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Title Study of Palanangal

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THE
STUDY OF PATANJALI

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To

The Hon'ble Chief Justice

SIR ASUTOSH MOOKERJEE, Kt., C.S.I.,

M.A., D.L., D.Sc., Ph.D.,

the greatest educationist of modern India,

a true friend and patron to all scholars,

the ONE MAN of the University of Calcutta,

this philosophical essay

is respectfully dedicated

as a token of great personal admiration.

PREFACE

This book was hurriedly written as the Griffith Prize essay as early as 1914, and it is published in a great hurry on the eve of my departure for England. Had it not been for the encouragement of the Hon'ble Chief Justice Sir Asutosh Mookerjee, Kt., C.S.I., the great patron of learning, this essay would never have been published. I have tried to give here an account of the Yoga System of thought as contained in the Yoga Sutra of Patanjali as interpreted by Vyāsa, Vāchaspati and Vijnāna Bhikshu with occasional references to the views of other systems. My work "Yoga Philosophy in relation to other Indian Systems of Thought" which I hope will be published shortly by the University of Calcutta is a more advanced and comprehensive work than the present attempt. But since it may yet take some time before that book is published I do not much hesitate to publish this essay. This is my earliest attempt on Indian Philosophy and no one probably is more conscious of its defects as myself. As I had to stay far away from Calcutta at Chittagong and as I had no time in my hands owing to my departure to England, I do very much regret that I could not properly supervise the work of its printing. Many errors of printing have consequently escaped. It is now hoped that the errors may not be such that they will inconvenience the reader much. So little work has up till now been done in the field of Indian Philosophy that in spite of its many defects, the author

has some excuse in publishing it. The author will consider all his labours rewarded if this essay is found to be of any use in any quarter.

It may seem convenient that before entering into the details of the work I should give a brief outline of the Yoga System of Patanjali at the very beginning of the work, which I hope may be of some use to the beginners.

The Study of Patanjali

However dogmatic a system of philosophical enquiry may appear to us, it must have been preceded by a criticism of the observed facts of knowledge. The details of the criticism and the processes of self-argumentation by which the thinker arrived at his theory of the Universe might indeed be suppressed, as being relatively unimportant but a thoughtful reader would detect them as lying in the background behind the shadow of the general speculations, but at the same time setting them off before our view. An Aristotle or a Patanjali may not make any direct mention of the arguments which led them to a dogmatic assertion of their theories, but for a reader who intends to understand them thoroughly it is absolutely necessary that he should read them in the light as far as possible of the inferred presuppositions and inner arguments of their minds ; it is in this way alone that he can put himself in the same line of thinking with the thinker he is willing to follow and can grasp him to the fullest extent. In offering this short study of the Pātanjala metaphysics, I shall therefore try to supplement it with such of my inferences of the presuppositions of Patanjali's mind, which I think will add to the clearness of the exposition of his views, though I am fully alive to the difficulties of making such inferences about a philosopher whose psychological, social, religious and moral environments differed so widely from ours.

An enquiry into the relations of the mental phenomena to the physical has sometimes given the first start to philosophy. The relation of mind to

Philosophical enquiries based on the relations of mind and matter.

matter is such an important problem of Philosophy that the existing philosophical systems may roughly be

classified according to the relative importance that has been attached to mind or to matter. There have been chemical, mechanical and biological conceptions which have ignored mind as a separate entity and have dogmatically

Different philosophical speculations compared.

affirmed it to be the product of matter only.* There have been theories on the other extreme, which have dispensed with matter altogether and

have boldly affirmed that matter as such has no reality at all, and that thought is the only thing which can be called Real in the highest sense. All matter as such is non-Being or Māyā or Avidyā. There have been Nihilists like the Śūnyavādi Buddhists who have gone so far as to assert that none of them exists, neither the matter nor the mind. There have been some who asserted that matter was only thought externalized, some who regarded the principle of matter as the Unknowable Thing-in-itself, some who regarded them as separate independent entities held within a higher reality called God or as two of his attributes only, and some who regarded their difference as being only one of grades of intelligence, one merging slowly and imperceptibly into the other and held together in concord with each other by pre-established harmony.

Underlying the metaphysics of Patanjali also, we find an acute analysis of matter and thought. He regarded matter on one hand, mind, the senses, and Ego

* See Ward's Naturalism and Agnosticism.

on the other, to be nothing more than two different kinds of modifications of one primal cause, the Prakriti. But he distinguished from them a self-intelligent principle which he called Purusha or the Spirit. By the highest generalisation possible he discovered that what we call matter consisted only of three primal qualities or rather substantive entities, which he called the Sattva or the intelligence-stuff, Rajas or energy and Tamas—the factor of obstruction or mass or Inertia. It is indeed extremely difficult to make a true conception of the nature of these three qualities or Gunas as he called them, when we consider that these are the only three elements which are regarded as forming the composition of all phenomena, mental or physical. In order to comprehend them rightly it will be necessary to grasp thoroughly the exact relation between the mental and the physical. What are the real points of agreement between the two? How can the same elements be said to behave in one case as the conceiver and in the other case as the conceived. Thus Vāchaspati says:—

The qualities (Gunas) appear as possessing two forms, viz., the determiner or the perceiver and the perceived or the determined. In the aspect as the determined or the perceived, the Gunas evolve themselves as the five infra-atomic potentials, the five gross elements and their compounds. In the aspect as the perceiver or determiner, they form the modifications as the Ego and the senses.

(गुणानां इदं द्वयं व्यवसायात्मकत्वं ; व्यवसायात्मकत्वं च । तत्र व्यवसायात्मकतां याञ्छतमास्थाय पञ्चतन्मात्राणि भूतभौतिकानि निर्मिमीते । व्यवसायात्मकत्वं तु गृह्यत्वरूपमास्थाय साङ्काराणीन्द्रियाणीत्यर्थः ।*)

Quotation from Vāchaspati.

* Vachaspati's Tattvavaiśārādī on the Vyāsa Bhāṣya, III. 47.

It is interesting to notice here the two words used by Vāchaspati, in characterising the twofold aspect of the Gunas, *viz.*, व्यवसायात्मकत्व, their nature as the determiner or the perceiver and व्यवसेयात्मकत्व, their nature as being determined or perceived. The elements which compose the phenomena of the objects of perception are the same as those which form the phenomena of the perceiving; their only distinction is that one is determined and the other is the determiner. Aristotle, Leibnitz, Hegel all of them asserted in their own ways that there was no intrinsic difference between the so-called mental and the physical.

With Aristotle, “as possibility of Form, Matter is reason in process of becoming, the antithesis between idea and the world of sense is at least in principle, or potentially surmounted, so far as it is one single being, but only on different stages that exhibits itself in both, in matter as well as in form.” The theory of causation as explained by him by the simile of the raw material and the finished article is almost the same as has been given by Vijñāna Bhikshu in his commentary on the system of Sāṅkhya—the causal action consists of the activity that manifests the effect (kārya) in the present moment just as the image already existing in the stone is only manifested by the activity of the statuary.— (कारणव्यापारोपि कार्यस्य वर्त्तमानलक्षणव्यापारमेव जनयति । यथा शिलामध्यस्थ-प्रतिमायाः लैङ्गिकव्यापारेण अभिव्यक्तिमात्रं). Thus it seems that Aristotle’s doctrine has some similarity with the Pātanjala-Sāṅkhya doctrine. But their difference much outweighs the similarity. For with Aristotle, potentiality and actuality are only relative terms; what is potential with reference to one thing is actual with reference to

Mind and matter are the two aspects of the same substance.

Aristotle and Patanjali.

another. All things are arranged in a state of becoming higher and higher ; and in this way, ^{Their differences} thought is also regarded as the Actual or the Form, and the other is called the Potential or Matter. But with Patanjali this is not the case. With him Sattwa, Rajas and Tamas are substantive entities which compose the reality of the mental and the physical. The mental and the physical represent two different orders of modifications, and one is not in any way the actuality of the other. Potentialities and actualities have place in this system but only in this sense that they are the absolute potentialities and actualities. As they conjointly form the manifold without, by their varying combinations as well as all the diverse internal functions, faculties and phenomena, they are in themselves the absolute potentiality of all things, mental and physical. Thus Vyāsa in describing the nature of the knowable writes.—The nature of the knowable is now described :—The knowable, consisting of the objects of enjoyment and liberation, as the gross elements and the perceptive senses, is characterised by three essential traits—illumination, energy and inertia. The Sattwa is of the nature of illumination. Rajas is of the nature of energy. Inertia (Tamas) is of the nature of inactivity. The Guna entities with the above characteristics are capable of being modified by mutual influence on one another, by their proximity. They are evolving. They have the characteristics of conjunction and separation. They manifest forms by one lending support to the others by proximity. None of these loses its distinct power into those of the others, even though any one of them may exist as the principal factor of a phenomenon with the others as subsidiary thereto. The Gunas forming the three classes of substantive entities manifest themselves as such, by their similar kinds of power. When any one

of them plays the roll of the principal factor of any phenomenon, the others also show their presence in close contact. Their existence as subsidiary energies of the principal factor is inferred by their distinct and independent functioning, even though it be as subsidiary qualities.—दृश्यस्वरूपमुच्यते । प्रकाशक्रियाश्चित्शीलं भूतेन्द्रियात्मकं भोगापवर्गाद्यं दृश्यम् । प्रकाशशीलं सत्त्वम् । क्रियाशीलं रजः । स्थितिशीलं तमः इति । एते गुणाः परस्परोपरक्त-प्रविभागाः परिष्कामिणः संयोगवियोगधर्माद्यः इतरैतरोपाश्रयेण उपार्जित-मूर्त्तयः परस्परान्नाङ्गित्वं ऽपि अरंभिन्नशक्ति-

Quotation from Vyāsa
Bhāṣhya.

प्रविभागाः तुल्यजातीयशक्तिभेदानुपातिनः प्रधानवैलायामुपदर्शितसन्निधानानुगुणत्वे अपि, व्यापारमात्रेण च प्रधानान्तर्णीतानुमितस्तिता.—*

It may be argued that in Aristotle also we find that Potentiality and Actuality exist together in various proportions in all things, but the fundamental distinction which must be noted here, is this, that in Aristotle, Form only exists in Matter as its end or goal towards which it is striving. And the manifold nature of the universe only shows the different stages of matter and form as being overcome by each other. But in the three Gunas, none of them can be held as the goal of the others. All of them are equally important and the very various nature of the manifold, represents only the different combinations of these Gunas as substantive entities. In any combination, one of the Gunas may be more predominant than the others, but the other Gunas are also present there and do their functions in their own way. No one of them is more important than the other, but they serve conjointly one common purpose, *viz.*, the experiences and the liberation of the Purusha or spirit. They are always uniting, separating and re-uniting again and there is neither beginning nor end of this—अन्वोन्वमिद्युनाः सर्वं नैषामादिसम्प्रयोगोविप्रयोगो वा उपलभ्यते ।

* See Vyāsa Bhāṣhya on Patanjali's Yoga Sūtras, II. 18.

They have no purpose of theirs to serve, but they all are always evolving "ever from a relatively less differentiated, less determinate, less coherent whole, to a relatively more differentiated, more determinate, more coherent whole" for the experiences and the liberation of the Purusha, the Spirit. When in a state of equilibrium they cannot serve the purpose of the Purusha ; so, that state of the Gunas is not for the sake of the

Independent state of equilibrium and two evolutionary state dependent on the Purusha.

Purusha ; it is its own independent eternal state. All the other three stages of evolution, *viz.*, the लिङ्ग (sign), अविशेष (unspecialised) and विशेष (specialised) have been caused for the sake of the Purusha. Thus Vyāsa writes :—The objects of the Purusha are no cause of the noumenal states. That is to say, the fulfilment of the objects of the Purusha is not the cause which brings about the manifestation of the noumenal state in the beginning. The fulfilment of the objects of the Purusha is not therefore the reason of the existence of that ultimate cause. For the reason that it is not brought into existence by the need of the fulfilment of the Purusha's objects it is said to be eternal. As to the three specialised states, the fulfilment of the objects of the Purusha becomes the cause of their manifestation in the beginning. The fulfilment of the objects of the Purusha is not therefore the reason of the existence of the cause. For the reason that it is not brought into existence by the Purusha's objects it is said to be eternal. As to the three specialised states, the fulfilment of the objects of the Purusha becomes the cause of their manifestation in the beginning. And because the objects of the Purusha become the cause of their manifestation they are said to be non-eternal. अलिङ्गवस्थायाम् न पुरुषार्थोद्दिष्टुः, न अलिङ्गवस्थायाम् चादौ पुरुषार्थता कारणं भवति इति । न तस्याः पुरुषार्थता कारणं भवति इति । नासौ पुरुषार्थकृता इति नित्या आख्यायते । त्रयाणां तु अवस्थानुशेषाणां

आदौ पुरुषार्थता कारणं भवति । स च अर्थोद्दिष्टनिमित्तं कारणं भवति इति अनित्या आख्यायते । *

Vachaspati again says :—The fulfilment of the objects of the Purusha could be said to be the cause of the noumenal state, if that state could bring about the fulfilment of the objects of the Purusha such as the enjoyment of sound, etc., or manifest the discrimination of the distinction between true self and other phenomena. If however it did that, it could not be a state of equilibrium. यद्यलिङ्गावस्थाश्चादुपभोगं वा सत्त्वपुरुषान्वयताख्यातिं वा पुरुषार्थं निवर्त्तयेत् तन्नवर्त्तनेहि न साव्यावस्था स्यात् ।† This state is called the

Prakriti

Compared with the Being of Hegel.

Prakriti, which may in some sense be loosely compared with the pure Being of Hegel. For it is like that, the beginning, the simple, indeterminate, unmediated and undetermined. It does neither exist nor does not exist, but is the principium of almost all existence. Thus Vyāsa describes it as the state which neither is nor is not, that in which it exists and yet does not ; that in which there is no non-existence ; the unmanifested, the noumenon (lit. without any manifested indication), the background of all. (निःसत्तासत्त्वं निःसदसत्त्वं निरसत्त्वं अव्यक्तम् अलिङ्गं प्रधानं । ‡). Vāchaspati explains it as follows:—Existence consists in possessing the capacity of effecting the fulfilment of the objects of the Purusha. Non-existence means a mere imaginary trifle (*e.g.*, the horn of a horse). It is described as being beyond both these states of existence and non-existence. The state of the equipoise of the three gunas of Intelligence-stuff, Inertia and

* See Vyāsa Bhāshya on Patanjali's Yoga Sūtras, II. 19.

† Vāchaspati Misra's Tattavaiśārādi commentary on Vyāsa Bhāshya on Patanjali's Sūtras, II. 19.

‡ Vyāsa Bhāshya, II. 19.

Energy, is nowhere of use in fulfilling the objects of the Purusha. It therefore does not exist as such. On the other hand, it does not admit of being rejected as non-existent like an imaginary lotus of the sky. It is therefore not non-existent. But even allowing the force of the above arguments about the want of phenomenal existence of Prakriti on the ground that it cannot serve the objects of the Purusha, the question comes that the principles of Mahat, etc., exist in the state of the unmanifested also, because nothing that exists can be destroyed ; and if it is destroyed, it cannot be born again, because nothing that does not exist can be born ; it follows therefore that since the principles of Mahat, etc., exist in the state of the unmanifested, that state can also affect the fulfilment of the objects of the Purusha. How then can it be said that the unmanifested is not possessed of existence? For this reason, he describes it as that in which it exists and does not exist. This means that the cause exists in that state in a potential form but not in the form of the effect. Although the effect exists in the cause as mere potential power, yet it is incapable of performing the function of fulfilling the objects of the Purusha ; it is therefore said to be non-existent as such. Further he says that this cause is not such, that its effect is of the nature of hare's horn. It is beyond the state of non-existence, that is of the existence of the effect as mere nothing. If it were like that then it would be like the lotus of the sky and no effect would follow from that—

निःसत्तासत्त्वं, सत्ता पुरुषार्थक्रियासमत्वं, असत्ता तुच्छता, निष्कान्तं सत्तायाः असत्तायाश्च यत् तत् तथोक्तम् एतदुक्तं भवति—सत्त्वरजस्तमसां सत्त्व्यावस्था न क्वचित् पुरुषार्थं उपयुज्यते इति न सती नापि गगनकमलिनीव तुच्छस्वभावा तेन नासत्यपि । स्यात् एतत् अव्यक्तावस्थायामपि अस्ति महदादितदात्मना, न हि सती विनाशो, विनाशे वा न पुनरुत्पादः न हि असतः उत्पादः इति महदादिसद्भावात् पुरुषार्थक्रिया प्रवर्तेत, तत्कथं निःसत्त्वमव्यक्तम् इत्यत आह निःसदसदिति । निष्कान्तं कारणं सतः

कार्यात् । यद्यपिकारणावस्थायं सदेवशक्त्यात्मना कार्यं तथापि स्वीचिदानर्थाक्रिया-
मकुर्वत् असत् इत्युक्तं । न चैतत् कारणं शशविषाणायमानकार्यमित्याह
निरसदिति । निष्कान्तम् असत्सुच्छरूपात् कार्यात् तथा सति हि व्योमारविन्दमिव
अद्यात्र कार्यमुत्पदीत ।*

Thus we see that if it is looked at from this narrow point of view of similarity, it may be compared with the pure Being of Hegel, a state of implicitude which is at the root of all determinate and concrete existence. In this state, the different Gunas only annul themselves and no change takes place, though it must be acknowledged that the state of equipoise is also one of tension and action, which however being perfectly balanced does not produce any change. This is what is meant by सद्दश परिणाम (Evolution of similars). Had this Prakriti been the only one principle, it is clear that it could be compared to the absolute of Hegel or as pure Being. Prakriti as the equilibrium of the three Gunas is the absolute ground of all the mental and phenomenal modifications—the pure potentiality.

If we ignore Purusha of the system then we can in some sense compare it with the God of Spinoza, “excludent of all determination”—“the one which is prior to all its modifications.” It may be compared with Spinoza’s *Naturans*. *Naturans* is conceived to possess the two attributes of thought and matter, both of which must be conceived through itself and as having always existed simultaneously in it. It can be described in the words of Plato as “The mother and receptacle of all visible things; we do not call it earth nor air, nor fire, nor water nor any thing produced from them, or from which these are produced. It is an invisible and formless thing, the recipient of everything, participating in a certain way of the unintelligible but in a way very difficult to seize”; or like the matter of Aristotle, “conceived

* Vāchaspati’s commentary on Patanjali’s Sūtras, II. 19.

in its abstraction from Form as without predicate, determination, distinction, as that which is the permanent subject in all becoming and assumes the most contradictory forms ; what however in its own being is different from everything, and has in itself no definiteness whatever."

In later Indian thinkers there had been a tendency to make a compromise between the Vedānta and Sāṅkhya doctrines and to identify (Prakṛiti) प्रकृति with the (Avidyā) अविद्या of the Vedāntists. Thus Lokāchāryya writes :—it is called Prakṛiti since it is the source of all change, it is called अविद्या (Avidyā) since it is opposed to knowledge, it is called

Prakṛiti, Avidyā and
Māyā.

Māyā since it is the cause of diversified creation. प्रकृतिरित्युच्यते विकारोत्पादकत्वात्, अविद्या ज्ञान विरोधित्वात्, माया विविचष्टिकत्वात्.* But

this is distinctly opposed in the Bhāṣhya which defines अविद्या (Avidyā) as विद्याविपरीतं ज्ञानान्तरं अविद्या, i.e., Avidyā is that another knowledge which is opposed to the right knowledge. In some of the Upanishads, Śvetāśvatara for example, we find that माया (Māyā) and प्रकृति (Prakṛiti) are identified and the great god is said to preside over it (मायां तु प्रकृतिं विद्यात् मायिकं तु महेश्वरं). There is a description also in the Rigveda X. 92, where it is said that (नासदासीत् न सदासीत् तदानीं) in the beginning there was neither the "Is" nor the "Is not," which reminds one of the description of Prakṛiti (प्रकृति) as निःसत्तासत्त्वं (that in which there is no existence or non-existence). In the Manu also we find अप्रतर्क्यम् अविज्ञेयम् प्रसुप्तमिव सर्वतः. In this way it may be shown from Geeta and other Sanskrit texts that an undifferentiated, unindividuated cosmic matter as the first principle in the beginning was often thought of and discussed from the earliest times. Later on this idea was utilised with slight modifications by the different schools

* Tattvatraya, page 48 (Chowkhamba edition), Benares.

of Vedāntists, the Sāṅkhyists and those who sought to make a reconciliation between them under the different names of Prakriti, Avidyā and Māyā. What Avidyā really means according to the Pātanjala system we shall see later on ; but here we see that whatever it might mean it does not mean Prakriti according to the Pātanjala system. Vyāsa Bhāshya makes mention of Māyā also in a couplet from Shashtitantrasāstra षष्ठितन्त्रशास्त्र,

गुणानां परमं रूपं न दृष्टिपथमृच्छति ।

यत् दृष्टिपथं प्राप्तं तन्मायैवसुतुच्छकं ॥

The real appearance of the Gunas does not come within the line of our vision. That, however, which comes within the line of vision is but paltry delusion and Vāchaspati explains it as follows :—Prakriti is like the Māyā but it is not Māyā. It is trifling (सुतुच्छक) in the sense that it is changing. Just as Māyā immediately changes, so the transformations of Prakriti are every moment appearing and vanishing and thus suffering constant changes. Prakriti is an eternal reality and thus different from Māyā मायैव न तु माया । सुतुच्छकं विनाशि । यथाहि माया अज्ञायैवान्यथा भवति । एवविकारा अपि आनिर्भावतिरोभावधर्माणः प्रतिक्षणमन्यथा । प्रकृतिर्निवृत्तया मायाविधर्मिणी परमार्थ ।

This explanation of Miśra makes it clear that the word Māyā is used here only in the sense of illusion, and that there is no allusion to the celebrated Māyā of the Vedāntists ; and Miśra says clearly that Prakriti can in no sense be called Māyā, since it is real. (Cf. Bhikshu here.)

A more definite notion of Prakriti we shall get as we advance further into the details of the later transformations of the Prakriti in connection with the Purusha. The most difficult point is to understand the nature of its connection with the Purusha. Prakriti is a material, non-intelligent, independent principle and the souls

Connection with
Purusha and the diffi-
culty of its conception

or spirits are isolated, neutral, intelligent and inactive. Then how can the one come into connection with the other ?

In most systems of Philosophy the same difficulty has arisen and has given the same troubles to comprehend it

The difficulty is almost unavoidable; since it is seen to exist in other western systems.

rightly. Plato fights the difficulty of solving the unification of the idea and the non-being and attempts to offer his participation theory; even in Aristotle's attempt to avoid the difficulty by his theory of form and matter, we are not fully satisfied though he has shown much ingenuity and subtlety of thought in devising the "Expedient in the single conception of development."

The universe is but a gradation between the two extremes of potentiality and actuality, matter and form. But all students of Aristotle know that it is very difficult to understand the true relation between form and matter, and the particular nature of their interaction with each other, and it has created a great divergence of opinion among his commentators. It was probably to avoid this difficulty that the dualistic appearance of the philosophy of Descartes had to be reconstructed in the pantheism of Spinoza. Again we find also how Kant failed to bring about the relation between noumenon and phenomenon, and created two worlds absolutely unrelated with each other. He tried to make up the schism that he effected in his Critique of Pure Reason by his Critique of Practical Reason, and again supplemented it by his Critique of Judgment and met with only dubious success.

In India also this question has always been a little puzzling and before trying to explain the Pātanjala point of view, I shall first give some of the other expedients devised for the purpose, by the different schools of Advaita Vedantism.

It is seen in other theories Indian as well.

Reflection theory—

I. अनादिरनिर्वाच्याभूतप्रकृतिः चिन्मात्रसम्बन्धिनी माया तस्यां चित्प्रतिबिम्ब ईश्वरः

Māyā is without beginning, unspeakable, mother of gross matter, which comes in connection with intelligence, so that by its reflection in the former we have *Iśwara*. The illustrations that are given to explain it both in *Siddhāntaleśa** and in *Adwaita Brahmasiddhi* are only cases of physical reflection, *viz.*, the reflection of the Sun in water, or of the sky in water.

II. अवच्छेदवादः—Limitation theory सर्वगतस्य चैतन्यस्य अन्तःकरणादिना अवच्छेदोऽवश्यभावीति आवश्यकत्वात् अवच्छेदी जीव इति पक्षं रीचयन्ते ।

The all-pervading intelligence must necessarily be limited by mind, etc., so of necessity it follows that “the soul” is its limitation. They illustrate their theory by giving those common examples in which the *Ākāśa* (आकाश) though unbounded in itself is often spoken of as belonging to a jug or limited by the jug and as such appeared to fit itself to the shape and form of the jug and which is thus called घटावच्छिन्न आकाश, *i.e.*, space as within the jug.

Then we have a third school of Vedantists who seek to explain it in another way :—Whereas others hold that soul is neither a reflection nor a limitation but just as the son of Kunti was known as the son of Rādha, so the pure Brahman by his Nescience is known as the Jiva and just as the prince who was brought up in the family of a low caste, it is the pure Brahman who by its own Nescience undergoes birth and death and by its own Nescience is again released.

अपरे तु न प्रतिबिम्बो नाप्यवच्छेदीजीवः किन्तु कौलेयस्यैव राधेयत्ववदविकृतस्य ब्रह्मणः एव अविद्ययाजीवभावः व्याधकुलसम्बन्धितराजकुमारहृष्टान्तं ब्रह्मैव स्वाविद्यया संसरति स्वाविद्यया विमुच्यते ।

* *Siddhāntaleśa* (*Jiveśwara Nirupapa*).

The Sāṅkhya Sūtra also avails of the same story in IV,

Sāṅkhya explication
of the connection.

I—राजपुत्रवत्त्वोपदेजात् which Vijñāna
Bhikshu explains as follows:—A
certain king's son in consequence

of his being born under the Star Ganda having been expelled from his city and reared by a certain forester remains under the idea : "I am a forester." Having learnt that he is alive, a certain minister informs him. "Thou art not a forester, thou art a king's son." As he, immediately having abandoned the idea of his being an outcast, betakes himself to his true royal state, saying, "I am a king" so too the soul realises its purity in consequence of the instruction of some kind person, to the effect—'Thou, who didst originate from the first soul, which manifests itself merely as Pure Thought, art a portion thereof.'

राजपुत्रः गण्डर्च-जन्मनापुराग्निःसारितः शवरेण केनचित् पोषितीडहं शवर इत्यभिमन्यमान आसीत् । तं जीवन्तं ज्ञात्वा कश्चित् अमात्यः प्रबोधयति न त्वं शवर राजपुत्रोसौति । स यथा ऋटित्येव चाख्ण्डालाभिमानं त्यक्त्वा तान्त्रिकं राज-भावनिवावलम्बने, राजाहमस्मि इत्येवमेवादि पुरुषान् परिपूर्णं चिन्मात्रत्वेन अभिव्यक्तात् उत्पन्नस्त्वं तस्यांश इति, etc.

In another place there are two Sūtras :—निःसङ्गं पि उपराजो विवेकान्, (2) जपास्कटिकयोरिव नोपरागः किन्तु अभिमानः (1) Though it be unassociated still there is a tinging through Non-discrimination. (2) As in the case of the Hibiscus and the crystal there is not a tinge but a fancy. Now it will be seen that all these theories only show that the transcendent nature of the union of the principle of pure intelligence is very difficult to comprehend. Neither the reflection nor the limitation theory can clear the situation from vagueness and incomprehensibility which is rather increased by their physical illustrations for the Chit or pure intelligence cannot undergo reflection like a physical thing and neither can it be obstructed nor limited

by it. The reflection theory that is pointed at by the Sāṅkhya-Sūtra जपाकटिकयोरिव नीपरागः किन्तु अभिमानः is not an adequate explanation. For here the reflection produces only a seeming redness of the colourless crystal which was not the thing with the Vedāntists of the reflection school. But here though the metaphor is more suitable to express the relation of Puruṣa with the Prakṛiti, the exact nature of the relation is more lost sight of than comprehended. Let us now see how Patanjali and Vyāsa seek to explain it.

Let me quote a few Sūtras of Patanjali and some of the most important extracts from the Bhashya and try to get the correct view as much as possible :—

- (1) दृग्दर्शनशक्त्योरिकात्मतेव अस्मिता II. 6.
- (2) द्रष्टा दृशिमादःशब्दोपि प्रत्ययानुपश्यः II. 20.
- (3) तदर्थ एव दृश्यस्य आत्मा II. 21.
- (4) कृतार्थं पति नष्टमप्यनष्टं तदन्यसाधारणत्वात् II. 22.
- (5) स्वस्वामिशक्त्योः स्वरूपोपलब्धिहेतुः संयोगः II. 23.
- (6) तदभावात् संयोगाभावो हानं तद्वशैः कैवल्यं III. 25.
- (7) सत्त्वपुरुषयोः शुद्धिसाम्ये कैवल्यम् III. 55.
- (8) चित्तेरप्रतिसंक्रमयास्तदाकारापत्तौ स्वबुद्धिसंवेदनम् IV. 22.
- (9) सत्त्वपुरुषयोरत्यन्तासङ्कीर्णयोः प्रत्ययाविशेषोभोगपरार्थत्वात् स्वार्थसंयमात् पुरुषज्ञानम् III. 34.

(1) The Ego-Sense is the illusory appearance of identity of the subject and the object operating in the field of consciousness.

(2) The self as seer is absolute in its transcendent purity ; yet it is capable of re-perception in experience.

(3) For his sake only is the being of the knowable.

(4) For the emancipated person the world phenomena cease to exist, yet they are not annihilated since they form a common field of experience for other individuals.

principles of other systems of philosophy is, that it regards its Purusha not as one but as many. Let us try to discuss this point in connection with the arguments of the Sāṅkhya Pātanjala doctrine in favour of a separate principle of Purusha. Thus the Kārikā says :—संघातपरार्थत्वात् त्रिगुणादिविपर्ययादधिष्ठानात् ।
 उच्यते भोक्तृभावात् कैवल्यार्थं प्रवृत्तेः च ।* “ Because an assemblage of things is for the sake of another ; because the opposite of the three modes and the rest (their modifications) must exist ; because there must be a superintending power ; because there must be a nature that enjoys and because of (the existence of) active exertion for the sake of abstraction or isolation (from material contact) ; therefore the soul exists.” The first is an argument from design or teleology by which it is inferred that there must be some other simple entity for which these complex collocations of things are intended. Thus Gaudapāda says :—“ In like manner as a bed, which is an assemblage of bedding props, cotton, coverlet and pillows is for another’s use, not for its own and its several component parts render no mutual service ; thence it is concluded that there is a man who sleeps upon the bed and for whose sake it was made. So this world, which is an assemblage of the five elements, is for another’s use ; or there is a soul, for whose enjoyment this enjoyable body consisting of intellect and the rest has been produced.

The second argument is that all the knowable has three elements involved in it, first ; the element of Sattwa, by which we have the intelligence-staff causing all manifestations, second, the element of Rajas or energy which is always causing transformations and the third is the

* Karika 17.

Tamas element which is the mass which serves the potentiality for the Rajas to actualise. Now such a Prakriti composed of these three elements cannot be a seer itself. For the seer must be always the same unchangeable, actionless entity—the ever present constant factor in all stages of our consciousness.

Third argument.—There must be a supreme background of pure consciousness, standing on which all our experience may be co-ordinated and expressed. This background is the pure actionless Purusha by a reflection from which all our mental states become conscious. Davies however explains it a little differently in accordance with a simile in the Tattwa Kaumudi—यथा रथादि यन्त्रादिभिः and says :—“The idea of Kapila seems to be that the power of self-control cannot be predicated of matter which must be directed or controlled for the accomplishment of any purpose, and this controlling power must be something external to matter and diverse from it. The soul however never acts. It only seems to act; and it is difficult to reconcile this part of the system with that which gives to the soul a controlling force. If the soul is a charioteer it must be an active force.” But Davies here commits the mistake of carrying the simile too far. The comparison of the charioteer and the chariot holds good only to the extent that the chariot can take a particular course only when there is a particular purpose of the charioteer to perform. The motion of the chariot is fulfilled only when it is connected with the living person of the charioteer, whose purpose it has to fulfil.

Fourth argument.—Since Prakriti is non-intelligent there must be one who enjoys the pains and pleasures in her. Really speaking the emotional and conceptual determinations of these feelings are roused into

consciousness by the seeming reflection of the light of Purusha.

Fifth argument.—Because there is tendency in all persons to run towards the oneness of the Purusha, which is to be achieved by liberation; there must be one for whose sake the modifications of the Buddhi are gradually withheld and a reverse process set up by which they return back to their original cause Prakriti and thus liberate the Purusha. It is on account of this reverse tendency of Prakriti to release the Purusha that a man feels prompted to achieve his liberation as the highest consummation of his moral ideal.

Thus having proved the existence of the Purusha, the Kārikā proceeds to prove the plurality of the Purusha “अन्वमरणकरणानां प्रतिनियमाद्युगपत् प्रवृत्तेश्च पुरुषवद्वलंसिद्धं देगुणविवर्थावाञ्चैव” । “From the separate allotment of birth, death and the organs; from the diversity of occupations at the same time and also from the different conditions of the three modes, it is proved that there is a plurality of souls.” Or in other words since with the birth of one individual all are not born; since with the death of one all do not die and since each individual has separate sense organs for himself and since all beings do not work at the same time in the same manner and since the qualities of the different Gunas are possessed differently by different individuals, the Purushas are indeed many. Patanjali though he does not infer in this way the plurality of the Purushas, yet holds this view as in the Sutra कृतार्थं प्रतिनष्टमप्यनष्टं तदव्यसाधारणत्वात्.” “Although destroyed in relation to him whose objects have been achieved it is not destroyed being common to others.”

Davies in explaining the former Kārikā says, “There is, however, the difficulty that the soul is not affected by the three modes. How can their various modifications

prove the individuality of souls in opposition to the Vedantist doctrine that all souls are only portions of the one, an infinitely extended monad?"

Really this question is the most puzzling one in the Sāṅkhya doctrine. But a careful penetration into the principles of Sāṅkhya Yoga would bring home to us the idea that this is a necessary and consistent outcome of the Sāṅkhya view of a dualistic conception of the universe.

Examination of the plurality of the Purushas.

For if it is said that the Purusha is one and by its reflection into different Buddhis we have the notion of different selfs, then it follows that these notions of self, or personality are false. For the only true being is the being of the one Purusha. So the knower being false, the known also becomes false, the knower and the known being vanished, everything is reduced to that which we can in no way conceive, *viz.*, the Brahman. It may be argued that according to the Sāṅkhya philosophy also, the knower is false, for the pure Purusha as such is not in any way connected with the Prakriti. But even then it must be observed that the Sāṅkhya Yoga view does not hold that the knower is false but it analyses the nature of the ego and says that it is the seeming unity of the Buddhi and the Purusha, both of which are reals in the strictest sense of the terms. Purusha is justly called the knower there. It sees and simultaneously with it there is a modification of the Buddhi, this seeing becomes joined with this modification of the Buddhi and thus arises the ego who perceives that particular form of the modification of Buddhi. Purusha always remains the knower. The Buddhi suffers modifications and just at the same time the Buddhi catches a glimpse of the light of the Purusha, so that the Samyoga or contact of the Purusha and

the Prakriti is at one and the same point of time in which there is unity of the reflection of the Purusha and the particular transformation of the Buddhi.

The knower, the ego and the knowable, none of them are false in the Sāṅkhya Yoga system at the stage preceding, the Kaivalya when the Bud-

The Examination
continued.

dhi becomes as pure as the Purusha ; its modification, resembles the exact form of the Purusha and then the Purusha knows himself in his true nature in the Buddhi ; after which the Buddhi vanishes. The Vedānta has to admit the modifications of the Māyā but has at the same time to hold it as unreal. The Vedānti says that the Māyā is as beginningless as the Prakriti and is as सन्न (ending) as the Buddhi of the Sāṅkhyists with reference to the released person.

But according to the Vedānta Philosophy the knowledge of ego is only a false knowledge—an illusion imposed upon the formless Brahman as Many. The Māyā according to the Vedāntist can neither be said to exist nor to non-exist. She is अनिर्वाच्य, i.e., can never be described or defined. Such an unknown and unknowable Māyā by its reflection upon the Brahman causes the many of the world. But according to the Sāṅkhya doctrine, the Prakriti is as much real as the Purusha itself They are two irreducible metaphysical remainders—the Prakriti and the Purusha. Their connection is beginningless (अनादि संयोग). But this connection is not unreal in the Vedanta sense of the term. We see that according to the Vedanta system, all notions of ego or personality are false and they are originated by the illusive action of the Māyā, so that ultimately when they vanish there are no other remainders. But this is not the case with Sāṅkhya, for as the Purusha is the real seer, its cognitions cannot be dismissed as

unreal, and so the Purushas or the knowers as they appear to us must be held as real. As the Prakriti is not the Māyā of the Vedāntist (the nature of whose influence over the spiritual principle cannot be determined) we cannot account for the plurality of the Purushas by supposing that one Purusha is being reflected into many Buddhis and generating the many egos. For in that case it will be difficult to explain the plurality of their appearances in the Buddhis. For if there be one spiritual principle, how should we account for the supposed plurality of the Buddhis. For to serve the supposed one Purusha we should rather expect to find one Buddhi and not many, and this will only mean that there would be only one ego, his enjoyment and release. Supposing for argument's sake that there are many Buddhis and one Purusha which being reflected into them is the cause of the plurality of selfs, then also we cannot see how the Prakriti is moving for the enjoyment and release of one Purusha, it would rather appear to be moved for the sake of the enjoyment and release of the reflected or unreal self. For the Purusha is not finally released with the release of any number of particular individual selfs. For it may be released with reference to one individual but it may remain bound in connection with others. So the Prakriti would not really be moved in this suppositional case for the sake of the Purusha but for the sake of the reflected selfs only. If we want to suppose it to take place in such a way as to avoid the said difficulties, then also with the release of one Purusha, all Purushas will have to be released. For really in the supposed theory there would not be many different Purushas, but it was the one Purusha which had appeared as many, so that with his release all the other so-called Purushas have to be released. We see that if it is the enjoyment (भोग) and salvation (चरुणै) of one Purusha which

appear as so many different series of enjoyments and emancipations then with his experiences all should have the same experiences. With his birth and death, all should be born or all should die at once. For really speaking it is the experiences of one Purusha which appear in all the seeming different Purushas. And in the other suppositions there is neither emancipation nor enjoyment Purusha at all. For there, it is only the illusory self that enjoys or releases himself. By his release no Purusha is really released at all. So the fundamental conception of Prakriti as moving for the sake of the enjoyment and release of the Purusha, has to be abandoned.

So we see that from the position in which Kapila and Patanjali were standing, this plurality of the Purushas was the most consistent thing that they could think of. Any compromise with the Vedānta doctrine here would have greatly changed the philosophical aspect and value of the Sankhya Philosophy. As the Purushas are nothing but pure intelligences they can as well be all pervading though many. But there is another objection that number is a conception of the phenomenal mind, how then can it be applied to the Purushas which are said to be many. But that difficulty remains unabated even though we should regard the Purusha as one. When we go into the domains of metaphysics and try to represent the Reality with the symbols of our phenomenal conceptions we have really to commit almost a violence to it. But this must have to be allowed in all our attempts to philosophise to express in terms of our conceptions that pure inexpressible free illumination which exists in and for itself beyond the range of any mediation by the concepts of images of our mind. So we see that the Sankhya was not inconsistent in holding the doctrine of the plurality of the Purushas. Patanjali does not say anything about it, since

he is more anxious to say about other things connected with the pre-supposition of the plurality of the Purusha. Thus he speaks of it only in one place as we have quoted above and says that though for a released person this world disappeared altogether, still it remains unchanged with all the other Purushas in common. Now Patanjali proceeds to prove the validity of an external world as

Reality of an objective world. against the idealistic Buddhists.

Thus in Sutra 12 of the Chapter on Kaivalya he writes :—“The past and the future exist in reality, since all qualities of things manifest themselves in these three different ways. The future is the manifestation which is to be. The past is the appearance which has been experienced. The present is that which is in active operation. It is this threefold substance which is the object of knowledge. If they did not exist in reality, there would not exist a knowledge thereof. How could there be knowledge in the absence of anything that might be known. For this reason, the past and present in reality exist.

Thus the भाष्य says भविष्यद्वाक्तिकमनागतं अनुभूतव्यक्तिकमतीतं स्वव्यापारोपाहृद् वर्तमानं त्रयं चैतदवस्तु ज्ञानस्वत्रयम् यदि चैतत् स्वरूपतो ना भविष्यद्भेदं निर्विषयं ज्ञानमुदपत्स्यत तस्मादतीतानागतं स्वरूपतोऽस्तीति ।

So we see that the present holding within itself the past and the future exists in reality. For the past though it has been negated has really been conserved and kept in the present and the future also though it has not made its appearance yet exists in potentiality in the present. So, as we know the past and the future worlds in the present, they both exist and subsist in the present. That which once existed cannot die and that which did never exist cannot come to be (नास्त्यसतः संभवः न चास्ति सतो विनाशः). So the past has not been destroyed

Present, Past and Future.

but it has rather shifted its place and hidden itself in the body of the present, and the future that has not made its appearance exists in the present only in a potential form. It cannot be argued, as Vāchaspati says, that because the past and the future are not present therefore they do not exist, for if the past and future do not exist how can there be a present also, since its existence also is only relative? So all the three exist as truly as any one of them, and the only difference among them is the different way or mode of their existence. यदि तु वर्तमानत्वाभावात् अतीतानागतयः असत्यः इत्यभो वर्तमानस्याप्यभावोऽतीतानागतत्वाभावात् । अथ-विशिष्टतया तु सत्त्वं त्रयाणामप्यविशिष्टं ।

Now he proceeds to refute the arguments of those idealists who hold that since the external knowables do never exist independently of our knowledge of them, their separate external existence as such may be denied. Again since it is by knowledge alone that the external knowables can present themselves to us we can infer that there is really no knowable external reality apart from its knowledge, just as we see that in dream states, knowledge can exist apart from the reality of any external world.

So it may be argued that there is really no external reality as it appears to us. The Buddhists hold that the blue thing and its knowledge as blue are identical owing to the maxim that things which are invariably perceived together are one.

सङ्घोपलम्भनियमादभेदीनीलतद्वियोः

So they say that the external reality is not different from our idea about it. To this it

Reality of the Ex-
ternal world.

may be replied that if as you say, the external reality is identical with our ideas and there is no other external reality existing as such outside my ideas, then why does it appear

as existing apart, outside and independent of my ideas ? The idealists have no ground to deny the external reality and assert that it is only the creation of our imagination like the experiences in the state of dream. Even our ideas carry with them the notion that the reality is outside our mental experiences. All our percepts and notions as this and that, arise only by virtue of the influence of the external world ; how can they deny the existence of external world as such ? The objective world is present by its own power. How is it then that this objective world can be given up on the strength of mere logical or speculative abstraction ?

Thus the Bhashya says :—There is no object without the knowledge of it, but there is knowledge without any corresponding object as imagined in dreams ; thus the reality of external things is like that of dream objects but mere imaginations of the subject and unreal. How can they who say so be believed ? Since they first suppose that the things which present themselves to us by their own force do so only on account of the invalid and delusive imagination of the intellect and then deny the reality of the external world on the strength of such an imaginary supposition of their own. नास्त्यर्थो विज्ञानविसहचरः, अस्ति तु ज्ञानम् अर्थविसहचरं स्वप्नादौ कल्पितमित्यनया दिशावल्लुखरूपमपङ्गवते, ज्ञानपरिकल्पनामात्रं वस्तु स्वप्रविषयोपमं न परमार्थतोऽस्तीति य आहु स्ते तथेति प्रत्युपस्थितम् इदं स्वमहात्म्येन वस्तु कथम् अप्रमाणात्मकेन विकल्पज्ञानबलेन वस्तुस्वरूपमुत्सृज्य तदेवापलपन्तः शब्देयवचनाः स्युः ।

The external world has generated the knowledge by its own presentative power (अर्थेन स्वकीययायासाद्यशक्त्या विज्ञानमजनि) and thus caused itself to be represented in our ideas and we have no right to deny it. Commenting on the Bhashya quoted above, Vāchaspati says that the method of agreement applied by the Buddhists by their सङ्घोपलम्बनियम

(maxim of simultaneous perception) may have a chance of being contradicted by an application of the method of difference. The method of agreement applied by the idealists when put in proper form sounds like this:—Wherever there is knowledge there is external reality or rather every case of knowledge agrees with or is the same as every case of the presence of external reality, so knowledge is the cause of the presence of the external reality, *i.e.*, the external world depends for its reality on our knowledge or ideas and owes its origin or appearance as such to them. But Vāchaspati says that this application of the method of agreement is not certain for it cannot be corroborated by the method of difference. For the statement that every case of absence of knowledge is also a case of absence of external reality cannot be proved, *i.e.*, we cannot prove that the external reality does not exist when we have no knowledge of it. (सद्दोषलक्ष-
नियमस्य वेद्यत्वं च हंतुसंदिग्धव्यतिरेकतयानैकान्तिकी).

Describing the nature of grossness and externality,
the attributes of the external world,
Continued. he says that grossness means the
pervading of more portions of space than one, *i.e.*, grossness
means extension, and externality means being related to
separate space, *i.e.*, co-existence in space (नानादेशव्यापिता खौल्यं
विच्छिन्नदेशता च बाह्यत्वम्). Thus we see that extension and co-
existence in space are the two fundamental qualities of the
gross external world. Now a percept or concept can never
be said to possess them, for it cannot be said that an idea
has been extending in more space than one and yet co-
existing separately in separate places. An idea cannot
be said to exist with other ideas in space and to extend
in many points of space at one and the same time.
To avoid this it cannot be said that there may be

plurality of ideas so that some may co-exist and others may extend in space. For co-existence and extension can never be asserted of our ideas, since they are very fine and subtle, and can be known only at the time of their individual operation, at which time however other ideas may be quite latent and unknown. Imagination has no power to negate their reality, for the sphere of imagination is quite distinct from the sphere of external reality, and it can never be applied to an external reality to negate it. Imagination is a mental function and as such has no touch with the reality outside, which it can by no means negate.

It cannot also be said that because grossness and externality can abide neither in the world external nor in our ideas therefore it is false. For this falsehood cannot be thought to be separable from our ideas, for in that case our ideas would be as false as the false itself. The notion of externality and grossness pervades all our ideas and if they are held to be false no true thing can be known by our ideas and they therefore become equally false.

Again knowledge and the external world because they happen to be presented together can never be said to be identical. For the method of agreement cannot by itself prove identity.

Continued. Knowledge and the knowable external world may be independently co-existing things like the notions of existence and non-existence. Both of them are independently co-existing naturally with each other. It is therefore clear enough says Vāchaspati that the force of perception which gives us a direct knowledge of things can never be undervalued on the strength of mere logical abstraction.

We further see, says Patanjali, that the thing remains the same though the ideas and feelings of different men may change differently about it

Continued.

(वस्तुसाय्ये चित्तभेदात् तयोः विभक्तः पन्थाः). Thus

A, B, C, may perceive the same identical woman and may feel pleasure, pain or hatred. We see that the same common thing generates different feelings and ideas in different persons ; external reality cannot be said to owe its origin to the idea or imagination of any one man, but exists independently of any person's imagination in and for itself. For if it be due to the imagination of any particular man it is his own idea which as such cannot generate the same ideas in another man. So it must be said that the external reality is what we perceive it outside and our knowledge about it is mere percepts. The two can never be mixed together.

There are again others who say that just as pleasure and pain rise along with our ideas and must be said to be due to them so the objective world also must be said to have come into existence along with our ideas. The objective world therefore according to these philosophers has no external existence either in the past or in the future, but has only a momentary existence in the present due to our ideas about them. That much existence only are they ready to attribute to external objects which can be measured by the idea of the moment. The moment I have an idea of a thing, the thing rises into existence and may be said to exist only for that moment and as soon as the idea disappears the object also vanishes, for when it cannot be presented to me in the form of ideas it can be said to exist in no sense. But this argument cannot hold good for if really the objective reality should depend upon the idea of any individual man, then the objective reality corresponding to an idea of his ought to cease to

exist either with the change of his idea or when he directs attention to some other thing, or when he restrains his mind from all objects of thought. Now then if it thus ceases to exist, how can it again spring into existence when the attention of the individual is again directed towards it. Again all parts of an object can never be seen all at once. Then supposing that the front side of a thing is visible, then the back side which cannot be seen at the time must not be said to exist at all. So if the back side does not exist, the front side also can as well be said not to exist (वे चास्यानुपस्थिताभागास्तेषास्य न स्युरिवं नास्ति पृष्ठम् इति उदरमपि न गृह्यते). Therefore it must be said that there is an independent external reality which is the common field of observation for all souls in general; and there are also separate "Chittas" for separate individual souls (तस्मात् स्वतन्त्रोर्थः सर्वपुरुषसाधारणः स्वतन्त्राणि च चित्तानि प्रतिपुरुषं प्रवर्तन्ते). And all the experiences of the Purusha result from the connection of this "Chitta" with the external world.

Now from this view of the reality of the external world we are confronted with another question—what is the ground which underlies the manifold appearance of this external world which has been proved to be real. What is that something which is thought as the vehicle of such qualities as produce in us the ideas. What is that self-subsistent substrate which is the basis of so many changes, actions and re-actions that we always meet in the external world. Locke called this substrate Substance and regarded it as unknown, but said that though it did not follow that it was a product of our own subjective thought yet it did not at the same time exist without us. Hume however tried to explain everything from the standpoint of association of ideas and denied all notions

Different views about
substratum.

of substantiality. We know that Kant who was much influenced by Hume, agreed to the existence of some such unknown reality which he was pleased to call the Thing-in-itself, the nature of which however was absolutely unknowable, but whose influence was a great factor in all our experiences.

But the Bhāshya tries to penetrate deeper into the nature of this substrate or substance and says :—*धर्मिस्वरूपमात्रो हि धर्मः, धर्मिविक्रिया एव एषा धर्मद्वारा प्रपञ्चते.* The characteristic qualities form the very being itself of the characterised and it is the change of the characterised alone that is detailed by means of the characteristic. To understand thoroughly the exact significance of this statement it will be necessary to take a more detailed review of what has already been said about the Gunas. We know that all things mental or physical are formed by the different collocations of Sattwa of the nature of illumination (प्रकाश), Rajas,—the energy or the mutative principle of the nature of action (क्रिया) and Tamas,—the obstructive principle of the nature of inertia स्थिति which in their original and primordial state are too fine to be apprehended (गुणानां परमं रूपं न दृष्टिपथमस्त्विति). These different Gunas combine themselves in various proportions and form the manifold universe of the knowable and thus are made the objects of our cognition. Though combining in different proportions they become in the words of Dr. B. N. Seal more and more differentiated, determinate and coherent and thus make themselves cognisable yet they never forsake their own true nature as the Gunas. So we see that they have thus got two natures, one in which they remain quite unchanged as Gunas, and another in which they collocate and combine themselves in various ways and thus appear under the veil of a multitude of qualities and

The view of the
Bhāshyakara.

states of the manifold knowable (सर्वमिदं गुणानां सन्निवेश विशेषनात्मनि परमार्थतो गुणात्मानः, ते व्यक्तसूत्रागुणात्मानः).

Now these Gunas take three different courses of development from the ego or अहङ्कार according to which the ego or अहङ्कार may be said to be सत्त्विक, राजस and तामस. Thus from the सत्त्विक side of the ego or अहङ्कार by a preponderance of सत्त्व the five knowledge-giving senses, *e.g.*, ear, eye, touch, taste and smell are derived. From the Rajas side of ego by a preponderance of Rajas the five active senses of speech, etc. From the Tamas side of ego or अहङ्कार by a preponderance of Tamas, the five Tanmātras. From which again by a preponderance of Tamas the atoms of five gross elements earth, water, fire, air and ether are derived.

In the derivation of these it must be remembered that all the three Gunas are conjointly responsible. In the derivation of a particular product one of the Gunas may indeed be predominant, and thus may bestow the prominent characteristic of that product, but the other two Gunas are also present there and perform their functions equally well. Their opposition does not withhold the progress of evolution but rather helps it. All the three combine together in varying degrees of mutual preponderance and thus together help the process of evolution to produce a single product. Thus we see that though the Gunas are three, they combine to produce on the side of perception ; the senses ; such as those of hearing, sight, etc., and on the side of the knowable, the individual Tanmātras of Gandha, Rasa, Rūpa, Śparsa and Śabda. The Gunas composing each Tanmātra again agreeably combine with each other with a preponderance of Tamas to produce the atoms of each gross element. Thus in each combination one Guna remains as

prominent, whereas others remain as dependent on it but help it indirectly in the evolution of that particular product.

Now this evolution may be characterised in two ways :—(1) Those which are modifications or products of some other cause and are themselves capable of originating other products like themselves ; (2) Those which though themselves derived, yet cannot themselves be the cause of the origination of other existence like themselves. The former may be said to be slightly (अविशेष) specialised and the latter thoroughly specialised, (विशेष).

Thus we see that from Prakriti comes Mahat, from Mahat comes Ahankāra and from Ahankāra we have seen above, the evolution takes three different courses according to the preponderance of Sattwa, Rajas and Tamas originating the cognitive and conative senses and Manas, the Superintendent of them both on one side and the Tanmātras on the other. These Tanmātras again produce the five gross elements. Now when Ahankāra produces the Tanmātras or the senses, or when the Tanmātras produce the five gross elements, or when Ahankāra itself is produced from Buddhi or Mahat, it is called Tattwāntara-pariṇāma, *i.e.*, the production of a different Tattwa or substance.

Thus in the case of Tattwāntara-pariṇāma (as for example when the Tanmātras are produced from Ahankār), it must be carefully noticed that the state of being involved in the Tanmātras is altogether different from the state of being of Ahankāra ; it is not a mere change of quality but a change of existence or state of being. Thus though the Tanmātras are derived from Ahankāra the traces of Ahankāra cannot be easily traced in them. This

derivation is not such that the Ahankāra remains principally unchanged and there is only a change of quality of the Ahankāra, but it is a different existence altogether having properties which differ widely from those of Ahankār. So it is called Tattwāntara-pariṇāma, *i.e.*, evolution of different categories of existence.

Now the evolution that the senses and the five gross elements can undergo can never be of this nature, for they are Viśeṣhas, or substances which have been too much specialised to allow the evolution of any other substance of a different grade of existence from themselves. With them there is an end of all emanation. So we see that the Aviśeṣhas or slightly specialised ones are those which being themselves but emanations can yet yield other emanations from themselves. Thus we see that Mahat, Ahankār and the five Tanmātras are themselves emanations, as well as the source of other emanations. Mahat however though it is undoubtedly an Aviśeṣha or slightly specialised emanation is called by another technical name Liṅga or sign, for from the state of Mahat, the Prakṛiti from which it must have emanated may be inferred. Prakṛiti however from which no other primal state is inferrible is called the Aliṅga (अलिङ्ग) or that which is not a sign for the existence of any other primal and more unspecialised state. In one sense all the emanations can be with justice called the Liṅgas or states of existence standing as the sign by which the causes from which they have emanated can be directly inferred. Thus in this sense the five gross elements may be called the Liṅga of the Tanmātras, and they again of the ego and that again of the Mahat, for the unspecialised ones are inferred from their specialised modifications or emanations. But this technical name Liṅga is reserved for the Mahat from which the Aliṅga or Prakṛiti can be inferred. This Prakṛiti however is the

eternal state which is not an emanation itself but the basis and source of all other emanations.

The Liṅga and the Aliṅga have thus been compared in the Kārikā :—

हेतुमदनित्यमव्यापि सक्रियमनेकाग्रितं लिङ्गं
सावयवं परतन्त्रं व्यक्तं विपरीतमव्यक्तम् ॥

The Liṅga has a cause, it is neither eternal nor universal, is mobile, multiform, dependent, attributive conjunct—and subordinate. Whereas the Aliṅga is the reverse. The Aliṅga or Prakriti however being the cause has some characteristics in common with its Liṅgas as contradistinguished from the Purushas, which is a separate principle altogether.

Thus the—Kārikā says :—

त्रिगुणमविवेकविषयः सामान्यमचेतनं प्रसवधर्मि ।
व्यक्तंतथाप्रधानं तद्विपरीतस्तथा पुमान् ॥

The manifested and the unmanifested Pradhāna are both composed of the three Gunas, indiscriminating, objective, generic, unconscious and productive. Soul in these respects is the reverse. We have seen above that Prakriti is the state of the equilibrium of the Gunas, which can in no way be of any use to the Purusha, and is thus held to be eternal though all other states are held to be non-eternal as they are produced for the sake of the Purusha.

The state of Prakriti is that in which the Gunas perfectly overpower each other and the characteristics (धर्म) and the characterised (धर्मी) are one and the same.

Evolution is thus nothing but the manifestation of change, mutation, or the energy of Rajas. The Rajas is the one mediating activity that breaks up all compounds, builds up new ones and initiates original modifications.

Evolution and what it means.

Whenever in any particular combination the proportion

of Sattva, Rajas or Tamas alters, as a condition of this alteration, there is the dominating activity of Rajas, by which the old equilibrium is destroyed and another equilibrium established, this in its own turn is again disturbed and again another equilibrium is restored. Now the manifestation of this latent activity of Rajas is what is called change or evolution. In the external world the time that is taken by a Tanmātra or atom to move from its place is identical with a unit of change. Now an atom will be that quantum which is smaller or finer than that point or limit at which it can in any way be perceived by the senses. They are therefore mere points without magnitude or dimension and the unit of time or moment (क्षण) that is taken up in changing the position of these atoms or Tanmātras is identical with one unit of change or evolution. The change or evolution in the external world must therefore be measured by these units of spatial motion of the atoms ; *i.e.*, an atom changing its own unit of space is the measure of all physical change or evolution.

In the mental world however each unit of time corresponding to this change of an atom of its own unit of space is the unit measure of change.

Thus Vāchaspati says यथा अपकर्षपर्यन्तं द्रव्यं परमाणुः एवं परमाणुकार्षपर्यन्तः कालः क्षणो यावता च समयेन क्षणितपरमाणुः पूर्व्वदेशं ज्ञात् उत्तरदेशमुपसंपद्येत स कालः क्षणः। Now this instantaneous succession of time as discrete moments one following the other is the notion of the series of moments or pure and simple succession. Now the notion of these discrete moments is the real notion of time. Even the notion of succession is one that does not really exist but is imagined for the moment that is come into being just when the moment just before had passed ; they have never taken place together. Thus Vyāsa says क्षणतत्कमयोर्नित्तं वस्तुसमाहारः

इति बुद्धिसमाहारो मुहूर्तादीरावाद्यः । सत्वयं कालः वस्तुष्वन्योपि बुद्धिनिर्माणः
शब्दज्ञानानुपातीलौकिकानां व्युत्थितदर्शनानां वस्तुस्वरूप इवावभासते । The
moments and their succession do not belong to the category
of actual things ; Muhurta, or moments, the day and night
are all aggregates of mental conceptions. This time which is
not a substantive reality in itself, but is only a mental
concept and which is represented to us through language
appears to ordinary minds as if it were an objective reality.

So the conception of time as discrete is the real one,
whereas the conception of time as
Time as discrete and
Time as succession and
Time as continuous
which is purely Bud-
dhi-Nirman.
successive or as continuous is unreal,
being only due to the imagination
of our empirical and relative con-
sciousness. Thus Vāchaspati further
explains it. A moment viewed in relation to things is
said to appear as succession. Succession involves the
notion of change of moments and this is called time by
those sages who know what time was. Two moments
cannot happen together. There cannot be any succession
of two simultaneous things. Succession means the notion
of change involving a preceding and a succeeding moment.
Thus there is only the present moment and there are no
preceding and later moments. Therefore there cannot be
any union of these moments. The past and the future
moments are those that are associated with change. Thus
in one moment, the whole world suffers changes. All
these characteristics are associated with the thing as
connected with the present moment.

अणस्तु वस्तुपतितः क्रमावलम्बी । क्रमस्य क्षणान्तर्यात्मा तं कालविदः काल
इत्याक्षयते योगिनः न च क्षीणो सद्भवतः । क्रमस्य न द्वयोः सद्भुवोरसम्भवात् ।
पूर्वखाटुत्तरभाविनी यदानन्तर्यं अणस्य स क्रमः । तस्मात् वर्तमान एव एकः अणो न
पुनोत्तरअणाः सन्तीति, तस्मान्नास्ति तत्समाहारः । ये तु भूतभाविनः अणासो
परिणामान्विता व्याख्येयाः तेन एकेन अणिन कृत्स्नो लोकः परिणाममनुभवति ।
तत्क्षणीपादुता खल्वनीसम्बन्धर्थाः ।

So we find here that time is essentially discrete being only the moments of our cognitive life. As two moments never co-exist, there is no succession or continuous time. They exist therefore only in our empirical consciousness which cannot take the real moments in their discrete nature that connect the one with the other and thus imagine succession or time as continuous.

Now we have said before, that each unit of change or evolution is measured by this unit of time क्षण or moment; or rather the unit of change is expressed in terms of these moments or Kshanas. Of course in our ordinary consciousness these moments of change cannot be grasped, but it can be reasonably inferred. For at the end of a certain period we observe a change in a thing; now this change though it becomes appreciable to us after a long while, was still going on every moment, so, in this way, the succession of evolution or change cannot be distinguished from the moments coming one after another. Thus Patanjali says in IV. 33. Succession involving a course of changes is associated with a collocation of moments (sutra 30-30). Succession as change of moments is grasped only by a course of changes. A cloth which has not passed through a series of moments cannot be considered as old (Bhāshya on the above). Even a new cloth kept with good care becomes old after a time. This is what is called the termination of a course of changes and by it the succession of a course of changes can be grasped. Even before a thing is old there can be inferred a sequence of the subtlest, subtler, subtle, grossest, grosser and gross changes (Vāchaspati's Tattvavisardi).

अथप्रतियोगी परिणामापरान्तनिर्याद्यः क्रमः ॥ अथान्तर्यात्मा परिणामस्यापरान्तेन अवसानेन दृश्यते क्रमः । नञ्जनशुभ्रतक्रमश्चथा पुराणतावस्वस्थान्ते भवति । (भाष्य) ॥ नवस्व हि वस्वस्य प्रयत्नसंरक्षितस्यापि चिरिण पुराणता दृश्यते । सोऽयं परिणामस्या-

is only the history of the different collocations of the Gunas. Now therefore if it is possible for a seer to see in one vision the possible number of combinations that the Rajas will have with Sattwa he can in one moment perceive the past, present or future of this cosmic evolutionary process ; for with such minds all past and future are concentrated at one point of vision which to an empirical consciousness appears only in the series. For the empirical consciousness, impure as it is, it is impossible that all the powers and potencies of Sattwa and Rajas will become manifested at one point of time ; it has to take things only through its senses and can thus take the changes only as their senses are affected by them ; whereas on the other hand if its power of knowing was not restricted to the limited scope of the senses it could have read and perceived all the possible collocations or changes all at once. Such a perceiving mind whose power of knowing is not narrowed by the senses can perceive all the finest modifications or changes that are going on in the body of a substance—see Yoga Sutra III. 53.

Kapila and Patanjali proceeded possibly at first with an acute analysis of their phenomena of knowledge. They perceived that all our cognitive states are distinguished from their objects by the fact of their being intelligent. This intelligence is the constant factor which persists amidst all changes of our cognitive states. We are passing continually from one state to another without any rest, but in this varying change of these states we are never divested of intelligence. This fact of intelligence is therefore neither the particular possession of any one of these states nor that of the sum of these states ; for if it is not the possession of any one of these states ; it cannot be the

Analysis of conscious states.

possession of the sum of these ; states, in the case of the released person again there is no mental state, but there is the self-shining intelligence. So they regarded this intelligence as quite distinct from the so-called mental states which became intelligent by coming in connection with this intelligence. The actionless, absolutely pure and simple intelligence they called the Purusha.

Now they began to analyse the nature of these states to find out their constituent elements or moments of existence if possible. *Movement of Thought Rajas.* Now in analysing the different states of our mind we find that a particular content of thought is illuminated and then passed over. The ideas rise, are illuminated and pass away. Thus they found that "movement" was one of the most principal elements that constituted the substance of our thoughts. Thought as such is always moving. This principle of movement, mutation or change, this energy, they called Rajas.

Now apart from this Rajas, thought when seen as *The Sattva side of thought.* divested from its sensuous contents seems to exhibit one universal mould or Form of knowledge which assumes the form of all the sensuous contents that are presented before it. It is the one universal of all our particular concepts or ideas—the basis or substratum of all the different shapes imposed upon itself, the pure and simple. Is-ness (sattva) in which there is no particularity is that element of our thought which resembling Purusha most, can attain its reflection within itself and thus makes the unconscious mental states intelligible. All the contents of our thought are but modes and limitations of this universal form and are thus made intelligible. It is the one principle of intelligibility of all our conscious states.

Now our intellectual life consists in a series of shining ideas or concepts ; concepts after concepts are shining forth in the light of the Pure Intelligence and pass away. But each concept is but a limitation of the pure shining universal of our knowledge which underlies all its changing modes or modifications of concepts or judgments. This is what is called the pure knowledge in which there is neither the knower nor the known. This pure object—subject-less knowledge differs from the Pure Intelligence or Purusha only in this that later on it is liable to suffer various modifications, as the ego, the senses, and the infinite percepts and concepts, etc., connected therewith, whereas the Pure Intelligence remains ever pure and changeless and is never the substrate of any change. At this stage Sattwa, the intelligence stuff is prominent and the Rajas and Tamas are altogether suppressed. It is for this reason that the Buddhi or Intellect is often spoken of as the Sattwa. Being an absolute preponderance of Sattwa it has nothing else to manifest, but it is pure shining itself. Both Tamas and Rajas being altogether suppressed then cannot in any way affect the effulgent nature of this pure shining of contentless knowledge in which there is neither the knower nor the known.

But it must be remembered that it is holding suspended as it were within itself the elements of Rajas and Tamas which cannot manifest themselves owing to the preponderance of the Sattwa.

This notion of pure contentless knowledge is immediate and abstract and as such is at once mediated by other necessary phases. Thus we see that this pure contentless universal knowledge is the same as the ego-universal. For this contentless universal knowledge is only another

The Tamas side of our thought in connection with the Sattwa side.

The Pure Sattwa or the contentless knowledge.

name for the contentless unlimited, infinite of the ego-universal. Thus Fichte also says in the introduction of his Science of Ethics :—“ How an objective can ever become a subjective, or how a being can ever become an object of representation: this curious change will never be explained by any one who does not find a point where the objective and subjective are not distinguished at all, but are altogether one. Now such a point is established by, and made the starting point of our system. This point is the Egohood, the Intelligence, Reason, or whatever it may be named.”

Thus the Bhashya II. 19, describes it as लिङ्गमात्रं महत्त्वं तद्धिते सत्तामात्रे महति आत्मनि and again in I. 36 we find निश्चरत्तमहोदधिकत्वं शातमनन्तमक्षितामात्रं भवति। यत्तेदमुक्तं “तमष्टमात्रमात्मानमनुविद्य अक्षीत्येवं तावत् संज्ञानोऽक्षितामात्रपरिणामो महत्त्वं। Thus the word अष्टमात्र by which Panchasikha described this Egohood about three thousand years ago is only repeated in Germany in the words of Fichte as the point where the subjective and the objective are not distinguished,—the pure Egohood or अक्षितामात्र as in Patanjali (Sutra IV. 4). This Mahat has also been spoken of by Vijnānā Bhikshu as the मनः or Mind in the sense of final अवसाय or निश्चय, i.e.,

Mahat, Manas, Asmitāmātra and Buddhi.

assimilation. Now what we have already said about Mahat will, we hope, make it clear that this Mahat is the last

limit up to which the subjective and the objective can be assimilated as one indistinguishable point which is neither the one nor the other, but which is the source of them both.

This Buddhi is thus variously called as महत्, अक्षितामात्र, मनः, सत्त्व, बुद्धि and लिङ्ग according to the aspects from which this state is looked at.

This state is called Mahat as it is the most universal thing conceivable and the one common source from which all other things originate.

Now this phase of Sattwa or pure shining naturally steps into the other phase, that of the Ego as knower or Ego as the subject. The first phase as महत् or अक्षितानाव was the state in which the सत्त्व was predominant and the Rajas and Tamas are in a suppressed condition. The next moment is that in which the Rajas comes uppermost and thus the Ego as the subject of all cognition—the subject I—the knower of all the mental states is derived. The contentless subject-object-less “I” is the passive सत्त्व aspect of the Buddhi catching the reflection of the spirit or Purusha.

In its active aspect however it feels itself one with the spirit and appears as the Ego or the subject which knows, feels and wills. Thus Patanjali says “दृग्दर्शनशक्तोरिकात्मतव अक्षिता” ।

The aspect of the seeming identification of the Buddhi and the Purusha.

पुरुषो, दृक्शक्तिः, बुद्धिः दर्शनशक्तिरित्येतयोरिकात्मरूपापत्तिरेव अक्षिता. Again in भाष्य I. 17

we have एकात्मिका संबिदक्षिता, which Vāchaspati explains as—साच आत्मना यद्दीवा सह बुद्धेरिकात्मिका संबिदत्. Thus we find that the Buddhi is affected by its own Rajas or activity and posits itself as the Ego or the subject as the activity. By this position of the “I” as active it perceives itself in the objective; in all its conative and cognitive senses, in its thoughts and feelings and also in the external world of extension and co-existence or in the words of Panchasikha व्यक्तमव्यक्तं वा सत्त्वमात्मत्वेनाभिप्रतीत्य तस्य संपदमनुनन्दत्यात्म संपदं मन्वानस्तस्य व्यापदमनुशीचत्यात्मव्यापदं मन्वानः । Here the “I” is posited as the active entity which becomes conscious of itself or in other words the “I” becomes self-conscious. In analysing this notion of self-consciousness we find that here the Rajas or the element of agility, activity or mobility has become predominant and this predominance of Rajas has been manifested by the inherent Sattwa. Thus we find that the Rajas side or “I as

active" has become manifested or known as such, *i.e.*, "I" becomes conscious of itself as active. And this is just what is meant by self-consciousness.

This ego or self-consciousness then comes off as the modification of the contentless pure consciousness of the

The egohood and the ego.

Buddhi; it is therefore that we see that this self-consciousness is but a modification of the universal Buddhi.

The absolute identity of subject and object as the egohood is not a part of our natural consciousness for in all stages of our actual consciousness even in that of self-consciousness there is an element of the preponderance of *Rajas* or Activity which directs this unity as the knower and the known and then unites them as it were. Only so far as I distinguish myself as the conscious, from myself as the object of consciousness am I at all conscious of myself. Thus, Fichte says:—"The whole mechanism of consciousness rests upon the manifold views of this separation and reunion of the subjective and the objective."

When we see that the Buddhi transforms itself into the ego, the subject, or the knower at this its first phase

The emanation of the "I."

there is no other content which it can know, it therefore knows itself in a very abstract way as the "I" or in other words, the ego becomes self-

conscious; but at this moment the ego has no content; the *Tamas* being quite under suppression, it is evolved by a preponderance of the *Rajas*; and thus its nature as *Rajas* is manifested by the *Sattwa* and thus the ego now essentially knows itself to be active, and holds itself as the permanent energising activity which connects with itself all the phenomena of our life.

But now when the ego first directs itself towards itself and becomes conscious of itself, one question which naturally comes to our mind is, "Can the

The Subjective and the objective sides proceed out of the "I" in consequence of the twofold aspect of the Gunas.

ego direct itself towards itself and thus divide itself into a part that sees and one that is seen." To meet this question it is assumed that the Gunas contain within themselves the germs of both subjectivity and objec-

tivity गुणानां हि द्वैरूप्यं व्यवसायात्मकत्वं व्यवसेयात्मकत्वं । Thus we find that in the ego this quality as the perceiver of the Gunas comes to be first manifested and the ego turns back upon itself and makes itself its own object. It is at this stage that we are reminded of the twofold nature of the Gunas :— गुणानां हि द्वैरूप्यं व्यवसायात्मकता व्यवसेयात्मकता च ।

It is by virtue of this twofold nature that the subject can make itself its own object; but as these two sides have not yet developed they are as yet only abstract and exist only in an implicit way in this self-consciousness.

Enquiring further into the nature of the relation of this ego and the Buddhi, we find that the ego is only an-

Ego only a modification of Buddhi.

other phase or modification of the Buddhi; however different it might appear from Buddhi it is only an appearance or phase of it; its reality

is the reality of the Buddhi. Thus we see that when the knower is affected in its different modes of concepts and judgments, the application is of the Buddhi as well; thus Vyāsa writes :—यद्व्यवधारकोद्भासोद्भवत्वज्ञानाभिनिवेशा बुद्धौ वर्तमाना पुरुषे चकारोपितसङ्गाताः ।

Now from this ego we find that three developments take place in three distinct directions according to the preponderance of Sattwa, Rajas or Tamās.

Modifications of the Ego.

By the preponderance of Rajas, the Ego develops itself into the five conative senses, Vāk (speech), Pāni (hands), Pāda (feet), Pāyu (organ of passing the excreta) and Upastha (generative organ). By the preponderance of Sattwa, the Ego develops itself into the five cognitive senses;—hearing, touch, sight, taste and smell and by a preponderance of Tamas it stands as the Bhūtādi and produces the five Tanmātras and these again by further preponderance of Tamas develops into the particles of the five gross elements of earth, water, light-heat, air and ether.

Now it is clear that when the self becomes conscious of itself as the object, we see that there are three phases in it, (i) that in which the self becomes an object to itself, (ii) when it directs itself or turns itself as the subject upon itself as the object, this moment of activity which can effect an aspect of change in itself, (iii) the aspect of the consciousness of the self, the moment in which it perceives itself in its object, the moment of the union of itself as the subject and itself as the object in one luminosity of self-consciousness. Now that phase of self in which it is merely an object to itself is the phase of its union with Prakriti which further develops the Prakriti in moments of materiality by a preponderance of the inert Tamas of the Bhūtādi into Tanmātras and these again into the five grosser elements which are then called the वाच्य or the perceptible.

The Sattwa side of this ego or self-consciousness which was now undifferentiated becomes further differentiated, specialised and modified into the five cognitive senses with their respective functions of hearing, touch, sight, taste and smell, synchronising with the evolution of the Prakriti on the Tanmātric side of evolution. These again

The modification as the senses.

The five Bhūtas.

individually suffer infinite modifications themselves and thus cause an infinite variety of sensations in their respective spheres in our conscious life. The *Rajas* side of the ego or the will becomes specialised as the active faculties of the five different conative organs.

There is another specialisation of the Ego as the *Manas* which is its direct instrument for connecting itself with the five cognitive and conative senses. What is perceived as mere sensations by the senses is connected and generalised and formed into concepts by the *manas*; it is therefore spoken of as सर्वार्थ in the भाष्य and उभयात्मकं मनः संकल्पकम् in the Kārikā.

Now though the evolutes or modifications of *Ahankāra* or Ego are formed by the preponderance of सत्त्व, रजस् and तमस्, yet the रजस् is always the सहकारि or instrumental of all these varied collocations of the *Gunas*; it is the supreme principle of Energy and supplies even intelligence with the energy which it requires for its own conscious activity. Thus *Lokāchāryya* says: The *Tāmāsa* Ego developing into the material world and the *Sāttwika* Ego developing into the 11 senses, both require the help of the *Rājasa* Ego for the production of this development. (“अन्याभ्यां सहकाराभ्यां स्वकार्योपजनने राजसाहकारः सहकारौ भवति”) and *Barabara* in his भाष्य writes: just as a seed-sprout requires for its growth the help of water as instrumental cause, so the *Rājasa* *Ahankāra* (Ego) works as the instrumental cause (सहकारि) for the transformations of *Sāttwika* and *Tāmāsa* *Ahankāra* into their evolutes. The mode of working of this instrumental cause is described as “*Rajas* is the mover.” The *Rājasa* Ego thus moves the *Sattwa* part to generate the senses; the *Tamas* part generating the gross and subtle matter is

also moved by the Rajas, the agent of movement. The Rājasa Ego is thus called the common cause of the movement of the Sāttwika and the Tāmasa Ego. सात्त्विकतामसाहङ्काराभ्यां स्वकार्योत्पादने बीजाङ्कुरस्य जलवत् राजसाहङ्कारः सहकारी भवति । अस्य सहकारित्वं नाम “ रजः प्रवर्तकं तत्र ” इत्युक्तप्रकारेण तवेन्द्रियहेतोः सत्त्वांशस्य भूतहेतोरसमौशस्य च चलन-स्वभावेन रजसा प्रेरकेण प्रवर्तनम् एवं सात्त्विक-तामसाहङ्करयोः साधारणं सहकारित्वमुक्तं । Vāchaspati also says : Though Rajas has no work by itself yet since Sattwa and Tamas (though capable of undergoing modification) are actionless in themselves, the agency of Rajas lives in this that it moves them both for the production of the effect. यद्यपि रजसो न कार्यान्तरमस्ति तथापि सत्त्वतमसौ स्वयमक्रिये, समर्थे अपि न स्वस्वकार्ये कुरुतः इति तदुभयस्मिन्नपि कार्ये सत्त्वतमसोः क्रियोत्पादनशारेण अस्ति रजसः कारणत्वमिति ।

And according as the modifications are सात्त्विक, तामस or राजसिक the ego which is the cause of these different modifications is also called Vaikārika, Bhutādi and Taijasa :


The Mahat also as the source of the Vaikārika, Taijasa and Bhutādi ego may be said to have three aspects ; thus Barabara Muni says : the original Prakriti is made up of three gunas from which every thing is produced. Mahat and the Ego produced from it are also made up of the three gunas. “ विगुणात्मिकाया मूलप्रकृतेरुत्पत्तिर्महानपि विगुणात्मकः । तथैव विगुणात्मकान्महत् उत्पत्तेरहङ्कारोपि विगुणात्मकः ” ।

Now speaking of the relation of the sense faculties with the sense organs, we see that the latter which are made up of the grosser elements are the vehicle of the former, for if the latter are injured in any way, the former is also necessarily affected :—आहङ्कारिकमपि प्राथरसनत्वक्चक्षुःश्रोत्रं भ्रूयुषिष्ठान्मेव, भूतोपकारापकाराभ्यां प्राणादीनामुपकारापकारदर्शनात् ।

To take for example the specific case of the faculty of hearing and its organ, we see that the faculty of hearing

शब्दभावधर्मकं तत्कार्यं स्पृशतन्मात्रं शब्दस्पृशभियधर्मकं एवं क्रमेण एकैकहृतेः ।
मात्रशब्देन च शान्तादिविशेषस्यैव व्याहृतिर्बोद्धव्या शान्तादिविशेषराहित्यादिव तेषा-
मविशेषसंज्ञकत्वं तन्मात्रेषु परस्परं कार्यकारणभावश्च व्युत्पत्तौ वायुाद्युत्पत्तेः
श्रुत्यादिषु श्रवणेन सूक्ष्मभूतेष्वपि तथा कार्यकारणभाववैचित्र्येण बोध्यः । एतानि
तामसाहकारान् शब्दादिक्रमेण उत्पद्यन्ते इति बोध्यम् ।

Thus the order of the evolution
Order of evolution of the Tanmātras as here referred to
of the Tanmātras. is as follows :—



The evolution of the Tanmātras has been variously
described in the Puranas and the
Different views of the genesis of the
of the Tanmātras. Smriti Literature. These divergent
views can briefly be brought under
two classes : those who derive the

Tanmātras from the Bhūtas and those who derive the
Tanmātras from the Ahankāra and Bhūtas from them.
Some of these Schools have been spoken of in the Barabara
Muni's commentary on the Tattwatraya—a treatise
on the Ramanuja Philosophy and have been already
explained in a systematic way by Dr. B. N. Seal. I
therefore refrain from repeating them needlessly. About
the derivation of the Tanmātras I further add that all
the other Sāṅkhya treatises, the Kārikā, the Kaumudi,
the Tattwa Vaiśārādī, the Sūtra and Pravachana Bhāshya,
the Siddhāntachandrikā, Sutrārthabodhinī, the Raj-
mārtāṇḍa and the Maniprabhā seem to be silent.

Further speaking of the Tanmātras, Vijnāna Bhikshu says that—

रन्मात्राण्यविशेषाणि अविशेषास्तदीहिते ।

न शान्ता नापि क्षीरा स्ते न सूक्ष्माविशेषिणः ॥

The Tanmātras are only in unspecialised forms, they therefore can neither be felt nor perceived in any way by the senses of ordinary men. This is that indeterminate state of matter in which they can never be distinguished one from the other, and they cannot be perceived to be possessed of different qualities or specialised in any way. It is for this that they are called Tanmātras, *i.e.*, when their only specialization is a mere thatness. The Yogis alone can perceive them.

Now turning towards the further evolution of the grosser elements from the Tanmātras, we see that there is a great divergence of view here also, some of which are shown below. Thus Vāchaspati says:—

Genesis of the grosser atoms.

पार्थिवस्य परमाणोः गन्धतन्मात्रप्रधानेभ्यः पञ्चतन्मात्रेभ्यः उत्पत्तिः । एवमायस्य परमाणोः गन्धतन्मात्रवर्जितेभ्यः रसतन्मात्रप्रधानेभ्यश्चतुर्भ्यः । एवं तेजसस्य गन्ध-रसतन्मात्ररहितेभ्यः रूपतन्मात्रप्रधानेभ्यस्त्रिभ्यः । एवं वायव्यस्य गन्धादितन्मात्र-रहितत्वात् स्पर्शप्रधानत्वात् स्पर्शशब्दतन्मात्राभ्याम् । एवं नाभसस्य शब्दतन्मात्रादेव एकत्वात् तद्विदं निमित्तं भूतसूत्राणाम् । I. 44.

Thus here we find that the Ākāśa atom अणु has been generated simply by the Ākāśa Tanmātra; the Vāyu atom has been generated by two Tanmātras, Śabda and Śparsa, of which the Śparsa appears there as the chief. The Tejas atom has been developed from the Śabda, Śparsa and Rūpa Tanmātras though the Rūpa is predominant in the group. The Ap atom has been developed from the four Tanmātras, Śabda, Śparsa, Rūpa and Rasa, though Rasa is predominant in the group, and the Earth or Kṣiti atom has been developed from the 5 Tanmātras, though the Gandha Tanmātra is predominant in the group.

Now the Yoga Vārttika agrees with Vāchaspati in all these details but differs from it only in this that it says that the Ākāśa atom has been generated from the Śabda Tanmātra with an accretion from Bhūtādi, whereas Vāchaspati says that the Ākāśa atom is generated simply by the Ākāśa Tanmātra only. Thus the Yoga Vārttika says :—एवमाकाशजातीयान् शब्दतन्मात्रसङ्घट्टारसङ्घटतात्प्राकाशाण्यजायते ।

Nāgeśa however takes a slightly different view and says that to produce the gross atoms, from the Tanmātras, an accretion of Bhūtādi as an accompanying agent is necessary at every step ; so that we see that the Vāyu atom is produced from these three : Śabda + Śparsa + accretion from Bhūtādi. Tejas atom = Śabda + Śparsa + Rupa + accretion from Bhūtādi. Ap atom = Śabda + Śparsa + Rūpa + Rasa + accretion from Bhūtādi. Kshiti atom = Śabda + Śparsa + Rūpa + Rasa + Gandha + accretion from Bhūtādi. Thus he says :—सर्वत्र तन्मात्रैस्तत्तत्प्रभृतोत्पादनेऽहङ्कारस्य सङ्घकारित्वं बोध्यं ।

I refrain from giving the Vishnu Purāna view which has also been quoted in the Yoga Vārttika and the view of a certain school of Vedantists mentioned in the Tattwa Nirūpaṇa and referred to and described in the Tattwatraya, as Dr. B. N. Seal has already described them in his article.

We see thus that from भूतादि comes the five Tanmātras which can be compared to the Vaisheshika atoms as they have no parts and neither grossness nor visible differentiation. Some differentiation has of course already begun in the Tanmātras as they are called Śabda, Śparsa, Rūpa, Rasa and Gandha which therefore may be said to belong to a class akin to the grosser elements of Ākāśa,

Vijñāna Bhikshu's view.

Nagesa's view.

Views referred to in Dr. Seal's treatise.

Tanmātras and the Vaisheshika atoms.

Vāyu, Tejas, Ap and Kshiti, so the Bhāshya also says, शब्दादीनां सृष्टिसमानजातीयानाम् ।

The next one, the Paramānu, which is gross in its nature and is generated from the

The gross atoms,

Tanmātras which exist in it as parts (तन्मात्रावयवः) may be compared with the Trasarenu of the Vaisheshikas or with the atoms of Dalton. Thus the Yoga Varttika says अथच परमाणुवैशेषिकैस्त्रसरिणुशब्देन उच्यते । अनाभिसु प्रथमपृथिव्याः परमसूक्ष्मात् पृथिवीपरमाणुः ।

The Bhāshya also says यथापकर्षपर्यन्तं द्रव्यं परमाणुः III. 52.

The Sutra also notes परमाणुः परममहत्त्वान्नोऽस्यवशीकारः I. 40.

The third form is gross water, air, fire, etc., which is said to belong to the महत् class.

Form as gross air, water, etc.

I cannot express it better than by quoting a passage from Nāgeśa : The hearing of the remarks of the Bhāshya is this that in the Tanmātras there exist the specific differentiation that constitute the five elements, kshiti, etc. By the combination of the five Tanmātras, the kshiti atom is generated and by the conglomeration of these gross atoms gross earth is formed. So again by the combination of the four Tanmātras the water atom is formed and the conglomeration of these water atoms make the gross water.

अवेदमवधेयम्, शब्दादीनां सृष्टिसमानजातीयानामिति भाष्योक्तिसन्मात्रपञ्चके काठिन्यकृद्वादि यद्वा पृथिवीत्वादिजातिरूपाव्यक्तयः सन्ति तत्र पृथिवीजातीयैः शब्दादिगन्धान्तपञ्चतन्मात्रैः पृथिव्यवयव आरभ्यन्ते, तेषाञ्च महत्पृथिव्यादिः परिणामः तस्यां पञ्चगुणोपलम्भात् । एवं जलजातीयैः शब्दादिरसपर्यन्तैश्चतुस्तन्मात्रैः जलपरमाणुवः तैभ्यः महत्जलादिः ।

There is however another measure which is called the measure of परम महत् which belongs to Ākāśa for example.

Now these Paramānus or atoms are not merely atoms

The feeling Elements of the Gunas.

of matter but they contain within themselves those particular qualities by virtue of which they appear, as pleasant, unpleasant or passive to us, If we have been

able to express ourselves well, I believe it has been made clear that when the inner and the outer proceed from one source, the ego and the external world do not altogether differ in nature from the inner ; both have been formed by the collocation of the Gunas सर्वमिदं गुणानां सन्निविशविशेषमात्मम् । The same book which in the inner microcosm is written in the language of ideas has been in the external world written in the language of matter. So in the external world we have all the grounds of our inner experience, cognitive as well as emotional, pleasurable as well as painful. The modifications of the external world are only translated into ideas and feelings ; it is therefore that these Paramānus are spoken of as endowed with feelings. Thus the Kārikā says :—

तन्मात्राण्यविशेषा संभ्यो भूतानि पञ्च पञ्चम्यः ।

एते स्मृता विशेवाः शान्ताचोराश्च मूढाश्च ॥

शब्दादितन्मात्राणि सञ्जायि न चैषां शान्तत्वादिरसि उपभोगयोग्यो विशेष इति भावशब्दार्थः ।

असु एषां भूतानामुत्पत्तिविशेषत्वे किम् आयातम् ? इत्यत आह एते कृता विशेवाः कृतः ? शान्ताचोराश्च मूढाश्च । च एको द्वितीयः सप्तम्यथे, यथाहाकाशादिवु स्थूलेषु केचित् सत्प्रधानतया शान्ताः, सुखाः प्रसन्नाः लघवः । केचिद्भ्रजःप्रधानतया चोरा दुःखाः अनवस्थिताः, केचित् तमःप्रधानतया मूढा विषया गुरवः । तेऽपि परस्परव्याघ्रता अनुभूयमाना विशेषा इति । स्थूलाश्च सप्तम्ये ।

तन्मात्राणि तु अण्डादिभिः परस्परव्याहताणि ।

नानुभूयन्ते इत्यविशेषा सञ्जा इति चोच्यन्ते ॥

The Vishnu Purana also says :—

तन्मात्राण्यविशेषाणि अविशेषास्ततोद्धिते ।

न शान्तानापि चोरास्तै न मूढाश्चाविशेषिणः ॥

Thus we see that here is another difference between the Tanmāstras and the Paramānus. The former cannot be perceived to be endowed with the feeling elements as the latter. Some say that it is not however true that the Tanmāstras are not endowed with the feeling elements, but

they cannot be perceived by any one except the Yogis ; thus it is said :—तन्मात्राणामपि परस्परव्याप्यस्वभावत्वमस्यैव तत्र योनिमात्रगम्यं । The Tanmātras also possess differentiated characters, but they can be perceived only by the Yogis ; but this is not one of universal admission.

Now these Paramanus cannot further be evolved into any other different kind of existence or तत्त्वान्तर (न विशेषेभ्यः तत्त्वान्तरमस्ति). We see that the Paramānus though they have been formed from the Tanmātras resemble them only in a very remote way and are therefore placed in a separate stadium of evolution.

The particular form of evolution with the atoms.

Now with the Bhutas we have the last stadium or stage of the evolution of Gunas. The course of evolution however does not cease here but continue ceaselessly as ever, but by its process no new stadium of existence is generated, but the product of the evolution is such that in it the properties of the gross elements which compose its constitution can be found directly. This is what is called चर्कपरिणामः as distinguished from the Tattwāntara-pariṇāma spoken above. The evolution of the Visheshas from the Avisheshas is always styled as तत्त्वान्तर परिणामः as opposed to the evolution that takes place among the Visheshas themselves which is called चर्कपरिणाम or evolution by change of qualities. Now these atoms of Paramānus of Kṣhiti, Ap, Tej, Marut or Ākāśa conglomerate together and form all sentient or non-sentient bodies of the world. The different atoms of earth, air, fire, water, etc., conglomerate together and form the different animate bodies such as cow, etc., or inanimate bodies such as jug, etc., and vegetables like the tree, etc. These bodies are built up by the conglomerated units of the atoms in such a way that they are almost in a state of fusion and lose themselves into the whole in a state of combination which has been styled as

अव्युत्सिद्धान्भव. In such a combination the parts do not stand independently but only hide themselves as it were in order to manifest the whole body, so that by the conglomeration of the particles we have what may be called a body, which is regarded as a quite different thing from the atoms of which they are composed. These bodies change with the different sorts of change or arrangement of the particles, according to which the body may be spoken of as "one," "large," "small," tangible or possessing the quality of action. There are some philosophers who hold the view that a body was really nothing except the conglomeration of the atoms; but they must be altogether wrong here since they have no right to ignore the "body," which appears with all its specific qualities and attributes before them; moreover, if they ignore the body they have to ignore almost everything for the atoms themselves are not visible.

Again these atoms though so much unlike the Vaisheshika atoms since they contain Harmonious and united activity of the Gunas in a process of genesis. Tanmātras of a different nature as their constituents and thus differ from the simpler atoms of the Vaishe- shikas, compose the constituents of all inorganic, organic or animal bodies in such a way that there is no break of harmony—no opposition between them—but on the contrary, when any of the Gunas existing in the atoms and their conglomeration becomes prominent, the other Gunas though their functions are different from it, yet do not run counter to the prominent Guna but conjointly with the prominent Guna help it to form the specific modification for the experiences of the Purusha. In the production of a thing the different Gunas do not choose different independent courses for their evolution, but join together and effectuate themselves in

the evolution of a single product. Thus we see also that when the atoms of different gross elements possessing different properties and attributes conglomerate together their difference of attributes does not produce a confusion but by a common teleology they unite in the production of the particular substances (see IV. 14).

Thus we see that the bodies or things composed by the collocation of the atoms in some sense differ from the atoms themselves and in another are only identical with the atoms themselves. We see therefore that the appearance of the atoms as bodies or things differs with the change of position of the atoms amongst themselves. So we can say that the change of the appearance of things and bodies only shows the change of the collocation of the atoms, there being always a change of appearance in the bodies consequent on every change of the position of the atoms. The former therefore is only an explicitude in appearance of the change that takes place in the substance itself; for the appearance of a thing is only an explicit aspect of the very selfsame thing—the atoms: thus the भाष्य says:—
 धार्मिस्वरूपमादीहि धर्मः, धर्मविक्रिया एव एषा धर्मद्वारा प्रपञ्चते । Often it happens that the change of appearance of a thing or a body, a tree or a piece of cloth for example can be marked only after a long interval. This however only shows that the atoms of the body had been continually changing and consequently the appearance of the body or the thing also had been continually changing; for otherwise we can in no way account for the sudden change of appearance. All bodies are continually changing—the constituent collocation of atoms—and their appearances. In the smallest particle of time or क्षण the whole universe undergoes a change. Each moment or the smallest particle of time is only the manifestation of that particular change. Time therefore

has not a separate existence in this philosophy as in the Vaisheshika but it is only identical with the smallest amount of change—*viz.*, that of an atom of its own amount of space. Now here the appearance is called the **वक्ष्य** and that particular arrangement of atoms or Gunas which is the basis of the particular appearance is called the **वर्ण**. The change of appearance is therefore called the **वक्ष्यपरिचय** ।

Again this change of appearance can be looked at from two other aspects which though not intrinsically different from the change of appearance have their own special points of view which make them remarkable. These are **Lakshana Pariṇāma** (लक्षणापरिचय) or **Avasthā Pariṇāma** (अवस्थापरिचय). Taking the particular collocation of atoms in a body for review, we see that all the subsequent changes that take place in it are existing only in a latent way in it which will however be manifested in future. All the previous changes of the collocating atoms are not also lost but exist only in a sublatent way in the particular collocation of atoms present before us. For the past changes are not at all destroyed but preserved in the peculiar and particular collocation of atoms of the present moment. For had not the past changes taken place the present could not have come. The present had held itself hidden in the past just as the future is hidden within the present. It therefore only comes into being with the unfolding of the past which therefore exists only in a sublatent form in it.

It is on account of this that we see that a body comes into being and dies away. This birth or death though it is really subsumed under the change of appearance has its own special aspect, on account of which it has been given a separate name as **Lakshana Pariṇāma** (लक्षणापरिचय). It considers the

Continued.

three stages of an appearance—the unmanifested when it exists in the future, the manifested moment of the present, and the past when it has been manifested, lost to view but conserved and kept in all the onward stages of the evolution. Thus when we say that a thing has not yet come into being, that it has just come into being, and that it is no longer, we refer to this Lakṣhaṇā Parīṇāma (लक्षणपरिणाम) which records the history of the thing in future, present and past, which are only the three different moments of the same thing according to its different characters, as unmanifested, manifested and manifested past but conserved.

Now it often happens that though the appearance of a thing is constantly changing owing to the continual change of the atoms that compose it, yet the changes are so fine and infinitesimal that they cannot be marked by any one except the Yogis; for though there may be going on structural changes tending towards the final passing away of that structure and body into another structure and body which greatly differs from it yet they may not be so remarkable to us, who can take note of the bigger changes alone. Taking therefore two remarkable stages of the things the difference between which may be so notable as to justify us to call the later one the dissolution or destruction of the former, we assert that the thing has suffered growth and decay in the interval, during which the actual was passing into the sublatent and the potential was tending towards actualization. This is what is called the Avasthā Parīṇāma or change of condition which however does not materially differ from the लक्षणपरिणाम and can thus be held to be a mode of it. It is on account of this that a substance is called new or old, grown or decayed. Thus in explaining the illustration given in the Bhāshya

of the "तत्रावस्थापरिणामः । तत्रनिरोधश्चेदु निरोधसंस्कारा बलवन्तौ भवन्ति । दुर्बला व्युत्थानसंस्कारा इति," the Yoga Varttika says :—संस्कारयोर्बलत्वदुर्बलत्वेऽप्यटस्य नवपुराणत्वादिवत्, उद्भिज्जासौ उत्पत्ति विनाश-रूपत्वे लक्षणपरिणामात् भेदानुपपत्तेः ।

It is now time for us to look once more to the relation of धर्मो, substance and धर्म, its quality or appearance.

The धर्मो or substance is that which remains common to the latent (as having passed over or Dharmi and Dharma. ज्ञान), the rising (the present or उद्भित) and the unpredictable (future or अल्पदेश) sharacteristic qualities of the substance.

The substance (take for example, Earth), has the power of existing in the form of particles of dust, a lump or a jug by which water may be carried. Now taking the stage of lump for review we may think of its previous stage, that of particles of dust, as being latent, and its future stage as jug as the unpredictable. The earth we see here to be common to all these three stages which have come into being by its own activity and consequent changes. Earth here is the common quality which remains unchanged in all these stages and so relatively constant among its changes as particles, lump and jug. This Earth therefore is regarded as the धर्मो, characterised one, the substance ; and its stages as its धर्म or qualities. When this धर्मो or substance undergoes a change from a stage of lump to a stage of jug, it undergoes what is called धर्मपरिणाम or change of quality.

But its धर्म, as the shape of the jug may be thought to have itself undergone a change—inasmuch as it has now come into being, from a state of relative non-being, latency or unpredictability. This is called the लक्षणपरिणाम of the धर्म or qualities as constituting षट. This षट is again suffering another change as new or old according as it is just produced or is gradually running towards its dissolution, and this is called the

अवस्थापरिचयान् or change of condition. These three however are not separate from the धर्मपरिचयान् but are only aspects of it; so it may be

Continued.

said that the धर्मो or substance directly suffers the धर्मपरिचयान् and indirectly the लक्षण and the अवस्थापरिचयान्. The धर्म however suffers the लक्षणपरिचयान् directly. The object which has suffered लक्षणपरिचयान् can be looked at from another point of view, that of change of state, viz., growth and decay. Thus we see that though the atoms of Kshiti, Ap, etc., remain unchanged, they are constantly suffering changes from the inorganic to the plants and animals, and from thence again back to the inorganic. There is thus a constant circulation of changes in which the different atoms of Kshiti, Ap, Tej, Vāyu and Ākāśa remaining themselves unchanged are suffering धर्मपरिचयान् as they are changed from the inorganic to plants and animals and back again to the inorganic. These different states or धर्म as inorganic, etc., again, according as they are not yet, now, and no longer or passed over, are suffering the लक्षणपरिचयान्. There is also the अवस्थापरिचयान् of these states according as any one of them (the plant state for example), is growing or suffering decay towards its dissolution.

This circulation of the cosmic matter in general applies also to all particular things say the jug, the cloth, etc.; the order of evolution here will be that of powdered particles of earth, lump of earth, the earthen jug, the broken halves of the jug and again the powdered earth. As the whole substance has only one identical evolution, these different states only happen in order of succession, the occurrence of one characteristic being displaced by another characteristic which comes after it immediately. We thus see that one substance may undergo

The evolutionary process constant.

endless changes of characteristic in order of succession; and along with the change of characteristic or *धर्म* we have the *लक्षणपरिणाम* and the *धर्मस्थापरिणाम* as old or new which is evidently one of infinitesimal changes of growth and decay. Thus Vāchaspati gives the following beautiful example—कौशाशेन कोष्ठागारे प्रयत्नसंरक्षिता अपि हि व्रीहयोद्भावने-
रतिवहुभिः पाणिस्पर्शसात्रविश्रीर्यमाणावयवरंस्थानाः परमाणुभावमनुभवन्तो दृश्यन्ते।
न चायमभिनवानामकस्यादेव प्रादुर्भवितुमर्हति। तस्मात् क्षणपरम्पराक्रमेण सूक्ष्म-
सूक्ष्मतरसूक्ष्मतरहृदहृदहरहृत्तमादिक्रमेण प्रतिषु विशिष्टोऽयंक्रमः। (A peasant
stocks quantities of paddy for many years, and the parts of these become so fragile that by the merest
touch these become powdered into dust. Such changes could never happen with new paddy. Thus, it is to be
admitted that in successive moments, this change must have continued to work from subtler beginnings to the
grossest ones, which were found to manifest themselves after a great lapse of time as in the case of the paddy
we have spoken of.)

We now see that the substance has neither past nor
future, the appearances or the qualities
The substance.. only are manifested in time by virtue
of which the substance also is spoken
of as varying and changing temporally, just as a line
remains unchanged in itself but acquires different
significances according as one or two zeroes are placed on
its right side. The substance—the atoms of *चित्ति*, *अप*, *तेज*,
सत्त्व, *ओम्*, etc., by various changes of quality appear as the
manifold varieties of cosmical existence. There is no in-
trinsic difference between one thing and another but only
changes of character of one and the same thing; thus the
gross elemental atoms like the water and earth particles
acquire various qualities and appear as the various juices
of all fruits and herbs. Now in analogy to the arguments
stated above, it will seem that even a qualified thing or

appearance may be relatively regarded as the substance when it is seen to remain common to various other modifications of that appearance itself. Thus a jug which may remain common in all its modifications of colour may be regarded relatively as the धर्मो or substance of all these special appearances or modifications of the same appearance.

We remember that the Gunas which are the final substratum of all the grosser particles are always in a state of commotion and always evolving in the manner stated before, for the sake of the experiences and the final realisation of the Purusha, the only teleology of the Prakriti. Thus the भाष्य says एवं धर्मलक्षणावस्थापरिणामैः शुक्लं न शब्दमपि गुणवृत्तमवतिष्ठते । चलंच गुणवृत्तम् । गुणस्वाभास्यं तु प्रवृत्तिकारणमुक्तं गुणानां । व्यासभाष्य III. 13.

The pioneers of modern scientific evolution have indeed tried scientifically to observe some of the stages of the growth of the inorganic, and the animal world into the man, but they do not give any reason for it. Theirs is more an experimental assertion of facts, than a metaphysical account of it. According to Darwin the general form of the evolutionary process is that which is accomplished by "Very slight variations which are accumulated by the effect of natural selection." And according to a later theory, we see that a new species is constituted all at once by the simultaneous appearance of several new characters very different from the old. But why this accidental variation, this seeming departure from the causal chain, comes into being the evolutionists cannot explain. But the Sāṅkhya Pātanjala doctrine explains it from the standpoint of teleology or the final goal inherent in all matter, so that it may be serviceable to the Puruṣha. To be serviceable to the Puruṣha

Comparison with modern theories of evolution of Darwin.

is the one moral purpose in the whole Prakriti and its manifestations in the whole material world, which guides the course and direction of the smallest particle of matter. From the scientific point of view the Sāṅkhya Pātanjala doctrine is very much in the same place as the modern scientists for it does not explain the cause of the accidental variation noticed in all the stages of evolutionary process from any physical point of view based on the observation of facts.

But it goes much to the credit of the Pātanjala doctrine that they explain this accidental variation, this अव्यपदेश्यत्व or unpredicability of the onward course of evolution from a moral point of view, the view of teleology, the serviceability of the Purusha. They however found that this teleology should not be used to usurp all the nature and function of matter. By virtue of the Rajas or energy we find that the atoms are always moving and it is to this movement of the atoms in space that all the products of evolution are accountable. We have found that the difference between the juices of cocoanut, palm, Bel, Tinduka (Diospyros Embryopteris) Amalaka (Emblie Myrobalan) can all be accounted for by the particular and peculiar arrangement of the atoms of earth and water alone, by their stress and strain alone; and we see also that the evolution of the organic from the inorganic is also due to this change of position of the atoms themselves; for the unit of change is the change of an atom of its own dimension of spatial position. There is always the transformation of energy from the inorganic to the organic and back again from the organic. So that the differences among things are only due to the different stages which they occupy in the scale of evolution,

Manifold transformations of the atoms and the teleology of Prakriti.

as different expressions of the transformation of energy ; but virtually there is no intrinsic difference among things सर्वे सर्वात्मक ; the change of the collocation of atoms only changes the potentiality into actuality, for everywhere throughout this changing world, there is the potentiality of everything for every thing. Thus Vāchaspati writes :—जलस्य हि रसरूपस्पर्शशब्दवतो भूमिश्च गन्धरसरूपस्पर्शशब्दादिवत्याः पारिणामिकं वनस्पतिलता-गुल्मादिषु मूलफलप्रसवपल्लवादिगततरसादिवैश्वरूप्यं दृष्टम् । सौयम्नेवमात्मिकायाः भूमिरनीदृशस्य वा जलस्य न परिणामी भवितुमर्हति । उपपादितं हि नासदनुपपद्यते इति । तथा स्थावराणां परिणामिकं जङ्गलेषु मनुष्यपशुसृगादिषु रसादिवैचित्र्यं दृष्टम् उपयुञ्जानाद्धि ते फलादीनि रूपादिर्भेदसंपदमासादयन्ति । एवं जङ्गमानां पारिणामिकं स्थावरेषु दृष्टम् । अधिरावसेकात् किल दाडिमीफलानि तालफल-मात्राणि भवन्ति । (व्यास भाष्य III. 14.)

Looked at from the point of view of the Gunas, there

is no intrinsic difference between

Evolution is qualified by the place in which the thing exists.

things, though there is a thousand manifestation of differences, according to time, place, form and causality.

The expressions of the Gunas, and the manifestations of the transformations of energy differ according to time, place, shape, or causality—which are the determining circumstances and surrounding environments, which determine the modes of the evolutionary process ; surrounding environments are also involved in determining this change and it is said that two Amalaka fruits placed in two different places undergo two different sorts of changes in connection with the particular points of place in which they are placed, and that if anybody transfers them mutually a Yogi can recognise and distinguish the one from the other by seeing the changes that the fruits have undergone in connection with their particular points of space—Thus the भाष्य says : Two Āmalaka fruits having the same characteristic genus and species, their situation in two different points of space contributes to their

specific distinction of development so that they may be identified as this and that. When an Amalaka at a distance is brought before a man who was inattentive to it then naturally he cannot distinguish this Amalaka as being the distant one which has been brought before him without his knowledge. But right knowledge should be competent to discern the distinction ; and the sutra says that the place associated with one Āmalaka fruit is different from the place associated with another Āmalaka at another point of space ; and the Yogi can perceive the difference of their specific evolution in association with their points of space ; similarly the atoms also suffer different modifications at different points of space which can be perceived by Īśwara and the Yogis. द्वयोरामलकयोर्जातिलक्षणसारूप्यात् देशभेदोऽन्यत्वकार इदं पूर्वमिदमुत्तरमिति । यदा तु पूर्वमामलकमन्यव्ययस्य ज्ञातुरुत्तरदेशे उपावर्त्तते तदा तुल्यदेशत्वे पूर्वमेतदुत्तरमेतत् इति प्रविभागानुपपत्तिः । असंदिग्धेन च तत्त्वज्ञानेन भवितव्यम् इत्यस्य इदमुक्तं ततः प्रतिपत्तिर्विवेकजज्ञानात् । कथं, पूर्वामलकसहचरयो देश उत्तरामलकसहचर्याद्वैशङ्गिनः । ते चामलके स्वदेशचरणानुभवभिन्ने । अन्यदेशचरणानुभवम् तयोरन्यत्वे हेतुरिति । एतेन दृष्टान्तेन परमाणीस्तुल्यजातिलक्षणदेशस्य तद्देशानुभवोभिन्नः सहचरणभेदात् तयोरीश्वरस्य योगिनोऽन्यत्वप्रत्ययो भवति ।.....देशलक्षणभेदो मूर्त्तिव्यभिजातिभेदाद्यान्यत्वं हेतुः । (व्यास भाष्य III.53)

Vāchaspati again says : Though all cause is essentially

all effects yet a particular cause takes

Limitations by time,
space, etc.

effect in a particular place, thus

though the cause is the same still

saffron grows in Kashmere and not in Panchala. So the rains

do not come in summer, the vicious do not enjoy happiness.

Thus in accordance with the obstructions of place, time,

animal form, and instrumental accessories, the same cause

does not produce the same effect. यद्यपि कारणं सर्वं सर्वोत्पन्नं तथापि

यो यत्र कार्यस्य देशो यथा कुङ्कुमस्य काश्मीरः । तेषां सत्त्वेपि पाञ्चालादिषु न

समुदाचार इति न कुङ्कुमस्य पाञ्चालादिषु अभिव्यक्तिः । एवं निदाघे न प्राणवः

समुदाचारः इति । एवं नापुण्यवान् सुखरूपं भुङ्क्ते न तस्मिन् पुण्यनिमित्तस्य

समुदाचारः इति । तस्माद्दृशकालाकारनिमित्तानामपवत्वाद् न समानकालम् आत्मनां अभिव्यक्तिः । (व्यासभाष्य III. 15).

Time space, etc., we see therefore are the limitations which regulate, modify and determine to a certain extent the varying transformations and changes and the seeming differences of things, though in reality they are all ultimately reducible to the three Gunas; thus Kasmere being the country of saffron it will not grow in the Pāñchalā country even though the other causes of its growth were all present there;—here the operation of cause is limited by space.

After considering the inorganic, vegetable and animal kingdoms as the three stages in the evolutionary process, our attention is at once drawn to their conception of the nature of relation of plantlife to animal life. To this point though I do not find any special reference in the Bhāshya yet I am reminded of a few passages in the Mahabharat, which I think may be added as a supplement to the general doctrine of evolution according to the Sāṅkhya Pātanjala Philosophy as stated here. Thus the Mahabharat says:—

घनानामपि हृत्त्वानामाकाशोक्ति न संशयः ।
 तेषां पुष्पफलव्यक्तिर्नित्यं समुपपद्यते ॥
 उष्णतो म्लायते पर्णं त्वक् फलं पुष्पमेव च ।
 म्लायते शीर्यते चापि स्पर्शसंज्ञाव विद्यते ॥
 वायुग्न्यग्निनिर्घोषैः फलं पुष्पं विशीर्यते ।
 शीतं वा गृह्यते शब्दस्पर्शात् शृण्वन्ति पादपाः ॥
 वक्त्रो विष्टयते हृत्त्वं सर्वतश्चैव गच्छति ।
 न ह्यदृष्टेस्तु मार्गोक्ति तस्मात् पश्यन्ति पादपाः ॥
 पुण्यापुण्यैस्तथा गन्धैर्धूपैश्च विविधैरपि ।
 अरोगाः पुष्यिताः सन्ति तस्मात् जिघ्रन्ति पादपाः ॥
 पादैः सलिलपानाच्च व्याधीनांचापिदर्शनात् ।
 व्याधिप्रतिक्रियत्वात् च विद्यते रसनं दृग्मी ॥

वक्त्रेणात्पलनार्त्नन यथोर्ध्वं जलमाददेत् ।
 तथा पवनसंयुक्तः पादैः पिवति पाटपः ॥
 मखदुःखयोश्च ग्रहणाच्छिन्नस्यच विरोहणात् ।
 जीवम् पश्यामि ब्रह्माणामचैतन्यं न विद्यते ॥

Nilkantha in his commentary goes still further and says that a hard substance called वज्रमणि also may be called living:—वज्रमणेरपि मत्कुणशीघ्रितस्पृशात् शीथ्यमाणस्य चैतन्यं व्याख्यातं । Here we see that the ancients had to a certain extent forestalled the discovery of Sir J. C. Bose that the life functions differed only in degree between the three classes, the inorganic, plants and animals.

These are all however, only illustrations of धर्मपरिणाम (Dharma Pariṇāma) for here there is no radical change in the elements themselves. The appearance of qualities being due only to the different arrangement of the atoms of the five gross elements. This change

Dharma Pariṇāma
 of mind and the
 senses.

applies to the Visheshas only—the five gross elements externally and the eleven senses internally. How the inner microcosm, the Manas and the senses suffer this धर्मपरिणाम we shall see hereafter, when we shall deal with the psychology of the Sāṅkhya Pātanjala doctrine. For the present it will just suffice here to say that the Chitta also suffers this change and is modified in a twofold mode; the patent in the form of the ideas and the latent, as the substance itself in the form of Sanskaras or impressions. Thus the भाष्य says:—चित्तस्य द्वये धर्माः परिदृष्टाश्चापरिदृष्टाश्च । तत्र प्रत्ययात्मकाः परिदृष्टा वस्तुमात्रात्मका अपरिदृष्टाः । ते च सतैव भवन्त्यनुमानेन प्रापितवस्तुमात्रसद्भावाः

“ निरोधधर्मसंस्कारा परिणामोद्य जीवन्म
 चेष्टा शक्तिश्च चित्तस्य धर्मादर्शनवर्जिताः ।

Suppression. characterization potentialisation, constant

change, life, movements, power are the characteristics of the mind besides consciousness.

This धर्मपरिणाम as we have shown it, is essentially different from the सत्कारणवाद of the Avisheshas which we have described above. This discussion about the evolution we cannot close without a review of the Sāṅkhya view of causation.

We have seen that the Sāṅkhya Pātanjala view holds that the effect is already existent in the cause but only in a potential form. "The grouping or collocation alone changes and this brings out the manifestation of the latent powers of the Gunas but without creation of anything absolutely new or non-existent." This is the true सत्कार्यवाद theory as distinguished from the so-called सत्कार्यवाद theory of the Vedantists which ought more properly to be called the सत्कारणवाद theory, for with them the cause alone is true, and all effects are illusory, being only impositions on the cause. For with them the material cause alone is true whereas all its forms and shapes are only illusory—वाचारम्भणं विकारो नामधेयं मृत्तिका इति एव सत्यम् । Whereas according to the Sāṅkhya Pātanjala doctrine all the appearances or effects are true and they are due to the power which the substance has of transforming of itself into those various appearances and effects योग्यतावच्छिन्ना शक्तिरेव धर्मः. The operation of the concomitant condition or efficient cause serves only in effectuating the passage of one thing from potency to actualisation.

Everything in the phenomenal world is but a special collocation of the Gunas; so that the change of collocation explains the diversity of the thingt. Considered from the point of view of the Gunas, as the things are all the same, so excluding that, the cause of the diversity in things is the power which the Gunas

All change ultimately reducible to the collocation of the Gunas.

have of changing their particular collocations and thus assuming various shapes. We have seen that the Prakriti unfolds itself through various stages—the Mahat called the great being—the Ahankāra, the Tanmātras called the Avisheshas, the five gross elements and the eleven senses, called the Visheshas. Now the Linga at once resolves itself into the Ahankāra and through it again into the Tanmātras. The Ahankāra and the Tanmātras again resolve themselves into the senses and the gross elements and these again are constantly suffering thousand modifications called the धर्म, लक्षण, अवस्था परिणाम according to the definite law of evolution (परिणामक्रम नियम).

Now according to the Sankhya Pātanjala doctrine, the Śakti—power, force, and the Śaktimān—the possessor of power or force are not different but identical. So the Prakriti and all its emanations and modifications are of the nature of substantive entities as well as power or force. Their appearances as substantive entities and as power or force are but two aspects and so it will be erroneous to make any such distinction as the substantive entity and its power or force. That which is the substantive entity is the force and that which is the force is the substantive entity. Of course for all popular purposes we can indeed make some distinction but that distinction is only relatively true. Thus when we say that earth is the substantive entity and the power which it has of transforming itself into the produced form, lump or jug as its attribute, we see on the one hand that no distinction is really made between the appearance of the earth as jug and its power of transforming itself as the jug. As this power of transforming itself into lump or jug, etc., always abides in the earth we say that the jug, etc., are also abiding in the earth, when the

power is in the potential state, we say that the jug is in the potential state, and when it is actualised, we say that the jug has been actualised. Looked at from the Tanmātric side the earth and all the other gross elements must have to be said to be mere modifications and as such identical to the power which the Tanmātras have of changing itself into them. The potentiality or actuality of any state is the mere potentiality or actuality of the power which its antecedent cause has of transforming itself into it.

Looked at from this point of view it will be seen that the Prakriti though a substantial entity is yet a potential power which is being actualised as its various modifications as the Avisheshas and the Visheshas. Being of the nature of power, the movement by which it actualises itself is immanent within itself and not caused from without. The operation of the concomitant conditions is only manifested in removing the negative barriers by which the power was stopped or obstructed from actualising itself. It being of the nature of power, its potentiality means that it is kept in equilibrium by virtue of the opposing tendencies that are inherent within it, which serve as one another's obstruction and are therefore called the आवरणशक्ति. Of course it is evident that there is no real or absolute distinction between आवरणशक्ति and कार्यकारी शक्ति; they may be called so only relatively, for the same tendency which may appear as the आवरणशक्ति of some tendencies may prove as the कार्यकारी शक्ति elsewhere. The example that is chosen to explain the nature of the Prakriti and its modifications conceived as power tending towards actuality from potentiality in the व्यासभाष्य is that of a sheet of water enclosed by temporary walls within a field but always tending to run out

Prakriti viewed as potentiality and actuality and conservation of energy.

of it. As soon as the temporary wall is broken in some direction, the water rushes out itself, and what one has to do is to break the wall at a particular place. The Prakriti also is the potential for all the infinite diversity of things of the phenomenal world, but the potential tendency of all these mutually opposed and diverse things cannot be actualised all at once. By the concomitant conditions when the barrier of a certain tendency is removed, it at once actualises itself into its effect and so on.

From any cause we can expect to get any effect, only if the necessary barriers can be removed, for everything is everything potentially, it is only necessary to remove the particular barrier which is obstructing the power from actualising itself into that particular effect towards which it is always potentially tending. Thus Nandi who was a man is at once turned into a god for his particular merit which served to break all the barriers of the potential tendency of his body towards becoming divine, so that the barriers being removed the potential power of the Prakriti of his body at once actualises itself into the divine body.

The Vyāsa Bhāṣhya mentions four sorts of concomitant conditions which can serve to break the barrier in a particular way and thus determine the mode or form of the actualisations of the potential. There are (1) **देश** place, (2) **काल** time, (3) **आकार** form and constitution of a thing ; thus from a piece of stone, the shoot of a plant cannot come out, for the arrangement of the particles in stone is such that it will oppose and stand as the barrier of its potential tendencies to develop into the shoot of a plant ; of course if these barriers could be removed, say by the will of God, as Vijñāna Bhikshu says, then it is not impossible that a shoot of a plant may come out of a piece of

Concomitant Causes.

stone—कदाचित् नहुषशरीरगदीनां सर्पादिभाववत् परमेश्वरादिसङ्कल्पतो घटादीनामपि प्रकृत्यापूरवशात् अव्यवस्थिताखिलपरिणामी भवत्येव । तथा चीकं लोकि कौरपि विषममयस्रतं क्वचित् भवेत् अस्रतं वा विषमेश्वरेच्छया—By the will of God poison may be turned into nectar and nectar into poison.

According to the Sāṅkhya Pātanjala theory धर्म merit can only be said to accrue from those actions which lead to a man's salvation and अधर्म from the quite opposite courses of conduct.

Merit or demerit as concomitant causes.

When it is said that these can remove the barriers of the Prakriti and thus determine its modifications it amounts almost to saying that the modifications of the Prakriti are being regulated by the moral conditions of man. According to the different stages of man's moral evolution, different kinds of merit धर्म or अधर्म accrue and these again regulate the various physical and mental phenomena according to which a man may be affected either pleurably or painfully. It must however be always remembered that the धर्म and अधर्म are also the productions of Prakriti and as such cannot affect it except by behaving as the cause for the removal of the opposite obstructions—the धर्म for removing the obstructions of अधर्म and अधर्म of धर्म. Vijñāna Bhikshu and Nāgēsha agree here in saying that the modifications due to धर्म and अधर्म are those which affect the bodies and senses. What they mean is possibly this, that it is धर्म or अधर्म alone which guides the transformations of the bodies and senses of all living beings in general and the Yogis.

Continued.

Thus we see that Nahusha's अधर्म or demerit stopped the fillings of the materials of his heavenly body from the five gross elements and those of his heavenly senses from the Ahankara. We find in another place that Vāchaspati gives the example

पुण्यकृतमखं भुङ्क्ते (the virtuous enjoys happiness) as an illustration of निमित्त or cause of धर्म and अधर्म as controlling the course of the development of Prakriti. We therefore see that the sphere of धर्म (merit) and अधर्म (demerit) lies in the helping of the formation of the particular bodies and senses (from the gross elements and Ahankara respectively) suited to all living beings according to their stages of evolution and their growth, decay or other sorts of their modifications as pleasure, pain and as illness or health also. Thus it is by his particular merit that the Yogi can get his special body or men or animals can get their new bodies after leaving the old ones at death. Thus Yoga Varttika says—" Merit by removing the obstructions of demerit causes the development of the body and the senses:—धर्मस्य अधर्मप्रतिवन्धपसारणद्वारा कायेन्द्रिय-परिणामनिमित्तत्वे उदाहरणमाह । and Nagesha says :—अन्यजातिपरिणतानां कायेन्द्रियाणां पूर्वपरिणामापाये उत्तरपरिणामोपजनितस्तत् तत् कायेन्द्रियप्रकृतिभूतानामवयवानाम् आपूरादनुप्रवेशाद्भवति । लोके वन्धोकादीनां चद्रपरिणामापाये तदुत्तरमहापरिणामोत्पत्तेर्भूतप्रकृतीनामनुप्रवेशेन दृष्टत्वात् अतो योगिनामपि देहेन्द्रिययोः परिणामान्तरकाले धर्मनिमित्तापेक्षाः कायेन्द्रियप्रकृतयः आपूरणेन स्वस्वजातीयं विकारमुपकुर्वन्ति, तत्र कायप्रकृतिः पञ्चमहाभूतानि इन्द्रियप्रकृतिश्चाहङ्कारः ।..... एवं शरीरस्य तारुण्यवाङ्कादिकमपि एवम् अणिमादिकं प्रकृत्यपगमात् इति बोध्यम् । Later on he says again—तत्र धर्मस्याधर्मापसारणद्वारा कायेन्द्रियपरिणामि निमित्तत्वे । एवं बलवान् अधर्मोऽपि धर्मापसारणेन तन्निमित्तं ।

As for Īswara I do not remember that the भाष्यकार or the Sutras ever mention him as having anything to do in the controlling of the modifications of the Prakriti by removing the barriers, but all the later commentators agree in holding him responsible for the removal of all barriers in the way of Prakriti's development. So that

Īswara.

Īśwara lies as the root cause of all the removal of barriers including those that are effected by धर्म and अधर्म. Thus वाचस्पति says ईश्वरस्यापि धर्माधिष्ठानार्थं प्रतिबन्धापनय एव व्यापारः i.e. god stands as the cause of the removal of such obstacles in the Prakriti as may lead to the production of merit or demerit.

Yoga Varttika and Nagesha agree in holding Īśwara responsible for the removal of all obstacles in the way of the evolution of Prakriti ईश्वरन्तु साम्यपरिणामादिरूपाखिलावरणभङ्गन उद्योषकः।

It is on account of god that we can do good or bad actions and thus acquire, merit or demerit. Of course God is not active and cannot cause any motion in Prakriti. But he by his very presence causes the obstacles, as the barriers in the way of Prakriti's development to be removed in such a way that he stands ultimately responsible for the removal of all obstacles in the way of Prakriti's development and thus also of all obstacles in the way of men's performance of good or bad deeds; Man's good or bad deeds पुण्यकर्म or अपुण्यकर्म, धर्म or अधर्म serve to remove the obstacles of the Prakriti in such a way as to result in pleasurable or painful effects; but it is by god's help that the barriers of the Prakriti are removed and it yields itself in such a way that a man may perform the good or bad deeds according to his desire. Nilkantha however by his quotations in explanation of 300/2, Śānti-parva leads us to suggest that he regards god's will as wholly responsible for the performance of our good or bad actions. For if we lay stress on his quotation एष सर्वं साधुकर्मकारयति तं यमेभ्यो लोकेभ्य उन्नियेषते। एष द्वेषासाधुकर्मकारयति तं यमयो गिनोषति, it appears that he whom God wants to raise is made to perform good actions and he whom God wants to throw downwards is made to commit bad actions. But this will indeed be a very bold idea as it will nullify even the least vestige of the freedom and

responsibility of our actions and is unsupported by the evidence of other commentators. Vijñāna Bhikṣhu also says with reference to this śruti in his Vijñānamṛta Bhāṣya III. I. 33तत्रापि कर्मान्तरस्थनिमित्तत्वात् वीजाङ्कुरवदनादानवस्थायाः प्रकृतः प्राणाधिकत्वेन चक्षुषत्वात् ; So we take the चर्माधिष्ठानता of Iśwara only in a general way to mean the help that is offered by Him in removing the obstruction of the external world in such a way that it may be possible for a man to practically perform the meritorious acts in the external world.

अनीश्वरः कथं मुच्येदित्येवं श्रुतकर्षण

वदन्ति कारणं श्रेष्ठं योगाः सम्यङ्मनीषिणः

Sāntiparva. 300/2.

Nilkantha writes thus :—एवञ्चैव साधुकर्मा कारयति तं यमिभ्यो

लोकिभ्य उन्निनीषते, अज्ञानानुरनीश्वरमात्मनः मुख-

Quotation from Nil-
kantha.

दुःखयोः । ईश्वरप्रेरितो गच्छेत् स्वर्गं वा श्वभनीव

वा ॥

इति श्रुतिश्रुतिभ्यां चित्तङ्कुरादिकं सकर्तृकं कार्यत्वात् घटवत् इति युक्त्यनुगृहीता-
भ्यामस्ति तदस्य ईश्वरः तदभावे हि स्वतन्त्रचेतनोऽनिष्टजनके कर्माणि न प्रवर्तते ।
चेद्बिद्वानप्यतोऽस्ति कश्चित् चेतनोधिष्ठाता न च कर्माणः प्रेरकत्वं सम्भवति तस्य प्रकृति-
कार्यस्य प्रवर्तकत्वायोगात्, तथाच पातञ्जलं सूत्रं—निमित्तं अप्रयोजकं प्रकृतौ नामावरण-
मेदस्य ततः चेद्विकवत् इति । निमित्तं पुण्यपापात्मकं कर्मा प्रकृतौ नामावरण-
प्रयोजकं न भवति, किं तर्हि, जलवत् स्वयं प्रवर्तमानायां प्रकृतौ कौदारिकवत्
आवरणभङ्गाय एव कर्माणि उपयुज्यन्ते । यथा यथादुरदृष्टप्रतिबद्धा गुणा प्रातिक्लेश्येन
परिणतं सददृष्टेन तु तद्विपरीतं क्रियते इति भूतार्थः । तस्मात् अथक्कान्तमशिवत्
उदासीनोपीश्वरः स्वसत्तामावेशे प्रधानं प्रवर्तयन् भक्तान् अनुगृह्णाति । अतो
भोक्तृप्रदाता ईश्वरोऽवश्यमस्ति इति ज्ञेयमिति योगानां युक्तिः ।

In support of our view we also find that it is by god's influence that the unalterable nature of the external world is held fast and a limit imposed on the powers of man in producing changes in the external world. Thus

Position of Iśwara
in the Universe.

Vāchaspati in explaining the भाष्य says न च ब्रह्मोपि पदार्थविपर्यया संकरोति । कश्चात् अन्यस्य यवकामावसायिनः पूर्वसिद्धस्य तथा भूतेषु सङ्ख्यात् इति । न खल्वेते यवकामावसायिनस्तत्रभवतः परमेश्वरस्य आज्ञामतिक्रमितु-
स्तुसहन्ते ।

Man may indeed acquire unlimited powers of producing any changes they like, for the powers of objects as they are changeable according to the difference of class, space, time and condition, are not permanent, and so it is proper that they should act in accordance with the desire of the Yogi ; but there is a limitation on their will by the command of god—thus far and no further.

Another point in our favour is this that the Yoga philosophy differs from the Sāṅkhya mainly in this that the Purushartha or serviceability to the Purusha is only the aim or end of the evolution of Prakriti and not actually the agent which removes the obstacles of the Prakriti in such a way as to determine its course as this cosmical process of evolution. Purushartha is indeed the aim for which the process of evolution exists ; for this manifold evolution in all its entirety affects the interests of the Purusha alone ; but that does not prove that this its teleology can really guide the evolution in its particular lines so as to ensure the best possible mode of serving all the interests of the Purusha, for this teleology being immanent in the Prakriti is essentially non-intelligent. Thus Vāchaspati says :—न च पुरुषार्थोऽपि प्रवर्तकः । किन्तु तदुद्देशेन ईश्वरः । उद्देश्यतामात्रेण पुरुषार्थः प्रवर्तकः ।

The Sāṅkhya however hopes that this immanent teleology in Prakriti acts like a blind instinct and is able to guide the course of its evolution in all its manifold lines in accordance with the best possible service of the Purusha.

The Pātaujala view, as we have seen, maintains that Īśwara removed all obstacles of Prakriti in such a way

that this teleology may find scope for its realisation.

Thus Sutrārthabodhini of Nārāyaṇa

Continued.

Tirtha says:—According to atheistic

Sāṅkhya the future serviceability of

the Puruṣha alone is the mover of the Prakṛiti.

But with us theists the serviceability of the Puruṣha

is the object for which the Prakṛiti moves. It is

merely as an object that the serviceability of the

Puruṣha may be said to be the mover of the Prakṛiti.

निरीश्वरसंख्येहि पुरुषार्थ एवानागतः प्रकृतीनां प्रवर्तकः । अस्माकं तु शिखराणां तदुद्देशेन प्रवर्तते । इति उद्देश्यतामात्रेण पुरुषार्थः प्रवर्तकः इत्युच्यते । IV 3.

As regards the connection of प्रकृति and युक्त्वः however,

both Sāṅkhya and Pātanjala agree according to Vijnana

Bhikshu in denying the interference of Iśvara ; it is

the movement of Prakṛiti by virtue of the immanent

teleology that connects itself naturally to the Puruṣha

प्रकृतिस्वातन्त्र्यावादिभ्यां सांख्ययोगिभ्यां पुरुषार्थप्रयुक्ता प्रवृत्तिः स्वयमेव पुरुषेण

आदाज्जीवेन संयुज्यते इत्यभ्युपगम्यते अयस्क्लान्तिन लौहव्य । (विज्ञानामृतभाष्य

विज्ञानमिच्छ 1.12. P. 34)

To recapitulate, we see that there is an immanent teleology in the Prakṛiti which connects it with the

Puruṣhas. This teleology is however

Recapitulation.

blind and cannot choose the suitable

lines of development and cause the

movement of the Prakṛiti along them for its fullest

realisation Prakṛiti itself though a substantial entity

is also essentially of the nature of conserved energy

existing in the potential form but always ready to flow

out and actualise itself only if its own immanent obstruc-

tions are removed. Its teleology is powerless to remove

its own obstruction. God by his very presence removes

the obstacles, by which the Prakṛiti of itself moves in the

evolutionary process and thus the teleology is realised :

for, the removal of obstacles by the influence of god takes

place in such a way that the teleology may get its fullest scope of realisation. Realisation of the teleology means that the interests of the Purusha are seemingly affected and the Purusha appears to see and feel in a manifold way and after a long series of such experiences it comes to understand itself in its own nature and this being the last and final realisation of the teleology of the Prakriti with reference to that Purusha all connections of the Prakriti with such a Purusha at once ceases ; the Purusha is then said to be liberated and the world ceases for him to exist, though it exists for the other unliberated Purushas, the teleology of the Prakriti with reference to whom have not been realised. So the world is both eternal and non-eternal i.e. its eternality is only relative and not absolute (अथ त्ववचनीयः प्रश्नः संसारीयमन्तवानथानन्त इति । कुशलस्वाप्ति संसारकम-समातिर्नंतरस्वेति अन्यतवावधारणे दोषः । तस्मादाहाकरणीय एवायं प्रश्नः ॥ IV.33.) भाष्य ।

The Yoga philosophy has essentially a practical tone and its object consists mainly in demonstrating the means of attaining salvation, oneness, the liberation of the Pnrusha. The Ethical enquiry the chief aim of the Yoga Philosophy. metaphysical theory which we have discussed at some length though it is the basis which justifies its ethical goal is not itself the principal subject of Yoga discussion. It only mentions it incidentally so far as it becomes necessary for it, in demonstrating its ethical views. We had first to explain the metaphysical theory, only because without understanding that, it was impossible for us to get a right conception of their ethical theories. It has now become time for us to direct our attention towards the right comprehension of the ethical theories of this philosophy. Chitta or mind always exists in the form of its states which are called its Vrittis. These comprehend all the manifold states of consciousness

of our phenomenal existence, and we cannot distinguish

Chitta.

the states of consciousness from consciousness itself, for the consciousness is not something separate from its states; it exists in its states and passes away with their passing and submerges when they are submerged. It differs from the senses in this that they represent the functions and faculties whereas Chitta stands as the entity holding the conscious states with which we are directly concerned. But the Chitta which we have thus described as existing only in its states is called the कार्यचित्त or चित्त as effect as distinguished from the कारणचित्त or चित्त as cause. These Kāraṇa Chitta or Chittas as cause are all-pervading like the Ākāśa and are infinite in number, each being connected with each of the numberless Purushas or souls (" एवं च चित्तं कार्यकार्यरूपेण द्विविधमाकाशवत्, योगिनां सर्ववस्तुदर्शनात् चास्य विभुत्वं । अन्यथा संनिकर्षाभावात् कथं गच्छेत्, योगजधर्मस्यापि प्रत्यासत्तिलकल्पने गौरवात्, तथात् योगजधर्म्येण तमसाख्यप्रतिबन्धकनिवृत्तिभावे कारणं, and also (विभवे चित्तं प्रतिनियतपुरुषभोग्यत्वात् पुरुषभेदीनामनं च) छाया व्याख्या V. 10.")

Reasons for acknowledging a Kāraṇa chitta.

The reason assigned for acknowledging such a Kāraṇa Chitta which must be all pervading, as is evident from the quotation, is that the Yogi can have the knowledge of all things all at once.

Vāchaspati also says that this Chitta being essentially of the nature of अहङ्कार is as all-pervading as the ego itself (तथादाहङ्कारिकत्वात्चेतसो, हङ्कारस्य च गगनमच्छलवत् वैलोक्यव्यापित्वात् विभुत्वं मनसः)

This Kāraṇa Chitta contracts or expands and appears as our individual Chittas in the various kinds of our bodies at the successive rebirths. The Kāraṇa Chitta is always connected with the Purusha and appears contracted when the Purusha presides over the

Relation of the Kāraṇa Chitta & Kārya Chitta.

animal bodies and as relatively expanded when he presides over human bodies and more expanded when he presides over the bodies of gods etc. This contracted or expanded Chitta appears as our कार्यचित्त which always manifests itself as our states of consciousness. After death the Kāraṇa Chitta which is always connected with the Purusha manifests itself in the new body which is formed by the आपूर (filling in of प्रकृति on account of effective merit or demerit that the Purusha had apparently acquired. The formation of the body as well as the contraction or expansion of the Kāraṇa Chitta as the corresponding कार्यचित्त to suit it is due to this आपूर. The Yoga does not hold that the चित्त has got a separate fine astral body within which it may remain encased and may be transferred along with it to another body at rebirth after death. The Chitta being all-pervading, it appears at once to contract or expand itself to suit the particular body destined for it by its merit or demerit but there is no separate astral body. (अतिबाह्यकलं तस्य न मथ्यामहे) वाचस्पति. IV. 10. In reality the कार्यचित्त as such always remains विभु or all pervading; it is only its कार्यचित्त or इति that appears in a contracted or expanded form, according to the particular body which it may be said to occupy.

The Sāṅkhya view however does not regard the Chitta to be essentially विभु but small or great according as the body it has to occupy मांख्याः प्रतिपुरुषं सर्वेशरीरसाधारणं एकैकमेव चित्तं किं तु घटप्रासादरूपं स्वल्पमहदाश्रयभेदेन प्रदीपवत् स्वल्पमहत्शरीरभेदेन संकोचविकासचालितया स्वल्पमहत्परिमाणं च न तु विभु । (नागेश IV. 10.) घटप्रासादकल्पं संकोच विकासि शरीरपरिणामाकारमात्मन् इत्यपरे प्रतिपन्नाः (भाष्य IV. 10.)

It is this चित्त which appears as the particular states of consciousness in which there are both the knower and the known
The nature of Chitta.

reflected, and it comprehends them both in one state of consciousness. It must however be remembered that this Chitta (चित्त) is essentially a modification of Prakriti and as such is non-intelligent; but by the seeming reflection of the Purusha it appears as the knower who is knowing a certain object, and therefore we see that in the states themselves are comprehended both the knower and the known. This Chitta is not indeed a separate Tattwa, but is the summed up unity of the 11 senses and the ego and also the five Prāṇas (ज्ञानादिद्विपुरीकादशेन्द्रियः पञ्चप्राणरूपः परिणामविशेषः (न.गीश V. 10.) It thus stands for all that is Psychological in man; the states of consciousness including the living principle in man represented by the activity of the five Prāṇas.

It is the object of the Yoga to restrain the Chitta gradually from its various states and thus gradually cause it to turn back to its original cause the कारणचित्त which is all-pervading. The modifications of the कारणचित्त into the states as the कार्यचित्त is due to its being overcome by its inherent Tamas and Rajas; so when the transformations of the Chitta into the passing states are arrested by concentration, there takes place a backward movement and the all-pervading state of the Chitta being restored to itself and all Tamas being overcome, the Yogi acquires omniscience and finally when this Chitta becomes as pure as the form of Purusha itself, the Purusha becomes conscious of himself and is liberated from the bonds of the Prakriti.

The Yoga philosophy in the first chapter describes the Yoga for him whose mind is inclined towards trance-cognition. In the second chapter, is described the means by which one with an out-going mind (बुद्धान चित्त) may also acquire Yoga. In the third chapter are described those phenomena which strengthen the faith of the Yogi

on the means described in the second chapter. In the fourth chapter is described the Kaivalya, absolute independence or oneness which is the end of all the Yoga practices.

The भाष्य describes the five classes of Chittas and comments upon their fitness for the Yoga leading to Kaivalya. Those Who are fit for Yoga.

are I. चित्त (wandering) II. सूदृ (forgetful) III. विचित्र (occasionally steady) IV. एकाग्र (one pointed) निरुद्ध (restrained). The चित्तचित्त is characterised as wandering, because it is being always moved by the Rajas. This is that Chitta which is always moved to and fro by the rise of passions, the excess of which may indeed for the time overpower the mind and thus generate a temporary concentration, but it has nothing to do with the contemplative concentration required for attaining absolute independence. The man far from attaining any mastery of himself is rather a slave to his own passions and is always being moved to and fro and oscillated by them. (See सिद्धान्त चन्द्रिका 1.1. भोजवृत्ति 1.2.)

II. The सूदृचित्त is that which is overpowered by Tamas, or passions like that of anger etc. by which it loses its senses and always chooses the wrong course : (सिद्धान्त चन्द्रिका 1.1 भोजवृत्ति 1.2.) Swami Harihararanya suggests a beautiful example of concentration in this state as in the case some kinds of snake who become completely absorbed in the prey they are ready to pounce upon.

III. The विचित्र चित्त or distracted or occasionally steady chitta is that mind which rationally avoids the painful actions and chooses the pleasurable ones. Now none of these three kinds of mind can hope to attain that contemplative concentration called Yoga. This last type of mind represents the ordinary people who are sometimes tended towards good and are again drawn towards evil.

IV. One pointed (एकाग्र) is that kind of mind in which true knowledge of the nature of reality is brought before the mind and thereby the afflictions due to Nescience or false knowledge are attenuated and the mind thus becomes favourable for attaining the निरोध or restrained state. All these come under the संप्रज्ञात type.

V. The Nirodha or the restrained mind is that in which all the mental states are arrested. This leads to Kaivalya.

Ordinarily our minds are engaged only in perception, inference etc.,—all those mental states which we all naturally possess. These our ordinary mental states are full of Rajas and Tamās. When the process of our ordinary mental states is arrested, the mind flows with an abundance of सत्त्व in the संप्रज्ञात Samādhi; lastly when even the संप्रज्ञात state is arrested, all possible states become arrested thereby.

Another important fact which must be taken note of is the relation of the actual states of mind called the Vrittis with the latent states called the Samskāras—the potency. When a particular mental state passes away into another, it is not altogether lost, but is preserved in the mind in a latent form as Samskāras which always are trying to manifest themselves in the actual form. The Vrittis or actual states thus are at once generating the Samskāras and they also are always tending to manifest themselves and actually generating similar Vrittis or actual states. There is a circulation from Vrittis to Samskāras and from them again to the Vrittis (संस्कारवृत्तिभिः क्रियन्ते संस्कारेण वृत्तयः एवं वृत्तिसंस्कारचक्रमनिश्चयवर्त्तते) So, the formation of Samskāras and their conservation

are gradually being strengthened by the habit of similar Vrittis or actual states, and their continuity is again guaranteed by the strength and continuity of these Samskāras. The Samskāras are like the roots stuck deep in the soil which grow with the growth of the plant above, but even when the plant above the soil is destroyed the roots remain undisturbed and may again shoot forth as plants whenever they may get a favourable season. So, for a Yogi, it is not enough, if he arrests any particular class of mental states but he must attain such a habit of his restraint that the Sanaskāra generated by his habit of restraint must be so strong as to overcome, weaken and destroy the Sanskāra of those actual states which he has arrested by his contemplation. Unless by such a habit, the Sanskāra of restraint (निरोधन संस्कार) which is opposed to the Sanskaras of the restrained mental states become powerful and destroy the latter, the latter is sure to shoot forth again in favourable season into their corresponding actual states.

The conception of Avidyā or Nescience here is not negative but it has a definite positive aspect. It means that kind of knowledge which is opposed to true knowledge (विद्याविपर्ययं ज्ञानान्तरमविद्या)

Avidyā. This is of four kinds (1) the thinking of the non-eternal world which is merely an effect as eternal ; (2) the thinking of the impure as the pure as for example the passions and the attractions that a woman's body may have for a man through which he thinks the impure body of the woman as pure.

II. (3) This also explains the thinking of vice as virtue, of the undesirable as the desirable ; and the thinking of pain as pleasure ; we know that for a Yogi every phenomenal state of existence

III.

is painful—परिणाम तापसंस्कारदुःखैर्गुणहतिविरोधाच्च दुःखमेव सर्वं विवेकिनः—

A Yogi knows that attachment *राग* to sensual and other objects can only give temporary pleasure for it is sure soon to be turned into pain. Enjoyment can never bring satisfaction, but only drags a man further and further into sorrows.

(2) Again at the time of enjoying pleasures there is always seen also the suffering from pain in the form of aversion to pain ; for the tendency of aversion from pain can only result from the incipient memory of previous sufferings. Of course this is also परिणामदुःखता, but it differs from the former in this that in the case of परिणाम दुःख (Pleasure turned into pain) pleasure is turned into pain as a result of change or *Parinama* in the future whereas in this case the anxiety of pain is a thing of the present, happening at one and the same time that a man is enjoying a pleasure.

Enjoyment of pleasure or suffering from pain causes their impressions called संस्कार or potencies and these again when helped by associations naturally create their memory and thence comes attainment or aversion, whence follows action, whence pleasure and pain and whence impressions, memory, attachment or aversion and again action and so forth.

All states are the modifications of the three *Gunas* ; in every one of them the functions of all the three *Gunas* are seen which are contrary to one another. These contraries are remarkable in their developed forms and these *Gunas* are seen to abide in various proportions and compose all our mental

Painfulness by
Sanskāras, the contrariety of and the functioning of the qualities.

states. Thus it is seen that a Yogi who wants to be released from pain once for all is very sensitive and is anxious to avoid even our so-called pleasures. (अक्षिपात्रकल्पोक्ति विद्वान्) see II. 15 (यथार्थातन्तुः अक्षिपात्रे व्यसः स्यर्गेन दुःखयति न चाप्येष गात्रावयवेषु, एवमेतानि दुःखानि अक्षिपात्रकल्पं योगिनमेव क्लियति नेतरं प्रतिपत्तारम् इतरं तु स्वकर्मापाहतं दुःखमुपात्तं उपात्तं त्यजन्त्यक्तं त्यक्तमुपाद्दानमनादिवासनाविचित्रया चित्तत्रया समन्ततोऽनुविद्धमिवाविद्यया हातव्यं एवमङ्गुलारममकारानुपातिनं जातं जातं वाह्याभ्यामिकीभयनिमित्ताः चिपञ्चाब्धः वापाः अनुप्रवन्ते । तदेवमनादिना दुःखस्रोतसा व्यञ्जमानमात्मनं सूतयामं च दृष्ट्वा योगी सर्वदुःखत्रयकारणं सम्यग्दर्शनं शरणं प्रतिपद्यते ।) 'The wise have in this case a similarity to the eye-ball. As a thread of wool thrown into the eye pains by a mere touch, but not so by coming into contact with any other organ, so do these afflict the Yogi who is as tender as the eye-ball, but not any one else whom they reach. As to others, however, who have again and again taken up pains as the consequence of their own karma, and who again took it up after having given it up, who are all round pierced through as it were by Nescience, possessed as they are of a mind full of afflictions, variegated by eternal residua of passions, who follow in the wake of the " I " and the " Mine " in relation to things that should be left apart, the three-fold pain caused by both external and internal means run after them as they are repeatedly born. The Yogi then seeing himself and the world of living beings thus surrounded by the eternal flow of pain, turns for refuge to right knowledge, the cause of the destruction of all pains.

The thinking of the mind and body and the objects of the external world as the true self and to feel affected by their change is what is called Avidyā.

The modifications that this Avidyā suffer may be collected under four heads. (I) The

Avidyā—of how many kinds.

ego, which as described above springs from the identification of the बुद्धि with

the Purusha.

II. From this ego springs **रग** or attachment which is the inclination towards pleasure and consequently towards the means necessary for attaining it for a person who has previously experienced pleasures and remembers them.

IV. Repulsion from pain also springs from the ego and is of the nature of anxiety for its removal; anger at pain and the means which brings in pain, sticks in the mind in consequence of the feeling of pain, in the case of him who has felt the pain and has the memory of it.

V. Love of life also springs from the ego. It is the feeling that exists in all persons and appears in a positive aspect in the form "May I live on" and in a negative aspect in the form "would that I were never to cease". This is due to the painful experience of death at some previous state of our existence, which exists in us as a residual potency (**वासना**) and causes the instincts of self-preservation and fear of death and love of life. These are called the five **Kleshas** or afflictions.

Now we are in a position to see the far-reaching effects of the identification of the Purusha with the **ब्रह्म**

We have already seen how it has generated the Macrocosm or the exterior world on the one hand, and **मनस्** and the senses on the other. Now we see that from it also springs attachment to pleasure, aversion from pain and the love of life, motives which are seen in most of our states of consciousness, which are therefore called the **क्लिष्ट** or the afflicted states. The five afflictions just mentioned are all comprehended in **Avidyā**, since **Avidyā** or false knowledge is at the root of all the five afflictions. The sphere of **Avidyā** is all false knowledge generally, and that of **Asmitā** is also inseparably connected with all our experiences which consists in the identification

Avidyā and its effects.

of the intelligent self with the sensual objects of the world, the attainment of which seems to please us and the loss of which is so painful to us. It must however be remembered that these five afflictions are only the different aspects of अविद्या and cannot be conceived separately from the Avidyā. These always lead us into the meshes of the world, far and far away from our final goal—the realisation of our own self—the emancipation of the Purusha.

Opposite to it are the Vrittis or states which are called अक्लिष्ट unafflicted, the अभ्यास (habit of steadiness) and Vairāgya, which being antagonistic to the afflicted states, are helpful towards achieving the true knowledge or its means (विवेकख्यातितत्साधनसम्बन्धात् अक्लं शफलत्वादक्लिष्टाः) व्यातिविषया गुणधिकार-विराधिष्ठीःक्लिष्टा (भाष्य). These represent such thoughts that tend towards emancipation and are produced from our attempts to conceive rationally our final state of emancipation, or to adopt suitable means for it. They must not however be confused with पुण्यकर्म (virtuous action), for both Punya and Papa Karma are said to have sprung from the Kleshas. There is no hard and fast rule with regard to the appearance of these Klišhta and Aklishta states, so that in the stream of the Klišhta states or in the intervals thereof, Aklishta states also might come—as the practice and desirelessness born by the study of the Veda, reasoning and precepts (आगमानुमानाचार्योपदेशपरिश्र्मलनसम्बन्धनी अभ्यासवैराग्ये) and remain unmixed with the Klišhta states quite distinct in itself. A Brahmin being in the village of Sala which is full of the Kiratas, does not become a Kirāta himself by that.

Each Aklishta state produces its own potency or संस्कार and with the frequency of the states, their संस्कार is strengthened which in due course by habituation suppresses the Aklishta ones.

These *Klishta* and *Aklishta* modifications are of five descriptions *प्रमाण* (Real cognition) *विपर्यय* (unreal cognition) *विकल्प* (logical abstraction and imagination) *निद्रा* (sleep) *स्मृति* (memory). These *Vrittis* or states however

must be distinguished from the six kinds of mental activity mentioned in (II. 18) *ग्रहण* (reception or presentative ideation) *धारण* (retention) *ईदृ* (representative ideation) *अपीदृ* (conceptual selection) *तत्त्वज्ञान* (right knowledge) *अभिनविश* (decision and determination) of which these states are the products.

We have seen that from *Avidyā* springs all the *Kleshas* or afflictions which are therefore seen to be the source of the *Klishta Vrittis* as well. *Abhy-*

Avidyā, Kleshas & Sanskāras. *āsa, Vairāgya*—the *Aklishta Vrittis*, which spring from precepts &c. lead to right knowledge and as such are antagonistic to the modification of the *Gunas* on the *Avidyā* side.

We know also that both these sets of *Vrittis*—the *Klishta* and the *Aklishta* produce their own kinds of *Sanskāras*, the *Klishta Sanskāra* and

Vrittis and Sanskāras. the *Aklishta* or *Prajñā* (प्रज्ञा) *Sanskāra*.

All these modifications of *Chitta* as *Vritti* and *Sanskāra* are the *Dharmas* (धर्म) of *Chitta*, considered as the *धर्म* or substance.

These *Vrittis* are also called the *मानस कर्म* as different from the *वाचककर्म* achieved in the exterior world by the five motor or active senses. These

Karinas. may be divided into four classes (1) *Krishṇa* (black) (2) *Śukla* (White) (3) *Śukla-Krishṇa* (white and black) (4) *Aśukla Krishṇa* (neither white nor black). The *Krishṇa Karma* are those committed by the wicked and as such, are wicked actions called also *अधर्म* (demerit). These are of two kinds viz:

वाञ्छ and मानस the former being of the nature of speaking ill of others stealing other's property etc. (निन्दा परस्वा-दानादीनि च) and the latter of the nature of such states as are opposed to Śraddhā, Vīrya etc. which are called the Śukla Karma, (तद्विपरीतं यद्वादि च तदुक्तं). The Śukla Karmas are the virtuous or meritorious deeds. These can only happen in the form of mental states and as such can take place only in the मानस कर्म्म. These are Śraddhā, Vīrya, Smṛiti, Samādhi and Prajñā which are infinitely superior to actions achieved in the external world by the motor or the active senses ये चैते मेवादाद्योऽध्यायिनां विद्वांसो वाञ्छसाधननिरनुग्रहात्मानः प्रकृतं धर्म्ममभि-निर्वर्त्तयन्ति । तयोर्मानसं त्रयीयं । कथं ज्ञानवैराग्ये केन अतिशय्येत्, दम्भकारणं च चित्तबलव्यतिरेकेण शारीरिण कर्म्मणा यत्थं कः कर्म्ममत्सङ्गत, समुद्रमग्न्यवहापिवेत् । the Śukla Karma belongs to those who resort to study and meditation (शुक्रतपः स्वाध्यायाध्ययनवताम्) (3) The Śuklakrishna Karma are the actions achieved in the external world by the motor or active senses. These are called white and black, because actions achieved in the external world however good (शुक्र) they might be, cannot altogether be devoid of wickedness (कृष्ण). For all external actions entail some harm to other living beings यदावत् वह्निःसाधनसाध्यं ततः सर्वेवास्ति कस्यचित् पीडा न हि व्रीह्यादिसाधनेपि कर्म्मणि परपीडा नास्ति अवघातादिसमर्थेपि पिपौलिकादि वधसम्भवात्) ।

Even the Vaidika duties though they are meritorious are associated with sins as they entail the sacrificing of animals (सर्व्वेवेदीकृतमपि कृष्णसङ्कीर्णमेव अनुग्रहश्च तत्र देवादीनां प्रसिद्ध एव । स्वल्पसङ्करः सपरिहारः सपत्यवमर्षः—पञ्चशिल्प) ।

The white side of these actions viz : that of helping others and doing good is therefore called धर्म्म as it is the cause of the enjoyment of pleasure and happiness for the doer. The Krishna side of these actions viz : that of doing injury to others is called अधर्म्म as it

is the cause of the sufferings of pain for the doer. As in all our ordinary states of existence we are always under the influence of धर्म and अधर्म which are therefore called (vehicles of actions) आशयः आशयेन साधारिकापुरुषा अस्मिन् इति आशयः । That in which some thing lives is its vehicle. Here the Purushas in evolution are to be understood as living in the sheath of actions (which is for that reason called a vehicle or आशय). Merit or virtue, and sin or demerit are the vehicles of actions. All Śukla Karma therefore, either mental or external, is called merit or virtue and is productive of happiness, all Krishna Karma either mental or external is called demerit, sin or vice and is productive of pains.

The Karma called Aśukla Krishna (neither black nor white) is of those who have renounced everything, whose afflictions have been destroyed and whose present body is the last one they will have (अयुक्ताङ्गणा संन्यासिनां चौचक्रे शानां चरमदेहानां ।) Those who have renounced actions, the Karma Samnyasis) (and not those who belong to the Samnyasasrama merely) are nowhere found performing actions which depend upon external means. They have not got the black vehicle of actions, because they do not perform such actions. Nor do they possess the white vehicle of actions, because they dedicate to Īswara the fruits of all vehicles of action brought about by the practice of Yoga.

Taking the question of Karmāśaya again for review, we see that being produced from desire काम avarice लोभ ignorance मोह and anger क्रोध it has really got at its root the Kleshas (afflictions) such as Avidyā, Asmitā, Raga, Dwesha, Abhinivesa. It will

Karmasnya the
Kleshas, and the
passions.

be seen easily that the passions named above, desire, lust, etc. are not in any way different from the Kleshas or afflictions named before ; and as all actions virtuous or

sinful have their springs from the said sentiments of कान, क्रोध, लोभ मोह, it is clear enough that all these virtuous or sinful actions spring forth from the Kleshas.

Now this Karmāśaya ripens into life-state, life experience and life time, if the roots—
 Ripening of the Karmāśaya and the afflictions. the afflictions exist. Not only is it true that when the afflictions are rooted out, no Karmāśaya can accumulate but even when many Karmāśayas of many lives are accumulated they are rooted out when the afflictions are destroyed. For, otherwise, it is difficult to conceive that the Karmāśaya accumulated for infinite number of years, whose time of ripeness is uncertain, will be rooted out ! So even if there be no fresh Karmasaya after the rise of true knowledge, the Purusha cannot be liberated but shall be required to suffer an endless cycle of births and rebirths to exhaust the already accumulated Karmāśayas of endless lives. For this reason, the mental plane becomes a field for the production of the fruits of action only, when it is watered by the stream of afflictions. Hence the afflictions help the vehicle of actions (कर्माशय) in the production of their fruits also. It is for this reason that when the afflictions are destroyed the power which helps to bring about the manifestation also disappears ; and on that account the vehicles of actions although existing, being innumerable and having no time for their fruition do not possess the power of producing fruit, because their seed powers are destroyed by his intellection. (प्रसङ्ख्यान).

Karmāśaya is of two kinds (1) Ripening in the same life (दृष्टकर्मवेदनौघ) (2) Ripening in another unknown life. That Puṇya Karmāśaya which is generated by intense purificatory action, trance and repetition of Mantras and that Pāpa Karmāśaya

Karmāśaya divided into two classes according to its time of ripening.

which is generated by repeated evil done to men who are suffering the extreme misery of fear, disease and helplessness or to those who place confidence or to those who are high-minded and perform Tapas, ripen into fruit in that very life, whereas other kinds of Karmāśayas ripen into fruit in some unknown life.

The living beings in hell have no Drishta Janma Karmāśaya, for, that life is intended for sufferance only and their body is called the Bhoga Śarīra intended for the sufferance alone and not for accumulating any Karmāśaya the effect of which they could meet in that very life.

There are others whose afflictions have been spent up and exhausted and they have thus no such Karmāśaya the effect of which they will have to reap in some other life. They are thus said to have no Adrishta

Janma Vedanīya Karma.

The Karmāśaya of both kinds described above ripens itself into the life-state, life time and life-experience. These are called the three ripenings or Vipākas of the Karmāśaya ; and they are conducive of pleasure or pain according as they are the products of Punyakarmāśaya virtue (or Pāpa Karmāśaya)—vice or demerit. (तेषामप्यपि परितापफला पुण्यापुण्याहेतुत्वात्) Many Karmāśayas combine to produce one life state ; for it is not possible that each Karma should produce one or many life-states for then there would be no possibility of experiencing the effects of the Karmas, because if for each one of the Karmas we have one or more lives, then there being endless Karmas, there would be no room for getting lives for experiencing the effects, and there will be no certainty of getting the

Lives which possess no Drishta Janma Vedanīya Karmāśaya.

Who have no Adrishta Janma Vedanīya Karmāśaya

The effect of Karmāśaya.

Jāti, Ayush and Bhoga.

effects in a certain life for it may take endless time to exhaust the Karmas already accumulated. It is therefore held that many Karmas unite to produce one life state or birth and determine also its particular duration of life (जाति) and the experiences (Bhoga). The virtuous and sinful Karmāśayas accumulated in one life, in order to produce their effects, cause the death of the individual and manifest themselves in producing the birth of the individual, his duration of life and particular experiences, pleasurable or painful. The order of undergoing the experiences is the order in which the Karmas manifest themselves as effects, the principal ones being manifested earlier in life. The principal Karmas here refer to those which are too ready to generate their effects. Thus it is said that those Karmas which produce their effects immediately are called primary whereas those which produce effects after some delay are called secondary (यद्यत्कर्मसुदूतमनन्तरमेव फलं दास्यति तत् प्रधानं यत् किञ्चिद्विलम्ब्य तदुपसर्जनं). We see thus that there is a continuity of existence all through; when the Karmas of this life ripen jointly they tend to fructify themselves by causing another birth as a means where to, death is caused, and along with it life is manifested in another body (according to the Dharma and Adharma of the कर्माशय) formed by the प्रकृत्यापूर (cf. the Chitta theory related before); and the same Karmāśaya, regulates the life period and the experiences of that life, the Karmāśayas of which life again take a similar course and manifest themselves in the production of another life and so on.

We have seen that the Karmāśaya has three fructi-

The Ekabhabika unigenital) Karmāśaya and the Aneka-bhabika (multi-genital) Vāsanā.

fications, viz : जाति आयुः and भोग. Now generally the Karmāśaya is regarded as Ekabhabika or unigenital, i.e. it accumulates in one life. Ekabhava

means one life and Ekabhabika means the product of one life,

or accumulated in one life एकजन्मावच्छिन्नस्य भवनं). Regarded from this point of view it may be contrasted with the Vāsanās which remain accumulated from thousands of previous lives from eternity and the mind pervaded all over with them is like a fishing net covered all over with knots. This Vāsanā results from a memory of the experiences of a life generated by the fructification of the Karmāsaya and kept in the Chitta in the form of potency or impressions (संस्कार). Now we have seen before, that the Chitta remains constant in all the births and rebirths that an individual has undergone from eternity; it therefore keeps the memory of those various experiences of thousands of lives in the form of Sanskāra or potency and is therefore compared with a fishing net pervaded all over with knots. The Vāsanās therefore are not the results of the accumulation of experiences or the memory of them of one life but of many lives and are therefore called अनेकभविक as contrasted to the Karmāsaya representing the virtuous and vicious actions which are accumulated in one life and which produce another life, its experiences and its life duration as a result of fructification (विपाक). This vāsanā is the cause of the instinctive tendencies, or habits of deriving pleasures and pains peculiar to different animal lives.

Thus the habits of a dog-life and its peculiar modes of taking its experiences and of deriving pleasures and pains are very different in nature

The Vāsanā theory explained.

from those of a man-life; and must therefore be explained on the basis of an incipient memory in the form of potency, or impressions (संस्कार) of the experiences that an individual must have undergone in a previous dog-life, of its own.

Now when by the fructification of the Karmāsaya a doglife is settled on a person, at once his corresponding

Vāsanās of a previous dog-life are revived and he begins

The manifestation of the Vāsanās according to the particular fructification of the Karmasaya.

to take interest in his dog-life in the manner of a dog; the same principle applies to the virtue of individuals as men or as gods. (तत्तत्सृष्टिपाकानुगुणमेवाभिव्यक्तिर्वासनानां) IV. 8.

If there was not this law of Vāsanās then any Vāsanā would be revived in any life, and with the manifestation of the Vāsanā of animal life, a man would take interest in eating grass and derive pleasure from it. Thus Nagesa says :—Now if those karmas which produce a man life would manifest the vāsanās of animal lives then one might as a man be inclined to eat grass and it is therefore that it is said that only the vāsanās corresponding to the karmas are revived. (नन्वेवं मानुषप्रापककर्माणां पश्यादि भोगवासनाभिव्यक्तौ तद्यभोजनेऽपि प्रवृत्तिः स्यादतत्सृष्टिपाकानुगुणानाम् (नारदः)

Now as the Vāsanās are of the nature of Sanskaras or impressions, they lie ingrained in the chitta and no hindrance is possible towards their being revived on account of their being intervened by other births. It is therefore that the Vāsanās of a

Vāsanās being of the nature of Sanskaras is similar to memory.

dog-life are at once revived in another dog-life, though between the first dog-life and the second dog-life, the individual might have passed many other lives, say that of a man, a bull etc. and though the second dog-life may take place many hundreds of years after the first dog-life and in quite different countries. The difference between Sanskaras, impressions and Smṛiti or memory is simply this that the former is the latent state whereas the latter is the manifested state; so we see that the memory and the impressions are identical in nature, so we see that whenever a Sanskara is revived, it means nothing but

the manifestation of the memory of the same experiences conserved in the sauskāra in a latent state. Experiences when they take place, keep their impressions in the mind, and may be intervened by thousands of other experiences lapse of time etc., but they are revived with the proper cause of their revival in a moment, and the other intervening experiences can in no way hinder their revival, So it is with the Vāsanās too, which are revived in no time according to the particular fructification of the Karma-saya in the form of a particular life, as a man, or a dog, or any thing else.

It is now clear that the Karmāsaya tending towards fructification is the cause of the manifestation of the

Karmāsaya are the cause of the manifestation of the Vsaanas.

Vāsanās already existing in the mind in a latent form. Thus the Sutra says :—When two similar lives are intervened by many births, long lapses of time and remoteness of space even then for the purpose of the revival of the Vāsanās they may be regarded as immediately following each other, for memories and impressious are the same (Sutra IV. 9). The Bhashya says :—the Vāsanā is like the memory (Smriti) and so there can be memory from the impressions of past lives intervened by many lives and by remote tracts of country. From these memories there are again the impressions (Sanskāras), so the memories are revived by manifestation of the karmāsayas, so since there may be memories from past impressions intervened by many lives, these interventions do not destroy the causal antecedence of those past lives, (जाति देश कालव्यवहितानामप्यानन्तर्यं स्मृतिरंस्कारयोः एकरूपत्वात्) (तथा च वासना तथा च स्मृतिरिति जातिदेशकालव्यवहितेभ्यः संस्कारेभ्यः स्मृतिः । स्मृतेषु पुनः संस्काराः इत्येवमेते स्मृतिसंस्काराः कर्माश्रयवृत्तिलाभवशाद्वाप्यन्ते । अतश्च व्यवहितानामपि निमित्तनैमित्तिकभावानुच्छेदात् आनन्तर्यमेव सिद्धं) ।

These *Vāsanās* are however beginningless since we see that a baby even shortly after its birth is seen to feel instinctively the fear of death, which it could not have derived from its experience of this life. Thus we see that if a small baby is thrown upwards it is seen to shake and cry like a grown-up man and from this it may be inferred that it is afraid of falling down on the ground and is therefore shaking through fear. Now this baby has never in this life learnt from experience that a fall on the ground will cause pain, for it has never fallen down on the ground and suffered pain therefrom ; so the cause of this fear cannot be sought in the experiences of this life but in the memory of past experiences of fall and pain arising therefrom, which is innate as *Vāsanā* in this life and thus causes this instinctive fear. So this innate memory which causes this instinctive fear of death from the very time of birth has not its origin in this life but it is the memory of the experiences of some previous life, and in that life also it existed as innate memory of some other previous life and in that also as the innate memory of some other life and so on to beginningless time. And this goes to show that these *Vāsanās* are without any beginning.

The beginningless-

The beginningless-
ness of these
Vāsanās or innate
memories.

Now coming to the question of the unigenitality—*Eka-bbabikatwa*—of the *Karmāśaya* and its exceptions, we find that a great confusion has occurred among the commentators about the following

Divergence of views
owing to confusion
of the reading of the
Bhāshya.

passage in the *Bhāshya* which refers to this subject: The *śāstra* says:—तद्वदृजन्मवेदनीयस्य नियतविपाकस्यैवायं नियमो न तु अदृजन्मवेदनीयस्यानियतविपाकस्य । कस्मात् । योहि अदृजन्मवेदनीयोऽनियतविपाकस्य त्रयी गतिः—कृतस्याविपकस्य नात्रः प्रधानकर्म्मणि अवापगमनं वा,

नियतविपाकप्रधानकर्म्मणामिभृतस्य वा चिरमवस्थानमिति । Here योगवार्त्तिक and नागेश take the reading to be तदाद्दृष्टजन्मवेदनीयस्य नियतविपाकस्य, etc., whereas Vāchaspati takes the reading quoted before ; there is thus a divergence of meaning on this point between Yoga Vārttika and his follower Nāgesa on one side and Vāchaspati on the other.

Vāchaspati says that the Drishtajanma vedanīya (to be fructified in the same visible life)

Vāchaspati. Karma is the only true Karma where the Karmāśaya is Ekabhabika unigenital, for here these effects are positively not due to the Karma of any other previous lives but are due to the Karma of that very life. So these only are the true causes of Ekabhabika Karmāśaya (दृष्टजन्मवेदनीयस्य नियतविपाकस्यैवायमेकभक्तित्वनियमः न तु दृष्टजन्मवेदनीयस्य) ।

Thus according to Vāchaspati we see that the Adrishta Janma Vedanīya Karma (to be fructified in another life) of unappointed fruition is never an ideal of Ekabhabikatwa or unigenital character ; for it may have three different courses : (1) It may be destroyed without fruition. (2) It may become merged in the ruling action. (3) It may exist for a long time overpowered by the ruling action whose fruition has been appointed.

Vijñāna Bhikshu and his follower Nāgesha, however, says that the Drishta Janma Vedanīya


Vijñāna Bhikshu and Nāgesha. Karma (to be fructified in the same visible life) can never be Ekabhabika or unigenital for there is no Bhāba, or previous birth there, whose product is being fructified in that life, for this Karma is of that same visible life and not of some other previous Bhaba or life ; and they agree in holding that it is for that reason that the Bhāshya makes no mention of this Drishtajanma Vedanīya Karma ; it is clear that the Karmāśaya in no other Bhaba is being fructified here.

(तत्र अदृष्टजन्मवेदनीयस्य नियतविपाकस्य एव अयं नियमः इति । एकभविकत्व नियमः इत्यर्थः । न तु अदृष्टजन्मवेदनीयस्य अनियतविपाकस्य चेति सगमम । दृष्टजन्मवेदनीयस्य भवाद्देतुत्वंन एकभविकत्वाभावः स्पष्ट एव इत्यतोऽनियतविपाकस्यैव एकभविकत्वनियमाभावे हेतुं पृच्छति (योगवार्तिक), दृष्टजन्मवेदनीयस्य तु भवाद्देतुत्वादेव एकभविकत्वनियमः (नागेश) । Thus we see that about Drishta Janmavedaniya Karma, Vāchaspati holds that it is the typical case of Ekabhabika Karma (Karma of the same birth) whereas Vijñāna Bhikshu holds just the opposite view, *viz.*, that the Drishtajanmavedaniya Karma should not at all be considered as Ekabhabika since there is no भव here or birth, it being fructified in the same life.

The Adrishta Janma Vedaniya Karma (works to be fructified in another life) of unappointed fruition has three different courses—(I) As we have observed before by the rise of Aśukla Krishna (neither black nor white) Karma the other Karmas—Śukla, Krishna and Śuklakrishna are rooted out; The Śukla Karmāsaya again rising from study and asceticism destroys the Krishna ones without their being able to generate their effects. These therefore can never be styled as Ekabhabika since they are destroyed without producing any effect. (II) When the effects of minor actions are merged into the effects of the major and ruling action and the sins originating from the sacrifice of animals at a holy sacrifice are sure to produce bad effects though they may be minor and small in comparison to the good effects rising from the performance of the sacrifice and these are merged along with it. Thus it is said that the experts being immersed in lakes of happiness brought about by their sacrifices bear gladly particles of the fire of sorrow brought about by the sins of killing animals at sacrifice (सृष्ट्यन्ते हि पुण्यसंभारोपनीतस्वर्गसुधा महाऋदावगाहिनः कुशलाः पापमात्रोपपादिता दृष्टवन्निकषिकात्). So we see that here also the minor actions having been performed

with the major do not produce their effects independently and so all their effects are not fully manifested and hence these secondary Karmāśayas cannot be regarded as Ekabhabika (अत्रापि प्रधानकर्मापूर्वस्य बलवत्तरकर्मात्तरिणाभिभवात् तदुपसर्जनस्यापि नैकभक्तित्वम्).

(III) Again the Adrishta Janma Vedaniya Karma (to be fructified in another life) of unappointed fruition (अनियत विपाक) remains overcome for a long time by another Adrishta Janma Vedaniya Karma (to be fructified in another life) of appointed fruition. A man for example may do some good actions and some extremely vicious actions, so that at the time of death, the Karmāśaya of those vicious actions becoming ripe and fit for appointed fruition generate an animal life, then his good actions whose benefits are such as may be reaped only in a man-life will remain overcome until the man is born again as a man : so this also cannot be said to be Ekabhabika (to be reaped in one life). We may summarise the classification of Karmas according to Vāchaspati in a table as follows :—



Thus the Karmāśaya may be viewed from two sides, one being that of appointed fruition and the other un-appointed fruition, and the other that of Drishtajanma Vedaniya and Adrishta Janma Vedaniya. Now the theory is that the Niyata Vipāka (of appointed fruition) Karmāśaya is always Ekabhabika, *i.e.*, it does not remain intervened by other lives, but directly produces its effects in the succeeding life.

Ekabhabika means that which is produced from the accumulation of Karmas in one life in the life which succeeds it. Vāchaspati however takes it also to mean that action which attains fruition in the same life that it is performed whereas what Vijñāna Bhikshu understands by Ekabhabika is that action alone which is produced in the life immediately succeeding the life in which it was accumulated. So according to Vijñāna Bhikshu, the Niyata Vipāka (of appointed fruition) Drishta Janma Vedaniya (to be fruited in the same life) action is not Ekabhabika, since it has no Bhāba, *i.e.*, it is not the production of a preceding life. It cannot be Anekabhabika also, so we see that this Niyata Vipāka Drishta Janma Vedaniya action is neither Ekabhabika nor Anekabhabika. Whereas Vāchaspati is inclined to call this also Ekabhabika. About the Niyata Vipāka Adrishta Janma Vedaniya action being called Ekabhabika (unigenital) there seems to be no dispute. The Aniyata Vipāka Adrishtajanma vedaniya action cannot be called Ekabhabika as it undergoes three different courses described above.

We have described Avidyā and its special forms as the Kleshas, from which also proceed the actions (कर्मा) virtuous and vicious (धर्म, अधर्म)

Review of Avidyā. which in their turn again produce as a result of their fruition, ज्ञानि, वायु and मोग and the Vāsanās or the residues of the memory of

these experiences. Again every new life or जति is produced from the fructification of actions of a previous life ; a man is made to perform actions good or bad by the Kleshas which are rooted in him, and these actions as a result of their fructification produce another life and its experiences, in which life again new actions are earned by virtue of the Kleshas and thus the cycle of life is continued anew. When there is प्रलय or involution of the cosmical world process the individual Chittas of the separate Purushas, return back to the Prakriti and lie within it, together with their own Avidyās and at the time of each new creation or evolution of the world these are created anew with such changes as are due according to their individual Avidyās, with which they had to return back to their original causes, the Prakriti and spend an undividable inseparable existence with it. (The Avidyās of some other creation being merged in the Prakriti along with the chittas, remain in the Prakriti as Vāsanās and Prakriti being under the influence of these Avidyās as Vāsanās create the corresponding Buddhis for the individual Purushas—which were—connected with them before the last Pralaya dissolution) (स्वर्गान्तरीयाया अविद्यायाः स्वचित्तेन सह निरुद्धाया अपि अस्ति वासना, तत्रासना वासितं च प्रधानं तत् सत्पुरुषसंयोगिनीं तादृशीमेव बुद्धिम् सृजति) । So we see that though the Chittas had returned to their original causes with their individual अविद्या—Nescience, the Avidyā was not lost but at the time of new creation it being revived created such Buddhis as might be suitable receptacles for it. These Buddhis are seen again to be modified further into their specific Chittas or mental planes by the name Avidyā which then is manifested in it as the Kleshas and these again in the Karmāśaya, Jāti, Ayush and Bhoga and so on ; the individual however is just in the same position as he was or would have been before the involution or Pralaya. The Avidyās of the Chittas which had returned to the Prakriti

at the time of the creation being revived created their own Buddhis of the previous creation and by their connection with the individual Purushas are the causes of the Sansara or the cosmic evolution—the evolution of the microcosm, the Chittas and the macrocosm or the exterior world.

In this new creation the creative agencies of God and Avidyā, are distinguished in this that the latter represents the end or teleology of the Prakriti—the ever-evolving energy transforming itself into its modifications as the mental and the material world, whereas the former represents that intelligent power which abides outside the pale of Prakriti, but which removes the obstructions offered by the Prakriti, herself; being unintelligent and not knowing where and how to yield so as to form the actual modifications necessary for the realisation of the particular and specific objects of the numberless Purushas, these Avidyās hold within themselves the पुरुषार्थ or serviceability of the Purushas, and are the cause of the connection of the Purusha and the Prakriti (तद्वहेतुरविद्या) so that when these Avidyās are rooted out it is said that the Purusārtha or the serviceability of the Purusha is at an end and the Purusha becomes liberated from the bonds of the Prakriti and this is called the final goal of the Purusha.

The ethical problem of the Pātāñjala philosophy is the uprooting of this Avidyā by the attainment of true knowledge of the nature of the Purusha which will be succeeded by the liberation of the Purusha and his absolute freedom or independence Kaivalya which is the last realisation of the Purusha—the ultimate goal of all the movements of the Prakriti.

The Ethical Problems.

This final uprooting of the Avidyā with its Vāsanās directly follows the attainment of true knowledge called the Prajñā in which state the seed of false knowledge is altogether burnt and cannot be revived again. Before this state, the discriminative knowledge which arises as the recognition of the distinct natures of the Purusha and Buddhi remains shaky, but when by continual practice, this discriminative knowledge becomes strengthened in the mind, its potency gradually grows stronger and stronger, and roots out the potency of the out-going states of activity (व्युत्थान संस्कार) and thus the seed of false knowledge becomes burnt up and incapable of fruition, and the impurity of the energy of Rajas being removed, the Sattwa as the manifesting entity becomes of the highest purity and in that state flows on the stream of the notion of discrimination—the recognition of the distinct natures of the Purusha and the Buddhi—free from impurity. Thus when in this way the state of Buddhi becomes almost as pure as the Purusha itself, all self-enquiry subsides, the vision of the real form of the Purusha arises and the false knowledge together with the consequent Kleshas, and the consequent fruition of actions, cease once for all. (ततः क्लेशकर्म्मनिवृत्तिः) This is that state of Chitta which far from tending towards the objective world tends towards the Kaivalya of the Purusha (तदाविदेकनिष्ठा केवल्यप्राप्ताभ्यां चित्तं).

In the first stages when the mind attains the discriminative knowledge but the Prajñā is not deeply seated, and occasionally the phenomenal states of consciousness are seen to intervene in the form of “ I am,” “ Mine,” “ I know,” “ I do not know,” because even then, the old potencies though becoming weaker and weaker are not finally destroyed and consequently occasionally produce their corresponding conscious

Continued.

and also Vitarkānugata, Vichārānugata Ānandānugata and Asmitānugata. True knowledge begins to dawn from the first stage of this Samprajñāta state, and when the Yogi reaches the last stage, the knowledge reaches its culminating point, but still so long as the potencies of the lower stages of relative knowledge remain, the knowledge cannot obtain absolute certainty and permanency, as it will always become threatened by any possible encroachment by the other states of the past Vyutthana (phenomenal activity now existing as the sub-conscious). So the last stage of Asamprajñāta Samādhi represents the stage in which the ordinary consciousness has been altogether surpassed and the mind is in its own true infinite aspect and the potencies of the stages in which the mind was full of finite knowledge are also burnt, so that with the return of the Chitta to its primal cause, the final emancipation is effected. The last state of Samprajñāta Samādhi is called Sanskārasesha, only because here the residua of the potencies of sub-conscious thought only remain and the actual states of consciousness become all extinct. It is now easy to see that no mind which is not in the Ekāgra or one pointed-state can be fit for the Asamprajñāta Samādhi in which it has to settle itself on one object and that alone. So also no mind which has not risen up to the state of highest निरोध or suppression is fit for the Asamprajñāta or the Nirvija state.

It is now necessary to come down to a lower level and examine the obstructions on account of which a mind cannot easily become one-pointed or Ekāgra. These nine in number are the following :—

Disease, langour, indecision, want of having the mental requirements necessary for Samādhi, idleness of body and mind, attachment towards the objects of sense, false

and illusory knowledge, non-attainment of the state of concentrated contemplation, unsteadiness and instability of the mind in a Samādhi state even if it can anyhow attain it. These are again seen to be accompanied by pain, and despair owing to the non-fulfilment of desire. Physical shakiness or unsteadiness of the limbs, taking in of breath and giving out of it. These are seen to follow the nine distractions described above of a distracted mind.

To prevent these distractions and their accompaniments it is necessary that we should practise habituation on one truth. Vāchaspati says that this one truth to which the mind should be settled and fixed was Iswara and Rāmānānda Saraswati and Narayana Tirtha agreed with him. Vijñāna Bhikshu however says that here by one truth any object gross or fine is intended (स्थूलादिवत् किञ्चित् तत्त्व' तदात्मनं चित्तमभ्यसत् पुनः पुनः कुर्यात्) and Bhoja supports Vijñāna Bhikshu and says that here "one truth" might mean any desirable object (कस्मिंश्चिदभिमतं).

Abhyāsa means the steadiness of the mind in one state and not altogether absence of any state ; for the Bhashyākāra himself has said in the Samāpattisūtra, that Samprajñāta trance, comes after this steadiness. As we shall see also hereafter, it means nothing but the application of the five means Śraddhā, Vīrya, Smṛiti, Samādhi and Prajñā ; it is an endeavour of setting the mind on one state, and as such does not differ from the application of the five means of Yoga with a view to settle and steady the mind (तत् सम्यादनेच्छया यद्वावीर्यं कृतिसमाधिप्रज्ञादीनां वत्यमाषानां साधनानामनुष्ठानमभ्यास-मिन्वभ्यासलक्षणं कर्तं, सिद्ध, 1. 13). This effort becomes firmly rooted, being well attended to for a long time without interruption and with devotion.

Now whether this one truth is Iswara or any other object it does not matter very much ; for the true principle

of Yoga is the setting of the mind on one truth, principle or object. But it is no easy matter to do it for an ordinary man ; for in order to do it successfully it is necessary that the mind should be equipped with Sraddhā or faith—the firm conviction of the Yogi in the course that he adopts. This keeps the mind steady, pleased, calm and free from doubts of any kind, so that the Yogi may proceed in the realisation of his object without any vacillation. Unless a man has a firm hold on the course that he pursues, all the steadiness that he may acquire will always be threatened by the danger of a sudden collapse. It will be seen that Vairāgya or desirelessness is only the negative aspect of this Sraddhā. For by it the mind is restrained from the objects of sense, with an aversion or dislike towards the objects of sensual pleasures and worldly desires ; this aversion towards worldly joys is only the other aspect of the faith of the mind and the calmness of its currents (the चित्तसंग्रहाद्) towards the right knowledge and absolute freedom. So it is said that the Vairāgya is the effect of Sraddhā and its product उपायकार्यतया वैराग्यस्य I. 20. विज्ञानभिन्नु. In order to make a person suitable for Yoga, Vairāgya represents the cessation of the mind from the objects of sense and their so-called pleasures and Sraddhā means the positive faith of the mind in the path of Yoga that it adopts, its right aspiration of attaining the highest goal of absolute freedom, and the fullest conviction of doubtlessness and calmness in it.

In its negative aspect Vairāgya is of two kinds Aparā and Parā. The Aparā one is that of a mind free from attachment to perceptible enjoyments, such as women, foods, drinks and power and having no thirst for scriptural enjoyables, such as heaven. The attainment of the states of Videha and the Prakritilaya has when it comes into contact with such divine

and worldly objects, a consciousness of its own, due to an understanding of the defects of those objects brought about by miraculous powers. This consciousness of power is the same as the consciousness of indifference to their enjoyment, and is devoid of all desirable and undesirable objects as such. This Vairāgya may be said to have four stages : (1) Yatamāna—in which the sensual objects are discovered to be defective and the mind recoils from it. (2) Vyatireka—in which the senses to be conquered are taken note of. (3) Ekendriya—in which attachment towards internal pleasures and aversion towards external pains, being removed, the mind sets before itself the task of removing the attachment and aversion towards mental passions for getting honour or avoiding dishonour, etc. The fourth and the last stage of Vairāgya called Vasikār is that in which the mind has perceived the futility of all attractions for external objects of sense and the scriptural objects of desire and having suppressed them altogether the mind does not feel attached, even if it any how comes in connection with them.

With the consummation of this last stage of Aparā Vairāgya, comes the Parā Vairāgya which is identical with the rise of the final Prajñā leading to absolute independence. This Vairāgya, Sraddhā and the Abhyāsa represent the unafflicted states (अक्लिष्टवृत्ति) which suppress gradually the Klishta or the afflicted mental states. These lead the Yogi from one stage to another, and thus he proceeds higher and higher until the final state is arrived.

As Vairāgya advances Sraddhā also advances, from Sraddhā comes Vīrya-energy, or the power or concentration (धारणा) and from it again springs Smṛiti—or continuity of one object of thought and from it comes Samādhi or cognitive and ultra-cognitive trance, after which

Vairāgya and Sraddhā, etc.

follows Prajñā and the final release. Thus by the inclusion of Sraddhā within Vairāgya, its effect, and the other products of Sraddhā with Abhyāsa we see that the Abhyāsa and Vairāgya are the two internal means for achieving the final goal of the Yogi, the supreme suppression and extinction of all states of consciousness, of all afflictions and the Avidyā—the last state of supreme knowledge or Prajñā (अभ्यासवैराग्याभ्यां तन्निरोधः ।).

As Sraddhā, Vīrya, Smṛiti, Samādhi which are not different from Vairāgya and Abhyāsa, (they being only their other aspects or simultaneous products) are the means of attaining Yoga, it is possible to make a classification of the Yogis according to the strength of these with the Yogi, and the strength of the quickness (संवेग) with which they may be applied towards attaining the goal of the Yogi. Thus the Yogis are of nine kinds :—

(1) of mildly energetic means, (2) of means of medium energy, (3) of means of intense energy.

Each of these may vary according to the mildness, medium state, or intensity of the quickness or readiness with which the Yogi may apply them. Thus there are nine kinds of Yogis. Of these the best Yogi is he who is तीव्रसंवेगाधिनादोपाय, *i.e.*, whose mind is most intensely engaged and whose practice is also the strongest.

There is a difference of opinion here about the meaning of the word संवेग, between Vāchaspati and Vijnāna Bhikṣhu. The former says that संवेग means वैराग्य here, but the latter holds that संवेग cannot mean Vairāgya and the Vairāgya being the effect of the Sraddhā cannot be counted separately from it. "Samvega" means quickness in the performance of the means of attaining Yoga ; some say that it means "Vairāgya." But that is not true for if Vairāgya

is an effect of the due performance of the means of Yoga there cannot be the separate ninefold classification of Yoga apart from the various degrees of intensity of the means of Yoga practice. The word "Samvega" etymologically does not mean "Vairāgya" also.

संवेगशोपायानुष्ठाने शैप्रम् । कश्चित् संवेगो वैराग्यमिति व्याचष्टे । तन्न । योगिना नवधात्वानुपपत्तेः उपायकार्यतया वैराग्यस्य उपायसदृत्वादिकं विहाय, स्वातन्त्र्येन सदृत्वादसम्भवात् संवेगशब्दस्य वैराग्यवाचकत्वाभावात् च ।

We have seen just now that *Sraddhā*, etc., are the means of attaining Yoga, but we have not discussed what purificatory actions must an ordinary man perform in order to attain *Sraddhā* from which the other requisites may also spring up. Of course these purificatory actions are not the same for all persons for they must necessarily depend upon the conditions of purity or impurity of each mind ; thus a person who is already in an advanced state may not require the performance of those purificatory actions which will be necessary for a man of lower state. We have said just now that the Yogis are of nine kinds, according to the strength of their mental acquirements, *Sraddhā*, etc.—the requisite means of Yoga and the strength of the quickness with which they may be applied. Neglecting the division by the strength or quickness of application along with these mental requirements we may divide the Yogis again into three kinds : (1) Those who have the best mental acquirements (उत्तमाधिकारी). (2) Those who are mediocres. (3) Those who have low mental acquirements.

In the first chapter of the Yoga aphorisms it has been said that *Abhyāsa*, the application of the mental acquirements of *Sraddhā*, etc., and *Vairāgya*, the consequent cessation of the mind from objects of distraction,

lead to the extinction of all our mental states and of final release. When a man is well developed he may rest contented with his mental actions alone, in his *Abhyāsa* and *Vairāgya*, in his *Dhāranā* (concentration), *Dhyāna* (meditation), and *Samādhi* (trance), which may be called the *Jñānayoga*. But it is easy enough to perceive that this *Jñānayoga* requires very high mental powers and so it is not within the easy reach of ordinary persons. Ordinary persons whose minds are full of impurities must pass through a certain course of purificatory actions, before they can hope to obtain those mental acquirements by which they can hope to follow the course of *Jñānayoga* with facility.

These actions which remove the impurities of the mind, and thus gradually increase the lustre of knowledge until the final state of supreme knowledge can be acquired are called *Kriyāyoga*. They are also called *Yogāngas* as they help the maturity of the *Yoga* process by gradually increasing the lustre of knowledge. They represent the means by which even an ordinary mind (विद्विषवित्त) may gradually purify the mind and make it fit, for the highest ideals of *Yoga*. Thus the *Bhāshya* says—By the sustained practice of these *Yogāngas* or accessories of *Yoga* is destroyed the five-fold unreal cognition (अविद्या) which is of the nature of impurity. Destruction means here disappearance, thus when that is destroyed, real knowledge is manifested. As the means of achievement are being practised more and more, so is the impurity being attenuated more and more. And as more and more of it is being destroyed, so also it goes on increasing more and more the light of wisdom following in the wake of destruction. This process reaches its culmination in discriminative knowledge which means that its highest culmination is in

the knowledge of the nature of the Purusha and the Gunas.

Now the assertion that these actions are the causes of the attainment of salvation, brings the question of the exact natures of their operations with

Nature of the operation of the Yogangas to bring salvation.

regard to this supreme attainment. Bhashyakar with respect to this

question says that they are the causes of the separation of the impurities of the mind just as an axe is the cause of the splitting of a piece of wood ; and again they are the causes of the attainment of the supreme knowledge just as वचनं is the cause of happiness and not in any other way. It must be remembered that causation is viewed according to the Yoga theory as mere transformations of energy ; the operation of concomitant causes is only by removing the obstacles which were impeding the progress of these transformations in a particular direction ; no cause can of itself produce any effect and the only way in which it can help the production of this effect into which by the principles of conservation and transformation of energy, the causal state passes out of its own immanent energy is by removing the intervening obstacles. Thus just as the passage of Chitta into a happy state is helped by वचनं removing the intervening obstacles or his previous good actions by removing the obstacles, so also the passage of the Chitta into the state of the attainment of true knowledge is only helped by the removal of obstructions due to the performance of the Yogangas ; the necessary obstructions being removed the Chitta passes naturally of itself into this infinite state of the attainment of true knowledge in which all finitude is merged.

In connection with this, Bhāshyakara mentions nine kinds of the operation of the causes: (1) as the cause of birth ; (2) of preservation : (3) of manifestation ; (4)

of modification ; (5) of sequential cognition ; (6) of separation ; (7) of attainment ; (8) of differentiation ; (9) of upholding.

उत्पत्तिस्थित्यभिव्यक्तिकारणप्रत्ययासयः ।

वियोगत्वधृतयः कारणं नवधा स्मृतम् ॥

The principle of conservation of energy and transformation of energy being the root idea of causation in this system these different aspects represent the different points of view in which the word causation is generally used.

Thus, the first aspect as the cause of birth or production is seen when for example, knowledge springs out of mind, so that the mind is called the cause of the birth of knowledge. Here mind is the material cause (उपादान कारण) of the production of knowledge, for knowledge is nothing but mind with its particular modifications as states (ज्ञानस्य इन्द्रियस्य उत्पत्तिरुपातिशयिन मनः कारणं सम्भवति उपादानत्वात्, भिन्न). Its difference from अस्मिकारण, which is not directly the cause of production, but serves to help it only in an indirect way by the removal of obstacles, is quite manifest. The स्थितिकारण or the cause which makes things preserved as they are, is the end they serve ; thus the serviceability of the Purusha is the cause of the existence and preservation of the mind as it is, and not only of mind but of all our phenomenal experiences.

The third cause of the अभिव्यक्ति कारण or the cause of manifestation (which is compared to a camp which manifests things before our view) according to Bhikshu is an epistemological cause and as such, includes among other things inferential cognition as well (the sight of smoke in the hill also falls under this) (आनुमानिकस्यापि अभिव्यक्तिसंख्ये प्रवेशाच्च).

Then come the fourth and the 5th causes, of Vikāra (change) and Anyatwa (otherness) ; thus the cause of

change (विकार) is exemplified as being that which causes a change; thus the mind suffers a change by the objects that are presented to it just as bile changes the raw food that is cooked by it; the cause of अन्यत्व (otherness) such as that brought about by a goldsmith in gold by making a bangle from it, and then again a necklace from it, is regarded as different from the change spoken of as Vikāra. Now the difference between the gold being turned into bangles or necklaces and the raw rice being turned into soft rice is this that in the former case when bangles are made out of gold, the gold remains the same in each case, whereas in the case of the production of cooked rice from raw rice by fire the case is different, for heat changes paddy altogether for the paddy does not remain unchanged in its modification as rice; (अग्निरपि पाकस्य अन्यत्वकारणं यद्यपि तथापि धर्मिणी धर्म्योः पुलाकत्वतश्चुलत्त्वयोर्भेदविवक्षया धर्म्ययोरेवजनापयिषि धर्म्यानुवर्तते इति न तस्य अन्यत्वं शक्यं वक्तुमिति विकारमात्रकारणत्वमुक्तमिति न सङ्करः); goldsmith, and heat both are indeed efficient causes, but the former only effects mechanical changes of shape and form only, whereas the latter heat is the cause of structural and chemical changes. Of course these are only examples from the physical world, their causal operations in the mental sphere vary in a corresponding manner; thus the change produced in the mind by the presentation of different objects follows a law which is the same as is found in the physical world when the same object causes different kinds of feelings in different persons; when Ignorance causes forgetfulness, in a thing anger makes the thing painful, and desire makes it pleasurable the knowledge of its true reality produces indifference; there is thus the same kind of causal change as is found in the external world. Then comes in for our consideration the cause of separation (Viyoga) which is only a negative aspect of the positive side of

the causes of transformations, as in the gradual extinctions of impurities consequent upon the transformation of the Chitta towards the attainment of the supreme state of absolute independence by discriminative knowledge. The last cause for consideration is the cause of upholding, (Dhṛti) ; thus the body upholds the senses and supports them for the actualisations of their activities on the body just as the five gross elements are the upholding causes of the organic bodies ; the bodies of animals, men, etc., also adopt one another for their mutual support. Thus the human body lives by eating the bodies of many animals and the bodies of tigers etc., live on the bodies of men and other animals and so also many animals live on the bodies of plants, etc. (मनुष्यशरीरं हि पश्यपक्षिमृगसरीसृपस्थावरशरीरोपयोगेन त्रियते । एवं व्याघ्रादिशरीरमपि मनुष्यपशुमृगादिशरीरोपयोगेन एवं पश्यमृगादिशरीरमपि स्थावराद्युपयोगेन । वाचस्पतिः ।) The four kinds of causes that are mentioned in Sankara's works and grammatical commentaries like that of Sushena, *loc.*, : उत्पत्त्य, विकार्य, भाष्य and संस्कार्य are all included within those nine causes mentioned in this quotation of the Bhāshyakāra.

The Yogāṅgas not only remove the impurities of the mind but help the mind by removing the obstacles to attain the highest perfection of discriminative knowledge. Thus they are the causes in a double sense (1) of the dissociation of the impurities (वियोगकारण) ; (2) of removing the obstacles which impede the course of the mind for attaining the highest development (आप्तिकारण).

Now coming to Yogāṅgas, we see them enumerated as follows :—यमनियमासनप्राणायामप्रत्याहारधारणाध्यानसमाधयोऽष्टाङ्गानि

Yogāṅgas. Restraint, Observance, Posture, Regulation of breath (प्राणायाम), Abstraction, Concentration, Meditation and Trance are the eight accessories of Yoga,

It must be remembered that the Abhyāsa and Vairāgya and also the five means of attaining Yogā, viz., : श्रद्धा, वीर्यं, etc., which are not different from Abhyāsa and Vairāgya, are by their very nature included within the Yogāṅgas mentioned above, and are not to be considered as independent means different from them (अभ्यास वैराग्यश्रद्धा-वीर्यादयोपि यथाश्रेयसेतत्त्वेन स्वरूपतो नान्तरीयकतया चान्तर्भावयितव्याः). The Parikarmas or embellishments of the mind spoken of in first chapter which we shall deal later on are also included under the three Yogāṅgas चारणा, ध्यान and समाधि. The five means श्रद्धा, वीर्यं, स्मृति, समाधि and प्रज्ञा are said to be included under तपः. स्वाध्याय and ईश्वरप्रणिधान of the Niyamas and Vairāgya under सन्तोष (तत्र वैराग्यस्थनियमान्तर्गत सन्तोष प्रवेशः श्रद्धादीनां च तप आदिषु परिकर्षणां च धारणादितिके श्रवणमननयोश्च प्रमाणविधयेव ज्ञाने साक्षाद्धेतुत्वम्) ।

To understand these better it is better first of all to give the definitions of the Yogāṅgas and then discuss about them and ascertain their relative values for a man striving after attaining the highest perfection of Yoga.

I. Yama — Restraint — तत्राहिंसासत्यास्तेयब्रह्मचर्यापरिव्रज्यानाः These Yama restraints are : Abstinence from injury (Ahimsā) ; Veracity ; Absinence from theft ; continence ; abstinence from avariciousness.

II. Niyama—Observances—शौचसन्तोषतपः स्वाध्यायेश्वर प्रणिधानानि नियमाः ।

These observances are cleanliness, contentment, purificatory action, study and the making of God the motive of all action.

III. Asanas—Posture—स्थिरसुखमासनम् steady posture and easy position तस्मिन् सति श्वासप्रश्वासयोर्नतिविच्छेदः प्राणायामः ।

IV. Regulation of breath (Prānāyama)-is the stoppage of the inspiratory and expiratory movements (of breath)

which may be practised when steadiness of posture has been secured.

V. Pratyāhāra—abstraction. स्वविषयासम्प्रयोगे चित्तस्य स्वरूपानुकार इवेन्द्रियाणां प्रत्याहार ।

Abstraction is that by which the senses do not come in contact with their objects and follow as it were the nature of the mind.

VI. Dharana—Concentration—देशबन्धचित्तस्य धारणा. Concentration is the steadfastness of the mind.

VII. Dhyāna—Meditation—तत्र प्रत्येकतानता ध्यानम्. The continuation there of the mental effort (to understand) is meditation (ध्यान).

VIII. Samādhi—Trance contemplation—तदेवार्थमात्रनिर्भासं स्वरूपशून्यमिव समाधिः. The same when shining with the light of the object alone, and devoid as it were of itself, is trance (or contemplation, Samādhi).

These are the eight Yogāngas which a Yogi must adopt for his perception. Of these again we see that

some have the mental side more predominant, whereas others have mostly to be actualised in exterior

action. Dhāraṇā, Dhyāna and Samādhi which are purely

of the Samprajñāta type and also the प्राणायाम and प्रत्याहार

which are accessories to them serve to cleanse the mind of

its impurities and make it steady and can therefore be

assimilated as being the same with the Parikarmas men-

tioned in Book I, Sutras 34-39 (प्रकूर्डन विधारणायां वा प्राणस्य

(35) विषयवती वा प्रवृत्तिकल्पना मनसः स्थितिनिवन्धनी, (36) विशोका वा

ज्योतिष्मती (37) बीतरागविषयं वा चित्तम् (38) स्वप्ननिद्राज्ञानालम्बनं वा (39)

यथाभिमताध्यानाद्वा). Of course these Samādhis of the

Samprajñāta type only serve to steady the mind

and to take it in attaining discriminative knowledge.

(एते इत्ययः अल्पेनैव कालेनोत्पन्नाश्चित्तनीश्वरविषयायां वा विवेकख्यातिविषयायां

वास्थितौ निबध्नन्ति ।).

Yogāngas and Pari-
karmas.

In this connection I think it will not be out of place for me to mention the other remaining accessories for cleaning the mind as mentioned in Book I, *viz.*, मैत्रीकरुणा-मुदितोपेक्षाणां पुण्यापुण्यविषयाणां भावनातश्चित्तप्रसादनम् (By cultivating habits of friendliness, compassion, complacency and indifference towards happiness, misery, virtue and vice (respectively) the mind becomes pure.

This means that we are to cultivate the habit of friendliness towards those who are happy ; this will indeed remove all jealous feelings, and thereby

Maitri Karunā
Muditā and Upekshā.

cleanse the mind and make it pure. We must cultivate the habit of compassion towards those who are suffering pain ; thus when the mind shows compassion which means that it wishes to remove the miseries of others as if they were his own, it becomes cleansed of the dirt of the desire of doing injury to others for compassion is only another name for sympathy which naturally brings oneself to the level of others towards whom he may be sympathetic. Next comes the habit of complacency which one should diligently cultivate as it makes our minds pleasurable inclined towards those who are virtuous. This removes the dirt of envy from the mind. Next comes the habit of indifference which we should acquire towards vice in vicious persons. We should acquire the habit of remaining indifferent where we cannot sympathise, as for example, with persons who are vicious ; we should not on any account get angry towards those who are bad and with whom sympathy was not possible. This will remove the dirt of anger. It will be clearly seen here that मैत्री, करुणा, मुदित and उपेक्षा mentioned here are only the different aspects of universal sympathy which should remove all perversities in our nature and unite us with our fellow-beings. This is the positive aspect of the mind with reference to the

abstinence of injury (अहिंसा mentioned, under *Yamas*) which will cleanse the mind and make it fit for the application of the means of (Śraddhā) श्रद्धा, etc. For unless the mind is pure, there is indeed no scope for the application of means of श्रद्धा, etc. for making the mind steady. (असत्यां पुनर्मेवमादिभावनायां न ते उपायाः स्थिरं कल्पन्ते) It will be seen that these represent the mental endeavours to cleanse the mind and to make it fit for the proper manifestation of Śraddhā, etc., and thus to steady it towards attaining the true discriminative knowledge.

Again of the Parikarmas by धारणा, ध्यान and सम्यग्ज्ञान समाधि and that by the habit of sympathy as manifested in मैत्री, करुणा, etc., the former is a more advanced state of the extinction of impurities than the latter.

Their respective positions.

But it is easy to see that ordinary minds can never make the beginning of their practices from these stages. They are so impure naturally that the positive universal sympathy as manifested in मैत्री, etc., by which the turbidity of mind is removed, are indeed things which are very hard to begin with. It is also necessarily difficult for them to steady the mind to an object as in धारणा, ध्यान and समाधि. Only men in advanced stages can begin to practise them. For ordinary people, therefore, some course of conduct must have to be discovered by which they can purify their minds and elevate them to such an extent that they may be in a position to cleanse the mind by the mental Parikarmas or purifications just now mentioned. Our minds also become steady in proportion as their impurities are cleansed. The cleansing of impurities only represents the negative aspect of the positive side of making the minds steady. The grosser impurities being removed, finer one remain, these are removed by the mental Parikarmas, supplemented by Abhyāsa or the application of Śraddhā,

etc., for the purpose of making the mind steady. Thus when the impurities are gradually more and more attenuated, at last the final germs of impurities are destroyed by the force of Dhyāna or the habit of Nirodha Samādhi, when Kaivalya is attained.

Now to speak of that course of conduct by which the gross impurities of ordinary minds are removed, we have to come to Yamas. They are as we have said before अहिंसा, सत्य, अस्तेय, ब्रह्मचर्य and अपरिग्रह ; of these अहिंसा is given such a high place that it is regarded as the root of the other Yamas, सत्य, अस्तेय, ब्रह्मचर्य, अपरिग्रह and the other Niyamas mentioned before only serve to make the अहिंसा perfect. We have seen before that मैत्री, करुणा, सुदृता and उपेक्षा serve to strengthen the अहिंसा since they are only the positive aspects of it, but now we see that not only they but other Yamas and also the other Niyamas शौच, सन्तोष, तपः, स्वाध्याय and ईश्वरप्रणिधान only serve to make अहिंसा more and more perfect. This अहिंसा when it is performed without being limited or restricted in any way by caste, country, time and circumstances and is adhered to thoroughly universally, is called महाव्रत or the great duty of abstinence from injury is sometimes limited to castes as for example the injury inflicted by a fisherman and in this case it is called अनुव्रत or restricted Ahimsa of ordinary men as opposed to universal Ahimsa of the Yogis called महाव्रत ; the same अहिंसा is limited to country as in the case of a man who says to himself, " I shall not cause injury at a sacred place " ; and by time, with reference to a person who says to himself " I shall not cause injury on the sacred day of Chaturdasi " ; by circumstances as when a man says to himself, " I shall cause injury for the sake of gods and Brahmins only " ; or when injury is caused by warriors in the battle field alone and in nowhere else. This restricted Ahimsa is only for

ordinary men who cannot follow the universal law of Ahimsa for a Yogi.

Ahimsa is a great universal duty which a man should impose on himself in all conditions of life, everywhere, and at all times without being restricted or qualified by any limitation whatsoever. In Mahabharat Mokshadharmādhyāya it is said that the Sāṅkhyists lay stress upon अहिंसा whereas the Yoga lays stress upon Samādhi; but here we see that Yoga also holds that Ahimsā should be the greatest ethical motive of all our conduct. It is by this Ahimsā alone that we can make ourselves fit for the higher type of Samādhi. All other virtues of सत्य, असंय only serve to make अहिंसा more and more perfect. It is not however easy to say whether the Sankhyists gave so much stress to अहिंसा that they regarded it to lead to समाधि directly without the intermediate stages of Samadhi. We see however that the Yoga also lays great stress on it and holds that a man should withhold from all external acts; for, however good they may be, they cannot be such that they would not lead to some kind of injury or हिंसा towards beings, for external actions can never be such that they can be performed without doing any harm to others. We have seen that from this point of view Yoga holds that pure works (शुद्धकर्म) are only those mental works of good thoughts in which a perfection of अहिंसा can be attained. With the growth of good works (शुद्धकर्म) and the perfect realisation of अहिंसा the mind naturally passes into the state in which its actions are neither good (शुद्ध) nor bad (अशुद्ध); and this state is immediately followed by the state of Kaivalya.

Veracity consists in word and thought being in accordance with facts. Speech and mind correspond to what has been seen, heard and inferred as such. Speech is uttered for the

purpose of transferring one's knowledge to another. It is always to be employed for the good of others and not for their injury, for it should not be defective as with Yudhishtir, where his motive was bad. If, however, it proves to be injurious to living beings even though uttered as truth, it is not truth; it is a sin only. By this outward appearance, this is a facsimile of virtue and one gets into painful darkness. Therefore let everyone examine well and then utter truth for the benefit of all living beings. All truths should be tested by the canon of अहिंसा (non-injury).

Asteya (अस्तेय) is the virtue of abstaining from stealing. Theft is the making one's own unlawfully of things belonging to others. Abstinence from theft consists in the absence of the desire thereof.

ब्रह्मचर्य—Brahmacharyya (Continence) is the restraint of the generative organ, and the thorough control of sexual tendencies.

Aparigraha (अपरिग्रह) is want of avariciousness, the non-appropriation of things not one's own; one happens to attain it on seeing the defects of attachment and of the injury caused by the earning, preservation and destruction of the objects of sense.

If in performing the great duty of अहिंसा and the other virtues which are auxiliary to it a man be troubled by the thoughts of sin, he should try to remove the sinful ideas by habituating himself to ideas which are contrary to them. Thus it is said if the high fever of the sins opposed to the virtues tend to push him along the wrong path, he should in order to drive them away entertain ideas like the following :—Being burnt up as I am in the fires of the world, I have taken refuge in the practice of Yoga giving as it does protection to all living beings. Were I to take

up the sins having once given them up I should certainly be a dog in my conduct. As the dog takes up his own vomit, so should I be acting if I were to take up again what I have once given up. This is called the practice of प्रतिपक्ष भावना (Pratipaksha Bhāvanā) meditating on the opposites of the temptations.

A classification of the sins of हिंसा, etc., may be made according as they are actually done, or caused to be done, or permitted to be done; and these again may be further divided according as they are preceded by desire, anger and ignorance; these are again slight, middling or intense. Thus we see that there may be twenty-seven kinds of these sins. Mild, middling and intense are again threefold each mild-mild, mild-middling and mild-intense. Middling-mild, middling-middling and middling-intense. Also intense-mild, intense-middling, and intense-intense. Thus there may be eighty-one kinds. This again becomes infinite on account of rule (नियम), option (विकल्प) and conjunction (समुच्चय).

The contrary tendency consists in the notion that these immoral tendencies cause an infinity of pains and untrue cognition. Pain and unwisdom are the unending fruits of these immoral tendencies and that in this idea lies the power which brings the habit of giving a contrary trend to our thoughts.

Thinking of the contrary tendencies. These Yamas together with the Niyamas which are going to be described are called Kriya Yoga. क्रियायोग, by the performance of which men become fit and gradually rise to the state of ज्ञानयोग by समाधि and attain Kaivalya. This course thus represents the first stage with which ordinary people should begin their Yoga work.

But people who are more advanced and naturally possess the virtues mentioned in Yama, have no necessity of making their beginning therefrom.

Thus it is said that some people may make their beginning with the Niyamas, तपः, स्वाध्याय and ईश्वरप्रणिधान it is for this reason that though they are mentioned under the Niyamas, they are also specially selected and spoken of as the क्रियायोग in the very first rule of the second Boko—तपःस्वाध्यायेश्वरप्रणिधानानि क्रियायोगः ; तपः means the strength of remaining unchanged in changes like that of heat and cold, hunger and thirst, standing and sitting; the absence of speech काष्ठमौन and the absence of social indications.

स्वाध्याय means the study of philosophy and the repetition of the syllable Aum.

ईश्वरप्रणिधान—This *Īśvara* Pranidhāna is different from the *Īśvara* Pranidhāna mentioned in Book I, where it meant love, homage and adoration of god, by virtue of which god by his grace makes Samadhi easy for the Yogi.

Here it is a kind of क्रियायोग and hence it means the bestowal of all our actions to the Great Teacher, God, *i. e.*, to work, not for one's own self but for God, so that a man desists from all desires of gaining any fruit therefrom.

When these are duly performed the afflictions become gradually attenuated and trance is brought about. The afflictions thus attenuated become characterised by unproductiveness, and when their seed-power has as it were, been burnt up by the fire of high intellection and the mind untouched by afflictions come up to the distinct natures of the Purusha and सत्त्व, the mind naturally returns to its own primal cause Prakriti and Kaivalya is attained.

Those who are already much advanced do not require even this Kriyayoga (क्रियायोग), as their afflictions are already in man in an attenuated state, and their minds in a fit condition to adapt themselves to

Samadhi; they can therefore begin all at once with ज्ञानयोग. So in the first chapter it is with respect to these advanced men that it has been said that Kaivalya can be attained by Abhyasa (अभ्यास) and Vairāgya without adopting the क्रियायोग—(उत्तमाविकारिणश्च समाधियोग्यतां शतशतं च सिद्धैव इत्यतः पूर्वपादे तदुभयं योगसाधनतया नोक्तम्—भिक्षु II. 2) at the Niyama Kriyā Yogas only Saucha (शौच) and Santosha (सन्तोष) remain to be said. Saucha (शौच) means cleanliness of body and mind. Cleanliness of body is brought about by water, cleanliness of mind is brought about by the removal of the mental impurities of pride, jealousy and vanity.

Santosha (सन्तोष) contentment is the absence of desire to possess more than is necessary for the preservation of one's life. It should be added that this is the natural result of the correction of the appropriation of others' things (स्तेय).

At the close of this section on the Yamas and Niyamas, it is best to note their difference which lies principally in this that the former are the negative virtues, whereas the latter are positive ones. The former can and therefore must be practised at all stages of Yoga, whereas the last being positive are attainable only by the distinct growth of mind through Yoga. The virtues of non-injury, truthfulness, sex-restraint, etc., should be adhered to at all stages of the Yoga practice. They are indispensable for steadying the mind.

It is said that in the presence of a person who has acquired steadiness in अहिंसा all animals give up their habits of enmity; when a person becomes steady in truthfulness, whatever he says becomes fulfilled. When a person

becomes steady in चक्षय absence of theft, all jewels from different quarters approach him.

Contenance being confirmed, vigour is obtained. Non-covetousness being confirmed, the knowledge of the causes of births is attained. By the steadiness of cleanliness, disinclination to this body and cessation of contact with others is obtained.

When the mind attains internal शीघ्र or cleanliness of mind, his सत्त्व becomes pure, and he acquires high-mindedness one-pointedness, control of the senses and fitness of the knowledge of self. By the steadiness of contentment comes the acquisition of extreme happiness. By steadiness of तपस् the dirt of this veil is removed and from that come the miraculous powers of endurance of the body अश्रिता, etc. and also the miraculous powers of the senses, viz., clairaudience and thought-reading from a distance. By steadiness of स्वाध्याय the gods, the Rshis and the Siddhas become visible. When Iswara is made the motive of all actions, trance is attained. By this the Yogi knows all that he wants to know just as it is in reality, whether in another place, another body or another time. His intellect knows everything as it is.

It should not, however, be said, says वाचस्पति, that in as much as the सम्प्रज्ञात समाधि is attained by making Īswara the motive of all actions, the remaining

Iswara Praṇidhāna
and the other Yogāngas.

seven Yogāngas are useless. For these Yogāngas are useful in the attainment of that mental mood which devotes all actions to the purposes of Īswara. They are also useful in the attainment of सम्प्रज्ञात समाधि by separate kinds of their collocations, and Samādhi also leads to the fruition of सम्प्रज्ञात योग but this meditation on Īswara though it is itself a species of ईश्वरप्रणिधान itself, Samprajnata Yoga (सम्प्रज्ञात योग) is yet more direct means than them. About the relation

of ईश्वरप्रणिधान with the other Angas of Yoga, Bhikshu writes :—It cannot be said that since Yoga can be attained by meditation on ईश्वरा, what is the use of the other disciplinary practices of the Yoga, for the meditation on ईश्वरा only removes ignorance. The other accessories bring about the Samādhi by their own specific ways of operation. Moreover it is by the help of meditation on ईश्वरा that one succeeds in bringing about Samādhi through the performance of all the accessories of Yoga ; so the other accessories of Yoga can not be regarded as unnecessary ; or rather it is the other accessories which bring Dhāranā, Dhyāna and Samādhi through meditation on God and thereby produce salvation since they cannot do that themselves :—(न चेश्वरप्रणिधानाद्वा योगनिष्पत्ती इतराङ्गवैयर्थ्यम् ईश्वरप्रणिधानस्य मोहमात्रनिवृत्तिहारत्ववचनात् । द्वारान्तरेण तु अज्ञानराशां समाधिसाधनत्वसम्भवात् । अपिच ईश्वरप्रणिधानेनैव निर्विघ्नं सर्वाणि अङ्गानि संप्र्याद्य समाधिं जनयति इति न अन्याङ्गवैफल्यम् । अथवा अन्यानि अङ्गानि ईश्वरप्रणिधान-द्वारा समाधिं निष्पादयन्ति इतराङ्गानां च स्वतो न एतादृशी शक्तिरस्ति इत्याशयेन ईश्वरप्रणिधानस्यैव तु मुख्यतः समाधिसाधकत्वं सूचितं ।)

Asanas are secured by slackening of effort by thought transformation as infinite. Thus posture becomes perfect and effort to that end ceases, so that there may be no movement of the body ; or when the mind is transformed into the infinite that makes the idea of infinity its own, it brings about the perfection of posture ; when posture has once been mastered, he is not disturbed by the contraries of heat and cold, etc. .

After having secured stability in the Asanas a person should try the Pranayamas. The pause that comes after a deep inhalation and that after a deep exhalation are each called a Pranayama ; the first is called external and the second internal. There is however a third mode, when the

lungs are neither too much dilated nor too much contracted there is another total restraint; where cessation of both these motions take place by a single effort just as water thrown on a heated stone shrivels up from all sides.

These can be regulated by keeping eye over space, span and number. Thus as the breathing becomes slower the space that it occupies also becomes smaller and smaller. Space is again of two kinds, internal and external. At the time of inhalation the breath occupies internal space which can be felt even in the soles of hand and feet, just like the slight touch of an ant. To try to feel this touch along with deep inhalation serves to lengthen the period of cessation of breathing. External space is the distance from the tip of the nose to the most remote point up to which breath can be felt, by the palm of the hand, or by the movement of any light substance like cotton, etc., placed there. Just as the breathing becomes slower and slower the distances traversed by it also becomes smaller and smaller. Regulations by time is seen when eye is kept over the time taken up in breathing by moments; each moment being the fourth part of the twinkling of the eye. So regulation by time means the fact of our attending to the moments or Kshanas spent in the acts of inspiration, pause and respiration. These Pranayams can also be measured by the number of normal duration of breaths. The time taken by the respiration and expiration of a healthy man is the same as that which is measured by snapping the fingers after turning the hand thrice over the knee, is the measure of duration of normal breath; measured by 36 such Matrās or measures in the first attempt or Udghata called mild; when it is doubled, it is the second Udghata (middling) when it is trebled it is the third Udghata (intense) called intense. Gradually

the Yogi acquires the practice of Prānāyāma of long duration, being daily practised and being increased in succession of a day, a fortnight, a month, etc. Of course he proceeds first by mastering the first Udghata, then the second and so on until the duration increases up to a day, fortnight a month as stated before. There is also a fourth kind of Pranayama transcending all these stages of unsteady practice when the Yogi is steady in his cessation of breath. It must be remembered, however, that while the Pranayams are being practised, mind must be fixed by ध्यान and धारणा to some object external or internal without which these will be of no avail for the true object of Yoga. By the practice of Pranayama mind becomes fit for concentration as in the Sutra प्रच्छेदेनविधारणाभ्यां वा प्राणस्य, where it is said that steadiness is acquired by प्राणायाम, and this steadiness is acquired in the same way as concentration as we find also in the Sutra धारणासु च योग्यतामनसः ।


When by Pratyahara the senses are restrained from their external objects we have what is called Pratyahara, by which the mind remains as if in its own nature being altogether identified with the object of inner concentration or contemplation ; and thus when this Chitta is again suppressed the senses which have already ceased from coming into contact with other objects and become submerged in the Chitta itself, also cease along with it. Dharana is the concentration of Chitta on a particular place, which is so very necessary at the time of Pranayamas mentioned before. The mind may thus be held steadfast in such places as the sphere of the navel, the lotus of the heart, the light in the brain, the forepart of the nose, the forepart of the tongue and such like parts of the body.

Dhyana is the continuance, the changing flow of the mental effort in the object of Dharanā
 Dhyana. (धारणा) unmediated by any other
 break of conscious states.

Samādhi or trance contemplation results when by deep concentration mind becomes transformed to the form of the object of contemplation. By
 Samadhi. Pratyahara or power of abstraction mind desists from all other objects except the one to which it is intended to be centred ; the Yogi as he thus abstracts his mind also tries to give it to some internal or external object, which is called धारणा ; it must also be noticed that to acquire the habit of धारणा and in order to inhibit the abstraction arising from the shakiness and unsteadiness of the body it is necessary to practise steadfast posture and to cultivate the Pranayama. Also for the purpose of inhibiting the distractions arising from breathing. Again in order that a man can hope to attain steadfastness in these he must desist from any such conduct which may be opposed to the Yamas, and also acquire the mental virtues stated in the Niyamas and thus secure himself against any intrusion of distractions arising from his mental passions. These are therefore the indirect and remote conditions which qualify the person for attaining धारणा, ध्यान and Samādhi. A man who through his good deeds or by the grace of god is already so much advanced that he is naturally above all such distractions to remove which it is necessary to practise the Yamas, the Niyamas, the Asanas, the Pranayama and Pratyahar, may at once begin with धारणा ; धारणा we have seen means concentration, with the advancement of which the mind becomes steady in repeating the object of its concentration, i.e., thinking of that thing alone and no other thing ; thus we see that with the practice of this state called ध्यान or

meditation in which the mind flows steadily in that one state without any interruption, and gradually with this, even the conscious flow of this activity ceases and the mind transformed into the form of the object under concentration becomes steady therein. We see therefore that Samādhi is the consummation of that process which begins in धारणा or concentration. These three धारणा, ध्यान and समाधि represent the three stages of the same process of which the last one is the perfection; and these three are together technically called संयम which directly leads to and is immediately followed by the Samprajñāta state, whereas the other five Yogāngas are only its indirect or remote causes merely. For Asamprajñāta state however these three are also not so intimate, for a person who is very highly advanced, or is the special object of God's grace may at once by intense Vairāgya and Abhyāsa pass into the Nirodha state or the state of suppression.

By the possession of Sanyama as gradually dawns the knowledge of Samādhi, so the Sanyama is gradually strengthened. For while the dawning of this Prajnaloka or the light of Samādhi knowledge this Sanyama also rises higher and higher. This is the beginning for here the mind can hold संयम or concentrate and become one with a gross object together with its name, etc., which is called the Savitarka state; the next plane or stage of Sanyama is that when the mind becomes one with the object of its meditation without any consciousness of its name, etc. Next come the other two stages called सविचारा and निर्विचारा when the mind is fixed on subtle substances as we shall see just now.



To comprehend its scope it is necessary to understand first of all the relation, between a thing, its concept and the particular name with which the concept or the thing is associated.

Savitarka.

It is easy to see that the thing (वस्तु), the concept (ज्ञान), and the name (शब्द) are quite distinct. But still by force of association the word or name stands both for the thing and its concept; the function of mind by virtue of which in spite of this unreality or want of their having any real identity of connections, they seem to be so much associated that the name cannot be differentiated from the thing or its idea, is called Vikalpa.

Now that state of Samādhi in which the mind seems to become one with the thing together with its name and concept is the lowest stage of Samādhi called सवितर्का; it is the lowest stage because here the gross object does not appear to the mind in its true reality, but only in a false illusory way in which it appears in ordinary life associated with the concept and the name. This state is not different from ordinary conceptual states in which the particular thing is not only associated with the concepts and their names but also with other concepts and their various relations; thus a cow will not only appear before the mind with its concept and name, but also along with other relations and thoughts associated with the cows as for example,—“This is a cow, it belongs to so and so, it has so many hair on its body and so forth.” This state therefore is the first stage of Samādhi in which the mind has not become steady and is not as yet beyond the range of our ordinary consciousness.

From this comes the Nirvitarka stage when the mind by its steadiness can become one with its object divested of all other associations of name and concept, so that the mind is not in direct touch with the reality of the

thing, uncontaminated by associations. The thing in this state does not appear to be an object of my consciousness but the consciousness becoming divested of all 'I' or 'mine' becomes one with the object itself; so that there is no such notion here, as I know this but the mind becomes one with the thing so that the notion of subject and object drops off and the result is the one steady transformation of the mind as the object of its contemplation. This state brings home to us the real knowledge of the thing, diverted by other false and illusory associations which apart from explicating the real nature of the object served only to hide it. This Samādhi knowledge or प्रज्ञा is called निर्विकल्पा. The objects of this state may be the gross material objects and the senses.


Now this state is followed by the state of सविचारा प्रज्ञा which dawns when the mind neglecting the grossness of the object sinks deeper and deeper into its finer constituents and the appearance of the thing in its grosser aspects drops off and the mind having sunk deep, centres and identifies itself with the subtle Tanmātras which are the constituents of the atoms as a conglomeration of which the object appeared before our eyes in the Nirvitarka state. Thus when the mind after identifying itself with the sun in its true aspect as pure light, tends to settle on a still finer state of it either by making the senses so steady that the outward appearance vanishes or by seeking finer and finer stages than the grosser manifestation of light as such, it apprehends the Tanmātric state of the light and knows it as such, and we have what is called the सविचारा stage. It has great similarities with the सवितर्का stage, while its differences from that stage spring from the fact that here the object is the Tanmātra and not the gross Bhuta. The mind in this stage holding communion with the Rupa Tanmātra for example is not coloured

variously as red, blue, etc., as in the Savitarka communion with gross light, for the Tanmātric light or light potential has no such varieties as different kinds of colour, etc., so that there are also no different kinds of feeling of pleasure or pain arising from the manifold varieties of light. So this is a state of a feelingless representation of one uniform Tanmātric state when the object appears as a conglomeration of Tanmātras of Rupa, Rasa or Gandha as the case might be. This state however is not an indeterminate stage as the Nirvitarka stage, for this Tanmātric conception is associated with the notions of time, space, and causality; thus the mind here feels that it sees at the present time these Tanmatras which are of such a subtle state that they are not associated with, pleasures and pains. They are also endowed with causality, in the way that from them and their particular collocations originate the atoms.

It must be noted here that the subtle objects of concentration in this stage are not the Tanmātras alone but also other subtle substances including the ego, the Buddhi and the Prakriti.

But when the mind acquires complete habit of this state in which the mind becomes so much identified with these fine objects—the Tanmātras—etc., that all conceptual notions of the associations of time, space, causality, etc., spoken of in the Savichāra and the Savitarka state vanish away, and the mind becomes one with the fine object of its communion. These two kinds of Prajnā, Savichāra and Nirvichāra arising from the communion with the fine Tanmātras have been collocated under one name as Vicharānugata. But when the object of communion is the ego as the subtle cause of the senses it is called *अनन्दानुगत* and when the object of communion is the subtle cause of ego the बुद्धि called also the *अक्षितानाम*

it is called अस्मितानुगत. There can be no Nirvichara communion with the manifested Prakriti as the object for it is not an actual state which can stand as the object of communion but only a state of final retirement, the returning back of all the effects into their primal state of potentiality ; so there can never be a Prajnā of such a stage. Thus we may restate the division of Samprajnāta Samādhi reconciling I. 17 with I. 42, 43, 44 as follows :-



Through the Nirvichara state, our minds become altogether purified and there springs the प्रज्ञा or knowledge called चतुर्भरा or true ; this true knowledge is altogether different from the knowledge which is derived from the Vedas or from inferences or from ordinary perceptions ; for the knowledge that it can give of Reality can never be had by any other means of knowledge either by perception, inference or testimony for their communication is only by the conceptual process of generalisations and abstractions and thus can never affirm anything about the things as they are in themselves which are altogether different from their illusory demonstrations in conceptual terms which only prevent us

from knowing the true reality. The potency of this Prajnā arrests the potency of ordinary states of distracted consciousness and thus attains stability. When however this Prajnā is also suppressed, we have what is called the state of Nirvija Samādhi at the end of which comes final Prajnā leading to the dissolution of the Chitta and the absolute freedom of the Purusha

Samadhi we have seen is the becoming of mind's oneness with an object by a process of acute concentration on it and a continuous repetition of it with the exclusion of all other thoughts of all kinds. We have indeed described the principal stages of the advancement of Samprajnāta Yoga but it is impossible to give an exact picture of it with the symbolical expressions of our concepts ; for the stages become clear to the mental vision of the Yogi as he gradually acquires firmness in his practice. The Yogi who is practising at once comes to know as the higher stages gradually dawn in his mind and distinguish them from each other ; it is thus a matter of one's own experience, so that no other teacher can advise him whether a certain stage which follows is higher or lower, Yoga itself is its own teacher (भूमरस्या इयमनन्तराभूमिः इत्यत्र योग एव उपाध्यायः—योगिन योगोज्ञातव्यो योगीयोगात्प्रवर्त्तते । धोऽप्रमत्तस्तु योगिन स योगि रमते चिरम् ॥

When the mind passes from the Samprajnāta state it is called Vyutthana in comparison to the Nirodha state, just as the ordinary conscious states are called Vyutthana in comparison to the Samprajnāta state, the potencies of the Samprajnāta state become weaker and weaker whereas the potencies of the Nirodha state become stronger and stronger and finally the mind comes to the Nirodha state and become stable therein ; of course this holds within itself a long mental history, for the potency of the Nirodha state can be stronger only when the

mind practises it and remains in this suppressed condition for long intervals of time. This shows that the mind being made up of the three Gunas is always suffering transformations and changes. Thus from ordinary state of distracted consciousness it gradually becomes one pointed and then gradually become transformed in a state of an object (internal or external) when it is said to be undergoing the Samādhi parinama or Samādhi change of the Samprajnāta type; next comes the change, when the mind passes from the Samprajnāta stage to the state of suppression (निरोध). Here therefore also we see that the same धर्म, लक्षण, अवस्थापरिणाम which we have already described at some length with regard to the sensible objects apply also to the mental states. Thus the change from the Vyutthana to the Nirodha state is the धर्मपरिणाम, the change as manifested in time, so that we can say that the change of Vyutthana into Nirodha has not yet come, or has just come, or that the Vyutthana state exists no longer, the mind having transformed itself into the Nirodha state. There is also here the third change of condition, when we see that the potencies of Samprajnāta state become weaker and weaker, while that of the Nirodha state becomes stronger and stronger. These are the three kinds of change which the mind undergoes called the Dharma, Lakshana and Avasthā change. But there is one difference between this change thus described from the changes observed in sensible objects that here the changes are not visible but are only inferrible from the passage of the mind from one state to another.

It has been said that there are two different sets of qualities for the mind, visible and invisible. The visible qualities whose changes can be noticed are conscious states, or thought products, or percepts, etc. The invisible

ones are seven in number and cannot be directly seen, but their existence and changes or modifications may be established by inference. These are suppression, characterisation, potentialisation, constant change, life, movements and power or energy of movements.

निरोध धर्मसंस्काराः परिणामीय जीवनम् ।

चेष्टा शक्तिश्च चित्तस्य धर्मा दर्शनवर्जिताः ॥

In connection with the Samprajñāta Samādhi some miraculous attainments are also described, which are said to strengthen the faith or belief of the Yogi, to the processes of Yoga as the path of salvation as the Yogi advances. These are like the products or the mental experiments in the Yoga method, by which the people may become convinced of the method of Yoga as being the true one. No reason are offered about the why of these attainments but they are said to happen as a result of the mental union with different objects. It is best to note them here in a tabular form.

| Object of Sanyam. | Sanyam. | Attainment. |
|---|----------|---|
| (1) Threefold change of things as धर्म, लक्षण and अवस्थापरिणाम । | Sanyama. | |
| (2) The distinctions of name, external object and the concept which ordinarily appears united as one. | " | Knowledge of the sounds of all living beings. |
| (3) Residual potencies संस्कार of the nature of धर्म and अक्षयम्. | " | Knowledge of previous life. |
| (4) Concepts alone (separated) from the objects). | " | Knowledge of other minds. |

| Object or Sanyam. | Sanyam. | Attainment. |
|---|----------|--|
| (5) Over the form of body. (कायरूप) | Sanyama. | Disappearance (by virtue of the perceptibility being choked). |
| (6) Karma of fast or slow friction. | „ | Knowledge of death. |
| (7) Friendliness, sympathy, and compassion. मैत्री, मुदिता, करुणा | „ | Power. |
| (8) Powers of elephant | „ | Power of elephant. |
| (9) Sun | „ | Knowledge of the world (the geographical position of countries, &c) |
| (10) | „ | Knowledge of the starry systems. |
| (11) Pole star | „ | Knowledge of their movements. |
| (12) Plenus of the Navel | „ | Knowledge of the system of the body. |
| (13) Pit of the throat .. | „ | Subdual of hunger and thirst. |
| (14) Tortoise Tube .. | „ | Steadiness. |
| (15) Coronal light | „ | Vision of the perfected ones—the seer or all knowledge by prescience. |
| (16) Heat | „ | Knowledge of the mind. |
| (17) Purusha | „ | Knowledge of Purusha. |
| (18) Gross substantive स्वरूप the astral सूक्ष्म conjunction अव्यय and purpose fulness चर्चबन्ध | „ | Control over the element from which follows attenuation, other powers, perfection of the body and non-residence by their characteristics. |
| (19) Act, the substantive appearance, egoism, the conjunction and the purposefulness of sensation चक्षुस्वरूप अस्मितान्वयार्थबल । | „ | Mastery over the senses; and thence come the quickness as of mind, unaided mental perception and mastery over the Pradhana. मनोजविलं विकरन्भावः प्रधान-जयश्च । |

These Vibhūtis as they rise with the performance of the processes of Yoga gradually deepen the faith श्रद्धा of the Yogi in the performance of his deeds and thus help his main goal or ideal by always pushing or drawing him forwards and forwards towards it by the more and more strengthening of his faith. Divested from the ideal they have no value of any importance.

Vibhūti and their position in the Yoga Philosophy.

After describing the nature of Karmayoga, and the way in which it leads to Jñānayoga, I believe it is time for us now to describe the third and the easiest means of attaining salvation, the Bhaktiyoga and the position of Iswara in the Yoga system with reference to a person who seeks deliverance from the bonds and shackles of Avidyā.

Bhaktiyoga and Iswara.

Iswara in the Yoga system is that Puruṣa who is distinct from all others, by the fact of his being untouched by the afflictions or vehicles of the fruition of action. Other Puruṣas are also in reality untouched by the afflictions, but they at least seemingly have to undergo the afflictions and consequently birth and rebirth, etc., until they are again finally released but Iswara though he is a Puruṣa yet He does not suffer any sort of bondage in any way. He is always free and ever the Lord. He never had nor will have any relation to these bonds. He is the teacher of the ancient teachers too beyond the range of the conditioning by time.

Iswara.

This nature of his has been affirmed in the scriptures and are taken therefore as the true one on their authority.

Scriptures and Iswara.

The authority of the scriptures are again acknowledged only because they have proceeded out of God or Iswara. The objection of an argument in a circle has no

place here since the connection of the scriptures with Iswara is beginningless.

There is no other divinity equal to Iswara, because in the case of such equality there may be oppositions between the rival Iswaras which Iswara, what he is might therefore result in the lowering of any one of them. He is omniscient in the highest degree for in him is the furthest limit of omniscience from which there is no beyond.

This Iswara is all-merciful, and though he has no desires of him to satisfy yet for the sake of his devotees he dictates the scriptures at each evolution of the world after dissolution. His functions But he does not release all persons, because he has to help only so much as they deserve; he does not nullify the Law of Karma, just as a king though he is quite free to act in any way he likes, punishes or rewards people according as they deserve.

At the end of each Kalpa he adopts the pure body from Sattwa which is devoid of any Karmasaya and thus communicates through it to all his devotees and dictates the scriptures. Again at the time of dissolution this body of pure Sattwa becomes submerged in the Prakriti; and at the time of its submersion in the Prakriti Iswara wishes that it might come forth again at the beginning of the new creation; thus it continues for ever that at each new creation the pure Sattwamaya body springs forth and submerges back into the Prakriti at the time of the dissolution of the universe.

In accepting this body he has no personal desires to satisfy as we have said before. He Himself untouched adopts it only for the purpose of saving by it. the people by instructing them with knowledge and piety which is not possible without

a pure Sattwamaya body ; so he adopts it but is not affected in any way by it. One who is under the control of Nescience cannot distinguish his real nature from it and thus is always led by it, but such is not the case with Iswara, for he is not in any way under its control, but only adopts it as a means of communicating knowledge to people.

A Yogi also who has attained absolute independence may similarly accept one or more pure Sattwamaya Nirmāṇa Chittas from Asmitāmātra and may produce one Chitta as the superintendent of all these (निर्माण्डित्तानि आस्रतामावात्) (प्रवृत्तिर्भेदे प्रयाजकं चित्तमेकं त्वनेकेषाम्). Such a Chitta adopted by a true Yogi by the force of his meditation is not under the control of the vehicles of action as is the case with the other four kinds of Chitta from birth, Oshadhi, Mantra and Tapas.

The Pranava or Aumkara is his name ; though at the time of dissolution the word of Pranava together with its denotative power becomes submerged in the Prakriti they reappear with the new creation just as roots shoot forth from beneath the ground in the rainy season. This Pranava is also called Swadhyaya. By concentration on this Swadhyaya or Pranava the mind becomes one-pointed and fit for Yoga.

Now one of the means of attaining Yoga is Iswara Pranidhana, or worship of God. This word according to the commentators is used in two senses, in the first and the second books of the Pātanjala Yoga apphorisms.

In the first book it means love or devotion to God as the one centre of meditation, in the second it is used to mean the abnegation of all desires of the fruits of action to Iswara and thus Iswara Pranidhana in this sense is included under

Kriyayoga. This abnegation of all fruits of action to **Iswara** purifies the mind and makes it fit for **Yoga** ; this is distinguished from the **Iswara Pranidhāna** of the first **Book** as the **Bhābana** of **Pranava** and **Iswara** in this that it is connected with actions and the abnegation of their fruits whereas the latter consists only in keeping the mind in worshipful state in **Iswara** and his word or name **Pranava**.

By devotion of **Iswara** **Prema** or **Bhakti** he is drawn towards the devotee through his **Nirmāṇa Chitta** of pure

Release through
the grace of **Iswara**.

Sattwa and by his grace he removes all obstructions of illness, etc., described in I. 30, 31 and at once prepares his mind for the highest realisation of his own absolute independence. So for a person who can love and adore **Iswara**, this is the easiest course for attaining **Samādhi**. We can make our minds pure in the easiest way by abnegating all our actions to **Iswara** and attaining salvation by firm and steady devotion for Him This is the sphere of **Bhaktiyoga** by which the tedious complexity of the **Yoga** process may be avoided and salvation acquired in no time by the supreme grace of **Iswara**.

This means is not indeed distinct from the general means of **Yoga**, *viz.*, **Abhyasa** and **Vairagya** which applies in all stages.

This process not
different from that
by **Abhyasa** and **Vai-
ragya**.

For here also **Abhyasa** applies to the devotion of **Iswara** as one Supreme **Tattwa** or truth and **Vairagya** is necessarily associated with all true devotion and adoration of **Iswara**.

This conception of **Iswara** differs from the conception of **Iswara** in the **Ramanuja** system in this that—there

Compared with
Ramanuja system.

Prakriti and **Purusha**, **Achit** and **Chit** form the body of **Iswara** whereas here **Iswara** is considered as being only a special **Purusha** with the aforesaid powers (एव)

भोक्तृभोग्यरूपेण अवहितयोः सर्वावस्थानस्थितयोः चिदचितोः परमपुरुषशरीरतया तद्विद्याम्यत्वेन तदप्रत्यक् स्थितिं परमपुरुषस्य चात्मत्वमाहः—रामानुज भाष्य I.I.)

In this system Iswara is not again the अधिष्ठाता Prakriti in the sense of अधिभागस्थिति but of Dharma and Adharma, and his agency is only in the removal of obstacles and thereby helping the evolutionary process of Prakriti.

Thus Iswara is distinguished from the Iswara of San-
kara Vedanta in this that there the
Adwaita Vedan- true existence is ascribed only of
tic Iswara. Iswara whereas all other forms and
modes of Being are only regarded as illusory.

After what we have studied above it will be easy to see that the main stress of the Yoga Philosophy lies in its method of Samādhi. The knowledge

Samādhi and its points of difference from perception inferences or scriptures as sources of knowledge.

that can be acquired by it differs from all other kinds of knowledge, ordinary perception, inference, etc., in this that it alone can bring objects before our mental eye with the clearest and most unerring light of comprehensibility in which the true nature of the thing is at once observed. Inferences and the words of scriptures are based on concepts or general notions of things. For the teaching of scriptures are manifested in words ; and words are but names, terms or concepts formed by noting down the general similarities of certain things and binding them down by a symbol. All deductive inferences are also based upon major propositions arrived at by inductive generalisations ; so it is easy to see that all knowledge that can be imported by them are only generalised conceptions. Their process only represents the method by which the mind can pass from one generalised conception to another ; so the mind can in no way attain the knowledge of the Real things, the absolute species, which is not the genus of any other

thing; so inference and scripture can only communicate to us the nature of the agreement or similarity of things and not the real things as they are. Ordinary perception also is not of much avail here since it cannot bring within its scope the subtle and fine things and things that are obstructed from the view of the senses; so knowledge by ordinary perception is limited by the incapacity of our senses to perceive subtle and remote things, and things which are obstructed from our view. But Sāmādhi has no such limitations, so the knowledge that can be attained by it is absolutely unobstructed, true and real in the strictest sense of the terms.

By deep concentration when all other states of mind are checked it is centred on one thing steadily and that alone, the mind becomes transformed as it were into the form of that thing, and thus the true nature of that thing at once flashes before it. It is akin to the conception of intuition by Bergson, the nature of which as described by Bergson applies in a certain measure to Sāmādhi. Thus Bergson says:—"It follows that an absolute could only be given in an intuition whilst everything else fall within the province of analysis. By intuition is meant the kind of intellectual sympathy by which one places oneself within an object *in order to coincide with* what is unique in it (*cf.* विधि) and consequently inexpressible. Analysis on the contrary, is the operation which reduces the object to elements already known, that is to elements common both to it and other objects. To analyse therefore is to express a thing as a function of something other than itself. Analysis is thus a translation, development into symbols, a representation taken from successive points of view from which we note as many resemblances as possible between the new object which we are studying

Sāmādhi and the intuition of Bergson.

and others, which we believe we know already. In its eternally unsatisfied desire to embrace the object around which it is compelled to turn, analysis multiplies without end the number of its points of view in order to complete its always incomplete representations and ceaselessly varies its symbols that it may perfect the always imperfect translation. It goes on therefore to infinity. But intuition, if intuition is possible, is a single act.

This view of Samādhi or intuitional trance is not opposed to whatever we say conceptual or perceptual intelligence that they are complimentary to each other. Like Kant, Patanjali does not bring about a schism between science and metaphysics. The realities of metaphysical order the so-called things in themselves or things as they are, are not transcendent to the world of Phenomena, but are only so subtle that the senses cannot grasp them. He does not make the metaphysics entirely artificial, and the science wholly relative; but with him both are true in their own respective spheres, and far from there being any schism between them, they are connected in one chain of development; science reigns where the mind is being led from concepts to concepts with the dogmatic belief that all knowledge must necessarily start in concepts, move in concepts and end in concepts; thinking or knowledge, as we call it, carries with it the belief that it comprehends all that is knowable, though in reality its sphere is so much limited that it can grasp the general notions and these alone. The thing as it is the real Vishesha (विशेष) apart from its symbolic side of conceptual representations can never be grasped by the conceptual side of knowledge. But the infra-conceptual or ultra-conceptual stages are not unreal in any way though they cannot be grasped either by the senses or by our conceptual intelligence. To grasp them

Kant, Bergson and Patanjali.

our mind must follow an inverse process of stopping its flow from concepts to concepts, but concentrated itself to one concept and that alone, and repeat it again and again to the exclusion of all other possible concepts, and thus become coincided, identified as it were with it, when the limitations of the concept at once vanish and the thing shines before the mind in its true reality. Such a Prajnā or intuitive knowledge is absolutely unerring for here the mind has been installed in the reality of the thing and merged in the very life of it. "To philosophise," according to Patanjali, "therefore is to invert the habitual direction of the work of thought; to practise it not in a random way but in a profoundly methodical manner; gradually to rise higher and higher in the acquisition of the true metaphysical knowledge, with a definite end in view until the highest stage, the one ideal consummation of all metaphysical knowledge is attained; the Prakriti then appears in her own true nature, and her relations with the Purusha are also discerned and the Yogi is absolutely freed from all bondage of Prakriti.

According to Patanjali it is our want of intuition of the reality, hidden beneath the continual flow of our varied concepts that is the root of all control exercised by the Prakriti over us. Moral and virtuous actions are here advocated only because they purify the mind and help it to acquire the power of intuition (प्रज्ञा) by which the real nature of things is revealed to the Yogi; before whose vision all obstruction melts away and all reality shines before him in absolute effulgence, nothing is too small for his intuition and nothing is too great.

The whole philosophy from Plato to Plotinus proceeded out of a supposition that "a variation can only be the expression and development of what is invariable," that "there is more

Plato.

in the immutable than in the moving and we pass from the stable to the unstable by a mere diminution. But with Patanjali we find that he had never any such bias as that. Prakriti, the sphere of the mutable and the unstable is not on that account less true than the Purusha—the immutable; only their realities are of two different kinds and neither of them can ever be reduced to the other. All evil is due to the want of right comprehension of their relative spheres; stable is always stable and unstable is always unstable and they must not be confused by either in any way. All evil is begotten out of their seeming illegitimate connection which forms the basis of all. With Plato we have seen that there is nothing positive outside ideas, diminution of the Reality of which into that of the unstable occurs by a process of diminution by the addition of zero-like Platonic “non-being” the Aristotelian “matter” a metaphysical zero joined to the ideas multiplies it in space and time. In the words of Bergson “this non-being is an illusive nothing; it creeps between the ideas and creates endless agitation, eternal disquiet like a suspicion insinuated between loving hearts.” The ideas or forms are the whole of intelligible reality, that is to say of truth. As to sensible reality, it is perpetual oscillation from one side to the other of this point of equilibrium. Immutability is more than becoming, form is more than change, and it is by a veritable fall that the logical system of ideas rationally subordinated and co-ordinated among themselves is scattered into a physical series of objects and events accidentally placed one after another. “Physics is but logic spoiled.”

Aristotle could not tolerate that ideas should thus exist independently by themselves but finding that he could not deprive them of this character, he pressed them into each other, rolled them up into a ball, and set above the

Aristotle.

physical world a form that was thus found to be the form of forms, the idea of ideas or to use his own words the thought of thought. Such is the God of Aristotle—necessarily immutable and apart from what is happening in the world, since he is only the synthesis of all concepts in a single one. It is true that no one of the manifold concepts could exist apart such as it is in the divine unity; in vain should we look for the ideas of Plato within the God of Aristotle. But if only we imagine the God of Aristotle in a sort of refraction from himself, or simply inclining towards the world, at once the Platonic ideas are seen to pour themselves out of him, as if they were involved in the unity of his essence. In the movement of the universe there is an aspiration of things towards the divine perfection, and consequently an ascent towards God as the effect of a contact of God with the first sphere and as descending consequently from God to things. The necessity with Aristotle of a first motionless mover is not demonstrated by founding it on the assertion that the movement of things must have had a beginning but on the contrary, by affirming that this movement could not have begun and could never come to an end, and that this perpetuity of mobility could happen only if it was backed by an eternity of immutability which it unwound in a chain without beginning or end.

In that revival of Platonism in Alexandria we see that as the possibility of an outpouring of Platonic ideas

Neo-platonism.

God exists behind us and his vision as such is always virtual and never actually realised by the conscious intellect. Everything is derived from the first principle and everything aspires to return to it; remoter the emanation lower the degree of perfection. After the one, reason possesses the greatest perfection and after it comes the soul. The true then we

see transcends the bounds of reason. "Knowledge" therefore of it is not won by proof, not by any inter-mediating process, not so that the objects remain outside of him but so that all difference between the knower and the known disappears; it is a vision of reason into its own self; it is not we who have the vision of reason, but reason who has the vision of its own self; even the vision of reason within which subject and object are still opposed to each other as different from each other must itself be transcended. The supreme degree of cognition is the vision of the supreme, the single principle of things, in which all separation between it and the soul ceases, in which this latter in divine rapture touches the absolute itself, and feels itself filled by it and illuminated by it. He who has attained this veritable union with God, despises even that pure thought which he formerly loved, because it was still after all only a movement and presupposed a difference between the seer and the seen. This mystical absorption or swooning into the absolute is therefore the last word of the Alexandrians. Thus Edward Caird wrote of Plotinus, "The inmost experiences of our being is an experience which can never be uttered. To this difficulty Plotinus returns again and again from new points of view, as if driven by the presence of a consciousness which masters him, which, by its very nature can never get itself but which he cannot help striving to utter. He pursues it with all the weapons of a subtle dialectic, endeavouring to find some distinction which will fix it for his readers and he is endlessly fertile in metaphors and symbols by which he seeks to flash some new light upon it. Yet in all this struggle and almost agony of his expression, he is well aware that he can never find the last conclusive word for it and has to fall back on the thought that it is unspeakable."

With the revival of Platonism in modern philosophy in Kant we see that the "beyond" the "Reality" has altogether eluded our grasp. There is no intuition that carries us into the non-temporal; all intuition is thus found to be sensuous by intuition. By changing the Platonic idea from a thing into a relation of the understanding, a law, he has substituted the universal Mathematic—a single and closed-in system of relations for the Platonic world of ideas, imprisoning the whole of reality in a network prepared in advance in which is unified and reconciled all the plurality of our knowledge in one universe of science. To realise this dream or at best an ideal, attempts have been made to determine what the intellect must be, and what the object in order that an uninterrupted mathematic may bind them together. And of necessity, if all possible experience can be made to enter thus into the rigid and already formed frame-work of our understanding it is (unless we assume a pre-established harmony) because our understanding itself organises nature and finds itself again therein in a mirror. The real things in themselves remain an unknown entity, a some-thing-like-non-Being and in its place are substituted some barren relations which are said to form an universe dignified by the name of science. Our intellect shall never be able to come into a touch with the reality; it is absolutely restricted and limited to this innate incapability of doing anything but Platonising in ideas; and as such all science only represents this dreamy, make-shift of symbolical relativity and never the Reality as it is, and metaphysics is impossible since it has nothing more to do than to parody with phantoms of things the work of conceptual arrangement which science practices seriously on relations.

To distinguish Patanjali from these different shades of representations spoken above, we see that he agrees with Aristotle in conceiving an unmoved as the cause of all that is endlessly moving for it is into these that the former unwinds itself.

That which unwinds is the same as that which is unwinded ; the "unmoved" only represents the throbbings and pulsations of the unactualised unwindings, the absolute potentiality. But this "unmoved" only represents the ground of the comic dynamic of all mutability and change, but does not explain the stable and "unmoved" which forms the background of all our conscious experiences. This "unmoved" and "unmovable" of our consciousness of pure shining effulgence, a constant factor of all conceptual mobility can never be confused with it. It is the only true immobile which no change can effect—altogether distinct from the universals or the particulars of our thought but illuminating them all in the conceptual illumination. No concept can ever catch hold of it. It is the one absolute "stable" element, all else are moving. Movement is the reality of matter which in none of its stages can in true sense be called the "unmoved." Matter holds within itself its own dynamic of motion ; it is as much real as the unmoved or stable Purusha ; they are two independent realities and none of them can be said to be derived from the other and consequently there is no diminution of reality involved in the conception of matter. Plato had to acknowledge the separate existence though he wanted to deprive it of all determinate qualities. Instead of making non-being colourless it would have been more consistent if he conceived the idea as the truly and absolutely colourless and the non-being of the equilibrium which holds within itself the principle of all

determinations and differentiations the ground of all genesis and transformations which appear within and without as the inner and outer worlds, the microcosm and the macrocosm. Aristotle caught sight of this, but substituted for the independent reality of the ideas only an ideality towards which matter is striving and thus made it the immanent teleology of matter. But Patanjali was not satisfied with it for even here the stable unconsciousness remained unexplained altogether; and without it our intellectual life will be reduced to a mere mobility of passing states without any stable principle with which they may be connected and unified. This principle to which or for which all these passing states form together an unified life, and the experiences of pleasures and pains is the Purusha, which serves as the external teleology of the Prakriti. The comprehension of this metaphysical reality is not a dream with him as with Kant, but a complement of our ordinary scientific or phenomenal experience. For the achievement of this final release of the Purusha it is necessary to invest the outgoing process of conceptual flow, to make it steady and one-pointed by which all the differentiating process being arrested the mind tends to become steady and stable and when the last stage is attained the nature of the real form of the Purusha is reflected and the outgoing order of phenomena by a reverse process returns back to the Prakriti. The Neo-platonists agree with Patanjali in so far as the assertion of the supreme validity of the process which brings about trance is concerned. Plotinus and Patanjali agree in their difference from Kant in this that there are other sources of right knowledge than those provided by the scanty scope of conceptual relativity of our thoughts. The light that they have shown in the illumination of the history of world-civilisation

will manifest itself to any enquiring mind as the first beams of sunshine bringing messages of hope and bliss from the region of eternal sunshine beyond the gloomy and imperfect vision of our science and will always awaken us to believe that with reality which is hidden from our view I may stand face to face only if I possess the will to do it. Many hidden mysteries are daily being discovered by men of genius by this intuitive perception योगप्रत्यक्ष but none of us try to penetrate methodically into the depths of this land of eternal bliss and communion. The face of truth is hidden by a golden veil (हिरण्यवेष पात्रेण सत्यस्यापाहतं मुखं) and let all mankind combine in their efforts to draw it away and adore the unveiled truth as it is in itself.

At the close of the previous sections it may be worth while to speak a few words on the theories of the physical world as supplementing the views that have been already stated above.

Ancient and modern
division of matter.

(Gross matter as the possibility of sensation has been divided into five classes according to their relative grossness corresponding to the relative grossness of the senses. Some modern investigators have tried to understand the five Bhutas, *viz.*, Akasa, Marut, Tej, Ap and Kshiti as the ether, the gaseous heat and light, liquids and solids. But I cannot venture to say so when I think that solidity, liquidity and gaseousness represent only an impermanent aspect of matter. The division of matter from the standpoint of the possibility of our sensations has a firm root in our nature as cognising beings and has therefore a better rational footing than the modern chemical division of matter into elements and compounds which are being daily threatened by the gradual advancement of our scientific culture. They carry with them no fixed and consistent rational conception as the definition of the

ancients but are mere makeshifts for understanding or representing certain chemical changes of matter and have therefore merely a relative value.

There are five aspects from which gross matter can be viewed at. These are (1) Sthula
Sthula Rupa. (gross), (2) स्वरूप (substantive), (3) Sukshma (subtle), (4) Anvaya (conjunction), (5) Arthavattwa (purpose for use). The Sthula or the gross physical characters of the Bhutas are described as follows:—

Qualities of Earth—Form, heaviness, roughness, obstruction, stability, manifestation (vritti), difference, support, turbidity (काष्ण) hardness and enjoyability.

Ap—Smoothness (स्नेह), subtlety (सौक्ष्म), clearness (प्रभा), whiteness (शौक्ला), softness (साह्वं), heaviness (गौरवं), coolness, (शैत्यं), conservation (रक्षा), purity (पवित्रत्व), cementation (सन्धान).

Tejas—Going upwards (उर्द्धमाक्), cooking (पाचक), burning (दग्ध), light (लघु), shining (भास्वर), dissipating (प्रवसि), energising (ओजस्वि), different from the characteristic of the previous ones.

Vayu—transverse motion (तिर्यग्यानं), purity (पवित्रत्व), throwing, pushing, strength (आक्षेपीनोदनं बलं), movability (चलम्), want of shadow (अच्छायता)—different from the characteristic of the previous ones.

Akasha—Motion in all directions (सर्वतो गतिः), non-agglomeration (अस्यूङ्ग) non-obstructive (अविष्टम्भः)—different from the characteristic of the previous ones.

These physical characteristics are distinguished from their aspects by which they appeal to the senses which are called their Swarupas. Earth is
Swarupa. characterised by Gandha or smell,

Ap by Rasa or taste, Teja by Rupa, etc. Looked at from this view we see that smell arises by the contact of the nasal organ with the hard particles

of matter, so this hardness or solidity which can so generate the sensibility of Gaudha is said to be the Swarupa of Kshiti. Taste can originate only in connection with liquidity so this liquidity or Sneha is the Swarupa or nature of Ap. Light—the quality of visibility—manifests itself in connection with heat, so heat is the Swarupa of fire. The sensibility of touch is generated in connection with the vibration of air on the epidermal surface; so this vibrating nature is the Swarupa of air.

The sensibility of sound proceeds from the nature of obstructionlessness, and that belongs to Akasa, so this obstructionlessness is the Swarupa of Akasa.

The third aspect is the aspect of Tanmātras which are the causes of the atoms or Paramānus. Their fourth aspect is their aspect of Gunas or the qualities of प्रकाश (illumination), क्रिया (action), स्थिति (inertia). Their fifth aspect is that by which they are serviceable to the Purusha by causing his pleasurable or painful experiences and finally his liberation.

Speaking about the aggregation with regard to the structure of matter we see that this is of two kinds (1) those of which the parts are in intimate union and fusion, *e.g.*, any vegetable or animal body, the parts of which can never be considered separately. (2) Those mechanical aggregates or collocations of distinct and independent parts (युतसिद्धावयव) as the trees in a forest.

A Dravya or a substance is an aggregate of the former type and is the grouping of generic or specific qualities and is not a separate entity—the abode of generic and specific qualities like the Dravya of the Vaisheshika conception. The aspect of an unification of generic

Suksha, Anwaya
and Arthavattwa

Aggregation.

Substance.

and specific qualities seen in parts united in intimate union and fusion is called the Dravya aspect. The aggregation of parts is the structural aspect of which the side of appearance is the unification of generic and specific qualities called the Dravya.

The other aggregation of Yutasiddhavayaba, *i.e.*, the collocation of the distinct and independent parts is again of two kinds, (1) in which stress may be laid to the distinction of parts, and (2) that in which stress is laid to their unity more than their distinctness. Thus in the expression mango-grove we see that many mangoes indeed make a grove but the mangoes are not different from the grove. Here stress is laid to the aspect that mangoes are the same as the grove which however is not the case when we say that here is a grove of mangoes, for the expression grove of mangoes clearly brings home to our mind the side of the distinct mangoe trees which form a grove.

Of the gross elements, Akasa seems especially to require a word of explanation. There are according to Vijnāna Bhikshu and Nagesha two kinds of Akasa,—Karana or primal and Karya the atomic. The first or the original is the undifferentiated formless Tamas, for in that stage it has not the quality of manifesting itself in sounds (तमोगुण विशेषतयेव व्यवह्रियते तदानीमाकाशताव्यञ्जकशब्दादिविशेषगुणाभावात् कारणप्रथिव्यादिवत्). This Karanas later on develop into the atomic Akasa which has the property of sound. According to the conception of the Puranas, this Karyākāsa evolves from the ego as the first envelop of Vayu or air. The Kāranākāsa or the non-atomic Akasa should not be considered as mere vacuum (आवर्णाभाव) but must be conceived as a positive all-pervasive entity (अवकाशस्वरूपम्) something like the ether of the modern physicists.

From this Akasa springs the atomic Akasa or the

Kāryākāsha which is the cause of the manifestation of sound. All powers of hearing even though they have their origin in the principle of egoism reside in the Akasa placed in the hollow of ear. It is here that the power of hearing is located. When soundness or defect is noticed therein, soundness or defect is noticed in the power of hearing also. Further when of the sounds working in unison with the power of hearing the sounds of solids, etc., are to be taken in, then the power of hearing located in the hollow of the ear stands in need of the capacity of resonance residing in the substratum of the Akasa of the ear. This sense of hearing then, having its origin in the principle of ego acts when it is attracted by the sound originated and located in the mouth of the speaker, acting as a loadstone. It is this Akasa which gives penetrability to all bodies ; in absence of this all bodies would be so compact that it would be difficult even to pierce them with a needle. In the Sāṅkhya Sutra II. 12. it is said that eternal time and space are of the nature of Akasa “दिककाली आकाशप्रकृतिभूती नित्यौ चदिककालौ तावाकाशप्रकृतिभूती प्रकृतेर्गुणविशेषाविब । अतो दिक्कालयो-
विभ्रुत्वोपपत्तिः । यौतुखखदिककालौ तौ तत्तदुपधिसंयोगादाकाशादुत्पद्येते इत्यर्थः
So this so-called eternal time and space does not differ from the one undifferentiated formless Tamas which we have spoken just now. Relative and infinite time, arises from the motion of atoms in space—the cause of all change and transformations ; and space as relative position cannot be better expressed than in the words of Dr. B. N. Seal, as “totality of positions as an order of co-existent points, and as met it is wholly relative to the understanding like order in time, being constructed on the basis of relations of position intuited by our empirical or relative consciousness. But there is this difference between space, order and time order :—there is no unit

of space as position (दिक्) though we may conceive time, as, the moment (क्षण) regarded as the unit of change in the causal series. Spatial position (दिक्) results only from the different relations in which the all pervasive Ākāśa stands to the various finite objects. On the other hand, space as extension or locus of a finite body, or Desa, has an ultimate unit being analysable into the infinitesimal extension quality inherent in the Gunas of Prakriti.”

Chitta or mind has two stages :—(1) in the form of states such as real cognition (प्रमान) including perception, inference, competent evidence, unreal cognition, imagination, sleep and memory, --(2) in the form in which all those states are suppressed (निवृद्ध). Between the stage of complete out-going activity (व्यपन्न) and complete suppression of all states, there are thousands of states of infinite variety through which a man’s experiences have to pass from the Vyutthana state to the Nirodha. In addition to the five states spoken of above, there is another kind of real knowledge, and intuition, called Prajnā, which dawns when by concentration the Chitta is fixed to any one state and that alone. This Prajnā is superior to all other means of knowledge either perception, inference or competent evidence of the Vedas in this that it is altogether unerring, unrestricted or unlimited in its scope.

Pramāna we have seen includes perception, inference and competent evidence. Perception originates when the mind or Chitta through the senses (ear, skin, eye, taste and nose) and being modified by their modifications by the external objects passes to them and generates a kind of notion or knowledge about them in which their specific characters are more predominant.

Description of the states.

Perception.

Mind is all pervasive and it can generate its notion in the external world by which we have the perception of the thing. Like light which emits rays and pervades all, though it may remain in one place, the Chitta by its Vrittis comes in contact with the external world and is changed into the form of the object of perception and is thus the cause of perception ; as the Chitta has to pass through the senses it becomes coloured by them, which explains the fact that perception is impossible without the help of the senses. As it has to pass through the senses it undergoes the limitations of the senses, which it can avoid, if it can directly concentrate itself to any object without the help of the senses ; from this originates the Prajnā by which dawns the absolute and real knowledge of the thing unhampered by the limitations of the senses,—which can act only within a certain area or distance and cannot take within its sphere the subtler objects.

We see that in our ordinary perceptions our minds are drawn towards the object as iron is attracted by magnets. Thus Bhikshu says in explaining the Bhashya of IV. 17 :—

अयस्कान्तमणिवदक्रिया एव विषया अयोवत् क्रियाशीलं चित्तं स्वमहिम्ना
 आकृष्य रुक्मिन् संयोज्य तदुपरञ्जयन्ति स्वाकारा कारयन्ति इति लाचारस इव बस्त्रम्
 अतो येन विषयेण उपरक्तं यच्चित्तं स विषयस्तस्य ज्ञातः इत्यर्थः । इतरे च अज्ञाता
 इत्यर्थः । The objects of knowledge though inactive in them-
 selves may yet like a magnet draw the everchanging
 Chittas towards it and change the Chittas in accordance
 with their own form just as a piece of cloth is turned
 red by coming into contact with red lac. So it is
 that the Chitta attains the form of anything with which
 it comes in touch. Perception or Pratyaksha is distinguished
 from inference, etc., in this that here the knowledge arrived
 at is predominantly of the specific and special characters

(विशेष) of the thing and not of the generic qualities as in inference, etc.

Inference proceeds from the inference and depends upon the fact that certain common qualities are found in all the members of a class, as distinguished from the members of a different class. So that the qualities affirmed of a class will be found to exist in all the individual members of that class; this affirmation of the generic characters of a class to the individual members that come under it is the essence of inference. This it seems comes very nearly to tracing all deductions from the *dictum de omni et nullo*.

An object perceived or inferred by a competent man is described by him in words with the intention of transferring his knowledge to another; and the mental modification which has for its sphere the meaning of such words is the verbal cognition of the hearer. When the speaker has neither perceived nor inferred the object, and speaks of things which cannot be believed, the authority of verbal cognition fails. But it does not fail in the original speaker God or Iswara and his dictates the Shastras with reference to either the object of perception or of inference.

Viparyyaya or unreal cognition is the knowledge of the unreal—a knowledge which possesses a form that does not tally with the real nature of the thing, *e.g.*, when a man sees two moons by some defect of the eye. Doubt (*e.g.*) “Is it a log of wood or a man?” The illusoriness of seeing all things yellow through a defect of the eye can only be known when the objects are seen in their true colour; in doubt however the defective nature is at once manifest. Thus when we cannot be definite whether a certain thing is a post or a man. Here no knowledge is not definite. So we have not to wait

till the illusoriness of the previous knowledge is demonstrated by the advent of right knowledge. The evil nature of Viparyyaya is exemplified in Avidya—Nescience—Asmitā, Raga, etc.

It is distinguished from Vikalpa—Imagination—in this that though the latter is also unreal knowledge their nature as such is not demonstrated by any knowledge that follows but is on the other hand admitted on all hands by the common consent of all mankind. It is only the learned who can demonstrate by arguments the illusoriness of such Vikalpa or imagination.

All class notions and concepts are formed by taking note of only the general characters of things and associating them with a symbol called the name. Things themselves however do not exist in the nature of the symbols or names or concepts, it is only an aspect of them that is diagrammatically represented by the intellect in the form of concepts. When the concepts are united or separated in our thought and language they consequently represent only an imaginary plane of knowledge for the things are not as the concepts represent them. Thus when we say "Chaitra's cow," it is only an imaginary relation for actually speaking no such thing exists as the cow of Chaitra. Chaitra has no connection in reality with the cow. When we say Purusha is of the nature of consciousness, there is the same illusory relation. Now what is here predicated of what? Purusha is consciousness itself and there must always be a statement of the relationship of one to another in predication. Thus it sometimes breaks a concept into two parts and predicates one of the other, and sometimes predicates unity of two concepts which are different. क्वचिद्भेदे भेदमारोपयति, क्वचित् पुनर्भिन्नानामभेदम् Thus its sphere has a wide latitude in all thought process conducted through

language and involves an element of abstraction and construction and is called Vikalpa. This represents the faculty by which our concepts are arranged in analytical or synthetical proposition. It is said to be शब्दज्ञानानुपाती वस्तुशब्दो विकल्पः, *i.e.*, the knowledge that springs from the relationing of concepts or names which relationing does not actually exist in the objective world as it is represented in propositional forms.

Sleep is that mental state which has for its objective substratum the feeling of voidness. It is called a state or notion of mind for it is called back on awakening when we feel that we have slept well, our minds are clear or we have slept badly, our minds are listless, wandering and unsteady. For a person who has to attain communion or Samādhi these notions of sleep are to be suppressed like all other notions. Memory is the retaining in mind of objects perceived when perception occur by the union of the Chitta with eternal objects according to the forms of which the Chitta is transformed ; it keeps these perceptions, as impressions or Sanskāras by its inherent Tamas. These Sanskaras generate memory when such events occur which by virtue of associations can manifest them. (स संस्कारः स्वयञ्जकाञ्जनस्तदाकारामिव याश्चग्रहणेभवाभिकाम् स्मृतिं जनयति) (व्यञ्जकसुद्धोधकं तेनाञ्जनं फलाभिमुखीकरणं यस्य, वाचस्पति).

Thus memory comes when the percept already known and acquired are kept in the mind in the form of impression and are manifested by the Udvodhakas or the associative manifestors. It differs from perceptions in this that the latter are of the nature of perceiving the unknown and unperceived, whereas the former serves to bring before the mind percepts that have already been acquired. Memory therefore is of the percepts acquired by real cognition, unreal cognition, imagination, sleep and memory. It manifests itself in dreams as well as in waking states.

The relation between these states of mind and the Sanskāras is this that, the frequency and repetition of this strengthens the Sanskāras and thus ensures the revival of the states again.

These states are all endowed with Sukha (pleasure), Duhkha (pain) and Moha (ignorance). These feelings cannot be treated separately from the states themselves, for their manifestations are not different from the manifestation of the states themselves. Knowledge and feeling are but two different aspects of the modifications of Chitta made out of Prakriti; hence none of them can be thought separately from the other. The fusion of feeling with knowledge is therefore more fundamental here than in the tripartite division of mind.

In connection with this we are to consider the senses whose action on the external world is known as "perceiving," "grahana," which is distinguished from "Pratyaksha," which means the effect of "perceiving," *viz.*, perception. Each sense has got its special sphere of work, *e.g.*, sight is that of eye, and this is called their second aspect, *viz.*, Swarupa. Their third aspect is "Asmitā" or ego which manifests itself in the form of the senses. Their fourth aspect is their characteristic of the Gunas, *viz.*, that of manifestation (प्रकाश) action (क्रिया) and retention (स्थिति). Their fifth aspect is that they are motivated for the Purusha, his experiences and liberation.

It is indeed difficult to find the relation of Manas with the senses and the Chitta. In more than one place Manas is identified with Chitta, and on the other hand, Manas is described as a sense organ. There is another aspect in which Manas is said to be the king of the cognitive and the motor senses. Looked at from this aspect Manas is possibly the directing side of the ego by which it directs

the cognitive and the conative senses to the external world and is the cause of their harmonious activity for the experiences of Purusha. As a necessary attribute of this directive character of Manas, the power of concentration which is developed by Prānāyām is said to belong to Manas. This is the Rajas side of Manas.

There is another aspect of Manas which is called the Anuvyavasāya or reflection by which the sensations (Ālochana) are associated, differentiated, integrated, assimilated into percepts and concepts. This is possibly the Sāttwika side of Manas.

There is another aspect by which the percepts and concepts are retained (धारण) in the mind as Sanskaras to be repeated or revealed again in the mind as actual states. This is the Tamas side of Manas.

In connection with this we may mention Uha (positive premise), Apoha (negative premise) and Tattvajñāna (logical conclusion) which are the modes of different Anuvyavasāya of the Manas. Along with these, will, etc., are also to be counted (Sec. II, 18 Yoga Varttika). Looked at from the point of view of Chitta, these may be regarded as the modifications of Chitta as well.

The motives which keep this process of outgoing activity are false knowledge, and such other emotional elements as egoism, attachment, aversion, and love of life. These emotional elements remain in the mind as power alone in the germinal state; or exist in a fully operative state when a man is under the influence of any one of them, or they become alternated by other ones, such as attachment or aversion or they may become attenuated by the meditation of contrarities. It is according to this that these are called प्रसन्न, उदार, विस्मिन्न and तन्. Man's mind or Chitta may follow these outgoing states or experiences or gradually remove these emotions which are commonly

called afflictions and thus narrow the sphere of these experiences and lead himself towards the final release.

All the Psychic states described above, *viz.*, प्रमाण, विपर्यय, etc., are called either afflicted or unaffiliated according as they are moved towards outgoing activity or are actuated by the higher motive of self-realisation and self-release to narrow the field of experiences gradually to a smaller and smaller sphere and afterwards suppress them altogether. These two kinds of motives, one of afflictions that led him towards external objects of attachment and aversion or love of life and that which leads him to strive for Kaivalya are the only motives which guide all human actions and psychic states.

They influence us whenever suitable opportunities occur so that by the study of the Vedas, self-criticism or right argumentation or from the instruction of good men अभ्यास and Vairāgya may be motivated by Vidyā (Vight knowledge) and tendency for Kaivalya may appear in the mind even when the man is immersed in the afflicted states of outgoing activity. So also afflicted states may come when the man is deeply bent or far advanced in those actions which are motivated by Vidyā or the tendency for Kaivalya.

It seems that the Yoga view of actions or Karma does not deprive man of his freedom of will through habituation in one kind of psychic states or actions towards Vyut-thhāna or towards Nirodha. It only strengthens the impressions or Sanskāras of those actual states and thus makes it more and more difficult to overcome their propensity of generating their corresponding actual states and thus to allow him to tread an unhampered course. The other limitation to the scope of the activity of his free will is the Vāsanā aspect of the Sanskāras by which he naturally feels himself attached with pleasurable ties towards certain

experiences and painful ones towards others. But these only represent the difficulties and impediments which are put before a man when he has to adopt that course of life—the contrary of which he might have been practising for a very long period extending over many life states.

But the free will is not curbed in any way, for this free will follows directly from the teleology of Prakriti which moves for the experiences and the liberation of the Purusha. So this motive of liberation which is the basis of all good conduct can never be subordinated to the other impulse, which goads the man towards outgoing experiences. But on the other hand this original impulse which attracts man towards these ordinary experiences as it is due to the false knowledge which identifies the Prakriti with the Purusha, becomes itself subordinate and loses its influence and power as such events occur which nullify the false knowledge by tending to produce a vision of the true knowledge of the relation of Prakriti with Purusha. Thus for example if by the grace of God the false knowledge (*Avidyā*) is removed, the true knowledge at once dawns before the mind and all the afflictions lose their power.

Free-will and responsibility of action cease in those life states which are intended for the sufferance of actions only, *e.g.*, life states of insects, etc.

APPENDIX I

SPHOTAVĀDA

Another point to be noted in connection with the main metaphysical theories of Patanjali is the Sphota theory which considers the relation of words with their ideas and the things which they signify. Generally these three are not differentiated, one from the other, and we are not accustomed to distinguish them from one another. Though distinct yet they are often identified or taken in one act of thought, by a sort of illusion. The nature of this illusory process comes to our view when we consider the process of auditory perception of words. Thus if we follow the Bhāshya as explained by Vijnāna Bhikṣu we find that by an effect of our organs of speech, the letters are pronounced. This vocal sound is produced in the mouth of the speaker from which place the sound moves in aerial waves until it reaches the ear drum of the hearer, by coming in contact with which it produces the audible sound called Dhvani. (ध्वनिर्नाम वागिन्द्रिय शब्दादिष्वभिहितस्योदानवायोः परिणाममेदः येन परिणामिनोदानवायुः वक्त्रुद्वाद्युक्त्याय शब्दधारां जनयन् श्रोत्रश्रोत्रं प्राप्नोति). The special modifications of this Dhvani are seen to be generated in the form of letters and the general name for these modifications is Nāda. This sound as it exists in the stage of Varnas or letters are also called Varna. If we apply the word Sabda or sound in the most general sense, then we can say that this is the second stage of sound moving towards word-cognition, the first stage being the stage of its utterance in the mouth of the speaker. The third stage of Sabda "is that in which the letters for example G, au, and h, of the word "Gauh" are taken together and the complete word

form "Gauh" comes before our view. The comprehension of this complete word form is an attribute of the mind and not of the sense of hearing. For the sense of hearing senses the letter form of the sound one by one as the particular letters are pronounced by the speaker and as they approach the ear one by one in air-waves. But each letter form sound vanishes as it is generated, for the sense of hearing has no power to hold them together and comprehend the letter forms as forming a complete letter form. The ideation of this complete letter form in the mind is called Sphota. It differs from the letter form in this that it is complete, inseparable, and unified whole devoid of any part, and thus are quite unlike the letter forms which die the next moment that they originate. According to the system of Patanjali as explained by the commentators, all significance belongs to this Sphota-form and never to the letters pronounced or heard. Letters when they are pronounced and heard in a particular order serve to give rise to such complete ideational word images which possess some denotation and connotation of meaning and are thus called "Sphotas," or that which illuminates. These are essentially different in nature from the sounds in letter forms generated in the sense of hearing which are momentary and evanescent and can never be brought together to form one whole, have no meaning and have the sense of hearing as their seat.

The Vaisesika view:—Sankara Misra however holds that this "Sphota" theory is absolutely unnecessary, for even the supporters of "Sphota" agree that the Sphota stands conventionally for the thing that it signifies; now if that be the case what is the good of admitting Sphota at all? It is better to say that the conventionality of names belongs to the letters themselves, which by virtue of that can conjointly signify a thing; and it is when

you look at the letters from this aspect—their unity with reference to their denotation of one thing—that you call them a Pada or name. (सङ्केतवत्त्वादेव पदार्थं प्रतीती किं स्फोटिक, वर्णानां वङ्गनानेकार्थप्रतिपादकत्वमेकं धर्म्मनभिप्रेत्य एकं पदमिति भाक्तो व्यवहारः—उपस्कार २. २२). So according to this view we find that there is no existence of a different entity called “name” or “Sphota” which can be distinguished from the letters coming in a definite order within the range of the sense of hearing. The letters pronounced and heard in a definite order are jointly called a name when they denote a particular meaning or object.

Kumaril's view :—Kumaril the celebrated scholar of the Mimāṃsā school also denies the Sphota theory and asserts like the Kanādas that the significance belongs to the letters themselves and not to any special Sphota or name. To prove this he first proves the letter forms as stable and eternal and as suffering no change on account of the difference in their modes of accent and pronunciation. He then goes on to show that the Sphota view only serves to increase the complexity without any attendant advantage. Thus the objection that applies to the so-called defect of the letter denotation theory that the letters cannot together denote a thing since they do not do it individually, applies to the name-denotation of the Sphota theory, since there also it is said that though there is no Sphota or name corresponding to each letter yet the letters conjointly give rise to a Sphota or complete name. (यस्मान्बयवः स्फोटः व्यज्यते वर्णवृद्धिभिः । सोपि पर्यनुयोगेन नैवेतेन विमुच्यते ॥ तत्रापि प्रतिवर्गं हि पदस्फोटिन गम्यते । न चावश्वघोव्यक्तिसदभावन्नचावधीः । प्रत्येकं चाप्यशक्तानां समुदायेष्यशक्तता । तत्र यः परिहारस्तेसमीचापि भविष्यति ॥)

The letters however are helped by their potencies (Sanskāras) in denoting the object, or the meaning. The Sphota theory has according to Kumaril and Parthasarathi also to admit this Sanskāra of the letters

in the manifestation of the name or the Sabda-Sphota, whereas they only admit it as the operating power of the letters in denoting the object or the thing signified. Sanskāras according to Kumaril are thus admitted both by the Sphota theorists and the Kumaril Bhatta's school of Mimāṃsa, only with this difference that the latter with its help can directly denote the object of the signified, whereas the former have only to go a step backwards in thinking his Sanskāra to give rise to the name or the Sabda-Sphota alone. (स्फोटशब्दपक्षे 'शब्दार्थ' संस्कारान्तरं स्मृति-तोरिव वा तदभिव्यक्तिसामर्थ्यमदृष्टमेव कल्प्यं तन्नाम्नाभिरर्थप्रतीतावेव कल्पितम् । किं च यदन्नाभिः संस्कारस्याग्रप्रतीतिसामर्थ्यं कल्प्यानि तद्वदपि स्फोटस्यावश्यं कल्पनीयमेव संस्कारस्य तु स्फोटाभिव्यञ्जकत्वमधिकम् ।)

Kumaril says that he takes great pains to prove the nullity of the Sphota theory only because if the Sphota view be accepted then it comes to the same thing as to say that words and letters have no validity so that all actions depending on them also come to lose their validity. (वाक्यानि वाक्यावयवाग्र्याणि, मन्थानि कर्तुं कृतएव यत्रः).

Prabhakara :—Prabhakara also holds the same view ; for according to him also the letters are pronounced in a definite order though when individually considered they are momentary and evanescent yet they maintain themselves by their potency in the form of a Pada or name and thus signify an object. Thus Saliknath Misra says in his *Prakarana Panchika*, p. 89, वर्णैर्जिव प्रत्यक्षैश्चर्यं प्रतिपत्तापपत्तये कश्चिद्विज्ञेयं चाग्रयित्वा युक्तः पूर्वपूर्वोपलम्भापिचत्वात्कारवर्णस्य । उपलम्भस्य च कल्पिकतया स्वतो विशेष्यमशक्यत्वात् पूर्वपूर्ववर्णोपलम्भजः संस्कार एवाग्रीयते ।
..... न प्रत्यक्षतो नाप्यनुमानतो वा
वर्णव्यतिरिक्तपदोपपत्तिरिति वर्णात्मकमेव पदं ।

Sabara :—The views of Kumaril and Prahākara thus explicated are but only elaborate explanations of the view

of Sabara who states the whole theory in a single line—
“पूर्ववर्णजनितसंस्कारसहितोऽन्तरो वर्णः प्रत्यायकः” 1. 1.5).

The last letter together with the potency generated by the preceding letters is the cause of significance.

Mahabhashya and Kaiyata :—After describing the view of those who are antagonistic to the Sphota theory it is necessary to mention the Vaiakarana school who are in favour of it; thus we find that Kaiyata in explaining the following passage of Mahabhashya.

कसर्हि शब्दः । (येनोच्चारितेन सावालाङ्गुलककुदखरविषाणिनां संप्रत्ययो भवति स शब्दः,)

Kaiyata says—वैयाकरणा वर्णव्यतिरिक्तस्य पदस्य वाक्यस्य वा वाचकत्वमिच्छन्ति, वर्णानां प्रत्येकं वाचकत्वे त्रितीयादिवर्णोच्चारणानर्थक्यप्रसङ्गात् आनर्थक्ये तु प्रत्येकमुत्पत्तिपक्षेयीगपद्येनोत्पत्त्यभावात्, अभिव्यक्तिपक्षे तु क्रमिणैवामिव्यक्त्या समुदायाभावादिकस्त्वप्युपाह्वानां वाचकत्वे सरोरसद्व्यादावर्थप्रतिपत्त्यविशेषप्रसङ्गात् तद्यतिरिक्तः स्फोटनादाभिव्यञ्जोवाचकः विसरेण वाक्यपदीयं व्यवस्थापितः ।

The Vaiyakaranas admit the significating force of names as distinguished from the letters. For if the significating force be attributed to letters individually, then the first letter being quite sufficient in significating the object, the utterance of other letters becomes unnecessary; and in this view if it is held that each letter has the generating power then also they cannot do it simultaneously, since they are uttered one after another. On the view of manifestation also since the letters are manifested one after another, they cannot be collected together in due order; if their existence in memory is sufficient, then we should expect no difference of signification or meaning by the change of order in the utterance of the letters; that is “Sara,” ought to have the same meaning as “Rasa.” So it must be admitted that the power of signification belongs to the Sphota as manifested by the Nādas as has been described in detail in Vakyapadiya.

Thus Bhartrihari says :---

- अह्वययास्त्रयोः सिद्धा घोम्यता नियता यथा ।
 व्यङ्ग्यव्यञ्जकभेदेन तथैवस्फोटनादयोः ॥ (98)
 प्रकाशकानां भेदे च प्रकाश्याधानुवर्त्तते ।
 शैलोदकादि भेदे तत्प्रत्यक्षं प्रतिविम्बके ॥ (100)
 तस्मादभिन्नकार्लषं वर्णवाक्यपदादिषु ।
 वृत्तिकालः स्वकालश्चवादर्भदात् विभज्यते ॥ (102)
 यः संयोग विभागाभ्यां करणैरुपजन्वते ।
 मस्फोटः शब्दजाः शब्दा ध्वनर्यान्वैरुदाहृताः ॥ (103)
 प्रतिविम्बं यथानावस्थितं तत्र क्रियावशात् ।
 तत्प्रवृत्तिमिवान्वेति सधर्मैः स्फोटनादयोः ॥ (49)
 पदेनवर्णा विद्यन्ते वर्णेष्ववयवा इव ।
 वाक्यात् पदानामत्यन्तं प्रभेदो नास्तिकथन ॥ (73)
 भिन्नं दर्शनमाश्रिता व्यवहारोनुगम्यते ।
 तत्र यन्मुख्यमैकेषां तसैः षां विपर्ययः ॥ (74)
 प्रत्येकं व्यञ्जका भिन्ना वर्णावाक्यपदेषु ये ।
 तेषामत्यन्तभेदेपि सङ्कीर्णा इव शक्तयः ॥ (89)
 व्यन्यमाने तथा वाक्यं वाक्याभिव्यक्तिहेतुभिः ।
 भागावग्रहरूपेण पूर्वं बुद्धिः प्रवर्त्तते ॥ (91)

etc.,

etc.,

etc.,

etc.

As the relation between the perceiving capacity and the object of perception is a constant one so is also the relation between the Sphota and the Nāda as the manifested and the manifestor (98). Just as the image varies according to the variation of the reflector as oil, water, etc., so also the reflected or the manifested image differs according to the difference of the manifestor (100). Though the manifestation of letters, propositions and names occurs in one and the same time yet there seems to be a before and after according to the before and after

of the Nāda utterances (102). That which is produced through the union and disunion (of Nādas or Dhwanis) is by the senses called Sphota, whereas other sound perceptions arising from sounds are called Dhwanis (103). As by the movement of water the image of a thing situated elsewhere also appears to adopt the movement of the water and thus seems to move, so also does the Sphota though unchanging in itself yet appears to suffer change in accordance with the change of Nāda which manifests it (49). As there are no parts of the letters themselves so the letters also do not exist as parts of the name. There is again no ultimate or real difference between names and propositions (73). It is only in popular usage that they are regarded as difference. That which others regard as the most important thing is regarded as false here, for propositions only are here regarded as valid (74). Though the letters which manifest names and propositions are altogether different from them yet their powers often appear as quite undifferentiated from them (89). Thus when propositions are manifested by the cause of the manifestation of propositions they appear to consist of parts when they first appear before the mind. Thus though the Pada-Sphota or the Vakya-Sphota do not really consist of parts yet as the powers of letters cannot often be differentiated from them, they also appear often to be made up of parts (91).

The Yoga View.—About the relation of the letters to the Sphota, Vāchaspati says in explaining the Bhāshya, that each of the letters has the potentiality of manifesting endless meaning, but none of them can do it individually; it is only when the letter form sounds are pronounced in succession by one effort of speech that the individual letters by their own particular contiguity or distance from

one another can manifest a complete word called the *Sphota*. Thus owing to the variation of contiguity of distance by intervention from other letter form sounds any letter form sound may manifest any meaning or word; for the particular order and the association of letter form sounds depend upon the particular output of energy required in making their utterance. The *Sphota* is thus a particular modification of *Buddhi*, whereas the letter form sounds have their origin in the organ of speech when they are uttered, and the sense of hearing when they are heard. It is well to note here that the theory that the letters themselves are endless potentiality and can manifest any word-*Sphotas*, according to their particular combinations and re-combinations, is quite in keeping with the main metaphysical doctrine of the *Sankhya-Patanjala* theory.

Vakya-Sphota :—What is spoken here of the letter form sounds and the *sabda-Sphotas* also apply to the relation that the *sabda-Sphotas* bear to propositions or sentences. A word or name does not stand alone; it always exists as combined with other words in the form of a proposition. Thus the word "tree" whenever it is pronounced carries with it the notion of a verb "asti" or "exists," and thereby demonstrates its meaning. The single word "tree" without any reference to any other word which can give it a propositional form has no meaning. Knowledge of words always comes in propositional forms, just as different letter form sounds demonstrate by their mutual collocation a single word or *sabda-Sphota*; so the words also by their mutual combination or collocation demonstrate judgmental or propositional significance or meaning. As the letters themselves have no meaning so the words themselves have also no meaning; it is only by placing them side by side in a particular order that a meaning dawns

in the mind. When single words are pronounced they associate other words with themselves and thus appear to signify a meaning. But though a single word is sufficient by association with other words to carry a meaning, yet sentences or propositions should not be deemed unnecessary for they serve to specialise that meaning (नियमाधिपतुवाद्:). Thus "cooks" means that any subject makes something the object of his cooking. The mention of the subject Devadatta and the object "rice" only specialises the subject and the object. Though the analysis of a sentence into the words of which it is constituted is as imaginary as the analysis of a word into the letter form sounds, it is generally done in order to get an analytical view of the meaning of a sentence—an imaginary division of it as cases, verbs, etc.

Abhikitanayavada and Anwitabhidhanavada :—This reminds us of the two very famous theories about the relation of sentences to words, *viz.*, "the Abhikitanayavada and the Anwitabhidhanavada." The former means that words themselves can express their separate meanings by the function Abhidha or denotation; these are subsequently combined into a sentence expressing one connected idea. The latter means that words only express a meaning as parts of a sentence, and as grammatically connected with each other; they only express an action or something connected with action: in (*Samanaya*) "bring the cow"—"gām" does not properly mean "gotwa" but "ānayanānawitagotwa," that is, the bovine genus as connected with bringing. We cannot have a case of a noun without some governing verb and *vice versa*—(*Sarvadarsana-sangraha*, Cowell).

The Yoga point of view :—It will be seen that strictly speaking the Yoga view does not agree with any one of these views though it approaches nearer to the Anwitābhidhāna

view than the Abhihitānyaya view. For according to the Yoga view the idea of the sentence is the only true thing; words only serve to manifest this idea but have themselves got no meaning. The division of a sentence into the component word conceptions, is only an imaginary analysis—an after thought.

Confusion the cause of verbal cognition:—According to Patanjali's view verbal cognition proceeds only from a confusion of the letter form sounds which are perceived in the sense of hearing, the sabda-Sphota which is manifested in the Buddhi and the object which exists in the external world. These three though altogether distinct from one another yet appear to be unified on account of the Sanketa or sign (सङ्केतोपाधिरेकाकारप्रत्ययः न तस्त्विकः। सङ्केतस्य निमित्तत्वा सङ्केते इति सप्तम्या) so that the letter form sounds, the sabda-Sphota and the thing can never be distinguished from one another. Of course knowledge can arise even in those cases where there is no actual external object, simply by virtue of the manifesting power of the letter form sounds—इन्द्रज्ञानानुपाती वस्तुशून्यः विकल्पः—This Sanketa is again defined as—सङ्केतस्तु पदपदार्थयोरितरेतराध्यासरूपः श्रुत्यात्मकः, योयं शब्दः, सोयमर्थः, यः अर्थः सशब्दः इत्येवमितरेतराध्यासरूपः सङ्केतो भवति। Convention is a manifestation of memory of the nature of mutual confusion of words and their meanings. This object is the same as this word, and this word is the same as this object. Thus there is no actual unity of words and their objects; it is only imagined to be so, by beginningless tradition. This view may well be contrasted with the Nyāya view which says that the convention of words by which they signify objects are due to the will of God.—अस्मात् शब्दात् अयमर्थो बोद्धव्यः इतीश्वरेच्छारूपः।

The Pātanjala system admits numberless souls, one primal matter called Prakriti constituted of three Gunas, Sattwa, Rajas and Tamas, and one omniscient, all-

