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LABOR RELATIONS

AND

HUMAN RELATIONS

Labor Relations and Human Relations

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LABOR RELATIONS AND HUMAN RELATIONS

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VIII

PREFACE

Any study of labor relations presented in this fall of 1947 appears in the long shadow cast upon the future by the uncertainties of the Taft-Hartley Act. For the law manifestly changes once more the general framework, so to speak, within which the still formative relationships between management and unions are developing in this country. The change presents itself, moreover, not as a gradual, mutually acceptable evolution of normal dealings between the parties, but as still another drastic transformation in the environment within which those dealings must now be adjusted.

Indeed, the opposition directed against the Labor-Management Act of 1947 by the unions recalls the deep resentments evoked among employers by the National Labor Relations Act only 12 years ago. The two laws belong together as related episodes in the chain of events that reveal labor relations in the United States still a crisis-conditioned, unformed institution, in which neither direction nor constitution can yet be charted. Depression, war, the upheaval of turbulent organizing campaigns, as well as the jolting impact of deep-reaching legal reform all have played significant parts in the developments of the past decade. Against the background of the strong traditions of voluntarism in American labor relations the important influence of law upon these developments stands forth particularly impressive.

However different the origin and scope of the two laws that typify the new trend — the Wagner and the Taft-Hartley Acts — both project comparable consequences for human relations in industry. Each has evoked resentments, fears, and

antagonisms from one party or the other that must exert potent influence upon the process of collective bargaining they both affirm. For, in final analysis, collective bargaining comprises relationships and activities among and between people whose behavior reflects the impact of such emotions.

Perhaps that is why hardly a student or practitioner in the field feels any assurance that law can provide effective answers to the problems that must be met. Even those who support regulations to meet specific abuses insist that the relationships worked out by the parties themselves alone can yield effective dealings from day to day. But such cooperative relationships cannot be imposed by law – and particularly not by law that becomes itself a target of conflict.

Good relationships, then, is the core of our need – sound relationships among management, union, and men. No aim wins more general endorsement. But how many of us are yet prepared to specify in concrete detail the steps by which such relationships should be pursued? How many indeed have undertaken even to spell out the content of these relationships we would develop in industry – what they must comprise in terms of human feelings, motivations, and attitudes?

Yet experience in other fields demonstrates that such purposive relationships – these channels of interaction between individuals and groups combining one with the other to promote defined objectives – constitute a highly complex, difficult, and subtle instrument to fashion even under the most favorable conditions. Certainly no one would deem favorable in the slightest degree the atmosphere in which relationships must now be built in industry—the barbed suspicions and antagonisms following in the wake of the turbulent organizing campaigns since 1935, to say nothing of the long-standing and persisting differences between management and men over dividing the returns from production.

Nonetheless, the promotion of sound relationships remains

the central objective – the nub of the continuing problem. Such relationships must be worked out and promoted among the very human people directly concerned in producing goods and services from day to day. They cannot be prefabricated and imposed by government fiat.

Yet unless industrial leaders of the men at work succeed in building such relationships they cannot hold government to that neutral role they still profess to prefer for it. For no government can tolerate the recurrent paralysis of widespread industrial conflict. Certainly power constitutes an important determinant in the dealings between management and unions. But as collective bargaining attains acceptance and maturity, it cannot much longer be enough for public policy – and collective dealings – to mirror the old concept of two power groups striking a fair bargain, as a neutral government seeks only to protect a true equality in the balance of bargaining strength. We cannot continue recurrently to redress the balance, placing the weight of government protections now on the side of labor, as in the Wagner Act, and then on the side of management, as in the Taft-Hartley Act, while the big protagonists on both sides grow steadily bigger for battling it out. Rather must the protagonists develop their own alternatives for battling it out, or expect to find the government intervening on an ever-widening scale to restrict the fighting.

And so all approaches to the problems of collective bargaining return to the quality of relationships developed among management and unions. For promoting sound relationships – relationships that focus upon cooperation even as they simultaneously make allowance for the areas of legitimate difference – we need preeminently systematic study and exploration of just what such relationships require in terms of daily function among human beings working together in concrete shops and mills and mines within the fast-spreading framework of collective bargaining. We need to

probe, too, just what this collective bargaining itself comprises in these same human and social as well as economic terms. Does it include the purposive relationships that must be created to promote cooperation and reduce conflict? Or is it truly a process of bargaining alone — of pursuing in each difference as much as can be wrenched from the other side by the current balance of power and the individual skills of negotiation? What, in a word, are these relationships — concretely — that we need, and how do we promote them, to make collective bargaining work as a social process involving many different people in our highly industrialized, interdependent economy?

This book represents an attempt to seek answers to such questions. It examines the course of interacting influence upon the intricate network of relationships when a union enters a workplace, as so many unions have entered so many workplaces in the turbulent decade just past. It probes the chain of influence and reaction to uncover the problems posed for leaders on both sides who seek earnestly to make the new frame of relationships a sound and effective context for living with collective bargaining. It explores the content of such collective bargaining as a social process involving human people. It suggests beginnings in approach and action that seem worthy of further test in improving joint relationships among such people.

Manifestly, in any effort of this kind, however tentative and formative its nature, the debt to colleagues and friends is heavy. Experience as arbitrator, as well as continuing discussions with friends in industry — employers, union officials, and workers, alike, have yielded invaluable insights.

The author cannot forego, however, the pleasure of a few specific expressions of appreciation: To Profs. Howard T. Lewis and Edward S. Bursk, editor-in-chief and managing editor, respectively, of the *Harvard Business Review,* for their encouragement and editorial assistance, as well as for

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BENJAMIN M. SELEKMAN

CAMBRIDGE, MASS.
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PART I

Transition in Labor Relations: A Social *Change*

Chapter I

IMPASSE IN COLLECTIVE BARGAINING

MUST we write collective bargaining down as a failure? Never before have we in this country had collective bargaining on so wide a scale as now. Never before have we had strikes on so large a scale as recorded for 1946. Never before have we attempted legal regulation of human relations in industry on so pervasive a scale as projected in 1947. Does this then mean failure in the whole institution of collective bargaining? Or does it mean, perhaps, that we have yet to learn what is involved in making collective bargaining work from day to day in actual mines, mills, and shops?

After a quarter century of war, depression, and revolution, crisis, to be sure, seems to have become normal social atmosphere the world over. But in contrast with the problems of reconstruction confronting the shattered nations of Europe through physical ruin and economic prostration, a paralysis of proved strength has faced us in the United States.

Needless to say, we too had been profoundly shaken by depression and war. But when victory was won, we glimpsed for a moment, perhaps, the great postwar destiny projected by the sheer dimensions of our war accomplishment. Almost immediately, however, we seemed to dissipate the opportunity in the frustrating conflicts that blocked the full production everyone so patently wanted and for which the American economy was so patently equipped. Not that these conflicts bedeviling our transition to peace were exceptional in the troubled aftermath of war — or even in our own national experience. Strikes and group friction hardly consti-

tuted new American experience in 1946, nor did they bear valid comparison with the civil wars and social upheavals facing other nations.

Nonetheless, it was sound instinct that made the American people view the disturbances in industry with grave concern and mounting alarm. The widespread sense of perplexity and frustration was intensified by the realization that collective bargaining had been fostered by positive public policy as an instrument of industrial peace. After long decades of struggle over the workers' right to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, we had determined to safeguard that right, not only to improve the position of employees in dealings with their employers but also in the national interest. "Experience has proved," the Wagner Act of 1935 affirms in a declaration of policy that the Labor-Management Relations Act of 1947 retains unchanged among its many changes, "that protection by law of the right of employees to organize and bargain collectively safeguards commerce from injury, impairment, or interruption, and promotes the flow of commerce by removing certain recognized sources of industrial strife and unrest, by encouraging practices fundamental to the friendly adjustment of industrial disputes arising out of differences as to wages, hours, or other working conditions, and by restoring equality of bargaining power between employers and employees."

Yet in spite of the fact that collective bargaining has become the dominant pattern of industrial relations in American industry, no one can feel we have procured industrial peace or even the stable and mature relationships between management and men that promise the subsidence of conflict and the growth of cooperation in the days ahead. Instead, the easing of one set of problems seems to have generated a new set. The organizing strike — the strike for union, as it was known in the 1920's — has declined in the 1940's. But 1946 was the peak year of stoppages in our whole industrial

history. Undeniably, the nation gained by the reduction in bitterness and violence with the decline of the struggle for sheer union recognition. Recurrent paralysis of the whole economy by the strategic power of organized workers, however, has created a new kind of dilemma. But the sharp divisions of opinion, the edged charges and counter-charges that accompanied the enactment of new federal regulations upon union activity in 1947 made it hard to believe that legislation would solve the dilemma; instead, new resentments and antagonisms threatened to inflame the development of our still formative labor relations.

Thus maladjustments in the human relationships of industry alone seem to block the beneficence of the technical know-how, the productive skills proved by our works and acknowledged by a war-shattered world. By very contrast with the productive potentialities of American industry, labor relations appear a Pandora's box continually spilling forth new vexations – smoldering hostilities, suspicions, and fears; high turnover, absenteeism, and strikes; discontents with wages that are the highest in the world; restrictions on output by men who are the most mechanically minded in the world – seemingly an incessant, seething ferment of dissatisfaction and discord.

Why? Why at the present juncture of labor relations, with the widespread acceptance of joint dealings, does the administrator – of union as well as of industry – who is anxious to promote cooperation find himself compelled to deal so predominantly with conflict? The question attains special point as it becomes clear that none of the disturbing developments of the postwar period in this whole area of social relationships, with its high voltage of emotionalism, is shaking underlying faith in true collective bargaining. Whatever reservations or antagonisms remain in the ranks of management, the spokesmen for industry continue generally to affirm their conviction that the unions are here to stay and

their desire to make collective bargaining work. Labor leaders, certainly, hold to their always fundamental belief in free collective bargaining as the sound and enduring instrument of dealings between management and men. Government officials, from the President down, confronted in wearying succession with stoppages that literally threatened the general welfare, called insistently and almost plaintively for this same "free collective bargaining" behind which the spokesmen of the parties to it had also explicitly aligned themselves. However much the legislation of 1947 may alter the course of industrial relations, its framers, too, affirmed the continuing policy of "encouraging the practice and procedure of collective bargaining. . . ."

What, then, has been getting in the way of this free collective bargaining for which the country so deliberately and planfully laid the groundwork? Unquestionably, the quiet, unheadlined procedures of negotiation and adjustment between many unions and companies throughout the stormy months after the fighting had ended on the battlefronts, have been achieving their impressive roster of amicable settlements. In precisely the same way, the American economy, despite the frictions of the reconversion period, has been employing more workers, turning out more goods, and feeding more people at home and abroad than ever before in its history. Yet just as the pervasive dissatisfaction with productive performance has been fed by the conviction that industry could do better in satisfying all that the American people required of it, collective bargaining, too, in the general judgment, has been falling short of its potential. Indeed, the two failures in realizing full capacity seemed clearly related; and, as a matter of fact, the interrelationship explained a considerable proportion of the mounting public anger against organized labor. The union press, of course, dilated upon the greed of other groups, the "strikes" of cattle raisers, lumbermen, and producers in fields of short supply, and the attacks upon price

controls by business interests even as they pressed for legislative curbs upon wage earners. But when every charge has been made and weighed, industrial conflict remains the most dramatic and persistent cause of stalled production; and industrial conflict – in both its episodic drama of overt clashes and its continuing ferment of frictional antagonism – denotes a breakdown of collective bargaining.

The causes of this breakdown naturally have been drawing persistent discussion. Had the new public policies of the United States raised up once more a form of group power, of monopoly? Certainly, none could deny the strategic power of unions speaking as sole representatives for workers in basic industries – coal, oil, steel, rubber, power, transportation, and so on. In our interdependent economy an industry-wide strike in any of these becomes, sooner or later, the equivalent of an uncalled general strike, an immediate or creeping paralysis. Nor have the leaders who wield such power manifested the self-restraint in its use that alone can make external restraints unnecessary. It seemed disturbingly easy, moreover, to recount the grave abuses of union power that threatened the general welfare. But when critics moved from scrutinizing the implications of labor's new power to proposals for curbing it, the complexities of establishing restrictions upon group activities without threatening democractic freedoms insistently obtruded themselves. They remained the great uncertainty shadowing the potentialities of the new regulatory legislation as its administration began over unions openly resentful and resistant. They produced the sharp disagreements that contrasted strikingly with the general endorsement of effective collective bargaining.

Organized management and unions, however much they might differ, for instance, upon the specific requirements of legislative regulations, have left no doubt of their common conviction that "any form of compulsory arbitration or 'supermachinery' for disposition of labor disputes may frustrate

rather than foster industrial peace."[1] The old fear that such compulsions would prove to be the entering wedge for a widening government intervention, ultimately and inevitably encompassing wage and price controls, was hardly laid by its avoidance in the enactment of 1947, so manifestly an experiment in social control without clear-cut social consent. Nor are the parties to collective bargaining alone in their distrust of punitive legislation in these areas of industrial relationship, for there was unmistakable significance in the demonstration that even the national unity of wartime had not won for the restrictions in the Smith-Connally Act a record of reducing conflict and preventing work stoppages. Nor has the experience of other democratic countries with antistrike legislation justified optimism for one more trial of it in present-day United States. On the contrary. Experience has seemed to underwrite for the expert observer the conclusion that "only a more or less complete dictatorship can make that policy work"; and to underscore for a democratic government the warning to "be careful not to expose its own impotence."[2]

For the power of organized labor is built upon masses of American working men and women. Their organizations as social institutions, with characteristic traditions and modes of response, certainly become distinct and separate components of the whole problem of "labor monopoly"; the individuals who rise to leadership in unions and the rivalries among them also exercise potent influence; but always the men in the ranks remain basic. Their pressures upon, and

[1] Policy statement of the Labor-Management Advisory Committee of the United States Conciliation Service, December 15, 1946, in the New York *Times,* December 16, 1946, p. 1, column 5. See also Report of the President's Labor-Management Conference on Industrial Relations, November, 1945, pp. 47-49.

[2] Public Policy in Labor Relations, LEISERSON, WILLIAM M., in *Papers and Proceedings of the Fifty-Eighth Annual Meeting of the American Economic Association,* January 24–27, 1946, *American Economic Review,* Vol. XXXVI, No. 2, May, 1946, p. 346.

relationships with, their leaders and their fellows; their loyalties and sentiments within their group organizations; their attitudes toward their jobs and those who direct them in the shops where the day's work is done and paid for; their aspirations and desires as citizens of their home community and their country – these motivate the activities we have now undertaken to regulate. But of them, as motives, we still know little. The labor movement has had a long history in the United States, but its rise to real strength in industry has been swift, short, and late. The highest membership it could boast after the First World War, at a time when the unions of other industrial countries attained their peak numbers, constituted only about one-third of that after the Second World War. Moreover, the decade within which this growth had occurred saw membership rolls register almost a fivefold increase over the depression low. By any method of counting, 15 million men and women, with the members of their families, comprise an impressive cross section of the nation.

Sober contemplation of these individual Americans who are union members, the anonymous miners in the coal towns who down tools at Mr. Lewis's nod, the tumultuous auto workers in urban Detroit who harry their leaders as well as their bosses, the musicians who "like Mr. Petrillo tough," the seamen and longshoremen along the waterfronts who literally blockade the nation when they strike in their own interest, or workers in any of the many varying contexts within which men work together to turn the wheels of the interdependent economy, such a contemplation or appraisal of the people constituting labor's new power by no means implies that legislative reform is either impossible or unnecessary. It suggests only that it can never prove simple.[8]

[8] See, for instance, GREGORY, CHARLES O., *Labor and the Law*, W. W. Norton & Company, Inc., New York, 1946; also SEIDMAN, JOEL, *Union Rights and Union Duties*, Harcourt, Brace and Company, New York, 1943.

For at its best, law constitutes an external and one-dimensional approach in this complex area of social behavior; it corrects abuses, establishes curbs, frames supplemental machinery of adjustment, sets bounds and limits. Law itself does not make a social institution effective from day to day in terms of its own intrinsic methods and objectives. Accordingly, whatever the legislative framework — whatever further revisions we make upon the 1947 revision of the policies established in the 1930's — we shall still need to discover why collective bargaining has not yet begun to work as its proponents anticipated it would and its present-day defenders still claim it can: to promote industrial peace and ordered relationships between management and men. We shall still have to learn, perhaps best from understanding what has been going wrong up to this point, how to make free collective bargaining truly effective — the instrument of a democratic, highly industrialized nation the American people still feel it should be.

This sense of unrealized potential draws support from the characteristic development of collective bargaining in the United States. Joint dealings on their present-day model are relatively new procedures in most of our basic industries. The union's right to exist was recognized by many American employers only during the depression decade before the war; the war then intervened with multiple government controls upon group action and relations in industry. Thereafter — and perhaps inevitably — the first year after the war witnessed the confusion and the frustration of a democratic nation trying to restore an economy free from the wholesale regimentation intrinsic in a global war. The second year saw the change in political direction from which the effort to change also the course of industrial relations took its mandate. And so the road ahead for human relations in industry is still uncertain.

Was it not indeed too much to expect that collective bargaining could escape all this surrounding confusion? At the

very least it seems fair to say that the new pattern of relationships — new in the sense of a national validation and widespread application never before known — has not yet received opportunity for peaceful experimental development. New union leaders, new union members, managements by the thousands who had never before dealt with unions were expected by some sort of automatic adaptation in such a time of upheaval to acquire know-how in one of the most difficult forms of human relations.

For like all social institutions, of course, collective bargaining preeminently and basically involves people. And yet it is also more than the constituent individuals who make it work or break down. The people are always part of the processes and procedures by which this modern industrial institution functions; but the institution in operation consists of people *plus* all the internal and external forces that impinge upon their feelings, beliefs, and aspirations and make them behave as they do in any given shop situation at any given time within any given framework of collective dealings. This may make collective bargaining seem formidably complex and convoluted, a wound-up coil of dynamic forces, reaching from the individual worker and manager to the broadest based social developments and back again, in such closely interacting influence that pressure at any one point makes itself felt at every other. Actually, such a concept of collective bargaining represents precisely the truth of its nature as a species of human behavior. It represents truth, moreover, simply because all forms of human behavior in modern society are thus complex and convoluted.

The gravest threat, indeed, to policy and action in labor relationships lies in oversimplification. It is entirely human for the harassed administrator to hunger for clear-cut formulas that can be applied to the affairs of shop and union to eliminate conflict and promote cooperation. But such formulas as welfare work, employee shareholding, high-wage

policy, majority representation, and, most recently, human relations have come and gone, while conflict persists and cooperation has still to be won. Unless and until we apply ourselves to learning why conflict in industry has proved so much easier to evoke than cooperation, we can hardly launch a promising or sound effort to make collective bargaining work effectively from day to day.

This study represents a small beginning in such learning. From the point of view of collective bargaining as it has been developing during the momentous years since 1935 – when unions secured their first real foothold in many basic industries – it seeks to examine the underlying transition in labor relations essentially as a deep-reaching social change; it seeks to spell out the influence of that change in process upon the daily behavior and feelings of the men and women involved; it seeks to explore ramifications of the evolving structure of joint dealings from the ground up. What happens in shop relationships when men and women are caught up in an organizing campaign? What psychological and social consequences follow upon a union's entry into the shop? When the first agreement is negotiated, does the transition from organizing to negotiating impose any psychosocial problems in addition to the generally recognized economic aspects of drawing up an initial contract? Can the leaders on both sides utilize the unsettlement of the transition to promote the readjustment to new relationships? Why have ferment and upheaval continued in so many shops long after collective dealings have been launched? Can the administrators on both sides do anything to curtail this period of no-man's-land lawlessness, when the old structure of relationships between management and men has been disrupted and the new has not yet been stabilized? How can we understand, and so deal with, illegal walkouts? How can we promote observance of collective contracts? What techniques are available for building a sound structure of joint relationships? What mechanisms of be-

havior come into play when grievances arise, and how are they best dealt with? Why has the introduction of changes in production programs consistently evoked resistance among the men at the bench? How about leadership: in our present-day ferment, what are the full requirements of effective leadership for management on the one side and for union officials on the other? What can the effective administrator do to understand the dynamics of conflict and cooperation among the men he leads, and thus to reduce the conflict and augment the cooperation?

These are some of the questions we must ask ourselves and seek to answer if managements and unions are to make of collective bargaining a socially useful tool for themselves and society, if collective bargaining is to evolve as an appropriate form of human relations in industry.

Chapter II

WHEN THE UNION ENTERS

DESPITE its status as national policy underwritten by both major political parties, collective bargaining remains, we cannot recall too often, unfinished business. Some four-fifths of present union membership represents relatively recent acquisitions; consequently, in many shops and mills, even in many industries, relationships have yet to be stabilized. Moreover, this is all unfinished business of an exceptionally emotional kind. Few indeed are those who can regard the rapid growth of unions with detachment. Trade unionism arouses intense loyalties, bitter antagonisms, and, in many quarters, more and more forms of bewilderment and confusion.

The context of the successive crises within which these developments have occurred has unquestionably intensified the reactions they evoke. The efforts to organize basic industries in a time of prostrating depression brought violence and bloodshed on the old model of no-quarter battle over union recognition and also the startling drama of new-model strategies such as the sit-down strike and the "quickie." Hardly had the most stubborn major opponents of unionism signed their names to the rapidly multiplying agreements for collective bargaining when the nation was engulfed in total war against the Axis. With the return of peace, reconversion was stalled by a succession of shutdowns in essential services and basic industries that seemed to transfer the headlines and sentiments of the foreign war just ended to explosions of internal strife.

Thus the swift growth of collective bargaining under the

aegis of government validation, itself an unsettling social force, occurred during the tensions of exceptional crises of world-wide upheaval and destruction. Little wonder that men reacted with their own specific anxieties and alarms — the workers grasping new instruments of security and advance in a changing world, the public swinging between a sense of concern over the needs of the common man and a sense of mounting perplexity before the implications of the unrestrained group power sponsored in the name of those needs, and the managers of industry seeking apprehensively for ways actually to live with collective bargaining.

Precisely because it is management that must live with organized workers and their representatives from day to day in the shops where goods are produced, the managerial administrators need particularly to understand what these new forces portend in terms of individual behavior and human relations. Watching the early answers to such fundamental questions in the concrete experiences of working with the men at the bench, management could often justify its particular brand of dismay by convincing instances: a union has won recognition; the first agreement has been signed; officials on both sides, ready to bury the hatchet, get set for the restoration of shop order and stable production. Instead, they find themselves forced to cope with persisting ferment and disturbed relations. A union may have won the right to represent the workers by a peaceful election or only after a protracted struggle. The first contract may glow with amity clauses and establish conditions generous by the standards of the industry, or it may bristle with safeguards against invasions of respective rights and prerogatives. No matter. Impatient demands for discipline will soon be heard; baffled efforts will be made to end confusion and to allay suspicions. The varying contexts of unsettlement in the first stage of collective dealings under the agreement merely demonstrate how deep-rooted the problem is.

The problem is also one of basic and many-faceted significance. Its immediately practical implications for management and union are obvious. Whatever their personal sentiments, a steadily increasing number of company executives are ready to predicate labor policy upon recognition that the unions are here to stay. They want to make the joint agreement work just as quickly and constructively as possible. Most union officials similarly accept a responsibility under the contract – both to their members and to management – for contributing to orderly relations and maximum production. Why, then, the friction, the harassment, and the emotional tensions?

Do economic motives suggest the answer? To be sure, collective bargaining has complex economic aspects that merit the expert analysis they have been given. And there is need for more analysis. But economics offers no final clues to this problem of unsettlement. The highest wages and best conditions that can be written into an agreement do not preclude disturbance under it.

Do law and law enforcement hold the answer? Whatever may be said for all the statutes regulating labor relations, from the precursors of the Wagner Act to the Labor-Management Relations Act, no one will claim that they have established order and stability. Although the era since 1932 has been one of unprecedented legislation, the fight goes on.

Something still has been missed. What we have failed to realize is that the entry of a union initiates a profound social change that ultimately transforms the whole shop community.

The Organizing Campaign

The change begins with the organizing campaign. Under current conditions the drive to unionize a shop is psychologically and socially unsettling. For it disrupts a going order of relationships (not necessarily a satisfactory order but still

a going one); it undermines long-established customs; it mobilizes conscious hostilities and brings latent ones to the surface. Behind all this, of course, stands the union's ultimate objective: its promise of another sounder order of relationships. But when the campaign is over, disintegration exists; reintegration is still to be achieved.

Appeals to Emotion. The unsettlement engendered by the organizing campaign arises from its characteristic strategy as evolved through decades of effort to establish collective bargaining. When the organizer approaches the workers of any shop, he concentrates from start to finish upon appeals to emotion. Rational, logical arguments are part of the kit, but an exceedingly minor part. The organizer uses colorful and highly charged phrases for transmitting his message. He fortifies sentiments already inclining workers toward unionism. He neutralizes fears. He overcomes indifference and beats down opposition. He galvanizes positive feelings and transmutes negative feelings into the loyalty that will make workers join up. Whatever the differences in specific tactics, he usually seeks to harness to his cause three powerful human drives: (1) the desire for economic improvement, (2) the craving to belong to the group, and (3) the impulse toward aggression and hostility.

Promises of higher wages, better conditions, and increasing security weigh heavily with workers, as with all people. We underestimate the strength of such promises if we dismiss them as merely economic. Few motives in our society are reinforced by more powerful sentiments or validated by more deeply rooted sanctions than the desires for material rewards.[1] If they bulk large in union organizing propaganda, they are addressed to aspirations pervading our society. At any rate, organizing literature, from the strike circular to the election broadside, invariably lists in one way or another the cash benefits, so to speak, that the workers will gain by join-

[1] *Cf.* Chap. IX, Conflict *and* Cooperation, pp. 225–231.

ing the union. All this comprises the most familiar and most obvious of the union's organizing appeals: the fruits in immediate personal interest to be harvested by signing a membership card.

The second appeal – the appeal to the sense of fellowship, the craving to belong – is seldom credited with the eager responses it evokes in those men who, by the very nature of the industrial process, frequently feel dwarfed, insecure, and isolated. The mass meetings the union convenes, its vivid programs, its slogans, its parades, all draw the individual into warm, exciting contacts with his fellows. He is offered the promise of fraternity as well as greater equality in the workshop. If the organization is already powerful, its spokesmen skillfully inflate the ego of the men by identifying individual membership with the strength of combined thousands. Be it large or small, the union is always equated with the best and most valued traditions of the nation: men should sign up to end dictatorship; they should scornfully reject paternalism; they should join because the union is the democratic way.

The third appeal – revolving around aggression and hostility – transforms the potential of the whole organizing campaign into the motor power of action. The organizers dramatize and make tangible the appeals of economic improvement and group solidarity by personifying whatever stands in the way of these objectives as enemies who must be fought. In this tactic, the unions express not only a deep-seated human propensity but also a venerable American custom. Personifications of abstract issues invariably focus antagonism better than do the issues themselves; among us, as everywhere, they have afforded releases for the free-floating hostility and aggression in men.

The organizer will of course make full use of the actual executives and supervisors in the plant if their past behavior affords substance for the antagonism he is mobilizing. But he

will also evoke hostility by stereotyped images of "the other side." Behind any employer, for instance, the average worker is made to see the so-called "profit maker" who never pays the wages he should, the inhuman corporate "interests" generally, or just the harsh figure of authority. The pickets who paraded before an unorganized shop, dressed as a convict gang dragging their chains after a make-believe policeman, were expressing on their placard in vivid imagery the sense of frustrated dissatisfaction felt by so many workers: "Don't Be Chained to the Machine for Less Money Than You're Worth; Join the ——— Union." Employers who have long prided themselves upon fair dealing with their men only to be shaken by the hostility thus unexpectedly turned toward them, should probably realize that they too have been temporarily assimilated into these hate images or symbols. Similarly, the discontents in the bituminous coal fields, now almost completely unionized but chronically harassed by overdevelopment and competition among thousands of mine owners, are centered by John L. Lewis upon the "steel trust," the house of Morgan, and Wall Street.

So, too, the men who refuse to join the union are tagged with fighting names. Scab is the most venomous. Boss's pet is a recurrent image of suspicious hostility among newly organized workers. "Free rider" expresses contempt for the holdout who presumably will enjoy the gains garnered by labor without sharing the costs of procuring them. Indeed, every term of ill repute by the standards of human association has been directed against the holdout — spy, stooge, traitor, informer, and so on.

The Strike. The activities upon which unions have come to rely for forcing recognition by the employer afford the workers specific outlets for the hostilities and antagonisms thus roused in them. The organizing strike is of course the most dramatic, and frequently through our history it has produced violence and bloodshed. We are close enough to the

many intensive drives launched by the unions in the period following 1933 to know what bitter-end battles these clashes can become. Seldom before that time had the country been rocked on so wide a scale by the turmoil of open industrial conflict. Even the reporting of developments in the mill towns, motor cities, and mining regions used the terminology of warfare, new and old: The familiar picket became part of a "mobile unit." "Motorized columns" dashed from plant to plant. "Massacre" was the term used in Chicago to describe a clash between police officers and marching strikers. Strikes took on revolutionary overtones as the sit-down placed the workers in possession of the plants they were "besieging."

Certainly the sponsors of the legislation culminating in the National Labor Relations Act counted among their objectives precisely the ending of such savage conflict over the issues of recognition. Administrative developments may in time introduce the test for retention of the new rights by the character of their use. But board decisions on such matters have by no means yet established any clear-cut trend. Nor do the amendments of the Labor-Management Relations Act of 1947 include any outlawing of the traditional organizing strike — the strike to unionize the unorganized. The unfolding drive to organize Southern industry may hold new problems of violence and upheaval on the older organizing model. The model may fairly be termed "older" because, from the start, the proponents of the Railway Labor and Wagner Acts unquestionably hoped that the introduction into industry of the democratic processes of majority representation would establish the right to collective bargaining by something better than sheer might. Nor can there be any doubt that the representation election and the membership count do constitute, from the standpoint of the public interest, means of determining such issues that are superior to the organizing strike or other tests by force.

The Representation Election. Yet we cannot safely assume

that the representation election offers an entirely peaceful, unprovocative instrument for establishing a union in a shop. Americans hardly need to be told how much hostility can be stirred by hard-fought political contests. Since the days of Jefferson politics has been full of lusty battles, with no quarter asked or given in the fusillade of hate and abuse discharged against the man currently in the White House, the State House, or the legislative chamber. Moreover, the representation election in industry contains various specific goads to high feeling beyond those generally characteristic of the struggle between ins and outs in political life.

For one thing, the election in industry does not necessarily constitute the exclusive tool for decision. It may, indeed, merely mark the culminating point in a long campaign that has included every weapon in the organizing arsenal. The elections, for instance, at the plants of the Bethlehem Steel Corporation and the pay-roll membership checks at the Republic Steel Corporation that won the union certification merely wrote the formal end to a bitter four-year battle. The consent election at the Jones and Laughlin Steel Corporation in 1937 followed a 36-hour strike. In rubber and automobile manufacturing plants and in other centers of the organizing drives of the 1930's elections terminated or accompanied "warfare" more often than they replaced it.

The representation election in industry, moreover, is not yet embedded in those democratic customs of acceptance and consent that make politics, despite all its antagonisms, a sound psychological release. There may be a question whether it ever can be.

In a political government the men in office accept a tenure definitely revocable at the will of the people; it is the political parties that constitute the continuing institutions. Our ability to "turn the rascals out" is thus a psychological safety valve for pent-up irritations as much as an assurance against arbitrary government. It may be unfair to make the men in

office scapegoats for all the ills that rankle in the sovereign voters, but this is generally accepted as part of the political game. When the voice of the people has spoken, all the antecedent tumult and shouting die — until the next election, when the defeated candidate of the last count may prove the new majority choice.

In industry, however, the union that wins a representation election takes hold with a determination to keep hold. It becomes part of the government in the shop and also a continuing institution. Indeed, the skilled conduct of union affairs quite literally hinges upon secure tenure of office.[2] Thus there is no recognized official opposition, only organization rivals. To each union, the rival union represents a usurper, a raider; and the union in possession, whatever the source of its title, wants clear-cut legal sanction for remaining in possession, undisturbed even by the challenge of an election.

The bitter rivalries that today cut across all union activities indeed exacerbate every inflammatory potentiality of the organizing campaign. The "invasion" of the South by labor organizers had hardly been announced when leaders of the American Federation of Labor and the Congress of Industrial Organizations trained their guns upon each other and upon the plants to which they were preparing to lay siege. Both the organizing strike and the representation election manifestly contain explosive potentialities in such a situation, where the typical appeals of the unions are addressed to men working together in a social and cultural environment of deep-seated group prejudices and where the "agitators" compete among themselves as well as with established industrial authority for recruits and allegiance. In such a context for conflict, rooted hatreds may well add their incendiary potential to the more generalized industrial hostilities.

[2] *Cf.* Chap. VIII, Wanted: Mature Labor Leaders.

The Roots of Hostility. For whether through the dramatic and open warfare of the strike or through the propaganda contests of the membership drive, organizing efforts activate the workers' resentments, hostilities, and aggressions in many different ways. This phenomenon, it must be immediately and emphatically stated, in no way constitutes an innate trait of labor unions; rather it is a characteristic form of social behavior.

By the very nature of things, the union must be the challenger, the party seeking by one means or another to upset a *status quo*. But never is it the union alone that determines the choice of means and thus the character of the organizing campaign. The record affords ample evidence that fighting techniques play such a large role in union organizing, in part at least, because employers have so widely and persistently opposed collective bargaining. Espionage and coercion, court injunctions, yellow-dog contracts, and black lists erected barricades for a long time against the entry of unions. With the validation of the right to organize by law and court decision, the forms of resistance have changed, but opposition still continues. Opponents of unions, moreover, possess their own particular hate images: the labor racketeer and union autocrat evoke hostilities analogous to those stirred by the profiteering employer and the shop dictator.

Briefly, it is the quality of industrial conflict itself, rather than the parties to it or the difference of interest, that gives especial effectiveness to a strategy of hate. Once conflict becomes bitter, hate strategies prove effective because they reach down to basic aspects of human nature and of our American tradition. Students of labor history have long made familiar the undoubted fact that no organizer or agitator can stir workers to union action unless real grievances exist among them. But we must also recognize that however well grounded the shop discontents articulated by the organizing

campaign may be, there will also be stirred up frustrations and aggressions entirely unrelated to issues arising in the employer-employee relationships.

When the union approaches a worker, the platform of demands makes no mention of his home concerns and satisfactions, his ambitions and shortcomings, his neighborhood associations or lack of them, his pleasures or disappointments in friendship and love. Nevertheless, these factors may figure prominently in the ensuing fight. Thus it is that the organizing campaign stirs many discontents beyond those arising in the shop. In this the worker differs not one whit from his supervisors or his employer. The boss himself, who vents his extra-shop frustrations upon his workers, who comes forbidding or explosive to his office after a bad time at home, is a familiar and accepted figure of fact and fiction. So also is the worker who, reversing the process, takes out his job humiliations upon the hides of his wife and children.[3] The hostility stirred against management in an organizing campaign, therefore, often takes on a synthetic quality. It affords the worker safe opportunity to let off steam not only against his foreman or employer but also against an unsatisfactory world in general. By promising to bring the boss to terms, to modify his sovereignty and to exact from him job improvements, the union not only offers the worker things he craves for their own sake but also permits him to battle resented authority wherever he has encountered it.

The strategy of organization, moreover, gives workers release through feelings and behavior sanctioned by our whole history. A worker caught up in the organizing campaign is also a man who from childhood on has been conditioned to discontent as a national virtue. He is expected to make his

[3] Illustrative portrayals of this displacement of negative feelings are vividly presented by JAMES JOYCE in his story "Counterparts" in the collection titled *Dubliners* and by WILLIAM DEAN HOWELLS in *The Rise of Silas Lapham,* Chap. XIV.

way, to get ahead, to show ambition, to better his lot and that of his dependents. To the extent that he is impatient with his progress, he remains smolderingly aggressive. The union mobilizes these disappointments and directs the aggressions toward the company or industry that it is trying to organize.

Group Appeals. It is important to realize that the organizing campaign is directed to the community and group, not only to the individual. And for the group, as for the individual, the campaign constitutes from the start an emotional, a psychological, and a social experience; its aim is to weaken whatever bonds may already exist with management and to establish new ones with the entering union.

The union aims its propaganda from the start at average, basically normal workers. These are the men, rather than just the chronic "soreheads," who get all stirred up. These workers, moreover, can be reached best through natural groups playing an important role in shop affairs even before the union enters. The union's very search for local leaders to help in the organizing effort constitutes tacit recognition of the importance of group ties prior to and beyond those of union affiliation. Thus the typical worker at whom organizing tactics are aimed is sought out not primarily as an individual but through the normal ties of interest and association.

As a large cross section of our people, the workers of course have their proportion of maladjusted, even neurotic, individuals. Shop fights may affect such maladjusted individuals markedly, may even bring them to leadership. But the union certainly does not seek such leaders; instead, it avoids them whenever possible. For the difficult personality, the "screwball," has too often presented union as well as management with the most intractable of problems.

The man whom the good organizer seeks first to win to the union cause is the one who already is looked up to by his fellow workers – the leader of a group. During the organiz-

ing campaigns of the 1930's, for instance, the men who had risen to leadership in the company unions that spread so widely in industry during the period of NIRA were often the spearheads of the drive for the labor unions under the Wagner Act.

Similarly, the skillful organizer seeks to adapt to various types of shop association the tactics best suited to each of them. Labor organizations have long been conscious of the ethnic group. They print circulars, ballots, and other union literature in as many foreign languages as may be required. They seek out the spokesman for each of the little colonies of transplanted Poland, Italy, or French Canada to be found in many works. They may send as an organizer to each of these foreign groups a fellow countryman. In our dynamic America, this policy can lead a conscientious union official into unexpected difficulties: after dispatching a Polish-speaking organizer to a steel mill town in which the working forces long had been dominated by Poles, a union executive was startled by a vigorous protest from the younger workers. They warned headquarters indignantly to remember they were not foreigners and would listen only to men who could "talk American" to them. For such young workers who like to talk American, ". . . a good Hallowe'en dance with a hot orchestra may be a better organizing device than months of speeches and reams of circulars — particularly if there is a company-union rival which is also holding a Hallowe'en party."[4] For the age group naturally constitutes a specific form of association, requiring specific types of appeal. So, too, women may not respond to organizing devices that enroll men; and varying ranks of skill may require varying approaches.

Even shop factions created by specific disputes may be utilized as proving ground for new leaders in the organizing

[4] SEIDMAN, JOEL, *The Needle Trades,* Vol. 1, *Labor in Twentieth Century America,* p. 241, Rinehart & Company, Inc., New York, 1942.

struggle. One CIO official, for instance, pressed for his weaver members a proposal to rotate shifts, in a mill where his union held a sharply contested mandate. In the bitter fight that followed, he cultivated astutely the leader of the opposition. When the struggle was over, the weave room was all CIO, and the former nonunion spokesman for the opposition became shop steward and close associate of the union officer.

Group ties within the community also are made to serve the cause of organization. If workers are church members, the sympathy of their pastor is sought. Fraternal clubs have proved fruitful avenues of approach. The union message is carried into the homes to enlist the support of wife and family. It is transmitted through every prestige channel of local public opinion that can be linked to the union cause. Meetings are addressed whenever possible by men who enjoy community respect — ministers, academic men, public officials, "big names" friendly to labor. Press publicity receives careful and assiduous attention. Local counsel may be hired to assist union staffs in legal defense. The nature of the community of course affects this phase of union tactics; the small mill town dominated by the plant involved, the unfriendly community that has attracted a runaway shop, the industrial city, the large metropolis — each requires and usually receives its special type of membership drive.

Thus from start to finish the organizing campaign seeks to win over the group as well as the individual to the union cause. Old loyalties are weakened and at times even destroyed. New loyalties are forged, the loyalties to the union.

Chapter III

NEGOTIATING THE FIRST AGREEMENT

THE ORGANIZING campaign is over. The shop community has been jolted out of its former equilibrium; relationships have been severly disturbed; strong emotional currents, mostly negative, have been let loose. What happens next?

Negotiations begin. The objective is to draft a contract satisfactory to both management and union, through which they will achieve an orderly administration of daily affairs. But often only disappointment and dismay are the end results. The negotiators may even share vividly the wide realization that the first collective agreement marks indeed a turning point in shop relations. At the National Labor-Management Conference convened by President Truman in November, 1945, for instance, the conferees recognized that initial collective agreements merit differentiation from existing contracts. "The difficult approach of labor and management to negotiation of first agreements" received therefore acute consideration, and six rules were listed as proved aids in an orderly initial negotiation that promised to make intervention by third parties an unlikely last resort. Useful as such rules may well prove, however, those who compiled them seemed also to have assumed, as do the negotiators generally themselves, that the signing of an agreement would somehow work the magic of transmuting the tense hostilities generated by the struggle over unionization into the mutual confidence required for shop cooperation. They failed even to reckon with the profound change in human activity and attitudes projected by the advance from organizing to negotiating.

Organizing, let us recall, represents an activity directed dominantly toward the emotions and involving the whole working force. Negotiation, in contrast, is preeminently a logical and technical process, representing a leadership activity carried forward by a small number of spokesmen for both sides in the privacy of the conference room. Top executives usually speak for management, since the issues to be decided affect production costs and the entire functioning of the company. The union generally is represented by a negotiating committee, which may include officials of local and national headquarters. The agenda to which these negotiators address themselves consist of formal categories of relationship: the type of union recognition; wages, hours, and shop conditions; seniority rules; grievance procedures; conditions surrounding hiring and discharge; and so on through the varying detail of trade union agreements. In discussion of those matters, the approved decorum of the conference room calls for a controlled rationality, a business-like orderliness. Presumably, as conference begins, the noise and the hubbub of the organizing campaign end; the fighting teams retire to the sidelines.

This approved or expected behavior, however, may not be realized at all. Intense feelings stirred by the organizing campaign do not subside merely because the rational proceedings of negotiation have opened. Even the negotiators themselves, if they have been deeply involved in the preceding struggle, do not become immediately logical and cool simply because they are now engaged in a coolly logical operation. The rank and file, just because their representatives are framing a formal document, certainly do not turn off the emotions kindled in them; instead, these varied and powerful emotions continue to heat the atmosphere within which the negotiators must confer. The intensity of such residual hostilities will vary directly with the duration and bitterness of the struggle generating them, but in some de-

gree they exist in every shop when a union has won recognition. They are supplemented, moreover, by anxious anticipations of things to come.

Surviving Hostilities and Anxious Anticipations. The fears and uncertainties that arise in connection with the changes in relations just ahead exert an influence hardly less potent than the hostilities and aggressions stirred by the struggle just over. These anxious anticipations are unsettling among the ranks of both management and labor.

Representing management, foremen and lower supervisory officials must now generally prepare to supervise workers who will be backed by a powerful organization of which their superiors seem highly conscious. Insofar as they must assume new responsibilities under the pending grievance procedures, they feel uncertain how best to conduct themselves in order to maintain shop authority and simultaneously to meet the requirements of shop representation. They feel themselves tensely the harassed "men in the middle", under pressures from their superiors above, and their subordinates below.

Nor are emotional tensions confined to the lower ranks of management. To top executives the entry of an outside union is generally a change imposed rather than welcomed – imposed by law or by defeat in conflict. Recognition is extended, therefore, with attitudes ranging from resignation and reluctance to continuing resistance. The undesired break with the familiar past generates fears that vary according to the degree of distaste for the new evolving pattern. These fears become important influences upon future relationships because they condition the spirit of negotiating and, later, of administering the new contract.

The union negotiators may, and generally do, possess their own particular anxieties. They are victors in a contest from which they too may have carried over the enmities of sheer fighting, especially if the struggle has been long and hard.

They are also victors upon whose head the crown of victory still rests uneasily. The all-important job of consolidation lies ahead. Their newly enrolled members expect tangible gains. They remain on guard against managements that have fended off unionization until no other recourse was available. Rival unions seem to be holding their fire for further attack at any weakness or concession. And in our troubled era some external stresses, be they postwar dislocations, general economic uncertainties, new legislative developments, looming technological changes, or whatever, are almost sure to shadow each step taken by a union that is just gaining foothold in a newly organized shop or industry.

When negotiations get under way, therefore, the most precisely logical concern for contractual niceties may merely cloak continuing hostilities and fears. The conference room may become an arena for a fight that has not really ended; the negotiators remain contestants. Picket lines and propaganda broadsides have given way to a tussle between professional teams. The aim of gaining entry or keeping the union out changes only its form as the parties struggle to prevent encroachments upon respective rights or to erect bulwarks for uncertain strength.

Manifestly, such negotiation cannot initiate the needed conversion of the hostile sentiments stirred by the organizing campaign to a general disposition for shop peace. It may not, indeed, even produce a contract without outside help; the negotiators may have to call in a third party as mediator. And even when a contract does emerge, no matter how, not peace but an uneasy armistice will follow. Always, those responsible for its administration will feel forced to maintain a state of preparedness against the recurrent flare-up of unresolved conflict through stoppages, slowdowns, and other symptoms of unsettlement.

Attention to Particulars, Not Principles. Yet a very different course for developing joint relations can be opened by a

different kind of negotiation. For the fact is that the negotiating process can and should be utilized positively as a social and psychological device for actually beginning to liquidate rather than merely continuing the hostilities brought to the surface during the organizing campaign. As soon as the negotiators recognize explicitly that negotiation thus offers alternative courses, they remain aware from the moment conference opens that not only the formal terms but also the fundamental quality of their evolving relations must now be determined.

The existence of alternatives always imposes a heavy responsibility upon those who make the choice. But in framing a first agreement the leaders of union and management can be assisted in making the right choice by the very content of the immediate job to be done. They have met to draw up the detailed terms of a collective agreement. Accordingly, they should address themselves at once, undeviatingly and exclusively, to those matter-of-fact details.

Whenever a negotiator even scents a principle approaching these important initial deliberations from the inner recesses of his own philosophy of what labor relations ought to be, he should smother it in an assiduous, concentrated discussion of particulars – particular wage rates, conditions of seniority, mechanisms of grievance procedure, possible forms of union recognition, or whatever the contract provision then before the parties may be. For principles once more mobilize emotions. Men feel deeply and strongly about the principle of incentive earnings, for example, in a way they never do about the actual adequacy or inadequacy of a specific piece rate. Once differences between the parties are articulated as clashing principles, settlement can come only as one side or the other gives way; there can be no comfortable compromise.

The Background of Experience. Needless to say, even valid

differences over the detail of particular contract terms can generate intense heat, for traditional prerogatives *are* being modified. But when the sparks begin to fly, the negotiators once again can find safeguards in the concreteness of the job they are doing. Today they do not have to start from the beginning. They have available a considerable body of experience regarding each of the provisions they are incorporating into their own agreement. Such established practices at least indicate what has already been safely done in various forms elsewhere.

Grievance procedure, for instance, can take one of a number of forms, but the choice is limited. Although more formal elaboration may be required in large companies than in small, the appeal machinery seldom exceeds five steps. As the first step, a company may wish to establish for its employees the right to take up complaints directly with their foremen; the union may prefer to have this first step proceed through the stewards. At each level comparable issues may have to be settled, up to the final step of arbitration.

Similarly, considerable discussion of provisions governing seniority may be necessary. In one company, seniority on a divisional or departmental basis may recommend itself; in another, on a plant-wide basis; in still another, on an interplant basis. The respective weight to be assigned to ability and length of service as measures of claim to a job, the extent of probationary period, if any, that shall precede the acquisition of seniority rights, the conditions under which these rights may be retained, frozen, or cumulated constitute legitimate issues between management and union and also among various groups and individuals within the union itself. Yet for seniority, as for union status, vacations, dismissals, leaves, job classification, wage systems, and all the rest of the possible provisions, debate will center upon a limited number of possibilities. Indeed, useful compendiums of existing vari-

ants of the clauses constituting the typical content of collective agreements have been made available and are kept up to date by periodic revision.[1]

In a word, there now exists what we may call a range of practices growing out of experience, from which both the basic content and the specific terms of collective agreement ultimately take their particular forms. In addition to these general practices, moreover, each industry tends to have its own customs. In the railroads the elaborately detailed document is typical. In the men's clothing industry the contract establishes merely a basic structure within which relationships in the individual shop develop their characteristic adjustments. The United Steelworkers Union prides itself upon its flexible standard contract. And so on for other industries.

The experience from which this range of typical practice stems also grows continuously. New demands and new methods appear; company techniques of negotiating evolve and change quite as much as do union demands. Since the war there has been an interest in provisions for company security to balance union security and a trend toward having company negotiators present their own demands instead of confining themselves to countering union demands. These developments furnish only the most recent illustrations of how dynamic and expanding the experience still is upon which the custom and law of collective dealings in the United States now draw in order to crystallize their range of typical practices. At any rate, this range presents the parties to a first con-

[1] For example, The Bureau of National Affairs, the National Industrial Conference Board, and the United States Department of Labor have made comparative studies of collective contract clauses. In 1941, under the title *Collective Bargaining Contracts,* the Bureau of National Affairs published a useful compendium, classifying some 2,000 different clauses of agreements; a study, made by Abraham A. Desser for the National Industrial Conference Board, analyzed 212 contracts in force in 1945.

tract, however uncertain and tense their approach to the new relationships, with a "safety code" for testing the demands made upon them by the men on the other side of the bargaining table.

None of this implies, however, that the path of the negotiators who are animated by the purpose of liquidating hostilities can be made smooth and easy. By outward signs their conference may seem little different from the one that merely masks continuing hostilities. Among them, too, voices may rise; sessions may adjourn in anger; and at times it may look as if the breaking point had been reached. But the inner quality of the two brands of excitement will be vastly different. In the one case, it is the excitement of irreconcilable conflict. Whether the parties be trigger-tempered or suavely but stubbornly legalistic, the underlying structure of relationships has yet to be settled. As in the organizing stage, victory or defeat continues the aim. In the other case, the purpose to agree now lies behind the effervescence of difference; accommodation and compromise become the aim in settling the terms upon which the new collective structure of relations is to be built. Accordingly, when the entry of the union really has been accepted, the negotiators need find no eruption in the conference room too alarming. They realize they are meeting essentially as peacemakers, and peacemakers do not break off relations because of differences regarding the terms of peace. They know they are not only bringing a conflict to an end; they are also — and far more significantly — ushering in a new era of relationships.

Participation by Foremen and Workers. But in industry, as in international affairs, we have now learned that the termination of hostilities, although it must always precede lasting peace, never automatically assures its construction. Thus, the negotiators, however adept their methods or however forward-looking their attitudes, cannot themselves create the new order of relationships. The pact they write can lay sound

technical and organizational foundations. But because a functioning peace must embrace the whole shop community, it cannot begin until the ranks of fighters have also laid down their arms. They too must be made to *feel* peaceful and collaborative.

Yet as conferences proceed, the erstwhile fighters remain outside the conference room. And in that inescapable fact lies the clue to what must come next. Obviously, the actual conferees cannot afford to forget that those outside continue to be emotionally involved in all that is transpiring inside. Their emotions must be reckoned with. And because these emotions, whether of foremen or workers, are dominantly the negative ones engendered by conflict and change – fears, uncertainties, aggressions, resentments, and so on – they must be converted or transmuted into the positive sentiments favorable to successful joint relations. This basic process of conversion should begin for them, as for the official conferees, during the stage of negotiating. Only by participation in the tasks of framing the new agreement can they acquire a conviction of their stake in its success.

As far as management is concerned, it should not prove too difficult to include supervisory officials in the fundamental activities of framing the new agreement. Already some companies hold special meetings with their supervisors before negotiations begin, to get their judgment upon the probable issues of the conference room. If regular foremen meetings are part of general company practices, such issues certainly can be placed upon their agenda when negotiations are about to start.

The supervisors may or may not conceive the changes projected by the contract as a defeat inflicted on them by their men. But the terms under negotiation do represent change in the shop position of the supervisors, who, like all men, are uneasy and fearful before such changes. Again like all men,

they fear a change that they help to fashion far less than one simply imposed upon them.

In the case of the union, however, rank-and-file participation in negotiation meets the basic dilemma of specialized skills versus popular agency in performing public business. Certainly, good negotiation demands experience and skill of a high order, qualities that become part of the equipment of seasoned union officials. The authority of such officials to arrive at final decisions in the conference room, moreover, increases their effectiveness against the men on the other side of the table. It is a familiar fact that management representatives often protest impatiently to a union's spokesman during negotiations, "You never can make a final commitment on anything until your members approve."[2] The lumbering and cumbersome character of devices for obtaining popular consent in union activity, as in all democratic activities, no doubt impedes the centralized expedition desirable in negotiating. Nevertheless, some unions have found it both possible and politic to include members in the proceedings that eventually produce a contract governing work affairs. They convene meetings to receive reports on the progress of negotiations, and they submit agreements for ratification by the members they will cover.

Such procedures merit acceptance by both sides as essential instruments of the transition to collective relations. They are sound psychologically as well as democratically. The very process of participation serves to cool off hostile sentiments and to channel them into the practical workaday problems of relationship. The discussion of such problems, in

[2] Of course management also cannot always bring powers of final decision to the conference table. In a major oil company, for instance, negotiations of a first contract were recurrently held up by the necessity of referring certain decisions from the Texas refinery to New York headquarters for approval.

turn, satisfies the craving for status and security. Indeed, the entire achievement of actually negotiating a contract gives tangible expression to the victory that the union men feel they have won by the organizing campaign just ended. As the first fruit of victory, the contract justifies the fight and assuages its emotions. But if there has been no participation, if the leaders alone do all the negotiating, the rank and file may go on fighting, as they so often do, precisely because they do not share this sense of actively harvesting victory.

Throughout the shop covered by the new agreement, therefore, participation in framing its provisions appears to be a necessary factor in preparing an atmosphere favorable to its acceptance as new shop law.

Launching the Agreement

Sooner or later negotiation, too, thus comes to a close. The contract has been written. On what can the contracting parties count to make the new code work, to start it operating smoothly and effectively? How, in a word, must it actually be introduced into the shop as the new shop law it is designed to be?

This poses a distinct problem for the leaders on both sides, one that naturally follows negotiation but is separate from it. Introducing the new agreement constitutes the third step in the transition begun by the organizing campaign. For even when everything possible has been done in the stage of negotiation to liquidate organizing hostilities and to create a favorable atmosphere for the joint activities that now become daily shop facts, it still remains necessary to convey the sober realization that these activities are actually ushering in a new way of shop life. The new agreement now must be *felt* as more than the pact of peace terminating hostilities and as more than the fruits of victory for one side or the other. Victory must be tempered by the challenging perception that the agreement contains the elements for building

the new relationships of shop peace because it sets up amicable and cooperative procedures for resolving differences and advancing the common interests of both sides.

This highly important third stage in relations, however, has hardly been recognized, as yet, as an integral step in transition, to say nothing of its being developed into the vivid development in shop affairs it must be made. Instead, after signing on the dotted lines of the agreement in the conference room, the parties proceed to set up its formal machinery in the shop. The machinery does not seem to work as the written rules declare it should. At the best there ensues the confusion, at the worst, the disorderly ferment, to which we have had to return repeatedly in this analysis as the most revealing feature of initial joint dealings. And at this point still one more source of such unsettlement emerges: the agreement has not been tangibly launched. For the men it covers, it has not been vitalized as a constructive new social structure to be jointly built. Instead, the foremen are likely to see in it a threat, or a mere annoyance, while for the workers it looms a chance for "showing the boss" or raking in gains.

Thus, to launch the agreement imposes two tasks upon mangagement and union leaders; one technical, the other emotional.

The Technical Launching. Company officers and union leaders must explain exactly what the agreement means to those who will be charged with its administration on the job. In detail, and clause by clause, they must show foremen and stewards particularly how the written words are to be translated into daily shop facts and activities. This aspect of launching the agreement may be called its technical launching, and it is encouraging to note what good beginnings are now being made in this field. We can only applaud the appearance of training projects for foremen and stewards in the performance of their duties under collective agreements, the preparation of stewards' manuals, the inclusion of problems

of joint dealings in foremen conferences, the joint meetings of shop foremen and stewards, held by some companies and also by some unions, and all similar programs directed toward imparting know-how in the thorny problems of human relations under new agreements.

It is important to emphasize that these programs must be thorough. The good steward's manual will contain all the material pertaining to shop issues from wage rates and the application of the agreement to social security detail and tax withholding on which his members may ask him questions. The successful training projects will be similarly exhaustive. Thus, one company takes two weeks of daily sessions to go over a new contract, clause by clause.[3] Both foremen and shop stewards are present. Questions and discussions are encouraged, while the company and union officials in attendance furnish the answers. The danger of varying interpretations of the same clause by one side or the other is obviously reduced to a minimum by such a program, which, by its very nature, also ministers to the conviction that the agreement belongs to the men who will work under it.

The Emotional Launching. The technical launching concerns preeminently the logical, formal content of the agreement as it must be applied by those holding positions of leadership in its daily administration. Unquestionably, the conduct of foremen and stewards in situations rising from the new agreement will affect the attitudes of the rank and file toward it. But a more direct means of launching the agreement tangibly for the rank and file also appears desirable. With this we arrive at the second need – the need to launch the new agreement emotionally, to launch it in a manner that will evoke the sentiments of cooperation and

[3] Though such conferences play a crucial role in launching a first contract, they obviously have their uses for all new versions or contract revisions as well.

mutuality required for its administration, just as the tactics of organizing stir up sentiments of conflict and aggression.

From this point of view the leaders must communicate not only the facts of the agreement but also feeling tones – an atmosphere of burying the hatchet, of smoking the pipe of peace. We may use these phrases descriptive of ceremonies for terminating conflict, because such *ceremonies,* appropriate to the occasion, the shop, and its people, seem to be the solution to this problem in industry. Among us, as among all people, ceremonial and ritual have long proved themselves vehicles of emotional communication. The need for them at this crucial point in shop transition is so clear, and the promise they hold gives such hope of reward, that it seems eminently worth while to experiment with them.

Neither their need nor their promise, however, should blind us to their difficulty. Clearly, in a democratic nation like our own, industry can only benefit by devising ceremonial channels for emotional communication; in this we should hardly leave the field completely to the totalitarian nations. The accomplishments of American industry, the high standards it assures the American people in a poverty-stricken world, certainly appear, in themselves, to be likely "celebration points" for intergroup commemoration. Needless to say, we have not yet begun even to canvass possibilities in this field, and one of the aims throughout this discussion will be to investigate each potential area for sharing the emotional satisfactions of modern work under joint dealings in American industry.

Yet continuous caution in such an approach also is required. The social arrangements under which we have developed the marvelous technical productivity of American industry have made, as we shall see, competitive striving and the resulting conflict so thoroughly the overriding motivations in work and work relations that it is never easy to evoke

cooperative sentiments. Ceremonially burying the hatchet seems particularly difficult after a union has secured entry into a hitherto unorganized shop. Seldom are relationships more negatively charged by hostilities, fears, and resentments. Obviously, to be effective, shop ceremonials cannot appear in the slightest degree forced or "phony." Unless the parties can plan a ritualized launching of their new agreement that will ring true to their situation and their mutually evolving sentiments, they had better forego the experiment. Yet, to repeat, under propitious conditions, experiment would seem of first importance.

That the problem, at any rate, does not lie beyond the ingenuity of management and unions is suggested by the program worked out by the officials of the Commonwealth Edison Company of Chicago and the leaders of Local Union 1361 of the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers. Their agreement to cover employees of the Super Power Department, the first formal contract ever entered into by the company with an affiliated union representing any of its employees, was signed in the union hall before a meeting of members specially called to witness the launching of the new constitution.[4] The very fact that the company executives and negotiating committeemen came to the union hall, the workers' hall, was significant of the sincerity of the management. There, on the union platform, company executives signed for the utility, local union officers for the union. The company's local representatives on the negotiating committee and the local union's negotiators were present and were introduced; and so were members of other locals of the union in Chicago and a number of other representatives of management. The spokesmen of management, led by the vice president in charge of operation, made short addresses after the public signing of the agreement, pledging support for success through wholehearted observation of its terms.

[4] *I.B.E.W.–Edison News*, Vol. 1, No. 4 (April, 1944), pp. 1–2.

In other words, what might have been a prosaic affixing of signatures in an office was turned into a constitutional convention, so to speak, with the electors participating in the solemn act of ratification. In another company, refreshments were served – in fact, two barrels of beer were consumed – following the explanation and interpretation of the agreement at a joint meeting of foremen, union officials, shop stewards, and employees. In still another, the manager who had just concluded a first agreement arranged for a convivial party in celebration – again not only for the conferees, as has become usual in some industries, but for the whole working force.

An agreement thus launched marks a real, almost tangible turning point in the profound social transition begun by the union's organizing campaign. An old order of shop relations has given way. The shop code that will underlie the new order has been formulated. But the men who wrote and ratified that new code have been made to realize vividly and concretely that the agreement in which it is embodied does not itself constitute a sound order of collective relations ready made. They will not approach it now as a prefabricated house, an edifice merely to be assembled in the shop out of terms of relationship manufactured in the conference room. Instead they will see it for what it challengingly is – an institutional framework within which the new shop order may rise from channels of joint activity; an evolving social structure itself, to be created by the efforts of men working together under its terms not only to resolve amicably such differences as may arise but also to cooperate in advancing the common interest of the whole shop community.[5]

[5] For an interesting account of a joint effort to make a purposive transition in relationships, see *The Society for Applied Anthropology, From Conflict to Cooperation, Applied Anthropology,* Vol. 5, No. 4, Fall, 1946.

PART II

Administering the Agreement

Chapter IV

BUILDING JOINT RELATIONSHIPS

WITHIN the new institutional framework potential in the first agreement the administrators of management and union begin the collective dealings that bring them together from day to day. If any single objective could be said to animate all of them in the normal shop situation, it would be that of securing observance of the new law they have just framed. Observance of joint agreements, indeed, constitutes today a prime national objective, widely held and persistently sought by management, union, government, and public. And little wonder. Some 15 million employees, or almost half of all engaged in private industry, are now working under union agreements. The effort to extend the number continues unremittingly. The swift growth of so many new organizations, rooting as they do in basic industries during a time of world-wide upheaval and unsettlement, has made the wildcat strike a vexingly familiar problem. The quest for company security and the effort to penalize breach of contract distill in succinct phrases the insistent demand for "observance."

How, then, is that observance to be secured? By authority? By imposing penalties for violations? By disciplining the men who breach this clause or that? Or by constructing relationships which in themselves so foster compliance that it becomes normal, habitual, customary behavior?

Building New Relationships

Manifestly, whatever choice the administrators make from among these varying alternatives, they choose a form of rela-

tionship. The recourse to authority as an instrument of enforcement implies a specific type of relation between those who will give the orders and those who will take them – or else. The order takers may persistently refuse to obey the mandates from above, be they enunciated by management or by union authority; or they may only now and then kick over the traces. Disciplinary measures must then be applied, again entailing a character of relationship between the disciplinarian and the disciplined. Those measures, the penalties for violation, may be written into the agreement itself, or, more formidably, into statutory law. In the latter case the intervention of government inevitably will change further the nature of evolving relationships, whether between management and union, management and men, or union and members.

The choice of means by which observance will be sought, in a word, is a choice of the most critical consequence. Few indeed are the administrators on either side who, if the choices were clearly open to them, would not seek the relationships which "in themselves so foster compliance that it becomes normal, habitual, customary behavior." Yet seldom do the probabilities, the potentialities of development present themselves in any such sharply defined guises. True, when a union organizes a given shop, it inevitably upsets the going order of relationships and disrupts the old way of dealing together. Some kind of new relationships must now be built. But many hostilities and anxieties, let us recall, have been stirred on both sides. Even if everything that can be done to liquidate these negative emotions, has been done during the processes of negotiating and launching the agreement, the transition under way must bring its measure of ferment and unsettlement. The men who must turn out goods want prompt restoration of order. Discipline, vigorous enforcement, and clear-cut penalties for violations appear as

the quickly efficacious recourse. To construct the relations that actually engender compliance seems a far more lengthy and laborious process.

Yet such a point of view oversimplifies the social complexities of the transition under way in the shop and overlooks our advancing insight into the dynamics of relationships. Generally, those stable collective dealings within which compliance has become customary represent in American industry today the slow accumulation of years of joint experience under long-established union agreements. The institutional framework may be embodied in the highly legalistic documents characteristic of the railroads or in the flexibly simple agreements of the needle trades. Under each, joint relationships have developed that have made observance normal shop behavior. Yet we need no longer conclude that only time and slow experience can construct such relationships. Instead, the establishment of *purposive* relationships to achieve defined objectives has been receiving ever-increasing attention. The problems of means and methods are invariably formidable. For even when only two individuals are involved, be they parent and child, doctor and patient, counselor and student, the effort to construct such relationships faces the uncertain complexities of human interaction.

How much more complex and uncertain the problem in the shop when administration of a union agreement begins! For here a whole network of relationships is to be modified and refashioned. Nor do the modifications broach a problem that the administrators of union and management can take up or leave as they will. Instead, they pose the very first order of business during the early stages of collective bargaining. Everything that precedes the moment when the agreement actually begins to operate is prologue. At that moment the major task presents itself, the job of constructing the new joint relationships.

For union relationships do not build themselves by an automatic metamorphosis of preunion relationships. They are built, and built well or poorly, by what men do or leave undone as they apply the clauses of the agreement to their mutual concerns in the shop. Building them well yields more than just good relationships; it yields a prime tool of administration. The question before the administrators on both sides is really whether they will undertake this crucial task consciously, with full knowledge of what they are actually doing and all it involves, or unconsciously, as by-product of very different and diverse concerns.

Hitherto, it must be said, construction of joint relationships has proceeded in the latter fashion, incidentally as it were, through the agency of men seemingly preoccupied with quite other matters.[1] Management generally has sought to restore order, to regain as much of the familiar *status quo* as possible so that its representatives might get on with the central job of production. It has tried to keep the union men at arm's length, demanded that union leaders enforce discipline, or attempted "appeasement" in an effort to demonstrate acceptance of the new order. For their part, union leaders have sought to calm down the new members with their seemingly insatiable demands, or to limit their own appearance on the newly organized local scene to occasions of trouble and disturbance. Yet every policy, every action, the manner of recourse to every new procedure, inevitably makes its contribution toward determining the quality of the joint relations in process of construction. Why, then, should not these same administrators realize purposively from the start that they *are* building new relations and then direct their daily activities toward shaping them in the mold of the objectives toward which they aim? If customary compliance and shop mutuality are the goals, what do these objectives involve in

[1] *Cf.* also Chap. IX, under The Union Leader and the Local Shop Community, pp. 244–247.

terms of consciously constructing the relationships that will engender them?

It is important from the outset to remain vividly aware of the all-inclusive nature of the administrative setup within which joint relationships must thus be consciously molded. Not only every foreman and every steward, not only every worker and every union agent but also every official – even if he does not deal directly with labor, unions, or production – must be affected by what is happening in the shop; and by his attitude and actions he, in turn, will influence the course of events. That the general manager, the production superintendent, the personnel and labor relations executive must be vitally involved is self-evident. But too often the involvement is conceived as stopping with them. The truth is that there is not a comptroller or treasurer, not a purchasing agent or methods engineer, not a chief accountant or transportation head who will not find himself, with his staff, sooner or later compelled somehow to recast accustomed ways of work. The quality of his adjustment, in turn, will permeate the whole structure of relationships and help determine the simultaneous readjustment other men are making. As in any social transition, no one in the changing shop community can remain untouched or stand apart. Along the several levels of administrative leadership on both sides men *must* relate one to the other as they function in new roles – foremen and stewards, supervisors and business agents, company executives and top union officials; each level of leaders must similarly tie in with those above and below in the leadership hierarchy; and finally all the leaders must relate themselves in new ways to the working force, who now, it must be remembered, are also union members.

Pivots of the New Relationships

As soon as we frame the task of administration in such human terms, its focus inevitably becomes the individual

shop. Regardless of the area of collective bargaining, be it industry wide, company wide, regional, or local, it is always the men working together in each plant who must live with the results of the bargain. The most broad-based agreement, no matter how wide a territory it covers, takes on the flesh and blood of daily conduct only within the specific social context of a particular shop.

Even if the same union and the same company are signatories, this context will differ from plant to plant and, indeed, from department to department. If the plant is large and the agreement rigorously legalistic, the men who must live with it and frame their conduct, one with the other, by its highly formalized clauses still will determine the spirit of enforcement and, thus, the quality of underlying relationships. If the plant is small and the agreement is a flexible, simply generalized definition of joint dealings, the men who work together in the face-to-face familiarity of a small-scale shop may feel no need for strict constructions of the written word. But whatever the surrounding frame of collective action, always the men involved will be distinct personalities, each bringing his own sentiments, adaptability, emotions, and background to the new relations. It is, to make one example typify the whole, foreman Adams who must deal with steward Jackson in one plant, as compared with foreman Murphy and steward Rosetto in another.

And within each shop, the foremen and stewards, unique though they are as individuals, become, as administrators of the agreement, the pivots of the whole structure of relationships upon which effective administration must ultimately rest. They are the officials who live in close association day in and day out with the men to and for whom the agreement must be applied. They are the officials through whom the whole machinery of adjustment is set in motion when men bring complaints regarding enforcement of any contract provision. They are the officials through whom company execu-

tives and union officials must maintain continuing contacts with the actual problems arising from daily administration.

Training Foremen and Stewards

The strategic position of these job representatives need hardly be elaborated. Yet too often in the past, and perhaps too often still today, they have been left to their own resources. With the rapid extension of union agreements, however, this policy of drift (or is it simply lack of policy?) has begun to give way. An increasing amount of thought is being given to means of training foremen and stewards for the effective performance of their new duties.

The sound launching of a new agreement, as we have seen,[2] requires the participation of these shop representatives in formulating its terms. Its actual administration also profits from the training programs by which the representatives are increasingly drilled in the terms of the contract they must apply.[3] For clearly, the oft-repeated injunction to "know your agreement" requires continuing implementation. Its meaning is not static; it cannot be learned once and for all before administration begins. Instead, it grows steadily with growing shop experience through concrete cases arising under specific clauses. Each case, the shop representatives are taught, will have its own unique features; it must, of course, be settled on its own merits. Action taken in com-

[2] *Cf.* Chap. III, Negotiating The First Agreement, pp. 36–38.

[3] Among the best manuals, which are paraphrased here and in the balance of this section, are the United States Department of Labor, Division of Labor Standards, *Bulletin* 66, 1944, "The Foreman's Guide to Labor Relations," pp. 12–21; *Bulletin* 60, 1943, "Settling Plant Grievances," pp. 30-39; *Manual of Instruction for TWUA Shop Stewards in the Plants of the American Viscose Corporation,* pp. 11–13, published by the Educational Department and Viscose Council, Textile Workers Union of America, CIO, prepared with the cooperation of the Division of Labor Standards of the United States Department of Labor, May, 1944.

parable disputes is therefore best studied to obtain not rigid precedents but useful reference points for handling current differences of the same type. The practice of incorporating such interpretations in successive editions of manuals or continuously through loose-leaf addenda and of reviewing them in conferences thus contributes to the cumulative know-how in collective dealings. With every complaint they handle or dispute they adjust, foremen and stewards experience the new shop relations in actual evolution.

Similarly, credit must be given to the developing practice of making articulate what may be called the "good form" of joint relations. To know how to handle oneself in accordance with the good form appropriate to any social situation invariably increases the individual's sense of security and thus his effectiveness. Each group has its own standards of square dealing and correct deportment. Everyone is expected to play the game — whether in school, athletic competition, profession, or business — by its unwritten as well as its written rules. In this sense, collective bargaining, too, is developing a code of correct behavior that cannot very well be incorporated into a formal document.

By its mandates each foreman and steward should strive to see the other fellow's point of view, even while defending the interests of those he represents. He should give the other fellow a chance to save face rather than brag about victories over him. A positive rather than a defensive approach averts the danger of yielding an advantage to the other side by losing one's temper, or carrying a chip on one's shoulder. Likewise, differences are narrowed by a businesslike manner that avoids personalities and sticks to the issues. No good job representative goes over the head of his coordinate on the other side of the conference table. He maintains at the same time a united front on his own side. When he must disagree with his colleagues, he asks for a recess so that the position to be taken can be worked out within the group. He is always

prompt in taking up grievances that have been presented to him and never makes empty threats or offers of sheer horse-trading.

For relations with worker-members, similarly simple guideposts have been set down. It is good human relations, for instance, to let every man have his say and to listen sympathetically as he says it. Interest in the worker as a human being, rather than merely a number on the pay roll or membership list, belongs to effective leadership. Necessary criticism must be given in a way that will not offend individual dignity. Praise, when merited, adds zest to work. Foremen and stewards should watch for sources of potential dissatisfactions and talk them over together in an effort to avert their crystallization into formal disputes. And so on.

Contrasting Changes in Status of Foremen and Stewards

It is in no sense to depreciate the importance of what is being done in this area to suggest that such training – if that is the right word – cannot furnish a complete answer to the basic problems of consciously, purposively changing relationships. For the men to whom the training is given cannot make the rules and guides for daily conduct an integral part of their habits of working together unless they are emotionally ready to accept the new relationships to which all this instruction is directed. We cannot count on an automatic acceptance of these relationships; indeed, we should count on exactly the opposite. For the foremen and stewards themselves must now adapt to emotionally charged changes in their own customary shop roles – changes inducing emotions which, in sharply contrasting ways, block their adjustment to the demands of constructive administration.

Before the union entered, the foreman already held a position of leadership in the shop. His early reactions to his new duties under the agreement are inevitably dominated by emotions and sentiments that cluster about his established

leadership. He remains foreman, of course, but the status of his position, he fears, has deteriorated. His authority is being diminished. Whatever loyalties he believed his men formerly gave him now seem to be shifting to union leaders. He is often uncertain even of what his own loyalty to management demands of him. If his superiors previously opposed union organization, he cannot feel sure how much in the agreement represents a reluctant surrender on their part to the force of law or union strength. Are they hoping for a break that will sooner or later lead to the elimination of the union? At any rate, he himself feels stranded in the no man's land of changing relations, caught between the management for which he still speaks and the organization speaking for his men. Certainly, almost everything he may henceforth do or want to do appears subject to new challenge and review from no one else but from his own employees! He really now has two sets of bosses: his superiors, who hand down policies for him to carry out, and his subordinates, who can exercise a veto on his execution of those policies. Under all these pressures, as experience in shop after shop testifies, foremen easily become confused, defensive, resistant, and combative.

In almost exact antithesis, the steward, formerly a rank-and-file worker, is suddenly endowed with new powers. He is now elevated to a leadership position; his status in the shop has markedly risen. As an employee he remains a subordinate of the foreman, but in his union office he becomes coordinate with him. What is more, the foreman has been and remains an appointee of management; however popular he may be, his authority over his men is still an imposed one. But the steward is elected by the men. He is a chosen leader; his authority derives completely from the men he represents. New and unaccustomed power goes to some men's heads, especially when, as in the steward's case, a strong organization that has just won a victory in the shop stands behind those exercising that power. Other men, however, even if

they are of leadership caliber, show themselves reluctant to assume the new responsibilities of so touchy a position. When the attitudes of company officials, on the one hand, and of union members, on the other, are still so uncertain, such men may hesitate to jeopardize their own established relationships. At any rate, unions over and over again find it extremely difficult to persuade men of promise and capacity to run for the "thankless" (a revealing word) office of shop steward.

Reorientation of Foremen and Stewards

Obviously, then, the task of preparing foremen and stewards for the strategic functions they must discharge in administering the agreement cannot be framed only in terms of what they must *know*. It must reckon also with what they themselves *feel*. Here is a challenging problem for management and union, far more difficult than compiling and conveying informative material. For when it comes to action, emotions are far more stubborn than the most logical facts. Precisely for this reason acquisition of knowledge does not necessarily produce desired action; indeed, what is often called "lip service" to a new policy may upon closer examination prove to be intellectual assent without emotional conviction. Or to put it in a telling folk phrase, one's heart is not in it.

All this underwrites the inescapable conclusion that training for foremen and stewards must include attention to more than the content of the agreement and to more than rules for its administration. It must include also attention to the men themselves. It cannot concentrate exclusively on what they must do; it must consider also what must be done for them. Primarily, they must be helped to work through the negative feelings rising from their changing roles and status in the leadership hierarchy of the shop community. The foreman must be given reassurance regarding the modifications of his

established leadership. The steward must be persuaded to temper his newly acquired powers of leadership at the very time that he must also learn to use them.

Perhaps "training" is not the right word for such an expanded program. For in these matters of emotional readjustment no easy set of lessons can be made available. Instead, the administrator must fit action to the individuals, the groups, and the situations in each shop. Each foreman and each steward must be dealt with as an individual personality in a concrete situation. Foremen and shop stewards, just like workers, are people. They also bring to their posts, as workers do to their jobs, personality traits crystallized out of unique life histories; their behavior is affected also by current associations in the family and in the community outside as well as inside the factory gates. Similarly, the situations within which readjustment must be made vary from place to place and time to time. The foreman or steward who is generally flexible and mature will readjust to the changes in his role more easily than a rigid, insecure person. But even the flexible, mature individual will find adjustment more difficult if the union has won recognition by a harsh, protracted struggle, and less difficult if by a short-term organizing campaign culminating in a representation election. Whatever the situation, the individual response of job leaders, as of all men, will vary with their individual personalities, while the same foreman or the same steward will adjust variously in different kinds of shop situations.

As soon as company and union officials grasp fully the fact that the foreman and shop stewards themselves, as well as their duties, thus enter into the total problem of administration, they can see immediately why conventional training courses will not provide the complete answer. In such courses, manifestly, only the duties are explored – what the adequate performance of those duties asks of the men who assume them. But to stop there is actually to place upon the

lowest ranks of leadership the major responsibility for constructing the whole network of relationships both sides seek – the relationships that will foster observance of the agreement. This is too much to ask of them, especially during the transitional period when they themselves are fearful or headstrong or uncertain in their new positions.

Continuing Guidance in New Roles

Only a continuing, stand-by, and guidance relationship with their bosses will prove adequate to help foremen and stewards overcome the emotional blocks arising from their changing roles. Each foreman and each steward must be made to feel entirely free to talk over with his superior not merely the actual situations he must handle from day to day but even any general doubts that may be bothering him. Such an ever-present opportunity to get things off one's chest has been used increasingly in recent years as a method of affording help to disturbed or troubled individuals.

Manifestly, the relationship existing between foreman and higher management and that between steward and superior union executives must influence the character of aid that can be furnished through such talks. These will not be the therapy interviews of case work or counseling; they will not be the fact-finding interviews of placement offices nor yet the high-pressure interviews designed to persuade the interviewee to follow courses that run counter to his own judgment of the shop situation. Yet all interviews employed to help the interviewed overcome anxieties and relieve tensions possess many features in common; they belong to the clinical, professionalized approach to human problems.

Thus the shop or union superior will learn to listen sympathetically to his foreman or steward, as the case may be. The shop resentative, in turn, will find the security to talk freely in an atmosphere of acceptance that stems from the shared objective of promoting shop cooperation under the new

agreement and from a common understanding that problems and difficulties must be jointly overcome in that task. Men naturally have intense feelings in new situations and difficulties, and the sheer knowledge that such feelings are accepted as normal by the higher-ups who pass judgment upon shop performance serves to ease the resulting tensions. Above all, however, it will never be any single interviews, or even interviewing as such, which will yield the most relief to foremen and stewards in the new difficulties they face. That relief will be furnished by the continuing relationship itself, the knowledge that the superior in the hierarchy of authority stands by as a source of guidance, support, and understanding in a job to be done by all concerned in it.[4]

In the case of the foreman, the conviction of personal understanding thus created compensates for the quite different, but shaken, conviction regarding his status under the agreement. For this willingness to take time with him individually about his own situation underwrites in action what otherwise remains merely fine words. The foreman emerges as the key man for management he has so often heard he is; his superior's active support does "butter some parsnips." As he thus works through his negative feelings concerning his new duties, he becomes ready for the interpretation that portrays these duties not as a diminution of his established authority but as a new way of exercising it. It is now authority with consent and participation. It calls for far greater skills. But

[4] Several sound expositions of the dynamics of interviewing are available for consultation by the executive. Perhaps the best discussions for his purposes are ROGERS, CARL R., *Counseling and Psychotherapy,* pp. 93-102, Houghton Mifflin Company, Boston, 1942; ROETHLISBERGER, FRITZ J., and WILLIAM J. DICKSON, *Management and the Worker,* pp. 270-291, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1939; HAMILTON, GORDON, *Theory and Practice of Social Case Work,* Columbia University Press, New York, 1940; GARRETT, ANNETTE, *Interviewing: Its Principles and Methods,* Family Welfare Association of America, New York, 1942.

the results obtained by such leadership are ultimately also far greater.

Much of this kind of interpretation can be conveyed through discussion of actual shop situations that perplex the foreman. Naturally, some issues arising under the agreement from day to day prove more complex and difficult than others. Yet failure in any produces uneasiness, as success increases confidence. The foreman accordingly should be made to feel he can quite properly seek aid from superiors whenever he needs it. Beyond the actual help to be given to him, the larger objective remains always to construct the meaningful interpersonal relationship which in itself generates a renewed sense of security.

Conference procedures should supplement this individual approach. But once again emphasis is placed upon emotional reorientation rather than upon didactic instruction. Conferences offer a vivid method for exchanging significant experiences, for obtaining from coordinates, as well as superiors, an evaluation of the way one is handling himself in difficult situations common to all. But the prime aim of top officials is to create a team spirit through these group-work procedures. For the team supports and sustains the individual, and it is just such support that the foreman, uncertain and insecure about his status, now needs.

A parallel task confronts the union in the case of the stewards. The union, too, must utilize individual-guidance relationships and conference procedures. But the content and the accent will be quite distinct, simply because the union's problems of local leadership are so different from those of management. For the union, obviously, is creating a new form of shop leadership, while management modifies an existing one. Indeed, the union's problems of administering the contract begins even before its individual stewards are named.

Although the steward comes to his new office as a rank-

and-file worker, in all probability he has already achieved some special record that sets him above his fellows. He may have played an especially active part in the organizing campaign, or he may have held unofficial leadership before organizing began – perhaps as an ethnic spokesman, a skilled craftsman, a reliable friend in need, a good fellow, a forceful personality. Often he will be outstanding for both reasons, since the union enlists these unofficial shop leaders as widely as it can in the organizing campaign.[5] Thus the background struggle for recognition exercises continuing influence upon actual administration, in that it furnishes the major recommendation for leadership to new union members in choosing their stewards.

Union officials frequently recognize the problem thus created for them: the need to supersede as soon as possible the militant with the administrative type of local leadership – in other words, to replace the belligerence rising from the organizing struggle with the collaboration implicit in the agreement. But in canvassing the methods by which this change may be achieved, union officials oversimplify the problem. They tend to place the burden of responsibility upon the employer. Management, they say, gets the kind of local union leaders it deserves. Aggressive tactics are the answer to a grudging observance by management of the agreement it has just signed. But once joint dealings are accepted in good faith, local union leaders will respond gradually by equally fair and cooperative dealings.

Let us give full weight to the logic of the union position. Certainly, opposition to unionism in the United States has kept the organizing conflict a bitter one until very recent years. A harsh struggle for recognition in each individual shop does place a premium upon hostility and aggression. Management attitudes under the agreement do determine worker response to an important degree. But as trade unions

[5] *Cf.* Chap. II, When The Union Enters, pp. 23–25.

spread and mature, they themselves discover that all their militant stewards do not make a spontaneous adjustment with the growing acceptance of collective bargaining. Some quiet down and some do not.

Early militancy proves itself more than situational – more, that is, than a product solely of the transitional situation in which administration of an agreement grows out of a fight for recognition. It also proves itself deeply personal in certain cases. Again, the ungrateful character of the position may tend to propel the so-called "militant" into leadership. But the vivid slang expression describing a man as willing to "stick his neck out" may point to an individual avid for new power, to one passionately devoted to the union cause, to another generally forthright and free-spoken, to a left-wing party liner, or to any number of still other kinds of "militant" fellows.

Thus there is no single, uniform type of militancy in local leaders to be replaced by a single, uniform type of cooperation. Instead, there are many gradations of personality traits aligning specific individuals in a specific shop along the range of behavior that is marked by unregenerate belligerence at one extreme and stable cooperativeness at the other. Only through working with the stewards as individuals, therefore, can union officials discover those who are emotionally unreconstructible militants and those who may be led into the new era of cooperation.

The objective of the continuing guidance relationship that union officials establish with their individual stewards is to bring about precisely the emotional readjustment implicit in this conversion to good administrative leadership. The steward learns that militancy is not the only way of representing astutely and manfully the interests of his rank and file. He is also made aware that he must preserve the prestige of the foreman. In these terms his job seems for a while to exert two opposite pulls. Like most men exercising new powers, the

steward derives satisfaction from their use. But even as he learns to use them, he must learn also to temper them.

To promote this regulation of the use of power, the interviews that become part of the continuing guidance relationship between representatives and their superiors prove once more an effective instrument of transition. The individual steward, like the foreman, is encouraged to talk out not only troublesome situations but also his feelings about his new job. The adaptable steward achieves growing insight through such a relationship with his superior in the union. Similarly, and again as in the case of the foremen, the stewards also may be directed through conference procedures toward developing a team spirit. But as soon as possible the more sober-minded and stable of the stewards should be made the core of the team. The approval of union officials is manifestly accorded to them; their experiences in daily administration are played up to show that militancy no longer furnishes the best approach for getting desired results; the stamp of group endorsement is placed upon their performance.

Changing the Workers' Attitudes

Yet no work with the stewards alone can assure the development of good administrators at the job level. Work must also be done with the rank and file to adjust their emotions and attitudes to the continuing demands of the new relationships.[6] Although every leadership situation is essentially a relationship, a relationship between leaders and followers, it would be hard to find one more characteristically so than that involving the steward. Like any other elected official, the steward speaks for his electorate and serves their interests. His leadership, however, is part-time, unpaid work; as a fellow worker, he knows and usually shares the sentiments of his electorate far more intimately and consistently

[6] See Chap. VIII, Wanted: Mature Labor Leaders, pp. 199–205.

than do his superiors. Indeed, the transmission of these sentiments to higher officials constitutes an important part of his job. Unquestionably, however, these very close associations with the members also subject the steward to the most direct kind of pressures from those who want action on specific demands and from all who crave fulfillment of vaguer expectations.

The expectations of new union members, no matter how much they vary in degree with differences in shop conditions, always constitute a source of potential disturbance in the administration of union agreements. The hopes aroused during organizing campaigns usually exceed any possibilities of full realization. In this, of course, unions are not unique; the chicken in every pot, the car in every garage, are typical electioneering. But peculiar influences tend to inflate promises in union electioneering. The continuing opposition to unionism in many industrial areas sharpens the fight for recognition and so tends to exaggerate all its appeals. Interunion rivalries precipitate a competition in promising "pie in the sky" in return for affiliation in the shop. Finally, the social sanctions we accord to discontent, together with the frustrations so close to the wellsprings of motivation in all of us, set free many long-unsatisfied urges in newly organized workers. Accordingly, when the sober terms of agreement have finally been formulated, the gains for employees, however real, may still fall short of the expectations aroused. Most of them do.

Obviously, then, to construct relationships that will engender compliance, the members, too, must be brought into an accepting attitude toward the realities of the union agreement. In all fairness, this part of the job must be undertaken by officials representing the union administration rather than by the local shop steward. For the steward possesses as yet neither the independence nor the knowledge, neither the

skill nor the prestige adequate for tempering these expectations that also constitute pressures upon him for militant action.

Various forms of conferences – now formal, now informal; now with smaller, now with larger groups – appear to be the vehicle for the continuing close attention required from higher officials in this whole area of steward-member relationships. Little reliance can be placed on merely mechanical devices, such as the widening practice of distributing copies of the agreement among employees. Most agreements are still phrased in highly technical and involved terms, and few men try to decipher the formalities of overlegalistic terminology. Even if contracts were reduced to vivid, simple language, desirable as that would be, the greater part of the job would still remain to be done. An understanding of the living content of agreements comes only from the experience of living with them. That is why continuing conferences, through which seasoned officials discuss the whys and wherefores of administrative action, are indispensable for the membership as well as for the stewards.

Such conferences, once again, must be regarded not as a means for conveying information and instruction – that is taken for granted – but primarily as a means of building meaningful relationships. Instead of walking off the scene once an agreement has been signed, leaving its administration wholly to the steward and reappearing only when trouble has arisen or discipline must be applied, union officials signify through these meetings a continuing concern with membership sentiment and feeling. Union members, like all men, respond to such active proof that they matter as individuals and as a group.

To the degree, moreover, that the members come to accept orderly adjustment under the agreement as preferable to belligerence, the union officials obtain the only final control possible over the inconvertibly militant steward. For a mem-

bership both intellectually and emotionally convinced that cooperation is a better form of relationship than conflict will tend to choose stable, well-poised men to represent them; eventually they will refuse to renew the mandates of the militants who cannot make the desired readjustment.

Joint Union-management Action

Only, then, by such painstaking work with stewards and members on the part of union officials and with foremen and other supervisors on the part of company officials can the sound relationships that foster observance of the agreement be constructed. But, as so often happens, we violate the organic interdependence characteristic of the whole network of relationships when we attempt to reduce it to constituent elements. Each side may take action to build effective leadership among its own local representatives, but such action can never achieve results that are completely independent of what the other side is doing, or not doing, toward the same end. A union that conditions its stewards, for instance, to recognize the job status of the foreman and to safeguard his prestige makes it easier for management to reassure the foreman about his position under the agreement. Similarly, a management that evokes sympathetic understanding in the foremen of the steward's strategic but often thankless job makes it easier for the union to convince its steward that power can be safely tempered. Even more, management and union together create the atmosphere that fosters the development of the type of administration they both desire. Within such an atmosphere each side can also make direct contribution toward creating effective local leadership on the other side.

Consider, for instance, the broad union objective of moving from the militant to the administrative type of leadership. Obviously, management can help strengthen the position of the more promising, fair-minded steward with his members

by trying whenever possible to give him something to take back to them. Local union leaders speak gratefully of such executives. Thus, when the vice-president of an electrical manufacturing company was retiring, a local union official paid him this tribute: "What made him really remarkable," he said in effect "was the way he'd never turn us down flat. The disputes that reached his office were naturally the tougher ones we couldn't settle in the shop. He'd look over every one as we brought it and say about even the toughest, 'Well, I don't know, but leave it with me and I'll see what I can do.' And he did – and never sent us back empty-handed if he could possibly avoid it."

Indeed, the intangibles of attitudes in management-union conferences always exercise a very palpable influence. The unfailing willingness of management to give every demand at least consideration evokes positive sentiments for the evolving relationships. By the same token, peremptory rejection stimulates negatively charged response. Accordingly, even when nothing but "no" can be said, the manner of saying it should be carefully weighed. Yet no matter how savory the sauce in which they are served, too many noes will undermine the position of the steward who must transmit them to his members. If this suggests a means for strengthening the collaborative representative, we cannot merely reverse the prescription to weaken the militant. To a belligerent steward, persistent refusals become a gage to battle. Indeed, there are no short cuts for dealing with the militants, especially in the early stages of joint relations. Usually the best policy is to wait out their incumbency, while handling each case they bring strictly on its merits, carefully but rigorously.

The union may make comparable contributions in helping to develop local supervisory leadership. Just as it pays dividends in sound relationships for management to recognize the steward's job as typically a thankless one and to help

build up his prestige and effectiveness, so it will profit the union to appreciate the difficulties of the foreman's position. The persisting effort to form foremen's unions in our basic industries is one dramatic symptom of their quest for greater security and surer status.[7] Just as management may strengthen the collaborative steward, accordingly, the union should counsel restraint in confronting the fair-minded foreman, simply because he is fair-minded, with demands so incessant or so extreme that he must turn many down. In dealings with the resentful, sullen foreman, the union must be willing to give management the same opportunity to reorient him that it asks for the militant steward.

Management and union officials naturally will find acceptance of such courses easier if they each also see the other side undertaking at once to train and guide its respective job representatives – and, in the case of the union, training the membership too.

Ceremonials to Stimulate Loyalties

Manifestly, to attain its strongest hold, this whole developing structure of relationships should rest upon the warm and deep loyalties of all involved in it. But such loyalties, too, are a matter of feeling rather than of logic. However much management may be persuaded intellectually that the unions are here to stay, or the workers, that they have a stake in cooperation with management, neither side thereby acquires automatically a strong and positive attachment for the evolving patterns of joint dealing. Loyalties are still given dominantly, if not exclusively, to the company or to the union. The new loyalties to the common cause growing out of the agreement remain to be evoked and developed. As in

[7] See Northrup, Herbert R., The Foreman's Association of America, *Harvard Business Review*, Vol. XXIII, No. 2 (winter, 1945), and Roethlisberger, Fritz J., The Foreman: Master and Victim of Double Talk, *Ibid*, No. 3 (spring, 1945).

all human relations, ceremony and ritual offer one way of stimulating such loyalties.

Social and community activities of various kinds may be explored as appropriate ceremonies for this purpose. But a difficulty in so utilizing them arises from the fact that they themselves have been enveloped by the historic conflict between industry and unions. Before the 1930's, when organized labor was weak, recreational and social programs in the shop were suspect as welfare work aimed at keeping the unions out. Nowadays, with the rapid growth of unions, some of them seem to have developed a comparable welfare work of their own, directed toward building loyalties to themselves. Educational courses, dances, outings, rallies, and contests are conducted by various unions as an important part of their year-round programs. It need hardly be said that any group may exploit social activities for its own legitimate purposes. But there is great loss if they are used solely to build exclusive loyalties in an area where the groups involved also pursue common objectives. From time immemorial, these modes of human expression, above all others, have carried the potential for making the sentiments of good will and fellowship vivid and pervasive. They should be used, far more than they have even yet been thought of, as instruments for kindling the cooperative feelings that are such essential components in the new network of relationships arising in the shop.

Here and there one begins to hear reports of the kind of thing that might be done. One local union, for instance, had been planning a library for its members. When the library was to be formally opened and dedicated, the union director invited the president and other executives of the company to participate in the ceremonies. In outlining the program at a union meeting he received some sharp criticism for crossing class lines. But after the event and the company president's understanding talk, to say nothing of his donation of several

volumes to the library, criticism gave way to general and warm satisfaction.

Beyond these experiments in satisfying wider human needs within industry itself, workers and management have yet to explore the cementing forces of their common American citizenship. Thus at any point where common purposes are naturally felt by men as citizens of the community, as well as workers and managers in a plant — be it launching a ship, helping to put over a community fund drive, or promoting civic improvements — opportunities offer themselves for building meaningful relationships. Beginnings have already been made in utilizing these extraindustrial sources for communal integration. Labor's representatives sit on the board of community chests and their constitutent social agencies. Labor manifests participating interest in housing programs, in educational administration, in medical facilities, in counseling services — in all the rich multiformity of voluntary group effort in American life.

No development promises a richer harvest not only for labor but for the communal welfare; labor's leaders might well give increasing attention and assign participating personnel to such endeavors. They offer a medium of social integration more rewarding than any other practical activity engaging the American people. The conflict of group interests dominates too much of American democracy; yet more than most people we have also developed those voluntary agencies and programs dedicated toward building better, finer communities for all our citizens. From them we might well exclude the patterns of conflict. Indeed, these agencies have been undergoing the progressive democratization characteristic of our whole society; labor not only has been demanding a share in their management but has been welcomed as part of their direction. Here its leaders may explore the potentialities of collaborative relationships so focal to the sound development not only of democracy generally but

of organized industry specifically. Men who work together and develop mutual understanding and respect on communal agency boards inevitably carry this closer relationship back into their joint concerns in the shop.

Attitudes of Top Leaders

Manifestly, all these measures for building new relationships place major responsibility upon the top officials of union and management – the men who formulate basic policy. Unless they themselves are firmly convinced that this is the effective way to secure observance of their agreement, the whole effort is doomed from the start. They must themselves achieve the reorientation they try to communicate down and across the lines of the whole network.

It is not a prescription easily filled. For the characteristic attitudes that management executives and union officials bring to a new agreement are embedded in a tissue of conflicting beliefs concerning what shop relationships are and of judgments on what they ought to be. Since these beliefs and valuations are not logically acquired and tested, as is the engineering knowledge applied to production, they cannot be revised by the usual scientific procedures. Instead, they are absorbed within each group as principles and held by the individual as truth beyond argument. Company executives saw their shop before the union entered, as a web of identical interests binding management and man; union officials visualized that same shop as a tangle of different interests within which workers were caught helplessly because they possessed less bargaining strength. Union and executives must then discover how these apparently clashing beliefs can be fused to yield joint action under the agreement.

It is precisely as such a fusion that the trade-union agreement takes on significance greater than the sum total of its particular terms. For essentially it embodies formal recognition both of difference and of mutuality. Major differences

as they exist at the given time have been reviewed during negotiation and settled. Wage schedules have been fixed, hours set, seniority rules formulated, bargaining representatives named and their status defined, and so on through the list of issues separating management and men. The very title "agreement" points the essence of what the parties have done. They *have agreed* upon the conditions under which they will work together for a defined period. At its end they will review the contract and agree upon further revisions to be made. If conditions change even during the term of the contract, provision usually is included for negotiating necessary adjustments. Finally, the possibility of disagreement regarding interpretation of this agreed-upon shop law has similarly been foreseen, and grievance machinery for orderly settlement has been established.

That differences exist is accepted as a fact. But the very manner of settling differences becomes a phase of shop mutuality.

Even more important, smooth adjustment of differences can be accomplished only through continuing cooperative relationships. But cooperative relations are human relations; they extend beyond any single focus of shop action. Hence, the establishment of sound relationships in the early stages of collective dealings becomes of paramount importance precisely because cooperation, well worked out and firmly grounded, extends beyond the terms of any one agreement and beyond any contractual period. Renewal of the agreement may then prove an orderly procedure rooted in mutual understanding rather than one more knockdown, drag-out fight. Every procedure and activity characteristic of joint dealings under a collective agreement bears the impress of the underlying relationships existing between management and union men. For it is these relationships that become the continuing factor in administering the contract. Since they are also a highly dynamic factor, they are affected in their

turn by every joint action under every joint procedure undertaken from day to day. Indeed, it is the central thesis of this whole discussion, as we shall see, that sound joint relationships serve as both the instrument and the product of the conduct of joint shop affairs – of handling grievances, revising terms of agreement, introducing change into the shop, reducing conflict, and promoting cooperation.

The demands this makes of top leaders seem self-evident. Clearly, each side must translate into daily dealings the necessary modifications of its own traditional approaches. It may appear that union officials have recognized the requirements of mutuality in their frequent insistence upon a spirit of mutual confidence and trust as essential to good administration of an agreement. Management executives may appear similarly to have adapted their former concept of mutuality to the changing shop order by their insistence that the agreement defines obligations as well as rights. But on closer scrutiny each of these prescriptions is found to embody a directive to the other side on how to promote cooperativeness. In each case, to be sure, the directive is aimed at frequent sins of omission. But it is always easier to be against sin as we see it in others than to determine just what true virtue demands in terms of redirecting our own behavior.

It is just such redirection for themselves that management and union officials must work out. Management will not abandon its former allegiance to mutuality if it no longer resents and rejects the expression of difference; henceforth such difference, too, is accepted as part of the game. The union, for its part, similarly must accept in terms of action, as well as profession, the fact that the agreement for its duration places major emphasis on collaboration in the shop. Thus the leaders on both sides, having met in the middle ground of difference plus mutuality, will find themselves able to communicate to their subordinates both the factual

information and the feeling tones necessary for building the new relationship.

A Democratic Relationship — or "Cracking Down"?

There can be no question that the creation of such relationships as this whole discussion has described imposes a difficult, time-consuming task. Obviously, these are more than two-way relationships. They are circular, binding members and stewards, stewards and foremen, local leaders and top officials, top officials and members, individuals and groups, each with the other and all with each one. They bind through ties of emotion as well as by terms of agreement. It is only when placed against the background of such a relationship that formal training courses can really take root. Only within such a relationship can the precepts for foremen and stewards included in those courses become in time shop folkways, organizational mores, which the men involved "obey" because they have absorbed them as the customary way of behaving in their dealings with each other.

Admittedly, to accomplish all this does require arduous, exacting effort. But what alternatives are available? We are thus brought back inevitably to the problem with which this analysis began. When a union enters, some kind of new relationship has to be built. In terms of achieving observance of the new agreement there are basically only two possibilities — the kind of relationship that preeminently engenders observance and the kind that preeminently imposes it. We shall have observance through the participation and consent characteristic of a democratic relationship, or we shall have observance imposed by authority, by "cracking down," by a power relationship.

Unfortunately, cracking down still often seems the easier recourse, especially amid all the complexities of so surcharged an area of human relations. But cracking down also

consumes time and exacts costs — and without anything much to show for them in final results. This much has been demonstrated again and again by the profound unsettlement that evokes the urgent calls for discipline and the pleas for time and patience during the early stages of collective bargaining. The wastes of illegal stoppages, slowdowns, individual resistances, and symptomatic disturbances of many other kinds are not easily ended by fiat. And yet in shop after shop, administrators continue to ponder penalties for this infraction or that, measures to curtail walkouts, threats of discharge, and eventually even revocation of union charters and the replacement of elected officials by trustees. Protests then rise against new forms of dictatorship — union dictatorship. The relationship that began in an attack against alleged management dictatorship has thus run full circle.

In promising contrast are the relationships that themselves promote observance. Ever-changing conditions will present themselves in either case; but only in the latter will adjustment generally be part of normal, spontaneous behavior. For the new relationships will have been patterned into habitual, customary ways of dealing together. This is not to say, of course, that friction will completely disappear; there is no human relationship, not even in the family, the closest known to man, from which such an ideal harmony can be expected.[8] But good relationships are those that furnish their own normal lubricants for overcoming the effects of friction. The whole structure does not break down at every large problem; the enforcement officers must not always rush in with demands for obedience — or else! And when some stubborn insubordinate can be brought to terms only by discipline, his own group either imposes penalties or approves those imposed.

[8] *Cf.* Chap. IX, Conflict *and* Cooperation.

Chapter V

HANDLING SHOP GRIEVANCES

ONLY for purposes of analysis, of course, can we separate the conscious construction of joint relationships from the stream of daily activity in the shop under a union agreement. The representatives of union and management do not take time out, as it were, from the actual tasks of administering the new agreement to build the new structure of relationships that must replace the old order of working together. Even when they have become aware that relationships serve also as continuing tools of administration, as the primary means through which observance of the agreement is eventually to be secured, they realize also that the desired relationships emerge from concrete dealings and activities. The new element they add remains only continuous awareness that the mode and character of such dealings together shape the relationships that in turn affect the nature of future dealings.

In this, of course, shop experience represents nothing unique. The physician who instills relationships of confidence and warm affect in the patient to help treatment achieves those desired relations through the processes of actual treatment. Just so, the counselor, however conscious of the need to structure a relationship with the client that will serve the purposes of counseling, accomplishes that structuring in the course of the interviews through which insight into the individual's problems are sought. And so on in every activity in which individuals and groups must relate one to the other within a frame of activity in which they are jointly interested and involved.

Thus, if the representatives of union and management are to focus upon constructing cooperative relationships, they will do so as they operate concretely from day to day under the joint agreement. Since the agreement has established a new shop law, its operation will bring union and management representatives together primarily when questions of infraction are raised. Shop law, like "law and order," generally evokes no concern when it is operating smoothly. Only when the parties whose interests it adjusts and regulates differ over interpretation or enforcement, does the system of control become a problem in administration. Quite justly, then, it has often been said that the heart of the union agreement lies in its grievance procedures.

That the complaint or grievance thus becomes the fulcrum of joint administration needs imply no alarming emphasis on differences and disputes. Actually, management and workers alike stand to gain from the operation of a "communications system"[1] that brings difficulties at the bench to the attention of the office. Everyone profits when sore spots are found before disaffection festers and spreads. Workers derive security from the knowledge that the agreement not only defines their civil rights in the plant but also provides the machinery for protecting them. Management similarly welcomes the assurance implicit in the existence of orderly means for composing differences that otherwise might interrupt production.

Grievance Procedures — the Heart of Shop Relationships

Even so, experience testifies abundantly that the best *formal* machinery of adjustment does not necessarily guarantee the achievement of these mutual objectives and the establishment of shop order. Here again, something beyond

[1] Golden, Clinton S., and Harold J. Ruttenberg, *The Dynamics of Industrial Democracy*, pp. 103–109, Harper & Brothers, New York, 1942.

the agreement seems to play a determining role. Here again, that something proves the underlying structure of relationships. We must, indeed, conceive of adjustment procedures not only as the heart of the union agreement but as the very heart of shop relationships.

The distinction is crucial. Grievances are inextricably interwoven not only with objective shop conditions but with the whole texture of subjective shop relationships. The effectiveness of grievance machinery must be evaluated, therefore, not by reference to contractual clauses alone but in terms of all that preceded their introduction and of all that conditions their continuing application. The adjustment of disputes even under a model industry-wide agreement thereby becomes unique in quality and character within each particular plant of the industry concerned, just like everything else pertaining to the agreement's administration – and for precisely the same reasons. It will be unique because the factors determining relationships differ from plant to plant in the personalities of people and leaders, in the background of collective dealings, in the traditions of company and union, in community sentiments, and so on.

Shop Relationships Not Static but Dynamic. The grievance and its adjustment must be assimilated, then, into the basic concept that makes relationships the dynamics of shop administration. From the moment a union begins to organize, throughout the whole transition to collective dealings and into the period of continuing joint administration, the relationships existing between management, union, and men hold the key to collective problems and processes.

But – and this is the basic point to be remembered – however soundly grounded they may be, *relationships can never be conceived as a static creation.* They cannot be regarded at any time as something finished once and for all – complete, final, and unchanging in form. Instead, sheerly because

they are relationships, they remain fluid, evolving, continuously affected by changes in any of the variable constituents that at any time determine their quality.

This fact was clearly demonstrated in one shop with a long record of good relationships when management and union were jolted by a series of ugly shop disputes, accompanied by insubordination and other symptoms of breakdown. Workers took things into their own hands without invoking the grievance machinery. A recent promotion had elevated to the position of foreman a worker unpopular with some of his fellows. Originally a member of a radical faction in the local union, he became as foreman something of a martinet. The sparks that flew at the benches reflected this new source of friction in relationships. Management had failed to appreciate the change in the relationship structure implied in this promotion. The new foreman had received no guidance in making his transition and establishing *his new relationship* with his fellow employees. Neither he nor his superiors realized that his supervisory leadership had to be accepted by those he would lead, all the more because in his former days he had articulated sentiments implicitly antagonistic to management.

Grievance Machinery as Gauge of Health of Relationships. Thus even in plants where mature relationships have long been established, the pressures of internal or external change may affect the going social structure. The possibility always exists that the most smoothly meshing relationships will grind now and then. What the administrator needs, therefore, is some means by which he can constantly gauge the smoothness of shop relationships. And it is precisely from this need that the grievance takes on cardinal significance.

Each grievance and its adjustment offer such a gauge, such a continuing index of the effectiveness of going relations. In the sequence of complaints presented for adjustment, the administrator obtains a microcosm of the whole structure of

relationships as they are functioning at the time, successive reproductions on a small scale of the interacting components that determine the quality of collective dealings. All factors that shape relationships come into play when grievances are brought for settlement. The personalities of the men involved in each given case and the sentiments they bring into conference, the leadership on both sides, the social context of administration in the shop, the organization of work — all are mirrored. If they are adequately understood and utilized, therefore, grievances suggest when and where special attention may be required to maintain the integrity of existing relationships.

Each complaint, in other words, should be regarded as a symptom revealing the state of health characterizing relationships. The actual, explicit claim advanced assumes its proper place in the behavior complex by which some individual or group, animated by a sense of injury, is expressing dissatisfaction. The content of the agreement remains important within a given shop situation, but it remains only one factor in the total behavior involved.

A Clinical Approach Recommended

What is being urged here, in other words, is a clinical approach to grievances and the grievance machinery — an approach that views complaints through the functioning processes of shop behavior by which men are working together to turn out goods and services.

In contrast, the present prevailing approach is legalistic. Dissatisfactions among the men at work are fixed within relatively static categories of causation, chiefly by reference to written clauses of a contract valid for a stated period of time. They are "reduced" — a revealing word — to writing; they are delimited by labels that record them as disputes over vacations, wage rates, overtime, working conditions, or whatever the specific claim may be. If the protest does not

fall clearly within the purview of some defined, accepted job right or regulation, it is thrown out of court. If, on the other hand, it does relate to current shop law, it will be debated according to approved legalistic procedures under the established machinery of joint conference and appeal. Time and again, everything may be neat and orderly in the adjustment of a grievance – except the behavior of the aggrieved.

The legalistic approach does not eliminate the feelings and tensions with which complaints are surrounded; it simply pronounces them "irrelevant." We forget that a grievance is, to quote that unsentimental book, the dictionary, something causing *grief, uneasiness, anger, annoyance,* something that *burdens, oppresses,* or *injures,* and implies a *sense of wrong done.*

Why, then, have officials, on the union as well as the management side, focused so exclusively upon the legal validity of the grievance? Why have they so carefully tried to squeeze the emotional content out of the issues to be handled under the adjustment procedures? Perhaps it would be more accurate to say that they have looked the other way in uncomfortable disapproval of the emotionalism implicit in a "sense of wrong done." They know that men get "het up" – but men shouldn't, they think, and men's feelings do not belong among the "facts" upon which administrators act. Similarly, they rely upon adjustment procedures modeled chiefly on judicial or courtroom practice, with its rules of objective, logical evidence, to settle the most emotionally charged disputes.

The Strengths and Weaknesses of Legalism. To understand this concentration upon the legalistic properties of adjustment, we must see legalism itself as a pattern of behavior. Compelling motivations underlie its adoption and evoke characteristic modes of response both from officials and from workers.

Beyond any question, the clean-cut orderliness of the

legalistic approach to shop frictions seems to promise the administrator precisely what he seeks in this highly surcharged area of human relations. Just because disputes are so often emotionally loaded, the representatives of both union and management seek above all, and quite understandably, uniform "businesslike" procedures for handling them. Their reference to the written agreement does appear to provide such familiar controls through a methodical, even-handed system of law and order.

Time and again, moreover, many factors combine to wring from the legalistic approach these strengths that the administrator seeks from it. The context within which joint dealings are developing, for one thing, often counsels reliance upon the ordered restrictions of legalism. When the union has but recently secured entry into a shop, for instance, and relationships exhibit inevitably the ferment of transition, a strict construction of the written agreement affords to management particularly an instrument for imposing at least a standard of order. The standard evokes from the union the respect accorded to mutually accepted law; its breach places the new organization on the defensive. If the old restraints upon shop behavior have been weakened, and if the capacity for demanding has been temporarily inflated, the clear mandates incorporated into the agreement enable management to press upon the union administrators the bounds they must bring their members to observe.

The size of the newly organized plant, again, as well as the general scope of bargaining also helps determine the uses of strict legalism. Manifestly, in the large plants characteristic particularly of so many of our newly organized basic industries, as well as in the multiplying agreements in which are reflected the steady drift toward industry-wide bargaining, the sheer size of the framework within which collective dealings must develop makes the orderly processes of general law prerequisite, even to the eventual refinements of face-to-face

human relationships within the constituent departments and work units where men will learn to live with the rules and regulations they have devised. Bigness inevitably creates a natural context for accepted law, and the legalistic approach in administering the agreement covering thousands of men in a large plant or over a wide area of enforcement indubitably meets an inherent need.

The very nature of the industrial relationship itself, particularly within such contexts of transition or bigness, contributes still greater strength to a legalistic administration of the joint agreement. The demands, or the underlying appetites, for improved conditions and advancing wages served by union organization are basically insatiable; sheer yielding to their immediate formulations or the mechanics of mere appeasement, does not win the administrator surcease from the continuing pressure for "more" expressed in grievances over contract interpretation, or, recurrently, over contract revision. Instead, insistence upon the limitations mutually accepted for the term of the agreement imposes the restraints essential to maintenance of shop order. The responsible representative of the union, as well as of management, needs this protection against the innately valid, typically American aspiration of union workers for "more and better – now." If, on the other hand, left-wing or party-line militants have risen to leadership in a union, management will find in an unbendingly rigorous but fair legalism the best available safeguard against conscious manipulations of these membership aspirations to activate the hostilities that lie always so close to the surface of shop relationships.

The swift growth of union power generally in the troubled years since 1933, moreover, increases further the uses of shop legalism as an instrument of ordered relationships. Whether the external curbs of legal regulation alone will ultimately furnish adequate answer to the growth of union power re-

mains to be seen;[2] but certainly part of the answer hinges upon the efficacy of the internal self-restraints developed under the law of the joint agreement. The time has passed in which the dominating power of the employer had to be balanced by fusing the group strength of the rank and file workers. Instead, two great aggregates of industrial power now face one another; in such a situation mutuality, a balanced acceptance of joint responsibility for productive efficiency within the frame of jointly formulated shop law, seems the new requirement.

Unquestionably, then, the legalistic approach in administering joint agreements meets many innate needs in the typical situations of evolving industrial relations. Even so, at the level of the work bench, where men must achieve their actual adjustments to the new laws they have framed as they live from day to day with collective bargaining, legalism must be supplemented and extended if industrial relations are to become truly a form of human relations. If, for instance, the grievance or complaint is to serve as a useful gauge of the *quality* of shop relationships, the administrator must never be satisfied merely to dismiss it by the tests of legalism; he must, instead, probe it by some means as a clinical communication of something wrong somewhere.

Under the legalistic approach, grievance procedures become a kind of sieve for sifting disputes. From foremen and stewards to top officials on both sides, administrators seek to separate the valid complaint from the invalid, the legitimate grievance from the "gripe." Legitimacy, however, is simply equated with defensible status under a specific provision of the agreement. Foremen and stewards are charged with gathering all the facts regarding any complaint presented to them. But "facts" in this connection comprise only those objective, tangible, even measurable data that can demon-

[2] See Chap. VIII, Wanted: Mature Labor Leaders, pp. 173–210.

strate whether the specific provision of the contract has been breached as claimed or not. The complaint with merit thus emerges as the one for which some degree of such support can be secured. By the same token, the emotions impelling men to complain in the given situation, the drives for which they may actually be seeking satisfaction in dubious requests for wage revisions, "unreasonable" demands for changes in conditions, and so on, are never counted among the facts worthy of attention.

In recent years this rigorous legalism has occasionally been modified to encourage recognition of the importance of "imaginary" grievances as well as of "real" ones. But nothing could testify more eloquently to the strong dominion of the legalistic approach than the manner in which this apparently significant advance still retained the agreement as the touchstone of what is "real" in shop grievances. An imagined wrong, say some manuals,[3] can affect an employee's mental attitude toward his job and thus impede production quite as seriously as a bona fide complaint. The wise steward or foreman therefore talks the imaginary grievance out with the worker, giving him a chance to get it off his chest. Indeed, in talking it out he may even uncover some real source of dissatisfaction. For example, complicated rules and regulations that are not sufficiently explained may lead a worker to think he is being treated unfairly. Just so, the manuals declare, one of the important gains anticipated from the written records of formalized grievance procedure lies in the elimination of any grounds for suspicion, real or imaginary, that cases have not been decided fairly according to the prescribed rules.

[3] See, for example, Division of Labor Standards, United States Department of Labor, *Bulletin* 60, 1943, "Settling Plant Grievances," pp. 1 and 9; *Idem, Bulletin* 66, "The Foreman's Guide to Labor Relations," pp. 14–15; also DAVIS, WILLIAM H., Industrial Peace – a War "Must," *Mill and Factory,* August, 1943; BARKIN, SOLOMON, Unions and Grievances, *Personnel Journal,* June, 1943.

Thus, all paths, even those that reflect recognition of the complexities of human relations, eventually lead back to the rules and regulations, the formal law of the shop. Nowhere is there any serious doubt that the tests of the printed word, the findings of the objective facts, will always establish the validity of the real grievance.

Grievances Disguised to Fit Legalistic Patterns. It is, however, nothing less than a typically human reaction that nullifies the "unfailing" aspect of this expectation. For, needless to say, workers hardly remain unaffected by the crucial development that establishes explicit tests by which grievances will be accepted as valid or rejected as imaginary. Instead, just as management and union forge the clauses of the agreement into a tool for sifting out legitimate from illegitimate complaints, the workers adopt these same clauses as sanctioned forms of expression for all manner of dissatisfactions. If only wage complaints, protests against transfers, shift assignments, changes in work loads, or some other "just" cause are accepted as legitimate, employees time and again will display a remarkable facility for fitting quite varied fears and resentments into the approved formats of complaining. They do not, of course, systematically think through this device for circumventing the rejections implicit in legalistic adjustment procedures. Their behavior is, rather, an unconscious response to the social situation created by the prevailing approach to grievances.

This is a response that has become very familiar to all who deal with human emotions and behavior, whether in the doctor's office, the child guidance clinic, the family case-work agency, the Army's neuropsychiatric service, or the industrial counselor's room. When strong emotions are denied an outlet for expression in their own terms, they find ways of utilizing some other outlet for expression in approved or disguised terms. That is why it is so important always to remain aware of the powerful negative emotions that are inescapably com-

ponents of grievances – the sense of injury, of injustice, of wrong done that mobilizes and then is fed by hostilities, fears, and resentments. For these shop emotions, however "valid" or "invalid" their source, can never be finally denied expression. No complaint, to put it bluntly, will ever be completely or effectively shut off or dismissed. It may be driven underground, in the temporarily silenced individual or the deceptively acquiescent shop, only to reappear sooner or later, recast in sanctioned demands if possible or, if not, in shop unrest, walkouts, slowdowns, turnover, absenteeism, lack of discipline, clique hostility, and so on.

Thus the clauses of the agreement come to define for the workers not only "valid" but also *sanctioned* complaints. They may use the established adjustment machinery precisely as it is intended to be used, to file a complaint against an objective condition that appears to be a violation of contractual rights. Or they may use it to generate unconscious disguises for latent discontent. The arguments they then adduce to prove the validity of their expressed protest represent rationalizations of their unexpressed and often very different dissatisfactions.

How workers fit unexpressed dissatisfactions into sanctioned, legal complaints may be illustrated by a relatively simple dispute. The growing wartime stringency of the labor market in 1941 compelled management in one plant to curtail the use of floor boys for carrying raw materials to, and finished work from, the benches of women employees. As the boys left the shop for military service or higher paying jobs, the superintendent assigned to the employees on relatively heavier work those who still remained. The other employees soon presented a demand for increases in wage rates, charging a change in work conditions. From the opening of the case, which was finally submitted to arbitration, the women showed considerable feeling. As piece workers, they argued, any time they lost in carrying materials and work affected

their pay envelopes. Furthermore, the bundles were heavy, they said, and thus increased their work load. Management showed that the services of floor boys had never constituted an accepted feature of the job; the superintendent had hired them voluntarily in 1939, and he would continue employing them as long as they could be procured. To raise rates in so temporary a condition seemed highly unjustifiable. The women still seemed to find time, moreover, to break into working hours for their customary afternoon smoke.

Was this a real grievance or an imagined wrong? Investigation soon convinced the arbitrator that the "wrong" protested was not the one expressed. Considerable and varied resentments seemed to exist between the shop groups still enjoying transport service and those which did not. The boys inflamed this feeling by teasing the girls who carried their own bundles. Prestige values thus had become attached to the services rendered by the floor boys; the girls felt unfairly devalued in comparison with their fellows who still received transport aid. The case was settled by the decision that as long as the company employed any floor boys, their assignments should be determined by joint conference. Nothing further was heard of the wage demands. But if those demands had been merely denied, there can be little doubt that dissatisfaction would have continued until it was shifted to some fresh "legal" demand.

The Strength of the Clinical Approach

What changes, then, should a clinical approach to the grievance suggest with regard to handling it? Perhaps it would be better first to ask just what such a revision of the prevailing legalistic approach will *not* do. The clinical approach will not alter the status of the agreement as an important instrument of shop control, even as the first recourse for treating grievances. It will not affect the basic aim of grievance procedure, which remains always, of course, the

effective administration of the agreement. It will not even transform in any fundamental way the steps by which treatment is initiated. Instead, it will modify and expand prevailing procedures until orderly handling utilizes not only the law of the agreement but every instrument of control that psychological and social insights make available.

In short, the law, whatever its form and whatever the context of joint dealings, discharges universally in the shop, as in all communities, very real and vital functions. The agreement establishes a network of rights and responsibilities apart from, and above, the men who execute the law. Thus safeguards are erected against arbitrary power and untrammeled authority. Management is conducted by rule, with the introduction and recognition of civil rights, while the interpretation of these rules and practices through the grievance procedure builds up what has been well termed "a system of industrial jurisprudence."[4] Manifestly, the agreement thus constitutes an instrument of control in the shop, protecting both individual rights and established order — but it remains only one instrument.

Yet current practice unfortunately rules out all other social and psychological controls that may help individuals and groups conform to the standards of behavior conducive to harmonious relations and efficient production. It is precisely to advance these objectives motivating the legalistic approach itself that we must be ready to modify and go beyond it.

Place of Formal Grievance Machinery. Under a clinical, as under a legalistic, approach to grievances the adjustment machinery of the agreement remains the first recourse when complaints are presented. It does so, however, not as a sieve for separating the valid grievance from the invalid, but rather as an instrument for sifting out the mode of settlement that will best handle each given dispute. Administrative at-

[4] SLICHTER, SUMNER H., *Union Policies and Industrial Management,* Chap. I, Brookings Institution, Washington, D. C., 1941.

tention is thus focused upon quite different issues from those under the prevailing legalistic approach. The technicalities of legitimacy give way to the realities of dissatisfaction. Emphasis is placed upon the problems of *treating* grievances rather than upon the mechanics of accepting or dismissing grievances. The agreement is utilized not to determine what merit the grievance possesses or its right to consideration, but to facilitate discriminating consideration of all grievances. The administrator seeks the settlement in each case that will most effectively and expeditiously overcome whatever interference is threatened to relationships and production. If that interference can be removed by application of the agreement, well and good; the case is thereby concluded. But if not, the interference will obviously not be mitigated or eliminated until the dissatisfactions underlying the complaint are also mitigated or eliminated.

Thus, each precept for investigation, each rule for action, should be expanded until it covers not only the "legal issues" but also the human behavior that must be handled. Consider, for instance, the injunction with which the foreman or steward is invariably launched upon his duties under the grievance procedures: "Get the facts." He may still begin by interpreting this injunction to demand of him a thorough investigation into the objective justification for the claim advanced by the aggrieved employee. This phase of his job, moreover, may require an elaborate inquiry. For instance, "getting all the facts means more than hearing just the story of the worker who has the kick . . . it may involve consultation with a whole department, or even the investigation of conditions in another mill, through the machinery of the national union. In some cases, too, the company's side of the story is needed to complete the picture. . . ."[5]

[5] "So You're a Steward: A Handbook for TWUA Shop Stewards and Department Committees," p. 19, Educational Department, Textile Workers Union of America, CIO, 1943.

"*When Is a Grievance Not a Grievance?*" So far, so good. But what about the next question which arises when the findings of investigation must be acted upon, and which has, as one manual puts it, "bothered shop stewards and union officials since the first contract was written. . . . When is a grievance not a grievance?"[6] Now, of course, the answer to that question is really quite unequivocal as soon as the legalistic approach is abandoned for the clinical one. It is, simply, "never." A grievance is never "not a grievance." Or to put it positively, a grievance, whatever its objective validity, is always a grievance in its more important connotations for smooth operation and efficient production. Invariably it expresses a discontent that must be dealt with if its potential for shop unrest is to be nipped.

Accordingly, instructions to foremen and stewards might be amplified at this point somewhat as follows:

After you have marshaled all the facts you can to test the objective merits of a claim, you will want next to determine just what kind of grievance you are facing. Quite naturally not all grievances will have the same basic nature. Some will seem to you clearly justified. Others again may appear completely unfounded — just another gripe, you may think. About still others you will not feel so sure, one way or the other. They may seem to have considerable merit, and yet they may also have aspects that raise questions in your mind.

Such uncertainties may simply point to the fact that interpretation of the agreement on the issues involved does need clarification. Or they may point to something else again.

But we all work toward one goal in these matters. The company wants its employees to be as satisfied in their jobs as it can make them. Therefore, we shall take some action on every grievance you receive. But to decide upon action, we need more facts than those that determine whether the

[6] *Ibid,* p. 13.

agreement or some shop regulation has been violated. We want anything and everything you can discover that will help you, and if necessary the rest of us, to determine just what is making the aggrieved employees dissatisfied.

For example: If the complaint involves only the individual making it, has he been involved in complaints before? If so, what settlements were made in these cases? If the complaint involves a group, are they employees who seem to act together often? Is there some formal, organizational reason why they all should press the claim? Does any one of them seem particularly active in it? Does the aggrieved employee show feeling that seems to you excessive or unwarranted in terms of the situation? What kind of feeling? Can you spot particularly anything on the job that seems to be rousing fear or resentment in him? Do you know of any trouble the complainant is facing outside the shop? As you investigate the objective merits of each case, always keep your eyes and ears open for these kinds of facts, too!

The investigation of a complaint, then, should not be considered complete until these two highly important bodies of facts have been compiled: (1) the evidence by which the foreman or steward can decide whether the grievance submitted to him presents a valid case within the terms of agreement; and (2) such data as may at least indicate the degree to which factors of personality, feelings, sentiments, group alignments, and so on, underlie its genesis or threaten to complicate its handling.

The social and psychological facts, let it be noted, are needed for the effective treatment of all types of grievances, irrespective of their objective validity or invalidity. For from the best grounded "real" complaint to the most unjustified "imaginary" one, every grievance reflects the various interacting components of shop relationships. Any particular one, therefore, may become the source of sharp and stubborn

difficulty if the significance of factors in relationships relevant to its treatment is left out of the reckoning.

Three Case Examples

Just how gravely such disregard can complicate handling of the most unexceptionably "legitimate" complaint or cause failure to reach the core of real trouble in the more complex kind may be best indicated through actual cases.

An Inflated Grievance. Consider, first, a relatively simple grievance — a complaint against job rating that arose on one of the railway services. It posed a straightforward question for decision: Was the aggrieved employee doing work of skilled status, as he claimed, or the semiskilled work for which he was being paid? Yet before this dispute was settled in the complainant's favor, it threatened to develop into a problem for the whole system; a chain of influences including personality traits, work customs, and lack of continuing guidance by higher union officials precipitated parallel but unfounded claims along the route. The example is all the more striking because these complications arose in handling a grievance on the railroads, where collective bargaining has been long established and the most stable relationships exist.

The real trouble developed, not from the mere grievance about job rating, but from the fact that the complainant was required by the rules to put his claim in writing, which he steadfastly refused to do. He was a generally fearful, insecure person and seemed afraid, of course without reason, that writing down his grievance might somehow endanger his position with the company. But union lodge officials as steadfastly refused to act upon his case until he met this initial requirement. The chief reason for the refusal was the lodge president's almost fanatical adherence to the rituals of the union and the contract. He conducted lodge meetings with the utmost ceremonialism and always in his Sunday best. The very seriousness with which he took his duties regarding

all union rules and rituals brought him such respect that none of the members would force his hand even in situations like this one, where many regarded his position as too unbending.

The very strength of this local union president, one of the most effective in the whole brotherhood, obviously constituted the source of difficulty by making him unable to meet flexibly the equally rigid, if exactly contrasting, personality trends of a fearful but loyal and conscientious worker with a grievance. Delays intensified the resentment and sense of injury of the complainant. The characteristic work customs of the service, which gather workers at station depots and yards along the route to lend one another a hand as they exchange union news, made the case a *cause célèbre,* stimulating widespread — and invalid — complaints of the same kind.

After eleven months of this impasse, the aggrieved worker finally transferred his membership to another lodge. Here the members voted the suspension of the rule requiring that complaints be filed in writing and the union officials were authorized to process the grievance.[7] After passing through the regular joint channels of adjudication, the claim was finally granted by the National Railway Adjustment Board.

All these complications were unnecessary. If the seasoned field director of union lodges in this region had maintained more constant contacts with them, he surely would have found ways to reckon with the personality traits that were blocking treatment of the case before needless delay and the particular work customs inflated it as they did.

A Disguised Dissatisfaction. If such factors snarl up the handling of eminently legitimate grievances, they may even

[7] Following the decision of the Supreme Court in *Elgin, J. and E. Ry. Co. v. Burley et al.* [65 Sup. Ct. 1282, June 11, 1945 and 66 Sup. Ct. 721 (1946)] requiring proof of agency to entitle a union representative to represent an aggrieved individual, this brotherhood tightened its administrative requirement that grievances be reduced to writing.

generate the more questionable complaints that disguise dissatisfactions in sanctioned formats.

In a branch mill of a textile company, for instance, the steward of the slashing room submitted a demand for increased rates in the name of the men he represented. The demand was defended as compensation for an alleged increase in work load caused by new automatic humidity controls on the machines the men operated. The use of these controls had been spreading through the industry, and this company was introducing them experimentally in another branch mill in the same town when it signed its first agreement with the union. The wage rates, accordingly, had been based on work conditions that included the automatic controls. As the management extended the introduction of these controls, both of this steward's machines were fitted with them; other slashers operated two machines with controls on only one or with no controls at all.

In presenting the alleged group protest, the steward ignored the grievance machinery and pressed the important wage negotiations on his own. On their failure he presented a strike ultimatum. It was management that then called in the union director. With his union relatively new, the director decided to proceed with the case, since feelings in the slashing room by now had become tense. There followed further joint conferences, three company time studies, arbitration through two hearings, visits by the arbitrator to the plant, a fourth study, and finally intervention by the Federal government.

During all these procedures the steward covertly and overtly prodded union and management, but always through entirely "proper" legalistic behavior. He compiled highly factual evidence to prove that the new control "was running us ragged," was "greatly increasing output" and thus was "increasing company profit." He constantly and aggressively interrupted union as well as management superiors, but only

to "correct" them on the "facts." He maintained an eagle-eyed watch upon shop developments that interpreted the most everyday decision in terms of his suspicions of the new machines. He expressed concern over his inability to hold "those young fellows," for whom he spoke, "in check" unless they were granted the demanded wage-increase. Although "those young fellows," like all workers, would have welcomed an increase, none of them at any time showed the steward's intense convictions in the matter (and as a matter of fact, they subsequently broke with him). He even "proved" that the new machine gave "bad quality" work – quality far inferior to his own skilled manual performance. And so on.

At any rate, these protracted and rationally convincing proceedings failed to budge the steward one jot from his original position. Every argument, every favoring circumstance proved completely unavailing against the vivid, personally documented knowledge that "the new machines are running us ragged." And undoubtedly the machines were – but through the fatigue induced by his strong emotional resistance rather than through any physical increase in the work load about which the management and men so exhaustively and logically argued.

This employee, recognized not only as a highly skilled craftsman but also as a bench and mill-town community leader for years, was manifestly reacting to what he felt was a threat to his skill and status. Thus he was utilizing the powers of his new union role to protect his established prestige values. All his "facts" and arguments, his conference behavior, his attitudes toward both union and management superiors, disguised the complex fear and the aggressions it evoked in this man of leadership caliber.

It is at least possible to ask whether awareness of personality factors – this skilled slasher and leader was often a "difficult fellow" – did not call for careful consideration and reassurance before controls were attached, in his case alone,

to both the machines he ran. Indeed, when adjustment proceedings were under way, both the astute union director and the understanding representative of the company realized that something different from the conditions against which he was leading a group protest must have been bothering him.

Surely a clinical approach to the dispute seemed indicated, particularly since no members of this craft in other branch mills of the company were staging similar protest against the introduction of the automatic controls. As it was, the immediate settlement based exclusively on the objective facts produced a short stoppage — and for the next two years this steward recurrently challenged his superiors. Finally, after more than two decades of admittedly exceptional service and despite the stringencies of the war labor market, he had to be discharged for one challenge too many.

A Friction with Complex Genesis. Just where would one find the real complaint in the involved situation that underlay a demand for replacement of work pants in another plant — a plant of a company manufacturing electrical cable and wire for industrial power, communications, and lighting equipment? Again, the explicit grievance was relatively simple. The men in the rubber-compounding department, complaining that the liquid splashed from the centrifuges and spoiled their pants, demanded they be supplied with new work pants, presumably woolen, as often as necessary. The management furnished protective rubber aprons. The men protested that aprons would not do because the compound splashed mostly from the knees down. Puttees were then offered in addition to the aprons. The men still expressed dissatisfaction: aprons created a work hazard around their machines; they were only for women anyway. They wanted regular pants, or else they would walk out.

For management to limit the handling of this dispute to the explicit demand for work pants would be to miss com-

pletely the real and complex genesis of the friction of which it was part. The company had expanded its work force more than fourfold to fulfill its war contracts. Before the war the employees had been represented by an independent union; after two elections an AFL union was certified as the bargaining agency. But it was the newer, short-time employees who had thrown their support to the AFL. Accordingly, these newer employees held the union offices. The older employees had, until recently, kept aloof from union activities; the foremen also had not been easily reconciled to the new union. This problem number one, a split between the older and newer employees, had to be healed if proper morale was to be developed. It was at least suggestive that the rubber compounders most active in the dispute were long-service employees — old-timers.

Again, both the management and local union were new to the procedures of collective bargaining. Because of this, the request for work pants was originally submitted to a labor-management committee on war production; only after several months did it reach the regular grievance machinery.

Company officials emphasized, moreover, that the rubber compounders had worked at their jobs for years without demanding replacements of work clothes; that showers and dressing rooms had been provided so the employees could wash up and change at the end of the work day. But they saw these objective facts as evidence that the men were unreasonable rather than as clues that they might be pouring accumulated dissatisfactions into one more sanctioned complaint.

Accordingly the precedents the compounders cited to support their demand were explained away by management as due to differences in objective work conditions. Yet management admitted that its own position was motivated at least in part by emotional concern or suspicion. To grant the demand of the rubber compounders, company officials feared,

would stimulate parallel demands for work clothes throughout the plant. They insisted that, while rubber coveralls had been provided for workers in another department, the work there was harder and dirtier than any place else in the plant; similarly, although coveralls also were granted millwrights, it was only for the specific times when they worked in carbon black. The officials thus missed what might also be an emotional clue in the compounders' declaration that they too would be willing to accept coveralls but not aprons.

As time passed and no decision on the complaint came from the labor-management committee, the compounders began to prod both management and their union officials. As their steward tossed the complaint about in the labor-management committee, the delay, as is usually the case, sharpened the discontent of the men. Then when the dispute was becoming dangerously heated, the union's business manager was called up for military service. The local union president took over with the feeling that he was left holding the bag. He called for help from the district vice president of the union, a seasoned full-time official, who promised a visit to the plant but under the pressure of wartime problems never came.

To complicate matters further, one employee who had been involved in a series of prior disputes was suspected of being the ringleader in this grievance. His behavior in one of these disputes had so violated the superintendent's codes of what constituted proper conduct in the shop that he never forgot it. Returning to work from a short but illegal walkout and feeling the better for a few drinks, this "agitator type" had asked the vice president in charge of production whether he, too, didn't find that it improved matters to come in with a few beers under his belt. Although the superintendent did not know whether this fellow actually was the ringleader in the work-pants dispute, he blamed him because "in shop relations when a man didn't behave the way he should once, probably he wouldn't next time either."

Thus, mere disposition of the claim for protective clothing in this company would leave completely untouched the underlying disturbances in relationships that were generating complaints. Old-timers and new-timers had to be integrated into a working team; inexperienced union officials had to be guided in their new responsibilities; foremen and union members had to be brought together more closely; grievance machinery had to be distinguished from war-production committees; individual personality problems had to be dealt with; the succession of disputes had to be related concretely one to another for adequate appraisal; and so on.

An effort to isolate the issues involved in *any* given grievance simply wrenches the underlying discontent out of its whole context. A grievance constitutes one incident in a continuum, a dynamic context of shop relations. The continuum will contain the factors that may complicate handling, or, if understood properly, the factors that should focus handling. These three case examples, like all others, represent episodes in a continuous context of relationships rather than detached incidents definable as grievances over anything as specific as wage rates or protective clothing.

Is the Clinical Approach Manageable?

At first encounter, the clinical approach may appear to project heavy burdens upon foremen and stewards and also upon higher company and union officials. Can we ask busy individuals to engage in exhaustive analysis of the context within which each grievance is generated?

Most of the administrators of a union agreement, it must be remembered, are already in contact with the people whose grievances they must handle and with the shop within which grievances find expression. The acceptance of the clinical approach sensitizes them to the aspects of relationships that will bear watching. They come to know the individuals and their personality trends, including the men who

usually "gripe." They hear of worries outside the shop that may affect an employee's mental attitude toward his job. They spot bench groups and their leaders. They are ready for fearful reactions when changes in the methods or organization of work must be introduced. When drastic external stresses impinge upon the factory as a result of legislation, depression strains, or war pressures, these men are not startled by their reflection in shop behavior.

It is always dangerous, amid the dynamic complexities of human relations, to proffer administrative "aids" that even savor of formulas for handling them. Yet the very concept of the grievance as a symptom, which underlies the clinical approach to their treatment, justifies analytic probing into the characteristic behavior of aggrieved individuals for clues that will enable the administrator to judge quickly the type of complaint confronting him in each given case.

Since all grievances embody a sense of injury or of wrong done, he will be prepared to encounter varying degrees of emotion in the aggrieved employee. But when the complaint is rooted in an objective condition or in a reality situation, that emotion should bear some proportionate measure to the cause evoking it. The employee's anger, resentment, or anxiety may be deeply felt; but it maintains demonstrable relationship to its objective cause and tends to disappear when the reality situation has been dealt with.

Complaints that furnish approved formats for latent discontents, on the other hand, often produce feeling and behavior that can fairly be described as "excessive" in terms of the explicit dissatisfactions articulated by the aggrieved employees. The employee may stew about his wrongs and dilate upon them to anybody who will listen. Or he may inflate his grievances, finding some fresh cause for dissatisfaction almost as the given cause has been considered. Nor do the feelings animating him in the given situation disappear when the generating situation itself has been cleared; instead, they linger,

to simmer as the residual negative emotions that recurrently explode into shop disturbances and hostilities. As the administrator grows in sensitivity to excessive behavior and feeling in grievance situations, of course, he must also learn to make allowance for ethnic and even individual variations in emotionalism. Thus the arbitrator in an industry containing many different nationalities comes to discount the explosive manner of testifying, often characterizing Italian or other South or East European workers as compared with, let us say, their Anglo-American fellows. Yet when all the necessary qualifications have been made, behavior that is excessive in terms of the generating situation remains a useful clue in the clinical approach to the grievance.

Similarly, behavior that may be described as "repetitive" affords the administrator a valuable guidepost in treating grievances. He may find an individual repeatedly complaining – the familiar sorehead. Again, he may receive numerous complaints from one department; or he may discover a group of workers at the bench recurrently involved in disturbances or in the grievance procedures. In each instance the repetitiveness furnishes a clue suggesting a deep-seated disturbance in relationships. The employee who seems grievance-prone probably cannot be adequately handled by considering his successive complaints objectively on their merits as he presents them one after the other. As long as he remains an employee, management and union both stand to gain by a sympathetic search for his underlying difficulty. Reference to shop or union counselors, or to medical services, if they exist, may meet the need; if not, a sympathetic superior may prevail upon the employee concerned to utilize recognized community agencies established to deal with such problems as seem at the root of his trouble.

When, on the other hand, an undue concentration of complaints occurs within a given department, examination of underlying relationships prevailing there would seem indis-

pensable even as the explicit grievances are submitted to the contractual procedures of adjustment. An overzealous steward may account for the continuing disturbance they symptomize, or a hard-bitten foreman may be at fault. Some technical bottleneck also may be impeding the flow of work at the department, or still another difficulty among the many potential disturbances of shop relations may require attention. The important point remains always that repetitiveness in grievance behavior should stimulate scrutiny of the deeper lying, continuing factors in relationships.

In the same way, what we may characterize as "imperviousness" to treatment under the established procedures that most reasonable men would accept as fair may be read as a clue indicating a subjective, rather than an objective, grievance. Time and again, union representatives quite as much as management confidentially confess their perplexity at the pigheaded stubbornness with which an aggrieved individual or group resists every effort to dispose fairly of their complaint. In such cases it is generally safe to conclude that more is at work in engendering dissatisfaction than appears on the surface. It will often happen, moreover, that the administrator in continuing contact with his men at work will confront behavior among aggrieved employees that exhibits all three symptoms of deeper lying disturbance.

For instance, the reactions of the slasher tender in the mill introducing automatic moisture controls revealed excess, repetitiveness, and complete imperviousness to the fairest, most patient efforts to deal with his explicit complaint. Quietly factual though he remained as administrating steward and testifying witness, the intensity with which he pressed the complaint against the automatic moisture control, in a context within which other slasher tenders in sister mills, and indeed throughout the industry, revealed no comparable concern, at once suggested feeling excessive in terms of the reality situation that seemingly evoked it. In addition,

he remained completely impervious to every effort of management, union, and outside conciliators to prove his fears unfounded; instead, he challenged the fairness and reliability of successive time studies, until faced with results he could no longer assail technically in terms of work load and output. Whereupon he dismissed the whole process of measurement as unintelligible — "a Chinese laundry ticket to us ordinary workers." Similarly, he remained immovable before every attempt at adjustment offered by company, union, arbitrator, or government mediators when the adjustment fell short of the wage increase he demanded. Finally when a decision was rendered against his claim, he was involved recurrently in a series of disturbances that found him clashing with shop fellows or subtly insubordinate under management orders.

The excessiveness, repetitiveness, and imperviousness that characterized his shop complaining or grievance behavior certainly offered symptoms indicative of the need for something beyond the rules and procedures of legalism. Invariably, wherever encountered, these symptoms may be read precisely in this way — as clues for treatment techniques predicated upon the whole reality of dynamic shop behavior.

On the whole, foremen and stewards should be expected generally to meet only the simpler demands of such continuous alertness to the factors of human relations. On the other hand, personnel managers, higher ranking company executives, and also union officials may well be asked to shoulder the requirements of deeper insights. Through the clinical approach adjustment procedures themselves become part of the continuum of relationships rather than legalistic tools intermittently taken up and laid aside. The skills of the clinical approach, moreover, like any other skills, gain proficiency with use. With every grievance handled, the administrator finds himself more adept in looking beyond explicit issues, more sure-handed in uncovering "real" — in the clinical rather than legalistic sense of that word — sources of

disturbance in shop relationships stirring beneath official grievances.

When adjustment procedures are thus assimilated into the context of relationships it becomes a mere convenience of speech to say that settlement of each successive grievance will still be initiated by the machinery established in the contract. So it will – but those who administer the machinery will not now isolate the issues of the case or the aggrieved employee presenting them, from the whole context; nor will they detach the moment of expressing a sense of wrong done from all that went before and all that may come after. The processing of the grievance will conform to the expectancies of those concerned in it; but every step taken will be directed by a clinical approach toward handling dissatisfaction – even when applying the agreement.

The administrator still acts upon the premise that judicial consideration by itself affords some relief for every dissatisfaction, whatever its source and whether or not it will prove finally amenable to legalistic settlement. But he knows also why consideration must be expeditious and sympathetic to achieve this result. The familiar warnings against delays in adjustment gain emphasis by insight into the emotional overtones in grievances. Precisely because grievances are expressions of a sense of wrong done, they are also ideal soil for "stewing," for distortion of the motives behind the alleged wrong, for exaggeration of its dimensions, for obessional preoccupation with all the other wrongs a malign fate may be inflicting. In the same way, he knows that the newer emphasis upon sympathetic listening represents a promising advance in human relations; but he knows also that to realize its potential, vigilance is still required lest the technicalities of procedure shut off this safety valve.

Consider, for instance, the typical formulas according to which the grievance generally is reduced to writing. Many of the "facts," both general and specific, recommended for

inclusion in the blank grievance forms are purely informative and so cannot affect adjustment adversely, *e.g.*, name of aggrieved employee, address, time clock or badge number, department, operation, shift, foreman, union ledger number, local union number, grievance case number, date, steward's name, and so on. But when a steward or foreman is instructed that the statement of the grievance should be clear, short, and to the point, does he not thereby himself receive encouragement, and transmit encouragement to the complainant, to fit the given dissatisfaction into some sanctioned format of complaining under the agreement? The sober fact is that feelings and sentiments, the motor power of grievances, can not always be reduced to expression that is "clear, short, and to the point." Indeed, deeper understanding of human motivation increasingly counsels against any effort thus to compress them. The clear and short statement of a grievance upon a standardized written form can be useful only if it is formulated *after* the aggrieved worker has been heard sympathetically and at whatever length he may require to get his sense of wrong done off his chest. It would seem desirable generally to call for putting the grievance in writing only after a first step has provided opportunity for full informal conference between the employee and the steward and foreman.

Care must also be taken that contractual specifications regarding the first step in grievance procedure are not permitted through narrowly legalistic interpretation to become an impediment to the development of sound relations. A graphic illustration of the need of flexibility to meet actual situations was furnished during a conference of a union's field representative with the foremen in a recently organized mill. The agreement provided that workers submit grievances first to their stewards. Discussion centered upon the problem presented by one of the foremen, who declared himself baffled by the increase in complaints that employees

had been bringing directly to him. He listened carefully only to find that most of the grievances the men voiced possessed no valid basis. Yet they persisted in coming to him, and he was at a loss to know just how to handle the situation.

Both the foreman's supervisory colleagues and the union representative were entirely agreed upon the answer to his problem. They referred him to the agreement to prove that he must refuse to listen. Under the agreement, he was told, the stewards were designated precisely for this job of determining who among complainants had a legitimate kick and who were merely griping. They would then tell the gripers to stop talking nonsense.

What the conferees were overlooking was the fact that unionization often brings to the surface pent-up irritations. These workers naturally carried their complaints to the one official who always had been, and still was, willing to listen carefully, a foreman who seemed to enjoy an excellent relationship with them. Indeed, management and union should have utilized this foreman to integrate the stewards with the restive workers, by urging that foreman and employees alike talk complaints over with the steward. In other words, this particular foreman could be made the key to developing the relationships implied in the agreement. It would work irreparable harm to stifle him for the sake of a narrow legalistic interpretation of the agreement.

Some Concluding Observations

It is impossible, of course, to convey in any detail the manifold variety of shop experiences that emerges from applying the clinical approach to everyday grievances arising on the job. Illustrative cases might be multiplied ceaselessly, only to reveal that no one is ever exactly like any other. Yet this seeming diversity does possess its own internal order, the order characteristic of all living experience. Common elements do constitute the stuff of which every grievance is

made. To reduce the grievance merely to these common elements, however, is to lose the organic wholeness that comes from their dynamic, interacting combination in endlessly particular contexts. Once more it is the plus quality in all human relationships that makes the grievance, too, something more than the sum of its constituent elements.

Nevertheless, the administrator must remain ever alert to these constituent elements. The better he knows workers, supervisors, and union officials as individual people; the more he understands the informal bench groups, shop cliques, and union factions into which they associate themselves within the larger formal organization; the more clearly he realizes how changes within and without the shop community reflect themselves in the emotions and sentiments that motivate shop behavior, the more adequately he can handle grievances and thereby also guide shop relations to serve his administrative purposes.

And thus we return to the point with which this discussion started. If grievances are to be handled effectively, they must be approached primarily through the dynamic flow of shop relations rather than through the static clauses of the agreement. When they are thus approached, they become in turn a gauge of the state of health in relationships.

Indeed, once shop relationships are thus conceived as the continuing factor in all shop behavior — in presenting the grievances that suggest difference and contain potential conflict, in settling them by the mutual adjustment projectures that promote collaboration — we must also be prepared to modify strategically a long-established truism of collective dealings. No axiom of joint bargaining has attained a stronger hold than that which differentiates sharply the processes of adjusting grievances under a current agreement from those that revise the actual terms of agreement. Renegotiation and grievance settlement thus are rigorously separated from each other.

True, this differentiation will always retain a large measure of practical usefulness. Renegotiation constitutes in essence, for one thing, a renewal of the basic compact between management and union. In these terms, at the completion of the contract there might be conveyed an emotional impact or an expression of sentiment that would prove far more meaningful for all concerned than any single application or interpretation of current terms. Again, those involved in renegotiating the terms of an agreement, embodying as it does shop custom or law, can test their own practices by the stream of tendency in these collective standards developing within industry as a whole, just as they did during the negotiation of a first agreement. Finally, just because basic revisions are in question, the techniques of joint dealing differ. The same unions that hold tenaciously to their right to strike when joint conference fails to achieve agreement will, on renegotiating contract clauses, strive unremittingly to reduce "wildcat" stoppages that protest interpretations of current terms. Similarly, the firm rejection by both parties generally of compulsory arbitration as the final step in renegotiation is parallelled by union persistence and growing employer acquiescence in incorporating arbitration into the hierarchy of appeal under grievance procedures.

But when all this has been granted, to understand the dynamics of shop behavior under collective agreements is to recognize also how blurred these apparently sharp boundaries become in the realities of joint dealings. They are man-made boundaries, useful in their way, yet artificially distinct channels within the unbroken flow of relationships. No one who follows in detail the proceedings of typical renegotiation conferences can long fail to observe the manner in which they, too, emerge as a stage in grievance procedure. Time and again, the representatives from the shop who speak at these meetings show themselves eager to provide redress for grievances they feel have not received satisfactory adjustment

under the expiring agreement. In one case, changes in rates without due notification may underlie the demand; in another, even unpopular appointments of foremen may motivate the quest for revisions. Skilled executives utilize the negotiating conferences to uncover and alleviate such discontents.

In the early stages of relationships, the negotiators may find themselves confronting more than sixty requests for very specific changes designed to meet continuing dissatisfactions, as did the negotiators at the Chrysler Corporation during the war. In the past it has been generally the union conferees who thus utilized the negotiation conference, just as they did the grievance procedures. More recently, management has been bringing its own complaints, originating under the administration of the past contract, to the conference table at which new terms are to be negotiated. This represents a healthy development. It would be just as desirable, as unions grow in strength, for management also to utilize the grievance procedures to protest violations of contract terms by union members. Be that as it may, however, there can be little question that renegotiation becomes, in the perspectives of the clinical approach, a current in handling dissatisfactions that must be channeled, just like the grievance procedures themselves, in the continuing evolving flow of shop relations.

Thus, from term to term, and within each period of its currency, the agreement remains significant in the hands of the administrator approaching shop dealings with the skills of the clinician.

In the hands of such a person, the agreement plays a better proportioned role in the total procedure of adjustment. It is indeed an important component in the structure of shop relationships, furnishing, as it were, their skeletal frame. But any agreement becomes a vital part of a living structure only as it acquires the power — the muscle tissue, so to speak — that men give it by conforming to its pattern of relationships; the

flesh and blood of their daily application of its terms; the ideas, sentiments, and emotions they pour into it. And the true significance of the grievance emerges only when we recognize the expression of dissatisfaction as a symptom of malfunction somewhere in this living structure of shop relations.

For relationships, let us recall once more, constitute the means by which the administrator pursues his objectives. Both observance of the agreement and efficient production rest ultimately upon the relationships of the men working together in the shop. Each grievance, even as it mirrors those relationships, must also be handled through them. In human relations the distinctions between cause and effect are seldom clean cut; the ties that link the sequence in which one experience proceeds from another are those of interacting influence. That is why grievances can be instruments for promoting sound relations; while sound relations certainly are the best means for dealing adequately with grievances.

Chapter VI

RESISTANCE TO SHOP CHANGES

EVERY shop administrator knows from experience the stubbornness of the whole category of disputes rising from the introduction of new methods of work. The appearance of something new, whether in the form of a new labor-saving device, a new incentive system, a new kind of supervision, or a new process, seems to sound an alert among men at work; they mount guard, as it were, suspicious in advance that the change bodes them no good. The problem that emerges becomes particularly baffling when time and time again it appears immaterial whether an innovation affects the workers adversely or not. Indeed, even when it promises them substantial benefit, they still may pull and haul and balk.

No class of complaints submitted for adjustment under the grievance procedures proves more impervious than these protests against change. Union representatives confess themselves baffled just as often as management; here is a problem for which neither side has as yet found the answer. Even though the new process or policy under challenge has been instituted with the consent of union officials, it may run into stiff opposition among the ranks of workers. In the effort to meet the discontent, jointly formulated proposals of adjustment may even win initial approval from the workers concerned, only to encounter the subsequent second thoughts that withdraw consent and renew resistance.

Formal union policy toward technological innovations has of course varied. It has varied with the nature of the changes and their potentialities for employment, with the conditions

surrounding their introduction and the general climate of opinion, and with the traditions of the union and the quality of collective relations. For some time now, however, most union leaders have accepted high productivity as a national goal and thus, also, the right of management to introduce improvements to increase efficiency. Yet generalized affirmations to that effect by union leaders often have a hollow ring; specific shop experience appears to tell a different story. Why the discrepancy? A closer view reveals that union officials are not leading their members in a resistance they know must ultimately prove futile, but rather that often they fail to carry their members with them in accepting a given change.[1] Predominantly, opposition stems from the men at work; union affiliation affects only the form, not the fact, of resistance.

A Persistent Problem

From the earliest days of our history this problem has been with us. On the one hand, the dynamic nature of modern industry, with its incessant incidence of change, has been widely accepted and even acclaimed; on the other hand, specific changes have always met resistance. We have avidly embraced the unending succession of comforts, services, and masteries that industry has brought to everyday living. We have also fiercely resisted the innovations that threatened our own individual stakes in the current economy of the nation. Both the owners and the drivers of the wagon teams on the early turnpikes, for instance, fought against the canals, and then with the canalmen against the railroads. Every industrial advance has had to be made against the understandably bitter opposition of those whose occupations it rendered obsolete. This much we now generally recognize and accept.

[1] *Cf.*, for instance, Slichter, Sumner H., *Union Policies and Industrial Management*, pp. 216-223, Brookings Institution, Washington, 1941.

But we have still to probe the reflex in daily work behavior. Obviously, this often harmful impact of advancing technology upon the individuals who man the currently established methods of work helps explain a good part of the anxious suspicions with which every shop innovation is viewed. Again and again, the emergence of improved techniques of production has brought the gravest kind of personal trouble. Displacement from jobs, dilution of skills, decay of home communities – the record of progress has had its black pages for the workers immediately affected. Painful memories linger to be passed down in family histories, to be circulated among friends and neighbors. Perhaps less poignant but just as vivid have been the experiences with early abuses of time studies and rate setting. The stop watch has become literally a hostile symbol, crystallizing all the resentments cumulated against the effort to introduce more efficient methods into the work situation.

MANAGEMENT'S DOUBLE STANDARD

And so it is that at the most pivotal point of industrial management we confront a major block; changes are inevitable and necessary, yet they are also almost invariably resisted at the work level. Management has yet to recognize, let alone try to cope with, the true nature of this block. The leadership group of business – the administrators, engineers, and technicians who have contributed so much to making American industry the miracle of productivity it has become – have concentrated upon *what* improvements and *what* changes must be introduced to lower costs and increase output. But in their preoccupation with the *what* they have given little or no attention to the *how*. In ceaseless search for improvements, they study production processes and methods; they experiment with new materials and new forms of organization; they analyze techniques and equipment. Their findings become facts of unimpeachable authority,

injunctions for necessary action. If material or technical difficulties arise to impede efficiency, they, too, are studied as facts until they are resolved – but only if the impediments are nonhuman factors in production.

As soon as an administrator confronts barriers that rise in human resistance, he resorts to a curious alchemy by which human behavior is transmuted into something different from fact, or at least from fact in the simon-pure, 24-carat essence that alone can be accepted as subject for study. Technical staffs then are no longer technical or scientific; they become instead hortatory and moralistic. They decry the inability of men to recognize "facts"; they deplore the "unreasonableness" of emotionally conditioned behavior in their employees; they denounce "irresponsible" leaders; they demand "discipline" to force acquiesence. In contrast to the procedures they themselves follow in all other production problems, they do not track human difficulties to their sources in an effort to gain understanding of the nature of the problem involved and of the interrelated factors that must go into its solution.

Management, in a word, predicates shop policy upon what we may term a double standard of fact: "true" facts contained in technical and material things and "false" facts presented by human behavior.[2] Yet we know, not only from experience in the daily conduct of business but also from studies of various human societies, that men invariably tend to regard with suspicion and discomfort anything new, strange, unfamiliar, that they close ranks against the alien and unknown. Why, then, should not apprehension in the face of shop change receive study and treatment as a "true" fact quite as much as a faulty design in a machine tool, an illogical factory layout, or any other technical obstacle to efficiency?

The answer of course is that it should be so studied and treated. No task, indeed, looms more crucial for management

[2] See Chap. VII, Wanted: Mature Managers, pp. 152–159.

than discovering methods that will neutralize the spontaneous, natural anxieties evoked by change and gain for each innovation the fullest possible measure of acceptance. It is not too much to say that we face here one of the most difficult and least explored areas of human relations, where no one is sure of his ground. What we need now is nothing more nor less than to recognize the problem, to approach it with humility, to pool experience, and to probe for helpful clues.

Characteristic Emotions in Resistance

We need first of all to understand the constellation of emotions and sentiments that are stimulated by managerial innovations. Central to the total response are the emotions of fear and anger. It is the fundamental nature of emotions to generate action. Indeed, the response in terms of behavior appropriate to the situation constitutes the intrinsic or biological purpose of all emotions. Thus, fear prepares the threatened organism for flight or a better defense, and anger prepares it for fight.[3] In the shop, of course, these typical responses take on specific modifications adapted to the modern work environment.

Fear. The prospect of injury or harm typically evokes fear. Because the new in the shop is also the unknown, it rouses in the employee anxious uncertainties lest in some way it may injure or harm him. "What will this mean to me?" expresses succinctly the disturbance usually felt. Some of these anxieties, as already pointed out, are fed by memories or tales of shop experience in which comparable changes have resulted in very real and grave trouble; others may represent mere worries and suspicions. Whether well grounded or not, the fear of possible harm underlies the basic reaction to change.

[3] For an excellent nontechnical discussion of emotions and their functions, see Strecker, Edward A. and Kenneth E. Appel, in collaboration with John W. Appel, *Discovering Ourselves,* 2d ed., pp. 114–196, The Macmillan Company, New York, 1944.

In addition, a subtle social disturbance is precipitated. In the shop, as in any community, a given change is introduced not into a vacuum but into a going, complex structure of relationships. This structure of relationships yields to its individuals comfortably customary patterns of working and living together. Accordingly, at whatever point the change is effected — in technical processes, in plant layout, in formal supervisory organization, or in some other feature of shop life — the disruption of wonted ways becomes always more than an individual experience. The unsettlement is communicated through all the interrelated components of the structure. This in turn creates certain forms of group-wide resistance, the most familiar being that of inertia, *i.e.*, reluctance to move, or to be moved, out of familiar daily grooves.

The pervasiveness of these resistances stemming from fear and inertia need not surprise us if we but realize that habitual behavior and familiar relationships are themselves basically a source of security. The formation of habitual patterns of reaction to daily demands is central to the whole learning process by which the individual acquires progressive mastery over his environment from infancy on. Education itself is in considerable measure a process of establishing conditioned responses in various areas of activity. If we had to give the amount of conscious thought and energy in adulthood to talking, reading, writing, spelling, counting, table manners, and so on, that we did when we first acquired these skills, we should hardly ever complete the routine job of everyday living. The man at ease with himself — *i.e.*, the man who feels secure — is the man who is certain he knows how to do correctly whatever may be required of him in a given situation.

In precisely this way, the existing organization of work and the existing structure of relationships in the shop are habitual and familiar. Complex skill, established procedures of working, the code of behavior that wins for a man accep-

tance among his bench fellows, or any other form of know-how there imparts a sense of personal security. The introduction of any new element threatens to disturb, and at times even disrupt, this know-how, which clearly represents for most of us the end product of long and laborious acquisition. For these reasons imposed change creates a period of uncertainties pregnant with suspicion and fear.

Anger. The fears aroused by proposed or actual changes in the shop, however, can seldom find release in the typical and direct response of flight. It is true enough that a worker may wish to escape or avert the new demands made upon him and that in times of active demand for labor he may even quit in protest against a proposed innovation. But the usual response is quite different. He strives, rather, to stay put in the position where he now feels threatened *and* also to avert the new threat. This calls for resistance at his post. The flight typically produced by fear is thus transformed into the fight typical of anger.

The emotions of fear and anger are always closely allied. Hence men working together in a shop soon reveal themselves hostile — either sullenly and smolderingly angry or "fighting mad" — to changes in their methods imposed upon them by authority. But once again they must usually find more or less indirect methods of fighting. The overt destructiveness of the pathetic machine wrecker of a century ago is no longer an acceptable recourse even within the working ranks. Change is now generally equated with progress. Employees hear from union spokesmen as well as from management that this progress yields the efficiency basic to rising standards of living. Instead of trying to block the threatening change directly, therefore, they turn to indirect attack. They may seek unreasonable wage increases even though the new job calls for less effort and skill. They may persist covertly in their old methods of work. They may protest suspiciously against the specific terms under which the change is intro-

duced. They may form bench associations with their fellows for defending the group stake in customary ways – through the measures of resistance just mentioned and through many more, including unwritten codes as to what should be the standard of daily ouput,[4] the more formal regulations of featherbedding, the force of strikes and walkouts, the sabotage of slowdowns, or simply a diffuse displaced hostility against all those in authority from the foreman up. Indeed, anyone who has handled shop disputes stemming from the introduction of change cannot fail to be impressed by the variety of tactics workers develop to resist innovations and also by the stubborn character of their resistance.

Threat to the Workers' Security System. The workers' resistance is so stubborn because they are each defending something far more compelling than any single vested or material interest in the job. They are each defending what amounts to a security system, the sense of adequacy and effectiveness that the individual man acquires, however unconsciously, through his work. This system comprises the network of attitudes and behavior patterns stemming from his job that helps maintain his concept of personal worth and his feelings of safety and security in his daily environment.[5]

Obviously, many diverse factors enter into the specific security system of each individual – his native endowment,

[4] ROETHLISBERGER, FRITZ J., and WILLIAM J. DICKSON, *Management and The Worker,* pp. 409–447, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1939.

[5] For a good discussion of this concept of security systems, see KARDINER, ABRAM, *The Individual and His Society,* pp. 89–91 and Chap. IV, Columbia University Press, New York, 1939; MASLOW, A. H., and BELA MITTLEMAN, *Principles of Abnormal Psychology,* pp. 131–141, 206-226, Harper & Brothers, New York, 1941; PLANT, J., *Personality and the Cultural Pattern,* pp. 83–143, Commonwealth Fund, New York, 1937.

Compare also Chap. IX, under Restoring the Sense of Individual Effectiveness in Work, pp. 222–225.

his childhood training and relationships, his education, and his adult experience in love, work, and play. Within the adult work community, as such, the tests by which men judge themselves and appraise their relative positions also derive significance from their impact upon relationships beyond and outside the job. They cluster mainly around three elements: (1) technical proficiency and pride in the particular job, (2) material reward in the form of salary or wages, and (3) satisfactions derived from interpersonal relationships enjoyed with fellows, superiors, and leaders, whether spontaneously or consciously chosen.

It requires little discussion to establish the strength of these sentiments and valuations in buttressing men in their total sense of individual worth and security. A highly skilled workman is usually a proud and self-respecting member of his community; it is not hard to discern his quiet satisfaction and his dignified conviction that he matters in his job. Even men of lesser skill develop pride in their ability and demand the respect due workmen who know their business. From time immemorial, men have derived both creative satisfactions and a respected place among their fellows from useful work well done.

The pay envelope, in turn, plays such an important part in the individual security system because it constitutes the social measure by which a place among his fellows is accorded each man for his particular contribution to the work needed by his society. The size of its contents establishes social status both within the shop and outside. It makes a man feel the effective provider or the inadequate failure in the close circle of family relationships; beyond subsistence, it accords the power to buy the goods upon which our society places high prestige values.[6]

We are becoming increasingly aware of the extent to which a man's relationships with other men in the shop also condi-

[6] See Chap. IX: Conflict *and* Collaboration, pp. 225–227.

tion his sense of comfort and well-being. The quality of these relationships constitutes perhaps the largest component in what we usually term "morale." One who is accepted and liked by his fellows derives assurance from their fellowship; one who is ostracized soon feels the loneliness of his isolation. Sound relationships with one's superiors are certainly indispensable to a sense of ease with oneself and one's job. Acceptance by those over whom one exercises authority is likewise important; it constitutes an essential of effective administration.

An Illustrative Case

How all these factors express themselves in concrete behavior may be illuminated by the experience of a firm we shall call the Regent Company, when it made a complete change-over of its production program. During the early 1930's, at the very depth of the depression, the company decided to shift its output from the low-quality, cheaply priced consumers' goods it had been producing for almost a quarter century to a quality product that would compare favorably with the best in the trade.

From an outside point of view the success of the company was truly outstanding. The business expanded, thus creating more jobs, and the company's product acquired a national reputation for high quality. The management at that point launched an active promotional campaign. Newspaper stories covered the new product. Buyers and other guests thronged the company's showrooms.

But within the shop community things were not going so well. There, frictions of all sorts followed one upon the other. Stoppages, slowdowns, sit-downs became at times veritably epidemic. And almost every one of these occurrences seemed to be caused by some proposed shop change.

Quite understandably, the shift from low-quality to high-quality production entailed many changes in the methods

and organization of work. Employees had to unlearn old skills and acquire new and often more painstaking ones. The pressure seemed unremitting. The workers would complain, "The boss always wants something different and new; he always wants more quality." All this happened despite the fact that the officials of the union with whom the firm had been dealing for over two decades had cooperated from the beginning in the new production program. Consulted before the change-over and realizing that jobs would be made available to hundreds of their members if the program proved successful, they had given their approval.

Yet changes in method *had* to run up against stubborn resistances. For even though the shift in production overcame a grave danger to jobs during the depression, the rate of change was so rapid that it was a constant threat to the security system of these workers; affecting their ways of working, their earnings, and their group associations. Because the changes were introduced not only rapidly but also erratically — without manifest plan or any pulse of regularity — their seeming threat was sharpened; the workers found no way of adapting daily performance in all its social and psychological complexities to eventual acceptance of innovation as an integral part of the quality program.

An established process of work that had been paid on an hourly basis, for instance, was subdivided into specialized operations to be paid on a piecework basis. The workers who were affected not only felt discomfort in the changes forced upon their customary operations but also feared that the different requirements henceforth demanded of each of them might threaten their group solidarity by instituting piece rates that would result in varying weekly earnings.

Again, every new method of work urged upon a worker or a group of workers seemed to mean possible losses in pay. The workers were impatient in their demand that wage rates on new operations be determined even before the operations

had been adequately tested. Demands for rate increases constituted almost an unfailing response to a proposal for change in methods of work, whatever its nature. Time and again, groups refused to go on until new rates were set.

New foremen appeared in the shops as management sought out supervisors experienced in quality production. To the workers each new foreman promised more of that unwelcome pressure to "do it different." They chafed, not only because this pressure disturbed their familiar ways of work, but also because it seemed to belittle their craftsmanship. Holding intransigently to their habitual methods, they expressed their resentful pride to the arbitrator: "We've been in this work a long time and we know our business." The new foremen, with their quality experience and their insistence on quality work, almost invariably found that the balky employees made their first months very rough going.

The workers resisted inroads against their structures of interpersonal relationships. Thus they were more sympathetic with the old-timers among their foremen, who, as they put it, could "also get a call-down now and then." Among themselves the employees coalesced into tight little bench cliques, which became their instruments of defense against the unnerving bombardment of change. Management was vividly aware of the presence and activities of these groups, without realizing the forces that generated and maintained them. "If we have twenty operations in a room," the manager complained, "we'll have twenty little groups, each with its own leader."

These groups developed a remarkable cohesiveness. Their watchword for action, as they expressed it and their supervisors echoed it, was always "one for all and all for one." They adapted their tactics to the nature of the change they were asked to absorb. Periodically – or, to put it perhaps more accurately, recurrently – they simply put on their hats and went home. Management insisted time and time again that

some way would simply have to be found to stop these illegal walkouts. The union officials and the permanent arbitrator for the industry were compelled to give considerable time to getting such strikers back to their tools.

Recurrent unauthorized stoppages constituted the most extreme weapon in the workers' arsenal of resistance but by no means the only one. The craftsmen, now doing one subdivided operation in the process each had formerly performed as a whole, spontaneously applied to themselves the principle of equality in order to safeguard their fellowship; even though under piece rates some naturally earned more than others, they pooled their pay envelopes at the end of each week and divided the aggregate contents equally. In the same cause of fellowship another group, composed of women workers on piece rates, equalized not earnings but the opportunity to earn; none would begin work on her materials until all were supplied. Many bench cliques likewise adopted an attitude toward supervisory criticism that reflected this "one for all and all for one" sentiment. If a member of such a bench clique was taken to task for not following new methods, his fellows joined in angry protests and ostentatious adherence to the old ways of working. And all groups jealously protected their identity; their members either refused outright to work with new assignees or subjected them to such ostracism that these newcomers themselves soon requested transfer.

It must undoubtedly appear amazing at first glance that such constant turmoil could coexist with an outstanding achievement in production. The explanation lay in the fact that the general manager actually enjoyed a basically good relationship with his employees as well as with union officials. The workers' service records ran from one year up to twenty years and over, with the majority of the force long-service employees; the very frictions which developed resembled family irritations exploding into protest and rebellion against

an arbitrary but well-meaning father. In their calmer moments, even after a walkout, workers admitted that the boss really was "a good sort; he just loses his temper sometimes." And impatient as the union leaders might now and again show themselves with the general manager, they realized that he was an able businessman, not untypical in his failure to apply in human relations the same degree of skill he brought to production. To him his ends were good; they benefited workers as well as the company. He not only failed to understand the consequences of his means for achieving these ends in unremitting pressure on the workers; he was even outraged that union officials — and the arbitrator,too — did not enforce the agreement to free him from these "constant illegal stoppages."

For his part, the arbitrator served as a sort of safety valve when crises arose. Familiar with the many factors shaping behavior in this shop, he listened, as tensions reached a breaking point, to the complaints of union officials, management executives, and employees alike. Outside the area of "family" irritations, he refused to become overconcerned or overdisciplinary but handled each difficulty as it arose, confident that when the individuals involved had once more let off steam, they would return to the production of an outstanding quality article in their trade.

Thus the employees of this company revealed the disturbances that inevitably follow the threat to security systems sensed in any innovation, *i.e.*, the threat to workmanship, compensation, and interpersonal relationships. Bench associations became tight little defense groups maintaining constant watchfulness and resistance within the ramparts of the security system. Yet a sound structure of over-all relationships among management, union, and men remained, so that the resulting turmoil became a kind of family friction rather than a bitter industrial conflict. Nevertheless, the errors of omission and commission that accounted for this friction

high-light the inadequacies in industry's approach to the human implications of change – implications, moreover, that obstruct the very production goals sought by management. They emphasize vividly that administrators when planning new methods of work fail to make allowance for the emotions and sentiments that will be evoked in the workers who must accept the changes.

Suggestions for Meeting Resistance

The problem of what to do about these feelings constitutes the heart of the task in adapting shop change into the structure of shop relations. In terms of the diagnosis here offered, two areas for action suggest themselves: (1) The *negative* feelings must be brought to conscious recognition and given acceptance as a normal response to a situation of change; moreover, reassurance must be provided against whatever prospect of injury seems to be felt by those involved. (2) The responses stimulated by these negative feelings must be turned into *positive,* constructive channels by utilizing such affirmative values as the change may possess.

Mitigating Negative Emotions. What concrete measures offer promise for mitigating negative emotions? Perhaps the first is *prior consultation.* Present-day discussion of such consultation confines itself to the pros and cons of union-management conferences on these matters. But consultation that stops with union officials, as it did in the Regent Company, can never be enough. Union and management both must consult the carriers of shop opinion and sentiment at all levels – the foremen and stewards, the bench leaders and their groups, the particular workers involved, and anybody else whom specific conditions may counsel. It is the imposed change that constitutes the feared change; consultation offers an antidote against the sense of imposition.

Talking it over, however, must be more than a logical exposition. Instead of concentrating upon talking men out

of their fears, suspicions, or resentments by decrying them, instead of emphasizing the lack of logical basis for their fears, management must accept these emotions as the entirely normal and human response most men give in such situations. Even when the fears have some real basis, frank acknowledgment of this reality may prove helpful. The results may be painful, but men accept an unfavorable condition more readily if they are convinced that it is inherent in a situation rather than in an arbitrary personal decision, if they feel that everything possible is being done to cushion its impact. When fears have no real basis, when, for instance, a new incentive system of pay, a new process, or a job-evaluation study has been carefully and fairly formulated and no one is to suffer but rather all stand to gain, then talking things over relaxes tensions and dispels suspicions. Anxieties that are ventilated, accepted, and frankly discussed are likely to be relieved.

Introducing Changes Gradually. The proper *timing* of change constitutes a second important ingredient for reducing resistance. Too many new machines, too many new foremen, too many changes in methods or organization of work coming all at the same time or in rapid succession are certain to work havoc, as they did in the Regent Company. Time and again, the necessities of war expansions created parallel tensions among foremen and workers at the bench; the later reconversion to peacetime production introduced different but equally potent anxieties and unsettlement. When one innovation follows another, tensions sharpen, disturbances accumulate, and protest and resistance sooner or later result in stoppages or take on particularly stubborn forms of slowdowns. Indeed, as soon as we understand the emotional mechanisms that underlie the response to change, it is not hard to realize why the rate of change becomes an important component in conditioning response. The appearance of new demands and new threats before earlier ones have been met

multiplies fears and hostilities and so intensifies resistance. Thus it is important to allow enough time for assimilation and adaptation.

As integral part of such considerations regarding the rate and timing of change, what we might term the "rythm of change" requires the most alert attention. On the whole, management has acted as if changes are to be introduced whenever the time seems technically right for them, however whimsical and erratic the underlying decision may appear to the men who must assimilate the new methods. Yet unless shop change bears some manifestly planned relation to prior shop practice, including prior shop changes, shop operations bog down somewhere. We need, in consequence, systematic experiment and research into what constitutes the optimum rate of change in human terms – a rate that is adjusted to considerations of individual and group equilibrium by avoiding jerky, sudden and unprepared disturbances to work habits and associations.

Establishing Adequate Grievance Machinery. Just because change disrupts going habits of work, a well-understood *grievance machinery* fortifies against the sense of threat and danger. Systematic procedures represent a continuing and stable element in the midst of impending changes. The very knowledge that one can turn to such familiar procedures offers a source of security. Moreover, the grievances that stem from change, whether predominantly objective or subjective, yield clues to the type of resistance to be handled, provided the administrator has learned how to probe complaints.[7] A simple, normal fear may lend itself to straightforward acceptance and reassurance; a more complex sentiment, expressed through bench organization, may require protracted treatment.

Evoking Positive Feelings. All the measures for handling resistance thus far discussed are aimed primarily at the nega-

[7] See Chap. V, Handling Shop Grievances, pp. 79–92.

tive emotions potential in change. But what about positive values that may be evoked to win actual acceptance rather than merely to mitigate resistance? Manfestly, positive values, too, must be focused upon the three elements that the worker feels are threatened by innovations: earnings, skills, and personal relationships.

Earnings. It need hardly be said that the administration of changes must be made as fair as possible. The management that finds ways of sharing gains with its workers through an opportunity for higher earnings and better conditions obtains thereby a very real incentive for the acceptance of the change. Certain changes, of course, inevitably entail drastic consequences for the workers immediately affected. In such instances it is futile to look for any positive values. But, at the least, adequate offsetting measures should be provided: separation wages, retirement annuities, retraining for new jobs, transfers to plants when work is available — all these and more must be part of management's program. No one can be made enthusiastic for a device that may put him out of business or lower his standing, even though in the long run the community as a whole may benefit. Whenever possible, therefore, workers should be helped to see a tangible, personal gain for themselves in any proposed change; when actual loss seems inevitable, some protections and compensatory programs must be offered.

Skills. How can positive sentiments concerning the securities in skills and workmanship be evoked? By its very nature, the engineering that advances efficiency erodes craftsmanship. The whole process of reducing costs, in order to make more and more goods available at prices the masses of consumers can afford, calls for a constant breaking down of rounded, complex skills into simpler repetitive jobs. Skilled craftsmen still hold very important places in production, but an ever-growing proportion of workers take rank as semi-skilled and unskilled. There is still need for the toolmaker

and the patternmaker, but increasingly the machine and the assembly line dominate production. When this is admitted, how can the sense of workmanship afford a means of promoting positive support for new methods that are continually being developed? It is an old question that reaches to the very heart of a major problem in modern industry. Can workers be helped to see the significance of the seemingly detached minor tasks they perform in turning out the final product? Can men in industry feel the emotion experienced by members of a team, who also play individual segmented roles to achieve a common goal that has social value appreciated by the whole community? We must somehow recapture for workers their feeling of identification with the whole product their combined labor turns out.

Interpersonal Relationships. This simply means that in modern industry, with its division of labor, the satisfactions inherent in workmanship must be consciously tied in with those of good interpersonal relationships. The team as a whole, the working unit, alone can transmit to most workers the full creative satisfactions of work well done and of communal significance. Management must therefore give serious attention to discovering means for making each worker feel himself a part of the team.

The sense of identity with an institution, whether it be a combat unit, a school, an athletic team, or a shop, comes to fruition only when the individuals making it up share in the knowledge of the goals and of how they are to be reached, believe them to be worth while, and participate in the satisfactions of their achievement. Consider, for instance, the failure of the Regent Company in all these respects. Management never took the workers into its confidence regarding the purpose of the shift from low-quality to high-quality production or the necessary measures in daily operation; and then finally it shut them out from the satisfactions of success, taking credit alone for the achievement through its dramatic

promotional campaign. The workers merely read press reports of the big doings; they saw visitors throng the showrooms; they noticed interviewers seeking out management representatives; they heard of various festivities. Not once were they even mentioned. Instead, while everybody else was celebrating, the ones whose labor had contributed so much to the occasion that was being celebrated were expected to go on with their daily grind and to do an ever better job. Since they were not made to feel that they were participants who also mattered, little wonder that they remained unreasoning obstructionists. The lesson is clear and can be summed up in a few words: Each company and each industry must somehow explore the possibilities for communicating to wage earners, both factually and emotionally, the purposes of the changes it recurrently asks them to absorb and also the pride in worth-while achievement through constant improvement in production.[8]

Importance of Good Relationship

Indeed, concrete evidence in study after study supports the group approach by demonstrating that satisfying interpersonal relationships are major determinants of employee efficiency.[9] Even the turmoil accompanying the development

[8] *Cf.* Chap. IX, Conflict *and* Collaboration, pp. 240–248.

[9] Fox, John B., and Jerome F. Scott, *Absenteeism: Managements' Problem,* Harvard Business School Division of Research, *Business Research Studies* 29, 1943; Mayo, Elton, and George F. F. Lombard, *Teamwork and Labor Turnover in the Aircraft Industry of Southern California,* Harvard Business School, Division of Research, *Business Research Studies* 32, 1944; Whitehead, T. N., *The Industrial Worker,* Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1938; Roethlisberger, Fritz J., and William J. Dickson, *Management and the Worker,* Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1939; Mayo, Elton, *Human Problems of an Industrial Civilization,* The Macmillan Company, New York, 1933, and *Social Problems of an Industrial Civilization,* pp. 59-112, Graduate School of Business Administration, Harvard University, Boston, 1945.

of a new product in the Regent shop, it will be recalled, did not prove a permanent impediment, simply because general relations between the general manager, union officials, and employees were fundamentally sound. The Regent management failed to realize, however, that the bench groups might have been converted from the start into cooperative teams for advancing the new production program still further, rather than being driven to obstructive conflict as blind defenders of the old.

It would be well particularly for engineers and technicians, the men so often actually initiating new methods, to give thought to this whole problem of developing positive relationships with those affected *before* introducing a specific change. An interesting example of this problem comes from a mill in which yarn winders, confronted with no less than five major changes affecting their job, showed determined opposition to rate revisions based on time studies made by two engineers until the good relationship developed with them by a third engineer could be used to overcome the resistance.

A national company had bought the mill in which the yarn winders had worked for years. A new management always brings uncertainty and thus an alerted emotional watchfulness. This new management changed the production schedules by decreasing the proportion of cotton yarns and increasing that of rayon yarns, which in turn introduced various alterations in the details of work. For example, women who had held the same workplace for years were moved; those who had performed jobs using mixed yarns were changed to jobs using one type of yarn; some had to cover more floor space in tending their spindles.

Piece rates had always been set by the mill manager without clocked studies. It was now decided to establish rates by time study. Moreover, the winding room was to be the place where these new methods would be introduced; they would

be applied later in the other departments. Thus the first time study ever conducted in the mill followed upon changes in management and in production program. The study was to be made by an outside engineer, but because of wartime conditions five months elapsed before one could be assigned to the job, and it was another three months before the studies were completed. A total of eight months had elapsed before the new rates were ready.

Meanwhile the employees had been put upon time rates, a customary practice whenever rates are to be changed or difficulties impede piece-rate earnings. The net result, however, was one more change. For eight months these pieceworkers had been earning a guaranteed weekly time wage, fixed at the approximate average earnings under the old piece rates. In other words, for all practical purposes these employees had become habituated to work done on a weekly basis instead of on a piecework basis.

As the new piece rates went into effect, the winders complained through their union that they could not earn their former take-home pay. Thereupon a four-week trial period was granted, during which a second engineer was assigned to the plant to check the studies of the first one. The original rates were found to be correct. Even so, allowances were made for further changes in yarns; and the requirement of machine cleaning, taking from 24 to 30 minutes a day, was eliminated from the winders' tasks. Nevertheless, and in spite of a further check, in which the local union president participated, and which showed that the winders could earn better than their former take-home pay, the workers still refused to accept the new rates.

At this stage the dispute was submitted to arbitration. Study of the testimony convinced the arbitrator that the rates were sound. But by this time so many misunderstandings and suspicions had crystallized that a decision simply reaffirming the rates would hardly prove satisfactory. So many

emotional contradictions had developed that the winders just could not seem to grasp, for instance, that the standard time computed for their jobs made allowances for personal time and normal interferences. In addition, the very concept of average earnings, utilized to compare past and present take-home pay, puzzled some of them. They submitted as evidence the pay envelopes of those with the highest earnings before the time studies were made – evidence of the maximum wages rather than the average wages. At the same time, it was only human for those who had previously earned below the average, about half of the winders, to dwell upon the more recent and more favorable weekly time wage.

It was clear that the most efficient workers were now slowing down to protect the less efficient among their friends. Whereas on the old piecework schedules a difference of some 25 to 30 per cent in output and earnings had always separated fastest from slowest workers, under the new piece rates one and all were turning out the same production each day. As fellowship all this may have been commendable, but it constituted a serious threat to production. Moreover, the difficulty for management went beyond the winders' room; the suspicions generated by this initial study would prove a serious handicap as the engineers moved on to other departments. The winders were thoroughly aroused, and such emotions are infectious.

At the bottom of the whole difficulty lay the emotional tensions almost inevitable in such a complex combination of changes. The women had lived and worked in this small mill town for years; they were friends and neighbors as well as fellow workers; they knew each other. But they knew the national union representative only as a man who appeared now and then from another city where he had his office. They described this dispute as "the first big thing the union has handled for us"; relationships between union members

and union executives were still undeveloped. Furthermore, in their long years of service together the winders had naturally formed many individual and group work habits. Although the job processes described and measured by time study were the standard ones of good winding practice, they were not necessarily those of the daily job as these winders had performed it. Under observation the girls did perform the standard routines; but alone, when the engineers left them, they reverted to their former methods. And above all, to be measured by stop watch and slide rule was in itself a confusing experience.

It seemed to the arbitrator that only a newcomer able to establish a relationship of confidence and understanding with the workers could break this circle of suspicion, resentment, misunderstanding, and habit. He decided to send a time-study expert as his representative, a woman who happened to be a staff member of another union. She made it her business to win the confidence of the winders. She left her stop watch lying peacefully in her bag during the first visits. Not until she had won the trust of the workers, *i.e.*, established a good relationship with them, did she begin to use her watch, and then only after a thorough explanation of its application to their particular problem. She then spot-checked the new rates and confirmed their soundness. But this technical aspect of her job constituted only a minor part of her contribution. She related herself to the emotions that arise on both sides in such situations. She got the winders to speak fully and freely. She helped them to see the difference between average and maximum wages. They came to understand that the job as they always did it was not the standard measured job. They also unburdened themselves of many persisting suspicions about previous incidents.

The atmosphere in the winding room almost palpably cleared. The arbitrator then submitted his decision. He explicitly formulated and accepted the feeling the winders

had brought to the dispute, diagnosed its social genesis, and affirmed the soundness of the new rates upon the findings of his own representative. The girls were urged to give them a fair trial; the arbitrator said he was confident that they would earn at least as much as they formerly did, probably more. Now that they had got rid of their suspicions, the winders turned to their work with gusto. Their earnings went up almost immediately.

The Context for Policy

So much for the factors that generate resistance to shop changes and for possible measures to deal with such resistance. It remains important, however, always to remember that the most carefully formulated program must be related in its application to the specific context of the shop community into which the change is to be introduced. Each shop context will prove itself unique. The personality traits of the men initiating and of the men absorbing the innovation naturally differ from shop to shop; their association into bench groups and their quality of leadership differ, too. The varying organization and traditions of both the company and the union are relevant factors. The climate of community opinion shifts from time to time and with each shift alters expectancies and attitudes. The structure and maturity of shop relations exercise their specific influence. The better each administrator knows his particular shop community, and the more closely he fits general policy for promoting acceptance of change to its specific characteristics, the greater his chances for success in smoothing the integration of innovations into the existing community organization.

Concluding Remarks

Resistance to change in the shop, then, confronts management with a problem that for all its serious import has not yet even received recognition, not to mention a willingness

to experiment with measures for its treatment. Because they know that their ultimate objectives are right, the men who define their goal as the production of ever more goods at ever lower costs resent the interference of other men. Resentment, of course, is itself an emotion; it makes human resistance to shop changes seem like sheer human cussedness. The administrator then becomes hortatory and moralistic when he needs above all an open-minded willingness to approach human interference precisely as he does technical difficulties – as a problem to be studied and solved in terms of its causative factors. Resistance does have its causes; it stems from individual emotions and social interrelationships. The emotions are powerful, but they also are entirely normal. They must be accepted as the typical response of men faced with situations that seem to threaten their customary security systems. Yet change, too, must be accepted. If emotions are the dynamos of human response in social situations, change is the dynamo of technological production in industrial society.

For the union officials, it is the technological imperative that becomes particularly commanding. Of course they must always remain aware of the human needs and anxieties of their members, and the provision of satisfactory answers in adequate safeguards and protections for those justified fears is admittedly their first responsibility. But as soon as a union achieves real acceptance, when it has won status not only as a legal but also as a legitimate organization in a shop,[10] its executives cannot dodge the correlative technological necessities in change situations. Indeed, their very concern for members in many shops of an industry, their very quest for steadily rising standards of living must eventually confront them with the requirements of steadily rising productivity in each constituent workplace by which alone such improvements in human well-being can be assured. The ultimate

[10] See Chap. VIII, Wanted: Mature Labor Leaders, p. 187.

focus of union-management cooperation in the shop therefore must lie in the interrelated human and technological concerns of shop innovation. Precisely when they accept the real requirements of advancing technical efficiency, the union leaders, with management, must confront the problems of human resistance. When the rest of us facilely (and piously) demand union-management cooperation from the powerful parties who administer industrial relations, only translation of their value-loaded goal of cooperation into the realities of concrete human behavior in the shop can indicate the difficulties of the job we thus impose upon these administrators.

Clearly, the problems of shop relations created by the almost invariable resistance to almost inevitable shop changes are complex, challenging, and inescapable. The unsettled conditions marking the period within which they must be tackled intensify the difficulty. Only *after* responsible administrators become aware of the true nature of the resistance will experiment and experience tell what may prove the most effective answer. Awareness must come first. Given that awareness, we may hope that the men who can master the most challenging technological problems will not bow in defeat to this parallel problem of human behavior. Leadership in industry, too, as we shall now see, today requires, above all, an understanding of what makes those who lead and are led behave like human beings.

PART III

Leadership and the Road Ahead

Chapter VII

WANTED: MATURE MANAGERS

THE DAILY conduct of shop relations in terms of the psychological and social factors that make them human relations obviously calls for expert skills of leadership and even for new insights and approaches to the administrative content of leadership. It is not too much to say that the qualities of leadership developed on both sides will determine the evolution of industrial relations in the United States. The era of ferment and general upheaval is one in which the executives in charge of the fast-growing unions and the intricately interdependent machinery of production must direct joint dealings. This fact intensifies — in a very direct and human way, as we shall see — the difficulties these men must overcome in the local shops where men at work actually live with collective bargaining. Never before have those at the helm in industry needed for labor relations so steady a hand or so imperturbable a temper as now. Never before, to put it in a phrase, have industrial leaders been in such need of emotional maturity.

In the ranks of management such maturity is demanded from bench foremen to top executives; it is demanded not only of those who deal directly with personnel problems but of all who affect managerial decisions, of the treasurer and purchasing agent as much as of the plant superintendent and the personnel director. In the ranks of labor the same emotional maturity will stand the field representative and the headquarters official in good stead.

Company executives cannot wait for labor leaders to become emotionally mature, nor can labor leaders wait for company executives. Once more, as so often in industrial relationships, the patterns of feeling and action prove to be an interacting web of stimulus and response. True, the content of mature behavior in labor relations will differ as between union official and management representative, since not only the sources of their authority but also the nature of their controlling ends and the character of the means by which they must pursue them differ. The demand that maturity thus makes today upon union officials is a topic into which we shall inquire in the following chapter. Here we shall examine specifically the need for emotionally mature managers and the contributions they can make to the development of sound industrial relations.

An emotionally mature person is one who accepts unpleasant facts, whatever their genesis, as concrete situations to be handled rather than hated. Accordingly, the mature manager avoids personalizing the developments that are distasteful to him; *i.e.*, he avoids ascribing responsibility for them to individuals who then can be blamed and fought and punished. He knows from experience, of course, that the men with whom he must deal from day to day often prove tough-minded and hard at best, unreasonable and unfair at worst. He acts upon the certainty that unpleasant developments need not by any means be accepted always as irresistible; that compliance with everything his men may want, just because it is human for them to want what they want, hardly constitutes his sole recourse in present-day labor relations. Far from it. But in handling shop situations he recognizes difficult human behavior as simply another manifestation of reality, one more phenomenon in which given causes produce the effects that become problems. Upon social and human, as upon technical, difficulties he does not make hasty judgments – or moralistic ones; he remains analytical.

He does not exhort and preach; he inquires. Above all, he knows that the reality facing him in shop relations invariably proves more complex than any explanation simple enough to satisfy his anger or his irritation.

Not only in business management but in all circles such maturity might well become an aspiration. Certainly it still represents a scarce commodity. Most of us — college professors, labor leaders, union workers, dirt farmers, yes, and industrial executives — find it easy to believe that we miss our just dues because some other men with special privileges willfully stand in our way. It cannot be denied, of course, that injustice and wrongdoing still occur in our imperfect world. And under stress and strain, immediate satisfactions do come from yielding to the prime emotions: from striking back in anger at someone who is part of the difficult situation; from retreating into the reassuring approval of our own group; from denouncing and hating men who behave as they should not in terms of what we want of them. But it is even truer more often than not that when the going gets rough for obtaining what we want, the difficulties and frustration inhere in manifold, variously generated stresses and strains affecting those other men quite as much as they do us.

Because the very stresses that make maturity essential also make it difficult, the particular stresses under which management must carry on during the days ahead certainly constitute a test of the most exacting kind.

Provocative Context of Transition

It would be hard indeed to find a set of conditions more provocative than those of industry in transition. Historical turning points evoke the fears, frustrations, and confusions that generate conflict rather than controlled readjustment. Manifestly, the present is a time of profound disturbance and change in ideas, codes, relationships, and the delicate balances of group power. For the past quarter century, in-

deed, American industry has stood at the center of a veritable succession of crises that became turning points. From the upheaval of the First World War to the sharp struggle over union organization; from the false peace of the 1920's, in international and domestic relations alike, to the convulsions of world depression and ensuing social reform; from the cataclysm of the Second World War to the clashes over wages, prices and controls — by now, it would seem, we should have learned how crisis-situations unleash aggressive conflict under the propulsion of powerful emotions and sentiments.

Nor can industry be done with the ferment of a crisis-situation even when the emergency itself has passed. Not only do the emotions stirred by the crisis often persist, but resulting social changes become instruments for articulating new dissatisfactions. The unions that gained recognition during the 1930's by toppling existing structures of shop relations in the turmoil of highly emotionalized campaigns are stimulating the employee demands of these postwar 1940's. Reforms written on the statute books after prolonged debate and sharp struggle become programs to be widened and improved; they thus also become issues of further debate and cause new struggles. And if the focal issues of our postwar era have already been made clear, if management, labor, and government all accept the drive for mounting living standards and adequate employment opportunities as the prime aspiration of our time, it is management that confronts the task of maintaining our demonstrated productive potential to assure abundance and security within a world of flux and ferment and hence of profound uncertainties.

These are industrial problems of tremendous dimensions. As they are all external forces — that is, external to the individual shop — they seem to transfer the focus of policy from individual plants to the government. In sober fact, they create responsibilities for shop management more direct and more

comprehensive than its representatives themselves have yet appreciated.

Management spokesmen may remind us that social programs become very practical problems of cost at the level where goods are actually turned out; that the myriad new regulations and interventions designed by outside critics remain scraps of paper until they are integrated into daily shop practice; that the shop administrator must still adjust to market conditions the production schedules through which America pursues the goal of abundance, must still meet the pay rolls expanded by periodic demands for more wages and more jobs. True enough. But if industrial executives stop with these familiar reminders of costs, competition, and the like, they put too narrow a limit on their actual responsibility for administration. For then they overlook an invariable medium – perhaps the most important one of all – through which the greatest social forces are transformed into immediate problems with which management must deal. They overlook the complex processes of interaction by which external stresses are internalized to become the anxieties, sanctions, and expectancies conditioning the behavior of men at work.

This translation is precisely the one that a mature management must make. Industrial administrators must recognize how all such broad, generalized factors as reconversion dislocations, veterans' seniority, reduced overtime, a labor government in Britain, a communist government in Russia, a New Deal or a resurgent Republican government in Washington find their reflection in the feelings and conduct of the men and women working under their direction. Some of these factors generate exigent fears and anxieties; others yield social sanctions for the demands made to allay those anxieties; still others determine the forms of leadership that become either the reliance for satisfying the sanctioned demands or the target for hostility as obstruction in the way of new

aspirations. As one form of our democratic leadership, management must give thought to its position in the terms of these psychosocial processes by which environmental pressures become individual fears and wants and the quest for new relationships.

Individual Anxieties. We need hardly dwell on the anxieties into which industrial issues are transformed when they reach the individual worker and his family. The memories of depression experience remain vivid enough to render most Americans sensitive to the connotations, for instance, of employment uncertainties. What we do need to remember always is that for the American worker the national problem becomes an insistent personal question. Before reconversion, he asked, "Will I have a job next month?" At the shutdown of a war plant he may have faced still another disturbing decision: "Can I remain in this community, or must I move again?" The return to straight-time, lower paying civilian jobs after V-J Day spelled painful personal readjustments for him. A household which had been running on a combined family income of $3,500 had then to prepare to get along on, let us say, $1,500; the war worker portrayed in the demand for "52 hours' pay for 40 hours' work" was seeking to offset a drop of 30 per cent in his weekly income. Rising living costs translated themselves into shrinking family stores and reduced recreation. For the longer pull, the drive for full employment similarly represents for the wage earner a direct promise of steady work and thus a chance for individual and family planning — something far more immediate than the national plans and unemployment budgets over which the policy makers dispute.

At any rate, the process of reducing standards is a thing of stresses and strains, of fears and frustrations at any time and at any level. Yet recurrently with fluctuations in the demand for labor, the individual employee must face such poignantly personal problems embodied in this process. Typi-

cally, any threat of deprivation unloosens aggressiveness. It evokes angry, bitter emotions that propel the frustrated individual to the resistance best adapted to his resources in the situation. So it is that the worker, fearful of losing a well-paying job, a newly raised level of income, and an improved mode of living, responds to the threatening shop development with the resentment and hostility that engender ultimate resistance. Therefore, if external forces are internalized as individual worries, strains, and pressures, the plant manager simply must deal with them through the behavior they evoke from his employees. For such behavior obstructs daily production.

Collective Aggressiveness. The obstructions to production also are acquiring their typical forms. The aggressions resulting from external threats of deprivation find their most frequent expression today in group activities. Collective aggressiveness furnishes increasingly the characteristic defense against threatened loss on the job, as well as the instrument of further advance; rugged individualism gives way, as it were, to "rugged groupism."

Powerful unions, with their roots firm in American industry, now articulate and implement the protests and cravings of the anxious, clamorous men at the workbench. Through the unions the great social currents of our time are internalized in still another way. They enter into sentiments and attitudes. They provide social sanctions for the increasingly dominant patterns of pursuing self-interest through collective aggressiveness. For instance, union workers who demanded a 30 per cent increase in wages on the threshold of reconversion were motivated by something more than the natural desire to support their families in the style to which wartime take-home pay had accustomed them; they also were convinced that only mass purchasing power can fully absorb the output of industry and so assure national prosperity.

Similarly, their ever-continuing pressure for measures

guaranteeing full employment draws support from something more than the natural human craving for a secure and respected place in society. They press these measures to defend private enterprise in a world where social systems, as such, are in competition with each other. The competition between private enterprise and state-controlled production, democracy and communism, individualism and totalitarianism will be decided, among other things, by the answers each provides, or fails to provide, to this challenge of full employment. Thus the spokesmen of "the common man" warn us insistently; and most of us have come to agree. Just as the rugged individualist long has equated his own pursuit of self-interest with the general welfare, the rugged collectivists now are armored in the righteousness of their own social equations.

All the unsettlement of this transition period seeps into the behavior of men at work. The hostilities of insecure workers, seeking ever higher returns from industry, become more aggressive as many different groups proclaim their demands as just and beneficent. Contrariwise, the most ardent affirmations of private management take on their undertones of defensiveness. Yet in every shop, management must produce goods and services through the labor of men responding to pervasive forces of this kind. Obviously, then, for effective management the administrator today requires, perhaps above all else, insight into the dynamics of human behavior. And a prime requisite for acquiring and utilizing such insight is the possession of emotional maturity.

MANAGER — KNOW THYSELF!

First among the demands such maturity makes upon the individual administrator is the old injunction: "Know thyself." But in modern terms what does knowledge of self actually imply for the administrator? It implies recognition on his part that his behavior, like that of his employees, has its

own dynamic motivations. He, too, acts under the spur of multiple drives, interests, ideas, and values. What he wants and what he does are conditioned by the same complex, "partly rational, partly emotional cultural setting"[1] as are the aspirations and behavior of the men who cross him in the shop. He too is reacting to the stresses of the times with his own anxieties and resentments.

The Fears and Anxieties of Management. Recall for a moment the typically upsetting situations confronting management in the turning points of recent years. Since the 1930's, the union organizer has got his foot in the shop door or has been persistently striving to get it there. Government, too, has encroached on shop affairs through continuing regulations and emergency controls. Plants that had to convert to war production, hiring in a tight labor market and training new workers, later had to reconvert to peace production, laying off workers in a surplus labor market, weighing job claims of returning veterans and displaced war workers, retraining old workers, and steering a course through wage strikes and their chain reaction of unsettlement. And all the time they have had also to keep a sharp eye on business competitors, rival unions, and government agencies.

Rare indeed has been the individual plant manager who has not felt from the start that each new interference with his wonted ways bodes him no good. His conviction of impending injury may be supported by very real experience, both his own and that of other managers, or it may stem from sheer worries and suspicions. But whether well grounded or not, the plant manager's concern over what these developments may come to mean for him individually underlies his basic response to the situation.

Here in essence is the human reaction to imposed change,

[1] *Cf.* MALINOWSKI, BRONISLAW, *A Scientific Theory of Culture and Other Essays,* pp. 3–6, 43–51, 120–131, University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill, 1944.

but this time with management rather than employees on the receiving end.[2] As employees respond to production changes, the manager responds to broader economic and social changes. In him, too, the threat of injury to his way of working and living evokes typically the reaction of fear, followed by anger against those whom, logically or illogically, he holds responsible.

He fears the effects of union and government intervention upon his ability to maintain profits or, more specifically, his own individual earnings. He fears their encroachment upon his "managerial prerogatives," a generalized term describing the status and conditions of workmanship essential to skilled administrative functioning. He fears deterioration of his personal relationships with others in the plant, particularly with the men over whom he must exercise continuing leadership. In other words, just as changes in production threaten the security systems of employees, so changes introduced by unions and government shake the security systems of managerial officers.

And fear stimulates in management, again as in workers, the same forms of human response through action. Initially, the administrator, too, would like above all to escape the imposition of these hated innovations — in his case, to insulate his plant from the disturbing currents of challenge and change. But isolationism proves an even less feasible mode of escape in industrial affairs than it does in international affairs. Nor can the manager beat back the feared change by all-out fight against it. Just as the worker no longer finds it effective to express his resistance by overt destructiveness like machine wrecking, so the manager can no longer use the same methods of fighting interference that he used in the past. He still may indulge in a bit of machine wrecking of his own kind, by shutting down his plants in an angry gesture of outrage and retaliation. But he cannot permanently

[2] See Chap. VI, Resistance to Shop Changes, pp. 111–120.

escape from collective bargaining; wherever he may move, it is still the law of the land. Widening government responsibility in economic life represents a world-wide trend. The social equations of labor receive ever broadening popular assent. National sentiments themselves, to sum it up, have been changing; the changes thus initiated, moreover, are still working themselves out through a continuing series of similarly unpalatable change-situations, the end of which no one yet can foresee. The men who must endure the stresses of turning out goods efficiently and profitably amid such conditions enjoy them no more than other men. They find plenty to fear and resent in looming developments. Understandably, they often are anxious and angry, even aghast.

Awareness of Feelings and Sentiments. Consequently, as mature managers their first concern for developing sound human relations through a time of crisis is the problem of what they must do with such feelings. As responsible leaders they must achieve their own controls; they cannot expect from the workers the same acceptance of management's normal anxieties that they, as management, must give to the equally normal anxieties of their employees.

A clue to the solution is afforded by the most dramatic experience of our day, the training of the greatest American armed forces of history. The soldier was explicitly prepared for the fear he would feel before and in combat.[3] He was counseled not to shrink from admitting he was afraid, not to believe that he was a coward because he felt what he did. Instead, he was to accept his fear as entirely normal response to a really dangerous situation. But he was not to act upon its initial impulse. He was not, for instance, to run away. Nor was he to dash headlong into the fight to demonstrate he

[3] See, for instance, *Psychology for the Fighting Man,* pp. 296–306 and 345–365. Reprinted from the *Infantry Journal* as Penguin Book S212, 1943 (prepared by the National Research Council in collaboration with Science Service).

was not afraid. Actually, so the soldier was taught, frank acceptance and understanding of fear might prove to be an instrument of survival. For fear helps prepare men for better defense. It makes them judiciously careful, willing to consider all the factors barring the way to a desired objective and thus better able to find the appropriate means for moving toward the goal. They can then put their reliance on their own trained skills in utilizing those means. In other words, if fear is accepted and understood in terms of its causes, it can be controlled and used constructively.

If these principles afford guidance to the plant manager, it is preeminently because he too is faced with threats or challenges that evoke in him deep-seated fear and anger. But the manager's problems also take on social complexities that make them diverge widely from the well-defined content of danger in combat. In sharp contrast to the alignment on the battlefield, the men facing each other in industry, even at the moments when they differ, belong in the larger sense to the same team. The men in conflict with the shop manager remain the men with whom he must work to turn out goods. Yet the concrete shop policies precipitating the conflict — the layoffs of reconversion, the dismantling or installing of machines, the revision of schedules — necessary though they may be to meet pressing production objectives, threaten the equally pressing interests of the men in the shop. And in the conflict-situations which begin to take form as management and labor confront each other with their respective fears, both seeking to secure their respective interests, there seem to be no trained skills, like those on which the combat soldier is taught to rely, for finding the way out of danger.

The Sources of Unrest

Prerequisite to all else in human relations, then, the manager must learn to know himself, to understand his own emotional reactions to unpalatable developments, to accept his

fears and angers as entirely natural responses to those situations, so that he can control them as influences upon his action. But when he has achieved such insights into his own behavior, he must next recognize that his employees' responses to these same stressful situations, even when they generate conflict, are equally normal. Seldom indeed does the plant manager proceed from such a premise. He does not, accordingly, accept the emotions animating his turbulent, restive workers objectively, as integral components of daily reality that must be handled dispassionately. Instead, with conclusive "logic" he establishes the unreasonable character of the demands made by his workers. He looks for formulas to handle the specific exasperations of specific strikes and walkouts and slowdowns. He traces the "irresponsibility" of union leadership and the incitements of "agitators" in the shops.

Let it be granted at once that often the manager uncovers real and pressing problems. Demands often are unreasonable in the immediate context within which they must be met. Unions have not learned, as they must, to key their actions to their focal responsibility in our interdependent economy. In so large a cross section of our population as the workers, there inevitably are men with deep-seated personality difficulties who become trouble makers. But attention only to such abnormalities and maladjustments, even though such attention is required, will not yield sound labor relations. For none of them, nor all of them together, constitute the essential source of shop unrest.

The real motive power behind shop conflict is in the wants and drives, the feelings and sentiments, of the typical American worker. Perhaps "typical American," without the word "worker," describes the sources of industrial conflict still more accurately. The workers, after all, belong to the same free, individualist American society of which their bosses, too, are citizens; the drives and aspirations of all of them

are molded by its characteristic values and disciplines. The quest for ever higher wages is part of the ambition to get on, to improve living standards, to give one's children better opportunities than his father enjoyed — all of which is sanctioned by the basic American creed.

But time and again when concrete demands for wage increases, job assignments, or some other improvement must be denied, the manager seems impelled to pass judgment upon the claimants as well as the claims. The factor that makes it difficult for even the most fair-minded, thoughtful administrator to see the normal motives behind vexing employee demands is his own consciousness of right acting. The course he must take in the given situation seems the only possible course and ultimately the best course for all concerned. He tends therefore to juxtapose right technological action (his own) against wrong human reaction (his employees').

An encounter of the author's revealed this common tendency with special clarity, precisely because in many important aspects the company president concerned showed himself able to accept the exasperations of shop behavior with mature objectivity. His company at the time was beginning reconversion. Almost at the outset the program was halted by an unauthorized stoppage. Condemnation of union officials and strikers alike was widespread, not only in the local community but in the press throughout the country. Still this employer commented, "Perhaps we have no right to impatience. After all the British labor movement did not become responsible and sober overnight. They had their growing pains; and probably when our unions have been accepted as long and as completely as the British, they too will have more disciplined members."

But when discussion moved to other phases of the reconversion problem, this fine objectivity gave way to moral indignation. Having shut down one of its war plants, the

company was offering its workers jobs in one of its prewar units. The men were refusing the jobs because they were not so desirable as those they had just lost, either in pay or conditions of work. With feeling, and at length, the manager condemned this refusal as "wrong" and "unreasonable."

In such a case, management's recourses were of course bound by the exigencies of the reconversion situation. The plant had to be closed; peacetime job rates had to reflect more rigorous considerations of cost than war work. All in all, therefore, the president of the company was quite human in his disappointment that the workers showed no gratitude for the company's effort to offer at least some alternative employment. But it is equally human for men to recoil from the apparent necessity of downward readjustment; such readjustments take time precisely because they go against every vital interest of the worker and his family. That is why criticism of those who will not readily accept the lower ranking, lower paying jobs that become their only alternative to layoff, in terms of what they have "no right" to refuse and of what they "ought" to appreciate, cannot be argued – or administratively applied. For such criticism reflects feelings and principles; it thus belongs to the realm of ethical valuation rather than of practical affairs. This same executive, moreover, would hardly expect anyone in his own circle of acquaintances to comply good-naturedly with the need for demotion or devaluation in position. Rather, he would most probably deplore the lack of fight in such a fellow, "licked from the start."

In other words, human behavior in the economic realm must not be judged by a double standard of values. The leader must, as has been well said, "be down-to-his-soles aware of how it would feel to be one of the led." He must be able to feel into the areas not only of his own immediate competency but also "those . . . affected by [his] acts of master leadership." He must know how the people thus

affected feel, "how the world looks to them, what *they* strive for, and what they think they strive for. He cannot be 'dead' in certain parts of human relationships."[4] Such understanding may not alter the action a plant manager must take when the policies he initiates are conditioned by such imperatives as those of reconversion, for instance. But it does shape the manner in which the policies are presented; it does induce willingness to explore jointly ways and means for lightening their hurtful impact; it does promote ability to canvass actual demands and potential conflicts with the same objectivity, the same searching type of inquiry applied to technological and financial problems.

Dangers of Truncated Realism. Certainly no requirement of leadership in our time is more crucial than this ability to feel oneself into the employee's place when confronting him with the severe consequences – for him – of right and necessary technical policy. Yet the behavioral mechanisms by which plant managers insulate themselves from such shared feelings are deeply rooted. None, perhaps, yields a greater armored assurance than what we may term "the cult of realism." Its adherents – and their number is legion – feel, as one of their eloquent spokesmen put it, that the engineers of business are "the last of the realists" – because they alone understand in all its implications the stern reality that industry exists to turn out more and more goods at ever lower cost; they alone recognize that industry must therefore embrace avidly every technological device for labor saving. This spokesman for business was scathing about theoretical people like college professors and ministers who talked also of human consequences and the satisfactions of men at work.

This kind of irritation with "sentimentalities" is vented by the "realists" in many guises, all the way from the old familiar derogation of men "who have never had to meet a pay roll"

[4] PLANT, JAMES S., Education for Leadership, *Educational Record*, April, 1944, pp. 118–126.

to what seems to be a division of the factors of production into special new categories of the sacred and profane. Engineering and finance possess a sacrosanct quality that renders any challenge to their alleged mandates a kind of profanation, so that stubborn realities of human behavior, which seem to get in the way of translating these mandates into action, take on aspects of the "wrong," the "unholy."

This sort of realist is, in truth, not a realist at all. For what he does is to truncate the reality that is industry, excluding from the title deed of realism the very real human beings whom he must manage. Instead of accepting shop reality as an organic social whole of many material and nonmaterial factors in interrelation, he compartmentalizes it into considerations of money, materials, and machines, which are "real" even when they are difficult, and of men, who are cussed or unreasonable when *they* are difficult. Thus he becomes eminently unrealistic in action, that is, as an administrator who must combine *all* the factors of production in the pursuit of his objectives. He identifies his own thought processes with the impressive "realism" of technology, just as he identifies his motivations with the impressive results in production.

Response to Total Environment. Thus we are brought once more to the vital requirement of maturity in labor relations. The administrator should possess precisely the capacity the pseudo realist lacks, the capacity to respond objectively to the daily realities that constitute his *total* environment. And the totality of the environment is the strategic strand in the patterns of stimuli and response that yield characteristically mature behavior.

Our normal daily environment, in industry as everywhere, is more than material, more than pecuniary; it is, above all, human. Industrial man, too, despite the technology that dominates his workaday world, remains always a social animal. Whether he acts as leader or follower, few indeed are the activities he pursues, the needs he satisfies, or the gratifica-

tions he obtains that do not involve him in relationships with other men. Evidently, then, the emotions and attitudes of these other men, reacting within the same situations and to the same natural or material or cultural forces, become an integral part of the realities to which he must constantly accommodate himself.

The quality or characteristic mode of a man's accommodation marks the degree of his maturity. Although some men kick a machine that refuses to run for them or angrily break a test tube that does not yield the compound they are looking for, they usually feel foolish afterwards. And few leaders, certainly, ever vent on nonhuman factors in their daily problems their exasperation for the difficulties they face. But many leaders still regard obstructive human behavior — obstructive of their own respective goals and wants in the situations involving obstructers and obstructed alike — with an indignation that leaves them feeling righteous and outraged rather than foolish.

It should not be surprising that many men in leadership positions, exhibiting truly astounding technical know-how, also exhibit this kind of emotional immaturity. Intelligence tests have familiarized us with the notion that chronological age constitutes only one index of maturity. The index of intellectual age also fails to describe the whole individual. Instead, we may now readily discern how any given man functions at any given time on quite a few different age levels — chronological, biological, mental, emotional, social.[5] About chronological, biological, or mental age the individual can do little himself; these largely "happen" to him, as aspects of his native endowment. But fortunately each normal individual by his own conscious effort can modify, or can be helped to modify, his characteristic modes of response so that he

[5] For a summary of current thought on this whole concept, see BAIN, READ, The Ages of Man, *The American Sociological Review*, Vol. 10, No. 3 (June, 1945), pp. 337–343.

develops the emotional and social maturity appropriate to the demands of the situations confronting him from day to day.

It is tremendously important that such maturity be achieved in industry, where its achievement obviously must begin with top policy-making executives. It is they who finally determine the policies by which each plant seeks adjustments to the evolving social developments that have such impact upon employee behavior. They must set the tone of transition and so also the atmosphere of changing relations. They transmit down the line of authority the mold into which lower ranking representatives cast and recast their approaches to human and social forces. And thus the achievement of emotional maturity at the top pervades the whole company.

Maturity in Collective Bargaining

Manifestly, an adult approach to these relationships must be spelled out in terms of actual functions. Consider, for instance, the crucial fact that employees today generally pursue their individual shop interests, as they conceive them, through group activities, through the formal institutionalism of union organizations and the informal face-to-face associations of bench teams. The manager who accepts this reality of group behavior must accept it actively. Verbal acceptance of collective bargaining as the "law of the land," for instance, is not enough. It is not enough to recognize that unions are here to stay unless that acceptance writes itself into behavior in every function that brings the shop administrator into dealings with union men.

When the mature administrator accepts a new social reality, even one distasteful to him, he seeks to integrate it into his daily environment. He endeavors to make the collective bargaining he must accept actually work. His acceptance of union organization therefore is itself eminently functional.

It is directed always toward the goal of sound dealings between management and men in daily shop affairs. It recognizes that every decision of shop policy, and so every managerial action produces its consequences in employee reaction. These reactions in turn become motivations, emotional energizers – fears, suspicions, and hostilities or, it may be, reassurances, confidence, and mutualities – that shape dealings at the next stage of ceaselessly dynamic relationships. The mature administrator always remains aware that collective dealings confront him not with a succession of detached episodes, each to be handled in the splendid isolation of its particular merits, but with a continuum of actions and reactions. Of course, he realizes that each episode must be handled by its appropriate methods, but he realizes also that the way it is handled will affect the episodes to come in shop relationships just as past action leaves its unfailing impress upon each present episode.

Organization. Thus, even within today's patterns of legal validation, by the quality of shop behavior one can almost differentiate between the newly organized shop that has signed an agreement after a bitter organizing struggle and the shop where the agreement followed an election or membership count without resistance by the management. For example, within a short interval an arbitrator was asked to render decisions in two disputes, both of which constituted first arbitrations under a first agreement, with contrasting results as follows:

(1) In one case, management had for some years been running away from the union. From its original home city in a Middle Atlantic state, it had moved southward, then returned again, only to backtrack north all the way into New England, where it located first in a large metropolitan center and ultimately in a smaller industrial community. There the union finally caught up with it during the tumultuous organizing campaigns of the 1930's. Determined this

time to make organization stick, the union organizers directed an intensely aggressive campaign against this runaway employer. Employees were bitterly aroused; and, as so often happens, their feelings did not subside when the overt struggle gave way to the administration of the agreement. Indeed, even the first arbitration quickly became one more avenue for conflict, with employer demanding discharge of hostile bench leaders, and employees exploding accusations at their management. Needless to say, the actual wage complaint proved a disguise for the underlying hostility. It required more than two years of combined union-management effort, with the help of the arbitrator, to stabilize relations in this company.

(2) In the other case, the contract had been negotiated after a membership count. Claims and counterclaims were amicably presented by union and management. It became clear that the wage issue also disguised the discontent generated by the home problems of a newly wed employee and the series of unsatisfactory adjustments by which the individual concerned attempted to create a shop status consonant with her home needs. For the union the case became a chance to demonstrate to the uncertain membership what organization could do for them. The employer, despite some initial perplexity, showed eventual insight into the varying drives generating the dispute, and he cooperated with union and arbitrator to deal as equitably as possible with the "aggrieved" employee. Settlement was achieved by mediation at the hearing itself.

Negotiation. Negotiation, too, proceeds in the context of feelings and sentiments generated during the stage of organizing, and renegotiation in the context generated by administrative experience under the agreement that has terminated. The actual bargaining procedure, in its turn, provides its own chain of psychosocial consequences.[6]

[6] See pp. 12–15, 26–29, 36–41, 106–110.

This does not mean that the mature manager engaged in negotiation will anxiously weigh each demand in terms of the aggressions denial may provoke. Negotiation has its skills and expectancies, and among seasoned negotiators each side knows the other is often ready to take less than is asked. But the angry, resentful (and therefore immaturely reacting) administrator uses the techniques of negotiation for other purposes than achieving a bargain. He converts them into instruments of continuing conflict; he utilizes them to keep the union in its place, a grudging, narrow place where the workers will find how little the new organization can do. He seizes every immediate advantage he can wring from the party of the second part; he capitalizes on the slip or oversight; he creates impossible burdens of enforcement and then denounces union irresponsibility. Again, the contrast between these approaches at the bargaining table may be emphasized by two actual cases.

(1) The experience in one case arose from negotiation of a first agreement. The management accepted the union on the basis of a membership count. Although no strike occurred, management had offered some resistance, and only after seven months was the first written contract concluded. The top executive of the plant found it difficult from the start to make his apparent acceptance actually functional in daily dealings. For understandable reasons he resented the union. His company had achieved through the century and more of its existence an enviable reputation for fair dealing with employees and customers alike. Though the wages paid its craftsmen were somewhat under the market rate they enjoyed certain privileges: sick leave of two or three days in any work week with no pay deduction (with half pay for longer periods of sickness), an insurance plan, and particularly a work schedule that gave them Saturday afternoons off.

During the war, however, as union wages rose, the em-

ployees began to crave the higher rates. Although the manager accepted the union's proof of majority mandate, he smarted also at what seemed to him ingratitude and disloyalty on the part of his employees. When the union finally won acceptance of the standard agreement for the industry, the manager's resentment found a legal outlet. During the negotiating conferences he made no special request for the standard hours clause. But neither did he point out to the union that the prevailing division of the 40-hour week into six days would end the Saturday half holiday in his shop.

Although the union eventually admitted its oversight, the manager made the more important discovery that employees do not easily relinquish long-established privileges. Very humanly, his workers wanted to retain their old Saturday half holiday together with the newly won higher wage rates. Very humanly also, the plant manager was punishing their "disloyalty" by insisting on literal application of the six-day work week established in the agreement. He was soon startled by an insubordinate refusal to work Saturday afternoons, two wildcat stoppages led by an employee with 11 years of service, and consequent disruptions of his production schedules. To make matters worse, the manager discharged the man who had led the wildcat stoppages. In the resulting impasse both sides had to resort to arbitration. Thus in a situation where organizing disturbances had been averted and everything in the history of the company seemed to favor achievement of good union-management relationships, conflict was generated because the manager acted upon his own feelings and sentiments to get even with the disturbers of established relationships.

(2) In contrast, an adult approach, exactly the opposite tactic, was pursued by a large-scale manufacturer in a basic industry during negotiations to renew an expired contract. Negotiations in this company usually were long and tough-minded. Under jointly formulated rules either side could call

for an adjournment at any time for the purpose of group conference. Another provision allowed either side to speak off the record at any time, although a stenographer made a verbatim transcript of the proceedings.

During the second day of the negotiations in question, the union spokesman made a proposal that the company representatives would have been eager to accept. But, after whispered comment, the manufacturing superintendent and the personnel director called for an adjournment. The latter pointed out to the union representative who had made the offer its implications for the union organization. "What you proposed would be very much to our advantage," the personnel director said in substance, "but I doubt whether you and the other union leaders could live with it." The union spokesman was brought up sharply. "Did I really say that? What a boner!" When the meeting reconvened, the union leader asked the stenographer to expunge his statement from the record. He had meant, he said to the conference, to speak off the record. The stenographer inquired, according to the rules, whether management would consent. An affirmative nod was immediately forthcoming.

The following day the situation reversed itself. One of the management negotiators spoke out of turn, as sometimes happens in human affairs, to propose a considerable concession to the union. The personnel director waited anxiously to see whether the union would capitalize on this mistake. Much to his satisfaction, the union spokesman called for an adjournment. "Did you realize what that fellow said?" he queried. "I surely did; what are *you* going to do?" was the reply. "Well, we would very much like to have that offer, but we know that the management couldn't live with it. Anyhow, this is pay day, and we're paying off." Thus when the meeting reconvened, the earlier exchanges were duplicated when management asked, with the consent of the union, that the record be expunged.

The labor-relations executive narrated this experience later as a demonstration of the dividends yielded by fair dealing, which undoubtedly it was. But the demonstration had still deeper implications. It demonstrated also the values of the adult, mature approach in collective dealings. Management had acquired a very real respect for the officials of this union with which it dealt. It found them hard-hitting men, but also men who were generally fair and responsible. Accordingly, management did not want to chance weakening them with their members in any way by grasping an immediate bargaining advantage.

Strengthening Good Union Leadership.[7] The need thus to feel oneself into the problems of the union leader, as well as into the emotions of employees, was illustrated in still another way in a very different type of industry and company. This shop furnished machine wipers to war plants. Its own employees received the low earnings typical both in laundering and textile manufacture, the industries with which it was associated. Their general wartime restiveness with substandard rates was accentuated by the high wages of war workers in the heavy-industry plants their company serviced.

When the textile union of which thye were members negotiated new contract rates, its officials were limited both by the wage levels of textile manufacture generally and the national wage-stabilization program. Although they won two successive increases from the company, the rates, ranging for most employees from 38 to 50 cents an hour, were still very low in terms of wartime costs of living, employee expectancies, and earnings among other war workers. The employees refused to endorse the contract granting the second increase but limiting the rates to a one-year term, despite the fact that it had been accepted by the union leaders.

[7] *Cf.* Chap. IV, Building Joint Relationships, pp. 65–67.

Management severely criticized the union officials involved. Yet against the existing currents of employee discontent and demands, the burden of enforcement placed upon the union proved simply impossible. As it was, the most responsible of the union stewards in the plant had to offset the formidable daily pressures through unremitting efforts to prevent wildcat strikes. Management could have strengthened these leaders by understanding the pressures from the ranks. It should have accepted an open-end wage clause conditional upon changes in national wage policy regarding substandard rates.

In short, then, the concrete connotations of maturity in union-management relations, can be derived only from the specific shop context in which action must be taken, precisely because it must always remain functional. The mature executive keeps his eye steadily on his long-term objective. He tests each step in joint dealings by the consequences it will produce for the relationships he seeks. He may, and of course often will, face emotionally immature union leaders, a situation which complicates his problem. But whenever possible, he strives functionally and actively to strengthen the effective union leader. What this may require of him in concrete policy, to repeat, will naturally vary with the particular situation in which he acts. In a negotiation he may face such opportunities as those just discussed. In handling grievances and in introducing changes, still different adjustments may be required.

In an industry like rayon manufacture, for instance, where the rate of technological change is so high that it creates chronic problems of displacement, a mature management may write acceptance of this reality and its human consequences into the agreement. The American Viscose Company has done so by its pioneering provisions for joint definition of technological change and for consultation upon each specific innovation, as well as for compensations to displaced

employees through dismissal wages or transfer to other jobs.[8]

Even in the potentialities of a strike "epidemic," the mature approach offers essential emotional controls. Management — and also the publicists who influence popular opinion — may well recall at such a time that during our history we have experienced and survived many grave strikes and strike "waves," particularly after the upheaval of war. We may profit by sober appraisal of the actual dimensions of any strike wave. We should determine realistically just how many of the more than 190 national unions functioning in our economy tend, in such a situation, to conduct negotiations like military campaigns rather than by conference-table give-and-take — how many beat the drums so to speak, and spring ultimatums and pronunciamentos that make headlines denied to less colorful bargaining procedures. Certainly the increased power of the unions and the mounting concern over steady production require persevering inquiry into methods for promoting industrial peace. But in this, too, we shall make sounder progress to the degree that we persist in conceiving the need as a joint exploration rather than a punitive expedition.

None of this is meant to imply that the individual manager operating in his specific plant or company must, merely because he is mature, alone bear responsibility for averting always and in all circumstances the negotiatory stalemate that makes a test of strength the sole alternative. On the contrary. Maturity enables him to estimate even the strike objectively in each concrete situation, in terms not only of its economic but also of its human consequences.

The demands that the union leaders with whom he deals are pressing may prove demonstrably excessive and "unreasonable" in their context of enforcement. But the excess may

[8] Article XII, Technological Changes, of an Agreement dated November 30, 1945, between American Viscose Corporation and Textile Workers Union of America.

stem from a variety of causes, and only in terms of its actual source can adequate countermeasures be determined. It may be that pressures from the ranks are strong; the members may feel deeply enough on the issues involved to undergo the personal costs and risks of a strike. In such a case the strike experience will function as a true learning process, with potentialities that will shape subsequent dealings. Or a young union organization may look upon the dramatic strike experience as a requirement for instilling a consciousness of unity into its unseasoned members. In such a case, management can do little more than permit the union leaders to appraise the risks.[9] The length of the strike, the willingness to compromise after a time, and the consciousness that membership emotions as stirred in the strike must affect the resumption of relationships will reveal the maturity of the union leaders with whom the manager must ultimately deal on the other side of the conference table. Similarly, still other factors may enter into strike decisions – internal union factionalism, interunion rivalries, the current vagaries of the left-wing party line, and so on.

The mature manager remains therefore always alert to the psychological and social, as well as the economic, factors that create the context in which he on the one side and union leaders on the other must weigh a strike decision; his maturity enables him to assimilate them all into a *total* situation to which policy will be adjusted. With the extension of industry-wide bargaining, of course, both parties will find themselves forced increasingly to weigh among other considerations the further possibilities of such legal regulations and government compulsions directed toward safeguarding the public stake in uninterrupted maintenance of essential production and communal services as the Labor-Management Relations Act of 1947 has introduced. But the greater the maturity the leaders themselves can bring to evolving joint

[9] *Cf.* Chap. VIII, Wanted: Mature Labor Leaders, pp. 205–207.

dealings, the better the chances of molding that evolution in the form they desire as spokesmen of focal industry in a democratic country. As a mature leader, each knows that every decision must be weighed in terms of the human feelings it will both satisfy and evoke among all concerned in our interdependent economy, to influence the further shape of things to come.

It need hardly be said that this counsel of objective insight into, and reckoning with, human emotions and sentiments in every concrete function of joint dealings from the conference to the strike is not urged upon the shop administrator as a form of antiintellectualism. On the contrary, the extension of rational controls into ever wider domains of social living remains the essential business of Homo sapiens. But without an understanding of the wellsprings of human behavior, attempts at increasing rationality in social relationships prove abortive.

Nor does the mature manager coddle his workers. A factory should never become a mental-hygiene clinic; its atmosphere must remain ordered, disciplined, and virile. An employee must meet the tests of job performance; he must submit, just as do his supervisor and executive, to the characteristic system of law and order established in the shop — the authority of management and the constitutionalism rooted in the union agreement. In the shop community, as in society generally, law stands above men, and thus constitutes ultimately the safeguard of these individual men themselves. Accordingly, when we trace the code of solidarity and the emotions that make workers slow down production or display hostility, we do not thereby endorse the codes or the emotions. But neither will it avail us to denounce them.

The mature manager seeks, rather, to understand this negative behavior in order to rechannelize and direct it, to harness the energies unloosed by emotions and sentiments to the joint objectives of the shop. This again should not

mean the manipulation or exploitation of emotions. The example of fascism abroad and democracy at home has given sufficient warnings of the dangers inherent in manipulating men. In the shop the goals of high productivity, human satisfactions, and stable relationships translated into joint concerns become the sound outlets toward which the administrator directs shop policy in terms of its consequences in shop behavior.

Need for Training

Obviously, we cannot look for the means of improving human relations in specific formulas or nostrums for handling now this difficulty and now that difficulty. The maturity we seek in our management group, from the foreman to the president of the company, demands patient and many-sided attention. We cannot simply choose technically promising "natural" leaders and expect them without help to become effective administrators, both in line and staff positions. Nor can supervisory and executive training be any facile thing of copybook psychology or inspirational ballyhoo. We need insight into human behavior, into the forces that make both for conflict and for cooperation.

To advance such insight, our schools of business and administration must prepare and offer truly professional courses drawing upon clinical material that gives appropriate emphasis to the human matrix in which policies are developed and introduced. Personality structures, individual and group behavior, the shop as a community wherein people agree and disagree, modes of accommodation, skills in building relationships – all these and more must be painstakingly examined as the determinants conditioning development of sound human relations.

The problems of administration are too critical, however, to wait upon the slow processes of training a new generation of administrators. Those now on the job who show a bent for

leadership should be given leaves of absence for full-time attendance at such university courses — courses perhaps especially devised for such practical men and planned within a time limit that will not make them prohibitive for the companies concerned. The training should then continue on the job, with daily experience and problems utilized to sharpen insight and skills. Ideally, a foreman should have at least as much training as a teacher; a superintendent or general manager, as much as a physician. The shop should serve as the clinic where practice complements and tests university teaching, much as the hospital serves the educational program by which physicians are trained.

Concluding Summary

A large order? Perhaps. But the job of management in present-day industry is itself truly a large order — endlessly complex and difficult. The men who manage the contemporary economic institution that we call a company face problems as tough and as challenging as those confronting the most advanced professions. Indeed, few professions today find their typical daily problems shaped by so portentous a range of influences as does industrial management. Unsettlement and the leftward drift of our time of change are variously internalized by the people working under each shop administrator as anxieties, sentiments, ideas, and sanctions. These in turn find expression in demands and drives that continuously disturb shop equilibrium and are implemented by union organizations that are generally powerful and often young and crude.

Difficult as is his task, the manager can hardly afford the luxury of retaliatory resentment. Instead, he must grant to the underlying motivations of workers who are always crossing him the validity that inheres in the aspirations to "get ahead." Administration then becomes something more than separate handling of disjointed problems — of objective action

to meet technological difficulties and moralistic reaction to human ones. Administration becomes truly the management of a continuing flow of interrelated factors, mutually interactive, with technology impinging on behavior and with behavior impinging on technology.

Chapter VIII

WANTED: MATURE LABOR LEADERS

THE CHALLENGE of maturity poses for the labor leaders problems equally momentous in their potentialities, if different in detailed character, from those confronting the manager. Just how portentous those problems are became dramatically clear as the whole nation after the war took measure of the greatly augmented power that had come to organized labor during the preceding decade. Uneasily, angrily, perplexedly, the people watched basic industries and essential services shut down one after another by the determination of workers and their spokesmen to obtain their demands for wage increases and other improvements in conditions of employment. Strikes, it may be said once again, were hardly then new experience; nor was it a novel discovery that revealed to us how interdependent are all the segments of the American economy. But the industry-wide strikes of 1946, on the threshold of reconversion at home and at a moment of tragic human needs abroad, stood forth as threats to our whole social structure.

One crucial question – or, perhaps better, one sentiment – regarding these highly charged developments in American industrial relations was left after the climactic tensions between national unions and management in basic industries had revealed how complex were the difficulties for which we now had to find an answer: Can labor leaders achieve the maturity essential for harnessing the evolving program of unions to the responsibility commensurate with their new power? Can they achieve the controls from within that alone

will give final answer to the demand for the controls from without, embodied in legal regulation?

The *need* for such maturity will not be questioned in any quarter. The sound development of industrial relations in this country requires of labor leaders the same maturity we expect of business administrators. For management alone can no longer attain the cooperation of the working force so essential to efficient production. Union leaders too must be reckoned with — as participating administrators if the shop is organized; as watchful, threatening challengers if it is not. Leadership in industrial relations becomes ever more widely a combined operation of management *and* union.

Thus it is that the demand for responsible, mature labor leaders grows ever more insistent. But it remains also largely exhortation and denunciation. We have yet to ask soberly just what such maturity entails for the labor leader in the content of his daily job. We have yet to put ourselves, each one of us, in the place of the union official who would honestly meet the full responsibilities of his strategic role in industry, and then to analyze just what this means in terms of specific performance.

When we do become seemingly specific, we seem also to subject these labor men to an unrealistic standard. They are expected to enforce a disciplined observance of agreements upon the most restive membership and at the same time to submit to its democratic control; to serve simultaneously as instruments of the group will and as curbs upon it. They are criticized for entering negotiations without power to settle, or with that power backed by a strike vote against the eventuality of failure to settle. They are exhorted to accept a wide responsibility for safeguarding economic welfare — and to keep hands off all but a narrowly defined area of shop decisions. They are frequently classed with racketeers who pursue their predatory way outside the law and with politicians who get out the sovereign vote that remakes the law.

In actual fact, the effective union leader must meet just such diverse demands, and therein lies the crux of his problem. (Leave aside the lawless fringe, the racketeers who muscle their way into certain organizations. They are few in number, and the problems they create are relatively simple compared with those confronting the honest union officer who wants to do a good job.) It is these inherent complexities of the union leader's total job in industry that make maturity in thought and action at once so important and so difficult for him. It is in terms of these complexities that we must ask what concrete suggestions can be offered to the many union executives who sincerely wish to reach the goal of mature, responsible leadership toward which we all would head them.

Obstacles to Maturity

The first step in moving toward any recognized goal lies in acknowledgment and understanding of the obstacles in the way. The typical daily relationships within which the labor leader must act confront him with paradoxes and difficulties that sharply contrast his problems of mature behavior with those of the management executive. He must be many different things to many different men: to management, union members, and the public. He must meet their varying expectations of him under difficulties that arise today chiefly from (1) the multibranched sources of his authority, (2) the external stresses that affect him and the men he is leading, and (3) the nature of his continuing objectives in a time of momentous transition.

Sources of Authority. It is true enough that the management executive must, directly or indirectly, obtain consent to his decisions from the men under him; the importance of such consent now receives ever-increasing recognition. Nonetheless, the manager still wields authority over his workers as of right — a right delegated to him by the owners of the

business. The labor leader, in contrast, is the elected representative of these same men; unlike the manager, he can be removed from office by them. Without their consent to policies and decisions, his very leadership is jeopardized. In his case the need for consent is not supplemental; it is inextricably woven into the very web of his leadership. Even more, it is conditioned directly by the results he achieves in promoting the interests of his followers. Thus his linkage with the union membership corresponds to the manager's ties with the stockholders he serves rather than with the men who work under his direction although it is the men at the work benches whom both must lead.

Even this comparison of union members and company stockholders must allow for subtle differences among equally subtle and significant similarities. In each case, these respective leaders in industry will be judged by their success in profitable operations; just as stockholders generally leave company affairs in the hands of a management that earns satisfactory dividends, so organized workers leave union affairs in the hands of officials who win wage increases and desired shop gains. Union leaders, however, must keep a watchful eye on their position in ways quite unnecessary for the manager.

While the manager also, of course, is a representative official, his awareness of his stockholders need hardly be intensely personal. Usually they constitute a somewhat indistinct, scattered electorate, who do not bother him so long as he yields them the going dividend rate. The dividends earned for the stockholders by the particular company he manages represent for most of them only part of their income; and because their total income is based on a diversified portfolio, they are satisfied with a more or less stabilized return from any single source. The union leader's "stockholders," on the other hand, do not accept any parallel notion of stabilized return from the company for which they work.

With the job their sole source of income, they look to it for more and ever more — for a rising standard of living, for economic security, for industrial citizenship, for "more" spelled out in many ways beyond the pay envelope. Thus the union leader is continually subject to challenge by the crucial test of how much he gets his members. He must always explain or defend his policies and programs. He must maintain constant watch over supporters and rivals who readily promise more. He wins his position and then retains it always as a political leader.

The pressures of union members on their leader thus are always vivid and direct. They make him spokesman of a protest movement that recurrently upsets the equilibrium so essential to effective business administration. As a union leader matures, he, too, acquires concern for costs and the solvency of a business as a secure source of jobs; but he cannot make this concern an effective element in shop relations until he succeeds in carrying his people with him. Just as the management official must, for mature leadership, look beyond the material processes of his company to the people with whom he works, the union official must look beyond the immediate pressures of his very human members to the material soundness of each individual company that so vitally affects them as people. Maturity thus finds union and management leaders approaching the same goal but from opposite starting points.

External Stresses. Again, like management executives, union leaders must approach their goal through relationships with many different men reacting variously to great external stresses — successive economic upheavals, world war, social reform, government intervention, and the competition of socialist, communist, and fascist economies. They, too, must seek answers for the restive men at work, as these forces are internalized to become anxieties, demands, and sanctions. They, too, must chart a wary course amidst changing na-

tional policies. They, too, must direct their staff and line officials through the uncertainties of changing group relationships. They, too, must resolve shop issues across the conference tables with representatives of the other side, who are also profoundly disturbed by these new social forces.

Yet when every allowance for these external stresses has been made, the central challenge for mature union leadership stems from the very specific internal change they have wrought in American labor organizations. From marginal, barely tolerated institutions, trade unions have become within these years of change and upheaval outstanding aggregates of group power in the nation. The long historic struggle for recognition has ended. No union can now be denied the right, through the processes of collective bargaining, to speak for the employees who give it a majority mandate. Seasoned union officials have long recognized the grave difficulties that arise when both local leaders and members must convert their relationships with management from the conflict over recognition to the cooperation implicit in a signed agreement.[1] Now organized labor as a whole faces this selfsame transition from fighting to administration. *The development of mature union leaders thus becomes one of the imperatives of our times.*

Transition from Organization to Administration. After union recognition has been won, the appeals used during organizing must be tranquilized, supplemented, and rechanneled – especially these three appeals: (1) the ever-expansible desire for economic gain, (2) the force of group solidarity, and (3) the impulse to hostility and aggression.[2] These drives can never be completely superseded. Although the technique of business administration should, after recognition, take primary place over the techniques of the organizing fight, unions remain basically fighting organizations. On

[1] *Cf.* Chap. IV, Building Joint Relationships, pp. 60–65.

[2] *Cf.* Chap. II, When the Union Enters, pp. 14–17.

both sides, the administrators who would achieve maturity must recognize this fact from the start as a reality; it avails little to pass judgment upon it. By such recognition they will spare themselves futile effort and consequent disappointment.

The tenacious reliance of unions upon the ultimate test of strength — that is, the strike — inheres in their intrinsic character as protest institutions. Labor leaders dwell proudly on the record of progressive improvement in workers' conditions achieved through ceaseless employee pressure. The short and simple annals of the poor have become, in democracy, a complex serial story that is never ended. There have been many stages in labor's advance: from the sun-to-sun day to the 40-hour week, from the struggle for free public schools to the spread of university extension courses, from the Malthusian fear of pauperization to social insurance, from machine wrecking to guaranteed work and wages, from the black list to job rights, from the iron law of wages to the purchasing-power theory; and invariably each gain has proved to be but a way station along the march to the goal ahead. The goal itself keeps advancing.

Because the advance has been always a battle also, the union, even after recognition, continues to be a fighting organization. The same dynamism of protest that animated unionism when it was struggling for acceptance now animates accepted unionism. The same motivations play and interplay. Protest expresses dissatisfactions. Dissatisfactions evoke hostility. Hostility promotes the aggressive quest for more. The quest for more reinforces the typical American drive to get on in the world, the solidarity of job fellowship, and the latent antagonisms against those in authority.

But the trade-union official who is mature has learned that if administrative procedures do not supersede the old basic drives, they do, and indeed must, temper them. Certainly today, when unions have won wide acceptance, the drive

for economic gain must be harnessed to considerations of productivity and costs. Group solidarity must be integrated with wider communal loyalties. In our interdependent economy, unions must accept responsibility for general welfare, not only for special-group welfare. The uses of hostility must be far different in unions that have attained an effective place in industry from what they are in organizations still struggling for recognition.

Achieving Peace through Conflict

The labor leader must recognize that peaceful advance has now become his major mode of progress – and that he must harness the motives of conflict to attain full effectiveness on the new course. This is a crucial change, indeed, and far easier to prescribe than to accomplish.

For the labor leader's central objective remains unchanged; it is simple, clear-cut, dynamic: improvement in conditions of working and living for his members. In pursuing that objective, however, in the stage of administration quite as much as in the organizing stage, the good union executive must fill a variety of conflicting roles. He must be the potent commander of a fighting organization, the rallying leader of a fraternal society, the democratic director of a political association, and the efficient business administrator of what amounts to a marketing cooperative: a group of men acting together to sell their own product, which is labor. For effective performance, these four functions of the job do not draw upon the same patterns of membership response or the same structure of leadership. In particular, the business function that becomes dominant in the transition to administration differs radically from the other three in its requirements.

The membership loyalties and group cohesiveness needed in a fighting, social and political organization can be built with tempting ease by militant action and appeal to militant motives – the militancy that is so characteristic of the or-

ganizing stage of development. This very militancy, however, gets in the leader's way when he is engaged in joint dealings with management under contract, *i.e.*, in administrative matters, and thus hamstrings the discharge of the business function.

Again, assured tenure of office emerges as almost a prerequisite for effective discharge of the business function. It is generally recognized that effective negotiation and administration of trade agreements call for a high order of skills. In his dealings with management, the union executive needs real business skill, which he can acquire only with experience. The necessary experience, in turn, can be accumulated only by continuing tenure in office. Yet this essential security of tenure finally can be won only by political expedients — by the machine politics that are at odds with the internal democracy required for the political health of the union, as well as with the feelings of personal involvement and identification demanded by the fighting and social functions.

Thus the innately contrary pulls of the job itself propel the union leader to militancy when his leadership is insecure and to the power relationships of union "dictatorship" when he has won security. Three factors reenforce this propulsion: (1) the role played by conflict situations in internal union affairs, (2) the heterogeneity of the whole union structure, with interunion rivalries often dictating the course of action that individual unions must follow, and (3) the unions' suspicions of management, fortifying their belief that they still are engaged in a struggle whose issue is their very existence and continued growth.

Role of Conflict in Internal Union Affairs. Conflict-situations, especially when leadership is still fluid and unsettled, seem to provide a channel whereby internal union affairs achieve maximum vitality. The political indifference of union members constitutes a baffling difficulty for the mature

leader who would temper hostilities and aggressions in joint dealings. Getting out a good attendance for local union meetings has presented a long-standing problem. Meeting night competes for the member's attention with many activities more enjoyable than usual union business or the content of day-to-day administration: the auto, the movie, the social club, the athletic contest, the intimate concerns of friendship and family life. But this inertia and lack of interest gives way to potential or actual conflict issues — to major questions such as wage demands, strike activities, and struggles for union office.

Take the matter of union elections when a sharp clash for important positions is under way. Conflicts in the shop continuously interact with such contests for office. Bids for union votes, as in all democratic politics, are usually couched in terms of promises — the concrete economic gains the candidate will bring to those who vote right. The union leader cannot remain insensitive to the effectiveness with which war psychology, in the union as in any social situation, cements membership and mobilizes loyalties. The rank and file may grumble and grouse and criticize their leaders, but they support officials who prove good fighters.

In office, this leader wants to fend off rivals; his lieutenants must be made to recognize that their own security lies with him. For their part, management's spokesmen want to deal with union officials who can assure observance of agreements. But it is difficult for a leader who faces periodically the danger of losing office to make himself also a stern disciplinarian. Somehow he must win the control over conventions that assures election results. Thus, sooner or later, as his organization stabilizes, the union government he leads becomes identical with the political machine that maintains it in power.

Heterogeneity of Union Structure. These intrinsically conflicting pressures are increased by the conditions under

which the labor leader must today perform his job, to prolong militancy further and intensify the drive for power within and among the unions. For the labor movement, so called, does not constitute a unitary, homogeneous structure to be converted uniformly from one central objective, organizing, to another objective, administration. Instead, it presents a complex of organizations, variously affiliated, of varying history and tradition and at various levels of development. At a time when some unions were just beginning the experience of normal joint dealings under normal peacetime conditions, others had long enjoyed the stability of accepted parties to collective bargaining. Obviously, the transition is not single-tracked.

Each union in this total structure presents a unique set of circumstances for leadership. Generally, the more recently organized unions, like that of the automobile workers, elicit from both unseasoned members and factional leaders patterns of response quite different from those typical in such older, stable organizations as the railroad brotherhoods. But even age does not constitute an unfailing index of maturity. The automobile workers, for instance, also differ from the steelworkers, although the two unions came into being about the same time; the steelworkers, with their historic traditions of union effort and their seasoned leaders taken from older unions, manifest an understandably greater stability. In precisely the same way among the older unions, too, the degree of maturity varies; the traditions, history, and conditions of work in coal mining have yielded patterns of militancy as contrasted with the cooperative attitude of the needle-trade workers. And finally, of course, each individual leader himself leaves an imprint upon the context within which his union's policy develops; his personality and characteristic modes of response inevitably assume an important place among the many interacting factors that determine the quality of relationships in the union he leads.

But when all allowance for individual union characteristics has been made, the fact remains that the very heterogeneity of this whole union structure places the balance of tendency on the side of militancy and excessive demands in wages and working conditions. Unseasoned leaders often force the hand of their older rivals even in straightforward wage programs and strategies. Union members generally keep a sharp eye on what their fellows are getting or seeking in other unions and trades.

The threat of rival leaders accentuates the drive for power; each leader wants to hold his own and to gain new members as quickly as possible. So bitter, indeed, are these rivalries among affiliates of the major central federations, the CIO and the AFL, that even within the house of labor itself the threatened clashes are feared as a greater danger to evolving collective relations than any other single factor. For group unities can be welded more quickly, alas, by the consciousness of an enemy than of a friend; hostility offers a better cement and a quicker source of strength than mutuality.

Competitive bidding for employee loyalties by union rivals and nonunion companies, in turn, utilizes the tokens of large economic gains traditional to the organizing period as a whole rather than the tempered advances of administration. And certainly there are sufficient unorganized regions and unorganized sectors or units to submerge the troublesome problems of administration in the more familiar, more dramatic preoccupations of the struggle for recognition.

CASE EXAMPLE: — RECONVERSION AND LABOR

Thus, in the melee of ordered wage negotiations and warlike wage campaigning that culminated in strike shutdowns after V-J Day, it was, with few exceptions, the new unions that beat the tom-toms. Virtually all the unions, of course, had been planning to ask for large wage advances. To a significant extent, management also seemed ready to grant

what in most times would have been considered substantial increases. Here was a typical situation calling for negotiation, industry by industry, regarding the actual amount by which wages should be raised. But when the demands for increases of 30 per cent or $2 a day were made public in propaganda barrages, administrative procedures became difficult. Whether functioning in the same industry or in different industries, most rival leaders had to get for their men at least as much as, and if possible more than, the wage advances that soon became the national pattern.

In trades where a long-established union dominated the field, however, some experienced union administrators did succeed in withstanding the pressures of undiscriminating militancy. Consider, for instance, the manner in which the Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America handled negotiation efforts on behalf of three separate trades, yielding each a different advance. Clothing workers gained a general increase of 15 cents an hour, piece-rate adjustments, a retirement fund (3 per cent of pay roll) and six paid holidays. Shirtmakers received an increase of 10 cents an hour and six holidays with pay retroactive to December 3, 1945. The laundry workers of New York obtained 60½ cents an hour as a minimum wage, a 10 per cent rate increase with a maximum of 10 cents an hour, reduced working hours beginning November 1, 1946, vacations with pay, five paid holidays, insurance benefits, and parallel adjustments for drivers and maintenance men. In announcing the terms of agreement negotiated for these three trades, the officers of the Amalgamated Clothing Workers interpreted the differences as ". . . natural, both because of the specific nature of the industries and also the realistic approach taken, as always, by the Amalgamated in governing itself by conditions characteristic of each trade."[3]

When an older union had to compete with a younger rival

[3] *Advance,* Vol. XXXI, No. 24 (December 15, 1945).

on the other hand, it proved almost impossible to maintain such a realistic approach. Thus the experience of the Amalgamated Meat Cutters and Butcher Workmen of North America, AFL, reflected a fruitless struggle to pursue policies deemed administratively desirable. When its officers initiated their program for wage increases, they projected an atmosphere of sober negotiations. While the officials prepared to ". . . push vigorously the desire of our people in the industry for more pay," they renounced any "intention to ask for a pay boost that would make our demands seem ridiculous from the viewpoint of both the public and the packer offidialdom. . . . . Our organization will never swerve from its policy that more in wages should not be demanded at any time than an industry can stand." Expressing the hope that no strike threat would have to be made, they declared that their whole program as well as the negotiations would be "businesslike and constructive."[4] As the wage negotiations proceeded, this union exchanged verbal blows with the United Packinghouse Workers of America, its CIO rival, deriding the latter's strategy and challenging its allegedly inflated promises and claims.[5] But when the younger organization had brought its own wage strategy to the brink of a strike, the AFL union (perhaps unhappily but nonetheless unmistakably) declared from the start for a solid front and also called its members out on strike.[6]

Over industry as a whole, quite as much as within any single industry where union rivals operate, the struggle for power and position reflected itself in the course of postwar bargaining. Most familiar – perhaps because most dramatic and arrogant – became the maneuvers of John L. Lewis,

[4] *The Butcher Workman,* Vol. 31, No. 10 (October-November, 1945), p. 1.

[5] *Ibid.,* Vol. 31, No. 11 (December, 1945), pp. 1 and 6.

[6] *Ibid.,* Vol. 32, No. 1 (January, 1946), pp. 1 and 3 and *The New York Times,* Sunday, January 6, 1946, Section 4.

pitting himself in the name of the miners explicitly against the operators and then the government, but implicitly too, as most observers agreed, against all the union rivals who contended with him for first place in the leadership of the whole labor movement.

The same union rivalries were intensifying the intrinsically militant, emotional struggle of organizing, which manifestly was not yet exhibiting any signs of abatement as the area of the administrative function was rapidly widening. Hardly had the first strike wave for postwar wage increases begun to ebb when both the CIO and the AFL mobilized forces for an invasion of the South. Whatever may be the merits of such organizing campaigns, they keep alive the older, more virulent kind of hostilities in industry. These hostilities, in turn, readily make themselves felt in the administrative functions that mature union leaders must concurrently discharge, largely because the legal validation of collective bargaining is relatively so new. Despite the legal status now enjoyed by their organizations, many union leaders still wonder how much real acceptance management gives them. In industrial relationships, as in all social relationships indeed, a sharp distinction must be made between legalization and legitimacy. Unionism has been legalized in the United States; it has evolved into legitimacy in Great Britain. Collective bargaining is statutory law in American industry; it is prevailing custom in British industry.

Suspicion of Management. The mature union leader, accordingly, must recognize that his habitual responses still reflect the insecurities of the turbulent organizing period — as actual events once more have demonstrated. For as the war drew to a close, the spokesmen of labor braced for an onslaught. "It is reasonable to suppose," the Executive Council of the American Federation of Labor reported to the convention of 1944, "we will be forced to meet a severe test when the war is over. No doubt the enemies of labor will unite

against us. That means we will be compelled to face united opposition on the part of our enemies and changed economic conditions will seriously affect our efforts to maintain American wage standards and conditions of employment."[7]

Philip Murray similarly articulated widespread suspicions among union leaders when he raised the alarm against the forces that were attempting "to sow the seeds of disruption" even during the war. "We have already seen," he warned, "the efforts on the part of some to divide veterans and labor. We must take heed in the strides that have been made by our enemies in creating points of conflict between farmers and labor. The arch antiunion industrialists in a particular industry will seek to mobilize all industrialists behind their union-busting program and thereby inject strife in our national life." In the same vein he prepared the automobile workers for the dangers he saw ahead in their particular industry: "There is an organized or evidences of an organized conspiracy to destroy you, to weaken your influence, to undermine you, to scandalize your leaders, and through the usages of such designings bring about your destruction."[8]

With the initiation of wage negotiations after the war, these anxious forebodings of trouble, particularly among the newer unions, were transformed into suspicious interpretations of management's resistance to the large increases demanded; indeed, such resistance was taken as proof of the "conspiracy" long feared. In organizations where officials have been negotiating with management for decades, differences over specific revisions of contract terms, however

[7] Report of the Executive Council to the 64th Annual Convention of the AFL, Nov. 20–30, 1944, Report of Proceedings, p. 120. Cited in LEVENSTEIN, AARON, *Labor Today and Tomorrow*, p. 156, Alfred A. Knopf, New York, 1945.

[8] Report of Philip Murray to the Seventh Constitutional Convention of the CIO, November 20, 1944, pp. 6–7; and speech to the Ninth Convention of the United Automobile Workers, CIO, September 11–17, 1944, *Proceedings*, p. 102.

strongly maintained, do not readily become threats of union busting in the eyes of leaders or of members. In contrast, where recognition has been but recently acquired, the tense emotions of the organizing struggle are easily reactivated by a challenging effort to secure large contractual improvements in shop conditions. Thus an official of the shipyard workers saw in management's "refusal to yield on labor's demands for a raise" close parallels to "what happened after the last war." He challenged the employers to say openly ". . . that they are determined there will be no more unions in the shipbuilding industry," and suspected management generally of hoping "that they will be able to split the American labor movement and break organized labor in this country."[9] Like-sounding echoes from the organizing struggle were heard through many discussions of differences over "labor's demand for a raise."

That none of these forebodings was realized undoubtedly constitutes one of the most significant indications of the present potentialities of industrial relations in the United States – if only labor leaders and management read these signs aright and seize the opportunity, now before them at least for a brief while, to promote a fruitful experiment in collective dealings. Of this, more presently. Here must be stressed not only how important it is for labor leaders to examine their own fears, but also how important it is for management to recognize that these fears of its intentions exist and impede the very transition it, too, would promote.

With the enactment of the Labor-Management Relations Act of 1947, indeed, many labor leaders felt they had received irrefutable evidence of the union-busting sentiments they had been so articulately suspecting; they saw in its complex

[9] *The Shipyard Worker*, Vol. X, No. 26 (December 24, 1945), p. 2; reporting the address of National Vice President John J. Grogan before the National Wage Conference at Colorado Springs on December 13, 1945.

clauses not curbs on union abuses, but restrictions on legitimate union activities. Once more it will be the response of the parties to this new legal frame of relationships, the fears and resentments on one side, and the punitive, or soberly cautious uses of its curbs on the other, that will determine when and how effectively industry will complete the transition in human relations before which it still stands. For, as always, fears and other negative sentiments evoke aggression in relationships, thereby accentuating the reliance on the residual militancy of the organizing conflict to which so many other factors in their job environment already incline union executives.

The Quandary before the Labor Leader. For the responsible union leader, then, these contradictory pressures of his own job — economic, psychological, and social alike — create a quandary. Somehow he must navigate successfully the transition from the organizing struggle to administration if he is to retain and develop soundly the legally protected status and power his institution has so recently won. Within organized labor as a whole, as well as within the individual unions that furnish the bulk of newly acquired strength, the leader's relationships with members, subordinate union officials, employers, and the general community must be restructed to fit the new situation in the United States. But to the degree — and it is a large degree indeed — that this restructuring requires mitigation of hostilities as a motivation for shop action, the leader confronts strong countercurrents of insecurity, suspicion, rivalries, and ferment that proverbially intensify aggressiveness. He must, in a word, accomplish the indispensable transmutation of the hostilities of the long organizing period to the collaborativeness of joint dealings in a social context that places all the major accents upon continued militancy.

However complex the problems of mature leadership for responsible union executives, there can be no dodging them. Either the transition will be mastered, and organized labor,

even while it remains a vehicle of group advance, will also be made an instrument of responsible industrial administration; or the whole development of our democracy, from which the unions derive their potent status, will change course.

It is unfortunate that historical accident has postponed this crucial transition for labor to so late a day, and that then it came as the result of a swiftly accelerated growth of union strength in the midst of world depression, world war, and world revolution. But if the past remains fixed, the future is formed by present decisions and actions of men. By this very accident of history, however, the time for decision is short. The union executive cannot simply let experience tone down the union program; he must by positive policies promote and accelerate the conversion to stable administration. Just what demands, then, confront him in terms of daily functioning?

Demand for Emotional Maturity

Again in the union leader's case, as in the business manager's, the primary demand is for emotional maturity. For the union leader, too, such maturity denotes a quality of objective response to his total environment and its surcharged human relationships. It requires insight into his own fears, values, and motivations; and a willingness to inquire into, rather than declaim against, the stubborn human cussedness of men who fail to behave as he thinks they should in their relations with him. In seeking to win over to desired policies the men with whom and for whom he deals, he balances human, technical, pecuniary, and social factors within the interacting whole they constitute as the context or situation within which he acts. But since the policies he desires look toward relationships with management, members, and fellow officials, all restructured to fit the needs of administration, it is the *total* reality of transition itself that

must immediately concern him. His own fears belong to that total reality as much as do the varying sentiments of the men in daily relationship with him; he reckons with *all* the human factors impinging upon the evolving union program.

Changing Relations with Management. In terms of this dynamic approach, consider first his focal relationships with management. The very confusions of transition give his fears and suspicions concerning management's fundamental attitudes to collective bargaining a measure of real substance; he can accept them objectively and yet at the same time recognize that they no longer reflect his total situation. The records of 1919 and 1937 underwrite his fears,[10] the experience of 1946 should begin to counteract them. For if 1946 contained evidence of surviving managerial antagonisms to collective bargaining, it also presented convincing proof of new attitudes that even the experience of 1947 did not shake in any fundamental.

The contrast between managerial attitudes during the periods of 1919 and 1946 is the best measure of the distance organized labor has traveled between these two periods and of the reality of labor's transition from the fight for survival to the responsibility of administration. True, both periods had their prostrating strike waves, and wage discontents were rife in each of them. But they also differ in a very significant characteristic.

After 1918, management and men faced one another predominantly across the battle lines of the harsh struggle for recognition. The defeat of the unions in the long-drawn, hard-fought steel strike in 1919 symbolized the drift of the time. Today the issue of union recognition has yielded cen-

[10] See, for example, *United Automobile Worker – CIO,* Vol. 9, No. 21 (November, 1945), pp. 4–5; *The CIO News,* Vol. 8, No. 49 (December 3, 1945), p. 3; *Steel Labor,* Vol. 10, No. 11 (November, 1945), p. 7; Ten Years of CIO: 1935–1945, *Economic Outlook, CIO* Department of Research and Education, Vol. 6, No. 11 (November–December, 1945).

tral place to disputes over wages and the amount by which they should be increased, the major continuing issue of the administrative phases of collective bargaining. Because the intensity of the hostilities setting management and unions against each other stems from the character of the conflict thus producing them, there simply can be no comparison between the two postwar strike waves as episodes in human relations.

Time and again during the tumultuous years after November, 1918, strike sectors and other scenes of industrial conflict were transformed into veritable battlefronts on which men were killed, property destroyed, and sporadic fighting, in the words of responsible historians, rapidly matured into "civil war."[11] To say merely that after V-J Day we have not encountered anything like such violence or no-quarter conflict fails to portray at all adequately the quality of the change. For the first time in industrial history, a wave of major strikes passed over the country without a single attempt by management to crush the union involved. If law — and labor shortages — deterred efforts to import or use strike-breakers, there were also few attempts to force entry through picket lines. Instead, employers actually provided shelters against the wintry cold for pickets and sent them warm refreshments. In the steel towns that became symbolic ramparts in both postwar conflicts, mounted police cleared the strikers of 1919 from the streets, and union leaders were barred from addressing strike meetings; 1946 saw union members deputized as the special police who maintained law and order, yet found little to do because even civil rights were nowhere challenged.

In all the major strikes of 1946 the "shooting" was limited

[11] PERLMAN, SELIG, and PHILIP TAFT, *Labor Movements,* p. 480, The Macmillan Company, New York, 1935. (Vol. IV of COMMONS, JOHN R., and associates *History of Labor in the United States.*) The quality of violence, hysterical emotionalism, and mutual belligerency in the industrial struggles of those years is vividly portrayed in Chaps. XXXIV–XLI, pp. 435–571.

to a barrage of paid statements in newspapers. While most of these stated the case of the various companies, some also sought to reassure striking workers against fears over company insurance benefits or retaliation when they returned to their jobs. Corporate management, in a word, has now substantiated its readiness to accept unions as industrial organizations "here to stay" by means of convincing deeds under what might justifiably be considered provocative conditions. The mature labor leader can hardly afford to neglect so telling an index of the changing realities to which he must fit policy.

Admittedly, the labor leader, as a realist, also must weigh all the counterbalancing considerations. Among employers it is true, as it is among union executives, that transition is by no means single-tracked; there are those who still show a fighting mood. Man-power limitations, moreover, may have affected managerial policy during the strikes; the unions have yet to discover what management strategy will be in a time of depression. Government has intervened in the basic industries where the nation could not tolerate a complete test of strength; the law places unusual protections about men on strike. There can be no doubt, finally, that the remarkable moderation of the strike clashes and the character of their gains testified also to the new power of organized labor.

But if such factors may fairly be urged as counterbalancing considerations, they must not be permitted to blot out the important reality on the other side of the balance. The danger is that too many union leaders may draw conclusions justified by these possible qualifications upon the wholeheartedness of management's acceptance, without proceeding also to the conclusions demanded by the concrete evidence that management nevertheless *has* accepted unionism. Such a failure would be disastrous; the opportunity for improved relationships cannot persist independently of the manner in which the unions respond to it. Management can-

not be expected to continue an accepting attitude unless union leaders show that acceptance is compatible with stable shop administration.

Demand for Adjustments in Policy

To capitalize upon this opportunity for improved relations, two adjustments in union policy regarding direct relations with management are indicated: (1) An accepted union must modify, even for fighting purposes, the very language system (if that phrase may be used here) that it inherits from the struggle for recognition. (2) In all phases of collective bargaining, a union must adopt carefully discriminating approaches toward dealings with individual companies in each industry; this is called for by the variety of employer attitudes characteristic of transition.

The "Language System" of Administration. It should not be hard for the mature union executive to realize why the "language system" of an accepted union must be made to serve the continuing relationships of administration rather than the occasional episodes of conflict. He has learned by convincing experience how conduct of any strike helps create the atmosphere in which the signed agreement that may follow it will have to be administered. Just as management cannot obtain quickly the disciplined order it anticipates after a bitter struggle over union recognition,[12] so union executives can hardly expect the management they have vilified and excoriated in bitter struggle over wages or other conditions of employment to settle down immediately thereafter to amicable cooperation and mutuality.

Even during the stage of administration, a strike, of course, remains essentially a fight; and fighting words possess their continuing uses for sustaining the staying power of the strikers and their sense of just cause. But the mature leader al-

[12] *Cf.* Chap. IV, Building Joint Relationships, pp. 45–49.

ways keeps in mind the limits set for him by the resumption of relationships beyond the strike. Let us read the record of recent postwar wage negotiations.

Time and again the long-recognized unions predicated action on relationships of which they boasted and which they wished to maintain. Officials of the International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union, for instance, expressed pride in the fact that "not one of the more than eighty collective agreements" to which their union was signatory had been "breached or dishonored."[13] Officials of the Amalgamated Clothing Workers felt sure that if the excellent cooperation and relationships prevailing in their industry "existed in all other industries, the country would not have the problems it is facing today."[14] The president of the International Brotherhood of Paper Makers affirmed his organization's intention to help sustain the increases they were seeking "by an increase in production" underwritten by, among other factors, "a higher standard of performance of the whole personnel" in the industry.[15]

Among the newer unions, too, encouraging signs of growing respect for these limits were evident. An experienced observer reported from the strike front of the steel workers, for instance, how the union local at Homestead voted down a proposal for a "verbal heckling campaign against supervisors over the union's public address system." The local president explained the rejection: "We've got to live with those men after the strike."[16] Yet at the same time, it need

[13] *Justice,* Vol. XXVII, No. 24 (December 15, 1946), p. 1.

[14] *Advance,* Vol. XXXI, No. 23 (December 1, 1945), p. 1. See also AMIDON, BEULAH, The Clothing Industry Says "We", *Survey Graphic,* Vol. XXXV, No. 2, (February, 1946), p. 42.

[15] *The Paper Maker's Journal,* Vol. 44, Issue 6 (December, 1945), p. 2.

[16] WALKER, CHARLES R., Steel: A Retrospect, *Survey Graphic,* Vol. XXXV, No. 4 (April, 1946), p. 127.

hardly be said, some union leaders still rang the familiar changes on hostility and bitter-end warfare that echoed the organizing struggle. Even more, they passed beyond the familiar charges of "conspiracy" to announce the strategy of "concentrating firing power," to hail their "panzer divisions" and "shock troops," and to invoke on picket placards the images of Mussolini, Hitler, and Tojo. Although these leaders probably did not quite realize the full implications of such language, they were, none the less, transferring the fighting symbols of a world war waged against the hated Axis enemies to an internal wage conflict – to managements who not only were ready to grant substantial increases but also would soon have to take up again the tasks of directing work to turn out the goods that all of us, the workers included, so abundantly want.

They demonstrated, too, that the older language system of no-quarter fighting can draw easy support, even in the new environment of union acceptance, because of the general lag in popular sentiment toward the corporation. Throughout our history, monopoly, corporate interests, Wall Street, and the trusts have been targets for deep-seated public suspicions and resentments. Just as union agitators have often been scapegoats, the corporations have constituted persisting hate symbols in our social conflict. It is not hard to rouse workers against alleged corporate conspiracies of big business, especially in the basic industries but recently organized. Both in their columns and cartoons, the labor journals time and again furnish strident, shrill elaborations on this old theme.

By still turning suspicion and hate against the "Wall Street exploiter," the union leader is not only inflaming unnecessarily the atmosphere of negotiation and administration in which these corporation executives must ultimately figure; he is also fighting a war that is well-nigh over. Sooner or later, the administrative approach in the unions must con-

ceive of the modern corporation for what it is — an institution mobilizing communal resources for the production of goods the community wants. There still are dishonest corporation executives, as there are dishonest union leaders; and remedies exist for the abuses they introduce into economic affairs. But on the whole, business administration has achieved far more of a foothold than union administration, and, as a result, the professional administrator and the professional attitude have made their extensive appearance in the ranks of industrial management.

Even with such business managers there remains, and always will remain, an authentic area of difference regarding the division of the "take" of industry. The union leader will find in these differences more than sufficient test of his skill and mettle. But insofar as he utilizes the lag in public understanding of the changing corporation to mobilize rank-and-file hostilities, he fails to take full advantage of the will to agree, to underwrite high wages and good conditions, to seek high productivity and high-level employment, a will characteristic of an ever-increasing part of modern management.

Still one more lag in the very language of union dealings remains to be overcome, one closely allied to this attitude toward the corporation. If union leaders often speak of corporate wealth as the exploiter, they speak of themselves as representatives of an underdog minority — of the pitiable "exploited." But today organized labor no longer represents either weakness or minority exploitation. Instead, these great aggregates of power face the responsibilities that in a democracy must accompany group strength; and despite all the legitimate pressures for continued advance, union workers today in the United States stand forth the highest paid, best fed, best clothed, and best housed "common men" in the world. Realism demands readjustments in the stereotypes of union vocabulary that will accord recognition to both strands

of fact – to the great advances achieved and the continuing aspiration for still further improvements.

A Discriminating Approach to Meet Varying Managerial Attitudes. In all collective dealings, as in the language of collective relationships, the current situation of transition would appear to demand of the union leader careful discrimination in formulating policies. If the managements he confronts, not only in strikes but across the conference table and in the shop under contract, exhibit a range of sentiments toward unionism, can a uniform policy meet the varying situations? Dealings with each company call instead for adaptation to the specific context within which collective relationships are evolving. Just as it is sound policy for a mature management to support the administratively minded union leader as effectively as possible, it is equally sound policy for a mature union executive to promote collaboration with a cooperative management.

Restructuring Membership Relations

In the relationships within which satisfactory joint dealings must develop, such a discriminating approach to management calls for systematic attention to membership sentiments. But in relations with their members, quite as much as with management, many union leaders after V-J Day felt considerable anxiety. They realized how much of their strength rested on new recruits. These recruits often revealed themselves as sharp-eyed calculators, who insistently wanted to know just what they were getting for their dues, who wanted always to get a good deal – and to get it pronto. True, conditions varied from union to union, but uncertainty concerning how much loyalty or staying power they could count on from their members was widespread among union leaders.

Today, strike experience has allayed this fear also, or should have allayed it. Even in the long-protracted strikes,

ranks held firm, and whatever might be the tensions of internal factionalism and of interunion rivalry, solidarity seemed the watchword. But the unity still remains predominantly that of fighting organizations, welded by hostility toward or clashes with management. Therein lies the challenge.

This consciousness of an enemy offers a potent instrument for unifying any group, be it a union or even a nation. After the attack on Pearl Harbor we in the United States discovered the cementing power of a threat to the national safety, and today we watch uneasily the splintering of wartime unity under the tug of conflicting group interests. The union leader, guarding and extending his organization's strength against the competition of powerful rivals, quite naturally remains aware of this potency in the alignment against — and in labor's case very concretely against — a "foe" who seldom gives as much as the group wants. It is not only in industry but in all relationships that hostility leads directly to active responses; the angry, inimical, or threatened individual fights back.

In contrast, amity, mutuality, and fellowship have no similarly direct patterns of response: these sentiments evoke relaxing emotions. Nevertheless, the responsible leader, soberly conscious of the demands that the task of administration makes upon him and his union, at least may be strengthened by the knowledge that teamwork is entirely as indigenous to human nature as fighting. Each can be nurtured and developed; each stems from a specific context. Administration manifestly furnishes the ordered context for mutuality. That is why the mature labor leader must increasingly seek instruments for evoking allegiance through sources of amity, through fraternal rather than through hostile emotions.

Building Mutuality. After the long hostilities of industrial relations, we need to rediscover the techniques for building group strength upon fellowship and joint purposes. This

does not necessarily imply that the closed shop, or any variant making membership a condition of employment, can have no valid uses. Instead, such a structure of relationships in our still turbulent, transitional labor scene may afford even the mature union leader the very security that enables him to promote the conversion of members to attitudes prerequisite for sound administration. But, basically, the closed shop projects a coercive pattern; a member joins or forfeits his job. This is hardly a structure of relationships calculated to evoke the warm emotional bonds of truly convinced allegiance. If the curbs upon these forms of compulsory membership written into the Labor-Management Relations Act of 1947 shift the focus of the leader's attention to the factors that build positive loyalties, a real gain may yet ensue for mature collective bargaining.

For while the traditions of union struggle have long fortified individual loyalties to the group, with the acceptance and legal validation of unionism, the membership count or representative election must steadily replace the no-quarter struggles for recognition that generate fighting traditions. In the same way stabilized unions must increasingly enroll members as individuals rather than as masses of new recruits bound by the sentiments of experience shared in conflict. Yet too often the cold preemptory approach or the cash nexus constitutes the union's sole reliance. Even in the older unions, good union men whose loyalties were absorbed in the atmosphere of their childhood homes are startled when they stop to think how bleak the act of joining up has become.

An official in a long-established union recalled with a distinct sense of shock the bare, ugly office to which prospective members of his local were sent for their union cards. The local secretary from whom they received those cards was certainly a good union man, but one with no talent whatsoever for conveying the feeling tones of fellowship. His strident manner of speaking, his abrupt, harsh preoccu-

pations with the initiation fee and membership dues, made the initial contact with the organization an unpleasant memory even for this official of strong loyalties.

Few unions instruct their stewards on proper approaches to new members, and initiation ceremonies are a waning tradition. Yet loyalty and allegiance to any fraternal organization are essentially emotional. Unions offer a natural soil for appropriate ceremonials; the unity of interest and the community of feeling lie close to the surface. Failure to evoke them seems unnecessary sacrifice of a deep source of strength in the human relations underlying effective union administration. Joining a union can be made a stirring and profoundly felt experience rather than an unpleasant compulsion, and membership, a rooted allegiance rather than a pecuniary calculation.

After members have been soundly recruited, the relationships of the leaders with them for purposes of administration must be continuing. Instead, union administration all too often is conceived predominantly as trouble shooting. The experienced leader appears on the local scene chiefly after crises have arisen, when serious difficulties have to be tackled or tough problems have to be met. Thus he deals almost exclusively with the negative components of joint relationships — with aggressions, resentments, conflicts. These require expert attention, but exclusive preoccupation with them naturally crowds out cooperative developments. Cooperation, it should always be remembered, is a continuing flow of relationships about concrete shop activities, and only continuing guidance can build the circular channels of shop communication through which such a flow may be directed.[17]

Educating the Members

Building these meaningful continuing relationships with members will serve in the additional task of educating the

[17] *Cf.* Chap. IV, Building Joint Relations, pp. 57–65.

members to an awareness of the realities they must face in this crucial matter of concrete cooperation with management.

The Purchasing-power Theory. Take, for instance, the purchasing-power theory that plays so large a part in wage strategy – the idea that any advance in wages is justified because it adds to the purchasing power of the workers and thus comes back to employers generally as increased volume of business. This theory has almost become union gospel. It needs now to be revaluated.

Such revaluations must be thought through first by the labor leader himself. He must himself see clearly that the purchasing-power theory cannot be used exclusively as a pecuniary concept, a measure solely of the amount of money going into the pay envelope. The theory must be translated instead into the equation of exchange that constitutes the fundamental in purchasing power: the amount of goods that the money in the pay envelope buys at a given price level. There will be continual demands for wage increases, but if they are to be equated with rising living standards, they must be met out of a continuously growing output. The immense productive capacity of American industry constitutes a marvel of our time, but there is nothing automatic in its wonder working. Workers, as well as machines and management, are factors in such productivity.

If the union leader does thus revalue his own notions and uses of the purchasing-power theory – and he has a long way yet to go to reach this goal of revaluation – only half his crucial job will be accomplished. He must then transmit the implications of such revisions to his members.

It is because this part of the job will prove so difficult that continuing guidance relationships with union members will stand the leader in such good stead. For even in the best of circumstances members will not readily surrender the facile social equations that make oversimplified notions of purchasing power an unfailing sanction for wage increases

– an instrument for preventing depression in times of good business and for overcoming depression when times are slack. They will not readily weigh immediate demands against long-term economic considerations. Even the attempt to turn them in these new directions will require of the leader real courage and conviction. But if he has established continuing relationships with his members and shop stewards, he at least has created the most favorable atmosphere for new policy. If he has brought them to feel that their participation and involvement in union policy-making are important to him, he can draw not only upon his own courage and conviction but also upon their confidence and consent.

Cooperation in Productivity. He will want all the members to do exactly what he himself must do in such a revaluation: make plant efficiency and productivity clearly a joint concern with management – in feeling and thinking, not merely in verbal profession. To achieve so momentous a change, he must overcome some of the most difficult human problems of his job. Suspicions and antagonisms, as we have seen,[18] are still aroused in workers by shop innovations; workers still eye warily the improvement that increases individual output. New methods of work always seem to entail more work; more output per man readily implies speed-up. Even when excellent joint relations have been established, when employees display generally friendly confidence in their shop management, they still often meet innovations with such suspicion and resistance.

There is welcome evidence of growing realization among the unions that they must find ways of communicating to their members the factors of joint interest in time study, production standards, wage systems, and technological innovation.[19] Continuing guidance relationships established for

[18] See Chap. VI, Resistance to Shop Changes, pp. 111–125.

[19] GOMBERG, WILLIAM, Union Interest in Engineering Techniques, *Harvard Business Review*, Vol. XXIV, No. 3 (spring, 1946), p. 356.

the general purposes of effective administration among local leaders, members, and their higher union executives will be useful precisely as an instrument or channel for such communication. Thus they will further this essential task of recasting the purchasing-power theory until it takes cognizance of the need for employees' consent to programs for increasing, under proper safeguards, the productivity prerequisite to rising real wages.

Relationships with Other Groups

Thus, over and over again the mature labor leader confronts one essential test for every policy he frames: Does it enable him to meet simultaneously the requirements both of the dynamic industrial protest movement for which he speaks and also of the stable, complex industrial administration that he must serve? Because he is the spokesman for his members, his leadership of them along this double-tracked road of advance entails relationships not only with management but also with other union officials and the public.

Test of Legitimate Release for Emotions. Strong emotions are evoked in all these relationships as the members pursue their drive for ever-improving conditions of working and living. But for the leader who accepts the demands of administration, a simple rule can guide adjustment to these human factors of feeling and sentiment: *As an administrator, he never evokes emotions beyond the limits of their release in legitimate action.*

Thus it is, in dealings with management, that even if a strike for higher wages must invoke its fighting symbols, the leader always keeps in mind the implications of the ultimate resumption of relationships. Hostilities, no matter how caused, are not turned on and off; residual antagonisms linger to inflame the run-of-the-mill issues of daily administration. Incessant pressure for rising living standards likewise belongs to the accepted arsenal of a protest organization,

but when the right of that organization to present demands has been recognized, the size, timing, and achievement of each demand must be related to the condition of the shop, the industry, and the economy, *in terms of the production from which all returns ultimately are made to the producers, including workers.* Similarly, group solidarity also has received its validation, but by that very fact the cohesive power it yields through the strike weapon is utilized only as a last resort.

Left-wing Influences. That is also why Communist or party-line extremists within the unions must eventually become, as they did in the 1920's, a problem with which the union administrator will have to come to grips. Their manipulation of the hostilities that lie so close below the surface in industrial relations sooner or later throws administration out of gear, precisely because these sectarians do not recognize the limits of legitimate action for their release within our social system. They do not hesitate to frame excessive demands for the "profit makers" alone to satisfy — or else. They do not draw back before the antagonisms that inflame shop relationships. They do not deem group solidarity actually solid until it has hardened into the rigid exclusions of the class struggle. It cannot be said that they will never sponsor shop cooperation, not in the light of their complete reversal of tactics after the Hitler invasion of Russia. But the emphasis on mutuality or conflict is determined only by such external considerations.

Fortunately, the masses of American workers have no dedicated interest in making trouble in their own country for the sake of Russia or any other foreign country — or even for a revolution that their generally conservative progressivism hardly yet contemplates. The mature labor leader can count on spontaneous rank-and-file support when finally he comes to grips with those left-wing groups that seek to stir

up hostility for hostility's sake, as a tool for dividing and weakening our democratic structure.

Top Leaders, Line Officials, and Union Administration. Also important for industrial administration are the relationships among union officials themselves. As in management's case, responsibility for modifying approaches begins with the top leaders; from the top these changing points of view are transmitted down the line. The roles of the line officials and the field representatives, as we have already seen, are crucial; in the large-scale unions of today no top leader can maintain continuing guidance relations with all his members. Here the final administrative handicap in the way of the mature union leader makes itself felt.

The union leader must build internal union administration (and the systematic body of knowledge and literature on which such administration must depend) even as he furthers transition to it. He must not only encourage training of administrative staff and field representatives, he must also build a staff adequate to the growing administrative task. Generally, the ranks of the intermediate offices are difficult to recruit; and in terms of membership pressures, they constitute the "expendables" of the organization. For one thing, no considerable financial rewards are offered.[20] The constant drainage of promising and ambitious men out of union office into other pursuits presents a recognized problem.[21] If the members succeed in attaining their desire of keeping dues as low as possible, they suffer, like taxpayers generally, in the quality of civil servant they attract.

Fortunately, however, some of the unions display aware-

[20] TAFT, PHILIP, Understanding Union Administration, *Harvard Business Review*, Vol. XXIV, No. 2 (winter, 1946), p. 245.

[21] DUBINSKY, DAVID, (President, International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union), cited by STOLBERG, BENJAMIN, in *Tailor's Progress*, pp. 217–218, Doubleday, Doran & Company, Inc., New York, 1944.

ness of their "need for more competent people to fill places in the daily activities of the organization," as the men's clothing workers recently indicated.[22] The papermakers' union similarly gave central place to the need for competent line officials.[23] The steelworkers' organization early recognized the job of training staff and local union leaders, even as they still faced the job of recruiting them.[24] In 1937 the International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union made it obligatory for new candidates for union office to complete the training course conducted or approved by its educational department.[25] At least one of the general professed aims of the workers' education movement has been to equip potential union leaders for executive responsibilities. Most recently, certain universities have been developing programs for promising men sent by their unions for training periods of varying length. It is to be hoped that, in facing the complex and difficult problems of union administration, universities and unions will make every effort to build effective curriculums for union executives, just as business and universities have already done for industrial executives.

Concluding Remarks

Thus every line of scrutiny, every angle from which the union official's job may be examined leads to a very real and sympathetic respect for its paradoxical complexities. Indeed, so bristling are the difficulties that they make it almost naïve

[22] *Advance,* December 1, 1945, p. 6; report of Vice President Blumberg to the meeting of the General Executive Board of the Amalgamated Clothing Workers.

[23] *Labor Unrest and Dissatisfaction;* report of the study made by the Special Research Committee, International Brotherhood of Paper Makers, June 15, 1944, pp. 26–32.

[24] Golden, Clinton S., and Harold J. Ruttenberg, *The Dynamics of Industrial Democracy,* pp. 63–71, Harper & Brothers, New York, 1942.

[25] Stolberg, Benjamin, *op. cit.,* p. 295.

to expect any quick achievement of the maturity that all agree is indispensable. Given the contradictions of his own role, the rivalries within his own movement, and the pressures of his own members in a time of upheaval and confusion, the most administratively minded union official cannot move swiftly in a direct line toward new objectives. He remains always a political leader, and even the maturity he eventually achieves will be conditioned by this characteristic nature of his role. It will, by reason of that central fact, differ from the maturity of the management leader, who from the start, and always predominantly, functions as an administrator.

The question may well be asked: If labor leaders encounter such difficulties in achieving maturity, is not legislation the surest remedy? Can the community afford, in our interdependent society, to wait for time to settle the rivalry and turbulence of union activity that shut down essential industries and services? Here we enter one of the most difficult aspects of labor relations, one so complex that it will require searching and cooperative exploration. Suffice it to say here that no legislation anywhere among democratic nations has yet succeeded in compelling men to work when they feel themselves sufficiently aggrieved to lay down tools. Workers market a commodity, their skill and labor, which cannot be divorced from themselves as free men. If it is strikes we want to curtail – and that is the heart of the public concern – we had better be painstaking in testing the legislative program launched in 1947. We may well keep constantly in mind the enduring truth that even the framers of the 1947 legislation, despite its restrictions on union activities, wisely recognized: in a democracy work cannot be coerced; it remains a voluntary act, most effective when based upon the consent implicit in sound human relationships.

All of which, at this particular juncture of events, obviously places a heavy burden upon the industrial executive as com-

pared with the union leader. The greater extent to which the professional aspects of his job have been realized, the growing recognition that he must keep the business solvent for the sake of employees as well as of stockholders, the stark fact that unbridled industrial conflict may wreck the social and economic structure, his own reluctance to give legal compulsions an entering wedge in industrial relations place upon him the prime responsibility for mature and understanding behavior. He must hold steady in a trying situation so that the nation as a whole, and the unions in particular, can catch up with the swift developments that have been transforming industrial relations. The more maturely he handles himself, the more likely the creation of that atmosphere in which the union executive also may come to feel that he, too, can function as a mature administrator. We thus end this discussion of joint leadership in industrial relations in the words which began it: Never before have the men at the helm of industry needed for labor relations so steady a hand or so imperturbable a temper as now.

Chapter IX

CONFLICT AND *COOPERATION*

IF LABOR relations confront our confused and troubled times with any central challenge, is it not this: How can we achieve in daily shop behavior the cooperation necessary for realizing both full production and maximum human satisfaction? Everyone urges cooperation, yet conflict confronts us on all too wide a scale.

Indeed, the patterns of conflict into which labor relationships since V-J Day have been set so predominantly have made restrictive regulation appear to many far more attuned to present-day realities than an exploration of the factors by which men may yet be welded into the cooperating corps of peacetime producers. Labor "monopolies," industry-wide strikes, wage drives, interunion rivalries, political ferment, continuous organizing campaigns, the unremitting drive for power, — here is a framework hardly conducive to cooperation.

Yet all this granted, it remains also true that these disturbances are part of a time of transition. The power of organized labor represents a very recent acquisition, attained, we cannot be reminded too often, under the aegis of favoring legislation during years of upheaval — of world depression, world war, and world revolution. If these external forces increase the ferment, they also testify to the relative moderation of the goals at which labor still aims. Against the programs of Communist Russia or even of West-European socialism, the pressure of unions in the United States for progressive improvement in the status of the

"common man" still fits squarely within the traditional American creed.

Alternative Courses Still Open

The American workers today, by their ever-growing numbers and their organized power, may become the arbiters of American destiny. This new historic fact cannot yet be equated with any inevitable direction in the evolution of our affairs. If the conflict patterns of transition prove enduring, we shall undoubtedly be forced into unfamiliar ways. No society can long tolerate stalemate or recurrent paralysis. But if we rely solely or even chiefly upon punitive restrictions, we must realize also that such regulation represents one more surrender to letting "government do it." Let us always remember that we shall then be seeking to regulate not material goods, monetary prices, or competition in enterprise but rather the labor inseparable from the laboring men in their organized hundreds of thousands.[1] Experience has thus far proved such intervention either ineffective in, or incompatible with, democracy.

Before permitting conflict in a time of manifest transition to place our major reliance upon a recourse so loaded against everything for which democracy historically has stood, would we not be well advised to explore the possibilities of fostering cooperation within the spreading framework of collective bargaining? Perhaps the harried administrator may say he cannot wait upon experiment in labor relations; the best we now can bring to his relief, he may feel, is doomed to prove too little and too late. But such prognostications were revealed overpessimistic in a far more threatening area of conflict; they may prove themselves similarly defeatist on the domestic front. The alternatives, moreover, are not necessarily mutually exclusive: even if we must thus handle a period of dominant conflict, even as we experiment with

[1] *Cf.* Chap. VIII, Wanted: Mature Labor Leaders, p. 209.

legislative machinery and establish curbs upon real abuses, will it not pay us simultaneously to explore methods for improving labor relations?

At any rate, the very dimensions of our industrial achievement challenge a surrender to defeatism. In war as in peace, American industry stands proved by its works – preeminent before the world. Why do not those who together turn out this flow of goods and services thereby develop the cooperative spirit, the team loyalty and cohesiveness, the pride of belonging to a top-ranking outfit that characterizes group effort in so many other fields of human activity? This is a question we cannot afford to leave unasked.

The Paradox of Physical Cooperation and Human Conflict

Never before have men been interlocked in so all-embracing a system of *physical* cooperation. Every schoolboy learns of the interdependence by which division of labor supplies his wants through an intricate, integrated chain of activities carried forward each day by men working on the land and under it, in mills and at assembly lines, over the roads and on the seas, in warehouses and behind store counters. But when in the course of time that same boy assumes his role as an adult worker, the concrete cooperative activity that links him with other men at work does not generate cooperative sentiments in him. On the contrary. The cooperation of the work activity seems to engender, as it were, the conflict of the work relationship – a challenging paradox indeed.

In most other human organizations that thus combine individuals for achieving mutually advantageous objectives, cooperation appears indigenous. It reveals itself as a form of pervasive, familiar human behavior, a type of activity that stems from relationships between individuals or among men combining in groups to promote common goals. Viewed

in this fundamental perspective, the cooperation so anxiously sought in industry thus represents a variant of the purposive association through which, even within our highly individualistic society, man interacts with other men from childhood on through life in satisfying his many diverse needs: through the family, church, neighborhood, social club, trade or professional association, labor union, political party — and workshop.

Cooperation in Other Institutions

Of all such institutions, it is in the family that, living and working together, engenders the most deep-rooted loyalties, the closest cohesiveness, the most spontaneous cooperation. Here cooperation springs naturally from the character of the relationships binding individuals one to the other. Here we see cooperation for what it essentially is, behavior evoked by positive interpersonal relationships motivated implicitly by common goals and purposes. The goals satisfy deep-seated inner drives — cravings for kinship, for communion, for sharing common experiences, as well as basic biologic instincts. The goals also receive social approbation. The husband seeking to provide for his family, the parents dedicated to rearing their children as happy and successful adults, the child retaining through life affection felt from the start for the parent who meets his needs when he enters into the world as a helpless infant, the wider circles of kinsfolk who recognize varying degrees of involvement in the well-being of each constituent — here is the manifold but accepted division of function among people in defined relationships all moving together toward common goals.

But is cooperation, even in the family, something unalloyed, constant, steeled against stresses and strains? Hardly. The same close relationships that generate a predominant will for cooperation stir also undercurrents of antagonism. "Problem children," for instance, are now accepted as young-

sters essentially in emotional conflict — a conflict engendered by clashing sentiments towards parents and brothers and sisters. The so-called "adolescent revolt" embodies an even more pervasive conflict rising from the contrary tugs of affection for the parent and of resistance to his authority on the threshold of individual maturity. In many manifestations, some conscious, others unconscious, the family thus evokes affection and resentment, sacrifice and possessiveness, favoritism and jealousy — sentiments that generate contradictory impulses for behavior.

Cooperation — and Conflict

Similarly, in other collaborative social institutions — the church, the club, the neighborhood association, the fraternity — the antagonisms of factions and cliques often crisscross the larger circles of cooperating activity. Everywhere, as men relate one to another in the diverse activities that constitute daily living, we find cooperation *and* conflict, loyalty *and* rebellion, devotion *and* disaffection reflected in behavior as intermeshed entities. Always the conjunctive "and" proves the strategic word, as throughout life these seemingly incongruous sentiments appear together in every social relationship.

Examining more closely these forces at work in the family and other institutions, we discover that the cooperative sentiments are proportional to the sense of community developed among the constituent individuals in each instance — to the sense of common interest in common goals. The greater this sense of community, the greater the degree of cooperation; the weaker the sense of community, the greater the friction — the pulling and hauling of individuals and factions. As a reciprocal of this direct correlation between the will to cooperate and the sense of community, the manifestations of conflict are also molded by the character of the relationships binding the individuals in each association. In the family,

for instance, negative sentiments rarely find overt acceptance; instead, all the social sanctions are given to the cooperation implicit in the very purposes of the institution. The antagonisms, therefore, are generally pushed into the subconscious, below the threshold of conscious feeling; and the individual who feels hostile to his kin also feels guilty because that sentiment violates his code of what is right and proper.

These dynamic complexities in the general problems of conflict and cooperation possess the most practical import. At the very outset they warn against approaching the problems of labor relations in any spirit of wistful search for a sort of idealized cooperation; they define the initial task rather as a realistic exploration of exactly what motivations and relationships will yield the cooperation truly appropriate to modern work. They pose the fundamental question of the extent to which a sense of community can be fostered at all in the shop to engender a will for cooperation, and by the same token to reduce the ever-present potential for conflict. They urge upon the administrator a constant awareness (1) that the capacity for conflict *and* cooperation lies deep in the human endowment; (2) that both are evoked in varying degree and in various interrelated ways by the manifold group activities and relationships into which the individual is drawn in a given society; and (3) that the shop, as one form of such association, furnishes its typical outlets for conflict and cooperation alike.

To trace the particular problems of shop relations to the very roots of human behavior in social living need not dismay us; indeed, it affords a source of encouragement. *Industrial conflict is then seen as a characteristic, rather than a catastrophic, aspect of human relations.* But at the same time such an approach also sobers expectation. If negative sentiments rise even from the close association of family life, can the industrial administrator ever hope to eliminate conflict

completely? Or must he, as he seeks persistently to promote cooperation, also be prepared always to handle conflict? Granting, again, that his goals in human relations must thus be adjusted not to the perfectionist "either . . . or" but to the realistic "both . . . and" bracket of conflict with cooperation, how can he advance the entirely valid aim of achieving the utmost possible cooperation, at the same reducing conflict to a minimum?

The Shop as a Community

In this frame of reference it is of prime importance for the administrator to understand his shop precisely as a community – a community that furnishes a particular context for behavior. He must realize that whenever an enterprise is launched, a community is also launched, willy-nilly – an association of men who assemble in a given place for a given part of each day to further certain objectives. Only as he approaches his shop thus as a community can he gain insight into the particular sentiments, feelings, and relationships within that context from which both conflict and cooperation spring. And in the shop, as everywhere, effective controls follow understanding; they cannot precede it. Some of the crucial problems of human relations now confronting industry stem from the fact that the community of men at work typically has received none of the purposeful concern of management; the community, such as it is, just grows, like Topsy.

At first glance, such a statement of the matter may seem too sweeping. Certainly the modern business executive does entertain some vague concept of a community. Generally he likes to think of the company as a "family." As his shop develops, he comes to look for responses that imply common interests and objectives. He is shocked, for instance, when his employees fail to show appreciation for the good condi-

tions he may have established, – a shock that is akin to "paternal" disappointment. The intrusion of "outsiders" is resented. Manifestations of "disloyalty" from the men evoke disappointment, hurt, and even outrage. Even more, the relationships that develop in the shop should, in management's opinion, root in an intrinsic mutuality of which loyalty is the natural outgrowth. This deep-lying, continuing desire to obtain the "togetherness" cemented by the ties of a true sense of community is mirrored in the latter-day use of the word "team" for what was once called the work-gang.

Such intuitive beliefs on the fringe of managerial attention must now become an explicit, and indeed a central, concern if industry is to make any progress towards a better ordered relationship within the shop. Just because it *is* simply impossible for men to be brought together in any form of continuing group organization without developing the interrelationships from which sentiments and behavior take shape, we cannot thereby assume that the responses of men at work in a shop will, in and of themselves, become dominantly cooperative. On the contrary. Experience seems to suggest that in industry resentments and hostilities flow strongly in the currents of behavior. At any rate, these sentiments can apparently be stirred into open conflict far more readily than the interdependence of work can be transmuted into a conscious will to cooperate. And so the manager, convinced that his men ought to give him true team spirit, waxes denunciatory upon his failure so often to obtain it. What is needed, however, is not exhortation, or condemnation, but a matter-of-fact, coolly rational inquiry into the reasons for this failure and the means of overcoming it.

Inquiry into the Relationships Engendering Conflict and Cooperation

What type of relationships between management and men, within the growing framework of collective bargaining, will

so recast group sentiments as to change the current balance of conflict and cooperation in industrial behavior? Manifestly, extensive and systematic research is called for if we are to uncover the factors that promote cooperation on the one hand and conflict on the other. Even a slight familiarity with industry bears witness to the existence of sufficient variation among shops and mills in these intangibles of relationships to counsel specific studies of many different companies. Indeed, the very fact that conflict and cooperation appear always to manifest themselves together in human behavior prepares one to find their incidence in industry also matters of degree rather than of clear-cut absolutes – matters of more or less. Some shops face more conflict at all times than others, while at any given time even a generally stable and cooperative shop may be shaken by an unusual degree of conflict. Cooperation is not something attained by generalized formulas applied in a vacuum. It consists of interdependent human activities carried forward in a given place and in given circumstances. The shop furnishes the context – the place and the ever-changing circumstances – within which management and men thus interact.

THE SHOP CONTEXT

The administrator often senses that this shop context is unique in each case, even though the reasons for its uniqueness may baffle him. The manager of a large textile mill, for instance, who had been visiting establishments in his neighborhood to obtain comparative wage rates, found it "almost impossible to get the exact picture" in any mill. Even when he investigated another branch of his own company, situated just across the street from his own plant, drawing upon the same labor supply to make the same product, and under the same instructions from the same company headquarters, he came back "with something missing. . . . I don't know what it is," he declared, "but there just seems to be an individuality

in each particular plant." This individuality, transcending all technical and geographical uniformities, reflects the character of the shop as a community, an interacting association of different human beings in structured relationships with each other. The factors shaping this communal individuality also determine the logic of the context within which conflict and cooperation develop.

It has been the purpose of this discussion from its beginning to uncover the identity and character of these determining factors as they operate in each unique shop context within the fast-growing framework of collective bargaining: how the personalities of men in their varying shop roles, with their codes of right and wrong behavior, their sentiments and feelings, exercise their influence; how change-situations, whether social or technological, also exert their varying impact to kindle emotions of fear, uncertainty, and anger and so find their reflection in shop relations; how the bench groups into which men form under such pressures for offense or defense create problems for both union and company leaders of the organizations of which they also are members – when, for instance, a union seeks entry into a shop, a technological innovation is introduced, or external upheavals consequent upon war, depression, reform programs, etc., stir internal ferment; and how the varying history, traditions, and leadership of such organizations affect shop behavior. In their almost infinitely varying combinations and permutations these are some of the major factors with which the administrator must reckon in dealing with the human problems underlying conflict and cooperation as he meets them from day to day in his particular shop or local union.

Where Are the Leaks?

To shift the accent of relationships from conflict to cooperation in a context involving so complex a variety of

dynamic interacting forces manifestly demands a constant awareness of the difficulties in the way. Those difficulties are many and serious; and it does not facilitate the administrator's task that one of the chief among them apparently has its origin in nothing less than the intrinsic nature of modern production – its inner logics as a system of work for satisfying wants. For why else would so encompassing a framework of cooperative activities fail to evoke the sentiments that generally spring from the sheer act of cooperating? Somewhere there must be leaks through which so many of the *sentiments* of mutuality are lost that the *realities* of interdependence do not fashion in the shop the spontaneous community of men bound in a task of basic communal significance. To trace these leaks to their source offers one of the most fruitful fields for study and experimentation.

Such an inquiry might well begin with a closer examination of the character of this work cooperation that somehow fails to engender human cooperativeness. For while we have become widely familiar with what we might call the physical nature of division of labor, we have yet to probe its full consequences for human effort and will in daily work. When each man produces part of a part, we easily agree, only coordinated group effort can fuse the parts into a finished product. This obviously constitutes interdependence; it means that each individual producer in the chain process must be combined with many of his fellows – and in the final analysis with all of them – to complete the age-old job of satisfying daily human wants. But if we pass lightly over the auxiliary verb, which here proves the strategic word – "*be* combined" – we miss the significant fact that for the individual worker the act of cooperating is initially passive. His linkage with other men tied into the process of combining labor to produce goods is outside his own volition. Industrial cooperation, in a word, begins of necessity as something imposed upon people, rather than as a response reflecting

their own desire and will; it is imposed both by the technical processes of present-day production and by the human agency of management.

Is Imposed Cooperation a Leak through Which Cooperatives Is Lost?

These two sources of imposed cooperation – the one implicit in impersonal technology and the other explicit in personal shop authority – may yield the first clue for understanding why the concrete cooperative activity that constitutes daily work, as Western industrialism knows it, engenders so much conflict. The sense of imposition may emasculate the sense of community in work. For unless the men in the ranks can somehow be made to equate managerial authority with the disciplines that further the interest of the whole shop community, the manager becomes the outlet for all the antagonisms potential in such authority – that is an authority not rendered acceptable to him who must take orders by a sense of identification with him who gives them, through common goals and joint purposes. In the typical dealings between management and men the resulting hostilities apparently find outlets through three focal sources of shop sentiments and attitudes: (1) the actual labor the manager tries to get from the men under his direction; (2) the methods by which he defines their rewards for that labor; and finally (3) the relationship he thus develops with the working citizens of a democratic society.

Restoring the Sense of Individual Effectiveness in Work

In exploring the hostilities implicit in modern industry, we must be careful not to idealize the human satisfactions in earlier societies. Man proverbially has had to earn his bread by the sweat of his brow, and nothing in the historic records justifies the belief that he ever found the toil and sweat in themselves deeply desirable. The reduction in

backbreaking human costs of labor by the development of modern industrialism has long been accounted one of its outstanding benefits. Nonetheless, from the beginning of human experience, work has been part of the whole effort of man to master and control his environment in the service of his needs. Its emotional satisfactions stem normally, therefore, from the sense of effectiveness the individual derives from the daily round of labor.

The average worker no longer draws this basic satisfaction from his job.[2] To be sure, modern industry yields the most sovereign control over nature yet achieved by man. But its sheer dimensions militate against the sense of individual effectiveness; the division of labor spins out the total effort of satisfying wants to such intricate patterns of interdependence that the individual frequently is dwarfed. The discovery of methods for imparting to each man at work the feeling that he is an indispensable part of the whole working group thus figures as a major problem for research and experiment. Unless each man acquires that feeling, he will not identify with the magnificent effectiveness of modern industry. And it is precisely because this sentiment of identification does not rise spontaneously from the modern job that the administrator now confronts the task of creating consciously the sense of community among men at work.

He confronts that task, moreover, against strong countercurrents. For the technical methods that make production increasingly a societal process have failed to maintain even those social associations by which the individual's daily work so long has been done among men. In preindustrial society, satisfying personal relationships of common interest and mutual aid did flow from the innate organization of craft production or farm labor. To recognize this fact is by no means to idealize the quality of group relations then binding

[2] KARDINER, ABRAM, *The Individual and His Society*, pp. 50–56, Columbia University Press, New York, 1939.

men at work together (any more than the nature of their sweat and toil). Nor is it to imply that individual discontents and maladjustments were unfamiliar experience in earlier days; or that masters – and mistresses – were then incapable of sadistic treatment of those who worked for them! It is only to recall how close group associations at the workbench or in the farmer's field rooted in the whole social organization.

The family, for instance, constituted the practically self-sufficient unit of agricultural society. Accordingly, the accepted authority of the father carried over into the daily work relationship as the children assumed their alloted chores and as the wife and daughters fabricated the materials produced by the father with the sons he trained. The division of labor was roughly marked, but the cooperation rooting in family relationships prevented undue concern over jurisdictional job disputes. Similarly, in the craft guilds of the towns, the underlying family and communal structure of daily living shaped work relationships. Apprentices were members of their masters' households; journeymen worked in the masters' shops, so that apprentices, journeymen, and masters remained familiars in all social relationships, from the shop to the community and back, through all the institutions of mutual aid. The disciplines by which the child came gradually to accept the routines of normal living, as transmitted by home, church, school, and community, encompassed the work relationship with all others that bound man to men.

From Division of Labor to Division of Living

In sharp contrast, the division of labor that comes to characterize modern work eventually becomes also a division of living. Is it not, indeed, a social datum of arresting significance that we should now be hailing as an important discovery the evidence that men carry family concerns and other outside preoccupations into the shop? The flow of

activity binding work and home and community has been split into so many separate currents that we have to reconstruct the total situations and environments in which we function as "total," rounded human beings. The authority in the home and in the community has lost any visible connection with authority in the shop. Men still work and play and enter into many group relationships, but not necessarily with the same people.

We can hardly find it surprising if such sluicing of the daily flow of living affects the motivations that shape the individual's attitude toward his job. To be sure, the industrial worker, quite as much as his forebears, labors to provide for himself and his family, to win for his children opportunities for improved living that lay beyond his own reach. But the connection between his work and these life objectives has become indirect; the pay envelope intervenes between these goals and the means to satisfy them that are contributed ultimately by the total economy. Accordingly, while most men grant intellectually the importance of full production and some establish satisfying personal relations on the job, few relate their own work functionally to the age-old purpose of turning out goods to supply men's wants. They may envisage the objectives of production clearly in terms of a steadily growing national output; but, as so often happens, everybody's business in general becomes nobody's business in particular. For the individual it is the pay envelope, not the tangible things he produces, that constitutes the direct tie between his own life objectives and the work by which he serves them.

Individual Goals in Work and the National Economy

Once again, we must not inflate this statement into the generalization that shop behavior is shaped exclusively, or even dominantly, by pecuniary motivations. As we have seen, men bring to the shop emotions, sentiments, and per-

sonality problems that often deflect behavior from the straight lines of self-interest; they respond to status drives on the job; they form bench groups, whether union or not, within which curbs on individual earning power are accepted to protect the average producer, and so on. Nonetheless, insofar as the purpose of every economy lies in producing the goods needed to support its people, the pecuniary drives calling forth individual effort in modern industry do fragmentize the pursuit of that central objective. The pay envelope furnishes each worker his right of withdrawing goods from the national output, and national output in turn can be increased only by increasing productivity at the work level; but the individual seldom equates his own drive for receiving ever more pay with the communal purpose of producing ever more goods. The two propositions do not form premises from which the effective conclusion inevitably follows for him. Instead, in the daily round of work and life he often finds a very different logic seemingly serving his purposes.

Within the terms of this individualist logic, moreover, the manager easily becomes the target for many suspicions, resentments, and dissatisfactions. However indirect the linkage of modern national production to individual life purposes via the pay envelope in the chain of working and living, the junction remains as crucial for each man as it ever was. Yet, in the eyes of the workers, management seems to make the major decisions that determine ultimately how each one of them fares in the intricate process. Management defines initially the rates of pay by which specific job assignments shall be compensated. Management assigns men to those jobs; management "gives" men work. Management measures output and introduces the innovations that increase productivity — to the long-run benefit of all consumers, perhaps, but also to the always potential short-run harm of some producers.

In short, management potentially becomes the personifica-

tion of all that the worker fears and resents in daily work, as well as of much that he values and admires in its over-all results. In the shop the fears and resentments naturally lie closest to the surface in the sources of motivation for behavior. There, where the worker must perform his daily job, management has failed to make divided labor meaningful, to make his job a manifest contribution in a cooperative process of producing things his society wants. Instead, the manager has concentrated upon "efficiency," without any consideration of the potential in meaningful, satisfying work and work relationships for efficiency itself. Thus efficiency has seemed generally limited to technical specialization,[3] which in turn has made change the one reliable constant in modern production, embedded within the dynamics of technology itself. But the introduction of innovations, as we have seen,[4] threatens the whole security system of the workers involved — their prides of workmanship, their interpersonal relationships in the shop, their pay envelopes. The fears evoked, even when ultimately proved groundless, engender resistance and resentment: resistance to the change itself and resentment against the person who introduces it. The negative emotions clustering about change-situations once more are easily projected on to management.

Division of Function and the Authoritarian Relationship

The manager's resulting difficulties in human relations are not alleviated by the fact that decision making and order giving in modern industrial production have become quite as segmented as its physical labor; division of function now

[3] See Drucker, Peter, The Way to Industrial Peace, *Harper's Magazine*, November, 1946, pp. 389–392, for reports on field visits to plants attempting during the war to counteract the emotional disturbances of assembly-line work.

[4] See Chap. VI, Resistance to Shop Changes, pp. 118–120.

parallels division of labor in its scope. Particularly as the size of the business enterprise increases, authority as well as the assembly of parts moves down a line; and orders as well as parts may come from without the shop quite as much as from within it. A typical mass-production plant may contain over 300 departments that must be made a coordinated, cooperating whole by that intricate line of authority. Though any individual at each level of activity may entertain an extremely vivid consciousness of his immediate superior, few can say just where his real boss functions or just who and what management really is.[5]

Let us remember that of the more than three million nonagricultural concerns conducting American business in 1937, less than 5,000 employed 40 per cent of the total industrial force. In their large-scale plants the emotion-fraught decision of just how much each pay envelope will hold is handed down by a distant top management. The foreman may make recommendations regarding the worker, the supervisor regarding the foreman, and so on up, and these recommendations may carry weight; yet final decision will hinge on higher-ups, on the provisions of union contracts, on the work of staff executives, etc. Thus the most pregnant decision in the shop relationship – the rate of pay – also becomes ever more widely a complex, technically intricate, time-studied, remotely controlled result of many-layered computation and of successive computers.

In any authoritarian relationship, of course, a certain measure of social distance separates the order giver from the order taker, the one who gives rewards from the one who receives them. Status distinctions further separate those above – the higher-ups or "superiors," – from those below, the subordinates and the "ranks" in the shop. In big business,

[5] See GARDNER, BURLEIGH B., *Human Relations in Industry*, pp. 4–10 and 24–39, Richard D. Irwin, Inc., Chicago, 1945; WHYTE, WILLIAM FOOTE, Ed., *Industry and Society*, McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., New York, 1946.

however, the social distance between the workers at the bench and their headquarters bosses seems to be amplified by functional or organizational distance. A New York office, where big-name, but personally unknown, executives evolve policies that pass implicit judgment upon the demands of workers in, let us say, the Middle West, is quite readily transformed into a stage of sinister conspiracy, upon which the traditionalized hate images of Wall Street and monopoly pursue their "selfish, evil machinations."

The Workers' Continuing Value Systems

This conflict pattern of relationship draws sanction finally from nothing less than the basic social arrangements by which interdependent industrial production has been developed in Western democracy. For the factory community cannot be completely understood apart from the larger context within which it functions. The tensions, stresses, and uncertainties engendered by change and crisis-situations in that external environment, as we have already seen, become elements in shop problems because they are internalized in workers and executives alike as anxieties, insecurities, and aggressions.[6] In precisely the same way, the systems of valuations and beliefs characteristic of American democracy are brought into the shop by the men who assimilate them from the society into which they are born and in which they are trained and reared. Each man, that is to say, brings to his job not only his own outside concerns and personality traits but also – as part indeed of his whole personality – what we may term his *social* character: his concepts of right and wrong, of just and unjust, of proper life goals and proper methods of pursuing them, of the measures of success and of failure in achieving them.

From the point of view of our present discussion, these cultural systems of valuation and belief take on a very special

[6] *Cf.* particularly Chap. VII, Wanted: Mature Managers, pp. 145–148.

significance. For they overlay the patterns of cooperation imposed by technology with patterns of conflict sanctioned by our individualist society. This by no means implies that the American Creed affirms only the strenuous life with its ceaseless struggle under the spur of personal ambition.[7] Our systems of values and ideas regarding all that goes into the good life produce, too, their mutually inconsistent attitudes, their ambivalent sentiments and drives. The pragmatic materialist who is considered the typical American is also a practical idealist;[8] the aggressive extrovert is an ingrained moralist, with a profound concern for human rights and dignity; the progressive "common man" who long has fought monopoly and the "money power" has always admired poor boys who became Rockefellers and Henry Fords — or Presidents of the United States.

After all the qualifications have been made, however, this final paradox still remains: Even as the technical organization of production has steadily increased the interdependence of man to men within the chain of daily work, by the sanctions of free enterprise its social organization has led each individual, according to his economic role, to regard other men more as competitors, rivals, exploiters, or "outside" union agitators than as fellow workers in a cooperative sys-

[7] There have been many excellent expositions recently of the American Creed as a factor in shaping American character and behavior. To cite a few of the better known, see GABRIEL, RALPH H., *The Course of American Thought*, The Ronald Press Company, New York, 1940; PARRINGTON, VERNON LOUIS, *Main Currents in American Thought*, Harcourt, Brace and Company, New York, 1927–1930; CURTI, MERLE, *The Growth of American Thought*, Harper & Brothers, New York, 1943; MYRDAL, GUNNAR, *An American Dilemma* (4th ed.), Vol. I, pp. 3–25; Vol. II, pp. 1027–1064, Harper & Brothers, New York, 1944.

[8] It is symptomatic, for instance, that the American businessman, who became known as the world's most successful money-maker, also became known as the world's outstanding private philanthropist.

tem. The resulting fissures have run both vertically and horizontally across the organization of production – among businessmen for trade, among workers for jobs, among union leaders for power, and among businessmen, workers, and farmers for income – to note only the largest cleavages. The conflict relationships thus overlaying the physical cooperation intrinsic in the whole economy have generated the more pervasive volitional drives in our industrial behavior.

INDUSTRY'S DIFFICULTIES OF HUMAN RELATIONS NOT UNIQUE

Within such a general framework, the difficulties in the way of promoting human cooperation in modern industry may appear almost insuperable. Yet these difficulties confront not industry alone but all institutions. The fundamental crisis in human relations centers in the erosion of those disciplines by which the men born into any society accept the various routines and responsibilities required to carry on the tasks of daily living.[9] Such disciplines emerge at their most stable and soundest when they are rooted in the very processes of communal living that bring man into functional relationships with his fellows. But it is precisely this kind of hold upon the individual that has been to a large degree impaired in the modern home, church, community, neighborhood, and school. Economic institutions can hardly escape the general tendency. Instead, we see here demonstrated once more the interrelatedness of everything in social living. For just as in preindustrial society the authority of family, church, and community carried over into economic activities because all social functions and relationships were closely integrated, so in our own day the division of labor and living has weak-

[9] MAYO, ELTON, *The Social Problems of an Industrial Civilization*, Division of Research, Graduate School of Business Administration, Harvard University, Boston, 1945.

ened the disciplines fostered through all these basic institutions to extend into work as into every other life routine.

In other words, we may safely recognize once more that these human problems are characteristic dilemmas of our time, not a catastrophic breakdown in industry alone. They pose questions demanding sober realism, not pessimistic discouragement. We in our generation must continue the never-ending quest of man for adapting the indispensable institutional tools for living together. So it is that in industry the administrator simply must face up to the tasks of increasing human participation — and gratifications — in the daily work environment. In the search for a sounder, more satisfying community in work, the improved relationships he seeks to build undoubtedly differ from those binding individuals in the family, the school, the neighborhood, or any other institution. To pattern shop relations on the model of the family represents really a lag in ideas, a nostalgic yearning for the idealized simpler days of our preindustrial forebears. Modern industry can hardly count upon the affectional ties, the close identifications that repress resentments, and the deeply felt community of purposes and goals characteristic of the family.

But if the means for improving shop relations must be fitted to the particular environment of modern work, they must nevertheless contribute to the building of a work community — to the conversion of the imposed cooperation of daily labor into the volitional cooperativeness of daily relationships.

The Double-branched Approach

Perhaps the first need lies in a realistic acceptance of the boundaries to this effort. In practical terms the administrator cannot concentrate exclusively upon promoting cooperation. He must be prepared also to handle conflict. He is not floored

by manifestations of hostility that confront him now and again, however unexpected and excessive they may appear. Admittedly, any executive caught within the circle of antagonism and hate carries a burden of daily "grief" that at times seems well nigh insupportable. Nonetheless, to the degree that he holds steady, showing himself imperturbable to provocation and impersonally prepared to probe even explosive situations, he succeeds eventually in alleviating suspicions, fears, and resentments. As he thus clears the atmosphere, he also manifestly promotes cooperation.

By the same token, methods that reduce conflict also help promote cooperation; contrariwise, those that promote cooperation inevitably reduce and mitigate conflict. Though hostilities and resentments may never be completely eliminated from shop relations, dealings between management and men can be moved far toward the beneficent pole in the range of conflict and cooperation. And while distinct techniques are required for minimizing the one and maximizing the other, advance on either front inevitably is reflected on the other.

Individual and Group in Production

In the shop, as everywhere of course, the individual, whether as leader of his own immediate group or of the larger organized association, or as follower in the ranks, exerts his influence upon the activities in which all are combined. The personal problems, traits, and sentiments that incline him at given times and in particular circumstances toward conflict or cooperation therefore become continuing components in the whole task of improving shop relations. Viewed in this light, recent developments in the use of the interview, generally designated as counseling, suggest an emerging administrative tool worthy of extended testing by the unions and management alike. For it represents an adap-

tation to industry of the psychotherapy directed to people under stress by practitioners in social work, mental hygiene, and clinical psychiatry.[10] There is no need to review here the requirements of the interview, the many misconceptions that easily group up about its potentialities, and the need for know-how in its use if it is to help the troubled, maladjusted, or disaffected individual attain insight into the sources of his negative feelings on the job. Qualifications are necessary because the interview procedure does not, of course, invariably heal the maladjustments toward which it is directed. But to the degree that individual tensions are relaxed and individual anxieties frankly faced, attitudes improve, self-direction supersedes drifting on the propulsive currents of hostility, and the atmosphere is cleared for positive cooperation.

However much the administrator needs to know about personality difficulties, these can hardly constitute the only focus of his continuing concern. As the effort to develop a conscious sense of community among men at work becomes explicit, it is obviously group relationships that assume

[10] ROETHLISBERGER, FRITZ J., and WILLIAM J. DICKSON, *Management and the Worker*, pp. 189–376, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1939. The following are also of interest: ROGERS, CARL R., *Counseling and Psychotherapy*, Houghton Mifflin Company, Boston, 1942; GARDNER, BURLEIGH B., *op. cit.*, pp. 168–255. In *Proceedings of the National Conference of Social Work*, Columbia University Press, New York, 1943, see HAMILTON, GORDON, *Counseling as Social Case Work*, and MCGOWAN, CAROLYN L., *Counseling in Industry*, pp. 216–236; in *The Family Journal of Social Case Work see* GAGE, ELENA, A Foundation for Industrial Counseling, July, 1944, pp. 176–182, and KATZ, ALFRED H., A Counseling Outpost for War Workers, April, 1945, pp. 43–49; BURLING, TEMPLE, Mental Hygiene in Business and Industry, *Mental Hygiene*, April, 1941, pp. 177–187; United States War Department, *Civilian Personnel Pamphlet* 1, 1943, "Personnel Counseling – Key to Greater Production"; MENNINGER, WILLIAM C., Psychiatry and the War, *Atlantic Monthly*, November, 1945, pp. 107–114.

steadily increasing importance. Recognition of the potential influence of the individual with his personality traits and his personal affairs does not thereby decline; but this individual receives attention primarily as a member of the working group and as a participant in its common interests. How can we make these common interests vividly felt? How can we bind the group as a whole in new identifications with the tools they use and the products they turn out together? How can we enlarge the notions of productivity, in the office as well as at the bench, until they include all the factors entering into production – materials, power, machines, and men – and so into the returns available for division among the cooperating producers? In such questions lies the deeper challenge of shop relations.

It must be said at once that very little applicable research and experimentation has as yet been directed toward these problems.[11] The rudimentary character of inquiry into this all-important field, however, makes it possible for the administrator to advance our understanding of group behavior by his own specific contributions. Not that he will take time off, so to speak, to build relations on a desired model. Instead, he will promote the desired community through the functional participation of each man in the continuing activities

[11] For formative and significant experimental work along these lines see the publications of Kurt Lewin and associates at the Institute for Group Dynamics at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. A useful brief summary is presented in MURPHY, GARDNER (ed.), *Human Nature and Enduring Peace,* Chap. 17, Houghton Mifflin Company, Boston, 1945. For a significant account of a conscious administrative effort to attain group participation see LILIENTHAL, DAVID E., *TVA – Democracy on the March* (6th ed.), Harper & Brothers, New York, 1946. A considerable literature of group work has been developing in the field of social work. For description as well as citation of sources see the article on Social Group Work in *Social Work Yearbook,* Russell Sage Foundation, New York, 1946.

of the shop. Indeed, the underlying soundness of this community must constitute a major consideration in every decision he makes.

Structuring Group Relations through Shop Activities: The Continuing Community and the Organizing Campaign

Let us review what this implies in concrete detail. As a union seeks entry into a shop, the continuing community of supervision and men passes through the tumult of the organizing campaign. Beyond that upheaval lies the resumption of relationships on a new basis. Hostilities and rancors do not subside when the campaign formally ends; they linger to inflame the dealings out of which the new order of relationships must grow.[12] The administrators of both management and union at that fluid point of transition, moreover, can make a conscious choice of the new type of relationship. Should the changing shop community be built by training foremen and stewards for its daily dealings, by conference techniques applied to the problems of these bench leaders on both sides, and by maintaining circular channels of communication between rank and file and varying levels of leadership; or should it be molded by cracking-down disciplines imposed from the top?[13]

Negotiations and the Participant Shop Community

So, too, the first negotiation may sharpen hostilities or help liquidate them. Later negotiations, similarly, are successful in the measure by which those at the conference table not only achieve concrete settlements on the disputed terms of agreement but also provide meaningful experience for those who must translate the contractual provisions into daily relationships. Throughout the ranks of supervision, from

[12] *Cf.* Chap. II, When the Union Enters, pp. 12–14.

[13] *Cf.* Chap. IV, Building Joint Relationships, pp. 73–74.

bench foremen upward on the one side as throughout the ranks of union members and their stewards on the other, the leaders who actually carry forward the negotiations must therefore establish techniques for participation, for continuing communication, and for emotional identifications that transform the signed contract into a living document. The shop "constitution," then, in a very real sense "belongs" to those who must make it actually work from day to day.[14]

The will to cooperate promoted by such procedures is something far more sinewy than the flaccid good will presumably created by sheer yielding to demands, by overgenerous giving and "appeasement." Indeed, if the impulses toward conflict remain active beneath the surface of the relationships from which cooperation also must flow, the outlets provided by the regulated tussles of negotiating may well prove salutory. The American at work, as in play and politics and many other communal activities, enjoys more what he wins than what he gets; he relishes a good, clean struggle. Hard-boiled negotiations, with each side putting up a good fight for its position and yielding when it must with good sportsmanship, may provide the color and educative participations that furnish sound releases for the conflict impulses in shop relations. In the *quid pro quo* emerging as terms of contract, workers may then be made aware of the "quids" promised on their side for the gains – the "quos" – fought for and won.

Grievance Procedure as a Tool for Reducing Conflict to Difference

In the same way, grievance procedure provides an outlet for articulating and draining off dissatisfactions as well as cooperative techniques for settling and probing conflicts over interpretation of the contract.[15] Once more, the administrator

[14] *Cf.* Chap. III, Negotiating the First Agreement, pp. 33–41.

[15] *Cf.* Chap. V, Handling Shop Grievances, pp. 76–79.

who recognizes that conflict and cooperation are always interacting components of a relationship utilizes the contractual procedures not only to handle each specific complaint, but also to advance the underlying sense of community in the shop. He approaches these controversies as we must learn to deal with all conflict: not hoping to eliminate it completely from social relationships, not satisfied even with the great advance of providing established machinery for peaceful adjudication by rule and law, but determined also to reduce conflict to difference – that is, to disagreement as free as possible from the hates and hostilities that engender overt fighting. Differences can be adjusted, creatively met by new inventions in relationships, accommodated, or even compromised. But hates, hostilities, and clashing "principles" can only win or lose. They are totalitarian!

Prevention in Labor Relations

To check the growth of these negative feelings, with their blighting impact upon the shop community, the possibilities of prevention in labor relations also merit administrative consideration. Systematic planning of production programs is no novelty in most shops. But very seldom does such planning pass beyond technical and financial factors. Inevitably every shop change, every policy, affects in varying ways the men through whom it must be executed. To the degree, therefore, that we learn to appraise such affects in advance, to the degree that every program takes social consequences into consideration, complicating human difficulties may be averted.

Such planning is facilitated by recognition of the recurrent friction points, the underlying factors in daily dealings that especially require careful attention. Granted, the particular form of problem-situations will differ from shop to shop and from time to time, since the context for shop behavior is always unique. Even so, uniform factors, let it be recalled once more, do combine recurrently in each case and so can be isolated

and classified for precautionary consideration.[16] Thus, the administrator who must introduce a change does well to be forewarned against the anxieties, and hence the resistance, he may meet among the workers. He looks for such sentiments at the point where job content may be altered, wage schedules may require adjustment, or interpersonal relations at the bench may be affected. He faces them frankly with the leaders of the men, union and informal alike. If there is an individual among the workers affected who is prone to griping or is rigidly set in his shop ways, he is marked for watchfulness as potential articulator of simmering group fears. These groups at the bench also may prove themselves instruments of resistance — or, if properly handled, of cooperation.[17]

Handling the Residual Fighting as Calculated Risks

However successful such techniques for confining conflict-situations within the bounds of "difference," however effective the planning to prevent and forestall conflict, the programs of labor relations must also include methods for handling overt eruptions. Needless to say, these eruptions — strikes, walkouts, hostilities, slowdowns, etc. — constitute end results in behavior that must be related to the whole complex of generating factors invariably underlying them. But in the typical framework of present-day shop relationships, the leaders on the union as well as on the management side inevitably face now and again decisions on such "end-result" conflicts. Have joint dealings, in a word, reached a point where it is better to face a showdown — to submit the developing differences to a test of force? In this decision, too, the leader appraises all the risks involved. To the recognized considerations of costs and public relations and the chances of victory, he applies a realistic judgment upon the impact of the fight on the shop community. Before the fight and

[16] *Cf.* Chap. V, Handling Shop Grievances, pp. 106–107.

[17] *Cf.* Chap. VI, Resistance to Shop Changes, pp. 125–127.

during it as well, he always keeps in mind the continuing community of men at work. Ultimately the men on the opposite sides of the picket lines will be working together once more; the strategies of the fight, accordingly, should not evoke hostilities so bitter that they cannot find release in the legitimate outlets of union action. The reminder from the strike front of steel in 1946 that "we've got to live with those men after the strike" might well become the test for all fighting techniques.[18]

What About Promoting Cooperation?

As thinking on shop relations is thus brought to the area of daily practice, it may appear that an inordinate portion of these suggestions are directed to the problems of conflict. What about the promotion of cooperation? Granted that the two forms of behavior are always interrelated, granted that effective handling of conflict moves the whole shop community along the range of relationships toward its more beneficent, cooperative pole, are we not still relinquishing cooperation by these emphases on techniques for handling conflict purely to the role of a kind of by-product, of a desired objective that will be realized more or less automatically as — and to the degree that — conflict is reduced?

If the ultimate answer is unequivocably "no," the immediate situation requires a realistic admission: However deplorable the fact, it remains a fact, nonetheless, that forces trending toward conflict and ferment now dominate labor relationships in the United States. Though potent historic and social causes underlie this situation, no realization of causes mitigates the gravity of the results with which we must now deal. The administrator who must grapple with them from day to day in his job of producing goods may justifiably ask whether cooperation in the present industrial scene is not squarely up to the other side. As long as the

[18] See Chap. VIII, Wanted: Mature Labor Leaders, pp. 195–199.

unions exhibit the militancy of their current programs — whether that militancy be a product of union rivalries, external pressures, ferment in the ranks, the character of leadership, or sectarian left-wing philosophy — is not management best advised to structure relationships frankly on conflict patterns? Must it not seek restraining laws, contractual safeguards against infringements upon "management's rights to manage", punitive rules to assure observance of signed agreements, rigorously strict construction of contractual terms, and so on, in a sort of constant rear-guard action against the surging but also divided ranks of organized labor? How, in a word, can one concern himself with building a cooperative shop community, when so much in the dominating national scene seems rigged against such a community?

We return again here, however, to the point from which we started: Other alternatives lie before us precisely because industrial relations are in process of transition. We find ourselves after the productive achievements of the war years in a period of impasse. Yet impasse, trying as it is, does not constitute an era of crystallized decision. Shop relationships remain still fluid; hence, the continuing need of improved techniques for handling and reducing conflict coexists with the urgency of exploring methods for consciously promoting cooperation among men at work. If conflict situations still seem to mobilize the more effective responses in industrial behavior, this does not mean only that we must learn how to handle or "prohibit" conflict. We may also investigate the possibilities of making cooperation in industry something as active, exacting, and tangibly rewarding as the traditional fight for the causes and demands in which men believe.

Cooperation Must Be as Active as Conflict

Manifestly, this phase of the double-branched approach toward improving labor relations is the more difficult. To recognize that effective cooperation in industry cannot be a

passive thing, a mere absence of conflict, undoubtedly constitutes a prerequisite to its promotion, but the concrete operations by which such theoretical recognition may become actual practice remain yet to be devised. Just how is the exhilarating sense of community to be attained in the shop; just how are men at work to be bound by a common interest in common goals?

The very paucity even of clues to the answer intensifies the natural reliance on still more discipline. The cooperation already imposed by the machine and by management will now be imposed yet again by restrictive laws, union responsibility, or aroused public opinion. Yet disciplines thus imposed from the top or from outside the disciplined individuals and groups yield only formal obedience, and only for a time; they never yield real cooperativeness. The typical American worker, as we know him, does not submit easily to threats without the resentments, reservations, and hostilities that finally find their own expression in "beating the game." In industry, as everywhere, his real cooperation is enlisted only through concrete activities tied to goals he feels vividly as his own.

Cooperation in industry, unlike virtue in everyday living, cannot be left to be its own reward. The industrial conflicts that absorb men's feelings so readily are tied up with immediate gains. After a strike, the worker finds more in his pay envelope if he wins; he takes the risks and costs in terms of that potential gain. Adverse possibilities — in price movements or influence on employment — remain dimly "long run." The beneficent results of cooperation have yet to be translated similarly into concretely immediate and tangible terms.

In the same way, broad-based industrial programs must be weighed not only for their economic, but also for their psychosocial, consequences. Consider, for instance, the annual wage. Thus far, this growingly attractive demand in the

union program has been discussed predominantly in economic terms. But must we not stop to ask ourselves how much cooperation or loyalty we may fairly expect from men who, by and large, are hourly rated workers, hired and paid on a short run beyond any other group in the economy? Granted all the difficulties confronting industrial establishments in introducing any program of guaranteed earnings for employees, is it not rather naïve to expect the selfsame employees to feel complete security in relationship with management?[19]

The Shop and Its Communal Environment

Finally, if cooperation in industry has failed, in part at least, because all social bonds have been to some degree eroded; if discipline is firmest when it is integral, a part of the individual's own code of rights and responsibilites as a member of his community, obviously the relation between work and citizenship must be restored. Indeed, in some New England towns, the teamwork between management and men in the shop clearly reflects their teamwork as fellow citizens in joint activities on town committees. In the same way, the turbulent relationships of Detroit's automotive plants may reflect the newness, the lack of an integrated communal life, among a citizenry drawn from every quarter of the country by the lure of the new industry. In a word, it is also naïve to expect healthy relationships within the factory gates if pathology deforms human relations in the surrounding community. A plant does not operate in a social vacuum. All of us need badly to get to work as citizens, to develop the good society in our respective towns through common activities — community funds, councils of social agencies, civic centers, sound government. Morality, too, like peace, is indivisible. Discipline inheres in such a morality,

[19] Snider, Joseph, *The Guarantee of Work and Wages,* Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1947.

in the codes of what is "good" and "right" behavior that grow out of the totality of activities engaging the individual in his family, his church, his club, his union, and his job. Fortunately, these communal codes contain common objectives that transcend economic, religious, racial, and social lines. Management, union, and men can truly cooperate to make their town one of which they all can be proud, one in which they are glad to rear their children. And to the extent that they cooperate as citizens, they also cooperate as workers turning out the goods their community needs.

The Union Leader and the Local Shop Community

The areas open for exploration in the quest for cooperation indicate not only the complexity of the task but also the dimensions of the opportunity. Though the quest demands the active concern of management and unions alike, the unions today face the sterner challenge. For while they too generally make obeisance to cooperation, potent factors tend still to focus union policy upon conflict issues.[20] Neither management nor union leaders, of course, can minimize the valid differences continuously existing between them in the range of shop relations. But as union power grows, no issue should be viewed solely as difference; instead, the concomitance of conflict *and* cooperation must be probed in every situation.

Consider, for instance, the sanctioned struggle over the division of the "take," not only in the economy as a whole but in each individual shop. The farseeing labor leader soon must recognize that cooperation as well as conflict can serve his goal of winning ever greater gains for his members. He must find ways of persuading those members that their entirely legitimate objective of more can be advanced not only through increasing their particular share in the whole to be divided but also in steadily augmenting that whole –

[20] See Chap. VIII, Wanted: Mature Labor Leaders, pp. 180–184.

a goal in which each and every participant in producing goods or services plays a part. In Russia and Great Britain, union leaders are urging this responsibility on their members through a party speaking each in its characteristic way for the working class that has become the "government." It remains to be seen whether our American unions can find their own characteristic methods for making the same essential amplification of policy while operating in the system of private ownership to which the majority of them still profess allegiance.

But this need for new integrations in the union's program is hampered by the intrinsic forces that make the local shop community a minor item on the total calendar of union leaders. Every policy they formulate, however, evokes the responses, sentiments and feelings that promote cooperation or stir conflict precisely in that local shop community. Thus, while it is true that American unionism today is not typically class conscious, the very origins and history of organized labor have cast its policies dominantly in national forms. Nowadays, unions concentrate ever more on wide-reaching economic issues like full employment, social security, the annual wage, and uniform national agreements. Of course there can be no question that sound shop relations require a soundly functioning economy and advancing living standards. Such tendencies in the union program, therefore, reflect in part merely a realistic appraisal of the general drift of social relationships in our large-scale, interdependent, and centralizing society. But they derive also from organized labor's historic character as a protest movement. These traditional protests yield social equations for individual and group wants; they identify special gain with national welfare. Such generalized formulations as, for instance, the purchasing power-theory and the day of the common man in turn provide the "principles" that rationalize and inflate the very concrete differences rising among management and men in

each shop. Thereby they also set them one against the other in antagonisms that become righteous as well as belligerent.

Within the labor movement, moreover, each labor leader quite understandably wishes to make his union a cohesive social organization buttressed by the staunch loyalties of its members. In such a quest any constituent shop community as such may appear a threat to the larger allegiance. Again, the rivalries within organized labor add further momentum to the emphasis upon specific union loyalties; they become instruments in the many-faceted drive for union power. Accordingly, each leader concentrates upon building loyalties to his union as such, rather than to the constituent productive community as such – and even more specifically to himself as against union rivals.

Managerial habits of thought also may show the impress of considerations outside the shop, *e.g.*, markets, competitive costs, and technological developments; but even in these matters they cannot be divorced from the problems of producing goods or services in concrete shops or mills or stores. In contrast, the union leader, even when he gives the grassroot shop his attention, tends to manifest his concern through efforts to satisfy a generalized union membership that contributes to the strength of the national organization in dealings with employers on the one side and union rivals on the other. In these terms, as we have already seen conflict issues unfortunately still evoke more of the drama and sense of involvement that win wide membership interest.[21] That is why the grassroots shop must, as a unique community of working individuals, demand ever-increasing attention from the union leader who desires to preserve a free American society through these times of upheaval and revolution. For only by structuring shop relationships so that they simultaneously promote cooperation and reduce conflict within the wider frame of collective dealings, so that they meet

[21] *Cf.* Chap. VIII, Wanted: Mature Labor Leaders, pp. 199–205.

simultaneously the disciplined requirements of production and the human requirements of democracy, can democracy itself survive.

Grassroots Participation

To be sure, the strong countercurrents are not hard to trace — the currents heading an infinitely complex, perplexing society toward centralization of power in political government, business management, and social organization. Under the impact of crisis, the forces of our day are relentlessly widening the area of human controls. We see the dangers of centralized power even as we see also the resistless drift to it everywhere in the world. We are reminded over and over again that we live in one world; we work in mass-production industries and consume through mass distribution; we reside in metropolises; we fight global wars. Nervously, we contemplate big business, big unionism, big government. Man may be impressed by bigness, but he is not yet domesticated to it. His most vivid sentiments still rise from his close and intimate associations in daily life — the small group, the local work unit, the home community.

Against this growing drift to centralized power, our only recourse for preserving for man his meaningful identification with his community lies in building local centers of effective participation. No grassroots center is more important today than the shop where daily work is carried forward. For a man's job is one of the natural pivots about which his life revolves. But as the source of goods and income, as an institution yielding status and prestige, industry also focuses human discontents and hence hostilities. It contains great aggregates of power, union and business, that may become the participants in building sound community relations — or the protagonists in such threatening conflict that the final source of authority, government, will take over completely. Thus it is that the creation of sound union-management rela-

tions in the local shop emerges a basic determinant of democratic survival.

If these tasks of human relations seem challenging indeed, they need not, by that token, put us on the defensive. Conflict, rooting deep in the human endowment, constitutes beyond doubt a substantial component in the relationships of every society. The totalitarians of right or left have yet to prove that their prohibitions upon the familiar conflicts in industry yield any completely cooperative-minded peoples. It is almost impossible to know just how their workers react on the daily job behind the "iron curtain" of secrecy and propaganda. But this much at least can be said: their exploitation of class and foreign aggressions indicates that the human capacity for hostility in totalitarian societies has thus far been given other and more dangerous outlets.

The strengthening of the grassroots shop, where men at work interact in conflict and cooperation, belongs to the whole problem of participation in democratic society. Totalitarianism in its various guises can discipline, purge, and manipulate; but democracy everywhere requires participation and self-regulation. Thus even as we must learn how to operate an interdependent national economy in an interdependent world, we must learn also how to decentralize administration so that each individual can feel himself effectively part of the total job of modern living together.

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