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DIVINE PERSONALITY AND HUMAN LIFE

BEING THE GIFFORD LECTURES DELIVERED IN THE UNIVERSITY OF ABERDEEN IN THE YEARS 1918 & 1919

SECOND COURSE

BY

CLEMENT C. J. WEBB

Fellow of St. Mary Magdalen College, Oxford



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DEDICATED TO

CHARLES JOHN SHEBBEARE

IN THE FORTIETH YEAR

OF OUR FRIENDSHIP

PREFACE

In publishing the second series of these Lectures I have to repeat, in respect of it, the expression, already prefixed to the first series, of my gratitude to the Senatus Academicus of the University of Aberdeen for the invitation to deliver them, to my own College in Oxford for leave of absence in order to avail myself of that invitation, and to my wife for her aid in preparing them for delivery and for publication. I am also, in regard to both series, greatly indebted to the kindness both of the Editor of the *Library of Philosophy* and of Professor Loveday alike in correcting the proofs and in suggesting improvements in the text.

The present volume, unlike its predecessor, does not contain in its notes any reference to the name of the friend to whom I have dedicated it. But my obligations to one with whom I have, since we were both schoolboys, constantly enjoyed the fullest and most intimate discussion of all the matters that have most concerned both or either of us, and especially of the great topics of Religion and Philosophy, are not to be measured by the number of such explicit references, and I am scarcely less conscious of them where our agreement is least than where it is closest.

September 1919.

SYLLABUS

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According to the conclusions reached in the preceding course of lectures, by the expression a 'Personal God' is meant a God with whom his worshippers may enjoy a personal intercourse. An emotion not well describable except in terms suggestive of such intercourse is associated with the higher forms of Religious Experience, even where there is no such explicit assertion of *Personality in God* as is made by Christianity alone among the great historic religions, and by Christianity only in connexion with a doctrine which denies God to be a single Person. This doctrine is found to avoid certain difficulties frequently felt to beset the doctrine of the *Personality of God.*

In the second course of lectures we are to examine *Personality in Man* in the light of these conclusions, and to discuss their bearing upon the problem of the 'value and destiny' of finite individual persons. An apology is offered for neglect—due to the lecturer's incompetence in them—of certain subjects relevant to these inquiries, namely Physiology, Psychology, and 'Psychical Research.' But attention is called to the fact that many of the processes which make up the psychical life of human beings seem to be carried on 'below the threshold of consciousness'; and an attempt is made to arrive at some understanding of what is meant by this and similar phrases. While it is observed that it would be hard to conceive of Personality under our conditions of time and space without such a 'subliminal region' of psychical life, the opposite

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may be said of the Divine Personality whereof (as was contended in the former course of lectures) we have experience in Religion. The task of the lectures immediately following will be that of investigating the manner in which a recognition of such Personality in God will affect our view of the various spheres of activity in which Human Personality is found to manifest itself.

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The greater part of waking human life is devoted to what may be called an ' economic ' activity, intended to secure the satisfaction of the appetites which serve for the maintenance of the individual and the continuance of the species. This activity, involving as it does the use of Reason, must be reckoned, along with the higher activities, scientific, æsthetic, moral, political, and religious, as an expression of Personality. These higher activities indeed first appear in its service, although it is perhaps not possible to find a stage of human development in which none of them is associated with it. Between the economic and the religious interest in human life there exists an obvious antagonism ; yet the economic activity is the indispensable basis of the religious as of all the other higher activities. The religious and ethical activities more conspicuously exhibit this double relation, at once positive and negative, to the economic ; and in this as in other respects the political activity is closely akin to the ethical. In the case of the scientific activity, and even more in that of the æsthetic, the negative relation is not so prominent, but it is notwithstanding present in these also. The man in whose life the economic activity greatly predominates is apt to feel a religion which emphasizes its negative relation to the economic life to be hostile to his interests ; but he often has himself a religion, though one which minimizes this negative relation. Such a Religion (which will usually be vaguely anthropomorphic, thereby pointing forward to a doctrine of Divine Personality), though common as a state of mind in individuals, does not easily assume the form of a religious institution.

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The scientific activity has two chief products: *Science* in the narrower sense of the word, and *Philosophy*. As was pointed out in the first lecture of the previous course, in *Science* Personality seems to be of little account; for, though it is a condition of the existence of Science, it is omitted from the account which Science gives of its conclusions. We can thus explain as due to the necessary limitations of Science the appearance of irrelevance to the scientific view of the world attaching to the thought of Divine Personality; while, if we start from that thought itself, we may find in that scientific view a means of purifying and enriching the very conception which it seems to reject. *Philosophy*, although unlike Science it deals with the Subject as well as with Objects, with Individuals as well as with Universals, is often supposed to incline its students towards Pantheism and so towards the rejection of Divine Personality. But a consideration of the mutual relations of Philosophy and Religion already discussed in the preceding course will at once reveal the ground of this supposition in the fact that, in differentiating itself from Religion, Philosophy maintains a purely cognitive attitude to the supreme Reality, while Religion is always an experience of God as in direct relation to our whole individual personality. At the same time Philosophy cannot, without prejudice to its business of contemplating Reality as a whole, omit from its survey the religious experience which is consummated in the worshipper's enjoyment of personal intercourse with his God.

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One might expect to find that the conception of Divine Personality, to which it is often thought easier to attribute an *imaginative* than a *scientific* value, would make an especial appeal to the artist; but in fact this is frequently not so. The explanation of this is that the artist is apt to represent to himself the personal God of religion as a tyrannical power, denying its rights to the impulse of

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self-expression, which is his very life: in fact as the "Urizen" of Blake's mythology. The work of Blake is especially worthy of study in this connexion as that of one who is both a great artist and a great religious mystic. In his bold anthropomorphism, in his hatred of the "Natural Religion" of the eighteenth century on account of its pre-occupation with the notion of a "Moral Governor," in the tendency to polytheism which is characteristic of him as of poets generally, and in his reiterated denial of a God who is more than human, we see illustrated both the attraction and the repulsion which the notion of Divine Personality exercises upon the artistic temperament.

A doctrine of Divine Personality which, like that advocated in these Lectures, insists on the *immanence* as no less important than the *transcendence* of God, may welcome such protests as Blake's against a view which would lay disproportionate stress on divine transcendence and in connexion with this disproportionate stress would tend to identify Religion with Morality. At the same time we find that with Blake, as with Signor Croce, a one-sided emphasis upon divine immanence prevents him from doing justice to the element in religious experience which is expressed theoretically by the affirmation of God's transcendence, and emotionally by the sentiment of humble adoration.

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The conception of a moral legislator and judge of the world, which is apt to repel the artist, has often been felt on the other hand to be congenial to the temper of the moralist; and atheism, understood as the rejection of the belief in such a God, has been frequently supposed to imply or promote immorality of life.

Notwithstanding the present unpopularity of the latter view, which, as is rightly felt, may be easily exploited in the interests of bigotry and injustice, it contains a kernel of truth in that the representation of moral laws as divine commands, which is cautiously approved even by Kant, is perhaps the representation of them which sets the fact of obligation in the most intelligible light. By the help of an examination of Kant's concepts of "auto-

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nomy," and of the "Kingdom (or rather Empire) of Ends," as well as of Martineau's doctrine of the revelation of a Personal God in conscience, we reach the conclusion that the notion of Divine Personality throws a light upon the nature of the fundamental moral experience, the consciousness of obligation, which no other conception of the ultimate Reality can afford.

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Our discussion of the relation of the conception of Divine Personality to the political activity of the human spirit takes the form of an examination of the *corporate personality* often attributed to certain communities and especially to the State. This attribution is not to be regarded as a mere metaphor or as a legal fiction; yet the Personality which can be rightly ascribed to a community is not Personality in its full and proper sense. It may be, however, suggested that the attribution of Personality to God is of the same kind; and certain facts in the history of Religion may be alleged in support of this suggestion. But it is found that the conception of corporate Personality, so far from leading us to deny Personality in a more proper sense to God, points in the contrary direction. The primitive deification of the spirit of the community may be recognized as the dim consciousness that the unity of the common spiritual life of men is to be sought in a Supreme Being who manifests in conscious personal intercourse the full reality of spiritual existence.

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The representation of God as One with whom personal intercourse is possible can be harmonized with the experience proper to the economic, scientific, æsthetic, ethical and social activities of the human spirit; but the true ground of this representation is to be sought in Religious Experience. By means of an examination of Dr. Rashdall's criticism of the claim to an "immediate" knowledge of God or even of other persons, the conclusion

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is reached that there is no inconsistency in holding that the experience whether of social intercourse or of personal religion is inexplicable apart from the admission of such immediacy, and also recognizing the part played in these forms of experience by 'inference' or 'intellectual construction.' The Lecture ends with a consideration of the objection to a doctrine of Divine Personality founded on the inadequacy to religious experience of the notion of Personality as applied to human beings. It is contended that, while no doubt a "supplementation" of this notion will be required, this must not be such as to eliminate from religious experience the possibility of a reciprocity in love between God and his worshipper.

LECTURE VIII

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The importance of Personality is depreciated from two contrasted points of view; from that of Naturalism and that of Absolute Idealism. By *Naturalism* is meant a way of thinking which identifies the 'philosophical' with the 'scientific' attitude of mind, and is thus, since the latter is conversant with 'Universals' only, disabled from grasping the Individual, and therefore the Person. But the depreciation of Personality by Naturalism is not merely due to this inability to take account of the Individual. It is due also to the necessity which it is under of regarding Personality as Natural Science must regard it, from the outside only, as a mode of behaviour of certain natural objects. Yet the very existence of Natural Science presupposes Personality, though, as essentially an apprehension of *objects*, it cannot come face to face with the *subject* whose activity itself is. There will always be something paradoxical in the association of an intelligence which takes the whole world for its object with material bodies of such seeming insignificance in that world as those of human beings; nor does the philosophy of Spinoza succeed in removing the difficulty which this association presents. It may however suggest the possibility of an argument which may be brought in support of the depreciation of Personality by Naturalism against the contention that Natural Science itself is only conceivable as the activity of a personal Mind: namely, that Personality in its turn presupposes Reason, which transcends the dis-

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tinction of persons. The recent attempts by Pragmatism and Personal Idealism to give to the *personal* principle of unity in our experience a priority over the *rational*, seem on examination to be unsuccessful ; and the presumption thus raised in favour of allowing on the other hand a priority to the *rational* over the *personal* principle is on the whole confirmed by a consideration of the phenomena of what is called 'multiple personality.' Nevertheless we are not hereby enabled to conceive Reason except as exercised by an *individual* and, in virtue of this exercise of Reason, a *personal* mind. Yet not only the facts of extreme and pathological 'dissociation' but many phenomena of everyday life, and in particular those of moral struggle, reveal the unity of human Personality as an achievement, though an achievement which would be impossible apart from a principle of unity which is operative from the very beginning of personal life, yet cannot be identified with the unity of the bodily organism.

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The idealistic depreciation of Personality turns upon the thought that, though a higher form of Individuality than some with which we are acquainted, it is yet an imperfect form, and is shown to be such by the fact that a person is essentially a member of a society. It is not indeed to be questioned that the individuality of Persons is not that which can be affirmed of the Absolute alone. But this does not dispose of the problem of the peculiar value of Personality as the only form in which, within our experience, Mind or Spirit is manifested as concrete reality. It is suggested that we need a whole-hearted recognition at once of the genuine unity of the object of Reason and also of the unity of each personal subject as a substantial element in the system of Reality and not merely an adjective qualifying it. The contention that finite Personality is merely 'adjectival' is closely bound up in the thought of those who maintain it with insistence upon the ethical principle of self-realization by means of self-surrender. The discussion of the bearing of this principle upon the question of the *value* of the individual Personality will lead us on to that of its *destiny*.

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We are here concerned with the doctrine of a personal life after death, but only so far as it is inferred from a certain theory of the nature or structure of Reality. The history of the modern European belief in Immortality may be traced back to two main sources: the religion of Israel after the exile and the philosophy of Plato. In both of these, the doctrine of Immortality was no mere survival or even refined interpretation of beliefs associated everywhere with primitive animism, but represented a new departure, the starting-point of which is the individual person's relation to the Eternal, and the value to be attributed to him in consequence thereof. It thus depends in either case on a certain view of the nature of Reality as revealed in a religious experience. Serious difficulties may be raised against this doctrine, some of the chief among which are briefly considered; and it is concluded that, while none of these are sufficient to put out of court the considerations based upon religious experience, it is also impossible in the face of them to make out a plausible case on other grounds for any such doctrine either of the 'immortality of the soul' or of the 'resurrection of the body.' But this very impossibility may be shown to be what might be expected from the point of view of the religious experience itself; for an assurance of a future life drawn from grounds belonging to another region of experience would lack the religious value of an assurance whose sole foundation is faith in the personal Love revealed in the religious experience the vindication whereof has been the main topic of these Lectures.

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DIVINE PERSONALITY AND HUMAN LIFE

LECTURE I

THE SUBJECT INTRODUCED

IN the course of Lectures which I had the honour of delivering in the University of Aberdeen in the year 1918, and which have since been published under the title *God and Personality*, I endeavoured to commend to my hearers certain conclusions of which I will venture now to remind the readers of my former volume, by way of introduction to what I am to offer to their consideration in the present course.

When we set ourselves to discover what is meant by a 'personal God' in the minds of those who lay stress upon the importance of this conception of the object of Religion, we found that it is a God with whom a personal relationship is possible for his worshippers. We observed that an emotion towards the Supreme Reality, of a kind which is not easily describable except in terms similar to those used of an emotion felt towards a person, is associated with the higher forms of religious experience, even where there is no explicit assertion of Personality in God by the authoritative form-

ularies of the religion in question.' Indeed, as was pointed out, such an explicit assertion is in fact made by the authoritative formularies of Christianity alone among the great historic religions of mankind. And in these formularies, as received by the great majority of Christians, *Personality in God* was, as I went on to show, associated with the doctrine that God was not a single Person. By this doctrine certain peculiar difficulties were avoided which have been felt to attach to the doctrine of the *Personality of God* often professed by individuals in recent times. These difficulties arose from the obviously social reference of the word 'personality' as used of human beings, a reference which has often been held to unfit it for application to the Supreme Reality, since this must, it is thought, be regarded, if not as all-inclusive, at least as not in its very essence correlative with beings merely finite. Now according to the Christian doctrine personal relations are conceived as constituting the inner life of the Supreme Reality, and the intercourse of the worshipper with God as a participation in this life, much as philosophers have frequently conceived human thought and knowledge as a participation in the eternal activity of the Divine Mind. It was not pretended that such a position was free from difficulties of its own any more than is the philosophical idealism with which I have just compared it. But it was contended, and an attempt was made to confirm the contention by a detailed consideration of some well-known problems of philosophical theology, that a conception of Divine Personality on lines suggested by the Christian doctrine to which I have referred was able to afford us more assistance towards a solution of these problems than any theory which could be put into competition with it; and moreover that the

doctrine in question was entitled to be considered as the most fully articulated expression of a religious experience by no means peculiar to the one religion which has definitely chosen to employ the expression 'Personality' in its account of God, nor even to those which might, in the more general sense of the phrase, as now commonly employed, be described as religions with a 'Personal God.'

In the sequel we are to examine *Personality in man* in the light of these conclusions. In the first Lecture of my first course I gave reasons which might justify us in postponing this examination to that of the conception of Personality in God. These reasons were both historical and philosophical. The historical reason was the priority of theological discussion in the development of the thought of Personality; the philosophical reason was the fact that Personality is itself an ideal which may best be studied at the outset apart from conditions which in our experience of finite persons limit its full realization; and therefore in the notion which, under the inspiration of religious experience, men had been led to form of Personality as it may be held to exist in God. But now we may turn to the consideration of finite Personality, and in the first place to the mutual bearing of such conclusions as have been already reached and the facts of man's nature as exhibited in the several different spheres of his distinctively human, that is, of his *personal* activity. After this we shall go on to discuss the 'value and destiny' (to use a convenient phrase borrowed from the title of the second series of Mr. Bosanquet's Gifford Lectures) of the individual human person, in the light of these same conclusions.

Here we shall find ourselves confronted with a tendency

characteristic of contemporary thought, under influences arising from two opposite quarters, those of Naturalism and of Absolute Idealism respectively, to insist upon the comparatively very subordinate value of the finite individual and to advocate, as the reasonable result of a conviction that the personal life of the finite individual possesses only such a very subordinate value, a resolute acquiescence in its transiency in fact. This will bring us to consider on the other hand the ancient and widespread belief in the immortality of the finite individual, with a view to discovering what light can be thrown on this tendency and on this belief by a Natural Theology based, as we saw that Natural Theology should be based upon the highest available religious experience of mankind.

There are certain subjects of which it would be natural to expect to look for a discussion in an examination of the problems of human Personality, but in respect of which I occupy the room of the unlearned, so that I have little or nothing to say about them that would be worthy of your attention. From a Gifford Lecturer his hearers and readers have the right to expect the results of first-hand study and reflection, and it would be out of place for me to offer to them the mere gleanings of my desultory reading in fields where I myself am wholly destitute of the training and experience which would enable me to move with the assurance that only a thorough knowledge of the ground can give. While I shall not hesitate to describe, for what it is worth, the general impression made upon me by what I have gathered concerning these matters from my inspection of others' accounts, so far as it has affected my general view of my main topic, I shall do no more than this; but it must not be supposed from

the inevitable superficiality of such a treatment that I underrate the importance to the understanding of human Personality of investigations with which I pretend to no more than a very slight acquaintance.

The first of these subjects is the Physiology of the brain and nervous system. I greatly deplore but I cannot now repair the defect in my education which has left me in regard to this, as in regard to all other departments of Natural Science, no better than an ignoramus.

Plainly any examination of the nature of human Personality undertaken by one without a greater and more intelligent familiarity than I can claim with the results obtained up to date by the researches of those who have devoted themselves to the study of this subject must fall very far short of what such an examination should be. For my part I can only confess my shortcomings in this respect and confine myself to a modest statement to be made in its proper place of such an opinion as I have been able, notwithstanding my ignorance of Physiology, to form as to the relation of human Personality to the bodily organism with which it obviously stands in a most intimate relation.

Those unfortunate features in the development of our educational system which have facilitated ignorance of the elements of Natural Science in students of Philosophy and Theology (and, it may be added, of the elements of Philosophy and Theology in students of Natural Science) are too obvious to us all for an individual victim of their malign influence to take to himself all or perhaps any great part of the blame for deficiencies with which they have had so much to do. But with the next confession of ignorance I have to make the case is different.

It will be thought by many that, while a philosopher

may without shame admit his lack of physiological knowledge, he cannot without putting himself out of court as a philosopher plead guilty to incompetence in Psychology so far as it can be pursued by the introspective method, by interrogation of others concerning their thoughts and emotions, or by observation of their behaviour in response to action exercised not (at any rate directly) upon their bodily organism, but upon what we call their mental or psychical susceptibility. Nor have I any intention of taking up your time by defending myself for what I shall frankly admit to have been a reprehensible neglect of studies relevant to my own, though not, I will admit, specially attractive to myself. I venture to think, indeed, that psychologists have often misconceived the scope of their science, in believing it possible to make the same kind of abstraction when they are dealing with our apprehension of objects as can be made by the students of a natural science when dealing with a particular class of objects apprehended. But this conviction, which I do very decidedly hold, does not excuse anyone who holds it from acquainting himself far more fully than I have ever done with ascertained facts, which are none the less facts that they have been described in a terminology coloured by what in my judgment is an erroneous theory.

There will therefore be in my treatment of the problem of human Personality much less reference than might be expected—very likely less than there ought to be—to the investigations of professional psychologists. But I shall not be able to avoid altogether some discussion of what is usually called 'multiple personality,' and shall have to venture on some conclusions as to the relation of the phenomena described under that name to the unity which might plausibly seem to be essential to what we commonly

mean by Personality. In this discussion I shall, however, pretend to no more than such a general knowledge of the facts in question as may be gathered from the reading of certain well-known and easily accessible works by psychopathological experts, and by summarizers of their results.

A third and last department of inquiry, for dealing with which I must admit myself without any special qualification, is that which is designated in this country by the name of ' Psychical Research.' It will be impossible in discussing the belief in the possibility of a continuation of individual personal life beyond the grave to omit altogether some consideration of the claim that such research has established the high probability or even the certainty of such a continuation in particular instances. But here also I must confine myself to general impressions and considerations. I have never made any attempts to engage for myself in investigations of the kind carried on by the Society of Psychical Research ; and I can make no pretence to that aptitude for careful and even meticulous accuracy in observation without which any work in this field would be of no evidential value at all.

In my previous course of Lectures I took less as an adequate definition of Personality than as a provisional attempt to orientate ourselves, so to say, in our study of it, the famous definition given in the Christological treatise ascribed to Boethius : *Persona est naturæ rationabilis individua substantia.* It may serve us as a guide in this way still. But we will now supplement it by some observations on certain features of our everyday use of the word ' person ' which become more important when we are considering the finite Personality of man than they were when our principal subject was the affirmation of Personality in God.

While, as we saw in a previous Lecture, we commonly use the word 'person,' implying as it does, according to the Boethian definition, the possession of rationality by those to whom it is applied, only of such human beings as have come to 'years of discretion,' and, should not, except with a certain playfulness, speak of a child as a person, yet sometimes we seem to regard this same word as saying the *least* that can be said of the man or woman of whom we use it, sometimes on the other hand as indicating that he or she is something *more* than ordinary. We remember how Mr. Pecksniff corrected Mrs. Lupin's description of Mary Graham in *Martin Chuzzlewit*[1] as a 'young lady': "'Mrs. Lupin,' said Mr. Pecksniff, holding up his hand with something in his manner as nearly approaching to severity as any expression of his, mild being that he was, could ever do. 'Person! young person!'"

In this instance and others of the same kind the use of the word 'person' suggests that the speaker wishes to say as little as possible of the man or woman in question. 'Least said soonest mended.' Yet the very colourlessness of the expression gives a special sting to the expression, which an abusive term would not have had; just as there was something very insolent in the apology made by a certain man for mistaking one neighbour for another, 'You are so exactly like everyone else.' In the same way the suggestion of the word 'person' in the phrase I have just quoted from Dickens was that Mary Graham was unworthy of being distinguished by any special attention.

But when the Dolls' Dressmaker in *Our Mutual Friend* called herself 'the person of the house,' she was claiming a social dignity which agreed but ill with her tender years; and sometimes, though perhaps oftener by American than

[1] C. 3.

by English writers, so and so is said to be 'a great person while the derivatives 'personage' and 'personality are still more frequently employed in a similar manner to suggest especial distinction.

The idiomatic use of the plural of the word last mentioned, 'personalities,' noticeably illustrates the ambiguity which hangs about this group of expressions. When we deprecate the introduction of 'personalities' into a discussion, we no doubt think of it on the one hand as the intrusion of what is in this particular connexion trivial, unimportant, negligible. We wish, it may be, to hear of rival policies, of opposed principles of action, of contrasted ideals; and we find that the champion of one of these in attacking the champion of another is dwelling on details of the latter's private life or conduct irrelevant to the matter in hand, and are led to suspect that the disputant who insists upon these is in the situation of the legendary advocate whose brief was endorsed 'No case: abuse the plaintiff's attorney.' Yet at the same time our dislike to the introduction of 'personalities' into serious debate is due in part to our feeling that the private life which is thus exploited in the interest of a political or religious controversy is, just because of its privacy, something sacred, which cannot without a certain impiety be treated as a mere means to an alien end, a counter in some one else's game. And even where there is contempt expressed in calling someone 'a person' there is in the word, along with its refusal of special respect or interest, a certain acknowledgment of his status as a member of society, which by giving no just occasion to the other to resent it as an attack upon his character, bottles up, as it were, the wrath which he notwithstanding feels, and may well increase the violence of its explosion when it finds a vent.

In the Lecture on Personality and Rationality which was included in my previous course I have already indicated the direction in which we are to look for an explanation of the ambiguities which I have just been illustrating from our everyday use of the word 'person' and of its derivatives. These words always allow to the human being in reference to whom they are employed the distinctively human dignity of Rationality; on the other hand they emphasize his or her Individuality. Individuality, however, they may in a particular context emphasize less, not only than the use of a proper name would emphasize it, but less than some other designation, which would not be applicable, as 'person' is, to all rational human beings. Thus Tom Pinch or young Martin Chuzzlewit would probably not have disliked hearing Mary Graham called a 'young lady' as much as they would have disliked her being called a 'young *person*.' For while all ladies are persons, not all persons are ladies; and it is thus more distinctive to be a lady than to be a person. Yet it is possible to have a proper name—a dog or a horse, a sword or a bridge, a tree or a rock may have a proper name—without being a rational being at all; and, though to be a lady is rarer than to be in some sense a person, nevertheless in so far as a person does not exercise some special and definite function in the system of society, he or she is rather potentially than actually a person. So again in speaking of so-and-so as a personage or *more Americano* as a 'great person' one is ascribing to the subject of such an assertion something beyond the possibilities implied in a certain social status, the possessor of which may not have given proof of any such distinctive use of his rational faculty as might secure for him a significance out of the common, as we say, and might lead us

to insist at once upon his rationality and his individuality by calling him emphatically a *person*.

I have perhaps lingered too long over a point which is not difficult, although it may need a little thought to perceive the bearing of our seemingly inconsistent use of these words upon the philosophical investigation of the nature of human Personality. But what has been said will prepare us for what is to come. It is in those human activities which are distinctively human, because they are rational and social, that we must study the nature of human Personality; and it is to be remembered that we are to study them with the conclusions of our former course in view. We have to ask whether they will be better or worse understood if we think of the activity of the Supreme Reality, in which "we live and move and have our being,"[a] as a *personal* activity, that is, as an activity having the form of *personal* intercourse, whereof in Religion we can by virtue of our own personality become participators.

Before, however, we come to the examination of these activities from the point of view thus indicated, it will be convenient to call attention to a fact of great importance, which must be constantly borne in mind while studying human Personality. I mean the fact that many of the processes which make up what may be called the psychical life of human beings seem to be carried on, to use a phrase which has become familiar to us in recent years, 'below the threshold of consciousness.' While profoundly sensible of the disadvantage at which I am placed in this regard by my lack of training in the systematic study of Psychology, I cannot altogether avoid the attempt to estimate the part played in the constitution of human Personality by the unconscious or sub-

[a] Acts xvii. 28.

conscious operations of our souls. I venture to express myself in these terms, despite the reluctance which psychologists often exhibit to commit themselves to an affirmation of the existence of a *soul*. For I am convinced that nothing is gained for clearness of thought by avoiding the use of the *word* soul and yet employing expressions which, like *psyche*, *psychology*, and the like, are mere equivalents of or derivatives from equivalents of *soul*, or by attempting to describe perceiving, knowing, thinking, willing, feeling and so forth without reference to anything which perceives, knows, thinks, wills or feels. For, say what we may, we cannot help conceiving such actions as the actions of some subject. And if it be contended that it is sufficient to speak of them as yours or mine, we cannot avoid having at last to face the question whether our *bodies* can be regarded as the subject of perceiving, knowing, thinking, willing, or feeling; and we shall then be forced to admit that only a body which is more than *merely* a body, which also *is* or *has* a soul, is capable of being thus regarded. I should indeed freely acknowledge that in thus using the world 'soul' one must be careful to remember that no doctrine of the independence of the soul upon the body, still less of its survival of the dissolution of the body, should be clandestinely taken for granted. We are merely to think of the soul as the subject of perceiving, knowing, thinking, willing, feeling. But 'soul' has too long been the word appropriated to designate precisely this subject, and the distinction of soul from body has too long expressed the obvious disparateness of these functions from that of motion in space, to be abandoned without danger of confusion arising from its remaining in the background of our thought as an unrecognized assumption, which would have to be dragged to

light if we were forced to explain to one unfamiliar with the technical language of psychologists what it is that we are talking about. It is better, I cannot but think, frankly to use the traditional word and to state plainly that we know or do not know, think or do not think, this or that about the soul.

Now it is obvious that since the soul is that which is conscious, which perceives and knows, ' the unconscious ' is an expression strictly applicable not to *soul*, but to what we cannot think of as perceiving and knowing, that is to *body* as distinguished from *soul*. And since the activity of soul is known to us as dependent in very many ways on conditions of body, we might very well speak of ' the unconscious ' contributing to the activity of soul, when we mean no more than that this activity appears to occur in connexion with certain bodily conditions and perhaps to take certain forms only in connexion with certain specific conditions of body. It is not, however, in this sense that I wish now to speak of an unconscious factor in the life of the soul. We shall have to turn later on to the general question of the mutual relations of soul and body. While these no doubt give rise to some very difficult problems, the particular problem upon which I now wish to offer some observations is not among them. Whether the activities of soul should rightly be said to *be caused by* or to *be parallel with*, or rather to *supervene upon*, or even merely to *arise on occasion of*, or to *have been by a pre-established arrangement harmonized with* certain conditions of body, it is in any case the very starting-point of the discussion concerning the relations of body and soul that the operations which we assign to each cannot be expressed in the terms appropriate to the other without a passage from one point of view to a different

one which is disparate from the former. Thus the problem of the connexion with or dependence of activities of soul on certain conditions of body must be distinguished from the problem of the phenomena which suggest that activities such as are proper to the soul may be carried on below the threshold of consciousness. It may therefore be well to advert for a few moments to a phrase which one sometimes finds employed, but of which it may fairly be said that it suggests a failure in those who use it to distinguish these problems. I refer to the phrase 'unconscious cerebration.' This is one of those phrases which should by all means be avoided, since they tend to obscure difficulties by language which has (as was recently observed of certain political formulas) a 'pleasing and sonorous sound' but which does not tend to intellectual enlightenment.

We shall most of us readily acknowledge that mental activity can, normally at any rate, be carried on only if the substance of the brain is in a certain condition. We should not expect hard intellectual work from a starving man; but we should not on that account think of speaking as though the digestive processes were themselves spiritual or psychical. Now, when people speak of 'unconscious cerebration,' they imply by the use of the epithet 'unconscious' that they are speaking of a process which is sometimes, though not on this occasion, *conscious*—that is, of a *spiritual* or *psychical* process; while, by the use of the substantive 'cerebration,' they suggest that they are describing, not a process somehow associated with or even dependent on movements of the brain substance, but a process actually *consisting* in such a movement, observed or inferred in the same way as we observe or infer other physical movements which we distinguish altogether

from our consciousness of them, and with which we do not suppose any psychical counterpart or consequence to be associated. Such language is merely misleading, and should by all means be avoided.

We are then not now concerned with bodily antecedents, causes, occasions, or parallels of spiritual or psychical activity, but with a process regarded as being itself of a spiritual or psychical nature, yet nevertheless as unaccompanied by any consciousness of it in the soul wherein it is supposed to be taking place. It will scarcely be disputed that there is something paradoxical in the conception of such a process, however hard it may be to avoid the assumption of its existence.

It has sometimes been held that, because for us to be aware of any object that object must coexist with a consciousness, we should be justified in saying that we cannot conceive the existence of any object apart from consciousness. The correctness of this reasoning may well be doubted in view of the fact that it seems rather to be involved in the very notion of Knowledge that the object known should be independent of the mental act in and by which it is known; and it may reasonably be suspected that there is a fallacy in the way in which the argument is stated; for it is one thing to say that apart from consciousness we cannot conceive the existence of an object, another to say that we cannot conceive an object to exist apart from a consciousness of it. But, however this may be, it is clear that when the object in question is a mental or psychical operation, many to whom it would never occur to see a difficulty in supposing something which may become an object of consciousness to exist independently of there being any consciousness of it, would nevertheless hesitate to affirm that such a *psychical*

process might exist without there being any consciousness of it in the soul to which it belonged.

It is true that the expression 'consciousness' must here be interpreted in a wide sense. It must be understood as it is understood when we speak of 'consciously willing' or being conscious of' a pleasure, a pain, or an emotion. No doubt even in such phrases as these there is implied a distinction between the volition or the feeling and the consciousness of it, a recognition that there exists, beside these forms of psychical activity, a factor in the whole state described which we may properly call *cognition*. But this factor need not be, if I may so put it, disengaged from its volitional or emotional concomitants. A state of extreme pain, for example, in which we could no longer be said to 'look before and after,' but were wholly absorbed by the pain from which we were suffering, would yet in this wide sense be called a consciousness of pain, or a painful consciousness.

It would perhaps carry us too far afield from our immediate subject, and it would certainly lead me into regions of psychological controversy which I am not competent to enter, were I to allow myself to be betrayed into discussion of many problems which thrust themselves upon our attention when we ask ourselves whether there can be any psychical process wholly unaccompanied by consciousness in such a wide sense as this. Our experience can certainly not be explained without at least admitting that what we can only understand as the result of psychical activity is sometimes, nay frequently, reached without our being able to remember being conscious of such activity. But we are far too familiar with *forgetting* for it to be safe to assume that we were *never* conscious of anything merely because we do not *now* remember it. That

all our conscious life does not fall within the system of what we call our *real* or *waking* experience everyone who has ever recollected his dreams is well aware. And many facts suggest the possibility (which is recognized even by ordinary language when we speak of what is 'at the back of our minds') of thoughts and feelings going on within us, even while we are awake, in detachment, as it were, from the predominant system of thought and feeling, and sometimes (as in the case of automatic writing) bringing about actions expressive of intelligent purpose which are yet inexplicable by the thoughts and feelings which enter into that predominant system.

When we say then that some of the processes which go to make up the pyschical life of human beings and to constitute what we call their Personality seem to be carried on 'below the threshold of consciousness,' we mean by 'consciousness' here the single predominant system of thoughts and feelings which determines in the main and directly the social activities of the individual in question. It does not follow that any of the processes carried on in this sense subconsciously are really in an absolute sense *unconscious*. And it is to be noted that in certain pathological cases, where such dissociations of consciousness as with most of us occur only when (as in sleep or delirium) we are taking no part in social life are so marked and so lasting as to introduce a notable dissociation even into the social life of those who are subject to them, we are forced to recognize a plurality of predominant systems and tend to speak of several 'personalities,' of which now one, now another, emerges above the 'threshold of consciousness.' I defer to a later stage any detailed criticism of this way of speaking. I am now only concerned to call attention to the part played in the constitution of

the life of the soul by processes which, judged by their results, are of the same kind as those which we call spiritual, mental, or psychical, but which, whether in a strict sense unconscious or not, go on below the threshold of the predominant or social consciousness. If the word 'the Unconscious' is used to describe the complex of these processes, it should clearly be recognized that it is used only by way of contrast with a fuller or more awakened consciousness, and not in the sense in which it is applied to what, as material, is distinguished altogether from the psychical, and therefore to the brain-substance considered as, like the whole body, a part of the 'external world,' and not as belonging to that whereof we can predicate consciousness, or, in a word, to the soul.

Whatever language be preferred, it is certain that human Personality cannot be understood apart from activities and processes which, though they may not be wholly unaccompanied by any sort of consciousness, certainly do not enter into what I have described as the predominant consciousness. This consciousness has been called above also the 'waking' and the 'social' consciousness. It may be convenient to add a few remarks on these designations of it, lest there should be supposed to be involved in them more than is intended.

First, then, as to the expression 'waking consciousness.' Our dreams are important in this context, since they form a part of what passes below the threshold of our predominant consciousness, yet are to a considerable extent remembered during our waking life. Although no doubt there is a far greater coherence in one's waking experience than in one's dreams, yet I am disposed to think one cannot explain the conviction that one is awake merely as an inference from features of the

waking life which are empirically found to distinguish it from the dream life. Hence I do not think that the term 'waking' and 'predominant' consciousness are necessarily synonymous, though usually they refer to the same object. In such cases of alternating consciousness as those of the celebrated 'Miss Beauchamp,' whose condition is studied in Dr. Morton Prince's well-known work, *The Dissociation of a Personality*, we should naturally, I think, speak of the patient as being awake in more than one of her states, while it might be hard to speak of any one of them as predominant.

On the other hand, it is not only in dreams that we have to do with the 'unconscious' or 'subconscious.' At every stage of the 'waking' life of everybody there occur incidents, for example, of forgetfulness, inattention, or distraction, the explanation of which is to be found in a region of the soul's life of which the person himself may be at the moment, at least as regards his predominant consciousness, quite unaware.[3] Thus if the predominant consciousness be called the 'waking' consciousness, it is not meant that it by any means controls or determines the whole of what takes place while we are awake.

The phrase 'social consciousness' also calls for some commentary. The dream-consciousness is no doubt markedly contrasted with the 'waking' consciousness by what is sometimes called its 'subjective' character. Dreams are private to the dreamer, and, except in very rare circumstances, as when a somnambulist assaults another man, when Coleridge dreams a *Kubla Khan* or Tartini a *Trille del Diavolo*, or again if a man should be, like Hamlet, stirred up to vengeance on his father's murderer

3 See Freud, *Psychopathology of Everyday Life* (*Psychopathologie d. Alltagsleben*, Eng. tr. London, 1914), *passim*.

by a vision of his father's ghost—except in such circumstances as these they remain quite apart from the dreamer's intercourse with his fellow men. It is the waking life alone that has direct social consequences and with which alone the judgment of society commonly concerns itself. Yet the adventures of our dreams are social in their character, and the great majority of them, at any rate, are modelled, even though with strange distortions, upon the social relations of which we have had experience while awake. And we may go further than this.

No one that I know of has thrown more light upon the subject of dreams than the eminent Austrian physician Dr. Sigmund Freud.[4] It is not necessary to be convinced by every detail of his theory to recognize the extraordinary suggestiveness and the large measure of truth which there is in his manner of interpreting the problems of this very obscure yet very intimate sphere of our experience. Now no feature of Dr. Freud's theory is more characteristic or important than his conception of what he calls the 'censor' in dreams. According to Dr. Freud every dream sets before the dreamer either explicitly or in a symbolical form the fulfilment of a wish. In mature life these are most often wishes which in waking life are suppressed, in consequence of their incongruity with our moral standards or social relations. But though in sleep our desires seem often to escape from the restraints which duty and prudence are, when we are not asleep, constantly placing upon them,[5] such escape is very far from complete. Frequently the psycho-analysis (as it is called) employed by Dr. Freud and his school for the discovery of the sup-

[4] See Freud, *The Interpretation of Dreams* (*Traumdeutung*, Eng. tr. London, 1913).

[5] Cp. Plato, *Rep.* ix. 571 c *seqq.*

pressed wishes which, if these investigators are right, lie frequently at the root of nervous disorders, has revealed to them in dreams of their patients which, even to the dreamers themselves, appeared innocent of all connexion with the subject of certain wishes, an elaborate symbolism by means of which these wishes have attained in masquerade, as it were, an imaginary gratification without, by the naked exhibition of their true significance, bringing upon themselves the intervention of what Dr. Freud describes as the 'censor within the soul.' For the disapproval of this 'censor' would otherwise have hindered this result and in breaking the dream have prevented the relief given by the seeming satisfaction of desires inconsistent with self-respect. The 'censor within the soul' is thus much the same as what is ordinarily meant by the Conscience, working effectively, even when sleep has cut us off from our ordinary social surroundings, as the surrogate in the subconscious life, if we may so express it, of our moral convictions or social prejudices.

Without following Dr. Freud in all the particulars of his view, I do not think that the main facts of what he calls a censorship of our dream thoughts can be denied by the candid student of his own dreams. And if this fact be admitted, we must allow that the psychical life, even when it seems most withdrawn into itself from communion with one's fellow men, is social through and through; and that; if the waking consciousness may be called social in contrast with the dream consciousness, it is because in the main only the waking consciousness has direct social consequences, not because the dream consciousness is not a consciousness of social relations. No matter how far we penetrate below the threshold of what we generally consider as our ordinary consciousness, we find that the

human soul is still social and therefore personal, and that its most abstruse recesses are describable in Tennysonian phrase as "abysmal depths of Personality." [6]

Any attempt to comprehend human Personality then is certainly doomed to failure that should ignore these depths and should content itself with the examination of those activities which are carried on in the full light of the agent's explicit consciousness. These activities themselves will be found on close inspection to be unintelligible apart from the assumption of the existence of processes in the soul to which this light has never penetrated. For the fuller investigation of such processes we must needs employ methods of inquiry akin to those pursued in the sciences concerned with external nature, rather than to those appropriate to what are sometimes called the normative sciences, such as are Logic, Ethics, and Æsthetics, sciences which rest (to use a familiar if not a wholly satisfactory phraseology) upon judgments of *value* and not merely upon judgments of *existence*, distinguishing the facts of thought, conduct, and expression as *valid* or *invalid*, *good* or *evil*, *beautiful* or *ugly*.

At the present time, however, there is little likelihood of what goes on 'below the threshold of consciousness' being unduly ignored. The danger is probably greater that the importance of Reason in human life should be too much disparaged in comparison with that of feeling and instinct. For the romantic reaction of a century ago against the Rationalism of the preceding age has been powerfully reinforced by a more recent movement of reaction at once against the intellectualist tendency in philosophy which is associated with the great name of Hegel and which was developed in the heart of the romantic movement

[6] *The Palace of Life.*

itself, and also against the revived Rationalism of nineteenth-century Natural Science, between which and the tendency just mentioned there is a kinship more apparent now than in their earlier days of mutual controversy. This more recent movement of reaction has received its principal stimulus from the habit of thought engendered by the evolutionary biology, whose way the Hegelian philosophy of development had prepared, while it was itself the crowning achievement of nineteenth-century Natural Science. So complicated are the relationships with which the history of ideas acquaints us.

The bent of contemporary thought being such as I have just described, it is worth while, before passing from our present subject, to note that, though the course of our articulated thinking and our deliberate action is constantly affected by the obscurer processes which we contrast with these as 'subliminal,' yet this does not in the least warrant us in overlooking the essential difference between the categories of Logic and Ethics on the one hand and those of empirical Psychology on the other; or justify us in reducing logical inference or the consciousness of obligation to the mere association of ideas, images or emotions, with the formation or arrangement of which principles of Reason and Duty have had nothing to do.

For, in our interpretation of the obscurer processes of which we speak, we are wholly dependent upon our knowledge of these principles. In one particular department we have seen how the Freudian interpretation of dreams is bound up with the recognition of a 'censorship,' to which our desires and fancies are still subject even in sleep, when we might think ourselves to have escaped from our daily burden of responsibility. And indeed if it is true that when we are awake " we are such

stuff as dreams are made of," [7] it must follow that our dreams are made of the same stuff as our waking life. And into that stuff we shall assuredly find already woven threads from the loom of Reason.

It is only with human life that we have in these Lectures to do; with life, that is, in a part of which the operations of Reason are manifest and, as we say, self-conscious. For only such a life should we ever think of calling *personal*. But it is the very essence of the contention of those who love to dwell upon the narrow limits of these manifest operations of Reason, in contrast with the vast domain of the instinctive and the unconscious, that the result of what is accomplished in these domains is not to be distinguished from what would have been accomplished by Reason, had it been present; or that, if distinguished at all, it is distinguished by a greater perfection in those very qualities which self-conscious Reason deliberately aims at producing than is found in the finished work of self-conscious Reason itself.

An older fashion of thought might have seen in this a striking evidence that a higher Reason was at work than the human; that the wisdom which we trace in the behaviour of living beings which do not seem to reason is not their own but God's. No doubt it is difficult for us to acquiesce in this explanation of the facts, partly (though not solely), because in the adaptation of organisms to their environment and in the working of instinct, wonderful as these are and interpretable only in terms of Reason working towards an end, there are indications of trial and error, of occasional failure, of injurious consequences, which seem incongruous with the immediate activity of a perfect intelligence such as we ascribe to

[7] Shakespeare, *Tempest*, iv. i. 156, 157.

God. We prefer therefore to speak of a Reason, immanent in the process of life, a phrase which explains little or nothing, but with which we cannot perhaps dispense.[8]

It is, however, one thing to recognize that human Personality (for it is with this that we are now concerned) includes a sphere of subconscious and instinctive as well as one of fully conscious and deliberate activity, and even to admit that the former sphere embraces a far larger part of our existence than the latter, and quite another to seek in the former rather than in the latter for the dwelling place of all the most valuable elements in our life, and especially (to come to what is our main business in these Lectures) of Religion. This, however, is nowadays not infrequently done. Under the influence of William James's well-known theory of what in religion is known as conversion 'as an uprush from the subconscious,'[9] one of the most eminent of contemporary British theologians[10] has sought in the 'subliminal' region for the divine factor in human nature generally, and in particular in the nature of him whom the Christian Church acknowledges to be very God as well as very man. I do not think that the future of theological speculation lies in the direction thus indicated. It is certainly true that the subconscious and instinctive life of the soul plays a part and a large part in Religion, as in every human interest which is more

[8] Cp. Bergson, *L'évolution creatrice*, pp. 279, 283. I may take this opportunity of observing that in view of these passages, which my friend Mr. K. C. Mukherjea has pointed out to me, I should not have contrasted M. Bergson's view with Plato's so sharply as I did in my *Studies in the History of Natural Theology*, p. 91.

[9] See James, *Varieties of Religious Experience*, Lectures VIII, IX, X.

[10] Sanday, *Christologies Ancient and Modern*. I have discussed this interesting book in a review published in the *Oxford Magazine* for Nov. 24, 1910 (vol. xxix, p. 103).

than occasional or superficial. With this statement the religious traditions of mankind are fully in accord; and (to advert once more for a moment to the doctrine just mentioned of the Godhead of Jesus Christ) the orthodox theology of Christendom has been at pains to insist that, in the case of its Master, the divinity which it ascribed to him was no mere accession of dignity to a personality originally merely human, but belonged to him from the very first. This is not the place to examine the validity of this assertion as regards the Founder of Christianity; it is only mentioned here in order to show that it is no new thing for Religion to acknowledge the immanence of Godhead in what it is now fashionable to call the subliminal region of our spiritual life.

But to go to the opposite extreme and so to insist upon this immanence as even by implication to represent the life which is fully self-conscious as less capable than the subliminal life of the divine indwelling, this is not indeed altogether a new thing—for Religion has from very ancient days been haunted by the magic of wizards "that peep and that mutter" [11]—but it is a retrogression from levels long ago reached by the greatest teachers of mankind. Such a view can in my judgment only be justified by a mode of thought [12] which would disparage Religion as belonging essentially to the lower ranges of intellectual development and as destined to wither away in the maturity of science and civilization.

The withdrawal of a large part of our spiritual life from the full light of consciousness into the subliminal

[11] Is. viii. 19.

[12] Such as that of Comte and of the school of French sociologists studied in my *Group Theories of Religion*; or again of Signor Benedetto Croce.

region seems to serve in the economy of nature a time-saving purpose.

We ourselves often, of deliberate intent, relegate thither much that we desire should not occupy the attention we would fain leave free for other and higher tasks. Thus we prefer that many of the actions of our daily toilet should be performed automatically; and trust ourselves to repeat a formula mechanically which, if we reflected upon its meaning, we might not be able to pronounce with equal accuracy. And what we thus do in certain cases of set purpose, Nature (as we speak) does for us on a larger scale. It is difficult to conceive of Personality under our conditions of time and space without such a resource. But, in our attempts to represent to ourselves as best we may a spiritual life emancipated from those conditions, we are apt to dispense with a subliminal element. Thus Aristotle [13] speaks of the Divine Life as an activity in which there is nothing merely potential or latent. And one of the New Testament writers suggests a like thought in a figure when he declares that "God is light and in him is no darkness at all." [14] But we should do wrong to interpret such sayings as implying that we ought to think of Spirit at its highest after the fashion of an activity which, like that of a finite soul, rests upon and issues from a substratum such as Aristotle called ὕλη or matter, while at the same time we suppose this substratum away. In the obscure speculations of the great German mystic Jacob Behmen concerning the 'fiery principle' in God, which is the very source of the divine glory, but which, when the true light does not thus break forth out of it, becomes the 'wrath of God,' the habitation of devils, there is intimated a truth which should never be overlooked in this

[13] See Ar., *Metaph.* Λ. 7. [14] 1 John i. 5.

connexion. We must not think of anything in our own spiritual life that has substance or power or value as excluded from the Divine Life. That which, apart from that life, gives to evil all its attraction and its force is nevertheless present in that life as what we can perhaps only describe as an energy contributory (not merely in subordination to the rest, but rather in co-ordination with them) to the whole eternal activity which is the being of God. If symbols we must have (and surely we need to have symbols, though we should be ever on our guard against treating them as the masters not as the servants of our thought), then the bush of the prophet's vision which was all on fire and yet was not consumed [15] is no bad symbol of him who is that which he is not only temporarily, partially, or potentially, but actually, fully, and eternally.

Unless the account given in the preceding course of Lectures was wholly mistaken, there is in Religion when it has attained its highest level, an experience of a perfect spiritual life, to which such terms as we have just used would be applicable, manifested in the form of personal intercourse.

We will now pass to the consideration of the various activities in which human Personality expresses itself, in their relation to the supreme spiritual Reality which is revealed to the human soul in the experience that we call Religion.

[15] Exod. iii. 2.

LECTURE II

DIVINE PERSONALITY AND THE ECONOMIC LIFE

WHEN the philosopher or theologian turns his attention to the various forms of activity in which human Personality expresses itself, it is at once caught by those which occupy the foreground in the record of human achievement, and confer celebrity on those who have been distinguished by their success in them—by Science, by Art, by Morality, by Politics, by Religion. Yet even in the case of those who are reckoned as the chief representatives of our race in these several fields the greater part of human life is not devoted to these dignified pursuits. Much of it is passed in sleep and, as the mention in the last lecture of Dr. Freud and the psycho-analysts may have reminded us, what passes in sleep is by no means to be ignored in the study of the personality of any particular human being. But even of waking life the business of satisfying the appetites which serve for the maintenance of the individual and the continuance of the species—of eating and drinking and mating—consumes a very considerable proportion.

It might be thought at first sight that, since these appetites are by no means peculiar to man, but are common to him with the lower animals, to which we do not ascribe Personality, the portion of human life which in the time-

table of our days is accounted for by them might be left on one side in a description of our *personal* activities. But, though the appetites are not peculiar to man, the deliberate and systematic provision which man makes for their gratification is something to which we find no real parallel elsewhere; and hence Plato was justified in giving to that type of human life which is characterized by preoccupation with this provision to the exclusion of other interests a name borrowed from the *wealth* which is accumulated by human beings to constitute a permanent source whence a means of satisfying their animal appetites can be regularly procured.[1]

A similar thought seems to have dictated the use of 'economic' by a contemporary philosopher to whom I have already referred, Signor Benedetto Croce, to denote the whole range of human action which is not determined by ethical considerations. And it is to be noted that where we seem to detect anything analogous to this deliberate and systematic provision for the satisfaction of appetite among creatures other than men—for example among bees and ants—we are apt to use words—such as 'economy' and the like—which belong properly to a life which, however much dominated by animal desires, nevertheless shows itself by its calculating and systematic character to be, as rational, distinctive of humanity and, we may legitimately say, expressive of *personality*.

But while noting that the form of human activity which may be called, in the sense above given to the word, the *economic* is to be reckoned on its own account among the main manifestations of Personality, it must not be overlooked that it is perhaps never found in actual detachment from some of the others which were previously enumerated.

[1] See Plat. *Rep.* ix, 580 E.

These other forms of human activity indeed make their first appearance, it would seem, in the service (so to speak) of the economic activity; while on the other hand it is probably not possible to discover a stage of human development at which none of them are associated with it, even if only in a menial capacity.

In saying that the other, and, as we are disposed to consider them, the higher forms of activity in which human Personality seeks and finds expression make their first appearance in the service of the economic activity, I must not be understood to be asserting that these higher forms are to be explained away as mere modes of the economic. On the contrary I am satisfied that it is wholly impossible to derive our desires for Knowledge, for Beauty, for Goodness, for Fellowship, or for God from the primitive appetites which minister to the preservation of the individual organism and the continuance of the species. To use the phraseology traditional in modern philosophy, I am convinced that apart from the recognition of *a priori* principles, the affirmations which we make in the Sciences, in Logic and Metaphysic, in Ethics and Politics, in Æsthetic and Theology cannot be justified. It is, however, in no wise inconsistent with this conviction readily to admit that, while the desire for Knowledge is something of an utterly different nature from any bodily appetite, the best means of satisfying those appetites are among the things that man first desires to know. So too we shall not be surprised to find primitive Ethics much occupied with right and wrong ways of securing food or a mate, or primitive Religion with obtaining divine assistance in the accomplishment of these tasks. We shall be prepared to agree with Aristotle [2] that the community which exists

[2] *Pol.* i. 2, 1252 b 29.

for the sake of living well came into existence for the sake of mere living; and to think it no improbable suggestion of modern anthropologists that the beginnings of pictorial art are to be sought in practices the main object of which was by sympathetic magic to promote the capture of animals which, as food or otherwise, might serve the economic purposes of their captors.

But while the primitive subservience of the desire for Knowledge and the rest to the business of supplying animal needs marks the kinship of man with the beasts, the fact that he seeks to use in the service of these needs objects which it does not enter into the heart of the beasts to conceive marks the superiority of his nature to theirs, as the *rational animal*, whose nature is in each fully-developed individual of the kind capable of what we call *personality*.

The problem to which we have now to address ourselves is that of the congruity of a doctrine of Personality in God, such as we found in the previous course was suggested by religious experience, with the *economic* life of man, the activities of which constitute as we have seen, at least as measured in terms of the time consumed in them, a very large proportion of the whole range of human conduct.

Now the first thing which strikes us in this connexion is that the man in whom the economic interest is dominant is apt to regard Religion, especially in its most fully developed forms, as an irrelevant extravagance, which belongs to another world altogether than that in which his daily life is passed. If there be such another world, it wll be soon enough to concern oneself with it when one is done with this; till then, as Mistress Quickly says to the dying Falstaff, "a should not think of God; there was no need to trouble himself with any such thoughts

yet."[3] And on their side the teachers of Religion seem to grudge to his pursuits the time and labour which he spends upon them. They deprecate his anxiety concerning what he shall eat and what he shall drink and what he shall put on.[4] They dispute the claim of the economic interest to more than a very subordinate place in human life. "A man's life consisteth not in the abundance of things which he possesseth."[5] "Meats for the belly and the belly for meats, but God shall destroy both it and them."[6] "The kingdom of God is not meat and drink."[7] Such sayings illustrate the antagonism which exists between the religious and the economic interest, and in view of this antagonism it would seem that the conception of religious experience as personal intercourse can hardly fail to appear incongruous with a way of thinking which would concede to the economic life the serious importance which it claims for itself, just because of the present reality with which this conception invests what to the economic man is only tolerable when regarded as something remote and devoid of immediate practical importance.

We thus encounter, at the very outset of our inquiry, an obvious incongruity between one of the forms of activity in which human Personality manifests itself—and that the form which possesses, though, maybe, not a greater intensity or a higher value, yet a wider extension than any other—and the conceptions which our former inquiries recommended to us as expressive of religious experience at its best. The next consideration to which I will call your attention, while it will still further emphasize this incongruity, may tend to show that we need not, on account of it, abandon the hope of attaining to a view of the human

[3] Shakespeare, *Henry V*, ii. 3.
[4] See Matt. vi. 25.
[5] Luke xii. 15.
[6] 1 Cor. vi. 13.
[7] Rom. xiv. 17.

spirit and its place in the universe which will not resolve into an illusion our religious experience of a personal intercourse with God.

This consideration is that of the peculiar relation of the economic life to the other forms of human life which have been enumerated, and especially to the ethical. To the ethical life the economic stands in a relation at once positive and negative. On the one hand the economic activity is the absolute presupposition of the ethical and of all the other 'higher' activities. We find this acknowledged by the Preacher on the Mount in the midst of his emphatic prohibition of an anxious preoccupation with economic interests which would postpone to them the search for "the kingdom of God and his righteousness." [8] "Your heavenly Father knoweth," he says, "that ye have need of all these things"; that is, of those things to the securing of which the economic life is devoted. And the scientific or the artistic activity is as little able to dispense with the economic as are the moral and religious.

On the other hand it is impossible to regard the ethical life as a mere development of or even as a mere addition to the economic. There is a necessary relation of antagonism between them. This truth also finds memorable expression in another saying from the same Gospel discourse: "Ye cannot serve God and mammon." [9] Critics of Kant's ethical doctrine have often found fault with certain utterances of his which seemed to imply that only where an action has no economic value can it possess a moral. Such an assertion (I do not say that Kant really intended to make it) would no doubt be mistaken; we shall indeed see later on that, on the contrary, every moral act must possess also an economic character. But

[8] Matt. vi. 32, 33. [9] Matt. vi. 24.

the language which these critics have in view has its origin in this philosopher's profound sense of the *negative* relation between the ethical and the economic activities, without recognizing which it is assuredly impossible to grasp the essential nature of Morality. For how can we bring home to ourselves what we mean by saying that we *ought* to do this or that, except by means of the contrast between what we *ought* to do and what we should *like* to do ?

It is true that there is what we may call an economic ' ought,' as when we say that we ought to forgo some pleasures in youth if we would secure for ourselves a comfortable old age. But though this ' hypothetical imperative,' as Kant would call it, is certainly not the ' categorical imperative ' of morality, *on the hypothesis* of the absolute worth of eventual comfort it presents the same *negative* relation towards what we *like* as the truly moral ' ought ' ; and its discordance from the latter only appears when we ask ourselves whether this hypothetical end is really itself of absolute worth and therefore the pursuit of it really obligatory. For to this question it is possible to reply that we prefer the ' bird in the hand ' of the present gratification to the ' two in a bush ' represented by the prospect of comfort in years which we may not live to see ; and, so long as we hold to the economic standard of comparison and do not introduce truly ethical considerations, this reply will annihilate the obligation implied in the original statement thatwe ' ought ' to deny ourselves the pleasure which now offers itself. The economic ' ought ' turns out therefore to derive its obligatory character from an assumption which need not be made ; and it is of course for this very reason that Kant distinguishes from it the genuine command of Morality as being *categorical,*

since that command does not depend upon any such assumption.

No attempt to understand the nature of human life or of the personality which manifests itself therein can conceivably be successful which does not recognize as a fundamental characteristic of it this relation at once positive and negative between the ethical and economic activities. Not merely is the latter activity the absolute presupposition of the former, but every ethical action must have an economic aspect. This has often given rise to perplexity in thoughtful minds. For it is impossible for him who perceives a moral obligation not to regard its fulfilment, however contrary to what others may call his 'interests,' as notwithstanding his *true* interest; nor can he but be dissatisfied if he falls short of what he knows to be his duty, however great the advantage in other respects which he may gain thereby. And hence he is apt to be assailed by the sophistry that thus, after all, his morality is but a refined self-seeking, and the ethical life merely a variety of the economic.

We shall, however, do well to note that, as the proverb says, 'Two can play at that game.' There is a counter-sophistry which, if less familiar to ordinary reflection, is equally plausible and equally inconclusive, and this the enthusiast for morality may bring forward in reply. When once we have come in view of the sovereign claim upon us of the Moral Law, we may feel ourselves uneasy in the contemplation of those numerous actions of our lives which are performed on impulse or at least without a thought of anything but the gratification of some appetite or some emotional desire. Is it worthy of a moral being to admit such actions? Must there not be a right and a wrong on every occasion, and ought we not

always to stay and consider what they are? Shall we not give an account of every idle word in the day of judgment? [10] and therefore ought we to allow any utterance of ours to *be* an idle word and not rather a deliberate expression of our judgment and will? [11]

Though such questions as these are, as I said, less often asked than those which bring into doubt the disinterestedness of all moral actions, they are common enough among the scrupulous and self-tormenting minority of mankind; and even those who are not of that number are not unfrequently haunted by a suspicion that a thorough-going morality *would* dictate to a larger part of life than seems commonly to be brought within its purview; and hence that such a thorough-going morality is impossible, or at least does not in fact exist even among those who profess to live by a higher rule than the economic. But there is sophistry in this kind of reasoning also. No part of life over which the will has any power is without a moral character, or can plead exemption from the liability to be judged at the tribunal of conscience. Yet not only does it fall within the competence of that tribunal to acquit of any offence many actions done impulsively and spontaneously, when they come up for judgment; we even judge it *right* and *good* that impulse and spontaneity should have a field within which they may have free play; and condemn as *wrong* a pedantic scrupulosity which denies them this privilege.

We need not therefore regard it as inconsistent with a view of human life which will give its due place to Religion as personal intercourse with God to admit the negative relation between the higher forms of human

[10] See Matt. xii. 36.

[11] Cp. *God and Personality*, Lecture V, on Fichte's moral philosophy.

activity and the economic, which is yet the presupposition of the rest. We shall do better to regard this same negative relation as a fundamental characteristic of the human spirit; and cease to attempt to get rid of it by endeavouring either on the one hand to exclude spontaneity and impulse from the moral life or on the other to bring morality under an economic formula.

I think that we must allow that even those great masters of moral philosophy, Plato and Aristotle, and especially the latter, in their attempt to exhibit moral goodness as the successful performance of man's function and as the means to happiness and its chief constituent, failed to bring out, as it should be brought out, and as Kant, for example, with whatever exaggerations of emphasis and neglect of certain aspects of life, did bring out, the essential diversity of the ethical from the economic standpoint of judgment.

I have dwelt at length upon the relation of the economic form of human activity to the ethical because it is here that may most clearly be observed that feature of the life of Spirit in which it 'denies itself,' sets itself in opposition to what is notwithstanding essential to its own being and presupposed in this very revulsion from it; and through this inner conflict achieves a fuller and richer existence than it could otherwise have attained.

But it will be worth our while briefly to survey the relations borne to the economic activity by the other higher activities which have been above enumerated

In respect of that one among them with which we are in these Lectures most especially concerned, namely the religious, its intimate connexion with the ethical is generally recognized; nor is this the place to enlarge upon the no less important distinctions which must be

drawn between these two closely allied forms of human life. Whatever has been said of the relation between the economic and the ethical activities may be said also of that between the economic and the religious. The former is the presupposition of the latter; and yet, when the religious life is fully established, it claims to be paramount even in the economic sphere. The sophistry which takes occasion from the economic aspect belonging to any action to attempt the subsumption of Morality under an economic formula is ready to undermine in like manner the independence of Religion. The counter-sophistry of moral rigorism finds a religious analogue in the extravagance of mystics and ascetics all the world over. That these extravagances are, however, no necessary feature of Religion, or even of mysticism and asceticism, we may learn from the attitude of so great a mystic and ascetic as St. Theresa, who was ever on the watch against encouraging among her nuns illusions due to fasting and want of sleep, and offered to God as an agreeable sacrifice the care she took of her own body.[12] While they give vent to the emotions engendered by the revulsion from the economic view of life which is a normal feature of Religion and which under certain circumstances finds expression in the experience known as 'conversion,' they nevertheless imply a neglect of the very negative relation which renders this revulsion necessary, since they treat the friction between flesh and Spirit upon which the movement of the religious life depends as though it could be abolished to the advantage of that life by the practical elimination of the flesh. If the perpetual sacrifice and yet the continual need of 'all these things' which the economic activity

[12] See *Letters of St. Teresa*, tr. Dalton, Letter VII (to the Bishop of Osma), p. 16.

seeks to obtain and secure, are alike necessary conditions of religious activity, we shall scarcely find the nature of this activity better expressed than in a religion of personal intercourse which represents that sacrifice as made to the bountiful Father whose gifts they are, and further by means of a doctrine of the incarnation and self-oblation of the eternal Son as falling not without but within the Divine Life itself.

Turning from the religious to the social or political activity, a close mutual connexion will be generally admitted to exist between it and the ethical, the relation whereof to the economic has already been considered. Some indeed may even affirm that the social and ethical activities are actually identical. Here too it is unnecessary to advert to the distinctions which may be drawn between them, for this subject must be considered more fully by us hereafter. But we have here to observe that, while the economic activity cannot be denied to be the presupposition of any social activity which aims at other than economic ends, it may be said that there is certainly no such negative relation between the two types of life as was alleged when we contrasted the ethical and religious activities with the economic. The economic activity is social from the outset. The rational human being in regard to whom (or to beings not human, so far as they are conceived to resemble men in possessing a capacity for social organization) we are alone accustomed to speak of economy, is always πολιτικὸν ζῷον, a social animal.[13]

For the present it will be sufficient to meet this observation with a reference to a celebrated saying of Aristotle's which has already been quoted above.[14] The State, he

[13] Aristotle, *Pol.* i. 2. 1253 a 3.

[14] See p. 47 *supra*.

says—and the State is for him the typical community—came into being for the sake of mere living—that is, as we may put it, is originally purely economic—but now exists for the sake of living well—that is, is now not economic merely but mainly ethical. The relation, at once positive and negative, which we have shown to hold between the economic and ethical activities will then hold between the economic community and the ethical. And when I spoke earlier in this Lecture of the desire which serves as motive to the social or political activity as a desire for fellowship, I had in view the activity of the community which, while not ceasing to be economic in its organization, is already in its ultimate principle of determination ethical.

When we turn to the relation of the economic life to the scientific, we find ourselves in the presence of facts which it may seem difficult to harmonize with the view, suggested by those which we have just been surveying, that the higher human activities, while resting upon the economic activity as their necessary and constant presupposition, live in and by a revulsion from it and opposition to it. Yet we shall, I think, find that the case of Science is not so different from those of Morality and Religion as might at first appear.

The economic activity is of course the necessary condition of the scientific as of the other activities of human life which we have already considered. Moreover this positive relation between them is not merely admitted by the higher of the two, it is readily proclaimed and insisted upon. A negative relation between them, such as that which we have found to exist between the economic and ethical activities, is less obvious. The masters of them that know do not seem to take up the same attitude

of opposition towards the riches of this world with which we are familiar in the preachers of morals and religion. Where we find something of the same sort in a philosopher —in a Pythagoras, a Socrates, an Epictetus, a Kant,— we are apt to think of such men as being rather (or at least no less) moralists or religious teachers than representatives of Science strictly so called. We think the characteristic view of science better exhibited in Aristotle's emphasis on the fact that Philosophy arises only when men have by the acquisition of wealth beyond their immediate bodily needs raised themselves to a position of affluence and economic security [15] ; or in Bacon's insistence that the function of Science is to minister to the increase of commodities for the relief of man's estate, and in his prophetic anticipations of the lavish expenditure of public resources in a well-organized effort to control nature by the discovery of its laws.[16] The undissembled love of the men of the Renascence for power and wealth and splendour and their contempt for the ascetic institutions with whose decadence they were familiar were intimately associated with their passion for knowledge and freedom of thought.

But though a negative relation to the economic activity is not so manifestly characteristic of the scientific life as of the ethical and religious, such a relation notwithstanding exists in the case of this form of life also.

We have heard not a little of late about the importance of bearing in mind the purpose we have in view in making any particular statement descriptive of our knowledge or opinion concerning this or that matter. It has even been suggested that to recognize the variety of purposes is to abandon the conception of an ' absolute ' truth as

[15] Ar. *Met.* A. 1. 981 b 20 *seqq.* [16] Bacon, *N.O.* i. 81.

unprofitable and fallacious. This suggestion appears to me to be quite wide of the mark. Some simple illustrations will best explain my meaning. My purpose in inquiring into my expenditure during the past year may be to produce an accurate balance-sheet—or only to satisfy myself how much I can conveniently invest in War Bonds. In the latter case I may ignore the shillings and pence; in the former I shall not be content without accounting for every one of these. I shall therefore, it may be said, take an answer in round figures as 'true' for the one purpose, as 'false' for the other. Does anyone suppose that there is anything here which detracts from the 'absoluteness' of truth? The common phrases 'true enough for the purpose in hand' and 'exactly true' express precisely what we think in such a case.

But no doubt there may be instances more difficult to deal with. There is a saying often used about stories told of our acquaintance: 'Non è vero ma ben trovato.' And conversely a story may be 'true' yet quite misleading if taken as characteristic of the person of whom it is related, so that it may (we think) be legitimately suppressed or even, at least by implication, denied in the interests of truth. Or, once more, we may hold our veracity to be unimpaired when we answer a question which is casually asked of us according to the knowledge accessible to us apart from confidential information which the interlocutor has no reason to suppose us to possess. I do not complicate the discussion by reference to cases involving a familiar ethical problem, such as that of the man intentionally asked about a secret matter by one who has no right to inquire into it; or of the would-be murderer seeking to know the whereabouts of his intended victim. But even in these cases there is nothing to

support the suggestion which I am criticizing. Our purpose in asking or answering the questions put to us always governs our choice or our interlocutor's choice of an answer; and no doubt the inevitable abstraction from any particular purpose in the examples given by writers of text-books on logic does impart to these examples a certain air of unreality. These writers too must in fairness be, like others, judged in the light of their own special purpose. Nevertheless the answer, whatever it is, must be *true*, if true at all, independently of the wishes of asker or answerer. And its truth must in this sense be 'absolute.'

This is indeed the presupposition of all discourse, of asking and of answering alike. The doctor who holds out to his patient a hope that he may still recover when in fact there is no prospect of his doing so may be justified on the ground that the false expectation which he thus arouses will prolong the sick man's life or spare him terror. That is a question of morals. But no one would say that the doctor was telling the truth.

I have spent too long a time in labouring a point which I can only say at last is to me strictly speaking beyond dispute; namely that my notion of truth implies its 'absoluteness' in the sense of its independence upon the purposes which govern its communication, and that any attempt to explain what truth is in terms which do not imply that we already know what it is, is doomed from the first to failure.

What is the bearing of all this upon our present inquiry? This: that it may bring out, by showing the ineptitude of the attempts sometimes made to deny it, the independence or autonomy of the activity of Knowledge, which, however often we may find it enlisted in the service of desires and interests of the kind which we have described

as economic, implies the presence of a capacity of apprehending what is *true* ; *absolutely* true, if you will, although this adverb does not add anything to what is involved in the word ' true ' itself.

Apart from the acknowledgment that we possess such a capacity, the whole fabric of our thought will collapse and, with the rest, the theories of those who call in question the truth of our possessing it, and in so doing assume that they know what is meant by truth, and confess that they are seeking for it in the answer to the question which they put. Students of Aristotle will remember how, despite his interest in the psychological antecedents and accompaniments of Knowledge, we constantly find him speaking [17] of the faculty of Knowledge itself, the νοῦς as he calls it, the Intellect or Understanding, as of something ' apart ' from these, and once at least even as coming ' from without ' [18] into a soul in whose development up to the point at which this higher nature supervened upon it there had been nothing to explain it. It is sometimes thought by those who first meet with such language as this that the great thinker whom a conventional tradition, illustrated by Raphael's cartoon at the Vatican, has so often contrasted with Plato as the man whose eyes are fixed upon the everyday world around us with the heaven-gazing watcher of things eternal, has here turned mystic for the nonce and patched his philosophy of experience with a piece of transcendent speculation. Such an explanation of Aristotle's doctrine of the νοῦς is, I am convinced, wholly mistaken. In it he is, I have no doubt, only insisting, in terms which may or may not

[17] Ar. *de Anima*, iii. 5. 430 a 17 ; ii. 2. 413 b 24, seqq. ; *Eth. Nic.* x. 8. 1178 a 22.

[18] Ar. *de Gen. An.* ii. 3, 736 b 28 ; cf. 6. 744 b 21.

be well chosen, upon the necessity of ascribing to Knowledge an independence and autonomy, which if it does not possess, it is not Knowledge at all, and Science in every form must yield place to a bottomless and self-destroying scepticism. This independence and autonomy of Knowledge establishes between it and the economic life, even when it is most completely subservient to the ends of that life, a negative relation such as we more easily recognize to hold between the ethical and the economic activities of the human spirit.

When we pass to the æsthetic activity which is stimulated by the desire for Beauty we find, to an even greater degree than in the case of the scientific, that the positive relation between it and the economic is far more readily recognizable than the negative.

Joy in the things with which the economic activity is concerned rather than revulsion from them or repudiation of them seems to be its characteristic. Nevertheless the negative relation may be seen here also. I will content myself with a quotation from the writings of one whose own life was devoted to the service of the Beautiful, and who moreover, as the words I shall cite sufficiently show, was fully alive to the contrast in their respective outlook upon the objects of the economic activity between Art and Religion. It is Francis Thompson who thus addresses 'the dead Cardinal of Westminster.'

Call, holy soul, O call
The hosts angelical
And say
" See, far away

" Lies one I saw on earth ;
One stricken from his birth
With curse
Of destinate verse.

" What place does He ye serve
For such sad spirit reserve,
Given
In dark lieu of Heaven

" The impitiable Dæmon
Beauty to adore and dream on,
To be
Perpetually

" Hers, but she never his ?
He reapeth miseries,
Foreknows
His wages woes.

" He lives detachèd days ;
He serveth not for praise ;
For gold
He is not sold ;

" Deaf is he to the world's tongue ;
He scorneth for his song
The loud
Shouts of the crowd ;

" He asketh not world's eyes ;
Not to world's ears he cries ;
Saith, ' These
Shut, if he please ' ;

" He measureth world's pleasure,
World's ease, as Saints might measure ;
For hire
Just love entire.

" He asks, not grudging pain ;
And knows his asking vain,
And cries—
' Love ! Love ! ' and dies,

" In guerdon of long duty
Unowned by Love or Beauty ;
And goes—
Tell, tell, who knows !

" Aliens from Heaven's worth,
Fine beasts who nose i' the earth,
Do their
Reward prepare.

" But are *his* great desires
Food but for nether fires ?
Ah me,
A mystery !

" Can it be his alone,
To find, when all *is* known,
That what
He solely sought

" Is lost, and thereto lost
All that its seeking cost ?
That he
Must finally,

" Through sacrificial tears
And anchoretic years,
Tryst
With the sensualist ? "

The upshot of the examination to which we have just subjected in turn the various higher activities of human life is that in them all, although more obviously in the ethical and religious than elsewhere, there is a positive and a negative relation towards the economic activity, upon which, while it serves them all as an indispensable foundation and condition, each after its own fashion turns its back as it were and finds itself in and through perpetually sacrificing to a new end of its own discovery the primary ends of that activity which it set out at first to subserve.

It might seem to be required by our plan that we should here ask whether such a doctrine of Divine Personality as it was suggested in our former course would represent the testimony of the most highly developed religious

experience will cast any light upon what we have called in the present Lecture the economic activity in human life. We shall probably be prepared, when we consider the peculiar relation which we have described as existing between this activity and those which we are accustomed to regard as 'higher' in the scale of value, to find that our view of the economic aspect of human Personality is less affected than our view of its other aspects by the doctrine in question.

A few words may, however, be said concerning the religion of the economic man. In strictness, indeed, if there be any truth in our account of the revulsion from the economic life which is involved in religion, we cannot speak of the religion of the economic man, because, so far as a man has a religion, he must to some extent have ceased to be an economic man pure and simple. But, as we are often told in a somewhat different connexion, the economic man pure and simple does not exist; and, on the other hand, a far larger proportion of the life of those who are no strangers to Religion, Science, Art, Morality or Politics is as a matter of fact determined by what we have designated as economic considerations than some of them would perhaps be very willing to admit.

We may thus speak of the religion of the economic man without absurdity if not with perfect correctness. For many a man, the main currents of whose life run in economic channels, is notwithstanding conscious of a need to put himself into accord with the all-controlling Power in the presence of which, when he considers himself and the world in which he lives and of which he forms a part, he feels himself to stand. In this sense he has, or at any rate seeks after, a religion, and that which will satisfy him we shall expect to have

the same kind of congruity with and diversity from that which satisfies a man who has reached a higher level of personal activity as exists between the experience of the less and the more advanced stages of other forms of the apprehension of Reality by the human mind. But we shall also do well to bear in mind the attitude of something little short of hostility to the economic life which we have seen to be characteristic of the awakening of the religious consciousness to the demand of God upon the soul. We shall not be surprised to find an attempt made to meet the need of a religion which, as we have seen, is often felt by men whose activities are mainly directed towards economic ends, without incurring that breaking up of the inward harmony of life, that revolution in general outlook, which must be effected before Religion can manifest itself within the soul in its proper form.

We saw in the former course of Lectures that it would be an error to identify a *personal* with an *anthropomorphic* God. We found rather that a thorough-going anthropomorphism was actually incompatible, just because it was so thorough-going, with that intimacy of personal intercourse which men seek to enjoy with a 'personal' God. Nevertheless such an attempt at a religion as we have now in view will usually by vaguely anthropomorphic language point forward to the thought of Personality in God, while on the other hand it will be apt to keep God as it were at a distance, and so be without the power or even the will to enter into those closer relations which the expression a 'personal God' is intended to suggest.

A religion of this kind is exceedingly common as a state of mind existing in individual men, but it does not easily assume the form of a religious institution. It is rather to be observed as a fact of considerable significance

that even among primitive peoples, which seem to regard religious practices as in the main instrumental to the achievement of economic ends, the whole apparatus of *initiation*, although intended to introduce the sons of the tribe to the ordinary duties of mature life, is so designed as to suggest a passage into another and more mysterious world than that which the eyes of the uninitiated, women or boys, daily behold, and in which even the everyday actions of the initiated men, those which are open to the inspection of their wives and children, are performed. Thus one may say that the negative relation between the religious and the economic activities is divined by men long before they are prepared to acknowledge that independence of the ends pursued by the economic activity which Religion when it has come to full age vindicates for itself.

LECTURE III

DIVINE PERSONALITY AND THE SCIENTIFIC LIFE

IN this Lecture I propose to pass to the consideration of the scientific activity in human life, and to inquire what light, if any, an examination of the way in which our personality exhibits itself therein may be found to throw upon the doctrine of Divine Personality developed in my previous course of Gifford Lectures. This activity is of course that the chief products of which are Science, in the narrower sense of the word, and Philosophy.

The difference between these two may be briefly, but, for our present purpose, sufficiently, said to lie in this, that Philosophy, concerning itself as it does with the Whole, *totum hoc quod sumus et in quo sumus*,[1] cannot omit from its consideration the *knower* or the Subject as well as the *known* or the Object; whereas Science, as distinguished from Philosophy, abstracts, in dealing with the world of objects, from its relation to the mind which knows it. It follows from this characteristic of Science that, as I have already, in the first Lecture of my earlier course, had occasion to point out, it is precisely in Science, thus understood, that Personality seems to be of least account. Personality is no doubt a condition of the existence of Science; but Personality is omitted from the account which Science gives of its conclusions. Thus

[1] Tertullian, *adv. Marcionem*, i. 10.

we see that these can be stated and understood apart from any interest in their first discoverer, while the work of the artist or philosopher cannot in the same way be separated from its spiritual context in the soul of the artist or philosopher by whom it was achieved.

It is thus in harmony with a fundamental feature in the nature of Science that the conception of Personality in God should seem at the least irrelevant to it, if not incongruous with it. There is a well-known story of Napoleon that he called the attention of Laplace to the absence from the pages of his *Mécanique Céleste* of any mention of God, and that he received from the great astronomer this answer: 'Sire, I had no need of that hypothesis.' Nowadays there would be few, even among convinced theists, who would not consider that Laplace was right in construing the mechanical system of the heavens without reference to a Divine Personality. Such a reference would be bound, we think, to be, as Bacon long ago hinted,[2] barren of results suitable for incorporation in the fabric of an exact knowledge of nature, or for application to those economic needs of men to which such an exact knowledge may be made to minister.

This being so, we are not surprised to find that, although many great men of science have been convinced believers in a personal God, the belief which they thus hold is not particularly congenial to the scientific temperament. Indeed we may suspect that it was often as the traditional mode of acknowledging all things to have proceeded not from Chance but from Reason that it recommended itself to some of those who have maintained it, rather than as the expression of a religious experience of intimate personal communion with the God whom they acknow-

[2] Bacon, *de Augm. Sci.* iii. 4.

ledged to be the 'great first cause' of the wonderful order which they studied. It may, moreover, be observed that, in days when the use of theistic language is less widely regarded as the only or even as the best way of affirming the rationality of the world, it is perhaps the mathematicians, astronomers and physicists that have been among the men of science least in haste to abandon it, just because the subject-matter of their studies is so highly abstract that, while testifying to the presence of Reason in the world, it has no particular suggestion, alternative to the traditional theism, to offer as to the mode in which that Reason may be supposed to exist and operate. On the other hand it is probably the biologists, who have the most concrete subject matter to study of any scientific men, that find this same traditional theism most uncongenial to their habits of thought. *Life* can make a better shift than Number or Space or Motion to take the place of God: and, if we try to think of it as taking that place, we shall find that the phenomena which we regard as the effect of its operation do not by any means suggest Personality in their cause; least of all a Personality invested with the attributes, customarily ascribed to God, of supreme wisdom and goodness.

It is a thought by this time familiar to us all that Nature may with some plausibility be said to bear witness to the power of God, and even to his wisdom, if indeed we can call that wisdom and not rather cunning which does not seem to be inspired at all by goodness; but that, as regards the goodness of God anyone would be rash who would rely upon the testimony of Nature to establish that. I recognize indeed the force of the reasoning which, from the days of Socrates and Plato onwards,

has found in Goodness the only ultimate guarantee of that rationality of the world which we must postulate if we are to have any Science or any Philosophy at all. I believe those Fathers of the Christian Church to have been in the right who built up the theology which was to incorporate their own religious experience upon the foundations of the philosophy in whose teaching this 'great argument' was central. But I greatly doubt whether, apart from some such religious experience as theirs of a personal relation to the Supreme Goodness, the conviction which that argument could carry to the understanding would avail, except it may be with a few exceptional souls, to give, in the face of the evil in the world, an assurance on which the unquiet heart might rest. Where, however, a religious experience of this kind is present, then the reasoning which could not do its work for it, may well overcome the fear that in believing it to be a genuine experience one is merely the dupe of a pleasing illusion.

But while faith in a God with whom personal intercourse is possible may be said to be uncongenial to the temper of a mind exercised chiefly in scientific activities, at any rate under the intellectual conditions of contemporary life, it is to be observed that from the point of view of such a faith this very uncongeniality is capable of explanation and justification, while from the purely scientific point of view the religious experience of personal intercourse with God must either remain a riddle or be dismissed as illusory.

Confining our attention for the moment to Science in the restricted sense in which we distinguish Science from Philosophy, we have already noted in the previous course of Lectures those characteristics of its procedure

to which it is due that Personality must for ever elude its grasp. Its gaze is necessarily fixed upon the objects of our knowledge, but the nature and conditions of Knowledge itself it cannot scrutinize without ceasing to be Science in the narrower signification of the term and passing into Philosophy, the concern whereof is not merely with the world of objects but with the Whole wherein the known is not severed from the knower nor the object from the subject. Even in the world of objects, Science with its generalizing method can only use the individual as a point of departure; and the Person, as the *individual subject* of knowledge, is doubly unamenable to scientific treatment. Lastly, a personal relation to the Supreme Reality, such as is expressed in that form of Religion which we have described as the highest, is still further removed from the possibility of such treatment; for here Personality is expressly contemplated in union with that ultimate nature of the Whole which, as we have seen, is the concern of Philosophy as distinguished from Science.

There is thus nothing to excite surprise in the appearance of irrelevance to the scientific view of the world which is sometimes and indeed often felt to attach to the thought of a God with whom personal intercourse is possible. On the other hand if we start from this thought itself we may, as I have already suggested, find that this same aversion to it on the part of Science may serve as a means of purifying and enriching the very conception which Science seems to reject.

A distinguished theologian of our own days[3] has

[3] Baron F. von Hügel, *Mystical Element in Religion*, ii. pp. 380, 381. On the value to Religion of scientific determinism cp. *Mystical Element in Religion*, ii. pp. 374 ff., and the same writer's *Eternal Life*, pp. 133, 388.

profoundly observed that the part played in the religious life of another age by the 'vision of judgment,' which once dominated the imagination of serious men, but has now for the great majority, even for those who would not deny it all significance, become a symbol of ever present moral issues rather than a mode of conceiving the ultimate relation of our life to its material environment and of this environment to our life—that the part once played by this expectation has now to a great extent been devolved upon the spectacle presented to us by Natural Science of the material universe, extending without bounds in space and enduring from eternity to eternity, under the reign of inviolable laws whereby every detail of its course is conceived to be determined. The task thus taken over is that of reducing to insignificance and convicting of vanity the everyday life and interests of human beings; and it will probably be admitted that this task is likely, at least for those who have learned to take seriously to heart the revelations of biology, geology, and astronomy, to be more thoroughly accomplished by the modern scientific determinism than by the old eschatology.

That it should, however, be performed as efficiently as may be is assuredly a matter in which Religion is profoundly interested. The feeling which frequently inspires some of the most active hostility encountered by religious tradition among us, the feeling that the conception of God offered to us by that tradition is unworthy of the awful majesty, the immeasurable vastness of this stupendous universe, whose secrets the devotees of Science are ever exploring without any fear of exhausting them—this feeling is in a most true sense a *religious* feeling; and Religion, when once it has had this feeling brought

home to it, can never be fully content with accepting a God to worship, regarding whom a doubt must lurk in the hearts of all but his most ignorant worshippers whether he is not on a scale, so to speak, quite out of proportion to the world with which the natural sciences acquaint us, and proportioned only to a picture of that world which with the increase of our knowledge we have long since outgrown.

In Science therefore, and in those very characteristics of Science which make it take little or no account of Personality—and which often arouse on the part of men imbued with the scientific temper a sharp opposition to Religion itself, Religion comes to recognize an indispensable helper in the work of enlarging her own conceptions to match the demands of that aspiration after the Highest and nothing short of the Highest which is the mainspring of her own activity.

In what I have just said I have not suggested that a reverent attitude towards the vastness of the material universe is other than reasonable. I have even affirmed it to be religious. It must, however, not be forgotten that there are those who would regard this attitude itself as mistaken and as the result of an illusion. According to the maxim which Sir William Hamilton took as the motto of his philosophy :—

> On earth there is nothing great but man.
> In man there is nothing great but mind.

Man, as Pascal says,[4] may be as frail as a reed, but he is a reed that thinks, and so is greater than the unthinking universe, by which he can so easily be crushed.

[4] *Pensées*, ed. Faugère ii. 84, ed. Brunschvig ii. 262.

Rank in the scale of values, it may be pointed out, must not be measured by the space occupied or the time outlasted; else the whale or the tortoise would be higher among animals than the human being. Nay, to Hegel [5] even the infinity of Space and Time themselves had nothing dreadful about it but its tediousness.

It is not irrelevant to our present subject to inquire where the truth lies in this matter. It seems difficult to deny the justice of the assertion that mere bigness and mere continuance in time are qualities in themselves unfitted to excite our reverence. On the other hand it is no less difficult to deny that both at least contribute to the sublimity of objects which we should generally allow to be sublime, for example the starry heaven. We remember how Kant [6] reckoned this as one of the two things—the Moral Law being the other—which inspired his own mind with a feeling of solemn awe; and assuredly he never said anything that awakened a wider and readier response in all who possess any capacity for such a sentiment. The Psalmist was moved long ago by this same spectacle to cry out to him whom he supposed to be its maker and his own: "What is man, that thou art mindful of him? or the son of man, that thou visitest him?" [7] And it would be strange if we, who have a juster conception than the Psalmist could have of the immensity and remoteness of the celestial bodies and of the countless ages through which they have endured, did not for that very reason feel with far greater poignancy that insignificance of ours in their presence of which he thus speaks.

[5] *Logik*, § 94 (*Werke*, vi. 184 f.).

[6] Kant, *Kritik der prakt. Vernunft*, 1 Th. Beschluss. (*Werke*, ed. Hartenstein v. p. 167).

[7] Ps. viii. 4.

We must, notwithstanding, observe that with him it is not, strictly speaking, towards them, but towards the Being the work of whose fingers he took them to be, that the awe excited by the sight of them was directed. Again, there are others—Plato and Aristotle, for instance—whom we know to have been profoundly impressed with a sense of the superiority of the stars to ourselves and who did not (at any rate in Aristotle's case) believe them to be the handiwork of a Creator but rather eternal in their own right. By Plato and Aristotle, however, they were regarded as themselves divine or perhaps rather as manifesting the presence of divine beings possessed of an intelligence far more exalted than our own. It is at any rate worth inquiring whether those among ourselves who neither believe them to be creatures of God nor attribute to them a superhuman intelligence are not in their reverent attitude towards them secretly influenced by associations belonging rather to these older doctrines than to the Naturalism which they consciously profess.

The heavenly bodies are among all the objects of our senses unquestionably (though not, it is true, to our senses themselves but to our knowledge) the biggest, the most remote and the most enduring. Yet, if I am right in my suggestion, the sentiment which even these inspire in us is not in truth due to those characteristics taken by themselves, but involves at least a subconscious recollection, if I may so express it, of a personification with which the immemorial language, not only of poetic literature but of that far more widely spread kind of poetry which is implicit in popular legend and fancy and seems almost instinctive in our race, has made us all familiar, however firmly we may be convinced of its scientific falsity. When we come to

any other things than these, whose bigness or distance or long continuance seems to impress us with a sense of awe in the contemplation of them, we are at once struck with the fact that this impressive bigness, distance, or long continuance is a purely relative quality. St. Peter's at Rome is imposing from its vastness as a temple made with hands; but a mountain of the same size would be of small account; nor do we cease to be capable of a

> vague emotion of delight
> In gazing up an Alpine height,[8]

because we are well aware of the insignificant proportion which is borne even by the highest peaks to the circumference of the terrestrial globe, itself but a grain of dust compared with the mighty systems of orbs unimaginably huge, to one of which it is an inconsiderable satellite.

In the same way we may be deeply moved by the venerable antiquity of a church many centuries younger than a time which from another point of view we should never think of calling ancient; and our reverent contemplation of the oldest works of men is not, I think, seriously disturbed by a contrast of the comparatively short period during which our race has existed on the earth with the vista of immense ages spread out before us by geology and astronomy.

These considerations may, I think, lead us reasonably to suspect that the awe excited in us by what is big and what is old is not in fact due to bigness and oldness in themselves, but to these, if at all, only in connexion with a scale quite different from the scale of mere quantity, whether it be quantity of space or of time.

[8] Tennyson, *The Two Voices*.

Our suspicion may receive support from the reflection that the Lilliputians did not worship the man-mountain,[9] nor does the thought of the "monstrous eft"[10] that, says the poet, "was of old the lord and master of earth," arouse in us a sentiment of reverential awe. And wherever this sentiment is found, I am much inclined to think that we shall find that we are imaginatively investing its object, if not with personality, at least with attributes which properly belong to persons.

The ancient building or tree, the mountain or ocean or planet is conceived as having watched many generations and as made wise by the gathered experience of long centuries. Even where (as I think is generally the case with Wordsworth) it is an essential feature of our sentiment for the natural objects, hills or woods or sea, which stand out as especially embodying the majesty which belongs to Nature as a whole, that we do *not* regard them as human, but rather as composing and solemnizing us by their very remoteness from—we may go so far as to say their indifference to—our desires and troubles, our passions and regrets—even there it is of '*presences* of Nature in the sky And on the earth,'[11] of 'a *presence* that disturbs us with the joy Of elevated thoughts'[12] that the poet who has most deeply felt and most nobly expressed the sentiment is led to speak. Nor would it, I believe, have been otherwise, had the contemplation of these 'powers' filled him, as it has spirits less happily tempered, not with solemn joy and consolation but with terror and despair; nay, had he even, like the preacher

9 Swift, *Voyage to Lilliput.*
10 Tennyson, *Maud*, iv. 6.
11 Wordsworth, *Prelude*, I. 464–5.
12 Wordsworth, *Lines composed a Few Miles above Tintern Abbey.*

in the cathedral of the City of Dreadful Night, seen in Nature nothing but

> Necessity Supreme,
> With infinite Mystery, abysmal, dark,
> Unlighted even by the faintest spark,
> For us the flitting shadows of a dream.[13]

So long, at least, as this sombre mood is mixed, as so often it is, with a sense of solemn awe, it must be that we still feel ourselves in a *presence*, though it be a presence that disturbs us with feelings very different from the joy of which Wordsworth speaks in the lines which I have just quoted.

It is also to be observed that those in whom the deepest emotions of awe and reverence are aroused by the contemplation of the immeasurable universe which surrounds us and its wonderful order, and who feel most acutely the jarring incongruity with the majesty of that spectacle of a religion which would see in it the expression of an intelligence like that which in themselves (as they would say) is conscious of its fleeting littleness in comparison with the sublimities confronting it, are not commonly devoid of a reverence no less genuine for the intellectual greatness of those whose genius has opened the eyes of their fellows to these same marvels. But this latter reverence really contradicts, not indeed the other reverence for Nature, but the disparagement of the human spirit which it is often supposed to entail. That disparagement rests indeed upon a confusion between the weak and perishable frame which is an infinitesimal part of the material universe and the mind which so astonishingly transcends the limitations of its original

[13] J. Thomson, *City of Dreadful Night*, § 14.

point of view by discounting and allowing for them in its miraculous ascent to the apprehension of laws valid for " all time and all existence." [14] It is not the bigness of Nature in comparison with the human body or its long continuance in comparison with human life which enables it to excite our reverence ; it is rather the perpetual challenge which it makes to the intellect and the imagination of man, by which if they may sometimes confess themselves baffled, they are baffled not as they would be by nonsense and chaos, but as by a *problem*, which must have a solution, though it be hard to find. Did we regard the mystery of things as a riddle like that famous one which was propounded at the mad tea party about the Raven and the Writing Desk,[15] we should entertain towards it not a feeling of reverent awe, but one of a quite opposite character.

Although the aspect of things with which the exercise of the scientific activity which we have been considering makes us acquainted may seem incongruous with the thought of Divine Personality, yet that same activity, if we turn our attention from its results to itself, is assuredly a fact extremely difficult of explanation from the principles of Naturalism. Known to us only as a manifestation of Personality, it reveals to us the spirit of man as conversant with the Eternal and the Infinite, and as finding a progressive satisfaction in the exploration of Nature just because there seems no end to the questions which may be asked and answered concerning it. The man of science is uplifted rather than depressed by the thought which brought sadness to the great pessimist of the Old Testament as he meditated on the " travail which God hath given to the sons of men to be exercised

[14] Plato, *Rep.*, vi. 486 A. [15] *Alice in Wonderland*, c. 7.

in it," [16] and the thought that "he hath set eternity in their heart"—a sense of the infinite, as we might put it—"yet so that man cannot find out the work that God hath done from the beginning to the end." Shall we be going far astray if we suggest that nothing but a manifestation of Personal Spirit could thus inspire the sentiment of reverential awe in the mind while in the very act of demonstrating by its scientific activity its own unique dignity; since to nothing less than Personal Spirit can Personal Spirit without loss of self-respect render the homage that the entertainment of that sentiment implies?

I do not think that we should be going far astray in making such a suggestion; but I am well aware that the rejoinder will readily occur to many that not to be less than Personal Spirit is not the same as to *be* Personal Spirit; that it is consistent with being *more* than Personal Spirit. This possibility I will shortly examine more closely when I have passed to the consideration of that other form of the cognitive activity which we nowadays call Philosophy rather than Science. But I am, I confess, exceedingly doubtful whether the attempt to think of the "Infinite and Eternal Energy from which all things proceed" (to quote Herbert Spencer's famous description of the God of Science [17]) as lacking Personality does not after all, while it unquestionably helps us to put aside certain problems which would puzzle us, if we were to ascribe personality to it, at the same time, in the apprehension of most of those who find it more to their liking than the traditional language of Religion, which calls it God, recall rather something which—like electricity, or the ether, or unconscious life—we should in

[16] Eccl. iii. 11. [17] *Ecclesiastical Institutions*, p. 843.

other connexions have no hesitation in ranking *below* Personality. When the thought of it excites—as we cannot doubt that it excited in Herbert Spencer himself—a reverential awe, we find that the language used of it at once approximates to that which is appropriate to a Person. "We find ourselves," says Spencer, "in the *presence* of an Infinite and Eternal Energy, from which all things proceed."

I am far from desiring to press overmuch an argument which might seem to be based upon the inevitably metaphorical character of the only language which we have to use. I do not think that Science, taken by itself, can assure us of Divine Personality. The only satisfactory evidence of that lies, as the only satisfactory proof of Personality in our fellow men lies, in personal intercourse. I have already insisted in my earlier course that by no reflection which abstracts from the religious experience can we reach the God of Religion.

But we may notwithstanding call the nature of the sentiment excited by the spectacle of the world in many men of science towards the mysterious Power from which it has its unity an evidence that the revelation of Religion is not altogether incongruous with the mood of Science. At the same time we may remember that the history of Natural Theology [18] has ever been the history of a discrimination between the anthropomorphism which would be justly exposed to the scoffs of Xenophanes as likening God to man as a particular sort of animal, no otherwise than a lion might liken him to a lion or a horse to a horse,[19] and that other anthropomorphism (if it is so to be called) which finds in man's mind and reason

[18] See *Studies in the History of Natural Theology*, pp. 79 ff.

[19] Cp. Rupert Brooke's *Fish*.

a credible witness to the presence of a royal intelligence (as Plato speaks) in the nature of Zeus.[20] For, this being so, we may gladly accept the help of Science to purify our notions of the Divine Nature by making us slow to indulgence in fancies which the personal relation to God experienced in Religion might have seemed to authorize, but which are felt to be out of place, when we consider that the God whom we know by faith is also—if he be God indeed—the 'veiled being,'[21] the 'Deus absconditus,'[22] —a part of whose ways it is the inexhaustible task and joy of the votaries of Science to discover.

But, as we saw, Science, in that narrower sense of the word in which we distinguish it from Philosophy, is not the only form which the scientific activity assumes; there is also Philosophy, in that sense, more fully established in modern times than formerly, in which we contrast it with what we describe as specifically Science. It is with those problems which Science leaves on one side, in order to concentrate its energies on the investigation of the objects which surround us in the world which the senses apprehend—though that very investigation certainly leads us far beyond what the senses can apprehend,—with the problem of the nature of that which is the *subject* of Science and not its *object*, and the problem of the Unity which is implied in the fact of Knowledge wherein things are objects to a subject—with just those problems it is that Philosophy, strictly so called, occupies itself.

How then does the scientific activity of the human spirit in the form of Philosophy stand toward the recognition of Personality in God?

[20] *Philebus*, 30 D. [21] H. G. Wells, *God the Invisible King*.
[22] Isa. xlv. 15. Cp. Pascal, *Pensées*, ed. Brunschvig ii. 101, 177, ed. Faugère ii. 114, 146.

It is, I think, a common impression that the study of Philosophy tends towards Pantheism; an expression which, in its popular acceptation, is understood to describe a view, agreeing with Theism as against Atheism in the recognition of an object of worship, while agreeing with Atheism against Theism in the denial to that object of worship of the attribute of Personality. Such common impressions are usually worth noting, and more often than not contain a kernel of true apprehension, which however needs much examination and sifting before it can be made available for incorporation in a reasoned view of the world. In the present case, we need not spend many words on the alleged tendency of Philosophy to reject mere Atheism. The aversion to this word which will be found to be general among philosophers is not wholly to be explained by the evil associations which it has gathered about it. It is true that in our own time as in others some thinkers who are deserving of all respect have not refused or have even claimed for themselves the designation of Atheist. For example Dr. M'Taggart [23] considers merely misleading the use of the word 'God,' except for a being conceived not merely as personal but as a finite person side by side with other persons, although no doubt vastly more powerful and good than any other; and so, as he sees no reason to believe in the existence of any such being, he has declared himself content to be described as an Atheist. Yet since for him the ultimate reality in the world is a spiritual unity, an eternal society of eternal individual spirits, his view, no less than that of most other philosophers, would probably appear to the 'man in the street'—or, shall we rather say,

[23] *Some Dogmas of Religion*, §§ 152 ff. (pp. 186 ff.).

to the ordinary journalist?—to fall under the head of Pantheism.

There are no doubt other thinkers—I would mention, among our own contemporaries, Mr. Bertrand Russell—whose doctrine the same critic from outside the schools of philosophy would consider fairly entitled to be called Atheism, since it not only leaves us with no object for worship, but forbids us that satisfied acquiescence which Dr. M'Taggart leaves to us in the supreme and ultimate reality of things which, if it cannot properly be called worship, may at least be described without absurdity as a beatific vision. Such philosophies of pessimism—to use another term in popular use—have, however, at any rate in the past, been in a very decided minority; and the impression that, speaking generally, Atheism is not the favourite attitude of Philosophy receives support from the facts of history. And the same facts undoubtedly give considerable ground for the suggestion that Philosophy has favoured on the whole a way of thinking which subordinates and ignores or even denies the notion of Divine Personality—a way of thinking such as is frequently, though not always accurately, described as Pantheism.

It has been already observed in my former course that while the personality of the man of Science is of course a condition of the results of his activity, yet those results may be and indeed should be stated in a form which abstracts altogether from that personality; but that, on the other hand, a similar abstraction cannot be made in Philosophy; so that it is not possible to study with profit the doctrines of the great philosophers, as one may the discoveries and hypotheses of the great men of science, elsewhere than in their original context.

If this be so, if the philosophical form of what I have called as a whole the scientific activity of the human spirit is thus so far more intimately affected by the individual personality of the agent than that other form to which the name of Science is more particularly appropriated ; and if moreover the very mission of Philosophy, as the contemplation of the Whole, of Absolute Reality, forbids her to pass over any feature of experience, least of all one so important as Personality, as being no concern of hers ; it is plainly impossible, when we find a tendency in Philosophy to think of God otherwise than as personal, to explain it as we did a like tendency in Science by the limitations requisite to its concentration on the performance of a special task, such as was for Science the exploration of the objective world.[24]

Philosophy is bound to take account of Personality. It cannot neglect the presuppositions of its own activity, and Personality is at least one of these. Again it cannot neglect any region of experience, neither that of personal intercourse between man and man, nor that of religious experience, which, as we know, often takes the form of a consciousness of personal intercourse.

But, as was pointed out in the tenth Lecture of my previous course, Philosophy stands to Religion in a

[24] I describe the task of Science thus, notwithstanding I may seem to some who hear me thereby to imply that Psychology is not a Science ; for I think that Psychology, so far as it is more than a branch of Physiology, must be reckoned rather with such philosophical disciplines devoted to the investigation of the human spirit as Ethics, Æsthetics, Logic, than with the Mathematical and Natural Sciences, of which in our modern use of the word Science we are mainly thinking. Although these disciplines are departmental as compared with Metaphysics, they yet involve a conception of the whole in a sense in which the mathematical and natural sciences by themselves do not.

peculiar relation in which she stands to no other of the several forms of human experience, all of which it is her office to survey. For Religion has, in a sense in which this cannot be said of any other form of experience, the same object as Philosophy itself. Hence Philosophy finds in Religion a rival or competitor, and indeed historically a competitor which is already in possession when she herself enters upon the field. For indeed it is in the soil of Religion that as a rule Philosophy springs up, and before she has differentiated herself from Religion, Religion both in the individual and in the race discharges functions which, when fully developed, Philosophy must take over.[25] It is in this situation that we must look for the true explanation of the tendency in Philosophy to represent God after what is called a pantheistic manner, or, to use a phraseology already adopted in these Lectures, to dwell upon his *immanence* to the exclusion of his *transcendence*.

Religion, not only in what, as we have seen, is the rare although highly developed form in which explicit stress is laid upon Personality in God himself, but always, is an experience of God as in direct relation to our whole individual personality, or at least to a social personality within which we feel ourselves to be included, and is thus distinguished from the purely cognitive attitude towards the supreme Reality which is proper to Philosophy. Thus, although Religion is never really an experience of a God *merely* transcendent, there is always in the experience an element which we may describe as the consciousness of his transcendence, and which at its fullest and highest becomes a consciousness of Divine Personality. So long therefore as Philosophy respects

[25] Cp. my *History of Philosophy*, p. 80.

Religion as an autonomous form of experience, it cannot ignore this characteristic of it, and must take account of it in its own conception of the Supreme Reality. Where Philosophy becomes a doctrine of divine immanence and as such calls in question the reality of the transcendence implied in the attitude of worship proper to Religion, it is really attempting to substitute itself for Religion; and this is just what Signor Croce, for example, would, as we have already seen, have it do. But such an explicit substitution, or even an attitude towards Religion which implies as much, does in fact tend to the impoverishment of human life, and incidentally makes for the disparagement of the human personality which attains its true dignity in the religious experience of personal intercourse with God.

It is quite consistent in Signor Croce to dismiss contemptuously the belief in the immortality of the individual soul and that in the existence of a transcendent God together as by no means corresponding to profound demands of the human spirit.[26] This belief in individual immortality we shall hereafter have to consider on its own merits; but even if, on other grounds, we should find ourselves forced to abandon it in its traditional form, on the principles of Signor Croce the position of the individual person in the world is strangely enigmatic. The arrogance of the tone in which this writer speaks of views which he considers outworn should not disguise from us the difficulties inherent in all theories which, like his, attribute deity to the Spirit which is in us and which we are (*Deus in nobis et nos*[27]), while regarding the only form in which this divine Spirit is conscious

[26] *Filosofia della Pratica*, Eng. tr. p. 261.

[27] Croce, *Saggio sullo Hegel* (ed. 1913), p. 137 (Eng. tr. p. 201):

of its own reality, the form, that is, of individual personality, as something essentially transient and perishable. That attempts to escape from these difficulties by assigning to individual personality a ' value and destiny ' such as is accorded to them by the traditional theology of Christendom are beset by grave difficulties of their own must be frankly admitted. But for the present it is sufficient to point out that by recognizing, as, in my judgment, she is bound to do, that Religion is a genuine and autonomous form of experience, Philosophy leaves open to herself a chance of profiting by any light which may be thrown upon this problem by the religious experience of personal intercourse with the Supreme Reality.

This experience Philosophy cannot indeed create from her own resources, any more than she can thus create any other form of experience, except that of reflexion, which is the experience of her own specific activity; but neither can she without prejudice to success in her own task refrain from taking it into account in displaying the mutual relations of that manifold spiritual experience of which in its entirety it is her office to be the interpreter.[28]

[28] It has been pointed out to me that in the discussions of this chapter I may seem to have ignored *historical* science. For my special purpose, however, since the object of history may be said to be the economic, ethical, political and religious activities of mankind, what is said elsewhere respecting these activities will serve also for this department of science, in which no doubt the impulse to *know* is no less manifested than in natural science or in philosophy.

LECTURE IV

DIVINE PERSONALITY AND THE ÆSTHETIC LIFE

WE pass from the scientific to the æsthetic activity of the human spirit. This activity is displayed both in the creation of works of Art and also in the pleasure taken in the beauty whether of such works or of Nature. These various manifestations of the activity we are now to consider are not so heterogeneous as the description of them just given might at first suggest. In our appreciation of works of Art our imagination is stimulated by them to reproduce, although in a fainter and weaker fashion, the activity which created them; and in the delight which we take in the beauty of Nature, there is an activity which expresses itself in the perception of this beauty where a Peter Bell, for the lack of such an activity, perceives nothing of the sort; an activity of the same kind, though at a lower level, as that which in a Turner or a Wordsworth creates a great landscape painting or a great descriptive poem.[1]

It might perhaps be thought that the conception of Divine Personality would be especially congenial to the human mind when engaged in this particular form of spiritual activity. For even those who would deny to

[1] The debt which this account of the æsthetic activity owes to Signor Croce will be obvious to those acquainted with his *Æsthetic*.

this conception any *scientific* value would often allow to it an *imaginative* one; and the æsthetic activity would seem to be pre-eminently one of the Imagination.

Yet it will on closer attention be found that the artist is indeed ready to use the conception for his own purpose, if it be expressly recognized as a product of Imagination and as free for him to manipulate as he will; but, if it be granted an independent and objective validity, he is apt to regard it as suggestive of a tyrannical Power, cruelly or fiendishly denying its rights to that impulse of self-expression which is his very life and holier to him than any repressive law can possibly be. This matter can, I am disposed to think, be nowhere better studied than in the works of Blake, enigmatical as they are, sometimes even to the very bounds of sanity or beyond them. For few, if any, artists have combined with genius so powerful in the creation of beauty a religious mysticism for all its obscurity and wilfulness so profound and original as that of this singular poet and painter, neglected in his own day, but now acknowledged as a prophet of much that is most stirring and challenging in the thought and temper of the present generation. I make for myself no claim for any special scholarship in this sphere. I do not pretend to have more than a vague and general acquaintance with his intricate mythology; I must confess that there is much in the 'Prophetical Books' which fails to convey any definite meaning to my mind. Nevertheless I will venture a few observations suggested by my reading of this strange master, which it seems to me may throw some light on the subject of my present Lecture.

We may say that Blake is at once boldly anthropomorphic in his representations of God and frankly hostile

to the thought of a God external and remote, especially when such a God is represented after the fashion favoured by the theology of the eighteenth century as the Author of Nature and the Moral Governor of man.[2] It is noteworthy that of all the mighty figures of his mythology none is, as it seems to me, so clearly drawn, none stands out as a living person with a character of his own so distinctly as Urizen, who symbolizes precisely this, to Blake, hateful aspect of Divinity. If the artist is often repelled by the thought of a 'personal God,' it is, I suspect, because he is apt, like Blake, to suppose that what the orthodox religious world has in view when urging the claims of that thought upon him is a Being of this kind, gloomy and inexorable, a foe to joy and to all that is impulsive and childlike, whose kingdom, whether in nature or in human life, is a 'reign of law,' enforced by terrible penalties; one who (so Blake at least is convinced) must himself be no less unhappy than he makes all who are subject to his sway.

But Urizen is only one of the beings among whom Blake distributes the various aspects under which men have envisaged the Object of their worship. And here we come upon another feature of his theology, in which he is decidedly representative of a general bent of artists in this regard, namely his leaning towards *polytheism*. Now in this leaning towards polytheism the religious tendency engendered by the æsthetic activity is in marked contrast with that engendered by the scientific. Philosophy in all countries is found to speak of God or the Godhead in the singular, even where the popular religion is polytheistic, and whether the philosopher himself

[2] 'Maker of all things, Judge of all men,' as the Confession in the Anglican Communion Service has it.

adopts towards that religion a hostile, an indifferent, or a patronizing attitude. And, in my first course of Lectures, when tracing the history of the attribution of Personality to God, I had occasion to point out how the great advance in the knowledge of the system of Nature which distinguished the period illustrated by the names of Galileo and Newton so greatly impressed men's minds with the unity of the Divine Source of that system as decidedly to encourage a Unitarian tendency in the religious thought of contemporary Christendom.

In sharp contradiction to this scientific monotheism stands the attractive force so constantly exercised upon poets and artists living under the shadow of a religion which has adopted the confession of the divine unity as its primary article of faith by the memories of an older day, when the imagination could delight itself among the "fair humanities of old religion"[3] unsaddened by the thought that they were unreal, and unchecked by the fear that they might be held to be profane. The long tradition, subsiding at times into a frigid convention, which has kept alive in European poetry and art the names and attributes of the Greek and Roman gods is in itself a witness to this regretful retrospect in the souls of those who have clung to it; and in our own national literature, since the great revival of poetry at the end of the eighteenth century, not a few of the chief masters, a Wordsworth, a Coleridge, a Shelley, a Keats—to name no others—have given memorable expression to the sentiment.[4]

[3] Coleridge, *Piccolomini*, ii. 4.

[4] See Wordsworth, 'The world is too much with us,' etc., and *Excursion*, iv. 847 ff.; Coleridge, *Piccolomini*, ii. 4; Shelley, *Hellas* (final chorus); Keats everywhere; see esp. *Dedication of Poems to Leigh Hunt*, 'I stood tiptoe,' etc.; *Endymion*, i. 307 ff.; *Ode to Psyche*.

The instinctive revulsion of the artistic temperament from the austerity of a strict monotheism should have been familiar enough to philosophic students of religion to prevent them from being startled, as I fear some of us were, when the late William James,[5] with characteristic disregard of tradition, suggested that there was something to be said on philosophical grounds in favour of a recognition of "Gods many." What seems to have attracted James in polytheism was indeed the spirit of adventure, congenial to his personal temperament which it appeared to him to call for in the man who committed himself to the care of one out of many gods thus to cut himself adrift from the chance of availing himself of the help of another in time of need. "If there be different gods, each caring for his part," he observes, "some portion of some of us might not be covered with divine protection, and our religious consolations would thus fail to be complete." This objection to polytheism did not in his eyes put it out of court. "For," as he says, "no fact in human nature is more characteristic than its willingness to live on a chance."

To pursue the more general question thus raised would, however, take us too far from our immediate subject of the religious attitude induced by the æsthetic activity of the human spirit. I will only take occasion to remark that James had not failed to perceive the true ethical and religious significance of the issue between monotheism and polytheism. This is already clearly pointed out by St. Thomas Aquinas in his *Summa contra Gentiles*.[6] It

[5] *Varieties of Religious Experience*, p. 526.

[6] *Summa contra Gentiles*, i. 42. See my *Studies in the History of Natural Theology*, pp. 243, 258; cp. p 104.

is not the mere number of those to whom the name 'God' is applied that is principally in question. Belief in a host of beings called Gods under a single supreme chief is compatible with a theology essentially monotheistic. What is not so compatible is a doctrine, like that of the Manichean dualism which in St. Thomas's own day was the most dangerous speculative opponent of Christianity in Western Europe—a doctrine which would leave us with two ultimate and eternal Principles opposed the one to the other as good to evil, thus opening up to the soul of man a choice of sovereignties, to either of which allegiance may with equal reasonableness be sworn, and under either of which a career is open to spiritual ambition.

That in Blake we have a representative of the artistic temperament, as in other respects, so in this particular respect of a tendency towards polytheism in religion, we have already seen. With him, however, the tendency did not take the form, as with Wordsworth, of a yearning after, or, as with Keats, of a resuscitation to new life of "the beautiful mythology of Greece." [7] He had taken indeed a great dislike to the whole classical tradition as being responsible for the fetters which the Age of Reason seemed to have cast upon the limbs of the Imagination. "The Stolen and Perverted Writings of Homer and Ovid, of Plato and Cicero, which all men ought to condemn, are set up by artifice against the Sublime of the Bible." So begins the Preface to his *Milton*. This may seem a strange saying with which to introduce a book the hero whereof is the glorified spirit of the English poet who of all others drank most deeply of the Greek and Roman fountains of inspiration. But the author was not unaware of the

[7] Preface to *Endymion*.

paradox; for he held it to be a fault in Milton that he had submitted himself so much to influences that to Blake seemed perverse and profane. For his own part Blake turns aside from them altogether.

Nor does he, despite the singular nationalism which leads him to insist so much upon the fancy that

All Things Begin and End in Albion's Ancient Druid Rocky Shore,[8]

seek for a mythology ready to his hand which might be identified with that of the ancient inhabitants of his own country, as Morris resorted to the Norse Eddas or Wagner to the *Nibelungenlied*; though it must be admitted that the nomenclature of his prophetic books owes something to the pseudo-Ossian, who passed with those who accepted his pretensions as the British analogue of Homer. On the Bible, which he held to be the true source of the Sublime, Blake indeed drew for much of his material; but in the sacred books of a monotheistic faith it was not possible to find fully developed a mythology adequate to his purpose; and he was thus thrown back upon the resources of his own invention.

This is not the place, even if I were competent, to enter upon a detailed, still less a critical description of the mysterious world which revealed itself to the inward vision of the poet-painter, and in which he lived a life of intense experience which included and interpreted for him the outward events, trivial and commonplace as they must have seemed in the eyes of his neighbours, which make up the story of his earthly life. I can pretend to do no more than call attention to certain features of his mythology which may prove instructive to us in the pursuit of our present inquiry.

[8] Blake, *Jerusalem*, i. 27–9.

At first sight Blake's polytheism undoubtedly suggests that it is a genuine polytheism of the type that, as St. Thomas insists, is more opposed to the Christian faith in the unity of God than any which, like the polytheism found by the Angelic Doctor in Plato's *Timæus*, makes one Supreme Deity the Master and Creator of the rest. There is division and strife among the Beings whom Blake calls 'the Eternals'; and he not unfrequently uses language which suggests an ultimate plurality of Divine Beings with no supreme unity except what may arise from the concord and co-operation of these.

Nevertheless it would be, I think, an error to regard his mythology as the symbol of a doctrine fundamentally at variance, in the same sense as the Manichean dualism, with the doctrine of the unity of God as asserted by Christianity. Other poets, as we have seen, in turning away from a monotheism which they had no intention of seriously rejecting, to forget it for the moment in an imaginative reversion to "a creed outworn," found in the legends of classical antiquity an opportunity for a freer exercise of the imagination than was possible to them in dealing with themes which would perhaps lend themselves less readily to variation and elaboration and would certainly be considered by their readers, if not by themselves, as too sacred to admit of such treatment. Blake, who held himself for a veritable prophet, and could say in all sincerity, "Mark well my words! They are of your eternal salvation!" [9] could not take a like course. The polytheistic imagery which he, no less than they, found congenial to the inventive spontaneity of his genius he must bring, if he was to use it at all, into the closest

[9] Blake, *Milton*, 3. 25.

connexion with his deepest religious and philosophical convictions. Consequently one is not tempted, as in the case of other poets one may be tempted, to think of it as a mere play of fancy, committing him to no denial of the article that God is one. Nevertheless, though one is doubtless right in not thus dismissing it as no evidence for his real belief, our very reason for taking it seriously is also a reason for taking no less seriously the monotheistic language which we also find him using on occasion. The " Divine Family " of which he sometimes speaks is several times represented as appearing not as many but as one man, often described as ' Jesus the Saviour.' [10] Without pursuing the subject further, I will content myself with saying that I think we shall come nearest to the truth if we think of Blake's polytheism in the light of the theosophical speculations (which we know him to have studied) of the sixteenth-century German mystic Jacob Behmen. The god-like forms whom he presents to us as mutually distinct and even mutually opposed I take him to have regarded rather as spiritual Principles which though, when severed from the unity of the Divine Life, they appear thus as diverse and conflicting elements in the process of the world's history, yet find their " perfect consummation and bliss " [11] only in the realization of their true and eternal nature as integral factors of that Supreme Unity.

We have now to inquire into the relation between Blake's representations of God in a human form or forms

[10] We also hear from time to time of ' the bosom of the Father ' ; though the Father himself does not appear as a personage anywhere in the Prophetical Books. The passage in *The Ghost of Abel* is not, I think, to be set against this ; Blake is here dramatically using Biblical imagery, not that of his own mythology.

[11] The phrase is taken from the Anglican Burial Service.

and the religious attitude commonly suggested by the expression 'belief in a personal God.' And here we are met by what looks at any rate like a marked difference of opinion between two of his best-known interpreters. On the one hand the late Mr. Swinburne in his celebrated Essay, which did so much to call general attention to the claims of Blake on the admiration of posterity, constantly speaks of him as a champion of *pantheism* against *theism*. On the other hand, Mr. Chesterton, in his interesting little book on the same subject, expresses himself strongly in the sense that, as he puts it, Blake "was on the side of historical Christianity on the fundamental question on which it confronts the East; the idea that personality is the glory of the universe and not its shame; that creation is higher than evolution because it is more personal; that pardon is higher than Nemesis, because it is more personal." And, commenting on the lines of Blake which tell us that

> God appears and God is light
> To those poor souls that dwell in night,
> But does a human form display
> To those that dwell in realms of day,

he expounds them thus: "God is merely light to the merely unenlightened. God is a man to the enlightened. We are permitted to remain for a time evolutionary or pantheistic until the time comes when we are worthy to be anthropomorphic." [12]

Now no doubt if by *theism* we mean what Blake calls *deism*, the belief in the remote Creator and stern Lawgiver of what was in his day described by the name, which he regarded as so monstrous, of 'Natural Religion,' then

[12] Chesterton, *William Blake*, p. 148.

Blake was, as Swinburne says, an enemy to theism. If by *pantheism* be meant the doctrine that human nature is in the fullest sense the image of God and itself divine, then Blake was certainly a pantheist. But to much that is usually called pantheism he would have been uncompromisingly hostile. I do not recollect that he anywhere names Spinoza, and probably he had never read him. But, had he done so, I suspect that he would have placed him under the same ban as Locke, in whom he saw a type of the Reason which was the enemy and tyrannical oppressor of Imagination; a protagonist of the 'Natural Religion' which he fiercely denounced as no religion at all. And Mr. Chesterton is no doubt right in holding that no way of thinking which finds God in what is *not* human and personal no less, if not more, than in what is such, would have won any sympathy from Blake. In what we call Nature as distinguished from man he could only discover divinity by discovering humanity also. It is only a "spectrous chaos" that speaks thus to Albion in the familiar vein of rationalistic philosophy, "I am your rational power, O Albion, and that Human Form You call Divine is but a Worm seventy inches long That creeps forth in a night and is dead in the morning sun, The fortuitous concourse of memorys accumulated and lost." [13] The precise opposite is in Blake's view the truth. For him even a real worm could not say with the Psalmist, "I am a worm and *no man*." [14] "Everything," he cries, "is Human." [15] M. Maurice Maeterlinck in *L'Oiseau Bleu* feigns that in the dog and the cat, in bread and in sugar, in water and

[13] Blake, *Jerusalem*, ii. 33. 5 ff.
[14] Ps. xxii. 6.
[15] Blake, *Jerusalem*, ii. 38. 48.

in light a human spirit lies concealed which can assume on occasion a human form. So Blake, not in playful fancy but in bitter earnest, sees everywhere under the mask of bird and beast, even of river and mountain and city, not, as with M. Maeterlinck, a quasi-human nature which can take sides with or against our race as such, but a true humanity.[16] All reality is for him in its innermost essence personal. Hence I do not question that Mr. Chesterton's interpretation of the verses I quoted above is essentially correct. True religion for Blake is personal intercourse with the Divine; and 'cosmic emotion' but a makeshift for those who are still in darkness and the shadow of death.

But it would be rash to assume that Blake, though certainly no ordinary pantheist, can be depended upon as a supporter of ordinary theism. "The worship of God is: Honouring his gifts in other men, each according to his genius, and loving the greatest men best; those who envy or calumniate great men hate God; for there is no other God." So says the Devil in *The Marriage of Heaven and Hell*; and those who know that strange and profound work of the singular genius whom we have been studying in this Lecture will remember it is the Devil's party (to which, we are incidentally told, Milton, being a true Poet, belonged without knowing it, and so in despite of himself made his Satan the hero of *Paradise Lost*) which is here represented as being on the right side. And indeed in his own person Blake had shortly before declared that "God only acts in existing beings or men."

Such a declaration, reminding us as it does, almost to the very words, of some pronouncements by Signor

[16] *Jerusalem*, ii. 38. 46 ff.

Croce which I quoted in my first course of Lectures, seem to place Blake, despite his high estimate of the dignity of human personality, definitely on the side of a theology which, like Signor Croce's, will have nothing to do with a *transcendent* Deity, but only with *Deus in nobis et nos*, God in us and not other than we. It would take us too far from our main theme to pursue any further our investigations into Blake's religious teaching. It will be sufficient for the present to indicate the relation which, so far as the exploration we have already made has carried us, we find it to bear to that 'historical Christianity' on the side of which Mr. Chesterton affirms him to stand in respect of the article of Divine Personality. For, as we saw in the earlier course, it is in historical Christianity that a stress has been laid on Personality in God which is absent from the other great religions of mankind.

Now, on the one hand, there is much in the doctrine of this historical Christianity which is (as Blake was well aware) to a considerable degree in accord with this notion of his of God as only known in the persons of men. According to that religion, although there is from eternity Personality in God, yet this has only been revealed in connexion with the appearance as very man among men of a Person in whose personal relation to his Father was manifested a permanent and inalienable feature of the Divine Life. God indeed, according to the dogma of Catholic Christianity, is, as we have often insisted, not *a* person at all. Nor does the correspondence of the Christian creed with such a view as Blake's or Croce's end here. It is Christ's own express teaching that a personal relation to himself is secured, and only secured, in personal service of his brethren: "Inasmuch as ye

did it unto one of the least of these, ye did it unto me." [17] God in Jesus, Jesus in his brethren: this is a doctrine which lies at the very heart of the Christian religion.

While the main tradition of Christian theology is very far from endorsing views of the extreme kind held by some of the school of Albrecht Ritschl—and especially by Professor Wilhelm Herrmann of Marburg [18]—who express themselves as if no knowledge of God which has come otherwise than through the historic Jesus can have real value for a Christian, yet to suppose that there is any source of such knowledge independent of the Person who was incarnate in him, that the Father can be approached except through the Son, would be to violate the deepest instinct of Christian piety. And, if it cannot be denied that Christians have often indulged in a devotion to Jesus Christ of which the service of their Christian brethren might seem to form no essential part, it has been generally recognized that such a strain of sentiment has peculiar dangers. The soundest and most central type of practical Christianity has been at pains never to separate what Jesus himself so emphatically joined together.

On the other hand there is a feature the absence of which from the religious temper of any one would, I think, at once stamp it as foreign to the Christian type, and which is missing in Blake, as also, unless I am mistaken, in Signor Croce—I mean the note of humility towards God. Blake constantly expresses his contempt for this in words which, although possibly susceptible of an interpretation which might bring them under the rubric of Christian orthodoxy, yet strike us at once as unquestion-

[17] Matt. xxv. 40.

[18] *Communion of the Christian with God* (Eng. tr. 1906).

ably discordant in tone not only with a merely conventional Christianity, but with the profoundest convictions of the Christian conscience. Such a saying as "Thou art a man, God is no more" [19] will illustrate what I mean; and it is noteworthy that when showing in some striking lines that the hero of the Gospels is no pattern of a righteousness of the sort ascribed there to the Scribes and Pharisees, a righteousness of strict conformity to Law and not of virtuous impulse, he notwithstanding seems to find in the humility towards God which he cannot deny Jesus to have exhibited an exception to the triumphant splendour of his example:—

> And when he humbled himself to God,
> Then descended the cruel rod.[20]

A passage quoted in one of the lectures of my previous course from Signor Croce, according to which the "man of reason's" words, "Courage and forward" are fully equivalent to the religious man's "Let us leave it in God's hands," [21] show that the Italian philosopher would have been much of Blake's way of thinking in this regard. I venture to think that this consequence of a doctrine of pure immanence, even in a prophet of the dignity of Personality like Blake, reveals its inadequacy to give theoretical expression to the full demands of the religious consciousness. Signor Croce would probably not dispute this, holding as he does that the religious consciousness, just in this demand for the transcendence of its Object, is convicted of being no necessary or permanent form

[19] Blake, *The Everlasting Gospel.*
[20] Blake, *The Everlasting Gospel.*
[21] Croce, *Filos. della Pratica*, pt. i, s. 2, c. 5, pp. 178 f.; cp. *God and Personality*, p. 198.

of spiritual experience, but a 'childish thing' to be put away on the coming of a full spiritual manhood. I will only repeat for myself, with a full realization of the fact that the confession must write me down in Signor Croce's judgment as—I will not say an ass, but—a child in philosophy, that such an estimate of the religious consciousness seems to me wholly arbitrary and impossible to anyone who has a real and intimate religious experience of his own.

There is, however, as one would expect, much to be learned from the sympathetic study of such a religious experience as Blake's—a deep and genuine religious experience in the soul of a great artist, of a type diverging as we have seen in some respects from the Christian, yet in some very close to it. There is a certain way of speaking about Divine Personality which may well find in it a valuable corrective. This is a way which is at once convicted of ineptitude by such a tale as the following. A certain schoolmaster, speaking of one who had presented a sum of money to his school, said: "This generous benefactor desires to remain anonymous—and so his name will be known only to himself and to me and to God—*and*" (he added, recollecting that the secret had not been so closely kept as he had implied)—"*and to one or two others.*" Everyone laughs at this story, perceiving at once the absurdity of reckoning God in as one of three or four possessors of a certain piece of information; and, in so laughing, we instinctively acknowledge that God is not *a* person among others, the transcendence implied in the religious experience of worship requiring, if our theology is to be adequate to that experience, correction by the confession of his immanence in the worshipper, even in the very act of worship.

A theology which neglects the immanence of God must not only fail, so long as there is genuine worship at all, to represent truly the facts of that religious experience which it claims to interpret, but may have an ill-effect on the piety which looks to it for intellectual guidance. It will tend to widen the breach between this piety and the mood natural to the artist, who thus comes into danger of deifying impersonal Nature and so falling back into a religion which misses the truth that was never out of Blake's sight, the truth which he expresses by his discovery in everything not only of Deity but of Humanity and therefore of Personality. Nevertheless it is not to be overlooked that the attitude towards Nature even of the artist who finds satisfaction in the thought that Nature is not human does in fact imply a personification of Nature; and that, on the other hand, the most devout worshipper under the forms of traditional religion is often found dwelling in like manner on the contrast between God and man, saying, it may be, with David in the Bible story: "Let us fall into the hand of the Lord, for very great are his mercies, but let me not fall into the hand of man." [22]

I do not intend to enter at this point into a discussion of the religious value of a worship which finds God in Nature apart from man rather than in the activities of the human spirit, as compared with one for which it is precisely in these latter that the Divinity *hidden* in Nature is properly speaking *revealed*.

The facts are by no means to be ignored which led Coleridge to say that the world (by which in this context he means the same as is meant by Nature, in the sense in which we are here using the expression) "so far from

[22] 2 Sam. xxiv. 14.

being a goddess in petticoats is rather the Devil in a straight waistcoat"; [23] or Mrs. Browning to affirm in more poetical language that we "may discern the heart of a lost angel in the earth." [24]

These facts at the very least militate strongly against an identification of Nature with God and may well suggest that there exist in the universe wills other than human, which, like many human wills, are evil or at any rate not wholly good, and that to such imperfect wills are to be ascribed what in nature we must reckon evil and yet cannot ascribe to human sin.[25] Into these questions I do not propose now to enter, and I mention them only to show that I am not unaware of their urgency and that I perceive them to have a bearing on the problem whether a purely natural religion is possible. For our present purpose it is quite sufficient to remark that, as has been already observed, the worshipper of Nature personifies the object of his worship, and thus may be called as a witness to the need for Religion of acknowledging Personality in God; while the artist's discontent, like that of the man of science, with a certain way of representing Divine Personality serves rather to purify and enrich than to render untenable the Theism which it tends to reject.

This work of purification and enrichment may be said, where we are concerned with the artist, to take two forms. In the first place we have the correction, after a fashion which in a Lecture of my former course [26] I suggested was desirable, of an inadequate mode of envisaging Divine Personality, by the recognition that in

[23] Coleridge, *Table Talk*, Apr. 30, 1830.

[24] *A Drama of Exile.*

[25] Cp. my *Problems in the Relations between God and Man*, p. 270; *Studies in the History of Natural Theology*, p. 100.

[26] *God and Personality*, p. 268.

the artist no less than in the geometer or in the moralist may the 'image of God' be traced. In the second place, the artist's or poet's impatience of the seemingly incomprehensible restrictions imposed upon the free exercise of imagination by creeds or dogmas may call attention to the element of artistic creation which is involved in all our representations of God, even in those which assume dogmatic form. The recognition of such an element is in no wise incompatible with regarding Religion as genuine experience, the apprehension of an independent or objective Reality. It has been lately pointed out by Signor Croce that in all perception there is an element of self-expression which is fundamentally of the same nature as that which appears with greater intensity in the creative activity of the artist. For we may gratefully accept the light here thrown by this acute thinker upon our present problem, without committing ourselves to the systematic mapping out of the forms of our spiritual life with which it is connected.

We may say that the higher the object which we apprehend, the larger is the measure in which this element of self-expression is present. Thus for intimate acquaintance with another person we need imagination in a greater degree than for the study of impersonal beings. No one would deny that without imagination the sympathetic understanding of a friend's character (or even for that matter the intelligent comprehension of an enemy's) would be impossible; yet few would doubt that what is thus understood is independently real. Just so in Religion, which is communion with the Divine, we may recognize the exercise of imagination, and that in an eminent degree, to be indispensable, without on that account disputing the genuine reality of its Object.

An eminent German writer of our own day has observed that " creative geniuses in every field, even where they come into sharp conflict with the traditional religion, have felt as though they were led and guarded by an unseen Power." [27] " This consciousness," he continues, " takes a different form in each of life's different departments. The great artist feels it differently from the great thinker. He will be more directly conscious of his creative power as being a gift and something that lifts him above himself." I think that on the whole these remarks are justified; and that in the temper characteristic of those who represent the æsthetic activity at its best the sense of a creative energy within themselves, which disdains to be controlled by the 'dead hand' of institutions or creeds, is balanced by a consciousness of being, in the very exercise of that creative energy, the instruments and vehicles of a transcendent Power, even though envisaged in a form no less vague than that of the Principle of Beauty towards which (along with the Eternal Being and the Memory of great men) Keats in the Preface to *Endymion* expresses a " feel of humility." Even Blake, from whom such a 'feel of humility' seems, as we have seen, to be markedly absent, regarded his 'prophetical books' as written at the dictation of his 'friends in Eternity.' [28]

This being so, there is nothing, one would say, alien to such a temperament in the recognition of Personality in God. For the humility which is naturally engendered by the consciousness in religious worship of a personal relation to the Highest, has nothing in it inconsistent

[27] Eucken, *Can we still be Christians?* (Eng. tr.), pp. 104–5.

[28] See his letters of Apr. 25 and July 6, 1803, to Butts, in Gilchrist's *Life*, i. pp. 185, 187. Cp. the address 'to the Public' prefixed to *Jerusalem*.

with the profoundest sense on the artist's part of a creative energy expressing itself in his special activity; on the contrary it agrees very well with the deep-seated consciousness that this very energy is itself a gift; and may naturally be felt even to involve a sense of the high dignity of his own vocation. But he will rightly refuse to think of God after a fashion which would make him not the inspirer of the artist's imagination, but merely the beneficiary of his achievements; so that his offering of his own peculiar endowments in God's service should appear a treatment of them as mere means to an end in no wise æsthetic. A God who should thus accept the works of a poet or artist in the spirit of a preacher or missioner who wants a revival hymn set to a taking tune, or of a clergyman who desires to attract a congregation to his church by an ornate ritual—such a God can assuredly be no God for the artist. But to conceive God in this manner is for everyone who, like the artist, is capable of a genuine appreciation of beauty to misconceive him and to set up a false God in the place of the true; since it is to conceive him as less than the highest that we can conceive.

The quarrel of the artist with Theism is often the expression of his dissatisfaction with a morality which seems to disapprove and condemn what he is sure is good; and he thinks of the God of whom he hears from the pulpit as just this censorious morality imagined as seated upon the throne of the universe. It is remarkable that Blake, whom we took in an earlier part of this Lecture as a type of the artist, has sometimes flung himself into outbursts in which he flouts and outrages the most sacred canons of the accepted moral code. Such passages seem strangely at variance with their

author's simple and blameless life, and yet they were most certainly seriously intended; one cannot conceive him as excusing himself, like Martial, on the ground that "his page was wanton but his life was clean."[29] What inspires even the most extravagant of them is the artist's passionate refusal to deny, in obedience to a law which has no care for beauty, the goodness of anything that is beautiful. If we identify Religion with Morality, or (which is the same thing) affirm that God is such an one as the Urizen of Blake's mythology, we shall never be able to overcome the artist's alienation from Religion. But Religion is not merely another name for Morality. I would end this Lecture, if I may, by repeating words which I have used elsewhere and in which I have tried to express what I believe to be the true relation which it bears to two great forms of spiritual activity which often seem to clash—the æsthetic, with which we have been dealing to-day, and the ethical, to which my next Lecture will be devoted.

"It is Religion—that is, the experience in which the soul is aware of itself as one or as capable of being one with the heart of Reality—which guarantees what we perceive of Beauty and of Goodness alike as no merely subjective or superficial appearances, but as intimations of the ultimate nature of that Reality whose essential attributes are manifested therein. Not only does Religion in this way guarantee Art and Morality as laying hold of Reality, but also, by its interpretation of both as witnesses to different attributes of one Reality, it secures each against the dangers which threaten it from its complete separation from the other. The selfishness and cruelty which sometimes attend upon one-sided æsthetic-

[29] i. 4, 5. *Lasciua est nobis pagina, uita proba.*

ism lose their inspiration when those elements of value in the world to which the sense of Beauty testifies are held to be secure in God, although certain modes of their expression are found to be incompatible with Duty. And that censoriousness of a one-sided moralism, which is constantly imposing limits upon artistic expression, limits which seem to the artist, with his passionate sense of Beauty, the fetters of an intolerable slavery, is corrected by the faith which, even in denying the legitimacy of certain modes of artistic expression, affirms that that which they would fain express is, so far as it is beautiful, also divine, and, even although it remain here and thus unexpressed, eternally secure in God." [30]

[30] *Group Theories of Religion*, pp. 187, 188.

LECTURE V

DIVINE PERSONALITY AND THE MORAL LIFE

AT the end of the preceding Lecture I reminded you of a conflict which is apt to break out between the attitudes toward life associated with the æsthetic and moral activities of the human spirit respectively, and suggested that in Religion it is possible to reach a point of view from which justice can be done to both parties in this controversy. This possibility depended upon the recognition of a distinction between Religion and Morality, a distinction which had already been considered in the fifth Lecture of my earlier course. But the very need to call attention to this distinction implies that there is a temptation to identify them. And, if proof were needed that this temptation exists, it would be sufficient to mention the name of Kant. It must, however, be observed as a fact of some importance to our present inquiry that it is much greater where the Religion in vogue is of the type usually designated as 'theism' and associated at the present day with the expression 'a personal God' than where the prevalent form of faith would be described in a popular classification as polytheistic or pantheistic. Where men worship one God it seems natural to regard him as the moral legislator and judge of the universe and moral laws as his commands. Such a representation, as we

saw, is apt to jar upon the artist, and is introduced by Blake into his mythology under the name of Urizen, as the picture not of the good or the highest God, but rather of a Demiurge such as he to whom some of the heretical Gnostics in the primitive age of the Christian Church had, much in the spirit of Blake, attributed the origin both of the material world and of the Old Testament with its law of commandments contained in ordinances.[1]

But with this very same representation Morality has often found itself quite at home. This association of Theism with Morality has its reverse in the notion which has so often been common that Atheism is inconsistent with moral rectitude, and the suspicion that the free thinking which leads to Atheism is a "cloke of maliciousness."[2] In a very large number of instances such a suspicion has been grossly unjust, and nowadays the reaction from the whole attitude which engendered it is so strong in us that we are perhaps more ready to expect in an Atheist an austere dignity of conduct than a reckless abandonment to sensual self-indulgence.

Perhaps even this expectation is rather of yesterday than of to-day. It belonged to a generation bred in an atmosphere wherein to deny that there is any God above from whom to expect "the due reward of our deeds" needed not only the courage to defy public opinion and face public obloquy but also the strength to maintain a high standard of duty for oneself without the support of faith in supernatural approval and assistance. But the prevalent—or at least a very common—temper of thoughtful men at the present moment is probably that which finds utterance in the declaration of an able American

[1] Eph. ii. 15.
[2] 1 Pet. ii. 16.

thinker now living, Professor Parker of Michigan, that for him who has renounced a belief in God "a new world dawns." For "we cannot look upon the cosmos as cruel for not realizing our wishes." The same writer adds: "After having lived some time away from the theistic position, one does not look back with regret upon it.' "The conception of man as the world's darling, cared for by a benignant heavenly father, while appealing to old memories in moments of weakness, is too unreal and too little challenging to courage and adventure, to keep hold of the twentieth century man. One finally ceases to wish to live in that protected world."[3] Here Atheism is regarded not merely as requiring some remarkable qualities in its adherents by reason of its lack of inspiration or of social encouragement, but as at once presenting a view of the universe ethically more satisfactory and promoting a finer type of character than those which were or could reasonably be associated with the faith which it abandons.

With respect to the second reason assigned by Professor Parker for his satisfaction in exchanging Theism for its opposite, it is sufficient to say that the description which he gives of the faith upon which he now looks back without regret is in no respect true of historical Christianity. It may apply fairly well to some moods of sentimental piety which have frequently flourished under the shadow of Christianity, perhaps even to certain theologies of comparatively recent origin which have sprung up about it and drawn sustenance from its roots, but from which a somewhat unheroic optimism and universalism have driven out the sterner elements of its creed. But who could recognize in this picture of a sheltered, timid,

[3] Parker, *The Self and Nature*, pp. 313, 315.

unadventurous faith, unbraced by the discipline of real life, the religion of Paul or Augustine or Dante or Luther or John of the Cross or Bunyan or Pascal or Wesley? We cannot help feeling here that Professor Parker is speaking of something whereof he knows but little.

From his other ground of satisfaction in parting from a belief in God, the heights and depths of which he so little comprehends, we may however learn something more to our purpose. We may learn that Theism dies hard even in those who least desire to keep it alive. For in fact the sense of relief that the world is *better* than we thought, because it did not intend the evil, the disappointment of our wishes, which it has produced, is expressed in terms redolent of that very personification of the Supreme Reality which Professor Parker would fain avoid. We had, it is suggested, previously suffered under the nightmare-like thought that it was deliberately bent on frustrating our desires, or at the least was most callously indifferent to the fulfilment of them. But now we have learned that it knew and cared nothing about them, our resentment is appeased. We cannot indeed worship it as God or trust it as a Father, but we have a better opinion of its character than when we believed it to claim from us such veneration and confidence. Through the whole argument we are sensible of the secret influence upon the writer's attitude of that irresistible tendency to apply ethical predicates to the Supreme Reality, which is in truth one of the strongest supports of Theism, and (I should not fear to add) one of the strongest arguments in its favour. When I was dealing in my former course of Lectures with the problem of Evil, I attempted to show that to hope by denying Personality to God really to abolish that problem, was to fall into the fallacy of assum-

ing that an argument valid within a restricted field of experience must necessarily be valid when extended to the whole universe of reality. I conceive that Professor Parker is in fact urging precisely the argument against which that criticism was brought, and that I have not therefore anything new to say about it which I have not already said there.[4]

Not only do I think that the attempt must fail to claim for Atheism (apart from the individual circumstances of particular cases) any moral superiority to Theism, but I doubt whether the old prejudice on moral grounds against Atheism did not contain a kernel of truth.

To prejudice the moral reputation of one to whose speculative convictions we are opposed on grounds of reason is so odious an action that we are inevitably shy of even appearing to perform it. Nevertheless is it not part of the relief which some minds feel in parting from a belief in God that, however little they may desire to plunge into courses which would be reprobated

[4] It should here be observed that Professor Parker does not, in rejecting Theism, "regard man as the sport of blind and inferior forces, or suppose there is no reason for our failure and death." He indulges in the speculation that these subserve the development of beings "doubtless far higher than we," as those of the lower creation minister in their turn to ours. "Nature," he says, "has co-operated with us in our endeavours, adjusting its will to ours, so far as it could."

While it is impossible to study without profit so vigorous, sincere, and independent a treatment of these great problems as Professor Parker's, I must confess that I do not share his complacency in the *Weltanschauung* which he recommends, or feel that for my part I should obtain any relief from the pressure of the 'riddle of the painful earth' by adopting it in exchange for a belief in God. And I am not even sure that it is not after all a theistic *Weltanschauung*, at any rate in the sense in which doctrines of a 'finite God' may be so called. That the word 'Nature' is substituted for the word 'God' does not seem to me greatly to matter.

by society or by their own conscience, or even to do anything which believers in God would consider to be displeasing in his sight, they nevertheless welcome the sense of no longer having to live " as ever in my great Taskmaster's eye " ? [5] I know that I have myself often experienced the attraction of such a prospect. It seems in some moods that, by abandoning belief in God, one might escape from a strain to which human nature is unequal into an easier life, wherein, without laying aside the decencies and self-restraints of civilization, or ceasing to delight in noble thoughts and deeds, or forfeiting the comfort which comes from self-respect, we might more easily forget our own sins and tolerate our own faults of character, might feel less bound to anxious self-scrutiny and to a penitence inconsistent with the equable cheerfulness which makes life's wheels run smoothly. I do not think I am uncharitable in conjecturing that many others beside myself may at times have shared such sentiments as these, and that some of that number, if they have on grounds of reason found themselves unable to retain faith in God, have experienced in some measure a consolation for what they have lost in the relief of feeling that they had not any more to do with one to whose eyes all is naked and opened and who reads the most secret thoughts and intents of the heart.[6] Yet I do not think that we can without much loss welcome in this way the disappearance from within us of that consciousness which the youthful Milton described in the famous line quoted above ; except indeed where it is not the surrender of our belief in God but the perfecting of our love for him which has cast out from our souls the fear of his severe inquisition.[7]

[5] Milton, *Sonnet on his being arrived at the Age of Twenty-three.*
[6] Heb. iv. 12, 13. [7] See 1 John iv. 18.

We need not then be deterred by the fact that some have made an improper and unjustified use, as a stick with which to beat their speculative or political opponents, of the congruity of a belief in God with our moral experience from frankly acknowledging that this congruity exists. It is a remarkable testimony to its existence that Kant, for all his anxiety to dissociate the obligation of Morality from any sanction external to the reason and conscience of the persons obliged, should feel himself constrained to admit the legitimacy of the familiar language which represents the Moral Law as divinely commanded, although he is careful to remind us that we must not look upon actions as obligatory because they are the commands of God, but should regard them as his commands only because we have an inward obligation to perform them.[8]

I venture to think, however, that his choice of the word 'autonomy' to express what Butler [9] had called the "manifest authority" of conscience was not in all respects a fortunate one. I will begin my criticism of this expression, by stating in somewhat different terms from his the truth about Morality upon which I take Kant to be chiefly insisting in his doctrine of the Autonomy of the Practical Reason. I will then attempt shortly to describe the motives which led him to select the word 'autonomy' for use in this connexion, and finally I will point out in what respect it seems to me apt to lead our reflections on the subject into a wrong track, and suggest that it must actually bear some part of the responsibility for

[8] See *Kr. der r. V.* Methodenlehre, 2 H. 3 Abschn. (Hart. iii. p. 546). Cp. *Grundlegung zur Metaphys. der Sitten* III (H. iv. p. 291); *Kr. der prakt. V.* 1 Th. 2 B. 2 H., sec. V. (H. v. p. 131); *Religion innerhalb der Gr. der bl. V.*, iii. 1, § 3 (H. vi. p. 196). *Tugendlehre*, Beschluss (H. vii. p. 299).

[9] Butler, *Second Sermon on Human Nature.*

what I shall maintain to be a mistaken theory both of moral and of political obligation.

When I only will some course of action because some one tells me it is right or because I see it conduces to something else which I desire, I do not in the strictest sense will that course of action as the one thing to be willed, as the unconditionally right and good thing. Just in the same way, when I make a mathematical statement on the authority of a text-book or of a professor of the science, or because I see that it will bring out the result hoped for, this is not really the same thing with seeing the necessity of the statement which I make. That I must see for myself immediately if I am to see it at all; I must see that this is the only thing that could be said in the case. Now I may quite intelligibly say that I only *will* for myself in the fullest sense what I will as the sole thing to be willed, the one right thing, just as I may intelligibly say that I only *think* in the fullest sense what I see to be the one thing thinkable.

We may, if we choose, speak in this sense of the Good Will, as *autonomous*, in contrast with a Will which chooses on grounds other than its own perception of the goodness of what is chosen and which may thus be called *heteronomous*. Yet such language must not be allowed to suggest that it is from my willing what is right that the obligation to do right comes. I cannot really think that my willing what is right is the source of my obligation to do it, although except by willing it I cannot realize the obligation, and in realizing the obligation I must so far in a sense *will* it, even if I do not actually *will to do* it, but take another and therefore wrong course. Just so I can only really *think* mathematically or logically so far as I see for myself the mathematical or logical necessity of what

I think, and in so seeing the necessity of something I must certainly think it so to be ; but although I may break off thinking of it at all rather than pursue the subject further, yet I do not and cannot regard the necessity of what I thus think as due to my thinking it. [10]

This truth, as it seems to me, Kant does not make so clear as might have been wished, in view of the fact that the word *autonomy* is one which lends itself so easily to an interpretation inconsistent with the independence of the obligation upon my willing to perform the obligatory act. The choice of the expression itself is to be explained by the marked tendency of the ethical doctrines which were prevalent in his day to seek the ground of moral obligation in something which might have been other than it is, we remaining the same, so that we might say—' I will to do this, because I wish to be happy, and I find that this will tend to make me so,' or ' I will do this, because it is written in a credible record of teaching, attested by accompanying miracles to be of supernatural origin, that thus and not otherwise am I commanded to do by a God who rewards obedience to his laws with eternal bliss and punishes disobedience to them with eternal misery.'

In opposition to any such teaching Kant desired to emphasize the intrinsic obligatoriness of that which the Moral Law enjoins ; and the form in which he did this was that of asserting that no extrinsic consideration could be the ground of the will to do right, which must thus be recognized as itself somehow the source of the very

[10] This paragraph is repeated, with slight alterations, from an article of mine on *The Permanent Meaning of Propitiation*, which appeared in *The Constructive Quarterly* for March 1917, and was reprinted in a collection of addresses published by Mr. Blackwell under the title, *In Time of War*.

law which from another point of view it obeys. He is indeed far from being unaware of the paradoxical appearance of his doctrine which in the case of a man accused by his conscience of disobeying the moral law would make the judge on the bench identical with the prisoner at the bar.[11] But he fell back for a solution of the paradox on the distinction, which plays so large a part in his philosophy, of the *homo noumenon* from the *homo phænomenon*: of the higher self which, itself pure reason, reveals itself in that consciousness of an absolute and unconditional authority to which we give the name of moral consciousness, from the lower self, which is all that presents itself to observation and reflexion and which, though 'rational' in its susceptibility to the imperative of Morality, yet experiences also the solicitations of sense, and appears as a particular object among others, subject to the conditions which the structure of the objective world imposes upon every part of itself.

This is not the place to enter upon a full discussion of this Kantian contrast, which may give occasion, as is obvious, to not a few very hard questions. But it is noteworthy that Kant in several passages is driven to a virtual admission that it is in practice impossible to avoid representing to ourselves the judge at whose tribunal our conscience accuses us when we do wrong, as a *holy God*, looking upon the injunctions of the moral law as his commands, and attributing to him the power (which *we* certainly do not possess, at least to any considerable degree), not only to *will* the contents of that law but to give them effect in the real world.[12] Nor, although

[11] *Tugendlehre*, Eth. Elem. 1 B. 1 Abth. iii. H. (H. vii. pp. 245–6).

[12] See *Kr. der pr. V.* loc. supra cit.; cp. *Kr. der pr. V.*, Methodenlehre, 2 Hptst. 3 Abschn. (H. iii. 546).

Kant is very careful to insist that such a God must be regarded as an *ideal* Being, in the sense that he cannot be an object of sensible experience (and for Kant this would carry with it the consequence that he cannot be the object of such personal intercourse as I have contended that God does in Religion become), is there any need to doubt that Kant himself did *believe* in the real existence of such a Supreme Moral Governor. But in his anxiety to disclaim any *knowledge*, properly so called, of a Being who transcended what he took to be the conditions of any knowledge open to our intelligence, he missed, as it seems to me, the true conclusion to be drawn from that consciousness of moral obligation which few have felt more profoundly and no one perhaps described more accurately than he. That conclusion I take to be the one stated explicitly and impressively by James Martineau, of whose view I may take as a summary the following quotation, in which he brings together the epistemological and the ethical realism which alike sundered him from Kant, to whose teaching he notwithstanding owed so much and with whose grave passion for the "stern lawgiver" Duty his own temper was so sympathetic. "In the act of Perception," he says, "we are immediately introduced to an *other than ourselves that gives us what we feel*; in the act of Conscience we are immediately introduced to a *Higher than ourselves that gives us what we feel*." [13]

It will be, however, worth our while to notice how very near to the position of Martineau Kant himself came, and at the same time to note that it was not only the refusal characteristic of the Critical Philosophy to claim knowledge outside of the sphere wherein the senses can

[13] *Study of Religion*, ii. 27.

verify the inferences of the understanding—though this refusal was no doubt of prime importance in the matter —which held him back from a like confession of a direct revelation in Conscience of a Personal God.

"It takes two," says Martineau in one place, "to establish an obligation. . . . The person that *bears* the obligation cannot also be the person whose presence *imposes* it; it is impossible to be at once the upper and the nether millstone. Personality is unitary and in occupying one side of a given relation is unable to be also on the other." Hence, he goes on, the sense of authority in the moral law implies "the recognition of another than I . . . another greater and higher and of deeper insight." [14] We have already noted that the difficulty here pointed out of identifying the subject and the imponent of the Moral Law had not escaped Kant; but that he would solve it by his distinction of the noumenal and the empirical self in man, although admitting at the same time the convenience (to say the least) of envisaging the imponent as an ideal Being in whom our own rational will,

[14] *Types of Ethical Theory*, ii. pp. 107 ff. The value of this passage is, I venture to think, considerably underrated by Professor Pringle Pattison (*Idea of God*, p. 36). The appearance of Martineau's two great works on Ethics and the Philosophy of Religion, *Types of Ethical Theory* and *A Study of Religion*, at a time when (especially at Oxford) the influence of Green was at its height made them, largely no doubt on account of their style which was that of their author's generation (he was in his eightieth year when the earlier of the two appeared), seem to some who, like myself, were then young students of philosophy, old-fashioned and lacking in profundity. In later years I have re-read them with greatly increased admiration, and have seen how well this writer deserved the commendation which I recollect my lamented teacher, Professor Cook Wilson, long ago bestowing on him for his bold faithfulness to the facts of our common moral experience. Cp. César Malan fils on the consciousness of obligation as *une expérience imposée* (G. Frommel, *César Malan fils*, in *Semaine religieuse de Genève*, Jan. 13, 1900).

which utters itself in the Moral Law, is personified and so distinguished from *my* personality who am called upon to *obey* that same Moral Law.

That he should acquiesce in a position of this kind is of course, as students of his philosophy will at once perceive, of a piece with that feature of his system which has been described as the doctrine of the *als ob*, 'as though it were.' We must, for example, study organic nature *as though it were* the work of design, act and live *as though we were* free, immortal, and under moral government, but we must not assert as matter of knowledge that which we thus may, or even must, postulate as guiding or regulative principles of thought or conduct. But, not to digress into a general discussion of the attitude which is expressed in such a doctrine, and confining ourselves to the instance with which we are here immediately concerned, it is singularly difficult to maintain it in the case of reverence for the imponent of the Moral Law. "Reverence," says Kant,[15] "refers always to persons only 'as its object,' never to things. Things can arouse in us inclination, and if things are animals (e.g. horses, dogs, etc.) also love, or again fear, as with the sea, a volcano, a beast of prey—but never reverence." He goes on[16] to observe that we try to rid ourselves of the burden of reverence for other men by attempting to find flaws in them. "Even the Moral Law itself in its solemn majesty"[17] is exposed to these attempts; that is why people try to identify it with mere sentiment and so forth. But is the Moral Law a Person? or is it personal only in us? We have to distinguish it from ourselves,

[15] *Kritik der praktischer Vernunft*, 1 Th. 1 B, iii. Hptst. (H. v. p. 81).

[16] *Ibid.* (H. v. p. 82).

[17] *In seiner feierlichen Majestät.*

as we have seen, and even Kant, though sometimes identifying our personality with that common Reason which utters itself in every man's conscience, on occasion falls into that other way of speaking which applies the epithet 'personal' to what distinguishes one man from another and modifies, if it does not counteract, in each of us the action of the reason common to all. Is not our only way of escape from the embarrassment created by the presence in us of this implanted sentiment of reverence for what, though bound up with our personality, is yet, as the object of our reverence, distinguished from it, the frank recognition of a Personal God, in the sense in which I have been contending for it in these lectures: of a God who is not only immanent but transcendent, with whom a relation only to be described as personal intercourse is possible, and is, in the experience of Religion, actually enjoyed?

I referred above to a consideration which seems to have reinforced in the mind of Kant his general tendency to limit knowledge and experience to the sphere wherein sensible verification is possible as a motive for not accepting this obvious and familiar solution of the problem prescribed to the intellect by the fact of moral obligation. I had in mind the peculiar theory of Moral Sovereignty with which we meet in his ethical writings.

It is well known that Kant describes the world as contemplated from the ethical point of view as a 'Kingdom of Ends,' that is, as an ordered community of beings every one of which is an 'end in himself,' and bound to recognize in his treatment alike of himself and of all his fellow members in that Kingdom that each and all possess this character. In this Kingdom we may ascribe Sovereignty in a special sense to God, because in him there is, as

we suppose, no recalcitrant lower nature by the side of a higher, upon which the action which is in accordance with the higher imposes itself as a *duty* to be performed, against the grain, as it were. He is sovereign, not because the laws of the Kingdom derive their obligation from his authority, but because he is not, like all the other members of it, conscious of subjection as well as of autonomy, and because, for this reason, the others can look to him as the representative of what is the true will of all, but what, although it is really our own true will, and although on reflection we must acknowledge it so to be, seems nevertheless to the rest of us, owing to the recalcitrant element in our nature, to be not what we *would* do but what we *must*; a constraint being laid upon us, though a constraint against which we know that we *ought* not to rebel.[18]

I think it will be instructive to seek for more light upon this peculiar conception of the place of God in the 'Kingdom of Ends' in Kant's choice of the word *Reich*, which is in this connection translated 'Kingdom.'[19] To Kant this word would not have suggested the Prussian State, of which he himself was a subject, with its efficient and centralized military autocracy, then not a century old, whose later history of vaulting ambition and sudden downfall is in the memory of us all to-day. That was a *Königreich*; but Kant does not employ this word for the spiritual commonwealth of which he speaks. He calls it a *Reich*; and *Reich* had to the German of his time a quite specific meaning. It meant the Empire, Roman in

[18] See Kant's *Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten*, 2 Abschn. (H. iv. pp. 280 ff.).

[19] The immediate suggestion of the phrase probably came from Leibnitz. See *Monadologie*, §§ 85 ff.

name and German in fact, of which the Prussian sovereign was but a subordinate member. The head of this State enjoyed in those countries of which he was only Emperor, and not also the ruler by some other title, a position at once far more venerable and dignified and far less powerful and independent than that which Frederick the Great and his successor exercised within the dominions which acknowledged their sway.

> Das liebe heil'ge röm'sche Reich
> Wie hälts nur noch zusammen?

'Good old holy Roman Empire! How does it still hang together!'—so sings one of the jolly companions whom Faust and Mephistopheles join in Auerbach's wine-shop at Leipzig.[20] The disrespectful allusion dates from a time not long after that at which Kant had borrowed the title of this same illustrious institution to describe the community whose bond is the eternal Moral Law, and of which God is the centre. Is it altogether fanciful to see in the position of God in that community an antitype of the Emperor's in the *Reich* of Kant's and Goethe's day, the position of one who differs from other Princes of the Empire in that, unlike them, he has himself no superior; whose supremacy is the expression of the common law which, among all the diversities of territorial enactments, runs throughout the Empire, yet towards whom the other Princes certainly do not stand in the position of subjects rendering him a 'habitual obedience,' in the sense of the Austinian definition of Sovereignty?

But it is precisely because Kant, as we have often had occasion to point out, combined with a profound insight into the nature of morality and a keen sensitiveness to

[20] Goethe, *Faust*, I. 2090.

anything which might prove derogatory to the dignity of that human nature which is capable of Morality, a defective sense for the specifically religious factor in human life and a haunting dread of the fanaticism which might be fostered by belief in a personal intercourse with the Supreme, that he was content to describe the relation of our spirits to God under a figure thus suggestive of something very different to that consciousness of dependence upon him, in which Schleiermacher found the essence of Religion, and which is at least a characteristic property that it cannot, while it remains Religion, cease to exhibit.

The frank recognition, which we find in Martineau, of the theistic implications of the consciousness of obligation is a step forward which we shall do well to make; although in making it we shall be wise to bear in mind, as useful warnings to ourselves, the considerations which withheld Kant from advancing in this direction. We shall take care lest, in recognizing that the consciousness of the Moral Law introduces us, as Martineau puts it, into the presence of a Divine Lawgiver, we deny to that law an intrinsic authority, needing not to be guaranteed by any other revelation from God than that which itself is. We shall also be on our guard lest, in refusing to forbid the devout soul the enjoyment of intimate communion with her Beloved, we forget that the critical understanding has a part to play in the service of God and abandon ourselves without reserve to the suggestions of a pious fancy, until we become victims of illusions such as those which Kant was so keenly desirous to discourage that he was suspicious of all use of words or gestures in private prayer, if not indeed of private prayer altogether.

But, if we may thus trace in the language of Kant the influence of the political traditions of his own country, there is another and very different influence which we know[21] to have strongly affected his mind, and to which we shall find it instructive to advert before we leave this discussion of his conception of Morality as Autonomy. The influence which I mean is that of Rousseau. Rousseau's notion of the *volonté générale* which is not necessarily the *volonté de tous*[22] is in the direct line of ancestry to Kant's conception of the Good Will which, proceeding from the universal Reason, constitutes the true worth and is the true personality of every one of us and always more truly my own will than a selfish will, which is dragged at the heels, as it were, of my animal appetites, can possibly be; so that even were every man in fact to err from the right path in will and deed, yet what each ought to do would still be the only thing in doing which his will would follow its *own* law and thus be able to claim that it was *autonomous*. The *volonté générale* is in Rousseau's political philosophy the will of the Sovereign, and the Sovereign, whose will it is, is the People in their collective capacity; in his private capacity each member of this Sovereign is a subject of that Sovereign whereof he is in his public capacity as a citizen an integral part; his private will may differ from the general will which is his own as a member of the Sovereign People; nay all the private wills together (the will of all) may vary from the 'general will' which aims only at the common good.

This conception, translated from the political to the ethical plane, would naturally assume the form of Kant's Good Will, which may be no one's private will, yet is

[21] See Kant, *Fragm. aus dem Nachlasse* (H. viii. 624).
[22] See Rousseau, *Du contrat Social*, c. 3.

every man's will in a sense in which no merely private will can be.

But the obligation under which an individual lies of obeying the Moral Law, which yet is said by Kant to be a *self-imposed* law, is not in Kant's view dependent on an *interest* which this obedience would serve ; the determination of the will to obey it is in fact the only genuine moral interest. The chief difference between Kant's own ethical theory and that of such a Kantian as Green lies in the elevation by the latter of the notion of a Common Good to the central position in the theory of Morality and the attempt to envisage Obligation as secondary to this. Now a view which finds in the ideal of a Common Good rather than the consciousness of Duty the ruling principle of Morality has gone back as it were from Kant to Rousseau, and obliterated the characteristic feature of the Kantian doctrine, the emphasis upon Obligation. It, however, connects itself with Kant through the conception of Autonomy, and thus links the Kantian teaching with a democratic political philosophy which traces its own descent from Rousseau, and in which the notion of Authority, the correlative of the notion of Obligation, finds but a precarious footing. I venture to think that the true corrective for this outstanding defect of such a philosophy is to be found in the development of Kant's teaching about the consciousness of Obligation along the line which is suggested by Martineau, and the recognition of this consciousness as the consciousness of a Divine Legislator.[23]

The theological development which took place within Christendom during the nineteenth century has to a great extent obviated the danger, his keen perception of which

[23] Cp. G. Frommel, *La Foi* (Dôle, 1900), p. 10.

had much to do with holding Kant back from such a recognition. In consequence of the progress of Biblical criticism and of the historical and comparative study of religions, the affirmation of a Divine Legislator directly revealed in our conscience or consciousness of obligation is far less likely than in Kant's own day to be interpreted as opening the door to the assertion that all the commands attributed to God in Scripture or ecclesiastical tradition may claim the obedience challenged by the "manifest authority" of Conscience, or to speak more properly, of the object of Conscience,—the Moral Law.

But in any case there is in philosophy no justification for allowing the possibility (or even the probability) that erroneous inferences may be drawn from a truth to hinder us from a candid statement of the facts as we find them; and, unless I am greatly mistaken, these certainly favour the assertion that in our consciousness of obligation we are aware of an imponent of the obligation whom we must reverence as other than ourselves and as not merely superior to us but supreme over us, even though, in virtue of the unconditional acceptance of the obligation by our reason, that which he imposes may be intelligibly spoken of as self-imposed. We must acknowledge in obligation, as it has been put,[24] an aspect not only of *autonomy*, but also of a *heteronomy*, which turns out on inspection to be really a *theonomy*. Such a heteronomy, however, is not a heteronomy in Kant's sense; for, as we have all along insisted, it is involved in our notion of God that he is immanent in our reason and will, which notwithstanding he transcends.

[24] Julius Müller, *Christian Doctrine of Sin*, Eng. tr. i. p. 81; cp. César Malan fils, as reported by G. Frommel in the article quoted above.

It is a familiar and a just criticism of a certain kind of idealistic theology that nothing is gained by merely transferring to a Divine Mind the creation of the object of knowledge by the act of knowing it, which it has been found impossible to maintain in the case of finite minds.[25] It may be suggested that a like criticism might be directed against the arguments which have here been put forward in support of the view that our moral experience is a consciousness of 'theonomy.'

If, we may be asked, it is true that we can no more regard the Categorical Imperative of duty as deriving its authority from our wills, although only in an act of will can we be said, properly speaking, to be conscious of the obligation which it lays upon us, than we can regard the reality of an object of knowledge as dependent upon the act of apprehending it, is there not the same kind of difficulty in making God's will the source of moral obligation that there is in making God's knowledge the source of the reality of that which he knows? For if what we see to be necessary to Knowledge and Will as such, when contemplating them in ourselves, is not also necessary to them as they are in God, are we not (it may be said) playing with the notion of a divine Knowledge and Will which are not after all Knowledge and Will in the proper sense at all?

I think, however, that this criticism overlooks some essential features of the situation. Even in respect of knowledge, there is indeed a real difficulty in conceiving a perfect or divine Intelligence as related no otherwise

[25] Cp. a paper *On Some Recent Movements in Philosophy considered in Relation to the Philosophy of Religion*, in *Transactions of the Third International Congress for the History of Religions*, Oxford, 1908, ii. pp. 416 ff.

to its object than a finite intelligence is related to that which it apprehends. It was to meet this difficulty that Aristotle, for example, was constrained to describe the divine Mind as having no object but its own activity of knowing.[26] But not only do we, in our own knowing, inevitably regard the object of our knowledge as independent of the act of knowing it, but the representation of this object as a divine thought, whatever advantage we may find it to have when we go on to construct a metaphysical or theological system, has, I think we must admit, no direct significance for us when we are merely trying to describe the activity of Knowledge as it exists in ourselves. But while we are, as it seems to me, unable to think of an act as right *because* we will it, our attitude towards the Moral Law is, as we have already seen, an attitude which we can scarcely describe satisfactorily except as one towards a Personal Lawgiver. Yet the moment that we attempt to distinguish in the will of this Personal Lawgiver the object which he wills from the will itself (so that we could conceive him as willing what we should *not* regard as obligatory [27]), it ceases to be the authority of which the moral experience is the consciousness. The conception of a Supreme Being who is not merely good but is *the Good* [28] is thus for the student of Morality not a speculation suggested by the desire (however legitimate and even inevitable that desire may be) to work out the thought of a Perfect Intelligence, but it is urged upon him in the course of reflexion upon the facts of the moral experience itself.[29]

[26] *νόησις νοήσεως*, Ar. *Met.* Λ 9, 1074 b 34, 1075 a 10.

[27] Could we so conceive him, we might have to echo J. S. Mill's famous protest, *Exam. of Hamilton*, p. 124.

[28] Cp. *God and Personality* I., pp. 237 f.

[29] We may recognize here, of course, the thought expressed by Kant in making God, Freedom and Immortality *problems* for the Theoretical, but *postulates* for the Practical Reason.

The recognition for which I have pleaded of the consciousness of Obligation as in its essence a consciousness of God will, I think, be found to have important consequences in the sphere of political philosophy. Thoughtful observers of contemporary public life can scarcely avoid having forced upon their attention the existence of a very general uncertainty as to the claim of constituted authority upon the submission and reverence of the members of the body politic. Under the name of 'democracy' a principle corresponding to that of 'autonomy' in the Kantian ethics is commonly put forward as the foundation of all legitimate power in the State; and the use in certain connexions of the expression 'self-determination' in a sense intimately allied with that given in current phraseology to 'democracy' emphasizes the close affinity of the view now prevalent of political liberty with that of moral freedom held by Kant and the thinkers of his school.

If in the word 'autonomy' as used by Kant there lay the possibility of a misinterpretation which, by not holding fast to Kant's doctrine of two distinguishable selves in every man, should pervert his meaning, and give us for his doctrine of complete disinterestedness one of such egoism as we find, for example, in the celebrated work of Max Stirner, far greater is the danger of such misinterpretation when we pass from the region of individual duty to that of political obligation.

For while in the sphere of the individual's moral life the frequent incompatibility of duty and pleasure is obvious, and there is even a tendency—found, as is well known, in Kant himself—to exaggerate its frequency, in the sphere of Politics the pursuit of the general happiness may be so plausibly represented as the whole content

of public duty, the sole end of public action, that it is especially easy here first to think of a 'common good' rather than of a 'common obligation,' and then to interpret this 'common good' in terms which really in the end are terms of individual happiness or pleasure. In this way the principle of Authority comes to be dissolved, and of the two aspects of the political community which at one period obtained historical expression in the rival theories of the 'social contract' and of the 'divine right of kings' respectively we lose sight of the latter altogether. Yet I venture to think that both these aspects must be kept in view if we are to realize a social unity which will be satisfactory to our moral consciousness.

It is not perhaps altogether needless to remark that the rival theories to which I have just referred were not only one-sided in their emphasis on one or the other of two equally necessary aspects of the fact which they sought to explain, but presented the aspect emphasized in a context of very disputable and in truth irrelevant matter. It is on account of this commingling of what is of permanent value in them with something of very inferior worth that both are apt to seem to the men of our age obsolete and fantastic. The notion of a primitive compact, of which no one can assign the date or describe the circumstances, binding upon all the descendants of its unknown framers; or again the notion of an inherent and indefeasible right of a person designated by a particular rule of hereditary succession to demand obedience from his fellow men—such notions are so little congenial to the minds of our contemporaries that the truths with which they were mixed are apt to be disregarded along with them.

Yet such truths they did contain: the doctrine of social

contract, the truth that without consent there is no legitimate authority; and the doctrine of divine right, the truth that the conception of authority with its correlative obligation cannot be deduced from that of consent, but derives from an ultimate experience of the human spirit incapable of explanation in terms of anything other than itself. These two truths correspond, as will be at once perceived, with the two aspects of the moral fact described by a writer whom I quoted in an earlier part of this Lecture the one as *autonomy* and the other as a *heteronomy* which turns out to be a *theonomy*.

And as with the principle of authority in the moral law to which the individual knows himself to be subject beyond all possibility of contracting himself out of his allegiance, so with the principle of Authority in the community. I am convinced that no other explanation will be found in the last resort satisfactory but one which exhibits it as the presence of God to the soul which is made in his image, after his likeness. Thus the legitimate authority in the community will have in the strictest sense of the word a 'divine right' to the obedience of its members; but that authority alone can be described as legitimate which is established by consent, just as in the individual's moral life the only way by which I can know the command of God to be his is by the recognition that this and nothing else can I will, in Kant's phrase, 'as law universal,' that is to say disinterestedly, and as what it is not merely pleasant but *right* that I should do. So indispensable to the morality of the action is this personal recognition of the obligation that the obligation may be intelligibly said to be *self*-imposed; at the same time this very recognition is a recognition of the source of obligation as the supreme and absolute

Lawgiver over all rational beings, and this I cannot without absurdity say that I myself am. Yet my subjection to this supreme Lawgiver in no way impairs my freedom, since it is only through my free choice of the right that I am conscious of his demands upon me; thus it can be said that "God's service is perfect freedom,"[30] or, in the yet stronger phrase of the Latin original of the collect whence these words are taken, he is one *cui servire est regnare;* in subjection to the Sovereign of the empire of beings who are ends in themselves his subjects are made sharers of his sovereignty.

In the common or political life of man—and, as Plato has taught us,[31] we see writ large in the structure of the community what is writ, as it were in lesser letters, in the structure of the individual soul—we see this same fact of obligation exhibiting the like dual structure. Yet, to carry on the Platonic figure, there is a sense in which the lines of the larger writing are less delicately and accurately drawn than those of the smaller. The individual soul finds himself face to face with a law which he may take to be none other than God's, but it is only in a primitive stage of civilization that the law which the citizen is expected to obey and the authority which makes it and enforces it present themselves as immediately and in themselves divine. In different periods and in different societies, the precise relation to God of the law and of the government which administers this law are variously conceived.

It would be a mistake to suppose that, as a matter of history, the view which has often obtained in modern times that a binding law must be regarded as the enact-

[30] Collect for Peace in the Anglican service of Morning Prayer.
[31] *Rep.* ii. 368 D ff.

ment of a definite person or body of persons, constituting the sovereign power in the community and therefore, as the Sovereign, competent to change at will any part of this law, is either a universal or a primitive view. On the contrary we more often find the Law regarded in earlier times as something which, so to say, runs of itself in the society and of which the rulers are only the guardians and administrators. The difficulty which this manner of conceiving Law, common as it was in antiquity and in the middle ages, is apt to present to legal theorists of a later time, is due, I think, not merely to a lack of historical knowledge and sympathy in these theorists, but also to the stronger sense of Personality which marks a more advanced stage of spiritual development. When the sense of Personality was weaker than it has since become, it was easier to think of the Law as binding upon us without raising the question, Who was its author? To a later age it might appear natural that, if not attributed to any human author, it must at least have been regarded as proceeding from God. But this was not necessarily or always so, though the higher the conception of God rose the less easy was it to evade the question of his relation to it.

Even in Judaism, where one would certainly expect to find entertained the notion of the Law as deriving all its binding force from the mere will of God, this way of looking at it is by no means the only one adopted. The son of Sirach [32] personifies the Law of Moses in terms which Christian theologians could apply to the second Person of their Trinity; and the Rabbis could talk of God as himself studying and observing that law. No doubt their language was not meant to be taken literally;

[32] *Ecclesiasticus*, xxiv.

it was only intended to express vividly and forcibly the Jewish doctors' estimate of their sacred code as possessing eternal and immutable validity. But their phraseology may serve to impress upon our minds that if, even under a religion of which a strict monotheism was the fundamental article, men could fall so easily into a way of speaking of Law as something binding of itself, it is no wonder that where religions prevailed which laid no such stress on the recognition of one supreme God, Law might well be regarded as divinely authoritative without being definitely envisaged as the statute or ordinance of a divine Legislator.

With the strengthening, however, of the sense of Personality, the time came at which the notion of an impersonal Law was found less satisfying, and it seemed reasonable to inquire after a personal imponent, human or divine. By this time, however, both the conception of the divine nature and knowledge of past history had alike advanced too far to encourage the direct attribution to God of the whole law obeyed by a political community; while the officials whose function was to declare, administer, or execute the law, were no longer (as in ages when the notions of absolute supremacy and perfect goodness were not yet associated so closely with divinity) regarded as themselves divine or of divine descent; at the most they might be held to reign 'by the grace of God' and claim a divine sanction for their authority.

A proof of this divine sanction was, however, needed; and in the absence of a supernatural or miraculous attestation, and with the weakening of confidence in such evidence as could be afforded by ecclesiastical approval or by arguments of the kind illustrated in the famous work of Filmer, to refute which Locke wrote the former of his *Two*

Treatises of Government, it was inevitable that resort should be had to the principle of *consent*. There was nothing indeed novel or unfamiliar about this principle. Indeed the theory of the Roman imperial jurisprudence had from the first traced the authority of the Prince to the People's transference of their sovereign rights to Augustus; and the imperial dignity, the highest in rank of all European magistracies, the only one indeed which claimed to be, in Dante's sense of the word, a Monarchy, had always been elective. But the principle of consent was at last left alone in possession of the field, and we have now to inquire whether it is compatible with a view which ascribes neither to the Law nor to those who administer and execute it any authority which is not derived from the consent of those who are subject to it or their representatives to entertain towards the Law itself or towards the government which enforces it a sentiment of reverence identical with or akin to that challenged by the Law which speaks in conscience to the individual soul, and which we have seen that we can best understand when we take it for a revelation of God, and the experience in which it is apprehended as an experience of personal intercourse with the Supreme Being. For only, I feel convinced, if such a sentiment of reverence can rightly be directed towards the authorities of the body politic, can obedience to them be in the long run justified on any other ground than mere self-interest.

If, however, there is any value in the reasonings of the earlier part of this Lecture, this sentiment of Reverence towards law and government can only be satisfactorily explained by the recognition that here, as in the moral consciousness of the individual, we find ourselves subject to a 'categorical imperative' (to use Kant's celebrated

phrase); while the consciousness of this 'categorical imperative' we shall here, as there, hold to be best described as an experience of the Presence of God. We have seen that our individual consciousness of obligation includes a factor which we may call with Kant *autonomy*, and a factor to which our sentiment of reverence corresponds and which has been called *theonomy*. If we recognize that political obligation also involves the second of these factors we shall see in the principle of consent, which is the ruling idea of what is nowadays called 'democracy,' the form assumed in this sphere by the principle we have previously described as *autonomy*.

For (as I have elsewhere put it) " only where the members of a community freely choose or accept for themselves the person or persons in whom the sovereign authority is reposed, is there an adequate security that this person or these persons, since they are not of different clay from those who are to be in subjection to them, will be able to appeal to a sense that the government *has* authority and can claim loyalty and obedience from its subjects. In other words the true ground of preference of free and popular institutions over despotic law lies not in this: that no one is really under *obligation* to obey any authority but one which is ultimately *his own*; but in this: that only where he has himself a say in appointing or accepting the vehicles of that authority can he be counted upon to acquiesce in their authority as—not his own—but the best representative he can find of God's. The one-sided doctrine of the divine right of kings, that is to say, embodied one half of the true doctrine of political obligation, while the one-sided doctrine of the rights of man embodied the other. In the process of reaction from the error which invested certain particular modes

of selecting the supreme authorities in the community with a religious sanctity, it is apt to be forgotten that there is a sense in which authority is not really authoritative at all unless it be essentially God's and not our own in any sense in which we can at all contrast our own with God's." [33]

I am thus at one with Mr. H. G. Wells—as represented by the remarkable book on which I commented in another connexion in the sixth Lecture of my first course—in regarding the true nature of political authority as *theocratic;* although my view of the God whose authority it is differs from his. I do not, however, perceive any such inconsistency as he seems to find with this main principle in the maintenance of a monarchical form of government. Such a form of government may rest as well as any other on the consent which is necessary to give to the community so governed the character of freedom or self-determination corresponding to the autonomy of the individual moral choice; while it is perhaps especially well qualified to bring before the imagination that other character of authority, in which it is representative of God. And as the apostle asks [34] how one who loves not his brother whom he hath seen can love God whom he hath not seen, so we may at least think that loyalty to a visible king may be not the worst training in loyalty to him whom Mr. Wells rightly describes as the ultimate recipient of all true loyalty, 'God the invisible King.' A comprehension of the former sentiment must indeed be presupposed in any appeal on behalf of the latter.

The conclusion then which I would draw from the

[33] *In Time of War*, p. 51.
[34] 1 John iv. 20.

considerations which have occupied us in this Lecture is that the conception of Divine Personality not only harmonizes very well with the ethical interest of mankind, but throws a light upon the nature of the fundamental moral experience, the consciousness of obligation which no other conception of the ultimate Reality can afford.

In our study of this experience we found ourselves led to include under it not only the experience of the Moral Law in the individual conscience but the notion of obligation in the political sphere.

My next Lecture, the sixth of the course, will deal in the first place with the relation of the conception of Divine Personality to that of collective or corporate personality. This latter conception has played a large part both in political and in religious thought; and examination of it from the point of view here adopted will form a convenient transition to the discussion of the place of the conception of Divine Personality in the religious life, which will occupy the seventh Lecture and close the portion of this course allotted to the investigation of the bearing of the conclusions reached in my former course upon the attitudes connected with the various forms of activity exhibited by the human spirit.

LECTURE VI

DIVINE PERSONALITY AND THE POLITICAL LIFE

ALTHOUGH in the last Lecture we were led to speak at some length of a problem of Political Philosophy, it was because that problem was in the most intimate manner connected with a problem of individual Ethics. We have now, however, to turn our attention to the social or political activity of the human spirit, and to inquire into the bearing upon it of those conclusions respecting Personality in God to which the reasonings of the first course of Lectures conducted us. And here we shall find ourselves confronted with a notion which has played no small part in the history of both political and religious thought—I mean the conception of corporate or collective Personality. It will be our task in the present Lecture to consider this notion, its significance and validity, and the relation of the Personality which may be attributed to a State or other community of human beings to the Personality of the individual members of such a community on the one hand and on the other to such personality as may be ascribed to God.

Man, said Aristotle,[1] is a social animal, πολιτικὸν ζῷον. A human being who should be able to dispense with social life would show himself thereby to be not in fact

[1] *Pol.* i. 2. 1253 a 3.

human at all, but either above or below humanity, ἢ θεὸς ἢ θήριον, a god or a beast. The suggestion contained in this celebrated observation that the Divine nature, unlike the human, is not social is one that other passages of Aristotle's writings show to have been more than a passing thought with him. In the tenth book of the *Nicomachean Ethics*[2] he surprises those whom the earlier portions of that treatise have accustomed to the thought that the only self-sufficiency attainable or desirable by a human being is one which leaves him still a focus of social relationships, and that the most advantageous field of his praiseworthy activities is the closely knit political community of a Greek city-state, by alleging it as a note of the superiority of the life of Knowledge to the life of Action that here less than anywhere else is a man dependent upon his fellows for the exercise of his activity; for so he is all the nearer to that supreme independence of anything in any sense beyond itself which, in Aristotle's view, must characterize the life of God. It was precisely this feature of the Aristotelian theology which, as I contended in the third Lecture of my previous course, justified us in refusing to call Aristotle's God, although undoubtedly conceived by him to be an 'individual centre of consciousness,' by the name of a 'personal God'; since he is without social relationships of any kind, whether internal (such as are affirmed by the Christian doctrine of the Trinity) or external (such as those which are mentioned in Lotze's description of the Supreme Being as "a living Love that wills the blessedness of others,"[3] and which appear at any rate to be presupposed in the religious experience of communion with God).

[2] *Eth. Nic.* x. 7. 1177 a 27 ff.

[3] *Microcosmus*, ix. 5, § 7 (Eng. tr. ii. p. 721).

A wholly *unsocial* being of this kind could not be called *personal*; for Personality is always social. But while a subject of external social relations may certainly be called a person, it is less obvious that a subject of internal social relations can be so called; and indeed, as we have already observed, the traditional language of Christian theology does not describe its triune God as *a person*. The expression has, however, sometimes been used of communities which possess social relations both internal and external; since they consist of human beings in personal relations with one another; and are related to other communities much as the individual members of each community are related to one another. It might further be suggested that we ought to think of any Personality which we can ascribe to God rather as a corporate or collective Personality of this sort than as a Personality like that which belongs to each of the individual members of a society; and that we could thus rightly say that God is in this sense *personal*, although not *a person*; unless indeed we were prepared to abandon monotheism and think of God as standing over against other Gods, as one member among many of a divine society.

What then is meant by attribution of Personality to a community such as the State? It is not by any means easy to give a brief answer to this question.

No doubt it might be said that we have to do here with nothing but a figure of speech. It is as easy to personify a community as to personify a virtue like Wisdom, or a passion like Love, a heavenly body like the Moon, or a river like the Thames, as to personify Death or Poetry, Philosophy or Fortune. But when we consider the part that patriotism and religious loyalty, the ambition and

the animosity of nations and churches—not to speak of the devotion of men to lesser societies, to colleges and schools parties and clubs—have played in the history of the world we shall scarcely feel this answer to be sufficient. It is assuredly no mere care for grace or convenience in literary expression which makes us ready not only to speak of communities in terms like those which we use of men and women, but to identify ourselves in pride or in shame with what they do, even where as individuals we have had no part in the doing of it, and to sacrifice to what we call their interests our own individual pleasure and comfort and advantage, nay even our health and our life, with no sense that we are thereby surrendering the freedom wherein our *personal* dignity consists, but rather the contrary.

There is another account of what is meant by attributing Personality to a community which is not so obviously inadequate as that of which I have just spoken. It may be said that the whole explanation of this language is to be sought in the fact that communities can be parties in a suit at law; can have rights which can be claimed and duties which can be enforced; and are thus treated as persons or rather are persons, so far forth as by a *person* is meant a subject of legal rights and duties.

According to this view Personality, whether in the case of an individual or of a community, is a notion which always refers to what has been called 'a world of claims and counterclaims,' a lawyer's world, so to say. Hence where the band of union between individuals is of a nature which excludes the intervention of lawyers, as in the family (for, if 'brother goes to law with brother' or husband with wife, we at once recognize that the family bond is broken and the marriage well on the way to dissolution)—in such a union the individual, it is said,

parts with his separate personality; while it is not the husband apart from the wife or the wife apart from the husband, the parents from the children or the children from the parents or from one another, but the family as a whole that stands over against other families, as a person over against other persons, in the world of claims and counterclaims to which Personality, by its very notion, belongs.[4]

Here however there is something to be observed which may well strike us as strange and paradoxical. To such a surrender of personal independence as is involved in Marriage we attach a high degree of value, just because we rate the confidence of mutual love as intrinsically something altogether better than the merely legal relation which is constituted by belonging to the same 'world of claims and counterclaims.' The Greek proverb κοινὰ τὰ φίλων, 'True friends have all things in common,' which Plato[5] sought to make the principle of unity in his ideal State, gives pointed expression to the thought of this supersession in friendship of the legal relation which rests upon the distinction of *meum* and *tuum*. It was the main objection brought by Aristotle against his master's scheme that the sentiment of affection, which alone could claim to set that distinction at nought, could not be expected to admit of extension over so large an area as Plato had contemplated, that the friendship possible in so wide a circle would be but a "watery friendship,"[6] too greatly diluted to act as a solvent of juristic and economic independence. But the Platonic proposal and the Aristotelian criticism of it agree in their acknow-

[4] See *God and Personality*, p. 52.
[5] *Rep.* iv. 424 A.
[6] ὑδαρὴς φιλία. See *Pol.* ii. 4. 1262 b 15.

ledgment of the power of love or friendship, when of a certain degree of intensity, to emancipate those whom they unite from the restrictions of the 'world of claims and counterclaims.'

Nevertheless, according to the theory which we are now discussing, we rise above this world through the intimacies of domestic life or of a comradeship only to find ourselves in it again as sharers in the corporate or collective personality wherein our individual personality has been merged. Nor is this true only of the family, which may be regarded from one point of view, in virtue of its more direct dependence upon animal instincts, as inferior in rank to communities in whose constitution the Reason has played a larger part. Even the State itself, which a very important school of thought has represented as the supreme community and the fullest expression of the social reason of man, finds its inner unity most intensely realized in the patriotic enthusiasm which in time of war willingly abandons the usual safeguards of individual freedom to absorb itself in a common effort. And this takes place just when the State as a whole is asserting its 'claims and counterclaims' most strongly in controversy with another State. Again, with respect to societies intermediate between the family and the State, to take one illustration out of many, the history of medieval Europe is full of the 'claims and counterclaims' of religious orders and houses, whose individual members had renounced all private property and identified themselves for life with the society into which they had retired from the layman's world of rights and duties.

If in the facts which have just been stated we find something which seems strange and paradoxical, it is because it is impossible to keep the notion of Personality

within the bounds of a purely juristic circle of ideas, to which it nevertheless undoubtedly belongs. If the word 'person' is nowhere applicable except where there is a plurality of persons standing to one another in definite relations such as are established and maintained by laws, it yet carries with it the connotation of the 'warmth and intimacy'[7] which belong to self-consciousness. Thus for a society merely to be treated as a possible party to legal proceedings seems scarcely sufficient to warrant a claim to Personality apart from such a sense of intimacy, of belonging in all things to one another, as may be wholly absent between the members of a legal corporation, but is often conspicuously present in the life of a family, and on certain occasions in that of a nation also.

We are thus compelled in regard to the possession of a claim to corporate Personality to recognize two types of community, the contrast between which has played a considerable part in recent political philosophy. They are already distinguished in the famous passage of Burke in which he declares that "the State ought not to be considered as nothing better than a partnership agreement in a trade of pepper and coffee, calico or tobacco, or some other such low concern, to be taken up for a little temporary interest, and to be dissolved by the fancy of the parties. It is to be looked on with other reverence; because it is not a partnership in things subservient only to the gross animal existence of a temporary and perishable nature. It is a partnership in all science; a partnership in all art; a partnership in every virtue and in all perfection. As the ends of such a partnership cannot be obtained in many generations, it becomes a partnership not only between those who are living, but between those who are living,

[7] James, *Principles of Psychology*, i. p. 331.

those who are dead, and those who are to be born. Each contract of each particular state is but a clause in the great primeval contract of eternal society, linking the lower with the higher natures, connecting the visible and invisible world, according to a fixed compact sanctioned by the inviolable oath which holds all physical and all moral natures, each in their appointed place." [8]

The two types of community which are here contrasted have also been opposed to one another as true corporate personalities to mere *personæ fictæ*. The *persona ficta* is merely the creation of law; its 'personality' is in the proper sense a 'fiction' and exists merely for the purposes of convenience it is defined by the act of the legislative authority to which it owes its being, and cannot do or suffer anything which that act does not declare it capable of doing or suffering. There is thus in it no principle, no possibility of growth or development. As Maitland, following Gierke, has pointed out,[9] it is agreeable to the traditions of the Roman Law as developed by the Italian commentators of the middle ages to see in all the corporations which it recognized, the State alone excepted, nothing but such *personæ fictæ*. In certain celebrated cases in the recent history of Great Britain, such as that about the right of the United Free Church of Scotland to property which belonged to the Free Church before its union with the United Presbyterian Church, and again that known by the name of the Taff Vale case, about the right of Trades Unions to employ their funds for political purposes, it was the question at issue whether a Church or a Trade Union is not after all something

[8] *Reflections on the Revolution in France* (*Works*, ed. 1882, ii. p. 368).

[9] See Maitland's Introduction to his translation of Gierke's *Political Theories of the Middle Age*.

more than a mere *persona ficta*, bound hand and foot by the terms of a trust deed or of articles of registration; whether it may not be entitled, like a real person, to develop its views, to reinterpret its thought, to change its mind, and yet continue the same 'person' that it was before. There is no doubt of course that the State claims for itself this liberty, which its judicial representatives are apt to deny to other corporations within the area which it controls. This is not the place to enter upon a discussion of these claims, whether in the instances quoted or in others which might be alleged. It is plain that recognition of the true personality of a particular corporation would not by itself necessarily decide its right to a particular property. For even an individual person might have money left to him for certain specific purposes and afterwards might change so much that he would be incapable of carrying them out. But on the other hand the view which sees in a corporation a mere creature of the law, definable in terms of its trust deeds or articles of association, undoubtedly excludes the possibility of the kind of change which seems inseparable from the development of a true finite personality. The cases of doubt to which reference has been made have been mentioned merely to illustrate the fact that, while some corporations may be no more than *personæ fictæ* and can claim personality only in a purely legal sense, in others the members are conscious of a unity which is much more like that of an individual personality than the unity of merely fictitious persons can be. To this sort of corporation the old jest does not apply that a corporation has neither a soul to be damned nor a body to be kicked; for they may do things which may deeply wound the conscience of men and women

who have yet no individual responsibility for them; and the material symbols or instruments of their activity may be handled in a way which is felt by their incorporators not, it is true, as physical pain, but yet with the same sense of indignity which would be experienced on his own account by a man who had been publicly horsewhipped.

In their desire to emphasize such facts as these some have, over-hastily as it seems to me, ventured to speak of a real corporate personality as though it were *another* person beside the persons of the individual members of the corporation. Legally it may be correct to say that such another person exists; but if this legal statement is treated as a metaphysical truth, we seem to be back among the sophistries against which Aristotle was wont to bring the celebrated argument of the 'third man.' [10] No more than the universal is to be treated as another particular beside the particulars which are its instances, is the corporation (or the crowd) to be treated as another person beside the persons who are its members; nor does the unquestionable fact that men gathered in crowds or organized in societies act otherwise than the same men would act apart warrant one in such neglect of differences which are no less real than the identities whereon by the use of such phraseology the whole stress is laid.

We shall find it to be the fact that 'personality' has generally been ascribed to a society, in other than a merely legal sense, by way of emphasizing the inadequacy of some other description of its nature. It is just as with the term 'organism,' which has also been applied to some societies in order to indicate that they are not mere assemblies, or even mere creatures of contract, but that they change in definite directions without a deliberate intention on

[10] Ar. *Metaph.* A. 9, 990 b 17.

the part of any individual member, much as vegetable and animal bodies without taking thought 'add to their stature' or otherwise go through a series of changes fitting them for the discharge of their specific functions. In this negative or at most analogous sense, the word 'organism' may be conveniently used of a society; but that it is dangerous to take it as literally applicable is clearly seen in the merely fanciful comparisons in which Herbert Spencer (for example) was led to indulge when attempting to do so.

I do not indeed hold—as will be clear from what I have already said concerning corporate personality—that the word 'personality' when applied to a society is as merely metaphorical as 'organism' applied in the same way. On the contrary I hold the doctrine of Plato's *Republic* to be true, that the structure of the individual soul is repeated in that of society, and that the individual soul first learns what its own structure is as writ large in the community. A State (and a State need not be the only society of which we can say this), though its behaviour may often remind us of that of such a body, is not an animal or vegetable body, but is in its essence a rational and spiritual being, giving effect to its will by action, through material instruments, in and upon the material world.

Yet if we go on to say without qualification that therefore it may be called a *person*, we must be careful lest we repeat the mistake of those who have taken too literally the statement that it is an *organism*. The Swiss jurist Bluntschli is not less fantastic in his treatment of the theme of the Personality of the State [11] than is Herbert

[11] *Theory of the State* (Eng. tr. of his *Lehre vom modernen Staat*), p. 23.

Spencer in his elaboration of its organic nature; and he does not, as the English thinker has done, take back in a sudden perception of his mistake the extravagances which he has been betrayed into offering as serious contributions to political theory. "Everything," as Butler said, "is what it is and not another thing,"[12] and a society is not (except in a merely legal sense) a person, though, as Plato showed, there is nothing in it which does not express an interest or an impulse which is a factor in the personal life of some of its members. I cannot better express what I take to be the truth about this matter than by quoting the account given of it by my immediate predecessor in this Lectureship, an account with which I find myself in substantial agreement.

"The phrase 'the social mind' is not," so says Professor Sorley, "a mere metaphor. But the unity of the social mind is of a different kind from the unity of the individual mind. The limits of the latter are determined by circumstances which are largely social, but the content is all related to a central point, an inner or subjective unity of feeling, striving, and apprehension, which is the first condition of there being any mental life at all, and which neither psychology nor sociology has been able to explain. With the social mind it is different. Its unity is a contract which can be traced historically. Social factors must always be assumed, but social unity is a growth in time and it does not start from a principle such as the subject of individual life, without which the existence of his mental experience is inconceivable."[13] I should myself rather say, with Plato, that it starts, not indeed from "a principle *such as* the subject of individual life," but from *that*

[12] Butler, Preface to the *Sermons*.

[13] *Moral Values and the Idea of God*, p. 130 f.

principle itself, without which the existence, not only of the individual's mental experience, but of the social unity itself, is inconceivable ; for the social unity is rooted in the mental experience of individuals.

The thought may not improbably suggest itself at this point that in the conception of corporate personality which we have just been discussing may be found the clue to that of Divine Personality which is the principal topic of these Lectures. We have already admitted that alike in speaking of Divine ' personality ' and in speaking of corporate ' personality,' we are using the word ' personality ' in a way which does not allow us to assume that all which is true of individual human ' personality ' will be true if transferred to a society or to God. In particular we have observed that what Professor Sorley calls " an inner or subjective unity of feeling, striving, and apprehension " is of the essence of individual Personality, but has no analogue in corporate Personality ; and I have elsewhere contended that the evidence of Divine Personality lies in the religious experience of personal intercourse or communion with God, not in any insight which we possess into the nature of the divine self-consciousness. It might seem then as though Divine Personality might be conceived as analogous to the Personality of a nation or State ; and as if the union in God of ' transcendence ' with ' immanence ' might be adequately conceived after the fashion of a like union in the case of the nation or State, towards which its members can exhibit loyalty and love and devoted service, and which yet lives only in and through the lives of the very citizens from whom such loyalty and love and service are demanded and obtained.

Moreover there are various facts in the history of

Religion which may seem to afford support to such a train of reasoning. At a certain stage of religious development we find each people worshipping as a God the spirit of its own common life. It distinguishes this spirit from itself, and pays it divine honours; but in this representation of it as a person inhabiting some sacred shrine in the midst of the people whose God it is, we are apt to see only a creature of the popular imagination. We cannot believe in the objective validity of the Virgin of the Athenian Acropolis, of Chemosh the god (or, as the Israelites called him, the abomination) of Moab, or indeed even of Jahveh, the God of the Israelites themselves, who came into the camp when the ark was carried into it and who dwelt in the thick darkness of the most holy place at Jerusalem.[14] We take it as a matter of course that the interviews of Scipio with the deities of the Roman Senate[15] were a politic invention on the part of the conqueror of Hannibal; and the phrase which the other day was so familiar to us, *der alte deutsche Gott*, (though perhaps it was not intended to mean much more than the expression 'God of our fathers' which we have certainly not shrunk ourselves from using) struck English readers of the late German Emperor's speeches as absurd if not blasphemous in its apparent reversion to a style of theology which has become for us impossible.

I have no intention of denying the real historical connexion between the personification of the spirit of the community which we see in the local tribal and national deities of the ancient world and the religious experience of personal communion with God which is, for me, the sole genuine evidence of Divine Personality. The con-

[14] 1 Sam. iv. 7; 1 Kings viii. 12.
[15] See Liv. xxvi. 19.

sciousness whether of the world as a whole, or of God, in the sense which that word bears for us, for whom it must mean, if it is to mean anything, the Highest, not only in some restricted sphere but in the world as a whole—this consciousness is mediated to man from the first through the consciousness of his group. To quote words which I have used elsewhere about one aspect of the 'idea of God:' "The conception of a divine reason first dawns upon the human mind in the form of a conception of a collective or social reason which the individual shares with his fellows. It first becomes distinguished from the conception of a merely social or collective reason, when the individual attains the level of development at which he not only sees in that which all his fellows recognize as valid or desirable the really or objectively valid, the really or objectively desirable, but comes to recognize that something may be really and objectively valid or desirable which not only he but his whole group fail to accept or desire."[16]

In the history of Israel we find indeed that it was precisely such lines as these that religious development followed. The very failures and disappointments which shook the national trust in the partiality of the national God for the community which was called by his name led the prophets of the nation to conceive him as the Judge of all the earth and to lay the foundations of the universal religion, whose worship is neither in Jerusalem nor in Gerizim, but in spirit and in truth.[17]

As however, with the enlargement of the religious horizon, if I may so express it, the worship once paid to the tribal deity is seen to be due to a God whom the heaven

[16] *Group Theories of Religion*, pp. 159, 160.
[17] John iv. 21.

of heavens cannot contain, there inevitably follows a withdrawal from the spirit of the community, as such, of that *personal* character which was attributed to it when identified with the Object of religious veneration. This is, as I take it, the true account of what may plausibly be represented as the gradual evolution of a religion which will ultimately dispense with Divine Personality as it grows accustomed to the thought that devotion to a community whereof one is a member requires for its justification no personal embodiment, whether in a king or in a god.

What we have to note is that it is exceedingly doubtful whether nothing is lost in our attitude to a community when we realize that it is only by a figure of speech that we can be said to have personal intercourse with it. It is the justification of Kingship as an institution which the freest of commonwealths may on that account well retain that the unquestionably real personality of the Head of the State, who symbolizes its unity and its tradition, supplies something which is lacking in the State itself; for the State, though it really possesses the unity and the tradition of which the King is but the symbol, does not possess them in a form which the individual citizen recognizes as a personality no less genuine than his own. This reflexion (though Hegel[18] may be quoted in support of it) will be, I am well aware, wholly unacceptable to a school which is often by its critics called after his name and which highly reveres his memory. For in making it I am certainly assigning to individual personality a higher value in comparison with the personality which can be attributed to a community than this school is commonly ready to grant to it. I shall not, however, enter

[18] See *Philosophie des Rechts*, § 279 (*Werke*, viii. pp. 361 foll.).

here upon a defence of my estimate against the thinkers whom I have in mind, for the subject will come before us again in a later Lecture of this course. All that I now wish to point out is that to the sense of something lacking in the 'personality' of the community is in my judgment due not only the satisfaction still so widely felt in the recognition of a single person (to use the Cromwellian phrase), who can act as the representative of the community in its claim to the loyalty of its members; but also that deification in earlier days of the spirit of the community of which I have already mentioned several prominent historical examples.

Of the conception of corporate Personality it may then be said that, so far from conflicting with the acknowledgment of Personality in God, it points with no uncertain finger to such an acknowledgment. As we saw in the last Lecture that our attitude toward the authority of the State finds its only satisfactory explanation in the recognition that it is the surrogate of a divine Lawgiver and Ruler, who in the consciousness of obligation is revealed as standing in the fulness of personality over against the finite personalities which realize their dignity and freedom in submission to him; so now the primitive deification of the spirit of the community of which we are members is seen to be the dim consciousness that the unity of that common spiritual life, which is found at last to be the private possession of no one group of men but of all rational beings, is to be sought in a Supreme Being, manifesting in conscious personal intercourse the full reality of spiritual existence.

It is indeed this truth which has received such striking expression in the Pauline description of a community whose life is nothing less than the life of God, since it is

the body of one " in whom dwelleth all the fulness of the Godhead bodily." [19]

The individual person is always a member of society; it is indeed, as we have often had occasion to observe, in virtue of his social activities that he comes to be called a 'person,' although (reading over in the small letters what we have learned to read in the large, according to the precept of Plato) we may come to recognize that in these activities a certain kind of subjectivity, inwardness, self-consciousness finds its function and expression. The life of God is always mediated to such individual persons through a society, for it is easy to see that even the mystic who flies 'alone to the Alone'[20] is conditioned in all that he says and does by the intellectual and spiritual inheritance of the community to which he belongs. The mediating society, considered apart from the life which it mediates to its members, is not indeed personal in the same genuine and primary sense in which its members are personal; but the true subject and source of that life must be conceived, if it is to be conceived in a manner adequate to the demands of the religious consciousness, as possessing the fulness of Personality.

Now in the theology of the religion which has taken most seriously the conception of Divine Personality, this Personality is represented (to employ words which I have used elsewhere [21]) as a complete self-consciousness or personality, the fulfilment or archetype of what we have imperfectly manifested in our individual selves. For in ourselves we recognize the self as contrasted with a not-self, which is thus the necessary complement

[19] Col. ii. 9. Cp. my *Problems in the Relations of God and Man*, p. 230.

[20] Plotinus, *Enn.*, vi. 9, § 11.

[21] *Problems*, pp. 234 ff. (with slight changes and omissions).

of the self, without which our self is incomplete. This not-self always is, nay must be, different from the self which is aware of it, yet this difference, which is necessary to knowledge, or even to consciousness, is felt also at the same time as the obstacle to full comprehension in so far as we cannot enter into the inmost nature of things unlike ourselves: while, if the things of which we are conscious are persons like the person that knows them, the 'knowledge of acquaintance' is possible, and we are able by sympathy and love to achieve a closer union, yet this too has its limitations, and there remains a bar which all the love and insight in the world cannot do away with. On the other hand that consciousness of ourselves which we have in introspection, self-examination, and so forth, seems to involve even at its best something of make-believe, wherein we treat as two that which is one and single.

Now in the doctrine of the Trinity we have the divine self-consciousness represented as freed from these limitations which we find in our own. God's not-self or other is described as being wholly what he himself is and knows himself to be; yet in this inner converse of God with God, the self and the other have each the satisfactory completeness of a distinct person; while, on the other hand, these two persons are each in the other in a mutual inwardness whereof the utmost human love and sympathy can but afford a faint image. Moreover the unity which makes possible the mutual intercourse of the two and is actualized in that intercourse is regarded as being not (as in us, when we contrast ourselves as subject with any object) something to be described by some such abstract name as 'unity,' 'absolute,' or the like; nor (as when we are thinking of our relations with other persons) as a love which

we feel, an attribute which belongs to us, a relation in which we are—no, nor even as something individual and personal, yet not *fully* individual or personal, like a community, a commonwealth, or a church, in which we live at one with our fellows; but as something which, 'proceeding from both' those who are mutually subjects and objects of the eternal process, possesses itself the complete reality of Personal Spirit.

The doctrine thus outlined may be justly considered as suggestive of a way in which not only may the nature of the object of our religious consciousness be conceived so as to afford satisfaction to the demand for a fully personal object of that consciousness, but also the social medium, through which the religious (and indeed the whole spiritual) life is imparted to the individual human soul, may be exhibited as reflecting an intrinsic sociality in the ultimate sources of that life.

I may perhaps be allowed to dwell for a little while on some particular features of this representation of the Divine Nature in virtue of which it meets certain characteristic requirements of the religious consciousness with which it might at first seem difficult to reconcile the admission of the essentially social character of Personality.

In the first place we may observe that it safeguards the *unity* of God, which might appear to be imperilled if the acknowledgment of Personality in God be found to involve the recognition of the Divine Nature as in itself social. The impulse to seek for an ultimate unity in the manifold variety of our experience is the very mainspring of our endeavour to understand the world about us, and on this account no mere polytheism will ever be found adequate to the requirements of the religious conscious-

ness ; for it is indeed in connexion with the religious consciousness, as I have elsewhere attempted to show,[22] that the first explicit efforts are made to frame, in obedience to that impulse, a conception of the whole. Even short of a strict dualism, like that which is expressed in the Manichean doctrine of a Good and an Evil Principle, the divergent and opposed characters attributed to the members of such a divine society as the Olympian pantheon render any such celestial court, despite the monarchy of Zeus or of the corresponding deity in other similar systems, an unacceptable representation of that supreme Object, in the quest whereof the human heart must disquiet itself until it can find rest in union therewith.[23]

On the other hand, this account of the Divine Nature, while emphasizing both its Personality and its Unity, yet does not endanger that very Unity itself by making it dependent for the social intercourse, in virtue whereof alone it can be described as ' personal,' upon beings which stand to it as its creatures. Where this is done the Divine Being is not self-sufficient, and the Unity of the Godhead is not that which is, as I have contended, required by the religious consciousness, namely that ultimate Unity which may be called the Unity of the Absolute, but only the unity which belongs to one member of a society of persons.

I do not overlook the possibility of arguing that the Trinitarian theology, for which these merits may be claimed, fails after all to do what it promises, in that, by leaving outside of the Divine Essence a world of created spirits, it has still on its hands the very same problems of unity

[22] *Group Theories*, pp. 188.

[23] Aug. *Conf.* i. 1, *Fecisti nos ad te, et inquietum est cor nostrum donec requiescat in te.*

and diversity, in respect of the relations existing between God and these created spirits, which it has made a show of solving by its theory of the mutual relations of the Persons included within the Divine Essence.[24] I have already, however, in the Lecture of my previous course which dealt with the Problem of Sin, suggested that, since it is precisely in the instance of personal character that we come nearest to understanding how perfection may co-exist with the desire of self-communication, we may, if we take seriously the doctrine of Divine Personality, see in the direction indicated by that doctrine, the hope of a settlement of this particular difficulty. I thus do not regard the transcendence of the Deity as incompatible with his having that perfection which is required in the Object of religious worship, provided that transcendence is conceived in the form which on many grounds appeared to be the most adequate to satisfy those demands of the religious consciousness which the doctrine of transcendence is designed to meet, in the form, that is to say, of Personality.

The discussion which has occupied us in this Lecture hitherto of the notion of corporate Personality and of its relation to that of Divine Personality, has been relevant to our subject because it might be suggested that a conception having its origin in the social or political activity of the human spirit would be found to throw a new light upon the significance of the tendency to ascribe Personality to God; a light in which that tendency would be seen to have been misinterpreted by us when we saw in it evidence that in Religion the worshipper does actually enjoy what may be properly called a personal intercourse with the Object of his worship.

[24] See *Journal of Theological Studies*, ii. 5 (Oct. 1900), pp. 54, '55.

But it remains to consider in respect of the social or political activity of the human spirit, as we have previously considered in respect of its scientific, artistic and moral activities, how far the attribution of Personality to God harmonizes with the frame of mind produced by the activity in question. And here at first sight it might seem as if there were good reason for holding that, at any rate when the development of political life has reached a certain stage, the theology which represents God as personal is uncongenial to the type of character correspondent to that stage.

Those who recollect the view put forward in the preceding Lecture of the theocratic implication of the notion of obligation alike in individual and in social life will have no difficulty in divining the nature of the reasoning which I have in my mind in saying this. The progress of the social or political consciousness from that of the slave-master and his slave to that of the free citizen reveals, it may plausibly be said, a constant tendency to the elimination from that consciousness of the sense of personal inferiority or dependence, and with the final disappearance of it must disappear all the comprehension of that worshipping attitude in Religion which reflected in other days the subject's abasement of himself before his chief or sovereign. The old fashion of worship cannot be that of the free man. The traditional phrases and observances of religion are apt to foster a temper inconsistent with and distasteful to that spirit of proud independence which recognizes no superior on earth; and this spirit cannot be at home with Religion until they are discarded.

The frame of mind which gives rise to this criticism is one which has found frequent expression in the literature

of the nineteenth century. To confine ourselves to that of England, the poetry of Swinburne is full of it:

> Glory to Man in the highest, for Man is the master of things,[25]

and probably the strain in the thought of William Blake, referred to in a previous Lecture of this course, which finds expression in such a phrase as:

> Thou art a Man: God is no more;
> Thine own Humanity learn to adore,[26]

had not a little to do with the attraction exercised by the older poet upon one who may almost be called his re-discoverer.

But, whatever glamour may be thrown by genius and enthusiasm about the crowning 'declaration of independence' which is not content with casting off allegiance to every earthly authority but refuses subjection even to God, it is assuredly a vain hope to think that by denying Personality to God we exalt the dignity of Personality in man. On the contrary, in the last resort the affirmation of Personality in God establishes as nothing else can do in a position of unassailable eminence the image of Divine Personality in man. Without that affirmation the confident assertion of man's greatness is apt to echo among the desolate spaces of a universe wherein this evanescent Personality seems to count for nothing, like the voice of a child shouting to keep his courage up among mountain solitudes by night. Personality may still be the highest thing we know, as the lost child is a thing more fearfully and wonderfully made than the mighty peaks or the

[25] Swinburne, *Hymn of Man.*
[26] Blake, *The Everlasting Gospel.*

barren moors or even the ancient heavens and their stars. But how will it be made easier for us to hold fast to our faith in the dignity of the human person, and in the strength of it to

> 'write' the style of Gods
> And 'make' a push at chance and circumstance,[7]

if we are convinced that there are no gods and that 'chance and circumstance,' as they presided over the origin of ourselves and of our race, shall also preside over its end and that of each of us to boot? I for my part cannot see. But in a world at the heart of which is a personal spiritual Life, whereof our own is in its essence a reflection, and into the fellowship of which we may be consciously brought in Religion,—in such a world speech of the dignity of Personality is at once seen to be no fantastic brag, flung in the face of an impenetrable mystery, but a solid truth capable of becoming the principle of a social order, rational, enduring, and progressive. Man, when sincere, knows himself to be little as well as great; and only if, where he is little, he is so in comparison with One who possesses (though not within human measures) that by reason of possessing which man is at the same time great, do his littleness and his greatness appear not as contradicting one another but as alike natural consequences of his place in God's world. Nor will anyone who is aware what belief in a God, as a Being with whom personal relations are possible, can be or has been in the past doubt its power to inspire a spirit of independence and a love of freedom at least as lofty as the highest that there is any reason to suppose Atheism competent to produce.

The human instinct for Reverence (if we may call it

[7] Shakespeare, *Much Ado about Nothing*, v. 1, 37, 38.

an instinct, remembering all the while that it is an instinct which presupposes the existence of Reason in the soul), when a speculative Atheism, which finds it essential to the dignity of human Personality to deny the reality of its Divine Archetype, has diverted it from what I should contend was its proper Object, will seek a substitute for that Object in a great man.

This fact may be illustrated from some sayings of Blake quoted in the third Lecture of this course, from the calendar of festivals prescribed by Comte for the Church which was to profess the Religion of Humanity, and also from the work of the poet Swinburne, to which I have referred just now as exemplifying the glorification of man when regarded as free from allegiance to God.

This hero-worship, while it sufficiently testifies to a human need of personal objects for reverence, cannot however be admitted without implicitly abandoning the humanitarian case (if I may so describe it for the moment), against the recognition of Divine Personality. For the hero-worshipper must allow recognition of a personal superiority in the hero resting not upon any representative character wherewith the hero has been invested by popular election or delegation. A representative character of a kind may indeed be ascribed to the hero; but only such as an hereditary king or aristocracy might claim in the political sphere. For in such cases there may be, and often is, a general acquiescence in their discharge of representative functions analogous to the general recognition of the hero in whatever guise—prophet or poet or patriot—as the spokesman of his people and his race. And if the human dignity of the hero-worshipper is not diminished by his hero-worship, what ground can there be for considering it to be inconsistent with a full consciousness of that

dignity to acknowledge the claim on our reverence of supreme Personality in God? If we feel ourselves not depressed but uplifted by the knowledge that our heroes may call us brethren, why should a contrary effect be expected from the conviction that we are the children of God? It may perhaps be said that the attitude which Religion requires us to adopt towards God is one not merely of reverence but of abasement; that a claim to lordship is other than one to admiration, however intense and fervent. But this objection can, I think, be easily met. We may be jealous of our personal dignity even in respect to our heroes, in so far as we know that, great as may be our debt to them for an enhancement of our personality, this personality is not itself wholly dependent upon them. In respect of that part thereof which is ours and not in any sense theirs, we owe it to ourselves to add to our recognition of our inferiority to them a recognition of their equality with us. But, in regard to the Supreme Personality whence ours is wholly drawn, we do not in any sense disparage the dignity of ours by acknowledging not only the superiority but the supremacy of the Father of spirits.[28] And indeed, as I attempted to show in the last Lecture, only by recognition of this supremacy is the existence in the community of authority and of obligation to obedience thereunto explicable without danger to the independence and freedom of the private citizen.

[28] It was wittily replied to some one who accused of Atheism a man noted for his pride of intellect: 'No, he reluctantly admits the existence of a *Superior* Being.'

LECTURE VII

DIVINE PERSONALITY AND THE RELIGIOUS LIFE

In the present Lecture we are to consider the bearing of a recognition of Personality in God upon the religious activity of the human spirit.

There are probably some to whom the thought of Religion apart from the acknowledgment of a personal object of worship is so unfamiliar that such an inquiry would seem to them to be unnecessary. They would echo an epigrammatic criticism on Comte's 'Religion of Humanity': *Une réligion sans Dieu! Mon Dieu, quelle réligion!* But history shows that a great Religion may exist and flourish in which worship is, at any rate, not envisaged as essentially a relation of personal communion with a living Spirit. And it is even possible, with the philosopher Schopenhauer, to regard the notion of a 'personal God' as actually inconsistent with a truly religious frame of mind. For him the condemnation of life as evil and illusory was of the very essence of Religion; to revert for a moment to the phraseology of the second Lecture of this course, he admitted only a negative relation of the religious to the economic activity of the human spirit.

The survival in Christianity from Judaism of belief in a Divine Ruler, a 'Moral Governor of the universe,' dealing out rewards to virtue and punishments to vice,

with the optimistic outlook which seemed to follow from it,[1] he considered prejudicial to that claim on the part of the younger faith to be regarded as in the proper sense a true Religion, which might otherwise have been grounded upon its character as, like Buddhism and the mysticism of the *Upanishads*, a doctrine of self-renunciation.[2]

Holding, as we have seen reason to hold, that there is a positive as well as a negative relation of our religious activity to our economic, we shall not in any case be able to accept this view of the great pessimist as it stands. We may indeed be ready to admit that the kind of theology which is exclusively preoccupied with the thought of a Moral Governor of the universe, the kind of theology against which, as we saw in a previous Lecture, Blake launched his passionate invective, is apt, by its indifference to Mysticism, which, when found in connexion with any creed whatsoever, always attracted the sympathy of Schopenhauer, to reveal a certain inability to comprehend much of what is deepest and most intense in religious experience. But, so far as this is so, this same kind of theology must also tend, even while describing God in terms of Personality, to deny to his worshippers the possibility of intimate personal communion with him. This is especially true, as we have several times had occasion to point out, of the theology of Kant, which Schopenhauer may be supposed to have had particularly in his mind. To deny, however, to the worshipper the possibility of genuinely personal intercourse with the Object of his worship is, according to the view put forward in these Lectures, to deny the Personality of God in any sense in

[1] For the view of this belief and of optimism as characteristic of Judaism, cp. Montefiore, *Liberal Judaism and Hellenism*, pp. 15 foll.

[2] Schopenhauer, *Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung*, § 70.

which the affirmation of it has a truly religious significance.

We have seen that the representation of God as one with whom such intercourse is possible can be harmonized with the experience proper to the economic, scientific, artistic, ethical and social activities of our spirit; but it is in *religious* experience that we must seek the true ground of this representation.

A distinguished philosopher and theologian of our own day, Dr. Rashdall, the present Dean of Carlisle, has lately criticized the claim, which he conceives to be implied in such language as I have not shrunk from using in these Lectures about an experience of personal intercourse in Religion, to an *immediate* as distinct from an *inferred* knowledge of God. This criticism is closely connected in the same thinker's mind with the insistence, which is characteristic of him, upon the view that the conviction which each of us has of the existence of other persons besides himself is based upon an argument from analogy. I think that a discussion of Dr. Rashdall's position will be found to be a convenient way of dealing with the claims of religious experience which the experient takes for an experience of personal intercourse with the Supreme Reality to be considered as evidence of Divine Personality.

What Dr. Rashdall disputes is that there is an 'immediate,' 'intuitive' or '*a priori*' knowledge of God's existence.[3] He points out that the "vast majority" of men, "including the most religious of them," are conscious of no such knowledge. "Missionaries do not find that they can assume a knowledge of God in their hearers; they have to prove it by arguments." "Individuals among ourselves,

[3] *Modern Churchman*, viii. pp. 305 ff. (Aug. 1918).

who are brought up without religious education, do not commonly possess " any belief in God. " I read fathers, schoolmen, modern theologians, without coming across a single trace of such immediate knowledge." " The great masters of philosophical thought, including the most theistic, never suggest such a notion. It is equally absent from the thought of what I may call the professional metaphysicians, and from that of men of essentially religious genius." He instances Martineau and Newman as inferring the existence of God from the experience of causality or from the consciousness of moral obligation. " A belief for which a reason, a ' because ' can be given is not immediate." The claim to an immediate knowledge of God is almost confined to a few mystics ; among whom " the great religious leaders of mankind " cannot, in Dr. Rashdall's opinion, be numbered, any more than the " vast mass of believers in any religion, or at all events, in any definitely theistic religion."

But further : " I do not know," says Dr. Rashdall, " of any sort of immediate knowledge or anything which can be at all plausibly called immediate knowledge, which bears the least resemblance to this alleged immediate knowledge of another spiritual being. It may be doubted whether even my knowledge of myself can properly be called immediate, in the strict sense of the word, since it is only by reflecting on what is implied in many successive states of mind that I construct the notion of a continuous self. I will not say that my knowledge of myself is an inference ; it may better be described as an ' intellectual construction.' But certainly my knowledge of other people's existence is a matter of inference. No philosopher has ever doubted this, so far as I know, till quite recently."

Now there is so much in all this that appears to me both true and important, while at the same time the intention of the writer would seem to extend to the denial that such an experience of personal intercourse with God is possible as I have in these Lectures contended gives its religious significance to the doctrine of Divine Personality (a doctrine strongly maintained, it is to be remembered, by Dr. Rashdall himself), that I think it worth while to state in some detail how far I should agree with and how I should differ from the view, so emphatically asserted in the words which I have quoted, that our knowledge of the existence of spiritual beings, whether of ourselves, of our fellow men, or of God, is never 'immediate,' but always the result either of 'inference' or of 'intellectual construction.'

It will be, however, convenient to prefix to this statement some observations on the *words* used by Dr. Rashdall to describe the kind of knowledge of God, the existence of which he disputes; for, as Bacon long ago warned us,[4] among the prejudices which lead the mind astray in the pursuit of truth, and against which we must ever be upon our guard, there is a numerous class which owes its existence to an over-carelessness in scrutinizing and testing the current coin of the intellectual market-place.

The words which Dr. Rashdall employs to describe this pretended knowledge of God are these: 'immediate,' 'intuitive,' '*a priori*.' He seems to consider these three adjectives as more or less synonymous, and to take for granted that knowledge reached by way of 'inference' can be qualified by none of them.

And first as regards the word 'immediate.' It is not by any means obvious that there can be no 'immediacy'

[4] *Nov. Org.* i. 43.

where there is 'inference.' Indeed, as a matter of fact, the common logic books have something to tell us of 'immediate inference.' But even in what is called 'mediate inference,' in syllogism, for example, there must at every stage be an *immediate* perception of the sequence of the conclusion upon the premisses, and without this all progress in that kind of reasoning would be impossible. On the other hand, the validity of those 'self-evident' laws of thought on which, according to Dr. Rashdall himself, all inference rests, and our knowledge of which he would probably allow to be 'immediate,' must ultimately be perceived in particular instances; and, though they are *used* universally from the first, their explicit statement in universal form as principles or axioms is the result of later reflexion. 'Immediacy' in a quite legitimate sense can thus perfectly well coexist with the 'mediation' which is characteristic of all 'inference'; it is indeed itself, as we saw, a feature of every inference; and thus there can be no good reason for confining the word 'immediate' to experiences (if such there be) of which no analysis or rational account can be given.

Still less can the word 'intuitive' be rightly appropriated to what is *irrational.* Yet Dr. Rashdall seems so to appropriate it when he connects with his denial that there is any *intuitive* knowledge of God an emphatic reminder that the *faith* by which in theological language we are said to apprehend him is contrasted by St. Paul not with *reason* but with *sight*; as though to call it 'intuitive' were necessarily to contrast it with Reason. Nor is it to be denied that we do find 'intuition' used not so very uncommonly in a loose and general way for a belief which possesses our minds, but for which we can give

no reason except that we are, as Descartes put it, *impelled by nature* to hold it, no less than for an apprehension of what is, in the same philosopher's phraseology, *evident by the light of nature.*[5] Yet the metaphor involved in the word 'intuition' unquestionably fits that word for expressing the latter of these, and unfits it for expressing the former.

For intuition is properly a kind of apprehension by the Reason comparable to clear and keen sight among the bodily senses. Only when we can speak of *seeing into* the necessity of that which we apprehend can we rightly claim an *intuition* of it. In such cases we do not ask 'why,' because the question does not arise; because nothing could make us more certain than we already are of that which we apprehend; not because we despair of obtaining an answer to our question, which yet, if it were accessible, might clear up what is now obscure to us. Holding, as Dr. Rashdall does, that the existence of God is not self-evident, he must also hold it not to be intuitive; but if it *were* self-evident, though it would in that case be 'intuitive,' it would nevertheless not fall outside of the sphere of Reason, except in that narrow and practically obsolete sense in which *only* 'discursive' reason, with its indirect approach to its object through an intermediate term, is held to be entitled to that name. Nor indeed can 'intuition' any more than 'immediacy' be regarded as excluded from the sphere of discursive reason itself. It is unfortunate that some of Aristotle's language concerning the 'intuitive understanding' which he calls νοῦς, language which has passed into the traditional phraseology of Logic, suggests that the task of this faculty is over and done with when we pass from the

[5] See Descartes, *Med.* iii.

first principles of reasoning to the truths which by the help of these principles we may go on to discover. For the whole process of discovery is only rendered possible by the constant exercise at every stage of the power of immediately apprehending the necessity, not merely of the ultimate premisses with which we start or which we find by analysis to be implied in our conclusions, but also of the passage from these to the conclusions which they necessitate.

The last term employed by Dr. Rashdall to describe the kind of knowledge of which he supposes those whom he is criticizing wrongly to affirm God to be the object is '*a priori*.' But surely it seems very strange to speak as though what is *a priori* cannot be 'inferred.' Originally indeed '*a priori*' designated a particular sort of inference, namely that which passed from cause to effect, instead of from effect to cause; but no doubt the expression has come nowadays, in accordance with its employment in the philosophy of Kant, to be used in a somewhat different connexion. Here too, however, *a priori* is certainly not opposed to *reason* or to *inference*; it is opposed to what is *empirical*; and it is scarcely accurate to represent those whom Dr. Rashdall has in view as claiming to possess an *a priori* knowledge of God; for what they claim is rather a knowledge of God by *experience*, analogous to, though not of course identical with, that which we have of objects in time and space by the bodily senses. The knowledge of God which Anselm and Descartes held that they had reached by means of the argument generally called 'ontological' might no doubt be called without impropriety an '*a priori*' knowledge; but this is certainly knowledge reached by the exercise of the Reason, although the reasoning employed may (like many legitimate in-

tellectual processes) not be satisfactorily reducible to syllogistic form.

Up to this point I have, it will be observed, said nothing as to my own view of the nature of the knowledge of God due to religious experience in the form of personal intercourse. I have only suggested that in expressing ourselves upon this subject it is important to be very careful—more careful perhaps than Dr. Rashdall has always been—in the use of our terms, since words such as these just discussed it is impossible to strip of the associations due to their original application and traditional employment.

Turning from these considerations of language to the substantial question at issue, it will be convenient to consider first very briefly the nature of the knowledge which each of us has of other persons beside himself. It is true that there is a sense in which the worshipper's consciousness of the Presence of God (which, as we have already seen, we are compelled in the interests of the religious life to regard as, in relation to our own souls, both 'immanent' and 'transcendent') is the consciousness of a Presence more intimate than that of another human being can be :—

> Closer is he than breathing, and nearer than hands or feet.[6]

But, in so far as it is a consciousness of the presence of a Spirit not only immanent in the spirit of the worshipper, but also distinguishable from his as that of another human being is distinguishable, so that we can "speak to him, for he hears, and Spirit with Spirit can meet," so far it is important for the understanding of religious experience to ascertain what sort of consciousness it is that we have one of another; and whether it is in truth

[6] Tennyson, *The Higher Pantheism.*

only by an ' argument from analogy ' that each of us comes to infer the existence of other persons beside himself. I will so far anticipate the conclusion of what I am to offer you upon this subject as to say that, while I entirely reject the doctrine that we infer the existence of other persons by means of an argument from analogy, I do not at all deny either the activity of Reason, or the presence of what may be called ' mediation ' in the process whereby we become aware of their existence.

The theory that I infer by analogy the existence of other persons beside myself appears to presuppose that we start from what may be called a *solipsistic* position—the position of one who as yet is unaware of the existence of anything—or at least of any person—beside himself. To me nothing appears more clear than that no one starts from such a position as this. It is obvious that before I can discuss with some one else the question whether or no I did start from this position I must already have abandoned it. We do no doubt seem sometimes to discuss things with other people in dreams. But we do not in such dreams regard our interlocutors as merely dream people. I am not a solipsist in my dreams, although, when I look back upon my dreams from the vantage-ground of waking life, I regard myself as the only person concerned in them ; and even then I plainly perceive my dream conversations to have been derived from or suggested by the waking experience in which I live in the society of other human beings. But in my dreams themselves I do not suppose that only I am concerned in them. On the contrary I think that I am dealing with other independently real folk who talk to me and I to them.

The case of dreams then does not seem sufficient to destroy my conviction that it is impossible to start from

a solipsistic position. I do not believe that anyone actually does so; and, when anyone tries to think himself into such a position, in order to make a new start thence, his solipsism, like Descartes' deliberate doubt of all which he had been hitherto accustomed to believe, exists merely as a negation, the denial of what was previously held. A real solipsism would, as it seems to me, exclude even the suggestion of the *conceivableness* of a reality beyond the self; for how and whence could such a suggestion arise? I am convinced that no one can make solipsism the starting-point of his thought, without the covert assumption that something exists beyond the self, that the self has an *other*, however decisively he may refuse to undertake the attempt to make distinct to his own mind what the nature of this *other* really is.

Even supposing, however, that one could start as a solipsist, how could one possibly hope to escape from this initial solipsism? We have seen that some, like Dr. Rashdall—who may perhaps claim Berkeley's authority in support of his view [7]—would maintain that it is possible to attain to a knowledge of other people's existence by means of an argument from analogy. I, it may be said, observe that certain of my ideas are usually attended by certain feelings; when therefore there occur in my experience certain ideas indistinguishable from these which are not attended by such feelings, I conjecture by analogy that such ideas are attended by these feelings after all, only they are felt not by me, but by some one else.

Now no doubt we do go through a process more or less of this kind when we desire to ascertain whether (for

[7] See Berkeley, *Principles of Human Knowledge*, §§ 135 ff. Berkeley does not, however, use the word 'analogy' in this connexion.

example) a figure in Madame Tussaud's celebrated exhibition is a real man or a wax-work image of one. If he blinks on my staring at him, starts if I touch him, and so forth, I conclude that it is a real man, and not a wax-work image. But in such cases we assume all through the existence of other men as a well-known fact; the question is only whether this is one of such other men or no. On the supposed argument from analogy to the existence of other men, we are not supposed as yet to have the notion of such existence at all. But then how in the world could such an explanation of certain ideas being unaccompanied by the feelings which have actually gone along with them, possibly occur to us at all?

The man in the well-known story, who repeatedly pinched his neighbour's leg, thinking it was his own, and felt nothing, exclaimed at length, 'Yes, it has come at last!' He thought, not that some one else felt the pinches, but that his own leg was paralysed. Our solipsist is supposed to be with respect to all the phenomena of consciousness in the same position as the man in this tale was in with respect to his neighbour's leg. He thinks that they belong to him; he expects from previous experience a certain phenomenon to be attended by a certain painful sensation; he finds it unattended by it; surely he would conclude, like the man in the story, that something had gone wrong with him, not (as no such possibility had *ex hypothesi* hitherto entered his head) that *some one else* was feeling a painful sensation such as he generally felt on occasion of a like phenomenon.

In actual fact, of course no one begins to reason before having already the notion of other people's existence. Human consciousness is from the first a social consciousness, the consciousness of an objective world common to

one's own self with other selves, through our intercourse with whom this consciousness is developed. We have no evidence to show how apart from such intercourse this distinctively human consciousness could be attained. We should, I fancy, seek in vain—whether among human children stolen in earliest infancy by wolves or elsewhere—for a real prototype of the 'Mowgli' of Mr. Kipling's delightful fiction.

But to deny on such grounds as these that the knowledge which each of us has of the existence of other persons beside himself can possibly be explained as the result of an inference by way of analogy is not to affirm, as is sometimes insinuated, the possession by everyone of us of a mysterious knowledge of the existence of other persons, independent of perception through the senses and similar to our knowledge of those logical or mathematical axioms whose universal validity is said to be self-evident. It does not expose us to a challenge to say prior to experience how many such other persons there are. It does not imply that we refuse to assign to the exercise of our reasoning faculty any part in the attainment of this knowledge or to acknowledge the presence in it of any kind of mediation.

Dr. Rashdall himself, as we have seen, hesitates to say that the knowledge which each of us has of his own existence is merely an 'inference,'—but neither can it, he thinks, be properly called 'immediate'; he prefers to describe it as an 'intellectual construction.' Now certainly the notion of a continuous self, persisting through change and distinguished from, while at the same time having its actual being in successive states of mind, may be very properly called an 'intellectual construction.' I should not myself object to anyone who so pleased calling it

an 'inference.' Unquestionably it needs an exercise of reason to attain to it, and without mediation by memory it would be impossible. Nevertheless there is presupposed in it throughout a consciousness of self which it explains or explicates, but which it could not create, and apart from which it could not itself exist. Nor at any point of the complex process of reflexion or 'intellectual construction' which we have mentioned does this consciousness cease to be in an intelligible sense 'immediate,' though with an 'immediacy' quite compatible with the presence of 'mediation' in that process.

For my own part, I should be prepared to contend that we may observe also in our knowledge of objects a like co-existence of 'immediacy' with 'inference' or 'intellectual construction.' It may, I think, be convincingly shown [8] (though this is not the place to deal at length with the subject) that all attempts, such as have been frequently made by psychologists, to explain our perception of an external world as derived from a consciousness of mental states merely as such, must be in the end unsuccessful; and that such perception is an irreducible element of our consciousness, and may be described as 'immediate,' although the elaborated notion of the world about us and of our own bodies in relation to it and within it which is characteristic of the mature human mind (not to speak of the further developments involved in the mathematical conception of Space and the scientific view of the world), is the result of a highly complicated effort of 'intellectual construction,' and includes much that is not only mediate and inferential but even analogical and hypothetical.

[8] See especially H. W. B. Joseph in *Mind*, N.S. 75, pp. 305 ff., 457 ff.; 76, pp. 161 ff. (July and Oct. 1910, Apr. 1911).

In quite similar fashion do I take the recognition of an immediate experience of intercourse with other minds to be consistent with the frank admission that our developed notion of a social world is an 'intellectual construction,' full of mediation of various kinds, though presupposing the presence in it throughout of such an 'immediate' experience, apart from which it would cease to exist. I do not think that there is in such a view anything strange or new; indeed, it seems to me to be already implied in the Platonic doctrine, to which I have frequently referred, and which all experience appears to confirm, that we learn the structure of our own souls through observation of the social structure which confronts us and which yet we can only understand by recognizing in it the expression on a larger scale of sentiments, desires, or impulses inherent in the nature of each one of us.

I hope that this long digression from our main topic will not be thought irrelevant and superfluous. I think it may prove to be of considerable assistance in clearing the way for a better understanding of what is meant by speaking of a religious experience of personal intercourse between the worshipper and his God.

For it will, I think, have become plain that it is possible to speak of having a direct or immediate knowledge of another person without intending thereby to lay claim to the possession of some mysterious or magical power, of which the great majority of our fellow men have no experience, and which is independent of the ordinary means of communication through sensible signs. No doubt it would be idle to deny that in passing from the mutual intercourse of human beings to the intercourse of human beings with God we have passed into a sphere less obviously familiar to all. Were it otherwise indeed

there would be no significance in the time-honoured contrast, to which, as we saw, Dr. Rashdall has directed our attention, of 'faith' with 'sight.' But we may at least be prepared by our examination of the nature of our acquaintance with persons like ourselves to admit that, if Religion be other than an illusion altogether, there may be an immediate knowledge of God enjoyed by ordinary religious people who would ascribe their conviction of his existence and their conception of their own relation to him to the arguments or persuasions of teachers and preachers, and would altogether disavow for themselves any acquaintance with such extraordinary experiences as are found in the biographies of those to whom the name of 'mystic' is commonly applied.

I conceive Descartes to have been right in his view[9] that in the consciousness of our own incompleteness or imperfection is implicit a consciousness of that with which we are thereby contrasted; or, in other words, a consciousness of God. This consciousness may, if we like, be called '*a priori*,' since it is not derived from any particular experience but is involved in the character of any human experience whatsoever.

In the same way the perception of Space may be called '*a priori*' if, as I hold, it is vain to attempt its derivation from any more primitive perception in which it is not already involved. But our conviction of the infinity of Space is also *a priori* in the sense that it is obviously not obtained by an induction of particular experiences, but by reflection on the nature of such experiences as involve a perception of externality. It is none the less *a priori* because such reflection requires the exercise of a power of abstraction which can hardly be supposed to

[9] See Descartes, *Med.* iii.

belong to all human minds, and because, even among the most civilized peoples, only comparatively few individuals ever attend to this implication of their own everyday thoughts and actions. But, unless we were from the first and still continued to be aware of the Space which we afterwards discover on reflexion cannot be finite, this reflection itself would be impossible; and in making it we inevitably—since it is precisely that very Space wherein our bodies are and no other which we have inferred to be infinite—come at last to regard ourselves as aware of infinite Space; for, though we certainly do not *perceive* at any time more than a finite region of space, we find ourselves unable to *think* of this same finite region which we perceive otherwise than as a portion of infinite Space.

In like manner my agreement with Descartes that what may be called an implicit consciousness of God is bound up with our self-consciousness from the first in no wise tempts me to deny the necessity of thought and inference to the attainment of such an articulation and explication of this familiar consciousness as could deserve the name of a knowledge of God; any more than the recognition that a certain consciousness of self is presupposed in all rational activity, or the conviction that it is impossible to deduce from anything which does not already imply it our perception of external objects, compels us to maintain that Psychology and Natural Science, or even that unsystematic familiarity with the ways of persons and things that we expect from sensible and experienced men of the world, come by nature. Certainly they no more do so than, despite the opinion expressed by Shakespeare's learned constable, do reading and writing.[10] After all, to regard it as characteristic even of Mysticism, as seen

[10] Shakespeare, *Much Ado about Nothing*, III. iii.

in its greatest representatives, to rely upon some immediate impression, which would render all thought and inference superfluous for the aspirant after divine knowledge, would be to make a grave mistake.

Yet when a man, whether he be what is called a 'mystic' or no, has once attained to a genuine religious faith, and convinced himself that he stands in the Presence of God, he is sure that he has stood there from the first; and that in the whole process of his conviction, although it may have included a stage at which he would have described himself as entertaining the possibility of God's existence as a mere hypothesis to account for certain experienced facts, God has in truth been revealing himself to him. He will be unable to conceive even his initial seeking of God as other than a response to an action of God upon his soul,[11] which was none the less immediate in one sense because in another it availed itself of means; just as we should not hesitate to speak of the direct or immediate influence of a teacher in stimulating the interest of a pupil, although no doubt this stimulation is mediated by voice and glance and touch, by sympathy with the pupil and study of his tastes.

So far I have only been concerned to contend that we may, without unfaithfulness to fact or disparagement of the part played by reason in the discovery of God, speak of a direct or immediate experience of the Divine Being.

While it has perhaps seldom if ever been found possible to avoid altogether in the language of Religion the description of our relation to the Divine Being in terms of a personal intercourse, it is not, as we have seen, true to say that in all systems this description is seriously taken.

[11] Cp. Pascal, *Pensées* (ed. Faugère, ii. 231), *Tu ne me chercherais pas si tu ne m'avais trouvé.*

And it has not been my intention to limit the application of the remarks which I have just made to systems in which it is so taken. But since, even where Personality is not ascribed to God in the theological account given of the religious experience, this experience is conceived, in proportion to its degree of perfection, to engage the whole or at least the heart of the worshipper's personality, it may, I think, be truly said that Religion is always the experience of a direct personal relation to the Highest.

This last sentence may perhaps require some commentary, which may be most conveniently given in a brief reference to one or two forms of Religion in which this character of personal intercourse may seem especially to be lacking.

There is no doubt a widespread type of Religion in which the worshipper regards his religious life rather as a matter of social observance or of identification of himself with his people than as an individual concern of his own. Yet here we find him usually recognizing that there are members of the community who are religiously his superiors just because their relation to the Divine has an intimate and immediate character lacking to his own.

On the other hand there are cases in which, although little account is made of Personality as a character of the Divine, yet the religion is very much an *individual* religion, finding its perfection in solitary asceticism and meditation, and the Object of religious veneration tends to be the 'dweller in the innermost,' the devotee's own ultimate Selfhood, reached by the abnegation of whatever seems transient and separable in the constitution of his personality.

Finally, in those types of philosophical Religion which expressly deny the reciprocation of the worshipper's re-

gard by the Object of his reverence, and thereby the truth of the representation of religion as personal intercourse, it is nevertheless just in the fullest development of a man's personality that he is supposed to attain to the contemplation of the Supreme excellence. Thus for Aristotle the νοῦς in each man is each man's true self;[12] and it is precisely in the complete understanding of our own nature as determined by our place in the Whole of reality that for Spinoza the *amor intellectualis Dei* consists.

Everywhere indeed our conception of Religion seems to include a certain 'warmth and intimacy'[13] which we associate with such experiences as we call emphatically *personal* (though of course in a sense all human experiences may be so designated). It is just this characteristic of Religion which the Founder of these Lectures had in view when he described it in his will as "a true and felt knowledge—not mere nominal knowledge—of the relations of man and of the universe to God." When we speak of some other form of activity than that which we generally designate as specifically religious, Science or Art or Morality or Politics or Philosophy, being this or that man's religion, we mean, I think, not only that his whole self is engaged in the pursuit of that activity, surrendered to it and dependent upon it, but also that this devotion to it is experienced with a warmth and intimacy the absence of which would make it no longer a religion but merely a task; as, on the other hand, the absence of a sense of self-surrender and dependence would reduce it to the standing of a hobby.[14]

But it is in intercourse with other persons that, outside of Religion, we find most readily and naturally the

[12] Ar., *Eth. Nic.*, x. 7, 1178 a 2.

[13] James, *Principles of Psychology*, i. p. 331. Cp. above, p. 151.

[14] Cp. *God and Personality*, p. 214.

consciousness of 'warmth and intimacy' united with those sentiments of reverence and self-surrender which would appear to demand in their object a reality fully equal to that of their subject. Thus the mutual relation of persons seems to be that which bears by far the closest resemblance to the relation of the personal Soul to the Supreme Reality which we call Religion; so that we shall expect attempts to assimilate it to any other form of human activity to be less satisfactory than that which allows the mutual relation of persons to suggest the language by which it is to be described. Especially will this be so if language drawn from other regions of human experience than that of personal intercourse be employed with a deliberate intention of divorcing Religion from the associations of the latter.

The historical development of Religion points, unless I mistake, in a direction quite different from that in which they suppose it to point who favour a preference of impersonal to personal language in speaking of its Object. It points towards the acknowledgment that in that religious experience which is least inadequately described as an experience of personal relations to the Highest is revealed a fundamental fact of the Divine Life, which thus becomes known as in its inner nature a blissful life of mutual knowledge and love.

It may, however, be said:[15] Granted that there has been so far at any rate on any considerable scale no higher or deeper form of religious experience than that which has found its best expression in terms of a personal intercourse between the worshipper and his God; is it not premature to assume that this or any other which has as yet made a figure on the historical stage is a fixed and

[15] I owe the suggestion of this difficulty to Professor Muirhead.

final form, beyond which it is impossible to anticipate a further development? The answer I should give to such a question as this will be found to introduce us to the problem which I propose to discuss in the next Lecture—that namely of the criticism by Naturalism from the one side, and by Absolute Idealism from the other, of the claim made on behalf of Personality to immunity from dissolution either into movements of matter or into categories of thought.

It would be only a parrying of such a question as I have supposed put to me to say—and yet it is, I think, worth saying at the outset—that nothing appears to me more to recommend the description of the relation between the worshipper and the Object of his worship in terms of personal intercourse than the circumstance that of all forms of Reality with which we are conversant none impresses us as possessing a larger measure than Personality of freedom from predetermined external conditions which would limit the possibilities of novel development. We might speak of the infinite possibilities of a chaos; we might call a lifeless machine or a living but mindless organism a systematic and even (in the latter case) a self-determined whole; but to combine systematic order with a possibility of development in various directions, determined by a self-conscious principle of choice within itself, is the prerogative of Mind or Reason; and the rational living being is, as we have often noted, that which we call a Person. Thus it is (as I observed when discussing the problem of sin in the former course of Lectures),[16] "in the instance of personal character" that "we seem to find no incompatibility between the thought of a perfection upon which we can place entire

[16] See *God and Personality*, p. 211.

dependence and that of a living activity, whose course could by no means be settled beforehand, but would afford to the spectator the joy of anticipating ever new and unexpected manifestations of power and wisdom and goodness." The 'personal' form of religious experience may thus fairly be said to merit less than any other the reproach of being 'fixed and final.'

Yet this consideration, though not, I think, wholly irrelevant, does no more, we may be told, than parry the question with which we are dealing. May it not be said that, granting the form of religious experience which finds in it a personal intercourse between the worshipper and his God to be, on the whole, the most satisfactory yet reached, it is unnecessary to assume that the human spirit cannot pass beyond this, as other forms have been left behind in the past? It is admitted that, even as it is, it is impossible to regard man's communion with the Divine as precisely analogous to that with his fellow man; that we must therefore supplement the statements which describe it in terms of the latter by others which emphasize God's immanence in his worshipper and the ultimate dependence of the whole process upon his activity. May not a further supplementation be eventually required, which would altogether subordinate the aspect of personal intercourse in some deeper and more perfect form of religious experience than that which is more or less adequately characterized by accounts which lay the principal stress upon that aspect?

To a criticism of this kind I would reply by calling attention to the following points.

I would freely allow the need of some supplementation (if we may use the word) of the mutual intercourse of human beings in order to describe the communion of human

beings with God. But I would insist that this 'supplementation' shall not be in fact a reduction; and that we do not end in so describing the latter that all which was gained by borrowing the language appropriate to the former is again lost. It can scarcely be doubted that this has sometimes been the ultimate result of what promised to be an elimination from religious experience, as merely temporary and subjective, of so essential a factor of anything at all resembling human intercourse as reciprocation by God of the worshipper's knowledge and love of him.

I would urge very strongly that we are presented with such a reduction instead of a supplementation, unless there be attributed to the Object of worship a reality at least as full and concrete as is attributed to his worshipper.

But I would recognize that some of those whom I should accuse of eviscerating rather than supplementing the view of religion which takes it for personal intercourse between God and man would insist that the accusation involves a fundamental misconception of the nature of both the Absolute Reality and the individual human personality. To meet this criticism it will become necessary for us to investigate more closely the real rank to be assigned in the kingdom of Reality to the finite individual person. To this problem I shall attempt to address myself in the following Lectures.

LECTURE VIII

NATURALISM AND THE VALUE OF THE INDIVIDUAL PERSON

THE importance of Personality is depreciated, as I have already observed, from two very different points of view, which may be conveniently designated as those of Naturalism and of Absolute Idealism. We might even speak of them as opposite points of view, were it not that we sometimes find them combined in the position of the same thinker. In the present Lecture I shall deal with them apart from one another, beginning with what I shall call the Naturalistic depreciation of Personality.

I will preface what I have to say under this head by recalling the confession which in the introductory Lecture of the present course I made of incompetence both in Physiology and in that border region of inquiry which is the subject matter of Psychophysics. This incompetence disqualifies me from treating with that fulness which the difficulty of the matter and its close connexion with our present subject would seem to demand the problem of the relation of Soul and Body. If my discussion of this problem should appear perfunctory, it is not from any lack of a due estimate of the intrinsic importance thereof, or from blindness to the truth that it is a deeply seated doubt whether, notwithstanding all that philosophers and theologians may say, the individual Soul is not in

fact an accident or adjunct of the Body, originating and perishing along with it, which is really the principal obstacle in the way of a more general intellectual acceptance of a religious view of the world. I must therefore ask my hearers to believe that I have not, in forming my own judgment, neglected to take such account of the results of biological research as was possible to me. In the few remarks which I shall make I shall endeavour to confine myself to considerations which, so far as I can see, are not at the mercy of further investigations yet to be made, or already made without my knowledge, into the nature and behaviour of our bodies, especially in relation to what we may call the psychical aspect of our being.

In the first Lecture of my earlier course I endeavoured to point out the difficulty which Personality must inevitably present to a philosophy which regards Natural Science as the type of genuine knowledge. I had there in view not so much a philosophy, such as is now commonly described under the name of Naturalism, which takes as its own the point of view characteristic of students of Natural Science; but rather one which, like that of Green, set out to criticize that point of view as inadequate to account for Natural Science itself. But, if we find even such a philosophy as this failing to do justice to the conception of Personality just because it devotes itself principally to an investigation of the presuppositions of Natural Science, still more shall we expect to meet with a like deficiency in a way of thinking which does not so much criticize as accept and make its own the identification of the 'philosophical' with the 'scientific' attitude of mind.

It is characteristic of Science, as we have already noted, to deal with Universals; the Individual, as such,

must always escape its grasp ; for Science the Individual has no interest except as the instance of a Universal. But if the Individual, as such, eludes the grasp of Science, it follows that we may say the same of the Person, the Rational Individual. It may, however, be contended either that Science is not really incapable of grasping the Individual even in the form of the Person, since the peculiarities of any individual organism may be traced by scientific research to peculiarities in the structure or development of the 'germplasm ;' or, alternatively, that, so far as it may be truly said to be incapable of grasping it, this is not because the Individual is *above* but rather because it is *below* its consideration ; since, so far as one means by the Individual a mere *this*, there is nothing to say about it except to answer the question 'this *what*?' by an account of the general nature whereof it is an instance. It is true that this second point is perhaps less likely to be made by a representative of the type of thought usually described as Naturalism than by the disciples of a philosophy akin to that whose depreciation of Personality will be discussed in the next Lecture ; but it is nevertheless in fact so much to the purpose of Naturalism that it will be appropriate to say something of it in connexion with that way of looking at the world.

It is not, I think, difficult to see that the kind of explanation of the individual organism which Science sometimes claims to give is only at the most an explanation of the peculiarities of the Individual, not of its Individuality. For a germplasm with a precisely similar structure and history would on this showing develop into a precisely *similar*—but surely not into the *same*—individual. It is this essential distinction between Similarity and Identity which defies scientific explanation, just because this

must always be an explanation in terms of characteristics which are or may be common to several individuals.

It is well known that a great philosopher has put forward as a grand principle of metaphysics the 'identity of indiscernibles.'[1] No two real beings, so Leibnitz held, could be, except for difference of position in time or space, exactly alike. There must be some intrinsic diversity between them whereby a sufficiently penetrating intelligence could distinguish them one from another. Hence to speak of two things really indiscernible by any mind whatever would be to speak of one and the same thing under two names. I do not now propose to discuss this principle, which has much to commend it to anyone who, like Leibnitz, acknowledges in the universal order the effect of Divine Wisdom and Goodness. But it is certainly not a principle to which Naturalism can consistently appeal. It is by no means evident to any one who does not take as an axiom the Principle of Sufficient Reason in Leibnitz's sense of it, namely as the principle of the choice of the best among the possibilities, that there can be no two real things exactly alike. Were there such they would indeed be indiscernible, but they would not be identical.

If they were really indiscernible, they might, however, although not identical, be said to be *all one to Science.* And this is precisely the view that Aristotle takes of real beings who are individual specimens of the same kind in the sublunary world. These, though as regards their *matter* they are distinct from one another, are, as regards their specific *form,* indistinguishable from one another, so that no universal statement relating to that

[1] See Leibnitz's 4th Letter to Clarke; and cp. *Nouveaux Essais,* ii. 27, iii. 6.

particular sort of thing can be made concerning one which could not as well be made about another. Thus to Science, since it is always concerned only with what can be the subject of such universal statements, these individuals are mere instances of the Universal; with their Individuality Science cannot deal, not because it is something too high for Science to reach, but because it is too low.

We shall find it, however, convenient to remind ourselves at this point that Aristotle thought otherwise of Individuality in what he regarded as a higher region of the universe than this earth in which our lot is cast.[2] The starry heavens are in his view tenanted by individual beings known to us through the immortal lights that are fixed in the spheres whose eternal motion is caused by the desire kindled in them by the excellence of these exalted spirits, even as the motion of the whole Universe is caused by its instinctive yearning after the supreme excellence of God. These beings are not regarded as individuals of one species or kind; each of them might rather be said to constitute a species by himself; and, since he has never come into being nor will ever pass away, there is no need as in this lower world for a multiplication of individuals that are born and die and thus in their continual succession perpetuate the race to which they belong and preserve its special contribution to the wealth of the Whole. The science of Astronomy has thus no need to ignore the distinction between individuals of the same specific nature or kind, since none such exists in the ethereal world whereof it treats.

Remote though these ancient speculations may seem from the knowledge which we now possess of the pheno-

[2] See on the nature of the star-spirits, *Met.* Λ 8, and cp. Z. 6.

mena to which they relate, there is still something to learn from them as to the nature of Individuality. It is as true now as in the days of Aristotle that, if ever an individual does but repeat a type without variation, it will be a mere instance of that type; and it is in no way derogatory to Science to say that it does not concern itself with it except as such an instance. But it is no less true that, where the individual not merely happens to be the only one of its kind but recognizes itself or is recognized in its individuality as an unique feature of the Whole, by the absence of which that Whole would be impoverished, there the incapacity of Science to grasp it except as an instance (though it may chance to be the sole instance) of an Universal does constitute a bar to any claim, such as Naturalism makes on behalf of Science, to determine the limits of Reality. It is of course another question altogether where we can predicate Individuality in the lower and where in the higher sense; whether indeed there *is* in fact any individuality which *merely* repeats a type. Leibnitz with his doctrine of the identity of indiscernibles denies this so far as relates to beings with a genuine unity of their own. So too it is another question whether, on the other hand, there be any objective significance in the notion of unique value, not for this or that conscious being, but, to use a phrase of Bacon's, *in ordine ad universum*.[3] A consistent Naturalism, we must note, could not admit that there is.

When, however, it was said that Naturalism depreciates Personality, more was meant than that neither Natural Science itself nor a philosophy whose view of the world is determined by the necessary limitations of Natural Science can take account of the Individual, whether

[3] Bacon, *Nov. Org.* ii. § 13.

rational or otherwise, except as an instance of some Universal. It was meant also that, in regarding Personality, such a philosophy must needs regard it *from the outside* only, as a mode of behaviour of certain natural objects, and therefore must inevitably see in it a sporadic and evanescent phenomenon, the peculiar interest whereof to ourselves who exhibit it cannot blind a sober observer to the small part played by it in the mighty cosmic drama which is unrolled before us by the researches of Natural Science.

But, as some of the most thoughtful representatives of Naturalism have acknowledged, if we look at the matter from the other side, we find the position reversed. The whole 'choir of heaven and furniture of earth' (to use the often-quoted phrase of Berkeley [4]) are known to us only as objects either of our perception by means of the senses or of our thought, which infers from the phenomena perceived by our senses unperceived causes of those phenomena, and laws according to which these causes produce the effects which we perceive. Nor (it may confidently be affirmed) have the efforts been successful which some have made to show that Perception and Thought, to which we owe the knowledge of the world which Natural Science investigates, are themselves intelligible as the product of that system of bodies in motion which they apprehend. Perception and Thought, whereby we apprehend objects, cannot be construed as part of the world of objects which we apprehend by means of them. This has been frequently pointed out, and I do not propose now to go over again ground so familiar to all students of this kind of questions.

I am not, however, contending that the impossibility

[4] Berkeley, *Principles of Human Knowledge*, § 6.

of explaining the Mind which apprehends the world of objects as an object among others in the world which it apprehends carries with it the possibility of turning the tables upon Naturalism and explaining the world of objects as dependent for its very being on the Mind which apprehends it. On the contrary, however we may be led eventually to think of the relation of Mind or Spirit to what we contrast with it as Matter or Nature, it seems to me that apprehension always presupposes that what is apprehended is in some sense independent of the act in which it is apprehended, even if (as would be generally admitted to be the case, for example, with a pain, such as a toothache) it cannot actually exist apart from being apprehended. It is sufficient, for my present purpose at any rate, to insist that Mind, which apprehends the world of objects, cannot be construed as merely a part of the world of objects which it apprehends.

It is indeed for this reason (to cast our thoughts back for a moment to a point discussed in my last Lecture) that the acquaintance which one mind has with another is not to be classed with its apprehension of what is not Mind at all. If we look in our acquaintance with other minds for an apprehension of this sort, we shall find only our apprehension of the material vehicles through which the other minds express themselves; and it is this fact which has led some (erroneously, as I think) to describe our acquaintance with other minds as due to an 'inference' from perceived facts, based on an analogy with other facts already known to us, as though it were comparable with the framing of those hypotheses to account for perceived phenomena which we make in our investigation of external Nature. We know other minds than our own,

not through apprehending them as objects, but through participation with them in a common activity.

But while Natural Science cannot explain Personality as part of the system which it explores, it presupposes it in the sense that we have no experience of Natural Science, nor can, as I venture to think, even conceive of its existence otherwise than as the activity of a personal Mind.

In its exclusive preoccupation with the Universal, Natural Science may find the Individual, rational or other, elude its grasp; and being, as it is, essentially an apprehension of Objects, it can never come face to face with the Subject whose activity itself is. But the capacity of apprehending the general nature of objects even after this abstract fashion is an attribute of that Rationality which differentiates Persons from individual beings of lower rank.

There will always be something paradoxical in the fact that with bodies of so small account in the vast material universe as those of human beings is associated an intelligence to which, just because it apprehends this universe in its immensity, this same paradox can present itself. We shall find it convenient to describe this paradox in the language of that one among the great historical systems of Philosophy which representatives of Naturalism often find more congenial to their own mood than any other—I mean the system of Spinoza.

According to Spinoza there is but one real Substance, which he calls indifferently 'God' and 'Nature;' and of this one Substance Extension and Thought are attributes, and the only two attributes known to us. They never interact with one another, nor do they overlap one another. The nature of God or the Universe may

be expressed in terms of either. There is what may be called a complete parallelism between them, so that there can be nothing in the mind which is not the 'idea' or mental counterpart of something bodily or material, nor anything in the material world of which there is not a corresponding 'idea.'

Thus to the whole material system corresponds such an understanding of it as is the goal of the physicist, an understanding in which there is no thought of purposes or 'final causes' but only of what may be called a mathematical or mechanical necessity. Such an imperfect apprehension of it as anyone of us actually has—and this constitutes his 'soul'—is primarily a consciousness of that part of the system which is called his 'body,' and of any other parts only so far as they are in direct or indirect contact with this. All in our 'souls' that has reference to our 'bodies' as things taken apart from the whole system of material nature (or, as Spinoza would say, of God under the attribute of Extension) only belongs to them so far as they themselves are similarly taken out of their context in the complete system of thought which he calls 'the infinite Understanding of God.' Such are the emotions which correspond to the effort by which a particular body maintains for a while its separate existence; and such again is the sense of acting spontaneously and for purposes of our own, which we experience when our movements are immediately due to processes within our bodies, the more remote causes of which lie in a region of the material universe which is beyond our ken. This latter sense is of course what is sometimes called the consciousness of the freedom of our wills; but Spinoza does not consider that, in discovering this supposed consciousness of freedom to be due merely to the imperfec-

tion of our knowledge, we need feel ourselves to be robbed of anything truly valuable. There is, he thinks, a much more precious kind of consciousness of Freedom, which comes not from ignorance, but from knowledge. For in proportion as a man sees in all that he is and does and suffers a consequence of the eternal and unchangeable nature of the Universe (or, as Spinoza would say, of God), he is delivered from the bondage in which he must remain, at the mercy of vain hopes and fears, so long as he thinks of himself as having interests and possibilities of his own apart from the Whole of which he forms a part.[5]

In this representation of the nature of the Universe, great as is the measure of truth in it, and attractive as it is in its majestic symmetry and stoical aloofness from absorption in those private desires and ambitions which make up the life of 'passion's slaves,'[6] there is yet, as I have said, one feature which gives rise to suspicion of its adequacy. That my little knowledge of the world is related to the infinite understanding of God as my little body to the infinite extension of Nature may be true enough. But there is nothing to correspond in the world of bodies with the capacity which there is in our minds, notwithstanding all their limitations, of identifying themselves with the whole of which they are a part, so far at least as to recognize their own imperfection, and even, in the supreme experience of the *amor intellectualis Dei*, of rejoicing in the perfection which, in another sense, they do not themselves enjoy. We remember how Aristotle, whose philosophy was in so many respects similar in temper with Spinoza's, was constrained by

[5] See my *Hist. of Philosophy*, pp. 158 ff.

[6] Shakespeare, *Hamlet*, III. ii. 76, 77, 'Give me that man That is not passion's slave.'

his recognition of this very capacity in the Soul for Knowledge, the claim to which necessarily involves a claim to the apprehension of the Absolute and Eternal, to supplement the story of its natural development as the inward expression of its bodily organization by the recognition of a factor, the νοῦς, of which he could only say that it "comes from without." [7] Not less truly does Spinoza's insistence on the presence of that in our minds whereby, as he says, "we feel and experience that we are immortal" [8] break in upon the parallelism which has made his teaching so congenial to thinkers of a naturalistic bent, though perhaps the incongruity is less openly confessed by the modern than by the ancient philosopher.

The existence of this consciousness of the Whole, which alone makes any kind of Science possible, forbids us to acquiesce in the depreciation of Personality whereof this consciousness is an integral factor when this depreciation is based on taking the world of objects which Natural Science investigates as the true reality, and the Mind, of which Natural Science is itself an activity, as a mere by-product or 'epiphenomenon' thereof. But there is left another possibility of depreciating Personality, which starts as it were from the other side, and sees in it no more than as it were an accident of Knowledge [9] notwithstanding that we are acquainted with knowledge only as a personal activity. As Naturalism could be accused of forgetting its own presuppositions, so it may be suggested that a view which takes Personality as the ultimate form or as belonging to the ultimate form of Mind forgets

[7] Ar. *de Gen. An.* ii. 3, 736 b 28.

[8] Spinoza, *Eth.* v. 23.

[9] Bacon says of the mind in his speech 'In Praise of Knowledge (*Life and Letters*, i, p. 123): 'The mind itself is but an accident to knowledge.'

to discriminate between what in Mind is the presupposition of its scientific activity and what is itself conditioned by the objects of that activity. It is to the consideration of the depreciation of Personality consequent on this latter way of thinking that we must now turn.

The trend of thought to which I am about to call your attention is one familiar enough to historians of Philosophy. In some respects it may be said that it was more characteristic of ancient than of modern times. For there is more than a merely philological interest in the facts noted in my former course of Lectures respecting the comparatively recent date at which the words ὑπόστασις and *persona* came to be employed in the philosophical sense associated by us to-day with the expression 'Personality.' Although the statement that the conception of Personality was unknown to the classical philosophy of Greece is often rashly made, and without qualifications which would be necessary before one could justly assent to it, there is notwithstanding an element and even an important element of truth to be found in it.

When it is asked whether Plato's God, for example, was in our sense a *personal* God, or the Immortality of the Soul on which he laid such great stress was in our sense a *personal* immortality, I am far from saying that it is impossible to give a definite answer and to support it by reasons; but I think it is plain that these were not questions which would have seemed to Plato himself so obvious and important as they would to the majority of thoughtful men to-day. Modern philosophers who do not think them important, or even regard them as questions which a truly philosophical inquirer would not put, would yet not deny them to be at any rate obvious.

In respect of Aristotle, the various proposed explanations of certain enigmatic expressions in his treatise *On the Soul* which were thought to deal with the relation of the νοῦς—that is, the capacity of apprehending absolute and eternal truth—to the individual personality of those who exhibit this capacity, fill an interesting chapter in the history of thought.[10] But, whatever we take to have been Aristotle's own intention in these expressions, we may be certain that he would not have left them so susceptible of diverse interpretation as he did, had he shared the preoccupation with the problem of Divine and Human Personality which made it a matter of such moment with his medieval disciples of every school to ascertain the full purport of what it could be maintained that he had taught concerning them.

It is not, however, my intention on this occasion to explore the history of that type of thought which issues in the view of Personality as belonging to a world which Philosophy can convict of being no more than Appearance and not to the ultimate nature of Spirit. I propose rather to examine it as it exists among our own contemporaries.

In the fifth Lecture of my previous course, I called attention to the two different principles upon which we unify our mental life—the *rational* and the *personal*. I endeavoured to show how, while they differed widely from one another, they nevertheless seemed each of them indispensable to the other. On the *rational* principle, there belong together the premisses and the conclusion of a syllogism, though the conclusion be drawn by one man from premisses he could only have had from another, who yet himself had never drawn from them their legiti-

[10] Cp. *Studies in the History of Nat. Theol.*, pp. 263 ff.

mate conclusion. On the *personal* principle there may belong together thoughts which have no rational connexion and are united only by links of association which would be unintelligible to any other person. Yet we should estimate the rank of a personality to a considerable extent, if not altogether, by the degree in which the succession of thoughts and volitions which make up the personal life is ordered on a rational principle, and should hardly allow the name of 'person' to anyone whose mind exhibited a complete absence of rational connexion between its contents. And on the other hand we certainly have no knowledge of rational connexion as holding except between thoughts and volitions which make part of some personal life or other.

It is, however, to be observed that, whereas Rationality is plainly a constituent factor in what we call Personality, so that there would be no meaning in speaking of a life as *personal* which was not *rational* at all, the affirmation that Reason is a personal activity may without absurdity be regarded as a merely empirical statement to which nothing warrants us in ascribing necessary and universal validity. The contents of a personal mind, it may be said, are tested by their conformity with principles of Reason; but the rational connexion—say, of the premisses and conclusion of a sound argument—is none the less *rational* though it be not present to any single *personal* consciousness.

There have appeared in our own day among English-speaking philosophers two kindred though not identical ways of thinking which have attempted to lay a greater emphasis upon the *personal* than upon the *rational* principle of connexion among the contents of our minds, and we may find it helpful at this stage to

consider how far they have proved successful. We may call them respectively 'Pragmatism' and 'Personal Idealism.' [11]

In respect of the former I am only concerned at present with its insistence upon the purposiveness of all thought and upon the importance of ascertaining the purpose of the thinker before sitting in judgment upon any expression of thought in words. Though I do not think that the purposiveness of thought has been denied or even really overlooked by any great philosopher, yet perhaps it has not always been sufficiently borne in mind that the bald propositions which are taken out of their context to serve as examples in text-books of Logic can no more, as they stand, be considered adequate expressions of thought than sentences similarly detached to illustrate grammatical rules can be regarded as possessing literary value. Forgetfulness of the other point which I have mentioned as one emphasized by Pragmatism has led to graver misunderstandings; and perhaps nowhere more remarkably than in the instance, especially interesting to us here, of the interpretation of religious formulas as statements of scientific fact without due attention to the purpose which they are intended to serve by those who frame and those who use them as expressions of certain religious experiences. But, while conceding to Pragmatism the truth of its doctrine of the purposiveness of thought and the importance of its warning to take into account a speaker's or writer's purpose before criticizing what he says or writes, we are compelled to charge its exponents with confusion between what in the purpose of a speaker or writer is irrelevant and what is relevant

[11] See *Proceedings of Congress of History of Religions*, Oxford, 1908, ii. pp. 419 ff.

to a decision as to the truth or falsehood of his utterances. I have, however, already in the second Lecture of my present course adverted in another connexion to this confusion, and I will not dilate upon it now. I will only observe that in subordinating Reason to Personality on the ground that a personal purpose inspires the logical or scientific activity, as it does every other activity of the human spirit, Pragmatism omits to notice that only so far as this purpose is directed to the attainment of the truth does it continue to inspire the scientific activity to the end. I may stop counting when I will; but if I go on counting, I can only count in one way. My change of purpose interrupts my activity of calculation and substitutes some other; it does not affect the laws of the calculating activity itself.

Personal Idealism is, I think, no more satisfactory than Pragmatism in its attempt to challenge for Persons a reality which it denies to Things. The very principle upon which the 'idealism' of Personal Idealists turns when they maintain that we cannot take the object out of relation to the subject to which in Knowledge we find it related, this same principle it abandons when it comes to persons. 'Persons' are, so it is held, independent of things, which have no reality except in relation to them; and, since persons do not exist, like things, only in virtue of being perceived or known, they are essentially independent of other persons also. Nevertheless, it seems extremely difficult to deny that apart from the relations of persons to other persons and to things we should be unable to give any account of what we should call their *personal* characteristics. This doctrine thus seems to plead a prerogative for persons which cannot easily be admitted. The ultimately independent reality of *persons*

is taken away by the same reasoning as in the view of the Personal Idealists themselves[12] takes away the independent reality of *things*. And in the long run the recognition of the independent reality of persons must lead also to that of the independent reality of things; so that Personal Idealism would appear to be no more than a halfway refuge between a Realism which Personal Idealists are apt to brand as Materialism and an Idealism to which they would deny the name of 'personal.' The Absolute Idealism which depreciates Personality as not belonging to the ultimate form of Mind or Spirit will be found to have the advantage in controversy with Personal Idealism of this type, which, in the case of things, has already denied that it belongs to the nature of Knowledge to have an object possessing reality independently of the act whereby it is known.

But not only have certain notable attempts to give to the *personal* principle of unity in our experience a priority over the *rational* seemed to end in failure, but serious difficulties may be raised about the stability of the personal unity of experience when compared with that of the rational. For about that ultimate systematic unity of Reality which is presupposed not only by every kind of Science but by any use of Reason in the conduct of our life there is no question at all comparable with the question about the ultimate unity of the personal Self, which is raised by such phenomena as go by the significant name of 'multiple personality.'

I indicated already in the first Lecture of this present course that I should not be able altogether to avoid the consideration of these phenomena; but also that I had no competence to offer more than such observations upon

[12] I have Dr. Rashdall chiefly in view.

the published accounts of them as might occur to one possessing neither a direct acquaintance with particular instances of their occurrence nor a thorough familiarity with the literature to which they have given occasion. With this preliminary caution, I give for what they are worth two remarks upon this subject, with the grounds for making them.

(1) The expression 'multiple personality' is not really a justifiable description of the phenomena in question; which are more fairly and appropriately designated by the phrase which forms the title of Dr. Morton Prince's well-known study of a celebrated case of the kind, 'the dissociation of a personality.' At the same time it is not to be denied that the other description—if it is, as I think it is, open to objection as question-begging—is not an unnatural one. For we seem to have in these phenomena an exaggeration or intensification of that marked change of mood and outlook which, when occurring in a lesser degree, leads a man's friends to say of him that he is become 'quite another person,' and, if we recollect the primary use of the word 'person' for a part played in social intercourse, it is plain that two so-called 'personalities' (such as 'Miss Beauchamp' and 'Sally' in Dr. Morton Prince's narrative) are distinguished by the fact that the social attitude and behaviour of the one were quite different from and even opposed to those of the other. Thus 'Miss Beauchamp' was depressed while 'Sally' was exuberant; 'Miss Beauchamp' shy and retiring, 'Sally' bold and forward; 'Miss Beauchamp' observant of conventionalities, 'Sally' defiant of them.

We shall find it convenient in examining the relative merits of these two contrasted forms of expression (contrasted, though sometimes both alike used by the same

writers in the same connexion), ' multiple personality and ' dissociation of a personality,' to distinguish what may be called an *alternation* from a *coexistence* of personalities in one bodily organism. It is not intended to suggest that these two kinds of phenomena may not occur or seem to occur in the case of the same organism ; as a matter of fact Dr. Morton Prince's account of the ' Beauchamp ' case provides an illustration of both.

Where there is only what may be called an alternation of personalities it would be misleading to use language suggesting their coexistence. For, if we symbolize the different ' personalities '—the different systems of emotion, interest and conduct exhibited by a certain human organism—as A, B, C, D, and the organism which exhibits them as X, then when X is A there is no system or (if we are to call it so) ' personality ' B actually in existence at all ; and so no person who actually possesses that ' personality,' though there is one who potentially possesses it in the same sense as Philip drunk is potentially Philip sober.

But when we have an apparent compresence of two or more ' personalities ' in one organism we do seem, if this is not an illusory appearance, to have actually two persons existing where one was before, each of whom could claim to be the same person with that one. Here there would seem to be a genuine disruption of personal unity, in a sense in which an alternation of so-called ' personalities ' is not, since in such alternation there is only one person concerned at any one time, and, to use our suggested notation, only one person at a time, whichever it be, XB, XC, or XD, claims to be one and the same person with XA and reciprocally.

I venture, however, to doubt whether there is really

any satisfactory evidence of this compresence of what we may describe as fragmentary personalities using the same organism. In the Beauchamp case 'Sally' professed to have been aware of the doings of 'Miss Beauchamp' *at the time*, and spoke of herself, as though, when 'Miss Beauchamp' was using the organism common to them both, she was herself living a conscious life in a state of unwilling suppression, from which she was unable to escape. 'Miss Beauchamp,' on the other hand, pretended to no recollection of the doings of 'Sally,' of which she appears to have been aware only by hearsay or by inference from their effects, just as one might be of the doings of some one else who had, as we say, *impersonated* one in one's absence and incurred obligations which one was afterwards expected to discharge. I will confess that Dr. Morton Prince's account has not left me convinced that 'Sally' had ever actually been conscious of 'Miss Beauchamp's' doings at the time, as of the actions of another person than herself. I suspect that we have here only a kind of illusion of the memory. 'Sally' really, I should conjecture, *remembered* these doings, which were indeed her own, since she was one person with 'Miss Beauchamp,' and did not need to learn them from others or infer them from their results. But the sense of alienation from certain of one's own past acts which sometimes may in waking life make a man say: 'I cannot believe it was myself whom I remember doing this or that,' and which occasionally in dreams gives rise to an illusory sense of distinction from oneself, has here, I should suppose, been exaggerated into a kind of hallucinatory recollection which yet does not recall a state of mind which ever actually existed. I know too well how small is my competence in a matter of this kind to attach more than

a very trifling weight to this expression of opinion. I lay no stress upon what is positive in it, and only put it forward as an explanation of 'Sally's' assertions of compresence with 'Miss Beauchamp,' which, if correct, would disable her testimony to an actual disruption of the personal unity such as to present to us at one and the same time two persons claiming, on the evidence of memory, identity with one and the same person.

It will, I hope, be clear that what I am doubting is the continuity of two personal consciousnesses with one and the same personal consciousness, and not such a dissociation of elements in the same personal consciousness that some, while repressed and denied free expression by the dominant will, may notwithstanding manifest themselves in bodily motions which the person is not conscious of initiating. For this of course not only happens in the case of 'automatic writing' and the like, but also very frequently in our everyday experience. I feel sure that no one can deny this who will pay attention to what passes in himself when endeavouring by the concentration of attention upon some particular subject to keep some other out of his mind, whether it be from a wish to escape a disagreeable duty or to "crush," in the poet's phrase, "a vice of blood Upon the threshold of the mind." [13]

(2) The second remark concerning these phenomena of dissociation which I desire to make is this: that the successful treatment of those who exhibit them with a view to reducing again to a unity the personality which has suffered dissociation appears to depend upon the use, as a standard and criterion, of an ideal of Personality as a rational and moral system of thought and action. In

[13] Tennyson, *In Memoriam*, § 3.

the instance studied in *The Dissociation of a Personality*, Dr. Morton Prince, who had not known the lady whom he calls Miss Beauchamp until she had already suffered the shock which resulted in the pathological conditions that led to his being consulted upon her case, relates how, as a result of his efforts at the reconstitution of the normal personality which had existed before the occurrence of that shock, he induced in her a state (distinguished by him as B. IV) which he took at first for the normal personality that he was hoping to restore. In this state she was free alike from the morbid depression of the Miss Beauchamp he had first known (B I) and from the unprincipled extravagance which distinguished the behaviour of 'Sally'; but on the other hand she lacked the more attractive features of both characters. She had neither the high ideals of the one nor the frank *joie de vivre* which gave a certain charm to the other. It is noticeable that Dr. Morton Prince was dissatisfied with this issue of his attempt at reconstruction, obviously because of its failure to realize the ideal of a harmonious reconciliation of all that was best in the various distinct and mutually disconnected moods—so distinct and disconnected as to challenge for them the title of 'personalities'—which successively manifested themselves in the physically continuous life of his patient. So much was he dissatisfied that he renewed his hypnotic treatment and did not rest until a somewhat worldly and frivolous character was replaced by one which sufficiently realized the ideal suggested by the fragmentary characters hitherto successively displayed before his observation. This new condition proved to have a stability which none of its predecessors during the period of his acquaintance with the case had possessed; and we are given in the concluding

pages of his book to understand that, when he wrote them, ' Miss Beauchamp ' remained in this state of mental and moral health, free from these abnormal interruptions of the continuity of her spiritual life which have made her so celebrated among psychologists.

We note then that this eminent expert in mental pathology, when seeking for a criterion of *personal* unity, finds it in *Reason*—and in Reason not only in that narrower sense which abstracts from Morality, but in that wider sense, familiar alike in the common language of mankind and in the teaching of the greatest philosophers, in which Morality is treated as the expression of Reason in practice.[14] So far therefore as priority can be asserted for one of the two principles of unity which we are considering over the other, we here again seem to find that the claim of the *rational* principle is stronger than that of the *personal*; though we must not forget on the other hand, that, if we only ascribe *personality* to an individual mind according as it conforms to the rule of Reason, this fact in no wise enables us to conceive Reason except as exercised by an *individual* and, in virtue of this exercise of Reason, a *personal* mind.

Before, however, we pass away from this subject, we may profitably take occasion by what has just been said to observe that the dissociation of the personal consciousness which has during recent years been studied in such extreme cases as that described in Dr. Morton Prince's book, has in less abnormal instances drawn upon itself in all ages the attention of moralists. I am thinking, of course, of the phenomena called by the Greeks ἀκρασία

[14] Cp. James, *Princ. of Psych.*, ii. p. 384. " In cases " (such as some instanced by James) " in which the secondary character is superior to the first, there seems reason to think that the first one is the morbid one."

and ἐγκράτεια, in which Reason and Inclination, the law of the mind' and the 'law in the members,' are seen striving one against the other, so that a man cannot do the things that he would[15] (as he says if he identifies his will with Reason), or prays that his own will may not be done (if he identifies it with inclination). For these phenomena are phenomena of *dissociation*, although they are not exceptional or morbid, but constitute a great part of normal human experience.

I will not do more than refer in passing to the question which cannot but occur in this context as to the bearing of our recognition that the existence of 'dissociation' is involved in our perception of the moral struggle within ourselves upon our view of the pathological dissociations of which we spoke above. While moral discord plainly does not as a rule lead to pathological dissociation, nor susceptibility to the latter go along with any special difficulty in securing the control of conduct by moral principle, yet the explanation of marked pathological dissociation in earlier times by diabolical possession (as we may reasonably suppose to be the case, for example, in such stories as that in the New Testament of the man who gave his name as Legion[16]), and the prominence of exorcism among the activities of the most primitive period of Christian evangelization, indicate a sense of connexion between moral weakness and mental disease which finds some confirmation in the general recognition nowadays of the part that moral and religious influences may play in the cure of the latter.

We may remark also that the temptation to speak of the dissociated elements of consciousness in patholo-

[15] See Rom. vii. 23.
[16] Luke xxii. 42.

gical cases as separate 'personalities' is paralleled by the tendency visible in great investigators of man's moral experience, such as Plato, Aristotle, and St. Paul, to describe the factors in human nature which are found at odds in the moral struggle in terms that approach personification of them in their separateness; notwithstanding that it is the unity of the personality within which they are mutually opposed which gives its significance to the whole description. It is no less true that a fundamental personal unity is in fact presupposed in the accounts given of 'pathological dissociation,' even where the word 'personality' is applied to each of the dissociated elements.

The point is so germane to these Gifford Lectures that I cannot refrain from touching here upon the possibility which might be suggested that the ascription of Personality to God, which is their theme, may be in fact merely a further stage of the personification of the parties to the moral struggle within human souls. The person who is the scene of this conflict, it may be said, identifies himself, as we have seen, now with one, now with another of these parties: the other with which he is not at the moment identifying himself, he tends to describe and imagine as another person not himself, whether he call it "no more I, but sin that dwelleth in me," or, on the other hand, "not I, but the grace of God which was with me."[17] There is a plausibility in this suggestion which is due as always with genuine plausibility to a spice of truth which it contains. The experience of Religion, as I have insisted throughout, is such that any theology which is to give an adequate account of it must affirm both the transcendence and the immanence

[17] Rom. vii. 17; 1 Cor. xv. 10.

of its Object, and affirm them in an intimate mutual connexion. But the factor in that experience which testifies to Personality in God is to be sought not in the consciousness of a distinction between the combatants in the moral struggle within us but in the consciousness of obligation which initiates the struggle, and in the sense of dependence upon Another than ourselves if the issue of the struggle is to be a victory securing to the higher principle its rightful authority. This is felt all the more strongly when we identify ourselves with that higher principle itself.

But with the recognition of being under obligation and of dependence upon Another, and with the interpretation of the experiences which suggest this recognition in terms not merely of relation to Another but of a *personal* relation to that Other, comes a further interpretation of the significance of the moral struggle itself which must inevitably seem to confirm our primitive tendency to personify the parties to it by envisaging the higher principle in it as representative of the Divine Personality, to the acknowledgment of which we have been led.

Even this very primitive tendency itself, however, deserves a careful examination, for it expresses a characteristic of the human soul which is of first-rate importance for the understanding of the problems of the moral life. This feature is the claim which each ideal that presents itself to us and our response to which embodies itself in a certain mood (or 'sentiment') makes to an undivided allegiance from him who entertains it. I cannot turn aside now to dwell upon this subject; I shall probably most easily suggest to you what is in my mind by reference to a poem of Browning's where the essence of it is put

in a very few words. In this poem[18] three ladies dispute of the reasons for preferring a lover. One would choose pure thoughts, another heroic deeds; the third, rather than either, "a wretch, mere losel in body and soul," so he loved her only. And the Abbé, who is umpire, decides in favour of the third:

> The love which to one and one only has reference
> Seems terribly like what perhaps gains God's preference.

Many ideals challenge our allegiance; to none can we, when once its appeal has really reached us, refuse recognition without committing the greatest of sins by denying that to be good which we know to be so; yet such recognition in any case is inadequate unless it commit us to a self-surrender which would seem to involve a like sin against other ideals. Set out in psychological rather than in ethical terms, this situation (with which no writer has more constantly occupied himself than the poet to whom I have just resorted for a vivid expression of it) may be described as the tendency on the part of every 'sentiment' or mood to expand itself into what, as associating itself with all which falls within the system of one person's psychical life, may be called a 'personality.' The existence of this tendency explains and gives a significance to the poetic or literary personification of the 'parts of the soul' or of the combatants in the moral struggle of which I spoke above It illustrates also the truth that personality is essentially a principle of unity and that, where we are tempted to speak of the abnormal dissociation of elements normally combined as 'multiple personality' it is just because the unity of Personality persists even in such dissociation so that each dissociated element

[18] *Which?* in *Asolando*.

in turn claims to possess that unity to the exclusion of the rest.

The final lesson then which we may learn for our present purpose from the phenomena of 'multiple personality' and from those more ordinary phenomena of delirium, dreaming, moral struggle, absent-mindedness—which in the light of these are seen to be, like them, phenomena of dissociation—is that in the life of the human soul there is from the first a principle of unity which is presupposed even where we seem to find the normal consciousness of it replaced by a consciousness not only of distraction but of mutual opposition; but also that this principle does not from the first succeed in reducing all the psychical material (if the phrase may be allowed), within and upon which it operates, to a harmonious order in which it will manifestly express throughout in divers ways the identical nature of the whole. The unity of human Personality is thus an achievement, although an achievement which would be impossible apart from a principle of unity operative from the very beginning of what can be called personal life at all.

It might at first seem as if this original unity could be no other than the unity of the bodily organism. If it be true that we have no experience of Reason except as a personal activity, it is no less true that (if we leave out of account the religious experience of personal intercourse with God, which some would assert to be no genuine experience at all) we have no experience of Personality except as expressing itself in and through an animal body. Moreover, in such cases of extreme distraction and dissociation as those which are described as exhibiting 'multiple personality,' it is primarily and in the main because they express themselves through the same bodily

organism that we take 'Sally' for the same person with 'Miss Beauchamp,' or, in another famous American case,[19] the candy-store keeper A. J. Brown for the same person as the Baptist preacher Ansel Bourne who disappeared from the town of Greene in Rhode Island two months before Brown set up his business at Norristown in Pennsylvania.

Why should we look further afield for an original unity of the person than in the unity of the organism? It is true that it is by no means easy to say what it is that constitutes the unity of the organism itself; but that is not a question upon which we can here enter. We may say, however, without much fear of contradiction, that there is nothing to suggest that a human personality could come into being except in connexion with a single organism. But it does not follow from this that we can identify the unity of the person, at any stage at which we can speak of a *person* at all, with the physical unity of the organism. The impossibility of doing this is well put by a thinker[20] who holds that "there is no mind without body," and that "mind and body are not an original diversity" but "the dichotomizing of an original unity," —a thinker who thus holds no brief for disembodied spirits or for a 'creationism' (to use the old theological expression) which would give to the soul an origin independent of the physical parentage of the body.

"The constituent elements of the mind and the constituent elements of the body," says Professor Wildon Carr, "are absolutely heterogeneous and there is no common factor in psychical and physiological process."

[19] See James, *Principles of Psychology*, i. 391 ff.

[20] Prof. Wildon Carr in his Inaugural Lecture at King's College, London.

"Memory and imagination do not pertain to the continuity of physiological process in the body, but to the unity and continuity of conscious experience which we call the personal self." "My reason for rejecting the simple statement that the brain thinks is that it seems to me untrue in fact. I can imagine that the brain might think and feel and will, but what I cannot imagine is how thought and feelings and volitions, if they were acts of the brain, would form the mind. They would in a certain way hang together and they would have the unity which comes from being owned, but could they of themselves form an organic individual system, such as the mind is? I find it then impossible to believe that, as a fact, the brain thinks, because I find that, as a fact, the brain is not the mind."

These admirably clear remarks describe, better than I could do in words of my own, the real obstacle which exists to supposing that the unity of the personal self can be satisfactorily explained by reference to the unity of the organism, however intimately we may hold the two systems which we call Soul and Body to be connected together.[21]

[21] There should perhaps here be mentioned one more consideration suggested by the doubt which the phenomena of dissociation seem at first sight to cast upon the stability of the personal principle of unity in experience. If unities of experience to which the name of 'personality' can be plausibly applied may coalesce in a richer and more stable personal unity, as in the reconstitution of 'Miss Beauchamp' by Dr. Morton Prince, may we not conceive of our normal personalities, which the presence in our thought of the idea of an unattained perfection convicts of being, as Descartes said, *res incompletæ*, as finding completion in such union with a vaster life, possessing the fulness of what our personality exhibits only in an inferior degree, so that their consciousness of personal unity would disappear as completely as that of 'Sally' in the life of Miss Beauchamp after her recovery? This question is less relevant to the topic of the present discussion than to the

But though we shall not find in the phenomena of dissociation reason to dismiss the personal principle of unity in human experience as a mere result of the temporary coalescence of heterogeneous units, comparable to the unity of a heap of sand or stones, we may certainly find in them some ground for regarding this principle as subordinate and secondary to the rational principle with which I contrasted it; since this latter serves as a standard by which to test the claim of any system of conscious activities to rank as personal, while no reciprocal claim can be brought forward on the part of Personality to serve as the standard of what is rational. The attempts of Pragmatism and of Personal Idealism to establish the primacy of the personal principle we have already judged to be unsuccessful; and we have thus so far found nothing with which we have cause to disagree in that comparative depreciation of this principle which is characteristic of thinkers who take their departure from some form of Absolute Idealism.

In the next Lecture I propose to carry further the consideration of this comparative depreciation of Personality by Absolute Idealism.

inquiry to which we shall pass in the concluding lectures of my course concerning the destiny of finite individual persons. But it may at once be said that there would be in such a consummation something which (if the view I took of the alleged compresence of two dissociated personal consciousnesses, as an illusion of the memory, be correct) is absent from the process to which it is suggested that it might be analogous. For there would be a single personal consciousness continuous with many distinct personal consciousnesses. And of this there seemed to be no genuine evidence within our experience.

LECTURE IX

ABSOLUTE IDEALISM AND THE VALUE OF THE INDIVIDUAL PERSON

THE depreciation of Personality from the idealistic point of view may be said to turn upon the consideration that, although a higher form of Individuality than some with which we are acquainted, it is yet an imperfect form, and has proved itself to be such by the fact that a person is essentially a member of a society of other persons, over against whom he has rights and to whom he has duties, and therefore cannot possess the full and self-sufficing individuality which belongs only to the Absolute.

Now certainly the individuality which can be ascribed to a person among other persons is not the individuality which can be affirmed of the Absolute alone, and it is not easy to suppose that anyone would dispute this. But the problem of the peculiar value which may be claimed for Personality, as the only form in which Mind or Spirit is manifested within our experience as concrete reality, is not disposed of by this consideration.

In studying the first series of Mr. Bosanquet's Gifford Lectures, to which I have so often had occasion to refer, and in which the view which I am now examining is set forth with great fulness and force, it is, I think, difficult to resist

the impression that the promise which it seemed to hold out of showing us what is that *principium individuationis* or 'Principle of Individuality' in virtue of which any one of us is considered to be an individual remains unfulfilled by an exposition which denies to that very Individuality a genuine right to be called Individuality at all, because it is not that all-embracing and absolute self-sufficiency which no one ever supposed that it was, and the limitation to which of the name 'individual' merely puts aside the question of the Individuality which we are accustomed to ascribe to persons. It is noticeable that the second series of Gifford Lectures, in which Mr. Bosanquet really discusses this latter question, is entitled 'The Value and Destiny of the Individual,' notwithstanding that in the preceding course the use of the term 'individual' in this sense has been described as 'improper' and 'incorrect.'[1] Thus, I venture to think, does the common sense of language assert itself.

In our ordinary way of speaking an individual person would be considered 'concrete,' while Justice, Love, Religion, though their names are invoked as designating things for which a man will dare to die—nay, would despise himself if he feared to die for them—would be called 'abstract,' because they stand for a virtue, a passion, a faith which can exist only as belonging to individual persons who behave or feel or think after a certain fashion. Against an unthinking acquiescence in such language philosophers of the school of Mr. Bosanquet do well to protest. The tendency of it is clearly revealed in the popular notion that 'concrete' is a synonym for 'material' or 'perceptible by the senses,' 'abstract' for 'immaterial' or 'imperceptible.' It encourages the prejudice that

[1] *Principle of Individuality and Value*, pp. 288, 311.

what the senses can apprehend is the sole genuine reality, a prejudice which, if not altogether incompatible with philosophy of any sort, is at least irreconcilable with any that could allow validity to Religion.

But the protest against it takes, as it seems to me, a form open to serious criticism when it treats the nature of individual persons as *adjectival*,[2] not merely because, apart from certain relations to other persons and things, they would not be what they are (just as those other persons and things would not be what they are apart from certain relations to them), but because they, it is said, belong to the ultimate Reality as it does not belong to them; much as, in the ordinary view, musical taste or a fair complexion (to take the Aristotelian examples) may be characteristics of a certain man, yet this relation cannot be reciprocated. Nay it is not only in respect to the ultimate or absolute Reality that Personality (or any kind of finite Individuality) is held by Mr. Bosanquet and those who think with him to be adjectival. When the scholar or the patriot or the martyr gives himself up to death in the service of learning or of his country or of his creed, he confesses, it may be said, that that for which he is content to sacrifice his life is the *substance* of which his individual personality is but a transient expression, and apart from which it has no significance. Can we speak of his personality as existing in its own right, as it were, even though what gives it all its worth and interest should perish? "Who dies if England lives?"[3] Does not the

[2] See the Symposium on *Do Finite Individuals possess a Substantive or an Adjectival Mode of Being* in *Proc. of Ar. Soc.*, vol. xviii.; published in *Life and Finite Individuality*, 1918; see esp. pp. 83, 127 ff.

[3] Kipling, *For All we Have and Are*, 1914 (*The Years Between*, p. 23).

question, do not still more the deaths of the multitudes who without hesitation have died that England might live, witness against the claim of the individual person to a substantiality to which the feelings and convictions, the manners and ideals, which distinguish one nation from another are but 'adjectives'? Is not rather the reverse nearer to the truth?

Such is the case for the view that human Personality, like every other form of finite Individuality, is 'adjectival.' Unquestionably it must give pause to those who use language which might seem to ascribe to Personality a supreme value and dignity in abstraction from the interests, the ideals, and the objects of attention which give to it character and import. But it does not convince me that it affords a justification for using language so paradoxical in the opposite direction as that which treats of a self-conscious subject of experience as in the same class with what has no conceivable being except as an 'adjective' of something else.

We will therefore try to examine somewhat more closely this view of finite Personality as 'adjectival.' We shall find, I think, that it resolves finite Personality into two factors: one being the assemblage of characteristics which distinguish one person from another, and each of which is in the traditional sense of the word, a 'universal,' which might belong equally well to several individuals; and a 'thisness' which is just the bare form of Individuality, and may be regarded as itself a 'universal,' inasmuch as *any* person may be (nay, every person *must* be) in a particular context '*this* person.' It may then be said with some plausibility: What is more abstract, more empty than this latter? Any individual will fit it quite as well as any other. What more elusive

and transitory? Like a shifting gleam of light, it falls now on one, now on another; from moment to moment, from spot to spot, we have a different 'this' before us.

On the other hand, when we turn to the characteristics which *do* permanently or at least importantly distinguish one person from another as 'thisness' does not, they are admittedly 'universal'; singly, nay even in combination, they may belong to several individuals, who might thus, if not juxtaposed in time or space, be 'indiscernible' by sense or thought.

Nevertheless, I think it may be shown that this analysis of finite individual Personality is incomplete. When Mr. Bosanquet,[4] in speaking of the finite 'individual' which is often said to be 'concrete' in distinction from the 'universal' which is called 'abstract,' describes it as 'the given person or thing,' he surely does some injustice to those whom he is criticizing. We are not here concerned with *things*; I will therefore confine myself for the moment to *persons*, without asking myself how far what is said of persons can be extended to things as well.

When we speak of 'a person' as *concrete* we are certainly thinking of much more than can be said to be 'given' in a particular experience of that person. We sometimes hear of some one presenting to his acquaintance 'a mere mask.' What is meant by such phrases is just this: that, in these instances, it is only what is 'given' that we are allowed to know. But we might express this otherwise by saying that we had never come into contact with *the real person*. When we speak of individual persons as pre-eminently concrete realities we always suppose

[4] In his review of my *Group Theories of Religion* in *Mind* for Jan. 1917.

that there is much more included in their reality than what is 'given' in any particular experience of intercourse with them.[5]

Again, although it is true that the characteristics which distinguish one person from another are, taken by themselves or even as an aggregate, 'universal'—that is, may be found in several distinct individual persons—

[5] Cp. Professor Stout, *Life and Finite Individuality*, p. 143. "Mr. Bosanquet seems always to take for granted that nothing can belong to the nature of the finite individual except his finitude. Whatever is positive in his being is regarded as apart from and independent of his limitation. He is distinguished from other beings and from the all-inclusive Universe not by what he is but merely by what he is not. It is this presupposition alone which gives point to Mr. Bosanquet's denial of the worth of the finite individual *qua* finite. What he is constantly maintaining is that finitude is mere defeat or limitation, and that therefore what is finite cannot have value *in so far* as it is finite. It is plain that this argument loses its force, if there are characteristics of the finite individual, which, though they are themselves positive and of positive value, none the less presuppose his limitation, so that they could not belong to a being which was not finite. But there are such characteristics. . . ." Mr. Bosanquet would probably reply that this criticism misses its mark, since he would not deny that individual personality (though, as he says, rather *a* personality than *our* personality) is essential to some features of Reality which are of very great value, such as loyalty or love. And the personality essential to these is for him, we must note, finite personality such as yours or mine, since he neither agrees with Lotze in allowing Personality to be attributable to the Infinite nor with Dr. Rashdall believes in a supremely perfect and eternal though finite Person, the Creator of persons like ourselves and the proper object of their reverence and worship. This view of the place of Personality in the system of Reality may undoubtedly be held in a general estimate of Mr. Bosanquet's position to balance the depreciatory language concerning it against which Prof. Stout's remarks are directed. But it does not acquit that language of blame on the score of one-sidedness; nor does it hinder a theistic student of Mr. Bosanquet's philosophy from suspecting that his refusal to admit the notion of Divine Personality into it has resulted in a certain failure to reconcile two aspects of Personality in general which are severally recognized in his work.

yet the principle of unity according to which they are combined in an individual Personality is in each case unique and is not identifiable with, nor, except from defect of apprehension in the observer, indiscernible from the principle according to which they are combined in any other. Nor do I think that the nature of this principle can be better distinguished from that of any principle which is in the proper sense 'universal' than by some such phraseology as that old Aristotelian one of 'Subject' and 'Attribute' which has so long commended itself to the reflective common-sense of mankind. So much would, I believe, be true, even if one did not attach a higher *value* to the individual Personality in the scheme of things than Mr. Bosanquet and those who hold with him are disposed to attach to it, and might most certainly be allowed without committing oneself to any assertion of such a *permanence* of individual persons as is claimed by believers in what is called 'personal immortality.'

It may, however, be said—as it is by Mr. Bradley[6]—that when we consider the relation between souls and the thoughts which belong to them, we find ourselves entangled in a "vicious circle," and ought to infer from this discovery that we are "in the realm of appearance" and therefore cannot ascribe ultimate reality to the things—souls in this case—of which we are speaking.

"For thought is a state of souls and therefore is made by them, while, upon its side, the soul is a product of thought. The 'thing,' existing in time and possessor of 'states,' is made what it is by ideal construction. But this construction itself appears to depend on a psychical centre, and to exist merely as its 'state.'"

[6] *Appearance and Reality*, p. 306.

To deal adequately with this passage would involve an examination of the whole philosophy of Mr. Bradley, such as it would be out of the question to undertake here. I will therefore grant what is here said of the 'thing' to be true, although I doubt myself whether it would not be a better way of stating the facts which Mr. Bradley has in view to say that it is discovered by an act of constructive thought to be what it is, a change of expression which would imply a good deal of difference in the interpretation of the facts in question. But it is sufficient for my present purpose to point out that the 'psychical centre' seems to fall outside the circle, 'vicious' or otherwise, which Mr. Bradley has indicated. For it is not that "thing, existing in time and possessor of states" which he has to his own satisfaction shown to be a result of 'ideal construction.' Thought is a state of such a thing—called a soul—and this soul is a product of thought. Here is our vicious circle. How does the 'psychical centre,' which is apparently distinguished from the 'soul,' come in? If Mr. Bradley merely means to suggest that the ideal construction which constitutes the "thing with states" called a soul itself presupposes a soul, why this variation of the phrase? May it not be that we have here in fact a covert admission of something which resists the alchemy of his dialectical method? The suspicion is encouraged by the admission, which we elsewhere find, that to Mr. Bradley there is something peculiarly mysterious and baffling in what he describes as the Absolute's division of itself into finite centres of experience, outside of which he is disposed to doubt whether any experience falls.[7]

[7] See *Appearance and Reality*, p. 527. Cp. *Essays in Truth and Reality*, p. 350 *n.* Cp. also Prof. Baillie (*Idealistic Construction of*

I am very far from suggesting that I have any explanation to give of the existence of individual persons or 'finite centres of experience' which would make it from Mr. Bradley's point of view less mysterious and baffling. Is there not, however, reason for wondering whether the fact of their existence and its inexplicability from that point of view does not cast doubt on the whole theory which ascribes reality in the proper sense to the One Absolute alone?

Thus in the end it is not only for the 'Personal Idealist' that Personality is found to resist analysis by the method which has sapped the claim of everything else to independent reality; the same thing has happened for his critics also. Only it is as in the old jest about Hume and Reid.[8] Reid (it was said) shouts, 'You cannot help believing in an external world,' and then whispers, 'But you can give no reason for your belief.' Hume shouts, 'You can give no adequate reason for retaining any belief in the external world,' then he adds in a whisper, 'But you cannot get rid of the belief.' Put the personal idealist for Reid, and Mr. Bradley or Mr. Bosanquet for Hume; for 'the external world' substitute 'the substantial reality of the personal self;' and all the rest may be left standing to serve our present purpose. Nor are these same opponents so far removed from one another as one might expect in their treatment of that other principle of unity in experience which we may call Reason, between which and the principle of Personality a question of

Experience, p. 35) on "the general problem of showing how experience becomes individuated." Is there not a question begged in the use of 'becomes' here? Why should he—should we—assume that it is not individuated from the first?

[8] Made by Dr. Thomas Brown in conversation with Sir James Mackintosh. See Mackintosh, *Ethical Philosophy*, 4th ed., p. 236 n. I am indebted for this reference to Professor Sorley.

priority arose in the preceding Lecture. For Reason or Thought is not conceivable apart from a subject; and none is provided by either of the two schools which I have mentioned except finite persons. But these, on the showing of either, are inadequate to the unity of subject which seems to be demanded by the unity of Reason. Such an Absolute Idealist as Mr. Bradley or Mr. Bosanquet proclaims aloud this inadequacy, which the Personal Idealist only admits by substituting under his breath for the identity in the content of Reason a mere similarity or a miraculously inexplicable coincidence.

What seems to be required is a whole-hearted recognition at once of the genuine unity of the *content*, or (as I should prefer to say) of the *object* of Reason—of that which we may call the world of Ideas, in the Platonic sense of that word—and also of the unity of each personal subject as a substantial element in the system of Reality, and not merely an adjective qualifying it.[9]

[9] A contemporary thinker, Dr. M'Taggart, has put forward a view of the world which might seem to fulfil this requirement. In this view the ultimate Reality *consists* of persons each of whom is an eternal differentiation of the Absolute. Despite, however, the ingenuity and suggestiveness of Dr. M'Taggart in meeting the obvious difficulties in his scheme, I find myself unable to accept a doctrine like that which Dr. M'Taggart shares with the younger Fichte (in his *Seelenfortdauer*) of the pre-existence of human souls in complete independence of the souls of those who are the progenitors of the bodies that now serve them for organs of expression. Moreover, neither the idealism of Dr. M'Taggart, which resolves the 'external world' into states of a knowing subject, nor his 'atheism,' which leave no proper object for religion, appears to me to do justice to the facts of our experience. Mr. Bosanquet (*Value and Destiny*, p. 258, n. 1) has made a distinction (though, as Professor Pringle Pattison has pointed out in his *Idea of God*, p. 275, he has not always strictly observed it) between 'elements' and 'members' of the Absolute. In his own view finite persons are the former, in Dr. M'Taggart's the latter. I should have no objection to speaking of them as 'elements' of the Absolute, if

The contention that the selfhood of finite persons must be considered as merely 'adjectival' is in the thought of those who maintain it closely bound up with insistence upon the ethical principle of self-realization by means of self-surrender, which has received classical expression in the great saying of Jesus: "Whosoever will save his life shall lose it; but whosoever shall lose his life for my sake and the gospel's the same shall find it," or, as it is rendered in the Fourth Gospel: "He that loveth his life loseth it; and he that hateth his life in this world shall keep it unto life eternal."[10] The principle that a man can only find his true self in the highest sense when, in the service of some cause which he values more than he values his own separate individual personal self, he is ready to sacrifice not only all that he possesses, but all that he is—this principle, it may be suggested, is not really accepted with one's whole heart so long as anything is held back, whether it be an 'immortal soul' or a metaphysical substantiality. This line of argument cannot but have a certain persuasiveness for those to whom the moral and religious ideals of Christendom are precious. They are apt to ask themselves whether by clinging to a belief in a future life for themselves, or even to a philosophical theory which gives to their own personality a 'substantive' rank, they are not after all convicting themselves of unwillingness to complete the renunciation of self which they profess and involving themselves in the guilt of Ananias and Sapphira.[11]

that word were used (as it might be) without prejudice to their claim to be considered 'substantial' rather than 'adjectival.' 'Members,' on the other hand, suggests (as I suppose it is intended to do) Dr. M'Taggart's 'world of immortals without a God.' And this, as I have said, I could not accept.

[10] Mark viii. 35; John xii. 25. [11] See Acts v. 1 ff.

But I think that one may be too soon put out of countenance by this sort of consideration. We shall find it profitable to examine more closely the actual facts of such self-surrender as is supposed to commit those who approve it to a sacrifice of their hopes of personal immortality and of their faith in the substantive reality of their personal selves. Of 'personal immortality' I will say nothing at present; it will occupy our attention in my next and concluding Lecture. I will confine myself in this to the light thrown by the actual working of the ethical principle of self-realization by self-surrender upon that depreciation of the value of finite Personality as compared with the ideals inspiring such self-surrender which is sometimes associated with emphasis upon that principle.

Let us take as our instance the self-devotion of the patriot who gives his life for his country. It is probable that, in the majority of cases, the country for which he sacrifices himself represents itself to his imagination as a system of personal relations which is the familiar and beloved setting of his own personal experience; including no doubt not persons only; for the places and the houses in which he has lived, the buildings which are haunted by the memories of his childhood, his school or his university or the home of his early married life, will be no small part of it; yet all as associated with parents and kinsfolk and teachers and friends and companions, with wife and children and neighbours and colleagues, the persons who belong to him and to whom he belongs.

One knows how often patriotic sentiment has been concentrated in loyal passion for a king, who is an actual person, for whom his soldiers and subjects are proud to fight and to die; and yet it is noteworthy that in a well-known song, written for the very purpose of substitut-

ing for such loyalty to the head of the State an enthusiasm for the multitude of its citizens, the appeal is made on the ground that so the object of our devotion will have become not less, but *more* personal :

> The people, Lord, the people !
> Not thrones and crowns, but men.[12]

Thus we see that while the strength of one form of devotion to the community lies in the undeniable personality of the monarch in contrast to what may seem to be the mere abstraction of a commonwealth, in its rival the personality of the monarch is dropped out of sight and ' the people ' as a number of actual human beings is put forward in contrast, not with a single *person*, but only with the outward material symbols of public authority. So far then I do not think that the facts of patriotic self-devotion can be said to support any depreciation of individual personality as compared with a ' universal,' of which by sacrificing itself thereto it confesses itself to be no more than a transitory organ or vehicle. We rather find persons sacrificing themselves for other persons. This no doubt implies the reality of the unity within which these persons are mutually related and which itself consists in these mutual relations of persons ; but it does not subordinate the individual personalities in the way and to the degree which certain theories seem to require.

But we may be asked what we should say of the sacrifice of his own life along with his nation's in a desperate cause by the member of a community so small and isolated that it might possibly be exterminated by massacre or famine, where the dying patriot would

[12] Ebenezer Elliott, *The People's Anthem* (*Poetical Works* ii., 203).

rather his people perished from the face of the earth than denied their ancestral religion or repudiated their obligation to some other community? Is not the maintenance of something which would be called 'abstract' by those for whom the individual alone is fully concrete here preferred to that of any individual person or persons concerned? And yet do we not approve the preference and admire the self-sacrifice?

It is important at this point to avoid so far as possible a familiar misunderstanding. If we suggest that, in such a case as that which has just been stated, there must be taken into account the feeling of self-respect which the person sacrificing himself would know he could not hope to enjoy if he refused to share his people's doom, or the approbation of his conduct by all who may come to know of it among mankind, or even by

> those pure eyes
> And perfect witness of all-judging Jove,[13]

we may be supposed to be falling into the old error of those whom their critics call the 'psychological hedonists,' and to be placing the worth of conduct in the emotional gratification which it may excite, notwithstanding that this very gratification presupposes an apprehension of that worth. For, unless the conduct in question were thought to possess such worth, the gratification could not arise and, unless it really possessed it, would not be justified.

Assuredly we must be careful not simply to set up against what seems to us an illegitimate abstraction from individual persons of universals, such as the principles and causes for which men will die, an equally illegitimate

[13] Milton, *Lycidas*.

abstraction of individual persons from such principles and causes as impart to them dignity and purpose in life. But we may nevertheless be able to show reason for holding that individual Personality cannot satisfactorily be regarded merely as a vehicle or organ of these principles or causes, or even of the life of a community highly organized enough to be capable of acting or suffering itself as a 'person' at law.

No doubt it may be said that those who hold the language which we are now censuring for an undue depreciation of individual Personality as being a mere vehicle or organ of a higher life are far from wishing to imply that individual Personality is a vehicle or organ which might be dispensed with altogether. They would not deny that it is an element, even (if we will) a necessary element, in the whole system of Reality. Indeed this may be allowed to be true of every form of existence.

But, without forgetting the evidence on the other side of such memoranda of old experience as that which tells us that 'there is no man who is indispensable,' we must, I think, if we are to be true to the facts, acknowledge also that the value which we assign to our own personality and to that of others with whom we have in a genuine sense personal acquaintance is not that of something which can really be replaced by anything else of the same sort (even by one which we should not hesitate to describe as better or nobler), in the same sense in which a mere *thing* could be so replaced. It is upon this peculiarity in the value which may be claimed for persons, who exist not only *in* but *for* themselves, that Royce's doctrine of Individuality as the embodiment of a unique purpose is based; and, without necessarily embracing this doctrine

in its developed form, we may admit the fact which it is intended to explain.

Nor need we hesitate to admit this fact as regards persons because one may not at once be certain that some things which are not persons nor even organisms—for example, works of architecture, sculptures, or paintings—may not share this peculiar character. Yet it is difficult to be sure that they do share it, apart from their association with individual persons. It is true that one may doubt not unreasonably the possibility of the exact reproduction of a great work of art in this kind by anyone but the original architect or painter. But if such an exact reproduction were to be achieved, would not that which would be lacking to the reproduction be merely its association with the person of its designer, an association which we should value just as we should value for a like association the autograph manuscript of a great poem or symphony, though we should not suppose it to possess a higher artistic value as literature or as music than would belong to a copy made by another hand?

Whatever we may hold regarding *things*, we may, I think, say of *persons* not only that we are unable to conceive those principles, causes, or communities for which persons sacrifice themselves as actually existing otherwise than as they are embodied in persons, are carried out by persons, or consist of persons, but that we shall hardly fail to find ourselves profoundly dissatisfied if we are convinced that the object to which persons have sacrificed themselves is never and nowhere realized except as an aim unfulfilled in any personal life as real as that which has been surrendered in its service; that not only have the heroes of our race "died in faith, not having received the promises,"[14]

[14] Heb. xi. 13.

but these promises are never received and never can be received by any persons whatever.

In saying this I am not, I think, going beyond what has been very emphatically said by Green in a passage of his *Prolegomena to Ethics*,[15] to which Mr. Bosanquet has thought it desirable in his *Value and Destiny of the Individual* to supply a commentary which shall make it consistent with the depreciation of individual Personality characteristic of his own idealism. To do this he accepts an alternative suggested by Green himself to the continuance of the personal life in a society "which shares in and carries further every measure of perfection attained by men under the conditions of life that we know." For such a continuance as this there is no room in Mr. Bosanquet's scheme; but when Green adds the words "or we may content ourselves with saying that the personal self-conscious being which comes from God, is for ever continued in God," his commentator interprets this as an indication that, in adding the reflection that "a capacity which is nothing except as personal cannot be realized in any impersonal modes of being," he may be understood to be insisting "not primarily that the goal of development should be *our* personality but that it shall be *a* personality; and the doctrine," he goes on, "has nothing against its being *more* than a personality, so long as in it all that constituted ourself can have fuller justice done to it than in our given self[16] it ever could have." In other words, it may be the *individual* but in no intelligible sense *personal* Absolute of Mr. Bosanquet's own philosophy.[17]

[15] § 185. See Bosanquet, *Value and Destiny*, pp. 279 ff.

[16] Here we have the ambiguous use of the word 'given' noticed above on p. 232.

[17] Cp. Prof. Pringle Pattison, *Idea of God*, pp. 270 foll.

I leave to my concluding Lecture the inquiry whether we should be satisfied in the last resort with the complete disappearance of any persons "not having received the promises" which had during their earthly pilgrimage sustained their spiritual life. I will not question the possibility of a devotion which is content wholly and for ever to go without what is given to others. And no doubt there is often in fact no very vivid imagination, in the person who makes the sacrifice, of those others' enjoyment of what is given to them; although, when this enjoyment is imagined, its probable or certain transiency and imperfection is apt to be forgotten. But it is unsatisfactory to think that we can only find what we count as the noblest satisfaction which we can have, so long as its true nature is hidden from our eyes. We are reminded of the old familiar 'paradox of hedonism' that virtue can have no justification except as a means to pleasure, but yet that it will fail to bring us pleasure, if, while practising it, we keep this, its true end, steadily in view. Just so, if we clearly apprehend that only in a personal life can the object for the sake of which we are called upon to surrender our personal life be an enjoyed reality, while yet we know of no personal life in which it can be more than an ideal to be striven after without expectation of personal enjoyment, we shall not indeed find that we can without violating our conscience refuse the surrender, but we shall hardly escape a despairing confession that there yawns between the ideal and the real, the 'ought to be' and the 'is,' a gulf which the dogmas of Mr. Bosanquet's philosophy will not avail to bridge.

It was precisely in order, by bridging this gulf, to secure our moral convictions—not in order to supply a sanction for the Categorical Imperative whose

"manifest authority"[18] stands in need of none—that Kant postulated the existence of God. The actual experience in Religion of personal communion with God—apart from the existence of which, as a fact of history, there would indeed have been nothing to put this expedient into Kant's hand—affords as nothing else can do a ground for faith in the survival of those ideals for which we are called upon to sacrifice ourselves, in the only fashion in which ideals can survive or live at all, namely, as included in a personal experience. Thus it is that the contribution which, as I argued in my earlier course, Religion makes to our conception of the supreme Reality, is found to aid us in dealing with the problem, which so deeply troubled the soul of Kant, the problem of the discrepancy between what *ought* to be and what *is* —a problem which the later development of Absolute Idealism, while effectively criticizing some of Kant's assumptions and showing that Practical and Theoretical Philosophy do not stand over against one another, the one only concerned with one of these two great opposites and the other with the other, has nevertheless failed to do more than restate in terms in some respects less open to objection than his.

It is noteworthy that an able American writer, whom I quoted in a previous Lecture,[19] and who would be quite out of sympathy with the Theism which I am defending, Professor Parker of Michigan, suggests that we may find a justification of human failure and death in the supposition that they minister to the development of beings far higher than we. Such a supposition might, on the hypothesis of an immanent teleology in Nature, explain, but could

[18] Butler, *Second Sermon on Human Nature.*

[19] See above, pp. 114 ff.

not console; since it is not suggested that there exist or might exist between us and these higher beings any such *personal* relations as in Religion we experience or think we experience with God, and through God with all spirits human or unknown who, like ourselves, live and move and have their being in him. The writer I am quoting could only, I feel convinced, give to his speculation anything of the consolatory power which faith in God may possess by doing explicitly what he occasionally does implicitly, and perhaps not quite intentionally,—treating, that is to say, what he calls 'Nature' as in fact a worshipful Being entitled to the name of 'God.'

We may then follow Green in holding that the doctrine of Personality in God which is suggested to us by religious experience sets the central fact of moral experience, the fact of self-sacrifice, in a new light. We shall be in agreement with Mr. Bosanquet, and no doubt with Green himself, in saying that, in speaking of Personality in God, we do not mean to deny that Personality in God must be more and other than it is in man; but we shall differ from Mr. Bosanquet (though I venture to doubt whether we shall not be nearer than he to what was in the mind of Green) in that we shall insist that Personality in God must mean at least the possibility of such a genuine personal intercourse between our souls and him as can find no place in the philosophy of the younger thinker.

So far we may go without raising the question whether we can suppose the individual human personality to survive the apparent cessation of its activities at death and the subsequent disappearance of the body which has been the sole organ and vehicle of those activities. The practical and historical importance of this question is nevertheless so great that, although I do not pretend to

have anything to say concerning it which is either new or interesting, the present discussion would be felt by everyone to be incomplete without some consideration of it. To such a consideration I will pass in my next and concluding Lecture, but I will before bringing the present Lecture to a close preface what I shall then say by a few remarks upon the spirit in which I should desire to approach it.

It is clear that, in venturing upon ground haunted by the most sacred affections and hopes of multitudes of our fellow men, one who speaks, however unworthily, from the place of such men as have preceded me on the foundation of Lord Gifford, cannot but incur a grave responsibility. On the one hand he runs the risk of making sad the hearts of any who may honour him with their attention, by disappointing the hope which they may have formed that he would be able to reassure them by arguments, strong enough to dispel invading doubts, of the reasonableness of a faith which they feel to be necessary if they are not to succumb under the weight of life's sorrows. On the other hand he is exposed to the temptation of forsaking the path of honest inquiry into truth in order to prophesy smooth things to himself and others. In these circumstances the best he can do is to speak as sincerely and as reverently as he can, to pretend to no more or less certainty than it has been given him to attain; and, in a matter where individual temperament and taste inevitably exercise so great an influence upon every man's opinion, to put forward frankly and modestly that which he has himself found, for what it is worth, avoiding all needless offence to the feelings of others and claiming no peculiar or exceptional value for his own.

If this course be taken, no mischief can be done, but rather some good, by throwing one's own thoughts upon this subject into the common stock. This is the least that can be expected from a professional student of the Philosophy of Religion, and the most that, if prudent, he will profess himself competent to do.

In undertaking this task, however, I shall not attempt a general survey of the problem of human Immortality, but shall endeavour to concentrate attention upon the hope of a life beyond death which springs from the religious experience of personal communion with the Eternal Being. I shall not altogether ignore other aspects of the question; but I shall only consider them so far as they reinforce on the one hand or as they weaken on the other the strictly religious hope which is alone germane to our present main inquiry.

LECTURE X

THE DESTINY OF THE INDIVIDUAL PERSON

IN his striking Gifford Lectures, to which I have already several times referred, on *The Value and Destiny of the Individual*,[1] Mr. Bosanquet has quoted from the letters of Keats a remarkable description of this world in which our earthly lives are passed as 'The Vale,' not of tears, but 'of Soul-making.' This description Mr. Bosanquet accepts as a true description, not indeed of the Absolute which is eternal, and which we cannot regard as a process in time, whether of soul-making or of anything else, but of the Universe as finite.[2]

Nevertheless it seems a strange description to accept even of the Universe 'as finite' or in time for one who holds (as Mr. Bosanquet holds) that the souls are made only to be *as souls* destroyed.[3]

Nor does it help us to say, as Mr. Bosanquet does in reply to a critic of this language,[4] that the souls are not destroyed but only *remade*. This is enough indeed for

[1] *Value and Destiny of the Individual*, p. 63. See Keats's *Letters*, ed. Colvin, p. 255; ed. Buxton Forman, p. 326.

[2] Cf. Pringle Pattison, *Idea of God*, pp. 278, 279.

[3] Cf. my *Group Theories of Religion*, p. 193 *n.* The same objection has since been strongly put by Prof. Pringle Pattison in the passage just cited from his Aberdeen Gifford Lectures on *The Idea of God*.

[4] Prof. Pringle Pattison. See Mr. Bosanquet's review of his *Idea of God*, in *Mind* for Oct. 1917.

Mr. Bosanquet, because he holds that the persistence of the 'values' on which persons have set their hearts is all that we have any true interest in demanding; a soul 'remade,' in the sense which the phrase seems to be intended by Mr. Bosanquet to bear, is in fact another later-born soul setting its heart on or even realizing the same values, and will not, for those to whom it seems that the unique personality of any one of them is itself a value calling for conservation, be in any intelligible sense the same soul at all. They will be disposed to retort upon Mr. Bosanquet with Aristotle's remark [5] that no one makes it his personal aim to possess all that is good on condition of having become a quite different person: for that would mean only that some one else possessed it; and in fact (Aristotle goes on to observe), so far as that goes, some one else already as it is possesses the supreme good, namely God. To Aristotle, we must remember, God is altogether another than we and not our higher Self or the Soul of our soul; so that it would not be a relevant criticism upon this passage to say that one who, like Green,[6] thought of God very differently, can speak as though the continuance in God of the life which is now ours would perhaps satisfy our aspiration after the immortality of our own Soul. I do not indeed wish to deny that the conservation of the values on which we have set our hearts in the life and consciousness of others is a possible and a worthy ideal, but only that there is, as Mr. Bosanquet seems to suggest, nothing of positive significance or worth in the hope of personal Immortality beside this.

In one of the Lectures of my former course I adverted to a certain difference which I thought could be detected

[5] *Eth. Nic.* ix. 4, 1166 a 210 ff.

[6] *Prolegomena to Ethics*, § 185. See above, p. 244.

between the attitude of Mr. Bosanquet and that of a philosopher with whom he is for the most part in close sympathy, I mean Mr. Bradley, towards the relation between the object of Religion and that of Metaphysics; and I said that an analogous difference would be found to exist between the attitudes taken up by these two eminent thinkers respectively toward the belief in a future life.[7] We found Mr. Bosanquet apparently convinced that his philosophy of the Absolute is competent to supply to Religion all the sustenance which it requires, so that there is nothing of essential importance to Religion in the faith of the great prophets, doctors and poets of Christendom which that philosophy cannot appropriate.[8] We found Mr. Bradley on the other hand acutely conscious of the inability of his metaphysical doctrine to supply the place of a Religion, and expressing his hopes of the rise of a new Religion which might live alongside of that doctrine more harmoniously than any now existing. The difference is real, though perhaps one rather arising from a difference in temperament and feeling than lending itself to formulation in opposed propositions.

Now in regard to a future life for individual persons we find much the same contrast between the same two philosophers. To neither does the evidence of a future life appear strong, still less convincing. To Mr. Bosanquet this appears no matter for regret, and he is satisfied with the confidence which his philosophy gives him in the eternal security in the Absolute of those values whereon our hearts are set; for there is, he thinks, nothing more that we need desire. And so he does not care to leave a

[7] *God and Personality*, p. 144.

[8] See '*Are we Agnostics?*' in *The Civilization of Christendom* (1893), p. 141.

door open for speculations and hopes which he regards as groundless and empty of real value.

Mr. Bradley, on the other hand, strikes a different note. One perceives that he has a genuine sympathy with desires for personal reunion with departed friends which yet he suspects of an inherent self-contradiction, and does not care decisively to shut the door upon the speculations and hopes which he, no more than Mr. Bosanquet, sees his way to encourage. It is a result of this divergence of sentiment—for it is a divergence of sentiment rather than of opinion—that the religious philosophy of Mr. Bosanquet wears an air of almost inhuman serenity while dismissing much that has been precious to many generations of our spiritual forefathers, and is still precious to multitudes of our fellow men; while in that of Mr. Bradley we find, on the other hand, a very human melancholy, as of one who, with all his devotion to his chosen task of following the argument whithersoever it may lead him, is yet profoundly convinced that there are inexorable limits set to Philosophy's power of satisfying the human spirit, and acutely sensible of the discontent which thus must remain to her votaries when she has done all that she can to reward their faithful service.

It is probable that Mr. Bradley's attitude in this matter would be found to commend itself to a larger number of persons than Mr. Bosanquet's; but it must be allowed that there is a very large and perhaps an increasing proportion of thoughtful people to whom the prospect of a continuance of a personal life beyond the grave, which to a former generation it seemed the chief recommendation of the Christian religion that it set in a clearer light than other creeds, does not possess its old attraction. Not only are they dissatisfied with the evidence offered

in its behalf; it is, if I may so put it, quite 'out of the picture' which they have formed of the plan of the universe and of human existence. What charm it may be made to wear in fancy has for them as little influence upon their serious concerns as the glamour of a fairy-tale, which we may take pleasure in reading, yet about which it scarcely occurs to us even to ask ourselves whether we wish that it could be true, still less whether we could believe that it was so. This lack of a genuine interest in what appeared to the greatest minds of a time not far remote from our own a problem of the gravest and most universal import is sometimes expressed with a certain air of bravado which may make us doubt whether it is really quite so deeply seated as it would have itself be thought.[9]

Convention always counts for something in these matters. In one age even daring spirits shrink from confessing, not only to others but to themselves, that an aspiration which to all around them means very much is to themselves indifferent; and they will go to the furthest point that their consciences will allow in acknowledging its nobility and significance. In another age we find quite a contrary state of things, and men sensitive to the currents of popular opinion will even feel a sense of shame in admitting themselves to be influenced by this same aspiration, when it has fallen out of fashion with those who are esteemed as the representatives of the most advanced and accurate thought of the day. One may be permitted to discount in both cases the influence of the prevalent drift of sentiment. Probably in other days there was more indifference,

[9] I need not say that I am not thinking of Mr. Bosanquet, who always discusses grave subjects with the seriousness which is their due. But I admit that I have sometimes felt Prof. Parker's language to be suggestive of the suspicion which I have indicated in the text.

in ours less indifference to the hope of Immortality than one would judge from the literature of the respective periods. It is noteworthy indeed that, as I remarked in the introductory Lecture to my previous course, the sad events of the late war have undoubtedly renewed and quickened in a remarkable degree in this, and probably in other belligerent countries, what had been to some extent, at any rate, a flagging interest in the problem of life after death.

For my own part, I will frankly confess that, while I find it hard to convince myself that human nature has changed so greatly within the last century that the age-long yearnings for a life after death have suddenly died away to the extent that one is sometimes disposed to believe; and while I admit the great difficulty of constructing a theodicy, a justification of the ways of God to man, which shall not include at least such a survival of death as shall suffer the individual to "see of the travail of his soul and be satisfied;"[10] yet the drift of opinion away from the old emphasis on personal immortality which was characteristic of so much of the theology and philosophy of the eighteenth century is reflected in my own sentiments. My imagination is not easily persuaded to reach forward into a world so different from this as must be any reserved for us after death; it is rather repelled than attracted by the phraseology, so familiar to us in our religious literature, which expresses exultation in the expected catastrophe and overthrow of the present order of nature. I do not feel—I doubt if I have ever felt—what Tennyson[11] has strikingly called "the sacred passion of the second life," a passion which became perhaps the ruling passion

[10] Isa. liii. 11.

[11] Tennyson, *Locksley Hall Sixty Years After*.

in the mind of the poet who so described it. I may thus perhaps be allowed to claim that, if I approach the subject of the present Lecture with a certain prejudice in favour of a belief historically so closely associated as that in Immortality with the religious experience on the reality and importance of which I am insisting, that prejudice is balanced by another prejudice, which is at least equal to and in some ways greater than it, a prejudice against a belief which jars upon and distresses my imagination, and from the consideration of which my mind has an instinctive tendency to turn aside.

In one of the lectures of my previous course I discussed the use of Myths in Philosophy, especially as illustrated by the writings of Plato; and in the course of this discussion was led to insist upon the error of expecting from Philosophy a forecast of the future. I will not now repeat what I then said on this subject, but will content myself with reminding you that prophecy of things to come, whether earthly or heavenly, is not the business of Philosophy, and that she is quite incompetent to supply it. The most that she can do towards throwing light upon the future is to describe that eternal nature or structure of Reality to which any events, past, present, or future, must conform themselves; for the study of this eternal nature or structure is her proper business. Thus, as the concern of a Gifford Lecturer is with Natural Theology, which I have taken throughout to be a branch of Philosophy, the result of philosophical reflexion upon religious experience, it is only with the doctrine of a future life so far as it is inferred from a certain theory of the nature of structure of Reality that I shall here occupy myself. Of such evidence for it as is offered by the investigation of ghost stories or of alleged communication with the dead

through spiritualistic mediums and the like I shall only speak by the way, and for the purpose of distinguishing this evidence from the properly philosophical grounds upon which the doctrine may be recommended to our acceptance.

The faith in Immortality which has long been a chief article of European religion derives historically from a double root; from the Platonic philosophy and from the religious experience of the Jews during the period of their history which intervened between the overthrow of their political independence and the rise of Christianity.

It is to be very particularly remarked that neither the Platonic doctrine nor that of Judaism is a mere development, still less a mere survival, of those more primitive beliefs of world-wide diffusion which form the topic of Sir James Frazer's Gifford Lectures on *The Belief in Immortality*. There is in both cases a notable break intervening between the prevalence of these older faiths and the higher creeds which were to take their place. The more ancient parts of the Old Testament bear witness to a belief in an underworld into which men passed after death and in which they were cut off from the life of their people and the worship of their people's God. "The grave cannot praise thee," says Hezekiah to his God, when he was recovered of what had seemed like to be his mortal sickness; "death cannot celebrate thee, they that go down to the pit cannot hope for thy truth. The living, the living shall praise thee."[12] "In death," exclaims the Psalmist, "there is no remembrance of thee; in Sheol who shall give thee thanks?"[13]

Dr. Charles, in his learned Jowett Lectures on *Eschatology*,

[12] Isa. xxxviii. 18, 19.
[13] Ps. vi. 5.

Hebrew, Jewish and Christian, has shown how in its earlier stages the higher religion of the Prophets was so far from developing their primitive doctrine of the underworld into one of a desirable immortality that by its deliberate discouragement, in the interests of the sole divinity of Jahveh, of the customs connected with the worship of departed ancestors, it rather tended to emphasize the loss in the grave of all such life, movement and knowledge as the older tradition had allowed to the shades of the departed, whom according to that tradition it was worth their descendants' while to propitiate and in emergencies to consult through the agency of witch or of diviner.

According to the view of Dr. Charles,[14] the primitive beliefs of Israel regarding the future life, being connected with Ancestor-worship, were from the first implicitly antagonistic to the religion which looked back to Moses as its founder, and in which Jahveh, the national God who dwelt in the midst of his people, was the sole object of worship. Hence this religion opposed itself to all pre-occupation with the state of the dead in the underworld; and the Sadducees of the Gospel, who said "that there was no resurrection"[15] and looked forward to no blessed future, were but maintaining a view which had at one time been the truly orthodox one in opposition to a heathenish dread or veneration of ancestral ghosts. But while thus destroying this older doctrine of an existence beyond the grave, the religion of Moses and the prophets "was," to quote Dr. Charles, "steadily developing in the individual the consciousness of a new life and a new worth through immediate communion with God." "It is," he goes on, "from the consciousness of this new life"

[14] *Eschatology,* pp. 52 foll.
[15] Mark xii. 18.

—not from the belief in a shadowy survival in the underworld—" that the doctrine of a blessed future—whether of the soul only immediately after death or of the soul and body through a resurrection at some later date—was developed in Israel. Thus this doctrine was a new creation, the offspring of faith in God on the part of Israel's saints."

If we may accept this account of the history of the Jewish doctrine of a desirable existence after death, given by an eminent scholar who has devoted his life to the study of the subject, we have in that history a singularly close parallel to the history of the corresponding doctrine among the Greeks. Here too we find a primitive belief that after death men's conscious being is prolonged in a dim and shadowy underworld, where, as Achilles says in the *Odyssey*,[16] it is less desirable to be a king than to be a bondservant upon earth; where the departed dwell in " dumb forgetfulness "[17] unless quickened into transient life by a draught of sacrificial blood. Here too this dreary notion of a future life was bound up with the propitiation of ancestors and (in the absence of any such religious opposition to practices of this nature as characterized the teaching of the Jewish prophets) this association with customs deeply rooted in the life and tradition of every family kept a certain respect for the older belief alive after it had lost all hold upon the minds of the educated. Thus in his *Nicomachean Ethics*[18] Aristotle is studious to avoid any direct attack upon it, while by no means concealing its lack of any importance for himself. On the other hand, when Socrates in Plato's *Republic*[19]

[16] *Odyss.* xi. 489 ff.
[17] Gray, *Elegy written in a Country Churchyard.*
[18] *Eth. Nic.* i. 11, 1101 a 22 ff.
[19] *Rep.* x. 608 D.

says to Glaucon: "Have you not noted that our Soul is immortal and never perishes?" and the clever, thoughtful young man of the world replies in undisguised astonishment: "By Jove, not I—can *you* go so far as that?" it was something very different from an acquiescence, like that of Aristotle, in the language of a time-hallowed domestic ritual that has excited his surprise.

Undoubtedly Glaucon was no stranger to this language, or to the allusions to the underworld in Homer and other poets, or even to the more cheerful, if not very elevated or spiritual imaginations of an "eternal drunkenness" [20] which his brother Adeimantus is made to recount in his presentation of the case for a selfish theory of Justice. Nor can we suppose that it is Plato's intention to represent his own brother as altogether ignorant of the existence of Orphic and Pythagorean speculations 'of a higher mood' than these, to which the doctrines of Socrates and Plato themselves were unquestionably much indebted—speculations on the essential divinity of the soul, and on its adventures before and after its incarnation in particular bodies. But a serious faith in the possibility of an immortality of real happiness for the soul of every man that would order his life aright, not dependent on the offerings of posterity or conditional on initiation into some secret society of worshippers, this was new to him. This faith Aristotle, it is to be noted, altogether ignores, no doubt because he did not himself share it, and did not wish to attack his master Plato on a point in respect of which he probably held that he agreed with that master in what he took to be the root of the matter, namely the eternity of the Reason. But it was precisely this faith, thus ignored by Aristotle, that became one

[20] *Rep.* ii. 363 D.

of the sources, the prophetic faith of Israel being the other, of the doctrine of Immortality which has been so prominent in the theology and philosophy of Christendom. In Greece itself "it never became a part of the national creed"[21] until it had been reinforced by the Christian proclamation of 'Jesus and the resurrection.'

It will not be supposed that I am pretending to give here even a brief summary of the whole history of the doctrine of a life after death among the Israelites and the Greeks. I should not indeed be competent to such a task, even were it relevant to my present purpose. I am not unaware that there were influences to which I have made no reference at all, which counted for something and even for much in the development of opinion in those nations upon this subject.[22] I have been content to indicate, what does appear to me to be the fact, that neither the Jewish hope of immortality which Christianity took up into itself (both Jesus himself and St. Paul ranging themselves with the Pharisees and against the Sadducees in this matter), nor the Platonic affirmation of the deathlessness of the human soul, were refined reinterpretations, still less mere survivals, of the beliefs associated with primitive animism all the world over. They represent a new departure, and they presuppose a breach with those earlier notions, a breach which took in the case of the Israelites the form of a religious reprobation, in that of the Greeks the form of a polite incredulity. And this new departure was in each case occasioned by reflexion on an experience, and I think we may even say in each case by reflection on a *religious* experience, although the experience of the Israelites more obviously

[21] Charles, *Eschatology*, p. 151.
[22] e.g. the Persian and the Egyptian.

possesses that character than that of the Greeks, which one would be at first no doubt disposed to describe rather as philosophical. It is possible, however, for both these designations to be applicable to the same experience.

We have seen how the increasing sense of spiritual intimacy between the pious Israelite and his God gave rise to an increasing conviction that such intimacy could not be thought to end with bodily death; and thus created a belief in immortality as the consequence of the individual soul's relation to the Eternal,[23] who was now no more regarded as merely a national deity, bound up with the national life and inconceivable apart from it, but as One with whom the soul of the individual Israelite could enjoy a communion, mediated indeed by the national beliefs respecting his character and will, but independent of the national ceremonies from which the worshipper was excluded by exile from the holy city or by the interference of foreign violence.

In the same way the Platonic assurance of immortality rests upon the recognition of the Soul's prerogative as the only kind of being capable of apprehending Ideas or Forms which, in the systematic unity which belongs to them as exhibiting in its fulness the nature of the Good, constitute the ultimate reality of the Universe. These Ideas are indeed operative everywhere; but in the Soul they are present in a peculiar sense, which entitles us to speak of that highest part thereof, which is cognizant

[23] It is to be observed that it is precisely upon this ground that Jesus, in his reply to the Sadducees (Mark xii. 26) bases his doctrine of a life after death, alleging Mosaic authority for it in the divine title which, by making God the God of Abraham, of Isaac, and of Jacob, proved that these saints must be thought of as *living* and not as *dead*.

of them, as the Place of Ideas.[24] Thus the Soul or, at least, this highest part of it participates in the eternity of the Ideas which are present to it and in it. We cannot, I think, but be struck with the resemblance, no doubt amid remarkable differences of expression, which this doctrine bears to the Jewish doctrine of Immortality as involved in the intimacy enjoyed by the Souls of the righteous with their Eternal Creator. Behind the latter lies what everyone who does not regard it as an illusion would admit to be a religious experience; behind the former a spiritual activity in following the argument whithersoever it may lead, while resolutely setting one's face toward whatever we cannot doubt, when it is presented to us, to be better than what is contrasted with it. Such an activity cannot be denied to be 'experience,' and only in a very narrow interpretation of the word 'religious' can that word fairly be regarded as inapplicable to it. The interpretation of the Platonic Ideas as the thoughts of God, which commended itself to Augustine,[25] was so far at least justified that, when the Platonist speaks of what is eternal and immutable, he is certainly speaking of what can only be described in the language of those who inherit the religious tradition of Israel as belonging to the nature of their one supreme God.

Against this striking resemblance of the two doctrines of Immortality, the combined influence of which upon the religion of modern Europe and America has been so great, we may set a notable difference between them; and in respect of this difference the belief in Immortality which forms so important a part of the popular religion of the modern world agrees rather with the Jewish than

[24] τόπος εἰδῶν. See Ar., *de Anima*, iii. 4, 429 a 28.
[25] Aug. *de div. quæst.* 83, xlvi.

with the Greek tradition. For it is above all things a belief in the immortality of the *whole individual*; whereas the Platonic doctrine was, or easily passed into being, a doctrine of the immortality, or rather the eternity, of the *Reason*, which transcends the distinction of one individual mind from another in its apprehension of an object which is common to all minds, since it belongs to the essential nature of Mind, wherever found, to apprehend it.

This is, I think, upon the whole a true account of the distinction between the respective tendencies of the two traditions; although on the one hand Plato himself was genuinely interested in the individual's hopes of future happiness, and on the other hand, St. Paul[26] seems sometimes to have approximated in his treatment of the old Hebrew distinction of 'soul' and 'spirit' (πνεῦμα) to the Greek distinction of 'soul' and 'reason' (νοῦς), and to have thought of Immortality as the prerogative of the 'Spirit,' regarding the soul as perishable like the body which it animates and which is of an essentially inferior nature to the "body which shall be," the glorious vehicle of the glorified 'spirit.' The relation borne by this body to the body which we commit to the earth is in that familiar passage so often heard at the burying of Christian people[27] compared to the relation of the seed to the full-grown plant; but the stress is laid by the apostle rather upon the *unlikeness* of these two than upon the *identity* which unites them as different stages of a single process of evolution. We must observe, however, that this speculation remains true to the Jewish type of doctrine in that it involves what St. Paul calls in Jewish fashion

[26] See Charles, *Eschatology*, pp. 409 ff.
[27] 1 Cor. xv. 36 ff.

a 'resurrection,' although he does not call the risen body the *same* with the body that was buried. The immortality to which he looks forward is the immortality of a complete human individual, and humanity was for him recognizable only in a spirit expressing itself through a bodily organism. The Christian Church has never in her teaching respecting a future life abandoned this position, which is indeed intimately connected with the central place which belongs to the Incarnation in her theological system.

The doctrine of Immortality of whose historical affinities the above paragraphs may perhaps afford for our immediate purpose a sufficient indication is thus a doctrine of the kind which we saw it was consonant with the aim of a course of Gifford Lectures to consider. It takes as its point of departure the nature of Reality as revealed in the religious experience of a personal relation of the individual soul to that Perfect and Eternal Being of which it becomes aware in and through the recognition of its own incompleteness and finitude.

If this experience can be adequately described as a revelation of this Supreme Being *to* and *in* the consciousness of the individual soul, or even, in view of the joy and delight excited in us by this revelation, as a *love* of God, which is, however, exclusively an *amor intellectualis*, and which admits of no reciprocation,[28] then indeed we may take upon our lips the famous words of Spinoza '*Sentimus experimurque nos æternos esse*';[29] but we shall

[28] See Spinoza, *Eth.*, v. 19. Cp. Goethe, *Dichtung und Wahrheit*, xiv. It is worthy of observation that the controversy aroused in the Catholic Church by the mystical movement called Quietism and its doctrine of the possibility of a *disinterested* love of God was contemporary with Spinoza.

[29] *Eth.* v. 23.

(with Spinoza) find no guarantee for the survival of bodily death by aught in us except the *intellectus* which is alone capable of this immortalizing communion with the Eternal. And to this the unique individuality which distinguishes each of us from all his fellows may seem to be indifferent. On the other hand, if we are conscious in our religious experience of *a reciprocal personal intercourse*, or (which I believe will be found in the end to come to the same thing) of *a religious value in our unique individuality*, expressible, and perhaps only expressible, in terms of the value which one human being has for another in the reciprocal personal intercourse of intimate friends,[30] we shall not easily be content to suppose that only the universal values expressed in our personal lives, and not also the unique individuality in which they have found expression, are secure in him who has known and loved us as individual persons.

Nevertheless there are in the way of a belief of this kind in Immortality, suggested by reflexion upon the

[30] I give this alternative statement, in order not to limit the religious experience of which I speak to cases in which there is a vivid imagination of the presence or utterance of the Divine Being with whom we are conscious of having to do in our religion. Such cases are almost certainly a minority and even a small minority of those which I should consider genuine instances of religious communion with God. But, in an immeasurably greater number of cases there persists through all the varying harmonies and discords of life, as the theme of the whole, never lost or abandoned altogether, the conviction that all I am, have been, and shall be, nay—as Browning's Rabbi ben Ezra says—

> All I could never be,
> All men ignored in me,
> That I was worth to God.

I do not think that we can interpret this conviction in terms other than those of a personal acquaintance with our soul on the part of God.

religious experience of personal intercourse with the Eternal, several serious difficulties. The principal of these I propose briefly to point out, offering upon each a few observations which will make no pretence to constitute an adequate discussion, but may serve to indicate my own attitude towards it.

By far the most obvious and, in my own judgment, the gravest of these difficulties is that suggested by the absence of any evidence of a generally convincing nature that a human soul can exist in independence of a human body. Anything like a full examination of this problem would indeed require a knowledge of the natural history both of Body and of Soul which I am very far from possessing. I can only, as I said, describe my own convictions, for what they are worth.

I take it that it will be very generally admitted by those who have considered this question that the connexion of Soul with Body is not capable of being exhibited as a necessity of thought; that the hypothesis that the former may exist apart from the latter is not from the first ruled out as unmeaning, however little ground there may be for entertaining it. On the other hand I see nothing in the conception either of Soul or of Body which rules out the possibility that, for reasons of which we are unaware, it is in fact impossible that a Soul should exist apart from a Body.

This being so, we are left to draw what conclusions we may either from the nature of the connexion of Soul and Body in so far as we are able to observe the phenomena in which it is exhibited, or from facts or alleged facts tending to show that souls do actually exist in a disembodied state.

To take the latter possible source of information first

I have already in the first Lecture of the present course disclaimed any particular competence to deal with the evidence brought forward by certain persons, who have engaged in what is called 'psychical research,' to support the belief in the existence of disembodied or discarnate Souls. I can only say that what I know of it on a very superficial acquaintance does not seem to me to carry conviction. The late Henry Sidgwick, a singularly cautious and judicious inquirer, who devoted much time and pains to these investigations, found himself at last convinced of the real occurrence of what is called 'telepathy' between persons in the body, but unable to agree with his brilliant though far less cautious and judicious friend and fellow-student of these matters, Frederic Myers, in thinking that the evidence placed also beyond reasonable doubt the activity of souls which had survived the dissolution of their bodies. Were it otherwise, no doubt the confident assertion of some that souls do not survive the dissolution of their bodies would be set aside by a contrary instance; and this would involve an addition to our knowledge of the Universe of the greatest interest at once scientific and practical. It would be absurd to deny this.

At the same time, it would be, I venture to think, very far from proving the Immortality of the Soul, still less from establishing the religious doctrine which is usually described by that name. For evidence that a soul could survive its body would be far from constituting evidence that it would never perish. Nor, if appeal be made to revelations from the spirit world, is there any antecedent reason for supposing that statements on this or other subjects made by persons who have passed through death would necessarily be any more trustworthy than statements

made by persons who have not. And as to the *religious* doctrine of Immortality, it is before everything else a doctrine of *values*; and the discovery that, as a matter of fact, some or all persons survived what we call death would not in itself establish such a doctrine any more than the discovery that some persons had recovered from a disease commonly supposed incurable, or had prolonged their earthly existence beyond the age of one hundred and fifty years.

Turning back from the alleged evidence of the actual existence of souls in a disembodied state (or at least without material bodies such as we are familiar with in our experience) to the nature of the connexion between Soul and Body, we find several competing theories put forward as to this connexion which you will not expect me now to examine in detail. Of them all, with perhaps one exception, it may, I think, be said, that they neither afford a proof, nor even establish a probability of the separate existence of the soul or of its capacity to survive the dissolution of its body. On the other hand there are some among them which may be said to exclude even the possibility of these things. But these, as it appears to me, are, either altogether, or in those respects in which they rule out the possibility of a life beyond the grave, plainly unsatisfactory accounts of the facts which they profess to explain or describe.

The one exception to the general failure of theories of the connexion of Soul and Body to afford a sufficient ground for the doctrine of a life beyond the grave is the ancient theory that the Body is the prison-house of the Soul, to which it is confined as a punishment for sins committed in a previous state of existence. While this theory is by no means extinct to-day, it is not likely to

find many adherents among ourselves, except upon grounds of revelation, such as are excluded from our present purview, or of the recollection by living persons of prenatal experience; and this latter I certainly know no satisfactory evidence to substantiate.

It is true that not a few thinkers have regarded the relation of the Body to the Soul as the same in principle with that of an instrument to the user of it; and this analogy would certainly seem to suggest, and has suggested to many, that one need no more expect the Soul to cease to exist when the Body is destroyed or worn out than one expects the life of a musician necessarily to perish or decay along with the organ on which he has been accustomed to play. But a closer consideration of the peculiarity, on any showing, of the special relation of *this* instrument to its user will immensely lessen the force of the argument. For it is an instrument which only this individual soul can use in this way as its own body; it is an instrument the appropriation of which by the soul is not voluntary; nay, to all appearance, the soul itself in every instance has been developed within its body and has been at every stage conditioned by its structure and its resources. The intimacy of the relation between a particular body and a particular soul in fact so far surpasses that existing between any artificial instrument and the human being who uses it that there would seem nothing paradoxical in supposing the former relation to be one belonging to the very nature of the soul, out of which it could not exist.

On the other hand certain views of the nature of the connexion between Soul and Body would seem to exclude the possibility that the soul should survive the dissolution of its body. Such would be that Pythagorean view of

the relation of soul to body as comparable with that of a harmony to the lyre which Simmias in Plato's *Phædo* [31] submits to the criticism of Socrates during the last hours of the great teacher's earthly life. For, were this true, then•

> As music and splendour
> Survive not the lamp and the lute,[32]

so the soul could assuredly not survive the body. The most obvious objection to this view (though it is not the objection taken by Socrates in the *Phædo*, which depends upon the previous admission by Simmias of the truth of the doctrine of Reminiscence) is that it ignores the outstanding difference between Subject and Object, and thus the distinctive characteristic of the very thing about which we are arguing.

The kindred theory of Epiphenomenalism in modern times was no doubt primarily intended as an account of *consciousness*, while the doctrine that the Soul is a Harmony was primarily intended rather as an account of *life*. But Epiphenomenalism, though more awake than the older doctrine to the distinctive importance of consciousness, fails altogether, I think we may say, to

[31] *Phædo*, 85 E foll.

[32] Shelley, *The Flight of Love*. The verse preceding the lines quoted in the text will serve further to illustrate the conception here in question, although it is not the connexion of soul and body of which the poet is speaking.

> When the lamp is shatter'd
> The light in the dust lies dead—
> When the cloud is scatter'd
> The rainbow's glory is shed.
> When the lute is broken,
> Sweet tones are remembered not:
> When the lips have spoken,
> Loved accents are soon forgot.

give an intelligible account of it or of any other activity which we may regard as belonging to the Soul. It leaves the Soul where Plato left the phenomenal world,[33] suspended between being and not being. For apprehension, desire, consciousness are unquestionably *there*, provoking us to inquiry concerning them; yet they have no place in the system of reality recognized by the Naturalism of the school which offers this theory for our acceptance.

The name of Psycho-physical Parallelism may be used to cover several theories of the nature of the connexion between Body and Soul, the adoption of some of which would scarcely admit of belief in the soul's continued existence after the dissolution of its body. Among these would certainly be included such as do not really play fair between the physical and psychical series which are said to be parallel, but in fact ascribe to the psychical series a dependence upon the physical which is not reciprocated. But to all these theories may be reasonably opposed a consideration already advanced in a previous Lecture, where we were discussing the possibility of finding in the unity of the bodily organism the principle of the association, implied in the phrase 'dissociation of personality.' The unity of the Mind or Soul is of quite a different kind from that of the Body. And the contrast which strikes us between these two is emphasized when we consider either in relation to the wider world with which it is connected. The Body as a material system is included within a vaster material system. The other parts of this system are external to it and excluded by it. On the other hand the Mind or Soul connects itself with what we may figuratively call its environment not by *excluding*

[33] *Rep.* v. 479 D.

it from but by *including it within* the unity of its own experience.[34]

I must not be supposed, in what I have just said, to have been aiming at anything like an exhaustive discussion of the various theories of the nature of the connexion between Soul and Body, even from the point of view of their bearing upon the possibility of the Soul's survival of the dissolution of its Body.

On such a supposition I should rightly be considered to have fallen very far short of even a very unexacting standard. But my purpose has been the far more modest one of stating, with just sufficient reference to the different theories put forward to indicate to those familiar with them the lines upon which I should be prepared to deal with them, my own conclusion, for what it is worth, that, while from no general view known to me of the nature of the connexion of Soul and Body—except the ancient hypothesis mentioned at the outset that the Body is the prison of a fallen Soul—can the persistence of a Soul in being after the dissolution of its Body be inferred as a necessary or even a highly probable consequence, yet none which appears to me to be tenable

[34] Cp. Prof. Wildon Carr, *Philosophy as Monadology*. I speak in the text of 'mind or soul' for the following reason. It is the 'mind' as the subject of experience which is thus so remarkably distinguished from the body as including instead of excluding within its own unity that with which it is connected in a system. If we attribute to the 'soul' vital activities below the level of consciousness, this may not seem to be true in the same way of the 'soul.' But, in the first place, the characteristic difference of organic growth from inorganic aggregation seems to lie in a process of assimilation which anticipates, as it were, the process of drawing within the unity of its own experience which is the characteristic of 'mind.' And in the second place, as was pointed out in my previous course of Lectures, we may be said to have in Life generally something which, as distinct from mere mechanism, we interpret on the analogy of Mind. (See *God and Personality*, p. 231.)

excludes altogether the possibility of such persistence. Nevertheless the close intimacy which in any case marks the association of the Body with the Soul and the lack of generally convincing evidence of the existence of souls apart from bodies inevitably arouse the suspicion that the connexion may in fact be necessary, although the grounds of this necessity have not been so far laid bare to our intelligence, and are perhaps never likely to be discovered thereby.

Under these circumstances, of the two forms of the doctrine of a future life which are best known in Europe, that which speaks of the *immortality of the soul* " delivered from the burden of the flesh " [35] and that which speaks of the *resurrection of the body* to be the organ of the Soul's ' life everlasting '—different forms of the doctrine which are sometimes held in combination—it is the latter which seems best to suit with this close intimacy of the connexion of Soul and Body and this lack of evidence for the existence of the Soul except in that connexion. But the belief in the Resurrection of the Body is beset with difficulties of its own which it is sufficient here to indicate. I do not propose to discuss them.

If this belief be entertained as relieving us from the difficulty of supposing the Soul capable of a disembodied existence, it is plain that this difficulty will still remain where an interval is held to elapse (as in the most usual representations of the Christian doctrine) between the termination of the soul's embodied existence on earth and its resumption of such an existence at some future date.

The hypothesis, defended by St. Thomas Aquinas,[36]

[35] Collect in the Burial Service of the Church of England.
[36] *Summa Theol.* I. lxxvi. 1. ad 6[m].

of an abiding inclination towards its Body on the part of the separate Soul will hardly be found to satisfy many to whom this difficulty presents itself as serious. It has been attempted[37] to meet it in another way by the substitution for a future resurrection of the Body of the assumption by the Soul at death of a new spiritual Body. It is possible to find an anticipation of such a view in the teaching of St. Paul. But though St. Paul no doubt conceived the body with which the soul of a redeemed person was hereafter to be clothed as a 'glorious body' very different from the present 'body of our humiliation,' and though, in the case of those who should be found alive at the return of Jesus Christ in glory to which he looked forward, he expected it to be assumed without a previous dissolution of the present body, and probably to absorb it into itself or even to result from some miraculous change passing over it; yet he held that it always was somehow continuous with the present body.[38] Where death had taken place before the second coming of Christ, the nature of this continuity could be illustrated from that which connects the seed with the plant which eventually springs from that seed. To us this whole speculation is apt to seem lacking in any basis of experienced fact. Nor can we easily even imagine any manner in which the structure of a multicellular organism, such as the human body, could be adapted to the purposes of an immortal life. It is true that our earthly bodies are not materially the same throughout our earthly existence and that they may perhaps not now contain a single particle which formed part of them some years ago. It was a difficulty raised by Cebes in the *Phædo* of Plato

[37] E.g. by Dr. Charles in his *Eschatology*.
[38] See 1 Cor. xv.

that the soul may during its earthly life wear out many bodies as a man may wear out many coats; yet perhaps his last body may outlast his soul, as his last coat may outlast his body.[39] But even if we were to fancy each successive coat as made out of its predecessor by a gradual process of repair, the continuity would lack the peculiar character which belongs to that of organic growth and decay. And the first body which the soul is known to possess always within our experience comes into existence in one way, and in one way only; and that a way which certainly affords no precedent for the wearing by the disembodied soul of a new body for itself not only materially but organically discontinuous with that first body.

Thus neither for the immortality of the soul without a body, nor for the resurrection or new creation of a body for an immortal soul shall we find to our hand any arguments (not depending on the acceptance of a special revelation) which can be said to make these doctrines even plausible in face of the objections from the analogy of our common experience and from the lack of any generally cogent evidence in support of any alleged experience inconsistent with this. To these objections we may before leaving the subject add one or two others of a somewhat different kind.

The first of these is the difficulty presented to the imagination by the thought of a future life which cannot plausibly be represented as of a piece with this. Questions may be raised like those urged by the Sadducees in the Gospel[40] or those mentioned by St. Paul in the chapter so often read among ourselves at the grave-side. I do not wish to say that such questions should not be raised.

[39] Plato, *Phædo*, 87 c ff.

[40] Cp. Bradley, *Appearance and Reality*, p. 509 *n.*

The attempt to work out in imagination the details of a state of being to which we look forward may be a proof of the genuineness of our expectation. But failure in the attempt does not in the least show that we are likely never to find ourselves in the state in question. We can easily illustrate this for ourselves from the difficulty in time of peace of imagining the conditions of war, or from the difficulty at any time of imagining the circumstances of our deaths, which yet we do not for a moment doubt that we shall have to undergo. The imaginative difficulties which undoubtedly beset the belief in a future life are rightly called difficulties; but they should not avail to outweigh any positive grounds which can be justly alleged for it. We need not fear to turn from them, as we read that Jesus turned from the puzzle about the woman with the seven husbands, to the religious experience of communion with a God who is "not the God of the dead but of the living"—for it is precisely in this experience that there is contained the strongest, and perhaps the only strong, reason for the 'hope of immortality.'

Distinguishable from, though kindred to, the imaginative difficulties of the belief in a future life is the sense, if I may so express it, that the scale of our personal interests is adapted to the scale of our earthly life, and that, projected into eternity, they would be changed out of all knowledge. The contrary argument from the unwillingness to part with life which is notwithstanding common to most men was met by the late Professor Metchnikoff, the eminent discoverer of the phagocytes, by his theory that only the unhealthy conditions of our ordinary existence and especially the character of our ordinary diet prevent us from coming to an age when we should as contented centenarians lie down, like tired

children, ready for the sleep that will know no waking. But such speculations do little to instruct us. Even as it is, we may probably say with truth that, in a very large number of cases, men are, when they come to die, weak and unconscious, or, if conscious, without any desire except that of rest. And, on the other hand, there seems no reason to suppose that a man whose days should be by a suitable regimen preserved for many years beyond what is now the normal limit of human life would, any more than old persons who, as we say, 'keep their faculties' now do, necessarily lose while consciousness remained those wide-ranging interests, as of a 'spectator of all time and all existence,'[41] which seem so disproportionate to the apparent brevity of his sojourn in a world, the knowledge and enjoyment of a far larger portion whereof than he can ever become acquainted with would still be utterly insufficient for the satisfaction of his intellectual and spiritual appetite. For the faculty of apprehending the Eternal and the Absolute, on the presence whereof in our minds depends this appetite, is itself out of proportion with our apparent position in the system of nature, as beings filling a very little space and lasting a very little time.

As I reminded you before, even Aristotle, with all his predilection for a naturalistic psychology, found himself driven to speak of this capacity as coming into our souls from without.[42] Yet, once introduced into the soul, it is not something which can be regarded as an accidental adjunct to it. The same Aristotle indeed has himself elsewhere said[43] that this faculty, the νοῦς, is each

[41] Plato, *Rep.*, vi. 486 A.
[42] Aristotle, *de Gen. An.* ii. 3. 736 b 28.
[43] *Eth. Nic.*, x. 7, 1178 a 2.

individual man's very self. And it is undeniable that that consciousness of self as a unity persisting through the vicissitude of our sensations, perceptions, and emotions by which with good reason we suppose ourselves to be differentiated from the lower animals, this very consciousness is intimately bound up with and involves that consciousness of Reality as a unity, within which we distinguish ourselves from the persons and things over against us, which is implicit in all use of reason and only becomes explicit in Philosophy.

There have, however, been throughout the history of philosophy thinkers—Aristotle himself, Averroes, Spinoza, will represent them in the ancient, medieval and modern periods of European civilization respectively—who have recognized this disproportion with our earthly destiny of that activity in our minds whereby we apprehend the Eternal and the Absolute, and have based upon it a theory of the immortality or rather eternity of this activity apart from those elements in our psychical nature which we should call more distinctively *personal*. These last may indeed seem to exhibit no such disproportion with the span of life which a man may reasonably look to accomplish in this world. And, although (it may be said) no doubt our sense of grief in parting from the affections and associations which are our most precious possessions in our earthly pilgrimage testifies to some dissatisfaction; it must be remembered that the quality thus imparted to our experience has itself a certain value of its own, which would vanish if the passing hence were really only a passing "from this room into the next." [44] Without the poignancy of regret for irretrievable loss, without the sense of the fewness and shortness of our days, life would

[44] See Tennyson, *The May Queen*. Cp. Sir O. Lodge, *Christopher*, p. 51.

(we may be disposed to feel) be emptied of its peculiar pathos, and death of much of its solemnity.

Such reflexions do, as it seems to me, tell against the easy optimism of a certain kind of spiritualistic doctrines which proclaim that 'there is no death,' for our judgments of value here range themselves along with the presumptions drawn from the silence of Nature against beliefs that are at once incongruous with earthly experience and discordant with the deeper harmonies of life. But the religious experience which is, at least to my thinking, the one strong ground for looking forward to a life beyond the grave, does not, as I understand it, suggest that 'there is no death,' but rather that 'death is swallowed up in victory.'[45] Acquaintance with a God who "has known our soul in adversity"[46] is acquaintance with a God in whom we can trust that nothing of such importance for the deepening and purifying of personal character as the lessons of the valley of the shadow of death will be lost in the life which is eternal because it is lived in him.

If we turn from philosophers such as those I recently mentioned to others who among thinkers of the highest rank stand out as exhibiting a genuine concern for personal immortality, to Plato or to Kant, we shall perhaps at first be disposed to think it a circumstance difficult to reconcile with the main contention of this Lecture that to neither of them does it seem easy to ascribe a doctrine of *personal* intercourse between man and God. It is not clear that the God of Plato was what we should call a 'personal' God; or perhaps it would be a more correct way of speaking to say that, so far as Plato believed in

[45] See 1 Cor. xv. 54.
[46] Ps. xxxi. 7.

a 'personal' God at all, that God was on the one hand not the 'Supreme Being,' and on the other hand was rather considered as the wise and good Spirit whose activity could be inferred from the ordered motions of the system of nature than as the object of the individual's devotion and worship. And, as to Kant, I have already had occasion to refer to the suspicion and even hostility with which he looked upon all pretence to any kind of personal intimacy with that God in whom he was yet convinced that the seemingly discordant worlds of sense and of duty find their reconciliation and their unity.

We may here note that both Plato and Kant, however they would have dealt with the problem of Divine Personality and whatever their attitude to what religious writers have called 'the practice of the presence of God,' were distinguished by an estimate of the dignity of the personal moral life and of its place in the system of Reality quite other than we find in Aristotle or in Spinoza; and that it is a consequence of this estimate that to them it seemed a matter of real concern whether the life of the individual person reached its term at death, the occurrence of which may depend on conditions quite irrelevant to the course of the moral development of the person who dies.

We may also profitably observe that with both Plato and Kant, though for different reasons, it was just in respect of the *religious* interpretation of the personal moral life that their theories of the principles whereon that life is based may justly be accused of a certain incompleteness.

In the case of Plato, the task of working out such an interpretation, thoroughly congenial though it would have been to the temper of his mind and the trend of his thought, was hampered by the deficiencies of the religious tradition

which he inherited. On the one side the only form of that tradition which might have been suggestive of Divine Personality was on moral grounds unacceptable to him, while that which was free from morally degrading associations was connected with the veneration of the heavenly bodies and of the order of the Universe, and so tended to remove the Divine to a distance from the personal life of human beings. It is, however, significant that, when we look to the later development of this thought among his Christian followers, we find the world of the Ideas, the eternal Natures which constitute the ultimate reality of the Universe, conceived as the content of the Logos or expression of the supreme Goodness, and this Logos as personal and indeed as no other than that very Person through whose intercourse with God as his Father the Christian Church had learned to regard personal relations as intrinsic to the Divine Life.

To some extent it is probably true that Kant was also held back from committing himself unreservedly to a religious interpretation of that reverence for the Moral Law of which he so often spoke by the inadequacy of the religious tradition with which he was familiar to the demands of the moral consciousness. No doubt the inadequacy was far less glaring in his case than in that of Plato. The very fact that he could put forward, in his work on *Religion within the bounds of mere Reason*, a purely ethical interpretation of the chief doctrines of the established faith of his country is eloquent testimony to this. But his anxious avoidance of any language which would make moral obligation dependent upon any theological sanction might well have found some justification in the view, with which he cannot have been unfamiliar, of the positive ordinances of the Old Testament as divine

commands, and even more in the representation, prevalent in some quarters, of the divine decrees of predestination and reprobation as arbitrary, and of the moral characters of men as irrelevant to the question of their standing in God's sight. And he may very likely have been influenced still more by aversion to the sentimental tendencies of some forms of contemporary Pietism in his shrinking from any notion of an emotional relation to God, such as might seem to be inseparable from the claim to experience a genuine personal intercourse with him.

But to this inadequacy of the religious tradition there was added in the case of Kant a temperament which unfitted him, not only for appreciation of the possibility of a personal relation between the devout worshipper and his God, but for those most intimate forms of human companionship from which the lovers of God have in all ages borrowed the language in which their piety can best find expression. Herein he presents, of course, a strong contrast to Plato, who holds love, the same love which in our affection for our friends and comrades seeks a personal object, to be the very principle whereon depends the philosophic quest of the Supreme Reality.

We need not then be overmuch deterred by the absence from the pages of Plato and of Kant of an express recognition of a personal intercourse in Religion between the worshipper and his God from seeing in their concern for personal Immortality a confirmation of the view which we had seemed to be approaching, that the experience of such a personal intercourse is the only trustworthy ground of a belief in a blessed life after death. For both philosophers emphasize in their different ways the *irrelevance* of death, if considered as the close of the development

of the moral character of persons conversant—and not merely in what we may call an impersonal fashion, but so as that their whole personality is involved—with the Supreme Goodness.

The conclusion of our inquiry then into the bearing of a doctrine of Personality in God upon the problem of the destiny of the individual human person is that this doctrine, understood as we have understood it, as the theological expression of an experience of personal intercourse between the worshipper and the Object of his worship, affords the only truly positive ground of which a Gifford Lecturer can take cognizance for a belief in future blessedness and immortality, such as can form an article in a religious creed. It does not, as we have seen, enable us to meet directly the insistent doubts suggested by our experience of the constant association of personal spirit with a body forming part of the system studied by the natural sciences. Such difficulties might be, at least negatively, met by convincing evidence of the kind alleged by some votaries of what is called 'psychical research.' But this evidence, so far as it went, would remove the subject from the context of religious *faith*.

If, however, the supreme and central fact of the universe is a personal Love, it is intelligible that the apprehension of this fact and of its implications for created persons, should be inaccessible to those cognitive activities which do not involve a *personal* orientation such as is expressed by the word 'faith.'

We have to note, moreover, that, unless religious experience (and that not only in the form which expresses itself most naturally in the doctrine of Personality in God) is altogether an illusion, it cannot be explained on the principle of a pure Naturalism. Nor is it only religious

experience of which this may be said. Science itself cannot be materialistically explained. The scientific man who professes a materialistic view of the world not only, like Hume,[47] forgets his paradoxical views when he turns aside from his speculations to amuse himself with a game of backgammon or divert himself in the society of his friends, but even in carrying on his scientific inquiries he forgets them; for, did he not forget them, they would paralyse him. The man who takes Religion into account is better able than the materialist to be true to all sides of human experience. And out of the experience of Religion springs the hope of Immortality.

It is no doubt true that this hope must fade away where the scientific view of the world holds exclusive dominion over men's thoughts. And conversely, where this hope prevails, it must unsettle that exclusive domination. Nor is it an ignoble loyalty which fears to encourage disaffection to a conception so majestic and comprehensive and up to a certain point so satisfying to mind and heart as this same scientific view of the world. There is a real danger lest in dwelling upon our personal hope our whole outlook should become trivial and, so to say, parochial. And that is why, as it seems to me, the only form of the hope which it is profitable to indulge is that which is directed, not upon our own eternal life, but upon God's; and only upon our own as involved in his. We shall not give the rein to our imagination, which is here incompetent. What in us and in our lives has in it the capacity to persist we cannot say; much that we may be disposed to regard as having it may in truth be as little fit to endure for ever as many childish tastes

[47] Hume, *Treatise*, I. iv. § 7 (ed. Selby-Bigge, p. 269).

and desires to be prolonged into mature life. "Beloved, now are we the sons of God, and it doth not yet appear what we shall be."[48] This is the testimony of religious experience. But if there is Personality in God, it cannot easily be thought that Personality in the sons of God is the evanescent thing that to the naturalistic view of the world it must seem to be. "We shall be like him, for we shall see him as he is."[49] "He is not the God of the dead, but of the living, for all live unto him."[50]

There can be no doubt that, in so far as such considerations weigh with us, we shall be compelled to sit more loosely than perhaps we have been wont to do to what may conveniently be called the naturalistic view of the world; and that despite its potent sway over our every-day imagination, and despite the danger, ever to be carefully guarded against, of making our liberty from its restraints a cloke for extravagant and fantastic license of speculation unworthy of our civilization.

To counteract this danger we shall do well to learn a lesson from Kant's treatment of the three great topics of the metaphysical theology upon which he directed his destructive criticism—God, Freedom, and Immortality —as Postulates of Morality. If there has been any substance in the contention of the Lectures which I am now concluding, we are at liberty to accept far more simply and less grudgingly than did Kant the testimony of religious experience. But we must keep ourselves from rashly assuming that convictions we have reached by way of reflexion upon the presuppositions of that experience can be verified apart from it. This is not to consent to such a divorce of Theology from Metaphysic as was recommended by Albrecht Ritschl, though it may serve

[48] 1 John iii. 2. [49] *Ibid.* [50] Mark xii. 27.

to make his motive in recommending it intelligible to us. It is only to acknowledge that religious experience has, like other kinds of experience, its own sphere and its own laws. What at first appear to us as limitations imposed by these are seen on further consideration to be involved in what gives the experience its peculiar value. A religious conviction can no more be attained without faith than a moral conviction without respect for duty or an æsthetic conviction without a sense of beauty in colour or sound or form; nor in any of these cases could we seriously desire it to be otherwise attainable. But in the religious experience we may enjoy acquaintance with God, consciousness of the freedom involved in this acquaintance, assurance of a life with and in him which lifts us above the changes and chances of mortality. We have every right to employ our minds in asking what bearing this acquaintance, this consciousness, this assurance have upon our whole view of the world; but we shall scrutinize very closely any inferences from them which seem to have lost sight altogether of the specific nature of the premisses from which it started. And in so scrutinizing them we shall after all be doing no more than observing a time-honoured rule of the common logic which has come down to us from Aristotle, and which warns us against neglecting the peculiar nature of the principles available in each grand department of knowledge, and against such migration from one of these departments to another as only a neglect of the peculiarity of the principles of each could have suggested.

With this remark I bring these Lectures to a close. No one can be more conscious than I of their inadequacy to the height of the great argument which I have attempted to handle in them. No one can be more fearful than I

of the possible discouragement which disappointment at this inadequacy may bring to some who may have looked for help to a discussion of these matters from a chair which has in the past been occupied by so many eminent men. But the poor in intellectual and spiritual as well as in material wealth may take shelter under the divine apology for her who cast into the treasury all that she had.

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