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

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THE EMERGING WORLD

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Foreword

THIS VOLUME is a collection of scholarly contributions on a wide variety of subjects and represents, even if indirectly, the wide range of Jawaharlal Nehru's interests. It is, therefore, a fitting tribute to his memory, and the contributors deserve the congratulations and thanks of all who wish to preserve the memory of India's first Prime Minister and one of the most outstanding personalities of the world.

It is not possible, within the compass of a Foreword, to give even a brief outline of Jawaharlal Nehru's magnificent contribution to the building up of new India and the contemporary world, or to describe those qualities which made his personality significant for us and the future generations. Jawaharlal Nehru was not a type—a scholar or a leader of men or a preacher of ideals or an aesthete. His interests and his capabilities extended beyond anything that could be indicated by a listing of the activities he was engaged in or the arts and sciences with which he was intellectually concerned. We could not classify him or even define him. He was something by himself, exalted and strange and strangely great.

He expressed sometimes his surprise at the affection which his people showered upon him. The surprise was genuine. He had, it is true, a deep and inspiring love for his people. But it was because of this very love that he endeavoured to say and do the right thing. He wanted to be judged. Instead, he was loved. His people loved him because of what he said and did, but they also looked beyond that to what he was. They sensed his amazing energy, his great dynamism. They realized that, for their sake, he was driving himself as hard as any human being possibly could, and yet maintained the detachment necessary for a balanced judgment in times of crisis and trial. They felt happy and reassured.

Jawaharlal Nehru had an unparalleled gift of seeing things as a whole. His scientific attitude comprehended a reverence for the spiritual; his insistence on a realistic approach could, all of a sudden, reveal its deep idealistic, if not romantic, origin. He astonished the intellectual and the scientist by saying things that were supremely relevant, but which the special interest of the scientist and the intellectual predisposed them to overlook. He could startle an audience of

distinguished physicians and surgeons, proud of having compiled a record of the medical achievements of the Second World War, by reminding them that it was part of their duty to prevent wars and the sufferings they inflicted upon mankind. He continuously pulled up intellectuals who left technological developments and their effects out of account in their thinking, and warned scientists that they would lead the world towards annihilation if they were not guided by moral values. He did all this with transparent sincerity and impressive competence, and it was impossible to challenge the validity of his approach.

He possessed an extraordinary curiosity and sensitiveness. There could not have been many persons in the world who were equally aware of the prevailing political and social conditions and trends and the intellectual movements of the world as a whole. But Jawaharlal Nehru's awareness was much more than a knowledge or a correct interpretation of existing facts. He had studied world history and its meaning had sunk deep into him. He could see the present as indissolubly linked with the past and the future, and identify himself with the ageless striving of mankind for truth and justice.

Such a man must, indeed, be a scholar. But while scholars generally confine themselves to certain spheres of knowledge because their interest or ability is limited to these spheres, or because they must concentrate on them to make a contribution which they can call their own, Jawaharlal Nehru's capacity to know and understand was not circumscribed by any limitations imposed by nature or circumstance. And while scholars avoid involvement in the realities of life to preserve their freedom or their objectivity, Jawaharlal Nehru deliberately involved himself in all problems of national and international significance. It was his close contact with everyday reality which stimulated him to search for the underlying meaning, the historical background and the future form of the problems of life. However far his search may have taken him, there was never any distance or any obstacle between him and everyday reality and those to whom he felt it necessary to communicate his ideas.

Jawaharlal Nehru was a leader of men. Leadership today is a science, with its own methods and techniques, its own strategy for the attainment of desired ends. Things are spotlighted or cast in the shade, proclaimed or left unsaid, according to calculations of how the electorate will react, much as the producer of a play controls movement, speech, and lighting to hold his audience enthralled.

Jawaharlal Nehru followed the elementary principle of straightforward dedication to causes nearest to his heart, and the completeness of his dedication made magnificent amends for his disregard of strategy and technique. It was his own concern for principles and values which guided him, principles and values which represented the highest form of national and international interest. He could plan and build for his nation; he was able to exert influence on international affairs and win acceptance, in a far larger measure than appeared possible after the close of the Second World War, for methods that would ensure peaceful coexistence of hostile nations and conflicting ideologies.

He appeared, at times, to be a preacher of ideals. That is a risk all who believe in principles and values must take. But he had an awareness of the realities of situations and the limitations of those who were confronted with them which kept his feet firmly on the ground. He realized that the greatest good of the greatest number could involve avoidable injustice and should not be followed recklessly. Above all, he realized that idealism must have a solid foundation of essential material interests, of the desire for 'bread', for security, for freedom and equal opportunity. One could believe in his ideal of a socialist welfare state on grounds of abstract principle, but also, and with equal genuineness, on grounds of material benefit. This socialist welfare state was not to be an organization of an anonymous mass. Jawaharlal Nehru was deeply concerned with the individual, and with an incredibly large number of individuals from all classes and all walks of life, individuals with ideas, with needs, with special capacities. His relationships with them were imbued with such solicitude and generosity that not only these individuals but all those who heard about them acquired a new vision of the individual's place in society. Jawaharlal Nehru, the preacher of ideals, was as clay in the hands of his noble and generous impulses.

And, finally, Jawaharlal Nehru was a lover of the beautiful, of flowers, of children, of the creations of literature and art. His love of the beautiful gained in intensity the less of himself and his time he could devote to it. The lines of Robert Frost which he noted down during his last days—

> The woods are lovely, dark and deep,
> But I have promises to keep
> And miles to go before I sleep,

bear witness to the moments of poetic, I would not hesitate to say mystic, exaltation he must have experienced in his furiously active life. He must have treasured these moments, but also transformed them into an inspiring and refining influence. For while we cannot describe him as a scholar or a humanist or an idealist and feel satisfied, we could say that his personality had all the qualities of a masterpiece of art—unity, balance, movement, contrast, rhythm.

ZAKIR HUSAIN

ABOUT THIS BOOK

SOON AFTER Shri Jawaharlal Nehru completed his seventy-fourth year last November, some of us who had the privilege of having known him and worked under his guidance and inspiration felt that we should present him with two volumes of felicitation on his seventy-fifth birthday—a book of essays and an album of photographs. Not wanting to embarrass him with praise, we thought the book he would be happy to receive was one in which scholars and men of action gave their reflections on the basic problems of our times. That is why this volume contains no direct tributes to Shri Jawaharlal Nehru's work and personality. It seeks instead to discover the new world that is emerging, a world which Shri Nehru has helped to call into being through his vision and tireless service.

Our invitations to philosophers and statesmen, historians and scientists to associate themselves with the effort met with ready response. Even as the contributions had begun coming in, however, Jawaharlal Nehru left us.

Death cannot alter our own, or the world's, admiration and affection for him. It was decided to continue work on the volume and it is being released on the day we had hoped to present it to him in person. What was to be a birthday souvenir becomes a memorial volume.

SHRIMAN NARAYAN

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The Emerging World Society

S. RADHAKRISHNAN

I

A NEW WORLD SOCIETY is gradually emerging. It is growing quietly, imperceptibly, in the minds and hearts of men. The tumult and the excitement, the anger and the violence, the perplexities of spirit, and the ambiguities of expression are the pangs of the birth of something new. We of this generation are called upon to work for this new order with all the strength and capacity for suffering we possess.

When religious prophets and philosophers speak of our common humanity, of the natural kinship of human beings, it is a part of wisdom and a need of the enlightened spirit. There is a wider recognition of this fact today than ever before in history. Man's basic physical structure, his mental make-up, his moral needs, his spiritual aspirations are the same the world over. The cycle of birth, growth, childhood and youth, of sickness, old age and death, of love and friendship, of sorrow and joy are the same for all men. We share a common origin and a common destiny: *ekaiva mānuṣījātih.* The human race is one. This oneness of humanity is more than a phrase, it is not a mere vision. It is becoming a historic fact. With the speeding up of communication, ideas and tools now belong to man as man. The necessities of the historical process are making the world into one. We stand on the threshold of a new society, a single society. Those who are awake to the problems of the future adopt the ideal of the oneness of mankind as the guiding principle of their thought and action.

II

IN PREVIOUS CENTURIES we had a limited vision of the world; of Asia, of Europe, of Africa. None of these large continents is the whole

world. They have come together and cannot get away from one another. The sciences of archaeology and anthropology reveal ancient art of great achievement, of beauty and complexity, which yet remained outside the traditional stream of Asian, European, or African history.

Facile generalizations are made by philosophers of history which are highly misleading. Hegel in his *Lectures on the Philosophy of History* says that 'Persia is the land of light, Greece the land of grace, India the land of dream, Rome the land of empire'.[1] It is true of all cultures that the greatest gift of life is the dream of a higher life. The pursuit of perfection has been the dominating motive of human life. Man is essentially a re-maker. He is not content with patterns of the past. He knows that every morning brings a new day, and every pulse-beat a new life.

East and West are relative terms. They are geographical expressions and not cultural types. The differences among countries like China, Japan, and India are quite as significant as those among European or American countries. Specific cultural patterns with distinctive beliefs and habits developed in different regions in relative isolation from one another. There were periods when China and India were pre-eminent in cultural affairs; others became prominent when Western nations became filled with the urge to expand. For the last three centuries Western nations aided by scientific development have dominated the East. The scientific and the industrial developments of the past three centuries have made a great gulf not only between the East and West but between the present Western civilization and that of its own past.

Recent developments have given rise to the misleading impression that while the West is scientific in outlook the East is spiritually minded. The one is said to be rational while the other is held to be religious. The one is regarded as dynamic and perpetually changing while the other is treated as static and unchanging. If we take a long view we will find that China and India have made fundamental contributions to science and technology till three or four hundred years ago and there have been illustrious examples of religious wisdom and sanctity in the West. The more we understand one another the more we feel that we are like one another. East and West do not represent two different types of consciousness or modes of thought.

Science and religion are aspects of every culture. The rational and

[1] English translation by Sibree (1861)

the spiritual are two strands inextricably woven in human nature, though in varied patterns. One or the other may be more prominent in different periods of human history.

Human beings are fundamentally the same and hold the same deep values. The differences among them, which are, no doubt, significant, are related to external, temporary, social conditions and are alterable with them.

III

IN SPITE OF SHARP international conflicts, setbacks, and mutual slandering, the world is getting to be one. Science knows no borders. Art and culture are becoming common possessions. The isolated existence of human groups has become outdated. It takes a matter of hours to travel from one end of the world to another. Radio, television, the Press, help us to follow events in other countries. Physical barriers have broken down, preparing the way for intellectual communication and spiritual communion. The most distant states have become near neighbours and an international society is in prospect.

The world is drawn together by the interconnectedness of world economy. Nations in Asia and Africa are passing through what is called a revolution of rising and yet unfulfilled demand for more reasonable standards of life. They are treading the road to modernization which is another name for industrialization. We are all using the same language in science and employing the same tools for industrial development. As a result new sets of values are springing up everywhere. Never before have men had the means of communication or the bonds of interdependence through which a world community is rendered possible. The world has become a unit and demands that it should be treated as one.

Today this is not only possible but necessary in view of the development of nuclear weapons of fantastic power. Leaders of states talk of the development of intercontinental ballistic missiles, the incomparable fire power they possess, and the eventual obliteration of any possible aggressor from the face of the earth. A nuclear arms race indicates the possibility, if not the probability, of putting an end to the human species in a nuclear war. It is not a question of who is the world's strongest military power or who has the lead in intercontinental missiles. Whoever may be the strong power no one will

survive a nuclear war. It is a dangerous illusion to believe that the use of these weapons will result in a decisive advantage to those who possess them. There is no such thing as military invincibility. Nuclear war will mean the ruin of all. The fate of all nations is inseparably tied up. Either we live together or die together. It is either one society or no society.

IV

THE ENDING OF THE HUMAN adventure on earth is a possibility we have to reckon with. Faced by such a challenge our differences of race and religion, class and colour, nation and ideology, become irrelevant. We have to devise a realistic way by which humanity does not compass its own destruction.

In the present condition of the world with its nervous apprehension it is essential and urgent for us to adjust ourselves to the new realities, adopt measures to prevent the abuse of the new, formidable means of destruction. We should develop a new flexibility, new powers of creative adaptation.

Militarism and nationalism have become outdated, outmoded. Heraclitus spoke of war as the father of all changes. For centuries war has been used as a method for settling international disputes. It has been terrible in its consequences. It has wiped out whole civilizations and destroyed entire peoples. But the new weapons have completely changed the nature of warfare. If a general agreement is not reached, if mutual confidence is not restored, if competition in this lethal race goes on, we will live in a precarious way, with the sentence of death threatening us all. War in the present age means the suicide and not the survival of man. As a method of settling international disputes, war has to be abandoned. There is no alternative to peace.

In mankind's chequered history we have fought each other again and again to uphold our distinctive ways of life. The instinct for each to cling to his own way is adopted by the nation-state at the present level of human evolution. Nationalism is a collective form of selfishness. Each race, each creed, each nation regards itself as the chosen of God, as the elect of the future, as the educator of the human race. There is a self-righteousness which each nation adopts about its culture, its pattern of life, and unconsciously, if not consciously, it uses its reason to serve its emotions and develop an aggressive hostility

to all those who reject this pattern and are committed to other ways of life. We deride what we do not understand; we reject what we do not recognize. National arrogance is a characteristic of all nations, in the East as in the West. The ancient Greeks destroyed the great civilization they developed by their passionate and violent attachment to their states. La Fontaine distinguished Frenchmen from the Spaniards by referring to national pride that 'ours is much more stupid and theirs much more mad'. A Frenchman declared that English is simply French badly spelt and badly pronounced. When national leaders use the apparatus of modern technology, the radio, television, etc., they tell their peoples that they are dishonoured by defeat, that they are threatened by their neighbours, that they should dare all things and die, if necessary, for the glory of their fatherland or mother country or ideological pattern. The barriers that separate peoples are thus intensified. The responsibility of literary writers and historians is great in the matter of exaggerating past wrongs and keeping old sores running. They help to make nations drunk, by imparting to nations false memories, inducing in them a sense of cosmic vision. While as individual human beings we are sensible, humble, generous, and appreciative of others, as members of this or that nation-state we are bitter, arrogant, vain, and almost unbearable.

Nation-states are too narrow for the modern world where we have conquered space and move faster than sound. Gandhi, even when he was fighting for India's independence, warned us against the reactionary character of nationalism. He said: 'A fallen and prostrate India cannot be of help to herself or the world. A free and enlightened India can be of help to herself or the world. I want my country to be free that one day, if need be, she may die that humanity may live.' It is in self-surrender that we fortify ourselves.

Nations are not immortal. They are not the permanent possessors of this planet. They are its temporary tenants. They will last long if they adhere to the moral law. The doom of nations cannot be delayed so long as the cupidities of man persist. Nations aim at permanence. We know, however, that all great societies perished leaving behind the great heritage of arts and skills, ideas and ideals on which we still build. No society dies in vain. All living things die but out of death comes life.

Gandhi required us to be faithful to the inner voice of conscience, the divine law not written by the hand of man but inflexible none the

less, the eternal fountain-source of all the codes that have ever been written in the course of ages. It is this moral law that binds the members of the human family together and gives us a new sense of responsibility for the safety and happiness of the whole human family. By being ourselves we best serve the interests of others. The interdependence of nations has become so close that no nation can be hurt without injury to the rest. Nations are no more islands; frontiers are losing their significance.

Belief in coexistence is not the outcome of expediency or of weakness. It is the only way to rid the world of intolerance and misunderstanding. There are no more closed societies. The new order we seek is not either national or continental. It is neither eastern nor western. It is universal. We must develop a sense of perspective and realize that our nation is one of many and each makes a specific contribution to the richness and variety of the world. Humanity is not this race or that nation, but the whole of mankind, which is getting together, we hope, for purposes of co-operation. Simply because war has been with us for many centuries, it does not follow that it will continue to be with us for all time.[2]

There is a conflict between the old concept of the nation-state, separate, sovereign, absolute, autonomous, and the new international community where we have to work together if we are to survive. It is time we abandon the past with national sovereignty and faith in force and work for the future with its ideals of peace, freedom, and justice under law. History is a road in which vital points are cross-roads.

V

PAST HISTORY OF HUMAN evolution gives us hope that by intelligent planning and deliberate effort we may slowly give up the military

[2] Some time ago the Soviet Premier, Mr. Khrushchev, said at Bucharest that 'Lenin's dictum that war is inevitable between the capitalist and the socialist groups is outdated in the present nuclear age'. 'The Communists are realistically minded people. They realize that in the current situation the relations between the two world systems should be built in such a way as to preclude the possibility of war.' Again, 'to prevent war, including local war, because it can develop into a world war, every people should bring pressure to bear on its government, to compel it to abide by the principles of peaceful coexistence of states with different social systems.' Mr. Khrushchev thinks that the old doctrine of the inevitability of conflict between capitalism and socialism has no meaning

method of settling disputes. Within the nation, we do not ordinarily resort to force to assert our rights. We have established the rule of law and we strive to settle our disputes through resort to law or by other peaceful methods.

There are individuals who are tempted to take the law into their own hands and we use the police force to deter them from the use of lawless violence. This secures that no one uses force to gain his selfish ends. Within a nation we have the rule of law, the framework of justice, and a police force.

We also establish conditions of human welfare which do not encourage unrest, disorder, and strife. Laws within nations are broken' when legitimate ambitions are thwarted, when misery is widespread, and the future seems blocked. When whole groups feel that they have no chance of maintaining themselves decently, they rebel against the established order. The forces of social passion, humane concern, and compassion are at work within the nation and seek to maintain a healthy condition in society.

All those who belong to a nation share certain ideals and purposes and work for the general welfare of the community as a whole. A nation is not a casual association of men for the performance of certain political functions. It is a vital union. The sense of nationality is derived not from race, language, or religion but from traditional values accepted by the members of the nation. They have a sense of honour, respect for indefinable obligations.

If conditions which prevail within a welfare state are extended on a world-scale, we should be prepared for a little sacrifice of national sovereignty, and be willing to accept peaceful methods of settling disputes, enforce peaceful legal solutions and avert violence, secure minimum economic conditions of well-being, remove the grievances of large communities which suffer from political subjection and racial discrimination, and develop a moral community based on spiritual values. A proper appreciation of the duties and responsibilities implied in world citizenship is necessary today. We have to lift the world off its hinges and transform the national man into a universal man.

The United Nations Organization is the first step towards the creation of an authoritative world order. It has not got the power to enforce the rule of law. It has used on occasions military force. There is talk about disarmament, inspection, and control. The cold war is the

today. Later, on the anniversary of Lenin's birth, Mr. Khrushchev said: 'One must not fail to note the emergence of mighty forces which act against war.'

result of the two power blocs facing each other in Europe, Asia, and Africa. If the cold war is to end, the groups should abandon the armament race to annihilation. If the two sides seek all the time arms that would outmatch those of each other, suspect and distrust each other, war becomes inevitable. Even as national welfare requires us to give up the personal right to use force, international security requires the surrender of the right to use force on the part of nations. We should strive to get the weapons out of the hands of nations and put them in international keeping. Except for local police forces the world's arms should be in the hands of an international force.

We need an international code of justice which should be enforced impartially. All this is possible only if there is general, simultaneous, controlled disarmament and the parallel establishment of an international police force.

If agreement is reached on total and universal disarmament, setting free large funds, these funds can be used for rendering extensive aid to all the underdeveloped nations. UNESCO, WHO, ILO, FAO, the World Bank, the Children's Fund and other such organizations are attempting to correct the present inequalities of opportunity and living standards among the nations of the world. They recognize that the economic problems are common to all humanity, irrespective of race, culture, or nationality. Hunger knows no nationality. Despair is not peculiar to any people. The world's resources should be developed for the benefit of all mankind. It is increasingly recognized that favoured nations have a responsibility to raise the less favoured ones to a higher level. Peace is secure only if the people of the world are freed from the burden of armaments, and from hunger, destitution, disease, and despair.

Colonialism and racial discrimination are admitted to be the sources of major conflicts and require to be eliminated. Provision should be made for peaceful changes towards political freedom and economic well-being of backward nations.

The sense of belonging together to the same nation is derived from a sense of sharing the same memories and hopes, the same historical experiences, the same artistic and cultural heritage. If membership of one world is to be developed, projects like the East-West Understanding and Co-operation should help us to realize the cultural wealth and knowledge to which we are all heirs. When mischievous misunderstanding is at work, it is our duty to work for creative understanding among nations.

It is for the political leaders to determine the practical steps by which the sources of power and communication now available to us can be used for closer co-operation and friendliness among the peoples of the world. No political understanding can be permanent without understanding at the cultural level. Apart from its intrinsic importance, such understanding contributes to the enrichment of human experience. Science and industry, education and culture are unifying us at the physical and intellectual levels. We need to look upon humanity not as a mere organization but as a living organism united from within by those values which are inseparable from human dignity and freedom. When the sense of human community is absent, society becomes a riotous mob.

We cannot conceive of a world without national differences, without cultural variety and artistic wealth. To a world which is becoming standardized, variety of cultures imparts beauty and creativeness. It is for organizations like the UNESCO to develop in the minds of men that large, inclusive vision of humanity through understanding and respect for differences, and increase global awareness and co-operation in the ways of peace. The world community will have, in common, science and technology, economic arrangements and political forms but it will also help the varied peoples of the world to develop their local customs, arts, and literature. These will save the new civilization from monotony.

Universities Then and Now

LORD ADRIAN

IN THE LAST YEARS of King Edward VII's reign Cambridge was surely one of the best universities, if not the best, in the English-speaking world. It had all the elements needed to fire the imagination of the students, the beauty of old buildings and gardens, the companionship of men of great ability, old and young, and the freedom to talk and to form one's own opinions. Among our seniors at Trinity College there were some of the most active leaders in new fields of science, mathematics, and philosophy and among our contemporaries there were brilliant young men who seemed destined to become the leading figures of our generation. We had no foreboding that some of the best of them had only a few more years to live, like some of the best from other universities and other countries. Their presence made us confident. We could feel that we were on the threshold of great advances and that the years we were spending at Cambridge were making us ready to play our part in them.

We had been to school at a time of rapid technical progress, in the first decade of the twentieth century. It was making life easier in every direction. In London there were telephones and typewriters and electric light in every office. One could listen to music from gramophones or mechanical piano players. Wireless telegraphy was used commercially and the petrol engine had given exciting possibilities of transport by land, sea, and air, with the motor-car already so well established that far-sighted men were thinking of alcohol as a fuel when the world supply of oil was exhausted.

No undergraduate at Cambridge could fail to couple this technological progress with the rapid advance of the basic sciences, though the developments which excited our seniors had scarcely filtered down to the undergraduate level. Few of us then were aware of the work of Einstein or Max Planck and still fewer of that of Freud, but we knew that the physics of the Victorian era had become outdated, that atoms had ceased to be indivisible and that J. J. Thomson

and Rutherford were working towards new conceptions of matter. We could be optimists, at least on the materialistic side.

The value of money was stable and we were not disturbed by rumours of war. We knew there were military castes which looked forward to it, but the economists assured us that no nation could face the cost of a major war. We thought that the good sense of governments would prevail or that the soldiers would not obey their orders. War could not serve the disputes of civilized nations and warfare would soon die out as knowledge and reason advanced.

The younger generation could think like that until 1914, for Cambridge then was far more isolated. The rest of the world was further away: the newspapers told us of major events abroad but journeys were longer and we still belonged to an island which had done very well for itself in the past and thought itself safe from the troubles of Europe.

Another factor increased our self-sufficiency. In England, Edwardian Oxford and Cambridge were the universities for the privileged class, for the sons of the well-to-do parents. Most of the undergraduates had studied the classics at boarding schools in the country; many of them were able and some were rebels but most of them had known one another at school. They gave the prevailing tone to life in college, though there were also the poorer men who were clever enough to win the scholarships and there were the students from other parts of the world with ideas of their own about British institutions.

Public school Cambridge was not unfriendly to men with different traditions. We were beginning to be less certain of our own. Kipling was out of fashion and Belloc was sowing doubt about the far-flung Empire existing to better the world. But few of us felt that our critics had much to complain of. We thought, I suppose, that Great Britain, whatever its motives, had done so much for the world that some ingratitude was natural. We might not excel other nations in music or painting and our industries needed more science to catch up with Europe, but we could claim the most enlightened form of government, the best civil service, and also the most powerful navy. Other countries might envy our freedom but our use of it would help them towards their own.

Since 1914 the world has changed to a different pattern. Two wars with their plagues and famines have forced the pace in technical progress. That progress, apart from warfare, has gained a world

where far more people can live in comfort, where knowledge and new ideas can spread with the speed of light. But the progress in warfare threatens the world with ruin and there are powerful nations with different ideals to keep them divided. We have far more reason to fear a war and are far more anxious that knowledge should spread so that all mankind would be wiser.

Europe was ready for knowledge at the time when Oxford and Cambridge were founded. At that time too the fighting had died away, life had more comfort and journeys were safer. The rulers needed scholars and clerks to help them and the younger men were eager to learn. The students had flocked to Abelard in Paris to gain more light on religion, they had studied the law at Bologna and Walter de Merton had founded his College at Oxford seven hundred years ago. Universities grew, but the general promise for learning faded. New ideas could endanger the peace of the state. Some might lead to eternal damnation. Heretical views were banned and the orthodox learning had lost its appeal.

The world moved slowly then and now the appeal has revived in a rapidly moving age. The scientific era has brought us a different kind of knowledge, confined to the world we live in and raising no hopes or fears of heaven or hell. No one can doubt the power it has brought to man to build the world to suit him, but the man-built world must have the expert planners and the users who understand it. To make it run smoothly needs education of every kind in every country. The practical need is reason enough and there is still the older reason behind, the human need for each generation to outgrow the ideas of its parents. We cannot deny our children the right to be taught as much as we know ourselves.

Great Britain has been slower than other countries in expanding its university system. We have more than doubled our student numbers and are planning a rapid increase, yet most of the Western world is doing better: Oxford and Cambridge have nearly doubled in size since 1910, though Trinity College was already so large that it could grow very little. But the student intake at Oxford and Cambridge has changed. Both have the able boys from the expensive schools but many more of them come from the schools that are run by the state. Preference goes to the better scholars and every student who gains admission is given a grant from the state to support him for the whole of his course. Though British society is not yet entirely classless, Oxford and Cambridge draw their students from a very

much wider range. They meet on an equal footing and the groups they form are based on what they are doing, in sport or art or politics or university study.

The isolation has gone and the Cambridge student has a welfare state at his back. But we who are old must feel he faces a bleaker prospect. The promise of 1910 has gone: we could think of the great material progress which science would bring to a world at peace, but our progress in war has deepened human division. Even if war can be banned by fear we have lost our dream of an ordered advance. We have seen how little the world can do to direct it for our science is still no guide to the human problem of living in friendship.

Yet the university life goes forward with little to show that our students are anxious. There are still the rebels, the men who are shy or aggressive and fail in personal contacts, the men who are nervous about their health or their future, and there are still the occasional failures. Yet the desire to excel is as strong as ever. Though the fashions in clothes and art and reading have changed, the Cambridge undergraduates are neither better nor worse behaved than we were. Most of them seem as adventurous, as ready for work and play, and as glad to live in a world of advancing knowledge.

Cambridge no doubt owes much to its long traditions, but university students in every country belong to a privileged class. They have shown themselves to be worthy of the best education: it will keep their minds at a stretch and give them a special esteem as the more responsible men. They have joined a class which has no national boundaries, which helps the progress of civilization. They may doubt their own ability but the present demand for knowledge will keep them busy. They should be able to face an anxious future; their work will be needed, for they are the people the world has chosen to make it more secure.

We are more concerned about those who are not so privileged, those who are slower to learn at school and cannot reach university level. The mechanized world of the future will have little need of the labourer's strength or even the craftsman's skill. At present, however, the picture is different: the machines are growing rapidly but so is the need for untrained workers. In prosperous countries the boys from school can earn enough to be independent before they are ready for manhood. But the older conventions of family life have gone and their work does not hold their interest. A few may be led to bad behaviour and fighting: it is checked as a rule by manhood but it

warns us of one of the problems which technical progress will not solve.

The advance in material comfort and leisure will reduce the worst divisions which trouble the human race, the divisions between the nations and between the rich and the poor. But the other division will still be there, between the more and the less intelligent men. The future world will need the ablest people to build it. They must be the planners and rulers: the rest can enjoy leisure but some will be discontented and some of these will be badly behaved.

But the danger ahead is the price we pay for our human nature. Mankind would come to a halt if no one could ever excel, if all the ideas were orthodox, and the rules were always obeyed. In a mechanized world if we lost our discontents we should face the risk of becoming machines ourselves.

The danger, too, may be less than we fear; we may find a way to reduce it by training the children better. Those who will fail at school may have brains which were worse from birth, but what their grown-up minds can do will depend on what they have had to fill them, the words they have learnt, the games they have played, the lives they have lived at home and at school. We cannot expect great verbal ability in the child of illiterate parents who lives in a crowded dwelling where no one reads. The child who comes from a literate background has a far better chance of making us understand him.

Most of us think that better social conditions will raise the attainment level of some of the backward boys and most of us think that a special pattern of school could teach them with less frustration and boredom. But we have no positive knowledge: the science of education is still an uncertain guide. We have scarcely begun to learn how thinking develops and how we can aid it; it is hard to distinguish the different reasons for failure, genetic defects or early trauma or disturbance of habit formation in childhood. Social and medical science are both involved in the problems of how we should train the children.

Every country intends to teach them better, but all the schools and the subjects they teach were evolved in an older and simpler world. We must build the schools and find the subjects for the mechanized world of tomorrow. We have to develop the kind of teaching which will suit a people with far more leisure; we have to teach them to use their freedom without disturbing their neighbours. They must have new aims to work for, new interests to engage

their minds. We must not allow the machines to debase the human spirit.

But we waste our time by thinking only of future dangers. There is much to be done in the present to use the knowledge the world has gained already. We must teach the new generation to advance beyond us: we must build the schools and universities and learn how to use them better. We must not discourage the world's desire for knowledge.

A Balance-Sheet for Science and Technology in Europe

SIR ERIC ASHBY

THE PROPOSITION I SELECT is as follows. Twice in history European civilization has been one fabric. Twice in history the fabric has been torn. Science and invention have contributed to its destruction, but in science and invention lies one hope for its repair.

Let us reflect for a few moments on the traffic of ideas in Europe. Under the Roman Empire there was a constant coming and going across the roads of Europe, of messengers, merchants, troops, and administrators. They carried with them the values and standards of Imperial Rome. This diffusion of ideas from one part of the Empire to another produced (as one historian has called it) 'a singularly uniform and cosmopolitan civilization throughout the Roman world, from which the local and provincial spirit was strikingly absent'.

The barbarian invasions destroyed this early fabric of European society. The unity of ideas was replaced by numerous regional cultures. Europeans became provincial. Much of the evidence for that provincialism survives to this day: witness (for example) the differences in local costumes, in the architecture of farmhouses, even in the traditions of haymaking, in the valleys of Tyrol and Carinthia and Steiermark. But scattered through this patchwork of provincialism there appeared centres of culture, communicating constantly with one another, united by the Catholic faith and the Latin tongue, a reticulum comprising monasteries, universities, cities, and courts, which held together. Again along the roads of Europe culture was carried to the common people, this time through the gossip of pilgrims, the songs of *jongleurs*, the preaching (and often the political propaganda) of priests and friars, the talk of students, and the worldly wisdom of merchants who attended the fairs and festivals.

The common language decayed; the common religion became fragmented into sects; traffic between the centres of culture diminished. The barriers which severed Canterbury from Rome also severed

Oxford from Paris. The channels of communication between university and university, city and city, became overgrown and stagnant.

When the traffic of ideas again revived it was not traffic between institutions or corporations; it was a traffic between individual scholars. The impulse which directed this traffic was no longer theology and the affairs of the Roman Church; it was the New Philosophy and the phenomena of Nature. The ideas of Galileo and Newton, Harvey and Descartes, Kepler and Boyle, were cosmopolitan. Frontiers could not keep them out; sectarian zeal could not suppress them; differences in language could not conceal them. Robert Boyle, for instance, read Galileo in Latin and Glaser in French, and regretted that he could not read the work of Germans except in translation; and although Boyle himself wrote in English his works were rapidly circulated on the Continent in Latin editions.

In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries science became one of the threads which held together the fabric of European civilization. A traffic which began between individuals became consolidated in the interchange of publications between scientific societies and academies. During the nineteenth century science became established in the universities and the universities began to regain a prestige in European life which they had lost since the Middle Ages. It is noteworthy that this prestige rested primarily on *Wissenschaft* and not on *Bildung:* on the university as a research institute and not on the university as a school for undergraduates. Gradually the universities became identified with science; it became commoner for great scientists to work inside them and not (as in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries) outside them. Today, notwithstanding the importance of such institutions as the Max Planck Gesellschaft in Germany and the Department of Scientific and Industrial Research in Britain, it is the universities which have once again become centres of high intellectual energy in Europe. They are continually in communication with one another, and the busiest channels of communication between them are in science. It is appropriate, therefore, that we should reflect upon the balance-sheet of science in Europe. What damage has science done, and what benefits has science brought, to European civilization ?

Science and invention are commonly charged with two crimes against contemporary Europe: one is the charge that every European now lives in the shadow of a great fear, due to the invention of nuclear weapons; the other charge is that every European now lives

in a cheapened and decadent world, where standards of craftsmanship and taste have been destroyed by mass production and where values have been debased by mass communication. I do not believe that either of these charges should appear on the balance-sheet of science in Europe.

It is indeed true that we live in fear of wholesale destruction and that war must be averted if Europe is to survive. But to live in fear is no new sensation for Europeans. We have always lived in fear. To be killed by an arrow or by plague is no less painful than to be killed by a bomb, and to starve is one of the worst ways to die. The mediaeval peasant walked in continual fear for his life and for the safety of his family. An arbitrary lord, a persecuting cleric, a ruined harvest, an infected rat, robbers, invading armies: any of these might at any time spell the collapse of his personal world. Living for him was as insecure as it is for a wild animal.

Justice now protects us against our superiors, medical science against infection, the welfare state against starvation, the police against robbers. These fears have now been minimized, only to be replaced by one great fear. But let us not assume that we are the first generation to live in fear: we are not. There is of course a great difference between the new fear and the old: the new fear is that death will extinguish not only ourselves and our families but our race and our whole civilization; and that Europe will become a poisoned graveyard, to be cautiously colonized, as radiation diminishes, by so-called primitive people from remote parts of the world. This is fear of a different order of magnitude, but it is a sophisticated difference. It may trouble your dreams and mine: it does not trouble the dreams of the Paris taxi driver or the German miner or the British bus conductor. Take Europe as a whole: fear is no new thing. What science has taken away with one hand she has given with another. It is only the sophisticated who suffer from a sense of doom.

The second charge brought against science and invention is that they have destroyed craftsmanship and cheapened taste, and that through mass production and mass communication Europe has become decadent and vulgar. Craftsmanship is certainly the affair of a smaller proportion of the population than heretofore and taste is shared by a larger proportion of the population; the standards of the *elite* have certainly been smothered. But one has only to glance at the achievements of European science and technology to know that Europe is not decadent or (in the ordinary sense of the

word) vulgar. Gilbert Murray remarked on this some years ago. 'In almost every form of physical competition' (he said) 'we are constantly beating the record. In intellect we are making extraordinary advances; in social studies, care of public health, care of children and old people, treatment of criminals and the like we are making constant improvements.'

Science and invention have not produced decadence, though they have changed standards, and (whatever the intellectuals of Europe may have lost) let us recollect that for the rank and file of Europeans these standards have practically all been improvements. The English labourer (for example) now has antibiotics for his wife at childbirth, free schooling for his children, air mail in three days from his son in Canada, leisure with television and the football pools to fill it, and for his summer holiday cheap trips to Ostend. This is to put improvement in its lowest terms. He can have also—if he wants them—the Halle Orchestra and the Pasquier Trio and the Amadeus Quartet brought to his room, and the great literature of the world in Fischer Bücherei and Penguin Press for the price of a packet of cigarettes. It is (again) only the sophisticated who share a sense of frustration. The cause of their frustration is not far to seek. In the nineteenth century, when people still believed in progress, social reformers and technologists were inspired by a programme: to end slavery, to diminish child mortality, to prevent many diseases, to raise living standards, to establish universal free education, to eliminate drudgery from the factory, to create leisure in the home, to improve communications. Much of this has been achieved. Millions are happier because of these achievements. Only the sophisticated see the irony of it, for despite these achievements they find themselves no longer able to believe in progress.

These considerations lead me to make this point: that we should not measure the impact of science and invention on Europe by the sophisticated standards of university professors. For the common citizen of Europe science and invention have not increased the level of fear nor led to a decay in standards. When we come to draw up a balance-sheet for science in Europe, fear and decadence should not be included on the debit side.

These two items rejected from a balance-sheet of science in Europe are nevertheless examples of the ambivalent effects of science and invention on society. We are all familiar with the way medical science in underdeveloped countries reduces mortality only to

generate famine. Even the humane triumphs of technology may be of dubious benefit to society. Are there similar examples of the ambivalent effects of science and invention in Europe ?

There are. One example is the dubious benefit of improvements in communication. Napoleon's armies crossed the Alps no faster than the Roman legions crossed. Gladstone's voice carried no further than the voice of Pericles. But within a few years of Napoleon's death the cities of Europe were linked by railways, and less than a century after his death an aeroplane had flown across the Atlantic. Within a generation of Gladstone's death the voice of Winston Churchill was heard over the radio by millions of people, and less than a generation later the Prime Minister of the day appeared on some five million television screens in Britain. London and Paris are not only within earshot; the journey from one to the other can be made in less time than the journey from Paris to Versailles took five generations ago.

Europe has contracted to the compass of a church parish. The instruments of communication are incredibly improved, but better communication has not led to closer communion. Europe has none of the cohesion of a church parish. Indeed our very proximity to one another only serves to emphasize our diversity. No Englishman is more stridently English than when he is travelling abroad; and it would be idle to pretend that understanding between the countries of Europe is any closer because they are now linked by air travel and radio and the tours of Thomas Cook. On the contrary, air travel has actually weakened some traditional bonds of understanding. The art of diplomacy, for example, rested in the old days on an ambassador and his staff who resided in a foreign country and who had some insight into the life of its people and the aspirations of its rulers. When these diplomatists negotiated on behalf of their country they were dealing with men they knew personally, in a cultural environment with which they were familiar. Diplomatists today still understand foreign countries and speak foreign languages, but their opportunities to negotiate are sadly restricted. Whenever a critical piece of negotiation has to be done it is the Minister for Foreign Affairs who arrives by air to do it, in a city where he has put down no roots, among people whose temperament he had no opportunity to study. And worst of all (for time is the lubricant for all diplomacy) the airborne Minister for Foreign Affairs cannot allow time for ideas to ripen or hints to mature; in a few hours he

has to fly back to his capital to prepare for another lightning journey to another country. It is little wonder that at the level of international politics countries misunderstand one another. The aeroplane has debased the art of diplomacy and in some ways it has vitiated the cohesion of Europe.

This is only one example of the ambivalent effects of technology on European civilization. A similar story could be told about the effects of mass media. There is much on the credit side. I can sit in my home in Cambridge and listen to a concert from Düsseldorf or a political commentator from Geneva, or I could be taken at my fireside (if I had a television set) on a tour of the antiquities of Greece. Such richness was beyond the dreams of my grandparents. But there is a debit side, too. Newspaper, radio, and television could bring all that is best in European culture and significant in international affairs into the homes of millions of Europeans. But this is not what happens—not in my country at any rate. The newspaper which most Londoners read gives more prominence to a sex crime in Kensington than to the European Common Market. The radio services—those within the provinces of the United Kingdom—are not sensational, but they do emphasize local and parochial activities: Scottish music or Ulster folk-lore or Welsh poetry. Through the popular organs of mass communication the common man is not sufficiently stimulated to look beyond the horizon of his own region. He is constantly reminded that he belongs to London or Scotland: he is rarely reminded that he belongs to Europe. And when national emotions are aroused these instruments for mass communication become weapons for propaganda, exciting hostility and exacerbating national differences. In the hands of dictators they become the most disruptive force in Europe, for they take captive the minds of men and they make possible a terrifying concentration of power. As Aldous Huxley wrote, 'never have so many been manipulated so much by so few'. We have to conclude that the technologies of communication have to be entered on both sides of the balance-sheet for science and technology in Europe.

Let us now turn to the credit side of the balance-sheet. The clear and undisputed benefit which science confers on Europe, and indeed on the whole literate world, is that it deals in universals. By this I mean that the theories held about natural phenomena are independent of latitude and longitude, of race, colour, and religion, of language and politics. There is a common faith in Boyle's Law and

Ohm's Law, whether the believer lives in Moscow or Rome, Paris or Peking. And so when two Europeans talk about science the differences between them become irrelevant. One may be a Communist of Magyar blood: the other may be Nordic and a capitalist. One may be a devout Catholic: the other an unbeliever. When they talk about science they are united by thousands of assumptions which they share in common and by a vast mass of propositions to which they both subscribe. They are united (and this is important) not only by common beliefs in the particular science in which they are both experts, but by a willingness to accept on trust the common beliefs of other scientists in fields outside their own expert knowledge. In brief, they share a common faith in science which is as stabilizing intellectually (though not, of course, in other ways) as the common religion shared by their ancestors five centuries ago. Wherever science is pursued in Europe there you find a centre of cosmopolitanism. The differences between men of different nationalities are minimized: their common understanding of the world of nature is manifested. Science is undoubtedly a force of cohesion among the scientists of Europe.

Moreover the scientists of Europe are obliged to submit to this force of cohesion which binds them to other countries. They must constantly study and take account of scientific work elsewhere, even if it is done by citizens of a country with which they have nothing else in common. A Roman Catholic chemist from Italy cannot disregard the work of a Presbyterian chemist from Scotland, on the grounds that the Scots chemist speaks a different language and worships in a different church. One has only to glance at the bibliographies at the end of research papers to realize the interdependence of the scientific world. Every laboratory in Europe is constantly changing its scientific strategy and modifying its research programme in the light of work going on in other laboratories. The scientists of Europe are united not only by a common faith but by obligations to a common faith. Provided a piece of research fulfils the unwritten rules of evidence for scientific discovery it is accepted and incorporated in the fabric of science, no matter who did the research or what language he spoke or what political opinions he held.

Of course faith in science is faith on a narrow front. You can predict the ethics of a man sincerely dedicated to the Sermon on the Mount or to the *Encheiridion*; you cannot predict the ethics of a man sincerely dedicated to Newton's laws of motion. Nevertheless let us

not underestimate the ethical value of science in international affairs. For centuries Europe was bedevilled by the stifling effects of closed systems of knowledge; they acted as hot-beds for bigotry and persecution and hatred. Since the scientific revolution knowledge has become an open system. Truth is now tentative, not final and revealed. Error is not a rejected alternative to truth, not something evil and to be persecuted. The scientific revolution has produced a 'formula for tolerating error'. This is at least a modest step forward. It has led already to a widespread recognition that both truth and error can be challenged, and when they are, each must submit itself to examination. And it is an integral part of the scientific tradition that this formula does not permit a man to tolerate what he has come to see are errors in his own thinking; it permits him only to tolerate what he believes to be errors in the thinking of his colleagues.

If there is to be cohesion in Europe, nothing is more necessary than a formula for tolerating error. All of us have a childlike propensity for believing that we are right. Englishmen (to take a trivial example) believe it is right that they should continue to use their weights and measures and their preposterous coinage and to drive on the left-hand side of the road, and Finns believe it is right to go on speaking Finnish despite the fact that most foreigners find it too difficult to learn. Over such divergences as these we have learnt tolerance. But we still have to learn tolerance over larger issues and it is here that the scientist's attitude to knowledge is relevant. If scientific knowledge is an open system, surely political knowledge should be an open system, too: a self-evident lesson, but one which European statesmen might profitably repeat to one another.

And so, on the credit side of the balance-sheet for science in Europe we can put, first, a new interdependence which unites the scientific laboratories of Europe as closely as the cathedrals and priories and abbeys of mediaeval Europe were united. Second, we can put a common faith in science which is shared by thousands of Europeans and which could become a foundation from which they explore and understand their differences. Third, the scientific revolution has destroyed what I would dare to call the tyranny of dogmatic truth—truth as our ancestors understood it—and has put in its place a formula for tolerating error in others.

It is no exaggeration, therefore, to say that the scientists and scholars of Europe comprise a coherent group, preserving their national differences but sharing common beliefs and common aspira-

tions. And universities, since they are the chief centres of scholarship in Europe, are united by science into one pan-European community. This is a precious asset in the balance-sheet for science in Europe.

But there is no cause to be complacent about this asset, for at present it is ineffective because it is in the hands of too few people. The hope for Europe depends upon cohesion among whole populations of Europeans, not solely among a handful of university teachers. One of the paradoxes of modern universal education is that the common man today is less in touch with what is best and most significant in European civilization than his ancestors were five centuries ago. Through religion (so mediaeval historians tell us) the civilization of the Middle Ages filtered down to the common man. The common man lived in wretched conditions; he was condemned to the state of life into which he had been born; his liberties were restricted. Nevertheless he received through his church some share of the culture of Europe. The disputations of the schoolmen coloured the sermons from his priest; week by week he heard Palestrina's music; as he knelt at Mass his eyes rested on an altar-piece by Van Eyck. The Universal Church was the source of education as well as of religion; through its influence the remotest villages of Europe were irrigated from the central rivers of learning. In making this contrast between the Middle Ages and our own day I do not mean to infer that there is no popular culture in contemporary Europe. Far from it. But contemporary popular culture exists separately from what the English call highbrow culture. Undoubtedly some cohesion is conferred on millions of Europeans through their common interest in Hollywood movies, jiving, and boxing. But it is not the sort of cohesion which withstands nationalism and racial prejudice. The traditions of science and scholarship have already proved that they can withstand nationalism and racial prejudice. Now if the assets of science are to benefit the balance-sheet of science in Europe, the common man must be helped to understand something of the objectivity, the humility, the tentativeness (if I may coin a word), which characterize a scientist when he is thinking about science. The common man must be helped to understand how—whatever else may divide Europe—European science is indivisible. This understanding—notwithstanding all the popularization of science by television and radio and press—we have so far failed to propagate beyond a narrow circle of well-educated citizens.

In brief, the interpretation of science to the common man is essential

if science is to contribute to the cohesion of Europe, and I venture to suggest that, in my country at any rate, a good deal of the interpretation of science is of the wrong kind for this purpose: so often we do not patiently explain how scientists work, but rather we exhibit, like showmen, the mysteries and marvels of invention and discovery. The marvels of science have good entertainment value and there is no reason why people should not be entertained by science; but this does not contribute to the cohesion of Europe.

The immense prestige of science, especially among those who do not understand what science is about, carries with it a potential danger. The danger is that the scientist may come to be regarded as an initiate in some esoteric cult, a withdrawn and distant priesthood, whose influence on the common people of Europe arises from a superstitious regard for his powers, not upon an understanding of his work. This danger is more likely to appear in Europe than America or Russia, for in European countries we still reserve higher education for a comparatively small proportion of the population. The vast majority of Europeans still depend on radio, television, and the popular press for their understanding of science. These organs of mass communication inevitably appeal to the emotions rather than to the intellect; they evoke wonder, surprise, and fear, rather than understanding. Anyone who has tried to use mass media to interpret science to the layman knows how much more difficult it is to teach than to entertain, and how dangerously easy it is for the scientist to become sacerdotal about his subject. Who (for instance) has ever heard of a television programme explaining how often research *fails* to make discoveries ! It is important to avert a danger inherent in the very prestige of modern science. To fail to do so would be to put an entry in the debit side of the balance-sheet.

If science is to contribute more to the cohesion of Europe its values must be interpreted to the common man. This is an educational problem of great difficulty. Dock workers, miners, bus drivers, textile operatives are not interested in the methodology of science; and if the radio bores them they turn it off. How can such men as these be persuaded that modern science and technology have made them indivisible from their fellow Europeans ! I have no solution to this problem; only two suggestions.

One is a small practical suggestion about the popularization of science. Every experimental scientist recognizes that craftsmanship is important in research. Discovery owes much to the technician.

For example the history of cytology in the nineteenth century is largely the history of microscopes. As soon as craftsmen were able to grind better lenses, biologists were able to discover more about cell structure. In the popularization of science much more could be made of the essential part played by technicians, craftsmen, and instrument-makers. For here is a link between science and the non-scientist. Through emphasis on the element of craftsmanship in science it may be possible to enlist the interest of the man who works with his hands, and to make him feel that he is not just a spectator, but an essential actor, in the modern scientific age.

The second suggestion is that universities should assume a greater responsibility than they have in the past for interpreting science to the common man and should study intensively how to do it. This is an activity which the Russians have tackled more vigorously than we have in the West. The Academy of Sciences of the U.S.S.R. has an institute for the interpretation of science to the public. Some of the techniques used by this institute are very effective: it is astonishing to hear a chauffeur or a postman discussing cosmic rays (for instance) at a level you would not find among similar folk in England or Germany. It would be very encouraging if the universities, which quite properly regard themselves as carrying some responsibility for the cultural cohesion of Europe, were to take steps to ensure that the man-in-the-street should understand, and feel he shares, three things about modern science: first that it is cosmopolitan; second that it is undogmatic; third that the obligatory cohesion which already exists among European scientists and scholars is a nucleus around which political and economic cohesion might grow. This is an age when the universities have a unique opportunity to influence the history of Europe. Since the fourteenth century they have not enjoyed such prestige nor played such a part in the affairs of state. For generations history flowed past them and they made scarcely a ripple on its surface. But in this mid-century the decisions of governments are embarrassingly dependent on scientists and technologists, many of whom are based upon universities. Universities are, for a second time, at the loom of history.

Scholars and scientists and technologists are specks round which international goodwill might crystallize; but neither they nor the universities where they work can alone suffice to restore the fabric of Europe. If that is to be done, goodwill and tolerance must become endemic among millions of average Europeans. Science can help to

spread goodwill and tolerance but faith in science alone will not solve Europe's problems: all it can do is to reinforce an older and deeper faith: the faith of men in mankind.

Is Peaceful Change Possible ?

EARL ATTLEE

'REVOLUTION WITHOUT TEARS.' This was the description given by an intelligent German writer to the period 1945 to 1951 during which I was Prime Minister of Great Britain. I shall endeavour here to give some of the salient features of the changes which took place in my country during those years.

All great wars are forcing houses of change. The way of life of most people receives a severe jolt. Things, they say, are never the same again. Some look back with regret to the old days, others look forward with excitement to the new. This was so after the First World War which marked the end of the old, apparently stable, state of affairs in which I was brought up and against which I had campaigned for many years.

At the end of that war the Conservatives, though led by a radical, Mr Lloyd George, came into power with a majority largely composed, as Lord Keynes said, of hard-faced men who looked as if they had done very well out of the war. They sought as far as possible to go back to the old conditions.

In 1945, on the contrary, a Government came in with a clear idea of what it wanted and a forward-looking outlook resolved on changing what it thought to be evil in the old state of things while carrying forward into a new age what it believed to be good. The Labour majority in the House of Commons was more representative of the whole nation than any of its predecessors. In its ranks were found not only a majority of wage-earners, but many professional men and women, the middle class and even aristocrats. In particular the old universities, Oxford and Cambridge, had in the Labour ranks many young men and women of high intellectual quality. They believed that the social and economic life of the community could and should be planned in such a way as to give to all the citizens the fullest life that the country could afford. The wartime Government led by Mr Churchill, a real coalition of all parties except the negligible Communists and Fascists, had taken a strong line against profiteering

and permitting large fortunes to be made out of the nation's necessity and had organized the country for the life-and-death struggle in which it was engaged far more completely than ever before. It was an object lesson of what could be done, given the will. Britain had been like a besieged city for the survival of which it was necessary to see to it that all the garrison and the citizens were cared for. It was necessary to make private interests subordinate themselves to the needs of the nation and for people to share and share alike. Therefore when Labour came into power, they found many wartime measures which could be utilized by a Government resolved on creating a more just social order and as a means thereto a planned society.

There was first the provision of work for all. This was not difficult in wartime, but between the Wars and even during the Chamberlain regime there had always been unemployment and at times and in certain places very heavy unemployment. Even when the depression of the 'thirties passed away, there was still a big unemployment problem. This was thought to be natural and indeed inevitable.

After every great war fought by Britain in the past there had always been heavy unemployment and acute distress with ex-servicemen vainly looking for work, but from 1945 onwards, apart from the necessary amount due to changing jobs, there was no unemployment problem. The Labour Government took steps to prevent it. Development was planned. Industries were started or brought to areas where they were needed. The nation's manpower was fully utilized.

Except during the Second World War there had always been large sections of the nation underfed. During the War rationing was introduced. Some people who formerly ate too much found their diet cut down, but the masses were better and more wisely fed than ever before. Labour continued this system while it was necessary and saw to it that no one went hungry. Particular care was taken to see that mothers, babies and young children got what they needed. The result can be seen in the greatly improved physique of the nation.

An American lady once asked my colleague Ellen Wilkinson, Minister of Education, 'Where under your Government are the privileged classes ?' Ellen replied, 'In the perambulators.' She was right.

The Lloyd George Government, after the First World War, had a fine educational scheme, but it remained a dead letter. In 1944 a similar scheme was prepared by a Conservative, Mr Butler, and a Labour man, Mr Ede. It was passed into law in 1944 and fully imple-

mented by the Labour Government which believed that all the mental resources of the nation should be fully developed with the result that many more boys and girls today have secondary and university education.

In the years before the War, successive Governments from the great Liberal Government of 1906 had gradually and piecemeal built up an incomplete system of social insurance, dealing with birth and infancy, sickness, industrial accidents, and old age. During the War, Mr Greenwood, a Labour minister, had caused to be prepared a comprehensive plan to provide security for all against these changes and chances of our mortal life. It was accepted by the Churchill Government, but it was not passed into law until the Labour Government came into power. This act laid the foundation of what is called 'the Welfare State'. As part of this the National Health Service was prepared and accepted by the Churchill Government. It was hoped to bring this into force before the end of the War, but a section of the doctors proved difficult. Successive ministers, a Liberal and a Tory, tried to get agreement, but failed. Mr Aneurin Bevan, Labour Minister of Health, was successful. It has proved an immense blessing not least to the black-coated workers and the professional men. Today every sick person can get the best medical and surgical treatment without regard to his means. The cost is mainly borne by state, and hospital treatment is available to all and hospitals have been or are being provided. Thus the fear of being reduced to penury by the illness of one of its members has been removed from every family in the land.

There was an acute housing problem after the War. Thousands of houses, shops, and offices had been destroyed by bombing while many others were worn out and inevitably run down during the War. An immense amount of repair work and rebuilding was done. But the problem of housing is still with us. We described the two great enemies as blitz, the effect of enemy action, and blight, the result of decades of neglect; the latter was the more difficult to deal with. Planning was undertaken. Areas were designated as national parks. A number of completely new towns were created which have proved very successful in relieving congestion. A measure designed to retain for the nation land values created by the community was repealed by the Tories when they came in, to the advantage of speculators and profit mongers.

Agriculture had known only two periods of prosperity for many

years, both during wars, when the need for home production was acute. After World War I agriculture lapsed again into depression. Great efforts had been made during World War II to raise production and to organize the industry. Labour, believing in a fair balance between town and country, continued to support the industry with the result that the countryside continued to be prosperous. Farmer and farm worker, whatever their political views, agree that the greatest Minister of Agriculture ever was Tom Williams, a former mine-worker. A transitional problem, that of bringing back and resettling the millions of servicemen, was effected with no friction, a great contrast to 1919 when there were many near mutinies, while war pensions have on the whole caused very little complaint.

Labour believed that certain parts of the economy should cease to be the subject of private profit and should become services, being basic to industry and the life of the nation. It had formerly seemed as if the bankers had been the masters rather than the servants of the community. Accordingly the Bank of England, formerly a private corporation, was nationalized and with this a degree of control could be exercised over the central banks. There was no opposition. Electricity and gas were already partly in the hands of the municipalities while Conservative legislation had brought generation and main line transmission largely under national ownership. The coal industry had been the subject of much industrial strife and needed organization. Accordingly the industries of fuel and power were nationalized and remain so today. A comprehensive measure was passed dealing with transport which included the nationalization of the railways. Road and rail services were co-ordinated. Unfortunately when the Tories came in, they transferred to private profit-making the paying part of the service, with the result that the railways are bankrupt and the roads overcrowded. Cables and wireless were also taken over. The iron and steel industry was also nationalized, but handed back by the Tories to private enterprise. With these two exceptions Labour's policy has been accepted. In every case compensation, perhaps too generous, was given to the former owners of these enterprises. The Iron and Steel Nationalization Bill led to a clash with the House of Lords but the verdict of the electors in 1950 was accepted and an act was passed curtailing the Lords' power of delay.

Labour took no action to get rid of the undemocratic parts of the Constitution so long as the will of the people was not thwarted. The necessary number of Labour Lords were made and though that

House was overwhelmingly Conservative, it co-operated with the Labour Government in carrying through Labour's legislative programme. Thanks to the wisdom of the Conservative leader, Lord Salisbury, there was no attempt to oppose the decision of the electors. A very different picture from the days of the last Liberal Government when almost all important bills were thrown out.

Despite difficulties over foreign exchange these years showed every year a great increase in industrial productivity. Special steps had been taken to make capital available for small and progressive businesses. During the War profits had been drastically controlled and the burden of taxation had been more fairly distributed. This was continued and the fiscal policy was directed to correcting the graver disparities in the distribution of wealth. The policy aimed at levelling up living standards.

The end of the War found the position of Britain altered. No longer safe behind her moat she was vulnerable to attack from the air. The concept of defence in isolation was obsolete. Labour's policy of collective defence, scoffed at by Chamberlain, was the only realistic policy. Labour based its policy on support for U.N.O. and close relations with the United States. Under threat from Russia Labour initiated N.A.T.O., welcomed the Marshall Plan, and aided the weaker nations. Britain co-operated with the U.S.A. in defeating the Berlin blockade and in repelling aggression in Korea. To support this policy Labour courageously maintained national service in peace time. At the end of the War, with the reconquest of territories seized by Japan, Britain resumed her position as an imperialist power. Already the white dominions, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa, had become free and equal partners in the Commonwealth, but British possessions in Asia, Africa, and elsewhere remained subject to British rule. Advances towards self-government had been made in the Indian subcontinent, in Burma, in Ceylon, and to a lesser extent elsewhere, but the Empire remained. Labour set about the task of transforming the Empire into a Commonwealth. The peoples of India, long restive under British rule, were given freedom to choose their future. They chose to form two States, India and Pakistan. Indian independence was carried through Parliament. So great was the goodwill engendered that the last Viceroy, Earl Mountbatten, became the first Governor-General of India, and when later India decided that she desired to become a Republic, she freely decided on continuing her membership of the Commonwealth. So

too did Pakistan and Ceylon. When Burma decided to leave, her request was freely granted. This unprecedented surrender of power by an imperialist power was effected in such an atmosphere of goodwill that today there are more British in India and more Indians in Britain than ever before. Labour's policy has since been carried on in Africa, Malaya, and elsewhere—another peaceful revolution.

Revolutionary changes in a democratic society, though brought about by the active impulsion of one political party, must, if they are to have any permanence, be generally acceptable and in effect express a change of view in the mental make-up of that society. The peaceful changes .brought about by the Labour Government with certain minor exceptions were accepted by their political opponents who did not try to put the clock back. In fact when Mr Macmillan visited Russia he claimed as two great British achievements the creation of the Welfare State and Indian independence. Though by the vagaries of the electoral system Labour was defeated in 1951, it actually received the biggest popular vote ever cast for a political party in Britain.

There has been a great change in the climate of opinion since pre-War days. The War brought social classes together not only in the fighting services, but at home in a community of suffering. The gulf between rich and poor has been narrowed. Mass poverty has been abolished. The idea of equal or at least more equal shares has been accepted. Mass poverty has gone, but so has a great deal of privilege. The old great house with its retinue of domestic servants has gone. Careers are far more open to ability than ever before. Much Government intervention is accepted as desirable. Even the Conservatives now accept planning by the state as necessary. Unemployment is no longer regarded as a kind of act of God, but its prevention is regarded as a duty by all parties. There are many manifestations of this change of attitude which would have struck an Indian returning to visit Britain having been away since 1940. Class distinctions are not what they were. Even the House of Lords has altered. There are life peers and peeresses and a dozen or more noble lords who come from the ranks of the manual workers.

Because of our British habit of retaining forms while altering their content, this revolution is not always appreciated but it is none the less very real.

The Task of Education

VINOBA BHAVE

IT IS THE TASK of education to make the student self-sufficient in the matter of acquiring knowledge. He must be rendered capable of gaining knowledge both by his own experiments and by using the experience of others. It reflects no credit on the teacher—it is in fact a discredit—that the student should remain in tutelage for twelve or fifteen years. We have a saying in Sanskrit to the effect that 'when a son has attained the age of sixteen he should be treated as a friend'.

We remember how Visvamitra, in the *Ramayana*, came to King Dasarath to ask him for the services of Ramchandra. 'I want Ram and Lakshman to protect my sacrifices,' he said. Dasarath did not want to let Ram go; but notice the reason he found for saying 'no'. 'My beloved Ram is not yet sixteen years old; how then can I send him with you ?' Then Vasishtha explained to him that his son would get from Visvamitra the very best kind of education, and that he was seeking him for the good of his education. I need not pursue the story further. I merely want to illustrate the idea that a boy of sixteen should be capable of acquiring knowledge by his own efforts. By that time he should have learned how to use a dictionary, a grammar, an encyclopaedia, and other reference books, and to read maps, diagrams, and guide-books. He should be able to read standard books in his own tongue and understand them, and he should be capable of learning new languages by his own efforts. He should be able to make his own experiments and so increase his knowledge of the world of Nature. The water beneath the soil has to be dug for; the springs of knowledge too must be dug for by penetrating the secrets of society and of the physical universe.

It is certainly possible to teach children a number of languages in school; but let us make sure that we give them such a mastery of one language that they get an understanding of linguistic principles by which they can learn other languages for themselves. Let us teach them how to teach themselves. The question, 'What shall we

teach our students ?' is asked in the *Upanishads*, and the answer given is that we should teach them 'the Veda of Vedas'. We teach the Vedas, but omit the Bible; we teach the Bible, but omit the Quran; we teach the Quran, but omit the Dhammapada; we teach the Dhammapada, but omit science; we teach science, but omit political economy. Where are we to stop ? No, we have to give them instead the Veda of Vedas, that is to say, the power to study the Vedas, and everything else, for themselves. We have to put into their hands the key to knowledge.

The things we set children to learn are bound to be forgotten, and they are not worth remembering in full. And because we know this, we declare them to have passed if they secure a mere thirty-three per cent of the marks. If someone were to come and ask us for a cook's job saying that he could manage to bake thirty or forty good loaves of bread out of every hundred, but that the rest would be bad, would we employ him ? A boy who gets thirty-three per cent of the marks is sixty-seven per cent a failure, but we have to pass him because we know that he cannot remember all the things we have taught him and so we give him so much latitude, so much margin.

I want the boy's knowledge to be one hundred per cent. He must feel quite sure that a thing is so. If he feels that 'perhaps it is so,' 'very possibly it is so,' that is not knowledge. The man who really knows can face the world with the confidence of a lion. In former times, when the day came for a student to leave his guru's house and go out into society, he was given a *mantra*. It was the token that his education was complete, and with it he entered the world. This is how the *mantra* runs:

> The four quarters of the world lie before me, and I am the Lord of creation. I am the maker, and to this clay I will give what form I please. For this is mindless matter, and I who have mind am able to give form to the mindless.

On the completion of his education a student ought to have that kind of confidence in his own powers. This is what matters, not a supply of miscellaneous information. The purpose of true education should be to train men to get the information which they need for themselves. Education means the attainment of self-sufficiency in learning.

At present education and defence are two separate departments

of the government. But in a non-violent society, education is itself the means of defence, and the better our education the less we need to spend on police and on the army. Whenever we think of education, we think of it as a spending department, and we lament that in a poor country like ours there is very little money to spend on it. True knowledge is a weapon before which all other weapons fail. Education ought to be able to claim that it can protect the country by the power of non-violence. An education which does not possess that power is not the queen but a slave, and would never win her freedom.

Education has, therefore, a social and a national goal as well as an individual goal. The goal of education for the individual is the attainment of self-sufficiency in learning. The goal of education for the nation, for humanity, must be freedom from fear, not only for this or that country, but for the world-wide community of man. It is our duty to think out the ways and means of reaching this goal; this is the greatest task before all of us today. Consider, for example, the immense amount of litigation that goes on. Why should there be so many disputes ? And when disputes do arise, why cannot people meet and settle their differences among themselves ? The reason, so it seems to me, is the dearth of the right kind of education. True education should strengthen the forces of love and peace.

People have got into the habit of thinking of Gandhi's system of Basic Education as if it were one method or system of education among others, like the Montessori Method or the 'Project Method'. But it is not a matter of method or technique; Basic Education stands for a new outlook, a new approach. The fountain-head of all the conflicts in the world is that knowledge has been separated from work. They have been separated in thought by a faulty psychology; they have been separated in life by a faulty sociology; they have been assigned different market values by faulty economics.

One of the basic principles of education, to my mind, is that work and knowledge must never be separated. The man who keeps them apart does not understand what true knowledge is. No real knowledge is to be had without action; there is no such thing as knowledge divorced from action. There is only one exception to this rule, and that is the knowledge of the Self which is divorced from action. It is beyond action. But all other forms of knowledge are linked with action. This is not a question of technique, but of a fundamental psychological principle. People come to me and say: 'If the children

have to work for two or three hours every day, how are they going to learn anything ?' It seems to me an extraordinary question. What we should really be asking is how they are ever going to learn anything if they spend three or four hours a day poring over books. In three hours a boy might read sixty or seventy, perhaps eighty, pages of a book—drink in, as it were, all that ocean of learning—but does he really learn anything ? The muscles of his eyes no doubt get some exercise. We never seem to have any doubt that by reading he is obtaining knowledge, and that reading is in fact the direct road to knowledge. It is nothing of the sort; on the contrary, book-learning is like a curtain that shuts us off from the world of real things. We learn what a mango is, not by reading about it, but by eating one.

There is a book called *The A. B. C. of Bee-keeping*, in which every possible piece of information about bee-keeping is to be found. Having read it, I thought: 'Now we can do something; let us get hold of some bees.' But I did not get them without many days of running hither and thither, and when I had got them, it took me a full two months more to win their confidence. Everything was written in the book, and the book was certainly of some help, but the high road to knowledge is direct action. Reading and study are supplementary to action; they are the accessory tools. It is like saying: 'This man has no spectacles, how can he see ?' The eyes, not the spectacles, are the organs of sight; the spectacles are merely accessories, but if the eyes are weak, the spectacles can certainly assist them. Eyes are primary, spectacles are secondary. Books, like spectacles, are secondary; they are not the most important instrument of knowledge. The fear that children will learn nothing if the time spent on books is reduced is not well founded. It is based on a misunderstanding of the psychological laws. The truth is that work and knowledge go together.

Separation of learning from labour results also in social injustice. Some people are given nothing to do but learn, and others nothing but hard labour; as a result society is split in two. Those who earn their bread by manual labour form one social class, and those who do only intellectual work form another, and the resulting cleavage is a grave social injustice as also economic injustice. Great injustice has been done by rating the value of manual and intellectual work so very differently. This threefold wrong—wrong mental attitudes, social cleavages, discrimination in the rewards of labour—has to be

done away with; and it is this abolition of injustice that must be the goal of our education.

Even if these differences are done away with, that will not by itself bring about a happy society. What, in the last analysis, is the right human way of living ? In my view the more closely we could live in harmony with Nature, the greater would our welfare and happiness be; the more we are cut off from Nature, the less contented we would be. Sarvodaya economics are based on two great principles. One is that the smallest possible percentage of our population should be employed in agriculture, and the largest possible percentage in other productive kinds of work. The second principle is that the life of the whole population should be closely in touch with agriculture. If a single person is cut off from the life of the fields, his life would lack completeness, and to that extent it would not be wholly satisfying. Everyone needs to be in touch with the land, to be rooted in the soil. Human lives are like trees, which cannot live if they are cut off from the soil which nourishes them. Therefore, everyone must have the opportunity to tend the soil; at the same time, the business of agriculture must be carried on so efficiently that the smallest possible number of people are tied entirely to the land. These are the two principles; they may seem to be mutually contradictory, but they are both parts of Sarvodaya. The production of food is only one part of the life of man, and no more time or labour should be spent on it than is absolutely necessary. Real human well-being will be reached only when the greater part of life could be given to the other interests that make up the world of man. At the same time it is a basic need of humanity to be in close touch with the earth, and a nation or civilization which is cut off from agriculture slowly but surely loses its vigour and degenerates.

How much joy, and how much blessing, there is in being able to go out in the open air, among the natural objects of creation ! City-dwellers cannot know this joy, and so they get a flower-pot and put paper flowers in it, and hang pictures of sunrise and sunset on the walls. So artificial has their life become that at night they cannot see the stars. When the German philosopher Kant was asked what were the greatest blessings of life, his reply was: the starry heavens above and the moral law within. How could our cities with all their artificial lighting be blessed with the sight of the starry heavens ? What is left, I sometimes wonder, for these people to burn ? They have burned up even the darkness of night, which was given to man

for peace, and rest, and quiet thought. Wherever one turns there are lights, lights, lights. What greater vandalism could there be ? There is no true joy for the man whose life is cut off from the heavens above and the world of Nature around. This means that the task before education is to change the whole system of values and way of life prevalent in our cities.

The progress of science has brought the whole world face to face with a new problem. Large numbers of children that were born to previous generations died before they were three years old, and this greatly relieved the pressure on the resources of humanity. Now, thanks to science, so many children do not die in infancy; our knowledge of health has increased so that the great majority of them grow up to maturity. In consequence, the world has a population problem, and a very serious one. I suggest that the best solution of this problem is to be found in intimate contact with Nature. When a man lives this natural life he gets so much satisfaction from it, so much real joy, that he has no need for other and artificial pleasures. I say this from my own experience. The reading of sacred books, and the company of saintly men, are certainly a great help towards a life of *brahmacharya* (self-control); but to live a natural life in the open air, and to work bare-bodied in the sunlight, is an even greater help.

No joy is to be compared with this joy of the free life. There is a word in Sanskrit for this boundless joy—the word *sukha*. Everyone desires to have this *sukha*, this well-being and contentment. In Sanskrit the primary meaning of *sukha* is 'the wide and boundless sky'. Happiness is to be found beneath the open sky. It is hard to find it where life is artificial and the sky is cramped. A simple life of harmony with Nature is essential to the true well-being of humanity; it is the task of education to lead the way and to show us how to regain our happiness.

Views on Coexistence and the Conflicts of Our Times

WILLY BRANDT

IN ITS MOST NARROW and certain meaning, coexistence between rival powers or competing social systems is simply the agreement to avoid atomic Armageddon. In this sense it has become established as an essential principle in international relations. Antagonists do have a common interest in preventing any thermonuclear war.

Yet in a more general sense, coexistence expresses the need to limit the forms in which the major conflicts of our time are carried on. Beyond that it has come to be associated with hopes that some conflicts may be brought under control and become canalized into forms of rivalry that are mutually beneficial and not destructive. According to this view, there is a point where coexistence may terminate in positive rather than merely defensive co-operation.

Hence, as a standard helping to govern international relations, the expectations and the calculations associated with coexistence cover a wide span. There is as yet no agreement—nor should one expect there to be—about the extent to which conflicts can be limited or controlled, specially when they are apparently not of a kind that will terminate in atomic warfare. There is even agreement that it is desirable to control all such conflicts.

Since 1945 the struggle between communist and so-called 'western' camps has been the major conflict of our times. That conflict, called the 'cold war', has not granted the world a single year of genuine peace, and it has produced several real wars.

Adherence by communists to the coexistence principle does limit the forms in which the conflict is being waged. But their advocacy of coexistence does not go so far as to suspend the conflict.

The major conflict of our times continues. What, however, is the nature of that conflict ?

About this there are also significant differences of opinion—between Moscow and Peking, but also within the free world. Viewpoints about

the nature of conflict with communist powers are relevant here because they produce corresponding judgments about what coexistence between democratic and communist states can mean.

It is a privilege for me to be able to develop a few thoughts on this subject for a book in honour of Prime Minister Nehru, a man whose life-work has given firmness to mankind's hopes for peace.

I shall distinguish here between five different positions concerning the character of international conflict in our time.

First, we must deal with communist theories about the conflict—and about the term peaceful coexistence as used and popularized by Premier Khrushchev.

Khrushchev's theory of 'peaceful coexistence' still rests upon the assumption that the world is divided into two permanently hostile systems, that the other system, the so-called capitalist one, is inevitably disintegrating, and that communists possess an obligation to push along this 'historical' process. For him coexistence is the recognition of the fact that wars between the two systems are no longer inevitable.

This is a significant limitation. Khrushchev's theory of coexistence has become part of the official foreign policies of most communist parties and states. On the other hand, the view that wars are no longer inevitable between the rival systems does not find universal agreement among communists. Powerful communist groups contest the very idea that a show-down in the form of a great war with capitalism can and must be avoided at all cost. Peking has given the impression not only of expecting to survive an atomic war but of believing that communism would emerge from the cataclysm as a kind of victor.

Perhaps even more relevant is the fact that when communists recognize that wars between the 'systems' are no longer inevitable it does not follow that military conflicts are never considered desirable. Explicitly, the communist view of coexistence still leaves room enough for revolutionary wars or a communist counter-revolutionary intervention. 'Just' wars are legitimate and should be supported by communist states up to the point where they might get out of control.

What must and what can be avoided, Soviet leaders do stress, is 'the most destructive war in history', the total and uncontrollable nuclear war. Beyond this, there is only the inconclusive impression that Soviet leaders may prefer—for strategic reasons—to reduce tensions now in certain areas where there is relatively little danger of a 'conventional' war escalading.

The fact therefore cannot be overlooked that communists justify coexistence to one another as being the presently most advantageous and expedient form of class struggle. While seeking to limit the risks of military conflict, coexistence, in the communist version, was never intended to conclude conflicts on the ideological, political, or economic levels.

If pursued in the Bolshevist manner such a struggle is competitive only up to a point and quite definitely aggressive. Walls are erected against a successful competitor. Experiments in atomic blackmail are undertaken a short distance from American shores and limited military actions are considered appropriate.

The way orthodox communists see it, peaceful coexistence does not imply mutual toleration; it is not coexistence in its proper meaning—not so very peaceful but, on the contrary, militant in that singular Bolshevist sense of the word. When frustrated in an attempt to gain an immediate objective often the communist tactics are to bring about a series of emergencies that may verge on but never exceed the brink of war. Communist states have proven that they are masters of 'brinkism'. They can apply or relax pressure with more sudden agility than the governments of open societies have, as yet, really learned to cope with.

The fact that Khrushchev takes peaceful coexistence seriously does, of course, not mean he is searching for a way to ensure permanent stability. The leaders of the Kremlin have so far refused to remove—and in most cases they refuse even to discuss—the real *causes* of tension. They confine political co-operation to controlling only the most harrowing *effects* of tension.

The important question is whether or not the communists' understanding of coexistence can ever be extended to mean more than what Nikita Khrushchev concedes or Mao Tse-tung desires.

Although the answer to this question will not be found in a theory but rather in practice, the possibility of there really ever being a positive answer will not depend solely on what communists think or even do in the meantime; the outcome will depend also on what is thought and done in the rest of the world.

Partly, the outcome will depend on the clarity of thinking and purpose in the free world—especially in regard to the concept of coexistence.

There is no necessary conflict between states with different social and economic systems. All sorts of social and economic systems exist

within the non-communist world and not one of these systems finds it hard to coexist with any other.

A large part of the non-communist world has already outgrown coexistence. Outgrowing colonialism and the egotism of mere tolerance, former imperialist countries are steadily feeling their way ahead into a new, more fruitful period of international development. Here cultural exchange is truly becoming a mutual advantage; increasingly complex forms of genuine co-operation are being developed; even political associations of states have become possible.

Where relations with communist governments are concerned, the day is past when non-communists thought that the way communists defined property-relations or operated kindergartens are an irreconcilable issue, and a cause of international enmity. A number of communist countries can reckon on economic assistance from 'capitalist' countries. West European and American thinkers find the ideas of independent communist philosophers like George Lukacs and Ernst Bloch, or a Polish communist political scientist like Leszek Kolakowski, stimulating.

The socio-economic institutions and the genuinely creative efforts of our respective 'systems' are simply not an objective cause of international conflicts.

Even worse, contrary to what communist leaders expect, as time goes on, this fact will probably become more and more apparent. All democratic systems have by now developed mixed forms of social and economic organization; the course of their evolution tends, apart from the swings of the pendulum, to strengthen the state's power to guide the economy and to ensure social security.

On the other hand, the economic systems of most communist countries in the Soviet power orbit are moving by reform in a direction where the individual matters more, where production is being geared more effectively to the interests of consumers, and where material incentives now are even being offered to individual peasants.

On this terrain of varying developments there is abundant room for discussion and for competition, but there is no need for a conflict.

However, if we hope to convince communists of that, surely we must cease to be the prisoners of our own deficient and misleading terminologies. In Europe and America, for example, one finds distrust of the word and concept 'coexistence' because it has been popularized by communists and defined so tenuously by Khrushchev himself.

Yet coexistence is not a communist concept, nor is it a Soviet monopoly. The idea is far more consistent with contemporary thought in western countries than with the ruling doctrine of any communist government. It is consistent with the basic democratic principles of human dignity, tolerance, the right of self-determination, and national independence. The broader implications of coexistence are inconsistent with theories of inevitable class warfare, or of inevitable hostility between 'socialist' and 'capitalist' states.

Nevertheless, for years Prime Minister Nehru remained almost the sole democratic statesman who pointed out distinctions of this kind. His having done so was a path-breaking effort; it received a form of affirmation when the late President Kennedy mapped out a new strategy for the era of coexistence that is helping to set us free from imprisonment by a terminology that refers to an 'East-West conflict' which, in a geographic sense, simply does not exist.

Although the free world is not identical with the non-communist part of the world, we do speak of a 'free world' in that misleading sense. We refer to 'the communist camp' as though it is firmly united, or we interpret feuds between communist powers as though they are irreconcilable.

It is self-defeating to refuse to question one's own assumptions. The capacity to do that is one of a free society's major advantages when dealing with a communist antagonist.

A *second* viewpoint about the major conflict of our times is often called 'realistic'.

The international struggle, we are told, is not primarily an issue of communism or democracy but rather the rivalry of two super-powers, behaving according to the dictates of classical power-politics.

There is some truth to this, but the thesis falls short of the problem. Without there having been a Bolshevist revolution, there probably would indeed be power rivalry today between the United States and Russia. Yet, this rivalry would not have taken the strange and restless form with which we have become familiar. In traditional balance-of-power politics, it was the order of things for 'other' powers, those between the poles, to shift their weight quite definitely from one side to the other. It requires a revolution for an Eastern bloc country to do that now; and any determined attempt to shift its weight on the part of a 'free' nation is probably intended primarily to bring about

a different arrangement of forces *within* the non-communist configuration.

In 'normal' power politics, Russia would not seek to aid Cuba because it is communist nor would the U.S. support South Vietnam because it is not. In Eastern European countries national security would not be measured according to the stability of a certain kind of one-party regime. Old-fashioned power-politics might create a Danzig but it takes modern ideologies to divide Korea or produce an absurdity like the Berlin Wall.

It is still a delusion to expect that a Soviet agreement to respect separate spheres of influence constitutes more than a temporarily valid strategy. The idea of different nations making a mutual effort to define each other's legitimate interests and then respecting this understanding leaves most communists cold. 'What's ours is ours and what's yours is negotiable' is still their substitute for stability.

True, the trend away from bipolarity and toward a greater diffusion of power does give the impression of restoring traditional balance-of-power standards. However, there are several reasons for doubting that this will really happen.

The conflict of our times is still a struggle for world hegemony. That has become less apparent in action taken by the Kremlin but it has become more apparent than ever in what Peking says. Communist efforts at world domination have been precipitated largely by ideology. Hence ideas have become major weapons. This is what makes it so difficult to agree upon terms for coexisting—and even to arrive at formal agreements to limit armament.

Finally, today there are powerful pressures leading towards supra-national forms of organization that have less and less to do with international communist developments or with the need for a common defence against communist power. These other forces—though for European integration, regional consolidation in Africa and the Near East, new forms of co-operation in the Americas, the offer of Atlantic partnership and free-world co-operation—have already set limits to the diffusion of power that is at present taking place. Counter-processes like these are, in one form or another, apt to play a role more decisive than nationalism or anything else seeking to restore a more or less autonomous balance-of-power system.

However, before considering these processes it is worth while to consider critically a *third* interpretation of the nature of the

conflict with communism—the view that ideology plays *the* decisive role.

It is, I think, a fact that the peculiar character of the conflict does derive from the fact that Russia and China are ruled by ideological parties which justify themselves by faith in a mission that is unlimited in space and time. That mission, the achievement of world communism, has at its disposal a system of principles and a folklore that can win converts and make 'true believers' feel that truth is their hostage. Bolshevist ideological training produces collective political *elites* with a discipline and sense of commitment that has not found its equal in modern history.

Because the communist goal is unlimited, its conflict with the so-called 'capitalist' rest of the world is irreconcilable. Thus, if this ideology, unrevised, is to have the last word, short of communist parties losing control in Russia and China, the conflict must continue until the entire world is communist. The only alternative would seem to be that the ruling parties cease to believe in their goal and, at the same time, also manage to free themselves from compulsions to pursue their mission.

Such compulsions are not just products of pure ideology; they also emanate from the extent to which party government in Russia, for example, and Russian power in the world have been, or must be, maintained on the basis of a revolutionary faith.

Desirable change therefore depends not only on the capacity of communists to adjust their ideology to reality but also on their ability to dispense with ideological criteria as well in their international behaviour.

That is asking a great deal, but I am inclined to believe that the modification of communism's zeal is within the realm of possibility. If this is true, their aggressive theory can be modified in time as well.

The critics of any coexistence 'offer' by communists frequently point out parallels between communism and 'national socialism'. In both cases we are dealing with totalitarian regimes. But it is misleading, even hazardous, to refuse to see where they differ. The Nazis rested all their hopes on conquering Europe, now or never, with one decisive sweep. By contrast, Soviet leaders do not believe they have to conquer Europe or the world with a single stroke. History, they believe, is with them all the way; and they have learned that nothing is gained and much may be lost by staking everything on a single card.

Therefore, communism's dangerous ideological commitment does leave more room for putting on the brakes of common sense.

Concretely, the communist preference for non-military methods of conflict derives from this and is nothing new. Lenin and Stalin, each in his time, sought to avoid becoming engaged in major wars. When they stridently proclaimed the theory that war was inevitable in the 'imperialist epoch', their practice was never based on the assumption that their own Soviet participation in the inevitable war was also inevitable. On the contrary, the theoretical expectation that they emphasized most of all was 'the war *between* capitalist powers'. Their paramount objective was to ensure the survival of the Soviet Union as an island 'encircled' by capitalism. Thus Lenin and Stalin sought to stave off the formation of an expected world-wide anti-Soviet coalition (which never did materialize) by adding fuel to the fires of conflict between non-communist countries. Even in former times Soviet leaders hoped that the 'fatherland of socialism' would remain unimpaired, with its continuous growth assured.

Such manoeuvring was at the bottom of the Soviet conception of coexistence in former times. The role played by 'peaceful coexistence' in contemporary communist thinking is quite different and far more important. It is no longer merely a tactic. It has been elevated to the realm of grand strategy and has become part and parcel of the routine doctrine that a man like Nikita Khrushchev wants every good communist to believe.

As such coexistence is both propaganda and conviction. In both respects it is a two-pronged weapon. Not only do communist leaders seek to banish the threat of thermonuclear destruction, they also have made 'peaceful coexistence' a strategic weapon, designed to paralyse and, finally, to conquer the non-communist world with every means that can be marshalled for the purpose, short of risking a major war.

Thus the role of ideology does explain the peculiar character of the communist struggle. The doctrinaire principles adhered to by communist leaders do influence their behaviour. That is one side of the picture.

Yet there is another side. These principles can also be altered in the interest of Soviet power as well as of Soviet society.

It is a fact that Khrushchev has begun to re-examine Bolshevist doctrines: the belief that warlike conflicts are inevitable between capitalism and communism, the promise that the Western 'capitalist

system' is for ever falling apart. Efforts are being made to comprehend —without repudiating too much of the 'true faith'—why Europe grows stronger and more unified instead.

In the domestic realm doctrinaire standards are also being revised. People within the Soviet orbit become ever more vocal and more urgent about demanding their rights. A modern industrial society, whether founded on democratic principles or not, is incompatible with a regime of *total* suppression; it creates conditions, social mobility and economic opportunities, which encourage a certain amount of freedom for the individual. Bigness and heterogeneity provide a protective cover for anonymity and the chance for a more private life. Soviet industrial society is also unable to evade such pressures.

Finally, although ideological commitment and faith in the unlimited goal still do motivate policy and determine the methods employed by Khrushchev and his followers, one thing does seem certain: the chances to realize more genuine coexistence perspectives in one's relations with the Soviet Union—and also with Red China—will depend on the interests of these states and not on the theoretical principles of their power.

Nevertheless, it would not be realistic or helpful for us to call for an ideological coexistence which Khrushchev does not want and which we ourselves could only desire in a very limited sense. What can and should be done is to encourage circumstances in which ideology no longer plays the dominant role.

It is not only crude Marxism but a poor kind of pragmatic scepticism to label as 'ideology' anything unpleasant that people believe in, in order to argue yourself that such beliefs are only a facade behind which the genuine, common interest supposedly lies.

However, this can also be said with well-meaning and naive intentions.

A *fourth* approach to the question, 'what is the nature of the conflict ?' simply stresses one fact: that there is an over-all historical trend pressing both systems in the same direction.

Once more, there is a great deal of truth to it. But when this insight is stressed to the exclusion of everything else it ends in a well-meaning but futile plea for ideological disarmament. It is far from justifiable to build policy upon a future possibility.

The non-communist viewpoints discussed thus far are all revealing, but without consideration of the other insights each remains of questionable usefulness.

The standpoints dealt with thus far all fix their attention on to the problem of communism.

There is a *fifth* view that goes further. It warns: the conflicts of the age are in the process of being altered—and some imagine also diminished—by other historical developments. There is, for example, the attrition of bipolar power-concentration between Moscow and Washington due to diffusion of power elsewhere in the world; there is the population explosion, the rise of the advancing nations, the process of automation in industries, evidence of differentiation in the communist bloc, the process of West European integration, the prospect that, before long, many nations can produce their own atomic weapons. All these things give firm substance to the perspective of fundamental revolutionary processes that are too large and new either for communists to comprehend or for us to grasp so long as we insist upon seeing communism as 'the' sole issue.

While communism must not cease to be considered a world-power or an international threat, this insight does call upon free countries to develop new standards by which to measure their global responsibilities. It was the late President Kennedy who said that the great currents of history are carrying the world away from the monolithic idea towards pluralistic perspectives. I believe this trend has opened the door for tendencies that are truly incalculable. Diffusion of power could make coexistence easier in various ways, but in others it will also make coexistence more difficult. We are concerned here with an extremely serious change; its dynamics are revolutionary; they can also be dangerous.

It is probably too simple to expect that the energies being released by independence, after colonialism, can be contained and settled in a multitude of independent nationalisms. New power vacuums are being created as well as new power centres on every continent.

There are areas so burdened by tradition that any accomplishment seems to require a revolution, and there are tribal societies being pulverized so rapidly that the chaos that follows offers political opportunities to any demagogue. Being tried severely by the times are traditional value systems which might, if they pass the test, help to create a marvellous new pattern of co-operative social and economic organization; on the other hand, new creeds have been created by 'living Gods' that can lead right back to bondage.

It is, of course, possible to support coexistence only to a degree set by its certain origin. Yet, if the starting point, prevention of atomic

war, is also to be the end of the concept's development, it will serve no purpose in spheres other than those which benefit inertia and seek to freeze the *status quo*.

In so revolutionary an age efforts of that kind seem self-deluding. Evidence that coexistence works (producing an agreement banning atomic tests nine months after the Cuba showdown) immediately lent momentum to developments in other spheres.

In such an open situation it is extremely important, I think, that the Atlantic Community and the free part of Europe develop structures that can overspan the blocs and permeate them.

It is our business to demonstrate that coexistence cannot work as the vehicle of an 'international class struggle', and to insist that it can only become a firm guardian of the peace if it promotes interdependence. In the democratic view, coexistence is required before one can really begin to solve the other urgent problems and conflicts that beset a world in which the industrial revolution has now become a world-wide process and where developing countries must be integrated as partners on equal terms into the society of nations. It is our business to promote a world order in which communities can be established that are broader than a single region and with standards that are tolerant enough to shelter more than a single set of beliefs. Otherwise we will be confronted either by greedy mergers between those countries which are more fortunate, or by hungry mergers between unfortunate countries.

If the long-term goal of free government is to keep the historical process open and creative, an encouragement for free individuals and for the growth of free communities, then this cannot be achieved in isolation, alone at home. It requires a clean break with *laissez-faire* diplomacy.

The elemental social and technological transformations of our times must be canalized for freedom's sake. That will mean working out guide-lines for international partnership; it calls for a high level of international fiscal planning. We shall have to develop standards by which we can enforce international restraints. We must intervene in the historical process.

During every new decade of our lives we are called upon to adjust ourselves to more radical changes than mankind formerly experienced in hundreds of years. How much has occurred in this new age since the day that India, under Prime Minister Nehru, regained sovereign independence !

The technical and social revolutions are the really decisive factors for the future progress of mankind. But the technological progress which opens unimagined new views before us also confronts us with unaccustomed perils.

If we all hope to grow with liberty and each preserve his moral heritage, we simply have no choice other than to become revolutionaries in the sense that is called for by democratic values and required by the age. For we will never master with recourse to old formulas or patent remedies the social problems which inevitably result from technological changes as great as we must expect. It will no longer be possible for us to concern ourselves with such matters as if they only were domestic problems; the uncertain future of this interdependent world compels us to make certain that all mankind can benefit from the technological accomplishments of the age.

'East' and 'West'

NORMAN COUSINS

ABOUT A CENTURY AGO, the sheer weight of facts being amassed in the sciences particularly, and in the world of scholarship generally, caused some of our best minds to attempt to subdivide all knowledge into 'fields'. This development, healthy though it was in many ways, has not been without unforeseen and often unhappy results. The scholars of man's past, for instance, now tend to concentrate on intensive studies of decades or single years in the history of one country.

This trend should, of course, have been counterbalanced all along by a determined effort to retain our old sense of the general shape of history, to the extent that this was still practicable. Instead, in the present era of atomic power, cybernetics, and instantaneous global communication, our scholars are still chopping periods, peoples, and nations up into mutually exclusive entities.

In making these strong statements, I have particularly in mind those thinkers and writers who perform a disservice to the human community by placing peoples and civilizations in two big bundles neatly marked 'East' and 'West'. Having created these rigid entities, they proceed to exalt one at the expense of the other. For example, scholars in Europe and the Americas who should know better, who should understand the implications of a superiority complex in the modern world, talk and write about the 'destiny of Western civilization' or the 'mission of Western man' or the 'prospects of Western civilization' or the 'survival of Western values'. Scarcely a month passes that an article or a book does not appear with Western man as the central and awesome figure of modern history.

What do these philosophers and scholars mean when they talk about the 'West' or about 'Western' man ? What is it that makes him different from 'Eastern' man ? Is it philosophy or literature or political science or a common yardstick of values ? Is it Christianity that defines the oneness of the West ? Is there a magic biological fluid that circulates through his body, creating a natural kinship between Europeans and North Americans and South Americans ?

First, let us consider the origin and distribution of the species. A not uncommon error here is to confuse anthropology with philosophy. 'Western' man is Greek and Roman, but he is also German and Scandinavian and English and Portuguese and Spanish and Polish and Russian and much more. If you go back far enough, there is a common stock, of course, but by going back just a little farther you can also include the people of Asia and Africa. Does living in Europe endow a person with a special chemical attraction for anyone who lives in the Americas ? And what part of the Americas are you talking about ? Canada ? Puerto Rico ? The United States ? Argentina ?

Is there a biological oneness felt between Germans and French that either party cannot possibly feel for, say, the Egyptians ? And how would you classify a substantial part of the Mexican population, with Spanish and Negro and Indian blood flowing together ? Are North American Indians to be considered East or West ? They are authentic Americans; in fact, they once owned the place, but the anthropologists relate them to Eastern races. When we talk about the destiny of Western man, then, do we include the Indians of North and South America ?

Or perhaps we are thinking of our political heritage. Classical Greece, in particular. True, Greece was the vital ground in which the political roots of democratic government were planted. It was here that the operation of society became a political science. The concept of constitutional government, separation of powers, limitation of tenure, direct responsibility of office holders to the people, rights and duties of citizens—in all these respects Greece made a towering contribution to history. When we add to this the Roman science of laws, we have a legacy that is deeply felt, deeply valued, deeply expressed—and rightly so.

Yet even this is not enough to tie the West together and enable us to talk of Western man as a recognizable and complete democratic entity. The history of the West shows far longer periods of monarchy, autocracy, oligarchy, and totalitarianism than it does periods of democratic government. It may be argued that the true lessons of Greece did not begin to be learned for two thousand years; yet even if we confine our scope to recent history we can see that the principal threats to democratic institutions have come from within the West itself. Nazism and Communism, with their nihilism and authoritarianism, their iron heels and their iron curtains, are prime disorders

within the body of the West. When we think of the citizen as a mighty source of freedom, are we thinking of the individual German under Hitler or the Argentinian under Peron ? The fact is that there is neither a political compact in the West nor even a general grouping around commonly accepted values.

If the case for the uniqueness of Western man moves from the political to the intellectual, here again we can pay our debt to the Greek teachers, philosophers, historians, and theoreticians. And we can pay an even greater debt to their disciplined rational intelligence than we do to the actual results of those intellectual labours. If more attention had been paid to Aristotle as an example of the creative thinker rather than as the sovereign monarch of all knowledge, perhaps there would have been less intellectual stagnation after the fall of Rome. As for Plato, it should also be recorded that many of his ideas on the perfection of man were to become distorted by numberless self-appointed Platonists, and that some of these ideas were to be used against man himself. The fact that versions of neo-Platonism played into the hands of advocates of a master race and brutalitarians is not to be held against Plato, of course, but it at least indicates that there is no firm agreement in the West about what he tried to say or about the practical application of his thought.

Long before Plato, ideas on the need for perfection in man and his institutions were being voiced and heard in Asia—especially in China, India, and Persia. The moral code of Zoroaster, aiming at the triumph of virtue not only over the material world but over the spiritual world as well, actually helped to fertilize Greek thought. Confucianism is almost synonymous with individual virtue and applied ethics, and has influenced far more people in the East than have been influenced by affirmative Platonism in the West. Similarly, it is doubtful whether the logic of Aristotle has made a more profound impact on any nation than it has upon Persia, possibly not excluding Greece itself.

The only generalization worth making about East and West is that there is far more cross-fertilization of ideas than has been generally acknowledged. A few Western scholars, such as Gilbert Chinnard, H. G. Creel, John Dewey, Lewis Mumford, George Sarton, Charles Farnsley, Horace Kallen, Irwin Edman, Jacques Barzun, Arnold Rowbotham, Bertrand Russell, Ralph Turner, and F. S. C. Northrop, have been concerned with the cross-currents and cross-penetration of ideas that have been associated with geographic East and West.

But too little of this has percolated through to the general body of our knowledge of scholarship.

More ought to be said about the mission of the Jesuits to China in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, and the impact upon them of Confucianism. They were accused in Europe of having been converted themselves. The favourable accounts of Confucianism they sent back made an important contribution to the development of the French ideas of equality. The Jesuit Le Compte was especially impressed by the absence among the Chinese of hereditary nobility and the absence of caste or other distinctions. The Physiocrat School, so important in the making of the French Revolution, formally acknowledged its great debt to Confucianism, as interpreted by the Jesuits. In turn, Benjamin Franklin and Jefferson acknowledged their debt to the Physiocrats.

It is unimportant whether such influences were primary or secondary. What is important is that neither East nor West held any monopoly, as Jefferson himself pointed out, on the concept of equality. It is interesting, too, to observe the basic similarity in the thinking of Jefferson and Confucius, especially in their concern for the farmer, their cordial disdain for mysticism, their belief in the natural rights of man, their strictures against authoritarianism, their emphasis upon education as a proper function of government, their belief in the full development of the individual's potential, and their unending search for public and private virtue.

Those who are accustomed to making pronouncements about the 'mission of Western man' or the 'destiny of Western man' will claim that we have so far slighted one fact of mountainous importance: Christianity. Isn't Christian civilization, they will ask, synonymous with Western man ? Isn't this what gives Western man the right to think of himself as different and special ?

The main trouble with this line of questioning, of course, is that it assumes that Christianity itself is an entity. Is there general agreement about the meaning of Christ and the teachings of Christ in the West ? Is there common acceptance of the same articles of faith ? Indeed, are not Christians divided by their beliefs into numberless and occasionally opposing denominations ? In a certain sense this is inevitable. So long as men will be confronted with new problems, so long as they have the capacity for creative interpretation, so long as they can exercise the right of free choice, they will be unable to

devise and stay within any single institution or credo. This is natural and right. There is strength in such diversity. But this strength is misapplied if it tries to segregate or compartmentalize humanity into Christians and non-Christians, Eastern and Western man, or make something unique of one man as against another. The province of Christianity is not the ennoblement of Western civilization but the ennoblement of man.

The greatest paradox of all, however, is that the truest expression of Christianity today is to be found, not in the West, but in the East. In India countless millions of people are living out the ideals of Christ, though they do not call themselves Christians and are unfamiliar with Christian theology. They are the poor and the meek and the merciful and the pure in heart. They regard life as sacred and will not harm it in any of its forms. They practise renunciation. They believe in non-violence and they worship the memory of a human being who perhaps has come closer to enacting Christianity than anyone else in modern history. Interestingly enough, Gandhi's struggle was directed against a Western Christian nation.

Are we to overlook the basic unity of most religions ? The code of Hammurabi, the Koran, the Talmud, the Analects, and the Bhagavad-Gita have many of the same fundamental tenets defined in the Sermon on the Mount. What we call the Golden Rule has its parallel expression in almost all other religions. The Islamic faith is as closely related to the Hebrew and the Christian faith as the latter two are to each other. It is astonishing to find how little is known about the Islamic religion in otherwise well educated circles in Europe and the Americas. The extent to which the Mohammedan belief incorporates many of the fundamentals of Hebraism and Christianity is overlooked in the frequent references of many Western thinkers to 'Judeo-Christian' traditions or civilization. This is properly regarded by the peoples of the Near East as another example of our philosophical and theological provincialism.

'When will the West understand, or try to understand, the East ?' asked the Japanese philosopher, Okakura-Kakuze, more than fifty years ago. 'We Asiatics are often appalled by the curious web of facts and fancies which has been woven concerning us. We are pictured as living on the perfume of lotus, if not on mice and cockroaches. It is either impotent fanaticism or else abject voluptuousness. Indian spirituality has been derided as ignorance, Chinese sobriety as stupidity, Japanese patriotism as the result of fatalism. It has

been said that we are less sensible to pain and wounds on account of the callousness of our nervous organization.'

The East, of course, is no more a political or cultural or anthropological entity than is the West, although those who talk with such careless ease about Western man generally juxtapose him against Eastern man. What common centre fuses an Afghanistan Muslim with a Filipino Catholic ? Or a Ceylonese Buddhist with a Chinese Taoist ? The religious Hindu is as appalled by the paganism of some of his Chinese neighbours as are the Episcopalians by Jehovah's Witnesses. Conversely, some Chinese are as baffled by Indian mysticism and Theosophy as many of us are, though it must be recorded that Theosophy is a product of the West. And the biggest ideological threat in Asia today, Communism, is not an Eastern idea but a Western one. What all this adds up to is not an Eastern entity but a vast complex inside a complex, with no single unifying thread.

The Asians—one and one-half billion of them—happen to share a continent which is a formal geographic unit only by human designation and not by divine insistence. To make grooved and rutted generalizations about these people is to commit a sin against good scholarship and the human community at a time when a vast expansion is needed in man's awareness and comprehension of man.

It is astonishing to see how often university conferences in Europe and the Americas on the problems of philosophy or politics in the modern world will allow stock references to Asian peoples and cultures to go unchallenged. One hears about the 'disdain for action' or about 'lack of systematic thought' or about the 'Oriental love of vagueness' or about the 'Eastern mentality' or about 'typical Eastern mysticism' or about the 'propensity for negation'.

What is most unfortunate about these remarks is not so much the polite arrogance which assumes that failure of communication is necessarily the fault of the next fellow, but the unscholarly technique of placing 'Eastern' philosophers inside a single academic enclosure. Anyone who has attended a philosophical meeting, whether in Japan or China or Indo-China or India or Pakistan or Turkey, is able to bear witness to the same spread of ideas and approaches, the same display of argumentation over ends and means, the same contrasts of soaring thoughts and plodding trivia which enliven similar meetings in Paris, London, or New York. Imagine, then, a meeting of Filipinos, Japanese, Chinese, Indians, and Pakistanis being characterized as though the ideas of only a single philosopher were being examined.

It must also be said that the East has its own provincial philosophers and scholars who lack an adequate background for an understanding of Europe and the Americas and who make the error of dealing in stereotypes and non-existent entities in writing about the 'iniquitous and materialistic West'. Even when they are friendly, they excuse our 'rashness' and 'impulsiveness' because of our youth. We are 'precocious', 'mechanistic', 'frivolous', 'irresponsible', 'ambitious', lacking in 'perspective', 'wisdom', 'insight'. As yet, however, Asian scholars have not proclaimed any missions for Eastern man, nor have they endowed him with a special claim on human destiny.

What an Eastern philosophical conference has most in common with a Western philosophical meeting, perhaps, is an apparent disposition to invest geographical entities with fixed cultural, ideological, or philosophical components. Thus it is not unusual to hear Western philosophy criticized as lacking in sufficient appreciation of the 'vital intangibles' or 'elusive but central values'. Along with this is the criticism of 'Western thought' as being overly concerned with systems and techniques and not enough with the domain beyond man's limited intelligence. This criticism, of course, is merely the Asian manifestation of a philosophical provincialism which is not centred in or confined to any single area.

So far as the overriding needs and purposes of man today are concerned, it is irrelevant to attempt to determine which set of stereotypes came first or which is more unscholarly or unfair—that of the West against the East or *vice versa*. What is important is that a major effort be made by all concerned to get away from the entity complex. It would be well, perhaps, if the world of scholarship would enter into a sort of compact on specificity. It should be made clear whether when we use the term 'East' we are thinking of everything from the Bosporus Straits to the Bering Sea, or whether we have a specific area or culture in mind. Proper distinctions should be made between Japan and China and India and Pakistan and Indonesia and Siberia and Iran and Syria and Israel. Similarly, when Asian scholars comment on Europe and the Americas it would be helpful to know whether they are thinking primarily of the Balkans or Scandinavia or South America or France or Canada or whatever.

Something else we can do is to liberate ourselves from some of the harmful misconceptions that are so much excess baggage. Consider, for example, the frequent remark mentioned above, that the East has a 'disdain for action'. It is said that it is virtually impos-

sible for Asians to get beyond opinions and into operations. Thus we have heard about Chinese lethargy, Indian passivity, Balinese serenity, and so forth. In the light of recent and current history, that picture can stand some revision. The Civil War in China, stretching over fifteen years, was conspicuous for its lack of lethargy on all sides. Indeed, the missing ingredient appears to have been, not action, but thought. Japanese aggression in concert with the Axis only a few years ago was sharply in contrast to the prevailing conception of an Oriental nation as lacking in drive or dynamics. It is worth noting, incidentally, that industrialization, militarization, mobilization, aggression, and colonization—all of which dominated Japanese life for perhaps a quarter of a century—had previously reached advanced development in the West. So far as India is concerned, the widespread outside impression of an almost universal passivity or impassiveness must be modified in the light of observable facts of life in India for at least fifty years. Passive resistance and non-co-operation were the most vital parts of a real *action* programme. After independence, intense political activity on the extremes of both left and right, activity from which Indian men of learning and letters sought no immunity or exemption, made India one of the least passive places on the face of the globe. Bali, too, more closely resembles a hotbed of Balkan intrigue than it does the glamorous, languorous land of Covarrubias's sketches.

As for the complaint of 'Oriental vagueness', I have searched my memory but I can recall nothing more tangible or more vividly conveyed than the needs and hopes of Asian peoples I was able to meet. Most memorable of all was the emphatic detail with which they documented their desire to maintain their freedom and self-respect, and their deep resentment at being regarded as inferior beings fit only for servants or subjects. Exclusion acts and humiliation by legislation leave them with no vague reaction. If anything, the response is severely normal—almost to the point of being terrifying. True, some Asian writers and philosophers may have cultivated vagueness for vagueness' sake, but it ought not to be difficult to draw up a list of Western writers and philosophers who have some fairly well developed abilities in that direction themselves.

Then, of course, there is the matter of the 'mystical, mysterious, spiritualistic, and occult East'. This is becoming more and more of a travel-poster slogan for tourists and less and less a description with any substance behind it. The most populous nation in Asia has had

more disdain for the popular conception of mysticism and the occult than perhaps any country in the world. The intensely practical and down-to-earth philosophy-religion of Confucius and Lao-tzu has little scope for higher metaphysics.

Is there nothing, then, that distinguishes the peoples of Asian countries from the peoples of Europe and America? Such differences as exist cannot be separated into two large spatial bundles conveniently tagged 'East' and 'West'. Many of the distinctions are national rather than continental, and even here it is important to take into account whatever pluralism may exist inside the nations themselves. In addition to the pluralisms are the paradoxes. Indeed, not until the paradoxes are located and defined does the essential nature of a culture begin to reveal itself. The finest observers, historians and anthropologists, have all been paradox-hunters. Hunting and comprehending paradoxes, moreover, is infinitely more challenging and rewarding than the pursuit of incredible entities.

We may live in the two worlds of 'East' and 'West', but we have only one planet to do it in. As L. L. Whyte has written in *The Next Development in Man*, the 'separation of East and West is over, and a new history opens rich in quality and majestic in scale'.

Development Planning in Principle and Practice[1]

JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH

NOT LONG AFTER WORLD WAR II, on a mountain-top in Switzerland, a group of somewhat aging and wholly perturbed scholars gathered to survey the scene and consider what should be done about all of the talk of planning and postwar planning then so much in vogue. Many stories have been told of that gathering, most of them no doubt apocryphal. One is of a bitter debate over whether to take a stand, as a matter of principle, against the public ownership of naval vessels. On this, some of the most spirited opponents of planning were inclined to compromise. But the purists are held to have insisted that naval defence should be supplied by private enterprise through competitive bidding.

Whether this discussion took place or not, it should have, for it contains all of the outstanding characteristics of the debate over planning: the tendency to see it as a religious issue, as a test of faith rather than as a practical question of public policy; the tendency to see a conflict between the market and planning, although prices can be a very useful instrument of the planner; and the tendency, above all, to identify public ownership and planning. All of this has been a source of great confusion and, as a result of this and the curious tendency for all discussions of the subject to attract those who say the most and know the least, most people, on encountering the word 'planning', decide to read no further. In general they are well advised.

Planning by national communities consists, first, in establishing

[1] A preliminary version of this paper was given as a lecture while I was serving as Ambassador in India and subsequently published in a small pamphlet called *Economic Development in Perspective* by the United States Information Service. I was not fully satisfied with the argument and subsequently made extensive revisions which this version reflects. I am publishing this new version in a volume called *Economic Development* (Harvard University Press and Houghton Mifflin Company, Boston, 1964) and, needless to say, I am grateful for this opportunity to put it before the readers of this volume.

selected objectives or goals and, second, in devising a method or design for reaching them. In the last century, the emerging industrial communities of Europe and North America accepted pretty much whatever fortune the miracle of economic progress brought them. We can agree that they did no planning, although it could be argued that, in the early years of the American republic, Alexander Hamilton's Report on Manufactures was the forerunner of the modern plan. In modern times, however, all advanced national communities have established fairly firm goals for themselves in matters of economic policy and have devised measures of greater or less efficiency for seeking to reach these goals. All can thus be said to plan. The United States holds before itself the need to keep unemployment below a certain maximum and to sustain a certain level of accomplishment, in relation to that of Soviets, in defence and space exploration. It is also disposed to set itself a certain percentage rate of growth of Gross National Product, but there has never been agreement on what it should be, and only economists remember the current rate. As the United States sets as its goals, in many matters, keeping ahead of the Soviet Union, so the Soviet Union sets as its goals catching up with the United States. In this aspect of planning, there is an excellent reciprocal relationship between the two countries. Each makes it impossible for the other to succeed too easily.

The difference between modern national communities is not in having a plan, but in the degree to which the existence of the plan is avowed, in the formality with which the goals are spelled out, and in the particular techniques used to achieve the goals of the plan. The United States, being officially an unplanned economy, does not avow its planning. It also uses techniques appropriate to its particular stage of development. India, Pakistan, Ceylon, are less reticent. And the techniques are the rather different ones that serve a much less advanced stage of development.

I elsewhere discuss the planning goal of the less developed country;[2] it is the improvement of the well-being of the typical or model person. This goal is the counterpart of the poverty of the poor and it is not only central but total. Rich countries have the luxury of a choice of goals; poor countries do not. My concern now is not with the goals of planning but with the techniques for achieving them. Here we encounter two closely interrelated and much debated questions: first, the extent of state initiative, as opposed to market

[2] In *Economic Development.*

incentive, that is required for reaching planning goals; and, second, the extent to which state initiative requires public ownership of productive facilities.

On one area of state initiative, there is general agreement. Where something must be brought into existence which cannot readily be bought or sold and which is deemed so important that it ought to be available to everyone, then a direct action by the state is necessary. Such, for example, is the case of education or the provision of roads or the prevention of disease.

There is implicit but not explicit agreement on another field. When, to go a little distance for a phrase, a great leap forward is necessary, there is no alternative to a state initiative. For the development of atomic energy in the advanced countries, there was no alternative to government action. Similarly with space exploration. The initial passages to the moon will cost some tens of billions of dollars. This will almost certainly discourage the average tourist and prevent the business from soon being placed on a paying basis. Accordingly, apart from the hideous possibility of remaining at home, there is no alternative to government-sponsored moon travel. The old-fashioned subsonic jet passenger transport would not have existed except as a by-product of government-sponsored military development. The development of supersonic transport has had to wait on government initiative. One rewarding result of these necessities has been the discovery of how much government initiative is welcomed in a capitalist economy once it is discovered that capitalism cannot do the job.

Where, however, no great leap is involved, there is a choice between having the initiative with central authority or leaving it to the market. In the United States the government on at least one occasion intervened to increase steel output. Rather more frequently, it has obtained more by leaving it to the market. Wheat production in the United States can be reduced—the problem of increasing output has long been academic—either by applying rigid controls or by allowing prices to fall in a sufficiently painful degree.

There is also some choice between whether the operating units in areas of state initiative—the organizations which provide roads and schools, the firms which organize the production of steel, atomic power, or supersonic aircraft—will be in public ownership or not. The traditional theory of planning has normally held that state leadership requires state ownership. Hence the ancient association

between planning and socialism and, parenthetically, much of the suspicion aroused by the word planning among private enterprisers. In practice, however, there can no longer be said to be any rule. Public ownership of schools and roads is agreed. Elsewhere there is some difficulty in telling what public ownership really is. Thus, the United States, deferring to conservative dislike of socialism, has numerous private corporations, which, however, sell only to the state. Their costs, prices, profits, and even executive salaries and expense accounts are subject to a measure of public restraint or review. The private ownership is largely nominal, although all concerned will insist on it, and some of the people involved are among our most vehement anti-socialists. And in some areas—research and development, atomic energy, electrical energy—the United States does make extensive use of public ownership.

By the same token, some countries make extensive use of private ownership of productive units even in areas of state initiative. In Poland and Yugoslavia, the state plays a role of considerable importance in relation to agriculture. But the industry remains substantially in private ownership.

The unplanned economy makes use of market incentives—higher or lower prices and incomes—to induce changes in output. The same device is almost equally pervasive under planning. The difference is not in the instrument but rather in the goals it serves. Thus, efficiency in the Soviet Union is rewarded by paying profits to executives and workers. Workers are encouraged to greater effort or to less agreeable jobs or localities by the promise of better pay. This is a very practical matter. There is no reason for having an individual do something badly or unwillingly by public order when he will do it well and willingly in the pursuit of personal reward. Similar procedures are followed in the other planned economies. Yugoslavia has made especially imaginative use of market incentives. The use of such incentives, like the use of public ownership in the Western economies, is still resisted in some degree for reasons of faith, but in diminishing degree. In all of the advanced economies, there is an increasingly pragmatic selection of instruments—state initiative, various forms of state ownership, market incentives—for reaching goals.

The underdeveloped, even more than the developed, country needs to know where it is going. The problem of progress is one of ele-

mentary prevention of hunger, exposure, disease. So here the existence of a plan is an imperative. This is agreed even by countries which conceal their own commitment to planning. As a result, for the developing country the word planning has ceased to be controversial. Five-year plans are the invention, and were once the exclusive possession, of the Soviet Union. Now Americans and Western Europeans with impeccable credentials assemble in consortiums presided over with unquestioned respectability by the World Bank to consider financing for the five-year plans of India or Pakistan. The country which does not have goals, and a programme for reaching these goals, is commonly assumed to be going nowhere. This may well be so.

There are three further reasons why, in the beginning stages of economic development, planning takes on special importance. A number of the steps that have the highest priority at this stage—education and improved transport and communication—are, by their nature, among the things which require the initiative of the state. Nineteenth century governments, though they could contentedly accept whatever the market provided in other areas, took the lead in providing popular education and in building railways, roads, canals, and communications systems. No country has ever obtained a satisfactory school or road system by leaving it to the private sector. Most railroad systems have an extensive history of state initiative and subsidy. Matters are still the same for the new country now.

Secondly, the new country, like the developed country, must use state initiative where a long leap is required. But in the new countries the leaps are not the exception. I have noted that, where the development of supersonic travel or communication by way of earth satellites is involved, the developed countries turn without hesitation (and without criticism except occasionally for the delay) to state initiative. These are their big leaps where the market cannot be relied upon. But in India the development of a steel industry, or a heavy engineering industry, or even a watch industry involves a comparable leap. Accordingly, it requires a comparable initiative by the state. The setting up of the huge Fairless works of the U. S. Steel Corporation near Trenton was a comparatively commonplace response to market prospects. The establishment of a plant of similar proportions at Bokaro in India, although there is little doubt about the demand for the steel, is a mammoth undertaking, and without state action nothing would happen. Only individuals with a uniquely simple

approach to the problems of economic development, or a peculiarly determined ambition for conservative applause, will make the mistake of generalizing from market performance in the developed country to what the market can accomplish in the poor country. It is no part of the good fortune of the poor country that this larger state initiative is required. As I stress elsewhere, economic development imposes, generally speaking, the greatest burdens on those governments that are least able to bear them. This is not a happy arrangement of human affairs but unfortunately there is no sign that such affairs were arranged for maximum convenience.

Finally, the poor country is under a particular compulsion to conserve resources. Not only is capital scarce but some of it comes free, or at concessional rates, as aid from abroad. Left to the market and the local distribution of income and demand, an undue amount would be invested in high-priced housing or the manufacture of expensive consumers' goods for the benefit of the well-to-do. And scarce resources in foreign exchange would slip away into luxury imports. All this is normal in the rich country but offensive in the poor. The United States in modern times has been the first to urge planning measures—licensing of luxury imports or taxation of luxury building—to prevent such waste. Conservative opponents of foreign aid are the first to complain when they hear about a recipient country importing Cadillacs.

Planning being peculiarly necessary in the poor country, I turn now to the requirements of a good plan. Of these, there seem to me to be four. And in present-day development planning, all are in some degree honoured in the breach. The price of this neglect is considerable.

The first requirement is that the choice of instruments for the execution of the plan be pragmatic. In the developed countries, capitalist or communist, although the contest between the theologians and the practical men continues, the latter, as I have noted, are in the undoubted ascendancy. In the United States, it is no longer necessary to find an appropriate doctrinal justification for a very extensive exercise of government initiative. One measure of the scope of this initiative is the proportion of the Gross National Product controlled and disposed of by the state. In the United States, this is approximately 20 per cent of the total, as compared with 13 to 14 per cent in India. There is similar pragmatism in the use of price and profit

incentives across the Iron Curtain. Even British Socialists, in some ways the world's most ardent defenders of doctrine for the sake of doctrine, have largely given up on public ownership or have reduced their commitment to it to a purely symbolic level. That is because it no longer serves a clear purpose in the British economy. The common denominator of all this change is the tendency to accept, sometimes rather reluctantly, what works.

Nothing, I think, is more to be recommended to the less developed lands than the same salutary tendencies. And here, unlike the more industrialized countries East and West, the test of works, not faith, has still to make its way. China is far more purist in application of doctrine than the Soviet Union. Partly as a reflection of the high church rigour of British socialist doctrine, socialism *qua* socialism rather than what socialism accomplishes is still an objective of many of the former British territories. This means that the test of public or private ownership is not necessarily what best advances development. Rather, in some metaphysical sense, it is what advances a socialist pattern of society. As a result, economic performance is regularly sacrificed to doctrine. And the suggestion that a more pragmatic test would be wise is resisted with a good deal of moral indignation. One wing of the modern left prefers in practice to attack capitalism and accept poverty rather than have a greater measure of progress with a pragmatically mixed economy.

It is worth repeating once more, especially for the improvement of those who might take conservative comfort from this formulation, that a pragmatic course requires equally that public ownership be accepted where this is required. The test of what is practical works both ways.

The decision on other instruments should be equally pragmatic and here, also, there is room for improvement in the less developed lands. The purposeful use of price incentives and disincentives can be a major substitute for administrative effort and time. No one doubts that good prices to farmers—and it is wholly consistent with effective use of the price system that these be guaranteed by the state—are superior for increasing output to orders enforced by police and magistrates. But likewise high import prices, the result of high tariffs and realistic exchange rates, may be far more efficient than import licences for rationing scarce foreign exchange. It may be wise to exclude luxuries by fiat. But ability and willingness to pay may not

be a bad test of the effective use of capital goods imports. Similarly, high interest rates, testing again the need of the community for the investment, may be superior to a system of licences and permissions as a device for rationing capital. High prices of imported capital or high interest rates may also usefully take the pressure off the planning system and thus play a useful supplementary role. The man who must pay the full price for imported goods has that much less incentive to offer bribes to obtain a licence. Even where the price system works less precisely than a system of licences, franchises, permissions, and orders, there may be a strong case for it because of its remarkable capacity for eliminating the costs of delay.

The second requirement of a good plan is that it be accommodated to the level of economic and cultural achievement of the country in question. In the beginning stages of development, plan creation is not properly a matter of economic planning at all; rather the goal is to build basic administrative organs, to develop the educational and basic cultural structure, and to get a viable and progressive social system. In Western Europe and the United States, following the French and American Revolutions, these steps laid the foundation for economic advance. The same steps following the Meiji restoration laid the same groundwork in Japan. In developing its Central Asian republics, the Soviets gave high priority to developing an effective system of provincial administration, to education, to providing a transportation system, and to getting the nomads into a settled system of agriculture.

It follows that, in the early stages of development, the task is not to set production targets and plan investment outlays. Rather it is to lay the administrative, social, and educational groundwork for such investment. Only in later stages is detailed planning of investment in order. It belongs, relatively speaking, to a rather advanced state of development.

The third requirement of a good plan is a sense of strategy. This applies, particularly, to the fairly advanced countries just mentioned. The standard modern development plan is an investment plan. It reflects decisions on how best to employ scarce capital resources. Its primary goal is the thing that investment is assumed to accomplish, namely a specified and presumably adequate rate of economic growth. In this planning, a good deal of thought goes into the matching and

phasing of the various segments of the plan—into insuring that kinds and amounts of steel being produced or imported will match requirements for steel in kind and amount, and that this balance between supply and requirements is maintained over time. Equally careful attention is accorded the supply of investment resources—the question of where, internally and externally, the capital is coming from. One can find little fault, in principle at least, with the way this part of the planning task is performed.

There is a grave danger, however, that such a plan will present all things as equally important. They are not. Some things are broadly catalytic in their role. Others are indispensable for improved well-being. Other things are merely passive and useful. A good plan must provide a strategy for economic advance. It is a well established fact that among angels virtue goes unnoticed. Equally if everything is held to be vital, the truly vital escapes attention.

By way of illustration, in an industrialized country a highly efficient transportation system and an economic and reliable source of power are indispensable. With these available, something is certain to happen; without them, one can be less sure. These industries provide the external economies of other industries. They make it possible for others to exist. In the somewhat different case of agriculture, while many things are useful, a few things are indispensable. Water, fertilizer, and improved seed can revolutionize agriculture. Other agricultural services, by contrast, have only a limited impact. Veterinary medicine, improved packaging, marketing advice, home economics may be useful but they will produce no major change.

Strong forces work against strategic concentration. In any country engaged in planning there is a relentless pressure on individuals, departments, and regions to have favourite enterprises included. To be outside the plan is to have a nasty sense of exclusion with practical financial consequences as well. The desire not to be accused of overlooking something is also strong. So there is a tendency for the plan to become not a plan but a list of all the things that should be done, that everyone would like to have done, or that anyone believes ought to be done or which might be a cause of criticism if overlooked. Specification of the things of strategic urgency is lost.

In the American colonies prior to independence and in the early years of the republic, there was no great surplus of food. The space between the mountains and the sea along the Atlantic was limited and not everywhere fertile; the demands for food and fodder some-

times exceeded its capacity and food had to be imported from Europe. A plan formulated along modern lines for relieving this situation would have emphasized the need for agricultural colleges, extension services, veterinary services, plant breeding, better marketing, control of insect pests, advanced horticulture, fish culture, and the provision of storage capacity for buffer stocks. Doubtless also there would have been mention of the need for improved transportation. But among all the other excellent and useful ideas, this could easily have been overlooked. In 1825, the State of New York opened a canal which connected the black lands of the West with the centres of population. On its completion, the food shortage came to an end and there has been no sign of recurrence. This canal was the strategic factor in the plan. The importance of isolating and emphasizing the elements of strategic importance is not less in the developing country today.

The fourth requirement of a good plan is that it emphasizes both the visible and the invisible dimensions of industrial achievement. Like an iceberg, much of a modern industrial society is out of sight. And, also like an iceberg, the invisible part has the greatest capacity for causing shipwreck. To get capital plant—railway lines, coal mines, airplanes, oil rigs—into use is the visible achievement of development planning. To ensure that this plant is efficiently used—that management is independent and sound, and that in consequence product quality is good, cost of production low, and earnings adequate for replacement and expansion of plant—is the much larger part of the task. This part lies below the surface. Nor is it sufficient that the developing country be only adequate in these respects. It must be more efficient than its older competitors. It was by low cost and efficient production that Germany and Japan won their places in the industrial constellation against the competition of the earlier arrivals. New industrial countries, such as Israel and Yugoslavia, have recently been making their bid in the same way. It is thus that both domestic and foreign earnings for further expansion are won.

I think it extremely important that the modern plan set firm targets, especially for publicly owned firms, for this invisible achievement. As valuable as firm targets for steel output are firm targets for man-hour productivity, costs, and returns. Goals so set become binding on all concerned. All are challenged to meet them. All have a sense of failure if there is a shortfall in performance. And there is, in addition, the highly practical fact that failure can be identified with

those responsible. If there are no standards, then no one fails the examination. Promotion and honour accrue to all alike. Economic achievement was not meant to be that easy, and certainly not in a developing nation. Socialists are oddly reluctant to accept advice from non-socialists on what to believe. That is partly because they are so regularly advised to give up their belief in socialism. It may still be worth reminding all socialists, none the less, that the most damaging thing that has happened to the idea of public ownership is the growing belief, reinforced by numerous and visible practical examples, that it is shockingly inefficient.

In much of present planning, targets are set for visible physical accomplishment—for capacity in place or for production. This is the easiest and certainly the smallest part of the task. But targets are equally practical for managerial performance, labour productivity, costs and returns; all lend themselves admirably to objective measurement. It is of the greatest importance that the modern development plan be as complete in respect of these goals as any other.

Some Qualities of Forthcoming Changes

RICHARD B. GREGG

THIS ESSAY IS BASED on a faith that somehow mankind will avoid nuclear war. Without that faith there would be no point in writing this.

Back in 1910 I knew a man who was then ninety-five years old and still active, clear-headed, and energetic. He said he could remember having used or seen used in common practice all the ways of lighting at night that man has ever used. As a boy in Ohio he saw people using wooden pine knots as torches. Then he used candles, then whale oil lamps, then kerosene oil (what the British call paraffin) lamps and lanterns, then gas, and finally the different kinds of electric lights. If he had lived in India, his lamps would have been fed not by whale oil but some vegetable oil such as mustard. The development of all these modes of lighting came in one man's lifetime.

Take another personal instance of rapid changes. I am now seventy-nine years old. In my lifetime I have seen the break-down and disappearance of eight empires. In roughly chronological order these are the old Chinese empire, the Austro-Hungarian empire, the German empire, the Russian empire, the Japanese empire, the British empire, the Dutch empire, the French empire. Back in the days of ancient Rome, if there had been eight empires existing simultaneously, it is strongly probable that it would have taken many hundred, perhaps a thousand, years to see them all crumble. Such is the acceleration of political processes.

It is widely recognized that now many aspects of life are changing. Of course all life and existence involves and requires change, but nowadays the speed of many of these changes is increasing. In order to keep our poise, and prepare and plan effectively, it may be wise to ponder some of the kinds and qualities of modern changes, not merely their speed and acceleration but also such qualities as range, depth, complexity, mutual relationships, and effects. A mere enumeration of them is troubling.

There are four kinds of changes taking place now with such speed and acceleration that they have aptly been called 'explosions'. There

is the population explosion, the urban explosion, the communications explosion, and the knowledge explosion.

The population explosion involves such obvious and appalling dangers to all peoples and all institutions that it has received the most attention. So widely and fully has it been discussed that, especially writing for Indian publication, I would cite only one statistical figure. In his book *The Time Has Come* (published by Knopf, New York, 1963) John Rock, M.D., says: 'Some 800,000 years were required for humanity to achieve a current population of three billion. But the second three billion will be added in the next forty years—a period only about one twenty-thousandth as long'. He has also said: 'World food production increased by less than 15 per cent during this century's first four decades—while population grew twice that much. Nutritionists tell us that, despite the heroic and heartening agricultural progress in many places, the world food deficit is likely to continue for several generations.'

It takes little imagination to realize that such tremendous increases, even if retarded by rapid adoption of universal birth control, will profoundly affect not only the character of peoples and their social, economic, and political institutions but also the soil, water supplies, vegetation, and purity of air, upon which all life depends everywhere. The effects will be highly complex, profound, and difficult.

Allied to the population explosion is the urban explosion, that is, the sudden growth of cities, faster even than the growth of populations at large. This fact and its significance have been recognized only recently. Last summer at Delos, Greece, there was a conference of top-ranking planners, architects, engineers, and sociologists on this subject, organized by the Athens Technological Institute. At that conference it was brought out that after thousands of years of slow growth, the cities everywhere are now enlarging very fast. While world population is now growing at the rate of two per cent a year, city population goes up by four per cent a year, and in the case of big cities by as much as five or even six per cent a year. As only one instance of such acceleration, the city of Athens, Greece, is now growing by three dwellings and one hundred square metres of road *every hour*. And the strong likelihood is that this growth rate will not slacken.

The phenomenon is widespread. Everywhere the peasants and country people are moving to the cities in search of work or a higher

standard of living. Industrialism and technology continue to advance at the expense of agricultural land and the numbers of agricultural population. The process is also pushed on by the growth of motor-car transportation of all kinds. In Britain now only about four or five per cent of the people live in rural areas and depend on them. The trend in the United States is similar; the farming population is steadily shrinking while the cities increase. The process seems to be irreversible.

Most of the people flocking to the cities are poor, and so the cities become largely slums. It is the same everywhere—Africa, South America, North America, Europe, China, India. With the coming of motor transport, most of the city people who can afford to move build and have their homes in suburbs, coming into the city only during working hours. Thus the city governments lose that source of taxable wealth and cannot afford the civic services that are so needed. So the cities decay, and with that decay comes a decay in the whole national culture, for all through history the cities have been the centres of culture. The whole matter is very complex alike in its causes, its internal development, and its results. We do not yet know enough about it to deal with it adequately.

There is yet another kind of increase so rapid that it deserves the name 'explosion'. I mean the increase of communications. For most of the millennia of man's existence on earth, his communications have been through speech and behaviour and, to some extent, through a few visual symbols of limited scope. When hieroglyphs and then alphabets were invented the scope of symbols rapidly enlarged. A relatively few centuries ago paper was invented by the Chinese and then came the art of printing.

Since then communications have leaped ahead. Not much more than one hundred years ago the telegraph and then the telephone appeared, and still more recently, radio and television and microfilm. Just a couple of years ago came the Telstar satellite by which radio and television cross the oceans directly and instantaneously. As one instance of recent rapid growth of communications, in the last five years the number of transoceanic telephone calls has doubled. Along with such increases have come the propeller and jet airplanes which transport the mails at great speed. The time in flight for a jet plane from San Francisco to Sydney, 6,000 miles, is only eighteen hours. Even with all the stops for refuelling, a letter mailed in New Delhi is fairly often delivered in New York in five days.

All this speeding up of communications has, of course, affected men's minds and all social processes profoundly and in all lands. It has immeasurably quickened and broadened and enriched thought and feeling everywhere. Eskimos, Central African villagers, peasants in India, China, Indonesia, and South America, as well as the peoples of the more industrialized nations, are listening on radio to news of events elsewhere, to political propaganda, to opinion, and to educational broadcasts. All this has stimulated and expanded commerce and economic life tremendously. The people of all nations have been, in effect, brought suddenly so close together that it is uncomfortable. The ignorances, misunderstandings, prejudices, hostilities, and suspicions of different nations and cultures are being rubbed together and, with a time lag, reduced to smaller and more manageable proportions. Despite the obstacles of different languages, mutual understanding and realization of human unity are growing faster than ever before in the whole history of mankind. Often that growth seems dreadfully slow, but nevertheless it is faster than ever before. Thus there is going on everywhere a deep growth in the self-consciousness of mankind.

Yet another explosively rapid growth is that of knowledge. In every realm of activity the discovery and recording of facts and information and the development of new theories and explanations is burgeoning at an almost frightening pace. This growth has been built on the foundation of the inventions of paper and printing and photography. One can say that the amount of paper consumed by a nation is a rough indication of the extent of its civilization. Note that I said civilization, not culture.

One of the most important of the rapidly growing kinds of knowledge is that of science. A recent book called *Little Science, Big Science* by Prof. D. J. deSolla Price of Yale University (Columbia University Press, New York, 1963) gives some striking information about this growth of science. Using data as to the number of scientists, the number of scientific journals, and other indices, he shows that since the middle of the seventeenth century—a few years after the death of Galileo—scientific activity has doubled every ten or twenty years, those two rates depending on what quantitative definition of scientist is chosen. An average figure for this rate would be fifteen years. World population is now doubling every forty years; so the growth of scientific activity is nearly three times faster. In some branches of science or technology the doubling rate is much faster.

As already noted, the number of overseas telephone calls recently doubled in only five years.

The money cost of science has been increasing as the square of the number of scientists, and research expenditure increases as the fourth power of superior scientists. At this rate, by the year 2,000, expenditure on science in the United States would increase far beyond the money value of the gross national product of all goods and services there. This is impossible. What it means is that at some point in the relatively near future the law of diminishing returns will become active and the curve of the growth of science will reach a peak and then level off into a plateau. Or possibly there might come a vast revulsion against science which could reduce scientific activity to insignificant amounts. Similar results one way or the other might happen to the growth curves of other kinds of knowledge—historical, psychological, economic, and so on.

Closely allied to this rapid growth of science is the growth of technology. The discoveries of science have been quickly applied and put to work in new kinds of technology. Sixty years ago the great industry in the State of Massachusetts, U.S.A., was textile manufacturing, both of wool and cotton. Now, most of the textile mills have gone and have been replaced by a mushroom growth of factories of electronic apparatus of many kinds. Other instances of this sort are the development of synthetic fibres such as rayon, nylon, orlon, and of plastics, the manufacture of vitamins, drugs, and chemical fertilizers, and the manufacture of aluminium products. One of the latest of these technical developments in the highly industrialized countries has been the rapid growth of automation which creates great unemployment, also the invention of high-speed computers which are solving very intricate problems in astonishing fashion, and at the same time creating other new problems.

Along with such changes have come some others nearly as rapid and many of them wholly new. There has been rapid destruction of forests, and soil erosion is far more rapid than before the ploughshare and tractor were invented. There is dreadful contamination and poisoning of rivers, lakes, and ocean shores by city sewage and wastes from tanneries and chemical plants. There is shocking contamination of the air by smoke from factories, fall-out from explosions of atomic bombs, and, in large industrial cities, the discharged vapours from motor vehicles.

Such rapid changes and accelerations of change in the ways of

living and working have profoundly affected family life and weakened traditional social bonds. In all countries there have been troubling increases in crime, especially among youth. There has been a weakening of established social and economic expectations. There have been disturbances of customs and status. Such social and economic changes have produced a widespread sense of insecurity and general anxiety, which in turn have produced suspicion and hostility not only between individuals but also between groups, between States, between nations, and between races. Fears are very devastating, especially when prolonged.

These rapid changes have brought about a failure of understanding between the generations, between parents and children. My younger brother told me he hesitated to give advice to his children because he knew that the world they would have to live in would be so completely different from that in which he had grown up that his advice would not meet their conditions and so be invalid. Education fails in both kind and amount to keep pace with these changes.

Nearly ten years ago such difficulties were pointed out in a radio broadcast by Sir Geoffrey Vickers, V.C. more cogently than I can. He said in part: 'We may argue whether this change or that is good or bad. We seldom recognize that the rate of change may itself be crucial. Let us suppose that mankind is infinitely adaptable—while believing and praying that it is not. Even if it is, its adaptability must be largely a function of the rate at which one generation replaces another. What each of us can learn is limited; but each generation starts from a new datum. Social as well as biological changes are phased to the number of generations, not to mere years. Quick changes demand quickly changing generations. But the generations are not changing more quickly. Though all other changes are being speeded, human life is getting longer and the influence of each generation is felt for longer than it used to be While this is so, the capacity of one generation for change must set a limit which cannot be transgressed with impunity.

'Suppose, for example, that things come to change so fast that what each generation learns about life by, say, thirty, is useless to guide its children or even to guide itself during its remaining thirty or forty years. Such a situation would be self-defeating; we should have made a world in which we were clueless. Is the possibility remote ? I wish I were sure that it is not with us now. . . . We are involved in an economic system in which multiplying goods, multi-

plying wants, and multiplying populations endlessly excite one another. . . . The economic problem of mankind is not whether we can continue to prosper but whether we can make the mutual relations of man and Nature sufficiently stable to provide an acceptable basis for human life.

'We face this problem with a fundamental handicap. We recognize vaguely that the well-being we desire is a wider concept than the prosperity we pursue. We dimly sense that our well-being demands other conditions beside prosperity, conditions which our power to prosper can serve both to create and to destroy. But we cannot yet discern these conditions clearly enough to make prosperity their servant, even within the limited measure of control which we have.'

In addition to all these changes and their social, economic, and political results is the tremendous fact that war as a settler of great issues is now, by reason of the atomic bomb, coming to an end. Atavistic forces are trying to keep it alive, but there can be no doubt of the writing on the wall. War has been so powerful an institution, so ubiquitously and for so long, that its fading away will by itself release enormous forces for the possible well-being of mankind.

All these considerations add up to a very deep and wide-ranging revolution, probably the greatest in all history. It may be a great psychological, moral, and spiritual mutation in the human race. These changes are not just to be in the future. We are in the midst of them already. Whole cultures and civilizations are being rapidly altered.

Any one of these rapid changes would have deep and prolonged ramifications and effects in all aspects of life. Nobody with even the largest vision and most sensitive imagination could foresee the results. So when we realize that all these kinds of great changes are taking place at once, we can see how futile it would be to attempt to predict what in detail the outcome may be, say twenty-five, fifty, or one hundred years from now. Nobody could make a permanent, fixed blueprint of long-term action to deal with events in such a maelstrom. One can offer neither prophecy nor advice. There can be no rigid, dogmatic, long-enduring 'solutions' to such problems; only tentative, experimental, short-term adjustments. Such vast and whirling forces and problems cannot be 'settled' but only endured and lived through, with the best and swiftest adaptations possible at the time. Those who refuse to adapt will probably not survive.

Such mighty changes and all the suffering involved will compel men to become aware of many of their hitherto largely unconscious

assumptions. By assumptions I mean such things as are taken for granted, such as the white man's false assumption that his people and his culture are superior to all others, the common (also false) assumption that man is the master of Nature, the assumption of the individual about himself that 'I exist', the prevailing modern assumption that there is a unity that ties together all the diverse things and forces in the universe. Each culture or civilization is based on a certain special constellation of largely unconscious assumptions. The recognition and acknowledgement of our assumptions is a difficult and painful process that we will not attend to until we are forced. Not only will such assumptions be dredged up from our subconscious lives; our suffering and realization of the unworkability and invalidity of many of our old assumptions will compel us to examine them rigorously and to reject those seen to be unsound, and adopt other, sounder assumptions. May be much of this shifting of assumptions will take place chiefly in the subconscious.

It is obvious that there will be great perils for individuals, groups, nations and whole civilizations. Everywhere, decisions will have to be made on a balancing of risks. And many mistakes will be made.

But risk is necessarily inherent in life itself. The protein molecules which make up so much of the tissue of all animals, including man, are very complex and maintain very intricate and delicate balances within themselves. They took ages to evolve. And the assembly of them into a living organism is a wonderful, delicate, complex grouping of co-operative fields of force. All this can easily be broken down and destroyed. As I once wrote elsewhere: 'All life proceeds on very delicate, subtle and complex integrations, balances, and margins.... On such narrow margins and with such delicate balances and integrations, life of all kinds has proceeded all down the ages.... Life creates a certain kind of order out of atomic disorder, randomness and chaos, and this order acts against and overcomes entropy (the Second Law of Thermodynamics).... That Second Law of Thermodynamics tells us, among other things, that order is less probable than disorder or chaos, for all atoms tend to regress to a wholly disorderly or random condition. If life is the highest mode of order, then life is the most improbable of all kinds of order. That is one reason why it took so many million years to appear. So if life is most improbable, it is inherently very risky and insecure.' Yet life has persisted in spite of the risks.

The operation of all these great changes is going to increase the

number and kinds of risks to be faced and endured. But since man created these increased risks, so also he can learn how to find his way among them and through them. For the same reason he will find courage to do so. If we were able to take the risks, our minds will, I believe, be able to find ways to live through them, as a species anyhow, even though there will probably be grave losses along the way. On the basis of biology and paleontology we can assume, I think, that one of Nature's most powerful and enduring forces is in the direction of creating, maintaining, and developing many forms of life. Man is a part and product of Nature, and thus shares that thrust and impulse to live and grow. That operates in his mind as well as his body. That force can and, I believe, will enable him to avoid a nuclear holocaust.

Such changes and such risks will daunt some, stimulate others. Using the maintenance and promotion of life and the best possible standard of life and the best possible interrelations between different kinds of life as a guide in making choices for action, man can, I believe, not only survive but rise to higher levels of life. It is a great time in which to be alive.

The Impact of the West on Indian Traditions

HUMAYUN KABIR

I DEEM IT AN HONOUR and a privilege to contribute to this volume in honour of Jawaharlal Nehru. Free India has accepted democracy, socialism, and a secular outlook as principles of her life. No one in recent history has contributed more towards the acceptance of these ideals by India and their embodiment in her constitution and governance than Jawaharlal Nehru. The first Prime Minister of independent India and an architect of Indian freedom, his life and work constitute a shining testimony to the way in which the spirit of the age has adopted and adapted Western values to Indian traditions.

I

SINCE THE DAYS OF MAN'S first appearance on earth, human masses have moved from one region of the world to another. They have carried with them their own customs and traditions and also borrowed new ones from the regions which they made their home. One evidence of this we find in language, which is the vehicle of human feelings and thought. Affinities between various Asian and European languages point to either a common origin or close association in prehistoric times. Common or similar beliefs, attitudes, and institutions among widely scattered peoples also suggest similar contacts among peoples from the earliest times.

Such influences have always been reciprocal and must be so from the nature of the case. One may nevertheless say that in the earlier ages the influence of Asia on Europe was greater than that of Europe on Asia. All the great religions arose on the Asian mainland. Asia gave the world its first alphabet and its first scientific system of numerals. Civilization began in Asia and Egypt which was physically and otherwise contiguous to Western Asia. As far as we know,

Alexander's expedition to Asia was the first occasion when European influences began to permeate through Asian and African countries. European elements again became an integral part of Afro-Asian culture when Islam incorporated Greek philosophy into its religious and philosophical outlook. Ever since, the contacts between Afro-Asia and Europe have expanded. Sometimes the one and sometimes the other has been the dominant partner, but in man's joint venture towards the achievement of a truly global civilization, their contacts and contributions have been increasingly intermingled.

It would be a fascinating study to trace the contributions which India has made to the intellectual awakening of Europe against this background of past and pervasive mutual influence. The purpose of the present study is however a more limited one. It seeks to measure the impact of the West on Indian traditions in the past five hundred years. Vasco de Gama's arrival at Calicut may be taken as a convenient starting point. Few, if any, in contemporary India realized the significance of the event, though the Portuguese arrived not merely as traders but also as representatives of Europe's military, imperial, and religious ambitions. Their advent soon challenged the prevailing social and religious traditions of India, especially as they engaged in proselytization on a mass scale. In their train followed other Western powers whose mutual rivalries in the economic and political fields added to the complexity of the Indian situation. After a complicated and confused struggle of a hundred years, the British emerged as the dominant power, ruling first through the East India Company and finally, from 1857 to 1947, directly under the British Crown.

British dominion over India meant domination of the West and had far-reaching effects on India's economic, social, political, and religious life. Its first and most immediate impact was felt on India's economic set-up and traditions. Since prehistoric times, Indian economic life had been organized in village communities where agriculture was combined with cottage industries to meet the simple requirements of a rural people. Lack of adequate communications meant that each agricultural community had to be more or less self-sufficient and self-contained. A few cities had grown up at confluences of rivers or in places of pilgrimage. They were also usually the centres of political power. While they drew freely on the resources of their hinterland, they led a largely isolated life. As surplus goods could not be easily transported, there was no effective demand for

increasing the scale of production. Nevertheless, a flourishing trade mainly in luxury goods had developed both internally and externally. Indian muslin, ivory work, brassware, and gold and silver filigree were bought in markets within India and outside. They excited the wonder and envy of foreign craftsmen and had already acquired international reputation before the beginning of the Christian era.

When Vasco de Gama came to India, the Industrial Revolution had not yet begun in Europe. By the time the British became dominant here, this Revolution was already in full progress in the British Isles. An importer of Indian textiles in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, Britain had become an exporter of cotton goods by the end of the eighteenth century. Growing industrialization of Britain disrupted the simple rural economy of India. It largely destroyed her cottage industries and led to increasing pressure on land. Poverty became widespread and increase in population added to the misery of the people.

As capitalism developed in Britain, labour also began to organize. By the middle of the nineteenth century, British standards of life had improved substantially. Increasing costs of production made British industrialists look for areas where labour and raw material were cheap and abundant. In course of time this led to the growth of industries within India. The impact was not fully felt till the latter half of the nineteenth century and was in the beginning halting and uncertain. Nevertheless, the opening of the first railway lines in the middle of the century was a visual demonstration of the change which had already set in. Factories began to grow in different parts of India. Improvements in transport and communications led to many far-reaching changes. One was the gradual disappearance of the difference in price levels between the village and the town. Until the First World War, prices were definitely lower in the villages than in the towns, but today the difference has almost disappeared. Another was the emergence of industrial towns which steadily grew larger in size and drew workers not only from the immediate neighbourhood but from distant regions of the country.

II

INDIAN SOCIAL TRADITIONS were deeply affected by the growth of industries. The earlier primarily agricultural communities had placed greater emphasis on communal welfare than individual advancement.

There is an old Indian saying that the individual must be sacrificed for the family and the family for the group. As industrialization grew in India, this mentality changed. The growth of factories and mills drew a large number of people away from villages. Not only was this a physical withdrawal from rural surroundings but, what is more important, it involved a psychological withdrawal from the customs which had prevailed in rural areas. In a village where every individual is known to everyone else, the pressure of tradition hinders any deviation from accepted social laws. The organization of society in joint families and the institution of caste make the forces of social rigidity and conservatism almost irresistible in such a context.

As people began to move from villages to the new industrial towns, the joint family began to crack. In a rural economy the individual's earnings were merged in the common family pool. When he moved away to the factory town, he tended to keep more and more of his earnings for himself and his wife and children. Caste also began to break down under the impact of industrialization. This happened in two ways. Work in factory towns offered new hopes of advancement to the energetic and enterprising among the younger generations and they were no longer content to follow the traditional occupations of their caste. These industrial centres also helped to break down social barriers and provided the so-called lower castes an opportunity of casting off their sense of humiliation in the anonymity of the city.

The steady extension of modern modes of transport and communications also operated against the institution of caste. Increase in social and individual mobility made it possible for people to choose their own vocations in areas of their own choice. A man who felt dissatisfied with his social status in his own village moved away to another part of the country where he assumed any status he liked. The railways began this process, and with the introduction of the country bus, the process of break-up of caste received a further acceleration. Untouchability cannot be maintained inside a crowded third class compartment of a train. Inside a bus where men and women of every class and type are packed together like sardines and literally thrown against one another in the process of churning that takes place as the vehicle ploughs its way through rough country tracks, it is even more futile to think in terms of caste and untouchability.

The employment of women in mills and factories also challenged age-old social traditions of the country. From immemorial times,

in India as elsewhere, women have been dependent on men for their living. In an agricultural community, the woman may work as hard as the man; nevertheless the predominantly patriarchal pattern of agricultural society restricts her freedom and makes her subservient to man. In modern industries, the position is different. The desire for a higher standard of living and increasing prices of necessities compel both husband and wife to go to work. The woman gets her income separately and begins to make a claim on it. With the growth of industries in India, women have moved away from the villages and in some cases from their homes. As they have moved freely among men, they have gained in self-confidence and poise. Their increasing self-assertion has brought in its wake many problems of social adjustment and in some cases led them to challenge traditional ethics, but this is a phenomenon which is by no means peculiar to India.

III

PERHAPS EVEN MORE far-reaching have been the results of the introduction of Western education into India. In ancient times, Indian education had encouraged a spirit of enquiry and experiment but by the beginning of the Christian era, this had been replaced by an attitude where authority came to be regarded as sacrosanct. Rational analysis steadily gave place to acceptance on trust. There is a Sanskrit saying that to remember is more important than to understand. It is not surprising that the growth of an authoritarian temper in society led in course of time to intellectual stagnation. Decay in every sphere of Indian life followed as an almost inevitable corollary.

The prevailing intellectual torpor had at first been shaken by the advent of the Muslims. Islam had started with an assertion of the freedom of the human intellect, but even in its homeland, the intellectual urgency was soon lost. As the earlier democracy of Islam decayed, authoritarianism became the dominant tone in Muslim thought and education. If this was so in the most creative centres of Islamic civilization, it is not surprising that Muslim education in India should also become increasingly dogmatic and stereotyped. It is true that during the reign of Feroze Shah Tughlak, an attempt was made to introduce a simple form of technical education in the country. It is also true that there was an attempt to develop historical and

political thinking, especially during the days of Akbar's rule. By and large, however, Muslim educational practice was confined to a repetitive study of religious scripture and theology. Blind acceptance rather than critical analysis became its dominant character and it crumbled when the challenge came from resurgent Europe.

The doors of education, whether in ancient or in mediaeval India, were in any case open to only a select few. There was then no system of public education anywhere in the world and India was no exception. For the vast majority, life flowed in traditional channels where sons succeeded to their fathers' professions. For girls, almost the only career open was that of the housewife. It is curious but not surprising that before the Western impact on India, respect for authority was not confined to a man's own scriptures but to revelation and scripture in general. The Hindu did not always accept the doctrines of his Muslim countrymen but gave to them a kind of grudging respect. Similarly the Muslim, even when he could not accept some of the beliefs of his Hindu neighbours, was generally inclined to pay respect to things he could not comprehend. Conformity and submission were characteristic of both Hindus and Muslims in mediaeval India.

Western education proved an explosive force that shook and in some cases shattered the walls of dogma and authoritarianism among all Indian communities. The Renaissance and the Reformation had fostered the spirit of criticism and enquiry among Europeans of almost all classes. The Industrial Revolution had given them a new sense of power over the forces of nature. The European was a newcomer on the world stage and with the brashness and self-assurance of the newcomer he set about demolishing old customs and beliefs. If he did so with the traditions of his own people, is it surprising that his attacks on the traditions of an alien people should be even more sweeping ?

In addition, political domination and economic surpremacy made the average British ruler of India contemptuous of Indian institutions and beliefs. And yet it is interesting to note that the British rulers were not anxious to introduce Western education into India. Perhaps they instinctively felt that the introduction of Western education would lead to a renaissance that would challenge British power and supremacy. In the earlier days of the East India Company's rule, all public funds were earmarked exclusively for oriental education. Enlightened Indians like Raja Rammohun Roy and British missionaries and philanthropists like Carey, Marshman, and Hare were the

pioneers of Western education in India against the opposition of the ruling powers of the day.

Once Western education was introduced, it brought about a complete transformation in the intellectual attitude of Indians. The pioneers were dazzled by the brilliance of Western achievement and sought to create in India a replica of Europe. They rejected all old beliefs and openly flaunted their acceptance of Western traditions and customs. Many shared the views which Macaulay later so blatantly expressed: one shelf of Western books was superior to the entire collection of Oriental wisdom embodied in Sanskrit and Arabic ! The excesses of these pioneers led to an equally strong reaction among the more conservative, and it took almost a century to dispel the miasma.

The revolutionary consequence of the acceptance of Western and the rejection of Eastern values was enhanced by the fact that for the first time in Indian history, education tended to become accessible to all. In ancient India, education was the prerogative of the Brahmins and in a few cases the Kshatriyas. In mediaeval times, it was almost exclusively the prerogative of rulers and aristocrats. The British paid scant heed to the susceptibility of Indian castes and classes and threw the doors of education open to all who were willing to profit by it. Many of the so-called lower castes took advantage of this opportunity to accept Western education and improve their social and economic status. In many cases, they also embraced Christianity. The fact that Western education was in the initial stages an almost sure passport to profitable employment also helped to draw an increasing circle within its orbit.

As Western education spread throughout the country, old traditions were continually challenged and new values exalted in their place. Thus, the influence of English literature helped in the growth of egalitarian ideas. The ideal Indian wife had always been a woman who gave unquestioning obedience to her husband. Shakespeare presented to young Indian intellectuals heroines of a new type. Portia and Rosalind are witty and educated and hold their own against men without effort or constraint..A Beatrice is not daunted by the wealth or power of any man. Young Indians began to look for new qualities in their womenfolk. In place of the timid, retiring, and obedient child-wife of the past, they began to demand in their wives qualities of self-confidence, poise, and comradeship. The change was not sudden and is not complete as yet, but a process was

set in motion that has taken Indian women to some of the highest positions attained by women anywhere in the modern world.

IV

THE IMPACT OF THE WEST, which began with a transformation of the economic organization and led to social and educational changes, also brought about a change in the political traditions of the country. Indian society in the past had been predominantly hierarchical and patriarchal. Society was hierarchical not only in terms of caste but also in terms of economic classes. There was widespread acceptance of one's station in life as the dictate of destiny. Society was patriarchal and paid the greatest reverence to age and status. Not only was the father of the family an absolute dictator, but within the family each age group accepted willingly the superiority of an older group. Husbands and wives have never been equals in the Indian social tradition. It was the duty of the wife to obey and respect her husband regardless of his title to obedience or honour. The great Indian economic and political thinker, Kautilya, had advised that a son should be treated as a friend when he attained manhood but this advice was never accepted in the practice of Indian society. Sons remained wards even when they were themselves fathers of children. Not only so, there was great inequality even among brothers. In the *Ramayana*, the hero Rama is hardly a few hours older than his brothers Lakshmana and Bharata, and yet the attitude of Lakshmana and Bharata to Rama is not one of comradeship or equality, but of deep reverence and obeisance.

India's hierarchical and patriarchal society began to break up as a result of the impact of the West. The process is not yet complete, and we are still witnessing its gradual replacement by one that is more egalitarian and democratic. The break-up of the joint family and the concentration of population in industrial areas have tended to increase the sense of equality among the people. During the days of British rule, the indifference of the ruling power to caste and class disparities among Indians also worked to the same end. In Greek history, tyrants encouraged the growth of democracy by concentrating all power in their own hands and bringing down to the same level all other citizens. Henry VII performed a similar function in Britain by curbing the church and the barons and increasing his

personal power at their cost. British rule in India helped, though perhaps without any plan or purpose, the democratic process by ironing out the differences and distinctions among Indian communities. The constant pressure of an alien rule made Indians conscious of their helplessness and disability *vis-a-vis* the rulers. In India, British rule therefore played the role which tyrants had played in ancient Greece.

The impact of the West helped the growth of democracy in another way. Personal rule had been the characteristic mode of government of India in earlier times. Indian proverbs attribute famines to the evil deeds of kings, while the weather gods were kind wherever the kings were virtuous. In place of this highly personalized administration of rulers, the British brought in a pattern of administration that was impersonal and based on law. This was accompanied by a degree of centralization unknown in earlier Indian history. Even the ablest and most dictatorial of former Indian kings could not enforce their authority throughout the vast territories of India when the means of transport and communication depended on manpower or animal power. The introduction of the railways, and, later the automobile, reinforced by the telegraph, the telephone, and radio changed the situation radically. Today air travel has enhanced still further the effectiveness of the Central Government and brought the whole of India within its easy reach. The impact of the West thus led to the decay of personal rule and the development of rule of law and laid the foundation of the democratic Republic of free India.

The impact also helped to develop the sense of Indian nationalism in both a positive and a negative way. The positive impulse was derived from the influence of the philosophy of Burke and Sheridan and Bentham and Mill. The negative influence was provided by the loss of the special privileges of Indian ruling castes and classes and their reduction to the status of subjects along with millions of their countrymen. The Western impact also broke down the prevailing social and economic hierarchy and encouraged the ideal of socialism which was initially unconscious and hesitant but in course of time has become a dominant factor in Indian political life. Simultaneously, the Western impact helped in sundering the bond between religion and the state. The secularism of modern India is thus a direct result of India's acceptance of democracy and socialism in a national state.

V

PERHAPS THE GREATEST IMPACT of the West on Indian traditions has been in the sphere of psychological attitudes. Agricultural communities are generally conservative and India was no exception. Lying outside the main route of migrations in human history and protected by the Himalayas from the impact of happenings in Central Asia, Indian society had developed its own norms and attitudes quite early in history. The comparatively hospitable climate and the abundance of food had developed in the people a spirit of acquiescence with fate. 'Live and let live' became the dominant note of Indian society. In the individual, it took the form of acceptance of whatever happened, which at times degenerated into fatalism. In society, it expressed itself in toleration of the widest divergences in belief so long as there were no disturbing deviations in conduct. No doubt there was poverty in the villages and a vast majority of the people lived a hard life; nevertheless a spirit of contentment pervaded the entire community. This was the prevailing mood even in the early decades of the present century. Natural devastations like floods and earthquakes were accepted with the same readiness as famine or pestilence or man-made social and economic ills.

Today this spirit of acquiescence has gone and the proverbial patience of the Indian is changing into one of unrest and anger. People are no longer content to accept their station in life but challenge the position in which they find themselves. In place of the old acceptance of fate and contentment with one's condition, there is a spirit of rebelliousness astir in the land. Even the older generations have not remained unaffected but the manifestation of the new spirit is strongest among the young and sometimes spills over into indiscipline or even delinquency. One visible manifestation of this restlessness is seen in the physical movement of the people. Millions of Indians are today on the move literally. Where formerly a man hardly ever moved out of his district and a woman perhaps never, peasant families in their thousands now embark every year on conducted tours that take them to the farthest corners of India. Even a casual visitor to India is struck by the immense numbers who crowd India's many trains. They are always overcrowded, and the overcrowding is on the increase even though the number of trains and their frequency have been considerably increased. This restlessness is not confined

to physical movement. It also expresses itself in attempts to change and modify practically every aspect of Indian life.

VI

IN CONCLUSION, WE MAY refer briefly to the impact of the West on India's religious traditions. It is not surprising that in the past India's attitude has on the whole favoured orthodoxy in religion. There has of course been a great variety of beliefs and experiences in the country and India has tolerated great divergences in religious thought. In the sphere of practice, however, Indian society has on the whole demanded conformity from its members. Observers from outside have often commented on this paradoxical situation where the widest latitude in belief has been combined with strict adherence to accepted modes of social behaviour.

The spirit of conformity has influenced even those who sought to break the hold of orthodoxy. This happened in ancient and mediaeval India and is also seen in the manner in which India has sought to absorb Western ideas. Raja Rammohun Roy started with a deep grounding in the Upanishads and the Islamic texts, but his views were later profoundly influenced by Western religious thought. In formulating his principles, however, he gave an Indian garb to the Western doctrines that he adopted. His formulation of the Brahmo faith is revolutionary in more senses than one and he has often been called the Father of Modern India. Nevertheless, his formulation always claims to be only a reinterpretation of old Indian texts in terms of the new knowledge he had gathered from the West. Swami Dayanand Saraswati is sometimes regarded as one of the most militant and influential reformers of Hinduism in recent centuries. He is another example of the way in which new Western ideas were given an ancient Indian garb. His insistence on monotheism, his crusade against caste, and his championship of the equality of men and women are strongly reminiscent of the West, but he declared that they were derived not from the teachings of the West but from the Vedas and the Upanishads of India. Sir Syed Ahmed Khan shows the same tendency in his formulation of modern beliefs in terms of ancient Islamic texts. Vivekananda's message of social service, Tilak's and Aurobindo's reinterpretation of the Gita, Iqbal's reconstruction of the religious thought in Islam, and Radhakrishnan's formulation of the Hindu faith in terms that are intelligible and

acceptable to the Western mind are also examples of the way in which Western influences have been incorporated in the earlier traditions of India.

VII

THE WESTERN IMPACT HAS profoundly changed the traditional Indian outlook in every sphere of life. In fact, it would have been surprising had it been otherwise. The economic bases of Indian life have changed and, with changes in economic structure, there have come social and political changes that have transformed both individual and communal conduct. Authoritarianism is steadily giving place to democracy based on a liberal, rational outlook. Predominantly static social relationships are being slowly replaced by contractual relations. Hindu marriage was in the past always regarded as a sacrament, but today there is a civil law which provides for contractual marriage among the Hindus. The growth of rationalism and contractual relationships has been a major factor in the break-up of the joint family which in turn has led to the growth of individualism and brought about far-reaching changes in psychological and religious attitudes.

With the advent of independence, the forces which make for change have received a new impetus and urgency. A measure of the impact of the West on Indian life and traditions is provided by the difference between the authoritarian, hierarchical, and acquiescent India of the past and the democratic, socialist, and secular India of the modern age.

The Future of Non-Violence

OLIVIER LACOMBE

IN 'THE EMERGING WORLD', is the future likely to provide mankind with opportunities for the development of non-violence, in political, social, and economic affairs ? Such is the challenge we and our sons have to accept from the present-day upheaval of conflicting forces throughout the world. India, of course, is primarily involved in the problem, in so far as Mahatma Gandhi has entrusted to her the precious legacy of Satyagraha, but the rest of humanity is also involved, inasmuch as the peaceful advancement of civilization is a concern common to all.

Now, to quote the famous pronouncement by Henri Bergson, the recent achievements of science and technique 'have given the human body a vast extension and a tremendous power. . . . In this body, increased beyond measure, the soul has remained such as it was, too small now to fill it up, too weak to control it. . . . The enlarged body requires an additional growth of the soul'.[1]

Supposing—not unwarrantably—the accelerated progress of technique to be an irreversible process, one feels compelled to adopt Bergson's suggestion, unless one favours some sort of dialectical materialism. Gandhiji, no doubt, seemed to advocate rather 'an intelligent return to simplicity, . . . to old absolute simplicity'. But we need not understand this saying too literally. After all, what Gandhiji deprecated was less machine itself than the fact that modern man has a 'craze' for surrendering to machine; so much so that he loses his dignity of a self-sufficient being and turns into a slave of technocracy. However that may be, we beg to be allowed not to discuss here the typically Gandhian question about the relevancy of asceticism in civil life as such, in spite of its momentous philosophical implications.[2] What we are directly concerned with is to

[1] Henri Bergson, *Les Deux Sources de la morale et de la religion*.(*The Two Sources of Morality and Religion*), p. 330.

[2] The problem is to determine whether asceticism is relevant to civil life in the same way as it is to personal and religious life, or in a different way, or in no way at all.

anticipate whether the world society, increasingly technological in its outfit and outlook, will be able to leave any good opening to *ahimsa* and Satyagraha, to peaceful means of dealing with human conflicts.

Those who take a pessimistic view of our problem are prepared to emphasize that man, endowed with a tremendous amount of brute force, is bound to follow the evil way of sheer violence, that nuclear physics can yield no other fruit than the atom bomb. On the contrary, optimistic rationalism of various descriptions contends that advancement in science and technique is bound to result, sooner or later, in social and human progress, since Reason is the one driving force at work on both levels.

However, we, for our part, are convinced, with Jacques Maritain, that neither the pessimistic attitude nor the optimistic one can give us the right answer, and that a true Middle Path (*madhyama pratipad*) has to be followed between and above them. 'The movement of progression of societies in time depends on the law of the double movement—which might be called, in this instance, the law of the degradation, on the one hand, and the revitalization, on the other, of the energy of history, or of the mass of human activity on which the movement of history depends. While the wear and tear of time and the passivity of matter naturally dissipate and degrade the things of this world and the energy of history, the creative forces which are proper to the spirit and to liberty . . . constantly revitalize the quality of this energy. Thus the life of human societies advances and progresses, thanks to the vitalization or super-elevation of the energy of history springing from the spirit and from human freedom. But, at the same time, this same energy of history is degraded and dissipated by reason of the passivity of matter. . . .We have here a notion of progress which is quite different both from the necessary, rectilinear and indefinite progress which the eighteenth century dreamed of, and in which future things were supposed to be always and by right better than past ones; and, on the other hand, from that negation of any progress and that disregard for the God-given *élan* at work in us which prevail among those who despair of man and of freedom.'[3]

History is ambivalent. The evil forces may be stronger at a time, and the spiritual endeavour may predominate at another. But no

[3] Jacques Maritain, *On the Philosophy of History*, Charles Scribner's Sons, New York, 1957, pp. 46-7.

Fate, whether rational or irrational, is the Master of History and human freedom has always room to work for the uplift of time to come. There is no doom of spiritual life and liberty inherent in technological advancement. Technology, although engrossed in the task of transforming matter, results from the activity of the creative mind. It alleviates the burden of physical existence and teaches man solidarity in collective effort. But, as Mahatma Gandhi rightly pointed out, mere technological mastery over matter may turn into a modern kind of slavery. Unless, indeed, humanity develops at the same time a new form of self-mastery.

We have to overhaul and bring to a state of higher and finer adjustment the complex of 'ends and means' in our technological environment, where the mighty and bulky perfection of physical means is by itself a threat to the free expansion of the soul in the realm of ends.

The pioneering work of Mahatma Gandhi in this field must remain for us as a beacon, a pattern, an incentive, even if circumstances have changed and the data of the problem are not quite the same as they used to be some decades ago.

We should not leave the responsibility of the present-day situation to statesmen and military chiefs alone, nor be satisfied with an emotional protest against the supposed wicked propensity of technically minded people to rely on such inhuman weapons as the atom bomb. As long as we, citizens, are not able to raise throughout the world a sufficient amount of energy from the soul to counterbalance the pressure of evil, even unaggressive statesmen will have to consider seriously whether it is or is not their duty to check evil forces through the physical dread of the so-called 'deterrent'.

It is incumbent on all, statesmen and citizens, to clear the ground of the thorns of domestic and international hatred, social and economic inequalities, ideological warfare, and in this way make atomic or other appalling sorts of 'deterrent' more and more irrelevant, less and less unescapable.

Willy-nilly, we have all entered the nuclear age, and we are now faced with both its harmful and beneficial potentialities. We cannot retrace our steps. The solution of our difficulties lies ahead of us. Only the force of the soul, the force of love, some sort of Satyagraha on a world-scale can make the beneficial potentialities of the nuclear era overpower its threatening dangers. And the force of the soul

normally depends on the free generosity and 'the effort of the few', whose example ought no less normally to be followed by the masses, when more and more light permeates through the social body.

Religion and the Problems of Peace

G. P. MALALASEKERA

I AM AWARE that Shri Jawaharlal Nehru, to whom we now pay tribute in this volume, did not like to be described as a 'religious' man. But, what is religion apart from compassion for living beings, *bhuta-daya*, and what greater exercise of that compassion can there be than the pursuit of peace for which Panditji devoted his whole life ? Hence my choice of subject: 'Religion and the Problems of Peace', because, to my mind, these two subjects, Peace and Religion, constitute the two most important factors involved in human happiness, the happiness we all seek. There has not been and never will be real happiness in the world without peace, and religion is above all the way to the attainment of peace. 'I speak of peace', said President John F. Kennedy in his famous speech at the American University in Washington, 'I speak of peace as the necessary, rational end of rational men. I realize that the pursuit of peace is not so exciting as the pursuit of war. But we have no more urgent task.'

The opposite of peace is conflict, and conflicts are the result of tensions. The field of human tensions around us is so vast that it would take too much time and energy to define and classify the various kinds of tensions and the causes that produce them. There are tensions originating among internal groups, such as labour and management, racial, religious, and language conflicts, conflicts within the family, conflicts which boil up in the minds of each one of us as individuals and, of course, the tensions emanating from the strife of social and political groups within each society and state. Then there are the international tensions which could be divided into two general categories—the historic tensions and the artificial, man-made tensions. The historic ones are those that have been handed down to us as a legacy of centuries in which human society has been finding itself in a world of eternal change. And change involves stress, conflict, and tension.

It is characteristic of our times that the historic changes have

attained the tempo and the dimensions of a world revolution in almost every department of life. The revolution in science has burdened us with the nuclear threat. The colonial revolution, which began in 1776, is still on the march in Africa and some parts of Asia. It has produced tensions not only in the relations between the emancipated countries and the colonial powers but also within the newborn States themselves and in their relations to other, external, collateral interests. These tensions are due to the universal aspiration for freedom and equality, as insistent as the desire for access to air and water.

We also have economic tensions. We are aware of the tragic economics of the world situation, the growing disparity between rich and poor nations, the haves and the have-nots, the desperate demands of the new nations for equality in commodities, for liberation from mounting, perennial trade deficits, from grinding poverty and economic despair, from hunger and the ignominy of underdevelopment. I must not omit to mention the tensions caused by the vast propaganda enterprises engaged in what has been called 'psychological warfare', used especially by the big powers in their desire for domination with their sophistry of developed and underdeveloped peoples, of inferior and superior political institutions, in terms of animosity and patronage, forgetful of the fact that civilization is a thing of manifold splendour and not something conforming to a particular pattern. These tensions have produced vicious circles of suspicion, fear, hatred, and vindictiveness, with relations between individuals, nations, and peoples being deeply infected by hostility. It is a restless world we live in, a world in which the burden of sorrow and unhappiness is big enough to crush the soul of any sensitive person, a burden far heavier in its totality than at any time in human history. It is no exaggeration to say that within a generation mankind has plunged from the highest expectations regarding the future to the deepest forebodings concerning the destiny of the world and man's civilization. Many feel that humanity is in peril of eventually destroying itself.

And this is where Religion comes in. Just as truly as war begins in the minds of men, so also must the resolution of conflict and the attainment of peace begin in the human mind. Centuries ago the wise King Solomon said that it is not the heaven of heavens that contains God, and in St. Luke's Gospel Jesus said that the Kingdom of God is to be found within us. So did the Buddha in His statement

that all things good and bad have their origin in the mind, have the mind as their progenitor.

Today human hopes and fears are very largely concentrated on what may happen in a world so closely drawn together that the prospect before mankind is often presented in terms of one world or no world at all, that the salvation of the world can only be attained by a fellowship of men. There can be no question that such fellowship can best be secured through religion. For religion's sole concern is with humanity. Science may include in its field of knowledge the starry world and the worlds beyond it, philosophy may try to find some universal principle at the root of all things, but religion inevitably concentrates itself on humanity. It illumines our reason, inspires our wisdom, stimulates our love, and claims our devoted, intelligent service. It is religion that imparts a unique value to our personality in all its completeness, combining and stressing in proper places, establishing a balance of lights and shadows in the background and the foreground. Real religion does not have to go beyond the human sphere for its goal. Salvation is to be obtained not elsewhere, in some other sphere, but in this world, as human beings. The aim of religion is not the ecstasy of lonely souls but the spiritual emancipation of mankind.

Man in his quest for happiness has achieved many things. We have mastered the material world and laid it under contribution to our comfort. But of true inward happiness we have gained very little; there is no contentment, no peace of mind. The world is filled with greed and lust, hatred and malice and ignorance of the verities of life, as shown by our false sense of values. Men seem to have little or no faith in the power of virtue to overcome evil.

Now, it is the self-imposed task of religion to prevent such things. Does it mean, therefore, that religion has failed in its purpose ? In a sense it does, but it would be truer to say that religion has never really had a chance. The world has too long been left to politicians and political coteries, soldiers and journalists, talking glibly about the sanctity of treaties, national honour, the freedom of small nationalities, the deliverance of the oppressed, protection of commerce, and the restraining effects of formidable armaments.

Religion, too, has a sinister past to redeem. Too frequently its mission to mankind has been submitted to the exigencies of provincial and national politics and nefarious schemes of aggrandizement and conquest. In earlier ages almost all religious wars were likewise

national wars. Many of the world's religions have not hesitated to wage 'Holy Wars'. Too often, also, has religion busied itself with details of ritual and dogma, questions of ministerial organization and the infallibility of books and persons. It has often manifested a dread of movement and a desire for comfort. It has been prone to feel smug and self-satisfied, content with which it followed its 'old work' of just telling people to be good, explaining to its docile and gradually diminishing flocks the theologies of the generations before last, looking after its establishments and endowments, purring at the hearth of its comfortable things, and, generally speaking, 'catching mice'. There has been a great reluctance to make any new departure, to attack injustices, to explore selfishness, to use its power to make the ape and the tiger die within us, and the donkey, who dies hardest of all.

All the time, while mankind has done everything to perfect the machinery of hate, religion has done little or nothing to organize and develop the institutions of love. We have harnessed thunder and lightning to our bombs and our rockets, mobilized our food, militarized our money, trained men, women, and children for war-work, and prostituted science for the better execution of the designs of hate. But how weak and ineffective, comparatively speaking, is our machinery for executing the designs of love !

To this extent, then, religion has failed. Its failure in the past makes its obligations for the present and the future all the more imperative. No one can say with truth that there is more hate in the world than love; what is true is that for the moment hatred has contrived to make itself stronger than love. The machinery of hate bases itself on the theory of human depravity; it presupposes the incurable ignorance, selfishness, and stupidity of man. The machinery of love must be built on the theory of human goodness, the unselfishness, compassion, and boundless capacity for self-sacrifice which are proved to be inherent in man. But for it to be effective love must be all-embracing, involving the completeness of self-giving, the true gift of love that maketh rich and addeth no sorrow, not the stereotyped feeling which often passes for compassion, fast disappearing without so much as spoiling one's breakfast. It must be love intensified even to sacrificial degree, total love, the love that casts out all fear and is stronger than death.

And how can love be organized ? By filling the earth with noble and happy human beings. Said John Ruskin: 'There is no wealth

but life, life including its powers of love, of joy, of admiration. That country is richest which nourishes the greatest number of noble and happy human beings.' Men are made noble first by removing from them their evil tendencies, unappeasable greed, fear, and suspicion that lead to hate and ignorance. They must be freed from moral blindness which results from conflicting interests, desire for revenge against past wrongs, fear of possible misuse of power by erstwhile enemies and the extraordinary resources human beings seem to possess for cloaking self-interest with idealism. This strange capacity for self-deception in the pursuit of what one considers to be ideals can be far more dangerous to spiritual growth than the cynicism of men who have discarded all ideals. It is a matter of supreme moment to us that we are in an incessant state of war between that which will save us and that which will drag us into the abyss of disaster. The spirit of fight belongs to the genius of life.

But the negative process of curbing desire and controlling passion is not enough. The spiritual development of the human race depends on the degree in which men and women learn to think independently, fearlessly, and rationally in proportion as mind and conscience are liberated from servile submission to authority and tradition. It assumes the right in everyone to think and, if he feels it worth-while, to speak his thoughts. The greatest progress follows from complete intellectual liberty and perfect freedom of judgment. We can no longer believe that that which has been for generations secure and impressive has been ordained by a divine Providence and will, therefore, endure. It is sanctimonious nonsense to talk about the sacredness of the old order. Men must be prepared to accept changes, even revolutions, if such revolutions provide new opportunities for both justice and freedom for the neglected people of the world. We must recognize that revolutions can have great creative possibilities though they can also sometimes take forms that will destroy both the good and the evil in civilization.

Religion must seek out the virtues already present in men and turn them to its own advantage. Patriotism is one such virtue. It is a noble quality, a salt against rottenness, a glorious spur to high endeavour. Only, it must be the genuine thing, free from prejudice, cruelty, hate, mean and morbid sentimentalism. So also with nationalism. They must be sublimated, qualified with humanism, transmuted. It is only the dense ignorance of their own nature and of their true

relationship with others which keep men and nations apart. Man's inherent humanity must be rescued from the unconscious self to the conscious.

For man to be happy he must establish harmonious relationships with all things with which he has dealings. There must, therefore, be peace in the world, true peace. The quality of peace is unconcerned with soldiers and weapons. What is wanted is the 'heart' that shall make it impossible for men and women to resort to violence. The phrase 'disarmament of minds' is of the utmost significance. There can be no true peace until and unless the causes of tension and conflict are removed. One of the most fruitful of these causes stems, as we see quite clearly, from racial antipathy and racial inequality, from the sense of injustice among the oppressed and the depressed people of the earth. The habits of centuries, even the habits of thought, have to be changed. The fear must also be removed that when men of low degree become the mighty they would turn their revenge on those who dominated them before. Revenge and injustice are both wrong. There can be no fellowship without righteousness, justice and goodwill among those concerned. There cannot be brotherhood except among equals; liberty is the essential preliminary to unity.

These are problems that cannot be shirked under the label of political issues. The separation of church and state stands for very important truths but it is dangerous as a dogma or a slogan unless carefully defined. Since religious ethics are relevant to the whole of life the fields of church and state overlap in many important ways. Both seek the welfare of the same community. 'Religion is politics and politics is brotherhood', said Blake, but the world called him a visionary and paid him no heed. Most leaders of religion were amused and some openly scoffed at him when Mahatma Gandhi attempted to associate religion with statecraft. With one glorious exception, no great nation has tried to maintain political advance side by side with the pursuit of spiritual fulfilment. The one exception was the Mauryan empire of the Buddhist King, Asoka, and the experiment was an unparalleled success.

Let us also remind ourselves that any activity based on religion must express our purest and deepest conscience, and assuage our thirst for righteousness. There can be no place in it for reservations. The integrity and well-being of every country, the contentment of every nation alike, is essential to the happiness of the world. Wher-

ever we are, we must all, in our daily lives, live up to the faith that peace and freedom walk together.

It is a very encouraging feature of the modern world that religions, all religions, have become increasingly alive to the problems of the inner lives of people, which are known as social problems. This is due to a greater appreciation of how much the individual is conditioned by society. It is being increasingly recognized that an individual is not an independent entity having its own freedom apart from its environment. The nature of the social and the political order is therefore of the utmost importance to the development of personal life.

Finally, we who seek to promote world fellowship must first cultivate fellowship among ourselves. Fortunately the favourable winds of change have blown here, too, and reconciliation has become the spirit of the age. The question arises of what may be expected of the forces of religion so evidently resurgent today. Can we marshal these forces in support of a world community, a fellowship of people and nations ? Will they co-operate for such a purpose ? Not only will they co-operate, but will they co-operate effectively ? For something more is required than a mere coming together. Forbearance is not enough because it means unwilling consent to let other people hold views different from one's own. Nor is tolerance enough, for it has an intolerable air of patronizing condescension. What is needed is appreciation—discriminative appreciation, understanding and respect.

The question is sometimes asked: can this be done without diluting the strength of motivation which religion should provide, the motivation essential for truly religious endeavour ? For the actively religious person is a dynamic personality acting under the force of strong convictions. How strong can these convictions be unless they are intimately associated with particular beliefs and practices which tend to promote religious differences rather than religious harmony ? Can we have it both ways ? I believe we can. It is not unity we should seek but union and that union will come through differentiation rather than amalgamation. Differences there have been and will be; they must continue; and undue emphasis on uniformity often results in disaster. It is by the discovery of the difficulties of his own nature that man is brought into fellowship with man.

We should be less inclined to deny and ever more ready to respect and affirm. Thus shall we become more sane and reasonable since

men are apt to deny what they do not understand and affirm those things in which they have found value. When it comes to prestige we should be more eager to give than to receive; when it comes to counsel more eager to take than to give. We must practise the charity of fellowship. This should not be difficult, for all forms of religion arise from the common life and the common ideals of humanity. They have similar spiritual capacity, similar potentiality of nature.

There are those who say that the whole trend of global life today is in the direction of a single world-religion. It is not my purpose here to discuss whether it is practical politics to think in these terms. In my view what we need is not so much a world-religion as a global religious life. We already see welcome trends in this direction. There is evidence of a new era of broadening in which each religion shows inclination to expand its base and take account of what is regarded as valid in other traditions. Such broadening also involves deepening, for we are thereby stimulated to understand our own religion better. We thus get a better appreciation of what pertains to the essence of our religion, the generating principle of religious life.

Everywhere leaders of vision and imagination are beginning to realize that in secular states which reject religion altogether, with clear excision of religion, something, even essentially political, has been lost. The conviction has grown that in such fields as law and order, education and social care, the state alone, by itself, cannot achieve these things successfully. The state alone cannot civilize men. Whatever else may be said about religion, it has meant in the past, and still means, dynamic motivation. Time and again men and women inspired by religious conviction have shown persistence, fortitude, and determination beyond what seems credible. Their faith has moved mountains. It is the same dynamism which we must today enlist in the cause of world peace.

I share the belief that a world-community is in the making, that modern man is standing on the threshold of a new thing, a civilization in the singular. This civilization will depend for its vitality upon the motivation which only spiritual religion can provide. In that new day, religion will also take new form in response to new challenges. Outworn shibboleths will be discarded and new insights admitted. In each religion there will be reinterpretations of traditional beliefs, a rediscovery of essentials, resulting in religion becoming not less but more of itself, making way for the convergence of the great religions on certain basic principles. There will be not a syncre-

tism or a synthesis but an enlarged dialogue, the unity of an orderly conversation; a coincident unity. Since life is a unity and man is a part of that life, the racial solidarity of man must inevitably follow therefrom. It will not be an easy task to accomplish but accomplish it we must. 'Our life', said Lord Morley, 'is a great and noble calling, not a mean and grovelling thing to be shuffled through anyhow; it is a lofty and exalted destiny. We wish for the flowering of that life in a world enlightened by knowledge, guided by reason and animated by love.'

I began with a quotation from President Kennedy; I cannot do better than end it with another quotation from that great human being. 'Our problems,' he said, 'are man-made; therefore, they can be solved by man. And man can be as big as he wants. No problem of human destiny is beyond the reach of human beings. Man's reason and spirit have often resolved the seemingly unsolvable—and we believe they can do it again.'

Europe and the Developing Countries

PIERRE MENDES-FRANCE

THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY comprises 170 million consumers. Considered as a unit, it is the world's largest importer, one of the principal markets for agricultural products and raw materials. This makes it clear that the E.E.C. will play a vital role in the relations between the economically advanced countries and those that are less developed and that it will be called upon to make a decisive contribution to the solution of the most difficult and complex tasks of our days.

But this role of the E.E.C. will be effective only if it is part of a general policy of development conceived as a great common undertaking which concerns the whole world. Accordingly, it is necessary to recall some general problems concerning the countries in the process of development and to try to outline constructive actions by which to deal with them and in which Europe as a whole can play its part.

It is not my intention to dwell more particularly on any one of the countries in process of development or on any particular period, such as the present or the recent past. It is preferable to try to sketch an over-all picture of the problems arising from the events of the last ten years and of the likely prospects for the near future.

Today, 85 per cent of the world's wealth is held by 18 per cent of its population. In other words, 82 per cent of the world's population has to depend on only 15 per cent of its resources. But the gap between the new countries and the advanced countries is increasing from year to year. If present trends continue, the less developed countries will possess 90 per cent of the population in 1970, but only 10 per cent of the world's resources.

The reasons for these trends—the prolonged continuance of which is unthinkable—are known. Starting out with a higher income, the industrialized countries register, in absolute figures, an annual pro-

gress roughly twenty times more rapid than that of the less developed countries.

This results, to a certain extent, from the insufficient share of industry in the production of the underdeveloped economies. The figure, to be sure, varies in the extreme: between 20 and 30 per cent in South Africa, Brazil, Argentina, Mexico, perhaps China; between 15 and 20 per cent in India, Morocco, Chile, Colombia; less than 10 per cent in Indonesia, Egypt, and Pakistan.

To this factor, one must add the effects of the comparative rates of population increase. The world rate of population increase from 1953 to 1959 was 1.7 per cent per annum. The increase of population was slower in Europe (0.8 per cent) and particularly in north-western Europe. But it was 1.9 per cent in Africa, over 2 per cent in Asia and almost 2.6 per cent in Latin America. If these rates are to stay as they are, the population will increase in the wealthy countries from 470 million inhabitants in 1962 to 520 million in 1970, an increase of 10 per cent; while in the underdeveloped countries, it will rise from 1,430 to 1,735 million, an increase of over 20 per cent.

Of course, the rates of population increase do not in themselves reflect underdevelopment. Increase in population takes on a special significance because it is often associated with rigid economic structures and the failure to increase production at a sufficient tempo. In the last ten years, all production has not remained stagnant in the less developed countries; often, it has progressed, but too slowly and, moreover, at very different rhythms from one country to another, or from one sector of production to another.

Putting aside all these particularities, it is only important to keep in mind an impressive global fact:

In 1962, the average per capita income of the industrialized countries belonging to the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development[1] was 1,900 dollars, whereas in the underdeveloped countries it was 130 dollars. In 1970, if present trends continue, the average income in the disinherited countries will increase to 150 dollars against 2,500 in the industrialized countries. That means that the difference between the two groups which is 1,770 dollars today will be 2,350 dollars in a few years.

Obviously, such a prospective evolution is intolerable. Every

[1]United States, United Kingdom, France, Western Germany, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, Canada, etc.

effort must be made to increase the income of the underdeveloped countries.

To this end, these countries—and this is their first task—will have to convert a larger part of their production into savings, to forgo unnecessary expenses, lavish consumption (private or public), prestige investments, and spectacular public works when they are not productive, and earmark the highest proportion of their resources for basic investments.

But, in any case, if the rate of savings remains small, there is the risk that the increase in income will not outweigh the growth in population. In Paraguay, the national product has increased by 1.5 per cent from 1953 to 1960, while the population has grown by roughly 2.7 per cent; thus, there was a reduction in per capita income. During the same period, Yugoslavia, where the rate of demographic increase is small (scarcely more than 1 per cent), registered a marked progress in per capita income.

In any event, before a country can take off (economically speaking), its rate of investments must be raised to a high level. Over the last few years, gross capital investments in the underdeveloped countries as a whole have amounted to 15 to 18 per cent of the gross national product, or approximately 30 billion dollars. But this proportion has varied in the extreme from one country to another. For the period from 1958 to 1960, it has been 9 per cent in the Philippines and 10 per cent in Chile, but 20 per cent in Taiwan and Colombia, and 22 per cent in Greece.

Everywhere, the share of the national income devoted to investments creates a pronounced discrepancy between production and consumption. In other words, it imposes privations on peoples who are already impoverished. And sometimes, these privations are rendered even more severe by other handicaps, such as: a drop in the prices of the raw materials exported (I shall have more to say on this point); heavy military expenditures; and the necessity of amortizing debts previously contracted (this is the case with an increasing number of countries).

Indeed, it is the duty of the more highly developed countries—and it is also to their interest—to support the efforts and plans of the countries suffering under all these difficulties. The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (O.E.C.D.) has set up for this purpose a special organ, the Development Assistance Commission (D.A.C.) representing the principal industrialized countries of

the West and Japan. The function of this group is primarily to increase the flow of capital to the countries in process of development and the effectiveness of the aid provided to them without infringing the freedom of their decisions.

In order to carry out such a programme, each of the beneficiary countries should have its own programme of action, or, more precisely, its Plan. Only then can it retain the ultimate control over the structural, administrative, fiscal, and other measures involved, which should not be conceived elsewhere or imposed from outside.

Now, if, after having examined one end of the chain, we take a look at what is happening at the other end, that is in the contributing countries, it becomes clear that external aid can materialize and be effective only if it obtains the support of public opinion in those countries.

Strong resistance is still met with in certain influential circles. But the difficult task of educating and moulding public opinion in such matters has made great progress in the last ten years in Europe.

Norway has been able to establish a special tax by which the population contributes directly and knowingly to the assistance of poorer countries. In Denmark, the government and the most powerful organizations have launched, to the same end, a large fund-raising campaign, which has brought very considerable results. In France each tax-payer knows that, when he pays 100 francs to the state, six or seven francs are devoted to the underdeveloped countries.

The participation of the member countries of the D.A.C. in the investments in other continents can take various forms: direct public contributions, gifts or loans in the form of cash, equipment, or technical assistance (apportioned for the most part bilaterally, that is, on the basis of agreements between governments, but also, in lesser degree, through the mediation of international institutions).

All these amount approximately to 6 billion dollars yearly to which is to be added $2\frac{1}{2}$ billions in private investments originating in the same countries. Not including of course military aid, this amounts to a total of about 8 billions, or between one-third and one quarter of the global gross investments in the developing countries.

Yet the gross total of Western aid was slightly less in 1963 than what it had been in 1962; and that is an unfortunate situation which the D.A.C. will have to examine and correct as soon as possible.

In the last few years, private investments have been continuously

decreasing. In 1956, they accounted for approximately 50 per cent of the resources made available by the Western countries to the less developed countries. In 1962, this proportion had fallen to 30 per cent. In fact it was even lower because so-called private operations were often made possible only through official guarantees on the part of the governments of the industrialized countries and this meant that private investments, in many cases, amounted in essence to indirect governmental aid.

The trend in the relation between public and private investments seems likely to continue. Private capital will correspond less and less to the needs of the countries in the process of development because they will require increasingly favourable financial conditions if their balance of foreign payments is not to be hopelessly dislocated by the burden of interest payments and amortization charges. Already this burden has doubled in five years and it amounts today to 2½ billion dollars, i.e. more than a quarter of the total external aid they get. On the other hand, the newly independent countries in Africa or Asia wish rightly to keep direct control over the key sectors of their economy, which again militates against private capital financing.

The share of the European Six in the total public and private aid to the countries in the way of development is far from negligible, coming to roughly 3,000 million dollars annually—two-thirds for the public sector (through bilateral or multilateral channels) and one-third for the private sector. The United States for its part provides approximately 4,700 million dollars.

However, these figures do not accurately reflect the real burden which aid to the underdeveloped countries represents for the countries that supply it. We can form an accurate picture only by taking into account the national income of the latter. In this light, France may be said to contribute most heavily. French investments of every kind in the underdeveloped world have amounted, for more than ten years, to 2 per cent of the French national income, that is about 1,300 or 1,400 million dollars yearly.

Although the greater part of France's expenditure in this field is for the benefit of Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, Equatorial Africa, and Madagascar, it participates also in various aid projects for the benefit of numerous countries on all five continents. The wherewithal it supplies to them has grown quite steadily but, in accordance with a trend already stressed, the share provided by government organs has increased more than that of private origin, rising from

58 per cent of the total in 1956 to more than 70 per cent in the last few years.

Taken as a whole, the 2 per cent of its national income which France sets aside for external aid is a larger share than that of any other country. It is an exact percentage of this kind that eminent experts of the U.N. have for long recommended to the industrialized countries. If all these countries provided a contribution amounting to 2 per cent of their national income, the solution of the problem of development would be greatly facilitated.

The essential is that every country be called upon to provide a contribution calculated on the basis of its own resources, and that the total contributions should, as soon as possible, begin to approach the amount needed.

For the time being, the financial aid that the industrialized countries are giving to other countries does not begin to measure up to the needs. And the proposals that have been made in the course of the last few years have shown that it is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to organize aid on a sufficient scale and within the required time, exclusively on a multilateral basis, that is, through international bodies.

In the great emergency that faces us, each of the industrialized or even semi-industrialized nations should solemnly undertake to earmark a certain percentage of its national income, say 2 per cent (or less at the beginning), to provide aid to development in the most suitable way. This could be done either by bilateral agreements or through international organizations. At least once a year, accounts should be submitted to an international authority such as the United Nations, which would draw up and publish a progress report. In fact, such a system would be an extension or widening of the semi-multilateral procedure already used by the Western industrialized countries and Japan through the D.A.C.

If the United Nations would adopt it and put it into effect, everything would be out in the open, at last. The publicity would prevent such abuses as political pressure or the expenditure of funds for unproductive purposes. World opinion would be informed of each country's contribution and those doing too little and too late would be induced to participate more effectively.

This would make possible a more systematic, co-ordinated and multilateral effort at a later stage.

But this is not all. International assistance must obviously be given in every department where the process of development requires it.

Most of the countries in question obtain a large part of their income by exporting food products and raw materials. One of the best forms of aid, consequently, consists in enabling them to draw greater benefit from their exports.

But, over a long period, the terms of trade, that is to say, the ratio between the prices of the raw materials sold by the poor countries and those of the manufactured products they buy, have followed an unfavourable trend. Of course, the terms of exchange vary from country to country, because they depend on the composition of each country's foreign trade. But, generally speaking, and as a result of a number of complex factors (the respective structures of the markets of the industrial and underdeveloped countries, the competition of raw materials produced by the industrialized countries themselves, the increasing utilization of synthetic products, and so on) it may be said that the countries producing raw materials are becoming steadily more impoverished.

U Thant, the Secretary-General of the U.N., recently stated that, in the last fifteen years, the financial aid provided by the most developed countries had not fully compensated the loss suffered by the countries exporting primary products owing to the way the market prices of these products had evolved. There were rich countries which, during certain periods, were saved from an unfavourable balance of payments only by the fact that they paid lower prices for the raw materials purchased from the poor countries !

Since the summer of 1962, there has been an increase in the prices of certain raw materials and agricultural products. But this movement has only partially compensated for previous losses and there is no guarantee, for the time being, about further developments. Anyway, in spite of the recent price increases, the share of the underdeveloped countries in world trade has fallen from 32 per cent in 1961 to less than 25 per cent in 1963.

The system in which world prices are below production costs, in which surpluses, impossible to sell and costly to store, coexist with shortages and famines, is tragically characteristic of an epoch that has proved unable to work out and put into effect the daring measures which, everyone knows, will have to be taken sooner or later.

A just reward for the labour and production of the poor countries and a guarantee of normal, stable and, if possible, increasing receipts,

remain objectives that are far from having been attained. It should be possible to increase the world prices of certain raw materials and agricultural products in such a way as to do away with the present glaring discrepancy between cost prices and market prices. Systems of floor-prices, ceiling prices, and buffer stocks already exist for certain products such as tin and wheat. These may not have been wholly successful, but they at least constitute important precedents.

Personally, I should suggest a comprehensive system based on a few simple principles:

The importing nations could gradually reduce the frequently high customs and other duties which limit the consumption of food products or materials originating in other continents.

The exporting nations could agree to put on the world market only a part of their production, corresponding to solvent needs.

Surpluses could be used to improve the food supply of some developing countries through gifts or sales at special prices and terms.

The financing could be done in part by a tax levied on the quantities sold normally on the market, in part by payments of the rich countries within the framework of the general contribution of two per cent, and in part by contributions from the beneficiary countries, which would be permitted, in order to safeguard their balance of payments, to pay them in non-transferable currencies.

But every effort to stabilize the world prices of raw materials must, if it is to be effective, be complemented by a transformation of existing commercial structures. Otherwise, the producers in the underdeveloped countries would gain next to nothing, for almost all the profit would go to certain intermediaries who still play an important role, engaging in monopolistic practices, taking advantage of fluctuations of supply and demand, the absence of storage facilities, and financial weakness of the producers, and making super-profits at the expense of the workers and farmers of overseas countries.

There is another equally complex problem. The underdeveloped countries will remain economically vulnerable as long as they are almost exclusively dependent on the production and sale of a limited number of raw materials. It will be more and more to the interest of these countries to increase their manufacture of semi-finished or, more frequently at the start, of import-saving goods, i.e. with a view to replacing goods previously imported by merchandise of local origin. So India, for instance, was on the right track when

it succeeded in becoming, like Japan, one of the most important textile exporters in the world.

To be sure, the industrial countries have every right to safeguard their essential interests and to meet the requirements of their economic health. The countries in process of industrialization must not disregard the difficulties of all kinds, not to say hardships, that can result from what has been called social dumping, that is, competition based on extreme disparities in wages and social legislation between one continent and another.

But where does unfair competition, social dumping, really begin? That is not easy to determine. The United States, after all, opens its markets, to a certain degree, to automobiles manufactured in Europe by workers receiving wages one-third or one half of those of American workers. The undesirable consequences of this form of trade could be avoided by negotiation in good faith between the United States, Canada, the European industrialized countries, and the new countries concerned, with a view to determining quantities or quotas and establishing criteria and necessary precautions.

In any case, the advanced countries must understand that the international distribution of production should be adapted to a world situation that has changed radically in the last fifty years. Actually such a process of adaptation is gradually taking place. The imports of manufactured goods by the six Common Market countries from developing countries have increased very rapidly over the last ten years and this increase—which was faster than that of similar imports in the totality of the industrialized countries—has involved no serious disadvantage for Europe.

The precedent of the cotton industry is also highly significant. Great Britain took the first step, several years ago, by opening its markets more amply to textile manufactures from India, Pakistan, and Hong Kong. A wider multilateral agreement was arrived at in October 1962 and the industrialized countries relaxed their quantitative restrictions on imports. The total quotas offered by the six E.E.C. countries will increase from 6,200 tons in 1962 to 12,000 tons in 1967.

Agreements of the same kind should be worked out between the industrialized countries on the one hand, and Latin American, African, and Asian countries on the other hand for other industrial commodities.

It is in the same spirit that the Belgian government, in May 1963,

proposed to the G.A.T.T. and, more recently, to the World Trade Conference a plan tending to favour the creation of new industries in the developing countries and to reduce the tariffs on products of these industries exported to the advanced countries. According to this project, the differences in cost prices and wages would be offset by a system of import taxes that would diminish the discrepancy between Western cost prices and the much lower cost prices prevailing in the developing countries. These compensatory duties would be refunded to the exporting countries thus increasing their supply of hard currency.

To be sure, the number of manufactured products that the nations in the process of industrialization can export is still small. In the first phase, these nations will limit themselves to the less mechanised sectors, involving a limited use of capital and large amounts of labour power. For their part, the advanced countries will be called upon to make commercial concessions, but that will not cause them unbearable hardships if they progressively convert their own industries, orienting them towards the most mechanized sectors which require heavy investments and a small but highly qualified labour force.

A new international division of labour is necessary. The heads of the European Economic Community are doing their best to make it clear to Western public opinion that whatever aid is not provided in this way will in the end have to be provided by financial loans and gifts.

It is obvious, however, that if the less developed countries wish to increase their industrial production and market it in the more advanced continents, they must not allow new and ruinous competition to spring up in their midst. This would be the case if a large number of new countries should decide to sell the same commodities in Europe or North America. Agreements are indispensable between those governments and planning administrations which might envisage the same types of industrialization. This implies a co-ordination of the plans for development and export which has often been advocated by the Economic Commissions for Latin America and for Asia and the Far East.

This brings us to the highly important question of a regional organization of the world's economic life. For the time being, the countries in the process of development are far more dependent on

trade with distant industrial countries than on relations with countries of their own region.

Argentine wheat is sold in Europe rather than in the neighbouring countries of Latin America which are indeed lacking in food. The countries of the Far East export to the West half of their excess sugar, whereas their neighbours import approximately equal quantities from Europe. Competing productive efforts have developed side by side in countries of the same region (coffee and bananas in Latin America, jute in India and Pakistan), a fact that can only aggravate the condition of already depressed markets.

Regional co-operation is the logical solution for such contradictions and some progress has already been made in this direction in Central and South America. This trend must be developed and strengthened in the near future, whatever political difficulties might be encountered.

Obviously, regionalist tendencies are at variance with the orthodox philosophy which has thus far dominated the G.A.T.T. and led it to neglect this problem. The industrialization of the underdeveloped countries would be greatly facilitated if the G.A.T.T. principles, and particularly those concerning the most favoured nation clause, were relaxed. It should be made possible, at least for a time, to grant specific privileges to the countries engaged in regional agreements, especially when in the process of development. For want of specific tariff provisions and concessions, measures designed to help some of them may well prove far more beneficial to advanced nations (Japan, for instance) and this, in turn, would intensify the opposition of the countries of Europe and North America to the conversion of world trade that remains so necessary.

In his sixth annual report the President of the European Economic Community reiterated E.E.C.'s determination to keep pace with its increasing responsibilities towards the countries in the process of development, to expand its financial assistance, to diversify its method of action, and to amplify its technical co-operation. Just as the E.E.C. is committed to a common commercial policy, it must now define common principles and set up common organs in connection with its aid to the development of the new countries. It already has, at its disposal, the European Development Fund and the European Investments Bank whose territorial competence could be extended to all the countries in the process of development. Such an extension

should be accompanied by a reinforcement of the resources at the disposal of these agencies. Such institutions could be instrumental in helping land, fiscal, and other reforms which are so necessary in certain countries.

Finally, because the Community is one of the largest of the world's markets for agricultural products and raw materials, it can, as I have already stressed, play a very effective part in stabilizing the prices of these commodities. Its present action in Africa to attenuate the fluctuations in the prices of certain agricultural products is a noteworthy example which might well be amplified.

All the methods of action that I have briefly outlined and many others must, if they are to be effective, be inspired by a spirit of solidarity, and of political clairvoyance, in other words by an accurate understanding of the historical transformations that are taking place before our eyes.

After all, what is happening today throughout the world is not so very different from what took place in our European countries in the nineteenth century, when economic and social changes shattered the old relationships between privileged categories and underprivileged classes. For a long time, the latter had been resigned to their condition. Then, suddenly, a hundred years ago, they began to demand more political rights and more social justice.

Certain doctrinaires believed that the antagonisms, which thus came to light, were irreducible and would lead to increasingly acute conflicts. Events have belied their pessimistic prophecies. In England, in France, in the Scandinavian countries, and elsewhere, the most dynamic elements, the more progressive political organizations and trade unions, and even an enlightened fraction of the possessing classes imposed a gradual transformation of political structures and social relations tending toward greater equity.

Taxation reforms, social legislation, the democratization of education and culture, and agrarian laws have reduced inequalities and made important progresses possible. A share of the power and wealth was transferred to those who had been largely deprived of them until then. Even if these steps forward were insufficient, no one can deny that they constituted progress and advance.

Moreover, the reforms have been beneficial to all; by increasing general productivity, they benefited the whole collectively, including those who had been obliged to make concessions and, in some cases, slight sacrifices at first.

At present we are witnessing, on a world scale, events rather similar to those which took place a hundred years ago within our European societies. Today there is a striking contrast between highly developed countries and disinherited nations, and it reminds one of the contrast which then existed between the privileged *bourgeoisie* and the working class and peasantry. After having acquired national sovereignty, the less favoured countries are demanding more equitable wages and a better life in return for the work they perform and the goods they produce.

Here again, far-sighted and courageous measures will bring about a better distribution of wealth and rights. If these measures are taken in time, they will later prove to be beneficial to all, including those who in the beginning will have to contribute and even to accept certain moderate sacrifices.

True, the development of the new nations that have recently acquired their independence remains contingent upon the effectiveness of their own policies, of decisions which are entirely in the domain of their own initiative and judgment. Every nation must reflect the profound preoccupations and authentic desires of its people.

But the international framework within which each nation lives depends on the collaboration of all.

The Role of Science and Technology in the Development of Underdeveloped Countries in South Asia

GUNNAR MYRDAL

I

IN MOST RESPECTS the conditions for economic development are much less favourable for the underdeveloped countries in South Asia today than they were for the now highly developed countries when they approached the era of their rapid development. Generally, this is true of climatic conditions, prospects for international trade, and, of course, population trends. There is, however, one important difference which would seem to counterbalance these greater difficulties: *the much higher level of scientific and technological knowledge at present available to the underdeveloped countries.* They need not go through the slow, costly process of trial and error necessitated by new discoveries and inventions. The accumulated heritage of past and present science and technology is now accessible with much less effort than was once required to develop it. As Edward S. Mason points out:

> . . . the underdeveloped countries . . . could hardly be at an absolute disadvantage, as compared with the initiators of industrial development, since they always have the alternative of devising techniques themselves, as their predecessors in development have done.[1]

This advantage from accumulated technological advance was once evident in the particularly high rates of industrialization and general

[1] Edward S. Mason, *Economic Planning in Underdeveloped Areas: Government and Business*, Fordham University Press, New York, 1958, p. 85—footnote 13.

economic development in those Western countries which entered the development phase at a later point of time.[2]

But the discussion cannot stop at this tautological assertion that the availability of more technological knowledge must *per se* be a difference in initial conditions that works to the advantage of the late-comer. All the authors who have written about this—including Mason—present a number of qualifications that tend to decrease this advantage. Before we continue our analysis, we should remark that the serious lack of empirical study of the relevant facts restricts us in most respects merely to stating problems that are still open, while what we feel we can positively assert remains vague and general.

One main category of those qualifications concerns the nature of modern technology compared with that once applied when the now developed countries had their spurts of industrialization. For one thing it is usually held that technological development has greatly increased the optimal plant or firm size. With advanced techniques, the volume of output required to achieve minimum costs—or even costs which are not very much higher—will therefore often be in excess of what the limited domestic market can absorb; this creates a special hardship for the smaller countries in the region.[3] The smallness of the domestic market gains importance because of the generally unpromising outlook for manufactured exports and regional co-operation.

It is worth noting, however, that optimally efficient production techniques imply a production function which, in conjunction with factor prices, yields minimum costs. Factor prices differ in the underdeveloped countries of the region from those existing in the developed countries, so that a different production function (and not simply a movement along a given function) might be optimally efficient in their circumstances; this technique might not imply a very large optimal size. Moreover, there might be a large area of indifference where a smaller size would not increase costs, or would

[2] This analogy is present in the thinking on economic planning in India. 'Countries which start later on their industrial career have some advantage in that they have, in the main, to take over and apply techniques that have been worked successfully in more advanced countries.' (India, Government of, Planning Commission, *Second Five Year Plan*, New Delhi, 1956, p. 6.)

[3] 'Smallness' in this context must be defined in terms of aggregate, monetized demand, actual and potential, not in terms of size of population. This should be remembered when comparing countries like Malaya and the Philippines with India or Pakistan.

do so only slightly. As has been suggested, 'the scope for developing new technological innovations, by modification and combination of various alternatives, is considerably broader than was the case when the original technological changes were developed'.[4] But such innovations require enterprise, fresh thinking and research, all of which are scarce in underdeveloped countries (see below).

It is the author's feeling that the adverse economic impact of limited domestic markets has been overemphasized in the literature. In any case, the impact is different on different industries and is often greater on heavy than on light industry. But much more detailed research is needed before the true significance of the size of the domestic market can be correctly appreciated. Enough relevant information is not available to warrant the blanket assertions found in the literature which are sometimes embellished by the presentation of untested mathematical models founded on abstract and unrealistic assumptions.

Another aspect of modern technology usually thought to increase the difficulties of its adaptation in South Asian countries is its character of requiring larger initial investments than were necessary in the earlier phases of Western industrialization. In this connection, it is pointed out that present-day technology is mainly a product of societies faced with labour scarcity and possessing a supply of capital relatively much greater than that existing in South Asia. Thus, modern technology tends to be labour-saving and capital-intensive. As such it is not closely adapted to the needs of economies faced with capital scarcity and labour abundance. If modern technology is more capital-intensive, much of it may be beyond the means of the extremely poor, capital-starved economies in the region; in any case this may severely limit the scope and rate of their industrialization.

But the assumption that modern technology is more capital-intensive is another proposition that requires more specific evidence and which is undoubtedly not valid in every instance. Many branches of industry using modern technology are capital-saving in the more important sense of reduced capital consumed per unit of output. Neither is it universally true that modern technology requires bigger units of capital initially, especially in light industry. Again, as in the case of optimal size, it may be that intelligent adaptation to the

[4] C. Wolf and S. C. Sufrin, *Capital Formation and Foreign Investment in Underdeveloped Areas.* Syracuse University Press, Syracuse, 1955, p. 40.

different factor proportions and other conditions in South Asia would enable modern technology to be utilized so that less capital is required. It seems, therefore, somewhat hazardous and perhaps misleading to make the usual broad generalizations.

Nevertheless, it is possible and perhaps probable that modern technology requires more overall capital investment in the form of transport and power than it did earlier. If so, and if these magnitudes are somehow allocated to new industries, the probability that new production techniques need a heavier initial investment rises sharply. Even that generalization seems somewhat uncertain, however. While much of the early industrial development in England preceded railway expansion, it involved canal building, which in the latter half of the eighteenth century represented a substantial investment. The other countries of Western Europe and the new world that had their industrial revolutions later had to invest in railways, which are just as expensive.

One important difference in modern industrial technology compared with that in the early phases of industrialization in the West is that, even apart from the demands upon overall capital investment, there are tremendous external economies if an industrial enterprise grows up in an already developed industrial surrounding. Or, from the opposite point of view, there is great difficulty in starting one single industry without that support. As Everett E. Hagen points out: 'A Western (industrial) economy is a technical (and cultural) complex, not a set of isolated pieces of technology'.[5] This character of modern technology makes the beginning stages of industrialization much more difficult today, particularly when lack of capital, enterprise, and skills sets narrow limits to the scope of the industrialization efforts.

A third main difficulty for the underdeveloped countries in the

[5] '. . . Every Western industry depends for its efficiency on other industries. It assumes the ready availability of materials, components, and tools. It depends also on auxiliary enterprises which can provide technical, financial, and managerial services on demand; on a complex network of communication and transportation facilities; and on an intricate system of business practices. A Western economy is a technical (and cultural) complex, not a set of isolated pieces of technology. In an underdeveloped society the auxiliary industries are missing and the framework of business practices is different. One piece cannot be detached from the complex and used efficiently elsewhere without skilful adaptation.' (Everett E. Hagen, *On the Theory of Social Change*, How Economic Growth Begins, The Dorsey Press, Cambridge, 1962, p. 31).

region when it comes to taking advantage of the higher level of technology is the shortage of skills. Clearly, the use of modern technology implies a certain minimum supply of various skills which are generally lacking in the region. There is a need not only for a somewhat more skilled labour force than is available in adequate numbers, but for technicians and managers as well. The achievement of the requisite skill levels of all kinds necessitates substantial efforts in the field of 'education', broadly conceived to include academic degrees in science, a widespread attack on illiteracy, and much for-the-job and on-the-job training. Managerial and engineering skills, in particular, are fully developed only after a certain amount of experience has been acquired.

A major point in this connection is that the adaptation of modern technology to the smaller plant size and lower capital intensity obtaining in the underdeveloped countries, which remains a possibility, would raise particularly heavy demands for technical and managerial skills. Without them, the South Asian countries might come more under the spell of having to adopt the techniques of the advanced countries, unadjusted to their own conditions. The difficulties already mentioned would then be more valid and relevant. The limitations of their domestic markets will thus usually pose a greater problem than they would, were the managerial and engineering skills necessary for this adaptation not so scarce. For the same reason, these countries may be compelled to use more capital-intensive techniques than would *per se* be economic. Bigger plants and firms may, indeed, provide a means of economizing these types of rare skills. Lack of skilled workers may in the same way induce more capital-intensive production techniques. It is obvious that the scarcity of trained managers, engineers, and workers, in addition to the limited supply of capital, sets narrow limits to developing at the outset the optimal complex of industries and auxiliary enterprises.

In this way *the lack of skills can be said to be a basic bottleneck.* There can be little doubt that the educational level now considered minimal for successful operation of a modern industrial establishment is substantially greater than it was in the early period of Western industrialization. Most of the inventions of the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries were mechanical in nature, whereas today they are increasingly concerned with the structure of matter and energy, chemical processes, metallurgy and so on. In the early phase of the industrial revolution it was the entrepreneurs themselves who, for

example in the textile industry, had to make the machines needed for their factories, which they were capable of doing since—it has been suggested—the new machinery

> . . . involved no principles that an intelligent merchant could not grasp. Indeed, much of the mechanical invention of these years was simply the result of the harnessing of the traditional skills of clock-makers, millwrights, blacksmiths, and the like to the needs of the entrepreneur.[6]

Or in the words of Mason,

> the early developments in industrial technology were undertaken not by men of science who discovered the practical application of general principles but by skilled artisans and tinkers working in the eighteenth-century equivalent of the twentieth-century garage.[7]

Successful adoption and adaptation of present-day technology, on the other hand, requires a much greater knowledge of general science as well as a more highly skilled and disciplined labour force. The connection between science and production is probably closer today than ever before in history (see below). The implications of this for any economy whose work force is largely unskilled and illiterate and where managerial and engineering talent is in short supply are obvious and must stand as a serious obstacle to the adoption of more modern production techniques by making them more costly and time-consuming.

II

OUR REMARKS ABOVE, LIKE the discussion in the literature to which they refer, concern industry. Though industrialization is of crucial importance for long-range development, the bigger and more pressing problem in the South Asian countries is agriculture. It contains the great majority of the labour force and must absorb by far the larger

[6] Charles Wilson: 'Technology and Industrial Organization,' in Charles Singer, E. J. Holmyard, A. R. Hall and Trevor I. Williams (editors), *A History of Technology*, Vol. V, The Late Nineteenth Century *c* 1850 to *c* 1900, The Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1958, pp. 799-800.

[7] Mason, *Economic Planning*, p.32.

part of the increase in the labour force for decades to come, even should industrialization proceed very much faster than it is proceeding anywhere in South Asia.

The problem of utilizing modern technology in agriculture is an altogether different proposition from applying it to industry.

For one thing, the factor proportions are more nearly fixed in advance and are entirely different. Modern agricultural technology in the Western world has been directed towards raising yields, while the labour force has been rapidly and steadily decreased. This is a pattern of technological development which simply does not fit South Asian conditions. Instead, a very large and rapidly increasing labour force must be used more effectively in agriculture. This makes the larger part of modern agricultural technology unadaptable to South Asian conditions. What can be used are some specific techniques—artificial insemination, new methods of preventing plant diseases, etc.—but even they often have to be radically adjusted to South Asian conditions.

The development problem in agriculture is, therefore, entirely different from what it is in industry, where it is feasible and may be advantageous to set up a new plant more or less along Western lines, if possible adjusted somewhat to the different conditions in regard to climate, factor proportions, etc. In fact, industrialization implies that many such plants are established, selected and co-ordinated in such a way that they form a complex containing as many external economies as possible. As the modern industrial sector is new, even the institutional barriers are not so serious. Doing this on a larger scale in agriculture, however, would rob the labour force imprisoned there of their meagre livelihood. On the whole, all land is cultivated; if more can be cultivated this is costly and there is usually labour pressing to use it following more or less the old pattern of labour intensity. The proportions of land and labour are thus in the main given and on the whole changing in a way to increase the need for a much bigger labour input per unit of cultivated area. The improvement of productivity in agriculture has to adjust to these existing and foreseeable proportions, as well as to the fixed institutional conditions which limit technical advance in various ways. This involves something more than and, more important, something completely different from just borrowing and adapting modern technology. It means in fact creating a new technology with little possibility simply of taking over even most of the specific techniques from the more advanced countries.

A second reason why adoption of modern agricultural technology from advanced countries is not very practical is that this technology is founded upon basic research which for natural reasons has not been aimed at agriculture carried on under the climatic and soil conditions in South Asia—except in regard to plantation economy, which has been a direct economic concern to investors in the Western countries. The institutions in the region working on basic or applied research in the agricultural field—and the same holds true for forestry—are far too few and ineffective to have had any major impact. Like economic research, their work is too much under the spell of Western science and technology. Often their ambition is to produce results that fit the Western tradition more than they fit the needs of their own countries.

III

WITH ALL THE RESERVATIONS we have noted in regard to the difficulties inherent in its adaptation to South Asian conditions, the availability of a superior technology should nevertheless constitute a net advantage in initial conditions. The qualifications refer essentially to the difference between modern technology and that applied when the now developed countries were developing. They should not entirely obliterate the fact—which *per se* must be a difference in initial conditions favourable to the underdeveloped countries in South Asia—that individual entrepreneurs as well as states can today approach their problems with a wealth of scientific and technological knowledge vastly superior to that accessible to the now advanced countries during their pre-industrial phase of development.

But this whole approach to the problem is static. The important thing about modern science and technology is not that they have achieved a much higher level, but that they are, in fact, continually and rapidly rising to ever higher levels. To an extent this dynamic character of the problem of technological progress may seem to have been taken care of by the occasional remarks that the problem 'is not merely one of introducing some degree of improvement in techniques; it is a matter of raising the *rate* of technological progress'.[8] It is then frequently pointed out that to accomplish this and to maintain a high rate of technological advance adapted to the condi-

[8] Benjamin Higgins, *Economic Development*, W. W. Norton Co., New York, 1959, p. 185.

tions peculiar to underdeveloped countries will require research facilities well in advance of the needs in the Western countries in their early phases of industrialization. It is also noted that rapid development assumes raising the levels of education generally and diffusing more rational and enterprising attitudes among the people and, in particular, among administrators and business entrepreneurs. These thoughts are then rationalized in the demands for a more scientific outlook and the arrival of the 'new man', the 'scientific man', the 'industrial man'.

The surprising thing is, however, that no one has pointed out the importance of the world environment within which the possible advances in enterprise, innovations, and research in the underdeveloped countries are accruing. In the developed countries science and technology are now progressing at an ever faster pace with huge resources placed at their disposal. This activity is naturally only to a very minor, almost infinitesimal, extent focussed on what is of direct importance for the underdeveloped countries. Its direction is determined by the interests of the developed countries themselves and of their various industries. Thereby it continually creates additional difficulties for the underdeveloped countries. What is in an almost inexplicable way concealed in economic writings on the role of science and technology in the development of underdeveloped countries is the obvious fact that its impact has been, and is today, operating to the great detriment of the development prospects of those countries; of course, in the more specific contexts of the several problems, this negative impact is registered and analysed. The general point that *the technological development continually creates new or increased impediments to economic development in underdeveloped countries is regularly missed by the economists.*[9]

[9] The fact is seen more often by the philosopher-historian, when he faces the general issue of the impact of science and technology on development, than by the economist.

'Briefly it may be stated . . . that the world is on the doorstep of a great transformation which will make the gap between the scientifically advanced and the scientifically backward nations deeper and wider; making the latter more than ever dependent for all essential things on the more powerful nations.' (K. M. Panikkar, *Afro-Asian States and their Problems*, George Allen & Unwin Ltd., London, 1959, p. 80).

The only fault with this statement of Panikkar's is that this is not a new development but one which dates far back. It, like the widening gap, is a process that has been going on for at least a century and more, though the speed of this process has been, and is, accelerating.

The deterioration in the trading position of the underdeveloped countries since shortly after the First World War—except in those few that have petroleum and other resources for which the demand is rapidly rising owing to the development in the developed countries—is thus in large part caused by scientific and technological advances in the developed countries: by rapidly raising agricultural productivity there, by making possible substantial savings of raw materials in industrial production, and by the development of synthetic industrial substitutes for some of them. Likewise, the population explosion is caused by advances in medical science and technology which have lowered mortality rates. Since the development of science and technology is not abating but is rapidly proceeding, it is to be expected that its detrimental impact on the economies of underdeveloped countries will continue. It would be unreasonable to expect that this activity, carried on in response to the needs felt in the developed countries and financed by them and their industries, would not be directed to the advantage of these countries and their industries.

Moreover, advances are advances, and it would be entirely contrary to the spirit of our civilization to argue that, as a protection for underdeveloped countries, these advances should be stopped or that their results should not be utilized. The rich countries will continue to raise agricultural productivity, make savings in the use of raw materials and develop new industrial substitutes. The time might not be too distant when, for instance, we are able to produce synthetically not only coffee but also tea and cocoa; research work to this end is proceeding in several industrial laboratories. And to cure diseases and prevent deaths, and to do this ever more effectively in the underdeveloped countries as well, is even more an intrinsic part of the ethos of our civilization, common to people in both the developed and underdeveloped countries. These efforts will continue, even though it is clear that they accelerate the population increase and build up ever greater impediments to economic progress.

IV

WHILE ANY TYPE OF protectionism in the interest of the development efforts in underdeveloped countries designed to restrict scientific and technological advance or its practical utilization is out of the question, what could be done is to counteract the unfortunate impact of that advance by *intentionally increasing research activity and directing*

much of it towards problems the solution of which would be in the interest of the underdeveloped countries. This would imply 'aid' offered by the developed countries of another type and, in particular, of a much bigger dimension than anything previously done or now contemplated in terms of technical assistance.

In agriculture there are vast areas of needed scientific and technological research. about the attributes of soils in various tropical areas, their reaction to rain in diverse quantities and distribution over the year, their need for drainage, irrigation, and fertilizers of different sorts, and their behaviour in relation to various combinations of water and fertilizers; about improved seeds and animal stocks, more productive cropping patterns, more appropriate tools and machines, improved means of preventing plant and animal diseases and of storage of perishable products, etc. It is the intensive study of similar problems in the temperate zones that has made possible the dramatically rising yields of land and animals with ever lower inputs of labour. As we noted, most of this new knowledge is not directly applicable, since the basic conditions of soil and climate are different and because the productivity gains must be accompanied by a fuller utilization in agriculture of a huge and rapidly increasing labour force, which for several decades cannot to any large extent be employed outside agriculture. It is no exaggeration to state that as yet the efforts to raise agricultural productivity in the underdeveloped countries by extension services and other means have been based on very unsatisfactory knowledge of the fundamental facts. Much more research should also go into planning irrigation schemes and making possible the use of the energy of wind, sun, and tides. In industry there is the whole problem of adjusting plants, machines, tools, and materials to the climatic and other conditions in South Asia, including the different proportions of various kinds of labour and other factors of production. In the population field it is, of course, primarily a question of improving contraception techniques in order to make the attainment of a new near-balance between births and deaths more feasible once the governments are prepared to launch a real campaign to spread birth control among the masses.

In all these respects—except perhaps the last—very little is as yet accomplished. What is needed is clearly much more research that is systematically directed toward solving the problems of underdeveloped countries. Some of this research could be carried out in

the underdeveloped countries themselves, but hardly on a scale even approaching that really needed to balance the continued detrimental effects of the scientific and technological development in the advanced countries without extensive assistance from the developed countries in the form of research personnel and funds.

Without a very large extension of our scientific and technological research activity, and a redirection of it to serve the development needs of the underdeveloped countries, the dynamics of technological progress will continue to work to the disadvantage of underdeveloped countries raising ever greater obstacles to their economic development.

V

IN A SENSE, THE most fundamental difference in initial conditions, when comparing the underdeveloped countries today with the Western countries in their pre-industrial phase, concerns the very different character of the era in which we now live: in particular, *the quickening pace of history, which makes a telescoping of change the only alternative not only to continued stagnation but to regression.* In the final analysis, this is a result of the high levels of economic development now achieved *by the developed countries* and the accelerating speed with which *they* continue to develop.

Change was not rapid in the beginning of Western development prior to industrialization. It is, indeed, difficult to overestimate the importance of gradualness in the early development of the Western countries where 'economic development' had its origins; this development is urgently needed in the underdeveloped countries, with their rapid and accelerating population increase. All the major 'revolutions' of the West—religious, intellectual, geographic, and even political in that they resulted in the emergence of consolidated nation-states—occurred long before the industrial 'revolution'; they also proceeded slowly, thereby permitting a relatively smoother adaptation of all relationships in society. In short, Western Europe was afforded several centuries to become accustomed to, and prepared for, change. It is as if the 'coefficient of changeability',[10] starting at a low level in the Middle Ages, rose and then continued to rise at

[10] The term is Gerschenkron's (A. Gerschenkron, 'Social Attitudes, Entrepreneurship and Economic Development', *Exploration in Entrepreneurial History*, October, 1953, Princeton).

an ever faster rate. And so very gradually the ideas of change, adaptability and mobility were accepted as a way of life, culminating in the kind of permanent 'revolution' within which people in the Western countries now live and are accustomed to. As Simon Kuznets puts it:

> . . . when the presently developed countries within the European orbit reached their pre-industrialization phase they already possessed a variety of social, political, and economic institutions, and particularly a prevailing set of views and scale of values which were extremely useful in that they permitted these societies to make the further adjustments which industrialization brought in its wake or which were essential concomitants.[11]

It is generally recognized that advances in science and technology were the result of and, at the same time, a driving force in this gradual development. From the viewpoint of the economist and the economic historian, improvement of the methods of production was of primary importance. The industrial revolution was understood to have required a number of 'inventions' of new production methods—even if the deeper analysis had to take into account a great number of changes in social and economic conditions, among them those advances in rationality and in scientific knowledge that made the inventions possible and, more importantly, utilized.

During the nineteenth century, when economics took shape as a science, and before the speed of accumulating technological advances had increased further, it was natural for economists to lean towards the view that the great and radical inventions had already been made and that only 'improvements' remained. This is the impression which comes to mind when looking backwards and discovering how commonly a large number of improvements branched out from an earlier innovation; with hindsight, these appear to be consequential and, indeed, radical technological breakthroughs. Nineteenth-century economists produced very little explicit discussion of technological advance—less than in Adam Smith's time—but this was the usual implicit assumption. It was this way of looking at things that made it natural to assume that there would be no alteration 'in the state of the arts'. This assumption permeates classical and neo-classical

[11] Simon Kuznets, *Underdeveloped Countries—Present Characteristics in the Light of Past Growth Patterns*, Paper presented at the University of Texas Conference, April 21, 1958, Mimeographed, pp. 10-11.

economic analysis. We see it reflected today in the regular type of quasi-static analysis of the underdeveloped countries' problem of adopting the modern powerful technology of the advanced countries. The assumption also fits the common bias of assigning to savings and investment the crucial and almost exclusive role in economic development; we have inherited this bias from the classical and neo-classical economists, and it still dominates planning and most economic analysis of the development problem.

But now this whole way of looking at technological advance should be excluded by our experience of living in a society where technological advance is so very rapid and is, in fact, accelerating all the time. More and more it becomes an almost automatically operating engine driving the development process forward in the already developed countries. It is, indeed, euphemistic to try to grasp the reality of the situation in the highly developed countries by saying that they are now living through a new 'industrial revolution'. Whatever measure we apply, the Western world has had many 'industrial revolutions' since its first, and each follows ever closer upon the other. Indeed, we have good reason to expect that the great scientific and technological breakthroughs are yet to come.

One element in this process is that systematic and organized scientific research is playing an ever larger and more direct role in technological advance. This advance is increasingly characterized by innovations founded upon newly acquired scientific knowledge often of the basic type, while the element of 'invention' in technological advance is decreasing. As J. P. Corbett illustrates this historical fact:

> Of course, this new co-operation between theory and practice was, at first, extremely loose and unsystematic. The practical problems of navigation were indeed a powerful stimulus no less to astronomical enquiry than to the improvement of clocks. Even in the absence of such precise connexions, there was, no doubt, throughout the early period, a constant vague pressure of science and production on each other. At the very least they can be said to have flourished in the same climate of opinion. Yet such a crucial invention of the early industrial revolution as the steam engine was developed very slowly by practical engineers, on the basis of general mechanical knowledge but without any rigorous scientific analysis; and much the same appears to have been generally true of the other inventions of that period. With the nineteenth century, however, the case began to change. The old and

> influential but still very loose connexion between science and production began to be much more effective and direct. Over an ever widening field the achievements of research paved the way for production, and the problems of production called successfully upon research. Thus electrical generators were in economic use within a few decades of the fundamental work of Faraday which made them possible in theory. In our day, finally, this co-operation between the producer and the theorist has reached a very high level of efficiency.[12]

This ever closer relation between science and technology has certainly been a major cause of the acceleration of technological advance. It also gives us reason to expect the curve to be of the exponential variety. Without wanting to press the analogy too far—as we are not in a position to define either knowledge or the increase of knowledge in terms permitting quantitative measurement—it is reasonable to assume that the growth in scientific knowledge is proportional to the previously acquired capital of knowledge. Knowledge should thus grow by compounded interest and technology should advance along a parallel line.[13]

Taking as given the civilizational environment in the developed world where this development now takes place, the acceleratingly rapid growth of scientific and technological knowledge becomes a force, speeding up and bending the course of history in a way which is largely outside our control. How could we control it ? In the field of armaments and war preparations we have recently realized the danger it implies for world cataclysm. All governments are in principle committed to attempt to institute controls by international agreement of the use of knowledge in this field and all sensible people are backing this attempt. Even in this area, where the mutual interests in control are immense, the difficulties of carrying it out in practice loom so large that few people are very optimistic. In other fields a slowing down of the practical application of science and technology in production and consumption is not even desired. It could not be desired in the civilization with the competitive coexistence of nations

[12] J. P. Corbett, *Europe and the Social Order*, A. W. Sythoff, Leyden, 1959, p. 20.

[13] William F. Ogburn was probably the first social scientist to think along this line in a systematic fashion. He supported his view by pointing to the fact that new knowledge tends to develop simultaneously by the work of many researchers in different places. See William F. Ogburn, *Social Change*, The Viking Press, New York, 1928.

and political blocs in which we live. The effects upon our societies of this force for change, however, are beyond our perception. Historians and philosophers themselves have generally shied away from attempting to analyse in more specific terms the implications for the sort of society we will be living in. However, the speeding up of history is clearly visible even if we do not see clearly in what direction it is bending this process.

Until now, the modern democratic welfare state of the Western countries has been able to contain the dynamics of scientific and technological change without bursting. This is undoubtedly due to two facts: first, from the beginning that development was indigenous to these countries themselves; second, it had a slow beginning over many centuries, during which it only gradually gathered its present explosive momentum. Society has become adjusted to it; at least it has succeeded in doing so up to now. Russia was part of Europe and always had scholars and technicians who played an active role in the development of science and technology. The Soviet state has directed its planning so that it has its full share in scientific and technological advance and even leads the process in one field after another. Russia has the resources to do so and can by means of its political system effectively allocate them for this purpose.

The underdeveloped countries cannot possibly raise their aspirations in the same way, except in very limited, indeed insignificant, fields. Modern science and technology is there a force which comes almost entirely from outside. And these countries are not afforded the opportunity for gradualness in development that typified the now developed countries. Technological advance must be experienced as a shock administered by external forces. Meanwhile scientific and technological advance in the developed countries has had, and continues to have, the detrimental effects upon their development prospects that we pointed out in Section III. The foreseeable acceleration of this advance makes it probable that these detrimental effects will be increasingly consequential. We have assumed that any control of this advance which would hamper it, or its practical utilization, in order to protect the underdeveloped countries, is excluded.

The only possible 'control' is the positive one of an intentional policy in the developed countries to greatly increase scientific and technological research and direct it toward solving the problems of the underdeveloped countries. To be effective, this would have to be done on a massive scale. At present, making this possibility

explicit—as its realization on such a scale is not in sight—means only underlining the additional difficulties which the acceleratingly rapid technological development in the developed countries is bound to create in South Asia as in other underdeveloped countries.

I spell out this disturbing conclusion—without trying to conceal it by opportunistic and illusory rationalizations, of which I find so exceedingly many among both my Western and my South Asian colleagues—not to discourage but, on the contrary, to prepare us for more radical action. It is my conviction that for many more reasons than I have been able even to hint at in this brief paper, focussed as it is only on one theoretical angle of South Asian development problems, the world is drifting into a calamitous situation. Governments in the underdeveloped countries need to plan changes of much bigger scope and to carry them out with much firmer determination. The rich countries, on their side, must think through their aid policies and be prepared to give them entirely new directions and, in particular, much larger dimensions. To point this out in a straightforward way, I have humbly thought to be the most fitting tribute I could pay in this volume, in which we honour the great intellectual and sincere idealist, Jawaharlal Nehru.

World Morality and World Peace

LINUS PAULING

I CAN THINK OF no more appropriate subject to discuss in an essay in honour of Shri Jawaharlal Nehru than world morality and world peace. Shri Nehru has striven to solve world problems in ways compatible with moral principles, and there exists in the world the continuing hope that India will take a leading part in the now mandatory process of abolishing war.

It is characteristic of the world of today, as of all earlier times, that the principles of morality that apply to the actions of individual human beings do not apply to the actions of nations. There is a tremendous difference between personal morality and national morality. Whereas most men and women, all over the world, accept the principles of ethics and morality that have been formulated and expounded by the great philosophers and religious leaders of the past, and behave in accordance with them, nations act in ways that are determined almost entirely by considerations of selfish national interest. Commenting on the rejection of ethical principles by governments, Alfred Jay Nock wrote: 'A legislature sometimes does a good thing; but it never does it just because it is a good thing.' Aristotle asked: 'Can a moral man represent his nation ?', and he answered: 'No, because nations are immoral; it is considered proper for a strong nation to attack a weak one, if she can benefit herself thereby, irrespective of what the principles of morality have to say about such an action.'

The immorality of nations is associated with the retention of the principle of national sovereignty, which is the rejection of world law, the refusal to formulate and accept a set of dispute-settling rules based upon the principles of ethics and morality. Nations have instead depended upon war or the threat of war as the mechanism for the settling of disputes.

I believe that the development of tremendously destructive weapons, based upon nuclear fission and nuclear fusion, now forces the world to abolish the institution of war and to replace it by world

law. I believe that we can win a great victory over the evil of war, and at the same time over the plagues of man's condition, over poverty, starvation, and economic exploitation, and over much of the suffering caused by disease.

Instead of the principle of maximizing human happiness, I prefer the principle of minimizing the suffering in the world. The difference between maximizing happiness and minimizing suffering may be illustrated by an example. On a scale of income, we may select a certain value as standard—one that is just enough for a satisfactory life. An increase of 80 per cent in income would give some added happiness—but the suffering caused by a decrease of 80 per cent surely deserves a far greater weight, perhaps 100 times greater.

I do not accept the contention that we do not know what is good and what is evil. Even though my relationship to myself is subjective and that to other human beings is objective, I accept the evidence of my senses that I am a man, like other men; I am 'fed with the same food, hurt with the same weapons, subject to the same diseases, healed by the same means, warmed and cooled by the same winter and summer'; when I am pricked, I bleed, as do other men; when I am tickled, I laugh; when I am poisoned, I die. I cannot contend that it is the result of anything but chance that I am I, that this consciousness of mine is present in this body; I cannot in good faith argue that I deserve a better fate than other men; and I am forced by this logic to accept as the fundamental ethical principle the Golden Rule. As variously expressed over the ages, it reads: 'This is the sum of duty: Do naught unto others which would cause you pain if done to you' (*Mahabharata*); 'What you do not want others to do to you, do not do to others' (Confucius); 'We must behave to our friends as we would wish them to behave to us' (Aristotle); 'As ye would that men should do to you, do ye also to them likewise' (Luke); 'To do as you would be done by, is the plain, sure, and undisputed rule of morality and justice' (Lord Chesterfield); 'I must always act in such a way that I can at the same time will that the maxim by which I act should become a universal law' (Immanuel Kant); 'To do as one would be done by, and to love one's neighbour as one's self, constitute the ideal perfection of utilitarian morality' (J. S. Mill).

I have made a modern formulation of the Golden Rule: 'Do unto others twenty per cent better than you would be done by—the 20 per cent is to correct for subjective error.'

But what is the Golden Rule of *nations* in their mutual inter-

course ? It seems to be: 'Do unto others as evilly as you can find an excuse for.'

Let me mention a minor example. On 30 January 1964 my wife and I participated in a conference on world government in the Centre for the Study of Democratic Institutions, where I am a staff member. Representatives of the National Delegations to the U.N. from 30 nations were expected to be there. Only 27 came; the Hungarian Ambassador and the First Secretaries of Poland and Czechoslovakia had been forbidden by the U.S. State Department to come to Santa Barbara. This action was described by the State Department as retaliation for travel restrictions on U.S. diplomats in the U.S.S.R.; for some reason the State Department was extending its retaliation to other countries. A few weeks later the Polish Government, which had never placed any restrictions on the freedom of movement in Poland for representatives of the U.S. Government, ordered that travel restrictions be made—very grievous ones, in that the main road from Warsaw to the principal Baltic Sea vacation resort was forbidden to American diplomats.

There is the possibility that through such trivialities, such manifestations of the insolence of office, the world will be destroyed—through a dispute as to whether American soldiers must get out of or may remain in the trucks at the check-points on the road to Berlin, or whether or not the trains should carry the East German flag.

We are forced now to solve the great world problems, to move toward the world of the future. Clarence Ayres in his book *Toward a Reasonable Society* (University of Texas Press, 1961) has asked how we are to know in what direction progress for society lies, and has stated his conviction that 'whether scholars recognize it or not, mankind has all along had some way of knowing, clearly and consistently, what is good and what is not.' He said that he had first learned what that way of knowing is from John Dewey—what Dewey called the 'instrumental' process, which is identical with what Thorstein Veblen called the 'technological' process. Ayres has written that 'both of these great pioneers recognized this process as (in Veblen's words) the "life process" of mankind, a process that runs in unbroken continuity through the activities of all societies and has the same meaning for all, so that a good charitable bequest, or a good peace treaty, or a good system of regulation of the flights of airplanes, is good in exactly the same sense that a cave man's striking stone was good: good in the sense of bringing home the

bacon. We do have the means of knowing good from bad, exactly as we have the means of knowing truth from error. This does not mean that we do not make mistakes. But it does mean that we can eventually recognize a mistake and go about correcting it. We can do so because this continuous instrumental-technological process itself provides the standards of judgment both of truth and error and of good and bad.'

During year after year, decade after decade, century after century the world has been changed by the discoveries made by scientists and by their precursors—by those brilliant, original, imaginative men and women of prehistoric times and more recent times who learned how to control fire, to cook food, to grow crops, to domesticate animals, and then to build wheeled vehicles, steam engines, electric generators and motors, and nuclear fission power plants. These discoveries have changed not only man's environment but also his beliefs and institutions. Ayres, more clearly than his predecessors Dewey and Veblen, has pointed out that 'tribal beliefs, and the institutional and ceremonial practices in which they are objectified, are simulacra of scientific knowledge and technological skills. That is, what Veblen calls "ceremonial adequacy" is an imitation of technological adequacy. The tribal medicine man purports to be altering the course of events in imitation of the *tool activities* by which *technicians really DO alter* the course of events.'

Our system of personal morality, as expressed in the operating social and economic structures as well as in law, is full of imperfections, and these imperfections have been accentuated during recent decades by the changes in the nature of the world that have been brought about by science and technology. There is great misery caused by the abject poverty of about half of the world's people; yet most scientists and technologists in the world today are working to make the rich richer and the poor poorer, or are working on the development and fabrication of terrible engines of mass destruction and death whose use might end our civilization and exterminate the human race.

A few months ago, in March 1964, a group of thirty-two people (all citizens of the United States except one, the Swedish economist Gunnar Myrdal) issued a statement entitled The Triple Revolution: An Appraisal of the Major United States Crises and Proposals for Action. This statement, which is directed mainly to problems in the United States, is in fact pertinent to the greater problem of world

morality and world peace to an extent such as to justify my summarizing and discussing it.

In their statement the members of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Triple Revolution point out that recent changes in the nature of the world, resulting especially from the discoveries of scientists, demand a fundamental re-examination of existing values and institutions. Three separate and mutually reinforcing revolutions are now taking place: the weaponry revolution, the cybernation revolution, and the human rights revolution.

The weaponry revolution has involved the development of explosives with several million times the explosive power of those used in earlier wars, and the building up by the two great nuclear powers, the United States and the Soviet Union, of stockpiles of nuclear weapons with total explosive power about 50,000 times as great as that of all of the explosives used during the whole of the Second World War. It is almost certain that if these weapons were to be used in an all-out nuclear war the United States and the Soviet Union would cease to exist, and the people of these countries would all be killed; great damage would also be done to other countries and to the people in them.

The cybernation revolution involves the use of computers and automated self-regulated machines in developing a system of almost unlimited productive capacity that requires a smaller and smaller amount of human labour. Under an economic system in which economic resources are distributed on the basis of contributions to production, the development of cybernation has been leading to the withholding of purchasing power from a larger and larger fraction of the American people. The consequence is that there are about 10,000,000 unemployed people in the United States at the present time (about 5,000,000 unemployed and looking for employment, and another 5,000,000 who have quit looking for work and are not included in the unemployment statistics of the U.S. Department of Labour). The moral question arises as to whether or not all people are entitled to benefit from the resources of the earth and the products of industry. In the United States today, the major economic problem is not how to increase production, but rather how to distribute the abundance that is provided by cybernation. It is recommended by the Committee that 'society, through its appropriate legal and governmental institutions, undertake an unqualified commitment to provide every individual and every family with an

adequate income as a matter of right'. This recommendation is made for the United States; but I believe that it should be extended to the whole world.

The third revolution now under way is the human rights revolution. All over the world there can be found the increasing conviction that oppression of human beings must be abolished, and that social, political and economic systems must be developed in which every human being will be of value and will feel valued.

Let me now discuss the weaponry revolution in greater detail. It is in the means of waging war that the greatest of all changes that have occurred in the world have been made, and these changes have been the result of the discoveries made by scientists.

The chemist and chemical engineer Alfred Nobel made a very important contribution to civilization a century ago, when he invented dynamite, a safe high explosive incorporating nitroglycerine, and also invented the blasting cap, a device for detonating the high explosive. These inventions have permitted many of the great structures characteristic of our modern civilization to be made. Alfred Nobel then said that he wanted to invent 'a substance or machine with such terrible power of mass destruction that war would thereby be made impossible forever'. Scientists have now discovered the explosive substances that Nobel wanted to invent. They are the substances uranium and plutonium, which undergo the process of nuclear fission with the liberation of explosive energy ten million times that of Nobel's favourite explosive, nitroglycerine, and the substance lithium deuteride, which undergoes the reaction of nuclear fusion, under favourable circumstances, with the release of explosive energy fifty million times that of nitroglycerine. These substances with terrible power of mass destruction were developed by scientists about two decades ago. The uranium-235 and plutonium-239 fission bombs were first exploded in 1945, at Alamogordo, Hiroshima, and Nagasaki. Nine years later the first of the modern weapons, the fission-fusion-fission superbombs, was exploded—the twenty-megaton Bikini bomb, with energy of explosion equal to that of 20 million tons of TNT, one thousand times greater than that of a 1945 fission bomb. This 1954 superbomb contained less than one ton of nuclear explosive, and the energy released in the explosion of this bomb was greater than that of all of the explosives used in all of the wars that have taken place during the entire history of the world, including the First World War and the Second World War.

Today, eighteen years after the construction of the first atomic bomb, the nuclear powers have stockpiles containing thousands of superbombs. The stockpiles are so great that if they were to be used in a war hundreds of millions of people would be killed, and there is the possibility that civilization itself might not survive the catastrophe.

I have estimated that the stockpiles of nuclear weapons now amount to 320,000 megatons. The Bikini bomb was a twenty-megaton bomb, with an energy of explosion equal to that of twenty million tons of an ordinary high explosive such as TNT. One such bomb, exploded over any city on earth, would largely destroy it, and would kill most of its inhabitants. These bombs now exist by the thousands, and there are thousands of vehicles—great bombers and rockets—capable of carrying them from one continent to another.

The significance of the estimated total of 320,000 megatons of nuclear bombs may be brought out by the following statement: The Second World War was a six-megaton war; if there were to take place tomorrow, in one day, a six-megaton war, equivalent to the Second World War in the power of the explosives used, and then another such war the following day, and so on, day after day, for 146 years, the present stockpiles would then be exhausted—but, in fact, these weapons might be used in a single day, the day of the Third World War.

No dispute between nations can justify nuclear war. The only sane policy for the world is that of abolishing war.

The first significant step toward the abolition of war and its replacement by world law was taken in 1963, when the Moscow Test-Ban Treaty was formulated by the United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union. This treaty has been signed by most of the nations in the world.

I am glad that the changes in the world resulting from the discoveries of scientists are of such a nature as to force the nations of the world to move in the direction of greater morality, and especially to force them to give up the immoral institution of war. I do not feel that it was inevitable that the discoveries of scientists should operate in this way, but I am thankful that they are operating in this way.

The time has come now for other steps toward the abolition of war to be taken.

There is the imminent possibility of the acquisition of nuclear weapons by several nations or groups that do not now have them.

This spread of nuclear weapons would constitute a grave risk to the world, in that it would increase the probability that a major war would be started by some human error or technical accident or would be deliberately initiated, and it would increase the difficulty of achieving the abolition of war and of achieving general and complete disarmament. Preventing the spread of nuclear weapons is an essential part of the struggle to end war. The 1960 treaty making all of Antarctica an atom-free zone constitutes a promising precedent, and we may hope that the principle of demilitarization will be extended to other areas, especially central Europe, as proposed by Rapacki, Kennan, and others. Under this proposal the whole of Germany, Poland, and Czechoslovakia, and perhaps some other countries, would be largely demilitarized, and their boundaries and national integrity would be permanently assured by the United Nations. I am sure that if a solution other than nuclear destruction is ever achieved of the complex problem of Berlin and Germany, it will be through demilitarization, not remilitarization.

There are some difficulties associated with the problem of the destruction of the now existing nuclear weapons. First, it is unlikely that the United States and the Soviet Union will carry out any major stage of the process of disarmament unless the Chinese People's Republic is a signatory to the disarmament agreement, and it is unlikely that the Chinese People's Republic would be a signatory to such a treaty unless she had been accepted into the community of nations, under conditions worthy of her stature. It may be several years before the Chinese People's Republic is brought into the United Nations and given a seat on the Security Council. Moreover, there is the possibility that during the process of nuclear disarmament some weapons might be concealed or surreptitiously fabricated, and then used to terrorize and dominate the disarmed world. There is also the danger that in the process of disarmament, when the stockpiles of nuclear weapons have become small enough so that their use would not necessarily lead to the destruction of civilization, a nuclear war involving the two great nuclear powers would be initiated by the deliberate decision of the militarists of one of the powers.

I believe that there is an action that could be taken immediately to decrease the present great danger of outbreak of nuclear war. My proposal, which I hope will be given consideration by the national governments of the world, is that there be instituted with the maximum expedition compatible with caution a system of joint

national-international control of the existing stockpiles of nuclear weapons. Under this proposal the Soviet nuclear weapons would be put under the dual control of the Soviet government and the United Nations, such that these weapons could be used only with the permission both of the Soviet government and of the United Nations, and a similar system of dual control would be instituted also for the American nuclear weapons, such that they could be used only with the permission both of the American government and of the United Nations. To have these two great stockpiles of nuclear weapons (and also the smaller stockpiles, those of Great Britain and France, if these nations did not destroy their weapons) under joint national-international control would, of course, immobilize these weapons, and prevent their use. These stockpiles would, however, remain in existence, as the deterrents of war, until, at some future time, they would have become meaningless, and could then be dismantled, and the fissionable and fusionable materials used for the production of electric power, for the benefit of humanity.

Even a small step in the direction of this proposal, such as the acceptance of United Nations observers in the control stations of the nuclear powers, would decrease significantly the probability of nuclear war.

Small wars are dangerous, because a small war may grow into a great war. Moreover, insurrectionary and guerrilla warfare often is characterized by extreme savagery and a great amount of human suffering, so that the abolition of small wars would be a boon to humanity. However, the only hope for many people, people who are subjected to continuing economic exploitation and to oppression by a dictatorial government, is at the present time the hope of revolution, the hope of overthrowing the dictatorial government and replacing it with a democratic government that would work for the welfare of the people. I believe that in the course of developing a system of world law to take the place of war as a means of settling disputes between nations it will be possible to include in the system a method by which the people in any country may be able to overthrow a dictatorial government in a peaceful way. This might be done, under suitable world legislation, by a process of referendum, supervised by the United Nations, carried out perhaps once a decade in every nation. I recognize that there are difficulties in achieving this end without at the same time permitting the small nations to be

dominated by the great powers, but I believe that these difficulties can be overcome.

Many years might be required to achieve such an addition to the body of world law. In the meantime, much could be done through a change in the policies of the great nations. During recent decades insurrections and civil wars in small countries have been instigated and aggravated by the great powers, which have provided weapons and military advisers, increasing the savagery of the wars and the suffering of the people. The world needs a new philosophy in its handling of these problems.

The axiological philosopher Robert S. Hartman has pointed out that man 'has not been able, to this day, to think validly about the most important thing there is, the life of the individual human person. . . . The cause is one of the fallacies committed by Aristotle, . . . namely, that since *reason* works by abstraction and generalization, the *unique*—which by definition is neither abstract nor general—cannot be grasped by reason. . . . The paradox of man's intellectual history is . . . that *man has valued his own faulty* thinking higher than his own life . . . . Rationalizations, systems, ideas have ruled supremely in history, and human beings have fallen their victims. If we examine history we find that all really great crimes, all the collective and individual slaughters committed legally by civilized men and nations, have been committed in the name of some abstraction—some concept of "nation," "god," "race," and now, of all things, "economic system".'

It is the concept of 'economic systems' that is responsible for the Cold War and the 'hot wars' of the last two decades. At the end of the Second World War there was a great decrease in the military budget of the United States. The period of decreased militarism was, however, a short one; within three years the increase in the budget began—the military budget in 1949 passed the 15 billion dollar mark, and continued to rise until it exceeded 50 billion dollars in 1963. This increase in militarism was associated with the initiation of the Cold War, which has been primarily the effort to prevent the smaller nations from abandoning capitalism and the system based upon economic exploitation, in favour of communistic or socialistic regimes such as the one existing in Yugoslavia. In April 1947 General George Marshall, who had been appointed Secretary of State in January of that year, 'realized that the United States of America would have to take the initiative if Europe was to be saved from an economic

catastrophe, involving political anarchy'. (These are the words used by August Schou, Director of the Norwegian Nobel Institute, in his discussion of the award of the Nobel Peace Prize to Marshall.) The Marshall Plan was, in the words of J. P. Morray, 'designed to thwart revolution by relieving social discontent under capitalism. The other kind of aid against revolutionary perils, military aid, was not long in coming. It took the form of a Military Defence Assistance Pact for bolstering the armed forces commanded by anti-Communist governments; the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO); and the stationing of American troops in Europe.'

I believe that the time has now come for the nations of the world to co-operate in the solution of world problems, and to work together for the welfare of the whole of humanity. I do not believe that either Capitalism or Communism will succeed in ridding the world of the other—instead, each of these systems will continue to develop and to improve, during the period of coexistence that has now begun, and in the course of time they will grow toward one another, with the acceptance of those attributes of each system that are good and the elimination of those that are bad.

But in the meantime the national governments continue for the most part along the path of immorality and national selfishness. The diplomats and national leaders for the most part still retain the policy that it is just as important to do harm to other nations and peoples as to do good for one's own nation and people.

In discussing the immorality of nations, I shall refer most often to my own nation, the United States of America—not because other nations, such as the Soviet Union, are significantly less immoral, but because I have both greater knowledge about the actions of the United States than of other nations and greater interest in its morality.

The record of the United States over a long period of years has been one of rejection of moral principles and of democracy in favour of support of capitalism. Cuba provides a good example. In the article on Cuba in the 11th Edition of the *Encyclopaedia Britannica* (1910) there are the following statements: 'The preliminaries of the elections of December 1905 and March 1906 being marked by frauds and injustice, the Liberals deserted the polls at those elections and, instead of appealing to judicial tribunals controlled by the Moderates, issued a manifesto of revolution on the 28th of July, 1906. This insurrection rapidly assumed large proportions. The Government was weak and lacked moral support in the whole Island . . . . The

President resigned, Congress dispersed without choosing a successor, and as an alternative to anarchy the United States was compelled to proclaim on the 29th of September a provisional government.... The insurrectionists promptly disbanded. Government was maintained under the Cuban flag... and the regular forms of the constitution were scrupulously maintained so far as possible. No use was made of American military force save as a passive background to the Government.... On the 28th of January 1909 the American Administration ceased.... The last American troops were withdrawn from the Island on the first of April 1909.'

There followed for Cuba a long period of misery, dictatorship, and economic exploitation, and finally, after the long dictatorship of Batista, the Castro revolution.

This period was described by Senator John F. Kennedy in his Presidential campaign speech in Cincinnati on 6 October 1960 in the following words: 'We refused to help Cuba to meet its desperate need for economic progress. We used the influence of our Government to advance the interests and increase the profits of the private American companies that dominated the Island's economy.... Administration spokesmen publicly hailed Batista as a staunch ally and good friend at a time when Batista was murdering thousands, destroying the last vestiges of freedom, and stealing hundreds of millions of dollars from the Cuban people.... Thus it was our own policies, *not* those of Castro, that first began to turn our former neighbour against us.'

In 1953 and 1954 the United States Government added new military commitments by negotiating treaties with South Korea, the Nationalist Government of China, and several other countries in Asia and the Middle East.

For five years we have been involved in a cruel and dirty war in South Vietnam, a war to prevent the Vietnamese people from achieving independence and self-determination. This war is fought with machine guns, bombs, helicopters, and napalm-white phosphorus incendiaries provided by the United States. The people of South Vietnam are sick of fighting, they are surfeited with the continued destruction, starvation, suffering, and death that war has brought to them, and with the succession of civil and military dictators that we have forced upon them. And this war is being carried on because we are not willing that South Vietnam be neutral in the competition between Capitalism and Communism.

Outstanding among the immoral institutions of Government is the CIA, the United States Central Intelligence Agency. In January 1964 Senator Eugene McCarthy, of Minnesota, published in the *Saturday Evening Post* an article entitled 'The CIA is Getting out of Hand'. In this article he said, 'Wrapped in its cloak of secrecy, the United States Central Intelligence Agency modestly hints that it has overthrown foreign governments, admits that it violates international law, and doesn't deny that one of its exploits wrecked a summit conference.' He said that the CIA was making foreign policy, and was thus assuming the roles of the President and Congress. He mentioned that the CIA overplayed its legitimate role when it engaged in the Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba, an invasion that might have been construed as an act of war. Also, Senator McCarthy said that the CIA claimed to have master-minded the overthrow of the Government of Guatemala in 1954. In 1963 Senator Thruston B. Morton, who had been Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations in 1954, stated that the CIA, with the approval of President Eisenhower, had engineered the overthrow of the democratically elected government of President Arbenz in Guatemala, in order that this government could not proceed with its announced plans of income-tax reform, land reform, and nationalization of some industries, for the benefit of the people as a whole. Then the President of the United States congratulated the military dictatorship for its 'historic demonstration of devotion to the cause of freedom'.

This betrayal of the principles of morality and democracy was repeated in 1963. The right-wing government of President Miguel Ydigoras, in preparation for a forthcoming election, had announced its pledge to carry out income-tax and land reforms. The government was overthrown by a military coup just before the election. The election was cancelled, all political activity was prohibited by the new military dictatorship, and the announcement was made that any political party with Communist sympathies (that is, tending toward socialism) would be prohibited. The military dictatorship was immediately recognized by the United States. I do not know what role the CIA played in this 1963 coup in Guatemala.

Nor do I know the role played by the CIA in the overthrow of constitutional government in Brazil in the spring of 1964. The democratically elected president, President Goulart, was striving to solve the very serious problems of inflation, unfavourable balance of trade, and the miserable poverty of many millions of Brazilians,

caused primarily by the decrease in the price of exported commodities, especially coffee. He made some mild proposals for social and economic reforms, involving nothing illegal or unconstitutional—and was overthrown by force and violence and driven out of the country by a military coup. The military dictatorship abrogated the Constitution, put 8,000 people in jail, withdrew political rights from many members of the Brazilian Parliament, and then, within a week, was sent 'warmest good wishes' and 'congratulations' by the President and Secretary of State of the United States.

Much of the misery of the world today is the result of the continued increase in the prices of manufactured goods and decrease in the prices of raw materials. If the price of coffee had been 20 cents per pound higher over the last seven years, Brazil's economic problems would be only minor—the extra income would have paid the whole of her external debt, the principal cause of the inflation of her currency.

In the 1962 Alliance for Progress report it is said that Latin America had lost 12 billion dollars in eight years because of the decreased prices of her exports. This amount of money could have largely industrialized these underdeveloped countries.

In 1961 the U.S. gave $ 167,000,000 to Colombia as Alliance for Progress aid. During that year Colombia's income was decreased by $ 460,000,000 by the decrease in the price of coffee. The Alliance for Progress aid constituted a minimal relief of the suffering caused by economic manipulations that increased the impoverishment of the Colombian people.

In the process of bringing morality into the actions of nations and of developing a system of world law based upon the principles of morality, it is evident that there must be developed a stable, world-wide economic system such as to prevent the fluctuation in prices of raw materials and exports that can ruin the economy of the smaller nations.

War and nationalism, together with economic exploitation, have been the great enemies of human freedom, of the rights of individual human beings. I believe that, with war abolished from the world, there will be improvement in the social, political, and economic systems in all nations, such as to benefit every human being and to increase the freedom of every person.

One problem that has often given rise to war is the problem of boundary disputes between contiguous nations. The proposal has

been often made that boundary disputes, as well as other disputes, should be settled by arbitration, rather than by war. The Norwegian Legislature (the Storting) in 1890 urged that permanent treaties for the arbitration of boundary disputes and other disputes between nations be made. At that time the world had not yet reached the stage in its development when a proposal for the abolition of war could be successful, but the arguments used by the Storting are still pertinent. The statement was then made that 'the Storting is convinced that this idea has the support of an overwhelming proportion of our people. Just as law and justice have long ago replaced the rule of the fist in disputes between man and man, so the idea of settling disputes among peoples and nations by arbitration is making its way with irresistible strength. More and more, war appears to the general consciousness as a vestige of prehistoric barbarism and a curse to the human race.'

We are forced now, by the development of weapons with terrible powers of mass destruction, to eliminate from the world for ever this vestige of prehistoric barbarism, this curse to the human race. I hope that India, with her historical interest in ethical and philosophical problems, will take the lead in the attack on the problem of the development of a system of world law that will permit the achievement of the great goal of the abolition of war. I believe that we are now forced to undertake this great task, and to succeed in it; I believe that the nations of the world are now forced to be moral, forced to give up the immorality of war and to accept the domination of world law, based upon morality and justice. I am confident that we shall succeed; that we shall in the course of time be enabled to build a world characterized by economic, political, and social justice for all human beings, and a culture worthy of man's intelligence.

Towards a Wider Conception of Our Common Humanity

SIR JAMES PLIMSOLL

THE STATESMAN IS the politician who anticipates the great problems—anticipates in the sense of foreseeing them and taking action to meet them. He strives to make politically feasible what he sees to be best in long-term realities and basic principles. This is what distinguishes the statesman from the politicians who simply coast along or who use current situations to gain power or to maintain themselves in power while troubles grow up for the future.

Today, many of the most important and urgent problems requiring foresight and anticipatory action concern divisions arising out of differences in race, colour, religion, language, or caste. These divisions sometimes coincide with, or are affected by, divisions along other lines, representing conflict or tension—between nations, out of considerations of power; between economic or social groups, out of what is thought by each to be its self-interest; between haves and have-nots; between those in power and those without; between the privileged and the deprived; between those who are vigorous and ambitious and those who are tired and satisfied.

These and other differences and conflicts have always existed. What is new today is a wider sense of the common humanity of us all, and a wider understanding and acceptance of its implications: that exploitation of, or discrimination against, members of any group is an affront to everyone of us as human beings, will not be allowed to persist for ever, and must be settled sooner or later in accordance with universal principles of basic human rights.

This understanding and acceptance have been given more practical force by technical progress which has mixed us all up much more. It has been reinforced by desire to avoid war, given additional urgency and persuasiveness as we have come to understand what nuclear war means. This has increased the pressure to settle differences peacefully both between and inside states.

Of the differences based on race, colour, religion, language, or caste, the most important and perplexing is colour, and to a lesser extent race, which in practice is sometimes the same thing. Differences in colour are readily perceptible and are unchangeable. The fear or suspicion often felt of the stranger or the dissentient is intensified in the case of a man with a different-coloured skin because he is, rightly or wrongly, identified immediately by his appearance, whereas someone else may pass unnoticed if in colour and dress he is the same as the rest of a community even though in essential attitudes and intentions he may be different. A man does not choose his colour or race: he is born with it, and it remains with him all his life. He can, to varying degrees depending on his environment and perception, change his religion or language. He may shed his caste, though it might not be possible to acquire the new standing he would want. But colour persists and, where this means a lower status and discrimination, it is the unfairness of it that rankles most.

Theoretically, some of the other sorts of difference can be changed. Indians migrating overseas and settling in Indian communities, for example in Fiji, often do not perpetuate the caste distinctions that would have kept them in separate groups at home. Uprooting, forcible or voluntary, is a great destroyer of personal inhibitions and of the restraints of tradition and custom which can make life and society rigid and stagnant and hold back progress. An example of this is the new vitality and fresh approach of some of those who came into India in 1947 as refugees: their homes had literally tumbled around them and the framework of society in which they had lived for generations had gone, and therefore, despite anguish and often destitution, they had to tackle life anew without intangible impediments which they could not of their own accord have thrown off. Thus social mobility was achieved, though at a terrible price.

But in normal circumstances the scope for an individual to make a change is limited. The society into which he wants to merge might not be willing to admit him, the society which he wants to leave might not be willing to let him go. Furthermore, the individual may not want to lose his special identity. Though he may want to live in peace as part of the wider community, with full opportunities for self-expression and advancement, he may not want to abandon or modify his religion, or his traditional customs, or other things that mark him off as different from the majority of his fellows.

Thus, differing communities which have to live side by side present

many complex problems, such as the rights of the majority as against the rights of a minority; the role of the individual in society; the achievement of real equality as distinct from equality in theory or in law; and the desire of those in possession to retain what they have as against the pressures of those who want to take it away, the latter representing the forces of progress or perhaps simply old-fashioned freebooting. There is always a tendency for the majority to demand conformity from a minority, and for a minority to be aggressive in asserting its separate entity. It is not possible to lay down general rules or principles applicable in all cases, other than the banal injunction that each community should live and let live. Every case has to be taken on its merits. But one can point to two things that are necessary to forestall and meet basic tensions: action well in advance, and continuing measures.

It can be fatal to wait. A drift apart may make a split or clash inevitable and produce an explosive situation where the differences may have hardened and the parties are unwilling to allow time in which to work out solutions. Furthermore, where harmony has been achieved, it cannot be assumed that it will persist unless continuing measures are taken to maintain it and to forestall and deal with new sources of tension before they can develop.

If being in a minority and having a privileged status go hand in hand, that is a potentially explosive situation. If being in a minority and being denied opportunity and human rights go hand in hand, that is a potentially explosive situation, too. Such a situation can exist when a section, whether majority or minority, *believes* it is 'underprivileged', whether it is so or not. This feeling of dissatisfaction often only develops when people start to move up, and become aware for the first time that their lot can be bettered.

It is easy to see cases of intercommunal tension today which now seem almost insoluble but which might have been responsive to timely measures.

The Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland was an experiment in a multiracial society. It failed. Failure may not have been inevitable from the start, though many hold that view. But really a multiracial society was not properly attempted. The skeleton and even the flesh was there, but the living blood was never sent coursing through the veins. If the Federation was to survive and become a living reality in which all races were working together and feeling they had a stake in

their country, then from the very beginning in 1953 it was a race against time. From the outset active and continuous steps should have been taken at all speed to build up a sense of unity; to develop habits of co-operation between the members of the different communities; and to have an expanding degree of social intercourse. This was not done. Whatever rights existed on paper, Africans at the end still played little effective role in some important areas of political and social life. Though it was a federal system, key European Ministers at the centre often had little or no personal contact with African authorities and representatives in the component territories. This is not to say that nothing had been done in the intervening years to create a multiracial society, but it was not enough.

So in 1963 the white minority, substantial in size, many of them born in Southern Rhodesia and thinking of it as their home, knowing the contribution they had made to the development of the territory, were afraid that in an African-dominated country there would be no place for them, that they would be ill-treated, and that the economic complex that they had built up would be destroyed or allowed to run down. The black majority on the other hand were conscious of the depressed economic standards of most of their number and of their inferior political and social position, and knew also that in many other parts of the continent Africans were becoming independent. No practical arguments, about the need for preparedness or for smoothing a transfer, could persuade them of the need for long delay. The whites had had time, and had not used it. If they were given much more time, they would not be trusted to use it, either. And so the two sides stared at one another across the abyss, and the Federation collapsed.

In South Africa it will be even more difficult to bring about a solution without violence and destruction and without the subordination of one community to another, whether on present or new lines. The settlement begun by the Campbell-Bannerman Government seemed a generous one at the time, and indeed it was so in the light of feeling then. It offered a prospect of lasting amity between Briton and Boer in South Africa. But it largely ignored the position of the non-European, and this profoundly affected the working out of relations between the English and Boer elements. In a society where the basic human rights of some are restricted or suppressed, the rights of all others can be brought in question. A society which does not provide a place with full human rights and opportunity for all its

members—indeed, in this case for a majority of its members—cannot be a lasting one. So in the end relations between the English and the Boers have become almost an irrelevance. Field Marshal Smuts, who did so much in so many fields, neglected the one thing which was literally life and death to his country. Rather than face the questions posed by the presence of the non-European elements, Smuts and most of the white population of South Africa hoped desperately that a day of decision could be put off indefinitely.

Now the outcome in South Africa, whatever it is, will be less comfortable—indeed much worse than that—for everyone than it would have been if measures had been set under way a long time ago to develop a form of society or a constitutional structure where everyone, regardless of race or colour, had full opportunity and equal rights. Steps which might have had a chance even fifteen years ago would now be looked on with suspicion, and today time would be denied for working them out and for preparing the people, European and non-European.

Cyprus is another example of lost opportunity. The constitution of 1961 required for its effective working the full co-operation with one another of the Greek and Turkish elements—a requirement which went beyond the laying down of rights and processes on paper. Habits of mind and intercommunal contact needed to be developed. But from the beginning the two communities continued to distrust and checkmate one another instead of working together. By 1964 Cyprus was teetering on the edge of civil war. The opportunity of 1961 was lost. Yet the lost opportunities really went further back, over decades, when leaders of the two communities, and others with responsibilities, could have been working for intercommunal understanding and co-operation.

The world today is studded with missed opportunities, where it is too late to do what might once have achieved less painful and more fruitful solutions than are likely to emerge now. There are also situations which have not yet produced explosions but which, in the absence of timely action, are likely to be explosive. In Latin America there are the frustrations of relatively poor economies, on the edge of the wealthy societies of North America, held back through faults of their own political and social structures, and regarding themselves, rightly or wrongly, as victims of lack of sympathy and lack of help from wealthier states. Again, inside many Latin American states there is potential trouble between the poor (often Indian or aborigine in

origin) and higher classes. Other examples are intercommunal troubles in India and Pakistan; Germans and Italians in Alto Adige (the Italian Tyrol); the attitude of Africans to Arabs and Asians in East Africa; and Chinese minorities in South-East Asia. In these and some other cases any action being taken—and it very often is being taken—is a race against time, and continuous activity is needed to prevent deterioration and to stimulate positive progress.

Even where some degree of intercommunal harmony exists, it cannot always be taken for granted. Alertness is needed on the part of responsible citizens to discern signs of unhealthiness that could lead to cleavage, so that steps can be instituted to forestall trouble by removing what might become grounds of dissension or by creating understanding of whatever is causing suspicion. The recent intensified feeling among French Canadians that they are not getting a fair deal is an example of recrudescence of tensions. Another example is the tension between Greeks and Turks on the mainland brought to the surface again by the happenings on the island of Cyprus, thereby undermining much of the work of reconciliation that had been done by the two countries in the preceding thirty years. Wherever tension is latent, governments and citizens have to be watchful and ready to work hard and continuously to preserve and promote the conditions that will maintain intercommunal harmony.

The examples taken so far are mainly of tensions and conflicts within a single country. Wider differences can stretch across national boundaries. Indeed, often there has been a danger—and it would be a danger to mankind as a whole and not only to those directly and immediately concerned—that colonial questions might be turned into colour questions, on which the nations of the world would range themselves on one side or the other according to the colour of their people's skins. The more vicious forms of this have so far been averted, though no one could deny that colour has to varying degrees been an element in some colonial questions, not only inside dependent territories but also between countries.

Another international division is between countries with high average standards of living and those with low standards. A healthy world will not exist while one group of countries has steadily been increasing wealth and begins to ask what their people can do with their increased income and leisure, while another group of countries is hard put to it to keep large numbers of their people from starvation and destitution. Such a world could not persist in peace. We must there-

fore anticipate the future crisis by present action based on accepting a common obligation to promote the development and welfare of all peoples. This means, of course, obligations on the part of the poorer countries as well as the richer ones. Hard work and time will be needed, and some countries will go ahead faster and further than others, depending on their material and human resources and institutions and on the policies of their governments. Nor is the problem simply one of providing and receiving economic aid. Even more important than aid are an expanding world economy, access to markets, and effective international demand for raw materials at adequate prices for producers.

Most of the problems of today have had a counterpart in one form or another in the past, but there are new elements, one of which is the greater expression of international concern about human rights. International concern is not new: there was Victorian England's concern at the ill-treatment of Bulgars and Armenians, for example. But in recent years new ground has been broken in the expression of international concern—the provisions on human rights in the Charter of the United Nations in 1945; the adoption by the United Nations General Assembly in 1948 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights; subsequent work by various organs of the United Nations; and work by bodies like the Council of Europe and the International Commission of Jurists.

Hitherto much, though not all, of this work has been declaratory. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights is a set of standards at which all nations should aim, not a legally binding or enforceable document. The delegation of much authority to international bodies for the interpretation or enforcement of provisions on human rights runs into problems of domestic jurisdiction (still a real problem, though ideas of what constitutes the field of domestic jurisdiction have changed over recent years) and into the fear, in countries where wide individual freedom already exists, that international intervention could lead to the limitation rather than extension of this freedom, because some countries would want to place more emphasis on the responsibilities of the citizen to society than his rights. At this stage of human development, most scope seems to lie in regional action, where general principles of the Universal Declaration can be weighed in their application by bodies drawn from countries roughly similar in social systems, types and stages of economic development, and

cultural traditions. A start has been made in Western Europe, flowing from the European Convention on Human Rights. In various parts of the world international provisions have been attempted in regard to minorities. It may be that, in some cases where minorities or antagonistic communities are an element in a problem, international machinery of inspection, interpretation, and enforcement of human rights in respect of certain situations can be established and used—provided that the parties concerned can agree first on what is to be applied by whatever body is to be entrusted with the task and on what the situations consist of.

It is good that international standards are proclaimed even if we, being fallible creatures, fall short of them. Mankind is aiming at a new, better world. It should be no defence of a wrong action by a government—say, a newly independent country—that it is only doing what others have done in the past. Many persons and governments in the United Nations and elsewhere have supported courses contrary to their own immediate interests, because they wanted to establish a new sort of world, not the old sort of world with different men on top. They do not want European imperialism replaced by someone else's imperialism. They do not see colour problems in terms only of whites versus the rest, and they know there are many sorts and gradations of colour and consequent problems of discrimination and tension.

But in situations where a major element is tension between communities—based on race, colour, religion, language, caste, or some other factor—the easing of the tension and the effective exercise of human rights by everyone in the area concerned will require measures going beyond the legal or constitutional declaration of those rights and the establishment of machinery to enforce them.

Many divisions are not the simple divisions on the basis of colour or religion that superficially they seem to be. Consequently measures to promote harmony have to be taken that aim at bringing about a healthy society in which tolerance is fostered, and at removing the factors that cause some groups to be disliked or to be at a disadvantage.

If a minority group holds positions of wealth or power, or is widely believed to hold them, it is exposed to attack by persons envious or in search of loot. That has been the case with Jews in many countries, Chinese in South-East Asia, Indians in East Africa, and

some of the victims of communal riots in India and Pakistan. Sometimes the picture of the greater prosperity of members of a group is exaggerated: the proportions of wealthy persons in the minority community may be no greater than the proportion of wealthy persons in the community as a whole. Sometimes persons of one group have been almost willy-nilly drawn into particular occupations—Jews into usury in mediaeval Europe because Christians were not supposed to deal in money, or immigrants into trade and professions in countries where foreigners are not allowed to own land.

There is no innate quality in an individual that separates him from the rest of the community. But he may, because of his social environment or upbringing as part of a group, have characteristics that, as he matures and often quite early in life, distinguish him and the other members of his group from the rest of the society, and he may not lose these characteristics while his group retains its special character. Some of these characteristics have been the results of historical factors of the sort just mentioned. Sometimes there are differences in religious practices, such as dietary laws which could have the effect of impeding social intercourse between the members of two groups. In other cases the distinction might grow from differing traditional social practices: one group may spend its money on feasts and festivals, whereas another group does not do so and consequently acquires capital which the first does not. Generations of persecution or depressed status can affect the behaviour of some groups. In parts of the world some tribal people are regarded as lazy and incapable of developing any land allotted them (I have heard this criticism in both India and Australia) but the truth may be that their past history has made them nomadic rather than settled; that they have not received the explanation or training that will enable them to see how effort would result in output; or that they believe that they would not be allowed to keep for themselves much of the output of any labour.

Measures to promote harmony may be directed to the community as a whole, for example general economic policy. Full employment and economic expansion can help remove resentment at strangers and minorities who might otherwise be regarded as competitors for jobs or envied for their assets. Some measures may be directed at those at a disadvantage. Education, economic assistance, and changes in law can remove certain occupations from being the monopoly of one group or can open them to those who are not in them. Again, to bring about social mobility requires that minorities be given the same

opportunities for education and self-expression as everyone else and that they be encouraged to avail themselves of these opportunities. In some places, members of a particular group do not mix socially with others, not because of legal or traditional barriers, but because, when persons from two groups meet socially, they have little in common to talk about. Their backgrounds and interests are often completely different, and will remain different so long as their present education and environment are left as they are.

Who is to do these things ? The first responsibility should lie on the leaders of the nation, particularly those in high office. But lower down the line a great deal can and should be done, by civic leaders, religious leaders, teachers, journalists—by all those who help to shape public opinion, who are looked to by their fellows, and who can know what is going on at the ground level. In parts of India where communal disturbances have been in the air, positive work of great value has sometimes been done by local men, often on an intercommunal basis.

Preaching communal harmony, and denouncing racial discrimination, have their role. But exhortation is not enough. It is necessary to explain why there are differences in the practices of communities, and why tolerance or composition of differences is necessary. For example, practices by some religions which others find odd or revolting can be understood better when the symbolism behind them is understood. Fear, dislike, or distrust of the stranger can sometimes be removed by making him less strange. Sometimes, but not always. Differences can always be explained but they cannot always be explained away.

Political and community leaders, therefore, both national and local, have a duty to give a lead both to public opinion at large and to opinion within particular groups. They can try to shape opinion so that a situation will not arise subsequently where opinion cannot be made reasonable. Every leader is conscious of the limits placed on his own freedom of action by the extent to which opinion in his country or community will support him. Most men are more conscious of the problems of their own public opinion than of the corresponding problems of others, but they exist for everyone. The constructive politician will not take public opinion as a fixed fact but will regard it as a variable factor which he can himself try to influence, and he will on occasion run risks to do so.

Other politicians may be exploiting the resources of demagogy to different ends, such as creating incendiary issues to give a sense of

unity to a nationalist movement or a new state, or simply promoting personal power or imperial aggrandizement. Mob passions can be aroused, and controlled press and radio abused, to block understanding and incite violence. Unfortunately, recent history has so many examples of this that it is unnecessary to quote any. But examples of the opposite—of courageous and constructive working up-stream—are also to be found. In India during the past year, many Government leaders and many private citizens have spoken out for communal harmony and understanding when some of the things they said were not altogether popular.

An example of what can be done to give a lead to public opinion can be found in Australia's post-war relations with Japan, which are now extremely good. After the Second World War, bitterness existed among many Australians towards Japanese, who had committed atrocities against Australian and other forces and had threatened to invade the Australian mainland. It was widely feared that Japan would become an aggressor again and could not be trusted. But the Australian Government, having signed the peace treaty with Japan which entered into force in 1952, put the treaty in the context of a broader approach. First, Australia insured itself against the possibility of renewed Japanese aggression by entering into a military alliance in the Pacific with the United States—ANZUS—which assured Australia of American support against aggression from anyone. The second element in the Australian Government's approach was the positive one of working to bring Japan genuinely within the international community and afford it a full opportunity to develop peacefully and to prosper. It was appreciated that if Japan, with its pressure of population on limited resources, was not treated as part of the family of nations and was not given economic outlets, it might be led to violent and destructive courses again.

The first element in this approach—securing the military backing of the United States—was popular with Australian public opinion. But many were distrustful of the second, and some Australian political figures were inclined to bow to, or even play on, anti-Japanese feeling. This was not the attitude of the Australian Government. The Prime Minister, Mr. Menzies, made broadcasts which put the case for a broader approach to Japan than one based on past bitterness. He, and other Government leaders, went beyond exhortation and general explanation, and put some of the arguments in bread-and-butter terms, such as the trade advantages to be expected for Australia.

Private citizens, including some leaders of ex-servicemen and former prisoners of war, threw their weight behind the Government's approach. Meanwhile the Australian Government set itself the programme of settling within the shortest possible time every one of the differences with Japan remaining from the Second World War. This was accomplished remarkably quickly. Other questions, which by their nature were continuing and could not be disposed of once and for all, notably pearling and trade, were approached constructively and energetically, with a desire to achieve something that would advantage both countries. Japan for its part exercised restraint in its own actions and policies, particularly in exporting to Australia. Australian public opinion responded. Confidence bred confidence. Today relations between Japan and Australia are very good; thousands of Australian tourists visit Japan every year, and Japanese visit Australia; and this year Japan may be Australia's biggest customer.

The story does not concern communal differences but it is relevant to the argument because it illustrates several things. A Government can give a lead to public opinion even when it initially may be risking unpopularity. All parties—in this case, Australia and Japan—have to play a part and take appropriate attitudes and action. Exhortation and explanation are not enough; practical measures, sometimes only indirectly related, are also needed. All this, given time and active backing by responsible citizens and private organizations, can promote conciliation where lasting hostility and bitterness had seemed dominant.

These things take time. Men have to be trained; new political organs established and set in operation; habits of co-operation developed; opinion shaped, in both the majority and minority communities; fears allayed; and social systems and traditions modified. Given time, people's attitudes do change, for better or worse. Attitudes vary from generation to generation, according to changes in political, social, and economic environment or to the influence of education. In Australia, and in many other federal states, attitudes have changed almost unconsciously on the relationship of the central government to the states or provinces, and constitutional conventions and practices operate today that the drafters of the constitution would not have accepted. In India and Pakistan the younger people have grown up and come to maturity in an independent country, and

also they have not had the experience of living in undivided India with all that that meant, in both opportunities and frustrations; while the older generation is passing which knew one army, one civil service, one country.

Therefore, given time, the whole climate within which problems have to be worked out can be changed, though not always for the better. Sometimes it is possible to think in terms of generations, particularly where relationships exist which are not too unsatisfactory but need to be made better. But where problems are already acute, the whole process of change has to be speeded up, and things have to be done in a short space of time which could be more efficiently and more equitably done over a longer period. Sometimes even this little time is not available. If preparatory and forestalling measures have been left too late, attitudes will have frozen, so no 'give' is left on any side; and also the genuineness of motive in seeking delay will not be accepted by the others. The right course is to begin early and to use whatever time is there. People will not wait if they do not see time being used, and used in the right direction.

Once processes of change have been set under way, developments may be unpredictable. New forces will be set loose which the authorities may not be able to control—new ideas, new personalities, new parties. There have, it is true, been cases where the course of events has been orderly and as predicted. But recent history provides many examples where, once the transfer of power from a colonial authority has begun, the pace of change has been quicker than expected and the persons emerging as leaders have not always been the expected ones. Again, within countries with communal differences, a depressed class becomes more pressing as it approaches equality than when it was far back. The narrower the distance, the less reason is seen for any distance to be maintained at all, and the more competent the members of the group are to assert the rights they claim. Negroes in the United States afford some examples. Yet again, the emergence of a strong personality or an apparently haphazard falling out of circumstances has sometimes wrenched political development away from the line it was hoped it would take.

Since starting to make a change can set on foot forces which one cannot foresee and might not be able to control, there may sometimes be a temptation to let sleeping dogs lie. In the long run this builds up to something worse (for example, the situation in South Africa), and

should be resisted unless one is content with the philosophy of *aprés nous, le déluge.*

Adjustment between communities—racial, religious, national, or other—can only be achieved with any prospects of success, permanency, and equity when what is sought is not a victory of one party over another, but a sense of common achievement, common protection, and common opportunity. This was part of the teaching of Gandhi. It means, in effect, a recognition that each individual and each group belongs to a wider community and ultimately to humanity as a whole. What we must be groping for, and building on, is the sense of our common humanity. It means, for example, we should strive to avert nuclear war, not just because it would result in the destruction of ourselves, but also because it would result in the destruction of our brothers (the other side). This is not utopian. It can flow from an expanding world community, just as many little states in the course of time have merged into bigger political units, and just as the Scots and the English, once bitterly opposed, became one nation. But we today can no longer afford the wars that accompanied such processes in the past.

It does not absolve us from deciding what is good and what is bad. This is not always the same as what is winning and what is losing—we must not simply give way on some mechanistic assumption as to inevitability or 'wave of the future'. Defeatism would have led Britain to surrender to Hilter in 1940. We must be prepared to stand up for certain things against odds.

Sometimes we must meet and live with the dilemma resulting from the fact that it usually needs more than one side to make adjustments (India's adherence to Panch Shila was not matched by Communist China, and India resisted aggression when it came). Sometimes the elements in the situation are for the time being completely intractable, with the various parties unyielding in tactics and beyond persuasion because of history, teaching, and group solidarity. In such cases the hard facts mean, at best, a period of delay, and at worst collision. Sometimes, when constructive progress appears to be being made, it is destroyed because one faction believes it has the other on the run, that it need make no more concessions, and that it can even withdraw from the accommodations it has already reached.

We cannot ignore the irrational elements in life and society. But we can try to make them more controllable. Nor can we exclude the possibility of new charismatic leaders, like Hitler and other Pied

Pipers who will take irrational and other disruptive elements, rouse up and play on passions, and set out deliberately to bring about communal tension and international war. We can try to eliminate the conditions which allow such men to prosper. There will be men who will want total victory for one side, and total subjection and defeat for the other. We can try to prevent these things happening: we can stand up to them if they do occur.

Much of what I have had to say will seem a commonplace to those who have thought or read about race problems and intercommunal tensions. I have referred here to some with which I have been concerned in the past, in the United Nations and elsewhere. Often I have felt, 'If only this had been tackled earlier'; or 'If only such-and-such a group would allow a little time for the other group to accustom itself to some new ideas, and for some preparations and adjustments to be made'; or 'If only some responsible members of the warring communities at various levels would establish some human contact with one another'.

One can give only broad guide-lines, hardly universal principles. Every problem has to be treated on its merits, drawing from experience with somewhat similar problems but remembering that many key elements, rational and irrational, will be different in different situations.

Most of my discussion has been on communal questions, using the word 'communal' in its widest sense, to cover groups distinguished by race, colour, religion, language, caste, and the like. The argument put forward is that the statesman will foresee and take action to meet the great problems as far in advance as possible; that action can be most effective if a lot of time is available, but only if the time is seen to be used and action is begun early; that the action has to go beyond provisions on paper, and should promote a healthy society in general as well as improve the acceptability or status of any group that is the object of discrimination or enmity; that a big role has to be played, in explanation and conciliation, by community leaders as well as national leaders; and that the aim should be conciliation rather than total victory or subjugation.

But though the discussion here has been mainly on communal problems, most of it is applicable to international conflicts too. In both, intercommunal and international, as we stumble on, fast or slowly, and occasionally slip back, we should keep to the widening conception of our common humanity, which means that the sort of

world which will be best for any one of us to live in will be one in which everyone else also has basic human rights and a free and equal opportunity to exercise them and to express himself.

The Essence of Hinduism

C. RAJAGOPALACHARI

I AM NOT SPEAKING to learned men but seek to explain Hinduism to the very ordinary good Christians and others who wish to understand the Hindu religion. The state is 'secular' in India but the people are not 'secular'. They are far from withdrawing importance from religion, each section in respect of its professed faith, although they all agree that the state should make no discrimination in favour of or against any one of the religions prevailing in India—Islam, Judaism, Zoroastrianism, Christianity, Hinduism, or other. It would indeed be a misfortune if the people of India became 'secular' in this sense. No system of national secular education and no number of laws and scheme of prisons can fill the place of religion (whatever particular religion it may be does not make a difference) in keeping a nation as large as ours at a tolerable level of civilization in conduct and behaviour. We cannot afford to throw away what has been built up through the ages as a self-restraining factor in the life of our hundreds of millions. The vast bulk of the people of India are Hindus and it is necessary that their religion should be properly understood by people following other religions in India and abroad.

Make no mistake that all Hindus today understand, believe in, and follow the Hindu religion faithfully. They understand, believe and follow it to the same extent as Christians do their religion—no more. So do not judge the Hindu religion by what you see the Hindu people do. This warning is as necessary for the people belonging to other faiths who wish to know what Hinduism is, as a similar caution should prevent Hindus from judging what Jesus Christ taught from what they see Christians of Europe and America do.

Everyone knows these days that the Hindus are heirs to a great religious philosophy and that they have inherited a body of very high-grade thought about the Supreme Intelligence that governs the universe. But the Hindus, while accepting the Brahman of their philosophers, worship and offer flowers and fruit to images and

symbols, as those philosophers too did. This needs a few words of explanation.

All the religions of the peoples of the world define God as an invisible Spirit. So also does Hinduism. All the religions lay down that God is omnipresent. He is everywhere, pervades everything, is in the hearts of all beings. The Hindu religion particularly stresses this. So it has followed it up to its logical end. If one wishes to offer Him worship and contemplation, one can do it by looking upon every living being, every inanimate thing before one as an embodiment of the Spiritual Being since God is everywhere and in everything. Faith and devotion and earnest reverential approach are the prerequisites of one's finding God in any object and in any form or symbol. In order to make this easy, rites and ceremonies are gone through which symbolize the descent of God on any idol of clay, wood, stone, or metal, or even a handful of grass one places before oneself for the purpose.

It is experienced by everyone who sincerely wishes to meditate on the Supreme Being how distracting the world is. Images and symbols help the required concentration of mind. Indeed, a Hindu believes God is there in fact. The icon or the symbol is one of the many shapes God presents himself in to the eyes of a pious person. This is the idolatry of the Hindus. It is stupid to hold that God is everywhere but not in the image to whom a pious Hindu offers his reverence.

People are told that Hindus believe in fate and that they do not, therefore, have faith in human endeavour. This is totally wrong. Hindu religion lays down that nothing is produced except by causes, including human endeavour. It lays down that it is man's duty to act and to act according to dharma. There are great Western philosophers who also have come to the conclusion that everything is predetermined, including your own volition and consequent endeavour. Hindu religion believes this too; but it definitely wants men to act, and act according to dharma. You should perform what you are expected to perform according to the accepted rules of right conduct. Man has the freedom to act and shape his destiny. The doctrine of karma lays down that every act, word, and thought leaves its unchangeable effect, but you can always modify the effect by a fresh act. Whether this act of yours is the result of real free will or whether even that is predetermined by unchangeable causes is a grand mystery both in Hinduism and in the latest Western philosophy. But we *feel* we are free and we should enjoy that freedom and utilize it to do what

is right. This is the rule in Hindusim as in other religions. The world is God's play, but we should all act our parts in the way of dharma, because it is God's play, *not our* play. It is serious life for us. Hinduism unmistakably lays down the doctrine of responsibility.

Hinduism lays down that death does not end the story of a soul's life. Death helps the soul to throw off one body and to take another body to work out the account of good and bad deeds. Just as energy or matter in physics cannot be destroyed, the soul of man cannot and does not die and disappear from existence. Death is only a phenomenon of transfer of habitation. Rebirth does not carry memory forward. Everyone begins anew with disabilities and endowments based on the previous life, and a new opportunity arises with each birth for progress or degeneration, or salvation. When you are inclined to be harsh or forget the duty of tenderness, remember that it may be your lost father or mother or sister or wife or brother or child or beloved friend who asks for your love and compassion.

Like Christianity, Hinduism also tells its votaries that one can get absolution for sin by surrender to His grace and through prayer and penitence. The mercy of God is incorporated in Christianity in the image of Jesus His son. In Hinduism it is incorporated in the image of the Supreme Mother who is always associated with the Supreme Father. They are one and yet they are apart, in order to help our understanding of Him. We have a loving and forgiving Mother to whom we can appeal, before whom we can confess, and to whose grace, if we surrender, we shall obtain her intercession. This is exactly the same as the Christian's faith in Jesus.

Our daily lives and thought should under Hinduism be pure and good, even as they should be under Christianity. Dharma is the all-important name given in Hinduism for what is right and should be done by any person under any given circumstances. Do not deviate from it, says Hinduism, when you are pursuing any object, be it wealth or pleasure or spiritual progress. Dharma is the mariner's compass of life. It is that which holds society together. It is that which makes the human family one, and makes it also one with the rest of living beings. There is a voice within, which, if we care, we can hear. It is conscience, Socrates's Daemon, the *Iswara* in the heart according to Hinduism.

This is Hinduism. It is a great religion and it was given to us by great and good men who lived pure and divine lives and thought high thoughts.

Reflections on Violence

SIR HERBERT READ

VIOLENCE IS A WORD often on our lips today, and you may be prepared to admit that the world has some justification in associating it particularly with the United States. Americans might retort with perfect justice that the greatest outbreaks of violence known to history have not occurred in the United States but in Europe, and that in spite of the high statistics for murder, assassination and other crimes of violence, citizens of the United States are essentially a peace-loving people, anti-militaristic, with no other wish but to use their immense power to protect and perfect their own unaggressive way of life. But the point of this brief essay is to suggest that violence is not something we can disown or disguise—that it is, on the contrary, an expression of basic instincts which are likely to overwhelm us unless they are brought to consciousness and controlled. In other words, we must accept violence and believe in its ultimate efficacy.

This was the argument of a famous book which appeared when I was a young man and had a great effect on the intellectuals of my generation: *Reflections on Violence* by Georges Sorel. The first edition of this book appeared in France before the First World War, in 1908. It was translated into English by T. E. Hulme, a young philosopher who was killed in that war, but not before exercising a fundamental influence on poets such as Ezra Pound and T. S. Eliot. My first literary task after the 1914-18 war was to edit his posthumous papers, a volume called *Speculations* which prolonged that influence for many years. In that way, through the mediation of Hulme, Georges Sorel became one of the unacknowledged creators of our present intellectual climate.

But not only in England and America. Apart from its immense influence on the Syndicalist Movement in France, Sorel's book was translated into Italian by no less a person than Benedetto Croce; it had a great and disastrous influence on another Benedetto—Mussolini. Sorel had expressed an inescapable truth—that violence is the only cure for the evils of *bourgeois* civilization. But Sorel was not

thinking in terms of military violence—the violence of the proletariat would be expressed in the general strike, that is to say, in an act of non-violence. 'I believe', he wrote, 'that the only means by which the pernicious influence of the demagogues may be wiped out are those employed by Socialism in propagating the notion of the proletarian general strike; it awakens in the depths of the soul a sentiment of the sublime proportionate to the conditions of a gigantic struggle; it forces the desire to satisfy jealousy by malice into the background; it brings to the fore the pride of free men, and thus protects the worker from the quackery of ambitious leaders, hungering for the flesh-pots.'

Such idealism may seem rather remote after the reality of two World Wars and the universal corruption of the socialist movement, which in every country is now under the spell of ambitious leaders, hungering for the flesh-pots. But the present state of affairs only serves to prove the correctness of Sorel's diagnosis. In renouncing the concept of violence, the myth of the general strike, the socialist movement lost the only energy and idealism it ever possessed.

It will be said that violence cannot be deployed in this way—that to play with the myth of violence is like playing with fire in a powder magazine. But anything capable of animating the mind of man is dangerous, and what we need in the present age of apathy and selfish affluence is some feeling for sublimity. The ideal of universal peace is sublime, but it will never be achieved by middle-class politicians, or by 'well-intentioned progressives', as Sorel called them. It will be achieved if at all by direct action on the scale of the general strike, in other words, by the myth of violence. And that is the paradox of our situation: we do not rise above our aggressive instincts by frustrating them, but only by giving them a revolutionary purpose.

Violence is the use of strength (Latin, *vis*) to obtain one's desire, and as such it is coeval with the evolution of our species, man. Pindar celebrated eternal strife, father of all things, and Homer's great poem, the *Iliad*, is an epic of violence or force. 'The true hero, the true subject, the centre of the *Iliad*,' wrote Simone Weil, 'is force. Force employed by men, force that enslaves man, force before which man's flesh shrinks away. In this work, at all times, the human spirit is shown as modified by its relations with force, as swept away, blinded by the very force it imagined it could handle, as deformed by the weight of the force it submits to.'

Force or violence, today as in the past, remains at the very centre

of human history, still furthering or deforming our ideals, still modifying our relations with one another and with the external world. Whatever the psychologists may have to say on the subject, we need not hesitate to call such a force an instinct, a mode of spontaneous behaviour which we display from birth. To quote an anthropologist: 'Man is a wild species and every baby born is a wild young thing. Advancing age, weakening vitality, and a long accumulation of fears and experiences may at last work a general inhibition on certain animal sources of human behaviour. But the dilemma of any society, closed or free, finds its chief place of residence in the birth-rate. Every *accouchement* delivers to society a creature who somehow must be tamed. Every *accouchement*—today, tomorrow, and to the end of our species' time—presents civilization with an aspiring candidate for the hangman's noose. Yet truly to domesticate him means probably to destroy him.' (Robert Ardrey, *African Genesis*, London, 1961, pp. 336-7.)

Our main task, as people dedicated to the formation and preservation of that non-violent mode of life we call civilization, is to investigate the various modes in which this force can be *transformed.* To eradicate violence is not in our power, and it may be doubted whether this could be the end-result of any process of human evolution. Violence is a component of the evolutionary process. But to admit the existence and the inevitability of violence in our destiny is not to condone it. Our whole effort, on the contrary, should be to control this force, to domesticate it and harness it to our needs. Like Prometheus, we must defy the fate that has been inflicted upon us. We are born with this instinct which if we indulge it degrades us to the level of predatory animals; luckily we have also evolved the self-knowledge and the power of self-transcendence that enable us to use such a vital force for positive or creative purposes.

The process of transformation is effected at both the individual and the social level, but every individual act of transformation is also a social act of transformation, and more and more we are driven to the conclusion that the problem of violence can be solved only within a social context—an Oedipus complex, for example, already implies a group of three people, and psychotic states like paranoia and schizophrenia involve a still wider group of participants. We are always part of one another and we solve our problems by mutual aid. For aggression we substitute congression, and that too is a component of the evolutionary process. But there is a sense in which we can dis-

tinguish between *individual* aggression, whether in infancy at the breast or later as acts of felony and manslaughter, and *multiple* aggression, that is to say, aggression that takes the form of mass revolt and war. War is legalized manslaughter and the state, which we tend to regard as primarily an organization for the suppression of violence, came into existence as the agent of mass violence. In rebellion and war we give free expression to our predatory instincts. It is significant that the Latin word *vis* is also used in the plural for military forces, and in English too we speak of military *forces*—the forces of the Crown, etc.

Violence, therefore, should be recognized as a basic reality of life and suppressed violence as a power capable of transforming life. But now I come to the main point of these brief reflections on violence. I have already mentioned the concept of non-violence, which is not to be confused with a state of inertia or apathy. Non-violence, as conceived by Gandhi, is the recognition of violence as a reality and of non-violence as equally (and oppositely) a reality. Non-violent resistance, Gandhi's specific strategy, is a deliberate contradiction in terms, for resistance necessarily implies the use of force, of counter-force. Gandhi always recognized the violence in our nature, and he preached a discipline or control of this force. Non-violent resistance is contained violence, and that is the explanation of its effectiveness. To maintain social action and mutual effort, the only forces that can transform reality, man must believe in the ultimate efficacy of violence. Such a belief, according to Sorel, constitutes a social myth, the specifically modern myth, and only in so far as we are inspired by such a myth, can justice be secured in this world.

Possibly these reflections on violence, since they end in paradox, are merely confusing. But my intention will have been grasped if non-violence as a social force is seen as the antithesis of our deepest instinct, and as the only force that is capable of transforming the world.

Rich Lands Poor Lands: Recollections and Reflections*

ESCOTT REID

IN THE PAST FIFTEEN YEARS or so the rich lands and the poor lands have been trying to create a working partnership through which the richer help the poorer in their efforts to speed up their economic development. This essay sets forth some personal recollections and reflections on some of the problems of creating and strengthening this partnership.

The basis of successful partnership is, of course, mutual understanding among the partners. A person from a rich land can achieve a reasonable degree of understanding of the problems of the poor lands only if he has a compassionate heart, imaginative sympathy, and a sense of history. For the seeker after wisdom about the problems of underdevelopment must, if he comes from a rich land, acquire the ability to feel in his bones something of what life is like for a poor man in a poor land and for a political leader in a poor land who must urge the poor man to sacrifice present goods for future hopes. It is difficult to acquire this ability without seeing the poverty of poor lands with one's own eyes.

During the four and a half years that my wife and I were in India, we were fortunate in having many visitors from Canada. Whenever possible, we would take them to see two or three average Indian villages, not the best, the show places, not the worst, just the average. Some of these visitors from Canada were experts on the economic problems of India. They knew what the per capita national product of India was; they knew how many calories were in the usual diet of the average Indian; they knew how many yards of cloth he used a year; what the statistics were on infant mortality; what was the average expectation of life. They had read about India. They had

* A note at the end of the essay defines the terms: rich lands, poor lands, middle-class lands, international economic aid. The note also indicates the extent of the increase in aid from 1949 to 1964.

talked about India to people who had lived there. They had seen movies of India. But—and this is a revealing commentary on our inability to communicate with each other—no matter how much they had studied about India's problems and poverty, when they saw for the first time with their own eyes their first average Indian village, they were shocked by the depth of its poverty. It was so much worse than anything they had ever dreamed of.

Only a comparatively few people from the rich lands can have this kind of opportunity to be shocked into the beginning of an awareness of what life is like for most people in most of the poor lands. Others in the rich lands have the harder task of stretching their imaginations in order to achieve this beginning of understanding.

And what do I mean by a beginning of understanding ? I mean chiefly four things. Firstly, a realization of the extent of poverty in the poor countries. Of their total population of thirteen hundred million, (excluding the Soviet Bloc and China) at least three quarters are poverty-stricken. Secondly, a realization of the intensity of this poverty. It is not the kind of poverty which people in rich countries think of when they talk about a war against poverty at home. Most people who are considered poor in the rich lands would be considered well off in the poor countries. Thirdly, a realization that most of the poor of the world are peasants living on the land, and that the peasant is the key to the success of development programmes in the great majority of poor countries. Fourthly, a realization that most of the poor of the world are not white, and that their culture, unlike that of the so-called Western world, is not derived from Western Christendom.

All the world's great religions and philosophies unite in affirming that all men are brothers. One of the most encouraging developments since the war is the recognition by an increasing number of the people of the rich lands that they are a small, almost entirely white island of privilege among the vast poverty-stricken majority of the brotherhood of man, which is far different from them in culture, way of livelihood and physical appearance.

This, I call the beginning of understanding of the problem of the relations between rich lands and poor lands. It is the beginning of wisdom about the problems of the economic development of poor lands. It is, of course, only the beginning of wisdom. Again I take my illustrations from India, the country in the underdeveloped world which I know best, and a country which constitutes a very large part

of the underdeveloped world since it has a population of almost five hundred million.

The Indian peasant is poor. A recognition of his dire poverty is central in any discussion of the problems of economic development in India. But the Indian peasant has many other attributes which are also relevant to these problems of economic development. There is the way he feels about the caste group he belongs to and about other higher or lower caste groups in his village. Because of the way he feels it is difficult for the various caste groups to work together to promote the interests of the whole village. The village tends to be divided into factions. There is the villager's attitude to the cow and the monkey. Most Hindu villagers consider it a sin to kill either the cow or the monkey and India is plagued by useless cows and destructive monkeys. There is in most Indian villages what most people from rich lands would consider to be undue deference to the traditional ways of the past, whether they are ways of cultivating rice, or sowing wheat, or preparing food, or not using latrines.

I remember the first tour my wife and daughter and I made of Indian villages at the beginning of 1953. We spent ten days visiting village after village. We slept in government bungalows on the outskirts of the villages. One of the first villages we visited was, we were told, even poorer than the average. On our tour of that village we were shown a rich mango grove and a fertile tomato patch, and we saw that the crop had been mangled the night before by monkeys. In village after village we saw half-starved milk-bearing cows competing for scanty pasture with useless old three-quarter starved cows. We heard stories of feudalistic privilege and oppression.

The natural reaction of the outsider is to conclude that what India should do—if India is to double its agricultural production in fifteen years or so as it must—is to break down its caste system, destroy the useless cows and the destructive monkeys, and eradicate from its villages the hierarchical and feudal traditions.

This is a natural reaction. But I think that the second stage in the attainment of wisdom about the problems of economic development in underdeveloped peasant countries is an acceptance of the fact that changes of this sort cannot be made in a mere decade or two and that to secure badly needed immediate increases in agricultural production it is necessary to work through existing social institutions. Thus if the greybeards dominate a village it is necessary to concentrate on the task of converting the greybeards to using

improved seeds, fertilizers, new methods of cultivation and so on. If the villagers will not kill monkeys perhaps they will look the other way if outsiders trap them and kill them far away from the village.

A third stage in the attainment of wisdom is, I suggest, the realization of why it is necessary that the leaders of the poor countries have even harder heads than the leaders of the rich countries and why it is more difficult for the leaders of poor countries to make hard-headed decisions.

Suppose agricultural production in a typical poor country were to go up by five per cent a year. Are the farmers to be allowed to increase their consumption by five per cent a year ? They easily could, not by spending their increased income on luxuries, but by spending it only on bare necessities for the growing population in the villages. The farmer and his wife and children could spend the little bit of extra income per head on a little more food, a few more clothes. But if the farmer consumes all the increase in his production, how is the poor country to finance its industrialization programme and feed the fast-growing population of its towns and cities ? If there is a five per cent increase in agricultural production, will it not be necessary for the government to siphon off in one way or another, say, one-quarter or one-third of the returns from that increase in order to finance industrial expansion ?

Take another and a different kind of hard choice. A poor country is building a dam to irrigate land which has hitherto had to depend on scanty and irregular rainfall and water drawn from shallow wells. The farmers in the area are poor. They need water badly. It would be possible to distribute the water over 500,000 acres. Every farmer in the area would get some water for his fields. Every farmer would get bigger crops. It would also be possible to do a scientific soil survey and select out of the total area of 500,000 acres the best 250,000 acres and provide water only for those acres. The farmers who farm the other 250,000 acres would get no irrigation water. The experts say that by concentrating the water on the best 250,000 acres, instead of spreading it thinly over 500,000, one would get a much bigger increase in the total agricultural production of the area. Indeed the best guess of the experts is that if everybody got a little water the total agricultural production in the whole area would probably increase by about fifty per cent, whereas if the water was used only on the better land agricultural production in the whole area would probably be trebled. But the farmers who own the poorer

land, who are for the most part the poorer farmers, would see their richer neighbours get plenty of water while they would get none.

Take a third problem. In the past dozen years or so, agricultural production has been increasing in a typical poor country by about three and a half per cent a year while population has been increasing by about two and a half per cent a year. Virtually everybody who has studied the problem agrees that a one per cent annual increase in agricultural production per head of population is just not good enough. The per head increase should be at least two and a half per cent a year which, at present rates of population growth, would mean doubling agricultural production in about fifteen years. In order to increase production at this rate, farmers must be persuaded to improve their methods of cultivation, to use improved tools, better seeds, more fertilizer. The problem is to pick out the districts and the farmers in those districts who are most receptive to new ideas and to concentrate on them. This is easier said than done. Nevertheless, the only possibility of getting really big increases in agricultural production in the near future is to concentrate on helping the more efficient farmers to produce more and on giving them the incentive to do so. May be it is necessary to select out of the more efficient farmers the ones who are the acknowledged leaders of the village because, if they accept new methods, their example is apt to be followed by the other villagers. But this means that the less efficient farmers, who are for the most part the poorer farmers, would not be helped directly by the government's agricultural services. The immediate beneficiaries of the government's activities would for the most part be the richer farmers.

Faced with this sort of problem, the soft head ruled by the soft heart would always make the soft choice and a poverty-stricken country would never lift itself out of its poverty. The soft heart ruled by the hard head would make something close to the hard choice, would make this choice in sorrow and grief of heart. This is the sad burden borne by the leaders of the governments of the poor countries.

It is a burden which can be borne by compassionate men only if they do their best to reconcile the necessity of increased production with the demands of social justice.

Thus in the last two examples of hard choices the farmers who get the scarce water or the scarce agricultural services should not be permitted to retain for their own use the whole of the resulting increase in the value of their farm production. They

should be permitted by the government to keep only that proportion which is necessary to provide them with sufficient incentives to use the water efficiently or to change their methods of cultivation to more efficient methods. The rest of the increase in the value of their farm production should be siphoned off by the government by water rates or taxes of one kind or another. Some of the money thus siphoned off can wisely be used by the government to finance a massive rural works programme which could employ the farmers in the area who do not benefit directly from the new irrigation project or from the services the government provides. The works projects should be of the kind which lead directly to increased agricultural production. They should include contour bunding, desilting of canals and small reservoirs, damming of rivulets and streams, digging of surface wells, tree planting, and other projects for soil conservation and land reclamation.

The inescapable task of an institution like the World Bank is to help the leaders of the governments of the poor countries to shoulder the burden of hard choices. The World Bank helps them with advice. It helps them with loans. But it only helps the governments of those member countries which ask for its help. If a member country asks it to do so, the World Bank will analyse as best it can the costs and benefits of alternative courses of action in respect of a particular project or a particular sector of the economy of the member country. Some of the possible courses of action will be softer than others. The result of the Bank's analysis will be that before a government makes a soft choice it knows the economic cost of making that choice. And by economic cost I do not mean the cost in dollars or rupees or dinars. I mean the cost in terms of slowing down the pace of the economic advance of the country.

For in each of the three examples I have given of decisions between hard choices and soft choices, the selection of the soft choice means just that. It means that the economic advance of the country will be slower than it otherwise would have been. There will be less food produced, and thus more hunger. There will be fewer resources available for building more factories, and thus more unemployment.

Rich countries are fully familiar with this kind of problem. It is of the very stuff of politics. The governments of rich countries are constantly having to make decisions on how far they should slow down the material advance of the country as a whole in order to reduce disparities among regions or among social or economic groups or in

order to achieve political or cultural objectives. The governments of rich countries are constantly aware that the selection of one alternative rather than another may mean the loss of several constituencies in the next election. It may even mean the loss of the election.

If a rich country consistently chooses policies which involve sacrificing economic considerations, its rate of economic advance will slow down but it will still have a very high standard of living. In almost all the poor countries the situation is tragically different. In poor countries with rising populations, if governments over a period of time consistently sacrifice economic considerations, the rate of economic advance will fall below the rate of population growth and the people, already poor, will become poorer; the people who now have some hope of a better life for their children will be left without ground for hope.

Thus it is essential for the governments and peoples of the poor countries generally to make something close to the hard choices whereas it is not essential for the rich countries. But at the same time it is much more difficult for a poor country to reject the temptation of soft choices than it is for a rich country. For the rejection of soft choices so often means holding down increases in consumption by the poor. It so often means putting off doing much to reduce inequalities and inequities among regions and among groups within regions. It so often means sacrificing today's goods for tomorrow's hopes. These are things which it is difficult enough for governments and peoples to do in rich countries. It is much more difficult in poor countries.

IN GIVING THEIR AID to poor lands, the governments and peoples of rich countries are constantly faced with the necessity of deciding between hard and soft ways. They can provide aid for hard projects or for soft projects. A hard project is one which a careful, expert investigation has shown to be well-conceived, designed and engineered and which is likely to result in increases in production in the poor country which are commensurate with its real economic cost to that country.

A soft project may serve better in the short run the prestige of the government that gives it and of the government that receives it, but its real benefit to the economy of the poor country can be low. A typical soft project is the monumental large dam for irrigation which will not result in much increase in production because it is not accompanied by adequate subsidiary irrigation channels, by adequate grassroots research on what crops should be grown on the newly irrigated

land and what particular variety of seeds should be used, or on how much water should be used at various times of the year for each type of crop on each type of land in the area, or by setting up effective methods of teaching the farmers how to use the water. Even if the project for the large irrigation dam did not suffer from all these defects, it would be a soft project if it did not yield as big a return in increased production as alternative methods of using the resources which would be required to build the dam and make it effective. Alternative uses of the resources might be making better use of dams already built, or building a number of smaller dams, or digging deep wells, or improving dry farming.

The governments of rich countries can make the soft choice of using their aid to a poor country to build up their own industries for producing capital goods with little regard to whether it is wise for that particular poor country to go in for that particular kind of investment at that time. Or they can make the hard choice of reconciling the building up of their own industries with the long-run economic interests of the poor countries. Thus if steel plants and nuclear power plants are built in the wrong place at the wrong time in the wrong size they will slow down economic development. The expansion of the steel industry in India has been a wise use of scarce resources but there are at least half a dozen underdeveloped countries whose pace of economic advance has been slowed down in the past fifteen years by building steel plants. They would be further advanced now if they had spent the money on projects of higher economic priority. There is danger that in the next five or ten years comparable misinvestments will be made by poor countries in nuclear power plants.

A great Western European statesman was talking to me two and a half years ago about the economic development programme of a poor country whose president had just been visiting him. He said: 'This country has a very sensible development programme.' He paused. 'No steel plant.' His simplification was the simplification of the political realist. For that country at that time to include a steel plant in its development programme would have been to demonstrate that it was not serious in its efforts to raise the standards of living of its people.

The governments of rich countries can make the very hard decision to give their aid to poor countries not just in the form of grants and loans but also by opening their markets to the goods

of the poor countries. They can give a reasonably large proportion of their aid through international agencies, or they can give almost all of their aid bilaterally and tie it to the purchase of their own goods and services. When their aid is tied to the purchase of their own goods and services they can turn a blind eye when their contractors and suppliers, not having to meet international competition, charge prices higher than they would on contracts subject to international competitive bidding. Or they can make the hard choice of deciding that, though their bilateral aid will be tied, it will not be given for goods and services which are, say, more than fifteen per cent above world prices.

Then there is the question of the terms of aid. How generous should the terms be ? How big should be the element of subsidy in the loans ? Should some of the aid be given in the form of outright grants ? Here the paradox is that often the hard-headed decision is to give the aid on soft terms.

The more hard-headed choices the governments and peoples of the rich countries make, the easier it is for the governments and peoples of the poor countries to make hard-headed choices, and the more hard-headed choices they make the easier it is for the rich countries to increase their aid.

WHEN MY WIFE AND I arrived in Bombay in November 1952 on our way to Delhi, the Governor of Bombay was Sir Girja Shankar Bajpai. Sir Girja was one of the most distinguished of the Indian members of the old Indian Civil Service. He was a scholar in Persian and in Sanskrit. He was an excellent administrator and diplomat. His last post before India became independent was that of India's representative in Washington in 1944 and 1945. I knew him at that time. After independence he became the first head of the Indian Foreign Office. He had recently retired from that post to become Governor of Bombay. He asked us to stay with him overnight before taking the train to Delhi.

I had a long talk with him that night. I pressed him for advice. I shall always remember his reply. He said to me that in his view the ambassadors who were successful in New Delhi were those who approached the problems of India with respectful sympathy.

When Girja Shankar Bajpai used that term, respectful sympathy, he may have been thinking of an ancient Indian Sanskrit saying on how one should give to the poor. The great Indian poet and philoso-

pher, Rabindranath Tagore, cited this saying in one of his essays. He was contending that in India the use of wealth had been 'subject in the past to the strong pressure of social will.' 'The donor,' he wrote, 'had to give with humility; the Sanskrit saying, *Sraddhaya deyam*, give with reverence, is significant.'[1]

Those in the rich lands who give advice and money to the poor lands could usefully meditate on this Sanskrit saying: *Sraddhaya deyam*, give with reverence, give with humility.

And what is the text which those in the poor lands who receive advice and money from the rich lands might usefully meditate on ? Tagore, in another of his essays, wrote:

> Man has to win his manhood every day of his life, and the history of every nation is the history of the campaigns it has undertaken to win victory over itself. Man comes into this world to penetrate the impenetrable, and attain the unattainable, and he grows strong and prosperous by removing obstacles from his path. Hence the Sanskrit saying *Veerabhogya vasundhara*, the world belongs to the valiant. Each nation has a special problem given it by God, and it finds its salvation by solving it rightly.'[2]

Perhaps the motto of the partnership between rich lands and poor lands should be: *Sraddhaya deyam: Veerabhogya vasundhara.*

I am not despondent about the future of that partnership. I am hopeful. For that partnership has grown in wisdom and in strength in the past fifteen years and, if men of good will, compassion, imagination, intelligence, and energy think hard enough, make hard enough choices, struggle hard enough, I see no good reason why the partnership should not continue to grow in wisdom and in strength.

What is now required is for the rich and poor members of the partnership—and the middle-class countries in between —to examine together the extent to which the poor lands have succeeded in the past fifteen years in their war against poverty, disease, and ignorance, and why it is they have not been able to accomplish more.

In the past fifteen years, poor lands have increased their total

[1] Postscript to 'Letters from Russia' published in the book, *Russiar Chithi*, 1931.

[2] 'Rammuhan Roy, a Pilgrim of India' (*Bharatpathik Rammohan*). Pamphlet, 1933.

production of goods and services at about the same rate as rich lands. This is a great accomplishment. But it does not mean much for the average man, woman, or child in the average poor lands. In the first place even if production per head were to go up at the same rate in rich lands and poor lands, say, at four per cent a year, this would mean an increase of about $ 120 per head in the United States but only $ 3 per head in India. Secondly, the same rate of increase in production in rich lands and poor lands does not mean the same rate of increase in production per head for the population of poor lands has been increasing twice as rapidly as the population of rich lands.

In the past fifteen years the population of the poor lands has increased by about two-fifths, the population of rich lands by only about one-fifth. It seems probable that in the poor lands more than half of the increases in production are being absorbed by increases in population. It is this staggering rate of increase in population which constitutes the greatest single obstacle to substantial improvements in the standards of living of the poor lands. This obstacle is much more serious than we, either in the rich lands or the poor lands, thought fifteen years ago.

There are other important obstacles which are much greater than we had thought. The peasant is harder to move, the skills of public administration and business management are scarcer, the traditions and the social institutions which inhibit progress die harder, the relations between the giver and the receiver of aid are more delicate and complex.

It has become increasingly clear that the needs of the poor lands are much greater than we thought fifteen years ago. If the poor lands are to succeed in raising the standards of living of their peoples, they need to curb their population growth. They need to be able to draw on much larger resources. Resources of capital: capital derived from private foreign investors and from foreign governments; capital derived from domestic savings. Resources in terms of more and better entrepreneurs, engineers, social anthropologists, teachers, administrators, economists; from at home and from abroad. Resources of knowledge, in rich lands and poor lands, of what are the principal obstacles to rapid economic growth, and what are the best ways around those obstacles. Resources of faith and hope in the possibilities of economic and social progress in the poor lands. Resources in terms of a sustained determination by the governments

and peoples of rich lands and poor lands to make the achievement of this progress a primary objective of national policy. Resources of political leaders in the poor lands who know that

> 'Our stability is but balance, and wisdom lies
> in masterful administration of the unforeseen.'[3]

Rare political skills are needed by the leaders of the poor lands and the rich lands if the partnership of poor lands and rich lands is to succeed. Rare diplomatic skills are needed by the people in poor lands and rich lands who serve the partnership. For the giving and receiving of advice is a delicate and hazardous operation. A country which is not proud is not worth helping.

The giver of advice can usefully remind himself of four things. Firstly, that human judgment is fallible. Secondly, that luck or providence or the unpredictable plays a large role in economic development. Thirdly, that while it is a good thing for poor peoples to have more to eat and to wear, better places to live in, more and better nurses, doctors, and teachers, and less illness, it is a better thing for them to have these goods without sacrificing those ancient values of their society which can give them a feeling of belonging to a group, a sense of dignity and the possibility of serenity. The fourth thing which a giver of advice to a poor land can usefully remind himself of is that, even if final truth has been revealed to him, he is not Moses laying down the law from Mount Sinai. He is a partner speaking to a free and equal partner. For him success is measured not by the wisdom of the advice he gives but by how much of his wise advice is accepted. His task is one of persuasion. When he intervenes with advice his 'intervention should be in the least abrasive, the least corrosive way possible'.[4]

The receiver of advice can usefully remind himself that the advice is coming from a free and equal partner in a joint endeavour, that the resources this partner provides come from the savings or taxes of individuals in the rich lands, and that the willingness of these individuals to continue to put up money depends in large part on whether

[3] Robert Bridges: *The Testament of Beauty.*

[4] Abe Fortas referring to intervention by the Supreme Court of the United States in the criminal proceedings of a state in the argument before the Court in the Gideon Case in 1963. Anthony Lewis, *Gideon's Trumpet*, Random House, New York, 1964, p. 172.

they believe the partnership is achieving what it set out to do. For that reason, the partner giving aid is inevitably concerned with the economic policies of the aid-receiving country and with the use which that country is making of all its resources whether derived from foreign or domestic sources—from private foreign investors, from loans or grants from foreign governments, from taxes, the profits of publicly owned companies, or domestic savings. It is the total of resources with which he is concerned, not just the resources from abroad or the use of the aid made available for one particular project.

The more clearly it can be demonstrated to the legislatures and peoples of the aid-giving countries that the economic policies are wise and the resources well used, the easier it is for governments and legislatures in the rich lands to resist pressures to transfer part of their aid from the fight against poverty abroad to the fight against pockets of poverty at home. The easier it is for them to open up their markets to the exports of the poor lands, and to make the other hard choices which face the aid-giver. The easier it is for them to increase their aid.

We the people of the rich lands and the poor lands have learned much in the last fifteen years from our partnership. We have come increasingly to realize that the partnership can evolve from one between two groups of countries, one rich and aid-giving and one poor and aid-receiving, to a partnership where each as it moves up the ladder of economic and social progress can increase the help which it gives to those below it on the ladder. The poor cannot give much money to the poorer but they can share the benefits of their experience and that experience has often cost them much in sweat and tears. When they pass on the lessons they have learned from their failures and their successes that gift can be of great worth. The countries which have recently succeeded in lifting themselves out of the ranks of the poor into the ranks of what one might call the middle-class powers, have an especially important role to play, since their economies and their problems are intermediate between those of the rich and the poor. They can interpret between the two groups. They can transmute the experience of the rich into a form in which it is more easily usable by the poor.

We have learned in the last fifteen years how intimate our partnership must become if we are to succeed in our war against the ancient enemies of man: poverty, disease, and ignorance. We realize better each year how important to our children and our children's children

is success in the partnership, how rewarding the partnership can be to all who participate in it.

Those of us who have been privileged to serve the partnership by living in a land like India have had opportunities to learn even more. We have learned of the gifts India has to share with the world—the beauty of its landscapes, the richness of its culture, the courage, dignity, and gaiety of its people.

I often think back on the first tour I made of the Indian countryside in February of 1953. My memories are full of colour, of fragrance, and of music. The golden glow of the early morning and the late afternoon. The gold of the mustard fields. The fragrance of the flowering fields of peas and of mustard. The sweet smell of boiling sugarcane juice. The tree-lined canal banks. The long shadows of late afternoon and early morning. The bells of the bullock-carts. And the gay singing of the villagers heard across the fields during the day or from the villages at night.

I often think of the Rajasthan peasant women whom I used to meet when I walked in the early morning through the streets of New Delhi near the Canadian residence. I see them again walking to their hard work of building the new Delhi. Walking with magnificent carriage in their gaily coloured clothes, chattering, laughing, sometimes singing. These women have become to me a symbol of hope. They come from the heart of India, its villages. They are those villagers whom Tagore once described as 'eternal tenants in an extortionate world, having nothing of their own'. But they are not broken by their poverty or their hard work. They go from their shacks to their hard work in dignity and gaiety. And it is the courage, the patience, the dignity, and the gaiety of the mass of the people of India which make India rich in spite of its poverty—not just the wisdom of its teachers and saints and scholars, and the beauty of its landscapes, its monuments, and its shrines.

The whole world would be impoverished if India, the vessel of an ancient, lovely, and living culture, were to dissolve into anarchy or if to save itself from anarchy it were to be false to its traditions of tolerance and humanity. The whole world will be enriched by India's success in its programme of economic and social development. For success will release tremendous latent energies in India, and those energies will produce not only things of the hand but things of the mind and spirit. And what is true of India is true of so many of the poor lands. Today the mind and spirit of the poor lands are cabined,

cribbed, confined by their poverty. To release the poor lands from the imprisonment of their poverty will be to enrich the lives of all men everywhere.

JUST BEFORE I LEFT India in May 1957 at the end of my assignment as Canadian High Commissioner, I wrote a confidential farewell despatch to Ottawa summing up my impressions of India. The essay concluded with a study of Mr. Nehru. In this study I said:

'He finds it exciting to be the creative, practical politician who prods, pushes, pulls, cajoles, leads, babies India out of the bullock-cart and cow-dung age into the age of jet airplanes and nuclear energy. Because he is the leader of India in a high adventure of national development, he lives in a pleasurable state of whirling, restless activity, a state which he himself has called "continuous excitement" . . . .

'Sometimes I have had the feeling watching Nehru that he is a magician who conjures up a vision of a united, progressive India and that when he passes from the scene the vision will disappear. It is a vision which he conjures up and he does it deliberately. He doesn't do it to mislead the foreigner. He does it because he knows that India can advance only if it can see visions and dream dreams, if it draws on the best in its past, if it breaks with the worst. . . .

'He genuinely returns the respect, the adulation, and the love of the Indian people for him. . . . He loves India in a poetic, almost mystical way. He loves the land of India, and it is a land which is easy to love. . . . He is enchanted by the great vistas of Indian history. . . . He feels for the misery of the people of India. Their misery hurts him. It makes him impatient. It makes him angry.'

Much of what I then said about Mr. Nehru describes the happy warrior who serves the partnership between rich lands and poor lands. He is enchanted by the great vistas of the histories of the lands of Asia and Africa and Latin America. He feels for their misery. He is exhilarated by a sense of participation in a high adventure. He sees visions and he dreams dreams.

World Bank, Washington, May, 1964

NOTE

This essay is concerned with the two-thirds of the world outside the Moscow and Peking groups of countries. The countries in this two-thirds of the world are divided into three groups according to the average income of their inhabitants, that is, their per capita gross national product. The borderlines between poor, middle-class, and rich lands are arbitrarily set at $250 and $750. Poor lands have a per capita G.N.P. of not more than $250, rich lands at least $750. Middle-class lands are the ones in between. The following examples from Europe indicate where these borderlines run: Turkey and Portugal are just poor enough to fit into the category of poor lands; Greece and Yugoslavia are just well enough off to be middle-class; Italy is just well enough off to be a rich land. The per capita G.N.P. of India is $75, of the United States $3,000. The total population of the poor lands is 1,300 millions; of the middle-class lands 200 millions; of the rich lands 500 millions.

The term economic aid is used to cover the transfer of resources from rich lands to poor lands by loans and grants from governments and includes loans and grants in the form of food and raw materials. Economic aid does not include military support or military aid. Annual figures of aid are commitments less interest and repayments of capital on outstanding loans. When comparisons are made between different years, the comparisons are between dollars of roughly equal purchasing power. The 1949 dollars are converted into 1963-64 dollars.

In 1963 the total aid from rich lands to poor lands as defined above through multilateral agencies and through bilateral programmes, was almost three times what it had been in 1949: over four billion dollars in 1963 compared with about a billion and a half in 1949. In 1949 only three or four countries had regular bilateral programmes of economic aid to poor lands. Now more than a dozen countries have such programmes. In 1949 the United States was providing aid at a rate of about a billion dollars a year. Now the United States is providing aid at a rate of over three billion dollars a year. In 1949 the United Nations Special Fund and the Expanded Programme of Technical Assistance did not exist. The Colombo Plan was established in 1950; the International Finance Corporation in 1956; the International Development Association in 1960; the Inter-American Development Bank in 1960; the Alliance for Progress in 1961. The first United Nations Conference on Trade and Development was held in 1964.

Asia, Africa, and the World

CARLOS P. ROMULO

His Excellency
SHRI JAWAHARLAL NEHRU
India

July 14, 1964

Dear Prime Minister Nehru:

IT GIVES ME PLEASURE to address you thus even in your absence. And if I persist in this form of our dialogue, it is because it really is still possible to do it. You belong to the rank of those eminent personages who outlive their generation and even survive the cruel claims of death. Such is the immortal rank of Plato, of Aristotle; of Buddha and Christ; of Zarathustra, Tagore, and Gandhi. Like theirs, we feel that your message continues to be before us—but yours is the more relevant because it was our great privilege to have worked with you in the cause of Asia and its freedom, and because with you, we also had had the supreme chance of sometimes giving you our dissent.

In short, you are historically with us and of us, and one can never refrain from reflecting on the import of the historic significance of such an experience.

No doubt you have left an irreplaceable void in the politics of Asia: Nehru is one man in a century. But certainly, the ethical conduct in politics to which you have committed India will continue its logic in the context of the political situation that is to emerge in Asia in the forthcoming decades and your ideas on the autonomy of nations and the freedom of man will work out their implications in the intellectual canons that shall be established in our emergent international order. No: your passage from us does not end your influence; nor will it diminish the power of your persuasion. You will remain a presence among the generations in Asia and your politics will continue to influence Asian democracy.

To think of you, for instance, is to have in mind the history of

modern India, and although perhaps you may reject this judgment because of an innate modesty on your part, you also express—in the leadership you have shown in your country and in Asia itself—the very integrity of the concept of the Afro-Asian community.

India is respected in the community of nations not only because of its ancient and venerable civilization, although this also must be taken into account in the respectful attitude of the twentieth century world towards India. But were it only for its ancient civilization, India would have elicited merely the same esteem that we hold for, say, Greece, Rome, or Alexandria: some past reality or image or symbol to go back to in times of confusion, but without the capacity to sustain the very confused and tangled demands of industrial life in the twentieth century. There is no doubt that these names suggest memorable civilizations; so does the ancient civilization of India.

But India was fortunate in having leaders who sought to establish the continuity of her greatness. History itself is continuous, and when we think of the continuity of the greatness of India, we think also of her great men: of Gandhi, Prasad, Tagore, Maulana Azad, and Nehru.

Gandhi sought to revive the national spirit of India and made it a great moral force against a modern phenomenon of politics: colonialism. Against the militarism of the West represented by British rule in India, Gandhi endeavoured to muster the spiritual force of the Indian identity and to imbue the Indian people with the consciousness of unity; in the end, the spirit of Gandhi and the Indian nation prevailed in the midst of the colonial policy of *divide et impera.*

But when we consider the position of India in contemporary times, we perforce must think of the leadership that you have provided India in the most difficult years not only in its own history but also in that of our own country. Of the national leaders of the world today, your position is most unique. Ours is a deeply political era, but by your leadership, you seem to suggest philosophical motivations—rather than demands of *Realpolitik*—in your political conduct. You have succeeded in maintaining the important role of India in the world not through military strength or industrial power. You have done it not by expeditient political alignments—which, as a matter of fact, you have shunned—but through the concept of

international understanding and the promotion of peace. And in a divided world where loyalty is importunately sought and highly rewarded, you have maintained a position of admirable integrity: you have bluntly told the leaders of the big powers that the loyalty that is meet and due alone to humanity is that loyalty which answers to the principles of justice, integrity, and freedom.

India's position in world politics has often been referred to as deriving from the policy of 'non-commitment'. This is an error. India has maintained a consistent commitment to freedom, to the idea of the equal dignity and worth of all peoples and nations; to the principle of self-determination; to the idea of international co-operation; and to the steadfast adherence to the enlightened rule of law. No other country in the modern international community of nations has perhaps been more committed to these principles to the point of risking national security than India. India's renunciation of violence has, at least in one recent instance, surprised her political equipoise. But it has also convinced the world that brutality, however convenient it sometimes is, however effective it often is, especially in supporting territorial claims, can never be valid, in the ultimate sense, as a moral principle.

It is this aspect of India which is modern and alive to the political situation of our own century that accounts for its important position in world affairs today. And it is this aspect which informed and inspired more than one nationalist movement in Asia and Africa.

In saying this, I do not mean to imply that it was mainly India's influence that has created the nationalist resurgence in Asia. It would indeed be quite inaccurate to say that. It is possible that India has offered the rest of Asia a lesson and a model in political attitudes, but as you yourself would say, nationalism, like revolution, does not have to be imported. Nationalism was a political necessity for the nations in Asia and Africa that aspired to freedom, equality, and justice, but permit me to reiterate what I had said in the Azad Memorial Lecture: it was India that provided modern Afro-Asian nationalism its conscience.

Today, Asia and Africa represent more than geographical entities. They also represent a new political concept, pervaded by the spirit of nationalism: the desire for equality and self-determination, and for freedom, enlightened by the aspiration to attain the Good Life. These, I think, also sustain the Afro-Asian reality. To conceive of Asia and Africa without having in mind the factuality of the

motivating power of their aspirations is to be deceived about the essential nature of the Asian and African communities.

The error of the West in its way of regarding Asia today is not so much that it still believes in the rightness of colonialism. Even the West—the Soviets as well as the other big powers of the United States, Great Britain, and France—now agrees with the moral and political rightness of decolonization. But the error that persists in the West is that, seeing that Asia and Africa have been consigned to underdevelopment by their own colonial policies, they now think that the drive for survival and economic prosperity serves to justify the continued political regimentation of the Afro-Asian mind and spirit. This is a fallacy. What challenges the peoples of Asia and Africa today is no longer the presence of the West in the complex realities of the international situation. Asian and African nations are as much aware of the fact that, in much the same way that the East cannot be ignored, the West, too, cannot be effaced.

So that it is not the power of the West that challenges our peoples today but the universalistic implications of Western civilization. By this I refer to the scientific technology, the attitudes, and the general humanism that Western civilization now implies. The nations of Africa and Asia have to meet the challenge of science. Having lived for so long within a tradition-bound social reality, cordoned off by colonial policies from the sophistications and harshness of an industrial culture, our peoples now find it necessary to have science and scientific technology, in order to ensure the general advancement of their various societies. It has been said that the relatively less powerful nations of the West—let us say, France—are aspiring at the present time to equal the atomic power of both the United States and Soviet Union. Well, the aspiration should be legitimately conceded to France, and not only to France. It is the aspiration of every nation everywhere. It should be a happy event if atomic reactors should be established in all nations for peaceful purposes—for general prosperity; for socio-economic development; for medical progress; for scientific purposes, etc. As you may have already inferred, when I justified the aspiration of countries towards possession of atomic power, I was not thinking in the destructive and militaristic sense that seems inordinately to control the thinking of the West.

Therefore, since our concern here is not scientific power as an aggression potential, it becomes inevitable for us in Asia to determine

or define its responsible uses. The application of science demands a complex of corresponding responsibilities on the part of peoples or the societies that use it. Asia must continue to exert its moral force to encourage the further advance of science and technology, and always to insist on the consistently responsible use of it.

There is yet another aspect in which the concept of an integrated Afro-Asia could be used as a moral force in the present situation of our century. I refer to the anomalous discrepancy in the distribution of wealth in our times. Asia and Africa are both rich in resources. When we come to inquire why their various societies have been kept in such a stage of development in the twentieth century, we actually touch upon a serious political issue. Adam Smith, somewhere in the eighteenth century, wrote of the wealth of nations. His point of view was essentially optimistic and understandably so. He was trying to explain, and theorize on, the phenomenon of the rising *bourgeoisie.* But Adam Smith's *bourgeois* feelings were to become the support of forces destructive of colonial societies, and one has merely to contrast the social reality in Asia and Africa against the possibilities of the twentieth century to perceive how Smith's optimism has truly become a fertile source of grief.

Which leads me to a contemporary observation. I write this after the Ministers' Meeting in Preparation of the Second Asian-African Conference in Djakarta. To be sure we missed your presence there, but it was encouraging to feel in the Conference hall the sense of an expanding Asia and Africa, of nations rediscovering their *elan vital.* The natural and legitimate nationalism of the Afro-Asian peoples found expression in a serious concern for the independence of other nations; in support of liberation movements of other peoples; and in a resolve to share their resources with each other, their skills, their technology, not for the selfish reason that one nation alone may live, but that it shall become possible for all nations within the Afro-Asian community to realize economic aspirations and give substance to national independence. One is moved to consider the great implications of this new moral force. For within the context of what we now consider modern times, it was the civilization of the West and its technology that have mainly dominated the events of the world and influenced its schemes and action. We are familiar with the injustice that resulted from this situation and, even if one were not an anti-neo-colonialist, it is yet

open to one to be aware of the cultural blight that fell upon the world that was shaped from it.

One considers, for instance, the confession of a quite respectable American intellectual of his feelings of inadequacy at the discovery that his education was, to use his term, terribly incomplete. The attitudes that were formed by the educational system of his country were based on the prejudice that only half of the globe was worthy to be considered; the other half could either be romanticized or regarded merely as a base of colonial exploitation. Because to him the world was coextensive only with the territorial limits of the West, he was needlessly excluded from the civilization of Africa. His intellectual vision extended only as far as the rim of the Western horizon beyond which he dared not ask and, therefore, never came to know.

To mention this instance in the education of only one man is not to refer once again to the familiar dichotomy of East and West. It is merely to point to the inhibitions that the minds of both East and West have long been subjected to. It is not strange, therefore, perhaps, to notice that up to the present instant of human history, politics have still persisted in the idea of blocs; of divisions; of tribes. The consequence has been that we have evolved a type of politics based on suspicion and hostile opposition rather than on an understanding of mutual interests. Of modern writers, I think it was Kipling who eloquently expressed this anomaly with boyish approval: after telling us that polar directions are irreversible, that, in his own words, East is East and West is West, he comes to the conclusion that the twain will never meet.

Well, we have witnessed how the politics of the greater part of our century have consistently affirmed this bad poetry of Kipling. Necessarily, such politics have also succeeded in establishing a habit of mind suggestive of exclusivistic morality and ethics.

For that matter, it is a happy event for me to report to you that it was not this, but the idea of integration, that prevailed in the Preparatory Conference at Djakarta. It is possible to say that Asia and Africa have come now to establish a new politics based on a concept which history will certainly write down into its pages and into the textbooks of our educational system. I speak of the idea of 'mushwarah' and 'muphakat', the concepts which guided the first Bandung Conference. The motto of the Indonesian Republic *Bhinneka Tunggal Ika,* unity in diversity, expresses the new politics

that I speak of. It may as well express the new politics of the near future.

But to say this is also to imply the influence that Afro-Asia will exert upon the civilization of the latter part of this or the next century. It would be too far-fetched for us to speculate on that world, but perhaps it is not so difficult to say now that it shall have been one which you have helped create and project with your genius and your dedication.

Yours sincerely,

CARLOS P. ROMULO

Secularism in India

SAMPURNANAND

THE INDIAN CONSTITUTION is based on secularism, and we consider India to be *par excellence* a secular state. We are also convinced that secularism is not a concept to which India was a stranger in the course of her long and chequered history and that strict adherence to the principle of secularism is the sheet-anchor of the country's independence and ordered life.

It is well, in a matter of such vital importance, to be sure of the exact meaning and implications of the words we use. There is otherwise the danger of their degenerating into slogans that mean different things to different people and carry, in their emotional overtones, the seeds of confusion and disruption of public life.

Secularism has been described as 'the belief that the state, morals, education etc. should be independent of religion'. This is a comprehensive definition, and a practical one for a country like ours which has citizens belonging to a large number of religious denominations, the mutual relations of some of which have not been particularly happy in the not very distant past. Apart from the question of general principles, it would be impracticable to base public education, for instance, on the tenets of religion in India. The question, 'Which religion ?' would immediately arise. There is, no doubt, a certain fundamental unity in the teachings of all religions but there are differences on vital matters. A person who believes in the law of karma, as Hindus, Jains, Buddhists, and Sikhs do, cannot subscribe to the same concept of God, if he believes in one, as a follower of one of the Semitic religions. If education were merely synonymous with the imparting of knowledge about the external universe, there would be no difficulty, but if education means, as it certainly does, the bringing out of what lies latent in the educand's mind, the development of his ego, the placing of the whole of his personality *en rapport* with the universe, difficulties are sure to be encountered. One way of getting over these difficulties is not to admit their existence. This is the method which we are following. It has

certain clear advantages. It allows us to cover a large field of human existence which is neutral to all religions and, therefore, non-controversial. By avoiding areas of conflict, it permits the business of the world to be carried on with a fair amount of efficiency and provides humanity with a more or less common platform. But it does not solve all problems: it relegates some to the background but they cannot stay there for ever. By avoiding the questions with which religion deals, it leaves a part of the personality undeveloped and paves the way for crises and inner conflicts. By scrupulously keeping religion at arm's length, the administration of public education is greatly simplified and also becomes uniform. But a high price has to be paid on the psychological level. It is true that the suffering and the conflict have to be faced by the individual but society is made up of individuals. There can be such a thing as a mass psychosis, a spiritual revolution on a world-wide scale, caused by the persistent suppression of certain vital elements of the personality. It is said that religion is the private concern of every individual. This is true in a sense, but the private concern of every individual becomes a matter of common interest to society, like hunger or sex. It is not for the state to decide which particular theory about the goal of human existence or the means of redemption is the correct one, but the state must realize that men have such problems and it must take steps to help them to solve their difficulties. At any rate, it must create the proper atmosphere and such an atmosphere is not created by treating these questions as matters of no moment.

What is true of education is no less true of morality. The state impinges upon the field of ethics in a hundred different ways, through law and jurisprudence for example. A sound system of jurisprudence, as of political theory, cannot be built up except on the basis of certain philosophical assumptions, which provide answers to certain questions of fundamental importance. What is the nature of man ? Is consciousness an epiphenomenon or an eternal entity, beyond birth and death ? If the latter, has the conscious entity certain ends or purposes, arising from its very nature ? What is the relation between individual and society ? Has the individual any rights as against society ? How far is the individual responsible for his actions ? What should be the functions and limits of punishment ?

In any modern textbook, these questions would be treated as philosophical. They are philosophical but they belong to the region where religion and philosophy meet. At any rate, religion has a good

deal to say about the nature of man and the goal of human existence and no philosopher can afford to ignore what religion says. The rest may be a matter of logical deduction. One can try to keep religion out of morals by avoiding all direct reference to it but the nature of man's life in society cannot permit us to shut out consideration of questions which lie within the province of religion. A consistent reply to some of the questions I have indicated is the only thread on which theories of jurisprudence and politics, sociology and penology can be strung together. Bereft of such a connecting link, they will fall apart and be governed, if at all, by considerations of political exigency and the brain-waves of particular leaders.

It can be seen that the attempt to divorce religion from social institutions like education and public morality, using the word in the wide sense indicated above, cannot be much of a success. If certain important regions of the mind are left untouched, a void is created which is not conducive to intellectual and spiritual health. In such circumstances, neither education nor the instruments of public morality can cater for the needs of the whole man and the ultimate result may well be chaos and an unsteady response to the total environment. A narrow interpretation of the term secularism is, therefore, thoroughly undesirable.

So far as the state is concerned, the position is comparatively simple. No one is proposing the adoption of any particular religion as the state religion of India. The state is, and must continue to remain, strictly neutral as among the various religions prevalent in the country. No special advantage is to be allowed to accrue to anyone by virtue of his membership of a particular religious persuasion; equally, no one must suffer any disadvantage because of his religious faith. All citizens, irrespective of their religions, have to be treated as equal in the eye of the law and a man's religion should not be a factor in his eligibility for public office or enjoyment of amenities provided by the state. This, in brief, is the essence of the practical application of the principles of secularism at the level of the state and public administration. There can be no departure from this position. India will stand or fall by this policy.

Such secularism is not a new idea for India. We need not look to the West for guidance in this matter because secularism is in accord with the best traditions of Indian culture and political thought. It was practised even in those days when India had a definite state religion. To take only one instance from the past, the history of

Asoka's empire is before us. He was a devout Buddhist but there was no distinction between Buddhists and others in the matter of preferment to office under government. There is no evidence to show that Harsha or the great Gupta emperors departed from this policy. Coming to later times, we have the example of Akbar. He was a Muslim but Hindus and Muslims held the highest civil and military offices in the state without distinction. Many enlightened rulers of the erstwhile Indian States followed these great examples without provoking adverse comments from any section of their subjects.

The fact of the matter is that secularism is not so much a matter of state policy as an attitude, a frame of mind, and Indian philosophic tradition with its proclamation *Ekam sat, vipra bahudha vadanti*, 'the Reality is one, the wise call it by many names,' is a powerful instrument for fostering it. Such an article of faith leaves no room for intolerance. A deeply religious man, a man with faith in his own spiritual heritage, is also likely to be the most tolerant of men. As a member of society he cannot differentiate between man and man on grounds of religious belief. All religions reveal the Reality, more or less. We have had before us the great example of Mahatma Gandhi: he was tolerant because of his Hinduism, not in spite of it.

The state cannot have anything directly to do with religion, but it will be failing in its duty if it does not take active steps to create that attitude, that frame of mind, in which true secularism can grow and flourish; if it continues, ostrich-like, to ignore the existence of some of those regions of the psyche which are the common province of education, ethics, law, and religion. The state can certainly help to build up what might be called a spiritual atmosphere. In our mad adherence to the letter, we are today doing violence to the spirit of secularism. An occasional exhortation by a Radhakrishnan may be tolerated and even encouraged; almost everyone waxes eloquent on the spiritual values inherent in Indian culture, in the expansive mood stimulated by a generous dinner or a dutifully cheering audience. But all this does not take us far enough. The atmosphere in our schools and colleges is too formal, too materialistic, and not conducive to the growth of that approach to Nature which is characteristic of the true scientist. A real seeker after Truth is imbued with the spirit of reverence, reverence for Nature, reverence for life. A look at the products of our educational institutions shows an entirely different spectacle. The young educated Indian has no faith in anything, not even himself; he is not aware of anything which

evokes in him feelings of reverence. He is a cynic. This is not very favourable material for building up the nation's prosperity or the development of its cultural life.

There is another reason why we should seek a positive approach in these matters. India has adopted as its goal the establishment of a democratic and socialist society in the country. I shall not discuss socialism, but surely democracy is meaningless unless it stands on the firm pedestal of respect for the individual. Respect for the individual implies the unequivocal admission of the theory that the individual, as a conscious entity, has a permanent nature and is not a mere chance product of atomic conglomeration. If the individual has a basically permanent nature, the logic of its fundamental characteristics will endow it with certain inalienable rights, independent of the state. There will also be a definite direction in which the individual's personality can develop and the state as well as other social institutions must bend their efforts in this direction. To act otherwise would be to thwart the natural growth of the human personality and to invite social chaos. Education and law must, therefore, be so oriented deliberately as to serve the individual's inherent spiritual interests.

We have forgotten that in committing ourselves to a democratic way of life we have committed ourselves to much more than the formation of cabinets and the casting of votes. If we are not prepared to work out the full implications of principles which we profess to have adopted in all seriousness, we shall be stultifying ourselves. Secularism is not merely a device for preventing the followers of different religions from flying at one another's throats. It has to be an active instrument for enabling the Indian citizen to rise to the fulness of his stature, a means for the development of the whole man.

Unfortunately, our national leadership does not seem to have realized this. It has not given the proper lead on this problem. It keeps itself severely aloof from anything that seems to have a religious flavour and has created the impression that to be religious-minded, to have a faith, at any rate in Hindu religious ritual, is a sign of backwardness, of the bullock-cart age mentality. Religion, among the so-called educated, has almost become a thing to be ashamed of, not to be publicly admitted. This attitude is the fertile soil in which cynicism, want of faith, and indifference to the deeper things of life, would find sustenance. The result of the growth of such poisonous

weeds in the mind cannot but be disastrous in the extreme. Secularism is fast deteriorating into contempt for religion and anti-religionism. The rising generation is ground between two stones—communalism masquerading as religion on one side, and a vacuous fatuity, a famine of faith, masquerading as secularism on the other. It must be saved from being crushed between the two. Those who escape such spiritual death become the legitimate prey of soulless materialism, unrelieved by the idealism which makes Russian Communism almost a form of religion. Surely this is not the kind of cultural renaissance to which we can look forward with equanimity.

The Zen Language

DAISETZ T. SUZUKI

I

WHEN I WAS DISCUSSING *Sein* (Being) with a distinguished German philosopher in the summer of 1953, he asked me how Zen Buddhism would describe it. I told him the following story:

Tokusan Senkan[1] one day gave this sermon: 'If you ask, you commit a fault, if you do not ask, you turn against.' He did not say 'against what', he simply said 'turn against'. A monk came out of the assembly and began to make a bow before the master. The master lost no time in giving him a blow with his staff. Said the monk, 'I was just beginning to bow to you,—why do you strike me, O master ?' The master replied, 'If I had waited for you to open the mouth, what would it have availed ?'[2]

Then I added, 'This is the kind of language Zen uses in regard to *Sein*.' The philosopher smiled and made no further comment.

Tokusan was one of the great masters of the T'ang Period and was noted for his use of the stick. His favourite utterance to his disciples was: 'Say a word, and you get thirty blows of my stick ! Don't say a word, and you get them just the same !' It was in this manner that Tokusan made his staff speak in place of his mouth. In actual fact, a stick often speaks more efficiently and eloquently than logic; it is more directly to the point than linguistics. The following is also taken from the *Transmission of the Lamp*, fas. 15:

Tokusan once made this declaration: 'Tonight I am not going to have anybody question me on any subject. If anybody does, he gets thirty blows of my stick.' A monk came forward and proceeded to bow before the master. The master struck him right away. The monk protested, 'I have not even begun asking the question, and how is it that you strike me, O master ?' The master asked, 'Where do you

[1] Tê-shan Hsüan-chien, 790-865. Throughout this paper the reading of the names of the Zen masters, as they are given in the text, is Japanese; the Chinese is given in footnotes or in parentheses.

[2] *The Transmission of the Lamp* (*Dentôroku*), fas. 15, under 'Tokusan Senkan'.

come from ?' 'I am from Sinla (Korea).' The master at once retorted, 'You deserved the blows of my stick even before you set foot on the boat.'

When Rinzai Gigen[3] heard of this, he sent a monk to Tokusan with the instruction: 'As soon as he strikes you, take the stick away from him and poke his chest with it and see what he will do.' The monk came to Tokusan and when he was about to bow, Tokusan sure enough struck the monk. The monk then took the stick away from Tokusan as he was instructed, and poked him in the chest. Tokusan without saying a word retired to his room. The monk returned to Rinzai and reported all that took place. Rinzai remarked, 'I had hitherto been somewhat suspicious of him.'

Tokusan was not, however, always appealing to the stick. One day, when he saw a monk coming to him, he shut the gate. The monk knocked. Tokusan asked, 'Who is knocking ?' 'A lion, sir', was the answer. The master opened the gate. Hardly had the monk finished bowing when the master got astride his neck and chided him, 'O you beast you, where have you been gadding about. ?'[4]

II

IN POINT OF FACT, the Zen master turns not only the stick but anything that comes his way into an instrument by means of which he expresses his experience of Reality. The stick is only one of such instruments, and Tokusan himself would not hesitate to make use of anything which he thought at the time to be expedient. A few of such methods resorted to by other Zen masters will be given below so that we can see how free and independent each in his way demonstrated Zen, and also how absolutely indifferent they were in regard to the logicalness of things.

1. The encounter of Hyakujō[5] with Baso[6] took place in the following way: Baso one day had a walk with Hyakujō and noticed

[3] Lin-chi I-hsüan. Died 867. Known for his cry 'Kwatz !', as Tokusan was for his stick. *Sayings of Rinzai* (*Lin-chi Lu*).

[4] *The Transmission of the Lamp*, fas. 15.

[5] Pai-chang Huai-hai, died 814.

[6] Ma-tsu Tao-i, died 788.

a flock of wild geese flying. He turned round and asked Hyakujō, 'What are they ?'

HYAKUJŌ: They are wild geese.

BASO: Where are they flying to ?

HYAKUJŌ: They have flown away.

Baso turned around abruptly, and, taking hold of Hyakujō's nose, gave it a twist. Overcome with pain he cried out, 'Oh ! Oh !'

BASO: Have they really flown away ?

It is said that this made Hyakujō's back wet with perspiration.

He went back to his room and began to cry bitterly. A friend-monk of his asked him, 'Have you any bad news about your parents ?'

HYAKUJŌ: No no.

THE FRIEND-MONK: Did something go wrong with our master ?

HYAKUJŌ: No.

MONK: Why are you crying so ?

HYAKUJŌ: Our master knows. You had better go to him and ask.

The friend-monk went to Baso the master and asked him about the cause of Hyakujō's crying. The master said, 'He knows much better than I.' Whereupon the monk came back to Hyakujō, and this time found him laughing heartily. The monk asked, 'What is really the matter with you ? The last time I saw you, you were crying bitterly. Now you are laughing. Have you lost your mind ?'

HYAKUJŌ: Yes, I was crying before, but I am laughing now.

The following day Baso came up to the Dharma Hall to give a sermon, and the matting was spread before him as usual. Hyakujō came out from among the congregation and began folding up the matting.[7] Baso came down from the pulpit and went back to his room. He then called Hyakujō to him and asked, 'Why did you roll up the matting even before I began giving my sermon ?' Hyakujō said, 'Yesterday, you twisted my nose and it hurt.' Baso asked, 'Where was your mind then ?' Hyakujō responded, 'It doesn't pain any more.'[8]

2. Nansen Fugan[9] once sent a letter to Shūyū,[10] one of his disciples,

[7] The matting is spread before the master to be used by a monk who performs his bowings on it.

[8] *The Gotō Egen*, fas. 3.

[9] Nan-chüan P'u-Yüan, 748-834.

[10] Chu-yü.

in which he stated: 'Reason (*li*) undergoes modifications as it asserts itself in particular events (*shih*), which unfold themselves extensively (that is, objectively), but they are not outside. Events fuse into one another in Reason, and they then are serene and lonely, and they are not inside.'

The messenger monk asked Shūyū, 'What is meant by "particular events unfold themselves extensively and they are not outside"?'

SHŪYŪ: There is no harm in giving one hundred answers to one question.

The monk proceeded, 'How about "events are serene and lonely and not inside" ?'

SHŪYŪ: He is not a good hand who confronts a world of sounds and forms.

The same message was handed to Chōsha,[11] another disciple of Nansen. When the messenger monk asked him what he thought of the first question, Chōsha opened his eyes wide and just looked. When the monk went on with the second question, Chōsha was seen closing his eyes.

The same messenger monk proceeded to a third disciple of Nansen called Jōshū[12] and asked him the same first question. Jōshū made as if eating a bowl of rice. When asked about the second one, he began to wipe his mouth with his hands.

When the monk reported to the master how the three disciples responded, each in his own fashion, Nansen remarked, 'Each one of them is worthy of being my disciple.'[13]

By way of explanation I may add a few words here. Nansen's sermon revolves around two key terms: Reason and events (*li* and *shih*). *Li* is what we may call the principle of oneness or sameness and *shih* is the principle of manyness or diversity. An objective world (designated here as 'outside') of multitude is arranged in time and space as long as it is viewed in the aspect of diversity. When it is seen as the manifestation or concretization of the principle of sameness, its diversities disappear, and are seen 'fusing' into one another, but the two principles do not contradict each other. The one is not to be regarded as extending itself as 'outside' reality while the other has a lonely 'inner', as subject and object. The Zen master, as far as words are concerned, does not go any further. He

[11] Chang-shah Ching-ts'ên.

[12] Chao-Chou Tsung-shên, 778-897.

[13] *The Gotō Egen*, fas. 3.

stops here. It is for his disciples personally, that is, each by himself to discover something or nothing.

3. Ummon Bunen[14] once asked a monk, 'Where do you come from ?'

MONK: I came from Saizen (Hsi-ch'an).

UMMON: What does he teach recently ?

The monk opened his arms.

Ummon gave him a slap.

MONK: I have something to say.

It was Ummon who opened his arms this time.

The monk failed to answer.

Thereupon Ummon gave him a blow of his stick.[15]

4. Sekiso Keisho[16] asked Dōgo Enchi,[17] 'After your passing away, how should I answer if anyone asks me about the ultimate thing ?'

Dōgo called the novitiate-attendant. When the latter answered, he was told to fill the pitcher.

The master remained silent for a while and then asked Sekiso, 'What did you ask just now ?'

Sekiso repeated his question.

The master stood up and left the room.[18]

III

FROM THESE EXAMPLES taken at random from Zen literature without attempting to be systematic or exhaustive, we can readily see what 'language' is used by Zen masters. No doubt they frequently use some abstract philosophical terms such as *li* (reason), *shih* (particular events), *yung* (action or function), etc., but the process of reasoning, if there is any, is altogether unique. As far as words are concerned we are not to make any reference to reasoning in Zen,—there are no traces of it in the cases above cited. The masters' attitude is from the beginning to ignore reasoning. They have passed this stage, they are already in the region where no amount of reasoning

[14] Yün-men Wen-yen, died 949.

[15] *The Hekigan*, Case 54.

[16] Shih-shuang Ch'ing-chu, 807-888.

[17] Tao-wu Yüan-chih, 779-835.

[18] *The Transmission of the Lamp*, fas. 14.

will do any good in making one grasp 'the thing'. Their concern is to express what is inexpressible in its very nature. In ordinary human intercourse, communication is carried on by means of language. Simple primitive feelings or emotions can be transmitted by movements of the body or of its parts or of both, but anything not belonging to the order of the affective life of man is generally conveyed by word of mouth. The animals have no intellectual life and, therefore, no language, no articulated sounds whereby ideas can be conveyed from one to another. The animals emit sounds as a sort of physiological reflex, or utter cries to give warning to their fellow-animals. But such are all on the plane of the primitive unconscious. When the Zen masters utter a 'Kwatz!' they may be thought to be coming back to the animal level in their demonstration of Zen.[19] There is indeed something of this in Zen, for the masters sometimes extol the animals, such as cats or oxen or dogs, as having the Buddha-nature in some sense more effectively than humans. In any case, one thing we notice in their sermons or *mondo* or demonstrations is that they shun reasoning. They almost despise language.

Another remarkable point in Zen is its making no reference to Buddha or anything that suggests things commonly considered religious or spiritual. Zen does not speak of God, sin, another life, being good or bad. Though it does not refer to Buddha, one master at least gives this advice: 'Where there is no Buddha, pass on quickly; where there is Buddha, do not tarry long.' Or sometimes he would say, 'If you talk about Buddha, rinse your mouth for three years.' Another goes so far as to say that if he saw Buddha coming out of his mother's body and making the great proclamation, as Buddha is reported to have done, he would strike him dead by one blow of a stick and give the corpse to the dogs. The Zen masters are strong-

[19] In the *Lankāvatāra Sūtra* we read (English translation, p. 91 et seq.): 'Words are not known in all the Buddha-lands; words are an artificial creation. In some Buddha-lands dharmas are indicated by looking steadily; in others by gestures; in still others by a frown, by the movement of the eyes, by laughing, by yawning, or by the clearing of the throat, or by recollection, or by trembling. Mahāmati, for instance, in the worlds of the Steady-looking and in those of Exquisite Odours, and in the land of Samantabhadra the Tathāgata, Arhat, Fully enlightened One, the Bodhisattva-Mahāsattavas, by steadily looking without a wink, attain the recognition of all things as unborn and also various excellent samadhi. For this reason, Mahāmati, the validity of all things has the reality of words. It is observed even in this world that in the kingdom of such special beings as ants, bees, etc., they carry on their work without words. . . .'

minded, but we must remember that they say these things not just to spite Buddha or any 'holy' object. Those who know, fully realize that the Zen masters stand on a higher eminence and thence give their judgments on views held by ordinary minds that cannot go beyond conditionalities. The Zen masters do not use language in that way. Their language is always direct, plain, and straightforward, only it is to be understood from the transcendental point of view. Therefore, as long as we are standing on the level of relative consciousness, as we ordinarily do, there will be no understanding of Zen whatever. It is in this sense that I say that Zen has no symbolism. The flower is beautiful, and when Zen declares it to be so, it is just so, it means just that, and nothing more or less. The only difference between the Zen appraisal and that on the plane of ordinary thinking is that Zen views things, as it were, *sub specie eternitatis.*

Ludwig Wittgenstein[20] is reported to have declared that 'All existential propositions are meaningless', that 'All metaphysical propositions are meaningless', while Eritz Mauthner, who is said to have influenced Wittgenstein very much, says that 'Language is a tool unable to express adequately either Nature or our own sensations and feelings.' Language is really inadequate to give full expression to anything that goes beyond logic or intellection, and human life as we all know is more than senses and intellect. William James is quoted as writing: 'Reality, life experience, concreteness, immediacy, use what word you will, exceeds our logic, overflows and surrounds it.' This is really a significant statement. The fact is that life is richer than mere reasoning in words or ideas. For practical purposes we generalize, standardize, specialize, or mechanize. The result is that there is no more a living person but a murdered, dissected corpse.

It is often convenient and serves to explain many questions when we assume the existence of two worlds: one is an intellectually reconstructed world where logic operates and the other is a world of instincts, aspirations, imaginations, and deeper intuitions. Language and logic are primarily meant for the first world and not for the second. While the second world needs language to express itself, language as embodying logic is not meant to govern things of this second world. When once expressed in language we are apt to think that what governs language, that is, logic, also governs our

[20] *Hibbert Journal*, October 1953, Pp. 89-90.

instincts, impulses, urges, prayers, and intuitions, and all forms of inmost human aspirations. But in this we err—and it is this error which lies at the root of much annoyance in this actual life where we find the first and the second worlds inextricably blending with each other. We as social beings have invented language as a means of communication for all practical, utilitarian purposes. But while making full use of language we are all the time aware of something which goes too deeply down for language to express it; this 'something' does not belong in the realm of the senses and intellect nor does it come out of the realms of inspirations and imaginations. It is indeed the basis of all the things we do—thinking, feeling, willing, etc., it is the doer himself, the actor himself, the feeler himself, the thinker himself. It thus defies being expressed in language or in words generally. As soon as it is expressed in any way, it is objectified, and when it is objectified it is dichotomized and is no more itself, it loses its self-identity.

This 'it' (*shako* in Japanese, and *chê-ko* in Chinese), to be exact, being the ground of the first as well as the second world, defeats all our attempts to give a name to it. When a name is given it, we make it stand away from itself, turning it into one of those namable things we have around us, inside and outside. This is the negation of the very thing we would like to take hold of. Neither logic nor symbolism can catch it. They—logic and symbolism, poetry and music—they all point to it, but they are not 'it' as long as they are what they are. The 'it' is in everything and it is everything and everything is it, only when we have 'it'.

How can this be ? What means is there to take hold of 'it' when it eludes all our linguistic or symbolic attempts to know it, to see it, to hear it ? Zen has invented its own language or symbolism, which is called by masters 'living words' (*kwakku, huo-chü*) in contrast to 'dead words' (*shiku, ssŭ-chü*). But we must remember that words themselves have no inspiring or quickening power in them. They acquire this power when a mind that has grasped the elusive, slippery, double or rather multiple-tongued 'little bit' (*shashi, hsieh-tzŭ*) handles them. In fact, words, as they are, are neither 'alive' nor 'dead'.

When the Zen master pronounces that 'God is God', or 'Buddha is Buddha', or 'Zen is Zen', or 'I am I', the proposition is interpreted by the ordinary man as tautological, and conveying no meaning whatever. But it is otherwise with the Zen master, for out of this

'tautological' meaningless proposition he will evolve such deductions as: 'God is God' in the same sense as when I say 'I am I', and therefore, 'God is I' and 'I am God', and, further, 'I see the flower and the flower sees me', and then, 'In this, God is seeing himself' or 'God is creating the world'. Each time I see the flower, the flower is a new flower, a new creation. The flower has no past, therefore, it is not connected with the one in my memory. It is an absolute reality as it stands before one, with no present, with no past, with no future. It is not a generalized, intellectually reconstructed, publicly owned flower. It is simply 'the little bit' (*kono shashi*). All this becomes 'intelligible' only when a man goes beyond linguistics and symbology, when he stands independent of 'one hundred negations', and of 'speech and silence'. The following is given to illustrate this:

A monk came to Baso Dōichi and asked, 'Apart from the four propositions and one hundred negations,[21] O master, will you tell me directly what was Bodhi-Dharma's idea in coming from the West?'[22]

BASO: I am too tired today, and unable to answer. You had better go to Chizo.

The monk saw Chizo as directed and asked the same question.

CHIZO: Why don't you ask the master ?

MONK: It is the master himself who directed me to come to you.

CHIZO: My head aches today. You go to Brother Kai and ask him about it.

The monk now went to Brother Kai, who however, had this to say: 'As to that I am unable to give you any answer.'

The monk finally returned to the master and reported the whole procedure. Thereupon the master remarked, 'Chizo's head is gray and Kai's dark.'

What does this all mean ? As far as words are concerned there is no clue whatever to what these Zen men are driving at. We cannot

[21] The four propositions are: (1) 'A' is 'A'; (2) 'A' is not 'A'; (3) 'A' is both 'A' and 'not-A'; and (4) 'A' is neither 'A' nor 'not-A'. 'One hundred negations' means every form of negation including the negation of a negation. 'Bodhi-Dharma's idea in coming from the West' refers to his visit to China in order to propagate Zen. But the real meaning of the question concerns the fundamental significance of Reality. If Reality is beyond our understanding and cannot be expressed by means of language, how can we know anything about it ? Or how can we have any communication in regard to it ? 'Directly' means 'without resorting to language'.

[22] *The Hekigan Roku* ('Blue Rock Records'), 'Case' 73.

get anything logically or symbolically intelligible out of their talk in regard to the main question which started this strange manoeuvre on the part of the three. However closely we may analyse it, logic or metaphysics cannot construct anything out of it.

To begin with, Baso's apparent excuse not to answer the monk's question because of his not feeling well,—can this be regarded really as an excuse ? Was he really feeling so fatigued ? If so, what about the final remark about the colour of the hair of Chi and Kai ? This remark, as we can see, is altogether trite and from the point of language or logic has not the remotest reference to the question brought out by the monk who was in earnest to know the meaning of Ultimate Reality. Bodhi-Dharma's mission to make the Chinese people acquainted with Zen could not surely have been just wishing to inquire into the monks' tonsorial peculiarities. They all use words, and the words do not convey any sense.

Indeed, these Zen masters are using words, using them all the time. But they would say that they are using words in such a way as not to be caught by 'the four propositions' or by 'one hundred negations'. The words when they are taken by themselves apparently convey no ideas suggestive of 'what moved Bodhi-Dharma to come to China' or of 'what constitutes the essence of the Buddha's teaching'. Yet, without words those Zen men would not be understanding one another. What then is the relation between the words and the understanding ? Evidently, words as they are manipulated by the Zen masters stand to their objects in no definable relationship. The masters are bound neither by logic nor by symbolism, they go beyond reasoning as well as image-creating. If they have any kind of symbolism at all, they do not seem to be making a systematic appeal to it. They may affirm something today but they will be perfectly ready to ignore it tomorrow. Consistency is not in their vocabulary. They use words in such a way that words as such have no specific value. Black is not always black, it turns at any moment and without any apparent reason into white, and conversely. Thus, Zen is often said to be 'trackless' (*apada*) or devoid of a circumference (*agocara*). Every symbolism has its rationality, while Zen seems to thrive on irrationalism.

Zen's language or, better, words, therefore, do not belong to the second world of urges, aspirations, and prayers. It issues from where the first and the second worlds are merged, that is where the first flows into the second and the second into the first. The differentiation

of the first and the second is the outcome of intellection, and in Zen this intellection is transcended, but let it be remembered that the transcendence or merging or identification does not mean the annihilation or suppression of the second or of the first. The first is here along with the second, only they do not operate independently or exclusively or contradictingly. Zen is where such dichotomous conceptions have not yet invaded human consciousness. The first world is logical and discursive and the second may be said to belong to the realm of poetry, music, and religion. But as long as these worlds resort to words in their logical or symbolic relationships, Zen is not to be found there. Zen belongs where words have not yet found their way into the human mind or to the divine mind for that matter, which made God utter his divine fiat. As soon as 'Let there be light' came out of his mind or mouth, God is already far away from himself and, therefore from Zen; there is a divorce between Zen and God, between Zen and man. When Zen begins to feel a need for words, Zen is defeating itself. But this Zen's 'defeating itself' is the beginning of Zen. Zen is Zen when Zen is no more itself. And when Zen is no more itself Zen has its existence and at the same time this means its downward career. Words issue from Zen and kill it. Therefore, the masters are never tired of emphasizing the necessity of going beyond both affirmation and negation. This is the region where the 'thirty blows of a stick' come upon any one of us who would play with words of any kind.

The meaning of the following passage from the *Hekigan*, 'Case' 82, will be illuminating in this connection: 'If "this matter" (*kono ji* in Japanese and *tz'ŭ-shih* in Chinese) were to be sought in words, it would be like trying to strike the moon with a pole—an affair of impossibility. Therefore, it is declared in an unmistakable manner by an ancient wise man that when a man wishes to be intimate to the point, he is not to come out with a question. Why ? Because the question is where the answer is and the answer is where the question is. This monk[23] wants to see one load of absurdity exchanged for another load of absurdity. Hence his question, and how lame it is!' Continues the *Hekigan:* As long as the trail of Reality is followed in the Tripitaka ('the triple basket') or in the 'Twelve Divisions of

[23] A monk asked Dairyo (Ta-lung), 'The corporeal body (*rūpakāya*) is subject to decay and what about the solid body of reality (*dharmakāya*) ?' Dairyo answered, 'The mountain flowers in full bloom are like a gold brocade; the mountain stream, where forming a pool, is like indigo.'

Scripture', we shall never come across anything looking like Reality. The words of Zen, the masters would say, are tasteless, and when we try to swallow them, they choke the throat. 'A mass of white clouds is gathering across the entrance to the valley, and the home-coming birds, as the evening-dusk spreads, know not where to locate their nests.' The homeward way to Reality is not to be sought by means of words.

Thus, William James states that 'Reality, life, experience, concreteness, immediacy, use what word you will, exceeds our logic, overflows and surrounds it.' Logic belongs in the first world of sense and intellect, and the second is of poetry, music, and religion, whereas the world we actually are living in is neither the first nor the second, it is where both are merged into one undivided whole. Out of this whole, which, however, is not to be separated from its parts, Zen issues and carries on its business. Zen is, therefore, neither logic nor poetry in its ordinary sense, and the words it uses are neither signs nor symbols. Zen has its root in absolute emptiness (*śūnyatā*). To see this root an eye is needed which opens vertically instead of horizontally as our ordinary eyes do. And this eye opens in two ways inwardly as well as outwardly, it sees God as well as the world. It is the same eye with which a man sees God as well as himself. We notice some of the Indian gods with this vertical eye. This makes them look strange as when they are seen provided with more than one face and one pair of arms. But the eye is symbolical. The two eyes we have are really able to work out their native functions by being related to the gods' vertical eye. It is not the horizontal eyes that see things but the vertical one. Most of us think it is the sciences that supply us with all kinds of microscopes and telescopes to see the unknown worlds, but as a matter of fact it is the vertical eye that goes on inventing every sort of apparatus by means of which we explore beyond our visionary fields. What is really wonderful is not the fields thus revealed, showing us infinite varieties of curiosity and mystery, but the vertical eye that is behind all these. Words are for our horizontal eyes and not for the vertical eye. Zen wants to keep this eye free from taints.

IV

SUIGAN RYOSAN,[24] one of the Zen masters of late T'ang, was escorted

[24] Ts'ui-yen Ling-san was one of the principal disciples of Seppō Gison (Hüseh-fêng I-ts'ung).

by a monk who asked him: 'I understand that whenever we use words they taint [the Ultimate Reality]; what then is the Ultimate Reality, O master ?' The master answered, 'Whenever we use words, they taint.' Another time there was a monk who asked, 'O master, pray tell me without resorting to the tongue.' This is also the request to designate Ultimate Reality by not using words. Buddhists are all told that the Dharma or Tao or Godhead is beyond the intellect and cannot be expressed in language. The monks, therefore, are anxious how to get hold of the Dharma, the Ultimate Reality, without resorting to the instruments of speech such as the tongue, lips, or throat.

Suigan gave his answer, 'You talk about it in the tea-room to your heart's content.'

At the end of one summer session, Suigan the master made this declaration: 'I have been talking all this summer to you. Do you find my eyebrows are still in their place ?' This refers to the traditional saying that whoever talks untruths will see his eyebrows fall off. Now Suigan had been giving sermons about Zen during the whole session for the benefit of the monks, but in truth Zen has nothing to talk about because the Ultimate Reality is beyond words and outside the pale of logical understanding. But the master had been actually talking about it—this is committing the sin of lying and his eyebrows ought surely to be falling off by this time.

To this declaration or challenge which apparently has nothing to do with Ultimate Reality itself, three of his friends responded. Chōkei[25] said, 'They are growing !' Hofuku[26] said, 'He feels uneasy who is disposed to steal.' Ummon[27] gave an exclamation, 'Kuan[28] !'

As far as language is concerned we have to confess that Suigan and his three friends are talking nonsense, for what has Zen to do with the eyebrows ? Whether or not they fall off on account of Suigan's sermonizing all the summer on matters which do not allow sermonizing, that is, matters which are beyond talking or rationalizing, is not a matter of concern either to Zen itself or also to its students—

[25] Chang-ching Hui-lêng, 853-932.

[26] Pao-fu Tsing-chan, died 928.

[27] Yün-men Wen-yen, died 949.

[28] This literally means 'a frontier-gate' where the travellers are required to show their passport. Ummon frequently gave one-word reply: 'What is the Tao (Way) ?' 'Pass on (*kyo*) !' 'What is Dharma-eye ?' 'Everywhere (*fu*)' 'When a patricide or matricide is committed, the sinner confesses before Buddha. When he murders Buddha, to whom would he confess ?' 'Revealed (*ro*) !'

The Hekigan ('Blue Cliff') 'Case' 8.

this would be the point of view most of us at the sensuous or intellectual level might take. As to the remarks of Suigan's friends, we do not really know what to make of them. But that they are not altogether nonsensical is gleaned from the comments by Engo, an illustrious Zen master of the Sung dynasty, and the author of a great Zen textbook known as the *Hekigan-roku.*[29]

According to him, 'This sermon of Suigan is like a mountain precipitously towering and threateningly confronting us[30] and in possession of a power that will move heaven and earth. While the *sutras* and *shastras* consisting of 5048 fascicles are devoted to the treatment of such subjects as Mind, Buddha-Nature, instantaneous enlightenment, or gradual disciplining, Suigan avoids all such abstract and subtle discussions. He is altogether unique in this respect. Let me ask, what are his intuitions in talking this way ? He can not just be indulging in nonsensicalness. He must have something in mind to make such a remark as is here given. What can his pedagogical motive be ? He must have some reason for it. All the masters of the past, wishing to make people come to the understanding of Zen, resorted to a variety of means. They knew how to take food away from the hungry man, or to rob the needy farmer of his ox, whereby each is deprived of his last resort of support. For as long as a man has something on which he relies and by which he defends himself, he is found asserting himself, making a great deal of himself. Such will never be able to get rid of the feeling of pride and self-importance, which is indeed the last stumbling block on the way to Ultimate Reality. Most people fail to see this because they try to discover something in words and are unable to see the inner man himself who gives meaning to the utterance. It is only when this is accomplished that we know where the Zen man is and why he acts in such and such ways. If this were not the case, Ummon, Chōkei, and Hofuku, three friends of Suigan, would not take the trouble to react to his challenge.'

This is a parapharse more or less of Engo's comment on Suigan. To show how much importance Engo gives to Suigan's sermon let

[29] 'Blue Cliff Collection'. The book is also called *Hekigan-shū* (*Pi-yen-chi*, 'Blue Cliff Collection'), and is one of the most important books in the study of Zen. It contains one hundred 'Cases' with Secchō Jūken's versified comments and Engo Kokugon's interpretative discourses on them. Both Secchō and Engo are great Zen masters of the Sung dynasty.

[30] *Koshun, ku-chün*, literally 'solitary and precipitous'.

me further quote Engo's foreword which he has attached to Suigan's statement about his 'eyebrows'. As a literal translation will not make much sense I give here what is more or less an interpretation of Engo. Even this the reader may find difficult to comprehend.

'He who understands will behave as a free man in all his relationships with the world. He is like a dragon in control of the waters, he is like a tiger in the mountains. But he who understands not will find himself deeply involved in worldly complications and unable to behave as a free man. He is like a sheep caught in the fence, he is like a man who keeps on waiting for a rabbit by the bush where he once saw one caught.

'A phrase given by a Zen master is sometimes like a lion crouching on the ground; it is sometimes like a sacred sword of the god Vajra, sometimes it silences all the talk that may be going on in the world, sometimes it lets itself go with every movement of the waves on the ocean.

'When a free man meets another free man as he moves on in the world, he will recognize the other, they will decide on a line of action, they will distinguish what is good from what is not, and thus testify to each other.

'When a man is involved in the whirlwind or worldly complicities let him be supplied with an eye that opens vertically, and he will be able to sit down on these ten quarters of the world, standing straight up like a precipice one thousand feet high.

'Therefore, it is said that when a free majestic movement presents itself, it recognizes no rules, no conventionalities.

'Sometimes a blade of grass is made to transform itself into a golden-coloured Buddha-body, while the golden-coloured Buddha-body is sometimes transformed into a blade of grass.

'Now let me ask how this is possible.'

(Engo then gives Suigan's sermon on the eyebrow.)

To show further what importance the Zen men have been attaching to this sermon of Suigan, I will quote a part of Secchō's versified comment in which he says:

> 'Suigan's words to his fellow-monks
> Have no parallel in history.'[31]

[31] Literally, 'one thousand old'.

Following this, Secchō has for Ummon's 'Kuan !' another couplet:

> 'His response with "*Kuan !*"
> Is the case of "money lost and condemned".'

This means, 'One disaster is not enough and another follows.' The Japanese saying corresponding to this is: 'A wasp stings the weeping face.' Is there something like this in Ummon's remark ? Engo's comment here is, 'Whose case is this, anyway ? Who is the one who lost money and is condemned for it ? Is it Suigan ? Or Ummon ? Or even Seccho himself who gives this comment ?' Engo continues: 'Those who have "an eye" will understand where all this finally comes to and can point out what they are talking about. But for those who cannot see beyond the words and their "logical" significance Zen is the strangest thing in the world. Suigan is like a flawless white jade, but who is here who can evaluate its genuine merit ? The old masters are always well disposed towards their followers and would employ all sorts of pedagogical methodology so that they would also come to a realization.'

It is fairly time to come to a conclusion, and I will state that Zen's language is altogether different from that which we ordinarily encounter in our everyday parlance as well as our logical and philosophical arguments. When the phrases or sentences are taken independently, they seem to yield good sense. For instance, Chōkei's statement, 'They (eyebrows) are growing' or Hofuku's 'He feels uneasy who is disposed to stealing' gives sense when each is considered in itself independent of Suigan's sermon or challenge. Suigan himself is not unintelligible if he is not regarded as a Zen master but as making a common-sense observation in a rather jovial mood. When, however, the entire scene is brought out in connection with what has been taking place in the Suigan monastery during the summer session when the master committed himself to a great deal of sermonizing on Zen, his remark at the end of the session cannot be thought as no more than a pleasant joke on the part of the abbot of the important institution. It must be regarded as conveying some weighty meaning which must have an inner bearing on the ultimate mission of Zen teaching. Apparently, the entire procedure here is a book of ciphers. Where is the key to the cryptogram ? Especially, Ummon's '*Kuan* !'—what does it mean ? Hakuin, one of the greatest

Zen masters of modern Japan, puts his 'comment' on the '*Kuan !*' saying, 'An angry fist cannot strike a smiling face.' When a baby innocently smiles at the man threatening with an angry fist, he may not know how gracefully to dispose of his tightly-closed hand. Has Ummon's '*Kuan !*' as well as Suigan's asking about his eyebrows something innocent and guileless as a baby's smile ? The entire presentation as we have here is enveloped in the heavy mist of impenetrabilities. Anyway, Zen has its own language.

Ancient Contacts and Relations between India and China

TAN YUN-SHAN

THE EARLY CONTACTS AND RELATIONS between India and China are lost in the mists of time. They developed into a long-lasting link, to the mutual advantage of both.

Chinese records of the early contacts are numerous if little known. Some are no doubt mystical and mythological; others are curious and apocryphal; but a good many are historical while a few are literary. The material is scattered over a large number of books. The more important ones are:

(1) *Shan-Hai Ching*, the 'Canon of Mountains and Seas'; traditionally attributed to the Great Yu, the first Emperor of Hsia Dynasty (2205-1766 B.C.) and his co-worker Po-Yi, but with interpolations of later periods.

(2) *Shui-Ching*, or the 'Water Classic'; ascribed to Sang Ch'in of the Han Dynasty (206 B.C.—A.D. 220).

(3) *Shui-Ching-Chu*, the 'Commentary of the Water Classic'; by Li Tao-Yuan of the Northern Wei Dynasty (A.D. 424-535).

(4) *Lieh-Tzu*, the 'Book of Master Lieh', traditionally attributed to a Taoist philosopher, Lieh Yu-K'ou of the Chou Dynasty (1122-256 B.C.), but the authenticity of the book is doubtful.

(5) *Chu-Shu Chi-Nien*, the 'Annals Written on Bamboo'; discovered in a royal tomb of 300 B.C. at Chi-Chun in A.D. 279-280; but the text has been long regarded as spurious.

(6) *Chou-Shu Yi-Chi*, the 'Records of Wonders of the Chou State'; it has long been lost but widely quoted and relevant to several other books.

(7) *Shih-Yi Chi*, the 'Records of Forgotten Affairs'; by Wang Chia of Eastern Tsin Dynasty (A.D. 317-420). The complete original text was lost; the present one is a compilation of fragments edited by Hsiao Ch'i at the beginning of the sixth century A.D.

(8) *Shih-Chi*, the 'Historical Records'; it is the first important

orthodox History of China, by Szu-Ma Ch'ien of the Former Han Dynasty (206 B.C.—A.D. 23).

(9) *Han-Shu*, 'History of the Han Dynasty (the Former or Western Han)'; by Pan Ku and his sister Pan Chao of the Later or Eastern Han Dynasty (A.D. 25-220).

(10) *Hou-Han-Shu*, 'History of the Later or Eastern Han Dynasty'; by Fan Yi of the Sung State of Southern Dynasty (A.D. 420-479).

(11) *San-Kuo-Chih*, or 'The Annals of the Three Kingdoms', by Chen Shou of the Western Tsing Dynasty (A.D. 265-317).

(12) *Hou-Wei-Shu*, 'History of the Northern Wei Dynasty' (A.D. 386-550); by Wei Shou of the Pei-Ch'i Dynasty (A.D. 550-577).

(13) *Li-Tai San-Pao Chi*, the 'Records of the Three Jewels—Buddha-Dharma-Sangha—of Different Ages from the very Beginning'; by Fei Ch'ang-Fang of the Sui Dynasty (A.D. 581-618).

(14) *Fu-Tsu Tung-Chi*, the 'Records of the Lineage of the Buddha and Buddhist Patriarchs'; by Chih-P'ang of the Sung Dynasty (A.D. 960-1127).

(15) *Fu-Tsu Li-Tai Tung-Tsai*, 'General Records of Buddha and Buddhist Patriarchs of Past Ages'; by Nien-Ch'ang of the Yuan Dynasty (A.D. 1206-1368).

A few excerpts or abstracts from these books will show the general nature, contents, and characteristics of them all.

(1) In *Shan-Hai Ching* occurs the following, as quoted by Tsung-Ping of the Sung State of the Southern Dynasties (A.D. 420-479) in his essay 'Ming-Fu Lun':

> It was said in the *Shan-Hai Ching* by Po-Yi, that in 'the country of T'ien-Tu (India)...people are cuddly and fond, and full of love towards men.' On this Kuo P'o commented: 'What was called in ancient times T'ien-Tu is India where Buddha was born. The fondling and cuddling and love of the people are the same as the Maha Maitri of the Tathāgata (Buddha). These were already known to this country even in the remote ages of the Three Emperors and the Five Rulers.'

The words quoted from *Shan-Hai Ching* by Tsung-Ping are slightly different from the original text and might have been interpolated.

(2) In *Lieh-Tzu*, it was stated thus:

> Once Confucius was asked by a prime minister named P'i: 'Who

is the saint ?' After pausing for a little while, Confucius said: 'I have heard of a sage in the West, who set order without rule, made people believe him without words, and enlightened all to act without instruction. So majestic and supreme was he that no earthly name could be assigned him for designation.' Confucius, so far as we know, was a contemporary of the Buddha and what he meant by 'the West' is usually regarded as India.

(3) In Wang Chia's *Shih-Yi-Chi*, we find the following passage:

During the period of Warring States (403-221 B.C.), in the 7th year of King Chao's reign of the Yen States, some emissaries came to his court from the country of 'Mu-Hsu' which is another name for India. There was a magician named Shih-Lo or 'Shila'. When asked about his age, he said: 'A hundred and thirty years old'. He carried a metal staff, held a water jug, and said that it took him five years to reach the capital of Yen after having left his country. He was good at performing magical tricks; on the tips of his fingers he made a pagoda of ten storeys and three feet in height.

(4) In the book *Fu-Tsu Li-Tai Tung-Tsai*, we find an interesting story:

During the years of Emperor Mu (1001-945 B.C.) of the Chou Dynasty (1122-256 B.C.), a Deva came from the Extreme West (i.e. India). This Deva, it was believed, could turn hills into rivers, rivers into hills, transform cities and towns, enter into water and fire, go through metal and stone; in short, he was credited with every kind of supernatural power. The Emperor respected him as a saint and built a Middle-Heaven-Paradise to accommodate him.

(5) Another interesting story found in the book *Fu-Tsu Tung-Chi* reads thus:

In the 4th year (268 B.C.) of King Cheng of the Ch'in State at the end of the Chou Dynasty, eighteen monks headed by one Shih-Li-Fang (Sribandhu) came to China from the Western Region (India). The King disliked their strange habits and put them into prison. But at night a Diamond-spirit broke the prison-gate into pieces and let the prisoners out. The King was frightened and

sent the monks away with great respect and politeness. For at that time the conditions of the State were not favourable; the monks could not be kept and worshipped in the country.

The passages quoted are somewhat fanciful and even fantastic. Nevertheless they are well-known and provide a corpus of legend relevant to the contacts and relations that existed between ancient India and China. Some of these have been corroborated from Indian literature and other sources.

It is widely accepted that during the time of King Chandra Gupta Maurya (322-305 B.C.), one of his ministers named Chanakya also called Kautilya wrote a book entitled *Arthashastra* in which the name of China and Chinese silk were mentioned. According to a Sanskrit Buddhist scripture called *Buddhacharita*, which was translated into Chinese as *Fu-Pan-Hsing-Chi Ching*, by Jnanagupta in A.D. 587 during the Sui Dynasty (A.D. 581-618), the Buddha was once instructed by a teacher, Visvamitra Acharin, who taught him many books among which one was a book of China. In another Sanskrit Buddhist scripture *Ratna-Kuta*, or 'The Great Treasure of Buddhist Scriptures', translated into Chinese as *Ta-Pao-Tsi-Ching* by Budhiruchih during the Tang Dynasty (A.D. 618-907), we also find the names of several Chinese feudal states, such as 'Wu', 'Shu', 'Chin', etc.

In yet another famous Sanskrit Buddhist scripture called *Lalita-Vistara*, a Vaipulya Sutra of the Buddhist Tripitaka—translated into Chinese four times, of which only two are existent now, one called *P'u-Yao-Ching* by Dharmaraksha in A.D. 308 during the Western Tsing Dynasty (A.D. 265-318) and another called *Fang-Kwang Ta-Chuang-Yen Ching* by Divakara in A.D. 689 during the Tang Dynasty (A.D. 618-907)—there is an interesting passage which reads as follows:

A Bodhisattva asked his teacher, 'Which script, Master, will you teach me? The Brahmi or the Kharoshti ? The script of Anga, or Banga, or Kalinga ? The Chinese script or the Huna script ? Among the sixty-four scripts, which one will you teach me ?'

In the great Indian epic, the *Mahabharata*, we also find frequent reference to China, the Chinese people and Chinese things. It will not be out of place if we quote below two passags from this epic.

(1) In book three, the Vanaparvan, Krishna said to Yudhisthira. 'I find you invited the Hunas, the Chinese, the Tukharas, and the people of Sindh to your sacrifice.'

(2) In book five, the Udyogaparvan, King Dhritarashtra said: 'The king Bhagadatta presented him an army of one akshauhini comprising 21,870 elephants, 21,870 chariots, 65,610 horses and 109,350 foot composed of Kirata and Chinese soldiers and looked as if it was clothed with gold. That invincible army appeared as charming as a forest of Karnikara trees, the flowers of which are of yellow or golden colour.'

And again: 'I shall present to Krishna a thousand horses of Chinese origin.'

All these show the great antiquity of the contacts between the two ancient countries, India and China, and the two most cultured and religious peoples, Indian and Chinese.

The orthodox historical records in China of ancient Sino-Indian contacts first appeared in the *Shih-Chi* or 'The Historical Records' by Szu-Ma Ch'ien. In a chapter entitled 'Ta-Wan Chuan' or 'Records of Ferganah', it was stated that Emperor Wu of the Western Han Dynasty (206 B.C.—A.D. 24) sent one of his intimate high officers Chang Ch'ien, to contact the Western Kingdoms. Chang Ch'ien went up to Ta Hsia (Bactria), a kingdom established by the Greeks on the north-western border of India, where he heard not only the name of India but of several other things Indian. On his return to China, after a long and hazardous expedition of thirteen years, he submitted a detailed report to the Emperor on the conditions of several Western Kingdoms such as Ta-Wan (Ferganah), An-Hsi (Parthia), Ta Hsia (Bactria), Yueh-Chih, etc. It contains a short passage regarding India and China:

> Chang Ch'ien said: 'When I was in Bactria, I saw bamboo staffs of Ch'ung region and cloths of Shu region (both in present Szu-Ch'uan province of China). On inquiring "How and from where did they get these things ?", the Bactrian people said: "Our countrymen went to India and bought them there. India is situated to the south-east of Bactria at a distance of several thousand *li* (Chinese miles). The people and their customs are, generally speaking, the same as those of Bactria. But the level of their land is lower, and climate much hotter and weather more damp. The people ride on the backs of elephants and fight when there is war.

The country borders on a big water." According to my calculation, Bactria is twelve thousand *li* away from, and was situated on the south-west of, China. Now India is situated several thousand li away on the south-east of Bactria and there are things of Shu and Ch'ung regions. From this we can see that it (India) must not be very far away from Shu and Ch'ung (Szu-Ch'uan, China).'

Next to *Shih-Chi*, comes the *Han-Shu*, or *Chien-Han-Shu*, 'History of Former Han Dynasty' (206 B.C.—A.D. 23), the first dynastic history and second of the twenty-four orthodox histories of China. In a chapter entitled '*Hsi-Nan-Yi Chuan*' or 'Records of South-Western Barbarian Kingdoms', it also contains a passage relating to India as in the *Shih-Chi*. This passage reads as follows:

In the first year of the Reign Yuan-Shou of Emperor Wu (A.D. 122), 'Po-Wang-Hou', the Marquis of Po-Wang, (Chang Chien) said that when he was sent to Ta-Hsia (Bactria), he saw cloths of the Shu region and bamboo staffs of the Ch'ung region there. On inquiring how and from where they came, the answer was 'They came from a south-eastern country called Sheng-Tu (India) which is several thousand *li* away and where traders of the Shu region were selling them. Some other people also heard that on the west of the Ch'ung region, about two thousand *li* away, there is a country called Sheng-Tu.

Chang Ch'ien emphatically asserted that Bactria was situated on the north-west of China and strongly commented on the friendliness of that country towards China. But the difficulty is the obstruction of the Hun-Nu. If a route through the Shu could be opened, then India would be quite near to China and without danger in the way. Therefore, the Emperor ordered emissaries Wang Jan-Yu, Pei Shih-Chang, Lu Yueh-Hen, and more than ten other persons to go to India through the south-western barbarous region. When they went up to the T'ien Kingdom (present Yun-Nan province of China), they were received and entertained by the T'ien king Tang-Ch'iang. The king promised to find the way out for them to go to India. But for more than four years, they were detained in K'un-Ming and could not reach India. (*Ch'ien-Han-Shu*, Volume 95: *Hsi-Nan-Yi Chuan*).

The passage gives us the impression that the emissaries sent by

Emperor Wu failed to reach their goal. It is true the attempt to open a short south-western route to India through Szu-Ch'uan, Yun-Nan, Burma and Assam, did not succeed at that time. But it does not mean that there had been no contact between the two countries during this period. For, in another book entitled *Hsi-Ching Tsa-Chi* or 'Miscellaneous Records of the Western Capital of the Former Han Dynasty' there is factual evidence of such contacts:

> During the time of Emperor Wu, the Sheng-Tu country (India) presented the Emperor a 'joint-ring-halter-bridle-saddle' (Lien-H'uan-Chi) all made of white jade. The bridle was decorated with agate, and the saddle with white illuminant precious stones. When the saddle is put in a dark room, it shines like sunlight and illuminates a space of more than a hundred cubic feet. After that people in the capital Chang-An (now Hsi-An) began to decorate their horses and saddles very luxuriously. They emulated one another in engraving their saddles. Sometimes it cost a hundred gold pieces to decorate a horse. They used the shells of white clams of the South Sea to make stalks of plants, and red gold to make flowers, and set them in the carved designs on the saddle. Still they were not satisfied, because it could not make any sound. They then added to it strings of small round bells adorned with tassels, so that when the horses ran it seemed as though bells and musical stones were being struck, and the tassels flew like banners and streamers. (*Hsi-Ching Tsa-Chi*. Volume 2).

The Former Han Dynasty was followed or actually continued by the Later Han (Hou-Han) Dynasty (A.D. 420-479). During this period, contacts between the two countries were further developed. The *Hou-Han Shu*, or 'History of the Later Han Dynasty', the second dynastic history and the third of the twenty-four orthodox histories of China, carries a longer passage which gives a more detailed description of Sino-Indian relations. It says thus:

> The T'ien-Tu country, also called Sheng-Tu (Hindu), is situated several thousand *li* away on the south-east of Yueh-Chih. Its customs are the same as those of Yueh-Chih; but its land level is low, the climate hot, and the weather damp. The country borders on a big water. The people ride on elephants' back and fight when at war. They are physically weaker than the Yueh-Chih people.

They cultivate and follow the Buddha-Dharma. They usually avoid killing and that has become their habit. Starting from the west of Yueh-Chih and the country of Kao-Fu (Kabul, now Afghanistan) southwards up to the West Sea (the Arabian Sea), eastwards up to the country of P'ang-Ch'i (Bengal), all are territories of Tien-Tu (India).

Sheng-Tu has, besides its capital, separate cities and towns numbering several hundreds. Each city or town has a head. It has also separate states numbering several tens, and each state has a king. Although there are slight differences among the separate states, they all use Sheng-Tu as their common name. At an earlier time, they were all under the Yueh-Chih. The Yueh-Chih killed their kings and put a military general to rule their people.

The country produces elephant, rhinoceros, tortoise-shell, gold, silver, copper, iron, lead, and tin. It has communication and commercial intercourse with Ta-Ch'in (Rome) and there are precious things from that country. It also produces fine cloths, nice woollen carpets, sandalwood, rock-honey, pepper, ginger, and black-salt.

In the time of Emperor Ho (A.D. 89-106), it sent several delegations to the court and made offerings. This was broken off for some time because of the rebellion of the Western Regions. But it was renewed during the reign of Emperor Huan. In the 2nd year (A.D. 159) and the 4th year (A.D. 161) of Yen-Hsi, several delegations came again and made offerings to the court. (*Hou-Han-Shu:* Volume 118.)

After the Hou-Han Dynasty, came San Kuou or 'Three Kingdoms', (A.D. 221-277), namely, (*a*) the Shu-Han-Chi or Monor-Han Dynasty (A.D. 221-263), (*b*) the Wei-Chi or Wei Dynasty (A.D. 220-264), and (*c*) the Wu-Chi or Wu Dynasty (A.D. 222-277). These were followed by Lieng-Tsin or the two Tsin Dynasties—the Hsi-Tsin Chi or Western Tsin Dynasty (A.D. 265-317), and the Tung-Tsin-Chi or Eastern Tsin Dynasty (A.D. 317-419). After these came the Nan-Pei Ch'ao or the North and the South Dynasties. The Nan-Ch'ao or South Dynasty was subdivided into four short periods, namely the Liu-Sung-Chi or Liu-Sung Dynasty (A.D. 420-479), the Ch'i-Chi or Ch'i Dynasty (A.D. 479-502); the Liang-Chi or Liang Dynasty (A.D. 502-557); and the Ch'en-Chi or Ch'en Dynasty (A.D. 557-589).

The Pei-Ch'ao or North Dynasty was also subdivided into five short periods, namely the Pei-Wei-Chi or Northern Wei Dynasty (A.D. 386-532); the Hsi-Wei-Chi or Western Wei Dynasty (A.D. 532-554); the Tung-Wei-Chi or Eastern Wei Dynasty (A.D. 534-550); the Pei-Ch'i-Chi or Northern Ch'i Dynasty (A.D. 550-577); and the Pei-Chou-Chi or Northern Chou Dynasty (A.D. 557-580). These were followed by another short but united dynasty called Sui-Chi or the Sui Dynasty (A.D. 589-618). Then came the great Tang-Ch'ao or the Tang Dynasty, (A.D. 618-907).

Each of these dynasties, long or short, united or divided, has its own orthodox dynastic history, jointly or separately. They are as follows:

(1) *San-Kuo-Chih*, or 'History of the Three Kingdoms', consisting of sixty-five volumes by Chen-Shou of the Tsin Dynasty.

(2) *Tsin-Shu*, or 'History of the Tsin Dynasty', consisting of one hundred and thirty volumes, by Fang Hsuan-Ling of the Tang Dynasty.

(3) *Sung-Shu*, or 'History of the Liu-Sung Dynasty', consisting of one hundred volumes, by Sen Yo of the Liang Dynasty.

(4) *Nan-Ch'is-Shu*, or 'History of the South-Ch'i Dynasty', consisting of fifty-nine volumes, by Hsiao Tzu-Hsien of Liang dynasty.

(5) Liang-Shu, or 'History of the Liang Dynasty', consisting of fifty-six volumes, by Yao Szu-Liang of the Tang Dynasty.

(6) *Ch'en-Shu*, or 'History of the Ch'en Dynasty', consisting of thirty-six volumes, by the same author as above.

(7) *Hou-Wei-Shu*, or 'History of Later Wei Dynasty', consisting of one hundred and fourteen volumes, by Wei Shou of the North Ch'i Dynasty.

(8) *Pei-Ch'i Shu*, or 'History of the North Ch'i Dynasty', consisting of fifty volumes, by Li Pei-Yo of the Tang Dynasty.

(9) *Chou-Shu*, or 'History of the Northern Chou Dynasty', consisting of fifty volumes, by Ling-Hu Teh-Fen of the Tang Dynasty.

(10) *Sui-Shu*, or 'History of the Sui Dynasty, consisting of eighty-five volumes, by Wei Cheng of the Tang Dynasty.

(11) *Nan-Shih*, or 'History of the South Dynasty', consisting of eighty volumes, by Li Yen-Shuo of the Tang Dynasty.

(12) *Pei-Shih*, or 'History of the North Dynasty', consisting of one hundred volumes, by the same author as above.

(13) *Chiu-Tang-Shu*, or 'Old History of the Tang Dynasty', con-

sisting of two hundred volumes, by Liu Hsu of the Later Tsin Dynasty.

(14) *Hsin-Tang-Shu*, or 'New History of the Tang Dynasty', consisting of two hundred and twenty-five volumes, by Ou-Yang Hsiu of the Sung Dynasty.

In all these orthodox dynastic histories, there are particular sections or chapters or even volumes on foreign countries, especially those countries on the borders of China, describing their peoples and races, their geographies and histories, their languages and scripts, their manners and customs, their religions and philosophies, their arts and architectures, and so on; in other words, all aspects of their cultures and civilizations, especially their contacts and relations with China. Of all these countries, India has naturally been the most prominent, respected, and friendly. As these records are too numerous and voluminous, it is not possible to quote them here.

The stream of contacts between the two countries flowed in fulness during the great Tang Dynasty. The two greatest Chinese Buddhist pilgrims, Hsuan-Tsang and Yi-Tsing, who are well-known not only in India and China but the world over, both belonged to the reign of this dynasty.

In both *Chiu-Tang-Shu*, 'The Old History of Tang Dynasty', and *Hsin-Tang-Shu*, 'The New History of Tang Dynasty', it has been recorded thus:

> T'ien-Tu (Heavenly India) is situated on the south-east of Ts'ung-ling (Parmir). It is also called the 'Land of Brahmans'. Its border measures more than thirty thousand *li*. The whole country is divided into five Regions, namely (1) Central T'ien-Tu, (2) Eastern T'ien-Tu, (3) Southern T'ien-Tu, (4) Western T'ien-Tu and (5) Northern T'ien-Tu. Each of them has an area of several thousand square *li*. The Southern T'ien-Tu is bound by great seas; the Northern T'ien-Tu is backed by snowy mountains; the Eastern T'ien-Tu is bordered on its eastern side by big seas adjoining Fu-Nan and Lin-Yi (present Burma and Malaya); the Western T'ien-Tu is adjoined by Kashmir and Persia: and the Central T'ien-Tu is surrounded by the other four T'ien-Tus.
>
> The King of Central T'ien-Tu is surnamed Siladitya, also called Sri Harsha. The kingdom is hereditary and there has been no usurpation. The land is low, damp, and hot. Paddy ripens four times in a year. There are diamonds like fluorspar, which does not

melt even after being smelted a hundred times, and which can cut jade. There are also Chandana, Tulipa Gesneriana, and other fragrant things. There are commercial contacts with Rome. Therefore its precious goods come up to Fu-Nan and Chiao-Chih (Indo-China) for trading. Its people are prosperous and happy. They do not keep books and records. The tillers offer their harvest for sale and use cowries as money. All people have deep eyes and long noses. The most respectful salutation is to touch the heel and lick its dust.

In the 15th year (A.D. 642) of the Chen-Kuan reign of the Tang Emperor Tai-Tsung, King Siladitya of Magadha sent a delegation and made presents to the Emperor. Emperor Tai-Tsung reciprocated this goodwill mission and sent a delegation with gifts and a sealed imperial letter of greetings in return. King Siladitya received the delegation with the joy of surprise and asked his people whether there had ever been delegations coming from Maha-Chinsthan. All replied: 'Never.' Then the King received the sealed imperial letter with deep salutations. Immediately after this, King Siladitya sent another delegation and made offerings again to Emperor Tai-Tsung. The Emperor treated the delegation with great honour and also sent another delegation with his Chief-Minister-in-Attendance Li Yi-Piao as Leader and his Chief Bodyguard Wang Hsuan-Ts'e as Deputy Leader to King Siladitya in return. The King ordered his great minister to go to the other suburbs to receive the Imperial Delegates. People of the whole town and district came out to welcome them, burning incense and lining both sides of the road. The King received the Imperial guests and gifts with deep salutations facing the eastern direction. And again he sent in return yet another delegation with offerings of 'Fire-Pearls' (Huo-Chu), Tulipa Gesneriana, Bodhi trees etc. (*vide Chiu-Tang-Shu*, Vol. 198; and *Hsin-Tang-Shu*, Vol. 121).

Besides these, there were many other missions of goodwill, and political and diplomatic contacts between the two countries during the Tang Period. According to another important book *Ts'e-Fu Yuan-Kwei* or 'Biographies of Rulers and Ministers in All Ages', consisting of one thousand volumes compiled by Wang Ch'in-Jo and Yang Yi of the Sung Dynasty (A.D. 960-1278) under the direct supervision of Emperor Chen-Tsung (A.D. 998-1022), the following exchanges of importance took place between India and China:

(1) In the fifth month of the 22nd year of the Chen-Kwan reign (A.D. 648), Wang Hsuan-Ts'e led a Chinese mission to India for the second time. (*Ts'e-Fu Yuan Kwei*, Vol. 973.)

(2) In the third month of the third year of the Han-Heng reign (A.D. 672), several kingdoms of South India sent delegations to China and made presents of their states (*ibid.* Vol. 970).

(3) In the third month of the third year of the T'ien-Shou reign (A.D. 692), kings of the West India, South India, North India and Central India sent goodwill missions to the Tang Court and made offerings (*ibid.* Vol. 970).

(4) In the sixth month of the second year of the Hsien-T'ien reign (A.D. 713), a delegation from South India came to China to make offerings (*ibid.* Vol. 971).

(5) In the eighth month of the second year of the K'ai-Yuan reign (A.D. 714), West India sent a delegation to the Court and made offerings (*ibid.* Vol. 971).

(6) In the second month of the third year of the K'ai-Yuan reign (A.D. 715), India sent emissaries to the Court and made offerings (*ibid*, Vol. 971).

(7) In the fifth month of the fifth year of the K'ai-Yuan reign (A.D. 717), Central India sent a delegation to the court and made offerings of their productions (*ibid.* Vol. 971).

(8) In the fifth month of the eighth year of the K'ai-Yuan reign (A.D. 720), South India sent a delegation to the Court and presented the Emperor with some leopards and parrots of five colours (*ibid.* Vol. 971).

(9) In the sixth month of the 17th year of the K'ai-Yuan reign (A.D. 729), a Buddhist monk called Tripitaka Mitra came from North India to the Court and offered Indian medicines (*ibid.* Vol. 971).

(10) In the eleventh month of the 18th year of the K'ai-Yuan reign (A.D. 730), Central India sent a delegation to the Court and made offerings (*ibid.* Vol. 971).

(11) In the fourth month of the 25th year of the K'ai-Yuan reign (A.D. 737), a great Buddhist priest named Dharma-Jain came to the Court from Eastern India and made offerings of Indian medicines, Sanskrit *sutras* and *sastras*, and books on *mantras*, national politics, and astrology, all in Sanskrit (*ibid.* Vol. 971).

(12) In the fifth month of the first year of the Ch'ien-Yuan reign (A.D. 758), the King of Gandhara sent a great military leader to the

Court, and the Emperor conferred on him the honorary title of general (*ibid.* Vol. 971).

There was still another interesting and fascinating story of an Indian who became a general-commander of Emperor Teh-Tsung's garrison. According to the book *Tang-Kao-Sheng-Chuan* or 'Biographies of Famous Buddhist Monks of T'ang Dynasty', when a famous Indian Buddhist priest called Gautama-Prajna or Tripitaka-Jnana came to the T'ang capital Chang-An, in the second year of the Chen-Yuen reign of Emperor Teh-Tsung, he met his cousin who was a general-commander of the Emperor's garrison and had a Chinese name Lo-Hao-Hsin (Good Heart Lo). They greeted each other with great joy, mixed with deep feeling and emotion. The general-commander invited Gautama-Prajna to his house and kept him there for worship for a number of years. Later on the Emperor invited Gautama-Prajna to translate Buddhist scriptures from Sanskrit into Chinese and he actually translated into Chinese the *Ta-Cheng Li-Ch'u Liu-Po-Lo-Mi-To-Ching* (*The Mahayana-Shal-paramita-Sannepata-Sutra*) in ten volumes which is one of the important scriptures on Buddha-Dharma. (*Tang-Kao-Sheng-Chuan*, Vol. 2.)

Besides the visits recorded by the court historians and chroniclers, there were many references to personal, commercial, cultural, and religious contacts between the two nations during the same period in other books, such as *Li-Tai San-Pao Chi*, *Fu-Tsu Tung-Chi*, *Fu-Tsu Li-Tai Tung-Tsai*, and *Li-Tai-Kao-Sheng-Chuan* (or 'Biographies of Eminent Buddhist Monks in All Ages').

After the Tang Dynasty, the contacts began to decline. They were renewed through all the Wu-Tai or Epoch of the Five Short Dynasties (A.D. 907-960), namely Hou-Liang-Chi, the Posterior Liang Dynasty (A.D. 907-923), Hou-T'ang-Chi, the Posterior Tang Dynasty (A.D. 923-936), Hou-Tsin-Chi, the Posterior Tsin Dynasty (A.D. 936-947), Hou-Han-Chi, the Posterior Han Dynasty (A.D. 947-951), and Hou-Chou-Chi, the Posterior Chou Dynasty (A.D. 951-960); the Sung-Chao or the Sung Dynasty (A.D. 960-1127); Nan-Sung or the Southern Sung Dynasty (A.D. 1127-1278); Yuan-Chao or the Mongol Dynasty (A.D. 1264-1368); and until the end of Ming-Chao or the Ming Dynasty (A.D. 1368-1644). It has to be stated, however, that the contacts were much less extensive and intensive, owing to the change of circumstances in both countries. Again space does not permit me to deal with them in detail.

The whole history of ancient cultural contacts and relations

between India and China may be divided into different stages and aspects. In the first stage, there were individuals whose motive might have been nothing more than curiosity and adventure, but they certainly evinced great enthusiasm, earnestness, courage, and devotion. They never had any fear of hardship or danger, or any notion of advantage or benefit or even worldly pleasure. They merely wanted to see something new and to discover something unknown. Whatever they did, they did for no worldly consideration, not even for name and fame. They were really great pioneers of human progress, evolution, culture, and civilization.

In the next stage, the contacts between the two countries developed from private and individual into public and official, and from merely inquisitive and adventurous into cultural, religious, commercial, political, and diplomatic. Of the various kinds, the cultural and the religious were like the two wheels of a great chariot, carrying pilgrims, missionaries, emissaries, and delegations, running and rolling between the two countries and overcoming all difficulties and obstacles. The most significant aspect of the ties between the two countries in this period was the introduction and development of Buddhism in China.

On the advent of Buddhism in China there is a corpus of sacred legend. Notwithstanding the many fanciful stories and the different interpretations and dates given in numerous texts, it could be said that the actual event took place during the period of Emperor Ming (Ming-Ti, A.D. 58-75) of the Later Han Dynasty (A.D. 25-220).

According to the book *Han-Fa-Pen-Nui-Chuan* or 'A Sketch of Development of Buddhism in the Han Dynasty', it was in the third year of Yung-Ping (A.D. 60) that Emperor Ming dreamt, one night, of a golden Titan, sixteen feet tall, with radiant light on his head, flying about the palace court. The Emperor, not knowing what this miraculous symbol meant, told his ministers about the dream and asked for their explanation. One of his ministers named Fu-Yi informed him that it was the incarnation of the Buddha of T'ien-Tu (India). Then the Emperor ordered a pilgrim delegation under the leadership of the military general Tsai-Yin and the civil official Wang-Tsun to proceed to Tien-Tu. Tsai-Yin and his party arrived in the eighth year of Yung-Ping (A.D. 65) at Khotan, where they fortuitously met Kasyapa Matanga and Dharmaraksha who were then proceeding with Buddha's images and *sutras* towards the Eastern Land (China). They then travelled back together and reached Lo-Yang, capital of the Han Dynasty in the tenth year of Yung-Ping

(A.D. 67). Since the Buddha images and *sutras*, it was said, were loaded on the back of white horses, the Emperor, having accorded them all a hearty reception, specially built a temple, named Pei-Ma-Szu, or the 'White Horse Temple', for their accommodation. This, the first Buddhist temple and monastery in China, still remains in a magnificent condition in the suburbs of the city of Lo-Yang in Ho-Nan province in Central China.

Immediately after the imperial reception to and the formal acceptance of Buddhism by Emperor Ming, the great Indian missionaries, Kasyapa Matanga and Dharmaraksha, started preaching the new gospel on the one hand and translating the Buddhist *sutras* from Sanskrit into Chinese on the other. Of all their translations the most famous one is the 'Sutra in Forty-two Sections'. This is the first scripture of Chinese Buddhism. Kasyapa Matanga and Dharmaraksha were followed by many virtuous monks and learned Buddhist scholars who went from India to China to carry out their mission. The most well-known names among others are Buddhabhadra, Kumarajiva, Bodhidharma, Subhakara, Vajrabodhi and Amogha. We have no time and space to describe their numerous activities.

It was, however, not always a one-way traffic. Since so many great Buddhist missionaries and scholars travelled from India and other 'Western Regions' to China, some devoted Chinese monks too were naturally inspired by their examples and tried to visit India, the holy cradle of Buddhism. The foremost among them was Fa-Hsien of the Tsin Dynasty who travelled through Central Asia to India during the early years of the fifth century. After visiting scores of states and spending about fifteen years he returned to China by sea carrying with him a treasure of Buddhist scriptures. Fa-Hsien was followed by Hsuan-Tsang of the Tang Dynasty. He also came to India through Central Asia, in the middle of the seventh century and, after visits to about a hundred states and the lapse of seventeen years, returned to his fatherland with six hundred and fifty-seven Buddhist classics. After Hsuan-Tsang came Yi-Tsing who sailed from Kan-Ton (Kuang-Chou) to India in the last quarter of the seventh century, and returned to China by the same way, with four hundred books of Buddhist literature. These noble souls not only translated into Chinese the Buddhist scriptures from original Sanskrit, but also wrote valuable accounts of their travels. The *Fu-Kuo-Chi* or 'Records of Buddhist Countries' by Fa-Hsien, *Si-Yu-Chi* or 'Records of the Western Kingdoms' by Hsuan-Tsang, and *Nan-Hai Chi-Kuao-Chuan* or

'Messages from the South Sea' by Yi-Tsing, are famous travelogues, narrating numerous anecdotes and miracles of Buddhism and giving vivid accounts of the people and culture of India. They are valuable not merely as pearls of Buddhist literature but also as guides to the study of ancient and mediaeval history and civilization of India. It is but natural that they have been rendered into several languages and command respect from scholars all over the world.

It must be remembered, however, that there were many more monks and scholars who either perished on the way or disliked to leave their earthly names to posterity. In the *T'ang-Kao-Hseng Chuan*, or 'Biographies of Eminent Buddhist Priests of Tang Dynasty', there is a poem of which two lines are specially significant. They read as follows:

Away from Chang-An
eminent monks go West to learn;
Out of one hundred,
not even ten do return.

From this it is evident that while many came to India from China to seek the Buddha Dharma, very few were fortunate enough to return to their own country. This must be equally true with respect to the Indian missionaries who toured the 'Eastern Land' to preach the Buddha Dharma there.

The Buddhist monks and missionaries carried not only Indian Buddhism to China, but also Indian culture and civilization. The translations of Buddhist literature into Chinese are unparalleled in quantity and quality. Over more than one thousand years from the Later Han Dynasty to the Yuan Dynasty, there were 190 translators, both Indian and Chinese, whose names appear in the works; 1,440 kinds and 5,586 volumes of translated texts still exist. The anonymous translators and the lost translations must be countless in number. The work of translation was carried on with great care and caution, usually under the auspices of the Emperors themselves. The translators were learned and wise Buddhist scholars who sat down to work in company for the purpose of securing mutual consultation and reference; and every sound and every meaning must have undergone detailed discussion before they were written down in black and white.

In the dynasties of Sui, T'ang and Sung, we hear of special institutions for translation, in which there were several departments to divide labour; some were entrusted with the study of the original text; some ascertained pronunciations; some translated the sentences;

some studied the meaning; some beautified the style; some corrected errors; some supervised the whole work; and so on and so forth. As for the method of translation, strict rules were laid down for all translators to follow. Mention may be made of 'Five Limits' in the T'ang Dynasty and 'Six Rules' in the Sung Dynasty. How much superior they were to the so-called modern scholars who write so cheaply and translate so hastily ! The Chinese Buddhist monks and scholars in different ages also did a great deal of creative work besides translation. They wrote numerous commentaries and treatises on Buddhist religion and philosophy, and arranged all Buddhist writings in proper order, so as to enable Buddhist literature to attain a very high state of perfection.

Buddhism was thus established and developed in China not only as a popular faith of the Chinese people but also as a deep-rooted philosophy and culture. Buddhism, Taoism, and Confucianism are usually regarded as the three great religions of China, and they can easily be called the Trinity of Chinese Religion. There are, moreover, two striking and interesting events in the history of Chinese Buddhism which amply demonstrate the influence of the religion even in matters of state: there had been once an 'Emperor-Monk' and once a 'Monk-Emperor'. Liang Wu-Ti of the Southern Dynasty thrice cast away his worldly crown and became a monk in the Tung-Tai temple; hence he was entitled the 'Emperor-Monk'. On the other hand, the founder of the Ming Dynasty, T'ai-Tsu, was at first a monk in the Huang-Chih temple; he drove away the Mongol king and made himself Emperor of all China; hence he was styled the 'Monk-Emperor'.

Another significant feature of the contacts between the two countries is the high degree of consciousness of each other's culture and civilization. Their meeting was marked by love and respect. There was nobility and friendliness in the exchange of greetings and gifts. There was not the least insincerity or unfriendliness, no suggestion of personal advantage and disadvantage. Their motives and actions, their thoughts and deeds, were purely religious and cultural. The missionaries and emissaries, monks and scholars, both Indian and Chinese, through their stupendous work and labour, laid the foundation of an intimate and lasting relationship between the two great nations.

These intimate relationship subsisted for centuries, during which there never arose any quarrel or dispute, conflict or controversy,

struggle or strife, until, owing to vicissitudes in the life of both the countries, there ensued a period of forgetfulness. For some hundreds of years, the paths between India and China became dimmed by darkness and covered up with the dust of indifference. The formal contacts stood practically in abeyance, especially during the British period in Indian history and the Manchu period in the history of China, but mutual love and esteem for the spiritual qualities never altogether ceased to be. As soon as a new opportunity offered itself there was a renewal of the ancient bond between the two peoples. For the resurgence of these contacts the credit ought to go to Poet Rabindranath Tagore, the beloved Gurudeva. He visited China in 1924 and the impression he created among the Chinese people during his sojourn was not inferior to that of the Indian teachers and missionaries who had preached the Indian religions and philosophies in the past. The Chinese people generally regard Gurudeva Tagore and Mahatma Gandhi as modern Bodhisattvas. It was due to the Gurudeva's inspiration that the writer of this article organized the Sino-Indian Cultural Society—in India in 1933 and in China in 1934—as the starting point of a cultural movement for linking up once more the cultures and civilizations of the two countries. The Visva-Bharati Cheena Bhavana is the offspring of the Sino-Indian Cultural Society. It was founded under the sacred guidance of Gurudeva, and Gandhiji called it 'a symbol of living contact between China and India'.

Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru's desire for a revival of the ancient relationships between India and China was as great and as strong as Gurudeva's. Indeed he was to preside over the opening ceremony of the Visva-Bharati Cheena Bhavana on 14 April 1937 but was prevented from doing so by an illness. Time and again in his speeches Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru has given expression to his deep knowledge and understanding of Chinese civilization and culture, and to his love and sympathy for China and the Chinese people. The present border problem between the two countries is a matter for deep sorrow and regret. It should be solved as early as possible for the good not only of the two countries but of all mankind.

Towards One World by Peaceful Change

ARNOLD TOYNBEE

THERE CANNOT BE life without change, and the pace of change in human life is faster in our time than ever before. There cannot be change without friction, or friction without animosity; and the never-ceasing change in human affairs is therefore always threatening to explode into violence. In fact, all of us are constantly on the brink of violence in this rapidly changing present-day world of ours. But this is not only the era of unprecedentedly rapid change; it is also the era of the atomic weapon; and violence in the form of atomic warfare would, we know, destroy not merely civilization but society and perhaps life itself. The restraint of violence by mutual tolerance and forbearance is one of the necessary conditions for social life in all circumstances. In the Atomic Age this is also one of the necessary conditions for mere survival; and here, I believe, the present generation of the human race has a lesson to learn from the Indian tradition —a tradition that, among Indians of our time, is represented pre-eminently by Shri Jawaharlal Nehru.

The Indian missionaries of an Indian philosophy, Buddhism, were the first people in history to think and feel in terms of the human race as a whole. They felt a concern for all their fellow human beings; they had a vision of mankind as being potentially a single family and they set themselves to turn this potential unity into an accomplished fact by peaceful persuasion. These Buddhist ideals were first conceived of about 2,500 years ago; their relevance to human needs is perennial; and they have never been more relevant than they are in the Atomic Age. All honour to those pre-atomic-age Indian seers and leaders, the Emperor Ashoka and the Mahatma Gandhi. These great souls had the spiritual insight to appreciate the intrinsic wrongness of animosity and violence, without having to wait to have this truth hammered into their minds by the horrifying object-lesson of Nagasaki and Hiroshima.

For our generation, Ashoka is a symbolic figure. His policy, his experience, and his consequent change of heart and change of policy are sign-posts of the direction in which all politics must now move if the wages of mankind's traditional political sins are not to be atomic death—as they will be, for certain, if, now that we have been overtaken by the Atomic Age, we fail to make a revolutionary break with deeply-ingrained political habits.

When Ashoka came to the throne, he found himself the ruler of the greater part of the Indian subcontinent. If he could add the rest of Peninsular India to his hereditary dominions, he would have united the whole of the subcontinent politically up to its 'natural frontiers'. Political unification has been one of the conventional objectives of kings; it is a good objective in itself, but the conventional means of attaining it has been the evil means of war, and Ashoka, like countless rulers before him, resorted to this evil means when he attacked and conquered Kalinga. Ashoka's new departure was his horror and remorse at the evil that he had let loose, and his resolve not to commit this sin again. Ashoka now renounced his original aim of adding the rest of Southern India to his empire by military conquest, but he did not renounce his objective of unification. He continued to pursue this aim, but thenceforward by peaceful means and on a grander scale. He now set himself to propagate, not the Maurya Empire, but Buddhism, and this not just up to the limits of the Indian subcontinent, but up to the limits of the inhabited world.

We know, from Ashoka's own inscriptions, that he sent Buddhist missions to the successors of Alexander the Great. Unfortunately for the western end of the Old World, this seed fell on stony ground. Ashoka's missions made so slight an impression on the Macedonian war-lords to whom they were addressed that they failed to gain a place in our Greek historical records; and the Romans would, no doubt, have been equally obtuse to the truth and salvation offered by Buddhism if Buddhist missionaries had made their way that far west. The rest of Ashoka's missionary work, however, fell on good ground and bore fruit. Thanks to Ashoka's mission to Ceylon, the Theravadin form of Buddhism is prevalent today, not only in Ceylon, but in Burma, Thailand, and Cambodia as well. And the Buddhist missionaries who pressed on across the north-east corner of the Seleucid Empire into Sinkiang carried the seeds of the Mahayana into China, Vietnam, Korea, and Japan. Today Buddhism is the religion, or one of the religions, of nearly half the human race. This feat of religious

unification, on this scale, has been achieved, not by force, but by peaceful persuasion. It is an Indian achievement; the Indian emperor Ashoka was the initiator of it. This was something quite new in human history. Ashoka started something new because he reacted in a new way to the evil of war.

If mankind is not going to commit mass-suicide, the world of the future is going to be the kind of world that Ashoka made it his mission to call into existence after he had had his change of heart. But, alas, such changes of heart are exceptional, not only in rulers, but in human beings in all walks of life. The ideal of a peaceful unification of the whole human race was injected into human history by Ashoka more than 2,000 years ago. Meanwhile, the political scene has continued to be much the same waste land that it was before Ashoka's day. Politically the human race has continued to be split up into tribal splinters mutually alien to each other, and innumerable further tribal wars have been fought since the time when Ashoka renounced war-making. In our own lifetime we have lived through two wars that have engulfed the whole world. Does the future lie with Ashoka's ideal ? Or does it lie with the conventional nationalism that has brought countless woes upon mankind in the past, and that is going to lead us into committing mass-suicide if we go on indulging in it now that we have been overtaken by the Atomic Age before we have had the change of heart that Ashoka had about our human habit of resorting to war ?

What are mankind's prospects today ? At first sight they look gloomy when we survey the present state of the world with open eyes and—as far as is humanly possible—without wishful thinking.

The fission of mankind into tribal splinters, for example: since the end of the Second World War, the number of sovereign independent states on the political map of the world has almost doubled. The former domain of the British Indian Empire is a case in point. It has now been partitioned among three sovereign independent states: the Indian Union, Pakistan, and Burma. This increase in the number of independent political units is a good thing, of course, in so far as it signifies the political liberation of formerly subject peoples. But independence has its seamy side as well. Asian and African peoples who were formerly at issue with their European rulers are at issue with each other today, now that the former European empires have been liquidated. India is at issue with Pakistan and with China; Pakistan is at issue with India and with Afghanistan. And the present objects

of dispute between Asian peoples—and African peoples too—are European imports. European imperialism has taken an unintentional posthumous revenge on the formerly subject continents. In the act of setting them at liberty again, Europe has infected them with her own unfortunate political ideology.

Conflicts over debatable territories; wrangles between linguistic majorities and minorities: these used to be specifically European political maladies, but now they have become world-wide. The struggle between Walloon and Fleming for predominance in the city of Brussels has been reproduced, since India gained her independence, by a previously unknown struggle between Maharashtrians and Gujaratis for predominance in the city of Bombay. In Kashmir the subcontinent has found an equivalent for Europe's Alsace. And India today is almost as language-conscious as Eastern Europe is. The re-mapping of India on linguistic lines into states representing language-groups is a counterpart of the re-mapping of the East European territories liberated from the former Ottoman, Habsburg, Russian, and German empires. It is not, of course, a bad thing in itself to try to make administrative districts coincide with language-areas. In a sense this is a corollary of democracy; since democracy will not be a reality unless the people are administered in their local mother-tongue. Yet the attempt to re-map either India or Europe into a mosaic of linguistically homogeneous states is bound to be disappointing and therefore to be persistently contentious. The attempt to draw administrative boundaries that will sort out different language-areas from each other may be as skilful, as complex, and as honest as can be. Yet, when the administrative map-maker has done his best, there will still be linguistic minorities left stranded on what, for them, is the wrong side of the administrative dividing line; and the fate of such minorities is everywhere unenviable.

India has been less successful than China has been in dealing with her domestic language problem. The Indo-European languages of Northern India have no affinity at all, of course, with the Dravidian languages of the South. They are closer to the languages of Europe and Russia than they are to the non-Indo-European languages of India herself. In the past, this linguistic diversity did not breed discord. In religion and in culture, India—both Aryan and Dravidian —was a unity. The Sanskrit importations into the Dravidian languages' vocabularies are evidence of a cultural unification which surmounted and transcended even the sharpest linguistic frontiers.

Every inhabitant of the subcontinent who needed to be bilingual or multilingual became so as a matter of course. The intellectual ability was there, and, as in present-day Switzerland, there were no political inhibitions to stand in the way. Unhappily the situation is no longer the same now. In large parts of India, there is, today, a competition between rival languages that is as acrimonious as it is anywhere in Europe. The Dravidian's resistance to Hindi is as tough as the Fleming's resistance to French and as the French-speaking Canadian's resistance to English.

China, on the other hand, is now within sight of her national goal of linguistic unification. Of course, China had an easier start. All dialects of Chinese are related to each other—perhaps as closely as the North Indian languages that have a common ancestor in Sanskrit. One of them—the so-called 'Mandarin' dialect that has inevitably been adopted as the all-China national language—is the mother-tongue of by far the greater part of China. It is spoken from Manchuria to Yunnan; the non-Mandarin dialects are confined to the provinces along the south and south-east coasts, from the Sino-Vietminh frontier to the estuary of the Yangtze.

The speakers of these southern and south-eastern dialects of Chinese are not mutually intelligible either to each other or to the speakers of 'Mandarin' Chinese. But they have a means of intercommunication which the Aryan-speakers and Dravidian-speakers of India do not possess. The Chinese characters are the common heritage of the whole of China; and each character has the same meaning for every Chinese, even though a Cantonese and a Manchurian Chinese may pronounce the characters quite differently. So any two mutually unintelligible Chinese have only to stop talking and to take to pen and paper and they will be in communication with each other at once. However, there are now few Chinese left who are not also mutually intelligible by word of mouth; for, in our lifetime, the speakers of the southern and south-eastern dialects have been busily learning to speak 'Mandarin'. They feel no reluctance, such as a Bengali-speaker or a Tamil-speaker feels about taking to Hindi. The southern Chinese literary heritage is not in danger, as the Bengali and the Tamil literary heritages are. In China this problem does not arise, because the literary heritage of the speakers of all Chinese dialects is identical. It is the immense common corpus of Chinese literature written in the classical characters. No doubt, China might run into some India-like linguistic problems of a mild kind if she

were to replace the characters by the Latin, or some other, alphabetic script. But, cumbrous though the characters are, the leaders of China will think twice before abandoning a traditional form of writing that is so potent a unifier as the characters are. Thanks to the characters, a Chinese could establish some communication with a Japanese by addressing Chinese characters to him on paper. For the Japanese use the characters extensively in their Chinese meanings; though they have also used a selection of them for the un-Chinese purpose of making out of them a couple of alphabets or syllabaries.

One of the many bad effects of the European malady of linguistic nationalism is to divide the population of a country into a privileged majority and one or more penalized minorities. This is what happened in Hungary when she regained her national independence in 1867 within the framework of a Habsburg Empire that was now reorganized into an Austro-Hungarian Dual Monarchy. The settlement of 1867 spelled liberation for the Magyars; but the Magyars amounted to barely half the population of Hungary; and the liberation of the Magyars brought adversity upon all the non-Magyar minorities. They were now put under pressure to abandon their ancestral non-Magyar languages and cultures and to Magyarize; and they were penalized by being treated as second-class citizens when they refused to give up their own national identities. Down to 1846 the language of the Hungarian parliament had been Latin. After 1867 it was Magyar, and the non-Magyar-speaking Hungarian minorities resented this. For, unlike Latin, Magyar was not a politically neutral language.

It was the same story in inter-war Poland after the re-establishment of a Polish state in 1919. This was liberation for the Poles but adversity for the Ukranians, White Russians, and other non-Polish minorities which, in the aggregate, amounted to about a third of inter-war Poland's population.

Down to 1945, Asian and African students of European affairs used to find these European wrangles and injustices incomprehensible. They did not feel tempted to behave in that way among themselves. But now, since the liquidation of the former British, French, Dutch, and Belgian colonial empires in Asia and Africa, liberation has reproduced some of its bitter fruits in these two bigger continents. In the act of being liberated, a number of previously subject Asian and African populations have been splitting into dominant majorities and penalized minorities in the melancholy Hungarian and Polish style. For instance, one of the first treaties with a foreign

country that has been made by the new African regime in Kenya, which is essentially a Kikuyu regime, has been a treaty with Ethiopia under which the ruling peoples in the two countries are to co-operate in preventing their respective Somali minorities from seceding to Somalia. Thus the liberation of Africa spells liberation for some Africans only, while it spells subjection for others. In Africa today, an unhappy feature of modern East European history is reappearing. Independent India, too, has her experience of this. She has her Nagas; and the Nagas are India's equivalent of Hungary's Slovaks and of Britain's Irish.

For a West European observer of current Asian and African affairs, one of the most unexpected and most disconcerting aftermaths of the liquidation of the West European colonial empires has been the adoption of these now defunct empires' frontiers as sacred national heritages of the liberated countries. How astonished Sir Mortimer Durand would have been if he could have lived to see Pakistan defending the Durand line against Afghanistan's demands for the establishment of an independent state of Pakhtunistan on what was once the British and is now the Pakistan side of a line drawn originally by a British official to serve British interests. India's self-dedication to the McMahon line would, no doubt, be just as astonishing to Sir Henry McMahon. As for the north-west frontier of the former British Kenya colony, this was drawn and redrawn in the successive partitions of Africa, first in the eighteen-eighties and eighteen-nineties and then for the peace-settlement after the First World War. What Western observer of the first stage of Mr Kenyatta's career would have guessed that one of Mr Kenyatta's first declarations, on taking over the government of Kenya, would be that Kenya's frontiers were sacrosanct ? All the political viruses that were parasites of liberation in Europe now seem to be fastening upon the recently liberated countries of Asia and Africa. This is melancholy; it is also alarming; it bodes ill for the achievement of the unity through fraternity that, in the Atomic Age, is the necessary condition for mankind's survival.

If this were the whole of the picture, it would be difficult not to make catastrophe inevitable by giving way to despair. Fortunately the spread of Europe's ideas and ideals to other continents has not been wholly divisive and destructive in its effects. Together with their European-like nationalism, the now dominant Asian and African peoples that are the heirs of European imperialism have also been

adopting a common culture; and a community of culture that transcends national differences and national animosities is also a European-like phenomenon. The new modern-educated leaders of the liberated Asian and African peoples share with the Western peoples a common culture that, as far as we know, is the first literally world-wide culture to arise up to date. Here we see the forerunners of a new world-civilization. At present, this world-civilization is in its infancy. It is confined to a handful of pioneers; but representatives of it are now to be found, in greater or lesser numbers, in every country in the world; and it looks as if, as time goes on, this world-civilization is going to spread to wider and wider circles and is, at the same time, going to change in quality. To begin with, it has been taking shape within a predominantly Western framework; and this has been inevitable, because the progressive material unification of the human race during the last few centuries has been mainly the work of Western hands. Gradually, however, the many branches of the non-Western majority of mankind are going to make their contributions to mankind's common treasure. We may look forward to a world-civilization in the future that will have incorporated in itself all that is best in each of our local traditions. This is the emerging world-society in which all the recently liberated peoples are now eager to be enrolled as members. With one side of their minds they are each insisting on its own national sovereignty and independence and its own cultural individuality. This wave of nationalistic feeling was to be expected, and we have to wait patiently until satiety makes it begin to subside. What was unexpected—and this is encouraging—is that the leaders of the newly liberated peoples should have been so quick to acquire also at least the beginnings of an oecumenical civic sense.

As the spiritual unification of the world makes headway, nationalism will, of course, kick against the pricks. In all continents, nationalism is age-old and archaic-minded. Yet the only way in which the nations of the world have any chance of preserving something of their traditional national identities is to subordinate themselves voluntarily to a supranational world-government. The alternative is not the preservation of their former sovereign independence; the alternative is annihilation; for, in the Atomic Age, war, if waged again, will grind the belligerents to powder, without making the traditional distinction between victors and vanquished that has given wars their historic significance in the past.

The whole of mankind and the whole surface and air-envelope of our planet have now been united through 'the annihilation of distance' by the progress of modern technology. Our world has been united for good or for evil. If we are not to turn it into our common slaughter-house, we have to turn it into our common family home. The one thing that we cannot now do is to split this technologically unified world up again into the insulated compartments of the past.

Technology has been a unifier ever since the first of our subhuman ancestors chipped a flint into the earliest tool. Technology is a necessary instrument for the establishment and maintenance of world-unity, and our modern technology is already adequate for this job. But technology is not enough. It can bring fists within striking distance of each other and it can arm these fists with lethal weapons, but it cannot move hearts into feeling mutual confidence and love instead of feeling mutual fear and hate. And this spiritual level is the one on which unity has to be achieved if this unity is to be constructive.

This brings us back to the spirit of Ashoka and of Gandhi. The distinguishing feature—and perhaps characteristically Indian feature—of these great souls is that they had the vision and the courage to take revolutionarily new spiritual departures. Mahatma Gandhi had also the practical ability to translate a utopian-looking vision into an immense practical political achievement. Can this Indian spirit now inspire the Indian people as a whole to break out of our traditional human nationalism into a new concern for, and allegiance to, the human race as a whole ? If India could succeed in breaking through the barrier of political convention and habit, she would have opened up a path along which the rest of mankind could follow her.

Since India attained her political independence, India has been on trial. While she was still struggling to win her independence, she embraced Mahatma Gandhi's ideal, and, under his leadership, she achieved her independence in the new Gandhian way. But the attainment of independence has brought with it a greater moral ordeal than the previous struggle for it. A sovereign independent people—and especially one that has only recently become independent again—is under temptation to behave in the bad old conventional way—the way in which Ashoka acted in the first phase of his history after ascending the throne: the phase in which he attacked and conquered Kalinga. In her territorial disputes with Pakistan and with China, independent India has been acting, so far, in the conventional rather than in the Gandhian manner. With Gandhi's spirit to inspire

her, could she not rise to the height of breaking with the traditional conventions of nationalism ? Could she not make a new start—a Gandhian start—in her approach to these vexed international questions ? This is a hard thing to ask of any nation: it is to ask a nation to rise above itself. Yet this can be asked of India; for, in rising above herself, India would be rising to the spiritual level that Gandhi has set for her. And she committed herself to this when she placed herself under Gandhi's guidance. In the struggle for independence, Gandhi's spirit performed a miracle: it made it possible for India and Britain to part from each other in peace and with mutual charity. Is it not time for the miracle to be repeated ? Britain is now out of the picture. The neighbours with whom India has to come to terms now are Pakistan and China. Here are two fresh opportunities for India to recapture the spiritual initiative by making another Gandhian break-away from traditional human behaviour.

The Creative Individual

G. Tucci

When a man like Jawaharlal disappears, the world is like a sky in which the light of a star goes out. But men such as he never die: they are bound to live, never fading in the memory of mankind. Though we cannot refrain from lamenting his passing away, we should celebrate his entrance in a more durable existence, not subject to the laws of physical being. The life of great men begins when they die: their names and their deeds will never cease to be a source of inspiration; they will continue to survive in that peculiar form of existence which lies in the mind and the memory, at once frail and eternal, immaterial and indestructible. This is the real survival of man: his being always among us, even after his passing away, what we may call the escape from the laws of time, a change from the past into an everlasting future, a privilege reserved but to a few. Still, there are some troubled souls that feel dissatisfied with the present, and eager to escape from it; an evasion which can only be attained in contemplation and meditation, that is, a breaking up of everyday reality, an escape from history for the time being, a glimpse of other planes, other than that in which we happen to be. Time and again, some men dissatisfied with society have deeply felt the urge of wandering in the boundless, spaceless, translucid realms of timeless dreams, as did the *rishis* of old.

No doubt, we live in history; we are as it were deeply submerged under its waves. Still, there is a way, I do not say of breaking away from it—which is made impossible by life itself—but a way of transposing one's personality in a world outside and beyond it, a world swayed by the imagination. This does not imply that we should necessarily keep ourselves aloof from the society of men; it means rather that we should transpose ourselves mentally and spiritually into a different plane of existence, a world which exists only in our imagination, and is shaped by it. In spite of its being independent from the impact of society, which apparently has no use for it, this plane is perhaps even more real than conventional reality, because

it bursts forth from the innermost and most creative resources of our mind and soul.

Reality is not only that which we perceive; there is another reality, whose existence lies only in its being thought and fancied: its truth rests with the sincerity and evidence of its experience. Unfortunately, it so happens that the world in which we live prevents us from resorting to this joyous and confident escape.

In fact, the main aspect of modern civilization seems to me to lie in the collapse of the free play of individuality: the community is taking the upper hand over the individual, to such an extent that it claims either by persuasion or by compulsion to force his unconditioned assent to its presumptions, laws, and schemes.

Freedom, I agree, is such a thing as is not fit for all, but for the few. And yet, it is nowadays a cheap good, offered to one and all; it has become the main goal of mankind, the easiest to attain. But I venture to say that in the past the individual was offered a far wider scope for complete freedom in thinking, and even in acting; there were more ways of escaping from the society of men than are available today. It was to that escaping from society that the *Upanishads* were due. When desired, seclusion could easily be attained in the past; meditation and solitude, silence and contemplation were at hand, provided one wanted to have them. It is a different matter nowadays. Never has man enjoyed less freedom than at present, although freedom has now become the most misused of words, to the point of losing all meaning, because everybody lends to it a particular meaning of his own, according to his conceptions or misconceptions.

What is quite clear is the fact that society now controls all sorts of means directed to creating a standard of opinions, with which everybody is imbued, even unconsciously, and which are accepted unquestionably. By degrees, a spiritual and intellectual atmosphere is thus created, which all individuals are bound to breathe. Even if one were unwilling to yield to it, it shapes or at least influences the course of one's thoughts, and defeats all attempts at opposing it, or getting rid of it, because the denial of a situation presupposes its solution, and causes a forced direction for one's thoughts or ideas, thus restricting the area of the free and unbiased activity of one's mind.

All of this frustrates the ingenuous and instinctive thinking or dreaming of man. I imagine a free man, whom creative impulse

inspires, to be like a superb and gigantic tree of the jungle, which grows without anybody's help, being the outcome of a wanton and unchecked force, which makes it outgrow all the plants and grasses of the jungle, driving it upwards to the skies. Such trees stand alone, one here and the other there, at a distance from each other, each with a destiny of its own, and no other end but itself, its own beauty and strength, to survive for centuries, whereas the numberless plants below are being regularly wasted by the rolling of the seasons and the devouring force of time and nature.

On the contrary, what is society but the coexistence of an infinite number of finite beings, all of them breathing the same air, using the same words, living only on words, ignoring that each one of them is in fact fatally enclosed within himself ? Even if he does apparently communicate with his fellow beings, each one is essentially a mystery for the other. It is no paradox to say that the only direct and truthful way of communication, eloquent and at the same time capable of conveying our inner soul to another being, is not by words, but by silence. And yet, take away from man the delusion that he can express himself by words, and tell him that his inner being is beyond the reach of words, he will be overcome by fear and trouble. It follows that human beings want to be kept together by words and, what is far worse, by some abstractions on which society rests and whose form and expression are ever changing with the times. As a consequence, a contrast arises between the content and the demands of a community on one side and the individual on the other, who happens to have no fear of being alone, who wishes to be alone, and in whom there may occur that sudden spark through which the mortal may join the immortal. Human society is a balance of quantities. It forces its own will upon men, as of necessity it must keep together the many, that is, the numbers. The many make up the quantity, and quantities added up make the mass, a desert in which the tree of individuality is bound to wither. The forcible penetration of politics into society, in a way unprecedented up to now, represents a greater check than ever to the growth of those imaginations or fancies in which a free man finds the reason of his life; so it is, because politics shape new aggregates and organizations, in which all men absorb the same opinions and inspirations.

Unlike what it used to be, everybody nowadays feels interested in political activities, and takes part in them, be it willingly or unwillingly, since everyone has acquired the right, in theory at least, of

expressing his own views on the matter, and of proposing himself as a responsible actor in the process of its development.

What I deeply regret is the growing tendency among men of letters, thinkers, and artists, who should be defenders of the liberty of men—not in the sense in which politics pretend to realize it, but in that higher sense which I would like to lend to it—to accept this situation. Even against their own will, I agree, they cannot help feeling the impact of the political situation in which they live, or in which they are involved. But times are changing fast; evolutions or revolutions occur so suddenly, within the span of a generation; the social and political outlook undergoes alterations so deep as to be often contradictory in their structure. What appears as the best today is likely to become the worst tomorrow: hence a feeling of insecurity, with regard to every conviction, persuasion, or belief. The rhythm of changes has never been so fast as in our times: what was accepted yesterday is rejected today, and the reverse. We are thus tied to the ephemeral and the endless becoming within the uncharted course of time, to the various aspects of *anityata*, the ever-changing mood of mankind, the passing away of everything, men and societies, religions and empires, philosophies and their systems, political creeds, all of them but ripples on the vast expanse of the restless ocean of time. It thus happens that thinkers and writers are so much impressed by the impact of history and by the ideas and preconceptions with which it weaves its impermanent net, that their attention is mainly centred on this very *anityata*. Their thoughts and feelings are therefore so tinged by the atmosphere of the moment, that they are hardly inclined to escape, except for a few cases, the race of time, and they participate boldly, even if not always truthfully, in the passions of that very moment. Thus they are no longer themselves, they do not yield to the uniqueness of rare visions, but turn merely into loudspeakers of the commonplaces of the many.

The worst of it is that it is considered necessary for a writer to be committed in the contentions and the moods that rage around him, to colour his works with the main motives to which a particular situation gives rise. By so doing, he is fatally led to criticize those who yesterday did what he is doing today, although tomorrow he will be subject to the same fate. I am afraid that, by acting thus, thinkers and writers belie their mission, which consists in creating a peculiar reality, shaped by thought or imagination, which differs from the material one, or the delusive reality of historical facts. The reality

of imagination is a peculiar way of being, which, once it has been given birth, exists nowhere and yet everywhere and in every time, ready to be created anew in the mind and the spirit of those who can approach it with understanding and sympathy, which is a way of being eternally alive.

The truly creative mind should therefore keep itself aloof from the alluring environment of the moment, go its own way, as the greatness of its creations will depend on its solitude.

Those who adjust readily to the demands of their times, depending on some situation external to themselves, or serving or proclaiming current ideas, are killing the inspiration which might be theirs: conformity spells death to a genius. Creative minds, whether religious masters, artists, or thinkers, have never yielded to their times, thus opening up new horizons and new paths, and changing the spiritual and mental outlook of men.

Unfortunately, the impact of events nowadays on everybody is such that even religion, which is supposed to be a free relation between man and the Unknown, a concrete, inexpressible experience in which nobody can interfere and which asserts a link—true or imaginary, it does not matter, provided it be felt as a vital experience between the limitations of what we are and the boundless freedom which is Eternity—is compromising with society. At its requests, Churches are yielding to temporality, eagerly seeking economic power. Thus the light is fading which religion used to spread on suffering mankind.

Man is thus confronted with mental abstractions, and is growing increasingly unfamiliar with those divine imaginations in which alone he can assert his release from himself and from history.

Let us, therefore, take shelter once more in our inner life, where only lies truth: *tamaso ma jyotirgamaya.*

Purpose in Education

ZAKIR HUSAIN

THIS VOLUME WAS PLANNED for presentation to Jawaharlalji on his next birthday, and I had thought of writing about Purpose in Education as an act of personal homage to one who inspired our national life with a compelling sense of purpose. The homage is still due, and must be paid with all the greater feeling of dedication, now that Jawaharlalji is no longer there to receive it. He was a symbol of thoughtfulness, of endeavour and confidence, above all of love for the people whom we aspire to serve. He has now become a part of India, a part of its fields, rivers, and mountains, of its fertility, its majesty, and beauty. We, too, must become part of him through identification with his most distinctive quality, an all-absorbing sense of purpose, and begin where we must—with education.

Education is given in and for a society. It is an anticipation of the future on behalf of the present and future generations, and its principles and methods are governed by the view that is held in regard to the forces that mould the present and the future of a society. We can regard social development as being determined by immutable laws or as something to which each can contribute in accordance with his idea of the desirable or the good, or as something for which each is morally responsible and which ought to have the spirit and the structure which ethical ideals (or God's will) require that it should have.

There are facts that we must accept, like the alternation of night and day, the change of seasons, the biological processes of birth, growth, decay, and death. This acceptance has also an internal aspect. In the early stages of man's life on earth, the number of things whose acceptance was regarded as inescapable was very large and comprehended almost the whole of man's physical and social existence. Necessity was given a divine quality; it became an embodiment of the good and was worshipped. Progress can be regarded as resistance, in some form or to some degree, to the established habits of positive acceptance. If the alternation of day and night could not be changed,

the laws governing social life and imposing obligations on the individual could be. Man could rise above the cycle of birth, growth, decay, and death by asserting the reality of a moral law that was independent of the physical, and adopting a criterion of the desirable and the good that derived from his own will. Progress has consisted even more in the awareness of ethical and spiritual obligations, in the endeavour to shape life so that these obligations could be fulfilled, and to consider their fulfilment a command that could not be disregarded at any cost. Social development has not affected the laws and processes of nature, and whatever men have desired, whatever they have done in response to a moral or spiritual command, they have had also to recognize that they must operate within a framework of natural and psychological laws; they have had, in other words, to assume that there were factors that could be regarded as inevitable and inescapable. In our forecast of the future, which we must anticipate in order to make education purposeful, we cannot, therefore, wholly exclude the acceptance of necessity or the exercise of free will or the obedience to moral commands, but must give each of these its proper place.

Education can be, and indeed has been, based, in a considerable number of societies, on what may be called the philosophy of the inevitable and on a technique of making people desire what they are told is sure to happen, and identify themselves morally with a 'scientifically' predetermined future. The philosophy by itself would not have enabled this concept of education to develop into a system. This has been achieved by its being given a political and technological character. Statesmen who were concerned with scientific prognostications of the future realized that men might not submit to an inevitable destiny only because of fear of hunger, the hope of reward, or fear of punishment. So they created an ideology to take the place of belief. They made suggestion into an irresistible force by pressing into its service all the means of mass communication—the press, the radio, films, television—and cultivated in the people a capacity of thinking and feeling only what is suggested to them. They thus not only inculcated a submission to destiny, but also inspired an exalted feeling of security by eliminating distrust and doubt, pricks of conscience, and the idea of an overriding moral law. Technology, in the form of a planned industrial development that would provide all that could possibly be desired, has lent powerful support to political ideology, so that man looks for self-realization in becoming a cog in a vast

machine. The political, economic, and social system thus becomes an anonymous, suprahuman power, and the individual's will and moral judgment are completely absorbed by the obligation to fulfil the demands of a predetermined necessity.

Under such a system the principles and the purposes of education are dictated by the state and are reducible to various forms of ideological propaganda. It would not be fair or historically correct to regard this concept of education as possessing no background. The course of scientific and technological advance in the Western world has created a situation in which the exercise of free will, to say nothing of normative ethics, appears irrelevant and futile. It is assumed that there is no authority to determine what we ought and what we ought not to do, practical reason cannot give any guidance, moral values are relative, and conscience—or God's will—are illusions that cannot bear scrutiny. The school of depth psychology finds its fulfilment in the denial of what has been called man's moral nature and has made disillusionment into a scientific objective. Education cannot, therefore, according to this view of things, have a general purpose; it can only be a method applied to individuals with specific motives. Modern man has become a transit point for cultural influences—for opinions, pleasures, prejudices, tastes. He is no longer the focal point of moral decisions, conscious of his responsibilities and desirous of their fulfilment.

Are we willing to commit ourselves to an abdication of all human rights, or the complete negation of a moral sense ? Should we wait for complete knowledge and absolute certainty in regard to the future of humanity before we decide finally what the aim and purpose of education ought to be ? What has so far been taken for education is a process of inducing the individual, under varying types and degrees of pressure, to desire actively what exists, because what exists is assumed to be good, either because it is something predetermined or because it is the best that could be attained. Our educational principle and methods would be entirely different if we shifted our attention to the individual himself from things that are external to him and made education the process of subordinating the will to ethical commands, to obligations imposed 'from above'.

The spirit of man is not a straightforward pattern woven into nature. It is not just a link in a chain of causal relationships, as psychological technicians would like to prove it to be. It is the place of a quite intimate experience in which alone values are apprehended

and in which the demands of different values are weighed against each other. It is only in the silent inwardness of the spirit that things like the meaning of existence, the challenge of the higher life, and the obligatory dedication to the higher human values unfold themselves. It is there that revelation has its source; it is there that eternal truth finds a response and an opportunity to permeate life.

If this line of thought is followed, the concept of education is entirely changed. Man ceases to be the means to an end; he becomes the end itself. He does not need to commit himself to what is assumed to be necessary and, therefore, absolutely desirable; he can follow his own inner promptings. He will not, because of his acceptance of moral responsibility, discover solutions to all problems. There will, however, be maintained within him a constant and fruitful tension created by the confrontation of his moral nature with the world of time and space and its physical fate.

It will be the aim and function of the education of such a man (*a*) to help him develop his faculties, (*b*) to transmit to him his traditions and his cultural heritage, and (*c*) to awaken his inner self and kindle a light within him.

The first function, that of helping in development, could more properly be called 'upbringing'. It should not be regarded as a technique but as an understanding of the laws of biological and mental and spiritual growth, and their application with due regard to individual needs. The function of transmission cannot be fulfilled if it is regarded as a routine, for the transmission of knowledge, traditions, and values does not take place as a direct or automatic process. It does not and cannot consist in filling a supposedly empty mind with supposedly useful information. Transmission in the real sense can take place only if there is participation by the growing mind in the process of transmission, if there is continuous exercise of judgment, both by the teacher and the student, and the growing mind is enabled to assimilate the values that conform to its own mental structure. The third function concerns workings of the human mind that are too intangible for precise statement. One can only refer to the prophets, reformers, idealists and their bringing light into the life of their fellowmen, to educators like Pestalozzi and Gandhi and Tagore and Nehru, to that love and understanding and faith which evoke joyful response in the young and foster the desire for a just and righteous and dedicated life. These three functions of education are not separate, they do not follow in any sequence. They constitute

a single function which education must continuously perform, utilizing its methods and techniques for the attainment of the great purpose it must serve of producing free men who consciously accept the moral responsibility to create and maintain a society based on equality, freedom, and justice.

The statesmen who led us towards freedom, who gave us our Constitution, and whose policy set us on the road to a secular, democratic, welfare state have indirectly defined the purpose of our education, and Gandhiji has been a living example of the lofty principle that the means must be worthy of the ends. There could be no more inspiring challenge for the Indian educator. How are we to meet this challenge, and prove ourselves worthy of the responsibility that has fallen upon us ?

India is a secular, democratic, welfare state. The political and legal attributes of the state, sovereignty, power, territory, are assumed; its social and moral attributes are asserted. We are not only an independent people, with a fully representative democratic government; we are a people who have committed ourselves to the principle that the state is the embodiment of a social and political ideal, that it is a moral entity. This is a commitment over and above the citizen's duty of obedience and loyalty that we read of in the textbooks of political science, something over and above the patriotism which demands unconditional surrender of property, other loyalties, and life itself at the bidding of the state. These obligations we must, indeed, accept and fulfil. But we are bound to the state, and the state to us, by a moral trust which gives Indian citizenship its specific character. We believe our state embodies a moral idea. We shall be false to it if our personal lives do not reflect our faith, if the state does not abide within us as we do within the state. It should be one of the main purposes of our education to make us aware of our moral responsibility and able to discharge it to the limit of our capacity.

Of course, this cannot be done in a vacuum. We cannot have awareness of a responsibility without opportunities to fulfil it. And here again Indian education has to meet a magnificent challenge. India is a land with many communities living side by side. They have things in common and also a character that is distinctive, formed by a history of co-operation and conflict, of peaceful coexistence, rivalry and hostility, of creative tensions and sterility and decadence. India is also a land that can be regarded as a geographical unity, or conceived as consisting of regions inhabited by people with

their own language, economic interests, and way of life. A dogmatic nationalism, disdaining to distinguish between unity and uniformity, would seek to simplify problems by ignoring differences; a dogmatic communalism and regionalism would reduce unity to a pious hypothesis. Education must face these issues directly. A timid and fearful acceptance or an impatient brushing aside of facts can never be a solution, for nothing enduring can be created by fear or evasion.

Education must regard national integration as an essential objective and exercise itself in discovering effective means for its attainment. It would, I presume, have to pose questions and insist that those who desire to be educated should find answers satisfying to themselves and welcome to others.

What are the implications of an Indian citizen being the member of a religious community, of his speaking the language and possessing the culture of a particular region, and of looking for means of livelihood within it ?

Every religion is a complex of spiritual, moral, and social values, and the continuous endeavour to realize these values gives a unique character to its believers as a social group. The values themselves are universal, but the forms given to them are not, and we see in the history of every religious community both a desire to maintain the forms and a desire to revalue them in the light of the absolute. The human conscience works both ways, maintaining and destroying, and the less of questioning and rejecting there is, the less there is also of vitality and dynamic force. The believer who insists on blind adherence to forms, who abdicates the right to appeal to his conscience, who is afraid, let us say bluntly, to aspire to the higher and the highest is not fulfilling his duty either to his religion or to himself. Still worse is the believer who has not awareness of the values represented by his community's faith but identifies himself zealously with its political, economic, and social interests. Worst of all, perhaps, is the light-hearted repudiation of all beliefs and practices in the name of enlightenment, liberalism, or modernism, because it leads directly to the vicious conclusion that freedom consists in turning one's back on spiritual and moral obligations. It is the task of education, I would say, to cultivate an attitude of reverence, on the one hand, and to assert, on the other, the duty of the individual to develop a capacity for judgment and a sensitiveness of the conscience that will enable him to make a true choice of the values he will serve. There is no religion, no ethics, no culture that can be inherited by empty and

inert minds, and no society can maintain itself without an alert and dynamic moral sense.

It is in the nature of the moral judgment to seek freedom from irrelevant considerations. A man does not become better because he lives in a particular region or speaks a particular language or has a particular pattern of habits or behaviour. There is hardly anyone who would disagree with this statement in principle. But still we insist on our preferences in matters of religion, region, and culture being valid, because while education at the moment tends to emphasize the unique in our religions and cultures, the exercise of moral judgment in regard to ourselves is not encouraged. If we do have judgments, they are the judgments of others, and very often they convert quite natural and reasonable preferences into undesirable and sometimes harmful prejudices.

One great reason why we have communalism and regionalism clinging to our minds like parasites is that we allow our thinking to be influenced deeply, if not exclusively, by the fact that the population of India consists of communities—religious, regional, linguistic—and all too easily fall into the error of regarding these communities as definable units. If, however, we regarded the free, morally responsible individual citizen as the basic unit, the whole character of our thinking would change. The Hindu, the Muslim, the Sikh, the Bengali, the Tamilian, the Punjabi would not be expected to disown his religious or cultural affiliations: he would be asked, in the name and in the interest of his professed affiliations, to exercise his judgment as a free and moral person, to make himself count and not just be counted. This would also make the meaning of secularism clearer than it is today. For secularism is not the abdication by the state of all rights in matters of religion and morality. It is not even the happy coexistence of religious communities. It is an affirmation of the duty of the state and of the citizens to look upon each individual citizen as a free, moral person in his own right. It is a challenge to the believer, whatever his religion, to prove that his faith does not depend on exclusiveness or on the artificial stimulus of self-praise, but is able to contribute fully and freely towards building up the spiritual and moral strength of the Indian people as a whole.

We cannot perhaps look to history for precedents either of the state being a moral entity or of a people being integrated in a body politic as free, moral persons. But what may be proved never to have existed as a fact has always existed as an ideal. The state has re-

presented the selfish interests of its citizens and has, in their name, exercised power and used violence, but the professed aim even of such a state always has been justice and the punishment of wrong-doing. And political philosophy, from Plato to our own times, has sought to make the state the embodiment of moral values and to justify its power on the ground that it served moral ends. On the other side, though patriotism has always been tainted by fear, prejudice, selfishness, hate, patriots whose lives are held up as examples have believed that they were serving the highest human values. We, as a people, have assigned an essentially moral role to our state and a moral character to our citizenship. Are we thereby rejecting our own history and all human history as well ? We shall be forced to say that we are, if we continue to believe that it is only our religious communities that represent moral values and not the state or the morally conscious individuals comprising the Indian people. Prejudices and animosities of all kinds have, indeed, thriven on Indian history as generally conceived and as taught in our schools and universities even today. But if we consider the individual in history not only as the potential but as the actual bearer of moral responsibility, the whole perspective on our history will change. It will not only become intelligible, but acquire a deep spiritual significance. It will not be the history of Hindus and Muslims and Sikhs. It will be the history of beliefs, of ideas, of social forces, of moral struggles, of human weakness and strength, and we shall be able, as individuals, to identify ourselves with what is significant and ignore what is not; we shall, as individuals striving to attain fairness of judgment and conscious of our own liability to commit error and injustice, understand how and why the individuals, whose lives and actions constitute our past, thought and acted as they did. And not only pride in their achievements but also sorrow for the wrongs they committed will bring us closer together today, for shared sorrow unites as much as joy.

These larger purposes of education must be clear in our minds before we begin a discussion of educational policy and of the practical means of realizing our ideal of a socialistic welfare state.

Perhaps the most convincing evidence of our desire to create a free, democratic society was the deliberate association of the mass of the people, the population of the rural areas, with the national movement. The vision and foresight of our statesmen took them to the rural population even when it was doubtful whether it was mentally prepared to receive them, but faith in the people was richly

rewarded. They became aware of the purpose of the national movement and gave it passionate support. For our national leadership even this was not enough. The people had to be educated not only to achieve freedom but to become useful citizens of a socialistic welfare state. They had to be educated for a purpose and according to a plan.

The essential elements of this plan at the primary level were that education should be provided to all, that it should be imparted through the mother-tongue, that, whether it began at the age of five or six or seven, it should continue till the age of fourteen and that it should centre mainly round some productive activity.

The principle of free compulsory education up to as high a level as it is possible to provide with the means at the disposal of the state is universally recognized. But the population of India, the rate of its increase, and the inadequacy of available resources have been very frustrating handicaps. The urge to apply this principle has not, however, diminished, and it is sure to be realized in practice. The directive of the Constitution that education should be provided to all children in fifteen years' time was based on an optimistic appraisal of our capacity, but it has proved very useful in creating a sense of urgency. The principle that the medium of education should be the mother-tongue has also been accepted, and has been easier to act upon. But the problems arising out of the need for a national language and for making the Indian child aware of the diversity of languages in the country has necessitated the introduction of languages other than the mother-tongue even at the elementary level. This imposes a burden on the child. We must, in course of time, be able to devise methods of teaching languages that will make learning them less of a burden.

The question of age has a significance which educational planning should not ignore. There is a stage in the growth of the child when the forces at work within it seek a direction of their own. They must be guided, in the interest both of the child and of society, towards the vocation, the destiny of the child. This guidance is not a simple and straightforward matter. The first stage of the child's growth is a period of experiment, of haphazard choosing of interests, or of a hesitancy to make any choice, and even where the general pattern of aptitudes is apparently clear, there are chances of its undergoing unexpected transformations. It is for this reason that the organization of early education around some productive activity assumes crucial importance. In the first place, it helps the child to clarify its vague

picture of life, to discover the larger order and system of which its home life and school routine form a part. Secondly, it promotes a realization of the importance of making things for the satisfaction of needs, and brings the child into direct contact with the things made by others, that is, with their ideas of how needs could be satisfied. It learns to associate form with function, and can be made to feel the urge to create more pleasing forms for the better performance of functions. Finally, the child can be habituated to the principle of planned work, and an appraisal of all accomplished work, so that it can plan its own improvement.

The ideal of equal educational opportunity cannot be realized by forcing all to acquire the same type of education, without regard for their individual circumstances and aptitudes. The boy or girl who passes out of school at the age of fourteen and does not go to a secondary school should be able to go to continuation schools for professional education. There should be a vast network of such schools throughout the country, in both the rural and the urban areas, for thorough training in a profession and with courses in the humanities and sciences to enlarge the outlook. We have some institutions for such training, but they are far from enough to provide the country with the multitudes of skilled workers—farmers, smiths, fitters, carpenters, joiners, masons, to name only a few—that are needed for rapid economic and industrial development and for raising the standards of competence. Out of the ranks of these skilled workers will come those who are enterprising enough to build up small businesses and those who take higher courses in institutions for technical training. We have not so far really tapped the resources of man-power and the potential talent of the people. Principles of education as well as planned scientific economy require that we do so as soon as possible.

Secondary education must also have the two aspects of being a self-sufficient stage and a preparation for the university. Diversification at the secondary stage is obviously indicated, but it should be a flexible diversification, because we cannot be certain enough that the pattern of aptitudes which has become apparent at a certain stage will not change later. No harm will be done if we have more than one type of secondary school with possible intercommunication so long as reasonably adequate arrangements are made for guiding the students to the right type of school. What is important is that the thoughtfulness, the habit of planned work, and the social sense

inculcated in the primary school should here become more established and that the self-assertion characteristic of the adolescent period should find healthy expression. This is also the stage when a scientific attitude towards the problem of life should be cultivated, both as a corrective of the cocksureness that is often evident in the adolescent and as a preparation for the intellectual discipline of the university.

The scientific attitude is as old as man's desire for certainty, and is still much less common than the progress of science and technology would incline us to believe. It is not the attitude even of all scientists, for while they will not, in their special fields of work, accept any statement which is not supported by adequate proof, they may otherwise be quite credulous and gullible. The sensational press all the world over, and most of all in the educationally and scientifically advanced countries, thrives on the fact that people allow themselves to be influenced by statements—and even more by the manner of making them—without stopping to think that the statements may be wholly or partially false and may have been made with particular motives. The great enemies of the scientific attitude today are those who are willing to let others think and state the truth for them, scientists who agree to invent instruments of destruction because they assume on the authority of others that there are peoples whom it is necessary to destroy, statesmen who accept prejudiced views and take action on them, citizens who cast enthusiastic votes for candidates about whom they know little or nothing at all, neighbours who suspect and quarrel with each other because of mischievous reporting by children—one could go on listing the categories indefinitely. In fact, we are all of us guilty in some form or to some extent of being unscientific in our attitude. For the scientific attitude is nothing but a continuous questioning to arrive at the truth. Freedom, equality, democracy are the result of the gradual predominance of the scientific attitude in political and social affairs, the result of questioning, over the centuries, the right of the strong to dominate the weak, the right of the few to special privileges, the advantages and disadvantages of an *elite* ruling over the rest of the people. Social reform, the advancement of women, improvements in methods of education—all have been due to the adoption of a scientific attitude in various spheres of life. But all that has been obtained can also be lost if the scientific attitude is abandoned. Minor issues between nations can be magnified and lead to destructive wars, discontented citizens of a democracy can submit to the usurpation of power by a dictator, or

a party can acquire absolute power by suppression of all opposition The destiny of mankind depends on the universal cultivation of a scientific attitude.

It may seem inconsistent to regard both the moral law and the cultivation of a scientific attitude as norms of conduct to be followed simultaneously. But if we do not confuse science with technology and with the ideology of an acquisitive capitalist society, the cultivation of a scientific attitude will promote the objectivity we associate with justice in our dealings and will enable our moral nature to find free but disciplined expression. On the other hand, arguments based on ethics without any allowance being made for that examination of all aspects of an issue, which is the basis of a true scientific attitude, will lead to a conflict of ethical standards and may create the confusion we desire to avoid. Objectivity, it has been truly stated, is morality.

The principles on which our Constitution is based and the socialistic welfare state which is the objective of our social and economic policy can be regarded as blessings bestowed on us by an enlightened leadership. They can also be regarded as the results of a scientific attitude towards political, economic, and social affairs, as the most reasonable answers to fundamental questions as to why all Indian citizens should not be equal in political and legal status, why the opportunities given to them should not be equal, why the capital resources and the means of production should be concentrated in a few hands and not belong to the people as a whole, why development should be haphazard when it can be planned. We must realize that if we have accepted the moral obligations embodied in our Constitution and state policy, we have thereby also undertaken to maintain a scientific attitude towards our public affairs. We have undertaken, that is, not to walk blindly, not to take decisions thoughtlessly or out of prejudice or anger, not to ignore the larger context when considering details. On the positive side, we have committed ourselves, both in national and in international affairs, to taking a balanced view of things, to dealing justly and patiently with those who oppose or disagree with us, to making every effort to understand the real nature of any problems that need a solution. Our universities must produce persons of the highest administrative, technical, and intellectual competence, and they must also carry the responsibility of keeping us aware of what is happening and why, and what is to be done and how in every field of life and activity. 'In this world of incessant and feverish activity,' Jawaharlalji said in his memorable

address on the occasion of the conferment upon him of the degree of Doctor of Laws at Columbia University in 1949, 'men have little time to think, much less to consider ideals and objectives. Yet, how are we to act, even in the present, unless we know which way we are going and what our objectives are ? It is only in the peaceful atmosphere of a university that these basic problems can be basically considered. It is only when young men and women, who are in the university today and on whom the burden of life's problems will fall tomorrow, learn to have clear objectives and standards of values that there is hope for the next generation.' It is not the function of the university to think for the people but to make the people think for themselves, and for the right things in the right way.

A certain degree of detachment is necessary to maintain objectivity and impartiality, and even more to make a correct choice of the problems on which thought has to be concentrated. Our universities must concern themselves with 'the vital ideas of the time,' as a philosopher has put it. They must concern themselves with principles, with policies, and with the assessment of their results. But they must also identify themselves with the Indian people, their past, present, and future. Their motto may well be 'knowledge for its own sake', if by knowledge is meant meaningful information which stimulates the mind and creates the desire for the acquisition of more complete and more meaningful information. Knowledge is not dead matter transferred from one person to another, not a mass of statements, concepts, symbols stored in the memory and protected against any contact with life. It is something which builds personality, promotes intellectual responsiveness and moral sensibility, generates dynamism, and establishes continuously higher standards for ascertaining the truth, and of making it a part of everyday thoughts and actions.

Education, as I said at the beginning, is anticipation of the future. Our statesmen have charted this future for us, not as something predetermined but as something that flows out of man's moral nature. It is for the educators now to see that we have the will and the competence to realize the ideals that have been indicated and given constitutional form. Educators at all levels will have to co-operate if we are to inherit the future that can be ours and this co-operation can be achieved only if the universities dedicate themselves not only to the advancement of knowledge but to a fuller understanding of the whole purpose of education.

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