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SOVIET DOCUMENTS ON FOREIGN POLICY

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SOVIET DOCUMENTS ON FOREIGN POLICY

SELECTED AND EDITED BY

JANE DEGRAS

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PREFACE

THE documents in the present volume, the second in the series, cover the chief aspects of Soviet foreign relations and policy for the years 1925 to 1932.

As in the first volume, treaties and agreements registered with the League of Nations and published in its *Treaty Series* have been omitted. It was also decided to omit the speeches and proposals made by the Soviet delegation to the preparatory commission of the League of Nations disarmament conference. These are long and repetitive, and their substance is summarized in the reports to the Central Executive Committee and the Soviet Congress, which are given. On the other hand, a few Communist Party documents have been included, where they treat of questions which might otherwise have appeared unduly neglected.

No collection of this kind can fill in more than part of the total picture. Like all official documents, these must be critically examined in their proper context; they are intended primarily for the student, as one indispensable source among the many he will have to consult.

It was not possible in all cases to check the text of Stalin's articles and speeches selected for inclusion with the original version; where this was done, the editor used the second and ninth editions of *Voprosy Leninizma* (Moscow, 1926 and 1933), *Ob Oppozitsii, Stat'i i Rechi 1921–1927* (Moscow, 1928), and *XV S'ezd VKP(b), Stenograficheskii Otchet* (Moscow, 1928).

Square brackets indicate corrections inserted by the editor; round brackets reproduce brackets in the original text. Where two texts have been consulted, the first reference gives the source followed; angular brackets, in conjunction with footnotes, indicate textual variations between the two. The spelling of proper names in texts taken from the English has been made to conform with that used elsewhere in this volume. Unless a document is headed 'extracts', points of omission are reproduced from the text used as source.

The following customary abbreviations have been used: RSFSR for Russian Socialist Federal Soviet Republic, USSR for Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, NKID and Narkomindel for People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, TsIK for Central Executive Committee, Sovnarkom for Council of People's Commissars, and VKP(b) and CPSU for Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

The translations have been made by the editor, who gratefully acknowledges the help given by Mrs M. Dewar and Mr J. Atkinson.

A comprehensive list of documents, from which this selection has been made, is to be found in *Calendar of Soviet Documents on Foreign Policy* (Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1948).

J. D.

January 1952

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EXTRACT FROM A SPEECH BY STALIN AT THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE RUSSIAN COMMUNIST PARTY

19 *January* 1925 Stalin, vii, p. 11

. . . The international situation is beginning to change radically. New conditions are maturing, foretelling new complications for us, and we must be ready for them. Intervention is again becoming a current question. What are the facts?

Firstly, the strengthening of the colonial movement and of the liberation movement in general in the East. India, China, Egypt, Sudan—these are important bases for imperialism. There the colonial movement is growing and will grow. This is bound to turn the ruling classes in the Great Powers against us, against the Soviets, for they know that the seeds falling on this fruitful soil in the East will grow and mature. They will certainly grow.

Secondly, complications are maturing in North Africa, in Morocco and Tunis. In connexion with this a new regrouping of forces is taking place, new preparations for new military complications among the imperialists. The fact that Spain suffered defeat in Morocco, that France is stretching its hands out towards Morocco, that England will not tolerate a strengthening of France in Morocco, that Italy is trying to exploit the new situation to stretch its hands out towards Tunis, that the other States will not allow this, that England and France, competing with each other, are trying their utmost to secure their influence in the Balkans, in the new States formed as a result of the dissolution of Austria-Hungary—all this recalls well-known facts from the history of the last war, recalls facts preceding the last war. Albania—that is no accident; it is a struggle of the Great Powers to maintain their influence over this little morsel. All this shows that forces are being prepared and regrouped throughout Europe in connexion with the complications beginning in the Far East, and with the new prospects opening in North Africa. All this is the premiss of a new war. And a new war is bound to touch our country.

Thirdly, the strengthening of revolutionary sentiments among the English workers. This is a fact of first-rate importance. England is the leading country in Europe. The schism which is beginning between the General Council of the Trade Unions and the Labour Party, the splits within the Labour Party that have begun and are developing, all this shows that something revolutionary, something new is growing there. It frightens the ruling strata in England. This must turn them against Soviet Russia, for the revival of the movement in England is taking place under the banner of friendship with Russia.

Fourthly, in connexion with these conditions of which I have spoken, in connexion with the fact that the conditions for war are ripening and war may become unavoidable, not of course tomorrow or the day after, but within a few years, in connexion with the fact that war cannot fail to make the internal revolutionary crisis more acute both in the East and the West, in connexion with this we cannot fail to put to ourselves the question of being ready for everything. I think that the forces of the revolutionary movement in the West are powerful, they are growing, they will grow, they may lead somewhere or other to the scrapping of the bourgeoisie; so it is. And it will be very difficult to restrain it. The example of the neighbouring States shows this clearly, for example Estonia and Latvia. The question of our army, of its strength, of its readiness, with the complications in the surrounding countries, is bound to arise as a most vital question.

This does not mean that, in this situation, we must necessarily go in for an active offensive against anybody. That is not true. If anybody slips into such a tone it is incorrect. Our banner remains as before the banner of peace. But if war begins, we shall not be able to sit by with folded hands; we shall have to make a move, but we shall be the last to come out, and we shall make a move in order to throw the decisive weight into the balance, the weight that might tip the scales.

Hence it follows: be ready for everything, get our army ready, shoe them and clothe them, study and improve technique, improve chemistry, aviation, and in general raise our Red Army to the required level. The international situation requires this of us.

INTERVIEW BY CHICHERIN ON THE RETIREMENT FROM OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES SECRETARY OF STATE

21 *January* 1925 *Izvestia*, 21 *January* 1925

Secretary of State Hughes, who has just retired after four years of Government service, will not be remembered kindly by our countrymen, or by any who hold dear the interests of human progress and the establishment of more just relations between nations. Four years ago many people looked forward with considerable optimism to the era of Republican rule which had just begun. As soon as President Harding was installed in power the All-Russian Central Executive Committee approached him with a proposal for the establishment of relations.[1] The American Government's refusal,[2] transmitted not directly to the Soviet Government but through the American Consul in Reval, in extremely harsh terms, was primarily the doing of Hughes, who had

[1] *Soviet Documents*, i, p. 244. [2] *U.S. Foreign Relations*, 1921, ii, p. 768.

just taken up his duties. When the Soviet Government addressed to President Coolidge proposals for the discussion of differences existing between us,[1] in response to the President's declaration in Congress on 6 December 1923,[2] the American Government made a negative reply[3] which was again primarily the personal work of Hughes. The precipitateness with which Hughes sent his reply to this overture on the part of the Soviet Government clearly demonstrated the extent to which, overwhelmed with blind hatred for the Soviet Union, he did all in his power to hinder the regulation of relations between the USSR and America, to which certain Government circles were at that time favourably inclined. On more than one occasion, in replies to institutions or groups interested in the renewal of relations with the USSR, Hughes expressed the most intransigent hostility towards the Soviet Union. It became axiomatic that no improvement in relations between the United States and the USSR was possible so long as Hughes remained in charge of the State Department. When one set of arguments had been disproved by actual events beyond a shadow of doubt, Hughes would think up new arguments in order to prevent any alteration in relations with us, not even showing scruples in the use of forged documents.

His main argument over a long period was the assertion that the Soviet Republic was economically an empty land, incapable of either importing or exporting anything. The trade relations which have gradually developed between America and ourselves, despite the difficulty entailed in the non-recognition *de jure* of one party, have knocked this clumsy assertion on the head. The living facts and daily observation have disproved in the most resounding manner his other assertion that the Soviet Government was a band of men out of touch with the popular masses and maintaining its power by violence. The more the living facts of the Soviet structure were disclosed to Americans, by means of the work of the American Relief Administration during the famine and the visits of American statesmen to the USSR, the more this monstrously stupid argument astonished one by its blatant contradiction of the facts.

Recently Hughes has been fond of quoting the annulment by the Soviet Government of the debts of former Governments,[4] but when we proposed to discuss this question with him he refused, thus proving the hypocrisy of his argument. There remained one last argument: the supposed propaganda work of the Soviet Government. This argument was only applicable because Hughes used the word 'Moscow' instead of more precise terms in his statements. He could lay whatever facts he

[1] *Soviet Documents*, i, p. 417.
[2] *U.S. Foreign Relations*, 1923, i, p. vii.
[3] ibid., ii, p. 788.
[4] *Soviet Documents*, i, p. 43.

liked at the door of the Soviet Government, no matter how remote they were, when the indefinite term 'Moscow' was substituted for more precise political conceptions. That same America which was for a time the home of the First International could not reconcile itself to the fact that Moscow was the home of the Third International. But it was not only the Soviet Republics that experienced the profound reaction and doctrinaire narrowness of Hughes's policy. With the passage of time Hughes became more and more identified with support for aggressive imperialism in world affairs.

It is too early to link any sort of prophecies with the person of the new Secretary of State. It would be too risky to attempt to predict anything about his future activity. It is to be hoped that his acquaintance with actual economic relations, due to his active role in American industry, will be reflected in a vitalizing manner in his future activity. We shall not draw any conclusions from his former activity in London because there he did not direct policy but fulfilled other people's prior decisions. May real life, of which he has had immediate experience in his industrial work, open his eyes to those perspectives which remained for his predecessor a closed book with seven seals. Life itself is powerfully straining forward to break down the Chinese wall which Hughes erected between America and the USSR. Influenced by one of the best men in American politics, Senator Borah, the President has conceived the idea of calling a conference on disarmament. But how can such a conference be called without the State which occupies one-sixth of the globe, and how can such a State be invited when legal relations with it do not exist, and every opportunity of entering into relations with it is turned down on principle? The first step of the newly elected President in the realm of world affairs is thus bringing him up against the obvious necessity of drawing the USSR into the circle of countries with which the United States has political relations. Indeed, one need only look at a map to convince oneself of the utter impossibility of prolonged retention of the artificial system created by Hughes, whereby the two greatest countries in the world were kept apart. The entry of the USSR into the arena of Pacific relations confronts American policy in the Pacific with this impossibility, and the day-to-day interests of the latter will continue to be frustrated if this clumsy separation from the USSR is continued.

But further, the American Government no longer limits itself to a Pacific policy, but becomes daily more involved in all European, Asiatic, and other colonial relations. How then can it apply the policy of the ostrich to our country, which covers half Europe and Asia?

Indeed, what an absence of elementary logic is revealed in this artificial separation. America is literally overflowing with free capital

which seeks investment, while the USSR presents a magnificent picture of natural resources waiting to be brought to fruition by capital. Great prospects not only for the well-being of our two countries but for the enrichment of world economy are linked with the future penetration of American capital into our country in fruitful work. Indeed, as early as 1918, Comrade Lenin gave deep thought to and elaborated a plan for the attraction of foreign capital on a concession basis, to develop our natural resources, and sent this plan via Colonel Robins to America, as being the country destined by nature more than any other to participate in this process.[1]

I am not prophesying, I am not making any bets. I am simply stating the facts of the situation and, on the basis of these facts, I take the liberty of expressing the hope that the replacement of State Secretary Hughes by another statesman will prove a historic step on the path towards the renewal of relations between our two countries, an act to which life urges them with irresistible power.

EXTRACTS FROM A PRESS INTERVIEW BY CHICHERIN ON THE AGREEMENT WITH JAPAN

22 *January* 1925 *Izvestia*, 22 *January* 1925

The signature on 20 January in Peking of the Soviet-Japanese agreement[2] is something far more significant than the mere recognition of the USSR by one more Government, something far more significant even than merely the settlement of questions in dispute between the two Governments. It is not only the starting point of a period of friendly relations between the peoples of the USSR and Japan; it is a real revolution in Far Eastern politics as a whole and in contemporary politics generally. For us it is the end of the entire period of intervention, civil war, and unsettled conditions in the Far East, and the consummation of the progressive development, advancing steadily forward, of our political relations in the East, which embrace ever new spheres with the gradually extending friendship with the peoples of the East. It undoubtedly consolidates our position in the Far East. . . . The Russian Far East has now entered on a phase of peaceful development and friendly relations with all its neighbours. For Japan itself this treaty means the creation of a friendly rear should it be threatened by complications there. More than six months ago the establishment of friendly relations with the great Chinese people gave a new dimension to the Soviet policy of promoting brotherhood between peoples on the principle

[1] *Russian-American Relations*, p. 204.
[2] *League of Nations Treaty Series*, xxxiv, p. 32.

of their self-determination. The friendship which is growing from day to day between the USSR and the Chinese people, caught up in a broad liberation movement, finds its completion in the creation of friendly relations with Japan. The treaty is the realization of one of the constant aspirations of the peoples of the USSR.

On this occasion I recall that one of the shrewdest of Japanese politicians long ago understood the tremendous importance of friendship between Japan and Russia. In the nineties of the last century, when Tsarist policy began to reveal its unceremoniously aggressive designs on Korea, Japanese politicians tried long and hard to prevent the rupture of friendly relations between Japan and Russia and to find some compromise. Two days ago, while waiting for the telegram announcing the signature of the Soviet-Japanese agreement, I was reading the memoirs of Hayashi,[1] Japanese ambassador to England, which tells in detail of the Japanese efforts, during the time of Lobanov and Muravev, to reach agreement with the Tsarist Government. The memoirs of Rosen,[2] Tsarist ambassador in Tokyo, confirm from the other side the account of how persistently the Japanese Government sought agreement with Russia. But the Tsarist Government quite unceremoniously violated the mutual undertakings of non-intervention in Korean affairs and embarked on the policy which compelled Japanese ruling circles to an opposite policy and to base their international relations on a long-term alliance with England.

If at that time in its policy towards Japan the Tsarist Government was the aggressor, with all the rudeness and greediness peculiar to it, then in the first years of the Soviet regime which replaced the Tsarist Empire, a regime which by its very nature aimed at peace and brotherhood between the peoples, the aggressor, and a most vigorous aggressor, without declaring war, was the Japanese Government. That period has ended, and the unusually cordial and friendly reception given to Comrade Joffe, the Soviet representative, at his first appearance on Japanese territory showed with striking clarity to what degree the broad masses of the Japanese people understood the necessity and importance of friendship with the USSR. The cheers which greeted Comrade Joffe in Tokyo were an eloquent prelude to the signature of the treaty...

Without waiting for the conclusion of the treaty, we have already had some experience of economic collaboration with the Japanese. Far Eastern fisheries have according to the old custom been leased to Japanese, and the result of these contracts may be recognized as in the highest degree favourable. This is only the first step, and in many

[1] *The Secret Memoirs of Count Tadasu Hayashi*, ed. by A. M. Pooley, London, Eveleigh Nash, 1915.

[2] Rosen, Baron, *Forty Years of Diplomacy*, Allen & Unwin, 1922.

other matters we can go half way to meet Japanese requirements and aspirations in economic matters. A successful beginning will be continued still more successfully.

The profound difference between our regime and the Japanese leads to profound differences also in the principles underlying the policy of the two States. We rely on the loyalty of the Japanese Government, just as they can rest assured of ours; both sides will, of course, refrain from violating the undertakings and the friendly political relations established under the treaty, and will adhere strictly to the principle of non-intervention in the internal affairs of the other.

The signature of the agreement is thus the first act. Its consequences will of course have profound repercussions on the entire complex of world relations.

NOTE FROM CHICHERIN TO THE GOVERNMENT OF OUTER MONGOLIA ON THE WITHDRAWAL OF SOVIET TROOPS

24 *January* 1925 *Tikhii Okean*, 1936, iii, p. 73

In July 1921 the Mongolian People's Government addressed to the Government of the RSFSR a note concerning the non-withdrawal of Soviet military detachments from Mongolia before the final liquidation of the threat represented by their common enemies, who had concentrated their forces and set up a new machinery of government in the eastern Mongolian steppes.

As there was still a threat to the free development of the Mongolian people, and also to the security of the Russian and Far Eastern Republics, the Government of the RSFSR in its note of 10 August 1921[1] acceded to the request of the Mongolian Government. On 17 October of the same year the Mongolian Government addressed a note to the Government of the RSFSR containing a proposal for the liquidation by joint action of the remnants of the White Guard bands concentrated in western Mongolia.

In its note of 28 October the Government of the RSFSR informed the Mongolian Government that, in order to put the proposal into effect and in the interests of the security of the frontiers of the RSFSR, it had ordered its troops to deliver, in conjunction with the people's revolutionary army of Mongolia, a decisive blow against the remnants of the enemy, in order to secure for the peoples of Mongolia and the RSFSR conditions for peaceful life and labour.

In the course of the following years, protected by Mongolian and Soviet troops, genuine order was established as a result of the

[1] *Soviet Documents*, i, p. 252.

revolutionary activity of the people's Government, and conditions for the further democratization of the country, for its proclamation as a republic, and for the convening of the Great All-People's Huruldan have been secured. In keeping with these circumstances on the frontier between Mongolia and the RSFSR and the former Far Eastern Republic, which at the desire of its people became part of the RSFSR, the rule of law has been firmly established.

In view of this, and of the final liquidation of the remnants of the White Guard bands, the Government of the USSR, which took over from the Government of the RSFSR the conduct of the external relations of the Russian Republic, considers that the presence of Soviet troops on the territory of the Mongolian People's Republic is no longer necessary.

With great satisfaction the Government of the USSR observes the happy consummation of the State structure of Mongolia by the Great Huruldan, which guarantees the further development and consolidation of popular government in the country.

PRESS INTERVIEW BY KARAKHAN, SOVIET AMBASSADOR TO CHINA, ON THE SOVIET AGREEMENT WITH JAPAN

24 *January* 1925 *Izvestia*, 25 *January* 1925

Four important questions created difficulties in our negotiations with Japan: (1) the return of Sakhalin; (2) the question of the old treaties; (3) the question of Tsarist debts and of our losses as a result of intervention; (4) the question of the coal and oil concessions in North Sakhalin.

These questions were settled in the following way: North Sakhalin is to be evacuated as soon as it becomes physically possible from the climatic point of view, but in any case not later than May of this year.

The old treaties will be reviewed at subsequent meetings. Only the treaty of Portsmouth[1] remains in force. We agreed to this as it has a purely historical significance, and is important for Japan precisely from the historical point of view, for the victory over the Tsarist forces and the signing of the treaty in Portsmouth represented for Japan, as it were, taking its degree as a great Power. While recognizing that treaty, we repudiated in a separate declaration all responsibility for its contents.

The question of the Tsarist debts, as well as mutual claims, is to be examined later.

The most difficult question to decide was that of the concessions. From the very beginning of the negotiations Japan regarded the con-

[1] *State Papers*, xcviii, p. 735.

cessions as a payment for recognition, for the losses it had suffered, and as compensation for the evacuation of Sakhalin. We, having agreed to give concessions to the Japanese, which is in line with our general concessions policy, decided not to go beyond the limits set in the terms usually fixed for the granting of concessions. The final terms agreed upon are the same as those in all our concession agreements.

The significance of the treaty is considerably greater than the contents of its clauses. The treaty with Japan formally removes the last vestige of intervention, which was in fact already liquidated by the Red Army. The return of Sakhalin completes the unification of the regions torn from the USSR. It is true that there is still Bessarabia, but we may assume that since Japan was forced to return our territory to us, then Rumania, which is courageous only so long as it feels that it has outside support, will realize that its position has become more difficult.

The agreement with Japan, by strengthening our position in the Pacific, serves as a warning to America which, by not making a treaty with us, only makes its own position worse. By strengthening us in the Far East, the agreement ensures the conditions for the further strengthening of our position in the Pacific and the economic development of our Far Eastern provinces. It was impossible to hope for the full resumption of our rights on the Chinese Eastern Railway without the resumption of normal relations with Japan.

For Japan the agreement at the present time has even greater significance than for us. The threat of isolation which characterizes Japan's present position is removed by the presence on the mainland of a friendly Power. Its importance for Japan may be gauged by the indescribable joy which seized Japan when the signature of the agreement was reported.

The first stone, and the most difficult, in our relations with Japan has been laid. We are counting on broad economic collaboration with Japan, which will give our productive forces an opportunity to develop and will give Japan the raw materials without which it would fall into complete dependence on America and England.

Reports from America today show that they are beginning to grasp all the disadvantages of the absence of relations with us. It is true that the same reports predict that negotiations with America will be as long drawn out as those with Japan and as difficult, but I do not think that is correct. In fact there are not so many issues dividing us and America as there were in our negotiations with Japan. If America is willing to understand that our internal regime is our own affair, that they must reconcile themselves to it, and that our regime fully guarantees normal and healthy economic collaboration with any capitalist Power, there will be no obstacles to agreement.

EXTRACTS FROM AN INTERVIEW BETWEEN STALIN AND HERZOG, OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF GERMANY

3 *February* 1925 Stalin, vii, p. 34

Herzog: Do you think that political and economic conditions in the democratic-capitalist German Republic such that the working class should, within the more or less near future, wage the struggle for power?

Stalin: It would be difficult to answer that question precisely, if it were a matter of time limits and not of tendencies. It is unnecessary to prove that the present situation differs substantially from that in 1923, as regards both international and internal conditions. But that does not exclude the possibility of a sharp change in the situation in the near future in favour of the revolution, in view of the possibility of grave changes in the external situation. The instability of the international situation is a guarantee that this supposition may become highly probable.

Herzog: Given the present economic situation and the present correlation of forces, shall we need a long preparatory period to win over the majority of the proletariat (which Lenin said was the most important task for the Communist Parties of all countries before the seizure of political power)?

Stalin: As for the economic situation, I can only evaluate it from the standpoint of the general data at my disposal. I think that the Dawes plan has already had certain results leading to a relative stabilization of the situation. The infiltration of American capital into German industry, the stabilization of the exchanges, the improvement in a number of the most important branches of German industry—which is far from signifying the radical recovery of the German economy—finally, the slight improvement in the material position of the working class, all this is bound to lead to a certain strengthening of the position of the German bourgeoisie. That is, so to speak, the positive aspect of the Dawes plan. But it also has a negative aspect which will inevitably be revealed in a certain time and which is bound to destroy the positive results of the plan. The Dawes plan undoubtedly implies the twofold pressure of capital on the German proletariat, internal and external. The contradiction between the expansion of German industry and the shrinking external markets for that industry, the divergence between the paralysing demands of the Entente and the limited possibilities of the German economy satisfying those demands—all this, inevitably worsening the position of the proletariat, poor peasants, employees, and intelligentsia, is bound to lead to an explosion, to the direct struggle of the proletariat to win power. But this is not to be regarded as the only circumstance favouring the German revolution. The victory of

that revolution requires in addition that the Communist Party should represent the majority of the working class, should become the decisive force in the working class. Social-democracy must be exposed and beaten, must be reduced to the position of an insignificant minority of the working class. Without that it is useless to think of the dictatorship of the proletariat. For the workers to be victorious, they must be inspired with one will, they must be led by one party, enjoying the unquestioning confidence of the majority of the working class. If there are two competing parties of equal strength within the working class, then even with favourable external conditions an enduring victory is impossible. Lenin was the first to insist on this in the period before the October revolution as the most essential condition for the victory of the proletariat.

The situation most favourable for the revolution would be that in which the internal crisis in Germany and the decisive growth in the strength of the Communist Party were to coincide with serious complications within the camp of Germany's external enemies. I think that the absence of this latter condition in the 1923 revolutionary period was far from being the least important negative factor in the situation . . .

Herzog: You said that together with the negative aspect of the Dawes plan the second condition for the winning of power by the CPG is for the Social Democratic Party to be completely exposed in the eyes of the masses and no longer to represent a serious force among the working class. In view of the facts as they are, there is still a long way to go to that. This speaks clearly of the inadequacies and weakness of the Party's present methods of work. How do you evaluate the results of the December 1924 elections, when the social-democrats, a wholly corrupted and rotten party—not only lost nothing, but increased their votes by about two million?

Stalin: That is not a question of the German Communist Party's inadequate work. It is primarily a question of American loans and the infiltration of American capital plus the stabilization of the exchange having somewhat improved the situation, created illusions as to the possibility of a radical liquidation of the internal and external contradictions connected with Germany's situation. It was on that illusion, as on a white horse, that German social-democracy rode into the Reichstag. Wels is cock-a-hoop now about his victory at the elections. But he clearly does not understand that he is celebrating an alien victory. It is not German social-democracy that has won, but the Morgan group. Wels was and remains only one of Morgan's shop-assistants.

EXTRACTS FROM A SPEECH BY RYKOV AT THE CENTRAL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE

3 *March* 1925 *Protokoly*, p. 9

At the present time the Union's international position has two features of special importance. The first concerns recognition. Up till now the USSR has been recognized *de jure* (i.e. officially, with exchange of diplomatic representatives) by England, Italy, Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Greece, Mexico, France, Japan, and also Poland, the Baltic States, and the Eastern States. With many other countries we engage in trade and have *de facto* relations.

At the same time we experienced certain difficulties in our international policy over the past year . . . A number of States which have recognized us demand that the Soviet Government should recognize all those obligations which the Tsarist Government and our bourgeoisie had incurred towards these States. Pressure in this direction on the Soviet Union coincided with the fall of the MacDonald Government in England. As you know, the provisional treaty,[1] concluded between us and the MacDonald Government and signed by both sides, which laid down rules for settling questions in dispute, was not submitted to the English House of Commons for examination. It was around this treaty, and the attitude towards our Union, that the election struggle which brought the Conservatives to power was fought. With the formation of the Conservative Government in England a certain deterioration in the attitude of a number of States towards us could be noted. There were even press reports about efforts to conclude a formal agreement and a formal treaty against the Soviet Union. These reports were not officially confirmed, but there is no smoke without fire. It is probable that individual politicians tried to sound out the possibility of forming a bloc of bourgeois States against the USSR.

The establishment of diplomatic relations with France and the ratification of the convention with Japan put an end, in this case, to the attempts to reach an anti-Soviet agreement, which had had no real results. I recall this talk about organizing a bloc against us only in order to make it clear that recognition should not be identified with the real international position of our Union. Recognition by itself does not prevent an attack on us by bourgeois States, and we are by no means guaranteed against a repetition of attempts to exert pressure on the USSR in the future. These attempts might be made in connexion with one of the most acute problems in our foreign policy, the problem of the Tsarist debts. The claims made on our Union by the former creditors of the Tsarist Government represent a very considerable sum, for which

[1] Cmd. 2260.

it is of course worth the while of the west European bourgeoisie to fight and to make a fuss. Consequently the possibility of further attacks from that quarter is not excluded.

There is another circumstance which causes foreign Governments much anxiety, that is the position of our Union in the East. If the position of the USSR in the Far East and Middle East over the last two or three years is compared with that of any of the west European States, it will be seen that our importance and our influence throughout the East has grown steadily, while that of the bourgeois States has steadily declined. Moreover, there is every sign that in the East the national liberation movement is growing and this movement sees in the way we have settled our national and colonial problems the realization of its wishes and aims. Therefore the eastern peoples find in the Soviet Union their friend and their ally. This causes the utmost anxiety to the entire capitalist world, whose fate is to a large extent bound up with the exploitation of the East.

The present position of western Europe, although the revolutionary wave has clearly receded and the tempo of the workers' movement has slowed down, and although the bourgeois centre parties have grown stronger, cannot just the same be regarded as stable. At the present time it is not only not better, but a good deal worse than it was before the war. The imperialist war and the Versailles peace not only failed to solve the problems which were to have been settled by the war, but in fact made them more acute and confused. The different capitalist countries are fighting for markets just as they did before the war. The struggle between them shows that within the framework of capitalist society mankind cannot find even a short-term answer to the difficult problems hindering its development and this makes the formation of a large and powerful anti-Soviet bloc unlikely.

On the credit side of our foreign policy there are the series of recognitions and the strengthening of our prestige throughout the East. These successes acquire greater value in that we achieved them while we were restoring our economy, stabilizing the currency, and cutting down the issue of paper money, not merely without outside help but in spite of the active opposition of bourgeois States . . .

Our friendly and peaceful relations with China are known to you. Now that the convention with Japan has been concluded the Far Eastern question may be regarded as settled in the sense that the eastern frontier is quite peaceful.

You have seen the text of the convention in the press. Under it Japan is to withdraw its troops from North Sakhalin. We are granting Japan an oil concession in Northern Sakhalin, the extent of the concession being kept within 50 per cent. of the total, that is, half of the

oil-bearing seams in Northern Sakhalin will be worked by Japan on a concession basis. The form of granting these concessions is specially restricted, in the sense that after every allotment made over to Japan, the next allotment is retained by us, that is the areas are divided out like a chessboard. By these means we safeguard the interests of our country and retain full control over the entire oil-bearing area.

The conclusion of the agreement with Japan was preceded by the replacement of Hughes in the United States. I do not know if this is an instance of causal dependence. It is possible that it is no more than a coincidence in time, and that Hughes gave up his post for another reason which had nothing to do with his attitude to the USSR. But even if it were so, even if it were just a coincidence in time, still the conclusion of the treaty with Japan must make United States policy towards our Union throughout these seven years appear very dubious in the eyes of the American public. There were times when it seemed that Mr Hughes's policy, i.e. the refusal, on grounds of principle, to enter into any kind of relations with us, would get the upper hand, and the USSR would be isolated. Seven years after the October revolution, the attempt to defend the principle of isolating the Soviet Union is seen to be no longer possible. Now it is United States policy towards the USSR which turns out to be isolated, for after the conclusion of the treaty with Japan the chain is quite closed. Now that diplomatic relations have been established with England, France, Italy, Turkey, Persia, Afghanistan, China, and Japan, Hughes's policy goes overboard.

American business circles must understand that on the basis of the agreement with Japan our economic relations with that country, and our connexions by means of concessions, will develop very rapidly, and consequently our influence throughout the Far East will expand greatly. The trend in the United States which is in favour of the opening of negotiations to re-establish normal relations between that country and the USSR has already begun to grow more powerful . . .

Many people in France think that once the Soviet Government is recognized by France as the legal Government, we must recognize as valid all the obligations undertaken by the Tsarist and Kerensky Governments, and the attempt is made to give them an exclusively commercial and financial character. It seems to me that this is not only a commercial and financial question. Relations between Tsarist Russia and the Russia of the coalition Governments and France had a broad political foundation, and pursued broad political aims, and it was to realize these that financial relations between these States were developed . . .

The decree annulling loans was a completely logical development of

the renunciation of all the imperialist objectives and agreements of Tsarist Russia. Therefore we cannot formally recognize our indebtedness on loans made to the Tsarist and Kerensky Governments, but that by no means excludes the possibility of a compromise on the basis of the principle of mutual advantage. At the present time, it seems to me, our relations with France have reached a point at which arguments about whether we should or should not recognize the debts must be set aside, and a start be made with a businesslike examination of the question how France can help us and how we can help France. We must get down to an examination of practical business plans on the basis of mutual concessions and advantages for both sides . . .

As to England, there is at the moment no sign of a change in that country's attitude to us. The situation remains as it was left after the new Conservative Government declined to submit the treaty we signed with the MacDonald Government to the House of Commons. Since the rejection of the treaty we have had no new proposals from the English Government. It seems to me that the tearing up of the treaty does us much less harm than it does them, since it provided for the payment of part of the claims of English property-owners. In conversation with an English correspondent I said: 'It's your turn now, the turn of the English. If you don't want to receive anything, we shall pay nothing. If you want to receive something, then tell us how and on what terms.' We do not reject the conditions put forward under MacDonald. And now it is up to those who want to get something from us to choose what they prefer: to get something or nothing. We shall wait to see what new proposals are put forward from the English side . . .

EXTRACTS FROM A REPORT BY CHICHERIN ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS TO THE CENTRAL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE

4 *March* 1925 *Protokoly*, p. 31

England's policy consists in going hand in hand with America, leaning upon America, and furnishing support for America in its ramified world policy. America, swollen with gold so to speak, and at the same time rather hesitantly entering the world political arena and disinclined to interfere too much in European affairs, willingly goes hand in hand with England and the antagonism between them does not appear on the surface. Of course, the time will come when the antagonism does appear, but at present it does not. However, not everything in their relations is agreeable. One very notable fact is the change in America's position in China. . . . At first America followed its own road in China, a different road from that of the great European Powers;

then its road coincided with theirs; now again America is leaving the company of the great European Powers and is out to win the sympathy of the Chinese people. This is a rather notable rift in Anglo-American relations.

France stands aside. It has its own wishes and its own interests. It would willingly pursue an independent policy of rapprochement with the Soviet Republic and of friendship towards Turkey, particularly in Asia—a policy distinct from England's policy. There is practically no corner of the earth where English and French interests do not diverge. But in the first place France is subject to financial pressure. World financial power is in England's hands. If England ceases to discount French treasury bonds, that would mean bankruptcy for the French Government. Moreover, they are bound together by the Versailles treaty. So long as the Versailles treaty exists you cannot get away from it. Therefore French attempts to pursue an independent policy are frequently shortlived. Its policy changes and vacillates; attempts are made to set it free, but in the end the pressure is put on, and frequently, indeed always, France goes with the Entente Powers. France, however, is arming, is preparing for something. Why this enormous air force? Why these submarines? The future will still have some surprises.

On the other side stands Japan. Japan is in an equivocal position. It now occupies the position of an imperialist Power. It has a powerful industry, navy, and army; it rules certain parts of the mainland of Asia, although as an imperialist Power it cannot catch up with America and England. At the same time it belongs to the coloured peoples of Asia. The situation is equivocal. On the one hand, an imperialist Power, on the other, an Asiatic coloured people—fermenting with hostility to the policy of the rule of the white man. Hence that deep uncertainty which permeates Japanese policy. Recently England has begun on the construction of the Singapore naval base. It turned down alliance with Japan for the sake of alliance with America. America takes unfriendly action, such as the ban on Japanese immigration. Japan feels itself threatened. That is why it wished to draw closer to us, a wish that grew stronger and stronger until it led to the recent Japanese–Soviet treaty. After three years of tentative exploration, of hesitation, of attempts to strike a bargain, we have an agreement, which means that Japan is trying to secure itself from the other side. This policy also represents a very marked retreat from the old undivided rule of the united Entente.

Italy stands aside. It is an equal partner in the Entente but feels injured because it received too small a share of the spoils after victory . . . Italy dreams of an independent way of developing Italian imperialism, being squeezed in the Mediterranean by the older imperialisms of England and France.

Then there is Germany, which is trying hard to get on to an equal footing with the Entente Powers. It may be said—it's a safe bet—that in the final analysis, whatever agreements Germany comes to with the western Powers, German politicians will always recognize the need of securing their rear in the East. We may be certain that, whatever vacillations have been apparent in German policy—and there were, are, and will be such vacillations—in the final analysis Germany will not break with us, will not abandon that policy of friendly relations with us which has already lasted some years. There are indeed vacillations, because Germany is trying, now by relying on England, now by developing economic collaboration with France (this latter is a fact of the highest importance, for, whatever difficulties commercial negotiations with France come up against, objective forces impel French and German industry to try to reach agreement and to collaborate) to create for itself a position on an equal footing with the Entente Powers, but in the end it always turns out that the Versailles treaty is too strong. It seemed that the gradual evacuation of the occupied areas was beginning. And then the Entente decided to postpone the evacuation of the Cologne area.

The Allied Control Commission reports on alleged infringements of the treaty by Germany in regard to disarmament.[1] Thus the very policy of the Entente arising from the Versailles treaty, apart from anything else, compels Germany to maintain a policy of friendly relations with the Soviet Republic. There are many difficulties and misunderstandings to overcome, but these are overcome, and the general line remains . . .

NOTE FROM KARAKHAN, SOVIET AMBASSADOR IN PEKING, TO THE CHINESE FOREIGN MINISTER ON THE WITHDRAWAL OF SOVIET TROOPS FROM OUTER MONGOLIA

6 *March* 1925 *Russian Review*, 1 *May* 1925, p. 198

In the beginning of the year 1921 part of the White Guard armies routed by the Red Army, retreated to Mongolian territory, where, having united with elements hostile to the Soviet Government, they created a base for new attacks upon the territory of the Soviet Republics with the aim of overthrowing the authority of the workers and peasants. Repeated requests addressed to the Chinese Government for the liquidation of the White Guard bands of Semenov, Ungern, and others, freely operating and organizing on the territory of Mongolia, led to no positive results, as the Chinese Government was indifferent to these

[1] cf. Cmd. 2429.

urgent appeals by the Soviet Government. In view of this in the interests of the safety of its frontiers the Soviet Government was constrained to conduct part of the Red Army into Mongolian territory and liquidate all the White Guard bands and organizations which, organized and supported by foreign imperialism, were preparing to invade the Soviet Republics once more from Mongolia.

After the liquidation of the White Guard armies part of the Red Army remained in Mongolia in the interest of the preservation of order and for the purpose of preventing the organization of White bands as a new menace to the safety of USSR.

With the establishment of order and the organization of proper authority the Soviet Government gradually decreased the Red Army forces in Mongolia. However, the absence of relations between the Soviet Government and China and the latter's participation in a coalition hostile to the USSR blocked the settlement of the question of the Red Army's presence on Mongolian territory, and only the agreement signed between the USSR and China on 31 May 1924,[1] paved the way for the settlement of this question. According to the treaty signed on 31 May 1924, it was stipulated that after the question of the withdrawal of the forces from Outer Mongolia, namely, the question of the term of the withdrawal of these forces and the measures to be taken in the interest of the safety of the frontiers, had been decided at a conference, the Soviet Government would remove its forces from Outer Mongolia.

However, despite the fact that the conference was to be opened within a month from the signing of the treaty, internal circumstances prevented the Chinese Government from doing so in due time. Meanwhile the Soviet Government, although in virtue of the agreement with China it might not have removed its forces until the period of their evacuation had been fixed at the conference and the requisite guarantees for the safety of the frontiers had been given by the Chinese Government, decided, nevertheless, to withdraw its forces immediately without awaiting the conference.

I herewith have the honor to inform the Chinese Government that the Soviet Government has proceeded with the withdrawal of its forces from Outer Mongolia with the assent of the Mongolian Government, and that at the present time the evacuation of the Red Army detachments from the territory of Mongolia is finished.

In bringing this to the Government's knowledge I hope that the Chinese Government will suitably appreciate this friendly step by the Government of the USSR. The Government of the USSR also trusts that the circumstances which formerly constrained it to send the Red

[1] *League of Nations Treaty Series*, xxxvii, p. 175.

Army to Mongolian territory will not, in conjunction with altered conditions, recur in the future.

At the same time I earnestly express the confidence that the Chinese Government will not neglect the happy occasion for settling the problem of the interrelations between two brother peoples by a peace-promoting arrangement with the Mongolian people.

The Government of the USSR, while regarding the interrelations in question as the exclusive affair of the Chinese and Mongolian peoples, will, nevertheless, be happy to witness the restoration of brotherly association between the Chinese and Mongolian peoples according to principles of justice and on the basis of their national aspirations, which will assure the further economic progress both of Outer Mongolia and of the north-western region, and will likewise promote the development of economic and other relations with the USSR.

ARTICLE BY STALIN ON THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION AND THE TASKS OF THE COMMUNIST PARTIES

22 *March* 1925 Stalin, vii, p. 52

The following basic facts should be noted among those which have decisive importance in the international sphere:

1. There is no doubt that capital has succeeded in extricating itself from the bog of the post-war crisis. The stabilization of the exchange in a number of capitalist countries, the growth of world trade and the expansion of production in separate countries, the import and infiltration of capital, particularly Anglo-American capital, into the countries of Europe and Asia—all this tells of the 'constructive work' of capital. This 'work' is proceeding, as is known, with the Anglo-American bloc at its head. The so-called 'Dawesization' of Germany must be regarded as one of the most important results of this 'work', that is, the change from the method of military intervention to the method of financial intervention, to the method of Germany's financial enslavement.
2. There is no doubt also that in the centre of Europe, in Germany, the period of revolutionary advance has already come to an end. The period of revolutionary advance, when the movement boils and comes to a head, overflowing the brim, while the Party's slogans lag behind, when the masses break through the framework of legality and storm the old structure, spontaneously taking into their own hands the creating of a new law—that period in Germany is already of the past. From the period of storm the workers' movement in Germany has entered upon a period of marshalling

its forces, of forming and training the proletarian army under the banner of communism. It is hardly necessary to prove that this is a circumstance of great importance. It must be stated with the greater precision in order to make a rapid adaptation to the new situation and to begin work in preparing the revolution afresh.

These are the facts which have a *positive* significance for the bourgeoisie, for they speak of capitalism's strength and success at the given moment. But besides these there are other facts of *negative* significance for capitalism.

1. There is no doubt that alongside the strengthening of capitalism the contradictions between the capitalist groups are growing, there is a growth in the forces which weaken and disintegrate capitalism. The struggle between England and America for oil, for Canada, for markets, etc.; the struggle between the Anglo-American bloc and Japan for eastern markets; the struggle between England and France for influence in Europe; finally the struggle between enslaved Germany and the dominant Entente—all these are well-known facts, signifying that capitalism's successes are insecure, that the process of its 'recovery' conceals in itself the conditions of its internal weakness and decay.
2. The growth and consolidation of the national liberation movements in India, in China, in Egypt, in Indonesia, in North Africa, etc., damaging capitalism in the rear. If the 'recovery' of imperialism requires the expansion of spheres of influence in the colonies and dependent countries, while the struggle of these countries against imperialism grows clearly more powerful, then it is obvious that imperialism's successes in this sphere cannot be enduring.
3. The struggle for the unity of the trade union movement in Europe and the crisis in the Amsterdam international. The struggle of the English trade unions for unity in the trade union movement, the support of the Soviet trade unions in this struggle, the transformation of the struggle for the unity of the trade union movement into a struggle against the counter-revolutionary Amsterdam bosses (Oudegeest, Sassenbach, Jouhaux, etc.) pursuing a course of splitting the trade unions—all these facts show that the Amsterdam international is experiencing a profound crisis. What is this Amsterdam crisis? It is the instability of bourgeois power, for the Amsterdam trade union bureaucracy forms a particle and prop of this power.
4. The economic growth of the Soviet Union. There is no doubt that the bourgeois scribblers' chatter about the incapacity of the Soviets to put industry on its feet has suffered complete disaster.

> There is no doubt that in the last two years after intervention and blockade the industry of the Soviet Union has been revived and strengthened. There is no doubt that the material and cultural position of the workers has in that short time substantially improved. There is no doubt that this improvement will continue. All these circumstances now have decisive importance in revolutionizing the workers in capitalist countries. I think the workers of the West have never been so interested in Russia as they are now. Why? Because rumours are reaching them of the *new way of life* of the Soviet workers in the workers' State called the Soviet Union, and they would like to test the reliability of these rumours. The fact that tens and hundreds of workers, holding every kind of opinion, come from Europe to Russia and poke into every corner —that fact shows undoubtedly that interest in Russia will grow among the workers of the West with every month. There is no doubt that this pilgrimage to Russia will grow. And when they are convinced that every step in industrial development in Russia means a step in the improvement of the workers' position, and not a worsening, as is usual in capitalist countries, they will understand that it is time for them too, the workers of the West, to build a workers' State of their own. That is why merely the existence of the Soviet State represents a mortal danger to imperialism. That is why there can be no lasting successes for imperialism so long as the Soviet State exists and develops.

These facts have a *negative* significance for the bourgeoisie, for they tell of the strength and probable success of the revolutionary movement in the near future.

The struggle of these opposing tendencies, negative and positive, forms the basis and content of the contemporary international situation. In this struggle of opposites there has grown and faded a so-called pacifism, which did not manage to flower, or to create either an 'era' or an 'epoch' or 'period'. It justified neither the hopes of the conciliators nor the fears of the counter-revolutionaries.

In this same struggle the 'glorious' names of Poincaré and Hughes, MacDonald and Herriot, were lost in ruin.

Which of these tendencies will come out on top, the positive or the negative?

There can be no doubt that *in time* the tendencies unfavourable to capitalism and favourable to the revolution will triumph, for imperialism is incapable of solving the contradictions which tear it apart, for it is only capable of healing them for a time, after which they will break out and reappear with new and shattering force. But there is no

doubt either that at the *present* moment the positive tendencies favourable to capitalism have got the upper hand. This is the peculiarity of the present international situation.

In consequence we have some sort of phase of calm in Europe and America, 'disturbed' by the national revolutionary movements in the colonies and 'darkened' by the existence, development, and strengthening of the Soviet Union.

For the bourgeoisie this means a '*breathing space*', increased export of capital, further enrichment, greater oppression and exploitation in the colonies, greater pressure on the Soviet Union, the concentration of all the forces of counter-revolution around Anglo-American capital.

For the proletariat of capitalist countries it means the beginning of a period of marshalling their forces, the beginning of a period of forming and training the proletarian armies under the banner of communism in conditions of a system of repression alternating with a system of 'freedom'. For the colonies it means intensifying the struggle against national oppression and exploitation, intensifying the struggle for liberation from imperialism. For the Soviet Union it means the exertion of all our efforts for the further development of industry, for strengthening the defensive capacity of the country, for concentrating the revolutionary forces of all countries against imperialism. Hence, the tasks of the communist parties are:

1. To exploit to the utmost each and every contradiction in the bourgeois camp with the object of disintegrating and weakening its forces, with the object of strengthening the position of the proletariat.
2. To mark out concrete ways and means of bringing the working class of the leading countries into close contact with the national revolutionary movement in the colonies and dependent countries with the object of the widest support of that movement against the common enemy, against imperialism.
3. To push forward and carry to the end the struggle for the unity of the trade union movement, bearing in mind that this is the surest means of capturing the millions of the working class masses. For we cannot capture the millions of the proletarian masses without having captured the trade unions, and it is impossible to capture the trade unions without working in them and without gaining in them the confidence of the working masses month by month and year by year. Without that it is useless to think of achieving the dictatorship of the proletariat.
4. To mark out concrete ways and means of bringing the working class into close contact with the small peasants, crushed by the bureaucratic machine of the bourgeois State and the extortionate

prices of the all-powerful trusts, bearing in mind that the struggle for the small peasantry is the immediate task of a party moving towards the proletarian dictatorship.

5. To support the Soviet Government and frustrate the interventionist machinations of imperialism against the Soviet Union, bearing in mind that the Soviet Union is the bulwark of the revolutionary movement of all countries, that the preservation and strengthening of the Soviet Union means hastening the victory of the working class over the world bourgeoisie.

PRESS INTERVIEW BY V. L. KOPP, SOVIET PLENIPOTENTIARY ENVOY TO JAPAN, ON SOVIET–JAPANESE RELATIONS

27 *March* 1925 *Izvestia*, 27 *March* 1925

There is no doubt that the Soviet–Japanese treaty is one of the most important political documents of our time. It not only lays the formal foundation for the resumption of diplomatic relations between two great Powers, broken for the last seven years; not only does it provide a solid framework within which in the near future important economic questions of vital importance for Japanese economy—the question of the fisheries in Far Eastern waters and of the oil and coal concessions in North Sakhalin, will be settled in the interests of both parties, but it puts an end—and this is its basic importance—to the period of unrest and disturbance in the Far East created by the absence of good-neighbourly relations between two great Far Eastern Powers, and lays the basis for their all-round collaboration in all spheres where their mutual interests touch.

Careful and impartial study of these mutual interests should, after the long period of estrangement, be the chief task of the Governments and peoples of the two countries. Only on the basis of mutual understanding and respect for mutual interests is it possible to define and to carry out the practical tasks before the two countries in the complicated international situation in the Far East. The rapprochement and collaboration of the Soviet Union and Japan threaten no-one's interests and will not be at anybody else's cost. The Soviet–Japanese agreement is an instrument of peace. The Soviet Government has no other intention than to use it to develop economic and cultural relations between the Soviet and Japanese peoples. The State structure of the Soviet Union, based on the full equality of the multitude of nationalities inhabiting its vast territory, is the best guarantee that this goal of all-round rapprochement and collaboration will really be reached.

It would be inexcusably frivolous to try now to give practical details

of the forms which Soviet–Japanese collaboration is likely to take, or even to indicate its most important signposts. The international situation in the Far East, more complex than ever before, and the peculiar conjunction of interests there, will in each case determine these tasks and affect their practical character.

At the present moment, when Soviet–Japanese relations are making a start on a new foundation, it suffices to express my complete conviction that these questions, in whatever circumstances they arise, will be settled in a spirit of profound understanding of mutual interests and of peaceful collaboration of the peoples of the two countries.

PRESS STATEMENT BY CHICHERIN ON THE BULGARIAN CHARGES OF SOVIET COMPLICITY IN THE SOFIA CATHEDRAL EXPLOSION

21 *April* 1925 *Izvestia*, 23 *April* 1925

The United Press has asked me to make a statement in connexion with the declaration of the Bulgarian Premier Tsankov that the explosion in Sofia Cathedral was an act in which the 'Russian Government' had a hand.[1] I am not surprised at this impudent lie from an adventurer who seized power with the help of an insignificant band of army conspirators, and who holds it by means of continual mass murder, torture, and other violent deeds. When a regime of terror which oppresses an entire country drives the people to such a vivid expression of their desperation as the Sofia explosion, the utter bankruptcy of the regime and the insufferable military terror are shown up to the whole world, and the adventurer who lives by violence and falsehood from one day to the next is compelled to put forward a false and irrelevant reason for the occurrence and to invent the guilty party. Tsankov's false statement comes just at the very moment when the enemies of the Soviet Government, frightened by its internal consolidation and its external strength, are everywhere trying to damage the international position of the USSR by lies, slander, and subterfuge. No matter in what part of the world the masses express their dissatisfaction, the opponents of the USSR assert that we have a hand in it; if there is a revolt anywhere the opponents of the USSR have no doubt that we are guilty. The examples are too fresh in our minds for it to be worth while going through them. The drawing up of false documents in order to discredit the Soviet Government has become a customary manœuvre on the part of bourgeois Governments, and if in his slanderous attacks on the USSR Tsankov should quote documents in his possession they would have to be classed as forgeries from the outset. In view of the fact

[1] cf. *The Times*, 18 April 1925 et seq.

that some time ago it was disclosed that enemies of the Soviet Government had ordered from a Berlin printer forms bearing the illiterate heading of a non-existent section of the Comintern, and since the Bulgarian Government has published supposed documents of the Comintern printed on precisely such forms, its forgeries have been unmasked before the world. The real worth of Tsankov's accusations should be clear to every impartial person. I declare in the most decisive and categorical terms that any attempt to connect the Sofia explosion with the activity or inspiration of the Soviet Government is a fabrication and a downright lie from first to last, and that there is no connexion between the Soviet Government and the Sofia explosion.

EXTRACTS FROM A REPORT BY STALIN ON THE WORK OF THE FOURTEENTH CONFERENCE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE SOVIET UNION

9 *May* 1925 Stalin, vii, p. 91[1]

What are the new and special features of the international situation which determine its essential character at the present time?

One new thing that has emerged recently, and which has left its mark on the international situation, is that in Europe the revolutionary tide has begun to ebb, a certain calm has set in, what we call the temporary stabilization of capitalism, while at the same time the economic development and political power of the Soviet Union have grown.

What is this ebb of revolution, this calm? Is it not the beginning of the end of the world revolution, the beginning of the liquidation of the world proletarian revolution? Lenin said that with the victory of the proletariat in our country a new epoch had begun, an epoch of world revolution, an epoch filled with conflicts and wars, of advances and retreats, of victories and defeats, an epoch leading to the victory of the proletariat in the chief capitalist countries. If the revolution in Europe has begun to ebb, does it not mean that Lenin's thesis in regard to this new epoch, the epoch of world revolution, loses its force? Does it not mean that the proletarian revolution in the West is set aside?

No, it does not.

The epoch of world revolution is a new stage of revolution, an entire strategic period, covering a number of years, perhaps even a number of decades. In the course of that period there may and must be ebbs and flows in the revolutionary tide . . .

Since the victory of October we have entered the third strategical period, the third stage of the revolution, which has as its goal the

[1] Comparison with earlier editions reveals a number of insignificant verbal variations.

overthrow of the bourgeoisie on a world scale. How long this period will last it is difficult to say. In any case there is no doubt that it will be long, just as there is no doubt that it will have its ebbs and flows. The world revolutionary movement has now entered a phase when the revolution is receding, but for a number of reasons of which I shall speak later it will give place to a period of advance which may end with the victory of the proletariat but may not end in such a victory, but give way to a new ebb which in its turn will give way to a new revolutionary advance . . .

But this is only one side of the picture. The other side is that, alongside this ebb of the revolution in Europe we have the tempestuous economic growth of the Soviet Union and the development of its political power. In other words we have not only the stabilization of capitalism. We have at the same time the stabilization of the Soviet regime. We have therefore two stabilizations: the temporary stabilization of capitalism and the stabilization of the Soviet regime. The characteristic feature of the present international situation is the establishment of a certain temporary equilibrium between these two stabilizations . . .

Which is going to triumph over which? That is the main point. How is it that one stabilization can exist alongside the other, how can there be these two poles? Because there is no longer a single and all-embracing capitalism. Because the world is divided into two camps, the camp of capitalism under the leadership of Anglo-American capital, and the camp of socialism under the leadership of the Soviet Union. Because the international situation will in a greater and greater degree be determined by the relationship of forces between these two camps.

Thus what is characteristic of the present moment is not only that capitalism and the Soviet regime have been stabilized, but also that the forces of these two camps have reached a certain temporary equilibrium, with perhaps a certain plus on the side of capital and a certain minus on the side of the revolutionary movement, for the period of calm which has set in, compared with the previous revolutionary surge, is undoubtedly, although only temporarily, a setback for socialism . . .

How in fact is the stabilization of capitalism expressed? Firstly in this, that America, England, and France have for the time being reached agreement on the means of despoiling Germany, and on how far they will go in this. In other words, they have agreed on imposing what they call the Dawes plan on Germany. Can this be called a lasting agreement? No. Because, firstly, they reckoned without their host, that is, without the German people; secondly, it means a double yoke on the German people, the yoke of the national bourgeoisie and the yoke of the foreign bourgeoisie. To think that a nation as civilized as Germany,

and a proletariat as highly cultured as the German proletariat, will consent to bear this double yoke without making a series of powerful efforts to throw it off by revolutionary upheavals is to believe in miracles. Even a fact as reactionary in its nature as the election of Hindenburg as President leaves no doubt that the temporary understanding of the Entente Powers against Germany is unstable, indeed ludicrously unstable.

Capitalist stabilization is expressed, secondly, in this, that English, American, and Japanese capital have reached a temporary understanding about their spheres of influence in China, in that vast market for international capital, about the ways to despoil it. Can this be regarded as a lasting agreement? Again, no. Because, firstly, the parties to the agreement are fighting and will fight to the death among themselves over the sharing of the spoils; secondly, the understanding has been reached behind the backs of the Chinese people who do not wish to submit and will not submit to the laws of alien robbers. Does not the growth of the revolutionary movement in China make it clear that the machinations of the alien imperialists are doomed to failure?

Capitalist stabilization is expressed, thirdly, in this, that the imperialist groups in the leading countries have reached temporary agreement about reciprocal non-interference in the exploitation and oppression of 'their' colonies. Can this agreement or effort at agreement be regarded as stable? No. Because, firstly, each of the imperialist groups is trying and will try to seize for itself a part of the colonies of the others; secondly, the policy of oppression pursued by the imperialist groups in the colonies only hardens and revolutionizes these colonies, thus making the revolutionary crisis more acute. The imperialists are trying to 'placate' India, to repress Egypt, to tame Morocco, to tie Indo-China and Indonesia hand and foot, using all and every kind of cunning machination. Perhaps they will get certain 'results' by these means. But there can be no doubt that these machinations will not and cannot serve their purpose for long.

Fourthly, capitalist stabilization may be expressed in this, that the imperialist groups of the leading countries will try to come to an understanding about a united front against the Soviet Union. Let us assume that they cook up such an agreement. Let us assume that they succeed in forming something in the nature of a united front, using any and every kind of trick, like the lies and forgeries used at the time of the Sofia explosion. Is there any reason to believe that an understanding against our country, or stabilization in this respect, is likely to be enduring or successful? I do not think there are any such reasons. Why? Because, firstly, the threat of a united front and a concerted capitalist attack would create the strongest bond, rallying the entire

country around the Soviet Government as never before and turning it, even more than when it was, for example, under attack by the 'fourteen States', into an impregnable fortress. Remember the threats that the not unknown Churchill made at that time. You know that it was enough for this threat to be uttered for the entire country to unite around the Soviet Government against the imperialist invaders. Because, secondly, a campaign against the Soviets would inevitably loosen a whole series of revolutionary knots in the rear of our opponents, disintegrating and demoralizing the imperialist ranks. And there can scarcely be any doubt that of late such knots have been piling up, and that they promise no good for imperialism. Because, thirdly, our country is no longer alone, for we have as allies the workers of the West and the oppressed peoples of the East. There can scarcely be any doubt that war against the Soviet Union will mean the war of imperialism against its own workers and colonies. I do not need to prove that, if they do attack our country, we shall not sit by with folded hands, that we shall do everything we can to unleash the revolutionary lion in every country of the world. The leaders of the capitalist countries cannot be unaware that we have some experience in this field.

EXTRACTS FROM THE REPORT OF RYKOV, CHAIRMAN OF THE COUNCIL OF PEOPLE'S COMMISSARS, TO THE THIRD SOVIET CONGRESS

13 *May* 1925 *Stenograficheskii Otchet*, p. 35

The international situation of our Union, surrounded on all sides by capitalist countries, is determined by the following two factors. The first is its revolutionary significance. The very fact of the existence of the Soviets stimulates the struggles not only of the workers, but of all oppressed peoples, all oppressed countries, and particularly the peoples of the East.

On the other hand there is trade to be done with our Union, there are concessions to be granted there; our Union covers a sixth of the earth; without our Union, without some business relations with us, economic reconstruction and political stability in Europe are impossible.

The conflict between these two factors is apparent in the attitude of the bourgeois States towards us. Among some feelings of malice prevail because the USSR, a Republic of workers and peasants, is standing firmly on its feet and tempts other workers and peasants to organize the same kind of republic for themselves. This is the feeling among some of them, and therefore they do not decide at once to resume business relations with us and are full of implacable hate.

Among others the anxiety for commercial relations has got the upper hand, and the recognition that after the failure of intervention they must

reconcile themselves to the fact of our existence and to the realization that without agreement with us, without trade with us, without the inclusion of our Union in general commercial and economic intercourse the economy of the countries of Europe cannot be restored, that without all this the crisis in Europe will not recede, but grow stronger.

Added to this, of course, is the fact that there are profits to be got from trade with us. And as we are not only communists but also practical people, interested in trade, we have no objection to profits being made from trade with us, because of course without profits there would be no trade . . . Sometimes common sense gets the upper hand. This happens particularly when they see that it is impossible to count on intervention, and equally impossible to rely on agreed diplomatic action against our Union or on the organizing of a boycott to enforce the payment of debts.

I shall not go through the list of *de jure* recognitions, but should like to remark that for us acts of recognition are only formal acts. Recognition in itself has of course very great value, but it is not in itself enough to guarantee peace, not enough to guarantee the establishment of normal commercial and economic relations. Recognition is only an essential preliminary to the establishment and development of economic and diplomatic relations with the countries which have recognized us. That is the point.

There are a number of obstacles . . . I refer to the pre-war loans, to Tsarist indebtedness, to the demands for payment on all the bonds which are presented to us by bourgeois States . . .

Until now we have categorically refused to pay on any bonds issued before the formation of the Soviet Republic. I do not think there is any need for the present congress to abandon that position.

What was the basic idea of military intervention on Soviet territory? You will recall that countries like France and England, the Czechoslovak troops, etc., took the most direct and closest part in it. The idea behind it was the struggle for the payment of these debts.

But shall we really, after that, after an outright military struggle in which seven million workers and peasants took part, when we defended with the bayonet one of the most important conquests of the October revolution, the cancellation of Tsarist debts, shall we really, after having gained the victory over intervention by the unheard-of sufferings of the masses, shall we really, in negotiations with diplomats, yield what we won by the blood and struggles of millions of workers and peasants?

There is another reason why we cannot recognize the Tsarist debts, and that is that a considerable part of them was attached to political agreements of the Tsarist Government with the west European bourgeois Governments; we cannot recognize that indebtedness because we

have renounced everything that the west European Governments undertook to give the Tsar; we do not demand the Bosphorus or Constantinople, nor anything that by compacts of roguery and robbery, of which this indebtedness formed a part, was included in the open and secret agreements of the Tsar with bourgeois Governments.

Nevertheless, while rejecting completely the juridical approach to this question (we have not recognized and shall not recognize the debts) we do not reject the possibility of striking a bargain. We tried to do this with the MacDonald Government, and we are willing now on the basis of an agreement of practical advantage to both sides to strike a bargain and to settle all these questions. For us the basis of such an agreement is mutual benefit. We shall not enter into anything that does not bring us advantage, into anything that increases the burden of taxation on the workers and peasants. An agreement acceptable to both sides should be sought and can be found within the limits of mutual benefit.

We had an example quite recently in the agreement with Japan which demonstrates that, given the willingness to make mutual concessions, the two sides can reach an agreement which is of advantage to both of them. You know that by the treaty with Japan a number of questions was settled. Japanese troops have already evacuated North Sakhalin, and it is now wholly a part of the territory of our Union. On the other hand we granted to the Japanese concession rights to exploit part of the oil industries, the oil deposits in Sakhalin.

After the conclusion of this treaty with Japan there remains in effect one country which still refuses to enter upon official relations with the USSR; that is America. It has long stood at the head of that movement which has been trying to isolate the USSR. Now that the USSR has been recognized by practically all countries it is not the Soviet Republic which is left isolated but the United States of America.

The realization that there is a certain inconvenience in this position, particularly now that good and normal relations have been established with Japan as well as with China, has begun to penetrate the mind of broad sections of the American public. A trend of thought has recently gained strength among Americans which regards the absence of business relations with the USSR and the artificial separation from Russian affairs as wholly disadvantageous for America. Although this trend is growing stronger in America, and our commercial relations with that country are expanding, we have still not received any proposal for any negotiations from the Government of the United States . . .

As to the other countries which have not recognized us, in the first place, there are not many of them; and secondly, we are not inclined to make any concessions to them for the favour of *de jure* recognition. Recently we refused to conclude an agreement with Hungary because

we saw no need to buy the recognition of Hungary, and of countries like Hungary, at the cost of concessions which might in one way or another conflict with the interests of our Union. The other States will have to take into account that the later they are, the worse it will be for them.

I should like to deal further with France.

We have suffered certain disappointments in the hopes bound up with the resumption of diplomatic relations with France. It was assumed that after that resumption commercial and economic relations would be developed on a much wider scale than has in fact happened, and that a number of collateral questions hampering normal work for the two States would be quickly settled. I have in mind such questions as the ships at Bizerta and Georgia.

In regard to the Bizerta ships the diplomatic representatives of your Government had a number of conversations both with the French Premier and with leading French politicians. They all promised to settle this question in favour of the USSR—but none of them has done it so far.

Incidentally, the retention of warships, i.e. of the country's means of defence, is unheard of in diplomatic practice. It is possible that this can all be explained in part by the internal instability of France itself and the French Government, by the struggle of the different political parties in Parliament and the instability of the previous Herriot Government.

At the same time France is exerting the greatest pressure in regard to Tsarist debts and loans. This is explained by there being about two million French citizens who hold Tsarist and other Russian bonds. These two million persons have, besides their numbers, enough political weight to exert pressure on the Government in this matter of settling the question of Tsarist debts. If there are two million in France fighting for the recognition of debts, we had here, at the time of intervention, not two but seven million with arms in hand who fought against the recognition of debts . . . Therefore it is necessary to settle this question on the basis of a compromise and of mutual advantage. If the French help us by one means or another in the reconstruction of our economy, we agree to pay something to France, but only provided that they help us in economic reconstruction, in the factories and fields. We think of a compromise in these terms. All Europe knows that our peasant is after all the best payer, and if he is given a plough on credit, he will pay back with interest. That is the basis on which, if they help us, we are ready to help them and to come to terms with their public opinion. That is the only possible basis for an agreement between France and us on the question of Tsarist indebtedness . . .

Until recently we have had an almost unbroken series of bandit raids from across the Polish frontier. The Polish Government has always

excused itself on the ground that it had not the forces to stop these raids. However, they have stopped recently, and I think it was not without some action by the Polish Government. Recently our ambassador in Poland had to enter an official protest against the quite extraordinary campaign conducted in the columns of the Polish press in regard to the USSR and its Government . . .

All these facts show that our relations with Poland are rather abnormal. To some extent, of course, this abnormality can be explained by the direct contrast between Polish national policy and ours, and since Polish White Russia lies across the border from Soviet White Russia, and Western Ukraine across the border from Soviet Ukraine, this contiguity provokes among the oppressed national minorities on Polish territory the greatest sympathy for the USSR and dissatisfaction with the Polish regime which, in their turn, provoke the hatred of the Polish Government for the Soviet Union.

The latest attacks in the Polish press compelled our ambassador to make special representations to Poland to put an end to these attacks so that more or less normal relations might be reached with the Polish State and the Polish Government. As soon as these wholly ridiculous and petty attacks have been eliminated, the way will be cleared for business negotiations and for an economic rapprochement between Poland and the USSR.

It seems to me that the Poles, Lithuanians, Estonians, Latvians, and Finns should, in regard to the Soviet Union, take into account that any other Government but the Soviet Government would not merely not have given them independence, but would have destroyed them at the first opportunity. The inhabitants of the frontier countries of these separate Republics which were formed from parts of the single Tsarist Russia of that time, know very well that our programme of national self-determination guarantees the independence of all these countries a thousand times better than any treaty or legal declaration. As all these States have common frontiers with the Soviet Union, they are subject to pressure by a whole series of other States which are unfriendly to us.

Recently I was briefly informed that these countries are beginning to build new war factories—for aircraft in one town, for arms in another, for ammunition in a third; it should be borne in mind that none of these Republics has enough money in its purse for such purposes. Somebody is giving them money to build war factories, and close to the frontiers of our Union.

Another fact which should not be ignored is the secret meeting recently held of the Baltic countries. But the secret leaked out, and, apparently, it was chiefly from us that the secret was kept, and not

without reason. This meeting was called a meeting of the Baltic States—apparently from the word 'Baltic Sea'. But there was present a representative of Rumania, a country situated on the Black Sea. We got the impression that Rumania sent its representative to this conference to arrange for keeping Bessarabia within Rumania. It would be difficult to think of any other reason for the presence of a Black Sea State at a Baltic conference. They have no common frontiers, and the only thing common to them is that all these countries have a common frontier with us; Rumania, having managed to slip something into its basket, is now looking for help in keeping it there.

This and a number of other facts indicate that attempts are being made to reach an agreement directed against the USSR. Up to now we have no information to show that these attempts have led to any result, but the possibility is not excluded that when things are more favourable for war, for intervention, or for other less extreme methods of pressure on the USSR, such attempts may lead to some kind of agreement.

EXTRACTS FROM A SPEECH BY CHICHERIN AT THE THIRD SOVIET CONGRESS

14 *May* 1925 *Stenograficheskii Otchet*, p. 83

Comrades, the criticism voiced here, and the numerous notes received from those present, show with what a lively interest the Congress, and consequently the Soviet public in general, follows questions of foreign policy. And, indeed, at the present time domestic and foreign policy are so closely interwoven with each other that there is a direct connexion between every question of internal policy and foreign policy as a whole which it is extremely easy to detect. Criticism was directed most often and most sharply against our policy in regard to Poland. In particular it emerged indisputably that the clause of the Riga treaty[1] guaranteeing national minorities the opportunity for cultural development remains a dead letter in Poland. To reply to the question: 'Why is this so?' we must see its relation to our policy as a whole and to all the combinations in international life today. In fact, what do the comrades who make this criticism want? Do they not want us to start a war? A couple of such eccentrics may perhaps think like that, but it is not the opinion of the Soviet public.

We have no desire and are not preparing to wage war. This is one of the many questions between us and Poland at the present time. And this question can be examined and understood only in connexion with

[1] *League of Nations Treaty Series*, vi, p. 51.

all other questions between us and Poland, only in relation to our policy as a whole. The basic content of our foreign policy, its primary assumption, its first requisite, is its profound anxiety for peace, its profoundly peaceful character. Our policy is designed to preserve peace, to establish enduringly peaceful relations, and to further the consolidation of general peace. This is fundamental—that our foreign policy is linked both with the general principles of our regime and with a whole series of basic factors in the political situation. The working masses want peace, and not only the working masses here, in our Union, but throughout the whole world.

On us, the first Government of workers and peasants, lies a tremendous responsibility, to history, to the revolution, and to the workers of the world. And we, as the first workers' and peasants' Government, must clearly show the workers of the world that our first words on entering the international arena are the maintenance of peace . . .

Here, on this very spot, five years ago, just after we had signed our first peace treaty with a neighbouring country, I said that we were entering on a new phase of our history, which I described as a peaceful duel, the duel of two economic systems. And the course of this peaceful duel—a course which, on our side, has been more and more successful—is now being completed; that is what our policy consists of.

The foreign policy of any Government consists in the final analysis of two basic factors: of defence and attack. All the complicated games of diplomatic combination with which capitalist diplomacy is concerned consist, on the one hand, of preparation for the event of war and of building up such powerful international alliances as may serve for the defence of the given country; and when there is no war, for the defence of its security, the defence of its interests by means of diplomatic combinations. Secondly, also by means of diplomatic combinations, in preparation for offensive action, preparation for conquest and for carrying out offensive imperialist actions. The entire policy of all capitalist Governments is comprehended in those two basic tasks, and all the complexity of diplomatic combinations conceals in itself defence and attack.

The desire for conquest, imperialist aspirations, the urge to exploit other peoples, are wholly alien to our workers' and peasants' Government. They are wholly alien to us; we have no such aims. Our diplomatic activity has purely defensive tasks, but these are made more difficult because, taking no part in the game of conquest which is the essence of capitalist diplomacy, we are so to speak deprived to a considerable extent of that ready cash, that possibility of offering compensation, and of all those elements of diplomacy thanks to which, in the policy of imperialist States, the element of defence and the element of attack are

intertwined. Our policy, the basis of which is the desire to maintain peace and to contribute to general peace, is a defensive policy, which in all its calculations, efforts, and actions pursues the object of defending or preparing for the defence of our territories, our frontier, our coasts, and those approaches leading to our coasts. When, for example, we insist on the closing of the Straits to warships (on which we shall continue to insist), the object is clearly to contribute to the general peace, for to that extent the area in which hostilities can be conducted is lessened; secondly, it reduces the burden of armaments; thirdly, it increases the security of our shores . . .

A little episode has just occurred which has given rise to a still stronger campaign against us, to the accusation that we want to break the peace and stir up trouble everywhere. A conference was called at Geneva by the League of Nations to regulate the international trade in arms. We declined to take part in this conference, for reasons which anyone can understand. The League of Nations, which is in fact a coalition of the victor Powers who wish to impose their will on other States, convened this conference. We do not categorically boycott the League always. There have been cases when we have agreed to enter into negotiations with the League for technical or for humanitarian purposes, such as the reduction of the burden of armaments. But in this case the draft convention on the international trade in arms[1] which the League sent us showed clearly that what they had in mind was to strengthen the dominion of the imperialist States over the weaker States and the oppressed peoples. What the draft amounted to was that the trade in arms should be strictly regulated between the designated Governments, and all licences for the export of arms should be sent to a central office set up by the League of Nations. This meant control by the group of imperialist Powers dominating the League of Nations over the entire international arms trade. The draft further established special prohibited zones, where control was to be even stricter, and the intervention of the League and, in its name, of the imperialist Powers, in the life of particular States was to go even further. In the first draft these prohibited zones embraced the countries of the Near East and Africa, but just before the conference, England proposed that China should also be included among them. We refused to take part in this conference which, while appearing to regulate the trade in arms, really strengthened to the utmost the rule of the imperialist Powers over the weaker peoples. This served as an excuse for a new and extremely furious campaign against us. You have probably read in the newspapers that the Geneva press, connected with the permanent home of the League, is beginning to clamour for the transformation of the League

[1] League of Nations, 1924, ix, C. 758, M. 258, p. 17.

of Nations into some kind of universal alliance against the USSR, justifying this by the fact that our absence from this conference prevented the dominant States from putting through this plan. If the USSR does not take part in the conference, then there is practically no hope for it. Using this as its basis, the press connected with the League is beginning to call for a kind of crusade, led by the League of Nations, against the USSR. Another recent event serving as the theme for new and fierce attacks on us was the sorting out and grouping of the peoples of central Asia. The fact that in central Asia Union and Autonomous Republics have been formed, established on the basis of nationality, served as a pretext for the press hostile to us to make the charge that these Republics are to be used as the starting point and prop for annexationist intentions against neighbouring States. Yesterday we reproduced an extract from an article in *The Times*[1] where the idea is worked out that these new Republics are to be used for an offensive against their neighbours or for the annexation of certain neighbouring territories. This is another example of how our actions, which are designed to settle and stabilize relations, to create more lasting and peaceful relations, are misinterpreted by our enemies in a reverse sense and serve as an excuse for calumnies against us and for the accusation that we have aggressive and annexationist aims . . .

The events in the Balkans are practically the chief theme of our opponents, who accuse us of trying to ignite the spark of war and stir up every kind of trouble. In this connexion, too, we must state that we are no more interested in the Balkans than in any other country. We are glad that peaceful relations are developing on the basis of national self-determination and national delimitation. We are satisfied when any political relations are stabilized on the basis of national self-determination. But we have no aggressive aims, no wish to start and stir up trouble in the Balkans or anywhere else. That too is a calumny which we must here most decisively reject.

Thus, our policy of peace towards Poland is only part of our general policy of peace as a whole. So, putting the question which the critics have put, about the Polish failure to implement article 7 of the Riga treaty, we ask: what is the easiest and quickest way of getting that article of the treaty put into operation? And we find that the worse our relations with Poland, the less is that article observed. When our relations with Poland in general are less strained, the violations of that article are milder. Thus our general relations with Poland are reflected in this particular question.

In Poland there are, by and large, two chief trends. One may be described as adventurist, imperialist, militarist; the other is pacific, in

[1] Possibly a reference to an article in *The Times* of 10 January 1925.

particular it is anxious for a firm agreement with us. Such an agreement is necessary for Poland itself, for the thorough rehabilitation of its economy, which is in a pretty poor state. It is necessary for Poland itself, for consolidating this young State. There are therefore very powerful elements in Poland in favour of a firm agreement with us. On the other hand there are militarist elements, anxious, as it were, to throw their weight about and extend their power—the alliance with Rumania, the desire to extend their eastern connexions right up to Persia, and, finally, Poland's Baltic policy, which has already been spoken of here and which was expressed in the Helsingfors and Riga conferences of army general staffs. The two elements in Poland which throw their weight on the side of peace are the peasantry—and it is no accident that the Riga treaty was signed by the famous peasant leader Dombski—and heavy industry, which for business reasons wishes to establish stable and peaceful relations with us and use these for their economic expansion. Thus our aim is to get together with that trend inside Poland, which is really strong at present, that is opposed to adventurist behaviour, to the militarist elements in Polish policy, and which is using its influence in favour of agreement with us. Our aim is to get together with this element in Polish policy and Polish society, for our aim also consists precisely in lessening the perpetual conflicts and differences which interfere with the full restoration of peaceful conditions of life on our western frontiers. Our object is to conclude a lasting agreement with Poland.

It has already been made clear here that Poland's geographical position makes such an agreement exceptionally important to us from the standpoint of our general policy, for no large-scale military offensive can be undertaken against us without the participation of Poland, which would be the advance guard of such an offensive. Precisely for that reason the establishment of stable relations with Poland occupies a highly important place in the general calculations of our peace policy. Precisely because economic stimuli in Poland itself play such an important part in this matter, we on our part are trying to extend our economic connexions with Poland.

Recently our Foreign Trade Commissariat has begun to be much more active in Poland than previously. This activity will also be a factor of considerable importance in coming to a stable agreement with Poland, just as, in relations with our neighbours and with all those small States whose connexions with the imperialist Governments were exposed here yesterday, their economic relations with us represent a substantial counter-weight to all the political stimuli originating with the imperialist Governments.

Everywhere, wherever we look, whatever particular part of our policy we take, we come up in the final analysis against the fundamental

combinations of world policy, i.e. the world policy of the great Powers, who stretch out their tentacles everywhere, who are active in Poland and on our western borders and throughout the length and breadth of the Near and Far East. In these fundamental combinations of world policy we discern two kinds, two basic and it may be said opposed tendencies. The first category is the one which—from one direction or another, with one State or another—works for the creation of a united front against us. I am not speaking of the visits paid by one Minister or another who afterwards deny any wish to create a united front. I am speaking of general tendencies, which float in the air, are written about in the press, and spoken of by politicians.

The other kind of combination is that which, because of the antagonisms of the great Powers, seeks to draw us into one combination or other of capitalist States. In France, for example, in the press and in speeches by statesmen during the Herriot Government, this kind of combination was suggested—of course, not by Herriot himself: France against England, i.e. France and Russia together with Poland and Japan against England, which had drawn Germany over to its side. That is one combination which has been worked out recently and there were, of course, others, e.g. Germany with us, and so on.

Right through the complex political situation in which we have to operate our policy of peace, of the establishment of peaceful relations on the basis of national self-determination, we have to operate among those two categories of international combinations: the united front against us and the attempt by means of one combination or another to use us on a particular side.

I should say, however, that recently the first of these categories has been the dominant one . . .

The chief part is still played by England. But England forms a close bloc with America. When the direct interests of the United States are involved, they come out with categorical declarations and adopt an imperious tone, as the decisive factor. In this respect the first speech[1] by the new American ambassador, who had only just arrived in London, at the banquet given in honour of his arrival, was extremely characteristic. He warned the States of Europe that unless they settled down among themselves and refrained from upsetting established relations, the United States would cease giving them any kind of help whatever. And then he went on to make it clear that by these established relations he meant the Dawes plan.

Thus the Dawes plan, which means the direct domination of American capital, more than any other, in European relations, interests the American Government so much that it threatens the European States with

[1] *The Times*, 5 May 1925.

withdrawing its help if it turns out that the plan is getting into difficulties, and as, since the world war, most of the gold has piled up in the vaults of the American banks, and as America is the chief creditor and the chief possible creditor in the future for the entire world, it is quite clear that this threat of financial pressure can be decisive in international affairs. But though, in certain basic questions of interest to American capital, American diplomacy acts quite independently and decisively, in others, in daily international life, where lesser questions of general interest are concerned and form the subject of talks, it is England, and English diplomacy, which is the most active and most influential.

Therefore when we consider our own position, when we read in the world press of the creation of a united front against us, when we ask ourselves: what part can this or that State play, we must first of all consider the position of England. But there something is going on which is not quite clear to us. The English Foreign Secretary officially declares that he was not, is not, and will not be the author and originator of any plan whatever for a united front against us. Nevertheless we find in the world press and in the English press a wealth of indications that English influence is playing a part in creating an atmosphere of general hostility towards us, in which we now have to work . . . We should like to express the wish that in their practical policy the actions of the English Government corresponded more closely with the Minister's declarations.

However, the official attitude of the English Government towards us in the last few months has been hesitant and has changed. Early in the year, just when England and the continental States had failed to get together on a number of questions like Morocco and Tunis, the official attitude of the English Government was this: let the Soviet Government propose negotiations; we are ready to conduct them; let it make proposals, we shall examine them. And then we said: we are willing at any moment and with the utmost readiness to begin and conduct negotiations, we would like to know what precisely, in the treaty signed with MacDonald, is unacceptable to the new English Government. We cannot make new proposals if we do not know what makes the former proposals unacceptable. They say to us: 'make proposals', and we say: 'here is the treaty, show us what is unacceptable and then we shall know what proposals are possible.' But we are not shown.

At the present moment the attitude of the English Foreign Secretary is rather different. He says that the establishment of more settled relations with the USSR is impossible so long as we do not cease propaganda. That is already another thing. It is a literal repetition of what Lord Curzon said at our only meeting in Lausanne.

When I asked him what possibilities did he see of improving our relations, he answered that no improvement was possible so long as we

continued our propaganda. Then I asked him: 'What propaganda? We have a Government; we have a civil service; employees of the Government and the Government with all its apparatus are obliged to refrain from propaganda. But the Government cannot foresee what some citizen or other is going to say somewhere. If a private citizen violates the law, or a treaty, he is held responsible but we cannot insist on the communist party not being a communist party. We cannot insist on a member of the communist party ceasing to talk as a communist.'

Curzon replied: 'If it is a question of cutting all-out propaganda down by 50 per cent, His Majesty's Government will not enter into conversations on this subject.' Precisely the same theme is expressed in Chamberlain's 'cease propaganda'.

What propaganda? This is a fundamental question in our relations. Every obligation arising from international relations our Government is prepared to accept and does accept. If the English Government shows us that at this point or that we abused diplomatic intercourse, diplomatic rights, the diplomatic machinery, that this or that official acted in violation of international undertakings—everything required of us in this respect we are prepared to undertake. But if they say that any propaganda whatever in the USSR must be stopped, that means asking the communist party to cease being a communist party. What it amounts to is, do we stay or not?

We stay. The experience of the early years showed clearly enough that we cannot be overthrown, that we are here and here we stay—'j'y suis, j'y reste.'

The question is the fundamental one of our relations with the surrounding capitalist world . . .

What do they want? War? They do not want war. They cannot want war. Intervention again? They have tried that once already. What then do they want? They must understand that it is essential to agree upon a *modus vivendi* between England and us, between the capitalist States and our State. But to arrive at this *modus vivendi* the English Government must take the position it occupied earlier, i.e. the regularizing of relations between Government and Government. It must abandon the point of view that the communist party should cease to be a communist party. Everything possible in regard to official policy, official agreement and obligations as far as our official apparatus is concerned, our Government is ready to undertake and does undertake. On that basis concrete stipulations and definite agreements can be made. And we may recall that when we concluded the provisional treaty with England in 1921,[1] which is at present the only valid treaty, we suggested

[1] Cmd. 1207.

that England should not limit itself to this brief and extremely general agreement. We proposed the examination of all questions with which we were concerned with a view to arriving at a compromise between us and England forming a tolerable *modus vivendi*. This was rejected—Lloyd George's Government wanted no such conference. Even MacDonald did not examine thoroughly and concretely all the complex and disputed questions which confronted us.

Until that is done, there will remain between us and England—and consequently in international affairs as a whole—that element of instability which is so painfully felt by those same capitalist States. And if Chamberlain says that the cause of this instability is the existence of the USSR, then it is Chamberlain himself who is to blame for not trying to arrive at a compromise with us which would remove, as far as possible, as far as present-day historical circumstances permit, that element of instability between us and England and therefore the instability in world affairs.

Relations between us and France are much simpler because France's own policy is not so world-wide, so comprehensive, as England's. We do not encounter France everywhere on our path. We do not encounter French agents on all our frontiers as we encounter English agents on all our Asiatic frontiers. French policy possesses, as it were, a greater range of vacillation. Though, when France requires a counter-weight to England, it is more ready to come to terms with us; though, to a large extent, and particularly in the East, there are no antagonisms and no conflicts between us and French policy, still the most sensitive point in our western relations, i.e. our relations with Poland, is at the same time one of the central factors in our relations with France, so that the settlement of one is closely bound up with the other. If we reach a settlement in our relations with France, that will react on our relations with Poland, and vice versa.

We want to reach agreement with France not only about debts, but about all the political questions before us too. It is now a question whether the new French Government will be more resolute, will it agree to negotiations on the whole series of political questions, which would be in the highest degree timely. In this respect French policy is distinguished no less than English by lack of clarity and by fluidity.

England's policy consists in officially denying any hostile intentions against us, while in fact wherever we turn we come up against the opposition of English agents. What are they after? What do they want? Is the English Government trying to get ready to strangle us, or is it on the contrary trying to isolate us and so to strengthen its position in regard to us? Is the English Government preparing a new campaign against us, or trying to create an atmosphere more favourable to itself

for negotiations? We do not know; it is not clear. English policy is fluid; different tendencies are in conflict. French policy is equally fluid.

The present moment is distinguished by the extraordinary abundance of obscure and inconclusive indications in world affairs in general and in particular in the system of relations with us. Debts, of course, play a great part, and although at the moment we are conducting no negotiations with the English Government, we would think it quite possible to negotiate with the City, with private capitalists in England. This would facilitate future negotiations with the English Government.

We are on the eve of negotiations with France. The French Government has referred us to the association officially representing the interests of the bondholders, which will conduct negotiations on their behalf. Our delegation, led by Comrade Preobrazhensky, has thoroughly studied the financial aspect of the French bondholders' demands. Thus there is a possibility of beginning negotiations. We have made an official statement about that. My own opinion is that an agreement is not nearly so impossible as many think. Comrade Rykov said here that we are ready to make sacrifices in return for corresponding benefits—that is a formula which makes agreements possible . . .

There is an even greater degree of fluidity and obscurity in German policy. The German Government showed very clearly its reluctance to abandon the friendly relations with us established and developed in recent years. But, on the other hand, if the policy of the pact of guarantee with the western Powers proposed by the German Government at the instigation of England should be put into operation, if Germany should enter the League of Nations, then, despite the wish of the German Government, it will by the force of things find itself in a position which will scarcely make it possible to continue, at least in the same degree as formerly, the relations established between us.

A great deal depends on the further course of our economic relations. The commercial treaty on which our representatives and the German delegates are at present at work in Moscow, may also therefore be a weighty factor in the settlement of international political relations.

The same obscurity and fluidity can even be seen on the part of Italy, which throughout this last period has in general maintained a friendly attitude to us. Nevertheless the Italian Government does not adhere sufficiently unambiguously at the present moment to the line previously followed. I am thinking of the talk that has been going on in Italian ruling circles about the fate of the Italian–Soviet treaty,[1] signed and ratified by the highest authority in Italy. The Italian–Soviet treaty is completely legal and has come into force, and we find the questions about annulling this treaty now being put in parliamentary circles

[1] *State Papers*, cxx, p. 659.

incomprehensible. We would like greater firmness and greater clarity on the part of the Italian Government in regard to the opposition to the treaty by these parliamentarians.

By and large this fluidity, this lack of clarity, this lack of definition, are characteristic of the present state of international affairs. It is more difficult than ever before to foresee what tomorrow will bring: will the dangers be greater, will the plans for a united front be realized, or will there be a further rapprochement with one or another State, a further expansion and consolidation of our international connexions . . .

But I should say that the unfavourable elements, the elements making for the unification of world reaction, have recently been stronger, and therefore, in so far as our policy aims at dispersing combinations directed against us, at averting all possible dangers, to that extent the present moment presents greater difficulties than the preceding period. And when criticisms are made, when we receive notes from those present here about this or that particular question—we haven't succeeded in this, we haven't succeeded in that, the English Government rejects the treaty, etc.—in reality the question is much broader. It is a question of the degree to which we shall continue to avert that united front against us which extremely influential elements, not Governments maybe, but nevertheless, elements extremely influential in the dominant countries, have more and more set before themselves as their object.

While the present situation in Europe has these uncertain characteristics, the direct opposite can be observed in the Asiatic States. Ancient China, that elder among the nations, is now proving itself to be a young man, with the outlook of a young man. The ancient peoples of China are now proving themselves youthful, full of fire; before them the broadest prospects are open and with tremendous energy they are breaking the chains which still bind them. Our strength consists in this, that everybody knows, all the peoples of the East know, that we do not aspire to any dominion or any influence, whether open or concealed, explicit or masked, political or economic. Nor do we desire to exploit the peoples of the East who are economically backward. That is the root of our real influence in the East, which has nothing in common with what the capitalist States call influence, and which is something quite new—it is the consciousness of solidarity and community of interests in parallel efforts directed towards analogous ends.

We have recently been able to observe to what an extent the policy of even the most imperialist Powers, in the first place England, is trying to adapt itself to the changed situation in the eastern States. It was not so long ago that English diplomats in China supported a scheme of financial control somewhat reminiscent of the Dawes plan. Only last year the leading English paper . . . carried reports of plans for the

financial control of China. At the present time the same papers are supporting England's recent enemy, the Japanese protegé Marshal Chang Tso-lin, whom they regard as the future dictator, with whom it is desirable for English diplomacy to maintain friendly relations. This is a quite different approach from that used even six months ago.

This change in methods is even more striking in Persia, where quite recently English diplomacy employed pressure, threats, the sharp tones of one in command, and where now, on the contrary, it is adapting itself to the efforts of the Persian Government to modernize and centralize Persia, to create a new Persia. The English Government is trying to draw over to its side this new, modernized Persia, which has as its goal the complete emancipation of the country, political and economic, from any pressure, any intervention in its internal affairs.

It will be extremely interesting to see what happens, because in all this of course there is a strong element of internal contradiction. At the present moment English diplomacy, with extreme flexibility, is trying to adapt itself to those changing conditions, and at bottom that shows to what extent the relations between the awakening peoples of the East and the forces of world imperialism have already changed.

The peoples of the East will continue unswervingly on this path without any vacillation. That is, there will, of course, be vacillation among the small group of rulers who do not always pursue the path taken by a people for its emancipation. But I am not talking of that small handful, I am not talking of some general or other; I am talking of the basic line of development of the peoples of the East, which goes unswervingly and unchangingly forward, and proceeds in close unity with us, the only friend, the unchanging and true friend of the peoples of the East, a friend whose policy towards them conceals nothing, masks nothing, and is preparing no disagreeable surprises for them.

It is from the standpoint of these broad calculations of policy that we should approach those particular questions of which our critics have spoken here. We cannot sacrifice general prospects and general purposes to any local, partial purpose. These partial and local purposes must be fitted in as part of this general system . . .

EXTRACT FROM THE RESOLUTION OF THE THIRD SOVIET CONGRESS ON RYKOV'S REPORT

16 *May* 1925 *Stenograficheskii Otchet, Postanovlenia,* p. 5

1. The Third Soviet Congress, having heard and discussed the report of the Government of the USSR made by the Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR, Comrade A. I. Rykov, fully and

completely endorses the Government's actions and its programme for further work in foreign and domestic policy.

2. The Congress notes with satisfaction that in the period covered by the report a number of capitalist Governments have recognized the first proletarian State, which rests on the fraternal union of the workers and peasants and expresses the close solidarity between the toilers of the various peoples and nations within the USSR. However, the Congress cannot ignore the danger signals which indicate that the capitalist States are making preparations for new conflicts and new wars.

The inability of capitalism to create an enduring, firm, and stable order, the struggle among the most powerful capitalist States for the exploitation of central Europe, the colonies, and dependent countries, finally, the advance of reaction and terror in a number of countries—all this is bound to arouse alarm and anxiety for the cause of peace.

The Congress observes the appearance of dangerous attempts on the part of a number of Powers to create again by various means a hostile encirclement of our Union, which takes the form of an entire system of military conferences, agreements, and support for the measures taken by different Governments against the USSR, and also of campaigns based on forgeries and lies. All this is bound to arouse fears among all toilers and all honest citizens of the Union, as well as among the international proletariat and working peasantry.

3. The Congress considers that in such a situation, more than ever before, the USSR must be a pillar of peace and its surest guarantee.

The struggle for peace and the promotion of international economic intercourse remain the basic instructions which the Congress gives the workers' and peasants' Government embodied by the Central Executive Committee and the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR.

4. At the same time the Congress, expressing the will of many millions of working people, regards it as the duty of the Government to watch strictly over the interests of the Union and to guard its frontiers from possible attack.

The Congress instructs the Government to give due attention to the Red Army and Red Fleets and the Air Force, bearing in mind that the actual strength of the armed forces of the Union is, as was demonstrated throughout all the Soviet State's struggle for existence, the chief guarantee against attacks on the workers' State . . .

MANIFESTO OF THE THIRD SOVIET CONGRESS TO THE WORKERS OF THE WORLD ON THE EVENTS IN BULGARIA

16 *May* 1925 *Stenograficheskii Otchet, Postanovlenia*, p. 4

The Third Soviet Congress considers it an obligation of honour to make this declaration to the workers of the entire world, to the whole of mankind, to all peoples and States:

The working class and peasantry of the USSR are filled with indignation by the unheard of savagery of the Tsankov Government. To cut off the flower of the working population, to shoot and strangle thousands of people, to revive medieval tortures, to place the gallows on the town square, covering all this over with hypocritical words about the defence of Christian civilization—only the gang of professional murderers insolently calling itself the Bulgarian Government would do this. The Third Soviet Congress dismisses with contempt the slanderous calumnies on the USSR in connexion with the Sofia explosion, used to screen the cruelties of the barbarian hangmen.

The Third Soviet Congress in the name of millions of workers and peasants expresses its anger and contempt for the executioners covered from head to foot in the blood of peasants and workmen.

The Third Soviet Congress sends brotherly greetings to the Bulgarian proletarians and farmers fearlessly fighting for the liberation of the Bulgarian people.

The workers and peasants of the Soviet Union express their firm conviction that the Bulgarian people, welded together by blood, will sooner or later achieve their liberation.

EXTRACTS FROM AN ADDRESS BY STALIN TO THE COMMUNIST UNIVERSITY OF THE PEOPLES OF THE EAST

18 *May* 1925 Stalin, vii, p. 144

Let us pass to the second question, that of the tasks of the University in regard to the colonial and dependent countries of the East . . .

1. The liberation of the colonial and dependent countries from imperialism cannot be achieved without a victorious revolution: independence will not come as a gift.
2. It is impossible to advance the revolution and win complete independence in the colonies and dependent countries where capitalism has developed without isolating the conciliatory section of the national bourgeoisie, without freeing the petty-bourgeois revolutionary masses from their influence, without conducting a policy

making for the hegemony of the proletariat, without organizing the advanced elements of the working class in an independent communist party.

3. No enduring victory is possible in the colonial and dependent countries unless the liberation movement in these countries is effectively linked with the proletarian movement in the advanced countries of the West.

The chief task of communists in the colonial and dependent countries consists in making these conclusions the starting point of their revolutionary work.

What, in relation to these circumstances, are the immediate tasks of the revolutionary movement in the colonies and dependent countries?

What distinguishes the colonies and dependent countries at the present time is that there is no longer a homogeneous and all-embracing colonial East. Formerly the colonial East was represented as something homogeneous and uniform. That picture no longer corresponds with the reality. We now have at least three categories of colonial and dependent countries. First, countries like Morocco, which have no proletariat, or practically none, and are completely undeveloped industrially. Second, countries like China or Egypt, where industry is slightly developed and the proletariat is comparatively small in numbers. Thirdly, countries like India, more or less well developed as capitalist countries and with a national proletariat fairly large in numbers.

Obviously, these countries cannot all be treated in the same way.

For countries like Morocco, where the national bourgeoisie has so far no reason to split into a revolutionary and a conciliatory party, the task of the communist elements is to do everything possible to create a united national front against imperialism. The emergence of the communist elements to form a single party can in such countries take place only in the course of the struggle against imperialism, and more particularly after a successful revolutionary ⟨struggle⟩[1] against imperialism.

In countries like Egypt or China, where the national bourgeoisie has already split into a revolutionary and a conciliatory party, but where the conciliatory section of the bourgeoisie cannot yet unite with imperialism, communists can no longer aim at the formation of a united national front against imperialism. In such countries they must change from the policy of a united national front to the policy of a revolutionary bloc of the workers and the petty bourgeoisie. In these countries such a bloc may take the form of a single party, a party of workers and peasants,[2] but in such a way as *really* to represent a coalition of two forces

[1] In earlier editions: war.

[2] In earlier editions: a party of workers and peasants, like the Kuomintang.

—the communist party and the party of the revolutionary petty-bourgeoisie. The tasks of this bloc are to expose the irresolution and inconsistency of the national bourgeoisie and to wage a vigorous struggle against imperialism. Such a dual party is necessary and expedient, so long as it does not tie the communist party hand and foot, so long as it does not obstruct the communist party's freedom to carry on agitation and propaganda, so long as it does not prevent proletarians from rallying round the communist party, so long as it promotes effective communist party leadership of the revolutionary movement. Such a dual party is unnecessary and inexpedient if it does not meet all these conditions, for it can only lead to the merging of the communist elements into the ranks of the bourgeoisie, to the communist party's loss of the proletarian army.

In countries like India there is a somewhat different state of affairs. What is important and new in the conditions of existence of colonies such as India is not only that the national bourgeoisie has split into a revolutionary and a conciliatory party; most important is it that the conciliatory section of this bourgeoisie has already come to an agreement on fundamentals with imperialism. Fearing revolution more than imperialism, more concerned about its moneybags than about the interests of their own motherland, this part of the bourgeoisie, the wealthiest and most influential, has both feet in the camp of the irreconcilable enemies of the revolution, forms a coalition with imperialism against the workers and peasants of its own country. The revolution cannot be successful unless this coalition is broken. But in order to break it the attack must be concentrated against the conciliatory national bourgeoisie, exposing its treachery, liberating the working masses from its influence, and systematically working for the conditions required for the hegemony of the proletariat. In other words, the task is to prepare the proletariat in colonies such as India for the part of leader of the liberation movement, gradually displacing from that post of honour the bourgeoisie and its spokesmen. That is the task—to create a revolutionary anti-imperialist bloc and to secure the hegemony of the proletariat in that bloc. This bloc may, but need not always, take the form of a single workers' and peasants' party, held together formally by a single platform. In such countries the independence of the communist party must be the chief slogan of the leading communist elements, for the hegemony of the proletariat can be prepared and carried through only by the communist party. But the communist party can and must enter into an open coalition with the revolutionary wing of the bourgeoisie so that, having isolated the conciliatory national bourgeoisie, it can carry with it the millions of the urban and rural petty-bourgeois masses in the struggle against imperialism.

It follows that the immediate tasks of the revolutionary movement in the colonies and dependent countries where capitalism has developed are:

1. To win over the best elements of the working class to communism, and to create independent communist parties.
2. To form a national revolutionary coalition of the workers, peasants, and revolutionary intelligentsia against the coalition of the conciliatory national bourgeoisie and imperialism.
3. To secure the hegemony of the proletariat in this coalition.
4. To fight for the emancipation of the urban and rural petty bourgeoisie from the influence of the conciliatory national bourgeoisie.
5. To ensure that the liberation movement is linked with the proletarian movement of the advanced countries.

These are the three groups of immediate tasks confronting the active workers in the colonial and dependent countries of the East.

They acquire a particularly serious character, and a particularly great significance if regarded in the light of the present international situation. The international situation at the present time is distinguished by the fact that the revolutionary movement has entered a period of temporary calm. What sort of calm? What can it mean at the present time? It can only mean greater pressure on the workers of the West, on the colonies of the East, and, above all, on the Soviet Union as the standard bearer of the revolutionary movement of all countries. It can scarcely be doubted that the imperialists have already begun their preparations to exert such pressure on the Soviet Union. The campaign of calumny in connexion with the insurrection in Estonia, the monstrous campaign in connexion with the Sofia explosion, the universal attacks of the bourgeois press on our country—all this is the preparation for an offensive. It is the preliminary bombardment of public opinion, designed to accustom the man in the street to sorties against the Soviet Union and to create the moral prerequisites for intervention. What will be the outcome of this campaign of lies and calumny, whether the imperialists will risk a serious offensive, the future will show. But that these sorties bode no good for the colonies, that there can be no reason to doubt. Therefore the question of preparing a counter-blow of the united forces of the revolution against the probable assault of the imperialists is one which cannot be avoided.

That is why the undeviating execution of the immediate tasks of the revolutionary movement in the colonies and dependent countries acquires particularly great importance at the present moment.

Bearing all these circumstances in mind, what is the mission of the

University of the Peoples of the East in regard to the colonial and dependent countries? It consists in examining all the special features of revolutionary development in these countries and in training cadres coming from these countries in such a way as to ensure the execution of the various immediate tasks set forth above.

There are about ten different groups of students in the University of the Peoples of the East who have come to us from the colonial and dependent countries. Everybody knows that these comrades are thirsting for light and knowledge. The task of the University of the Peoples of the East is to make real revolutionaries of them, armed with the theory of Leninism, equipped with the practical experience of Leninism, and able to carry out the immediate tasks of the liberation movement in the colonies and dependent countries, not out of fear, but from conviction.

DECREE OF THE CENTRAL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE ON THE MOSCOW-CHINA FLIGHT

1 *June* 1925 *Sobranie Zakonov*, 1925, i, p. 578

In view of the importance of developing the cultural and economic relations of the USSR with the friendly peoples of China and Mongolia, and of improving communications with the border Soviet Republics and regions, the Association of Friends of the Air Force and the Russian Company 'Dobrolet' are organizing early in June of the present year a flight from Moscow to China.

This flight, to be carried out by aircraft and motors of primarily Soviet design and construction, is undertaken in the interests of Soviet civil aviation and to test the achievements of the Soviet aviation industry; taking place for the first time because of the unusually great difficulties, it is of the greatest and most exceptional importance.

Proceeding from these considerations, the Presidium of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR considers it necessary to give those taking part in the forthcoming flight, airmen and organizers, the most energetic co-operation, and appeals to all Soviet authorities along the route to be followed to take all measures necessary for the successful accomplishment of the forthcoming flight.

EXTRACTS FROM A PRESS INTERVIEW BY CHICHERIN ON RELATIONS WITH ENGLAND AND EVENTS IN CHINA

2 *July* 1925 *Izvestia*, 2 *July* 1925

In certain English papers, as well as in some papers in other countries, a bitter campaign is being waged against our Government in connexion with the events in China. This has received virtually official sanction in the speech made by Lord Birkenhead, Secretary of State for India, concerning relations between England and the USSR.[1] . . . He warned that the moment would come when the English Government would ask itself whether it was really helpless when confronted with a Government having diplomatic representation in England which is nevertheless trying by unceasing underground activities throughout the world to destroy the British Empire.

As Foreign Commissar I cannot pass over in silence this extraordinary utterance by a member of another Government with which we are in normal relations. In effect Lord Birkenhead is seeking a rupture of diplomatic relations with us. His speech is therefore aggressive in the extreme, and amounts to the demand for the most hostile measures against us, beyond which there is only war. It is quite obvious that Lord Birkenhead and those with him are seeking a pretext to start a conflict the consequences of which cannot be foreseen. Lord Birkenhead's speech is so serious that I as Foreign Commissar of the Soviet Union must call the most serious attention of all to the grave consequences which would follow from the realization of his threats . . .

The occasion for Lord Birkenhead's speech was provided by the events in China. The victim of political oppression on the part of the great Powers, the victim of economic exploitation on the part of capital in the more developed countries, the victim of direct brutality on the part of the representatives of those countries in China—the Chinese people by mass strikes and various kinds of political demonstrations have risen against this yoke . . . The most extreme English conservatives, among them Lord Birkenhead, anxious to keep the foreign yoke on the Chinese people but with an eye on public opinion in their own countries, seek a scapegoat. But the accusations they have made against our Government are lies from beginning to end.

The first thing that interests the English in their relations with China is the development of trade between the two countries. I declare that we have done absolutely nothing that might even in the slightest degree injure China's foreign trade, in particular its trade with England. On the contrary, the settlement of the questions confronting China which in my opinion is the best, that is, the establishment of a rejuvenated,

[1] *The Times*, 29 June 1925.

centralized, democratic China, independent and free of any encroachment on its sovereign rights, will promote to the utmost the development of China's trade with other countries and in particular with England. I do not deny that our Government sympathizes with the struggle of the Chinese people . . . but this does not mean intervention in the internal affairs of another State, and our policy carefully and strictly avoids anything that might be interpreted as such intervention. It is the crudest of lies to assert that our Government wants to create or to preserve a state of chaos in China . . . It is none other than the imperialist Powers who in China support now one, now another general or governor, thus perpetuating internecine strife in China and making the creation of a democratic regime impossible. Our Government, on the contrary, considers the triumph of democracy in China the outcome which will be most desirable and appropriate, from the point of view also of China's relations with other countries . . .

No less absurd than the accusation that we are trying to create chaos in China is the one that charges our Government or our agents with trying to promote in China a movement against foreigners in general. The internationalist programme of the party which is in power in our country guarantees quite clearly that our Government or our agents would never make it their aim to stir up in one people hatred against all other peoples. On the contrary, we regard with the utmost sympathy the development in China of progressive principles, productive forces, and close association of the Chinese people with all other peoples.

Lord Birkenhead goes further and accuses our Government of trying to disrupt the British Empire and of giving support everywhere to a movement which is the scourge of humanity. Why did the Minister forget to say that from the moment when *de facto* relations were established between our Government and Great Britain it was none other than our Government which persistently and repeatedly proposed to the English Government an examination of all questions in dispute between us, with a view to working out an agreement in the interests of both parties . . . Let Lord Birkenhead remember that not only was it our Government which always took the initiative in the attempt to reach agreement with England, but that attempts against the external security of our State proceed precisely from the great Powers. The friendly relations created between the USSR and the States of the East, which are growing more and more firm with every day, are the result of the practical application by our Government of the principle of national self-determination.

PRESS STATEMENT BY KRASSIN, SOVIET AMBASSADOR TO FRANCE, ON MOROCCO AND ON THE ENTRY OF GERMANY INTO THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS

8 *August* 1925 *Le Temps*, 8 *August* 1925

People in Moscow are sometimes surprised at the criticisms levelled against the Soviet press because of its attitude to the affair in Morocco. But it is not surprising that events as important as those now taking place in Morocco interest our press, and that it does not confine itself to the mere publication of news. In none of the articles about Morocco in the Soviet press can the slightest sign of hostility to France be found. On the contrary, our press, while holding its own views on colonial policy, has not the least intention of creating difficulties for France. In any case, I can guarantee that in the most diverse quarters in the USSR, and particularly in the Government, there is the most sincere wish to see your country settle the Morocco affair in the most satisfactory manner. The USSR has no interest in aggravating the international difficulties now confronting France. If at times opinions are expressed in the Soviet press which are not shared by everybody here, they are just the same inspired by the desire to see France freed from the anxiety which the Morocco affair represents.

As to the reports in certain French and foreign newspapers that the Government of the USSR has sent envoys to Abd el Krim and has given financial help to the Riff leader, may I state, officially and in the most categorical terms, that these reports are devoid of any foundation whatever, and that the Soviet Government has never intervened and is not intervening in any way whatever in the events in Morocco, and has no relations whatever with the Moroccans.

Nor do the people in Moscow understand the criticisms levelled at the Soviet Government because of its attitude to the security pact and to the entry of Germany into the League of Nations. Let me say first of all that the Reich Government conducts its foreign policy according to its own opinions, and that the Soviet Government neither wishes nor is able to exercise any pressure on German decisions. It can only express its opinion on the proposed pact. Nor should it be forgotten that the pact was proposed by Germany itself. On the other hand it is obvious that, in so far as the negotiations relating to the pact and to the entry of Germany into the League of Nations are clearly designed to isolate the USSR and to set up a bloc of all European States against it, the people and the Government of the Union cannot look with much sympathy on such efforts to consolidate the peace.

EXTRACTS FROM A PRESS INTERVIEW BY KARAKHAN ON HIS RETURN FROM CHINA

10 *September* 1925 *Izvestia*, 10 *September* 1925

As to the questions hampering the course of the Soviet–Chinese conference, I may say that the opening of the conference was delayed not through any fault of ours, but because the Chinese authorities had not carried out certain points of our agreement concerning the Chinese Eastern Railway, the return of property belonging to Russia, etc. We have been assured that all these misunderstandings will be smoothed out.

The latest events in China indicate that the chief danger to Canton comes from Hong Kong. It should be noted that the Chinese Government in Canton has not prohibited trade with Hong Kong, but that the trade unions have declared a boycott; there is no ground for charging the Chinese Government with responsibility for this. Moreover, even if it were admitted that the Chinese authorities had proclaimed a boycott of English goods, thus violating the rights of foreigners, there is a quite specific legal channel for making a protest to the Peking Government . . .

The events in China have led to a considerable increase in our trade with that country. Two months ago there was an acute shortage of fuel in Canton and of rice, and Chinese commercial circles quickly got into touch with our economic agencies which in a very short time procured from Vladivostok the goods required for Canton and thus prevented serious consequences.

At present we are the only sellers of kerosene and petrol in the Kwantung province. If the foreign syndicates are not able to find a way out of the serious situation created for them, we shall be able to secure for ourselves this new market . . .

The customs conference with which the Powers think to reassure China can scarcely have much importance, for it will give China nothing, or practically nothing. Every increase in customs revenue goes in the first place and chiefly to pay off debts to the Powers. The Kuomintang has come out against this conference, calculating that it will give the masses nothing but illusions. It is hardly likely that the Powers will be inclined to give China tariff autonomy . . .

The good order on the Chinese Eastern Railway is one of our great achievements. At the present time its technical condition is excellent. The line has not been in such a good state at any time since 1917 as it is now.

There are tens of thousands of Soviet citizens now living in Manchuria. In view of this, the Chinese authorities are engaging for service in Manchuria persons with a knowledge of the Russian language.

Unfortunately, these are all hostile to the Soviet regime, White Guards who try to injure the Soviet Union in any way they can. There are a particularly large number of White Guards in the police, the majority of whom were formerly members of the Tsarist police.

The Russian teachers in the schools of the Chinese Eastern Railway, attended by the children of our Soviet citizens, are also hostile to the Soviet Union. We cannot ignore this, or leave the education of our children in the hands of monarchists. The question of their dismissal will very shortly be raised; there are more than eighty of them, many of whom have taken Chinese citizenship in order to retain their posts.

Our air expedition which visited China aroused enormous interest and did a great job as a visible refutation of the rumours put about that our country was in a state of complete chaos. Our air squadron was a tangible proof of our success and of the restoration of our industry.

PRESS INTERVIEW BY CHICHERIN (WARSAW) ON SOVIET-POLISH RELATIONS

28 *September* 1925 *Izvestia*, 4 *October* 1925

My journey through Warsaw is connected with my journey to central Europe, where I am going for a medical cure, although just where I am not yet sure. However, in passing through Warsaw I was extremely glad to be able to stay here a few days, in order to have personal contact with Polish political leaders and so help to remove certain misunderstandings which have arisen between us, and establish some firm points of agreement on which to base further diplomatic conversations, directed towards an enduring rapprochement between our two countries.

The reception offered me by the Polish Government, marked as it was by the most friendly sentiments, not only evokes in me feelings of the most lively recognition, but also constitutes a political fact of real importance. I must also mention the extremely friendly attitude of the press to my visit.

Our relations during the past few years have shown a gradual evolution in which those things which divided us have more and more given way to an ever increasing friendliness between our countries. This is not only a vital necessity for ourselves, but is also an extremely weighty international fact. The manner in which our Government regards this rapprochement, and undoubtedly the manner in which the Polish Government understands it, precludes it from having any character of aggressiveness directed against any other nation. It is enough to look at the map of Europe to realize the enormous importance in international affairs of the relations being established between our Union

and Poland. In the same degree in which conflicts between us were reflected most vividly in the entire European situation, so a firm rapprochement between us should have a profound influence on the whole international complex of forces and relations.

This rapprochement presupposes the settlement of a whole series of concrete, practical questions standing between us. These include: (1) the whole series of questions arising out of the Riga treaty, which will be the subject of detailed and careful discussion between us; (2) the vast field covered by questions of an economic character.

Friendship between States becomes firm and unshakeable when it is based on close and deep economic ties. The strengthening of our own internal economy and the development of productive forces in the Soviet Union result in the expansion of our external trade relations; this has already had a marked effect on our economic relations with Poland. Our present large orders in Poland are only the beginning of those economic relations which will be fully developed only when a trade agreement has been signed between our Union and Poland. Other questions of an economic nature, which will have a profound effect on the economy of the countries concerned, are also linked with that of a trade treaty—for example, the question of transit. Besides these weighty problems is a series of less important matters of a diplomatic nature which also have an economic aspect, such as the forthcoming signature of an agreement on railway communications.

Work on all these questions will have the desired results only if in their general policy both States are unreservedly friendly and well-disposed towards each other. In this basic task of the creation of a friendly policy on the part of each country towards the other, personal contact and the direct exchange of views with the political leaders in the other country are of inestimable value. This is more easily achieved with Poland than with some other countries because the natural and irresistible development of friendship between our country and Eastern peoples, based on our recognition of the principle of the right of all nations to self-determination, does not in any way infringe upon the interests of the Polish State. As regards certain complications which have arisen between our Union and Poland, their settlement by no means presents insurmountable difficulties. At the present time, when there are so many elements of conflict in the world, and when so many may and do arise out of unforeseen circumstances, the establishment of a stable, friendly line by each of our countries with regard to the other is a matter of particularly serious significance for both.

To the question, what were the aims of Soviet policy at the present time Comrade Chicherin replied:

In the conclusion of a trade agreement between two countries the

granting of the right of transit through the other country is always one of the main desires of both sides. I doubt whether anyone would conclude an agreement without the right of transit.

To the question, what demands the Soviet Government would make concerning the conclusion of a trade agreement, Comrade Chicherin replied: I can say nothing about that before the time comes. These questions will be cleared up if conversations are opened.

To the question whether the present conversations would take the form of a treaty, Comrade Chicherin replied: A treaty is always the result of prolonged work after conversations.

PRESS INTERVIEW BY CHICHERIN (BERLIN) ON THE LOCARNO PACT AND BRITISH POLICY TOWARDS THE USSR

2 *October* 1925 *Izvestia*, 4 *October* 1925

Comrade Chicherin said that there were innumerable proofs that the English Government was pursuing a policy of encirclement in regard to the USSR. The Conservative Government, he said, clearly does not want the differences between England and the USSR to be smoothed out. English policy in regard to the pact of guarantee[1] was an integral part of its basic anti-Soviet activity.

Comrade Chicherin admitted that the English plans to separate Germany from the USSR ran counter to the wishes of the German Government, but he pointed out that the question arose whether England would not succeed after the pact was concluded in forcing an anti-Soviet policy on Germany. In regard to articles 16 and 17 of the League of Nations Covenant (article 16 provides for obligatory participation by all League members in sanctions against a State recognized by the League as 'violator of the peace'; article 17 stipulates that, in the event of a dispute between two States of which only one is a member of the League, the State which is not a member State is subject to the decisions of the League Council; failing that, the article provides for the application of article 16 or article 12; article 12 provides for arbitration), Comrade Chicherin said: England will not let a single chance go by without exploiting it to the maximum for its anti-Soviet purposes. Article 16 may not be a danger for Sweden or Norway, but with England's policy what it is at present, it means something quite different for Germany.

Under this article Germany will fall into a position in which with France's help England will be able to exercise the strongest pressure on Germany, while in regard to France England will be able to appear as

[1] Cmd. 2525.

defender of Germany. 'If you add to this that England can promise Germany great benefits at Poland's expense, you have the policy of the carrot and the whip.'

Referring to the commercial treaty[1] about to be concluded between the USSR and Germany, Comrade Chicherin said he regarded this as proof of Germany's desire not to be diverted from the Rapallo policy. The very fact that there is an agreement is an explicit demonstration in favour of the Rapallo policy.

PRESS INTERVIEW BY CHICHERIN (BERLIN) ON THE SOVIET UNION AND THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS

4 *October* 1925 — *Izvestia*, 6 *October* 1925

In his interview with a representative of the *Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung* Comrade Chicherin emphatically denied the frequently heard statement that the USSR intended to enter the League of Nations at some future date. 'The question of entry into the League of Nations,' said Comrade Chicherin, 'does not arise in any way. No matter what the circumstances, we refuse to raise the prestige of other States by entering the League of Nations. It is a fact that any nation that enters the League of Nations loses its independence, unless of course it is one of the victor States.'

Comrade Chicherin expressed himself with particular candour, emphasized by the press of all parties, concerning the consequences of Germany's entry into the League. 'The supposed advantages will prove to be illusory,' he said. 'Perusing article 16 I am reminded of the inscription on a monument in Munich in memory of the Bavarians who died fighting for Napoleon. This inscription reads: "They also gave their lives for their Fatherland." I could never understand how the Bavarian soldiers gave their lives "for their Fatherland". In the interests of Germany I can only hope that this historic incident will not be repeated here.'

Continuing, Comrade Chicherin explained how under article 16 Germany could be compelled to take part in economic sanctions against other countries. English banks were just at this moment beginning to boycott the foreign transactions of the Soviet Union by refusing to discount our bills of exchange.

Comrade Chicherin went on to contrast the western victor nations, 'triumphant, but not united in their aims', with the 'powerful peoples of the East who are now awakening'. The Soviet Union was the only friend of the peoples of Asia. The Soviet Union had shown itself to be a

[1] *League of Nations Treaty Series*, liii, p. 7.

real friend to China. Japan expressed the warmest friendly relationship with the Soviet Union. In the degree in which the Soviet Union developed friendly relations with the peoples of Asia, England's hostility to the USSR increased. England's programme was to use the West to neutralize the USSR in the East. 'The guarantee treaty, the entry of Germany into the League of Nations, and the statement concerning the defence of Germany against attack by France—all this,' declared Comrade Chicherin, 'is just an interlude before the big act directed against the peoples of Asia and their friends.'

EXTRACTS FROM AN INTERVIEW BY SOKOLNIKOV, COMMISSAR FOR FINANCE, ON NEGOTIATIONS WITH FRANCE AND CREDIT AGREEMENTS WITH GERMANY

6 *October* 1925 *Izvestia*, 6 *October* 1925

The course of the Franco–Soviet conversations on the question of debts, begun in Paris in a purely introductory form, is at the moment held up by what it is hoped will prove only a temporary stumbling-block. We for our part have declared our complete readiness, for the sake of establishing normal economic relations, to make such concessions as are possible from the point of view of the interests of the workers' and peasants' State. However, our attempts to reach an effective and serious agreement meet with opposition, the cause of which must be sought in the vacillations of French policy in general. It may be that after temporary agreement has been reached on the question of French debts in England and America the matter of settling the differences between the USSR and France on the question of debts will again be on the agenda. The delay is in any case not to be attributed to the Soviet Government, since the conversations on debts are held up by the French . . .

In this matter of foreign credits the last few days have seen the achievement of great success, the significance of which can hardly be exaggerated. An agreement has been concluded between the State Bank and a group of important German banks, granting the State Bank a credit of 75 million German marks, which, together with our trade credit, will make it possible to buy goods in Germany on credit to the sum of 100 million gold marks. This agreement is the first of a series of important credit agreements with foreign banks, the realization of which is the task of the systematic policy of the State Bank.

This agreement shows that the credit of the USSR abroad has risen significantly, and in particular it demonstrates the authority acquired by our State Bank in the international market. This credit is not on a

long term, being granted only for a period of months. A further task will be the obtaining of long-term credits.

The significance of this credit agreement with German banks is that the USSR may proceed immediately to the import of foreign goods destined for the further development of industry and agriculture as well as for the general market, instead of having to postpone these orders until the Union has a surplus of foreign exchange as a result of its export operations. The credit obtained by the State Bank will give our agriculture the advantage of several months and will make it possible to speed up and extend the import of goods into the country. I repeat that this agreement is significant in principle, as well as in practice. It has made the first breach in the credit blockade directed against the USSR.

EXTRACT FROM A PRESS INTERVIEW BY CHICHERIN (BERLIN) ON THE SOVIET ATTITUDE TO THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS

15 *October* 1925 *Izvestia*, 17 *October* 1925

Chamberlain's statement about the USSR, and various other allusions to the same subject, refer to two different possibilities. The dispatch of a Soviet 'observer' to the League of Nations, and the entry of the USSR into the League of Nations as a member. As to the first, the Soviet Government has frequently stated officially in the last few years that there is nothing to prevent an observer being sent to the League. The reason why the Soviet Government is ready, in certain conditions, to send an observer, while it is firmly opposed to entry into the League of Nations in any circumstances, is that to send an observer is for purposes of information only; it does not bind the Soviet Government and does not compel it to submit to decisions taken by a majority in the League. The Soviet Government has declared on many occasions that it thinks it impossible to find an arbiter who would observe sufficient objectivity in making decisions on differences between the Soviet Government and governments of another 'type'. Consequently the Soviet Government considers it impossible to submit itself to the collection of Powers called the League of Nations, which partly adheres to the principle of arbitration, and partly applies the principle of majority decision with the consequent reprisals and punitive measures. The Soviet Government cannot submit its actions and decisions, which are based on the principles of the Soviet system, to the decisions of a majority of States which are based on wholly different foundations. All this shows that the dispatch of an observer is quite acceptable, but entry into League membership absolutely unacceptable for the USSR. I see no way of constructing a bridge here to avoid possible misunder-

standings. I should like to emphasize once more that a change in Soviet policy towards the League of Nations is quite impossible. We have again been hearing frequently of statements by responsible members of the English Government according to which England is preparing an international campaign for the creation of a bloc directed against our State. Moreover, certain press representatives, undoubtedly reflecting the opinion of the English Government, have frequently expressed the idea that the conclusion of the guarantee pact was desirable from the point of view of uniting with Germany for the fight against our State. I must therefore await a more authoritative statement of a change in the English Government's point of view, which would be of more lasting significance than a statement on behalf of the English Government made by newspapers which neither officially nor semi-officially binds the English Government.

EXTRACTS FROM A RESOLUTION OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE CPSU AND THE COMMISSARIAT FOR FOREIGN TRADE, ON FOREIGN TRADE

6 *November* 1925 *Izvestia*, 6 *November* 1925

1. The organization of foreign trade in a proletarian State surrounded by capitalist States should be subject to two basic aims: (*a*) the maximum assistance and stimulation towards the development of the productive forces of the country; (*b*) the defence of the economic structure of the country from the attacks of capitalist States . . . It is absolutely certain that the least relaxation of the State monopoly of foreign trade would bring with it an increase in capitalist pressure on our socialist forms of economy, and the inevitable broadening of such relaxation would lead to the subjection of our entire economy to the technically more developed economy of the capitalist countries—in other words, to the downfall of our socialist economic structure. On the other hand the maintenance of the present tempo in the development of our national economy, essential for the building of socialism, demands a certain adaptation in the existing methods whereby the monopoly of foreign trade is realized.

2. Contact between the economy of the USSR, governed by the proletariat, and the world market takes place under conditions of imperialist hegemony in this market . . . By means of foreign trade international capital endeavours to bind us by its conditions; it attempts and will continue to attempt to enslave our country and turn it into its own colony. This circumstance compels us to be on our utmost guard in this sector of our economic front, striving to reinforce our positions so that we may both repulse the pressure of capitalism and use foreign

trade to strengthen the economy of the USSR and hasten the building of socialism . . .

3. The monopoly of foreign trade must remain in full force. It must be strengthened, for it is one of the most effective means for repulsing the economic pressure of capitalist countries. No tariffs and no other means of regulating trade can protect us to the same extent as the monopoly of foreign trade. Lenin's words on this matter, addressed to the plenary session of the Central Committee of the Communist Party in December 1922, should be recalled:

> No tariff policy can be effective during the era of imperialism and of monstrous disparity between poor countries and countries of unbelievable wealth. In such conditions any of the rich industrial countries can completely break down tariff defences. In order to do this a country has only to introduce an export subsidy for the export to Russia of those goods on which we lay tariffs. Any industrial country has more than enough money to do this, and as a result of such a measure any industrial country could most certainly destroy our home industries . . . There can be no question for us of any tariff policy during the present era of imperialism other than the system of state monopoly of foreign trade.[1]

This description by Vladimir Ilyich Lenin of the monopoly of foreign trade as the most important means for the defence of socialist construction in the economic battle with the capitalist world remains in full force with reference to the near future. It is essential to combat decisively all open and masked tendencies in favour of the abolition or relaxation of the State monopoly of foreign trade—tendencies nurtured in the final analysis by petty-bourgeois forces in our economic life.

4. The importance of foreign trade in the development of our economy becomes greater every year. As our economy develops it becomes more and more involved in the world's trade turnover and extends its connexions with the world market. The rapid growth of our economy which is essential during the next few years can be achieved under conditions of the maximum extension of our connexions with the world market. This applies both to agriculture and to industry . . .

We must energetically develop our exports, since on them depends the increase in marketability in our peasant economy, the expansion of its purchasing power, and its general improvement. Furthermore, the development of exports means the extension of the possibility of buying abroad equipment for our industry and machinery and tools for agriculture, thus enabling us to hasten the pace of the transfer of our economy on to a new technical basis.

5. The conditions of foreign trade have altered considerably during the past year. The turnover from foreign trade has markedly increased

[1] *Sochineniia* (4th. ed.), xxxiii, p. 419.

as a result of the general improvement in our national economy. A big step forward will be made this year, when, as a result of a good harvest, it is estimated that the foreign trade turnover will be about 2 milliard rubles, i.e. about 60 per cent of the pre-war turnover. Although the growth of foreign trade has for a number of objective reasons lagged behind the growth of other branches of the national economy, which have this year reached 90 per cent of the pre-war turnover, it is proposed to increase turnover this year by 100 per cent (this is the maximum increase possible in the rate of foreign trade expansion taking into consideration the tempo of development of other branches of national economy); this creates certain difficulties at the present moment which can be overcome by improving the existing forms for the organization of foreign trade, by imparting to them greater flexibility, and by the creation of new forms which will answer the changed economic conditions . . .

6. While retaining unimpaired the system of the monopoly of foreign trade we must adapt the forms for the organization of foreign trade to the changing economic conditions and tasks of the Union, at the same time retaining the absolute unity of all Soviet organs operating abroad. The changed economic conditions demand greater differentiation in the realm of foreign trade. The measures which must be taken should follow these lines:

(*a*) the retention of the State monopoly of foreign trade;
(*b*) the creation of a more flexible system of special trade organizations, the simplification of the trading apparatus, and the reduction of its costs;
(*c*) the observance in the realm of foreign trade of the healthy interests of industry and agriculture.

7. On the basis of these statements the plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party has recognized as essential for the maintenance of the unity of action and for the closer association of producers and economic organs with the basic work of strengthening, developing, and realizing exports, the organization of stock companies, share-holding societies, and syndicates for the more important of our separate exports, to facilitate the export of the particular merchandise. Similarly, in order to attract to import operations State and economic organs which constitute a sufficiently circumscribed branch of the national economy, to provide some guarantee of improved quality in imports and reduce overhead charges, and to put into effect a regular system of pricing, it is essential to organize special import companies and societies. Both the export and the import companies and societies will carry out their operations abroad through the corresponding

sections of the Trade Delegations, and in this way will be attained that unity of approach of all Soviet organs abroad which has been mentioned above . . .

The organization of all these stock companies and share-holding societies, and the direction of all export and import companies is the concern of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Trade. The names of members of stock-companies, the distribution of shares among them, and the form of entry into and retirement from the company are to be laid down in the constitution of each company and confirmed by the Council of Labour and Defence, on presentation by the People's Commissariat for Foreign Trade. As a rule the above mentioned export and import companies will not enjoy monopolistic rights and only in exceptional circumstances may the Council of Labour and Defence by special ordinance grant monopolistic rights to one or another company . . .

PRESS STATEMENT BY LITVINOV ON THE SOVIET UNION AND THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS

23 *November* 1925 Kluchnikov & Sabanin, iii, 1, p. 334

Recently the press in all quarters of the globe has begun to spread rumours that the Soviet Government was departing from its former position in regard to the League of Nations. Certain newspapers have even devoted leading articles to comment on these rumours, using phrases from articles in the Soviet press and from interviews given by Soviet representatives abroad, torn from their context, and distorting them and interpreting them in an arbitrary fashion. There is not the slightest doubt that all these press rumours and comments are not accidental. They coincided in time with the conclusion of the famous Locarno agreements, and, clearly, they are prompted not merely by the optimistic mood created after Locarno among European and American political circles, but by the particular desire to facilitate the acceptance of these agreements among those sections of the public in various countries in whom they arouse more or less distrust because of the possibility of their being used against the USSR. It can be assumed with good reason that this interpretation of the position said to have been taken recently by the Soviet Government in regard to the League of Nations and Locarno, is deliberately inspired by certain circles in their own interest.

I think it necessary to clear up these artificially created misunderstandings and to declare, with the utmost emphasis, that all these rumours and comments do not correspond in the least with the inten-

tions of the Soviet Government. We regard the League of Nations, as before, not as a friendly association of peoples working for the general good, but as a masked league of the so-called great Powers, who have appropriated to themselves the right of disposing of the fate of weaker nations. The fact that Germany, a defeated country that is in the military sense weak, is now entering the League, does not imply a change in the character of the League; it only means that certain Powers are counting on using Germany to assist in carrying out their plans in general, and their hostile designs against the USSR in particular.

More than any other Government, the Soviet Government is interested in strengthening peace, on the basis of independence and self-determination for all nations. That is why it would welcome the creation of an international organization in which and through which every nation could realize its national sovereign rights and all nations could settle the differences arising between them by peaceful and friendly means. But less than any other Government does the Soviet Government see in the existing League of Nations an approximation to such an organization. Up to now the League of Nations has not in the slightest degree justified the hopes and expectations placed in it by its protagonists. It has not only failed even once to protect the rights and security of a small or weak nationality against coercion and the military verdict of stronger Powers, but on the chief question which is of vital interest to all mankind, and in particular to us, on the question of disarmament, it has not yet taken one single serious step.

The League is a cover for the preparation of military action for the further suppression of small and weak nationalities. To a considerable degree it is only a diplomatic *bourse*, where the strong Powers arrange their business and conduct their mutual accounts behind the back and at the expense of the small and weak nations. The USSR, as a State of the working masses, cannot take responsibility for the League of Nations, which sanctifies the enslavement and exploitation of foreign nations. Inspired solely by the desire to avoid any complications which might break the general peace, and in particular the progress of its great work of internal construction, and pursuing its policy of non-intervention in the internal affairs of other nations, the USSR does not feel the slightest desire to enter an organization in which it would have to play the part either of hammer or of anvil. In particular, the Soviet Government knows that it would then be confronted, in the form of partners or even of judges, with States, many of which have not even recognized it, and consequently do not even conceal their enmity towards it, and with others, even among those which have recognized it, which even now behave towards it with ill-concealed hostility.

You may therefore inform the public in your country that all the

rumours of some kind of change in the Soviet Government's attitude to the League of Nations, and incidentally to Locarno, are without foundation, and that the Government of the USSR, like the Government of the United States, is firmly determined, in the future as in the past, to stand aside from such organizations.

PRESS STATEMENT BY CHICHERIN (PARIS) ON THE FRANCO-SOVIET NEGOTIATIONS

15 *December* 1925

Le Temps, 17 *December* 1925
Izvestia, 17 *December* 1925[1]

I am very well satisfied with the result of my conversations with the French political leaders, and with a number of notable persons in all spheres. The exchange of views with those who direct French foreign policy has shown that, in regard to the programme of future negotiations between our two countries and the best way of arranging them, we have in general approximately the same ideas.

The two delegations, which will meet after M. Rakovsky's return from Moscow, will themselves work out the details of this programme, the composition of the sub-commissions, and the other practical questions which will arise. At the moment we are only on the threshold of these negotiations; they will certainly be arduous, but I am convinced they will be successful, and I think the prospects distinctly favourable. I am quite aware of the difficulties which will have to be overcome in the course of these negotiations, but I have had occasion to note the good will and the eagerness to reach a satisfactory result shown most clearly by both sides.

It is obviously premature at the moment to speak of any decisions, for these will be the subject of the forthcoming negotiations. All the rumours about the decisions at which our two Governments are said to have arrived have no foundation in the facts.

In a general way, I have been able to observe the profound change that has taken place in the state of mind and in public opinion in France in regard to my country. In the course of many conversations I have had in Paris with people engaged in the most varied fields of activity, I could feel this new spirit which at present prevails.[2]

The desire for peace and the desire to contribute to the consolidation

[1] The two versions vary in a number of details; the French version has been followed here.

[2] This is followed in *Izvestia* by the following paragraph, which does not appear in the French version: 'I do not in any degree hide from myself the fact that in France, as elsewhere, there exist tendencies inimical to us, but I am convinced that they will continue to lose strength. These hostile groups attempt to represent us as the enemies of world peace. Nothing is more false.'

of the general peace is one of the basic principles of our policy. No other policy is possible for us, for we need peace to attain the fundamental goal of our activity, that is, economic reconstruction, for which we must have friendly relations with other countries, and stable and uninterrupted economic relations.

In our desire for peace we are at one with the peaceful aspirations of the French people, and this will in a very great degree facilitate the consolidation of our relations with France. Recent events in international affairs have brought home the immense importance of the Soviet Union in international political and economic relations. In France and in other countries it is realized that a general settlement of international affairs is impossible without the Soviet Union. The way to get this is not, we think, the one suggested to us, and our negative attitude to the League of Nations remains unchanged. But there is another way, and we think, the only way, of attaining this end: the way of direct agreements with other countries on all questions of mutual interest. I think we are entering on a period of direct agreements between us and other Governments, and I am convinced that an understanding between us and the French Government on questions of interest to our two countries will help enormously to speed up the settlement of questions pending between us and other countries.

Our anxieties in regard to the Locarno treaty are well enough known, and it has still to be proved that they are in fact groundless. The future will show whether the Locarno agreement really has the peaceful character attributed to it by its signatories, or whether some of them will not have reason to regret later on what has been done.

For all these questions, as for the international situation in general, a favourable outcome of our negotiations with France will have the utmost importance, and we enter upon them with the most optimistic expectations.

PRESS STATEMENT BY CHICHERIN (PARIS) ON FRANCO-SOVIET RELATIONS

17 *December* 1925 *Le Temps*, 18 *December* 1925

I think the present general situation most propitious for the development of stable friendly relations between the Soviet Federation and France. I have noted, on the part of the French leaders, the existence of clear and undoubted good will, and of a really serious wish to reach a settlement, beneficial to both interested parties, of all the questions pending between our Governments. I have also noted with the greatest satisfaction the existence among the French leaders of a deep and serious

understanding of the rich and beneficent prospects that the consolidation of relations between our two countries opens up in the interests of general peace.

We must distinguish between questions of immediate interest which should be tackled at once, and objectives of a more general character needing progressive and gradual realization. I think the exchange of views I have just had with the French leaders extremely favourable in regard to both of these. The practical questions which confront us will be the subject of the negotiations which are to begin as soon as possible. On this point our two Governments are in complete agreement; the essential basis of the questions we have to deal with should form the subject of negotiations which will no doubt require time and patience, but the opinions we have exchanged briefly on the essence of these questions lead us to hope that we shall succeed. We also reached agreement on another point, on the necessity of not waiting for the conclusion of these negotiations, which may be long drawn out, before discussing urgent current questions of interest to both Governments and coming to an understanding about them.

If our two Governments reach agreement on political questions requiring immediate settlement, that will be of such great importance to both of us that there should be no call for delay of any kind. The geographical position of our two countries, the immense part which France plays in the European continent, and the position of our Union, as it were astride two continents, all that would give the utmost importance to any agreed settlement between our two Governments. Thus the mutual confidence which we have already observed with the greatest rejoicing, will spring up on both sides, and form the foundation for stable relations uniting our countries. The absence of any conflict between the natural and vital interests of our countries on the one hand, and, on the other, the part which can be played by any decision upheld by our two Governments, that is what should impel the Soviet Union and France towards agreement. The mutual trust already shown in our conversations in these few days has convinced me that France will not lend itself to any grouping directed against my country. It is therefore with the best hopes for our future relations that I leave this city where in these last few days I have had such highly interesting conversations.

EXTRACTS FROM A SPEECH BY STALIN AT THE FOURTEENTH CONGRESS OF THE CPSU: POLITICAL REPORT OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE

18 *December* 1925 Stalin, vii, p. 261[1]

The International Situation

What is fundamental and new, deciding and permeating all events for this period in the sphere of foreign relations, is that a certain temporary equilibrium of forces has been established between our country, which is building socialism, and the countries of the capitalist world, an equilibrium which has determined the present phase of 'peaceful co-existence' between the land of Soviets and the capitalist lands. That which we at one time thought of as a brief breathing space after the war has changed into an entire period of respite. Hence a certain equilibrium of forces and a certain period of 'peaceful coexistence' between the world of the bourgeoisie and the world of the proletariat.

At the bottom of all this lies the internal weakness, the weakness and powerlessness of world capitalism on the one hand, and the growth of the revolutionary movement of the workers in general, particularly the growth of forces here, in the land of Soviets, on the other.

What lies at the basis of this weakness of the capitalist world?

At the basis of this weakness lie those antagonisms which capitalism cannot overcome, within which the entire international situation takes shape—antagonisms which the capitalist countries cannot surmount and which can be overcome only in the course of development of the proletarian revolution in the West.

What are these antagonisms? They can be grouped under five heads.

The first group consists of those between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie in the capitalist countries.

The second group consists of those between imperialism and the liberation movement in the colonies and dependent countries.

The third group consists of those which are developing and cannot fail to develop between the victor States in the imperialist war and the defeated States.

The fourth group consists of those which are developing and cannot fail to develop between the victor States themselves.

And the fifth group consists of those which are developing between the land of Soviets and the capitalist countries as a whole.

These are the five basic groups of antagonisms within which the development of our international position is proceeding. Comrades, unless we examine briefly the nature and growth of these antagonisms, we cannot understand the present international position of our country . . .

[1] Compairson with earlier editions reveals a number of insignificant verbal variations.

5. *The Capitalist World and the Soviet Union*

I pass now to the fifth series of antagonisms—to the antagonisms between the Soviet Union and the capitalist world.

What is fundamental in this respect is that capitalism no longer embraces the entire world. After the Soviet land appeared on the scene, after old Russia had been changed into the Soviet Union, capitalism ceased to embrace the entire world. The world was divided into two camps: the camp of imperialism and the camp of struggle against imperialism. That is the first thing to be noted. The second thing to be noted on this question amounts to this, that the countries of capitalism are headed by two important countries, England and America, as an Anglo-American union. At the head of the dissatisfied countries, fighting imperialism to the death, stands our country, the Soviet Union.

The third thing is that two basic but opposed centres of attraction are being created, and in keeping therewith, two gravitational pulls towards these centres throughout the world, Anglo-America for the bourgeois Governments, and the Soviet Union for the workers of the West and the revolutionaries of the East. Anglo-America attracts by its wealth; you can get credits there. The Soviet Union attracts by its revolutionary experience, its experience in the struggle for the liberation of the workers from capitalism and of the oppressed peoples from imperialism. I am speaking of the pull of the workers of Europe and the revolutionaries of the East towards our country. You know what it means for a European worker or a revolutionary from the oppressed countries to live with us, how they make a pilgrimage here, and what an attraction our country exercises for everything honest and revolutionary throughout the world.

Two camps, two centres of attraction.

The fourth thing is that in that camp, the capitalist camp, there is no unity of interests and fusion, that there a battle of interests prevails, disintegration, a struggle between the victors and vanquished, a struggle between the victors themselves, a struggle between all the imperialist countries for colonies, for profits, that because of all this stabilization in that camp cannot endure. While in our country there is a healthy and strengthening stabilization, the expansion of our economy, the growth of our socialist construction, and throughout our camp there is a gradual and steady rallying around the proletariat of our country of all the dissatisfied elements and strata of the West as well as the East, a rallying around the Soviet Union.

There, in the capitalist camp—discord and disintegration. Here, in the Socialist camp, unity and the ever-growing fusion of interests against the common enemy, against imperialism.

These are the basic facts which I wanted to indicate in regard to the contradictions in the fifth series—the contradictions between the capitalist world and the Soviet world . . .

What follows from all these antagonisms? What story do they tell? They tell of the corrosion of the capitalist world by a whole series of internal contradictions which are making capitalism powerless, and, on the other hand, they tell of our world, the world of socialism, being joined and welded together; as a result of this and precisely on that basis there has arisen that temporary equilibrium of forces which put an end to the war against us, which marked the beginning of the phase of 'peaceful coexistence' between the Soviet States and the capitalist States.

There are two further facts I should mention which are also of influence in this matter, that instead of a period of war a phase of 'peaceful coexistence' has set in. The first is that at the given moment America does not want war in Europe. She says to Europe as it were: 'I lent you milliards, you keep quiet; if you want to go on getting money, if you don't want your currency to turn topsy-turvy, sit down and work, earn money and pay the interest on your debts.' It is hardly necessary to prove that this American advice, even if it is not decisive for Europe, cannot in any case be without effect.

The second fact is that from the time of the victory of the proletarian revolution in our country, the world capitalist system has lost a whole huge country, with huge markets and huge raw material resources, and this of course is bound to have an influence on Europe's economic position. To lose a sixth of the world, to lose our country's markets and raw materials, this means for capitalist Europe to reduce its production, shakes it radically. And so, to put an end to this estrangement of European capital from our country, from our markets and raw materials, it seemed necessary to agree to a phase of 'peaceful coexistence' with us, in order to steal into our markets and to get at our raw material resources —otherwise, clearly, there was no possibility of reaching some kind of economic stability in Europe.

6. *The External Situation of the USSR*

All these are the factors which have determined a certain equilibrium between the socialist camp and the capitalist camp throughout the world, which have replaced the phase of war by a phase of respite, which have changed a brief respite into an entire period of respite, and which gave us the opportunity, as Ilyich said, for some kind of 'collaboration' with the capitalist world.

Hence that phase of 'recognition' of the Soviet Union which has begun and is likely to go further. I shall not enumerate the countries which

have 'recognized' us. Of the great countries which have not recognized us America alone remains. Nor shall I expatiate on the trade agreements concluded, for example with Germany and Italy, after recognition. I shall not dwell long on the considerable expansion of our foreign trade, on the particular interest shown in this trade by America as a country exporting cotton to us, and by England and Germany as countries importing our grain and agricultural products. One thing should be said, that the present year is the first in which we are, on any considerable scale, after the phase of 'peaceful coexistence' with capitalist States set in, entering into fruitful and extensive commercial connexions with the capitalist world.

This does not, of course, mean that we have already settled all those unsettled questions, so to speak, and all those, so to speak, claims and counter-claims which were and still are in existence between our State and the western States. We know that they are demanding the repayment of loans. Europe has not yet forgotten them and will not forget them, at least not so quickly. They tell us that our pre-war indebtedness to Europe amounts to 6 milliards, war indebtedness is estimated at seven milliard odd rubles, in all, therefore, to 13 milliard. Taking into account the fall in the exchanges, and deducting the share of the border States, it appears that we owe not less than 7 milliard to the west European States. Of course, our counter-claims arising from English, French, and American intervention at the time of the civil war, amount (if we accept Larin's calculations) apparently to 50 milliard rubles, so we are owed five times [*sic*] as much as we owe . . . But if we calculate in a more niggardly fashion, as the Finance Commissariat does, it comes to not less than 20 milliard. In any case we are the gainers. However, the capitalist countries do not wish to come to terms on this, and we still figure in their balance sheets as debtors. This is the reason for the troubles and hitches in the negotiations with the capitalists. That is how it was with England, and that is how it will be, most probably, with France.

What is the position of the Central Committee of our Party on this? It remains the same as it was when the treaty with MacDonald was concluded. We cannot abrogate the famous law of our country, promulgated in 1918, annulling Tsarist debts.[1] We take our position on the basis of that law. We cannot annul those decrees which were issued and which legalized the expropriation of the expropriators. We stand, and shall in the future stand, on the basis of these laws. But we are not against making certain exceptions, with a view to practical negotiations, both for England and France, concerning former Tsarist debts, that is, pay a small fraction and get something in return. We have no objec-

[1] *Soviet Documents*, i, p. 43.

tions to satisfying former private owners by granting them concessions, but again on condition that the terms of the concessions are not enslaving. This was the basis on which we succeeded in reaching agreement with MacDonald. The underlying idea of these negotiations was the cancellation of war debts. That was precisely why the treaty was rejected. By whom? Undoubtedly by America. Although America did not take part in the negotiations between Rakovsky and MacDonald, although MacDonald and Rakovsky came to the well-known draft agreement, although this draft was of advantage to both sides and more or less satisfied the interests of both parties, nevertheless, as it proceeded from the idea of the cancellation of war debts and America did not want to create such a precedent, for it would have lost the milliards which it has in Europe, America 'gave its advice' and there was no treaty. Nevertheless we still abide by that draft.

Of the questions of our foreign policy, of the questions arising in the period covered by the report, questions particularly delicate and controversial, which concern the relations between our Government and the west European Governments, I should like to refer to two: firstly, a question which has arisen more than once and will again arise with the English conservatives—that is the question of propaganda; and secondly, the question of the Communist International.

We are accused of conducting special propaganda both in Europe and in the colonies and dependent countries against imperialism. The English conservatives maintain that the Russian communists are the people who are called on to destroy the power of the British Empire. I should like to declare here that all this is downright nonsense. We do not need any special propaganda either in Europe or in the East now that the workers' delegations themselves come to us, learn about our ways, and carry the news about our ways to all the countries of the West. We do not require any other kind of propaganda. That is the best, the most powerful, and the most effective propaganda for the Soviet regime against the capitalist regime.

They tell us that we are conducting propaganda in the East. I maintain that that too is downright nonsense. We do not need any special propaganda in the East now that, as we know, our entire State structure is created on the foundation of the coexistence and fraternal collaboration of the peoples of the most varied nationalities in our country. Any Chinese, any Egyptian, any Hindu who has come to our country and spent six months here, is able to convince himself that our country is the only country which understands the soul of the oppressed peoples and which knows how to get the co-operation of the proletarians of the former ruling nationality with the proletarians of the former oppressed nationalities. We do not need any other propaganda, any other agitation

in the East than that the delegations coming from China, India, Egypt, having worked here and having used their eyes, should carry the news of our way of life throughout the world. This is the best propaganda, and the most effective of all kinds and forms of propaganda.

But there is one force which may destroy and is bound to destroy the British Empire: that is the English conservatives. That is the force that will undoubtedly and infallibly lead the British Empire to destruction. It is enough to recall the policy of the conservatives when they came to power. What did they begin with? They began by repressing Egypt, increasing pressure in India, interfering in China, and so on. That is the conservatives' policy. Who is to blame, and who is guilty, if the English lords are incapable of another policy? Is it really difficult to understand that, taking such a course, the conservatives must, as surely as twice two is four, bring the British Empire to unavoidable disaster?

Some words about the Comintern. In the West rumours are spread by the capitalist retainers and the writers of forged letters that the Comintern is an organization of conspirators and terrorists, that communists travel about the western countries with the object of hatching plots against European rulers. Among other things, the Sofia explosion is linked up with communists. I must state, what should be known to every civilized person, if he is not a complete ignoramus and if he is not corrupted, that communists never had, have not, and cannot have anything in common with the theory and practice of individual terror, that communists never had, have not, and cannot have anything in common with the theory of plots against individual persons. The theory and practice of the Comintern consists in the organization of the mass revolutionary movement against capitalism. That is true, that is the task of communists. Only ignoramuses and idiots can confuse plots and individual terror with the policy of the Comintern in the mass revolutionary movement.

A few words about Japan. In the West some of our enemies are rubbing their hands: Look, they say, in China the revolutionary movement has begun—of course, the Bolsheviks have bribed the Chinese people—who else would bribe a people of 400 million?—but this, they say, will mean that the 'Russians' will clash with the Japanese. All that is twaddle, comrades. The forces of the revolutionary movement in China are enormous. They have not yet been fully revealed. They will reveal themselves in the future. The rulers of the East and West, who do not see these forces and do not take them sufficiently into account, will suffer for it. We, as a State, cannot fail to take these forces into account. We think that China is confronted with the same problem as confronted North America when it united into one State, as confronted Germany when it was formed into one State and united, as confronted

Italy, when it was united and liberated from its foreign enemies. Here truth and justice are wholly on the side of the Chinese revolution. That is why we sympathize and shall sympathize with the Chinese revolution in its struggle for the liberation of the Chinese people from the yoke of the imperialists and for the unification of China into one State. Whoever does not and will not take this force into account will certainly lose. I think Japan will understand that it too must reckon with this growing force of the national movement in China, which is going forward and sweeping everything from its path. It was precisely because he did not understand this that Chang Tso-lin is ruined. But he is ruined also because he built his entire policy on quarrels, on the worsening of relations between the USSR and Japan. Any general, any governor of Manchuria who builds his policy on quarrels between us and Japan, on a worsening of relations between us and Japan, will certainly come to grief. Only he will keep his position who builds his policy on the improvement of our relations with Japan and on a rapprochement between us and Japan, only such a general and such a leader can keep his position in Manchuria secure, for we have no interests which would lead to a worsening of our relations with Japan. Our interests point to a rapprochement between our country and Japan.

7. *The Tasks of the Party*

I turn to the tasks of our party in connexion with the external situation. I think that the tasks of the party should be indicated, in the sense of its work, in two spheres: in the sphere of the *international* revolutionary movement and then in the sphere of the Soviet Union's foreign policy.

What are the tasks in the sphere of the *international* revolutionary movement? These tasks consist, first, in working to strengthen communist parties in the West, directed to their winning a majority of the working masses. Second, to work for the strengthening of the struggle of the workers of the West for trade union unity, for strengthening the friendship between the proletariat of our Union and the proletariats of the capitalist countries. Here that phase of pilgrimage, of which I spoke and the importance of which I sketched earlier, is relevant. Third, to work for the strengthening of the bonds between the proletariat of our country and the liberation movement in the oppressed countries, for they are our allies in the struggle against imperialism. And fourth, to work for the strengthening of the socialist elements in our country, for the victory of these elements over the capitalist elements, a victory of decisive importance for the revolutionizing of the workers of all countries. Usually, comrades, speaking of the tasks of our party in the sphere of the international revolutionary movement, the first three only are mentioned, and the fourth forgotten—that our struggle in our country,

the struggle for the victory of the socialist elements in our country over the capitalist elements, our struggle for construction, is also international in significance, for our country is the basis of the international revolutionary movement, for our country is the primary lever for the development of the international revolutionary movement, and if construction here among us proceeds at the right rate, that means that we are carrying out our work in the international revolutionary movement by all other channels precisely as the party requires us to do.

These are the tasks of the party in the sphere of the international revolutionary movement. Now the tasks of the party in the sphere of our Union's *foreign* policy.

First, to work in the struggle against new wars, then for the preservation of peace and for ensuring so-called normal relations with the capitalist countries. The idea of peace is the basis of our Government's policy, its external policy. The struggle for peace, the struggle against new wars, the exposure of all steps taken for the preparation of a new war, the exposure of steps which mask the actual preparation of war under the flag of ⟨pacifism⟩[1] that is our task. That is precisely why we do not want to join the League of Nations, for the League of Nations is an organization for concealing the preparatory work for war; to join the League of Nations you must choose, as Comrade Litvinov rightly said, between the hammer and the anvil. But we have no wish to be either a hammer for the weak nations or an anvil for the strong. We do not want the one or the other; we are for peace, we are for the exposure of all steps leading to war, under whatever pacifist banners they are hidden. Whether it is the League of Nations or Locarno, it is all the same; we will not be duped by a flag, or frightened by a noise.

Secondly, to work for the expansion of our trade with the outside world on the basis of the foreign trade monopoly.

Thirdly, to work for a rapprochement with the countries defeated in the imperialist war, with those countries which are the most injured and wronged of all capitalist countries, and which for this reason are in opposition to the ruling alliance of the great Powers.

Fourthly, to work for close links with the dependent and colonial countries.

These are the tasks before the party at the present moment in the sphere of international relations and the international workers' movement.

[1] In earlier editions: pacifism (Locarno).

PRESS STATEMENT BY CHICHERIN (BERLIN) ON SOVIET FOREIGN RELATIONS

21 *December* 1925 *Izvestia*, 23 *December* 1925

Replying to a number of questions on foreign affairs put by Berlin press representatives, Comrade Chicherin said he was completely satisfied with the conversations he had had in Paris. On Rakovsky's return to Paris, three commissions would be set up: the first, juridical, to decide what treaties previously concluded between Russia and France remained in force and what treaties can be used as the basis for new agreements; the second, economic, to examine the question of the old loans, and, of course, the counter-claims of the Soviet Government (in connexion with losses suffered by the USSR as a result of French intervention). The same commission will be instructed to seek a basis for organizing French credits in the USSR. Thirdly, the political commission will examine the question of future Franco–Soviet relations in general.

The Paris negotiations established that there are no serious differences between France and the USSR. Both parties consider it important to establish and strengthen mutually friendly relations.

Referring to Anglo–Soviet relations, Comrade Chicherin said that the obstacle to their settlement was the consistently hostile attitude of the English Government. Despite the Soviet Government's readiness to enter into negotiations on the questions which keep the two sides apart, there is not the slightest indication of a desire on the part of the English Government to enter into such negotiations. Members of the English Government declare their readiness to listen to new proposals of the Soviet Government. But the Soviet Government cannot make any new proposals so long as the English Government does not make it known which articles of the treaty signed between the USSR and the MacDonald Government it considers unacceptable. We are very anxious to settle the questions in dispute, but we are under the strong impression that at the present time the English Government is not anxious for such a settlement.

On the Soviet attitude to the League of Nations Comrade Chicherin said that, now as before, the Soviet Government considers it impossible to enter the League, since the differences between the Soviet State and the capitalist States are too great to allow them to work together in the League. The Soviet Union would propose, in opposition to the suggestion of Soviet entry into the League, the conclusion of separate definite agreements with England and other States to regulate their mutual relations. The Soviet Union found arbitration treaties unacceptable, since arbitration between the Soviet State and capitalist

States was impossible. The Soviet Union proposed, as a better method of securing peace, general disarmament or the limitation of armaments. The Soviet Government had replied[1] to the League of Nations' request for its comments on the draft treaty of mutual assistance that it protested against the draft being used to put off the disarmament question to a comparatively distant future; it was prepared to support the proposal for a disarmament conference to be held immediately, and it would take part in such a conference.

'As things are now,' said Comrade Chicherin, 'we are not invited to a disarmament conference. We are being invited to take part in a commission to prepare the conference. We fear that this commission will be a disarmament burial commission. The Soviet Government has not yet determined its attitude to the setting up of this commission.' Comrade Chicherin said that should this or any other conference be held in Switzerland, that would be an obstacle to Soviet participation.

Turning to the question of the Locarno treaty, Comrade Chicherin said that the Soviet Government's fears of the consequences of Locarno do not in the least extend to the intentions of the German Government, whose good will was not in doubt. These fears extend to the objective circumstances which will be created for Germany by the Locarno treaty. This treaty gives the English Government the opportunity of exerting strong pressure on Germany, as a result of which Germany might be compelled, even against its own wish, to change its attitude to the Soviet Government. 'We shall', said Comrade Chicherin, 'follow with friendly attention the policy which the German Government will pursue.'

Referring to Mosul, Comrade Chicherin declared that the decision of the League Council[2] aroused grave fears. If England does not adopt a more conciliatory attitude, this decision may have fateful results. Strategically, Mosul is so important for Turkey that despite Turkey's great desire for peace, it cannot yield beyond certain defined limits. If the situation should take a critical turn, it would be a great misfortune for the general political position. Comrade Chicherin said further that the charge made in the English press that the Soviet Government was stirring up China against foreigners, and particularly against the English, was untrue. The Soviet Government's attitude to the Chinese Government was friendly and correct. It did not conceal its sympathy with the Kuomintang and its programme of achieving an independent, enlightened, modern, federal Chinese Republic (which would be to the advantage of other countries too), as against a subject China, unable to make good its right to self-determination.

[1] *League of Nations Official Journal*, 1924, p. 752.
[2] League of Nations, 1925, vii, C. 400, M. 147.

The Soviet Government values very highly the marked expansion of economic relations with the United States. These would, of course, be free of the greatest difficulties only after diplomatic relations are established. The Soviet Government is still ready, as it declared when President Coolidge took office, to examine without prejudice all questions in dispute. American papers had attributed to Comrade Chicherin the statement that the Soviet Government would in no circumstances agree to the settlement of the debt question. Comrade Chicherin said that the report was completely false. On the contrary, the Soviet Government had proposed the regulation of all questions in dispute, including the question of the loans granted to Kerensky.

Replying to questions on the internal situation of the USSR Comrade Chicherin emphasized that certain difficulties which had arisen in connexion with the export of grain did not in the least alter the fact of the marked economic progress and the growing importance of the Soviet Union. 'It may be said,' Comrade Chicherin stated, 'that from the business as from the political point of view, the necessity of regulating relations with the USSR becomes clearer and clearer. The necessity for this has been revealed particularly clearly since Locarno.'

PRESS STATEMENT BY LITVINOV ON THE SOVIET–TURKISH TREATY

24 *December* 1925 *Pravda*, 24 *December* 1925

The negotiations for a treaty with Turkey to supplement the 1921 treaty[1] were begun many months ago by the Soviet ambassador in Ankara, Comrade Surits. When Surits left Ankara full agreement had been practically reached, but there remained one clause still to be agreed on. After Surits had reported to Narkomindel, a suitable formula was found which satisfied both sides. Both Governments took advantage of the simultaneous presence in western Europe of People's Commissar Chicherin and the Turkish Foreign Commissar, Tewfik Rushdi Bey, for the signature of the agreement. Its signature in Paris was therefore quite accidental.

The treaty[2] consolidates the actual relations which have long existed between the two countries. These have made any kind of aggressive or hostile intentions on the part of the Soviet Union or Turkey towards each other quite impossible. I will not deny that the formal consolidation of these relations and the hastening of the signing of the agreement was partly a response to the false rumours appearing from time to time in the Anglo–American press, and particularly frequently recently, of

[1] *Soviet Documents*, I, p. 237.
[2] *League of Nations Treaty Series*, CLVII, p. 353.

some kind of agreement between the USSR and Italy directed against Turkey. On the other hand, the Soviet Government was aware of the activities of certain States who were trying to attract Turkey into an alignment hostile to the USSR. The signature of the agreement should put an end to those alarmist rumours and dispel any fears or doubts about the firmness of Soviet–Turkish friendship among the public of both countries.

While consolidating the friendly relations between the USSR and Turkey, the agreement also represents a substantial step in the consolidation of peace generally. As can be seen from the text, it is not directed against anybody, and threatens nobody's interests.

I think it necessary to state explicitly that there are no secret clauses or protocols. The best proof of the peaceful intentions of the agreement is the Soviet Government's willingness to conclude similar treaties with all countries with which it maintains normal diplomatic relations. The only way by which the possibility of the formation of mutually antagonistic groups and combinations can be excluded is the conclusion of agreements between all States similar to the Turkish–Soviet agreement. This, and not the machinations of the League of Nations or pacts like Locarno, will really help to avert war.

PRESS SUMMARY OF THE NOTES SENT ON 19 JANUARY 1926 BY KARAKHAN, SOVIET AMBASSADOR TO CHINA, TO THE CHINESE FOREIGN MINISTER, GENERAL CHANG TSO-LIN, AND THE SOVIET CONSUL IN HARBIN, ON CONDITIONS ON THE CHINESE EASTERN RAILWAY

19 *January* 1926 *Izvestia*, 22 *January* 1926

The Soviet ambassador in Peking, Comrade Karakhan, sent a vigorous protest to the Chinese Foreign Ministry against the arbitrary actions of the Mukden military authorities on the Chinese Eastern Railway. Comrade Karakhan requested the Chinese Ministry to inform him immediately of the steps it will take in the matter. Comrade Karakhan's note concludes:

Fully respecting China's sovereignty, the Government of the USSR renounced its right to protect the Chinese Eastern Railway, assuming and hoping that the Chinese authorities would appreciate this action and would be particularly careful to respect the interests of the railway and to maintain order on it, responsibility for which was entrusted to them alone. It is to be regretted that the central authorities of North Manchuria are clearly unaware of their obligations. May I therefore request you to give them the necessary instructions.

I have furthermore to state that should the central authorities of North Manchuria and the local administration be unable or unwilling to secure the protection and good order of the railway, I am prepared to discuss with you the measures which it would in that case be essential for our two Governments to take. May I call your attention to the gravity of the situation created and to the need for taking extraordinary measures, and also to the possibility of serious consequences if the existing state of affairs should be prolonged. I should add that my Government will consider the Chinese Government responsible for the losses caused by the actions of the Chinese authorities and for the acts of violence committed by Chinese troops.

At the same time Comrade Karakhan addressed a telegram direct to Chang Tso-lin in which he listed the acts of violence committed by the Chinese troops and declared: 'I hope you will realize the full gravity of the situation and take steps to put an end to these outrages. Before informing my Government of the state of affairs, I should like to know what steps you have taken in the matter. I consider that in sending this telegram I have given you due warning and can therefore bear no responsibility for subsequent events.'

In the telegram sent to the Consul-General in Harbin, Comrade Grandt, Comrade Karakhan approved the actions of the Soviet manager of the railway Ivanov, and suggested that the Consul-General ask the Chinese authorities whether they intend and are in a position to put a stop to the acts of violence of the Chinese troops.

I will regard an evasive answer from the Chinese authorities as outright support for disorder and disorganization, responsibility for which will rest entirely on the Chinese authorities. I emphatically reject any attempt by the Harbin consular corps to invite Ivanov to meet them for the purpose of settling the conflict.

We cannot allow anybody to mediate between the Chinese Eastern Railway and China, as the affairs of this railway concern China and the USSR alone. The efforts of the Chinese authorities to push things as far as intervention by the consular corps is an intolerable humiliation of China. The situation created may lead to irreparable consequences. I am not without hope that you will be able to settle the dispute amicably and suggest that you make every effort in this direction.

TELEGRAM FROM CHICHERIN TO KARAKHAN, SOVIET ENVOY IN PEKING, FOR TRANSMISSION TO THE MUKDEN GOVERNMENT, ON THE ARREST OF IVANOV, SOVIET MANAGER OF THE CHINESE EASTERN RAILWAY

22 *January* 1926 Kluchnikov & Sabanin, iii, 1, p. 336

On 21 January the Chinese military authorities in Harbin arrested Ivanov, manager of the Chinese Eastern Railway, while the local authorities made not the slightest attempt to settle the affair by way of negotiation with the Soviet Government. This unprecedented behaviour on the part of the Harbin authorities followed five days during which the Soviet–Chinese agreement on the Chinese Eastern Railway had been systematically broken and the administration prevented from carrying out their duties by the military authorities, who connived at creating disorder on the railway and organized the seizure of trains by the military.

We expect the Chinese Government to take the steps necessary for the peaceful settlement of the question, and not to refuse an inquiry into violations of the Chinese Eastern Railway agreement by one as by the other side, and we demand that within three days order on the railway shall be completely re-established, the agreement put into effect, and Ivanov released.

Should the Chinese Government for any reason be unable to secure the settlement of these questions in a peaceful manner within the said time, the Soviet Government requests the Chinese Government to permit the USSR to use its own forces to secure the operation of the agreement and to defend the mutual interests of China and the USSR in the Chinese Eastern Railway.

I await a reply.

TASS COMMUNIQUÉ ON THE AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE SOVIET CONSUL IN MUKDEN AND THE MANCHURIAN DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS CONCERNING THE CHINESE EASTERN RAILWAY

27 *January* 1926 *Izvestia*, 27 *January* 1926

On 24 January Comrade Krakovetsky, Consul-General of the USSR in Mukden, and Hao, chief of the Central Diplomatic Administration in the Three Eastern Provinces, signed brief basic points of agreement amounting to the following: Comrade Ivanov and all workers arrested by the Manchurian authorities in connexion with the dispute on the Chinese Eastern Railway are to be released; normal railway communications will be restored after their release; the transport of armaments

will be on the basis of the already existing regulations, the Chinese Government being credited with such profit from the railway as is its due; security troops will be transported in the same manner, in accordance with the existing regulations. In future the movement of troops must be strictly in accordance with the regulations laid down for the CER. The questions of the resumption of activity by workers' trade union organizations, of compensation for losses caused by the actions of the Manchurian authorities during the dispute, and of the responsibility of persons guilty of violence and destruction will be the subject of further discussion by both parties.

Comrade Ivanov has been released. Other persons arrested are being, or have already been, released.

NOTE FROM KARAKHAN TO THE CHINESE FOREIGN MINISTER ON THE ARREST AND ILL-TREATMENT OF SOVIET CITIZENS EMPLOYED ON THE CHINESE EASTERN RAILWAY

28 *January* 1926 *Izvestia*, 30 *January* 1926

I must protest most energetically against the arrest of Soviet employees, against the repressive measures to which they are subjected, and also against the use of torture on Soviet citizens for the object of compelling them to give testimony intended to justify the criminal actions of the Chinese authorities. I am compelled to observe that these criminal actions, committed by irresponsible generals, may complicate China's position and increase the difficulties of the struggle of the Chinese nation to abolish extra-territoriality for foreigners. The acts of violence committed by irresponsible generals impede the development of the struggle and postpone the day when China will be able to resume its sovereign rights. May I ask you to transmit to the Manchurian authorities by telegraph an urgent instruction to cease the insults, arrests, and torture of Soviet citizens. I call your attention in the most serious manner to the necessity of taking energetic measures, otherwise we shall have a much more acute situation than that of 24 January. I await an immediate reply informing me of the steps you have taken.

EXTRACTS FROM A PRESS STATEMENT BY CHICHERIN ON THE CHINESE EASTERN RAILWAY DISPUTE

5 *February* 1926 *Izvestia*, 5 *February* 1926

The hostile press in capitalist countries has hastened to use the Chinese Eastern Railway conflict, which is just coming to an end, as an occasion for new slanders and false assertions about us. In its anxiety to discredit

the Soviet Republic in the eyes of the Asiatic peoples who are fighting for their liberation, and of the masses in Europe and America, the capitalist press has portrayed the diplomatic struggle which we have had to wage in Manchuria in these last few days as the resumption of the aggressive imperialist policy of the old Tsarist Government. This crude lie is shattered at the lightest touch of factual analysis. Throughout this crisis the Soviet Government stood firmly, as it continues to stand, on the ground of the treaty concluded with China on 31 May 1924. It did not and will not make any demands or requests which go beyond the terms of that treaty . . .

During the past year and a half the system of joint commercial exploitation of the CER by the Soviet Republic and China has had excellent results; revenues have increased and its technical condition has been improved. The successful operation of this system has naturally aroused among the enemies of the Soviet Republic and China the desire to spoil the relations between the two and disrupt their joint work, which was running smoothly. A considerable number of White Guards, remaining in Manchuria after the defeat of Kolchak and his accomplices, tried in every way to create difficulties in the operation of the railway and, conscious of the support of outside elements, tried to persuade representatives of the Chinese authorities here and there to put difficulties in the way of collaboration between China and the Soviet Republic. This last conflict broke out because enemies of the USSR succeeded in persuading some local representatives of the Chinese military authorities, who had fallen under influences hostile to us, to commit illegal acts.

The necessity of settling the question of payment for the transport of troops on the CER served as a pretext for these illegal actions. Under the by-laws of the CER, which remain in force in so far as they are not modified by the treaty of 31 May 1924, Chinese troops are carried by the railway at half the usual rates . . . Being a commercial undertaking, the CER must be run on strictly commercial lines; the management cannot allow the free transport of Chinese forces, which would bear too heavily on the finances of the railway. Some months ago it was decided to restore the former regulations about payment for the transport of Chinese troops, a decision to which, at the time, no objection was made. The management had no intention of demanding payment from the Chinese troops themselves when they made the journey, but it insisted on the Chinese military authorities taking responsibility for payment within a given time for the transport of troops on credit. The disorders which started on the railway in January were originally aimed, it was alleged, at securing the free transport of troops in contravention of the previous regulations. But later on these illegal actions of the local

Chinese authorities became more extensive in character, and there began the seizure of the railway by the military authorities, and the removal of the administration authorized by the treaty. The arrest of the manager of the railway, Comrade Ivanov, whose appointment was made by the board of directors and confirmed by the Soviet Government, was a gross challenge to the Soviet Union and was followed by a mass persecution of the railway workers, arrests, searches, and the closing down of the trade unions, which play an important part in the management of the railway. The replacement of the administration appointed under the treaty by outside persons was equally a most flagrant violation of the Soviet–Chinese treaty.

The Soviet Government chose a course of action clearly prescribed by its treaty relations with and friendship for China. Having addressed to the Chinese Government a demand for the re-establishment of order on the CER, for the fulfilment of the treaty and the release of Comrade Ivanov, the Soviet Government simultaneously requested the Chinese Government to give the Soviet Government permission to use its own forces to achieve these ends if the Chinese Government found it impossible to do so itself within three days. Thus the Soviet Government did not wish to act apart from the governmental authority of the Chinese people at present in existence. It had in mind the adoption of the measures to enforce the treaty only in agreement with that authority.

The Chinese Government promptly met the Soviet Government halfway, and took what steps it could, demanding from Chang Tso-lin, the actual ruler of Manchuria, the restoration of the conditions prescribed by the treaty. Negotiations between him and our Consul-General Krakovetsky led in a few days to a favourable result. Chang Tso-lin issued a number of orders designed to settle the conflict. First of all Comrade Ivanov was released . . . Negotiations are also proceeding about the liability of those guilty of violence and of illegal acts on the railway, about the dismissal of certain prominent persons among the Chinese military authorities who played a particularly odious part in the disorders on the railway, and also about the compensation to be paid the railway for the losses suffered. The Soviet Government is striving solely for the enforcement of the treaty in regard to the CER, and for ensuring its orderly operations, while strictly respecting the principle of Chinese sovereignty and the rights of the Chinese Government on Chinese territory. The crisis which has just ended served clearly to illustrate the peaceful methods and aims of the Soviet Government, and its firm and unchanging determination to maintain a friendly attitude towards China and a completely correct attitude towards the Chinese Government. The way in which the Chinese Government acted during the conflict shows that it too maintains a friendly and

completely correct attitude to the USSR. Equally proper was the attitude of the Japanese Foreign Ministry, which stated officially that the CER dispute was the business of the USSR and China, and expressed hopes for a peaceful settlement.[1] The Soviet Government for its part wishes to develop further the friendly relations already established with the Japanese Government, and thinks it necessary to avoid anything which might disturb those relations.

May I express the hope that despite all the difficulties which attend the restoration on the Chinese Eastern Railway of the conditions established by treaty, the recent crisis may help to stabilize conditions on the railway and facilitate the further consolidations of relations between the USSR, China, and Japan.

NARKOMINDEL STATEMENT ON FRENCH MEDIATION IN THE SOVIET DISPUTE WITH SWITZERLAND

14 *February* 1926 Kluchnikov & Sabanin, iii, 1, p. 337

In connexion with the invitation of the Council of the League of Nations to the USSR to take part in the preparatory disarmament conference at Geneva, fixed originally for 15 February but later postponed, the Government of the USSR, having decided in favour of taking part in the proposed conference, considered it impossible to send its delegation to Switzerland, the Government of which has refused to give satisfaction for the assassination of Comrade Vorovsky in 1923.

Even before the Government of the USSR had sent its reply to the Council of the League of Nations, the French Government kindly offered to act as mediator in settling the conflict between the USSR and Switzerland. Proceeding, as always, from the general peaceful principles of its policy, the Government of the USSR accepted the offer of the French Government and immediately informed the latter of its minimum demands; if the Swiss Government met these demands, the Government of the USSR would consider the dispute settled. These demands consisted, firstly, in the straightforward and unambiguous expression by the Swiss Government of its regret for the murder; secondly, in view of the serious character of the incident, in that Government demonstrating its regret by making financial compensation to the daughter of the murdered man.

It was explained to the French Government that the USSR cannot send delegates to Switzerland until the Swiss Government has in one way or another dissociated itself from the groups and individuals who applauded and still applaud the murder of Comrade Vorovsky as a great

[1] cf. *The Times*, 25 January 1926.

exploit; this has created an atmosphere conducive to the justification of murder, in which such acts, should they be repeated, will be committed with impunity.

At the opening of the negotiations the Government of the USSR agreed to the French Government's proposal that the Swiss declaration should not be addressed directly to the USSR, in view of the absence of diplomatic relations between the two countries, but should be transmitted through the French Government as intermediary. At the same time the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs accepted in principle the draft of the notes which the French Government proposed should be exchanged with the Government of the USSR; only insignificant corrections were made in the text.

On the other hand the Swiss Government, which ostensibly agreed in words to give the USSR satisfaction for the murder of Comrade Vorovsky, tried during the negotiations to formulate the draft in such a way as to avoid giving the impression that in making such a declaration it was doing anything new, giving the USSR satisfaction for the first time. It introduced correction after correction, each formula worse than the previous one, to which it had consented only a few days previously.

The Government of the USSR did not attach so much significance to individual words as it did to the spirit of reconciliation which it expected the Government of Switzerland to show as a means of clearing the hostile atmosphere. Unfortunately, it is precisely this spirit of reconciliation which the Swiss Government has so far failed to show. It is enough to mention a single but characteristic example: from the wording proposed by the French Government, 'The Swiss Government sincerely condemns the murder of Comrade Vorovsky and expresses its regret, etc.', the Swiss Government insisted on the deletion of the word 'sincerely'.

In the same irreconcilable spirit the Swiss Government rejected all formulations which established its explicit agreement with the principle of compensation for the daughter of the murdered man. It preferred ambiguous phrases which gave no direct reply to the question which interests the Soviet public, that of the real attitude to the murder of the Soviet delegate shown by the Government of the country to which the Soviet Government has again been invited to send its representatives.

Finally, while declining to make a definite reply, the Swiss Government tried to place the hole-and-corner murder of the official delegate of the Soviet Government on the same plane as the material losses suffered by Swiss citizens as a result of Soviet revolutionary legislation.

For the above-mentioned reasons, unfortunately, agreement was not reached.

The People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs has noted with gratitude the good will and energetic efforts to settle the conflict both of the French Foreign Ministry as a whole and of the French ambassador in Moscow, M. Herbette, in particular.

NOTE FROM KHAKIMOV, SOVIET CONSUL-GENERAL IN THE HEJAZ, TO THE KING OF HEJAZ AND SULTAN OF NEJD AND ASSOCIATED TERRITORIES

16 *February* 1926 *Sbornik Dogovorov*, iv, p. 14

On the instructions of my Government I have the honour to inform Your Highness that the Government of the USSR, acting on the principle of national self-determination and deeply respecting the will of the people of Hejaz, expressed in your election as their King, recognizes your Highness as King of the Hejaz, Sultan of Nejd and Associated Territories.

In virtue of the above the Soviet Government considers itself in a state of normal diplomatic relations with the Government of Your Highness.

EXTRACTS FROM AN AGREEMENT WITH PERSIA ON THE UTILIZATION OF FRONTIER RIVERS AND WATERS FROM GERI-RUD TO THE CASPIAN SEA

20 *February* 1926 *Sbornik Dogovorov*, iii, p. 50

The Government of the USSR and the Government of Persia, recognizing the need, under article 3 of the peace treaty between the RSFSR and Persia of 26 February 1921,[1] to determine definite shares in and establish the manner of utilizing frontier rivers and waters from the Geri-Rud river to the Caspian Sea, have agreed to conclude the present agreement on this subject, for which purpose they have appointed a mixed commission composed of the following plenipotentiaries: For the Government of the USSR, Alexander Fedorovich Mor and Ivan Ernestovich German; for the Government of Persia, Mirza Seyid Ahmed Khan Moazzami, Hamid Khan Saiyakh, and Mirza Mohammed Khan Maasumkhani.

The said plenipotentiaries, having presented their credentials, which were found to be drawn up in due form and in the customary manner, have agreed to the following:

1. The waters of the Geri-Rud (Tejen) river, beginning from the

[1] *League of Nations Treaty Series*, ix, p. 401.

Pul-i-Khatun bridge, downstream along the entire stretch of the frontier between the contracting parties, shall be divided into ten equal parts, of which three parts shall be for Persian use, and seven parts for the use of the USSR.

The water of the Geri-Rud (Tejen) river shall be measured by experts of the contracting parties at the village of Doulet-Abad and on all the canals fed by the Geri-Rud (Tejen) river both in Persia and in the USSR along the stretch from the village of Doulet-Abad to the Pul-i-Khatun bridge. The entire quantity of water arrived at as the result of the said measuring shall also be divided into ten equal parts.

In order to ensure a correct division of the water of the Geri-Rud (Tejen) river at Doulet-Abad the experts of the contracting parties shall construct a permanent sluice at this place. The costs of construction shall be borne by the contracting parties, who shall mutually approve the construction plans, in proportion to the share of water received by each at this place.

2. Until the construction of a reservoir (in conformity with article 3 of the present agreement) the village of Giarmab on Persian territory (15 versts above Pul-i-Khatun) and the Pul-i-Khatun post on the territory of the USSR, shall each have the right of drawing water from the Geri-Rud at the rate of 50 litres per second. Should either of the contracting parties take for its village more than 50 litres of water, the surplus shall be counted as part of its share below the Pul-i-Khatun bridge.

3. Since the distribution of the water of the Geri-Rud (Tejen) river determined by the present agreement will not satisfy the requirements of either of the contracting parties because of the enormous loss of water by the Geri-Rud (Tejen) in the spring floods, the two parties recognize the expediency of constructing a reservoir on the Geri-Rud above Pul-i-Khatun to hold the surplus water for the use of the contracting parties.

The contracting parties agree to the construction of such a reservoir, to the necessary technical survey of the locality, and to the conclusion of a special agreement on the construction and exploitation of the reservoir and the terms for the division of its waters.

4. All the water of the Chaacha river and of all its tributaries shall be divided into two equal parts, of which one shall be for the use of Persia and the other shall be allowed to pass on to the territory of the USSR.

The water of the Chaacha river shall be measured by the experts of the contracting parties at the frontier and on all the canals fed by the Chaacha on Persian territory, from the frontier to the point of confluence of the Abegiarm and Khour rivers (at the village of Amir-Abad). The

total quantity of water arrived at by the said measuring shall be divided into two equal parts . . .

[Under articles 5, 6, 7, 8, 14, 15, and 16 similar provisions to those in article 4 are made relating to the rivers Meana, Kelat-Chai, Archinian, Lain-su, Chandyr, Sumbar, and Atrek.]

9. All the water of the Kazgan-Chai (Zenginanlu) river shall be divided into five equal parts, of which two parts shall be for the use of Persia and three for the use of the USSR.

The water of the Kazgan-Chai (Zenginanlu) river shall be measured by the experts of the contracting parties at the frontier and on all the canals fed by the Kazgan-Chai (Zenginanlu) river on Persian territory from the frontier up to and including the place above the village of Zenginanlu where the village draws its water. The total quantity of water arrived at by the said measuring shall be divided into five parts, of which the Persian share (2/5) shall include that amount of water which flows through Soviet territory from Kazgan-Chai to supply the Liutfabad district.

The Government of the USSR undertakes to allow the unhindered passage by the canal passing through its territory of that quantity of water which Persia allocates from its share for the use of the Liutfabad district.

In order to supply water to the Liutfabad district the Persian Government is granted by the Government of the USSR the right to conduct the water by the old Babajik Canal instead of through the present canal or to build a new canal on the territory of the USSR. The USSR grants Persia this right free of charge.

The place where the new canal is to be built shall be determined by agreement with the Government of the USSR.

All expenditure incurred in the restoration of the Babajik canal or the construction of a new canal shall be borne by the Persian Government.

The Government of the USSR undertakes to allow unhindered passage on to its territory of Persian nationals, furnished with the requisite papers, appointed to clean and repair the canal serving the Liutfabad district.

10. The Persian Government undertakes to release to the USSR from the Giulriz river into the canal on Soviet territory 10 litres of water per second (1/2 senga) for the use of the Artyk station.

To measure this water the USSR shall build at the frontier on its territory and at its expense and in the presence of an expert from the Persian side a new sluice.

11. All the water of the Durungiar river and of the salt springs in the river Durungiar valley shall be entirely for the use of Persia.

12. All the water of the Kelte-Chinar river shall be for the use of Persia.

The Persian Government undertakes not to hamper nationals of the USSR in using the waters of the springs on Persian territory in the valley of the Kelte-Chinar river (below the Persian village of Kelte-Chinar) which nationals of the USSR are using at the present time, and also to allow unhindered passage to Soviet nationals furnished with the requisite papers to clean and to work on these springs and on the bed of the river which they supply.

13. All the water of the river Firiuzinka (Firiuza) shall, after the needs of the village of Firiuza have been met, be for the use of the Soviet villages downstream . . .

15. Should the USSR, after the signature of the present agreement, erect on its territory by the river Sumbar hydrotechnical installations to retain water, the Government of the USSR undertakes to allow as much water to flow into the Atrek river in the irrigation period as would have passed in the absence of these installations in the given meteorological conditions. The USSR shall inform Persia in advance of its intention to erect such installations.

16. . . . Should Persia after the signature of the present agreement erect by the river Atrek on its territory hydrotechnical installations to retain water, the Persian Government undertakes to allow in the irrigation period as much water to pass to the frontier between Persia and the USSR where the division of the Atrek river water begins as would have passed in the absence of such installations in the given meteorological conditions. Persia shall inform the USSR in advance of its intention to erect such installations.

17. The waters mentioned in the present agreement shall be measured at the request of Persia or the USSR by the experts and water officers of the contracting parties jointly and for each separate river and the canals fed by it simultaneously.

Persia and the USSR mutually undertake to allow unhampered access on to their territory of the experts and water officers authorized to execute the works on the rivers mentioned in the present agreement if furnished with the requisite documents, which shall indicate the place for crossing the frontier.

18. The waters on the frontier shall be measured at the most convenient places within 200 metres of the frontier on the Persian or Soviet side. The places shall be selected by mutual agreement between the experts of the contracting parties.

At the places selected for measurement the Soviet experts shall erect, at the cost of the USSR and in the presence of an expert from the Persian side, a hydrometric post for each river, consisting of three water

gauge racks, one levelling mark, and one light service bridge; the river bed shall if necessary be put into proper order.

The experts and water officers of the USSR and of Persia shall have equal rights to use the hydrometric posts.

19. Should differences arise between the water officers of the contracting parties on any question of water utilization, these questions shall be submitted for joint settlement to the following representatives of Persia and the USSR (who may be represented by their deputies): for the Geri-Rud (Tejen) river, the Governor of Serakh for Persia, and the Serakh district water officer for the USSR; for the Chaacha, Meana (Kara-Tikan), and Kelat-Chai (Nafte) rivers, the Governor of Kelat for Persia and the Dushak district water officer for the USSR . . .

20. If the provisions of the present agreement in regard to the sharing of the waters of the frontier rivers and waters and their mutual utilization be violated by the nationals of the contracting parties, both parties are obliged to take immediately on their own territory the necessary steps to rectify the infringement, to conduct an investigation, and to make the guilty parties responsible under law for their acts.

21. The sharing and method of utilization of the frontier waters laid down in the present agreement shall be brought by the contracting parties to the attention of their local frontier authorities and of the populations of the districts adjacent to the rivers within one month of the signature of the agreement.

22. The present agreement is subject to ratification within six months of its signature. Ratifications shall be exchanged in Teheran.

23. The present agreement enters into force immediately on its signature.

24. The present agreement, consisting of twenty-four articles, is drawn up in the Russian and Persian languages in two authentic copies. Both texts shall be considered authentic.

Done in Poltoratsky (Askhabad) 20 February 1926 (1 Esfand 1304).

SPEECH BY RAKOVSKY AT THE OPENING OF THE FRANCO-SOVIET NEGOTIATIONS

25 *February* 1926 *Izvestia*, 27 *February* 1926

I should like first of all, on behalf of the Soviet delegation, to express to the chairman of the Council of Ministers and to the president of the conference our sincere gratitude for their welcome, and to join my wishes to theirs for the success of our labours. We are about to examine a number of questions which, covering the economic and political relations

between our two countries, refer both to the past and to the present, and have as their aim to provide a firm and enduring basis for future relations between France and the USSR.

I do not think it will be disputed if I say that neither of the delegations loses sight of the importance of these questions, their complexity, and the difficulties they involve. The Soviet delegation's task is complicated by a special circumstance which, let us hope, will be taken into consideration by the French delegation. This is that the revolutionary events which have occurred in our country and which have radically transformed not only our political institutions but also the psychology of our peoples, have also changed radically the content of all international problems. Echoing the words of the great French revolutionary leader, Boissy d'Anglas, president of the National Convention, I may say that in six years Russia has lived through six centuries. But after what the chairman of the French delegation has just said, let me hasten to add that it does not at all follow that, notwithstanding the difference in our laws and institutions, we cannot arrive, on comparing our points of view, at decisions which can reconcile the interests we represent. We firmly believe that if the bridges which in the past united France and the former Russian Empire have been broken by the storm of events, then new bridges can be thrown across from one shore to the other. We believe that new relations and a new friendship can be born of new interests and needs, and in keeping with the deepest aspirations of our peoples. Under the changing surface of historical events these aspirations continue to exist, having as their bases the development of productive forces, the expansion of industry, and the growing need of trade, and also the similarity of political interests.

You ask us, Mr Chairman, not to lose sight of the innocent crowd of small people who form the great majority of French holders of Russian bonds. I think it necessary in this case, leaving the field of generalities, to declare that since 1919, since our Government was for the first time invited to a conference, the projected Princes Island conference, we have frequently expressed our desire to find a settlement of the debt question which would satisfy these small holders.

As a result of the erroneous ideas about the revolutionary events in Russia, it was not understood in the West that the settlement of such questions must have a purely practical character, taking into account not only the interests of the French bondholders but also the psychological changes among the peoples of the USSR, and also the need of the latter to receive that material assistance which would allow them to assume new obligations.

Faced now with the same problem, we are happy to note the practical spirit with which the speech of the chairman of the French delegation

was permeated. We too, attaching greater importance to results than to forms, can assure you that we are guided by the same desire to bring our negotiations to a successful conclusion. In replying to the note from M. Herriot announcing French recognition of the USSR,[1] the Central Executive Committee of the USSR expressed its desire to remove all misunderstandings with France, and its conviction that all the questions referred to in the French Government's note could be settled by full agreement between the two Governments and to the great advantage of the Soviet Union and France. In interpreting the will of the supreme legislative body of our country, and the will of our Government, the Soviet delegation will neglect nothing that can make it effective. Our labours should end successfully, because both parties are equally interested in a successful result.

The French people and the peoples of the USSR emerged from a war without parallel in history after exceptionally severe trials, I might say, if it were possible from the total of misfortunes which befell the world to measure the part falling to each, more severely tried than any other country. Your people, deeply concerned like ours to restore their material well being, and make up for the human losses suffered, are permeated with a strong desire for peace and feel in the same degree the desire to bring about an international order which will prevent a repetition of the bloody experience of the past.

I take this opportunity of repeating the declaration frequently made by the Soviet Government, that we are ready, while adhering fully to the principles which are the bases of our policy, to take part in any serious attempt to remove the danger of conflicts and wars which unhappily continues to overshadow the world. We share fully the attitude expressed by the chairman of the French delegation that the dignity of contemporary States forbids any intervention in their internal affairs and demands mutual respect for their institutions and sovereignty. Having suffered more than any other country from intervention, which in its scope recalls the coalitions formed at the time against the French revolution, our country subscribes eagerly to this principle.

The task to which we are now turning is limited to the interests of two countries, but we can without presumption express the hope that the agreement at which we are aiming will serve as an example and facilitate the conclusion of similar agreements with other Powers. Our labours are not directed against any other party. They are inspired by the desire to collaborate with all Powers, great and small. Apart from that, the constitution of the USSR and its foreign policy are firmly based on respect for the right of free national self-determination and threaten no other country and no other people.

[1] *Soviet Documents*, i, p. 473.

I should like to emphasize the significance we attach to the lively interest in our negotiations shown by the chairman of the Council of Ministers who in 1922, at the Cannes conference, foresaw the importance for the world as a whole of the resumption of normal relations with the USSR.

We are glad that M. de Monzie leads the French delegation; during his stay in Moscow he had the opportunity of forming an estimate both of our desire to reach agreement and of the tremendous strides made by the USSR in economic and political reconstruction. We welcome the presence at the conference of prominent members of Parliament and of the Government, who have had an opportunity of studying the problems confronting us, and who by meeting Soviet representatives have become familiar with our situation, for this can only make our success more sure.

It gives me reason to say that the task confronting us, however difficult it seems, can none the less be accomplished, and that the hopes placed in this conference, not only by those directly interested, but by the broad masses in both countries, will not be disappointed.

LETTER FROM KALININ TO THE AFGHAN GOVERNMENT ON THE EIGHTH ANNIVERSARY OF ITS INDEPENDENCE

27 *February* 1926 *Izvestia*, 28 *February* 1926

On behalf of the peoples of the Soviet Union I offer sincere congratulations on the eighth anniversary of the independence of Sovereign Afghanistan. I am happy to note the ever increasing consolidation of the internal and external position of Afghanistan, whose heroic people under the leadership of their enlightened chief have achieved such outstanding successes. The Soviet Union follows with profound interest these successes of the Afghan people to whom it is bound by bonds of sincere friendship and the grievous experiences in the years of struggle for independence. On behalf of the Soviet Government I express the firm conviction that the friendship between the peoples of Afghanistan and the Soviet Union, so happily established and pledged in the 1921 treaty,[1] will grow uninterruptedly and that no temporary and fortuitous difficulties in our relations, which provoke the senseless joy of our common enemies, will hold up the ever deepening rapprochement between our peoples, whose collaboration is a guarantee of genuine peace in central Asia.

[1] *Soviet Documents*, i, p. 233.

EXTRACTS FROM A PRESS STATEMENT BY CHICHERIN ON SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY

27 *February* 1926 *Manchester Guardian*, 27 *February* 1926

The Soviet Government's attitude with regard to the summoning of a Conference on Disarmament has been defined with the utmost clarity, making the slightest misunderstanding impossible. The Soviet Government has always expressed the utmost readiness to take part in any consultations and conferences that had as their object disarmament or limitation of armament, no matter by whom these consultations or conferences were brought about.

It did not propose the postponement of the meeting of the Preparatory Commission on Disarmament, and to Sir Eric Drummond's communication concerning the proposal of five Powers to postpone it the Soviet Government replied[1] that, though fully prepared for an immediate beginning of the work of the Commission, yet, taking into consideration the demand of other Powers for its postponement, it did not object to this.

If the Swiss Government agrees in the end to satisfy the perfectly lawful and even very modest demands of the Soviet Government connected with the murder of Vorovsky, the obstacle preventing the journey of the Soviet representatives to take part in the Preparatory Commission in Geneva will thereby be removed. If, however, the Swiss Government stands obstinately by its present position, the Soviet representatives will be able to take part in the Preparatory Commission only if it meets in another country.

The sharing of the Soviet Government in the work of preparing the Conference on Disarmament is regarded by itself as extremely desirable, corresponding as it does to the whole of its line of policy during the whole period of its existence. In the present period of international relations the Soviet Government first, before other Governments, put forward a proposal for placing before all the Powers this question of disarmament. In particular, at the Genoa Conference, both in my opening speech and in the speeches of the Soviet delegates in various commissions, the task of disarmament was brought forward as the most urgent and important of all.[2] In the same year the Soviet Government tried to carry through, at a conference with its Western neighbours, a proportional and simultaneous reduction of armaments, but to its regret was unable to obtain the agreement of the other members of this conference.

When, in connexion with the working out by the Commission of the

[1] *Mirovoe Khoziaistvo*, 1926, 4, p. 134.
[2] *Soviet Documents*, i, pp. 298, 306.

League of Nations of the project of the so-called Treaty of Mutual Assistance,[1] the question of disarmament was placed before all the Powers, the Soviet Government stated that it considered this problem most actual and urgent, and proposed that its solution should be sought as soon as possible without waiting for the working out of any sort of treaties between the Powers. And, at the present time, we look upon this problem as the most actual and urgent, and expressing our full readiness to take part in all conferences called with this object, we set ourselves the task of the possible easing and speeding of international measures for the lessening of the burden of armament and the danger of war.

The opinion, to be found in the English press, that in the position of the Soviet Government in this question is shown some sort of change in its attitude towards the League of Nations is entirely wrong. I can assure you in the most definite manner that our attitude towards the League of Nations remains precisely what it was, but we have always declared that where disarmament is concerned we are for its sake ready to take part even in meetings summoned by the League of Nations.

The attitude of the Soviet Government in the problem of disarmament fully corresponds to the general pacific character of its policy and to its continual efforts to assist in the preservation of general peace. An example of these efforts was shown during the recent conflict on the Chinese Eastern Railway. The Soviet Government sought in this exclusively the observance and carrying out of the treaty with China concluded in May 1924, and representing an extremely large concession to Chinese national demands. This treaty was a very clear expression of the Soviet Government's policy, based as it is on friendly relations with peoples struggling for their complete independence and unity and on the full recognition of the sovereign rights of national States and the rights of all nations to self-definition. This treaty actually destroyed the so-called denationalized zone, and completely established in it Chinese sovereign power, Chinese administration, police and courts, handing over the guarding of the railway to the Chinese authorities.

The actual railway itself, in the building of which had been invested hundreds of millions of roubles taken from the peoples of Russia, remained as a commercial undertaking under the joint management of China and the Soviet Union. But this treaty, a treaty between equals, and representing the exact opposite to unequal imperialist treaties, must be honestly and strictly observed. Everyone who sympathizes with China must in the fullest degree approve the efforts of the administration of the Chinese Eastern Railway to preserve its treaty rights on it and

[1] *League of Nations Official Journal*, Special Supplement 16, p. 103.

to put a stop to the arbitrary behaviour of the military organs. In the struggle for the observance of this treaty the Soviet Government acted as its friendly attitude towards China and its hostile attitude toward all imperialist policy demanded. My communication to the Temporary Government of the Chinese Republic was an attempt, legitimate and based on treaties, to come to agreement with the Chinese Government on the measures necessary to bring to an end illegal acts on the Chinese Eastern Railway. The Chinese Government came to meet the Soviet Government, and I may say that as a result of the recent crisis our friendly relations with China have been still further strengthened.

These friendly relations define our general position in the question of present Chinese events. The Soviet Government observes in the strictest manner the most correct friendly relations with China. It considers that it has the right not to hide its sympathy for the national liberation movement of the Chinese people, which is very swiftly developing, growing stronger, and extending its political influence. The Soviet policy decidedly and on principle denies all distinction between European and colonial peoples and their right to complete independence and self-definition, in opposition to British Imperialism, which in the period of the struggle between parliamentarism and absolutism in Europe and the period of the European national wars, gave open diplomatic and even military assistance to parliamentary institutions in European nations and to the European peoples who were struggling for unity and liberation, and also to the Spanish colonies in South America, while at the same time with regard to the Chinese people and to peoples of the East in general British Imperialism applied a policy of denying those same rights . . .

The Soviet Government and its agents are far from trying to develop in the Chinese people any hatred towards foreigners. On the contrary, a free, democratic China, the creation of which has our sympathy, will present far more favourable conditions for close friendly relations with all countries than a China enslaved and exploited, under the burden of unequal treaties. The national movement of oppressed peoples, with which we sympathize, must in general lead to the greatest cultural efflorescence of these peoples.

In connexion with our relations with China, the press hostile to us have thrown an entirely false light on the policy of the Soviet Government with regard to Mongolia. Soviet troops entered Mongolia in the course of the struggle with the White Guard army of Ungern, who occupied Urga and took possession of the whole of Mongolia, and soon after the entrance of Soviet troops into Urga, the Mongolian Government, for very comprehensible reasons, asked that these troops should remain for some time longer, since the White Guard detachments were

still not liquidated and continued to threaten the existence of the Mongolian Government. As soon as this danger had passed Soviet troops were removed from Mongolia.

I refer to this fact because it differs in the sharpest manner from the line of policy of other States with regard to weaker peoples and countries. I would point out the retention of English troops in Egypt after their entrance of Egyptian territory in 1882, to the retention of English troops for the guarding of the Suez Canal, and in general to the accustomed practice of the Great Powers in this connexion.

Our line of behaviour with regard to Mongolia is the exact opposite. Our relations with Mongolia are based on the perfectly sincere and profound friendship that connects our countries. The Mongolian is actually a popular Government, and the so-called Huruldan, the chief parliamentary organ of Mongolia, is based on universal suffrage. Our Government at the same time recognizes the sovereignty of China over Mongolia, and this circumstance is fixed by treaty.

In general, our relations with the peoples of the East are based on mutual friendship and on a perfectly peaceful policy free from any sort of aggressiveness. Looking over the history of the development of these relations, one may observe that we were all the time the object of attack on the part of imperialist Powers in Asia, and that our friendly relations with the national movements of the peoples of the East developed in the course of our struggle against the aggressive policy of Imperialism directed against ourselves.

At the time when English diplomacy was working, with the help of Greek troops, in the effort to smash National Turkey, that same English diplomacy in Menshevik Georgia was supporting every kind of movement directed against us in the Northern Caucasus. Our rapprochement with National Turkey was alike for her and for ourselves an act of self-preservation.

Our rapprochement with the national movement in Persia came about in the process of a struggle against those remnants of English troops and military agents who before this had been carrying on the policy of intervention against us, and in changing circumstances continued to carry on the same line of hostility towards us.

In Central Asia the *Basmachi* movement was to a considerable degree a product of the activity of English agents, in particular of Consul Etherton in Kashgar.

Our rapprochement with the Mongolian national movement came about in the process of struggle against the White Guard movement in Siberia, one of the leaders of which was the English General Knox.

In China itself, at our first coming into touch with the Central Government in Peking we were brought up by the hostile attitude of the

Chinese Government towards entering into diplomatic relations with the USSR, and the reason of this was pressure from imperialist Powers, and it is only in the process of rapprochement with the Chinese national movement that we have succeeded in breaking through these obstacles set up by England and other Western Powers.

On the other hand, all the legends put about concerning the alleged interference of our Government in India are based on simple inventions, and in this connexion I may be permitted to remark that we are observing with the utmost firmness the obligations of the Anglo-Soviet Agreement of 1921.[1] The press that is hostile to us refers to the fact that there are Communists in India, but I permit myself to ask: can it be that because in the USSR the Communist party is in power Communist parties in other countries ought to cease to exist? If there are Communists in India, that is a product of India's political life. And if in various countries Communist parties exist, I permit myself to ask, Can it be that as a result of the Communist party being in power in the USSR the Communist parties in other countries ought to deny themselves the existence of their international centre?

If an analysis of Soviet policy shows in the most convincing manner that it is free from any kind of aggressiveness, the same can by no manner of means be said of the policy of other Powers, and in particular of the attitude towards Russia of the ruling spheres in England. Not to speak of the whole series of utterances by members of the English Government and by English politicians against the USSR to which we have more than once had to refer, as recently as in the February number of the *Fortnightly Review* there appeared an article over the familiar signature of 'Augur', who has more than once shown in his articles extreme proximity to English governing spheres, an article under the title, 'Europe, Turkey, and Russia', to which it is impossible not to turn the most serious attention.

The whole article, from beginning to end, has as its object to represent the Soviet Union as the chief obstacle in the way of the realization of the intentions of the British Government, and it ends with the most unambiguous and unconcealed threat of the use against the Soviet Union of the method of armed attack. It is the coarsest and most naked threat of war, with complete clarity showing the need for the Soviet Union to stand steadily on guard and continually to reckon with the possibility of a new armed attack.

If more than once in my utterances I have had to point to the hostile actions of English diplomacy against us and, moreover, to refer to plain facts, the unscrupulous, hostile press tries to make the deduction that I myself have a hostile attitude towards England. I declare in the

[1] Cmd. 1207.

most categorical manner that there is not a particle of truth in this and that I shall welcome with the utmost delight the day on which it will be possible for us to enter on the path of an improvement of our relations with England.

The Soviet Government has always declared that at any moment it is ready to begin negotiations with the English Government. More than once I have had to point out that if these negotiations have not been begun hitherto the fault was not that of the Soviet Government. I cannot, however, refrain from pointing out that the extremely long continuance of the present state of affairs, during which our Government has to feel the result of England's hostile policy, cannot but in the long run affect the feelings of our popular masses. The only thing that can put an end to this, and is actually to the mutual interest of the peoples of the USSR and of England, is a serious improvement in the political relations between the USSR and England, which will be a factor of first-class significance in the interests of general peace.

EXTRACTS FROM A PRESS STATEMENT BY CHICHERIN ON THE DISARMAMENT CONFERENCE AND THE EUROPEAN SITUATION

6 *April* 1926 *Izvestia*, 6 *April* 1926

In the press of various countries I have recently seen remarks to the effect that several Governments are impatiently awaiting the reply of the USSR to the invitation to send representatives to a preparatory commission on disarmament, to meet in Geneva. This impatience surprises me, for our Government has frequently and unequivocally stated that it cannot participate in conferences and commissions held on Swiss territory . . .

In view of the stubborn refusal of the Swiss Government to meet our minimum legitimate demands in connexion with the assassination of Comrade Vorovsky, we are compelled to state that it is absolutely impossible for us to send any representatives whatsoever into Swiss territory. This fact is well known to the League of Nations, or, more precisely, to those of its members which play the leading part in it. If in spite of this the Council of the League of Nations decided at its last session to summon a preparatory commission on disarmament in Geneva, it is direct proof that the leading Powers in the League do not really want our participation in the commission and the conference on disarmament which is to follow . . .

The very fact of the summoning of a preparatory commission on disarmament in circumstances which exclude the possibility of participation by the USSR shows beyond a shadow of doubt that the Powers

have not the least intention of proceeding to effective disarmament, and that the summoning of a commission or a conference will be nothing more than an empty comedy . . .

Throughout the whole post-war period the League of Nations has not ceased to demonstrate its incapacity to advance in the slightest degree the cause of peace and the improvement of international relations. After the victory of one imperialist coalition over another the League of Nations played the role of a victors' organization, the purpose of which was to secure for the victors the fruits of victory and share them out painlessly among themselves. Last year the English Conservative Government attempted to use the League of Nations as one of the pieces in its complex game of isolating the USSR and uniting against it in one form or another all the leading Governments. These English governmental aims were openly expressed in statements made by many English ministers and in the press in articles such as the well-known one by Augur in the *Fortnightly Review*. In the forefront of international relations was to be the combination of Locarno Powers, which would lead to the isolation of the USSR and to united action not only against the USSR but also against colonial peoples who were struggling for freedom. The League of Nations was allotted an auxiliary role in regard to the Locarno combination. The Locarno union of Powers was to play the same role as had been played a century ago by the Holy Alliance . . .

The utter discredit of the League of Nations as a result of the picture given by Geneva of irreconcilable antagonisms between the Powers is so clear and unquestionable that the government press of leading countries considers it no longer possible to cover it up . . .

I remember that when I was discussing the political outlook with Lloyd George in Genoa after the failure of the Genoa conference, he said to me that he had hoped that the summoning of the Genoa conference would rescue the European continent from its condition of disturbance and chaos, but it seemed that all his efforts would be unsuccessful and all that would be left for England to do would be to leave the European continent to look after itself, while England itself became more closely united with its Dominions. He even prophesied that the Conservatives who would replace him would follow this policy. However, the Conservatives have so far not followed it; on the contrary, Mr Chamberlain's entire policy has been directed to acquiring the role of dictator and leader in Europe. The Geneva session of the League of Nations is in fact a serious defeat for Mr Chamberlain's continental policy which was designed to turn England into a super-arbitrator and the leading Power in Europe. It may be that tendencies for closer union with the Dominions and a lessening of participation in continental affairs will again become strong in England now.

The immediate cause of the Geneva breakdown was the inner contradictions in Mr Chamberlain's own policy. He was intent on uniting all countries against the USSR and completely forgot to reckon with the antagonisms between them. As we know, after conferring with M. Briand in Paris Mr Chamberlain supported the proposal to give Poland a place on the Council of the League of Nations, which was to compensate for the political blow which Poland had suffered as a result of the signing of the Locarno treaties, and the subordination of the former Franco-Polish treaty[1] to the mechanism of the League of Nations. At the basis of this combination lay the desire of the English Government to hinder the prospect of a rapprochement between Poland and the USSR, and by enticing Poland into a western orientation to detach it from stable relations with the USSR. Wishing to draw Poland into a united front against the USSR, Mr Chamberlain did not take into account the existing contradiction between the interests of Poland and Germany. Mr Chamberlain attempted quite mechanically to force all countries into a single file, not seeing the antagonisms between them. In compensating Poland for the damage to its international position by giving it a seat on the Council of the League of Nations, Mr Chamberlain attempted to strengthen the Versailles system of political relations, opposing Poland to Germany, thus tying himself up in the contradictions of his own policy, for on the one hand he tried to balance Germany against France, while on the other he tried to compensate Poland for its loss and to balance it against a Germany which he had strengthened. The ultimate aim of Mr Chamberlain's whole policy—the formation of a united front against the USSR—was thus founded on insuperable inner contradictions, ignorance of which could not help but result in the break-up of the united front which we have witnessed in Geneva . . .

The set-back which the recent policy of the German Government has suffered at Geneva is a clear illustration for Germany of the consequences of the preference for the so-called western orientation—i.e. orientation towards the Versailles victors—to the further development of friendly relations with the USSR. The hopes placed on the supposed omnipotent English Conservatives have not been justified. Instead of the firm international structure in which Germany hoped to find its corner there is nothing but a heap of ruins. If the Governments from which Germany expected its acceptance into the Council of the League of Nations were unable to accomplish this formality, what can Germany expect from them when more serious matters are at stake?

[1] *League of Nations Treaty Series*, xviii, p. 12.

DECREE OF THE CENTRAL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE ON THE OWNERSHIP OF LANDS AND ISLANDS IN THE ARCTIC

15 *April* 1926

State Papers, cxxiv, p. 1064
Izvestia, 16 *April* 1926

All discovered lands and islands, as well as all those that may in the future be discovered, which are not at the date of the publication of this decree recognized by the Government of the USSR as the territory of a foreign Power, are declared to be territories belonging to the USSR, within the following limits:

In the Northern Arctic Ocean, from the northern coast of the USSR up to the North Pole, between the meridian 32° 4′ 35″ east longitude from Greenwich, passing along the eastern side of Vaida Bay through the triangulation mark on Kekursk Cape, and meridian 168° 49′ 30″ west longitude from Greenwich, passing through the middle of the strait which separates Ratmanov and Kruzenstern Islands of the Diomede group of islands in the Bering Straits.

EXTRACTS FROM LITVINOV'S REPORT ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS TO THE CENTRAL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE

24 *April* 1926

Protokoly, p. 1051

Comrades, in reviewing recent international events, we must dwell, because it is the most outstanding fact, on the unsuccessful conclusion of the last sessions of the League of Nations and the League Council, which deeply discredited the League and dealt a serious blow to the policy of the Powers connected with Locarno.

On the question of the composition of the Council the Powers could not agree among themselves, and as a result the entry into force of the Locarno agreements was postposed until the autumn; the possibility of agreement being reached in the autumn is also in doubt. Thus the formation of a united front has broken down, at least for the time being. What I have said indicates the continued existence of profound contradictions among the great Powers, which neither the Locarno conference nor the 'conciliatory' atmosphere of the League of Nations has been able to eliminate or even to weaken.

In the circumstances arising from these contradictions, which are far from being completely hidden at Geneva, the League of Nations' attempt to call a conference on disarmament would have little chance of success, even if the Soviet Union had been admitted to participation in it. The decision of the League Council to exclude the USSR from participation in the preparatory commission, and consequently from

the disarmament conference itself, by choosing for the meeting a place where the Soviet Government has clearly and explicitly refused to send its delegates, shows that the failure of the conference is the conscious aim of the policy of the leaders of the League of Nations.

There is no reason for me to go into details here about our correspondence on this question with the League of Nations and about our reasons for considering it impossible for the Soviet Government to send delegations to Switzerland. I should only like to observe that to our carefully elaborated argument the League of Nations was unable to advance a single argument in favour of the retention of Geneva as the seat for the conference, except for the ridiculous and childish reasons attributed to the League by the bourgeois press, such as the difficulty of transporting the technical apparatus, i.e. the pens and ink, from the League secretariat to another town, or the reluctance to yield to the Soviets! We should also take note that, while inviting us to collaborate, the League does not find it possible to yield even to the most reasonable request if it is made by the Soviets, although this request would not trespass on anybody's interests or anybody's convenience.

I should add that after sending our first note[1] to the League of Nations we notified the Governments of certain countries closely associated with the League Council that we would regard the rejection of our proposal to have the conference held outside Switzerland as the deliberate exclusion of the Soviet Union from participation in the conference and as a challenge which would make future collaboration of the Soviet Government with the League of Nations more difficult, even within the narrow limits to which we have permitted it up to now, notwithstanding our generally negative attitude to the League. Since, nevertheless, the League Council, in which representatives of the Governments we had thus notified took part, reaffirmed its decision that the conference be held in Geneva, then no other reason can be assigned to the decision, and to the motives dictating it, than that given by Narkomindel in its last note[2] to the League of which you already know.

It was not difficult to foresee in advance that the most unscrupulous of our enemies would not be able to resist the temptation to represent our rejection of Switzerland as a cover for our secret reluctance to take part in disarmament. We can calmly ignore such insinuations, which cannot deceive anybody, for everybody knows that our Government has not only always expressed its readiness to collaborate in the work of disarmament, which it first proposed as a most urgent task at the Genoa conference, and to which it tried to give a practical form at the Moscow conference, but, in a still broader manner, it has throughout its

[1] *League of Nations Official Journal*, 1926, p. 635.
[2] ibid. p. 661.

existence always made the object of its foreign policy the maintenance of peace, promotion of the general peace, and the development of friendly relations with all nations.

In carrying out this pacific policy we long ago proposed to all countries the conclusion with us of agreements which would have excluded the possibility of attacks on each other or participation in inimical actions, and would have secured reciprocal neutrality in the event of armed conflicts with third parties. A few months ago we signed such a treaty with Turkey. It is with the deepest satisfaction that I now report to you that such a treaty, with Germany, has been signed in Berlin today.[1]

Let me acquaint you with the contents of the treaty. . . .

On signing the treaty the plenipotentiaries of the two countries exchanged notes or declarations, in which Germany for its part states that the treaty will assist in the maintenance of general peace and that in the given case both Governments, in the negotiations referred to in article 1, will be guided by their recognition of the necessity of general peace.

Further, Germany explains its point of view about the League of Nations. It assumes that the basic idea of the League is the settlement in a peaceful and equitable manner of international disputes, and that in this respect the treaty is not in conflict with the purpose of the League. Further, the German Government gives notice of its possible conduct should there arise in the League of Nations any aspirations not in accordance with this basic idea of peace and unilaterally directed against the USSR.

Further the German Government explains its attitude towards the famous articles 16 and 17 of the League Covenant. You know that these articles provide for the possibility of international sanctions, international reprisals, if the League recognizes a country as the aggressor in a conflict. The German Government declares that the question whether the USSR is, in any armed conflict with a third Power, the aggressor, can be decided by the League of Nations in a manner binding on Germany only with the consent of Germany, as it stated in its well-known declaration at Locarno.

It is further proposed that a special convention be concluded providing for the settlement of conflicts between the two countries by peaceful means, i.e. by means of arbitration or a conciliation commission. In our reply we took note of the German Government's declaration and declared that we too regard the purpose of the treaty as the maintenance of general peace and notified our consent to the conclusion of a special convention on arbitration or a conciliation commission.

[1] *League of Nations Treaty Series*, liii, p. 387.

It is not superfluous to remark here that everything that has been signed in Berlin today will be published in full, and that no secret treaties, no secret protocols or annexes to the agreement have been signed.

The treaty is an appendix to, or rather an amplification of, the Rapallo treaty, and is in complete accordance with those friendly relations which were established between our Union and Germany, and which both parties wish to preserve in future. The Rapallo treaty was dictated both by the desire of the two countries to establish friendship, by their community of interests, and by the dangerous international position in which both States found themselves at that time, surrounded by a sea of enmity. Since then, of course, a great deal has changed on the international scene. I do not know whether Germany can at the present time count many friends among the European States, whether since Locarno and Geneva it regards its relations with other European States as adequately pacified and consolidated, whether it regards itself as free from any danger. That is Germany's affair. As to our Union, then, although relations with a whole series of States have improved, and they have recognized us *de jure*, it must just the same regard its position as somewhat threatened, and the enmity towards it on the part of the western non-Soviet world as continuing to exist. In such circumstances we cannot exclude the possibility of a general or collective attack on the Union. The object of Soviet diplomacy is therefore to lessen the danger of the formation of anti-Soviet blocs and combined attacks; the lessening of such dangers naturally increases the chances of general peace.

As against the policy of other Powers, in so far as it has been expressed recently in agreements of which you know, such as, for example, the Polish-Rumanian agreement,[1] or concerning military alliances, mutual military assistance– a policy which amounts to the formation of military groups, military blocs, and combinations like those which led to the 1914 war—our Union puts forward a policy of concluding treaties of non-aggression, of preserving peace, and of refraining from interference in the armed conflicts of third States. If this policy were followed by other States, the results, as regards the maintenance of peace, or at any rate the exclusion of the possibility of large-scale wars, would, I think, be incomparably greater than the results of all the measures of which we know taken by the League of Nations in the past and those which it may be able to take in the future.

European diplomacy and its press have in the last few days been racking their brains over the question whether the Soviet-German treaty contradicts the so-called spirit of Locarno. The question and the reproach are not, of course, addressed to us, for we have retained full

[1] ibid. lx, p. 161.

freedom of action and are bound by no agreements, neither by the Locarno agreements nor any other. But, objectively speaking, the answer to that question depends on the objects set by Locarno. If Locarno, as its authors try to convince us, really aimed at the pacification of Europe, at a real improvement and consolidation of the relations between European States, then its advocates should clearly give a warm welcome to the Soviet-German treaty as a further step in strengthening friendship between two great nations. But if, as we have always suspected, one of the aims of Locarno is the formation of a united anti-Soviet front and the isolation of our Union, then in that case we must admit that the treaty signed today really does contradict the spirit of Locarno, and we can only rejoice that we have succeeded to some extent in depriving Locarno of its anti-Soviet sting. I say 'to some extent' because, judging by the fury and spite of the attacks on Germany for concluding this treaty, and the references to Locarno, it must be said that Locarno continues to represent a threat to our Union.

Besides the signature of the treaty, another favourable sign of the friendly relations between our Union and Germany is the law recently passed in Germany for a Government guarantee of a certain part of credits totalling 300 million marks.[1] The German Government rightly estimated the importance of this factor for improving the economic aspect of relations with the USSR in the immediate future. Guarantees of 60 per cent have already been given, partly by the central German Government, partly by local German Governments (Saxony, Prussia, etc.). The realization of the credits has unfortunately been held back because the German banks, looking to their profits, are asking a rate of interest which is too high for us to accept. The banks, clearly, do not yet know that we are looking not for credits in general, but for advantageous credits. If the terms are unfavourable, we prefer to do without credits altogether, the more so as in a great number of countries large firms have already offered us extensive credits on terms more favourable than those which the German banks are asking.

Friendship with Germany in no case excludes our desire to establish friendly relations with other countries. We must however bear in mind that our public and private agreements with Germany are facilitated by the fact that the German Government, as early as Rapallo, putting general national requirements above the private interests of particular groups and persons, agreed to the mutual cancellation of claims. Up to now, unfortunately, no other Government has taken this national-State attitude, and financial claims heavily burden our relations with a number of States with which we should like to have, and could have, thoroughly friendly relations.

[1] cf. *The Times*, 22 April 1926.

Even agreement to leave the question of reciprocal claims open made it possible to establish and consolidate very firm friendly relations with Italy. Nothing has so far darkened these relations and let us hope that they will not be darkened in the future. The 1924 treaty[1] gave an impulse to the rapid development of our commercial relations with Italy which, in respect of imports, last year exceeded the pre-war figure.

The negotiations with France are only now entering the phase of businesslike examination. An encouraging feature is the simultaneous review by the delegations of the questions of debt recognition and of credits. On these two questions, inseparably connected with each other, practical decisions are now being worked out. So far the practical proposals of the two parties are fairly wide apart. We think that agreement with France can be of enormous advantage to both countries. France has become a country with a powerful industry, and agreement with the USSR, which will make it possible for economic relations to be widely expanded, would mark a considerable step forward, not only for us, but for France too. The prospects of collaboration with France should the conference reach agreement will be of the utmost significance and act as an important link in the chain of international events contributing to the consolidation of universal peace.

In our relations with England nothing, unfortunately, has changed. It is wholly false and slanderous to assert that the Soviet Government is conducting an inimical and aggressive policy against England. Precisely the contrary is true: wherever we come into contact with English diplomacy it is pursuing an active and systematic political struggle against our State, joining its enemies and threatening its security. When the Labour Government was in power we thought it one of our most important diplomatic tasks to reach agreement with England on all international questions. Ever since the Conservative Government has been in power we have let pass no opportunity of stating our readiness to conduct negotiations with it on all questions in dispute between us, and in particular on the question of claims, which was pushed into the forefront by our opponents in England. We continue to attach enormous importance to the question of agreement or, at least, to an improvement in relations with England. Just recently, however, it has been possible to detect some signs of a certain shift in our favour even in England. I am thinking, firstly, of the debate in Parliament[2] on the extension of export credits to the USSR, when even a part of the Conservatives voted against the Government, represented by the vice-president of the Board of Trade, who adopted a negative attitude on this question, and when the Government majority fell to 89, that is, considerably lower than the usual figure.

[1] *State Papers*, cxx, p. 659. [2] 1 March 1926, *H.C. Deb.* 5 s., vol. 192, col. 1099 ff.

Secondly, the reference by Churchill to a favourable attitude towards our Government on the question of debt settlement.[1] We cannot for a moment say that we agree with the substance of Churchill's statement which is, of course, wholly unsatisfactory, the more so as he referred to war credits, which the English Government even in Lloyd George's time had agreed to annul; nevertheless, the very mention of the desirability of agreement coming from Churchill is not without symptomatic significance.

Thirdly, there was the reply of the English Foreign Office to the London Chamber of Commerce, which demanded the abrogation of the 1921 agreement; the Foreign Office reply[2] referred to the receipt by us of credits in England as linked with agreement on debts; we cannot accept the Foreign Office point of view as it stands, but in the given case we should note it as a sign of the movement in our favour to which I referred.

English ministers' speeches are not always consistent in tone and content. Reference is frequently made in these speeches to the necessity for some kind of preliminary declaration by the USSR before negotiations are opened. We cannot accept that point of view. We think it in the highest degree desirable that businesslike negotiations should be opened with the English Government for settling questions in dispute. We are far from regarding the granting of credits in England as a kindness or a favour, for the credits will carry with them large-scale orders which will react most favourably on English industry.

The first step would be an exchange of suggestions in the normal manner through diplomatic representatives. We are still awaiting the English Government's observations on our practical proposals which, at the time of MacDonald's Government, took the form of a preliminary treaty. It is not, of course, a question of prestige, or of who takes the first step. As soon as the English Government makes it possible for us to believe that they are as sincerely ready as we are to open negotiations in a businesslike manner and carry them through to a successful conclusion, we shall do everything necessary to move the question out of its present deadlock.

Over all the great Powers of Europe towers America in its colossal might. From the most diverse sources we have been informed of the steady growth of trends in America in favour of agreement with our Union. It is true that the American Government apparently maintains its former attitude. It cannot be said that our differences with America are particularly great. From unofficial and semi-official sources we have been informed more than once that the American Government stipulates, as a condition of the resumption of relations with us, the

[1] 24 March 1926, *H.C. Deb.* 5 s., vol. 193, col. 1233 ff. [2] *The Times*, 8 April 1926.

recognition of loans made to the Provisional Government of Kerensky, and would be prepared to consider favourably our just counter-claims.

In direct negotiations such a way of putting the question would present no difficulty. For its part the Soviet Government has more than once declared its readiness to enter into immediate negotiations with the American Government, and I state this again now from this tribune. If certain members of the American Government demand a preliminary settlement in their favour of the questions in dispute between us, that demand must be recognized as unusual, abnormal, and unacceptable. May I express the opinion that, if negotiations were opened, there is every reason for optimism about their results. We can only wait for a sign of equal readiness on the part of the American Government. I am quite convinced that the course of events will inevitably lead both sides to agreement, and in the future to very close economic collaboration.

We attach the greatest importance to stable and lasting agreement with our nearest western neighbours, in particular with Poland, and to the elimination of all matters in dispute between us. I would like to remind those who are opposed to agreement between us, and who cry out about the danger threatening Poland from the east, that the restoration and consolidation of Poland's independence would not have been possible without the victory of the October revolution over Tsarism. Even the Kerensky Government adopted an ambiguous and even a chauvinist attitude towards Poland and also towards Finland and other countries. The White émigrés still have that attitude, although for tactical reasons they sometimes conceal it. From the material on Polish-Russian relations during the war recently published by our central archives it is clear that Polish bourgeois politicians (some of whom still occupy leading posts in Poland today) consented to every compromise with the Tsarist ministers, to the most meagre plans for autonomy, without even daring to dream of the independence of Poland. Only the Bolsheviks, who in the period of the most ruthless Tsarism proclaimed the principle of national self-determination, including the right to secede, put that principle into effect when they came to power.

You are all aware of the extreme economic and financial crisis, and the severe unemployment, prevailing now in Poland. It is quite obvious that the financial crisis has its roots in the general economic crisis engendered by the exhaustion of the internal market, especially the peasant market, and the absence of outlets in foreign markets. This grave situation is exploited by one of Poland's imperialist protectors to enslave it economically, under the guise of helping it, and to turn Poland and its army into an instrument of its foreign policy in eastern Europe. The USSR, on the other hand, could provide a big market for a considerable part of Polish industry now idle. Despite all difficulties our orders even

now have enabled certain large textile concerns in Lodz to start work, giving employment to thousands. Unfortunately the traditional policy of Polish ruling circles, supported by their foreign well-wishers, prevents these circles from taking a bold and consistent path towards rapprochement with the Soviet Union.

Unfortunately, all our efforts to reach lasting agreement with Poland have up to now been defeated by the Polish Government's anxiety to play the part, so to speak, of the manager of external relations for all the Baltic States. We seek agreement with Poland, while Poland insists on speaking on behalf of all the Baltic States which, as far as we are aware, have never authorized it to do so.

We do not, and are not prepared to recognize Poland's protectorate, open or concealed, over the Baltic. The stubborn reluctance of the Polish Government to speak only on behalf of its own State has up to now brought to nothing all our attempts at rapprochement. The report of the prolongation, although in a changed form, of the Polish-Rumanian treaty[1] similarly lessens our hopes of reaching agreement with Poland. This has held up the conclusion of a trade agreement which could be of advantage to both countries only if it formed part of a general comprehensive agreement. For its part the Soviet Government is interested not only in the development and consolidation of good neighbourly relations, but in a rapprochement with Poland. The Soviet's peace policy, particularly in regard to its neighbours, built out of the ruins of Tsarism, makes this rapprochement perfectly possible. The economic interests of the Soviet population, which require the import from abroad of certain industrial products which might be imported no less economically from Poland than from other countries, make rapprochement particularly desirable. It depends solely on a decisive change in Poland's policy to our Union whether stable relations, in the interests of both States and their peoples, are established in the near future.

We propose guarantee pacts with each of the Baltic States separately or with certain of them collectively. Estonia and Latvia are of great importance to us from the economic point of view as countries of transit. In political matters we are trying to establish firm friendship with them, which would secure our frontiers in that region. Up to the present this has been prevented partly by outside influences. In addition to that we have unfortunately no reason to be fully satisfied with the actions of the Latvian Government in regard to the assaults on our diplomatic couriers. The investigation is not being pursued with the energy and thoroughness on which we had a right to count, and therefore it has had no results yet. The statement made to us by the Latvian Government after the attack has in large part not yet been put into effect. The

[1] *League of Nations Treaty Series*, lx, p. 161.

conduct of the investigation and a number of additional small facts make us fear that Latvia will become another Switzerland, and create the impression that in Latvia, alongside alien influences, certain groups or parties are seriously working to disrupt relations and counteract our efforts to improve relations. I trust that this danger is also clear to the Latvian Government and that it will take timely steps to remove it.[1]

Particularly friendly relations with Lithuania prevail. We believe that in the interests of peace in eastern Europe the greater precision introduced into our relations with Lithuania will be a substantially useful factor. Similarly our friendly relations with Finland are growing steadily stronger and firmer. We have concluded about 30 conventions with Finland regulating all aspects of our relations as neighbours.

We are also deeply interested in the maintenance and further development of the existing friendly relations with the three Scandinavian States. In the last few years Sweden has occupied a most important place in our foreign trade, and its present exports to us far exceed the pre-war figure.

Recently we concluded a commercial agreement with Norway, under which a number of disputed questions was settled and the reciprocal satisfaction of the economic needs of the two countries facilitated. Since the resumption of diplomatic relations with these two Scandinavian States we have had no friction or conflicts.

Normal relations are still absent between our Union and certain European States, such as Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Belgium, Holland, etc.

We place great value on good relations with all States, wherever situated, and therefore regret that some of them still suffer from the illusion that it is possible to force us to agree to preliminary conditions for recognition. They would do well to realize once and for all that our Government has firmly decided not to give these States any privileges, any undertaking, any promises, in exchange for recognition. It will calmly wait until the Governments and peoples of these countries come to realize that the establishment of normal relations with a country of 150 million people is no less valuable and advantageous for them than for our Union, and that the examination of questions in dispute can begin only the day after recognition, and not the day before or the same day.

Not the last reason for the English Government's hostility toward us is the development in China of the national-revolutionary movement, which leading English politicians regard, or rather pretend to regard, as the outcome of our alleged agitation and our alleged incitements.

[1] cf. *Izvestia*, 6, 13, and 28 February 1926.

The period beginning roughly last autumn may be described as one of planned attack by aggressive imperialism on the Far East, in which the leading part has been played by English diplomacy. Of course, the development of the internal forces of the Chinese revolution has not ceased, but lately, as the full extent of the Chinese problem has been grasped by the imperialist Powers, the international situation has become incomparably more difficult for the development of the national liberation movement in China. The struggle of the militarist groups and their changing fortunes is not without its effect on the development of the internal forces of the Chinese national liberation movement. The success of the national armies in particular had enormous importance last year in the sense of assisting the development of the national liberation social forces, the creation of favourable conditions for the development of the workers' and peasants' movement, and the elimination of the danger of the physical bloody suppression of the masses in the national revolutionary movement. It is easy enough to understand then that world reaction set itself the task of creating a united front against the national armies. At the present time we must reckon with this state of affairs, while fully aware at the same time that the national liberation movement of 400 million will continue to advance steadily forward.

We do not conceal our sympathy with a movement whose programme is the creation of a revived, free, and fully sovereign democratic China. But our Government adheres strictly to the principle that every nation must itself arrange its own destiny. We think that the realization of China's national tasks is the business of the Chinese people themselves. In this as in other cases, the basic principle of our diplomacy is non-interference in the affairs of other States. Loyal and correct relations with the Chinese Government, with the legitimate central political authority of the Chinese nation, and with all local authorities—that is the abiding principle of our policy in China, given true expression by our ambassador in China, Comrade Karakhan. We indignantly reject the insinuations of those who have recently been trying to make a distinction between our plenipotentiary representative in Peking and our Government, to represent his policy as something different from the Government's policy. When the local authorities in Canton pursue a policy which is of the greatest benefit for the broad masses of the population, a policy drawn from the Kuomintang programme, we of course welcome it. Let the London *Times* tell you what that policy is--a newspaper which can hardly be suspected of sympathy for the revolutionary liberation movement in China. This is how *The Times* describes the Canton Government's policy:

[Hong-kong confesses, with British bluntness, that] whatever the label worn by the Canton Government, it is more nearly a Government than any Canton

has had for some years. It has reunified the province of Kwangtung. It has a policy, and it appears to be determined to put down official corruption, which has been the bane of China. Canton is clean, and more or less peaceful, and for six months has done without Hong-kong.[1]

That is the policy with which we sympathize.

On the other hand we are trying to get normal friendly relations with the local government in our neighbour Manchuria. Two years ago the representative of the Three Eastern Provinces, that is, of Manchuria, attended the agricultural exhibition at Moscow and even presented a banner. We should like to remain on such friendly relations with the ruler of Manchuria, Chang Tso-lin, if he himself does not make this impossible by hostile attacks or a hostile policy. I am glad of the opportunity of informing you that one such incident has been satisfactorily settled. I refer to the note published in the Harbin press and, I think, republished briefly in our own press, of the Mukden central diplomatic office which attacked Comrade Karakhan. Comrade Serebriakov, whom we sent to Manchuria, reports that after a short conversation with Chang Tso-lin they exchanged the following note:

> The representative of the Central Diplomatic Office of the Three Eastern Provinces on the one hand, and the Soviet Consul-General in Mukden on the other, taking into account the circumstances of the origin of the correspondence between the Central Diplomatic Office and the Consul-General in the period between 9 and 12 April 1926, as expressed in the exchange of notes from the Consul-General of 9 and 11 April, and from the Central Diplomatic Office of 12 April, have agreed on the mutual withdrawal of the said notes.

The Manchurian question is of particular importance for us because of the Chinese Eastern Railway, the main artery of our railway communications with the Far East. On this question we take our stand on the execution of the 1924 treaty. We regard it as essential to respect most strictly the sovereign rights of China, through whose territory the railway runs, and we think it essential to eliminate anything which might infringe them. We regard the railway as a commercial undertaking in which we have equal rights with China. We think it necessary to draw up regulations in the greatest detail which will secure all China's legitimate demands and at the same time preserve our treaty rights on the CER and protect Russian workers and employees from arbitrary action.

Manchuria plays a specially important part in international affairs also because we encounter there the political and economic interests of Japan, whom we are most ready, within the limits of possibility, to meet half way. We think Japan has a most powerful part to play in the world,

[1] *The Times*, 24 March 1926.

and we are trying by every means to come to terms with it. Since the subjects of our negotiations are on Chinese territory, we think it necessary that China should take part in them, represented by the central Government and the local authorities. Friendly relations with Japan constitute one of the fundamental tasks of our diplomacy. The negotiations between us and Japan about concessions in Sakhalin have ended successfully. We are now conducting negotiations with Japanese citizens on timber concessions in the Far East and are working out a fisheries agreement. But we want to go further. We would like to settle questions in dispute with Japan on such a broad basis as to place our friendly relations with that country on a firm and enduring foundation.

In Turkey the entire policy of the Kemalist Government, aimed at guarding the Turkish people from subjection to the economic rule of foreign capital, creates a deep contradiction between Turkish policy and the aspirations of the great Powers. We have the deepest sympathy for the desire of the Turkish people to liberate themselves from such domination. Politically our friendship with Turkey, based on treaties and on the general requirements of retaining its independence, has been given a new foundation with the signature in Paris of the treaty of neutrality, non-aggression, and non-participation in hostile combinations.

In Afghanistan we welcome the growing stabilization of the authority of the present Government, which expresses the policy of the Afghan national party and supports the programme of creating a modernized, progressive, nationally free Afghanistan.

The formation of the national Union Republics in Central Asia, as we have more than once stated, is not in the slightest degree intended to create complications with neighbouring States; on the contrary, the establishment of completely normal relations with local nations on the basis of creating local republics out of them, should, by and large, reflect favourably on our relations with the peoples of the East generally, and therefore with the States bordering on Central Asia. We must in any case protest against any insinuation in the press hostile to us which attributes to us or our Union Republics annexationist aspirations. The quick settlement of the question of the Urta-Tugai island[1] by referring it to a mixed commission showed how easily, when both parties' basic political line takes a favourable direction, accidental and temporary incidents can be settled and rapidly pass, leaving no trace behind.

In concluding this survey of the international situation, let me note the steadily growing role and influence of the Soviet Union both in the West and in the East. Our diplomacy will as before continue to follow carefully all the movements of our enemies, open and secret, frustrating their crafty intentions and exposing their hostile machinations. In trying

[1] Kluchnikov & Sabanin, iii, 1, p. 339.

to strengthen the security of our State, we do not aim at injuring the interests of any other State with which we have normal and friendly relations. The basic factor of our diplomacy was and remains our desire to extend friendly connexions with other nations, to place them on a firm foundation, and together with this to contribute by all means to the general peace not in words, but in deeds.

STATEMENT BY THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR TO FRANCE ON THE SOVIET-GERMAN TREATY

26 *April* 1926 *Le Temps*, 26 *April* 1926

I am anxious to set in its true light the history of this treaty. It has been said in the press that the treaty is a reply to the Locarno pact. That is not at all true. Negotiations with Germany, like the negotiations with Poland—not to speak of other countries—have been carried on for a fairly long time. Their object was to create relations of lasting peace and amity between the Union and these countries.

We reached a conclusion more quickly with Germany than with Poland because of the absence of that complex of problems involved by our common frontier with the latter. But we hope to reach agreement with Poland as well as with the Baltic States, with whom we are also negotiating.

As regards the nature of the treaty with Germany, I confirm that it is a treaty of non-aggression and reciprocal neutrality. Underlying it is the same leading idea which was expressed in the treaty with Turkey, that is, peace.

PROTOCOL ON THE OPTION OF CITIZENSHIP OF SOVIET AND TURKISH CITIZENS IN THE FRONTIER AREA

31 *May* 1926 *Sobranie Zakonov*, 1927, ii, p. 743

The undersigned, acting respectively on behalf of the Government of the USSR and the Government of the Turkish Republic,

Recognizing the usefulness of fixing a time limit for carrying out article 12 of the treaty between Russia and Turkey signed in Moscow 16 March 1921 and article 13 of the treaty between the Governments of the Soviet Socialist Republics of Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia on the one part, and the Government of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey on the other part, signed at Kars with the participation of the RSFSR 13 October 1921,[1]

[1] *Soviet Documents*, i, pp. 237, 263.

Have agreed to the following provisions:

1.

The inhabitants of the territories mentioned in article 12 of the said treaty of Moscow and in article 13 of the said treaty of Kars who wish to take advantage, in accordance with the conditions of the said articles, of the right to leave the territory of the country in which they are living, may do so within the period of one year from the day when the present protocol enters into force.

2.

The present protocol shall be ratified as soon as possible.

It will enter into force on the day when the instruments of ratification are exchanged, which exchange shall be effected in Ankara.

In confirmation of which the undersigned have signed the present protocol and have affixed thereto their seals.

Done in duplicate in Moscow
31 May 1926

Georgii Chicherin
Zekiai

NOTE FROM THE SOVIET CHARGÉ D'AFFAIRES IN LONDON ON SOVIET CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE BRITISH GENERAL STRIKE FUNDS

12 *June* 1926 *Anglo-Sovetskie Otnoshenia*, p. 91

The Home Secretary, Sir William Joynson-Hicks, on 10 June made the following statement in the House of Commons: 'During the general strike the Russian Government did send money to this country, transferring funds for the purposes of the strike.'[1]

I have to state that the Soviet Government has never sent money to English strikers. All the details referring to the sums sent, to those who sent them, and to those who received them, are no doubt well known to His Majesty's Government.

For its part, the Soviet Government could not interfere with the right of the Russian trade unions to dispose of funds belonging to them, or of moneys specially raised for this purpose.

[1] *H.C. Deb.* 5 s., vol. 196, col. 1680.

REPLY TO THE BRITISH NOTE ON SOVIET FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE TO BRITISH MINERS

15 *June* 1926

The Times, 16 *June* 1926
Anglo-Sovetskie Otnoshenia, p. 92

Having perused the memorandum[1] the British Government handed to the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs on 12 June the Soviet Government considers it necessary to point out to the British Government that in the Soviet Union there is not a total prohibition of the export of currency but only a restriction of the export which requires a permit in each individual case. The Soviet Government, expressing the will of the workmen and peasants of the USSR, could not forbid the trade unions which are organized by the millions of workmen of the USSR to send money abroad to render support to trade unions of another country.

At the same time the Soviet Government calls the attention of the British Government to utterances, not agreeing with the real facts and not in accord with normal relations between governments, made by some members of the British Government who stated that the sum remitted to the General Council of the British Trade Unions was sent by the Soviet Government while in reality it was sent by the Central Council of the all-Russian Union of Trade Unions, in agreement with the Soviet trade union centres.

TASS STATEMENT ON THE CREDIT AGREEMENT WITH GERMAN BANKS

27 *June* 1926

Izvestia, 27 *June* 1926

Tass learns from well-informed sources that the German telegram[2] refers to the financing of the 300 million mark German credits, guaranteed by the German Government. As has already been made known, the German banks, led by the Deutscher Bank, originally demanded payment of 11¾ per cent annually for the use of the credits, whereas the Reichsbank rate was 8 per cent. Because of this demand negotiations were broken off in January of this year, as the Soviet Government declared that it was not ready to pay more than 10 per cent for these credits, that is, 2 per cent more than the Reichsbank rate. Negotiations with the German banking consortium were resumed only a few days ago thanks to the mediation of the German Government, and the settlement of the question was facilitated by a reduction in the Reichsbank rate from 8 to 6½ per cent. Corresponding to this change, the Soviet proposal amounted to the payment of 8½ per cent annually. The compromise accepted yesterday thanks to the co-operation of the

[1] *The Times*, 16 June 1926. [2] *Izvestia*, 27 June 1926.

German Government, on the payment of 9·4 per cent annually, represents a substantial approximation to the Soviet position and clears the road for the wide-scale utilization of the credits guaranteed by the German Government for the re-equipment of our industry and the industrialization of our country.

NARKOMINDEL STATEMENT ON THE BRITISH WHITE PAPER ON RUSSIAN AID TO BRITISH STRIKERS

27 *June* 1926 *Anglo-Sovetskie Otnoshenia*, p. 93

In the last few days a number of speeches have been made by members of the English Government about relations with the USSR, the last being the speech of Sir Austen Chamberlain in the House of Commons on 25 June. The day before, on 24 June, the White Book published by the English Government appeared, containing documents which, according to the publisher, were seized on the premises of the English Communist Party at the time of the raid in October of last year.[1]

All these facts have aroused great interest, and a certain alarm in the press and among the workers and the public, and the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs considers it necessary to make this statement on the matter.

The Soviet Government will only be in a position to make an exhaustive statement about the collection of documents published by the English Government when it has received the book. What leaps to the eye is that these documents, of which according to its own statement, the English Government has been in possession for nearly a year, are only now being cited by English ministers. In any case, the Soviet Government states in the most categorical fashion that the Soviet trade delegation in England, like other Soviet trade organizations abroad, as well as its diplomatic agencies, have refrained absolutely, and do refrain, from any connexion whatever with foreign communist parties, and in general from any interference in the internal political life of the country in which they work.

The spokesmen of the English Government are trying to interpret the fraternal help given by the workers of the USSR and their trade union organizations to the strike in England as an act of intervention by the Soviet Government in the internal affairs of the British Empire. While I think it beneath our dignity to reply to the crude and intolerable onslaughts made in this connexion by certain English ministers on the USSR, its working class, and its trade union organizations, the Soviet Government points out that the adherence of any Government to any

[1] Cmd. 2682.

given political party, and the predominant position of one political party or another in the trade unions, is a common enough phenomenon. But nobody has ever drawn from this fact the conclusions to be found in the speeches of English Government spokesmen in regard to the Soviet trade unions. The part played by the Communist Party in the workers' movement of the USSR and in its trade unions cannot in the slightest degree weaken the principle of their independent initiative and activity in all matters concerned with the defence of working-class interests and the trade union struggle, and that of course includes relations with fraternal organizations in other countries and mutual aid in case of need. These trade union rights, recognized, though in a more restricted form, at least *de jure* in all west European countries, are guaranteed in the USSR both *de jure* and *de facto* by the very nature of the State and the substance of its political authority.

The Soviet Government notes with satisfaction the statement of the British Foreign Secretary on the undesirability of the severance of diplomatic relations between the two countries, and on the fatal effect of any such severance on the further course of peaceful relations.[1] But the Soviet Government is bound to protest most emphatically against, and to refute, his contention, which has no foundation whatever, that the USSR does not observe its treaty with England. It must be stated most explicitly and clearly that ever since the 1921 treaty has been in force, there has not been a single act, on the Russian side, which is in conflict with the provisions of this treaty. The last conclusion drawn in the British minister's statement, in this connexion, is in sharp contradiction to the Soviet Government's position. While the British minister, on the basis of untrue assertions, draws the conclusion that an improvement of relations between the USSR and England is impossible, the Soviet Government is of the opinion that an improvement of relations between the two States would be the greatest achievement for the peaceful development of international relations. The Soviet Government's deep love of peace, and its anxiety to settle all conflicts threatening the general peace, are thus in sharp contrast with the British Government's policy, which officially refuses improved relations with the greatest State on the continent.

The degree of friendliness in the relations between States is expressed primarily in their economic relations. The most important part of the speech of the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Churchill, was his attacks, which were clearly aimed at prejudicing economic relations between England and the USSR.[2] These attacks by the man who was chiefly responsible for English intervention in the Soviet Republic in 1918–19

[1] Statement in the House of Commons, 25 June 1926.
[2] *The Times*, 21 June 1926.

clearly pursue the same objectives as regards the Soviet Republic as those which he has set himself since its formation. Churchill has not forgotten the blockade and intervention, and his present speech was designed to promote the renewal of economic blockade against us. Of course, we might have treated Churchill's statements with less seriousness, knowing that his words could never be taken at their face value, were it not for his position as Chancellor of the Exchequer.

Throughout its existence the Soviet Government has tried hard to develop commercial relations with England, clearly beneficial to both countries. Although the English Government has not extended to Anglo-Soviet trade either the Trade Facilities or the Export Credits Act, and the English Treasury has never assisted that trade in any way, it has developed steadily and is continuing to grow. The Soviet Government protests most emphatically against the assertion that it does not always meet its commercial obligations. No Soviet trade organization has ever failed to meet its obligations, and everybody who has had dealings with them is bound to agree that all their obligations have always been most carefully carried out. Churchill's statement, suggesting the idea that the credits received by the Soviet Government may not be repaid, is most sharply at variance with the facts, and can hardly mislead anybody. But it is impossible to deny that such a speech by the English Government's finance minister is most sharply at variance with the elementary proprieties in the relations between States.

The Soviet Government finds it completely incomprehensible that such speeches by responsible members of the Government should be permitted and tolerated, being clearly in conflict with the interests not only of a foreign but of their own State. The Soviet Government regards as false the contention frequently made by members of the English Government, that normal relations between England and the USSR are more necessary to the latter than to the former. The Soviet Government contends that these normal relations are necessary for both countries. If these members of the English Government think that, as regards the questions in dispute between England and the USSR, they can by such statements force the Soviet Government to make any concessions, they are deeply mistaken. The Soviet Government places the highest value on its relations with England and is wholly desirous that these shall be maintained, and in particular that trade between the two countries shall be developed to the maximum, but at the same time it is sufficiently aware of the part the Soviet Union plays in world political and economic affairs, of its strength and its power, not to yield to the pressure of hostile, frivolously tendentious, and grossly unbecoming sallies of individual members of any other Government pursuing aims which are in conflict with the interests, not only of both States, but of the

peaceful course of international relations. In precisely the same way the Soviet Government, taking note of the official statements of the leader of the British Empire's foreign policy, declares for its part that it notes them with satisfaction as regards the undesirability of a break between the two States, but it considers the views of the British minister incorrect as regards the alleged impossibility of an improvement in political and economic relations between England and the USSR.

NOTE FROM THE SOVIET ENVOY IN HELSINKI TO THE FINNISH FOREIGN MINISTER ON THE PROPOSED GUARANTEE PACT

12 *July* 1926 Kluchnikov & Sabanin, iii, 1, p. 346

. . . I now have the opportunity of informing you that as a result of a thorough examination of the aide-mémoire (of 5 May)[1] B. S. Stomoniakov, a member of the Collegium of the Foreign Affairs Commissariat, has had two conversations with the Finnish ambassador in Moscow. . . . In the course of these conversations the question arose of the desirability of clarifying and approximating the point of view of both parties on those questions which were touched upon in the aide-mémoire of 5 May, and for this purpose to start verbal negotiations. In particular, my Government raised the question of the correct interpretation to be placed upon the Finnish Government's proposal in regard to the Aaland Islands, since the convention of 20 October 1921[2] is not recognized by the Soviet Government, which disputed it. At the same time more exact information was requested regarding the attitude of the Finnish Government to point 3 of the aide-mémoire, dealing with peaceful means for settling disputes between the two countries.

On 28 June Mr Ambassador Haksell kindly informed B. S. Stomoniakov that my Government's proposal on the method of conducting negotiations for the conclusion of a guarantee pact was acceptable. Mr Haksell at the same time indicated that the Finnish Government proposes that relations between the USSR and Finland in regard to the Aaland Islands be regulated in their full extent by means of a special agreement. Mr Haksell put forward the idea of the signature of a similar special convention on peaceful means for settling disputes.

In furtherance of this object I now have the honour to inform you that my Government is disposed to enter immediately into verbal negotiations for the conclusion of a guarantee pact with Finland. The object of these negotiations should be the all-round clarification and approximation of all the points of view of both parties on those questions which are to be settled within the framework of such a pact, by which means

[1] Kluchnikov & Sabanin, iii, 1, p. 344. [2] *State Papers*, cxiv, p. 421.

the scope of the questions to be dealt with in the projected instrument would be determined. This would also provide the opportunity, at the conclusion of the negotiations, for drafting the guarantee pact and reaching final agreement on the basis of the draft. At the same time I have the honour to confirm that my Government is ready to enter into negotiations with Finland for settling the Aaland Island question in its full extent and concluding a special agreement on that question, provided that the negotiations on this subject are conducted as part of the general negotiations for a guarantee pact and that the agreement will be signed simultaneously with the guarantee pact as an annex to it. Similarly, the Finnish Government's proposal for the conclusion of a convention on the peaceful settlement of disputes is acceptable on the same terms.

In informing you that my Government has instructed me to conduct verbal negotiations with you, as I have already stated, may I at the same time convey to you my Government's hope that this method of negotiation will in the greatest degree serve the aim of reaching agreement quickly on the guarantee pact, and that such a pact will provide a new and solid basis for the development and consolidation of good-neighbourly relations and peaceful collaboration between the USSR and Finland.

PROTEST FROM CHICHERIN TO THE BULGARIAN FOREIGN MINISTER AGAINST FORCIBLE REPATRIATION INTO SOVIET TERRITORY

13 *July* 1926 Kluchnikov & Sabanin, III, I, p. 347

Although it has little hope of any practical result from its protests to the Bulgarian Government against the system of forcible repatriation which has grown up so long as the extreme reactionaries are in power in Bulgaria, the Soviet Government nevertheless considers it necessary by these means to draw the attention of all civilized countries to the said practice of the Bulgarian Government, which is an unparalleled violation not only of international law but of the elementary requirements of humanity. At the same time it publicly places on the Bulgarian Government responsibility for all the reprisals which it will be compelled to take in the future both against persons resident within the USSR without permission and in particular against those in charge of the vessels which brought them.

INTERVIEW BY YURENEV, SOVIET MINISTER IN PERSIA, ON SOVIET-PERSIAN RELATIONS

29 *July* 1926 *Izvestia*, 29 *July* 1926

Since the end of last year Persian-Soviet trade has been somewhat restricted. This has come about because the Persian Government has switched all its transport to the removal of grain bought from us at the end of 1925, virtually depriving our commercial organizations of any means of transport.

We do not regard this as representing any unfriendly move on the part of the Persian Government, but it has nevertheless caused extreme complications for our commercial organizations in Persia. In connexion with this and a number of other circumstances, the Soviet Government was compelled to close the frontier temporarily to Persian exports,[1] while granting the maximum of privilege to Persian traders who desired to complete the purchase of Soviet goods in the territory of the USSR. The Soviet Government has striven and is still striving to equalize as far as possible the balance of trade with Persia. At the same time the Soviet Government, feeling sincere friendliness towards the Persian people, has made it possible for Persian merchants to export first to the Baku fair and now to the Nizhni-Novgorod fair the quantities of goods which have accumulated abroad.

The attitude of Persian merchants to the Nizhni-Novgorod fair is excellent. Many notable merchants have already arrived. Persian merchants have brought rice, Morocco-leather, wool, cotton, and other merchandise. They have undertaken to buy Soviet goods to the extent of the proceeds from the sale of their own goods. It is to be hoped that sooner or later commercial relations between the USSR and Persia will finally return to their normal course.

Speaking of the political relations of Persia and the USSR, Comrade Yurenev stated that they were on the way to an effective, good-neighbourly settlement. The appointment of Ali Gholi Khan Ansari, former Minister in Moscow, as Minister of Foreign Affairs, gave us grounds to hope that the settlement of Persian-Soviet affairs would proceed at a quicker pace.

There were before the Persian and Soviet Governments a series of questions which had been awaiting settlement for some years. Such questions were: the fisheries, customs, consular, and frontier conventions.

Comrade Yurenev declared that he was convinced that certain difficulties connected with the discussion of these questions would soon be overcome. These questions were of great import to Persia and the USSR. Relations between friendly neighbouring peoples should be

[1] cf. *The Times*, 5 April 1926.

expressed in a firm and perfectly clear manner. The enemies of Persia and the USSR would not succeed in casting a shadow over their relations, for the interests linking Persia and the USSR were too vital.

Comrade Yurenev considered that the visit to Teheran of Comrade Moiseyev, the aviator, would undoubtedly contribute to the strengthening of friendly relations between Persia and the USSR. Moiseyev had received an excellent and attentive welcome in Teheran and had handed to the Premier, Mustafa al-Mamelek, a letter from Comrade Chicherin. The people of Teheran were delighted at the speed of the flight and at the good condition of the Soviet machine.

TELEGRAM FROM CHICHERIN TO THE BULGARIAN FOREIGN MINISTER ON FORCED REPATRIATION

3 *August* 1926 — *Izvestia*, 4 *August* 1926

I am compelled to state that, although your reply[1] to my telegram of 13 July contains many substantial inexactitudes, it indirectly confirms in full the facts concerning the misfortunes and sometimes the loss of life suffered by repatriates, through the fault of the Bulgarian Government. Since you insist that the cause of these evils was the 'common fault of both Governments' I must return to the question and correct those distortions of the facts which could, in the eyes of uninformed persons, remove the blame from the Bulgarian to the Soviet Government. You will remember that in 1923 a number of prominent workers, engaged in returning to their homeland former soldiers of the White armies, and certain employees of the Soviet Red Cross were killed, with the full support of the Bulgarian Government by murderers who have still not been traced, and at the same time members of the Red Cross Mission in Sofia were arrested, some of them beaten, and were expelled from Bulgaria. The legitimate demands of the Soviet Government, directed towards ensuring the extraterritorial rights of members of the Soviet Mission, and such further repatriation as was possible, were categorically rejected by the Bulgarian Government.[2] In such circumstances the entire legal and moral responsibility for the fate of repatriates in Bulgaria, deprived by the Bulgarian Government of any defence of their own interests, devolves upon that Government.

Similarly your statement that the instances of repatriates being put out to sea in old, unseaworthy sailing boats or damaged motor-boats, were few, is equally untrue. You will hardly suspect of tendentiousness the information of the Sofia newspaper *Zora* which after the dispatch of my telegram carried an article entitled 'New Victims in the Black

[1] *Izvestia*, 4 August 1926. [2] Kluchnikov & Sabinin, iii, 1, p. 285.

Sea', describing the martyrdom of passengers who left Varna for Odessa. In the words of the paper 'there were sixty Russians in the boats—men, women and children. At sea the overloaded boats were overtaken by a severe storm against which they were powerless. Two boats were lost in the storm, and with them forty people, including women and children. The third boat was saved by chance and was washed into Kustenji harbour.'

It only remains to establish whether the Bulgarian authorities really had nothing to do with these embarkations. All the facts at the disposal of the Soviet Government bear witness to the contrary, and the Government has no grounds for doubting them.

In my telegram of 13 July I pointed out that special offices for dealing with the embarkation of repatriates to the USSR were operating legally in Sofia, although they have no authority for the work. . . .

Such is the history of the question. I regret that I cannot give an answer in substance to your complaint that the Soviet Government sends arms into Bulgaria by persons supplied with legal visas. This complaint is too lacking in evidence. You give neither names nor dates. If you will compare these statements of the Bulgarian police with the fact that since the rupture between the USSR and Bulgaria in 1923 all relations between the two countries have been discontinued, it will be evident to you that this information is unsubstantiated. The Soviet Government would be glad to receive from you a precise list of such cases. As regards repatriation, all that has been said above will assist the 'civilized world' to which you appeal to decide on whom falls the responsibility for the curtailment of legal repatriation and the introduction of a system of illegal shipping of people to the frontiers of the USSR.

DECREE OF THE CENTRAL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE AND THE COUNCIL OF PEOPLE'S COMMISSARS ON THE METHOD OF COMMUNICATION BETWEEN GOVERNMENT INSTITUTIONS AND OFFICIALS OF THE USSR AND THE UNION REPUBLICS AND GOVERNMENT INSTITUTIONS AND OFFICIALS OF FOREIGN STATES

27 *August* 1926 *Sobranie Zakonov*, 1926, i, p. 1018

I.

1. Communication between Government institutions and officials of the USSR and the Union Republics, and Government institutions and officials of foreign States abroad is effected through the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs of the USSR.

No other means of communication may be employed except by direct legal instruction to that effect, or under the provisions of valid treaties

entered into by the USSR, or by special agreement between the respective Government institutions or officials of the USSR or of the Union Republics and the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs.

2. Communication between Government institutions and officials of the USSR and Union Republics and foreign diplomatic missions on the territory of the USSR is effected through the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, or by its instructions or with its consent.

Note 1. The Central Administration of the People's Commissariat for Foreign and Internal Trade of the USSR has the right to communicate directly with commercial counsellors and commercial attachés of the foreign diplomatic missions on current economic matters which have no political character; on all questions of principle arising out of such communication the People's Commissariat for Foreign and Internal Trade must immediately inform the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs.

Note 2. The method of communication between the Government institutions and officials of the USSR and the Union Republics and foreign consular agencies in the USSR shall be determined by the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs in accordance with the treaties in force and with the laws of the USSR, and, where necessary, in agreement with the Council of People's Commissars of the Union Republic concerned. The method of communication between the military and naval authorities of the USSR and foreign military and naval attachés shall be determined by agreement between the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs and the People's Commissariat for Military and Naval Affairs.

3. Should Government institutions and officials of the USSR or the Union Republics receive from foreign Government institutions or officials abroad, or from foreign diplomatic missions in the USSR, any written communication on questions of a political or State economic character, they must forward such communications to the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, without replying to them, together with all the information available on the subject of the communication in question which may assist the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs to reply to the foreign State institution or official. In the case of personal representations on the part of foreign State institutions abroad, or of foreign diplomatic missions in the USSR on such matters, the Government institutions and officials of the USSR and the Union Republics must confine themselves to pointing out that such representations should be made to the appropriate agency of the People's Com-

missariat for Foreign Affairs, and must immediately notify the latter of the occurrence of the interview.

4. The method of communication laid down in article 3 shall not apply to the Government institutions and officials of the USSR and the Union Republics on questions of a cultural or routine character (in particular, it does not apply to scientific and educational institutions, to post and telegraph offices, to the offices and agencies of the railway, water, and air transport services, the customs, militia, and fire services, to savings banks and information offices), provided that the matter concerned is within the competence of these offices or persons.

5. Officials of the USSR and the Union Republics who violate the provisions of this decree will be held responsible under criminal or disciplinary procedure.

II.

6. It is proposed that the Councils of People's Commissars of the Union Republics publish within one month a list of the decrees which lose their validity on the entry into force of the present decree.

NARKOMINDEL STATEMENT ON THE MEMORANDUM OF THE ESTONIAN AND LATVIAN GOVERNMENTS ON THE PROPOSED GUARANTEE PACT

27 *August* 1926 *Izvestia*, 27 *August* 1926

The following memorandum from the Latvian Government was handed to Comrade Borkusevich, chargé d'affaires of the USSR in Riga:

With reference to the communications which you have addressed to me recently in the name of your Government, on the question of the conclusion of a guarantee pact between Latvia and the USSR, I have the honour to inform you that although the Latvian Government is still of the opinion, expressed in para. 6 of its last memorandum (24 July),[1] that a preparatory commission as proposed would be best suited for the discussion of questions connected with the conclusion of a treaty, the Latvian Government does not wish that this question of procedure should stand in the way of the settlement of the main question. Consequently the Latvian Government does not consider it essential to insist on the formation of a preparatory commission, and is agreeable to direct negotiations with the Soviet Government. However, in order to avoid any misunderstanding, I consider it my duty to inform you at the same time that the Latvian Government reserves full liberty of action in the matter of maintaining contact with other States which are directly interested in the settlement of this question.

[1] Kluchnikov & Sabanin, III, I, p. 348 [misdated 24 June].

A similar memorandum has been received from the Estonian Government.

Accepting the abandonment by Latvia and Estonia of a preparatory commission with great satisfaction, the Soviet Government has directed its representatives in Riga and Reval to proceed immediately with negotiations for the conclusion of a guarantee pact with these countries.

NARKOMINDEL STATEMENT ON THE SOVIET PROPOSAL FOR A NON-AGGRESSION PACT WITH POLAND

28 *August* 1926 — *Izvestia*, 28 *August* 1926

Some days ago the plenipotentiary representative of the USSR in Warsaw handed to the Polish Minister for Foreign Affairs a draft treaty covering non-aggression, the joint renunciation of all aggressive actions, a mutual guarantee of neutrality in the event of an attack on either by a third Power, non-participation in political and economic agreements directed against the other party, and the settlement of disputed questions by a conciliation commission.

The Soviet Government expressed the wish that the pact might be signed during the visit to Moscow of M. Zaleski, Polish Minister for Foreign Affairs, expected in August, returning Comrade Chicherin's visit to Warsaw last year, but this proposal did not meet with the sympathy of the Polish Government. The return visit was to have taken place in May but had to be postponed because of the change of Government in Poland.

Because of Comrade Chicherin's illness the return visit of M. Zaleski has been postponed until late autumn.

TREATY OF NEUTRALITY AND NON-AGGRESSION BETWEEN THE USSR AND AFGHANISTAN, AND FINAL PROTOCOL

31 *August* 1926 — *Sbornik Dogovorov*, iv, p. 11

With a view to the consolidation of the friendly relations and the strengthening of amicable neighbourly connexions, happily existing between the USSR and the Sovereign State of Afghanistan on the basis of the treaty signed in Moscow 28 February 1921,[1] which remains in force in all its parts irrespective of whether the present treaty remains in force or is annulled, the plenipotentiaries of the two high contracting parties:

The plenipotentiary representative of the USSR in Afghanistan M. Leonid Stark and His Excellency the Foreign Minister of the Sovereign

[1] *Soviet Documents*, i, p. 233.

State of Afghanistan M. Mahmud-Bek-Khan-Tarzi on 31 August 1925 [1926] in the city of Paghman, having exchanged their credentials, which were found to be in due form, have drawn up and signed the following articles, designed to strengthen friendly relations between the two States and to ensure lasting peace.

I

In the event of war or of military action between one of the contracting parties and a third or several other Powers, the other contracting party undertakes to observe neutrality in regard to the first.

II

Each of the contracting parties undertakes to refrain from any attack on the other, and on its own territories it will take no steps which might inflict political or military injury on the other contracting party. In particular, each of the contracting parties undertakes not to take part in any alliances or agreements of a military or political character with another or several third Powers which might be directed against the other contracting party, or in any boycott or blockade of a financial or economic character directed against the other contracting party. Furthermore, should the conduct of a third Power or of third Powers towards one of the contracting parties be of an inimical character, the other contracting party undertakes not only to refrain from supporting such conduct, but is bound on its own territory to oppose it and the hostile actions and designs arising therefrom.

III

The high contracting parties, mutually recognizing their State sovereignty, undertake to refrain from any armed or unarmed intervention in the internal affairs of the other contracting party and they will refrain completely from assisting or participating in any intervention by a third or several third Powers which might take steps against the other contracting party. The contracting parties will not permit and will prevent on their territory the organization and activity of groups and the activity of individuals prejudicial to the other contracting party or which are aimed at the overthrow of the political regime of the other contracting party, or which make attempts on its territorial integrity, or which assemble and recruit armed forces against the other contracting party. In like manner the two sides will not allow or give permission for the passage through their territory of armed forces, arms, stores of firearms, military equipment, or any kind of war material designed for use against the other contracting party.

IV

The contracting parties agree to enter within four months into negotiations for establishing the method of settling differences which may arise between them and which cannot be settled by the customary diplomatic means.

V

Each of the contracting parties retains complete freedom of action to take steps to establish any sort of relations and alliances with third Powers which lie outside the limits of the obligations, the terms of which are set forth in the present treaty.

VI

The present treaty enters into force from the moment of its ratification, which shall take place not more than three months after its signature, and shall remain in force for three years. After the expiration of that term the treaty shall be considered as automatically prolonged for successive periods of one year unless either of the contracting parties shall inform the other contracting party six months before the expiration of the treaty of its desire to discontinue it.

VII

The present treaty is drawn up in two copies, in the Russian and Persian languages, both texts being authentic.

Paghman, 31 August 1926

Final Protocol

The undersigned, duly authorized to sign the treaty of neutrality and non-aggression between the USSR and the Sovereign State of Afghanistan, on signing the said treaty exchanged, on the instructions of their Governments, the following declarations:

Leonid Stark, plenipotentiary representative of the USSR in Afghanistan, declares that the Government of the USSR has instructed him to affirm on behalf of that Government that at the moment of signing the said treaty the Government of the USSR, faithful to the principles of the treaty concluded 28 February 1921, has no obligations whatever towards any or several States which might be inconsistent with the treaty of neutrality and non-aggression signed this 31 August. He declares in like manner on behalf of his Government that the Government of the USSR affirms that during the entire term of validity of the said treaty of neutrality and non-aggression it will not enter into any treaties or agreements which might be inconsistent with the present

treaty. The Government of the USSR is convinced that friendly relations between the USSR and the Sovereign State of Afghanistan will, on the basis of the Moscow treaty of 28 February 1921 and the Paghman treaty of 31 August 1926, develop steadily and serve the supreme goal of general peace.

NOTE FROM CHICHERIN TO THE CHINESE CHARGÉ D'AFFAIRES IN MOSCOW ON THE CHINESE EASTERN RAILWAY

31 *August* 1926 Kluchnikov & Sabanin, iii, 1, p. 350

The competent agencies of the Soviet Government on the Chinese Eastern Railway have informed us that Marshal Chang Tso-lin has put demands to the administration of the railway which radically violate the relevant provisions of the agreement of 31 May 1924 between the USSR and China, subsequently supplemented by the agreement of 20 September 1924 between the USSR and the Autonomous Government of the Three Eastern Provinces of China. The first amounts to the demand for the unilateral seizure of all vessels belonging to the railway, and the second to the demand for shutting down the educational department . . . of the railway and the transfer of all the railway schools . . . to the department of popular education attached to the chief administration of the special area of the Three Eastern Provinces of China.

The Soviet Government has more than once tried to regulate relations on the Chinese Eastern Railway, both with the Chinese Government and with the Autonomous Government of the Three Eastern Provinces, by the examination in a friendly spirit of all disputed questions, but for reasons beyond its control all these efforts have come to naught.

Even at the present time the Soviet Government is willing to examine all disputed questions arising from the said agreements between the USSR and China, but it protests categorically against unilateral action on the Chinese side in violation of the existing treaty rights of the USSR and Northern Manchuria.

The Soviet Government declares that it cannot allow actions by the Autonomous Government of the Three Eastern Provinces which violate existing treaties and deprive the USSR of rights on the Chinese Eastern Railway secured by treaty. It expects the immediate withdrawal of the said demands to the administration of the railway, and asks that these questions be transferred for examination to the diplomatic agencies of both Governments, which are functioning normally . . .

NOTE FROM THE SOVIET REPRESENTATIVES IN STOCKHOLM, LONDON, ROME, AND PARIS TO THE GOVERNMENTS CONCERNED ON THE PROPOSED CONFERENCE CONCERNING MOROCCO

2 *September* 1926 Kluchnikov & Sabanin, iii, 1, p. 352

The Soviet Government has been informed that the Spanish Government has approached the Powers which signed the General Act of the Algeciras Conference[1] with a proposal for the calling of a new conference to review the regulations established by the general act and by subsequent international conventions.

I am instructed by my Government to remind you that the participation of my country in the Algeciras Conference gives it the right to participate in the said review on an equal footing with other participants in the Algeciras Conference, to explain its attitude to the questions which are to be discussed in accordance with the principles underlying its present policy.

Accordingly I am authorized to declare, on behalf of my Government, that it reserves the right not to recognize decisions which may be taken on the said question in which it has taken no part. In particular my Government calls attention to the necessity of its agreeing to the place of the forthcoming conference, if it is to be convened.

NOTE FROM CHICHERIN TO THE CHINESE CHARGÉ D'AFFAIRES IN MOSCOW ON THE CHINESE EASTERN RAILWAY

7 *September* 1926 Kluchnikov & Sabanin, iii, 1, p. 351

Despite the emphatic warning contained in its note of 31 August to the Chinese Government . . . the Soviet Government has not only failed to receive an appropriate reply, but has information about further illegal actions by the authorities of the Three Eastern Provinces of China.

According to this information, the Chinese authorities in Harbin on 2 September seized all vessels and all the property connected with navigation belonging to the Chinese Eastern Railway, the seizure being accompanied by the expulsion of employees of the navigation offices of the railway and their replacement by other persons, while the flag of the railway flown by these vessels was hauled down and the flag of the Chinese naval department raised in its place. On 4 September the same authorities committed a further illegal act by forcibly expelling employees of the Chinese Eastern Railway from the premises of the educational department and its printing works.

While noting with indignation the unprecedented actions of the local

[1] *State Papers*, xcix, p. 141.

Chinese authorities, which not only grossly violate treaty relations between the USSR and the Chinese Republic, but are wholly intolerable between States which are in normal diplomatic relations with each other, the Soviet Government points out that the present Chinese Government cannot be unaware that by permitting such actions on the part of the authorities of the Three Eastern Provinces it is introducing grave difficulties into future normal diplomatic relations with the USSR; consequently the entire responsibility for the worsening of these relations will lie on the Chinese Government.

While stating once again its complete readiness to submit all disputed questions arising from the agreements in force between the two States to thorough examination, the Soviet Government expects the Chinese Government to take due measures for the immediate annulling of the said acts in violation of its rights, and for putting an end to a situation which might have the most unfavourable repercussions on the future relations of the two countries.

The Soviet Government is firmly convinced that the Chinese Government, in the interests of maintaining and developing further the relations of the two States, will not delay its reply or the taking of measures necessary to liquidate the conflict with the USSR.

SPEECH BY CHICHERIN ON THE SIGNATURE OF THE PACT OF NEUTRALITY AND NON-AGGRESSION WITH LITHUANIA

28 *September* 1926 *Izvestia*, 29 *September* 1926

In the name of the Government of the USSR I welcome M. Slyazhevich, chairman of the Council of Ministers and Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Lithuanian Republic, and now a guest of the workers' and peasants' State, on this occasion of the great strengthening of friendly relations between the peoples of the Union and the Lithuanian Republic.

The treaty[1] which has just been signed, inspired by the sincere desire of the Soviet Union to strengthen friendly relations with the Lithuanian people, will itself make possible the further development and ordering of these relations.

This treaty with its guarantees, besides strengthening the friendship which exists between both peoples, and without at the same time infringing the legitimate interests of other States, also aims at promoting the consolidation of peace in Europe, a matter which now as in the past constitutes the basis of the international policy of the Soviet Government. I do not doubt that the signing of this treaty will contribute to the strengthening of the independence of the Lithuanian people.

[1] *League of Nations Treaty Series*, lx, p 145

I take the liberty of expressing my conviction that the signing of the treaty will also stimulate the further development of economic interrelations, on the basis of the trade agreement which is shortly to be concluded.

I propose a toast to the well-being and prosperity of the Lithuanian people, and to the strengthening of their international position.

I also propose a toast to the health of M. Slyazhevich, the author of the treaty which is to strengthen friendly relations between the peoples of the USSR and Lithuania.

NOTE FROM RAKOVSKY, SOVIET ENVOY IN PARIS, TO THE FRENCH FOREIGN MINISTER, PROTESTING AGAINST THE FRANCO-RUMANIAN TREATY OF 10 JUNE 1926

2 *October* 1926 — Kluchnikov & Sabanin, iii, 1, p. 354

Having read the text of the treaty[1] signed between France and Rumania on 10 June 1926, my Government has authorized me to inform you of the grave impression made on the peoples of the USSR by the conclusion of this treaty.

In virtue of this treaty the French Government in fact promises Rumania its collaboration in such a form and to such an unlimited extent as, while guaranteeing to Rumania support for the present territorial *status quo*, allows it to continue the illegal and forcible occupation of Bessarabia by force of arms. By this treaty France places itself on the side of the Rumanian Government which, despite the most elementary principles of international law and its own formal statements, and also the statements of the Allied diplomatic representatives, including the French representative, at Jassy in 1917, despite the repeated declarations made in the formal treaty[2] between General Avarescu and the Soviet Government in 1918, and finally, despite the frequently expressed desire of the Bessarabian people, refuses to carry out its undertakings and to evacuate territory belonging to the USSR.

The French Government should know that the peoples of the USSR, like the entire population of Bessarabia, have never consented and never will consent to regard as legal the occupation of Bessarabia or its annexation by Rumania, despite the repeated protests of the Government of the USSR and of the population of Bessarabia, at a time when the working masses of the Union, fighting for their freedom and independence, succeeded in defeating their oppressors, both internal and external.

In signing this treaty at a time when the USSR and France are in

[1] *League of Nations Treaty Series*, lviii, p. 225. [2] *Soviet Documents*, i, p. 65.

normal relations with each other, and when negotiations are proceeding between the two Governments aimed at removing, in the interests of both countries, those obstacles which hinder their friendly development, the French Government has aroused doubt in the minds of all the nationalities of the Union in the sincerity of its intention to work for closer relations between the two countries.

In promising Rumania its help in the event of war, and in proclaiming the community of French and Rumanian interests without mentioning Bessarabia, the French Government is supporting the aggressive and grasping tendencies of the Rumanian ruling circles. In doing so it lessens the chances of a peaceful settlement of the Bessarabian question on the basis of the right of national self-determination, and intensifies the danger to peace in eastern Europe.

I have to state that my Government cannot regard the conclusion by France of the treaty of guarantee with Rumania otherwise than as an unfriendly act, directed against the interests both of the USSR and of the Bessarabian population.

NOTE FROM KERZHENTSEV, SOVIET ENVOY IN ROME, TO THE ITALIAN PRIME MINISTER AND MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS PROTESTING AGAINST THE ITALIAN-RUMANIAN TREATY OF 16 SEPTEMBER 1926

6 *October* 1926 Kluchnikov & Sabanin, iii, 1, p. 355

The treaty of friendship between Italy and Rumania, signed on 16 September this year,[1] and the notes exchanged on the same day between the heads of the Italian and Rumanian Governments, could not fail to attract the most serious attention of my Government and have provoked wide repercussions among the popular masses of the Soviet Union.

As the Italian Government knows, the Soviet Union, as well as the broad masses of the Bessarabian population, protested and continue to protest most emphatically against the seizure of Bessarabian territory effected by Rumanian armed forces in 1918, and its retention under Rumanian rule by means of an army of occupation, in violation of the requirements of international law and of the obligations to the Soviet Government undertaken by the Rumanian Government in the person of its present Prime Minister General Avarescu, and despite the will of the Bessarabian population.

Acting on the principle of national self-determination and protecting the interests of the Bessarabian population, the Soviet Government has more than once stated, before the entire world, that it does not and will

[1] *League of Nations Treaty Series*, lxvii, p. 393.

not recognize any instrument under which Bessarabia, despite the will of its inhabitants, is said to be joined to Rumania.

With all the emphasis arising from the consciousness of its rights and the interests of the Soviet Union and the Bessarabian population, my Government has frequently declared that it accorded no validity whatever to the agreement[1] on Bessarabia signed in Paris 28 October 1920 by the representatives of a number of Powers, including Italy, regardless of whether or not the agreement was ratified by all the signatory Powers.

In these declarations the Soviet Government left not the slightest doubt that no decision on the Bessarabian question could be accepted without the participation and agreement of the Soviet Union, and that it would regard any such act as a sign of unfriendliness towards the Soviet Union.

That friendly relations between the USSR and Italy have developed so happily up to the present gave my Government the right to expect that the Italian Government would refrain from any act which might give ground for the presumption that Italy would adopt, on the question of Bessarabia's political status, an attitude inimical to the Soviet Union and opposed to the interests of Bessarabia.

To its profound regret, my Government is compelled to observe that in its note to General Avarescu the Italian Government not only failed to state that the treaty signed by Italy at a time when there were no normal diplomatic relations between the USSR and Italy was unacceptable, but found it opportune to refer to the possibility in the future of support by Italy for the 1920 treaty which is inimical to the USSR and in conflict with international law.

In protesting, on the instructions of my Government, against this new attempt to include the Bessarabian question as one which may be the subject of agreements between Italy and Rumania or any other third Power, I am authorized to direct the attention of the Italian Government to the fact that the realization of the possibility to which the Minister-President refers in his letter to General Avarescu would be a violation of the sovereign rights and interests of the Soviet Union incompatible with friendly relations between the two countries, would reinforce the aggressive and adventurist tendencies of the ruling circles of Rumania, and thereby diminish the possibility of the peaceful settlement of the Bessarabian question on the basis of national self-determination.

[1] *State Papers*, cxiii, p. 647.

PRESS INTERVIEW BY RAKOVSKY (PARIS) ON THE SOVIET-LITHUANIAN PACT

6 *October* 1926 *Izvestia*, 8 *October* 1926

In an interview with a representative of the Havas agency Comrade Rakovsky declared that the Soviet-Lithuanian treaty signed on 28 September was completely in accordance with the Soviet-Lithuanian treaty[1] of 1920, with article 3 of the Riga treaty,[2] and with the Soviet note[3] protesting against the seizure of Vilna by Zeligowski. After referring to Comrade Chicherin's statement that the treaty is not directed against the legitimate interests of third parties, Comrade Rakovsky emphasized the Soviet Government's efforts to conclude a non-aggression pact with Poland and, in particular, the latest formal Soviet proposal which, according to the Polish press, was 'attached to the file'. 'However', said Comrade Rakovsky, 'we must consider that that is not their last word. The assertion made in several French newspapers that the Soviet Government wants to conclude separate agreements with Poland and the other Baltic countries in order to isolate Poland, and therefore make it easier to attack it, is absurd. All the treaties of neutrality concluded by the USSR start from the assumption that they refer to the possibility not of the contracting parties being the aggressors, but to the possibility of their being the victims of aggression. On the assumption that the USSR was the aggressor, the undertaking to observe neutrality automatically falls to the ground. The Soviet Government cannot however agree to conclude a collective treaty in which the USSR was one of the contracting parties, and the other Poland together with the other Baltic States, *because that would mean ourselves creating an anti-Soviet coalition.* It would moreover mean the establishment of a protectorate by the strongest member of the coalition over its weaker members. This is not in the interests of the Baltic States themselves, whose independence should be defended from all sides.'

PRESS INTERVIEW BY ALEXANDROVSKY, SOVIET MINISTER IN LITHUANIA, ON THE SOVIET-LITHUANIAN TREATY AND VILNA

10 *October* 1926 *Izvestia*, 13 *October* 1926

The Soviet Union's peace policy, aimed at establishing close economic and political relations with all neighbouring States, has warded off certain dangers threatening the peaceful relations which have been established between the USSR and its nearest neighbours. The Soviet

[1] *League of Nations Treaty Series*, iii, p. 105. [2] ibid., vi, p. 51.
[3] *Soviet Documents*, i, p. 379.

Government's proposal to conclude guarantee pacts with its neighbours was warmly welcomed by the people and the ruling circles of Lithuania. The democratic Government of Lithuania responded willingly to the peoples of the USSR, who are trying to establish peaceful and friendly relations with all the peoples of the world. The Lithuanian-Soviet treaty is permeated with the sincere desire of both States to strengthen the friendship between them and to clear the path for the further ordering and development of Lithuanian-Soviet relations. In no way infringing the legitimate interests of third States, the treaty is aimed at promoting peace in eastern Europe.

After referring to the kind of attack to which the treaty has been subject in certain quarters, Comrade Alexandrovsky pointed out that the Lithuanian Republic, which was the first Baltic country to respond to the Soviet initiative concerning guarantee pacts, refuses to serve as an instrument of war intrigues, in whatever quarter they originate. In the clause of the treaty of particular importance to Lithuania—that dealing with the Vilna question—the Soviet Government has only reaffirmed its former attitude. Under this clause the Soviet Government, as before, is prepared to recognize any settlement of the Vilna question arrived at by voluntary agreement between Poland and Lithuania. Any decision on this question taken against the will of the Lithuanian people, by whomever taken and in whatever circumstances, cannot be binding on the USSR, which is always guided by the precise meaning of the treaty obligations it undertakes.

EXTRACTS FROM A SPEECH BY LITVINOV AT A RECEPTION TO VISITING GERMAN REICHSTAG DEPUTIES

11 *October* 1926 *Izvestia*, 13 *October* 1926

We are glad to observe that the mutual understanding in the political, economic, and cultural spheres is growing stronger and richer. German industry and trade occupy a notable place in Soviet relations with the outside world, and I am firmly convinced that as Soviet economy develops that place will become more and more important. The recently concluded agreement on credits by German to Soviet industry is an indication of the understanding of the mutual interests of the two States. Rightly continued and expanded, the mutual advantages and highly promising prospects of this policy in the field of trade and finance are quite obvious. The possibilities of Soviet-German economic collaboration are far from being exhausted, and they confront German industry and finance with new tasks corresponding to the interests of both countries . . .

The normal development of cultural and economic intercourse between two States presupposes also the parallel development and consolidation of political relations between them. We all have a lively memory of the political significance, both at the time it was signed and now, of the Rapallo treaty. Having emerged victoriously from the years of foreign intervention and blockade, the Soviet Union continued to feel the hostility of the entire capitalist world. Germany at that time was no better circumstanced, being unable to put up any resistance to the insults and blows falling on it in the name of Versailles. The two States stretched out friendly hands to each other, causing confusion and perplexity among their common enemies, and Germany was thus the first western State to understand the necessity of establishing normal and friendly relations with the Soviet Union.

On the other hand the Soviet Union was the first and only State to protest openly before the entire world both against the Versailles treaty, against the occupation of the Ruhr, and other acts hostile to Germany taken by the Conference of Ambassadors and the League of Nations.

Europe today is torn by a number of international contradictions no less, if not greater than, on the eve of the war. The separate treaties and alliances concluded in such abundance recently are far from contributing to peace. Although the majority of them are aimed, directly or indirectly, against the interests of the Soviet Union, we, refusing to yield to provocation, shall as before reply by consistent efforts for peace and by strengthening those elements in international affairs which can prevent new clashes . . . That is why the mutual co-ordination of Soviet and German efforts, and the loyal pursuit of the policy laid down in the agreements concluded between them, is a wholly irreplaceable guarantee of the preservation of peace in general and in particular in eastern Europe.

SOVIET-TURKISH PRESS COMMUNIQUÉ ON THE MEETING BETWEEN THE SOVIET FOREIGN COMMISSAR AND THE TURKISH FOREIGN MINISTER AT ODESSA

14 *November* 1926 *Izvestia*, 16 *November* 1926

The Turkish Foreign Minister M. Tewfik Rushdi Bey invited the Commissar for Foreign Affairs Comrade Chicherin to visit Turkey during his journey abroad. As it was impossible for Chicherin to take advantage of this invitation, the two Governments agreed that the meeting should take place at Odessa.

Tewfik Rushdi Bey and Chicherin, having jointly examined the questions of interest to the two Governments, came to the conclusion

that not one of the existing questions could change the direction of the policy of the two States, and consequently disturb the relations between them, that it is in the highest degree desirable to make these relations still closer and more cordial, and that the strengthening of these relations is of the utmost importance for the general peace.

REPLY TO POLISH REPRESENTATIONS CONCERNING THE SOVIET-LITHUANIAN TREATY OF 28 SEPTEMBER 1926: NOTE FROM THE SOVIET ENVOY IN WARSAW TO THE POLISH FOREIGN MINISTER

19 *November* 1926 Kluchnikov & Sabanin, iii, 1, p. 356

. . . Under article 3 of the Riga treaty the Soviet Government renounced rights and claims to the land lying to the west of the frontier established in article 2 of the same treaty, and at the same time undertook to recognize any agreement which might be arrived at between the Polish and Lithuanian Republics in regard to lands in dispute between them to the west of the said frontier.

Up to the present the Government of the USSR has received no notification of any such agreement from the Governments of the Polish and Lithuanian Republics. On the contrary, it has been informed by the Lithuanian Government that it regards the dispute on the Polish-Lithuanian frontier as still unsettled.

As to the decisions of the so-called Conference of Ambassadors, to which reference is made in the said note[1] from the Polish Government, the Government of the USSR cannot consider itself obliged to recognize in regard to this question the competence of any third party whatever, in particular not that of a conference held in a European capital of representatives of certain third States which cannot, whether on the grounds of historical, juridical, or moral right, lay claim to the right to dispose of the areas in dispute in the given case. The Government of the USSR has already had the honour of placing this point of view before the Government of the Polish Republic in its note[2] of 5 April 1923. The Government of the USSR is also aware that the competence of the said conference is also disputed by the Government of the Lithuanian Republic, and it does not consider that it has the right to enter into a discussion of the motives underlying the Lithuanian Government's attitude to the said conference.

At the same time the Government of the USSR declares that in signing the treaty of 28 September of this year with the Government of the Lithuanian Republic, it had no intention whatever of placing in

[1] Kluchnikov & Sabanin, iii, 1, p. 356. [2] *Soviet Documents*, i, p. 382.

doubt article 2 of the Riga treaty which fixes the frontier between the USSR and the Polish Republic.

The Soviet Government takes this opportunity of stating once again the unchanging desire of the peoples of the USSR to live in peace and friendship with all other peoples and their sincere wish to establish friendly relations with the Polish people.

EXTRACTS FROM A PRESS STATEMENT BY CHICHERIN ON HIS MEETING WITH THE TURKISH FOREIGN MINISTER

24 *November* 1926 *Izvestia*, 24 *November* 1926

A meeting between us was indispensable. It was necessary for the Turkish Foreign Minister and the Soviet Foreign Commissar by direct and personal discussions to examine together all the questions involving our two States in order by exhaustive joint discussion to deepen and define the settlement of these questions and to indicate the clear and precise prospects of further harmonious political collaboration.

Seven years of unbroken and close friendly relations have borne fruit. The understanding between our two Governments is now greater than ever. This was achieved by my meeting with the distinguished and gifted Turkish political leader. It was necessary to sum up, make precise, and put into a systematic form the results which have followed from seven years of friendly political relations. Objective historical forces underlie our relations with Turkey, which has built itself up on new foundations. A wealth of experience had accumulated, which required to be systematized and summed up by direct conversations between the Turkish Minister and myself. Almost a year ago we met in Paris, and signed a treaty of neutrality of the greatest importance to both countries. We discussed several questions of interest to our two Governments, but lack of time severely restricted our conversations and the events of the past year made it necessary to review them and deal with things more thoroughly. Our meeting in Paris last year had the most favourable effect on our relations and on the possibility of harmonizing the policy of the two Governments. It was clear to us that another meeting, in conditions providing the opportunity for more prolonged conversations, would still further promote rapprochement. The important events of the past year confronted us with a number of questions requiring joint examination . . .

We reviewed all the questions confronting our Governments, exchanged views on our relations with other States, explained our Governments' attitudes to the principal contemporary political questions. We created no league, pan-Asiatic or any other kind, and in

general we did not draw up any agreements directed against third parties.

As I pointed out in my talk to Turkish and Soviet sailors in Odessa, there has been a notable parallelism in the fate of our two countries in the past seven or eight years. When Odessa, the town in which we were meeting, was being destroyed by the imperialist occupationists and their White Guard followers, young Turkey, exerting its forces to the utmost, was fighting the imperialist invaders and the old Sultan's Government and the classes supporting it. Our popular masses, and the popular masses of Turkey, came out victorious, and, busy with peaceful labours and with their internal reconstruction, the peoples of both the USSR and Turkey are fighting against the attempts of world capital by peaceful penetration and by gradually strengthening their economic position to subject both countries to its dominion.

The community of interests binding us and Turkey consists therefore in this, that for both peoples the securing of peaceful labour and internal reconstruction is the basic task. This greatly facilitates agreement on our policy. Both the USSR and Turkey are engaged in peaceful labours within their own frontiers, and neither has any intention of threatening anybody else. World imperialism, always trying to extend the frontiers of its rule, threatens both the USSR and Turkey.

The friendly relations between our States and the harmony of their policies are thus profoundly peaceful in character.

PRESS STATEMENT BY CHICHERIN (BERLIN) ON SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY

6 *December* 1926

Izvestia, 8 *December* 1926

In an article by Augur in the December number of the *Fortnightly Review* the writer speaks of a united front of European Powers against the USSR. The ties of friendship linking Germany and ourselves are already so strong that I rely on them completely. However, the dangerous character of the tendency expressed in Augur's article must be underlined. Included in the united front created by Augur is Poland; furthermore, the settlement of Polish-German differences is regarded as a *sine qua non* for the creation of the united front. In Augur's own words the leader of European great Powers is England. If this programme found favour on the Continent it would be a great threat to peaceful development. Despite the repeated and reassuring statements made by official representatives of English diplomacy, they attack us at every step and on all sectors of the political front, exactly in the spirit of Augur's

reasoning. The supposed hostility towards England which the English are always ascribing to us belongs to the same category of situations as that envisaged by an old French proverb which says: 'That's a wicked beast—when he's attacked he defends himself.' What is decisive however is the fact that the Soviet Government has offered and continues to offer the hand of peace to England, but it is left in the air. The policy of encirclement which is being followed with regard to us is a hard fact, and we are fighting back, not without success.

The vital interests of the small States which are our neighbours in the West so obviously demand the conclusion of guarantee treaties that sooner or later, whether after procrastination or not, this aim, more important for our neighbours than for us, will be realized. We shall go as far as possible to meet the Baltic States, but we shall not go back on our principle of rejecting arbitration pacts. I do not doubt that sooner or later all the Baltic States will sign guarantee treaties with us, without clauses about arbitration.

I regard our treaty with Lithuania as extremely important, for it should contribute significantly to the stabilization of the situation in eastern Europe. The treaty with Lithuania does not in any way affect the treaty of Riga with Poland, and Lithuania is also given a place in the sun. Our relations with Poland present more difficulties. The Polish Government persistently aims at negotiations which would result in a collective east European guarantee treaty. In other words, Poland wishes to obtain the protectorate of the Baltic States. Such is the abyss which separates us from Poland at the moment. Augur's programme, supported by our opponents, is designed to make use of this difference against us. Our policy with regard to Poland, however, is of a completely peaceable character.

Augur's article also shows what influences are attempting to sway German policy. No doubt the German Government and public opinion will emphatically repudiate these influences. Since my visit to Berlin last year relations between Germany and ourselves and our international position have established themselves more firmly, despite the efforts of the enemy camp. The Soviet-German treaty and the negotiations on German credits for the USSR, all in a preliminary stage last year, are now facts. Thus our political relationship is properly regulated and a profound and lasting economic tie links our two States.

Our relations with France have noticeably improved in comparison to last year. Our economic negotiations with France are of such a complex nature that it will not be surprising if they require a long time. I am glad to say that from 1924 and 1925 the international significance of the USSR began to be understood in France. Our political relations

with France have become much more satisfactory, and it should be noted that they cannot injure any third Power. However, it cannot be said that nothing overshadows these relations. For instance, a certain dissonance is introduced by the French attitude towards Rumania, and the same is true of Italian policy, although our relations with Italy are good.

We are gradually realizing our programme of the conclusion of direct guarantee treaties with separate States, in which alone we see the possibility of ensuring peace. I cannot restrain myself from Homeric laughter when various clever people attempt to persuade us that entry into the League of Nations is a means to counteract isolation and a sort of guarantee. In our opinion membership of the League of Nations does not increase security but decreases it, it does not decrease isolation but makes one more dependent, and in the ultimate analysis it strengthens the might of the State which, in the words of Augur, is the leader in Europe. The USSR will not let itself be enticed into that trap. Whoever continues to assert that the USSR will enter the League of Nations is simply, to put it mildly, twisting the truth.

We have also concluded guarantee treaties in the East, with Turkey and Afghanistan. We demonstrated to the whole world the force and depth of our friendly relations with Turkey when in Odessa my Turkish colleague and myself achieved complete unanimity of views on all questions of international relations. Complications in our economic relations with Persia, with whom we are otherwise in friendly political relationship, are on the way to being completely settled. While *The Near East and India*, a journal closely associated with the English Colonial Office, was recently reckoning with vulgar candour on the possibility of inciting wild tribes to rise against the Persian Government, and of using other means simultaneously, if the Persian Government would not act according to England's orders—the English press and English agents declare the USSR is responsible for such risings when they occur. Our relations with the Persian Government are completely friendly and unconditionally loyal.

The historical significance of the surprisingly rapid development of Chinese democracy, spread by the Kuomintang, is clear to everybody. No matter what the speed of events in future, South China of today will in any case be the Chinese republic of tomorrow. The Soviet Government has not interfered in Chinese affairs, but it is friendly towards the Canton Government and the successes of our friends give us joy. Chang Tso-lin may try to infringe our rights on the Chinese Eastern Railway but he cannot hold back the historical development of China, and we are not disposed to cede our rights.

Augur and his surprisingly limited conservative sympathizers think

that the Soviet Government is the source and cause of strikes in England and of the nationalist movement in China. If a political movement is so blind with regard to the present it clearly has no future.

The USSR is going through a period of peaceful and uninterrupted growth that cannot be held back. Peace is our fundamental belief, and the gradual improvement and consolidation of our relations with other countries is the content of our policy. The path along which we are travelling and by which we are avoiding isolation consists in establishing friendly political and ever improving economic relations with others, and not in falling into the League of Nations trap from not looking where we are going. Economic relations are creating a more and more stable basis for our political relations. I can definitely state that Germany is in advance of other European nations in the development of economic relations with us.

CONVENTION WITH TURKEY FOR THE REGULATION OF THE USE OF FRONTIER WATERS, AND PROTOCOL

8 *January* 1927 *Sobranie Zakonoi*, 1928, II, p. 1366

The Central Executive Committee of the USSR on the one part, and the Turkish Republic on the other, animated by the desire that cordial relations and sincere friendship, based on mutual interests, may reign for ever between them, have decided in the interests of both parties to conclude a convention on the use of the waters of frontier rivers, streams, and brooks, and for this purpose have appointed as their plenipotentiaries:

for the USSR: O. Karklin, A. Kalandadze, S. Shadunts;

for the Turkish Republic: Fahri Bey, Vehbi Bey, Hassan Bey, Jemal Bey;

who, having exchanged their full powers, which were found to be in due and proper form, have agreed to the following provisions:

1. The two contracting parties shall each use half of the water of the rivers, streams, and brooks which coincide with the line of the frontier between the USSR and the Turkish Republic.

2. Each contracting party reserves the right to retain all the installations for water utilization which are in existence at the moment the present convention is signed. They may be repaired and their structure restored and shall be maintained and repaired by the contracting party to which they belong in accordance with the technical requirements of water utilization.

3. In order to divide the water and to study the flow of the rivers, the two contracting parties shall set up hydrometric observation posts (posts for determining cross sections, flood marks, and rates of flow).

Both parties shall have the right to determine the cross sections of the river bed along those stretches of the rivers where the quantity of water is to be ascertained.

The places for the hydrometric observation posts shall be selected by a mixed commission composed of an equal number of representatives of the two contracting parties.

4. To determine the flow of the river waters the two contracting parties shall establish a mixed commission on a parity basis which twice a year, from 15 June to 1 July and from 1 September to 15 September, shall determine at the hydrometric observation posts the flow of water in the rivers falling within the present convention and shall jointly draw up a report on the quantity of water.

The mixed commission shall be formed of two representatives of each of the contracting parties.

If one of the contracting parties, should the level of water in the rivers fall, declares it to be necessary to determine the flow of water at the appropriate hydrometric observation posts at other times than those set forth above, the other party is obliged to send its representatives within fifteen days from the day when the declaration was made to the respective Government of the wish to take measurements. If the representatives of one of the parties do not arrive within the stated time, the other party has the right to determine by itself the flow of water in the rivers but the results of the determination of the flow must be communicated to the other party.

Should the other party itself measure the same flow and arrive at different results, it has the right to demand that new measurements be taken.

The two contracting parties shall share equally the joint costs of the determination by the mixed commission of the flow of water in the rivers.

5. Should it be necessary to raise the level of water in the rivers and to make artificial reservoirs in order to construct irrigation canals, each of the contracting parties shall have the right to construct barrages.

(*a*) When a barrage is erected by one of the contracting parties the quantity of water due to the other party must be allowed to pass freely by the barrage or the reservoir, and free passage for fish shall also be ensured.

(*b*) While the barrage is being erected both contracting parties shall have the right to use both banks of the river for preliminary works and for the provisional passage of water while the work is in progress, and also to erect all kinds of hydrotechnical installations,

temporary embankments, defensive works, etc. These installations however shall not divert the water for more than 250 metres from the construction site.

(c) The party constructing the barrage shall take all measures to protect the interests of the other contracting party from any injury which might result from its work, and when the work is completed shall compensate the other contracting party for any material damage if such damage occurred despite the measures taken.

A special agreement between the two Governments is required in each case for the erection of barrages which can be used as bridges.

6. To protect the banks of the rivers which form the frontier from undermining by water, each contracting party retains the right to build buttresses, provided that it protects the other party from any harmful consequences from such building.

7. Neither of the contracting parties may artificially change the direction of the river channel. Should the frontier rivers be deflected from their bed, both parties shall have the right to carry out regulating and repair works on both banks of the said rivers, due warning being given to the other contracting party.

8. Both parties reserve the right to erect hydro-electric stations and mills, but the places for diverting and channelling the water for the said stations and establishments should be close to each other and sited in such a way that no injury is caused to the other party, and that the part of the river (the free part) used by the hydro-electric station or mill does not encroach on original installations already in existence or projected for the construction of irrigation canals and the various other installations of the contracting parties provided for in the present convention.

9. Each party has the right to install pumps on condition that only that part of the water is used which is due to the interested party.

10. The final selection of the siting and type of installations referred to in articles 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, and 9 of the present convention shall be made and laid down by the mixed commission mentioned in the preceding articles.

The date for convening the mixed commission will be fixed not later than three months from the day when its convening is requested by one of the two parties.

The party which takes the initiative in convening the mixed commission shall send the Government of the other party, at the same time as the proposal for its meeting, a sketch plan of the proposed installation.

In the event of differences of opinion in the mixed commission all questions in dispute shall be referred for final settlement to the Governments of the two parties.

11. Nationals of both contracting parties have the right to use on equal terms the waters forming the frontier between the USSR and the Turkish Republic on the following conditions:

(i) Nationals of both contracting parties may use the rivers and streams coinciding with the line of the frontier and used for mills, irrigation, watering, and fishing during the hours of daylight without special permission.
Approach to the river bank at night, if found necessary for essential purposes, is permitted only at points to be mutually agreed upon by the frontier authorities of the two States.

(ii) Cattle brought to water shall not cross into the territory of the other party.
Should cattle by accident cross the frontier the herdsman shall be allowed to cross the frontier not farther than 50 metres to lead the cattle back as quickly as possible.
Watering places shall be selected and agreed by the frontier authorities of the two parties.

(iii) Each party has the right to fish from its bank. Fishing at night is forbidden.

(iv) The present article does not apply to the following rivers and streams: Arax, Arpa-Chai, Poskhov-Chai, Kura, and Chorokh.

12. The present convention is subject to ratification within two months of its signature.

It will enter into force upon the exchange of ratifications. The instruments of ratification shall be exchanged as soon as possible at Ankara.

The present convention shall remain in force for five years. Should neither of the contracting parties take steps to denounce or amend the convention by the end of that time, it shall remain in force for another year and shall be valid so long as no steps are taken to denounce or amend it.

In witness whereof the aforesaid plenipotentiaries have signed the present convention and affixed thereto their seals.

Done in two copies in French at Kars, 8 January 1927.

Protocol

The undersigned [here follow the names given in the convention] have agreed as follows:

1. In conformity with article 5 of the convention signed at Kars 8 January 1927 on the use of the waters of frontier rivers, streams, and brooks between the USSR and the Turkish Republic, the Government of the Turkish Republic grants the Government of the USSR the right to build on the River Arax, at an approximate distance of 750 metres

upstream from the Karakale bridge, a barrage for the Sardarabad Canal being constructed by the USSR; for this purpose the Government of the USSR is authorized to engage in the essential survey work on the Turkish bank of the River Arax, and to undertake works for the construction of the barrage.

The barrage is to be of the type shown in the sketch plan attached to the present protocol.

2. The area in which the survey work is to be done, and the superficial area required for building the barrage on the Turkish bank of the Arax, are fixed by the following measurements:

(i) for survey work an area in length equal to 1,400 metres upstream from the Karakale bridge, and in width equal to 80 metres.

(ii) for constructing the dam an area equal in length to 800 metres starting from the same point, and in width 150 metres.

3. The Government of the USSR grants the Government of the Turkish Republic the right to take the waters of the aforesaid reservoir by means of a canal to be subsequently built by Turkey to irrigate the fields of the Ighdir Valley, to the extent of 50 per cent of the water therein and on the following conditions:

(i) The Turkish Republic undertakes to share in the cost of construction of the Sardarabad barrage in proportion to the amount of water used and to the economic benefits which the barrage confers on the two parties;

(ii) The Turkish Republic reserves the right to make use when it so wishes of this barrage provided it pays the cost provided for in paragraph (i) of this article. The time of payment for the costs in question shall be agreed between the Governments of the two contracting parties.

4. In order to prevent the canals of the Ighdir Valley from drying up, the Government of the USSR, which is constructing the Sardarabad barrage, undertakes to ensure that, until the Turkish Republic shall enjoy the use of the Sardarabad reservoir by taking water from it by means of a canal, the said canals take the same amount of water that they took before the construction of the aforesaid barrage.

In particular, in order that half the water of the river may be directed towards and close by the Turkish bank during the dry season, it also undertakes to build by the Turkish bank a lock similar to that which is to be constructed by the Soviet bank, and to regulate the river bed from the lock to the beginning of the Ighdir Valley canals in such a way that the water cannot extend over the entire bed.

The USSR, which is building the barrage, shall defray the costs of the aforesaid works.

5. The Government of the USSR, which is building the barrage, shall take all the steps necessary to protect the interests of the Turkish Government from any injury which may be caused by its building and, when the work is completed, shall compensate the Turkish Republic for any material damage if such damage, despite the precautions taken, shall have been caused.

6. The Turkish Government reserves the right to inspect the building of the barrage, of the type shown in the sketch plan attached to the present protocol.

7. The present protocol is subject to ratification within two months of its signature.

It enters into force upon the exchange of ratifications.

The instruments of ratification shall be exchanged at Ankara as soon as possible.

In witness whereof the aforesaid delegates have signed the present protocol and attached thereto their seals.

Done in two copies in French at Kars, 8 January 1927.

PRESS STATEMENT BY LITVINOV ON KELLOGG'S STATEMENT TO THE UNITED STATES SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE[1]

17 *January* 1927 *Mezhdunarodnaya Zhizn*, 1927, 1

Statesmen of capitalist countries have recently acquired the habit of excusing their incapacity in internal affairs or their aggressive designs in foreign affairs by reference to Bolshevik machinations and the 'plots' of the Soviet Government. Whether it is a question of the strike in England, or of the American fleet's raid on the independent State of Nicaragua, or of the shooting of the citizens of Java and Sumatra by Dutch police—there is always the same excuse: the plots of the Bolshevik Government. I shall not be surprised if enlightened statesmen of the great Powers begin to ascribe to the machinations of the Bolsheviks the earthquake in Japan and the floods in America. To attempt a serious refutation of these fantastic explanations would be an insult to public opinion.

I am acquainted with the resolutions of the Third International. I cannot at the moment check whether Mr Kellogg has quoted them correctly. I am also acquainted with the malicious resolutions of the American Federation of Labour, directed at the very basis of the Soviet regime in the USSR. To ascribe the attack of the American fleet on Nicaragua to the criticism of imperialism in the resolutions of the Third International is just as ludicrous as it would be to ascribe a bad harvest

[1] *U.S. Foreign Relations*, 1927, i, p. 356.

in the USSR to the resolutions of the American Federation of Labour.

G. V. Chicherin was entirely right in welcoming the renewal of normal relations between the USSR and Mexico. The Government of the USSR will apply all its strength to the renewal of normal relations with all the countries of America. The Soviet Government's relations with Mexico are not and cannot be other than relations of loyalty and non-interference. To ascribe the deterioration of relations between the United States of America and Mexico to the completely loyal statements of Chicherin is to mock the public.

The Soviet Government has always stood for and continues to stand for the renewal of normal relations between the USSR and the United States. It can only express its regret that the fantastic attacks of Mr Kellogg are dictated by a totally opposite point of view, having nothing in common with the renewal of normal diplomatic relations between both countries.

AGREEMENT WITH SWEDEN ON CONSULAR QUESTIONS: NOTE FROM THE VICE-COMMISSAR FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS TO THE SWEDISH AMBASSADOR IN MOSCOW

2 *February* 1927 *Sbornik Dogovorov*, IV, p. 35

I have the honour to inform you that the Government of the USSR, having judged it useful to determine, in agreement with the Government of Sweden, the reciprocal rights, privileges, and immunities of consuls-general, consuls, vice-consuls, consular agents, as well as of heads of chancelleries and secretaries of consular missions, has authorized me to make the following declaration:

Consuls-general, consuls, vice-consuls, consular agents, as well as heads of chancellery or secretaries of Swedish consular missions shall enjoy in the USSR all the exemptions, prerogatives, immunities, and privileges which are or may be granted to agents of the same rank of the most-favoured nation.

It is understood however that the foregoing provision shall not be applied to the exemptions, prerogatives, immunities, and privileges which the Government of the USSR has already granted or may in the future grant to States on its Asiatic frontier or to States whose territory on 1 August 1914 formed in all respects an inseparable part of the former Russian Empire. Nor shall this provision apply to the rights of consuls in regard to legacies bequeathed to Swedish nationals in the USSR, which rights shall be laid down in a special agreement.

The establishment of consulates-general, consulates, vice-consulates, or consular agencies in other towns and places than those in which the

consular institutions of one or the other party have already been established shall be the subject of previous agreement between the two parties. Consuls-general, consuls, vice-consuls, and consular agents shall be appointed in the manner laid down for the civil service and shall be paid by the appointing Government. They shall further be obliged not to engage in commerce or industry on the territory of the country in which they are exercising their functions. Before appointing a consul-general, consul, vice-consul, or consular agent the Government appointing him shall ask the Government of the State on whose territory the said consular representative is to exercise his functions for its consent to the appointment.

The present agreement shall be applied from the day of the signature of the present note and shall not lose its validity until three months after its denunciation.

[The Swedish reply is, *mutatis mutandis*, in the same terms, with the exception of the first sentence of paragraph 3, which runs: 'It is understood, however, that the foregoing provision shall not be applied to the exemptions, prerogatives, immunities, and privileges which the Royal Government [of Sweden] has already granted or may in the future grant to Denmark, Finland, or Norway.']

PRESS STATEMENT BY LITVINOV ON THE CHINESE SITUATION AND ANGLO-SOVIET RELATIONS

4 *February* 1927 Kluchnikov & Sabanin, iii, 1, p. 357

The accusations insistently advanced by certain conservative circles in England against the Soviet Government in connexion with the failure of English diplomacy in China compel me, in the interests of general peace and of preserving friendly relations between the two countries, to make the following statement:

The present situation in China is distinguished by the breakdown of the negotiations between O'Malley, Counsellor to the British Embassy, and the Canton Government as a result of the English Government's refusal to withdraw its armed forces. The Soviet Government, which throughout its policy both in the West and in the East, has given numerous proofs of its pacific intentions, cannot but regret the situation thus created, and is convinced that this feeling is shared by the English people themselves, as well as by the people of China, who cannot have any interest in the prolongation of the conflict. The young Canton Government, which is faced by the tremendous tasks of consolidating the national forces and the State structure, cannot but strive to secure

peaceful conditions in which to develop its work and to eliminate external complications. Consequently all friends of the Chinese people are bound to use all their influence to ensure a peaceful settlement of China's external political problems and should employ every means which may lead to this end.

It appears that O'Malley's last proposals provide an acceptable basis for the Canton Government to settle the questions at present in dispute with England. It is only to be regretted that, judging from Mr. Chen's statement,[1] the combination of these peaceful negotiations with threats and the menace of armed intervention spoilt the success of this overture. No wise counsels of moderation can help when the actions of a directly interested party are dictated, not by the appropriate considerations and a correct appreciation both of the circumstances and the psychology of the other party, but by the desire of conservative circles nursed in old traditions which they have not discarded to demonstrate physical strength. These same conservative English circles are now trying to unload their own mistake on to the Soviet Government, trying to make it the scapegoat by means of a ludicrous fable which explains the liberation movement of the many millions of China, the greatest in history, by the 'machinations' of Soviet 'agents', a fable in which not a single educated person does or can believe. The Soviet Government has never concealed its sympathy for the liberation movement of the Chinese people, but it by no means follows that it must recommend or has in fact recommended to the Canton Government a worsening of its relations with England, or that it would prevent a peaceful agreement with England.

The Soviet Government never loses sight of the obligations towards Great Britain which it undertook in virtue of the 1921 treaty, under which Great Britain too assumed a number of obligations towards the USSR, and it has no intention of losing sight of them in the future, being concerned with the preservation of peace and of mutual economic and political relations. We find ourselves in complete agreement with the position taken by the General Council of the trade unions in so far as it works in favour of a peaceful settlement of the conflict with Canton, and also with those progressive circles in English society which point out that a worsening of Anglo-Soviet relations will be of advantage to neither side and will injure the interests not only of Great Britain as a whole, but of those very financial and industrial groups which are now calling for a break more loudly than anyone. It seems to me that even the position of England in the East, as is rightly pointed out by those same progressive circles, will not be strengthened as a result of England's becoming more hostile to the

[1] cf. *The Times*, 3 February 1927.

USSR. The young Canton Government refuses to sign the treaty with England in an atmosphere of threats and intervention. The meaning of this refusal should be a subject for reflection. What came of intervention when it was tried against the USSR was learnt by the English creditors who agitated for it. It can hardly be doubted that England was a loser, and not a gainer, from intervention in the USSR.

I hope that the right-minded elements in English society and in the English Government will prevail over the protagonists of the mailed fist policy, which has never brought anything but misfortune to the nations and to the cause of peace.

STATEMENT BY LITVINOV AT THE CENTRAL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE ON RELATIONS WITH BRITAIN

21 *February* 1927 *Anglo-Sovetskie Otnoshenia*, p. 97

1. It is quite true that the anti-Soviet campaign has burst out in England again, but this does not date from yesterday. The campaign was systematically waged right up to the resumption of diplomatic relations and has never ceased, now quietening down, now flaring up again with more or less force whenever Great Britain is experiencing internal or external difficulties. It has become the practice not only in England, but also in certain other capitalist countries, to charge the USSR with responsibility for all reverses and disturbances of a domestic or foreign character. The USSR is made responsible for revolutionary events even in those countries where no Soviet citizen has yet set foot, such as Nicaragua, Chile, etc.

2. It is clear from the authentic documents published a few days ago in our press what are the groups and forces behind the present anti-Soviet campaign in England. They are, first, the Russian emigrants, monarchists, former Tsarist officials settled in London and making use of their old connexions and protected by the English civil service and even by some members of the present English Government; secondly, the group, not very large but disposing of large financial resources, of the so-called creditors of Russia, i.e. foreign property owners of industry nationalized by the October revolution and big speculators who bought up the shares of former Russian industrialists, in particular the oil magnates, who fled abroad. It is in the first place precisely these groups who continue naïvely to think, despite the failure of the intervention undertaken at the time by England at their instigation and in their interests, and the other measures of intimidation, that they can frighten the 150 millions of the Soviet population and dictate to them the terms of agreement.

3. These circles, indulging in the customary practice to which I have referred of declaring the Soviet Government guilty of all the misfortunes of capitalist countries, exploit every British political crisis, concealing their rapacious demands under slogans of a general national and political character and investing themselves in the togas of saviours of the fatherland from alleged Soviet wiles and intrigues.

4. Certain members of the English Government also openly join in this campaign. Unfortunately, even the English Government as a whole gives the impression, by its ambiguous conduct, in contradiction to the generally accepted standards to be expected after the resumption of diplomatic relations, that it encourages this campaign, making unfounded and vague statements about the violation of the 1921 treaty by the Soviet Government. It should be remembered in this connexion that as early as 1923, after the famous English ultimatum, the then Foreign Secretary, Lord Curzon, undertook on behalf of the English Government that infringements of the undertakings given 'should be brought immediately to the attention of the Government concerned rather than that such incidents, if they are found to occur, should be allowed to accumulate before complaint is made'.[1]

5. I must categorically declare that neither the Soviet Government nor its Embassy in London has ever received from the English Government the slightest indication of even a single factual example of the violation of the 1921 treaty. There has been of course no shortage of general unsubstantiated accusations both in Parliament and in the public statements of English ministers, as well as in interviews between Chamberlain and our representatives, but all our suggestions that these charges should be backed by real concrete instances were invariably rejected and are still rejected.

6. We have not in the past concealed and we do not now conceal our sincere sympathy with the Chinese people's liberation movement, their struggle for independence, which has met with considerable success in the past year. While a year or two ago the foreign press spoke of the Chinese national revolutionary movement ironically, as of an 'artificial creation of Moscow agents', now even the worst enemies of the Chinese people and their struggle for independence are bound to admit that the movement is the legitimate expression of the inevitable and powerful historical process making for the creation of a national Chinese State, that China despite everything is beginning to pursue its own independent policy. We may note with satisfaction that a certain change is taking place, very slowly it is true, in the policy of certain Powers. It is apparently dictated by a growing understanding of the impossibility of pursuing the old traditional policy towards China and of the

[1] Cmd. 2895, p. 23.

inevitability of the growth and consolidation of independent national China. We could only welcome the establishment between China and other countries of relations based on equality.

In this connexion we should note the present position of Japan, the nearest neighbour of China and the USSR, in contrast to the position of the English Government, as expressed in the speech[1] of the Foreign Minister Shidehara at the last session of the Japanese Diet. We can only welcome the idea of the Japanese Foreign Ministry that 'any attempt at the forcible establishment of peace by pressure from outside does more harm than good'.

7. The USSR is sincerely anxious to establish completely normal relations with England. The Soviet Government is prepared to examine and to settle peacefully all conflicts and misunderstandings which may arise, as was shown by its signature of the Anglo-Soviet treaty of 1924, subsequently annulled by the present English Government. The Soviet Government has not discarded the proposals it has made more than once, but which have not been met with sympathy by the English Government, for the resumption of the negotiations which were broken off when the present English Government took office, and for the settlement of mutual claims. It is obvious that the present anti-Soviet campaign of some members of the English Government and of certain circles in English society, coinciding with deplorable and intolerable threats against the USSR, cannot further the cause of peace or the establishment of normal relations between the two countries.

8. It is sincerely to be regretted that the established and expanding commercial relations between the Soviet Union and England are not developing in a way corresponding both to the interests of the two countries, and to the position which the British Empire holds in the industrial and financial world. The most serious obstacle is the periodic outburst of an anti-Soviet campaign which disturbs the calm atmosphere necessary for prolonged economic intercourse. Stable economic connexions are impossible with such disturbances and in that uneasy atmosphere created by the activities of the warmongering anti-Soviet elements in England. These activities cause injury to the interests of the peoples of the USSR and Great Britain, and create a threat to peace. I should like to hope that the English Government will understand the harmfulness and the utter senselessness of the campaign which sows enmity between two nations, and will meet the wishes of the Soviet Government for the establishment of truly normal relations between our two countries.

[1] *The Times*, 19 January 1927.

REPLY FROM LITVINOV TO THE BRITISH FOREIGN SECRETARY'S NOTE ON ANGLO-SOVIET RELATIONS

26 *February* 1927

Cmd. 2822
Anglo-Sovetskie Otnoshenia, p. 105

The chargé d'affaires *ad interim* of the USSR in Great Britain has telegraphed to me the note[1] handed to him on 23 February, and published on the same day in the English press, bearing the signature of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Sir Austen Chamberlain.

1. The note begins by recording the quite indisputable fact of the unsatisfactory nature of the relations existing between the USSR and Great Britain. The unsatisfactory nature of these relations Sir Austen Chamberlain endeavours to explain in the note, as he has also frequently done in the past in his public speeches inside and outside Parliament, as due to the supposed contraventions on the part of the Soviet Government of the undertakings assumed by it in regard to Great Britain in the sphere of propaganda. The note quotes verbatim the agreement signed by the Soviet Government on 4 June 1923, which states: 'The Soviet Government undertakes not to support by money or in any other way persons or organizations or agencies or institutions which have as their object the *sowing of dissatisfaction or the fomenting of disturbance in any part of the British Empire*, and undertakes to impress upon its officials and persons holding official positions the necessity of an absolute and uninterrupted observance of these conditions'.[2]

2. In the course of the three and a half years which have passed since that agreement was signed the British Government has repeatedly addressed itself to the Soviet Government, directly and by means of public utterances, with reproaches in regard to fancied contraventions of that agreement. Setting aside these reproaches, the Soviet Government has always demanded that they should be supported by the indication of concrete cases of some kind. In contravention of the undertaking assumed in the same year, 1923, on behalf of the British Government by the then Minister for Foreign Affairs, Lord Curzon, 'immediately to bring to the knowledge of the Soviet Government supposed cases of contravention of undertakings, and not to allow such cases to accumulate without charges being preferred' (Lord Curzon's note[3] of 29 May), the British Government up to now has preferred to address to the Soviet Government general sweeping reproaches, never presenting them in detail, with the exception of one case only, when at the time of the general election in Great Britain in 1924 an unsuccessful attempt was made to support an accusation by a reference to the famous and already historical so-called 'letter of Zinoviev', the then president

[1] Cmd. 2822. [2] Cmd. 1890. [3] ibid

of the Executive Committee of the Communist International. But the Soviet Government, which declared then and there that it could not assume responsibility for the acts of an international organization directed and controlled by delegates of the Communist parties of different countries, agreed, however, in view of the special political rôle which the letter might play, to any expert examination of the letter, and agreed to recognize the decision of any arbiter. The refusal of the proposal of the Soviet Government by the British Government could not be otherwise understood than as a withdrawal of the accusation, and from that time the counterfeit nature of the letter has no longer evoked any doubts in the minds of anyone, including the circles of the Labour party, which was in power in England at the moment when the accusation in question was put forward. Thus, the only concrete accusation was based on a forged document, the so-called 'Zinoviev letter'. Moreover, not one of the persons who misled the British Government was punished, although this forged letter created at one time a threat to peace, exacerbated to an extraordinary degree the relations between the two States, and set its stamp on the whole further development of Anglo-Soviet relations.

3. Quoting the agreement of 4 June 1923, Sir Austen Chamberlain, throughout the whole of the note, also brings forward not one case of contravention by the Soviet Government of that agreement, i.e. not one case 'of the sowing of discontent or fomenting of disturbance in any part of the British Empire'. The note of the British Government merely enumerates a number of public utterances of Soviet public men within the USSR and of newspaper articles also in the Soviet press. I must therefore give the reminder that between the USSR and Great Britain there exist no agreements which should limit the freedom of speech and of the press within the confines of the two countries. As the British Government has not taken upon itself an undertaking on behalf of its citizens to praise or not to criticize the social and political structure of the Soviet State, so also the Soviet Government has not undertaken to demand from its citizens that they should praise or should not criticize the social and political structure of Great Britain and, in general, of capitalist countries. In the Trade Agreement of 1921, with the contravention of which the Soviet Government has also been repeatedly charged in the form of bare assertions, the article regarding propaganda binds both sides merely 'to refrain from hostile action or measures against the other party and also from carrying on, *outside their own confines*, any official direct or indirect propaganda against the institutions of the British Empire or of the Russian Soviet Republic . . .' To bring under the force of the Agreement of 1923 or of the Agreement of 1921 printed or verbal utterances within the confines of the USSR is arbitrarily to extend the scope of these agreements.

4. I could quote a multitude of examples of the wide use and, unfortunately, of the extremely immoderate abuse of the right to carry on propaganda within the confines of Great Britain against the USSR on the part of members of the British Government. I shall confine myself to only a few examples. Speaking in Watford on 20 June, the Secretary of State for India, Lord Birkenhead, speaking of Moscow and the Soviet Government, declared that they were 'a band of murderers and robbers' (*Morning Post*, 22 June 1925). At a Conservative meeting at Tunbridge Wells, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Mr Winston Churchill, attacking the British Socialists, declared 'behind this wretched movement . . . there stands the dark power of Moscow. There we have what we have never had—a band of international conspirators collected from the dregs of the big towns of Europe and America, which has despotically taken possession of all the enormous resources of what was once the famed mighty Russian Empire' (*Morning Post*, 30 November 1925). In another place, in Bolton, to be precise, Mr Churchill talked of the Soviet Government as 'the dark conspirators of the Moscow Kremlin' (*Daily Telegraph*, 22 June 1926). Similar outbursts may be found in the utterances (of the Home Secretary, Sir William Joynson-Hicks,)[1] of the Colonial Secretary, Mr Amery, of the Secretary of State for Air, Sir Samuel Hoare, of the Secretary of State for War, Sir Laming Worthington-Evans, and others, not to mention those holding similar opinions in the Conservative party, like A. T. Cook, who, at the Conference of the Conservative party at Scarborough, on 17 October 1926, called the Soviet Government 'a group of international bloodsuckers' (*Morning Post*, 18 October 1926), like Commander Locker-Lampson, Sir William Davison and others. The press of the governing Conservative party abounds in still more violent attacks on the USSR, defaming from day to day Soviet institutions, the Soviet Government and its representatives in London, and spreading the most improbable fantastic inventions regarding the situation in the USSR. It is impossible, moreover, not to observe that the representatives of Great Britain in Moscow, who enjoy the same privileges as the diplomatic representatives of other countries, have never been subjected by the Soviet press to the insults and defamations to which the representatives of the Soviet Government in London have been subjected on the part of the English Conservative press.

5. It is impossible to find, either in the Soviet press in general or in the very articles and speeches to which reference is made in the British Government's note, violent outbursts against Great Britain and inventions regarding Great Britain of a similar nature to those which are detailed above. It is impossible, really, to regard as anti-British propaganda an analysis and estimate of the foreign policy of the British

[1] Omitted from the Russian text consulted.

Government and of its relation to the Soviet Union, or reasonings based on general principles on the part of party workers on the inevitability of a world revolution, on the significance of the national revolutionary movement in the East, much less still the idea expressed by the People's Commissar for Health respecting the significance of physical culture from the point of view of the revolutionary labour movement, or the appointment, which has no relation whatever to Anglo-Soviet mutual relations and which has been accepted by the Italian Government, of Citizen Kamenev, who had expressed within the limits of his party work one or other view regarding the problems of his party, as Ambassador to Italy. As for the *Izvestia*, which is considered the official organ of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR in the sense that in it all decrees and enactments of the Government are obligatorily printed, that newspaper is one of the most widely circulated newspapers which serves hundreds of thousands of readers and is bound to give all information interesting these readers, including appeals and resolutions of Soviet as well as party institutions. The institution which publishes it can as little be responsible for the contents of appeals and resolutions of that kind as for what is communicated in the newspaper regarding declarations and utterances of an anti-Soviet character, including also communications regarding the speeches of English Ministers which have been quoted above. It must once more be repeated that the printing of any material or any verbal utterances within the confines of the USSR is not a contravention of any undertakings whatever assumed by the Soviet Government.

6. The special displeasure of the British Government is evoked apparently by the opinions expressed by Soviet public men regarding the anti-Soviet direction of British policy in third countries. But surely it would be possible with no less right and foundation to describe as obsessions the constant references of politicians and of members of the Government of Great Britain to the fancied ubiquity and all-powerfulness of the so-called 'Soviet agents', who are represented as to blame for each and every difficulty of the British Empire in pretty well every corner of the globe.

7. The Soviet Government greatly regrets the unsatisfactory state of Anglo-Soviet relations which is referred to in the note of the British Government. It considers, however, that to explain this melancholy phenomenon as due to mutual recriminations and the hostile tone of the press of the two countries would be to give cause as effect and vice versa. The Soviet Government would also consider it lacking in correctness and undignified to seek for explanations of the phenomenon in the physiological or psychological peculiarities of one or other British statesman. It is inclined to think that the abnormality of these relations is

expressed not only in the fact that the representations of the two countries do not correspond to the interests of the development of relations between Great Britain and the USSR. The point also is that in its treatment of the Soviet Union the British Government deliberately departs from generally accepted international standards and customs and even elementary decencies, that it periodically hurls at the Soviet Government general accusations in the form of bare assertions, refusing even to discuss them, that it avoids the settlement of mutual claims and grievances either by the diplomatic channel or by means of special conferences, commissions or delegations, that it, refusing the usual diplomatic ways of regulating disputes, allows itself to converse with the Soviet Government in a tone of threats and ultimatums, that it, finally, ignoring the constitution of the USSR, obstinately endeavours in its notes to substitute for the formal Government of the Union party or even international institutions. The same abnormality of relations has found expression also in the fact that the British Government in its note allows itself an unheard-of and unprecedented tone in regard to the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the USSR, Citizen Chicherin. The regime established by the British Government in regard to the Soviet State fosters and encourages that hostile campaign which finds its expression in utterances highly insulting to the USSR in the English Parliament, both on the part of Members of Parliament and even also of members of the Government, and in the English press. This campaign is appraised in the public opinion of the USSR and in the speeches and articles of Soviet public men, the enumeration of which constitutes the main contents of the British note. It should be added that the constant attempts of the British Government to minimize or even to eliminate altogether the significance of the fact of the resumption of diplomatic relations, together with the entirely reliable information in the hands of the Soviet Government recently published, regarding the still-continuing relations and attempts to come to an understanding between individual members of the British Cabinet and former Tsarist diplomats and representatives of counter-revolution working for a second intervention, do not allow the public opinion of the people of the USSR to forget the part which Great Britain played in the first intervention.

8. At the end of his note Sir Austen Chamberlain thought it timely and proper to put forward a threat of complete rupture of commercial and diplomatic relations in case of non-fulfilment by the Soviet Government of new demands which do not arise from existing Anglo-Soviet agreements and mutual formal undertakings. Declaring that threats in regard to the USSR cannot intimidate anyone at all in the Soviet Union, the Soviet Government allows itself to express the conviction that the conclusion of the Trade Agreement of 1921, as also the later

resumption of diplomatic relations, corresponded to the interests and needs both of the peoples of the Soviet Union and of the British Empire. If the present British Government considers that the cessation of Anglo-Soviet commercial and all other relations is called for by the needs of the English people and will be for the benefit of the British Empire and of the cause of universal peace, it, of course, will act accordingly, taking upon itself full responsibility for the consequences arising therefrom.

9. The Soviet Government on its part confirms that the declarations of the late Krassin, quoted in the British Government's note, regarding the desirability of the removal of all the difficulties which exist between the two countries and of the causes for mutual complaints and regarding the desirability of the establishment of completely normal relations, actually correspond to the unchanging sincere desires of the Soviet Government. Fulfilling the will to peace on the part of the toiling masses of the Soviet Union, in full harmony with the similar strivings of the wide masses of the people of Great Britain, the Soviet Government will in the future too follow its peace-loving policy, which excludes all aggressiveness in regard to other countries. It will sincerely welcome steps taken to meet it, on the part of the British Government, on the same path to peace.

TRADE AND NAVIGATION AGREEMENT WITH TURKEY

11 *March* 1927 *Sobranie Zakonov*, 1927, II, p. 845

The USSR on the one part, and the Turkish Republic on the other, being desirous to strengthen the friendly relations so happily existing between them and to promote the development of economic relations between the two countries and to regulate the conditions of settlement of their nationals in the respective countries, have decided to conclude a treaty of trade and navigation and have for this purpose appointed as their plenipotentiaries:

The Central Executive Committee of the USSR:	M. Yakov Surits, Soviet Plenipotentiary Envoy Extraordinary in Turkey, and M. Akim Yurev, Soviet trade representative in Turkey;
The President of the Turkish Republic:	His Excellency Ali Jenani-bey, former Minister for Trade and Deputy for Ghazi Eintab in the Turkish Grand National Assembly, and His Excellency Ali Shefki-bey, Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs,

Who, having presented their credentials, which were found to be in due and proper form, have agreed to the following provisions:

Chapter One

Settlement

1.

Nationals of the two contracting parties shall have the right of freely entering the territory of the other party, of residing there, and of leaving, provided they observe the regulations in force in that territory; in this respect they shall not be placed on a less favourable footing than that on which the citizens of the most-favoured nation are or may be placed.

It is understood that, regardless of the other provisions of the present treaty, the provisions of the present article shall not restrict the freedom of each of the parties to prohibit the entry into various parts of its territory of the nationals of the other party, provided such prohibition applies to the nationals of all other countries. Exception may however be made in this respect in regard to nationals of countries bordering on the prohibited areas.

2.

Nationals of either of the contracting parties, when entering the territory of the other party, as also when leaving that territory, in conformity with the provisions of article 1 of the present treaty, shall have the right, while complying with the laws and regulations in force concerning imports to and exports from that country, to import and to export their property destined for their personal and domestic use. In this respect the nationals of the contracting parties shall not be placed in a less favourable position than that in which the nationals of the most-favoured nation are or may be placed.

3.

Nationals of either contracting parties residing on the territory of the other shall be subject to the jurisdiction of the country of residence.

The said citizens shall have free access to courts of all instances both to seek and to defend their rights; in general they shall enjoy in regard to the protection afforded by the law and the courts the rights which are or may in the future be granted to the nationals of the country of residence.

In regard, however, to *cautio judicatum solvi* and legal assistance (facilities provided for the indigent) the same rules shall apply to nationals of either of the contracting parties residing on the territory of the other party as are applied to nationals of the most-favoured nation.

Questions relating to family rights and legal competence, as well as to rights of inheritance, both testamentary and intestate, shall be the subject of a special agreement to be concluded by the contracting parties within a year from the day when the present treaty enters into force.

4.

Nationals of either of the contracting parties shall be exempt on the territory of the other party from any compulsory civil, naval, or military service, whether in the regular forces or the militia. They shall similarly be exempt from any taxes, whether in money or kind, imposed in commutation of any of the services enumerated above.

They shall likewise be exempt from any compulsory official duties, whether legal, administrative, or municipal.

Should natural calamities occur, citizens of either of the contracting parties on the territory of the other may be called on for labour service.

In regard to military contributions and requisitions, as well as taxes and dues for military needs, nationals of either of the contracting parties shall not be subject on the territory of the other party to a less favourable regime than the nationals of the latter.

In any case, in regard to the contributions, requisitions, taxes, and dues mentioned in the present article, nationals of either of the contracting parties shall not be placed on the territory of the other in a position less favourable than that in which nationals of any other country are or may be placed.

5.

Each of the contracting parties guarantees to the nationals of the other party in everything concerning the acquisition of any kind of property, its ownership, immunity, and disposition, the same treatment as it guarantees its own nationals and the nationals of the most-favoured nation.

The stipulations of the present article shall not prejudice the stipulations of Turkish law prohibiting foreigners from acquiring in Turkey immovable property situated outside urban settlements; in regard however to the acquisition of such property situated outside urban settlements nationals of the USSR shall enjoy in Turkey the regime granted to the nationals of the most-favoured nation.

6.

Nationals of either of the contracting parties, having entered the territory of the other party in accordance with the provisions of article 1 of the present treaty, may engage there in industrial and commercial

activities, intellectual and physical labour, on the same conditions as the nationals of the most-favoured nation.

They may not engage in those branches of trade and industry or in those professions and occupations which are reserved exclusively for local nationals. In regard to these professions and occupations, however, they shall not be placed in a position less favourable than that in which nationals of the most-favoured nation are or may be placed.

It is understood that those branches of industrial activity which are the object of State monopolies or are concerned with national defence are excepted from the application of the first paragraph of this article.

7.

The contracting countries undertake to recognize the validity of arbitration agreements concluded in accordance with local legislation between the nationals or juridical persons of the two countries, provided that both parties reside in one of the contracting countries.

The contracting countries likewise undertake to execute arbitration awards made under the said agreements, provided that:

i. the execution of the arbitration award does not conflict with any previous decision on the same question by the judicial institutions of either of the contracting countries;

ii. the decision makes no stipulation in conflict with the laws of the country in which it is to be executed.

8.

Juridical persons of all kinds established on the territory of either of the contracting parties, in accordance with the laws there in force, for industrial, commercial, or other economic objects, shall be recognized as juridical persons on the territory of the other party and, in particular, shall have the right of appearing in court both as claimant and as defendant.

It is agreed that the above provision shall not affect the question whether a juridical person established on the territory of either of the contracting parties may or may not be permitted to conduct its operations on the territory of the other party; this question shall always remain subject to the regulations in force on this question on the territory of the latter.

In any case, in regard to admitting the said juridical persons of one of the contracting parties to the territory of the other, and in regard to conducting their operations on that territory as well as in all other respects, the said juridical persons of one of the contracting parties shall not be placed on the territory of the other party in a position less

favourable than that in which juridical persons of the most-favoured nation are or may be placed.

9.

Nationals of either of the contracting parties admitted to the territory of the other party shall not there be subject, in regard to their persons, their property, or their activities, to any other or higher taxes or dues than those to which similarly situated local nationals and nationals of the most-favoured nation are or may be subject.

Juridical persons, private or State, established in the territory of one of the contracting parties and permitted to conduct operations on the territory of the other party, shall not be subject there, whether in regard to their property or their activities or in any other respect, to any other or higher taxes and dues than those to which similarly situated juridical persons, private or State, established on that territory, and similar juridical persons of the most-favoured nation permitted to conduct their operations there, are or may be subject.

The provisions of the present article refer both to taxes and dues imposed for the benefit of the State, and to taxes and dues imposed for the benefit of municipalities and corporations.

Chapter Two

Trade and Navigation

10.

Taking into consideration that in the USSR foreign trade is a State monopoly, the Turkish Government grants the trade delegation of the USSR and its agencies permission to carry out the following functions on Turkish territory:

(*a*) to superintend the interests of the USSR in regard to foreign trade;

(*b*) to regulate foreign trade and the exchange of goods between the USSR and Turkey in accordance with the provisions of the present treaty;

(*c*) to conduct the foreign trade of the Government of the USSR and promote the development of commercial relations between the USSR and Turkey.

11.

The trade delegation of the USSR in Turkey, situated in Ankara, forms an integral part of the Embassy of the USSR in Turkey. The trade representative and his two deputies are part of the Embassy staff and shall enjoy personal immunity and other privileges and prerogatives granted to members of diplomatic missions.

12.

The premises of the trade delegation in Ankara and the premises of its branch in Istanbul, situated at 464 Grande rue de Péra (Soviet Khan) shall enjoy extra-territoriality.

This extra-territoriality shall not hinder the application of the provisions of article 13.

13.

Legal actions taken in Turkey by the trade delegation and the economic results of these actions shall be treated according to Turkish law and subject to Turkish jurisdiction.

Property of the USSR in Turkey may likewise be attached with the exception of articles destined for the exercise under customary international law of the sovereign rights of the State or for use in the official activities of diplomatic and consular missions.

14.

The Government of the USSR assumes responsibility for all commercial contracts concluded by its trade delegation in Turkey. For commercial contracts concluded by other State enterprises of the USSR these enterprises shall themselves be responsible.

15.

The contracting parties are agreed that the trade delegation of the USSR in Turkey shall have the right of opening branches in the following Turkish towns and ports: Istanbul, Smyrna, Trebizond, Mersin, Erzerum, Konia or Eski-Shekhir.

The opening of new branches shall be the subject of agreement between the two Governments.

16.

Should the Turkish Government establish a trade delegation on the territory of the USSR, it and its staff shall be granted by the Soviet Government the same rights, privileges, and immunities as are granted to the trade delegation of the USSR in Turkey.

17.

Each of the contracting parties undertakes not to apply to imports from the territory of the other party or exports to that territory any restrictions other than those included in the general regulations governing this question in regard to all other countries.

18.

Products of the soil and industry of either of the contracting parties shall be allowed to pass in transit through the territory of the other party in accordance with the general legislation of the latter by ways open for transit under the general legislation of the country, and shall be exempt on that territory from any transit dues.

Irrespective of the provisions of the first paragraph of the present article the USSR agrees to grant Turkey freedom of transit for goods of Turkish origin dispatched from Turkey via Batum to Asiatic countries, and likewise freedom of transit for goods of Turkish origin dispatched from Turkey via Batum from the western to the eastern vilayets of Turkey and from the eastern to the western vilayets of Turkey.

The transit of goods of Turkish origin dispatched from Turkey by the ways mentioned in the present article shall be conditional on verification by agencies of the USSR that the goods are of Turkish origin and are dispatched from Turkey. The method of verification is laid down in the final protocol attached to the present treaty.

19.

In the transporting of passengers, luggage, and goods by railway, road, and inland waterways the contracting parties shall not discriminate between the inhabitants of the territories of the two parties.

It is understood that the provisions of the first paragraph of the present article shall not prejudice the right of the two parties to fix transport charges at their own discretion.

Both parties declare their complete readiness to conclude immediately after the entry into force of the present treaty a special convention on through-railway traffic for the transport of passengers, luggage, and goods.

20.

Vessels and ships sailing under the flag of one of the contracting parties, on entering or leaving the waters and ports of the other party, whether in ballast or with cargo, regardless of the place where they began their journey or of their destination, shall enjoy there in all respects the same regime as local vessels and ships and shall not be subject there to any other or higher duties or fees, under whatever name they are imposed, on behalf or for the benefit of the State, province, municipality, or any other body authorized by the Government, than those which are or may be imposed on local vessels and ships.

21.

Cargoes, regardless of the place where they were dispatched or of their destination, shall not be subject to any other or higher customs or

duties, and shall not be subject to any other regulations than if they were imported or exported under the national flag. The passengers thereon and their luggage shall likewise enjoy the same treatment as if they had travelled under the national flag. Their crews shall enjoy the same treatment as the crews of vessels and ships under the flag of the most-favoured nation.

22.

The provisions of articles 20 and 21 shall not apply to the special laws designed to protect, restore, and develop the national mercantile marine, to the coastal trade, which is reserved for the national flag exclusively, to fishing in territorial waters, to the pilot service and to the employment of pilots, to towing and to other port services, as well as to navigation in inland waters.

23.

The nationality of vessels and ships shall be recognized by both parties on the basis of documents and certificates issued by the competent authorities of the respective State in accordance with the laws and regulations of each country.

The contracting parties undertake to conclude a special agreement on the mutual recognition of ships' documents certifying the technical condition of the vessel and its register, namely: bills of measurement, certificates of seaworthiness, and other similar documents. Until such an agreement is concluded the parties undertake mutually to recognize the above-mentioned ships' papers duly issued by either of the contracting parties.

24.

Vessels and ships sailing under the flag of either of the contracting parties, when entering a port of the other party for the sole purpose of completing its cargo there or unloading part of its cargo, may, while conforming with the laws and regulations of the respective State, retain on board that part of its cargo destined for another port or another country, and re-export it without being obliged to pay any customs or fees for that part of its cargo with the exception of inspection charges which shall, however, be levied at the lowest rate fixed for national navigation.

25.

In the event of shipwreck, running aground, accidents at sea, or compulsory entry of a vessel of one of the contracting parties into the waters of the other party, the vessel and its cargo shall be entitled to the same facilities and privileges as are granted in similar circumstances

by the laws and regulations of the country concerned to its own vessels. The captain, crew, and passengers, both personally and in regard to the vessel and cargo, shall be entitled to help and assistance in the same degree as local nationals.

In regard to charges for rescue work the legislation of the country where the rescue occurred shall apply as applied to its own nationals and vessels.

Goods salvaged from the vessel which has been grounded or suffered shipwreck shall not be subject to any customs duties provided they are not imported into the country for internal consumption.

26.

Products of the soil and industry of Soviet origin imported directly from the USSR shall not upon their import into Turkey be subject, while the present treaty is in force, to any customs duties, including coefficients, or to any import charges, other or higher than those which are or may be imposed on the like products of any third country.

27.

Products of the soil and industry of Turkish origin, imported from Turkey, enumerated in list 1 annexed to the present treaty, shall benefit upon their import into the USSR, while the present treaty is in force, from a percentage reduction on the general tariff in force for the import into the USSR of the goods mentioned in the said list 1.

In any case, products of the soil and industry enumerated in the said list 1, as well as products of the soil and industry of Turkey enumerated in list 2 annexed to the present treaty, shall not be subject upon their import into the USSR to any customs duties, including coefficients, nor to any other import charges other or higher than those which are or may be imposed on like products from any third country.

28

Internal taxes, dues, and duties which are or may be imposed on the territory of either of the contracting parties for the benefit of the State, municipalities, or corporations, on the production, sale, consumption, or transport of any goods shall not be higher or more onerous in regard to goods which are the product of the soil or industry of the other party than those which are imposed on similar goods of local origin or of any third State which is or may be placed on the most favourable footing.

29.

In regard to guarantees, the method of levying customs duties, and other customs procedure connected with imports and exports, each

contracting party grants the other all the facilities which it grants or may in the future grant to any third country.

30.

Each contracting party retains the right of demanding, upon the import of the products of the soil and industry of the other party, the presentation of a certificate of origin attesting that the imports were produced on the territory of the other party.

The certificate of origin of Soviet goods shall be issued in the USSR by the People's Commissariat for Trade of the USSR and its agencies, and the certificate of origin of Turkish goods by the Turkish Ministries of Trade and Agriculture and their respective local agencies, as well as by Turkish Chambers of Commerce.

The form of the certificate of origin of goods exported from the USSR to Turkey and imported from Turkey into the USSR shall be drawn up by mutual agreement between the two parties.

The said certificates of origin shall be endorsed and legalized by the competent bodies of the respective parties in accordance with the regulations in force at the time the present treaty is signed on the territory of the country into which the goods so certified are being imported.

31.

The provisions of the present treaty in regard to most-favoured nation treatment shall not apply to:

i. Privileges which either of the contracting parties has granted or may in the future grant to countries on their frontier to facilitate trade in the frontier zone.

ii. Obligations which may be imposed on either of the contracting parties in virtue of a customs union.

iii. Privileges which the USSR has granted or may in the future grant to countries whose territory on 1 August 1914 formed part of the former Russian Empire.

iv. Special privileges and exemptions, both those now in force as well as those which may be established in the future, in regard to the customs tariff or in general to any aspect of trade, between Turkey and the countries which in 1923 separated from the Ottoman Empire.

32.

The present treaty is subject to ratification and the instruments of ratification shall be exchanged in Ankara as soon as possible.

The said treaty enters into force within one month from the exchange of ratifications.

At the expiration of one year from its entry into force either of the contracting parties may give notice of its intention to denounce the treaty, after which however it shall continue in force for a further six months from the day such notice was given by either of the contracting parties.

In witness whereof the plenipotentiaries have signed the present treaty and affixed thereto their seals.

Done in two copies in Ankara, 11 March 1927.

List 1

Commodity	*Percentage tariff reduction*	*Commodity*	*Percentage tariff reduction*
Onions	100	Undressed leather	
Grapes	98·5	(*a*) With hair	100
Dried figs, not in sugar, and all fruits and berries not in sugar, except currants	98·5	(*b*) Without hair	80
Oranges	60	Dried undressed leather	
Lemons	75	(*a*) With hair	100
Nuts of all kinds, except those enumerated separately	91·5	(*b*) Without hair	70
Almond and pistachio nuts, in shell	97·3	Pumice stone	2
Almond and pistachio nuts, shelled	98·2	Gum tragacanth	64
Butter	100	Olive oil	20
Cheese	100	Raw cotton	100
Fresh meat	100	Silk waste	20
Livestock	100	Raw silk	35
Silkworm eggs	100	Wool	100
		Silk, thrown and spun	
		(*a*) Unbleached and undyed	20
		(*b*) Bleached and dyed	20
		Woollen rugs	96

List 2

Peas, beans, broad beans, lentils, fresh and dried	Tiumbek (for narghile)
Fresh and dried little peas	Poultry
Fruits of all kinds, fresh and dried	Bones
Turkish locust beans	Horns and hooves
Olives	All kinds of leather
Saffron	All kinds of footwear
Acorns	Firewood
Grape juices and syrups	Barrels and other common wooden articles
All kinds of jams	Hay
All kinds of syrups	Sesame
Fresh fish	Ground sesame
Dried fish	Liquorice
Refined salt	Emery
Egg yolks	Meerschaum
Eggs	Amber, grey, yellow, and black
Tobacco in leaf	Chinaware

List 2 (contd.)

Coal
Liquorice juice
Sesame oil
Rose oil and rose essence
Soap
Tanning bark
All kinds of tanning articles, including nut galls and valonia
Valex [valonia extract?]
Dye woods, whole or ground (roots, berries, leaves and bark for dyeing)
Madder root
Earths for dyeing
Chrome ores
Scrap iron
Lead
Copper articles
Nails, ordinary and for horse shoeing
Books and textbooks
Raw hemp
Silk cocoons
Mohair
Cotton thread
Linen and hemp thread
Cotton fabrics of all kinds
Fishing nets
Articles made of rope
Woollen cloths of all kinds
Used clothing
Articles made of amber
Articles made of celluloid
Opium
Vegetables (canned, fresh, salted, including tomato purée)
All kinds of animal fats
All kinds of resin
All kinds of non-edible oils for industrial use
Cotton waste
Pharmaceutical and drug articles

Final Protocol

In signing the trade and navigation treaty concluded this day between the USSR and the Turkish Republic, the two contracting parties have agreed to the following provisions:

Ad article 5

By 'urban settlements' is meant in Turkey places which at the present time have a municipal organization, small towns with a population of 2,000 to 20,000, large towns with a population of more than 20,000, and prefectures.

Ad article 8

Taking into consideration the peculiar character, in certain respects, of juridical persons in the USSR, the contracting parties agree that to all economic organizations constituted in the territory of the USSR in conformity with its laws, such as State economic organizations of every kind, State trusts and syndicates, joint stock companies of every kind, co-operatives, and all other economic organizations which intend to conduct operations in the Turkish Republic, shall be applied, in regard to their admission to Turkish territory, and in regard to their conducting their operations on that territory, a regime no less favourable than that applied in the territory of the Turkish Republic to the commercial, industrial, financial, insurance, and other companies, as well as to the

juridical persons of every kind, of the most-favoured nation; the registration of the said Soviet organizations on Turkish territory shall be effected by their presenting to the Ministry of Trade or its local agencies a statement giving the trade name of the organization, the place of its establishment, its nationality, the amount of its capital, and an undertaking to conform in its operations on Turkish territory with the stipulations of Turkish law, a copy of its articles of association, a copy, sworn to by a Soviet notary and a Turkish diplomatic or consular authority in the USSR, of the Soviet Government certificate certifying that it was established in accordance with the laws in force in the USSR and that it is now functioning, and a warrant duly attested by a Soviet notary and a Turkish diplomatic or consular authority in the USSR or by a public notary in Turkey, authorizing the representative named by the organization to be registered to conduct the operations named in its articles of association and to represent it in all lawsuits arising from the fact of those operations, on behalf and at the cost of the organization, in courts of all degrees, whether as defendant or as claimant or in any other capacity.

Ad article 12

If, during the period of validity of the present treaty, the Istanbul branch of the Soviet trade delegation in Turkey shall move to other premises, the extra-territoriality granted to this branch shall be transferred to its new premises.

Ad article 18

1. It is agreed that the USSR retains the right, in regard to the transit of the products of the soil and industry of Turkey by the ways mentioned in article 18, to demand, on the arrival of these products on Soviet territory, certificates of origin certifying that these products are products of the soil and industry of Turkey.

Certificates of origin shall be issued by the Ministries of Trade and Agriculture and their local agencies, and also by Chambers of Commerce.

The said certificates shall be endorsed in Turkey by the trade delegation of the USSR or its agencies, and in places where such bodies do not exist by the consular institutions of the USSR.

Should the Soviet customs officers have serious reasons for doubting that the goods in transit correspond with the goods indicated on the certificate, they may verify that the goods correspond with the certificate within a maximum period of one week.

2. It is understood that the provisions of article 18 do not apply to goods the import of which into the territory of the respective country is prohibited by law.

Ad article 23

The Government of the USSR declares that the provisions of article 23 in no way cancel the rights of the USSR to all vessels of the former Russian fleet, naval and commercial, which were the property of the Russian Government or were subject to nationalization under Soviet legislation and which were taken abroad at the time of intervention or evaded nationalization by any other means.

The present protocol forms an integral part of the present treaty and enters into force simultaneously with the latter.

Done in two copies in Ankara, 11 March 1927.

NOTE FROM THE SOVIET CHARGÉ D'AFFAIRES IN CHINA TO THE CHINESE FOREIGN OFFICE PROTESTING AGAINST THE RAID ON THE SOVIET EMBASSY IN PEKING

6 *April* 1927 Kluchnikov & Sabanin, III, I, p. 371

Today, at 11 o'clock in the morning, an armed detachment of police and soldiers effected a forcible entry into the compound of the Embassy and occupied its western section, including the living quarters and offices of the military attaché. The police and soldiers who had broken in arrested the employees of the Embassy and the Chinese servants who were in that part of the Embassy territory, treating some of them roughly and mercilessly beating them. The soldiers and police searched and plundered a large number of the private houses situated in this part of the Embassy territory. They searched and sacked the service quarters of the military attaché. They paid particular attention to the library and the club; these buildings were completely destroyed, and the books carried off. Women and children who happened to be there at the time of the raid were robbed, their money taken from them; they were arrested and released only at 7 p.m. in the evening. Nobody from other parts of the territory of the Soviet Embassy was allowed to approach these scenes of violence and pillage, and even responsible Embassy functionaries who tried to get into touch with those in charge of the raiding forces were roughly repulsed by the police. The intruders still continue in occupation of the premises, and in consequence a number of Embassy employees are without shelter. The insulting attitude displayed towards the extra-territorial rights of the Soviet Embassy is of such an intolerable and unprecedented character that the Soviet Embassy, in addition to making the most energetic protest, has already reported on the matter to its Government and is awaiting the decisions of the latter before taking further steps.

NOTE FROM LITVINOV TO THE CHINESE CHARGÉ D'AFFAIRES IN MOSCOW ON THE RAID ON THE SOVIET EMBASSY IN PEKING

9 *April* 1927 Kluchnikov & Sabanin, iii, 1, p. 373

In connexion with the attack by armed soldiers of Chang Tso-lin's army and the Peking police on the premises of the military attaché of the Soviet Embassy in Peking and the living quarters of employees of the Embassy, I have the honour to ask you to transmit the following to the Peking cabinet:

1. Further to the note of M. Chernykh, chargé d'affaires of the USSR, of 6 April of this year, in which he reported that an outrageous assault had been made on the premises of the military attaché and the living quarters of Embassy employees, who had been beaten and arrested, and their houses raided and plundered, it can now be stated on the basis of information now at our disposal that the living quarters and offices of the military attaché, despite protest, were raided, sacked, and partly destroyed, and that the houses of Embassy employees were likewise sacked and pillaged. A number of employees were arrested, some of whom were beaten and subjected to violence and insults. The names of all those arrested cannot be established, since the armed police and soldiers would allow no one to enter the courtyard of the premises of the military attaché and the employees, and up to now the names of those arrested have not been reported. At present armed soldiers and police continue to occupy all the premises of the military attaché and the living quarters of the Embassy employees.

2. The raid carried out by the Peking authorities is an unprecedented violation of the elementary rules of international law. The immediate assumption made by Mr Chen, chargé d'affaires of the Peking Government in Moscow, that the raid had been carried out by robbers, and not by the State police, is now, after the note . . . of the Chinese Foreign Office, shown to be erroneous. The People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs was the more inclined to consider Mr Chen's assumption as probable, since it could not imagine that the lawful executors of the will of the Peking cabinet could commit such acts as those enumerated in M. Chernykh's . . . note and set forth above, that is: the arrest and beating of employees, the destruction of the military attaché's premises, the raid and sacking of the trade delegation, and of a large part of the living quarters of Embassy employees adjacent to the premises of the latter. It may now be considered as firmly established that the actions which Mr Chen described as a robbers' raid were committed by the police and soldiers of Peking on the instructions of the Peking Government. Such acts of violence are entirely without precedent between two countries maintaining official relations with each other.

3. If the Peking Government considered that it was raiding premises which, as it writes in its note,[1] are in the 'direct charge of the Soviet Embassy', then it had no right to take any action in regard to these premises without notifying the Soviet Embassy. But the police and soldiers who carried out the raid refused permission, not merely to the representatives of the Embassy, but . . . to M. Chernykh himself, to enter the compound where the searches and sackings were taking place. Such conduct can be explained only on the assumption that the Peking cabinet preferred the violence and plunder of its agents to take place in the absence of official persons. The Peking Government's wholly improbable and implausible statement that during the raid weapons and documents were found which provide proof of the preparation of an insurrection may explain why the raid on the premises of the military attaché and the living quarters of Embassy employees was carried out in such an extraordinary manner. For in such circumstances, which make even the most elementary supervision impossible, such as lists of articles removed etc., there is no guarantee that among the objects said to be 'found' on these premises there will not be included articles which might be used by the hostile alien influences which inspired and sanctioned the raid of 6 April.

4. If the Peking cabinet had information that Chinese citizens were to be found on territory in the direct control of the Soviet Embassy to whom it attributed activities directed against its interests, then it had every opportunity and was obliged in the first place to bring this information to the knowledge of the Soviet Embassy. However, as can be seen from your note . . . the Peking Government considered it more correct to apply in this matter to the diplomatic corps in Peking, and, with the consent of the Dutch ambassador, Oudendijk, acting on behalf of the diplomatic corps, to violate the extra-territorial rights of the military attaché, to use force against the employees of the Embassy, and to sack and destroy their homes. The collaboration of the Peking Government's soldiers and police with the representative of the diplomatic corps in Peking throws light on the real driving force behind these outrageous acts of violence and infringement of international law, and proves in whose interests they were committed.

The Soviet Government, emphatically protesting against this violence and violation of rights, considers it essential to insist on the fulfilment of the following elementary demands:

(*a*) The Chinese armed detachment and police must be immediately withdrawn from the premises of the military attaché, the employees of the Embassy, and the trade delegation.

[1] Kluchnikov & Sabanin, iii, 1, p. 372.

(*b*) All the arrested employees of the Soviet Embassy and Soviet economic institutions must be immediately released.

(*c*) All documents removed from the premises of the military attaché must be immediately returned.

(*d*) Property in the form of money, personal belongings, furniture, books, etc., pillaged and taken by the police and the military command of the Ankuochun must be immediately returned to its owners.

The Soviet Government considers that until these demands are satisfied it is compelled, as a mark of its protest, to recall its chargé d'affaires, M. Chernykh and the entire Embassy from Peking, leaving only personnel to carry out consular duties.

The Soviet Government restricts itself to the above-mentioned demands which are far from placing the Peking Government in a humiliating situation. Any imperialist Government whose representative had been subjected to such violence would have answered with ferocious reprisals. The Soviet Government, disposing of sufficient technical resources to enable it to resort to measures of retaliation, nevertheless declares that it decisively renounces such measures. The Soviet Government knows full well that irresponsible circles of foreign imperialists are trying to provoke the USSR into war. The Soviet Government is fully aware that the Peking cabinet has been made the tool in a game being played by foreign imperialist circles. But the Soviet Government has been guided, is guided, and will be guided in its policy by the interests of the working masses of the entire world, including the interests of the Chinese masses and the working class of all countries. In reply to this act of provocation, which was meant to worsen the international situation and turn the hostilities in fact being conducted by certain imperialist Powers against China into a new world war, the Soviet Government declares that it will not let itself be provoked by anybody and will with all its strength stand for the cause of peace between nations. In doing so the Soviet Government does not doubt that its desire for peace will meet the friendly support of the working masses of all countries, including—and in the first place—the peoples of China and the USSR.

JOINT SOVIET-SWISS DECLARATION, SETTLING THE DISPUTE ARISING FROM THE ASSASSINATION OF VOROVSKY

14 *April* 1927 *Sbornik Dogovorov*, iv, p. 27

In connexion with the desire of the Governments of the USSR and of the Swiss Confederation to settle the conflict existing between their two

countries which arose in consequence of the assassination of M. Vorovsky at the time of the Lausanne conference, and in consequence of the attempt on the lives of MM. Arens and Divilkovsky, the Swiss Federal Council again declares that it condemns these criminal actions and deeply regrets them. Furthermore, in a spirit of conciliation it is ready, when the negotiations between the Governments of the USSR and the Swiss Confederation on the complex of questions still awaiting settlement between the two countries begin, to grant material assistance to M. Vorovsky's daughter, in a manner and by means to be agreed upon simultaneously with these questions.

Thereafter both Governments declare the conflict between their countries settled and the reciprocal restrictive measures annulled.

NOTE FROM THE SOVIET CONSUL-GENERAL IN THE HEJAZ TO THE DIRECTOR OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE HEJAZ

15 *April* 1927 *Sbornik Dogovorov*, IV, p. 15

I have the honour to bring to Your Excellency's notice that my Government has instructed me to inform you that it has received the notification of the transformation of the Sultanate of Nejd into a kingdom under the name of 'Kingdom of Nejd and Associated Territories' and the proclamation of His Highness the King of the Hejaz, Abdul Aziz ibn Abdur-Rahman as-Saud as King under the title 'King of the Nejd and Associated Territories'. In this connexion, my Government offers His Highness the warmest congratulations.

TELEGRAM FROM LITVINOV TO STRESEMANN ON THE FIFTH ANNIVERSARY OF THE TREATY OF RAPALLO

16 *April* 1927 *Izvestia*, 19 *April* 1927

On the fifth anniversary of the signature of the Rapallo treaty,[1] which laid the foundation for friendly relations between Germany and the USSR, it is my pleasant duty to send greetings to you, Mr Minister, and to the German Government. The Governments of our two countries have steadfastly observed the principles of the Rapallo treaty, which found particularly clear expression in the conclusion of the treaty of 12 October 1925 and the Berlin treaty of 24 April 1926.[2] The Union Government is deeply convinced that the consolidation and development of friendly collaboration between Germany and the Union corresponds in all respects with the interests of the peoples of both countries.

[1] *League of Nations Treaty Series*, XIX, p. 247. [2] ibid., LIII, pp. 7, 387.

I am firmly convinced that the principles of the Rapallo treaty, the importance of which has been confirmed throughout these five years, will in the future too serve as the foundation for the favourable development of Soviet-German relations and for securing the peace so essential for the peoples of the entire world.

EXTRACTS FROM THE REPORT OF RYKOV, CHAIRMAN OF THE COUNCIL OF PEOPLE'S COMMISSARS, TO THE FOURTH SOVIET CONGRESS

18 *April* 1927 *Stenograficheskii Otchet*, p. 6

This Congress is taking place in an extremely tense and alarming international atmosphere. Our foreign policy has developed recently in conditions where active hostility to the Soviet Union has been growing in a number of countries. In this connexion the Union Government has had to overcome considerable difficulties in carrying out the basic principles of its foreign policy—the securing of peace and the development and consolidation of economic and political relations with other countries . . .

There is considerable anxiety about the possibility of preserving and securing peace. This anxiety is caused by a number of international events of the kind which, in the history of international affairs, have more than once occurred on the eve of armed conflicts. Therefore the question whether what has been happening recently is not the prelude to or preparation for war is the most important question of contemporary international politics . . .

What are the chief nodal points in international affairs today? It seems to me that there are two, China and our Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. The population of these two gigantic States represents nearly one-third of total world population. Around these two at the present moment public opinion is mobilizing, both the forces hostile to them and the forces friendly to them.

Why are these two countries the target for imperialist aggression? As to China, the reason for the aggressive mobilization against the liberation movement of the Chinese people is China's position as the focus of colonial policy. What is really being decided on the territory of China is the future of imperialism, at least the future of imperialism in the forms in which it has developed over the last decades.

Our State is the object of hostile capitalist aggression because on its territory the problems of socialist construction are being decided. The increase in our economic strength, the greater political importance of our Union, mean the victory of the socialist organization of society. That

is why these two States are the focus of the mounting aggression of the international bourgeoisie . . .

The starting point, chronologically, of the mobilization of public opinion and of the forces hostile to our Union was Mr Chamberlain's note . . .

The real reason for the Conservative Government's note can be found only by following the anti-Soviet agitation against our Union which is being conducted by a considerable part of, if not by the entire Conservative Party.

The chief elements in their propaganda are: first, the Tsarist debts; secondly, the solidarity of the Soviet working class with the working masses of England; and thirdly, the imperialists' dislike of the sympathy of the Chinese people for our Union, which they call 'participation' by the Soviet Union in the Chinese liberation movement . . .

I must point out that not one of these three questions has been discussed between us and official English representatives. Although we have frequently suggested that practical negotiations should be started, the present Conservative Government has steadily refused to make these so-called 'controversial questions' the subject of official negotiations. Nevertheless, using precisely these three facts, the English Conservatives are conducting a campaign in England which not only hampers the development of economic and commercial relations but which may, in certain circumstances, lead to a break. The rupture of diplomatic relations between two such great States as the USSR and England is bound to have repercussions on the entire European political situation, is bound to make the maintenance of peace more difficult. The exploitation of problems which have not been the subject of businesslike examination to worsen and break relations should therefore be regarded as criminal. In view of their enormous importance in international affairs I shall deal with them in detail.

In regard to the position of the working class in our Union, its rights, and its connexions with the world working-class movement, everybody, even the Conservatives, must start from the fact that ours is a workers' State, and for that very reason not only the labouring masses and workers' organizations, but the Government of our Union itself, can openly declare its fraternal and class solidarity with the working class and toilers of other countries . . .

The second question is that of debts. On this question the Soviet Government has already stated its point of view more than once, and to a certain extent it was embodied in the treaty with the previous English Government. That treaty had already been initialed by the English Prime Minister at the time, MacDonald, and by the chairman of our delegation Comrade Rakovsky. The treaty was drawn up in

accordance with the situation as it had developed, taking into account the interests of both countries. It indicated how questions in dispute were to be settled and at the time was considered advantageous both to the English and to us. With the coming to power of the Conservatives the treaty was not ratified. It is obvious that if the new Conservative Government really and truly wished to make an agreement with us it should have indicated what it did not agree with in the initialed treaty, how, in its opinion, the treaty should be altered, and have put forward a new draft treaty. I must state that up to the present day the Soviet Government has not received any concrete proposals of the changes in the treaty considered necessary by the Conservatives. Our representatives in England, Rakovsky, the late Krassin, and Rozengolts, have more than once suggested to the English Government the practical examination of such new proposals or changes in the treaty as might be made by the English side. I must state that the English Government has always declined to do this and has made no proposals.

In the absence of any concrete proposals from the Conservative Government concerning methods of settling this question in a practical and mutually advantageous manner, we cannot come to any other conclusion than that the English Government is waiting for a favourable moment when it will be able to impose on the USSR the unconditional and unilateral recognition of debts.

If the English Conservative Government, taking on itself the role of European advocate for the Tsarist debts, finds it convenient to wait, it has of course a right to do so. But it seems to me that such an attitude benefits neither the general economic relations between the two countries, nor the creditors themselves.

The note which was received from the English Government threatened a break. Our note adequately refuted the statements and accusations officially advanced by the English Government and stated the Soviet Government's point of view on the question both of the possibility of a break and of the responsibility for it. Judging by the declarations of certain English Ministers, the rupture has not occurred because it was recognized to be untimely, as both internationally and in England itself it encountered a whole series of difficulties which forced the Conservative Government to refrain from a break at the present moment . . .

The national liberation movement in China is now one of the chief, if not the chief reason for dissatisfaction with the Soviet Government and for making every kind of accusation against it. This dissatisfaction is now growing sharper with the development of the Chinese liberation movement. It was so before too, beginning practically at the same time as the signing of the treaty between the USSR and China, the first treaty to recognize China's complete sovereignty and to be based on the

complete rejection of the special privileges and rights which foreigners enjoy in China. In this treaty the imperialists saw a stimulus to the development of the anti-imperialist movement . . .

Once we made a treaty with China, as equal with equal, that fact alone put the imperialist States, which regarded China as a semi-colonial country subject to their rule, in an extremely awkward position.

The latest events have shown that the imperialists do not wish to be reconciled to one or the other, i.e. they do not want to count China as a sovereign State like themselves, nor do they want to allow the Chinese people to 'wriggle themselves free' from the imperialist countries. The situation in China at the present time is characterized in fact not only by the presence of civil war, but by the participation in that war of almost all the interested imperialist countries. That is evident if only from the number of troops and warships of these countries now in China. I received yesterday the following information: there are now in China the following naval units: British, 80; American, 55; Japanese, 12; French, 13; Italian, 12; and one Spanish—in all 173 warships. This is an enormous war squadron. There are the following land forces: 15 battalions, 1 division, and 3 brigades, and in addition 3 artillery detachments. In fact war is already being waged on Chinese territory. It would be naive to try to prove that the presence of such forces is necessary merely to protect the interests of foreigners living in China. In intelligible political language the presence of these armed forces means in fact intervention . . .

It seems to me that there are no 'substantial' disagreements among the imperialist States about policy in China. It is true that occasionally a report appears that this Power or the other does not agree with the rest on one point or the other. On questions of detail, of course, disagreements between them are quite possible, but on the fundamental question—whether it is necessary to use armed force in a China that is liberating itself there is no great difference of opinion among the imperialists. This is the direction in which Japan's attitude has also apparently turned; in connexion with recent events Japan has strengthened its armed forces in south China and has begun to concentrate considerable armed forces in north China too.

Other ways of fighting the national liberation movement are to back the troops of the northern warlords, and to attempt to disintegrate the national movement itself. According to press reports, the latest events in south China—the split in the national camp, the *volte-face* of Chiang Kai-shek—did not take place without preparations behind the scenes on the part of certain representatives of the imperialist States. All those armies and troops which are concentrated in China are in

themselves a provocation to hostilities. That is not only our point of view; it is perfectly well understood by the bourgeoisie . . .

In this situation there occurred the raid on part of our Embassy in Peking, a raid which was approved and agreed to beforehand by the ambassadors. This action, without parallel in the history of international relations among 'civilized' States, aroused a storm of indignation among the Soviet public. The Government realizes that by these peculiar means they want to push us, at any cost, into war with China. It is impossible to explain what has lately happened to us on Chinese territory by any other purpose. And I declare here, as I did at the RSFSR Congress,[1] that the Soviet Government will not yield to this provocation. Great sympathy for our Union and for our State is one of the keynotes in the development of the Chinese national liberation movement. This supplies a pretext for those who accuse us of anti-British agitation on Chinese territory. But they have never made any concrete charges against us on this score. The Soviet Government has more than once requested the Conservative Government of England to produce a factual instance of any anti-British statement by a representative of the Soviet Union. Up to now the English Government has been unable to do so. Apart from that, it should be noted that we regard China as just as much a sovereign State as Britain, and think that we should answer for our conduct in China—if it were ever to come to the point of having to answer for it—not to the English, but to the Chinese. Anything else would be as inequitable as if, for example, Chiang Kai-shek or the Shanghai authorities were to ask us to answer for the conduct of our representatives in London.

It is regarded as our fault that the Soviet citizen, Borodin, is taking a hand in Chinese affairs. The intrigues against the English are attributed to the activity of this Borodin. I must state that Borodin is not our representative in China, has received no authorization from the Soviet Government, and therefore our Government is not responsible for Borodin's actions . . .[2]

There is great danger in the fact that the bourgeois world underrates the strength of the national liberation movement which is now occurring on Chinese territory. There have come into the movement millions of people from the oppressed classes of this oppressed nation. This movement has such strength that it is scarcely conceivable that it can be restrained by armed detachments or even by entire armies. Therefore persistence in military intervention inevitably grows, in China, into a great imperialist war. This war will be waged on the shores of the Pacific, for dominion over which certain countries are contending; hence the great likelihood that this war will become a world war.

[1] *Izvestia*, 12 April 1927.

[2] Cf. Cmd. 2874, p. 29.

When I was speaking of recent events in China at the RSFSR congress, I was asked: Have we any troops on Chinese territory? I answered no. Thereupon certain foreign newspapers interpreted my reply as a sign of the weakness of our Government. But it is precisely in the absence of forces on Chinese territory, in the absence of coercion against China, that there lies the greatest of possible guarantees of co-operation and friendship with the Chinese people. It is precisely the absence of our forces in China that makes us stronger there than other States, and places us and our nationals in a safer position than the nationals of those countries which are intervening on Chinese territory . . .

The English note, it seems to me, pursues another purpose besides those of which I have already spoken, the ideological preparation, if the expression is allowed, of an anti-Soviet bloc. Otherwise it is impossible to explain why the business-like English have converted their note into a broadsheet, a proclamation. The only purpose in issuing such a proclamation is to rally broad bourgeois circles for the business of ideological preparation of the encirclement of our Union. And in fact recently many conservative papers have been repeating that it is necessary to 'surround the USSR', 'destroy the Bolshevik danger', 'establish a *cordon sanitaire*', etc., etc.

This kind of agitation is in essence preparation for encirclement, psychological preparation for intervention. Virtually open bargaining has begun for an anti-Soviet alignment. In the light of this anti-Soviet campaign and this bargaining specific importance attaches to the ratification by the Italian Government of the protocol legalizing Rumania's seizure of part of the territory of the USSR, Bessarabia. For a long time the Italian Government found it unnecessary and untimely to ratify this protocol, but now, at the time of the anti-Soviet campaign, it has changed its point of view. On this question of the Bessarabian protocol it must be said once and for all that no papers, notes, ratifications, or assertions about Bessarabia can have any significance whatsoever unless the Soviet Government is a party thereto.

At the present time the bourgeoisie are trying to use our attitude to the League of Nations for a campaign against us, blaming the Soviet Government for not entering the League, and for refusing to work for the general 'cause of peace'. This question of our attitude to the League of Nations may become current again both in connexion with the general international situation, and because the 'geographical' obstacle to our participation in the work of the League of Nations or of its commissions has now been at last removed. A few days ago the Soviet envoy in Germany, Comrade Krestinsky, and the Swiss ambassador signed a protocol liquidating the dispute that arose out of the murder of Comrade Vorovsky at the time of the Lausanne conference . . .

Does the League of Nations really fight for peace? China and England are members of the League of Nations. It may be asked, what difference has that made in the relations between these two countries? English armed forces are carrying out on Chinese territory just the same kind of intervention, if not worse, as they did before the foundation of the League of Nations, which has not even discussed this question of the war in China . . . The League of Nations is an instrument in the hands of a small group, a few powerful imperialist States, for their rule over all other States. The League of Nations has never played and is not playing any other part, if you leave out the harmful illusions created by its very existence. These illusions are still strong and widespread although all the facts speak against them. They try to prove that the League of Nations is the organization called upon to save the world from war, and that our refusal to enter it is a sign that we do not wish to fight for peace. We have supported and shall support every real movement in the struggle for peace, and are fully and completely agreed to support every real pacific organization. But we do not want to enter an organization like the League of Nations.

The League of Nations is trying to prove its pacifism by calling a disarmament conference . . . The point of everything that is going on in the preparations for this conference is that it is not a conference on disarmament, but a conference on how to maintain military preparedness with the minimum expenditure for those countries which now rule the world. The essence of the proposals which have been published is that the ruling Powers are trying to establish an armaments regime which would make it impossible for other States to strengthen their armaments to capacity in defence against the strong imperialist States . . .

What are the principles of the policy which we have pursued for the period that is past and which are, in the Government's opinion, obligatory for the future? In analysing the attitude of foreign States towards us, we must bear in mind two basic factors in the so-called 'Russian question'.

The first is the growth of economic interest in the USSR thanks to the strengthening and development of its economic might and the expansion of the Soviet market.

The second is the growth of hostility towards the USSR (of the ruling political groups) *pari passu* with the strengthening of the international importance and political influence of the USSR.

Until quite recently the economic development of the Soviet Union proceeded virtually without foreign technical assistance. The process of developing the new structure, the industrialization of the country, denotes a considerable expansion of the import of the products of the

industrial countries, primarily the import of equipment for our factories and the use of the experience of European and American countries in the organization of industry. In normal political circumstances this opens broad prospects for these countries of an expansion of the Soviet market. Side by side and parallel with the struggle for peace, we shall do all we can, while of course fully maintaining the foreign trade monopoly, to develop our trade relations and encourage to the utmost technical and concession connexions between our State and other countries.

A number of things have happened recently in regard to concessions policy which have been used abroad in an attempt to prove that it is impossible to work in the USSR. The pretext for this is that recently some concessionary undertakings were liquidated. I must declare quite emphatically that the reason for the failure of these concesssionary undertakings was that they calculated on using the funds of our State banks and other Soviet banks. We admit concessionaires, not for them to work on our money, but in order to attract foreign capital. Because of this difference we were compelled to close down and liquidate certain concessionary undertakings. The responsibility falls, naturally, not on us, but on the concessionaires. In attracting in the form of concessions west European experience to work here, on Soviet territory, we are far from objecting to the concessionaires getting their profits, but on their own capital, their own experience, and not on our money and our experience. With this necessary and obligatory reservation we shall try in future to expand our concessionary relations.

Passing to an analysis of the political treaties which we have concluded in the period under review with various countries and of the relations established with them, I must indicate the essential difference between our treaty political relations and those of the west European States among themselves. There you have a system of so-called groups of a number of capitalist countries, with the help of which they try to secure their influence and rule in times of peace and their joint action in time of war. In certain cases, even now, there are agreements going as far as military alliances (for example Poland, Rumania). This system serves the purpose of spacing out forces in the event of war. We have not and shall not take part in any of these groups.

Our treaties are of a so-called bilateral character, i.e. they are concluded between two States without the participation of any third State or group. In these treaties we pursue one goal—the securing of real peace and the guaranteeing of neutrality of the two parties in the event of hostilities. Thus under our system of treaty relations not only are no new military conflicts being prepared, which is what happens with the system of groups and coalitions, but, on the contrary, by means of the obligation to neutrality the scope of possible hostilities is restricted . . .

Recently there has been a lively discussion in the press, particularly abroad, about our relations with Germany. There is much discussion of the question whether Germany has changed its orientation from the East to the West. I must say that in the five years since the signature of the Rapallo treaty we have had no cause for complaint or for any dissatisfaction with the relations established between the USSR and Germany. As I said, after the Rapallo treaty a commercial treaty was signed, and then on 24 April 1926 the pact of neutrality and of non-participation in hostile combinations. In connexion with the Locarno conferences and Germany's entry into the League of Nations, the press in a number of countries began to assert that Germany had agreed to allow the armed forces of other countries to pass through its territory in the event of hostilities between those countries and the USSR. These assertions were quite recently repeated. On this matter the German Government declared that it had assumed no such obligations. The said declaration was made officially by Stresemann, the German Foreign Minister, both in the Reichstag and specifically to the Soviet Government.[1] The Soviet Government cannot, of course, disbelieve the official statements of the German Government. In our future relations with Germany we shall proceed on the assumption that in the event of any intrigues against the USSR Germany will not allow itself to be used for any armed attack upon us.

Together with this I must point out that economic and cultural connexions with Germany are growing from year to year, and more than with any other country. The German Government has guaranteed special credits for our industrial orders in Germany. The original sum of these credits was quite recently raised to 315 million RM. These credits have now been fully taken up and the orders placed with German works and factories. These credits went entirely on the purchase of machinery and equipment required for the industrialization of our country. All this shows that the policy laid down at Rapallo has been justified . . .

A large place has been occupied in the Soviet Government's foreign policy in the period under review by the question of our relations with the Baltic States and Poland. In fulfilment of our peace policy, we proposed the conclusion of treaties of neutrality and non-aggression to our nearest western neighbours.

One obstacle up to now has been the fact that Poland has wanted to be the guardian or surety for all the other Baltic States and has tried to create from Rumania to Finland an unbroken chain of States negotiating with us through Poland and with Poland's help. The USSR rejects this point of view and considers that the creation of a united

[1] cf. G. Stresemann, *Reden und Schriften*, Dresden, Carl Reissner, 1926, ii, p. 217.

front of countries from the Baltic to the Black Sea in regard to the USSR cannot serve to strengthen peace. This was one of the chief differences. A number of statements have recently been made by Polish statesmen about the desirability of hastening the conclusion of the treaty. Unfortunately, although we agree with them, action has not yet followed quickly enough on these words . . .

In the Far East the preservation of peace depends in a large degree on Japan. That is why the problem of peace in the East depends on the relations to be established between the three principal eastern countries, Japan, the USSR, and China. Consequently the Soviet Government in its relations with Japan tries to develop peaceful relations as widely as possible and to settle those questions about which up to now negotiations have been conducted between the two Governments. The Japanese Foreign Minister recently made a speech indicating the same wishes on the part of the Japanese Government.

We must start from the fact that there are no serious disagreements between us and the Japanese Government, and therefore we see no great obstacle to a further rapprochement. In particular, there is no obstacle in the interests which both these States have in Manchuria. Public opinion in Japan, which at first feared that the Soviet Republic's policy was reviving the grasping tendencies of the Tsarist Government in the East, is now beginning to take account of the radical difference which exists between the Soviet Republic's peace policy and the Tsar's policy. One of the obstacles to the real development of commercial relations with Japan is that economic negotiations, and in particular negotiations on a fisheries' agreement, have not been concluded. The Government of the USSR is trying to expedite these negotiations and to pass on to negotiations for a commercial treaty. Unfortunately, for reasons not dependent on us, these negotiations have been dragged out longer than is necessary in the interest of the two States, but let us hope they will be brought to a successful conclusion in the near future . . .

From what I have said we must draw the conclusion that together with a great many successes, together with an improvement and development in our relations with a number of countries, for example Germany and Turkey, and the possibility of reaching agreement with other countries, e.g. Japan and France, the general world situation in relation to the USSR is considerably more alarming than it was at the time of the last congress.

We must recognize clearly that as the capitalist system encounters more and more acute difficulties in its development, as the so-called stabilization of capitalism becomes more and more uncertain and precarious, capitalist circles will try to load a considerable part of the responsibility for these failures, both in international affairs and at

home—in the struggle against the working class—on to the Soviet Union. In so far as the developing movement in China adopts friendship and sympathy for our State as its slogan, in so far as any revolutionary-liberation movement, any working-class movement adopts the same slogan—to that extent will the attacks on our Union become greater.

It is no accident that precisely now, when the future of imperialism is in great danger, aggression against our Union grows from day to day. Whether this aggression will lead to military adventure against us, nobody can now say. In the long-term historical rivalry of the two systems, socialism and capitalism, armed conflicts between these systems are of course possible. The Soviet Government will do everything necessary not to be taken unawares.

EXTRACTS FROM THE RESOLUTION OF THE FOURTH SOVIET CONGRESS ON RYKOV'S REPORT

20 *April* 1927 *Stenograficheskii Otchet, Postanovleniia*, p. 3

1. The Fourth Soviet Congress, having heard and discussed the report of the chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR, Comrade A. I. Rykov, on the work of the Government of the USSR for the past two years, fully endorses the Government's actions and its political and economic programme.

2. At the same time the congress notes that the activities directed to the development and strengthening of connexions with capitalist countries encountered great difficulties because of the growing hostility towards the Soviet Union of the Governments of certain capitalist countries. In the opinion of the congress this hostility is growing because the very existence of the workers' State, successfully building socialism and renouncing national oppression and violence, steadily weakens the position of the world bourgeoisie in relation to the working class and the peoples of the colonial countries which it exploits and oppresses.

3. The congress anxiously directs the attention of all workers to the recent extremely rapid strengthening of the international bourgeoisie's aggression against the USSR. The extremely strange English note of 'warning', and then the unheard-of insolent violence, unprecedented in the history of international relations, against the Soviet diplomatic missions in Peking and Shanghai, committed with the obvious purpose of provoking us, force the USSR to be on guard. The congress instructs the Government to be prepared to repulse any new attempts to provoke the Soviet Union into war with anyone at all, and to do everything possible to prevent war.

4. The congress warns the entire world that the policy of the international bourgeoisie towards the USSR and the struggle waged by the imperialist countries against the national liberation workers' and peasants' movement in China involves the danger of a new world war.

5. The congress expresses its sympathy with the national liberation movement of the Chinese people and fully approves the Soviet Government's policy to China, based on recognition of China's complete sovereignty, on the principle of equality, and on the complete renunciation by the USSR of the special privileges which foreigners enjoy in China.

6. The congress directs the attention of all peoples to the indisputable fact that the USSR is the only State in the world which directly and openly and consistently pursues a pacific policy corresponding to the interests of mankind. Fully approving this policy of peace, the congress instructs the Government to continue as before unswervingly along this road and to try to establish and strengthen friendly relations with foreign States. The congress notes with satisfaction that these efforts have found a response among certain States; the development of economic intercourse with these countries is the best testimony to the correctness of this policy.

EXTRACTS FROM AN ARTICLE BY STALIN ON THE CHINESE REVOLUTION

21 *April* 1927 Stalin, ix, p. 221[1]

I

The Perspectives of the Chinese Revolution

The fundamental facts determining the character of the Chinese revolution are:

(*a*) The semi-colonial position of China and the financial-economic domination of imperialism;

(*b*) the oppression exercised by the feudal survivals, reinforced by the oppression of militarism and the bureaucracy;

(*c*) the expanding revolutionary struggle of millions of the working and peasant masses against the feudal bureaucratic yoke, against militarism, against imperialism;

(*d*) the political weakness of the national bourgeoisie, its dependence on imperialism, its fear of the surge of the revolutionary movement;

[1] In addition to those noted, a number of minor changes have been made in this text as compared with the original version of this article.

(*e*) the growing revolutionary activity of the proletariat, and the growth of its authority among the millions of the labouring masses;

(*f*) the existence of the proletarian dictatorship in a neighbouring country.

Hence two paths of development of Chinese events:

Either the national bourgeoisie will defeat the proletariat, make a deal with imperialism and together with it take the field against the revolution in order to end it by establishing the rule of capitalism;

or the proletariat will brush aside the national bourgeoisie, consolidate its hegemony, and draw after it the millions of the labouring masses in town and country in order to overcome the resistance of the national bourgeoisie, to gain complete victory for the bourgeois-democratic revolution, and ⟨then gradually to move it⟩[1] on to the path of socialist revolution with all the ensuing consequences.

One or the other.

The crisis of world capitalism and the existence of a proletarian dictatorship in the USSR, whose experience can be successfully used by the Chinese proletariat, greatly increase the possibility of the Chinese revolution developing along the second path.

On the other hand, the fact that imperialism is attacking the Chinese revolution, by and large, as a united front, that there is not now among the imperialists the division and the war which existed, for example, in the imperialist camp before the October revolution and which weakened imperialism—this suggests that the Chinese revolution will meet much greater difficulties on the road to victory than the revolution in Russia, that desertions and treachery in the course of the revolution will be incomparably greater than in the period of the civil war in the USSR.

Therefore the struggle between these two roads for the revolution is the characteristic feature of the Chinese revolution.

Precisely for that reason the basic task of communists consists in the struggle for the victory of the second road of the Chinese revolution.

II.

The First Stage of the Chinese Revolution

In the first period of the Chinese revolution, in the period of the first march to the north, when the national army, approaching the Yangtse, gained victory after victory, although the mighty movement of workers and peasants had not yet fully developed, the national bourgeoisie (the non-compradores) went together with the revolution. This was a revolution of the united *all-national* front.

[1] In earlier editions, then to move it.

This does not mean that there were no contradictions between the revolution and the national bourgeoisie. It only means that the national bourgeoisie, in supporting the revolution, tried to use it for its own ends, and by directing it primarily along the path of ⟨territorial conquest⟩[1], to check its impetus. The struggle between the right and left wings of the Kuomintang in this period was the reflection of these contradictions. Chiang Kai-shek's attempt in March 1926 to expel the communists from the Kuomintang was the first serious attempt of the national bourgeoisie to curb the revolution. It is known that even then the Central Committee of the VKP(b) considered that it was 'essential to follow the line of keeping the Communist Party within the Kuomintang', that it was necessary 'to work for the withdrawal or the exclusion of the right wing from the Kuomintang' (April 1926).

This was the line towards the further development of the revolution, towards close collaboration of the left wing and the communists within the Kuomintang and in the composition of the national government, towards reinforcing the unity of the Kuomintang and at the same time exposing and isolating the Kuomintang right wing, subjecting them to the discipline of the Kuomintang, using the right wing, their connexions and their experience, so long as they submitted to Kuomintang discipline, or towards their exclusion from the Kuomintang if they infringed that discipline and betrayed the interests of the revolution.

Subsequent events completely confirmed the correctness of this line. The powerful development of the peasant movement, and the organization of peasant unions and committees in the village, the powerful strike wave in the towns and the creation of councils of trade unions, the victorious advance of the national troops towards Shanghai, besieged by the armies and navies of the imperialists—all these and similar facts tell us that the line taken was the only correct line.

Only in this way can we explain the fact that the attempt of the right wing in February 1927 to split the Kuomintang and create a new centre in Nanchang was defeated by the unanimous resistance of the revolutionary Kuomintang in Wuhan.

But this attempt was a sign that a regrouping of class forces was proceeding in the country, that the right wing and national bourgeoisie were not taking things quietly, that they would intensify their work against the revolution.

The Central Committee of the VKP(b) was therefore right when in March 1927 it said that:

(*a*) At the present time the Chinese revolution, in connexion with the regrouping of class forces and the concentration of the imperialist

[1] In earlier editions, foreign territorial conquest.

armies, is passing through a critical period, and that its further victories are possible only by proceeding vigorously towards the development of a mass movement;

(*b*) it is necessary to keep to the course of arming the workers and peasants, of turning the local peasant committees into effective organs of power armed for self-defence;

(*c*) the Communist Party should not conceal the treacherous and reactionary policy of the right wing of the Kuomintang and should mobilize the masses around the Kuomintang and the Chinese Communist Party to expose the right wing (3 March 1927).

It is therefore easy to understand that subsequently the mighty surge of the revolution on the one hand, and the attack of the imperialists in Shanghai on the other, were bound to throw the national Chinese bourgeoisie into the counter-revolutionary camp, just as the occupation of Shanghai by the national troops and the strikes of the Shanghai workers were bound to unite the imperialists to suppress the revolution.

And that is what happened. The Nanking shootings served in this respect as the signal for a new demarcation of the forces fighting in China. By the shootings in Nanking, and by delivering an ultimatum, the imperialists wanted to show that they were seeking the support of the national bourgeoisie for a common struggle against the Chinese revolution.

By shooting at workers' meetings and making his *volte-face*, Chiang Kai-shek, as though in reply to the challenge of the imperialists, said that he was ready for a deal between the imperialists and the national bourgeoisie against the workers and peasants of China.

III.

The Second Stage of the Chinese Revolution

Chiang Kai-shek's *volte-face* signalized the abandonment by the national bourgeoisie of revolution, the birth of a centre of national counter-revolution, and the compact of the right wing Kuomintang with imperialism against the Chinese revolution.

Chiang Kai-shek's *volte-face* means that in south China from now on there will be two camps, two governments, two armies, two centres—the centre of revolution in Wuhan and the centre of counter-revolution in Nanking.

Chiang Kai-shek's *volte-face* means that the revolution has entered the second stage of its development, that there has begun the change over from revolution on an *all-national* united front to the revolution of the millions of the *working* and *peasant* masses, to the *agrarian* revolution,

which will strengthen and extend the struggle against imperialism, against the gentry and feudal landlords, against the militarists and the counter-revolutionary Chiang Kai-shek group.

This means that the struggle between the two paths of revolution, between the supporters of its further expansion and the supporters of its liquidation, will grow sharper from day to day, filling out the entire present period of the revolution.

This means that the revolutionary Kuomintang in Wuhan, waging a vigorous struggle against militarism and imperialism, will be turned in fact into an organ of the revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry, while the counter-revolutionary group of Chiang Kai-shek in Nanking, breaking away from the workers and peasants and drawing near to imperialism, will in the end share the fate of the militarists.

But it follows from this that the policy of maintaining the unity of the Kuomintang, the policy of isolating the right wing in the Kuomintang and using them for the purposes of the revolution, no longer corresponds to the new tasks of the revolution. This policy must be replaced by a policy of the resolute exclusion of the right from the Kuomintang, a policy of resolute struggle against the right up to their ⟨complete political liquidation⟩[1], a policy of concentrating all power in the country in the hands of the *revolutionary* Kuomintang, the Kuomintang without its right-wing elements, the Kuomintang as the bloc of its left wing with the communists.

It follows from this further that the policy of close collaboration between the left wing and the communists within the Kuomintang acquires at the present stage a special force and a special significance, that this collaboration reflects the alliance of workers and peasants that is being formed outside the Kuomintang, and without this collaboration the victory of the revolution is impossible.

It follows from this further that the chief source of strength for the revolutionary Kuomintang is the further development of the revolutionary movement of the workers and peasants and the consolidation of their mass organizations, of the revolutionary peasant committees, the workers' trade unions, and other mass revolutionary organizations as the preparatory elements of Soviets in the future, that the chief pledge of the victory of the revolution is the growth of this revolutionary activity of the millions of the labouring masses, while the chief antidote against the counter-revolution is the arming of the workers and peasants.

It follows from this, finally, that, while fighting in the same ranks with the revolutionary Kuomintang, the Communist Party must more than ever retain its independence, as the necessary condition for

[1] In earlier editions, complete liquidation.

ensuring the hegemony of the proletariat in the bourgeois-democratic revolution . . .

The opposition thinks it inexpedient for the Communist Party to take part in the Kuomintang. The opposition considers it expedient, if you please, for the Communist Party to leave the Kuomintang. But what does the exit of the Communist Party from the Kuomintang mean *now*, when the entire imperialist pack with all its hangers-on is demanding the expulsion of the communists from the Kuomintang? It means abandoning the battlefield and throwing over our allies in the Kuomintang, to the joy of the enemies of the revolution. It means weakening the Communist Party, injuring the revolutionary Kuomintang, facilitating the work of the Shanghai *Cavaignacs*, and surrendering the banner of the Kuomintang, the most popular of all banners in China, into the hands of the Kuomintang right wing.

This is just what the imperialists, the militarists, and the Kuomintang right wing are demanding.

It follows, therefore, that by advocating the withdrawal of the Communist Party from the Kuomintang *at the present moment*, the opposition is playing into the hands of the enemies of the Chinese revolution.

PRESS INTERVIEW BY OSINSKY, CHAIRMAN OF THE SOVIET DELEGATION TO THE WORLD ECONOMIC CONFERENCE

3 *May* 1927 *Izvestia*, 5 *May* 1927

In an interview given to representatives of the German press, Comrade Osinsky, chairman of the Soviet delegation to the international economic conference, explained that the late arrival of the Soviet delegation in Geneva was due in the first place to the comparatively late settlement of the Soviet-Swiss conflict, and also to the delay in nominating the members of the delegation as a result of the holding of the Congress of Soviets in Moscow.

'The dispatch of a Soviet delegation to Geneva has given rise to a multitude of the most diverse rumours', continued Comrade Osinsky. 'For instance, there is a rumour that the Soviet Union has altered its position with regard to the so-called League of Nations. In this connexion it must be pointed out that the Soviet Government has never refused to take part in any international conference for the discussion of questions which are of importance in international life, whether such a conference was called by the League of Nations or some other body. The deciding factor in such instances is the composition, the work, and the decisions of the conference. Our participation in conferences does not in any way bind us with regard to the League of Nations and we do not contemplate

any alteration in our attitude towards it. Equally erroneous is the assertion that the Soviet Government solved the conflict with Switzerland in order to be able to participate in the conference. On the contrary, the solution of the conflict simply made the participation of the USSR in the conference logical and automatically possible, but the solution of the conflict does not signify any alteration whatsoever in the Soviet attitude to this conflict.'

Speaking of the tasks before the economic conference and the Soviet delegation Comrade Osinsky said: 'The Soviet delegation's most important tasks are: (1) to express the point of view of public opinion in the Soviet Union on the matter of the international economic position and the so-called 'difficulties' connected with it; (2) to put forward Soviet proposals on concrete matters and on matters of principle, with the object of liquidating the chronic crisis from which the economy of the bourgeois world is suffering; (3) to demonstrate the results of the economic development of the Soviet Union on a socialist basis; (4) to define the basis on which it is possible for two opposite economic and social systems to exist side by side—on the one hand capitalist western Europe and America, and on the other—socialist USSR; (5) to make concrete proposals and explanations on all questions connected with these points.

Our delegation includes people who are connected with various branches of economic life, people who occupy leading posts in some branch, and notable experts on economic affairs. They represent public opinion in the first socialist State, the first workers' republic. This fact lays a stamp on our delegation which radically differentiates it from any other, and constitutes the premise for the expression by our delegation of our general point of view in principle, and of our views on particular questions, all of which will differ radically from the views of other delegations. This does not, of course, exclude the possibility of co-operation with a number of other delegations on many questions, if only because the Soviet Union considers it a duty to support the efforts to attain political and economic equality on the part of those nations which are usually restricted in these matters. Apart from this, the difference between two economic and social systems existing side by side does not exclude the possibility of agreement between the States representing each system, but, on the contrary, makes it possible.'

Questioned by the reporters on the relations of the Soviet delegation with the German delegation, Comrade Osinsky replied: 'As regards the German delegation, in view of the fact that the interests of the USSR and Germany coincide on many points, the Soviet delegation expect to co-operate with the German in many matters. But in all respects the Soviet delegation will naturally maintain good relations with the German delegation.'

STATEMENT BY LITVINOV, VICE-COMMISSAR FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS, ON THE PUBLICATION OF DOCUMENTS ALLEGED TO HAVE BEEN SEIZED DURING THE RAID ON THE SOVIET EMBASSY IN PEKING

6 *May* 1927 *Mezhdunarodnaya Zhizn*, 1927, 5

In connexion with the search carried out in the Soviet Embassy in Peking the headquarters of the Ankuochun (Chang Tso-lin) has recently begun to publish lists of 'documents' alleged to have been seized in the military attaché's offices and in the apartments of Embassy employees.[1] In addition the headquarters of Ankuochun include among these documents those supposed to have been found during the search of Soviet diplomatic couriers travelling on the steamer *Pamyat Lenina* and arrested by Chang Tsu-chang's police in Nanking.

The foreign press publishes the text of these documents as received by telegraph from their Peking correspondents and affects a belief in their authenticity, making various comments and drawing the conclusion necessary and convenient for those Governments which encouraged, if they did not initiate, the raid on the Soviet mission.

The circumstances of the raid make it impossible for us to say anything concerning the mass of documents alleged to have been seized. Not only was none of our official representatives invited to be present during the search, but the police directly prevented this. For instance, when Comrade Chernykh, chargé d'affaires, tried to enter the territory of the military quarter the police would not let him pass, just as they would not let pass other official representatives of our mission.

The police retained possession of the apartments of employees and the offices of the military attaché for several days, after which they removed to the police station all the articles, furniture, and papers which they had collected, without noting their description or number. We cannot possibly establish just what was taken by the Chinese police in a search under these circumstances, so extremely favourable to the substitution of all types of forged documents, especially when one takes into account the close co-operation of Ankuochun with Russian Whites, whose hands are well practised in the production of forged anti-Soviet documents.

As soon as the first news of the raid was received the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs stated plainly in its note that 'in such circumstances, which make even the most elementary supervision impossible, such as lists of articles removed, etc., there is no guarantee that among the objects said to be "found" on these premises there will not be included articles which might be used by the hostile alien influences which inspired and sanctioned the intrusion of 6 April'. The People's

[1] cf. *Bolshevik Activities in China, Some Documents seized in the Soviet Military Attaché's Office at Peking on 6 April 1927*, *Peking & Tientsin Times*, 12, 24, and 28 May 1927.

Commissariat for Foreign Affairs expressed itself in the same spirit in its note of 22 April.

The circumstances of the arrest and search of our diplomatic couriers in Nanking were also extremely characteristic. The first two searches, made without the attendance of any official representative of ours or of the diplomatic couriers themselves, were unproductive. Only on the third day, at the third search, carried out again with the help of Russian White Guards and without the attendance of any official representative of ours or of the couriers themselves, were some documents supposed to have been found.

The headquarters of Ankuochun has so far only published lists of 'documents', omitting details of their content. The only document of which a photograph has been published in the *North China Standard* in Peking bears all the signs of forgery. The author of this document obviously did not know that a new orthography was introduced ten years ago in the USSR, and has written this document in the old orthography with several bad mistakes. It is clear that in its haste to establish its assertion that important documents had been seized, the headquarters of Ankuochun had to give an urgent order for the preparation of a document to a not particularly skilled craftsman in this business. The fact that Ankuochun had to publish such a crudely produced forgery is a further proof of the absence of any real documents of a compromising character among the material seized.

It is characteristic that whereas the documents have been readily shown to persons in no way concerned with them, and have been kindly submitted to the diplomatic corps in Peking and to the military attachés of all foreign missions for them to study, Ankuochun has not considered it necessary to show them to the representative of the Soviet Embassy.

How far these 'documents' are 'valuable' may be seen from the comparatively impartial conclusion of the Peking correspondent of the *Berliner Tageblatt*, who has seen them.

Those of the documents seized in the Soviet Embassy and published so far have given unusually meagre data. Moreover the authenticity of the more compromising documents is extremely doubtful. For instance, memoranda despatched to the Soviet military attaché are written in a form only partly corresponding to the new Russian orthography. It is also noticeable that the really compromising documents were not published until three weeks after the search, while those first published evoked only laughter and are meaningless.

It has been asserted by some foreign correspondents who, according to their own statements, have seen all the documents, that such a mass of documents could not be prepared in so short a time, but this says nothing in favour of the authenticity of the documents. The lists published by

Ankuochun show that most of the material consists of routine communications and informatory material such as may be found in any military attaché's office and foreign mission in Peking. Such informatory material may include material of a military, economic, or political character. It may be that among the documents seized during the raid there is material of an informatory nature, it may be that there is a lot of it, but that does not guarantee the authenticity of all sorts of instructions which people will no doubt attempt to introduce into the mass of material seized during the raid. It is interesting to see that in publishing the 'material' Reuter quotes in detail the last orders of the sixth extended plenary session of the Executive Committee of the Comintern, published by us in all the newspapers, in separate brochures, etc.

The multitudinous factories throughout the world which specialize in the preparation of every possible kind of forged letter or instruction are already in action, and the headquarters of Ankuochun will be able to publish a further series of 'documents' in which it will be established 'without a doubt' that the Soviet Government carries on propaganda in China, interferes in Chinese internal affairs, incites opposition and pogroms against foreigners, and all that sort of nonsense which nobody believes any longer. Or perhaps the factories were working before the raid, preparing 'documents' to specific order, and the raid itself was arranged in order to give these forgeries a semblance of authenticity.

In any case, we can state that if the circumstances of the raid and search were such that there was no guarantee against the appearance of forged letters and documents among the material seized, the limited information which has reached the press concerning the content of some of these documents permits it to be affirmed with full certitude that in this instance we are dealing with a broad preconceived plan to spread slander about the activities of Soviet agents in China by means of forgeries, and to worsen the relations between the USSR and other Powers, in particular Japan. I am convinced that as further titles or the documents themselves are published, this will become obvious to every impartial person.

PROTEST AGAINST THE POLICE RAID ON THE PREMISES OF THE SOVIET TRADE DELEGATION IN LONDON: NOTE FROM THE SOVIET CHARGÉ D'AFFAIRES IN LONDON TO THE BRITISH FOREIGN SECRETARY

12 *May* 1927

The Times, 14 *May* 1927
Anglo-Sovetskie Otnoshenia, p. 110

At half-past four this afternoon the premises of Arcos and the Trade Delegation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics at 49, Moorgate

were occupied by armed police; this in spite of the fact that, in accordance with the trade agreement of 1921, the premises of the Trade Delegation, being the offices of M. Khinchuk, the official Trade Agent of the USSR in Great Britain, enjoy diplomatic immunity. According to Article 5 of the above trade agreement, M. Khinchuk enjoys all the rights and immunities enjoyed by the official representatives of other foreign Powers in Great Britain. The right of M. Khinchuk to the above-mentioned privileges was confirmed quite recently by the Foreign Office note of 16 February 1927.

During the raid, which is still in progress at the time of writing, an employee of the Trade Delegation, M. Khudiakov, who had refused to give up the key of a safe containing the personal papers, cipher codes, etc. of the official Trade Agent, was assaulted by the police. The post addressed to the official Trade Agent, which had just been brought by the couriers, was carried off by the police.

These proceedings are a flagrant violation of article 5 of the trade agreement, which includes the following passage:

'Official Agents shall be at liberty to communicate freely with their own Government and with other official representatives of their Government in other countries by post, telegraph, and wireless telegraphy in cipher and to receive and dispatch couriers with sealed bags, subject to a limitation of three kilograms per week, which shall be exempt from examination.'

Moreover, in accordance with article 1 of the trade agreement, the British Government has undertaken 'not to exercise any discrimination against such trade as compared with that carried on with any other foreign country, or to place any impediment in the way of banking, credit and financial operations for the purpose of such trade.' But the very fact of the occurrence of the raid must inevitably injure Anglo-Soviet trade.

In addition, I must point out that during the raid the most elementary guarantees and demands of common decency were violated. The search was begun before the presentation of the warrant, which was only handed to the assistant director of Arcos, M. Sorokin, an hour after the commencement of the search. In nearly the whole of the premises the search proceeded in the absence of representatives of the institution raided. All the employees of Arcos and of the Trade Delegation, both men and women, were detained and subjected to a personal search. Among those detained were women possessing diplomatic passports, as, for instance, the wife of the chargé d'affaires and the wife of the financial attaché, Mme Shannin. The personal search of the women was carried out by male police officers.

I beg to state that I have informed my Government of all that has

occurred, but, whilst awaiting their decisions and instructions, I consider it my duty to protest most emphatically against the violation in the above manner of the obligations undertaken by the British Government in accordance with the trade agreement of 1921.

NOTE FROM LITVINOV TO THE BRITISH CHARGÉ D'AFFAIRES IN MOSCOW ON THE POLICE RAID ON THE PREMISES OF THE SOVIET TRADE DELEGATION IN LONDON

17 *May* 1927 *Anglo-Sovetskie Otnoshenia*, p. 115

1. In his note of the 12th of this month, the Soviet chargé d'affaires in England, M. Rozengolts, registered a formal protest with the British Government against the violation of the 1921 trade agreement represented by the raid of the English police on the premises of the Soviet trade delegation in London and by the examination and removal from the premises of delegation documents, including its ciphers and codes, and against the offensive and violent behaviour of the police in the said raid. While confirming and supporting M. Rozengolts's protest in the most emphatic manner, I consider it necessary to direct the attention of the British Government to the following:

2. Having entered into economic relations with Great Britain and other western States immediately after the cessation of intervention and blockade of the USSR, the Soviet Government took into account that, if the safeguarding of commercial secrets is given great importance in the relations between private commercial firms, then, under the State monopoly of foreign trade, Government bodies in complete charge of all the import and export activities of the entire State and conducting their operations within the framework of State plans and proposals previously drawn up, must have particularly firm guarantees of the inviolability of the State documents, instructions, circulars, orders, etc., which they send abroad. Therefore, in the subsequent negotiations on the resumption of relations with Great Britain and other western States and on the conclusion of trade agreements, the Soviet Government always put forward with particular firmness its demand that the complete immunity and inviolability of its commercial agencies abroad be secured. The Soviet Government was aware of the atmosphere of hostility in which the commercial agents of the first Soviet State have to work abroad, and of the exceptional attention which they might attract from reactionary police circles in these countries.

The principle of the immunity of the trade delegations and representations of the Soviet Union has now been recognized by nearly all the countries with which the Soviet Government has treaty relations. No objections were raised against this principle by the British Government,

in the person of Sir Robert Horne, then president of the Board of Trade, who, in 1921, conducted negotiations with the late M. Krassin. This principle was embodied in the fifth article of the Soviet-British trade agreement of 1921, which has now been violated by the British authorities in the grossest and most insulting manner.

3. According to our information, the court order authorizing the raid on Soviet House in Moorgate Street, which was shown only an hour after the police began the raid, was made out both for the Arcos limited liability company and for the trade delegation. Although Arcos is formally a limited liability company, registered under English law, the British authorities could not be unaware that it is chiefly, if not exclusively, engaged in carrying out the commercial instructions of Soviet economic bodies.

A police raid on a large English trading company, with a good standing in British business circles, with an annual turnover of tens of millions sterling, which has punctually fulfilled its obligations, is altogether unprecedented in the history of the City of London. The only object of the raid could have been to cause injury to the Soviet interests connected with the activities of Arcos by compromising the latter and creating around it an atmosphere of distrust and hostility. From this point of view the Soviet Government feels that it has a right to protest against the raid on Arcos too.

4. However, if in regard to Arcos the British authorities, ignoring the most elementary requirements of propriety, commercial usage, and even reasonableness, can refer to their formal right, there cannot exist the least doubt that the violent irruption of the police into the premises of the trade delegation and the acts they committed there are even formally a flagrant violation of the agreement of 1921. Since, according to the fifth article of that agreement, the official agent of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics is granted the right to use cipher correspondence, it follows clearly that the correspondence and codes cannot in any circumstances be examined by the agents of the other State or by any outside persons whatever without the permission of the head of the trade delegation. Since the same article of the agreement grants the official agent the right, under diplomatic immunity, to receive sealed packages through special couriers, then the immunity of the contents of those packages is self-evident.

Nevertheless, police agents, having forced their way into the premises of the trade delegation and the private office of M. Khinchuk, the official agent enjoying diplomatic immunity, allowed themselves to examine and take away without discrimination all papers found there, including ciphered correspondence, codes, and papers received by the diplomatic mail, etc. At the same time, two employees of the cipher

department of the trade delegation, Miller and Khudiakov, who, fulfilling their duty, protested against the illegal demands of the police, were subjected to acts of violence and even beaten, while the wife of the chargé d'affaires *ad interim* of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, who was on the premises and has a diplomatic passport, was detained by force and searched.

5. No less significant is the political aspect of the above-described measures of the British Government. The absolutely unprovoked police raid on a Government institution of another State, apart from the question of treaty rights attaching to it, is, in itself, a most serious hostile act, without doubt jeopardizing the further maintenance of relations between the interested States, with all the ensuing consequences. That the trade delegation by its activities gave no justification for such a raid can be proved by the fact that the British Government in no single instance made representations or complaints about this activity. The police authorities themselves who undertook the raid apparently did not expect to find on the premises of the trade delegation any documents throwing the least shadow on the delegation's activity, or capable of serving as a reason for accusing it of illegal actions. Otherwise they would have taken good care to make the search in conditions which would have guaranteed against the abuses possible in such cases, and guaranteed faith in the results of the search. By refusing the representative of the trade delegation the right to be present during the search and to certify the authenticity of the documents taken away by drawing up a proper list and protocol, the police authorities deprived the search of any formal significance. The British Government certainly has cognizance of the Soviet Government's note referring to the police raid recently made in the same manner and in analogous circumstances in China. To provide the search with even the most elementary legal guarantees was in the circumstances the more necessary, in view of the ominous role already once played in the relations between the Soviet Union and Great Britain by a forged document.

6. It is impossible not to recall today the note[1] of 23 February, in which Sir Austen Chamberlain, referring to the tension in the relations between the Soviet Union and Great Britain, sought reasons for this tension in the behaviour of the Soviet press and of certain Soviet statesmen and public leaders. The police raid on the premises of the Soviet trade delegation and the motives underlying this action clearly show where the true reasons for the unsatisfactory state of Soviet-British relations should be sought. In contrast to the unfounded accusations against the Soviet Government, absolutely unconfirmed by any proofs although often repeated, of the non-observance of obligations under-

[1] Cmd. 2895.

taken and the violation of the rules of international intercourse, the Soviet Government can produce absolutely unquestionable proof of violation by the British Government of the Soviet-British agreement of 1921, and of the most offensive handling of persons enjoying the right of diplomatic immunity, while the requirements of international law and universally recognized international usage were totally ignored.

7. These actions of the British Government demonstrate that it is not merely unconcerned about the tension in Anglo-Soviet relations, which it deplored in its note of 23 February, but that it appears to be trying to aggravate the tension to the utmost. These actions are flagrantly out of keeping with the declarations frequently made by the British Government of its desire to maintain the general peace and to improve the economic situation in Europe. These actions, coinciding with the meetings of the world economic conference called by the League of Nations, of which Great Britain is the leading member, with the object, according to its organizers, of stimulating and strengthening international economic intercourse and removing all unnecessary obstacles and hindrances to the economic collaboration of the nations, prove to the entire world where the real destructive forces are to be found which are working to increase economic chaos and anarchy in Europe.

8. Putting above everything else the interests of peace, and desiring to ensure peaceful conditions for internal construction within the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the Soviet Government has patiently suffered for a long time a series of gross attacks and provocative challenges from individual members of the British Government and the Government itself. The Soviet Government has repeatedly declared its willingness to do everything in its power, within the limits of normal relations and negotiations on equal terms, for the adjustment of all misunderstandings and questions in dispute between the two States. With this object it did not discontinue trade relations with Great Britain, but tried to expand them to the extent rendered possible by those British business circles which came half-way to meet the Soviet Government, and in so far as the British Government did not prevent it. It noted with satisfaction the growing interest in the Soviet market discernible lately on the part of the City of London, and the growing confidence in Soviet economic organizations shown by London banks, as testified by the agreement regarding a credit of £10 million concluded with one of these banks just before the raid.[1] However, the hostile campaign, absolutely unprecedented in its recklessness and hate, and which was meeting with growing encouragement from members of the British Government, culminating in the raid on the premises of the

[1] cf. *The Times*, 16 May 1927.

trade delegation, compels the Soviet Government with all the earnestness and frankness demanded by the alarming situation created, to ask the British Government whether it desires the further preservation and development of Anglo-Soviet trade relations or whether it intends in the future too to hamper them.

9. For its part the Soviet Government categorically declares that the continuation of trade relations is possible only on condition of the strict observance by the British Government of the trade agreement and of the guaranteeing to the economic agencies of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics the possibility of uninterrupted, undisturbed, and normal work. The Soviet Government equally emphatically declares that while realizing the tasks it has set itself of internal development according to a definite economic plan, and while co-ordinating with this plan its foreign trade operations, it cannot countenance the conduct of these operations being made dependent on casual party combinations in England, electioneering manoeuvres, or the fantastic surmises of this or that minister. The Soviet Government feels it has the right to demand from the British Government a clear and unequivocal reply from which it may be possible to draw due conclusions. At the same time it reserves the right to present demands for satisfaction for the violation by the British Government of its treaty obligations, for insults suffered, and for material losses caused by the action of the police.

DECREE OF THE COUNCIL OF PEOPLE'S COMMISSARS ON MEASURES TO SECURE THE NORMAL COURSE OF FOREIGN TRADE OPERATIONS

17 *May* 1927 Kluchnikov & Sabanin, iii, 1, p. 382

In order to secure the uninterrupted course of Soviet export and import operations and the unhindered execution of the planned tasks in the field of foreign trade, the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR decrees:

1. To propose to the People's Commissariat for External and Internal Trade to secure the observance of the general rule that foreign trade operations shall be conducted by the trade delegations and economic organizations of the USSR which are entitled to operate on foreign markets only in those countries with which the USSR has normal diplomatic relations and in which the Soviet foreign trade agencies are assured of conditions guaranteeing the possibility of an unhindered and normal course for commercial operations.
2. Exceptions to the general rule referred to in article 1 shall be made by permission of the People's Commissariat for External and

Internal Trade only in those cases where the necessity for an exception is determined by particularly important economic considerations or by the special features of the trade operation in question.

STATEMENT BY THE SOVIET TRADE DELEGATION IN LONDON ON THE DISCONTINUANCE OF ORDERS IN BRITAIN

24 *May* 1927 *The Times*, 24 *May* 1927

In view of the uncertainty created by the police raid on the premises of Arcos, Ltd., and the Trade Delegation, the Soviet trading institutions in this country have been instructed to discontinue the placing of all further orders in Great Britain, pending further developments.

STATEMENT BY LITVINOV ON THE SEVERANCE OF ANGLO-SOVIET RELATIONS

26 *May* 1927 *Anglo-Sovetskie Otnoshenia*, p. 122

1. The decision of the British Government to sever diplomatic and economic relations with the USSR is no casual or unexpected event connected with the raid on Arcos and the alleged disloyalty of the Soviet trade organizations. This decision must be considered as the logical consummation of the anti-Soviet policy which the present Conservative Government has pursued from the very day when, having deceived the electorate by means of a forged document, it came into power. While basing its political programme on a ruthless struggle against the working class in England and the enslavement of China, India, Egypt, and other countries, the Conservative Government could not reconcile itself to the existence of a workers' and peasants' Government which made no secret of its sympathy with the class struggle of the proletariat and the national movement of oppressed peoples. Accordingly the desire to bring about the downfall of the Soviet Government at all costs was the core of the British Conservative Government's activity. Throughout its existence this Government has not ceased its anti-Soviet intrigues, designed to isolate and weaken the Soviet Union so as to destroy it the more successfully. If it has hesitated up to now to break relations, that was only because it counted on finding allies for a general attack on our Union. When this hope was not fulfilled, the British Government decided to assault the USSR independently and openly, once again hoping that this would serve as a signal for similar attacks by other countries.

2. To break diplomatic relations with the USSR and to create a threat of war are actions perfectly in harmony with the general policy of the British Government, which consists in inciting and arming one country against another, in preventing the stabilization of peace and order in Europe and in other parts of the world. The part played by this Government in Egypt, China, and finally in the destruction of Anglo-Soviet political and economic relations is so clear to each and all that I do not need to dwell on it. Sir Austen Chamberlain himself repeatedly declared that a rupture of Anglo-Soviet relations would be pregnant with danger to the general peace. In effecting this rupture, the Nobel peace prize-winner must now admit that the danger of war not only does not trouble him, but is desired by him and enters into the political calculations of his Government. The rupture of diplomatic relations cannot be regarded otherwise than as an acceleration of war preparations, for it can have no other object and would be absurd from the point of view of England's own interests. The rupture cannot be aimed merely at depriving English industry of Soviet orders, running into millions, and the English consumer of cheap raw materials, at increasing unemployment and releasing the Soviet Government from any obligations towards England.

Beyond any doubt all that has occurred renders it impossible to maintain trade relations with England. The Soviet Government now has no guarantees not only against raids and the seizure of commercial correspondence, but against other acts of violence including the confiscation of goods belonging to our State organizations. Neither can Arcos continue its operations, inasmuch as it has developed its commercial activity on account of the sale of goods of Soviet State bodies and the purchase of goods of British origin at their orders and on their account.

The English Government has been aiming at this for a long time. It has now had its way, having made the maintenance of commercial relations practically impossible and taken on itself the entire responsibility for their cessation. It is extremely significant that the raid on Arcos and the trade delegation was made the day after agreement had been reached with the Midland Bank for financing Soviet orders to English industry up to £10 million sterling, an agreement opening further prospects for the rapid development of economic relations between the two countries.

3. In the light of the facts I have given, the statement by Mr Baldwin yesterday in the House of Commons, and his attempt to justify the rupture by a melodramatic story worthy of the best American films, are wholly ludicrous and unconvincing. Who can doubt, after Mr Baldwin's speech, that the rupture is not the result of the raid, but that the raid

itself was made in preparation for the rupture? Mr Baldwin did not even succeed in justifying the raid even from the purely police point of view. He had to admit that the mythical lost document in search of which the English police engaged in its noisy and fateful expedition, was not found on the premises of the trade delegation. Thus Mr Baldwin himself recognized that Mr Hicks had systematically deceived public opinion in England by using this document as the reason for the raid. Having fallen down on this central point, which has catastrophic consequences for the cause of peace, Mr Baldwin in a pitiful and uncertain manner now clutches at other 'documents' which are said to have been found. But even there he was unable to speak of any documents which might have compromised the work of the trade delegation. Can one really in fact speak seriously of some private letters or other, said to have been extracted from the pockets of certain employees, even if this police report corresponds to the truth, which, remembering the 'Zinoviev letter', may be doubted. Even if it were proved that an employee of Arcos or the trade delegation were conducting a 'criminal' correspondence with trade unions or other workers' organizations, can the institution for which he works really be made responsible for him? You know that, apart from the head of the trade delegation, none of its employees, still less the Arcos employees, enjoys diplomatic immunity, all being personally responsible for their own actions. Their pockets could have been turned out by the police outside the premises of the delegation, and if 'criminal' documents were found, these employees could have been proceeded against in law. The Foreign Office is well aware that our Embassy and trade delegation in London, as elsewhere, require all their employees to sign an undertaking that, on pain of dismissal and being held responsible, they must strictly observe the laws of the country of their residence, must not intervene in its internal affairs, and must conduct no propaganda. If any employee, without malicious design or provocative intent, breaks the undertakings he has assumed, the trade delegation cannot of course be held responsible.

4. As to the charge of espionage against the trade delegation, I must reject it as a malicious insinuation. The raid did not bear out the charge. If the English police, as Mr Baldwin maintains, knew that trade delegation employees were engaging in espionage, why were they not charged and brought into court? They did not do so for the simple reason that they did not have a shred of proof, because the charge was made without any foundation. But one would have to be particularly shameless, while attributing espionage to Soviet bodies, to admit at the same time that the British Government itself is organizing espionage, engaged in getting secret 'documents' belonging to the Soviet Government. Clearly, Mr Baldwin is confusing the activity of the English

company, Arcos, with the operations of the well-known English commercial firm in Paris recently convicted of espionage against France.

5. Conscious of the weakness of his position, and of the impossibility of justifying the raid on the trade delegation, and the violation of the 1921 trade agreement that that meant, Mr Baldwin called to his aid some new documents of unknown origin, which in any case have no bearing on the raid on Arcos. Since he again referred to the activities of M. Borodin, I must, despite his report in Parliament, again declare that M. Borodin is not in the service of the Soviet Government, nor does he stand in any official relations with it, and that I fully confirm my own and Comrade Rozengolts's statement on this matter.

6. By these petty 'facts' and 'documents', invented *ad hoc*, Mr Baldwin is trying his hardest to conceal the basic political fact of an attack on a Soviet institution, the rupture of relations, and the direct threat to peace. Mr Baldwin will not be able by such facts to screen so important an event as the rupture of diplomatic relations and the preparation of a new war. Our country is drawing the logical conclusions and is taking all steps to see that it is not taken unawares. Other countries, which England will try to drag after itself on the same road of breaking the peace and creating chaos throughout the world, should understand the criminal adventure into which they are being dragged. For its part the Soviet Government will, more carefully than before, follow all the cunning tricks and machinations of the English Government's warlike diplomacy, in order to parry and ward off the blows being prepared against it by all the means at its disposal and by all measures to defend the cause of peace.

REPLY TO THE BRITISH NOTE BREAKING RELATIONS WITH THE USSR

28 *May* 1927

Cmd. 2895
Anglo-Sovetskie Otnoshenia, p. 131

The Soviet Government has acquainted itself with the contents of the note[1] handed yesterday to citizen Rozengolts in which the announcement is made of the denunciation by the British Government of the Trade Agreement of 1921, and of the severance of diplomatic relations between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Great Britain.

This decision was no surprise to the Soviet Government. It has already for long been aware that a rupture of relations with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics was being prepared by the whole policy of the present British Conservative Government, which has declined all

[1] Cmd. 2895.

the proposals of the Soviet Government for the settlement of mutual relations by means of negotiations.

The Soviet Government once again decisively rejects all accusations that it infringed at any time whatever the Trade Agreement of 1921 as quite without proof and entirely groundless. The sole source of these accusations, as has been repeatedly and absolutely incontestably established, is dishonest information drawn from most suspicious White émigré sources and forged documents with which the British Government has willingly operated throughout the whole course of the existence of relations between it and the Soviet Government. The lack of results of the search of the Trade Delegation, which was carried out with the utmost thoroughness over several days, is the most convincing proof of the loyalty and correctitude of the official agents of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. The Soviet Government passes over with contempt the insinuations of British Ministers regarding espionage by the Trade Delegation and considers it beneath its dignity to reply to them.

The Soviet Government places on record that the British Government had no legitimate grounds either for the first infringement of the Trade Agreement of 1921 in the form of a police raid on the extra-territorial premises of the Soviet official agent or for the second infringement, consisting in denouncing this agreement without the six months' notice provided for therein.

For the whole world it is quite clear that the basic cause of the rupture is the defeat of the policy of the Conservative Government in China and an attempt to cover this defeat by a diversion in the direction of the Soviet Union, while the immediate grounds are the desire of the British Government to distract public attention from the failure of the senseless police raid on 'Arcos' and the Trade Delegation, and to extract the British Minister of Home Affairs from the dreadful fix into which he has fallen, thanks to that raid.

The peoples of the Soviet Union and their Government cherish no enmity towards the peoples of the British Empire and wished to maintain with them normal and friendly relations. The peoples of the British Empire undoubtedly desire the same. But the present British Government did not, and does not, want these normal relations and has tried from the very first day of its existence to keep relations with the Soviet Union in a state of constant stress and to exacerbate them still further. The British Government preferred to a system of normal relations a system of violence and enmity. It has decided on the rupture of diplomatic relations, for which it must take the whole responsibility upon itself, taking into full account the shock which this rupture will inevitably cause to existing political and economic international relations. It could

not fail to appreciate that the rupture will increase the economic chaos from which Europe has not yet emerged after the world war, and that it will deal a heavy blow to the cause of peace. It decided, however, on this act, sacrificing the interests of the broad masses of the British Empire and even of British industry.

The Soviet Government takes cognisance of this act in the full conviction that it will be condemned not only by the toilers but also by all the progressive elements of the whole world. At the same time it expresses its assurance that the time is near when the British people will find the possibility of realizing without hindrance its strivings for peace and for the establishment of normal friendly relations with the peoples of the Soviet Union.

INTERVIEW BY OSINSKY ON THE WORLD ECONOMIC CONFERENCE

2 *June* 1927 *Izvestia*, 2 *June* 1927

In an interview given to a Tass representative Comrade Osinsky summed up the results of the conference as follows: What positive benefits has the bourgeois world gained from the conference? What was the relationship of the forces of the countries represented at the conference? What benefit has the Soviet Union gained from participation in the conference?

The bourgeois countries have gained little from the conference because the contradiction of interests dividing the capitalist countries and groups of capitalists made agreement among them difficult to attain. These contradictions gave rise to a particularly fierce struggle between France and England. The plan proposed by Loucheur some time before the conference did not receive its approval since it was opposed by England, and America paralysed the intentions of both England and France. The result of this conflict was that the decisions reached by the conference were extremely abstract and unsubstantial, being limited to general statements. The French delegation (Loucheur) was in favour of the conference expressing its approval of a movement towards a European customs union and a gradual lowering of tariffs, without however any encroachment upon the sovereignty of individual countries—i.e. without any obligatory lowering of tariffs in ruling empires.

In addition the French delegation vehemently defended the rationalization of production and the formation of European cartels in order to combat American competition.

As I said in my first speech[1] to the conference, Loucheur's slogan amounted to free trade, but only for monopoly cartels.

[1] League of Nations, 1927, II, C. 356, M. 129, 1, p. 125.

It is characteristic that just at the time when the conference was assembling a bill was introduced in the French Chambre des Députés proposing the increase of customs tariffs. Consequently the plan for the lowering of tariffs was directed against countries which have a predominantly agrarian economy.

Interested in the lowering of tariffs only in certain instances, and even concerned to raise them in respect of her competitors, England cut right across the French proposals. The Loucheur plan received no support from the English delegation and the outcome was a resolution devoid of content.

Connected with the question of lowering tariffs was the question of agrarian tariffs. In this matter the Soviet delegation stood for the removal of agrarian tariffs. France, who imposes high agrarian tariffs, objected to this proposal, and was supported by the German delegation. Consequently no effective decision was reached in this direction.

The interests of different countries and capitalist groups again clashed over the question of cartels and the rationalization of production. Resolutions on these matters were equally unsubstantial and superficial.

The only full and exhaustive resolutions reached were on questions such as the simplification of customs procedure, the cessation of subsidies to trading undertakings, the perfection of customs nomenclature, and so forth, all of which were passed unanimously, but which were of a purely technical nature.

Not a single decisive word was uttered by the conference on the means of overcoming world economic 'difficulties'; it did not solve the problems put before it by the capitalist Governments, not to mention the solution of basic problems and the means of resolving world economic contradictions.

As regards our position at the conference and the extent to which its resolutions will assist in the development of our links with the world market, it may be affirmed that for us the results of the conference are completely satisfactory.

Before the opening of the conference there were apprehensions, not unfounded, that, since the question of the 'removal of hindrances to international trade' would be raised at the conference, the Soviet monopoly of foreign trade was bound to be attacked.

Indeed, in the draft resolutions and in the resolutions passed there are sections on State monopoly and the limitation of import and export. Both sections are directed against monopoly and limitation. If they did not contain clauses excluding their application to the USSR these resolutions would most certainly constitute a direct attack on us. Our first task therefore was to secure the saving clause, and we fought for it from the first.

As a result of this effort, and with the considerable support of the American delegation, we were successful, and a special formula touching us was introduced into the resolution passed by the conference.[1] In the second part of the formula it is stated that only those resolutions on which the Soviet delegation voted shall apply to the USSR. Since we did not vote on the resolutions concerning monopoly etc., they do not apply to us.

The first part of the formula lays down the principle—although not altogether as clearly as we requested—that our economic system, the system of socialist economy, is recognized as an existing fact by the bourgeois world, and that the conference rejects any attack, even a moral one, on the socialist system of the USSR.

In addition the conference in the same formula recognized as essential the development of economic relations with the USSR. Since this formula was accepted after the Arcos raid and on the eve of the rupture between England and ourselves, the statement that the participation of the USSR in this international conference was a 'happy token of the peaceful economic co-operation of all countries' was a counterblast to the policy of the English Government, if not also an oblique condemnation of it. It is interesting to note that at the last session the English delegation also voted for this formula, and first to vote for it was the chairman of the delegation, Arthur Balfour, one of England's most important industrialists.

Among our positive gains must be counted the fact that during the period of the conference we made contact with representatives of the commercial and industrial circles of many bourgeois countries. In these meetings the Soviet delegation and its individual members vouchsafed exhaustive information on the situation in the USSR. This will undoubtedly bear fruit in the future work of our trade missions abroad. Even if only for this purpose, I consider it extremely important for the USSR to participate in any further conferences of this nature.

Another conclusion I draw is that we must energetically set about improving the distribution of our economic information abroad. The majority of the delegates displayed a truly primitive ignorance concerning what is actually happening in the USSR and what is our actual economic position. Our participation in the conference, the information we gave about the economic structure of the USSR, and the firm conviction of the success of that structure which permeated the speeches of the Soviet delegates, have without doubt significantly contributed to the raising of our prestige in economic affairs in the eyes of the bourgeois world.

The well-known English journalist Augur has written in a Polish

[1] League of Nations, 1927. II. C. 356, M. 129, i, p. 56.

paper that the causes of the Anglo-Soviet rupture were: (1) the defeat suffered by the USSR (?) in China, and the political weakness brought to light in this connexion; (2) our economic weakness, brought to light by the international economic conference, and the critical economic situation in the USSR. Both of Augur's explanations are fantastic, but especially the second. For it can be said without the least exaggeration that the great majority of the members of the conference who came from bourgeois countries formed totally different and entirely contrary impressions of our economic situation and our economic strength.

It is hardly likely that Arthur Balfour would have voted for 'peaceful commercial co-operation' with the USSR, that country with 'a different economic system', if he had thought that this system was in a critical situation, and that the economy of the USSR had displayed before the conference the 'weakness' of which Augur speaks.

AGREEMENT WITH LATVIA ON LEGAL HELP IN CIVIL CASES

2 *June* 1927 *Sbornik Dogovorov*, IV, p. 31

The USSR on the one part, and the Latvian Republic on the other, have appointed the following plenipotentiaries to conclude an agreement on legal help in civil cases:

The Central Executive Committee of the USSR.

Anastasi Ivanovich Mikoyan, member of the Central Executive Committee, People's Commissar for Foreign and Internal Trade;

Alexander Pavlovich Serebrovsky, alternate member of the Central Executive Committee, vice-chairman of the Supreme Council of National Economy of the USSR;

Boris Spiridonovich Stomoniakov, member of the Collegium of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs;

Yakov Stanislavovich Ganetsky, member of the Collegium of the People's Commissariat for Foreign and Internal Trade;

Yuli Vikentievich Rudy, member of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee, member of the Collegium of the People's Commissariat for Transport;

The Government of the Latvian Republic: Robert Bilmanis, member of the Latvian Sejm;
Dzon Hahn, member of the Latvian Sejm;
Ringold Kalnings, member of the Latvian Sejm;
Fridrik Menders, member of the Latvian Sejm;
Karl Osols, Latvian Ambassador in Moscow;

who, having presented their credentials, which were found to be in due and proper form, have agreed to the following:

1. The following provisions shall be applied in relations between the contracting parties in serving documents or complying with requests referring to the execution of acts appertaining to lawsuits or other court actions in civil cases.

2. The serving of documents shall be effected by a notice addressed by the Consul of the State in which the request originates to the president of the provincial court in the USSR, and to the president of the circuit court in Latvia.

Requests for the execution of court orders shall be transmitted through diplomatic channels.

Should the request fall outside the competence of the institution to which it has been addressed, the notice of serving or the request for executing a court order shall be handed over to the competent institution, and the institution making the request shall be immediately informed thereof.

3. Notices of serving and requests for executing court orders shall be drawn up in the language of the State issuing the notice or request, and shall be accompanied by a certified translation in the Russian or Latvian language respectively. The translation shall be certified by the diplomatic or consular representative of the State in which the request originates, or by a sworn or officially designated translator of the State in which the request originates or of the State to which the request is addressed.

In notices on the serving of documents and in requests for executing court orders a brief indication shall be given of the number and contents of the documents to be served, or of the enclosures in the requests for the execution of court orders. The provisions of paragraph 2 of article 5 remain unaffected.

Documents containing proof of serving or explanations of the failure to serve, replies to requests, and documents taken in complying with requests, shall be furnished with translations only at the desire of the State in which the request originates, and upon payment of the costs of translation.

4. Notices on the serving of documents and requests for the execution of court orders shall indicate the institution from which the request originates and also the name and status of the parties. Notices on the serving of documents shall also give the address of the intended recipient and state the nature of the document to be served.

Each contracting party shall inform the other of the forms to be used for the notice of serving.

5. The serving of documents shall be the concern of the appropriate institution of the country to which the request is addressed. This institution may, except in the cases provided for in paragraph 2, confine itself, in complying with the request for serving, to transmitting the document to the recipient if the latter is willing to accept it.

If the document to be served is drawn up in the language of the country to which the request is addressed, or is accompanied by a certified translation as provided for in article 3, the institution to which the request is addressed shall at the desire of the institution making the request, serve the document in the manner prescribed by domestic legislation for such serving, or even in a special manner provided this does not conflict with the law.

6. Serving (of documents) shall be attested either by a receipt dated and signed by the recipient, or by a certificate of the institution of that State to which the request is addressed, in which the fact, manner, and time of the serving are shown.

These certificates are to be returned by the institution to which the request is addressed through the channels indicated in paragraph 1 of article 2.

7. Each of the contracting parties may, through its diplomatic or consular representatives, without applying compulsion, serve documents on its own nationals residing on the territory of the other State.

8. The judicial institution to which a request for the execution of a court order is addressed is obliged to comply with it, making use of the same measures of compulsion as are applied in carrying out requests by institutions of the State to which the request is addressed. Procedure also is determined by the laws of the State to which the request is addressed, but, at the request of the institution making the request a special form may be used, in so far as this does not conflict with the laws of the State to which the request is addressed.

The institution making the request must, if it so demands, be informed of the time and place at which action will be taken in accordance with its request so that the interested party may be present.

9. The execution of notices on the serving of documents and of requests for the execution of court orders may be refused if the State on whose territory the execution is to be effected considers it liable to endanger its sovereign rights or its security.

Should doubts arise as to the authenticity of a request for the execution of a court order, its execution may be postponed until these doubts are removed.

10. No fees, stamp duties, or charges of any kind may be collected for the execution of notices of the serving of documents and of requests for the execution of court orders, with the exception of payment to defray the expenses of witnesses and experts.

These payments, like the costs of translation which may be incurred under paragraph 3 of article 3, shall be made in each case on the return delivery of the request.

11. Any difficulty which may arise in connexion with notices of the serving of documents or requests for the execution of court orders shall be settled through diplomatic channels.

12. The present agreement, drawn up in the Russian and Latvian languages, shall enter into force within one month of the exchange of the instruments of ratification and shall be valid for five years. Ratifications shall be exchanged in Riga.

If, one year before the expiration of the five-year term, neither of the contracting parties denounces the agreement, it shall continue in force until one year has elapsed from the day when either of the parties denounces it.

In witness whereof the plenipotentiaries have signed the present agreement.

Done in Moscow in two authentic copies, 2 June 1927.

PROTEST AGAINST THE ASSASSINATION OF THE SOVIET ENVOY TO POLAND: NOTE FROM LITVINOV TO THE POLISH MINISTER IN MOSCOW

7 June 1927 Kluchnikov & Sabanin, III, I, 385

The Government of the USSR has just received a short telegraphic report of the murder by a Russian monarchist of M. Voikov, the plenipotentiary representative of the USSR in Poland.

The Government of the USSR considers this unprecedented and criminal act as bound up with the whole series of acts aimed at destroying the diplomatic representation of the USSR abroad, and creating a direct threat to peace. The raids on the Peking Embassy, the siege of the Shanghai consulate, the police attack on the trade delegation in London, the provocative rupture of diplomatic relations by England—this entire series of acts has unleashed the activity of terrorist groups of reactionaries who, in their impotent and blind hatred of the working class, are seizing at the weapon of political murder.

The Government of the USSR also sees in the murder of its ambassador

the result of the Polish Government's not having taken all necessary measures against the criminal activities on Polish territory of Russian counter-revolutionary terrorist organizations, which are particularly dangerous to the cause of peace in the present tense international situation.

The Union Government some time ago called the attention of the Polish Government to the activities of the White Guard terrorists, and repeatedly warned the Polish Government of the possibility of provocative criminal acts by those elements. Consequently, while entering an emphatic and indignant protest and holding the view that the Polish Government cannot repudiate responsibility for what has happened, the Soviet Government reserves the right to revert to this question after the receipt of fuller and more exhaustive details bearing on the crime committed in Warsaw.

SOVIET GOVERNMENT MEMORANDUM TO THE GOVERNMENTS OF ALL COUNTRIES MAINTAINING RELATIONS WITH THE USSR ON THE RUPTURE OF ANGLO-SOVIET RELATIONS

7 *June* 1927 *Anglo-Sovetskie Otnoshenia*, p. 161

In its note of 27 [26] May to M. Rozengolts, Soviet chargé d'affaires in London, the British Government made known its denunciation of the commercial agreement of 16 March 1921 between the USSR and Great Britain, and the cessation of diplomatic relations between the two countries.

In view of the quite immeasurable consequences which the step taken by the Government of Great Britain may have, affecting the destiny not only of these two countries but of the rest of the world, and in view also of the references in the speeches of British ministers in the House of Commons to justify to third countries the decision taken by the British Government, with the clear intention of introducing an element of estrangement into their relations with the USSR, the Soviet Government thinks it its duty to bring the following to the notice of the Governments of the countries with which it maintains normal or *de facto* relations:

1. The British Government explains the denunciation of the 1921 trade agreement without the six months' notice stipulated in the agreement, and the cessation of diplomatic relations with the USSR, by the arbitrary attribution to the Soviet Government of the violation of that part of the agreement which sets forth the mutual obligation of both parties to refrain from hostile propaganda against each other. No convincing evidence has ever yet been brought in support of this accusation,

and it remains merely an unproven assertion of the British Government, which has obviously calculated that its opinions and conjectures must be acknowledged by the entire world as beyond appeal and beyond dispute.

2. In his speech in the House of Commons on 26 May Sir Austen Chamberlain referred to the first official accusations that the Soviet Government had violated the 1921 trade agreement contained in the memorandum of 7 September[1] of that year presented by Mr Hodgson, at that time official British Agent in Moscow, on the instructions of Lord Curzon, at that time Foreign Secretary. In its reply[2] of 27 September, signed by M. Litvinov, Vice-Commissar for Foreign Affairs, the Soviet Government examined in detail the material adduced in the memorandum, and indicated clearly the source from which the greater part of it was drawn. This turned out to be a publishing concern established by Russian White Guard émigrés; the exact address of the concern was given, and facsimiles reproduced of the very information used in the memorandum presented by Mr Hodgson. This was the first occasion on which Lord Curzon, then a Conservative member of a coalition Government, distinguished for his 'impartial and tolerant' attitude to the Soviet Union, like some members of the subsequent Conservative Government, resorted to the help of false documents to justify his anti-Soviet attacks. In the same Soviet note the other fabrications in the British memorandum were also thoroughly refuted by objective evidence; since Lord Curzon tried to make the Soviet Government responsible for the actions of the Third International, the note emphatically declared that the 1921 trade agreement was signed on behalf of the Soviet Government, which can answer and is obliged to answer only for its own and its agents' actions, and not for the Third International. The Soviet Government has always held this attitude in regard to the Third International, holds it now, and will hold it in the future.

3. In the following year-and-a-half the British Government did not make any official accusations of the violation by the Soviet Government of the trade agreement, but in May 1923 Lord Curzon, seeking a settlement in Britain's favour of a disputed international question concerning fishing rights for British trawlers in Soviet territorial waters, and payment in compensation for the shooting in the USSR of a British spy, returned again to his favourite theme and once more preferred unproven charges of the violation of the part of the trade agreement relating to propaganda, and even strengthened the accusation with an ultimatum.[3] As a result of the conversations then being held between the late Lord Curzon and Krassin, a new agreement was drawn up, designed to eliminate the possibility of future fruitless arguments concerning general unfounded

[1] Cmd. 2895. [2] ibid. [3] Cmd. 1874.

accusations which cannot be objectively proven or refuted. Under this supplementary agreement both States solemnly undertook '. . . to bring to each other's knowledge each separate violation of the treaty and thus to give no excuse for complaints to accumulate'. The strict observance of this agreement would undoubtedly have improved Soviet-British relations, and freed them to a certain extent from the influence of the most aggressive sentiments and desires of some members of the British Government. Thanks to this agreement no further unfounded charges were made for a year and a half, and, after the Labour Party came to power and the Soviet Government received full recognition, it was possible to hold a Soviet-British conference which ended in the conclusion of the Anglo-Soviet treaty[1] of 8 August 1924, which was to lead to the settlement of questions in dispute and to the further consolidation of mutual relations.

4. The next disturbance in Soviet-British relations was caused by a document which has already gone down to history as the 'Zinoviev letter', put into circulation, as was later established, as an election manœuvre by the Conservatives and the Conservative press. During the election fever a new note,[2] over the signature of Mr Gregory, head of the Russian section of the British Foreign Office, was sent to the Soviet Government accusing it of so-called propaganda on the grounds of the said 'Zinoviev letter'. Although this document was not attributed to the Soviet Government, but to the Third International, the Soviet Government, in view of the exceptional importance of the incident, took the opportunity of declaring immediately in the most emphatic manner that the document was false, and proposed that the British Government submit it for expert examination to a court of arbitration.[3] Meanwhile, the document had played its part in the return to power of the present Conservative Government, which, of course, declined the proposal for impartial expert investigation. The falsity of the document is not now doubted by anybody, and has been recognized by many members of Mr MacDonald's cabinet, if not by Mr MacDonald himself. Only a few days ago the *Manchester Guardian* reported that its correspondent had succeeded in getting on the track of the organization or persons who fabricated the document. If after that the British Government, through the words of its minister, states in the highest parliamentary tribune that the document is authentic, that only demonstrates its unceremonious attitude to facts and evidence, and the astonishing tolerance of its audience. As its first step on coming to power thanks to the 'Zinoviev letter', the Conservative Government annulled the Soviet-British treaty concluded with the MacDonald Government, which had opened prospects of the complete settlement of the reciprocal claims

[1] Cmd. 2262. [2] *The Times*, 25 October 1924. [3] *Soviet Documents*, i, p. 473.

of the two countries and provided a sound basis for Soviet-British relations.

5. Since then the British Government has steadfastly rejected all proposals made by representatives of the Soviet Government for the resumption of negotiations to regulate and improve relations. Such proposals have been made more than once not only by responsible representatives of the Soviet Government in their official speeches and declarations, but also by the Union's diplomatic representatives in London: M. Rakovsky, at his meeting with Sir Austen Chamberlain on 5 November 1925, M. Krassin on 11 October 1926, and M. Rozengolts on 13 July 1926 and 14 February 1927, stated quite clearly the readiness of the Soviet Government to conduct negotiations to settle the differences separating the two States and to establish normal relations.

6. Instead of trying to settle relations the British Government did everything it could to keep them in a state of permanent tension and to aggravate them further, making its final goal the complete rupture of relations and, possibly, even an armed attack on the Soviet Union. Seeking allies for putting these anti-Soviet intentions into effect, the British Government tried, as far as its influence extended, to keep other countries from settling their relations with the Soviet Union. More than one European Government referred to English influence as the chief obstacle to the settlement of its relations with the Soviet Union. Since there were no grounds for the British Government's accusing the Soviet Government of disloyalty or of violation of the trade agreement, it invariably resorted to charges of propaganda, precisely because by these means it could gain greater freedom of movement, by the use of forged documents. After long preparatory work and stirring up public opinion through the conservative press and speeches by ministers, the British Government on 23 February sent a note to the Soviet Government again alleging violations of the trade agreement. On this occasion again not a single instance was adduced which might have fallen within the scope of the 1921 agreement concerning propaganda beyond the borders of one's own State. In this note accusations were made against the Soviet Government in regard to various articles in the Soviet press and to certain speeches made by public men on Soviet territory, which were not to the liking of the British Government. The note contained not a single factual charge of violation by the Soviet Government of any obligation, but merely criticized the Soviet press and Soviet speakers, as was shown in the reply sent by M. Litvinov on 26 February.

7. After this further failure to convince the outside world that the Soviet Government had violated the undertakings it had assumed, the British Government made still greater efforts to find material which might lend a certain conviction to its usual accusations.

In this connexion definite hopes were placed, it is clear, on the raid on the Soviet Embassy in Peking, which was carried out, if not at the instigation of the British Mission in Peking, then at any rate with its full co-operation and encouragement. Not finding among the documents seized in the Soviet Embassy in Peking, and the forgeries introduced among them by the Russian White Guard collaborators of Chang Tso-lin, any material suitable for its purpose, the British Government decided to make a police raid on Arcos and the trade delegation.

8. The raid was carried out in clear violation of the 1921 agreement, and to justify this extraordinary step the English police put out an obviously incredible story about a certain secret document, allegedly missing from the English War Office and therefore infallibly to be found in Soviet House. From the very beginning the police were aware of the ludicrous and unconvincing character of this story, but they hoped to justify the raid by the results of the search. These results have now become clear enough, and the whole world knows that the loyal and correct attitude both of Arcos and the trade delegation could not be more fully and convincingly demonstrated than by the failure of the search conducted with such thoroughness. It was necessary to search a large building for two entire days, to break open locked cupboards and steel doors, to hold up the work of a large commercial undertaking, in order to discover in the pockets of two employees some letters which, even if they were genuine, could only bear on the personal activities of these employees. If we add to that that the employees themselves categorically deny that the letters and lists of addresses attributed to them were found on them, that the police allowed no witnesses to be present at the search, and that the participation of the English police in manufacturing forged issues of entire newspapers was officially admitted by the representatives of the British Government in the House of Commons on 8 March 1921, when forged issues of the Moscow *Pravda* were shown to have been prepared in Scotland Yard, then the complete failure of the police raid becomes fully obvious. If the object of the raid was to demonstrate the abuse by the trade delegation of the privileges and extra-territoriality granted it, then such abuse cannot be proved by finding 'documents' in the pockets of two private employees enjoying no privileges and subject to British jurisdiction.

9. Aware of the impossibility of justifying the raid and the weakness of the British Government's position in this matter, the Prime Minister, Mr Baldwin, and Sir Austen Chamberlain, in their speeches in Parliament, resorted to the help of other alleged documents, having no relation whatever to the raid. The extracts quoted by them in their speeches would stand up as little to expert examination as the other documents used by the British Government in its correspondence with the Soviet

Government, and it is therefore easy to understand why the British Government so emphatically rejected the opposition's proposal to have the documents investigated by a parliamentary commission. There is therefore no need to dwell on the nature of all these documents. To describe them it is enough to point out that Sir Austen Chamberlain recalled the document allegedly found at the arrest of the Soviet citizen, Dosser, in Hong Kong in 1925, the authenticity of which even the mixed court at Shanghai refused to acknowledge.

10. This is the story of the charges brought by the British Government against the Soviet Government of violations of the relevant provisions of the trade agreement on propaganda, and of the abuse of diplomatic privileges—charges based exclusively on the use by the British authorities of every kind of untrustworthy information from suspicious sources and outright forgeries. The British Government not only used this untrustworthy information itself, but supplied it to other Governments, in particular the American. Now, when the British Government has revealed its hand and made public all the material which, in its opinion, is most compromising for the Soviet Government, the utterly unfounded character and untrustworthiness of its suspicions and of the charges it has made against the Soviet Government for six years should be clear to the entire world.

11. It is also necessary to note that these charges were unfounded not only in the formal sense, but partly also in their contents. The British Government has always interpreted the Soviet Government's independent eastern policy, which openly proclaimed the sovereignty and independence of a number of eastern States and the legitimacy of their demand for equality with other countries, as anti-British propaganda. In this term it has included every manifestation of sympathy with oppressed peoples and classes, not only by the Soviet Government, but by private organizations in the USSR. The British Government was even inclined to regard as a violation of the 1921 treaty the refusal of the Soviet Government to forbid Soviet workers from giving material help to the starving families of the miners on strike in England.

12. Clearly, at the last moment, the British Government itself felt the inadequacy of the explanations of its decision to sever relations by allegations of propaganda, and in the debate in Parliament it for the first time made a new charge against the Soviet Government—participation by its agents in espionage. But in this case too the British Government could not bring a shadow of proof. The discovery of espionage is a thoroughly familiar phenomenon in capitalist countries, but there has been no instance before of its serving as the reason for breaking relations or denouncing treaties. It is sufficient to recall the recent case of the commercial firm in Paris which, it was found, was

being used as a cloak for spying on French aviation; this did not even give rise to an exchange of notes between the Governments concerned. In the USSR, primarily in the Caucasus and central Asia, no fewer than eleven British spies have been detained in recent years, whose names are well known to the British Government which has made representations on their behalf through its chargé d'affaires in Moscow. They were all arrested and expelled from the USSR although, if the Soviet Government had wished to make a fuss about their activities, they might have been charged in court and received fairly heavy sentences. On the other hand, during the whole time that *de facto* and diplomatic relations have existed between the USSR and Great Britain, there has been no case of a Soviet citizen detained on British territory for espionage. When the Home Secretary, Sir William Joynson-Hicks, takes it on himself to talk boldly of 'numerous Soviet spies, of an elaborate system of espionage, and of his knowledge of the names and addresses of the majority of these spies', the incredibility of his statements is demonstrated by the simple fact that he cannot explain why they were not charged under British law and why they were allowed to stay in the country. The charges of espionage are more ridiculous than all the rest.

What has been said above leads to the wholly unmistakable conclusion that the British Government had no legitimate grounds for breaking the Soviet-British agreement of 1921, by, first of all, making a raid on the extra-territorial premises of the official agent, in violation of article 5 of the said trade agreement; secondly, by the unilateral denunciation of the agreement without the six months notice stipulated in article 13.

Equally unmistakable is the conclusion that no fault of the Soviet Government served as the reason for breaking diplomatic and commercial relations between the two countries, but that all the earlier charges made against the Soviet Government and the police raid on the trade delegation had the object of creating the appearance of a justification for the rupture at which the present British Government has been aiming from the first day of its existence.

The responsibility for the rupture of diplomatic relations and for all the grievous effects on world economy and the cause of peace which this action involves, rests wholly and exclusively on the present British Government.

EXTRACTS FROM A STATEMENT BY THE CHAIRMAN OF THE AMTORG TRADING CORPORATION IN NEW YORK ON THE BREACH IN ANGLO-SOVIET RELATIONS AND SOVIET TRADE WITH THE UNITED STATES

June 1927 *Soviet Union Review, July–August* 1927, p. 121

I have received numerous inquiries as to how American-Soviet trade will be affected by the breach in Anglo-Soviet relations. While it is still too early to give any figures in detail, my correspondence of the past few days indicates that there should be a decided gain in Soviet purchases here . . .

I am in a position to state authoritatively that the break with England will have no effect on the economic plans for the current year in the Soviet Union. Orders to be placed abroad for industrial expansion will suffer no curtailment. The financial position of the Soviet Union in connexion with commitments and trade is well taken care of.

In accordance with the plans for industrial expansion in the Soviet Union for the coming year, we may expect a considerable increase in Soviet imports and orders abroad. There is every indication that these plans for enlarged foreign trade will be fully carried out. There is also every indication that the break with England will facilitate the effort being made by Soviet industrialists to trade directly with American firms, through the authorized trading companies here, eliminating the European middle-man, and to enter into closer relations with the American technical world.

To sum up: the secure position in connexion with Soviet trade plans for this year, the industrial program for the coming year, the recent increase in orders placed here and the curtailment of trade with Britain, all these show the direction to be taken by Soviet trade with the United States.

REPLY TO THE POLISH NOTE ON THE ASSASSINATION OF VOIKOV: NOTE FROM LITVINOV TO THE POLISH MINISTER IN MOSCOW

11 *June* 1927 Kluchnikov & Sabanin, III, I, p. 387

The Soviet Government notes with satisfaction the Polish Government's regret concerning the murder in Warsaw of P. L. Voikov, plenipotentiary representative of the USSR.

The Soviet Government also notes with particular satisfaction the report of the indignation aroused by this crime and its emphatic condemnation by both the Polish Government and Polish public opinion.

While also noting with satisfaction the Polish Government's declaration of its willingness to compensate M. Voikov's family, and while

regarding this as evidence of good will, and as an action arising from the circumstances of the case and in keeping with international usage in similar cases, the Soviet Government nevertheless does not consider it possible to give this proposal practical effect, since it considers it incumbent on the Soviet State itself to take care of the family of its representative, who died at his post.

The Soviet Government, however, cannot agree with the interpretation placed on the events of 7 June by the Polish Government in your last note,[1] and is compelled, today in an even greater degree than in my note of 7 June, to regard the murder of its representative in Warsaw not as the individual act of a madman, but as one manifestation of the systematic and organized struggle against the USSR by the dark forces of world reaction and the enemies of peace. The events enumerated in my note of 7 June, particularly the rupture of diplomatic relations which had been carefully prepared by the present British Government, unleashed these dark forces, especially those of the counter-revolutionary and terrorist organizations of Russian refugees which, speculating on a tense international situation, are doing their utmost to help militant imperialism to provoke complications between the USSR and other States, and thrust their peoples into bloody slaughter in the false hopes of restoring by these means the Tsarist-imperialist regime and regaining the privileges they lost as the result of the revolution.

Therefore the crime of 7 June is infinitely more significant than an isolated individual act and is in itself a threat to the peaceful normal relations between our two States for whose consolidation and development the Union Government has systematically laboured, and particularly its late representative in Warsaw P. L. Voikov, as the Polish Government justly observed in your note of 9 June. The Soviet Government welcomes the recognition by the Polish Government of the fact of improved relations between the two States, and for its part considers that mutual efforts to consolidate good-neighbourly relations are a most essential factor in general peace, particularly in the strained international situation recently prevailing, which arose in spite of the peaceful disposition of the USSR, a disposition constantly manifested and recorded in more than one document.

With all the more regret therefore is the Soviet Government compelled to point out that the Polish Government has not up to now paid due attention to the fact that the tolerance shown by the Polish authorities towards various kinds of terrorist organizations in Poland engaged in hostile activities against the Soviet Government is an obstacle to the favourable development of relations between the two countries.

[1] Kluchnikov & Sabanin, III, i, p 386.

The Soviet Government cannot agree with your statement that the Polish Government has always opposed and prohibited any planned activity on Polish territory directed against the Soviet Union. The Soviet Government has at its disposal ample material illustrating the tolerance and, in certain cases, the outright support, whether planned or not, for active struggle against the Soviet Government by the organization of terrorist acts and bandit raids into Soviet territory. In the immediate future material bearing on this question will be submitted to you by the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs.

In your note it is emphasized that the actual murderer of the Soviet plenipotentiary representative in Warsaw is of non-Polish nationality. However, it has been established that he is a Polish citizen, the son of a well-known counter-revolutionary leader who was granted Polish citizenship after he had left the USSR. The granting of Polish citizenship to such persons, which undoubtedly facilitates their anti-Soviet activities, adds to the responsibility of the Polish Government for such activities. Unfortunately, the case in question is not an isolated one. Particularly prominent was the case of Bulak-Balakhovich, the well-known counter-revolutionary who, according to the protocol of 30 September 1921 signed by representatives of the Polish and Soviet Governments, was to have been deported from Poland not later than 20 October of the same year, but who was granted Polish citizenship, remained in Poland, and, as the press reported, was even officially received several times by the highest Government representatives.

The Soviet Government cannot concur in the Polish Government's repudiation of responsibility for the murder by referring to the late M. Voikov's refusal to accept the personal protection offered him. With the existence on Polish territory of persons and organizations whose aim is active struggle against the Soviet Union and its representatives, the placing of a guard over these representatives is of course an inadequate measure which does not achieve its purpose. The relevant Polish authorities should have directed their attention and efforts to putting a stop to the criminal activities of those persons and to keeping unceasing watch over them. The Polish Government had known for a long time that organizations hostile to the USSR had made it their object to make an attempt on the life of the Soviet representative in Warsaw. This was communicated . . . by the Polish Government itself to the Soviet Legation on 2 November 1924, i.e. two days after M. Voikov's arrival in Warsaw. But even at that time . . . the Soviet Government declared that the real safety of its representatives and the assurance that the Soviet Legation in Warsaw could carry out its work could be secured only if the Polish Government, in execution of article 5 of the treaty of Riga, would forbid the further stay on Polish territory of organizations and persons whose

activities were directed against the Soviet Union and its representatives. Unfortunately, the Polish Government did not take the proper measures, and there arose the situation which led to the unprecedented crime of the murder of the Soviet ambassador to Poland.

The crime of 7 June has provoked profound indignation among the peoples of the Soviet Union. It would be in the interests of peace and of good relations between the two States to prevent it from leaving deep traces in the minds of the peoples of the USSR. The Soviet Government hopes that the Polish Government, in order to prove in deeds its desire to consolidate the friendly relations to which its note of 9 June refers, will without delay satisfy the elementary demands of the USSR arising from the circumstances of the case, and thereby help to eliminate the unfavourable influence exerted on these relations by the unprecedented crime of 7 June.

In accordance with what has been set forth above, and taking into account the regrets, indignation, and emphatic condemnation of the crime expressed by the Polish Government, the Soviet Government expects:

1. that the Polish Government will take all the steps necessary for a thorough investigation of the case, finding out all the guilty persons, and discovering all the threads of the crime, and for the prompt and severe punishment of the guilty persons, particularly the murderer himself;
2. that the Polish Government, in accordance with the preliminary negotiations between M. Ulianov, Soviet chargé d'affaires *ad interim* and the representative of the Polish Ministry for Foreign Affairs, will allow M. Ulianov, or another representative of the Soviet Government, to take part in the subsequent proceedings in the case; and
3. that the Polish Government will finally take immediate and energetic measures to put an end to the activities on Polish territory of terrorist and bandit organizations and individuals directed against the Soviet Union and its representatives, and will expel from Poland persons engaged in such activities; on this point the Soviet Government expects to receive from the Polish Government an immediate communication in this sense.

The Soviet Government considers that in present conditions the consequences of the tragic murder in Warsaw can in fact be overcome not in virtue of formal declarations, but only as a result of real measures on the part of the Polish Government concerning the White bandit terrorist organizations. Accordingly, the Soviet Government is compelled to insist on the execution of the above-mentioned elementary demands.

NOTE FROM KOZLOVSKY, SOVIET CONSUL-GENERAL IN SHANGHAI, TO THE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE CHINESE FOREIGN MINISTRY IN THE KIANGSU PROVINCE, PROTESTING AGAINST THE RAID ON THE OFFICES OF THE FAR EASTERN BANK

17 *July* 1927 *Izvestia*, 19 *July* 1927

In a private conversation I had the honour to direct your attention to the entirely unprovoked and demonstratively hostile character of such actions on the part of the military authorities in regard to the Far Eastern Bank. The raid was the direct result of the insolent campaign of calumny recently waged by the imperialist and White Guard press in Shanghai against Soviet economic organizations and particularly the Far Eastern Bank. By their actions the local Chinese military authorities have not merely shown their solidarity with those anti-Soviet demonstrations but have in effect invited representatives of the municipal police and of Russian White Guards employed by them to act in the capacity of experts in the operations of the Far Eastern Bank.

It is my duty to point out that public opinion in the USSR will automatically connect the action of the Chinese military authorities against the Far Eastern Bank with the outrageous raids which occurred in London and Peking. Public opinion will be particularly shocked by the co-operation with the municipal police and Russian White Guards, in actions hostile to the USSR, of representatives of authorities maintaining friendly relations with the USSR which at the time so sharply condemned the Peking raid and the surrounding of the premises of the consulate-general and the Shanghai branch of the Far Eastern Bank.

In conclusion I must call your attention to the responsibility which will undoubtedly rest on the Chinese authorities for the enormous losses which the Far Eastern Bank and its clients will suffer as a result of the sudden and enforced suspension of the bank's operations, which closely affect the interests of many Soviet citizens and Soviet economic organizations in China.

In entering an emphatic protest against the said arbitrary and hostile actions of the local military authorities, may I request you to take steps immediately to liquidate this distressing incident, and also to prevent such actions in the future by the military authorities which might cause enormous damage to our friendly relations. In particular we insist on the immediate removal of the seals from the premises of the Far Eastern Bank, and on allowing it to resume its operations immediately and to the fullest extent.

EXTRACTS FROM AN ARTICLE BY STALIN ON THE WAR DANGER

28 *July* 1927 Stalin, ix, p. 322[1]

It is hardly open to doubt that the chief contemporary question is that of the threat of a new imperialist war. It is not a matter of some indefinite and immaterial 'danger' of a new war. It is a matter of a real and material *threat* of a new war in general, and a war against the USSR in particular.

The division of the world and spheres of influence which resulted from the last imperialist war have already become 'out of date'. Some new countries (America, Japan) have moved forward. Some old countries (England) have gone back. Capitalist Germany, buried so to speak at Versailles, is reviving and flourishing, getting steadily stronger. Bourgeois Italy, with jealous eyes on France, is climbing up.

A frenzied struggle is going on for markets, for markets for the export of capital, for sea and land routes to these markets, for a new division of the world. Antagonism is increasing between America and England, between Japan and America, between England and France, between Italy and France.

Antagonism is increasing within the capitalist countries, breaking out from time to time in the form of open revolutionary offensives by the proletariat (England, Austria).

Antagonism is increasing between the imperialist world and the dependent countries, breaking out here and there in the form of open conflicts and revolutionary outbursts (China, Indonesia, North Africa, South America).

But the growth of all these contradictions means the growth of the crisis of world capitalism, despite the fact of stabilization, a crisis incomparably deeper than the crisis before the last imperialist war. The existence and prosperity of the USSR, the country of the proletarian dictatorship, only makes the crisis deeper and more acute.

It is not surprising that imperialism is preparing for a new war, seeing in it the only way of solving this crisis. The unparalleled growth of armaments, the universal recourse of bourgeois governments to fascist methods of 'administration', the crusade against communists, the frenzied baiting of the USSR, direct intervention in China—all these are different aspects of one and the same phenomenon—the preparation of a new war for a new division of the world.

The imperialists would long ago have fallen to fighting each other if it were not for the energetic fight of the communist parties against imperialist wars, if it were not for the USSR, whose peaceful policy is

[1] In addition to those noted, a number of minor changes have been made in this text, as compared with the original version of this article.

a heavy weight dragging at the feet of the instigators of a new war, if it were not for fear of weakening each other and thus encouraging a new breach in the imperialist front.

I think that this last circumstance—the fear of weakening each other and thus encouraging a new breach in the capitalist front—is one of the important factors so far restraining them from fighting among themselves.

Hence the 'natural' anxiety of certain imperialist circles to push the contradictions within their own camp into the background, to patch them up for the time being, to create a united imperialist front and to launch a campaign against the USSR in order to solve the deepening capitalist crisis, if only partially and temporarily, at the expense of the USSR.

The fact that the initiative in this matter, in creating a united imperialist front against the USSR, has been taken by the English bourgeoisie and its fighting staff, the Conservative Party, should not cause us any surprise. English capitalism always has been, is, and will be the most ferocious suppressor of popular revolutions. Beginning with the great ⟨French bourgeois revolution⟩[1] at the end of the eighteenth century and ending with the Chinese revolution now in progress, the English bourgeoisie has always stood and will continue to stand in the front ranks of the destroyers of the liberation movement of mankind. Soviet people will never forget the violence, pillage, and military invasion which our country suffered a few years ago by favour of the English capitalists. What is surprising in English capital and its Conservative Party again taking the lead in war against the world centre of the proletarian revolution, against the USSR? . . .

It is quite understandable that the Conservative Party, preparing for war with the USSR, has for several years been carrying on preparatory work for creating a 'holy alliance' of large and small States against the USSR.

If, until recently, this preparatory work by the Conservatives was carried on more or less under cover, now, recently, they have gone over to 'direct action', dealing open blows against the USSR and trying to rig up in everybody's sight the celebrated 'holy alliance'.

The first open blow delivered by the Conservative English Government was in Peking by the raid on the Soviet Embassy. This raid had at least two objects. It was to reveal 'awful' documents about the 'disruptive' work of the USSR, thereby creating an atmosphere of general indignation and grounds for a united front against the USSR. It was to create a military conflict with the Peking Government and drag the USSR into war with China.

[1] In earlier editions, French revolution

This blow, as is known, miscarried.

The second open blow was delivered in London by the raid on Arcos and the break with the USSR. The aim of this blow was to create a united front against the USSR, to start a diplomatic blockade of the USSR throughout Europe, and to provoke a series of breaches of treaty relations with the USSR.

This blow, as is known, also miscarried.

The third open blow was delivered in Warsaw, by the organization of the murder of Voikov. The murder of Voikov, organized by the agents of the Conservative Party, was, in the minds of its authors, to play the part of the Serajevo murder, dragging the USSR into a military conflict with Poland.

This blow also, you may say, miscarried.

How can we explain why these blows have not so far had the effect which the Conservatives expected?

By the contradictory interests of the various bourgeois States, of whom many are interested in maintaining economic relations with the USSR.

By the peaceful policy of the USSR, firmly and steadily conducted by the Soviet Government.

By the reluctance of the States dependent on England—whether it is Chang Tso-lin's State, or Pilsudski's State—to serve as the dumb instrument of the Conservatives to the prejudice of their own interests.

The honourable Lords, apparently, do not wish to understand that any State, even the most insignificant, is inclined to consider itself something unique and tries to live its own life and does not wish to gamble its existence for the sake of the *beaux yeux* of the Conservatives. The English Conservatives forgot to take all these facts into account.

Does this mean that there will be no more such blows? No, it does not. On the contrary, it only means that the blows will be repeated with fresh force.

These blows should not be regarded as accidental. They grew naturally out of the international situation as a whole, out of the position of the English bourgeoisie both in the 'metropolitan' country and in the colonies, out of the position of the Conservative Party as the party in power.

The entire present international situation, all the facts in the English Government's sphere of 'operations' against the USSR, both its organization of a financial blockade of the USSR and its secret talks with the Powers about the anti-Soviet policy, both its subsidies to the émigré 'governments' of the Ukraine, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Armenia, etc. for the purpose of organizing revolts in these countries of the USSR and financing espionage-terrorist groups, blowing up bridges, setting fire to factories, and terrorizing Soviet ambassadors—all this undoubtedly tells

us that the English Conservative Government has entered firmly and decisively on the road of organizing war against the USSR. In no case can we exclude the possibility that the Conservatives may succeed in certain circumstances in knocking together one military bloc or another against the USSR.

What are our tasks?

Our task consists in beating the alarm in all countries of Europe about the threat of a new war, in arousing the vigilance of the workers and soldiers in capitalist countries, and in preparing the masses, ceaselessly preparing to meet in the full armour of the revolutionary struggle each and every attempt of the bourgeois governments to organize a new war.

Our task consists in putting into the stocks all those leaders of the workers' movement who 'consider' the threat of a new war an 'invention', who soothe the workers with pacifist lies, who shut their eyes to the bourgeoisie's preparations for a new war, for these people want the war to take the workers unawares.

Our task consists in the Soviet Government continuing to conduct, firmly and steadily, a peaceful policy, a policy of peaceful relations despite the provocative thrusts of our enemies, despite the stings to our prestige.

Provocateurs from the hostile camp sneer at us and will continue to sneer at us, asserting that our pacific policy is explained by our weakness, the weakness of our army. This sometimes irritates some of our comrades, who would like to take up the challenge and demand that we take 'decisive' steps. That shows a weakness of the nerves; that shows a lack of firmness. We cannot and should not dance to the tune of our opponents. We must go our own way, defending the cause of peace, demonstrating our desire for peace, exposing the aggressive intentions of our enemies and showing them up as instigators of war.

For only such a policy can give us the possibility of rallying the working masses of the USSR into a united fighting camp if the enemy should force war upon us, or, rather, when the enemy force war upon us.

As to our 'weakness', or the 'weakness' of our army, it is not the first time our enemies have been mistaken on this score. Eight years ago, when the English bourgeoisie engaged in intervention against the USSR, and Churchill threatened a campaign of 'fourteen States', the bourgeois press also bawled about the 'weakness' of our army, but the whole world knows that the English interventionists and their allies were ignominiously thrown back beyond the frontiers of our country by our victorious army.

It would do no harm for the gentlemen who are instigating a new war to bear this in mind.

Our task consists in strengthening the defensive capacity of our country, raising its national economy, improving industry, including war industries, strengthening the vigilance of the workers, peasants, and soldiers of our country, hardening their will to defend socialist society, and getting rid of the indolence which unfortunately is still far from being liquidated.

Our task consists in strengthening our rear and clearing out the rubbish, not hesitating to punish 'their serene highnesses' the terrorists and those who set fire to our factories and workshops, for the defence of our country is impossible without a strong revolutionary rear.

Not long ago a protest was ⟨received⟩[1] from the well-known leaders of the English labour movement, Lansbury, Maxton, and Brockway, against the shooting of twenty terrorists and incendiarists from among the Russian princes and nobility. I cannot regard these English labour leaders as enemies of the USSR. But they are worse than enemies.

They are worse because, while calling themselves friends of the USSR, they, by their protest, make it easier for the Russian landlords and the English detectives to go on organizing the murder of the representatives of the USSR.

They are worse than enemies because by their protest they bring it about that the workers of the USSR are unarmed in the face of their cursed enemies.

They are worse than enemies because they do not want to understand that the shooting of twenty 'serene highnesses' is a necessary measure for the defence of the revolution.

It is not for nothing that people say 'God save us from such friends; we can deal with our enemies ourselves'.

As to the shooting of twenty 'excellencies', let the enemies of the USSR know, the enemies at home as well as the enemies abroad, that the proletarian dictatorship in the USSR is alive and its arm is strong.

What can we say after all this of our wretched opposition and its new attacks on the party in face of the threat of a new war? What can we say about the same opposition finding it timely, when war threatens, to strengthen their attacks on the party?

[1] In earlier editions, received by Comrade Rykov.

EXTRACTS FROM A SPEECH BY STALIN TO A JOINT MEETING OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE AND CENTRAL CONTROL COMMISSION OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE SOVIET UNION

1 *August* 1927 Stalin, x, p. 14[1]

What are the stages of the Chinese revolution?

In my opinion there are three:

First—revolution on an all-national *united* front, the Canton period, when the revolution aimed its blows primarily at foreign imperialism, and the national bourgeoisie supported the revolutionary movement;

Second—the bourgeois-democratic revolution, after the nationalist forces reached the Yangtse, when the national bourgeoisie withdrew from the revolution, while the agrarian movement grew into a mighty revolution embracing tens of millions of peasants (the Chinese revolution is now in this second stage of development);

Third—the Soviet revolution, which has not happened yet, but which will begin . . .

The characteristic feature of the Chinese revolution is that it has passed the first stage of its development; the period of revolution on an all-national united front has passed, and the revolution has entered the second stage of its development, the period of agrarian revolution.

The Turkish (Kemalist) revolution, for example, is on the contrary still stuck in the first stage of its development, the stage of the bourgeois-liberation movement, and is not even attempting to pass on to the second stage, the stage of agrarian revolution.

What was the Kuomintang and its Government in the first stage of the revolution, in the Canton period? At that time it represented a bloc of workers, peasants, bourgeois intelligentsia, and national bourgeoisie. Was Canton at that time the centre of the revolutionary movement, the revolutionary *place d'armes*? Was it right at that time to support the Canton Kuomintang as a government fighting for liberation from imperialism? Were we right to help Canton in China and, shall we say, Ankara in Turkey, when Canton and Ankara were waging a struggle against imperialism? Yes, we were right. We were right, and we were following in Lenin's footsteps, for the struggle of Canton and Ankara dispersed the forces of imperialism, weakened and overturned imperialism, and thereby facilitated the development of the home of the world revolution, the development of the USSR . . .

How is the united front with the national bourgeoisie in the first stage of the colonial revolution to be understood? Does it mean that the communists should not intensify the struggle of the workers and peasants

[1] In addition to those noted, a number of minor changes have been made in this text, as compared with the original version of the speech.

against the landlords and the national bourgeoisie, that the proletariat must sacrifice, even in the smallest degree, even for one minute, its independence? No, it does not. The united front can have revolutionary significance only if and only provided that it does not prevent the communist party from conducting its own independent political and organizational work, organizing the proletariat as an independent political force, rousing the peasantry against the landlords, openly organizing the revolution of the workers and peasants and so preparing the conditions for the hegemony of the proletariat . . .

Let us pass now to the second stage of the Chinese revolution.

If the first stage was distinguished by the fact that the revolution was directed primarily against foreign imperialism, the characteristic feature of the second stage is that the revolution is directed primarily against internal enemies and above all against the feudalists, against the feudal regime.

Did the first stage accomplish its task of overthrowing foreign imperialism? No, it did not. It bequeathed this task to the second stage of the Chinese revolution. It only gave the revolutionary masses the first push against imperialism for it to finish its race and to hand this task to the future.

It must be assumed that the second stage of the revolution will not fully succeed in accomplishing the task of expelling the imperialists. It will give a further push to the broad masses of the Chinese workers and peasants against imperialism, but it will do so in order to hand on the consummation of the task to the succeeding stage of the Chinese revolution, the Soviet stage . . .

What was the task of the communists in the second stage of the revolution in China, when the centre of the revolutionary movement was obviously moving from Canton to Wuhan and when, side by side with the revolutionary centre in Wuhan, a counter-revolutionary centre was being created in Nanking? It was to use to the utmost the opportunities provided by the open organization of the party, of the proletariat (trade unions), the peasantry (peasants unions), the revolution as a whole. It was to push the Wuhan Kuomintang to the left, towards the agrarian revolution. It was to turn the Wuhan Kuomintang into a centre of struggle against the counter-revolution, into the kernel of the future revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry.

Was this policy right?

The facts have shown that it was the only correct policy, capable of training the broad masses of the workers and peasants in the spirit of the further development of the revolution.

The opposition at the time demanded the immediate formation of

Soviets of workers' and peasants' deputies. But that would have been adventurism, an adventurist leap ahead, for the immediate formation of Soviets would have meant jumping the left-Kuomintang phase of development. Why? Because the Kuomintang in Wuhan, having supported alliance with the communists, had not yet been discredited and exposed in the eyes of the broad masses of the workers and peasants, had not yet exhausted itself as a bourgeois-revolutionary organization. Because to put forward the slogan of Soviets and overthrow of the Wuhan Government at a time when the masses were not yet convinced by their own experience of the uselessness of that Government, of the need to overthrow it, would have meant to leap ahead, to break away from the masses, to deprive ourselves of the support of the masses, and thus to frustrate what had been started . . .

What is the Anglo-Soviet Committee? It represents one of the means by which our trade unions are connected with the English unions, with reformist unions, with reactionary unions. At the present time we are carrying out our work of revolutionizing the working class in Europe by three channels:

(*a*) through the Comintern, through the communist sections, whose first task it is to eliminate the reformist political leadership in the workers' movement;

(*b*) through the Profintern, through the revolutionary trade union minorities, whose first task it is to defeat the reactionary workers' aristocracy in the trade unions;

(*c*) through the Anglo-Soviet unity committee, as one of the means of facilitating the struggle of the Profintern and its sections to ⟨isolate⟩[1] the labour aristocracy in the trade unions.

The two first channels are fundamental and permanent, obligatory for communists so long as there are classes and a class society. The third channel is only temporary, subsidiary, episodic, and therefore unstable, not always hopeful, and sometimes completely hopeless. To put the third on the same level as the first two is to go against the interests of the working class, against communism. After all that, how can they babble about our banking on the Anglo-Soviet Committee?

In proceeding to the formation of the Anglo-Soviet Committee, we managed to establish open contact with the trade union organizations of the working masses of England. What for? Firstly, to facilitate the creation of a united front of the workers against capital, or, at least, to make more difficult the struggle of the reactionary leaders of the unions against the formation of such a united front. Secondly, to facilitate the creation of a united front of the workers against the danger of

[1] In earlier editions, to disintegrate and isolate

imperialist war in general, against the danger of intervention in particular, or, at least, to make more difficult the struggle of the reactionary trade union leaders against the formation of such a united front.

Are communists in general permitted to work in reactionary trade unions? This is not only permitted, but is sometimes obligatory, for in the reactionary unions there are millions of workers, and communists have no right to refrain from ⟨entering⟩[1] these unions, finding the way to the masses, and winning them for communism.

Look at Lenin's little book on *Left Wing Communism, an Infantile Disorder*, and you will see that the Leninist tactic obliges communists not to refuse to work in reactionary trade unions.

Are temporary agreements with reactionary trade unions permissible in general, agreements of a trade union or of a political character? Not only are they permissible, but they are sometimes obligatory. Granted that in the West the trade unions are in the majority of cases reactionary. Everybody knows that. That is not the point. The point is that these unions are *mass* unions. The point is that the masses can be reached through these unions. The question is that such agreements must not obstruct and limit the freedom of revolutionary agitation and propaganda for the communists, that such agreements help to disintegrate the reformists and to revolutionize the working masses who for the time being follow their reactionary leaders . . .

Does the Anglo-Soviet Committee hamper our agitation and propaganda; can it do so? No, it cannot. We have always criticized and shall criticize the reactionary attitude of the leaders of the English labour movement, exposing to the masses of the English working class the perfidy and treachery of their leaders . . . We are told that this criticism may lead to the English breaking up the committee. Let them do so. The point is not whether there will be a break or not, but on what question the break will come, what idea the break will demonstrate. The point at the moment is the threat of war in general, and of intervention in particular. If the English break up the committee, the working class will know that the reactionary leaders of the English labour movement have done so from *reluctance to oppose* their imperialist government in organizing war. It can scarcely be doubted that in these circumstances a break brought about by the English will facilitate the communists' work of overturning the General Council, for the question of war is now the fundamental question of the day.

Perhaps they will decide not to break. What will that mean? It will mean that we have consolidated our freedom to criticize, our freedom to continue to ⟨criticize⟩[2] the reactionary leaders of the English labour movement, exposing their treachery and social-democratism to the

[1] In earlier editions, putting out feelers into

[2] In earlier editions, to heap abuse on

broad masses. ⟨Would that be good for the labour movement?⟩[1] I think it would not be bad . . .

I know there is a certain sort of people among us who maintain that the more quietly we behave, the better it will be for us. These people say: 'Things were going well with the USSR when England broke off relations; it was even better when Voikov was killed; but things became worse when we showed our teeth and, in reply to the murder of Voikov, shot twenty counter-revolutionary "excellencies"; before we shot the twenty they were sorry for us in Europe, and sympathized with us; after we shot them, on the other hand, they stopped sympathizing and began accusing us because we are not such good little boys as European public opinion would like us to be.'

What do the reactionary-liberal philosophers say about this? We can only say this about them, that they would like to see the USSR toothless and unarmed, falling flat before our enemies, surrendering to them. There was 'bleeding' Belgium, the figure of which was here and there reproduced at one time on cigarette packets. Why not have the USSR 'bleeding'—everybody would then be sympathetic, everybody would then be sorry for it. Oh no, comrades, we are not of that opinion. Rather let them go to the devil, all these liberal-pacifist philosophers, with their 'sympathy' for the USSR. If only we have the sympathy of the millions of the labouring masses the rest will come right. And if it should be necessary for anybody to be 'bloodstained', we shall turn all our forces to ensuring that it is not the USSR, but a bourgeois country, that is made to bleed . . .

Is it not a fact that of late capitalism has improved and rationalized its techniques, piling up enormous masses of goods which there is no possibility of selling. Is it not a fact that capitalist governments are becoming more and more fascist, attacking the working class and temporarily strengthening their position. Does it follow that stabilization has become firm? Of course not. On the contrary, precisely these facts make the world capitalist crisis more acute, a crisis incomparably deeper than that which preceded the last imperialist war.

It is precisely the fact that capitalist governments are becoming fascist, precisely this fact makes the internal situation in the capitalist countries more acute and leads to revolutionary offensives by the workers. (Vienna, England.)

It is precisely the fact that capitalism is rationalizing its techniques and producing a vast quantity of goods which cannot find a market, precisely this fact aggravates the struggle within the imperialist camp for markets for goods, markets for the export of capital, and generates the conditions for a new war, for a new redivision of the world.

[1] In earlier editions, Would that be good for us?

Is it really difficult to understand that the incredible growth of the productive possibilities of capitalism, with the known limitation of the world market and the stability of 'spheres of influence', makes the struggle for markets greater and the capitalist crisis deeper.

Capitalism could solve this crisis if it could raise by several times the wages of the workers, if it could substantially improve the material position of the peasantry, if it could therefore substantially increase the purchasing power of the labouring millions and expand the capacity of the home market. But then capitalism would not be capitalism. Precisely because capitalism cannot do this, precisely because capitalism uses its 'profits' not to improve the well-being of the majority of the workers, but to intensify their exploitation and to export capital to less developed countries in order to get still higher 'profits'—precisely for this reason the struggle for markets for goods, the struggle for markets for the export of capital, generates a desperate struggle for a new redivision of the world and of spheres of influence, a struggle which has already made a new imperialist war unavoidable.

Why do certain imperialist circles regard the USSR with hostility, organizing a united front against it? Because the USSR is a rich market for goods and for the export of capital. Why do these imperialist circles intervene in China? Because China is a rich market for goods and for the export of capital. And so on and so forth.

There is the basis and origin of the inevitability of a new war, whether it is between separate imperialist coalitions, or against the USSR . . .

There is one question which marks the watershed between all possible groups, trends, and parties, and which tests their revolutionary or anti-revolutionary character. This is the question of the defence of the USSR, of the unconditional and unreserved defence of the USSR from imperialist attack.

He is a *revolutionary* who, without reservation, unconditionally, openly, and honestly, without secret military conferences, is ready to protect and defend the USSR, for the USSR is the first proletarian revolutionary State in the world, which is building socialism. He is an *internationalist* who, unhesitatingly, unconditionally, and without vacillation, is ready to defend the USSR because the USSR is the basis of the ⟨world revolutionary movement⟩,[1] and it is impossible to defend and to advance ⟨this movement⟩[1] unless the USSR is defended. He who thinks to defend the ⟨world revolutionary movement⟩[1] apart from and against the USSR is going against the revolution, and will certainly slide into the camp of the enemies of the revolution.

Two camps have now been created in face of the danger of war and in connexion therewith two positions: the position of unconditional

[1] In earlier editions, world revolution.

defence of the USSR and the position of struggle against the USSR. The choice must be made, for there is not and cannot be a third position. On this question neutrality, vacillation, reservation, the search for a third position—these are attempts to evade responsibility, to turn aside from ⟨unconditional struggle in defence⟩[1] of the USSR, to find oneself fettered at the most critical moment for the defence of the USSR. What does the evasion of responsibility mean? It means sliding imperceptibly into the camp of the enemies of the USSR.

EXTRACT FROM A NARKOMINDEL PRESS DEPARTMENT STATEMENT ON THE ANTI-SOVIET PRESS CAMPAIGN

10 *August* 1927 — *Izvestia*, 10 *August* 1927

The anti-Soviet forces unleashed by the break with England make themselves felt with great acrimony in the European press in the form of an enormous number of fabrications and calumnies surpassing in their abundance and the strangeness of their fantasy anything offered in recent years to the reading public. There is no doubt that the chief inspirer and purveyor of these inventions is the English press . . .

It is quite clear that this campaign by the hostile press is in its way a preparation for more serious actions in the future. It is intended, in the first place, to discredit the Soviet Government in the eyes of those who have not yet finally gone over to the active enemies of the USSR; and secondly, to instil courage in the hearts of those circles and Governments which are still inclined to weigh the risk of such an undertaking as war against us . . . It is important to establish that, despite the absence of openly hostile acts, public opinion in Europe is feverishly elaborating methods tried out at the time of intervention, and there is being created around us with the help of lies and slander a moral atmosphere which is intended to facilitate an open offensive against us at a moment favourable for the enemies of the Soviet Union.

EXCHANGE OF NOTES WITH PERSIA ON FRONTIER COMMISSIONERS: NOTES FROM SLAVUTSKY, SOVIET CHARGÉ D'AFFAIRES IN PERSIA, TO THE PERSIAN VICE-MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS

14 *August* 1927 — *Sbornik Dogovorov*, iv, p. 43

1.

Herewith I have the honour to inform you that, with the object of preventing any kind of frontier incident occurring on the Soviet-Persian border, and also with the object of settling quickly such incidents as

[1] In earlier editions, unconditional defence

occur, the Government of the USSR considers it appropriate to make the following arrangements:

The USSR and Persia shall each appoint five frontier commissioners for the entire length of their common frontier. The place of residence and the area of activity of the Soviet frontier commissioners shall be the following:

Soviet Julfa—along the frontier from Ararat to Mugan.
Soviet Astara—the frontier district from Astara to Mugan inclusive.
Chikishliar—the frontier region of the river Atrek.
Ashkhabad-Poltoratskii—the frontier region from the river Atrek to Artyk; and
Serakho-Sovetskii—along the frontier from Artyk to the end of the Soviet-Persian frontier line in the east.

The commissioners of each State shall be undoubted subjects of that State and their names shall be previously submitted to the Government of the other contracting party. Neither of the contracting States may select as commissioners persons who were formerly subjects of the other contracting State.

Should a commissioner of either of the contracting parties take any action with regard to the other party which exceeds the limits of his competence and conflicts with the obligations of his office, the other contracting party shall have the right to demand the removal of that commissioner.

The said commissioners are obliged to see that no event or other happening occurs along the common frontier of the contracting parties which threatens to disturb order along the frontier and may be the cause of disputes between the frontier inhabitants of the two States or violate the interests which the two parties have in virtue of valid treaties and agreements. Should such incidents nevertheless occur, the commissioners are obliged to take measures to settle them and to liquidate them as rapidly and easily as possible within the limits of the regulations set forth below. The said commissioners have no competence to settle differences connected with the determination of the frontier or with territorial questions, and have no right to draw up corresponding protocols on these questions.

When incidents occur involving aggression by one party against the other, the commissioner of that party which is the victim of aggression shall inform the commissioner of the party committing the aggression, and they shall proceed jointly to the place where it was committed to conduct an investigation. The commissioner of the party committing the aggression must immediately take steps to settle and liquidate the affair.

The commissioners may in minor and urgent cases liquidate such affairs by appealing to the local authorities of the other party with a view to subsequently informing each other, and jointly draw up and sign a protocol

The decision whether incidents come into this category of minor and urgent cases shall be by agreement between the commissioners of both parties, and until such agreement is reached no communication between the frontier commissioner and the local authorities of the other party is permitted.

The commissioners of the two parties shall have the following rights:

(*a*) to cross the frontier at all official points open for the crossing of the frontier within the area to which they are appointed, carrying an official permit with which they are furnished for a fixed period by the contracting States. To cross the frontier at other points, the commissioners must reach agreement among themselves beforehand on each separate occasion.

Note: Whenever they cross the frontier, the commissioners must produce their permit for registration by the frontier authorities of the other party.

(*b*) equal enjoyment of the right of personal immunity to the extent granted to consuls.

(*c*) the use of codes in their correspondence with the political representatives and consuls of their State.

In submitting the above arrangements for your examination, I have the honour to request you to be good enough to inform me of your opinion of the proposed arrangements, and, should the Persian Government agree, to inform the envoy extraordinary of the places of residence and the area of operations of the Persian frontier commissioners, and where possible to arrange that they coincide with the places and areas of the frontier commissioners of the USSR.

In conclusion, may I assume that information about the personal composition of the frontier commissioners will be exchanged after agreement on the arrangements noted above for their activities.

2.

Herewith I have the honour to confirm the receipt of your postal note of 14 August concerning the consent of the Persian Government to the arrangements proposed in my note of 14 August for frontier commissioners.

In regard to your explanation of the paragraph in my note which runs:

The said commissioners are obliged to see that any kind of event or other happening occurring along the common frontier of the contracting parties

which threatens to disturb order along the frontier or may be the cause of disputes between the frontier inhabitants of the two States, or violate the interests which the two parties have in virtue of valid treaties and agreements, is prevented . . .

I have the honour to inform you that my Government agrees with the explanation given in your note, that:

The frontier commissioners must prevent any kind of aggressive action by bandits or frontier inhabitants against the frontier inhabitants of the other party, and contraband activity, and shall see to the maintenance of order on the frontier, and in no case shall the commissioners of either party have the right to intervene in questions relating to the determination of the frontier, or in political and other internal affairs of the other State.

At the same time I have the honour to inform you that the names of the Soviet frontier commissioners will be submitted to you in the next few days, and I hope that the Persian Government for its part will be so good as to present its commissioners, who are to be sent to the Soviet-Persian frontier.

In conclusion may I express my conviction, which I hope that you, Mr Minister, share, that the appointment of the frontier commissioners will help to promote the peaceful productive labour of the frontier inhabitants and the further consolidation of the profoundly friendly relations existing between the peoples and Governments of the USSR and Persia.

STATEMENT BY RAKOVSKY ON HIS POSITION AS AMBASSADOR

4 *September* 1927 *Manchester Guardian*, 6 *September* 1927

1. I repudiate formally and emphatically the idea that one of the representatives of the Soviet Union is capable of organizing desertion on the soil of France, with whom the Union Government maintains peaceful relations. Any diplomatic representative of the Soviet institution who could meddle in such fashion in the internal affairs of France would be unworthy of his Government's trust and unfit to fulfil the mission of representation between France and the Soviet Union.

2. The declaration signed by myself, in my capacity as a member of the Central Committee of the Russian Communist party, has in mind the possibility of a war against the Soviet Union, and, consequently, does not apply to a concrete immediate instance; at any rate it does not apply to France, whose policy in relation to Russia the Soviet considers peaceable.

My signature beneath the incriminating document can, so far as it

concerns our diplomatic activities, only permit of one conclusion—namely, to work with the greatest zeal to remove the differences existing between Russia and France, and so enhance the chances of general peace. I vehemently protest against any other interpretation of my actions, which would be contrary to my Government's policy and to my own feeling and standpoint up to the present.

PRESS STATEMENT BY LITVINOV ON FRANCO-SOVIET RELATIONS

16 *September* 1927 Kluchnikov & Sabanin, iii, 1, p. 398

1. When I returned recently from abroad, I was inclined to think that the fears expressed here of the imminence and inevitability of war were to some extent exaggerated and premature. The anti-Soviet campaign now stirred up in France, recalling both by its extent and its methods the anti-Soviet campaign in England which preceded the rupture of Anglo-Soviet relations, compels me to think that these fears may perhaps err on the side of minimizing the danger, and that the preparation for war has a basis not confined to the frontiers of England alone.

2. Only naïve persons, or politicians deliberately intending to deceive, can say that the anti-Soviet campaign in France is directed only against the person of our present ambassador Comrade Rakovsky, and was aroused by his signature of the well-known statement of the opposition. As ambassador for two years Comrade Rakovsky never once gave the French Government the slightest cause for dissatisfaction. His personal sympathies for France are known to all. We have reason to think also that up till now the French Government itself valued highly his friendly disposition towards France, his loyalty, and his untiring efforts to establish firm friendship between the peoples of the USSR and of the French Republic. Only a few days ago his loyalty was publicly attested by M. de Monzie, who as chairman of the French delegation to the Franco-Soviet conference has been most frequently in touch with Comrade Rakovsky and has had an opportunity of observing his activities. If the conference managed to reach a successful settlement of the most complex question dealt with in the negotiations, that of compensation for State loans, and thus cleared the way for the composing of other differences, it is in the first instance due to Comrade Rakovsky personally. I think it quite unnecessary to dwell on the incident of Comrade Rakovsky's signature of the opposition statement, for that was closed by the explanations made by Comrade Chicherin and by Comrade Rakovsky himself.[1] M. Herbette stated officially to Comrade Chicherin that M. Briand found these explanations satis-

[1] cf. *Le Temps*, 4 and 5 September 1927.

factory and regarded the incident as closed. Furthermore, the French Government is aware of our readiness to sign at any time a special agreement on reciprocal non-intervention in internal affairs, although I must state categorically that the activity of Soviet agents in France has given no cause for the demand for such an instrument. It is quite obvious that this incident is only a pretext and subterfuge for those reactionary circles in France whose specific aim in launching this campaign is the rupture of Franco-Soviet relations and the breakdown of the negotiations for a debt settlement.

3. We have more than once pointed out, and serious politicians in France recognize this fully, that no objective causes for misunderstanding between the USSR and France exist. At the time we were assured by the French side that the only stumbling-block in the way of further rapprochement between the two States was the debt question. But now this question has just been satisfactorily settled by the French and Soviet delegations, who worked out a scheme for annual payments of 60 million gold francs by the USSR by which millions of holders of Russian bonds, now quite valueless, would have benefited. Under this scheme credits would be granted to finance Soviet orders to French factories, which would have expanded the market for the products of French industry. This agreement opens up further possibilities for economic and political rapprochement between the two States. It is no accident that the anti-Soviet campaign began just two days after agreement was reached, for it is primarily an attempt to disrupt that agreement and then to carry out Great Britain's anti-Soviet policy in France. It is not for nothing that a part of the French press, citing names, pointed out that the anti-Soviet campaign was inspired and launched by the same groups which some months ago brought about the Anglo-Soviet rupture. Of course, in France as in England, the domestic inter-party struggle is not the least important factor in the anti-Soviet campaign, but I cannot discuss that because that of course would make me guilty of intervention in internal affairs.

4. Let them not tell us that it is merely a question of replacing an ambassador who has 'compromised' himself. What is being now decided is the fate of the Franco-Soviet conference, the fate of the agreement already reached, the fate of Franco-Soviet relations as a whole. I do not know whether the quarters hostile to us and the press which obeys them have considered that, as the story of Anglo-Soviet relations has shown, there can be no question of any agreement on claims or on payments should normal diplomatic relations deteriorate, still less if they should cease altogether. These quarters are therefore also assuming a very grave responsibility towards their many countrymen who hold Russian securities. Leaving aside any deliberate intent on the part of those

responsible for the campaign, we must remember that events have their own logic. And now it is clear to everybody in the West that the rupture of Anglo-Soviet relations created an inexorable threat to the general peace, and over-burdened the already tense international situation with new dangers of war. To an even greater degree a Franco-Soviet rupture would extend the magnitude of these dangers. That is why we can, without beating about the bush, describe the skirmishers of the anti-Soviet campaign in France as instigators of war, incendiarists of a world conflagration. But we have not lost all hope that the French Government as a whole and pacific public opinion in France will see these dangers and be able to avert them.

NOTE FROM RAKOVSKY, CHAIRMAN OF THE SOVIET DELEGATION TO THE FRANCO-SOVIET CONFERENCE, TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE FRENCH DELEGATION, ON DEBTS AND CREDITS

21 *September* 1927 Kluchnikov & Sabanin, iii, 1, p. 399

. . . At the plenary session on 19 March 1927 it appeared that there was full agreement between the two delegations on a total sum of 60 million gold francs as the average annual payment by the Soviet Union in settlement of the pre-war loans issued or guaranteed by the former Russian Governments, as well as on the number of these annual payments. However, differences appeared about the request of the Soviet delegation concerning the progressive increase in payments and the clauses dealing with deferment, which the French delegation did not wish to accept, and also about the request of the French delegation concerning the clauses about most-favoured-nation treatment, which was contested by the Soviet side.

Early in May I informed you on behalf of the Soviet delegation that, wishing to give further proof of their willingness to reach agreement, they abandoned both the table of progressive payments and the deferment clause, and that at the same time they accepted the stipulation about most-favoured-nation treatment put forward by the French delegation.

Since the details about payments and the methods of making them have already been worked out in the course of the preceding negotiations between the experts of both delegations and confirmed (by the latter) at previous plenary sessions, all the elements required for a complete agreement about debts are at hand.

There remains the question of credits.

From the very beginning (of the negotiations) the interrelationship of the two questions and the parallelism in the means of dealing with them were laid down by mutual agreement at the plenary sessions.

May I remind you that at one of the plenary sessions the rapporteur of the economic commission, M. Seruisse, set forth the French attitude on the question of the organization of credits. It remained to fix the sum and the terms of these credits. The Soviet delegation's request for credits of $220 million, of which one-third was to be in cash to be paid over two years, with deferment of payment up to ten years, was recognized as incompatible with the conditions of the French market and with the prevailing state of Soviet credit in France; the Soviet delegation thereupon received the permission of their Government to reduce considerably the sum and the dates of payment, and to abandon the request for credits in cash.

After my last visit to Moscow I had the honour to inform you verbally, as I did likewise the Foreign Affairs Ministry, of our new credits proposal, which you will find set forth in the proposal on debts and credits attached hereto.

The Soviet delegation are sure that the French delegation will appreciate the substantial step taken by the Soviet Government for the purpose of reaching a settlement of this question, the more so as the Soviet delegation are prepared to examine together with the French delegation the question of material guarantees designed to safeguard the new creditors from any possible risk.

For the rest, the Soviet delegation have always approached the question of credits from the standpoint of the mutual interests of both countries. Underlying the delegation's proposal on credits was the idea of establishing economic relations between the two countries on a firm foundation, giving them a direction which would be advantageous both for French trade and industry and for the Soviet economy.

France, particularly since the war, has become an industrial country. The productivity of its industry greatly exceeds the demands of the home market, and therefore the winning of new markets is a condition of its further development. Now that the franc has been stabilized, it has become more and more difficult to win new markets, since this stabilization places all producing countries on an equally competitive footing. In now offering French industry part of the Russian market for a number of years we think we are providing an answer to the question now preoccupying the French economy.

Even now, despite the enormous difficulties in the way of trade between the two countries owing to the absence of a trade agreement, the trade turnover shows a steady increase.

(Extracts from trade statistics: French exports to the USSR rose in three years from 7·8 to 20 million rubles; Soviet exports to France from 26 to 84 million, of which 9·5 and 20 millions respectively represented products of the oil industry.)

These figures, apart from their objective importance, acquire peculiar importance in connexion with the question of material guarantees for future credits. After granting these credits French exports (to the USSR) will expand considerably; we can already foresee that in the first year they will reach a total of 60 to 70 million gold rubles.

In order to give further proof of its desire to reach a final agreement on the question of debts and credits quickly, the Soviet Government has given its consent to a further step forward.

Assuming, on the basis of the information given in private conversation, that the French delegation would recommend their Government to agree to a request for credits not exceeding $60 million, to be granted in instalments of 12 million annually over five years, and (assuming) that the divergence on the credit question thus amounts merely to a difference of figures, the Soviet Government declares its readiness to deposit in a French bank within six months from the present day the sum of 30 million gold francs, as a preliminary instalment on the first half-yearly payment to the holders of pre-war bonds. This sum would be deposited immediately after the ratification by both Governments of the agreement on war debts and on credits.

The French delegation will no doubt realize what a substantial effort the annual payment of 60 million francs in gold currency, that the Soviet Government undertakes to make after the agreement is concluded, represents for Soviet finances.

It is well known that even before the war Russia's balance of payments showed a deficit, and that this was made up by raising loans abroad and by a stream of foreign capital. The disturbances caused by war and revolution, the diminution in foreign trade, despite the economic recovery of the country—all this makes the obligation referred to even more difficult and will require substantial resources on our part.

In assuming these weighty obligations, we are giving real and indisputable proof of the interest we feel in the many French holders of Russian bonds, consisting for the most part of small investors, and in maintaining good political relations between the two countries.

At the same time we suggest that the settlement of these first two points in the programme of the conference will allow us to continue in a particularly favourable atmosphere the examination of the other questions on the agenda.

The Soviet Delegation's Proposals

I. Debts: The Soviet delegation propose that the following points be included in the agreement to be concluded between the two delegations on the question of pre-war debts and of credits:

1. The Soviet Government agrees to pay as its share in settling

pre-war loans issued or guaranteed by former Russian Governments and circulating in France:

41 annual payments each of 60 million gold francs, representing the arithmetical average of the annuities set forth in the amortization table, and provided for in the contracts of issue;

10 annual payments each of 60 million gold francs as arrears and as compensation for the payments which have not been made since payment on the debts was suspended;

10 annual payments each of 60 million gold francs as an additional premium.

2. The present agreement shall be reviewed, should a more favourable arrangement than that made with French creditors, all other things being equal, be proposed to the Soviet Government by the nationals of other countries who are creditors in respect of pre-war loans or of loans guaranteed by former Russian Governments. In that case the present agreement is to be amended in such a way as to ensure for French nationals an arrangement in all respects identical.

3(*a*) The annual payments set out in paragraph 1 will be made into a general Russian debt fund to be set up in Paris by agreement between the Soviet and French Governments;

(*b*) This body will undertake the distribution of the annual payments set out in paragraph 1;

(*c*) Securities on which payment is allowed shall confer the right to the issue of new coupons by the general fund;

(*d*) The prerogatives arising from the present agreement shall not be extended to:

(i) securities now held by other than French nationals;

(ii) securities not quoted in France;

(*e*) The question of sharing in the prerogatives arising from the present agreement shall be made the subject of a special examination in regard to the two following categories:

(i) Securities imported into France and which were sold by foreigners to French nationals after . . . . (measures shall be taken to secure the observance of this clause);

(ii) Securities quoted in Germany and of which French citizens who have acquired French nationality in virtue of the Versailles treaty were the possessors before 11 November 1918.

(*f*) In the event of disputes, a mixed commission to be attached to the general fund shall determine which securities shall enjoy the prerogatives arising from the present agreement.

II. Credits: Industrial and commercial credits shall be opened in France, allocated for the development of economic relations between France and the Soviet Union on the following terms:

1. The total figure for these credits shall be fixed at $120 million;

2. These credits shall be assigned in annual amounts of $20 million, and thus extend over six years;

3. They shall be granted exclusively for orders placed with French industry or for purchases from French firms, including the purchase of colonial goods, in the proportion of two-thirds for orders and one-third for purchases;

4. These credits are to be used exclusively for production purposes, i.e. for equipment for industry, agriculture, transport, and for municipal undertakings in the Soviet Union;

5. The liquidation of each annual part of these credits will be made after the six years, but the payment of interest shall begin from the day of the first year in which the credit is granted;

6. The Soviet delegation are prepared to examine jointly with the French delegation the material guarantees to secure the regular payment of interest and the repayment of the principal on these credits.

III. The agreement on debts enters into force only after the conclusion of the agreement on credits set out above.

IV. The Soviet Government undertakes to deposit as a preliminary payment within six months from the present date in a French bank the sum of 30 million gold francs, representing one half of the first annual payment allocated for the holders of pre-war loans. This sum shall be distributed among the holders of the said loans immediately after the ratification by both Governments of the agreements on debts and on credits.

PRESS STATEMENT BY LITVINOV ON FRANCO-SOVIET RELATIONS

22 *September* 1927 *Izvestia*, 22 *September* 1927

I assure you categorically, and empower you to publish this statement, that the French and Soviet delegations have reached full agreement on the question of debts. The general agreement has not been signed simply because the French delegation have not yet accepted our proposals for credits. Although the question of credits has been settled in principle, there is not unanimity with regard to the extent of these credits. All doubts will however soon be dispelled when the French public learns that the Soviet Government is prepared within the next six months to pay into a bank the first half-yearly instalment of 30 million gold francs, from which the first payments can be made to French holders of Russian securities immediately upon the ratification by both Governments of the general agreement on debts and credits. Comrade Rakovsky has today been empowered to communicate this to the French delegation.

EXCHANGE OF NOTES WITH PERSIA REGARDING COMMERCIAL RELATIONS: NOTES FROM KARAKHAN TO THE PERSIAN FOREIGN MINISTER

1 *October* 1927 *Sbornik Dogovorov*, IV, p. 72

The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, in view of the wishes frequently expressed by our two Governments concerning the best methods of promoting economic relations between the USSR and Persia and being sincerely anxious to assist the development of trade between the two friendly countries while awaiting the conclusion of a commercial treaty, agrees that economic relations between the two countries shall be arranged in the following manner. If within two years a commercial agreement between the USSR and Persia shall not have been concluded, the Government of the USSR reserves the right to review the arrangements set forth in this note.

1. For the period during which the provisions set forth in this note remain valid, the Government of the USSR establishes for trade in the products of the soil and industry of Persia enumerated in the attached list (annex 1), a system allowing their import into the USSR within the limits of specified annual quotas without the issue of special permits for their import.

Accounts of the amounts imported under the said quotas shall be kept by the Soviet and Persian customs offices. The Soviet customs

office will issue certificates to Persian merchants and organizations for the goods they import into the Union.

2. During the first year in which the provisions of this note shall be in operation, the Government of the USSR agrees to admit, on the terms stated in paragraph 1 of this note, the products of the soil and industry of Persia mentioned in the attached list (annex 1) into the USSR up to a total sum of 50 million rubles (250 million krans), of which industrial raw materials shall amount to approximately 30 million rubles (150 million krans) and consumer goods to approximately 20 million rubles (100 million krans).

At the end of nine months in each year during which the provisions of the present note are operative, the trade delegation of the USSR in Teheran together with the Persian Ministry of Public Works shall proceed to value the imports into Persia from the USSR and the imports into the USSR from Persia. Values shall be based upon the average selling price in Persia and the USSR respectively, excluding customs duties and other dues collected. In this valuation, the exchange rate of the chervonets throughout the period of validity of the provisions of this note shall be taken as equal to 50 krans.

If at the end of nine months in any year during which the provisions of the present note are operative it appears that imports into Persia from the USSR exceed imports into the USSR from Persia, the import quotas from Persia laid down for that year shall be increased by the amount of the excess.

'Industrial raw materials' is understood to mean the commodities enumerated in the list attached to the present note (annex 1) under items 1–10. 'Consumer goods' is understood to mean the commodities enumerated in the same list under items 10 [11]–17.

3. Three months before the end of each year in which the provisions of the present note are operative the Soviet trade delegation in Persia together with the Ministry of Trade and Public Works shall begin to draw up the quotas for the following year.

In no circumstances may the total sum of the import quotas into the USSR to be drawn up be less in value than the value of the total of the quotas for the first year in which the present provisions are operative, i.e. may not be less than 50 million rubles (250 million krans); similarly, the same proportions of industrial raw materials and consumer goods, 60 per cent and 40 per cent, laid down for the first year shall be retained.

4. Persian merchants and organizations shall have the right to import into the USSR 50 per cent of the quota of industrial raw materials and 50 per cent of the quota of consumer goods referred to in paragraph 2 of this note. At least 25 per cent of the industrial raw

materials imported by Persian merchants and organizations shall be offered for sale to Soviet State and co-operative organizations, and only if the latter refuse to buy or offer less favourable terms may they be sold to private persons.

It is taken for granted that this 25 per cent is to be reckoned not on each individual consignment imported by one Persian merchant or another, but on the total annual import of industrial raw materials by Persian merchants and organizations.

The remainder of the said quotas, that is 50 per cent of the industrial raw materials and 50 per cent of the consumer goods, shall be imported into the USSR through Soviet economic agencies.

Should the Soviet economic agencies fail to import from Persia, in the first nine months of each year in which the present provisions are operative, the full quantities specified above, the right to import the remainder shall be transferred to Persian merchants and organizations who may exercise this right until the end of the year and for the first month in the following year. The Soviet trade delegation in Persia shall inform the Persian Government not later than the tenth month of each year in which the present provisions are operative of the quantity so remaining.

The provisions of this paragraph shall also apply to the cases mentioned in clause 3 of paragraph 2 of this note.

5. Imports into the USSR by Persian merchants and organizations of the products of the soil and industry of Persia in the quantities specified in paragraph 4 of this note shall be effected on the principle of net balance, meaning by this that for every consignment of goods imported into the Union by Persian merchants and organizations, 90 per cent of the value of the Persian goods must be exported to Persia in the form of the products of the soil and industry of the Union, calculating the value by exchange prices where the commodity is quoted on the exchange, and by market prices where the commodity is not quoted on the exchange. The remaining 10 per cent of the value realized in the Union from the sale of the goods imported by Persian merchants and organizations may be transferred abroad in foreign currency.

6. Goods imported into the USSR by Persian merchants and organizations shall be cleared through the Soviet customs on presentation of a certificate to the customs that they are exporting Soviet goods representing 90 per cent of the value of the goods they have imported, or of a certificate issued by the Soviet transport and export organizations of the dispatch to Persia of goods of the said value.

Moreover, Persian merchants and organizations shall have the right to clear from the Soviet customs goods imported on quota account if they present a guarantee from a bank, or from another source acceptable

to the Soviet Government, that they will purchase Soviet goods representing 90 per cent of the value of the goods imported, calculated on exchange prices for goods quoted on the exchange and on market prices for goods not quoted on the exchange.

The banks whose guarantee is acceptable to the Soviet Government are to be listed separately.

Samples of goods held in customs warehouses shall be issued to Persian merchants and organizations; they shall likewise have the right to import samples of their goods in the customary manner, to enable them to sell their goods by sample. Moreover, Persian merchants and organizations shall have the right, while observing the customs regulations laid down on this point, to show their goods held in the customs warehouses to purchasers.

Subject to the provisions of clause 1 of paragraph 4, Persian merchants and organizations shall have the right to sell their goods in the USSR both to State and co-operative organizations and to private organizations and persons.

7. In order that Persian merchants and organizations may be able to purchase Soviet goods while awaiting the sale of the Persian goods they have imported, the Government of the USSR agrees that the Soviet Bank for Foreign Trade or any other Soviet bank designated by the Soviet Government shall open credits for Persian merchants and organizations on the security of the goods they have imported on quota account up to 50 per cent of the value of the goods. To receive the said credits it is essential that they present to the bank the Soviet customs certificate of the import of the said goods.

8. To cover the value of the goods imported into the USSR by Persian merchants and organizations the latter shall have the right of purchasing freely on Soviet territory and freely exporting to Persia all the products of the soil and industry of the Union, with the exception of:

(*a*) oil and oil products;
(*b*) bread grains and flour;
(*c*) metal scrap;
(*d*) goods not required on the Persian market; i.e. furs, pelts, carpets;
(*e*) articles of which the export is forbidden across any Soviet frontier.

A list of the articles of which the export is forbidden at the present time is attached (annex 2).

9. Should Persian merchants or organizations export Soviet goods to Persia before importing goods into the Union the Soviet customs shall provide them with certificates according to the invoice for the Soviet goods exported. Upon presentation of the certificate Persian merchants

and organizations shall have the right to import Persian goods into the Union to the amount shown on the certificate, and in these cases the Soviet customs shall not hold back the goods in question. The said certificates shall be made out in the name of the exporter but Persian merchants may transfer their right to import into the Union to other Persian merchants by having the certificate endorsed and attested by the appropriate bodies in the Soviet Union or Persia.

The provisions of paragraph 5 of the present note shall be applicable to these cases.

10. Should the value of Soviet goods exported from the USSR by Persian merchants and organizations exceed in any individual case the value of the Persian goods they import, they shall have the right, upon presentation of the Soviet customs certificate, to import into the Union additional goods to the amount of the excess, within the limits of the import quotas.

The provisions of paragraph 5 of the present note shall be applicable to these cases.

11. For the period during which the provisions of the present note are operative, the Soviet Government shall allow Persian nationals and organizations to engage in trade and industry on Soviet territory in conformity with the laws and regulations of the central Soviet authorities and shall place them in this respect on the same footing as local nationals and juridical persons.

The Soviet Government hopes that the Persian Government on its side will for the same period allow Soviet nationals, juridical persons, and State economic organizations to engage in trade and industry on Persian territory in accordance with the laws and regulations of the central Persian authorities, and that they will in this respect be placed on the same footing as local nationals and organizations.

12. In the interests of the Persian national economy the Government of the USSR, in accordance with article 20 of the treaty of 26 February 1921[1] and in furtherance of its provisions, grants freedom of transit for the products of Persian soil and industry across Soviet territory to third countries.

For the period during which the provisions of the present note are valid, the Soviet Government shall also grant Persian merchants and organizations the right to export freely to third countries all the products of the soil and industry of Persia imported into Soviet territory but not sold there. On exporting the said goods the customs duties paid on their import into the Union shall be refunded to the Persian merchants and organizations, on condition that it shall be shown that the goods are the identical goods previously imported.

[1] *League of Nations Treaty Series*, ix, p. 401.

Similarly for the period during which the provisions of the present note are valid, the Soviet Government shall, as provided in the treaty of 26 February 1921, also allow the transit through Soviet territory to Persia from third countries with which the Union has or may have commercial treaties or agreements, of the following articles:

(*a*) all articles ordered by the Persian Government for its own use and not destined for trade, with the exception of arms, military stores, and military equipment;

(*b*) for Persian citizens:

(i) machinery and articles required to equip factories and workshops and for the requirements of public utility undertakings; machinery, and articles required for constructional work and road-building;

(ii) medicines of all kinds and surgical instruments;

(iii) paper and printed matter;

(iv) light automobiles and lorries, and

(v) silkworm eggs.

At the same time the Soviet Government will take steps to remove any obstacle to the transit of the articles mentioned in the respective sections of the present paragraph.

The Soviet Government also agrees to consider with the utmost good will requests from the Persian Government concerning the transit through Soviet territory to Persia of the goods included under section (*a*) of the present paragraph from countries with which the USSR has no commercial treaty or agreement.

13. For the period during which the present provisions are operative Persian merchants and organizations exporting Soviet goods will be granted all the privileges granted in the USSR to Soviet nationals and juridical persons relating to the imposition of excise dues and transport charges.

Should the Soviet Government grant further such privileges, they will be extended to Persian merchants and organizations for the import of Persian goods into the Union.

For the period during which the present provisions are operative, Persian merchants and organizations shall be placed on the same footing, in regard to transport charges and the order of transport for the goods they import into the Union, the Soviet goods they export to Persia, and for the goods they trans-ship through the Union, as Soviet State economic organizations, provided the goods are dispatched directly from the frontier to the place where they are to be sold, from the

place where they are bought to the frontier, or from one frontier of the Union to the other.

Unsold Persian goods in Baku or at other places in the Soviet Union situated close to the Persian frontier where there is a customs office shall if dispatched directly to another place in the Union enjoy the privileges set forth in clause 3 of the present paragraph.

The Soviet Government hopes that the Persian Government will grant similar privileges for the import and export operations of Soviet nationals, State economic organizations, and juridical persons, to the extent that they are or shall be granted to Persian nationals and organizations.

14. The Government of the USSR hopes that the Persian Government, in view of the importance of means of transport for the development of trade between the Union and Persia, will agree that Soviet means of transport such as automobiles, carts, and pack animals belonging to the Union or to its economic organizations, and also caravans in the service of Soviet economic organs whose contracts are registered with the local police or at the Governor's headquarters, shall be requisitioned only in cases of public misfortune or for military purposes.

These requisitions may be effected only at the order of the Persian central authorities, and on every such occasion the Soviet trade delegation in Persia shall be duly informed at the time. In no circumstances shall means of transportation belonging to Soviet consular and commercial representatives in Persia be subject to requisitioning.

The Soviet Government hopes that should such requisitionings take place the Persian Government will do everything possible to assist the transporting of Soviet merchandise and will pay appropriate sums for the use of means of transport belonging to the Union and its economic agencies and for any damage sustained by the means of transport during the period of requisitioning.

15. The Soviet Government hopes that the Persian Government will recognize the interest which Soviet State economic organizations, nationals, and juridical persons have in renting plots of land in Persia and the buildings thereon, and will remove the obstacles to the leasing by Soviet State economic organizations, nationals, and juridical persons of plots of land and the buildings thereon, provided that the leases are drawn in conformity with the laws and regulations of the central Persian authorities in force. If by law or Government regulation any privileges in regard to the leasing of land and the buildings thereon are granted and put into effect in Persia, they shall be extended to the State economic organizations, nationals, and juridical persons of the USSR.

On its part the Soviet Government agrees to grant Persian nationals and organizations most-favoured-nation treatment in regard to the renting of land and the buildings thereon.

16. The Soviet Government hopes that if in the future it should be found necessary to mint Persian silver coinage abroad, then, although the Persian Government has definitely decided to enlarge its own mint, its attitude to the minting of Persian coinage at the Leningrad mint will be as friendly as it has been in the past. As to orders for the minting of coins at the Persian mint, these shall be dealt with in the order in which the contracts were concluded.

17. For the period during which the provisions of the present note are in operation, the Soviet trade delegation in Persia, whose function it is to look after Soviet interests in matters of foreign trade, to regulate and effect the exchange of goods between Persia and the Union, and also to promote in every way the development of trade relations between the two countries, shall be subject to the following regulations:

The Soviet trade delegation in Persia, situated in Teheran, shall be considered part of the Soviet Embassy in Persia. The trade representative and his deputy shall be considered members of the Soviet Embassy and shall enjoy the right of personal immunity and other privileges accorded to members of the diplomatic corps.

The premises of the trade delegation in Teheran, situated in Pamenar, and also the private dwellings of the representative and his deputy, which shall be in the same building, shall enjoy rights of extra-territoriality.

Note. By premises of the trade representative is meant all the premises occupied by the trade delegation as its offices.

The right of extra-territoriality cannot, however, be an obstacle to the application of the following provisions:

All juridical acts of the trade delegation in Persia, and actions arising therefrom, must be effected on the basis of Persian laws and must be subject to Persian law and jurisdiction. Similarly the Persian Government may attach Soviet property in Persia, with the exception of articles which under international law are destined for the use of members of the diplomatic and consular staffs.

The Soviet Government assumes responsibility for all contracts concluded by the trade delegation in Persia, but responsibility for contracts concluded by other Soviet institutions rests with those institutions; the entire activity of such institutions shall be subject to Persian law.

Should the Persian Government wish to open a trade delegation in the Union, it and its staff shall enjoy the same rights, privileges, and immunities from the Soviet side as are granted the Soviet trade delegation in Persia.

18. The regime set forth in the preceding paragraphs shall be valid for two years from the day when the present note enters into force.

Annex 1

Commodity	*Value in 000 rubles*	*Approximate weight in tons*
Industrial raw materials		
1. cotton	14,200	14,755
2. wool	5,460	4,260
3. hemp	1,050	2,460
4. gum tragacanth	1,200	655
5. sheepskins and goatskins	700	575
6. furs, caracul, lambskins	3,500	385
7. sesame seed	160	395
8. castor-oil plants	100	205
9. sausage-skins	100	800,000 pieces
10. other unspecified (such as gall-nuts, raw silk, wax, etc.)	530	
Total	27,000	
Consumer goods		
11. polished rice	11,500	41,885
12. dried fruits	5,500	18,030
13. almonds and nuts	1,400	670
14. oranges and lemons	800	3,280
15. morocco leather	3,000	490
16. livestock	400	
17. other unspecified (vegetables, milk products, eggs, spices, henna, etc.)	400	
Total	23,000	
Grand total	50,000	

Note 1. Weights in the above list are given as a guide, and the values are not binding on the Persian merchants in selling their goods.

Note 2. If after nine months of each year during which the above provisions are valid it appears that as a result of natural misfortunes, harvest failures, etc., it is impossible to export from Persia the quantity of any commodity shown in the above list, the Soviet trade delegation in Persia at the request of the Persian Ministry of Public Works shall substitute for the commodities of which it is impossible to export the above quantities, other commodities in the list. It is agreed that the substitution of one commodity for another may be made only within the same category of goods (raw materials or consumer goods) and if possible the substitute shall be of equal importance to the Soviet national economy.

Annex 2

List of goods of which the export is forbidden

1. Arms, munitions, and explosive substances, field-glasses, aircraft and parts of aircraft and military equipment according to lists drawn up by the Customs and Tariffs Commission in agreement with the People's Commissariat for Military and Naval Affairs and the United State Political Administration.

   Note. As an exception to this clause, articles enumerated in it may be exported by special permission, granted separately for each individual case, of the Customs and Tariff Commission in agreement with the People's Commissariat for Military and Naval Affairs and the United State Political Administration.

2. Cancelled securities.

3. Antiques and *objets d'art*, such as: various kinds of *objets d'art* and antiques, pictures, drawings, portraits executed by hand, sculptures, aquarelles, miniatures, tapestries, antique ikons and antique objects of church use, antique objects of domestic use, antique arms and furniture, carpets, cloths, and ornaments, antique apparel, manuscripts, and books, antique musical instruments, antique handicraft tools and various kinds of articles of archaeological importance.

   Note. The articles listed in this clause may be exported only by special permission of the People's Commissariat of Education of the Union Republic concerned.

4. Cotton.

   Note. Cotton waste for paper-making and oil-seed waste may be exported under regulations established by the Customs and Tariffs Commission.

5. Live pigeons, various.

6. Antelope horns.

7. Zedoary seeds and cloves.

Supplementary Note No. 1

Supplementing my note of today's date on commercial relations between the USSR and Persia, I have the honour to inform you that for the period during which the provisions of the present note are valid, in addition to the commodities enumerated in paragraphs 8 and 12, the free export from the Union to Persia, and the transit through Soviet territory is forbidden also for zedoary seeds and santonin.

Supplementary Note No. 2

I acknowledge the receipt of your note of today's date which runs as follows:

'Considering that a number of countries have forbidden the import of opium into their territory, and that according to international regulations the

trans-shipment of opium is permitted only in countries which do not prohibit the import of this product, the Persian Government, when any consignment of opium or its derivatives is dispatched in transit through the USSR, will notify the Soviet Government that it has given permission for the export of the said quantity of opium or its derivatives from Persia, and for the dispatch of this quantity to its country of destination.

'It is understood that the Soviet Government and its agents bear no responsibility if any country refuses to accept the opium or its derivatives dispatched from Persia and trans-shipped through the USSR.'

I have the honour to inform you that my Government agrees with the provisions of this note.

Supplementary Note No. 3

The Government of the USSR, anxious to promote and facilitate to the utmost trade relations between the Union and Persia, requests the Persian Government to take steps to reduce the tax on kerosene and petrol of Soviet origin to two shai per batman, from the ten shai now levied on these products under the law abolishing road tolls. Since the Persian Government, to compensate for the losses caused the Persian treasury by the reduction of this tax, considers it necessary to conclude a new customs convention, and since full agreement has already been reached between the two Governments on this question, the Soviet Government hopes that the two measures, i.e. the entry into force of the customs convention signed today[1] and the reduction of the tax on kerosene and petrol of Soviet origin, will be effected not later than the beginning of 1928. In this connexion the Soviet Government reserves the right to discontinue the privileges granted in virtue of the note on commercial relations, with the exception of the transit rights for exports from Persia across Soviet territory stipulated in the treaty of 26 February 1921, if the said taxes shall not be reduced by the beginning of 1928.

Supplementary Note No. 4

I acknowledge the receipt of your note of today's date, which runs as follows:

'The Persian Government, in agreement with the Government of the USSR, considers it undesirable that commercial transactions between Persia and the Union should be conducted by a limited number of intermediaries and in this connexion it will do everything it can to prevent abuses in the transfer from one person to another of the certificates issued by the Soviet customs authorities for the export of goods from the Soviet Union; in particular, the Persian Government will do everything it can to see that these certificates do not themselves serve as articles of trade and that no large part of them shall be collected into the possession of any one ill-disposed person.'

I have the honour to confirm that my Government is in agreement with everything set forth in the above note.

[The terms of the Persian reply correspond, *mutatis mutandis*, to the terms of the above notes.]

[1] *Sobranie Zakonov*, 1928, ii, p. 508 (French text).

Protocol to Paragraph 17

On exchanging notes concerning commercial relations between the USSR and Persia, the two parties, represented by the undersigned have agreed as follows:

Since there is no foreign trade monopoly in Persia, the sole functions of a Persian trade representation, should one be established in the Soviet Union, will be to provide information and to promote trade relations between the Soviet Union and Persia.

L. Karakhan

Moscow, 1 October 1927 — Ali-Goli Khan Ansari

[The text of the corresponding notes from Persia, reproduced in English from a manuscript source in *Soviet Treaty Series*, I, 1917–28, edited by Leonard Shapiro (Georgetown University Press, Washington, D.C., 1950) p. 344, gives in addition the following protocol relative to the transit of arms:

At the time of the Exchange of Notes relative to the commercial relations between USSR and Persia, the two Parties represented by the undersigned Plenipotentiaries agreed upon the following provisions:

With regard to the transit of arms, ammunition and materials of war, it is agreed that if one of the Parties desires to ship these articles in transit through the territory of the other Party, the latter shall give its most sympathetic consideration to such a request.]

EXCHANGE OF NOTES BETWEEN THE USSR AND PERSIA CONCERNING THE PORT OF PAHLEVI: NOTE FROM KARAKHAN, VICE-COMMISSAR FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS, TO THE PERSIAN FOREIGN MINISTER

1 *October* 1927 — *Sbornik Dogovorov*, iv, p. 95

1.

The Government of the USSR is convinced that after the transfer of the port of Pahlevi to the Persian Government, the latter will maintain in a good state of repair the existing protective installations and the existing port moorings (with the exception of the wharves at present leased to the Caspian Steamship Company) and the depth of the channel giving entrance to the port and of the approaches to the moorings, ensuring unhindered access for Soviet commercial sea-going vessels to the port and the approaches to the port moorings, and also maintain in good condition the territory of the port, light that territory, maintain in it the necessary guard and adequate fire-fighting equipment, as well as proper conditions in the fairway to ensure safe entry into and departure

from the port of all vessels, such as lighthouses, leading marks (small light signals on land indicating the direction of entry into the channel), buoys (floating marks anchored to the bed to indicate the channel), guide posts, and, finally, to ensure the safe entry of vessels into and their departure from the port by an adequate pilot service.

2.

Similarly the Soviet Government, considering it a mutual interest that the Caspian Sea shall be exclusively a Soviet-Persian sea, requests the Persian Government not to employ at the port for twenty-five years non-Persian citizens as employees, workers, or contractors. In this connexion the term Persian citizens shall not include nationals of third States who have taken Persian nationality.

3.

The Soviet Government notifies the Persian Government that all sections and wharves at Pahlevi which shall be used by the Caspian Steamship Company and other Soviet economic agencies, shall not enjoy any extra-territorial rights and shall be subject on an equal footing with the remaining territory of the port to all laws, administrative and customs regulations and orders, valid for Persian territory.

4.

As, according to Persian customs regulations, the placing of goods in warehouses which do not belong to the owners of these goods is forbidden, and as the goods to be transported by the steamship and transport companies do not belong to them, the Soviet Government requests the Persian Government as an exception from this regulation, to instruct its customs officers, after customs formalities have been carried out and customs dues paid, not to hinder the placing and safe keeping in the warehouses of the transport and steamship companies of the USSR of the goods to be transported by these companies.

5.

The Soviet Government grants to the Persian Government as its property the wireless station in the port of Pahlevi and also the building situated in the port territory in which the body managing this station is housed. However, in view of the expenses incurred and the necessity of this station for navigation purposes, the Soviet Government requests the Persian Government to agree to place this station and the aforementioned building at the disposal of the Caspian Steamship Company for three years without payment. If in the course of those three years no Persian

wireless station has been opened in Pahlevi or its neighbourhood, such use shall continue for a further two years free of charge and after that the station and the building shall pass to the Persian Government.

6.

The Soviet Government expresses the hope that the Persian Government will agree to lease to the Soviet Government for a term of three years from the day when the lease to be simultaneously concluded between the Persian Government and the Caspian Steamship Company enters into force, the building on the section marked no. 9 on the map of the port of Pahlevi attached to the lease, together with the electricity station which it houses, in order that the said electricity station may continue, at the standard maintained up to the present, to provide light free of charge for the territory of the port and the port buildings.

On its part the Soviet Government undertakes in the course of the said three years to construct a new and more powerful electricity station to provide light for the territory and buildings of the port.

At the end of the three years the present electricity station will be transferred to the Persian Government in accordance with article 12 of the said lease between the Persian Government and the Caspian Steamship Company.

The electricity station to be newly erected will be transferred to the Persian Government on the expiration of the general lease.

7.

The Soviet Government expresses the hope that the Caspian Steamship Company will in the future, as at present, enjoy the right to have at its disposal for permanent service in the port a number of vessels (barges, tugs, and other auxiliary means) not exceeding four, for its operations.

Should it be necessary for the steamship service to have more than four vessels at the port for conducting the permanent service, such addition can be made only with the consent of the port administration.

It is understood that the vessels here referred to shall carry no armaments.

8.

The Soviet Government, anxious to give assistance to the Persian Government, expresses its readiness to conclude a special agreement with the Persian Government for carrying out dredging work in the port of Pahlevi. Similarly, should the Persian Government wish to purchase a dredger, the Soviet Government will assist it in this matter.

9.

In concluding this note, the Soviet Government brings to the attention of the Persian Government that when handing over the port of Pahlevi a protocol of transfer will be signed by both parties in duplicate.

SPEECH BY CHICHERIN ON SIGNING THE AGREEMENTS WITH PERSIA

1 *October* 1927 *Izvestia*, 2 *October* 1927

It has given us great satisfaction to proceed with you, sir, to the signing of agreements which should finally strengthen the friendly relations between our peoples, since it was you who first crossed the barrier which divided our two countries in 1920, in order to put an end to the covert state of hostilities between us, and signed here, at this very table, the treaty of 1921 which we have now carried further and perfected. During the years that followed you worked unceasingly for the development and strengthening of relations between us; it was in the course of our many conversations that there first arose the idea of the conclusion by our Governments of a treaty such as the one we have now brought into being; the complicated questions which have faced us in the process of developing commercial relations have always been discussed by us in all their details, thus making possible the results which are now incorporated in our agreements. After your departure Minister of the Court Ali-Mirza-Teimurtash-khan, members of the Commissariat of Trade and myself worked out in daily and sometimes nightly sessions the texts of the diplomatic documents which, in their final form, have been signed today. However, there still remained serious problems which were difficult to settle, there were still important points of difference between us, and you once more appeared among us, this time as Minister for Foreign Affairs, showing the importance which Persia attached to agreement with us. The disputed questions were settled, the negotiations were completed, and today we stand before the accomplished fact. Our long labours are crowned with success. At the present moment when world imperialism is marshalling all its forces in all countries in order to create a united front against us, the signing of these agreements becomes a political act of weighty significance which will create a deep impression everywhere. The interests of security for both our countries, the interests of their unhampered development, and in particular their economic development, which requires close economic links between us, these interests have found expression in today's agreements and will of necessity impart to the latter inner strength, stability, and durability. Today, sir, we have accomplished a historic deed which will last for long. I have unreserved faith in its beneficent consequences for the future

development of our countries and the close union of our peoples. I therefore especially compliment you on the signature of today's agreements, I thank you for your valuable co-operation, and I beg you to convey to your Government my greetings and my hopes for the beneficent and lasting effects of the agreements signed today.[1]

NOTE FROM CHICHERIN TO THE FRENCH AMBASSADOR IN MOSCOW ON THE POSITION OF RAKOVSKY AS SOVIET AMBASSADOR TO FRANCE

4 *October* 1927 — Kluchnikov & Sabanin, iii, 1, p. 405

The Vice-Commissar M. Litvinov has placed before the Soviet Government the contents of the verbal statement[2] you made to him on behalf of your Government on 1 October, concerning the French Government's request for the recall of M. Rakovsky from his post as plenipotentiary envoy. In the opinion of the Soviet Government your statement refers to a question of the utmost importance in the relations between the two countries. The Soviet Government is so reluctant to agree to M. Rakovsky's recall, which it regards as inexplicable in view of the success already achieved, thanks to M. Rakovsky, in the matter of reaching agreement about debts, and as endangering the negotiations between the two Governments concerning both debts and credits, and other important questions, of which the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs has frequently informed you, that it hesitates to take any decision until it is in possession of a precise formulation of the request put forward by the French Government for the recall of M. Rakovsky, and of the reasons dictating this request.

I therefore have the honour to request you . . . to send on behalf of your Government a written statement of the decision of the French Council of Ministers and of the reasons for that decision. On receiving that written statement I shall not fail to place the decision of your Government before the Presidium of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR.

TASS STATEMENT ON THE CAMPAIGN FOR THE RECALL OF RAKOVSKY

5 *October* 1927 — *Izvestia*, 5 *October* 1927

The French press has published a communiqué from the Moscow correspondent of the United Press to the effect that Comrade Chicherin had notified the readiness of the USSR to recall Rakovsky. The People's

[1] For the other agreements between the USSR and Persia signed on 1 October 1927 see *League of Nations Treaty Series*, cxii, pp. 275, 297.

[2] cf. *The Times*, 3 October 1927.

Commissariat for Foreign Affairs has empowered Tass to state that the United Press correspondent's communiqué concerning Rakovsky is not in accordance with the facts. Neither Comrade Chicherin nor any other official person has given an interview or made any statement about Rakovsky during the past few days, whether to the United Press correspondent or to any other press representative. On the contrary, the Agency knows that the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs was and continues to be opposed to the recall of Rakovsky, as it has continually told M. Herbette, for it sees no justification for it and considers that Rakovsky's recall could only have the most unfortunate effect on the negotiations between the two Governments.

NOTE FROM CHICHERIN TO THE FRENCH AMBASSADOR IN MOSCOW CONCERNING RAKOVSKY'S RECALL

12 *October* 1927 Kluchnikov & Sabanin, iii, 1, p. 407

The People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs has brought your note[1] of 7 October to the attention of the Soviet Government, and, in accordance with its decision, I have the honour to inform you of the following:

1. The Soviet Government does not deny the right of the French Government to request the recall of representatives of foreign States, but it is of the opinion that such a request, particularly when it refers to an ambassador who, in the course of two years, has successfully conducted, in the interests of both States, negotiations of the highest importance, and with results of an extremely substantial nature, should be grounded on serious considerations. The Soviet Government is obliged however to state that it cannot agree with the arguments set forth in your note.

2. The incident cited in your note of M. Rakovsky's signature in Moscow, in the course of an internal party discussion, of the declaration of 9 August, was the subject of an exchange of verbal notes and of a conversation between us, as a result of which you . . . stated to me on 4 September that your Government was satisfied with the explanation it had received from me and that the incident could be regarded as closed. This was the more natural and understandable since M. Rakovsky made a public declaration in the same terms as my explanation, displaying complete unanimity between him and myself in condemning the motives and intentions incorrectly ascribed to him, and which both he and I regard as inconsistent with the functions of an ambassador. If the French Government, according to your statement . . . considered

[1] Kluchnikov & Sabanin, iii, 1, p. 405.

itself satisfied with the explanation received, it is impossible to understand why it now returns again to this question and demands satisfaction once more.

3. Clearly, the French Government itself is aware of the baselessness and inadequacy of the reasons given above for the recall of the Union's ambassador, if it now thinks it necessary to reprove M. Rakovsky for the publication of a letter to M. de Monzie. In regard to the incident in question, may I first of all remind you . . . and your Government that in these last few weeks and months a considerable part of the French press, using information which it could have obtained only from official French sources, and distorting and incorrectly repeating this information, has spread rumours that the negotiations conducted between the Soviet and French delegations concerning compensation for French holders of Russian pre-war bonds were completely fruitless and unsuccessful. These rumours, designed to discredit the conduct of our delegates to the Franco-Soviet negotiations and the serious intention of the Union Government to settle questions in dispute and improve relations with France, could not be ignored by the Union Government. This circumstance compelled M. Rakovsky to publish his account of the agreements reached and of the questions still in dispute. If to this is added that M. Rakovsky published his account with the knowledge of the chairman of the French delegation, M. de Monzie, the baselessness of rebuking M. Rakovsky for disloyal and incorrect behaviour becomes quite clear.

4. In the course of dealing in greater detail with these considerations in conversation with yourself . . . both I and M. Litvinov indicated that the recall of M. Rakovsky, to whose efforts and energy the results achieved at the Franco-Soviet conference are to a large extent due, is bound to bring moral loss to the conference, and, objectively, cannot fail to have an unfavourable effect on its further labours; consequently the Union Government refuses to assume any responsibility whatever, even in the remotest degree, either for the recall of M. Rakovsky or for the possible consequences of that recall. Taking into consideration the fact that the steps you have taken for the recall of M. Rakovsky preceded and coincided with a wholly unparalleled campaign against M. Rakovsky, and with intolerable insults against him on the part of certain organs of the French press, which could only have got their information from official sources, then it is wholly unfitting to talk of the courteous form which it is desired to give to the request for his recall.

5. If the reasons for the recall of M. Rakovsky given in your note and examined above, which are obviously unfounded, are set aside, there remains only the fact itself of the French Government's formal request for M. Rakovsky's recall. The Union Government does not dispute the

French Government's right to request a foreign Government to replace one ambassador by another. It is bound to give attention to such a request from the French Government, despite the baselessness of the reasons given to the Union Government. The Union Government therefore finds itself compelled to release M. Rakovsky from his duties as ambassador to France and to appoint a successor to the post, to which it hereby solicits the consent of the French Government.

EXTRACTS FROM RYKOV'S REPORT TO THE CENTRAL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE

15 *October* 1927 *Protokoly*, p. 20

In the course of the past ten years the international situation of the Soviet Union has changed sharply and has passed through a number of stages. In the period immediately after the October revolution the Soviet Republic was attacked by the German imperialists who, having occupied part of the Ukraine, forced us to accept the humiliating provisions of the Brest treaty, the treaty which Vladimir Ilyich called disgusting. That gave us a breathing space of about a year. After that there began a more prolonged period of hostilities with the capitalist States of the Entente, with whose help the armies of Kolchak, Denikin, Yudenich, and Wrangel were created. In this struggle our workers and peasants defeated the imperialist and White Guard troops, forcing them to withdraw from the territory of our Union.

The civil war having ended, a longer breathing space began, during which our representatives met the representatives of capitalist States at Genoa and The Hague. During that period we tried, by making concessions, to prolong the breathing space, to secure as far as possible conditions for the peaceful existence of our State in a hostile environment. At Genoa and at The Hague our proposals were rejected by the representatives of the chief capitalist States.

Now we have already behind us some years of peaceful relations. Normal friendly relations have been established with a great many States; with some we have started negotiations to settle questions in dispute and regulate the debt problem. I am sure this session of the TsIK will agree with the Government's opinion that now, thanks to internal consolidation and the USSR's stronger international position, there is no longer any point in going as far as the terms which we offered at Genoa and The Hague. Then we were ten times weaker than we are now, on the tenth anniversary of the October revolution. At that time, because we were so weak, we agreed to pay large sums. We are willing to buy ourselves out now, but the purchase price has already fallen

much lower than it was at the time we first met the representatives of the capitalist world at Genoa and The Hague.

This also defines our attitude to the negotiations with France and a number of other countries. We start from the assumption that the development of normal economic relations between the USSR and the capitalist world is necessary not only for us, but also for capitalist countries.

Our foreign trade turnover has steadily risen in the last few years . . . but it has still lagged behind the development of the national economy as a whole; it should, however, grow considerably in the next few years. The further expansion of economic relations is one of the most important factors in securing peace.

Our entire foreign policy is directed to prolonging to the utmost this peaceful breathing space. Recently, as you know, a rather serious blow was struck at this. After a few years of peaceful construction the USSR was again threatened by war. The rupture of Anglo-Soviet relations and a number of other signs bear witness to the attempt to organize a hostile bloc, to prepare a new attack on the Soviet Union.

We shall in the future as in the past ten years oppose this policy with a policy of peace and of agreements, but without any concessions of principle in regard to the gains made by the October revolution.

EXTRACTS FROM AN INTERVIEW BETWEEN STALIN AND A DELEGATION OF FOREIGN WORKERS ON THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS AND RUSSIAN DEBTS

5 *November* 1927 Stalin, x, p. 206[1]

The reasons why the Soviet Union does not take part in the League of Nations have been given frequently in our press. May I refer to some of them. The Soviet Union is not a member of the League of Nations and takes no part in it primarily because it does not want to assume responsibility for the imperialist policy of the League of Nations, for the 'mandates' which the League of Nations issues for the exploitation and oppression of colonial countries. The Soviet Union does not take part in the League of Nations because it is against imperialism, against the oppression of the colonies and dependent countries.

Secondly, the Soviet Union does not take part in the League of Nations because it does not want to assume responsibility for the warlike preparations, the growth of armaments, the new military alliances etc., which are defended and consecrated by the League of Nations and

[1] In addition to the changes noted, a number of minor changes have been made in this text, as compared with earlier editions.

which are bound to lead to new imperialist wars. The Soviet Union does not take part in the League of Nations because it is wholly and completely opposed to imperialist wars.

Finally, the Soviet Union does not take part in the League of Nations because it does not want to be a constituent part of that screen for imperialist intrigues which it represents and which it hides behind the unctuous speeches of its members.

⟨In present conditions the League of Nations is⟩[1] a 'house of assignation' for the imperialist business managers, arranging their business behind the scenes. What is said officially in the League of Nations is empty chatter designed to deceive the people. What the imperialist managers do unofficially behind the scenes of the League of Nations is the real business of the imperialists, pharisaically covered over by the eloquent orators of the League of Nations. What is there surprising in the Soviet Union not wanting to be a member and participant in this anti-popular comedy . . .?

Our proposals concerning pre-war debts were published in Rakovsky's well-known interview. I think they should be known to you. They are based on the simultaneous receipt of credits by the USSR. In this we are abiding by the well-known principle– you give, I give. You give credits, and you will get from us something on the pre-war debts; if you don't give, you won't get.

Does this mean that in principle we recognize the pre-war debts? No, it does not. It only means that, while the decree annulling Tsarist debts remains in force, we are ready, as a practical agreement, to pay something of the pre-war debts if we are given in exchange the credits we need and which will benefit French industry. We regard payment on the debts as an additional interest on the credits we receive to develop our industry.

They speak of the war debts of Tsarist Russia, of various claims on the USSR connected with the results of the October Revolution. But they forget that our revolution is in principle a repudiation of imperialist wars and of the Tsarist debts connected with them. They forget that the USSR cannot and will not pay on the war debts. They also forget that the USSR cannot leave out of account the pillage and violence to which the country was subjected for several years at the time ⟨of the military intervention⟩ of foreign States, and on which the well-known Soviet counter-claims are based.

[1] In earlier editions: The League of Nations is.
[2] In earlier editions: of the intervention.

EXTRACTS FROM AN ARTICLE BY STALIN ON THE INTERNATIONAL CHARACTER OF THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION

6 *November* 1927

Leninism (1940), p. 198
Stalin, x, p. 240

A number of fundamental questions could be noted on which the October Revolution influences the development of the revolutionary movement throughout the world.

1. The October Revolution is remarkable primarily for having caused a breach in the front of world imperialism, for having overthrown the imperialist bourgeoisie in one of the biggest capitalist countries and put the Socialist proletariat in power.

The class of wage workers, the class of the persecuted, the class of the oppressed and exploited has *for the first time* in the history of mankind risen to the position of the *ruling* class, setting a contagious example to the proletarians of all countries.

This means that the October Revolution *has ushered in* a new era, the era of *proletarian* revolutions in the countries of *imperialism* . . .

Such generally known facts as the progressive growth of Communism in the capitalist countries, the growing sympathy of the proletarians of all countries for the working class of the USSR, and, finally, the many workers' delegations that come to the land of the Soviets, prove beyond a doubt that the seeds sown by the October Revolution are already beginning to bear fruit.

2. The October Revolution has shaken imperialism not only in the centres of its domination, not only in the 'mother countries'. It has also struck blows at the rear of imperialism, its periphery, having undermined the rule of imperialism in the colonial and dependent countries . . .

This means that the October Revolution has *ushered in* a new era, the era of colonial revolutions which are being conducted *in the oppressed countries* of the world *in alliance* with the proletariat and *under the leadership* of the proletariat . . .

The era of revolutions for emancipation in the colonies and dependent countries, the era of the awakening of the *proletariat* in these countries, the era of its *hegemony* in the revolution, *has begun.*

3. Having sown the seeds of revolution both in the centres of imperialism as well as in its rear, having weakened the might of imperialism in the 'mother countries' and having shaken its domination in the colonies, the October Revolution has thereby jeopardized the very existence of world capitalism *as a whole.*

While the spontaneous development of capitalism in the conditions of imperialism has passed—owing to its unevenness, owing to the inevit-

ability of conflicts and armed clashes, owing, finally, to the unprecedented imperialist slaughter—into the process of the decay and the dying of capitalism, the October Revolution and the resultant secession of a vast country from the world system of capitalism could not but accelerate this process, washing away, bit by bit, the very foundations of world imperialism.

More than that. While shaking imperialism, the October Revolution has at the same time created—in the first proletarian dictatorship—a powerful and open *base* for the world revolutionary movement, a base such as the world revolutionary movement *never possessed* before and on which it now can rely. It has created a powerful and open *centre* of the world revolutionary movement, such as the world revolutionary movement *never possessed* before and around which it now can rally and organize a *united revolutionary front of the proletarians and of the oppressed nations of all countries against imperialism.*

This means, firstly, that the October Revolution inflicted a mortal wound on world capitalism from which the latter will never recover. It is precisely for this reason that capitalism will never recover the 'equilibrium' and 'stability' that it possessed before October. . . .

The era of the 'stability' of capitalism *has passed away*, taking with it the legend of the indestructibility of the bourgeois order.

The era of the collapse of capitalism *has begun.*

4. The October Revolution is not only a revolution in the domain of economic and social-political relations. It is at the same time a revolution in the minds, a revolution in the ideology, of the working class. The October Revolution was born and gained strength under the banner of Marxism, under the banner of the idea of the dictatorship of the proletariat, under the banner of Leninism, which is Marxism of the era of imperialism and of proletarian revolutions. That is why it marks the victory of Marxism over reformism, the victory of Leninism over Social-Democratism, the victory of the Third International over the Second International.

The October Revolution has cut an impassable furrow between Marxism and Social-Democratism, between the policy of Leninism and the policy of Social-Democratism . . .

But matters did not end there. The October Revolution went further than drawing a line of demarcation between Social-Democracy and Marxism; it cast Social-Democracy into the camp of the downright defenders of capitalism *against* the first proletarian dictatorship in the world. When Messrs Adler and Bauer, Wels and Levy, Longuet and Blum abuse the 'Soviet regime' and extol parliamentary 'democracy', these gentlemen mean that they are fighting and will continue to fight *for* the restoration of the capitalist order in the USSR, *for* the

preservation of capitalist slavery in the 'civilized' states. Present-day Social-Democratism is an *ideological prop* of capitalism. Lenin was a thousand times right when he said that the present Social-Democratic politicians are 'real agents of the bourgeoisie in the labour movement, the labour lieutenants of the capitalist class', that in the 'civil war between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie', they would inevitably range themselves 'on the side of ⟨Versailles⟩[1] against the Communards'. *It is impossible to put an end to capitalism without putting an end to Social-Democratism in the labour movement.* That is why the era of dying capitalism is also the era of dying Social-Democratism in the labour movement. The great significance of the October Revolution lies also in the fact that it marks the inevitable victory of Leninism over Social-Democratism in the world labour movement.

The era of the domination of the Second International and of Social-Democratism in the labour movement *has come to an end.*

The era of the domination of Leninism and of the Third International *has begun.*

PRESS STATEMENT BY LITVINOV BEFORE HIS DEPARTURE FOR GENEVA

22 *November* 1927 *Vneshnyaya Politika*, p. 104

1. The decision of the Union Government to send a delegation to the fourth session of the preparatory disarmament commission has given rise abroad to all sorts of rumours and unfounded assumptions about the position which the Union delegation propose to take up at Geneva. Some maintain that the Union Government is sending a delegation to Geneva for the sole purpose of conducting propaganda and agitation, others that the sending of a delegation to Geneva means a change in the attitude of the USSR both to disarmament and to the League of Nations. I should therefore like to define briefly the attitude of the USSR to disarmament and thus put an end to the dissemination by the bourgeois press of unfounded assertions and tendentious rumours.

2. The Government of the Soviet Union has never concealed its disbelief in the willingness and ability of capitalist countries to abolish the system of wars among nations, and consequently to achieve disarmament.

3. This disbelief is sufficiently warranted by the entire history of international relations since the world war of 1914–18, to which pacifists and pseudo-pacifists tried to attach the label 'the last war', by the steady and systematic growth of the armed forces of the capitalist States, by the

[1] the Versaillese

doubling and trebling of military budgets in comparison with 1913, and by the progressive increase in the general burden of militarism.

4. Further justification of this disbelief is provided by the seven years' fruitless activity concerning disarmament of the League of Nations, which is supposed to make the securing of universal peace and the achievement of disarmament its principal aim. It is enough to recall that the League of Nations only reached the question of disarmament in 1924, that is, in the fifth year of its existence, and then the convening of the conference was postponed until 1925. So far the cause of disarmament has not merely made no progress, but even the date for convening the conference cannot yet be determined. Similarly, the question of naval disarmament, which was specially singled out, still remains unsettled, while the question of the reduction of military budgets, with which the League has been 'busy' since 1920, has also been indefinitely postponed. Instead of the real and perceptible disarmament which the popular masses of all countries demand, we have so far as a result of the League of Nations' work only meaningless declarations and a heap of resolutions and proposals, intended to serve the purposes of one or another international political group.

5. Nevertheless, despite the opposition of capitalist countries, the Soviet Government in the ten years of its existence has made every effort to make some progress in the field of general disarmament, or at least of the partial though real reduction of armaments, which weigh so heavily on the shoulders of the working masses. It is enough to recall the first decree[1] of the Soviet Government on peace, passed on 8 November 1917, the proposal[2] of the Soviet delegation to the 1922 Genoa conference to include the question of general disarmament on the agenda, and finally the calling by the Soviet Government in the same year of the conference in Moscow attended by the western neighbours of the USSR, at which, as chairman of the delegation, I put forward a practical and reasoned plan for the proportional reduction of armed forces, a plan rejected by all the others taking part in the conference.[3]

6. Having in 1925 received an invitation from the League of Nations to take part in a disarmament conference it was preparing, the Soviet Government accepted in principle, declaring in its note[4] of 16 January 1926 that it 'welcomes every step and every movement towards disarmament, is genuinely anxious to be represented at the disarmament conference and on the preparatory commission'. The League of Nations however deprived the USSR of the possibility of really taking part in the three sessions of the preparatory commission which have been held

[1] *Soviet Documents*, i, p. 1. [2] ibid., p. 300. [3] ibid., p. 352.
[4] *League of Nations Official Journal*, 1926, p. 635.

by choosing Switzerland as the place for their meetings, where, for known reasons, the Union could not at that time send its delegates. Now, as a result of the removal of these reasons, that is, as a result of the settlement of the dispute with Switzerland, the Union Government, in conformity with the decision I referred to, is sending a delegation to take part in the forthcoming fourth session of the preparatory commission and in the disarmament conference itself, if it should ever be convened. By this decision the USSR is depriving its enemies of the possibility of attributing to it, even in the smallest degree, the possible failure of the conference, and its neighbours of an excuse for their refusal to disarm on the ground that the USSR was absent from the conference.

7. The Soviet State, by its very nature free of any kind of imperialist aspirations or annexationist territorial appetites, is consistently pursuing a policy of peace. In a truly pacific spirit it proposed and still proposes to all its neighbours the conclusion of non-aggression pacts. Proceeding from a pacific policy, the Soviet Union continues to insist on the necessity for complete and universal disarmament. If the capitalist countries think the realization of the plan for complete disarmament at one stroke or over a short period inacceptable, the Soviet delegation agree to the gradual carrying out of the plan by stages to be laid down at the conference.

8. The Soviet delegation are going to Geneva with their own independent programme. They will regard as their allies at Geneva those delegates who either adhere to this programme or put forward proposals tending in the same direction. They will regard as one of their most important duties that of fixing the attention of the commission, and later of the conference, on the necessity of creating really firm and most effective guarantees of peace, and will fight against any attempt to divert attention to third-rate questions and fruitless resolutions, or to turn the commission or the conference into an instrument of the policy of one or another State or group of States.

PROTOCOL ON THE LINKING OF AIR LINES BETWEEN THE USSR AND PERSIA

23 *November* 1927 — *Sbornik Dogovorov*, iv, p. 233

In execution of the provisions of article three of the Postal Convention[1] of 25 April 1923 between the Governments of the USSR and Persia, the Government of the USSR, represented by its plenipotentiary envoy extraordinary, Yakov Khristoforovich Davtian, on the one side, and the Government of Persia represented by its Vice-Minister for Foreign

[1] *League of Nations Treaty Series*, cx, p. 323.

Affairs, M. Mirza Fathulla Khan Pakrevan, and the Vice-Minister for Posts and Telegraphs, M. Mirza Kasym Khan Sur-e-Israfid, on the other side, have signed the following protocol:

Article I

The Government of the USSR on the one side, and the Government of Persia on the other, with a view to developing commercial, passenger, and postal communications between the USSR and Persia, and international postal exchange, agree to link up the Soviet and Persian airlines between Pahlevi and Baku.

Article II

For this purpose the Persian Government will permit aircraft of the Ukrvozdukhput to make regular flights from Baku to Pahlevi and back, and similarly the Government of the USSR will allow regular flights on the same line, i.e. from Pahlevi to Baku and back, by aircraft of the company, which is the Junkers Company, running postal and passenger air services in Persia, and will put this into effect by a special treaty with the Persian Government.

Article III

Both Governments agree to afford the said companies every kind of assistance in legal matters, facilitating the formalities connected with customs and visas, granting successive monthly visas to the pilots and mechanics, and exempting the aircraft and their parts from customs duties.

Article IV

The aircraft and their crews shall be subject to the laws and regulations of the State in which they find themselves, or over whose territory they are flying. In this connexion aircraft of Ukrvozdukhput in Persia shall be placed on an equal footing with Junkers aircraft in the USSR.

Article V

The two Governments shall reciprocally place aerodromes at the disposal of the aircraft of the said companies according to their choice. Soviet aircraft in Pahlevi shall have placed at their disposal the same aerodromes as the Junkers aircraft.

Article VI

A special agreement is to be concluded between the said aviation companies on the apportioning of the post, cargoes, and passengers, on charges, through tickets, and so on.

Article VII

A special agreement is to be concluded between the postal authorities on air postal exchange in accordance with the postal convention and international usage.

Article VIII

The present protocol is drawn up and signed in the Russian and Persian languages and each signatory of the protocol shall receive one copy. The protocol enters into force from the day of its signature.

Done in Teheran, 23 November 1927.

NOTE FROM THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR IN WARSAW, BOGOMOLOV, TO THE POLISH FOREIGN MINISTER, ON THE POLISH-LITHUANIAN DISPUTE

24 *November* 1927 *Izvestia*, 27 *November* 1927

On the instructions of my Government I have the honour to inform you of the following:

The Government of the USSR is disturbed by the tense situation which has recently been created between Poland and Lithuania and which is a threat to peace. The Union Government is bound to view with alarm the development of a conflict pregnant with the gravest complications and which may lead to new bloodshed and new sufferings for millions of working people throughout Europe.

Without entering into an examination of those questions which form the subject of the dispute between Poland and Lithuania, the Union Government thinks it necessary to point out that the maintenance of peace depends to a much larger degree on Poland than on Lithuania, since the latter, because of its resources, cannot be interested in seeking a settlement of its claims by means of an armed conflict with Poland. The Government of the USSR has not failed, on its part, to direct the attention of the Lithuanian Government in the same friendly fashion to the necessity of avoiding any steps which may aggravate an already tense situation. However great the divergence between the claims of Poland and Lithuania, the Union Government is deeply convinced that the settlement of all disputes between these States can be obtained through exclusively peaceful means. But the conflict between the two States is growing more and more acute, and reports about the possibility of armed clashes more and more frequently disquiet public opinion in all countries.

In particular public opinion in the Soviet Union is especially disturbed by the fact that reports have appeared in the responsible Polish

press, and have not been authoritatively contradicted, that the Polish Government had decided on a 'radical cutting of the knot of Polish-Lithuanian relations'.

Without entering upon an estimate of all the disturbing reports reinforcing these fears, the Government of the USSR, being the nearest neighbour of Poland and Lithuania, and vitally interested in the maintenance of peace in eastern Europe, is compelled with the utmost gravity to direct the attention of the Polish Government to the immeasurable dangers of an eventual attack by Poland on the independence of Lithuania in whatever form, and expresses the conviction that the Polish Government, which only recently in such solemn form declared its desire for peace, will in fact be able to remove the threatening danger of war.

The Union Government hopes that the Polish Government will interpret this démarche as dictated exclusively by the anxiety of the USSR to maintain peace in general, and particularly to promote the development of peaceful and friendly relations with Poland.

AGREEMENT WITH AFGHANISTAN ON THE KABUL–TASHKENT AIR LINE

28 *November* 1927 *Sobranie Zakonov*, 1928, ii, p. 669

On 28 November 1927, in Kabul, the Government of the USSR, represented by the plenipotentiary representative of the USSR in Afghanistan M. Leonid Nikolaevich Stark, on the one hand, and the Government of the Sovereign State of Afghanistan, represented by the Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Sovereign State of Afghanistan, M. Guliam Sadik Khan, on the other, concluded the following agreement, having as its object the establishment of a regular post and passenger air service between Kabul and Tashkent.

1.

The Government of the USSR and the Government of Afghanistan will each place two of their aircraft, with the necessary air crews, at the disposal of the Kabul–Tashkent air-line. The flights from Tashkent to Kabul and back are to be made on schedule twice a month, and additional flights whenever necessary.

2.

The Government of Afghanistan accepts responsibility for the construction for the line on Afghan territory of landing fields, aerodromes, and other necessary installations, and for their maintenance in good repair.

3.

The Government of the USSR accepts responsibility for the construction on the territory of the USSR of the landing fields, aerodromes, and other installations required for the line, and for their maintenance in good repair.

4.

The Government of the USSR agrees to place at the disposal of the management of the Afghan air service the spare parts, fuels, and lubricants required for the Kabul–Tashkent line at the prices in force for the Soviet air lines.

5.

The upkeep of the personnel to serve the said air-line assigned by the Soviet Union is the responsibility of the Government of the USSR. Similarly, responsibility for the upkeep of the personnel assigned by Afghanistan rests with the Government of Afghanistan. The Government of the Sovereign State of Afghanistan and the Government of the USSR will inform each other in advance of the names of their pilots and mechanics who will serve on this line.

6.

Both sides undertake to have at all aerodromes and landing fields of the line adequate supplies of fuel and lubricants and also the necessary materials and spare parts for supplying the aircraft of both sides serving this line. Each side undertakes to fix in good time and to inform the other side of the prices to be paid on its territory for these goods by the other side.

7.

The accounts for fuel and lubricants and also for other materials and spare parts taken and used by the aircraft of either side on the territory of the other side, and also for other expenditure connected with the air-line, will be settled in January of each year for the past year between the plenipotentiary representative of the USSR in Kabul and the Afghan Foreign Ministry.

8.

Should the aircraft of one of the contracting parties be damaged on the territory of the other party, the aircraft is to be repaired by that party on whose territory the damage occurred, at the cost of the party to whom the aircraft belongs; the aircraft is to be conveyed to the repair shops of the party on whose territory the damage occurred, and, if it should be possible to repair the aircraft and the party to whom it

belongs agrees to the cost, the aircraft is to be repaired and flown to the territory of its owner. Should repair be impossible, the aircraft is to be conveyed by the party on whose territory the damage occurred up to the frontier of the party to which the said aircraft belongs.

9.

Both sides undertake to give all possible assistance on their territory to the aircrews of the other party, particularly in the event of forced landings.

10.

The two parties agree to draw up the necessary customs regulations.

11.

The charges for carrying passengers and post between Kabul, Termez, and Tashkent are to be laid down in a special agreement, according to clause 14, and are to enter into force not later than 1 January 1928.

12.

Expenditure on the upkeep and servicing of the line (the construction and maintenance of ground equipment, fuel and lubricants, spare parts and materials, the upkeep and repair of aircraft and flying personnel) undertaken by each side shall be borne by that side. Similarly, the income received by each side from the use of the aircraft they put into service on the line is to be at the disposal of the respective party.

13.

Payment for passengers and post is to be collected as follows: for flights from Tashkent and Termez to Kabul by Soviet aircraft, by the Central Asiatic department of 'Dobrolet' in Tashkent and Termez; by Afghan aircraft, by the consulate-general of Afghanistan in Tashkent; for flights from Kabul to Tashkent and Termez, by the Soviet plenipotentiary representative and the offices of the Afghan air force respectively in Kabul.

14.

Technical questions arising in connexion with the execution of the present agreement (the drawing up of schedules and changes therein, the equipping and provisioning of the line, the decision on landing stops, the fixing of charges, etc.) are to be regulated and established by means of direct arrangements between 'Dobrolet' and the administration of the Afghan air force.

15.

The present agreement enters into force from the moment of its signature. Flights are to begin not later than 1 January 1928.

16.

The present agreement is to remain in force until 1 January 1929.

17.

The present agreement has been drawn up in two copies, in the Russian and Persian languages, and both texts are authentic.

TASS STATEMENT ON BALDWIN'S STATEMENT IN PARLIAMENT ON ANGLO-SOVIET RELATIONS

2 *December* 1927 *Izvestia*, 2 *December* 1927

Tass reports that on 29 November the English Prime Minister, Baldwin, replied in the negative to the question put to him in the House of Commons by the Labour Member, Wedgwood, whether 'his speech adumbrating a renewal of relations with Russia has yet received any response from the Russian Government'.

It is pointed out in Moscow political circles that Baldwin's reply might give ground for the assumption that English governing circles and the English public were unaware of the contents of Comrade Rykov's speech at the Tenth Congress of the Communist Party of the Ukraine at Kharkov (published in the Soviet press on 25 November), in which, replying to Baldwin's Guildhall speech of 9 November, he declared that the Soviet Government holds the English Government solely responsible for the rupture of Anglo-Soviet relations, but that the Soviet Government does not refuse to resume diplomatic and commercial relations on the reciprocal condition advanced by Baldwin of non-intervention in each other's affairs according to the formula: 'Baldwin will not interfere in our affairs and Rykov will not interfere in British affairs'.

It has however been established that Comrade Rykov's speech was certainly known to the British public. Comrade Rykov's statement was published on 26 November (i.e. three days before the meeting of Parliament in question) in the leading British newspapers, for example *The Times*, the *Daily Telegraph*, and the *Manchester Guardian*. (The *Daily Telegraph*, moreover, headed its report of Rykov's speech 'Russian Reply to Prime Minister'.) Moscow political circles think therefore that Comrade Rykov's statements, widely disseminated in the English press, as can clearly be seen from Wedgwood's question, cannot be unknown to the English Prime Minister.

EXTRACTS FROM STALIN'S REPORT TO THE FIFTEENTH CONGRESS OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE SOVIET UNION

3 *December* 1927 Stalin, x, p. 283[1]

It is clear that the revolutionary awakening of the ⟨colonial and dependent countries⟩[2] presages the end of world imperialism. The fact that the Chinese revolution has not yet led to an outright victory over imperialism cannot have decisive significance in the light of the prospects of the revolution. Great popular revolutions in general do not attain final victory in the first round. They grow and become stronger in a series of ebbs and flows. That is how it has been everywhere, including Russia. That is how it will be in China.

The most important result of the Chinese revolution is the fact that it has aroused from age-old sleep hundreds of millions of the exploited and oppressed and brought them into movement, has at last exposed the counter-revolutionary nature of the generals' clique, has torn the mask from the servants of the counter-revolution in the Kuomintang, has increased the authority of the Communist Party among the popular masses, has raised the movement as a whole ⟨to a higher level⟩,[3] and aroused new hopes among millions of people in the oppressed classes of India, Indonesia, and so on. Only the blind and the faint-hearted can doubt that the Chinese workers and peasants are moving forward to a new revolutionary surge.

As to the revolutionary movement of the European working class, here too, in this sphere too, we have clear signs of a leftward movement of the lower-grade workers and of a revolutionary revival. Such facts as the general strike and the miners' strike in England, the revolutionary offensive of the Vienna workers, the revolutionary demonstrations in France and Germany in connexion with the murder of Sacco and Vanzetti, the electoral successes of the German and Polish Communist Parties, the clear differentiation in the labour movement in England, in accordance with which the workers are moving to the left and the leaders to the right, into the heart of obvious social-imperialism, the growth of the Second International into an outright subsidiary of the imperialist League of Nations, the decline in the authority of the social-democratic parties among the broad masses of the working class, the simultaneous growth in the influence and authority of the Comintern and its sections among the proletarians of all countries, the growth of the authority of the USSR among the oppressed classes of the entire

[1] In addition to those noted, a number of minor changes have been made in the text, as compared with *XV S'ezd VKP(b)* (Moscow, Gosizdat, 1928).

[2] In the original report: colonial countries.

[3] In the original report: to a higher level, to the level of the organization of Soviets.

world, the 'Congress of Friends of the USSR', and so on—all these facts undoubtedly show that Europe is entering a new phase of revolutionary advance . . .

Thus we have every sign of deepening crisis and increasing instability of world capitalism.

If the *temporary* post-war economic crisis of 1920–1 with its internal chaos and its deterioration in relations among capitalist countries may be considered past, as a result of which a period of partial stabilization has begun, the *general* and *fundamental* crisis of capitalism, which emerged as a result of the victory of the October revolution and the loss of the USSR from the world capitalist system, has not only not passed, but, on the contrary, is becoming deeper and deeper, shaking the very foundations of the existence of world capitalism.

Stabilization has not only failed to arrest the development of this general and fundamental crisis, but, on the contrary, has provided the basis and source for its further development. The growing struggle for markets, the need for a new division of the world and of spheres of influence, the collapse of bourgeois pacifism and of the League of Nations, the feverish activity to create new coalitions and align forces with a view to ⟨a possible new war⟩,[1] the mad expansion of armaments, the ruthless pressure on the working class and the colonial countries, the growth of the revolutionary movement in the colonies and Europe, the growth in the authority of the Comintern throughout the world, finally, the consolidation of the power of the Soviet Union and the strengthening of its authority among the workers of Europe and the labouring masses in the colonies—all these are facts which cannot fail to shake the very foundations of world capitalism . . .

Facts indicating the tendency towards peaceful relations in the period under review are: the non-aggression treaty with Turkey, the treaty of guarantee with Germany,[2] the customs convention with Greece, the credit agreement with Germany, the treaty of guarantee with Afghanistan, the treaty of guarantee with Lithuania, the treaty of guarantee initialed with Latvia, the commercial agreement with Turkey, the settlement of the dispute with Switzerland, the treaty of neutrality with Persia, the improvement in relations with Japan, the growth of economic intercourse with America and Italy.

Facts indicating the tendency towards warlike aggression in the period under review: the English note about financial help to the striking miners, the raid on the Soviet diplomatic missions in Peking, Tientsin, and Shanghai, the raid on Arcos, the break between England and the USSR, the murder of Voikov, the terrorist acts by the English hirelings in the USSR,

[1] In the original report: new wars.

[2] In the original report this is followed by: recognition by Uruguay.

the worsening of relations with France in connexion with Rakovsky's recall.

If two years ago we could talk of a period of comparative equilibrium and of 'peaceful co-existence' between the USSR and capitalist countries, now we have every reason to maintain that *the period of 'peaceful co-existence' is receding into the past*, giving place to a period of imperialist attacks and of the preparation of intervention against the USSR.

It is true that the English attempts to create a united front against the USSR have not yet been successful. The causes of this failure are: the contradiction of interests within the imperialist camp, the interest certain countries have in economic relations with the USSR, the peaceful policy of the USSR, the opposition of the European working class, the imperialists' fear of starting off a revolution at home in the event of war against the USSR. But this does not mean that England is abandoning the work of organizing a united front against the USSR, that it will not succeed in organizing such a front. The threat of war remains, despite England's temporary failure.

Hence our task—to pay attention to the contradictions in the imperialist camp, to delay war, ⟨'to buy ourselves free'⟩[1] from the capitalists, and to do all we can to maintain peaceful relations.

We must not forget Lenin's remark that our work of construction will depend a great deal on whether we succeed in postponing war with the capitalist world, a war which is inevitable, but which may be delayed either until the proletarian revolution starts in Europe, or until the colonial revolution is fully mature, or, finally, until the capitalists fight each other for the sharing of colonies.

Therefore the maintenance of peaceful relations with the capitalist countries is for us an obligatory task.

The basis of our relations with capitalist countries consists in admitting the existence of two opposed systems. Experience has completely justified this. Sometimes the question of debts and credits is a stumbling-block. Our policy on this point is clear. It is based on the formula: 'You give—I give'. You give credits to fertilize our industry, and you will get a certain part of the pre-war debts, which we shall regard as supplementary interest on credits. If you don't give, you won't get. The facts show that we have certain achievements in the matter of receiving industrial credits. I am thinking here not only of Germany, but also of America and even of England. What is the secret of this? Our country represents the largest market for the import of equipment, and it is precisely for these products that capitalist countries need markets . . .

[1] No quotation marks in the original report.

Hence the tasks of the party:

1. In regard to the international revolutionary movement:
   (*a*) *the struggle to develop the Communist Parties throughout the world;*
   (*b*) *the struggle to strengthen the revolutionary trade unions and the united front of the workers against the capitalist offensive;*
   (*c*) *the struggle to strengthen friendship between the Soviet working class and the working class of capitalist countries;*
   (*d*) *the struggle to strengthen the links between the Soviet working class and the liberation movement in the ⟨colonial and dependent countries⟩.*[1]

2. In regard to the foreign policy of the USSR:
   (*a*) *to fight against the preparation of new imperialist wars;*
   (*b*) *to fight the interventionist tendencies in England and to strengthen the USSR's ability to defend itself;*
   (*c*) *a policy of peace and of maintaining peaceful relations with capitalist countries;*
   (*d*) *the expansion of our trade with the outside world on the basis of consolidating the foreign trade monopoly;*
   (*e*) *rapprochement with the so-called 'weak' and 'inferior' States which are enduring the oppression and exploitation of the ruling imperialist Powers.*

SOVIET CONSULATES IN CHINA: REPLY FROM CHICHERIN TO THE NOTE OF THE SHANGHAI COMMISSIONER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS WITHDRAWING RECOGNITION

16 *December* 1927 — *Pravda*, 17 *December* 1927

The Soviet Government has never recognized the so-called National Government in Nanking, in whose name the note of 15 December[2] was handed to the Soviet Consul in Shanghai. The 'National Government' in Nanking must be aware that all Soviet consulates on Chinese territory are established under the provisions of the treaty between China and the Soviet Union signed in Peking in 1924, and every appointment of a consul to Shanghai, as to any other place in China, was made with the knowledge and consent of the Peking Government. The Shanghai authorities, like all other local Chinese authorities, merely took note of these appointments. Therefore the statement in the Nanking 'National Government's' note cancelling the recognition of consuls in various provinces can only mean that the generals who have seized power in

[1] In the original report: colonial countries.

[2] *Pravda*, 17 December 1927.

Nanking, urged thereto by the imperialists, considered it convenient to have in the area under their rule chiefly the consuls of those countries which have retained the 'unequal treaties' with the Chinese.

2. The Soviet Government must most emphatically reject the unfounded statements in the note of 15 December that the Soviet consulates and State commercial agencies were used for 'red propaganda and as refuges for communists'. In particular we most emphatically reject the charge against our consulate in Canton, which is accused of having served as a base for the conduct of the revolutionary movement of the workers and peasants in Kwantung. There is nothing new in the fact that the revolutionary movement of the workers and peasants in China is looked on as the outcome of the activity of Soviet official institutions. For several years now the enemies of the Chinese people, the imperialists of all countries, have regarded the great revolutionary movement of the Chinese people as the result of the intrigues of 'outside forces'. The fact that the 'National Government' in Nanking repeats the counter-revolutionary fables of the oppressors of the Chinese people proves better than anything else whose will it is now executing.

3. The Soviet Government is convinced that the attitude adopted by the Chinese authorities in Shanghai will in the first place injure the Chinese people and Chinese national interests, and that those who so frivolously embark on a hostile policy towards the USSR will be the first to feel its negative consequences.

STATEMENT BY CHICHERIN ON THE EVENTS IN CANTON AND THE ILL-TREATMENT OF SOVIET CITIZENS

23 *December* 1927 *Pravda*, 23 *December* 1927

The People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs has more than once had occasion to note that whenever a revolutionary movement occurs on any part of the earth's surface, the enemies of the USSR invariably declare that it was provoked by agents of the Soviet Government. In regard to China not only the reactionary press, but even ministers of capitalist countries have for long been trying to represent the entire national movement as the product of Soviet policy and the work of Soviet agents. This was done by the counter-revolutionary generals, who drowned in streams of blood the magnificent rising of the revolutionary workers of Canton. While piling up on the streets of Canton mountains of corpses of tortured workers, they acted particularly vindictively against Soviet citizens in Canton, who were among the first of their countless victims. We have no precise information yet about the most recent events in Canton, but we can say without hesitation that a number of Soviet

citizens there have suffered a horrible death after every kind of outrage. There are reports from various sources of the tragic death of the Soviet Vice-Consul, Comrade Khassis, and it can scarcely be doubted any longer that this disturbing news is true. But grave and great as are the crimes of the Canton generals against the USSR, all the same the responsibility for them cannot be confined to Canton alone.

Political action by the Kuomintang generals against the USSR and its representatives covers the whole of South China, and the Canton atrocities were only the most marked of its manifestations. The political responsibility for these atrocities thus falls on all the leaders within the areas of the so-called 'national' governments. Not only Chang Fa-hwei and Li Fu-ling, who are active in Canton, but also others, such as Li Chi-sheng, Chiang Kai-shek, Pai Chung-hsi, etc., are guilty of these crimes. But in the case in question responsibility falls also on the other forces of world reaction hostile to the USSR. All these imperialist and White Guard groups in Shanghai, Hong Kong, and other important centres of colonial policy in China were spurred on and inspired, as now clearly appears, by London; this has been confirmed by the praise of the English press, and it played virtually the most important part in the development of these events. English imperialist reaction must be recognized as the chief motive force of the Canton blood-letting and of the violence, murder, and expulsions committed against Soviet citizens.

The workers of the USSR grieve for the tragic death of comrades tortured by the hangmen and executioners of the South Chinese counter-revolution, but their blood has not flowed in vain. A people of 400 million cannot be halted on their road to liberation, and those militarist cliques who have made the leaders of the national movement into its executioners will be swept away without trace. The liberated Chinese people will not forget their Soviet friends who fell at the hands of their oppressors; their memory will weld together still more closely the two great States, bound by blood.

The Soviet Government sees in the acts of unparalleled cruelty of the Chinese counter-revolution and of the forces behind it an offensive against the USSR. Pursuing unchangingly its policy of peace, the latest expression of which was the Soviet disarmament proposals at Geneva, the USSR is at the same time ready for the worst and will not be taken unawares.

In the name of the Soviet Government the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs protests before the entire world against the outrages of the Chinese counter-revolution. The Soviet Government reserves the right to take all steps which it considers necessary in connexion with the bloody crimes committed in South China against the USSR. These savage acts will not go unpunished.

STATEMENT BY THE CHAIRMAN OF THE SOVIET STATE BANK ON THE FRENCH CLAIM TO SOVIET GOLD IN THE UNITED STATES

16 *March* 1928 *Soviet Union Review*, April 1928, Supplement

The action taken by the Bank of France in the United States in regard to gold of Soviet origin calls for certain elucidations.

The trade turnover between the Soviet Union and the United States has of late experienced a large and steady growth. The United States is the principal source of supply of raw materials (such as cotton, hides, metals, etc.) and of various machinery and equipment for the USSR. In addition the United States serves as an intermediary for Soviet import operations with other parts of North and South America and with the Far East.

Unlike exports to most other countries Soviet exports to the United States are less in value than imports and the balancing of accounts between the two countries requires the covering of the difference in favor of the United States by payments in cash.

The adverse balance in the accounts between the State Bank of the USSR and banks of the United States have impelled the former on many occasions to sell gold in London or Berlin and to transfer the proceeds of the sales to the United States. This roundabout method of settling accounts was neither in the interests of the State Bank of the USSR nor in the interests of its American correspondents. Therefore the State Bank attempted to establish direct relations with the American credit market.

For the purpose of carrying out this policy and also in order to settle accounts with the German Garantie und Kredit Bank in connexion with some contemplated additional purchases to be made in the United States through the German bank, the State Bank of the USSR made a consignment of gold to New York to the value of $5 million. Upon the arrival of the gold in the United States doubt arose in Treasury Department circles as to the admissibility of this gold in view of the fact that the gold was of Soviet origin and that as far back as 1920 the Federal Reserve Bank was prohibited by the United States Government from accepting gold of Soviet origin or gold belonging to the Soviet Government.[1]

The raising of this question came quite unexpected not only to the State Bank of the USSR and the German Garantie und Kredit Bank but also to the American banks in agreement with whom the shipment had been made, and even to the heads of the American Government who, in the persons of the President of the United States, Mr Coolidge,

[1] *U.S. Foreign Relations*, 1920, iii, p. 722.

and the head of the State Department, according to the press, stated after the arrival of the gold that they saw no objection to the admission of gold of Soviet origin.

The reference to a ruling of 1920 appears still more inexplicable in view of the fact that after its issue, specifically at the end of 1921, an agreement was concluded in London between the American citizen, Mr Brown, and Mr Krassin, representative of the USSR, under which the Soviet Government was to export to the United States gold to the value of $10 million for the purchase of food supplies, this gold to be placed to the credit of the American Relief Administration. The gold was admitted to the United States without any obstacles.

Notwithstanding the statements of President Coolidge and Secretary of State Kellogg, the consignment of gold was not admitted for assay and for transfer to the Federal Reserve Bank. An action of this nature on the part of the United States Government departments cannot, of course, aid the development of Soviet-American trade relations, since gold is the natural medium in adjusting unfavorable trade balances or seasonal fluctuations of one kind or another.

Furthermore, it is necessary to point out that for the State Bank of the USSR gold of Soviet origin—produced in the country itself—apart from serving as a reserve against note issue, is also an export commodity, precisely in the same way that oil is for the Soviet Naphtha Syndicate, cotton cloth for the Soviet Textile Syndicate, or furs for the corresponding Soviet industrial and trade organizations. If the United States prefers that accounts between economic organizations of the Soviet Union and trading firms of the United States, and also accounts with the Far East and South America be cleared by the State Bank through the mediation of other countries, especially by means of gold exports to such countries, the result of this method of settling accounts, while undoubtedly advantageous to foreign banks, will hardly be in the interest of American firms.

After the last adverse decision of the United States Government on the question of the admission of Soviet gold for deposit, the German Garantie und Kredit Bank made a proposal to the American banks to reship this gold back to Germany. However, the American banks hesitated to comply with the request in view of the fact that the Bank of France had presented through the federal courts a claim to the gold on the ground that this consignment consisted, either wholly or in part, of the same gold which the French Bank had on deposit in the former Russian State Bank in the years 1915–17.

This claim is entirely groundless inasmuch as the gold possessed by the State Bank of the USSR was obtained by purchases from private parties, from gold-producing trusts, in the domestic market, and even

abroad. With reference to this particular consignment of gold, it is definitely established by the stamp on the gold and by the books of the State Bank of the USSR and of the refining plants that this gold was produced in the years 1925 and 1926.

A claim of this kind appears still more strange to the State Bank of the Union when it is considered that from May 1925 to February 1928, that is, in a period of less than three years, the State Bank effected a turnover with the international markets of gold imports and exports of 200 million rubles (over $100 million), two-thirds of which was with England. The Bank of France, was, of course, well informed in regard to all of these shipments of gold belonging to the State Bank of the USSR. However, up to this time the Bank of France did not see fit to launch similar attacks either in England, Germany, or in any other country, evidently recognizing that not a single country carrying on regular trade relations with the USSR would regard its claims as having any foundation.

To this may be added that the State Bank of the USSR, founded in October 1921, can in no way be considered the successor of the old State Bank. The Soviet State Bank inherited neither the assets nor the liabilities—not even the files—of the Imperial State Bank or of any other formerly existing bank. At the time of its establishment it received as initial capital an allotment from the budget of two trillion paper rubles.

How the State Bank was built and how the people of the Soviet Union, in spite of the catastrophic decline of the ruble, aided in strengthening and developing the bank, is well known, not only to all citizens of the Soviet Union but also to the banks throughout the world; also the methods used and the rate at which the State Bank was able to accumulate, in the course of its commercial operations, gold and foreign exchange reserves.

The State Bank of the USSR is responsible only for obligations incurred by itself. The State Bank of the USSR is an independent corporate body, in no manner a part of the State Treasury Department. The State Bank does not carry any responsibility for the debts of the Treasury Department.

Similarly, in the United States the State Bank assumes responsibility only for its own obligations. It is strange that the Bank of France, a bank of a country carrying on diplomatic relations with the USSR, presents in such a unique manner claims against the USSR which result from war-time relations between the Tsarist and the French governments and their respective central banks. This is still more inexplicable in view of the well-known fact that the Soviet and the French governments, upon resumption of diplomatic relations, mutually agreed to adjust all fiscal disputes through negotiations.

The presentation by the Bank of France of this absolutely baseless claim may be explained only by a desire to put obstacles in the way of developing and strengthening trade relations between the State Bank of the USSR and the friendly banks in other countries,—the United States among others,—and by a desire to hamper the issue operations of the State Bank, through the raising of doubts as to the right of the State Bank to dispose, in its own way, of its gold and foreign exchange funds. These calculations are ill-advised. The State Bank will continue to support in the future, with an even greater measure of success, I hope, the building up and strengthening of Soviet commercial and credit operations with foreign banks and industrial and trade organizations, on the basis of the established correct procedure.

The news of the action of the French Bank, supported by a hostile note of the French ambassador in the United States, which was aimed at the breaking up of normal and friendly commercial relations between the State Bank of the USSR and foreign banks, in particular those of the United States, and at the undermining of the issue operations of the State Bank, will arouse sentiment among the broad masses of the Soviet Union who have made the greatest sacrifices in order to create and build up their State Bank and their own stable currency.

Neither can there be any doubt that this attempt of the Bank of France will arouse the public opinion of the United States, which will see in this action an attempt to transplant the disputes between the Soviet and the French governments to the territory of the United States. This procedure endangers the further development and strengthening of the trade and banking relations between the Soviet Union and the United States which, conducted in a perfectly proper manner and with profit to both countries, present the most favorable prospects for further growth and development.

I am fully confident that the American courts, with their characteristic sense of justice and equity, will not create any unnecessary difficulties to the development of Soviet-American trade relations and will refuse to grant the unfounded claims of the Bank of France.

INTERVIEW BY CHICHERIN ON THE ZINOVIEV LETTER

22 *March* 1928 — *Pravda*, 22 *March* 1928

From the communiqué of the English official radio and the Reuters agency of 19 March I learn that the English Prime Minister, Mr Baldwin, has defended in the House of Commons the refusal of the British Government to satisfy the Labour Party's demand for an investigation of the 'Zinoviev letter' affair. In the course of his speech Mr Baldwin

gave information of supposed statements made by myself and by the Soviet Government on this matter.[1]

I affirm categorically that there is no truth in the information given by Mr Baldwin. It is pure invention from beginning to end, totally devoid of any foundation in fact, and bearing moreover a distinctly slanderous character, so that it is deeply insulting to members of our Government.

But in giving this information Mr Baldwin overreached himself and revealed its falsity. In his speech there is a remarkable discrepancy between his assertions and generally accepted facts. According to the English official radio Mr Baldwin said that about a month after the appearance of the so-called 'Zinoviev letter' I informed my colleagues that the original had been destroyed, and the Soviet Government could calmly insist on the conduct of an investigation. If we turn to the documents in the case we see that Mr Gregory's note,[2] the enclosure to which was the so-called Zinoviev letter, was presented to Rakovsky on 24 October 1924, and that immediately upon receipt from London of details of the contents of Mr Gregory's note and the enclosure to it our Government telegraphed to Rakovsky that it categorically and insistently proposed to submit to an impartial third-party court the establishment of the fact that the so-called 'letter from the Comintern' of 15 September was a forgery. This proposal was passed to the Foreign Office in a note dated 27 October 1924.[3] Where then is the 'month after'? Mr Baldwin invented the month's lapse after which the Soviet Government supposedly decided to propose the investigation of the affair by a third-party court, when in fact this proposal was made by our Government immediately upon receipt by us of news of the presentation of the forgery to Rakovsky.

Rakovsky's note of 27 October was not accepted by the British Government on the grounds that it demanded the punishment of the officials guilty of taking part in the fabrication of this forgery. In his letter of 1 November Rakovsky emphasized the justice of this claim, in view of the great moral damage caused by Mr Gregory's note of 24 October.

In a note[4] addressed to Mr Chamberlain on 28 November Rakovsky in the name of our Government expressed extreme surprise that whereas the British Government had turned down the proposal for the examination of the incriminating document by an impartial third-party court, it made public declarations about the authenticity of the document, on the basis of information not known to anybody.

Rakovsky at the same time declared that the Soviet Government could not accept such unproven statements. and that 'the Soviet

[1] 215 *H.C. Deb.* 5 s. col. 59.
[2] *The Times*, 25 October 1924.
[3] *Soviet Documents*, i, p. 473.
[4] ibid., p. 477.

Government, on its part, must insist on its offer of arbitration, contained in the note of 27 October, as the sole means to an unbiased settlement of this question'.

Later, when the British Foreign Secretary declared in the House of Commons that the proofs of the authenticity of the 'Zinoviev letter' could not be published for fear of danger to the person who delivered this document to the British Government, Rakovsky, acting under the instructions of our Government, addressed a note[1] to Mr Chamberlain on 21 December stating that the Soviet Government was ready to guarantee the unhindered departure from the Soviet Union of the above-mentioned person. However, Mr Chamberlain was only able to reply with the bare statement that he had nothing to add to his former note.

Now the British Labour Party has proposed to the British cabinet that it should order an investigation of the so-called 'Zinoviev letter'. The British cabinet has rejected this proposal, for any investigation would undoubtedly disclose the spuriousness of the document.

It is the more important that such an investigation should be carried out in so far as during the past three and a half years extremely valuable evidence on the origin of this forgery has come to light. But naturally the English Government is the more afraid of an investigation as the evidence of the falsity of the 'letter' becomes stronger.

When Druzhilovsky was being tried in a Soviet court for forgery he stated in evidence (recorded in the court proceedings) that he knew how the 'Zinoviev letter' was prepared in Berlin. His testimony throws a particularly strong light on this affair. In Berlin Druzhilovsky executed the orders of a Polish captain, Paczurkowski, who, according to Druzhilovsky, was in touch with other intelligence agents. In his testimony Druzhilovsky gave detailed factual material concerning the preparation of the 'Zinoviev letter' by Zhemchuzhnikov, Belgardt and Gumansky, Russian émigrés who worked for both Paczurkowski and the English intelligence service. Druzhilovsky states that Zhemchuzhnikov told him that the draft for the 'Zinoviev letter' was drawn up in his apartment by Belgardt and Gumansky. According to this information the 'Zinoviev letter', after it had been prepared in Berlin, was passed to London by divers routes simultaneously. The extremely precise and detailed testimony of Druzhilovsky decisively refutes the false version of the English Government affirming the authenticity of the 'Zinoviev letter'.

Later, in January of this year, during the trial of Schreck, the well-known pacifist Mertens stated under oath, before the High Court of Leipzig, that an English publicist living in Geneva had told him that

[1] *Anglo-Sovetskie Otnoshenia*, p. 87.

the so-called 'Zinoviev letter' was fabricated by a Polish agent called Paczurkowski who worked in close co-operation with the defendant Schreck.[1] If further investigation were made, more proof would be forthcoming to the effect that the forgery known as the 'Zinoviev letter' was produced in these circumstances.

But the British cabinet stubbornly refuses to sanction an investigation. Meanwhile even the reliable English newspaper the *Manchester Guardian* on 23 May 1927 established—admittedly with certain reservations, but with sufficient clarity—that this forgery, like other false documents, was drawn up in Berlin, to which the newspaper added: 'there is reason to believe that the letter originated from a Polish source in Berlin'.

To the actual origin of the forgery Mr Baldwin opposes his version about its being received by a 'gentleman in the City', Mr Im Thurn, from a 'gentleman who stands near to the communists'. Strong light is thrown on the position of this second 'gentleman' by the fact that to him Comrade Zinoviev is known as Apfelbaum. Although Apfelbaum is not Comrade Zinoviev's surname he was known by this name to the intelligence agents of many countries. Everybody now knows that his surname is Radomyslsky. The above-mentioned 'gentleman' by this alone disclosed in an unquestionable manner his allegiance to the intelligence service.

The British Government is pinned to the wall and deliberately evades the disclosure of a truth which is hard for it to bear. It uses methods which were applied of old in the religious courts by the Jesuits who were always ready to advance the most terrible accusations, without any foundation, against those they wished to destroy. The Jesuits demanded that their words alone be believed. But if it is laid down as a premise that one must believe every assertion without proof, and if it is considered possible to decry anybody in any manner, then the possibility of good relations with such Jesuits is excluded from the first.

TASS STATEMENT ON THE NARKOMINDEL REPLY TO THE JAPANESE NOTE ON THE IMPORT OF ARMS INTO CHINA

27 *March* 1928 *Pravda*, 27 *March* 1928

Tass learns from well-informed sources that in reply to the Japanese proposal that the USSR associate itself with the decisions of the Powers reached in Peking on 5 May 1919[2] concerning the prohibition of the import of arms into China, the Government of the USSR has stated that the import of arms into China lies exclusively within the competence of the Chinese Government. The USSR has always avoided the

[1] cf. *The Times*, 11 and 30 January 1928.
[2] *U.S. Foreign Relations*, 1919, i, p. 670.

conclusion of agreements with any Powers at the expense of a third party without the participation of the latter. On the strength of this the USSR declines to associate itself with the above-mentioned agreement, all the more so since in consequence of the special rights of several Powers in China they are in a position to import arms into China and station forces and a fleet there. The Government of the USSR once more affirms that it has never imported and has no intention of importing arms into China.

EXTRACT FROM A REPORT BY STALIN TO A MEETING OF MOSCOW COMMUNISTS ON THE SHAKHTY TRIAL

13 *April* 1928 Stalin, xi, p. 53

What is the class background of the Shakhty affair, where are its roots, and on what class basis could this economic counter-revolution arise?

There are comrades who think the Shakhty affair accidental. They usually say: we were really caught napping here; we didn't have our eyes open, but if we had not been yawning we would not have had any Shakhty affair. That there was carelessness, and a good deal of it, there can be no doubt. But to explain everything by that is to miss the main point.

What do the facts, the material about the Shakhty affair, tell us?

They tell us that the Shakhty affair is economic counter-revolution plotted by some bourgeois specialists who formerly controlled the mines. They tell us further that these specialists, organized in a secret group, received money for sabotage from the former owners who are now émigrés, and from counter-revolutionary anti-Soviet capitalist organizations in the West.

The facts tell us, finally, that this group of bourgeois specialists acted and destroyed our industry on the instructions of capitalist organizations in the West.

What does all this tell us? It tells us that we are dealing here with economic intervention by west European anti-Soviet capitalist organizations in the affairs of our industry. At one time there was military-political intervention, which we succeeded in liquidating by a victorious civil war. Now we have an attempt at economic intervention, to liquidate which we do not need a civil war, but which we must just the same liquidate and which we are liquidating by all available means.

It would be stupid to assume that international capital will leave us in peace. No, comrades, that is not true. Classes exist, international capital exists, and it cannot calmly watch the development of the country which is building socialism. Formerly international capital thought

of overthrowing the Soviet power by means of direct military intervention. The attempt failed. Now it is trying, and will try in the future, to weaken our economic power by means of invisible economic intervention, not always obvious but fairly serious, organizing sabotage, planning all kinds of 'crises' in one branch of industry or another, and thus facilitating the possibility of future military intervention. It is all part and parcel of the class struggle of international capital against the Soviet power, and there can be no talk of any accidental happenings.

It is one of two things: *either* we shall go on with our revolutionary policy, rallying the proletariat and the oppressed of all countries around the working class of the USSR, and then international capital will do everything it can to hinder our advance; *or* we shall abandon our revolutionary policy, make a number of concessions of a fundamental nature to international capital, and then, if you please, international capital will not object to 'helping' us to transform our socialist country into a 'good' bourgeois republic.

There are people who think that we can pursue a liberating foreign policy and at the same time get the capitalists of Europe and America to praise us for it. I shall not prove that such naive people have and can have nothing in common with our party.

England, for example, asks us to establish with it rapacious spheres of influence somewhere, let us say in Persia, in Afghanistan, or Turkey, and assures us that it is ready to establish 'friendship' with us if we make this concession. Could we make such a concession, comrades?

America asks us to abandon as a principle the policy of support for the liberation movement of the working class of other countries, that everything would go along fine if we made such a concession. Could we make such a concession, comrades?

We could establish 'friendly' relations with Japan if we agreed to share Manchuria with it. Could we make such a concession? Or, let us say, we are asked to 'modify' the foreign-trade monopoly and agree to pay all war and pre-war debts. Could we agree to that, comrades?

But precisely because we cannot make these and similar concessions without denying ourselves, for that very reason we must be prepared for international capital organizing every kind of dirty trick against us, whether it is a Shakhty affair or something else like it.

These are the class roots of the Shakhty affair. Why was international capital able to bring off military intervention against us? Because there were in our country whole groups of military specialists, generals and officers, pets of the bourgeoisie and the landlords, who were always ready to undermine the very foundations of the Soviet power. Could these officers and generals have organized a serious war against the

Soviet power without the financial, military, and other support of international capital? Of course they could not. Could international capital have organized serious intervention without the help of this group of White Guard officers and generals? I think not.

There were comrades then who thought that military intervention was accidental, that if we had not let Mamontov, Krasnov, and the rest out of prison, there would have been no intervention. That of course is not true. That the setting free of Mamontov, Krasnov, and other White Guard generals played a part in the development of the civil war there can be no doubt. But that the roots of military intervention lay not in this, but in the class contradictions between the Soviet power on one side, and international capital with its string of generals in Russia on the other, of that too there can be no doubt.

Could a few bourgeois specialists, former mine managers, have organized the Shakhty affair without the financial and moral support of international capital, without the prospect that international capital would help them to depose the Soviet power? Of course they could not. Could international capital organize economic intervention here, like the Shakhty business, unless we had in our country bourgeois, including certain groups of bourgeois specialists, ready to drown the Soviet power in a thimbleful of water. Clearly it could not. Are there not among us such groups of bourgeois specialists, ready to engage in economic intervention, to injure the Soviet power? I think there are. I do not think there can be many of them. But that there are certain insignificant groups of counter-revolutionary specialists, far fewer than at the time of military intervention, of that there can be no doubt.

The union of these two forces provides the basis for economic intervention in the USSR. Precisely in this consists the class background of the Shakhty affair.

NARKOMINDEL STATEMENT ON THE CORRESPONDENCE WITH THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT CONCERNING THE CLAIMS OF THE BANQUE DE FRANCE TO SOVIET GOLD IN THE UNITED STATES

14 *April* 1928 — *Izvestia*, 14 *April* 1928

In connexion with the French Foreign Ministry's communiqué[1] published by the Havas Agency, Tass has received the following information from the NKID:

The communiqué in question, referring to the Franco-Soviet correspondence on the question of the gold belonging to the State Bank of the USSR and held at the time in the United States, asserts that 'the

[1] *Le Temps*, 13 April 1928.

Ministry (in its reply) explained precisely the position taken by the French Government in regard to the claims of the Banque de France in connexion with the dispatch to New York of the Soviet gold to which the bank was asserting a claim. In the notes exchanged there was no mention of the negotiations for a debt settlement which, contrary to reports published in certain papers, are continuing by the exchange of correspondence, as was agreed with the Soviet envoy to Paris.'

The communiqué cited above creates the impression that the French Foreign Ministry's note was a direct reply to the question raised in the Soviet Government's notes[1] regarding the position taken by the French Government on the alleged claim of the Banque de France. In fact the French Government's note, addressed to the Soviet Embassy in France, gives no direct reply on the substance of the French Government's position. While referring to the Banque de France's assertion of its rights to the said part of the gold the Ministry for Foreign Affairs still does not reply to the question whether or not it supported these 'claims' before the United States Government. It only communicates that the French Government asked the United States Government whether the prohibition on the import of Soviet gold is still in force in the United States.

As to the assertion in the said communiqué that negotiations 'are being conducted by means of correspondence, as was agreed with the Soviet envoy in Paris', Tass is informed that this statement does not correspond with the facts, since the Soviet envoy in Paris has not yet received a reply to the Soviet proposal to continue the conference, nor to the question when the French Government intends to resume negotiations. No correspondence between the two Governments on this question has taken place or is taking place.

EXTRACTS FROM LITVINOV'S REPORT TO THE CENTRAL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE ON THE WORK OF THE SOVIET DELEGATION TO THE PREPARATORY DISARMAMENT COMMISSION

21 *April* 1928 *Protokoly*, p. 772

At the very first steps taken by the League of Nations about disarmament the bourgeois press began to express fears of the League's disarmament energies being paralysed by the fact that outside the League there was such a powerful State as the USSR with a large army and allegedly unwilling to disarm. Credulous people, reading the press of that time, might have thought that the members of the League and other bourgeois States found among themselves no obstacles to disarmament, that

[1] *Izvestia*, 8 April 1928.

nothing was required but the adherence of the Soviet Union to the idea of disarmament, and that there were no other military dangers than the existence of the imperialistically-inclined Red Army. It was, however, impossible to keep on repeating these assertions, without making any attempt to invite the Soviet State to take part in the League's disarmament work. And so the necessary invitation was sent to the Soviet Government. There is no need for me to relate to you the circumstances which at first gave that invitation an almost derisive character . . . We were invited to the first sessions of the preparatory commission in a country to which, as the League of Nations knew, the Soviet Government was at that time unable to send delegates. The Soviet Government at once accepted the invitation in principle and, as soon as external obstacles were removed, did in fact send a delegation for active participation in the work of the commission.

Could the Soviet Government have done otherwise? From the very first days of its existence it had appealed to all nations to disarm.

Having received such proposals from bourgeois Governments, it could not have rejected them merely because of its views on the capitalist structure and the imperialism inseparable from it, because of its opinion of the sincerity of these proposals, the character of the pacifism of the leaders of the League of Nations, and so on. Sincerity or insincerity are best of all tested by action. Had we rejected the proposal we would have made it possible for the League of Nations to place the responsibility for its own failures on the absent Soviet Government. Finally, if the bourgeois Governments, impelled by public opinion and mass pressure in their own countries, declare themselves, if only in words, for disarmament and peace, why should we not take them at their word and demand the public transformation of these words into deeds? By setting up a commission or conference on disarmament, the League of Nations, whether it likes it or not, is setting up and legalizing an international tribune for the propaganda of the idea of peace and disarmament. Was it for us to let such an opportunity slip?

In my speech at the November session of the commission I immediately made a frank declaration[1] that I considered this commission to be the most suitable tribune for the propaganda of peace and disarmament, and that the Soviet delegation intended to use this opportunity to the full. . . . When we say disarmament, we mean complete thorough immediate disarmament. If this is rejected, we want an explanation of the obstacles to it and then we can consider how to remove them. If other States are unable to prove the existence of such insuperable obstacles but still reject our proposals, this only confirms that they do not want disarmament because it conflicts with their policy; but then let them not

[1] League of Nations, 1927, ix, C. 667, M. 225, p. 9.

hint that the Soviet Government, the Red Army, alleged red imperialism, are the only obstacles to the establishment of peace on earth.

That, comrades, was the idea of our proposal for complete general disarmament at the November session of the preparatory commission. We only got the idea of disarmament discussed in principle. The commission was at that time not courageous enough to reject our proposal outright, either formally or in substance. . . . Caught unprepared, the fourth session of the preparatory commission was unable to advance any objections, formal or otherwise, to our proposal, and contented itself with postponing its consideration to the fifth session, when they hoped to be in a position to counter our radical proposal for complete disarmament with their evolutionary conception of partial disarmament. Having obtained the formal consent of the commission to the inclusion on the agenda of the fifth session of the proposal for complete disarmament, the Soviet delegation drew up a draft for an international convention[1] and sent it out for the consideration of all Governments a month before the opening of the fifth session. . . .

The overwhelming majority of Governments represented in the commission decided to reject *in toto* our proposal for general and complete disarmament. But it would, of course, have been inexpedient, politically inexpedient, to reject it simply because the Governments considered complete disarmament undesirable and unacceptable, and therefore they had to consent to a preliminary consideration of our draft in order, if possible, to criticize, censure, and deride it. . . .

You are probably aware of all the arguments brought forward at the commission from my speech[2] in reply to these criticisms, which was published in the Soviet press almost in full. I will dwell only on a few of them. Not every speaker, of course, had new or original arguments to produce. They frequently repeated each other, and not all their arguments were of equal value. Several speakers, for example, pointed out in tones of reproach that the preparatory commission had already worked out at its first three sessions methods for the solution of the question of disarmament—partial disarmament of course—had already drawn up draft measures, and that by our new draft convention we were setting all this work at naught and annulling all the labour already expended. The chairman of the commission himself in his closing speech found it possible to describe the work of the Soviet delegation as destructive, on the ground that it proposed cancelling work already done and introduced new drafts instead of continuing to build on those already begun. This, of course, cannot be considered a serious argument worthy of serious reply. . . .

[1] ibid., 1928, ix, C. 46, M. 29.
[2] ibid., 1928, ix, C. 165, M. 50, p. 268.

Others objected that armaments are not the only cause of war and that consequently other causes giving rise to war would remain even after disarmament. Perfectly true. But it is equally true that armaments are the only means of warfare, that war cannot be waged without armaments. Incidentally, this contention was also disputed in the commission; some went so far as to say that even after disarmament, after the abolition of all armed forces and the dissolution of all armies and navies, wars would still be possible and could be waged with the help of police, militias, night-watchmen, prison-warders, forest-guards, and so on . . . .

More serious, indeed on the surface the most serious argument, was the contention that the richest and most industrially developed countries could, in the case of complete disarmament, rearm more easily and quickly than the smaller and poorer countries. Amplifying this idea, some speakers reminded the commission that just as society includes criminal elements who break the law, which makes police forces essential, so there are also criminal nations capable of violating international conventions and consequently an international convention for general disarmament, and that since our draft convention admits of no military sanctions (measures of constraint), the least industrially developed and least prosperous countries would be in danger. Since the USSR cannot as yet boast of great riches or a too highly developed industry, the distrust expressed by the speaker clearly does not apply to our Union. Consciously or unconsciously the speakers unambiguously hinted that it was the great powers which might turn out to be the criminal nations who would violate the convention and use their industry and financial superiority to attack poor agricultural countries. You will see from this that during the nine years of its existence the League of Nations, despite almost unintermittent joint meetings between representatives of bourgeois countries and constant meetings between their ministers, has been unable to dispel their mutual suspicions so far as to get such a solemn public act as a convention on general disarmament considered inviolable. After that it is hardly surprising that moral disarmament and the building up of international morals are the chief subjects of discussion in the League of Nations. Obviously, the morals of capitalist States are greatly in need of reinforcement.

The sincerity of the argument I have just mentioned against complete disarmament may, however, provoke certain doubts if we remember that it was brought forward not by delegates from small agricultural countries, but by representatives of such great States as Great Britain and Italy. Great Britain is entitled to consider itself among the richest, most highly industrialized countries of the world, and, unless a hint was intended at the possibility of the infringement of the convention

by the still richer United States of America, Lord Cushendun apparently assumed the role here of a disinterested advocate for the less favoured countries, protecting them from his own nation. In plain language his argument amounted to this: if all countries disarm under an international convention, England, as the richest and most industrially developed country, will be unable to resist the temptation hurriedly and secretly to rearm and to fall on disarmed nations.

I spoke at Geneva of the practical impossibility of such a secret recreation of armies and navies and absolutely secret preparations for war, and I will therefore not repeat here my counter-arguments. I should only like to say that it is our Soviet State which would have the strongest grounds for distrusting the other participants in the proposed convention, derived from the relations that have been established and from experience. I recall the precise words said to me by Lenin when we discussed the proposals we made in 1919 to Mr Wilson through Bullitt.[1] You will probably remember that at that time we received a proposal for an armistice on all fronts in the civil war on the basis of the cessation of hostilities, the cessation of all transport of military materials and effectives, etc. Lenin said to me half interrogatively: 'We will observe all these conditions. But is there any certainty that our enemies will?' . . . Today also, however great and legitimate our distrust of the bourgeois countries which hate us, however great for us the danger of their violating an international convention, we shall not refrain from further efforts or from increasing those efforts for the realization of the great idea of complete disarmament and the ending of warfare by international agreement.

Conscious of the weakness of their arguments, the delegations were forced to come into the open . . . One of the arguments against complete disarmament, we may note, turns out to be the necessity of suppressing internal insurrections, and the maintenance of the present powerful armies with their super-dreadnoughts, aeroplanes, zeppelins, bombers, tanks, etc., is essential for this purpose.

The delegates, no doubt themselves feeling the awkwardness of such arguments, did not dwell upon them long. They clung chiefly to arguments of a formal nature. The Covenant of the League, they said, forbids its members to disarm completely since article 8 obliges members of the League to disarm only to the degree required by their security, while other articles envisage military sanctions against countries attacking any member of the League, which sanctions require troops. We pointed out in vain that in the first place article 8, while obliging States to carry out partial disarmament, by no means forbids total disarmament; secondly, that it would be cheaper and more advantageous for the

[1] *Soviet Documents*, .., p. 147.

nations to change an article of the League Covenant than to pay milliards for the maintenance of armies and navies; and thirdly, that, given total disarmament, one country could not attack another and military sanctions would therefore be unnecessary. The delegates, however, stuck firmly to the argument that the League Covenant was a limit 'not to be overstepped' and total disarmament was incompatible with membership of the League . . .

Speaking of the delegations and commissions, we must assign a special place to the German delegation, which from beginning to end of the session acted on parallel lines with the Soviet delegation, openly supporting our project for total disarmament as a basis for the work of the commission, and the immediate consideration of our second disarmament project.

It is also satisfactory to note that on this occasion the Soviet delegation received considerable support from the Turkish delegation, attending the preparatory commission for the first time. Together with us and the German delegation, they consistently opposed all attempts to relegate our draft convention to any sub-commissions, to ignore it or secretly bury it. The Turkish delegation spoke in favour of our draft convention for total disarmament being transmitted to the forthcoming international conference, even if it were not approved by the preparatory commission . . .

Leaving aside the German and Turkish delegations, it must be admitted that the unanimity in the decisions of the commission was partly due to the fact that the proposals emanated from the Soviet delegation, and that the desire to demonstrate a united front against us frequently prevailed over other considerations. Otherwise it would be difficult to understand why the representatives of the small States, who can have no imperialist dreams, and even the representative of a country like Bulgaria, which was disarmed under the peace treaty together with Germany, and which can only benefit from the disarmament of other countries, should speak out against the idea of total disarmament.

As you see, the Soviet delegation in Geneva were placed in a far from equal position, and this will give you some idea of the conditions in which Soviet delegations have to work at international conferences. This peculiar kind of equality was more sharply demonstrated somewhat later, but I will refer to this later on.

Having rejected our draft convention for total disarmament the commission proceeded to the third point on the agenda, which read: 'the state of the work of the preparatory disarmament commission'. This state was a sorry one, and the chairman reported on it in dismal tones. In reply to the German delegation, the chairman explained at the opening of the session that during the discussion of this item any pro-

posals bearing in any way on disarmament could be made. Profiting by this, the German delegation made a very modest proposal that all States should be obliged to publish in the *League Year-Book* full information about their armed forces. The commission, however, decided that this proposal should be discussed during the second reading of the commission's draft convention for the reduction of armaments, which had its first reading at the third session. When the German delegation proposed that this second reading should be taken, it appeared that this too was impossible, since the dissensions between the great Powers arising at the first reading had so far not been eliminated. It might have been thought that the preparatory commission had been set up precisely for joint consideration of proposals and joint settlement of any dissensions. How often have we heard that it is the greatest merit of the League of Nations that it affords the possibility of frequent meetings between the representatives of States to settle all conflicts and dissensions between them. It appears, however, that this merit has extremely conditional and limited significance, and that even the dissensions arising in the process of the work of the League itself and its organs, must be settled outside by way of secret diplomatic negotiations. . . . The German delegation therefore proposed that the commission admit its inability to deal with the difficulties which had arisen and recommend the Council of the League of Nations to convene immediately an international disarmament conference which might, because of its greater authority, be able to deal with those difficulties from which the preparatory commission was unable to extricate itself.

This proposal, of course, had no chance, and was rejected. The Soviet delegation then stated that as their project for total disarmament had been rejected, the majority of the delegations declaring on behalf of their Governments that they could only consider schemes for partial disarmament, they would submit an entirely new project for partial disarmament for the immediate consideration of the commission. The Soviet delegation were simple enough to imagine that by this proposal they were getting the commission out of a very difficult situation and saving it to a considerable extent from discredit. To our astonishment, most of the delegations were almost more bitterly opposed to our new project than they had been to the first, this time insisting on the immediate closing of the session. We were once again blamed because, in proposing the immediate consideration of the disarmament project, we were asking the commission to retrace its steps, and our proposal was found to run counter to the more 'progressive' proposal of the French delegation to close the session and go home.

The agitation stirred up by our second project was so great that the chairman of the commission even found it necessary to reassure the

meeting at once by a most emphatic declaration that our new project would in no case be submitted to the consideration of the present session. Three times I tried vainly to get the chairman to give his reasons for this declaration, but could get no satisfactory reply or explanation. It was only pointed out that the delegates had not been prepared for our project, had not studied it, and had no instructions from their Governments. I had to remind the chairman and the commission that when draft disarmament conventions had been introduced by other delegations they had been discussed immediately; the American delegation had requested its Government for telegraphic instructions and the commission had actually suspended its sittings for some days pending a reply from America. I demanded equal rights for the Soviet delegation and their proposals, but again could get no satisfactory reply. By then the state of mind in the commission made it useless to expect reasonable, logical, and well-grounded discussion. A general resolution for the rejection of our first project for total disarmament, and for the postponement of the discussion of our second project, of the German delegation's proposal, and of the second reading of the commission's own project until the next session, the date for which was left to the chairman's discretion, was very hurriedly passed. . . .

This second reading will, however, only be possible when and if the present diplomatic negotiations lead to the removal of the dissensions referred to. If such an agreement is not arrived at the commission will probably never be convened again.

My report to the Fifteenth Congress of the Communist Party on the fourth session of the preparatory commission was published at the time in our press.[1] In that report I gave a detailed account of the so-called draft conventions drawn up by the commission itself, the second reading of which we have just spoken about. These projects, I would remind you, contain not a single figure, not a single formula, for the reduction of armaments. They merely enumerate the types of weapons, military supplies, different categories of war materials, naval and air armaments to be reduced. There is not a word in the draft convention of the extent of this reduction. The differences between the great Powers which they are now trying to compose by diplomatic means were evoked by the mere nomenclature and enumeration of what was to be reduced. Even so they have been unable to eliminate them in the course of twelve months. When the long-awaited agreement on nomenclature is at last arrived at, and the other States which are taking no part in the secret negotiations adhere to it, and if no new differences as to nomenclature arise at the second reading, only then will they begin on the numerical determination of the level of armed forces, separately for every item of

[1] *Borba za Razoruzhenie*, p. 52.

nomenclature and for every country. It will then be necessary to establish precisely how many rifles, cannon, aeroplanes, etc., each country may have. But does this project provide for any general coefficients or objective criteria for carrying out this highly complicated, delicate, and controversial work? Not at all. The commission or the conference is to be guided by article 8 of the Covenant of the League of Nations, which leaves it to each State to reduce its armaments according to its own security, geographical position, etc. Are there any indisputable, objective criteria for this security? Of course not. And if disputes between a few States about nomenclature cannot be settled in the course of twelve months, we may well ask how many years or decades will be needed for fifty or sixty States to agree upon the degree of security required for each of them and upon the quantity of armaments which would correspond with this debatable degree of security . . .

⟨If the aim of the Soviet delegation at Geneva had been simply to discredit the League of Nations, to expose the capitalist States represented in it, and, as Lord Cushendun expressed it, to tear from it the mask of pacifism, we might be highly satisfied with the results of the fifth session. There would be no need for us to speak or write about this, since the bourgeois press itself has done so, writing openly of the breakdown of the League of Nations, of its falling into disrepute and of its almost catastrophical condition.⟩[1]

Since, however, we are anxious to urge all nations towards real, immediate, and maximum disarmament, we are bound to express our sincere disappointment and extreme regret at the outcome of the work of the commission and the melancholy state of affairs in regard to disarmament revealed at the session.

The pacifism which I described in the beginning of my speech is trying to open new paths, to find new outlets. Almost simultaneously with the fifth session of the preparatory commission we heard of the proposal of the United States Government addressed to a number of selected States for the prohibition of war as an instrument of national policy . . . It might have been thought that this State at least would have supported our proposal for total disarmament, since armies and navies are merely instruments for war or the threat of war. If we have no intention of making or threatening war, why spend millions of the peoples' money on the maintenance of those armies and navies? I put this question to the American delegate at Geneva, without, however, getting a convincing reply. He said that 'disarmament alone would not create the confidence necessary to the realization of our tasks'. I was not quite clear which of 'our' tasks he meant. If he meant peace, it would seem easier to have

[1] This paragraph has been omitted from the Russian text used, but is to be found in *Vneshnyaya Politika*, p. 167.

confidence in a neighbouring State which showed its devotion to peace by destroying all offensive weapons, than if it stood before us fully armed and increasing its armaments, confining itself merely to a promise not to attack us. Had the United States demanded the moral prohibition of war in addition to material disarmament, we should have been the first to support the proposal. . . . Since the American delegation in Geneva saw no need to explain the absence of logic in their behaviour, we ourselves must seek answers to our perplexing questions. And so, as a conjecture, may I direct your attention to the formulation of the American proposal; it does not speak of the prohibition of war in general, but merely of the prohibition of war 'as an instrument of national policy'. The use of this qualification leads us to suppose that certain kinds of war will retain their legitimacy. If we had made such a proposal our sharp-eyed opponents would no doubt have hastened to draw the conclusion that we were leaving a loophole for civil war. No-one, however, would dare to make such an assumption with regard to the Government of the United States, yet it is obvious that some kind of war is to remain legalized. What kind? Is it not intended to preserve war for promoting international justice, as understood by the leading States, or for the, of course, disinterested settlement of other peoples' conflicts, or war in the name of humanity, as understood by the capitalist States, or, finally, war in defence of that civilization for which the Belgian representative pleaded, against those barbarians he was thinking of?

If our guess is right it becomes clear why the American delegation reject total disarmament.

I think the features and extent of the pacifism of capitalist Governments, which has its origin among the advocates of world war, of a fight to a finish, have been outlined clearly enough to distinguish it from that desire for peace consistently shown by the Soviet Government. . . .

Our opponents could find no other way of slurring over this distinction and discrediting the pacific moves of the Soviet delegation, the character of which became especially clear to the broad masses after the fifth session of the preparatory commission, than once more to spread ridiculous rumours through the French press, which was of course willing to oblige, about an attack in preparation by the Soviet Union on its nearest neighbours—Latvia, Estonia, Rumania, and, of course, 'inoffensive' Poland. The Soviet Government, you see, is experiencing difficulties and crises from which it can extricate itself only by some sort of military adventure. We know some of the sources of these rumours; we know the diplomats and military attachés who are especially zealous in spreading these rumours, which they themselves, of course, do not believe. But it is just because we do know the sources of these rumours that we become apprehensive; is it not the purpose of these rumours to

serve as a smoke-screen behind which preparations for a direct or indirect attack on the Soviet Union are being made? . . .

Even if we ignore the unceasing hostile outbursts against us by other countries, we must record the recent intensification all over the world of those same diplomatic and militarist tendencies which led in 1914 to a world war. What happened at the fifth session of the preparatory commission was nothing but the triumph of that same militarism which preceded and accompanied the war. Under cover of pacifist phraseology as to security guarantees and pacts of non-aggression, the same kind of political combinations which were the fruit of the practices of pre-war diplomacy are being effected. At the present time it is not only innocent-seeming treaties of non-aggression and arbitration, or rather, supplementary secret protocols which are being worked out; it is not only foreign offices that are at work, but in some countries the general staffs of the army and navy. This is no mere surmise on my part, it is a fact about which the People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs has the most reliable information. The only Soviet State at present in existence is too weak to influence this threatening course of international events. It can only warn the peoples against the danger threatening them; but the louder its warning voice and its appeals for peace and disarmament, the greater will be the efforts of other countries to silence this voice at all costs and to discredit it by insinuations, malicious slander, provocative rumours, scandal, etc. . . .

The peaceful policy of the Soviet Government is not to be changed by such methods of attack. So long as other Governments keep up such an irreconcilable position about disarmament, we, of course, shall not weaken the defensive power of our State, but will keep a careful watch on all the movements of our innumerable enemies. At the same time we declare, as we have declared before, that the primary aim of Soviet policy and Soviet diplomacy is to secure peaceful conditions for our internal creative work, without infringing on the national interests of any other State. The Soviet Government will not allow itself to be deflected from the path of that peaceful policy of which its proposal to all nations for complete, immediate, general disarmament is a striking manifestation.

EXTRACTS FROM AN INTERVIEW BY THE COMMISSAR FOR TRADE ON THE TENTH ANNIVERSARY OF THE DECREE NATIONALIZING FOREIGN TRADE

22 *April* 1928 *Pravda*, 22 *April* 1928

On 22 April 1918 one of the most important decrees[1] of the proletarian dictatorship was published, establishing a new commanding height in

[1] *Soviet Documents*, I, p 71.

the position of the proletarian State which was building socialism amid capitalist encirclement . . .

Having encountered the resistance not only of the overthrown exploiting classes of Russia, the landlords and capitalists, but also of the entire world bourgeoisie, the first Soviet Republic had quickly to erect a defence against the capitalists who were strangling socialism and to secure its defence from all class enemies, internal and external . . .

The nationalization of foreign trade, decreed on 22 April and given organizational form in the monopoly of foreign trade, was the principal fortress erected against economic intervention by the wealthy and powerful capitalist States. The foreign-trade monopoly, concentrating all the economic relations of the first proletarian State with all capitalist markets, creates the most favourable conditions for the rapid growth of our young socialist industry. It is the true guardian of the industrialization of our country. It secured a rate of reconstruction, and subsequently of new industrial construction, more rapid than anywhere in the world.

The foreign-trade monopoly is the primary protection of the planned beginnings and socialist foundations of our economic system and of its independence from attempts at intervention by world capitalism. In the form of the foreign-trade monopoly the proletarian State built for itself that defensive rock against which break the waves and blows of the world market, world exchanges, crises, and fluctuations.

The foreign-trade monopoly not only guards and assists the industrialization of our country, not only defends the planned basis of our economy from the anarchy of world capitalist markets, but also makes it difficult for foreign capital to get into direct contact with the remnants of the Russian bourgeoisie, with private capital and the kulak elements in the village which are growing weaker from day to day. That is why no external or internal difficulties in the past ten years have induced the Soviet Government to weaken the monopoly . . .

The foreign-trade monopoly is the only effective method of regulating our economic relations with the capitalist world while preserving the economic independence of the Soviet Union . . . The strength and importance of the foreign-trade monopoly for the future of our socialist development are well understood by our enemies also. Since the foreign-trade monopoly is a special form of the class struggle between two diametrically opposed economic systems, the Soviet and the capitalist, and since, better than anything else, it arms us in this struggle against the wealthy and powerful States, to that extent the capitalist countries unceasingly struggle against it . . . Now we have our trade missions and commercial organizations in all leading countries which are important to us economically and play a part in our trade turnover. The series of

trade agreements with a number of capitalist countries in which the forms of the foreign-trade monopoly are incorporated is a most important achievement . . .

Our enemies are particularly dissatisfied because, with the foreign-trade monopoly (1) they cannot get the colonial super-profits which exporters and importers gained in Russia before the war; (2) they cannot export or import the goods which are of greatest commercial interest to our trading partners if our economy is not interested in their export or import; (3) they cannot transform the Soviet market into an object of policy of world capital and thus cannot destroy the planned economy of the Union or disturb socialist construction; (4) it is impossible for foreign capital to expand freely in the USSR and hence to dominate, for example, our oil and manganese industries . . .

EXTRACTS FROM A NOTE FROM CHICHERIN TO THE POLISH AMBASSADOR IN MOSCOW ON THE ATTEMPT ON THE LIFE OF THE SOVIET TRADE REPRESENTATIVE IN WARSAW

7 *May* 1928 *Mezhdunarodnaya Politika, 1928,* p. 115

Last year's events have revealed beyond any doubt the absence of the most elementary conditions securing the normal activity and the very safety of the plenipotentiary representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in Warsaw. Eleven months have hardly passed since the tragic death of P. L. Voikov, Soviet plenipotentiary representative, when, on 4 May, criminal elements made an attempt on the life of A. S. Lizarev, trade delegate of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in Poland, which only because of accidental circumstances had no tragic consequences. Other circumstances which took place prior to that event have shown that the activities of criminal elements directed against the safety of the plenipotentiary representation of the USSR in Poland were not suspended even during the interval between these two events.

The denial of the organized character of all these attempts that occurred during the past year, and their presentation as the acts of eccentric or abnormal individuals who are by chance present on Polish territory, is contradicted if only by the very number of these attempts, as well as by the circumstance that until last year no such deeds were committed in Poland, although the same allegedly eccentric and abnormal individuals had been living there before. The particulars of these events and the circumstances which accompanied them leave no doubt as to the systematic and organized character of the attempts upon the life of the plenipotentiary representative and of the senior officers of the Soviet Embassy in Poland.

This unprecedented situation in which, contrary to all generally recognized international customs and guarantees of international law, the Soviet Embassy in Poland has found itself, has been caused not so much by the increased activities of the terrorist émigré organizations . . . as by the exceptionally favourable atmosphere for carrying out their criminal plans which these terrorist organizations have found in Poland. This atmosphere has been created by the assembly in Poland of a great number of criminal elements from among the White émigrés, as well as by the existence of a White émigré press which openly sympathizes with the terrorist acts directed against the Soviet representatives, and in practice the immunity enjoyed by that press, which in fact constitutes an encouragement of terrorist activities.

It is well known that considerable numbers of White émigrés are concentrated in other European States where there are also Soviet missions. In not one of these States, however, has the activity of the terrorist émigré organizations been able to assume the proportions it has attained in Poland in the course of last year. This refers also to other States bordering on the Soviet Union from the west, in spite of the fact that the terrorist organizations have been striving and are striving to use especially the neighbouring States as bases for their activities against the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Evidently the measures undertaken in other countries against the criminal elements among the Russian émigrés are more effective than the Polish in impeding the activities of the terrorist organizations, which fear reprisals both against individuals and against émigré organizations and colonies. There is no doubt that in Poland the terrorist organizations have, for this reason, found it easier to find people to carry out their criminal orders in Poland than elsewhere. Poland has thus become the scene of a terrorist struggle directed against the Soviet Union by émigré organizations which are getting assistance and financial support from obscure sources interested in creating complications between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and other States . . .

What has been said clearly indicates the inadequacy of the measures undertaken by the Polish Government against the criminal activities of the White émigrés, which are not only directed against the life of Soviet representatives, but are deliberately and systematically endeavouring to provoke a serious conflict between the two States. However, even these insufficient measures have been in practice nullified by the altogether unexampled inactivity of the Polish authorities . . .

Thanks to this inactivity of the Polish authorities, Soviet-Polish relations have been during the past year in effect at the mercy of the dark forces of the White emigration. A band of criminals was in a position not only to threaten the lives of Soviet representatives in Poland, but also

to disturb Soviet-Polish relations at any time when that was necessary and convenient for the leaders of the émigrés and their patrons and protectors.

The Government of the Soviet Union believes that the Polish Government itself should have come to the conclusion that the situation created by the circumstances presented above constitutes a direct threat to the relations between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Poland, and should, therefore, no longer be tolerated, and that serious and decisive measures should be undertaken immediately to ensure real security and immunity for the Soviet Mission in Poland, and for the protection of Soviet-Polish relations against incessant disturbances.

The Soviet Government therefore expects to receive immediate information from the Polish Government as to the measures adopted by it for the decisive suppression of the terrorist activities of the White émigrés in Poland.

PRESS INTERVIEW BY CHICHERIN ON JAPAN AND CHINA

22 *May* 1928 *Izvestia*, 22 *May* 1928

1. What is the attitude of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs to events in Tsinan and in general to the Japanese memorandum[1] concerning Northern China?

—Unconditionally negative. Anyone who has followed the policy of the Soviet Government throughout the ten years of its existence will easily understand that it cannot approve, either directly or indirectly, any form of intervention or military occupation in general, and particularly with regard to the Chinese people. The policy of the Soviet Government is one of good-neighbourly relations with China and unconditional non-interference in the internal affairs of China.

2. What is the attitude of other Powers to the Japanese memorandum?

—I do not possess complete information about all the Powers which have relations with China. According to such information as I have, Powers like England, the United States, and France, display a thoroughly approving attitude towards the steps taken by Japan in China.

3. How is this to be reconciled with the 'peaceful' role of the League of Nations, the projects for disarmament and 'eternal peace', and the convention against the import of arms into China?

— Logically they are, of course, irreconcilable. But words about peace in the League of Nations are one thing and facts of military

[1] *The Times*, 19 May 1928.

intervention are something totally different. Facts are stronger than words. Because of this the speeches of bourgeois statesmen about peace will not be trusted.

4. The upshot is that the League of Nations will wash its hands of the affair, tacitly sanctioning events in China?

— Yes, that is the upshot.

5. Is it true that Japanese forces took up their quarters in the 'military suburb' of the USSR in Peking?

— No, not completely true. At first we had information that some of the Japanese forces had taken up their quarters in the 'military suburb' of the USSR in Peking, despite the protest lodged by our consul in Peking. But later we received fuller information from which it transpires that after attempting to occupy the 'military suburb' Japanese forces later retreated and evacuated the 'military suburb'. The 'military suburb' is the property of the USSR and no forces of whatever country have a right to occupy it.

NOTE FROM CHICHERIN TO THE POLISH AMBASSADOR ON ANTI-SOVIET ACTIVITIES IN POLAND

16 *June* 1928 *Pravda*, 17 *June* 1928

In my note of 7 May I called your attention to the fact that the continuing absence of guarantees of the safety of the diplomatic mission of the USSR in Warsaw has become a direct threat to the relations between the USSR and Poland. In view of the situation created, the Soviet Government considered that the Polish Government should inform it immediately of the measures taken to secure finally and definitively the cessation of terrorist activities on the part of the White émigrés in Poland.

From your note of 3 June[1] the Soviet Government observes that the Polish Government considers that the warning given to the White émigrés in its statement of 14 August 1927[2] is sufficient to dispose of the present abnormal situation. The measures taken by the Polish Government on that basis, however, appear wholly inadequate to prevent the terrorist activities of the White émigré organizations, as may be seen by the latest attempt on 3 May.

Nor can the Soviet Government accept as adequate the measures taken by the Polish Government after the attack on Voitsekhovsky. In your note of 3 June you refer to a number of arrests made after that attack. But recently all the persons arrested in connexion with the

[1] *Mezhdunarodnaya Politika, 1928*, p. 117. [2] *Le Temps*, 17 August 1927.

attempt of 3 May were released. Such measures, having only a temporary effect, can scarcely make the required impression on the criminal circles of White émigrés in Poland.

The Soviet Government considers that to ensure the security of the Soviet diplomatic mission and to protect the relations between the USSR and Poland from constant shocks, more serious steps are necessary. Since the Polish Government, according to your note of 3 June, has taken and intends to take steps 'to make impossible in the future' any terrorist acts against the diplomatic mission of the USSR, the Soviet Government will await information as to the practical measures taken by the Polish Government.

Unless the Polish Government takes serious and decisive steps against the White émigrés, the Soviet Government cannot consider as satisfactorily settled the question put in my note of 7 May, and places on the Polish Government the responsibility for the security of the Soviet diplomatic mission in Poland.

EXTRACTS FROM A SPEECH BY STALIN ON THE PROGRAMME OF THE COMMUNIST INTERNATIONAL AT A MEETING OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE SOVIET UNION

5 *July* 1928 Stalin, xi, p. 150

As to the contents of the draft programme: it seems that certain comrades think the draft programme not entirely international in content, because, as they say, it has a 'too Russian' character. I have not heard such objections here, but such objections are made, it appears, in some Comintern circles.

What might give grounds for such an opinion? Perhaps the fact that there is a special chapter about the USSR in the draft programme? But what is there bad about that? Is our revolution in its *character* really a national and only a national revolution, and not primarily an international revolution? Why then do we call it the *basis* of the world revolutionary movement, the lever of revolutionary development in all countries, the fatherland of the world proletariat? . . .

It is true that the international character of our revolution imposes on the proletarian dictatorship in the USSR certain obligations in regard to the proletarian and oppressed masses of the entire world. Lenin was proceeding from this point of view when he said that the meaning of the existence of the proletarian dictatorship in the USSR consisted in doing everything possible for the development and triumph of the proletarian revolution in other countries. But what follows from this? It follows, at the least, that our revolution is part of the world

revolution, the basis and instrument of the world revolutionary movement.

It is also true that not only the revolution in the USSR has obligations and carries them out in regard to the proletarians of all countries, but the proletarians of all countries also have certain fairly serious obligations towards the proletarian dictatorship in the USSR. These consist in supporting the proletariat of the USSR in its struggle against internal and external foes, in war against war designed to crush the proletarian dictatorship in the USSR, in campaigning for the direct crossing over of the imperialist armies to the side of the proletarian dictatorship in the USSR in the event of an attack on the USSR. Does it not follow from this that the revolution in the USSR cannot be separated from the revolutionary movement in other countries, that the triumph of the revolution in the USSR is the triumph of the revolution throughout the world?

Is it really possible after all this to speak of the revolution in the USSR as of a purely national, isolated revolution, apart from its connexions with the revolutionary movement throughout the world?

And, on the other hand, is it really possible after all this to understand anything in the world revolutionary movement apart from its connexion with the proletarian revolution in the USSR?

What would the programme of the Comintern be worth, if, while dealing with the world proletarian revolution, it ignored the basic question of the character and tasks of the proletarian revolution in the USSR, of its obligations to the proletarians of all countries, of the obligations of the proletarians of all countries towards the proletarian dictatorship in the USSR?

TELEGRAM FROM CHICHERIN TO THE RUMANIAN FOREIGN MINISTER ON THE SALE OF FORMER RUSSIAN PROPERTY IN RUMANIA

29 *July* 1928 *Izvestia*, 31 *July* 1928

According to information received by the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs the sale by auction has begun in Galatz of various property belonging at one time to the Russian army, and of 200 steamers (tugs and other shipping property) belonging to the former firm, the Russo-Danubian Steamship Company, which was founded on capital provided exclusively by the Russian State.

According to generally accepted legal principles the said property belongs indisputably to the USSR. The Soviet Government regards this

property as being deposited with the Rumanian Government until such time as the relations between the two parties are settled.

In its communication[1] of 18 August 1921 the Soviet Government warned all Governments, including the Rumanian Government, that it would not recognize any transaction regarding its property concluded without its consent. The Government of the USSR, while protesting emphatically against the sale of this Soviet property, places on the Rumanian Government responsibility for any loss sustained by the Soviet Government.

The Government of the USSR gives notice that it reserves the right of claiming the property illegally sold. The sale by the Rumanian Government of property belonging to the USSR gives the Soviet Government cause to raise the question of the application of similar measures to Rumanian property at the disposal of the Soviet Government.

TASS STATEMENT ON THE POLISH PROTEST AGAINST BUKHARIN'S SPEECH AT THE COMINTERN CONGRESS

31 *July* 1928 *Izvestia*, 31 *July* 1928

Since the publication of Comrade Bukharin's speech at the Comintern congress[2] articles and statements have begun to appear in the foreign and particularly in the Polish press, asserting that this speech constitutes interference in Polish affairs.

According to information received by Tass from authoritative quarters, the Polish ambassador M. Patek, in an interview with the Vice-Commissar for Foreign Affairs Comrade Karakhan, attempted to argue from these statements and this point of view, despite their obvious lack of substance, and even to interpret Bukharin's speech as an infringement of article 5 of the treaty of Riga. A report to this effect was sent out some days ago by the semi-official Polish telegraph agency and appeared in the Polish press.

Comrade Karakhan expressed extreme surprise that M. Patek should consider it possible to make a protest on the said grounds. At the same time Comrade Karakhan reminded M. Patek that the Soviet Government had frequently explained that the Comintern was not a Government but a private organization, created by parties which operate with complete legality in a majority of States. Comrade Karakhan added that there are facts which really hamper rapprochement between the USSR and Poland, and mentioned the murder of Voikov, the attempt

[1] Summarized in *Manchester Guardian*, 24 August 1921.

[2] *Sechster Weltkongress der Kommunistischen Internationale*, Verlag Carl Hoym Nachfolger, Hamburg-Berlin, 1928.

on Comrade Lizarev, and the indulgence which the Polish authorities continue to display towards White émigrés whose aim is in fact direct interference in the internal affairs of the USSR.

PRESS STATEMENT BY CHICHERIN ON THE KELLOGG PACT

5 *August* 1928 — *Izvestia*, 5 *August* 1928

The so-called Kellogg pact, or, more exactly, the multilateral treaty for the prohibition of war as an instrument of national policy,[1] has been the centre of attention in diplomatic circles in all countries since December last. Throughout all that time there has been a lively exchange of opinions among the Powers about the drafting of the pact, but it did not occur to them to invite the USSR to take part in the negotiations. Clearly, the leading Governments in these negotiations could not have failed to consider whether or not to invite the USSR, and if they did not do so they had their own sufficient reasons.

This circumstance cannot fail to underline the real aims of the so-called Kellogg pact.

The omission of the Soviet Government from those taking part in the negotiations brings us in the first place to the thought that the real aims of the initiators of the pact obviously included and include the desire to make of it a means of isolating the USSR and of fighting against it. The negotiations for the conclusion of the pact are clearly a constituent part of the policy of encircling the USSR, which is at the present moment at the centre of international affairs. May I remind you that when our delegate Comrade Litvinov returned from the December session of the preparatory disarmament commission he gave in his report[2] a brief analysis of the Kellogg proposal and demonstrated brilliantly that the prohibition of war as an instrument of national policy was a metaphorical expression of the preparation of war as an instrument of world counter-revolution. The real object of the Kellogg pact becomes even clearer in the light of the French reservations included in the American Government's note[3] of 23 June transmitting to the Powers initiating the pact its second draft. The American Government emphasized that the second draft was meant to give expression to French demands. In its reply to this note the French Government still more frankly underlined that the object of the Kellogg pact was to preserve existing international treaty relations, but in a less sharp form this idea was expressed by the American Government also in sending out the second draft. The French Government contrasts war waged to further national policy with war to perpetuate the existing treaty relations of

[1] *U.S. Foreign Relations*, 1928, i, p. 153.
[2] *Soviet Union and Peace*, p. 151.
[3] *U.S. Foreign Relations*, 1928, i, p. 97.

the interested nations. In the opinion of the French Government, the first consists in the given Government acting on its own irrespective of existing relations with other States. The second implies that the States wage war to preserve existing treaty relations. Precisely for that reason the French treaties with Poland and Rumania are of the kind which form part of the general system of present treaty relations, so that a war arising from them is not war as an instrument of national policy, but a war to perpetuate existing peaceful and friendly relations between the signatories of the pact. When the American Government in communicating the revised draft pointed out that it met French requirements, it was not mistaken: it is really said in the pact that its signatories renounce war as an instrument of national policy in order to perpetuate existing peaceful and friendly relations between their peoples. In its covering note of 23 June the American Government explains in detail that the Covenant of the League of Nations, the Locarno agreements, and French treaties with a number of Powers, fall within the scope of the relations referred to in the Kellogg pact. This proves clearly that the Kellogg pact is an integral part of the preparation of war against the USSR. The same applies to the English reservations about the defence of a whole series of territories in different parts of the world being essential to the security of the British Empire, and that England will adhere to the pact only on condition that it is clearly recognized that it retains freedom of action in regard to the defence of these territories.

In its note of 23 June the American Government refers to the replies of the English and other Governments, and shows that no reservations made by them or by other Governments conflict with the second draft of the pact. Not only that, but the American Government maintains that the pact fully secures the legitimate interests of all its participants. The American Government goes even further and declares that any nation at any moment, regardless of the provisions of the treaties, has the right to decide whether circumstances require it to resort to war or not in its own legitimate defence, and if that nation should fight in a good cause, the entire world will applaud.

Not one of the Powers initiating the pact raised any objection to these definitions of its meaning. Not one of them disputed them. It seems to me that it should be clear to everybody that the point of all this diplomatic activity of the leading western Powers is directed against the USSR.

Recently certain new facts have appeared on the international scene in regard to the Kellogg pact. A considerable part of the German press has conducted a campaign to invite the USSR to be a signatory. Certain Liberal English papers such as the *Daily News*, and certain left-wing French papers and also a part of the American press have begun to

express the same idea. This expression of opinion in the press has raised the question whether it is possible to invite the USSR to participate in the Kellogg pact and whether it would agree to do so.

My answer to this is that it is still not too late. The pact has not been signed. Negotiations with the USSR as to its contents could still be held. Although the so-called inviting Powers have already agreed among themselves, if they really wanted to make of the pact something different from a means of preparing war against the USSR, they could easily open negotiations with the Soviet Government. Their desire or reluctance to do so will serve as proof of their real aims—peace or the preparation of war. I can state that our Government is prepared to take part in such negotiations. Their outcome will depend on their substance, but the Soviet Government does not consider it out of the question to sign the Kellogg pact. Up to now our Government has received neither an invitation to take part in the negotiations, nor the text of the proposed multilateral treaty, nor the suggestions and reservations proposed by other Powers. Only if we receive the official documents shall we be able to take part in the negotiations, and, if they are favourably concluded, take part also in the signing of the pact.

To put an end to war is one of the basic aims of Soviet policy. Our Government is trying by its policy to remove the possibility of any war. Whatever may be the objective results of a future war, our chief aim is to prevent any war. Among the wars which we are trying to prevent are those which serve as an instrument of national policy. Our Government therefore quite agrees that it is necessary to do everything to exclude the possibility of wars serving as an instrument of nationalist or imperialist policy, but it finds this proposed prohibition inadequate. Our press has done a great deal to explain the real meaning of the Kellogg pact. We thought it necessary to criticize the pact, and if we take part in the negotiations we shall put forward the amendments which we consider necessary. Our Government notes that the pact, already inadequate, is rendered still less valuable by the reservations made by France and England, and the right granted to all signatories to interpret the pact in the spirit of their own national or imperialist policy. In particular, our Government would emphasize that the Kellogg pact is made less valuable in the first place by the circumstance that it is not accompanied by any undertaking in regard to disarmament. Our delegate, Comrade Litvinov, spoke of this at the preparatory disarmament commission.

The chief task of the Soviet Union's foreign policy is the preservation of peace. Our Government's proposals on disarmament make this quite clear. Our Government is bound to try to use even the American draft pact to advance further in the struggle to maintain universal peace. We

do not conceal the fact that the attitude taken by the most influential section of the press in England, France, and the United States leaves little hope of the possibility of our taking part in the negotiations. Our Government regards it as thoroughly abnormal that the negotiations should proceed without its participation. If we were invited, then I repeat that the possibility of the signature of the Kellogg pact by our Government is not excluded.

CONVENTION WITH TURKEY ON THE INVESTIGATION AND SETTLEMENT OF FRONTIER DISPUTES

6 *August* 1928 *Sobranie Zakonov*, 1930, ii, p. 828

In order to simplify the investigation and settlement of minor frontier disputes and incidents

The Government of the USSR on the one hand, and the Government of the Turkish Republic on the other, have decided to conclude a convention, and have therefore authorized:

The Government of the USSR:

Yakov Surits, plenipotentiary representative of the USSR,
Vladimir Potemkin, Counsellor to the Embassy of the USSR,
Andrei Ivanchenko,
Andrei Kalandadze.

The Government of the Turkish Republic:

His Excellency Zekiai Bey, deputy for Diarbekir.

The said delegates, having presented their credentials, which were found to be adequate and drawn up in the appropriate manner, have agreed as follows:

1. All minor frontier incidents and disputes (article 2) which may arise after the entry into force of the present convention, shall be decided on the spot by the bodies and in the manner set forth in articles 3–14 of this convention.

Note. All frontier incidents and disputes which occurred before the entry into force of this convention shall be settled by diplomatic means. With the mutual consent of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs of the USSR and the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of the Turkish Republic, these matters may be examined and settled in the manner set forth in the present convention for minor incidents and disputes.

2. The term minor frontier incidents and disputes in the present convention is understood to mean:

(*a*) isolated cases of shooting at posts, sentries, and private persons in

the frontier area, provided that such shooting does not cause death, wounding, or material damage;

(*b*) crossing of the frontier without the necessary permission by local residents, customs officials, or frontier guards, provided that such crossing is of an accidental character and not effected with evil intent;

(*c*) detention of domestic animals which have crossed the frontier;

(*d*) carrying off cattle or other property from across the frontier;

(*e*) the crossing of the frontier by armed persons, provided it is not of a political character;

(*f*) damage to installations on water or land which are in the direct neighbourhood of the frontier;

(*g*) other frontier incidents and misunderstandings of the same character.

3. The representatives of the frontier authorities authorized to examine and settle minor frontier incidents and disputes are: for the USSR, the frontier commissioner, the same being in command of the frontier area; for the Turkish Republic, the chief frontier officer, or persons authorized by them.

The area of operations of the said functionaries and their permanent station shall be determined in a protocol to be attached to the present convention.

4. Decisions concerning the matters to be examined by the frontier commissioners or persons authorized by them referred to in article 3 of the present convention shall be taken by mutual agreement between the said functionaries of the USSR and the Turkish Republic. These decisions are to be put in writing in the briefest possible form, drawn up and signed in two copies, one in the Russian and one in the Turkish language.

5. Should agreement not be reached, the matter is to be transferred for settlement by the Governments of the contracting parties. In these cases the above-mentioned functionaries of each party shall only undertake an investigation, and each side shall send the material collected to the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs of the USSR and the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of the Turkish Republic respectively.

6. The decisions of the functionaries referred to in article 3 concerning questions indicated in paragraphs (*a*), (*b*), (*c*), (*e*), and (*g*) of article 2, and also decisions on the return of detained property and cattle, are binding on both sides.

Should it be impossible to make compensation in kind of stolen property or cattle, and also in regard to losses referred to in paragraph (*f*) of article 2, the commissioners shall confine themselves to establishing

the facts; compensation for the property, cattle, or losses shall be made by the guilty persons in the manner required by the laws of each of the two countries.

7. The functionaries referred to in article 3 shall by mutual agreement set up special control and crossing stations, where statements and letters on these matters shall be drawn up, frontier questions examined, and decisions taken put into effect, in particular, the readmission of persons detained by one of the contracting parties, and the return of animals and property.

8. The frontier commissioners of each party and persons authorized by them have the right to cross the frontier in order to proceed to the meeting places mentioned in article 10 on business connected with the investigation of frontier incidents and disputes on the basis of documents issued, for the USSR, by the local frontier authorities and the local agents of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, and for the Turkish Republic, by the chief frontier officer.

These documents shall be endorsed for each separate crossing of the frontier by the functionaries (article 3) of the other contracting party at the control and crossing stations mentioned in the attached protocol.

9. To facilitate the settlement of conflicts the functionaries referred to in article 3 of the present convention have the right, should the need arise, to issue permits to complainants, witnesses, or experts of their country for a one-time crossing of the frontier. These permits shall be endorsed by the functionaries of the other contracting party.

Plaintiffs, witnesses, and experts shall not carry arms on the territory of the other party.

10. Meetings between the functionaries referred to in article 3 to investigate and settle frontier incidents and disputes shall take place at the meeting places or frontier crossing stations mentioned in the protocol attached to this convention, on the proposal of either party.

11. The functionaries referred to in article 3 shall, when on the territory of the other party for the purpose of settling frontier incidents and disputes, enjoy personal immunity and the right to wear the uniform of their service.

The said persons have the right to transport duty free food supplies and such articles as are necessary for their work (office equipment, etc.); the weight of such luggage shall not exceed 30 kilograms per person. Luggage is subject to the usual customs inspection.

Note: The term personal immunity is here understood to mean the right of the said functionaries, when on the territory of the other party, not to be subjected to personal search, nor to be detained, except when legally sentenced for an offence against public law.

12. Persons permitted to cross the frontier in the manner stipulated in article 9 are under the protection of the laws in force in the country on whose territory they find themselves. Such persons are allowed to take with them food supplies for one day without the payment of customs duties, but subject to customs inspection.

13. Upkeep and travelling costs of the functionaries engaged on the matters provided for in this convention shall be borne by each side independently, but each side shall enjoy the co-operation of the other side in the provision of means of transport and accommodation, and also in regard to obtaining documents and depositions required in the investigation.

14. Should the functionaries of either side find it necessary to question a witness or complainant on the territory of the other side, the said questioning shall be conducted by the functionaries of the side to which the witness or complainant belongs, in the presence of the functionaries of the other side.

15. The first meeting of the functionaries referred to in article 3 to organize the work in their area shall be held not later than one month after the entry into force of this convention.

16. The present convention enters into force one month after the day on which declarations concerning its ratification are exchanged between the Governments of the contracting parties.

The parties shall exchange the said declarations with as little delay as possible.

17. The present convention shall be valid for three years.

18. The present convention is drawn up in three original copies in the Russian, Turkish, and French languages. For purposes of interpretation the French text will be regarded as authentic.

CONVENTION WITH TURKEY ON THE CROSSING OF THE SOVIET-TURKISH FRONTIER BY INHABITANTS OF THE FRONTIER ZONE

6 *August* 1928 *Sobranie Zakonov*, 1930, ii, p. 382

In conformity with article 7 of the treaty of Kars[1] concluded on 13 October 1921, the Central Executive Committee of the USSR on the one part, and the President of the Turkish Republic on the other, inspired by the desire to establish good-neighbourly relations and to facilitate economic intercourse between the residents of the frontier zone of the Georgian SSR and the Turkish Republic, have decided to conclude

[1] *Soviet Documents*, i, p. 263.

a convention regarding the crossing of the frontier and have appointed for this purpose the following plenipotentiaries:

For the USSR: Yakov Surits, plenipotentiary envoy extraordinary of the USSR,
Vladimir Potemkin, Counsellor to the Embassy of the USSR,
Andrei Ivanchanko,
Andrei Kalandadze.

For Turkey: His Excellency Zekiai Bey, deputy for Diarbekir,

who, having exchanged their credentials, which were found to be in due and proper form, have agreed to the following:

1. Inhabitants of the contiguous districts of the Georgian SSR and the Turkish Republic permanently domiciled in villages and towns situated on either side of the frontier to a depth of 10 kilometres shall enjoy the right to cross the State frontier between the USSR and the Turkish Republic according to the following regulations:

2. The persons mentioned in article 1 have the right to cross the frontier at the permit posts situated on the Russian side at Sarp, Maraditi, Orjoshani, and Karzakh, and on the Turkish side at Sarp, Maraditi, Badela, and Kenabrel.

The substitution of other posts for those mentioned in this article shall be made during the validity of the present convention by agreement between the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs of the USSR and the Turkish Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

3. Inhabitants of the frontier zone are permitted to cross the frontier for the following purposes:

(*a*) to do their work, agricultural, constructional, or other;
(*b*) to search, with the help of the local authorities, for lost cattle or stolen property;
(*c*) to give medical assistance or consult with physicians;
(*d*) to trade, within the limits of the trade treaty;
(*e*) on family affairs;
(*f*) to give help in the event of misfortunes (fires, floods, etc.).

4. The frontier may be crossed only between sunrise and sunset except in the following cases, when the frontier may also be crossed at night:

(*a*) in the case of fires, fire brigades are permitted to cross the frontier;
(*b*) when medical assistance is urgently required, medical personnel and close relatives of the sick person are permitted to cross.

5. The frontier may be crossed on presentation of a pass issued in the customary manner by the district authorities in the Georgian SSR and

by the authorities of the nahiye, kaza, or vilayet in the Turkish Republic. These passes shall be valid for fifteen days only from the day of issue. If at the expiration of that term the bearer of the pass has not recrossed the frontier, the local authority shall grant an extension to enable him to return to his own country. If at the expiration of the extension he has still not recrossed the frontier, the local authority may apply to him the laws of the country regarding entry and sojourn on its territory without the necessary permit.

On crossing the frontier it is necessary to present together with the pass a certificate of identity issued in accordance with the regulations in force in the country of permanent domicile of the person crossing the frontier.

Note 1. The two parties shall provide each other with a list of persons and administrative frontier bodies authorized to issue permits together with information as to the section of the frontier to which their authority to issue such passes extends.

Note 2. Persons who have crossed with these passes into the territory of the neighbouring State must register their pass with the local authorities.

6. Persons who have crossed the frontier shall have the right to move freely on the territory of the other State only within the 10-kilometre frontier zone. Permission to cross the frontier in the manner set forth in the present convention shall be given not more than once a month.

Note: Permission to cross the frontier more than once a month shall be given only to persons who cross for agricultural work. In other exceptional cases such permission may be given with the mutual consent of the frontier authorities of the two countries.

7. No other formalities are required for passes than registration and inspection, which shall be made free of charge.

8. The following persons shall not enjoy the right to cross the frontier in the manner set forth in the present convention:

(*a*) persons guilty of handing their passes to other persons and those who use passes which do not belong to them;

(*b*) persons to whom the authorities of the other party request that passes shall not be issued;

(*c*) persons who have been punished under the laws of either party for smuggling, unauthorized crossing of the frontier, or banditry;

(*d*) persons awaiting or on trial.

9. Articles and objects, already worn or used by the persons crossing the frontier, as for example clothes, linen, tools and instruments of a

trade or profession required for a short-term stay, draught animals and their harness to a number in keeping with the object of the journey, and also food supplies not exceeding in weight 10 kilograms per person, shall not be subject to any tax or duty.

10. Each of the contracting parties retains the right to apply the regulations in force for the prohibition or limitation of the import or export of any article.

11. On returning to their own country persons who have crossed the frontier may take with them only the articles and objects which they had when they crossed the frontier.

Other articles or goods which they wish to take with them shall be subject to the ordinary customs regulations.

12. Should the area adjacent to the other party be declared threatened with epidemic sickness, each of the contracting parties has the right to apply all the regulations provided for such a case.

13. The present convention shall not apply to the crossing of the frontier by persons accompanying herds of cattle, which crossing is the subject of the pasture convention.[1]

14. To facilitate the use of the lands within the three-kilometre zone of the frontier belonging to inhabitants of the frontier area, passes shall be issued valid for one year.

These passes shall be registered and endorsed by the relevant local authorities once for the entire period, and free of charge.

The provision regarding free movement on the neighbouring State set forth in article 6 shall be applied to persons crossing the frontier in accordance with this article.

On crossing the frontier with an annual pass the certificate of identity referred to in article 5 must be presented.

15. The passes referred to in articles 5 and 14 shall be drawn up in the Georgian, Russian, and Turkish languages in the following form:

I. Pass

Valid for 15 days (article 5)
Surname and first name
Patronymic
Age
Height
Colour of eyes
Colour of hair
Colour of beard
Distinguishing marks
Nationality

[1] *Sobranie Zakonov*, 1929, II, p. 605.

Certificate of domicile. Destination and purpose of crossing. Persons accompanying bearer (mother, wife, daughters, unmarried sisters, sons under 12 years).

. . . information about whom is given above, residing in the village or kaza of . . . is permitted to cross the frontier.

This pass is valid for fifteen days.

Date, signature, and stamp.

II. Pass

Valid for one year (article 14)
Surname and first name
Patronymic
Age
Height
Colour of eyes
Colour of hair
Colour of beard
Distinguishing marks
Nationality
Distance of land from frontier
Certificate of domicile

Persons accompanying bearer (mother, wife, daughters, unmarried sisters, sons under 12 years).

. . . information about whom is given above, residing in the village or kaza of . . . owner of land in the village of . . . is permitted to cross the frontier to cultivate the said land. He has the right: (1) to take with him draught cattle, carts, tools and instruments, provisions, seed and everything required for this purpose; (2) to bring back with him the harvest, and (3) to cross to his land at night in case of need.

The present pass is valid for one year and must be presented once to the local authorities.

Date, signature, and stamp.

16. The present convention shall enter into force when the instruments of ratification are exchanged.

It shall be ratified as soon as possible.

Ratifications shall be exchanged in Ankara.

The present convention shall be valid for 5 years.

If neither of the contracting parties denounces it or requests its amendment six months before its expiration, it shall remain in force until one year has elapsed from the day when either of the contracting parties denounces it or requests its amendment.

In witness whereof the plenipotentiaries have signed this agreement and affixed thereto their seals.

Done in Ankara in two copies, 6 August 1928.

NOTE FROM LITVINOV TO THE RUMANIAN FOREIGN MINISTER ON THE SALE OF SOVIET PROPERTY IN RUMANIA

11 *August* 1928 *Izvestia*, 17 *August* 1928

In connexion with your communications of 4 August,[1] may I bring it to your attention that the Soviet Government continues to hold the Rumanian Government responsible for any material loss which the Union may suffer from the sale of Soviet property undertaken by the Rumanian Ministry of Transport.

Since the Soviet Government has no knowledge of the condition of the vessels at the time of their sale, and cannot therefore correctly estimate their value, it reserves the right not to recognize the contracts under which the Rumanian Government intends to sell property belonging to the Soviet Union.

Nor can the Soviet Government accept the information that the sums received for the sale of the shipping property shall be handed over to the owner as subsequently established by the Rumanian Government. The Soviet Government has repeatedly declared and declares now that the only lawful owner of the property to be sold is the Soviet Government. These property rights apply to all the property mentioned in your telegram as well as to all other property of the former Russian army and the Russo-Danubian Steamship Company.

TASS STATEMENT ON THE INVITATION TO THE USSR TO SIGN THE KELLOGG PACT

28 *August* 1928 *Izvestia*, 28 *August* 1928

On 27 August the French ambassador M. Herbette, on the instructions of his Government, handed to the Vice-Commissar for Foreign Affairs M. M. Litvinov an official invitation to the Government of the USSR to adhere to the pact outlawing war (the so-called Kellogg pact). M. Herbette stated on behalf of his Government that what was in view was adherence to the pact on the same conditions and with the same privileges as are granted to those Powers which signed the pact on 27 August. Thereupon M. Herbette handed Comrade Litvinov a copy of the signed pact.

[1] *Izvestia*, 17 August 1928.

Comrade M. M. Litvinov asked the ambassador to transmit to him officially a list of all the Governments to which such an invitation had been extended, as well as all the documents bearing on the diplomatic correspondence concerning the pact, stating that the said information was required by the Soviet Government for an examination of the proposal transmitted by the French ambassador.

Simultaneously with the signature in Paris of the pact outlawing war, the ambassador of the United States in the countries not included among the fifteen original signatories of the pact extended to the Governments to which they are accredited the invitation to adhere to the signed document. As has already been reported in the press, a different procedure was foreseen in regard to the USSR, that is, the invitation to sign the pact was extended by the French Government and made on its instructions by the French ambassador in Moscow.

Thus the initiators of the pact against war *officially* took a step which was certainly not foreseen when the idea of the pact first came up. By this we mean the invitation to the Soviet Government. There is no doubt whatever that the step, however disagreeable it may be to some of the fifteen original signatories, was forced on them by the repercussions of the Soviet Government's statement that *without the USSR* the pact would inevitably carry an *anti-Soviet sting*. A great many European and American papers observed that without the signature of the USSR the Kellogg pact could not be regarded as a completed document. However temptingly the picture was drawn for certain signatories of the pact of *formal freedom of action* in regard to an *offensive war against the USSR*, the initiators of the pact clearly had no other alternative but to pay attention to the sentiments of considerable sections of the public in Europe and America and officially invite the USSR to adhere to the pact.

Nor was that all. In order that the invitation itself to immediate adherence should be extended on the same day that the pact was signed, its initiators had to depart in a certain degree from the procedure required in the document itself. We have already noted that the third paragraph of the pact contains a provision for the adherence of States not included among the original signatories, but only after the pact had been ratified by the fifteen signatories and had entered into force. Thus, according to the original plan, it might happen that the entry into force of the pact for each of the fifteen, on the one hand, and for a number of the remaining States, *would not have coincided in time*. It would follow that the original signatories of the pact would *retain freedom* for offensive action against one or another of the States which did not take part in the ceremony of 27 August, for an indefinite period of time. Now, clearly, this has been changed, and the pact will enter into force *at one and the same moment* for the fifteen signatory States and for all those

which adhere to the pact between the time of its signature and its ratification.

This departure from the original intention similarly corresponds to the tendency expressed in the statements of the newspapers to which we referred earlier.

It should be noted that only the *basic text of the pact* was signed yesterday in Paris. It was this text which was handed to the Soviet Government by the French ambassador. This indicates that the reservations to the pact made by the French and English Governments (as well, of course, as those which may be made by any other State adhering to the pact) are left merely for eventual interpretation of the pact by the participant which makes the reservations, and has no binding force for any other participant. It must be emphasized that putting the question in this way makes the obligations under the pact which have a categorical character in the text of the pact itself, *extremely elastic* and consequently *extremely imprecise.*

Commenting recently on the statement of the Assistant State Secretary of the United States, Castle, we pointed out that both in the procedure of adherence, and in the obligations imposed by the pact, there were a number of *unclear* factors. M. Herbette's official statement removed *part* of these doubts. Comrade Litvinov's request for additional information, referring to the documentary side of the question, indicates what is still *not altogether clear.* A full elucidation of all the details will undoubtedly enable an answer to be given to the invitation extended yesterday to the Government of the USSR.

EXTRACTS FROM LITVINOV'S NOTE TO THE FRENCH AMBASSADOR IN MOSCOW ON SOVIET ADHERENCE TO AND COMMENTS ON THE KELLOGG PACT

31 *August* 1928 *Vneshnyaya Politika*, p. 335

On 27 August you were so kind as to bring officially to my notice that . . . (*e*) the Government of the French Republic accepted the commission of bringing to the attention of the Government of the USSR through you the text of the said pact and of inquiring whether it was willing to adhere to the pact, and that (*f*) if so, you were authorized to accept the act of adherence for transmission to Washington.

In informing you by this note of the reply of the Government of the USSR to your inquiry, I have the honour to request you to transmit the following to your Government for further transmission to the Government of the United States of America:

1. Having from the very first days of its existence made it the basis

of its foreign policy to maintain and secure general peace, the Soviet Government has always and everywhere acted as a consistent partisan of peace and has met half-way any step taken in that direction. In regard to this question the Soviet Government considered and still considers that the only effective means of averting armed conflicts is the carrying into effect of the plan for complete and universal disarmament, for in an atmosphere of universal feverish arming any rivalry among the Powers inevitably leads to war, which is the more destructive the more the armaments system has been improved. A detailed plan for total disarmament was submitted by the Soviet delegation to the preparatory commission of the League of Nations disarmament conference, but unfortunately it found no support from the majority of the commission, including the representatives of those same Powers which are original signatories of the pact signed in Paris. The plan was rejected, although its acceptance and execution would have meant a real guarantee of peace.

2. Being unwilling to let slip any opportunity of lightening the burden of armaments which weighs upon the popular masses, the Soviet Government, after its proposal for total disarmament was rejected, not only did not refuse to examine the question of the partial reduction of armaments, but through its delegation at the preparatory commission itself put forward a detailed proposal for partial, though quite substantial disarmament. However, the Soviet Government must unfortunately observe that this plan too met with no sympathy in the preparatory commission, which thus, by the open opposition to the Soviet proposals, from almost all the States which were the first to attach their signature to the pact suppressing war, gave a further demonstration of the utter powerlessness of the League of Nations in regard to disarmament, which is the surest guarantee of peace and the most effective means of abolishing wars.

3. Together with its consistent advocacy of disarmament the Soviet Government, pursuing its pacific policy, proposed to other Powers, long before the idea of the pact now signed in Paris arose, the conclusion of bilateral pacts renouncing not only war, as provided in the Paris pact, but any and every kind of aggression and armed conflict. Some States, such as Germany, Turkey, Afghanistan, Persia, and Lithuania, accepted the proposal and signed such pacts with the Soviet Government; other States ignored the proposal and declined to answer, while still others rejected the proposal on the strange ground that the unconditional renunciation of aggression was inconsistent with their obligations towards the League of Nations. This however did not prevent the same Powers from signing the Paris pact, which says nothing at all about the inviolability of those obligations.

4. The facts enumerated above prove indisputably that the idea of

eliminating war and armed conflicts from international policy is the basic and guiding idea of Soviet foreign policy. Nevertheless those who took the initiative in the Paris pact did not consider it necessary to invite the Soviet Government to take part in the conversations preceding the pact, or in drawing up its text. Nor were those Powers invited which are genuinely interested in securing peace either because they have been the victims of aggression (Turkey, Afghanistan) or are its victims now (the republic of the great Chinese people). Nor does the invitation to adhere to the pact transmitted by the French Government contain provisions which would allow the Soviet Government to exert any influence on the text of the instrument signed in Paris. The Soviet Government, however, proceeds on the axiomatic assumption that it can in no circumstances be deprived of the right which the Governments that have signed the pact have or could have exercised, and, in virtue of this right, it must make a number of preliminary remarks about its attitude to the pact.

5. In the first place, the Soviet Government is compelled to express its most profound regret at the absence from the Paris pact of any obligation whatever to disarm. The Soviet delegation to the preparatory commission has already had occasion to state that only the coupling of the pact prohibiting war with total and universal disarmament can really provide effective means for the securing of general peace, while, on the contrary, an international treaty 'prohibiting war' will remain a dead letter without any real content whatever unless it is accompanied at least by such an elementary guarantee as the limitation of armaments, which are steadily growing. The recent public statements of some of the participants in the Paris pact about the inevitability of further armaments even after its signature support this contention. The new international political groupings now arising, in particular in connexion with the question of naval armaments, give it still sharper emphasis. The situation thus created makes it now more than ever imperative to take decisive steps towards disarmament.

6. Turning now to the text of the pact, the Soviet Government considers it necessary to point out that in the first article the formula for the prohibition of war lacks definition and clarity, leaving the way open to varied and arbitrary interpretations. For its part it suggests that every international war should be prohibited, whether as an instrument of so-called 'national policy' or as serving other aims (for example the suppression of national liberation movements, etc.). The Soviet Government is of the opinion that the prohibition should apply to war not only in the formal juridical sense of the word (i.e. assuming the 'declaration' of war, etc.), but also to such warlike actions as intervention, blockade, the military occupation of foreign territory and foreign ports, etc. The

history of the last few years provides not a few instances of such warlike actions, bringing enormous misery to peoples. The Soviet Republics themselves were the object of such attacks, and at the present time the 400 million Chinese are suffering from such attacks. Moreover, such warlike actions frequently develop into large-scale wars which by then it is completely impossible to stop. But these questions, of such importance from the standpoint of maintaining peace, are passed over in silence in the pact. Moreover, the same first article speaks of the necessity of settling all international disputes and conflicts solely by peaceful means; the Soviet Government is of the opinion that in this connexion the non-peaceful means to be prohibited by the pact should also include the refusal to establish normal peaceful relations or the severance of such relations between nations, since acts of this character, which eliminate the channels for the peaceful settlement of disputes, aggravate relations and help to create an atmosphere favourable to the outbreak of war.

7. Among the reservations made in the diplomatic correspondence between the original signatories of the pact, the Soviet Government pays particular attention to the reservations of the British Government made in paragraph 10 of its note of 19 May this year.[1] Under this reservation the British Government retains freedom of action in a number of regions which are not specifically enumerated. If this refers to regions forming part of the British Empire or its Dominions, they are all of them already included in the pact, and cases of aggression against them are already provided for in the pact, so that the British reservations in regard to them might appear, to say the least, superfluous. But if it refers to other areas, the signatories to the pact have the right to know precisely where the British Government's freedom of action begins and where it ends. But the British Government reserves to itself freedom of action not only in the event of military attack on these areas, but in regard to any 'unfriendly' act or so called interference, while it clearly reserves to itself the arbitrary right of determining what constitutes an 'unfriendly' act or 'interference' which would justify open military action on its part. To recognize such a right would mean to justify war and might serve as an infectious example to other signatories, who, in virtue of their equality of rights, would also arrogate to themselves the same right in regard to other areas, and in the end there might not remain anywhere on earth to which the pact could be applied. Indeed, the British Government's reservation includes an invitation to another signatory of the pact to exclude some other areas from its scope. The Soviet Government can only regard this reservation as an attempt to use the pact itself as an instrument of imperialist policy. However, the British note in question

[1] *U.S. Foreign Relations*, 1928, i, p. 66.

was not communicated to the Soviet Government as an integral part of the pact or as an annex thereto, and therefore it cannot be regarded as binding on the Soviet Government, any more than the other reservations contained in the diplomatic correspondence concerning the pact between its original signatories. Similarly, the Soviet Government cannot agree with all the other reservations which might serve to justify war, in particular with the reservations made in the correspondence referred to excluding from the scope of the pact decisions arising from the Covenant of the League of Nations and the Locarno agreements.

8. What has been said above may be summed up in the following observations: the absence from the pact of the obligation to disarm, which is the only essential element in guaranteeing peace, the inadequacy and indefiniteness of the formula for prohibiting war, and the presence of a number of reservations designed to exclude in advance even the likeness of an obligation towards the cause of peace. Nevertheless, since the Paris pact objectively contains certain obligations on the part of the Powers towards public opinion and gives the Soviet Government a further opportunity of putting to all signatories of the pact the question which is most important in regard to peace, that is, the question of disarmament, the settlement of which provides the only guarantee that wars will be avoided, the Soviet Government expresses its consent to adhere to the Paris pact.

In keeping with the foregoing, I shall have the honour of forwarding to you my Government's instrument of adherence to the pact as soon as the formalities connected therewith are concluded.

EXCHANGE OF NOTES WITH LITHUANIA CONSTITUTING A COMMERCIAL ARRANGEMENT

24 *September* 1928 *Sobranie Zakonov*, 1929, II, p. 310

In the *Government Gazette*, No. 272, an order signed by the Minister of Finance was published announcing the establishment of higher customs duties in respect of goods imported into Lithuania from countries with which it has no commercial agreements. In this connexion, on instructions from my Government, I have the honour to request you to be good enough to inform me whether the Lithuanian Government contemplate applying the increased tariff to goods imported from the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics into Lithuania, having regard to the fact that the USSR is applying and intends to apply in the future the principle of most-favoured-nation treatment to goods imported from Lithuania into the USSR.

At the same time I have the honour to observe that the principle of most-favoured-nation treatment does not affect

(*a*) exemptions which the USSR grants or may grant to Estonia, Latvia, Finland, and States on the continent of Asia bordering on the USSR;

(*b*) exemptions which the Lithuanian Government grants or may grant to Estonia and Latvia;

(*c*) exemptions which are or may be granted to frontier States to facilitate local traffic within the frontier zone to a depth not exceeding 15 kilometres on either side.

3. The consent of the Lithuanian Government to the above-mentioned does not prejudice the right of either the Lithuanian Government or the Government of the USSR at any time to revoke these stipulations upon six months' notice given to the other party.

[The reply of the Lithuanian Government, of the same date, corresponds, *mutatis mutandis*, to the terms of the Soviet note.]

TREATY OF FRIENDSHIP AND COMMERCE WITH THE YEMEN

1 *November* 1928

State Papers, cxxix, p. 949
Sbornik Dogovorov, vi, p. 6

In conformity with the good will and wishes of the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the one part and of His Majesty the King of the Yemen, the Imam Yahia, the son of the Imam Mohammed Hamideddin, and his Government, on the other, and the efforts of both parties to establish normal official relations, and also to lay the foundations of economic intercourse between the two countries, and to promote the development of such intercourse; and based also on the grounds of sincerity in the establishment of friendly relations between the two Governments and their peoples, and on the recognition of the mutual equality of the parties in everything that concerns the rights and general circumstances that exist between the countries and peoples;

The above-mentioned parties have agreed to conclude this treaty of friendship and commerce, and to regard it as a preliminary step towards those negotiations for the conclusion of the requisite agreements that future circumstances may make necessary consequent on the measure of the development and expansion of the economic connexions between the two countries, such as those concerning commerce or others on which both parties shall have agreed. At the present time they have agreed to the following:—

1. The Government of the USSR recognize the complete and absolute independence of the Government of the Yemen region and its

King, His Majesty the Imam Yahia, the son of the Imam Mohammed Hamideddin, and his sovereignty. His Majesty the King of the Yemen and his Government value the sincere disposition and noble sentiments which the Government of the USSR cherish towards the Yemen State and its people, and also towards the other nations of the East. And therefore between the contracting parties there have been established official relations in harmony with the preamble stated above.

2. The contracting parties undertake to facilitate commercial intercourse between the two States. In accordance with this undertaking the nationals of both parties shall have the right, after receiving permission for that purpose, to enter into the territory of the other State, and in accordance with its laws to stay there, occupying themselves with commerce and carrying out all necessary activities on condition that all cases which may arise between the nationals of the two parties shall be decided by the local courts of the State in which they are, and in accordance with its legislation.

Trade in goods that are prohibited by the laws of one of the parties may be forbidden, and the goods confiscated by either of the Governments should such be found within its territory.

The contracting parties undertake to assist in granting every facility compatible with local legislation in respect of the taxes and customs duties on the goods belonging to the nationals of the two States.

3. This treaty shall enter into force and be applied by both Governments after it has been signed and ratified by the Government of the USSR in the customary official manner, with effect from the day when His Majesty the King of Yemen, the Imam Yahia, receives an official intimation from the above-mentioned Government.

4. This treaty of friendship and commerce shall continue in force and be applied for a period of 10 years, reckoning from the date specified in article 3. On the expiration of that period, the continuance of the treaty or its replacement by another shall depend on the wish of both contracting parties, and on whatsoever agreement they may arrive at in the future.

5. This treaty of friendship and commerce is called 'the Treaty of Sanaa'.

It consists of a preamble, the conclusion that follows below, and 5 articles, including the present one. It is drawn up in the Arabic language in two copies, which have to be exchanged between the two contracting parties.

Conclusion

For the preparation of this treaty for final ratification in accordance with articles 3 and 4, it has been signed in Sanaa, the capital of Yemen,

by the delegate of the Government of the USSR, the citizen Astakhov, on behalf of that Government, and by Kadi Mohammed Ragib, delegate representing His Majesty the King of Yemen, the above-mentioned Imam, after their full and complete mutual agreement as to both the text and the meaning of the treaty.

EXTRACTS FROM A REPORT BY LITVINOV TO THE CENTRAL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

10 *December* 1928 *Vneshnyaya Politika*, p. 3

. . . As before the world war, so after it, the chief if not the only arbiters of the fate of world policy are the so-called great Powers, or, to make myself better understood, let me say the imperialist Powers. The only change in the situation made by the world war is that the States which were defeated in that war have quitted the so-called concert of great Powers, as well as the Russian Empire, transformed by the will of its workers and peasants into the Soviet Union, which by its nature can have nothing in common with any kind of imperialist policy. What is also new in the situation is that the imperialist Powers have succeeded in creating a very powerful organ, called the League of Nations, whose help they frequently employ to realize their aims.

Immediately after their successful world war and their unsuccessful armed intervention on the territory of our Union, these Powers were engaged primarily in healing their own wounds, in bringing their domestic affairs into order, stabilizing their currencies, and consolidating their victory, i.e. completing the process of disarming the defeated countries and bringing them to complete submission. This process was completed comparatively recently; the conclusion of the Locarno agreements may be regarded as its last phase. These have substantially restricted the freedom of political manœuvre of the principal opponent of these Powers in the world war, Germany. While they thus represent the consummation of the policy of the victor countries in the first post-war period, the Locarno agreements may also be regarded as the beginning of a new and more active policy on their part, pursuing new aims though using old means and methods. The end of the Locarno conference coincided with a notable revival of the diplomatic activity of capitalist States. Lively diplomatic intrigues on pre-war lines are proceeding, new goals are being marked out, new political combinations, groupings, and regroupings are being formed, military alliances, and, precisely as in the years before the war, political negotiations are gradually passing from the chancelleries to the staff headquarters, diplomatic conversations alternate with the visits of generals and

admirals, and as a result the outlines of a new and bloody conflict are beginning to appear more and more clearly, even the probable theatres of approaching hostilities are becoming defined. The clearest examples of this kind of diplomatic activity are, we must agree, the well-known Anglo-French agreement[1] and the recent Anglo-Japanese negotiations.[2] The participants in this agreement and these negotiations officially maintain that they have discussed questions of a limited significance only—Britain and France, questions connected with disarmament; Britain and Japan, the co-ordination of action in China. The broader aims attributed to these conversations are denied; but this official denial fails to inspire confidence not only in our country, but also in those whose Governments secretly, behind their peoples' backs, take part in these diplomatic activities. It is enough to glance at the English press to see that we are dealing here with extremely serious and menacing matters, which will in the near future shape a course of events leading inevitably to a new world war. The world press is only guessing at the immediate objects of these new military and political combinations—the United States alone, or the USSR as well, and perhaps Italy and Germany too . . . Scarcely any doubt exists as to the menacing character of these combinations. Lloyd George, who is not inexperienced in these matters, described the Anglo-French agreement as 'the most menacing event since the world war'. I am dealing with only the most important factors in recent international affairs, but they by no means exhaust the subject. There have been many more suspicious conferences and meetings, tours of generals in countries fairly close, geographically, to our Union. These have perhaps a more immediate significance for our Union, but they are the outcome of the more important events to which I referred.

Completely absorbed in internal reconstruction, the Soviet Government, in accordance with the instructions of the highest Soviet authorities, holds aloof from these diplomatic concoctions and intrigues, refusing to take part in any military or political alliances. At the same time, it is compelled to follow carefully events as they unfold, realizing well that the breaking of the peace in any part of the world may lead to general war and that, even if the USSR is not drawn by provocative action into war, its economy and its plans for construction might be substantially damaged by any war. The Soviet Government must, of course, follow with particular care the participation of its immediate neighbours in international combinations and alignments, and everything that may directly touch its interests. Anxious to contribute to the preservation of peace, the Soviet Government considers it its duty to expose international intrigues which bear in them the seeds of war to world public

[1] Cmd. 3211. [2] 223 *H.C. Deb.* 5 s., col. 395.

opinion, and in particular to the workers, on whom the greatest burdens and losses of war usually fall.

At the same time the Soviet Government indicates the road which provides the maximum guarantee of general peace. This is the road of immediate, complete, and general disarmament, or at least the greatest possible reduction of armaments as the first step to complete disarmament. These principles were embodied in the drafts on complete and on partial disarmament put forward by the Soviet delegation at the preparatory disarmament commission.

The Soviet Government's greatest service to the cause of peace was to get the question of complete and general disarmament raised for the first time in an official manner. Even if the problem is at the moment unsolved, the very fact that it was raised enormously stimulates the desire and the efforts of the popular masses for peace.

You know the fate of the disarmament drafts to which I referred, for the work of the Soviet delegation to Geneva was the subject of a special report I gave at a previous session. The proposal for complete disarmament was rejected *in toto*, without argument. Our proposal for partial disarmament was shelved, and the League of Nations is, apparently, not concerned about it. The date for calling the next session of the preparatory commission has long passed, but the commission shows no sign of life. In August I asked the chairman whether and when he intended to convene it, and received a vague reply, that he could decide on the date only when the League Assembly, then in session, was over and after he had looked into certain matters. The Assembly ended long ago, and the events to which the chairman referred have also ended. These were the famous Anglo-French negotiations for a naval agreement. The fact is that the preparatory commission decided that the differences which had arisen between certain States, especially among the so-called great Powers, should be discussed not inside the commission itself, publicly, with all members taking part, but quietly, behind the scenes, in diplomatic fashion. The preparatory commission therefore kindly agreed to cease to exist for a time and to await the outcome of the negotiations about the disagreements among the great naval Powers. A private conference of these Powers at Geneva ended unsuccessfully. Conversations then took place between Britain and France only, and ended in an agreement based on the old diplomatic principle, you give, I give. In the given case the application of this principle means that each side undertakes not to insist on the reduction of the armaments which are of special interest to the other. Where is the disarmament, you will ask. Isn't it rather an agreement not to disarm? But that is a mistake; it is not quite like that, for both parties agreed on the reduction of those armaments of concern to States which did not take part in the negotia-

tions, and so a third naval Power, the United States, has declared that it considers such an agreement unacceptable. Thus the events on the outcome of which the calling of the preparatory disarmament commission depends ended in a fiasco which has only deepened the already existing disagreements on naval disarmament. I therefore asked the chairman of the commission what was delaying the calling of the commission, and whether it was not time for it to meet and decide whether it should continue in existence and how it was to justify its existence. If he replies that new negotiations are probably to be held between Britain and France, who have 'agreed', and the United States, which 'disagrees', the outcome of which he intends to await, then the masses who are thirsting for peace will have to fortify themselves with a huge dose of patience. The negotiations between Britain and France took five months. The more people take part, the longer negotiations last; perhaps an even longer time will be required for the successful conclusion of these negotiations. And if agreement is reached, it might be found unacceptable by other naval Powers, with whom it will then be necessary to begin new negotiations, the time taken increasing in geometric progression. But any agreement by a group must be discussed by the preparatory commission, where the States which are not included in the group may still have a word to say. The conclusion of such negotiations is lost in the dark distance. In my letter to the chairman of the commission I therefore suggested that the commission should avoid roads which end in an impasse and examine the Soviet draft for partial disarmament, which has the advantage that it establishes general criteria binding on all for the reduction of armaments and makes private conversations between individual States or groups unnecessary and superfluous. My letter has already been sent, and as soon as it reaches its destination, that is in a day or two, it will be published. . . .[1]

Cutting across our disarmament proposals come Mr Kellogg's proposals for the conclusion of an international pact renouncing war as an instrument of national policy. Our Government regarded this pact critically, noting its inadequacy and limitations. The principle of renouncing war was included in the drafts for a non-aggression pact which we proposed to a number of States. But our proposals were of wider scope, including questions of non-aggression, and left no room for equivocation. The pacts we proposed also included the undertaking to remain neutral and not to take part in any hostile association or alliance. The acceptance of these proposals by a majority of States would have dealt a powerful blow at that system of military and political groups, combinations, and alliances which characterized pre-war diplomacy, which led to world war, and which, as I said before, threatens new

[1] League of Nations, 1929, ix, C. 195. M. 74, p. 201.

wars on a world-wide scale. Nevertheless, considering that the States signing the Kellogg Pact undertake certain moral obligations regarding non-aggression, and that the pact has a certain though limited significance, our Government did not hesitate to adhere to it and its adherence has been formally effected. Our Union was thus one of the first States to ratify the so-called Kellogg Pact, which has not yet been ratified by even one of the fourteen States which signed it at Paris and are regarded as its initiators. The absence of any special haste in ratifying the pact will not surprise anybody who has attentively studied its origin and the correspondence between the United States and other countries, and who knows how strong and sustained was the opposition to it, and that, not counting our Union and some small and medium countries, the pact was accepted most unwillingly by the majority of its signatories. It is not without interest to note that the pact has not yet been ratified by Poland, and as to our Baltic neighbours, none, with the exception of Lithuania, has yet adhered to it.

As you see, the pacific actions of the Soviet Government find no response among other States. It was like that at Genoa, it was like that at the Moscow disarmament conference we called, it was the same when we proposed non-aggression pacts, it is the same now with our disarmament proposals. Moreover, our activity in regard to peace is clearly not to the taste of certain countries, and even exasperates them. Apparently the efforts of the Soviet Government on behalf of peace, cutting across their policy, which requires the maintenance of their armaments at the present level if not higher, do not improve our relations with these countries.

It must be admitted that our proposals place the imperialist countries in a rather difficult position. While rejecting our proposals, they must pay some tribute to the anti-war sentiments of the masses and the petty-bourgeois pacifists. They do not stop avowing their love of peace, the word peace is always on their lips, and since it would be politically inexpedient to admit openly their unwillingness to disarm, and since they cannot answer our arguments for disarmament, they resort to questioning the sincerity of our proposals. The argument is cheap, unconvincing, and beside the point. Our sincerity can be tested only by accepting our proposal; if they are really convinced of our insincerity, they have only to appear to accept our proposal in order to expose it. But they do not do this, realizing the risk, for in their hearts they know that we would disarm, and they could only be confounded by a real test of our sincerity . . .

Recently M. Briand made the most extraordinary statement, to call it nothing more, that the obstacle to general disarmament was—what do you think?—the Red Army. I base this on an interview given by

M. Briand and published in the press, in which he is stated to have said: 'The European Powers cannot go further in the limitation of armaments chiefly because the Soviet Union maintains a large and powerful army, and even boasts of its fighting capacity'. And M. Paul-Boncour at the September session of the League of Nations also said that 'the fate of disarmament depends on the decisions of the United States and the USSR'.[1] That we are proud of the fighting capacity of our army is a fact, for it is only thanks to its fighting capacity, in which we believe, that the proletarian State has been in existence these twelve years, and can occupy itself with building socialism. But we need this army only so long as it is confronted by the large armies of the capitalist countries. Disband those armies, and we will have no need of our army. We will find more useful and productive occupations for our soldiers than military service. We proposed this, but M. Briand's Government rejected it and still rejects it. After that, what sense is there in pointing at our army?

For greater effect M. Briand thought it necessary to say at the League Assembly—out of politeness not mentioning us by name, it is true—that the Soviet army is expanding more rapidly than the armies of other countries, both in man-power and material.[2] If this were true, it would still not justify the rejection of our disarmament proposals. But it is in fact not true. I shall not compare the strength of the Soviet and French armies in absolute numbers, for that would prove nothing. But since it is often maintained that the French army has been reduced in comparison with pre-war times, it will not be out of place to inform you that according to official French figures given in the League of Nations handbook, French expenditure amounted in 1913 to 349 million dollars at par, and in 1928 to 393 million . . .[3]

In considering these questions we should not forget that before the war France had to reckon with a powerful German army of about 800,000, which was undoubtedly a threat to France; now this army has been reduced to 100,000. There is moreover the Locarno treaty, which obliges Great Britain to assist France with all its forces if it should be attacked from the east. I will not speak of the obligations of France's allies, Czechoslovakia, Rumania, Yugoslavia, and Poland. We cannot count on outside military help. Along our entire western frontier there are countries which are armed and continuing to arm, and which have reason to count on the help of that same French army and perhaps the armies of other countries. In comparing the armies of different countries, we must also bear in mind their character and structure, and therefore we should not forget that the Red army is built mainly on a territorial

[1] *League of Nations Official Journal*, Special Supplement 67, p. 60.
[2] ibid., Special Supplement 64, p. 80.
[3] cf. League of Nations, *Armaments Year-Book*, 1927–8, p. 455.

basis, which fits it primarily for defence, but not for attack. But the consideration which should dominate everything is that by our proposals for non-aggression pacts and disarmament, as throughout our policy for eleven years, we have proved the pacific character of our intentions while other countries, rejecting our proposals, give sufficient cause by their policy to raise doubts about their attitude to our Union.

M. Briand, in speaking of our army, referred not only to France, but also to Poland and Rumania, which are said to be 'not without anxiety as to Russia's intentions'. M. Briand said he could understand this anxiety, and noted that 'Poland and Rumania wish to maintain extremely friendly relations with Russia'. I should like to put the following question to M. Briand: How does he explain Poland's rejection of all our peaceful proposals? Why did Poland reject our 1922 proposal for a proportional reduction of the armaments of the Soviet Union, Poland, and the Baltic countries? This would have been a far greater risk for us than for the other members of the conference. Why did Poland not accept our proposal for a non-aggression pact, which should at least have diminished its 'anxiety' about our Union, and given a firmer guarantee of peace than the Kellogg pact? At the time Poland explained its negative attitude by reference to the impossibility of signing a pact which ignored its obligations in regard to the League of Nations and contained no clause about compulsory arbitration. But having recently signed the Kellogg pact without these stipulations, Poland proved how untenable was the position it adopted in negotiations with us. Perhaps there were other considerations against the conclusion of a non-aggression pact. What were they? Furthermore, why does Poland steadily refuse to sign a trade agreement with us, beginning negotiations only to break them off? A trade agreement is not a guarantee against aggression, but just the same it strengthens relations between States and is therefore a factor making for peace. How else has Poland shown its peaceful intentions towards the USSR? In the speeches of its commanders, who have openly talked of the violation of the territorial integrity of the USSR? In the honours shown to the émigrés, enemies of workers' and peasants' Ukraine, or in the public discussion in the Polish press of the question of depriving Soviet Ukraine and White Russia of their independence and enslaving them? Let them show us even one Polish proposal which might be interpreted as expressing a peaceful disposition on the part of the Polish Government. We have no aggressive feelings, intentions, or appetites in regard to Poland. Correct relations exist between us and Poland, but we consider them inadequate. We have given sufficient proof of our wish to strengthen and deepen these relations. We shall continue to do so because we realize the tremendous significance of an improvement in our relations with Poland not only for eastern

Europe, but for peace in general. But we should like to see proof of the existence of a similar wish on the other side. May I assure M. Briand that his anxiety for Poland has, as far as it concerns us, no foundation. We should like to be as tranquil in regard to Poland's policy in eastern Europe and towards the Soviet Union.

As regards Rumania, the clearest proof of our desire for peace is given by our passivity, even though the question of Bessarabia, now occupied by Rumania, is still not settled. The various Rumanian Governments, having rejected the proposal we made at the Vienna conference[1] for a fair and peaceful settlement of the dispute in accordance with the interests and wishes of the Bessarabian population, preferred to prepare for the settlement of this question by military means. With this in mind they concluded military alliances against us, took part in anti-Soviet combinations, and supported the preparations of Petliura and the Russian monarchists. Such a policy is clearly not conducive to the settlement of the Bessarabian question. Let us hope that the new Rumanian Government will seek other means of reaching agreement with the Soviet Union.

It is not Soviet policy which gives cause for anxiety, but the facts I have mentioned about the Polish and Rumanian Governments' attitude to us, the constant conversations between the general staffs of these two countries, and the liveliness of their relations with French military circles. The entire European press, not only ours, called attention to the repeated visits of the French General Lerond to the countries nearest to us. The French ambassador in Moscow stated to me that he was not on an official mission. I shall not dispute an official statement by the French Government, but the fact of General Lerond's repeated visits to eastern and south-eastern Europe is indisputable, and our people are not disposed to believe that generals carry olive branches, and therefore their anxiety is quite understandable.

We regret that M. Briand referred to us only in connexion with our army, which least of all can or should be a cause of anxiety to France. I am sure that M. Briand does not attribute to us the slightest ill will, in feeling or intention, towards the French Republic. He must know that on our part there is certainly no obstacle to the establishment of the most friendly relations with France, and that there is no conflict between the political interests of France and the USSR individually; consequently they should least of all interest themselves in each other's army. We would have preferred M. Briand to recall the proposal we made for a pact of non-aggression, the proposals, still awaiting an answer, made more than a year ago by Rakovsky, to settle questions in which large numbers of French people are interested. We would have

[1] *Soviet Documents*, i, p. 436

preferred, instead of the polemics about military matters forced on us, to discuss with M. Briand the conclusion of commercial and other agreements which would stimulate economic relations between the two countries. Finally, we would have liked M. Briand to be better informed about our intentions and wishes, and then perhaps he would not have made the attacks on us of which, comrades, I have just told you.

A good deal of opposition to our efforts for peace comes from the Conservative Government of Great Britain. Our proposals for disarmament, our exposure of British imperialist intrigues, are no doubt among the reasons why relations with Great Britain have not so far been resumed. A year and a half has already passed since relations were broken, and the British Government, like the English people, have had an opportunity of summing up the results of that break. If, as there is reason to think, the Conservative Government was anxious for the break in order (1) to put the USSR in a position in which new terms could be dictated to it, (2) to damage the prestige of the USSR in the Near East, and (3) to set an example to other States, with the object of completely isolating the USSR and dealing it a crushing blow, then it can now be stated that not one of these objects has been achieved. We are no more inclined now than before to accept unacceptable terms. Materially we have suffered less from the break than Great Britain itself, which is shown by the fact that we did not use the trading opportunities and credits for £15 million which were made available by a powerful English banking group and were at our disposal even after the break. We did not use them not because of the British boycott, but because we found better opportunities in other countries, and also because the absence of a juridical basis and the political uncertainty and disquiet compelled us, as a matter of prudence, to avoid any long-term contracts with English firms on which our own planned economic construction depended. As to our relations with the Near East and Turkey, they have never been so good as now. The example set by the Conservative British Government did not infect other countries, and the balance of our external relations, excepting with England, remains the same as before the break. The only result of the break is the serious injury done to the commercial interests of a large number of English industrialists, and greater international tension, which strengthens the factors making for war.

In recent speeches of certain British representatives there have been hints that they now realize the error and failure of the break from the point of view of British interests. We welcome this, for it was not we who worked for the break with England. We have never concealed our desire to maintain and expand relations with all countries without exception,

including such a highly industrialized country as Great Britain. When English ministers, answering reproaches about the prolonged absence of relations between two great States, talk of the need for an initiative from our side, they forget that there is no cause to doubt the presence on our side of the desire to resume relations, while we have no idea how far there has been any serious change in those ideas of the Conservative Government which at the time dictated the break. The Soviet Government pays little attention to questions of form and etiquette, and therefore at Geneva it took the initiative, through me, of explaining these ideas to Mr Chamberlain, but in conversation with me Mr Chamberlain, instead of discussing future prospects, preferred to talk of the past, so that it was useless to continue. When English ministers, replying to Members of Parliament who demand the resumption of relations, describe our Union as though it were a house falling in ruins, which it is dangerous to approach, that can only be regarded as a pre-election manœuvre intended to justify the break *ex post facto* and to counter the reproaches which might be levelled at the Conservative Government in the forthcoming election campaign. The English Government is, I am sure, well informed about the real state of affairs in our Union, and knows that it bears not the slightest resemblance to a ruined house. The Soviet Government has survived more than one British Government. In any case we reckon with the possibility of a continuation of the old hostile policy of the Conservative Government towards the USSR, with all its consequences.

We are often criticized for making bogeys of non-existent anti-Soviet blocs, for exaggerating and inflating the dangers threatening our Union, for placing too much confidence in reports of anti-Soviet plans and preparations. Of course, not all such reports deserve equal confidence and attention, not all the rumours reaching us can be precisely verified and documented. Let us even grant that not a few rumours are started with the obvious intention of misinforming and scaring us. But what we do know, what is based on incontestable evidence, on documents, and even on the admissions of our enemies themselves in official speeches, is more than enough to give us a clear idea of the dangers threatening us from without. The fight against our Union has never ceased; it has only assumed different forms according to changing circumstances . . . With such an attitude to the Soviet Union, the proposal that we should submit our disputes with other countries for settlement to organizations or persons whom we know to be hostile to us is ridiculous. That we ourselves are not in principle opposed to arbitration in general is shown by the fact that, on certain questions, such as for example concessions, we do submit disputes for decision to courts of arbitration. But we think that in an enormous number of cases arbitration might be replaced by

conciliation commission procedure; this would prevent conflicts which arise suddenly from taking on the threatening aspect of military clashes . . .

In addition to the countries already mentioned, there are other capitalist States which have long been convinced, or are gradually coming to the conviction, that co-operation with the proletarian State is both possible and advantageous, despite its peculiar social and political features. Leaving history to settle the controversy between the two systems, they establish normal and at times even friendly relations with us, extracting for the present day all the political and economic advantage possible from co-operation with a State of 140 million people. The most prominent example of such a State is Germany, which has maintained and strengthened its relations with the Soviet Union for seven years. Those States which were unwilling or unable to establish such relations with us have made efforts to impair our relations with Germany, which have sometimes met with temporary success. There were, for example, the hostile steps taken by certain German Government departments, and by the public in Germany, such as the action of a group of German banks in joining the international association of creditors of Russia,[1] which was a violation of the Rapallo treaty. Although we had to make the appropriate response to such actions, general relations between the two States did not suffer therefrom. The course of international affairs in the last few years has shown that those who attempt to effect a breach between Germany and the Soviet Union can only offer Germany in compensation promises and assurances, the fulfilment of which is compatible neither with their general policy, nor with the maintenance in unviolated form of the state of affairs created by the Versailles treaty and other post-war peace treaties. This truth is penetrating more and more deeply into the consciousness of broad public circles in Germany. The Soviet-German negotiations now proceeding in Moscow demonstrate the mutual anxiety to extend and expand economic co-operation, full regard being paid to the political and economic peculiarities of the two countries. This co-operation is firmly based on the treaties of Rapallo and Berlin.

We note with great satisfaction the steady and rapid expansion of our economic relations with the United States. That country expresses perhaps more clearly than any other the general interests of the capitalist world, but we must in justice note that up to the present we have not found the Government of the United States among those which are intriguing against our Union. We do not forget that in the difficult famine years the American people gave us generous help through the American Relief Administration, directed at that time by the future

[1] cf. *Izvestia*, 13 November 1928.

President, Mr Hoover. Although the United States has for many years shunned us, the realization is gaining ground there of the necessity and possibility of the profitable and fruitful economic opportunities provided by the Soviet Union for the financial resources and technical achievements of America. In no country were the prejudices against our Union at one time so strong, nowhere were fables and nonsense about our Union so widespread as in America. And this is not surprising for, while the frequently well-paid agitators, ill-disposed towards our Union, not only American, but of other nationalities too, principally counter-revolutionary émigrés, had a completely free field of activity for their anti-Soviet campaign, the field was closed—and is in part still closed—to Soviet people, to counteract this campaign and to give the American public practical information about the situation here. The change of attitude I have noted is substantially promoted by the ever more frequent visits of representatives of the financial, commercial, industrial, and intellectual world in America, who get the opportunity of convincing themselves personally of the absurdity of the idle stories about the Soviet State on which America has for so long been fed. It may be said with certainty that 99 per cent of the reports of the Americans who have visited our country are extremely favourable to us. But facts and figures speak more eloquently than any report, and these are the steady rise in American exports to the USSR, the increasing use we make of American technical resources, and our scrupulous observance of all the obligations we undertake. We cannot of course conceal the fact that this economic collaboration suffers considerably from the absence of any legal basis, the absence of official relations between the Governments of our two countries. The references made by British ministers to the example of such collaboration as proof of its possibility even in the absence of normal relations are sophistries. Economic relations are to a certain extent possible even with the States most hostile to us. We have had some trade with England since the break and are trading now, but the implacable figures of exports and imports which members of the British Government were compelled to quote in Parliament indicate the tendency to a grave economic decline which the rupture of relations involved. It is not therefore difficult to guess that, however satisfactory our present economic relations with the United States, they would double and treble if normal relations were established. Besides, the British ministers pretend that they see no difference between normal relations not having been established, and the cessation of relations where they have already existed; that they are unaware of the political antagonism which arises from the rupture and which cannot fail to have its effect on economic relations also.

When we speak of official relations, we have in mind not merely

judicial recognition. We are not, for example, greatly interested in the purely lawyer's question debated in America, whether our signature of an international agreement also signed by the American Government constitutes recognition. That kind of recognition might have been discussed in the first few years after the October revolution, but in the twelfth year of its existence a State is no longer in need of verbal individual recognition. Eleven years of one and the same Government at the head of a nation of 140 million people, occupying a sixth part of the earth, that in itself is objectively a fact of general recognition. To talk about recognizing the Soviet Government is now merely ludicrous. Recognition can have significance when it provides a legal basis, when it coincides with the exchange of representatives and the establishment of that official intercourse which is absolutely essential for the correct maintenance and development of both political and economic relations. We have never concealed our regret at the absence of official relations with the transatlantic Republic, with whom we neither have nor can foresee any disputes. The circumstances to which I have referred provide favourable conditions for the settlement of certain controversial questions if both parties agree to enter into direct communication. . . .

Our relations with Italy provide an example of the possibility of normal and extremely correct relations despite the difference in our social and political systems; they have given rise to virtually no pretexts for substantial mutual complaints, with all the difference in the two regimes.

The same may be said of our relations with Japan. The normal development of our commercial and other economic relations proves that they are mutually advantageous. The conclusion of the fisheries convention[1] created the necessary basis for the participation of Japanese firms in exploiting our fishery resources in the Far East in keeping with our laws and interests.

We note with regret that China is still far from emancipating itself from the external forces hostile to it. The Nanking Government, to the prejudice of the Chinese people's interests, is continuing Chang Tso-lin's policy of the period when the Soviet Embassy was raided, which was followed by the rupture of relations.

The visit paid to our country in the summer by the Afghan Padishah served to reinforce the already firm character of our friendly relations with Afghanistan. We are following with the greatest interest and sympathy the progressive reforms being introduced in that country . . .

As I have already had occasion to state, our relations with the countries of the Near East and Turkey have never been so close and friendly as they are now.

[1] *League of Nations Treaty Series*, lxxx, p. 341.

No changes have occurred in our relations with our Baltic neighbours, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, and Finland, apart from the conclusion of a commercial treaty with Latvia which has led to a general improvement in our relations with that Republic. We cannot fail to take a lively interest in the fate of these neighbouring countries, particularly since they lie along our chief routes to the West. We watch attentively the maintenance by these Republics of their formal and real independence, in its full extent, and to see that self-determination, in its application to them, shall not be interpreted by anyone in Balkan fashion. We are compelled to pay special attention to the struggle for independence being waged by Lithuania, with whom we have relations of unchanging friendship. We are following the development of the Polish-Lithuanian disputes and contributing as far as we can to their peaceful settlement. . . .

In its twelfth year the Soviet Government has to note with regret the absence of completely normal relations, or of any relations at all, with a number of European countries. These include some which had considerable financial claims on the Soviet Union, arising from revolutionary decrees. They thought that by refraining from recognition they would force us to make a satisfactory settlement of their claims. I think they have had enough time to convince themselves of the ineffectiveness of that method of exerting pressure and of the fact that, by depriving themselves of their natural share of economic relations with us, with its attendant advantages, they are cutting off their nose to spite their face. There are also countries which, while having no claims, have still not established relations with us, although their own political interests should impel them to do so.

The establishment of normal and even friendly relations with most capitalist and semi-capitalist States indicates that the efforts directed to their further extension are not without prospects. There are no objective obstacles to the establishment of such relations with all other States, and to the improvement of existing relations where necessary and possible. There are only artificial obstacles. We have not only announced the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other States, but have shown that we act on it, in our relations with Germany, Italy, and other countries, which have never had any reason to complain on this score. Whoever speaks of our intervention or propaganda is only creating artificial obstacles, or using this as a pretext to justify their hostility to the Soviet Union, dictated by quite different reasons, or as a weapon in an internal struggle. One of these artificial or deliberately created obstacles is the periodical repetition and dissemination of legends about our difficulties, about alleged crises, catastrophes, insurrections, and the approaching end of the Soviet system. In part this kind of campaign

serves to hide their own wounds and to divert attention from the disorders and the social conflicts in their own country. A campaign of this kind is being conducted now, on a broad front, by exploiting our self-criticism, which we allow to an extent unthinkable in any other country, our own statements, in the press and in speeches, about our deficiencies and difficulties, which we do not hide, and which no government of a capitalist country ever brings itself to do. In the foreign bourgeois press the difficulties we admit are distorted and magnified to enormous proportions . . .

All these machinations of our enemies will not move us from the path on which for more than eleven years we have been moving with firm steps towards our goal. We have not and have never had any aggressive aims or desire for conquest. We have no intention of attacking anybody; on the contrary we shall, as before, and with even greater strength, continue our struggle for peace and disarmament. We are conducting this policy of peace not because of any weakness, or from sentimental pacifism, but because it is inherent in the nature of the Soviet regime, because it is in accordance with the interests of our work of construction and the interests of the working masses of the world. But so long as our proposals for disarmament, or for the partial reduction of armaments, are rejected, we must not and shall not diminish our capacity to defend ourselves in face of the capitalist countries who are armed to the teeth, continuing to arm and to improve their weapons, using their highly developed industrial techniques. We shall not do so, otherwise it might occur to someone, believing the story about our alleged weakness or difficulties, to attack us, and then our Red Army will justify the fighting reputation it has deservedly acquired, so that this conflict would be really turned into the 'last and decisive fight'.

NOTE FROM LITVINOV TO THE POLISH AMBASSADOR IN MOSCOW PROPOSING A PROTOCOL TO BRING THE TREATY OF PARIS ON THE RENUNCIATION OF WAR INTO FORCE

29 *December* 1928 *Vneshnyaya Politika*, p. 340

On 24 August 1926 the Union Government, through its plenipotentiary representative in Warsaw, communicated to the Government of the Polish Republic a draft non-aggression treaty. This proposal followed from the negotiations which, at the invitation of the Soviet Government, had been held between the two States, and also expressed the course in foreign policy to which the Government of the USSR has unchangingly adhered in its relations with other States, and in accordance with which it put forward the proposals for disarmament, first at the Moscow

conference which it convened as early as 1922 and later in the League of Nations preparatory disarmament commission.

While regarding general disarmament as the most effective guarantee of the maintenance of peace, the Union Government considers that non-aggression treaties may help substantially in preventing armed conflicts between States.

The Union Government is compelled to observe that although negotiations for the conclusion of such a treaty were begun with the Polish Government some years ago, they have made no progress, despite the most serious efforts of the Union Government to reach agreement.

Since it attaches considerable importance to the signing of a non-aggression treaty for the consolidation and development of Soviet-Polish relations and for strengthening general peace, the Soviet Government regrets the fruitlessness of its efforts, and for its part again declares its unchanging readiness to sign a non-aggression treaty with the Government of the Polish Republic.

While negotiations for a non-aggression treaty between Poland and the Soviet Union remained fruitless, the Polish Government, when invited to take part in the Kellogg pact, i.e. in a multilateral treaty for the renunciation of war as an instrument of national policy, signed this treaty with other States on 27 August 1928 in Paris; to this treaty the Government of the Soviet Union subsequently also adhered.

On receiving the invitation to adhere to the Paris treaty (Kellogg pact) the Soviet Government, in a note to the French Government, referred to the absence from the pact of the obligation to disarm, which is the most substantial element in guaranteeing peace, to the inadequate and imprecise formulation of the clause prohibiting war, and to the presence of other factors which weakened the significance of the treaty. The Soviet Government is still of the opinion that this pact does not provide those guarantees for the preservation of peace which would result from the pacts of non-aggression and non-participation in hostile groupings which it proposed.

Since, however, the Soviet Government observed that the Paris treaty (Kellogg pact) imposes on its signatories certain obligations of a peaceful character, it immediately adhered to the pact and, treating all its actions in the sphere of securing peace with great seriousness, it would like to see the treaty enter into force as quickly as possible, particularly as between the Soviet Union and its nearest neighbours.

Unfortunately, the entry into force of the Paris treaty depends, according to article 3, on its ratification by the fourteen designated States. In the four months which have elapsed since the treaty was signed, not one of these fourteen States has ratified it, a circumstance which induces fears that the treaty may for a long time to come remain

an instrument which is not even formally binding on anyone. Apparently the only way by which the treaty can be put into effect earlier between individual States is by their signing a special supplementary instrument.

Since it regards the securing of peace in eastern Europe as a matter of first-rate importance, and since, of the States on the western frontier of the Soviet Union, Poland has signed the Paris treaty, the Soviet Government decided to propose to the Polish Government the signature of the attached protocol,[1] under which the Paris treaty for the renunciation of war would enter into force between the Soviet Union and Poland immediately after its ratification by these two States, regardless of the provisions of article 3 of the treaty. By signing the said protocol the Polish Government would of course be assuming a moral obligation to effect as quickly as possible, in the manner laid down, the simultaneous ratification both of the Paris treaty and of the protocol itself. As to the USSR, its adherence to the Paris treaty has already been ratified by the Presidium of the Central Executive Committee of the Soviets.

In drawing your attention, Mr Minister, to article 4 of the protocol, which makes provision for its signature by any other State which has adhered to the Paris treaty, or to the extent to which it has adhered to the treaty, the Soviet Government expresses the firm conviction that the realization of its proposal at the present time within the framework of the relations between the Soviet Union and Poland would in a considerable degree assist in the strengthening of peace in eastern Europe.

I should point out that in making the present proposal the Soviet Government is not withdrawing its earlier proposal to the Polish Government for a non-aggression pact, the conclusion of which in the future would serve to strengthen still further good-neighbourly relations between the USSR and the Polish Republic.

The Soviet Government hopes to find support for its present proposal on the part of the Polish Government, bearing in mind that the latter, having already signed the multilateral Paris treaty, of which the USSR is also a signatory, can have no objection to its coming into force as quickly as possible between the two States.

At the same time the Soviet Government informs the Polish Government that it is simultaneously making a similar proposal to the Lithuanian Government, as the only Baltic country which has so far signed the Paris treaty. It has not yet addressed such a proposal to Finland, Estonia, or Latvia only because these States have not yet formally adhered to the Paris treaty. The Soviet Government, however, reserves the right to do so once they have effected their adherence.

[1] *League of Nations Treaty Series*, lxxxix, p. 369.

REPLY TO THE POLISH NOTE ON THE PROPOSAL TO BRING THE TREATY OF PARIS INTO FORCE: NOTE FROM LITVINOV TO THE POLISH CHARGÉ D'AFFAIRES IN MOSCOW

11 *January* 1929 *Vneshnyaya Politika*, p. 342

1. In acknowledging the receipt of your note[1] of 10 January, containing the provisional reply of your Government to my note of 29 December 1928, I have the honour to request you to bring the following to the notice of your Government:

The Government of the USSR notes with satisfaction the Polish Government's declaration of its readiness in principle to accept the proposal to accelerate the entry into force as between the USSR and the Polish Republic of the Paris treaty on the renunciation of war. The Soviet Government, however, regrets the absence from the said note of the Polish Government's consent to the immediate realization of the Soviet Government's proposal, which imposes on neither party any new obligations beyond those already accepted under the Paris treaty. This proposal seemed to the Soviet Government so clear and simple that it felt justified in expecting an equally clear and simple reply.

2. The Polish Government was good enough to indicate a number of circumstances which, in its opinion, prevents Poland signing the protocol proposed by the Soviet Government. To make the Soviet Government's position quite clear, may I deal with the separate points in your note.

3. The Polish Government expresses surprise that in its note of 29 December the Soviet Government referred briefly to the negotiations which have taken place in the past between the Soviet Government and Poland concerning the conclusion of a non-aggression pact, and saw fit to comment on the lack of precision in the reference to these negotiations. In this connexion it is sufficient to recall that at one time the Soviet Government proposed to the Polish Republic and the Baltic States a simultaneous and proportionate reduction of armed forces, a proposal which they rejected. The Soviet Government then proposed to the same States the signature of a pact of non-aggression and non-participation in hostile groupings; this proposal was not made dependent on any conditions, or on the settlement of any other questions which might be of interest to the Soviet Union. By putting forward a number of conditions, the Polish Government in fact rejected the Soviet Government's proposal for the unconditional mutual renunciation of aggression. This was the substance of the negotiations in question, and it cannot be disputed. There is no need to enter here into an examination of the reasons why the Polish Government connected non-aggression with conditions which made the conclusion of the pact impossible. But I

[1] *Mezhdunarodnaya Politika, 1929*, p. 3.

think it is not superfluous to add that the Polish Government did not connect its signature of the Paris treaty renouncing war with these conditions.

4. It was precisely this last circumstance, i.e. the unconditional signature by the Polish Government of the Paris treaty to which the Soviet Government also adhered, which induced the Soviet Government to make its proposal of 29 December to Poland. It assumed that, as Poland found it possible to accept unconditionally the obligation to renounce war in its relations with the Soviet Union, it would scarcely advance conditions for giving this obligation formal validity as speedily as possible. At the same time, the last paragraph of your note, M. Chargé d'Affaires, may be interpreted to mean that the Polish Government makes the signature of the protocol dependent on the participation of other States. This condition is the more difficult to understand as, in the event of its ratification by the fifteen signatory States, the Paris treaty automatically enters into force between Poland and the Soviet Union, irrespective of the adherence of all the Baltic States. It is difficult to see why Poland cannot unconditionally accept the same obligation to renounce war in regard to the USSR now, before the pact has been ratified by the remaining fourteen States.

5. The Soviet Government is firmly convinced that the signature of the suggested protocol even by the USSR and Poland alone would not only serve to consolidate peaceful relations between the two States, but would be a most powerful factor for peace throughout eastern Europe. But if the Polish Government does not hold this opinion as to the importance of stable peace between the USSR and Poland, and considers desirable the participation of other eastern European States in the protocol, its objections would be well-founded and comprehensible only if the Soviet Government had placed any obstacles in the way of participation by those States in the protocol. In fact, in its note of 29 December, the Soviet Government stated quite clearly, and in a manner which admitted of no dispute in interpretation, that the protocol is open to adherence by any State which wishes to do so. Moreover, in the same note it expressed the wish that the neighbouring States would participate in the protocol. It was also stated that the Soviet Government had so far made a similar proposal to Lithuania alone, and not to the other Baltic States, only because it was informed that the latter had not yet formally adhered to the Paris treaty. The Polish Government should understand that it is impossible to address a proposal for accelerating the entry into force of a treaty to countries which have not yet signed or adhered to that treaty.

6. In its note of 10 January the Polish Government expresses perplexity because the Soviet Government proposed participation in the

protocol to Lithuania which, under the Riga treaty, does not border directly on the Soviet Union. The Soviet Government could with greater justice express its perplexity at the Polish Government's request that an invitation to sign the protocol be addressed to Estonia and Finland, which are territorially even further removed from Poland. The difference is, however, that there are no questions in dispute between the USSR, Finland, and Estonia, which might give grounds to fear that peace between them will be violated, which cannot be said of the relations between Poland and Lithuania. It is not so long since Polish-Lithuanian relations aroused great fears as to the fate of peace in Europe, and Poland itself attempted through the League of Nations to bring to an end the state of war between itself and Lithuania. In view of this it seemed to the Soviet Government that the Polish Government would surely welcome the Soviet Government's invitation to the Lithuanian Republic to join in the protocol.

7. The Polish Government itself stated in its note that the Baltic States had, in one form or another, declared their readiness to adhere to the Paris treaty, from which it follows that the act of adherence itself had not yet been effected. Both before dispatching its note of 29 December to the Polish Government and particularly since then the Soviet Government tried by diplomatic channels to elucidate the formal relations in which the Baltic States stood to the Paris treaty, but unfortunately these efforts were unsuccessful. The Soviet Government assumes that some kind of formal procedure is laid down for adherence to any treaty. When the invitation to adhere to the Paris treaty was extended to the Soviet Government, it was informed, in reply to its inquiry, of the form in which the instrument of adherence was to be signed and effected. After its adherence the Soviet Government was informed through the courteous mediation of the French Government that the United States had taken note of the Soviet Union's act of adherence, in witness whereof the Soviet Government was sent a copy of the Paris treaty signed by Mr Kellogg. If this procedure was obligatory for all signatory States, then it should not be difficult to discover which of the Baltic States have adhered to the pact. Up to now the Soviet Government has been informed officially only of the Lithuanian Government's adherence to the treaty. The moment, however, that any other Baltic State gives official notification of its adherence to the pact, the Soviet Government is ready to invite it immediately to adhere to the protocol accelerating its entry into force. Meanwhile the Soviet Government is still trying to find out the position of the Baltic States in regard to the Paris treaty. It knows that efforts in the same direction are also being made by the Lithuanian Government. The Soviet Government would welcome parallel efforts by the Polish Government also.

8. Similarly, should Rumania, with which the Soviet Government is not in diplomatic relations, be included among the States which have formally effected adherence to the Paris treaty, the Soviet Government is ready to invite its adherence to the proposed protocol. It is quite obvious that, having adhered to the Paris treaty, the Soviet Government realized that it undertook obligations in regard to Rumania, once the latter had adhered to the treaty, which excluded methods of war as the means of settling conflicts, although this is far from implying that the questions now in dispute are settled. The Soviet Government can therefore have no objection to the early coming into force of this obligation in regard to the Rumanian Government by the latter's adherence to the Soviet-Polish protocol, which is provided for in article 4. The Soviet Government would be grateful if the Polish Government would find out and let it know as soon as possible whether Rumania has formally adhered to the Pact of Paris and whether it is disposed to sign the protocol proposed by the Soviet Government. Thus the reference to Rumania cannot be regarded as a convincing explanation of the Polish Government's refusal to put the Soviet Government's proposal into effect immediately.

9. Taking into consideration, however, that the object of the Soviet Government's proposal is to accelerate the entry into force of the Paris treaty renouncing war, if only among a few States, it is bound to take care that the evasive attitude or the refusal of one State or another to sign the protocol should not act as a brake on the entry into force of the protocol itself, and consequently of the Paris treaty, between those States that sign the protocol beforehand or adhere to it.

10. The Polish Government's note also refers, as a further obstacle to the realization of the Soviet Government's proposal, to the alleged obligation arising from the Paris treaty of unanimous ratification procedure for the original signatories. The Soviet Government finds no such obligation in the Paris treaty for it is nowhere said that ratification by States which have signed the treaty should be simultaneous or shall follow some stipulated course. Nor does the treaty place any limitation on its signatories concerning the conclusion among them of any treaties or agreements which are not in conflict with the Paris treaty. In the case in question the Soviet Government is proposing nothing other than the entry into force of the same Paris treaty between two or more States. Since the initiators and signatories of the treaty were trying to consolidate existing peaceful relations and to exclude war from international practice, they can scarcely object to any agreement which serves the same ends. The Soviet Government considers that the interests of the peoples both of the USSR and of Poland, and their desire for peace, cannot tolerate obstacles put forward by third States to the renunciation

by their Governments of war as an instrument of their national policy. It is doubtful whether any such third State could be found, which would openly erect such obstacles.

11. While confirming that not one of the fifteen States which signed the Paris treaty has yet ratified it, the Polish Government's note expresses the hope that their attitude to the treaty will be elucidated in the immediate future. The Soviet Government considers that this hope, too, should not prevent Poland accepting the Soviet Government's proposal. The signing of the protocol would retain its great moral significance for Soviet-Polish relations even should the Polish Government's hope not prove over-optimistic, and the protocol shortly be absorbed by the entry into force of the Paris treaty between all its signatories. Its signature could have even greater significance for peace if ratification of the Paris treaty by all the fifteen States should for one reason or another be delayed for a longer period.

12. In recommending the above considerations to the attention of your Government, the Soviet Government looks forward to an early clarification of the definite attitude of the Government of the Polish Republic to the proposed protocol and a corresponding notification of the Polish Government's readiness to give the proposal practical effect.

NOTE FROM THE SOVIET ENVOY IN ANKARA TO THE TURKISH FOREIGN MINISTER INVITING TURKISH ADHERENCE TO THE KELLOGG PACT PROTOCOL

26 *February* 1929 *Izvestia*, 1 *March* 1929

On the instructions of my Government I have the honour to enclose herewith the text of the protocol signed at Moscow on 9 February 1929 by the USSR, Latvia, Poland, Rumania, and Estonia, on the entry into force of the Paris treaty of 27 August 1928 renouncing war as an instrument of national policy. The said protocol was ratified by the Central Executive Committee of the Union on 13 February 1929.

I am instructed by my Government to add that, in view of Turkey's geographical position, thanks to which its pacific policy is a particularly valuable factor making for peace in eastern Europe, and taking into account also the constant efforts of the Soviet Union and the Turkish Republic towards friendly collaboration in the work of consolidating the general peace, my Government would particularly warmly welcome Turkey's adherence to the said protocol in accordance with article 5.

EXTRACTS FROM THE REPORT BY RYKOV, CHAIRMAN OF THE COUNCIL OF PEOPLE'S COMMISSARS, TO THE FIFTH SOVIET CONGRESS

20 *May* 1929 *Stenograficheskii Otchet, Bulletin 1*, p. 5

I. *The two tendencies in the attitude of the capitalist world to the USSR*

Comrades, the first part of my report will be devoted to the international policy of the Union Government. In my report to the last congress I said that the characteristic feature of the international position of the USSR was the duality of its relations with the capitalist world. Two trends are in conflict with each other among bourgeois governments: the first is aggression, expressing itself in hostility to the first government of the dictatorship of the working class ever to be established, and has as its aim the annihilation of the proletarian dictatorship; the second tolerates, at least in the given conditions, the peaceful coexistence of the two economic systems, the Soviet and the capitalist.

The deliberations of the fourth congress in April 1927 fell in a period when the aggressive tendencies were particularly strong. I need only remind you that shortly after the conclusion of the congress, Anglo-Soviet diplomatic relations were severed.

If I wanted to describe briefly, as far as international relations are concerned, the main features of the period of the fourth congress and that immediately subsequent, I would refer to two. The first was the tremendous tension in Anglo-Soviet relations, the second the enormous expansion of the revolutionary movement. The connexion between these two phenomena, was, of course, not merely one of time, but also one of substance. For what did this expansion and the possible victory of the revolution in China mean? An enormous strengthening of the revolutionary position throughout the world, a decline in the power of imperialism, and a substantial consolidation of the position of our Union in a capitalist environment.

International tension in connexion with the Anglo-Soviet break reached a very high pitch. This was shown in such events as the assassination of our representative in Warsaw, Comrade Voikov. Then complications arose in Franco-Soviet relations, leading to the French Government's request for the recall of our ambassador in Paris, Comrade Rakovsky, and the appointment of another to take his place; in December of the same year certain events took place in Canton which were reflected in the brutal treatment of employees of the Soviet consulate in Canton. At the same time, alongside the Chinese revolution, the rising wave of the world revolutionary movement was seen in such events as the strikes of the English miners and the growth of the revolutionary-national movement in a number of colonial countries.

The momentum of the revolutionary movement in the East could not of course fail to influence the activities of the English Conservatives in regard to our Union. The rupture of diplomatic relations between the USSR and England in May 1927 was not unexpected. In the lobbies at the March 1927 session of the League of Nations, perfectly concrete plans for the formation of an anti-Soviet bloc were quite seriously put forward by the English. Thus the basic problem of international relations, around which, as around an axis, international affairs revolved in the spring of 1927, was the strained relations between the USSR and the capitalist world. At the heart of this tension was the worsening of relations between our Union and the English Conservative Government. The British Government was trying to get into its hands the leadership of all forces hostile to the Soviet Union.

A great number of English politicians pointed out that the downfall of the Soviet Union would in very great measure make it easier for them to deal in their own way with the colonial countries. Thus hostility to us in that period was not only open hostility to the class enemy, to the proletarian Government and the proletarian State; it was also connected with the hope of thereby improving the position of Britain in the colonies against the rising waves of the revolutionary movement.

It is difficult to say how far hopes and plans for a direct armed attack played a part in this aggression, although the actions preceding the break surpassed in their crudeness anything previously known in the history of diplomatic relations. You all remember that at the raid on Arcos fireproof safes were broken open, floors in the Arcos building taken up, documents seized, etc. Before that the English Government had not disdained using obviously forged documents, including the so-called Zinoviev letter, which was indisputably proved to have been a gross forgery.

The subsequent policy of the English Government and of those English Conservatives who organized this aggression began to lead to methods of economic pressure on our Union. All the calculations that we were experiencing such economic difficulties that a crash was threatened, all prophecies of such a crash, emanated from these circles and served as another means of mobilizing all those forces which made this anti-Soviet movement possible.

Now again the foreign press from time to time publishes reports of the same kind- referring to a crisis, a crash, bankruptcy, etc. This is no longer dangerous, because if you indulge for a number of years in prophecies none of which is ever fulfilled, people cease to believe in them. That is what has happened with the prophecies of our ruin.

In doing all this, the English Government counted on becoming the organizer of all forces hostile to our Union. What came out of it? As

you know, at the present time even the bourgeois press has come to the conclusion that it is not we and you who have suffered defeat, but the English Government, as not one State followed it. Despite the economic and financial warfare waged against us by England, up till now all our trade, our economic relations with the capitalist world, continue to develop. This shows that the attempt to organize a united front against us, an attempt which two years ago occupied the centre of the international scene, ended, for that period, in failure.

The Conservative Government of England broke off relations with us and began to organize an international bloc against us, talking, if not of war, then of a blockade. The failure of the English Conservatives' attempt to create an anti-Soviet bloc and to put us in a particularly difficult position is explained, first, by the fact that they had not learnt that they were dealing with a Government and a State which was at one with the people, which by its very nature and its class basis cannot change its policy even under the threat of war. The firmness and resolution of our foreign policy arises from the socialist principles of development of the USSR and the determination of all the peoples inhabiting our country to defend the gains of the October revolution. The second reason is that among the bourgeois States themselves there are enough antagonisms to ensure diversity of attitudes on the part of the different Governments to the work of the English Government in organizing a united front against the USSR, and the same diversity of attitudes to the Soviet Union.

It requires a degree of naïveté unpardonable even among the English Conservatives to organize the world on the basis of the Versailles treaty, with its oppression of some countries by others, and then to count on a united bloc of these same countries and on the absence of antagonisms between them. Simplicity of this kind had already to a certain extent doomed to failure in advance a united front against the USSR. Moreover, there are so many antagonisms between the Governments of the bourgeois States, arising from the nature of their interests and their policy, that it would be impossible for the Conservative Government to get a united bloc even apart from the Versailles system. That is why in the course of time the English Government saw that it was necessary to retreat. The formula of retreat from the position occupied was the resolution of the League of Nations Council in June 1927. This resolution proclaims a moral front against communism. It is a retreat, because it expresses in a very weak form the objects at the realization of which the British Conservative Government was aiming. This formula, of course, reflects aggressive intentions against our Union, as our Union is a State in which the Communist Party is in power. There is no open recognition, no open declaration of the necessity of creating an anti-Soviet bloc for

the struggle against communism. It breathes a peculiarly hypocritical spirit, as shown in the words 'moral front'. But it is clear to everybody that they spoke of 'moral' precisely because they could speak of no other.

On this point, I must say that we are not particularly agitated by the moral attitude towards us of these persons who passed the resolution on the attitude to communism and to the State which organizes the communist regime. We and you never counted in our work of construction on the moral sympathy of Churchill, Joynson-Hicks, and their parties. We were always convinced of the contrary. At the same time we and you always counted not only on the moral but on every kind of sympathy from the hundreds of millions of workers, peasants, and oppressed peoples of the colonies, whose sympathy and support for us is infinitely more valuable, since such moral support for the USSR is the direct expression of the interests of hundreds of millions of labouring humanity.

Against this background of increasing aggression on the part of the capitalist world against the USSR a whole series of new phenomena appeared, which illustrate the work going on to organize the anti-Soviet front. In France Senator de Monzie stepped forth as the ideologue of the anti-Soviet bloc, proposing the creation of a special organization of west-European capital to force the Soviet Union to make large concessions, justifying himself by saying that he was not interested in politics; in his eyes the formation of such a bloc is a business matter, but not politics. . . .

It should be noted that these tendencies and this agitation, which began to be taken up in other countries, also found an echo in part of the German press, which represented de Monzie's and de Jouvenel's plans as a method of 'self-defence' against the Soviet foreign trade monopoly, pretending that it was a question of agreement with the USSR, while in fact the plans of these politicians envisaged opposing to the USSR a united front of capitalist Europe. The *Bergwerkszeitung*, organ of German heavy industry, only this year published an article by de Jouvenel, in which he repeats the proposals and arguments he put forward at the time of the Anglo-Soviet break. A number of business men based on this campaign the hope that we would be compelled to abolish the foreign trade monopoly, and then the Soviet State would be accessible to every speculator and imperialist robber. In the Paris paper *Pax* (a name clearly intended to be ironical, *pax* means peace) someone wrote: 'Only the Soviets can fear the creation of such an economic bloc, for if they still have some chance of success in the political struggle, the struggle in the economic field will become more and more difficult for them, and they will soon no longer be in a position to withstand the inexorable pressure of reality.'

All this shows how much energy was expended, in connexion with

the Anglo-Soviet break, to go on from that break to the formation of an anti-Soviet bloc. Closely connected with this were such facts as the policy of seizure by the Banque de France of our gold being exported to the United States, the participation of German bankers in the association of Russian creditors—a participation which, to use diplomatic language, is clearly a 'moral' contravention of the treaty of Rapallo.

Side by side with these hostile trends in the international situation, trends of another kind developed, in the direction of peaceful constructive collaboration between the Soviets and the bourgeois world. I shall speak of these trends in detail in a later part of my report.

In these circumstances our policy consisted in doing everything possible to overcome and remove the activity of the forces and trends hostile to us, trying to preserve peace as the necessary condition for the construction of socialism in the USSR.

II. *The Struggle for Peace*

The Soviet Government has frequently declared that the struggle for peace is a basic and organic part of our foreign policy. It derives from the interests of our Union, its economic development and socialist construction, in which the working class of the entire world is interested. In the struggle for peace we are putting into effect a policy representing the interests of the workers of the whole world, because in war and from war, clearly, it is not the arms contractors who suffer, but those who make up the armies, that is, the workers and peasants. This has always provided us with the firm basis of principle in our resolute struggle for peace.

The fourth Soviet congress which took place two years ago issued as our chief guiding formulation in the sphere of foreign policy the following direction: 'The congress directs the attention of all peoples to the indisputable fact that the USSR is the only State in the world which directly and openly and consistently pursues a pacific policy, corresponding to the interests of mankind. In fully approving this policy of peace, the congress instructs the Government to continue as before unswervingly along this road and to try to establish and strengthen friendly relations with foreign States. The congress notes with satisfaction that these efforts have found a response among certain States; the development of economic intercourse with these countries is the best testimony of the correctness of this policy.' Our work in international affairs has been devoted to the carrying out of this chief directive of the fourth congress.

At the same time as the English Conservative Government, preparing the rupture of diplomatic relations, made its violent raid on the premises of the Soviet Trade Delegation in London, at the same time as English political leaders were working on the preparation of a financial and

economic blockade of the Union, the Soviet delegation at the international economic conference at Geneva in May 1927 put forward a programme which maintained the possibility of the 'peaceful co-existence of the two economic systems, the capitalist and the socialist'. This programme of the 'peaceful co-existence' of the two economic systems, as the necessary condition for the construction of socialism in the USSR was consistently put into operation by the Soviet Government in the period between the fourth and fifth congresses.

Our policy of struggle for peace was shown with particular clarity in that period in the activity of our delegation to the preparatory disarmament commission, in our attitude to the Kellogg pact, and in the so-called Moscow protocol, signed on our initiative with the States on our frontiers.

As you know, the League of Nations has been engaged on the question of disarmament for eight years. Our delegation to the fifth session distributed to all those taking part a memorandum from which it appeared that the various bodies of the League of Nations have in that time held 121 meetings on the question of armaments limitation and passed 111 resolutions. The deliberations of the various bodies on disarmament fill 14,000 pages. When I read that armaments are increasing in all countries I thought: will this not manure the soil in which cannon, machine-guns and poison gases grow? It is to such a commission that our delegates came to fight for peace. I do not think that many of those present will envy them their work in that environment. Up till now they have not succeeded in reducing armaments by one soldier, one gun, one cruiser, one bullet, but they have filled 14,000 pages, used up a huge quantity of paper with a very high degree of efficiency.

The Soviet Union was invited to take part in the work of the preparatory commission as early as 1925. At that time we replied that we did not unconditionally refuse to discuss the disarmament question, and were ready to take part in the work of the commission. But we could only do so if its sessions were held in a place to which we could travel. We pointed out that we could not take part in the work of a commission sitting in Switzerland because our ambassador to Italy, Comrade Vorovsky, had been killed there in quite unparalleled circumstances; he had gone there with the knowledge of the Swiss Government to take part in the Lausanne conference. We did not wish to send other sons of the October revolution to their death.

A settlement of the dispute with Switzerland arising from the assassination of Vorovsky was delayed through no fault of ours. This dispute was settled in April 1927, and that enabled the USSR to take part in November December 1927 in the world economic conference, and in the preparatory disarmament commission.

At the fourth session at the end of 1927 Comrade Litvinov on behalf of the Soviet Government put forward a proposal for complete and general disarmament, under which

the contracting States solemnly affirm that the only real way to preserve peace is the universal and complete abolition of all armed forces, and conclude the present convention, and have for this purpose appointed their plenipotentiaries who, having exchanged their credentials, which were found to be in due and proper form, have agreed as follows: Complete disarmament will begin on the day the present convention enters into force; it will be carried out within four years in such a manner as to reduce the possibility of armed conflicts by the end of the first year.[1]

This was the proposal we made. Now, and at the time we made the proposal, we were accused of having made frivolous proposals, of making proposals which a bourgeois government was not in a position to accept. We replied that if anyone wants to introduce a proposal which would be accepted without any difficulty, he should introduce one not for disarmament, but for supplementary armaments, which would correspond with what was happening, but our task consists in fighting against that.

The Soviet Government took good note that the imperialist States would not proceed with this very radical, but at the same time very simple form of the practical achievement of disarmament. Nevertheless we put forward our proposals, as we are fully aware that the peoples will fight against war and for disarmament, and sooner or later establish governments which will bring it into being. For us there is no doubt that disarmament will be achieved as the result of a prolonged and bitter struggle, that it will mean the end of a long period of history. True, these events will not occur suddenly; they will be the result of a great movement and of great upheavals among peoples, nations, and States. But they will happen the sooner, the more quickly and the more resolutely and the more consistently the struggle is waged.

The representatives of the Governments guiding the work of the preparatory commission of the League of Nations could not in their replies to Comrade Litvinov adduce a single argument, corresponding with the interests of the working class and the peoples, against the realization of immediate and universal disarmament, but their tactics had of course a serious foundation in the class interests of those imperialist groups who hold political power in the bourgeois States. In putting forward the demand for immediate, complete, and universal disarmament, the Soviet delegation exposed the imperialist military tendencies of the governments of the capitalist countries and tore the veil from the cabinet secrets of the League of Nations; it is in the lobbies

[1] cf. League of Nations, 1927, ix, C. 667, M. 225, pp. 9–10.

of the League of Nations that negotiations are conducted and treaties and agreements concluded which have other objects than the securing of peace. The Soviet delegation showed that our country, a proletarian State, is waging an honest and consistent struggle for peace. The many millions of the working masses of all countries saw in the Soviet proposals the reflection of their own longing for peace.

The preparatory commission rejected the Soviet proposal for general disarmament, arguing from article 8 of the League of Nations Covenant, which runs: 'The members of the League acknowledge that the preservation of peace requires the reduction of national armaments to the lowest point consistent with national safety and the enforcement by common action of international obligations.' The members of the League of Nations regard this article as a prohibition of disarmament. Clearly they think that even if it were possible to do so, if there were no insuperable obstacles to general disarmament, adherence to the letter of the Covenant, as though it were of 'divine' origin, must come first. And on this purely formal ground they refused to have our proposal for general disarmament discussed.

Just the same it found a wide response not only among the working and peasant masses, but also among those elements of the intelligentsia who can be counted as sincere pacifists. When our demand for general disarmament was rejected, we suggested to our delegation to make a further effort for the practical settlement of the question of disarmament and to introduce a proposal for gradual disarmament, as the first step towards complete disarmament. Our second proposal ran as follows: 'The contracting States recognize that the only just course to pursue is that of a progressive reduction of all kinds of armaments as regards their composition and number, this method being the least injurious to the interests of the weakest States, which are economically dependent on the stronger, and it is accordingly desirable to take this principle as a basis for the reduction of armaments.'[1]

We proposed that the reduction of armaments should proceed very rapidly for those States with large armies and large technical resources, and less rapidly for weak States with small armies and insignificant technical resources. This proposal could not be rejected on the same formal ground that the Covenant of the League of Nations forbids disarmament. In proposing partial disarmament, the gradual reduction of armaments, we did nothing constitutionally improper, from the formal aspect, from the point of view of the Covenant, and the commission was obliged to examine our proposal. Then endless delays began. Examination of our plan was put off for thirteen months. Twice Comrade Litvinov addressed to Loudon, chairman of the commission, very

[1] League of Nations, 1928, ix, C. 165, M. 50. p. 347.

firm reminders of the necessity of convening the preparatory commission to examine the project.[1] It was convened only after thirteen months. Comrade Litvinov has just recently returned from the last session of the preparatory commission, which rejected this proposal too, for reasons not foreseen in the League of Nations Covenant. It was rejected because the task of the preparatory commission is allegedly only to indicate the kind of armaments which are to be reduced. Everything else must be dealt with at the international conference.

You are mistaken if you think that the task of the international conference is to establish levels for the reduction of armaments. Nothing of the kind! The international conference is not to determine precise figures for disarmament either; it is only to register the statements of each State on its security. Every State will itself determine whether it can or cannot reduce everything. This is what they are trying to make appear as work for the limitations of armaments. The laughter in this hall which greets my factual account, indicates that the Soviet congress fully understands the diplomatic game of the bourgeois Governments. All the talk of the representatives of bourgeois Governments regarding disarmament, the reduction of armaments, the constitution of commissions, special bodies, etc., really serves to conceal the growth of armaments and the preparation of new wars. The preparatory commission rejected even such elementary proposals by our delegation as the prohibition of the aerial bombardment of civilian populations, the prohibition of the preparation in times of peace of means of chemical warfare, etc.

There was one peculiar feature of the sixth session of the preparatory commission which has just concluded. To a large extent it declined to use its former method of reckless playing with pacifist words. At the sixth session the chief militarist governments threw off the mask. The preparatory commission excluded from the arms subject to reduction trained land forces, military stores for mobilization purposes, non-commissioned ranks of the air force, military aircraft, etc., etc. It thus excluded from the arms subject to reduction all the basic elements of power in a modern army. It not only rejected our proposals, but a number of its own which had been included at former sessions in its own draft convention. To exclude from the draft convention such basic elements of military strength as army reserves and military stores makes the commission's draft a worthless bit of paper . . .

III. *The Kellogg Pact and the Moscow Protocol*

Mankind and the working class should understand the meaning of the fact that in these conditions, and with a threat of such a war, all our proposals for peace, disarmament, and the limitations of armaments

[1] League of Nations, 1929, ix, C. 195, M. 74, pp. 200, 201.

were rejected. This in itself is enough to show the absurdity of the hopes and the deliberate hypocrisy of the League of Nations, which under cover of pacifist phrases helps the capitalist governments to arm and to prepare for war. Against this background, with the cause of peace in this state and war being prepared, the campaign connected with the Kellogg pact developed. Confronted by our disarmament proposals, and the broad wave of sympathy with us which spread in all countries, the bourgeois world could not, it is clear, dispense with some kind of pacifist gesture. That is why there is nothing unexpected in its appearance. The Kellogg pact runs:

The high contracting parties solemnly declare, in the names of their respective peoples, that they condemn recourse to war for the solution of international controversies and renounce it is an instrument of national policy in their relations with one another. The high contracting parties agree that the settlement or solution of all disputes or conflicts, of whatever nature or of whatever origin they may be, which may arise among them, shall never be sought except by pacific means.

The Kellogg pact, signed in Paris on 28 August 1928, was put up in opposition to the peace policy of the USSR and our disarmament proposals, and was at the same time *the first attempt by American diplomacy to take the leading position in international affairs and to create its own peace system, in opposition to the League of Nations*. The mere fact that the European States were compelled, although they had no wish to do so, to accept the Kellogg proposal, proves the extraordinary expansion in the role of the United States. The Kellogg pact cannot be regarded as a factor in the prevention of war, as this document contains no real guarantees against war; in particular it says nothing about disarmament or even the limitation of armaments. It would therefore be erroneous to connect the question of real prevention of war with the Kellogg pact. It contains no guarantees that war will not break out. War destroys all treaties, because these are all concluded between contracting parties in terms of peace. It would therefore of course be erroneous to link with the Kellogg pact the question of real practical measures for preventing war. This was our estimate of the Kellogg pact from the very beginning. While criticizing and revealing the underlying idea of the pact, however, the Soviet Government had no intention of giving the leaders of the anti-Soviet bloc a formal excuse for an attack on the USSR. Similarly it considered that, with all its deficiencies, the Kellogg pact, by imposing a 'moral obligation' would, even if in the slightest degree only, make the psychological preparation for war more difficult. With these considerations in mind, the Union Government decided to adhere to the pact . . .

We were not only before others in signing and ratifying the pact, but thought it necessary to use it in order to strengthen peaceful relations

between the USSR and neighbouring countries. As we were quite convinced that the ratification of the Kellogg pact would be dragged out for a long time (and we were quite right in this, the pact has not yet entered into force), and that every step in strengthening peace is a great success for our policy and secures our interests, we proposed to our neighbours that the pact should be signed without waiting for its entry into force, i.e. its ratification by all the original signatories. We had to spend a great deal of effort and time to get our peace initiative put into effect and overcome the resistance of certain governments. The Moscow protocol was signed 9 February 1929 by the USSR, Poland, Latvia, Estonia, and Rumania. It was later adhered to by Turkey, Persia, Lithuania, and the Free City of Danzig.

In summing up the results of our foreign policy in the years since the fourth congress, the absence of any result of the work of the preparatory disarmament commission should be noted. At the same time it should be said that the hopes of those politicians and writers who assume that since the preparatory commission rejected the Soviet proposals, we shall abandon our struggle for peace, are quite baseless. Our struggle for peace, spreading wider and wider, will be continued as actively as before . . .

V. *Soviet Foreign Policy*

Comrades, the fulfilment of the five-year plan is bound up with an enormous development in our exports and imports, the import of a vast mass of equipment for our industry, agriculture, and transport. Therefore we are not less, but more interested than before in the development of peaceful relations and trade agreements. The fulfilment of the five-year plan demands consistent and systematic work over a number of years. Therefore in international relations we are trying for such solidity and firmness in relations with individual States that no setback or loss will occur from that quarter in carrying out the colossal schemes of works laid down in the plan. In our foreign relations, precisely in this matter of developing business connexions, we recently concluded negotiations with Germany, highly successful and advantageous to both sides, and a protocol[1] was signed 21 December 1928 which develops and extends the scheme of commercial-economic relations between us and Germany established by the trade agreement of 1925.[2] Germany was the first to enter into commercial relations with us, by way of financial and credit arrangements which considerably facilitated our imports from Germany and loaded German industry with orders. In the practical carrying out of this agreement German business circles must have been convinced that, as far as punctuality goes, we, if I may so

[1] *Sobranie Zakonov*, 1929, ii, p. 110. [2] *League of Nations Treaty Series*, lii, p. 7.

express it, are more punctual than the punctual Germans, and a whole series of payments were made before the due date. This attitude of German business circles is in keeping with the interests of both sides. We also recently signed with Germany a convention on conciliation procedure[1] for the examination of questions in dispute. It is based on the principle of equal representation of both parties and ensures the speedy settlement of conflicts by peaceful means. Of course, there have been certain misunderstandings even with Germany, but they have all been successfully eliminated. At the moment we are not quite satisfied with the attitude of the German authorities in connexion with the activities of the White Guards who fabricated anti-Soviet political documents in Berlin. Our complaints on this score arise not from the mere desire to punish some criminals; they arise from the desire to clear up finally an affair which has international significance and is connected with the USSR. The spurious documents forged by this and other gangs of swindlers have sometimes had great importance, as was the case with the 'Zinoviev letter' in the last English elections. They have complicated diplomatic relations between the USSR and other States and have had repercussions on international diplomatic activity. This is no ordinary band of rogues, but a political organization of criminal swindlers, which found an entry into the most distinguished bourgeois homes and into bourgeois diplomacy.

The All-Russian Soviet Congress of 1922 recommended the Rapallo treaty as a model for treaty relations between Soviet States and the capitalist environment; now after nearly eight years of normal relations with Germany, we can affirm the correctness and the mutual advantageousness of the basis on which these relations were built and on which we should develop them further.

I have already spoken in full detail of our relations with Great Britain in the earlier part of my report. Up till now diplomatic relations have not been re-established. You also know that in breaking relations with the USSR the Conservative Government did not attain the objects it had in view when it took this step. On the contrary, the objective facts tell of the damage inflicted on basic branches of English economy, in particular in the export trade, in consequence of the absence of a normal basis for trade with us for two years. It is this which explains the healthy tendency in English business circles advocating the re-establishment of connexions as they were before the break. It is this which led to the recent visit of about one hundred representatives of the English business world to the USSR. But even now, although there are no such bitter attacks on the Soviet Union as there were at the time of the last elections, Prime Minister Baldwin, referring in his speech to the unprofitable and

[1] ibid., xc, p. 219.

precarious nature of relations with the Soviet Union, declared that he could not recommend the expansion of trade with us. In his speech he propounded a new thesis, which has not so far been used by any of the Conservative Government leaders. For two years Conservative circles have steadily maintained that the development of trade with the USSR is possible without the re-establishment of normal political relations; they have not contested the advantages of trading with us. Now the head of the Conservative Government is trying to prove the disadvantageousness of trade with the USSR. I shall not contradict him, for the facts themselves prove the opposite with such clarity, prove that there is no single instance of trade with us being disadvantageous to our trading partner, or of our trading organizations failing to carry out any of the commercial obligations they assumed. The dimensions of our trade are of course determined by the juridical, legal, and financial conditions laid down for our trade in the different countries. As to our attitude on the question of relations with England, it is clearly set out in the recently published statement[1] of Comrade Piatakov, the representative of the Government commission for negotiating with the English industrialists. We think that there is every possibility of settling all questions in dispute on the basis of the 1924 treaty with the MacDonald Government.

Now the United States, another of the greatest countries. Relations with the United States, both in regard to trade, and to the settlement of such questions as technical help in the development of our economy from the technically advanced American economy, are developing very intensively. Not only is the engineer Cooper consultant for the construction of the Dnieper hydro-electric power station, to the great benefit of that undertaking, but a large number of other eminent and competent American engineers are giving technical help in our work of construction, and giving our technicians and engineers the opportunity to learn about the industry and production methods of the United States itself. Negotiations are now being conducted with some of the biggest American firms concerning new technical aid contracts. With connexions being extended in this way, the absence of diplomatic relations even at the present stage is not only an obstacle, but peculiarly absurd. The further development of these relations, of course, comes up against this obstacle, that the conclusion of big economic and commercial deals, without the chance of backing them diplomatically and legally, is for us not merely inconvenient, but far too risky.

Relations with France have remained as they were at the time of Rakovsky's departure. The learned Bakhmetev discovered a way of maintaining living creatures in a state of semi-animation, a peculiar

[1] *Izvestia*, 6 April 1929.

kind of prolonged sleep, *anabiosis*. Our relations with France remain through no fault of ours, in this state. After the proposals made by Rakovsky on the outcome of the work of the commission to examine all questions of debts and credits, there has been no movement of any kind. We have had no answer to those proposals, nor to our proposal for a political treaty of mutual non-aggression. Apart from that, there have been in the French Government's policy towards us in the last two years quite a number of actions which can scarcely be said to express any burning desire for the establishment of more cordial relations.

Relations with Italy have developed quite normally, except for the occasion in 1927 when Italy ratified the protocol upholding Rumania's alleged right to Bessarabia. But that, of course, cannot make us waver in the slightest in our attitude to the forcible seizure of that region.

The Baltic Countries: I have already spoken of them in connexion with the Moscow protocol, which undoubtedly made for a considerable improvement for the period in question in our relations with neighbouring countries. But we think that the signature of the protocol should be followed by acts which strengthen and reinforce it. Since the States referred to signed a protocol renouncing war with each other, it is only natural to assume that they desire not only to refrain from war, but to strengthen peaceful relations among themselves all round. The desire to develop further the peaceful intentions expressed in the protocol would be quite intelligible . . . such a desire exists—I say this with the utmost seriousness and responsibility—in the Soviet Government. Unfortunately, among some other signatories of the Moscow protocol no such desire is apparent, in their relations with the USSR, at least not in practice. It is enough to mention recent events in Warsaw. The mitigation of the sentence on the White Guard Voitsekhovsky, who made an attempt on the life of our trade representative in Poland, Comrade Lizarev, the speeches of Voitsekhovsky's defending counsel, with their insulting slanders and recklessness, who was not once pulled up by the presiding judge, the scurrilous campaign in the Polish press against the USSR—all this proves that the new Polish Government is departing from the spirit of the Moscow protocol. We think it necessary to direct the special attention of the public in both countries to the immense importance of establishing really, and not only formally, normal relations between Poland and the USSR, in the interests both of the two countries and of general peace. We have more than once declared—and I repeat it now again that we are seriously anxious to reach lasting friendly relations with Poland. We offered Poland a pact of non-aggression, we offered to take the most serious measures to ensure tranquillity on the frontier, and they know that we made this offer not from cowardice (for everybody knows that if we are attacked and obliged to

fight, we can and shall fight back with a will). In our entire policy towards Poland we have proceeded, and we are now proceeding, on the assumption that the strengthening of peaceful relations benefits both peoples and both States.

Recently we signed a trade agreement[1] with Estonia. This should and can play a great part in stimulating economic intercourse between Estonia and the USSR and strengthening political relations. As to Finland, it has not yet adhered to the Moscow protocol, but not long ago we were informed that, although formally it has not yet adhered to the protocol, it already considered itself in a certain degree bound by its provisions. This means that the last of our neighbours will shortly adhere to it.

Our relations with Rumania are in a class by themselves. They are connected with the question of Bessarabia. In Rumania they tried to interpret the joint signature of the Moscow protocol, which speaks of the renunciation of war as an instrument of national policy, as our renunciation of Bessarabia, as our recognition of the right and justice of that unlawful occupation which now obtains in Bessarabia. We replied that in regard to Bessarabia our position is exactly as before. Let the Bessarabians themselves—those who live in Bessarabia, let them determine by a plebiscite with whom they want to live—with Rumania or with us. All we propose to Rumania is a fair and free plebiscite, conducted in such a way as to exclude pressure on the Bessarabian people from one side or the other.

Our relations with Japan continue to develop quite normally. This year for the first time the Soviet-Japanese fisheries convention,[2] signed in 1928, enters into full force. It is the basis on which an equitable settlement of particular disputes which arise in this field is assured. We hope that with the co-operation of the Japanese Government further progress will be made in extending and strengthening political and economic relations between the two countries.

Our relations with Persia are also developing normally. The adherence of Persia to the Moscow protocol, together with the Soviet-Persian treaty[3] of non-aggression and neutrality which was already in existence, as well as the commercial treaty, is a further step consolidating our relations with this State. The declaration of the Persian Government on non-intervention in Afghan affairs[4] is an indication of the similarity of attitude of the Soviet and Persian Governments in regard to Afghanistan's national independence.

Our relations with Turkey arise not merely from the need to strengthen mutual intercourse, but to consolidate peace in the Near East. The

[1] *League of Nations Treaty Series*, lxxxiv, p. 323. [2] ibid., lxxx, p. 341.
[3] ibid., cxii, p. 275. [4] cf. *The Times*, 17 April 1929.

adherence of Turkey to the Moscow protocol was a further expression of these relations and of collaboration in the work of strengthening peace and developing political and economic relations.

Turning to Afghanistan, I must observe with the utmost regret that the internal crisis which the Afghan people are now going through, complicated by antagonisms of a national, racial, and social character, is being prolonged. A country which for the ten years of its existence as an independent State made great progress, despite enormous internal difficulties, in restoring the national economy, has now for six months been in a state of acute crisis, thanks to the opposition of reactionary forces, actively supported from without. I must also direct your attention to the tense situation created on certain sections of the Soviet-Afghan frontier, adjacent to the territory where the authorities set up by Amanullah's Government have been superseded. I am thinking of a revival of brigandage endemic in these districts of Afghanistan, the administration of which, even if it does not take part in the formation and supplying of the bands, at any rate does nothing to prevent their crossing into Soviet territory. We shall continue our policy of complete non-intervention in the internal affairs of the Afghan people. I hope that the progressive forces in the country, created in the ten years of Afghan independence, will triumph over the reactionary elements and preserve the independence and influence they have won.

As a result of the frank disinclination of the Czecho-Slovakian Government, normal political relations do not yet exist between that country and ourselves. In the circumstances, economic relations between the two countries have naturally been unable to develop to an adequate extent. The report recently received, that Czecho-Slovakia intends to dovetail its relations with the USSR in conformity with the Little Entente as a whole, including Rumania, which is in occupation of Bessarabia, indicates tendencies and claims on the part of that Government which cannot lead to any good.

The deployment of the political, financial, and economic machinery of the forces aggressively inclined towards the USSR has not brought the results that their leaders counted upon. The measures to exert pressure on the USSR have not diminished either the rate or the extent of our socialist construction. The plans to create an economic bloc directed against us have miscarried. Recently there has been a whole series of events indicating a growth in the tendency towards maintaining peaceful economic relations with us.

From what I have said it seems to me clear, first, that the elements of aggression against our State, the possibility of an attack on our State, certainly exist, but our policy of fighting for peace and of prolonging the breathing space has not been entirely unsuccessful. Our policy as a

whole must also in the future consist in fighting with all our strength and all our means for peace, for the development of business relations with all States. In view of the existence of aggressive factors and of the danger of war, of the cessation of the peaceful respite, we must in no circumstances and not for a moment forget to strengthen the defensive forces of our State and our country.

EXTRACTS FROM THE RESOLUTION OF THE FIFTH SOVIET CONGRESS ON THE REPORT OF THE GOVERNMENT

22 *May* 1929 *Mezhdunarodnaya Politika, 1929*, p. 184

2. The Congress completely approves the Government's foreign policy . . . and notes with satisfaction that, together with the successes of socialist construction within the country, it has strengthened the Soviet Union's international position.

The Congress notes that, despite the increasing hostility shown by certain capitalist States towards the proletarian State, which made itself felt particularly sharply in the period immediately after the fourth Soviet Congress, the Government has succeeded for the moment in removing the immediate danger of war and in concluding a series of international treaties which consolidate the Soviet Union's pacific policy.

Thus the aggressive attempts of capitalist States (military and other treaties directed against the USSR, the organization of blocs, the organization of a financial-economic boycott and of a semi-blockade, etc.) have not at the present stage been crowned with success, and among the capitalist bourgeoisie of a number of countries (the United States and England) the movement towards the development of economic relations with the USSR has been strengthened.

3. At the same time, the Congress is bound to note that the conflict of interests between different capitalist groups and the growth of the competitive struggle between them are a source of international tension and give rise to the danger of new wars. The rejection by the preparatory disarmament commission of the Soviet disarmament proposals, and the reluctance shown at the sessions of the commission by the capitalist States which are members of the League of Nations and took part in the work of the commission to take even the smallest step towards the reduction of naval armaments, confirm once more that these States, despite the obligation they assumed under the Kellogg pact to renounce war as an instrument of national policy, are in fact building their entire policy on the preparation of a new world war.

While approving the efforts of the Union Government in support of peace, and the struggle it has waged for disarmament, which cannot fail

to meet with the warmest sympathy from the workers of the entire world, the Congress, taking into account the military preparations of the imperialist Powers and the unceasing hostile attacks on the USSR, proposes that the Union Government, while continuing its labours to maintain peaceful relations with all Powers, should at the same time take all steps to strengthen the country's defensive capacity.

EXTRACTS FROM A NOTE FROM KARAKHAN, VICE-COMMISSAR FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS, TO THE CHINESE CHARGÉ D'AFFAIRES IN MOSCOW ON THE POLICE RAID ON THE SOVIET CONSULATE IN HARBIN

31 *May* 1929 *Sovetsko-Kitaiskii Konflikt*, p. 21

At 2 p.m. on 2 [27] May a detachment of police suddenly broke into the premises of the Soviet Consul-General in Harbin. They conducted a search which lasted about six hours. Throughout this time the Soviet Consul-General M. Melnikov and his colleagues were detained and deprived of the opportunity of communicating with the outside world. Physical violence was used against the Vice-Consul, M. Znamensky. Despite the Consul's emphatic protest, the police took away part of the consular correspondence and arrested all visitors found on the premises of the consulate, to the number of thirty-nine. All the arrested persons are Soviet citizens living in Manchuria. Among them are many employees of Soviet State and economic institutions and of the Chinese Eastern Railway administration in Harbin, who had come to the consulate on business, and a number of Soviet citizens who had come about their passports and visas, and, finally, three temporary extra employees of the consulate. The Chinese police, and the Russian White Guards serving in the Chinese police, openly took money and articles belonging to the consulate and its employees.

The day after the raid the police published a statement,[1] remarkable for its shamelessness and stupidity, about their discovery of a 'meeting of the Third International' allegedly held in the basement of the consular offices . . .

The police raid and search of the Soviet consulate, which is protected by international law, is a flagrant violation of the very principles of international law. The detention of the Consul and his colleagues for six hours, the arrest of visitors, including those in the Consul-General's office, the seizure of consular correspondence, which enjoys immunity under international law, accentuate the violence and illegality of the

[1] cf. *The Times*, 29 May 1929.

entire affair, emphasizing the complete contempt of the police authorities for the elementary principles of international law and international intercourse . . .

The report of a 'meeting of the Third International' in the consulate is an obvious and ludicrous invention, and reveals complete ignorance. It is merely a feeble attempt of the local authorities to avoid due responsibility for their flagrant acts which are liable to create new difficulties in the relations between the two neighbouring countries.

The Soviet Government must bring to the attention of the Government of the Chinese Republic that the illegal police raid on the Soviet consulate in Harbin was made after prolonged preparation in the form of a campaign of provocation against the Soviet Union and its consular representatives, expressed not only in irresponsible press articles, but also in slanderous utterances by official and semi-official persons and bodies of the National Government. The Soviet Government notes that this police raid on the premises of the Soviet Consulate-General in Harbin, in conjunction with the said campaign, creates an atmosphere in which the normal work of the consular representatives of the USSR on Chinese territory becomes extremely difficult, if not wholly impossible. The situation created is the more serious in that the recent events were preceded by the raid on the Soviet Embassy in Peking on 6 April 1927, the White Guard raid on the Soviet consulate in Shanghai on 25 October 1927, the destruction of the Soviet consulate in Canton in December 1927, in which five of the employees were killed, and a number of acts of violence from the Chinese side on the Chinese Eastern Railway. All these acts, for which the various Chinese authorities are responsible, have so far remained unindemnified, and prevent the resumption of normal Soviet-Chinese relations.

The Soviet Government . . . has refrained from any reprisals, however justified they would be in the circumstances. In particular, it has continued to give the missions and consulates of the Chinese Republic on Soviet territory all the protection to which they are entitled under international law and which is necessary if they are to function normally. In doing so the Soviet Government was guided by the desire to secure to Chinese citizens resident on Soviet territory the same degree of protection and care from their consular institutions as is enjoyed by foreign nationals of other Powers maintaining diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union. But it is compelled to note that its peaceful and friendly attitude is apparently exploited by influences hostile to the USSR as evidence of its willingness to refrain from replying to any future provocations to its consular offices in China . . .

The Soviet Government protests energetically against the said outrages by the police and demands that orders be given immediately for

the release of the Soviet citizens arrested on the consulate premises, and the return of all the correspondence, money, and other articles removed.

At the same time, the Soviet Government is forced to state that as the Chinese authorities show by all their acts that they are unwilling and unable to maintain the generally accepted standards of international law and intercourse, it will not on its part henceforth consider itself bound by those standards in regard to the Chinese representative in Moscow and Chinese consulates on Soviet territory, and that these will no longer enjoy the extra-territoriality to which they are entitled under international law.

The Soviet Government declares that the Soviet Union is in all circumstances unchangingly anxious to maintain and preserve friendly relations with the Chinese people. It must, however, emphatically warn the Nanking Government and its agents against any further trials of the Soviet Government's patience by acts of provocation and the violation of treaties and agreements.

TASS STATEMENT ON THE CONVERSATIONS BETWEEN THE SOVIET VICE-COMMISSAR AND THE POLISH AMBASSADOR ON THE ANTI-POLISH DEMONSTRATIONS IN TIFLIS

19 *June* 1929 *Izvestia*, 19 *June* 1929

In connexion with the demonstrations of Georgian White émigrés which took place in Poland with the participation of representatives of the Polish authorities, spontaneous meetings and protest demonstrations were held throughout Georgia against the conduct of the Polish authorities, which violates Poland's treaty obligations towards the USSR.

On 8 June many thousands of spontaneous demonstrations were held in Tiflis. The columns of demonstrators filed for three hours past the building of the Polish consulate. On 12 June the demonstrations were repeated on a much larger scale, and on this occasion certain groups of demonstrators indulged in excesses in the form of throwing rotten eggs into the building.

Although, according to the news from Tiflis, these incidents were provoked by the conduct of individual members of the Polish consular staff, who did not display sufficient coolness and tact while the demonstration was passing, the Vice-Commissar for Foreign Affairs, Comrade Karakhan, during a visit to the NKID by the Polish ambassador to Moscow M. Patek on 13 June, expressed regret concerning the impermissible excesses which took place in Tiflis.

M. Patek stated that he had not yet received instructions from Warsaw on this question and would therefore for the present do no more than request that steps be taken to ensure the security of the Polish consulate in Tiflis. Comrade Karakhan promised M. Patek to take the necessary steps to prevent similar incidents in the future.

In the course of the conversation M. Patek called attention to the fact that, according to the information at his disposal, the protest movement in Georgia had assumed a widespread character and many resolutions of an anti-Polish character had been passed, and that such incidents did damage to Polish-Soviet relations.

Comrade Karakhan pointed out to M. Patek that the cause of these incidents was to be sought in the indignation which seized the Soviet Union, and in particular Soviet Georgia, in connexion with the demonstrations against Soviet Georgia held in Poland, in which several officials took part.

On 14 June M. Patek again called on Comrade Karakhan, having received instructions from his Government to enter an official protest against the incident in Tiflis. Having taken note of this, Comrade Karakhan stated that he had expressed regret for the incident even before the receipt of the Polish protest, and the question might thus be considered closed.

EXTRACTS FROM A NOTE FROM KARAKHAN TO THE CHINESE CHARGÉ D'AFFAIRES IN MOSCOW ON THE CHINESE ATTEMPT TO SEIZE THE CHINESE EASTERN RAILWAY

13 *July* 1929 *Sovetsko-Kitaiskii Konflikt*, p. 23

I am instructed by my Government to request you to communicate the following to the Mukden Government and to the National Government of the Chinese Republic in Nanking:

According to reports received by the Soviet Government, on the morning of 10 July the Chinese authorities raided the Chinese Eastern Railway and seized the railway telegraph along the entire line, thus cutting telegraphic communication with the USSR; closed and sealed, without offering any reason, the Soviet trade delegation's premises and also the offices of the State trading department, the textile syndicate, the oil syndicate, and the merchant shipping department . . . Then the Taipan of the railway (the chairman of the board of directors of the CER), Lin Yung-huan, presented to M. Emshanov, manager of the CER, the demand that the management of the railway be handed over to a person appointed by the Taipan. When the manager of the railway, M. Emshanov, refused to accede to this illegal demand as a gross

violation of the agreement on the provisional administration of the CER signed in Peking on 31 May 1924 and also of the agreement[1] between the Government of the USSR and the antonomous Government of the Three Eastern Provinces of the Chinese Republic signed in Mukden 20 September 1924, both he and the assistant-manager of the railway, M. Eismont, were removed from their posts. They were replaced by persons appointed by the Taipan. The heads of the traction and traffic departments, as well as other persons, were removed at the Taipan's orders and replaced in the main by Russian White Guards. Throughout the CER the trade-union and co-operative organizations of the CER workers and employees were closed and sacked, and searches and arrests carried out, more than 200 Soviet citizens in the employ of the railway being arrested. About 60 Soviet citizens, including MM. Emshanov and Eismont, have already been expelled from China.

At the same time news was received of the concentration along the Soviet frontier of Manchurian troops who have been brought into a state of military preparedness and moved right up to the frontier. It is reported that in addition to the Manchurian troops, Russian White Guard detachments are disposed along the Soviet frontier whom the Manchurian command intend to send across into Soviet territory.

The said actions are a most glaring and flagrant violation of the direct and unambiguous provisions of the treaties in force between the USSR and China . . .

According to the spirit and letter of the Peking and Mukden agreements of 1924, the CER is to be jointly administered by the USSR and China; it may become Chinese property either upon the expiration of the term fixed in the treaties, or, prior to that date, by China purchasing the railway by agreement of the two parties; the illegal actions of the Taipan of the CER noted above, sanctioned by the Chinese Government, amount in fact to the seizure of the CER and are an attempt at the unilateral abrogation of existing treaties.

The 1924 agreements provide a quite explicit procedure for the settlement of all disputed questions concerning the railway. Under article 6 of the agreement of 31 May 1924, and article 1, paragraph ii of the Mukden agreement 'all questions on which the management cannot agree must be submitted to the Governments for a just and friendly settlement'. Each party therefore has the fullest opportunity of placing any question before the other party in a perfectly legal and normal manner and of trying to get its demands satisfied. The Chinese side, however, both in this instance and in several preceding instances, such as the seizure of the telephone station, has preferred to act in a unilateral and illegal manner which not merely violates the treaties in force

[1] *Sobranie Zakonov*, 1927, ii, p. 732.

between the USSR and China, but throws them completely overboard.

In noting that the above-mentioned actions of the Taipan of the CER are a gross violation of the treaties between the USSR and China, the Government of the USSR enters a most emphatic protest against them and calls the attention of the Mukden Government and the National Government of the Chinese Republic to the extreme seriousness of the situation which has been thereby created . . .

If the Chinese authorities had any complaints about the regime established for the CER or about the actions of individual Soviet representatives on the railway, or even about the rights on the CER established by treaty, including the duration of the treaty and the purchase of the CER before the designated date, they had under the provisions of the treaties every opportunity of putting any such complaint before the Government of the USSR in a legal manner.

The Soviet Government observes that in regard to the CER it has always shown its willingness to settle any disputed point in a friendly manner. As recently as 2 February in a note[1] delivered by the Soviet Consul-General in Mukden to the central diplomatic office of the Three Eastern Provinces of China, the Soviet Government declared that it 'considers it highly desirable that all disputed questions, and in particular questions regarding the railway, which have not been settled in the past years and have created misunderstandings and complications in the normal working of the railway should be examined and settled in order to avoid possible misunderstandings and conflicts'. This proposal, which shows how ready the Soviet Government is to meet the reasonable wishes of the Chinese side, gave the Chinese Government the opportunity of having any of the questions in which it was interested examined. It did not, however, wish to take the opportunity offered by the Soviet Government and the proposal remained unanswered. Neither was there any reply to the telegram sent on the 11th of this month by the People's Commissar for Transport to the chairman of the board of directors of the CER declaring Soviet willingness to examine all disputed questions immediately and stating that the conduct of these negotiations had been entrusted by the Transport Commissariat to M. Serebriakov, a member of its collegium.

The present Chinese authorities are apparently inclined to interpret this policy of the peaceful and friendly settlement of all disputed questions, and the policy of respect for China's sovereign rights, which is a fundamental negation of the principles of the imperialist policy of bourgeois States, not as one arising from the very nature of the Soviet power, but as a manifestation of its weakness. This clearly is the reason why the Chinese authorities allow themselves to commit a series of

[1] cf. *U.S. Foreign Relations*, 1929, ii, p. 189.

grossly violent and provocative acts against the USSR, abusing its pacific attitude. The Soviet Government is therefore compelled to remind the Chinese authorities that it disposes of the means required to defend the legal rights of the peoples of the USSR from any violent encroachments whatever.

Remaining true to its policy of peace the Soviet Government, despite the violence and provocation of the Chinese authorities, again declares its readiness to enter into negotiation with China on all the questions connected with the CER. Such negotiations are, however, possible only on condition that the arrested Soviet citizens are immediately set free and all the illegal actions of the Chinese authorities abrogated.

In accordance with the foregoing the Soviet Government proposes:

1. To convene immediately a conference to settle all questions connected with the CER;
2. The Chinese authorities to cancel immediately all the illegal actions concerning the CER;
3. All arrested Soviet citizens to be released immediately, and the Chinese authorities to put a stop to all prosecutions and persecutions of Soviet citizens and Soviet institutions.

The Soviet Government suggests that the Mukden Government and the National Government of the Chinese Republic ponder the serious consequences which the rejection of the Soviet proposal might have.

The Soviet Government declares that it will expect an answer to this proposal within three days and gives notice that if a satisfactory answer should not be received, it will be compelled to resort to other means to defend the legal rights of the USSR.

NOTE FROM KARAKHAN, VICE-COMMISSAR FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS, TO THE CHINESE CHARGÉ D'AFFAIRES IN MOSCOW ON THE WITHDRAWAL OF SOVIET REPRESENTATIVES FROM CHINA

17 *July* 1929 *Sovetsko-Kitaiskii Konflikt*, p. 31

In confirming the receipt of your note of 17 July[1] containing the reply of the Chinese Government in Nanking to the Soviet Government's note of 13 July, I have the honour, on behalf of the Government of the USSR, to communicate the following:

The Soviet Government considers the reply of the Chinese Government unsatisfactory in content and hypocritical in tone. Being anxious to restore the legal basis of the relations between the USSR and China, infringed by the Chinese authorities, the Soviet Government in its note

[1] *Sovetsko-Kitaiskii Konflikt*, p. 30.

of 13 July put forward as a minimum three essential and completely moderate proposals:

1. Cancellation of the unilateral and completely illegal actions of the Chinese authorities on the CER which violate the agreements in force between the USSR and China;
2. the cessation of all repressive measures against Soviet citizens and institutions;
3. the convening of a conference to settle all questions connected with the CER.

In its reply the Chinese Government in fact rejected the Soviet Government's proposals.

Instead of restoring the Peking and Mukden agreements, unilaterally set at naught by the Chinese authorities, and thus preserving the basis for good-neighbourly relations, the Chinese Government's note sanctions the unilateral abrogation of these agreements and thus destroys the possibility of normal relations between the two States.

Instead of cancelling the illegal actions of the Taipan of the CER, who by force removed from their posts officials appointed by the administration on the representation of the USSR, the Chinese Government's note sanctions these actions, thereby justifying the seizure of the CER.

Instead of putting an end to the illegal measures of repression against Soviet citizens and institutions, the Chinese Government's note sanctions these measures and hypocritically attempts to justify them by a lying reference to alleged mass repressive measures against Chinese citizens in the USSR, while knowing quite well that in the USSR such measures are taken only against an insignificant group of spies, opium traffickers, underworld characters, smugglers, and other criminal elements among the Chinese in the USSR.

Instead of agreeing outright to the immediate calling of a conference of the parties to settle all disputed questions, the Chinese Government's note avoids this question, thus rejecting the proposal and destroying the possibility of settling the conflict by way of agreement between the parties.

The reference in the Chinese Government's note to propaganda as the reason for the illegal actions of the Chinese authorities is false and hypocritical, for the Chinese authorities have on their territory sufficient means to prevent and put a stop to such activity if it were in fact taking place without having to seize the CER and sever the treaty relations in force between China and the USSR.

The real reason for the coercive actions of the Chinese authorities on

the CER and the Chinese Government's note of 17 July sanctioning that coercion becomes particularly clear from the official statement of the head of the Chinese State, Chiang Kai-shek, reported in the press. In this statement Chiang Kai-shek, speaking of the illegal actions of the Chinese authorities on the CER, and justifying them, declares outright: 'Our measures, designed to take the CER into our own hands, are not in the least unusual . . . We want first of all to take the CER, and then we can embark on an examination of other questions.' These words leave no doubt as to the real meaning of the Chinese Government's note of 17 July.

In view of this, the Soviet Government observes that all means of settling by agreement the conflicts and disputes on the CER provoked by the Chinese authorities and aggravated by the Chinese Government's note of 17 July have been exhausted.

The Soviet Government is therefore compelled to take the following steps, placing all responsibility for the consequences on the Chinese Government:

1. To recall from China all Soviet diplomatic, consular, and commercial representatives;
2. To recall from China all persons appointed by the Soviet Government to the CER;
3. To suspend all railway communication between China and the USSR;
4. To invite the diplomatic and consular representatives of the Chinese Government in the USSR to leave Soviet territory immediately.

At the same time the Soviet Government declares that it retains all the rights arising from the Peking and Mukden agreements of 1924.

NARKOMINDEL STATEMENT ON THE FRENCH OFFER OF MEDIATION IN THE SOVIET-CHINESE DISPUTE

23 *July* 1929 *Sovetsko-Kitaiskii Konflikt*, p. 34

In connexion with the situation created as a result of the rupture of Soviet-Chinese relations, the French Government addressed to the Government of the USSR an offer to undertake to mediate for the peaceful settlement of the Soviet-Chinese conflict.

This offer was made in Paris on 19 July by the Foreign Minister M. Briand to the Soviet envoy to France Comrade Dovgalevsky, and in

Moscow, on M. Briand's instructions, by the French ambassador M. Herbette to the Vice-Commissar for Foreign Affairs, Comrade L. M. Karakhan, on Sunday 21 July.

On 22 July the Vice-Commissar for Foreign Affairs Comrade Karakhan, on behalf of the Soviet Government, replied to the French offer, stating to M. Herbette that 'the French Foreign Minister's offer is appreciated. The Soviet Government must however observe that this offer is pointless in view of the refusal of the Chinese authorities to restore the legal basis, which they have violated, that is the necessary prerequisite to agreement, as stated in the Soviet Government's note of 13 July. As to the question of further possible complications, the Soviet Government must state that no-one is so solicitous to preserve peace as the Soviet Government, in so far as this depends on it. There is no reason to doubt that the USSR was and remains the mainstay of the cause of peace.'

REPLY TO THE BRITISH MESSAGE ON THE RESUMPTION OF RELATIONS WITH THE USSR

23 *July* 1929

Cmd. 3418
Izvestia, 24 *July* 1929

The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics note the communication[1] from the British Government that they are willing to re-establish diplomatic relations with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the interruption of which was not the consequence of the fault or desire of the Government of the Union. The Government of the Union welcome this proposal in the interest of both countries and of the cause of peace. The Government of the Union consider it necessary that there shall be established as soon as possible a lasting agreement regarding disputed questions, and believe that such a lasting agreement can only be attained through both parties being treated as having equal rights and by the maintenance of reciprocal dignity and esteem.

The Government will assume the rights and duties of States in diplomatic relations between themselves as soon as the British Government takes upon itself these rights and duties.

In view of the fact that the note from the British Government aims at a preliminary exchange of views exclusively regarding the procedure to be followed in the subsequent discussion of disputed questions and not at an actual discussion of these questions, and being of the opinion that these deliberations regarding procedure can be concluded in the

[1] Cmd. 3418.

course of a very short period, the Government are requesting M. Dovgalevsky, plenipotentiary representative of the Union in France, to journey to London for this purpose.

NOTE FROM DOVGALEVSKY TO THE BRITISH FOREIGN SECRETARY ON THE NEGOTIATIONS FOR THE RESUMPTION OF RELATIONS

31 *July* 1929 Cmd. 3418

Izvestia, 2 *August* 1929

The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics have done everything on their side to facilitate the rapprochement between the Union and Great Britain and the resumption of normal diplomatic relations between the two countries. The fact, however, that the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs has stated[1] to M. Dovgalevsky, the Soviet Ambassador to France, that it is impossible for the British Government to re-establish normal relations between the two countries before the solution of the questions outstanding between them, shows that the British Government do not desire or are unable to bring about the resumption of these relations. If such were not the case, the British Government would not have proposed, as a preliminary condition for the re-establishment of normal relations, the solution of questions so complicated and contentious as the mutual claims and counter-claims. This new circumstance, which was not foreshadowed by the note from the British Government addressed to the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs on 17 July, requires a fresh examination of the question. For that reason the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs finds itself compelled to ask for fresh instructions from the Praesidium of the Central Executive Committee of the Union, which will consider the new proposals of the British Government at its next plenary session.

DECREE OF THE REVOLUTIONARY MILITARY COUNCIL ON THE FORMATION OF THE SPECIAL FAR EASTERN ARMY

6 *August* 1929 *Sovetsko-Kitaiskii Konflikt*, p. 37

1. To unite all the armed forces now stationed on Far Eastern territory into one army, and to call it the 'Special Far Eastern Army'.
2. To appoint Comrade Blücher as the commander of the Special Far Eastern Army.
3. Comrade Blücher to take up his duties immediately.

[1] Cmd. 3418.

PRESS STATEMENT BY KARAKHAN ON THE SITUATION ON THE CHINESE EASTERN RAILWAY

15 *August* 1929 *Sovetsko-Kitaiskii Konflikt*, p. 39

As a result of the violence committed by the Chinese authorities in regard to the CER and its Soviet personnel, the railway has fallen into a most serious state approaching complete ruin. The wholesale dismissal of employees and workmen, the replacement of responsible officials by casual and incompetent persons, the orders given on the railway by the military authorities who have virtual control both of the locomotives and of the property and receipts of the line, have led to the complete breakdown of the entire business of the CER.

We have more than once warned both the Nanking and the Mukden Governments of the serious consequences which would follow from their unparalleled violation of the 1924 agreements between the USSR and China determining the status of the CER. We shall naturally hold the Nanking and Mukden Governments wholly and entirely responsible for all the material loss resulting from the seizure of the railway and the arbitrary orders of the Chinese authorities and the Russian White Guards, and from all their consequences.

At the same time, we must warn all foreign Governments as well as all persons and institutions which may have any business with the CER that the Soviet Government will not recognize any contracts concluded after the seizure of the CER by the Chinese authorities in regard to the railway by the Chinese authorities or persons appointed by them, or any obligations undertaken by them on behalf of the railway.

DECREE OF THE CENTRAL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE AND THE COUNCIL OF PEOPLE'S COMMISSARS BREAKING RELATIONS WITH CHINA

16 *August* 1929 *Mezhdunarodnaya Politika, 1929*, p. 186

Having heard the report of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs on the Chinese Government's reply to the Soviet Government's note of 13 July, TsIK and SNK of the USSR resolve:

1. To break diplomatic, consular, commercial, and other relations with the Chinese Republic.
2. To instruct Narkomindel to inform the Chinese Government of this immediately.
3. To propose to the Governments of the Union Republics, and to the People's Commissariats of the USSR and other institutions and bodies whom it may concern, to take the steps necessary to put paragraph 1 of the present decree into effect.

REPLY TO THE CHINESE PROPOSAL FOR A JOINT DECLARATION OF THE TERMS OF SETTLEMENT OF THE SOVIET-CHINESE DISPUTE

29 *August* 1929 *Sovetsko-Kitaiskii Konflikt*, p. 42

On 29 August at 6 p.m. the acting Commissar for Foreign Affairs, Comrade M. M. Litvinov, received the German ambassador to Moscow, Herr von Dirksen, and informed him of the readiness of the Soviet Government to accept the Chinese Government's proposal[1] for the signature of a joint declaration worded as follows:

1. Both sides declare that they will settle all questions in dispute between them in accordance with the 1924 agreement, and in particular will settle the terms for the buying back of the Chinese Eastern Railway in accordance with article 9 of the Peking agreement.

Both sides will immediately and in due form appoint plenipotentiary representatives to a conference to settle all the questions referred to in the preceding paragraph.

2. Both sides are of the opinion that the situation on the CER which has arisen since the conflict should be changed to accord with the Peking and Mukden agreements of 1924, on the understanding that all such changes will be made by the conference provided for in the preceding article.

3. The Soviet Government will nominate the manager and assistant-manager of the railway, who shall immediately be appointed by the board of directors of the said railway.

The Soviet Government will instruct CER employees who are Soviet citizens, and the Chinese Government will instruct the local authorities and agencies, to observe strictly the stipulations of article 6 of the 1924 agreement.

4. Both sides shall immediately release all persons arrested in connexion with the present incident or after 1 May 1929.

When handing the Soviet draft declaration to Herr von Dirksen Comrade Litvinov stated that the Soviet Government sees no reason to appoint a *new* manager and assistant-manager in place of those previously duly appointed, who have carried out their duties strictly in accordance with the treaties.

Nevertheless, said Comrade Litvinov, should the Chinese Government appoint a new chairman of the board of directors instead of the present chairman, who is directly responsible for the violation of the CER regime established by treaty, then Narkomindel, in keeping with the unswervingly pacific policy of the USSR and to meet the wishes of the Chinese Government, will submit to the Soviet Government the question of nominating a new manager and assistant manager. Comrade

[1] *U.S. Foreign Relations*, 1929, II, p. 309.

Litvinov stated further that it was of course understood that the nomination of the manager and the assistant should be made simultaneously with the signing of the text of the joint declaration.

EXTRACTS FROM A PRESS STATEMENT BY LITVINOV ON THE SOVIET REPLY TO THE NANKING PROPOSALS FOR A SETTLEMENT

6 *September* 1929 *Sovetsko-Kitaiskii Konflikt*, p. 44

The Soviet Government's reply to the proposal made to us by the Nanking Government through the German Government to sign a joint declaration is a further proof of the Soviet Government's readiness to take every opportunity of settling the Soviet-Chinese conflict by agreement, despite the new and monstrously provocative acts of the Chinese authorities even after the illegal seizure of the Chinese Eastern Railway. The pacific character of the Soviet Government has been revealed particularly clearly in these CER conflicts which, if China had been dealing with any other country than the Soviet Union, would long ago have led to the outbreak of war.

While taking all the steps necessary to protect the interests of the workers' and peasants' State, the security of our frontiers, and the peaceful pursuits of the frontier population from the unceasing attacks of White Guard bands supported by the Chinese authorities, the Soviet Government has kept the way open for a peaceful liquidation of the conflict in the hope that at the last moment the voice of reason would convince even the most adventurist elements among the Chinese military of the utterly disastrous imprudence, for China's national interests, of the policy they are pursuing, of violence, of the illegal and insolent trampling underfoot of agreements voluntarily concluded on a basis of complete equality.

True to its unchanging policy of peace, the Soviet Government gave its consent to the signature of the joint declaration proposed by the Nanking Government, merely proposing certain amendments and giving greater precision to the draft, without which further negotiations would have been fruitless.

The Soviet Government could not fail to point out the unwarranted character of the Nanking Government's wholly unjustified demand for the appointment of a new manager and assistant manager of the CER, since no single fact has been or could be adduced of the violation by the said persons in their work of any obligation arising from the Peking and Mukden agreements, and since the accusation made against them and other railway employees after the seizure of the CER of communist propaganda is a slanderous fabrication from

beginning to end, based on illiterate forged documents ordered by White Guard organizations to justify the seizure of the CER. Nevertheless, Narkomindel considered it possible, if the Nanking Government agreed to appoint a new chairman instead of the present chairman, on whom falls direct responsibility for the violation of the treaty and the aggressive actions on the CER, to meet the wishes of the Nanking Government in this respect and to submit to the Soviet Government the question of appointing a new manager and assistant manager.

It is obvious that the appointment of a manager and assistant manager must take place not later than the signing of the joint declaration, for without that the necessary conditions for negotiations could not be created.

As to point 6 of the Peking agreement, then, since we insist on the strict observance of the entire agreement, there can be no difference in regard to the particular obligations imposed on both parties by the agreement.

Unfortunately, we have received no reply from the Nanking Government about its readiness to sign immediately the draft joint declaration, which gives ground for the assumption that either the Nanking Government itself does not wish to settle the conflict by agreement, or that this is being prevented by external forces hostile to the USSR . . .

The same object of aggravating our relations with China apparently, is being pursued in the slanderous statements by the chairman of the Chinese delegation at Geneva, who tries to justify the actions of the Chinese military by making absurd and unfounded accusations against the Soviet Union, which has given an example of exceptional patience and peacefulness . . .

At the same time the firing on our frontier forces is continuing as before, as well as attempts to cross into our territory. Such facts clearly reveal the hypocritical character of the alleged pacifism of the head of the Chinese delegation in Geneva.

While maintaining the greatest firmness and calmness in face of these new provocative anti-Soviet attacks, the Soviet Government will not allow itself to be misled by diplomatic manœuvres and the cunning of the Nanking generals or by the falsely pacifist declarations of their representatives in Geneva, but will as before take and strengthen all the measures necessary to defend the interest of the workers' and peasants' State and restore its rights.

STATEMENT BY LITVINOV ON THE NEGOTIATIONS FOR THE RESUMPTION OF SOVIET-BRITISH RELATIONS

6 *September* 1929

Cmd. 3418

Izvestia, 7 *September* 1929

The point of view of the Soviet Government on the question of resumption of normal diplomatic relations between Britain and Russia is quite clear and well known. It was precisely stated by M. Piatakov on 5 April last[1] on the order of the Soviet Government to the British Trade Delegation, which visited the Soviet Union whilst the Conservative Government was in office. The same point of view was expressed in the note from [the] Soviet Government, dated 23 July last, which was handed to the British Government through the Norwegian Chargé d'Affaires at Moscow. This note expressed the readiness of the Soviet Government to discuss the procedure of negotiations on the question of differences between the two countries, which negotiations were to take place after the complete restoration of normal diplomatic relations.

If the declaration of the British Foreign Secretary is to be understood in the sense that he desires again to meet a representative of the Soviet Government to discuss only procedure—into which will naturally enter formation of the agenda of future negotiations—no objection will be made on the part of the Soviet Government. The Soviet Government is ready to take corresponding steps as soon as the British Government states the place and the time of negotiations on procedure.

NOTE FROM LITVINOV TO THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT ON THE RESUMPTION OF NEGOTIATIONS

12 *September* 1929

Cmd. 3418

Izvestia, 14 *September* 1929

The Soviet Government have noted for their guidance a communication from the British Government in which, with reference to my statement of the 6th instant, they invite the Soviet Government again to send a plenipotentiary to London on 24 September for the discussion with the Foreign Minister of the question of the method of procedure. In accordance with the above-mentioned statement and their note of 23 July in which is stated the Soviet Government's willingness to discuss, for the time being, only the question of the method of procedure at succeeding negotiations and not questions under dispute, the Soviet Government agree to send to London on the stated day a representative with the necessary powers. The exact time and English port of arrival of the Soviet Government representative will be stated later.

[1] *Izvestia*, 6 April 1929.

NOTE FROM NARKOMINDEL TO THE NANKING GOVERNMENT, TRANSMITTED THROUGH THE GERMAN AMBASSADOR IN MOSCOW, ON THE PROPOSED JOINT SOVIET-CHINESE DECLARATION ON THE DISPUTE

17 *September* 1929 *Sovetsko-Kitaiskii Konflikt*, p. 54

1. The Soviet Government, guided by its unchanging policy of peace, readily accepted the Chinese Government's proposal for the signature of a joint declaration.

2. The Soviet Government introduced into the draft declaration proposed by the Nanking Government only the most absolutely essential amendments and changes making for greater precision required by point 2 of the Nanking draft itself (recognition of the Mukden and Peking agreements). The Soviet Government has from the very beginning of the conflict regarded compliance with the provisions set forth in these amendments as the primary prerequisite for the work of the conference, and still regards it as such.

3. In its note of 9 September[1] the Nanking Government rejects the above-mentioned minimum amendments, thus also cancelling its consent, given in the draft declaration, to the appointment of the Soviet manager.

This consent, given in point 3 of the Nanking draft declaration, could only have meaning and point if the Soviet manager and his assistant were appointed *immediately*. In objecting to their immediate appointment, the Nanking Government withdraws its own proposals and frustrates the settlement of the conflict by means of agreement.

4. The same character of withdrawal of its own proposals attaches also to the Nanking Government's supplementary proposal transmitted to the Soviet Government on 13 September through the German ambassador,[2] in which the Nanking Government substitutes for the question of the Soviet manager of the railway and his assistant the question of the appointment of the assistant only, in clear contradiction both to the Peking and Mukden agreements and to point 3 of its own draft joint declaration.

5. In view of the Nanking Government's rejection of the fundamental conditions for signing the declaration and conducting negotiations, the question of the place for the negotiations becomes pointless and the responsibility for the further development of the conflict rests entirely on the Nanking Government.

[1] *U.S. Foreign Relations*, 1929, II, p. 316.
[2] ibid., p. 319.

PROTOCOL BETWEEN THE UNITED KINGDOM AND THE USSR ON THE PROCEDURE FOR THE SETTLEMENT OF OUTSTANDING QUESTIONS

3 *October* 1929

Cmd. 3418
Sbornik Dogovorov, vi, p. 5

The undersigned, the Right Honourable Arthur Henderson, M.P., His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and M. Valerian Dovgalevsky, Ambassador of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to the French Republic, having, on instructions from their respective Governments, entered into an exchange of views on questions connected with the above-mentioned subject, have reached the following agreement:

1. The following questions shall be settled by negotiation between the two Governments:

1. Definition of the attitude of both Governments towards the treaties of 1924.
2. Commercial treaty and allied questions.
3. Claims and counter-claims, inter-governmental and private; debts, claims arising out of intervention and otherwise, and financial questions connected with such claims and counter-claims.
4. Fisheries.
5. Application of previous treaties and conventions.

2. Negotiations between His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics with a view to the settlement of the above-mentioned questions shall take place immediately on the resumption of full diplomatic relations, including the exchange of Ambassadors.

3. The aforesaid negotiations shall be conducted on behalf of the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics by the Soviet Ambassador in London, and on behalf of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom by His Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

4. The plenipotentiaries of the two Governments shall, if necessary, be assisted by joint committees, the members of which shall be appointed in equal number by each Government from among their nationals, whether officials or not, specially acquainted with the matters under discussion.

5. These experts shall report to each of the plenipotentiaries on the results reached in their joint examination of the respective questions and on the solution thereof which they suggest.

6. All agreements resulting from the negotiations between the

plenipotentiaries shall take the form of a treaty or treaties between the two Governments.

7. Immediately on the actual exchange of Ambassadors, and not later than the same day as that on which the respective Ambassadors present their credentials, both Governments will reciprocally confirm the pledge with regard to propaganda contained in article 16 of the treaty signed on 8 August 1924, between Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

8. Simultaneously with the approval by both Governments of the procedure laid down in paragraphs 1–7, His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom will take the decision to resume normal diplomatic relations with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, including the exchange of Ambassadors.

9. The steps to be taken, as set out in the preceding paragraphs, including the decision concerning the re-establishment of diplomatic relations, will be brought for approval before Parliament early at the beginning of the next session. Immediately after this question shall have been discussed in Parliament, each of the two Governments will take the usual steps for the appointment of their respective Ambassadors.

AIDE-MÉMOIRE ON THE GERMAN PROPOSAL THAT THE SOVIET AND CHINESE GOVERNMENTS RELEASE PERSONS ARRESTED IN CONNEXION WITH THE CER DISPUTE

16 *October* 1929 *Sovetsko-Kitaiskii Konflikt*, p 67

In acknowledging the receipt of the German Embassy's aide-mémoire[1] of 9 October, the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, on the instructions of the Soviet Government, thanks the German Government for the initiative it took, which was dictated by humanitarian considerations. However, taking into account the Soviet Government's experience which proves that the Nanking Government disregards obligations voluntarily undertaken and promises made, and still refuses to show good will and the readiness to observe agreements faithfully, the Soviet Government considers that the German Government's proposal of an agreement for the release of arrested persons by both sides will unfortunately not accomplish its purpose and is unacceptable to the Soviet Government.

[1] *Sovetsko-Kitaiskii Konflikt*, p. 62.

STATEMENT TRANSMITTED THROUGH THE GERMAN EMBASSY IN MOSCOW TO THE NANKING AND MUKDEN GOVERNMENTS ON THE TRIAL OF SOVIET CITIZENS ARRESTED IN HARBIN

18 *October* 1929 *Sovetsko-Kitaiskii Konflikt*, p. 68

On 27 May 1929 when the Harbin consulate-general was raided thirty-seven Soviet citizens who were visiting the consulate were arrested. Although the Soviet Government requested their release in its note of 31 May, they remained for many months in custody.

The court proceedings staged to try them attempted a retrospective justification of the illegal raid on the consulate-general and the unwarranted arrest of the Soviet citizens present at the time. This trial was conducted with complete disregard for the established rules and standards of court procedure. All the requests of the accused and the defence for the summoning of witnesses, for confrontation, etc. were summarily refused by the court on the ground that everything was clear to the court even before the trial. The accused were not even allowed to see the originals of the 'documents' which have already been more than once denounced by the Soviet Government as forgeries and which, together with the fact of the presence of the arrested persons on the consulate premises, served as the sole evidence against the accused in the trial.

A trial of this kind was bound to arouse the deepest indignation not only in the USSR but among the public of other countries and of China itself. Nevertheless on 15 October the accused were sentenced to imprisonment for various long terms.

The Soviet Government is compelled to state that, as the entire course of the trial showed, it was a monstrous judicial farce to which the Soviet Government attaches no legal significance and which it regards as camouflage for the latest act of arbitrary lawlessness against Soviet citizens.

REPLY FROM KARAKHAN TO THE AFGHAN FOREIGN MINISTER ON THE FORMATION OF THE NEW AFGHAN GOVERNMENT

19 *October* 1929 *Izvestia*, 20 *October* 1929

The People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, confirming the receipt of the telegrams of 15 and 17 October[1] from the Afghan Foreign Ministry, has the honour to acknowledge the information that Marshal Mohammed Nadir Khan has been recognized by the national representatives of Afghanistan.

[1] *Izvestia*, 20 October 1929.

The People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs notes with satisfaction your statement, made in the name of the Afghan Government, that the friendly relations existing between the two Governments will be continued in the best manner and on the firmest foundations. The People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, confirming on behalf of the Government of the USSR the steadfastness of the good-neighbourly relations between the two States, expresses its readiness to develop them further on the basis of existing agreements in accordance with the interests of strengthening Afghanistan's independence and its economic and cultural progress.

REPLY FROM SIMANOVSKY, NARKOMINDEL AGENT IN KHABAROVSK, TO TSAI YUN-SHENG, HARBIN DIPLOMATIC COMMISSIONER, ON THE PROPOSED TERMS OF SETTLEMENT

22 *November* 1929 *Sovetsko-Kitaiskii Konflikt*, p. 74

The Soviet Government is in favour of a peaceful settlement of the conflict, but considers it impossible to open negotiations before the Chinese side has carried out the conditions of which China was informed by the German Government on 29 August.[1] These conditions amount in substance to the following:

1. The official consent of the Chinese side to the restoration on the CER of the position as it was before the conflict, on the basis of the Peking and Mukden agreements of 1924;
2. The immediate resumption of their offices by the manager and assistant-manager of the railway nominated by the Soviet side, under the terms of the Peking and Mukden agreements;
3. The immediate release of all Soviet citizens arrested in connexion with the conflict.

The Soviet side declares that, as soon as the Chinese side fulfils these conditions, and the Soviet Government is officially informed that this has been done in a written communication, the Soviet Government will immediately release all Chinese arrested in connexion with the conflict and will take part in a Chinese-Soviet conference for the final settlement of all disputed questions.

[1] *Sovetsko-Kitaiskii Konflikt*, p. 42.

NARKOMINDEL STATEMENT ON THE SOVIET REPLIES OF 19 AND 27 NOVEMBER TO THE MUKDEN GOVERNMENT'S PROPOSALS FOR A SETTLEMENT

28 *November* 1929 *Sovetsko-Kitaiskii Konflikt*, p. 73

On 19 November the Narkomindel agent in Khabarovsk received the following telegram from the Harbin Diplomatic Commissioner Tsai Yun-sheng:

On 20 [*sic*] November former employees of Soviet consulate in Harbin Kokorin and Nechaev crossed the Pogranichnaya-Grodekovo front. Request that they be met and the army command informed.

On 21 November Comrade Kokorin, formerly employed in the Soviet consulate in Harbin and attached after the rupture of relations with China to the German consulate in Harbin to render assistance to Soviet citizens, crossed into Soviet territory by the Pogranichnaya station, accompanied by the former CER dragoman Comrade Nechaev and the Chinese Colonel Wang. Comrade Kokorin transmitted an official statement by Tsai that he is empowered by both the Mukden and Nanking Governments to open negotiations immediately to settle the Soviet-Chinese conflict, and Tsai's request to the Soviet Government to appoint its representative to meet him.

On 22 November the Narkomindel agent in Khabarovsk, Comrade Simanovsky, sent Tsai Yun-sheng, through Comrade Kokorin, returning to Harbin accompanied by Nechaev and Wang, the following written reply:

The Soviet Government is in favour of a peaceful settlement of the conflict, but does not consider it possible to start negotiations before the Chinese side has carried out the preliminary terms of which China was informed through the German Government on 29 August. These conditions amount in effect to the following:

1. Official consent of the Chinese side to the restoration of the status quo on the CER existing before the conflict, on the basis of the Peking and Mukden agreements of 1924.
2. Immediate reinstatement of the manager and assistant-manager of the railway nominated by the Soviet side, according to the Peking and Mukden agreements of 1924.
3. Immediate release of all Soviet citizens arrested in connexion with the conflict.

The Soviet Government declares that as soon as the Chinese side has fulfilled these conditions, and the Soviet Government officially informed thereof in a written communication, it will immediately release all Chinese arrested in connexion with the conflict and take part in a Chinese-Soviet conference for the final settlement of all questions in dispute.

On 27 November Narkomindel received the following telegram in Chinese from Mukden:

I have just received the telegram handed by Kokorin to the Diplomatic Commissioner Tsai and have noted its contents.

Since both parties equally desire to carry out the Russo-Chinese and Mukden agreements of 1924, I give my consent in principle to the three preliminary conditions stipulated in your note of 29 August and to the supplementary declaration referring to them.

Arising from the second point, I ask your esteemed Government to nominate the manager and assistant-manager immediately.

As to points 1 and 3, considering that they refer to both parties equally, it is necessary to appoint responsible persons for both sides to examine ways of putting them into effect.

Kindly reply by telegraph.

26 November Chang Hsu-liang

On the same day Narkomindel dispatched the following reply by telegraph to Marshal Chang Hsu-liang, President of the Mukden Government:

The People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs has received your telegram of the 26th of this month, in which you state that you fully accept the preliminary conditions communicated to you in writing on the 22nd of this month by the Harbin Diplomatic Commissioner Tsai Yun-sheng. These conditions were as follows:

1. The official consent of the Chinese side to the restoration of the situation on the CER as it existed before the conflict on the basis of the Peking and Mukden agreements of 1924.
2. The immediate reinstatement of the manager and assistant manager of the railway nominated by the Soviet side, according to the Peking and Mukden agreements of 1924.
3. The immediate release of all Soviet citizens arrested in connexion with the conflict.

In accordance with the second point, the Soviet Government recommends that M. Emshanov be reinstated as manager of the CER and M. Eismont as assistant-manager, and awaits your immediate official confirmation of this.

As to points 1 and 3, which you also accept, the Soviet Government proposes that immediately point 2 is carried out you send your plenipotentiary to Khabarovsk with official written credentials, and for its part appoints the Narkomindel agent in Khabarovsk, M. Simanovsky, to examine the technical method of putting these points into effect and to settle the time and place for the Soviet-Chinese conference.

NOTE FROM LITVINOV TO THE GERMAN AMBASSADOR IN MOSCOW REJECTING THE NANKING GOVERNMENT'S PROPOSALS FOR THE SETTLEMENT OF THE DISPUTE

29 *November* 1929 *Sovetsko-Kitaiskii Konflikt*, p. 75

I have the honour to confirm the receipt of the Nanking Government's note of 14 November[1] which you handed to me this morning. The Soviet Government has already received an official communication from Marshal Chang Hsu-liang accepting the preliminary conditions necessary for the speedy settlement of the dispute by direct negotiations. The Nanking Government's proposals set forth in the said note could only prolong the conflict and are therefore pointless.

EXTRACTS FROM A SPEECH BY RYKOV TO THE CENTRAL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE ON CONCESSIONS

29 *November* 1929 *Protokoly*, Bulletin 1, p. 7

Now a few words on the question of our concessions policy. There is a good deal of talk about that too in the bourgeois press. As a result of the expansion of our State industry, the share of concessionary undertakings is falling sharply. At the present time concessions output is measured in tenths of 1 per cent.

I do not wish in the least to conceal the fact that some of the concessionaires have wound up their concerns in our country. But at the same time it should be noted that our connexions with the bourgeois world have grown by way of foreign trade and also, for example, in such matters as technical assistance, on which we are spending this year several tens of millions of rubles.

As to the concessions which have been wound up, it should be said that we do not consider ourselves in the least to blame. We are willing to grant further concessions, on these conditions:

1. Concessions must be concessions, that is, they must be run on their own money and not on ours. By our concessions policy we want to attract capital, and not capitalists, as people we find agreeable. We do not need capitalists as capitalists at all. When capitalists come here and want to operate with our money, we tell them that it is not what we want at all, but exactly the contrary.
2. A concession in our country is not a concession in a colonial country, that is, the concessionaires cannot, as the workers say, squeeze us. Here, at the meeting of the TsIK, I put it more

[1] *U.S. Foreign Relations*, 1929, ii, p. 360.

politely: both the extent of the concessionaires' profits, and the transfer of these profits abroad in foreign currency, must be kept within limits. We quite understand that if foreign capital comes to our country it must of course earn more than in its own country. We do not object to that. Concessionaires' profits may be greater here than in bourgeois countries, but not unlimited.

3. Those who take part in concessions undertakings should not entertain the illusion that private property owners will again return to the USSR, that private property will some time again rule in our national economy, that there is any possibility of capitalism being restored here, and should not by their conduct give any excuse for reproof on this score.

In short, working with their own funds, no squeezing, and no business with counter-revolution—these are the terms for concessionaires.

PROTOCOL BETWEEN THE USSR AND THE MUKDEN GOVERNMENT ON THE SETTLEMENT OF THE CONFLICT CONCERNING THE CHINESE EASTERN RAILWAY

3 *December* 1929 *Sbornik Dogovorov*, VI, p. 8

1. On behalf of the Mukden Government the Diplomatic Commissioner Tsai declares that the chairman of the board of directors of the Chinese Eastern Railway, Liu, is removed from the chairmanship of the board.

On behalf of the Soviet Government the agent of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs in Khabarovsk, Simanovsky, declares that, after the chairman of the board, Liu, has been removed from his post as chairman, it will, in accordance with the declaration made by Litvinov, Vice-Commissar for Foreign Affairs, to the German ambassador in Moscow on 29 August, be prepared to appoint to the posts of manager and assistant-manager of the CER new persons to take the place of MM. Emshanov and Eismont. In this latter case the Soviet Government retains the right to appoint MM. Emshanov and Eismont to other posts on the CER to which Tsai gave his verbal assent in conversation with M. Simanovsky.

2. The Diplomatic Commissioner, Tsai, declares on behalf of the Mukden Government that, anxious to do all in its power towards the settlement of the conflict between China and the USSR and to remove any excuse for further complications, the Mukden Government will strictly observe the Mukden and Peking agreements of 1924 as a whole and in their separate parts. The agent of the People's Commissariat for

Foreign Affairs in Khabarovsk, Simanovsky, on behalf of his Government, noted with satisfaction the declaration of Commissioner Tsai that the Mukden Government will strictly observe the 1924 agreements, and on his part declared that the Government of the USSR, taking its stand as always on the agreements in force between China and the USSR, will, naturally, observe them strictly, both as a whole and in their separate parts.

The above declaration, as given in the first and second paragraphs of the present protocol, is regarded as accepted by both parties.

Nikolsk-Ussuriiskii,
3 December 1929

REPLY FROM LITVINOV TO AMERICAN REPRESENTATIONS ON THE SOVIET-CHINESE DISPUTE

3 *December* 1929 *Sovetsko-Amerikanskie Otnoshenia*, p. 65

1. The USSR has followed a policy of peace from the first day of its existence and, unlike other Powers, has not once had recourse to military action, apart from essential measures of defence provoked by direct attacks on the Union or by the armed intervention of certain Powers in its internal affairs. This policy of peace has been and will be unswervingly pursued by the Union, independently of the Paris treaty on the renunciation of war.

2. During the course of the past few years the Nanking Government has ignored the customary method of resolving by diplomatic channels such disputes as arise and has conducted a provocative policy towards the USSR, in violation of normal international practice and agreements, despite the fact that these agreements were not imposed upon China by force of arms or other coercive measures, but were concluded freely on a basis of full equality, and that the Soviet Union, as is well known, voluntarily surrendered in these agreements all extra-territorial rights, consular jurisdiction, and other privileges, the abolition of which the Chinese Government is still vainly trying to obtain from other Powers.

3. The culminating point of this policy was the seizure of the Chinese Eastern Railway without any warning or previous announcement of any grievance, in violation of the existing agreements for the joint management of the railway.

4. The Union Government supposes that had the Nanking Government behaved in this way towards the United States, Great Britain, or France, the Governments of these countries would have regarded it as constituting adequate cause for them to avail themselves of the

reservations they made on signing the Paris treaty on the renunciation of war. The Soviet Government announced at the time that it did not recognize these reservations and would not itself have recourse to them.

5. The Nanking Government did not stop at the illegal seizure of the Chinese Eastern Railway, but also mobilized along the Soviet-Manchurian frontier an army, detachments of which, together with the counter-revolutionary Russian bands they contain, made systematic attacks on the USSR, entering Soviet territory, shooting at units of the Red Army and frontier settlements, plundering and violating the peaceful population, and causing considerable losses in life and property by these actions. Despite repeated warnings addressed to the Nanking Government through the German Government, these attacks did not cease but rather became more frequent and increased in intensity. These attacks compelled the Soviet Far Eastern Army to take countermeasures in the interests of defence and the protection of the peaceful inhabitants of the frontier region.

Thus, the activities of the Red Army were provoked by considerations of absolutely essential self-defence, and do not in any degree constitute an infringement of any obligations arising out of the treaty of Paris, which cannot be said about the presence on Chinese territory and in Chinese ports of the armed forces of the Powers which have today addressed identical notes to the Soviet Government.

6. The Soviet Government notes that the Government of the United States has addressed its note[1] to the Soviet Government at the moment when the Soviet and Mukden Governments have already agreed upon a number of conditions and are conducting direct negotiations which may make possible the speedy settlement of the Soviet-Chinese conflict. In view of this circumstance the aforementioned note cannot but be regarded as totally unjustifiable pressure on the negotiations, and consequently cannot in any way be considered as a friendly act.

7. The Soviet Government further observes that the treaty of Paris on the renunciation of war does not make provision for the delegation of the function of guardian of the pact to any State or group of States. In any case the Soviet Government has never announced its agreement that any Governments should, of their own accord or in consultation with one another, assume such a right for themselves.

8. The Soviet Government states that the Soviet-Manchurian conflict can only be settled by means of direct negotiations between the USSR and China on the basis of conditions known to China and already accepted by the Mukden Government, and that it cannot allow any interference in these negotiations or in the conflict.

[1] *U.S. Foreign Relations*, 1929, ii, p. 372.

In conclusion the Soviet Government cannot help expressing its astonishment that the Government of the United States, which at its own desire has no official relations with the Government of the Soviet Union, finds it possible to approach the Soviet Government with advice and 'instructions'.

[Identical notes were sent on the same day to the French and British Governments, without the concluding paragraph.]

REPORT BY LITVINOV, VICE-COMMISSAR FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS, TO THE CENTRAL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE

4 *December* 1929 *Protokoly*, Bulletin 14, p. 1

Unlike other Commissariats, the Commissariat for Foreign Affairs cannot, unfortunately, put forward a five-year plan of work, a plan for the development of foreign policy. It is not difficult to see why. In putting forward control figures and drawing up the plan of economic development we start from our own aspirations and wishes, from a calculation of our own potentialities, and from the firm principles of our entire policy, but in examining the development of foreign policy we have to deal with a number of factors that are scarcely subject to calculation, with a number of elements outside our control and the scope of our action. International affairs are composed not only of our own aspirations and actions, but of those of a large number of countries, built on different lines from our Union, pursuing other aims than ours, and using other means to achieve those aims than we allow. In those countries capitalism still rules, no less anarchically and no less chaotically in foreign policy than in economic life. The economic antagonisms between these countries give rise to political antagonisms. The ruin and disorders consequent upon the imperialist war increased and intensified them. If, by political agreements and combinations, they succeed for a time in removing one or another of these antagonisms within a group of States, all that happens is that new antagonisms are immediately created between this group of States and others. The geographical distribution of these antagonisms may change, but they do not diminish either in quantity or quality. If to that we add the instability in the internal political life of the majority of these countries, more marked after the war, the sudden transition from so-called democracy and parliamentary government to the methods of government used by the fascists and the semi-fascists, and to those for which no general definition has yet been found, if we add the unceasing internal struggle of classes and of the political parties representing their interests, the kaleidescopically frequent fall and changes of governments, each new government

frequently pursuing a policy opposed to the policy of its predecessor, then it becomes abundantly clear that it is impossible even to talk of planning in foreign affairs. Nor, in such a state of affairs, is there reason to be surprised at the fruitlessness and failure of the majority of international economic and political congresses and conferences which have been held in the last few years.

In contrast to the general picture of international life which I have sketched, we can, without undue modesty, note the unchanging, consistent, and methodical nature of Soviet foreign policy.

The core of this policy, now as twelve years ago when the Soviet Power was established, is the defence of the conquests of the October revolution from foreign encroachment, the desire to secure peaceful conditions for the internal construction of socialism, and, as far as possible, to ward off the horrors and burdens of war from the workers of the entire world.

Power in the hands of the age-old champion of international peace, the proletariat, undeviating adherence to the great principles of October and the will of Lenin, non-participation in the political alignments and combinations of some States against others, the absence of any imperialist appetites or of the desire to enslave and subjugate other peoples, the settlement of the national question on the basis of the utmost tolerance and respect for the national culture of even the smallest nationalities--these are the factors which give special stability to the Soviet Government's foreign policy. The fact that over one-sixth of the earth's surface there is such a stable State, thoroughly permeated by the idea of peace and wholly devoid of any aggressive intentions, is in itself a powerful factor making for peace.

I will not today, comrades, dwell on all the practical measures undertaken by the Soviet Government with the object of consolidating peace. I have already made a report on them at the previous session of the Central Executive Committee.

The new, additional, and wholly objective proof of our peaceful aspirations is provided by our five-year plan; to carry out this plan we must strive for conditions of uninterrupted peace. It should be clear to everybody that it would be insane to start out on this gigantic plan, which will require the utmost expansion of our resources, if at the same time we had not resolutely determined, at whatever cost, as far as it depends on us, not to allow the peace to be broken. True, the fulfilment of the plan is not our final aim, it is only the foundation of that vast edifice of socialism which we are building and shall build. Further five-year plans will follow the first, and for these too conditions of peace will be as necessary as they are for the first.

But, however weighty the mite which our Union contributes to the

cause of peace, it cannot be secured by the efforts of our country alone. While actively and independently bringing forward its own peace proposals, the Soviet Government responds to all peace overtures, wherever they come from and by whatever motives they are dictated. Holding that the surest guarantee of peace lies in the complete destruction or the reduction of armaments, the Soviet Government has continued throughout the year to take part in the preparatory commission for the disarmament conference, notwithstanding the fact that the commission at the long-drawn-out previous sessions quite convincingly showed both its inability and its unwillingness to tackle the problem of disarmament seriously. At its sixth session, which was held this year, the preparatory commission almost completed its 'labours', which, alas, amounted to the final rejection of the Soviet Government's proposals both for complete disarmament, and for the substantial reduction of existing armaments. Having turned down both Soviet draft conventions, and insisted on the discussion of its own previously-prepared draft, the commission consistently rejected all Soviet amendments and cut out even from that draft every single thing which had the remotest bearing even on partial disarmament. By mutual concessions to each other, the delegations managed to remove from the draft those items which referred to the armaments of their own countries. By these means the commission excluded from the draft convention the article on military reserves, human and material. To give you an idea of the work of the last session of the preparatory commission it is enough to tell you that it firmly and decisively rejected the proposal I made more than once, that the words 'reduction of armaments' be mentioned in the draft convention. Thus the commission decided to put before the forthcoming disarmament conference not the reduction, but only the limitation of armaments, which will allow the existing level of armaments not only to be maintained, but even raised. I said that the commission had *almost* finished its work, for in the last three sessions it has not dealt at all with the question of naval disarmament. As you know, separate negotiations are taking place on this question, not very successful so far, among certain naval Powers, who will meet in conference in London next January. If they come to any agreement, which, as can already be predicted, will be concerned not with the reduction of naval armaments but only with changes in the naval ratios between the five Powers, the Commission reserves to itself the honourable task of registering the agreement, after which it will introduce at the forthcoming international conference, if it takes place at all, the draft convention which, it can already be said, will have no connexion with disarmament, whether of land, naval, or air forces. As you see, with all the changes and zig-zags in their foreign policy, the capitalist countries, when it comes to sabotaging disarmament

and other peaceful overtures, display constancy, unanimity, uniformity, and even a certain methodicalness. But we would be doing them an injustice if we did not note one more instance of constancy in their foreign policy. I refer to the steadfastness with which they display unfriendliness and enmity to the Soviet Union. This unfriendliness, of course, takes different forms at different times and in different countries, now appearing more strongly, now more weakly, but always there, if only latently. I am speaking, of course, not of every single country, but of the overwhelming majority. I do not forget that in all States there are millions, and tens of millions, of proletarians, who follow with warm sympathy and loving anxiety events in the country which is building socialism, who spiritually share in that construction and co-operate in its success. I am speaking of the unfriendliness of the reactionary elements among the bourgeoisie and the petty-bourgeoisie, among the ruling circles and the greater part of the press in those countries. The principal channel through which this policy of enmity is expressed and conducted is the capitalist and the so-called social-democratic press, which with unflagging energy has continued for twelve years to heap abuse on the Soviet Union and its leaders, to invent incidents which have never occurred, to distort the real state of affairs in our Union, to magnify the difficulties we were bound to encounter in carrying out the gigantic tasks we have set ourselves, to ignore our successes and achievements, to attribute to us 'sins' which were never committed, using the alleged disclosures of false witnesses and renegades, forged documents, and other dirty methods. Not only the press, but many Governments too are not averse to using the clearly inferior output of the document forgers from among the dregs of the White Guard emigration. Manufacturers of anti-Soviet documents continue to enjoy the hospitality, and sometimes the protection too, of the authorities even in countries more friendly to us, and even in those cases where their activity is directed against the interests of the very countries which shelter them.

The unfriendliness and enmity to which I have referred are further fostered by the continuing policy of non-recognition of the Union on the part of some States and by the irresponsible efforts of others to damage its prestige. The atmosphere of hostility and non-recognition thus created does not, of course, serve to consolidate peace; on the contrary, it helps to increase distrust and the sense of alarm in international affairs. Moreover, this atmosphere is sometimes a direct encouragement to the more adventurist and irresponsible Governments, urging them on to actions which may give rise to an immediate threat to peace. As an illustration of this, I will first of all refer to the conflict with China which broke out in the summer. I do not need to dwell in detail on the services rendered by the Soviet Union to the Chinese people and

the Chinese national movement, to which a powerful impetus was given by our renunciation of unequal treaties, extra-territoriality, and other privileges. On the other hand, the Chinese people still continue to bear the burden of unequal treaties with States which retain their concessions, their jurisdiction, and their privileges with the help of troops and warships. You may ask, why do the Nanking rulers, in their relations with these States, employ only the servile language of requests and prayers, accepting insults and humiliations, while in regard to the one State which has recognized the equality of the Chinese people, their full right to do what they think fit in their own land, which has concluded agreements with them on the basis of equality, most advantageous to China, the Nanking or Mukden generals, scorning customary diplomatic procedure, resort to insolent acts of provocation, violence, and expropriation? Why has the history of the relations between the Chinese rulers and our Union in the last few years been one of unilateral and systematic violation of agreements entered into voluntarily, of raids, of arbitrary expropriations, of brutal treatment of Soviet Government officials in China? How can we explain the behaviour of the Chinese generals who, having crowned this policy of violence by the outright seizure of the Chinese Eastern Railway—which by agreement was under the joint administration of both Governments—insolently challenged our Union, which failed to lead to war immediately thanks only to the patience and the pacific attitude of the Soviet Government? How can we explain this striking contrast in the conduct of Nanking towards the imperialist States on the one hand and our Soviet State on the other? A partial explanation can be found, of course, in their reliance on our pacific attitude and in their knowledge of the absence of any imperialist designs on our part. It is dangerous to provoke a conflict with the imperialist Powers, for, even with the Kellogg pact and the League of Nations, it might serve as an excuse for fresh conquests in China, for extending the privileges of foreigners, for imposing heavy indemnities on the Chinese, etc., while Nanking clearly does not expect such reprisals from the Soviet side. Nanking enters upon this adventure on the condition that at the worst, the Soviet Union will use its power only to restore its rights, illegally violated. But this only partially explains Nanking's actions. The fact is that Nanking would never have taken this risk, never engaged in this costly adventure, if it had not relied on the general atmosphere of anti-Soviet hostility, and if it had not therefore counted on the sympathy or even on the direct assistance of the capitalist States. Therefore even if we reject the highly probable assumption that one Power or a group of Powers pushed the Chinese into the conflict, we must recognize that in any case the indirect responsibility for the conflict created on the Soviet-Chinese frontier rests collectively on the capitalist States, whose

anti-Soviet policy always warrants reliance on their encouraging any adventure directed against the Soviet State. There is no doubt at all that without the implicit or even the active encouragement of other Powers in the early stages of the conflict, and without this reliance on widespread anti-Soviet hostility, Nanking would never have decided on the provocative policy which has led to the present situation.

This situation became so serious that we were compelled to mobilize the Special Far Eastern Army, as there was no guarantee that Nanking would not be encouraged by some unseen hand to further hostilities, and that an attack would not be made by the Chinese or the White Guard bandits on our frontier. And in fact it turned out that our fears were justified. In the last few months there have been many instances of really warlike provocations from the Chinese side, which of course encountered resolute resistance from the Far Eastern Army. With every fresh sally by the Chinese that resistance became more shattering. Our troops would have been in too unfavourable a position if in repulsing the Chinese bands and detachments advancing on to our territory they had stopped short on the frontier itself, giving the other side the opportunity to reoccupy their former positions and make fresh sorties. Our troops had therefore sometimes to destroy the strong points from which the most troublesome and frequent attacks on our frontier were made, for this was the only way we could guarantee the security of the population living on the frontier. These counter-measures were of a purely defensive character, and not taken in pursuit of any political ends.

At the same time we cannot forget that the CER workers and employees—Soviet citizens—remaining in Manchuria are all the time being subjected to outrageous humiliations, ill-treatment, and tortures, and sometimes even put to death for no offence at all. The rumours spread by the Chinese about the alleged plots they have discovered among our citizens, about propaganda, etc., are of course fairy-tales which not a single serious person inside or outside China believes. It is not the Chinese people we hold responsible for these actions, but the present rulers of China, those really responsible for the hostile policy towards us, the more so as that policy is causing grave injury to China itself, since it makes the struggle of the Chinese people for their liberation from the unequal treaties, for the abolition of extra-territoriality etc. more difficult. Not long ago a foreign diplomat in Moscow asked me, not without malice, whether we now recognize our mistake in renouncing extra-territoriality in China. Look, he said, what the Chinese let themselves do to your citizens. I replied that notwithstanding all that had happened we do not regret our policy of friendship for the Chinese people; it is not our renunciation of extra-territoriality that is a mistake,

but the insane policy of Nanking and Mukden, which gives you the excuse to consider your policy of imposing extra-territoriality on China, and your unwillingness to recognize the sovereignty of the Chinese people in their own land the correct one.

We know that the Chinese people are longing for the rapid settlement of the conflict; this is supported by the fact that rumours are being spread all the time by Nanking and Mukden about negotiations they say they are conducting with us. Those rumours are apparently intended to soothe the Chinese people, but meanwhile Nanking has refused and still refuses to enter into negotiations. It is true that some time ago Nanking, using the German Government as intermediary, proposed that we jointly sign a declaration with them, but when, having examined their offer, and in order to test their sincerity, and to get some guarantee of the effective execution of the obligations to be undertaken, we proposed the immediate restoration of the rights of the Soviet manager and assistant-manager in accordance with the Peking and Mukden agreements, our proposal was rejected. We have proposed to China the minimum preliminary conditions for the settlement of the conflict, from which we have no intention of retreating. We stated this so categorically and so frequently that it was quite clear both to Nanking and to Mukden that the conflict could not be settled otherwise than by the acceptance of these conditions. If, despite this, they temporized and dragged out the conflict, we should seek the explanation of this too in their reliance on the assistance or intervention of third Powers or of the League of Nations.

Only in these very last days, after the Far Eastern Army had carried out particularly severe counter-attacks on the Chinese and White Guard bandits, Chang Hsu-liang, Commander-in-Chief and Governor of the provinces, which have to bear all the economic and military consequences of the conflict which Nanking is prolonging, officially declared that he accepted our conditions; this was more fully defined in a protocol published today, signed by his Diplomatic Commissioner, Tsai. In this connexion I would like to remind you that the position on the CER prevailing up to the conflict was based not only on the Peking, but also on the Mukden agreement, concluded with Chang Hsu-liang's father Marshal Chang Tso-lin; that we have not recognized formally the Nanking Government, and that it is entirely its fault that the *de facto* relations between us were broken off. And now, at the very time that we are engaged with Mukden in drawing up a peaceful settlement of the conflict the Nanking Government, whether on its own initiative or on foreign orders, is making a further attempt to get help from the imperialist Powers and the League of Nations to prevent the peaceful and rapid settlement of the conflict which is in sight.

You know from today's papers that the Governments of the United States, France, and England have declared their readiness to give Nanking the 'help' requested. They are, you see, deeply concerned in securing peace, and therefore . . . they think it their sacred duty to intervene and prevent a peaceful end to the dispute. When Nanking was plotting and preparing to seize the CER, when it thereupon carried out that seizure, when we gave full publicity to the Chinese raids on our territory, it did not occur to these 'pacific' Powers that such highly provocative acts were disturbing peaceful and good-neighbourly relations between the USSR and China, creating a threat to peace, and they did nothing to restrain China from such acts; they did not hasten to intervene, to urge upon Nanking the illegality and senselessness of its actions, or the justice and entire acceptability for China of the terms we put forward. Only now, when the Mukden Government itself is convinced, at last, that the situation created on the CER will bring no advantages to China, but will on the contrary do it colossal harm and require enormous sacrifices, and therefore took the only appropriate steps to put an end to such a state of affairs, these Powers became troubled and began to take counsel with each other, thinking up ways and means of encouraging China to further obstinacy and the prolongation of the conflict. And this is done in the name of peace, in the name of the Kellogg pact. Fifty-four nations signed the pact and only three of them, authorized by nobody, have selected for themselves the role of guardian of the pact. To do this they have had to do some vigorous sponging, in order to wipe out for the time being the memory of their military detachments in Peking, Tientsin, Shanghai, and Weihaiwei, of their cruiser squadrons and minesweeper flotillas, their submarines and torpedo-boats in Chinese ports and on the Yangtse, of their troops in Egypt and on the Rhine, and of the comparatively recent events in Central America, to wipe out the memory of the many other facts of the recent past and even of the present with which they are burdened. The American Government even forgot that our Soviet Government, which is only twelve years old, is still so small that it is obliged not to notice it and not to recognize it. It writes in its statement that it is following the course of events with anxiety. But here in the USSR there are as far as we know no representatives of the American Government who might have followed from our side what has been happening on the Soviet-Manchurian frontier, while we, having no representatives in America, are similarly deprived of the opportunity of informing the American Government in due time of the events in which it is interested. And this is where some doubt arises; has it followed everything, is it informed about everything? It is true that the Nanking representative, the well-known Soviet-baiter Wu Chai-chu, is admitted to the State Department

of Washington, and he is probably Mr Stimson's chief source of information. But may I ask Mr Stimson whether it does not occur to him that such information may not be distinguished either by completeness or by objectivity, and that it should, at the very least, be regarded as one-sided. The principle of hearing the other side—*audi alteram partem*—is surely not alien to the American spirit. That is why we find it strangest of all that it is precisely the American Government which has apparently taken the initiative in the collective démarche of the three Powers.

But however incorrect and one-sided the information which the three Powers have or wish to have, they cannot ignore the following circumstances. The last attack of our troops on the Chinese raiders has apparently convinced the Manchurian generals that they are unable to oppose the Red Army with any chance of success, and they have drawn the appropriate conclusions. If it should advance farther, our Special Far Eastern Army would hardly meet with any serious obstacle. We are in a position in which any imperialist Government usually prefers not to negotiate, but to dictate terms. But are we going to exploit the advantages of our position? Are we going to impose on China new terms in keeping with the situation? The protocol we signed yesterday with Tsai gives a negative answer to these questions. Our terms today remain the same as those we put forward at the outbreak of the conflict. From this fact alone it is completely clear that the counter-measures of the Special Far Eastern Army have no political objectives and consequently cannot be regarded as in any way a violation of the Kellogg pact.

What effect can the démarche of the Powers have? In my opinion, none. At the worst the authors of the démarche will be able to register on the credit side of their 'peaceful' intentions a certain delay or complication in the negotiations already begun with Mukden by strengthening Nanking's pressure on Mukden to adopt a negative attitude. But I am more inclined to think that Mukden, and perhaps even Nanking, is able to think realistically and to understand that no démarche will make us move from the firm position we took at the very beginning of the conflict. They will understand that delay can only make China's position more disadvantageous. We think that we are on the way to a durable settlement of the CER conflict, and at the same time to the removal of opportunities for the further artificial creation of mistrust and hostility between the Soviet and the Chinese peoples, who are anxious to live not only in peace but in sincere friendship and mutual respect. But, however it turns out, whether the direct contact now established between us and Mukden leads to a rapid end to the conflict, or whether the forces hostile both to our Union and to China will succeed for a time in preventing that, we are quite convinced that, relying on the universal sympathy for our policy among the workers and peasants of our Union,

on the recognition of its justice, which in regard to the substance of the conflict even our enemies do not dispute, on the strength of our Far Eastern Army, which has already given telling proof of its steadfastness, boundless devotion, and heroism, we shall obtain the acceptance of our just terms and the restoration of the violated rights of our workers' and peasants' State.

Comrades, by Bolshevik firmness, patience, and consistency, we succeeded not long ago in reaching a settlement of another serious conflict, which weighed heavily on the international scene, and was scarcely less a threat to peace than the events on the Soviet-Chinese frontier. I refer to the Anglo-Soviet dispute, which we have now settled. Both conflicts, as you remember, began with illegal and provocative raids on Soviet institutions. In both conflicts a substantial part was played by forged documents and the deliberate distortion of the nature of the Soviet Government's policy. Together with this purely external similarity, both conflicts broke out against a background of that widespread unfriendliness to the Soviet State of which I have just spoken. The English move to break off relations, like the Chinese adventure, was undertaken in the expectation of sympathy, support, and even imitation by other States. At one time it seemed to us that Narkomindel would have to submit the questions arising in connexion with the settlement of the Anglo-Soviet conflict to the Central Executive Committee for decision. Permit me therefore to deal in rather greater detail with these questions, in order to explain what might have made it necessary to appeal to the TsIK, and why such a step was found unnecessary. You know that the chief question in dispute between us and the British concerns the so-called monetary claims of the English bourgeoisie, arising from our decrees about the Tsarist debts and the nationalization of banks and factories. These claims served as part excuse for intervention, which fostered the civil war and dragged it out for several years, in its turn giving rise to counter-claims from our side for the enormous material losses inflicted on our country and our nationals. Having squandered on intervention hundreds of millions of pounds and having suffered defeat, Great Britain continued to try to get from us satisfaction of its claims by 'peaceful means'. These 'peaceful means' consisted in the first instance of an economic blockade of the Union, and then in the refusal over a number of years to recognize the Soviet Government and to establish diplomatic relations. When, however, even these means did not help, and the Soviet Government firmly refused to enter into any negotiations concerning claims before normal relations were established, Great Britain, through the Labour Government which came into power, recognized the Soviet Government, after which it was possible to negotiate on the questions in dispute. These negotiations resulted in the

framing of a commercial treaty and a preliminary general treaty, including certain principles on the basis of which the English claims and our counter-claims were to be settled.

With the help of a document forged at the appropriate moment, known to history as the 'Zinoviev letter', the Conservatives replaced the Labour Party in power and refused to ratify these treaties. The question of the English claims was again left in the air, for the Soviet Government with characteristic firmness resolutely refused to go beyond those concessions to which it had agreed in working out the treaties. After two and a half years of fruitless search, the Conservative Government resorted to new 'heroic' means—the rupture of diplomatic relations. It hoped thereby to compel the Soviet Government to agree to terms for settling the question of claims which the most irreconcilable and reactionary circles of the English bourgeoisie had tried to impose on it. It would perhaps not have decided on such a risky step, fraught with such serious consequences, if it had not counted on finding accomplices and followers in other powerful European countries; but in this they miscalculated.

As a condition for the restoration of relations the Conservative Government put forward the demand, in the terms of an ultimatum, for the preliminary examination and settlement on its own terms of all the questions in dispute. Negotiations within the framework of normal diplomatic relations, in conditions of equality for both sides, did not appeal to the English Conservatives; they preferred to put pressure on us by rejecting normal relations and so to extract from us the terms they wanted. But they miscalculated again, for the Soviet Government, firmly maintaining its position, not merely refused to agree to such terms but even refused to enter into any negotiations whatever before relations were re-established. Our Union has this peculiarity, that every blow it receives from without not only fails to weaken it, but in fact makes it stronger, because such blows call forth strong tides of energy and enthusiasm among the working masses. We easily survived the rupture which in the imagination of the English Conservatives we should have regarded as little short of catastrophe. We did not beg forgiveness, we did not go to Canossa, and we made no proposals to the Conservative Government. In English industrial bourgeois circles, not excluding Conservative circles, grave doubts arose as to the wisdom of the tactics chosen by their Government, which not only failed to expedite the settlement of the questions in which they were interested and to bring them any profit, but clearly inflicted damage on the English economy itself. Expression was given to these doubts, and to the search in the City of London itself for new ways of settling the questions of interest to Great Britain, by the dispatch of an industrial mission to

Moscow. It became quite clear that the card of breaking off relations played by the Conservative Government in its anti-Soviet game had been trumped.

Together with the other failures in its foreign policy, the rupture of Anglo-Soviet relations contributed in no small degree to the defeat of the Conservative Party at the last English elections. It was not difficult for the opponents of that party to exploit the failure for election purposes by putting forward a programme for the immediate and unconditional resumption of diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union. The promises made by the Labour Party during the election campaign are, of course, England's own affair, and do not formally impose any obligations in regard to relations with us on the Government it has set up. But those promises were public property and could not be ignored; it was impossible to pretend that we knew nothing about them. But apart from these promises and obligations, it could not be expected that the party which won the elections, which had so harshly criticized the Conservative Government's policy of breaking off relations, would not seriously adopt the opposite policy. Let me remind you again, comrades, that that policy consisted in the attempt to impose on us a preliminary settlement of the questions in dispute before the resumption of normal relations. We were therefore not a little surprised when the new British Government, instead of directly advising us of their readiness to resume normal relations at once, proposed that we send an envoy to London for negotiations. It is true that these negotiations, according to the text of the formal proposal, were only to be concerned with the procedure for the examination of the nature of the questions in dispute, which was to take place after the resumption of relations. It seemed to us that even procedure could be discussed successfully when the substantial negotiations began, the more so as the extent and character of the dispute were well known to both parties and the Soviet Government has never rejected any attempt at the settlement of these disputes in normal circumstances. But our policy consists in keeping firmly to our basic position and our substantial interests, and in not quarrelling about trifles, especially on purely technical questions. We therefore sent Comrade Dovgalevsky to London as our plenipotentiary, having previously informed the English Government that the conversations must be confined to negotiation procedure, and not touch upon the substance of the problems. When, however, Comrade Dovgalevsky arrived in London, he was met with the following proposal from Mr Henderson; as the first session of the new Parliament was over, and the new session was to open in three months' time, and without the sanction of Parliament the Government does not decide to resume relations, would it not be convenient to utilize the 'spare time' in discussing and settling the

substance of the questions in dispute. Thus it was suggested to us that, before the resumption of normal relations, in an atmosphere created by the prolonged absence of normal relations, we should begin negotiations for the satisfaction of the English bourgeoisie's claims. This proposal, in substance if not in form, did not differ from the preliminary terms for the resumption of relations which the Conservative Government tried fruitlessly for some years to impose on us. It did not in any way correspond with the objects for which Comrade Dovgalevsky was formally invited to London, and for which he was sent. For Comrade Dovgalevsky to have remained in London would have been useless, and nothing was left to us but to recall him, informing Mr Henderson that his proposal would be submitted to the Central Executive Committee or its Presidium. Why did Narkomindel decide to submit the question to the TsIK? Not, of course, because it considered it necessary or possible to depart from the position it had taken and which it had held for many years, nor because it expected to receive new instructions from the TsIK. It was not difficult to predict what the TsIK's decision would be; but in view of the failure of English Governments, not only the Conservative but the new Government, to understand our attitude, to understand that it was unchangeable, we thought it timely to give the supreme legislative body of our Union the opportunity to declare, in the most authoritative fashion, and once and for all, that no Government and no measures will be able to move the Soviet Government from those positions from which it defends the real interests of our Union. It was necessary once and for all to clear away any doubt, to demolish any calculations based on the possibility of concessions from our side, which we had repeatedly declared would not be made.

Mr Henderson, however, understood in time that our referring the matter to TsIK was a more decisive rejection of his proposal than a simple negative. He again invited our envoy to London, letting it be understood that this time the conversations would be confined to discussing the procedure for the negotiations. The second meeting between Mr Henderson and Comrade Dovgalevsky concluded with the signature of a protocol on the agenda for the forthcoming negotiations; this protocol, which includes the undertaking immediately to restore normal diplomatic relations in their full extent, and to exchange ambassadors, Mr Henderson promised to submit to Parliament for ratification. As you know, by the combined votes of the Labour and Liberal Parties against the Conservative Party—among whom, however, there were three schismatics, who voted against their party—Parliament approved the protocol, after which the Soviet and English Governments, carrying out the due formalities, appointed their ambassadors.

We record with satisfaction the resumption of normal relations with

Great Britain; we do not doubt that this is fully in keeping with the interests of the English people also. All sincere partisans of peace will welcome the cessation of the state of conflict between two such powerful countries as our Union and Great Britain. It is not impossible to see in the settlement of the Anglo-Soviet conflict the removal of one of the greatest anomalies in international life. But what has really happened? Is not the existence of diplomatic relations between any two capitalist States regarded as thoroughly normal and usual, not worthy of special mention? Why should the establishment of relations between Great Britain and the Soviet Union be regarded as such an extraordinary event? No satisfactory answer can be found to these questions unless you remember the atmosphere of hostility and enmity to the Soviet State about which I reported earlier today. Despite the numerous declarations of capitalist statesmen about their anxiety to draw the Soviet Union into the so-called 'family of nations' on the basis of complete equality, about their readiness to recognize that the peoples of our Union have the right to build their own social and political system, they in fact regard as normal the absence of relations between capitalist countries and the Soviet Union. The establishment of relations with the Soviet Union is considered as something extraordinary, requiring explanation and justification. When diplomatic representatives are exchanged between a European country and a distant State, with which it is connected by scarcely any political and economic interests, nobody demands an explanation. But when it is a question of establishing diplomatic and economic relations with our Union, a country of 140 million people, they ask: Why is it necessary? For whom? What is the advantage? How great will the profit be? Will there be a favourable balance? Will guarantees be given that the balance will be favourable? etc., etc. And when it is shown beyond doubt that relations with the Soviet Union will stimulate trade and industry, reduce unemployment, provide cheaper raw materials and mass consumption goods, that, in brief, they will be highly advantageous to the entire economy and consequently to the entire population, then new questions are put. Will these relations satisfy this or that manufacturer, bank, insurance company, this or that group of people, for the losses suffered twelve years ago at the time of the October revolution? And if no completely satisfactory answer is given to this question, then frequently the interests of the country as a whole are sacrificed to the supposed interests of individuals or groups. I said 'supposed' interests because in fact even these persons and groups, as experience has shown, gain nothing and can gain nothing from the absence of relations between their country and us. The defenders of these supposed interests, whose thought is so strongly fettered by the already historically remote facts of the cancellation of

debts and nationalization of factories, should remember the facts of a less remote past, such as for example intervention, which gave rise to claims on the part both of the Soviet State and of many private individuals. But we do not regard these claims as an impediment to the maintenance of normal relations with other countries.

The refusal to establish normal relations with our Union, or the severance of such relations, is not always openly justified by the prosaic interests of individuals and groups. When a more popular and 'elevated' explanation is required, which can be understood by wider sections of the bourgeois population, and in particular by the less politically literate sections of the population, not directly interested in maintaining or cultivating hostile relations with the Soviet State, then the well-known bogey of 'propaganda' is dragged out into the light. In all capitalist countries, you see, there is peace and quiet, a social paradise. All classes of the population, proletariat, peasantry, officials, and petty-bourgeoisie are all completely satisfied with their position, they do not aspire to improve their lot, and they protest against nothing. There are no street demonstrations, no strikes, no peasant insurrections, no communist movement; nobody knows anything about the country which is building socialism and the dictatorship of the proletariat, no word of the Comintern reaches them; in short, nothing disturbs the stability of the country. But should an ambassador or a commercial representative of the Soviet Government appear in the country, how quickly the picture changes. Suddenly a workers' movement springs up, taking on, as if at the wave of a magic wand, the most stormy forms of development.

The calls of the Comintern have a different ring, they are differently understood by the proletariat, while the colonial peoples, until then quiet and peaceful, begin to rebel against the metropolis, and the revolutionary movement of discontent spreads in a broad and powerful stream which threatens to wash away the foundations of the State. This is the picture usually drawn of the consequences of installing a Soviet ambassador in a country where one bourgeois group or another, and the political party representing its interests, desire, for wholly different reasons, not to establish relations with the Soviet Union. It would be a waste of time for you to show that the workers' movement existed in fairly revolutionary forms long before the October revolution, that it exists now everywhere, quite independently of the presence or absence of a Soviet Embassy, and not only a workers' but a communist movement; that this movement develops differently even in two countries which both have a Soviet Embassy, and that consequently, this movement has quite different roots, and its development is conditioned by quite different and immutable causes within the development of capitalist society, which rests on the exploitation of the workers; that nowhere

and never has any evidence been brought of the existence of any formal or real connexion between the Soviet bodies abroad and the local workers' movement. It would be a waste of time for you to indicate the obvious truth, that in any colony and in any country there are enough local people familiar with local conditions, with the dialects and psychology of the farmers, who can give form and direction to the discontent arising from economic or national causes more successfully than these ubiquitous, legendary 'emissaries' from Moscow. But argument is useless, for those who use so-called propaganda to scare people do not themselves seriously believe in the existence or the significance of this propaganda. They only rely on the ignorance and immaturity of their listeners or readers, to whom they can tell any tales regardless of facts or documents. But this question I have dealt with has another side. What do they want from us, when they accuse us of propaganda? We can find the authentic answer to this question in the formulation of the undertakings which Mr Henderson proposed and which we agreed to exchange with the British Government. This formulation, accepted by us in the 1924 treaty, runs as follows

The contracting parties solemnly affirm their desire to live in peace and amity with each other, scrupulously to respect the undoubted right of a State to order its own life within its own jurisdiction in its own way, to refrain and restrain all persons and organizations under their direct or indirect control, including organizations in receipt of any financial assistance from them, from any act overt or covert liable in any way whatsoever to endanger the tranquillity or prosperity of any part of the territory of the USSR or the British Empire, or intended to embitter the relations of the Union or the British Empire with their neighbours or any other countries.[1]

In this clause, clearly, are enumerated those indisputable principles according to which States should conduct their relations with each other, but which, clearly, they have not all observed in the past. Let us take these principles one by one. Using our undoubted right to build our life as we think fit, we established the unshakeable principle of foreign-trade monopoly. Did the capitalist States respect our right when they persistently attacked the foreign-trade monopoly, hoping, of course in vain, by exerting pressure on us by all the economic means at their disposal, to abolish that monopoly? Do they respect our jurisdiction, when foreigners and their Governments do not hesitate to protest openly against one or other judicial or administrative measure of the Soviet authorities? Can similar instances be adduced of pressure from us on other States with the object of compelling them to renounce, for our benefit, some system or other embodied in their domestic regime? There are no such instances. Who is it who violates this agreed principle

[1] *League of Nations Treaty Series*, xcix, p. 61.

of international life, we or they? Moreover, did not the intervention of the Powers in 1918–20 endanger the tranquillity and prosperity of the territories of the Union? Did or did not the military help given to Poland when it attacked the Ukraine in 1920 endanger the tranquillity and prosperity of part of the Union's territories? Did the contacts between officials and even Governments and the émigré monarchist and terrorist organizations, the émigré self-styled Ukrainian, Georgian, and the other 'governments' also contribute to the prosperity of our Union? Did not the ratification by Great Britain, France, and Italy of the so-called Bessarabian protocol,[1] designed to give a supposed legitimacy to the military occupation of Bessarabia, endanger the tranquillity and welfare of the Union's territories? And did not this very act of ratification embitter the relations of the Union with its Rumanian neighbours, creating a situation of prolonged and most serious conflict? The conclusion by a number of States of military conventions with Poland and Rumania, the continued dispatch to these countries of war materials and military instructors, of military missions or generals to encourage their military preparations; finally the encouragement given to every kind of alliance designed to encircle the Soviet Union by a ring of Baltic and other leagues—do all these really improve, and not embitter relations between the Union and its neighbours? Was the purpose of the conduct of some States in the present conflict with Manchuria, in particular in the last few days, the improvement and not the worsening of our relations with our Chinese neighbour? Let them point to similar actions or even actions approaching these on our part in regard to other States. They cannot, for there have been none. And if the activities I have enumerated denote 'propaganda', are not those very States most guilty of it which complain loudest against our supposed propaganda and demand from us guarantees for the future?

If we turn to propaganda in the special sense of the word, which is not mentioned at all in the formula I have quoted, but which is clearly understood, what picture do we get? Hundreds and thousands of the organs of the press in almost all countries have for twelve years libelled our Union every day, attacking the Soviet regime, insulting the Soviet Government as a whole and its members individually in the most reckless terms, abusing and slandering, trying to prove the bankruptcy of our methods and aims, predicting our inevitable downfall, extolling the capitalist system to the detriment of the communist. But it is not only the press which is engaged on this job, but also the most respectable statesmen—past, present, and future ministers. Anti-Soviet sermons expressed in language far from parliamentary are delivered in Parlia-

[1] *State Papers*, cxiii, p. 647.

ments. You will find these sermons even in the judgements and summings-up of foreign judicial bodies, distinguished, as you know, for their special objectivity. Is all this not propaganda, directed against the Soviet Union? This obvious propaganda the stern political public prosecutors on the other side of our frontiers try not to notice. But when our *Izvestia* or *Pravda*, or any other of our not very numerous newspapers, indulges in disrespectful comments about capitalism or a foreign statesman, and writes of the superiority of the communist to the capitalist regime, then there is an outcry and an uproar throughout the foreign press, questions are asked in Parliament, diplomatic notes and protests fly, legends are born about alleged Soviet propaganda against which special measures must be taken and which is even an obstacle to the establishment or maintenance of normal relations with our Union.

If socialism, which is being constructed so far only in one country, a great and powerful country it is true, is not apprehensive of its fate, does not fear downfall as a result of the verbal and written effusions of parliamentary orators, clerical sermonizers, thousands of newspapers and periodicals distributed in hundreds of millions of copies, why should capitalism, established throughout the rest of the world, tremble at the consequences of the literary efforts of a few Moscow newspapers or the oratory of Soviet publicists? Is not this nervousness displayed by the partisans of capitalism in itself proof of the poverty of that system, and even the best possible propaganda against it? All this would be merely ridiculous if it did not give rise to international disturbances. The utter frivolity, absurdity, and baselessness of the charges of propaganda brought against the Soviet Government are obvious. In this connexion I cannot deny myself the pleasure of quoting a remark made by Lloyd George in the English Parliament on 5 November during the debate on propaganda; nobody of course will suspect him of friendly partiality for our Union. He said:

With regard to the propaganda in the East, all I can say is that I have been longer a Member of the House than the Leader of the Opposition, and I can tell him of the sort of things that we used to hear about the propaganda of Imperialist Russia in the East. I remember perfectly well how the Russians were constantly accused, and I think rightly accused, of propaganda in India, and of designs against India . . . I remember the speech delivered by the distinguished father of the late Foreign Secretary, when talking about the Russian Foreign Secretary, he said that you could not believe a word he said and that one who supped with the devil must have a long spoon. But nobody ever dreamt, least of all Mr Joseph Chamberlain, of breaking off relations with Russia, turning out the Ambassador here, and if anybody had proposed it in this House he would have been treated as if he were a lunatic.

Further, speaking of our Union, Lloyd George continued:

She may not behave at the table in the same sort of way as older Governments who are more trained in methods of restraint and of concealing their thoughts, and of doing their propaganda against each other . . . it is done in such a way that they can repudiate everything. It has been done in the past, and it will be done again. The Russian Government do it more crudely . . . but the old Russian subtlety will come back again and they will be able to beat the most exquisite master of that art by doing it in such a way that nobody will be able to point a finger at any particular minister who has done it at all. That is almost inevitable until nations understand each other better, until there is more good will between nation and nation.

As you see, Mr Lloyd George does not lack a sense of humour, and distinguishes himself from other statesmen, who put themselves in a completely ludicrous position when they talk with a serious face of so-called propaganda. But the point is that we now have an authoritative statement by Mr Lloyd George, who has held a number of ministerial posts in English cabinets, including that of Foreign Secretary and Prime Minister, publicly testifying that the British Government, like other Governments, has conducted and is conducting propaganda against other States. Naturally, he makes no exception in favour of the Soviet Union. Is further proof necessary of the hypocrisy of these pathetic propaganda charges against the Soviet Government?

We ourselves require of all countries represented in Moscow non-interference in our domestic affairs, and we ourselves loyally observe the same policy of non-intervention in regard to other countries and shall continue to do so. We must however state that unfounded general accusations about propaganda or the attempt to make the Soviet Government responsible for persons and organizations over which it has neither formal nor real control, whether open or concealed, cannot be regarded by us otherwise than as a premeditated pretext to justify the failure to establish normal relations or the severing of such relations, if not graver anti-Soviet machinations.

Returning to the significance of the resumption of diplomatic relations with Great Britain, I should like to mention that the economic advantages which it involves for both States are unquestionable, and are scarcely disputed even in Great Britain itself. The English industrial mission which visited us this year was convinced by the statistics of the enormous possibilities opened up by economic collaboration between the two countries. It will depend on the English business world, and to no small extent on its Government, how far these opportunities are used; in our view they present a completely separate and important task, independent of the decisions arrived at with regard to disputes held over from the past. We think that the settlement of the past, demanding

as it does, because the questions are so complex, considerable time, should not automatically precede measures necessary in the interests of today and tomorrow. We hope that a way will also be found for the satisfactory settlement of questions in dispute, if the other interested party will not make fruitless efforts to impose concepts and principles alien to us, but will seek together with us such a settlement of the question as will be advantageous to both sides. On our side there is good will, the sincere desire to establish friendly relations with the peoples of Great Britain, to remove those misunderstandings which have up to now been deliberately created by certain circles in order to estrange the two States. It is, however, to be regretted that the relations just established have already been somewhat darkened by the British association with the American démarche in the Manchurian conflict.

Comrades, I have dwelt chiefly on our relations with two countries only—China and Great Britain—since the settlement of the conflicts with them constituted a substantial part of our recent policy. In our relations with other countries during the time that has passed since my last report to the TsIK there have been no substantial changes. As before, we maintain the most cordial relations with Germany. As before, we follow with the greatest sympathy its efforts to liberate itself from the fetters by which it is bound under the Versailles treaty, and from which the chief sufferers are the working classes. We would warmly welcome the success of these efforts if they really led to the removal or even only to the weakening of the Versailles chains. Our interests are not at variance with Germany's anxiety to settle relations with other countries, but of course only in those cases where this settlement does not draw Germany into anti-Soviet alliances and does not draw it away from the basis of the Rapallo treaty, which has had such beneficial results both for Germany and for our Union. The past year provided further evidence that in Germany there are persons, groups, organizations, and even parties whose aims it is to make a radical change in Germany's entire policy, turning it towards anti-Soviet machinations in exchange for illusory political benefits. We must watch these efforts attentively, however insignificant and few those responsible for these efforts may be; but just the same we should not conclude that there has been any change in the basic line of Soviet-German relations, which should not be affected by the unavoidable misunderstandings and differences on secondary questions. The basic objective circumstances which at the time prescribed the Rapallo treaty, and which have made for many years of friendship between us, continue by and large to operate now and must for a long time determine our mutual relations. There are still in evidence the basic premises which gave Germany the opportunity of taking first place in our economic relations with the

West. By the conclusion of a series of treaties and agreements a broad legal frame was provided for the development of relations with Germany. Our connexions with the West have of course been extended and will be further extended, as a result of which, of course, competition among foreign States for the Soviet market will grow stronger; on the other hand our requirements have also grown tremendously with the rapid development of our industry and agriculture. To a considerable extent, the size of its share in meeting these requirements will depend on Germany itself.

We note, not without regret, that our relations with France, though normal, are rather cool. If the French bourgeois press as a whole reflects even in the slightest degree the attitude towards us of the French Government, that attitude can only be regarded as very unsatisfactory. The part played by France in yesterday's démarche suggests that it is not inclined to take a back seat in international anti-Soviet moves. On our part there was and is no obstacle to an improvement in our relations, whether political or economic. But we have been given no reason to think that in any move we make in that direction we could rely on an appropriate response.

Our relations with Italy are wholly correct. During the past year an Italian air squadron has visited Odessa and Soviet warships have visited Naples, and both enjoyed the fullest hospitality. Economic relations, with the help and encouragement of both Governments, have also developed successfully. We are also happy to notice an almost complete absence of any misunderstandings between the two States. I have just received a brief note from the Italian ambassador in Moscow informing me that his Government also associates itself with the American démarche. I like to think that the delay in this announcement indicates that the Italian Government itself is aware of a certain lack of correspondence between this action and the relations which both Governments are anxious to establish with each other.

In signing the Moscow protocol on the immediate entry into force of the Kellogg pact we gave further proof of our active desire to strengthen peace with the world in general, and especially with our western neighbours. In particular, we hoped that the Moscow protocol would have a restraining influence in those Polish quarters which have always tried to create and perpetuate conflicts between the two countries. Unfortunately, these hopes have not been justified, and our relations continue from time to time to suffer shocks as a result of the blows administered now by individual representatives of Polish political life, now by the Polish press. The Polish Government apparently regards our present relations as adequate and quite correct, but we have a somewhat different idea of what is correct, and would sincerely like a change in

these relations for the better; with that in mind we made appropriate proposals to the Polish Government, but without result, through no fault of ours. We are however glad to note the recent improvement in commercial relations.

We note with the utmost satisfaction the steady development of friendly relations between the USSR and the Free City of Danzig, as shown in the visit paid us by the President of the Free City M. Sahm. The Danzig Government recently gave us proof of its loyal policy and its sincere desire to establish friendly relations with the Soviet Union.

No important change has occurred in the past year in our relations with the Baltic States. I am very glad to be able to record the undoubted progress in our relations with Estonia, with whom we concluded a trade agreement in May.[1] I am convinced that the atmosphere of better understanding established in the last few months between us and the Estonian Government will serve as the basis for the further development of relations between our two countries.

Our relations with all the Scandinavian States are developing normally, although the appearance of imperialist aspirations in regard to the East in certain Swedish quarters requires our attention.

The new Austrian Government has declared its readiness to cooperate with us in the maintenance and development of economic relations.

We have signed a temporary trade agreement[2] with Greece, ensuring the maintenance of mutually advantageous trade between our two countries.

In surveying our relations with the western countries we must not forget that on our south-west frontier one province, not formally separated from our Union, is still occupied by another country. This occupation the self-elected custodians of the Kellogg pact do not notice. I am referring to Bessarabia, the population of which has never ceased to desire to be reunited with us; this is something which we must not forget.

Turning to countries outside Europe, I must first of all record the preservation, inviolable and complete, of friendly relations with the great Turkish Republic. The friendship of our Union contrasts favourably with that of other countries, where friendly relations frequently are established at a given moment by a Government of one party which finds itself in power, whose policy may tomorrow be changed by another party which succeeds it in office. The friendship of our Union does not depend on temporary conjunctions or chance combinations. Backing that friendship are hundreds of millions of workers, all the peoples of the

[1] *League of Nations Treaty Series*, xciv, p. 323.
[2] *Sobranie Zakonov*, 1929, ii, p. 1189.

territories of the Union. This cannot fail to have an appreciable effect on the balance of international affairs. We know that our friendship is appreciated in Turkey just as for the same reasons we value Turkish friendship. Comrade Karakhan will shortly go to the Turkish capital to give Turkey personal testimony of the unchanging friendliness of our attitude. Conversations will shortly begin in Moscow to make certain changes in the Soviet-Turkish treaty of 1927. I am sure that on the basis of the experience gained in the two years in which that treaty has been in force we can conclude negotiations quickly and create a still firmer foundation for future economic co-operation.

We are glad to record a notable stabilization in our relations with our great neighbour in the Far East, Japan, and the reciprocal loyalty observed by both Governments. In Japan, as in other countries, there are groups anxious to impair these relations, and resorting to the usual methods. There was a chance that these desires would be translated into actions inconsistent with loyalty. May I express my conviction that the efforts of these groups will be defeated in the future as they have been up to now by the desire of the Japanese Government and people to maintain and develop loyal and good-neighbourly relations.

Our relations with Persia also remain unchangingly friendly. Persia's desire for economic emancipation and for the consolidation of its international position has always met with our complete sympathy. Both States are taking all steps in their power to promote the unimpeded development of the economic relations which are of great importance to both.

Our neighbours the Afghans have borne great trials this year. Afghanistan has suffered convulsions which have caused us anxiety, interested as we are in the Afghan people fully preserving their independence. Faithful to the basic principles of our policy, we have refrained from the slightest intervention in the bitter internal struggle taking place in that country, and from supporting one group against the other, merely watching to see that there shall be no intervention on the part of other neighbours of Afghanistan. At present there is an end to these convulsions. As in 1919, when Afghanistan first appeared on the international scene as an independent State, so now the Soviet Government, interested in the quickest possible pacification and stabilization of Afghanistan's internal situation, did not hesitate to recognize the new Government in the very early days of its formation. In its reply of 19 October to the Afghan Foreign Ministry's notification of 15 October of the formation of Mahommed Nadir Khan's Government, Narkomindel, confirming on behalf of the Soviet Government the unchanging nature of the good-neighbourly relations between the two States, expressed its readiness to develop them on the basis of existing

agreements, in keeping with the interests of consolidating the independence of Afghanistan and its economic and cultural progress.

Among the transatlantic countries we have, unfortunately, no official relations with the great republic of the United States, but our relations with the American business world have developed and strengthened considerably; American industry is peculiarly adapted to our own industry's rate of development. Under suitable conditions further considerable steps might be taken towards an economic rapprochement of our two countries. We shall quietly await the recognition of this need by those on whom such steps depend, as has already happened among a large number of American business men. The reception accorded recently to the Soviet aeroplane *Strana Sovetov*, and many other facts indicate the presence and the growth of interest in and sympathy for our Union in America.

Today the independent Republic of Panama suddenly remembered our existence. It too, you see, is concerned about upholding the Kellogg pact. We can only send Panama our wishes that the pact will preserve Panama itself and strengthen its independence.

From this cursory review of our foreign relations you will see, comrades, that for the period covered by my report we have fully maintained our position, if we exclude the damage inflicted on us on the CER, which we are convinced will shortly be indemnified. The restoration of diplomatic relations with Great Britain, broken two and a half years ago, is an indisputable gain. It would, however, be naive and foolish to imagine that we can rest peacefully now that this stabilization has been reached or even if our international situation showed some improvement, and consider that our external security has been secured. The convulsions which the capitalist world is experiencing, its search for a settlement by violent means of the antagonisms by which it is split, the complete bankruptcy of the pseudo-pacifist disarmament slogans, proving the tenacity of the militarist and imperialist spirit, penetrating into every pore of international politics, all these taken together do not permit us to relax our guard. But the chief danger is the untiring enmity and ill will of the capitalist world to our Soviet State, providing a favourable and nourishing soil for conflicts such as that in Manchuria, for a policy of non-recognition and breaking-off relations, and for even more serious complications. There is no need to indicate exactly at each moment where and how hostilities against us are being prepared. It is enough to note the existing enmity and the continued unwillingness of capitalist States to reconcile themselves to the existence of the Soviet Union; in that we cannot fail to see a constant threat to our Union. We cannot neutralize and balance that threat by diplomatic means alone. A real balance can only be achieved by the further consolidation of our

internal strength, by the successful execution of our economic plans, by maintaining and expanding that enormous enthusiasm among the workers, the middle and poor peasants, which up till now has served as the chief defence of the Soviet power, and by the further cementing of the unity of our party, and since our peace proposals are consistently rejected, also by steady endeavour to strengthen the defensive capacity of our country.

We cannot expect the hostility towards our country to be appreciably lessened, still less wholly eradicated. Pursuing undeviatingly our policy of peace, we shall try to avert the possibility of this hostility being translated into violence against our Union. At the same time we must endow our country, by internal economic measures, with such strength, such capacity for defence, that such violence will have no chance of success, and that the failure, or even only the riskiness of such actions will be completely clear to all our potential antagonists. But so long as the capitalist world exists, with its imperialist appetites, stubbornly rejecting all our proposals for general disarmament, and even increasing their armaments, there cannot of course be any complete guarantee that acts of violence against our State will not be undertaken. Because of that possibility, and only because of that, we must take care that the workers' and peasants' army and navy are always ready to accept the challenge. The brilliant defence of our Far Eastern Army against the Chinese raiders and invaders is a pledge to us that, in this respect too, we can be quite tranquil.

STATEMENT BY SOKOLNIKOV, SOVIET AMBASSADOR IN LONDON, ON ANGLO-SOVIET ECONOMIC RELATIONS

20 *December* 1929 *The Times*, 21 *December* 1929

The full renewal of diplomatic relations between the USSR and Great Britain is a step undoubtedly based on sound economic and political necessities. The absence of normal relations between the two Governments rendered the international situation more acute and was a constant menace to the maintenance of peace, in which the working masses are vitally interested. On the other hand, under such conditions it was impossible to develop stable trading relations, founded on mutual confidence, and the well-known figures for the trade turnover between Great Britain and the USSR confirm this.

I hope that the renewal of relations and their further consolidation, by taking into account the interests of both countries, will be followed in the coming year by favourable results and will induce a movement of the trade turnover in an opposite direction. It is a favourable sign

that already the orders of Soviet organizations in London amounted in October and November 1929, to £3,687,000, as against £1,195,000 in the corresponding months of 1928.

However, it does not follow from this that it would be advisable to shut our eyes to the difficulties which have to be overcome before trade between the two countries will reach the proportions corresponding to their economic possibilities and requirements.

At the present time nobody can deny the extraordinarily rapid growth in the national economy of the USSR. The five years' plan of economic development has already, in the first year, not only been fulfilled, but the estimates provided in the five years' plan for 1928–9 have been exceeded. The increase in the output of industry in 1928–9 was 24 per cent over that in 1927–8, and in 1929–30 it is estimated to increase the output by 32 per cent over that in the previous year (the calculations are made throughout in unchanging values), whereas the annual increase was put down in the five years' plan at 20–22 per cent. The capital investments in industry and the construction of electrical power-stations in 1929–30 are estimated at nearly £450,000,000. The greater part of this capital expenditure is to be used for the construction of new factories and the re-equipment of old ones. This, in its turn, will make it necessary to import large quantities of machinery and all kinds of equipment.

Consequently, and this is particularly important for the prospect of Anglo-Soviet trading relations, the demand on the part of the USSR is growing, particularly for metallurgical products, machinery and tools, products of the electrical and chemical industries, means of transport (ships), etc. The very rapid development of State and co-operative large-scale agricultural enterprises is creating an enormous demand for tractors and combines and other complex agricultural machinery. The demand of the Soviet market will make it desirable for British industry to study seriously the question of adaptation to the peculiarities of that market, and at the same time it may lead to the expansion of those branches of industry, the products of which can find a large sale in the USSR.

Another problem to be faced is that connected with finance. Without the necessary financial arrangements for the purpose of establishing stable and rapid extension of trade between Great Britain and the USSR, the development of economic relations is bound to proceed more slowly. Endeavouring to carry out more rapidly and successfully its plans of socialist reconstruction, the Government of the USSR, on its side, will be ready to take steps towards a settlement of the financial claims which are being made upon it, taking into account our counter-claims.

But whatever steps the Soviet Government may take for this purpose, they must be directly connected with measures favourable to the further development and consolidation of the national economy of the USSR.

I hope that these questions will be investigated very thoroughly in the coming negotiations, and that every effort will be made to find a solution to the problems confronting us. I should at the same time add that the Soviet Union, i.e. the wide, toiling masses, who welcome the restoration and development of Anglo-Soviet economic relations, are at the same time fully conscious of the important successes achieved by the Soviet economy, in spite of the almost complete foreign financial isolation.

We have every intention of fulfilling loyally any obligations which we undertake, and at the same time rely on countries in friendly relations with us taking into account, on their side, the unalterable basis of our political and economic system. Under such circumstances it will be possible to consolidate the relations between the USSR and Great Britain, founded, as they will be, on mutual benefit, and to lay the foundation of a lasting and peaceful co-operation between the peoples of the two countries.

PROTOCOL ON THE SETTLEMENT OF THE CONFLICT CONCERNING THE CHINESE EASTERN RAILWAY

22 *December* 1929 *Sbornik Dogovorov*, vi, p. 9

The undersigned, duly authorized plenipotentiaries of their Governments, have agreed as follows:

1. The first item in the preliminary terms proposed by the Soviet Government, is understood by both parties as being completely in accordance with the telegram of the Acting Commissar for Foreign Affairs M. Litvinov of 27 November of this year and with the Nikolsk-Ussuriisk protocol of 3 December of this year, as restoring the position based on the Mukden and Peking agreements existing before the conflict.

All disputed questions which arose during the period of joint Soviet-Chinese management of the railway are to be settled at the forthcoming Soviet-Chinese conference. In accordance with this, the following measures shall be put into operation forthwith:

(*a*) Resumption of the activities of the management of the CER on the former lines as laid down by treaty and the resumption of their duties by the Soviet members of the board. In future the Chinese chairman of the board and the Soviet vice-chairman of the board are to act only jointly, in accordance with paragraph 6 of article 1 of the Soviet-Mukden agreement.

(*b*) Restoration of the former proportions in the number of departments headed by Soviet and Chinese nationals, and restoration of the rights of the Soviet managers and assistant-managers of departments (or the immediate appointment of new candidates, should these be proposed by the Soviet side).

(*c*) Orders and regulations concerning the line, issued on behalf of the management and administration of the CER since 10 July 1929, are to be regarded as having no validity, unless they are duly confirmed by the legitimate management and administration of the railway.

2. All Soviet citizens without exception arrested by the Chinese authorities after 1 May 1929 and in connexion with the conflict are to be released immediately, without division into any category, including Soviet citizens arrested at the time of the raid on the Harbin consulate on 27 May 1929.

The Soviet Government also will immediately release all Chinese nationals without exception arrested in connexion with the conflict and all interned Chinese soldiers and officers.

3. All workers and employees of the CER of Soviet nationality who were dismissed or resigned after 10 July 1929 shall have the right and opportunity of returning immediately to the posts they held before their dismissal and of receiving the sums due to them from the railway. Those among this number who do not take advantage of this right are to be given their full wages, pension contributions, etc.

Appointments to vacant posts are to be made only at the instance of the legitimate management and administration of the CER and all former Russian citizens who are not Soviet nationals who were engaged for work on the CER during the period of the conflict are to be immediately and unconditionally dismissed.

4. The Chinese authorities will immediately disarm the Russian White Guard detachments and expel their organizers and instigators from the Three Eastern Provinces.

5. While the question of the resumption of full diplomatic and consular relations between the USSR and China remains open until the Chinese-Soviet conference, both parties consider it possible and necessary to reopen immediately the Soviet consulates in the territory of the Three Eastern Provinces and the Chinese consulates at appropriate points of the Soviet Far East.

Taking into consideration that on 31 May of this year the Soviet Government declared that 'as the Chinese authorities show by all their actions their obvious reluctance and inability to comply with the generally accepted rules of international law and custom, the Soviet

Government on its part does not henceforth consider itself bound by these rules in regard to the Chinese Embassy in Moscow and the Chinese consulates on Soviet territory', that 'henceforth this Embassy and these consulates will not be regarded as enjoying the extraterritoriality to which they are entitled under international law', and that both parties intend to restore consular relations between them on bases in keeping with international law and custom, the Mukden Government declares that it undertakes to assure to the Soviet consulates on the territory of the Three Eastern Provinces all the immunities and privileges due to them by international law and custom, and, it is understood, will refrain from any kind of action whatever which violates these immunities and privileges. On its part, the Soviet Government abrogates the special regime it established for Chinese consulates in the interval between 31 May 1929 and the rupture of relations and grants these consulates, to be reopened on the territory of the Soviet Far East in accordance with the first paragraph of the present article, all the privileges and immunities to which they are entitled under international law and custom.

6. With the reopening of consulates the opportunity is immediately granted for all Soviet business undertakings in existence before the conflict in the area of the Three Eastern Provinces to resume their normal activities. Similarly, Chinese commercial undertakings established within the USSR are granted the opportunity to resume their activities, in so far as these were curtailed in connexion with the conflict on the CER.

The question of commercial relations between the two countries as a whole is to be settled at the Soviet-Chinese conference.

7. The question of real guarantees for the observance of the agreement in the interests of both parties is to be settled at the forthcoming conference.

8. The Soviet-Chinese conference to settle all questions in dispute shall be convened in Moscow for 25 January 1930.

9. Peaceful conditions are to be immediately restored on the Chinese-Soviet frontier, with subsequent withdrawal of troops by both sides.

10. The present protocol enters into force immediately on its signature.

Khabarovsk,
22 December 1929

SIMANOVSKY,
TSAI

NARKOMINDEL STATEMENT ON THE SOVIET REPLY TO THE INVITATION TO ATTEND THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TARIFFS

27 *January* 1930 *Pravda*, 27 *January* 1930

In connexion with the communication of the Secretary-General of the League of Nations regarding the possibility of Soviet participation in the international conference convened for 17 February in Geneva to conclude a so-called 'tariff truce', the Vice-Commissar for Foreign Affairs, M. M. Litvinov, on the 23rd of this month sent the following note to the Secretary-General of the League of Nations:

'Referring to your note of 7 November 1929, I have the honour to inform you that the Government of the USSR does not intend to take part in the conference which is to draw up a convention for establishing a tariff truce.'

PRESS STATEMENT BY LITVINOV ON THE RUPTURE OF RELATIONS WITH MEXICO

1 *February* 1930 *Mezhdunarodnaya Politika, 1930*, p. 224

The recall of the Mexican chargé d'affaires from Moscow, which was preceded by a statement[1] thereon by the Mexican deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs, M. Estrada, is not in the least in accordance with anything that has happened in the actual course of relations between the two States. The relations between the two countries and Governments have throughout left nothing to be desired. I am convinced that the Mexican people and their former Government valued very highly the sympathy of the peoples of the Union with Mexico's struggle against its subjection to the interests of the imperialist Powers, and with its desire to strengthen its independence. In their turn, the Mexican ambassadors in Moscow constantly assured us of the deep sympathy of the Mexican people for our Union, and this was far from being an empty diplomatic phrase. It is self-evident that no conflicts, whether of a political or economic character, arose or could arise between the Soviet Union and far-off Mexico. Nor were there any indications of dissatisfaction from one side or the other. The suggestion that the departure of the Mexican ambassador, M. Herzog, from Moscow some weeks back was of a political character is wholly false. In taking leave of me, M. Herzog explained his departure partly on personal grounds, and partly by the instructions from his Government to examine certain questions in

[1] *The Times*, 25 January 1930.

central Europe. No protests were made by M. Herzog, or by his predecessors, or by the Mexican Government to our representatives in Mexico.

With these friendly relations existing between ourselves and Mexico, the Mexican Government's well-known telegram to us in connexion with the Soviet-Chinese conflict was in itself a clear indication that external influences were exerting greater pressure on Mexico.

The Mexican chargé d'affaires was unable to give me any other official explanation of the rupture of relations than a reference, clearly dragged in by the hair, to alleged 'communist intrigues' conducted in various countries against Mexico 'on the orders of Moscow'. He adduced no concrete facts, for no such facts were at the disposal of his Government, which might justify, if only in the eyes of the Mexican people themselves, not merely a rupture, but even any kind of deterioration in relations with the Soviet Union. The Mexican Government did not, of course, dare to accuse us of interference in internal Mexican affairs, for this would have been a monstrous lie, but merely referred to some intrigues in third countries, allegedly dictated by Moscow. The affair is too ridiculous to spend much time upon it, but since no other causes for the rupture of relations exist or have been adduced by the Mexican Government, it can only be assumed that the Mexican Government, in the given case, acted under the pressure of external forces, and that there no longer exist in Mexico those prerequisites which at one time made possible the establishment of normal and even completely friendly relations with the Soviet Union. We can therefore only express our sympathy with the Mexican people in this affair.

NOTE FROM ANTONOV-OVSEYENKO, SOVIET PLENIPOTENTIARY REPRESENTATIVE IN WARSAW, TO THE POLISH FOREIGN MINISTER ON THE DISCOVERY OF A BOMB IN THE SOVIET EMBASSY

28 *April* 1930 *Mezhdunarodnaya Politika, 1930,* p. 228

On 26 April a chance concurrence of circumstances prevented an explosion in the Soviet Embassy in Poland which might have caused the death of its entire personnel.

The Soviet Government, interpreting this terrorist attempt as an effort to provoke grave and far-reaching complications in Soviet-Polish relations, is compelled to direct the attention of the Government of the Polish Republic to the fact that it could only have taken place in the conditions created by the recent increase in the anti-Soviet activities of certain circles in Poland and in that part of the Polish press with which they are connected. These activities, which have attracted the attention

of the public not only in the Soviet Union and Poland, but throughout the world, are designed to create an atmosphere in which the rupture of relations between the Soviet Unions and Poland, with all its consequences, would be unavoidable. The attempt of 26 April shows that these activities do not stop short of even such means to achieve their criminal ends, which are a danger to peace.

The Soviet Government, which steadfastly strives to develop and strengthen good-neighbourly relations with Poland, is compelled to observe that the said activities, which are undoubtedly connected with the actions of certain international elements, represent a great danger not only to the relations between the Soviet Union and Poland but also to peace as a whole.

The terrorist act of 26 April is not, unfortunately, the only instance of an attempt on the Embassy of the USSR in Poland. The Soviet Government is compelled to recall the unsuccessful attempt by Traikovich in September 1927, the attempt of 4 May 1928 on Lizarev, Soviet trade representative in Poland, the attack of 21 November 1929 on the Soviet consulate in Lvov, the recently discovered terrorist plot against the same consulate, and, finally, the act of 7 June 1927, to which the plenipotentiary representative of the USSR in Poland, P. L. Voikov, fell victim.

In observing that, notwithstanding all the grave events enumerated above, such attempts are still possible in Poland, the Soviet Government thinks it necessary to emphasize that the event of 26 April, when connected with the increasing activity of anti-Soviet circles both in Poland and elsewhere, takes on an unusual significance, and represents one element in the broadly conceived plan to provoke conflicts between the Soviet Union and Poland.

The Government of the USSR, concerned about the state of Soviet-Polish relations, has more than once in the past directed the attention of the Government of the Polish Republic to the need for energetic measures to put an end to the criminal activities of adventurist circles in Poland, which are systematically trying to destroy the peace between the two countries.

The unsuccessful terrorist act of 26 April is a terrible warning which compels the Soviet Government to call attention once more to the extreme danger of the situation thus created, and to place on the Government of the Polish Republic responsibility for taking effective measures to dispel the dangerous atmosphere in Poland in which ever and anon incidents occur designed to provoke an attack on the USSR.

JOINT SOVIET-GERMAN STATEMENT ON RELATIONS BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES

13 *June* 1930 *Soviet Union Review, July–August* 1930, p. 111

In the relations between Germany and the USSR, a number of questions have arisen in the course of time which, in the interests of the further development of mutual friendly relations, require to be settled. All these questions taken together have been the object of the general diplomatic conversations which have taken place between the two governments during the past few weeks in Berlin and Moscow, and which are being brought to a definite conclusion at the present time.

Part of the separate claims of each side have already been satisfactorily cleared up in the conversations that have taken place. The remainder must be subject to review by the adjustment commission provided for this purpose by the treaty[1] of 25 April [January] 1929, which must meet annually in the middle of the year, and which this year will meet on 16 June in Moscow for its current session.

In considering the separate questions that have arisen, both governments alike are actuated by a desire to surmount the difficulties that have arisen, in the spirit of the Rapallo treaty and of other treaties that are in force between them, and by the desire to pursue the policy which they have followed for many years on the basis of these treaties, in the future development of international relations as well.

In the course of a frank exchange of opinion they have again come to the conclusion that the fundamental difference in their systems of government should not be an obstacle to the further fruitful development of amicable relations. In this connexion both governments agree that they must refrain from any attempts at active influence in the internal affairs of the other country.

Both governments have decided to support their mutual relations on this basis, and so to approach the questions which may in the future arise between them, whether touching on the direct relations between the two countries or any other matters relating to their interests.

They are convinced that in this way they will serve both the interests of their own countries, and the interests of international peace.

[1] *League of Nations Treaty Series*, xc, p. 219.

EXTRACTS FROM STALIN'S REPORT TO THE SIXTEENTH CONGRESS OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE SOVIET UNION

27 *June* 1930

Leninism (1933 ed.), p. 315
Voprosy Leninizma (9th ed.), p. 487[1]

The most important result of the world economic crisis is that it has laid bare and sharpened the contradictions inherent in world capitalism.

(*a*) It is laying bare and sharpening the *antagonisms between the most important imperialist countries*, the struggle for markets, the struggle for raw materials, the struggle for export of capital. To-day none of the capitalist States is satisfied any longer with the old distribution of spheres of influence and colonies. They see that the relation of forces has changed, and that correspondingly markets, sources of raw materials, spheres of influence, etc., must be divided afresh. The most important of these antagonisms is that between the United States and Great Britain. Both in the sphere of export of manufactured goods and in the sphere of the export of capital, the struggle lies in the main between the United States and Great Britain. You have only to take up any economic journal, any document dealing with the export of goods and capital, to realize this. The principal arena of struggle is South America, China, the colonies and dominions of the old imperialist States. The balance of forces in this struggle, and a very definite balance, is in favour of the United States. In the train of the principal contradiction come less important but fairly vital contradictions—between America and Japan, between Germany and France, between France and Italy, between England and France, etc.

There can be no doubt at all that, in connexion with the developing crisis, the struggle for markets, raw materials, export of capital will be intensified month by month and day by day.

The means of struggle are tariffs policy, cheap goods, cheap credit, regrouping of forces and new military and political alliances, growth of armaments, preparation for new imperialist wars, and, finally, war itself. I spoke of the crisis which has affected all branches of production. But there is one branch which has not been affected by the crisis. That is the armaments industry. It is growing all the time, in spite of the crisis. The bourgeois States are furiously arming and re-equipping their forces. What for? Of course, not for a friendly talk, but for war. The imperialists need war because it is the only means of dividing up the world afresh, dividing up anew the markets, sources of raw material, and spheres for capital investment.

In such conditions, naturally, so-called pacifism is living out its last days, the League of Nations is rotting even before burial, 'disarmament

[1] A few minor changes have been made after comparison with the Russian text.

schemes' are falling into oblivion, while conferences for reducing naval armaments become conferences for re-equipping and enlarging navies.

This means that the war danger will grow at an increasingly rapid rate . . .

(*b*) The crisis is laying bare and will sharpen the *antagonisms between the victorious and vanquished countries*. Among the latter I have in mind principally Germany. Undoubtedly, in connexion with the crisis and the sharpening of the problem of markets, the pressure on Germany, not only as a debtor but also as one of the biggest exporters, will be increased. The peculiar relations which have been established between the victorious countries and Germany might be depicted in the form of a pyramid, on the peak of which America, France, Britain, etc., are seated in lordly attitudes, with the Young Plan in their hands inscribed 'Pay!' while below Germany lies flattened out, at the end of its resources, and forced to devote its last energies to carrying out the order to pay the milliards of the indemnities. Would you like to know what this is called? It is called the 'spirit of Locarno'. To imagine that such a situation can pass without any consequences for world capitalism means to understand nothing at all of real life. To imagine that the German bourgeoisie will be able to pay 20 milliard marks in the next ten years, while the German proletariat, living under the double yoke of 'its own' and the 'foreign' bourgeoisie, will allow the German bourgeoisie to squeeze these 20 milliards out of its sinews without serious struggles and convulsions, means to go mad. Let the German and French politicians pretend that they believe in this miracle. We Bolsheviks do not believe in miracles.

(*c*) The crisis is laying bare and sharpening the *antagonisms between the imperialist States and the colonial and dependent countries*. The growing economic crisis cannot but reinforce the pressure of the imperialists on the colonies and dependent countries, which represent the basic markets and sources of raw material. And in fact this pressure is being reinforced to the last degree. It is a fact that the European bourgeoisie is now in a state of war with 'its' colonies in India, Indo-China, Indonesia, and North Africa. It is a fact that 'independent' China has already been divided up in effect into spheres of influence, while the counter-revolutionary cliques of Kuomintang generals, fighting among themselves and ruining the Chinese people, are carrying out the will of their masters in the imperialist camp.

We must consider that the bottom has finally been knocked out of the lying story that the staff of the Russian Missions in China are responsible for the breaches of 'peace and quiet' in China. The Russian Embassies have long ago left both Southern and Central China. But there *are* British, Japanese, German, American, and every other kind of mission. The Russian Embassies have long ago left both Southern and Central

China. But there *are* German, British, and Japanese military advisers of the warring Chinese generals. The Russian Embassies have gone long ago. But there *are* British, American, German, Czecho-Slovak, and every other kind of weapons, rifles, aeroplanes, tanks, poison gases. And what is the result? Instead of 'peace and quiet' in Southern and Central China the most unbridled and most destructive war of generals, financed and instructed by the 'civilized' States of Europe and America, is now raging. We get a fairly piquant picture of the 'civilizing' work of the capitalist States. The only mysterious thing is, what have the Russian Bolsheviks to do with it all?

It would be ridiculous to think that the imperialists can commit these outrages with impunity. The Chinese workers and peasants have already replied to them by setting up Soviets and a Red Army. It is said that already a Soviet Government has been formed there. If that is true, I think it is nothing to be surprised at. There can be no doubt that only the Soviets can save China from final collapse and beggary.

As for India, Indo-China, Indonesia, Africa, etc., the rise of the revolutionary movement in these countries, sometimes assuming the form of a national war for liberation, cannot be doubted. The gentlemen of the bourgeoisie expect to flood these countries with blood and to rely on police bayonets, calling to their help people like Gandhi. There can be no doubt that police bayonets are a bad support. Tsarism also tried in its day to rely on police bayonets, but what kind of support it got from them everyone knows. As for helpers of the type of Gandhi, Tsarism had a whole herd of them, in the shape of liberal compromisers of every kind—which, however, led to nothing but confusion in the end.

(*d*) The crisis is laying bare and sharpening the *antagonisms between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat* in the capitalist countries. The crisis has already intensified the pressure of the capitalists on the working class. The crisis has already produced a new wave of capitalist rationalization, a further deterioration in the position of the working class, the growth of unemployment, the growth of the army of permanently unemployed, the lowering of wages. It is not surprising that these circumstances should revolutionize the situation, sharpen the struggle of classes, and push the workers forward to new class battles.

In this connexion, social-democratic illusions among the working masses are being destroyed . . .

But the fact that the masses are turning away from social-democracy means that they are turning towards communism. And this is what is actually taking place. The growth of the trade union movement associated with the Communist Party; the electoral successes of the Communist Parties; the wave of strikes taking place under the leadership of the communists; the development of economic strikes into

political protests organized by the communists; the mass demonstrations of workers sympathetic to communism, which arouse a very lively response among the working class—all this shows that the masses of workers are coming to regard the Communist Party as the only party capable of fighting capitalism, the only party worthy of the confidence of the workers, the only party which one can follow, and which it is worth while following, in the struggle for emancipation from capitalism. This is the turning of the masses towards communism. This is the guarantee that our brother Communist parties will be transformed into large mass parties of the working class. It is only necessary for the communists to be capable of rightly summing up the situation and properly making use of it. Developing an irreconcilable struggle against social-democracy, which represents the agency of capitalism within the working class, and smashing to atoms each and every deviation from Leninism, which brings grist to the mill of social-democracy, the Communist parties have shown that they are on the right track. It is essential that they should finally settle on that track. For only on this condition can they hope to win the majority of the working class and hope successfully to prepare the proletariat for the coming class battles. Only on this condition can we count in the further growth of the influence and authority of the Communist International . . .

I spoke earlier of the contradictions of world capitalism. But besides these contradictions there is still one more. I mean the contradiction between the capitalist world and the USSR. True, it is not a contradiction of the *internal capitalist* type. It is a contradiction between capitalism as a whole and a country building socialism. But this does not prevent it decomposing and shaking the very foundations of capitalism. Still more, it lays bare to the very roots all the contradictions of capitalism and gathers them up into one knot, making of them a question of life and death for the capitalist regimes themselves. Therefore every time that capitalist contradictions begin to grow acute the bourgeoisie turns its gaze towards the USSR, as if to say: 'Cannot we settle this or that contradiction of capitalism, or all the contradictions taken together, at the expense of the USSR, the land of the Soviets, the citadel of the revolution, which by its very existence is revolutionizing the working class and the colonies, preventing us arranging for a new war, preventing us dividing the world anew, preventing us having our way in its extensive internal market, so necessary for capitalists, particularly today, owing to the economic crisis?'

Hence the tendency to adventurist assaults on the USSR and to intervention, a tendency which is bound to be strengthened as a result of the developing economic crisis.

The most vivid expression of this tendency at the present time is

present-day bourgeois France, the birthplace of that most amiable scheme, 'Pan-Europa', the 'cradle' of the Kellogg Pact, the most aggressive and militarist country of all aggressive and militarist countries of the world.

But intervention is a two-edged weapon. The bourgeoisie knows this perfectly well. It will be a good thing, the bourgeoisie think, if intervention passes off smoothly and finishes up in the defeat of the USSR. But supposing it finishes in the defeat of the capitalists? There has already been one intervention, after all, which ended in defeat. If the first intervention, when the Bolsheviks were weak, ended in defeat, what guarantee is there that the second will also not end in defeat? Everyone sees that the Bolsheviks are far stronger today, economically, politically, and in the sense of the defensive preparedness of their country, than they were then. And what about the workers in the capitalist countries, who will not permit intervention against the USSR, who will fight against intervention and, if anything happens, may strike at the rear of the capitalists? Would it not be better to take the line of developing commercial relations with the USSR—which the Bolsheviks do not object to, either?

Hence the tendency to maintain peaceful relations with the USSR.

Thus we have two series of factors and two different tendencies acting in opposite directions:

(1) The policy of undermining economic relations between the USSR and the capitalist countries, provocative assaults on the USSR, open and clandestine efforts to prepare intervention against the USSR. These are factors menacing the international position of the USSR. It is the working of these factors that explains events like the rupture of diplomatic relations by the British Conservative Cabinet, the seizure of the Chinese Eastern Railway by the Chinese militarists, the financial blockade of the USSR, the clerical 'crusade' headed by the Pope against the USSR, the organization of sabotage through our technical experts by the agents of foreign States, the organization of explosions and arson, like those which were organized by some of the staff of 'Lena Goldfields', attempts on the life of representatives of the USSR (Poland), petty attacks on our exports (United States, Poland), etc.

(2) Sympathy with and support of the USSR by the workers in the capitalist countries, the growth of the economic and political might of the USSR, the growth of the defensive capacity of the USSR, the policy of peace undeviatingly pursued by the Soviet Government. These are factors which consolidate the international position of the USSR. It is the operation of these factors that explains events like the successful liquidation of the conflict on the Chinese Eastern Railway, the restoration

of relations with Great Britain, the growth of economic relations with capitalist countries, etc.

It is the struggle of these two factors that determines the external position of the USSR.

It is argued that the stumbling block in the way of improving economic relations with the bourgeois States is the question of debts. I think this is not an argument to secure payment of the debts, but a pretext used by aggressive elements for interventionist propaganda. Our policy in this sphere is clear and well grounded. On condition that we are granted credits, we are ready to pay a small part of the pre-war debts, treating them as additional interest for the credits. Without this condition we cannot and should not pay. Do they want more of us? On what ground? Is it not known that these debts were contracted by the Tsarist Government which was overthrown by the revolution, and for the obligations of which the Soviet Government cannot assume responsibility? They talk about international law and international obligations. But on the foundation of what international law did the 'Allied' gentlemen cut Bessarabia off from the USSR and hand her over to be enslaved by the Rumanian feudal landlords? By what international obligation did the capitalists and Governments of France, Britain, America, and Japan attack the USSR, intervene in its affairs, plunder it for three whole years, and ruin its people? If this is called international law and international obligation, what is robbery called? Is it not clear that, by permitting these acts of robbery, the gentlemen of the 'Allies' renounced the right of appealing to international law and international obligations?

They say further that the propaganda of the Russian Bolsheviks is an obstacle to the promotion of 'normal' relations. With the object of warding off the harmful influence of propaganda, the bourgeois gentlemen time and again shut themselves off with 'cordons', 'barbed wire entanglements', graciously conferring the honour of protecting these 'entanglements' upon Poland, Rumania, Finland, etc. It is said that Germany is consumed with envy because they do not want to entrust her with protecting the 'cordons' and the 'barbed wire entanglements'. Is it necessary to prove that the talk about propaganda is not an argument for establishing 'normal relations', but a pretext for interventionist propaganda? How can people who do not want to look ridiculous 'shut themselves off' from the ideas of Bolshevism, if in their own country the ground is favourable for these ideas? Tsarism also 'shut itself off' from Bolshevism in its day, but was not successful, as you all know. It was not successful because Bolshevism grows everywhere and anywhere, not from without but from within. It might seem that there are no countries more 'shut off' from the Russian Bolsheviks than China, India, and Indo-China. Well? Bolshevism is growing there and will grow, in spite

of all kinds of 'cordons', because apparently conditions exist there which favour Bolshevism in those countries. What has Russian Bolshevik propaganda got to do with it? Now if the capitalist gentlemen could in some way 'shut themselves off' from the economic crisis, from the poverty of the masses, from unemployment, from low wages, from the exploitation of the toilers—then it would be a different story, then they would have no Bolshevist movement. But that is just the point, that every rogue looks out for a chance to justify his weakness or his incapacity by throwing the blame on the propaganda of the Russian Bolsheviks . . .

Our policy is a policy of peace and of strengthening trade relations with all countries. The result of that policy is the improvement of relations with a number of countries, and the conclusion of a number of agreements for trade, technical assistance, etc. Its result also is the adherence of the USSR to the Kellogg Pact, our signature of the well-known protocol referring to the Kellogg Pact with Poland, Rumania, Lithuania, etc., and the signing of the protocol extending the validity of our treaty of friendship and neutrality with Turkey. Lastly, the result of that policy is the fact that we have succeeded in maintaining peace and have not allowed our enemies to draw us into conflict, despite a number of provocative acts and adventurist assaults by the warmongers. We shall continue this policy of peace in the future, with all our might and with all our resources. We do not want a single foot of foreign territory. But we will not give up a single inch of our own territory either, to anyone.

TELEGRAM FROM LITVINOV TO THE GERMAN FOREIGN MINISTER ON THE EVACUATION OF THE RHINELAND

3 *July* 1930 *Mezhdunarodnaya Politika, 1930*, p. 165

Please accept and transmit to the German Government the congratulations of the Government of the Union on the occasion of the ending of the regime of occupation by foreign troops of part of German territory and on the restoration of the sovereignty of the German people. The Union Government, having publicly protested on 13 January 1923[1] against the occupation of German territory, notes with particular satisfaction the restoration of the rights of the German people in the Rhineland.

[1] *Soviet Documents*, I, p. 368.

EXTRACTS FROM A NOTE FROM I. M. MAISKY, SOVIET PLENIPOTENTIARY ENVOY IN HELSINKI, TO THE FINNISH FOREIGN MINISTER, ON THE VIOLATION OF THE FRONTIER BY THE FORCIBLE EXPULSION OF FINNISH CITIZENS INTO SOVIET TERRITORY

16 *July* 1930 *Mezhdunarodnaya Politika, 1930*, p. 232

The frontier authorities of the USSR have recently observed that a number of Finnish citizens have been systematically and forcibly thrust over the Soviet-Finnish frontier into Soviet territory, this having taken place without the consent of the Union authorities . . .

The cases enumerated are far from exhausting the list of Finnish citizens recently thrust by force out of Finland into the territory of the Soviet Union.

The facts here adduced demonstrate that in Finland the method of banishing from the country persons who are, in the opinion of certain Finnish organizations and official bodies, undesirable, is illegally to expel them across the Soviet-Finnish frontier on to the territory of the USSR. Information in the possession of the Union Government leaves no doubt that both the bringing of persons to the frontier, as well as their actual expulsion into the USSR, occurred not merely with the permission, but with the direct co-operation and participation of the Finnish authorities, as well as the Schutzkorps organization.

What has been set forth above cannot but be known to the Finnish Government, since reports concerning the expulsion into the USSR of active members of the labour movement have for some time been appearing in the columns of the Finnish press.

The Union Government protests energetically against this systematic violation of the frontier from the Finnish side by armed detachments crossing over into the territory of the USSR, thus infringing the standards prescribed by international law and custom.

The Union Government expects the Finnish Government to take effective measures to put an end to further violations of the frontier and further illegal expulsions of Finnish citizens. The Union Government expects the Finnish Government not to delay taking steps to investigate the cases which have occurred of frontier violation by agents of and persons responsible to the Finnish Government, and to call those guilty in this matter to account, and to give the Union Government an exhaustive explanation.

PRESS STATEMENT BY LITVINOV ON HIS APPOINTMENT AS COMMISSAR FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS

25 *July* 1930 *Mezhdunarodnaya Politika, 1930*, p. 238

The decision of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR on my appointment as People's Commissar cannot in any way signify any change whatever in the foreign policy of the Union; not merely because I have already been working for the past ten years in the Commissariat for Foreign Affairs in close collaboration with my predecessor, Comrade Chicherin, with whom I have actively shared in working out and conducting questions of foreign policy, while in the past two years I have in fact been in charge of the Commissariat, but chiefly because a change in the heads of departments in the Soviet State cannot have the same significance as in capitalist countries. In these, changes in the Government, and in particular among those in charge of foreign policy, are in the majority of cases the result of a struggle among political parties and the class interests they represent, and sometimes of adaptation to a changing international situation or even to external influence. In the country of proletarian dictatorship, where the workers and peasants exercise full and undivided power, foreign policy is wholly determined by the will of the working and peasant masses, which finds its expression in the decisions of the Soviet Government.

The principles of the October revolution are the foundations of the Union's foreign policy, and the defence of the conquests of the revolution from external action and intervention is one of its principal objects. No less important as an object of Soviet diplomacy is to secure conditions of peace and freedom from external disturbances for our socialist construction. The greater our plans of development, the more rapid their pace, the greater is our interest in the preservation of peace. Our efforts have been directed to this end up to now, and will continue to be directed thereto in an even greater degree in the future.

We have to build socialism in our own country, surrounded by capitalist countries occupying five-sixths of the earth's surface. We cannot ignore this fact and do not ignore it, and we are therefore trying to discover and put into operation methods for the peaceful co-existence of the two social systems. We have, and shall have in the future, to make the greatest efforts to combat the aggressive tendencies of certain capitalist groups making for the creation of constant disputes and conflicts between the two systems; therefore these efforts will be directed to the consolidation and maintenance of peace among the nations.

However, the important national, political, and economic antagonisms existing within the capitalist world prevent the adoption of a uniform attitude towards the Soviet Union and the elaboration of

unified methods of struggle against it. The so-called peace treaties which brought the imperialist war to an end, which imposed tremendous burdens on some countries for the benefit of the others, have aggravated these antagonisms, tracing an ineffaceable barrier between the so-called victors and vanquished. Because of our natural sympathy with countries where the greatest weight of the burdens imposed falls on the workers, and also because the States interested in the perpetuation of the consequences and injustices embodied in these treaties are also at the same time conducting a most aggressive and hostile policy towards our Union, a certain community of interests has been established between the Soviet Union and the States which suffered from the war. On the basis of this community of interests there have developed with some of these States wholly correct, normal, and even in some cases friendly relations, which we are anxious to develop and strengthen in a loyal fashion in the future. We do not, however, seek to take part in the grouping of some States against others; we shall sincerely try at the same time to establish similar relations with all States that wish to do so.

We do not deny that in carrying out the plans for our expanding economy, we should like to be able to count on the further expansion of our economic intercourse with other States. The more our economy expands, the greater the field for the application of foreign technique, foreign labour, the products of foreign industry, and even of certain raw materials. But even here we encounter inimical tendencies among certain hostile capitalist groups, who are conducting a campaign for the severance of economic relations with our Union. Their efforts appear to be directed chiefly against our exports, but in fact they are against our entire foreign trade, for a reduction in our exports would inevitably mean a corresponding reduction in our imports. The foreign exchange connexion between exports and imports is so clear that it is unnecessary to dwell upon it. The States being subjected to this campaign, emanating from interested but insignificant groups of our competitors in the export markets, and which have placed artificial legislative or other obstacles in the way of the import of our raw materials and goods, should not naively believe that these measures will not involve the reduction or cessation of our imports from them. We are, however, convinced that all these anti-Soviet campaigns are doomed to failure, for in the long run they must injure not only our interests, but even more the interests of those countries which join in such campaigns. At the present time, when the economic crisis is spreading so deep and wide, affecting almost all European and non-European countries, the exclusion from world trade of a country as vast as our Union, which is growing stronger economically and which alone is free from depression, will scarcely be regarded as an appropriate measure in keeping with

the interests of a realistic policy. A real and correct understanding of the interests of the capitalist countries themselves must impel them to prolong and extend their economic relations with the Soviet Union.

We ourselves take full account of the necessity for economic relations and trade agreements in the given historical circumstances. We therefore did not in the past decline, and we do not intend to decline to meet representatives of other countries, and examine jointly with them the problems which may affect the interests of our Union. We shall willingly support designs and proposals aimed at removing the possibility of armed conflicts and of securing general peace. We shall, however, take the part of merciless prosecutor whenever we find that under the hypocritical mask of pacifist phrases there are concealed appetites and interests that have nothing to do with peace and with the real interests of the nations. We shall confine ourselves to the role of observer in those cases where the real aims of international gestures are insufficiently clear to us and require greater precision and exposition. We remain resolutely hostile to any international actions which might in any degree favour the oppression of some nations by others or the preparation of new wars.

We shall with particular attention follow the policy of our nearest neighbours, where a strengthening of aggressive and chauvinist movements has recently become discernible, representing a serious threat to peace; now as before we are of the opinion that one of the most important tasks of our diplomacy is to strengthen peaceful good-neighbourly relations with these countries in the spirit of the pacific proposals we have repeatedly made and of the Moscow protocol.

In general we shall continue our old and tried foreign policy in the consciousness of its correctness, its accordance with the interests of all peoples, and also in the consciousness of the growing might of the Soviet Union.

EXCHANGE OF NOTES WITH ITALY ON THE IMMUNITY OF STATE PROPERTY: NOTE FROM THE SOVIET CHARGÉ D'AFFAIRES IN ROME TO THE ITALIAN FOREIGN MINISTRY

26 *July* 1930

State Papers, cxxxiii, p. 713
Sobranie Zakonov, 1930, ii, p. 970

With reference to the decision arrived at on 14 June 1929, by the Central Executive Committee and the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR which prescribed that 'the sequestration of and the taking of executive measures in regard to property belonging to a foreign country may only be effected with the previous authorization in each

individual case of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR', and also to the Royal decree-law No. 1621 of 30 August 1925, as modified by the law No. 1263 of 15 July 1926, which reads: 'steps may not be taken for the sequestration, mortgaging or sale, and, in general, the taking of any executive measures in respect of movable and immovable property, ships, credits, deeds, securities and any other object belonging to a foreign State without the authorization of the Minister of Justice', and, further, having regard to the fact that the above-mentioned decision of the Central Executive Committee and the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR 'only extends to the property of those States which adhere, as regards property belonging to the USSR, to the principle of reciprocity', and that the provisions of the above-mentioned Royal decree-law 'apply only to those States which accord reciprocity, which fact must be declared by a decree of the Minister', and that 'against the said decree no appeal is permitted either judicially or administratively', I have the honour, in accordance with instructions from my Government, to inform Your Excellency that, so far as the Kingdom of Italy is concerned, the necessary condition of reciprocity exists for the application of the decision of 14 June 1929, of the Central Executive Committee and the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR.

[The Italian reply is, *mutatis mutandis*, in similar terms.]

SPEECH BY LITVINOV AT A RECEPTION TO THE TURKISH FOREIGN MINISTER

24 *September* 1930 *Vneshnyaya Politika*, p. 252

I am happy to welcome you as the Minister for Foreign Affairs of our friendly neighbour Turkey, and as one whose name has been closely associated with the development of Soviet-Turkish friendship throughout the last ten years. We and you remember the time when both the Soviet Republics and Turkey heroically held out against the military attacks of world imperialism, which fell upon the peoples of our countries only because they had decided to build their life freely, independently, and without any outside interference.

It was precisely at that time of severe and self-denying struggle that there was born that friendship which later, developing and strengthening, took on the character of really close friendly collaboration. This collaboration went beyond the bounds of direct Soviet-Turkish mutual relations and is now an important factor in world politics.

The 1925 Paris treaty of neutrality and non-aggression, also signed by you, Mr Minister, will go down into history as a new form of rapprochement be ween friendly States and of the consolidation of peace. The

Ankara protocol[1] signed last December, which also bears your signature, serves as further proof of the growth of mutual confidence between the Soviet and Turkish Republics and as a further demonstration of the pacific intentions of our countries.

Our countries' struggle for the right to a really independent existence and to peaceful construction did not end after the failure of the vain efforts of the imperialists to suppress by military intervention the Soviet and national Turkish revolutions. It is continuing in new forms and by new methods, and still demands from our countries the most intense and unbroken vigilance, and special attention to those new manifestations in international life which, under a pacific exterior, may threaten the interests both of the USSR and of Turkey. Soviet and Turkish diplomatic collaboration in the struggle for peace is in the present circumstances a most responsible historical task.

Your visit here to the USSR, Mr Minister, will give you the opportunity to acquaint yourself with the magnificent work of construction which the peoples of the Union are striving to accomplish, and which in itself demonstrates their undeviating desire to maintain peace. In the same way Turkey, too, needs peace to carry out the tasks of internal construction. The peoples of the USSR follow the successes of the Turkish Republic on the economic and cultural front with the utmost attention and enthusiasm, for the growth of its power is a most necessary factor in the general peace.

May I again express my happiness at this meeting with you in Moscow, convinced as I am that such direct contact between those in charge of the foreign policy of our friendly countries will help in the successful realization of our task—the further consolidation of Soviet-Turkish friendship, which is a powerful factor in the struggle for peace.

EXTRACTS FROM A NOTE FROM LITVINOV TO THE FINNISH MINISTER IN MOSCOW ON THE VIOLATION OF THE FRONTIER BY THE FORCIBLE EXPULSION OF FINNISH CITIZENS INTO SOVIET TERRITORY

28 *September* 1930 *Mezhdunarodnaya Politika, 1930*, p. 235

The Union Government could not ignore the facts of the systematic violation of the frontier by the forcible expulsion of Finnish citizens into Soviet territory, irrespective of the reasons for this expulsion, and considered itself forced to enter a protest on this matter to the Finnish Government. In making this protest, the Union Government hoped that the Finnish Government would take into account the intolerable

[1] *League of Nations Treaty Series*, clvii, p. 361.

situation created on the frontier, representing a threat to good-neighbourly relations between the two countries, and would take effective steps both to punish the guilty and to prevent similar expulsions in the future.

Unfortunately, the Union Government is compelled to observe that the Finnish Government's reply[1] is wholly unsatisfactory, and gives no assurance of a sincere desire to secure normal conditions on the frontier. This is borne out by the fact that even after the receipt by the Finnish Government of the Soviet envoy's note of 16 July, further frontier violations occurred . . .

The Finnish note of 16 September, after attempting to deny outright the facts concerning these expulsions, endeavours to justify the violation of the frontier by the 'broad popular-patriotic movement in Finland'. This in itself is a confirmation by the Finnish Government of the facts which, in the same note, it attempted to deny, for there would be no need for the Finnish Government to refer to the 'patriotic movement' if it did not admit the existence of the facts which were the subject of the Soviet protest. By calling it patriotic, the Finnish Government clearly wished to imply that the movement in question is attended by illegal acts and violence towards Finnish citizens, of a kind with which the Government was not able to deal, and that these acts include the illegal expulsion of citizens into the USSR. The Soviet Government is aware, from the Finnish and foreign press, of cases of detention, of compulsion to give up public and elective posts, of the kidnapping and beating of Finnish citizens, including members of municipal councils and of the supreme legislative body of Finland, the Sejm, committed by private organizations and persons belonging to that movement to which the Finnish note obviously refers as 'popular-patriotic'. So long as the acts of these persons are committed within the frontiers of Finland, they are internal matters for Finland, but when these private organizations and persons think they can illegally deport their political opponents and compatriots whose presence they find disagreeable into Soviet territory, without the consent of the Soviet authorities, then the Soviet Government cannot accept a reference to 'patriotic' or other motives as justification. Nor can it allow that the Finnish Government itself regards as a patriotic act the violation of the frontier and the creation of a threat to normal good-neighbourly relations with the Soviet Union.

As further justification for the expulsion of Finnish citizens across the frontier the note of 16 September also refers to the geographical circumstances which make it difficult to prevent the crossing. This might have been taken into consideration to a certain extent with regard to individual crossings, as for example happened in the case of criminal

[1] *Mezhdunarodnaya Politika, 1930*, p. 233.

elements from Soviet prisons and places of detention, who had good reason to count on Finnish sympathy and on a relaxation for their benefit of the vigilance of the Finnish frontier guard. The Union Government has had occasion more than once to note such a relaxation of vigilance, when, as frequently happened, separate groups of counter-revolutionary White Guard terrorists and members of espionage organizations crossed on to Soviet territory from the Finnish side. But this relaxation of the guard assumes especially great importance when, as in the present case, it is a question of systematic mass expulsions across the frontier of Finnish citizens, taking place openly, and even reported in the press, and—what is worse—with the active collaboration of the local officials. In the Soviet note of 16 July concrete instances were given of the active collaboration of the authorities, and even their names were mentioned . . . Should the Finnish Government so wish, it can be given written depositions by Finnish citizens who were subjected to expulsion and torture, as established by medical examination, in which both the Schutzkorps and local officials took part. It is necessary to refer to these beatings and torture because these facts completely contradict the assumption made in the Finnish note that the persons concerned crossed the frontier of their own free will. When it is proposed to those who are brought to the frontier after beating and torture that they cross the frontier, under the threat of further torture and even of death, they can hardly be said to have crossed the frontier voluntarily, and these crossings too can only be described as forcible expulsions, just as much as those in which Finnish citizens are thrust physically over the frontier by members of the Schutzkorps and other organizations.

As to the readiness expressed in the Finnish note to receive back the Finnish citizens expelled into the USSR, the Union Government will place no obstacles in their way should these persons wish to return to their homeland and again surrender themselves to the same organizations and persons whose victims they have been. But in that case the Soviet Government would have no guarantee that these same persons would not again be illegally thrust over the frontier, so long as the Finnish Government does not condemn these expulsions and takes no effective measures to see that they are not repeated in the future. The Finnish note asserts that the Finnish citizens expelled across the frontier had been engaging in criminal activities, from which it follows that these citizens are well known to the Finnish Government. It is a matter for surprise that these citizens, who are said to have broken the laws of Finland, were not only not detained by the judicial authorities in accordance with those laws, but were given the opportunity, with the collaboration of the representatives of the Finnish authorities, to escape from justice, while those guilty of this collaboration were not only not

made to answer for their offence, but were officially described in the note as members of a patriotic movement.

The Union Government's protest refers to numerous quite specific and clearly established cases of the forcible deportation across the frontier of Finnish citizens by persons and organizations enjoying the protection of the Finnish Government, with the collaboration of the Finnish officials. It is therefore difficult to understand to what degree the responsibility of the Finnish Government for these events can be lessened by the circumstance mentioned in the Finnish note, of five instances of the voluntary crossing of the frontier in the course of two years by private citizens, for whose actions the Union authorities can bear no responsibility. The Union Government, moreover, knows nothing of these circumstances and no information about them has ever before been given by the Finnish Government; they can therefore have no connexion with the subject of the Union Government's protest.

In noting the wholly unsatisfactory character of the Finnish Government's reply to its note of 16 July, the Union Government is compelled to insist on the immediate cessation of forcible expulsions across the frontier, and awaits information from the Finnish Government of the measures taken to prevent similar incidents in the future and of the penalties imposed on those guilty of violating the frontier.

Should the Finnish Government maintain the attitude taken in its note of 16 September, the Union Government will be compelled to conclude that the Finnish Government has no interest in maintaining good-neighbourly relations with the Soviet Union.

COMMUNIQUÉ ON THE CONVERSATIONS BETWEEN THE PEOPLE'S COMMISSAR FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE TURKISH FOREIGN MINISTER

3 *October* 1930 *Mezhdunarodnaya Politika, 1930*, p. 241

During the visit to Moscow of the Turkish Foreign Minister, M. Tewfik Rushdi Bey, a friendly exchange of views took place between the Minister and the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, M. M. Litvinov, and the Vice-Commissar, L. M. Karakhan, concerning Soviet-Turkish relations and various international questions. The Turkish ambassador to Moscow, M. Hussein Ragib Bey, and the plenipotentiary envoy of the USSR in Ankara, Comrade Y. Z. Surits, also took part in the conversations.

During the course of the conversations the two sides were able to note that the interests of the USSR and Turkey in regard to present international problems completely coincide; they were similarly able to note the identity of their appreciation of these problems.

At the same time it was established that Soviet-Turkish friendship, now more than ever, is a most powerful factor for peace.

As to the relations between the USSR and Turkey, the two sides unanimously recognized that there is not a single question which might overshadow the concord between the two countries and that, on the contrary, their relations are acquiring an ever closer and more friendly character; the two States consider it their duty to make these relations still more close and cordial.

During the course of the conversations it was agreed that such meetings between those in charge of foreign policy in the two States were the most appropriate means for strengthening relations between the two countries, and that it follows that it should continue to be used in the future.

SPEECH BY L. M. KARAKHAN OPENING THE SOVIET-CHINESE CONFERENCE

11 *October* 1930 *Mezhdunarodnaya Politika, 1930*, p. 243

Today the Soviet-Chinese conference, provided for in the protocol signed 22 December 1929 at Khabarovsk by the USSR and the Chinese Republic, enters upon its labours. According to the Khabarovsk protocol this conference should have opened on 25 January of this year, but unfortunately, owing to circumstances for which the Union Government bore no responsibility, there has been a delay of nine months in beginning our work. I should like to express the hope that the circumstances which prevented the opening of the conference in due time will not affect its further progress or delay its labours, which are of great importance for the peoples of both countries.

Our task at the conference which opens today is to a certain extent made easier because the Khabarovsk protocol, on the basis of which the conference has been convened, defined the scope of those questions which we are to examine and decide, and the principles by which we are to be guided in conducting the present negotiations are defined in the Peking and Mukden treaties of 1924. Soviet policy towards China was fully and clearly expressed in those treaties, which carried into effect the policy laid down by the Union Government in its declarations[1] to the Chinese people in 1919 and 1920.

That policy, which the Union Government pursued and pursues in its relations with China, was and is the policy of repudiating all the unjust privileges extorted by violence from the Chinese people by the Tsarist Government, the policy of establishing friendly relations on the basis

[1] *Soviet Documents*, 1, pp. 158, 212.

of complete equality and reciprocity of interests of the peoples of the USSR and China, the policy of sympathy with the Chinese people in its struggle against unequal treaties and for complete independence, for the abolition of each and every obstacle standing in the way of its full development.

The treaties concluded in 1924 between the USSR and China opened a new page in the history of Chinese relations with the outside world, and were the first treaties concluded by China on the basis of real and complete equality and reciprocity. These treaties were warmly approved by all sections of the Chinese people and strengthened their position in the struggle against unequal treaties and for the conclusion of equal treaties, for which the treaties between the USSR and China served as a model. To our regret China, despite its efforts, has not so far succeeded in modelling its relations with other countries on those treaties. I can here only express my warm hope that China's efforts in this direction will be crowned with success.

Steadfastly insisting on the execution of the Peking and Mukden agreements, the Union Government has strictly and consistently adhered to them, both in letter and spirit. The acute conflict between the USSR and the Chinese authorities in 1929, which lasted more than six months, led to the severance of all relations between the two countries and to the incursion of armed bands and detachments into Soviet territory, against which we were forced to take appropriate measures. This extremely serious conflict between the two countries was settled on 22 December 1929 by the Khabarovsk protocol, which established peaceful conditions on the frontier, brought the treaties between China and the USSR into force again, and on the Chinese Eastern Railway restored the normal situation existing before the conflict. Hence, together with the 1924 treaties, the Union Government regards the Khabarovsk protocol as a most important instrument governing present relations between the USSR and China, and providing the basis for the conference we are today opening.

We hope that the Chinese side, with whom we are today entering upon our labours, recognize as we do that the Peking and Mukden agreements of 1924 and the Khabarovsk protocol of 1929, defining the relations existing between our countries, are the international instruments, providing a broad foundation for the definitive settlement, in a spirit of friendship and complete equality, of all questions concerning Soviet-Chinese relations, by which we will be guided in our work at this conference.

The strict fulfilment of the obligations undertaken by both countries in these three instruments will help to strengthen further good-neighbourly relations between the two countries and speed the work of the

conference. I hope to hear that the delegate of the Chinese Republic is in agreement with me on this.

In extending a welcome to the delegate of the Chinese Government, Mo Teh-hui, and to the Chinese delegation, I wish success to this conference, which is called to settle all questions in dispute between the USSR and China, to strengthen relations between the two great countries, and to secure lasting and stable peace in the Far East.

RESOLUTION OF THE COUNCIL OF PEOPLE'S COMMISSARS ON ECONOMIC RELATIONS WITH COUNTRIES WHICH IMPOSE SPECIAL RESTRICTIONS ON TRADE WITH THE USSR

20 *October* 1930 *Mezhdunarodnaya Politika, 1930*, p. 250

The Council of People's Commissars resolves:

To propose to the People's Commissariat for External and Internal Trade of the USSR to adopt the following measures in regard to those countries which impose special restrictions not extended to other countries on trade with the USSR by the application of special measures of a legislative or administrative character which hinder the normal import of Soviet goods into those countries:

1. To cease completely or to reduce to the minimum orders and purchases in those countries;
2. To cease using the shipping of those countries;
3. To issue jointly with the People's Commissariat for Transport special restrictive regulations for goods in transit which are the produce of or sent from those countries;
4. To take steps jointly with the People's Commissariat for Transport to cease altogether or to reduce to the minimum the use of the ports, means of transit, and bases in those countries for Soviet re-export and transit operations.

EXTRACTS FROM AN INTERVIEW BY THE VICE-COMMISSAR FOR TRADE, A. P. ROZENGOLTS, ON RESTRICTIONS ON TRADE WITH THE SOVIET UNION

22 *October* 1930 *Izvestia*, 22 *October* 1930

Some time ago a campaign was opened in the West, and has recently become much stronger, against Soviet exports. This campaign has moved from the columns of the bourgeois press to the offices of ministers and to parliaments, and has already taken form in government regulations and very nearly in bills for legislation. An attempt is made to

explain the origin of this campaign by the severe economic crisis in the West which the initiators and leaders of the campaign try to attribute to Soviet exports. This explanation is of course designed for those ignorant of economic affairs and for political illiterates, for even those with only the very slightest knowledge of economic and political questions cannot fail to understand that the present crisis has quite different and much deeper roots and that the question of Soviet exports has no bearing on the problem . . .

That the campaign against Soviet exports is dictated by motives far from economic in their character is shown by the fact that the lead has been taken by the countries which occupy a very low place in the list of those importing raw materials from us and which in general do not and cannot compete with them with their own raw materials. Our exports to France, for example, in 1928–9 amounted to 4·9 per cent of our total exports. Wheat is not exported either by Estonia or by Latvia, which are in fact buyers of foreign wheat, yet these countries together with Poland are taking part in the first agrarian conference convened, on the initiative of the Rumanian minister for trade, under the anti-Soviet flag . . .

I may be asked, are the initiators and leaders of the anti-Soviet campaign really unaware of the deplorable results which will follow if their campaign is successful. To that I should reply that, in the first place, the campaign originated and is being waged in those countries which through their own fault have not yet succeeded in arranging normal economic relations with our Union, and therefore they themselves would suffer comparatively little from the cessation or diminution of trade with the Union. They know that the deplorable results of the campaign will be felt chiefly by other countries, which have managed to establish fairly lively relations with our Union, and it is at the expense of these countries that they want to conduct their campaign. It is not impossible that a subsidiary aim of the campaign is to weaken these countries and make them more dependent on its initiators. Secondly, and I should like to emphasize this particularly, the campaign does not at all arise from the crisis, with the object of lessening the crisis, but pursues the definite political aims of the countries individually and the common aim of the general struggle against the Soviet Union. The enemies of the Soviet Union, even after the failure of their military intervention, have never laid down their arms; every year they sharpen and try out a new kind of anti-Soviet weapon. The present campaign against Soviet exports has the same object as the clerical campaign last year, that is, the preparation of public opinion for intervention. I am, however, convinced that this campaign, like other anti-Soviet campaigns, will also fail, and will not achieve its object.

The Soviet Government cannot remain a passive spectator of the anti-Soviet actions with which this campaign is accompanied. When the French Government recently promulgated special regulations[1] for the importation of a number of Soviet articles of export, our plenipotentiary representative in Paris made an emphatic protest against establishing special regulations for trade with the Soviet Union. The French Government attempted to justify its decree by an utterly unfounded reference to reciprocity. The monopoly of foreign trade existing in the Soviet Union and the Soviet licence regulations apply equally to all countries, and we should have no ground for complaint if the French Government had issued similar regulations for all countries. We cannot, however, be reconciled with the passing of regulations applied exclusively to the USSR and it was against this that our protest was directed.

Nor can we, furthermore, confine ourselves to protests alone if they do not accomplish their purpose. The decree of the Council of People's Commissars published yesterday instructs the People's Commissariat for Trade to take the appropriate defensive measures against artificial barriers and restrictions created by special laws and regulations. That is the meaning of the Sovnarkom decree.

NOTE FROM SURITS, SOVIET ENVOY TO TURKEY, TO THE TURKISH FOREIGN MINISTER ON ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE RECEPTION OF VISITING WARSHIPS

25 *November* 1930 *Sbornik Dogovorov*, vii, p. 19

I have the honour to inform you that, with the object of simplifying the existing customary arrangements and of reducing expenditure when warships make visits, the Government of the USSR is disposed to conclude with the Government of the Turkish Republic a reciprocal agreement containing the following provisions.

The visits of warships shall be divided into two categories, of which one shall be official visits, i.e. those which are made by invitation; and unofficial visits, i.e. those which take place on the initiative of the State to which the vessel belongs. The request for the permission required for the visit to take place should indicate whether the visit is to be regarded as official or unofficial.

In regard to official visits, no changes will be made in the arrangements for an official reception which have been made hitherto; in the second case, the customary calls will be made, but no official reception will be arranged.

[1] *Le Temps*, 27 October 1930.

Should the Turkish Government approve the arrangement suggested above, agreement on this matter will be regarded as reached from the moment when a communication to this effect shall have been received.

[The Turkish reply, dated 25 December 1930, expresses approval of the arrangements proposed in the Soviet note.]

PRESS STATEMENT BY LITVINOV (BERLIN) ON HIS DEPARTURE FROM GENEVA BEFORE THE FINAL SESSION OF THE PREPARATORY COMMISSION ON DISARMAMENT, AND ON HIS VISIT TO MILAN

27 *November* 1930 *Dokumenty*, i, p. 9

En route to Moscow Comrade Litvinov stopped in Berlin. In an interview with the Berlin correspondent of Tass, he gave the reasons for his departure from Geneva, and also for his visit to Milan. Questioned as to the reasons for his departure from Geneva before the conclusion of the session of the disarmament conference preparatory commission, Comrade Litvinov replied:

'I gave the reasons in my last statement to the commission, shortly before I left.[1] The Soviet delegation took a most active part in the work of the commission so long as there was the slightest hope of giving some real content to the so-called draft disarmament convention. But all hopes vanished when the relevant Soviet amendments were rejected, and the commission concluded the second reading of the chapters referring directly to the reduction of armaments. It became quite clear to us that the drafts for a convention, on which the commission composed of the representatives of thirty States had worked for about five years, and which in their present form might have been just as well drawn up in a week by a few conscientious civil servants, might serve as a basis for a discussion on the rejection of disarmament rather than on a real reduction of armaments. The commission is at present zealously engaged on the question of so-called "publicity" and of "the exchange of information", and there is every reason to fear that some delegations at least have in mind the substitution of publicity for disarmament. But publicity in itself cannot put a stop to an armaments race among the Powers; indeed it may even become the starting point for such a race if the conference which is to be held should nevertheless take some steps towards the reduction of armaments. The commission is already hastening to legalize exceptions to and violations of the convention. Proposals are being laid before the commission according to which a State has only to declare that it considers itself threatened to have the right to break the

[1] League of Nations, 1931, ix, C. 4, M. 4, p. 208.

convention. If such proposals are accepted, the Soviet Union would prefer to be free of any obligations arising from the convention, for not only does it have the subjective feeling of being threatened, but these threats are made daily and openly discussed in the press; there is completely objective and indisputable evidence of their existence.

'But the Soviet Union does not ask for any exceptions in its favour; it is ready to carry out, steadfastly and conscientiously, any undertaking concerning a real reduction in armaments, to the same extent as other countries. The general impression left on the Soviet delegation by the work of the commission is that certain Powers which, thanks to the quantitative and qualitative superiority of their armaments, occupy a dominating position in the world arena and are anxious to maintain and extend their domination, have firmly decided on no account to reduce their military strength. Instead of helping to expose these trends before public opinion, the preparatory commission concealed them, and, taking the line of least resistance, and anxious for apparent unanimity, fell into line with precisely those delegations which represented the tendency not to permit disarmament to which I have referred. But as a result of partial divergencies among these same dominant States, unanimity was far from being achieved, and therefore the difficulties encountered in the commission could not be overcome and have been left as a legacy for the future conference. Of course, if at that conference too the delegations have the same instructions as those by which the delegations to the preparatory commission were guided, then there will be no point in thinking of disarmament or the reduction of armaments. If the conference wanted to work out an international convention on the reduction of armaments, it would have to begin by appointing a new preparatory commission, which would provide a pretext for a further postponement of the business of disarmament.'

Concerning his visit to Milan Comrade Litvinov said: 'The relations between the Soviet Union and Italy, maintained and strengthened over seven years, made it necessary for those in charge of foreign policy in the two countries to exchange views on those relations and on other international questions of interest to both sides. Considering that the foreign ministers of European countries meet every year, and even more frequently, nothing unusual need, it would appear, be seen in a meeting between the Soviet Commissar and those in charge of foreign affairs in those countries which maintain not only formally correct, but really normal diplomatic and economic relations with the Soviet Union. Such meetings can cause anxiety only among those who, behind a pacific mask, are trying to isolate and weaken the Soviet Union or other States. They talk of pan-Europa and at the same time criticize an effort towards rapprochement between two European countries. The pacific

intentions of the Soviet Government rest on incontestable facts, and every step it makes towards rapprochement with other States can only serve the cause of peace. The true friends of peace can only rejoice at this rapprochement.'

REPLY TO THE BRITISH AMBASSADOR'S REPRESENTATIONS CONCERNING THE REFERENCES TO GREAT BRITAIN IN THE INDUSTRIAL PARTY TRIAL

December 1930 — 246 *H.C. Deb.* 5 s. col. 10

References to the possibility of the participation of British circles in interventionist plans were made by the accused in written depositions at the time of the preliminary examination, and confirmed by them later in court. Neither the examining authorities nor the court can deprive the accused of the right to give evidence or to make such confessions as they consider necessary. The Public Prosecutor naturally based his indictment upon the confessions of the accused, which he could not ignore. However, the court and the Public Prosecutor at the time of the trial paid almost no attention to the references to England. Nor did the Public Prosecutor dwell upon these accusations in his final speech for the prosecution. Neither did the Government anywhere express its views upon these references to England.

REPLY TO FURTHER BRITISH REPRESENTATIONS CONCERNING THE REFERENCES TO GREAT BRITAIN IN THE INDUSTRIAL PARTY TRIAL

December 1930 — 246 *H.C. Deb.* 5 s. col. 797

The accusation in court was directed against the eight accused who in their statements referred to the possible participation of British circles in intervention. The Public Prosecutor could not ignore these statements and took action on them in his commentaries. The Government does not in such circumstances give instructions to the Public Prosecutor, and could not thus, in the case in question, demand that he should ignore investigatory materials, of whatever nature they might be. It is the business of the Court to investigate these materials, to establish their credibility and give its decision. This decision has now been given. I can add nothing more to this.

EXTRACTS FROM MOLOTOV'S REPORT TO THE CENTRAL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE

4 *January* 1931 *Protokoly*, Bulletin 1, p. 23

The world economic crisis also leads inevitably to more acute differences between States. This is expressed in greater instability in international affairs. Could it indeed be otherwise? It is known that stability in international relations in Europe is connected primarily with the introduction of the Young Plan, which imposes an enormous burden of payments on defeated Germany. But the Young Plan, like the entire body of post-war treaties between the capitalist States of Europe, is going through a particularly critical period. There are weighty reasons for this.

The world economic crisis makes the burden of reparation payments imposed by the Young Plan on Germany still heavier. Economists, for example Comrade Varga, calculate that as a result of the fall in prices the burden on Germany, reckoned in commodities, is 15 per cent greater than it was when the Young Plan was accepted. This is bound to make for greater instability in the relations between European countries, in so far as they rest on the fulfilment of post-war treaties.

Or take the question of India. In present conditions the Indian problem is of tremendous importance in world social and economic development. But how successfully is it being settled? All the tramping around a 'round table' does not advance the solution of this problem. And this too can only lead to greater instability in international affairs.

Or take the world economic conference which met in November last year in Geneva. We should be interested in the results of the work of such conferences. But in this case there were no results. On no question of substance did the participants in this conference—the delegates of many countries—manage to reach agreement. No agreement was reached on action to regulate international economic life. Only a resolution was passed which stated that agreement had not been reached. To give an idea of the work of this conference I should mention one other fact. The chairman, the former Dutch Finance Minister Colijn, handed in his resignation to the Secretary-General of the League of Nations immediately after the conference, referring directly to its failure.

The failure of this attempt to regulate international economic relations inevitably increased the instability in international economic and political relations. But this increasing instability is pregnant with great danger to the cause of peace. These facts merely reflect the sharpening of the struggle now going on concerning the revision of post-war treaties. If we add that, despite the crisis, the war industries of countries like France and Poland are steadily expanding and turning out increasing

quantities of armaments, we get a clearer idea of the dangers to peace and of the surprises which the present international situation has in store for existing peaceful relations between States.

Passing to our relations with other States, I shall deal chiefly with foreign trade.

It can be said that over the past year our foreign trade, both exports and imports, has continued to develop, and for 1931 we are providing for a further expansion of our trade with other countries. . . .

While noting the growth of our foreign trade as a whole, it should be pointed out that, in the case of certain countries, our foreign trade in the past year has been unable to follow a normal course. In those cases where, at the dictation of the most aggressive forces, special measures were adopted against us, measures of an obviously hostile character, it was of course impossible to count on the development of commercial relations. When, instead of establishing normal credit terms, special hostile measures were taken against Soviet exports, this was bound to have its effect in reducing our imports from those countries.

How, for example, could our trade with Finland grow, when hooligan attacks were made again and again on shops in that country which sell Soviet products? If anybody thinks that repeated hooligan attacks on Finnish citizens trading in Soviet goods do not interfere with the development of normal trade, he is obviously mistaken. . . .

At the same time it should be said that by and large our relations with the majority of foreign States have developed along normal channels. I do not wish at the moment to enumerate all the countries to which this applies. But in any case it can be said that our relations have developed normally with Germany, Turkey, Italy, England, Japan, Sweden, Persia, Afghanistan, Austria, Greece, the Scandinavian and Baltic countries. We hope also for a successful outcome of the Soviet-Chinese conference, which is to carry to a conclusion the matters dealt with in the Khabarovsk agreement.

While noting these facts, we should not forget that in a number of countries new attempts are constantly being made to launch anti-Soviet campaigns, using the most artificial pretexts. Last year, as is known, the most fuss and the biggest anti-Soviet campaign was developed around the so-called crusade and the Kutepov case. Lately the campaign against alleged Soviet dumping has acquired particularly great importance. What does it matter if those who conduct this campaign and shriek so loudly about the economic collapse in the USSR obviously contradict themselves when at the same time they shout about the dangers of Soviet dumping. It is easy to understand that it is not because of good economic conditions that these gentlemen attribute their misfortunes to alleged Soviet dumping. Entangled in their own contradic-

tions, and anxious to unload their own sins on to others, they can of course seek a way out by organizing an anti-Soviet campaign, like the campaign against alleged Soviet dumping. But for practical people that only proves their helplessness and nothing more. The political significance of this abominable campaign is the same as that of other anti-Soviet campaigns. It is one way of preparing for such anti-Soviet actions as will lead to the rupture of peaceful relations. The organization of anti-Soviet campaigns abroad is nothing but preparation for an attack with the object of disrupting peaceful socialist construction in our country. The facts have already shown that those who are at the head of the anti-Soviet campaign are also in fact at the same time the most active in preparing intervention against the USSR, in undermining the cause of peace. . . .

I must refer to our relations with France.

It should be noted first of all that influential French circles have apparently done everything they can to pile up obstacles to the development of Franco-Soviet commercial relations; a great deal has been done to create a hostile attitude and to eliminate foreign trade between the USSR and France. The decree of 3 October speaks for itself. As is known, certain other States, such as Belgium and Rumania, followed the French example by issuing similar decrees. It leaps to the eye that these steps were preceded by a visit of the French Minister for Trade, Flandin, to the capitals of precisely those countries. On the other hand it should be noted that since the Soviet decree of 20 October, designed to protect our foreign trade from the hostile actions of certain foreign countries, nobody has yet been found willing to follow France in promulgating such anti-Soviet measures. Clearly it is no accident that up to the present the group of States which have taken special steps against Soviet exports by and large coincide with the French military-political bloc. Is any further confirmation required that interested circles regard the French decree of 3 October, issued by the previous Government, as but one preparatory step for further and more aggressive action against the USSR? Obviously, such steps by the French Government cannot serve to promote trade between France and the USSR, or to strengthen normal relations between them.

Finally, the 'Industrial Party' trial surely cannot be regarded as an accident. It is undoubtedly the result of deep causes making for the violation of peace. The Soviet Government is bound to take this into account and therefore to take the steps required to remove obstacles to the consolidation of peace. We must wait to see what attitude the new French Government takes on these questions. In the given case we prefer waiting to making prophecies.

STATEMENT TO THE GOVERNMENTS OF GREAT BRITAIN, GERMANY, ITALY, NORWAY, PERSIA, POLAND, FRANCE, AND JAPAN, MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS, ON THE CALLING OF THE DISARMAMENT CONFERENCE

12 *January* 1931 *Dokumenty*, i, p. 87[1]

In accordance with the majority resolution of the preparatory disarmament commission, the Council of the League of Nations at its next session will probably be occupied with determining the place and date for the disarmament conference and with the appointment of the conference chairman. In the opinion of the Soviet Government the conference may be of international significance, for the question of the preservation and consolidation of peace, or of a new and destructive war, may to a considerable extent depend on the results of the conference. The Soviet Government has frequently expressed the view that in existing circumstances the only guarantee of the preservation of peace would be disarmament or, at the very least, the maximum reduction of armaments. It put forward draft conventions on these lines in the preparatory disarmament commission, and will submit them again for examination by the conference itself. This bears witness to the Soviet Union's special interest in the success of the conference, and to its willingness to take a most active part in its work. The Soviet Government is of the opinion that for the labours of the conference to be successful complete equality between all those taking part in the conference, great Powers and small, must be assured.

It is, however, compelled to observe that this equality was not observed in the preparatory commission in regard to the Soviet delegation not only by the decisions of the commission, but primarily in the clearly biased conduct of the chairman of the commission. The minutes[2] of the commission contain not a few instances in proof of this assertion. It required particular self-restraint and patience on the part of the Soviet delegation, and also the realization of the enormous importance attached by their Government to the question of disarmament, for the delegation not to withdraw from the commission because of the tactlessness and rudeness of its chairman. No doubt the chairman's conduct arose in part also from his being a citizen of a State which for fourteen years has declined to enter into normal relations with the Soviet Union and, being thus deprived of accurate sources of information about the Union, is therefore more liable than other capitalist countries to prejudice against the USSR.

Arising from this, the Soviet Government considers that the right to participate in the election of the conference chairman should be granted

[1] Misdated 15 January. [2] League of Nations, 1931, ix, C. 4, M. 4.

to all members of the conference without exception, and that therefore he should be nominated not by a group of Powers, nor by organizations to which not all the participants in the conference belong, but by the plenary conference itself. The Soviet Government, moreover, is of the opinion that as chairman, and consequently leader of such an important world conference, there cannot be chosen the representative of a country which in the preparatory disarmament commission adopted a markedly negative attitude towards disarmament, or of a country with a highly developed war industry of international importance, materially interested in the maintenance and expansion of armaments, or finally of a country which does not maintain normal relations with all States which are participating in the conference.

Nor, it is self-evident, can a person be elected as chairman of the conference who is famous for his public attacks on or prejudices against one State or another.

Furthermore, for the work of the conference to be successful, all those taking part in it should be assured of the requisite conditions for undisturbed concentration on the questions relating to the work of the conference. The Soviet delegation were to a considerable extent deprived of such conditions in the preparatory commission because of the hostile atmosphere created by the Geneva press and local anti-Soviet organizations, to which must be added the well-known international organization for the preparation of intervention in the USSR headed by M. Aubert, who defended the murderer of the Soviet plenipotentiary envoy, Comrade Vorovsky. Prejudice and preconceived ideas about the USSR are naturally stronger in those countries which have no representative in the Soviet Union and are thus deprived of trustworthy information about it and rely exclusively on the reports of irresponsible journalists.

The Soviet Government therefore considers that a country should be chosen as a meeting place for the disarmament conference which maintains normal relations with all States taking part in the conference.

TASS STATEMENT ON THE SETTLEMENT OF QUESTIONS IN DISPUTE WITH FINLAND

28 *January* 1931 *Izvestia*, 28 *January* 1931

According to information received by Tass from authoritative sources, the Soviet plenipotentiary envoy in Finland, Comrade Maisky, and the Foreign Minister of Finland, M. Procopé, recently held conversations on those questions in connexion with which the Soviet Government dispatched notes to the Finnish Government, to wit, the expulsions across

the frontier in the summer of last year, and the election posters which appeared last autumn during the election campaign in Helsingfors.[1] During these conversations the Minister Procopé expressed regret at the incidents which had occurred and gave information about the legal action being taken and about the measures to prevent incidents of a similar character in the future. The said questions may thus be considered settled.

REPLY FROM LITVINOV TO THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS INVITATION TO TAKE PART IN THE COMMISSION OF ENQUIRY FOR EUROPEAN UNION

6 *February* 1931

League of Nations Official Journal, 1931, p. 545
Dokumenty, ii, p. 52

I have received your letter of 23 January, in which you inform me that the Commission of Enquiry for European Union has decided 'to study the world economic crisis, in so far as it affects the European countries as a whole, and to invite . . . the Soviet Union to participate in this study'.[2]

This communication, taken in conjunction with the French Government's Memorandum[3] concerning the organisation of a European Union, which was officially communicated to the Soviet Government, and with the debates which took place at the last session of the Commission of Enquiry in so far as the Soviet Government is acquainted therewith, has left the said Government in a state of doubt as to a certain number of questions.

The replies of various Governments to the French Memorandum with regard to the nature of the new organisation's aims and the most suitable methods of achieving those aims, contain a number of contradictions.

The Soviet Government has its own view on the causes of the permanent economic divergencies existing between the different States, and of the economic depression and crises which periodically arise in capitalist countries, as well as on the means by which humanity should seek and can attain effective solidarity between peoples; but it does not appear necessary to state this view here. Furthermore, it must be evident to all the States concerned that, without generally ensuring universal peace, and more particularly European peace, by eliminating the causes which threaten to disturb it, there can be no hope of the efforts to

[1] *Izvestia*, 22 September 1930, 27 November 1930.
[2] cf. *League of Nations Official Journal*, February 1931, p 472.
[3] League of Nations, 1930, vii, 4 p. 9.

establish European solidarity in the economic or any other sphere achieving any degree of success. The 'bourgeois' economists themselves acknowledge the indissoluble connection between the political unrest which at present exists and which is continually growing more profound throughout the world with the constant increase in armaments, which in certain countries represent as much as 40 per cent and 50 per cent of the national budgets, and the more and more serious international economic antagonisms which are developing simultaneously with the economic crisis within each country.

It is equally obvious that it is impossible to pursue the aim of improving the relations between the different States and of consolidating between them that peace which forms the necessary foundation of any economic co-operation and at the same time to try to oppose some of these States to others. In the same way, if the aim is a union of Europe as a geographical unit, without specifying that this union only applies to States based on a given social and political system, it must be acknowledged that the participation of any particular State in this union must follow automatically from its geographical situation, and this no discussion can modify; the union must comprise all countries belonging to this geographical unit, even as regards only a small part of their territory.

In view of the self-evident nature of these considerations, it is incomprehensible and surprising that a group of European States should arrogate to themselves the right to decide on the admission or non-admission of another group of European States to a community which claims the title of 'Pan-European'. The singularity of this fact is not lessened when we see, for example, Switzerland, whose territory is only 0·4 per cent of the area of Europe, or even Norway, for which the corresponding figure is 3·1 per cent, pronounce against or question the admission of a country like the Soviet Union, occupying in Europe alone a territory forming nearly 45 per cent of this continent, and nearly twice the size of the combined areas of France, Belgium, Roumania, Yugoslavia, Spain, the Netherlands, Sweden, Denmark and Norway. In considering this question it is necessary to reject altogether as entirely inappropriate all arguments and conclusions of a legal and purely abstract nature, which might be suitable in an assembly of lawyers but not in an international political assembly comprising the statesmen responsible for the conduct of foreign affairs in a large number of countries. If, however, in spite of the title of the body from which the invitation received by the Soviet Union emanates, the intention is not to establish a general union of European States but to establish within the Continent of Europe two groups of countries separated by purely legal or by political and social characteristics, we are inevitably led to

ask whether equal and equivalent rights will be given to the two parties in this organisation in their contemplated co-operation.

The resolution of the Commission of Enquiry for European Union says that the latter 'has decided to study the world economic crisis'. It is not clear, however, from this text whether the Commission proposes to confine its activities to this question, or whether it reserves the right to bring other questions within its scope at any moment, and whether, in the latter case, the discussion of these questions will be undertaken only by a group of European States or by all these States. This question is a natural one, since in the course of the debates of the Commission of Enquiry the opinion was expressed that questions might come before the Commission which would be very difficult to discuss in the presence of a representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, but it was not stated whether this was because those questions were of no interest to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics or because they interested it too closely. If this idea were adopted by the Commission as a whole, the Soviet Union might have to participate in the work of a Commission which would take steps to prevent its representatives from sharing in the discussion of questions of the most immediate concern to them and in which in fact they were the principal party concerned.

The Soviet Government, realising that it cannot hope to have any light thrown on these questions outside the meetings of the Commission, and that it would probably be embarrassing for the Commission to give definite replies, has decided to take part in the forthcoming proceedings of the Commission of Enquiry for European Union, while reserving its final attitude to the Commission's future work until it has received the necessary enlightenment and until it has itself studied the Commission and the nature of the unification which the inviting section of the Commission has in view.

In taking this decision, the Soviet Government has been guided by its constant desire to contribute to the success of all steps which, with its help, may be directed towards the consolidation of universal peace, and more particularly of European peace; at the same time, it takes its stand on the principles, theoretically recognised in the French Memorandum, of the sovereignty of States and of their equality of rights, and on the idea that the new organisation cannot 'be opposed to any ethnographical combination . . . either in Europe itself or in other continents'.

EXTRACTS FROM A REPORT BY MOLOTOV TO THE SIXTH SOVIET CONGRESS

8 *March* 1931 *Stenograficheskii Otchet*, Bulletin 1, p. 25

The anti-Soviet campaigns already referred to are not the only proof of the preparation for intervention; there are a number of other facts. The steps taken to organize an *economic blockade*, which are steadily increasing in number, also give warning of intervention.

The campaign against the import of Soviet goods is being waged with particular frenzy. We find proof of this in the special law passed in America, with its amendments,[1] and also in the greater pressure of the English Conservatives in this direction. The French were particularly prompt in taking action against us. We need only recall the decree of 3 October 1930. As is known, France's aggressive anti-Soviet policy is, at French instigation, being pursued in a number of other countries too. There can only be one purpose in such an aggressive policy—to organize an economic blockade of the USSR.

The avowed imperialists in France and England no longer hesitate to speak openly of economic war against the USSR. For instance, the appeal recently issued in England of the Trade Defence Union[2] . . . openly refers to the need for a 'united front in the economic war against the common enemy, communism'! In the present circumstances the organization of an economic blockade is the most important factor in the preparation for intervention against the Soviet Union.

The chief part in creating the anti-Soviet front is played by the so-called European Committee formed on the initiative of the French Foreign Minister Briand for the purpose of creating a bloc of European States against the Soviet Union. The stubborn opposition of Briand and of the representatives of States dependent on France to inviting the USSR to the May conference for the so-called 'study of the world crisis' showed that the leaders of the European Committee are definitely anxious to turn this organization into the headquarters for preparing an attack on the USSR. Despite the ambiguous interpretations of the invitation extended to the Soviet Union to take part in the special conference of the European Committee, the Soviet Government thought it necessary to accept in order to clarify on the spot the plans and intentions of this organization, and to determine what the attitude of its representatives at the conference should be. How much the leaders of the European Committee, with Briand at their head, are still trying even now to carry on their work without 'outsiders', and particularly without the USSR, can be seen from the failure to invite any Soviet

[1] cf. *The United States and the Soviet Union*, pp 214–22

[2] *The Times*, 12 February and 7 March 1931.

representatives to any of the three sub-commissions now preparing the May conference of the European Committee. The greater will be the Bolshevik vigilance and firmness of our delegates to the May conference. The greater will be our energy in exposing all anti-Soviet machinations for which they are now trying to use also the European Committee.

In order to show how, under cover of phrases about disarmament, work is persistently going on to prepare new imperialist wars and armed attacks on the USSR, we must dwell on the results of the work of the preparatory commission of the *disarmament* conference. Despite all the efforts of the Soviet delegation to get a real reduction in armaments, the commission in its work—if in this context it is appropriate to use the word 'work'—took a quite different position, that of using talk about disarmament to conceal a mad growth of armaments.

In the four years of existence of the preparatory commission the armaments of the capitalist States have not only not been reduced, but have grown considerably. In that time the danger of new imperialist wars has not only not lessened, but on the contrary has grown greater. The preparatory commission as a whole has gone in the direction in which it has been pushed by the French delegation, which represents at the present time the most belligerent imperialist circles of Europe. For the rest, the attitude taken by France, which has nothing in common with the interests of real peace, was fully supported both by Great Britain and the United States. The Polish and Rumanian delegations were distinguished by the particular energy and zeal with which they rejected any proposals leading to the reduction of existing armaments. In contrast to other delegations, the Japanese generally did not conceal their frankly negative attitude to the reduction of armaments. Italy's position was at bottom determined by the desire to come out with no less armaments than those of any other continental Power, that is, of France. Germany took up a special position in the preparatory commission, rightly reminding the commission that the prohibition on the rearming of Germany was at the time proclaimed as the beginning of general disarmament, of which the representatives of the ruling imperialist Powers in Europe do not like now to be reminded.

The results of the work of the last session of the preparatory disarmament commission, expressed in its draft plan and explanatory report, amount to a rejection of any limitation of certain kinds of armaments, and to a justification of the maintenance and expansion of other kinds of armaments. The decision taken at the suggestion of the American delegation is a complete travesty of the very idea of disarmament; this gives each State the right, when it considers that its 'security' is threatened, to raise the level of armaments laid down in the convention and only to inform the other signatories of the convention who, in their

turn, naturally, will not fail to take advantage of this circumstance to increase their own armaments.

All this compelled the Soviet delegation to dissociate themselves decisively from the work of the preparatory commission and to expose openly in their speeches the complete failure of the commission's work to promote disarmament.

The Council of the League of Nations has finally convened the world disarmament conference for February 1932; there can be no illusions about this among those who are really trying to achieve disarmament and general peace. It is a known fact that when there is need to agree about increasing armaments, then almost side by side with the 'disarmament' commissions, and in any case 'not interfering' with their work, conferences are convened, like the London naval conference, or, as is now happening, secret diplomatic negotiations are conducted, and in this way all the business of this kind is settled. Given all these circumstances, the preparation of new imperialist wars will by no means be made more difficult, nor will it by any means be slowed down, by the convening of the conference.

As to the USSR, it can take part in the disarmament conference only in so far as the conference will really strive for disarmament or at least for a substantial reduction in armaments. And we must warn the capitalist States that neither before the conference, nor at the conference itself, shall we allow decisions and agreements to be forced on us which were made in our absence and without our participation.

The fruitlessness of all the commissions and conferences so far held by the bourgeois countries on the disarmament question, and the rapid growth of armaments that is in fact taking place in all the imperialist States, prove that these States are not in the least interested in really strengthening peace, that on their part everything is being done to prepare and unleash new imperialist wars. Here, too, the spearhead is pointed, as everybody can see, against the Soviet Union . . .

However, despite the increasingly open interventionist sentiments among the ruling bourgeois circles of the capitalist States, the USSR has successfully carried on its struggle for peace. Relying on the growing support of the working masses in the capitalist countries, on the growing economic power and defensive capacity of the country, the Soviet Government has strengthened its international position and has in this respect undoubtedly achieved not inconsiderable results.

While the *general* and *basic* attitude to the Soviet Union within the capitalist environment is marked by growing hatred for the socialist State and by increasing alarm at our successes, we should not lose sight of the differences in the attitude of *individual* countries. Although, anxious as it is to strengthen peace, the Soviet Union has failed to

improve relations with particular countries such as France, not to speak of Poland, on the other hand the defeat of the Conservatives at the last elections brought in a new Government in England, and made it possible for normal diplomatic relations between the USSR and Great Britain to be restored. The interests of socialist construction are inseparably bound up with the strengthening of *peaceful relations* with other States and with the development of *economic relations* between the USSR and these countries. These tasks represented the real and unchanging basis of the Soviet Government's policy throughout the period under review.

The world crisis has not merely made the old contradictions more acute and deep; it has created new ones. While it has impelled the ruling capitalist groups in some countries, at the cost of whatever artificial measures, and in particular customs tariffs, to cut down imports, to fence themselves off from Soviet exports, in other countries, and particularly in those from which the USSR imports considerable quantities, there is inevitably a tendency to strengthen economic relations with the USSR. In some capitalist countries the attempts to suppress Soviet exports are openly beginning to get the upper hand, attempts to organize an economic blockade and prepare armed attacks on the Soviet Union. At the same time in other countries, which need Soviet raw materials, and particularly need the Soviet market for their exports, the desire to come to terms with the USSR on a number of economic questions survives and even grows. The world crisis has by no means softened the real contradictions within the capitalist camp. Consequently the attempts to create a united front against the USSR are bound even now to encounter considerable difficulties. In its struggle for universal peace, in its struggle to consolidate peaceful relations with other countries, the Soviet Government has more than once demonstrated its consistency and extraordinary firmness. The Soviet Union will continue this policy, remembering that peace is in the interests not only of the workers of our own country, but of all countries.

I shall deal briefly with our relations with individual countries, beginning with *Germany*.

The two years which have passed since the fifth Soviet Congress can be divided into two periods. The first covered the end of 1929 and the early part of 1930. In reporting to the Soviet Congress I cannot pass in silence over the fact that to our most profound regret German official and public circles, in the first period I have mentioned, appeared to be carried away by the wave of the anti-Soviet 'crusade', which for a time endangered the consolidation and development of Soviet-German relations. However, from the middle of 1930 these relations showed a favourable change, which I record with satisfaction. The fundamental

line in German policy in regard to the USSR has of late been one of friendly collaboration and the further consolidation of relations which have come successfully through a number of trials in the last nine years and which, we are deeply convinced, can and should be developed further to the mutual advantage of both countries and in the interests of the general peace. The presence in Moscow of a delegation of leading German industrialists is a further proof of the understanding which German leaders have shown of the importance and value of Soviet-German economic collaboration . . .

Our relations with *Italy* in the past two years have developed normally and in general favourably. In regard to commercial relations there has been a certain advance. The agreement concluded on 2 August last year, under which the Italian Government guaranteed long-term credits for orders placed by our State agencies in Italy, made it possible for us to expand our purchases in Italy considerably. The agreement was carried out in a shorter time than had been expected, and was even exceeded. At the same time Italy displays considerable interest in a number of our exports, such as oil, grain, coal, timber, etc. The development of our economic relations with Italy is the best proof of the possibility and the mutual advantageousness of trade between the USSR and capitalist countries, even though their socio-political systems are utterly opposed.

The re-animation of Soviet-Italian relations made it expedient to arrange a personal meeting between the Foreign Commissar, Comrade Litvinov, and the Italian Foreign Minister, Signor Grandi, for an exchange of views. As at the present time the greatest threat to peace is the creation of an anti-Soviet bloc of capitalist Powers, any rapprochement between the USSR and another country, the more when it is such an important country as Italy, is bound to serve the cause of peace . . .

In our relations with *Great Britain* since the last Soviet Congress there has been, as I have said, a marked change. The defeat of the Conservatives in the 1929 election was at the same time the defeat of their anti-Soviet policy . . . But we must bear in mind that the English Parliament, and part of the English press, is the scene of unceasing and bitterly hostile attacks on the USSR. In certain quarters, and particularly in the Conservative Party, everything is being done to bring about a break in Soviet-British relations. The Soviet Government must warn the Soviet Congress that it is necessary to follow the development of the situation in England with particular attention, for there, at the head of the anti-Soviet campaign and the movement for preparing intervention, stand the most influential leaders of the Conservative Party and former members of the English Government. If the wishes of this party and these persons are realized and they return to power, the cause of

universal peace will undoubtedly be jeopardized, for it is impossible not to see in these imperialist circles in England the direct organizers of intervention in the USSR, the direct organizers of a new world war. . . .

After what has already been said, I need not dwell in detail on our relations with *France*. Unfortunately it must be recognized that in Franco-Soviet relations is concealed an extremely serious and grave danger to the general peace. It is not for nothing that the French Government has persistently rejected our proposal for the conclusion of a non-aggression pact, as if the elimination of the danger of a violation of the peace were not in the French Government's field of interests. None the less we are ready to continue our efforts to strengthen our relations if we see that the French side is also sincerely ready to improve Franco-Soviet relations.

Relations between the USSR and *Poland*, unfortunately, still leave much to be desired. Although Poland accepted our proposal to sign the Moscow protocol, the efforts made more than once by the Soviet Government to consolidate Soviet-Polish relations have not met with the requisite response. On the other hand, as its direct neighbour, we cannot fail to note that at the last three sessions of the preparatory disarmament commission Poland has taken a determined and active part in turning down all Soviet and other proposals for the real reduction of armaments. . . .

The picture of international life would be incomplete if I did not mention another State, which until now has in our minds been more closely allied to the Middle Ages than to contemporary life. It is easy to guess that I am talking of the *Vatican*, which in the last few years has been trying to intervene actively in international affairs—to intervene, of course, in defence of the capitalists and landlords, the imperialists, the interventionists, the incendiarists of war. It has long been known that the Catholic fathers are chosen from among those who are able to do intelligence work for the general staffs. Now these gentlemen have shown a special zeal, not in prayers 'for the peace of the entire world', but in the organization of the anti-Soviet campaign at the order and in the pay of messieurs the capitalists. Since the Pope of Rome himself has recently stood openly at the head of certain anti-Soviet campaigns, then, clearly, it was not difficult to get, for example in England, the Archbishop of Canterbury to lead one dirty anti-Soviet campaign, and the Bishop of Durham to lead a no less abominable political campaign against the workers' and peasants' republic . . .

The struggle for peaceful conditions for the development of the Soviet Union is inseparably bound up with the struggle for general peace, and consequently inseparably bound up with the consolidation of fraternal relations with other peoples. In today's circumstances the struggle for

peace signifies the struggle against the growing preparations for anti-Soviet intervention and against their imperialist instigators. We speak openly to the workers of the Soviet Union and of all countries of the growing danger to peace. At the same time we express our unshakable conviction that an armed attack on the USSR now represents the chief danger for those who dare to break the peace and attack the Soviet Union.

TREATY OF COMMERCE AND NAVIGATION WITH TURKEY

16 *March* 1931 *Sobranie Zakonov*, 1931, ii, p. 491

The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the one part, and the Turkish Republic on the other, being desirous to consolidate the friendly relations so happily existing between them, and to promote the development of economic relations between the two countries, as well as to regulate the conditions of establishment of their nationals in the respective countries, have decided to conclude a treaty on trade and navigation, and have for this purpose appointed the following plenipotentiaries:

The Central Executive Committee of the USSR: Lev Karakhan, deputy People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs;

The President of the Turkish Republic: Hussein Ragib Bey, Turkish ambassador extraordinary to the USSR;

who, having presented their credentials, which were found to be in due and proper form, have agreed to the following provisions:

I.

Citizens of either contracting party shall have the right, on the same conditions as the citizens of any foreign country, to enter the territory of the other party, to move about there, to take up residence there, and to leave there, in so far as they observe the laws, rules, and regulations which are or shall be in force concerning the entry, movement, residence, and departure of foreigners in general.

It is understood, however, that the provisions of the present treaty do not invalidate either the right of each contracting party to permit or prohibit at its discretion immigration into its territory, or the regulations which are or may be in force in regard to passports, visas, and *permis de séjour*.

Each contracting party retains the right, either on the basis of a legal judgement, or in virtue of laws and administrative regulations, or from considerations of the internal or external security of the State, to forbid individual citizens of the other contracting party to stay on its territory, and to expel them for these reasons.

2.

Citizens of either of the contracting parties when entering or leaving the territory of the other party in accordance with the provisions of article 1 of this treaty, shall have the right to bring in and to take out their property destined for their personal and domestic use, while conforming with the laws and regulations in force on these matters in the country of import or export. In this connexion citizens of either of the contracting parties shall not be placed on a less favourable footing than that which is or may be established for citizens of the most-favoured nation.

3.

Citizens of either of the contracting parties residing on the territory of the other party are subject to the jurisdiction of the country of residence.

The said citizens shall have free access to the courts of all instances to seek and to defend their rights; in general they shall enjoy in regard to legal and judicial protection the rights which are or may be granted in the future to the citizens of the most-favoured nation.

Questions concerning surety for legal costs and legal assistance (facilities granted to poor persons) shall be settled, until a special agreement has been concluded, in accordance with the relevant legislation in force in each of the contracting countries.

Questions concerning family right and juridical competence, as well as the right of inheritance, whether testamentary or intestate, shall be the subject of a special agreement to be concluded between the contracting parties.

4.

Citizens of either of the contracting parties shall be exempt on the territory of the other party from any obligation to serve in the army, navy, or air force, in the militia, or in the national guard. They shall likewise be exempt from any dues, in money or kind, payable in commutation of service in the above-mentioned forces.

Likewise they shall be exempt from any obligatory official function, whether judicial, administrative, or municipal.

In the event of natural calamities, citizens of either of the contracting parties on the territory of the other party may be called on for labour service.

In regard to military service and requisitioning, as well as taxes and contributions for war purposes, citizens of one of the contracting parties shall not be subject on the territory of the other party to less favourable regulations than those which are or may be in force for citizens of the most-favoured nation.

5.

As regards the acquisition, possession, and disposition of all kinds of property, real and personal, the contracting parties shall reciprocally grant the citizens of the other party most-favoured-nation treatment.

6.

Citizens of either of the contracting parties who have entered the territory of the other party in accordance with the provisions of article 1 of this treaty may engage in industrial and commercial activities, intellectual and physical labour, on the same conditions as citizens of the most-favoured nation.

The contracting parties may reserve for their own citizens exclusively, in virtue of laws and regulations which are or may be in force on their territory, itinerant trades, hawking, and any other occupation or profession they think fit.

7.

Juridical persons of every kind established on the territory of either of the contracting parties in accordance with the laws in force there for the purpose of engaging in trade or industry, shall be recognized as juridical persons on the territory of the other party and in particular shall have the right to go to law both as claimants and defendants.

It is agreed that the above-mentioned stipulations do not affect the question whether a juridical person established on the territory of one of the contracting parties may or may not be permitted to engage in operations on the territory of the other party, which question shall always remain subject to the relevant legal regulations which are or may be in force on the territory of the latter.

Should the general legislation in force in either of the contracting States require a preliminary authorization for the admission of foreign juridical persons to engage in activities on its territory, the admission of each juridical person of either of the contracting parties to the territory of the other shall be subject to such preliminary authorization.

It is however agreed that in regard to the formalities required for the admission of juridical persons of either of the contracting parties to the territory of the other, the said juridical persons shall not be placed in a less favourable position than that in which juridical persons of the most-favoured nation are or may be placed.

It is agreed that juridical persons of either of the contracting parties who shall be admitted in accordance with the provisions of the present article to operate on the territory of the other party shall enjoy there most-favoured-nation treatment.

8.

Citizens of either of the contracting parties admitted to the territory of the other party shall not be subject there, either personally or in regard to their property or their activities, to any taxes or fees other or higher than those to which citizens of the most-favoured nation are or may be subject in the same circumstances.

Juridical persons established on the territory of either of the contracting parties and allowed to conduct operations on the territory of the other party shall not be subject there, either in regard to their property or their operations or in any other respect, to taxes or fees other or greater than those to which juridical persons with similar economic objects of the most-favoured nation allowed to engage in operations there are or may be subject in the same circumstances.

The provisions of the present article refer both to taxes and fees imposed for the benefit of the State, as well as to those imposed for the benefit of municipal authorities and corporations.

9.

Taking into consideration that foreign trade in the USSR is a State monopoly, the Government of the Turkish Republic grants the trade delegation of the USSR and its agencies referred to in articles 10 and 14 permission to carry out the following functions on Turkish territory:

(*a*) to superintend the interests of the USSR in regard to foreign trade;

(*b*) to regulate foreign trade and the exchange of goods between the USSR and Turkey in accordance with the provisions of the present treaty;

(*c*) to effect the foreign trade of the Government of the USSR and promote the development of trade relations between the USSR and Turkey.

10.

The trade delegation of the USSR in Turkey, situated in Ankara, forms a constituent part of the Embassy of the USSR in Turkey. The trade representative and his two deputies form part of the Embassy staff and enjoy personal immunity and the other privileges and prerogatives granted to members of diplomatic missions.

11.

The premises of the trade delegation in Ankara and the premises of its branch in Istanbul shall enjoy extra-territoriality.

This extra-territoriality shall be no impediment to the application of the provisions of article 12.

12.

Juridical actions of the trade delegation effected in Turkey and the economic consequences of these actions shall be treated according to Turkish law and shall be subject to Turkish jurisdiction.

Similarly property of the USSR in Turkey shall be liable to attachment except for articles destined for the use according to international law of the representation of the sovereignty of the country or for the official activities of diplomatic or consular representatives.

13.

Since the trade delegation of the USSR acts on behalf and on the account of the USSR, the Soviet Government assumes responsibility for all commercial contracts legally concluded in Turkey by the trade delegation or by persons duly authorized by it. However, the Government of the USSR assumes no responsibility for the activities of State economic organizations which, according to Soviet law, are solely responsible for their own acts, with the exception of cases where responsibility for such acts has been explicitly accepted by the trade delegation acting on behalf and on the account of the Government of the USSR. Turkey shall however enjoy in this connexion for so long as the present treaty is valid most-favoured-nation treatment.

14.

The contracting parties agree that the Soviet trade delegation in Turkey shall have the right to open branches in the following cities and ports of Turkey: Istanbul, Izmir, Trebizond, Mersin, Erzerum, Konia or Eski-Shekhir.

The opening of new branches shall be the subject of agreement between the two Governments.

15.

Should the Government of the Turkish Republic establish a trade delegation (or the post of commercial attaché or any other similar post) on the territory of the USSR with the purpose of promoting the development of trade relations between the two countries and also to superintend the economic interests of Turkey on Soviet territory, such delegation (or post) and its staff shall enjoy the same rights, privileges, and immunities

as are granted under articles 10 and 11 of the present treaty to the Soviet trade delegation in Turkey.

16.

Each of the contracting parties undertakes to apply to imports from or exports to the other party no restriction or prohibition which is not applied to all other countries, with the exception of prohibitions or restrictions established in connexion with public order and the protection of health, State security, plant and animal diseases; these restrictions shall be applied without distinction to countries similarly situated.

17.

Products of the soil and industry of either of the contracting parties shall be admitted in transit through the territory of the other party in accordance with the general legislation of the latter by ways open for transit in virtue of the general legislation of the country and shall be exempt from all transit dues on this territory.

Regardless of the provisions of the first paragraph of the present article the USSR agrees to grant the Turkish Republic the right of freedom of transit for goods of Turkish origin coming from Turkey and consigned via Batum to the countries of Asia, and likewise the right of freedom of transit for goods of Turkish origin coming from Turkey and consigned via Batum from the western vilayets of Turkey to its eastern vilayets and from the eastern vilayets of Turkey to its western vilayets.

18.

As regards the transportation of passengers, luggage, and goods by rail, by road, and by inland waterways, the contracting parties shall make no distinction between the inhabitants of the territories of the two parties.

It is understood that the provisions of the first paragraph of the present article shall not prejudice the right of both parties to fix charges at their own discretion for their own transport routes.

19.

Ships and vessels sailing under the flag of one of the contracting parties when entering in ballast or with cargo the waters and ports of the other party or when leaving them, regardless of the place from which they have come or of their destination, shall there enjoy in all respects the same treatment as local ships and vessels, and shall not be subject there to any other or higher dues or fees, however they may be called, imposed on behalf of or for the benefit of the State, the province, the municipality, or any other body authorized by the Government, than those which are or may be imposed on local ships and vessels.

Their cargoes, regardless of their origin or destination, shall not be subject to any other or greater charges or dues, and shall enjoy treatment no different from that to which they would be subject if they were imported or exported under the national flag.

Their passengers and the passengers' luggage shall likewise enjoy the same treatment as if they had travelled under the national flag.

Their crews shall enjoy the same treatment as the crews of the ships and vessels under the flag of the most-favoured nation.

20.

The privileges of national treatment granted by each of the contracting parties to the other under the provisions of article 19 shall not be extended to the services enumerated below, which shall continue to be regulated by the laws and regulations which are or may be in force in the respective countries:

1. coastal navigation;
2. fishing in the territorial waters of the contracting parties and in the Sea of Marmora; nor shall they be extended to special privileges which are or may be granted in regard to the products of fishing;
3. the privileges which either of the contracting parties grants or may grant to its nationals for the purpose of encouraging the development of its merchant navy, either by way of premiums or subsidies on the construction or acquisition of merchant vessels, or by premiums or other encouragement to the merchant navy;
4. the privileges granted to water sports associations;
5. the exercise of the maritime services of ports, roadsteads, and shores, the exercise of the rescue and maritime assistance services, as well as the piloting and towing services;
6. the employment of pilots;
7. the reduction of lighthouse dues granted by the Government of the Turkish Republic to vessels flying the national flag and making regular journeys for carrying the Turkish post between Turkish ports.

21.

The nationality of the ships and vessels shall be recognized by one party and the other on the basis of documents and certificates issued by the competent authorities of the respective State in accordance with the laws and regulations of that country.

The contracting parties undertake to conclude a special agreement on the reciprocal recognition of ships' papers certifying the technical state of the vessel and its register, namely: bills of measurement, certificates of seaworthiness, etc. Until such an agreement is concluded the

parties undertake mutually to recognize the above-mentioned ships' documents duly issued by either of the contracting parties.

22.

Vessels of either of the contracting parties may enter one or more ports of the other party both for the complete or partial unloading of their cargoes, goods, and passengers brought from abroad, and for the complete or partial loading there of cargoes, goods, and passengers destined for abroad.

23.

In cases of shipwreck, running aground, maritime disaster, or the compulsory entry of the vessels of one of the contracting parties into the waters of the other, the vessel and its cargo shall enjoy the same privileges and immunities as are granted in similar circumstances by the laws and regulations of the respective country to its own vessels. Assistance and aid shall be given to the captain, crew, and passengers, both personally and in regard to their vessel and cargo, to the same extent as to nationals.

In regard to fees for rescue operations, the legislation of the country where the rescue occurred shall be applicable as it is applied to national ships and vessels.

Goods saved from the vessel which has run aground or suffered shipwreck shall not be subject to any customs duties so long as they are not imported into the country for internal consumption.

24.

Products of the soil and industry of Soviet origin imported directly from the USSR shall not throughout the period of validity of the present treaty be subject upon importation into Turkey to any customs duties, including coefficients, or to any other import dues, other or greater than those which are or may be imposed on similar products from any third country.

25.

Products of the soil and industry of Turkish origin imported directly from Turkey shall not throughout the period of validity of the present treaty be subject upon importation into the USSR to any customs duties, including coefficients, or to any other import dues, other or greater than those which are or may be imposed on similar products from any third country.

26.

Internal dues, fees, and taxes which are or may be imposed on the territory of one of the contracting parties for the benefit of the State,

municipal authorities or corporations, on the production, sale, consumption, or transport of any goods, shall not be higher or more onerous in regard to goods which are the product of the soil and industry of the other party than those imposed on similar goods of local origin or, in the absence of similar local products, on the products of third countries which are or may be in the future on a most-favoured-nation basis.

27.

In regard to guarantees, the method of collecting customs, and other customs formalities concerned with imports and exports, each of the contracting parties grants the other the enjoyment of all privileges which it grants or may in the future grant to any third country.

28.

Each of the contracting parties retains the right to demand, upon the import of the products of the soil and industry of the other party, a certificate of origin attesting that the merchandise imported was produced on the territory of the given party, or that it is to be regarded as such because of the processing which it has undergone there.

Certificates of origin of Soviet merchandise shall be issued in the USSR by the People's Commissariats for Foreign Trade and for Supplies and their agencies, as well as by Soviet Chambers of Commerce, and certificates of origin for Turkish merchandise by the Ministry of National Economy and its local agencies, as well as by Turkish Chambers of Commerce.

The form of the certificate of origin of merchandise exported from the USSR to Turkey and imported from Turkey into the USSR, shall be laid down by mutual agreement between the two parties.

The attesting and legalization of the said certificates of origin shall be effected by the competent agencies of the respective parties in accordance with the regulations in force at the time the present treaty is signed on the territory of that party importing the merchandise mentioned in the certificates.

In all questions concerning the issue and legalization of certificates of origin, the contracting parties agree to apply the most-favoured-nation formula.

29.

The provisions of the present treaty in regard to most-favoured-nation treatment shall not extend to:

1. privileges which either of the contracting parties grants or may in the future grant to States on their frontiers to facilitate trade in the frontier region;

2. obligations which may be imposed on either of the contracting parties by a customs union;
3. special privileges which the USSR has granted or may in the future grant to countries whose territory before 1 August 1914 formed part of the former Russian Empire;
4. special privileges, both those now in force and those which may in the future be agreed upon between Turkey and countries which separated from the Ottoman Empire in 1923.

30.

The present treaty is subject to ratification and the exchange of ratifications shall take place in Ankara as soon as possible.

The said treaty enters into force within one month from the exchange of ratifications.

At the end of one year from its entry into force either of the contracting parties may notify the other of its intention to denounce the treaty, but the treaty shall remain in force for six months from the day of such notification by either of the contracting parties.

The contracting parties may agree to another period during which the treaty is to remain in force.

In witness whereof the above-mentioned plenipotentiaries have signed this treaty and affixed thereto their seals.

Done in two copies in Moscow, 16 March 1931.

Final Protocol

At the moment of signing the treaty on trade and navigation concluded this day between the USSR and Turkey, the undersigned plenipotentiaries made the following reservations and declarations, which form an inseparable part of the said treaty.

Ad article 1.

(i) It is understood that, regardless of the other provisions of the present treaty, the provisions of this article do not limit the freedom of either of the contracting parties to make special regulations for entry into various parts of their territory, if such regulations are applied to the citizens of all other countries.

(ii) The Government of the Turkish Republic declares that in regard to the regulations protecting the home labour market the provisions of the second paragraph of article 6 retain validity.

Ad article 7.

(i) The provisions of article 7 shall not be extended to the trade delegation of the USSR in Turkey or its agents, in regard to whom the regime is set forth in articles 9 to 14 of the present treaty.

(ii) The provisions of articles 3, 4, and 5 of the present treaty shall be correspondingly applied to juridical persons of either party on the territory of the other.

Ad articles 7, 8, & 13.

The expression 'juridical persons' is understood to mean, on the one hand, Turkish commercial, industrial, financial, transport, and all other kinds of companies pursuing economic ends, and, on the other, Soviet commercial, industrial, financial, transport, and all other kinds of organizations pursuing economic ends.

Ad article 16.

The Government of the USSR declares that all the measures it has promulgated concerning the prohibition of the export of arms, ammunition, instruments of war, or, as an exception, any other military supplies, may be applied to the Turkish Republic only if they are extended to all foreign countries without exception.

Ad article 17.

(i) It is agreed that the USSR retains the right, in regard to the transit of the products of the soil and industry of Turkey by the ways mentioned in article 17, to request on the arrival of these products in Soviet territory the presentation of certificates of origin attesting that those products are the products of the soil and industry of Turkey. Certificates of origin shall be issued by the Ministry of National Economy and its local agencies, and also by Turkish Chambers of Commerce.

The said certificates shall be endorsed in Turkey by the trade delegation of the USSR or its agencies, and in localities where these do not exist by the consular institutions of the USSR.

(ii) It is understood that the provisions of article 17 do not extend to goods the import of which into its territory is prohibited by the legislation of the respective country.

(ii) Regardless of the provisions of article 17, the USSR agrees to grant Turkey, in accordance with Soviet regulations in force in this connexion, the right of transit for goods going from the western to the eastern vilayets of Turkey and produced in foreign countries which have commercial agreements with the USSR.

Ad article 18.

In regard to the transport of goods of either of the contracting parties by the railways of the other party, the charges to be made shall be the

lowest made in the same conditions on the same route and in the same direction.

To facilitate and promote mutual economic relations between the two countries the contracting parties agree to open negotiations to establish direct communication, without re-loading for merchandise or changing for passengers, between the USSR and Turkey across the Caucasian frontier.

Ad article 19.

The contracting parties agree to instruct the competent bodies to observe strictly the notification to the other party of all changes on the waters washing the shores of the respective State, such as the position of buoys, changes in lighthouse service, etc.

Ad article 25.

Turkish dried grapes (sultanas) shall not be subject in the USSR to customs duties or other dues, additional taxes or coefficients of increase or to any treatment less favourable than that which is or may in the future be accorded to currants.

Ad article 27.

It is understood that such articles as cases, bags, and other kinds of packing material imported from the USSR to Turkey and consigned to the trade delegation and economic organizations of the USSR for packing goods bought by them in Turkey shall not be subject to the payment of customs duties if these articles are re-exported within six months. Upon their import they shall be subject to a conditional payment of a fee equal to the customs duty applicable in such instances, which shall be refunded when they are sent back within the said time limit on its being established that they are identical with the imported articles.

Ad article 28.

The term 'processing' used in the first paragraph of article 28 implies an increase of 50 per cent in the original value of the article of foreign origin as a result of operations, manipulations, or improvements effected after its import into the territory of either of the two countries.

CREDIT AGREEMENT WITH GERMANY

14 *April* 1931 — *Foreign Economic Relations*, p. 31

The following is a brief summary of the agreement entered into between the German industrial representatives and the Soviet Supreme Economic Council of 14 April 1931. This agreement was signed by Piatakov,

Lubimov, and Bitker on behalf of the Soviet Government, and by Kraemer, Koettgen, and Reuter on behalf of the German industrialists.

The Supreme Economic Council of the USSR during the period from 15 April 1931, to 31 August 1931, is to place with German firms new orders amounting to about 300 million marks in addition to the normal business done between Germany and Russia.

These additional orders are subject to the stipulations laid down in the new agreement or to be decided upon in conjunction with the German suppliers, with regard to technical conditions, prices and dates of delivery. The Supreme Economic Council undertakes to place all orders under the terms of this Agreement not later than 31 August 1931. The Soviet Delegation in Germany is to countersign all orders placed in Germany by Soviet organizations and takes responsibility in respect of these contracts according to Clause 9 of the German-Soviet Economic Agreement of 12 October 1925.[1]

Orders placed under the present agreement are subject to the following conditions of credit and payment:

(*a*) For orders in respect of which twelve months' credit has hitherto been granted:

20 per cent by bill of exchange with order payable 27 months after delivery.

55 per cent by bill of exchange on delivery—payable in 13 months.

The remaining 25 per cent by bill of exchange on delivery payable in 17 months.

This means an average credit of 14 months.

(*b*) In respect of orders upon which up to the present time 18 months' credit has been granted:

20 per cent by bill of exchange with order—payable 20 months after date of delivery.

55 per cent by bill of exchange on delivery—payable in 20 months.

The remaining 25 per cent by bill of exchange on delivery—payable in 24 months.

The average credit on these orders will thus be 21 months.

(*c*) In respect of orders for which 24 months' credit has previously been given:

20 per cent by bill of exchange with order—payable 27 months after delivery.

50 per cent by bill of exchange on delivery, payable in 33 months.

30 per cent by bill of exchange on delivery, payable in 33 months.

The average credit on these orders will thus be—28·8 months.

[1] *League of Nations Treaty Series*, lvii. 7.

(*d*) Interest is to be charged quarterly and paid either in cash or by six months' acceptances. Upon these acceptances interest of 2 per cent above the German State Bank rate of discount is to be paid. All acceptances in respect of advance credits are to be free of interest during the first three months.

The rate of interest on acceptances shall be the rate of discount of the German State Bank on the date upon which the acceptance is drawn.

Agreements with regard to payments and acceptances must be made within the period for which the special agreement is made.

The present agreement does not alter any obligations entered into under the general agreement between Russia and Germany.

All contracts to be concluded under the present agreement between the dates of 15 April and 31 August 1931 are subject to the terms of this agreement.

In the event of a German firm, upon entering into a contract concerning delivery, requesting that Berlin should be stipulated as the place of jurisdiction, neither the Soviet organization placing the order nor the Trade Delegation of the USSR in Germany shall object to this stipulation in so far as it concerns contracts entered into under the present agreement.

The Supreme Economic Council of the USSR shall reserve the full right of placing orders with any German firms it chooses. At the same time, German firms have the right to decide whether they are willing to accept orders on the conditions of the present agreement and to what extent.

The Trade Delegation of the Soviet Union is shortly to enter into negotiations with German economic organizations with regard to a revision of the terms of delivery of 9 February 1927, particularly in relation to inspection and erection. In the meantime the present terms of delivery stipulated by the Trade Delegation of the USSR in Germany shall remain in force.

REPLY FROM LITVINOV TO THE COMMUNICATION OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS ON THE AGENDA OF THE COMMISSION OF ENQUIRY FOR EUROPEAN UNION

23 *April* 1931

League of Nations Official Journal, 1931, p. 943
Dokumenty, ii, p. 62

I have received the letter dated 1 April[1] in which you were good enough to inform me that the third session of the Commission of Enquiry for European Union will open on Friday, 15 May 1931, at 11 a.m., at the Secretariat of the League of Nations.

[1] League of Nations, 1931, vii, C. 395, M. 158, pp. 71, 75.

You enclosed with your letter the provisional agenda of the session, consisting of three items:

I. Report of the Organization Sub-Committee on the Constitution, Organisation and Procedure of the Commission;

II. Proposal regarding the Participation of the Free City of Danzig in Certain of the Commission's Proceedings;

III. Economic Questions: The World Economic Crisis in so far as it affects Europe as a Whole.

A note to item III states that, in accordance with the decision of the Commission of Enquiry at its meeting on 19 January 1931, the Governments of Iceland, Turkey and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics will be represented during the Commission's discussions on this item of the agenda.

Is it to be inferred from this statement that the three countries mentioned are not to be represented during the discussions on the first two items of the agenda? It seems to me that such an interpretation would be inconsistent with the previous decision of the Commission of Enquiry. This decision stated that the Commission had decided 'to study the world economic crisis in so far as it affects the European countries as a whole, and to invite, through the Secretary-General, the Governments of Iceland, Turkey and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, to participate in this study'. So long as the Commission has not placed any other question on its agenda, this decision means that the three countries mentioned are taking part in all the Commission's proceedings. But a country which is taking part in all the proceedings of a Commission is entitled to express its views as to the form of organisation of the Commission, its constitution, its composition and its methods of operation, because these various questions of procedure are bound to influence the lines on which the Commission will work, and even its actual decisions. This right is unquestionable, unless the participation of any particular country has been limited to certain specified questions; but the Commission of Enquiry for European Union has not taken any such decision in respect of the Soviet Union, Turkey or Iceland.

If, therefore, the decision of the Organisation Sub-Committee means that the three countries in question will be excluded from the discussions on the first two items of the agenda, that decision is necessarily inconsistent with the decision reached by the Commission of Enquiry on 19 January; or else it means that the Sub-Committee is settling in advance a question which was, to say the least of it, still open—*viz.*, that of the participation of three European countries in the examination of any material problems which the Commission of Enquiry might

subsequently place upon its agenda. If this latter point is answered in the affirmative, the three countries 'invited' are indisputably entitled to take part in the settlement of questions of procedure. In excluding the three countries from the debate on these questions, the Organisation Sub-Committee is clearly acting on the assumption that those countries are only to be associated in the decisions on certain problems, and not on all the problems with which the Commission of Enquiry has to deal. I do not see, however, on what that assumption is based.

Attributing a restrictive sense to the Organisation Sub-Committee's decision, you thought it necessary, Sir, to inform me that you could not state exactly when the Commission would begin its examination of item III of the provisional agenda—doubtless assuming that the delegation of the Soviet Union was only to arrive in Geneva in time for that date. I regret to observe also that you do not state by whom that date will be determined. In other words, you invite the delegations of three European States to come to Geneva without giving them any exact date. Whereas, on receiving your first invitation to the European Commission, I had to call attention to the obscurity and ambiguity of the decision reached by the Commission on 19 January and to say that the delegates of the 'invited' States would have to proceed to Geneva to ascertain more definitely the meaning of the invitation, I am now obliged, after your second communication, to observe that the delegates of the 'invited' States are asked to come to Geneva to ascertain also the date of the invitation. It would be hard, I think, to find any other instance of such a method of invitation, whether in Europe or elsewhere. Such invitations might be objectively interpreted as designed to provoke a refusal on the part of those invited, were it not necessary to allow for the sincerity and frankness which is absolutely essential in the organisers of so vital a cause as that of the unification of Europe.

Trusting that you will be good enough to bring the foregoing to the notice of the organisers of the third session of the Commission of Enquiry for European Union, I have the honour to inform you that the delegation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics will hold itself in readiness to arrive at Geneva between 15 and 25 May, and will await notice of the exact date on which it is invited to proceed thither; I must ask you to note that the delegation cannot travel from Moscow to Geneva in less than four days following the receipt of such notice.

AGREEMENT WITH ITALY ON STATE GUARANTEES FOR ITALIAN EXPORTS TO THE USSR

28 *April* 1931 *Foreign Economic Relations*, p. 27

1.

The Italian Government gives as from this date Italian exporters the pledge of State guarantee (as mentioned in the Royal Decree of 7 June 1927, No. 1046, altered and put into force on 14 June 1928, No. 1417) up to 350 million lire including interest for delays in payment on orders for Italian goods placed during 1931 by the People's Commissariat for Foreign Trade through Soviet Trade Representation in Italy. The limit of 350 million lire may be extended by agreement between Italian and Soviet governments. This guarantee is subject to the following general and specific conditions:

(*a*) The object of the guarantee consists in providing liquid credits for the purpose of exporting Italian goods to the Soviet Union.

(*b*) The extent of the Italian State guarantee is to be established at 75 per cent of the total value of each supply, including interest for delays in payment, according to the Royal Decree-Law of 22 August 1930, No. 1404;

(*c*) To all guarantees provided for under the agreement may be extended the general benefit of derogation mentioned in the Royal Decree-Law of 24 October 1929, with the limitation of the obligatory uncovered amount incumbent on suppliers up to 15 per cent of the total value of orders.

Thus the guarantee holds good for every payment, after preliminary deduction of the obligatory uncovered amount from the last payment, or, should this be insufficient, from the payments immediately preceding it.

2.

Above-mentioned orders by Soviet Trade Representation will be allotted to categories of goods as in Table 1, appended to this Agreement. It is understood that orders for steamship supplies cannot exceed 100 million lire.

3.

Payments by USSR will as a rule be made in instalments. The maximum and average terms for such payments on all categories of goods are mentioned in Table 1 appended to this Agreement, while the average payment (to wit, 250 million lire), on orders for all categories of goods in their totality, with the exception of steamships, will be 25

months from day of delivery; if orders on steamships do not exceed 100 million lire, leaving in force the above-mentioned average term of 25 months for 250 million, the difference between the maximum sum set aside for steamship orders and the actual sum paid, may be used for other goods of any sort, on the terms of payment set down in Table 1, irrespective of the above-mentioned average credit of 25 months; terms of payment for other categories of goods not provided for under this Agreement will be established by agreements between the Italian Ministry of Finance and the Soviet Trade Representation in Italy.

4.

The premium corresponding to the guarantee will be established each year according to the amount laid down in Table 2 appended to this Agreement.

5.

Replies to demands of conversion of the state pledge into an effective guarantee will be given to firms applying in not more than 20 days after they are received.

6.

Soviet Trade Representation in Italy reserves to itself absolute freedom of choice among supplying firms.

7.

Orders provided for under this Agreement will be placed on the Italian market given the same technical and commercial conditions as offered by other countries for such goods.

8.

The Italian government organs will recommend Italian firms and enterprises interested, to offer technical aid to industrial organizations and enterprises in USSR.

9.

This Agreement, which will remain in force during 1931, will be considered as renewed for another year unless notice of denunciation is given three months before its expiration, but the Italian government may consider it null by the end of the current year and before the expiration of the term fixed for declaration of denunciation, if during this period the Soviet Trade Representation does not place orders up to 75 per cent of the sum provided for in Clause 1. Orders placed and formulated between 1 January and 20 April 1931, will be included in

the total sum of 350 million lire, but the conditions of the Agreement of 2 August 1930, will be applied to them. The Agreement of 2 August is considered null and void and completely substituted by this Agreement.

EXTRACTS FROM A PROTEST AGAINST THE ANTI-SOVIET CAMPAIGN IN FINLAND: NOTE FROM KRESTINSKY, VICE-COMMISSAR FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS, TO THE FINNISH CHARGÉ D'AFFAIRES

17 *May* 1931 *Izvestia*, 19 *May* 1931

1. Despite frequent warnings by representatives of the Soviet Government, both to Helsingfors and to the Finnish diplomatic mission in Moscow, since the summer of last year, the campaign of enmity and hatred against the Soviet Union in Finland is continuing and growing stronger.

This propaganda is carried on at meetings and in the press and acquires a more serious character from the fact that the Finnish organizations and persons who conduct it receive support from official Finnish institutions. Recently this campaign has been accompanied in particular by the systematic advocacy, both printed and oral, by various Finnish organizations and persons, of the annexation of the Karelian Autonomous USSR and certain areas in the Leningrad district; certain circles have gone so far as to advocate the annexation to Finland of the entire northern part of the Soviet Union as far as the Urals . . .

I shall not enumerate all the examples of this kind, since those already cited are enough to show that the aggressive campaign for annexing parts of the territory of the Soviet Union has become a direct threat to peaceful relations between the Soviet Union and Finland, and to peace in general.

2. The propaganda against the Soviet Union referred to in paragraph 1 has been particularly marked in the slanderous campaign now being conducted in Finland about alleged persecution of the Ingrians in the Soviet Union. The Soviet Government notes that the desire of the working masses of the Finnish peasantry settled in part of the Leningrad district to improve their material position by reconstructing their farms on more progressive socialist lines (collective farms, established voluntarily in the USSR by the working peasants themselves) was used by Finnish organizations hostile to the Soviet Union for a new anti-Soviet offensive in which information known to be false was used. This was not opposed by the Finnish Government, although it was informed of the true state of affairs. Moreover, by its entire attitude the Government of Finland by giving a friendly reception to the various deputations and

petitions from organizations of whose anti-Soviet character it was well aware, by giving permission for collections to be taken up to further this campaign about Ingria, and by granting a Government subsidy to the so-called Ingrian Union, etc., helped to create in the minds of the public in Finland false ideas about the position of the Finnish peasantry living in the Leningrad district and fostered the anti-Soviet atmosphere in Finland.

3. This hostile atmosphere has placed the plenipotentiary representative of the USSR in Finland in a position which makes it difficult for him to exercise his functions in the customary manner. It leads not only to individual acts of hooliganism against the plenipotentiary representative, of which the Foreign Minister of Finland is aware, but also to acts of organized aggression, such as the hostile demonstration in front of the Embassy premises on 12 May this year, which was held with the permission of the authorities, who limited themselves to sending a few dozen police, passive witnesses of the demonstration.

The attitude of Finnish Government bodies to the Soviet Embassy in Finland is illustrated, apart from the events described above, by such actions as the withdrawal of Finnish citizenship from persons who worked in the Soviet consulate in Vyborg as porters, and by the intolerable and wholly unfounded assertion of the Abo High Court prosecutor in an appeal to the Supreme Court that the Soviet plenipotentiary envoy in Finland financed one of those accused of communist agitation.

The complete inactivity of the Finnish authorities in regard to persons and organizations directing and executing hostile acts against the Soviet Embassy can be interpreted by these persons and organizations only as the Finnish Government's consenting to them, and as encouragement to further sallies and demonstrations against the Soviet Embassy. In this connexion the Soviet Government is compelled to note the regrettable fact that the Acting Foreign Minister M. Kukkonen in his reply to the Soviet plenipotentiary envoy's representations of 13 May[1] did not find it possible to promise to take steps to prevent the repetition of demonstrations against the Embassy such as occurred on 12 May.

4. The atmosphere of immunity for persons and organizations committing acts of hostility against the Soviet Union is further illustrated by the fact that, despite repeated assurances by the Finnish Government, to be found in particular in the public statement in the Finnish Government's communiqué of 28 January of this year, persons guilty of violating the Soviet-Finnish frontier by the forcible expulsion on to Soviet territory of a number of Finnish citizens have either not yet been made to answer for their actions in a Finnish court, or have been in effect exempt from punishment by the imposition of conditional sentences for brief periods.

[1] *Izvestia*, 15 May 1931.

5. Although the Finnish Government has more than once expressed its desire to expand trade between Finland and the USSR, the campaign waged against Soviet-Finnish trade from the very beginning of the so-called Lapua movement, accompanied, as everybody knows, by numerous illegal and hooligan acts against both Soviet commercial bodies and Finnish firms trading with the Soviet Union, has met no opposition from the Finnish authorities. Moreover, until now the Finnish Government has not considered it necessary to come out publicly even with an expression of disapproval of this campaign, which is not only paralysing Soviet-Finnish trade but reacts unfavourably on relations between the two States.

In view of the foregoing I protest emphatically in the name of my Government against the actions of the Finnish Government noted above, and in particular against the allowing of systematic propaganda in favour of the alienation of parts of the Soviet Union carried on by organizations enjoying the support and subsidies of the Finnish Government, and also against the allowing by the Finnish authorities of an anti-Soviet demonstration before the Embassy of the USSR in Helsingfors. At the same time the Soviet Government places on the Finnish Government entire responsibility for the situation created by its actions in the relations between the two States.

DRAFT PROTOCOL OF A PACT OF ECONOMIC NON-AGGRESSION SUBMITTED BY THE SOVIET DELEGATION TO THE COMMISSION OF ENQUIRY ON EUROPEAN UNION

18 *May* 1931

League of Nations vii, 7, p. 89
Dokumenty, ii, p. 75

The representatives of the undersigned European countries, Recognizing that:

(*a*) The mitigation of the crisis which has overtaken the national economy of most countries requires, in addition to abstention from war as a means for the solution of international conflicts, the complete cessation of all forms of economic aggression, both avowed and concealed, by any countries or groups of countries, against any other countries or groups of countries;

(*b*) The cessation of economic aggression is an essential condition for the peaceful co-operation of States in the sphere of economics, irrespective of their political-economic systems;

(*c*) The cessation of economic aggression would help to put an end to the present atmosphere of mistrust, uncertainty, and alarm, weighing so heavily upon the economic position;

And hoping that all other countries inspired by their example will join this Protocol,

Have decided to recommend their Governments to sign the following Protocol:

1. The contracting parties once more solemnly confirm the principle, proclaimed at the International Economic Conference of 1927, of the peaceful coexistence of countries, irrespective of their social-political and economic systems.
2. The parties undertake in their mutual relations to forgo any discrimination whatever, and to regard as incompatible with the principles of the present Protocol the adoption and application in their respective countries of a special system directed against one or more of the countries signing the present Protocol or not applicable to all other countries.

This Protocol will be ratified and come into force between those of the contracting parties who give in their ratification papers to the President of the Commission for the study of a European Union.

This Protocol may be subscribed to by all States in the world. Notification of adherence will be given to the President of the Commission for the study of a European Union, and it will immediately come into force between the State subscribing to it, and all other parties to it.

The President of the Commission for the study of a European Union will notify all parties to the Protocol of every new ratification or of every adherent, as soon as ratification papers have been received.

STATEMENT BY LITVINOV ON THE SOVIET DRAFT FOR A PACT OF ECONOMIC NON-AGGRESSION

21 *May* 1931 — League of Nations, 1931, VII, 7, p 66

It seems to me that the statement[1] I made here on Monday last is sufficient explanation of the necessity for the Protocol before you. You are not likely to ask that I should recapitulate that statement, or go into further details. I do not think it would tend to create a suitable atmosphere for the discussion of an instrument such as the proposed Protocol for me to cite examples of the way in which various countries have so far acted contrary to the spirit of this Protocol.

I propose in this Protocol the adoption of certain general principles which should dominate the economic relations between countries, principles which are essential for that economic collaboration of European countries which is the avowed aim of this Commission.

[1] League of Nations, 1931, VII, 7, 30.

What would be the obligations undertaken by the Governments in signing this Protocol? Briefly summarised, they amount to the abstention from hostile measures in the economic sphere against any country or group of countries from political or other motives—in other words, to declare economic war illegal. It is this that entitles me to compare this Protocol to pacts of political non-aggression,

To avoid misunderstanding, I should like to say at once the adoption of this Protocol would in no way deprive any country of the right to conclude commercial treaties or other economic arrangements based on mutual concessions and privileges. Our object is the prevention of discrimination between countries—that is to say, the singling out of one or more countries as the object of hostile legislative or administrative measures, which are not applied to other countries.

The Protocol has a special bearing upon the relationship between the Soviet Union and the rest of European countries. It would be fresh confirmation of the principle adopted by the 1927 Conference, as to the peaceful coexistence, at the given historical stage, of two economic systems. This confirmation is the more necessary in that many countries have so far acted directly contrary to this principle. Accusations of economic discrimination between countries for political motives have been made against the Soviet Government, and no clearer refutation of these accusations could be given than the proposed Protocol. The economic policy of every country must, of course, be based upon mutuality, and this mutuality would be secured for all by the signing of the Protocol.

The Sub-Committee did not find it necessary to recommend any special procedure for dealing with this question, and decided to leave it to the Commission of Enquiry to form its own judgment as to the substance of the Protocol. Some delegates have expressed doubts whether the members of the Commission of Enquiry will feel authorized to sign the Protocol immediately. The argument was advanced that the Protocol came as a surprise, and was not known to the various Governments before the present session of this Commission. As to this, I would say that many other resolutions introduced at this session (including the proposals of the French delegation), had not been circulated or made public beforehand, while the principles involved in the Protocol are not nearly so controversial and complicated.

I would venture to say that spontaneity is most essential in all matters regarding non-aggression and general peace. If a man has to take his time before answering a question as to his peaceful or hostile intentions, that answer loses much of its weight, even if it affirms his good will. There are assembled here the Foreign Ministers of nearly all European countries, who know the policy of their Governments, who know whether or not the principles involved in the Protocol fit in with

this policy, and there seems to me no adequate reason why the question should not be settled on the spot. Our Chairman said the other day that a great thing would be achieved by the signing of an economic pact of non-aggression. For my part, knowing as I do the peaceful policy of my Government, I am ready to sign it immediately. Would it be too much to ask the representatives of other Governments to define their attitude?

SOVIET REPLY TO THE FINNISH PROTEST AGAINST THE EXPULSION OF FINNS FROM INGRIA: NOTE FROM KRESTINSKY TO THE FINNISH CHARGÉ D'AFFAIRES IN MOSCOW

24 *May* 1931 — *Izvestia*, 26 *May* 1931

In acknowledgement of your note dated 16 May 1931[1] I have the honour to explain as follows:

1. The declaration[2] made by the chairman of the Russian delegation at the Dorpat peace conference on 14 October 1920 and quoted in your note was, as is evident from the protocol, the reply to a request from the Finnish side that it be explained 'how Soviet Russia intended to apply to the Ingrian population the principles laid down in the second part of section eleven (para. 11) of the Constitution of the Soviet Government', and as such it bore a purely informative character in the sense of elucidating the question of the enjoyment by the Finnish population of the former Petrograd province of the rights granted under the laws of the RSFSR to national minorities inhabiting the territory of the latter.

The Union Government is therefore compelled to reject the attempt made in your note to deduce from that statement any rights whatsoever for the Government of Finland, and in particular the right to watch over the application to the Finnish population in the Leningrad region of Soviet laws concerning nationalities in the USSR or to enter into negotiation with the Government of the Soviet Union on this question.

2. Affirming that the realization by the Soviet Union of its internal economic policy and the realization by the labouring masses of the Soviet Union of measures for the advancement of their national economy are the affair of the USSR and the peoples of the Union, in view of which they may not be made the subject of diplomatic discussion with foreign States, still less of interference, and seeing from your note of 16 May that the Government of Finland itself is aware of this, I am compelled to state that the approach made in your note is precisely such an interference in the internal affairs of the USSR and cannot therefore be subject to investigation in substance.

[1] *The Times*, 20 May 1931. [2] *League of Nations Treaty Series*, iii, p. 59.

3. While denying to the Government of Finland any right whatsoever to approach the Government of the USSR on questions affecting the Finnish population of the Leningrad region, on the grounds advanced above in paras. 1 and 2 of this note, the Government of the USSR none the less considers it necessary to explain the following, in order to deprive the Government of Finland once and for all of the possibility of appealing to its lack of information to justify the neglect—to say the least—which it shows with regard to the unrestrained anti-Soviet campaign conducted by elements hostile to the USSR:

The Finnish population of the former Petrograd province enjoys, now as previously, in common with all other nationalities in all parts of the Soviet Union, all the rights granted to nationalities of the USSR under its laws.

If in their endeavours to improve their material well-being the vast majority of the Finnish peasants of the Leningrad region go over to collective forms of agriculture, like their Russian neighbours, and by decisions taken in their rural meetings proceed to cast out from their midst the kulaks who constitute an insignificant part of the population and who attempt by all means, including the use of terror, to hinder the advancement of the material and cultural level of the vast majority of the Finnish peasantry, one cannot, if one approaches the matter in any impartial manner, see in these measures of self-defence taken by the people themselves any more infringement of the rights of the Finnish population than in the juridical and administrative punishment of criminal and treasonable elements from among the same people.

4. The dispatch and publication by the Government of Finland of its note of 16 May of this year amounts in fact to political support for the counter-revolutionary struggle of an insignificant group of kulaks in the Leningrad region against the change-over made by the whole population to new and more advanced forms of agriculture, and constitutes interference in the internal affairs of the USSR.

The Union Government cannot permit such interference in the internal affairs of the USSR and is compelled formally to reject the entire démarche of the Government of Finland and to protest against such interference by the Government of Finland in the internal affairs of the USSR.

TASS STATEMENT ON THE EXCHANGE OF NOTES CONCERNING THE ANTI-SOVIET CAMPAIGN IN FINLAND

24 *June* 1931 *Izvestia*, 24 *June* 1931

On 4 June the Finnish chargé d'affaires in Moscow transmitted to the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs a note in answer to the notes sent to Finland by the Soviet Government on 17 and 24 May and already published.

The note states that the Soviet communication of 24 May has not changed the views expressed by the Finnish Government in its note of 16 May. As regards the note of 17 May, the Finnish Government does not, in its reply, touch upon the substance of the facts adduced in the note and which were the basis of the Soviet Government's protest.

The Finnish Government fails to state its attitude regarding the aspects of the anti-Soviet campaign dealt with in the Soviet note, including the propaganda being conducted in Finland for the annexation of certain parts of the Soviet Union. The Finnish Government confines itself to the statement that the accusations contained in the note of 17 May are 'in part devoid of foundation and in part clearly based on error or exaggeration'. The note denies that the Finnish Government has 'assisted in any way the unfavourable development of the relations between the two countries', and suggests that a further exchange of notes on the questions touched upon in the notes of the Union Government cannot, in the opinion of Finland, lead to any favourable results.

In answer to this note the Vice-Commissar for Foreign Affairs, N. N. Krestinsky, sent the following note to M. Westerlund, Finnish chargé d'affaires in Moscow:

Confirming the receipt of your note of the 4th of this month addressed to People's Commissar M. M. Litvinov, may I ask you to bring the following to the attention of your Government:

The Union Government construes your note to mean that the Finnish Government, notwithstanding the protests of the Union Government set forth in the notes of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, retains its former attitude on the questions which served as the subject of the recent correspondence between the two Governments, and consequently will as before continue to permit the campaign of enmity and hatred which has been carried on for a long time in Finland against the Soviet Union, and which is a threat to the existing relations between the two States.

The Union Government is compelled, in view of this, to draw the conclusion that responsibility for any consequences arising from the situation thus created rests entirely on the Finnish Government.

TASS STATEMENT ON THE POLISH PROPOSAL OF A NON-AGGRESSION PACT

27 *August* 1931 *Izvestia*, 27 *August* 1931

On 23 August the Polish ambassador, M. Patek, presented to the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs a document reproducing the Soviet draft of a non-aggression pact presented in 1926 to the Polish Government by the Soviet plenipotentiary envoy, the late M. Voikov. The document also contains an exposition of the conditions on which, in 1926 7, the Polish Government made the conclusion of a non-aggression pact with the USSR dependent, and which the Soviet Government considered unacceptable and irrelevant to the pact. As is known, as a result of these conditions negotiations were in fact discontinued in 1927, and have not been resumed since that time. Since the Polish Government has not abandoned its conditions and the Soviet Government has not accepted them, there has been no reason for a renewal of negotiations. The new document now presented by M. Patek, as already stated, repeats the same conditions, and adds one more which has not heretofore figured in the negotiations. Thus the above-mentioned document is not a step forward in Polish-Soviet negotiations but a step backward. Moreover M. Patek, in delivering the document, made no proposal for the resumption of negotiations and himself described the document merely as a summary of the negotiations of 1926 7. The document was delivered by M. Patek on the day of his departure from Moscow for a prolonged holiday.

PRESS STATEMENT BY LITVINOV (BERLIN) ON THE NEGOTIATIONS FOR A NON-AGGRESSION PACT WITH POLAND

29 *August* 1931 *Izvestia*, 30 *August* 1931

Recently, and with particular prominence during the last few days, there have appeared in the press statements concerning negotiations said to be commencing, in progress, or renewed, between the Governments of the USSR and Poland on the subject of the conclusion of a pact of non-aggression. There has even developed an exchange of polemics between organs of the press and telegraph agencies as to where these negotiations were being held, on the initiative of which country, and whether directly between the Soviet Union and Poland or with the assistance of third parties. These arguments were totally unnecessary, for no negotiations have been or are being conducted. This has been stated several times by the Soviet press and Tass, but I think it may not be superfluous to confirm these statements in the words of one who, it

would seem, should know about negotiations if they were taking place. I am convinced that the cause of peace and the relations between countries not only does not benefit, but rather suffers from the shrouding of the facts and the releasing of information which leads public opinion into error. At the present time more than ever before, clarity and precision in the designation of the relations between countries are essential.

What are the facts? In August 1926, that is, exactly five years ago, the Soviet Government proposed to the Polish Government the conclusion of a pact of non-aggression and submitted the draft of such a pact. Analogous proposals were made by the Soviet Government to all the Baltic countries. The Polish Government's attitude to the Soviet proposal was negative at that time. They did not of course reject the proposal outright, as is rarely practised in diplomacy, but made the conclusion of the pact dependent upon conditions known to be unacceptable to the Soviet Union, and which should not concern relations between the USSR and Poland. Since the Polish Government insisted on these conditions no agreement was reached and negotiations were finally broken off in 1927, and have never been renewed since that time. The rumour that the Soviet Government renewed its offer to Poland in August 1930 is a complete fabrication. The Soviet Government had no occasion to repeat its proposal, since the Polish Government gave it no reason to think that it had altered its attitude towards the Soviet proposal or would withdraw the conditions it had put forward. A document delivered a few days ago in Moscow by M. Patek, the Polish ambassador, once more confirms the unchanging negative attitude of the Polish Government to a pact, for not only are the old conditions laid down in the document, but a new one is added. Patek not only made no proposals for the resumption of negotiations, but himself explained the delivery of the document as motivated by the desire to sum up the negotiations of 1926–7. On the day preceding delivery of the document M. Patek called on me and said not a word about the forthcoming delivery of the document or about a pact of non-aggression in general, informing me that he was going on leave.

It only remains to add that relations between Poland and the USSR have not been the subject of negotiations between the USSR and any third party. The Soviet Government continues to regard as desirable the conclusion of non-aggression pacts with all countries with which it is in immediate contact, and it has made corresponding proposals to all such countries in its time. It considers that the obligations of non-aggression and the safeguarding of peace should be accepted by all countries unconditionally, all the more since the general Kellogg pact of non-aggression is signed without conditions. Soviet proposals for the conclusion of pacts have so far been accepted and realized only by

Germany, Turkey, Lithuania, Persia, and Afghanistan. We hope to add to this list of countries France, with whom we are negotiating a pact and not meeting with any difficulties. It is obvious that we are striving to improve our relations with Poland, but this cannot be achieved by the dissemination of rumours concerning non-existent negotiations. That can only cause irritation and polemics, which are to be avoided. I am compelled to make this declaration in the interests of Soviet-Polish relations.

The profound world crisis which we are now experiencing seems as if it will force all States to support and realize Soviet peace proposals. The Soviet Government for its part will not let slip any opportunity to bear witness, not by word but by deed, to its sincere endeavours to co-operate as far as is within its power in clearing the political atmosphere and in international pacification; with these aims it agreed to participate in the pan-European commission and came forward there with proposals for the conclusion of a general pact of economic non-aggression. The economic crisis is leading to a strengthening and sharpening of the contradictions between States, and the pact proposed by us could in some degree weaken this tendency. The forthcoming session of the pan-European Commission will debate this question, and our non-aggression pact may prove a touchstone which will demonstrate the desire or otherwise of this or that capitalist country to maintain peaceful economic relations with the Soviet Union.

PROVISIONAL COMMERCIAL AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE USSR AND SINKIANG

1 *October* 1931 *China and the Soviet Union*, p. 376

The Provincial Government of Sinkiang of the Republic of China and the USSR, in view of their adjoining territories and historical economic relations and the desire repeatedly expressed to develop their trade relations, have hereby agreed pending the conclusion of a formal Commercial Treaty between the Republic of China and the USSR, upon the following terms: The USSR have concluded an agreement as follows:

I. It is agreed that merchandise as well as travellers from Sinkiang Province to the USSR, or *vice versa*, shall hereafter effect passage through the frontier points, Irkeshtan, Holkutz, Bakhti and Dzimunai in accordance with the existing laws and regulations of the Republic of China and the USSR.

II. The Provincial Government of Sinkiang desires that the Government of the USSR should permit merchants of Sinkiang to import into

the USSR any amount of various products of Sinkiang to be sold to the national commercial bureaux of the Soviet Union, without having first to obtain special permits for the act. This does not, however, include products whose importation is forbidden by the existing laws of the Soviet Union.

III. The Provincial Government of Sinkiang agrees to allow the commercial bureaux of the USSR and its citizens the privilege to carry on trade in the areas of Kashgar, Ili, Tacheng, Altai and Tihwa as well as the right to appoint from the above-named areas representatives or commissioners to proceed to Yarkent, Turfan, Karashar, Khotan and Aksu to enter into sale and purchase contracts of trade with the local merchants or commercial houses and to enforce the execution of the same.

For the purpose of putting this trade with the Soviet Union on a regular basis, the Provincial Government of Sinkiang agrees to permit employees of the commercial bureaux of the USSR and its citizens the privilege of free travelling, in accordance with the existing laws and regulations, to and from the various representatives as well as places where such commercial bureaux are situated.

IV. The Provincial Government of Sinkiang desires that the Government of the USSR should allow its commercial bureaux and citizens when they enter into sale and purchase contracts with merchants or commercial houses of Sinkiang, freely to arrange the terms as regards price, transportation, and terms of contract and to register such items with the government bureaux in accordance with the existing laws of China. The Provincial Government of Sinkiang declares that the date limit for registration shall not exceed five days, in accordance with the existing practice in Sinkiang. In case of dispute, the Provincial Government of Sinkiang undertakes that government offices under its jurisdiction shall investigate the contracts or agreements held by either side, and to enforce fair and just fulfilment of such contracts in accordance with the existing laws of China.

V. The Provincial Government of Sinkiang agrees not to impose higher or heavier Customs dues or taxes on the commercial bureaux of the Soviet Union or its citizens than such as are paid by Chinese merchants or business houses, in accordance with the existing laws of China, either at the present or at any future time. Should business taxes or similar levies be introduced at some future time, in accordance with the existing laws of China, commercial bureaux of the Soviet Union or its citizens shall pay such taxes or levies along with Chinese merchants or business houses.

VI. With the object of promoting the national economy of Sinkiang, the Provincial Government of Sinkiang desires that the Government of the Soviet Union should supply in full in the nature of a business deal

various machineries for the development of Sinkiang, such as industrial, electrical, agricultural and transportation machines, also to provide necessary technicians, in the same nature, for the reconstruction of Sinkiang, and to train Chinese technicians for the same purpose. It is requested that the Soviet Government should give appropriate assistance in the improvement of agriculture, cattle raising, etc., in connexion with the national economy of Sinkiang.

VII. With the object of promoting the national economy of Sinkiang, the Provincial Government of Sinkiang desires that the Soviet Government should allow free passage through territories of the USSR of such products of Sinkiang into China proper or of such products of China proper into Sinkiang, as are given in the appended list. This list shall be made out by a special commissioner appointed by the Provincial Government of Sinkiang with the Soviet Consul-General at Urumchi, on the basis of developing commercial relations between Sinkiang and the USSR, not later than 15 November of the present year. Said list may be revised yearly to suit conditions necessary to the national economy of Sinkiang and the Soviet Union.

The Provincial Government of Sinkiang desires that the Soviet Government should allow free passage through its territories of such articles as are needed by the former, but not for purposes of trade, either from China proper into Sinkiang or from Sinkiang into China proper or from a third country with which the Soviet Union has commercial agreements already concluded or to be concluded in the future.

The Provincial Government of Sinkiang acknowledges the receipt from the Soviet Government of a written document stating that, should any article to be transported through the territories of the USSR be prohibited by existing laws, passage of such would not be permitted. The above specified clauses are concluded with the aim and purpose of developing mutual economic relations, to which the Provincial Government of Sinkiang signifies agreement, and shall take effect herewith.

Annex I

For the purpose of developing trade between Sinkiang and the USSR, the Provincial Government of Sinkiang has ordered the Sinkiang Customs to make a uniform rate of dues on all merchandise of import and export between Sinkiang and the USSR in order to facilitate the mutual development of trade.

Annex II

In order to promote the facilities for trade between the Soviet Union and Sinkiang, the Government of the USSR proposes to establish at

Urumchi, Kashgar, Ili and Tacheng, Soviet financial bureaux to take charge of the trade and financial affairs of the Soviet commercial bureaux or intercourse with Chinese merchants or business houses. Said financial bureaux will also accept commissions from Chinese merchants or business houses. The financial bureaux are entitled to charge certain amounts upon mutual consent, for the execution of such commissions.

Annex III

For the purpose of facilitating passenger traffic and transportation of goods, the Government of the USSR desires that the Provincial Government of Sinkiang will agree, six months after the opening of the pass at Dzimunai, to the closure of the pass at Irkeshtan, so that merchandise already in transit and intended to pass through the pass at Irkeshtan may be enabled to arrive at its destination.

Annex IV

The Provincial Government of Sinkiang considers it necessary to regulate telegraphic communications between Sinkiang and the USSR. For this purpose there should be direct connexion of the cable between Tacheng and Bakhti. At the same time, direct wireless communication between Sinkiang and the USSR should also be established. The procedure and conditions for the materialization of such arrangements shall be made by the Chinese Commissioner for Foreign Affairs in Sinkiang and the Soviet Consul-General at Urumchi.

PRESS STATEMENT BY LITVINOV ON HIS ARRIVAL IN TURKEY

27 *October* 1931 *Izvestia*, 28 *October* 1931

I am particularly glad to have had the opportunity, which I have long desired, of visiting Turkey, a country with which the Soviet Union is firmly linked by many years of friendship and co-operation. I am glad to be able to exchange views again with my friend, your Minister for Foreign Affairs, Tewfik Rushdi Bey, and to establish better contact with other statesmen of the Turkish Republic. I take this opportunity of transmitting by way of the press the greetings of the Government of the peoples of the Soviet Union to the people of the friendly Turkish Republic.

Soviet-Turkish friendship dates from the first days of the existence of the USSR and the new Turkey. This friendship is more than ten years old. During this long period the international life of all countries has been packed with exceptional circumstances and has been marked by particular fluidity. The world war left a heavy political and economic

heritage, not only failing to remove international contradictions but to a considerable extent sharpening them. One cannot speak of any stabilization of international relations whatsoever. During this period relations between countries have been established and changed again in accordance with the rapidly moving events and changing situations. The definite forms they sometimes assumed would prove to be rather in the nature of temporary combinations.

All countries are feeling their way towards the development of mutual relations, but have not yet found it. Against this background of the fluidity and the indefiniteness of international relations the firmness and durability of Soviet-Turkish relations stand out with particular prominence. As regards the Union, I can assure the Turkish press and through it the Turkish people that its policy of friendly relations with Turkey is deeply embedded in the bases and forms part of the substance of its foreign policy. Hence the constancy and sincerity of its relations with Turkey. I am convinced that the origin and character of Turkish relations with the Soviet Union are similar. The conclusion by both countries of a treaty is an expression of our reciprocal policy, laying no conditions upon established relations but on the contrary constituting their formal consolidation.

This explains how the reciprocal obligations undertaken by both countries are not felt as constraining and limiting the sovereignty and independence of their respective foreign policies even when in consequence of the peculiarities of either country they do not take the same attitude to one or another phenomenon of international life.

Our long-standing friendship has given birth to a mutual trust which will allay any apprehensions concerning any independent steps which either country considers profitable, for both countries are fully assured that neither will ever participate in activities directed against the other.

The relations which have been established between the Soviet Union and Turkey, despite the existing difference in their social and economic systems, may and should serve as an example for other States, just as the treaties concluded by them have already served. These relations in themselves constitute an element of world peace and permit both countries to work in close co-operation in the cause of the establishment of world peace. In their striving to build socialism in their country the peoples of the Union have set themselves gigantic tasks in the field of industrialization and the collectivization of agriculture. The fulfilment of these aims demands an unrelenting harnessing of all their energies. The successes which they have so far achieved stimulate and inspire their further efforts towards the attainment of their aims. There can hardly be people anywhere who still doubt the sincere striving of the

Soviet Government towards a lasting peace, essential for the realization of these basic aims.

The programme of the Turkish Government and the many statements of Turkish statesmen have made public the great aims which are before Turkey also in the realm of the development of the national economy, and in particular of Turkish industry and the natural resources of the country. There can therefore be no doubt about the sincerity of the Turkish people's striving for peace. This creates a basis for co-operation and united action by both countries in the cause of the establishment of world peace.

The successful fulfilment of the five-year plan, the unexampled achievements in the realm of industrialization, and the radical reconstruction of the technical bases of the Soviet Union make possible the extension of Soviet-Turkish economic co-operation and the attainment of a more rapid tempo of development. In the next few years we shall see a very considerable broadening of Soviet-Turkish co-operation in economic and technical fields.

REPLY BY KARAKHAN, VICE-COMMISSAR FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS, TO THE STATEMENT OF HIROTA, JAPANESE AMBASSADOR IN MOSCOW, ALLEGING SOVIET SUPPORT FOR THE FORCES OF GENERAL MA

29 *October* 1931 *Dokumenty*, iii, p. 34

The Government of the USSR cannot refrain from expressing its astonishment at the statement[1] made on 28 October by the Japanese ambassador, Mr Hirota, on behalf of the Japanese Government, concerning the fabrications and rumours, wholly devoid of foundation in fact, emanating from irresponsible persons among Japanese and Chinese circles interested for one reason or another, because of the present situation in Manchuria, in the dissemination of provocative rumours.

The Japanese Government cannot be ignorant of the fact that there are no Soviet instructors with the Tsitsihar forces, just as there are none with the forces of any other Manchurian province, that these troops have not received and are not receiving any arms or military supplies from the USSR, and that no support has been given by the USSR to either of the contending sides in Manchuria.

The Union Government maintains a policy of strict non-intervention not because such a policy may be advantageous or disadvantageous to anyone, but because it respects the international treaties concluded with China, respects the sovereign rights and independence of other

[1] *Dokumenty*, iii, p. 33.

States, and considers that a policy of military occupation, even if pursued under the guise of so-called assistance, is incompatible with Soviet peace policy and with the interests of general peace.

The Government of the USSR expresses the hope that the present reply settles all the questions raised in the statement made by the Japanese ambassador, Mr Hirota, on 28 October.

COMMUNIQUÉ ON THE MEETING BETWEEN LITVINOV AND THE TURKISH MINISTERS

30 *October* 1931 *Izvestia*, 2 *November* 1931

Conversations have been held between the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the USSR, Comrade Litvinov, on the one side, and the President of the Turkish Council of Ministers, Ismet Pasha, and Turkish Foreign Minister, Tewfik Rushdi Bey, on the other, which were distinguished by great cordiality. The Soviet envoy to Turkey, Comrade Surits, and the Turkish ambassador to Moscow, Hussein Ragib Bey, also took part in the conversations. Views were exchanged on questions concerned with the relations between the two countries, and also on important international questions. These conversations again made clear the firmness of the foundation on which Soviet-Turkish friendship, established ten years ago, rests, as well as the extensive opportunities for promoting economic intercourse between them. During these conversations, which pursued the goal of peace and of maintaining close and cordial relations between the two countries, the most complete identity of views was observed. Comrade Litvinov repeated the invitation to visit Moscow already given to Ismet Pasha by Comrade Surits on behalf of the Soviet Government, which was accepted with sincere satisfaction. The date of Ismet Pasha's journey to Moscow will be announced later.

One of the most fortunate results of these fruitful conversations was the prolongation of the treaty of friendship and neutrality signed in Paris 17 December 1925 and of the three protocols of the same date attached thereto.[1] The protocol of prolongation of the said treaty signed 17 December 1929 and the naval protocol of 7 March (both of which were signed in Ankara) were similarly prolonged.

[1] *League of Nations Treaty Series*, clvii, pp. 361, 365, 367.

STATEMENT BY LITVINOV TO THE JAPANESE AMBASSADOR IN MOSCOW ON THE SOVIET ATTITUDE TO THE SITUATION IN MANCHURIA

14 *November* 1931 *Dokumenty*, iii, p. 41

In the statement handed to you on 29 October of this year by M. Karakhan, Vice-Commissar for Foreign Affairs, the Soviet Government noted the utter absurdity and falseness of the inventions and rumours emanating from irresponsible quarters, concerned, for one reason or another, with the present situation in Manchuria, in spreading provocative rumours.

The Government of the USSR stated with the utmost clarity that it adheres to the policy of strict non-intervention which derives from its traditional and unchanging policy of peace, of respect for the international treaties concluded with China, and of respect for the sovereign rights and independence of other States.

The Soviet Government was entitled to expect that its statement, which was so clear that it left no room whatever for doubt or ambiguity, and which, according to the information you gave to M. Karakhan, Vice-Commissar for Foreign Affairs, was greeted with satisfaction by the Japanese Government, would put an end to the provocative anti-Soviet campaign and the inventions about the help said to be given by the Soviet Government to Chinese forces in Manchuria.

It is with the deepest regret that the Soviet Government is compelled to note that interested Japanese military circles are still busily inventing and spreading, through the Japanese press and telegraph agencies, wholly groundless rumours about the help being given by the Soviet Government to some Chinese generals or other.

That these rumours have moreover an official character and source is shown by the official statement made by the representative of the Japanese authorities in Mukden on 12 November, which asserts outright that reinforcements consisting of 'Chinese and Korean communists' were transferred from Blagoveshchensk.

Nor can the Soviet Government fail to remark that similar suppositions were made on the same day by Nakano, Japanese Vice-Consul in Harbin, in his interview with the director of the Soviet consulate-general in Harbin.

The Soviet Government draws the attention of the Japanese Government to this unscrupulous anti-Soviet campaign, which is being systematically waged by certain military circles in Manchuria with the object of creating difficulties in the relations between Japan and the USSR.

At the same time the Soviet Government considers it appropriate to recall the assurances which the Japanese ambassador gave me, that the interests of the USSR would suffer no loss by the events in Manchuria.

It is the more necessary to recall this, since there is information that preparations are being made by the Japanese command to cut the Chinese Eastern Railway in the Tsitsihar area, which would paralyse the railway and cause material injury to the USSR. The Soviet Government trusts that the assurances given by the Japanese Government will remain in force and will not be broken.

REPLY BY LITVINOV TO THE JAPANESE AMBASSADOR'S STATEMENT ON THE TRANSPORT OF CHINESE TROOPS ON THE CHINESE EASTERN RAILWAY

20 *November* 1931 *Dokumenty*, iii, p. 43

The Soviet Government notes with satisfaction your statement[1] that the Japanese Government does not believe the rumours of the violation of the principle of non-intervention, and of Soviet assistance to the Chinese generals, and that it thus dissociates itself from the irresponsible statements made by Japanese officials, clearly without the sanction of their Government. The Soviet Government could not expect the Japanese Government to have a different attitude to the rumours in question after the perfectly explicit statement by M. Karakhan, made on the instructions of his Government, concerning strict non-intervention in the Japanese-Chinese conflict and the absence of any help given to one side or the other.

In so far as your statement draws a parallel between the present events in China and the Soviet-Chinese dispute of 1929, I am compelled to point out the incorrectness of the analogy. Although the Chinese authorities indisputably and obviously violated Soviet treaty rights, the Soviet Government did not invade and had no thought of invading Manchuria. Only after repeated attacks by Chinese and Russian White Guard detachments on Soviet territory did Soviet troops cross the Manchurian frontier in order to repel the attackers, disarm them, and put an end to further attacks. There was no question of occupation, even of a temporary character, of Chinese territory by Soviet troops, or of the removal of the existing authorities and the creation of new authorities. Nor was there at the time the remotest possibility of infringing the legitimate rights and interests of Japan. As soon as the Soviet troops had carried out their strictly limited tasks they were withdrawn to Soviet territory. The Soviet Government did not exploit its own military superiority and Chinese weakness to impose any new conditions on China, or to settle questions not directly connected with that particular dispute.

[1] *Dokumenty*, iii, p. 42.

If, Mr Ambassador, in noting the refusal of the Japanese Government to transport Chinese troops at the time of the 1929 conflict, you refer to the South Manchurian Railway and contrast this with the alleged transport of Chinese troops by the Chinese Eastern Railway during the present Japanese-Chinese conflict, may I make the following explanation. The South Manchurian Railway is under the complete direction and control of Japan and is guarded by Japanese troops, while the Chinese Eastern Railway is under joint Soviet-Chinese administration and is guarded by Chinese troops, under the exclusive control of the Chinese authorities. You are no doubt aware that the Soviet Government voluntarily surrendered the privilege of the Tsarist Government to maintain troops in China and particularly on the Chinese Eastern Railway. It does not regret having done so, for it is convinced that in renouncing the privileges of the Tsarist Government it acted quite correctly. But it follows that conditions on the SMR cannot be identified with conditions on the CER. The Soviet Government is not aware that the Chinese troops guarding the CER were transported by the CER for military operations. There was no necessity for this so long as the sphere of the Japanese-Chinese conflict was confined to South Manchuria. The danger could arise only when the Japanese troops moved up to the line of the CER. When this danger materialized, the Soviet Government took the fact into account and on 12 November instructed the Soviet section of the CER administration to continue to pursue a policy of neutrality and in no circumstances to agree to the transport to the front by the CER of the troops of either of the belligerent parties. And in fact, notwithstanding all the difficulties created by the proximity of the front, the CER as a whole was able to maintain a neutral position. I considered it necessary to make this explanation, Mr Ambassador, in order to emphasize that I cannot agree with you concerning the responsibility of the CER.

The Soviet Government notes with satisfaction the repeated assurances of the Japanese Government of its anxiety to prevent any damage to the interests of the CER and the USSR, of the absence of any intention on the part of the Japanese armies of paralysing the work of the CER. But it must be noted that despite the original statement you made to me on the instructions of your Government, of its orders concerning the maximum narrowing down of military operations in Manchuria, these operations have been steadily extended and have gone far beyond their original limits. This fact, which increases the possibility that Soviet interests may be involved, cannot fail to cause grave anxiety to the Soviet Government.

In all its relations with other States the Soviet Government has consistently pursued a strict policy of peace and of peaceful relations. It

attaches great importance to the maintenance and consolidation of its present relations with Japan. It adheres to a policy of strict non-intervention in the conflicts between other countries. It assumes that the Japanese Government, too, is anxious to maintain the relations between the two countries and that in all its actions and dispositions it will respect the inviolability of Soviet interests.

TASS STATEMENT ON THE NEGOTIATIONS FOR A NON-AGGRESSION PACT WITH POLAND

22 *November* 1931 *Izvestia*, 22 *November* 1931

We are informed from authoritative sources that yesterday, 21 November, M. M. Litvinov, People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, received the Polish envoy, M. Patek, and proposed to him that the negotiations regarding a non-aggression pact be resumed. Previously, on 14 October, M. Litvinov, on the instructions of the Government, had proposed to the Polish Government through the late chargé d'affaires, M. Zelezinsky, that a non-aggression pact be concluded in the same terms as the Franco-Soviet pact[1] which has been initialed.

The Soviet Government acted on the assumption that since negotiations on the basis of the Soviet draft in 1926 had led to disagreement, the proposal of a new text, already accepted by France, would encounter no objections on the part of Poland. The Polish Government, however, stated on the 14th of this month to M. Litvinov, through M. Patek, that the text of the Franco-Soviet pact was not acceptable to Poland, and that the draft pact proposed by the Soviet Government to Poland in 1926, with certain amendments made by Poland, was preferable. Yesterday's statement by M. Litvinov signifies the agreement of the Soviet Government to a resumption of negotiations on the basis of the 1926 draft. The negotiations will begin in the very near future.

EXTRACTS FROM AN INTERVIEW BY STALIN ON GERMANY AND THE PROPOSED SOVIET-POLISH NON-AGGRESSION PACT

13 *December* 1931 *Interview with Emil Ludwig*, p. 13

But if we are to speak of our sympathies toward any particular nation, or rather, to the majority of the population of any particular nation, then of course, we must speak of our sympathy for the Germans. Our feelings for the Americans cannot be compared with our sympathies for the Germans . . .

[1] *League of Nations Treaty Series*, clvii, p. 411.

I know that a certain dissatisfaction and alarm is noticeable among certain German statesmen, who fear that the Soviet Union, in its negotiations, or in any treaty that may be concluded with Poland, may take some step that would imply that the Soviet Union gives its sanction to, or guarantees, the possessions and frontiers of Poland. In my opinion such fears are groundless. We have always declared our willingness to conclude pacts of non-aggression with any government. We have already concluded such pacts with a number of countries. We have openly declared our desire to sign a pact of non-aggression with Poland. And when we declare that we are ready to sign a pact of non-aggression with Poland, it is not a mere empty statement; it means that we actually do want to sign such a pact. We are politicians of a peculiar breed, if you like. There are politicians who promise a thing one day, and next day either forget all about it, or else deny that they promised any such thing, and do so without blushing. That is not our way. Whatever we do abroad inevitably becomes known inside the country, to all workers and peasants. If we declared one thing, and did another, we should forfeit our authority. As soon as the Poles declared their willingness to start negotiations with us regarding a pact of non-aggression, we naturally consented and began negotiations.

What, from the point of view of the Germans, is the most dangerous thing that might happen? A change of attitude towards the Germans for the worse? But there is no foundation for that. We, like the Poles, must declare in the pact that we shall not resort to force, or aggression, in order to change the frontiers of Poland bordering the USSR, or to violate their independence. Just as we make such a promise to the Poles, so they must make a similar promise to us. Without such a point, namely to the effect that we shall not resort to war in order to violate the independence or the integrity of the frontiers of our respective States, no pact could be concluded. Without that, a pact would be out of the question. That is the most we can do. Does that mean recognition of the Versailles system? It does not. Does it mean guaranteeing frontiers? It does not. We never have been guarantors for Poland and never shall be, just as Poland never has been, and never will be a guarantor of our frontiers. Our friendly relations with Germany will remain what they have been hitherto. That is my firm conviction.

Therefore, the misgivings of which you speak are entirely groundless. Those misgivings arose owing to rumours that were spread by certain Poles and Frenchmen. They will disappear when we publish the pact, that is, if Poland signs it. It will then be seen that it contains nothing directed against Germany.

EXTRACTS FROM MOLOTOV'S REPORT TO THE CENTRAL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE

22 *December* 1931 *Protokoly*, Bulletin 1, p. 34

By and large relations between the USSR and capitalist countries have not changed over the past year . . .

In keeping with its policy of consistently defending the cause of peace, the USSR has entered into negotiations for a pact of non-aggression with Poland. These negotiations are still in progress, and we are anxious to bring them to a successful conclusion. In any case, everything the USSR can do to this end has been and is being done.

Recently we have received proposals for the conclusion of non-aggression pacts from Rumania, Finland, and Estonia. We think that the conclusion of non-aggression pacts with these, as with other countries, and particularly with those bordering the USSR, is fully in accordance with the Soviet Government's peaceful policy and with the securing of general peace. As before, we are anxious to get the question of concluding these non-aggression pacts on the way to practical realization. Everything that depends on the USSR in this matter is being done by the Soviet Government.

The most important question in our foreign situation is, of course, events in the Far East, events in Manchuria. It is clear that the scale of these events is not diminishing, but is rather tending to expand more and more widely.

You know that the League of Nations tried to intervene in the military activities taking place in Manchuria, but this intervention had not the slightest effect in putting an end to the present occupation of Manchuria or to military activities. The results were the direct opposite.

On two occasions the League of Nations tried to bring forward some kind of concrete proposals about the occupation of Manchuria. We know to what that led.

At first the League of Nations even named a day, the 14th October in fact, and in certain quarters illusory hopes were placed in this for the possibility of some kind of change for the better, that is, for the winding up of hostilities in Manchuria. But nothing of the kind happened.

After a further and most protracted consideration, the League of Nations recently burst out with a decision to send to Manchuria, in the name of the five Powers . . . a commission of scientific investigation, that is, it proved its complete reluctance and powerlessness to check in any degree the further development of hostilities in Manchuria. This second decision of the League is a direct mockery of its own first resolution, and in substance sanctions the military occupation of Manchuria and the extension of hostilities there.

All this compels us to increase our vigilance in regard to Far Eastern events. We must not forget that we have a common frontier with Manchuria. We are quite confident that our Far Eastern heroes will be up to the mark, and will keep a sharp eye on the Soviet frontiers in the Far East . . .

Events in the international field require greater vigilance of us, and we must again emphasize our basic principle: we do not need any foreign land, but we shall not yield an inch of our own land to anybody.

The disarmament commission is soon to be convened. The imperialist Powers, whose interests have nothing in common with disarmament . . . are making attempts to have the commission postponed, and even to get it altogether dropped.

The ruling imperialist Powers are still more energetic about turning the disarmament commission into a comedy, one which will give them no trouble about getting on with disarmament. Everything is being done to prevent the commission from dealing with its direct task, and from interfering with the growth of armaments, particularly those of the strongest imperialist Powers. In the eyes of the latter, the point of their participation in the commission is to use it as a cover which leaves them completely free to increase their armaments and construct military and political blocs for new imperialist wars.

In the final analysis the proposals put forward by the imperialist Powers amount to the same thing—their idea is not disarmament, but freedom of action for increasing armaments.

There is only one proposal which is really aimed at disarmament; that is the one introduced by the USSR . . .

Side by side with the fuss about the convening of the disarmament commission, there is increasing evidence of a growing danger to peace. The profound economic crisis is making the contradictions among the imperialist States more and more acute, and making their internal situation worse by sharpening class contradictions. The economic struggle in connexion with the introduction of any and every kind of protectionism and super-protectionism has already turned into real economic war between particular capitalist States. One step more, and another, and the struggle for markets will turn into an imperialist war. The danger of new military imperialist adventures is growing.

The USSR in particular must reckon with the danger of imperialist attack. We have authentic information that at the present time in certain diplomatic offices there is the most lively discussion of the question of a military attack on our Union. We should not forget that many of those who organized military intervention against the USSR in the past are still alive, and are now, with others, with new repre-

sentatives of imperialism, busily engaged in preparing an attack on the workers' republic.

In connexion with the events in Manchuria, our press, and the foreign press, including bourgeois papers, have exposed more than one provocative attempt to drag the USSR into war. The incendiarists of war in the imperialist camp will go on with their provocations intended to drag the USSR into war and to organize a military attack on our State. We must be ready in the future too for these provocations.

Our reply to all this is the consistent pursuit of a peaceful policy. Our reply is increasing vigilance. Our reply is the expansion of socialist construction and, above all, the realization of the five-year plan in 1932.

Our country is witnessing an outburst of creative labour, gigantic construction, the victorious building of socialism. In this we see a strengthening not only of our internal but also of our international position. The successful fulfilment of the national economic five-year plan, its realization in four years, the development along the entire front of the struggle for socialism—this will be our answer to our class enemies. Our task is to strengthen the cause of peace and international socialism, to secure the victory of the working class.

JOINT SOVIET-GERMAN STATEMENT ON THE SIGNATURE OF A PROTOCOL FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF ECONOMIC RELATIONS

22 *December* 1931 *Izvestia*, 24 *December* 1931

The economic negotiations which were begun on 14 November between the German Minister of National Economy, Warmbold, and the head of the Soviet delegation and plenipotentiary envoy of the USSR, Khinchuk, the aim of which was to place the economic relations of the two countries on a more solid foundation and to facilitate their further development, were completed on 22 December with the signing of a protocol. The decisions set forth in the protocol, which are subject to ratification by both Governments, are designed in the first place to eliminate the difficulties arising as a result of the economic crisis in all markets, which are affecting Soviet-German trade as well. The course of the negotiations, in which those most closely concerned with economic affairs in both countries participated, gives ground for the expectation that the aim of the negotiations will be achieved.

TASS DENIAL OF THE REPORTED OFFER OF SALE OF THE CHINESE EASTERN RAILWAY TO JAPAN

24 *December* 1931 *Izvestia*, 24 *December* 1931

In connexion with reports in the English, Japanese, and Chinese press to the effect that the chairman of the board of the Chinese Eastern Railway had agreed to the cession to Japan of the southern sector of the CER, that the USSR had offered to sell the southern sector to Japan, that the board of the railway was considering the question of the sale of this southern sector, and finally that the Japanese were purchasing shares in the CER, and so forth, Tass is empowered to state, on the basis of information received from an authoritative source, that all these reports have no basis whatsoever in fact. Tass is also empowered to state that neither the Chinese nor the Soviet members of the board, nor the board of the railway as a whole, have concerned themselves with questions of this nature.

PRESS STATEMENT BY LITVINOV ON SOVIET NON-AGGRESSION PACTS WITH NEIGHBOURING COUNTRIES

26 *January* 1932 *Soviet Union Review, March* 1932, p. 56

The contents of the pacts proposed by the Soviet government are very simple and consist in undertaking obligations not to enter upon aggressive action and to eliminate so far as possible causes which might lead to infringement of the peaceful relations existing between the governments concluding such treaties. If, in negotiating such pacts, the contracting parties are really animated by the desire to strengthen peaceful relations and pursue no indirect aims, then it is possible to complete the negotiations very rapidly. This is exemplified by the negotiations with Finland which were satisfactorily concluded by the signing of a pact within two weeks.

Negotiations with Poland were commenced a few weeks earlier than with Finland, and have resulted today in the initialing of the non-aggression pact published in the press.

Negotiations with Latvia are proceeding slowly and negotiations with Estonia were opened only a few days ago. After the signing of the pact with Finland and the initialing of the pact with Poland, the conclusion of pacts with Estonia and Latvia should not present any special difficulties.[1] Negotiations with Estonia and Latvia should be further simplified by the circumstance that mutual neutrality is already provided for in the existing peace treaties with them, and that therefore no repetition of that obligation is necessary.

[1] For the non-aggression pacts with Finland, Poland, Estonia, and Latvia, see *League of Nations Treaty Series*, clvii, p. 393; cxxxvi, p. 41; cxxxi, p. 297; cxxxxviii, p. 113.

The draft pact with Rumania has also been practically agreed upon. Both parties have agreed to negotiate and have found it necessary to set aside the unsettled Bessarabian question. It is quite evident that when no official relations exist between two states and they have serious territorial and other disputes, a bilateral pact between them cannot be concluded without mentioning that these questions shall not be touched upon and are set aside.

We fully understand that inasmuch as Rumania virtually occupies Bessarabia, she would wish to forget the existing dispute and to interpret failure to mention it as our silent consent to the occupation. We cannot agree to that. Rumania, however, goes considerably further and seeks a formulation of the point on non-aggression from which would follow our recognition either of Rumanian sovereignty in Bessarabia or of the Dniester River as the Bessarabian frontier. We cannot agree to that, either. It must be stated quite clearly that both sides have maintained their positions on this disputed question and that the conclusion of the pact in no way interferes with those positions. The aim of the pact is to eliminate the possibility of aggression by either party against the other, and this aim is achieved in the first article of the pact which has already been agreed upon as follows:

'Both contracting parties, declaring that they have renounced war as an instrument of national policy in their mutual relations, undertake mutually to refrain from any attack by land, sea, or air against each other, either separately or jointly with other powers.'

Furthermore, the Soviet side has agreed to add to this article a second paragraph to the effect that any attempts whatsoever to settle territorial or other disputes existing between the two countries by violent means, will be considered a violation of the pact.

The Soviet government has given sufficient evidence of its good will and of its sincere desire to conclude non-aggression pacts. The rest, however, depends on the good will of others.

NARKOMINDEL STATEMENT ON AN INTERVIEW BETWEEN THE JAPANESE AMBASSADOR AND KARAKHAN, VICE-COMMISSAR FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS, ON MANCHURIA

26 *February* 1932 *Dokumenty*, iii, p. 66

On 24 February Comrade Karakhan received the Japanese ambassador, to whom, on the instructions of the Soviet Government, the following questions were put:

1. The Japanese command in Harbin requested the CER for seventeen troop trains to transport troops to Imianpo and beyond towards

Pogranichnaya on the pretext of protecting the lives of Japanese residents. It was pointed out to the ambassador that this request for transport is not for the transport of troops in the ordinary way, such as has occurred up till now, as it is intended to send them on towards the Soviet frontier. This exceeds the competence of the CER administration. The Soviet Government wished to know whether the Japanese Government was aware of this request, and, if so, the Soviet Government asks for clarification.

2. The Japanese command in Harbin proposed to the CER administration that a reduction of 50 per cent be made in the transport charges and that Japanese troops destined for the guarding of the CER be transported free of charge. The Japanese ambassador was informed that this proposal was not of a technical, but of a political character, involving the treaties in force between the USSR and Japan on the one hand, and the USSR and China on the other, and the matter therefore is outside the competence of the CER which is a commercial undertaking. The Soviet Government wishes to know whether the Japanese Government is aware of this request and, if so, asks for clarification.

3. The ambassador was further informed of the growing activity of Whites in Manchuria under the protection of the Japanese and with their direct support, and his attention was called to the discrepancy between this and the placatory assurances given by Hirota to Litvinov and Karakhan that the Japanese would not support the Whites. On behalf of the Soviet Government Karakhan asked the ambassador for an explanation of the actions of the Whites.

4. Finally, Comrade Karakhan asked the ambassador for information about the new State being formed in Manchuria and about its character. The Japanese ambassador, Hirota, promised to put all these questions immediately before the Japanese Government.

NARKOMINDEL STATEMENT ON AN INTERVIEW BETWEEN THE JAPANESE AMBASSADOR AND THE VICE-COMMISSAR FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS ON MANCHURIA

29 *February* 1932 *Dokumenty*, iii, p. 70

On 27 February the Japanese ambassador, Hirota, called on the Vice-Commissar for Foreign Affairs, L. M. Karakhan, and, on the instructions of the Japanese Government, made the following statement in reply to the questions put to him on 24 February:

1. On the second point raised by the Soviet Government, the proposal made by the Japanese command to the CER administration for

an agreement for the transport of Japanese troops by the CER, the Japanese Government knew nothing, and it has asked the Japanese authorities in Manchuria for information.

2. In regard to White Guard activity and the formation of a new State the Japanese Government is sending additional telegraphic instructions.

3. As to the transport of Japanese troops on the eastern section of the CER, the ambassador was instructed to make the following explanation:

Following on the changed state of affairs in the region of the eastern section of the CER, Japanese nationals resident in that area were forced to take refuge in Harbin and other quiet places in Manchuria. However, more than 20,000 Japanese nationals (including Koreans) remain in these areas. They cannot flee from this region because of their large numbers and therefore the Japanese command must send troops for their protection.

It is not proposed to send the troops towards the Soviet frontier. They will be sent to Imianpo and only in the case of the most urgent necessity will they possibly be sent to Heilin.

In view of this the Japanese Government has instructed the ambassador to confer with the Soviet Government and to request it to send instructions to its representatives in Manchuria to reply affirmatively to the request for the use of the eastern section of the CER for the transport of Japanese troops.

The Japanese command will of course respect the interests and rights of the USSR in north Manchuria and it has proved this when sending troops to Tsitsihar and Harbin. The Japanese Government asks the Soviet Government to have no fear that the Japanese troops will encroach on the interests and rights of the USSR in the CER. The Japanese Government assures the Soviet Government that these interests and rights will be fully respected. The only object in dispatching troops to the east of Harbin is to save Japanese nationals.

Therefore the Japanese Government requests the Soviet Government to permit the dispatch of Japanese forces to Imianpo station and, in case of urgent necessity, to Heilin, in the same way as, at the time, it agreed to their dispatch to Tsitsihar and Harbin.

On the same day Comrade Karakhan gave the Japanese ambassador the following reply to the Japanese Government's request:

In reply to the Japanese Government's request for permission to transport Japanese troops on the Chinese Eastern Railway from Harbin to Imianpo, and if necessary to Heilin, I am instructed by my Government to make the following statement:

The transport of Japanese troops by the CER conflicts in certain

respects with the treaty concluded at Peking in 1925[1] between the USSR and Japan, under which the treaty of Portsmouth[2] remains in force. However, taking into consideration the Japanese Government's reference to the special circumstances compelling it to make this request to the Soviet Government, and, in particular, considering that the Chinese authorities in Manchuria and the Chinese section of the CER administration requested the CER administration to allow Japanese troops to be transported on the eastern line of the CER, the Soviet Government agrees, as an exceptional and temporary measure, to instruct the Soviet section of the CER administration to permit a limited number of Japanese troops from Harbin to travel to Imianpo and if necessary as far as Hcilin.

In giving its consent to the transport of Japanese troops to the stations named above, the Soviet Government makes that consent conditional on the assurances of the Japanese Government that the rights and interests of the USSR in the CER will in no circumstances be infringed by the Japanese authorities and high command.

In addition, Comrade Karakhan put two questions to the Japanese ambassador concerning the treaty of Portsmouth, requesting their transmission to the Japanese Government.

1. Under article 7 of the Portsmouth treaty Russia and Japan undertook to operate the railways in Manchuria solely for commercial and industrial purposes 'and in no form whatever for strategical purposes'. The frequent requests of the Japanese Government for the transport of Japanese troops by the CER, and the transport of those troops by the CER, i.e. the use of this railway by Japan for strategic purposes, come into the category of cases excluded under Article 7 of the Portsmouth treaty, and the Soviet Government considers that these facts lead to a violation of the Portsmouth treaty. The Soviet Government strictly observes this and other articles of the Portsmouth treaty, and has instructed me to ask the Japanese Government whether it can rely on the Japanese Government and the Japanese command also observing article 7 of the Portsmouth treaty in relation to the CER.

2. The Soviet Government is reliably informed that recently Japanese troops have been concentrated in areas adjacent to the Soviet-Korean frontier. Under article 2 of the Portsmouth treaty both sides undertook 'to refrain from any military action on the Russo-Korean frontier which might endanger the security of Russian or Korean territory'. The Soviet Government, which has strictly observed this undertaking, would like to receive an explanation from the Japanese Government of the massing of Japanese troops on the Soviet-Korean frontier.

The Japanese ambassador undertook to telegraph this inquiry immediately to Tokyo.

[1] *League of Nations Treaty Series*, xxxiv, p. 32. [2] *State Papers*, xcviii, p. 735.

NARKOMINDEL STATEMENT ON THE JAPANESE AMBASSADOR'S REPLY TO THE SOVIET INQUIRIES ABOUT MANCHURIA

22 *March* 1932 *Dokumenty*, iii, p. 74

In regard to the questions put to the Japanese Government by the Vice-Commissar for Foreign Affairs, Comrade Karakhan, in an interview with the Japanese ambassador, Hirota, concerning White Guard activities, the new State in Manchuria, and the violation of the Portsmouth treaty, already reported in the press, the following additional explanations and assurances have now been received from the Japanese Government.

On White Guard activity the Japanese ambassador, Hirota, on the instructions of his Government, made a statement rejecting the version that 'recently direct support has been given by the Japanese authorities to Russian White Guard organizations in Manchuria'. The statement went on to deny the numerous reports in the foreign and Soviet press of aggressive White Guard activities in Manchuria supported by the Japanese. In particular, the Japanese ambassador's statement confirms the report of the Japanese War Department published in Tokyo on 27 February that 'there is no foundation whatever for the press reports that Japanese troops in Manchuria are organizing a White Guard division whose task it is to threaten the Soviet frontier', and that 'should there be any truth in the reported presence among the Whites of such elements who, using the name of the Japanese army as cover, are preparing malicious intrigues, the military authorities are ready to take energetic steps to put an end to it'.

Finally the Japanese ambassador, in his statement of 19 March, gave assurances in the name of the Japanese Government that 'the Kwantung army, closely following the activities of the Russian Whites, is prepared if necessary to take the appropriate measures to suppress any political and still more any insurrectionary action against the USSR'.

This is in accordance with the Japanese ambassador's statement to Comrade Karakhan on 15 March that 'Japan will not allow the Whites to undertake anything against the USSR'.

On the question of the new State in Manchuria the Japanese ambassador gave the following explanation of the Japanese Government's position. If the new Government in Manchuria guarantees Japan the execution of treaty obligations, ensures security of life and property for Japanese citizens, and if it will try to develop friendly sentiments towards Japan, then Japan will welcome such a Government.

As to relations with other States, the new Government of Manchuria, according to the Japanese ambassador, will be guided in its policy by the 'open door' and 'equal opportunities' principles. The Japanese

ambassador informed Comrade Karakhan that the new Government has not been recognized by Japan. For the present the Japanese Government is only 'observing the course of events in Manchuria'.

As to the Portsmouth treaty the Japanese ambassador, on the instructions of his Government, gave explanations to Comrade Karakhan on both 5 and 19 March. The Japanese Government sees no violation of the Portsmouth treaty in the dispatch and concentration of troops by the CER as, according to Hirota, this was done not in pursuit of any strategic aims, but with the object of protecting the life and property of Japanese residents. As to the use of Japanese troops to guard the CER, the Japanese Government gives as justification that, in connexion with events in Manchuria, the guard along the southern section of the railway had disappeared, and as there was a danger of attacks by bandits and of an interruption of traffic on the line, the Japanese troops had to take over the guarding of the southern line. Since 3 March Japanese troops have ceased to act as guards; this is now being done by Kirin troops.

While assuring the Soviet Government that Japan has loyally observed and will in the future continue to observe the Portsmouth treaty, the Japanese ambassador stated to Comrade Karakhan that Japan is pursuing no strategic aims on the CER and that 'the Japanese Government has not the slightest intention of leaving troops along the line of the CER'.

Concerning the concentration of troops along the Soviet-Korean frontier the Japanese Government gave the following explanation. In the Japanese ambassador's statement to Comrade Karakhan on 5 March the Japanese Government, while not denying the concentration of troops on the Soviet-Korean frontier, explained that this was not with any object that might threaten Soviet territory. In his statement on 19 March the Japanese ambassador referred to the presence in this area of frontier guards only, and assured Comrade Karakhan that since the resumption of diplomatic relations between the USSR and Japan their troops on the Soviet frontier had not been reinforced.

To the Japanese Government's counter-questions about the concentration of Soviet troops on the Soviet-Korean frontier and the construction of aerodromes there, put by the Japanese ambassador on 19 March, Comrade Karakhan replied that there was no foundation for these reports, that there was no concentration of Soviet troops on the Soviet-Korean frontier and none is intended, just as there is no intention of undertaking any other military measures running counter to the Portsmouth treaty. The Soviet Government, pursuing a consistent peace policy, strictly observes the Portsmouth treaty and hopes, said Comrade Karakhan, that the Japanese Government and its representatives in

Manchuria will likewise observe the obligations resting on Japan in virtue of that treaty.

TASS STATEMENT ON THE SOVIET REQUEST FOR THE RECALL OF THE CHINESE CONSUL AT BLAGOVESHCHENSK

18 *April* 1932 *Izvestia*, 18 *April* 1932

It has come to the knowledge of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs that the Chinese Consul at Blagoveshchensk has been making use of his privilege of sending coded telegraphic messages to transmit to all parts of China and other countries various appeals over the signature of General Ma, who is in hiding in Heilungkiang province in north-west Manchuria.

Since this constitutes an abuse by the Chinese Consul of the rights granted him, and since it may prejudice the policy of strict non-interference in Manchurian affairs conducted by the Soviet Government, Narkomindel has requested the Manchurian Government to recall the present Chinese Consul in Blagoveshchensk and to appoint another in his place. At the same time orders have been given to suspend temporarily the transmission of all telegrams emanating from the Chinese Consul in Blagoveshchensk.

REPLY TO THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS INQUIRY WHETHER THE SOVIET UNION WOULD BE WILLING TO SUBMIT EVIDENCE TO THE LYTTON COMMISSION: LETTER FROM LITVINOV TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE LEAGUE

22 *April* 1932 *U.S. Foreign Relations*, 1932, iv, p. 8

Pursuant to the request which you were so good as to transmit to me by your letter[1] of the 20th instant I have the honor to communicate to you the following reply from the Government of the USSR:

The Soviet Government would be disposed to give all possible aid to the work of any commission that would be sincerely actuated by a desire to make clear the actual state of affairs in Manchuria and which would really desire to put an end to the armed conflicts which are taking place in China. The Soviet Government, however, which is not a member of the League of Nations, has participated neither in the examination of present events in China nor in the formation of Lord Lytton's Commission and has no representative on that Commission; it is not, therefore, in a position to assure itself that the information that its representative might furnish would receive appropriate treatment and cannot,

[1] *U.S. Foreign Relations*, 1932, iv, p. 7.

therefore, assume any responsibility for the conclusions that the Commission of the League of Nations might reach; in these circumstances the Soviet Government feels obliged to reply to your request in the negative.

EXTRACTS FROM A SPEECH BY MOLOTOV AT A RECEPTION TO THE TURKISH PREMIER AND FOREIGN MINISTER

28 *April* 1932 *Izvestia*, 30 *April* 1932

Allow me to call the day of your arrival in the capital of the Soviet Union a significant day in the development of Soviet-Turkish friendship. I consider it significant first of all because members of the Soviet Government have had the opportunity of establishing direct contact with such outstanding political leaders of the friendly Turkish Republic as you, Mr Premier. I also consider it significant because you came to the Soviet Union accompanied by highly authoritative representatives of the political thought, the press, the economy, and the culture of the new Turkey, whose visit to the Soviet Union will have first-rate importance for an understanding of all aspects of Soviet construction and for establishing direct contact between Turkish and Soviet institutions in the fields of economy, culture, education, scientific research, etc. I emphasize this point because mutual knowledge is a pledge of mutual understanding, and mutual understanding is the firm foundation of Soviet-Turkish friendship.

Soviet-Turkish friendship, the importance of which extends far beyond the limits of direct Soviet-Turkish relations, is an old friendship tried in the furnace of international events. Such friendship may truly be called historical. It arose when, at the end of the imperialist war, the peoples of Turkey and the Soviet Union were forced to wage an intense struggle against the forces of imperialism for their right to an independent existence and to build their life anew according to their own interests. Both countries had not only to fight the remnants of the old regime, but also to defend their revolutionary gains from foreign intervention. It was then that the foundations of co-operation and friendship between our peoples were laid.

The twelve years that have passed since then have witnessed the steady development and deepening of Soviet-Turkish relations and collaboration. This was expressed in a number of important political and economic treaties and agreements in accordance with the interests of both countries and reflecting the peaceful policy they undeviatingly pursue.

Soviet-Turkish collaboration in the political sphere created a new

type of political agreement—the pact of non-aggression and neutrality, the first of which was that concluded between the Soviet Union and Turkey on 17 December 1925. This pact has more than once served, and will continue to serve, as a model for the settlement by the two parties of disputes in their relations with other States. The principles on which Soviet-Turkish relations were based have stood the test of time and have demonstrated their vitality and their outstanding importance for both parties.

Our economic relations have also developed, despite all the differences in the social and economic customs of our countries. The economic progress of the Soviet Union and the great advances in the economic life of the Turkish Republic give us the right to hope for the further development and deepening of economic collaboration between the two.

Of great assistance in the development and strengthening of friendly Soviet-Turkish relations was the constant personal contact maintained between the political leaders of the two States. The series of meetings between Soviet and Turkish leaders of foreign policy, the visits paid to the respective capitals, the exchanges of views on important international questions, always created the most favourable conditions for establishing unity of views on these questions.

Your visit to Moscow now, when in international affairs the influences hostile to the cause of peace are growing steadily stronger, is especially important, and underlines the enormous significance of Soviet-Turkish friendship, both directly for the interests of our two countries, and generally for the cause of peace. The Government of the Soviet Union, and the Soviet public are well aware, Mr Premier, of your leading role in the history of the new Turkey. Your name is closely connected with that of the leader of the new Turkey, the respected President Ghazi Mustafa Kemal. Your name is inseparable from such historic factors in the development of the Turkish Republic as the battles in Anatolia, the negotiations in Lausanne, the programme of national, economic, and cultural construction, and the fundamental stages in Soviet-Turkish relations. Therefore it is with special satisfaction that I greet you today in the capital of the Soviet Union, and in your person warmly greet the heroic Turkish nation. I am also happy to welcome our old friend the Turkish Foreign Minister, Tewfik Rushdi Bey.

TASS COMMUNIQUÉ ON THE VISIT TO MOSCOW OF THE TURKISH PREMIER AND FOREIGN MINISTER

8 *May* 1932 *Izvestia*, 8 *May* 1932

During their visit to the USSR the chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Turkish Republic, Ismet Pasha, and the Turkish Foreign Minister, Tewfik Rushdi Bey, had several conversations with all the

responsible members of the Soviet Government; the respective ambassadors of the two countries attended these meetings.

The conversations were of a particularly cordial and friendly character, permitting the examination on a broad basis both of international questions of interest to the two countries and of the direct relations between the two States. Full community of views was established, making it clear that the policy of close co-operation in the past has been completely justified, and that the present international situation and the cause of general peace dictate the necessity not only of continuing but of extending that co-operation.

Special attention was paid to questions of economic and cultural intercourse between Turkey and the USSR. The personal knowledge gained by the Turkish visitors of the economic construction now proceeding in the USSR and of the achievements of Soviet science revealed in many instances the existence of marked similarities in the tasks confronting the two countries in these fields, and the practical possibility of wider and more effective contact.

Agreement in principle was reached on the methods of such practical contact, and to this end the Soviet Government has opened a long-term credit of $8 million to be made available in goods by annual instalments for the acquisition of the latest kinds of equipment of Soviet industry.

It was also recognized as useful that cultural connexions, particularly those between the scientific institutions of the two countries, should be made closer and more active.

TASS STATEMENT ON THE SOVIET REPLY TO THE LYTTON COMMISSION'S REQUEST FOR PERMISSION TO TRAVEL THROUGH SOVIET TERRITORY

21 *May* 1932 *Izvestia*, 21 *May* 193·

Lord Lytton's Commission in Harbin addressed to the Soviet Government, through the Soviet Consul-General in Harbin, Comrade Slavutsky, a request to permit a group of members of the Commission to proceed via Blagoveshchensk to Sakhalin to meet General Ma. The Soviet Government instructed Comrade Slavutsky to inform the League of Nations Commission that, being unwilling to violate the principle of non-intervention in the internal affairs of Manchuria, it was compelled to refuse the request of the members of the Lytton Commission.

EXTRACTS FROM A CREDIT AGREEMENT WITH GERMANY

15 *June* 1932 *Foreign Economic Relations*, p. 33

Whereas the Soviet-German Agreement of 14 April 1931 assisted in the development of trading relations between Germany and the USSR and led to an extension and simplification of business relations between the industries of both countries, the two parties concluded on 15 June 1932 a new agreement under the following conditions:

I.

The Trade Delegation of the USSR in Germany and other USSR organizations agree to place in the period between 15 June 1932, and 31 May 1933, with German firms, orders under conditions of the present agreement, taking into consideration the technical requirements, price, and periods of delivery in accordance with agreements with the respective firms.

II.

Agreements for industrial equipment for the USSR must be sanctioned by the USSR Trade Delegation in Germany without any changes and without delay. The USSR Trade Delegation in Germany undertakes to countersign the agreement and is jointly responsible for the financial obligations therein in accordance with Article 9 of the Soviet-German Agreement of 12 October 1925, and is responsible for all the payments under all the agreements. The place for payment (signing of acceptances, cheques, cash payments) must in each case be Berlin. . . .

III.

B. INTEREST.

Interest is calculated every three months and is paid in each case in six months' acceptances free of all cost and interest. The interest is calculated on the prevailing discount rate of the Reichsbank of the previous quarter. In calculating quarterly interest, those acceptances on which a full quarter's interest is not yet due but on which at least one month is due must also be taken into consideration.

The buyer shall pay on all bills issued interest at 2 per cent above the prevailing discount rate of the Reichsbank. This is, however, not to exceed 10 per cent nor to be lower than 7 per cent per annum. Should the Reichsbank discount rate be reduced below 5 per cent the buyer has the right to raise the question of a reduction of interest. No interest is to be paid on the bills for the first three months, the period of grace however should not exceed the date of delivery of goods.

IV.

Both parties must agree as to date of payment and delivery of bills.

V.

All Agreements concluded between 15 June 1932, and 31 May 1933, between German firms and the USSR organizations empowered to place orders are subject to the present Agreement. Agreements concluded before 15 June 1932 are also subject to the present Agreement if it was stipulated at the time that they are subject to general agreements to be concluded in the future.

VI.

The Trade Delegation of the USSR in Germany reserves its full right to select the firms with whom to place orders. Individual German firms are also free to decide to what extent they are willing to accept orders on the basis of the present Agreement.

VII.

This Agreement comes into force on 15 June 1932. It is understood that the negotiations between the USSR Trade Delegation and the Union of German Industrialists on the interpretation of the general conditions of delivery as well as the erection of the machinery are to be concluded within four weeks from the date of the Agreement coming into force. Before this interpretation is determined all orders placed in connexion with the present Agreement are to be subject to the conditions of delivery previously in existence—in accordance with the Agreement of 9 February 1927.

TASS STATEMENT ON THE SOVIET-JAPANESE FISHERIES AGREEMENT

22 *August* 1932 *Izvestia*, 22 *August* 1932

The agreement between the USSR and Japan signed on 13 August by the Vice-Commissar for Foreign Affairs, Karakhan, and the Japanese ambassador in Moscow, Hirota, settles a number of questions which arose during the practical application of the fisheries convention[1] concluded between the two countries in 1928. The basis of the settlement of these questions adopted in the agreement is the strict observance of all the articles and provisions of the said convention.

The chief question of interest to both Japanese and Soviet enterprises is that of the rent of the coastal fishing grounds from which the fishing industry is carried on in Soviet Pacific waters. The convention provided that these grounds were to be acquired by auction on the principle of free competition, and rented for a period of from one to five years.

[1] *League of Nations Treaty Series*, lxxx, p. 341.

Exceptions were made in the case of Soviet State enterprises, which acquire their grounds without auction. However, the number of these grounds was until now limited in such a way that the enterprises in question could not make use of grounds which brought the total catch in general to more than two million puds, or 20 per cent of the total catch of all the fishing grounds. The convention provided for the possibility of exceeding that limit, but only by special agreement to that effect between the two Governments.

The convention also provided for the renting of grounds without auction to other entrepreneurs, but again only by agreement to that effect between the two Governments.

Under the new agreement the said limitation on the amount of the catch established for Soviet State enterprises has been increased to five million puds, thus enabling these enterprises to increase considerably the number of fishing grounds they exploit.

At the same time the agreement provides that the grounds now rented to Japanese citizens shall not be put up for auction before the expiration of the period of the fisheries convention, i.e., before 1936. Sixty grounds are excluded from this provision, and will be put up for auction.

The agreement thus provides that there will be put up for auction annually all new (newly-opened) grounds, sixty of the grounds now rented to Japanese citizens, and the grounds rented by Soviet private persons and enterprises, excluding Soviet State enterprises.

The agreement notes in conclusion that its signing terminates all disputes which have arisen between Japan and the USSR in connexion with the renting of grounds by Soviet State and other enterprises, the terms and conditions of rental of which were, in the Japanese view, laid down without sufficient consideration of the general interests of the Japanese entrepreneurs.

The agreement consists of four brief articles setting forth the above conditions, mutually satisfying the interests of the fishing enterprises of both countries.

NOTE FROM STARK, SOVIET ENVOY TO AFGHANISTAN, TO THE AFGHAN FOREIGN MINISTER, ON THE APPOINTMENT OF FRONTIER COMMISSIONERS TO SETTLE FRONTIER INCIDENTS

13 *September* 1932 *Sbornik Dogovorov*, vii, p. 54

I have the honour to inform you that, with the object of preventing any kind of border incident on the Soviet-Afghan frontier, and also of settling such incidents as quickly as possible should they occur, my

Government considers it appropriate to make the following arrangements:

1. The USSR and Afghanistan shall each appoint six frontier commissioners for the entire length of their common frontier.

2. The frontier commissioners of the USSR, who are to examine and settle frontier incidents, shall be:

(*a*) The head of the Merv frontier section, permanently stationed in the town of Merv, and with an area of operations extending from the junction of the Soviet with the Persian-Afghan frontier to frontier post no. 53, 40 kilometres to the north-west of the town of Doulet-Abad.

His assistants shall be: the chief of the Kushk fortress frontier section, permanently stationed at the Kushk fortress, and the chief of the Takhta-Bazar frontier section, permanently stationed at Takhta-Bazar;

(*b*) The head of the Kerkinsk frontier section, permanently stationed in the town of Kerk. This section stretches from frontier post no. 53 to the eastern boundary of the village of Salty-Aryk.

His assistants shall be: the chief of the Shiram-Kuyu frontier section permanently stationed at Shiram-Kuyu, and the chief of the Khotab frontier section, permanently stationed in the village of Khotab.

(*c*) The head of the Surkhan-Darinsk frontier section, permanently stationed in the town of Termez and with an area of operations from the village of Salty-Aryk to the Staro-Ovrazhnyi post ruins, 50 kilometres south-east of the town of Termez.

(*d*) The head of the Sarai frontier section, permanently stationed in the town of Baumanabad (formerly Sarai-Komar) and with an area of operations from the Staro-Ovrazhnyi post to the rock on the bank of the Piandj River 4½ kilometres north-east of the village of Shoonak.

His assistants shall be: the chief of the Aivaj frontier section, stationed at Aivaj, and the chief of the Sary-Chashmensk frontier section, stationed in the village of Sary-Chashme.

(*e*) The head of the Kala-i-Khumb frontier section, stationed in the town of Kala-i-Khumb and with an area of operations from the rock on the bank of the Pianj River 4½ kilometres north-east of the village of Shoonak to the junction of the rivers Yaz-Gulem and Pianj.

(*f*) The head of the Khorog frontier section, stationed in the town of Khorog and with an area of operations from the river Yaz-Gulem to the junction of the Soviet-Afghan-Chinese frontier.

His assistants shall be: the chief of the Ishkashim frontier section, stationed at Ishkashim, and the chief of the Liangar frontier section, stationed at Liangar.

3. The commissioners of each State shall be subjects or citizens of that State. Neither of the contracting States may appoint as commissioners persons who were formerly subjects or citizens of the other State. When appointing the commissioners, each Government shall inform the other about the appointments made. In order that the frontier commissioners may carry out their work in an orderly and uninterrupted fashion, the parties consider it necessary that the procedure for presenting the frontier commissioners to the Government of the other party shall be completed rapidly, by telegraph. The parties shall give instructions to their frontier authorities that frontier commissioners who are being replaced shall not leave their sections before the arrival for duty of those who are to replace them.

4. The frontier commissioners are bound to prevent in the frontier area any kind of aggressive action by criminals against the frontier residents of the other party and to see to the maintenance of order on the frontier, and they are also bound to take energetic steps to see that in no case shall arms be fired from the territory of one party against the posts, sentries, or private persons or territory of the other party. Should such actions nevertheless by chance take place, they must immediately put a stop to them and make an investigation. In the first place the frontier commissioners must take decisive and energetic steps to liquidate those criminals on their territory in regard to whom there is adequate evidence of guilt. With this in view the frontier commissioners have the right to present to the other party a list of the names of the criminals to be found on the territory of the other party and liable to liquidation or to expulsion from the frontier region into the interior of the country. If there is a likelihood that the pursued persons may cross into the territory of the other party, the frontier commissioner of the first party is bound to inform the frontier commissioner of the other party in good time so that the necessary steps shall be duly taken to liquidate these criminals on the territory of his State. Should there be frontier violations or persecutions by the inhabitants of one party of the inhabitants of the other party, the commissioner of the injured party shall report on this to the commissioner from whose area the disturbance of order proceeded, after which the two commissioners jointly shall proceed to the place where the incident occurred to investigate the matter. The commissioner

in whose area the preparations were made is bound to take with all possible speed the steps necessary to liquidate the incident.

Note. The frontier area is reckoned as an area extending to a depth of eighteen (18) kilometres.

5. The category of questions referred to in article 4, and subject to joint settlement by the frontier commissioners, includes:

(*a*) accidental crossing of the frontier by inhabitants of the frontier area (excluding frontier officials of both parties) and help in returning them to their own territory;

(*b*) shooting from the territory of one party at the posts, sentries, private persons, or the territory of the other party,

(*c*) crossing by armed persons or armed gangs of brigands from the territory of one State on to the territory of the other;

(*d*) accidental crossing of domestic animals and herds (large and small cattle) from the territory of one party to the territory of the other, stealing property and cattle from across the frontier, and also the transporting of raw materials and industrial products and the driving of cattle by contraband means from the territory of one party to the territory of the other;

(*e*) damage to farms, property, and other equipment, including river and irrigation works, in the immediate neighbourhood of the frontier;

(*f*) all other frontier incidents of a local character.

Note. Questions concerning the determination of the frontier, and also questions of a political or economic character, for which no provision has been made in the present note, do not lie within the competence of the frontier commissioners.

6. Should a frontier incident occur, the commissioner of the party on whose territory it occurs must inform the commissioner of the other party immediately of what has taken place, after which both commissioners must without any delay proceed together to the scene of the incident to make the necessary investigations and take the necessary steps, and also to draw up and sign a protocol. They may settle frontier incidents by mutual agreement.

7. Where incidents require that measures shall be taken immediately the commissioner of each party has the right, should the commissioner of the other party be absent from the spot, to turn to the local authorities of the other party, so that the matter may then be brought to the notice of the commissioner of the other party, and in case of need they shall jointly undertake a supplementary investigation and take supplementary measures. The parties shall draw up and sign a protocol on the

results of the investigation of the incident, both by the local authorities, and by the supplementary investigation, and on the measures taken in the one and the other case. The list of incidents to be treated as matters of urgency shall be drawn up by agreement of the commissioners of both parties, and until such agreement is reached, the frontier commissioners may not appeal directly to the local authorities of the other party. In cases of the utmost urgency and in the absence of the commissioner of the other party, the frontier commissioners may appeal to the local authorities regardless of whether or not the matter at issue is included among the questions on which the frontier commissioners had previously agreed.

8. The commissioners' decisions and minutes are to be drawn up in two original copies, in the State language of the two parties, and as briefly as possible.

9. Should the commissioners not reach agreement on an incident which has occurred, the question is to be immediately transferred for settlement by diplomatic means.

10. The frontier commissioners of both parties shall enjoy the following rights:

(*a*) they may cross the frontier at places mutually agreed upon by the commissioners and on the basis of documents giving their official position, and may be accompanied by an interpreter, a secretary, and an assistant. These latter persons may cross the frontier on the production of documents issued to them by their frontier commissioner. All the documents mentioned in the present paragraph shall be stamped by the representatives of the other party with a visa for a fixed period. In addition, persons with such documents are obliged whenever they cross the frontier to present their passports to the frontier authorities of the other party;

(*b*) the commissioners have the right, in case of need, to give permission to injured parties, witnesses, and experts of their side to cross the frontier once in both directions, but the number of such persons shall not exceed ten (10);

(*c*) injured parties, experts, and witnesses crossing into the territory of the other party in the said manner, shall not carry arms;

(*d*) the frontier commissioners of both parties, and also their official correspondence, shall enjoy immunity on the territory of both parties;

(*e*) the frontier commissioners shall enjoy the right to wear the uniform of their service;

(*f*) the frontier commissioners are entitled to use codes in their correspondence with the political representatives and consuls of their State;

(*g*) the frontier commissioners shall enjoy the right of transporting duty free stores of provisions and of all articles required by them for the execution of their duties, such as office equipment. The weight of such luggage shall not exceed fifteen kilograms per person. Such luggage is liable to the usual customs inspection.

11. Each party shall bear the cost of the upkeep and travelling expenses while on duty of its frontier commissioners, and shall enjoy the co-operation of the other party in regard to getting means of transport and lodging, and also in regard to the granting of documents required in an investigation, and in receiving depositions from such persons as may be required.

12. Should it be necessary for the frontier commissioner of one of the parties to question a witness or injured party on the territory of the other party, the questioning shall be conducted by the frontier commissioner of the party to which the witness or injured party belongs, in the presence of the frontier commissioner of the other party.

13. The first meeting of the frontier commissioners to organize the future work in their area shall take place not later than one month after the exchange of notes setting up the frontier commissioner service.

14. Should a frontier commissioner of one party take any action in regard to the other party exceeding the limits of his competence or in contradiction to his duties, the other party shall have the right to request his removal and his replacement by another commissioner.

15. Everything set forth above in regard to the frontier commissioners, including the method of their appointment as provided for in the third article of the present note, shall, in the absence of any commissioner, be extended to his assistant, who shall have the same powers.

16. Should it be necessary to change the number of sections of the frontier commissioners, to change the area of their operations, their duties and rights, or the place of their residence as given in the second article of the present note, all such changes will be effected by agreement between the plenipotentiary representative of the USSR in Afghanistan and the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of the Kingdom of Afghanistan, or between the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs of the USSR and the Embassy of the Kingdom of Afghanistan in Moscow, by means of a supplementary exchange of notes.

17. The agreement set forth in the present note will remain in force for three (3) years. Thereafter it shall remain in force without a time

limit, each side having the right to denounce it by giving notice six (6) months in advance to the other party.

In submitting the above for your consideration, I have the honour to request you to inform me of the opinion of the Afghan Government on this matter.

Should the Government of Afghanistan agree to the above, will you be good enough to inform me of the places of residence and the area of operations of the Afghan frontier commissioners.

[The Afghan reply of the same date is, *mutatis mutandis*, in identical terms.]

STATEMENT BY LITVINOV AT THE SIXTH SESSION OF THE COMMISSION OF ENQUIRY FOR EUROPEAN UNION

1 *October* 1932

League of Nations, 1932, vii, 13, p. 13
Vneshnyaya Politika, p. 237

M. Litvinov (USSR) said that, if he intervened in this discussion, it was partly owing to the fact that representatives of the Soviet Union had had no opportunity of expressing their views upon the Stresa decisions at Stresa itself. The Stresa Conference was supposed to consist of delegates from exporting and importing countries, especially from the East and the Centre of Europe, and it was apparently assumed that the Soviet Union had neither imports nor exports, while as to its eastern situation, the points of the compass at international conferences would appear to show political rather than geographical direction. Soon, perhaps, the organizers of conferences might find it convenient to discover that the world itself did not contain all the countries marked on the map. But he would leave this aspect of the problem for the moment.

In the interests of brevity, he would not dwell upon the variety of proposals and suggestions contained in the report[1] of the Stresa Conference, especially as they were more in the nature of pious hopes than of schemes capable of realisation. The most that could be said of them was that, good as they might be in themselves, they ran counter to recent practice in the majority of the States represented at Stresa. It might, of course, be a good thing for the Governments concerned to bear in mind the Stresa recommendations—it might serve as a reminder that, in their everyday economic and legislative practice, they were doing precisely the opposite to what they themselves acknowledged at international conferences to be right. The impossibility of putting into practice these recommendations would emphasise the fact that conflicts

[1] League of Nations, 1932, vii, 11.

of interest, both between nations and within nations, could not nowadays be overcome in the interests of international solidarity.

But among the proposals there was one which, if it was not fated to join the limbo of pious hopes, did call forth certain considerations, and even apprehensions, on account of the principle underlying it. He referred to what was called the scheme for the 'revalorisation of cereals'. This measure was obviously prompted by the consideration that, owing to the drop in the price of cereals, the exporting countries were experiencing difficulties in covering their payments abroad for their own imports, past and present. Hence a diminution in imports, reacting upon the industrial countries and creating a factor in the general economic crisis. The drop in the price of cereals impoverished the agricultural population and lowered its purchasing capacity, thus leading to the same results—that was to say, to the restriction of industrial production, with all its consequences. It was therefore proposed to establish a fund to provide premiums for grain-exporting countries, by way of compensation for the drop in prices. There could be no doubt that the agricultural countries would profit by this scheme, and from this point of view there could be no objection to it—unless it were from the contributors to such a fund. But, in connexion with the question whether it could lead to a recovery of industry and to alleviation of the crisis, many doubts were bound to arise.

In the first place, what guarantees were there that the grain-exporting countries, in their competition with each other and with extra-European countries, in their fight for markets would not further lower prices, counting upon the premiums? Moreover, how would privileges accorded to some agricultural countries react upon the rest of European grain-exporting countries? After all, the establishment of premiums amounted to preferential treatment, and to the circumvention of the principle of the most-favoured nation. The Rapporteur himself had practically admitted this. All the objections raised here or elsewhere to preferential treatment and the infringement of the long-established principle of the most-favoured nation applied therefore, more or less, to the scheme before the Commission.

M. Litvinov was naturally concerned with the effect the scheme might have upon the foreign trade of his own country, which exported certain cereals in larger quantities than all the countries mentioned in the report together. He did not raise this question in the name of either justice or equality, but from the point of view of the economic crisis and of the interest of the industrial countries of Europe. He had already had occasion to refer in the Commission of Enquiry to the economic interdependence of the Soviet Union and the rest of the world. He would not burden the Commission with statistics, but would merely say that the

Soviet Union now occupied the first place in the import of machinery, absorbing one-fourth of world machinery exports. Certain branches of industry in such countries as Germany, Great Britain, Sweden, Poland, and others, were largely kept going by Soviet orders. He had read, for instance, that, in Germany alone, not less than 300,000 industrial workers were employed in carrying out Soviet orders. In normal circumstances this interdependence was not likely to be weakened. The term 'autarchy', so popular in some countries, was not used or thought of in the Soviet Union. But the imports of his country, like those in other countries—indeed, more than in most—depended very largely upon its exports. Any diminution in receipts from exports, whether owing to reduction in volume or a drop in prices, must necessarily entail a corresponding diminution in imports. It was therefore obvious that, should the realisation of this scheme bring about such results for the Soviet Union, European industry as a whole might suffer more than it would gain by the total increase of the purchasing power of some countries, by 75 million francs, which would, after all, have to come out of its own pocket.

These were the considerations which he hoped the various bodies dealing with the scheme for the revalorisation of cereals would bear in mind. For his own part, he sincerely believed that the present crisis could be neither cured nor alleviated by any measures amounting to discrimination and the intensification of economic strife between countries. He took that opportunity to remind the Commission that nearly a year had elapsed since he had submitted a proposal for the conclusion of an economic pact of non-aggression. After passing through a series of committees, that proposal had found lasting peace in one of them. He did not think present economic relationships justified such an attitude towards the Soviet proposal. If it were not clear a year ago, it should be clear by now, that international economic war existed and was spreading, and that discrimination was eating into international and economic life. He ventured, therefore, to express the hope that the Commission would realise that the time had come to disinter the Soviet draft Convention for a non-aggression pact.

PRESS STATEMENT BY LITVINOV ON THE NEGOTIATIONS FOR A NON-AGGRESSION PACT WITH RUMANIA

16 *October* 1932 *Izvestia*, 16 *October* 1932

The negotiations with Rumania began nearly ten months ago in Riga, where the Rumanian Government proposed that the negotiations should take place. Even before the representatives of the two States

met in Riga, Rumania, through the mediation of the Polish Government, stipulated that the substance of the questions in dispute between the two States should not be dragged into the negotiations, but left aside. This referred primarily to the question of Bessarabia, and also to other questions which were thus to be left open even after the conclusion of the non-aggression pact.

The negotiations in Riga were conducted on the basis of a draft submitted by the Soviet Government, and of a Rumanian counter-proposal. In the course of a few weeks the representatives of the two States succeeded in reaching agreement on practically all the articles of the pact, and the agreed text of these articles was embodied in a protocol and signed by both sides. The pact consisted in all of a few articles, including a mutual undertaking of non-aggression and neutrality and the obligation not to include other agreements which would conflict with that undertaking. The pact was to have been concluded, by agreement of the two parties, for five years, as was the pact with Poland, Rumania's ally. The Soviet pacts with Finland and other countries were also concluded for a five-year period.

There was disagreement on two points at Riga. The Rumanian representative decisively opposed as irrelevant any reference, either in the preamble or in any other part of the pact, to the omission of questions in dispute between the two parties as not affecting the pact, and that each Government fully maintains its position on these questions. The objection was the more unfounded as Rumania itself, on the eve of the negotiations, made this a preliminary condition, and as the existence of disputed questions between the USSR and Rumania, above all the question of Bessarabia, is known to the entire world and cannot be denied. For its part Rumania proposed formulas for the non-aggression undertaking which might be interpreted as implicit recognition by the Soviet Government of the occupation of Bessarabia. We emphatically rejected these formulas, and for our part proposed others in which it was clearly stated that the USSR undertakes not in any circumstances to resort to force to settle any questions in dispute. These formulas gave Rumania a complete guarantee that even the dispute over Bessarabia will not be used by the Soviet Government to withdraw from its obligations under the non-aggression pact. The discussion on these two points made it clear that the Rumanian delegation were less interested in a non-aggression pact than in receiving from the Soviet Government an implicit or tacit recognition of the occupation of Bessarabia. The negotiations were therefore broken off, to be subsequently resumed through the mediation of third countries. But while the Soviet side were prepared, for the sake of reaching agreement, to make the utmost possible concessions, proposing new formulas for the points in dispute,

the Rumanian side advanced no new proposals, but held stubbornly to the demands and objections it had made at Riga. We even accepted certain compromise formulas proposed by the representatives of countries allied to Rumania, but they were one after the other consistently turned down by the Rumanians.

It is being asserted, for example in Rumania, that negotiations were continued directly between me, when I was in Switzerland in July attending the disarmament commission, and M. Titulescu, who was at that time also in Switzerland. That is not true. M. Titulescu declined to hold direct conversations with me and made no proposals. A Polish intermediary made certain proposals, but stated that these were not binding on Rumania. These proposals amounted to beginning the negotiations again from the beginning, on the basis of an entirely new draft, completely ignoring what had already been agreed at Riga. This new draft embodied the same ideas expressed a few days ago by M. Titulescu in his Paris interview.[1] Such a proposal, which meant that the previous negotiations would be wiped out, could not of course be accepted, and therefore I proposed concentrating our efforts on eliminating the two differences remaining from the Riga negotiations.

Before my last departure for Geneva on 13 September a new compromise proposal on the chief divergence was put forward by a country allied to Rumania. Unfortunately, I was at the same time again handed a new draft pact, differing in all its articles from the text agreed at Riga.

We had every reason to believe this proposal had been agreed with Rumania. I stated that I was prepared to accept the new compromise proposal as a basis facilitating the reaching of agreement in future negotiations with Rumania provided that no objections were raised to the articles already agreed upon. I said the same on my way to Geneva at a meeting with the Rumanian ambassador in Warsaw, M. Cadere, with whom it was agreed to resume conversations in Switzerland.

Negotiations were in fact resumed in Switzerland, and M. Cadere was the Rumanian plenipotentiary. He, however, declared that his Government did not consider itself bound either by the protocol signed in Riga by its plenipotentiary, or by the proposals made by the representatives of countries allied to Rumania. We had a few meetings in the course of which we succeeded in again agreeing on the entire pact with the exception of one point, the difference on which, however, is much narrower. Before my departure from Geneva he proposed a formula for this disputed point which in effect removed the only remaining difference and made the early signature of the pact possible. Unfortunately, on the following day he stated that his proposal was not accepted by his own Government, and expressed doubts as to its accepting the other

[1] Cf. *The Times*, 14 October 1932.

formulas agreed upon between us earlier. He decided to go to Bucharest in order finally to ascertain the views of his Government.

From the above account of the negotiations as they occurred it is clear that if Rumania were really anxious, like our other neighbours, to conclude a non-aggression pact, and were not pursuing indirect aims; then such prolonged negotiations would not have been required and agreement would long ago have been reached. But the systematic disavowal of its own plenipotentiaries and of the representatives of countries allied with Rumania reveals traces of different influences contending with each other in Rumania, whether of an internal or external character. The course of the negotiations sometimes made us doubt the seriousness and sincerity of Rumania's desire to conclude a pact. We have public statements of responsible Rumanian politicians to the effect that Rumania has no need of such a pact. It is difficult to expect such politicians to conduct negotiations with the object of reaching agreement, however much they talk of their desire for rapprochement between the USSR and Rumania. To change articles agreed upon after prolonged negotiations by others, thus affording scope for new disagreements, can have no other object but to drag out the negotiations as long as possible and to postpone the signature of the pact, possibly to prevent the conclusion of a non-aggression pact between the Soviet Union and Rumania altogether.

As to the Soviet Government, now as throughout the negotiations it is inspired by the sincere desire to conclude non-aggression pacts with Rumania and other countries as quickly as possible. It considers a second signing of the Kellogg pact superfluous, and it attaches greater significance to the conclusion of special bilateral pacts as guarantees of peace than to the universal Kellogg pact which, as is known, has not prevented the outbreak of hostilities between Japan and China, both of them signatories. It cannot, however, agree that negotiations on such a serious matter should be converted into a diplomatic game for unknown and alien ends. In my opinion any further negotiations should be conducted on the basis of the text already twice agreed upon with Rumanian representatives. With good will on Rumania's part lengthy negotiations, if any, will hardly be necessary, for there now remains only one difference on which the Rumanian Government has to give a formal answer. I am sure that after the Geneva negotiations the Soviet point of view on this question is well enough known to the Rumanian Government.

NOTE TO THE RUMANIAN GOVERNMENT PROPOSING A PACT OF NON-AGGRESSION: LETTER FROM DOVGALEVSKY, SOVIET AMBASSADOR IN PARIS, TO THE FRENCH PRESIDENT

9 *November* 1932 *Le Temps*, 1 *December* 1932

The Soviet Government, having recourse to the good offices of the French Government, requests that the following declaration be brought to the knowledge of the Rumanian Government:

'Anxious to demonstrate once more its peaceful intentions towards Rumania, the Soviet Government declares that it is ready to allow the Rumanian Government, for four months from today's date, the option of concluding a non-aggression pact with the USSR in the terms agreed upon between M. Litvinov and M. Cadere, including the final protocol suggested by M. Cadere.'

To confirm once more its devotion to peace, the Soviet Government declares its adherence to the policy of refraining from the use of violence for the settlement of disputed questions, and to the obligations of the pact of Paris of 27 August 1928.

PRESS STATEMENT BY LITVINOV ON THE SIGNATURE OF THE PACT OF NON-AGGRESSION WITH FRANCE

30 *November* 1932 *Soviet Union Review*, *January* 1933, p. 5

The conclusion of a non-aggression pact with France, after the conclusion of a similar pact with Poland and other neighbors, gives us special satisfaction for the further reason that we see in this the fruition of the idea of bilateral non-aggression pacts put forward by the Soviet Government many years ago, long before the Kellogg proposal.

We now see a recognition on the part of a considerable number of countries, including the French Republic, of the special significance of such bilateral pacts in connexion with the existing Kellogg-Briand Pact. And that is understandable. Bilateral pacts are much more comprehensive in their contents, including in themselves obligations called forth by the special conditions in each case of the mutual relations between the two countries party to them, and furthermore, they are free from those numerous reservations which were added on the conclusion of the Kellogg-Briand pact and on which, as we know, its violators have fallen back. It is hoped that the Soviet-French example will find further adherents . . .

In view of the doubtful success of the disarmament conference, it is up to all governments to give special consideration to seeking new methods of guaranteeing peace. We, to be sure, are deeply convinced

that the best method of guaranteeing peace and general security is complete disarmament or, at least, immediate and appreciable reduction of armaments. But we by no means decline to consider and carry out other, if less effective, guarantees of peace. While not recognizing the authority of the League of Nations, and rejecting military sanctions, we nevertheless do not object to the further spreading and strengthening of obligations to abstain from war and aggression, and are ready to participate in working out any measures against the violators of these obligations under conditions of guaranteeing for all, including the USSR, complete objectivity in the solution of these problems. Every international effort in the direction of strengthening peace will always find a favourable response from the USSR. But in order to establish completely peaceful relations between all countries it is necessary that such relations exist between individual countries. From that point of view the conclusion of the Soviet-French pact is a valuable contribution to the cause of international co-operation. It seems to me that the co-operation of the Soviet Union in this should be especially valuable because of the fact that the Soviet Union has never belonged, does not and never shall belong to any military or political groupings, that it never has changed and never will change the basic line of its foreign policy, leading to the establishment of peace and friendly relations with all peoples.

We should like today to mark the beginning of a new era in the mutual relations between the USSR and the French Republic. We hope that it will be so.

TASS STATEMENT ON CONVERSATIONS WITH THE JAPANESE CHARGÉ D'AFFAIRES IN MOSCOW ON THE CHINESE FORCES INTERNED IN THE USSR

11 *December* 1932 *Soviet Union Review, January* 1933, p. 6

On 8 December Mr Amo, on the instruction of the Japanese Government, asked Mr Karakhan to hand over General Su Ping-wen and his soldiers. Mr Amo, explaining the viewpoint of his government, said in effect:

'The Japanese government is responsible for maintaining order in Manchukuo. You have disarmed General Su and his army, and the Japanese government is grateful to you for having taken this correct action. But even if these anti-Manchurian elements are disarmed they can endanger the safety of Manchukuo if at any time they return to any place in Manchuria, and those responsible for maintaining order in Manchukuo are taken unawares. If they are sent to China, then they

will not only conduct agitation harmful to Japan and Manchukuo, but they will be surrounded with sympathy by the Chinese, and will probably become heroes, as was the case with General Ma. This may encourage lawless elements in the border districts and endanger the order and safety of Manchukuo. Therefore, in the interests of maintaining order, the Japanese government asks the Soviet government to hand over General Su Ping-wen and all his army now on Soviet territory to the Japanese army.'

Mr Karakhan expressed surprise that the Japanese government should make such a request and declared that the Soviet government, as the government of an independent State maintaining a neutral position, not only could not surrender General Su and his supporters, but could not even discuss the question.

During the exchange of opinions Mr Amo stated that in the present case the question of neutrality did not apply as General Su could not be regarded as the representative of an independent faction engaged in lawful struggle. General Su rebelled against Manchukuo, destroyed international communications and allowed pillage and slaughter, and should be regarded not as a political opponent, but as a criminal who had perpetrated crimes against Manchukuo.

Karakhan replied that this viewpoint was, to say the least, incomprehensible. From the very beginning of the conflict it was known perfectly well that the USSR was neutral and the Japanese government had repeatedly acknowledged this.

Furthermore, it was also known that the Japanese government sent an official commission to Matsievsky Station to negotiate with General Su. The Japanese government would hardly have endeavoured to arrange a peaceful conference with General Su on neutral territory, the USSR, if it considered him a criminal. And it was quite impossible to imagine that the Japanese government would have officially approached the Soviet government with the request that it act as mediator between the Japanese government and General Su—in other words, between the Japanese government and a criminal.

Mr Karakhan also reminded Mr Amo that, at the request of the Japanese government, the Soviet Government entered into negotiations with General Su for the release of all Japanese residents, the majority of whom were released before the defeat of General Su, and the remainder brought over safely by him to Soviet territory. The correct and gentlemanly conduct of General Su in this respect was in itself sufficient to rule out any question of his being handed over after he had been disarmed and interned.

'Finally,' said Karakhan 'there are tens of thousands of insurgent White guards in Manchukuo and Japan who are struggling against and

preparing for armed struggle against the USSR. The Soviet government, however, has never demanded their surrender, and the Japanese government itself, which can hardly regard them as representatives of an independent State, has never proposed to surrender them to the USSR, apparently understanding that such questions concern the internal politics of the country in question.'

Mr Karakhan then declared that Mr Amo should regard the refusal to hand over General Su and his supporters as the official reply of the Soviet government.

Late the same evening, Mr Amo again visited Mr Karakhan and informed him that he withdrew his request for the surrender of General Su and asked only that his internment should be continued and that the Soviet government should consult with the Japanese government concerning the further fate of his army.

Mr Karakhan replied that the fate of General Su's former army was an internal affair concerning the USSR alone and could not be the subject of discussion or agreement with another government. He pointed out that in the relations between the USSR and Japan there was a precedent which should have deterred Japan from making such a request. He referred again to the White guard generals and the thousands of White guard soldiers enjoying complete freedom in their openly hostile actions against the USSR on Japanese territory and above all in Manchukuo, where they have their own military and other organizations which enjoy the patronage of official persons, and whose members enjoy official posts in the police and other government departments. These White guards, he declared, persecute Soviet citizens and try to provoke a crisis in the relations between the USSR and Japan and Manchukuo, and the Japanese government has never consulted the Soviet government regarding their fate.

On December 10 Mr Amo repeated the request of his government regarding the continued internment of General Su and consultation with regard to his future fate, and Mr Karakhan reiterated the Soviet government's refusal to discuss the question.

PRESS STATEMENT BY LITVINOV ON THE RESUMPTION OF RELATIONS WITH CHINA

12 *December* 1932 *Soviet Union Review, January* 1933, p. 2

Dr Yen and I today exchanged notes[1] whereby diplomatic relations between the USSR and China were restored. This quite normal act, in my opinion, hardly requires an explanation. What does require explanation is the rupture of relations between States or a refusal of

[1] *Sbornik Dogovorov*, vii, p. 5.

relations—phenomena which are an infringement of normal international life and which sometimes constitute a danger to peace.

There is no need to dwell on the events which led some years ago to a rupture between the USSR and China. It suffices for me to recall that those events occurred not on the initiative of the USSR.

The policy of the Soviet Government dictates the establishment and maintenance of normal relations with all States and does not consider rupture or refusal of relations to be suitable means of regulating international questions. It is unlikely that any State which in the past has had recourse to this method can boast of any successes in settling questions of dispute with the Soviet Union.

I am certain it is most unlikely that any one in China today can think that the regrettable events which led to the rupture of relations between the USSR and China were of any benefit to the latter. But it is beyond doubt that the commencement of the present troubles in the Far East is in no small degree due to the fact that not all of the States situated on the shores of the Pacific Ocean have been maintaining diplomatic relations with one another.

The peoples of the Soviet Union have felt and feel the greatest sympathy toward the Chinese people, toward their efforts to maintain their independence and sovereignty and to achieve a status of international equality. The Soviet Government has given repeated proofs of its friendly attitude toward China. Thus, alone among the States, it freed China from unequal treaties, extra-territoriality and other rights and privileges wrung from China by Tsarist imperialism, and agreed to transform the railway concession secured by the Tsarist government on Chinese territory into a commercial undertaking under joint management of the USSR and China. These were the feelings of disinterestedness and friendship by which the Soviet Union was guided in establishing relations with the Republic of China in 1924. It is by these same feelings and not by any temporary considerations that today's restoration of relations has been dictated. For the Soviet Union, which is free of all secret political combinations and agreements, an improvement in relations with one country does not signify worsening its relations with another. Only such a policy genuinely assists and strengthens general peace.

It is only when all States maintain relations with one another that we shall be able to speak seriously of international co-operation in the cause of peace, of international guarantee of the observation of peace pacts and agreements and the creation of authoritative international organizations.

I am therefore convinced that all sincere adherents of peace and international co-operation will learn with satisfaction of the resumption of relations between our two great States.

TASS STATEMENT ON SOVIET-JAPANESE NEGOTIATIONS FOR A NON-AGGRESSION PACT

17 *January* 1933 *Izvestia*, 17 *January* 1933

On 13 December 1932 the Japanese Ministry for Foreign Affairs handed to Comrade Troyanovsky, diplomatic representative of the USSR in Tokyo, a verbal note containing the official Japanese reply to the proposal made by Litvinov on behalf of the Soviet Government on 31 December 1931 to Yoshizawa, who was at that time returning via Moscow to Tokyo to take up the post of Foreign Minister.

In the note handed to Troyanovsky the Japanese Government indicates that different opinions are possible as to the time which might be considered appropriate for the conclusion of a non-aggression pact. One opinion advocates the conclusion of a non-aggression pact which would secure in the future the settlement of questions in dispute between the two countries. Another, opposing point of view, is that the causes of possible disputes should first of all be eliminated, and that only then might more general questions, such as that of a non-aggression pact, be examined. For its part the Japanese Government finds that the moment for the conclusion of a non-aggression pact is not yet ripe, and considers it preferable to consider the settlement of the various questions now at issue between the two countries. For the present the Japanese Government would prefer an exchange of views concerning methods of averting the difficulties which may arise from the contiguity of the troops of both parties, and of settling locally such difficulties by peaceful means, for example, by the establishment of a Japanese-Soviet-Manchurian commission for averting border incidents.

In reply to the communications of the Japanese Government, which thus postpones for the present the Soviet proposal for the conclusion of a non-aggression pact, Comrade Troyanovsky on 4 January 1933 presented to the Japanese Foreign Ministry a verbal note in which the Soviet Government expresses its complete agreement with the first of the opinions referred to above, and notes with satisfaction that this point of view is represented in Japanese circles. The Soviet Government expressed regret that the Japanese Government had not found it possible to share this opinion and had adhered to the opposite view, the logical consequence of which would necessarily lead to the complete rejection of the idea of a non-aggression pact and of the idea embodied in the Kellogg-Briand pact for the international repudiation of war as a means of settling disputes. The Japanese Government apparently considers the conclusion of non-aggression pacts appropriate only between those Governments which have no questions at issue between them, but with the present economic and political interdependence of the nations

such a situation hardly exists and is scarcely possible, particularly as between States which are more or less close neighbours. Moreover, the settlement of existing disputes is no guarantee that new disputes will not arise in the future. The Soviet Government further points out in its note that the States which have non-aggression pacts with the USSR have by no means, in concluding these, certified the absence of mutual disputes and claims. The USSR has very recently agreed to the conclusion of a non-aggression pact with a neighbouring State with which it has a disputed frontier and well-founded territorial claims. The meaning of non-aggression pacts, as of the Kellogg-Briand pact, consists, in the opinion of the Soviet Government, in this, that the Governments concluding them, assuming the existence or the possibility of disputes between them, reject the settlement of such disputes by violence.

For its part the Soviet Government considers that there are no disputes between the USSR and Japan which could not be settled by peaceful means, or which it would not agree to settle peacefully. To dispute this would be to repudiate the Kellogg-Briand pact, to which both the USSR and Japan are parties. In proposing a non-aggression pact to Japan the Soviet Government did not ignore the existence of this international instrument, but only attempted to strengthen it, and by means of a bilateral agreement to extend and adapt it to the special conditions of the two countries.

The Soviet Government declares in its note that its proposal was not dictated by any passing considerations, but was the outcome of its entire pacific policy, and it will therefore hold good in the future.

The Soviet Government expresses doubt whether the refusal of one side to conclude a non-aggression pact will assist in the creation of an atmosphere favourable for the settlement of all disputes and the dispelling of misunderstandings.

The Soviet Government takes note of the Japanese Government's statement in its verbal note that 'Japan and the Soviet Union are prepared scrupulously to respect each other's sovereign rights and to refrain strictly from violating in the slightest degree each other's frontiers', and expresses its conviction that if this undertaking is strictly observed there will not arise, as there have not arisen in the past, any border incidents, even with the temporary presence of Japanese troops at the Soviet border.

At the same time the Soviet Government expresses its readiness to examine and consider the Japanese proposal for the establishment of a Japanese-Soviet-Manchurian commission to avert border incidents, on the lines of those now in existence between the Soviet Union and Rumania, Poland, and other neighbouring States.

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