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THE NEW BALANCE OF POWER
IN EUROPE

THE NEW BALANCE OF POWER IN EUROPE

BY

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PREFACE

The present study is an attempt to describe the formation of a new European balance of power with its possible consequences of war or peace. Two political groups are racing to attain military supremacy. One of these groups seeks to maintain the political structure of Europe, the other strives to change it. The purpose of this work will be to examine and appraise the possible chances of each group in reaching its end. To attain the aim of this work it is necessary first to study the motives and aspirations which draw the several states into each of two groups. An incidental task is to survey the indications permitting the supposition that in case of general conflict the respective groups may count on the military assistance of certain states. Further, it is pertinent to appraise the power of each group. It is quite natural that this appraisal should necessarily be based on their military strength, and therefore evaluation is made of the military power of the states in question.

As Germany's position is considered to be largely the key to the situation, special attention is given to the state of armaments in that country. A close study has been undertaken in regard to the possible magnitude of German secret armaments partly on the basis of French military sources and partly on the basis of material which the writer obtained from war depart-

ments of several European countries. The financial and economic situation, insofar as it influences foreign policy and military strength, is also taken into consideration.

An indication is given of what seems probable contingencies in the case either of an European war, or of further development of the situation in peace. In short, the aim is to present a synthesis of the forces shaping the destiny of the old world.

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CHAPTER I

THE REVISIONIST POWERS

It is a truism that the political face of the world has little stability. The change of boundaries and even of the names of countries, however, is not a constant uninterrupted process but is a course generally established by convulsions, first of arms and then of diplomatic negotiations. It is especially in the second stage, before the conclusion of a treaty, that the political face of territories is malleable, and that the artist is needed who is endowed with sufficient intuition, vision, wisdom, self-control, and knowledge to fix the new forms in a way to fit the needs and the natural process of the life of the nations in question. How long treaties will be viable depends upon his wisdom.

During the time which elapsed between the armistice day and the conclusion of the peace treaties, immense territories for redistribution were at the disposal of the treaty makers. The German colonies, the Near East, and Central Europe were waiting for new tags of sovereignty. Furthermore, the world was ready to accept new moral principles in dealings with international problems.

But the problems which the world inherited in 1919 were the facts that a number of nations bent all their energies toward changing the territorial status

quo created in Paris, while Germany and the other defeated states devoted all their efforts toward regaining equality in their status of sovereignty. Though the majority of the dissatisfied nations are primarily preoccupied with territorial claims, it is the German demand for "equality," or what Chancellor Bruening and the other leaders of the nation call "freedom," which threatens, if there is no redress in the situation, to break down the present political system of Europe, and may be that of the world.

ITALY

Italian foreign policy is shaped by the following basic economic and social factors:

1. The problem of disposing of her large surplus population which has a growth of about half a million per annum.
2. Her shortage of essential raw materials and fuels.
3. Her dependence upon imported foodstuffs for domestic consumption.

Italy's potential agricultural resources have been almost exhausted, and thus she is prevented from a further material increase in production. In spite of the supreme efforts of the Fascist regime to enhance production, approximately 35 per cent of the country's total grain requirement is met by imports. Italy's economic dependence upon foreign countries is not alleviated by a great export industry, as in the case of Germany. Her trade balance is constantly

unfavorable. Hence her financial weakness. The lack of foodstuffs and raw materials is of fundamental importance in the question of Italy's national security, since an effective blockade by an enemy power would quickly reduce Italy to her knees. Italy lacks practically every essential mineral.¹ She has no iron, copper, tin or gold. For coal she is dependent on England and Germany; for oil on England and Russia.

An equally important determinant of Italy's foreign policy is the serious pressure of her growing population. Before 1914 the Italian emigration movement amounted to a yearly average of 400,000 people. Even this safety-valve, which before the war stripped Italy of her best labor material, is closed at present by American immigration restrictions. For a time France served as an outlet and in the decade after the

¹ Constantine E. McGuire, *Italy's International Economic Position* (New York, 1926), p. 108.

DISTRIBUTION OF ITALY'S LAND AREA

	Types of land	Hectares	Percentage
Seed Lands:			
Cereals.....		7,109,300	23.0
Temporary grass and other forage lands...		2,135,300	6.9
Other arable and fallow.....		4,065,800	13.1
Meadows and permanent pastures.....		6,789,500	21.9
Horticulture.....		1,492,700	4.8
Forest (including chestnuts).....		5,583,200	18.0
Productive non-cultivated lands.....		1,251,000	4.0
Total agrarian and forest lands.....		28,435,300	91.7
Unproductive area.....		2,562,600	8.3
Total.....		30,998,400	100.0

World War about two million Italians emigrated into scarcely populated France. But this outlet now is similarly barred. France begins herself to struggle with the problem of unemployment as well as that of the Italianization of Southern France by immigration.

But, even if a possibility of emigration could be found, the loss of the best labor material would not be countenanced by a nation desiring growth and power. This does not seem to the Fascists to be a permanent solution to the problem of growth in population. " *I am not an enthusiastic partisan of emigration,*" declared M. Mussolini before the Italian Senate of May 28, 1926, " *It is a sad and sorrowful necessity which Italy can only accept . . . Emigration is nothing but the pauperization of the people themselves. Only the strongest, the most daring, and the most courageous emigrate.*"

Most significant is the recent legislation in Italy, encouraging larger families and establishing a tax on bachelors. With an enormous pressure of growing population with no outlet, this encouragement seems certainly to indicate the tendency of the government to acquire territories for the surplus. Italy's present colonial possessions, though covering a considerable area, are practically unproductive both in providing opportunities for her emigrants and in supplying her industries with raw materials. Her African territories comprise Libya, Eritrea, and Italian Somaliland. In the two latter the tropical climate is unsuit-

able for white colonization,² and Libya is almost wholly desert except for a narrow belt on the sea-shore and a few scattered oases. The Libyan area is three times that of Italy herself, but there are less than 25,000 resident Italians. The revenue of the colony is absorbed in the military expenditures necessary to check warrior tribes.

Italian Libya is a striking contrast with the French North African colonies. The economic opportunities in these latter are great, though they are not the richest of the French possessions. The Italian population of the French colonies outnumbers the French and has led to French legislation affecting naturalization of Italians. This circumstance is a cause of friction between the two governments.

Italy's colonies fail to provide an outlet. Less than 30,000 Italians have settled in the colonies and possessions.³ There are six times as many Italians in French Tunis and Algiers as there are in all the Italian colonies together.

When the territorial acquisitions of Great Britain and France by the Versailles Treaty were made public in Italy, popular dissatisfaction was freely expressed. It was pointed out that whereas Great Brit-

² There is an immigration into Eritrea and Somaliland from India and China.

	Native population	Italian population
3 Libya	775,000	24,560
Eritrea	392,000	3,901
Italian Somaliland	650,000	596
Dodecanese Isles	100,000.	

ain, France, and South Africa had secured approximately 950,000 square miles in mandates over the former German colonies, some of which are territories of great economic value and adapted to white colonization, Italy had received nothing from the mandates settlement.

This dissatisfaction over the distribution of the former German colonies has given point to Mussolini's frequent references to Italy's "legitimate colonial aspirations." At the time when the German colonies were distributed among the victorious powers, Italy was mainly preoccupied with internal political strife. This weakened her position in the diplomatic negotiations. The Fascists, after the interior consolidation had been accomplished, at once turned their attention to foreign policy and put forward their claims.

The Fascists attempt to prove the legitimacy of their claims by a comparison of the respective positions of France and Italy. They point to the fact that France's area of 235,000 square miles is rich in agricultural products and is the best provided in minerals in Europe. The population rose from 37 millions in 1870 to 40.7 millions in 1928, including 3 million immigrants.⁴

Italy's area of 121,000 square miles supports, in spite of the far less favorable agricultural circum-

⁴ Under the rule of Louis XIV France contained one-third of the total European population, while at present it embraces one-twelfth.

stances and the practically complete lack of raw materials for industries, 41 million men, with a growth of half a million per annum.

France's colonial possessions before the Versailles Treaty covered an area of 4 million square miles, with 48 million inhabitants. To these were added in 1919 another half a million square miles and 12 million inhabitants. These colonies represent an inestimable source of wealth, comparable only to the British possession of India.

Italy, on the other hand, with an enormous pressure of population and lack of foodstuffs and raw materials and with a colonial empire of no use for white colonization received scarcely anything at Versailles.⁵ The Fascists further stressed the point that the French Colonial Empire serves, besides its source of wealth, principally to aggrandize French military contingents.

One-third of the French standing army is composed of colored troops garrisoned in France. At present there is even some colored immigration into France. The number of colored African immigrants in Paris has risen to over 200,000 and in Marseille to over 100,000. As they generally intermarry with the local population (the immigrants being mostly men), they are considered in France as a correction for the low birth rate and a source of combatant material.

⁵ Eritrea, Somali (or Libya), 750,000 square miles and a population of under 2 millions.

It is this clash of demographic tendencies which threatens the treaties of 1919 from the Italian side. It is one of the factors which constantly conditions the continuation of the Versailles settlement.

GERMANY

Economic Dependence

With Germany, the problem is not so simple. The revisionists claim that the economic and financial clauses of the Peace Treaty put Germany at the mercy of unfriendly neighbors. Though lacking space, Germany could even do without territorial increment, if it were not for other complications. Her highly efficient industry, her gift for organization, and the hard working qualities of the people would enable her to support that part of the population, amounting to about 25 millions, which cannot be fed by the products of the domestic soil, if tariff barriers did not bar her exports. Economists estimate that the German soil can provide foodstuffs for about 40 million people. This number was reached in 1870. Since then, it has been not so much the acquisition of colonies as the enormous development of industry which has made a relatively high standard of living possible for a population which rose to 68 millions in 1914.

It is true that since that time the situation has changed somewhat. It must be kept in mind that the livelihood of the surplus population of 25 millions is

dependent on a complicated and artificial organization of production, built up for purposes of export. The several producing regions of the Reich had to complement each other through a rational division of production and the whole mechanism was directed toward supplying Central and Eastern European and the overseas markets with industrial products in exchange for raw material and foodstuffs. The surplus population in reality lived on the excellent functioning of this mechanism.

Not only the German but even the British sympathizers with revisionism assert that the Clemenceau school believed that the German-French rivalry can be settled in favor of France only by limitation of Germany's surplus strength—by cutting off the means of livelihood of her surplus population. These revisionists cite the word of Clemenceau about the German people: "*Il y en a vingt millions de trop*"—20 millions, the number by which the German population surpasses that of the French mother-country.

Maynard Keynes, the representative of the British Treasury at the Paris Peace Conference, expressed this tendency thus:

It was the policy of France to set the clock back and to undo what, since 1870, the progress of Germany had accomplished. By loss of territory and other measures her population was to be curtailed; but chiefly the economic system upon which she depended for her new strength, the vast fabric built upon iron, coal, and transport must be destroyed. Hence sprang

those cumulative provisions for the destruction of highly organized economic life.⁶

The Reduction of German Earning Capacity

Keynes describes the German economic system before the war as dependent (a) on its overseas commerce (b) on coal and iron (c) on the transport and tariff system.

The overseas commerce was based on (1) the mercantile marine, (2) the colonies, (3) the foreign investments, (4) exports, (5) overseas connections of her merchants.

1. By the delivery of ships, stipulated in the Treaty, the German merchant marine was swept from the sea.

2. The colonies were taken without exception.

3. The foreign investments were almost entirely expropriated.

4. The export markets were extremely restricted. Germany's great pre-war markets, Central Europe and the Balkans, were impoverished, and imports were barred by high tariffs at the borders of the newly erected states. Russia was almost lost as a market. The overseas markets were taken over during the war by other exporters, such as Japan and the United States, while many of those countries which formerly did not possess industries began to develop them and at the same time to bar imports.

⁶ John M. Keynes, *The Economic Consequences of the Peace* (New York, 1919), p. 36.

5. The overseas connections of the merchants were lost during the war.⁷

The second resource which gave Germany a living was the coal and iron supply on which her industry was built.

While Germany lost (not taking into account the colonies) through the cession of territories 7 per cent of her population, she lost, according to Keynes, 75 per cent of her iron ore supply and 33 per cent of her coal supply, and 40 per cent of her blast furnaces. The Institute of Economics in Washington puts the respective figures at 74, 26, and 40 per cent.⁸ According to this Institute she was deprived of 30 per cent of her steel mills and 28 per cent of her rolling mills. Furthermore 15.4 per cent of her arable land, 16.4 per cent of her wheat growing area, 17.7 per cent of her rye fields were lost.

As to the tariff and transport system, the third factor in her economic life, Germany's river-system was taken from German control. This is now under the control of Commissions, of which a majority of the members are from former enemy states. Out of the 19 members of the Rhine Commission only four are Germans. For example, the German harbor, Kiel on the Rhine, is managed by the French. Germany had also to hand over a considerable part of her rolling material. The Institute of Economics in Washington estimated the national wealth of Germany at 300 bil-

⁷ See for details, *ibid.*, *passim*.

⁸ Moulton and McQuire, *Germany's Capacity to Pay* (New York, 1923).

lion Goldmarks for 1913 and at 125 billion Goldmarks for 1921,⁹ not taking account of the colonies. The lost colonies were estimated at 100 billion Goldmarks.

The extreme lack of capital, due to the inflation, which took its catastrophic form during the French occupation of the Ruhr, was made more acute through the circumstance that the accumulation of new capital was rendered fairly impossible by the drain on the national economy by the reparation payments and by the adverse trade balance.¹⁰ The unfavorable trade balance was caused by the disorganization of the national producing system, as illustrated by the above items of losses and the example of Upper Silesia, where an economic unit considered indivisible was cut in two.¹¹

⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁰ 1919 — 12 billion dollars.	1926 + 0.2 billion dollars.
1920 — 0.5 billion dollars.	1927 — 0.7 billion dollars.
1921 - 0.5 billion dollars.	1928 - 0.3 billion dollars.
1922 — 0.6 billion dollars.	1929 ± 0 billion dollars.
1923 — Ruhr occupation.	1930 + 0.3 billion dollars.
1924 — 0.5 billion dollars.	1931 + 0.7 billion dollars.
1925 — 0.6 billion dollars.	

In 1929 imports: 3.9 billion dollars.
 exports: 3.9 billion dollars.

In 1931 imports: 15 billion dollars.
 exports: 2.2 billion dollars.

The export surplus of 1931 was occasioned by a dangerous strangulation of imports and by dumping exports even at a loss. See, Basic Experts Report, December 1931.

¹¹ See for references: Sir Robert Donald, *The Polish Corridor and the Consequences* (London, 1929); Lieutenant Colonel Graham Seton Hutchison, member of the Plebiscite Commission: *Silesia Revisited*, 1929; Rene Martel, *The Eastern Frontiers of Germany* (London, 1930), Max Sering, *Germany under the Dawes Plan* (London, 1929).

It is only in its main features that we have tried to sketch the handicaps with which Germany, after the war, had to start in rebuilding her economic life.

Vulnerability of German Economic System

The reorganization of the German producing mechanism took place only with great economic strain on the people and with the help of foreign loans. The indebtedness of the economic system to foreign creditors of about 7 billion dollars at an average rate of interest of 8 per cent was the consequence.

Nevertheless, even revisionists show optimism in Germany's economic future, provided she has the possibility of exporting her industrial products, and politics do not interfere in economics.

The problem is just this: whether or not the balance of payments will be sufficiently favorable to assure the stability of the German financial structure, the failure of which would have incalculable social and political consequences in a country which is not capable of feeding its population with the products of its own soil.

In order to understand the following part of this work it is necessary to keep in mind that Germany is absolutely dependent on her foreign trade, and that any power in a position to wreck this trade can either reduce Germany through the gradual starving off of her 25 million surplus population, which cannot be fed with the products of her own soil, or bring her

to her knees in accepting the conditions the other power imposes upon her.

A practical demonstration of this possibility was witnessed during the period of the blockade on Germany between the armistice and the signing of the Versailles Treaty. This blockade, which was held the most effective means to force the signing of the Treaty, brought about 800,000 civilian deaths from under-nourishment.¹² This policy can be used, though naturally not as effectively, as a weapon in a continued war of peace-time.

Clemenceau is supposed to have said after the signing of the Peace Treaty, " This is the continuation of war." This was brought up before the American Senate by Senator Borah, Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee, on April 19, 1932, who asked that the war debts should be not cancelled until certain European powers stopped their peace-time war.¹³ The details of this fight, which is still taking place in a smaller or greater degree, will be examined later; at present we draw attention only to the phenomena of the emergency decrees and exchange regulations in Central Europe.

The Two Vulnerable Points

It is assumed that German economic life can be attacked from two main directions. The first, natur-

¹² M. Sering, *op. cit.*, p. 33. See also, H. W. V. Temperley, *A History of the Peace Conference of Paris*. (London, 1920) II, 51.

¹³ Senator Borah is known as one of the main American revisionists.

ally, is to deprive her of foreign markets. The second, is to destroy the financial and credit structure of the country. The deprivation of markets is to a great extent taken care of by the present general tendency of high tariff barriers, and no special intrigue of a political adversary is needed. Nevertheless, the German-Polish tariff war, resulting in an almost complete cessation of trade relations, has the character of direct political pressure. M. Tardieu's particular kind of Danubian scheme tended also to the economic (and naturally the political) isolation of Germany. As Czechoslovakia is the only real manufacturing country among the five Danubian States envisaged by Premier Tardieu for an economic union, it would have meant a tremendous boom for her at the expense of Germany, who was to be excluded from the Union. We will examine later this particular problem; here, the only important point to mention is that, although two states, Rumania and Yugoslavia, are members of the French military alliance system, they were nevertheless favorable to the inclusion of Germany in the Danube Union. So also were Austria and Hungary, thus comprising four of the five states in question. But Tardieu opposed it categorically. It is asserted that, beside the fear of political rapprochement caused by economic ties between Germany and the above mentioned states, the reason for the exclusion of Germany was the desire to keep her foreign trade as restricted as possible. Thus, such an economic *cordon sanitaire* around Germany would continue to

weaken her and to make her amenable to further political concessions. But, as we have already mentioned, depriving Germany of foreign markets by tariff walls is a process which goes on even without political intrigues.

Balance of Payments and Reparations

Another possibility of destroying German economic life, which is based on an extremely complicated and artificial system of production, is the wrecking of her monetary and credit system. In some instances, as in the time before and during the Ruhr occupation, political insecurity may in itself accomplish this, but a far surer way is that through reparation payments. Unless the recent Lausanne agreements become operative, Germany will have to accomplish for three generations political payments averaging annually half a billion dollars. This sum must be paid in gold (or foreign currencies based on gold). The problem here is (and this is the famous "transfer" problem) how to acquire this gold or these foreign currencies based on gold. If there were no tariff-barriers, quotas, licensing systems, embargoes, or exchange controls, all having as a consequence the strangling of foreign trade, the economic solution would be for German workers to work an hour or half an hour more every day during three generations to sell their products abroad, and to pay off with the net proceeds of their surplus work the political debts. Thus, they would sell abroad

for currencies based on gold (Dollar, Franc, Gulden, etc.) and pay with these currencies their foreign political creditors. This method would certainly have bad psychological effects, as such surplus-work would be considered by the German people as the "tribute" of the vanquished, payable for generations; but, from the economic point of view, the net proceeds (i. e., the difference between the raw material purchased and the finished goods sold abroad) in the form of foreign currency would satisfy the demand for foreign means of payment or in gold for the purposes of political payments.

On the other hand, if the debtor country (Germany) be prevented from selling abroad the result of her labor—and this is the case actually because of the existing tariff barriers, quotas, licenses, embargoes and exchange controls—how can she acquire the necessary means of payment (foreign currency or gold) to satisfy the foreign beneficiaries?

This is the problem of "transfer" and the answer is that unless the creditor countries accept the visible exports (in form of goods) or the invisible exports (in form of services like shipping, banking, labor abroad, foreign tourists in Germany, etc.) of the debtor (Germany) no debt payments can take place across the frontier. If the foreigners do not buy in Germany or do not accept German services, the Germans will have no foreign currency to pay debts abroad. One might ask, why not pay in Marks? Yes, but the Mark has only a value abroad in so far as

some foreigner is willing and able to buy from Germany or spend the money in Germany.

The problem is, whether Germany has or has not a favorable balance of payments whereby foreign means of payments are acquired; and, if she has a favorable balance, is it sufficient to meet foreign obligations?

Let us make the assumption that foreign tourists in Germany spend yearly X dollars and that this favorable item in the balance of payments would not be off set by German tourists abroad. Suppose the foreign tourists in Germany desire to eat bananas, bread, oranges or oysters. These and hundreds of other items must be provided from abroad at the sacrifice of diminishing the foreign currency at Germany's disposal. Thus, if no German went abroad the year in question, the net proceeds in foreign currency for Germany derived from foreign tourists would be $X - Y$, Y being the amount paid abroad for goods consumed by the tourists. It is the surplus left which counts.

Germany's imports of foodstuffs, reduced to a minimum level, average about 1.3 billion dollars a year. Approximately half of this amount goes for foodstuffs originating in her former colonies. Thus, the revisionists say, if the colonies, or part of the colonies, had been left in Germany's possession, there would probably be no transfer-problem in reparations. The same consideration applies to raw materials. For the carrying on of industrial production, the

minimum of necessary raw material imports is a yearly average of 2 billion dollars. These figures are supposed to be the indispensable minimum requirements lest industrial production stop and famine arise.¹⁴

Hence, exports must first balance this minimum of 3 billion imports; then, if there is a surplus, other obligations may be paid. But the balancing of these three billion imports by exports is a difficult task. It is pointed out that Germany is compelled to import at least this amount or face famine. But her customers are not compelled to buy her manufactured goods. In this way, by the progressing policy of economic isolation in the world, her position will be more and more difficult.

Moreover, as the situation stands in 1932, Germany has to pay yearly about half a billion dollars in principal and interest on her public and private debts abroad. These are not the political debts ("reparations"). If she desires to maintain her credit—which she must do in order to carry on foreign trade—she must pay these commercial debts. Thus, half a billion of her eventual export-surplus is earmarked for the payment of these debts. Nevertheless, with the exception of two years she has constantly had an unfavorable balance of payments. This is due to the tariff walls prevailing throughout the world. The gap was filled for a time by borrowing abroad, but these sources ceased to be available after 1930.

¹⁴ See Young Plan Advisory Committee report of December 24, 1931, ch. I, on low level of imports in the year 1931.

The position in 1932 is that, in spite of an artificial check on imports by exchange regulations (which check can only be temporary), Germany has not even enough export surplus to meet her private debts abroad. It remains to be seen how she will face such a situation.

Our somewhat detailed study has had the purpose of demonstrating the thesis of the impossibility of Germany making political payments without an adequate surplus in exports. It is the general contention that the reparation payments, with the present trade barriers, cannot be met. This fact is conceded by practically all economists, including the French.

Gold Reserve and Sanctions

One may conclude that now is the occasion for an unfriendly and powerful creditor to wreck the German monetary and credit system. This political creditor may threaten Germany with sanctions in case of default in political payments.

But Germany, the political debtor, remembering the occupation of the Ruhr, and trying to delay the political crisis, resorts to the last means with which she can satisfy for a time her foreign creditor. The gold reserve of her Central Bank serves as the basis for her currency. At least half a billion dollars of gold is required for this purpose. This would be the legal minimum of 40 per cent to cover the paper money in circulation. Germany began to pay out of

her gold reserve. The monetary structure of the Reich faced imminent collapse.

If the government dares to declare a moratorium on the payment of reparations, a crisis in foreign policy is imminent. The Young plan gave France the right to resort to sanctions. The text says that the political creditor regains "full liberty of action." This was the possibility, fully legalized, of another Ruhr occupation. Let us assume the reoccupation of the Rhineland. It is believed that the school of M. Poincare would not be unfavorable to this turn of events. MM. Tardieu and Laval are of this group. M. Poincare's words pronounced before the Ruhr occupation were reiterated again and again in Germany. M. Poincare said on June 26, 1922:

So far as I am concerned, it would pain me if Germany were to pay; then we should have to evacuate the Rhineland, and we should thus lose the benefit of the experiment which we made in order, peaceably but weapon in hand, to conquer the population of that frontier river. What do you regard as better, the encashment of money or the acquisition of new territory? I, for my part, prefer the occupation and the conquest to the money and reparations. Hence, you will comprehend why we need a powerful army and vigilant patriotism; you will comprehend that the *sole means of saving the Treaty of Versailles is to arrange matters in such a way that our defeated enemies cannot fulfil its conditions.*¹⁵

Germany has not been compelled to declare the moratorium herself. The imminent crisis was staved off by the moratorium on political payments offered

¹⁵*Populaire*, June 26, 1922.

by President Hoover in June 1931. This move took out of the hand of the French government the weapon of sanctions. But the gold reserve of the Reichsbank dwindled to about a 100 million dollars; that is, under 10 per cent of the currency in circulation, while the minimum was 40 per cent. Panic arose; the flight of capital from Germany and the run on the banks threatened with immediate collapse the monetary and credit system.

The economic life of Germany on the edge of the precipice was about to fall when Chancellor Bruening stayed its descent with the rope of the Hindenburg emergency decrees. The foreign exchange holdings of the country were put under control; the flight of capital was barred by punishments of ten-year prison terms and confiscation of property; the principal banks came under state control. The hand of the government dealt rudely with the economic life of the nation. Germany lay on the operating table, with Bruening, the ascetic-minded surgeon, bent over, asking himself, will this experiment succeed?

Comparison With Britain

The reader may ask, what would have happened if Germany, paying out her gold reserves, had gone off the gold standard? Would it not have been an event similar to that of the English drama, which finally, however, did not prove to be such a great tragedy? Many later suggested that Germany should follow England's example. But there is an immense differ-

ence between England (and France) and Germany. England (and France) with their position of world power, enjoying political security and enormous resources of wealth (which are in great extent their colonies), may "manage" for a while, perhaps for a long time, the level of their currency. Such is not the case with Germany. The complete destruction of the German currency by the inflation during the Ruhr occupation has remained a nightmare to the people. It wiped out the fortunes of the middle-classes and of the creditors. The consequence was economic chaos. The suggestion of a repetition would cause such a panic among the population and such a run of the mark that it would dwindle to zero in a short time. Furthermore, the great indebtedness of Germany to foreigners would not relieve the debtors from their burden in case Germany went off the gold standard. Foreign debts are payable in foreign currency. On the contrary, their payment would be much more onerous. And, finally, if the reparation payments, had to be continued—payable in gold—the burden on the state would have been multiplied, as the gold (or foreign currency based on gold) would have to be acquired with a depreciated domestic currency. The continued payments of political and private debts in gold with a falling, depreciated home money would be a process similar to the falling of an avalanche, which, the further it rolls, the bigger it grows. Obviously there would have been no escape for Germany by simply going off the gold standard. -

The delicate structure of economic life in Germany is kept going at present to a certain extent by the moratorium on reparation payments and the emergency decrees.

The Real Aim of German Revisionism

It may seem strange to the reader that the economic and financial position of Germany is dealt with here without touching on the subject of this work: the revision of the Treaty. But it seems hardly possible to understand the revisionist aims and the chances to attain them without putting stress on the economic and financial dependence of Germany on the good or ill will of foreign countries.

It is simpler to explain the claims of the revisionists with territorial aspirations, such as the Danzig Corridor. This method is good for reasons of simplicity, but it is misleading. The issue is more considerable. It is the independence of Germany. As the revisionists assert, the attempt to deprive Germany of her independence is based on a system the two pillars of which are: one-sided disarmament, and economic strangulation, largely by means of reparation payments of improper proportions.

Keeping this in mind, the revisionist movement completely changes in character. Instead of being aggressive, it becomes defensive. Thus considered, the aim of the revision of the Treaty is the aim which the world once believed the Treaty would accomplish:

the equality of the status of sovereignty among the powers, including Germany.

By means of unilateral disarmament and by means of "arranging matters in such a way that the defeated enemy cannot fulfil the conditions of the Treaty," as M. Poincare has put it, which means reparations, Germany, it is contended, is at the mercy of the armed neighbors in a military sense, and of the political creditor—provided he is armed enough to use sanctions—in an economic sense.

The Vicious Circle

As the Germans see it the problem presents the aspect of a vicious circle. For instance, France's military allies, Yugoslavia and Rumania, would like to cooperate closely with Germany in an economic sense. It is only Germany who is able to buy their surplus agricultural products. For these Germany would exchange industrial products. The expansion of mutual trade would augment the consuming power in these Balkan states and in Germany too. With a greater purchasing power both would again buy more from each other and prosperity would be enhanced in these countries, which economically complement one another. These are well established facts. However, this process is prevented by French determination to maintain the present political structure of Europe through political alliances. It is not to France's interest to see a rapprochement between the above states—even economic rapprochement, because

it might result in more friendly political relations—and, as the Germans point out, she does not desire to see Germany too prosperous. By what means, in the opinion of the Germans, can France oppose such an economic cooperation? By two means. The first is military; here she holds the whip in her hand. With a gesture she can dismiss the petty " disloyal " acts of Eumania or Yugoslavia or even the more " daring " German attempts. Who would protect Eumania if attacked by Russia? Certainly not disarmed Germany. And to oppose France directly—nobody would think of such a thing in these Balkan States. But why irritate these little allies by mentioning the military position? For, second, there is, according to the German argument, plenty of gold " sterilized " in the vaults of the Banque de France to accomplish political purposes. The constant flow of reparation payments and the attraction of the " security " offered by the great conservative military power to the liquid assets of the world piled up enough of this magic metal to give little tips to obedient governments. It is estimated that in 1931 France granted to her allies political loans up to 240 million dollars.

Thus, the Germans say, the reparation payments, which brought Germany to the edge of economic catastrophe, are used to prevent her from recovering from this catastrophe. The same may be said from the military point of view.

The Treaty of Versailles gave Germany the right to replace successively the six old war vessels with

new ones, limited to 10,000 tons. Even built with the utmost skill and at relatively great expense, it is contended that the navy made up of these vessels would be a negligible quantity in comparison with the forces of the great naval powers. Nevertheless, for little states on the Russian border they would be a certain factor to cope with, and hence Germany's influence would not be entirely negligible.

Consequently, the Germans say, France tries to stop the building of these vessels. Therefore, as the economic catastrophe became imminent, France asked several conditions in return for not pushing the head of the swimmer under water, such as discontinuance of building of the second of the 10,000 ton German cruisers (or " Pocket Battleships "). This would deprive Germany of the remotest possibility of defense. It would invite any power, the Germans believe, to repeat an invasion similar to those into Upper Silesia, or Memel, or the Ruhr. "With this possibility an internal political crisis would arise with Hitlerite explosions, hatred, and powerless excitement. Confidence in the financial and economic stability of Germany would disappear. And then with an even firmer whip-hand, France would be more than ever the arbiter of questions as to whether or not states like Rumania or Yugoslavia might cooperate economically with Germany. The Germans see themselves in a vicious circle, practically defenseless economically and also in a military respect, and constantly exposed to even further strictures

upon their means of self-preservation. It is, as they see it, a tide which grows and threatens to swamp the last vestiges of sovereignty. No independent action is then possible without the consent of the powers who hold the whip. And these are France on one side, Poland on the other.

It was only meant to touch here on the question of one-sided disarmament as it enters into the working of the vicious circle. The problem of one-sided disarmament, which is logically considered more important to Germany than the economic dependence, will be dealt with in detail later. It is enough to stress here that the real aim of the revisionists is the escape from what they consider a water-tight system of one-sided disarmament, and from the constant threat of economic collapse, which in their eyes makes illusory the denomination of Germany as an independent, sovereign state.

And, in the opinion of the revisionists, this dependence of Germany is a threat to her national existence. They cite the words of Clemenceau, "*vingt millions de trop*," insisting that France's aim is to reduce the German population, by economic strangulation, to numerical equality with France, a process the accomplishment of which is not expected to be an edifying social phenomenon.

The Main Demand: Equality of the Military Status

As to the military position, Germans feel themselves so defenseless, in consequence of the one-sided

disarmament, that they suppose that Germany will be the future battlefield of the powers—France and Eussia, for example. It is from this angle that the extreme nationalists play on the nerves of the populace. These problems are the underlying factors of revisionism. They are considered as questions of life and death, of independence, and, last but not least, of "national honor." While this view is uninterruptedly reiterated by the nationalists, it is the subconscious driving force of the whole people. The Danzig Corridor, the Anschluss, the minority problem, etc., are accessories. The latter are not questions of national existence, as is the question of one-sided disarmament in face of the modern weapons of France and Poland, none too benevolent neighbors. Even those who are considered by the French as moderates and partisans of cooperation with France, express themselves in a phraseology according with this state of mind, as, for instance, in the declaration (April 8, 1932) of Chancellor Bruening, whose fall has been regretted because of his patience and moderation. "Firmness as a matter of fact and courtesy in form . . . but the road to *freedom* will be stony and demand sacrifices. . . ." Similarly does President von Hindenburg use the word "independence" in fixing the aim of Germany.

Signs of Nervous Tension

The question of Manchuria is cited daily in the German press as conclusive evidence that inequality

of armaments invites conquest. The *coup d'etat* of Lithuania on Memel made the discussion more heated. The Germans point out that even a dwarf-state like Lithuania dared to occupy the German territory of Memel in 1923 (to regain some of its former losses occasioned by the capture of the Lithuanian Vilna by the Poles) and did not hesitate, in 1932, to destroy the autonomy of Memel guaranteed by the Great Powers. Such action as that of the Lithuanians, the Germans say, encourages the Poles in their behavior in the Danzig situation and even in respect to East Prussia. After the second Memel coup in 1932, indeed, the Poles moved in the "Free City" of Danzig. At a conference of Polish students held at Danzig on February 12, 1932, a Councillor of the Polish Foreign Office, M. Lalicki, expressed his opinion that certain parts of eastern Prussia would be taken from Germany. The delegate of Polish Pomerellia aired his belief that France would not mind seeing the Poles give Germany a lesson for not paying the reparations. The gravest incident of the meeting was the writing of a letter by M. Strassburger, former Polish High Commissioner of Danzig, saying that, as recompense for the unpaid reparations, France must take German frontier territories and that Poland would take eastern Prussia and Danzig. This letter was read at the meeting.¹⁶

¹⁶ An American author on the subject, Colonel E. A. Powell, cites in his book *Thunder over Europe* (New York, 1931) similar statements apt to aggravate the German nervousness due to one-sided disarmament. Such statements are, for example, by M. Roman

The reaction to these declarations (made in the territory of the Free City of Danzig and considered by that city as violation of her sovereignty) was that East Prussia, and especially the border regions, voted in the following presidential elections for Hitler. To allay their fears and excitement, General Wilhelm Groener, the Minister of Defense and Interior, who combated Hitler, discussed openly in the *Koenigsberger Allgemeine Zeitung* the possibility of an armed invasion of East Prussia by one of Germany's neighbors, and reassured the populace that Germany's army and navy were ready to protect them, thereby sounding a sharp warning against any such plans. He said:

I understand fully that the populace of Prussia feels exposed and threatened in view of the striking disparity in armaments between Germany and her neighbors. I do not underrate this danger but it is necessary to face it with a cool head, for we know that East Prussia is not without protection and at the mercy of foreign imperialism.

In the first place, the detachment of the army stationed there watches over the security of this province, while the navy maintains connections with the Reich, backed by a populace that is willing to sacrifice its blood for the defense of

Dmowski, former Minister of Foreign Affairs and leader of the National Democratic party, in his book published in 1925: "The Corridor is worthless to Poland unless she obtains East Prussia as well." Mr. Srokovski, formerly Polish Consul-General at Konigsberg, is the author of another work in which the annexation of East Prussia is advocated: "No sacrifice could be too great which would win East Prussia in one way or another, and draw it into the orbit of the Polish race. This would indeed be work of a civilizing character." Half a dozen similar statements of important personalities are cited in Colonel Powell's work.

German soil. At any rate, the defensive power of Eastern Prussia implies great risk of failure for an aggressor.

For this should be known: a hostile invasion of East Prussia would not be met merely with passive but by active resistance, and this resistance would not be confined to the East but would be based on the whole moral and material strength of the German people, which on this vital national issue is united beyond all party considerations.¹⁷

This declaration of the Reich's Minister of Defense and Interior is not to be taken too seriously. It is an address to the electorate of a province which lives under the constant fear of invasion. This same province was invaded in 1914 by the Russians, and now it fears the Poles. Thus they are inclined to support Hitler. Therefore, General Groener had to assure them that he would defend them. But if he had talked to his collaborators in the Ministry of Defense in Berlin he would probably have described the situation in a different way. He knows the inadequacy of the Reich's present forces. His words should have been less confident.

After news was received that Polish troops were concentrating near Danzig [says the *New York Times*], the Reichstag's Foreign Affairs Committee adopted a resolution calling on the government to "make clear to Poland that any attack on Danzig will be regarded by the whole German people as an assault on their vital rights and responded to accordingly."

In addition, there is the adoption of another resolution moved by the non-jingo Centrists, acknowledging the Chancellor's declaration that the lawful rights of the Germans in Danzig and Memel would be protected but adding, "in view of events there and the outrages against German people, the

¹⁷ *New York Times*, March 24, 1932.

Foreign Affairs Committee expects the Reich's Government to take all appropriate measures for the timely prevention of renewed violation of those cities' rights, and interests."¹⁸

The above has been quoted to demonstrate the principal preoccupations and the underlying currents in Germany. They explain the real revisionist aims. British public opinion, with its keen sense of political problems, realizes this feature of revisionism. The British Admiral, H. W. Richmond, declared on February 11, 1932: " The unrest of Germany is principally because of inequality in armaments. The effort she would make to recover her security would involve Europe in another great war." Commenting on this statement and on the disarmament conference, the *London Times*, semi-official organ of the foreign office, noted in an editorial: " The permanent inequality is a danger to peace. The redress of inequality, while it is the most natural and reasonable of German demands, also gives the first clue to the stabilization which the French demand when they demand ' security.' " ¹⁹

The redress of inequality in armaments between France and Germany is not considered in Germany—at least not by the great majority of the people—as a means to regain lost territories, but as an aid in itself. It is primarily a psychological problem, and it is difficult to tell whether the challenged sense of security or the humiliation seems to them more intolerable.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, May 27, 1932.

¹⁹ *London Times*, February 11, 1932.

A study of the aims which largely occupy the extreme German nationalists can be made through a survey of the declarations of Hitler and his organs. In the several recent electoral and propaganda campaigns, by which Hitler tried to rally both the extreme and more moderate nationalist elements and play up to their feelings, he constantly stressed the subjugation, humiliation, and defenselessness of Germany through one-sided disarmament, but did not mention any territorial aspirations of Germany or his party. Not that the Hitlerites would be satisfied with the Polish corridor. Later it may play the role of an Alsace-Lorraine. But the military defenselessness is at present the overwhelming, infuriating problem. Hitler's remarks on this problem, with no mention of the Corridor, are significant. His three most representative recent declarations on Germany's international position are the following:

(December 4, 1931) Rapprochement must proceed from France, and was impossible as long as France could not bring herself to cease trying to treat 65,000,000 Germans as a second-class nation. After 1871 Germany had imposed no political conditions, and the indemnity had been completely cleared off within three years. No conditions had been imposed to prevent France's rearming again immediately. Germany had acted with this magnanimity after winning the 1870 war entirely unaided. France, having "won" the late war in very different circumstances, was still endeavouring to keep her heel on the neck of Germany 12 years after. The Disarmament Conference would be the great test of the common sense of the entire world. If the world allowed France to keep her

armaments at their present high level, which was quite unnecessary for her security, it would mean that the world wanted France to continue her system of hegemony by means of blackmail.

(December 7, 1931) French imperialism, the desire to dominate Europe, yea, the world, is back of the sinister political decisions of the present day from Washington, London, Vienna, Home and Budapest. All are practically paralyzed by France's domination of the gold situation, and therewith the political situation.

If France is permitted to continue to pursue her policy of financial bullying and political extortion, as is now the case, the world in a certain sense will become French, France thus realizing her program of world domination, compared with which certain dreams of Louis XIV appear insignificant and innocent. The area between Cadiz, Calais, Copenhagen, and Constantinople has become virtually French territory.

The rest of Europe will have to bow down before the new factor whose man power in case of war will come from iVfrica. The meaning every American school child can realize. Europe under French domination will cease to be European and will be in danger of becoming African. A parallel is the Koman Empire in decline using increasing numbers of Teutonic soldiers and falling gradually into the hands of various Germanic races.

Europe and the world have the choice. If world conscience suffers defeat through French militarism, Europe is lost and the ultimate outcome will be chaos.

(December 13, 1931) French militarism, with Russian Bolshevism, forms one of the greatest dangers for the development of mankind. The world, in tolerating the possibility that "French niggers" might tomorrow again occupy the Rhineland, must not be surprised that the spectre of Bolshevism stands at the end of this development.

His theme is exclusively the military and economic, but emphasizes above all Germany's military defenselessness. This same applies to the moderate German view. It is Chancellor Bruening's "Leitmotiv," and similarly that of President Hindenburg. The latter's 1932 New Year's address refers to Germany's international problems in the following way:

The magnitude of the sacrifices gives us a right to claim from other nations that they must not impose requirements upon us impossible of fulfillment, and thus stand in the way of our recovery.

Our claim to a security equal to that of others is so justified that it cannot be denied.

The Lord has saved Germany from deep distress before. He will not forsake us now.

In a statement on the significance of the disarmament conference General Groener compares the present status of armaments to the ways of Napoleon.

Once already in the history of mankind an egotistical attempt by France to subdue whole nations by violence under the flag of the ideals of 1789 has plunged the world into ineffable misery. But, just as love of liberty on the part of the nations wrecked Napoleon's plans, our times in the long run will not suffer a hegemony based upon violence.

General Groener contends that the growth of semi-military associations in Germany represents nothing but the reaction of the German people to the inequality of armaments in Europe.

The official declarations are always aimed at Germany's right to equality in security and chance to

economic recovery. Not even the peaceful revision of the frontiers is mentioned, to say nothing of a forceful change. The peaceful alteration of the boundaries remains a future problem, for which there is no thought in the present critical situation. There has been only one occasion when Germany was occupied with this problem. During 1926 and 1927 negotiations were carried on between Belgium and Germany looking towards the buying back of Eupen and Malmédy by Germany. The plan seems to have found considerable support in Belgium, but M. Poincaré intervened, apparently on the ground that any alteration of Germany's western frontiers would be a dangerous precedent, and the plan came to nothing.²⁰

Several plans are mentioned for the rectification, with mutual compensation, of the eastern (Polish) frontier. These plans will be illusory until there is a change in the general atmosphere of distrust and excitement. To the possibilities of an arrangement such as proposed in Germany and in certain French quarters, we shall refer later. In consequence of Germany's action in ratifying the Locarno pact it may be said that the Reich has decided to regard as irrevocable the cession of Alsace-Lorraine to France. Matters are naturally different in the East. The German official view with respect to the eastern frontiers was given by Dr. Stresemann in the Reichsrat on March 10, 1925. He stated that Germany had

²⁰ *Foreign Policy Information Service*, Vol. V, no. 8; *Manchester Guardian*, January 29, 1929.

not offered to conclude an eastern guarantee pact. His explanation was as follows:

Germany has not the power to force through an alteration of her frontiers, nor the desire to do so. Since, however, Article XIX of the Covenant of the League expressly states that treaties which may have become inapplicable can be altered, no one can expect Germany finally to renounce taking peaceful advantage for herself of this opening for future developments.

Eventual changes in the general political constellation in Europe, to which we shall refer again, may induce Germany and Poland to come to a compromise agreement. It may be that Poland will at some time seek German aid to preserve the Polish eastern frontiers. The Germans believe that with equality in the military status of Germany and France the Anschluss would be consummated and the treatment of German minorities in Poland greatly improved. It is assumed that with an equality in the status of sovereignty mutual respect and more normal relations would be facilitated.

At the Disarmament Conference Germany adhered to the American proposal aiming at scrapping offensive weapons and retaining only defensive armaments. Fortifications and similar weapons, serving essentially for defense, would be permitted by this proposition, while those weapons, which are indispensable to the traversal and destruction of modern defense lines, such as heavy artillery, tanks, and gas, would be abolished. Any policy aiming at territorial acquisition would be unfavorable to such a scheme.

The German support of this proposition demonstrates her main pre-occupation: to get rid of those weapons with which her neighbors can force her rapidly to her knees. It is her exasperation in view of this possibility which dominates the German mind.

It is in pursuing the English policy for peace on the Continent that Sir John Simon, the British Foreign Secretary, stated, February 8, 1932, at the Disarmament Conference: " The security which we set before us as our ideal is security for all," and that the present situation " creates the illusion of security in one quarter while at the same time aggravating the sense of insecurity in another."

That inequality in the status of armaments is the greatest danger on the European continent may seem to superficial observers of European affairs somewhat paradoxical. Is a disarmed nation a threat of war *because* it is disarmed? But this seems to be the crux of the problem. An illustration of this case will be attempted subsequently in this work by description of the present military situation of Europe. But, in order to do this, a survey must be made of the position of the states in question, first from the political and then from the military point of view. It is only by the game of alliances that a disarmed nation may hope to regain equality. And for this reason it would ally itself with anybody at hand, even with those whom it would consider, in other circumstances, as a danger to Europe and to itself. But in a desperate situation any means must suffice. It is this

consideration which makes Admiral Richmond say that Germany's inequality in armaments will be the source of the next great war. An attempt to sum up the forces which are mobilizable for and against Germany may provide some estimate as to the magnitude and the possible outcome of such an eventual conflict.

The Chain Towards the East

It was pointed out in the preface of this study that no detailed examination of the revisionist claims will be undertaken. The literature on this subject is abundant. Most of the authors are convinced of the just nature of the revisionist claims, but an attempt to appraise the outcome is another matter. An estimate in this direction may be attempted by surveying the forces behind revisionism.

Thus, the claims of the other countries defeated in the World War will be passed over rapidly with the aim merely of demonstrating the alignment of these states. No attempt at justification will be undertaken. For the moment it is only important to see whether the other defeated states may be counted upon in the camp—if necessary, the war camp—of the revisionists.

AUSTRIA

In the words of the *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, the territory left to the newly formed republic of Austria " consists of some of the poorest and most mountainous areas of the former Austrian Empire

only about one-third is under cultivation; another third is covered with forests; and the remainder is largely mountainous."

The " Foreign Policy Reports " (Vol. VII, No. 12) of the American Foreign Policy Association says concerning Austria:

The dismemberment of the Hapsburg Empire, which had constituted a vast free-trade area, and the erection of high tariff barriers by the Succession States have deprived Austria of its principal markets and sources of raw materials, and have crippled important branches of its industries. The failure of the League of Nations during the past few years to obtain greater facilities for Austrian foreign trade raised anew the question of the country's "capacity to live" (*Lebensfähigkeit*). Meanwhile, all hope of a union with Germany, which had been periodically advocated in Austria as the only remedy for the country's economic ills, appeared to be precluded by the peace treaties which imposed on Austria the obligation to maintain its political and economic independence. It was under these circumstances that the Vienna Protocol attempted, by a single dramatic stroke, to cut the Gordian knot of Austria's economic problems.

The Vienna Protocol of 1931 was the announcement of the Austro-German customs union plan, the realization of which was prevented by energetic French protests. The French rejection of the plan was made on the ground that an economic union would be the first step to a political one: the "Anschluss." Furthermore, the protocol of Vienna invited any other state to join the economic union in order to stimulate trade by enlarged markets. Rumania and Yugo-

slavia, the French allies, announced that they were ready eventually to join the economic union. France considered this move a danger to the post-war political alignment, which roughly divided the Continent into victors and vanquished, as it meant a tendency towards the establishment of a new system of treaties based on the mutual economic interests of former enemy states. The agricultural countries of Southeastern Europe, which have acted since the war as satellites of France, are developing economic ties with Germany and Austria, where they find a market for their surplus grain. The pro-German orientation of these countries has caused considerable anxiety to France, as they are considered pillars of the system of the Versailles *status quo*, which must be enforced, if necessary, by armies. For these reasons, and also because of the fear of seeing Germany economically improved by the plan, France and Czechoslovakia categorically opposed it.

On the other hand, for Austria the "Anschluss " does not mean merely economic salvation by opening to her the German market; it also involves a question of sentiment, Austria being of the same ethnic stock as Germany. It is possible that the artificial separation of this southeastern part of the German people will be made possible for a time, either by force or by some political or dynastic combination involving the Danube Valley. But in case of a general European upheaval it is hardly conceivable that Austria will not side and unite with Germany.

HUNGARY

To quote again from the *Encyclopaedia Britannica*: " The Treaty took from Hungary all her gold, silver, copper, salt, and mercury mines; all but one of her iron mines; her largest and best collieries; and 86 per cent of her forests."

Hungary is generally used as a symbol for the injustice of the peace treaties. The following claims are brought forward: First, it is stated, that the Hungary of 1914 was a perfect geographical unit, surrounded by the wall of the Carpathian Mountains five to eight thousand feet in height, except in the southwest, where the Danube, the Drava, and the Leitha rivers were its frontiers. Then it is pointed out that she was a perfect economic unit, the plain in the center being agricultural, while the mountain regions on the borders supplied the former with timber, minerals and industrial products. In point of fact, Hungary was, from the ninth century until 1918, a political unit without essential changes in its frontiers, a centrally organized realm of the kings of Hungary. Only once, in the sixteenth century, was there an interruption in this continued stability of its frontiers, when the Turks invaded its southern parts. The Slav population in the south immigrated as a result of the Turkish pressure. As to the Rumanians of former East Hungary (Transylvania), their existence is explained in two ways. The Hungarian version is that they filtered in during the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, driven by Turkish

conquerors, and settled as shepherds and small peasants in Transylvania, which remained under the sovereignty of Hungarian princes. The Rumanian version, however, is that the Hungarians subjugated them after occupying Hungary in the ninth and tenth centuries. The Hungarian answer to the Rumanian version of subjugation in the tenth century is that, if it were true, it would only demonstrate that the Hungarian nation, having had political, economic, and cultural rule over the country for over a thousand years, did not follow the policy of the kings of France, who cast the different races under their rule into a homogeneous unity which became the great French nation.

Notwithstanding the fact that Hungary was for more than a thousand years a political, economic and geographical unit, the Hungarians acquiesced in the loss of territories where the majority of the population was not Hungarian. They asked for a drawing of the frontiers on the basis of plebiscites, referring to the principle of self-determination of peoples as enunciated later by President Wilson. However, as the neighbors, principally Rumania and Czechoslovakia, saw that Hungary was disarmed after the armistice, they were not satisfied with liberating their racial or national brothers, but asked vast territories inhabited by purely Hungarian populations and refused to appeal to plebiscites. Benes, representing the interests of the Little Entente and Minister of Foreign Affairs for Czechoslovakia, changed

his territorial demands four times before the negotiation of the peace treaty, each time asking more.²¹ A skillful politician, he foresaw the future weaknesses of the states of the Little Entente.

Some data may be cited as to the proportion of the dismemberment of the Hungarian nation from the book of Aldo Dami, the G-nevese ethnologist:²² Hungary has lost 63 per cent of her population. Before the war she had a population of 21 millions, with 18 millions not including Croatia-Slavonia. She has been reduced to 8 millions. If one considers the detached territories without Croatia and Slavonia, the Hungarians there (including the Germans) numbered 4,800,000, Rumanians 2,900,000, Slovaks 1,800,000, South Slavs 750,000, Ruthenians 400,000. Hungary of 1914 had to the extent of 65 per cent a Hungarian population (including Germans, which constituted 10½ per cent) and 35 per cent of other nationalities. Aldo Dami²³ considers the Ruthenians of pre-war Hungary as friendly and allied to the Hungarians and so assumes that in the territories taken away from Hungary about half of the population was transferred against its wish.

This statement applies to the whole territory taken away. But there live along the present frontier of

²¹ Sir Robert Donald, *The Tragedy of Trianon* (London, 1928), pp. 294-295.

²² A. Dami, *La Hongrie de Demain* (Andre Delpuech, Editor, Paris, 1929), pp. 64-69.

²³ See concerning these Ruthenians Sir Robert Donald, *The Tragedy of Trianon*, p. 140.

Hungary about 2,000,000 Hungarians, forming a homogeneous mass with the Hungarians of the present reduced Hungary.²⁴ Thus there is a band around the frontier from 10 to 50 miles wide, populated purely by Hungarians. Lord Rothermere, owner of the Northcliffe press, began a campaign in his newspapers in 1927 for the reattachment of this strip, and thus the imagined new boundaries were called the " Rothermere line." This line is now considered the goal of the Hungarian territorial claims.

It is asserted that the detached Hungarian minorities are greatly oppressed. The Hungarians considering themselves superior to their Balkan neighbors, point to the English and French reports on the cultural decline of the detached territories. Besides, the expropriation without indemnity of private property exercised on the Hungarians in detached territories has intensified the Hungarian anger. The problem which the Treaty left for solution to future generations in the case of Hungary is both racial and economic.

BULGARIA

The sore point of this defeated state is Macedonia, the greater part of which was handed over to Yugoslavia by the post-war settlement. The Macedonian question is so well known by its accompanying phenomena of daily political murder and unrest that it

²⁴ See a rather complete work on the subject by R. Dupuis, *le Probleme Hongrois* (Paris, 1931); Sir Robert Donald, *A Danger Spot in Europe* (London, 1925); *The Tragedy of Trianon*.

is superfluous to dwell on it. There is a continuous and dangerous tension between Bulgaria and Yugoslavia.

This chain of defeated states (notwithstanding eventual possibilities of transitory and provisional silence as to their aims, as for instance, in case of a threat of economic collapse) forms a part of Europe constituting a grave danger to the *status quo* of Versailles. It is hardly conceivable that ancient and politically highly developed races, like the Hungarian nation, for instance, will not attempt to bring about a change of the present situation.

Though somewhat tendentious, an American sympathizer with revisionism, Colonel E. A. Powell, describes the situation thus:

The colossal amputations performed upon the defeated Danubian countries have placed upward of five and a quarter million Germans (that is, Austrian Germans), nearly three million Magyars, and not far from a million Bulgarians under alien rule. And, mind you, these nine million-odd human beings were not consulted as to their fate. Their sentiments were no more considered than those of the negroes who were sold down river in slavery days. Nor did the troubles of these unhappy chattels end with their enforced change of nationality. Under their new rulers many of them have been subjected to tyranny and oppression compared with which the British treatment of the American colonists was considerate and generous. Moreover, the small areas left to Austria, Hungary, and Bulgaria, with a combined population of about 20 millions have been so completely stripped of their natural resources, so hemmed in by economic and political barriers,

so effectually cut off from access to outside markets, that the most these people have to look forward to is a struggle for bare existence.

As a result of this unjust and unintelligent settlement we find today in the basin of the Danube close to 30 millions of Austro-Germans, Magyars and Bulgarians who, impoverished, oppressed and discouraged, are sullenly biding their time. They have nothing to lose by upsetting the present order of things and everything to gain.²⁵

TURKEY

It cannot be said that Turkey is today a revisionist country. The great bulk of her revisionist aims was realized after the war waged by Kemal Pasha in 1920-1922. The Treaty of Sevres, corresponding to that of Versailles, was changed into that of Lausanne and with it the whole map of the Near East.

The Allies of the World War were obliged to consent to the reentry into Constantinople of the Turkish Nationalists and to recognize Turkish sovereignty in Eastern Thrace. The Treaty of Lausanne only served to emphasize the end of all the ex-territorial privileges in Turkey which were reserved for Europeans before the World War and afterwards for the victorious Powers. So far Turkey has attained independence, and, situated at the Straits, she is a considerable power. Nevertheless, the cohesion of the Moslem World and the not quite solved problem of the sovereignty of Constantinople, assign to Turkey, in case of a new general war, a place on the side of

²⁵ E. A. Powell, *Thunder over Europe*.

those forces which work against the *status quo*. All the signs point to this fact. -But the attitude of Turkey we shall examine later in the part of this work devoted to the diplomatic position of the states in question.

RUSSIA

Italy, Germany, Austria, Hungary, and Bulgaria are revisionist countries. Russia may be characterized as having nothing to lose and everything to win by a general European conflagration. The Kremlin may, for a time, prefer order in the capitalistic states, as it depends on them for imports necessary for the completion of Russia's economic development, but ultimately another chaos in capitalistic Europe will be used to push forward the position of the U. S. S. R. The systems must at some time clash. Even those elements in Russia which are not wholeheartedly devoted to Communism find national aims even in an offensive war. There are the 6 million Russians (Ukrainians) in East Poland, and there is Bessarabia, similarly with an Ukrainian population, given to Rumania. Both Rumania and Poland are pillars of the Versailles system. Thus, preparation for war, the building up of the "key-industries" for warfare, and especially the training of enormous numbers of troops are the first aims of the Kremlin. A defensive policy may prevail until the economic development is satisfactory, but, occasion given, the huge forces of the U. S. S. R. will be used for promoting the further

aims of Russia and Communism. This means first an attack on the present territorial status of Europe.

Thus, with Russia as the last, and, in a military respect, already the most powerful link in the chain, we have completed a survey of the forces the alignment of which are directed against the present *status quo* in Europe. Subsequently, the diplomatic and military position of the other European States will be examined.

It would seem expedient to begin with forces on which the present *status quo* is built.

CHAPTER II

THE STATUS QUO SYSTEM

The enumeration of those Powers which are capable of forming a new alignment against the existing political system of Europe is based on their well known claims. All those who have, or believe they have, an interest in maintaining the present *status quo* are thus their opponents. A system of alliances unites this group, which is composed of France, Belgium, Poland, and the Little Entente (Czechoslovakia, Rumania, Yugoslavia). The system of military alliances which maintains the political *status quo* was established as follows:

Military alliance between France and Belgium, concluded on September 7, 1920; political and military alliance between France and Poland, concluded on February 19, 1921; treaty of alliance between France and Czechoslovakia, signed on January 25, 1924; treaty of alliance between France and Rumania, concluded on June 10, 1926; treaty of alliance between France and Yugoslavia, signed on November 11, 1927; treaty of political and military alliance between Czechoslovakia on the one side, and Yugoslavia and Rumania on the other, concluded on April 14, 1921; treaty of political and military alliance between Rumania and Yugoslavia, signed on July 2, 1921. The two latter treaties were the founda-

tion of the Little Entente, directed principally against Hungary; the last one also against Bulgaria; treaty of military alliance between Poland and Rumania, signed on March 3, 1931.

The position of the *status quo* group is clear: they want to keep what they hold at present, be it political hegemony or territory. In some instances certain members of the group try to strengthen their dominating position or—in the case of Poland—to change the map to the disadvantage of the vanquished of 1918. But this latter assumption is not a prominent motive of their attitude. Poland seized Vilna and Lithuania took Memel after the conclusion of the peace treaty. During the occupation of the Rhineland France worked with the view of retaining that territory. Nevertheless, on the whole—discounting a possible threat of the Poles on East Prussia—the *status quo* group is mainly intent upon holding the present dominant position in Europe (Russia excluded), and no real evidences of territorial appetites are manifested among them.

France's military alliances in the East, built up by her with the motive of surrounding Germany with an iron ring, are for France both a tower of strength and a source of weakness. They may help in intimidating Germany into submission, and assure for France hegemony in Europe. But for several reasons these young, politically undeveloped and thus irresponsible states may involve their protector in war. They mean not only assets, but also liabilities,

such as Russia and other possible enemies. In order to keep her proteges loyal and effective, France must organize their armaments, finance them, make their quarrels her own, and guarantee their boundaries. France is under moral obligation to champion these allies in cases where world opinion is doubtful about their justification. This liability means a lessening of France's moral position in the eyes of the world.

The situation of France at present is not dissimilar to that of the First Empire. Napoleon's attempt to weaken and dominate Prussia only threw her into the arms of Russia and stimulated German unity and resistance. It brought about Napoleon's downfall and the end of French domination of the continent for a century. Substitute Germany for Prussia, and there is a forecast of future events. The discord of German political parties—even such extremes as Hitler and the socialists—will be forgotten, and Germany may choose even Russia as her ally to escape from the present situation. Thus, through the alliance of France with the Eastern satellites, Russia and Germany are driven together, and their alliance may involve the breakdown of the Versailles system and of the hegemony of France. For the present, however, the French alliance system represents the ruling power of Europe and the enforcement of the Versailles system.

FRANCE

To explain the Franco-German feud on the basis of psychological differences would lead to extensive

philosophical speculations. Lack of space and want of authority forbid the writer to indulge in such an attempt. Moreover, after all is said and done, the logical results of such an analysis would tend toward the conclusion that both France and Germany are among the very few nations which have contributed in highest degree to the cultural, intellectual, scientific, social, and economic development of humanity. If their cultures or civilizations differ in certain aspects, there are the more chances of their being able to complement each other. Intellectual differences are absolutely necessary for development as they produce spiritual tension, eliminate monotony and indifference, and stimulate mutual cultural fructification. But, as with every vital force, necessary tensions of mind may be misused by ambition. If these forces are shifted over in an unscrupulous way into the field of politics, falsified, and led into wrong channels, they may become sources of political enmity. Is this kind of antagonism contributing much to the Franco-German conflict? Although it seems advisable to avoid an answer, it is certain that the question of national prestige is at the root of the problem.

The fact that German national unity was not realized until the second half of the nineteenth century made possible for centuries France's dominating position on the continent. It is hardly conceivable that, in the face of a free and united Germany, the French "*gloire* " would have outshone every other nation, as during the reigns of Louis XIV and Napoleon I.

But a united German nation, outnumbering by 30 million (with the present Austria) the 40 million French people and having a greater and more effective industry, would be, if some unnatural restraints are not put upon it, perhaps the greatest Continental Power.

There would be, if considered in a sound way, nothing degrading in it for France. The difference would not be so great as between France and Spain, the latter having 20 million inhabitants. First, France has a colonial Empire which raises the number of French subjects to 100 million. Moreover, the soil of the mother country is far richer than that of Germany. The fact that France has the richest mineral deposits on the continent makes possible great industrial development. Second, the high organizing and military qualities of the French, aided by their undeniable superiority over the Germans in diplomacy and psychologic understanding of international propaganda, would place France fairly equal to Germany as a Power.

It is conceivable that this role of equality, natural in itself, would displease the high society of Paris (including the "Boulevard St. Germain"), known for its exquisiteness and for its national pride. It is said that France is directed by some 200 families. They are the heirs of the Bourbon and Bonaparte traditions and the fortress of a romantic, brilliant, and colorful political mentality, which has no little attraction for French politicians and journalists.

The traditional French aim of maintaining the balance of power favorable to France, by barring German unity or by occupation of German territory, such as the Rhineland and other provinces, is at the bottom of the more than three hundred year old quarrel. Richelieu originated the claim to the Rhineland, and for three centuries it has been one of France's principal aims. It was the policy of Richelieu which led to the French intervention in the Thirty Years War. The result was the annexation of Alsace to France by the treaty of Westphalia, which was completed by the conquest of Strasbourg in 1681. This policy was continued up to the beginning of the nineteenth century when Napoleon became the master of a large part of German territory. The treaty of Vienna in 1815 deprived France of all the territories conquered by Napoleon and put the French frontiers back where they were before January 1, 1792. France thus retained Alsace and also Lorraine, which had been united to the French Crown by the marriage of Louis XV with Maria, daughter of the last Duke of Lorraine. Though the French were forced to abandon the Rhineland, their claims to it did not cease. The avowal of the Empress Eugenie to Paleologue gave affirmation to the thesis of historians that the aim of Napoleon III, in declaring war on Prussia in 1870, was the annexation of the Rhineland. But the defeat of France resulted in the loss of Alsace-Lorraine. After the treaty of Frankfurt in 1871 the principal French aim was the re-

covery of these provinces, and the claim to the Rhineland was forgotten until it was revived during the World War. The reply of M. Poincare in 1917 to the peace proposals of the Austrian Emperor, Charles IV, demanded the permanent separation of the Rhineland from Germany. This claim was successfully barred at the peace conference in 1919 by the opposition of President Wilson and of Lloyd George. Temporary occupation of the Rhineland was substituted for it. During this occupation, M. Poincare was active in pursuing the original plan of separation and sent the French Deputy, M. Dariac, to the Rhineland to report to him on the best methods of achieving this aim. Though Dariac's report was confidential, it was published in the *Manchester Guardian*, in November, 1922, and its publication, combined with the resistance of the Rhenish population, ruined Poincare's policy.¹

¹ See the brilliant article on the subject of the English publicist Robert Dell, *Current History*, August, 1931, XXXIV, 658. That the occupation of the Rhineland really means in the French mind acquiring definite supremacy over Germany, is illustrated by some articles of the representative French press. *Le Temps*, the semi-official organ of the Foreign Office wrote on the subject on March 12, 1922: "On the day on which we have an effective customs barrier on the line held by our army, we can deprive German industry of its cast iron; i. e., of its daily bread. We can ruin it. By creating this customs border, we can disorganize not only the iron industry of Germany, but also her chemical industry, her agriculture and her coal trade." *L'Eclair* is of similar opinion in an article published on January 19, 1922: "With Dusseldorf, Duisburg and Ruhrort we are already holding excellent strategic positions. For a future war? No! For financial pressure, for the economic intellectual, and moral penetration of Germany." And as to the Ruhr, the *Democratic Nouvelle* already

Compensations for what the Rhineland policy failed to accomplish are sought by exploiting the difficulties of the transfer problem of the reparations combined with the tariff-barriers, and by the "sanctions" behind it combined with the one-sided disarmament of Germany. And this, after all, could have led to the reoccupation of the Rhineland. The Hoover moratorium of 1931 on reparations and war debts threatens at least the moral right of France to "sanctions," which means reoccupation. But the legal right to use them is not destroyed, and it may be that the question of "sanctions" will come up again, at least as a factor in the bargaining on other issues, as, for instance, disarmament.

The "*leitmotiv*" of French policy is to be seen in the problem of "security." Since in the World War northern France was actually the scene of the military operations, with devastation as the consequence, the argument of "security" was influential with the broad masses of public opinion. The French propaganda was based on this argument. But it is hardly conceivable that any French politician takes

wrote on July 7, 1921: "Public opinion does not yet realize that Germany can pay our bill by simply ceding the Ruhr. The value of this district is not appreciated. It is not understood that the possession of the Ruhr will give us the hegemony of Europe."

It may be assumed that even after the failure of the Rhineland policy, a considerable part of French public opinion considers the re-occupation of the territory as desirable. M. Rene Pinon, Political Editor of the *Revue des Deux Mondes*, one of, if not the most distinguished French periodicals, wrote in *Current History* (August, 1931): "The treaties of 1815 established Prussia on the left bank of the Rhine, where she had no right to be, and she is still there."

it very seriously. They know well what the " German invasion " theory is worth. First, they know that " invasion," separated from " war guilt," is but a matter of fortune of arms. The first of the three German invasions displayed by the French propaganda is that of 1814. It followed the defeat of Napoleon I at Leipzig. No comment on it is necessary. The second " invasion " followed Napoleon's lost battle at Waterloo, which he fought in vain for the reconquest of the European continent.

In 1870, after Napoleon III declared war on Prussia, the first troops which crossed the border were the three French divisions at Saarbriicken. It was the battle at Sedan which definitely turned the tide. In 1914, indeed, the advance of the German troops to Compiegne and their holding of the positions till the end of the war can be called an invasion. But an advance of troops into enemy territory is far from being a proof of guilt. It is luck in strategic operations. As the Germans advanced into northern France, Russians pushed into East Prussia. In the beginning the Germans had good luck on the French front and hard luck on the Russian. For the Allies, things went well on the Russian front and bad on the French. The fortune of arms and the strategic position may be used as proof of war guilt only in uncritical circles. Nevertheless, propaganda gains force in inverse ratio to the knowledge of the newspaper reader. Those who are familiar with the past of Europe will find the historical foundation of the

French " security " thesis even more irrational. Germans claim 12 French invasions into Germany, the Eühr occupation of 1923 not included.²

But neither are these " invasions " in themselves a positive proof of guilt. In later pages a study of the military situation will demonstrate more closely the absence of sincerity in, and a rational basis for the French security thesis. As Professor Lindsay Rogers of Columbia University declares:

In order to disguise this irrationality,, certain legends must be preserved. French publicists must argue that Article 231 of the treaty of Versailles expresses the truth—that the war came because of the aggression of Germany and her allies and that Germany justly accepted responsibility for all the loss and damage which were caused. As diplomatic revelations are made and as discussions of war origins suggest that war guilt is perhaps not undivided, the pertinent issues cannot be fairly examined. The new evidence must be brushed aside. For if it be admitted that Article 231 is in too extreme terms, the French will not be able to rely on the theory that the peace treaty properly puts Germany in a state of nonage. Moreover, in support of this legend of Germany's exclusive responsibility for the war, an auxiliary legend must be kept current—that Germany now shows unmistakable signs of

² France's intervention during the Thirty Years War; the Dutch War (1672-1678) with the French occupation of Westphalia; 1681 (conquest of Strasbourg); 1688-1697 (devastation of the Palatinat by the French); during the Spanish Succession War (1701-1714); Austrian Succession War (1740-1748) with the occupation of Southern Germany; the Seven Years War (1756-1763); at the outbreak of the French Revolution occupation of further districts in Alsace; the first War of Coalition (1792-1797); the second War of Coalition (1799-1802); the third War of Coalition (1805); Napoleon's occupation of Prussia in 1806, which lasted until 1813.

awaiting the day when the Versailles settlement can be revised by force. Hence, every indiscretion by a German politician is seized upon, magnified and declared to be a threat. When Hindenburg was elected to the Presidency of the German Republic, the portent was grave. The fears turned out to be false. Every Reichstag election has been a similar portent. If the moderate parties gained, the meagerness of their gains was alarming. If the moderate parties lost, the increased strength of the extremists was the menace.³

But, one may ask, why do the French politicians follow the policy of keeping Germany weak and crippled! Why do they not follow the eloquent words of Burke in his speech on conciliation with America: "Magnanimity in politics is not seldom the truest wisdom; and a great empire and little minds go ill together"?

If history recorded but wise policies, no crushing catastrophes would have occurred. In France, as in every country, foreign policy takes shape through the operation of several forces. The population does not "make" foreign policy; it rather reflects the political education given to it by a certain group which has the most effective means to do it. This mentality of the populace influences on the other hand the politician who fears for his votes.

In France the important press is owned by the Steel Union, interested in the manufacture of armaments. At the same time the majority of the press receives regular subsidies from the government. Robert Dell, the well known English Publicist and Paris

³ *Current History*, August 1931, p. 666.

correspondent of the *Manchester Guardian*, writes concerning the subsidizing system:

The money is provided out of the secret service funds, and the system has been brought to perfection by Briand. The Quai d'Orsay gives a regular subsidy to a large number of papers, which varies according to the importance of each paper.⁴

The interests of the Steel Union and the Quai d'Orsay hardly clash.

The officials of the Foreign Office belong to those social circles which especially represent the nationalistic tradition. Thus, the reported purchase of *Le Temps*, semi-official organ of the Quai d'Orsay, in 1931 by the Steel Union occasioned no remarkable change in the policy followed by the paper. Mr. Dell writes:

The French government can in a few weeks, through the press, entirely change what passes for public opinion, work up a panic or quiet it down, make one country popular or another unpopular. At a certain time the tap of the German peril was turned off and the tap of the Italian peril turned on, with the result that in a few weeks the Frenchmen ceased to be afraid of Germany and became afraid of Italy. Then for some time both taps were running at once, and the French people were afraid both of Germany and Italy. Next the tap of Italy was turned off and Germany was again the menace.⁵

Some of the provincial papers are more moderate and independent. The foremost is the *Depeche de Toulouse*, backing the party of Herriot. At one

⁴ *Ibid.*, November 1931, p. 196.

**Ibid.*

time this paper even dared to advocate cancellation of reparations, a suggestion, however, with which Herriot hastened to deny connection.

It is in the capital that the career diplomats, the armament manufacturers, and high society exert their chief influence. Besides their influence on the press, it is also the vanity of the politicians which puts a weapon in the hand of high society. Flag-waving politicians are more certain of applause than those who preach reason. If a statesman proposed an amelioration of the conditions imposed by the peace treaties, appeals of the influential press to popular fear would oppose any such attempt.

As M. Phillip, the witty Paris correspondent of the *New York Times*, puts it, the failure of all revisionist appeals is assured by the fact that the " security " thesis has become an accepted doctrine of the French politics. The acceptance of the doctrine is due to the quality which in France is considered " clear logic." It may, however, be alleged that what passes for logic is often not so much clear thinking as a lack of other qualities and consequently a greater sureness of expression. Hasty minds are not confused by doubts about the premise on which they build their case. In the schools they are taught to reason along certain lines, and it is remarkable what unity of method in reasoning there is in France. Patriotism and love of logical exposition of the idea created the doctrine of security. The thesis is no longer treated as a debatable matter. That the French standing army is

six times as great as the German, that, taking into consideration the trained reserves, the proportions are at least ten to one, that Germany is deprived of the most powerful modern weapons and France is the best equipped with them in the world, that France has the most powerful fortification line of the world and Germany is not allowed to have any, that France is financially the strongest Great Power and Germany the weakest—all these facts which should be posed as premise of the thesis, are left out of account. Such considerations are matters of practical politics to the Anglo-Saxon mind. But, with the French, the security thesis must be treated with the passion which attaches to the discussion of moral principles.

Since the Treaty of Versailles France has been taught to think politically in terms of security and reparations. Security and reparations have been used by the Nationalists (almost exclusively controlling the press) to create the French political " doctrine " in which the meaning of " security " and reparations was translated into the notion of France's national existence; and the questions they involve so exploited that any Frenchman who dares to advocate the cancellation of reparations or to suggest that France's best security lies in friendship with her neighbors, is likely to be treated as a lunatic if not a traitor.

When M. Leon Blum, leader of the left opposition, declared before the Chamber that the best security **for** France is " equality in security," and that it was

France's obligation to follow Germany in disarmament, General de Saint-Just, deputy of the Right, exclaimed: " It is an advocate of Germany who is speaking! "⁶

The reasoning of the editorial writer of *Le Temps* is as follows:

France wishes peace. Unfortunately, other nations do not. For them war is the supreme, decisive, and normal argument in international disputes. It follows that a state opposing French policy (even in the particulars resulting from recent economic or political forces) opposes the French policy of peace. Such a state cannot be argued with. It must be kept down by force. For if such a state is given an inch, it will take an ell. Even though that inch or ell does not directly affect French interests it must be resisted. If it is not, French efforts to achieve security will be unsuccessful.⁷

And, indeed, if the premise on which this deduction is built is accepted; namely, " France wishes peace; unfortunately, other nations do not," then M. Leon Blum, advocating French disarmament, is a lunatic or a traitor.

In consequence of the education of the populace through the drum-beat of the press, owned by the Steel Union and subsidized by the Quai d'Orsay, the politician will find the French " security " thesis sound, and necessitated by " French interests." Through its espousal he may hope to enhance his own reputation. The mechanism of the Foreign Office, with its old and experienced career diplomats,

⁶ February 23, 1932.

⁷ *Current History*, August 1931, p. 665.

may force into line the attitude of politicians in international affairs. Inexperience in diplomatic technique may result in timidity, and it is the line of least resistance which the politician will follow, especially in face of the power of a press admitting no chance for counter-argument. The spirit was given by men like Clemenceau and Poincare, and the mechanism was developed until escape is extremely difficult.

Aristide Briand, though in his objectives completely in accord with the nationalists, tried to use other methods and was defeated. Herriot, radical-socialist (in America he would call himself " liberal "), though opposing Tardieu, must also stand for reparations and one-sided armaments as well as one-sided disarmament, that is, " security."

Fear, however [says the lucid Englishman], is not the real motive of the French attitude toward Germany. No doubt the French people are afraid of Germany and also of Italy, but only because their fear is worked up by a tied press controlled by the government. The French general staff are afraid neither of Germany nor of Italy. They know France could easily deal with them in present conditions, apart from the treaty of Locarno. The fundamental obstacle to reconciliation between France and Germany is the system of alliances devised to bolster up French hegemony on the Continent of Europe. It is because the rulers of France cannot bring themselves to abandon that dream of hegemony, because they cannot admit German equality, that reconciliation between France and Germany is impossible.⁸

⁸ *Current History*, August 1931, p. 662.

French hegemony on the Continent accomplished by such means as the occupation of German territory, disruption of German unity, financial and economic strangulation, one-sided disarmament, etc., results, after all, in a military peace. There is war in every field except the battlefield. But the "*pax romana*" translated into "*la paix française*" resembles dangerously that of Napoleon I. The system of military alliances, the subduing of Germany, and one-sided disarmament are methods already tried out by the Emperor. They resulted in throwing Prussia into the arms of Russia. The repetition of this move, however distasteful it would be for Germany of today, is a possibility; and just there, if no where else, lies the imprudence of the French policy.

Germany wants no revision of the new Franco-German frontier. By the treaty of Locarno she voluntarily renounced Alsace-Lorraine forever,* and the great majority of the Germany people (Hitlerites included) have accepted that renunciation and have no desire to recover Alsace-Lorraine. Germany, left alone and free, not forced into the arms of Russia, would not mean a menace to France. An acceptance of reduction of armaments, especially if the aggressive weapons were abolished while fortifications were admitted, would reduce a threat of aggression almost to naught. Equality would result.

But it is difficult for the French to abandon the dream of hegemony. It was difficult for Napoleon, and so it seems to be for that high strung, brilliant,

and vainglorious class of French "*elite*," to which the "*gloire*" of Louis XIV and Napoleon is so sweet. In their eyes, French hegemony is justified by the superiority of French civilization. For many, it is this sentiment which makes life worth living. After all, temperament has its place in history.

Meanwhile, the diplomatic isolation of France becomes more apparent. Italy has turned against her. Even the states of the Little Entente, bound to do lip service, show some uneasiness. France cannot count on English help for the realization of her plans. The Anglo-Saxons lined up with Italy and Germany at the disarmament conference. But French arms and French gold still radiate and dominate in undiminished glory—indeed, with somewhat too much glory to be safe.

Financial Strength

The gold reserves of the Banque de France in the spring of 1932 reached the amount of those of the Federal Reserve Banks, and even surpassed it by some insignificant sum. Both held something less than 3 billion dollars. Besides this amount, the Banque de France had about half a billion dollars of sight balances abroad, which represent a claim on gold. A further conversion of French balances in New York would make the gold reserves of the French central bank more than those of the American. The French note circulation, the principal form of credit, is about \$3,300,000,000, which means that

there is more than 100 per cent coverage by gold and gold exchange. A great part of the gold, or about 60 per cent, is thus sterilized, since the requirements for coverage of the note circulation on a sound economic basis is about 40 per cent. At the same time the Bank of England which had fought since 1925 to keep a gold reserve of £150,000,000 (the minimum recommended by the Cunliffe Committee) finally had to abandon the gold standard. Germany's gold reserve, in the prosperous years, vacillated between \$300,000,000 and \$666,000,000. In 1932 it sank to about \$100,000,000.

The fact that France with a 40 million population has an amount of gold in its Central Bank equal to that of the United States with 125 millions of people (and higher per capita wealth), and that she has 30 times more gold than Germany with 65 million inhabitants, is enlightening concerning the gold distribution in the world.

The explanation as to how this enormous quantity of gold has been piled up in France is rather complex. The German reparation payments were comparatively a minor factor. After the stabilization of the franc confidence in France's political security and natural wealth attracted foreign speculative capital. Capital investments from politically insecure countries, like Germany, and economically disadvantageous places like England, were directed to the tower of strength in Europe. French capital, which fled at the time of a depreciating franc, began to come

back from abroad. These capital movements, used for investments in France, were inducted finally into a gold movement toward France.

Another reason for the piling up of gold in France is that the assumption on which the international gold standard is based, namely, that the flow of gold makes an automatic correction of departures from equilibrium in international payments, does not really work here. In spite of inflowing gold, the French price level remained low in relation to outside prices; the balance of payments was thus favorable, and the export trade piled up, increasing balances in foreign countries. The amount yearly spent by foreign tourists in France is supposed to have been in prosperous years nearly a billion dollars. The greatest part of this amount meant a net gold influx.

The correction for this gold congestion would be a rise of the price level in France or an exportation of capital from France. The French price level, however, is surprisingly insensitive, and no important French investments have been made abroad. The result has been an incessant accumulation of gold in France and of balances abroad. After the *de jure* stabilization of the franc in 1928, the Banque de France discontinued the purchase of gold abroad. Instead of the Banque de France, the French private banks went on buying gold abroad. The balances of the French Central and the private banks abroad, together with the short term foreign balances of other

nations, have been the principal cause of the catastrophic monetary disturbances of the present depression period.

Gold and Policy

With a considerable amount of surplus gold political operations are possible, and these means were employed by France not only for financing the military apparatus of her allies but also in the game of diplomacy. The maneuvering with gold may be illustrated in connection with the proposed Austro-German customs plan.

Central and South Eastern Europe, which before the war formed an economic unit, is now disrupted by new national boundaries. Austria, without markets, struggles for her life. Germany's pre-war exports to the Danube region were nearly 50 per cent of her total exports. Now they have sunk to 10 per cent. On the other hand, the Danubian agricultural states, Hungary, Rumania, Yugoslavia, and Bulgaria, have an unmarketable export-surplus of about 3 million tons of grain, which can be sold only in Germany but actually is not.

The catastrophic fall in prices of grain brought the agricultural Danube states near to economic ruin. The tottering of the old Rothschild bank, the Viennese Creditanstalt, revealed the depth of the void underlying Central European finance—save where it rested on the gold of Paris. Germany, and more especially Austria and the agricultural Danube

states, struggled for markets. Only by complementing their respective productions could they hope to escape economic ruin.

M. Briand had produced his own scheme of European economic cooperation, but started from the principle that the economic problem must be subordinate to the development of "political security." More than two dozens of European nations began arguing. There was enough to argue about. Meanwhile, the trade depression deepened, unsalable crop surpluses piled up in the agrarian countries, while Austria and others drifted fast toward bankruptcy.

A League meeting in November 1930 got no further than a vague recommendation of bilateral agreements between industrial and agricultural states. A meeting of M. Briand's European commission in January 1931 ended in establishing several more committees and subcommittees. Dr. Schober, Austrian Foreign Minister, came back to Vienna reporting, ⁱ"not one iota of positive achievement." Meanwhile the foreign obligations of Austria, contracted as morphine injections to keep alive this torso on the new map of Europe, pressed harder and harder on a shrinking revenue, and Austrian industry became more and more heavily indebted to local banks.

On March 21, 1931, a startling event occurred. Austria and Germany disclosed their plan for a customs-union. They did not embark on a diplomatic correspondence with the two dozen governments whose representatives took part at the meetings of

M. Briand's European commission, for, if the meetings had had no result, correspondence would have had less. Such correspondence had become a tradition, a pleasant one so long as the finances were in a flourishing state. But here it was a different matter, so Germany and Austria worked out their customs plan, based on the recommendation of the European commission for bilateral agreements. Moreover, they invited anyone to join the scheme who cared to do so. The effect was painful to M. Briand; and Czechoslovakia, with Benes true to France, was upset and started a vehement attack on the scheme, but even in that country the prospect of a free market was having its effect. M. Titulesco, of the allied Rumania, declared that he felt a " distinct attraction " for the offer. Important trade agreements were actually negotiated between Germany and Rumania, and who knows how far they would have gone! Rumania was also negotiating with Hungary. Hungarian opinion was favorable to the plan. Count Bethlen, the premier, saw in the scheme the " verge of a new economic order." Yugoslavia did not conceal her sympathies with the plan.⁹ Bulgaria and Italy were more than interested, and the latter's press held that it appeared conceivable for Italy to join this " practical United States of Europe, *made* while Briand was dealing in words." Visions of a spirit of cooperation different from that of Versailles began to rise throughout Europe.

⁹ *Foreign Policy Reports*, Vol. VII, No. 12, p. 231.

But what happened to the principle of the French foreign office? The economic problem must be subordinate to the development of political "security," declared the Quai d'Orsay. Was not an Austro-German customs union—the joining of others made it even worse—a rebellion against the peace treaties? Both negative and positive measures must be taken. The negative measures were summed up by the *Journal des Debats*:

If we agree to use the pacific means at our disposal, we can be in a position definitely to promise the Germans that their rebellion against the peace treaties will inevitably be followed by a collapse of the reichsmark similar to that of 1923. Germany is free to run the risk, but in any case she now is warned of the consequences.¹⁰

And Berlin was not the only capital where those "pacific means" had been accumulated.

The critical situation of the Creditanstalt, which controlled nearly 80 per cent of Austrian industry, was the starting point. The withdrawal of French short term credits following the announcement of the Vienna Protocol brought about the crash. "The flight from the shilling was becoming a flight from the mark. The financial catastrophe in the summer of 1931 is too well known to need review. Hoover tried to help, but the effect of the moratorium on reparations (June 20) was lost by two weeks of French

¹⁰ For typical arguments on the customs plan, see editorials by Pierre Bernus, *Journal des Debats*, March-May 1931.

¹¹ *New York Times*, May 17, June 7, 1931; *Foreign Policy Reports*, Vol. VII, No. 12, p. 236.

sabotage. On July 7 France agreed that the moratorium would release the debtors for an entire year, but in the meantime still more funds had flowed out of Austria and Germany—mostly to Paris.¹² The French then agreed to help both Germany and Austria, but only on political terms. These conditions were: financial and economic control, reduction even of the level of armaments fixed by the Versailles Treaty, final renunciation "now and forever" of the customs union, and repudiation of the propaganda for revision of other points of the peace treaties.¹³ Chancellor Bruening refused, and the German emergency decrees followed, while German finances and economics continued to hover between life and death buoyed up by a series of emergency measures.

But Austria, the weaker partner, approached Paris for mercy. According to the account of Dr. Scholer, the foreign minister, the Austrian envoy was referred to the Quai d'Orsay, where he could find neither M. Briand nor M. Briand's assistant. An unnamed official revealed the terms: Complete abandonment of the customs plan; an inquiry by the League into Austria's financial conditions and the acceptance in advance of the findings; an undertaking to inform France before concluding any future treaties affecting the political or economic situation in Europe.¹⁴

¹² *Ibid.*, p. 236; W. Orton, "The Meaning of the Gold Crisis," *Atlantic Monthly*, February, 1932.

¹³ *Foreign Policy Reports*, Vol. VII, No. 12, p. 238.

¹⁴ *New York Herald Tribune*, June 22, 1931.

On June 17, the Bank of England helped out Austria with the entire 21 millions needed without any guarantee or terms.¹⁵ But, because of England's own financial plight the noble bank very soon had to suffer for her generosity. The loan had to be withdrawn, and Austria was on her knees before the Quai d'Orsay.

Hungary, too, in the meantime, had been brought back to a satisfactory state of mind. The " pacific means " announced by the *Journal des Debats* were effective. The banks were closed by government decree, and Count Bethlen was wiring for money to the western capitals. After agonizing delay, he received 25 millions in Paris. The terms included, according to press reports, a lease of the Hungarian railroads, control of Hungarian finances, and renunciation of all efforts of revisionism. Count Bethlen had the privilege of negotiating the trade agreement with Austria, and he was the favorite of Mussolini. He had hailed the customs plan as the " verge of a new economic order." Now he had the privilege of announcing the conclusion of the life-saving loan of 25 millions. After he did so, he left. Soon he was followed into the wilderness by Arthur Henderson, who helped Austria through the Bank of England to postpone her surrender to France.

While these " pacific means " worked well in the negative sense, the gold surplus at the disposal of

¹⁵ *The Economist* (London) May 30, 1931; *New York Times*, June 14, 1931.

the French government was also being manipulated along positive lines. The finances of the Little Entente—two members of which were not unfavorable to the projected Austro-German customs union—were bolstered by French capital, and indeed on adequate terms. Thus the customs scheme was another occasion for capital movements. After the elimination of some minor difficulties, a 50 million dollar loan to Rumania was negotiated and signed on March 11, 1932. The governor of the Rumanian Central bank opposed violently the conclusion of the loan on the French terms, which stipulated for control by the bank of France. This would have meant, among other consequences, the abandonment of the favorable commercial treaty in view with Germany. At the request of the French minister to Bucharest the Rumanian premier had to appeal to the King and the governor of the National Bank was simply dismissed. After this matter was regulated Rumania received the 50 million.¹⁰ But matters were more difficult with Yugoslavia. She refused the French conditions and made, indeed, an attempt to get money elsewhere. But capitalists do not like to advance money to dictatorships on questionable foundations. American bankers demanded too much collateral. The French terms on the other hand imposed too many conditions—abandonment of the favorable trade policy towards Germany and recognition of other previously undertaken obligations to France. The matter

¹⁰ *New York Times*, March 11, 12, April 3, 1931.

dragged on for a month, and in April it caused a Cabinet crisis. The loan was signed on May 8,¹⁷ not without backward glances from Belgrade to the projected customs-union. However, Yugoslavia received the 42 million dollars.

These loans, like most of those given in the last years, were made through the armament manufacturing interest, Schneider-Creusot, the main source of war equipment for Poland, Yugoslavia, and Rumania.¹⁸ The fight of Foreign Minister Benes against the customs plan was not supported wholeheartedly in Czechoslovakia. The resistance had to be disposed of with a 50 million dollar loan, which was concluded in Paris the same day Dr. Benes made a vigorous attack in the Chamber of Deputies on the Austro-German customs-plan (April 23).¹⁹ To close the ring around Germany, Schneider-Creusot granted in the same month a 40 million dollar loan to Poland. It was to build up the railway line between Upper Silesia and the new port, Gdynia, built by Poland in the Polish Corridor.²⁰ The building of this port is considered in Germany as the economic ruin of Danzig; and in consequence of the Franco-Polish move to switch it out of position as the port of the Danzig Corridor the free city threatened to protest to the League of Nations.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, May 9, 1931.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, May 1, 1932.

¹⁹ *Foreign Policy Reports*, Vol. VII, No. 12, pp. 237-238.

²⁰ *Ibid.* P.238.

The question of the customs-union was gently transferred to the World Court, but Dr. Schober had already resigned before the decision of the Court was published and Vienna and Berlin were left to count the cost of their diplomatic experiment. The French maneuver in connection with the Austro-German customs-plan served as an example to demonstrate the working of the surplus gold reserve, continuously employed to maintain the system of Versailles.

CHAPTER III

MILITARY POWER

The strong position of the status quo bloc of states is due in part to the financial strength of France. Nevertheless, the decisive basis of the Versailles system is the military power of France and of her allies. The real proportion of forces can be estimated only if we take into account all the states lined up for and against the present political structure of Europe.

France and Germany will need to be studied somewhat more closely. To the comparison of these two states we add a short examination of the Italian forces. The survey of the military power of the other states will follow later, and an attempt will be made to forecast, on the basis of studies of military experts, the possible outcome of a clash between the two groups.

STRATEGIC POSITIONS

Of the three countries, France, Germany and Italy, it is France whose geographical position is the most favorable. She is one of the few countries possessing easily defended natural boundaries. Along the Italian and Spanish frontiers she is protected by high, strongly fortified mountain ranges. On the west she is bounded by the ocean and on the north by Belgium, with whom she is closely linked by a military

alliance. Of her 1,723 miles of boundaries and the 1,758 miles of seacoast, France has only about 300 miles of frontier, bordering on Germany, not protected by natural geographical barriers.¹ Here, in place of natural defenses France has erected the most powerful fortification line at present existing. The special credits granted in 1931 (outside of the military budget) for this fortress line are reported to be seven billion francs. The defenses consist of four chains of fortified areas, which are stretched parallel along the Franco-German and Franco-Belgian frontiers. The last line runs along La Fere, Reims, Langres, Dijon and has its continuation at Lyons, Grenoble and Marseille, down to Toulon. In front of this chain three others are erected, the most exterior being only 5 to 8 miles distant from the German boundaries.²

Germany, on the other hand, has 3,691 miles of land boundaries and 1,070 miles of seacoast. Neither in the East (Poland) nor in the West (France, Belgium) has she natural frontiers. All her fortifications in the West have been dismantled in accordance with the provision of the Versailles Treaty. To these provisions must be added those concerning the zone extending 32 miles eastward from the Rhine where no German troops can be garrisoned. If any German military force should enter into this Ger-

¹ General Marie Eugene Debeney, *Sur la securite militaire de la France* (Paris, 1930) p. 13. General Debeney, former chief of the French General Staff (left this post in 1930) points out that even of these 300 open miles 76 miles are along the Rhine River.

² See articles by E. Lauzanne in the *Matin*, October, 1930.

man territory, it would be considered, according to the terms of the Locarno Treaty, as " aggression " on the part of Germany and a *casus belli*. Thus the German territories on the left and right banks of the Rhine are the " glacis " of the French fortress line, opposing no resistance to a French advance. France's food supply is assured, since she is self-supporting in foodstuffs; the German raw material and food shortage would be even more acute than during the World War, since the Danube states are more cut off. Since she has recovered Alsace-Lorraine, France is the richest European country in minerals. Alsace-Lorraine contains 75 per cent of the German iron supply. The great bulk of the French " key-industries " (for war needs) has been transferred southward. On the other hand, the most important German industries are in the demilitarized zone or quite near to it, in striking distance of the French.

Italy is not so bad off as Germany, but her situation is not reassuring. The Alps, on the north, offer a formidable line of defense. The coast towards France is presumably fairly well barred by fortifications. The positions of the Po and Rhone Valleys provide some advantage for France (the Po being easier to reach than the Rhone), but on the whole it is not likely that any attack would have decisive results on the French-Italian frontier. Austria is barred by the Alps, but at present she would not play an enemy role in any event. Yugoslavia is not sufficiently powerful, and the frontier is mountainous.

But the Italian coast in the Adriatic is flat and straight, without any advantageous naval base, while on the other side, the coast of Yugoslavia is an ideal hiding place for submarines and other forces which could provoke a great navy with impunity. The Italian coast all the way around is full of important towns, and, Italy's navy being inferior to that of France, the situation might become unpleasant. The short distance from French North Africa makes an attack from the sea on South Italy possible by surprise landings,³ while for France the supply of troops from North Africa could probably be effectively interrupted only by the British fleet. The main Italian railway lines are along the seashore while the very important key industries of Italy are in the north, in the flying range of French bombers. An advantageous point in Italy's strategic position is that she is in control of the Otranto strait locking in the very inferior Yugoslavian fleet. But the greatest disadvantage in Italy's position is her danger of being left at the mercy of any enemy who would cut off her supply of food and raw materials. The main route of supply is the sea, and thus there arises the vital question as to which group of allies would be superior in the Mediterranean. England's attitude would be decisive. There are, besides the sea, one or two passes through the Alps, the usefulness of which in case of a revisionist war we will examine later.

³ General De Marinis (Italy), emphasized this fact at Geneva. See Jacques Lyon, *Les Problemes du Desarmement* (Paris, 1931), p. 152.

Germany's geographical inferiority to France is enhanced by the fact that France is square-formed, while Germany is outstretched, extending far towards the east, with East Prussia completely disjoined from the body of the Reich.

The Conquering of Fortification Lines

The superiority of France's strategic position is raised to almost perfect security by the fortress and fortification lines, constituting four successive chains. General Debeney, who, until 1930, was chief of the French General Staff, says that any attack on these lines could be successful only in case the troops were armed, "*a la moderne pourvu du materiel le plus complet qui soit.*"⁴ These modern weapons were prohibited to the Germany army in the peace treaty. Heavy artillery is indispensable for the conquest of modern fortification lines. Captain Liddell Hart, British military author, explains the situation as follows:⁵ After the war of 1870 the head of the German General Staff, the elder General Moltke, determined Lorraine (at that time a province of Germany) to be the battlefield in case of a new Franco-German War. In 1879 he had done away with this plan and decided to remain in the defensive in case of a war. He made this decision because he believed the newly erected French fortification line unconquerable. In the year 1897 General Schlieffen elabo-

⁴ General Debeney, *op. cit.*, p. 14.

⁵ *Vossische Zeitung*, January 30, 1932.

rated the German strategic plans to flank these fortifications and take the way through Belgium. The fortresses of Belgium and those of France on the Belgian frontier were comparatively weak. The year 1914 came. The Belgians rejected the German demand for passage of the Reich's armies through Belgian territory. How were the doors to be opened? It was the work of the German heavy artillery. The world was surprised at the news of the conquest of the fortresses of Namur and Liege, destroyed by the heavy German shells.

The rise of the use of machine guns, however, made the advance of the troops extremely difficult. Their main use was in combination with trench positions. The trench line was indestructible for light artillery and thus heavy artillery in great quantities had to be manufactured to make a breach in it. In the later phases of the war attacks on trenches were only possible with the use of enormously concentrated masses of heavy artillery. This means gave some results, but comparatively small ones, and even in these cases sacrifices of man-power were too great in proportion, because of the effectiveness of machine guns in the defense lines. The attack on defense-lines has been rendered more effective by the Allied Powers through the combination of the two main aggressive weapons: tanks and heavy artillery. They finally broke the German lines in the autumn of 1918. Tanks were not vulnerable to the best defensive weapon, the machine guns.

At present, if an attacking army possesses no huge stock of heavy artillery and tanks, the conquering of defense lines is well-nigh impossible. The use of machine guns and of other automatic arms is greatly enhanced and has to-day a greater effectiveness than heavy artillery.

Captain Liddell Hart asserts that the present French fortification lines are impregnable to an army not possessing heavy artillery and tanks, as is the case with the Germans. His opinion thus is in accordance with that of General Debeney. But Captain Hart stakes his whole reputation as an expert upon the proposition that no army, even equipped with all modern weapons, can break a fortification line where the defender employs enough automatic arms. He considers heavy tanks and heavy artillery as exclusively aggressive weapons and demands their abolition.

The same conclusion is reached by Major Lefebure, another well-known British military author. He considers the French defense lines as representing " a practically insuperable obstacle " to the present German forces.⁶

The foregoing short study serves a double purpose; first, to appraise the strategic security of France afforded by natural frontiers and fortification lines; second, to attempt to measure the value and purpose of the weapons used by modern armies.

⁶ Major Victor Lefebure, *Scientific Disarmament* (London, 1931), pp. 132-133.

Two more weapons must be mentioned; first, airplanes, and second, chemicals. Air bombers, if protected by light and speedy fighting planes, are extremely useful in destroying communication lines, manufacturing centers, and big cities. Their operation in battles, however, is not decisive.⁷ The same applies to chemical warfare, the employment of which, connected mainly with attacks of air bombers on civil population without gasmasks, may involve destruction of life, health and especially the morale of the resisting power; but the relatively low death toll from gas (2 to 3 per cent of the total losses during the World War) in the battlefields does not allow one to attribute to this weapon a major importance.⁸ In any case the preparation for chemical warfare (shell-filling, fabrication of launching devices, field tests, and training of important special troops for operation in the field) is an extremely large task and cannot be performed secretly. According to an extensive study on the subject written by Major Lefebure, organizer of the British chemical warfare during the World War,⁹ a minimum of nine months is required for such preparations; that is, for the application in the battlefield of chemicals ordinarily used for commercial purposes. As any such preparation for chemical warfare is forbidden to the Germans, this weapon does not figure in consideration of the defense of French fortress lines.

⁷ General Debeney, *op. cit.*, p. 48.

⁸ Major Lefebure, *op. cit.*

⁹ *Ibid.*

The number of troops required for the defense of the French fortifications is put by General Debeney at 300,000, which is satisfied by the " *couverture* " (troops at disposal without mobilization).¹⁰ This number is considered sufficient to deal with a considerably greater opposing force than the official strength of the German army, even if equipped with the best of modern attacking weapons.¹¹

MILITARY FORCES OF FRANCE, GERMANY AND ITALY

The total organized forces of the above states, computed in the study of the American Editorial Research Reports¹² entitled " Military and Naval Expenditures," the respective figures of which were based largely on material of the League of Nations Armaments Year Book of 1929-30, as follows:

Total organized forces:

France	6,085,993
Italy	3,409,529
Germany	100,000

Of these there are:

In Franco:

Active forces	615,000
Reserve forces.....	5,400,000

In Italy:

Active forces	353,000
Reserve forces.....	3,056,000

In Germany:

Only active forces, no trained reserves.

¹⁰ General Debeney, *op. cit.*, pp. 13-14.

" *Ibid.*, p. 14.

¹² Vol. III, 1930.

These figures will only be accepted provisionally, as subsequent examination will lead us to estimate both the Italian and German forces higher. The German " secret armaments " will be studied on the basis of French contentions.

For the purposes of a great war the calculation must be based on the total forces. The trained reserves in France are of the highest military quality.¹³

As to the armament material, the figures given below are only approximate (based on several sources).

	France ¹⁴	Italy ¹⁵	Germany ¹⁸
Military aircraft	4,730	1,640	
Tanks	3,500	150	
Artillery guns	6,300	3,000	288
Machine guns	45,000	16,000	1,926

The French Forces

The standing army¹⁷ is composed of

32,800 army officers.

106,000 non-commissioned officers.

42,000 military gendarmes.

18,000 Foreign Legion.

100,000 North Africans.

90,000 Colonial troops.

240,000 Metropolitan (white) troops serving under compulsory military service.

¹³ General Debeney, *op. cit.*, p. 84.

¹⁴ *All the World's Aircraft*.

¹⁵ Foreign Policy Association, *Information Service*, Vol. VI, No. 2.

¹⁶ Military and heavy aircraft forbidden by Versailles Treaty.

¹⁷ In 1931. In round figures, totaling something over 600,000.

The number of professional soldiers with a long term of service is over 315,000. Their training is considered equal (or, taking account of the lack of certain modern armaments in the German army, superior) to the German professional army of 100,000. One-third of the troops garrisoned in France are colored and mostly long-serving professionals.¹⁸ Mobilizable colored troops in case of war are put at 1,000,000.

The term of service of the compulsory (not professional) contingents, through which every able bodied Frenchman must pass, is one year. This is considered the time necessary for full training.¹⁹ The French trained reserves are of high military value,²⁰ with a training including maneuvers in divisions, indispensable for high combat efficiency.²¹

Of the standing army 400,000 men are garrisoned in France (mostly near to the German frontier) and 150,000 in North Africa, at 1 to 2 days transportation distance (Algiers-Marseille 20 hours). The rest are in other parts of Africa, in Indo-China and elsewhere. In times of diplomatic tension, the troops garrisoned in North Africa can easily be transported to France.

¹⁸ In the World War the number of colored troops employed by the French was 870,000. Of these 570,000 were on the Franco-German front. The seven North African divisions were among the French "elite" troops. These colored crack troops were sent later into the Rhineland and the Ruhr district. They are of first class combating value to France.

¹⁹ See the principles put forth by the United States representative in the 3d session of the Preparatory Disarmament Conference.

²⁰ General Debeney, *op. cit.*, p. 84.

²¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 53-54.

The organization of the French army is based on the notion of the "*armee de couverture*." Formerly, "*armee de couverture*" meant the standing army. But, since the passage of military laws of 1927-29, it means standing army plus the contingents of the three subsequent years which passed through the colors. These contingents are called "*disponibilite*," meaning that those men who left the colors in the three last years are continuously at the disposal of the commanding military authority of the district they live in and can be called up for service without authorization of legislation or without an order of general mobilization. The "*disponibilite*" is actually called under colors for maneuvers,²² but the value it represents consists in raising the effectiveness of the standing army to 1,400,000 upon a few hours' notice.²³ To this number may be added three or four divisions from North Africa. This "*armee de couverture*," consisting of 46 infantry divisions, five cavalry divisions, and special troops (aviation and technical troops) constitute the first "wave"—forces at the disposal of the French General Staff in a few hours without an order of general mobilization.²⁴ The concentration of the complete "*armee de couverture*" on the frontier can be effected in eight days, with half of it arriving in from two to three

²² For maneuvers of three weeks were called in 1929, 16,500 officers and 210,000 men and in 1930, 16,500 officers and 230,000 men.

²³ "Loi sur la reorganisation de l'armee" of July 13, 1927, and "Loi des cadres et effectifs" of March 28, 1928.

²⁴ General Debeney, *op. cit.*, p. 43.

days. There are, besides these "marching-up" troops, the continuous garrisons of the frontier regions, especially those of the fortification lines.

Under the protection of the "*armee de convex-
ture*" the mobilization of the first reserve can be carried out, bringing up the strength of the army in three weeks to about 3¼ million men. This contingent and 2 million men of the second reserve make up the "*nation armee*," to which the mobilized colored trained reserves must be added. It is to be noted that the colored man material is exploited up to something less than 25 per cent. However, it is questionable whether much more can be done in this field, as the populations of certain colonies display a more than doubtful loyalty. This is the case especially with Indo-China. The North African colonies, on the other hand, are a source of highest value for completing the French human war-material.

It may be stated that the entire power of the French nation is organized for the contingency of a war on the principle of the "*nation en armes*." General Debeney considers this fact, in his study written while he was Chief of the French General Staff, as assuring France her superiority in case of war.²⁵ At the same time he considers the organization of an army on the basis of voluntary service in a professional army (even if the numbers of effectives, their organization, and the quality of their armament

²⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 62.

be not limited as those of the Germans) as not capable of exploiting the full warpower of a nation (*potentiel de guerre*).²⁶ This important thesis has been accepted by the leading military experts. In the case of Great Britain and the United States, the professional army system means not that those nations consider it as the best exploitation of their " *potentiel de guerre*," but that they, being isolated by the sea, have no intention of fully using it. They consider not their land armaments, but their navies as matters of primary importance, to which the doctrine of " *nation en armes* " is not pertinent. As the United States representatives pointed out in Geneva:

The crux of the whole question of land armaments is involved in the question of trained reserves and the reserve material with which to equip the trained reserves. A nation possessing an adequate trained reserve, with the material to equip it—arms, etc., and with the necessary ammunition in stock, can begin fighting offensive battles immediately on the outbreak of war.

A nation that does not possess an adequate trained reserve, and material in stock to equip it, but which must train its personnel and convert its resources into arms and equipment, will not only be unable to engage in offensive battles, generally speaking, for a minimum of a year, but also will run the greatest danger of defeat and disaster during that period.²⁷

The possibility of employing fully the war power (*potentiel de guerre*) inherent in a nation by the sys-

²⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 61.

²⁷ Official opinion of the U. S. Delegation in the report of the Preparatory Commission for the Disarmament Conference in December 1926. See also the repeated declarations made there by Lord Cecil.

tern "*nation en armes*," combined with a great professional stock in the standing army (in France 315,000 men), cause this system to be considered as the ideal one by the French military experts.²⁸

The quantity of French tanks and artillery, outnumbering that of Italy and Great Britain combined, assures the superiority in equipment of the trained reserves, the importance of which has already been pointed out in quoting the American delegation at Geneva.

As to the navies, the Italian tonnage of about 400,000 lags behind the French by some 150,000. This inferiority, though alleviated by the superiority of the Italian heavy bombing planes, assures the French the protection of the communication between North Africa and France. Naturally heavy losses may occur during the transportation of troops. Because of this superiority of the French navy, and because the Italians lack the necessary funds to compete with France, they have built an excellent air force of heavy bombers, with which they hope to check the French naval attacks on their exposed littoral towns and to defend their communications with Sicily, Sardinia, and Africa. For Italy, there is, in addition, the problem of defending her exposed, but vital, foreign food supply and raw materials. The attitude of Great Britain would, of course, be decisive in the Mediterranean. Though France possesses a fleet superior to

²⁸ The Commander-in-Chief up to February 1931 was Marshal Petain, since then General Weygand.

that of Italy, the quality of the Italian men-of-war seems to be above that of France. Foreign navies give orders for building to Italy, as well as to England, but seldom to France. The excellent work of the Italian shipyards is held accountable for this fact. However this may be, the question of navies is of secondary importance in a war for revisionism, which, if it should occur, would be mainly a continental struggle with land armaments. The German fleet, with her 115,000 tons and no possibility of enlargement, without battleships and submarines, would only come into consideration in the Baltic Sea, where, if allied with Russia, it could perhaps dominate and assure communication with that Power. In the Mediterranean and the Atlantic it cannot be considered as a factor. The French, at any rate, consider their fleet as superior to that of both Italy and Germany. It is this two-standard principle which made the French discuss the new German 10,000 ton cruiser, superior to boats of similar tonnage of other navies. In itself, the building of this 10,000 ton cruiser, inferior to battleships, has been interesting to France only insofar as by much discussion it served as propaganda for proving Germany's desire for armaments. But the discussion omitted to mention that the boat is inferior to battleships, which Germany is not allowed to possess.

There is, besides all the crushing superiority of French armaments, a possible weakness—the qualitative inferiority of the French air forces. Though

possessing numerically more war planes than Britain and Italy together (Germany is not allowed to have any), there has been some discussion and doubt about their quality. Though this circumstance would not mean a decisive inferiority of France in case of war, it could bring about relative disadvantages, such as the difficulty of effectively bombing Italy, especially the industrial centers in the North and the communications with Germany through the passes in the Alps. Numerous criticisms were recently made in the French Chamber on the inefficiency of the air forces.²⁹ It must be assumed that the defects of French aviation were somewhat exaggerated, the

²⁹ During the debate on French Military aviation in the Chamber on January 29, 1932, M. Georges Leygues, former Minister of Marine frankly declared that there was not a single really efficient flying machine in the French Naval Air Service. Their fighters were slower than the bombers of other countries; there had been serious mistakes in the choice of machines. He did not ask for additional credits, which were already enormous, but for their better use. Today, with the electrode bomb, 25 aeroplanes could start 4,000 fires in a great town. Attack, he said, was the only effective defence, and it needed good machines. M. Scapini said the French bombing squadrons did not have enough range, and the French fighters were very much inferior to the British, which were at least 45 miles an hour faster. M. Bouesse said the French Minister of Colonies recently flew back to France from Indo-China in foreign machines. Dangerous machines were sent to military pilots, and a big flying-boat, on which great hopes had been built, sank at its first flight; it had cost one million dollars. The Air Minister, intervening, agreed that fighters and bombers had been neglected in favor of army cooperation types. M. Laurent-Eynac (former minister of air, who was attacked during the debate) said this was done in conformity with the views of the General Staff, which regarded aviation as an auxiliary arm and **air attacks** not decisive. *London Times*, January 30, 1932. See also General Debeney, *op. cit.*, p. 48.

speeches having been made five days before the opening of the Disarmament Conference in Geneva. Nevertheless, the fact seems to remain true that the assumed qualitative inferiority of the French air force has been due to the fact that the General Staff has considered airplanes only as auxiliary weapons; and perhaps it may also be due to relative lack of technical skill.

At the time of the criticism it was announced in Paris that the French air force was about to take into service a new model of heavy long-distance bombers which was claimed to be superior in performance to any other machine of the type in existence, having a cruising radius of action of over 600 miles, that is, 1,200 miles in a straight line, with a full load of 1,000 pounds of bombs on board.³⁰ It seems, however, that at present France is outclassed in heavy bombers by Italy and England.³¹

But this qualitative inferiority of the air forces does not mean any inferiority of the French military power. M. Daladier, one of the leaders of the Herriot party, points out in a study,³² that the French General Staff has at its disposition, in a few hours notice the standing army of 600,000 combined with the " *disponibilite* " of 700,000. At the same time the staff is making an effort to increase the yearly military budget by 80 million dollars,³³ whereas before

³⁰ *London Times*, January 26, 1932.

³¹ See M. de Brinon in the *Paris Information*, February 10, 1932.

³² *Ripublique*, January 28, 1932.

³³ 1925-1931.

the World War, it was augmented by only 6 million dollars yearly.³⁴ There is no doubt about the superiority of the French military power. The financial means of the country made it possible to raise the military expenditure from 11.7 billion francs for 12 months in 1928 to 17.1 billion francs in 1931 for the first nine months³⁵ (over 22 billion francs or about 900 million dollars for 12 months) despite the fall in prices of about one-third. This is the avowed expenditure, but there is also a large amount of additional military expenditure concealed in the estimates for the various Civil Departments.³⁶

The military outlay of Italy averages about 300 million dollars and that of Germany about 150 millions.³⁷ Germany appropriated for the year 1932 only 124 million dollars for her army, in spite of the far higher cost of keeping up a professional (mercenary) army as compared with one of compulsory military service. Poland and Czechoslovakia, having compulsory service, spend 136 million dollars for the combined standing armies of 400,000 men equipped with all modern weapons, while Germany spends only 12 million less on her standing army of 100,000 men without the most costly modern weapons.³⁸ While the French government had to spend in 1929 on one

³⁴ 1904-1913.

³⁵ M. Auriol in the French Chamber on February 10, 1932.

³⁶ *Manchester Guardian* February 11, 1932, report on the debate in the French Chamber.

³⁷ *American Editorial Research Reports*, vol. III, 1930, based on figures given by the League of Nations Armaments Year Book.

³⁸ *New York Times*, January 18, 1932.

soldier, military pay not included, a daily average of 20 cents, the German government had to put up with a cost of 33 cents.³⁹ The daily pay of the French soldier under the colors with compulsory service is one cent, while the German voluntary (professional) soldier receives 41 cents.⁴⁰ Hence the higher cost of the German army as compared with that of France and even more with that of Poland. On the other hand, Italy has the same financial advantage of the compulsory military service as France and Poland.

On the whole, even if the differences in cost between France and Germany are disregarded, France spends about twice as much for military purposes as Germany and Italy combined.

It is not the will for peace which leads Italy to restrict her outlay, but her limited financial means as compared with France. In her effort to keep pace with France, Italy must use other than financial means. Germany, on the other hand, has not only less financial power than France, but the disarmament clauses of Versailles restrict her freedom in using the money as she pleases.

The German Forces

1. *Officially Avowed Armaments.* Colonel Reboul, the well-known French military author, discussing

³⁹ The military clauses of the Versailles Treaty make the equipment of the army more expensive, as supply by the state is forbidden and mass production cannot take place.

⁴⁰ 1929. Figures of the respective ministries of war.

the war-power of Germany and her possible secret armaments, writes concerning the disarmament clauses of the Versailles Treaty: " Marshal Foch, distrusting Germany and fearing that the Germans might evade the terms, took his precautions and adopted a text in which he worked out the details." ⁴¹

The numbers, equipment, organization, and terms of service for the German army, as laid down in the Versailles Treaty, were fixed by Marshal Foch and the French General Staff. For this action there is only one slight precedent in modern history: After Prussia was defeated at Tilsit in 1807 by Napoleon, the Convention of Paris fixed the number of effectives of the Prussian King but even this convention only restricted the number of troops for 10 years, after which Prussia might resume liberty of action. But the restrictions imposed on Prussia during these 10 years were not comparable with those of the Versailles Treaty, as they fixed only the number of men, leaving a great possibility to catch up in power by other means, such as the fast enrollment and rotation of the effectives under the colors, providing the possibility of having trained reserves and improved equipment. Control of the execution of the plan was made through diplomatic channels and not taken seriously.⁴²

But the present disarmament clauses of the Versailles Treaty, so far as is humanly possible, take

⁴¹ Colonel C. Reboul in the second of a series of articles entitled: " Le potentiel Militaire de rAllemagne," *Le Temps*, August 18, 1931.

⁴² General Nollet, *Une experience de desarmement* (Paris, 1931)

into consideration every detail of modern armaments ; and the control commission, under the direction of the French General Nollet, has executed its task with " *tout le zele et la fermete* " possible.⁴³ The control commission even went to the extent of examining the width of the walls of former barracks which had been transformed into apartment houses, in order to be sure that the building could not again be easily transformed into barracks. This " interallied Control Commission," headed by General Nollet, was composed of 406 officers and 767 soldiers. The special controlling organ for air questions had 140 officers and 196 soldiers. The commission was backed by an extensive secret intelligence service, rinding ample help among the rival populations, antagonized by adherence to party organizations such as communists and nationalists. In spite of all this mechanism, however, some secret arming has been possible, the extent of which we will study in the light of the French disclosures. Through the working of the intelligence service backed by lavish French expenditure for the purpose, armaments manufactured in Germany in evasion of treaty stipulations are well known to France. Their military value, however, is limited, as France could at any time use her legal right to propose an investigation of the situation through the machinery of the League of Nations. Since the withdrawal of the Control Commission in 1927 this right is deputed to any Power, and it is to

⁴³ General Nudnat in *Le Temps*, February 20, 1932.

be assumed that France or Poland have not used it because the results of such an investigation would probably have been meager and ineffective. There are, however, certain possibilities, more legal than secret, of enhancing the value of Germany's military power. An examination of these will be made later.

In the military clauses of the Versailles Treaty the German army is fixed at 4,000 officers, 96,000 soldiers. The high military value of these troops, insofar as training is concerned, is indisputable. Their term of service is fixed by the Treaty at not less than 12 years for soldiers of rank and 25 years for officers. As the complete training of men can be effected in one year⁴⁴ it may be taken for granted that the greatest part of their period of service is unfruitful from the point of view of Germany's military power. This circumstance bars the possibility of training reserves. Their quality, on the other hand, is to be estimated as equal to the 315,000 men under French colors serving as professional soldiers for long terms. But the limitations put by the Treaty on the equipment of the German troops results in less efficiency. These limitations are the following:

1. There is no heavy artillery. Only 288 light artillery guns are granted. (France possesses about 6,300 heavy and light artillery guns.)
2. No military aircraft is allowed.
3. Tanks are forbidden. (France has about 3,500 tanks.)

⁴⁴ See General Debeney, *op. cit.*, p. 84, on the French trained reserves.

4. Only 1,926 machine guns are allowed. (France has about 45,000.)

5. All fortifications in the Western (Franco-German) region had to be scrapped and no fortifications can be built or modernized on the Eastern (Polish) frontier regions and other German territories.

6. The territories on both banks of the Rhine have to be demilitarized, that is, no German troops may enter those provinces. These territories thus compose a French " glacis."

7. No mobilization plans can be elaborated. (Every country is prepared for the concentration of its troops, as for instance by the plans given to the railways. Even Switzerland has its mobilization plan.)

8. No military training may be given the German youth or civilian.

9. Preparations for chemical warfare are forbidden.

Thus, if these prescriptions are followed by Germany, her well-trained army of 100,000 is still necessarily inferior to 100,000 Frenchmen. But the French war forces are about 6,000,000 men.

2. *German Secret Armaments.* Extensive study on this subject has been made by the French. A number of military experts published examinations of the real war power of Germany, taking into consideration Germany's efforts to build up her defence forces in addition to the forces granted by the Treaty. This is done mainly to impress public opinion. Thus, in sur-

veying the alleged facts given by the French military authors, we arrive at a maximum of possibilities.

General Debeney, in his rather serene and impartial study published while he was the Chief of the French General Staff, puts the German mobilizable military forces not at 100,000, but at 400,000.⁴⁵ This army would be composed of the 100,000 standing army, of the 150,000 special police, " *schupo*," of the army soldiers dismissed after their 12 years service-term, and of a limited number of volunteers trained secretly. This study of General Debeney was undertaken not so much for impressing the public with the German danger, as a scholarly treatise on the military forces opposing France.

Colonel Reboul in his series of articles in *Le Temps* tries to impress the public. For this reason he is sometimes obliged to abandon the unbiased point of view of an expert. But his study will be the more interesting, as one may be sure that he does not underestimate the German power. He puts the trained forces of Germany at 2,000,000 men.⁴⁶ Of these, 1,600,000 would be delivered by the private associations, that is, the Hitlerites, Communists, Stahlhelm, Jungdo, and Reichsbanner, and still mobilizable war veterans. The remaining 400,000 represent the same forces as those counted by General Debeney. Colonel Reboul admits that Germany has formally satisfied the demand of the Allied Powers set forth in the ulti-

⁴⁵ General Debeney, *op. cit.*, p. 15.

⁴⁶ Colonel Reboul, *op. cit.*, art. VIII, *be Temps*, August 14, 1931.

matums of London (March 25,1921) and Paris (May 5,1921) for barring any military training of private associations,⁴⁷ but he has no faith in the carrying out of the German decrees. Lacking proof of violations, he cites the decree of President von Hindenburg of December 31, 1926, forbidding any military instruction of civilians, and the report of the Conference of Ambassadors of the Allied Powers on the execution of the military clauses of the Versailles Treaty by Germany. This report, elaborated by military experts and sent to Geneva in March, 1931, acknowledges the execution of the military clauses, but states that the Control Commission was not in a position to control the execution of the Hindenburg decree of December 31,1926, as the activity of the Commission stopped on January 31,1927.⁴⁸ In this Colonel Reboul sees a polite allusion by the members of the Control Commission (in their report written in 1931) to their doubt about the execution of the decree. The report further calls attention to the existence of certain defence organizations (" *Grenzscliütz* ") in the frontier districts. The report does not indicate, however, whether these organizations did or did not receive military training. It says also that, before the Hindenburg decree prohibiting military training in the private associations had been announced, such training took place. Also noted are minor violations in the organization of the police.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, art. I . , *Le Temps*, August 1, 1931.

Colonel Reboul sums up the infractions of the disarmament clauses as follows:

That the personnel of the German General Staff has been recompleted contrary to treaty clauses;

That this recompletion was made after they had attended courses of instruction (High Military School for Officers is forbidden by the Treaty);

That those artillerists of the army, who are designated by the Treaty to attend only to training the munition supply have also been taught to manipulate the guns;

That the soldiers designed by the Treaty for the service of automobile training have undertaken exercises in using armored automobiles;

That members of the army attended training schools for commercial aviation;

That instructors and stands for rifle shooting were put at the disposal of sporting societies;

That members of these sporting societies received military training for a short period.⁴⁹ This period was supposed by Colonel Reboul to have been for three or four weeks, and, in some special cases, as much as three months. University students in particular were trained.⁵⁰ Colonel Reboul also supposes that a faster rotation of the effectives of the army is going on, and he points to certain German members of the French Foreign Legion, who, after having served only six instead of 12 years in the *Eichswehr* (the German army) have been enlisted into

⁴⁹*Ibid.*, art. V., *Le Temps*, August 30, 1931.

⁵⁰*Ibid.*, art. VIII, *Le Temps*, September 11, 1931.

the French Foreign Legion. Together with the " *Grenzschütz*," the defence organization in the frontier regions, Colonel Reboul puts, as we stated before, the number of trained civilians at 1,600,000. He does not, however, give any indication of the calculation by which he arrived at this figure. Nor does he indicate the cases where actual training in field service has been observed. Colonel Reboul assumes, further, that the army has several sets of equipment allowed in the Treaty, thus multiplying the figures permitted as maxima.⁵¹ The Control Commission, he says on the other hand, was not able to find any stocks of war material besides those in possession of the army. He says, however, that this was mainly due to the resistance of the Germans to an approach. " *A Potsdam*," he writes, " *nos officiers découvrirent des armes cachées, mais ils se heurterent à une telle résistance ouverte qu'ils ne purent arriver jusqu'à elles.*"⁵²

Colonel Reboul arrives after some calculation at the amount of armaments in possession of the civil population and in that of the Bavarian government, which had to fight the short communist rule in Munich. In possession of the civilian population on April 7, 1921:

14 artillery guns.
49 short-distance guns.
3,853 machine guns.
200,000 rifles.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, art. X., *Le Temps*, October 10, 1931.

⁵² *Ibid.*, art. V., *Le Temps*, August 30, 1931.

The civilian population has not returned this amount of the army stocks which were given to the anti-communist guards. For the same purpose the Bavarian government distributed among the anti-communist army members:

190,000 rifles.

3,395 machine guns.

35 light artillery guns.

11 heavy artillery guns.

After the notes of Paris and London of 1921, according to Colonel Reboul, the Germans handed over only parts of these hidden war stocks.⁵³

The violations against the military clauses of the Treaty committed by the Germans as enumerated by Colonel Reboul are significant insofar as they indicate the proportions in which they may have really taken place. On the other hand, there are certain indications in the series of articles of the French military author of the difficulties inherent in secret arming. He admits that training of great masses of troops mobilizable for the battlefields requires years.⁵⁴ And thus he admits that the eventual training of civilians in the Reichswehr (army) does not provide Germany with sufficient mobilizable trained reserves.⁵⁵ In Art. IX (*Le Temps*, October 3, 1931)

⁵³*Ibid.*, art. IX., *Le Temps*, October 3, 1931.

⁵⁴*Ibid.*, art. VI, *Le Temps*, September 6, 1931. Also see the official opinion of the U. S. Delegation in the Preparatory Commission for the Disarmament Conference (1926), which puts the minimum time for training of men for field service at one year.

⁵⁵Colonel Reboul, *op. cit.*, art. VIII, *Le Temps*, September 11, 1931.

he grants that " *on ne pent pas davantage camoufler une production de materiel de guerre, des qu'elle depasse un certain stade dans la fabrication.*" Thus, no secret fabrication of war material is possible.

In Article X (*Le Temps*, October 10, 1931) he admits that " *les recherches de celles-ci (des commissions de controle) ne pouvaient les conduire dan ces conditions qu'd des resultats partiels et insignifiants.*" These" conditions "were hiding of war stock by the civilian population. But he states at the same time that this hidden material quickly becomes deteriorated and unusable ("*le materiel ainsi conserve devait se deteriorer rapidement* ").

Interesting material has been published in an interview of M. Bouillon-Lafont, rapporteur of the Budget of the French Ministry of War, with the *Matin*.TM The article appeared on the day of the opening of the Disarmament Conference. M. Bouillon Lafont enumerated the factories which serve secretly Germany's military power. Airplanes, which may be used for military purposes, are those of the firm of Ileinckel, designed for pursuit-planes (Types " H. I). 38 "and " H. D. 43 "), and those of the German firms, Junkers and Dornier, built in factories abroad and introduced with slight changes as commercial airplanes in Germany (Types " R. 45," " K. 47 " and " K. 37 ").

The number of such airplanes at the disposal of Germany was not given by M. Bouillon-Lafont, but

⁵⁶ February 2, 1932.

he declared that the German Government, controlling a number of great German banks with interest in certain machine factories abroad, may provide itself through such connections with the weapons prohibited in the Versailles Treaty. The plants controlled by Germany were the arms factory in Solothurn, Switzerland, the machine factory in Oerlikon, Switzerland, and the airplane factories in Eomanshorn and Altenheim in Switzerland. Moreover, in Holland the German Government controls the "Siderius" and "Venlo" companies (the latter possesses optical works), as well as the Fokker aircraft construction company. In Sweden it controls the plants of Limmhan and Botors. He added that while German financial interests in arms manufacturing undertakings abroad are not in conflict with the letter of the Versailles Treaty, it is certainly in conflict with its spirit, as these factories provide possibilities of clandestine armament supply to Germany. He gave no proof that such trade was actually going on.

Another article of the *Matin* contends that German munitions are being manufactured in Italy.

Denials were naturally issued by the states in question. In Holland the war ministry invited the French military attache to visit and inspect the stocks of the munition factory "Siderius" at Krimpen.⁵⁷ In Sweden the "Botors" company invited the British

⁵⁷ The Hague correspondent of the *Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung*, January 20, 1932.

military attache to visit their plants (January 26, 1932). No doubt, there is much sensation seeking and propaganda making about the assertions concerning Germany's present war power, but it may be assumed nevertheless that she possesses a greater defence mechanism than that fixed in the Treaty. It would be contrary to the natural instincts of a nation if it let its forces be limited to 100,000 men without modern war equipment in the face of one neighbor commanding a force of over 6,000,000, and another, Poland, one of more than 3,000,000. That German aviation is destined among other means to balance the disproportion may well be assumed. How far commercial airplanes may be converted into war planes is a much discussed question. The possibilities with the time lag involved in such conversion are treated in a scholarly manner by the British military expert, Major Lefebure, in his book, *Scientific Disarmament*. The German thesis naturally tends to prove that commercial planes are only of an auxiliary value to air forces.⁵⁸ The small value of commercial planes in general for aerial warfare is also maintained by the President of the French Air Commission, Colonel Brocard.⁵⁹ The difference between the planes serving the two purposes is particularly in their speed where a disproportion of 20 or 30 per cent

⁵⁸ Colonel F. W. von Oertzen, "Volkerbund der Liifte," *Vossische Zeitung*, November 21, 1931.

⁵⁹ Cited after Dr. Groener, German Minister of Defence, *Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung*, December 16, 1931.

may be considered as decisive. On the other hand, the German " Lufthausa " Company is increasing the speed of their planes constantly. Planes in their service are supposed to reach 200 miles an hour.⁶⁰ Dr. C. Dornier, the constructor of the famous Dornier machines, declared in Munich on December 9, 1931, that the giant flying boats and planes were built in such a way that they would be able to compete in speed, ease of manipulation, and steering with small sporting and middle-sized machines.⁶¹ Thus, if these big planes should compete with the light fighters, it would mean a change in the aspect of aerial warfare. The superiority of the German commercial aviation over the French is acknowledged everywhere.⁶² These new types of German planes could be superior to the French military planes, asserts the above mentioned Frenchman, Colonel Brocard.⁶³ General Denvignes calls the big German planes " air-cruisers," and says that besides the planes of those factories mentioned by M. Bouillon-Lafont, types capable of being used for military purposes are produced in the Dornier plant in Italy and in the Junker plants in Russia.⁶⁴

The number of commercial planes eventually convertible to war planes is supposed by General Den-

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, December 10, 1931.

⁶¹ *Ibid.*

⁶² Joseph Cyrille Magdelaine Denvignes, *Ce que j'ai vu et entendu en Allemagne; la guerre ou la paix* (Paris, 1927).

⁶³ *Ibid.*, p. 253.

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 252.

vignes to be equal in Germany and France, but he contends that the German planes are far superior in quality. The number of both is estimated as over 500.⁶⁵ The same figures were given to the writer in the summer of 1931 by official German spokesmen, denying, however, the high military value of the German planes. The "Air League of the British Empire" puts the number of the French war planes at 4,700.⁶⁶ General Denvignes admits that Germany does not possess such planes. How far the superior quality of the German commercial planes may balance a qualitatively inferior, but quantitatively 10 times superior French air force remains to be seen. There remains also the problem of training crews. It is admitted by military experts that individual training of pilots is inadequate if it is not complemented by exercises in squadrons and combined maneuvers.⁶⁷ Here again the question arises whether an eventual secret training of German pilots in "friendly" countries like Italy or perhaps Russia would serve the purpose. At any rate, the French General Staff does not think too much of the decisive nature of air attacks.

. . . le bombardement aerien massif ? Ce serait une solution bien incomplete; meme en accordant a ces procedes degression des facility, que nous contestons d'ailleurs, pour une execution parfaite, il n'en reste pas moins que *leurs resultats sont limit es*

⁶⁵ *Ibid*, p. 248.

⁶⁶ 1931.

⁶⁷ General Debeney, *op. cit.*, p. 53.

par leur nature meme. Sans doute ces resultats infligent a la victime les plus graves dommages et la plus douloureuse epreuve, mais ils laissent intacts la plus grande partie de ses moyens.⁶⁸

" Potentiel de Guerre "

The military inferiority of Germany is admitted—so far as the writer knows—by all French experts. Such declarations as the one made by M. E. Herriot closing his campaign for reelection to the French Chamber cannot be taken seriously:

As long as there is insanity somewhere in the world I shall continue to vote for military credits. There are 40,000 trained cyclists in Germany who are not merely sportsmen and who could race across our frontier on a very short notice.

More than 500 military airplanes were lined up side by side in a grand review in Italy the other day. I am certainly a pacifist, but as long as we have to take madmen into consideration I shall favor prudent precautions.⁶⁹

While perhaps well suited to the purposes of an electoral campaign, the idea of " trained cyclists " at least is of no practical significance in military calculations.

On the other hand, the French argument of German danger because of superiority in "*potentiel de guerre* " is repeated everywhere. The argument is based on two facts: first, that Germany has 65 million inhabitants as against the 40 million of France; second, that Germany is industrialized to a higher

⁶⁸ Ibid., pp. 48-49.

"New York Times, October 19, 1931.

degree than France. Certainly the Versailles Treaty in general and its military clauses specifically could not deal sufficiently with these two factors of eventual German superiority. Insofar as the Treaty gave some of the most important industrial regions to France (Alsace-Lorraine with 75 per cent of the German iron resources and an important part of German industries and other mineral resources) and to Poland (Upper Silesia with about 30 per cent of the German coal supply and highly important industries) and detached 7 per cent of the German pre-war population; and further, insofar as it handed over the German colonies and imposed on Germany heavy economic and financial burdens, the balance in the "*potential de guerre*" has been shifted to the advantage of France. Nevertheless, there still remains the fact that the German national income in 1928 has been estimated at about 14 billion dollars, while that of France (without the colonies) at about 10 billions.⁷⁰ This means less per capita income for Germany, but, in an absolute sense, there is an important difference, which is due (considering the greater natural wealth of the French soil) to the superior industrial efficiency of the German people.

Now, taking for granted that the war material at the disposal of Germany in peace time is far inferior to that of France, can this superior industrial ap-

⁷⁰ M. Jacobsen in *Economist*, London, cited from the American Editorial Research Reports, 1930, III (*Military and Naval Expenditures*).

paratus be used in case of war to create over night a powerful stock of weapons? An answer is supplied in the official opinion of the United States delegates in the report of the Preparatory Commission for the Disarmament Conference (at Geneva) in December 1926.

The crux of the whole question of land armaments is involved in the question of trained reserves and the reserve material with which to equip the trained reserves. A nation possessing an adequate trained reserve, with the material to equip it—arms, etc., and with the necessary ammunition in stock, can begin fighting offensive battles immediately on the outbreak of war. A nation that does not possess an adequate trained reserve, and material in stock to equip it, but which must train its personnel and convert its resources into arms and equipment, will not only be unable to engage in offensive battles, generally speaking for a minimum of a year, but also will run the greatest danger of defeat and disaster during that period.

It is generally accepted by all military men that at least a year of training is required to produce troop units, including divisions, capable of successful employment in offensive battles. The experience of the U. S. A. has also demonstrated that industrial resources cannot be converted, nor mass production of armaments take place, in less than from 12 to 20 months.⁷¹

The same principle applies to the transformation into a war weapon of the chemical industry, much discussed because of the superiority of this industry in Germany. If there does not exist a ready mechanism in time of peace for using the chemical ma-

⁷¹ For a detailed study of the subject, see Major Lefebure's work, *Scientific Disarmament*, *passim*.

terial for war purpose, there would be no danger of chemical warfare for a long time after the outbreak of war.

Major Lefebure, the organizer of the British chemical warfare during the World War, puts the necessary time-lag in converting industrial chemical material into war weapons (bulk manufacture of fighting devices and the training of special troops for the field work) at 8 to 12 months. The filling of shells with chemical material on a large scale cannot be done secretly. Not only is it dangerous work but workers must be trained, while a great number of plants must be specially organized. The same applies to the field tests of chemical warfare devices. They require a vast testing-field, with danger to the population. Nor can the training of troops to use the certain devices be hidden.⁷²

And, as Major Lefebure puts it, a relative security is reached, if within a year of the outbreak of hostilities no nation has adequate forces to invade another and to effect a quick decision. In the meantime the concerted action of the neutral powers—provided they wanted to do so—could prevent any nation from being the judge of its own case. In any event, the enormous military machinery of France, capable of occupying Germany within a short time,⁷³ would not

⁷² Major Lefebure examines the problem in the minutest detail in his work *Scientific Disarmament*.

⁷³ The speed of the tanks, of which France possesses more than all the other great powers combined, is nearly 50 miles an hour and that

have to cope with German chemical weapons, while France herself possesses a ready apparatus for chemical warfare. For, as Major Lefebure points out in his work, the French chemical industry does not lag far behind the German.

The French General Staff also does not believe in the convertibility on short notice of the German industry into war power. General Debeney writes as the chief of the General Staff in 1930:

La mobilisation industrielle, *même bien préparée exige une longue période de demurrage*; il est indispensable d'avoir des stocks dès le temps de paix

Industrial mobilization cannot satisfy the needs " du debut, ni comme quantité ni surtout dans les délais nécessaires."⁷⁴

He declares further, that the "*potentiel de guerre* " cannot be utilized fully by a professional army, even less limited than the German.

Sans doute cette valeur militaire réside pratiquement dans l'organisation destinée à *mettre en action* ce qu'on appelle le potentiel de guerre. Nous avons dit les raisons techniques pour lesquelles l'armée de métier, sous quelque forme qu'elle se présente, paraît incapable de réaliser complètement cette fin, la possibilité au contraire pour les institutions actuelles (of France) de préparer la levée de la nation en armes.⁷⁵

of the motorized heavy artillery 35 miles. See *New York Times*, October 8, 1931. The occupation of Germany, without fortification lines, would be presumably a question of months, if not weeks.

⁷⁴ General Debeney, *op. cit.*, p. 31.

⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, *op. cit.*, p. 61.

Apparently, Colonel Reboul has assigned the highest evaluation of the number of mobilizable trained reserves at Germany's disposal. He puts the figure at 2,000,000 and of these 1,600,000 are supposed to have passed military training secretly in private associations. Thus, the remainder of the German manpower is not trained. These men, in the official opinion of the United States delegation in the report of the Preparatory Commission for the Disarmament Conference in December, 1926, " will be unable to engage in offensive battles, generally speaking, for a *minimum of a year* " and the nation thus unprepared and in war with a powerful neighbor whose reserves are trained " will run the greatest danger of defeat and disaster during that period."

Further, are there any proofs, that the 1,600,000 men mentioned by Colonel Reboul are trained?

The writer attempted in the summer of 1931 to investigate how far this training goes in the private associations. He had the opportunity to come into close contact with lieutenants of the Hitlerites and of other " storm troops " and acquired from these friends certain information, the accuracy of which he has no reason to doubt. His impression was that in the " storm troops " of these associations, at loggerheads with each other and denouncing each other, a fierce patriotic or communistic spirit may be found. But granting some latitude for exceptions, their " military " training seemed to be restricted to purposes of parade-marching and street-fighting. No

field training—perhaps with some exceptions—is going on, and hardly any rifle shooting. Naturally, the military spirit and discipline of these "troops" are an advantage for later real military training, and in about three to six months these men, in the opinion of the writer (who is himself a graduate of an army officers' college), may be trained for field-combatants.

An exception is the training of the "*Grenzschiitz*," the defence organization of the frontier regions, existing especially in East Prussia. These men, numbering probably a few hundred thousands, may be mobilized in case of a Polish attack and constitute a good auxiliary army to the *Eichswehr* divisions.

Colonel Reboul said that the period of training of the German University students was from three to four weeks, in some cases three months. This period would thus be insufficient. But, take the case where secret training in these associations would last a longer period, months or even a year; as the instruction is supposed to be secret, no training in higher units, such as regiments, brigades, not to mention divisions, would be possible. As General Debeney says, any instruction not including training in higher units is "*la negation de Vinstruction*."⁷⁶

On parle beaucoup des enseignements de la guerre et on applique ce vocable a beaucoup de conclusions contestables: pourtant, s'il est un enseignement que nul ne puisse recuser, c'est bien l'efficacite, prouvee jusqu'a l'evidence, de l'union des armes: fantassins, cavaliers, artilleurs, sapeurs, aviateurs

TM *Ibid.*, p. 64.

n'obtiennent aucun resultat durable en agissant d'une facon independente; ils peuvent tout en operant ensemble. La division est la premiere des grandes unites de toutes armes; c'est dans la division que les armes apprennent a combattre ensemble.⁷⁷

Without combined training in the division (of artillery, infantry, etc.) the troops are not adapted to field use.

I/entrainement au combat, tout au contraire, ne peut se pratiquer utilement qu'avec des troupes, des troupes de toutes armes: la division est l'ecole de l'union des armes, c'est la premiere educatrice des forces morales de l'armee.⁷⁸

The same conclusion is reached in the official opinion of the U. S. Delegates at Geneva:

It is generally accepted by all military men that at least a year of training is required to produce *troop units, including divisions, capable of successful employment in offensive battles*TM

Even if Germany were allowed to train all her man material, the superiority of Germany in consequence of her " *potentiel de guerre* " would not be absolutely assured. Germany has 65 million inhabitants, France 40, but the entire French Empire has sovereignty over 100 million men. Her Colonial Empire gave her an inestimable help in crack troops during the World War. At present the colored troops have doubled in

⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 53.

⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 54.

⁷⁹ Report of two Preparatory Commissions for the Disarmament Conference, December 1926.

number compared with those of the World War, but it is estimated that only 25 per cent of available man material is utilized. How far this estimate is exact cannot be examined here, but it seems probable that the number of the at present mobilizable colored troops (mainly North African) which is about one million, may be still augmented. One-third of the French standing army is at present comprised of colored troops, and it may be assumed that, after tedious work of organization, this proportion could perhaps not be reached, but approached as to the trained reserves. It must be kept in mind that against 40 million white French there are 60 million colored colonial subjects.

France, the richest nation in Europe in iron and other mineral supplies, with unequaled financial power, with twice as many motorcars as Germany, with more double-railroad tracks than Germany,⁸⁰ with an enormous Colonial Empire representing a huge source of wealth, certainly does not face Germany, in spite of the higher industrial efficiency of the latter, as a country with much less " *potentiel de guerre*." Furthermore, it must be remembered that Germany is not self-supporting in raw materials and foodstuffs. This circumstance was one of the main factors in Germany's defeat in the World War.

The present military power of Germany, as represented in mobilizable troops of full value, may be put in accordance with the estimate of General Debeney

⁸⁰ Major H. Rhode, *DevAsch-Franzozische Macht-faktoren*.

at 400,000. Eventually another million men can be sent into the field after a period of training. A successful attack by this, or even a superior force, upon a great power is naturally unthinkable; and, as General Debeney puts it, a professional army of this magnitude, is an "*illusion de force militaire*." ⁸¹ On the other hand, as to the required defence forces, Major Lefebure says "the adequate defence of their natural land boundaries for a reasonable period could not be assured by figures of the order of the present German capacity." ⁸² This means that Germany is not only exposed to the diplomatic blackmail of her neighbors, but may be transformed into a battlefield of two foreign Powers, as, for instance, France and Russia.

Germany, in order to escape this situation, may enter another war. But this she can do only with powerful military allies, and even then she would expose herself to destruction by her neighbors. Whether she would reach her aim in the final outcome, is another question.

The Italian Forces

The length of the Italian peninsula, with 4,800 miles of seacoast, makes the country highly vulnerable. Submarines, especially developed weapons of France and Yugoslavia, might succeed in blockading Italy; and an effective blockade would cut off her

⁸¹ General Debeney, *op. cit.*, pp. 78-79.

⁸² Major Lefebure, *op. cit.*, pp. 132-133.

raw materials and food supply. About 30 per cent of Italy's food must be imported. Italian policy is directed to assure this supply through the Eastern Mediterranean. The numerous important cities on the coast are exposed to attacks from the sea, especially through the air. Such attacks are particularly dangerous as their signaling is difficult. The vulnerability of Italy through air attacks is enhanced by the fact that the industrial centers (Torino, Milan, Trieste) are in the north, near the frontiers. The attempt to avert successful air attacks has induced the Italian government to build an extremely powerful air force. The greatest efforts have been concentrated on this weapon and the quality of the Italian war planes is considered to be the first in Europe after Great Britain's.⁸³ In order to overcome the quantitative inferiority of their navy as compared with that of France, the Italians have built particularly powerful bombing airplanes. But the long peninsula does not allow the arrangement of the air squadrons in advantageous echelons. Italy hopes, however, to have an air force superior to that of France, despite numerical inferiority. In 1930 Italy's air forces were estimated at 1,640 war-planes⁸⁴ as against 4,730 French ones.⁸⁵

The Italian standing army consists of only 16,000 officers and 220,000 men. The yearly contingent of

⁸³ *he Temps*, February 14, 1932.

⁸⁴ Foreign Policy Association *Information Service*, Vol. VI, fto. 2.

⁸⁵ Publication of the *Air League of the British Empire*, 1930.

men in Italy is 260,000 (France's average is 250,000), but only 180,000 are called under the colors annually. Their instruction, however, is assured to a certain extent by other means. The effectives of the standing army are higher than this number as the term of service (with some exceptions) is 18 months. To the standing army must be added, however the "*Cara binieri*," crack troops similar to gendarmes, with 1,100 officers, 11,350 non-commissioned officers and 49,000 men. There is further the "*Guardia Finanziaria*," on the frontiers, with complete military training. It consists of 700 officers, 5,300 non-commissioned officers, and 20,000 men. Ready in a few hours for mobilization are the regular fascist militia, with 3,000 officers and 300,000 men.⁸⁰ These are of first-class training, as those not mobilizable for field-service are rejected.⁸⁷ A special fascist militia exists for controlling vital points of the state (communications, frontiers, etc.) numbering 1,000 officers and 14,000 men.

Thus, in reality, the standing army numbers about 338,000 men, among whom there are 48,000 *' professionals " (17,000 officers and 31,000 non-commissioned officers). French superiority is thus assured, since France has about 315,000 professionals and 300,000 men. On the other hand, only about 400,000 of these are garrisoned in France, 150,000 being in North Africa (one or two days distance).

⁸⁶ *Milizia* volontaria per la sicurezza nazionale—M. V. S. N.

⁸⁷ *Corriere della Sera*, April 1, 1930.

It may be assumed that Italy can mobilize immediately, and send at a few days' notice a first " wave " of 600,000 to 700,000 men, marching up to the frontier in three weeks, with the first half arriving before the seventh day of mobilization.⁸⁸ As half of the Italian divisions of the standing army are in the North, their marching up (about 180,000 men) may be effected in two to three days. These are naturally only estimates. For the first " wave " the equipment is ready. How far the war stocks are piled up for the further mobilizable reserves is not known. Certain difficulties may result from the limited financial means of the country. The mobilized army and its trained reserves will have a figure of about 3i million. Italy, however, with certain efforts, may raise the number to five million.⁸⁹ This effort may be successful as the total fascist militia forces are estimated at 1,100,000.⁹⁰ Further, a law for compulsory pre-military training for youth of and above 18, for a term of two years, and for several days a week, was voted on December 19, 1930. The number of youths yearly under training is estimated at 300,000.⁹¹ This system and the militia are less expensive forms of military service. Besides these methods, there exists already a pre-military training of the

⁸⁸ General Ludendorff, *The Coming War* (London, 1931).

⁸⁹ Colonel K. L. von Oertzen, *Rustling und Abrüstung* (Berlin, 1929), p. 94.

⁹⁰ Senator Eccard in the French Senate Foreign Affairs Commission, January 20, 1932 (*New York Times*, January 21, 1932).

⁹¹ Colonel Oertzen, *op. cit.*, p. 88.

youth from eight to eighteen (" *Balila* " for 8-15, " *Avanguardia* " for 15-18). The fascist government makes all possible efforts to advance the national and fighting spirit of the youth and the population. This is especially necessary in Italy, as the great war did not evidence the high military values of the Italian people. At present there is an attempt to overcome the limited financial means by a great deal of voluntary, non-paid service.

In case of war, the law on the " Organization of the Nation for War " (June 6, 1925) puts at the disposal of the state every human and material resource of the country, women included. This law is similar to that in France called " *loi sur l'organisation generale de la nation pour le temps de guerre.*" The command of all the Italian war forces (army, air-forces, and navy) is centralized in one hand.⁹²

The total war-expenditure of war decreased nominally somewhat from 5,551 million lira in 1930-31 to 5,280 million lira in 1931-32, but, taking account of the fall of prices, this means in reality at least a 20 per cent increase.⁹³

The Italian fortifications on the French and Swiss frontiers are inferior to those of her neighbors. But they are considered sufficient to bar an invasion.⁹⁴ As to Italian heavy artillery, the material is of lower quality. A great quantity of such material was cap-

⁹² *Ordinamento del Regio Esercito*, March 11, 1926.

⁹³ Col. von Oertzen, *op. cit.*, p. 81.

⁹⁴ General Ludendorff, *op. cit.*

tured during the World War and consists of old models.⁹⁵ So far as tanks are concerned, the Italian General Staff considers them less useful in the mountainous country. In the Alps, which form the greatest part of the frontiers other than the sea, they are almost inapplicable. The money here saved may be utilized for the air force.

In spite of feverish efforts, Italy has not been able to equal France in military power. A somewhat arbitrarily composed table of figures gives one some indication of the proportion of the three military powers examined:

	France	Italy	Germany
Total organized forces.	6,000,000 excellent or good	5,000,000 medium or good	400,000 ⁹⁶ excellent and 1,000,000 aux- iliary troops mobilizable in a few months or even weeks
Military and eventually convertible air craft.	5,200 medium	1,900 excellent	500 ⁹⁷ excellent
Tanks.	3,500	150.	
Artillery guns.	6,300	3,000	288 (?) no heavy guns
Machine guns.	45,000	16,000	6,000 (?) ⁹⁸
Tonnage of navies on Apr. 1, 1931.	628,603	395,002	115,780
War expenditure (1932) approximate esti- mate).	\$900,000,000	\$300,000,000	\$150,000,000

⁹⁵ Colonel von Oertzen, *op. cit.*, p. 86; *Le Temps*, Feb. 14, 1932.

⁹⁶ Versailles Treaty: 100,000.

⁹⁷ Versailles Treaty: none.

⁹⁸ Versailles Treaty: 1,926.

Taking into consideration the strategic positions of these countries, it may readily be assumed that France alone could outweigh the other two combined." But France does not stand alone.

⁹⁹ General Ludendorff, *op. cit.* The same conclusion is reached by General Debeney, *op. cit.*, p. 62.

CHAPTER IV

ALLIANCES AND ALIGNMENTS

THE ALLIES OF FRANCE

Belgium

The military agreement concluded between Belgium and France in 1920 authorizes collaboration in time of peace between the Belgian and French general staffs with a view to organizing mutual measures of defence in the event of an attack by Germany. In 1930, however, a vigorous campaign was launched in Belgium by M. E. Vandervelde, former Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs, for the abolition of this military alliance. M. Vandervelde asserted that the Locarno pact made the military agreement unnecessary and that this alliance, with the extension of the French fortification line to the German-Belgian frontier, gave the impression of Belgium being a vassal of France. This argument was strengthened by the assumed displeasure of the British at the extension of the French fortification line to Belgium. M. Vandervelde asked what would be expected of Belgium should France become involved in a war in support of her eastern allies.¹

Nevertheless, the military agreement is still in force. Had the Germans not committed the enormous

¹ Colonel E. Powell, *op. cit.*, pp. 52-53.

diplomatic blunder of marching through Belgium in 1914, it may be assumed that the tendencies of Belgium to break away from France would have materialized. For it must be remembered that out of the 8 million inhabitants in Belgium there are, according to the census of December 12, 1921, only 3,300,000 French speaking people (the Walloons), while the Teutonic Flemish of northern Belgium amount to 3,800,000. The rest of the population, that is, nearly one million, is German (especially in the district detached from Germany in virtue of the Versailles Treaty). The Flemings are distinctly separatists, and their sympathies turn towards the Dutch, their ethnical brothers. Since the beginning of 1932 Belgium has been divided into two parts: a Walloon and a Flemish, with a third mixed region including Brussels. According to this territorial division, the languages in the army and administration are Flemish or French. Eupen and Malmedy retain German as the official language.² It is believed that the main obstacles to a reunion of the Flemings with Holland are economic. There are, however, in spite of great antagonism of the Flemings to the French speaking sections and the French in general, no sympathies on their part toward Germany. The memories of the World War are still alive. On the other hand, considering the power of the Flemings and their aversion to the French, it is to be asked whether France might count on Belgium, if France were

² *Le Temps*, March 4, 1932.

drawn into a conflict with Germany on Eastern problems, that is, in a case where no pretext of German aggression could be given. The possibility of Flemish secession and union with Holland would give pause to the Walloon French sympathizers.

The Belgian army mobilized for war is 600,000 strong.

The Eastern Allies

The erection of new states in Europe or the aggrandizement of small ones, already existing, was partially a consequence of the Wilsonian principle of self-determination. From the French point of view, however, the significance of their existence lay in the fact that they broke up the block of the Central Powers. In order to assure their enmity against Germany and the other defeated states, the new states were allowed to acquire huge territories with populations which constituted an ethnic unit with the defeated peoples. It may be assumed that the same French craving for sure allies inspired the solution of the Polish outlet to the sea. The " Corridor " was traced along the Vistula, thus cutting Germany into two pieces, while it could well have been drawn to the mouth of the Niemen, along the German-Lithuanian frontier. The German-Polish antagonism seemed to be thus assured. Poland is economically a logical complement to Germany, since Poland is predominantly agricultural and Germany predominantly industrial. But the dispute over the Corridor, com-

bined with Poland's political alliance with France, has prevented an economic (and political) rapprochement with Germany; even a trade treaty between the two countries has hung fire for years. The situation is similar in Southeastern and Central Europe, where the Little Entente on one side and Germany, Austria, Hungary, Bulgaria, and even Turkey on the other, are unable to come to an economic or political agreement. And this is exactly the situation between those states which could complement each other economically. The huge territories populated with discontented peoples are a source of great political trouble and even military weakness for the new states. One-third of their populations antagonize the states whose subjects they became through the peace treaties. They are the so-called "minorities."

Figures for the populations of the states allied to France and their respective divisions into majorities and minorities will be given here from the compilations of Joseph S. Roucek, who, being a Czech, represents the point of view of the majorities.³

Counties	Majority	Minority
Poland	17,667,000	9,547,770
Czechoslovakia	8,760,000	4,844,000
Yugoslavia	9,971,600	2,160,100
Rumania	11,576,000	6,240,600
Total of eastern allies of France	47,974,600	22,792,470

³ Joseph S. Roucek, *The Working of the Minorities System Under the League of Nations*, Prague, 1929, pp. 15-17.

As can be seen, the eastern allies of France represent a powerful group of 70 million, the military power of which is enhanced by the relatively good equipment of their troops which are largely financed and organized by France. (The equipment of Rumania and Yugoslavia is still rather poor.) On the other hand, one-third of their population, hostile to their present political status, is not only backed by the irredenta of the defeated Central Powers, but also by Russia. Poland has a minority of nearly 6 million " Ukrainians " (in Galizia and Eastern Poland) ; and Bessarabia, belonging at present to Rumania, is populated mainly by the same race; while Czechoslovakia has also considerable trouble with her " Ukrainian " minorities. The Ukrainians are part of the Russian nation, and known for their nationalistic spirit. The fight between the Polish troops and Ukrainians in the beginning of 1932 was reported to have caused 10,000 casualties.⁴ Their " pacification " seems to have involved methods which were characterized by Lord Cecil in January, 1932, at Geneva as " shocking to the conscience of the world."⁵ The same, if not greater difficulties, are encountered by Poland with the German minorities. In cases like Upper Silesia, the problem is the more complicated, as the Germans have been the ruling class. They were the proprietors, directors, and engineers

⁴ *Manchester Guardian*, February 1, 1932.

⁵ *Ibid.*

of the industries and other economic organizations. They seem to be indispensable, or at least difficult to do without. The situation is similar with the German and Hungarian minorities included within the Little Entente states.

The problem of minorities is so well known that it is superfluous to examine it. It results mainly from the attempt of the new states to assimilate quickly the huge populations allotted to them by the treaties—a task disproportionate to their strength. In many cases, as with the German and Hungarian minorities, the new states have to face the problem of assimilating races, politically and economically more highly developed than themselves. What the new states fail to achieve by pacific methods, they attempt to do by force and pressure. This has results quite the opposite from those desired. In the case of the Bulgarian (Macedonian) minority in Yugoslavia the result is mutual homicide.⁶

In Yugoslavia, where although the minorities are relatively less numerous, there arose the separatist movement of the Croats and Slovenes, about two-thirds as large as the total majority population. It resulted in killing of the parliamentary leaders of the Croats and in the establishment of dictatorship in Yugoslavia. The Yugoslavs, who alone of the eastern allies of France are supposed to have real military virtues, which they proved during the World War, are divided into two camps bitterly opposing each

⁶ *London Times*, January 22, 1932.

other. No Croat or Slovene is admitted to commanding positions in the army.

The disruption of the economic unity of Central Europe (comprising Germany and present-day Austria as industrial states, Hungary, Rumania, Yugoslavia, Poland and Bulgaria as agricultural states and Czechoslovakia as both agricultural and industrial) is not unpunished. All these Central European countries, for or against the treaty, are facing economic ruin. Czechoslovakia is the best off. But everywhere communism is rumbling; economic and political dissatisfaction is growing. Some of these countries have ceased to pay their debts and proclaimed a moratorium. Others are about to follow suit.

In all these countries there is great distress. The standard of living of the wage-earners has fallen almost below a human level, and in many places the peasants, even those who own their land but cannot export, are returning to the primitive method of barter, exchanging the products of their farms for goods which local traders can supply. Money has become devaluated or entirely missing.

As to Yugoslavia, for example, Stephen Graham writes in the *Manchester Guardian*:

The Government is nervous as to the doings of the Communists. Anti-Communism has been aggravated by the bomb outrages on the trains. How nervous the police are about the trains may be judged by the fact that when one evening I was walking up and down the platform at Ljubljana waiting for a train an official came up to me and told me that was forbidden. I must stand in one place. And as though it were

a symbol of Europe's paralysis, there are no longer any through trains to Yugo-Slavia. No foreign railway carriage is allowed to enter the country for fear that it may be bringing hidden explosives.⁷

Practically the whole of Central and Southeastern Europe is a paralyzed part of the world. And still politics predominate over economic considerations.

The great military power of the eastern allies of France is threatened by two inner disintegrating forces: the minority problem, and the communist danger, the latter being the consequence of economic distress and the proximity of Soviet Russia. In all of them, except Czechoslovakia, which is soundest economically speaking, dictatorships relying solely on military force have been established. National minorities and communists must be held down with an iron hand.

The armies of the eastern allies of France are as follows (1930-1931):

	Poland	Rumania	Yugo-slavia	Czecho-Slovakia
Officers	18,000	15,000	7,500	10,000
Non-commissioned officers..	37,000	25,000	8,500	15,000
Privates in standing army..	220,000	150,000	95,000	116,000
Total standing army.	275,000	190,000	180,000	141,000
Trained reserves about . . .	3,200,000	1,200,000	1,000,000	1,000,000
Total forces in war.	3,475,000	1,390,000	1,180,000	1,141,000
Warplanes.	1,000	500	450	1,000
Light artillery.	3,450	2,050	1,750	1,500
Heavy artillery.	736	175	250	600
Tanks.	350	(?) 200	50	?
Machine guns.	34,000	14,000	9,000	21,000

As the above table shows, the greatest military power of these states is Poland.

⁷ *Manchester Guardian*, December 31, 1931.

The total war forces of the eastern allies of France would be about 7 million men. But, taking into consideration the hostile minorities, this war power will be considerably less. The best case for the Alliance must be viewed in the instance where it does *not* have to count on the cooperation of these recalcitrant nationalities. Another possible paralyzing factor to be considered is the attitude of the Croats and Slovenes in Yugoslavia, composing two-thirds of the Yugoslavian majority. Thus, even leaving out of consideration the minorities (which form one-third of the population) and ignoring the attitude of the Croats and Slovenes, we may count upon a military force of about 5 million men. Nor have we taken into account the presumably strong communistic element.

With this rather arbitrary calculation we arrive at the conclusion that the French military alliance system, if working to its full extent, would command over 11 or 12 million men. The morale and fighting value, however, of the eastern allies may be considered at present as more than questionable.

AUSTRIA, HUNGARY, BULGARIA, AND TURKEY

Insofar as this chain of defeated states would serve as an auxiliary force in case the Great Powers draw Europe into another general conflagration, they would not prove a negligible quantity; hence the diplomatic efforts of the several powers to extend their spheres of influence over them.

The military virtues displayed by Hungarians during the World War made them the assault troops of the Central Powers. Bulgaria as a military nation does not lag behind Hungary, and Turkey demonstrated her efficiency by changing the 1919 Treaty of Sevres into that of Lausanne, when she emerged liberated from the second-rate sovereignty status imposed on the vanquished of the World War. Austria is industrially highly developed, and her man material is good. None of these states need to trouble about minority problems, but might all hope to organize help from the minorities in their neighbor countries, the conquerors. How far the *irridenta* sentiment will prove effective it is impossible to predict. Without considering such evident cases as the Macedonian minority in Yugoslavia, which, since the peace treaties, has not ceased to cause military trouble to the conqueror state, it seems that the attitude of the subjected nationalities will prove a source of assistance to the formerly defeated states which is not to be ignored.

The four allies of Germany in the World War have a combined population of about 35 millions, Austria with 7, Hungary with 8.7, Bulgaria with 5.8, and Turkey with 14 millions. The armaments of these states were limited in the peace treaties to negligible quantities. Turkey freed herself from these obligations after the war waged by Kemal Pasha in 1922 and has at present a mobilizable force in war time of about 1,500,000 men.⁸ The equipment of these

⁸ Colonel von Oertzen, *op. cit.*, p. 164.

troops, however, is incomplete, due to the limited financial means of the country. While Turkey is training her man material *de jure*, the others do so partially, *de facto*. Contrary to the character of the private associations in Germany, those of Austria have a military character. Taking as a basis the admission of their leader, Prince Starhemberg, 300,000 men for the Nationalists (Heimwehren, etc.) associations would not be a too high figure.⁹ The troops of the socialists could be put at 200,000. The strong regular army of 30,000 men are crack troops.

Hungary has built up her armaments under the protection of Italy.¹⁰ The immediately mobilizable forces of Hungary were put by the French General Bourgeois at 300,000, and of this number eight divisions are alleged to be storm troops of the very best quality.¹¹ Though the accuracy of the figures of the writer in the French General Staff's paper may be questioned, there is no doubt of the fact that

⁹ *Le Temps*, October 3, 1931.

¹⁰ This fact was revealed to the public on January 1, 1928, by the case of St. Gotthard, when in this town on the Austro-Hungarian frontier the Austrian customs officer discovered a consignment of 2,000 machine guns from Italy to Hungary. The affair was brought by the Little Entente before the League of Nations asking an investigation of the state of armaments on Hungarian territory. In the Council, however, Great Britain and Italy opposed the steps ("Petit Parisien," March 30, 1928). The Italian press called the Little Entente "cowardly" in attempting the one-sided disarmament of the small Hungary. See *Giornale d'Italia*, February 25, 1928. After this Italian contempt for the peace treaty, Mussolini declared the necessity of its revision. *Le Temps*, March 30, 1928.

¹¹ *Echo de Paris*, January 18, 1932.

the psychological tension caused by prescriptions of one-sided disarmament results in efforts towards secret armaments. It is difficult to say, however, how far the war capacity of Hungary is exceeding the figures laid down in the treaty of Trianon. It is only to be kept in mind that the population of post-war Hungary, near to 9 million, is a factor to be counted with in Central Europe. Whatever internal differences may divide the Hungarian nation, it is a fanatically united force as regards regaining its equality of sovereignty, called by Hungarians "liberty." This nation, defeated and destroyed by the Mongols under Gengis Khan, invaded for a century by the Turks, later under the domination of Austria, and invaded by Russians, has always regained in the shortest time, in consequence of its political and military qualities, liberty and power. It is because of those qualities that in 1920 the director of the French Foreign office, M. Paleologue, tried to bring Hungary into the system of the French Alliance against Soviet Russia, forming with Poland and Rumania a "*cordon sanitairc*." The price for such an alignment considered by Paleologue was certain adjustments of boundaries which would have returned to Hungary some territories populated principally by Hungarians. The plan failed to materialize on account of the opposition of Czechoslovakia.¹²

As to Bulgaria, with a population of nearly 6 million, arming is considered an open secret. Here again,

¹² A. Dami, *op. cit.*, p. 26.

the tension is enhanced by the circumstance that legally she is not permitted to arm. The consequence is a revolt of national conscience against the inequality of status in sovereignty. Bulgaria is supposed to have 600,000 trained men, and the fighting qualities of this people are known through the activities of the Macedonian " revolutionists " in Yugoslavia.

It would not be an exaggeration to estimate the total military forces of these defeated states in case of war at 3 million men.¹³ The equipment of the troops would probably be in many cases incomplete, partially because of financial stringency and partially because secret arming imposes certain restrictions which do not allow the full exploitation of the "*potentiel de guerre*." Furthermore, the economic misery and social distress in Austria, Hungary, and Bulgaria loosen the discipline of the populations. It may be, however, that the resulting embitterment exploited by the nationalists (as in the case of Hitler in Germany), may add to the spirit of rebellion against the peace treaties, which, rightly or wrongly, are accounted in great part responsible for economic ills.

Assuming the hypothesis that the above-mentioned states would side with the revisionists (Italy and Germany), the odds in favor of the *status quo* would be:

France and her allies.	11-12 million men
Revisionists.	9 million men.

¹³ This number represents only about 8 per cent of the combined populations. France, not counting the colored troops, like Italy and Poland, can mobilize over 12 per cent of her people.

Besides the higher figures, the *status quo* bloc commands equipment of higher quality. However, the difference does not seem so enormous, especially if one takes into account the internal political difficulties of the eastern allies of France. In the summer of 1931 a high French officer remarked to the writer, "We are stronger, but the great X in the equation is Russia."

RUSSIA

The attempt must be made to determine the role which may possibly be played by Russia in the balance of power in Europe. Within the border of the Soviet Union (satellite states excluded) there are 162 million people, with a yearly increase of population of about 3.1 millions. Russia covers one-sixth of the land surface of the globe, while her population embraces more than one-twelfth of the inhabitants. The inherent military strength of Russia maybe estimated from the fact that she was able to invade Germany and Austria-Hungary at the same time during the World War. Practically the whole Austro-Hungarian army and the greatest part of that of Germany (leaving in France entrenched defensive forces) were needed to push the Russian forces back. The defeat, if it is to be called that, came about through the revolution against the Czarist regime and civil war. This military strength, of course, is presumably effective only in the West, while in the Far East it may well be assumed that the Japanese could advance as far as the Baikal Lake. The Trans-

Siberian railroad, being one-tracked and the only communication, is not adequate for rushing sufficient troops to the Far East. On the other hand, a Japanese advance towards the West would encounter the same difficulties to an even greater extent. Thus, if Russia had to fight on two fronts, she would remain on the defensive in the East, leaving the Japanese attack to freeze around Lake Baikal and in the endless snow-fields of Siberia. A few hundred thousand men would suffice for this task.¹⁴ But she would throw in her armies of many millions on to the western front, against Poland and Rumania.

The mobilizable military forces of Russia are supposed by practically every military student to be well trained and well equipped. Their enthusiasm for Soviet aims and their fighting spirit are explained by the fact that they make up young Russia, and their enthusiasm is the basis of the system. The anti-communist elements are either the older generation or those in exile. There remains the problem, however, whether the economic situation of the country would admit of a prolonged war. It is not certain that this question is very pertinent. The western neighbors would probably be soon defeated, as Russia seems to have about double the military forces of those of all the French eastern allies combined. As the forces of these allies would be occupied—in case of a gen-

¹⁴ The Russian forces in the Far East during the Manchurian crisis, in the first half of the year 1932, were reported to be about 150,000 men.

eral conflagration—in other directions too, the citation of the odds of the Russians as two to one does not seem exaggerated. However, the man material of Russia exploited at present for military purposes is estimated at 5 per cent of the population,¹⁵ making about 8 million men. If we realize the fact that France (without the colonial troops) and Italy can send into the field over 12 per cent of their population, the possibility of increasing the Russian forces becomes evident. But it would take considerable time and effort to train and equip another 8 or 10 million men. Thus the economic factor must be considered in case of a prolonged war.

Economic Problems

The ambitious plan of the Soviet Government to exploit the unparalleled wealth of the Russian soil to an extent which approaches that of the United States requires such a transformation of social and economic conditions in the country that it must be left out of practical consideration. Whether or not future generations will arrive at this goal cannot interest the student of the present international situation. On the other hand, every economic development of the Soviet regime will augment the power of the fighting forces in comparison with those of the Czar. This will result either in keeping pace with the

¹⁵ Estimate of the U. S. War Department. See *Editorial Research Reports*, 1930, III, 511 ff.

neighbors, or in surpassing them, as the economic state of these neighbors is also in a most precarious condition.

The first Five Year Plan, at the expense of considerable sacrifices in the daily living standard of the population, has laid a broad foundation for the growth of projected large industries and large state and collective farms. The second Five Year Plan promises, besides further rapid growth of the Soviet production apparatus, a substantial improvement in the everyday standard of living.

The fantastic ambitions of the Five Year Plan naturally will not be realized. No one who knew about it expected this, but, in spite of its failure, there is a relatively great achievement. As Mr. Walter Duranty states, the program of 1931 was only a fraction more than half accomplished.¹⁶ There is a certain decline in comparison with the previous year, due mainly to the world's economic depression lowering the value of Russian exports needed for the purpose of industrial equipment.¹⁷

¹⁶ *New York Times*, November 29, 1931.

¹⁷ How the world depression has affected Soviet trade is indicated in a Moscow dispatch from the correspondent of *The New York Times* dated November 23, 1931. We learn from this dispatch that "the total export figures for the first nine months show that the Soviet Union exported 15,600,000 tons of goods with a value of \$300,000,000 and imported 2,500,000 tons of goods at a cost of \$405,000,000, leaving an adverse trade balance of \$105,000,000," which is about nine times as large as the adverse trade balance of 1930. The same dispatch says that the same nine months' period last year "showed exports of 1,000,000 fewer tons, but the value was \$70,000,000 greater, which shows what the world depression has done to Soviet trade."

Mr. Duranty speaks also of " the failure of each branch of transportation, coal, iron, and steel," pointing out that this reacts on the other branches and all four react on industry as a whole, especially on new construction, where desperate efforts have been needed to keep within a month or six weeks of the schedules. " New construction," he adds, " is further retarded by the decreased purchasing power abroad of Soviet exports, and certain cuts may be necessary in the rate of equipment, from both foreign and native sources, although it is asserted that the slowing down will not be greater than necessary to correspond with the delay on actual construction schedules." The main issue, however, is not that of keeping within the fantastic schedules. Retardation of a month or six weeks has no importance except a slight psychological one. But there are other issues to be considered.

Fundamentally these issues are: first, the establishment of discipline needed for modern production methods in both industry and agriculture, with corresponding technical education; second, the development of natural resources to make the country independent of foreign imports and thus successfully to resist foreign aggression, economic or military; third, the raising of living standards on material, cultural, and hygienic planes.¹⁸ And on every occasion and by

¹⁸ See 1932 edicts of the Central Committee of the Communist party and the speeches at the Congress of Osoaviakhim, which has 12,000,000 members, and the still more important Labor Federation Congress representing upward of 17,000,000 workers.

every device—publicity in the press, radio, and movies—the lesson is now being driven home to the Russian people that the Five Year Plan is not just a mechanical program but a method of transforming the whole life of the nation.¹⁹

¹⁹ M. Walter Duranty, Moscow correspondent of the *New York Times*, who is well known by his judicious reports, takes one of the descriptions of the Russian situation, as the most typical of those written by impartial foreigners. He writes:

"Take the opinion of Colonel Frederick Pope, president of the Nitrogen Engineering Company of New York, who for the past four years has been adviser to the Soviet chemical trust on the building of its huge plant at Berizniki, in the Urals, now nearing completion. He said: 'I signed a contract with the Russians reluctantly—I had the usual capitalist ideas about Bolsheviks and disliked and distrusted them. But I have changed my mind. I think they are fine people, honest, invincible and courageous, and I believe they will win through. I think America is making a grave mistake in not recognizing the U. S. S. R. and is losing a big business opportunity. I have paid four visits to Berizniki and watched it grow from bare fields somewhere on the edge of Siberia to a giant factory where 26,000 men are employed and living in a new town two miles from the plant.' That sounds good, but you should see that town. Modern stone houses with no indoor sanitation or running water. Unpaved streets, mud, dust, snowdrifts, stinks and no places of amusement. The food is mostly black bread and dried fish—once I saw a peasant selling wizened apples in the market for five rubles apiece and his sack was empty in 20 minutes. They are planning street car service to the factory. Meanwhile there is only one bus, so most of the men walk. The factory has a power station so up-to-date and elaborate that America might envy it—so up-to-date and elaborate that the Russians cannot run it. But they'll learn. I never saw people who work so hard and try so hard.

"Construction Chief Granowsky was a celebrated cavalry leader in the civil war, a strong, competent fellow but he never saw a factory **like** this before—and now he is building it. He gets things done **but** the whole system is hit or miss. They learn by doing it. This is **true from** top to bottom. Their chemical engineers are technically **efficient** but they **are** laboratory minded, not factory minded. **Until**

The scope of this study does not admit of examining in detail the problem which is treated already in a superabundant literature. Whether or not the ambitious program of the Soviets to treble their output in the second Five Year Plan, during which energies will be concentrated on increasing the production of consumers' goods (in the first Five Year Plan the aim was the establishment of the industrial equipment), will be realized is beside the point. It probably will not be. But the problem is, whether the power of Russia will or will not increase in proportion to that of its neighbors. In comparison with the economic power of the United States the Russians will be poor. But the aspect changes if we take into consideration that Rumania has no war industries whatsoever, that Poland's key industries are practically all in Upper Silesia, owned and managed by Germans and are proportionately insufficient, and that in both countries the economic and financial distress

recently the technical staff evaded or feared responsibility, but Stalin's speech last July made a great improvement.

"On my last two trips I found a world of difference. The Russians have not yet learned that time spent in cleaning up a plant will save time in completing and running it. It is not merely a question of building plants but running them, which requires eternal vigilance about detail which they lack. Yet I have no doubt of their success. Berizniki will run—badly at first, then better and finally smoothly because these people have will, energy and staying power which can't be beaten."

M. Duranty adds: "There briefly you have also the story of the great metallurgic plants of Magnitogorsk and Kuznetz or the Dnieper power dam or the coal mines and all the new factories of the Five Year Plan. It is everywhere the same—muddle, mess, hardship, learn as you go along and unflinching determination."

is overwhelming. Of all the eastern allies of France only Czechoslovakia has powerful "key-industries," and these are owned and managed mainly by the Bohemian Germans, on territories close to Germany.

It was, however, the very first effort of the Soviet Government to secure for itself war industries. This was put above all other considerations. They have been built up in Central Russia, principally in the Ural districts. They cannot be reached by enemy bombers. How far their effectiveness has grown may be seen by the output of war-planes, reaching actually 1,500 a year, supposed to be of high value as they are manufactured mainly by Germans and Italians.²⁰

The Soviet Army

The army's principal force is the incomparable man material which is trained on principles of the modern German field service.²¹ Up till now it has been assumed that 8 to 10 million men were trained in this way, serving in the standing army, the official figure of which is 563,000 (consisting of 29 divisions), or in the "territorial troops" of 41 divisions with an attached militia system. One million two hundred thousand men, mobilizable as trained combatants, leave the Red Army yearly.²² This means that in 10 years the mobilizable forces of

²⁰ *Le Temps*, March 30, 1932; *Dagens Nyheter* (Stockholm), March 29, 1932.

²¹ Reglementation of the field service of 1925 and 1929.

²² Colonel L. von Oertzen, *op. cit.*, p. 146.

Russia may be as high as 20 million men. Beside the term of service, which is one or two years, there is compulsory training for youths on a line similar to that in Italy. The difference is only that in the last stage of pre-military training instruction is given in machine gun shooting, chemical warfare, and regular field service, so that the recruits to the Red Army are considered as trained men. Military training is extended even to women. The compulsory military service of women in case of war was adopted by the law of September 23, 1925, but has been only since enforced on August 1, 1928.

On March 7, 1932, the Soviet army newspaper *Red Star* gave some interesting details regarding the women students in the Army Officers Colleges. The number of " student officers " of the female sex is progressively increasing. The same number of *Red-Star* tells us about the incorporation of 1 million women into the military organization " *Osoaviakim*," which provides for the training of militia reserves. The " *Osoaviakim* " has 12 million members. General R. P. Eideman, its commandant, calls it " the reserve Red Army."

The Soviet Government's own estimate of its military strength and fitness was recently given by L. M. Kaganovich, a member of the all-powerful Politburo, and, next to Joseph Stalin and Premier Molotoff, the strongest man in the Communist party of Russia.

To our enemies at home and abroad, Kaganovich said, we wish to state that our army is growing and becoming stronger

day by day. It consists of the working class, of the collectivized farm laborers, of the poor peasants. Our organized forces include 11,000,000 members of trade unions, 9,000,000 members of voluntary defense organizations, more than 1,000,000 delegates to the Soviets, 5,000,000 members of the League of Communist Youth and 4,000,000 pioneers. The leaders of this army are 2,000,000 members of the Communist party, the best organized proletarian party in the world.²³

January 15, 1932, in the Foreign Affairs and Army Committees of the French Senate General Bourgeois gave an account of a second Russian standing army between the Ural Mountains and Western Siberia as comprising 1 million men.²⁴

The first "wave," in the immediately mobilizable Russian army, is considered to be from 3,600,000 to 4,000,000 men. Naturally, with the defective transportation system their marching up would be not much faster than that of the Czar's army in 1914.

The air force seems to be of high quality. Italy sends most of the hydroplanes, Holland and Czechoslovakia the land planes.²⁵ Of these latter, however, the bulk is of home production, often mounted with the British Jupiter motors. The Russian air force is supposed to be numerically the greatest in Europe, after that of France.

Besides the Far East, from which side no vital parts of Russia can be attacked, there are open only the Rumanian and Polish frontiers. The majority of

²³ Cited from E. Tobenkin, "The Soviets prepare for war," *Current History*, June 1932, p. 275.

²⁴ *London Times*, January 16, 1932.

²⁸ *he Temps*, March 30, 1932.

the Soviet divisions are garrisoned in these frontier provinces near to Rumania and Poland.

The equipment of the Red Army, insofar as the first " wave " is concerned, seems to be assured and of good quality, but that of the great masses of further mobilizable reserves seems to be more than questionable.

Colonel E. A. Powell asserts that Soviet Russia has the most efficient and far-flung intelligence service of all the powers.²⁶ This assumption is based on the fact that the Soviets have their followers in all military organizations and war factories. Especially strong is the position of the Communists in Yugoslavia, Rumania and Poland, despite the war waged upon them by the dictatorships. On the other hand, the Red Army seems to be enthusiastic and extremely well disciplined.²⁷ There is little doubt that the western neighbors of Russia would be crushed by the Soviet Army. Poland and Rumania with about 45 million inhabitants, more than one-third of them enemies to their states, with the two provinces on the Russian border, Bessarabia and Galicia, with a huge majority of Russian (Ukrainian) population continually causing armed trouble, will hardly be the bastions of the West against the Red Army. There are less than 30 million Poles and Rumanians against 162 million Russians. Of this 30 million resistance, the Rumanians showed themselves during the World

²⁶ Colonel Powell, *op. cit.*, p. 237.

²⁷ Colonel von Oertzen, *op. cit.*, p. 150.

War as lacking in the necessary fighting qualities. This was proverbial in the Central Powers, whose soldiers rejoiced at the news of their transportation to the Rumanian front. And there is no great prospect that Rumania and Poland will obtain substantial help elsewhere. The other powers will have their hands full. Against a developing Russia there would be only one rampart for western civilization, Germany. Even certain Polish Quarters recognize this awkward situation. The newspaper *Slovo*, which generally backs Marshal Pilsudski, wrote on December 31, 1931:

" There may come a moment when we will not demand the disarmament, but the rearmament of Germany, which is the force capable of checking the Russian Menace."

The unfortunate solution of the Polish Corridor, however, is apt to strain the relations of the two countries through suspicion and fear. As the French Nationalist, M. Gustave Herve, recommended, in exchange for an alteration in the shape of the western frontiers of Poland (by which change the Poles would not lose anything, as an outlet to the sea could be drawn on the Niemen), Germany could guarantee the eastern boundaries of Poland.²⁸ Unfortunately, the policy of the French Schneider-Creusot arms manufacturing firm does not cover the demand of M. Herve. It is this firm which encouraged with loans the Polish military and commercial investments

²⁸ G. Herve, *France-Allemagne. La Reconciliation ou la Guerre* (Paris, 1931).

in the Corridor.²⁹ Any change of the present German-Polish frontiers would be contrary to the line of least resistance. It would require that incredible thing, world policies directed by reason.

Similarly, in the Baltic Sea only the German fleet is capable of checking the Russian. The navy of Poland and those of the dwarf states on the Baltic are negligible quantities. The Russian fleet has a tonnage of 216,000, while the German is 115,000. It is generally assumed that other fleets may be prevented from entering the Baltic, as was the case from 1914 to 1918. Thus, at present, the German and the Russian navies are the only ones to face each other in that sea. As the Russians have to maintain out of this tonnage another fleet in the Black Sea, and, as the German naval qualities are first class, it may be assumed that the German fleet could cope at present with the Russian. But the Versailles Treaty prohibited the increase of the German tonnage, while Russia's hands are free. Sir Herbert Russel, the well known British naval expert and editor of the *Naval and Military Record*, has repeatedly expressed his opinion that, in the interest of European peace, it is necessary to have a strong German Baltic fleet which can check the Russian navy.³⁰

At present, however, Germany is at the mercy of any army which pleases to march into German territory, be it the Red Army, or the French, or both,

²⁹ *Foreign Policy Reports*, Vol. VII, No. 12, p. 238.

³⁰ *Naval and Military Record*, October 1, 1930.

which might choose Germany as a battlefield. Germany will thus be forced to take part on that side which promises it escape from this situation. And, however repulsive it may be to Germany, it is Russia who promises this.

DIPLOMATIC POSITION OF THE EASTERN POWERS

The Treaty of Versailles made out of Germany a useful pivot for Soviet foreign policy. Since Germany was not to be included on equal footing with the other powers in the new political structure of Europe, she chose to remain outside. The status of German sovereignty, which is felt by the Germans to deprive them of "independence and liberty," and the two main characteristics, one-sided disarmament and political payments exceeding war damages (thus exposing Germany to foreign interference for three generations), made Germany's reintegration in the European post-war system more than doubtful. Since 1922, when Germany and Russia concluded the Rapallo pact (April 16), the diplomatic and economic cooperation of the two states has never ceased. The third great power joining this group is Italy. The cooperation of the three is evident on the occasion of every international conference. It was Italy who with the help of Germany forced the invitation of Russia and Turkey to the conferences at Geneva on European economic cooperation. Russia and Turkey, not members of the League of Nations, but, strictly regarded, European states, had to be admitted despite

the opposition of France and her allies. At the disarmament conference in February 1932 it was Dino Grandi, the Italian Foreign Minister, who delivered those parts of Chancellor Bruening's address which the delicacy of Germany's position did not allow to be put forward by her own delegates. It was Signor Grandi who demanded the equality of sovereignty for Germany, proving Germany's right, and it was he who told the other powers—especially France—that, if they refused to adopt the German status of armaments, they would break their word given in the peace treaty. Thus, Chancellor Bruening was in the position of making a " mild " address and of winning the sympathies of world opinion. Then came Litvinoff, the Russian delegate, in a gratuitous but annihilating attack on the French thesis. He also attacked the French alliance system as contrary to the French doctrine of cooperation.³¹ In these debates the groups opposing each other took clear shape. The French position had its enforcement through M. Sato (Japan) and the delegate of the eastern allies of France. While these debates were going on in Geneva, M. Molotoff, the president of the Council of the People's Commissars (Soviet Premier), addressing the Soviet Trade Unions Congress, declared: " The plans of the Imperialists in the Far East are very closely connected with the plans of the General Staffs of some western states." The Paris Press, on the other hand, applauds

Tokyo's position in the Far Eastern conflict as the bulwark of the European *status quo*.³² The *Krasnaja Swesda*, organ of the Soviet War Council, draws attention to the editorial of *Le Temps* which appeared on November 10, 1931 and which invited Poland and Japan to cooperate in the face of Russia. The *Krasnaja Swesda*, says the article of the *Le Temps*, represents the policy of the Quai d'Or say.³³ A new combat on equality of disarmament (or armaments) occurred at Geneva on April 19, 1932, when the German position was heavily supported by Russia and Turkey, the French by Japan and the eastern allies of France, and M. Titulesco (Rumania) and M. Sato (Japan) put forward their "special geographical position." These respective positions may be observed in all important political movements. It is to be mentioned, however, that, at the disarmament conference, Germany's demand for equality had also, besides the regular support, that of Britain and the United States, lined up against the French and Japanese militaristic point of view. During the Memel conflict in the beginning of 1932 Poland and France came out for Lithuania, while it was especially Russia who took the part of Germany.³⁴

A conciliatory attitude of France toward Germany is a nightmare to the Soviets. The *Pravda* organ of the Soviet Foreign Office fears that France may command Poland to make an approach toward Ger-

³² *JWw York Times*, November 17, 1931.

³³ *Krasnaja Swesda*, November 16, 1931.

³⁴ *New York Times*, March 26, 1932.

many in order to line up the two against Russia.³⁵ The financial weakness of the revisionist bloc in Europe was considered by a Soviet spokesman a political setback for Russia.³⁶ What the Treaty of Versailles and Germany's freindship mean to the Soviets may be seen by an editorial in the organ of the Soviet Foreign Office. The " *Pravda* " of April 7, 1932, declared:

The Soviet Union enjoys the friendly feelings of great masses of the German people, as it did not recognize the " rapine-treaty " of Versailles imposed upon Germany. This friendly feeling of Germany is the obstacle to the organization of a Western anti-soviet front. It is this circumstance which induces certain interests to. compromise, at any price, the relations between the Soviet Union and the Reich.³⁷

These remarks appeared in the account of an attempt by two men, later condemned to death as Polish terrorists, to kill a German diplomat in Moscow. The verdict delivered by the Supreme Military Court in Moscow, on April 7, 1932, said that the crime had been committed by the gang of Leon Lioubarski, Polish subject, who came into Russia with diplomatic papers. The same group attempted to kill the German Ambassador in 1931, and then shot the Counselor of the German Embassy in order to break off the diplomatic relations between the Soviet Union and Germany.³⁸ The members of the gang were condemned to death for high treason and executed.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, November 7, 1931.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, December 30, 1931.

³⁷ *Le Temps*, April 24, 1932.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, April 8, 1932.

Kussia tries further to exploit the revisionism of the other ex-allies of Germany. The army newspaper the *Red Star*, in a leading article on April 10, 1932, attempted to prove that the Soviet Union and Germany have a common interest in the failure of the French Danubian scheme. The paper declared that France desires to rivet the Versailles system more firmly and at the same time to "extend her system of military alliances and create a second group of powers fronting the Soviet Union with the barbed wire entanglement of French interventionist schemes." The French plan, according to the *Red Star*, was designed not to cure the crisis, but to enslave still more the Danubian countries.³⁹

Bulgaria and Turkey are indeed friends of Russia. M. Stefanof, Bulgarian Minister of finances, negotiated at Berlin in November 1931 and concluded in January at Geneva with M. Litvinoff a commercial and political pact.⁴⁰ At the same time the Bulgarian Prime Minister, M. Mushanoff, visited Kemal Pasha in Angora, and this visit coincided with the renewal by M. Litvinoff and Tewfik Rushdi Bey of the Turco-Soviet Treaty of 1925. The *London Times* wrote on this occasion:

The French and Yugoslavian Ministers to Sofia did not hesitate to express their anxiety to the (Bulgarian) Prime Minister on the ground that there were rumors of the impending formation of a triple alliance between Greece, Bulgaria and Turkey, with the support of Italy and Soviet Russia.⁴¹

³⁹ *Manchester Guardian*, April 11, 1932.

⁴⁰ *Le Temps*, January 17, 1932.

⁴¹ *London Times*, November 10, 1931.

M. Mushanoff made an address at the dinner given in his honor by the Turkish premier in which he recalled the days of the Bulgaro-Turkish alliance and their heroic deeds during the great war, adding, however, that the same alliance should be devoted now to peaceful work.⁴² Russia's friendship with Turkey was further cemented by Foreign Commissar Litvinoff's visit to Angora in November, when Mustapha Kemal Pasha made sufficiently marked demonstrations in the visitor's honor to annoy considerably the rest of the diplomatic corps.⁴³ In April, 1932, Ismet Pasha, the Turkish Premier, visited Moscow. The Soviet celebrated his reception as though it were the return of a victorious Roman General. For the first time since the Soviets were in power, the St. George Hall in the Kremlin was used for a military reception to a foreigner. The celebration was performed with great pomp and was attended by hundreds of thousands. The Turkish premier declared, " This friendship is secure," and said that it was " the outgrowth of the common interests and aspirations of the two nations." ⁴⁴

At the Balkan Conference in Constantinople, October, 1931, on one side stood Rumania and Yugoslavia, fully satisfied with the territories which the Great War brought them; at the other extreme were Bulgaria and Albania, objecting to the Peace Treaties and asking better treatment for the minorities;

⁴² *Le Temps*, December 5, 1931.

⁴³ *New York Times*, December 30, 1931.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, April 29, 1932.

while in the middle stood Turkey as peace-maker.⁴⁵ The military outpost of Italy in the Balkans is Albania, which with Hungary and Bulgaria, encircles Yugoslavia, Italy's Adriatic antagonist. Turkey had a hard time and finally failed to draw together the Balkan nations, two of which, Yugoslavia and Rumania, are under French control. Turkey also attempted to effect a reconciliation between Rumania and Russia, and, in January, 1932, invited representatives of both countries to visit Angora. But Rumania, on French protest, refused to choose Angora as the place for negotiations. It was at the same time that Italy and Turkey came to a definite political agreement. The Rumanian negotiations with Russia for a non-aggression pact failed at Warsaw, as Russia refused to recognize Bessarabia as a Rumanian province.⁴⁶ Turkey is considered in the Balkans as

⁴⁵ *London Times*, October 27, 1931.

⁴⁶ *New York Times*, January 28, 1932. Russia concluded with Poland and France and several other states, on the eve of the disarmament conference, a whole series of pacts of non-aggression. The French nationalist press denounced these non-aggression pacts as a sham worked out by Germany and Russia to impress the Geneva conference. Poland seems to have concluded the pact upon the pressure from Paris, as in large circles of the French population the French guarantee of the Polish frontiers and the money spent on it were regarded as too heavy a sacrifice. Poland had to concede on all points to Russia, as for instance to the condition that Russia sign a similar pact with Rumania, and also to the guarantee by Russia of the Polish western frontiers, and to an arbitration treaty. It was simply a non-aggression pact, which seemed to Russia welcome as propaganda at Geneva and as giving time to build up Russian economy, while facing Japan. The French Nationalist government, on the other hand, enhanced its prestige and that of the *status quo* order in Europe

a peace-maker, since her interests are rather to neutralize the prevailing enmities. The reasons which made Turkey turn towards Italy and Russia are the demilitarization of the Straits and the loss of Syria, occupied by France. The French troops had a difficult time conquering the Syrian revolts in 1925.

In the main, however, Turkey continues to look towards Asia. She eliminated the differences with Persia about the Kurd tribes and now enjoys cordial relations with her eastern neighbor. Turkish economic and financial influence, under the leadership of Turkish banks, is growing in Teheran and Bagdad. The rapprochement between Iraq and Turkey was made at the initiation of the former and resulted in close ties in 1931, especially after the visit to Bagdad of Tewfik Rushdi Bey, Turkish foreign minister. The mandate over Iraq was abandoned by Britain in January, 1932, and Lord Cecil at Geneva promoted not only the liberty of Iraq, but helped Iraq to special commercial agreements with Turkey.⁴⁷

The resultant friendly relations between Britain and Turkey is in marked contrast to the Franco-Turkish tension. Turkey comes into ever closer ties with the neighboring small Near Eastern Mohammedan states.⁴⁸ Abbas Hilmi Pasha, who, it is supposed before public opinion. Russia hoped to get money, France to sell something; but generally the Russians took the non-aggression pact seriously, after the conclusion of which Premier Molotoff accused, before the public, the neighbor General Staffs of planning war on Russia.

⁴⁷ *London Times*, January 29, 1932.

⁴⁸ Political and economic agreement with Fejssal in January 1932.

posed, will become King of Syria, went in January, 1932, to Angora for long conversations with Mustafa Kemal. It seems that Britain desires to strengthen Turkey as she did during the nineteenth century, but France antagonizes her in respect to Syria. Hence the Turko-Italian friendship. On the other hand, Turkey would be defenseless from the Caucasus against Russia, but Russia desires cooperation with Angora, as the Turkish position in the Straits could bar a French naval attack in the Black Sea. Thus, as between Russia and France, Turkey chose the former. Turkey has no interest in seeing allied states of France in the Balkans. The Turkish navy is built up by Italy. On the other hand, the Russo-Italian cooperation is not limited to the agreement of the Italian government to guarantee payment for Italian goods exported to Russia or to diplomatic assistance. It went to the extent that, during the visit in Italy of Admiral Douchenof, Chief of Staff of the Russian Black Sea Fleet, an agreement was concluded between the two governments providing for technical naval collaboration. Experts of the navies are exchanged, and Russians are trained in Italy.⁴⁹ This seems to be a counter-check to the strict cooperation of the General Staffs of the eastern allies of France, and the organization of their military forces by the French General Staff, which began in Czechoslovakia and Poland under General Weygand in 1919-1920.⁸⁰

⁴⁹ *Le Temps*, March 30, 1932.

⁵⁰ There are periodical reunions of the army leaders of the Little Entente. On December 9, 1931 such a one was held in Prague in the

The revisionist network has naturally been extended to Bulgaria. In July, 1929, an Italian naval and air squadron paid Bulgaria a visit of courtesy in the course of which General Italo Balbo, Italian Minister of the Air Forces, made a speech encouraging Bulgaria to renew claims to Yugoslav-Macedonia.⁵¹ In January the Military Club at Sofia received the representative of Hitler with great enthusiasm, and the head of the Bulgaria State Church declared himself a fascist.⁵²

The Macedonian revolutionary organization recently held a congress at Ruen (Bulgaria) and decided not to limit the organized revolts and armed actions to that part of Yugoslavia which was taken from Bulgaria by the Peace Treaty, but to extend its activities to the whole territory of Yugoslavia.⁵³ Hungary concluded an alliance with Italy on April 5, 1927. Since that time Italy has given Hungary great diplomatic aid.

Russia's aim at present is neither to wage wars nor to ferment revolutions abroad, but to strengthen her economic life. In her diplomatic activity she does not work with revolutionary aims, as she did at the beginning of the Soviet Regime, but by a policy of co-operation and by the conclusion of treaties which may grow into hard and fast military alliances. Her

quarters of the Czechoslovakian General Staff; the Rumanian Chief of Staff, General Samsonovic, and the Yugoslavian Chief of Staff, General Milanovic, attended with their respective technical aides.

⁵¹ *New York Times*, July 9, 1929.

⁵² *Le Temps*, January 17, 1932.

" *Ibid.*, April 27, 1932.

method is similar to that employed by France and Russia in their military pacts concluded against Germany before the World War, which disregarded differences in internal political structures and did not let the Czar's displeasure with Democratic France (for giving refuge to Russian anarchists and socialists) frustrate ulterior political aims.

This is the case of present day Russia and other powers. But the dictators in the Chigi Palace and the Kremlin have this in common: both are hardboiled realists, both know where they are going and do not greatly care how they get there. The domination of France over the European continent led Italy into cooperation with Russia. Italy is far from Russia and does not seem to be afraid of Communism. The position of Germany is somewhat different. She is not so keen for a Russian alliance, which would be considered a step of despair.

Italy is coming out for Germany on every occasion. On June 5, 1928, Mussolini demanded the revision of the Versailles Treaty before the Senate. On October 25, 1931, Mussolini declared in Naples that "it is impossible to talk about a reconstruction of Europe if certain clauses of the Peace Treaties, which brought the peoples of Europe to the brink of despair and material disaster, are not changed." He demanded also the correction, of certain "territorial absurdities," alluding to Danzig, Hungary and Macedonia. "And can it be said there is legal equality among nations," he asked, "when on one side they

are armed to the teeth and on the other they are condemned to be unarmed? These were the ideas which concern true peace and which cannot be disassociated from justice otherwise it would be based on vengeance, rancor and fear." Signor Grandi openly rallied to the side of Germany and absolutely supported the German thesis at the Geneva disarmament conference. In the *Popolo d'Italia* (January 11, 1932) Mussolini wrote an article entitled " Close the tragic account of war," demanding cancellation of the German political payments and war debts in general. The Grand Council presided over by Mussolini passed a resolution on April 9, 1932, the first point of which demanded the renunciation of reparations and the cancellation of war debts. The fourth point of the resolution declared that " there must be a revision of those clauses of the peace treaties which bear in themselves the seeds of new war and disquiet among the nations." On the same day, Chancellor Bruening in Koenigsberg (the old capital of the Prussian kings and now severed from Germany by the Danzig Corridor), asked the German people to unite behind Hindenburg, if for nothing else but for the fight for Germany's *liberty*." But Germany's position is not similar to that of Italy. It knows well that " war for liberty " would mean a great war of nations on German soil and the certain destruction of Germany, and, even if its group would come out victorious, Russian Communism would be the real conqueror. Chan-

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, April 11, 1932.

cellor Bruening, the Catholic leader, looks beyond all the daily struggle toward an eventual understanding with France. The Hitlerites themselves see as the aim of their internal policy the breaking down of Bolshevism. Will they ally with the Soviets! If they do so it will only be with great reluctance.

Though Russia does not desire war until she is economically strengthened, the Bolsheviki are arousing the whole nation to the danger of war, and latest reports declare that "intense preparations" are being made to instruct every able-bodied man, woman, and child in Russia in the handling of rifles, machine guns, and bombs. "An almost feverish military spirit" was reported in Russia during the 1932 May Day celebrations, and General Vissili Bluecher, commander of the Red Army in Siberia, said to his troops: "'The flames of war are beginning to flicker near our frontiers. We know the capitalist world wants war and is ready to choke the hated Soviet Union.'"⁵⁵

If the state of political and economic anarchy be not appeased, the catastrophists of the left and the right may have their day in Europe. Trotzky, in his exile said in the spring of 1932; "The Key of the world situation is at present not at Mukden, but at Berlin."

⁵⁵ *New York Times*, May 9, 1932.

BRITISH POLICY

British policy toward Europe since the war has been determined mainly by the desire for reconstruction. This aim has been dictated by political reasons, such as the old balance of power theory, and by the economic motive, that is to say, the revival of British trade with the Continent. The fact that both official Britain and British public opinion, the first in a veiled, the second in an open way, came out in 1931-1932 against the two fundamental provisions of the Versailles Treaty, one-sided disarmament and political payments, is not astonishing. It is the same orientation of Britain which made her violently oppose the French occupation of the Ruhr. Ramsay MacDonald's letter to Poincare in February, 1924, discloses partially the underlying anxieties: "The people of this country regard with anxiety what appears to them to be the determination of France to ruin Germany and to dominate the continent without consideration of our reasonable interests and of future consequences to European settlement." He referred to the apprehension caused in England by "the large military and aerial establishments maintained not only in eastern but also in western France."⁵⁶ It is the same attitude which led the British Admiral Richmond to pronounce a veiled threat against France, admitting the possibility of the resumption of German submarine building in case

⁵⁶ Sir Arthur Willert (Chief of the Press Bureau of the British Foreign Office), *Aspects of British Foreign Policy* (New Haven, 1928).

the French submarines, a danger to the British fleet, should not be scrapped.⁵⁷ At the disarmament conference the British Foreign Minister came out for "equality in security," which is the German thesis, and joined the German front against France. Viscount Cecil has repeatedly urged equality of armaments (or disarmament) for Germany and abolishment of the "aggressive" weapons to which France clings and which were forbidden to Germany.⁵⁸ Field Marshal Lord Robertson declared in Albert Hall on July 7, 1931, that the "great danger of protraction of disarmament is its effect on Germany," and added that "one cannot expect that it will support for long this humiliation." It is the same argument which was used by Admiral Richmond later; namely, that the effort of Germany "to recover her security"—called by the *London Times* "the most natural and reasonable of German demands"—"would involve Europe in another great war."⁵⁹ He takes for granted that Germany would be supported by Russia; and to avoid just this result Sir Herbert Russel, the British naval expert, has gone so far as to ask for a strong German fleet to oppose Russia.⁶⁰ Both Stanley Baldwin, the conservative leader, and MacDonald oppose the French view on reparations. So, too, does Mr. Neville Chamberlain, Chancellor

⁵⁷ *London Times*, February 11, 1932.

⁵⁸ *New York Times*, December 22, 1931; *Foreign Affairs*, October 1931, pp. 21-22.

⁵⁹ *London Times*, February 11, 1932.

⁶⁰ *Naval and Military Record*, October 1, 1930.

of the Exchequer, who asks the "subordination of political ambitions and prejudices to considerations which are of importance to humanity."⁶¹ These are words similar to those used by Chancellor Bruening. Sir Walter Layton, the British representative on the Basle Financial Expert Committee on Reparations, says with reference to reparations:

It would be highly desirable if the slate were wiped clean because of the removing of a long-drawn-out source of irritation and a sense of war psychology. If it were done by agreement it would repay itself a thousandfold, and if France wants to make her position really secure the best thing she can possibly do is to take the lead and either wipe out the reparations liability or make it a nominal pound a year.⁶²

The fact that Great Britain does not see good prospects for peace in the present status quo of Europe is evident from the circumstance that while it guaranteed the inviolability of the Franco-German frontier it refused to do the same for the Polish-German boundaries. As pointed out by Sir Arthur Willert, the head of the Foreign Office Press Bureau, British opinion on this point is "so definite that it was obviously no use arguing with it." "It had to be accepted" he added, "as a fixed point in the evolution of our foreign policy."⁶³ Responsibility for maintaining the Polish-German frontier was opposed not only by the Dominions, which felt that it involved an unnecessary increase of British commitments in

⁶¹ *New York Times*, May 11, 1932.

⁶² *Manchester Guardian*, January 14, 1932.

⁶³ Sir Arthur Willert, *op. cit.*, p. 58.

Europe, but it was also rejected "vigorously at home."⁶⁴ The *London Times*, semi-official organ of the Foreign Office, writes on the French proposals at Geneva: "The Tardieu scheme is oppressive. Its purpose is the permanent enforcement of the European conditions established by the Peace Treaties."⁶⁵

British willingness to cancel German political payments is, in the first place, motivated by the desire for economic reconstruction. Germany's purchasing power is of vital interest to British trade. Further, England has great investments in Germany and Central Europe, and there is also the question of balance of power, still more evidently revealed in the British demand for equality for Germany in armaments. From this trend of British policy may be drawn the primary conclusion that England wishes to check too great an ascendancy of French power. But, taking into consideration the fact that equality in armaments may result in German superiority, which cannot be desirable to England, it seems that we must go further in exploring the British aims. A clue is given to the solution if we consider Russia as a danger to British interests. There is "evidence of Russian intrigue and propaganda against our (British) interests in India, Persia, Turkestan and Afghanistan," writes Sir Arthur Willert.⁶⁶ And thus may come the second conclusion: England wants to

⁶⁴ Sir Arthur Willert, *op. cit.*, p. 59.

⁶⁵ March 18, 1932.

⁶⁶ Sir Arthur Willert, *op. cit.*, p. 113.

see Germany as a checkmate to Russia. Hence, the demand of the British naval experts for opposing the Russian navy with a strong German fleet. And hence the fear of the British naval and military leaders that Germany, if not allowed to recover her security, may throw herself into the arms of Russia. In this case they fear that Russia, Germany and Italy will later become an irresistible combination in Europe, involving the breakdown of the balance of power. But, if Germany regains her security she will refuse to cooperate with the Soviets; the guarantee for this is provided by the circumstance that the German military element hates communism. Only a policy of despair can drive the German nationalists to work for a Russian victory, which, taking into consideration the proximity of Russia and the power of the German socialists and communists, would be fatal to the interests of the leading class in Germany. On the other hand, if Germany does not go with Russia, she cannot go against France. This is natural, as, in case of a German war against France, the Russians would attack Poland; this would mean Russia's advance to the German frontier, injuring Germany even as ally and threatening her in the future. But this would be a favorable situation for Germany as compared with the possibility of Russia siding with France. German interests would be much better served by economic cooperation with Central Europe (Poland included)—a process which will be natural if France has no longer the power to restrain her. This eco-

conomic cooperation, which is—as we have seen in the earlier parts of this study—the natural solution of the economic problems of Europe, would mean that Germany's interests be extended to the states on the western frontier of Eussia. In this case Germany would face the Soviet Union. It seems that this solution would satisfy the English demand for prosperity in Central Europe, also for a fair balance of powers on the Continent, equalized sufficiently to assure British political influence without using her army, which would not mean much in a great war in which Germany would lead Russia and Italy.

The British policy, which perhaps will assume clearer shape in future years, probably will only be evident, as is generally the case, when an actual crisis emerges. Whatever her aims are—probably they are not yet clear to the British Foreign Office itself—it is a fact that Britain is helping Germany to get rid of reparation payments and of the military inequality imposed upon her by the Versailles Treaty. Nevertheless, it would be rash to state that England is in intimate cooperation with Germany or even that there are signs of some sort of alliance. France's power in the western part of Europe is unchallenged, and this circumstance is the primary factor upon which the English count. Russia is still a doubtful quantity and would hardly come into consideration as a possible British ally. Britain does not desire in any event to secure a balance of power by strengthening Russia. To oppose France with

only debilitated Germany, perhaps Italy included, is also not very promising in view of the dominant financial and military position of France.

It is a certain principle of conservative foreign policy that, when another power is too strong to oppose, discretion dictates the wisdom of a bargain and association with that power as preferable to a doubtful opposition. There is even a certain group of Conservatives, represented by Sir Austen Chamberlain, who have a hidden but vigorous hatred against Germany.⁶⁷

Further, the dominant Tory school of thought has not a very great interest in Europe; its field of action is the Empire. Perhaps it would allow the French to do as they please if it could get a "deal" from them over such matters as British coal exports and French help in thawing out the frozen credits in Central Europe, which would involve cancellation of reparations and French loans to the broken countries.

Against this limited realism, however, there are not only the elements concerned with a far-sighted

⁶⁷ The secret naval agreement of France and Britain concluded by Sir Austen and put aside in consequence of its revelation in 1928, and the consternation it caused in the United States, Italy and Germany, was a product of this group. The secret treaty assured British naval supremacy on the one hand, and on the other French Military supremacy on the Continent, by agreeing to the French disarmament scheme in which the trained reserves are not counted in fixing the strength of armies. As Germany has no trained reserves, while France's main power lies in them, it would have guaranteed French domination—at least until Russia and Italy help Germany out of the situation.

policy—we have earlier cited some of them—but also the mass of the nation, which sympathizes with Germany and considers present day Europe as full of dangerous problems. How far British public opinion went in forgetting the last vestiges of ill will towards Germany could be seen from the declaration of the Archbishop of York at Geneva at the opening of the Disarmament Conference in 1932, in which he said that the war-guilt clause of the Versailles Treaty " offends the Christian conscience."

After all is said and done, the best conclusion on the British attitude may lie in assuming that, in case of a conflict Britain can not be counted on with either side, especially in view of the attitude of her Dominions and India. As the great conflict would be waged on the Continent, her military help would not be decisive in any event. She has enough to do with her Dominions and Colonies. On the other hand, the English have given Germany certain diplomatic help, and there is a powerful tendency in England to demand Germany's rehabilitation in a political, economic and military sense, without which European peace seems to her to be endangered.

CHAPTER V

THE POSSIBLE WAR

As practically every student of the European situation admits, a new general conflagration in Europe is not a remote probability. There are a number of danger spots in Europe. Let us take only one sore spot, Bessarabia. Russia refused to recognize it as a part of Rumania, and, after weary negotiations, the proposed non-aggression pact failed. In the spring of 1932 there were military incidents on the Bessarabian frontiers, a region which resembles no-man's-land. But a conflict in connection with Bessarabia could not be limited to Russia and Rumania. Poland must help Rumania, and France must help Poland. France, however, cannot send an army to Poland except through Germany. Germany presumably will refuse the passage of French troops through her territory. She would do so for several reasons. The Berlin Treaty, concluded between Russia and Germany, obliges Germany to preserve friendly neutrality towards Russia. The main reason, however, would be to prevent Germany from becoming the battlefield of nations, as so often has been the case. The first action of Russia would be an aerial bombardment of the German communication lines (railway bridges, stations, etc.) in order to keep the French from marching up. As retaliation for break-

ing friendly neutrality German cities would then be bombed by the Russian air forces. Further, as the eastern allies of France would be drawn into the war, the opposing alliance, led by Italy, would not hesitate to intervene. Italy is connected in the Balkans with too many gun-powder barrels which are apt to explode if the Little Entente wages war. There is Albania, the Italian military outpost on the flank of Yugoslavia. There is Macedonia with Bulgaria behind it and Italy behind Bulgaria. All these danger spots may explode even in themselves, without a general war. Naturally, if there is an upheaval elsewhere their involvement in the conflict seems inevitable.

But, besides these probable outbreaks of hostilities, it is hardly conceivable that Italy would let down the only great power which assures the European balance of powers—barring an exclusive domination of France. Thus, Italy would be involved in war with France, either directly or indirectly through the Bessarabian conflict. But the Alps are barriers between France and Italy, and Italy can help Russia only by sending troops through the Tyrolese passes into Germany to bar the French advance. At first, such possibilities seem far-fetched, but European military and political circles discuss them as quite natural hypotheses. The above assumptions are in harmony with the strategic theory of General Graziani,¹ and are upheld by General de Bono.² General Ludendorff,

¹ *Nuova Antologia*, December, 1931.

² *Le Temps*, December 27, 1931.

Chief of the German General Staff during the World War, assumes that the Italians will move in case of a French advance toward the East.³ Thus the main battlefield, in case of a great war, wherever it begins, will be Germany. This is bound to be so, as surely as it is that France, Italy, the eastern allies of France, and Russia will wage the war.

It is quite natural that Germany will not wait to become the testing field of the new modern weapons and theories of war. She will go with those who promise her escape from her present precarious situation due to her one-sided disarmament. And those nations are Italy and Russia. With the help of Italy she will do her best to break the French advance towards the East, which means through Germany. This resistance will mean the destruction of Germany, but as it is bound to come in a general war anyhow, Germany will try to obtain from it what she considers her liberty. France will probably defeat the combined forces of Germany and Italy, but will be exhausted by the task. It is generally believed in France, so far as the writer has had opportunity to scrutinize the opinion of military men there, that the French population, ferocious in the defence of their soil, will not be enthusiastic in a war for Bessarabia. The French Socialists will go into war against their will, and a great part of the "bourgeoise" will do so with little "elan." French military circles plan, it is said, to send against Russia mainly African

troops who do not ask about the reasons for war. Nevertheless, the war machinery, once in movement, the French tank armada will crush the resistance of Germany. Germany is able to send a small number of excellent troops against the French military steam roller and provide some technical and tactical surprises. Rifle bullets of high velocity transpiercing the armors of tanks, mines laid before the tanks, artificial clouds to confuse them, and other devices may emerge.

The semi-trained volunteers and civilians will entrench themselves. All this naturally has only a relative value in face of the formidable French war machinery. The few German elite troops will soon be exhausted and half-trained or non-trained volunteers will be an easy prey to modern automatic weapons. The example has been provided for this in a fairly demonstrative way during the Sino-Japanese hostilities in 1932. It is probable, however, that, with the help of the especially mobile and well equipped Italian troops, France will be barred from advancing too rapidly into Central and Eastern Germany. In these unoccupied parts of the Reich new formations can be erected, and in two or three months a German army of a million or more men may reinforce the defence lines. The more times Germany can win, the less are the French chances—hence the French theory that heavy artillery and tanks are not aggressive weapons and that for France defence lies in attack. But, even if Germany can bar France for sev-

eral months, which is not impossible in view of the desperate resistance she is apt to show, the final destruction of the country is beyond doubt. The French are too strong, and even at the price of exhaustion they are bound to break German resistance, even combined with that of the Italians coming through the somewhat limited communication lines in the Tyrolese Alps.

During this fierce German-Italian resistance, the other members of the two groups will one after the other or simultaneously enter into line. In Central and Eastern Europe mutual killing will develop. The eastern allies of France will have their hands full with their own rebelling minorities, and with the Revisionist Chain in Central and Eastern Europe. The two Russian border states will have to fight on two fronts. One of them, Rumania, may face on the left wing of her opponents the Turkish troops, which proved in 1920-22 too successful against Greece not to suggest that they can handle Rumania also.

Poland, which has, without its minorities, 20 million inhabitants, will face the 160 million Russian people single handed. On the German-Polish frontier the " *Grenzschiltz* " will oppose feeble Polish troops, possibly with no advance on either side, both being occupied in another direction. Yugoslavia, somewhat paralyzed by Croat and Slovene separatists, and Czechoslovakia, with well equipped troops but containing in her main industrial centers a majority German population and possible sabotage, will have

to face the Austrian, Hungarian, Bulgarian, and Albanian forces and possibly one or two Italian army corps. But these conflicts are of secondary importance. The main problem will be the Russian advance towards the West. What chances the Poles will have in resisting them may be appraised by the fact that only the combined German and Austro-Hungarian armies were able to cope with Russia in the World War. Whether or not they meet the French forces on the Polish-German frontier or in Poland or in Germany herself, the probable result will be the complete destruction of both Germany and Poland.

The more that time advances, the better the huge reserves of man material of the Soviets will be trained. The turning of the " *Osoaviakhim* " into a Soviet Reserve Army, and the training even of women may assure the Soviets command over such masses of combatants that the French forces, exhausted by the German and Italian resistance, diverted in keeping down the occupied German territories, revolting Colonies, further Italian attacks, and home revolution of socialists and communists refusing to fight against the Soviets on distant fronts, will not have very good chances against an inexhaustible stream of fast-arriving Russian reserves. Here an eventual Japanese advance in the Far East would not weigh heavily in the balance. Siberia is no road for an advance and a few Russian army corps allied with Asiatic space would suffice to localize the Japanese war in Asia.

Hardly anybody believes that Japan could advance farther than the Lake Baikal. Thus it may be assumed that the Russian armies pouring into the West could renew the energies of the peoples opposing France.

The outcome of the war, however, must be left to the imagination of the reader. General Ludendorff assumes that only the Soviets, aided by socialist-communist revolts throughout Europe, can be the final winner. But here, in the region of nightmares, we must abandon the course of our fantasy.

ANOTHER HYPOTHESIS

The gloomy prospects that confront disarmed Germany will certainly induce that country to regain a status which she may consider as "equality in security." But even without the threat of becoming the battlefield of other nations, the German people, potentially the most powerful in Europe, will try, as their moderate Chancellor Bruening has said, to emerge "from the dishonorable condition of legal and factual inferiority to equality and freedom with the community of nations."⁴ Besides the fact that her one-sided disarmament exposes her to political and economic blackmail, it might well be assumed that Field Marshal Lord Robertson is right in declaring that Germany will not tolerate long what he calls "humiliation." This situation seems, indeed, intolerable for long. The extent of national bitterness

⁴ *New York Times*, May 9, 1932.

may be measured in the victories of the Hitlerites. The cited work of General Ludenorff warns the German people not to abandon themselves to illusions lest they be destroyed by the superior French military machine. But he fears that reason may lose its ground and Germany, relying on Italy and Eussia, will rebel with arms against the present situation. Such an event, however, seems none too probable. There is another course to take. The probable failure of the Disarmament Conference to attain substantial reduction in armaments, equalizing to a certain extent the security of both France and Germany, will probably lead Germany to resume arming theoretically " in secret " to such an extent that any aggression of a neighbor would be profitless. For this purpose Germany is now sufficiently protected, if we accept the theory of the higher efficiency of defensive weapons in proportion to those of aggression. We dealt with this theory in discussing the views of several military authors. If reports are correct this is the solution which Chancellor Bruening tried to secure at Geneva in 1932. It was asserted that he offered to exchange for theoretical (legal) equality factual inferiority in armaments, sufficient only for defensive purposes. As France does not seem willing to abandon the proportions of the Versailles Treaty, it must be assumed that Germany will resume in a slow, possibly " secret " way the building of its military power. Two circumstances help her in this attempt: first, with the technical inven-

tions, and changes in theory of tactics following these inventions, the clauses of the Versailles Treaty become more and more obsolete. Second, with public opinion against her, France will not have enough moral authority to control and investigate efficiently the eventual "secret" trainings of military value in German sporting societies and other private organization. This would mean that while Germany could not exploit to a high degree her potential military power, it would give her enough defensive forces to make an invasion into Germany an unprofitable undertaking. The "secret" arming will not be really secret, but will be partially accomplished without contradicting the Versailles clauses and partially by evading or even violating those clauses in a more or less discreet way. But once this stage is reached she will be in a different bargaining position. Thus, if in the meantime the French do not prefer provocation and attempt to suppress every move toward evasion of the Treaty ties—in which case probably the above described general war would take place—Germany will arrive at a bargaining position where she can reach an agreement with France similar to that allegedly proposed by the German Chancellor at Geneva.

But, with the resumption by Germany of her position as one of the great military powers in Europe, great changes in policies are possible. First, the agricultural states of Central and Southeastern Europe will no longer have reason to oppose Germany, but

every reason to come to a political agreement with her, for rapprochement is urgently necessary for their economic reconstruction. These states are predominantly agricultural, while Germany is their potential market. The political hostility, due to the French alliance system, would not then be an obstacle to economic cooperation. Why might this political antagonism cease? For two reasons: first, these states would no longer have a chance to fight Germany; second, they would consider Germany as their natural protector against Russia. Once the Germans escape the desperate situation of being alone and disarmed between two war-preparing camps, they will find no reason to ally with Russia but will have great reason to keep that state out of their sphere of influence. This sphere of influence will extend sooner or later to all Central Europe, and thus the Germans will be able and likely to protect these states against Russia. It is very natural that the balance of power should be held by Germany on the one hand, and Russia on the other. The revulsion of the German ruling classes against the Soviets will do the rest. Once the political antagonism between Germany and the former eastern allies of France becomes senseless, the economic cooperation profitable to both parties will begin. If one considers in what distress these peoples live, this course seems inevitable. On the other hand, Germany having cut off her relations with the Soviets, which were dictated only as a solution of despair, she would have, besides the most obvious eco-

nomic reasons, a great interest in not hurting the feelings of these eastern countries. Germany would have to count upon the circumstance that she would no longer be in a quasi-alliance with Russia and that France is still one of the greatest European powers. Thus the solution of such problems as the Danzig-Corridor would have to be made on a give and take basis. It seems quite reasonable that Germany would regain the coast (the city of Danzig and its environments), which is populated by Germans, thus linking East Prussia again with the Reich. The other parts of the present "corridor" could be retained by Poland. On the other hand, the Polish outlet to the sea could be created along the Niemen River towards Memel. As M. Herve says in his book, *La Reconciliation ou la Guerre*, the awkward situation of Lithuania, whose former capital (Vilna) has been occupied by the Poles while the Lithuanians seized the former German territory of Memelland, must have some kind of a solution. This dwarf state without its former capital could enter into a form of confederation with Poland—and if Poland and Germany desire it in common, there will be no effective protest against this solution—thus providing Poland with an outlet to the sea. If, however, Lithuania should refuse, Germany would simply reintegrate the Memelland, which was illegally occupied by Lithuania a few years after the conclusion of the peace treaties, and provide an outlet for Poland to the sea along the Niemen River. Other territorial changes would not be desired by

either Germany or Poland. Germany and the Eastern States have everything to win from close economic and political cooperation. The prosperity of Central Europe would probably be restored. In this event Germany could renounce the Colonies and be sure that the minority problem would be handled by the eastern states with all due tact and consideration.

With political antagonism becoming senseless, the economic aspect would become more and more important. Central Europe would regain step by step the economic unity which it formed before the World War and which seems to be an indispensable condition to the future existence of these states.⁵ The desire to reestablish this economic unit may be seen even at present, in spite of artificial political antagonism, and may be noted equally in the "victorious" and defeated states.

The economic solution, the working of which would be smoothed by German organization and not counteracted by intrigues of other great powers, would pull together these small Central European states. Austria would naturally join Germany. Hungary would come to a compromise. The first attempt to accomplish this was undertaken by Count Bethlen during his interview with the Rumanian King in December, 1931.⁶ Rumors are circulated that there is a possibility of a rapprochement even so far as a personal union under the Rumanian King. The

⁵ See M. Keynes, *Economic Consequences of Peace*.

⁶ *Le Temps*, December 11, 1931.

political bargain would consist in some solution of the status of former Hungarian territories populated mainly by Hungarians, an eventual change in the boundaries, or an autonomous Transylvania with equal rights to Hungary and old Rumania; and, on the other hand, Hungary, as equal partner in the Personal Union would guarantee the military position of Rumania. Rumania certainly needs it. Hungary would have to fear nothing from such a combination—her position is more than assured in a combination with Rumania, especially if Transylvania should be autonomous. The Hungarians would probably find a great deal of attraction in some combination of this sort.⁷ The problem of a personal union between Hungary and Rumania was brought up at the Conference of the Little Entente at Montreux in February, 1932. Prince Ghika, the Rumania Foreign Minister, answered evasively the question put by Dr. Benes and the Yugoslavian representative on this subject.⁸ That means a good deal. Once the Hungarians and the Rumanians arrive at such intimate relationship, the other two members of the present "Little Entente" (which would naturally cease to exist after the achievement of the changes described above) would have to come to terms also with the other countries of Central Europe.

Indeed, the economic scheme of Central European cooperation would mean the revival of the famous,

⁷ *Ibid.*, December 11, 1931.

⁸ *Ibid.*, February 3, 1932.

ill-fated " Mitteleuropa." It would mean a great deal of German influence in Central Europe. The tendencies of these states seem to be in this direction. In consequence of the economic situation, and possibly with a view to future political necessities, a considerable part of the Rumanian press demands a new political orientation, directed towards Germany.⁹ The Rumanian Finance Minister, M. Argetoianu, opposed the Tardieu scheme of excluding Germany from the Danube Union.¹⁰ The situation is similar in Yugoslavia. M. Jura Tomitchitch, head of the foreign trade department of the Ministry of Commerce, expressed his views in the following way:

L'AUemagne et la Yuogoslavie se complementent. L'Allemagne fabrique des produits industriels dont la Yougoslavie a besoin et celle-ci offre ses produits agricoles, ses bois et ses mineraux. La nature meme favorise ces echanges par le Danube qui peut transporter les uns et les autres. . . . lis sont decides a ne plus attendre. Dans les travaux publics, il faut construire des routes, des ponts, des chemins de fer, des ecoles, des hopitaux, des equipements electriques, etc., ameliorations qu'on ne peut plus retarder. Il y a dans le pays des richesses non employees comme les mines, les chutes d'eau, les bois. Ce serait un peche de ne les point exploiter. Pour ces travaux d' importants capitaux sont necessaires; pour longtemps encore dans l'avenir la Yougoslavie demandera les produits allemands. . . . En 1927 l'Allemagne ne tenait que le quatrieme rang dans les importations Yougoslaves, en 1930 elle vient au second.¹¹

⁹ *Ibid.*, December 1, 1931.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, December 1, 1931; *Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung*, April 5, 1932.

¹¹ *Le Temps*, November 20, 1931.

Dr. Bagdic, Yugoslavian Minister to Berlin, wrote at the same time in the *Politika* that a Danubian scheme is "impossible without Germany."

Foreign Minister Markinkovitch in his address before the Yugoslav Senate on March 23, 1932, was of a similar opinion, though he did not express himself so frankly as the two above-mentioned ministers.¹² In the opinion of the Basle Bank officials the Tardieu scheme would be wrecked if only by the fact of Yugoslav opposition to the exclusion of Germany.¹⁸ Further, Germany and Yugoslavia came to a special agreement to exchange industrial for agricultural goods by circumventing the laws prevailing in both countries controlling foreign currency movements.^{1*} Similarly, it is quite natural that other states, like Hungary and Bulgaria, tend towards the German market. About 50 per cent of the total amount of German imports, before the war, came from Austria-Hungary. As the present Danubian States embrace great territories which did not belong to the old monarchy, the percentage would be even a great deal higher.

The inclusion of Italy in this economic cooperation would not seem impossible. She is with Germany, the main importer of Danubian agricultural products.¹⁸ Besides agricultural products, such as grain,

¹² *New York Times*, March 24, 1932.

¹³ *Ibid.*, April 3, 1932.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, April 3, 1932.

¹⁵ An analysis of the agrarian production of the Danubian countries and the absorption capacity of the neighboring states may be of

cattle, etc., Eastern Central Europe desires Germany and also Italy as markets for the sale of lumber and minerals. The economic revival of the Central European states depends on the realization of the idea of "Mitteleuropa."

Great Britain would gain from this solution also. First, German foreign trade would find markets in Central Europe and would not be compelled to compete so strenuously with Britain in other markets. British exports to Central Europe are unimportant. On the other hand, prosperity in Germany is of the greatest value to Britain, as Germany is one of the

interest in this connection. On the basis of the years before the crisis—that is, 1928 and before—the average export surplus of the agrarian Danube countries amounted to 4,500,000 tons. (This figure includes wheat, rye, barley, oats and maize.) Of these grains Austria imported only 650,000 to 775,000 tons per annum; Czechoslovakia 750,000 to 850,000 tons. This would make together a grain import of the two industrial countries amounting from 1,400,000 to 1,700,000 tons. Under these circumstances the French proposition would have an unsold corn surplus of the Danubian States of about 3,000,000 tons. Before 1928 Germany had to import cereals to 7,000,000 tons. Germany and Austria together require cereals amounting to about 7,800,000 tons; Germany, Czechoslovakia, and Austria together up to 8,700,000 tons. The cereal imports of France amount only to the small total of 550,000 to 1,350,000 tons; Italy requires annually the importation of 2,700,000 to 3,700,000 tons. Italy, together with Austria, requires an import of grain amounting to 3,350,000 to 4,450,000 tons.

These figures show that the cooperation of the five Danubian States alone could not absorb their total agrarian products. If Germany were included then this combination could not only absorb all the cereals of Southeastern Europe but Germany would have to import about 3,000,000 tons of corn from overseas. If, instead, Italy were included, then almost the total grain produce of these countries would be absorbed, leaving only an insignificant quantity of Danubian cereals undisposed of.

principal British markets. Further, prosperity in Germany and Central Europe means the thawing out of British capital invested and now " frozen " there. The United States would be in a somewhat similar position to Great Britain.

Only France would have to abandon her political scheme, as her eastern allies would see little sense in a French Alliance which ruined their economic position. But would a consolidation of the part of Europe from the North and the Baltic Sea to Constantinople not assure more security than the present catastrophic situation? Many Frenchmen believe so.

No doubt the realization of such a plan would encounter enormous difficulties. But the unparalleled economic distress of Central Europe may help to bring politics into line with economic necessity. The map of Europe would undergo some slight changes, but it would be by mutual agreement, dictated by the economic and political interests of those concerned. Other changes, such as the realization of the " Anschluss," the cancellation of so-called " reparation " payments beyond the value of war damages, and, last but not least, equality in the status of sovereignty, would automatically follow.

Germany, of course, would not only be a potential, but an actual Great Power, and it is more than possible that the world would not consider this as disastrous.

As to Italy, her fear and her desperate effort in the race of armaments with France would be some-

what alleviated by the change in the balance of power in Europe. A rapprochement with France would seem possible. France, on the other hand, would be perhaps glad to obtain Italian friendship by handing over to Italy some of the "burdens" she assumed in 1919. Italy would be glad to take over the unselfish and difficult task of promoting the civilization of the backward races in some of the former German colonies, now called "mandates." Incredible as it may seem, this humanitarian role would probably satisfy the expansionist policy of Italy. And Italy would then be in a position to abandon her cooperation with Eussia.

As to Germany, the realization of her dream of an economic "Mitteleuropa" would make her forget the African dream, which is full of heavy burdens. Germany would make a good bargain. Economic "Mitteleuropa" is not an easy combination but the mutual interests of the states in question, in emerging from the present catastrophic situation, would possibly facilitate the German talent for organization aiming at the economic reconstruction of Central Europe.

If the merely political considerations and those of ⁶¹prestige" are left aside, a compromise can be reached on boundary problems such as Danzig. The changes required there are insignificant in comparison with the danger of the present situation. This fact is recognized even in influential French circles. Romain Holland, one of the most outstanding

living Frenchmen, wrote in the *New York Nation* of April 22, 1931:

The fact is, the boundaries established by the treaties of 1919 cannot from the point of view of two-thirds of Europe be maintained. Our French informants stop their ears to the agonized cries of the vanquished countries. Germany, rubbed raw, whose enormous energy is being reborn—Germany is starved and will not be able to bear this repression more than a year or two without social and national convulsions that will make the Western World tremble.

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