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GREEK PHILOSOPHY II

GREEK PHILOSOPHY

A COLLECTION OF TEXTS

WITH NOTES AND EXPLANATIONS

BY

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VOLUME II

ARISTOTLE, THE EARLY PERIPATETIC SCHOOL AND THE EARLY ACADEMY



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PREFACE

To this volume I have few things to add. Those who take the trouble of reading it will easily understand the purpose of the book. I altered my first project so far as to think it better to divide Greek philosophy after Plato into two volumes, so that after this one there will be a third containing the Hellenistic systems and Neoplatonism with its preparation.

I wish to express my gratitude to Professor A. Mansion at Louvain, who kindly read the manuscript of the chapter dealing with Aristotle's philosophy of nature, and to Professor Fr. Wehrli of Zürich, who was so kind as to give me the opportunity of reading his manuscript on Lycon and the two Aristons before it was published, in September 1951, and of discussing certain points with him [1].

I thank also Dr. W. Vollgraff and Dr. L. M. de Rijk, who read the proofs with me, and two English ladies, Mrs. Paap and Mrs. Breuning, who purified the barbarisms of my English text.

Perfection is a thing not easily attained in earthly life. A few misprints are rectified in the Errata. I hope that, for the rest, very few mistakes have crept in.

C. J. d. V.

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[1] The references to Prof. Wehrli's edition of the fragments of Heraclides Ponticus in ch. XIX, 3, were added by himself to the proofs of this work.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

As to the text of Aristotle, I did not follow exclusively one edition. Generally speaking, I used the editions of Sir David Ross of the *Physics*, *Metaphysics* and *Analytica*, that of Minio-Paluello of the *Categories* and *De interpretatione*, Rackham's of the *Ethica Nicomachea*, Immisch for the *Politica*. For the *De anima* I used P. Siwek's edition, of the *Rhetoric* those of M. Dufour and J. H. Freese, of the *Poetics* those of Bywater and of Hardy. Of Theophrastus' *Metaphysics* I used, as is indicated, the edition of Ross-Fobes; where newer editions are lacking, the fragments are taken from Wimmer. For the other Peripatetics I used Wehrli's *Schule des Aristoteles*; for the Academy the indicated sources and the existing collections of the fragments of Speusippus (Lang) and Xenocrates (Heinze).

BOOK III
ARISTOTLE
TENTH CHAPTER
LIFE AND WORKS

1—PROLEGOMENA: THE ARISTOTELIAN QUESTION

the problem

395—Concerning Plato we had to ask the radical question whether we really know his doctrine; whether his own works do contain this doctrine, or whether we have to pay more attention to the indications of his disciples. This may be called the Platonic question. It dates from Trendelenburg's work on the ideal Numbers (1826). One might speak of an Aristotelian question too, in the sense of a radical problem of the tradition. Werner Jaeger was the first to raise this matter radically in his *Aristotle* of 1923. The problem is due to the following two points: 1. We have not the complete works of Aristotle at our disposal; 2. the writings which we possess contain older and younger parts, and it would not be difficult to make Aristotle contradict Aristotle.

Ad 1. Of Plato we possess the complete literary works meant for publication. On the other hand, his school-teaching is not directly known to us. With Aristotle, the situation is exactly the reverse: his literary works, which were much read in Antiquity, are lost, while his school-writings are preserved to us. A scholar like Jaeger ascribed to this situation the seeming opposition of character between Plato and Aristotle. This view, however, is only partly justified: it leaves out of account the fact that the lost works of Aristotle all belonged to the period of his youth. This being so, the study of their fragments can teach us something of the development of their author and of the genesis of his philosophy; but they are not to be put on one level with his riper works. The true Aristotle remains for us the author of the School-writings, more especially of the ripest parts of them, the utility of the older fragments being precisely this, that they give us a standard by which to distinguish the older from the younger parts of his works.

Ad 2. The school-writings of Aristotle, as they are preserved to us, cannot be divided into three chronological periods, as may be done with Plato's works. The mixture of earlier and later parts runs through the whole of them. Now this creates a rather complicated situation. Werner Jaeger was the first to realize this problem clearly and to propose a solution which, although it may be corrected and completed on several points, has given a new approach and new *élan* to the studies of Aristotle.

what has been reached

396—Three points have been established:

1. The existence of a Platonic period in the thinking of Aristotle has been proved by Jaeger [1].

2. The period between the Academy and the Lyceum, which seemed to be a vacuum as long as the school-writings were all supposed to be written during the latest period [2], has now been filled up with a large part of them.

3. Our idea of the latest period of Aristotle's activity as a teacher has been considerably changed.

a restriction

397—From the fact that many points in the chronology of the works of Aristotle are not definitely cleared up, it must not be concluded that we cannot yet form for ourselves an idea of the philosophy of Aristotle nor get a true knowledge of it. It must be noted first that the description, given by W. D. Ross in his *Aristotle* of 1923, was made before its author knew the work of Jaeger, which appeared in the same year. This fact is an interesting illustration of the remark which has been made by A. Mansion in his *Introduction à la Physique Aristotélicienne*: that, if one wishes to speak of Aristotle's philosophy of nature, or even of any other part of his philosophy, ethics excepted, the situation is not so unfavourable and problems not so complicated as they might seem to be [3].—Why? Mansion said it very clearly in his Introduction cited above: the reason could be this, that in the development of Aristotle's thinking after all the continuity is more important than the difference; which might be seen in the fact that Aristotle himself did little to eliminate all the traces of his earlier opinions that may be seen in the final form of his works [4].

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[1] J. Bernays, *Die Dialoge des Aristoteles in ihrem Verhältnis zu seinen übrigen Werken*, Berlin 1863, tries to confine the Platonic influence to the literary form of Aristotle's early writings. V. Rose, who collected all these platonizing passages from the Dialogues of Aristotle, went further and concluded that they were spurious (*Aristoteles Pseudepigraphus*, Lipsiis 1863).

[2] In fact this was the opinion of Zeller (*Ph. d. Gr.* II 2, [3] p. 155), and also of Bernays.

[3] Mansion, *o.c.*, [2]1946, p. 7.

[4] Ib., p. 33/34: "Mais ce qu'il faut noter surtout c'est que, de façon générale, Aristote n'a pas jugé nécessaire de remanier profondément ces rédactions reprises à quelque cours antérieur et ainsi l'adaptation de la doctrine à des vues devenues plus tard classiques chez lui, apparaît par moments comme bien imparfaite. C'est, sans doute, qu'il avait davantage conscience de l'unité et de la continuité de sa pensée, que des étapes diverses et mêmes parfois contradictoires entre elles qu'elle avait parcourues, pour aboutir à son développement ultime."

2—LIFE AND WORKS OF ARISTOTLE

398—Dionys. Halic., *Ep. I ad Ammaeum* 5, p. 727 R.: life

'Αριστοτέλης πατρὸς * μὲν ἦν Νικομάχου τὸ γένος καὶ τὴν τέχνην ἀναφέροντος εἰς Μαχάονα τὸν 'Ασκληπιοῦ [1], μητρὸς δὲ Φαιστίδος, ἀπογόνου τινὸς τῶν ἐκ Χαλκίδος τὴν ἀποικίαν ἀγαγόντων εἰς Στάγειρα· ἐγεννήθη δὲ κατὰ τὴν ἐνενηκοστὴν καὶ ἐνάτην ὀλυμπιάδα Διοτρεφοῦς 'Αθήνησιν ἄρχοντος (ol. 99, 1; a. 384) [2] ... ἐπὶ δὲ Πολυζήλου ἄρχοντος (ol. 103, 2; a. 366/7) τελευτήσαντος τοῦ πατρὸς ὀκτωκαιδέκατον ἔτος ἔχων εἰς 'Αθήνας ἦλθεν, καὶ συσταθεὶς Πλάτωνι χρόνον εἰκοσαετῆ διέτριψε σὺν αὐτῷ. ἀποθανόντος δὲ Πλάτωνος ἐπὶ Θεοφίλου ἄρχοντος (ol. 108, 1; a. 348/7) ἀπῆρε πρὸς Ἑρμίαν τὸν 'Αταρνέως τύραννον [3] καὶ τριετῆ χρόνον παρ' αὐτῷ διατρίψας ** ἐπ' Εὐβούλου ἄρχοντος (ol. 108, 4; a. 345/4) εἰς Μυτιλήνην ἐχωρίσθη [4]· ἐκεῖθεν δὲ πρὸς Φίλιππον ᾤχετο *** κατὰ Πυθόδοτον ἄρχοντα (ol. 109, 2; a. 343/2),

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[1] Aristotle's father was the court-physician of Amyntas II, king of Macedonia and father of Philippus.

[2] Diog. Laert. V 9 gives the same chronology and traces it back to the Chronicle of Apollodorus.

[3] Hermias is known to us as one of the addressees of the Sixth Letter of Plato. The two others, Erastus and Coriscus, disciples of Plato and his Academy, doubtless tried to introduce in their native town Scepsis certain political reforms that had been suggested in the Academy. Jaeger, *Aristotle*, ²1948, p. 113, sums up the tendency of Plato's Letter in the following words: "Presumably Plato wished to institute a friendship between the two companions and their "neighbour" Hermias, because, while he recognized their noble disposition, he was afraid they might be somewhat doctrinaire. The letter that we possess is the solemn record of this peculiar pact between *Realpolitik* and theoretical schemes of reform."

At the request of this Hermias, who possessed a formidable military power and was practically independent of the Persian Empire, Ar. and Xenocrates established themselves at Assos after the death of Plato, and stayed there for three years. For Aristotle these years were a period of intense work. An important part of his works on logic, physics and metaphysics was written here. Surely Erastus, Coriscus and Hermias attended his lectures. We find the name of Coriscus frequently cited in the Organon to illustrate an individual case as opposed to the καθόλου.

[4]) That Aristotle left Assos and settled at Mytilene was probably due to the influence of Theophrastus, who was a native of Lesbos and also an ancient disciple of Plato and the Academy. That, during the years of Assos and Mytilene, Aristotle was already occupied with biological research, may be inferred from the fact that in his biological works localities in Asia Minor and Lesbos are rather frequently mentioned. Consult: Thompson, Translation of the *Historia animalium*, p. VII, and the same, *Aristotle as a biologist*, p. 12.

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* πατρὸς is a correction of Van Herwerden. The Mss have υἱὸς.

** διατρίψας Wolf; Mss τρίψας.

*** ᾤχετο Usener; others read ἔχετο.

καὶ διέτριψε χρόνον ὀκταετῆ παρ' αὐτῷ καθηγούμενος Ἀλεξάνδρου [1]· μετὰ δὲ τὴν Φιλίππου τελευτὴν ἐπ' Εὐαινέτου ἄρχοντος (ol. 111, 2; a. 335/4) ἀφικόμενος εἰς Ἀθήνας ἐσχόλαζεν ἐν Λυκείῳ χρόνον ἐτῶν δώδεκα. τῷ δὲ τρισκαιδεκάτῳ, μετὰ τὴν Ἀλεξάνδρου τελευτὴν ἐπὶ Κηφισοδώρου ἄρχοντος (ol. 114, 2; a. 322) ἀπάρας εἰς Χαλκίδα νόσῳ τελευτᾷ, τρία πρὸς τοῖς ἑξήκοντα βιώσας ἔτη.

three poems of Aristotle

399—a. Olympiodorus in his Commentary on Plato's *Gorgias* has preserved for us the following poem of Aristotle in commemoration of Plato (Fr. 673 Rose):

on Plato

ἐλθὼν δ' ἐς κλεινὸν Κεκροπίης δάπεδον
εὐσεβέως σεμνῆς φιλίης ἱδρύσατο βωμὸν
ἀνδρὸς ὃν οὐδ' αἰνεῖν τοῖσι κακοῖσι θέμις·
ὃς μόνος ἢ πρῶτος θνητῶν κατέδειξεν ἐναργῶς
οἰκείῳ τε βίῳ καὶ μεθόδοισι λόγων,
ὡς ἀγαθός τε καὶ εὐδαίμων ἅμα γίνεται ἀνήρ·
οὐ νῦν δ' ἔστι λαβεῖν οὐδενὶ ταῦτα ποτέ.

The poem has been interpreted by Wilamowitz in *Aristoteles und Athen* II, p. 412-416. He declares the construction βωμὸν φιλίας to be a metaphor that would be tolerable "für backfische, aber nicht für Hellenen", and is most inclined to explain φιλίας as a genitivus causae. "In any case Ar. means that the man about whom he speaks, i.e. Eudemus, founded an altar for Plato for the sake of his friendship" ("um seiner Freundschaft willen dem Platon einen Altar gestiftet hat"). Jaeger protests against the assumption that Plato was formally venerated as a god by his disciples, and I think he is right. Having stated that the dedicator of the altar is unknown to us, he remarks: "a Greek would surely have assumed without question that what was meant was that he set up an altar to most honourable Philia, in honour of the friendship of the man whom bad men may not even praise" (*Aristotle*, p. 108).

---

[1]) Hermias had friendly relations with the Macedonian court (an anti-Persian coalition). It is probable that on his recommendation Philip invited Aristotle to be the praeceptor of the young Alexander.

Of his years at the Macedonian court are doubtless Aristotle's six books on philological problems in Homer (Ἀπορήματα Ὁμηρικά), brought to Alexandria by Demetrius of Phaleron. Here they became the foundation of philological studies of the Alexandrian scholars.

For Alexander Aristotle wrote a work Περὶ μοναρχίας and another about colonization.

According to a decree of the Delphians, found by Homolle in 1895, Aristotle and his nephew Callisthenes were praised and honoured for having made a list of the Pythionikai (Dittenberger, *Syll.*[3], 275). This list, which was a valuable document for the history of Greek literature, must have been made by Ar. in the very last years of his stay at the Macedonian court or during the first year of his second stay at Athens, Callisthenes having gone to Asia in 334. Other similar lists of the victors of the great Dionysia and of those at Olympia are mentioned among the works of Ar.

As to the last four lines of this elegy, cp. the nrs. **275a**, **b** and **374a** of our first volume.

b. Fr. 674 Rose (Diog. Laert. V 6), an epigramma dedicated to Hermias of Atarneus, who had been treacherously arrested at a conference, and sent captive to the Great King. The latter, having vainly tried to coerce him into revealing Philip's plans, finally executed him by a *servile supplicium* (crucifixion).

on Hermias

τόνδε ποτ' οὐχ ὁσίως παραβὰς μακάρων θέμιν ἁγνὴν
ἔκτεινεν Περσῶν τοξοφόρων βασιλεύς,
οὐ φανερῶς λόγχῃ φονίοις ἐν ἀγῶσι κρατήσας,
ἀλλ' ἀνδρὸς πίστει χρησάμενος δολίου.

c. Fr. 675 Rose (Athenaeus XV, p. 696 A; also Diog. L. V 7). Hymn to Virtue, in honour of Hermias, who died as a martyr for the sake of philosophy.

Hymn to Virtue

Ἀρετά, πολύμοχθε γένει βροτείῳ,
θήραμα κάλλιστον βίῳ,
σᾶς πέρι, παρθένε, μορφᾶς
καὶ θανεῖν ζαλωτὸς ἐν Ἑλλάδι πότμος
καὶ πόνους τλῆναι μαλεροὺς ἀκάμαντας·
τοῖον ἐπὶ φρένα βάλλεις
καρπὸν ἰσαθάνατον χρυσοῦ τε κρείσσω
καὶ γονέων μαλακαυγήτοιό θ' ὕπνου·
σεῦ δ' ἕνεχ' οἱ Διὸς Ἡρακλέης Λήδας τε κοῦροι
πολλ' ἀνέτλασαν ἔργοις
σὰν ἀγρεύοντες δύναμιν.
σοῖς δὲ πόθοις Ἀχιλεὺς Αἴας τ' Ἀίδαο δόμους ἦλθον·
σᾶς δ' ἕνεκεν φιλίου μορφᾶς καὶ Ἀταρνέος ἔντροφος ἀελίου
χήρωσεν αὐγᾶς·
τοιγὰρ ἀοίδιμος ἔργοις, ἀθάνατόν τέ μιν αὐξήσουσι Μοῦσαι
Μναμοσύνας θύγατρες, Διὸς ξενίου σέβας αὔξουσαί τε φιλίας
τε γέρας βεβαίου.

Wilamowitz explained this poem in *Ar. u. Athen* II, p. 405-412; Jaeger in *Aristotle*, p. 117 ff.

πόνους μαλερούς ἀκάμαντας - unceasing labours, wearing out.

καρπὸν ἰσαθάνατον. I have adopted the correction of Wilamowitz: ἰσαθάνατον. Athenaeus has τ' ἀθάνατον, Diog. L. εἰς ἀθάνατον.

The meaning is: ἴσον τῇ ἀθανασίᾳ.

χρυσοῦ τε κρείσσω καὶ γονέων - better than gold and ancestors.

σοῖς δὲ πόθοις - not so much "through longing for thee" as "by enthusiasm for thee" (cp. Gorgias' *Epitaphios*, Diels VS^5 II 81 B 6, the end, where the orator

says that, "though they have died themselves, ὁ πόθος οὐ συναπέθανεν"; which does not mean "the longing for them"—for this can hardly be called ἀθάνατος —, but "the enthusiasm for noble deeds" [1]).

Διὸς Ξενίου σέβας and γέρας φιλίας may be paraphrased as follows: ὅτι καὶ Δία Ξένιον ἐσέβετο καὶ φιλίαν βέβαιον ἐγέραιρεν.

two kinds of lectures

400—Ar. used to lecture during the morning hours for a selected group of more advanced disciples, while in the evening he lectured for a larger, non-selected circle of students.

Gellius, *Noct. Att.* XX 5, 1:

Commentationum suarum artiumque, quas discipulis tradebat, Aristoteles philosophus ... duas species habuisse dicitur: alia erant quae nominabat ἐξωτερικά, alia quae appellabat ἀκροατικά. ἐξωτερικὰ dicebantur quae ad rhetoricas meditationes facultatemque argutiarum civiliumque rerum notitiam conducebant, ἀκροατικὰ autem vocabantur in quibus philosophia remotior subtiliorque agitabatur quaeque ad naturae contemplationes disceptationesve dialecticas pertinebant. huic disciplinae, quam dixi, ἀκροατικῇ tempus exercendae dabat in Lycio matutinum nec ad eam quemquam temere admittebat, nisi quorum ante ingenium et eruditionis clementa atque in discendo studium laboremque explorasset. illas vero exotericas auditiones exercitiumque dicendi eodem in loco vesperi faciebat easque vulgo iuvenibus sine delectu praebebat; atque cum δειλινὸν περίπατον appellabat, illum alterum supra ἑωθινόν; utroque enim tempore ambulans disserebat. libros quoque suos, earum omnium rerum commentarios, seorsum divisit, ut alii e x o t e r i c i dicerentur, partim a c r o a t i c i.

Cp. Cic., *De fin.* V 12; *Ep. ad Att.* IV 16, 2; Strabo XIII 1, 54, p. 609; Plut., *Adv. Coloten* 14, 4, p. 1115.

the fate of Ar.'s library

401—The library of Aristotle had a highly remarkable fate.

a. Strabo XIII 1, 54, p. 608:

told by Strabo

Ὁ γοῦν Ἀριστοτέλης τὴν ἑαυτοῦ (βιβλιοθήκην) Θεοφράστῳ παρέδωκεν, ᾧπερ καὶ τὴν σχολὴν ἀπέλιπε, πρῶτος ὧν ἴσμεν συναγαγὼν βιβλία καὶ διδάξας τοὺς ἐν Αἰγύπτῳ βασιλέας βιβλιοθήκης σύνταξιν. Θεόφραστος δὲ Νηλεῖ παρέδωκεν, ὁ δ' εἰς Σκῆψιν κομίσας τοῖς μετ' αὐτὸν παρέδωκεν, ἰδιώταις ἀνθρώποις, οἳ κατάκλειστα εἶχον τὰ βιβλία οὐδ' ἐπιμελῶς κείμενα· ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἤσθοντο τὴν σπουδὴν τῶν Ἀτταλικῶν βασιλέων, ὑφ' οἷς ἦν ἡ πόλις, ζητούντων βιβλία εἰς τὴν κατασκευὴν τῆς ἐν Περγάμῳ βιβλιοθήκης, κατὰ γῆς ἔκρυψαν ἐν διώρυγί

[1] See the remarkable study of C. W. Vollgraff on the *Epitaphios*: *L'oraison funèbre de Gorgias*, Leiden 1952, p. 85-87, and the following section (p. 87-169).

τινι [1]· ὑπὸ δὲ νοτίας καὶ σητῶν [2] κακωθέντα ὀψέ ποτε ἀπέδοντο οἱ ἀπὸ τοῦ γένους Ἀπελλικῶντι τῷ Τηΐῳ πολλῶν ἀργυρίων τά τε Ἀριστοτέλους καὶ τὰ τοῦ Θεοφράστου βιβλία· ἦν δὲ ὁ Ἀπελλικῶν φιλόβιβλος μᾶλλον ἢ φιλόσοφος· διὸ καὶ ζητῶν ἐπανόρθωσιν τῶν διαβρωμάτων [3] εἰς ἀντίγραφα καινὰ μετήνεγκε τὴν γραφὴν ἀναπληρῶν οὐκ εὖ καὶ ἐξέδωκεν ἁμαρτάδων πλήρη τὰ βιβλία. συνέβη δὲ τοῖς ἐκ τῶν περιπάτων, τοῖς μὲν πάλαι τοῖς μετὰ Θεόφραστον, οὐκ ἔχουσιν ὅλως τὰ βιβλία πλὴν ὀλίγων καὶ μάλιστα τῶν ἐξωτερικῶν [4], μηδὲν ἔχειν φιλοσοφεῖν πραγματικῶς, ἀλλὰ θέσεις ληκυθίζειν [5], τοῖς δ' ὕστερον, ἀφ' οὗ τὰ βιβλία ταῦτα προῆλθεν, ἄμεινον μὲν ἐκείνων φιλοσοφεῖν καὶ ἀριστοτελίζειν, ἀναγκάζεσθαι μέντοι τὰ πολλὰ εἰκότα λέγειν διὰ τὸ πλῆθος τῶν ἁμαρτιῶν. πολὺ δὲ εἰς τοῦτο καὶ ἡ Ῥώμη προσελάβετο· εὐθὺς γὰρ μετὰ τὴν Ἀπελλικῶντος τελευτὴν Σύλλας ἦρε τὴν Ἀπελλικῶντος βιβλιοθήκην ὁ τὰς Ἀθήνας ἑλών· δεῦρο δὲ (εἰς Ῥώμην) κομισθεῖσαν Τυραννίων τε ὁ γραμματικὸς διεχειρίσατο φιλαριστοτέλης ὤν, θεραπεύσας τὸν ἐπὶ τῆς βιβλιοθήκης, καὶ βιβλιοπῶλαί τινες γραφεῦσι φαύλοις χρώμενοι καὶ οὐκ ἀντιβάλλοντες, ὅπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων συμβαίνει τῶν εἰς πρᾶσιν γραφομένων βιβλίων καὶ ἐνθάδε καὶ ἐν Ἀλεξανδρείᾳ.

and by Plutarchus

b. Plut. *Sulla* 26, 1-2 tells the same story:

Ἀναχθεὶς δὲ πάσαις ταῖς ναυσὶν ἐξ Ἐφέσου, τριταῖος ἐν Πειραιεῖ καθωρμίσθη· καὶ μυηθεὶς ἐξεῖλεν ἑαυτῷ τὴν Ἀπελλίκωνος τοῦ Τηΐου βιβλιοθήκην, ἐν ᾗ τὰ πλεῖστα τῶν Ἀριστοτέλους καὶ Θεοφράστου βιβλίων ἦν, οὔπω τότε σαφῶν γνωριζόμενα τοῖς πολλοῖς. λέγεται δὲ κομισθείσης αὐτῆς εἰς Ῥώμην Τυραννίωνα τὸν γραμματικὸν ἐνσκευάσασθαι τὰ πολλά, καὶ παρ' αὐτοῦ τὸν Ῥόδιον Ἀνδρόνικον εὐπορήσαντα τῶν ἀντιγράφων εἰς μέσον θεῖναι καὶ ἀναγράψαι τοὺς νῦν φερομένους πίνακας.

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[1] "in a cave". Athenaeus I 3 a tells us that, before the arranging of the library at Pergamum, Neleus sold books of Aristotle to Ptolemaeus Philadelphus for the library at Alexandria.

[2] Moths or worms.

[3] διαβρώματα — worm-eaten parchments.

[4] If this account is true, we must note that the school-writings of Aristotle came very near to being lost for ever, and that the full knowledge of his philosophy barely escaped being confined to the first generation of the School. Up to Cicero Antiquity would have known Aristotle almost exclusively from his exoteric writings. We have some reason to doubt this. Zeller II 2, [3] 138-154. Interesting from this point of view is the list, given by Diog. Laert. V, 22-27, which is probably based on a list made by Hermippus c. 200 B.C. Many of the school-writings of Ar., or parts of them, are mentioned here under other titles.

[5] θέσεις ληκυθίζειν — declaim commonplaces.

Works of Aristotle

402—Aristotle's literary work is divided by Ross into three main sections:

(1) Works of a more or less popular order, which were published by himself;

(2) Memoranda and collections of material, which may have been made by disciples;

(3) scientific works, written by himself.

Nearly the whole existing Corpus Aristotelicum, so far as it is authentic, belongs to the third group.

First group The list of Diog. begins with 19 works which seem to have been all more or less popular and belonged to the Platonic period of Ar. The greater part were dialogues; some of them bore the same titles as certain dialogues of Plato: *Sophistes, Politicus, Menexenus, Symposion.* The dialogue *Eudemus* or Περὶ ψυχῆς, written shortly after 354, was modelled closely on the *Phaedo.* The *Protrepticus,* addressed to Themison, the prince of Cyprus, also belonged to the period of the Academy. The Περὶ φιλοσοφίας, still written in the form of a dialogue, was a work of Platonic style but with marked differences in doctrine. It dates from the years of Assos.

Second group Of the second group a large number of titles is mentioned. Of the extant works of Aristotle only book K of the *Metaph.*, and probably the Ἀθηναίων πολιτεία may be classed among this group.

Third group The so-called school-writings of Ar. Systematically classified the Corpus Aristotelicum contains the following works:

I. On logic, brought together in the *Organon.*

1. Κατηγορίαι (*Categoriae*). Probably authentic [1].
2. Περὶ ἑρμηνείας (*De interpretatione*). There is no reason to doubt the authenticity.
3-4. Ἀναλυτικὰ πρότερα and ὕστερα (*Analytica priora and posteriora*).
5. Τοπικά (*Topica*).
6. Περὶ σοφιστικῶν ἐλέγχων (*De sophisticis elenchis*).

II. Philosophy of nature.

1. Φυσικά or Φυσικὴ ἀκρόασις (*Physica*), 8 books.
2. Περὶ οὐρανοῦ (*De caelo*), 4 books.
3. Περὶ γενέσεως καὶ φθορᾶς, *De generatione et corruptione,* 2 books.
4. Μετεωρολογικά (*Meteorologica*), 4 books, of which the fourth is generally considered as not genuine [2].

In the Corpus follows the short book Περὶ κόσμου (*De mundo*). It is surely not a work of Aristotle. Probably it dates from the first century B.C. Its philosophy bears the traces of Posidonius.

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[1] In modern times the authenticity has been doubted, because the idea of substance in this work differs from that of *Metaph.* ZH. Suzanne Mansion pleaded against the authenticity (*Proceedings of the tenth International Congress of Phil.*, Amsterdam 1949, pp. 1097-1100), L. M. de Rijk defends it (in *Mnemosyne* 1951, pp. 129-159).

[2] A. Mansion, *Introd.* p. 16, judges the unauthenticity not sufficiently proved.

If we follow the order of the Corpus Aristotelicum, we have to mention first the psychological works, and then the biological.

III. Psychology.

1. Περὶ ψυχῆς (*De anima*), 3 books.
2. The so-called *Parva naturalia*, containing
   (1) Περὶ αἰσθήσεως καὶ αἰσθητῶν (*De sensu et sensibili*)
   (2) Περὶ μνήμης καὶ ἀναμνήσεως (*De memoria et reminiscentia*)
   (3) Περὶ ὕπνου (*De somno*)
   (4) Περὶ ἐνυπνίων (*De insomniis*)
   (5) Περὶ τῆς καθ' ὕπνον μαντικῆς (*De divinatione per somnum*)
   (6) Περὶ μακροβιότητος καὶ βραχυβιότητος (*De longitudine et brevitate vitae*)
   (7) Περὶ ζωῆς καὶ θανάτου (*De vita et morte*) [1]
   (8) Περὶ ἀναπνοῆς (*De respiratione*).

In the Corpus follows here the short treatise Περὶ πνεύματος (*de spiritu*), which may have been written ± 250. It contains a later doctrine than was known to Aristotle [2].

IV. Biological works.

1. Περὶ τὰ ζῷα ἱστορίαι (*Historia animalium*), 10 books, of which the tenth is not of Ar. Probably also b. VII, a part of VIII, and b. IX are spurious. A large collection of facts.

The following 4 works give the author's theories based on them.

2. Περὶ ζῴων μορίων (*De partibus animalium*), 4 books.
3. Περὶ ζῴων κινήσεως(*De motu animalium*).
4. Περὶ πορείας ζῴων (*De incessu animalium*).
5. Περὶ ζῴων γενέσεως (*De generatione animalium*), 5 books.

In the Corpus these authentic works of Aristotle are succeeded by a series of treatises which all originate from the Peripatetic School, but not from the Master himself. Among them are the *Problemata*, a large collection of all kinds of problems —mathematical, optical, musical, physiological, medical—; partly they reach back to Ar. himself.

V. Metaphysics.

Τὰ μετὰ τὰ φυσικά, 14 books, first collected by Andronicus and placed by him after the Physics, whence they were called by this name. The science we call *metaphysics* is named by Ar. himself πρώτη φιλοσοφία, or also θεολογία.

VI. Ethics.

1. Next follow in the Corpus the 10 books of the Ἠθικὰ Νικομάχεια (*Ethica Nicomachea*).
2. The 2 books of the Ἠθικὰ μεγάλα (*Magna moralia*).
3. Four books of the Ἠθικὰ Εὐδήμια (*Ethica Eudemia*), namely the books A, B, Γ, H. The books Δ E Z have been left out, because they are the same as E Z H of

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[1] The first two chapters of this treatise are headed by the editors Περὶ νεότητος καὶ γήρως. Ar. mentions this subject at the beginning of the first chapter, but he does not deal with it here.

[2] The distinction of veins and arteries, which was unknown to Ar.

the *Nicomachean Ethics*. The last three chapters of the *Eudemian Ethics* (H 13-15) are also separated and headed as a book VIII (Θ), e.g. by W. Jaeger.

These three works, of which only the *Nic. Ethics* are without doubt authentic [1], are followed in the Corpus by a small treatise Περὶ ἀρετῶν καὶ κακιῶν, which dates probably from the first century B.C. or A.C.

VII. Politics and Economics.

1. Πολιτικά, 8 books.

2. Οἰκονομικά, 3 books, generally not accepted as authentic. The third exists only in a Latin translation.

Of the large collection of 158 politeiai, which was made in the School of Ar. and on his suggestion, only that of the Athenians has been preserved (found on a papyrus in 1890). This document being probably not written by Ar. himself but by a disciple, we had good reason to mention it as belonging to the second group.

VIII. Rhetoric and Poetics.

1. Τέχνη ῥητορική, 3 books, of which the third has been suspected, but is now generally believed to be authentic.

In the Corpus it is succeeded by the Ῥητορικὴ πρὸς Ἀλέξανδρον, an early Peripatetic work, but not of Ar. himself.

2. Περὶ ποιητικῆς, authentic but fragmentary.

3—DATE OF ARISTOTLE'S WORKS ACCORDING TO W. JAEGER

Concerning the chronology of the works of Ar. W. Jaeger has come to the following results:

First period **403**—To the first Athenian period (the Academy) belong *the Dialogues* of Ar. (except the Περὶ φιλοσοφίας) with the *Protrepticus*.—Jaeger fixed no special date either to the *logical treatises* of Ar. or to his *Rhetoric*. But he says somewhere more or less incidentally that Ar.'s logic was formed at an early date, probably still in the Academy [2]. We have good reasons to put the *Rhetoric* in a later period.

In treating the *Metaphysics*, of which the older part must have been written at Assos, Jaeger remarks that at that date the fundamental principles of the *Physics*

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[1] The *Magna moralia* are now generally considered as a work of a generation after Aristotle, and are in fact proved to be so by various arguments, lastly by an analysis of the style (K. O. Brink, *Stil und Form der ps. Aristotelischen MM.* Thesis of Berlin 1933). As to the *Eudemian Ethics*, since Jaeger they are generally believed to be an early work of Aristotle, from his platonizing period. In a recent study (*Studien zu den Ethiken des Corpus Ar.*, Paderborn 1940) F. J. Schächer tries to prove that they are not a work of Ar., but of his able disciple Eudemus of Rhodos. The arguments he gives in order to prove this thesis, are for the greater part not conclusive. Yet, in my opinion he has shaken the theory of Jaeger as to the early date of the work in question and opened a new perspective.

[2] Certainly it is not necessary to deduce that the six works of the *Organum* were all written during the first period, and we can hardly admit that this was the opinion of Jaeger. But he has left the task of stating this point more precisely to others.

were already fixed: the idea of teleology, the principles of form and matter, potency and act. Consequently J. admits that the first books of the *Physics* (*I and II*) were conceived, and probably written, at Athens, under the eyes of Plato. He assumes this explicitly for *De caelo I*, where the hypothesis of aether has been proposed for the first time as a new solution opposed to Platonism.

At Athens was also written the oldest part of the *Politics*, the criticism of Plato's *Republic*: *Pol. II*, 2-3. Ar. wrote it before having read the *Nomoi*. He must have received this work at Assos and, having read it hastily, have added a short review of it to the ch. 3 of *Pol. II*. "Perfectly Platonic" is, according to J., *book III* of the *De anima*, which contains the doctrine of the noûs. The actual form of this book may be of a more recent date, the substance of the thought originates from the Academy.

the middle period

404—The years of Assos, Lesbos and the Macedonian court. At Assos was written *the oldest part of the Metaphysics* ("Urmetaphysik"): the books A (historical survey, Δ (a kind of encyclopaedia of philosophical terms), K 1-8 (treating the same subject-matter as the books B Γ E, but in an earlier form); next the book Λ, the so-called *Theology*, a short survey of the whole metaphysical system, except ch. 8, which is a later addition; finally chapters 9-10 of the book M [1] and the whole book N, in which the theory of the Ideas is shortly criticized and Speusippus' theory of numbers amply [2].

The books B and Γ are also of an early date, but posterior to K 1-8.

From the same time as *Metaph. A* dates *the dialogue* Περὶ φιλοσοφίας, which contains almost the same criticism of the theory of the Ideas as the first-mentioned book.

From the period of Assos also date the *Eudemian Ethics*. Jaeger characterizes this work as "reformplatonisch". He means by this term, that the author, having given up the theory of Ideas, wishes to found a new, reformed Platonism. The main argument for the early date of this work is that the term φρόνησις is used here in the Platonic meaning of philosophical insight into a transcendent reality, whereas later, in the *Nic. Eth.*, Aristotle uses it to indicate a ἕξις πρακτική, even for animals (a kind of instinct for what is or is not harmful to them).

According to J. *a part of the Politica* too was written at Assos, namely the last books, H Θ, containing the ideal state (ἀρίστη πολιτεία), which is opposed to that of Plato. To this part of the work belong the books B [3] and Γ [4]. On the other hand, the books Δ E Z are of a much later date: giving an empirical foundation to the best constitution, they belong to the third period of Ar.'s activity. Book A has then been put at the head of the whole, by way of introduction.

As to the *Physics*, we found that J. rather suggests that books I and II were written at Athens during the life of Plato. In this case book VII too, which

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[1] These two chapters are an older introduction to the discussion of the theory of numbers.

[2] In the book N the name of Xenocrates is not mentioned. His theory is criticized by Ar. very sharply in the book M, which for this reason must have been written in a later period, namely in the Lyceum, when Xenocrates was the head of the Academy. During the years of Assos, while Speusippus directed the School of Plato at Athens, Xenocrates was in the company of Ar.

[3] A survey of former theories of the state, partly written at Athens (the ch. 2-3) partly at Assos.

[4] Book Γ treats the notion of πόλις and πολίτης.

belongs to the oldest parts of Ar.'s works, must be dated in the first period. Book Θ [1] being a later addition (to be dated in the third period), we have the impression, though J. does not say so explicitly, that Books III-VI must be placed in the middle period, at Assos or later, but most probably at Assos, because in these years the author was occupied with what is called by J. *speculative physics.*

What he states explicitly is, that *the form in which we have the work De caelo* dates from these years (at least two years after the death of Plato, but not much later). The style is near to that of Περὶ φιλοσοφίας; the theory of the movement of the celestial spheres in B 8 is later than that of the movement of the celestial bodies in Π. φιλ.

Also the Περὶ γενέσεως καὶ φθορᾶς, being a work of "speculative physics", is to be dated in this period, probably still at Assos. J. sees these works of physics as being of the same order of ideas as the politics of the ideal state, the ethics based on theology (the *Eudemian Eth.*) and that part of the Metaphysics which exhibits the same character ("Urmetaphysik").

the third period

405—Ar.'s second stay at Athens: the years of the Lyceum. There is an important province in the works of Ar. which, according to J., originates without exception from the third period: the *research-work*, as well on the field of history as on that of nature. The only argument for this late dating which J. gives, is, that the expedition of Alexander furnished a great deal of material for zoology as well as for botany [2].—According to this theory all the biological works of Ar. belong to the last period of his activity.

The *Meteorology* too is dated by J. in the last period. He does so with reference to the work *on the rising of the Nile*, which ends with the triumphant words:

Οὐκέτι πρόβλημά ἐστιν· ὤφθη γὰρ φανερῶς ὅτι ἐξ ὑετῶν αὔξει.

J. cites these words as characteristic of the experimental method of Ar., as opposed to that of Plato and the Academy, which was still closely followed by Ar. himself in his early, Platonizing works [3].

To the third period J. also reckons the whole group of *anthropological-physiological treatises*: *De anima* I and II, the *Parva naturalia* without exception. (Not the doctrine of the noûs in *De anima* III, which harmonizes with the early ethics and metaphysics).

J. points especially to the method used in the treatise on *divination by dreams*, which being purely experimental differs *toto coelo* from the point of view in the middle period, in Περὶ φιλοσοφίας [4].

Finally J. cites the fifth chapter of the *De partibus animalium I* in order to illustrate the purely empirical character of Ar.'s idea of science during this last period [5]. We give the text of this famous chapter.

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[1] This book contains a revision of the theory of the Prime Mover.

[2] In fact, J. opposes the method of research of Ar. and his successors to that of Plato and the Academy, Ar.'s purpose being to study the details, while Plato's was merely the division of notions.—The question is first whether this opposition is justified. We have to remark that, in order to make a division of notions, details must be studied. Secondly, we saw Ar. occupied in Mikrasia and on Lesbos with the collection of material for the *Historia Animalium.*

[3] Jaeger, *Aristotle*, p. 331.

[4] Ib., p. 162 ff., 333 f. In the *De divinatione per somnum* Ar. no longer explains the prevision of the future in the dream state as proceeding from metaphysical regions, but he explains it in a purely natural way, by means of psycho-physiology.

[5] Ib., p. 337-340.

406—Aristotle, *De part. anim.* I 5, 644 b^{22}-645 a^{36}: **the beauty of empirical research, expounded by Ar.**

Τῶν οὐσιῶν ὅσαι φύσει συνεστᾶσι, τὰς μὲν ἀγενήτους καὶ ἀφθάρτους εἶναι τὸν ἅπαντα αἰῶνα, τὰς δὲ μετέχειν γενέσεως καὶ φθορᾶς. Συμβέβηκε δὲ περὶ μὲν ἐκείνας τιμίας οὔσας καὶ θείας ἐλάττους ἡμῖν ὑπάρχειν θεωρίας (καὶ γὰρ
26 ἐξ ὧν ἄν τις σκέψαιτο περὶ αὐτῶν, καὶ περὶ ὧν εἰδέναι ποθοῦμεν, παντελῶς ἐστὶν ὀλίγα τὰ φανερὰ κατὰ τὴν αἴσθησιν), περὶ δὲ τῶν φθαρτῶν φυτῶν τε καὶ
ζῴων εὐποροῦμεν μᾶλλον πρὸς τὴν γνῶσιν διὰ τὸ σύντροφον· πολλὰ γὰρ περὶ
30 ἕκαστον γένος λάβοι τις ἂν τῶν ὑπαρχόντων βουλόμενος διαπονεῖν ἱκανῶς. Ἔχει δ' ἑκάτερα χάριν. Τῶν μὲν γὰρ εἰ κατὰ μικρὸν ἐφαπτόμεθα, ὅμως διὰ τὴν τιμιότητα τοῦ γνωρίζειν ἥδιον ἢ τὰ παρ' ἡμῖν ἅπαντα, ὥσπερ καὶ τῶν
35 ἐρωμένων τὸ τυχὸν καὶ μικρὸν μόριον κατιδεῖν ἡδιόν ἐστιν ἢ πολλὰ ἕτερα καὶ
545 a μεγάλα δι' ἀκριβείας ἰδεῖν· τὰ δὲ διὰ τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ πλείω γνωρίζειν αὐτῶν λαμβάνει τὴν τῆς ἐπιστήμης ὑπεροχήν, ἔτι δὲ διὰ τὸ πλησιαίτερα ἡμῶν εἶναι καὶ τῆς φύσεως οἰκειότερα ἀντικαταλλάττεταί τι [1] πρὸς τὴν περὶ τὰ θεῖα
5 φιλοσοφίαν. Ἐπεὶ δὲ περὶ ἐκείνων διήλθομεν λέγοντες τὸ φαινόμενον ἡμῖν, λοιπὸν περὶ τῆς ζωϊκῆς φύσεως εἰπεῖν, μηδὲν παραλιπόντας εἰς δύναμιν μήτε ἀτιμότερον μήτε τιμιώτερον. Καὶ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς μὴ κεχαρισμένοις αὐτῶν πρὸς τὴν αἴσθησιν κατὰ τὴν θεωρίαν ὅμως ἡ δημιουργήσασα φύσις [2] ἀμηχάνους
10 ἡδονὰς παρέχει τοῖς δυναμένοις τὰς αἰτίας γνωρίζειν καὶ φύσει φιλοσόφοις. Καὶ γὰρ ἂν εἴη παράλογον καὶ ἄτοπον, εἰ τὰς μὲν εἰκόνας αὐτῶν θεωροῦντες χαίρομεν ὅτι τὴν δημιουργήσασαν τέχνην συνθεωροῦμεν, οἷον τὴν γραφικὴν ἢ τὴν πλαστικήν, αὐτῶν δὲ τῶν φύσει συνεστώτων μὴ μᾶλλον ἀγαπῶμεν τὴν
15 θεωρίαν, δυνάμενοι γε τὰς αἰτίας καθορᾶν. Διὸ δεῖ μὴ δυσχεραίνειν παιδικῶς τὴν περὶ τῶν ἀτιμοτέρων ζῴων ἐπίσκεψιν. Ἐν πᾶσι γὰρ τοῖς φυσικοῖς ἔνεστί τι θαυμαστόν· καὶ καθάπερ Ἡράκλειτος λέγεται πρὸς τοὺς ξένους εἰπεῖν τοὺς βουλομένους ἐντυχεῖν αὐτῷ, οἳ ἐπειδὴ προσιόντες εἶδον αὐτὸν θερόμενον πρὸς
20 τῷ ἴπνῳ ἔστησαν (ἐκέλευε γὰρ αὐτοὺς εἰσιέναι θαρροῦντας· εἶναι γὰρ καὶ ἐνταῦθα θεούς), οὕτω καὶ πρὸς τὴν ζήτησιν περὶ ἑκάστου τῶν ζῴων προσιέναι δεῖ μὴ δυσωπούμενον [3], ὡς ἐν ἅπασιν ὄντος τινὸς φυσικοῦ καὶ καλοῦ. Τὸ γὰρ μὴ τυχόντως ἀλλ' ἕνεκά τινος ἐν τοῖς τῆς φύσεως ἔργοις ἐστὶ καὶ μάλιστα·
25 οὗ δ' ἕνεκα συνέστηκεν ἢ γέγονε τέλους, τὴν τοῦ καλοῦ χώραν εἴληφεν. Εἰ δέ τις τὴν περὶ τῶν ἄλλων ζῴων θεωρίαν ἄτιμον εἶναι νενόμικε, τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον οἴεσθαι χρὴ καὶ περὶ αὐτοῦ· οὐκ ἔστι γὰρ ἄνευ πολλῆς δυσχερείας ἰδεῖν ἐξ ὧν συνέστηκε τὸ τῶν ἀνθρώπων γένος, οἷον αἷμα, σάρκες, ὀστᾶ,' φλέβες καὶ τὰ
30 τοιαῦτα μόρια. Ὁμοίως τε δεῖ νομίζειν τὸν περὶ οὑτινοσοῦν τῶν μορίων ἢ

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[1] ἀντικαταλλάττεταί τι - balances somewhat.

[2] ἡ δημιουργήσασα φύσις - "Nature that created them as an intelligent artist. See on the meaning of this version our Ch. XIII, § 3, nrs. **499-501**.

[3] προσιέναι δεῖ μὴ δυσωπούμενον - "we must not recoil with childish aversion".

τῶν σκευῶν διαλεγόμενον μὴ περὶ τῆς ὕλης ποιεῖσθαι τὴν μνήμην, μηδὲ ταύτης χάριν, ἀλλὰ τῆς ὅλης μορφῆς, οἷον καὶ περὶ οἰκίας, ἀλλὰ μὴ πλίνθων καὶ πηλοῦ καὶ ξύλων· καὶ τὸν περὶ φύσεως περὶ τῆς συνθέσεως καὶ τῆς ὅλης 35
οὐσίας, ἀλλὰ μὴ περὶ τούτων ἃ μὴ συμβαίνει χωριζόμενά ποτε τῆς οὐσίας αὐτῶν.

Jaeger, l.c., calls this "a programme for research and instruction in the Peripatetic School" [1], which explains to us the spirit that reigns in the works of Ar.'s followers. As to Ar. himself, J. describes the spirit of his later years as opposed to his former conception of metaphysics in the following words: "He no longer speaks of the world of appearances as more knowable to us but to be contrasted with the essence of reality, which is more knowable naturally [2]. He justifies metaphysics now by means of the everlasting longing of the human heart to penetrate the mysteries of the imperishable and invisible world, and is ready to content himself with the merest corner of that hidden truth, while the precedence of real science (ἡ τῆς ἐπιστήμης ὑπεροχή) is now clearly assigned to empirical research. This is the praise of devotion to the small, the confession of allegiance to the study that fulfills its highest achievements in the *History of Animals*, the collection of *Constitutions*, the history of the theatre, and the chronicle of the Pythian competitions."— "He (Ar.) organizes and overcomes the manifold (ἄπειρον) of appearances, which Plato simply passes over" [3].

the organization of science

407—To the third period of Ar.'s activity belongs also the organization of the writing of a complete *history of the sciences*. *Theophrastus* was charged with the writing of a detailed *History of philosophy* (the Φυσικῶν δόξαι in 18 books), from Thales up to his time. This work has been the basis for all later doxography.

Eudemus of Rhodos had to write a *History of the mathematical sciences* (arithmetic, geometry, and astronomy), probably also of *theology*.

Meno wrote the *History of Medicine*, the Ἰατρικά, known to us by a papyrus-fragment.

J. mentions here, too, the great illustrated work Ἀνατομαί, a collection which was regularly used in the medical lectures of the Lyceum. Ar. often refers to it in his treatises.

the revision of the theory of the First Mover

408—To this last period belongs, finally, the revision of the theory of the First Mover in *Metaph.* Λ 8. This revision is based on new astronomic theories: Eudoxus admitted 26 celestial spheres, his (indirect) disciple Callippus assumed 33; Ar. himself comes in *Metaph.* Λ 8 to 47 or 55, and accordingly postulates the existence of the same number of Unmoved Movers. J. thinks this to be an innovation after the original theory, which admitted of only one Unmoved Mover, who alone governs the kosmos which is one, and is called therefore θεός. Thus in

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[1] "ein Forschungs- und Unterrichtsprogramm der peripatetischen Schule".

[2] We shall find this view of Ar. directly at the beginning of his *Physics* (I 1) and of his *Metaphysics* (A 2). See our nrs. **470** and **519** (982a$^{23-25}$); also *Eth. Nic.* I, 1095b$^{2-4}$ (our nr. **566**).

[3] "Ar. organisiert und überwindet das Apeiron der Erscheinungen, das Platon überfliegt", Jaeger says. The truth of this statement, however, seems to me doubtful, because Plato in the *Philebus* designed as the especial task of philosophy the determining of "the intermediate stages" between the One and the Apeiron.

chapters Λ 7 and 9-10, which form a close unity. The 8th chapter is clearly a later addition.

Phys. VIII also gives a revised treatment of the question of the First Mover, and must be of a later date [1].

409—To complete the image we have to make to ourselves of Ar.'s third period according to Jaeger, we must state the following points.

Parts of the *Politics*, *Ethics* and *Metaph.* to be placed in the third period

1. First the empirical books (Δ E Z) of the *Politics* must be reckoned to this last period, as they are based on the material of the 158 constitutions; then also book A, which is an introduction to the whole.

2. J. does not say explicitly that the *Nic. Ethics* are to be placed in this period too. This seems, however, to be an almost inevitable conclusion. First by the character of the work. The empirical books of the *Politics* are characterized by J. as a *phaenomenology of real political life*. Now the *Nic. Ethics* give such a *phaenomenology of moral life*. And secondly, the relation to the *Eudemian Ethics*. We have seen that by J. this work was placed in the middle period. The *Nic. Ethics*, representing a later phasis of Ar.'s thought, then seem almost necessarily to have been written in the third period.

3. Finally the central books of the *Metaphysics*: Z H Θ, containing the doctrine of substance and that of potency and act, and with them the introductory book E. Are they to be placed in the third period?—Such seems to be the opinion of J., though he only says explicitly that book M, which criticizes Xenocrates, must have been written in the years of the Lyceum. The thesis of J., however, is not to say that Ar. *has abandoned metaphysics* during this period and has turned to merely empirical research, but rather that he *has changed his conception of metaphysics*, the object of this science having been first to him supra-sensible being, afterwards the ὂν ᾗ ὄν, which means: being in all its *nuances*, being in its multiplicity. Now this is in harmony with the spirit of empirical research. Thus it fits well to the third period.

4—REACTIONS AND CORRECTIONS

410—The work of Jaeger has been generally acknowledged as a study of fundamental importance. Its chronology has been adopted by *Ross* [2], *E. Bréhier* [3] and *Überweg-Praechter* [4].

the results of Jaeger generally accepted

E. Hoffmann wrote in the *Philologische Wochenschrift* of 1924 that J. "had resuscitated the living Aristotle in the flesh". He understands Jaeger in this way that a separation should be made between a metaphysical and an empirical period in the development of Ar.

J. Bidez in *Un singulier naufrage littéraire dans l'Antiquité: à la recherche des épaves de l'Aristote perdu* (Brussels 1938) is occupied with the early works of Ar. in the footsteps of Jaeger.

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[1] We treat this question in our Ch. XIII, § 5.

[2] W. D. Ross remarks in the Introduction to his *Aristotle-Selections* (New-York 1938, p. XIV: "The attempt to trace the development of Ar.'s thought through his works is still in its infancy." Yet the main conclusions of J. are well established in his opinion, and he adopts almost J.'s whole chronology.

[3] *Histoire de la Philosophie* I, 1926.

[4] *Geschichte der Phil.* I, [12]1926.

E. Bignone uses the traces of the lost works of Ar. for the study of Epicurus.

Jaeger's theory of the revision of the doctrine of the First Mover has found an almost general agreement—up to the very last years [1]. So by *M. J. Lagrange* in his article *Comment s'est transformée la pensée religieuse d'Aristote d'après un livre récent* in *Revue Thomiste* 1926, p. 285 ff., and by *R. Mugnier, La théorie du premier Moteur et l'évolution de la pensée aristotélicienne*, Paris 1930.

With the same question deals *M. Bousset, Sur la théologie d'Aristote: monothéisme ou polythéisme?* in *Revue Thomiste* 1938, p. 798 ff.

serious objections of A. Mansion

411—a. *A. Mansion* of Louvain has been the first to criticize J.'s theories in a more radical way [2].

He remarks first that *Metaph.* Λ must be of a much later date than J. thinks it is, so that the distance of time which lies between ch. 8 and the rest of this book can by no means be so great as J. assumes it to be. Secondly, Ar. has left his *Metaph.* unfinished. This fact implies that he worked at it till the end of his life. It is impossible to accept that the work we have was finished before 335 [3].

Mansion's final judgment on the work of J. is that, in general, his conclusions cannot be accepted as being definitive. "En somme son travail est en grande partie à refaire."

b. After Mansion *Von Ivanka* protested against the separation of a metaphysical and an empirical period, which would have succeeded one another in Ar.'s development [4].

Other protests

412—The objections of Mansion and Von Ivanka were based on a purely historical method. Such is not the case of the protest of *M. de Corte* (in *La doctrine de l'intelligence chez Ar.*, Paris 1934) against the genetic method, applied by Jaeger to the study of Ar. De Corte starts from the Thomistic interpretation of Ar. as being the right one. Now the doctrine of Thomas on the *intellectus agens* as a part—or perhaps rather as a function—of the human soul may have been a real correction of Ar.'s doctrine of the noûs; it is, however, more a philosophical than a purely historical interpretation [5]. But, if the method of W. Jaeger is to be criticized, it should be done on purely historical grounds, not on dogmatic assumptions.

The same remark applies to the work of *P. van Schilfgaarde, De zielkunde van Aristoteles* (Leiden 1938): the author pleads for a philosophizing interpretation of Ar.,—which means with him, an interpretation in the style of Hegel [6].

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[1] Since the interesting study of *Ph. Merlan* on Ar.'s Unmoved Movers in *Traditio* of 1946, others too find traces of a plurality of Unmoved Movers in Ar.'s early works. See our nr. **518**.

[2] In the *Revue Néoscholastique de Louvain*, 1927, pp. 307 ff. and 423 ff.

[3] In fact, I do not think this to have been the opinion of J. Vid. supra (nr. **409**).

[4] *Scholastik* VII, p. 27 ff.

[5] *F. Nuyens* remarks rightly that the texts of Ar. point rather to the Averroistic interpretation of the noûs as a *substantia separata*.

[6] Dr. Nuyens wrote a review of this work in *Studiën* 1939, p. 66 f.; I did the same for the *Museum* 1940, p. 149 ff.

413—F. Nuyens, *Ontwikkelingsmomenten in de zielkunde van Aristoteles* (thesis of the University of Amsterdam, 1939), French translation at Louvain 1948 (*L'Evolution de la Psychologie d'Aristote*) has found in the development of the psychology of Ar. a criterion which enables him to a more exact determination of the chronology of Ar.'s works, and so to an important correction of the results of Jaeger. **the work of Nuyens**

Standard is: the conception of the soul as entelechy of a body in *De anima*. Soul and body are then essentially joined. The soul is not a substance, as it was with Plato and in the *Eudemus* of Ar. The question is: what are the intermediate stages between the *Eudemus* and the *De anima*? A special treatise on the soul, dating from the middle period, does not exist. But Ar. speaks repeatedly on the subject more or less incidentally, often in the *Ethics* and *Politics*, less frequently but still in a sufficient measure in the *Metaph.* and in his biological works. Three periods can be distinguished: **the leading principle**

(I) The first is that of an *antagonistic dualism*, in which body and soul are opposed to each other as hostile powers (the *Eudemus*);

(II) A *natural collaboration* of soul and body. The soul does not directly lose its independence. It is a vital power which, being joined to a special organ, lives in the body. It dominates the body and uses it as its instrument (*vitalistic instrumentism*). This conception is characteristic of the middle period. Biological study has influenced the author: in the *Eudemus* psychology was restricted to man, in *De anima* it has become "general", i.e. extending to all living beings;

(III) In the third period the soul is the entelechy of the body. Soul and body are essentially joined; whence follows that the soul comes into being and perishes with the body. It is no longer deemed immortal, as it was in (I).

The problem of the noûs is necessarily linked up with that of the soul. In the first period the noûs belongs to the soul and is immortal with it; in the second noûs and soul are separated, noûs is what is not bodily. In the third the noûs comes θύραθεν: it is immaterial and immortal. It does not belong to the soul. **the problem of the noûs**

This criterion leads its author to the following results: **Results**

1. Περὶ φιλοσοφίας does not belong to the middle period (Assos), as it was dated by Jaeger, but to the first. It is of the same time as the *Protrepticus* [1]. In this last work too the theory of Ideas is already criticized.

2. This statement has a further consequence: if Π. φιλ. was written in the Academy, then also *De caelo*, *Phys.* I-VII, and *De generatione et corruptione*.

3. The *Categories*, *Topica* and Π. σοφ. ἐλ. prove to belong to the first period; *De interpr.*, *Anal. pr.* and *post.* to the second.

4. To the middle period belongs, as it appears from the local references (to the region of Assos and Lesbos) the *Historia Animalium*. Ross had already remarked this. N. concludes: but with this fact the whole construction of Jaeger that the biological works of Ar. all belong to the third period and there mark a new phase in their author's development, collapses.

To the *Hist. anim.* succeeds the *De partibus anim.* In this work the dualism of body and soul is replaced by collaboration. The soul is localized in the heart.

The same view is represented by the *De motu anim.*, and some of the *Parva naturalia*, namely the *De iuv. et sen.*, *De vita et morte* and the *De resp.*

[1] We shall see in our next chapter that this conclusion of Dr. Nuyens cannot be right. This fact surely must exhort us to a certain prudence as to the application of his criterion.

The 6th treatise of the *Parva Nat.* however, the *De long. et brev. vitae*, is nearer to the *De anima*. It forms a transition to the third period. As to the rest of the biological works, only the *De gener. anim.* represents the same view as the *De anima*, and therefore belongs to the final period.

5. Concerning the *Metaph.* N. confirms the early date of the book A, B, K 1-8, M 9-10 and N; also that M 1-9 belongs to the final period. Book Γ has no texts relative to the soul, but E has. The view of the soul in this book is near to that of *De anima*. It must be dated shortly before this work.

N.'s criterion leads to an exact determination of the date of books Z H Θ. These books presuppose the definition of soul in *De anima*. Consequently they belong to the last years of Ar.'s activity. In book Θ, however, are also older traces. So this book, as we have it, is probably a later redaction of an earlier treatise.

Book I gives no indications as to its date.

Concerning Λ Nuyens confirms the objection of Mansion against Jaeger. Soul and body are considered in this book as form and matter of the living being. This must have been written *after De anima*, i.e. *very late*. Chapter 8 is a later addition, but as to time it is not far removed from the rest.

6. N. determines also the date of the *Nic. Ethics*. Whether this work belongs to the third period, to the beginning of it or to the end, is a question which was left open by Jaeger. Both Mansion and Ross date the work very late. N. comes to other conclusions: the psychology which is presupposed here, is not that of *De anima*; it is much nearer to Plato. For this reason the work must be dated surely ten years before the *De anima*: it may have been written towards the end of the middle period or at the beginning of the third.

7. Also regarding the *Politics* N. comes to an important conclusion. We saw that books IV-VI were reckoned by Jaeger to the third period, and that the first book was added, according to him, afterwards as an introduction to the whole. Now the relation of body and soul appears to be conceived in this book in a clearly mechanical way, and soul is divided into parts as was done by Plato but not in Ar.'s *De anima*. So this first book may have been written *early in the third period*, but by no means very late.

8. N. too cites the fifth chapter of the *De part. anim.* I and comments on it in a somewhat different way from Jaeger: we cannot cite this beautiful chapter as a document in illustration of a "positivistic" period in Ar.'s development. This author never cultivated science at the cost of speculative philosophy. Both go together, up to the end of his activity. The science which he defends here, is according to himself the prerogative of the φύσει φιλόσοφοι.

9. Finally the *De anima. The third book is not of an early date*, as it was in the opinion of Jaeger, and also of Ross. Its doctrine of the noûs is not Platonic; it is no remainder of a former period, but just the result of the psychology of the final period. The work shows a unity of composition; the problem of the noûs pervades the whole.

A part of the *Parva naturalia* is closely connected with the *De anima*: *De sensu et sensato*, *De memoria et reminiscentia*, *De somno et vigilia*, *De insomniis* and *De divinatione*. Together with the *De gener. anim.* they belong to the last years.

These then are the results of the work of Dr. Nuyens. The fact that they in their turn must be corrected on several points, does not take away the importance of the work.

Further results of this method

414—The chronology of the biological works has been determined more precisely by *I. Döring* in *Aristotle's De partibus animalium*, Göte-

borg 1943; that of certain treatises of the *Parva naturalia* by *H. J. Drossaart Lulofs, Aristotelis De insomniis et de divinatione per somnum*, Leiden 1947. Both authors know the book of Nuyens and make use of his results.

Objections

Some objections against the method of Nuyens have been made by *G. Verbeke, L'évolution de la psychologie d'Aristote*, in *Revue philosophique de Louvain*, 1948, pp. 335-351.

Verbeke remarks first that it is impossible to date whole works of Ar. on the ground of a few texts in which the relation soul-body is touched upon. In the same treatise may be earlier and later parts (as Döring proved that the first book of the *De partibus* is of a much earlier date than the following books of this treatise, and Drossaart Lulofs that both in the *De Somno* and in the *De insomniis* there are sections of an earlier and a more advanced date). Secondly he points out that the arguments adduced by N. for the early date of the *Topics* are not conclusive; thirdly that there are serious difficulties as to the chronology of the *Nic. Ethics*, the doctrine of the noûs in this last work being much nearer to Plato than is supposed by N.

I myself had to make an objection to N. regarding the early date he attributes to the Περὶ φιλοσοφίας. Now, because the chronology of the physical treatises is based by N. on that of this dialogue, this point too must be revised.

The main result of the work of N. remains that the biological works of Ar. are of a much earlier date than Jaeger had admitted; that the later books of the *Metaphysics* are of the author's latest years, and consequently that neither the "research"-work of Ar. is to be attributed as a whole to his latest period, nor the metaphysical speculation to a former phase of his development [1].

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[1] I have to remark here again that in my opinion Jaeger's theory does not necessarily imply that the last books of the *Metaph.* were written before 335, and that, consequently, the results of Dr. Nuyens on this point are rather a precision than a contradiction of Jaeger's views.

I had the opportunity, after having written the above chapter, to ask Prof. Jaeger himself, when he visited our country in July 1950, whether my impression on this point was right. He confirmed to me that it has never been his intention to make a radical separation between a metaphysical and a "positivistic" period in Ar.'s development. He did not think it possible to date books Z H Θ of the *Metaph.* more precisely, but he did not intend to exclude the possibility that they might have been written very late.

ELEVENTH CHAPTER
THE EXOTERIC WRITINGS

1—THE EUDEMUS OR ΠΕΡΙ ΨΥΧΗΣ

the theme

415—Ar. wrote this dialogue shortly after the death of Eudemus of Cyprus, a companion of his in the Academy of Plato, who died in Sicily under the standard of Dio (354). The story of his death is told by Cicero.

a. Cic., *De div.* I 25 (Fr. 37 R.):

Quid? singulari vir ingenio Aristoteles et paene divino ipsene errat an alios vult errare, cum scribit Eudemum Cyprium familiarem suum iter in Macedoniam facientem Pheras venisse, quae erat urbs in Thessalia tum admodum nobilis, ab Alexandro autem tyranno crudeli dominatu tenebatur. in eo igitur oppido ita graviter aegrum Eudemum fuisse ut omnes medici diffiderent. ei visum in quiete egregia facie iuvenem dicere fore ut perbrevi convalesceret paucisque diebus interiturum Alexandrum tyrannum, ipsum autem Eudemum quinquennio post domum esse rediturum. atque ita quidem prima statim scribit Aristoteles consecuta et convaluisse Eudemum et ab uxoris fratribus interfectum tyrannum. quinto autem anno exeunte cum esset spes ex illo somnio in Cyprum illum ex Sicilia esse rediturum, proeliantem eum ad Syracusas occidisse. ex quo ita illud somnium esse interpretatum ut cum animus Eudemi e corpore excesserit, tum domum revertisse videatur.

b. Cp. Plut., *Life of Dio*, 22:

Συνέπραττον δὲ (τῷ Δίωνι) καὶ τῶν πολιτικῶν πολλοὶ καὶ τῶν φιλοσόφων ὅ τε Κύπριος Εὔδημος, εἰς ὃν Ἀριστοτέλης ἀποθανέντα τὸν περὶ ψυχῆς διάλογον ἐποίησε, καὶ Τιμωνίδης ὁ Λευκάδιος.

the soul no harmony

416—In this dialogue Ar. defends the immortality of the soul and attacks the doctrine that the soul is the harmony of the body. Philoponus, in his commentary of the *De anima*, mentions the following two arguments, used by Ar. in the *Eudemus*.

a. Fr. 45 R., p. 50: **First argument**

Τῇ ἁρμονίᾳ, φησίν, ἔστι τι ἐναντίον, ἡ ἀναρμοστία· τῇ δὲ ψυχῇ οὐδὲν ἐναντίον. οὐκ ἄρα ἡ ψυχὴ ἁρμονία ἐστίν.

Jaeger, *Ar.* 41, points to the corresponding logical formula in the *Categ.* 3 b[24] ff.: Ὑπάρχει δὲ ταῖς οὐσίαις καὶ τὸ μηδὲν αὐταῖς ἐναντίον εἶναι. "Substances never have contraries".—Soul, then, is a substance, as is said directly by Plotinus, *Enn.* IV 7, 8: τὸ μὲν (sc. πρότερον, ἡ ψυχή) οὐσία, ἡ δὲ ἁρμονία οὐκ οὐσία.

Jaeger, though he does not think the *Categ.* authentic [1], cites another parallel between a Platonic argument (*Phaedo* 93 b-d) why the soul is no harmony, and a formula in the *Categ.* Plato says: the soul is either good, moral and rational, or the opposite. Now these opposed constitutions are a sort of harmony and disharmony of the soul. But the attributes "good" etc. and their opposites admit of a μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον. Consequently, if harmony = soul, the soul would admit of degrees,—which is impossible. Cp. *Categ.* 3 b[33]-4 a[9]: Δοκεῖ δὲ ἡ οὐσία μὴ ἐπιδέχεσθαι τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ τὸ ἧττον. E.q.s. "Substance does not admit of degrees".

b. Fr. 45 R., ib.: **Second argument**

Τῇ ἁρμονίᾳ, φησί, τοῦ σώματος ἐναντίον ἐστὶν ἡ ἀναρμοστία τοῦ σώματος, ἀναρμοστία δὲ τοῦ ἐμψύχου σώματος νόσος καὶ ἀσθένεια καὶ αἶσχος· ὧν τὸ μὲν ἀσυμμετρία τῶν στοιχείων ἡ νόσος, τὸ δὲ τῶν ὁμοιομερῶν ἡ ἀσθένεια, τὸ δὲ τῶν ὀργανικῶν τὸ αἶσχος. εἰ τοίνυν ἡ ἀναρμοστία νόσος καὶ ἀσθένεια καὶ αἶσχος, ἡ ἁρμονία ἄρα ὑγίεια καὶ ἰσχὺς καὶ κάλλος· ψυχὴ δὲ οὐδέν ἐστι τούτων οὔτε ὑγίεια φημὶ οὔτε ἰσχὺς οὔτε κάλλος· ψυχὴν γὰρ εἶχε καὶ ὁ Θερσίτης. αἴσχιστος ὤν. οὐκ ἄρα ἐστὶν ἡ ψυχὴ ἁρμονία.

c. Simplicius in Ar., *De anima* I 3, says that, according to Ar. in the *Eudemus*, the soul is an eidos. **the soul an eidos**

Fr. 46 R.:

Καὶ ἐν τῷ Εὐδήμῳ τῷ περὶ ψυχῆς αὐτῷ γεγραμμένῳ διαλόγῳ εἶδός τι ἀποφαίνεται τὴν ψυχὴν εἶναι.

J., l.c., remarks that in this period the young Ar. was still dependent on Plato in metaphysics, but completely independent of him in the sphere of logic and methodology. "The fundamental attitude embodied in the doctrine of the categories, and the main portions of the doctrine itself, had been developed before Ar. dared to shake the metaphysical foundation of Plato's philosophy".

417—a. The story of Midas and Silenus, cited by Plutarch in the *Consolatio ad Apollonium* 27: Silenus, captured by Midas, answers to the question of the king what is the highest good to man (τί ποτέ ἐστι τὸ **the immortality of the soul**

[1] *Ar.* p. 46, with note 3. I think the arguments adduced by J. on this point not decisive. I am rather inclined to accept the authenticity of the *Categ.* and to explain the doctrine of the πρώτη οὐσία in this treatise as a strong reaction of the author against the theory of the Ideas, which may be placed at the beginning of the years of Assos.

βέλτιστον τοῖς ἀνθρώποις καὶ τί τὸ πάντων αἱρετώτατον);—he answers after a long silence, μόλις and ἀνακαγχάζων (fr. 44 R., p. 49):

Δαίμονος ἐπιπόνου καὶ τύχης χαλεπῆς ἐφήμερον σπέρμα, τί με βιάζεσθε λέγειν ἃ ὑμῖν ἄρειον μὴ γνῶναι; μετ' ἀγνοίας γὰρ τῶν οἰκείων κακῶν ἀλυπότατος ὁ βίος. ἀνθρώποις δὲ πάμπαν οὐκ ἔστι γενέσθαι τὸ πάντων ἄριστον οὐδὲ μετασχεῖν τῆς τοῦ βελτίστου φύσεως· ἄριστον γὰρ πᾶσι καὶ πάσαις τὸ μὴ γενέσθαι, τὸ μέντοι μετὰ τοῦτο καὶ τὸ πρῶτον τῶν ἀνθρώπῳ ἀνυστῶν τὸ γενομένους ἀποθανεῖν ὡς τάχιστα. δῆλον οὖν ὡς οὔσης κρείττονος τῆς ἐν τῷ τεθνάναι διαγωγῆς ἢ τῆς ἐν τῷ ζῆν, οὕτως ἀπεφήνατο.

J., *Ar.* p. 48, rightly pointed to the Platonic style and spirit of this answer: Τὸ μὴ γενέσθαι is not merely "not to be born"; it also means "not to enter into Becoming".

the doctrine of the Ideas accepted by Ar.

b. Proclus in Plat. *Remp.*; Ar. fr. 41 R.:

Λέγει δὲ καὶ ὁ δαιμόνιος Ἀριστοτέλης αἰτίαν δι' ἣν ἐκεῖθεν μὲν ἰοῦσα ἡ ψυχὴ δεῦρο ἐπιλανθάνεται τῶν ἐκεῖ θεαμάτων, ἐντεῦθεν δὲ ἐξιοῦσα μέμνηται ἐκεῖ τῶν ἐνταῦθα παθημάτων.

The ἐκεῖ θεάματα are doubtless the Ideas.

c. The same fr.

the life of the soul without body normal

Ar. concludes from the above-cited fact that the life of the soul without body is normal and like a state of health, whereas the life in the body is to be considered as abnormal and a state of disease.

Φησὶ γὰρ οὖν καὶ αὐτὸς ἐκ μὲν ὑγείας εἰς νόσον ὁδεύοντας λήθην ἴσχειν τινὰς καὶ αὐτῶν τῶν γραμμάτων ὧν ἐμεμαθήκεισαν, ἐκ νόσου δὲ εἰς ὑγείαν ἰόντα μηδένα πώποτε τοῦτο πάσχειν· ἐοικέναι δὲ τὴν μὲν ἄνευ σώματος ζωὴν ταῖς ψυχαῖς κατὰ φύσιν οὖσαν ‹ὑγείᾳ, νόσῳ δὲ τὴν ἐν σώματι›.

the noûs a part of the soul

418—a. That the noûs was considered by Ar. during this period as a part of the soul (unlike the later doctrine of the *De anima*), appears from the passage of Simpl. cited supra (**416c**: the soul an eidos), Fr. 46 R., where he continues (after the words εἶδός τι ἀποφαίνεται τὴν ψυχὴν εἶναι):

καὶ ἐν τούτοις ἐπαίνει τοὺς τῶν εἰδῶν δεκτικὴν λέγοντας τὴν ψυχήν, οὐχ ὅλην ἀλλὰ τὴν νοητικὴν ὡς τῶν ἀληθῶν δευτέρως εἰδῶν γνωστικήν· τῷ γὰρ τῆς ψυχῆς κρείττονι νῷ τὰ ἀληθῆ εἴδη σύστοιχα.

The question might be asked here whether the words οὐχ ὅλην e.q.s. are still a report of Ar.'s view in the *Eudemus*, or whether they rather contain an explanation of Simplicius. In the first case—which seems to be the right one—this fragment would prove that the doctrine of the noûs as the highest part of the human soul, which therefore alone is divine and immortal, originates in the very first period

of Ar.'s thought [1]. This doctrine differs from that of *De anima*, where the noûs no longer is regarded as *a part* of the soul, but as a "separated substance" which comes from the outside. We find it explicitly in the *Protr.* (fr. 61 R.), in *Metaph.* Λ 3 and in the *Nic. Ethics*.

b. Ar., fr. 61 R. (from Iamblichus, *Protr.* ch. 8, p. 48 ed. Pistelli): **noûs alon immortal**

Οὐδὲν οὖν θεῖον ἢ μακάριον ὑπάρχει τοῖς ἀνθρώποις πλὴν ἐκεῖνό γε μόνον ἄξιον σπουδῆς ὅσον ἐστὶν ἐν ἡμῖν νοῦ καὶ φρονήσεως. τοῦτο γὰρ μόνον ἔοικεν εἶναι τῶν ἡμετέρων ἀθάνατον καὶ μόνον θεῖον. καὶ παρὰ τὸ τῆς τοιαύτης δυνάμεως δύνασθαι κοινωνεῖν, καίπερ ὢν ὁ βίος ἄθλιος φύσει καὶ χαλεπός, ὅμως οὕτως ὡκονόμηται χαριέντως ὥστε δοκεῖν πρὸς τὰ ἄλλα θεὸν εἶναι τὸν ἄνθρωπον. ὁ νοῦς γὰρ ἡμῶν ὁ θεός, εἴτε Ἑρμότιμος εἴτε Ἀναξαγόρας εἶπε τοῦτο, καὶ ὅτι ὁ θνητὸς αἰὼν μέρος ἔχει θεοῦ τινός.

c. Ar., *Metaph.* Λ 3, 1070 a[24-26].

Ar. is speaking here about pre-existing and non pre-existing causes. He says: Motive causes (τὰ μὲν κινοῦντα αἴτια) precede, formal causes (τὰ δὲ ὡς ὁ λόγος) are simultaneous with the thing they produce. It is a further question whether the form survives the thing. In certain cases this is certainly possible, e.g. the noûs.

Εἰ δὲ καὶ ὕστερόν τι ὑπομένει, σκεπτέον· ἐπ' ἐνίων γὰρ οὐδὲν κωλύει, οἷον εἰ ἡ ψυχὴ τοιοῦτον, μὴ πᾶσα ἀλλ' ὁ νοῦς· πᾶσαν γὰρ ἀδύνατον ἴσως.

d. Cp. Ar., *Eth. Nic.* X 7, 1177 b[26-31].

In the preceding lines the author has spoken of the advantages of the βίος θεωρητικός, being that of the activity of the mind (ἡ τοῦ νοῦ ἐνέργεια). He then continues:

Ὁ δὲ τοιοῦτος ἂν εἴη βίος κρείττων ἢ κατ' ἄνθρωπον· οὐ γὰρ ᾗ ἄνθρωπός ἐστιν οὕτως βιώσεται, ἀλλ' ᾗ θεῖόν τι ἐν αὐτῷ ὑπάρχει· ὅσῳ δὲ διαφέρει τοῦτο τοῦ συνθέτου, τοσούτῳ καὶ ἡ ἐνέργεια τῆς κατὰ τὴν ἄλλην ἀρετήν. Εἰ δὴ θεῖον ὁ νοῦς πρὸς τὸν ἄνθρωπον, καὶ ὁ κατὰ τοῦτον βίος θεῖος πρὸς τὸν ἀνθρώπινον βίον.

Now this νοῦς is not only *in* man, but it is *a part* of him, and his chief and best part. So we could even say that man is his noûs. 1178 a[2-4]:

Δόξειε δ' ἂν καὶ εἶναι ἕκαστος τοῦτο, εἴπερ τὸ κύριον καὶ ἄμεινον· ἄτοπον οὖν γίνοιτ' ἄν, εἰ μὴ τὸν αὑτοῦ βίον αἱροῖτο ἀλλά τινος ἄλλου.

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[1] I do not think it is already explicitly present in the *Eudemus*, but it is very near. Certainly Dr. Nuyens is not right in admitting that the limitation of immortality to the noûs is a characteristic of the last period of Ar.'s development. Ross and Mansion have rightly pointed out that this doctrine is of very early date.

2—THE PROTREPTICUS

the theme

419—The *Protrepticus* was an exhortation to the philosophic life, the βίος θεωρητικός, such as it was understood in the Academy. It was addressed to Themiso, the prince of Cyprus. Against the pragmatistic conception of knowledge in the school of Isocrates Ar. here fervently defends the beauty and the happiness of the purely contemplative life, which is exercised solely for its own sake. We have the answer from the school of Isocr. in the anonymous *Protrept. ad Demonicum.*

a. Ar., fr. 52 R., p. 59. The pragmatists speak:

Δεῖ δὴ μὴ λεληθέναι τὸν μέλλοντα περὶ τούτων ἐξετάζειν ὅτι πάντα τὰ ἀγαθὰ καὶ τὰ πρὸς τὸν βίον ὠφέλιμα τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἐν τῷ χρῆσθαι καὶ πράττειν ἐστὶν ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐν τῷ γιγνώσκειν μόνον· οὔτε γὰρ ὑγιαίνομεν τῷ γνωρίζειν τὰ ποιητικὰ τῆς ὑγιείας ἀλλὰ τῷ προφέρεσθαι τοῖς σώμασιν οὔτε πλουτοῦμεν τῷ γιγνώσκειν πλοῦτον ἀλλὰ τῷ κεκτῆσθαι πολλὴν οὐσίαν, οὐδὲ τὸ πάντων μέγιστον εὖ ζῶμεν τῷ γιγνώσκειν ἅττα τῶν ὄντων ἀλλὰ τῷ πράττειν εὖ· τὸ γὰρ εὐδαιμονεῖν ἀληθῶς τοῦτ' ἔστιν. ὥστε προσήκει καὶ τὴν φιλοσοφίαν εἴπερ ἐστὶν ὠφέλιμος ἤτοι πρᾶξιν εἶναι τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἢ χρήσιμον εἰς τὰς τοιαύτας πράξεις.

Ar.'s defence of the contemplative life

b. Ar., fr. 58 R. (Iamblichus, *Protr.* c. 9). The answer of Ar.:

Τὸ δὲ ζητεῖν ἀπὸ πάσης ἐπιστήμης ἕτερόν τι γενέσθαι καὶ δεῖν χρησίμην αὐτὴν εἶναι παντάπασιν ἀγνοοῦντός τινός ἐστιν ὅσον διέστηκεν ἐξ ἀρχῆς τὰ ἀγαθὰ καὶ τὰ ἀναγκαῖα· διαφέρει γὰρ πλεῖστον. τὰ μὲν γὰρ δι' ἕτερον ἀγαπώμενα τῶν πραγμάτων ὧν ἄνευ ζῆν ἀδύνατον, ἀναγκαῖα καὶ συναίτια λεκτέον, ὅσα δὲ δι' αὑτά, κἂν ἀποβαίνῃ μηδὲν ἕτερον, ἀγαθὰ κυρίως. οὐ γὰρ δὴ τόδε μὲν αἱρετὸν διὰ τόδε, τόδε δὲ δι' ἄλλο, τοῦτό τε εἰς ἄπειρον οἴχεται προιόν, ἀλλ' ἵσταταί που. γελοῖον οὖν ἤδη παντελῶς τὸ ζητεῖν ἀπὸ παντὸς ὠφέλειαν ἑτέραν παρ' αὐτὸ τὸ πρᾶγμα καὶ τί οὖν ὑμῖν ὄφελος καὶ τί χρήσιμον ἐρωτᾶν. ὡς ἀληθῶς γὰρ, ὥσπερ λέγομεν, εἴ τις ἡμᾶς οἷον εἰς μακάρων νήσους τῇ διανοίᾳ κομίσειεν. ἐκεῖ γὰρ οὐδενὸς χρεία οὐδὲ τῶν ἄλλων τινὸς ὄφελος ἂν γένοιτο, μόνον δὲ καταλείπεται τὸ διανοεῖσθαι καὶ θεωρεῖν, ὅνπερ καὶ νῦν ἐλεύθερόν φαμεν βίον εἶναι. εἰ δὲ ταῦτ' ἐστὶν ἀληθῆ, πῶς οὐκ ἂν αἰσχύνοιτο δικαίως ὅστις ἡμῶν ἐξουσίας γενομένης ἐν μακάρων οἰκῆσαι νήσοις, ἀδύνατος εἴη δι' ἑαυτόν. οὐκοῦν οὐ μεμπτὸς ὁ μισθός ἐστι τῆς ἐπιστήμης τοῖς ἀνθρώποις οὐδὲ μικρὸν τὸ γιγνόμενον ἀπ' αὐτῆς ἀγαθόν. ὥσπερ γὰρ τῆς δικαιοσύνης, ὥς φασιν οἱ σοφοὶ τῶν ποιητῶν, ἐν ᾅδου κομιζόμεθα τὰς δωρεάς, οὕτω τῆς φρονήσεως ἐν μακάρων νήσοις, ὡς ἔοικεν. οὐδὲν οὖν δεινόν, ἂν μὴ φαίνηται χρησίμη οὖσα μηδ' ὠφέλιμος· οὐ γὰρ ὠφέλιμον ἀλλ' ἀγαθὴν αὐτὴν εἶναί φαμεν, οὐδὲ δι' ἕτερον ἀλλὰ δι' ἑαυτὴν αἱρεῖσθαι αὐτὴν προσήκει. ὥσπερ

γὰρ εἰς Ὀλυμπίαν αὐτῆς ἕνεκα τῆς θέας ἀποδημοῦμεν, καὶ εἰ μηδὲν μέλλοι πλεῖον ἀπ' αὐτῆς ἔσεσθαι, αὐτὴ γὰρ ἡ θεωρία κρειττων πολλῶν ἐστι χρημάτων, καὶ τὰ Διονύσια δὲ θεωροῦμεν οὐχ ὡς ληψόμενοί τι παρὰ τῶν ὑποκριτῶν ἀλλὰ καὶ προσθέντες, πολλάς τε ἄλλας θέας ἑλοίμεθα ἂν ἀντὶ πολλῶν χρημάτων, οὕτω καὶ τὴν θεωρίαν τοῦ παντὸς προτιμητέον πάντων τῶν δοκούντων εἶναι χρησίμων. οὐ γὰρ δήπου ἐπὶ μὲν ἀνθρώπους τοὺς μὲν μιμουμένους γύναια καὶ δούλους τοὺς δὲ μαχομένους καὶ θέοντας δεῖ πορεύεσθαι μετὰ πολλῆς σπουδῆς ἕνεκα τοῦ θεάσασθαι αὐτούς, τὴν δὲ τῶν ὄντων φύσιν καὶ τὴν ἀλήθειαν οὐκ οἴεσθαι δεῖν θεωρεῖν ἀμισθί.

In *Metaph.* A 2, 982 a$^{11-28}$ we shall again find the theme that philosophy alone is exercised for its own sake and not χρήσεώς τινος ἕνεκεν (our nr. **519**).

420—a. Ar., fr. 52 R., p. 61 f. (Iambl., *Protr.* c. 6).

Phrónèsis is the highest good; therefore philosophy is to be striven after.

phrónèsis the highest good

Πάντες γὰρ ὁμολογοῦμεν ὅτι δεῖ μὲν τὸν σπουδαιότατον ἄρχειν καὶ τὸν τὴν φύσιν κράτιστον, τὸν δὲ νόμον ἄρχοντα καὶ κύριον εἶναι μόνον· οὗτος δὲ φρόνησίς τις καὶ λόγος ἀπὸ φρονήσεώς ἐστιν. ἔτι δὲ τίς ἡμῖν κανὼν ἢ ὅρος ἀκριβέστερος τῶν ἀγαθῶν πλὴν ὁ φρόνιμος; ὅσα γὰρ ἂν οὗτος ἕλοιτο κατὰ τὴν ἐπιστήμην αἱρούμενος, ταῦτ' ἐστὶν ἀγαθά, καὶ κακὰ δὲ τὰ ἐναντία τούτοις. ἐπεὶ δὲ πάντες αἱροῦνται μάλιστα τὰ κατὰ τὰς οἰκείας ἕξεις, τὸ μὲν γὰρ δικαίως ζῆν ὁ δίκαιος, τὸ δὲ κατὰ τὴν ἀνδρείαν ὁ τὴν ἀνδρείαν ἔχων, ὁ δὲ σώφρων τὸ σωφρονεῖν, ὁμοίως δῆλον ὅτι καὶ τὸ φρονεῖν ὁ φρόνιμος αἱρήσεται πάντων μάλιστα· τοῦτο γὰρ ἔργον ταύτης τῆς δυνάμεως. ὥστε φανερὸν ὅτι κατὰ τὴν κυριωτάτην κρίσιν κράτιστόν ἐστι τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἡ φρόνησις.

Two remarks must be made here.

I. The sentence that the φρόνιμος is the highest standard of what is good, at once reminds us of the Aristotelian definition of virtue as it is given in the *Eth. Nic.* II 6, 15 (1106 b^{36}-1107 a^{3}): "Virtue is a state of character, concerned with choice, lying in a mean, i.e. the mean relative to us, this being determined by a rational principle, and as the φρόνιμος would determine it" (our nr. **571b**).

Here again the φρόνιμος has the arbitrium of what is good.

II. W. Jaeger has pointed out that the meaning of the term φρόνησις as it is used here differs from that in the *Nic. Eth.*: in the *Protr.*, as in the *Eud. Eth.*, φρόνησις is used in the Platonic sense of the word, which means philosophical Insight, based on the knowledge of a transcendent reality, whereas in the *Nic. Eth.* it means simply *practical wisdom*, which has nothing to do with a transcendent reality, and may be predicated even of animals (*Eth. Nic.* VI 5, 1140 b^{30}). It is no longer directed towards the general, but towards the concrete. In *Eth. Nic.* VI 7, 1141 b$^{3-8}$, it is therefore said explicitly that men like Anaxagoras and Thales were not φρόνιμοι, but σοφοί, because they were indifferent to their own advantage, but strove after knowledge of the eternal laws of the universe (our nrs. **590a** and **591b**).

In the following passage of the *Protr.* we shall see that φρόνιμος and σοφός are here almost identic.

Therefore philosophy to be striven after

b. The same fr. continued.

Οὐ δὴ δεῖ φεύγειν φιλοσοφίαν, εἴπερ ἐστὶν ἡ μὲν φιλοσοφία καθάπερ οἰόμεθα κτῆσίς τε καὶ χρῆσις σοφίας, ἡ δὲ σοφία τῶν μεγίστων ἀγαθῶν, οὐ δὲ δεῖ χρημάτων μὲν ἕνεκα πλεῖν ἐφ' Ἡρακλέους στήλας καὶ πολλάκις κινδυνεύειν, διὰ δὲ φρόνησιν μηδὲν πονεῖν μηδὲ δαπανᾶν. ἢ μὴν ἀνδραποδῶδές γε τοῦ ζῆν ἀλλὰ μὴ τοῦ ζῆν εὖ γλίχεσθαι, καὶ ταῖς τῶν πολλῶν αὐτὸν ἀκολουθεῖν δόξαις ἀλλὰ μὴ τοὺς πολλοὺς ἀξιοῦν ταῖς αὐτοῦ, καὶ τὰ μὲν χρήματα ζητεῖν τῶν δὲ καλῶν μηδεμίαν ἐπιμέλειαν ποιεῖσθαι τὸ παράπαν.

The formula εὖ ζῆν is used by Ar. in the *Nic. Eth.* I 4, 1095 a[19], as a general and preliminary definition of happiness: both οἱ πολλοί and οἱ χαρίεντες (more civilized persons) agree on this point, that they identify happiness (τὸ εὐδαιμονεῖν) with τὸ εὖ ζῆν καὶ τὸ εὖ πράττειν.

Again we find the term used thrice in the eleventh chapter of the *Magna Moralia* II.

the theory of the Ideas still accepted

421—That the author of the *Protr.* still accepts the metaphysical basis of the theory of the Ideas, appears from the following passage.

a. Ar., *Protr.* 13 Walzer (Iambl., *Protr.* p. 54 and 55 Pistelli):

Τῶν μὲν ἄλλων τεχνῶν τά τε ὄργανα καὶ τοὺς λογισμοὺς τοὺς ἀκριβεστάτους οὐκ ἀπ' αὐτῶν τῶν πρώτων λαβόντες σχεδὸν ἴσασιν, ἀλλ' ἀπὸ τῶν δευτέρων καὶ τρίτων καὶ πολλοστῶν, τοὺς δὲ λόγους ἐξ ἐμπειρίας λαμβάνουσι· τῷ δὲ φιλοσόφῳ μόνῳ τῶν ἄλλων ἀπ' αὐτῶν τῶν ἀκριβῶν ἡ μίμησίς ἐστιν· αὐτῶν γάρ ἐστι θεατής, ἀλλ' οὐ μιμημάτων. — Μόνος γὰρ πρὸς τὴν φύσιν βλέπων ζῇ καὶ πρὸς τὸ θεῖον, καὶ καθάπερ ἂν εἰ κυβερνήτης τις ἀγαθὸς ἐξ ἀϊδίων καὶ μονίμων ἀναψάμενος τοῦ βίου τὰς ἀρχὰς ὁρμᾷ καὶ ζῇ καθ' ἑαυτόν.

Jaeger, *Ar.* p. 91, rightly remarks that in *Metaph.* A 2, 982 a[25] the author no longer speaks of αὐτὰ τὰ πρῶτα, but simply of τὰ πρῶτα:

Ἀκριβέσταται δὲ τῶν ἐπιστημῶν αἱ μάλιστα τῶν πρώτων εἰσίν.

The omission is not fortuitous: it is a consequence of the rejection of the Ideas, which makes the opposition to μιμήματα disappear.

terminology compared with π. ἰδεῶν

b. The expression αὐτὰ τὰ ἀκριβῆ in the *Protr.* is explained by the following passage from the Περὶ ἰδεῶν.

Ar., fr. 187 R., p. 149 (Alex. Aphr. in Ar. *Metaph.* I, 9, 990 b[10]):

Ἄλλων δέ τινων παρὰ τὰ καθ' ἕκαστά εἰσιν αἱ ἐπιστῆμαι, ταῦτα γὰρ ἄπειρά τε καὶ ἀόριστα, αἱ δὲ ἐπιστῆμαι ὡρισμένων· ἔστιν ἄρα τινὰ παρὰ τὰ καθ' ἕκαστα, ταῦτα δὲ αἱ ἰδέαι.

Concrete things are ἄπειρα and therefore not knowable; science has as its object "the determinate": τὰ ὡρισμένα. Cp. Jaeger, *Ar.* p. 93. The same term is used in *Protr.* c. 6 (fr. 52 R., p. 60, l. 21 ff.).

422—In this Platonically-minded work Ar. speaks in a tone of great disdain about earthly things.

a. Ar., fr. 59 R. (Iambl., *Protr.* c. 8, p. 132 Kiessling): **Disdain of earthly things**

Γνοίη δ' ἄν τις αὐτὸ καὶ ἀπὸ τούτων, εἰ θεωρήσειεν ὑπ' αὐγὰς [1] τὸν ἀνθρώπειον βίον. εὑρήσει γὰρ τὰ δοκοῦντα εἶναι μεγάλα τοῖς ἀνθρώποις πάντα ὄντα σκιαγραφίαν. ὅθεν καὶ λέγεται καλῶς τὸ μηδὲν εἶναι τὸν ἄνθρωπον καὶ τὸ μηδὲν εἶναι βέβαιον τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων. ἰσχύς τε γὰρ καὶ μέγεθος καὶ κάλλος γέλως ἐστὶ καὶ οὐδενὸς ἄξια. κάλλος γε παρὰ τὸ μηδὲν ὁρᾶν ἀκριβὲς δοκεῖ εἶναι τοιοῦτον. εἰ γάρ τις ἐδύνατο βλέπειν καθάπερ τὸν Λυγκέα φασίν, ὃς διὰ τῶν τοίχων ἑώρα καὶ τῶν δένδρων, πότ' ἂν ἔδοξεν εἶναί τινα τὴν ὄψιν ἀνεκτὸν ὁρᾶν ἐξ οἵων συνέστηκε κακῶν; τιμαὶ δὲ καὶ δόξαι τὰ ζηλούμενα μᾶλλον τῶν λοιπῶν ἀδιηγήτου γέμει φλυαρίας. τῷ γὰρ καθορῶντι τῶν ἀιδίων τι ἠλίθιον περὶ ταῦτα σπουδάζειν. τί δ' ἐστὶ μακρὸν ἢ πολυχρόνιον τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων; ἀλλὰ διὰ τὴν ἡμετέραν ἀσθένειαν οἶμαι καὶ βίου βραχύτητα καὶ τοῦτο φαίνεται πολύ.

b. In this spiritual climate life in a body becomes the death of the soul, and death the escape into a higher life. As we saw in the *Eudemus* (fr. 41 R.), the life of the soul without body seemed normal to the author and life with a body abnormal and like a disease (our nr. **417a**). Here the imprisonment of the soul in the body is painted in horrible colours as an unnatural state full of awful suffering.

Ar., fr. 60 R. (Iambl., *Protr.* 8, p. 134 K.): **the imprisonment of the soul in a body**

Τοῦτο γὰρ θεῖον οἱ ἀρχαιότεροι λέγουσι τὸ φάναι διδόναι τὴν ψυχὴν τιμωρίαν καὶ ζῆν ἡμᾶς ἐπὶ κολάσει μεγάλων τινῶν ἁμαρτημάτων. πάνυ γὰρ ἡ σύζευξις τοιούτῳ τινὶ ἔοικε πρὸς τὸ σῶμα τῆς ψυχῆς. ὥσπερ γὰρ τοὺς ἐν τῇ Τυρρηνίᾳ φασὶ βασανίζειν πολλάκις τοὺς ἁλισκομένους προσδεσμεύοντας πρὸς ἀντικρὺ τοῖς ζῶσι νεκροὺς ἀντιπροσώπους ἕκαστον πρὸς ἕκαστον μέρος προσαρμόττοντας, οὕτως ἔοικεν ἡ ψυχὴ διατετάσθαι καὶ προσκεκολλῆσθαι πᾶσι τοῖς αἰσθητικοῖς τοῦ σώματος μέλεσιν.

c. Next follows the fr. 61 R. on the divine character of the noûs, which alone is immortal. Our nr. **418b**. **Noûs alone divine and immortal**

423—Dr. Nuyens, Fr. ed. p. 93 ff., has pointed to what seems to him to be some later elements in the *Protr.* of Ar., namely firstly the idea of teleology in nature, and secondly what he calls the instrumental conception of the relation soul-body.

[1] After ὑπ' αὐγὰς a word has probably dropped out: τοῦ αἰῶνος is possible (after *Tim.* 37 d).

The principle of teleology

a. Ar., *Protr.*, 11 Walzer (Iambl., *Protr.* 9, p. 49 Pist.):

Τῶν μὲν οὖν ἀπὸ τύχης γινομένων οὐδὲν ἑνεκά του γίγνεται, οὐδ' ἔστι τι τέλος αὐτοῖς· τοῖς δὲ ἀπὸ τέχνης γιγνομένοις ἔνεστι καὶ τὸ τέλος καὶ τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα —, καὶ τοῦτο βέλτιόν ἐστιν ἢ τὸ διὰ τοῦτο γιγνόμενον. — Ἀλλὰ μὴν τὸ κατά γε φύσιν ἕνεκά του γίγνεται, καὶ βελτίονος ἕνεκεν ἀεὶ συνίσταται ἢ καθάπερ τὸ διὰ τέχνης· μιμεῖται γὰρ οὐ τὴν τέχνην ἡ φύσις ἀλλὰ αὐτὴ τὴν φύσιν, καὶ ἔστιν ἐπὶ τῷ βοηθεῖν καὶ τὰ παραλειπόμενα τῆς φύσεως ἀναπληροῦν.

b. Ar., *Protr.* 6 Walzer (Iambl., *Protr.* 7, p. 41 Pist.):

Ἔτι τοίνυν τὸ μέν ἐστι ψυχὴ τῶν ἐν ἡμῖν τὸ δὲ σῶμα, καὶ τὸ μὲν ἄρχει τὸ δὲ ἄρχεται, καὶ τὸ μὲν χρῆται τὸ δ' ὑποκεῖται ὡς ὄργανον. Ἀεὶ τοίνυν πρὸς τὸ ἄρχον καὶ τὸ χρώμενον συντάττεται ἡ τοῦ ἀρχομένου καὶ τοῦ ὀργάνου χρεία.

This is, according to Dr. N., a conception of the relation soul-body different from that of antagonism, as it was seen in the *Phaedo* and in the *Eudemus*: in principle it is just that instrumentism which is characteristic of the middle period of Ar.'s development, and therefore points to a later date of this work.

In fact, this argument of N. is not conclusive. We have to remark that Plato's psychology in the *Republic*, where the rational part of the soul is called the leading part or ἡγεμονικόν, implied this kind of instrumentism; so that the differences, arranged by N. in periods of Ar.'s development, were present at the same time in the thought of Plato. Why could they not be present at the same time in the thought of Aristotle too without there marking a different period?

In the next paragraph we shall find decisive reasons for upholding the early date of the *Protr.*

3—ΠΕΡΙ ΦΙΛΟΣΟΦΙΑΣ

the first book

424—In the first book of his Π. φιλ. Ar. seems to have treated of the history of philosophy, including the Orient.

a. In fr. 6 R. he mentions the magi and the dualism of Zarathustra (Diog. Laert. I 8).

the magi and Zarathustra mentioned

Ἀριστοτέλης δ' ἐν πρώτῳ περὶ φιλοσοφίας καὶ πρεσβυτέρους εἶναι (τοὺς μάγους) τῶν Αἰγυπτίων· καὶ δύο κατ' αὐτοὺς εἶναι ἀρχάς, ἀγαθὸν δαίμονα καὶ κακὸν δαίμονα, καὶ τῷ μὲν ὄνομα εἶναι Ζεὺς καὶ Ὡρομάσδης, τῷ δὲ Ἅιδης καὶ Ἀρειμάνιος.

We know that, in Plato's later years, the Academy was keenly interested in oriental wisdom. The doctrine of Zarathustra was mentioned also in the *Alcib. Mai.*,

which is certainly not a work of Plato but a product of his school in its early years [1].
See: J. Bidez, *Eos ou Platon et l'Orient*, Brussels 1945. Jaeger, *Ar.* p. 131 ff.

the Orphic poems

b. The fr. 7 R. mentions the Orphic poems. Ar. distinguishes their doctrine, which is old, from their literary form, which is of a much later date (Philoponus in Ar. *De anima* I 5).

— αὐτοῦ μὲν γάρ εἰσι τὰ δόγματα, ταῦτα δέ φησιν 'Ονομάκριτον ἐν ἔπεσι κατατεῖναι.

Jaeger, *Ar.* p. 129 f., explains this as an instance of the author's view that the same truths reappear in human history several times. Thus in *De caelo* I 3, 270 b[19], where he says, speaking of the name of the "first body" (aether): "It seems too that the name of this first body has been passed down to the present time by the ancients, who thought of it in the same way as we do" [2] οὐ γὰρ ἅπαξ οὐδὲ δὶς ἀλλ' ἀπειράκις δεῖ νομίζειν τὰς αὐτὰς ἀφικνεῖσθαι δόξας εἰς ἡμᾶς.

See also *Metaph.* Λ δ, at the end (1074 b[10]): κατὰ τὸ εἰκὸς πολλάκις εὑρημένης εἰς τὸ δυνατὸν ἑκάστης καὶ τέχνης καὶ φιλοσοφίας καὶ πάλιν φθειρομένων καὶ ταύτας τὰς δόξας (sc. that the first principles are regarded as gods) ἐκείνων οἷον λείψανα περισεσῶσθαι μέχρι τοῦ νῦν.

"While probably each art and each science has often been developed as far as possible and has again perished, these opinions, with others, have been preserved until the present like relics of the ancient treasure" [3].

Second book

425—a. In the second book Plato's doctrine of the ideal Numbers was criticized. Fr. 9 R. (Syrianus in Ar. *Metaph.* 12, 9):

'Ομολογεῖ μηδὲν εἰρηκέναι πρὸς τὰς ἐκείνων (sc. the Platonics before Xenocrates) ὑποθέσεις μηδ' ὅλως παρακολουθεῖν τοῖς εἰδητικοῖς ἀριθμοῖς, εἴπερ ἕτεροι τῶν μαθηματικῶν εἶεν, μαρτυρεῖ τὰ ἐν τῷ β̄ τῶν περὶ τῆς φιλοσοφίας ἔχοντα τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον „ὥστε εἰ ἄλλος ἀριθμὸς αἱ ἰδέαι, μὴ μαθηματικὸς δέ, οὐδεμίαν περὶ αὐτοῦ σύνεσιν ἔχοιμεν ἄν. τίς γὰρ τῶν γε πλείστων ἡμῶν συνίησιν ἄλλον ἀριθμόν";

the theory of Ideas criticized

b. Probably this passage belonged to a general criticism ot the doctrine of the Ideas. We know, both from Proclus and from Plutarchus, that Ar. criticized this doctrine sharply *in his Dialogues*.

Fr. 8 R. (Proclus ap. Ioann. gramm., *de mundi aetern.* II, 2):

Καὶ κινδυνεύει μηδὲν οὕτως ὁ ἀνὴρ ἐκεῖνος (ὁ 'Αριστοτέλης) ἀποποιήσασθαι τῶν Πλάτωνος ὡς τὴν τῶν ἰδεῶν ὑπόθεσιν, οὐ μόνον ἐν λογικοῖς . . . ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν ἠθικοῖς . . . καὶ ἐν φυσικοῖς . . . καὶ ἐν τῇ μετὰ τὰ φυσικὰ πολλῷ πλέον . . . καὶ ἐν τοῖς διαλόγοις σαφέστατα κεκραγὼς μὴ δύνασθαι τῷ δόγματι τούτῳ συμπαθεῖν κἄν τις αὐτὸν οἴηται διὰ φιλονεικίαν ἀντιλέγειν.

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[1] The arguments adduced by E. de Strycker in *Les Etudes Classiques* of 1942 are decisive.
[2] Transl. of W. K. C. Guthrie.
[3] Transl. of W. D. Ross.

c. Plut., *Adv. Coloten* 14 (same fr. R.).

Τάς γε μὴν ἰδέας περὶ ὧν ἐγκαλεῖ τῷ Πλάτωνι πανταχοῦ κινῶν ὁ Ἀριστοτέλης καὶ πᾶσαν ἐπάγων ἀπορίαν αὐταῖς ἐν τοῖς ἠθικοῖς ὑπομνήμασιν, ἐν τοῖς <μετὰ τὰ φυσικά, ἐν τοῖς> φυσικοῖς, διὰ τῶν ἐξωτερικῶν διαλόγων, φιλονεικότερον ἐνίοις ἔδοξεν ἢ φιλοσοφώτερον ἔχειν τῷ δόγματι τούτῳ, ὡς προθέμενος τὴν Πλάτωνος ὑπεριδεῖν φιλοσοφίαν· οὕτω μακρὰν ἦν τοῦ ἀκολουθεῖν.

I think Jaeger is right in referring this criticism of Platonism exclusively to the II. φιλ. Dr. Nuyens defends the thesis that in the *Protr.* too Platonism was criticized. We shall see in one of our next numbers that this opinion of N. is erroneous.

426—This book contained further what is called by Jaeger Ar.'s philosophy of religion.

Two sources of religious belief

a. Ar., fr. 10 R. (Sextus, *Adv. dogm.* III, 20-22):

Ἀριστοτέλης δὲ ἀπὸ δυοῖν ἀρχῶν ἔννοιαν θεῶν ἔλεγε γεγονέναι ἐν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, ἀπό τε τῶν περὶ ψυχὴν συμβαινόντων καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν μετεώρων. ἀλλ' ἀπὸ μὲν τῶν περὶ τὴν ψυχὴν συμβαινόντων διὰ τοὺς ἐν τοῖς ὕπνοις γινομένους ταύτης ἐνθουσιασμοὺς καὶ τὰς μαντείας. ὅταν γάρ, φησίν, ἐν τῷ ὑπνοῦν καθ' ἑαυτὴν γένηται ἡ ψυχή, τότε τὴν ἴδιον ἀπολαβοῦσα φύσιν προμαντεύεταί τε καὶ προαγορεύει τὰ μέλλοντα. τοιαύτη δέ ἐστι καὶ ἐν τῷ κατὰ τὸν θάνατον χωρίζεσθαι τῶν σωμάτων. ἀποδέχεται γοῦν καὶ τὸν ποιητὴν Ὅμηρον ὡς τοῦτο παρατηρήσαντα· πεποίηκε γὰρ τὸν μὲν Πάτροκλον ἐν τῷ ἀναιρεῖσθαι προαγορεύοντα περὶ τῆς Ἕκτορος ἀναιρέσεως, τὸν δ' Ἕκτορα περὶ τῆς Ἀχιλλέως τελευτῆς. ἐκ τούτων οὖν, φησίν, ὑπενόησαν οἱ ἄνθρωποι εἶναί τι θεόν, τὸ καθ' ἑαυτὸ ἐοικὸς τῇ ψυχῇ πάντων ἐπιστημονικώτατον. ἀλλὰ δὴ καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν μετεώρων· θεασάμενοι γὰρ μεθ' ἡμέραν μὲν ἥλιον περιπολοῦντα, νύκτωρ δὲ τὴν εὔτακτον τῶν ἄλλων ἀστέρων κίνησιν, ἐνόμισαν εἶναί τινα θεὸν τὸν τῆς τοιαύτης κινήσεως καὶ εὐταξίας αἴτιον. τοιοῦτος μὲν καὶ ὁ Ἀριστοτέλης.

The thought is of Plato and the Academy. Cp. *Laws* XII 966 d: our nr. **394a**.

Cosmic order a proof for the existence of God(s)

b. Fr. 11 R. Sextus (ib. 26-27) expresses this last view in rather picturesque colours. The passage may be taken quite well from Ar.'s II. φιλ. II.

Ἔνιοι δὲ ἐπὶ τὴν ἀπαράβατον καὶ εὔτακτον τῶν οὐρανίων κίνησιν παραγενόμενοί φασι τὴν ἀρχὴν ταῖς τῶν θεῶν ἐπινοίαις ἀπὸ ταύτης γεγονέναι πρῶτον· ὥσπερ γὰρ εἴ τις ἐπὶ τῆς Τρωικῆς καθεζόμενος Ἴδης ἑώρα τὴν τῶν Ἑλλήνων στρατείαν μετὰ πολλοῦ κόσμου καὶ τάξεως τοῖς πεδίοις προσιοῦσαν „ἱππῆας μὲν πρῶτα σὺν ἵπποισιν καὶ ὄχεσφιν, πεζοὺς δ' ἐξόπιθεν", πάντως ἂν ὁ τοιοῦτος εἰς ἔννοιαν ἦλθε τοῦ ὅτι ἔστι τις ὁ διατάσσων τὴν τοιαύτην τάξιν καὶ ἐγκελευόμενος τοῖς ὑπ' αὐτὸν κοσμουμένοις στρατιώταις, οἷον Νέστωρ ἢ ἄλλος τις τῶν

ἡρώων ὃς ἤδει „κοσμῆσαι ἵππους τε καὶ ἀνέρας ἀσπιδιώτας" · καὶ ὃν τρόπον ὁ ἔμπειρος νεὼς ἅμα τῷ θεάσασθαι πόρρωθεν ναῦν οὐρίῳ διωκομένην πνεύματι καὶ πᾶσι τοῖς ἱστίοις εὐτρεπιζομένην συνίησιν ὅτι ἔστι τις ὁ κατευθύνων ταύτην καὶ εἰς τοὺς προκειμένους λιμένας καταντῶν, οὕτως οἱ πρῶτον εἰς οὐρανὸν ἀναβλέψαντες καὶ θεασάμενοι ἥλιον μὲν τοὺς ἀπὸ ἀνατολῆς μέχρι δύσεως δρόμους σταδιεύοντα, ἀστέρων δὲ εὐτάκτους τινὰς χορείας, ἐπεζήτουν τὸν δημιουργὸν τῆς περικαλλοῦς ταύτης διακοσμήσεως, οὐκ ἐκ ταὐτομάτου στοχαζόμενοι συμβαίνειν αὐτὴν ἀλλ' ὑπό τινος κρείττονος καὶ ἀφθάρτου φύσεως, ἥτις ἦν θεός.

427—The same view occurs in the following interesting passage, which shows us Ar.'s transposition of Plato's allegory of the den.

Ar.'s transposition of the allegory of the den

Cicero, *De Nat. deorum* II 37, 95 (Ar., fr. 12 R.):

Praeclare ergo Aristoteles si essent, inquit, qui sub terra semper habitavissent bonis et inlustribus domiciliis quae essent ornata signis atque picturis instructaque rebus iis omnibus quibus abundant ii qui beati putantur, nec tamen exissent unquam supra terram, accepissent autem fama et auditione esse quoddam numen et vim deorum, deinde aliquo tempore patefactis terrae faucibus ex illis abditis sedibus evadere in haec loca quae nos incolimus atque exire potuissent, cum repente terram et maria caelumque vidissent, nubium magnitudinem ventorumque vim cognovissent aspexissentque solem eiusque cum magnitudinem pulchritudinemque tum etiam efficientiam cognovissent quod is diem efficeret tot caelo luce diffusa, cum autem terras nox opacasset tum caelum totum cernerent astris distinctum et ornatum lunaeque luminum varietatem tum crescentis tum senescentis eorumque omnium ortus et occasus atque in omni aeternitate ratos inmutabilesque cursus: quae cum viderent, profecto et esse deos et haec tanta opera deorum esse arbitrarentur. atque haec quidem ille.

the rupture with Platonism a fact

We have to state that the rupture with Platonism has become a fact here: the ideal World—a transcendent Reality which alone is truly real and of which sensible things are images—the ideal World of Plato has disappeared. There is just one reality: the sensible world in which we live. Its beauty and order point the philosopher to a divine Maker [1]. Surely this is a Platonic thought. But in the later philosophy of Ar. it has disappeared completely: the Prime Mover of *Phys.* VIII and *Metaph.* Λ is not the Maker of the kosmos as it is said in π. φιλ.. II.

Two conclusions must be drawn from this fact:

1. As in this work of Ar. the theory of the Ideas has been abandoned, while

[1] Surely not in the biblical sense of a Creator, but in the sense all Greeks gave to the term: the "Builder of the Universe" who "made the kosmos", i.e. who *arranged* formless matter into a kosmos.

it is still accepted in the *Protr.* (our nr. **421a**), it is impossible that the dialogue π. φιλ. would be anterior to the *Protr.* Hence the chronology of Jaeger must be right on this point, and it must be stated that the criterion of Nuyens has failed here [1].

2. As in this work, π. φιλ., Ar. admits of a Demiourgos, who "made the kosmos" in the Greek sense of the term, while in the so-called "theology" of *Metaph.* Λ no trace of this view can be found, it is impossible that this last book was written by its author at a rather early date, such as during the years of Assos or even before them. On the contrary, the chapters Λ 7, 9 and 10 represent a very different mind, and we must suppose that a considerable space of time elapsed between the half-Platonic view of II. φιλ. and the full-grown Aristotelian view of *Metaph.* Λ. So on this point A. Mansion appears to be right when he dates this book of the *Metaph.* much later than Jaeger does.

On the other hand, on the well-known words of *De caelo* I 4, 271 a[33]: „Ὁ δὲ θεὸς καὶ ἡ φύσις οὐδὲν μάτην ποιοῦσιν" a great light is poured by the present fr. from II. φιλ. It has been supposed [2] that these words are a mere literary form, an expression without any real meaning, because they do not fit in with Ar.'s view of the Prime Mover in *Phys.* VIII and *Metaph.* Λ. True,—but they do fit in excellently with the belief of the young Ar. in II. φιλ., who, having rejected the theory of the Ideas, still keeps the religious principle of Plato that a divine Mind must be the cause of order in the visible world.

428—The spirit of the *Timaeus* still speaks in the following fragments of II. φιλ.

the spirit of the *Timaeus*

a. Fr. 14 R. (Seneca, *Quaest. nat.* VII 30, 1):

Egregie Aristoteles ait numquam nos verecundiores esse debere quam cum de dis agitur. si intramus templa compositi . . . quanto hoc magis facere debemus, cum de sideribus, de eorum natura, de stellis disputamus, ne quid temere, ne quid imprudenter aut ignorantes adfirmemus aut scientes mentiamur.

b. Fr. 18 R. (Ps. Philo, π. ἀφθαρσίας κόσμου, p. 222, 12, Bernays):

Ἀριστοτέλης δὲ μήποτ' εὐσεβῶς καὶ ὁσίως ἐνιστάμενος ἀγένητον καὶ ἄφθαρτον ἔφη τὸν κόσμον εἶναι, δεινὴν δὲ ἀθεότητα κατεγίνωσκε τῶν τὰ ἐναντία διεξιόντων, οἳ τῶν χειροκμήτων οὐδὲν ᾠήθησαν διαφέρειν τοσοῦτον ὁρατὸν θεὸν ἥλιον καὶ σελήνην καὶ τὸ ἄλλο τῶν πλανήτων καὶ ἀπλανῶν ὡς ἀληθῶς περιέχοντα πάνθειον.

This fr. belonged to the third book π. φιλ.

A dialectical proof of the existence of God

429—a. A formal proof of the existence of God seems to have been given by Ar. in the so-called *argumentum ex gradibus.*

[1] It is far from me to pretend that this criterion is altogether useless. No, but it should be applied with greater prudence and controlled from other points of view.

[2] By Mansion in his *Introd. à la Phys. Ar.*

Ar., fr. 16 R. (Simpl. in Ar., *De caelo* I 9):

Καθόλου γὰρ ἐν οἷς ἐστί τι βέλτιον, ἐν τούτοις ἐστί τι καὶ ἄριστον. ἐπεὶ οὖν ἐστὶν ἐν τοῖς οὖσιν ἄλλο ἄλλου βέλτιον, ἔστιν ἄρα τι καὶ ἄριστον, ὅπερ εἴη ἂν τὸ θεῖον.

A second proof

b. Another proof is given in the fr. 17 R.:

Ἡ ἀρχὴ ἢ μία ἢ πολλαί. καὶ εἰ μὲν μία, ἔχομεν τὸ ζητούμενον· εἰ δὲ πολλαί, ἢ τεταγμέναι ἢ ἄτακτοι. ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν ἄτακτοι, ἀτακτότερα τὰ ἐξ αὐτῶν, καὶ οὐκ ἐστὶ κόσμος ὁ κόσμος ἀλλ' ἀκοσμία, καὶ ἔστι τὸ παρὰ φύσιν τοῦ κατὰ φύσιν μὴ ὄντος. εἰ δὲ τεταγμέναι, ἢ ἐξ ἑαυτῶν ἐτάχθησαν ἢ ὑπὸ ἔξωθεν τινὸς αἰτίας. ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν ὑφ' ἑαυτῶν ἐτάχθησαν, ἔχουσί τι κοινὸν τὸ συνάπτον αὐτὰς κἀκεῖνο ἡ ἀρχή.

This text reminds us of the final passage of *Metaph.* Λ 8: τὰ δὲ ὄντα οὐ βούλεται πολιτεύεσθαι κακῶς· "οὐκ ἀγαθὸν πολυκοιρανίη" etc.

Third book

430—The fragments 18-26 concern the eternity of the kosmos and the doctrine that the celestial bodies have souls. With the first thesis Ar. is against Plato's doctrine in the *Tim.* (at least as he took it); with the latter he showed himself to be still closely connected with the doctrine of the Academy.

difficulties in Ar.'s doctrine of God

Cic., *De nat. deorum* I 13, 33 (Ar. fr. 26 R.). The Epicurean Velleius is speaking.

Aristotelesque in tertio de philosophia libro multa turbat a magistro suo Platone non dissentiens. modo enim menti tribuit omnem divinitatem, modo mundum ipsum deum dicit esse, modo alium quendam praeficit mundo eique eas partes tribuit ut replicatione quadam [1] mundi motum regat atque tueatur. tum caeli ardorem deum dicit esse, non intellegens caelum mundi esse partem, quem alio loco ipse designarit deum. quo modo autem caeli divinus ille sensus in celeritate tanta

[1] I do not think, after all, that by the words *replicatione quadam* Cic. means *a retrogade movement*, such as is meant by Plato in *Politicus* 270 d (τῇ τοῦ παντὸς ἀνειλίξει), and by Ar. in *Metaph.* Λ 8, 1074 a² (σφαίρας . . . ἀνελιττούσας). Since the chief aspect of Aristotle's theory of the movement of the celestial bodies is that they move by a motion *returning on itself*, i.e. by a circular movement, I think that the plain and obvious sense of Cicero's words is to state that, sometimes, Ar. admitted a God to whom he attributed the rôle of governing and maintaining the movement of the universe *by a motion returning on itself*.—Festugière, *Le Dieu cosmique* p. 245 f., adopts the interpretation of J. Moreau who suggests that by *replicatione quadam* Cicero meant the movement of the first heaven which turns round in the opposite sense to that of the planets. In fact, since the motion of the first heaven is considered by Ar. as the πρώτη φορά (*De caelo* II 12), one could hardly qualify this as "retrograde" or "reacting", such as the movement of the planets presents itself to us when we compare it with the fixed stars.

conservari potest? ubi deinde illi tot dii, si numeramus etiam caelum deum? cum autem sine corpore idem vult esse deum, omni illum sensu privat, etiam prudentia. quo porro modo moveri carens corpore, aut quo modo semper se movens esse quietus et beatus potest?

That Velleius found some difficulties in Ar.'s theories about the first principle or God, is comprehensible and not without reason. When he says that Ar. called now "Mind" God, now the Universe, or "Someone else" whom he put at the head of it, or even aether (caeli ardorem), we can understand what is behind it. In fact, Ar. admitted one ἀρχή (fr. 17). He called it God and seems to have conceived his idea of an Unmoved Mover at an early date: even if *Metaph.* Λ 6 and 7 are much later, we have a proof for the existence of a Prime Mover in *Phys.* VII 1, and we see Ar. occupied with the problem of motion in the *De caelo* and *De gen. et corr.* In *De Caelo* II 3 he calls "the heaven" a θεῖον σῶμα which as such must be in eternal movement, i.e. in circular movement. For θεοῦ ἐνέργεια ἀθανασία, τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶ ζωὴ ἀΐδιος. ὥστ' ἀνάγκη τῷ θείῳ κίνησιν ἀΐδιον ὑπάρχειν. Now, this being so, it is contradictory to admit of a Prime Mover with the purpose of excluding a regressus ad infinitum, as is argued in *Phys.* I. This contradiction remains even when the celestial bodies are no longer regarded as animated beings having a θεῖον σῶμα which consists of aether, as was taught by Ar. in II. φιλ. III (see our next nr.).

In *Metaph.* Λ 8 we find Ar.'s final doctrine of the celestial spheres which have each an unmoved Mover, the "first heaven" being moved by the First Unmoved Mover, who is placed as the first principle above the others. In the same way we have to imagine that the star gods of II. φιλ. were considered by the author as inferior to the first principle. The inconsequence, also of the final doctrine, is that, the circular movement of heaven being considered as a necessary consequence of its divine character, the relation to a Prime Mover becomes problematic.

the divinity of the celestial bodies

431—a. Cic., *De nat. deorum* II 15, 42 (Ar., fr. 23 R.).

That the stars are animated beings, was proved by Ar. first by the following argument.

Cum igitur aliorum animantium ortus in terra sit, aliorum in aqua, in aere aliorum, absurdum esse Aristoteli videtur in ea parte quae sit ad gignenda animantia aptissima, animal gigni nullum putare. sidera autem aetherium locum obtinent. qui quoniam tenuissimus est et semper agitatur et viget, necesse est quod animal in eo gignatur id et sensu acerrimo et mobilitate celerrima esse. quare cum in aethere astra gignantur, consentaneum est in iis sensum inesse et intellegentiam. ex quo efficitur in deorum numero astra esse ducenda.

Plato, *Tim.* 39 e, spoke of the four elements as peopled by living beings. Cp. *Epin.* 984 d, where the fifth element (aether) is mentioned,—an argument for the later date of this dialogue.

We find the argument again in *Philo*, who interprets the inhabitants of the air as angels [1], and finally in *Apuleius*, in the *De deo Socratis* (on the daemonium) VIII 137. He too makes "daemons" out of the inhabitants of the air.

[1] *De gig.* 2, 7-8; *De plantat.* 3, 12; *De somn.* I 22, 135.

Consult: Jaeger, *Ar.* p. 144 ff.

b. Cic. ib. 16, 42-43. The stars must have a superior intellect, because they feed themselves on aether, the finest and lightest of elements. **they feed themselves on aether**

Etenim licet videre acutiora ingenia et ad intellegendum aptiora eorum qui terras incolant eas in quibus aer sit purus ac tenuis quam illorum qui utantur crasso caelo atque concreto. quin etiam cibo quo utare interesse aliquid ad mentis aciem putant. probabile est igitur praestantem intellegentiam in sideribus esse, quae et aetheriam partem mundi incolant et marinis terrenisque umoribus longo intervallo extenuatis alantur.

The same doctrine occurs in Plato, *Laws* V 747 d, and in the *Epin.* 981 e.

c. Cic. ib. (16, 43-44). The divinity of the celestial bodies proved by their order and by their movement. **their order proves that they are animated beings**

Sensum autem astrorum atque intellegentiam maxume declarat ordo eorum atque constantia (nihil est enim quod ratione et numero moveri possit sine consilio), in quo nihil est temerarium nihil varium nihil fortuitum. ordo autem siderum et in omni aeternitate constantia neque naturam significat (est enim plena rationis) neque fortunam, quae amica varietati constantiam respuit. sequitur ergo ut ipsa sua sponte suo sensu ac divinitate moveantur. Nec vero Aristoteles non laudandus in eo quod omnia quae moventur aut natura moveri censuit aut vi aut voluntate; moveri autem solem et lunam et sidera omnia; quae autem natura moverentur, haec aut pondere deorsum aut levitate in sublime ferri, quorum neutrum astris contingeret propterea quod eorum motus in orbem circumque ferretur; nec vero dici potest vi quadam maiore fieri ut contra naturam astra moveantur (quae enim potest maior esse?); restat igitur ut motus astrorum sit voluntarius. **Their divinity proved by their movement**

Quae qui videat non indocte solum verum etiam impie faciat si deos esse neget.

Cp. Plato, *Laws* X, 888 e sqq. and the *Epin.* 982 a sqq., where is spoken of an ἀρίστη βούλευσις of the stars, by which they accomplish their circular movement. Later Ar. denies this point explicitly, e.g. in the *Nic. Eth.* Γ 5, 1112 a[21]: περὶ δὲ τῶν ἀϊδίων οὐδεὶς βουλεύεται.

d. Also the doctrine that noûs is of the same substance as the heavenly bodies, viz. aether, appears to have been taught by Aristotle, probably in Π. φιλ. **Noûs of the same substance as the heavenly bodies**

Cic., *Acad. post.* I, 7, 26:

Quintum genus, eo quo essent astra mentesque, singulare eorumque

quattuor (sc. elementorum) quae supra dixi dissimile Aristoteles quoddam esse rebatur.

History of the doctrine This doctrine, which appears first with Alcmaeon of Croton (our nr. **46b**; cp. also Socr. in Xen., *Mem.* I 4, our nr. **216**, vol. I p. 145, n. 1, and Plato in *Tim.* 40 b-c, 42 b-d; our nrs. **352** and **354b**) had a remarkable history. It revived in the Arabian doctrine of the *intelligences of the spheres*, the last of which is the "active intellect" of man (*intellectus agens separatus*). Hence the disputations of Western philosophers of the 13th century: *de unitate intellectus* (Albertus Magnus, Bonaventura, Thomas, and again Duns Scotus). In the 16th century we find the doctrine of the consubstantiality of mind with the stars in Jacob Boehme. By his influence it appears again in certain poems of the Dutch 17th century poet Jan Luyken [1].

e. On the influence of Ar.'s II. φιλ. in later Antiquity, in particular the doctrine of the heavenly bodies, see the volume of A. J. Festugière, *Le dieu cosmique* (*La Révélation d'Hermès Trismégiste* II), Paris 1949, ch. VIII ff. Also E. Bignone, *L'Aristotele perduto e la formazione filosofica di Epicuro*, Firenze 1937; J. Moreau, *L'Ame du monde de Platon aux Stoïciens*, Paris 1939; A. J. Festugière, *Epicure et ses Dieux*, Paris 1946, ch. V.

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[1] Vid. A. C. M. Meeuwesse, *Jan Luyken als dichter van de Duytse Lier*, diss. Utrecht 1952, p. 234/5 and 271 (the modern author did not understand the doctrine).

TWELFTH CHAPTER

LOGIC

1—THE SCHOOL-WRITINGS. INTRODUCTORY REMARKS

432—Strictly speaking Ar.'s logic does not belong to the system of philosophy according to his own intention. Ar. made a systematical division of all human thinking. There is no place for logic in this scheme.

a. Ar., *Metaph.* E 1, 1025 b[25]: **Ar.'s division of all human thinking**

πᾶσα διάνοια ἢ πρακτικὴ ἢ ποιητικὴ ἢ θεωρητική.

The πράττειν is the province of ethics; it depends on free choice (προαίσεσις). The ποιεῖν aims at the realization of a concrete ἔργον, technical or artistic. Theoretical thinking has "a kind of being" as its object (περὶ γένος τι τοῦ ὄντος ἐστίν). Now, as this genus may have three different species, theoretical thinking contains three main provinces: *physics*, which deals with things which exist separately but are not immovable; *mathematics*, which has to do with things which are immovable but do not exist separately, and the *first philosophy* (called *metaphysics* by a post-aristotelian term) which deals with things which are both immovable and exist separately.

Ar. expresses this view in the following passage.

b. Ar., ib., 1026 a[13-18]; [18-19]: **the three provinces of theoretical thinking**

Ἡ μὲν γὰρ φυσικὴ περὶ χωριστὰ μὲν ἀλλ' οὐκ ἀκίνητα, τῆς δὲ μαθηματικῆς ἔνια περὶ ἀκίνητα μὲν οὐ χωριστὰ δὲ ἴσως ἀλλ' ὡς ἐν ὕλῃ· ἡ δὲ πρώτη καὶ περὶ χωριστὰ καὶ ἀκίνητα. — Ὥστε τρεῖς ἂν εἶεν φιλοσοφίαι θεωρητικαί, μαθηματική, φυσική, θεολογική.

As to the object of mathematics, Ar.'s formula betrays a certain hesitation: in fact, he is rather inclined to regard mathematical objects as an accident of physical things; and it is clear that, in this case, mathematics are rather near to physics. We have to treat this point in our ch. XIII, § 3.

c. Ar., ib., 1026 a[19-23]. Ar. continues after the lines cited sub **b**: **a hierarchy of sciences**

Οὐ γὰρ ἄδηλον ὅτι εἴ που τὸ θεῖον ὑπάρχει, ἐν τῇ τοιαύτῃ φύσει ὑπάρχει, καὶ τὴν τιμιωτάτην δεῖ περὶ τὸ τιμιώτατον γένος εἶναι. αἱ μὲν οὖν θεωρητικαὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιστημῶν αἱρετώταται, αὕτη δὲ τῶν θεωρητικῶν.

the object of the first philosohpy

d. Ar., ib. 1026 a$^{27-32}$:

Εἰ μὲν οὖν μὴ ἔστι τις ἑτέρα οὐσία παρὰ τὰς φύσει συνεστηκυίας, ἡ φυσικὴ ἂν εἴη πρώτη ἐπιστήμη· εἰ δ' ἔστι τις οὐσία ἀκίνητος, αὕτη προτέρα καὶ φιλοσοφία πρώτη, καὶ καθόλου οὕτως ὅτι πρώτη [1]· καὶ περὶ τοῦ ὄντος ᾗ ὄν ταύτης ἂν εἴη θεωρῆσαι, καὶ τί ἐστι καὶ τὰ ὑπάρχοντα [2] ᾗ ὄν.

We shall consider this conception of metaphysics more closely in our ch. XIV, § 1.

The place of logic

433—According to Ar. logic has the character of a propaedeusis to all sciences. He calls it τὰ ἀναλυτικά (the term "logic" is of a later date; it is generally used by Stoic writers in the first century), and Ar. thinks it necessary to study this discipline before exercising any science at all.

a. Ar., *Metaph.* Γ 3, 1005 b$^{2-5}$:

Ὅσα δ' ἐγχειροῦσι τῶν λεγόντων τινὲς περὶ τῆς ἀληθείας ὃν τρόπον δεῖ ἀποδέχεσθαι, δι' ἀπαιδευσίαν τῶν ἀναλυτικῶν τοῦτο δρῶσιν· δεῖ γὰρ περὶ τούτων ἥκειν προεπισταμένους ἀλλὰ μὴ ἀκούοντας ζητεῖν.

"As to the attempts of some of those who discuss the terms on which truth should be accepted"—

Ar. means that the inquiry into the conditions under which beliefs are to be accepted as true, should not be mixed up with questions about the nature of reality. It belongs to logic, which should be studied before one approaches the questions of being, which belong to metaphysics. Ross supposes that with the τινες τῶν λεγόντων Antisthenes and his school are referred to [3].

ἀλλὰ μὴ ἀκούοντας ζητεῖν - One should not inquire into the formal principles of knowledge which belong to logic while attending lectures on metaphysics.

b. The same principle is displayed in *Metaph.* α 3, 995 a$^{12-14}$:

Διὸ δεῖ πεπαιδεῦσθαι πῶς ἕκαστα ἀποδεκτέον, ὡς ἄτοπον ἅμα ζητεῖν ἐπιστήμην καὶ τρόπον ἐπιστήμης.

Later division of phil.

c. Directly after Ar. we find a different division of philosophy. The Stoics take logic as a part of it, dividing philosophy into these three parts: logic, physics (including metaphysics), ethics. See our vol. III.

Logic an "instrument"

434—Because then logic had the character of an "instrument" for all philosophy and science, the Ancients gave to it the name of *organon*. We find this term used in the following instructive passage of Philoponus.

Philoponus in Ar. *Anal. pr.* 6, 19 Wallies:

Ζητητέον, πότερον μέρος ἐστὶν ἢ ὄργανον ἡ λογική τε καὶ διαλεκτικὴ πραγματεία τῆς φιλοσοφίας, ἐπείπερ ἐναντίως καὶ διαφόρως δοκεῖ τοῖς παλαιοῖς

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[1] "And it must be universal in this way, because it is first".

[2] "And the attributes which belong to it".

[3] See the commentary of Ross on this place, *Metaph.* I, p. 263.

περὶ αὐτῆς. οἱ μὲν γὰρ Στωικοὶ ἀντικρὺς μέρος αὐτὴν ἀποφαίνονται, τοῖς ἄλλοις δύο μέρεσι τῆς φιλοσοφίας αὐτὴν ἀντιδιαιροῦντες· οἱ δὲ Περιπατητικοὶ τουτέστιν οἱ ἀπὸ Ἀριστοτέλους ὄργανον· οἱ δὲ ἀπὸ τῆς Ἀκαδημίας, ὧν ἐστι καὶ Πλάτων, καὶ μέρος καὶ ὄργανον φαίνονται λέγοντες.

We may see from this fragment, that the author does not consider logic as the *proprium* of Ar. and the Aristotelian spirit: Plato too was a logician, and Ar. built on the foundations which were laid by him.—This view is confirmed by modern scholars.

See: E. Kapp, *Greek Foundations of traditional Logic*, New-York 1942.

Cp. also the interesting study of R. Schaerer, *La dialectique platonicienne dans ses rapports avec le syllogisme et la méthode cartésienne* in *Revue de Théol. et de Phil.* N.S. t. XXXVI, 1948, p. 24-40.

The *Organon* of Ar. the doctrine of the syllogism

435—a. The centre of Ar.'s logic is his doctrine of the syllogism. This term occurs in Plato's *Theaet.* 186 d, our nr. **319b**, in the general sense of *thought* or *reflexion*. Ar. uses it technically in the sense of drawing a conclusion from two theses which have been admitted (premisses). He gives his definition in *An. pr.* I 1, 24 b[18]:

Συλλογισμὸς δέ ἐστι λόγος ἐν ᾧ τεθέντων τινῶν ἕτερόν τι τῶν κειμένων ἐξ ἀνάγκης συμβαίνει τῷ ταῦτα εἶναι.

Three of the six works of the *Organon* deal with the syllogism: the prior and posterior *Analytics*, the *Topics*, and as a fourth may be joined to them the Π. σοφ. ἐλ., which is closely connected with the *Topics*.

The interrelation of these works is as follows:

In the *pr. Anal.* the syllogism is defined and its various forms are treated. Abstraction is made of the truth of the premisses, so that the conclusion ought not to be true (This is what Ar. calls the *dialectical syllogism*).

The *post. Anal.* give the doctrine of demonstration: they deal with the apodeictic or scientific syllogism, of which the premisses are true.

The *Topics* are a large collection of arguments, not limited at all to the three main forms of the syllogism, but displaying a great multiplicity of forms. The Π. σοφ. ἐλ. is often considered as a part of the *Topics* and cited as the IXth book of them.

the *Topics* anterior to the *Anal.*

b. Brandis [1] already remarked that the *Topics* would have been written very differently, if their author had had in his mind a clear conception of the syllogism. The greater part of this work must be anterior to the doctrine of the *Analytics*.

This remark has been confirmed by modern critics, such as Fr. Solmsen [2], P. Gohlke [3] and E. Kapp [4].

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[1] *Über die Reihenfolge der Bücher des Aristotelischen Organons.* Abh. der Berl. Akad. 1833.

[2] *Die Entwicklung der aristotelischen Logik u. Rhetorik*, 1929.

[3] *Die Entstehung der ar. Logik*, Berlin 1936.

[4] *Greek Foundations of traditional Logic*, New-York 1942.

The latter cites the opening phrase of the *Topics* in order to prove that here the doctrine of the syllogism is not presupposed.

Ar., *Top.* I 1, 100 a$^{18-21}$:

Ἡ μὲν πρόθεσις τῆς πραγματείας μέθοδον εὑρεῖν, ἀφ' ἧς δυνησόμεθα συλλογίζεσθαι περὶ παντὸς τοῦ προτεθέντος προβλήματος ἐξ ἐνδόξων, καὶ αὐτοὶ λόγον ὑπέχοντες μηθὲν ἐροῦμεν ὑπεναντίον.

Next follows: Πρῶτον οὖν ῥητέον τί ἐστι συλλογισμὸς καὶ τίνες αὐτοῦ διαφοραί, e.q.s. Kapp thinks that this has been added later. It is more probable perhaps that this introductory chapter has been added later by the author and has been adapted by him to the character of the whole work.

the *Categ.* and π. Ἑρμ.

c. In the Corpus the *Analytics* are preceded by the *Categories* and the *De interpr.*

The *Categ.* begin with an explanation of the terms *homonymous*, *synonymous* and *paronymous*. Chapters 2 and 3 contain more grammatical than philosophical remarks. Ch. 4 gives the list of the ten categories, which are explained in the following chapters.

The *De interpr.* begins with a definition of nouns and verbs, gives remarks upon simple and compound nouns, on indefinites, on declension and conjugation; next on sentences or propositions (general, particular and indefinite; affirmative or negative, and the like).

Now in traditional logic the doctrine of the syllogism is preceded by a first chapter on terms and a second on propositions. Modern historians of philosophy, however, have pointed out that in Ar.'s *Analytics* the doctrine of the *Categories* and *De interpr.* is not presupposed [1]. These works may have been added later.

2—THE CATEGORIES: TERMS

aequivocal

436—a. Ar., *Categ.* 1 a$^{1-3}$:

Ὁμώνυμα λέγεται ὧν ὄνομα μόνον κοινόν, ὁ δὲ κατὰ τοὔνομα λόγος τῆς οὐσίας ἕτερος, οἷον ζῷον ὅ τε ἄνθρωπος καὶ τὸ γεγραμμένον.

univocal

b. Ib., 1 a$^{6-8}$:

Συνώνυμα δὲ λέγεται ὧν τό τε ὄνομα κοινόν, καὶ ὁ κατὰ τοὔνομα λόγος τῆς οὐσίας ὁ αὐτός, οἷον ζῷον ὅ τε ἄνθρωπος καὶ ὁ βοῦς.

derivatively named

c. Ib., 1 a$^{12-15}$:

Παρώνυμα δὲ λέγεται ὅσα ἀπό τινος διαφέροντα τῇ πτώσει τὴν κατὰ τοὔ-

[1] Thus E. Kapp in *Gr. Foundations* etc. It seems to me very doubtful whether this thesis is right. W. D. Ross says (*Ar.*, p. 21 f.): "The categories—some or all of them—appear in almost every one of Aristotle's works, and the doctrine is everywhere treated as something already established".

νομα προσηγορίαν ἔχει, οἷον ἀπὸ τῆς γραμματικῆς ὁ γραμματικὸς καὶ ἀπὸ τῆς ἀνδρείας ὁ ἀνδρεῖος.

437—a. Ar., Categ. 2, 1 a$^{16-19}$: **uncombined and combined words**

Τῶν λεγομένων τὰ μὲν κατὰ συμπλοκὴν λέγεται, τὰ δ' ἄνευ συμπλοκῆς. τὰ μὲν οὖν κατὰ συμπλοκὴν οἷον ἄνθρωπος τρέχει, ἄνθρωπος νικᾷ· τὰ δ' ἄνευ συμπλοκῆς οἷον ἄνθρωπος, βοῦς, τρέχει, νικᾷ.

b. Ib. 4, 1 b^{25}-2 a^{4}: **the ten categories**

Τῶν κατὰ μηδεμίαν συμπλοκὴν λεγομένων ἕκαστον ἤτοι οὐσίαν σημαίνει ἢ ποσὸν ἢ ποιὸν ἢ πρός τι ἢ ποῦ ἢ ποτὲ ἢ κεῖσθαι ἢ ἔχειν ἢ ποιεῖν ἢ πάσχειν. Ἔστι δὲ οὐσία μὲν ὡς τύπῳ εἰπεῖν οἷον ἄνθρωπος, ἵππος· ποσὸν δὲ οἷον δίπηχυ, τρίπηχυ· ποιὸν δὲ οἷον λευκόν, γραμματικόν· πρός τι δὲ οἷον διπλάσιον, ἥμισυ, μεῖζον· ποῦ δὲ οἷον ἐν Λυκείῳ [1], ἐν ἀγορᾷ· ποτὲ δὲ οἷον ἐχθές, πέρυσιν· κεῖσθαι δέ οἷον ἀνάκειται, κάθηται· ἔχειν δὲ οἷον ὑποδέδεται, ὥπλισται· ποιεῖν δέ οἷον τέμνει, καίει· πάσχειν δέ οἷον τέμνεται, καίεται.

The same list occurs in *Top.* I 9, 103 b$^{20-23}$.

In other places κεῖσθαι and ἔχειν are omitted; the other eight are cited as forming a complete list. So in *An. post.* I 22, 83 b$^{15-18}$. Cp. *Phys.* V 1, 225b $^{5-9}$; 2, 226 a$^{23-25}$.

Ross (*Ar.*, p. 22) remarks: "It seems as if he had later come to the conclusion that posture and possession are not ultimate, unanalysable notions".

In *Top.* I 9 instead of οὐσία the term τί ἐστι is used, both in the sense of *substance* and in that of *essence*. In other places Ar. uses in the latter sense the term τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι, e.g. *Top.* 8, 103 b$^{9-10}$, where he speaks about the "conversion" or interchange of terms:

Ἀνάγκη πᾶν τὸ περί τινος κατηγορούμενον ἤτοι ἀντικατηγορεῖσθαι τοῦ πράγματος ἢ μή· καὶ εἰ μὲν ἀντικατηγορεῖται, ὅρος ἢ ἴδιον ἂν εἴη· εἰ μὲν γὰρ σημαίνει τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι, ὅ ρ ο ς, εἰ δὲ μὴ σημαίνει, ἴ δ ι ο ν.

438—a. Ar., *Categ.* 5, 2 a$^{11-19}$: **Substance**

Οὐσία δέ ἐστιν ἡ κυριώτατά τε καὶ πρώτως καὶ μάλιστα λεγομένη, ἣ μήτε καθ' ὑποκειμένου τινὸς λέγεται μήτ' ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ τινί ἐστιν, οἷον ὁ τὶς ἄνθρωπος ἢ ὁ τὶς ἵππος. δεύτεραι δὲ οὐσίαι λέγονται, ἐν οἷς εἴδεσιν αἱ πρώτως οὐσίαι λεγόμεναι ὑπάρχουσι, ταῦτά τι καὶ τὰ τῶν εἰδῶν τούτων γένη, οἷον ὁ τὶς ἄνθρωπος ἐν εἴδει μὲν ὑπάρχει τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ, γένος δὲ τοῦ εἴδους ἐστὶ τὸ ζῷον· δεύτεραι οὖν αὗται λέγονται οὐσίαι, οἷον ὅ τε ἄνθρωπος καὶ τὸ ζῷον.

According to this passage οὐσία in its first and proper sense means: *the concrete, individual being.*

Now according to book Z of the *Metaph.* substance is not the individual, but the τί ἐστι, i.e. the *essence* or *quiddity*, which is neither purely individual—for it is the intelligible "form" of the concrete being—nor purely universal— for it is bound up with matter. See: A. M. de Vos, *La vraie substance d'après la Métaphysique*

[1] The fact that the Lykeion is mentioned, is used by Jaeger as an argument for the later date of the treatise (*Aristotle*, p 46 n. 3). But cp. Plato, *Euthyd.* 271 a.

d'Aristote (in *Proceedings of the tenth internat. Congress of Phil.*, Amsterdam 1949, p. 1094 ff.). For this reason, S. Mansion (ib., p. 1097 ff.) stating that the doctrine of the *Categ.* is the farthest removed from Plato, infers that this treatise is not authentic, as there is no period in Ar.'s development in which we could place it.

L. M. de Rijk argues against this (in *Mnem.* 1951, p, 148 ff. and in *The Categories of being*, p. 51 f.).

Definitions of substance in *Metaph.* Δ

b. Both senses are mentioned in Ar.'s book of definitions: *Metaph.* Δ 8, 1017 b[10], [21].

Οὐσία λέγεται τά τε ἁπλᾶ σώματα ... καὶ ὅλως σώματα ... ὅτι οὐ καθ' ὑποκειμένου λέγεται ἀλλὰ κατὰ τούτων τὰ ἄλλα. ... ἔτι τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι, οὗ ὁ λόγος ὁρισμός, καὶ τοῦτο οὐσία λέγεται ἑκάστου.

the first sense in two other places

c. The first sense is also found in *Metaph.* B 6, 1003 a[7-9]:

Εἰ μὲν γὰρ καθόλου, οὐκ ἔσονται οὐσίαι· οὐθὲν γὰρ τῶν κοινῶν τόδε τι σημαίνει ἀλλὰ τοιόνδε, ἡ δ' οὐσία τόδε τι.

d. It seems to occur again in *Metaph.* Z 13, 1038 b[34]-1039 a[2]:

Ἔκ τε δὴ τούτων θεωροῦσι φανερὸν ὅτι οὐδὲν τῶν καθόλου ὑπαρχόντων [1] οὐσία ἐστί, καὶ ὅτι οὐδὲν σημαίνει τῶν κοινῇ κατηγορουμένων [2] τόδε τι, ἀλλὰ τοιόνδε.

Ar. is proving here that universals are no substances. Yet it would be too rash to conclude that substances are in his final opinion individual things, even when he gives us some reason to make this inference. He is not yet at his final conclusion. We have to face the question again in dealing with the metaphysics.

Other characteristics of substance

439—Besides by the definitions, given under **438a**, the author characterizes substance by the following three points.

a. Substances never have contraries. *Categ.* 5, 3 b[24-25]:

Ὑπάρχει δὲ ταῖς οὐσίαις καὶ τὸ μηδὲν αὐταῖς ἐναντίον εἶναι.

b. No substance admits of degrees. Ib., 3 b[33-34]:

Δοκεῖ δὲ ἡ οὐσία μὴ ἐπιδέχεσθαι τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ τὸ ἧττον.

c. Opposite qualifications can be predicated of it. Ib., 4 a[10-11]:

Μάλιστα δὲ ἴδιον τῆς οὐσίας δοκεῖ εἶναι τὸ ταὐτὸν καὶ ἓν ἀριθμῷ ὂν τῶν ἐναντίων εἶναι δεκτικόν.

3—ΠΕΡΙ ΕΡΜΗΝΕΙΑΣ: PROPOSITIONS

440—Ar., *De interpr.* 1, 16 a[1-8]:

Πρῶτον δεῖ θέσθαι τί ὄνομα καὶ τί ῥῆμα, ἔπειτα τί ἐστιν ἀπόφασις καὶ κατάφασις καὶ ἀπόφανσις καὶ λόγος.

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[1] οὐδὲν τῶν καθόλου ὑπαρχόντων - no universal attribute.

[2] οὐδὲν τῶν κοινῇ κατηγορουμένων - no common predicate.

Words are symbols of παθήματα

Ἔστι μὲν οὖν τὰ ἐν τῇ φωνῇ τῶν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ παθημάτων σύμβολα, καὶ τὰ γραφόμενα τῶν ἐν τῇ φωνῇ. καὶ ὥσπερ οὐδὲ γράμματα πᾶσι τὰ αὐτά, οὐδὲ φωναὶ αἱ αὐταί· ὧν μέντοι ταῦτα σημεῖα πρώτως, ταὐτὰ πᾶσι παθήματα τῆς ψυχῆς, καὶ ὧν ταῦτα ὁμοιώματα πράγματα ἤδη ταὐτά.

these are images of things

In this case a declaration or statement (ἀπόφανσις) does not consist of grasping combinations in reality, but of making combinations of "impressions" (παθήματα) of the soul. These then may be called "notions". But they are ὁμοιώματα of things. A statement will be true when it combines two notions which are an image of two combined elements in reality; it will be untrue in the opposite case. So this passage does not contradict the famous passage in *Metaph.* Θ 10, 1051 b[3] (our nr. **557**):

Ἀληθεύει μὲν ὁ τὸ διηρημένον οἰόμενος διηρῆσθαι καὶ τὸ συγκείμενον συγκεῖσθαι, ἔψευσται δὲ ὁ ἐναντίως ἔχων ἢ τὰ πράγματα.

In the same way ἀληθὴς and ψευδὴς λόγος are defined by Plato, *Soph.* 263 b-d (our nr. **343**). Ar. builds on the foundation which has been laid by Plato.

441—His definitions of *nomen* and *verbum* are new.

a. Ar., *De interpr.* 2, 16 a[19-21]:

definition of *noun*

Ὄνομα μὲν οὖν ἐστι φωνὴ σημαντικὴ κατὰ συνθήκην ἄνευ χρόνου, ἧς μηδὲν μέρος ἐστὶ σημαντικὸν κεχωρισμένον· ἐν γὰρ τῷ »Κάλλιππος« τὸ »ἵππος« οὐδὲν αὐτὸ καθ' ἑαυτὸ σημαίνει, ὥσπερ ἐν τῷ λόγῳ τῷ »καλὸς ἵππος«.

According to the definition of λόγος (see our next nr.) in ch. 4, this word does not only indicate a phrase or sentence; it can also indicate a part of it, an "expression" consisting of words which have a meaning separately. Consequently the τῷ before καλὸς ἵππος ought not to be dropped.

b. Ib. 3, 16 b[6-8]:

verb

Ῥῆμα δέ ἐστι τὸ προσσημαῖνον χρόνον, οὗ μέρος οὐδὲν σημαίνει χωρίς, καὶ ἔστιν ἀεὶ τῶν καθ' ἑτέρου λεγομένων σημεῖον.

442—a. Definition of logos. Ib.4, 16 b[26-30]; 17 a[1-7].

phrase or sentence

Λόγος δέ ἐστι φωνὴ σημαντικὴ κατὰ συνθήκην, ἧς τῶν μερῶν τι σημαντικόν ἐστι κεχωρισμένον, ὡς φάσις, ἀλλ' οὐχ ὡς κατάφασις ἢ ἀπόφασις. λέγω δέ, οἷον »ἄνθρωπος« σημαίνει μέν τι, ἀλλ' οὐχ ὅτι ἔστιν ἢ οὐκ ἔστιν· ἀλλ' ἔσται κατάφασις ἢ ἀπόφασις, ἐάν τι προστεθῇ. —

propositions

Ἔστι δὲ λόγος ἅπας μὲν σημαντικός, ... ἀποφαντικὸς δὲ οὐ πᾶς, ἀλλ' ἐν ᾧ τὸ ἀληθεύειν ἢ ψεύδεσθαι ὑπάρχει. οὐκ ἐν ἅπασι δὲ ὑπάρχει, οἷον ἡ εὐχὴ λόγος μέν, ἀλλ' οὔτε ἀληθὴς οὔτε ψευδής. οἱ μὲν οὖν ἄλλοι ἀφείσθωσαν· ῥητορικῆς γὰρ ἢ ποιητικῆς οἰκειοτέρα ἡ σκέψις· ὁ δὲ ἀποφαντικὸς τῆς νῦν θεωρίας.

b. Ib. 5, 17 a[8-12].

simple propositions

Ἔστι δὲ εἷς πρῶτος λόγος ἀποφαντικὸς κατάφασις, εἶτα ἀπόφασις· οἱ δ'

ἄλλοι πάντες συνδέσμῳ εἷς. ἀνάγκη δὲ πάντα λόγον ἀποφαντικὸν ἐκ ῥήματος εἶναι ἢ πτώσεως ῥήματος· καὶ γὰρ ὁ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου λόγος, ἐὰν μὴ τὸ ἔστιν ἢ ἦν ἢ ἔσται ἢ τοιοῦτον προστεθῇ, οὔπω λόγος ἀποφαντικός.

affirmation, negation

c. Ib. 6, 17 a$^{25-26}$:

Κατάφασις δέ ἐστιν ἀπόφανσίς τινος κατά τινος, ἀπόφασις δέ ἐστιν ἀπόφανσίς τινος ἀπό τινος.

4—THE PRIOR ANALYTICS: THE DOCTRINE OF THE SYLLOGISM

Division of propositions: universal, particular

443—a. Ar., *An. pr.* I 1, 24 a$^{16-22}$:

Πρότασις μὲν οὖν ἐστι λόγος καταφατικὸς ἢ ἀποφατικός τινος κατά τινος. οὗτος δὲ ἢ καθόλου ἢ ἐν μέρει ἢ ἀδιόριστος. λέγω δὲ καθόλου μὲν τὸ παντὶ ἢ μηδενὶ ὑπάρχειν, ἐν μέρει δὲ τὸ τινὶ ἢ μὴ τινὶ ἢ μὴ παντὶ ὑπάρχειν, ἀδιόριστον δὲ τὸ ὑπάρχειν ἢ μὴ ὑπάρχειν ἄνευ τοῦ καθόλου ἢ κατὰ μέρος, οἷον τὸ τῶν ἐναντίων εἶναι τὴν αὐτὴν ἐπιστήμην ἢ τὸ τὴν ἡδονὴν μὴ εἶναι ἀγαθόν.

I. „Πρότασις est propositio ad conclusionem inde efficiendam praemissa".

II. The division of propositions into universal and particular is called a division according to quantity. Ar. makes it first in *De interpr.* 7, where he gives the following examples:

(a) Universal propositions:
Πᾶς ἄνθρωπος λευκός. — Οὐδεὶς ἄνθρωπος λευκός.

(b) Particular propositions:
Τις ἄνθρωπος λευκός. / Ἔστι Σωκράτης λευκός. — Οὐκ ἔστι Σωκράτης λευκός.

The division into affirmative and negative propositions, which has been made in *De interpr.* 6, is called in traditional logic a division according to quality.

Traditional scheme:

a.	All x is y	— Universal affirmative	— S a P
e.	No x is y	— Universal negative	— S e P
i.	Some x is y	— Particular affirmative	— S i P
o.	Some x is not y	— Particular negative	— S o P

modality

b. Ar. distinguishes also what is called in traditional logic the *modality* of propositions. In *De interpr.* 12 (beginning) he mentions:

δυνατὸν καὶ μὴ δυνατόν
ἐνδεχόμενον καὶ μὴ ἐνδεχόμενον
(what may and may not happen: contingent)
ἀδύνατον καὶ ἀναγκαῖον.

The same distinction is made in *An. pr.* I 2, 25 a$^{1-2}$:


assertoric, apodeictic, problematic

Ἐπεὶ δὲ πᾶσα πρότασίς ἐστιν ἢ τοῦ ὑπάρχειν ἢ τοῦ ἐξ ἀνάγκης ὑπάρχειν ἢ τοῦ ἐνδέχεσθαι ὑπάρχειν, —

Again in *An. pr.* I 8, 29 b$^{29-30}$:

'Επεὶ δ' ἕτερόν ἐστιν ὑπάρχειν τε καὶ ἐξ ἀνάγκης ὑπάρχειν καὶ ἐνδέχεσθαι ὑπάρχειν, —

c. Between the four kinds of propositions which are mentioned sub **a** the following relations are possible. **relations between propositions**



tessara logica

1. From the truth of the general proposition follows the truth of the subaltern particular ("All men are mortal"—"Some men are mortal"), but not inversely. In modern terminology the general proposition is also called *superimplicant* to the subaltern particular, while the latter is called *subimplicant* to the former [1].
2. From the untruth of the particular follows the untruth of the subaltern general ("Some Romans are not brave"—"All Romans are not brave"), but not inversely.
3. *Contradictory propositions cannot be both true or both untrue.*
4. Contrary propositions cannot both be true; they can both be untrue.
5. Subcontrary propositions cannot both be untrue; they can both be true.

The third rule is the fundamental law of thinking, on which all reasoning is built: the *principium contradictionis*. **Principium contradictionis**

Ar. does not formulate it in his *De interpr.*, nor at the beginning of his *Anal.* But the principle itself is presupposed in his whole doctrine of the syllogism. It is mentioned as such in *An. post.* I 11, a chapter which deals with axioms (fundamental theses, which are presupposed without any proof).

444—a. The classical formula of the principium contradictionis is found in *Metaph.* Γ 3, 1005 b$^{19, 32}$:

Τὸ αὐτὸ ἅμα ὑπάρχειν τε καὶ μὴ ὑπάρχειν ἀδύνατον τῷ αὐτῷ καὶ κατὰ τὸ αὐτό· — αὕτη δὴ πασῶν ἐστι βεβαιοτάτη τῶν ἀρχῶν· — ἀδύνατον γὰρ ὁντινοῦν ταὐτὸν ὑπολαμβάνειν εἶναι καὶ μὴ εἶναι. — διὸ πάντες οἱ ἀποδεικνύντες εἰς ταύτην ἀνάγουσιν ἐσχάτην δόξαν.

b. Cp. *An. post.* I 11, 77 a$^{10-11}$:

Τὸ δὲ μὴ ἐνδέχεσθαι ἅμα φάναι καὶ ἀποφάναι οὐδεμία λαμβάνει ἀπόδειξις.

c. Ib., 77 a$^{22-24}$: **principium exclusi tertii**

Τὸ δ' ἅπαν φάναι ἢ ἀποφάναι ἡ εἰς τὸ ἀδύνατον ἀπόδειξις λαμβάνει. καὶ ταῦτα οὐδ' ἀεὶ καθόλου, ἀλλ' ὅσον ἱκανόν, ἱκανὸν δ' ἐπὶ τοῦ γένους.

[1] Consult: S. Stebbing, *A modern introduction to logic*, London ^{6}1948, p. 58 f.

For instance, a mathematician will not say in general that either the affirmation or the negation is true, but that this or that line is straight or not straight.

This is the so-called *principium exclusi tertii*, another formulation of the princ. contradictionis.

apodeictical and dialectical premisses

445—a. *Anal. pr.* I 1 continued (24 a$^{22-25}$):

Διαφέρει δὲ ἡ ἀποδεικτικὴ πρότασις τῆς διαλεκτικῆς, ὅτι ἡ μὲν ἀποδεικτικὴ λῆψις θατέρου μορίου τῆς ἀντιφάσεώς ἐστιν (οὐ γὰρ ἐρωτᾷ, ἀλλὰ λαμβάνει ὁ ἀποδεικνύων), ἡ δὲ διαλεκτικὴ ἐρώτησις ἀντιφάσεώς ἐστιν.

This passage shows us which method of reasoning was exercised in the Academy and was called *dialectical* by Ar. A dialogue is carried on by two persons. One of them has the part of questioner, the other that of respondent and opponent. The question dealt with is called πρόβλημα. Every proposition can become a "problem": you have just to give the form of an ἀντίφασις to it: "Is it in this or in that way?" E.g.: "Is *two-footed animal* the definition of man, or not?" Or: "Is *animal* the genus of (the species) man, or not?" [1]—The simple question "Is two-footed animal the definition of man?" is a proposition. The ἀντίφασις makes a "problem" out of it. Now the questioner makes his partner choose his position: the responder says yes or no. That is: he "grasps one part of the ἀντίφασις". Then the questioner takes the other position. He continues asking. The responder has to see that he does not contradict himself; the questioner tries to get from the answers of his opponent a syllogism for his own thesis.

This, then, is the "reasoning from opinions that are generally accepted about every problem propounded to us" (συλλογίζεσθαι περὶ παντὸς τοῦ προτεθέντος προβλήματος ἐξ ἐνδόξων), as it was said in *Top.* I 1 (cited supra, nr. **435b**), for which the author said that he was seeking the right method in that work—a method which, in fact, has been found later in the *An. pr.*

b. The same passage continued (24 a^{25}-b ^{12}):

Οὐδὲν δὲ διοίσει πρὸς τὸ γενέσθαι τὸν ἑκατέρου συλλογισμόν· καὶ γὰρ 25
ὁ ἀποδεικνύων καὶ ὁ ἐρωτῶν συλλογίζεται [2] λαβών τι κατά τινος ὑπάρχειν
ἢ μὴ ὑπάρχειν [3]. ὥστε ἔσται συλλογιστικὴ μὲν πρότασις [4] ἁπλῶς κατάφασις
ἢ ἀπόφασίς τινος κατά τινος τὸν εἰρημένον τρόπον, ἀποδεικτικὴ δέ, ἐὰν ἀληθὴς 3c
ᾖ καὶ διὰ τῶν ἐξ ἀρχῆς ὑποθέσεων εἰλημμένη [5], διαλεκτικὴ δὲ πυνθανομένῳ 24
μὲν ἐρώτησις ἀντιφάσεως [6], συλλογιζομένῳ δὲ λῆψις τοῦ φαινομένου καὶ
ἐνδόξου, καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς Τοπικοῖς εἴρηται.

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[1] Examples taken from *Top.* I 4, 101 b$^{28-37}$.

[2] συλλογίζεται - draws a conclusion.

[3] λαβών e.q.s. - "by first assuming that some predicate applies or does not apply to some subject" (H. Tredennick).

[4] συλλογιστικὴ μὲν πρότασις - the premiss of a syllogism.

[5] διὰ τῶν ἐξ ἀρχῆς ὑποθέσεων εἰλημμένη - "if it is based on fundamental postulates".—ἐξ ἀρχῆς ὑποθέσεις are unprovable first principles, which are assumed in science: axioms or postulates. Ar. defines them in *An. post.* I 2, 72 a^{14}.

[6] ἐρώτησις ἀντιφάσεως - a question to his partner, which of the two possibilities propounded to him the latter will accept.

A definition of *proof* and *dialectical syllogism* is given in *Top.* I 1, directly after the definition of *syllogism*. We have to cite it later.

446—*An. pr.* I 1, 24 b$^{16-18}$: **term defined**

Ὅρον δὲ καλῶ εἰς ὃν διαλύεται ἡ πρότασις, οἷον τό τε κατηγορούμενον καὶ τὸ καθ' οὗ κατηγορεῖται, ἢ προστιθεμένου ἢ διαιρουμένου τοῦ εἶναι καὶ μὴ εἶναι.

447—**a**. Ib., 24 b$^{18-22}$: **Syllogism defined**

Συλλογισμὸς δέ ἐστι λόγος ἐν ᾧ τεθέντων τινῶν ἕτερόν τι τῶν κειμένων ἐξ ἀνάγκης συμβαίνει τῷ ταῦτα εἶναι. λέγω δὲ τῷ ταῦτα εἶναι τὸ διὰ ταῦτα συμβαίνειν, τὸ δὲ διὰ ταῦτα συμβαίνειν τὸ μηδενὸς ἔξωθεν ὅρου προσδεῖν πρὸς τὸ γενέσθαι τὸ ἀναγκαῖον.

Nearly the same definition occurs in *Top.* I 1.

b. Ib., 24 b$^{22-26}$: **Perfect and imperfect syllogisms**


Τέλειον μὲν οὖν καλῶ συλλογισμὸν τὸν μηδενὸς ἄλλου προσδεόμενον παρὰ τὰ εἰλημμένα πρὸς τὸ φανῆναι τὸ ἀναγκαῖον, ἀτελῆ δὲ τὸν προσδεόμενον ἢ ἑνὸς ἢ πλειόνων, ἃ ἔστι μὲν ἀναγκαῖα διὰ τῶν ὑποκειμένων ὅρων, οὐ μὴν εἴληπται διὰ προτάσεων.

I.e.: when the premisses have been formulated incompletely, so that something must be added in order to make the form of the syllogism complete.

c. Ib., 14 b$^{26-30}$: **"To be wholly contained in"**

Τὸ δὲ ἐν ὅλῳ εἶναι ἕτερον ἑτέρῳ καὶ τὸ κατὰ παντὸς κατηγορεῖσθαι θατέρου θάτερον ταὐτόν ἐστιν. λέγομεν δὲ τὸ κατὰ παντὸς κατηγορεῖσθαι, ὅταν μηδὲν ᾖ λαβεῖν τῶν τοῦ ὑποκειμένου, καθ' οὗ θάτερον οὐ λεχθήσεται· καὶ τὸ κατὰ μηδενὸς ὡσαύτως.

An example of τὸ ἐν ὅλῳ εἶναι: All men are mortal. Represented in a diagram:



(All S is P).

448—*An. pr.* I 2, 25 a$^{1-13}$:

Ἐπεὶ δὲ πᾶσα πρότασίς ἐστιν ἢ τοῦ ὑπάρχειν ἢ τοῦ ἐξ ἀνάγκης ὑπάρχειν ἢ τοῦ ἐνδέχεσθαι ὑπάρχειν, τούτων δὲ αἱ μὲν καταφατικαὶ αἱ δὲ ἀποφατικαὶ καθ' ἑκάστην πρόσρησιν, πάλιν δὲ τῶν καταφατικῶν καὶ ἀποφατικῶν αἱ μὲν καθόλου αἱ δὲ ἐν μέρει αἱ δὲ ἀδιόριστοι, τὴν μὲν ἐν τῷ ὑπάρχειν καθόλου στερητικὴν ἀνάγκη τοῖς ὅροις ἀντιστρέφειν, οἷον εἰ μηδεμία ἡδονὴ ἀγαθόν, οὐδ' ἀγαθὸν οὐδὲν ἔσται ἡδονή· τὴν δὲ κατηγορικὴν ἀντιστρέφειν μὲν ἀναγκαῖον, **Conversion of terms**

οὐ μὴν καθόλου ἀλλ' ἐν μέρει, οἷον εἰ πᾶσα ἡδονὴ ἀγαθόν, καὶ ἀγαθόν τι εἶναι ἡδονήν· τῶν δὲ ἐν μέρει τὴν μὲν καταφατικὴν ἀντιστρέφειν ἀνάγκη κατὰ μέρος (εἰ γὰρ ἡδονή τις ἀγαθόν, καὶ ἀγαθόν τι ἔσται ἡδονή), τὴν δὲ στερητικὴν οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον· οὐ γὰρ εἰ ἄνθρωπος μὴ ὑπάρχει τινὶ ζῴῳ, καὶ ζῷον οὐχ ὑπάρχει τινὶ ἀνθρώπῳ.

On the modal, qualitative and quantitative division of premisses, see supra, **443a, b.**

τὴν μὲν ἐν τῷ ὑπάρχειν καθόλου etc. - "It is necessary that in universal attribution the negative premiss should be convertible in its terms".—In these and the following lines rules are given for the conversion of terms in assertoric premisses (ἐν τῷ ὑπάρχειν) [1].

τὴν δὲ κατηγορικὴν - the (assertoric) affirmative premiss.

In ch. 3 rules are given for the conversion of terms in apodeictic and problematic premisses.

Figures and moods of syllogism

449—*An. pr.* I 4, 25 b^{26}-26 a^{2}.

Kapp [2] writes on this passage:

"It is one of the most impressive passages in Aristotle's writings, unsurpassed in its proud objectivity, when after careful preparation he introduces his syllogistical principle, which has predetermined the history of logic for more than two thousand years".

Syllogism and proof

a. 25 b$^{26-30}$:

Διωρισμένων δὲ τούτων λέγομεν ἤδη διὰ τίνων καὶ πότε καὶ πῶς γίνεται πᾶς συλλογισμός· ὕστερον δὲ λεκτέον περὶ ἀποδείξεως. πρότερον δὲ περὶ συλλογισμοῦ λεκτέον ἢ περὶ ἀποδείξεως διὰ τὸ καθόλου μᾶλλον εἶναι τὸν συλλογισμόν· ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἀπόδειξις συλλογισμός τις, ὁ συλλογισμὸς δὲ οὐ πᾶς ἀπόδειξις.

Cp. *Top.* I 1, 100 a$^{22-33}$: Ἀπόδειξις μὲν οὖν ἐστίν, ὅταν ἐξ ἀληθῶν καὶ πρώτων [3] ὁ συλλογισμὸς ᾖ, — διαλεκτικὸς δὲ συλλογισμὸς ὁ ἐξ ἐνδόξων συλλογιζόμενος ("which draws its conclusion from probable premisses").

We shall see proof more precisely defined in the *An. post.*

The first Figure

b. 25 b^{32}-26 a^{2}:

Ὅταν οὖν ὅροι τρεῖς οὕτως ἔχωσι πρὸς ἀλλήλους ὥστε τὸν ἔσχατον ἐν ὅλῳ εἶναι τῷ μέσῳ καὶ τὸν μέσον ἐν ὅλῳ τῷ πρώτῳ ἢ εἶναι ἢ μὴ εἶναι, ἀνάγκη τῶν ἄκρων εἶναι συλλογισμὸν τέλειον. καλῶ δὲ μέσον μὲν ὃ καὶ αὐτὸ ἐν ἄλλῳ καὶ ἄλλο ἐν τούτῳ ἐστίν, ὃ καὶ τῇ θέσει γίνεται μέσον· ἄκρα δὲ τό τε αὐτὸ ἐν ἄλλῳ ὂν καὶ ἐν ᾧ ἄλλο ἐστίν. εἰ γὰρ τὸ Α κατὰ παντὸς τοῦ Β καὶ τὸ Β κατὰ παντὸς τοῦ Γ, ἀνάγκη τὸ Α κατὰ παντὸς τοῦ Γ κατηγορεῖσθαι· πρότερον

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[1] The above sentence might be translated also as: "The assertoric universal negative premiss is necessarily convertible in its terms".

[2] *Gr. Foundations* etc., p. 66.

[3] πρώτων is defined in *An. post.* I 2 as ἐξ ἀρχῶν οἰκείων.

40 γὰρ εἴρηται πῶς τὸ κατὰ παντὸς λέγομεν. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ εἰ τὸ μὲν A κατὰ μη- *Celarent*
26 a δενὸς τοῦ B, τὸ δὲ B κατὰ παντὸς τοῦ Γ, ὅτι τὸ A οὐδενὶ τῷ Γ ὑπάρξει.

Instance of a syllogism of the first Figure: **Example**


All men are mortal — (propositio) maior — πρότασις μείζων.
Kings are men — ,, minor — ,, ἐλάττων.
Therefore Kings are mortal — conclusio — συμπέρασμα.

Each syllogism contains three terms: **the 3 terms**
τὰ ἄκρα (the extremes), namely
τὸ πρῶτον (ἄκρον), which is called τὸ μεῖζον (terminus maior),
τὸ ἔσχατον (ἄκρον), which is called τὸ ἔλαττον (terminus minor),
and τὸ μέσον (middle term, terminus medius), which occurs in both premisses but not in the conclusion.
The minor extreme (kings) is the subject of the conclusion (S),
the major extreme (mortal) is the predicate (P).
The middle term is indicated by M.

So S must be wholly contained in M, and M must be wholly contained in P. **First mood:**

Scheme: M a P
S a M
S a P

Diagram:




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Or M must be excluded from P. **Second mood:**

Instance: No man is sincere *Celarent*
Philosophers are men
Therefore etc.

Scheme: M e P
S a M
S e P

Diagram:



c. Two other modes are possible, namely *a i i* and *e i o* (second premiss particular), which are called by the names *Darii* and *Ferio*.

d. Ar. concludes his exposition of the First Figure thus (ib. 26 b$^{28-33}$):
28, 29 Δῆλον δὲ ... ὅτι πάντες οἱ ἐν αὐτῷ συλλογισμοὶ τέλειοί εἰσι· — καὶ ὅτι
31 πάντα τὰ προβλήματα δείκνυται διὰ τούτου τοῦ σχήματος· καὶ γὰρ τὸ παντὶ καὶ τὸ μηδενὶ καὶ τὸ τινὶ καὶ τὸ μή τινι ὑπάρχειν. καλῶ δὲ τὸ τοιοῦτον σχῆμα
33 πρῶτον.

Second Figure

450—a. *An. pr.* I 5, 26 b^{34}-27 a^{3}:

Ὅταν δὲ τὸ αὐτὸ τῷ μὲν παντὶ τῷ δὲ μηδενὶ ὑπάρχῃ, ἢ ἑκατέρῳ παντὶ ἢ μηδενί, τὸ μὲν σχῆμα τὸ τοιοῦτον καλῶ δεύτερον, μέσον δὲ ἐν αὐτῷ λέγω τὸ 35
κατηγορούμενον ἀμφοῖν, ἄκρα δὲ καθ' ὧν λέγεται τοῦτο, μεῖζον δὲ ἄκρον τὸ
πρὸς τῷ μέσῳ κείμενον, ἔλαττον δὲ τὸ πορρωτέρω τοῦ μέσου. τίθεται δὲ τὸ
μέσον ἔξω μὲν τῶν ἄκρων, πρῶτον δὲ τῇ θέσει. τέλειος μὲν οὖν οὐκ ἔσται 27
συλλογισμὸς οὐδαμῶς ἐν τούτῳ τῷ σχήματι, δυνατὸς δ' ἔσται καὶ καθόλου
καὶ μὴ καθόλου τῶν ὅρων ὄντων.


Instance of this figure: (*camestres*)

Every living being moves	*a*
No stone moves	*e*
No stone is a living being	*e*

Scheme:

P M
S M
———
S P

Diagram:



b. In this figure there will be only negative syllogisms. Ib. 28 a $^{7-9}$:

Δῆλον δὲ ... ὅτι οὐ γίνεται καταφατικὸς συλλογισμὸς διὰ τούτου τοῦ σχήματος, ἀλλὰ πάντες στερητικοί, καὶ οἱ καθόλου καὶ οἱ κατὰ μέρος.

Third Figure

451—a. *An. pr.* I 6, 28 a$^{10-20}$:

Ἐὰν δὲ τῷ αὐτῷ τὸ μὲν παντὶ τὸ δὲ μηδενὶ ὑπάρχῃ, ἢ ἄμφω παντὶ ἢ μηδενί, 10
τὸ μὲν σχῆμα τὸ τοιοῦτον καλῶ τρίτον, μέσον δ' ἐν αὐτῷ λέγω καθ' οὗ ἄμφω
τὰ κατηγορούμενα, ἄκρα δὲ τὰ κατηγορούμενα, μεῖζον δ' ἄκρον τὸ πορρώ-
τερον τοῦ μέσου, ἔλαττον δὲ τὸ ἐγγύτερον. τίθεται δὲ τὸ μέσον ἔξω μὲν τῶν
ἄκρων, ἔσχατον δὲ τῇ θέσει. τέλειος μὲν οὖν οὐ γίνεται συλλογισμὸς οὐδ' ἐν 15
τούτῳ τῷ σχήματι, δυνατὸς δ' ἔσται καὶ καθόλου καὶ μὴ καθόλου τῶν ὅρων
Darapti ὄντων πρὸς τὸ μέσον. καθόλου μὲν οὖν ὄντων, ὅταν καὶ τὸ Π καὶ τὸ Ρ παντὶ
τῷ Σ ὑπάρχῃ, ὅτι τινὶ τῷ Ρ τὸ Π ὑπάρξει ἐξ ἀνάγκης.


Instance of this figure:

Every seal is a marine animal	*a*
Every seal has lungs	*a*
Some marine animals have lungs	*i*

Scheme:

M P
M S
———
S P

Diagram:



b. In this figure will occur only particular syllogisms. Ib., 29 a$^{14-18}$:

Φανερὸν δὲ ... ὅτι συλλογίσασθαι τὸ καθόλου διὰ τούτου τοῦ σχήματος οὐκ ἔσται, οὔτε στερητικὸν οὔτε καταφατικόν.

452—The principal rules of the syllogism have been formulated explicitly by Ar. in the later chapters of the same book. **Rules of the syllogism**

a. *An. pr.* I 25, 41 b$^{36-37}$: **three terms required for demonstration**

Δῆλον δὲ ... ὅτι πᾶσα ἀπόδειξις ἔσται διὰ τριῶν ὅρων καὶ οὐ πλειόνων.

b. Ib., 42 a$^{32-33}$:

Τούτου δ' ὄντος φανεροῦ δῆλον ὡς καὶ ἐκ δύο προτάσεων καὶ οὐ πλειόνων· οἱ γὰρ τρεῖς ὅροι δύο προτάσεις. **two premisses required**

c. *An. pr.* I 32, 47 a^{39}-b ^{6}: **the middle term in both premisses**

39 Ἀνάγκη ... τὸ μέσον ἐν ἀμφοτέραις ὑπάρχειν (sc. ταῖς προτάσεσιν) ἐν ἅπασι τοῖς σχήμασιν. ἐὰν μὲν οὖν κατηγορῇ [1] καὶ κατηγορῆται τὸ μέσον,
47 b ἢ αὐτὸ μὲν κατηγορῇ, ἄλλο δ' ἐκείνου ἀπαρνῆται, τὸ πρῶτον ἔσται σχῆμα· ἐὰν δὲ καὶ κατηγορῇ καὶ ἀπαρνῆται ἀπό τινος, τὸ μέσον [2]· ἐὰν δ' ἄλλα ἐκείνου
5, 6 κατηγορῆται, ἢ τὸ μὲν ἀπαρνῆται τὸ δὲ κατηγορῆται, τὸ ἔσχατον [3]. οὕτω γὰρ εἶχεν ἐν ἑκάστῳ σχήματι τὸ μέσον.

d. *An. pr.* I 24, 41 b$^{6-13}$: **In every syllogism one premiss must be affirmative, and one universal**

6 Ἔτι τε ἐν ἅπαντι (sc. συλλογισμῷ) δεῖ κατηγορικόν [4] τινα τῶν ὅρων εἶναι καὶ τὸ καθόλου ὑπάρχειν· ἄνευ γὰρ τοῦ καθόλου ἢ οὐκ ἔσται συλλογισμός, ἢ οὐ πρὸς τὸ κείμενον [5] ἢ τὸ ἐξ ἀρχῆς αἰτήσεται [6]. Κείσθω γὰρ τὴν μουσικὴν
10 ἡδονὴν εἶναι σπουδαίαν. εἰ μὲν οὖν ἀξιώσειεν [7] ἡδονὴν εἶναι σπουδαίαν, μὴ προσθεὶς τὸ »πᾶσαν«, οὐκ ἔσται συλλογισμός· εἰ δέ »τινὰ ἡδονήν«, εἰ μὲν ἄλλην, οὐδὲν πρὸς τὸ κείμενον, εἰ δ' αὐτὴν ταύτην, τὸ ἐξ ἀρχῆς λαμβάνει [8].

453—Syllogisms of the second and third figures are to be controlled by reducing them to the first.

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[1] ἐὰν κατηγορῇ - if it is a predicate.
[2] τὸ μέσον - you have the middle figure.
[3] τὸ ἔσχατον - then you will have the third figure.
[4] κατηγορικόν - affirmative.
[5] οὐ πρὸς τὸ κείμενον - the conclusion will be unrelated to the assumption.
[6] τὸ ἐξ ἀρχῆς αἰτεῖσθαι - *petere id quod ab initio ad demonstrandum propositum est*; what is called a *petitio principii*. See our nr. **454**.
[7] ἀξιώσειεν - If we postulate or assume.
[8] τὸ ἐξ ἀρχῆς λαμβάνει - there is a *petitio principii*.

All imperfect syllogisms are validated in the first figure

a. *An. pr.* I 7, 29 a$^{30-39}$:

Φανερὸν δὲ καὶ ὅτι πάντες οἱ ἀτελεῖς συλλογισμοὶ τελειοῦνται διὰ τοῦ 30
πρώτου σχήματος. ἢ γὰρ δεικτικῶς ἢ διὰ τοῦ ἀδυνάτου περαίνονται πάντες [1]. ἀμφοτέρως δὲ γίνεται τὸ πρῶτον σχῆμα, δεικτικῶς μὲν τελειουμένων, ὅτι διὰ τῆς ἀντιστροφῆς [2] ἐπεραίνοντο πάντες, ἡ δ' ἀντιστροφὴ τὸ πρῶτον ἐποίει σχῆμα, διὰ δὲ τοῦ ἀδυνάτου δεικνυμένων, ὅτι τεθέντος τοῦ ψευδοῦς ὁ συλλο- 35
γισμὸς γίνεται διὰ τοῦ πρώτου σχήματος, οἷον ἐν τῷ τελευταίῳ σχήματι, εἰ τὸ Α καὶ τὸ Β παντὶ τῷ Γ ὑπάρχει, ὅτι [3] τὸ Α τινὶ τῷ Β ὑπάρχει. εἰ γὰρ μηδενί, τὸ δὲ Β παντὶ τῷ Γ, οὐδενὶ τῷ Γ τὸ Α. ἀλλ' ἦν παντί. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων. 39

In the second and third figures syllogisms are reduced to the first "by means of conversion", i.e. by transposing the terms of one of the premisses. E.g. in a syllogism of the form

$\left.\begin{matrix} M\ P \\ M\ S \end{matrix}\right\}$ (third figure) the terms of the second premiss should be converted.

We then get a syllogism of the form $\left.\begin{matrix} M\ P \\ S\ M \end{matrix}\right\}$ (first figure).

Every demonstration reducible to the first figure

b. *An. pr.* I 23, 41 b$^{1-5}$.

In the preceding passage Ar. has spoken of the procedure of hypothetical proof. Now in this case too a demonstration is to be reached by proving some proposition syllogistically. Ar. continues:

Εἰ δὲ τοῦτ' ἀληθές, πᾶσαν ἀπόδειξιν καὶ πάντα συλλογισμὸν ἀνάγκη γίνεσθαι b
διὰ τριῶν τῶν προειρημένων σχημάτων. τούτου δὲ δειχθέντος δῆλον ὡς ἅπας τε συλλογισμὸς ἐπιτελεῖται διὰ τοῦ πρώτου σχήματος καὶ ἀνάγεται εἰς τοὺς ἐν τούτῳ καθόλου συλλογισμούς. 5

Petitio principii

454—*An. pr.* II 16, 64 b^{28}-65 a^{4}:

Τὸ δ' ἐν ἀρχῇ αἰτεῖσθαι καὶ λαμβάνειν ἔστι μέν, ὡς ἐν γένει λαβεῖν [4], ἐν 28
τῷ μὴ ἀποδεικνύναι τὸ προκείμενον, τοῦτο δὲ ἐπισυμβαίνει πολλαχῶς· καὶ γὰρ εἰ ὅλως μὴ συλλογίζεται, καὶ εἰ δι' ἀγνωστοτέρων ἢ ὁμοίως ἀγνώστων, 31
καὶ εἰ διὰ τῶν ὑστέρων τὸ πρότερον· ἡ γὰρ ἀπόδειξις ἐκ πιστοτέρων τε καὶ προτέρων ἐστίν. τούτων μὲν οὖν οὐδέν ἐστι τὸ αἰτεῖσθαι τὸ ἐξ ἀρχῆς· ἀλλ' ἐπεὶ τὰ μὲν δι' αὑτῶν πέφυκε γνωρίζεσθαι τὰ δὲ δι' ἄλλων (αἱ μὲν γὰρ ἀρχαὶ 35
δι' αὑτῶν, τὰ δ' ὑπὸ τὰς ἀρχὰς δι' ἄλλων), ὅταν μὴ τὸ δι' αὑτοῦ γνωστὸν δι' αὑτοῦ τις ἐπιχειρῇ δεικνύναι, τότ' αἰτεῖται τὸ ἐξ ἀρχῆς. τοῦτο δ' ἔστι μὲν

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[1] περαίνονται πάντες - all the conclusions are reached.
δεικτικῶς - by demonstration.
ἢ διὰ τοῦ ἀδυνάτου - or by reduction ad impossibile.

[2] διὰ τῆς ἀντιστροφῆς - by means of conversion.

[3] ὅτι - we get a syllogism to the effect that —.

[4] ὡς ἐν γένει λαβεῖν - to take the expression in its widest sense.

οὕτω ποιεῖν ὥστ' εὐθὺς ἀξιῶσαι τὸ προκείμενον, ἐνδέχεται δὲ καὶ μεταβάντας
40 ἐπ' ἄλλα ἄττα τῶν πεφυκότων δι' ἐκείνου δείκνυσθαι διὰ τούτων ἀποδεικνύναι
65 a τὸ ἐξ ἀρχῆς, οἷον εἰ τὸ Α δεικνύοιτο διὰ τοῦ Β τὸ δὲ Β διὰ τοῦ Γ, τὸ δὲ Γ
πεφυκὸς εἶη δείκνυσθαι διὰ τοῦ Α· συμβαίνει γὰρ αὐτὸ δι' αὑτοῦ τὸ Α δεικνύναι
4 τοὺς οὕτω συλλογιζομένους.

Strictly speaking there is petitio principii when the conclusion is included in one of the premisses.

455—a. *Top.* I 12, 105 a$^{13-19}$: **Induction**

'Επαγωγὴ δ' (ἐστιν) ἡ ἀπὸ τῶν καθ' ἕκαστον ἐπὶ τὰ καθόλου ἔφοδος, οἷον εἰ ἔστι κυβερνήτης ὁ ἐπιστάμενος κράτιστος καὶ ἡνίοχος, καὶ ὅλως ἐστὶν ὁ ἐπιστάμενος περὶ ἕκαστον ἄριστος. ἔστι δ' ἡ μὲν ἐπαγωγὴ πιθανώτερον καὶ σαφέστερον καὶ κατὰ τὴν αἴσθησιν γνωριμώτερον καὶ τοῖς πολλοῖς κοινόν [1], ὁ δὲ συλλογισμὸς βιαστικώτερον [2] καὶ πρὸς τοὺς ἀντιλογικοὺς ἐνεργέστερον.

b. It is clear from the preceding passage, that induction, by which we conclude a general law from a number of particular cases, is no syllogism. Yet Ar. treats it as a kind of syllogism in the following passage.

An. pr. I 23, 68 b$^{15-37}$:

15 'Επαγωγὴ μὲν οὖν ἐστι καὶ ὁ ἐξ ἐπαγωγῆς συλλογισμὸς τὸ διὰ τοῦ ἑτέρου [3] **dealt with by Ar. as a kind of syllogism** θάτερον ἄκρον τῷ μέσῳ συλλογίσασθαι [4], οἷον εἰ τῶν ΑΓ μέσον τὸ Β, διὰ τοῦ Γ δεῖξαι τὸ Α τῷ Β ὑπάρχειν· οὕτω γὰρ ποιούμεθα τὰς ἐπαγωγάς. οἷον ἔστω τὸ Α μακρόβιον, τὸ δ' ἐφ' ᾧ Β τὸ χολὴν μὴ ἔχον, ἐφ' ᾧ δὲ Γ τὸ καθ' ἕκαστον
20 μακρόβιον, οἷον ἄνθρωπος καὶ ἵππος καὶ ἡμίονος. τῷ δὴ Γ ὅλῳ ὑπάρχει τὸ Α· πᾶν γὰρ τὸ ἄχολον μακρόβιον [5]. ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ Β, τὸ μὴ ἔχον χολήν, παντὶ ὑπάρχει τῷ Γ. εἰ οὖν ἀντιστρέφει τὸ Γ τῷ Β καὶ μὴ ὑπερτείνει τὸ μέσον [6],
25 ἀνάγκη τὸ Α τῷ Β ὑπάρχειν· δέδεικται γὰρ πρότερον ὅτι ἂν δύο ἄττα τῷ αὐτῷ ὑπάρχῃ καὶ πρὸς θάτερον αὐτῶν ἀντιστρέφῃ τὸ ἄκρον, ὅτι τῷ ἀντιστρέφοντι καὶ θάτερον ὑπάρξει τῶν κατηγορουμένων [7]. δεῖ δὲ νοεῖν τὸ Γ τὸ ἐξ ἁπάντων
29 τῶν καθ' ἕκαστον συγκείμενον· ἡ γὰρ ἐπαγωγὴ διὰ πάντων.

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[1] κοινόν - accessible.

[2] βιαστικώτερον - has more force to overcome opposition.

[3] διὰ τοῦ ἑτέρου - by one extreme term, sc. the minor extreme, namely concrete cases.

[4] συλλογίσασθαι - establishing a relation between the other extreme and the middle term.

[5] This remark is a *petitio principii*. Tredennick has seen rightly that these words cannot be attributed to Ar. Ross explains them by suggesting that a copyist has substituted ἄχολον for Γ.

[6] εἰ μὴ ὑπερτείνει τὸ μέσον - if the middle term is not wider in extension.

[7] Constr. θάτερον τῶν κατηγορουμένων - the other predicate.

Ἔστι δ' ὁ τοιοῦτος συλλογισμὸς τῆς πρώτης καὶ ἀμέσου προτάσεως· ὧν μὲν γὰρ ἔστι μέσον διὰ τοῦ μέσου ὁ συλλογισμός, ὧν δὲ μή ἐστι, δι' ἐπαγωγῆς. καὶ τρόπον τινὰ ἀντίκειται ἡ ἐπαγωγὴ τῷ συλλογισμῷ· ὁ μὲν γὰρ διὰ τοῦ μέσου τὸ ἄκρον τῷ τρίτῳ δείκνυσιν, ἡ δὲ διὰ τοῦ τρίτου τὸ ἄκρον τῷ μέσῳ. φύσει μὲν οὖν πρότερος καὶ γνωριμώτερος ὁ διὰ τοῦ μέσου συλλογισμός, ἡμῖν δ' ἐναργέστερος ὁ διὰ τῆς ἐπαγωγῆς.

"This kind of syllogism is concerned with the first or immediate premiss" (l. 30). Ar. means to say that induction supplies, without the aid of a middle term, the universal proposition which may stand as major premiss of a demonstrative syllogism. Concretely speaking: by means of some special cases (man, horse and mule) the universal proposition is established.:

Every bileless animal is long-lived.

Now this proposition might be used as the major of the following demonstrative syllogism:

Every bileless animal is long-lived
Man, horse and mule have no bile
Therefore: man, horse and mule are long-lived.

Induction is clearer for us, Ar. says, because it starts from observation; but objectively speaking—φύσει—the syllogism, which proceeds deductively, from the universal to the particular, is clearer and "more knowable".

By his theory of induction Ar. has given an answer to the question which has been left open in the *Pr. Anal.*: How do we get our first premisses?—Consequently we might expect that he would introduce induction as another means of getting knowledge next to the syllogism. In fact, induction has this meaning in *An. post.* I 18 and 31 (vid. infra). Cp. also *An. post.* II 19.—On the other hand, if induction is treated as a syllogism, it is a bad kind of syllogism, and therefore its conclusions cannot be true. For this reason then only the syllogism is treated by Ar. in his doctrine of demonstration, while induction is dealt with in the book on *dialectical* syllogism.

Induction non-demonstrative but dialectical

c. In this sense we have to understand Ar. when he says, in *An. pr.* II 23, 68 b[14]:

Ἅπαντα γὰρ π ι σ τ ε ύ ο μ ε ν ἢ διὰ συλλογισμοῦ ἢ ἐξ ἐπαγωγῆς.

5—THE POSTERIOR ANALYTICS: THE DOCTRINE OF DEMONSTRATION

The student's need of pre-existing knowledge

456—a. *An. post.* I 1, 71a[1-11]:

Πᾶσα διδασκαλία καὶ πᾶσα μάθησις διανοητικὴ [1] ἐκ προϋπαρχούσης γίνεται γνώσεως. φανερὸν δὲ τοῦτο θεωροῦσιν ἐπὶ πασῶν· αἵ τε γὰρ μαθηματικαὶ τῶν ἐπιστημῶν διὰ τούτου τοῦ τρόπου παραγίνονται καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἑκάστη τεχνῶν. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ τοὺς λόγους οἵ τε διὰ συλλογισμῶν καὶ οἱ δι' ἐπαγωγῆς· ἀμφότεροι γὰρ διὰ προγινωσκομένων ποιοῦνται τὴν διδασκαλίαν,

[1] διανοητική - "by means of discursive thinking", as opposed to the intuitive "seeing" of the noûs.

οἱ μὲν [1] λαμβάνοντες ὡς παρὰ ξυνιέντων, οἱ δὲ [2] δεικνύντες τὸ καθόλου διὰ τοῦ δῆλον εἶναι τὸ καθ' ἕκαστον. ὡς δ' αὕτως καὶ οἱ ῥητορικοὶ συμπείθουσιν· ἢ γὰρ διὰ παραδειγμάτων [3], ὅ ἐστιν ἐπαγωγή, ἢ δι' ἐνθυμημάτων [4], ὅπερ ἐστὶ συλλογισμός.

b. Ib., 71 a$^{11-16}$: **Its nature**

Διχῶς δ' ἀναγκαῖον προγινώσκειν· τὰ μὲν γάρ, ὅτι ἔστι [5], προϋπολαμβάνειν ἀναγκαῖον, τὰ δὲ τί τὸ λεγόμενόν ἐστι [6], ξυνιέναι δεῖ, τὰ δ' ἄμφω, οἷον ὅτι μὲν ἅπαν ἢ φῆσαι ἢ ἀποφῆσαι ἀληθὲς ὅτι ἔστι [7], τὸ δὲ τρίγωνον, ὅτι τοδὶ σημαίνει [8], τὴν δὲ μονάδα ἄμφω, καὶ τὶ σημαίνει καὶ ὅτι ἔστιν.

457—a. *An. post.*, I 2, 71 b$^{9-12}$: **Knowledge**

Ἐπίστασθαι δὲ οἰόμεθ' ἕκαστον ἁπλῶς, ἀλλὰ μὴ τὸν σοφιστικὸν τρόπον τὸν κατὰ συμβεβηκός, ὅταν τήν τ' αἰτίαν οἰώμεθα γινώσκειν δι' ἣν τὸ πρᾶγμά ἐστιν, ὅτι ἐκείνου αἰτία ἐστί, καὶ μὴ ἐνδέχεσθαι τοῦτ' ἄλλως ἔχειν.

Real knowledge is according to Ar.: (1) knowledge of the causes; (2) knowledge of the necessary, where we can see that it cannot be otherwise. So also in *Metaph.* A 1-2.

In *An. post.* II 1 Ar. says: We can ask ourselves four kinds of questions, namely: τὸ ὅτι, τὸ διότι, εἰ ἔστι and τί ἐστιν. Now the knowledge of the simple fact (τὸ ὅτι) is, according to Ar., not yet true knowledge. We then have to know the διότι, and in such a way, that we see that the thing cannot be otherwise.

The last point means that knowledge in the strict sense of the word is only possible of what is necessary, not of the contingent. See our next cited passage.

b. Ib., I 33, 88 b$^{30-35}$:

Τὸ δ' ἐπιστητὸν καὶ ἐπιστήμη διαφέρει τοῦ δοξαστοῦ καὶ δόξης, ὅτι ἡ μὲν ἐπιστήμη καθόλου καὶ δι' ἀναγκαίων, τὸ δ' ἀναγκαῖον οὐκ ἐνδέχεται ἄλλως ἔχειν. ἔστι δέ τινα ἀληθῆ μὲν καὶ ὄντα, ἐνδεχόμενα δὲ καὶ ἄλλως ἔχειν. δῆλον οὖν ὅτι περὶ μὲν ταῦτα ἐπιστήμη οὐκ ἔστιν· εἴη γὰρ ἂν ἀδύνατα ἄλλως ἔχειν τὰ δυνατὰ ἄλλως ἔχειν.

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[1] οἱ μὲν e.q.s. - "In the first case (i.e. with syllogism) we take premisses supposing that they are known and accepted by our opponent".

[2] οἱ δὲ - "In the other case (i.e. with induction) the universal is exhibited through the fact that the particular is clear".

[3] The instance infers the particular from the particular, and therefore is called by Ar. an imperfect form of induction, by which the universal is inferred from the particular (See *An. pr.* II 24).

[4] In *An. pr.* II 27 enthymema is defined as a syllogism starting from probabilities or signs.

[5] ὅτι ἔστι - "that the matter in question exists", i.e.: the fact must be assumed.

[6] τί τὸ λεγόμενόν ἐστι - "the meaning of the term used".

[7] "E.g. to say that in every question truth lies in the affirmation or negation, that is to assume the fact" (First case).

[8] Second case: the meaning of the term.

458—a. Ib. I 2, 71 b$^{16-25}$:

demonstration

Εἰ μὲν οὖν καὶ ἕτερός ἐστι τοῦ ἐπίστασθαι τρόπος, ὕστερον ἐροῦμεν [1], φαμὲν 16
δὲ καὶ δι' ἀποδείξεως εἰδέναι. ἀπόδειξιν δὲ λέγω συλλογισμὸν ἐπιστημονικόν.
ἐπιστημονικὸν δὲ λέγω καθ' ὃν τῷ ἔχειν αὐτὸν ἐπιστάμεθα. εἰ τοίνυν ἐστὶ
τὸ ἐπίστασθαι οἷον ἔθεμεν, ἀνάγκη καὶ τὴν ἀποδεικτικὴν ἐπιστήμην ἐξ ἀληθῶν 20
τ' εἶναι καὶ πρώτων καὶ ἀμέσων καὶ γνωριμωτέρων καὶ προτέρων καὶ αἰτίων
τοῦ συμπεράσματος· οὕτω γὰρ ἔσονται καὶ αἱ ἀρχαὶ οἰκεῖαι τοῦ δεικνυμένου [2].
συλλογισμὸς μὲν γὰρ ἔσται καὶ ἄνευ τούτων, ἀπόδειξις δ' οὐκ ἔσται· οὐ γὰρ
ποιήσει ἐπιστήμην. 25

Its conditions examined

b. The same passage continued (71 b^{25}-72 a^{5}):

1. The premisses must be true.

Ἀληθῆ μὲν οὖν δεῖ εἶναι, ὅτι οὐκ ἔστι τὸ μὴ ὂν ἐπίστασθαι, οἷον ὅτι ἡ διά- 25
μετρος σύμμετρος [3].

2. They must be primary and indemonstrable.

Ἐκ πρώτων δ' ἀναποδείκτων, ὅτι οὐκ ἐπιστήσεται μὴ ἔχων ἀπόδειξιν αὐ- 26
τῶν· τὸ γὰρ ἐπίστασθαι ὧν ἀπόδειξίς ἐστι μὴ κατὰ συμβεβηκός, τὸ ἔχειν
ἀπόδειξίν ἐστιν.

3. They must be the causes of the conclusion, better known than it, and prior to it.

Αἰτιά τε καὶ γνωριμώτερα δεῖ εἶναι καὶ πρότερα, αἴτια μὲν ὅτι τότε ἐπι- 29
στάμεθα ὅταν τὴν αἰτίαν εἰδῶμεν, καὶ πρότερα, εἴπερ αἴτια, καὶ προγινωσκό-
μενα οὐ μόνον τὸν ἕτερον τρόπον τῷ ξυνιέναι, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῷ εἰδέναι [4] ὅτι ἔστιν.

What is meant by "prior" and "better known".

Πρότερα δ' ἐστὶ καὶ γνωριμώτερα διχῶς· οὐ γὰρ ταὐτὸν πρότερον τῇ φύσει 33
καὶ πρὸς ἡμᾶς πρότερον, οὐδὲ γνωριμώτερον καὶ ἡμῖν γνωριμώτερον. λέγω 72 a
δὲ πρὸς ἡμᾶς μὲν πρότερα καὶ γνωριμώτερα τὰ ἐγγύτερον τῆς αἰσθήσεως,
ἁπλῶς δὲ πρότερα καὶ γνωριμώτερα τὰ πορρώτερον. ἔστι δὲ πορρωτάτω μὲν
τὰ καθόλου μάλιστα, ἐγγυτάτω δὲ τὰ καθ' ἕκαστα· καὶ ἀντίκειται ταῦτ' 5
ἀλλήλοις.

Cp. *Metaph.* Δ 11, 1018 b$^{32-34}$: Κατὰ μὲν γὰρ τὸν λόγον τὰ καθόλου πρότερα, κατὰ δὲ τὴν αἴσθησιν τὰ καθ' ἕκαστα.

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[1] He means: knowledge of the first, non-demonstrated principles. The question is dealt with in I 3, I 10, and most of all in II 19. See our nrs. **459**, **460** and **465**.

[2] "Unless these conditions are satisfied, the basic truths will not be appropriate to the conclusion" (G. R. G. Mure).

[3] "that the diagonal of a square is commensurate with its side" would be a μὴ ὄν, and as such it cannot be the object of demonstration.

[4] Not only in the second sense mentioned in **456b**, namely that of understanding the term used, but also in the first sense: that of knowledge of the fact.

First principles indemonstrable

459—"The premisses must be primary and immediate", i.e. not deducible from other premisses. This leads directly to the question how we can know our first premisses and whether there is another kind of knowledge which does not depend on demonstration. Ar. states first that we have to start necessarily from indemonstrable first principles.

An. post. I 3, 72 b$^{5-7}$, $^{18-25}$:

5 Ἐνίοις μὲν οὖν διὰ τὸ δεῖν τὰ πρῶτα ἐπίστασθαι οὐ δοκεῖ ἐπιστήμη εἶναι, τοῖς δ' εἶναι μέν, πάντων μέντοι ἀποδείξεις εἶναι. —

18 Ἡμεῖς δέ φαμεν οὔτε πᾶσαν ἐπιστήμην ἀποδεικτικὴν εἶναι, ἀλλὰ τὴν τῶν

20 ἀμέσων ἀναπόδεικτον. καὶ τοῦθ' ὅτι ἀναγκαῖον, φανερόν· εἰ γὰρ ἀνάγκη μὲν ἐπίστασθαι τὰ πρότερα καὶ ἐξ ὧν ἡ ἀπόδειξις, ἵσταται δέ ποτε τὰ ἄμεσα, ταῦτ' ἀναπόδεικτα ἀνάγκη εἶναι. ταῦτά τ' οὖν οὕτω λέγομεν, καὶ οὐ μόνον

25 ἐπιστήμην ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀρχὴν ἐπιστήμης εἶναί τινά φαμεν, ᾗ τοὺς ὅρους γνωρίζομεν.

Ar. means that beside demonstrative science there exists a higher and more fundamental science, which precedes demonstration, namely the intuitive knowledge of the first principles (ἀρχαί) by the noûs.

460—Ar. deals with first principles in chapters 10 and 11 of *An. post.* I.

a. *An. post.* I 10, 76 a$^{31-32}$:

First principles defined

Λέγω δ' ἀρχὰς ἐν ἑκάστῳ γένει [1] ταύτας ἃς ὅτι ἔστι μὴ ἐνδέχεται δεῖξαι.

b. Ib., 76 a^{37}-b^{16}:

What are special ἀρχαί?

Ἔστι δ' ὧν χρῶνται ἐν ταῖς ἀποδεικτικαῖς ἐπιστήμαις τὰ μὲν ἴδια ἑκάστης ἐπιστήμης τὰ δὲ κοινά, κοινὰ δὲ κατ' ἀναλογίαν, ἐπεὶ χρήσιμόν γε ὅσον ἐν τῷ

40 ὑπὸ τὴν ἐπιστήμην γένει [2]. ἴδια μὲν οἷον γραμμὴν εἶναι τοιανδί, καὶ τὸ εὐθύ [3], κοινὰ δὲ οἷον τὸ ἴσα ἀπὸ ἴσων ἂν ἀφέλῃ, ὅτι ἴσα τὰ λοιπά. ἱκανὸν δ' ἕκαστον

76 b τούτων ὅσον ἐν τῷ γένει· ταὐτὸ γὰρ ποιήσει, κἂν μὴ κατὰ πάντων λάβῃ ἀλλ' ἐπὶ μεγεθῶν μόνον, τῷ δ' ἀριθμητικῷ ἐπ' ἀριθμῶν.

Ἔστι δ' ἴδια μὲν καὶ ἃ λαμβάνεται εἶναι [4], περὶ ἃ ἡ ἐπιστήμη θεωρεῖ τὰ

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[1] ἐν ἑκάστῳ γένει - in every branch of science.

[2] What Ar. means by the analogous character of the κοινά, is clear from the example given *infra*: "Take equals from equals and equals remain". This rule can only be applied "in the genus which constitutes the province of the science in question"; e.g. geometrical magnitudes cannot be subtracted from numbers, nor numbers from geometrical magnitudes. But "the geometer may apply it to magnitudes and the arithmetician to numbers"; i.e. magnitudes can be subtracted from magnitudes, and numbers from numbers.

[3] γραμμὴν εἶναι τοιανδὶ κ. τὸ εὐθύ - the definitions of line and straight.

[4] ἃ λαμβάνεται εἶναι - sc. by the special sciences.

ὑπάρχοντα καθ' αὑτά [1], οἷον μονάδας ἡ ἀριθμητική, ἡ δὲ γεωμετρία σημεῖα καὶ γραμμάς. ταῦτα γὰρ λαμβάνουσι τὸ εἶναι καὶ τοδὶ εἶναι. τὰ δὲ τούτων πάθη [1] καθ' αὑτά, τί μὲν σημαίνει ἕκαστον, λαμβάνουσιν, οἷον ἡ μὲν ἀριθμητικὴ τί περιττὸν ἢ ἄρτιον ἢ τετράγωνον ἢ κύβος, ἡ δὲ γεωμετρία τί τὸ ἄλογον ἢ τὸ κεκλάσθαι ἢ νεύειν [2], ὅτι δ' ἔστί, δεικνύουσι διά τε τῶν κοινῶν καὶ ἐκ τῶν ἀποδεδειγμένων. καὶ ἡ ἀστρολογία ὡσαύτως. πᾶσα γὰρ ἀποδεικτικὴ ἐπιστήμη περὶ τρία ἐστίν, ὅσα τι εἶναι τίθεται (ταῦτα δ' ἐστὶ τὸ γένος, οὗ τῶν καθ' αὑτὰ παθημάτων ἐστὶ θεωρητική), καὶ τὰ κοινὰ λεγόμενα ἀξιώματα, ἐξ ὧν πρώτων [3] ἀποδείκνυσι, καὶ τρίτον τὰ πάθη, ὧν τί σημαίνει ἕκαστον λαμβάνει.

In the next paragraph Ar. qualifies these three elements shortly as περὶ ὅ τε δείκνυσι καὶ ἃ δείκνυσι καὶ ἐξ ὧν, i.e. the subject of the demonstration (περὶ ὅ), its object (ἃ), and its basis or starting-point (ἐξ ὧν).

Thesis, hypothesis and axioma

461—Not all things which are assumed without demonstration are called by Ar. axiomata. He speaks of θέσεις, ὑποθέσεις and ἀξιώματα.

Thesis is what is accepted without proof as basis of a demonstration. *Theseis* are of two kinds: (1) those which posit the meaning of a term (τί σημαίνει). These are definitions (ὁρισμοί). (2) Those which posit also the existence of the matter. These are *hypotheseis*.

Axioms are truths which intrude upon the mind. They include existence, but differ from hypotheses by being known from themselves and by being absolutely necessary for whomsoever wishes to learn anything.

An. post. I 2, 72 a$^{14-17}$:

Ἀμέσου δ' ἀρχῆς συλλογιστικῆς θέσιν μὲν λέγω ἣν μὴ ἔστι δεῖξαι μηδ' ἀνάγκη ἔχειν τὸν μαθησόμενόν τι. ἣν δ' ἀνάγκη ἔχειν τὸν ὁτιοῦν μαθησόμενον, ἀξίωμα.

From this definition of axiom appears clearly that Ar. does not only think of mathematical axioms, such as "Take equals from equals" etc., but also of the universal laws of logic: the *principium contradictionis* and *exclusi tertii*. We found supra (nr. **444b**, **c**) that they are mentioned in *Ar. post.* I 11.

See on Ar.'s doctrine of first principles: Ross, *Aristotle*, p. 43 ff.

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[1] περὶ ἃ ἡ ἐπιστήμη θεωρεῖ - the subjects, the existence as well as the meaning of which the science in question assumes, and the essential attributes (τὰ ὑπάρχοντα καθ' αὑτά) of which it investigates. τὰ ὑπάρχοντα are called later in the same passage τὰ πάθη.

[2] τὸ κεκλάσθαι ἢ νεύειν - "deflection or verging of lines". "κλᾶσθαι is used of a straight line deflected at a line or surface; νεύειν is used of a straight line tending to pass through a given point when produced" (W. D. Ross, Comm. in *An. post.*, p. 539).

[3] ἐξ ὧν πρώτων ἀποδείκνυσι - "which are the primary premisses of its demonstration".

462—According to Ar. strict science knows not only the fact, but also the cause. Now practically a science often does not know the causes. In this case the science which knows both the facts and the causes is "more precise and prior" to that which only knows the facts. And generally the more abstract science is to be ranked higher than that which studies a more concrete object. **A hierarchy of sciences**

An. post. I 27, 87 a$^{31-37}$:

'Ακριβεστέρα δ' ἐπιστήμη ἐπιστήμης καὶ προτέρα ἥ τε τοῦ ὅτι καὶ διότι ἡ αὐτή, ἀλλὰ μὴ χωρὶς τοῦ ὅτι τῆς τοῦ διότι, καὶ ἡ μὴ καθ' ὑποκειμένου τῆς καθ' ὑποκειμένου [1], οἷον ἀριθμητικὴ ἁρμονικῆς, καὶ ἡ ἐξ ἐλαττόνων τῆς ἐκ προσθέσεως [2], οἷον γεωμετρίας ἀριθμητική. λέγω δ' ἐκ προσθέσεως, οἷον μονὰς οὐσία ἄθετος, στιγμὴ δὲ οὐσία θετός [3]· ταύτην ἐκ προσθέσεως.

We shall find the same ideas again in the opening chapters of *Metaph.* Λ.

463—In ch. 31 of the same book Ar. deals with the question whether science can be reached by sense-perception. As we might expect from his treatment of induction in *An. pr.* II 23, he answers this question in the negative. Strictly speaking the syllogism is in his opinion the only means by which knowledge can be acquired by man. This chapter, however, must be compared with *An. post.* I 18, if we want to understand rightly the author's view of the function of sense-perception with regard to knowledge. **Science and sense-perception**

a. *An. post.* I 18, 81 a^{38}-b [9]: **Sense-perception a necessary condition to acquiring knowledge**

38 Φανερὸν δὲ καὶ ὅτι, εἴ τις αἴσθησις ἐκλέλοιπεν, ἀνάγκη καὶ ἐπιστήμην τινὰ
ἐκλελοιπέναι, ἣν ἀδύνατον λαβεῖν, εἴπερ μανθάνομεν ἢ ἐπαγωγῇ ἢ ἀποδείξει.
40 ἔστι δ' ἡ μὲν ἀπόδειξις ἐκ τῶν καθόλου, ἡ δ' ἐπαγωγὴ ἐκ τῶν κατὰ μέρος·
81 b ἀδύνατον δὲ τὰ καθόλου θεωρῆσαι μὴ δι' ἐπαγωγῆς, ἐπεὶ καὶ τὰ ἐξ ἀφαιρέσεως

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[1] A science is μὴ καθ' ὑποκειμένου when it studies νοητά and ἄυλα (e.g. arithmetic); it is καθ' ὑποκειμένου when it is concerned with concrete objects (αἰσθητὰ καὶ ὑλικά). Thus harmonics consider numerical relations ἐν ταῖς χορδαῖς.

[2] ἡ ἐξ ἐλαττόνων is a science which starts from less undemonstrated principles; i.e. which studies simpler entities. Such a science is, Ar. says, more exact and therefore prior to those sciences which study more complex entities and therefore have to assume more "theses" or "hypotheses". E.g. arithmetic is prior to geometry, which adds the principles of extension to those of number.

[3] The unit is οὐσία ἄθετος: "substance without position", while the point is οὐσία θετός: "substance with position".

λεγόμενα [1] ἔσται δι' ἐπαγωγῆς γνώριμα ποιεῖν, ὅτι ὑπάρχει ἑκάστῳ γένει [2] ἕνια [3], καὶ εἰ μὴ χωριστά ἐστιν, ᾗ τοιονδὶ ἕκαστον. ἐπαχθῆναι δὲ μὴ ἔχοντας αἴσθησιν ἀδύνατον. τῶν γὰρ καθ' ἕκαστον ἡ αἴσθησις· οὐ γὰρ ἐνδέχεται λαβεῖν αὐτῶν τὴν ἐπιστήμην· οὔτε γὰρ ἐκ τῶν καθόλου ἄνευ ἐπαγωγῆς, οὔτε δι' ἐπαγωγῆς ἄνευ τῆς αἰσθήσεως. 8, 9

"It is also clear that the loss of any of the senses entails the loss of a corresponding portion of knowledge".—This sentence indicates the existence of a certain necessary relation between sense-perception and knowledge: the former is a necessary condition to acquiring the latter, for it procures (indirectly) the universals by induction. *Nihil est in intellectu quod non prius fuerit in sensu.* Cp. the larger exposition of II 19 (our nr. **465**).

The position of *An. pr.* II 23 is sustained: knowledge of the particular is not possible. Therefore, science is only of the universal and by demonstration. But to the question "How do we come to knowledge of the universal?" Ar. answers clearly: *by induction.* And this is only possible by sense-perception.

No knowledge through sense-perception

b. *An. post.* I 31, 87 b[28]-88 a[8].

In the preceding chapter the author has stated that no science can be acquired by chance conjunctions. He now continues:

Οὐδὲ δι' αἰσθήσεως ἔστιν ἐπίστασθαι. εἰ γὰρ καὶ ἔστιν ἡ αἴσθησις τοῦ τοιοῦδε καὶ μὴ τοῦδέ τινος, ἀλλ' αἰσθάνεσθαί γε ἀναγκαῖον τόδε τι καὶ ποῦ καὶ νῦν. τὸ δὲ καθόλου καὶ ἐπὶ πᾶσιν ἀδύνατον αἰσθάνεσθαι· οὐ γὰρ τόδε οὐδὲ νῦν· οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἦν καθόλου· τὸ γὰρ ἀεὶ καὶ πανταχοῦ καθόλου φαμὲν εἶναι. ἐπεὶ οὖν αἱ μὲν ἀποδείξεις καθόλου, ταῦτα δ' οὐκ ἔστιν αἰσθάνεσθαι, φανερὸν ὅτι οὐδ' ἐπίστασθαι δι' αἰσθήσεως ἔστιν. ἀλλὰ δῆλον ὅτι καὶ εἰ ἦν αἰσθάνεσθαι τὸ τρίγωνον ὅτι δυσὶν ὀρθαῖς ἴσας ἔχει τὰς γωνίας, ἐζητοῦμεν ἂν ἀπόδειξιν καὶ οὐχ ὥσπερ φασί τινες ἠπιστάμεθα· αἰσθάνεσθαι μὲν γὰρ ἀνάγκη καθ' ἕκαστον, ἡ δ' ἐπιστήμη τῷ τὸ καθόλου γνωρίζειν ἐστίν. διὸ καὶ εἰ ἐπὶ σελήνης ὄντες ἐωρῶμεν ἀντιφράττουσαν τὴν γῆν, οὐκ ἂν ἤδειμεν τὴν αἰτίαν τῆς ἐκλείψεως. ἠσθανόμεθα γὰρ ἂν ὅτι νῦν ἐκλείπει, καὶ οὐ διότι ὅλως· οὐ γὰρ ἦν τοῦ καθόλου αἴσθησις. οὐ μὴν ἀλλ' ἐκ τοῦ θεωρεῖν τοῦτο πολλάκις συμβαῖνον τὸ καθόλου ἂν θηρεύσαντες ἀπόδειξιν εἴχομεν· ἐκ γὰρ τῶν καθ' ἕκαστα πλειόνων τὸ καθόλου δῆλον. τὸ δὲ καθόλου τίμιον, ὅτι δηλοῖ τὸ αἴτιον· ὥστε περὶ τῶν τοιούτων ἡ

[1] τὰ ἐξ ἀφαιρέσεως λεγόμενα - By these "products of abstraction" the objects of mathematics are meant. In opposition to Plato and the Pythagoreans Ar. considers them not as existing καθ' αὑτά (separate entities), but as properties of sensible objects. They can be isolated only by abstraction and thus constitute the subjects of mathematical demonstration. Cp. *De anima* III 7, 431 b[12-19].

[2] E.g. line or solid.

[3] ἕνια - certain properties which can be treated as separate though they are not χωριστά.

καθόλου τιμιωτέρα τῶν αἰσθήσεων καὶ τῆς νοήσεως [1], ὅσων ἕτερον τὸ αἴτιον [2]· περὶ δὲ τῶν πρώτων ἄλλος λόγος.

The end of the passage refers to II 19, where knowledge of non-demonstrated first principles is dealt with.

See on Ar.'s theory of induction: L. Robin, *Aristote*, p. 56 ff., where the instance of the eclipse is cited in order to prove that in Ar.'s opinion "induction is alien to science" (*L'induction est étrangère à la Science*);—a thesis which is right in this sense that induction in itself is no demonstration and therefore does not lead *in itself* to science. It would be wrong, however, if it were taken in the sense that induction has *nothing to do with* science. The above-cited passage clearly shows that such was not the opinion of Ar., and so does the final chapter of the *An. post.* (II 19), with which we have to deal in our nr. **465**.

464—The second book of the *An. post.* is concerned with definition. As we found before, of the four questions man can ask himself that of the ὅτι is preliminary to that of the διότι. In the same way that of the εἰ ἔστι leads on to that of the τί ἐστι.

Answering the last question is defining a thing. But true definition is not only nominal (e.g. eclipse is στέρησις φωτός); it has to mention also the cause (στέρησις φωτὸς ἀπὸ σελήνης ὑπὸ γῆς ἀντιφράξεως). In this sense then A. can say that the τί ἐστι and the διὰ τί are one and the same (*An. post.* II 2, 90 a^{15}).

Definitions first principles

a. As we have seen supra, definitions belong, according to Ar., to the first principles, which are assumed in the sciences without proof.

An. post. II 3, 90 b$^{24-25}$, $^{30-33}$:

Αἱ ἀρχαὶ τῶν ἀποδείξεων ὁρισμοί, ὧν ὅτι οὐκ ἔσονται ἀποδείξεις δέδεικται πρότερον [3]. —

Ὁρισμὸς μὲν γὰρ τοῦ τί ἐστι καὶ οὐσίας· αἱ δ' ἀποδείξεις φαίνονται πᾶσαι ὑποτιθέμεναι καὶ λαμβάνουσαι τὸ τί ἐστιν, οἷον αἱ μαθηματικαὶ τί μονὰς καὶ τί τὸ περιττόν, καὶ αἱ ἄλλαι ὁμοίως.

Nominal and causal definitions

b. Nominal and causal definitions distinguished.

Ib. II 10, 93 b$^{29-32}$, b ^{38}-94 a^{7}:

29 Ὁρισμὸς δ' ἐπειδὴ λέγεται εἶναι λόγος τοῦ τί ἐστι, φανερὸν ὅτι ὁ μέν τις ἔσται λόγος τοῦ τί σημαίνει τὸ ὄνομα ἢ λόγος ἕτερος ὀνοματώδης [4], οἷον τί 32 σημαίνει [τί ἐστιν] τρίγωνον.

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[1] What is called here νόησις anticipates the exposition of II 19, where grasping the universal from a multiplicity of concrete *data* is attributed to the noûs, a faculty which surpasses discursive thinking.

[2] περὶ τῶν τοιούτων ὅσων - in the case of facts like these which have a cause other than themselves.

[3] Our nr. **459**.

[4] λόγος ἕτερος ὀνοματώδης - an equivalent nominal formula.

Ἄλλος δ' ἐστὶν ὅρος λόγος ὁ δηλῶν διὰ τί ἔστιν. ὥστε ὁ μὲν πρότερος σημαί- 38
νει μέν, δείκνυσι δ' οὔ, ὁ δ' ὕστερος φανερὸν ὅτι ἔσται οἷον ἀπόδειξις τοῦ τί 94 a
ἐστι, τῇ θέσει [1] διαφέρων τῆς ἀποδείξεως. διαφέρει γὰρ εἰπεῖν διὰ τί βροντᾷ
καὶ τί ἐστι βροντή· ἐρεῖ γὰρ οὕτω μὲν [2] διότι ἀποσβέννυται τὸ πῦρ ἐν τοῖς
νέφεσι· τί δ' ἐστὶ βροντή; ψόφος ἀποσβεννυμένου πυρὸς ἐν νέφεσιν. ὥστε ὁ 5
αὐτὸς λόγος ἄλλον τρόπον λέγεται, καὶ ὡδὶ μὲν ἀπόδειξις συνεχής [3], ὡδὶ δὲ
ὁρισμός.

Parts of the definition

c. The formula that definition proceeds *per genus et differentiam* (*specificam*) is not in the *Analytics*, but in the *Topica*.

Top. I 8, 103 b[15]:

Ὁ ὁρισμὸς ἐκ γένους καὶ διαφορῶν ἐστίν.

465—The final chapter of the *An. post.* deals with the question of how we come to the apprehension of first principles.

the apprehension of first principles

An. post. II 19, 99 b[17]-100 b[17]:

Περὶ δὲ τῶν ἀρχῶν, πῶς τε γίνονται γνώριμοι καὶ τίς ἡ γνωρίζουσα ἕξις,
ἐντεῦθέν ἐστι δῆλον προαπορήσασι πρῶτον [4].

Difficulties

Ὅτι μὲν οὖν οὐκ ἐνδέχεται ἐπίστασθαι δι' ἀποδείξεως μὴ γινώσκοντι τὰς 99 b[30]
πρώτας ἀρχὰς τὰς ἀμέσους, εἴρηται πρότερον. τῶν δ' ἀμέσων τὴν γνῶσιν,
καὶ πότερον ἡ αὐτὴ ἐστιν ἢ οὐχ ἡ αὐτή, διαπορήσειεν ἄν τις, καὶ πότερον ἐπι-
στήμη ἑκατέρου [5] ἢ οὔ, ἢ τοῦ μὲν ἐπιστήμη τοῦ δ' ἕτερόν τι γένος, καὶ πότερον
οὐκ ἐνοῦσαι αἱ ἕξεις ἐγγίνονται ἢ ἐνοῦσαι λελήθασιν. εἰ μὲν δὴ ἔχομεν αὐτάς, 25
ἄτοπον [6]· συμβαίνει γὰρ ἀκριβεστέρας ἔχοντας γνώσεις ἀποδείξεως λανθάνειν.
εἰ δὲ λαμβάνομεν μὴ ἔχοντες πρότερον, πῶς ἂν γνωρίζοιμεν καὶ μανθάνοιμεν
ἐκ μὴ προϋπαρχούσης γνώσεως; ἀδύνατον γάρ, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς ἀποδείξεως 30
ἐλέγομεν. φανερὸν τοίνυν ὅτι οὔτ' ἔχειν οἷόν τε, οὔτ' ἀγνοοῦσι καὶ μηδεμίαν

Solution

ἔχουσιν ἕξιν ἐγγίνεσθαι. ἀνάγκη ἄρα ἔχειν μέν τινα δύναμιν, μὴ τοιαύτην δ'

First stage: αἴσθησις

ἔχειν ἢ ἔσται τούτων τιμιωτέρα κατ' ἀκρίβειαν. φαίνεται δὲ τοῦτό γε πᾶσιν
ὑπάρχον τοῖς ζῴοις. ἔχει γὰρ δύναμιν σύμφυτον κριτικήν, ἣν καλοῦσιν αἴσθησιν. 35

Ἐνούσης δ' αἰσθήσεως τοῖς μὲν τῶν ζῴων ἐγγίνεται μονὴ τοῦ αἰσθήματος,

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[1] τῇ θέσει - in the arrangement of its terms.

[2] οὕτω μὲν - in the first case.

[3] "Demonstration, like a line, is continuous, because its premisses are parts which are conterminous (as linked by middle terms), and there is a movement from premisses to conclusion. Definition resembles rather the indivisible simplicity of a point" (G. R. G. Mure).

[4] προαπορήσασι πρῶτον - by raising some preliminary problems.

[5] πότερον ἐπιστήμη ἑκατέρου - whether there is scientific knowledge of both, sc. as well of the primary premisses as of demonstrative knowledge.

[6] ἄτοπον - it leads to impossible consequences.

τοῖς δ' οὐκ ἐγγίνεται. ὅσοις μὲν οὖν μὴ ἐγγίνεται, ἢ ὅλως ἢ περὶ ἃ μὴ ἐγγίνεται, οὐκ ἔστι τούτοις γνῶσις ἔξω τοῦ αἰσθάνεσθαι· ἐν οἷς δ', ἐνεστιν αἰσθανομένοις
100 a ἔχειν ἔτι ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ. πολλῶν δὲ τοιούτων γινομένων ἤδη διαφορά τις γίνεται, ὥστε τοῖς μὲν γίνεσθαι λόγον ἐκ τῆς τῶν τοιούτων μονῆς, τοῖς δὲ μή.

Second stage: μνήμη

3 Ἐκ μὲν οὖν αἰσθήσεως γίνεται μνήμη, ὥσπερ λέγομεν, ἐκ δὲ μνήμης πολλάκις τοῦ αὐτοῦ γινομένης ἐμπειρία· αἱ γὰρ πολλαὶ μνῆμαι τῷ ἀριθμῷ ἐμπειρία μία ἐστίν.

Third stage: ἐμπειρία

6 Ἐκ δ' ἐμπειρίας ἢ ἐκ παντὸς ἠρεμήσαντος τοῦ καθόλου ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ, τοῦ ἑνὸς παρὰ τὰ πολλά, ὃ ἂν ἐν ἅπασιν ἓν ἐνῇ ἐκείνοις τὸ αὐτό, τέχνης ἀρχὴ καὶ ἐπιστήμης, ἐὰν μὲν περὶ γένεσιν, τέχνης, ἐὰν δὲ περὶ τὸ ὄν, ἐπιστήμης.

Fourth stage: τέχνη and ἐπιστήμη

10 Οὔτε δὴ ἐνυπάρχουσιν ἀφωρισμέναι [1] αἱ ἕξεις, οὔτ' ἀπ' ἄλλων ἕξεων γίνονται γνωστικωτέρων, ἀλλ' ἀπὸ αἰσθήσεως, οἷον ἐν μάχῃ τροπῆς γενομένης ἑνὸς στάντος ἕτερος ἕστη, εἶθ' ἕτερος, ἕως ἐπὶ ἀρχὴν ἦλθεν [2]. ἡ δὲ ψυχὴ ὑπάρχει τοιαύτη οὖσα οἷα δύνασθαι πάσχειν τοῦτο.

15 Ὃ δ' ἐλέχθη μὲν πάλαι, οὐ σαφῶς δὲ ἐλέχθη, πάλιν εἴπωμεν. στάντος γὰρ τῶν ἀδιαφόρων ἑνός [3], πρῶτον μὲν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ καθόλου (καὶ γὰρ αἰσθάνεται μὲν τὸ καθ' ἕκαστον, ἡ δ' αἴσθησις τοῦ καθόλου ἐστίν, οἷον ἀνθρώπου, ἀλλ' οὐ
100 b Καλλίου ἀνθρώπου) πάλιν ἐν τούτοις ἵσταται, ἕως ἂν τὰ ἀμερῆ στῇ καὶ τὰ καθόλου [4], οἷον τοιονδὶ ζῷον, ἕως ζῷον· καὶ ἐν τούτῳ ὡσαύτως [5]. δῆλον δὴ ὅτι ἡμῖν τὰ πρῶτα ἐπαγωγῇ γνωρίζειν ἀναγκαῖον· καὶ γὰρ καὶ αἴσθησις οὕτω τὸ καθόλου ἐμποιεῖ.

Knowledge of primary premisses by induction

5 Ἐπεὶ δὲ τῶν περὶ τὴν διάνοιαν ἕξεων, αἷς ἀληθεύομεν, αἱ μὲν ἀεὶ ἀληθεῖς εἰσιν, αἱ δὲ ἐπιδέχονται τὸ ψεῦδος, οἷον δόξα καὶ λογισμός, ἀληθῆ δ' ἀεὶ ἐπιστήμη καὶ νοῦς, καὶ οὐδὲν ἐπιστήμης ἀκριβέστερον ἄλλο γένος ἢ νοῦς, αἱ δ' ἀρχαὶ
10 τῶν ἀποδείξεων γνωριμώτεραι, ἐπιστήμη δ' ἅπασα μετὰ λόγου ἐστί [6], τῶν ἀρχῶν ἐπιστήμη μὲν οὐκ ἂν εἴη, ἐπεὶ δ' οὐδὲν ἀληθέστερον ἐνδέχεται εἶναι ἐπιστήμης ἢ νοῦν, νοῦς ἂν εἴη τῶν ἀρχῶν, ἔκ τε τούτων σκοποῦσι καὶ ὅτι ἀποδείξεως ἀρχὴ οὐκ ἀπόδειξις, ὥστ' οὐδ' ἐπιστήμης ἐπιστήμη. εἰ οὖν μηδὲν
15 ἄλλο παρ' ἐπιστήμην γένος ἔχομεν ἀληθές, νοῦς ἂν εἴη ἐπιστήμης ἀρχή. καὶ

Intuition apprehends the primary premisses

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[1] οὔτε - ἀφωρισμέναι: these states of knowledge are neither innate in a determinate form, nor —.

[2] ἕως - ἦλθεν: until the original formation has been restored.

[3] τῶν ἀδιαφόρων ἑνός - one of a number of logically indiscriminable particulars.

[4] τὰ ἀμερῆ - καὶ τὰ καθόλου: "the indivisible concepts, the true universals", i.e. the categories, which are *par excellence* universal and are indivisible because not constituted of genus and differentia. Cp. *Metaph.* M 8, 1084 b[14]; Δ 25, 1023 b[24] (Note of G. R. G. Mure).

[5] καὶ ἐν τούτῳ ὡσαύτως - "which by the same process is a step towards a further generalization" (Mure).

[6] μετὰ λόγου ἐστί: "and all scientific knowledge is discursive"—.

ἡ μὲν ἀρχὴ τῆς ἀρχῆς εἴη ἄν, ἡ δὲ πᾶσα ὁμοίως ἔχει πρὸς τὸ πᾶν πρᾶγμα [1].

From this passage it is clear, (1) that indeed in Ar.'s opinion sense-perception is at the basis of all human knowledge (the scholastic adagium: *Nihil est in intellectu quod non prius fuerit in sensu.* Cp. Kant, the opening sentence of the Kr. d. r. V.: "Dass alle unsere Erkenntnis mit der Erfahrung anfange, daran ist gar kein Zweifel";

(2) that knowledge is reached only by the function of a higher intellectual faculty, which he calls *noûs* (the *intellectus agens* of the scholastics). This faculty grasps directly the intelligible, which is one, out of the multiplicity of sense data.

Two remarks must be made in this place.

I. When we ask the question how the noûs can do this, Ar. answers: *The soul is so constituted as to be capable of this process.* Which means: he traces this function back to the organization of the human mind. Now by this acknowledgement what is called an *apriori*-element is introduced in Ar.'s theory of knowledge.

II. It is not sufficiently clear from the above passage that, according to Ar.'s doctrine, the intelligible appears only at the fourth stage of the process of knowledge. Between μνήμη and ἐμπειρία he speaks of a *logos* which arises out of the persistence of sense-impressions. By no means could this term be translated here by "notion", a notion being reached, according to Ar.'s account, only after experience, "when the universal has come to rest within the soul", being "one beside the many", and "residing as an identity in all the particular subjects".

Instead of the word *logos*, which is used by Ar. somewhat vaguely in 100 a^2, he uses later (in the *De anima*) the term *phantasma*, which indicates the sensible image resulting from sense-perception by memory. In this way Thomas Aquinas says: "Phantasma est intelligibile in potentia", and: "Abstrahit intellectus agens species intelligibiles a phantasmatibus" [2].

III. A third remark must be added. In 100 b^{1-3} Ar. speaks very shortly of that process of generalization, which he calls elsewhere ἀφαίρεσις. Mathematical abstraction, which is called "abstraction of the second degree" by scholastics, is dealt with in two passages of the *De anima*, namely II 6, 418 a^{7-25} and III 1, 425 a^{13-20}. See our chapter XVI, § 2, nr. **641**.

6—THE TOPICS AND DE SOPHISTICIS ELENCHIS

Topica

466—We had to cite the *Topics* several times in dealing with the *Analytics*. On the general character of the work see our nr. **435a, b.**

De soph. el.

467—The Π. σοφ. ἐλ. deals with fallacies.

a—*De soph. el.* I. 1, 164 a^{20-22}:

Περὶ δὲ τῶν σοφιστικῶν ἐλέγχων καὶ τῶν φαινομένων μὲν ἐλέγχων ὄντων δὲ παραλογισμῶν ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐλέγχων λέγωμεν, ἀρξάμενοι κατὰ φύσιν ἀπὸ τῶν πρώτων.

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[1] ἡ δὲ πᾶσα - πρὸς τὸ πᾶν πρᾶγμα: "while science as a whole is similarly related as originative source to the whole body of fact" (Mure).

[2] S. Th. I 85, 1, ad 4.

Καὶ adds a defining expression.

What are ἔλεγχοι

b. Ib., 164 b^{27}-165 a^{4}:

Ὁ μὲν γὰρ συλλογισμὸς ἐκ τινῶν ἐστὶ τεθέντων ὥστε λέγειν ἕτερόν τι ἐξ ἀνάγκης τῶν κειμένων διὰ τῶν κειμένων, ἔλεγχος δὲ συλλογισμὸς μετ' ἀντιφάσεως τοῦ συμπεράσματος. οἱ δὲ [1] τοῦτο ποιοῦσι μὲν οὔ, δοκοῦσι δὲ διὰ πολλὰς αἰτίας.

468—Ar. divides them into two main groups: (1) the *sophismata in dictione* (παρὰ [2] τὴν λέξιν), where the deceitfulness appears in the form; (2) *sophismata extra lectionem* (ἔξω τῆς λέξεως), where the fallacy can be seen only when the contents is regarded.

Two main groups

a. *De soph. el.* I 4, 165 b$^{23-24}$:

Τρόποι δ' εἰσὶ τοῦ μὲν ἐλέγχειν δύο· οἱ μὲν γάρ εἰσι παρὰ τὴν λέξιν, οἱ δ' ἔξω τῆς λέξεως.

Sophismata in dictione

b. Ib., b $^{24-27}$:

Ἔστι δὲ τὰ μὲν παρὰ τὴν λέξιν [2] ἐμποιοῦντα τὴν φαντασίαν ἓξ τὸν ἀριθμόν· ταῦτα δ' ἐστὶν ὁμωνυμία, ἀμφιβολία, σύνθεσις, διαίρεσις, προσῳδία, σχῆμα λέξεως.

Ar. explains them in the following pages (165 b^{30}-166 b^{20}).

(1) *Equivocation*: ambiguity in a word. When a term is used in a double sense in a syllogism, this syllogism has not three but four terms (*quaternio terminorum*), which is a breach of one of the first rules of the syllogism.

(2) *Amphiboly*: ambiguity in a sentence, e.g. when we cannot see which word is subject and which is object.

(3) *Composition*: when words are wrongly combined, e.g. "A man can walk while sitting, and can write while not writing".

(4) *Division*: by wrong separation of the words. E.g. 5 is 2 and 3.

(5) *Accent*: wrong interpretation of written words by changing the accent, e.g. pronouncing οὐ in stead of οὖ.

(6) *Figura dictionis*: misunderstanding caused by the grammatical form of a word, e.g. a masculine word with a female ending, etc.

Extra dictionem

c. Ib., 166 b$^{21-27}$:

Τῶν δ' ἔξω τῆς λέξεως παραλογισμῶν εἴδη ἐστὶν ἑπτά, ἓν μὲν παρὰ τὸ συμβεβηκός, δεύτερον δὲ τὸ ἁπλῶς ἢ μὴ ἁπλῶς ἀλλὰ πῇ ἢ ποῦ ἢ ποτὲ ἢ πρός τι λέγεσθαι, τρίτον δὲ τὸ παρὰ τὴν τοῦ ἐλέγχου ἄγνοιαν, τέταρτον δὲ τὸ παρὰ τὸ ἑπόμενον, πέμπτον δὲ τὸ παρὰ τὸ ἐν ἀρχῇ λαμβάνειν, ἕκτον δὲ τὸ μὴ αἴτιον ὡς αἴτιον τιθέναι, ἕβδομον δὲ τὸ τὰ πλείω ἐρωτήματα ἓν ποιεῖν.

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[1] sc. the sophists.

[2] An analogy with the expression σοφίσματα παρὰ τὴν λέξιν might be found in *Metaph.* E 4, 1027 b^{19}: τὸ δὲ ὡς ἀληθὲς ὂν καὶ μὴ ὂν ὡς ψεῦδος, ἐπειδὴ παρὰ σύνθεσίν ἐστι καὶ διαίρεσιν,—("since they depend upon"—).

These fallacies are explained in ch. 5.

(1) *Accidens*: whenever any attribute is claimed to belong in a like manner to a thing and to its accident. E.g.: "If Coriscus be different from "man", he is different from himself: for he is a man".

(2) *A dicto secundum quid ad dictum simpliciter*: whenever an expression used in a particular sense is taken as though it were used absolutely. E.g.: "If what is not is the object of an opinion, then what is not *is*".

(3) *Ignoratio elenchi*: to give a merely apparent refutation, e.g. by contradicting not really the same attribute but merely the name, or by proving that the attribute cannot be predicated of the subject, but not in the same respect and in the same way in which it was asserted.

(4) *Consequens*: whenever people suppose that the relation of consequens is convertible. E.g. bile is supposed to be honey because honey is attended by a yellow colour; also, since after rain the ground is wet in consequence, we suppose that if the ground is wet, it has been raining.

(5) *Petitio principii*: assumption of the original point to be proved.

(6) *Non causa pro causa*: whenever what is not a cause is inserted in the argument as though the refutation depended on it. I.e.: people try to refute a thesis by refuting a premiss which had not been assumed as such.

(7) *Facere ex pluribus interrogationibus unam*: whenever the plurality is undetected and a single answer is returned as if to a single question. E.g., when part is good and part bad, "Is the whole good or bad?"

Some instances of σοφιστικοὶ ἔλεγχοι may be found in our nr. **197**.

THIRTEENTH CHAPTER

ARISTOTLE'S PHILOSOPHY OF NATURE

1—INTRODUCTORY REMARKS

Philosophical unity of Ar.'s works on nature

469—Ar.'s philosophy of nature is not only found in his physical treatises (*Phys.*, *De caelo*, *De gen. et corr.*, *Meteor.*), in which anorganic nature is treated of, but also in those which deal with organic nature, the biological works. Nature is, according to Ar., principle of motion. Now the theory of motion is expounded by Ar. in his *Phys.*, and books I and II of this work, forming a general introduction to this theory, are at the same time a philosophical introduction to the whole of Ar.'s physical and biological works. On the other hand, the general philosophical principles, which have been expounded in the introductory books of the *Physics*, can be illustrated not only by the cosmological theory of the *De caelo*, by the theory of generation and passing away of beings and their qualities in *De gen. et corr.* and by that of atmospheric phenomena in the *Meteor.*; they can as well be commented on by numerous passages from the biological works. As A. Mansion put it in his excellent *Introduction à la physique aristotélicienne*: "Aristote se commente excellemment lui-même".

That this whole group of treatises was conceived by Ar. as a unity, can be seen from the introduction to the *Meteorologica*:

Meteor. I 1, 338 a^{20}-b^{22}, 339 a^{5-10}.

Περὶ μὲν οὖν τῶν πρώτων αἰτίων τῆς φύσεως καὶ περὶ πάσης κινήσεως φυσικῆς, ἔτι δὲ περὶ τῶν κατὰ τὴν ἄνω φορὰν διακεκοσμημένων ἄστρων καὶ περὶ τῶν στοιχείων τῶν σωματικῶν, πόσα τε καὶ ποῖα, καὶ τῆς εἰς ἄλληλα μεταβολῆς, καὶ περὶ γενέσεως καὶ φθορᾶς τῆς κοινῆς εἴρηται πρότερον. λοιπὸν δ' ἐστὶ μέρος τῆς μεθόδου ταύτης ἔτι θεωρητέον, ὃ πάντες οἱ πρότερον μετεωρολογίαν ἐκάλουν· ταῦτα δ' ἐστὶν ὅσα συμβαίνει κατὰ φύσιν μέν, ἀτακτοτέραν μέντοι τῆς τοῦ πρώτου στοιχείου τῶν σωμάτων, περὶ τὸν γειτνιῶντα μάλιστα τόπον τῇ φορᾷ τῶν ἄστρων. — (Follows an enumeration of this kind of phenomena: the Milky Way, comets and shooting stars, ἀέρος κοινὰ πάθη καὶ ὕδατος, winds and earthquakes etc.). Διελθόντες δὲ περὶ τούτων, θεωρήσωμεν εἴ τι δυνάμεθα κατὰ τὸν ὑφηγημένον τρόπον ἀποδοῦναι περὶ ζῴων καὶ φυτῶν,

καθόλου τε καὶ χωρίς· σχεδὸν γὰρ τούτων ῥηθέντων τέλος ἂν εἴη γεγονὸς τῆς ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἡμῖν προαιρέσεως πάσης. ὧδ' οὖν ἀρξάμενοι λέγωμεν περὶ αὐτῶν πρῶτον.

Division of the Physics

The opening sentence of this passage (Περὶ μὲν οὖν τῶν πρώτων αἰτίων τῆς φύσεως καὶ περὶ πάσης κινήσεως φυσικῆς — εἴρηται πρότερον) points to a division of the *Phys.* into two parts: (1) *on the causes* (bb. I and II), (2) *on motion* (bb. III-VIII). The distinction is not so clearly made by the ancient commentators. It has been re-established by A. Mansion.

2—THE FIRST BOOK OF THE PHYSICS

Introductory chapter

470—*Phys.* I 1, 184 a^{10}-b^{14}:

Ἐπειδὴ τὸ εἰδέναι καὶ τὸ ἐπίστασθαι συμβαίνει περὶ πάσας τὰς μεθόδους, ὧν εἰσὶν ἀρχαὶ ἢ αἴτια ἢ στοιχεῖα, ἐκ τοῦ ταῦτα γνωρίζειν (τότε γὰρ οἰόμεθα γινώσκειν ἕκαστον, ὅταν τὰ αἴτια γνωρίσωμεν τὰ πρῶτα καὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς τὰς πρώτας καὶ μέχρι τῶν στοιχείων), δῆλον ὅτι καὶ τῆς περὶ φύσεως ἐπιστήμης πειρατέον διορίσασθαι πρῶτον τὰ περὶ τὰς ἀρχάς [1].

Πέφυκε δὲ ἐκ τῶν γνωριμωτέρων ἡμῖν ἡ ὁδὸς καὶ σαφεστέρων ἐπὶ τὰ σαφέστερα τῇ φύσει καὶ γνωριμώτερα· οὐ γὰρ ταὐτὰ ἡμῖν τε γνώριμα καὶ ἁπλῶς [2]. Διόπερ ἀνάγκη τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον προάγειν ἐκ τῶν ἀσαφεστέρων μὲν τῇ φύσει ἡμῖν δὲ σαφεστέρων ἐπὶ τὰ σαφέστερα τῇ φύσει καὶ γνωριμώτερα. Ἔστι δ' ἡμῖν πρῶτον δῆλα καὶ σαφῆ τὰ συγκεχυμένα μᾶλλον· ὕστερον δ' ἐκ τούτων γίνεται γνώριμα τὰ στοιχεῖα καὶ αἱ ἀρχαὶ διαιροῦσι ταῦτα [3]. Διὸ ἐκ τῶν καθόλου ἐπὶ τὰ καθ' ἕκαστα δεῖ προϊέναι. Τὸ γὰρ ὅλον κατὰ τὴν αἴσθησιν γνωριμώτερον, τὸ δὲ καθόλου ὅλον τί ἐστιν· πολλὰ γὰρ περιλαμβάνει ὡς μέρη τὸ καθόλου [4].

Πέπονθε δὲ ταὐτὸ τοῦτο τρόπον τινὰ καὶ τὰ ὀνόματα πρὸς τὸν λόγον· ὅλον γάρ τι καὶ ἀδιορίστως σημαίνει, οἷον ὁ κύκλος· ὁ δὲ ὁρισμὸς αὐτοῦ διαιρεῖ εἰς τὰ καθ' ἕκαστα. Καὶ τὰ παιδία τὸ μὲν πρῶτον προσαγορεύει πάντας τοὺς ἄνδρας πατέρας καὶ μητέρας τὰς γυναῖκας, ὕστερον δὲ διορίζει τούτων ἑκάτερον.

One ἀρχή or many?

471—a. *Phys.* I 2, 184 b$^{15-22}$:

Ἀνάγκη δ' ἤτοι μίαν εἶναι τὴν ἀρχὴν ἢ πλείους, καὶ εἰ μίαν, ἤτοι ἀκίνητον, ὡς φησι Παρμενίδης καὶ Μέλισσος, ἢ κινουμένην, ὥσπερ οἱ φυσικοί, οἱ μὲν ἀέρα φάσκοντες εἶναι οἱ δ' ὕδωρ τὴν πρώτην ἀρχήν· εἰ δὲ πλείους, ἢ πεπερασ-

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[1] The principle that we can only be said to have knowledge if we know the causes of a phenomenon, is more than once repeated by Ar. Cp. *Metaph.* A 1, where the difference between ἐμπειρία and τέχνη or ἐπιστήμη is marked in this way, that the first knows only the ὅτι, the latter also the διότι.

[2] ἁπλῶς - absolutely.

[3] διαιροῦσι ταῦτα - "if we analyse them".

[4] "For the universal comprehends many things within it, like parts".

μένας ἢ ἀπείρους, καὶ εἰ πεπερασμένας πλείους δὲ μιᾶς, ἢ δύο ἢ τρεῖς ἢ τέτ-
20 ταρας ἢ ἄλλον τινὰ ἀριθμόν, καὶ εἰ ἀπείρους, ἢ οὕτως ὥσπερ Δημόκριτος, τὸ γένος ἕν, σχήματι δὲ ἢ εἴδει διαφερούσας, ἢ καὶ ἐναντίας.

b. Ib., 184 b[25]-185 a[5]; ib., a[12-14]: **The Eleatic thesis excluded**

Τὸ μὲν οὖν εἰ ἓν καὶ ἀκίνητον τὸ ὂν σκοπεῖν οὐ περὶ φύσεώς ἐστι σκοπεῖν·
185 a ὥσπερ γὰρ καὶ τῷ γεωμέτρῃ οὐκέτι λόγος ἐστὶ πρὸς τὸν ἀνελόντα τὰς ἀρχάς, ἀλλ' ἤτοι ἑτέρας ἐπιστήμης ἢ πασῶν κοινῆς, οὕτως οὐδὲ τῷ περὶ ἀρχῶν· οὐ γὰρ ἔτι ἀρχή ἐστιν, εἰ ἓν μόνον καὶ οὕτως ἕν ἐστιν. Ἡ γὰρ ἀρχὴ τινὸς ἢ τινῶν [1].—
Ἡμῖν δ' ὑποκείσθω τὰ φύσει ἢ πάντα ἢ ἔνια κινούμενα εἶναι· δῆλον δ' ἐκ τῆς ἐπαγωγῆς [2].

472—a. Ib., 185 a[20]-b[5]: **Refutation of the Eleatic thesis ex parte entis**

:0, 21 Ἀρχὴ δὲ οἰκειοτάτη πασῶν, ἐπειδὴ πολλαχῶς λέγεται τὸ ὄν, ἰδεῖν πῶς λέγουσιν οἱ λέγοντες εἶναι ἓν τὰ πάντα, πότερον οὐσίαν τὰ πάντα ἢ ποσὰ ἢ ποιά, καὶ πάλιν πότερον οὐσίαν μίαν τὰ πάντα, οἷον ἄνθρωπον ἕνα ἢ ἵππον
25 ἕνα ἢ ψυχὴν μίαν, ἢ ποιὸν ἓν δὲ τοῦτο, οἷον λευκὸν ἢ θερμὸν ἢ τῶν ἄλλων τι τῶν τοιούτων. Ταῦτα γὰρ πάντα διαφέρει τε πολὺ καὶ ἀδύνατα λέγειν. Εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἔσται καὶ οὐσία καὶ ποσὸν καὶ ποιόν, καὶ ταῦτα εἴτ' ἀπολελυμένα ἀπ'
30 ἀλλήλων εἴτε μή, πολλὰ τὰ ὄντα. Εἰ δὲ πάντα ποιὸν ἢ ποσόν, εἴτ' οὔσης οὐσίας εἴτε μὴ οὔσης, ἄτοπον, εἰ δεῖ ἄτοπον λέγειν τὸ ἀδύνατον. Οὐθὲν γὰρ τῶν ἄλλων χωριστόν ἐστι παρὰ τὴν οὐσίαν· πάντα γὰρ καθ' ὑποκειμένου τῆς οὐσίας λέγεται. Μέλισσος δὲ τὸ ὂν ἄπειρον εἶναί φησιν. Ποσὸν ἄρα τι τὸ ὄν· τὸ γὰρ
185 b ἄπειρον ἐν τῷ ποσῷ, οὐσίαν δὲ ἄπειρον εἶναι ἢ ποιότητα ἢ πάθος οὐκ ἐνδέχεται εἰ μὴ κατὰ συμβεβηκός, εἰ ἅμα καὶ ποσὰ ἄττα εἶεν· ὁ γὰρ τοῦ ἀπείρου λόγος τῷ ποσῷ προσχρῆται, ἀλλ' οὐκ οὐσίᾳ οὐδὲ τῷ ποιῷ. Εἰ μὲν τοίνυν καὶ οὐσία
5 ἐστὶ καὶ ποσόν, δύο καὶ οὐχ ἓν τὸ ὄν· εἰ δ' οὐσία μόνον, οὐκ ἄπειρον, οὐδὲ μέγεθος ἕξει οὐδέν· ποσὸν γάρ τι ἔσται.

b. Ib., 185 b[5-25]: **Refutation ex parte unius**

5, 6 Ἔτι ἐπεὶ καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ ἓν πολλαχῶς λέγεται ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ ὄν, σκεπτέον τίνα τρόπον λέγουσιν εἶναι ἓν τὸ πᾶν. Λέγεται δ' ἓν ἢ τὸ συνεχὲς ἢ τὸ ἀδιαίρετον ἢ ὧν ὁ λόγος [3] ὁ αὐτὸς καὶ εἷς ὁ τοῦ τί ἦν εἶναι, ὥσπερ μέθυ καὶ οἶνος. Εἰ μὲν
10 τοίνυν συνεχές, πολλὰ τὸ ἕν· εἰς ἄπειρον γὰρ διαιρετὸν τὸ συνεχές.
Ἔχει δ' ἀπορίαν περὶ τοῦ μέρους καὶ τοῦ ὅλου, ἴσως δὲ οὐ πρὸς τὸν λόγον [4]

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[1] I.e.: an inquiry into principles—or into *the* first principle—always presupposes a multiplicity.

[2] Which means: Ar. starts from the concrete reality of movement. A hypothesis which destroys this elementary fact has no sense.

[3] λόγος - definition, essence.

[4] πρὸς τὸν λόγον - relevant to the present argument.

ἀλλ' αὐτὴν καθ' αὑτήν, πότερον ἓν ἢ πλείω τὸ μέρος καὶ τὸ ὅλον, καὶ πῶς ἓν ἢ πλείω, καὶ εἰ πλείω, πῶς πλείω, καὶ περὶ τῶν μερῶν τῶν μὴ συνεχῶν· καὶ εἰ τῷ ὅλῳ ἓν ἑκάτερον ὡς ἀδιαίρετον, ὅτι καὶ αὐτὰ αὑτοῖς.

'Αλλὰ μὴν εἰ ὡς ἀδιαίρετον, οὐθὲν ἔσται ποσὸν οὐδὲ ποιόν, οὐδὲ δὴ ἄπειρον τὸ ὄν, ὥσπερ Μέλισσός φησιν, οὐδὲ πεπερασμένον, ὥσπερ Παρμενίδης· τὸ γὰρ πέρας ἀδιαίρετον, οὐ τὸ πεπερασμένον.

'Αλλὰ μὴν εἰ τῷ λόγῳ ἓν τὰ ὄντα πάντα ὡς λώπιον [1] καὶ ἱμάτιον, τὸν 'Ηρακλείτου λόγον συμβαίνει λέγειν αὐτοῖς· ταὐτὸν γὰρ ἔσται ἀγαθῷ καὶ κακῷ εἶναι καὶ μὴ ἀγαθῷ καὶ ἀγαθῷ, ὥστε ταὐτὸν ἔσται ἀγαθὸν καὶ οὐκ ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἄνθρωπος καὶ ἵππος, καὶ οὐ περὶ τοῦ ἓν εἶναι τὰ ὄντα ὁ λόγος ἔσται αὐτοῖς ἀλλὰ περὶ τοῦ μηδέν, καὶ τὸ τοιῳδὶ εἶναι καὶ τοσῳδὶ ταὐτόν [2].

Anaxagoras criticized

473—Having refuted the Eleatic hypothesis, Ar. examines the opinions of older physicists about the principles of physical bodies. Anaxagoras is discussed rather amply (ch. 4). He too admits, as Democritus did, an infinite number of first principles. To this thesis Ar. opposes the remark that the infinite cannot be known. There are several difficulties with the doctrine of Anaxagoras. Ar. concludes that it is better to assume a smaller and finite number of principles, as Empedocles did.

A finite number of principles should be assumed

Phys. I 4, 188 a$^{17-18}$:

Βέλτιόν τε ἐλάττω καὶ πεπερασμένα λαβεῖν, ὅπερ ποιεῖ 'Εμπεδοκλῆς.

474—Another correct view of the ancient physicist is, that opposites should be assumed as ἀρχαί. This is done e.g. by those who explained the genesis of the elements by rarefaction and condensation (we know this of Anaximenes, and it is said of Heraclitus too), even by Parm., who assumed two principles relative to the world of doxa, and by Democr. in his doctrine of the πλῆρες καὶ κενόν.

Opposite principles should be assumed

Phys. I 5, 188 a$^{26-30}$:

"Οτι μὲν οὖν τἀναντία πως πάντες ποιοῦσι τὰς ἀρχάς, δῆλον. Καὶ τοῦτο εὐλόγως· δεῖ γὰρ τὰς ἀρχὰς μήτε ἐξ ἀλλήλων εἶναι μήτε ἐξ ἄλλων, καὶ ἐκ τούτων πάντα· τοῖς δ' ἐναντίοις τοῖς πρώτοις ὑπάρχει ταῦτα, διὰ μὲν τὸ πρῶτα εἶναι μὴ ἐξ ἄλλων, διὰ δὲ τὸ ἐναντία μὴ ἐξ ἀλλήλων.

How many ἀρχαί?

475—A pair of opposites, however, is not sufficient. A third principle should be added, namely a subject, somewhat as the substratum of the contraries.

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[1] λώπιον - raiment.

[2] "There will be no difference between quality and quantity".

a. *Phys.* I 6, 189 a[21]-b[3]:

Three principles necessary

21 Ἐπεὶ δὲ πεπερασμέναι, τὸ μὴ ποιεῖν δύο μόνον ἔχει τινὰ λόγον· ἀπορήσειε γὰρ ἄν τις πῶς ἢ ἡ πυκνότης τὴν μανότητα ποιεῖν τι πέφυκεν ἢ αὕτη τὴν πυκνότητα. Ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἄλλη ὁποιαοῦν ἐναντιότης· οὐ γὰρ ἡ φιλία τὸ
25 νεῖκος συνάγει καὶ ποιεῖ τι ἐξ αὐτοῦ, οὐδὲ τὸ νεῖκος ἐξ ἐκείνης, ἀλλ' ἄμφω ἕτερόν τι τρίτον. Ἔνιοι δὲ καὶ πλείω λαμβάνουσιν ἐξ ὧν κατασκευάζουσιν τὴν τῶν ὄντων φύσιν. Πρὸς δὲ τούτοις ἔτι κἂν τόδε τις ἀπορήσειεν, εἰ μή τις ἑτέραν ὑποτίθησι τοῖς ἐναντίοις φύσιν· οὐθενὸς γὰρ ὁρῶμεν τῶν ὄντων οὐσίαν
30 τἀναντία [1]. Τὴν δ' ἀρχὴν οὐ καθ' ὑποκειμένου δεῖ λέγεσθαί τινος. Ἔσται γὰρ ἀρχὴ τῆς ἀρχῆς· τὸ γὰρ ὑποκείμενον ἀρχή, καὶ πρότερον δοκεῖ τοῦ κατηγορουμένου εἶναι. Ἔτι οὐκ εἶναί φαμεν οὐσίαν ἐναντίαν οὐσίᾳ [2]· πῶς οὖν ἐκ μὴ οὐσίων οὐσία ἂν εἴη; ἢ πῶς ἂν πρότερον μὴ οὐσία οὐσίας εἴη;
35 Διόπερ εἴ τις τόν τε πρότερον ἀληθῆ νομίσειεν εἶναι λόγον καὶ τοῦτον, ἀναγ-
189 b καῖον, εἰ μέλλει διασώσειν ἀμφοτέρους αὐτούς, ὑποτιθέναι τι τρίτον, ὥσπερ φασὶν οἱ μίαν τινὰ φύσιν εἶναι λέγοντες τὸ πᾶν, οἷον ὕδωρ ἢ πῦρ ἢ τὸ μεταξὺ τούτων.

Ar. seems here to come near to the conception of the older physicists —not Emped.—who admitted some primary element and then differentiated it by rarefaction and condensation. We shall see, however, in the following chapters that his own theory is elaborated in a very different way.

b. Rejection of any theory of four elements.

Ib., 189b[19-27]:

Not four

19, 20 Εἰ δὲ τεττάρων ὄντων δύο ἔσονται ἐναντιώσεις, δεήσει χωρὶς ἑκατέρας ὑπάρχειν ἑτέραν τινὰ μεταξὺ φύσιν· εἰ δ' ἐξ ἀλλήλων δύνανται γεννᾶν δύο οὖσαι, περίεργος ἂν ἡ ἑτέρα τῶν ἐναντιώσεων εἴη. Ἅμα δὲ καὶ ἀδύνατον πλείους εἶναι ἐναντιώσεις τὰς πρώτας. Ἡ γὰρ οὐσία ἕν τι γένος ἐστὶ τοῦ ὄντος, ὥστε
25 τῷ πρότερον καὶ ὕστερον διοίσουσιν ἀλλήλων αἱ ἀρχαὶ μόνον, ἀλλ' οὐ τῷ γένει· ἀεὶ γὰρ ἐν ἑνὶ γένει μία ἐναντίωσίς ἐστιν, πᾶσαί τε αἱ ἐναντιώσεις ἀνάγεσθαι δοκοῦσιν εἰς μίαν.

476—Ar. now begins to expound his own theory of the principles of "becoming" in the broadest sense. He introduces three principles: *the form* (εἶδος), *privation of the form* (στέρησις), and a *subject* (ὑποκείμενον) or matter (ὕλη). These three principles occur in every form of production.

The three principles

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[1] See the definition of οὐσία in *Categ.* 5, 2 a[11-13] (our nr. **438a**).

[2] *Categ.* 5, 3 b[25] (**439a**).

First the distinction is made between "becoming" in the absolute sense (ἁπλῶς) and "becoming this or that". The first is the coming-into-being of substances, e.g. ἄνθρωπος γίγνεται or τὸ μὴ μουσικόν (what is called in scholastic terminology *generatio simpliciter*), the latter the arising of a certain determination of a subject which already existed (*generatio secundum quid*), e.g. τὸν μὴ μουσικὸν ἄνθρωπον γίγνεσθαι μουσικὸν ἄνθρωπον. Now in all these cases, Ar. says, there is always some pre-existing subject.

1. The ὑποκείμενον

a. *Phys.* I 7, 190 a^{31}-b^{10}:

Πολλαχῶς δὲ λεγομένου τοῦ γίγνεσθαι, καὶ τῶν μὲν οὐ γίγνεσθαι ἀλλὰ τόδε τι γίγνεσθαι, ἁπλῶς δὲ γίγνεσθαι τῶν οὐσιῶν μόνων, κατὰ μὲν τἄλλα φανερὸν ὅτι ἀνάγκη ὑποκεῖσθαί τι τὸ γιγνόμενον· καὶ γὰρ ποσὸν καὶ ποιὸν καὶ πρὸς ἕτερον καὶ ποτὲ καὶ ποῦ γίνεται ὑποκειμένου τινὸς διὰ τὸ μόνην τὴν οὐσίαν μηθενὸς κατ' ἄλλου λέγεσθαι ὑποκειμένου, τὰ δ' ἄλλα πάντα κατὰ τῆς οὐσίας· ὅτι δὲ καὶ αἱ οὐσίαι καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα ἁπλῶς ὄντα ἐξ ὑποκειμένου τινὸς γίνεται, ἐπισκοποῦντι γένοιτ' ἂν φανερόν. Ἀεὶ γὰρ ἔστι τι ὃ ὑποκεῖται, ἐξ οὗ γίνεται τὸ γιγνόμενον, οἷον τὰ φυτὰ καὶ τὰ ζῷα ἐκ σπέρματος. Γίγνεται δὲ τὰ γιγνόμενα ἁπλῶς τὰ μὲν μετασχηματίσει, οἷον ἀνδριὰς ἐκ χαλκοῦ, τὰ δὲ προσθέσει, οἷον τὰ αὐξανόμενα, τὰ δ' ἀφαιρέσει, οἷον ἐκ τοῦ λίθου ὁ Ἑρμῆς, τὰ δὲ συνθέσει, οἷον οἰκία, τὰ δ' ἀλλοιώσει, οἷον τὰ τρεπόμενα κατὰ τὴν ὕλην. Πάντα δὲ τὰ οὕτω γινόμενα φανερὸν ὅτι ἐξ ὑποκειμένων γίνεται.

It can not always be directly known

b. We may not conclude from this passage that, according to Ar., the ὑποκείμενον can always be directly stated. At the end of the same chapter he tells us that, sometimes, it can be known only κατ' ἀναλογίαν.

Ib., 191 a$^{7-12}$:

Ἡ δ' ὑποκειμένη φύσις ἐπιστητὴ κατ' ἀναλογίαν. Ὡς γὰρ πρὸς ἀνδριάντα χαλκὸς ἢ πρὸς κλίνην ξύλον ἢ πρὸς ἄλλο τι τῶν ἐχόντων μορφὴν ἡ ὕλη καὶ τὸ ἄμορφον ἔχει πρὶν λαβεῖν τὴν μορφήν, οὕτως αὕτη πρὸς οὐσίαν ἔχει καὶ τὸ τόδε τι καὶ τὸ ὄν.

As he himself will explain later: the substratum, being undetermined, is not yet a "being" in the full sense: it is only *potentially* a being. It must be brought to being in the full sense by the determining form.

The term ὕλη

c. The term ὕλη is not used in this passage. Ar. here speaks of the ὑποκείμενον or ὑποκειμένη φύσις. In the *Metaph.* the term ὕλη is generally used. E.g.:

Metaph. Z 3, 1029 a[20-21]:

Λέγω δ' ὕλην ἡ καθ' αὑτὴν μήτε τι μήτε ποσὸν μήτε ἄλλο μηδὲν λέγεται οἷς ὥρισται τὸ ὄν.

d. The classical definition of ὕλη occurs in *Phys.* I 9, 192 a[31-32]: **Its classical definition**

Λέγω γὰρ ὕλην τὸ πρῶτον ὑποκείμενον ἑκάστῳ, ἐξ οὗ γίνεταί τι ἐνυπάρχοντος μὴ κατὰ συμβεβηκός.

"The primary substratum of each thing, an immanent principle from which a thing comes into being in a non-accidental way" (i.e. so that matter persists in the object which comes into being).

See further sub **496**.

477. Ar. continues, *Phys.* I 7, 190 b[10-23]:

10 Ὥστε δῆλον ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων ὅτι τὸ γινόμενον ἅπαν ἀεὶ σύνθετόν ἐστι, καὶ ἔστι μέν τι γινόμενον, ἔστι δέ τι ὃ τοῦτο γίνεται, καὶ τοῦτο διττόν· ἢ γὰρ τὸ ὑποκείμενον ἢ τὸ ἀντικείμενον. Λέγω δὲ ἀντικεῖσθαι μὲν τὸ ἄμουσον, ὑπο-
15 κεῖσθαι δὲ τὸν ἄνθρωπον, καὶ τὴν μὲν ἀσχημοσύνην καὶ τὴν ἀμορφίαν καὶ τὴν ἀταξίαν τὸ ἀντικείμενον, τὸν δὲ χαλκὸν ἢ τὸν λίθον ἢ τὸν χρυσὸν τὸν ὑποκείμενον.

Φανερὸν οὖν ὡς, εἴπερ εἰσὶν αἰτίαι καὶ ἀρχαὶ τῶν φύσει ὄντων, ἐξ ὧν πρώτων **2. the form: μορφή or εἶδος**
εἰσί καὶ γεγόνασι μὴ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς ἀλλ' ἕκαστον ὃ λέγεται κατὰ τὴν οὐσίαν,
20 ὅτι γίγνεται πᾶν ἔκ τε τοῦ ὑποκειμένου καὶ τῆς μορφῆς· σύγκειται γὰρ ὁ μουσικὸς ἄνθρωπος ἐξ ἀνθρώπου καὶ μουσικοῦ τρόπον τινά· διαλύσεις γὰρ [τοὺς λόγους] εἰς τοὺς λόγους τοὺς ἐκείνων [1]. Δῆλον οὖν ὡς γίνοιτ' ἂν τὰ γιγνόμενα ἐκ τούτων.

For a definition of the different meanings of εἶδος Ar. refers at the end of this book (*Phys.* I 9, 192 a[34]-b[1]) to the *Metaph.* Cp. our nr. **497**.

478—a. The same passage continued, 190 b[23-29]:

Ἔστι δὲ τὸ μὲν ὑποκείμενον ἀριθμῷ μὲν ἕν, εἴδει δὲ δύο. Ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἄνθρω- **3. The negative aspect of the subject: στέρησις**
25 πος καὶ ὁ χρυσὸς καὶ ὅλως ἡ ὕλη ἀριθμητή· τόδε γάρ τι μᾶλλον, καὶ οὐ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς ἐξ αὐτοῦ γίνεται τὸ γιγνόμενον· ἡ δὲ στέρησις καὶ ἡ ἐναντίωσις συμβεβηκός· ἓν δὲ τὸ εἶδος, οἷον ἡ τάξις ἢ ἡ μουσικὴ ἢ τῶν ἄλλων τι τῶν οὕτω κατηγορουμένων.

The third principle is introduced here in very concise terms. The meaning of the passage might be paraphrased as follows.

Things come to be, as it seems, by two principles: form and matter. The subject, however, has two succeeding states, which might be called the terms of the process of becoming: (1) the original state, from which it comes to be, e.g. μὴ μουσικός;

[1] "You can analyze it into the definitions of its elements" (Hardie). About the omission of the first τοὺς λόγους see the commentary of W. D. Ross on this place (p. 493).

(2) the opposite state, that which is to become, namely μουσικός. The first or negative state is called στέρησις (*privatio*), the privation of the form. The subject is in this state; it is identical with it, but *accidentally* (κατὰ συμβεβηκός), for it makes way for the form and thus it does not enter as a constituent element into the being which comes to be. So, in a certain sense, the στέρησις is no real principle of the generated being. E.g. a man is generated. Before there is "something unqualified", which is not-man.

In metaphysics the στέρησις means hardly anything; but in physics, for the explanation of coming to be, it takes a very important place, as important as that of the two other principles.

b. Ar. continues, ib. 190 b[29]-191 a[3]:

Διὸ ἔστι μὲν ὡς δύο λεκτέον εἶναι τὰς ἀρχάς, ἔστι δ' ὡς τρεῖς· καὶ ἔστι μὲν ὡς τἀναντία, οἷον εἴ τις λέγοι τὸ μουσικὸν καὶ τὸ ἄμουσον ἢ τὸ θερμὸν καὶ τὸ ψυχρὸν ἢ τὸ ἡρμοσμένον καὶ τὸ ἀνάρμοστον, ἔστι δ' ὡς οὔ· ὑπ' ἀλλήλων γὰρ πάσχειν τἀναντία ἀδύνατον. Λύεται δὲ καὶ τοῦτο διὰ τὸ ἄλλο εἶναι τὸ ὑποκείμενον· τοῦτο γὰρ οὐκ ἐναντίον. Ὥστε οὔτε πλείους τῶν ἐναντίων αἱ ἀρχαὶ τρόπον τινά, ἀλλὰ δύο ὡς εἰπεῖν τῷ ἀριθμῷ, οὔτ' αὖ παντελῶς δύο διὰ τὸ ἕτερον ὑπάρχειν τὸ εἶναι αὐτοῖς, ἀλλὰ τρεῖς· ἕτερον γὰρ τὸ ἀνθρώπῳ καὶ τὸ ἀμούσῳ εἶναι, καὶ τὸ ἀσχηματίστῳ καὶ χαλκῷ.

479—In the next chapter Ar. states that his theory is the true solution of the difficulties, which his predecessors were unable to solve.

Difficulties of predecessors solved by this theory

a. *Phys.* I 8, 191 a[23-34]:

Ὅτι δὲ μοναχῶς οὕτω λύεται καὶ ἡ τῶν ἀρχαίων ἀπορία, λέγωμεν μετὰ ταῦτα. Ζητοῦντες γὰρ οἱ κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν πρῶτοι τὴν ἀλήθειαν καὶ τὴν φύσιν τὴν τῶν ὄντων ἐξετράπησαν οἷον ὁδόν τινα ἄλλην ἀπωσθέντες ὑπὸ ἀπειρίας, καὶ φασὶν οὔτε γίνεσθαι τῶν ὄντων οὐδὲν οὔτε φθείρεσθαι διὰ τὸ ἀναγκαῖον μὲν εἶναι γίγνεσθαι τὸ γιγνόμενον ἢ ἐξ ὄντος ἢ ἐκ μὴ ὄντος, ἐκ δὲ τούτων ἀμφοτέρων ἀδύνατον εἶναι· οὔτε γὰρ τὸ ὂν γίνεσθαι (εἶναι γὰρ ἤδη) ἔκ τε μὴ ὄντος οὐδὲν ἂν γενέσθαι· ὑποκεῖσθαι γάρ τι δεῖ. Καὶ οὕτω δὴ τὸ ἐφεξῆς συμβαῖνον αὔξοντες[1] οὐδ' εἶναι πολλά φασιν ἀλλὰ μόνον αὐτὸ τὸ ὄν. Ἐκεῖνοι μὲν οὖν ταύτην ἔλαβον τὴν δόξαν διὰ τὰ εἰρημένα.

This is the Eleatic aporia: what comes to be must come forth either from being or from non-being. Both are impossible. Ergo —.

Ar. replies: it is possible, namely if both are admitted at the same time and in a special sense. If it is taken in the absolute sense, then, surely, nothing springs from non-being; but *accidentally* it does. For a being springs from στέρησις, which in itself is non-being. It springs from privation accidentally, because the pre-existing non-being is not admitted into the being that becomes.

And in the same way being springs from being, not essentially, but accidentally. For it is not the pre-existing being which is generated in that which comes to be.

[1] τὸ ἐφεξῆς συμβαῖνον αὔξοντες - they exaggerated the consequence of this.

But the new being springs from the pre-existing, as far as the latter contained a non-being in itself, which is now filled with a new determination.

This is expressed by Ar. in the following text.

Solution of the Eleatic aporia

b. Ib., 191 b[13-23]:

Ἡμεῖς δὲ καὶ αὐτοί φαμεν γίγνεσθαι μὲν οὐδὲν ἁπλῶς ἐκ μὴ ὄντος, ὅμως μέντοι γίγνεσθαι ἐκ μὴ ὄντος, οἷον κατὰ συμβεβηκός· ἐκ γὰρ τῆς στερήσεως, ὅ ἐστι καθ' αὑτὸ μὴ ὄν, οὐκ ἐνυπάρχοντος [1] γίγνεταί τι. Θαυμάζεται δὲ τοῦτο καὶ ἀδύνατον οὕτω δοκεῖ, γίγνεσθαί τι ἐκ μὴ ὄντος. Ὡσαύτως δὲ οὐδ' ἐξ ὄντος οὐδὲ τὸ ὂν γίγνεσθαι, πλὴν κατὰ συμβεβηκός· οὕτω δὲ καὶ τοῦτο γίγνεσθαι τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον, οἷον εἰ ἐκ ζῴου ζῷον γίγνοιτο καὶ ἐκ τινὸς ζῴου τι ζῷον, οἷον εἰ κύων <ἐκ κυνὸς ἢ ἵππος> ἐξ ἵππου γίγνοιτο [2]. Γίγνοιτο μὲν γὰρ ἂν οὐ μόνον ἐκ τινὸς ζῴου ὁ κύων, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐκ ζῴου, ἀλλ' οὐχ ᾗ ζῷον· ὑπάρχει γὰρ ἤδη τοῦτο·

The above solution borrows its terms from logic: the distinction between using a term *essentially* and *accidentally* is referred to in this chapter and illustrated by the instance "The doctor builds a house, not *qua* doctor, but *qua* housebuilder, and turns grey, not *qua* doctor, but *qua* dark-haired" (191 b[4-5]).

Metaphysical solution

c. Beside this solution Ar. gives a metaphysical one: in his theory of potency and act, which is explained at length in *Metaph.* Θ. The theory is referred to here, perhaps with reference to some older treatise.

Ib., 191 b[27-29]:

Εἷς μὲν δὴ τρόπος οὗτος, ἄλλος δ' ὅτι ἐνδέχεται ταὐτὰ λέγειν κατὰ τὴν δύναμιν καὶ τὴν ἐνέργειαν· τοῦτο δ' ἐν ἄλλοις διώρισται δι' ἀκριβείας μᾶλλον.

This theory compared with Plato's

480—In his last chapter of this book Ar. compares his own theory of becoming with that of Plato in the *Timaeus* and shows the superiority of his own theory. He reproaches Plato for not having acknowledged the principle of στέρησις: relative non-being, which is *accidentally* identical with matter, but *essentially* different. Because Plato neglected this distinction, he could not solve the difficulties of Eleatic philosophy: he formally attributed to matter a kind of non-being which does not belong to it and seems to reduce it to absolute non-being.

Phys. I 9, 192 a[3-12]:

Ἡμεῖς μὲν γὰρ ὕλην καὶ στέρησιν ἕτερόν φαμεν εἶναι, καὶ τούτων τὸ μὲν οὐκ ὂν εἶναι κατὰ συμβεβηκός, τὴν ὕλην, τὴν δὲ στέρησιν καθ' αὑτήν, καὶ τὴν

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[1] οὐκ ἐνυπάρχοντος - "this not surviving as a constituent of the result".

[2] About the insertion of the words ἐκ κυνὸς ἢ ἵππος see the comment of Ross on these lines (p. 495 f.).

μὲν ἐγγὺς καὶ οὐσίαν πως, τὴν ὕλην, τὴν δὲ στέρησιν οὐδαμῶς. Οἱ δὲ τὸ μὴ ὂν τὸ μέγα καὶ τὸ μικρὸν ὁμοίως, ἢ τὸ συναμφότερον ἢ τὸ χωρὶς ἑκάτερον. Ὥστε παντελῶς ἕτερος ὁ τρόπος οὗτος τῆς τριάδος κἀκεῖνος. Μέχρι μὲν γὰρ δεῦρο προῆλθον, ὅτι δεῖ τινὰ ὑποκεῖσθαι φύσιν, ταύτην μέντοι μίαν ποιοῦσιν· καὶ γὰρ εἴ τις δυάδα ποιεῖ, λέγων μέγα καὶ μικρὸν αὐτήν, οὐθὲν ἧττον ταὐτὸ ποιεῖ· τὴν γὰρ ἑτέραν παρεῖδεν.

The meaning of Ar. is clear: by introducing his third principle (the χώρα) in *Tim.* 48 e-50 d, Plato did assume a substratum, but he did not make any distinction between the substratum as a real principle *in* things (see Ar.'s definition of ὕλη sub **476 d**), a potential being, which *can* be in the full sense and only *per accidens* does not do so now, and, on the other hand, a second principle, which is in itself a non-being, namely the privation of the form which is still to be realized.

To this we might reply, that by Plato χώρα is not introduced at all as "matter" in the sense of a substratum, which is an immanent principle; but only as *space*, wherein coming to be happens to take place. Consequently, Ar. does not introduce a second principle next to Plato's principle of the Great-and-small. He introduces two totally different principles.

It should be granted, certainly, that Plato's description of becoming is difficult to understand and far from clear. On the other hand, Ar.'s hypothesis of a totally unqualified substratum contains certain difficulties. It is, finally, a purely logically construed hypothesis: a theory, which can serve as a basis for the explanation of becoming. But what corresponds with it in the order of reality, remains problematical.

3—THE SECOND BOOK OF THE PHYSICS

481—Ar. now begins to define "physis".

Phys. II 1, 192 b$^{8-23}$:

What is φύσει and what is not

Τῶν γὰρ ὄντων τὰ μέν ἐστι φύσει, τὰ δὲ δι' ἄλλας αἰτίας, φύσει μὲν τά τε ζῷα καὶ τὰ μέρη αὐτῶν καὶ τὰ φυτὰ καὶ τὰ ἁπλᾶ τῶν σωμάτων, οἷον γῆ καὶ πῦρ καὶ ἀὴρ καὶ ὕδωρ· ταῦτα γὰρ εἶναι καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα φύσει φαμέν. Πάντα δὲ τὰ ῥηθέντα φαίνεται διαφέροντα πρὸς τὰ μὴ φύσει συνεστῶτα. Τὰ μὲν γὰρ φύσει ὄντα πάντα φαίνεται ἔχοντα ἐν ἑαυτοῖς ἀρχὴν κινήσεως καὶ στάσεως, τὰ μὲν κατὰ τόπον, τὰ δὲ κατ' αὔξησιν καὶ φθίσιν, τὰ δὲ κατ' ἀλλοίωσιν· κλίνη δὲ καὶ ἱμάτιον, καὶ εἴ τι τοιοῦτον ἄλλο γένος ἐστίν, ᾗ μὲν τετύχηκε τῆς κατηγορίας ἑκάστης καὶ καθ' ὅσον ἐστὶν ἀπὸ τέχνης, οὐδεμίαν ὁρμὴν ἔχει μεταβολῆς ἔμφυτον, ᾗ δὲ συμβέβηκεν αὐτοῖς εἶναι λιθίνοις ἢ γηΐνοις ἢ μικτοῖς ἐκ τούτων, ἔχει, καὶ κατὰ τοσοῦτον, ὡς οὔσης τῆς φύσεως ἀρχῆς τινὸς καὶ αἰτίας τοῦ κινεῖσθαι καὶ ἠρεμεῖν ἐν ᾧ ὑπάρχει πρῶτως καθ' αὑτὸ καὶ μὴ κατὰ συμβεβηκός.

Definition of φύσις

"Nature is a principle of motion and rest for the thing in which it is immediately present, in virtue of itself (i.e. *essentially*) and not in virtue of a concomitant attribute" (i.e. *per accidens*).

The latter restriction excludes certain cases where nature comes very near to art. With art namely the cause works from without, with nature from within. But there are some cases where art works from within, e.g. the physician who treats himself. Yet these cases do not come within the definition of nature, Ar. says, for here art does not belong to the subject essentially, but *per accidens*.

Natural things are always realized in a subject

482—a. Ib., 192 b$^{32-34}$:

Φύσις μὲν οὖν ἐστὶ τὸ ῥηθέν· φύσιν δὲ ἔχει ὅσα τοιαύτην ἔχει ἀρχήν. Καὶ ἔστι πάντα ταῦτα οὐσία· ὑποκείμενον γάρ τι καὶ ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ ἐστὶν ἡ φύσις ἀεί.

"Each of them is a substance; for it is a subject, and nature is always realized in a subject".

Mansion [1] calls this "an expression of peripatetic realism, which indeed attributes a reality to abstract principles, but on condition of finding them in a material substratum, of which they can be separated only by thought".

What is called κατὰ φύσιν

b. These things, then, and their essential qualities are "according to nature".

Ib. 192 b$^{35-37}$:

Κατὰ φύσιν δὲ ταῦτά τε καὶ ὅσα τούτοις ὑπάρχει καθ' αὑτά, οἷον τῷ πυρὶ φέρεσθαι ἄνω· τοῦτο γὰρ φύσις μὲν οὐκ ἔστιν, οὐδ' ἔχει φύσιν, φύσει δὲ καὶ κατὰ φύσιν ἐστίν.

Two aspects of nature

483—Ar. now proceeds to explain his theory of the *two aspects of nature*: (1) there is a lower nature, *matter*, which is undetermined and "potential" with relation to the form; (2) a higher nature, *form*, which is intelligible (because determinate) and, by its presence, brings matter to full being (see nr. **484**).

Matter

a. Ib., 193a$^{10-21}$; $^{28-30}$:

Δοκεῖ δ' ἡ φύσις καὶ ἡ οὐσία τῶν φύσει ὄντων ἐνίοις εἶναι τὸ πρῶτον ἐνυπάρχον ἑκάστῳ ἀρρύθμιστον [2] <ὂν> καθ' ἑαυτό, οἷον κλίνης φύσις τὸ ξύλον, ἀνδριάντος δ' ὁ χαλκός. Σημεῖον δέ φησιν Ἀντιφῶν [3] ὅτι, εἴ τις κατορύξειε κλίνην καὶ λάβοι δύναμιν ἡ σηπεδὼν ὥστε ἀνεῖναι βλαστόν, οὐκ ἂν γενέσθαι κλίνην ἀλλὰ ξύλον, ὡς τὸ μὲν κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς ὑπάρχον, τὴν κατὰ νόμον διάθεσιν καὶ τὴν τέχνην, τὴν δ' οὐσίαν οὖσαν ἐκείνην ἣ καὶ διαμένει ταῦτα πάσχουσα συνεχῶς. Εἰ δὲ καὶ τούτων ἕκαστον πρὸς ἕτερόν τι ταὐτὸ τοῦτο πέπονθεν, οἷον ὁ μὲν χαλκὸς καὶ ὁ χρυσὸς πρὸς ὕδωρ, τὰ δ' ὀστᾶ καὶ ξύλα πρὸς

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[1] *Introd.*, p. 100.

[2] τὸ πρῶτον ἐνυπάρχον ἑκάστῳ ἀρρύθμιστον <ὂν> καθ' ἑαυτό - "that immediate constituent of it which taken by itself is without arrangement" (Hardie & Gaye).

[3] Diels, VS^{6} 87, B 15. Cf. Zeller I 2^{6}, pp. 1324-28.

γῆν [1], ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὁτιοῦν, ἐκεῖνα [2] τὴν φύσιν εἶναι καὶ τὴν οὐσίαν 20
αὐτῶν. —

Ἕνα μὲν οὖν τρόπον οὕτως ἡ φύσις λέγεται, ἡ πρώτη ἑκάστῳ ὑποκειμένη 28
ὕλη τῶν ἐχόντων ἐν αὑτοῖς ἀρχὴν κινήσεως καὶ μεταβολῆς.

"The immediate material substratum of things which gave in themselves a principle of motion or change".

Form

b. Ib., 193a[30-31]:

Ἄλλον δὲ τρόπον ἡ μορφὴ καὶ τὸ εἶδος τὸ κατὰ τὸν λόγον.

"The form and the type, sc. the definable form" (τὸ κατὰ τὸν λόγον: "which is specified in the definition of the thing". Hardie and Gaye).

c. In the next passage Ar. explains what he means by this definition.

Ib. 193 a[31]-b [5]:

Ὥσπερ γὰρ τέχνη λέγεται τὸ κατὰ τέχνην καὶ τὸ τεχνικόν, οὕτω καὶ φύσις 31
Matter without form is not yet φύσει τὸ κατὰ φύσιν λέγεται καὶ τὸ φυσικόν. Οὔτε δὲ ἐκεῖ πω φαῖμεν ἂν ἔχειν κατὰ
τὴν τέχνην οὐδέν, εἰ δυνάμει μόνον ἐστὶ κλίνη, μή πω δ' ἔχει τὸ εἶδος τῆς
κλίνης, οὐδ' εἶναι τέχνην, οὔτ' ἐν τοῖς φύσει συνισταμένοις· τὸ γὰρ δυνάμει 35
σὰρξ ἢ ὀστοῦν οὔτ' ἔχει πω τὴν ἑαυτοῦ φύσιν, πρὶν ἂν λάβῃ τὸ εἶδος τὸ κατὰ 193 b
τὸν λόγον, ὃ ὁριζόμενοι λέγομεν τί ἐστι σὰρξ ἢ ὀστοῦν, οὔτε φύσει ἐστίν.
Ὥστε ἄλλον τρόπον ἡ φύσις ἂν εἴη τῶν ἐχόντων ἐν αὑτοῖς κινήσεως ἀρχὴν
ἡ μορφὴ καὶ τὸ εἶδος, οὐ χωριστὸν ὂν ἀλλ' ἢ κατὰ τὸν λόγον. 5

"So, in another sense, nature is the form or type of things which have in themselves a principle of motion, a form not separable from them except in thought".

484—Real things, then, are the composites of these two constituents.

Ib. 193 b[5-8]:

The compositum Τὸ δ' ἐκ τούτων φύσις μὲν οὐκ ἔστι, φύσει δέ, οἷον ἄνθρωπος. Καὶ μᾶλλον
αὕτη φύσις τῆς ὕλης· ἕκαστον γὰρ τότε λέγεται ὅταν ἐντελεχείᾳ ᾖ, μᾶλλον
ἢ ὅταν δυνάμει.

Relation to Plato's doctrine of nature

485—A. Mansion, *Introd.* pp. 82-92, explained excellently how this Aristotelian conception of nature is related to that of Plato, especially in his later works, the *Tim.* and *Laws*. Plato was deeply convinced that coming to be and passing away and the existence of things cannot be caused by matter. He sought a reasonable ground for them: "that it is best for things to be as they are" (*Ph.* 96 a ff.), and, seeking this, assumed his "hypothesis" of Ideas. In *Laws* X again Pl. delivers a severe verdict on materialistic philosophy of nature: the regularity of the celestial movement can only be caused by an intelligence, a soul. Therefore, if we mean by

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[3] Plato in the *Tim.* derived gold and bronze from water (59 b) and bones (64 c, 73 e) from earth.

[2] ἐκεῖνα - the stable element.

"nature" what is original and wants no further explanation, we should say that soul is "natural" (φύσει), not the material elements (981 c-892 c; our nr. **388**).

In *Tim.* 52 d-53 b Pl. describes the χώρα before the creation of the kosmos as being filled with formless elements, in which irregular forces work and shocks occur. So there exists, according to Plato, some irrational element, next to soul and independent of it. But Pl. does not call this physis. As to Aristotle, he starts from such a physis and calls it by this name. But he does not adopt Plato's doctrine of soul. Instead of this he gives another explanation: above the irrational nature, called *hylè*, he superposed not soul, but a superior nature, *form*. This form is *not an intelligent principle*, not a thinking and deliberating being, but it is *intelligible*: the rational element in corporeal beings.

Thus it may be said in a certain sense that to Ar. nature is rational; only not in any personal sense.

Three questions

486—Ar. now asks himself three questions:

(1) Where is the border-line between physics and mathematics? For physical bodies contain surfaces and volumes, lines and points, and these are the subject-matter of mathematics.

(2) Where is the place of astronomy? Does it belong to physics, or not?

(3) Since nature has two senses, form and matter, with which is the physicist concerned?

1. Where is the border-line between phys. and math.?

a. *Phys.* II 2, 193 b$^{22-25}$:

Ἐπεὶ δὲ διώρισται ποσαχῶς ἡ φύσις λέγεται, μετὰ τοῦτο θεωρητέον τίνι διαφέρει ὁ μαθηματικὸς τοῦ φυσικοῦ. Καὶ γὰρ ἐπίπεδα καὶ στερεὰ ἔχει τὰ φυσικὰ σώματα καὶ μήκη καὶ στιγμάς, περὶ ὧν σκοπεῖ ὁ μαθηματικός.

2. The place of astronomy

b. Ib., 193 b$^{25-26}$:

Ἔτι ἡ ἀστρολογία ἑτέρα ἢ μέρος τῆς φυσικῆς.

3. Which is the object of natural science?

c. Ib., 194 a$^{12-13}$, $^{15-11}$:

Ἐπεὶ δ' ἡ φύσις διχῶς, τό τε εἶδος καὶ ἡ ὕλη, — ἀπορήσειεν ἄν τις, — περὶ ποτέρας τοῦ φυσικοῦ, ἢ περὶ τοῦ ἐξ ἀμφοῖν. Ἀλλ' εἰ περὶ τοῦ ἐξ ἀμφοῖν, καὶ περὶ ἑκατέρας. Πότερον οὖν τῆς αὐτῆς ἢ ἄλλης ἑκατέραν γνωρίζειν;

These questions are answered here by Ar. very shortly. They have been broadly treated by Mansion in his fifth chapter (*Introd.*, pp. 122-205).

First question

487—The first question should be understood starting from Platonism.

Plato's tripartition of being

a. According to Ar. in *Metaph.* A 6 Plato distinguished three degrees of being: αἰσθητά — μαθηματικά — εἴδη, corresponding with three kinds of knowledge. As to the introduction of εἴδη —an imperishable and non-changing kind of being, on which the αἰσθητά depend by μέθεξις —, we

gave the texts of A 6 and M 4 in our nr. **204a** and **b**. In A 6 Ar. continues (987 b$^{14-18}$):

Ἔτι δὲ παρὰ τὰ αἰσθητὰ καὶ τὰ εἴδη τὰ μαθηματικὰ τῶν πραγμάτων εἶναί φησι μεταξύ, διαφέροντα τῶν μὲν αἰσθητῶν τῷ ἀΐδια καὶ ἀκίνητα εἶναι, τῶν δ' εἰδῶν τῷ τὰ μὲν πόλλ' ἄττα ὅμοια εἶναι τὸ δὲ εἶδος αὐτὸ ἓν ἕκαστον μόνον.

We know this doctrine from Pl., *Rep.* VI, 509-511 [1] and VII 533-534: dialectic is placed at the top; it reaches up to true Reality and the Good. Next follows mathematical knowledge, which does not extend to contemplation of the highest Reality, because it cannot render an account of its first principles ("hypotheses"). Finally there is *doxa*, which is no knowledge in the strictest sense and cannot be so, because its object is the ever-changing nature of the sensible things. Plato has come very near to a science of nature. The essential purpose of his theory of Ideas was to explain how rational knowledge of sensible things is possible. But in the strictest sense Pl. denied it up to the end [2].

b. Ar. gives to physics a place in the system of sciences. True knowledge of physical objects is possible, because they contain an intelligible element within them, which is their essence: the form.

In physical objects this form is essentially joined to matter. In his *Metaph.* we shall see Ar. occupied with the question whether there exists any purely intelligible being, not joined to matter (what Ar. called "separate", χωριστόν). He answers in the affirmative. This, then, is the object of metaphysics, which is called by Ar. "first philosophy" or "theology". So we get the following tripartition of sciences:

Metaph. E 1, 1026 a$^{13-16}$:

Ar.'s tripartition of sciences

Ἡ μὲν γὰρ φυσικὴ περὶ χωριστὰ μὲν ἀλλ' οὐκ ἀκίνητα, τῆς δὲ μαθηματικῆς ἔνια περὶ ἀκίνητα μὲν οὐ χωριστὰ δὲ ἴσως ἀλλ' ὡς ἐν ὕλῃ· ἡ δὲ πρώτη καὶ περὶ χωριστὰ καὶ ἀκίνητα.

The tripartition itself is Platonic, but Ar. connects it with a different theory of knowledge, namely, his doctrine of abstraction. The objects of mathematics are the result of a further degree of abstraction than are those of physics. Physical objects, which are essentially joined to matter, cannot be separated from it, even in thought; mathematical objects, which are according to Ar. not "separate"

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[1] Our nr. **294**.

[2] *Phil.* 59 a-b. In my *Examen critique de l'interprétation traditionnelle du platonisme* (*Revue de Métaph.* 1951, pp. 249-268) I argued that in later platonism the opposition of an unchanging and immovable ideal World to that of ever-changing sensible things has been essentially broken down. If it is true that in *Parm.* and *Soph.* motion was introduced by Plato in the ideal World—as I think it was—this statement should be accepted. It does not take away the fact that, on the point in question, sc. the establishing of the possibility of natural science, Ar. has completed what Plato had begun.

(as Plato thought they are), but "somehow connected with matter", can be separated from it *in abstracto*.

This is what Ar. explains in the next passage of *Phys.* II, ch. 2.

c. *Phys.* II 2, 194 a$^{1-7}$: **Difference between phys. and math. objects**

Γίγνοιτο δ' ἂν τοῦτο δῆλον, εἴ τις ἑκατέρων πειρῷτο λέγειν τοὺς ὅρους, καὶ αὐτῶν [1] καὶ τῶν συμβεβηκότων. Τὸ μὲν γὰρ περιττὸν ἔσται [2] καὶ τὸ ἄρτιον καὶ τὸ εὐθὺ καὶ τὸ καμπύλον, ἔτι δὲ ἀριθμὸς καὶ γραμμὴ καὶ σχῆμα ἄνευ κινήσεως, σὰρξ δὲ καὶ ὀστοῦν καὶ ἄνθρωπος οὐκέτι, ἀλλὰ ταῦτα ὥσπερ ῥὶς σιμὴ ἀλλ' οὐχ ὡς τὸ καμπύλον λέγεται.

The latter are defined like "snub nose", not like "curved". σιμόν is with Ar. a classical instance of an accidens, and at the same time of a form which is realized in matter. E.g. the next passage.

d. *Metaph.* E 1, 1025 b$^{30-34}$:

Ἔστι δὲ τῶν ὁριζομένων καὶ τῶν τί ἐστι τὰ μὲν ὡς τὸ σιμὸν τὰ δ' ὡς τὸ κοῖλον. διαφέρει δὲ ταῦτα ὅτι τὸ μὲν σιμὸν συνειλημμένον ἐστὶ μετὰ τῆς ὕλης (ἔστι γὰρ τὸ σιμὸν κοίλη ῥίς), ἡ δὲ κοιλότης ἄνευ ὕλης αἰσθητῆς.

488—What is the place of applied mathematics: of astronomy, optics, harmonics? In other places mechanics, too, are mentioned. **Second question**

These sciences have to do with natural bodies; they also treat the accidents of them. Therefore Ar. calls them τὰ φυσικώτερα τῶν μαθημάτων. E.g. his work *De caelo* is a truly physical treatise. Yet the method of these sciences is a mathematical one. Where, then, are they to be placed?

Ar. answers: The position of astronomy is similar to that of geometry. Both deal with bodies, but from a special point of view, namely, making abstraction of corporeal reality. In the same way optics are a system of geometrical relations, harmonics of arithmetical propositions, mechanics an application of stereometry. But the method of astronomy is in a certain sense the inverse of that of geometry.

Ar. explains this in the passage following that which has been cited sub **487c**.

a. *Phys.* II 2, 194 a$^{7-12}$: **The method of applied mathematics**

Δηλοῖ δὲ καὶ τὰ φυσικώτερα τῶν μαθημάτων, οἷον ὀπτικὴ καὶ ἁρμονικὴ καὶ ἀστρολογία· ἀνάπαλιν γὰρ τρόπον τιν' ἔχουσι τῇ γεωμετρίᾳ. Ἡ μὲν γὰρ γεωμετρία περὶ γραμμῆς φυσικῆς σκοπεῖ, ἀλλ' οὐχ ᾗ φυσική, ἡ δ' ὀπτικὴ μαθηματικὴν μὲν γραμμήν, ἀλλ' οὐχ ᾗ μαθηματικὴ ἀλλ' ᾗ φυσική.

What he means to say is: astronomy etc. follow a mathematical method, but they have to return to physical reality and there apply the mathematical relations found by abstraction. Cp. *Metaph.* B 2, 997 b$^{14-35}$, where Ar. argues (against the platonic hypothesis of an intermediate world of mathematical objects, existing separately) that astronomy has to deal with the actual heavens of our world.

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[1] αὐτῶν - the subjects.

[2] ἔσται - to be linked with ἄνευ κινήσεως.

b. On the other hand, Ar. repeatedly teaches that sciences, the object of which is realized in phenomena and which therefore have to do directly with concrete things, are by this very reason less accurate, because the object is more complicated. E.g.

Metaph. A 2, 982 a$^{26-28}$:

'Ακριβέσταται δὲ τῶν ἐπιστημῶν αἳ μάλιστα τῶν πρώτων εἰσίν (αἱ γὰρ ἐξ ἐλαττόνων [1] ἀκριβέστεραι τῶν ἐκ προσθέσεως λεγομένων [2], οἷον ἀριθμητικὴ γεωμετρίας).

Nearly the same is said in *An. post.* I 27, 87 a^{31}.

Third question

489—Which "nature" is the object of physics: form or matter? Ar. answers: both.

Both matter and form are the object of physics

Phys. II 2, 194 a$^{12-15}$:

'Επεὶ δ' ἡ φύσις διχῶς, τό τε εἶδος καὶ ἡ ὕλη, ὡς ἂν εἰ περὶ σιμότητος σκοποῖμεν τί ἐστιν, οὕτω θεωρητέον. "Ωστ' ὄντ' ἄνευ ὕλης τὰ τοιαῦτα οὔτε κατὰ τὴν ὕλην.

Pre-socratic philosophers dealt almost exclusively with matter, e.g. Empedocles and Democritus. To their view Ar. opposes the subordination of matter to form. Hence follows that for the physicist form is of primary importance.

Matter and form are they object of the same science?

490—Ar. also asks the question whether the two aspects of nature belong to one and the same science or to a different one. He answers that both belong to the same, and illustrates this by the analogy of art; e.g. the building of a house.

First argument: the analogy of art

a. *Phys.* II 2, 194 a$^{21-27}$:

Εἰ δὲ ἡ τέχνη μιμεῖται τὴν φύσιν, τῆς δὲ αὐτῆς ἐπιστήμης εἰδέναι τὸ εἶδος καὶ τὴν ὕλην μέχρι του (οἷον ἰατροῦ ὑγίειαν καὶ χολὴν καὶ φλέγμα, ἐν οἷς ἡ ὑγίεια, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ οἰκοδόμου τό τε εἶδος τῆς οἰκίας καὶ τὴν ὕλην, ὅτι πλίνθοι καὶ ξύλα· ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων), καὶ τῆς φυσικῆς ἂν εἴη τὸ γνωρίζειν ἀμφοτέρας τὰς φύσεις.

Second argument: teleology in nature

b. Ib., 194 a$^{27-36}$; 194 b$^{7-8}$:

"Ετι τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα καὶ τὸ τέλος τῆς αὐτῆς καὶ ὅσα τούτων ἕνεκα [3]. ' Η δὲ φύσις τέλος καὶ οὗ ἕνεκα· ὧν γὰρ συνεχοῦς τῆς κινήσεως οὔσης ἔστι τι τέλος τῆς κινήσεως, τοῦτο ἔσχατον καὶ τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα. Διὸ καὶ ὁ ποιητὴς [4] γελοίως

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[1] αἱ ἐξ ἐλαττόνων - those which involve fewer principles.
[2] αἱ ἐκ προσθέσεως λεγόμεναι - those which involve additional principles (Ross).
[3] τῆς αὐτῆς (sc. ἐπιστήμης) καὶ - eiusdem ac.
[4] ὁ ποιητής - sc. Euripides, in a play unknown to us.

προήχθη εἰπεῖν »ἔχει τελευτήν, ἥσπερ οὕνεκ' ἐγένετο«. Βούλεται γὰρ οὐ πᾶν εἶναι τὸ ἔσχατον τέλος, ἀλλὰ τὸ βέλτιστον· ἐπεὶ καὶ ποιοῦσιν αἱ τέχναι τὴν ὕλην αἱ μὲν ἁπλῶς αἱ δὲ εὐεργόν [1], καὶ χρώμεθα ὡς ἡμῶν ἕνεκα πάντων ὑπαρχόντων. Ἐσμὲν γάρ πως καὶ ἡμεῖς τέλος· διχῶς γὰρ τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα [2]. — Ἐν μὲν οὖν τοῖς κατὰ τέχνην ἡμεῖς ποιοῦμεν τὴν ὕλην τοῦ ἔργου ἕνεκα, ἐν δὲ τοῖς φυσικοῖς ὑπάρχει οὖσα.

Third argument: matter and form are correlatives

c. Ib., 194 b$^{8-9}$:

Ἔτι τῶν πρός τι ἡ ὕλη· ἄλλῳ γὰρ εἴδει ἄλλη ὕλη.

Which means: Form and matter are correlatives. They claim each other mutually. But form can exist without matter (not in physical objects, but as object of metaphysics), matter cannot without form. Therefore Ar. says that matter belongs to the πρός τι.

The borderline between phys. and metaph.

491—Hence, in the final passage of our chapter the author speaks about metaphysics, as it should be distinguished from physics.

Phys. II 2, 194 b$^{9-15}$:

Μέχρι δὴ πόσου τὸν φυσικὸν δεῖ εἰδέναι τὸ εἶδος καὶ τὸ τί ἐστιν; ἢ ὥσπερ ἰατρὸν νεῦρον ἢ χαλκέα χαλκόν, μέχρι του. Τινὸς γὰρ ἕνεκα ἕκαστον, καὶ περὶ ταῦτα ἃ ἐστι χωριστὰ μὲν εἴδει, ἐν ὕλῃ δέ. Ἄνθρωπος γὰρ ἄνθρωπον γεννᾷ καὶ ἥλιος. Πῶς δ' ἔχει τὸ χωριστὸν καὶ τί ἐστι, φιλοσοφίας τῆς πρώτης διορίσαι ἔργον.

The meaning of this passage is: physics have to do with the eidos up to a certain point, namely, until the physicist understands the purpose of each thing. He has not to do with the eidos as far as this can exist in itself, not joined to matter. For in that sense the eidos is the object of a different science: metaphysics. Physical objects, however, are always form joined to matter. "Man is begotten by man, and by the sun as well".—The author means to say: physical generation can be explained from itself. A metaphysical man-in-himself is of no use to it. Organic beings generate themselves, "together with the sun"—because the heavenly bodies, especially the sun, have an important part in the physical process of generation.

Chapters 3-9

492—The next chapter (3) deals with the four causes, a subject which is continued in ch. 7 and 8, where the author argues that form is properly the cause of things. Having treated the questions of τύχη and αὐτόματον, which are also considered as causes of things, in chapters 4-6, he applies in his last chapter (9) the principle of the final cause to the problem of

[1] Some arts make the matter (from something different), others make it more serviceable (e.g. when iron is melted).

[2] From *De anima* 415 b^{2} we know what Ar. means by this distinction: τὸ δ' οὗ ἕνεκα διττόν· τὸ μὲν οὗ, τὸ δὲ ᾧ. E.g. in one sense health is the οὗ ἕνεκα of the medical art; in another sense the patient is.

the necessity of physical phenomena. This necessity does not proceed from antecedents to consequences, but inversely: the final cause is of primary importance.

This is the main thesis of Ar.'s natural philosophy.

the four causes

493—*Phys.* II 3, 194 b^{23}-195 a^{3}:

causa materialis

Ἕνα μὲν οὖν τρόπον αἴτιον λέγεται τὸ ἐξ οὗ γίνεταί τι ἐνυπάρχοντος, οἷον ὁ χαλκὸς τοῦ ἀνδριάντος καὶ ὁ ἄργυρος τῆς φιάλης καὶ τὰ τούτων γένη.

c. formalis

Ἄλλον δὲ τὸ εἶδος καὶ τὸ παράδειγμα· τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶν ὁ λόγος ὁ τοῦ τί ἦν εἶναι καὶ τὰ τούτου γένη, οἷον τοῦ διὰ πασῶν τὰ δύο πρὸς ἕν, καὶ ὅλως ὁ ἀριθμὸς καὶ τὰ μέρη τὰ ἐν τῷ λόγῳ [1].

c. efficiens

Ἔτι ὅθεν ἡ ἀρχὴ τῆς μεταβολῆς ἡ πρώτη ἢ τῆς ἠρεμήσεως, οἷον ὁ βουλεύσας αἴτιος, καὶ ὁ πατὴρ τοῦ τέκνου, καὶ ὅλως τὸ ποιοῦν τοῦ ποιουμένου καὶ τὸ μεταβάλλον τοῦ μεταβαλλομένου.

c. finalis

Ἔτι ὡς τὸ τέλος· τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶ τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα, οἷον τοῦ περιπατεῖν ἡ ὑγίεια· διὰ τί γὰρ περιπατεῖ; φαμὲν ἵνα ὑγιαίνῃ, καὶ εἰπόντες οὕτως οἰόμεθα ἀποδεδωκέναι τὸ αἴτιον. Καὶ ὅσα δὴ κινήσαντος ἄλλου μεταξὺ γίγνεται τοῦ τέλους, οἷον τῆς ὑγιείας ἡ ἰσχνασία ἢ ἡ κάθαρσις ἢ τὰ φάρμακα ἢ τὰ ὄργανα· πάντα γὰρ ταῦτα τοῦ τέλους ἕνεκά ἐστι, διαφέρει δ' ἀλλήλων ὡς ὄντα τὰ μὲν ἔργα τὰ δ' ὄργανα.

Instances

494—**a**. *Metaph.* H 4, 1044 a^{32}-1044 b^{1}:

Ὅταν δή τις ζητῇ τὸ αἴτιον, ἐπεὶ πλεοναχῶς τὰ αἴτια λέγεται, πάσας δεῖ λέγειν τὰς ἐνδεχομένας αἰτίας. οἷον ἀνθρώπου τίς αἰτία ὡς ὕλη; ἆρα τὰ καταμήνια; τί δ' ὡς κινοῦν; ἆρα τὸ σπέρμα; τί δ' ὡς τὸ εἶδος; τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι. τί δ' ὡς οὗ ἕνεκα; τὸ τέλος.

b. *Metaph.* B 2, 996 b$^{5-8}$:

Ἐνδέχεται γὰρ τῷ αὐτῷ πάντας τοὺς τρόπους τοὺς τῶν αἰτίων ὑπάρχειν, οἷον οἰκίας ὅθεν μὲν ἡ κίνησις ἡ τέχνη καὶ ὁ οἰκοδόμος, οὗ δ' ἕνεκα τὸ ἔργον [2], ὕλη δὲ γῆ καὶ λίθοι, τὸ δ' εἶδος [3] ὁ λόγος.

In the last example it is clear that the formal cause is identical with the final, only seen from a different point of view. In a sense the form is the efficient cause, too. For the notion of "house" *works* as an idea which is present in the mind of the architect and directs his activity.—The

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[1] τὰ ἐν τῷ λόγῳ - the parts in the definition.

[2] Final cause is the ἔργον, i.e. the *function* of the house: "giving shelter to things and bodies", as is said in the definition of *Metaph.* H 2, 1043 a^{16} (ἀγγεῖον σκεπαστικὸν χρημάτων καὶ σωμάτων), and again in *De anima* I 1, 403 b^{3}.

[3] Formal cause is the notion "house", the definition.

same might be remarked as to the first instance, and so it is generally with natural beings. For the form, which is within them, is the cause of their motion (growth), and it is at the same time the end.

This is expressed by Ar. in the next passage.

495—*Phys.* II 7, 198 a$^{22-29}$: **The three non-material causes often coincide**

Ἐπεὶ δ' αἱ αἰτίαι τέτταρες, περὶ πασῶν τοῦ φυσικοῦ εἰδέναι, καὶ εἰς πάσας ἀνάγων τὸ διὰ τί ἀποδώσει φυσικῶς, τὴν ὕλην, τὸ εἶδος, τὸ κινῆσαν, τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα. Ἔρχεται δὲ τὰ τρία εἰς ἓν πολλάκις· τὸ μὲν γὰρ τί ἐστι καὶ τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα ἕν ἐστι, τὸ δ' ὅθεν ἡ κίνησις πρῶτον τῷ εἴδει ταὐτὸ τούτοις· ἄνθρωπος γὰρ ἄνθρωπον γεννᾷ. Καὶ ὅλως ὅσα κινούμενα κινεῖ· ὅσα δὲ μή, οὐκέτι φυσικῆς· οὐ γὰρ ἐν αὑτοῖς ἔχοντα κίνησιν οὐδ' ἀρχὴν κινήσεως κινεῖ, ἀλλ' ἀκίνητα ὄντα.

496—We saw the definitions of matter sub **476c**, **d**. Matter there appeared as a perfectly undetermined substratum, which has to receive its determination from the form. So matter is potential, form the actuating principle.

Relative character of matter

In other places Ar. makes a distinction between matter in the absolute sense, which is called by the scholastics *materia prima*, and matter on a higher level, called δευτέρα ὕλη by the commentators. The first is perfectly undetermined and potential; the second, though it received a certain (elementary) determination, is still potential in relation to a higher form.

Thus, prime matter is the substratum of elementary bodies (fire, air, water, earth). In a second stage these elementary substances become in their turn "matter" for some more complicated substance of a superior determination: homogeneous parts are formed (ἡ τῶν ὁμοιομερῶν φύσις) in organic beings, e.g. bone and flesh. Then, in the third and last stage, heterogeneous parts are formed (ἡ τῶν ἀνομοιομερῶν), such as face and hand.

a. *De part. anim.* II 1, 646 a$^{12-24}$:

Τριῶν δ' οὐσῶν τῶν συνθέσεων πρώτην μὲν ἄν τις θείη τὴν ἐκ τῶν καλουμένων ὑπό τινων στοιχείων, οἷον γῆς ἀέρος ὕδατος πυρός. ἔτι δὲ βέλτιον ἴσως ἐκ τῶν δυνάμεων λέγειν, καὶ τούτων οὐκ ἐξ ἁπασῶν, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ ἐν ἑτέροις εἴρηται καὶ πρότερον. ὑγρὸν γὰρ καὶ ξηρὸν καὶ θερμὸν καὶ ψυχρὸν ὕλη τῶν συνθέτων σωμάτων ἐστίν· αἱ δ' ἄλλαι διαφοραὶ ταύταις ἀκολουθοῦσιν, οἷον βάρος καὶ κουφότης καὶ πυκνότης καὶ μανότης καὶ τραχύτης καὶ λειότης καὶ τἆλλα τὰ τοιαῦτα πάθη τῶν σωμάτων. δευτέρα δὲ σύστασις ἐκ τῶν πρώτων ἡ τῶν ὁμοιομερῶν φύσις ἐν τοῖς ζῴοις ἐστίν, οἷον ὀστοῦ σαρκὸς καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν τοιούτων. τρίτη δὲ καὶ τελευταία κατ' ἀριθμὸν ἡ τῶν ἀνομοιομερῶν, οἷον προσώπου καὶ χειρὸς καὶ τῶν τοιούτων μορίων.

Therefore, matter is called by Ar. something relative (490 c: τῶν πρός τι ἡ ὕλη).

Reaction of matter against form

b. Though matter is essentially passive, it does possess a certain activity. This might be inferred from the existence of monstrosities. In a sense these are natural beings, because they are generated by living beings according to a natural process. Yet they deviate from the normal type. Why?—Ar. replies: Because matter offers resistance to form and prevents it from realizing itself perfectly.

De gen. anim. IV 4, 770 b^{9-17}:

Ἔστι γὰρ τὸ τέρας τῶν παρὰ φύσιν τι, παρὰ φύσιν δ' οὐ πᾶσαν ἀλλὰ τὴν ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ· περὶ γὰρ τὴν ἀεὶ καὶ τὴν ἐξ ἀνάγκης οὐθὲν γίνεται παρὰ φύσιν, ἀλλ' ἐν τοῖς ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ μὲν οὕτω γινομένοις, ἐνδεχομένοις δὲ καὶ ἄλλως, ἐπεὶ καὶ τούτων ἐν ὅσοις συμβαίνει παρὰ τὴν τάξιν μὲν ταύτην, ἀεὶ μέντοι μὴ τυχόντως, ἧττον εἶναι δοκεῖ τέρας διὰ τὸ καὶ τὸ παρὰ φύσιν εἶναι τρόπον τινὰ κατὰ φύσιν, ὅταν μὴ κρατήσῃ τὴν κατὰ τὴν ὕλην ἡ κατὰ τὸ εἶδος φύσις.

See Mansion, *Introd.* pp. 114-116.

Matter a limiting element in nature

c. Generally speaking, matter sets bounds to the possibility of production of nature; for not every matter can adopt every determination.

Metaph. H 4, 1044 a^{17}:

Ἔστι τις οἰκεία — sc. ὕλη — ἑκάστου.

Form parallel to matter

497—Form is used in parallel senses to matter.

Now, "matter" is sometimes used by Ar. to indicate the corporeal object, as our senses can grasp it. Form, then, is *the intelligible type*, which is, opposite to the sensible substratum, the determining element in the order of knowledge.

the essence

Form, therefore, is *the essence*. Ar. often speaks of it with the terms τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι, οὐσία and λόγος (notion, definition). Cp. the passage about the four causes (**493**).

a. Cf. *Metaph.* Δ 2, 1013 a^{26}:

Τὸ εἶδος καὶ τὸ παράδειγμα, τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶν ὁ λόγος τοῦ τί ἦν εἶναι καὶ τὰ τούτου γένη etc.

Exactly the same words as in *Phys.* II 3.

b. *De gen. et corr.* II 9, 335 b^{6}:

ἡ μορφὴ καὶ τὸ εἶδος· τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶν ὁ λόγος ὁ τῆς ἑκάστου οὐσίας.

In general μορφή indicates a visible form, εἶδος an intelligible form or structure·

498—a. *Nature acts for the sake of an end, and it is itself an end.* **teleology** This is Ar.'s main thesis as to his doctrine on nature.

Phys. II 2, 194 a[28]:

Ἡ δὲ φύσις τέλος καὶ οὗ ἕνεκα.

This view of nature is closely connected with that of Plato in *Nom.* X and is directed against pre-socratic materialism, especially against Empedocles' doctrine on the forming of organisms (our nr. **111a-d**).

b. Not every thing can claim to be an end, but only that which is best. We saw this in **490b** (194 a[32]: Βούλεται γὰρ οὐ πᾶν εἶναι τὸ ἔσχατον τέλος, ἀλλὰ τὸ βέλτιστον). **The end is what is best**

Again in *Phys.* II 3, 195 a[23-25]:

Τὰ δ' ὡς τὸ τέλος καὶ τἀγαθὸν τῶν ἄλλων (sc. αἴτιά ἐστιν)· τὸ γὰρ οὗ ἕνεκα βέλτιστον καὶ τέλος τῶν ἄλλων ἐθέλει εἶναι.

The same in *Metaph.* Δ 2, 1013 b[25-27].

c. An ἀγαθόν is to Ar. always a certain plenitude of being, never a non-being. **always a plenitude of being**

De gen. et corr. II 10, 336 b[28-29]:

Βέλτιον τὸ εἶναι τοῦ μὴ εἶναι.

d. Hence a being never can strive after its own extinction, nature striving always for "what is best", i.e. a fuller development. Ar. therefore finds fault with Platonism, which would lead up to the impossible consequence that "the contrary would strive after its own extinction". **never non-being**

Phys. I 9, 192 a[19-20]:

Τοῖς δὲ (sc. Πλατωνικοῖς) συμβαίνει τὸ ἐναντίον ὀρέγεσθαι τῆς ἑαυτοῦ φθορᾶς.

e. Passing-away of individuals should be positively valued, as keeping up the universal order. **Positive value of passing-away**

De gen. et corr. II 10, 336 b[10]:

— ἐν ἴσῳ χρόνῳ καὶ ἡ φθορὰ καὶ ἡ γένεσις ἡ κατὰ φύσιν.

"The natural processes of passing-away and coming-to-be occupy equal periods of time" (Joachim).

499—Ar. gives four arguments for the finality of nature. **First argument for finality**

a. The first stands against Empedocles' theory of the forming of organisms. Ar. argues: natural facts happen regularly; but what happens regularly, cannot be ascribed to chance.

Phys. II 8, 198 b^{35}-199 a^{8}:

Πάντα τὰ φύσει ἢ ἀεὶ οὕτω γίνεται ἢ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ, τῶν δ' ἀπὸ τύχης καὶ τοῦ αὐτομάτου οὐδέν. Οὐ γὰρ ἀπὸ τύχης οὐδ' ἀπὸ συμπτώματος δοκεῖ ὗειν 199 a πολλάκις τοῦ χειμῶνος, ἀλλ' ἐὰν ὑπὸ κύνα· οὐδὲ καύματα ὑπὸ κύνα, ἀλλ' ἂν χειμῶνος. Εἰ οὖν ἢ ὡς ἀπὸ συμπτώματος δοκεῖ ἢ ἕνεκά του εἶναι, εἰ μὴ οἷόν τε ταῦτ' εἶναι μήτε ἀπὸ συμπτώματος μήτ' ἀπὸ ταὐτομάτου, ἕνεκά του ἂν 5 εἴη. Ἀλλὰ μὴν φύσει γ' ἐστὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα πάντα [1], ὡς κἂν αὐτοὶ φαῖεν οἱ ταῦτα λέγοντες. Ἔστιν ἄρα τὸ ἕνεκά του ἐν τοῖς φύσει γινομένοις καὶ οὖσιν.

Second argument

b. Ib., 199 a$^{8-15}$:

Ἔτι ἐν ὅσοις τέλος ἐστί τι, τούτου ἕνεκα πράττεται τὸ πρότερον καὶ τὸ ἐφεξῆς. Οὐκοῦν ὡς πράττεται, οὕτω πέφυκε, καὶ ὡς πέφυκεν, οὕτω πράττεται 10 ἕκαστον, ἂν μή τι ἐμποδίζῃ. Πράττεται δ' ἕνεκά του· καὶ πέφυκεν ἄρα τούτου ἕνεκα. Οἷον εἰ οἰκία τῶν φύσει γινομένων ἦν, οὕτως ἂν ἐγίνετο ὡς νῦν ὑπὸ τῆς τέχνης· εἰ δὲ τὰ φύσει μὴ μόνον φύσει ἀλλὰ καὶ τέχνῃ γίγνοιτο, ὡσαύτως ἂν γίνοιτο ᾗ πέφυκεν. Ἕνεκα ἄρα θατέρου θάτερον. 15

Mansion paraphrases lines 8-12 as follows.

"With all things that have a final term which is their completion, the development leading to that final term is the result of an action which aims at that term as an end. With a natural action, however, corresponds a natural agens, and the nature of this agens shows itself in the character of the development. Therefore, if the development aims at an end, then the nature which is its agens, does too".

Third argument

c. Ib., 199 a$^{15-20}$:

Ὅλως τε ἡ τέχνη τὰ μὲν ἐπιτελεῖ ἃ ἡ φύσις ἀδυνατεῖ ἀπεργάσασθαι, τὰ δὲ μιμεῖται. Εἰ οὖν τὰ κατὰ τὴν τέχνην ἕνεκά του, δῆλον ὅτι καὶ τὰ κατὰ τὴν φύσιν· ὁμοίως γὰρ ἔχει πρὸς ἄλληλα ἐν τοῖς κατὰ τέχνην καὶ ἐν τοῖς κατὰ φύσιν τὰ ὕστερα πρὸς τὰ πρότερα.

Fourth argument

d. Ib., 199 a$^{20-30}$:

Μάλιστα δὲ φανερὸν ἐπὶ τῶν ζῴων τῶν ἄλλων, ἃ οὔτε τέχνῃ οὔτε ζητήσαντα οὔτε βουλευσάμενα ποιεῖ· ὅθεν διαποροῦσί τινες πότερον νῷ ἢ τινι ἄλλῳ ἐργάζονται οἵ τ' ἀράχναι καὶ οἱ μύρμηκες καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα. Κατὰ μικρὸν δ' οὕτω προϊόντι καὶ ἐν τοῖς φυτοῖς φαίνεται τὰ συμφέροντα γινόμενα πρὸς τὸ τέλος, οἷον τὰ φύλλα τῆς τοῦ καρποῦ ἕνεκα σκέπης. Ὥστ' εἰ φύσει τε ποιεῖ καὶ ἕνεκά 25 του ἡ χελιδὼν τὴν νεοττιὰν καὶ ὁ ἀράχνης τὸ ἀράχνιον, καὶ τὰ φυτὰ τὰ φύλλα

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[1] τὰ τοιαῦτα πάντα - e.g. teeth (mentioned in the preceding passage) and other parts of the body, which seem manifestly to have been made for some special use.

ἕνεκα τῶν καρπῶν καὶ τὰς ῥίζας οὐκ ἄνω ἀλλὰ κάτω ἕνεκα τῆς τροφῆς, φανερὸν ὅτι ἔστιν ἡ αἰτία ἡ τοιαύτη ἐν τοῖς φύσει γινομένοις καὶ οὖσιν.

Finality is impersonal according to Ar.

Mansion remarks: It might seem from the third argument, that Ar. conceives of nature, on the analogy of art, as a deliberating and consciously acting being. If this were true, Ar.'s teleology would be anthropomorphist, as it is usually thought to be by modern critics. That it is not so, appears from the fourth argument: to Ar. finality implies neither deliberation nor intelligence. The cosmic order is *intelligible*, but *impersonal*. There is in nature *a coordination of certain activities and certain essences*, in such a manner, that those forms of activity assure to each species a regular development, repeated in innumerable individuals. This, and nothing else, appears to be the meaning of Ar.'s teleological explanation of nature.

Nature often represented by Ar. as an intelligent being

500—Nevertheless, a great number of passages might be cited in which Ar. speaks of nature as of an intelligent and consciously acting being [1]. We give some instances.

a. *De gen. anim.* II 6, 744 b[16]:

Ὥσπερ γὰρ οἰκονόμος ἀγαθός, καὶ ἡ φύσις οὐθὲν ἀποβάλλειν εἴωθεν ἐξ ὧν ἔστι ποιῆσαί τι χρηστόν.

b. *De part. anim.* IV 10, 686 a[20-24]:

Τοῖς μὲν οὖν ἄλλοις ἐστὶ καμπτὸς καὶ σφονδύλους ἔχων [2], οἱ δὲ λύκοι καὶ λέοντες μονόστουν τὸν αὐχένα ἔχουσιν· ἔβλεψε γὰρ ἡ φύσις ὅπως πρὸς τὴν ἰσχὺν χρήσιμον αὐτὸν ἔχωσι μᾶλλον ἢ πρὸς τὰς ἄλλας βοηθείας.

c. Ib., III 8, 670 b[33]-671 a[9]:

Κύστιν δ' οὐ πάντ' ἔχει τὰ ζῷα, ἀλλ' ἔοικεν ἡ φύσις βουλομένη ἀποδιδόναι
a τοῖς ἔχουσι τὸν πλεύμονα ἔναιμον μόνον, τούτοις δ' εὐλόγως. διὰ γὰρ τὴν ὑπεροχὴν τῆς φύσεως, ἣν ἔχουσιν ἐν τῷ μορίῳ τούτῳ, διψητικά τε ταῦτ' ἐστὶ μάλιστα τῶν ζῴων, καὶ δεῖται τροφῆς οὐ μόνον τῆς ξηρᾶς ἀλλὰ καὶ τῆς ὑγρᾶς
5 πλείονος, ὥστ' ἐξ ἀνάγκης καὶ περίττωμα γίνεσθαι πλεῖον καὶ μὴ τοσοῦτον μόνον ὅσον ὑπὸ τῆς κοιλίας πέττεσθαι καὶ ἐκκρίνεσθαι μετὰ τοῦ ταύτης περιττώματος. ἀνάγκη τοίνυν εἶναί τι δεκτικὸν καὶ τούτου τοῦ περιττώματος. διόπερ ὅσα πλεύμονα ἔχει τοιοῦτον, ἅπαντ' ἔχει κύστιν.

d. Ib., IV 5, 682 a[6-8].

Ar. is speaking here about insects which continue to live after they have been

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[1] Mansion, p. 261, notes 31-36, cites 20 passages, and in addition the whole treatise on *The Parts of Animals*.

[2] Sc. αὐχήν.

cut into pieces. The reason of this is, he says, that in such insects as have long bodies the central organ, which is the seat ot perception, consists of several parts.

Βούλεται μὲν γὰρ ἡ φύσις ἐν πᾶσι μόνον ἓν ποιεῖν τὸ τοιοῦτον [1], οὐ δυναμένη δ' ἐνεργείᾳ ποιεῖ μόνον ἕν, δυνάμει δὲ πλείω· δῆλον δ' ἐν ἑτέροις ἑτέρων μᾶλλον.

e. *De gen. anim.* III 2, 753 a$^{7-11}$:

Ἔοικε δὲ καὶ ἡ φύσις βούλεσθαι τὴν τῶν τέκνων αἴσθησιν ἐπιμελητικὴν [2] παρασκευάζειν· ἀλλὰ τοῖς μὲν χείροσι τοῦτ' ἐμποιεῖ μέχρι τοῦ τεκεῖν μόνον, τοῖς δὲ καὶ περὶ τὴν τελέωσιν, ὅσα δὲ φρονιμώτερα, καὶ περὶ τὴν ἐκτροφήν.

f. Ib., IV 10, 778 a$^{4-9}$.

In the preceding lines the author has spoken about the influence of the so-called natural periods (day and night, month and year) on the generation of living beings. He continues:

Βούλεται μὲν οὖν ἡ φύσις τοῖς τούτων ἀριθμοῖς [3] ἀριθμεῖν τὰς γενέσεις καὶ τὰς τελευτάς, οὐκ ἀκριβοῖ δὲ [4] διά τε τὴν τῆς ὕλης ἀοριστίαν καὶ διὰ τὸ γίνεσθαι πολλὰς ἀρχάς, αἳ τὰς γενέσεις τὰς κατὰ φύσιν καὶ τὰς φθορὰς ἐμποδίζουσαι πολλάκις αἴτιαι τῶν παρὰ φύσιν συμπιπτόντων εἰσίν.

Cp. *Phys.* II 8, 994 b^{4}: καὶ τὰ τέρατα ἁμαρτήματα ἐκείνου τοῦ ἕνεκά του.

How to explain this

501—How, then, to explain this?—

Mansion [5] answers,—and we think he is right—: The theory, expounded in *Phys.* II, is not anthropomorphistic, the application is. However, as all those passages are of a later date than *Phys.* II, so that it is not possible to explain them as expressing a more primitive stage in the thought of Ar., while, on the other hand, the author passes extremely severe judgment on Plato in the *Tim.*, we must conclude that the anthropomorphistic version is with Ar. rather a form of expression, which should not be taken too literally.

Cp. *De caelo* II 9, 291 a^{24}:

— ὥσπερ τὸ μέλλον ἔσεσθαι προνοούσης τῆς φύσεως.

"*As if* nature foresaw the consequences".—Here it is explicitly indicated, that we have only to do with an image. Wherever, then, the ὥσπερ has not been added, we have yet to understand this kind of expressions metaphorically.

To this, M. adds the argument that anthropomorphistic expressions are especially numerous in the fragments of Ar.'s literary works (those of II. φιλ. in *De caelo*).

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[1] The said organ.
[2] τὴν τῶν τέκνων αἴσθησιν ἐπιμελητικήν - a special sense of care for their young.
[3] "by the measure of these periods".
[4] "but she does not bring this to pass accurately".
[5] *Introd.*, p. 262-263.

Many instances of the same metaphorical use might be adduced from modern writers, and this not in popular works only.

Cp. in Bergson's *Evolution créatrice* the frequent use of terms like "nature has to triumph over resistances"; she "finds" or "tries different solutions for the same problem" [1]; she "operates not in this, but in that way" [2]; etc.

502—*De caelo* I 4, 271 a[33]: **'God and nature" in *De caelo* I**

Ὁ δὲ θεὸς καὶ ἡ φύσις οὐδὲν μάτην ποιοῦσι.

"God and nature"—almost as synonyms. What does this mean? Mansion answers: Not much, or rather *nothing*. It is just an expression, a metaphor. For it does not harmonize at all with Ar.'s conception of God in his scientific treatises on this subject (see § 5 of this chapter).

Now, certainly, M. is right. Only, when we remember that in the dialogue II. φιλ. the aspect of our visible world and of cosmic order seemed to Ar. a proof for the existence of gods [3], it might become clear to us that the author of *De caelo* I, which is of an early date, still adhered to, or at least was not far away from, Plato's religious conviction that a god or a divine Mind must have created the order of the sensible world. We can imagine that, only a few years later, the same author detached himself from this conviction.

503—Chapters 4-6 deal with chance and spontaneity (τύχη and αὐτόματον), which are generally considered as causes of many things in nature.

First, they are said to be neither the cause of things which always come to pass in the same way, nor of those which mostly do so.

The next distinction made by Ar. is that between things which happen τινὸς ἕνεκα and others which do not. Chance and spontaneity occur in the first group. We cite the text.

a. *Phys.* II 5, 196 b[17-32]: **Τύχη and αὐτόματον**

Τῶν δὲ γινομένων τὰ μὲν ἕνεκά του γίγνεται, τὰ δ' οὔ· τούτων δὲ τὰ μὲν κατὰ προαίρεσιν, τὰ δ' οὐ κατὰ προαίρεσιν, ἄμφω δ' ἐν τοῖς ἕνεκά του, ὥστε δῆλον ὅτι καὶ ἐν τοῖς παρὰ τὸ ἀναγκαῖον καὶ τὸ ὡς ἐπὶ πολὺ ἔστιν ἕνια περὶ ἃ ἐνδέχεται ὑπάρχειν τὸ ἕνεκά του. Ἔστι δ' ἕνεκά του ὅσα τε ἀπὸ διανοίας ἂν πραχθείη καὶ ὅσα ἀπὸ φύσεως.

Τὰ δὴ τοιαῦτα ὅταν κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς γένηται, ἀπὸ τύχης φαμὲν εἶναι. Ὥσπερ γὰρ καὶ ὄν ἐστι τὸ μὲν καθ' αὑτὸ τὸ δὲ κατὰ συμβεβηκός, οὕτω καὶ αἴτιον ἐνδέχεται εἶναι, οἷον οἰκίας καθ' αὑτὸ μὲν αἴτιον τὸ οἰκοδομικόν, κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς δὲ τὸ λευκὸν ἢ τὸ μουσικόν. Τὸ μὲν οὖν καθ' αὑτὸ αἴτιον ὡρισμένον, τὸ δὲ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς ἀόριστον· ἄπειρα γὰρ ἂν τῷ ἑνὶ συμβαίη.

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[1] Reason (in man) and instinct (in animals) are, according to Bergson, "different solutions for the same problem".

[2] Not by composition or construction, like a human artisan, but by division. The "method" of nature is put in opposition to the method of man. Yet, nature "operates" after some intelligible method!

[3] Our nr. **427**.

Καθάπερ οὖν ἐλέχθη, ὅταν ἐν τοῖς ἕνεκά του γιγνομένοις τοῦτο γένηται, τότε λέγεται ἀπὸ ταὐτομάτου καὶ ἀπὸ τύχης. Αὐτῶν δὲ πρὸς ἄλληλα τὴν διαφορὰν τούτων ὕστερον διοριστέον.

So both chance and spontaneity are in the sphere of things which happen ἕνεκά του. I.e.: chance is not against the finality of nature; it is subordinate to it, being an accidental cause.

Instance

b. Ib., 196 b[33]-197 a[3]: an instance of chance.

Οἷον ἕνεκα τοῦ ἀπολαβεῖν τὸ ἀργύριον ἦλθεν ἄν, κομιζομένου τὸν ἔρανον, εἰ ἤδει [1]· ἦλθε δ' οὐ τούτου ἕνεκα, ἀλλὰ συνέβη αὐτῷ ἐλθεῖν, καὶ ποιῆσαι τοῦτο τοῦ κομίσασθαι ἕνεκα [2]· τοῦτο δὲ οὔθ' ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ φοιτῶν εἰς τὸ χωρίον οὔτ' ἐξ ἀνάγκης· ἔστι δὲ τὸ τέλος, ἡ κομιδή, οὐ τῶν ἐν αὐτῷ αἰτίων, ἀλλὰ τῶν προαιρετῶν καὶ ἀπὸ διανοίας· καὶ λέγεταί γε τότε ἀπὸ τύχης ἐλθεῖν.

Definition of chance

c. Ib., 197 a[5-6]:

Δῆλον ἄρα ὅτι ἡ τύχη αἰτία κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς ἐν τοῖς κατὰ προαίρεσιν τῶν ἕνεκά του.

Automaton a larger notion than tychè

504—a. *Phys.* II 6, 197 a[36]-b [8]; b[13-18]:

Διαφέρει δ' ὅτι τὸ αὐτόματον ἐπὶ πλεῖόν ἐστι· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἀπὸ τύχης πᾶν ἀπὸ ταὐτομάτου, τοῦτο δ' οὐ πᾶν ἀπὸ τύχης. Ἡ μὲν γὰρ τύχη καὶ τὸ ἀπὸ 197 b τύχης ἐστὶν ὅσοις καὶ τὸ εὐτυχῆσαι ἂν ὑπάρξειεν καὶ ὅλως πρᾶξις. Διὸ καὶ ἀνάγκη περὶ τὰ πρακτὰ εἶναι τὴν τύχην· σημεῖον δ' ὅτι δοκεῖ ἤτοι ταὐτὸν εἶναι τῇ εὐδαιμονίᾳ ἡ εὐτυχία ἢ ἐγγύς, ἡ δ' εὐδαιμονία πρᾶξίς τις· εὐπραξία γὰρ. 5 Ὥσθ' ὁπόσοις μὴ ἐνδέχεται πρᾶξαι, οὐδὲ τὸ ἀπὸ τύχης τι ποιῆσαι. Καὶ διὰ τοῦτο οὔτε ἄψυχον οὐδὲν οὔτε θηρίον οὔτε παιδίον οὐδὲν ποιεῖ ἀπὸ τύχης, ὅτι οὐκ ἔχει προαίρεσιν· —

Τὸ δ' αὐτόματον καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ζῴοις καὶ πολλοῖς τῶν ἀψύχων, οἷον ὁ ἵππος αὐτόματος, φαμέν, ἦλθεν, ὅτι ἐσώθη μὲν ἐλθών, οὐ τοῦ σωθῆναι δὲ 15 ἕνεκα ἦλθεν. Καὶ ὁ τρίπους αὐτόματος κατέπεσεν· ἔστη μὲν γὰρ τοῦ καθῆσθαι ἕνεκα, ἀλλ' οὐ τοῦ καθῆσθαι ἕνεκα κατέπεσεν.

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[1] If the reading κομιζομένου is right, we must render: "A man gets back his money from his debtor who (at the very moment the other enters the market) is receiving contributions for a feast. He could have gone to the spot for the purpose of getting back his money, but"—etc.

[2] If the words τοῦ κομίσασθαι ἕνεκα must be kept here, it is necessary to put a comma after ἐλθεῖν: "But he went for some other reason, and now, (in fact), he has done it for the sake of receiving his money".—The expression of this idea might seem to us rather strange. Bonitz simply ejected τοῦ κομίσασθαι ἕνεκα, and this might appear to the modern reader a highly attractive solution. Yet, I do think it possible that Ar. wrote these words. Cf. 197 b[17] (our next nr.), where he says of the tripod that it "came to stand there so as to serve for a seat", though it did not fall for that use.

b. Ib., 197 b$^{18-22}$: **Definition**

Ὥστε φανερὸν ὅτι ἐν τοῖς ἁπλῶς ἕνεκά του γινομένοις, ὅταν μὴ τοῦ συμβάντος ἕνεκα γένηται οὗ ἔξω τὸ αἴτιον, τότε ἀπὸ ταὐτομάτου λέγομεν· ἀπὸ τύχης δέ, τούτων ὅσα ἀπὸ ταὐτομάτου γίνεται τῶν προαιρετῶν τοῖς ἔχουσι προαίρεσιν.

505—Finally, is necessity in nature absolute, or is it hypothetic?— Ar. answers: the material cause is ὧν οὐκ ἄνευ, but the final cause is the real and decisive cause. **Necessity in nature**

a. *Phys.* II 9, 199 b^{34}-200 a^{10}:

Τὸ δ' ἐξ ἀνάγκης πότερον ἐξ ὑποθέσεως ὑπάρχει ἢ καὶ ἁπλῶς; νῦν μὲν
200 a γὰρ οἴονται τὸ ἐξ ἀνάγκης εἶναι ἐν τῇ γενέσει, ὥσπερ ἂν εἴ τις τὸν τοῖχον ἐξ ἀνάγκης γεγενῆσθαι νομίζοι, ὅτι τὰ μὲν βαρέα κάτω πέφυκε φέρεσθαι τὰ δὲ κοῦφα ἐπιπολῆς, διὸ οἱ λίθοι μὲν κάτω καὶ τὰ θεμέλια, ἡ δὲ γῆ ἄνω διὰ κουφότητα, ἐπιπολῆς δὲ μάλιστα τὰ ξύλα· κουφότατα γάρ.
5 Ἀλλ' ὅμως οὐκ ἄνευ μὲν τούτων γέγονεν, οὐ μέντοι διὰ ταῦτα πλὴν ὡς δι' ὕλην, ἀλλ' ἕνεκα τοῦ κρύπτειν ἅττα καὶ σώζειν. Ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις πᾶσιν, ἐν ὅσοις τὸ ἕνεκά του ἐστίν, οὐκ ἄνευ μὲν τῶν ἀναγκαίαν ἐχόντων τὴν
10 φύσιν, οὐ μέντοι γε διὰ ταῦτα ἀλλ' ἢ ὡς ὕλην, ἀλλ' ἕνεκά του.

b. Ib., 200 a$^{30-34}$:

Φανερὸν δὴ ὅτι τὸ ἀναγκαῖον ἐν τοῖς φυσικοῖς τὸ ὡς ὕλη λεγόμενον καὶ αἱ κινήσεις αἱ ταύτης. Καὶ ἄμφω μὲν τῷ φυσικῷ λεκτέαι αἱ αἰτίαι, μᾶλλον δὲ ἡ τινὸς ἕνεκα· αἴτιον γὰρ τοῦτο τῆς ὕλης, ἀλλ' οὐχ αὕτη τοῦ τέλους.

Mansion [1] concludes: Finality, then, is according to Ar. the normal rule of nature, a necessity of an intelligible character. What is not governed by this law is what we call contingent, and is ascribed to accidental causes. But Ar. is not so much interested in the accidental and contingent as in the regular order of normal phaenomena, by which the universe is sustained in that being which is its agathon.

4—DEFINITIONS OF MOTION, SPACE AND TIME

506—Ar. now tries to define motion. The definition is preceded by some preliminary remarks. **Motion**

a. *Phys.* III 1, 200 b$^{16-21}$:

Δοκεῖ δ' ἡ κίνησις εἶναι τῶν συνεχῶν, τὸ δ' ἄπειρον ἐμφαίνεται πρῶτον ἐν τῷ συνεχεῖ· διὸ καὶ τοῖς ὁριζομένοις τὸ συνεχὲς συμβαίνει προσχρήσασθαι πολλάκις τῷ λόγῳ τῷ τοῦ ἀπείρου, ὡς τὸ εἰς ἄπειρον διαιρετὸν συνεχὲς ὄν. Πρὸς δὲ τούτοις ἄνευ τόπου καὶ κενοῦ καὶ χρόνου κίνησιν ἀδύνατον εἶναι.

[1] *Introd.*, p. 327.

b. Ib., b[26-28]:

Ἔστι δὴ [τι] τὸ μὲν ἐντελεχείᾳ μόνον [1], τὸ δὲ δυνάμει καὶ ἐντελεχείᾳ, τὸ μὲν τόδε τι, τὸ δὲ τοσόνδε, τὸ δὲ τοιόνδε, καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν τοῦ ὄντος κατηγοριῶν ὁμοίως.

Definition

c. Ib., 201 a[10-11]:

ἡ τοῦ δυνάμει ὄντος ἐντελέχεια, ἢ τοιοῦτον, κίνησίς ἐστιν.

the definition explained

d. Ib., 201 a[11-15]:

Οἷον τοῦ μὲν ἀλλοιωτοῦ, ἢ ἀλλοιωτόν, ἀλλοίωσις, τοῦ δὲ αὐξητοῦ καὶ τοῦ ἀντικειμένου φθιτοῦ (οὐδὲν γὰρ ὄνομα κοινὸν ἐπ' ἀμφοῖν) αὔξησις καὶ φθίσις, τοῦ δὲ γενητοῦ καὶ φθαρτοῦ γένεσις καὶ φθορά, τοῦ δὲ φορητοῦ φορά.

E.g.: something is actually x (stones, wood and mortar), potentially y (a house). Now motion is: actualizing the y-ness (the building of the house).

Space

507—a. *Phys.* IV 4, 212 a[21-22]: definition.

τὸ τοῦ περιέχοντος πέρας ἀκίνητον πρῶτον, τοῦτ' ἔστιν ὁ τόπος.

Space is motionless

b. Ib., 212 a[14-20]:

Ἔστι δ' ὥσπερ τὸ ἀγγεῖον τόπος μεταφορητός, οὕτω καὶ ὁ τόπος ἀγγεῖον ἀμετακίνητον. Διὸ ὅταν μὲν ἐν κινουμένῳ τι κινῆται καὶ μεταβάλλῃ τὸ ἐντός, οἷον ἐν ποταμῷ πλοῖον, ὡς ἀγγείῳ χρῆται μᾶλλον ἢ τόπῳ τῷ περιέχοντι. Βούλεται δ' ἀκίνητος εἶναι ὁ τόπος· διὸ ὁ πᾶς μᾶλλον ποταμὸς τόπος, ὅτι ἀκίνητος ὁ πᾶς.

Time

508—Preliminary remarks on time.

a. Time has to do with motion, but it is not motion.

Phys. IV 10, 218 b[9-18]:

not = motion

Ἐπεὶ δὲ δοκεῖ μάλιστα κίνησις εἶναι καὶ μεταβολή τις ὁ χρόνος, τοῦτ' ἂν εἴη σκεπτέον. Ἡ μὲν οὖν ἑκάστου μεταβολὴ καὶ κίνησις ἐν αὐτῷ τῷ μεταβάλλοντι μόνον ἐστίν, ἢ οὗ ἂν τύχῃ ὂν αὐτὸ τὸ κινούμενον καὶ μεταβάλλον· ὁ δὲ χρόνος ὁμοίως καὶ πανταχοῦ καὶ παρὰ πᾶσιν. Ἔτι δὲ μεταβολὴ μέν ἐστι πᾶσα θάττων καὶ βραδυτέρα, χρόνος δ' οὐκ ἔστιν· τὸ γὰρ βραδὺ καὶ ταχὺ χρόνῳ ὥρισται, ταχὺ μὲν τὸ ἐν ὀλίγῳ πολὺ κινούμενον, βραδὺ δὲ τὸ ἐν πολλῷ ὀλίγον· ὁ δὲ χρόνος οὐχ ὥρισται χρόνῳ, οὔτε τῷ ποσός τις εἶναι οὔτε τῷ ποιός. Ὅτι μὲν τοίνυν οὐκ ἔστι κίνησις, φανερόν.

[1] τι is bracketed by Ross; Spengel, Bonitz and Prantl inserted τὸ δὲ δυνάμει after μόνον, a correction which has been adopted by Hardie in his translation.

b. Ib. 11, 218 b[21-23]: **yet not without change**

'Αλλὰ μὴν οὐδ' ἄνευ γε μεταβολῆς· ὅταν γὰρ μηδὲν αὐτοὶ μεταβάλλωμεν τὴν διάνοιαν ἢ λάθωμεν μεταβάλλοντες, οὐ δοκεῖ ἡμῖν γεγονέναι χρόνος.

509—a. Time, then, appears to be a certain aspect of motion. Ib., 219 a[2-4]: **Time an aspect of motion**

Ληπτέον δέ, ἐπεὶ ζητοῦμεν τί ἐστιν ὁ χρόνος, ἐντεῦθεν ἀρχομένοις, τί τῆς κινήσεώς ἐστιν. Ἅμα γὰρ κινήσεως αἰσθανόμεθα καὶ χρόνου.

b. Ib., 219 a[10-14]: **Motion goes with magnitude**

Ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ κινούμενον κινεῖται ἔκ τινος εἴς τι καὶ πᾶν μέγεθος συνεχές, ἀκολουθεῖ τῷ μεγέθει ἡ κίνησις· διὰ γὰρ τὸ τὸ μέγεθος εἶναι συνεχὲς καὶ ἡ κίνησίς ἐστι συνεχής, διὰ δὲ τὴν κίνησιν ὁ χρόνος· ὅση γὰρ ἡ κίνησις, τοσοῦτος καὶ ὁ χρόνος ἀεὶ δοκεῖ γεγονέναι.

c. Ib., 219 a[14-21]: **πρότερον and ὕστερον**

Τὸ δὲ δὴ πρότερον καὶ ὕστερον ἐν τόπῳ πρῶτόν ἐστιν. Ἐνταῦθα μὲν δὴ τῇ θέσει· ἐπεὶ δ' ἐν τῷ μεγέθει ἐστὶ τὸ πρότερον καὶ ὕστερον, ἀνάγκη καὶ ἐν κινήσει εἶναι τὸ πρότερον καὶ ὕστερον, ἀνάλογον τοῖς ἐκεῖ. Ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ ἐν χρόνῳ ἐστὶ τὸ πρότερον καὶ ὕστερον διὰ τὸ ἀκολουθεῖν ἀεὶ θατέρῳ θάτερον αὐτῶν. Ἔστι δὲ τὸ πρότερον καὶ ὕστερον ἐν τῇ κινήσει, ὃ μέν ποτε ὂν κίνησίς ἐστιν [1]· τὸ μέντοι εἶναι αὐτῷ ἕτερον καὶ οὐ κίνησις. **not identical with motion**

d. Ib., 219 a[22-25]: **Yet connected with the apprehension of time**

Ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ τὸν χρόνον γε γνωρίζομεν, ὅταν ὁρίσωμεν τὴν κίνησιν, τὸ πρότερον καὶ ὕστερον ὁρίζοντες· καὶ τότε φαμὲν γεγονέναι χρόνον, ὅταν τοῦ προτέρου καὶ ὑστέρου ἐν τῇ κινήσει αἴσθησιν λάβωμεν.

510—a. Ib., 219 b[1-2]: **Definition**

Τοῦτο γάρ ἐστιν ὁ χρόνος, ἀριθμὸς κινήσεως κατὰ τὸ πρότερον καὶ ὕστερον.

b. Ib., 219 b[5-9]: **the definition explained**

Ἐπεὶ δ' ἀριθμός ἐστι διχῶς (καὶ γὰρ τὸ ἀριθμούμενον καὶ τὸ ἀριθμητὸν ἀριθμὸν λέγομεν, καὶ ᾧ ἀριθμοῦμεν), ὁ δὲ χρόνος ἐστὶ τὸ ἀριθμούμενον καὶ οὐχ ᾧ ἀριθμοῦμεν. Ἔστι δ' ἕτερον ᾧ ἀριθμοῦμεν καὶ τὸ ἀριθμούμενον.

So time is "the countable aspect of movement". If an event comes to pass "in time", this means that it is measurable ("countable") by time.

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[1] As to its substratum it is identical with motion; yet it differs from it in essence.

Existence in time

511—a. *Phys.* IV 12, 221 a$^{4-9}$:

Καὶ ἔστι τῇ κινήσει τὸ ἐν χρόνῳ εἶναι τὸ μετρεῖσθαι τῷ χρόνῳ καὶ αὐτὴν καὶ τὸ εἶναι αὐτῆς· ἅμα γὰρ τὴν κίνησιν καὶ τὸ εἶναι τῇ κινήσει μετρεῖ, καὶ τοῦτ' ἔστι αὐτῇ τὸ ἐν χρόνῳ εἶναι, τὸ μετρεῖσθαι αὐτῆς τὸ εἶναι.

Δῆλον δ' ὅτι καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις τοῦτ' ἔστι τὸ ἐν χρόνῳ εἶναι, τὸ μετρεῖσθαι αὐτῶν τὸ εἶναι ὑπὸ τοῦ χρόνου.

Eternal things are not in time

b. Ib., 221 b$^{3-7}$:

Ὥστε φανερὸν ὅτι τὰ ἀεὶ ὄντα, ᾗ ἀεὶ ὄντα, οὐκ ἔστιν ἐν χρόνῳ· οὐ γὰρ περιέχεται ὑπὸ χρόνου, οὐδὲ μετρεῖται τὸ εἶναι αὐτῶν ὑπὸ τοῦ χρόνου· σημεῖον δὲ τούτου ὅτι οὐδὲ πάσχει οὐδὲν ὑπὸ τοῦ χρόνου ὡς οὐκ ὄντα ἐν χρόνῳ.

Rest, too, is in time

c. Ib., 221 b$^{7-12}$:

Ἐπεὶ δ' ἐστὶν ὁ χρόνος μέτρον κινήσεως, ἔσται καὶ ἠρεμίας μέτρον κατὰ συμβεβηκός· πᾶσα γὰρ ἠρεμία ἐν χρόνῳ. Οὐ γὰρ ὥσπερ τὸ ἐν κινήσει ὂν ἀνάγκη κινεῖσθαι, οὕτω καὶ τὸ ἐν χρόνῳ· οὐ γὰρ κίνησις ὁ χρόνος, ἀλλ' ἀριθμὸς κινήσεως· ἐν ἀριθμῷ δὲ κινήσεως ἐνδέχεται εἶναι καὶ τὸ ἠρεμοῦν.

Would there be time if there were no soul?

512—At the end of this book Ar. raises the important question whether there would be time if there were no soul, i.e. if there were no knowing subject which could "count" or measure. He replies by saying that, in this case, there would still be movement, which is the "substratum" of time (τοῦτο ὅ ποτε ὄν ἐστιν ὁ χρόνος), but not its measurable aspect, which is "time".

Phys. IV 14, 223 a$^{21-29}$:

Πότερον δὲ μὴ οὔσης ψυχῆς εἴη ἂν ὁ χρόνος ἢ οὔ, ἀπορήσειεν ἄν τις· ἀδυνάτου γὰρ ὄντος εἶναι τοῦ ἀριθμήσοντος ἀδύνατον καὶ ἀριθμητόν τι εἶναι, ὥστε δῆλον ὅτι οὐδ' ἀριθμός· ἀριθμὸς γὰρ ἢ τὸ ἠριθμημένον ἢ τὸ ἀριθμητόν. Εἰ δὲ μηδὲν ἄλλο πέφυκεν ἀριθμεῖν ἢ ψυχὴ καὶ ψυχῆς νοῦς, ἀδύνατον εἶναι χρόνον ψυχῆς μὴ οὔσης, ἀλλ' ἢ τοῦτο ὅ ποτε ὄν ἐστιν ὁ χρόνος, οἷον εἰ ἐνδέχεται κίνησιν εἶναι ἄνευ ψυχῆς. Τὸ δὲ πρότερον καὶ ὕστερον ἐν κινήσει ἐστίν· χρόνος δὲ ταῦτ' ἐστὶν ᾗ ἀριθμητά ἐστιν.

5—THE THEORY OF THE FIRST UNMOVED MOVER

513—Ar. starts from the fact of movement in the sensible world. Now whatever is in movement is moved by something else. There must, then, be a First Movent, which is itself unmovable. This first Movent must be eternal, because movement is eternal—and such it is, in Aristotle's opinion, necessarily. It can have no parts nor magnitude, because

in a finite magnitude resides a finite force, and this could not be the cause of eternal motion. The first Movent, then, is incorporeal.

Ar. finally argues that the first Movent must be at the circumference of the world, because here the movement is quickest and therefore nearest to the Source.

We cite the end of Ar.'s exposition, where he resumes his main argument.

the theory of the Prime Mover in *Phys.* VIII

Phys. VIII 10, 267 a[21]-b[9]:

'Επεὶ δ' ἐν τοῖς οὖσιν ἀνάγκη κίνησιν εἶναι συνεχῆ, αὕτη δὲ μία ἐστίν, ἀνάγκη δὲ τὴν μίαν μεγέθους τέ τινος εἶναι (οὐ γὰρ κινεῖται τὸ ἀμέγεθες), καὶ ἑνὸς καὶ ὑφ' ἑνός (οὐ γὰρ ἔσται συνεχής, ἀλλ' ἐχομένη ἑτέρα ἑτέρας καὶ διῃρημένη), τὸ δὴ κινοῦν εἰ ἕν, ἢ κινούμενον κινεῖ, ἢ ἀκίνητον ὄν. Εἰ μὲν δὴ κινούμενον, συνακολουθεῖν δεήσει [1] καὶ μεταβάλλειν αὐτό, ἅμα δὲ κινεῖσθαι ὑπό τινος. 267b "Ωστε στήσεται [2] καὶ ἥξει εἰς τὸ κινεῖσθαι ὑπὸ ἀκινήτου· τοῦτο γὰρ οὐκ ἀνάγκη συμμεταβάλλειν, ἀλλ' ἀεί τε δυνήσεται κινεῖν (ἄπονον γὰρ τὸ οὕτω [3] κινεῖν) καὶ ὁμαλὴς αὕτη ἡ κίνησις, ἢ μόνη ἢ μάλιστα· οὐ γὰρ ἔχει μεταβολὴν τὸ κινοῦν οὐδεμίαν. Δεῖ δὲ οὐδὲ τὸ κινούμενον πρὸς ἐκεῖνο ἔχειν μεταβολήν, ἵνα ὁμοία ᾖ ἡ κίνησις.

'Ανάγκη δὴ ἢ ἐν μέσῳ ἢ ἐν κύκλῳ εἶναι [4]· αὗται γὰρ αἱ ἀρχαί [5]. 'Αλλὰ τάχιστα κινεῖται τὰ ἐγγύτατα τοῦ κινοῦντος, τοιαύτη δ' ἡ τοῦ ὅλου κίνησις· ἐκεῖ ἄρα τὸ κινοῦν.

514—The conclusion of the preceding passage leaves us with two problems: (1) How can a non-corporeal First Movent have its place at the outside of the universe? (2) How can it impart a physical movement?

To these questions Ar. gives the answer himself in the famous words in *Metaph.* Λ 7, 1072 b[3]:

It works as a final cause

Κινεῖ δὴ ὡς ἐρώμενον.

"It produces motion as being loved" or striven after.

Now this again leaves some difficulties: (1) If there is eternal movement, i.e. circular movement, which is the first and most perfect of motions, why then a First Mover? (2) If this First Mover, whom Ar. calls God (in *Metaph.* Λ), produces motion "as being loved", than a soul must be attributed to the first heaven; and,

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[1] συνακολουθεῖν δεήσει - "it will have to be subject to the same conditions as that which it moves".

[2] "So we have a series that must come to an end".

[3] οὕτω - sc. μὴ συμμεταβάλλον.

[4] sc. τὸ κινοῦν. ἐν κύκλῳ - at the circumference.

[5] αἱ ἀρχαί - sc. the first principles from which a sphere is derived. In ch. 8 Ar. has argued that only circular movement can be continuous and infinite.

if more unmoved movers are admitted (as Ar. teaches in Λ 8), so for each heavenly sphere.

Now the first point is against logic, the second against the view of modern science.

the Prime Mover in *Metaph.* Λ

515—What Ar. says further in *Metaph.* Λ, must be seen in connection with his doctrine of matter and form and of potency and act, which is expounded in the books Z-Θ (see our next chapter). We met with these principles in *Phys.* I-II.

(1) Matter is the indefinite, form the determining. In the physical world form and matter are united in the physical objects. But form can exist by itself, not in physical, but in metaphysical reality. The highest being, which as prime cause is at the beginning of all motion, must be pure form without matter.

(2) In order to explain the fact of physical change, Ar. assumes *a potential being*. This is something real (e.g. an acorn can become an oak, never a beech), but it must be brought to full reality (ἐνέργεια or ἐντελέχεια) by an efficient cause. Therefore the definition of motion, given sub **506c**. God, then, as supreme being, must be full reality or completion, and therefore absolutely necessary.

God as the absolutely necessary being

a. *Metaph.* Λ 7, 1072 b$^{4-11}$:

Εἰ μὲν οὖν τι κινεῖται, ἐνδέχεται καὶ ἄλλως ἔχειν, ὥστ' εἰ [ἡ] φορὰ πρώτη ἡ ἐνέργειά ἐστιν, ἧ κινεῖται ταύτῃ γε ἐνδέχεται ἄλλως ἔχειν, κατὰ τόπον, καὶ εἰ μὴ κατ' οὐσίαν· ἐπεὶ δὲ ἔστι τι κινοῦν αὐτὸ ἀκίνητον ὄν, ἐνεργείᾳ ὄν, τοῦτο οὐκ ἐνδέχεται ἄλλως ἔχειν οὐδαμῶς. φορὰ γὰρ ἡ πρώτη τῶν μεταβολῶν, ταύτης δὲ ἡ κύκλῳ· ταύτην δὲ τοῦτο κινεῖ. ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἄρα ἐστὶν ὄν· καὶ ἧ ἀνάγκη, καλῶς, καὶ οὕτως ἀρχή.

b. As absolutely necessary being, then, it is the First Principle, on which the universe depends.

Ib., 1072 b$^{13-14}$:

On this principle the universe depends

Ἐκ τοιαύτης ἄρα ἀρχῆς ἤρτηται ὁ οὐρανὸς καὶ ἡ φύσις.

One might justifiably call this a monotheistic principle. We find it expressed again at the end of the same book:

c. *Metaph.* Λ 10, 1076 a$^{3-4}$.

In the preceding lines Ar. rejects the theory of Speusippus, who assumed mathematical number as first principle, instead of the Platonic Ideas and ideal Numbers. He rejects it on the ground, that by this theory a multiplicity of ἀρχαί would be introduced.

Τὰ δὲ ὄντα οὐ βούλεται πολιτεύεσθαι κακῶς.

»Οὐκ ἀγαθὸν πολυκοιρανίη· εἷς κοίρανος ἔστω«.

516—Ar. now undertakes to describe the life and character of his Prime Mover.

a. *Metaph.* Λ 7, 1072 b[14-30]: **The life of the Prime Mover**

4, 15 Διαγωγὴ δ' ἐστὶν οἵα ἡ ἀρίστη μικρὸν χρόνον ἡμῖν. οὕτω γὰρ ἀεὶ ἐκεῖνο (ἡμῖν μὲν γὰρ ἀδύνατον), ἐπεὶ καὶ ἡδονὴ ἡ ἐνέργεια τούτου (καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἐγρήγορσις αἴσθησις νόησις ἥδιστον [1], ἐλπίδες δὲ καὶ μνῆμαι διὰ ταῦτα). ἡ δὲ νόησις ἡ καθ' αὑτὴν τοῦ καθ' αὑτὸ ἀρίστου, καὶ ἡ μάλιστα τοῦ μάλιστα. 20 αὐτὸν δὲ νοεῖ ὁ νοῦς κατὰ μετάληψιν τοῦ νοητοῦ· νοητὸς γὰρ γίγνεται θιγγάνων [2] καὶ νοῶν, ὥστε ταὐτὸν νοῦς καὶ νοητόν. τὸ γὰρ δεκτικὸν τοῦ νοητοῦ καὶ τῆς οὐσίας νοῦς, ἐνεργεῖ δὲ ἔχων, ὥστ' ἐκείνου μᾶλλον τοῦτο [3] ὃ δοκεῖ ὁ νοῦς θεῖον ἔχειν, καὶ ἡ θεωρία τὸ ἥδιστον καὶ ἄριστον. εἰ οὖν οὕτως εὖ 25 ἔχει, ὡς ἡμεῖς ποτέ, ὁ θεὸς ἀεί, θαυμαστόν· εἰ δὲ μᾶλλον, ἔτι θαυμασιώτερον. ἔχει δὲ ὧδε. καὶ ζωὴ δέ γε ὑπάρχει· ἡ γὰρ νοῦ ἐνέργεια ζωή [4], ἐκεῖνος δὲ ἡ ἐνέργεια· ἐνέργεια δὲ ἡ καθ' αὑτὴν ἐκείνου ζωὴ ἀρίστη καὶ ἀΐδιος. φαμὲν δὴ τὸν θεὸν εἶναι ζῷον ἀΐδιον ἄριστον, ὥστε ζωὴ καὶ αἰὼν συνεχὴς καὶ 30 ἀΐδιος ὑπάρχει τῷ θεῷ· τοῦτο γὰρ ὁ θεός.

If the question is asked: what is the relation of this God of Ar. to the world, our answer must be: Certainly not that of Creator to creation. First, Ar. assumes eternal matter; so he does not know creation in the biblical sense of the word. Secondly, his God does not know the world. He only knows Himself, and to Ar. this knowledge does not include any knowledge of the world [5]; on the contrary, it excludes it.

b. Cp. *Metaph.* Λ 9, 1074 b[33-35]: **Νόησις νοήσεως**

Αὐτὸν ἄρα νοεῖ, εἴπερ ἐστὶ τὸ κράτιστον, καὶ ἔστιν ἡ νόησις νοήσεως νόησις.

theory of a multiplicity of unmoved movers

517—We could read chapters 7, 9 and 10 of *Metaph.* Λ as a unity, in which we find one line of thought: the establishment of the principle of the Prime Mover, who is the one ἀρχή on which depends the whole of the universe and nature.

Ch. 8 introduces a theory, which might appear to us as harmonizing rather badly with the preceding, namely, that, as there are 47 or 55 celestial spheres, for each of them an unmoved mover should be assumed.

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[1] On the value of knowledge and perception in itself cp. *Metaph.* A 1.

[2] θιγγάνων - in coming into contact with its objects. Cp. nr. **559b** (*Metaph.* Θ 10, 1051 b 24 f.).

[3] τοῦτο - the actual possession of its object is rather the θεῖον which thought seems to contain in itself, than "that" (ἐκείνου),—sc. than the mere δεκτικὸν εἶναι τοῦ νοητοῦ.

[4] These words have been chosen by Werner Jaeger as a motto for his *Aristotle*.

[5] S. Thomas Aquinas, who explained Ar. with great benevolence, found the way to a larger interpretation: directly the divine Mind knows only itself, but in Himself God knows all things. ("Nec sequitur quod omnia alia a se ei sunt ignota; nam intelligendo se intellegit omnia alia.") So also in Brentano, who christianizes Ar. even far more than S. Thomas did.

a. *Metaph.* Λ 8, 1073 a$^{14-15}$; a^{23}-b^{1}:

Πότερον δὲ μίαν θετέον τὴν τοιαύτην οὐσίαν ἢ πλείους, καὶ πόσας, δεῖ μὴ λανθάνειν [1]. —

Ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἀρχὴ καὶ τὸ πρῶτον τῶν ὄντων ἀκίνητον καὶ καθ' αὑτὸ καὶ κατὰ συμβεβηκός, κινοῦν δὲ τὴν πρώτην ἀΐδιον καὶ μίαν κίνησιν· ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ κινούμενον ἀνάγκη ὑπό τινος κινεῖσθαι, καὶ τὸ πρῶτον κινοῦν ἀκίνητον εἶναι καθ' αὑτό, καὶ τὴν ἀΐδιον κίνησιν ὑπὸ ἀϊδίου κινεῖσθαι καὶ τὴν μίαν ὑφ' ἑνός, ὁρῶμεν δὲ παρὰ τὴν τοῦ παντὸς τὴν ἁπλῆν φοράν, ἣν κινεῖν φαμὲν τὴν πρώτην οὐσίαν καὶ ἀκίνητον, ἄλλας φορὰς οὔσας τὰς τῶν πλανήτων ἀϊδίους (ἀΐδιον γὰρ καὶ ἄστατον τὸ κύκλῳ σῶμα· δέδεικται δ' ἐν τοῖς φυσικοῖς [1] περὶ τούτων), ἀνάγκη καὶ τούτων ἑκάστην τῶν φορῶν ὑπ' ἀκινήτου τε κινεῖσθαι καθ' αὑτὴν καὶ ἀϊδίου οὐσίας. ἥ τε γὰρ τῶν ἄστρων φύσις ἀΐδιος οὐσία τις οὖσα, καὶ τὸ κινοῦν ἀΐδιον καὶ πρότερον τοῦ κινουμένου, καὶ τὸ πρότερον οὐσίας οὐσίαν ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι. φανερὸν τοίνυν ὅτι τοσαύτας τε οὐσίας ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι τήν τε φύσιν ἀϊδίους καὶ ἀκινήτους καθ' αὑτάς, καὶ ἄνευ μεγέθους διὰ τὴν εἰρημένην αἰτίαν πρότερον.

b. The numbers of these substances, then, must be determined by astronomy.

Ib., 1073 b$^{1-8}$:

Ὅτι μὲν οὖν εἰσὶν οὐσίαι, καὶ τούτων τις πρώτη καὶ δευτέρα κατὰ τὴν αὐτὴν τάξιν ταῖς φοραῖς τῶν ἄστρων, φανερόν· τὸ δὲ πλῆθος ἤδη τῶν φορῶν ἐκ τῆς οἰκειοτάτης φιλοσοφίᾳ τῶν μαθηματικῶν ἐπιστημῶν δεῖ σκοπεῖν, ἐκ τῆς ἀστρολογίας· αὕτη γὰρ περὶ οὐσίας αἰσθητῆς μὲν ἀϊδίου δὲ ποιεῖται τὴν θεωρίαν, αἱ δ' ἄλλαι περὶ οὐδεμιᾶς οὐσίας [2], οἷον ἥ τε περὶ τοὺς ἀριθμοὺς καὶ τὴν γεωμετρίαν.

c. Astronomical calculation leads Ar. to the following result.

Ib., 1074 a$^{10-16}$:

Ὁ δὴ ἁπασῶν ἀριθμὸς τῶν τε φερουσῶν καὶ τῶν ἀνελιττουσῶν [3] ταύτας πεντήκοντά τε καὶ πέντε. εἰ δὲ τῇ σελήνῃ τε καὶ τῷ ἡλίῳ μὴ προστιθείη τις ἃς εἴπομεν κινήσεις, αἱ πᾶσαι σφαῖραι ἔσονται ἑπτά τε καὶ τεσσαράκοντα. — τὸ μὲν οὖν πλῆθος τῶν σφαιρῶν ἔστω τοσοῦτον, ὥστε καὶ τὰς οὐσίας καὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς τὰς ἀκινήτους [καὶ τὰς αἰσθητὰς] τοσαύτας εὔλογον ὑπολαβεῖν.

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[1] Cf. *Phys.* VIII 8, 9; *De caelo* I 2, II 3-8.

[2] Ar. states here without any hesitation, that mathematics have no οὐσίαι as their object. In E 1 (cited sub **487b**) the formula is by no means so categorical. Our passage, then, seems to have been written rather late, at any rate at some posterior date than E 1.

[3] ἁπασῶν - sc. τῶν σφαιρῶν, both those which move the planets and those which "roll them back", counteracting the motion of certain spheres admitted by Eudoxus and Callippus, so that the first motion is restored. Vid. Heath, *Aristarchus of Samos*, p. 217 ff.

518—This chapter [1] is generally considered as being of a later date than the rest of book Λ. Jaeger, who devotes a whole chapter to this question [2], estimates the interval at some twenty years at least; Mansion does not think it so long. **Place of this theory**

The question has been treated lately in an original way by Ph. Merlan in *Traditio* IV (1946), pp. 1-30. The author argues that Ar. was not concerned with the question of monotheism or polytheism at all; that indications for the latter might be found in *Phys.* VIII 6 and in *De caelo* I 9 [3] as well, and that *Metaph.* Λ 8 harmonizes perfectly well with its surroundings. This chapter, therefore, should not be considered as a later addition. The unmoved movers of Ar. have taken the place of the ideal Numbers of Plato, as is clearly shown in the beginning of Λ 8, where Ar. finds fault with Pl. for not having determined the number of these beings with any satisfying argument.

Metaph. Λ 8, 1073 a[14-23]:

Πότερον δὲ μίαν θετέον τὴν τοιαύτην οὐσίαν ἢ πλείους, καὶ πόσας, δεῖ μὴ λανθάνειν [4] ἀλλὰ μεμνῆσθαι καὶ τὰς τῶν ἄλλων ἀποφάσεις, ὅτι περὶ πλήθους οὐθὲν εἰρήκασιν ὅ τι καὶ σαφὲς εἰπεῖν. ἡ μὲν γὰρ περὶ τὰς ἰδέας ὑπόληψις οὐδεμίαν ἔχει σκέψιν ἰδίαν (ἀριθμοὺς γὰρ λέγουσι τὰς ἰδέας οἱ λέγοντες ἰδέας, περὶ δὲ τῶν ἀριθμῶν ὁτὲ μὲν ὡς περὶ ἀπείρων λέγουσιν ὁτὲ δὲ ὡς μέχρι τῆς δεκάδος ὡρισμένων [5]· δι' ἣν δ' αἰτίαν τοσοῦτον τὸ πλῆθος τῶν ἀριθμῶν, οὐδὲν λέγεται μετὰ σπουδῆς ἀποδεικτικῆς)· ἡμῖν δ' ἐκ τῶν ὑποκειμένων καὶ διωρισμένων λεκτέον.

Then follows the rest of the text given sub **517a**.

Now there can be little doubt that, in *Phys.* VIII too, Ar. admitted of more ἀκίνητα. But (1) this book is not of an early date, and (2) chapter 8 of *Metaph.* Λ makes the impression of a later addition. So probably Mansion is right in supposing that there is some interval between this chapter and its surroundings, but not as long a one as Jaeger thought.

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[1] Except the passage 1074 b[31-38] ("Οτι δὲ εἷς οὐρανός, φανερόν E.q.s.), which seems to be an early fragment, embedded in a chapter written rather late in Ar.'s life.

[2] *Aristotle*, p. 342-367.

[3] The reference is to 279a[19-24], where Ar. speaks of τἀκεῖ, i.e. that which is outside the heaven, as being above place and time, immutable and immovable.

[4] This part of the opening sentence has been cited above, sub **517a**.

[5] We dealt with this text in **366**.

FOURTEENTH CHAPTER

THE METAPHYSICS

1—THE OBJECT OF METAPHYSICS

519—What is the object of metaphysics (in *Metaph.* A indicated by the term σοφία)?—Ar. answers in the opening chapters of this book: Wisdom is knowledge of the first causes.

Metaph. A, 1 and 2, 980 a^{21}-983 a^{23}:

Value of knowledge

Πάντες ἄνθρωποι τοῦ εἰδέναι ὀρέγονται φύσει. σημεῖον δ' ἡ τῶν αἰσθήσεων 980 a21
ἀγάπησις· καὶ γὰρ χωρὶς τῆς χρείας ἀγαπῶνται δι' αὐτάς, καὶ μάλιστα τῶν
ἄλλων ἡ διὰ τῶν ὀμμάτων. οὐ γὰρ μόνον ἵνα πράττωμεν ἀλλὰ καὶ μηθὲν μέλλοντες
πράττειν τὸ ὁρᾶν αἱρούμεθα ἀντὶ πάντων ὡς εἰπεῖν τῶν ἄλλων. αἴτιον δ' ὅτι 25
μάλιστα ποιεῖ γνωρίζειν ἡμᾶς αὕτη τῶν αἰσθήσεων καὶ πολλὰς δηλοῖ διαφοράς.

Its genesis [1]

Φύσει μὲν οὖν αἴσθησιν ἔχοντα γίγνεται τὰ ζῷα, ἐκ δὲ ταύτης τοῖς μὲν
αὐτῶν οὐκ ἐγγίγνεται μνήμη, τοῖς δ' ἐγγίγνεται. καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ταῦτα φρονι-
μώτερα καὶ μαθητικώτερα τῶν μὴ δυναμένων μνημονεύειν ἐστί, φρόνιμα μὲν
ἄνευ τοῦ μανθάνειν ὅσα μὴ δύναται τῶν ψόφων ἀκούειν (οἷον μέλιττα κἂν εἴ
τι τοιοῦτον ἄλλο γένος ζῴων ἔστι), μανθάνει δ' ὅσα πρὸς τῇ μνήμῃ καὶ ταύτην b25
ἔχει τὴν αἴσθησιν.

Τὰ μὲν οὖν ἄλλα ταῖς φαντασίαις ζῇ καὶ ταῖς μνήμαις, ἐμπειρίας δὲ μετέχει
μικρόν· τὸ δὲ τῶν ἀνθρώπων γένος καὶ τέχνῃ καὶ λογισμοῖς. γίγνεται δ' ἐκ
τῆς μνήμης ἐμπειρία τοῖς ἀνθρώποις· αἱ γὰρ πολλαὶ μνῆμαι τοῦ αὐτοῦ πράγμα-
τος μιᾶς ἐμπειρίας δύναμιν ἀποτελοῦσιν. καὶ δοκεῖ σχεδὸν ἐπιστήμῃ καὶ 981a
τέχνῃ ὅμοιον εἶναι καὶ ἐμπειρία, ἀποβαίνει δ' ἐπιστήμη καὶ τέχνη διὰ τῆς
ἐμπειρίας τοῖς ἀνθρώποις [2]· ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἐμπειρία τέχνην ἐποίησεν, ὡς φησὶ
Πῶλος, ἡ δ' ἀπειρία τύχην. 5

Difference between experience and science

Γίγνεται δὲ τέχνη ὅταν ἐκ πολλῶν τῆς ἐμπειρίας ἐννοημάτων [3] μία καθόλου
γένηται περὶ τῶν ὁμοίων ὑπόληψις. τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἔχειν ὑπόληψιν ὅτι Καλλίᾳ
κάμνοντι τηνδὶ τὴν νόσον τοδὶ συνήνεγκε καὶ Σωκράτει καὶ καθ' ἕκαστον οὕτω

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[1] The following passage should be compared with *Anal. post.* II 19 (our nr. **465**). See also **457a.**

[2] ἀποβαίνει δὲ - τοῖς ἀνθρώποις: "but really science and art come to man *through* experience".

[3] τ. ἐμπειρίας ἐννοήματα - empirical notions.

πολλοῖς, ἐμπειρίας ἐστίν· τὸ δ' ὅτι πᾶσι τοῖς τοιοῖσδε κατ' εἶδος ἓν ἀφορισθεῖσι, κάμνουσι τηνδὶ τὴν νόσον, συνήνεγκεν, οἷον τοῖς φλεγματώδεσιν ἢ χολώδεσι [ἢ] πυρέττουσι καύσῳ, τέχνης.

Πρὸς μὲν οὖν τὸ πράττειν ἐμπειρία τέχνης οὐδὲν δοκεῖ διαφέρειν, ἀλλὰ καὶ μᾶλλον ἐπιτυγχάνουσιν[1] οἱ ἔμπειροι τῶν ἄνευ τῆς ἐμπειρίας λόγον[2] ἐχόντων (αἴτιον δ' ὅτι ἡ μὲν ἐμπειρία τῶν καθ' ἕκαστόν ἐστι γνῶσις ἡ δὲ τέχνη τῶν καθόλου, αἱ δὲ πράξεις καὶ αἱ γενέσεις πᾶσαι περὶ τὸ καθ' ἕκαστόν εἰσιν· οὐ γὰρ ἄνθρωπον ὑγιάζει ὁ ἰατρεύων ἀλλ' ἢ κατὰ συμβεβηκός, ἀλλὰ Καλλίαν ἢ Σωκράτην ἢ τῶν ἄλλων τινὰ τῶν οὕτω λεγομένων ᾧ συμβέβηκεν[3]) ἀνθρώπῳ εἶναι· ἐὰν οὖν ἄνευ τῆς ἐμπειρίας ἔχῃ τις τὸν λόγον, καὶ τὸ καθόλου μὲν γνωρίζῃ τὸ δ' ἐν τούτῳ καθ' ἕκαστον ἀγνοῇ, πολλάκις διαμαρτήσεται τῆς θεραπείας· θεραπευτὸν γὰρ τὸ καθ' ἕκαστον)· ἀλλ' ὅμως τό γε εἰδέναι καὶ τὸ ἐπαΐειν τῇ τέχνῃ τῆς ἐμπειρίας ὑπάρχειν οἰόμεθα μᾶλλον, καὶ σοφωτέρους τοὺς τεχνίτας τῶν ἐμπείρων ὑπολαμβάνομεν, ὡς κατὰ τὸ εἰδέναι μᾶλλον ἀκολουθοῦσαν τὴν σοφίαν πᾶσι· τοῦτο δ' ὅτι οἱ μὲν τὴν αἰτίαν ἴσασιν οἱ δ' οὔ. οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἔμπειροι τὸ ὅτι μὲν ἴσασι, διότι δ' οὐκ ἴσασιν· οἱ δὲ τὸ διότι καὶ τὴν αἰτίαν γνωρίζουσιν.

Science knows the causes

Διὸ καὶ τοὺς ἀρχιτέκτονας περὶ ἕκαστον τιμιωτέρους καὶ μᾶλλον εἰδέναι νομίζομεν τῶν χειροτεχνῶν καὶ σοφωτέρους, ὅτι τὰς αἰτίας τῶν ποιουμένων ἴσασιν (τοὺς δ', ὥσπερ καὶ τῶν ἀψύχων ἔνια ποιεῖ μέν, οὐκ εἰδότα δὲ ποιεῖ ἃ ποιεῖ, οἷον καίει τὸ πῦρ — τὰ μὲν οὖν ἄψυχα φύσει τινὶ ποιεῖν τούτων ἕκαστον τοὺς δὲ χειροτέχνας δι' ἔθος), ὡς οὐ κατὰ τὸ πρακτικοὺς εἶναι σοφωτέρους ὄντας ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὸ λόγον ἔχειν αὐτοὺς καὶ τὰς αἰτίας γνωρίζειν. ὅλως τε σημεῖον τοῦ εἰδότος καὶ μὴ εἰδότος τὸ δύνασθαι διδάσκειν ἐστίν, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο τὴν τέχνην τῆς ἐμπειρίας ἡγούμεθα μᾶλλον ἐπιστήμην εἶναι· δύνανται γάρ, οἱ δὲ οὐ δύνανται διδάσκειν.

He who knows can teach

Ἔτι δὲ τῶν αἰσθήσεων οὐδεμίαν ἡγούμεθα εἶναι σοφίαν· καίτοι κυριώταταί γ' εἰσὶν αὗται τῶν καθ' ἕκαστα γνώσεις· ἀλλ' οὐ λέγουσι τὸ διὰ τί περὶ οὐδενός, οἷον διὰ τί θερμὸν τὸ πῦρ, ἀλλὰ μόνον ὅτι θερμόν. τὸ μὲν οὖν πρῶτον εἰκὸς τὸν ὁποιανοῦν εὑρόντα τέχνην παρὰ[4] τὰς κοινὰς αἰσθήσεις θαυμάζεσθαι ὑπὸ τῶν ἀνθρώπων μὴ μόνον διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον εἶναί τι τῶν εὑρεθέντων ἀλλ' ὡς σοφὸν καὶ διαφέροντα τῶν ἄλλων· πλειόνων δ' εὑρισκομένων τεχνῶν καὶ τῶν μὲν

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[1] ἐπιτυγχάνουσι - "hit the mark", succeed.

[2] λόγον - theory.

[3] ᾧ συμβέβηκεν - Ross rightly remarks that it is "of course not an accident of Callias, as opposed to his essence and his properties, that he is a man". The term is used simply to indicate that it is not directly "man" that the doctor cures, but directly Callias and indirectly man because C. is a man.

[4] παρὰ - that went beyond the common perceptions of man.

πρὸς τἀναγκαῖα τῶν δὲ πρὸς διαγωγὴν [1] οὐσῶν, ἀεὶ σοφωτέρους τοὺς τοιούτους ἐκείνων ὑπολαμβάνεσθαι διὰ τὸ μὴ πρὸς χρῆσιν εἶναι τὰς ἐπιστήμας αὐτῶν.

Purely theoretical science was invented last

Ὅθεν ἤδη πάντων τῶν τοιούτων κατεσκευασμένων αἱ μὴ πρὸς ἡδονὴν μηδὲ πρὸς τἀναγκαῖα τῶν ἐπιστημῶν εὑρέθησαν, καὶ πρῶτον ἐν τούτοις τοῖς τόποις οὗπερ ἐσχόλασαν· διὸ περὶ Αἴγυπτον αἱ μαθηματικαὶ πρῶτον τέχναι συνέστησαν, ἐκεῖ γὰρ ἀφείθη σχολάζειν τὸ τῶν ἱερέων ἔθνος.

Εἴρηται μὲν οὖν ἐν τοῖς ἠθικοῖς [2] τίς διαφορὰ τέχνης καὶ ἐπιστήμης καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν ὁμογενῶν· οὗ δ' ἕνεκα νῦν ποιούμεθα τὸν λόγον τοῦτ' ἐστίν, ὅτι τὴν ὀνομαζομένην σοφίαν [3] περὶ τὰ πρῶτα αἴτια καὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς ὑπολαμβάνουσι πάντες· ὥστε, καθάπερ εἴρηται πρότερον, ὁ μὲν ἔμπειρος τῶν ὁποιανοῦν ἐχόντων αἴσθησιν εἶναι δοκεῖ σοφώτερος, ὁ δὲ τεχνίτης τῶν ἐμπείρων, χειροτέχνου δὲ ἀρχιτέκτων, αἱ δὲ θεωρητικαὶ τῶν ποιητικῶν [4] μᾶλλον. ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἡ σοφία περί τινας ἀρχὰς καὶ αἰτίας ἐστὶν ἐπιστήμη, δῆλον. 982a

With what causes wisdom is concerned

Ἐπεὶ δὲ ταύτην τὴν ἐπιστήμην ζητοῦμεν, τοῦτ' ἂν εἴη σκεπτέον, ἡ περὶ ποίας αἰτίας καὶ περὶ ποίας ἀρχὰς ἐπιστήμη σοφία ἐστίν. εἰ δὴ λάβοι τις τὰς ὑπολήψεις ἃς ἔχομεν περὶ τοῦ σοφοῦ, τάχ' ἂν ἐκ τούτου φανερὸν γένοιτο μᾶλλον. ὑπολαμβάνομεν δὴ πρῶτον μὲν ἐπίστασθαι πάντα τὸν σοφὸν ὡς ἐνδέχεται [5], μὴ καθ' ἕκαστον ἔχοντα ἐπιστήμην αὐτῶν· εἶτα τὸν τὰ χαλεπὰ γνῶναι δυνάμενον καὶ μὴ ῥᾴδια ἀνθρώπῳ γιγνώσκειν, τοῦτον σοφόν (τὸ γὰρ αἰσθάνεσθαι πάντων κοινόν, διὸ ῥᾴδιον καὶ οὐδὲν σοφόν)· ἔτι τὸν ἀκριβέστερον καὶ τὸν διδασκαλικώτερον τῶν αἰτιῶν σοφώτερον εἶναι περὶ πᾶσαν ἐπιστήμην· καὶ τῶν ἐπιστημῶν δὲ τὴν αὐτῆς ἕνεκεν καὶ τοῦ εἰδέναι χάριν αἱρετὴν οὖσαν μᾶλλον εἶναι σοφίαν ἢ τὴν τῶν ἀποβαινόντων ἕνεκεν, καὶ τὴν ἀρχικωτέραν τῆς ὑπηρετούσης μᾶλλον σοφίαν· οὐ γὰρ δεῖν ἐπιτάττεσθαι τὸν σοφὸν ἀλλ' ἐπιτάττειν, καὶ οὐ τοῦτον ἑτέρῳ πείθεσθαι, ἀλλὰ τούτῳ τὸν ἧττον σοφόν.

Τὰς μὲν οὖν ὑπολήψεις τοιαύτας καὶ τοσαύτας ἔχομεν περὶ τῆς σοφίας καὶ τῶν σοφῶν· τούτων δὲ τὸ μὲν πάντα ἐπίστασθαι τῷ μάλιστα ἔχοντι τὴν καθόλου ἐπιστήμην ἀναγκαῖον ὑπάρχειν (οὗτος γὰρ οἶδέ πως πάντα τὰ ὑποκείμενα) [6], σχεδὸν δὲ καὶ χαλεπώτατα ταῦτα γνωρίζειν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, τὰ μάλιστα καθόλου (πορρωτάτω γὰρ τῶν αἰσθήσεών ἐστιν), ἀκριβέσταται δὲ τῶν ἐπιστημῶν αἳ μάλιστα τῶν πρώτων εἰσίν (αἱ γὰρ ἐξ ἐλαττόνων ἀκριβέστεραι τῶν ἐκ προσθέσεως λεγομένων [7], οἷον ἀριθμητικὴ γεωμετρίας)· ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ διδασκαλική γε ἡ τῶν αἰτιῶν θεωρητικὴ μᾶλλον (οὗτοι γὰρ διδάσκουσιν,

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[1] πρὸς διαγωγὴν - πρὸς τὸ εὖ ζῆν.
[2] *Eth. Nic.* VI 3, 1139 b[14]-1141 b[8].
[3] τ. ὀνομαζομένην σοφίαν - elsewhere called first philosophy.
[4] τ. ποιητικῶν - those which produce concrete results.
[5] ὡς ἐνδέχεται - as far as possible.
[6] πάντα τὰ ὑποκείμενα - all the instances that fall under the universal.
[7] We explained this sentence sub **488b**.

οἱ τὰς αἰτίας λέγοντες περὶ ἑκάστου), τὸ δ' εἰδέναι καὶ τὸ ἐπίστασθαι αὐτῶν ἕνεκα [1] μάλισθ' ὑπάρχει τῇ τοῦ μάλιστα ἐπιστητοῦ ἐπιστήμῃ (ὁ γὰρ τὸ ἐπι-
982b στασθαι δι' αὐτὸ αἱρούμενος τὴν μάλιστα ἐπιστήμην μάλιστα αἱρήσεται, τοιαύτη δ' ἐστὶν ἡ τοῦ μάλιστα ἐπιστητοῦ), μάλιστα δ' ἐπιστητὰ τὰ πρῶτα καὶ τὰ αἴτια (διὰ γὰρ ταῦτα καὶ ἐκ τούτων τἆλλα γνωρίζεται ἀλλ' οὐ ταῦτα διὰ τῶν ὑποκειμένων), ἀρχικωτάτη δὲ τῶν ἐπιστημῶν, καὶ μᾶλλον ἀρχικὴ τῆς ὑπηρετούσης, ἡ γνωρίζουσα τίνος ἕνεκέν ἐστι πρακτέον ἕκαστον· τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶ τἀγαθὸν ἑκάστου, ὅλως δὲ τὸ ἄριστον ἐν τῇ φύσει πάσῃ [2].

Especially with the final cause

Ἐξ ἁπάντων οὖν τῶν εἰρημένων ἐπὶ τὴν αὐτὴν ἐπιστήμην πίπτει τὸ ζητούμενον ὄνομα· δεῖ γὰρ ταύτην τῶν πρώτων ἀρχῶν καὶ αἰτιῶν εἶναι θεωρητικήν· καὶ γὰρ τἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα ἓν τῶν αἰτίων ἐστίν.

Ὅτι δ' οὐ ποιητική, δῆλον καὶ ἐκ τῶν πρώτων φιλοσοφησάντων· διὰ γὰρ τὸ θαυμάζειν οἱ ἄνθρωποι καὶ νῦν καὶ τὸ πρῶτον ἤρξαντο φιλοσοφεῖν. ἐξ ἀρχῆς μὲν τὰ πρόχειρα τῶν ἀτόπων [3] θαυμάσαντες, εἶτα κατὰ μικρὸν οὕτω προϊόντες καὶ περὶ τῶν μειζόνων διαπορήσαντες, οἷον περί τε τῶν τῆς σελήνης παθημάτων καὶ τῶν περὶ τὸν ἥλιον καὶ ἄστρα καὶ περὶ τῆς τοῦ παντὸς γενέσεως. ὁ δ' ἀπορῶν καὶ θαυμάζων οἴεται ἀγνοεῖν (διὸ καὶ ὁ φιλόμυθος φιλόσοφός πώς ἐστιν· ὁ γὰρ μῦθος σύγκειται ἐκ θαυμασίων)· ὥστ' εἴπερ διὰ τὸ φεύγειν τὴν ἄγνοιαν ἐφιλοσόφησαν, φανερὸν ὅτι διὰ τὸ εἰδέναι τὸ ἐπίστασθαι ἐδίωκον καὶ οὐ χρήσεώς τινος ἕνεκεν. μαρτυρεῖ δὲ αὐτὸ τὸ συμβεβηκός [4]. σχεδὸν γὰρ πάντων ὑπαρχόντων τῶν ἀναγκαίων καὶ πρὸς ῥᾳστώνην καὶ διαγωγὴν ἡ τοιαύτη φρόνησις ἤρξατο ζητεῖσθαι [5]. δῆλον οὖν ὡς δι' οὐδεμίαν αὐτὴν ζητοῦμεν χρείαν ἑτέραν, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ ἄνθρωπος, φαμέν, ἐλεύθερος ὁ αὐτοῦ ἕνεκα καὶ μὴ ἄλλου ὤν, οὕτω καὶ αὐτὴν ὡς μόνην οὖσαν ἐλευθέραν τῶν ἐπιστημῶν· μόνη γὰρ αὕτη αὐτῆς ἕνεκέν ἐστιν.

Phil. no science with practical use

Therefore the only free science

Διὸ καὶ δικαίως ἂν οὐκ ἀνθρωπίνη νομίζοιτο αὐτῆς ἡ κτῆσις· πολλαχῇ γὰρ ἡ φύσις δούλη τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἐστίν, ὥστε κατὰ Σιμωνίδην »θεὸς ἂν μόνος τοῦτ' ἔχοι γέρας«, ἄνδρα δ' οὐκ ἄξιον μὴ οὐ ζητεῖν τὴν καθ' αὑτὸν ἐπιστήμην [6].

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[1] αὐτῶν ἕνεκα = pursued for their own sake.

[2] On the primary importance of the final course see nrs. **492** ff., **498** ff.

[3] τὰ πρόχειρα τῶν ἀτόπων - Alexander of Aphrodisias cites the following examples: why amber attracts chaff-like substances (a question which interested Thales), the nature of the rainbow (discussed by Anaximenes and by other early thinkers), and other meteorological problems.

[4] τὸ συμβεβηκός - what really has happened; "the course of events".

[5] I think τῶν must be inserted: in 981 b^{27} two groups are mentioned, namely (τέχναι) αἱ μὲν πρὸς τἀναγκαῖα, αἱ δὲ πρὸς διαγωγὴν οὖσαι, the last being partly for the material, partly for the spiritual or mental εὖ ζῆν (καὶ πρὸς ῥᾳστώνην κ. διαγωγήν).

[6] ἄνδρα δ' οὐκ ἄξιον e.q.s. - The quotation, known to us by Plato's *Protagoras* 341 e, continues: ἄνδρα δ' οὐκ ἔστι μὴ οὐ κακὸν ἔμμεναι (Edmonds, *Lyrici* II, p. 284).— οὐκ ἄξιον - "it is unfitting". Ar. again refers to this question in *Eth. Nic.* X, at

εἰ δὴ λέγουσί τι οἱ ποιηταὶ καὶ πέφυκε φθονεῖν τὸ θεῖον, ἐπὶ τούτου συμβῆναι 983a
μάλιστα εἰκὸς καὶ δυστυχεῖς εἶναι πάντας τοὺς περιττούς [1]. ἀλλ' οὔτε τὸ θεῖον
φθονερὸν ἐνδέχεται εἶναι, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὴν παροιμίαν πολλὰ ψεύδονται ἀοιδοί,
the most divine and honourable οὔτε τῆς τοιαύτης ἄλλην χρὴ νομίζειν τιμιωτέραν. ἡ γὰρ θειοτάτη καὶ τιμιωτά- 5
τη· τοιαύτη δὲ διχῶς ἂν εἴη μόνη· ἥν τε γὰρ μάλιστ' ἂν ὁ θεὸς ἔχοι, θεία τῶν
ἐπιστημῶν ἐστί, κἂν εἴ τις τῶν θείων εἴη. μόνη δ' αὕτη τούτων ἀμφοτέρων
τετύχηκεν· ὅ τε γὰρ θεὸς δοκεῖ τῶν αἰτίων πᾶσιν [2] εἶναι καὶ ἀρχή τις, καὶ
τὴν τοιαύτην ἢ μόνος ἢ μάλιστ' ἂν ἔχοι ὁ θεός. ἀναγκαιότεραι μὲν οὖν πᾶσαι 10
ταύτης, ἀμείνων δ' οὐδεμία.

Its final result Δεῖ μέντοι πως καταστῆναι [3] τὴν κτῆσιν αὐτῆς εἰς τοὐναντίον ἡμῖν τῶν ἐξ
ἀρχῆς ζητήσεων. ἄρχονται μὲν γάρ, ὥσπερ εἴπομεν, ἀπὸ τοῦ θαυμάζειν πάντες
εἰ οὕτως ἔχει, καθάπερ <περὶ> τῶν θαυμάτων ταὐτόματα [4] [τοῖς μήπω τε-
θεωρηκόσι τὴν αἰτίαν] ἢ περὶ τὰς τοῦ ἡλίου τροπὰς ἢ τὴν τῆς διαμέτρου ἀσυμ- 15
μετρίαν [5] (θαυμαστὸν γὰρ εἶναι δοκεῖ πᾶσι <τοῖς μήπω τεθεωρηκόσι τὴν
αἰτίαν> εἴ τι τῷ ἐλαχίστῳ μὴ μετρεῖται)· δεῖ δὲ εἰς τοὐναντίον καὶ τὸ ἄμεινον
κατὰ τὴν παροιμίαν ἀποτελευτῆσαι, καθάπερ καὶ ἐν τούτοις ὅταν μάθωσιν·
οὐθὲν γὰρ ἂν οὕτως θαυμάσειεν ἀνὴρ γεωμετρικὸς ὡς εἰ γένοιτο ἡ διάμετρος 20
μετρητή. τίς μὲν οὖν ἡ φύσις τῆς ἐπιστήμης τῆς ζητουμένης, εἴρηται, καὶ τίς
ὁ σκοπὸς οὗ δεῖ τυγχάνειν τὴν ζήτησιν καὶ τὴν ὅλην μέθοδον.

520—After having given an account of earlier philosophy (the rest of book A), Ar. now proceeds to state the main problems of metaphysics.

Metaph. B 1, 995 a[24]-996 a[17]:

List of ἀπορίαι Ἀνάγκη πρὸς τὴν ἐπιζητουμένην ἐπιστήμην ἐπελθεῖν ἡμᾶς πρῶτον περὶ 995a
ὧν ἀπορῆσαι δεῖ πρῶτον· ταῦτα δ' ἐστὶν ὅσα τε περὶ αὐτῶν ἄλλως ὑπειλήφασί 25
τινες, κἂν εἴ τι χωρὶς τούτων τυγχάνει παρεωραμένον. ἔστι δὲ τοῖς εὐπορῆσαι
βουλομένοις προὔργον τὸ διαπορῆσαι καλῶς· ἡ γὰρ ὕστερον εὐπορία λύσις
τῶν πρότερον ἀπορουμένων ἐστί, λύειν δ' οὐκ ἔστιν ἀγνοοῦντας τὸν δεσμόν, 30
ἀλλ' ἡ τῆς διανοίας ἀπορία δηλοῖ τοῦτο περὶ τοῦ πράγματος· ᾗ γὰρ ἀπορεῖ,
ταύτῃ παραπλήσιον πέπονθε τοῖς δεδεμένοις· ἀδύνατον γὰρ ἀμφοτέρως προελ-

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the end of ch. 7 (1177 b[26]): Ὁ δὲ τοιοῦτος ἂν εἴη βίος κρείττων ἢ κατ' ἄνθρωπον, where he answers to this objection: Οὐ χρὴ δὲ κατὰ τοὺς παραινοῦντας ἀνθρώπινα φρονεῖν ἄνθρωπον ὄντα οὐδὲ θνητὰ τὸν θνητόν, ἀλλ' ἐφ' ὅσον ἐνδέχεται ἀθανατίζειν καὶ πάντα ποιεῖν πρὸς τὸ ζῆν κατὰ τὸ κράτιστον τῶν ἐν αὑτῷ (nr. **606b**).

[1] πάντας τοὺς περιττούς - "all those who occupy themselves with things which do not concern them".

[2] πᾶσιν - of all things.

[3] δεῖ καταστῆναι - must end in.

[4] ταὐτόματα - marionettes.

[5] The incommensurability of the diagonal of a square with the side.

θεῖν εἰς τὸ πρόσθεν. διὸ δεῖ τὰς δυσχερείας τεθεωρηκέναι πάσας πρότερον, τούτων τε χάριν καὶ διὰ τὸ τοὺς ζητοῦντας ἄνευ τοῦ διαπορῆσαι πρῶτον ὁμοίους εἶναι τοῖς ποῖ δεῖ βαδίζειν ἀγνοοῦσι, καὶ πρὸς τούτοις οὐδ' εἴ ποτε τὸ ζητούμενον εὕρηκεν ἢ μὴ γιγνώσκειν· τὸ γὰρ τέλος τούτῳ μὲν οὐ δῆλον τῷ δὲ προηπορηκότι δῆλον. ἔτι δὲ βέλτιον ἀνάγκη ἔχειν πρὸς τὸ κρῖναι τὸν ὥσπερ ἀντιδίκων καὶ τῶν ἀμφισβητούντων λόγων ἀκηκοότα πάντων. — ἔστι δ' ἀπορία πρώτη μὲν περὶ ὧν ἐν τοῖς πεφροιμιασμένοις διηπορήσαμεν, πότερον μιᾶς ἢ πολλῶν ἐπιστημῶν θεωρῆσαι τὰς αἰτίας· καὶ πότερον τὰς τῆς οὐσίας ἀρχὰς τὰς πρώτας ἐστὶ τῆς ἐπιστήμης ἰδεῖν μόνον ἢ καὶ περὶ τῶν ἀρχῶν ἐξ ὧν δεικνύουσι πάντες, οἷον πότερον ἐνδέχεται ταὐτὸ καὶ ἓν ἅμα φάναι καὶ ἀποφάναι ἢ οὔ, καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν τοιούτων· εἴ τ' ἐστὶ περὶ τὴν οὐσίαν, πότερον μία περὶ πάσας ἢ πλείονές εἰσι, κἂν εἰ πλείονες πότερον ἅπασαι συγγενεῖς ἢ τὰς μὲν σοφίας τὰς δὲ ἄλλο τι λεκτέον αὐτῶν· καὶ τοῦτο δ' αὐτὸ τῶν ἀναγκαίων ἐστὶ ζητῆσαι, πότερον τὰς αἰσθητὰς οὐσίας εἶναι μόνον φατέον ἢ καὶ παρὰ ταύτας ἄλλας, καὶ πότερον μοναχῶς ἢ πλείονα γένη τῶν οὐσιῶν, οἷον οἱ ποιοῦντες τά τε εἴδη καὶ τὰ μαθηματικὰ μεταξὺ τούτων τε καὶ τῶν αἰσθητῶν. περί τε τούτων οὖν, καθάπερ φαμέν, ἐπισκεπτέον, καὶ πότερον περὶ τὰς οὐσίας ἡ θεωρία μόνον ἐστὶν ἢ καὶ περὶ τὰ συμβεβηκότα καθ' αὑτὰ ταῖς οὐσίαις, πρὸς δὲ τούτοις περὶ ταὐτοῦ καὶ ἑτέρου καὶ ὁμοίου καὶ ἀνομοίου καὶ ἐναντιότητος, καὶ περὶ προτέρου καὶ ὑστέρου καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἁπάντων τῶν τοιούτων περὶ ὅσων οἱ διαλεκτικοὶ πειρῶνται σκοπεῖν ἐκ τῶν ἐνδόξων μόνων ποιούμενοι τὴν σκέψιν, τίνος ἐστὶ θεωρῆσαι περὶ πάντων· ἔτι δὲ τούτοις αὐτοῖς ὅσα καθ' αὑτὰ συμβέβηκεν, καὶ μὴ μόνον τί ἐστι τούτων ἕκαστον ἀλλὰ καὶ ἆρα ἓν ἑνὶ ἐναντίον· καὶ πότερον αἱ ἀρχαὶ καὶ τὰ στοιχεῖα τὰ γένη ἐστὶν ἢ εἰς ἃ διαιρεῖται ἐνυπάρχοντα ἕκαστον· καὶ εἰ τὰ γένη, πότερον ὅσα ἐπὶ τοῖς ἀτόμοις λέγεται τελευταῖα ἢ τὰ πρῶτα, οἷον πότερον ζῷον ἢ ἄνθρωπος ἀρχή τε καὶ μᾶλλον ἔστι παρὰ τὸ καθ' ἕκαστον. μάλιστα δὲ ζητητέον καὶ πραγματευτέον πότερον ἔστι τι παρὰ τὴν ὕλην αἴτιον καθ' αὑτὸ ἢ οὔ, καὶ τοῦτο χωριστὸν ἢ οὔ, καὶ πότερον ἓν ἢ πλείω τὸν ἀριθμόν, καὶ πότερον ἔστι τι παρὰ τὸ σύνολον (λέγω δὲ τὸ σύνολον, ὅταν κατηγορηθῇ τι τῆς ὕλης) ἢ οὐθέν, ἢ τῶν μὲν τῶν δ' οὔ, καὶ ποῖα τοιαῦτα τῶν ὄντων. ἔτι αἱ ἀρχαὶ πότερον ἀριθμῷ ἢ εἴδει ὡρισμέναι, καὶ αἱ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις καὶ αἱ ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ; καὶ πότερον τῶν φθαρτῶν καὶ ἀφθάρτων αἱ αὐταὶ ἢ ἕτεραι, καὶ πότερον ἄφθαρτοι πᾶσαι ἢ τῶν φθαρτῶν φθαρταί; ἔτι δὲ τὸ πάντων χαλεπώτατον καὶ πλείστην ἀπορίαν ἔχον, πότερον τὸ ἓν καὶ τὸ ὄν, καθάπερ οἱ Πυθαγόρειοι καὶ Πλάτων ἔλεγεν, οὐχ ἕτερόν τί ἐστιν ἀλλ' οὐσία τῶν ὄντων, ἢ οὔ, ἀλλ' ἕτερόν τι τὸ ὑποκείμενον, ὥσπερ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς φησι φιλίαν ἄλλος δέ τις πῦρ ὁ δὲ ὕδωρ ἢ ἀέρα· καὶ πότερον αἱ ἀρχαὶ καθόλου εἰσὶν ἢ ὡς τὰ καθ' ἕκαστα τῶν πραγμάτων, καὶ δυνάμει ἢ ἐνεργείᾳ· ἔτι πότερον ἄλλως ἢ κατὰ κίνησιν· καὶ γὰρ ταῦτα ἀπορίαν ἂν παράσχοι πολλήν. πρὸς δὲ τούτοις πότερον οἱ ἀριθμοὶ

the chief problem

the most difficult one

καὶ τὰ μήκη καὶ τὰ σχήματα καὶ αἱ στιγμαὶ οὐσίαι τινές εἰσιν ἢ οὔ, κἂν εἰ οὐσίαι πότερον κεχωρισμέναι τῶν αἰσθητῶν ἢ ἐνυπάρχουσαι ἐν τούτοις; περὶ γὰρ τούτων ἁπάντων οὐ μόνον χαλεπὸν τὸ εὐπορῆσαι τῆς ἀληθείας ἀλλ' οὐδὲ τὸ διαπορῆσαι τῷ λόγῳ ῥᾴδιον καλῶς.

These questions are dealt with throughout the following work.

521—There is a science which investigates being as being, and is different from the sciences that investigate special parts of being.

Metaph. Γ 1, 1003 a[21-32]:

Philosophy the science of being as such

Ἔστιν ἐπιστήμη τις ἡ θεωρεῖ τὸ ὂν καὶ τὰ τούτῳ ὑπάρχοντα καθ' αὑτό. αὕτη δ' ἐστὶν οὐδεμιᾷ τῶν ἐν μέρει λεγομένων ἡ αὐτή· οὐδεμία γὰρ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπισκοπεῖ καθόλου περὶ τοῦ ὄντος ᾗ ὄν, ἀλλὰ μέρος αὐτοῦ τι ἀποτεμόμεναι περὶ τούτου θεωροῦσι τὸ συμβεβηκός, οἷον αἱ μαθηματικαὶ τῶν ἐπιστημῶν. ἐπεὶ δὲ τὰς ἀρχὰς καὶ τὰς ἀκροτάτας αἰτίας ζητοῦμεν, δῆλον ὡς φύσεώς τινος αὐτὰς ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι καθ' αὑτήν. εἰ οὖν καὶ οἱ τὰ στοιχεῖα τῶν ὄντων ζητοῦντες ταύτας τὰς ἀρχὰς ἐζήτουν, ἀνάγκη καὶ τὰ στοιχεῖα τοῦ ὄντος εἶναι μὴ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς ἀλλ' ᾗ ὄν· διὸ καὶ ἡμῖν τοῦ ὄντος ᾗ ὂν τὰς πρώτας αἰτίας ληπτέον.

522—Ar. continues speaking about the manifold senses of the term "to be". As, then, science everywhere deals chiefly with that which is primary, the philosopher has first to do with substances.

Ib. 2, 1003 b[16-19]:

Therefore substances the first object of phil.

Πανταχοῦ δὲ κυρίως τοῦ πρώτου ἡ ἐπιστήμη, καὶ ἐξ οὗ τὰ ἄλλα ἤρτηται, καὶ δι' ὃ λέγονται. εἰ οὖν τοῦτ' ἐστὶν ἡ οὐσία, τῶν οὐσιῶν ἂν δέοι τὰς ἀρχὰς καὶ τὰς αἰτίας ἔχειν τὸν φιλόσοφον.

523—**a.** The philosopher must also consider the things that are in mathematics called axioms, for these are true of all existing things, and therefore no special science inquires into their truth.

Metaph. Γ 3, 1005 a[19]-b[2]:

Phil. must also study the axioms

Λεκτέον δὲ πότερον μιᾶς ἢ ἑτέρας ἐπιστήμης περί τε τῶν ἐν τοῖς μαθήμασι καλουμένων ἀξιωμάτων καὶ περὶ τῆς οὐσίας. φανερὸν δὴ ὅτι μιᾶς τε καὶ τῆς τοῦ φιλοσόφου καὶ ἡ περὶ τούτων ἐστὶ σκέψις· ἅπασι γὰρ ὑπάρχει τοῖς οὖσιν ἀλλ' οὐ γένει τινὶ χωρὶς ἰδίᾳ τῶν ἄλλων. καὶ χρῶνται μὲν πάντες, ὅτι τοῦ ὄντος ἐστὶν ᾗ ὄν, ἕκαστον δὲ τὸ γένος ὄν· ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον δὲ χρῶνται ἐφ' ὅσον αὐτοῖς ἱκανόν, τοῦτο δ' ἔστιν ὅσον ἐπέχει τὸ γένος περὶ οὗ φέρουσι τὰς ἀποδείξεις· ὥστ' ἐπεὶ δῆλον ὅτι ᾗ ὄντα ὑπάρχει πᾶσι (τοῦτο γὰρ αὐτοῖς τὸ κοινόν), τοῦ

περὶ τὸ ὂν γνωρίζοντος καὶ περὶ τούτων ἐστὶν ἡ θεωρία. διόπερ οὐθεὶς τῶν κατὰ μέρος ἐπισκοπούντων ἐγχειρεῖ λέγειν τι περὶ αὐτῶν, εἰ ἀληθῆ ἢ μή, οὔτε γεωμέτρης οὔτ' ἀριθμητικός, ἀλλὰ τῶν φυσικῶν ἔνιοι, εἰκότως τοῦτο δρῶντες· μόνοι γὰρ ᾤοντο περί τε τῆς ὅλης φύσεως σκοπεῖν καὶ περὶ τοῦ ὄντος. ἐπεὶ δ' ἔστιν ἔτι τοῦ φυσικοῦ τις ἀνωτέρω (ἐν γάρ τι γένος τοῦ ὄντος ἡ φύσις), τοῦ καθόλου καὶ τοῦ περὶ τὴν πρώτην οὐσίαν θεωρητικοῦ καὶ ἡ περὶ τούτων ἂν εἴη σκέψις· ἔστι δὲ σοφία τις καὶ ἡ φυσική, ἀλλ' οὐ πρώτη.

b. He must also study the law of contradiction, which is the most fundamental principle of all.

Ib., 1005 b[5-23]:

and the law of contradiction

5, 6 Ὅτι μὲν οὖν τοῦ φιλοσόφου, καὶ τοῦ περὶ πάσης τῆς οὐσίας θεωροῦντος ᾗ πέφυκεν, καὶ περὶ τῶν συλλογιστικῶν ἀρχῶν ἐστὶν ἐπισκέψασθαι, δῆλον· προσήκει δὲ τὸν μάλιστα γνωρίζοντα περὶ ἕκαστον γένος ἔχειν λέγειν τὰς βεβαιοτάτας ἀρχὰς τοῦ πράγματος, ὥστε καὶ τὸν περὶ τῶν ὄντων ᾗ ὄντα τὰς πάντων βεβαιοτάτας. ἔστι δ' οὗτος ὁ φιλόσοφος. βεβαιοτάτη δ' ἀρχὴ πασῶν περὶ ἣν διαψευσθῆναι ἀδύνατον· γνωριμωτάτην τε γὰρ ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι τὴν τοιαύτην (περὶ γὰρ ἃ μὴ γνωρίζουσιν ἀπατῶνται πάντες) καὶ ἀνυπόθετον. ἣν γὰρ ἀναγκαῖον ἔχειν τὸν ὁτιοῦν ξυνιέντα τῶν ὄντων, τοῦτο οὐχ ὑπόθεσις· ὃ δὲ γνωρίζειν ἀναγκαῖον τῷ ὁτιοῦν γνωρίζοντι, καὶ ἥκειν ἔχοντα ἀναγκαῖον. ὅτι μὲν οὖν βεβαιοτάτη ἡ τοιαύτη πασῶν ἀρχή, δῆλον· τίς δ' ἔστιν αὕτη, μετὰ ταῦτα λέγωμεν. τὸ γὰρ αὐτὸ ἅμα ὑπάρχειν τε καὶ μὴ ὑπάρχειν ἀδύνατον τῷ αὐτῷ καὶ κατὰ τὸ αὐτό· — αὕτη δὴ πασῶν ἐστι βεβαιοτάτη τῶν ἀρχῶν· ἔχει γὰρ τὸν εἰρημένον διορισμόν.

In the following chapters of this book the law of contradiction is established by proofs, and objections to it are refuted.

524—In E 1 Ar., having first divided all intellectual work into three main groups—theoretical, practical and productive— [1], next divides the theoretical sciences into three other provinces: physics, mathematics and first philosophy or theology [2], the last having the ἀκίνητος οὐσία as its object.

Metaph. I 1, 1026 a[18-32]:

First phil. or theology has the immutable substance as its object

Ὥστε τρεῖς ἂν εἶεν φιλοσοφίαι θεωρητικαί, μαθηματική, φυσική, θεολογική (οὐ γὰρ ἄδηλον ὅτι εἴ που τὸ θεῖον ὑπάρχει, ἐν τῇ τοιαύτῃ φύσει ὑπάρχει), καὶ τὴν τιμιωτάτην δεῖ περὶ τὸ τιμιώτατον γένος εἶναι. αἱ μὲν οὖν θεωρητικαὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιστημῶν αἱρετώταται, αὕτη δὲ τῶν θεωρητικῶν. ἀπορήσειε γὰρ ἄν

[1] Our nr. **432a**. [2] **432b**.

τις πότερόν ποθ' ἡ πρώτη φιλοσοφία καθόλου ἐστὶν ἢ περί τι γένος καὶ φύσιν τινὰ μίαν (οὐ γὰρ ὁ αὐτὸς τρόπος οὐδ' ἐν ταῖς μαθηματικαῖς, ἀλλ' ἡ μὲν γεωμετρία καὶ ἀστρολογία περί τινα φύσιν εἰσίν, ἡ δὲ καθόλου πασῶν κοινή)· εἰ μὲν οὖν μὴ ἔστι τις ἑτέρα οὐσία παρὰ τὰς φύσει συνεστηκυίας, ἡ φυσικὴ ἂν εἴη πρώτη ἐπιστήμη· εἰ δ' ἔστι τις οὐσία ἀκίνητος, αὕτη προτέρα καὶ φιλοσοφία πρώτη, καὶ καθόλου οὕτως ὅτι πρώτη [1]· καὶ περὶ τοῦ ὄντος ᾗ ὄν ταύτης ἂν εἴη θεωρῆσαι, καὶ τί ἐστι καὶ τὰ ὑπάρχοντα ᾗ ὄν.

There might seem to exist a contradiction between this definition of the object of metaphysics and that of Γ 1 (cited sub **521**). Duns Scotus [2], who had the interpretations of Avicenna and Averroës before him, regarded them as a dilemma: Avicenna, who follows Γ 1, says that *being as such* is the object of metaphysics,—Averroes, according to E 1, teaches that this object is *God and the intelligences*. Duns Scotus, after a long hesitation, takes the part of Avicenna. Aristotle himself, however, seems not to have considered the two views as contradictory: in Γ 2 (cited sub **522**) he gives, if not a synthesis, yet a transition from the first to the second.

2—PLATO'S THEORY OF IDEAS CRITICIZED

Chapters A 6 and 9

525—In *Metaph.* A 6 the author gives an outline of the theory of Ideas: the introduction of supra-sensible Forms as the true object of knowledge, because sensible things are always changing [3]; the assumption of mathematical objects as existing between Forms and sensibles [4], and the theory of first principles, the One and the great-and-small, from which the Numbers were deduced [5]. He compares this doctrine with that of the Pythagoreans, from which it is distinguished by a few features, and concludes that Plato knew only the material and the formal cause [6].

In ch. 9 of the same book he gives a more elaborate criticism of the theory.

First objection

526—*Metaph.* A 9, 990 a[33]-b[8]:

Περὶ μὲν οὖν τῶν Πυθαγορείων ἀφείσθω τὰ νῦν (ἱκανὸν γὰρ αὐτῶν ἅψασθαι τοσοῦτον)· οἱ δὲ τὰς ἰδέας αἰτίας τιθέμενοι πρῶτον μὲν ζητοῦντες τωνδὶ τῶν b ὄντων λαβεῖν τὰς αἰτίας ἕτερα τούτοις ἴσα τὸν ἀριθμὸν ἐκόμισαν, ὥσπερ εἴ τις

[1] "and it will be universal in this sense, because it is first".

[2] *Quaestiones in Metaphysicam Aristotelis* I, qu. 1 (Ed. Wadding, t. IV, p. 510-518).

[3] Our nr. **204a**; cp. **204b** and **268a**.

[4] Nr. **362b**, with n. 1. [5] Nr. **365a**. [6] **365b**.

ἀριθμῆσαι βουλόμενος ἐλαττόνων μὲν ὄντων οἴοιτο μὴ δυνήσεσθαι, πλείω δὲ ποιήσας ἀριθμοίη (σχεδὸν γὰρ ἴσα — ἢ οὐκ ἐλάττω — ἐστὶ τὰ εἴδη τούτοις περὶ ὧν ζητοῦντες τὰς αἰτίας ἐκ τούτων ἐπ' ἐκεῖνα προῆλθον· καθ' ἕκαστον γὰρ ὁμώνυμόν τι ἔστι καὶ παρὰ τὰς οὐσίας, τῶν τε ἄλλων [1] ἔστιν ἓν ἐπὶ πολλῶν, καὶ ἐπὶ τοῖσδε καὶ ἐπὶ τοῖς ἀϊδίοις [2]).

527—Ib., 990 b$^{8-17}$: **The proofs of the theory examined**

Ἔτι δὲ καθ' οὓς τρόπους δείκνυμεν [3] ὅτι ἔστι τὰ εἴδη, κατ' οὐθένα φαίνεται τούτων· ἐξ ἐνίων μὲν γὰρ οὐκ ἀνάγκη γίγνεσθαι συλλογισμόν, ἐξ ἐνίων δὲ καὶ οὐχ ὧν οἰόμεθα τούτων εἴδη γίγνεται [4]. κατά τε γὰρ τοὺς λόγους τοὺς ἐκ τῶν ἐπιστημῶν [5] εἴδη ἔσται πάντων ὅσων ἐπιστῆμαι εἰσί, καὶ κατὰ τὸ ἓν ἐπὶ πολλῶν [6] καὶ τῶν ἀποφάσεων, κατὰ δὲ τὸ νοεῖν τι φθαρέντος [7] τῶν φθαρτῶν· φάντασμα γάρ τι τούτων ἔστιν. ἔτι δὲ οἱ ἀκριβέστεροι τῶν λόγων [8] οἱ μὲν τῶν πρός τι ποιοῦσιν ἰδέας [9], ὧν οὔ φαμεν εἶναι καθ' αὐτὸ γένος, οἱ δὲ τὸν τρίτον ἄνθρωπον [10] λέγουσιν.

528—Ib., 990 b$^{22-34}$: **There should be only Ideas of substances**

Ἔτι κατὰ μὲν τὴν ὑπόληψιν καθ' ἣν εἶναί φαμεν τὰς ἰδέας οὐ μόνον τῶν οὐσιῶν ἔσται εἴδη ἀλλὰ πολλῶν καὶ ἑτέρων (καὶ γὰρ τὸ νόημα ἓν οὐ μόνον

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[1] τῶν τε ἄλλων - "so also in the case of all other groups", i.e. even for those things other than substances.

[2] τοῖς ἀϊδίοις - i.e. the heavenly bodies.

[3] δείκνυμεν - "we", disciples of Plato.

[4] "others would prove the existence of Ideas of things of which we Platonists think there are none" (Ross).

[5] The argument "from the sciences" would imply the existence of Ideas of *artefacta*, which were probably not recognized by the Platonists of Aristotle's time.

The arguments here referred to are given in a very concise form. We need the comments of Alexander of Aphrodisias to understand their sense fully.

[6] τὸ ἓν ἐπὶ πολλῶν is the argument for the existence of Ideas from the existence of groups of particulars.

καὶ τῶν ἀποφάσεων - On the positive sense of negations according to Plato, see *Soph.* 257 d-258 b (our nr. **342**). W. D. Ross comments: "There was no need to suppose bare negative Ideas; anything that could be explained by participation in a negative Idea could be explained more simply by non-participation in the positive Idea".

[7] τὸ νοεῖν τι φθαρέντος - the argument from the fact that it is possible to think an object even when the thing has perished. Ar. argues that according to this argument there must be an Idea of each perishable thing.

[8] οἱ ἀκριβέστεροι τῶν λόγων - Ross, citing Jackson, explains: Ar. has previously pointed out certain *consequences* of Platonic arguments; he now points out certain *implications actually stated* in Plato's more accurate arguments, though unwelcome to his successors.

[9] τῶν πρός τι - e.g. in the *Phaedo* the Idea of τὸ ἴσον (74 a-77 a).

[10] τὸν τρίτον ἄνθρωπον - See on this argument *Parm.* 132 d-133 a (our nr. **327c**).

περὶ τὰς οὐσίας ἀλλὰ καὶ κατὰ τῶν ἄλλων ἐστί, καὶ ἐπιστῆμαι οὐ μόνον τῆς οὐσίας εἰσὶν ἀλλὰ καὶ ἑτέρων, καὶ ἄλλα δὲ μυρία συμβαίνει τοιαῦτα)· κατὰ δὲ τὸ ἀναγκαῖον καὶ τὰς δόξας τὰς περὶ αὐτῶν, εἰ ἔστι μεθεκτὰ τὰ εἴδη, τῶν οὐσιῶν ἀναγκαῖον ἰδέας εἶναι μόνον. οὐ γὰρ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς μετέχονται [1] ἀλλὰ δεῖ ταύτῃ ἑκάστου μετέχειν ᾗ μὴ καθ' ὑποκειμένου λέγεται [2] (λέγω δ' οἷον, εἴ τι αὐτοδιπλασίου μετέχει, τοῦτο καὶ ἀϊδίου μετέχει, ἀλλὰ κατὰ συμβεβηκός· συμβέβηκε γὰρ τῷ διπλασίῳ ἀϊδίῳ εἶναι), ὥστ' ἔσται οὐσία τὰ εἴδη.

529—Ar. now presents his main objection: Forms do not contribute anything to sensible things, nor to our knowledge of them.

Plato's Ideas are of no use

a. Ib., 991 a[8-19]:

Πάντων δὲ μάλιστα διαπορήσειεν ἄν τις τί ποτε συμβάλλεται τὰ εἴδη τοῖς ἀϊδίοις τῶν αἰσθητῶν [3] ἢ τοῖς γιγνομένοις καὶ φθειρομένοις· οὔτε γὰρ κινήσεως οὔτε μεταβολῆς οὐδεμιᾶς ἐστὶν αἴτια αὐτοῖς. ἀλλὰ μὴν οὔτε πρὸς τὴν ἐπιστήμην οὐθὲν βοηθεῖ τὴν τῶν ἄλλων (οὐδὲ γὰρ οὐσία ἐκεῖνα τούτων· ἐν τούτοις γὰρ ἂν ἦν), οὔτε εἰς τὸ εἶναι, μὴ ἐνυπάρχοντά γε τοῖς μετέχουσιν· οὕτω μὲν γὰρ ἂν ἴσως αἴτια δόξειεν εἶναι ὡς τὸ λευκὸν μεμιγμένον τῷ λευκῷ, ἀλλ' οὗτος μὲν ὁ λόγος λίαν εὐκίνητος [4], ὃν Ἀναξαγόρας μὲν πρῶτος Εὔδοξος [5] δ' ὕστερον καὶ ἄλλοι τινὲς ἔλεγον (ῥᾴδιον γὰρ συναγαγεῖν πολλὰ καὶ ἀδύνατα πρὸς τὴν τοιαύτην δόξαν).

b. Ib., a[19]-b[1]:

Ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδ' ἐκ τῶν εἰδῶν ἐστὶ τἆλλα κατ' οὐθένα τρόπον τῶν εἰωθότων λέγεσθαι. τὸ δὲ λέγειν παραδείγματα αὐτὰ εἶναι καὶ μετέχειν αὐτῶν τἆλλα κενολογεῖν ἐστὶ καὶ μεταφορὰς λέγειν ποιητικάς. τί γάρ ἐστι τὸ ἐργαζόμενον πρὸς τὰς ἰδέας ἀποβλέπον [6]; ἐνδέχεταί τε καὶ εἶναι καὶ γίγνεσθαι ὅμοιον ὁτιοῦν καὶ μὴ εἰκαζόμενον πρὸς ἐκεῖνο [7], ὥστε καὶ ὄντος Σωκράτους καὶ μὴ ὄντος γένοιτ' ἂν οἷος Σωκράτης· ὁμοίως δὲ δῆλον ὅτι κἂν εἰ ἦν ὁ Σωκράτης ἀΐδιος. ἔσται τε πλείω παραδείγματα τοῦ αὐτοῦ, ὥστε καὶ εἴδη, οἷον τοῦ ἀνθρώπου

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[1] "for participation per accidens does not exist".

[2] "but a thing must share in its Form as in something not predicated of a subject".

[3] τ. ἀϊδίοις τῶν αἰσθητῶν - as in **526**: the heavenly bodies.

[4] λίαν εὐκίνητος - easily refutable. On the doctrine of Anaxagoras referred to, see our nr. **124**.

[5] Eudoxus of Cnidus, the famous astronomer, who spent long years in Plato's Academy (± 365), seems to have taught that the Ideas are immanent in things, though he held that they are substances. On the last point he did not agree with the (later) theory of Ar.

[6] These words refer to the Demiurgus in Plato's *Timaeus*.

[7] "without being copied from it".

τὸ ζῷον καὶ τὸ δίπουν, ἅμα δὲ καὶ τὸ αὐτοάνθρωπος. ἔτι οὐ μόνον τῶν αἰσθητῶν παραδείγματα τὰ εἴδη ἀλλὰ καὶ αὐτῶν, οἷον τὸ γένος, ὡς γένος εἰδῶν [1]· ὥστε τὸ αὐτὸ ἔσται παράδειγμα καὶ εἰκών.

How can Ideas exist separately?

530—Ib., 991 b[1-9]:

Ἔτι δόξειεν ἂν ἀδύνατον εἶναι χωρὶς τὴν οὐσίαν καὶ οὗ ἡ οὐσία· ὥστε πῶς ἂν αἱ ἰδέαι οὐσίαι τῶν πραγμάτων οὖσαι χωρὶς εἶεν; ἐν δὲ τῷ Φαίδωνι οὕτω λέγεται, ὡς καὶ τοῦ εἶναι καὶ τοῦ γίγνεσθαι αἴτια τὰ εἴδη ἐστίν· καίτοι τῶν εἰδῶν ὄντων ὅμως οὐ γίγνεται τὰ μετέχοντα ἂν μὴ ᾖ τὸ κινῆσον, καὶ πολλὰ γίγνεται ἕτερα, οἷον οἰκία καὶ δακτύλιος, ὧν οὔ φαμεν εἴδη εἶναι· ὥστε δῆλον ὅτι ἐνδέχεται καὶ τἆλλα καὶ εἶναι καὶ γίγνεσθαι διὰ τοιαύτας αἰτίας οἵας καὶ τὰ ῥηθέντα νῦν.

If Ideas are numbers, how can they be causes?

531—Ib., 991 b[9-21]:

Ἔτι εἴπερ εἰσὶν ἀριθμοὶ τὰ εἴδη, πῶς αἴτιοι ἔσονται; πότερον ὅτι ἕτεροι ἀριθμοί εἰσι τὰ ὄντα, οἷον ὁδὶ μὲν <ὁ> ἀριθμὸς ἄνθρωπος ὁδὶ δὲ Σωκράτης ὁδὶ δὲ Καλλίας; τί οὖν ἐκεῖνοι τούτοις αἴτιοί εἰσιν; οὐδὲ γὰρ εἰ οἱ μὲν ἀΐδιοι οἱ δὲ μή, οὐδὲν διοίσει. εἰ δ' ὅτι λόγοι ἀριθμῶν [2] τάνταῦθα, οἷον ἡ συμφωνία, δῆλον ὅτι ἐστὶν ἕν γέ τι ὧν εἰσὶ λόγοι. εἰ δὴ τοῦτο ἡ ὕλη, φανερὸν ὅτι καὶ αὐτοὶ οἱ ἀριθμοὶ λόγοι τινὲς ἔσονται ἑτέρου πρὸς ἕτερον. λέγω δ' οἷον, εἰ ἔστιν ὁ Καλλίας λόγος ἐν ἀριθμοῖς πυρὸς καὶ γῆς καὶ ὕδατος καὶ ἀέρος, καὶ ἄλλων τινῶν ὑποκειμένων ἔσται καὶ ἡ ἰδέα ἀριθμός· καὶ αὐτοάνθρωπος, εἴτ' ἀριθμός τις ὢν εἴτε μή, ὅμως ἔσται λόγος ἐν ἀριθμοῖς τινῶν καὶ οὐκ ἀριθμός, οὐδ' ἔσται τις διὰ ταῦτα ἀριθμός.

532—a. Ar. repeats his main objection to the theory of Ideas, and reproaches the Academy for having abandoned the chief task of philosophy: to seek the cause of sensible phenomena.

Ideas do not explain phenomena

Ib., 992 a[24-29]:

Ὅλως δὲ ζητούσης τῆς σοφίας περὶ τῶν φανερῶν [3] τὸ αἴτιον, τοῦτο μὲν εἰάκαμεν (οὐθὲν γὰρ λέγομεν περὶ τῆς αἰτίας ὅθεν ἡ ἀρχὴ τῆς μεταβολῆς), τὴν δ' οὐσίαν οἰόμενοι λέγειν αὐτῶν ἑτέρας μὲν οὐσίας εἶναί φαμεν, ὅπως δ' ἐκεῖναι τούτων οὐσίαι, διὰ κενῆς λέγομεν [4]· τὸ γὰρ μετέχειν, ὥσπερ καὶ πρότερον εἴπομεν, οὐθέν ἐστιν.

They have nothing to do with the final cause

b. Ib., a[29]-b[1]:

Οὐδὲ δὴ ὅπερ ταῖς ἐπιστήμαις ὁρῶμεν ὂν αἴτιον, δι' ὃ καὶ πᾶς νοῦς καὶ

[1] In the sense of genus of various species.
[2] λόγοι ἀριθμῶν - ratios of numbers.
[3] τ. φανερῶν - sensible things.
[4] διὰ κενῆς λέγομεν = κενολογοῦμεν (is empty talk).

πᾶσα φύσις ποιεῖ, οὐδὲ ταύτης τῆς αἰτίας, ἣν φαμεν εἶναι μίαν τῶν ἀρχῶν, οὐθὲν ἅπτεται τὰ εἴδη, ἀλλὰ γέγονε τὰ μαθήματα τοῖς νῦν [1] ἡ φιλοσοφία, φασκόντων ἄλλων χάριν αὐτὰ δεῖν πραγματεύεσθαι.

3—SUBSTANCE

What "is" in the primary sense is substance

533—a. *Metaph.* Z 1, 1028 a$^{10-20, 29-31}$:

Τὸ ὂν λέγεται πολλαχῶς, καθάπερ διειλόμεθα πρότερον ἐν τοῖς περὶ τοῦ ποσαχῶς [2]· σημαίνει γὰρ τὸ μὲν τί ἐστι καὶ τόδε τι [3], τὸ δὲ ποιὸν ἢ ποσὸν ἢ τῶν ἄλλων ἕκαστον τῶν οὕτω κατηγορουμένων. τοσαυταχῶς δὲ λεγομένου τοῦ ὄντος φανερὸν ὅτι τούτων πρῶτον ὂν τὸ τί ἐστιν, ὅπερ σημαίνει τὴν οὐσίαν (ὅταν μὲν γὰρ εἴπωμεν ποιόν τι τόδε, ἢ ἀγαθὸν λέγομεν ἢ κακόν, ἀλλ' οὐ τρίπηχυ ἢ ἄνθρωπον· ὅταν δὲ τί ἐστιν, οὐ λευκὸν οὐδὲ θερμὸν οὐδὲ τρίπηχυ, ἀλλὰ ἄνθρωπον ἢ θεόν), τὰ δ' ἄλλα λέγεται ὄντα τῷ τοῦ οὕτως ὄντος τὰ μὲν ποσότητες εἶναι [4], τὰ δὲ ποιότητες, τὰ δὲ πάθη, τὰ δὲ ἄλλο τι. — Δῆλον οὖν ὅτι διὰ ταύτην [5] κἀκείνων ἕκαστον ἔστιν, ὥστε τὸ πρώτως ὂν καὶ οὐ τὶ ὂν ἀλλ' ὂν ἁπλῶς ἡ οὐσία ἂν εἴη.

Substance is primary in definition, in knowledge and in time

b. Ib., 1028 a^{31}-b ^{2}:

Πολλαχῶς μὲν οὖν λέγεται τὸ πρῶτον· ὅμως δὲ πάντως ἡ οὐσία πρῶτον, καὶ λόγῳ καὶ γνώσει καὶ χρόνῳ. τῶν μὲν γὰρ ἄλλων κατηγορημάτων οὐθὲν χωριστόν, αὕτη δὲ μόνη· καὶ τῷ λόγῳ δὲ τοῦτο πρῶτον (ἀνάγκη γὰρ ἐν τῷ ἑκάστου λόγῳ τὸν τῆς οὐσίας ἐνυπάρχειν)· καὶ εἰδέναι δὲ τότ' οἰόμεθα ἕκαστον μάλιστα, ὅταν τί ἐστιν ὁ ἄνθρωπος γνῶμεν ἢ τὸ πῦρ, μᾶλλον ἢ τὸ ποιὸν ἢ τὸ ποσὸν ἢ τὸ πού, ἐπεί καὶ αὐτῶν τούτων τότε ἕκαστον ἴσμεν, ὅταν τί ἐστι τὸ ποσὸν ἢ τὸ ποιὸν γνῶμεν.

The eternal question "What is being" means "What is substance"

c. Ib., 1028 b$^{2-4}$:

Καὶ δὴ καὶ τὸ πάλαι τε καὶ νῦν καὶ ἀεὶ ζητούμενον καὶ ἀεὶ ἀπορούμενον, τί τὸ ὄν, τοῦτό ἐστι τίς ἡ οὐσία.

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[1] τοῖς νῦν - The reference is certainly to Speusippus, head of the Academy since the death of Plato.

[2] Sc. in Δ 7.

[3] τί ἐστι καὶ τόδε τι - It should be noticed that the author, before coming to his definitive conception of οὐσία, in the beginning of this very book uses the term in exactly the same way as it is used in *Categ.* 5 (our nr. **438a**), namely, not only in the sense of essence or quiddity (τί ἐστι), but also in the sense of *the individual being*.

[4] τῷ - εἶναι: "by the fact that they are, some of them, quantities of that which *is* in this primary sense, others qualities of it", etc.

[5] διὰ ταύτην - sc. τ. πρώτην κατηγορίαν.

534—Having first qualified οὐσία as τί ἐστι or as τόδε τι, Ar. now proceeds to ask whether, then, natural bodies and their parts are substances (as he seems inclined to admit [1]), or something else next to them (e.g. Ideas and mathematical objects), or even not these but some other things.

Are natural bodies and their parts substances?

Metaph. Z 2, 1028 b$^{8-15}$:

Δοκεῖ δ' ἡ οὐσία ὑπάρχειν φανερώτατα μὲν τοῖς σώμασιν (διὸ τά τε ζῷα καὶ τὰ φυτὰ καὶ τὰ μόρια αὐτῶν οὐσίας εἶναί φαμεν, καὶ τὰ φυσικὰ σώματα, οἷον πῦρ καὶ ὕδωρ καὶ γῆν καὶ τῶν τοιούτων ἕκαστον, καὶ ὅσα ἢ μόρια ἢ τούτων ἢ ἐκ τούτων ἐστὶν ἢ μορίων ἢ πάντων, οἷον ὅ τε οὐρανὸς καὶ τὰ μόρια αὐτοῦ, ἄστρα καὶ σελήνη καὶ ἥλιος)· πότερον δὲ αὗται μόναι οὐσίαι εἰσὶν ἢ καὶ ἄλλαι, ἢ τούτων τινὲς ἢ καὶ ἄλλαι, ἢ τούτων μὲν οὐθὲν ἕτεραι δέ τινες, σκεπτέον.

535—**a.** Four possibilities must be considered.

Four meanings of the term "substance"

Metaph. Z 3, 1028 b$^{33-36}$:

Λέγεται δ' ἡ οὐσία, εἰ μὴ πλεοναχῶς, ἀλλ' ἐν τέτταρσί γε μάλιστα· καὶ γὰρ τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι καὶ τὸ καθόλου καὶ τὸ γένος οὐσία δοκεῖ εἶναι ἑκάστου, καὶ τέταρτον τούτων τὸ ὑποκείμενον.

Can the substratum be substance?

b. Ib., 1028 b^{36}-1029 a^{2}:

Τὸ δ' ὑποκείμενόν ἐστι καθ' οὗ τὰ ἄλλα λέγεται, ἐκεῖνο δὲ αὐτὸ μηκέτι κατ' ἄλλου· διὸ πρῶτον περὶ τούτου διοριστέον· μάλιστα γὰρ δοκεῖ εἶναι οὐσία τὸ ὑποκείμενον πρῶτον.

c. Now matter is defined as that which is nothing in itself: neither a definite being, nor a quantity nor any other thing by which being is qualified (our nr. **476c**). "For there is something of which each of this is predicated"...

Ib., 1029 a$^{26-33}$:

In fact, this consequence is impossible

Ἐκ μὲν οὖν τούτων θεωροῦσι συμβαίνει οὐσίαν εἶναι τὴν ὕλην· ἀδύνατον δέ· καὶ γὰρ τὸ χωριστὸν καὶ τὸ τόδε τι ὑπάρχειν δοκεῖ μάλιστα τῇ οὐσίᾳ, διὸ τὸ εἶδος καὶ τὸ ἐξ ἀμφοῖν οὐσία δόξειεν ἂν εἶναι μᾶλλον τῆς ὕλης. τὴν μὲν τοίνυν ἐξ ἀμφοῖν οὐσίαν, λέγω δὲ τὴν ἔκ τε τῆς ὕλης καὶ τῆς μορφῆς, ἀφετέον, ὑστέρα γὰρ καὶ δῆλη· φανερὰ δέ πως καὶ ἡ ὕλη· περὶ δὲ τῆς τρίτης σκεπτέον, αὕτη γὰρ ἀπορωτάτη.

536—Ar. now proceeds to study essence. He begins with some logical remarks. **Substance as essence**

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[1] Note the expressions φανερώτατα μὲν and φαμεν.

a. The first question is: What is the τί ἦν εἶναι?

Metaph. Z 4, 1029 b13-16:

Meaning of essence

— ἐστὶ τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι ἑκάστου ὃ λέγεται καθ' αὑτό. οὐ γάρ ἐστι τὸ σοὶ εἶναι τὸ μουσικῷ εἶναι· οὐ γὰρ κατὰ σαυτὸν εἶ μουσικός. ὃ ἄρα κατὰ σαυτόν.

b. Only those things have an essence whose account is a definition.

It belongs only to things which can be defined

Ib., 1030 a6-7:

— τὸ τί ἦν εἶναί ἐστιν ὅσων ὁ λόγος ἐστὶν ὁρισμός.

E.g. "white man" cannot be defined, because it is a compound of substance and another category, the essence being "just what something is".

Species only have a definition

c. Ib., 1030 a7-14:

Ὁρισμὸς δ' ἐστὶν οὐκ ἂν ὄνομα λόγῳ ταὐτὸ σημαίνῃ (πάντες γὰρ ἂν εἶεν οἱ λόγοι ὅροι· ἔσται γὰρ ὄνομα ὑτῳοῦν λόγῳ, ὥστε καὶ ἡ Ἰλιὰς ὁρισμὸς ἔσται), ἀλλ' ἐὰν πρώτου τινὸς ᾖ· τοιαῦτα δ' ἐστὶν ὅσα λέγεται μὴ τῷ ἄλλο κατ' ἄλλου λέγεσθαι. οὐκ ἔσται ἄρα οὐδενὶ τῶν μὴ γένους εἰδῶν ὑπάρχον τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι, ἀλλὰ τούτοις μόνον (ταῦτα γὰρ δοκεῖ οὐ κατὰ μετοχὴν λέγεσθαι καὶ πάθος οὐδ' ὡς συμβεβηκός).

Other things only in a secondary sense

d. Ib., 1030 a14-32:

Ἀλλὰ λόγος μὲν ἔσται ἑκάστου καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τί σημαίνει, ἐὰν ᾖ ὄνομα, ὅτι τόδε τῷδε ὑπάρχει, ἢ ἀντὶ λόγου ἁπλοῦ ἀκριβέστερος· ὁρισμὸς δ' οὐκ ἔσται οὐδὲ τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι. ἢ καὶ ὁ ὁρισμὸς ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ τί ἐστι πλεοναχῶς λέγεται; καὶ γὰρ τὸ τί ἐστιν ἕνα μὲν τρόπον σημαίνει τὴν οὐσίαν καὶ τὸ τόδε τι, ἄλλον δὲ ἕκαστον τῶν κατηγορουμένων, ποσὸν ποιὸν καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα τοιαῦτα. ὥσπερ γὰρ καὶ τὸ ἔστιν ὑπάρχει πᾶσιν, ἀλλ' οὐχ ὁμοίως ἀλλὰ τῷ μὲν πρώτως τοῖς δ' ἐπομένως, οὕτω καὶ τὸ τί ἐστιν ἁπλῶς μὲν τῇ οὐσίᾳ πὼς δὲ τοῖς ἄλλοις· καὶ γὰρ τὸ ποιὸν ἐροίμεθ' ἂν τί ἐστιν, ὥστε καὶ τὸ ποιὸν τῶν τί ἐστιν, ἀλλ' οὐχ ἁπλῶς, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος λογικῶς φασί τινες εἶναι τὸ μὴ ὄν, οὐχ ἁπλῶς ἀλλὰ μὴ ὄν, οὕτω καὶ τὸ ποιόν. — δεῖ μὲν οὖν σκοπεῖν καὶ τὸ πῶς δεῖ λέγειν περὶ ἕκαστον, οὐ μὴν μᾶλλόν γε ἢ τὸ πῶς ἔχει· διὸ καὶ νῦν ἐπεὶ τὸ λεγόμενον φανερόν, καὶ τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι ὁμοίως ὑπάρξει πρώτως μὲν καὶ ἁπλῶς τῇ οὐσίᾳ, εἶτα καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις, ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ τί ἐστιν, οὐχ ἁπλῶς τί ἦν εἶναι ἀλλὰ ποιῷ ἢ ποσῷ τί ἦν εἶναι.

Conclusion

e. So in fact definition and essence belong primarily to substance, secondarily to the other categories.

Ib., 1030 b4-7:

Ἐκεῖνο δὲ φανερὸν ὅτι ὁ πρώτως καὶ ἁπλῶς ὁρισμὸς καὶ τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι τῶν οὐσιῶν ἐστίν. οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὁμοίως ἐστί, πλὴν οὐ πρώτως.

537—In the next chapter (5) Ar. deals with some difficulties concerning the definition of τὰ οὐχ ἁπλᾶ, ἀλλὰ συνδεδυασμένα, such as σιμότης, where the definition of "snub" always implies a reference to the substance to which it belongs ("nose"). Ultimately all terms in categories other than substance are shown to be in principle of this type, the definition of them being ἐκ προσθέσεως, i.e. involving a reference to the substance to which they belong.

Metaph. Z 5, 1031 a[1-5]: **The definition of compounds always ἐκ προσθέσεως**

Δῆλον τοίνυν ὅτι μόνης τῆς οὐσίας ἐστὶν ὁ ὁρισμός. εἰ γὰρ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων κατηγοριῶν, ἀνάγκη ἐκ προσθέσεως εἶναι, οἷον τοῦ †ποιοῦ†[1] καὶ περιττοῦ· οὐ γὰρ ἄνευ ἀριθμοῦ, οὐδὲ τὸ θῆλυ ἄνευ ζῴου (τὸ δὲ ἐκ προσθέσεως λέγω ἐν οἷς συμβαίνει δὶς τὸ αὐτὸ λέγειν ὥσπερ ἐν τούτοις).

538—Ar. now raises the question whether a thing is identical with its essence. He answers: Not always. E.g. not in terms formed by a substance coupled with an accidental predicate, such as "white man". But in terms καθ' αὑτό they are the same. E.g. "the Good" itself cannot differ from its essence, nor can "living being".

a. *Metaph.* Z 6, 1031 a[15-18]: **Is each thing = its essence?**

Πότερον δὲ ταὐτόν ἐστιν ἢ ἕτερον τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι καὶ ἕκαστον, σκεπτέον. ἔστι γάρ τι πρὸ ἔργου πρὸς τὴν περὶ τῆς οὐσίας σκέψιν· ἕκαστόν τε γὰρ οὐκ ἄλλο δοκεῖ εἶναι τῆς ἑαυτοῦ οὐσίας, καὶ τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι λέγεται εἶναι ἡ ἑκάστου οὐσία.

b. Ib., 1031 a[19-24]: **Not in the case of accidental unities**

Ἐπὶ μὲν δὴ τῶν λεγομένων κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς δόξειεν ἂν ἕτερον εἶναι, οἷον λευκὸς ἄνθρωπος ἕτερον καὶ τὸ λευκῷ ἀνθρώπῳ εἶναι. εἰ γὰρ τὸ αὐτό, καὶ τὸ ἀνθρώπῳ εἶναι καὶ τὸ λευκῷ ἀνθρώπῳ τὸ αὐτό· τὸ αὐτὸ γὰρ ἄνθρωπος καὶ λευκὸς ἄνθρωπος, ὡς φασίν, ὥστε καὶ τὸ λευκῷ ἀνθρώπῳ καὶ τὸ ἀνθρώπῳ.

c. Ib., 1031 a[28]-b[4], b[11-15]: **but in the case of self-subsistent beings**

30 Ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν καθ' αὑτὰ λεγομένων ἆρ' ἀνάγκη ταὐτὸ εἶναι, οἷον εἴ τινες εἰσὶν οὐσίαι ὧν ἕτεραι μὴ εἰσὶν οὐσίαι μηδὲ φύσεις ἕτεραι πρότεραι, οἵας φασὶ
b τὰς ἰδέας εἶναί τινες; εἰ γὰρ ἔσται ἕτερον αὐτὸ τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ ἀγαθῷ εἶναι, καὶ ζῷον καὶ τὸ ζῴῳ, καὶ τὸ ὄντι καὶ τὸ ὄν, ἔσονται ἄλλαι τε οὐσίαι καὶ φύσεις καὶ ἰδέαι παρὰ τὰς λεγομένας, καὶ πρότεραι οὐσίαι ἐκεῖναι, εἰ τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι οὐσία ἐστίν. καὶ εἰ μὲν ἀπολελυμέναι ἀλλήλων, τῶν μὲν[2] οὐκ ἔσται ἐπιστήμη

[1] ποιοῦ codd. Bonitz conjectured ἀρτίου.
[2] τῶν μὲν - the οὐσίαι.

τὰ δ' [1] οὐκ ἔσται ὄντα. — Ἀνάγκη ἄρα ἓν εἶναι τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἀγαθῷ εἶναι καὶ καλὸν καὶ καλῷ εἶναι, <καὶ> ὅσα μὴ κατ' ἄλλο λέγεται, ἀλλὰ καθ' αὑτὰ καὶ πρῶτα· καὶ γὰρ τοῦτο ἱκανὸν ἂν ὑπάρχῃ, κἂν μὴ ᾖ εἶδη, μᾶλλον δ' ἴσως κἂν ᾖ εἴδη.

Other argument for the identity

d. Ib., 1031 b[18-22]:

Ἔκ τε δὴ τούτων τῶν λόγων ἓν καὶ ταὐτὸ οὐ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς αὐτὸ ἕκαστον καὶ τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι, καὶ ὅτι γε τὸ ἐπίστασθαι ἕκαστον τοῦτό ἐστι, τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι ἐπίστασθαι, ὥστε καὶ κατὰ τὴν ἔκθεσιν [2] ἀνάγκη ἕν τι εἶναι ἄμφω.

The case of accidental terms

e. Ib., 1031 b[22-28]:

(τὸ δὲ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς λεγόμενον, οἷον τὸ μουσικὸν ἢ λευκόν, διὰ τὸ διττὸν σημαίνειν οὐκ ἀληθὲς εἰπεῖν ὡς ταὐτὸ τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι καὶ αὐτό· καὶ γὰρ ᾧ συμβέβηκε λευκὸν καὶ τὸ συμβεβηκός [3], ὥστ' ἔστι μὲν ὡς ταὐτόν, ἔστι δὲ ὡς οὐ ταὐτὸ τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι καὶ αὐτό· τῷ μὲν γὰρ ἀνθρώπῳ καὶ τῷ λευκῷ ἀνθρώπῳ οὐ ταὐτό, τῷ πάθει δὲ ταὐτό [4]).

Conclusion

f. Ib., 1032 a[4-6]:

Ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἐπὶ τῶν πρώτων καὶ καθ' αὑτὰ λεγομένων τὸ ἑκάστῳ εἶναι καὶ ἕκαστον τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ ἕν ἐστι, δῆλον.

Essence and definition

539—After a digression on the various kinds of becoming (ch. 7-9), Ar. now raises the question as to what belongs to the essence, and therefore to the definition. Should the definition of a whole contain the definitions of the parts?

Whole and parts

a. *Metaph.* Z 10, 1034 b[20-28]:

Ἐπεὶ δὲ ὁ ὁρισμὸς λόγος [5] ἐστί, πᾶς δὲ λόγος μέρη ἔχει, ὡς δὲ ὁ λόγος πρὸς τὸ πρᾶγμα, καὶ τὸ μέρος τοῦ λόγου πρὸς τὸ μέρος τοῦ πράγματος ὁμοίως ἔχει, ἀπορεῖται ἤδη πότερον δεῖ τὸν τῶν μερῶν λόγον ἐνυπάρχειν ἐν τῷ τοῦ ὅλου λόγῳ ἢ οὔ. ἐπ' ἐνίων μὲν γὰρ φαίνονται ἐνόντες ἐνίων δ' οὔ. τοῦ μὲν γὰρ κύκλου ὁ λόγος οὐκ ἔχει τὸν τῶν τμημάτων, ὁ δὲ τῆς συλλαβῆς ἔχει τὸν τῶν στοιχείων· καίτοι διαιρεῖται καὶ ὁ κύκλος εἰς τὰ τμήματα ὥσπερ καὶ ἡ συλλαβὴ εἰς τὰ στοιχεῖα.

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[1] τὰ δὲ - the Ideas themselves, e.g. the Good.

[2] It becomes clear by the exhibition of instances.

[3] "For both that to which the accidental quality belongs, and the accidental quality, are white" (Ross).

[4] But it will be the same as the quality "white".

[5] Ross translates "formula", with reference to *De interpr.* 16 b[26] (our nr. **442a**).

b. Then, are the parts prior to the whole?

Are the parts prior?

Ib., 1034 b28-32:

"Ετι δὲ εἰ πρότερα τὰ μέρη τοῦ ὅλου, τῆς δὲ ὀρθῆς ἡ ὀξεῖα μέρος καὶ ὁ δάκτυλος τοῦ ζῴου, πρότερον ἂν εἴη ἡ ὀξεῖα τῆς ὀρθῆς καὶ ὁ δάκτυλος τοῦ ἀνθρώπου. δοκεῖ δ' ἐκεῖνα εἶναι πρότερα· τῷ λόγῳ γὰρ λέγονται ἐξ ἐκείνων [1], καὶ τῷ εἶναι δὲ ἄνευ ἀλλήλων πρότερα [2].

540—Why, then, is man prior to the finger and a circle to its segments, whereas individual letters are prior to the syllable?—Ar. answers: material parts are not prior, parts of the form are.

a. Ib., 1035 a1-12:

Material parts not prior

Εἰ οὖν ἐστὶ τὸ μὲν ὕλη τὸ δὲ εἶδος τὸ δ' ἐκ τούτων, καὶ οὐσία ἥ τε ὕλη καὶ τὸ εἶδος καὶ τὸ ἐκ τούτων, ἔστι μὲν ὡς καὶ ἡ ὕλη μέρος τινὸς λέγεται, ἔστι δ' ὡς οὔ, ἀλλ' ἐξ ὧν ὁ τοῦ εἴδους λόγος [3]. οἷον τῆς μὲν κοιλότητος οὐκ ἔστι μέρος ἡ σάρξ (αὕτη γὰρ ἡ ὕλη ἐφ' ἧς γίγνεται), τῆς δὲ σιμότητος μέρος· καὶ τοῦ μὲν συνόλου ἀνδριάντος μέρος ὁ χαλκὸς τοῦ δ' ὡς εἴδους λεγομένου ἀνδριάντος οὔ (λεκτέον γὰρ τὸ εἶδος καὶ ᾗ εἶδος ἔχει ἕκαστον [4], τὸ δ' ὑλικὸν οὐδέποτε καθ' αὑτὸ λεκτέον [5])· διὸ ὁ μὲν τοῦ κύκλου λόγος οὐκ ἔχει τὸν τῶν τμημάτων, ὁ δὲ τῆς συλλαβῆς ἔχει τὸν τῶν στοιχείων· τὰ μὲν γὰρ στοιχεῖα τοῦ λόγου μέρη τοῦ εἴδους καὶ οὐχ ὕλη, τὰ δὲ τμήματα οὕτως μέρη ὡς ὕλη ἐφ' ἧς ἐπιγίγνεται.

b. So parts of the definition are prior. E.g. the acute angle is not a preceding part of the right angle, but the right angle is logically prior. For the acute angle is defined as being smaller than the right angle.

E.g. the acute angle

Ib., 1035 b4-8:

"Οσα μὲν γὰρ τοῦ λόγου μέρη καὶ εἰς ἃ διαιρεῖται ὁ λόγος, ταῦτα πρότερα ἢ πάντα ἢ ἔνια· ὁ δὲ τῆς ὀρθῆς λόγος οὐ διαιρεῖται εἰς ὀξείας λόγον [6], ἀλλ' ‹ὁ› τῆς ὀξείας εἰς ὀρθήν· χρῆται γὰρ ὁ ὁριζόμενος τὴν ὀξεῖαν τῇ ὀρθῇ· »ἐλάττων« γὰρ »ὀρθῆς« ἡ ὀξεῖα.

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[1] The parts are explained by reference to the whole (ἐξ ἐκείνων λέγονται).

[2] "in respect also of the power of existing apart from each other the wholes are prior to the parts" (Ross).

[3] ἀλλ' ἐξ ὧν etc. - but only the elements of which the formula of the form exists.

[4] τὸ εἶδος καὶ ᾗ εἶδος ἔχει - "the form, or the thing as having form, should be said to be the thing".

[5] τὸ δ' ὑλικὸν οὐδέποτε - "but the material element by itself must never be said to be so".

[6] The formula of the right angle does not include the formula of the acute angle.

c. Other examples and conclusion. Ib. 1035 b[9-14]:

Parts of the definition prior

'Ομοίως δὲ καὶ ὁ κύκλος καὶ τὸ ἡμικύκλιον ἔχουσιν· τὸ γὰρ ἡμικύκλιον τῷ κύκλῳ ὁρίζεται καὶ ὁ δάκτυλος τῷ ὅλῳ· »τὸ« γὰρ »τοιόνδε μέρος ἀνθρώπου« δάκτυλος. ὥσθ' ὅσα μὲν μέρη ὡς ὕλη καὶ εἰς ἃ διαιρεῖται ὡς ὕλην, ὕστερα· ὅσα δὲ ὡς τοῦ λόγου καὶ τῆς οὐσίας τῆς κατὰ τὸν λόγον, πρότερα ἢ πάντα ἢ ἔνια.

d. Thus in living beings, too: parts of the soul have priority, material parts have not.

So in the case of living beings

Ib., 1035 b[14-22]:

'Επεὶ δὲ ἡ τῶν ζῴων ψυχὴ (τοῦτο γὰρ οὐσία τοῦ ἐμψύχου) ἡ κατὰ τὸν λόγον οὐσία καὶ τὸ εἶδος καὶ τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι τῷ τοιῷδε σώματι (ἕκαστον γοῦν τὸ μέρος ἐὰν ὁρίζηται καλῶς, οὐκ ἄνευ τοῦ ἔργου ὁριεῖται, ὃ οὐχ ὑπάρξει ἄνευ αἰσθήσεως), ὥστε τὰ ταύτης μέρη πρότερα ἢ πάντα ἢ ἔνια τοῦ συνόλου ζῴου, καὶ καθ' ἕκαστον δὴ ὁμοίως, τὸ δὲ σῶμα καὶ τὰ τούτου μόρια ὕστερα ταύτης τῆς οὐσίας, καὶ διαιρεῖται εἰς ταῦτα ὡς εἰς ὕλην οὐχ ἡ οὐσία ἀλλὰ τὸ σύνολον.

541—To the question whether matter should be admitted into the definition of physical beings, these being essentially composed of form and matter, Ar. answers: no, matter does not enter into the definition.

a. Ib., 1035 b[27-31]:

matter the individuating principle

'Ο δ' ἄνθρωπος καὶ ὁ ἵππος καὶ τὰ οὕτως ἐπὶ τῶν καθ' ἕκαστα, καθόλου δέ [1], οὐκ ἔστιν οὐσία ἀλλὰ σύνολόν τι ἐκ τουδὶ τοῦ λόγου καὶ τησδὶ τῆς ὕλης ὡς καθόλου· καθ' ἕκαστον δ' ἐκ τῆς ἐσχάτης ὕλης ὁ Σωκράτης ἤδη ἐστίν, καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὁμοίως.

In the last sentence (καθ' ἕκαστον δὲ e.q.s.) matter is qualified as the principle of individuation: "As to the individual, immediately after the ultimate matter Socrates comes in".

Only parts of the form are parts of the definition

b. Ib., 1035 b[31]-1036 a[2]:

Μέρος μὲν οὖν ἐστὶ καὶ τοῦ εἴδους (εἶδος δὲ λέγω τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι) καὶ τοῦ συνόλου τοῦ ἐκ τοῦ εἴδους καὶ τῆς ὕλης <καὶ τῆς ὕλης> αὐτῆς. ἀλλὰ τοῦ λόγου μέρη τὰ τοῦ εἴδους μόνον ἐστίν, ὁ δὲ λόγος ἐστὶ τοῦ καθόλου· τὸ γὰρ κύκλῳ εἶναι καὶ κύκλος καὶ ψυχῇ εἶναι καὶ ψυχὴ ταὐτό.

Concrete things not definable

c. Ib., 1036 a[2-8]:

Τοῦ δὲ συνόλου ἤδη, οἷον κύκλου τουδὶ καὶ τῶν καθ' ἕκαστά τινος ἢ αἰσθητοῦ

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[1] τὰ οὕτως ἐπὶ τῶν καθ' ἕκαστα etc. - terms which are thus applied to individuals, but universally.

ἢ νοητοῦ — λέγω δὲ νοητοὺς μὲν οἷον τοὺς μαθηματικούς, αἰσθητοὺς δὲ οἷον τοὺς χαλκοῦς καὶ τοὺς ξυλίνους — τούτων δὲ οὐκ ἔστιν ὁρισμός, ἀλλὰ μετὰ νοήσεως ἢ αἰσθήσεως γνωρίζονται, ἀπελθόντες δὲ ἐκ τῆς ἐντελεχείας [1] οὐ δῆλον πότερον εἰσὶν ἢ οὐκ εἰσίν· ἀλλ' ἀεὶ λέγονται καὶ γνωρίζονται τῷ καθόλου λόγῳ.

d. Ib., 1036 a$^{8-12}$: ὕλη αἰσθητή and ὕλη νοητή

Ἡ δ' ὕλη ἄγνωστος καθ' αὑτήν. ὕλη δὲ ἡ μὲν αἰσθητή ἐστιν ἡ δὲ νοητή, αἰσθητὴ μὲν οἷον χαλκὸς καὶ ξύλον καὶ ὅση κινητὴ ὕλη, νοητὴ δὲ ἡ ἐν τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς ὑπάρχουσα μὴ ᾗ αἰσθητά, οἷον τὰ μαθηματικά.

ὕλη νοητή is identified by Alexander with extension.

542—Ar. now proceeds to discuss the question why that, the account of which is a definition, is one.

E.g.: why is "two-footed animal" one and not two? "Man" and "white" are two when the one does not belong to the other, one when it does. But in "two-footed animal" one element does not share in the other; the genus does not share in the differentiae (else it would share in contraries at the same time). And even if it were to share in its differentiae, the same difficulty would arise, for the differentiae of man are more than one: possessed of feet, two-footed, wingless. Why, then, are these one?

Ar. answers: ζῷον is the genus, δίπουν the differentia. But this difference is to be divided again, and again, until the indivisible species is reached. The last difference will be the substance and definition of the thing.

Metaph. Z 12, 1038 a$^{16-20}$:

Οὕτως ἀεὶ βούλεται βαδίζειν ἕως ἂν ἔλθῃ εἰς τὰ ἀδιάφορα· τότε δ' ἔσονται τοσαῦτα εἴδη ποδὸς ὅσαιπερ αἱ διαφοραί, καὶ τὰ ὑπόποδα ζῷα ἴσα ταῖς διαφοραῖς. εἰ δὴ ταῦτα οὕτως ἔχει, φανερὸν ὅτι ἡ τελευταία διαφορὰ ἡ οὐσία τοῦ πράγματος ἔσται καὶ ὁ ὁρισμός.

So the last difference constitutes the unity of the subject of a definition.

543—The author now comes to his conclusions from the preceding points (ch. 13-17).

a. First, the universal cannot be a substance.

Ib. Z 13, 1038 b$^{8-16}$: No universal a substance

Ἔοικε γὰρ ἀδύνατον εἶναι οὐσίαν εἶναι ὁτιοῦν τῶν καθόλου λεγομένων.
10 Πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ οὐσία ἑκάστου ἡ ἴδιος ἑκάστῳ, ἣ οὐχ ὑπάρχει ἄλλῳ, τὸ δὲ καθόλου κοινόν· τοῦτο γὰρ λέγεται καθόλου ὃ πλείοσιν ὑπάρχειν πέφυκεν. τίνος οὖν οὐσία τοῦτ' ἔσται; ἢ γὰρ πάντων ἢ οὐδενός, πάντων δ' οὐχ οἷόν τε· First reason

[1] ἀπελθόντες ἐκ τῆς ἐντελεχείας - as soon as they are no more actuated by νόησις or by αἴσθησις.

ἑνὸς δ' εἰ ἔσται, καὶ τἄλλα τοῦτ' ἔσται· ὧν γὰρ μία ἡ οὐσία καὶ τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι ἕν, καὶ αὐτὰ ἕν.

Second reason

Ἔτι οὐσία λέγεται τὸ μὴ καθ' ὑποκειμένου, τὸ δὲ καθόλου καθ' ὑποκειμένου τινὸς λέγεται ἀεί.

b. No substance can consist of substances.

Ib., 1039 a$^{3-10}$:

No substance consists of substances

Ἀδύνατον γὰρ οὐσίαν ἐξ οὐσιῶν εἶναι ἐνυπαρχουσῶν ὡς ἐντελεχείᾳ· τὰ γὰρ δύο οὕτως ἐντελεχείᾳ οὐδέποτε ἓν ἐντελεχείᾳ, ἀλλ' ἐὰν δυνάμει δύο ᾖ, ἔσται ἕν (οἷον ἡ διπλασία ἐκ δύο ἡμίσεων δυνάμει γε· ἡ γὰρ ἐντελέχεια χωρίζει), ὥστ' εἰ ἡ οὐσία ἕν, οὐκ ἔσται ἐξ οὐσιῶν ἐνυπαρχουσῶν καὶ κατὰ τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον, ὃν λέγει Δημόκριτος ὀρθῶς· ἀδύνατον γὰρ εἶναί φησιν ἐκ δύο ἓν ἢ ἐξ ἑνὸς δύο γενέσθαι.

544—The next consequence concerns the theory of Ideas.

Absurd consequences as to the Ideas

Metaph. Z 14, 1039 a^{30}-b^{6}, b$^{17-19}$:

Εἰ οὖν ἐστί τις ἄνθρωπος αὐτὸς καθ' αὑτὸν τόδε τι καὶ κεχωρισμένον, ἀνάγκη καὶ ἐξ ὧν, οἷον τὸ ζῷον καὶ τὸ δίπουν, τόδε τι σημαίνειν καὶ εἶναι χωριστὰ καὶ οὐσίας· ὥστε καὶ τὸ ζῷον. εἰ μὲν οὖν τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ ἓν τὸ ἐν τῷ ἵππῳ καὶ τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ, ὥσπερ σὺ σαυτῷ, πῶς τὸ ἓν ἐν τοῖς οὖσι χωρὶς ἓν ἔσται, καὶ διὰ τί οὐ καὶ χωρὶς αὐτοῦ ἔσται τὸ ζῷον τοῦτο; ἔπειτα εἰ μὲν μεθέξει τοῦ δίποδος καὶ τοῦ πολύποδος, ἀδύνατόν τι συμβαίνει, τἀναντία γὰρ ἅμα ὑπάρξει αὐτῷ ἑνὶ καὶ τῷδέ τινι ὄντι· εἰ δὲ μή, τίς ὁ τρόπος ὅταν εἴπῃ τις τὸ ζῷον εἶναι δίπουν ἢ πεζόν; ἀλλ' ἴσως σύγκειται καὶ ἅπτεται ἢ μέμικται· ἀλλὰ πάντα ἄτοπα. —

Therefore, Ideas no substances

Εἰ δὴ ἀδύνατον οὕτως ἔχειν, δῆλον ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν εἴδη αὐτῶν οὕτως ὥς τινές φασιν.

545—Another consequence: concrete individual beings are not definable; —therefore, the Ideas, which are said to be separate particulars (!), cannot be defined.

Individual beings not definable

a. *Metaph.* Z 15, 1039 b$^{20-31}$:

Ἐπεὶ δ' ἡ οὐσία ἑτέρα, τό τε σύνολον καὶ ὁ λόγος (λέγω δ' ὅτι ἡ μὲν οὕτως ἐστὶν οὐσία, σὺν τῇ ὕλῃ συνειλημμένος ὁ λόγος, ἡ δ' ὁ λόγος ὅλως), ὅσαι μὲν οὖν οὕτω λέγονται, τούτων μὲν ἔστι φθορά (καὶ γὰρ γένεσις), τοῦ δὲ λόγου οὐκ ἔστιν οὕτως ὥστε φθείρεσθαι (οὐδὲ γὰρ γένεσις, οὐ γὰρ γίγνεται τὸ οἰκίᾳ εἶναι ἀλλὰ τὸ τῇδε τῇ οἰκίᾳ), ἀλλ' ἄνευ γενέσεως καὶ φθορᾶς εἰσὶ καὶ οὐκ εἰσίν· δέδεικται γὰρ ὅτι οὐδεὶς ταῦτα γεννᾷ οὐδὲ ποιεῖ. διὰ τοῦτο δὲ καὶ τῶν οὐσιῶν τῶν αἰσθητῶν τῶν καθ' ἕκαστα οὔτε ὁρισμὸς οὔτε ἀπόδειξις ἔστιν, ὅτι ἔχουσιν ὕλην ἧς ἡ φύσις τοιαύτη ὥστ' ἐνδέχεσθαι καὶ εἶναι καὶ μή· διὸ φθαρτὰ πάντα τὰ καθ' ἕκαστα αὐτῶν.

b. Ib., 1040 a$^{8-9}$: **Therefore, no definition of Ideas**

Οὐδὲ δὴ ἰδέαν οὐδεμίαν ἔστιν ὁρίσασθαι. τῶν γὰρ καθ' ἕκαστον ἡ ἰδέα, ὡς φασί, καὶ χωριστή.

A very strange conclusion, which, really, does not redound to the credit of its author.

546—Two wrong views about substance.

a. *Metaph.* Z 16, 1040 b$^{5-10}$: **Most so-called substances are potentialities**

Φανερὸν δὲ ὅτι καὶ τῶν δοκουσῶν εἶναι οὐσιῶν αἱ πλεῖσται δυνάμεις εἰσί, τά τε μόρια τῶν ζῴων (οὐθὲν γὰρ κεχωρισμένον αὐτῶν ἐστίν· ὅταν δὲ χωρισθῇ, καὶ τότε ὄντα ὡς ὕλη πάντα) καὶ γῆ καὶ πῦρ καὶ ἀήρ· οὐδὲν γὰρ αὐτῶν ἕν ἐστιν, ἀλλ' οἷον σωρός, πρὶν ἢ πεφθῇ καὶ γένηταί τι ἐξ αὐτῶν ἕν.

b. Ib., b $^{16-27}$: **Unity and being are no substances**

Ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ ἓν λέγεται ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ ὄν, καὶ ἡ οὐσία ἡ τοῦ ἑνὸς μία, καὶ ὧν μία ἀριθμῷ ἓν ἀριθμῷ [1], φανερὸν ὅτι οὔτε τὸ ἓν οὔτε τὸ ὂν ἐνδέχεται οὐσίαν εἶναι τῶν πραγμάτων, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ τὸ στοιχείῳ εἶναι ἢ ἀρχῇ· ἀλλὰ ζητοῦμεν τίς οὖν ἡ ἀρχή, ἵνα εἰς γνωριμώτερον ἀναγάγωμεν. μᾶλλον μὲν οὖν τούτων [2] οὐσία τὸ ὂν καὶ ἓν ἢ ἥ τε ἀρχὴ καὶ τὸ στοιχεῖον καὶ τὸ αἴτιον, οὕπω δὲ οὐδὲ ταῦτα, εἴπερ μηδ' ἄλλο κοινὸν μηδὲν οὐσία· οὐδενὶ γὰρ ὑπάρχει ἡ οὐσία ἀλλ' ἢ αὐτῇ τε καὶ τῷ ἔχοντι αὐτήν, οὗ ἐστιν οὐσία. ἔτι τὸ ἓν πολλαχῇ οὐκ ἂν εἴη ἅμα, τὸ δὲ κοινὸν ἅμα πολλαχῇ ὑπάρχει· ὥστε δῆλον ὅτι οὐδὲν τῶν καθόλου ὑπάρχει παρὰ τὰ καθ' ἕκαστα χωρίς.

To the question why a thing is, and why it is one, Plato answered: because it participates of being and of unity. Ar. rejects this answer, for the "one" and "being" are no substances. They are κοινά, being predicated of all things.

547—Ar.'s final view of substance: substance is "form" or "quiddity".

a. Ar. now again asks the question: Why is a thing what it is? E.g. why are these stones etc. a house?

Metaph. Z 17, 1041 a$^{26-32}$: **Why is a thing what it is?**

Διὰ τί ταδί, οἷον πλίνθοι καὶ λίθοι, οἰκία ἐστίν; φανερὸν τοίνυν ὅτι ζητεῖ τὸ αἴτιον· τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶ τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι, ὡς εἰπεῖν λογικῶς, ὃ ἐπ' ἐνίων μέν ἐστι τίνος ἕνεκα, οἷον ἴσως ἐπ' οἰκίας ἢ κλίνης, ἐπ' ἐνίων δὲ τί ἐκίνησε πρῶτον· αἴτιον γὰρ καὶ τοῦτο. ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν τοιοῦτον αἴτιον ἐπὶ τοῦ γίγνεσθαι ζητεῖται καὶ φθείρεσθαι, θάτερον δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ εἶναι.

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[1] ὧν μία ἀριθμῷ ἓν ἀριθμῷ - as things whose substance is numerically one are numerically one, —

[2] τούτων - partitively: of these concepts.

b. The question really means: why is this material a certain thing?

Because the quiddity belongs to it

Ib., 1041 b$^{4-9}$:

Ἐπεὶ δὲ δεῖ ἔχειν τε καὶ ὑπάρχειν τὸ εἶναι, δῆλον δὴ ὅτι τὴν ὕλην ζητεῖ διὰ τί <τί> ἐστιν· οἷον οἰκία ταδὶ διὰ τί; ὅτι ὑπάρχει ὃ ἦν οἰκίᾳ εἶναι. καὶ ἄνθρωπος τοδί, ἢ τὸ σῶμα τοῦτο τοδὶ ἔχον. ὥστε τὸ αἴτιον ζητεῖται τῆς ὕλης (τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶ τὸ εἶδος) ᾧ τί ἐστιν· τοῦτο δ' ἡ οὐσία.

This, then, is Ar.'s final answer to the question: what substance is.

4—POTENCY AND ACTUALITY

548—a. A definition of "potency" in its primary sense ("power") is given in

Primary sense of the term δύναμις

Metaph. Θ 1, 1046 a^{11}:

ἀρχὴ μεταβολῆς ἐν ἄλλῳ ἢ ᾗ ἄλλο.

"a source of change in another thing, or in the thing itself *qua* other".

b. From this primary sense the author derives (a) the potency of being acted on by another or by the thing itself *qua* other; and (b) insusceptibility to change for the worse by the agency of another thing, etc.

Derivated notions

Ib., 1046 a$^{11-16}$:

Ἡ μὲν γὰρ τοῦ παθεῖν ἐστι δύναμις, ἡ ἐν αὐτῷ τῷ πάσχοντι ἀρχὴ μεταβολῆς παθητικῆς ὑπ' ἄλλου ἢ ᾗ ἄλλο· ἡ δ' ἕξις ἀπαθείας τῆς ἐπὶ τὸ χεῖρον καὶ φθορᾶς τῆς ὑπ' ἄλλου ἢ ᾗ ἄλλο ὑπ' ἀρχῆς μεταβλητικῆς. ἐν γὰρ τούτοις ἔνεστι πᾶσι τοῖς ὅροις ὁ τῆς πρώτης δυνάμεως λόγος.

c. Ar. wants to distinguish the notion of "power" of the term δύναμις from the notion of "potentiality". This sense of the term is explained in ch. 6 of the same book,

Potentiality

1048 a$^{32-35}$:

Λέγομεν δὲ δυνάμει (sc. ὑπάρχειν τὸ πρᾶγμα) οἷον ἐν τῷ ξύλῳ Ἑρμῆν καὶ ἐν τῇ ὅλῃ τὴν ἡμίσειαν, ὅτι ἀφαιρεθείη ἄν, καὶ ἐπιστήμονα καὶ τὸν μὴ θεωροῦντα, ἂν δυνατὸς ᾖ θεωρῆσαι.

549—Ar. continues speaking on potency in the sense of "power".

Rational and non-rational powers

Metaph. Θ 2, 1046 a^{36}-b^{9}, $^{15-20}$:

Ἐπεὶ δ' αἱ μὲν ἐν τοῖς ἀψύχοις ἐνυπάρχουσιν ἀρχαὶ τοιαῦται, αἱ δ' ἐν τοῖς ἐμψύχοις καὶ ἐν ψυχῇ καὶ τῆς ψυχῆς ἐν τῷ λόγον ἔχοντι, δῆλον ὅτι καὶ τῶν b δυνάμεων αἱ μὲν ἔσονται ἄλογοι αἱ δὲ μετὰ λόγου· διὸ πᾶσαι αἱ τέχναι καὶ αἱ ποιητικαὶ ἐπιστῆμαι δυνάμεις εἰσίν· ἀρχαὶ γὰρ μεταβλητικαί εἰσιν ἐν ἄλλῳ ἢ ᾗ ἄλλο. καὶ αἱ μὲν μετὰ λόγου πᾶσαι τῶν ἐναντίων αἱ αὐταί, αἱ δὲ ἄλογοι μία

ἑνός, οἷον τὸ θερμὸν τοῦ θερμαίνειν μόνον ἡ δὲ ἰατρικὴ νόσου καὶ ὑγιείας. αἴτιον δὲ ὅτι λόγος ἐστὶν ἡ ἐπιστήμη, ὁ δὲ λόγος ὁ αὐτὸς δηλοῖ τὸ πρᾶγμα καὶ τὴν στέρησιν. — Ἐπεὶ δὲ τὰ ἐναντία οὐκ ἐγγίγνεται ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ, ἡ δ' ἐπιστήμη δύναμις τῷ λόγον ἔχειν, καὶ ἡ ψυχὴ κινήσεως ἔχει ἀρχήν, τὸ μὲν ὑγιεινὸν ὑγίειαν μόνον ποιεῖ καὶ τὸ θερμαντικὸν θερμότητα καὶ τὸ ψυκτικὸν ψυχρότητα, ὁ δ' ἐπιστήμων ἄμφω.

550—The existence of any "potential being" when there is no actuality, is denied by the Megarian school [1]. Ar. defends his theory against this attack.

a. *Metaph.* Θ 3, 1046 b$^{29-33}$:

The attack of the Megarian school

Εἰσὶ δέ τινες οἱ φασιν, οἷον οἱ Μεγαρικοί, ὅταν ἐνεργῇ μόνον δύνασθαι [2], ὅταν δὲ μὴ ἐνεργῇ οὐ δύνασθαι, οἷον τὸν μὴ οἰκοδομοῦντα οὐ δύνασθαι οἰκοδομεῖν, ἀλλὰ τὸν οἰκοδομοῦντα ὅταν οἰκοδομῇ· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων. οἷς τὰ συμβαίνοντα ἄτοπα οὐ χαλεπὸν ἰδεῖν.

b. Ib., 1046 b^{33}-1047 a^{17}:

Absurd consequences of this theory

Δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι οὔτ' οἰκοδόμος ἔσται ἐὰν μὴ οἰκοδομῇ (τὸ γὰρ οἰκοδόμῳ εἶναι τὸ δυνατῷ εἶναί ἐστιν οἰκοδομεῖν), ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων τεχνῶν. εἰ οὖν ἀδύνατον τὰς τοιαύτας ἔχειν τέχνας μὴ μαθόντα ποτὲ καὶ λαβόντα, καὶ μὴ ἔχειν μὴ ἀποβαλόντα ποτέ (ἢ γὰρ λήθῃ ἢ πάθει τινὶ ἢ χρόνῳ· οὐ γὰρ δὴ τοῦ γε πράγματος φθαρέντος, ἀεὶ γὰρ ἔστιν), ὅταν παύσηται, οὐχ ἕξει τὴν τέχνην, πάλιν δ' εὐθὺς οἰκοδομήσει πῶς λαβών;

Καὶ τὰ ἄψυχα δὴ ὁμοίως· οὔτε γὰρ ψυχρὸν οὔτε θερμὸν οὔτε γλυκὺ οὔτε ὅλως αἰσθητὸν οὐθὲν ἔσται μὴ αἰσθανομένων· ὥστε τὸν Πρωταγόρου λόγον [3] συμβήσεται λέγειν αὐτοῖς. ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδ' αἴσθησιν ἕξει οὐδὲν ἂν μὴ αἰσθάνηται μηδ' ἐνεργῇ. εἰ οὖν τυφλὸν τὸ μὴ ἔχον ὄψιν, πεφυκὸς δὲ καὶ ὅτε πέφυκε καὶ ἔτι ὄν, οἱ αὐτοὶ τυφλοὶ ἔσονται πολλάκις τῆς ἡμέρας, καὶ κωφοί.

Ἔτι εἰ ἀδύνατον τὸ ἐστερημένον δυνάμεως, τὸ μὴ γιγνόμενον ἀδύνατον ἔσται γενέσθαι· τὸ δ' ἀδύνατον γενέσθαι ὁ λέγων ἢ εἶναι ἢ ἔσεσθαι ψεύσεται (τὸ γὰρ ἀδύνατον τοῦτο ἐσήμαινεν), ὥστε οὗτοι οἱ λόγοι ἐξαιροῦσι καὶ κίνησιν καὶ γένεσιν. ἀεὶ γὰρ τό τε ἑστηκὸς ἑστήξεται καὶ τὸ καθήμενον καθεδεῖται· οὐ γὰρ ἀναστήσεται ἂν καθέζηται· ἀδύνατον γὰρ ἔσται ἀναστῆναι ὅ γε μὴ δύναται ἀναστῆναι.

551—Ar. now proceeds to explain what actuality is.

Actuality

a. *Metaph.* Θ 6, 1048 a$^{30-32, 35}$:

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[1] See our nrs. **234** and **235.**

[2] ὅταν ἐνεργῇ μόνον δύνασθαι - "that there is only δύναμις when there is ἐνέργεια".

[3] τὸν Πρωταγόρου λόγον - see our nr. **171.**

Ἔστι δὴ ἐνέργεια τὸ ὑπάρχειν τὸ πρᾶγμα μὴ οὕτως ὥσπερ λέγομεν δυνάμει [1]. — τὸ δὲ [2] ἐνεργείᾳ.

b. The author wishes to explain the thing by instances, not by definition. He apologizes for this method.

Explained by instances

Ib., 1048 a[35]-b[5]:

Δῆλον δ' ἐπὶ τῶν καθ' ἕκαστα τῇ ἐπαγωγῇ ὃ βουλόμεθα λέγειν, καὶ οὐ δεῖ παντὸς ὅρον ζητεῖν ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ ἀνάλογον συνορᾶν, ὅτι ὡς τὸ οἰκοδομοῦν πρὸς τὸ οἰκοδομικόν [3], καὶ τὸ ἐγρηγορὸς πρὸς τὸ καθεῦδον, καὶ τὸ ὁρῶν πρὸς τὸ μῦον μὲν ὄψιν δὲ ἔχον, καὶ τὸ ἀποκεκριμένον ἐκ τῆς ὕλης πρὸς τὴν ὕλην, καὶ τὸ ἀπειργασμένον πρὸς τὸ ἀνέργαστον. ταύτης δὲ τῆς διαφορᾶς θατέρῳ μορίῳ ἔστω ἡ ἐνέργεια ἀφωρισμένη θατέρῳ δὲ τὸ δυνατόν.

Difference between movement and actuality

552—Potential being must be actualized by a moving cause; but movement as such is not really action, or not complete action. It is actuality only when the end is present in it.

Ib., 1048 b[18-35]:

Ἐπεὶ δὲ τῶν πράξεων ὧν ἔστι πέρας οὐδεμία τέλος ἀλλὰ τῶν περὶ τὸ τέλος, οἷον τὸ ἰσχναίνειν ἡ ἰσχνασία [αὐτό], αὐτὰ δὲ [4] ὅταν ἰσχναίνῃ οὕτως ἐστὶν ἐν κινήσει, μὴ ὑπάρχοντα ὧν ἕνεκα ἡ κίνησις [5], οὐκ ἔστι ταῦτα πρᾶξις ἢ οὐ τελεία γε (οὐ γὰρ τέλος)· ἀλλ' ἐκείνη <ᾗ> ἐνυπάρχει τὸ τέλος καὶ [ἡ] πρᾶξις. οἷον ὁρᾷ ἅμα <καὶ ἑώρακε>, καὶ φρονεῖ <καὶ πεφρόνηκε,> καὶ νοεῖ καὶ νενόηκεν· ἀλλ' οὐ μανθάνει καὶ μεμάθηκεν οὐδ' ὑγιάζεται καὶ ὑγίασται. εὖ ζῇ καὶ εὖ ἔζηκεν ἅμα, καὶ εὐδαιμονεῖ καὶ εὐδαιμόνηκεν. εἰ δὲ μή, ἔδει ἄν ποτε παύεσθαι ὥσπερ ὅταν ἰσχναίνῃ, νῦν δ' οὔ, ἀλλὰ ζῇ καὶ ἔζηκεν. τούτων δὴ <δεῖ> τὰς μὲν κινήσεις λέγειν, τὰς δ' ἐνεργείας. πᾶσα γὰρ κίνησις ἀτελής, ἰσχνασία μάθησις βάδισις οἰκοδόμησις· αὗται δὴ κινήσεις, καὶ ἀτελεῖς γε. οὐ γὰρ ἅμα βαδίζει καὶ βεβάδικεν, οὐδ' οἰκοδομεῖ καὶ ᾠκοδόμηκεν, οὐδὲ γίγνεται καὶ γέγονεν ἢ κινεῖται καὶ κεκίνηται, ἀλλ' ἕτερον, καὶ κινεῖ καὶ κεκίνηκεν· ἑώρακε δὲ καὶ ὁρᾷ ἅμα τὸ αὐτό, καὶ νοεῖ καὶ νενόηκεν. τὴν μὲν οὖν τοιαύτην ἐνέργειαν λέγω, ἐκείνην δὲ κίνησιν.

553—When is one thing the potency of another? E.g. can we say that earth is potentially a man, or even that sperma is?

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[1] Here follows the description of the δυνάμει ὄν, cited sub **548c**.
[2] The thing which stands in contrast to this.
[3] τὸ οἰκοδομικόν - that which is capable of building.
[4] αὐτὰ δὲ - the bodies.
[5] μὴ ὑπάρχοντα etc. - without being already that at which the movement aims.

a. *Metaph.* Θ 7, 1048 b^{37}-1049 a^{5}: **When does a thing exist potentially?**

Πότε δὲ δυνάμει ἔστιν ἕκαστον καὶ πότε οὔ, διοριστέον· οὐ γὰρ ὁποτεοῦν. οἷον ἡ γῆ ἆρ' ἐστὶ δυνάμει ἄνθρωπος; ἢ οὔ, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ὅταν ἤδη γένηται σπέρμα, καὶ οὐδὲ τότε ἴσως; ὥσπερ οὖν οὐδ' ὑπὸ ἰατρικῆς ἅπαν ἂν ὑγιασθείη οὐδ' ἀπὸ τύχης, ἀλλ' ἔστι τι ὃ δυνατόν ἐστι, καὶ τοῦτ' ἔστιν ὑγιαῖνον δυνάμει.

b. Ar. distinguished two ways of passing from potentiality into actuality: (1) ἀπὸ διανοίας, i.e. by art, (2) in natural beings by an immanent principle (ἐν αὐτῷ τῷ ἔχοντι).

Ib., 1049 a$^{5-12}$: **In products of art**

Ὅρος δὲ τοῦ μὲν ἀπὸ διανοίας ἐντελεχείᾳ γιγνομένου ἐκ τοῦ δυνάμει ὄντος, ὅταν βουληθέντος γίγνηται μηθενὸς κωλύοντος τῶν ἐκτός, ἐκεῖ δ' ἐν τῷ ὑγιαζομένῳ, ὅταν μηθὲν κωλύῃ τῶν ἐν αὐτῷ· ὁμοίως δὲ δυνάμει καὶ οἰκία· εἰ μηθὲν κωλύει τῶν ἐν τούτῳ καὶ τῇ ὕλῃ τοῦ γίγνεσθαι οἰκίαν, οὐδ' ἔστιν ὃ δεῖ προσγενέσθαι ἢ ἀπογενέσθαι ἢ μεταβαλεῖν, τοῦτο δυνάμει οἰκία· καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὡσαύτως ὅσων ἔξωθεν ἡ ἀρχὴ τῆς γενέσεως.

c. Ib., 1049 a$^{13-18}$: **In natural beings**

Καὶ ὅσων δὴ ἐν αὐτῷ τῷ ἔχοντι, ὅσα μηθενὸς τῶν ἔξωθεν ἐμποδίζοντος ἔσται δι' αὐτοῦ· οἷον τὸ σπέρμα οὔπω (δεῖ γὰρ ἐν ἄλλῳ <πεσεῖν> καὶ μεταβάλλειν), ὅταν δ' ἤδη διὰ τῆς αὐτοῦ ἀρχῆς ᾖ τοιοῦτον, ἤδη τοῦτο δυνάμει· ἐκεῖνο δὲ [1] ἑτέρας ἀρχῆς δεῖται, ὥσπερ ἡ γῆ οὔπω ἀνδριὰς δυνάμει (μεταβαλοῦσα γὰρ ἔσται χαλκός).

554—Actuality is prior to potency in the broadest sense.

a. *Metaph.* Θ 8, 1049 b$^{4-12}$: **Actuality prior to potency**

Ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ πρότερον διώρισται ποσαχῶς λέγεται [2], φανερὸν ὅτι πρότερον ἐνέργεια δυνάμεώς ἐστιν. λέγω δὲ δυνάμεως οὐ μόνον τῆς ὡρισμένης ἢ λέγεται ἀρχὴ μεταβλητικὴ ἐν ἄλλῳ ἢ ᾗ ἄλλο, ἀλλ' ὅλως πάσης ἀρχῆς κινητικῆς ἢ στατικῆς. καὶ γὰρ ἡ φύσις ἐν ταὐτῷ ἐστὶν [γίγνεται· ἐν ταὐτῷ γὰρ] γένει τῇ δυνάμει· ἀρχὴ γὰρ κινητική, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐν ἄλλῳ ἀλλ' ἐν αὐτῷ ᾗ αὐτό. — πάσης δὴ τῆς τοιαύτης προτέρα ἐστὶν ἡ ἐνέργεια καὶ λόγῳ καὶ τῇ οὐσίᾳ· χρόνῳ δ' ἔστι μὲν ὡς, ἔστι δὲ ὡς οὔ.

b—First it is logically prior. Ib., 1049 b$^{12-17}$: **1. logically**

Τῷ λόγῳ μὲν οὖν ὅτι προτέρα, δῆλον (τῷ γὰρ ἐνδέχεσθαι ἐνεργῆσαι δυνατόν ἐστι τὸ πρώτως δυνατόν, οἷον λέγω οἰκοδομικὸν τὸ δυνάμενον οἰκοδομεῖν,

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[1] ἐκεῖνο δὲ - in the former state.

[2] διώρισται - namely, in Δ 11.

καὶ ὁρατικὸν τὸ ὁρᾶν, καὶ ὁρατὸν τὸ δυνατὸν ὁρᾶσθαι· ὁ δ' αὐτὸς λόγος καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων, ὥστ' ἀνάγκη τὸν λόγον προϋπάρχειν καὶ τὴν γνῶσιν τῆς γνώσεως).

c. Next, it is prior in time in the following sense.

2. **in time**

Ib., 1049 b[17-27]:

τῷ δὲ χρόνῳ πρότερον ὧδε· τὸ τῷ εἴδει τὸ αὐτὸ ἐνεργοῦν πρότερον, ἀριθμῷ δ' οὔ. λέγω δὲ τοῦτο ὅτι τοῦδε μὲν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου τοῦ ἤδη ὄντος κατ' ἐνέργειαν καὶ τοῦ σίτου καὶ τοῦ ὁρῶντος πρότερον τῷ χρόνῳ ἡ ὕλη καὶ τὸ σπέρμα καὶ τὸ ὁρατικόν, ἃ δυνάμει μέν ἐστιν ἄνθρωπος καὶ σῖτος καὶ ὁρῶν, ἐνεργείᾳ δ' οὔπω· ἀλλὰ τούτων πρότερα τῷ χρόνῳ ἕτερα ὄντα ἐνεργείᾳ ἐξ ὧν ταῦτα ἐγένετο· ἀεὶ γὰρ ἐκ τοῦ δυνάμει ὄντος γίγνεται τὸ ἐνεργείᾳ ὂν ὑπὸ ἐνεργείᾳ ὄντος, οἷον ἄνθρωπος ἐξ ἀνθρώπου, μουσικὸς ὑπὸ μουσικοῦ, ἀεὶ κινοῦντός τινος πρώτου· τὸ δὲ κινοῦν ἐνεργείᾳ ἤδη ἔστιν.

3. **in substance**

d. Thirdly, it is prior in substance. Ib., 1050 a[4-10]:

Ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ οὐσίᾳ γε, πρῶτον μὲν ὅτι τὰ τῇ γενέσει ὕστερα τῷ εἴδει καὶ τῇ οὐσίᾳ πρότερα (οἷον ἀνὴρ παιδὸς καὶ ἄνθρωπος σπέρματος· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἤδη ἔχει τὸ εἶδος τὸ δ' οὔ), καὶ ὅτι ἅπαν ἐπ' ἀρχὴν βαδίζει τὸ γιγνόμενον καὶ τέλος [1] (ἀρχὴ γὰρ τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα, τοῦ τέλους δὲ ἕνεκα ἡ γένεσις), τέλος δ' ἡ ἐνέργεια, καὶ τούτου χάριν ἡ δύναμις λαμβάνεται.

Actuality either in the object, or in the agent

555—a. Actuality can either be in the object which is made, or in the agent.

Ib., 1050 a[30]-b[3]:

Ὅσων μὲν οὖν ἕτερόν τί ἐστι παρὰ τὴν χρῆσιν τὸ γιγνόμενον, τούτων μὲν ἡ ἐνέργεια ἐν τῷ ποιουμένῳ ἐστίν (οἷον ἥ τε οἰκοδόμησις ἐν τῷ οἰκοδομουμένῳ καὶ ἡ ὕφανσις ἐν τῷ ὑφαινομένῳ), ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων, καὶ ὅλως ἡ κίνησις ἐν τῷ κινουμένῳ)· ὅσων δὲ μὴ ἔστιν ἄλλο τι ἔργον παρὰ τὴν ἐνέργειαν, ἐν αὐτοῖς ὑπάρχει ἡ ἐνέργεια (οἷον ἡ ὅρασις ἐν τῷ ὁρῶντι καὶ ἡ θεωρία ἐν τῷ θεωροῦντι καὶ ἡ ζωὴ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ, διὸ καὶ ἡ εὐδαιμονία [2]· ζωὴ γὰρ ποιά τίς ἐστιν). ὥστε φανερὸν ὅτι ἡ οὐσία καὶ τὸ εἶδος ἐνέργειά ἐστιν.

b. In time, one actuality precedes the other, straight back to the First Mover.

the First Mover first actuality

Ib., 1050 b[3-6]:

Κατά τε δὴ τοῦτον τὸν λόγον φανερὸν ὅτι πρότερον τῇ οὐσίᾳ ἐνέργεια δυνά-

[1] ἐπ' ἀρχὴν . . . καὶ τέλος - to a principle, i.e. an end.

[2] That eudaemonia is an "energy" of the soul, is the starting-point or basis of Ar.'s treatise on the virtues in the *Eth. Nic.* See our nr. **566** (EN I 7, 15, 1098a[15-17]).

μεως, καὶ ὥσπερ εἴπομεν [1], τοῦ χρόνου ἀεὶ προλαμβάνει ἐνέργεια ἑτέρα πρὸ ἑτέρας ἕως τῆς τοῦ ἀεὶ κινοῦντος πρώτως.

c. The eternal is always actual. It cannot be potential, for the potential is contingent, and therefore perishable.

Ib., 1050 b$^{6-14}$; $^{16-17}$, ^{18}:

Eternal beings always actual

Ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ κυριωτέρως· τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἀΐδια πρότερα τῇ οὐσίᾳ τῶν φθαρτῶν, ἔστι δ' οὐθὲν δυνάμει ἀΐδιον. λόγος δὲ ὅδε· πᾶσα δύναμις ἅμα τῆς ἀντιφάσεώς ἐστιν· τὸ μὲν γὰρ μὴ δυνατὸν ὑπάρχειν οὐκ ἂν ὑπάρξειεν οὐθενί, τὸ δυνατὸν δὲ πᾶν ἐνδέχεται μὴ ἐνεργεῖν. τὸ ἄρα δυνατὸν εἶναι ἐνδέχεται καὶ εἶναι καὶ μὴ εἶναι· τὸ αὐτὸ ἄρα δυνατὸν καὶ εἶναι καὶ μὴ εἶναι. τὸ δὲ δυνατὸν μὴ εἶναι ἐνδέχεται μὴ εἶναι· τὸ δὲ ἐνδεχόμενον μὴ εἶναι φθαρτόν. — Οὐθὲν ἄρα τῶν ἀφθάρτων ἁπλῶς δυνάμει ἔστιν ἁπλῶς. — Ἐνεργείᾳ ἄρα πάντα.

556—a. *Metaph.* Θ 9, 1051 a$^{4-15}$:

The good actuality more valuable than the good potency

Ὅτι δὲ καὶ βελτίων καὶ τιμιωτέρα τῆς σπουδαίας δυνάμεως ἡ ἐνέργεια, ἐκ τῶνδε δῆλον. ὅσα γὰρ κατὰ τὸ δύνασθαι λέγεται, ταὐτόν ἐστι δυνατὸν τἀναντία [2], οἷον τὸ δύνασθαι λεγόμενον ὑγιαίνειν ταὐτόν ἐστι καὶ τὸ νοσεῖν, καὶ ἅμα [3]· ἡ αὐτὴ γὰρ δύναμις τοῦ ὑγιαίνειν καὶ κάμνειν, καὶ ἠρεμεῖν καὶ κινεῖσθαι, καὶ οἰκοδομεῖν καὶ καταβάλλειν, καὶ οἰκοδομεῖσθαι καὶ καταπίπτειν. τὸ μὲν οὖν δύνασθαι τἀναντία ἅμα ὑπάρχει· τὰ δ' ἐναντία ἅμα ἀδύνατον, καὶ τὰς ἐνεργείας δὲ ἅμα ἀδύνατον ὑπάρχειν (οἷον ὑγιαίνειν καὶ κάμνειν), ὥστ' ἀνάγκη τούτων θάτερον εἶναι τἀγαθόν, τὸ δὲ δύνασθαι ὁμοίως ἀμφότερον ἢ οὐδέτερον· ἡ ἄρα ἐνέργεια βελτίων.

b. Ib., 1051 a$^{15-19}$:

A bad actuality worse than bad potency

Ἀνάγκη δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν κακῶν τὸ τέλος καὶ τὴν ἐνέργειαν εἶναι χεῖρον τῆς δυνάμεως· τὸ γὰρ δυνάμενον ταὐτὸ ἄμφω τἀναντία. δῆλον ἄρα ὅτι οὐκ ἔστι τὸ κακὸν παρὰ τὰ πράγματα· ὕστερον γὰρ τῇ φύσει τὸ κακὸν τῆς δυνάμεως.

c. From this fact the author draws an important conclusion, namely, that there is no evil among eternal things.

Ib., 1051 a$^{19-21}$:

No evil among eternal

Οὐκ ἄρα οὐδ' ἐν τοῖς ἐξ ἀρχῆς καὶ τοῖς ἀϊδίοις οὐθὲν ἔστιν οὔτε κακὸν οὔτε ἁμάρτημα οὔτε διεφθαρμένον [4] (καὶ γὰρ ἡ διαφθορὰ τῶν κακῶν ἐστίν).

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[1] Vid. supra (**554b**, the end).

[2] Ὅσα γάρ etc. - "Everything of which we say that it can do something, is alike capable of contraries" (Ross).

[3] καὶ ἅμα - "and it has both potencies at one and the same time".

[4] διεφθαρμένον - perverted; διαφθορά - perversion.

5—BEING AND TRUTH

557—In the last chapter of *Metaph.* Θ the author gives his definition of truth, which has become so famous in the history of human thought. It is presented as follows.

Metaph. Θ 10, 1051 a^{34}-b^{9}:

'Επεὶ δὲ τὸ ὂν λέγεται καὶ τὸ μὴ ὂν τὸ μὲν κατὰ τὰ σχήματα τῶν κατηγοριῶν, τὸ δὲ κατὰ δύναμιν ἢ ἐνέργειαν τούτων ἢ τἀναντία, τὸ δὲ [κυριώτατα ὄν] b ἀληθὲς ἢ ψεῦδος, τοῦτο δ' ἐπὶ τῶν πραγμάτων ἐστὶ τῷ συγκεῖσθαι ἢ διῃρῆσθαι,

Definition of truth

ὥστε ἀληθεύει μὲν ὁ τὸ διῃρημένον οἰόμενος διῃρῆσθαι καὶ τὸ συγκείμενον συγκεῖσθαι, ἔψευσται δὲ ὁ ἐναντίως ἔχων ἢ τὰ πράγματα, πότ' ἔστιν ἢ οὐκ ἔστι τὸ ἀληθὲς 5 λεγόμενον ἢ ψεῦδος; τοῦτο γὰρ σκεπτέον τί λέγομεν. οὐ γὰρ διὰ τὸ ἡμᾶς οἴεσθαι ἀληθῶς σε λευκὸν εἶναι εἰ σὺ λευκός, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ σὲ εἶναι λευκὸν ἡμεῖς οἱ φάντες τοῦτο ἀληθεύομεν.

558—**a.** In *Metaph.* E 4 Ar. separated truth from the province of Metaphysics, because truth and falsity are not "in things", but merely a πάθος τῆς διανοίας.

Truth excluded from metaphysics in E 4

E 4, 1027 b^{25}-1028 a^{1}:

Οὐ γάρ ἐστι τὸ ψεῦδος καὶ τὸ ἀληθὲς ἐν τοῖς πράγμασιν, οἷον τὸ μὲν ἀγαθὸν ἀληθὲς τὸ δὲ κακὸν εὐθὺς ψεῦδος, ἀλλ' ἐν διανοίᾳ, περὶ δὲ τὰ ἁπλᾶ καὶ τὰ τί ἐστιν οὐδ' ἐν διανοίᾳ· — ὅσα μὲν οὖν δεῖ θεωρῆσαι περὶ τὸ οὕτως ὂν καὶ μὴ ὄν, ὕστερον ἐπισκεπτέον· ἐπεὶ δὲ ἡ συμπλοκή ἐστιν καὶ ἡ διαίρεσις ἐν διανοίᾳ 30 ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐν τοῖς πράγμασι, τὸ δ' οὕτως ὂν ἕτερον ὂν τῶν κυρίως [1] (ἡ γὰρ τὸ τί ἐστιν ἢ ὅτι ποιὸν ἢ ὅτι ποσὸν ἤ τι ἄλλο συνάπτει ἢ διαιρεῖ ἡ διάνοια), τὸ μὲν ὡς συμβεβηκὸς καὶ τὸ ὡς ἀληθὲς ὂν ἀφετέον — τὸ γὰρ αἴτιον τοῦ μὲν ἀόριστον τοῦ δὲ τῆς διανοίας τι πάθος.

To this view our passage in Θ 10 adds a new element, namely that, with the συμπλοκή in thought, a συμπλοκή in reality must correspond.

The same view has been expressed with some emphasis by Plato, at the end of his *Sophist*, as a solution of the difficulty concerning ψευδὴς δόξα. See our nr. **343**.

b. That truth and falsity depend on combination, is also said in *Categ.* 4, at the end. Immediately after having enumerated the ten categories, with a few instances of each, the author continues (*Categ.* 4, 2 a$^{4-10}$):

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[1] τὸ οὕτως ὂν ἕτερον τῶν κυρίως - since which *is* in this sense is a different sort of "being" from the things that are in the full sense.

Truth and falsity depend on combination

Ἕκαστον δὲ τῶν εἰρημένων αὐτὸ μὲν καθ' αὑτὸ ἐν οὐδεμιᾷ καταφάσει λέγεται, τῇ δὲ πρὸς ἄλληλα τούτων συμπλοκῇ κατάφασις ἢ ἀπόφασις γίνεται. ἅπασα γὰρ δοκεῖ κατάφασις καὶ ἀπόφασις ἤτοι ἀληθὴς ἢ ψευδὴς εἶναι· τῶν δὲ κατὰ μηδεμίαν συμπλοκὴν λεγομένων οὐδὲν οὔτε ἀληθὲς οὔτε ψεῦδός ἐστιν, οἷον ἄνθρωπος, λευκόν, τρέχει, νικᾷ.

559—In Θ 10 Ar. develops the consequences of this view.

Considering first truth and being in the case of "composites" [1], he states: "Being is being-united; not-being is not-being-united. About things which may be either united or divided the same opinion is at different times false and true; not so with regard to things that must be as they are" (Ross).

a. *Metaph.* Θ 10, 1051 b$^{9-17}$:

Truth and being in the case of composites

Εἰ δὴ τὰ μὲν ἀεὶ σύγκειται καὶ ἀδύνατα διαιρεθῆναι, τὰ δ' ἀεὶ διῄρηται καὶ ἀδύνατα συντεθῆναι, τὰ δ' ἐνδέχεται τἀναντία, τὸ μὲν εἶναί ἐστι τὸ συγκεῖσθαι καὶ ἓν εἶναι, τὸ δὲ μὴ εἶναι τὸ μὴ συγκεῖσθαι ἀλλὰ πλείω εἶναι· περὶ μὲν οὖν τὰ ἐνδεχόμενα [2] ἡ αὐτὴ γίγνεται ψευδὴς καὶ ἀληθὴς δόξα καὶ ὁ λόγος ὁ αὐτός, καὶ ἐνδέχεται ὁτὲ μὲν ἀληθεύειν ὁτὲ δὲ ψεύδεσθαι· περὶ δὲ τὰ ἀδύνατα ἄλλως ἔχειν οὐ γίγνεται ὁτὲ μὲν ἀληθὲς ὁτὲ δὲ ψεῦδος, ἀλλ' ἀεὶ ταὐτὰ ἀληθῆ καὶ ψευδῆ.

Bonitz (*Metaph.* 409) remarked that the meaning of "composites" in this passage is not "quae ex pluribus elementis coaluerunt"—and in this he was right—but "in quibus cum substantia coniungitur accidens aliquod, veluti homo albus, homo sedens, diagonalis irrationalis et similia". Now, if this last point were true, the whole class of composites would consist of ἐνδεχόμενα, and those things which "are always composed" or "cannot be divided" could not belong to them. By σύνθετα then is rather meant: *judgments*, in which a subject is copulated with a predicate, be it accidental or not; so that the "truth" intended here is what is called the *veritas logica* by the schoolmen (adaequatio rei et intellectus).

b. Since being and non-being, truth and falsehood then depend on combination, the question arises: what is being and non-being; what truth and falsity, in the case of incomposites.

Ib., 1051 b$^{17-30}$:

Truth and being in the case of incomposites

Περὶ δὲ τὰ ἀσύνθετα τί τὸ εἶναι ἢ μὴ εἶναι καὶ τὸ ἀληθὲς καὶ τὸ ψεῦδος; οὐ γάρ ἐστι σύνθετον, ὥστε εἶναι μὲν ὅταν συγκέηται, μὴ εἶναι δὲ ἐὰν διῃρημένον ᾖ, ὥσπερ τὸ λευκὸν <τὸ> ξύλον ἢ τὸ ἀσύμμετρον τὴν διάμετρον· οὐδὲ τὸ ἀληθὲς καὶ τὸ ψεῦδος ὁμοίως ἔτι ὑπάρξει καὶ ἐπ' ἐκείνων. ἢ ὥσπερ οὐδὲ

[1] For the meaning of this term see our explanation under the text. It has been suggested to the author by Mr. L. M. de Rijk, who deals with it in the first chapter of his thesis, *The Categories of being*, Assen 1952.

[2] τὰ ἐνδεχόμενα - "contingent things", i.e. composed things, consisting of a substance and an accidental attribute, e.g. "white man".

τὸ ἀληθὲς ἐπὶ τούτων τὸ αὐτό, οὕτως οὐδὲ τὸ εἶναι, ἀλλ' ἔστι τὸ μὲν ἀληθὲς ἢ ψεῦδος, τὸ μὲν θιγεῖν [1] καὶ φάναι ἀληθές (οὐ γὰρ ταὐτὸ κατάφασις καὶ φάσις), τὸ δ' ἀγνοεῖν μὴ θιγγάνειν (ἀπατηθῆναι γὰρ περὶ τὸ τί ἐστιν οὐκ ἔστιν ἀλλ' ἢ κατὰ συμβεβηκός· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ τὰς μὴ συνθετὰς οὐσίας, οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν ἀπατηθῆναι· καὶ πᾶσαι εἰσὶν ἐνεργείᾳ, οὐ δυνάμει, ἐγίγνοντο γὰρ ἂν καὶ ἐφθείροντο, νῦν δὲ τὸ ὂν αὐτὸ οὐ γίγνεται οὐδὲ φθείρεται, ἔκ τινος γὰρ ἂν ἐγίγνετο).

By ἀσύνθετα, as opposed to the σύνθετον, is meant: being as the object of thinking, *before* the act of judging; i.e. being as the object of *simple apprehension*. Thought "grasps" a thing without any affirmative or negation. This apprehension is called by Ar. θιγγάνειν. Rightly he says that, strictly speaking, there is no question of falsehood in this case: things do not lie (i.e.: they do not cause an untrue image of themselves in our mind). "Truth" may then be spoken of here as far as things are the causes of images in our mind. This is what is called by scholastics *veritas ontologica*.

c. The author concludes: About all things that are essences and "actualities" (i.e. actually existing beings) we cannot err. Either we know them or we do not.

In this case error is excluded

Ib., 1051 b$^{30-33}$:

"Οσα δή ἐστιν ὅπερ εἶναί τι καὶ ἐνέργειαι, περὶ ταῦτα οὐκ ἔστιν ἀπατηθῆναι ἀλλ' ἢ νοεῖν ἢ μή· ἀλλὰ τὸ τί ἐστι ζητεῖται περὶ αὐτῶν, εἰ τοιαῦτά ἐστιν ἢ μή.

d. So "being" in the sense of truth, and non-being in the sense of falsity, is one group (depending on combination); the other (that of the ἀσύνθετα) is "true" only in this sense that it is known, the opposite being not "falsity" or "error", but "ignorance".

Ib., 1051 b^{33}-1052 a^{4}:

Τὸ δὲ εἶναι ὡς τὸ ἀληθές, καὶ τὸ μὴ εἶναι τὸ ὡς τὸ ψεῦδος, ἓν μέν ἐστιν [2], εἰ σύγκειται, ἀληθές, τὸ δ' εἰ μὴ σύγκειται, ψεῦδος· τὸ δὲ ἕν [3], εἴπερ ὄν, οὕτως ἐστίν [4]· εἰ δὲ μὴ οὕτως, οὐκ ἔστιν; τὸ δὲ ἀληθὲς τὸ νοεῖν ταῦτα· τὸ δὲ ψεῦδος a οὐκ ἔστιν, οὐδὲ ἀπάτη, ἀλλὰ ἄγνοια, οὐχ οἵα ἡ τυφλότης· ἡ μὲν γὰρ τυφλότης ἐστὶν ὡς ἂν εἰ τὸ νοητικὸν ὅλως μὴ ἔχοι τις.

560—As to eternal being, something has been said of it in the books on Substance (Z H) and in that on Potency and Actuality. The existence and nature of the unmoved Movers is dealt with in Λ 6-10. We have treated this part of Ar.'s first philosophy in connexion with *Phys.* VIII (nrs. **515-518**).

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[1] θιγεῖν - Ar. means by this: an apprehension which is infallible and direct.
[2] ἓν μέν - is one group.
[3] τὸ δὲ ἕν - the other —.
[4] οὕτως ἐστίν - it exists in the sense as indicated *supra*.

FIFTEENTH CHAPTER

THE PRACTICAL SCIENCES

1—THE THREE ETHICS AND THEIR INTERRELATION

561—The three Ethics of the Corpus Aristotelicum are first mentioned as works of Ar. by Atticus, a Platonist in the days of Marcus Aurelius, cited by Eusebius, *Praep. Ev.* XV 4, 9, p. 795 d: **Three works on ethics attributed to Ar.**

αἱ γοῦν Ἀριστοτέλους περὶ ταῦτα πραγματεῖαι, Εὐδήμειοί τε καὶ Νικομάχειοι καὶ Μεγάλων Ἠθικῶν ἐπιγραφόμεναι . . .

562—**a.** Five books of Ethics are mentioned in the list of Aristotle's works in Diog. Laert. V 1, 23:

Ἠθικῶν α′ β′ γ′ δ′ ε′. **the *Eth. Eud.***

By these five books the *Eudemian Ethics* must have been meant.

b. A work on ethics in ten books is mentioned in the list of Hesychius: the *Nicomachean Ethics.* **the *Eth. Nic.***

From these data we may infer that books Δ E Z of the *Eud. Eth.*, which are identic with *Eth. Nic.* E Z H, belonged to the last work, and not to the *Eud. Eth.*

563—**a.** That the *Eth. Nic.* were in earlier Antiquity generally considered as a work of Ar., may be inferred from Cic., *De fin.* V 5, 12. **Who is the author of these works?**

(One should not concede too much space to Fortune, the author says; for in doing so you encroach upon the force and dignity of virtue).

Quare teneamus Aristotelem et eius filium Nicomachum, cuius accurate scripti de moribus libri dicuntur illi quidem esse Aristoteli, sed non video cur non potuerit patri similis esse filius.

b. In later Antiquity traces may be found here and there of the opinion that Eudemus and Nicomachus were the authors of the works named after them. E.g. Diog. Laërt. VIII 88:

φησὶ δ' αὐτὸν — sc. Εὔδοξον — Νικόμαχος ὁ Ἀριστοτέλους τὴν ἡδονὴν λέγειν τὸ ἀγαθόν.

Here a passage from *Eth. Nic.* X is referred to under the name of N.

Difference in character

564—The reason why these works have been attributed to different authors, may have lain in the fact that they show a remarkably different conception of life. In the *Eud. Eth.* we find a platonic view of life, of a clearly religious character. Philosophy is directed to the contemplation of the highest Being, the Good. And it is this contemplation which endows man with the force and the power of acting virtuously. On the other hand, in the *Nic. Eth.* the bond with religion is severed: moral life depends on itself.

See for this difference Jaeger, *Ar.*, p. 238 ff. Of great importance is the meaning of the term φρόνησις in both works. In the *Eud. Eth.* it means philosophical insight into the highest Being, while in the *Nic. Eth.* it indicates practical wisdom, which is not even limited to man, but may be attributed to animals too. Cp. our nr. **420a**, remark II.

Modern judgment about the authenticity

565—a. The authenticity of the *Eud. Ethics* was first defended by P. von der Mühll (Göttingen thesis, 1909), next by E. Kapp (Freiburg thesis, 1912). W. Jaeger adopted Kapp's results and determined the place of the *Eud. Eth.* as a platonizing work of Ar.'s early years, between the *Protr.* and the *Nic. Eth.*

This view has been generally accepted, e.g. by Ross and by A. Mansion.

Recently E. J. Schächer, *Studien zu den Ethiken des Corpus Aristotelicum*, Paderborn 1940 [1], has come back to the ancient hypothesis which makes Eudemus the author of the Ethics named after him. Schächer tries to prove by a comparison of the passages on φιλία, that the *Eud. Eth.* depend on the *Nic.*, not inversely, and that the *Magna Mor.* were written before the *Eud. Eth.*, this work being apparently unknown to the author of the *M. M.* The arguments used by Sch. are for the greater part not conclusive. Yet he has re-opened the discussion on the authenticity of the *Eud. Eth.*, and further inquiry must decide whether his solution is correct.

b. As to the *Magna Mor.*, modern research has led to reliable results: this work dates from the first generation of the Peripatetic School, the years of Theophrastus and before the influence of the Stoa.

The question has been hotly debated by W. Jaeger and H. von Arnim, during the years 1924 - 1929. This discussion has been amply reported by A. Mansion, *Autour des Ethiques attribuées à Aristote*, in the *Revue Néoscolastique de Louvain*, 1931, p. 80-107, 216-236 and 360-380.

E. J. Schächer, in the first of his above-cited Studies, begins with Schleiermacher and deals too with the studies of Brink (an analysis of the style of the MM, Berlin thesis, 1933) and Theiler (1934).

If any doubts were still possible as to the date of the *MM*, they have been definitely removed by the thesis of Brink.

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[1] *Studien zur Geschichte u. Kultur des Altertums*, herausgeg. von der Görres-gesellschaft, XXII. Band, 1. u. 2. Heft.

2—THE NICOMACHEAN ETHICS. FORMAL PRINCIPLES (the Books I-III 5)

566—Ar. qualifies all human action as being directed towards a purpose, and defines the final purpose as *well-being* (eudaemonia), which consists of *an activity of the soul in accordance with reason*, i.e. in accordance with virtue.

Eth. Nic. I, 1-7, 1094 a[1]-1098 a[20].

All human activities aim at some good

1094a Πᾶσα τέχνη καὶ πᾶσα μέθοδος, ὁμοίως δὲ πρᾶξίς τε καὶ προαίρεσις, ἀγαθοῦ τινος ἐφίεσθαι δοκεῖ[1]· διὸ καλῶς ἀπεφήναντο τἀγαθόν, οὗ πάντ' ἐφίεται. Διαφορὰ δέ τις φαίνεται τῶν τελῶν· τὰ μὲν γὰρ εἰσιν ἐνέργειαι, τὰ δὲ παρ' 5 αὐτὰς ἔργα τινά. Ὧν δ' εἰσὶ τέλη τινὰ παρὰ τὰς πράξεις, ἐν τούτοις βελτίω πέφυκε τῶν ἐνεργειῶν τὰ ἔργα. Πολλῶν δὲ πράξεων οὐσῶν καὶ τεχνῶν καὶ ἐπιστημῶν πολλὰ γίνεται καὶ τὰ τέλη· ἰατρικῆς μὲν γὰρ ὑγίεια, ναυπηγικῆς δὲ πλοῖον, στρατηγικῆς δὲ νίκη, οἰκονομικῆς δὲ πλοῦτος. Ὅσαι δ' εἰσὶ τῶν τοιού- **A hierarchy of ends**
10 των ὑπὸ μίαν τινὰ δύναμιν, καθάπερ ὑπὸ τὴν ἱππικὴν χαλινοποιητικὴ καὶ ὅσαι ἄλλαι τῶν ἱππικῶν ὀργάνων εἰσίν, αὕτη δὲ καὶ πᾶσα πολεμικὴ πρᾶξις ὑπὸ τὴν στρατηγικήν, τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον ἄλλαι ὑφ' ἑτέρας, — ἐν ἁπάσαις 15 δὴ τὰ τῶν ἀρχιτεκτονικῶν τέλη πάντων ἐστὶν αἱρετώτερα τῶν ὑπ' αὐτά. Τούτων γὰρ χάριν κἀκεῖνα διώκεται. Διαφέρει δ' οὐδὲν τὰς ἐνεργείας αὐτὰς εἶναι τὰ τέλη τῶν πράξεων ἢ παρὰ ταύτας ἄλλο τι, καθάπερ ἐπὶ τῶν λεχθεισῶν ἐπιστημῶν.

The supreme end

Εἰ δή τι τέλος ἔστι τῶν πρακτῶν ὃ δι' αὐτὸ βουλόμεθα, τὰ ἄλλα δὲ διὰ τοῦτο,
20 καὶ μὴ πάντα δι' ἕτερον αἱρούμεθα (πρόεισι γὰρ οὕτω γ' εἰς ἄπειρον, ὥστ' εἶναι κενὴν καὶ ματαίαν τὴν ὄρεξιν), δῆλον ὡς τοῦτ' ἂν εἴη τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ ἄριστον. — Ἆρ' οὖν καὶ πρὸς τὸν βίον ἡ γνῶσις αὐτοῦ μεγάλην ἔχει ροπήν, καὶ καθάπερ τοξόται σκοπὸν ἔχοντες μᾶλλον ἂν τυγχάνοιμεν τοῦ δέοντος;
25 Εἰ δ' οὕτω, πειρατέον τύπῳ γε περιλαβεῖν αὐτό τί ποτ' ἐστὶ καὶ τίνος τῶν ἐπιστημῶν ἢ δυνάμεων. Δόξειε δ' ἂν τῆς κυριωτάτης καὶ μάλιστα ἀρχιτεκτονι- **It is the object of politics**
κῆς. Τοιαύτη δ' ἡ πολιτικὴ φαίνεται. Τίνας γὰρ εἶναι χρεὼν τῶν ἐπιστημῶν
1094b ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι, καὶ ποίας ἑκάστους μανθάνειν καὶ μέχρι τίνος, αὕτη διατάσσει[2]· ὁρῶμεν δὲ καὶ τὰς ἐντιμοτάτας τῶν δυνάμεων ὑπὸ ταύτην οὔσας, οἷον στρατη-

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[1] W. D. Ross rightly remarked that, according to the division of πᾶσα διάνοια in *Metaph.* E 1, we might have expected that Ar. would have distinguished between productive and moral activity, the first being ποιητική, the second πρακτική; and that, if this distinction had been made, a very different system of ethics would have resulted.

[2] Which of the sciences should be studied in a state, and up to what point they should be learned, is a question which has been dealt with at length in the *Republic* of Plato. To a disciple of the Academy it was indeed a major point of politics.

γικὴν οἰκονομικὴν ῥητορικήν. Χρωμένης δὲ ταύτης ταῖς λοιπαῖς πρακτικαῖς τῶν ἐπιστημῶν, ἔτι δὲ νομοθετούσης τί δεῖ πράττειν καὶ τίνων ἀπέχεσθαι [1], τὸ ταύτης τέλος περιέχοι ἂν τὰ τῶν ἄλλων, ὥστε τοῦτ' ἂν εἴη τὸ ἀνθρώπινον ἀγαθόν. Εἰ γὰρ καὶ ταὐτόν ἐστιν ἑνὶ καὶ πόλει, μεῖζόν γε καὶ τελειότερον τὸ τῆς πόλεως φαίνεται καὶ λαβεῖν καὶ σῴζειν· ἀγαπητὸν μὲν γὰρ καὶ ἑνὶ μόνῳ, κάλλιον δὲ καὶ θειότερον ἔθνει καὶ πόλεσιν.

Different degrees of precision in different sciences

Ἡ μὲν οὖν μέθοδος τούτων ἐφίεται, πολιτική τις οὖσα· λέγοιτο δ' ἂν ἱκανῶς, εἰ κατὰ τὴν ὑποκειμένην ὕλην διασαφηθείη. Τὸ γὰρ ἀκριβὲς οὐχ ὁμοίως ἐν ἅπασι τοῖς λόγοις ἐπιζητητέον, ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς δημιουργουμένοις. Τὰ δὲ καλὰ καὶ τὰ δίκαια, περὶ ὧν ἡ πολιτικὴ σκοπεῖται, τοσαύτην ἔχει διαφορὰν καὶ πλάνην ὥστε δοκεῖν νόμῳ μόνον εἶναι, φύσει δὲ μή. Τοιαύτην δέ τινα πλάνην ἔχει καὶ τἀγαθὰ διὰ τὸ πολλοῖς συμβαίνειν βλάβας ἀπ' αὐτῶν· ἤδη γάρ τινες ἀπώλοντο διὰ πλοῦτον, ἕτεροι δὲ δι' ἀνδρείαν. Ἀγαπητὸν οὖν περὶ τοιούτων καὶ ἐκ τοιούτων [2] λέγοντας παχυλῶς [3] καὶ τύπῳ τἀληθὲς ἐνδείκνυσθαι, καὶ περὶ τῶν ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ καὶ ἐκ τοιούτων λέγοντας τοιαῦτα καὶ συμπεραίνεσθαι [4]. Τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον καὶ ἀποδέχεσθαι χρεὼν ἕκαστον τῶν λεγομένων· πεπαιδευμένου γάρ ἐστιν ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον τἀκριβὲς ἐπιζητεῖν καθ' ἕκαστον γένος, ἐφ' ὅσον ἡ τοῦ πράγματος φύσις ἐπιδέχεται· παραπλήσιον γὰρ φαίνεται μαθηματικοῦ τε πιθανολογοῦντος ἀποδέχεσθαι καὶ ῥητορικὸν ἀποδείξεις ἀπαιτεῖν.

The student should have reached riper years

Ἕκαστος δὲ κρίνει καλῶς ἃ γινώσκει, καὶ τούτων ἐστὶν ἀγαθὸς κριτής. Καθ' ἕκαστον ἄρα ὁ πεπαιδευμένος, ἁπλῶς δ' ὁ περὶ πᾶν πεπαιδευμένος. Διὸ τῆς πολιτικῆς οὐκ ἔστιν οἰκεῖος ἀκροατὴς ὁ νέος· ἄπειρος γὰρ τῶν κατὰ τὸν βίον πράξεων, οἱ λόγοι δ' ἐκ τούτων καὶ περὶ τούτων. Ἔτι δὲ τοῖς πάθεσιν ἀκολουθητικὸς ὢν ματαίως ἀκούσεται καὶ ἀνωφελῶς, ἐπειδὴ τὸ τέλος ἐστὶν οὐ γνῶσις ἀλλὰ πρᾶξις. Διαφέρει δ' οὐδὲν νέος τὴν ἡλικίαν ἢ τὸ ἦθος νεαρός· οὐ γὰρ παρὰ τὸν χρόνον ἡ ἔλλειψις, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ κατὰ πάθος ζῆν καὶ διώκειν ἕκαστα. Τοῖς γὰρ τοιούτοις ἀνόνητος ἡ γνῶσις γίνεται, καθάπερ τοῖς ἀκρατέσι· τοῖς δὲ κατὰ λόγον τὰς ὀρέξεις ποιουμένοις καὶ πράττουσι πολυωφελὲς ἂν εἴη τὸ περὶ τούτων εἰδέναι.

What is the supreme good?

Καὶ περὶ μὲν ἀκροατοῦ, καὶ πῶς ἀποδεκτέον, καὶ τί προτιθέμεθα, πεφροιμιάσθω τοσαῦτα· λέγωμεν δ' ἀναλαβόντες, ἐπειδὴ πᾶσα γνῶσις καὶ προαίρεσις ἀγαθοῦ τινος ὀρέγεται, τί ἐστιν οὗ λέγομεν τὴν πολιτικὴν ἐφίεσθαι καὶ τί τὸ πάντων ἀκρότατον τῶν πρακτῶν ἀγαθῶν. Ὀνόματι μὲν οὖν σχεδὸν ὑπὸ τῶν

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[1] "What we are to do and what we are to abstain from" has been minutely prescribed in the *Laws* of Plato. Ar. again shows himself a true disciple of the Academy in regarding this point as the normal task of legislation.

[2] ἐκ τοιούτων - with such premisses.

[3] παχυλῶς - roughly.

[4] It is a basic law of the syllogism that the conclusion cannot contain more than the premisses.

πλείστων ὁμολογεῖται· τὴν γὰρ εὐδαιμονίαν καὶ οἱ πολλοὶ καὶ οἱ χαρίεντες [1] λέγουσιν, τὸ δ' εὖ ζῆν καὶ τὸ εὖ πράττειν ταὐτὸν ὑπολαμβάνουσι τῷ εὐδαιμονεῖν· περὶ δὲ τῆς εὐδαιμονίας, τί ἐστιν, ἀμφισβητοῦσιν καὶ οὐχ ὁμοίως οἱ πολλοὶ τοῖς σοφοῖς ἀποδιδόασιν. Οἱ μὲν γὰρ τῶν ἐναργῶν τι καὶ φανερῶν, οἷον ἡδονὴν ἢ πλοῦτον ἢ τιμήν, ἄλλοι δ' ἄλλο, πολλάκις δὲ καὶ ὁ αὐτὸς ἕτερον (νοσήσας μὲν γὰρ ὑγίειαν, πενόμενος δὲ πλοῦτον), συνειδότες δ' ἑαυτοῖς ἄγνοιαν τοὺς μέγα τι καὶ ὑπὲρ αὐτοὺς λέγοντας θαυμάζουσιν· ἔνιοι δ' ᾠοντο παρὰ τὰ πολλὰ ταῦτα ἀγαθὰ ἄλλο τι καθ' αὑτὸ εἶναι, ὃ καὶ τοῖσδε πᾶσιν αἴτιόν ἐστι τοῦ εἶναι ἀγαθά. Ἁπάσας μὲν οὖν ἐξετάζειν τὰς δόξας ματαιότερον ἴσως ἐστίν, ἱκανὸν δὲ τὰς μάλιστα ἐπιπολαζούσας ἢ δοκούσας ἔχειν τινὰ λόγον. Μὴ λανθανέτω δ' ἡμᾶς ὅτι διαφέρουσιν οἱ ἀπὸ τῶν ἀρχῶν [2] λόγοι καὶ οἱ ἐπὶ τὰς ἀρχάς [2]. **A methodical remark**

Εὖ γὰρ καὶ Πλάτων ἠπόρει τοῦτο, καὶ ἐζήτει πότερον ἀπὸ τῶν ἀρχῶν ἢ ἐπὶ τὰς ἀρχάς ἐστιν ἡ ὁδός [3], ὥσπερ ἐν τῷ σταδίῳ ἀπὸ τῶν ἀθλοθετῶν ἐπὶ τὸ πέρας ἢ ἀνάπαλιν. Ἀρκτέον μὲν γὰρ ἀπὸ τῶν γνωρίμων, ταῦτα δὲ διττῶς· τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἡμῖν τὰ δ' ἁπλῶς [4]. Ἴσως οὖν ἡμῖν γε ἀρκτέον ἀπὸ τῶν ἡμῖν γνωρίμων. Διὸ δεῖ τοῖς ἔθεσιν ἦχθαι καλῶς [5] τὸν περὶ καλῶν καὶ δικαίων καὶ ὅλως τῶν πολιτικῶν ἀκουσόμενον ἱκανῶς. Ἀρχὴ γὰρ τὸ ὅτι· καὶ εἰ τοῦτο φαίνοιτο ἀρκούντως, οὐδὲν προσδεήσει τοῦ διότι. Ὁ δὲ τοιοῦτος ἢ ἔχει ἢ λάβοι ἂν ἀρχὰς ῥᾳδίως [6]. Ὧ δὲ μηδέτερον ὑπάρχει τούτων, ἀκουσάτω τῶν Ἡσιόδου [7]·

οὗτος μὲν πανάριστος ὃς αὐτὸς πάντα νοήσῃ,
ἐσθλὸς δ' αὖ κἀκεῖνος ὃς εὖ εἰπόντι πίθηται,
ὃς δέ κε μήτ' αὐτὸς νοέῃ μήτ' ἄλλου ἀκούων
ἐν θυμῷ βάλληται, ὁ δ' αὖτ' ἀχρήϊος ἀνήρ.

Ἡμεῖς δὲ λέγωμεν ὅθεν παρεξέβημεν. Τὸ γὰρ ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν οὐκ ἀλόγως ἐοίκασιν ἐκ τῶν βίων ὑπολαμβάνειν. Οἱ μὲν πολλοὶ καὶ φορτι-

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[1] οἱ χαρίεντες - people of superior refinement.

[2] "Arguments *from* the first principles" are *deductive* or *apodeictic* arguments; those *to* the first principles are *inductive*. See our nrs. **447-455**.

[3] Ross points to *Rep.* VI 511 b, the passage about the ἀνυπόθετον (our nr. **294**, p. 203). But in fact, neither Plato's ascent from the hypotheseis, used as ἀρχαί, upward to the anhypotheton is anything like Aristotle's deductive argument, nor is his descent from the anhypotheton back to the inferior εἴδη of the same kind as a λόγος ἐπὶ τὰς ἀρχάς with Ar. Mark also the use of the imperfect: ἠπόρει and ἐζήτει. Evidently there are frequent λόγοι ἐπὶ τὰς ἀρχάς in the Socratic dialogues. And whenever things are explained by participation in Ideas, what else is this than a λόγος ἀπὸ τῶν ἀρχῶν?

[4] On the distinction between γνωριμώτερα ἡμῖν and γνωριμώτερα ἁπλῶς see our nr. **406**, n. 5.

[5] "must have been brought up in good habits".

[6] The man who is trained by good habits possesses moral principles implicitly.

[7] *Erga* 293, 295-297 Rzach.

Three main types of life

κώτατοι τὴν ἡδονήν· διὸ καὶ τὸν βίον ἀγαπῶσι τὸν ἀπολαυστικόν. Τρεῖς γάρ εἰσι μάλιστα οἱ προέχοντες, ὅ τε νῦν εἰρημένος καὶ ὁ πολιτικὸς καὶ τρίτος ὁ θεωρητικός [1]. Οἱ μὲν οὖν πολλοὶ παντελῶς ἀνδραποδώδεις φαίνονται βοσκημάτων βίον προαιρούμενοι, τυγχάνουσι δὲ λόγου διὰ τὸ πολλοὺς τῶν ἐν ταῖς ἐξουσίαις ὁμοιοπαθεῖν Σαρδαναπάλλῳ [2]· Οἱ δὲ χαρίεντες [3] καὶ πρακτικοὶ τιμήν. Τοῦ γὰρ πολιτικοῦ βίου σχεδὸν τοῦτο τέλος. Φαίνεται δ' ἐπιπολαιότερον εἶναι τοῦ ζητουμένου· δοκεῖ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς τιμῶσι μᾶλλον εἶναι ἢ ἐν τῷ τιμωμένῳ, τἀγαθὸν δ' οἰκεῖόν τι καὶ δυσαφαίρετον εἶναι μαντευόμεθα. Ἔτι δ' ἐοίκασι τὴν τιμὴν διώκειν ἵνα πιστεύσωσιν ἑαυτοὺς ἀγαθοὺς εἶναι· ζητοῦσι γοῦν ὑπὸ τῶν φρονίμων τιμᾶσθαι, καὶ παρ' οἷς γινώσκονται, καί ἐπ' ἀρετῇ· δῆλον οὖν ὅτι κατά γε τούτους ἡ ἀρετὴ κρείττων. Τάχα δὲ καὶ μᾶλλον ἄν τις τέλος τοῦ πολιτικοῦ βίου ταύτην ὑπολάβοι. Φαίνεται δὲ ἀτελεστέρα καὶ αὕτη· δοκεῖ γὰρ ἐνδέχεσθαι καὶ καθεύδειν ἔχοντα τὴν ἀρετὴν ἢ ἀπρακτεῖν διὰ βίου, καὶ πρὸς τούτοις κακοπαθεῖν καὶ ἀτυχεῖν τὰ μέγιστα· τὸν δ' οὕτως ζῶντα οὐδεὶς ἂν εὐδαιμονίσειεν, εἰ μὴ θέσιν διαφυλάττων. Καὶ περὶ μὲν τούτων ἅλις (ἱκανῶς γὰρ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἐγκυκλίοις εἴρηται περὶ αὐτῶν)· τρίτος δ' ἐστὶν ὁ θεωρητικός, ὑπὲρ οὗ τὴν ἐπίσκεψιν ἐν τοῖς ἑπομένοις ποιησόμεθα. Ὁ δὲ χρηματιστὴς βίαιός τίς ἐστιν [4], καὶ ὁ πλοῦτος δῆλον ὅτι οὐ τὸ ζητούμενον ἀγαθόν· χρήσιμον γὰρ καὶ

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[1] Ar.'s three βίοι are clearly of Pythagorean origin. Cp. our nr. **4**.

[2] Athenaeus mentions two epitaphs of Sardanapallus (336 *a* and 530 *b*, *c*). The first is: Ἔσθιε, πῖνε, παῖζε· ὡς τἄλλα τούτου οὐκ ἄξια, sc. τοῦ ἀποκροτήματος (is not worth a snap of the fingers).

The second was probably cited by Ar. in his *Protrept.*, and by this quotation it became famous in Antiquity. It runs.:

Κεῖν' ἔχω ὅσσ' ἔφαγον καὶ ἐφύβρισα καὶ μετ' ἔρωτος
τέρπν' ἔπαθον· τὰ δὲ πολλὰ καὶ ὄλβια πάντα λέλυνται.

Cic. translates it in *Tusc. Disp.* V 35, 101:

Haec habeo quae edi quaeque exsaturata libido
hausit; at illa iacent multa et praeclara relicta.

He adds to it these lines of Ar., which Jaeger thinks were taken from the *Protr.*: "Quid aliud, inquit Ar., in bovis, non in regis sepulchro inscriberes? Haec habere se mortuum dicit, quae ne vivus quidem diutius habebat quam fruebatur".

He refers again to it in *De finibus* II 32, 106.

[3] See p. 137, note 1.

[4] The text as we read it contains some difficulties. Modern interpreters mostly supply βίος with χρηματιστής and translate: "The life of money-making is a life of compulsion" or "constraint"; by which they mean either that this life is undertaken only under compulsion (Ross), or that in this life a man cannot follow his natural inclinations, or perhaps both. Yet there remains some doubt as to the question whether the text is sound. We have no other instances of χρηματιστής used adjectively. And even if this is right, I think it would be better to supply the word ‹βίος› after χρηματιστής, because in copying it could be easily dropped before βίαιος.

A former generation made some conjectures. G. Ramsauer in his edition of the *Eth. Nic.* of 1878 proposed to write βάναυσός τις instead of βίαιός τις. James Watt,

ἄλλου χάριν. Διὸ μᾶλλον τὰ πρότερον λεχθέντα τέλη τις ἂν ὑπολάβοι· δι' αὐτὰ γὰρ ἀγαπᾶται. Φαίνεται δὲ οὐδ' ἐκεῖνα· καίτοι πολλοὶ λόγοι πρὸς αὐτὰ καταβέβληνται.

The Good of Plato criticized

Ταῦτα μὲν οὖν ἀφείσθω· τὸ δὲ καθόλου [1] βέλτιον ἴσως ἐπισκέψασθαι καὶ διαπορῆσαι πῶς λέγεται, καίπερ προσάντους τῆς τοιαύτης ζητήσεως γιγνομένης διὰ τὸ φίλους ἄνδρας εἰσαγαγεῖν τὰ εἴδη. Δόξειε δ' ἂν ἴσως βέλτιον εἶναι καὶ δεῖν ἐπὶ σωτηρίᾳ γε τῆς ἀληθείας καὶ τὰ οἰκεῖα ἀναιρεῖν [2], ἄλλως τε καὶ φιλοσόφους ὄντας· ἀμφοῖν γὰρ ὄντοιν φίλοιν ὅσιον προτιμᾶν τὴν ἀλήθειαν [3]. Οἱ δὲ κομίσαντες τὴν δόξαν ταύτην οὐκ ἐποίουν ἰδέας ἐν οἷς τὸ πρότερον καὶ ὕστερον ἔλεγον [4] (διόπερ οὐδὲ τῶν ἀριθμῶν ἰδέαν κατεσκεύαζον)· τὸ δὲ ἀγαθὸν λέγεται καὶ ἐν τῷ τι καὶ ἐν τῷ ποιῷ καὶ ἐν τῷ πρός τι, τὸ δὲ καθ' αὐτὸ καὶ ἡ οὐσία πρότερον τῇ φύσει τοῦ πρός τι [5] (παραφυάδι γὰρ τοῦτ' ἔοικε καὶ συμβεβηκότι τοῦ ὄντος)· ὥστ' οὐκ ἂν εἴη κοινή τις ἐπὶ τούτων ἰδέα. Ἔτι δ' ἐπεὶ τἀγαθὸν ἰσαχῶς λέγεται τῷ ὄντι (καὶ γὰρ ἐν τῷ τι λέγεται, οἷον ὁ θεὸς καὶ ὁ νοῦς, καὶ ἐν τῷ ποιῷ αἱ ἀρεταί, καὶ ἐν τῷ ποσῷ τὸ μέτριον, καὶ ἐν τῷ πρός τι τὸ χρήσιμον, καὶ ἐν χρόνῳ καιρός, καὶ ἐν τόπῳ δίαιτα [6] καὶ ἕτερα τοιαῦτα), δῆλον ὡς οὐκ ἂν εἴη κοινόν τι καθόλου καὶ ἕν· οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἐλέγετο ἐν πάσαις ταῖς κατηγορίαις, ἀλλ' ἐν μιᾷ μόνῃ. Ἔτι δ' ἐπεὶ τῶν κατὰ μίαν ἰδέαν μία καὶ ἐπι-

1. Arguments from the doctrine of the categories

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followed by Burnet, read the text as it stands in this way: βίᾳ ὅστις ἐστίν ("the business-man is by compulsion whatsoever he is"). C. M. Mulvany (in *Class. Quart.* XV 1921, p. 85-98) suggests that βίαιος should be explained as βαιός: little, trifling. He translates: "The business-man is a little person"—sc. of minor importance towards happiness.

[1] τὸ δὲ καθόλου - sc. ἀγαθόν. In the conception of Ar. the Platonic Ideas are "universals", which are abstracted from the concrete things or phenomena. In this case "the good" as a universal should be abstracted from many concrete ἀγαθά. But this is impossible, Ar. says; since these good things fall under different categories, no κοινόν could be found here.

[2] τὰ οἰκεῖα ἀναιρεῖν - to sink our personal feelings.

[3] This maxim, which has become famous by the above words of Ar., has been expressed as clearly and explicitly by Plato in criticizing Homer: Ἀλλ' οὐ γὰρ πρό γε τῆς ἀληθείας τιμητέος ἀνήρ (*Rep.* X, 595 c).

[4] Plato and his followers do not admit of Ideas of things within which they recognize a priority and a posteriority. Well, Ar. says, this is exactly the case with the categories: substance is prior to the others.—He means priority in the hierarchy of being: like two presupposes the monad and three the dyad; again, like body presupposes the plane, and plane presupposes the line. In the same way to Ar. the more primitive soul has priority of being over the more developed soul: the vegetative soul over the sensitive, the sensitive over the rational. And that is why there does not exist a "soul" in general, which is a reality in itself (*De anima* A 1, 402 b$^{5-8}$; B 3, 414 a^{29}-b^{19}). So it is with substance and the other categories: substance can exist without the others, not inversely.

[5] See the doctrine of the categories in **437b** and **438a**.

[6] δίαιτα is used here for the good in the category of place. Heliodorus explains: τόπος ἐν ᾧ εὖ διάγομεν.

στήμη [1], καὶ τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἁπάντων ἦν ἂν μία τις ἐπιστήμη· νῦν δ' εἰσὶ πολλαὶ καὶ τῶν ὑπὸ μίαν κατηγορίαν, οἷον καιροῦ, ἐν πολέμῳ μὲν γὰρ στρατηγικὴ ἐν νόσῳ δ' ἰατρική, καὶ τοῦ μετρίου ἐν τροφῇ μὲν ἰατρικὴ ἐν πόνοις δὲ γυμναστική. Ἀπορήσειε δ' ἄν τις τί ποτε καὶ βούλονται λέγειν αὐτοέκαστον, εἴπερ ἓν τε αὐτοανθρώπῳ καὶ ἀνθρώπῳ εἷς καὶ ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος ἐστὶν ὁ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου. Ἡ γὰρ ἄνθρωπος, οὐδὲν διοίσουσιν· εἰ δ' οὕτως, οὐδ' ἧ ἀγαθόν. Ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ τῷ ἀΐδιον εἶναι μᾶλλον ἀγαθὸν ἔσται, εἴπερ μηδὲ λευκότερον τὸ πολυχρόνιον τοῦ ἐφημέρου. Πιθανώτερον δὲ ἐοίκασιν οἱ Πυθαγόρειοι λέγειν περὶ αὐτοῦ, τιθέντες ἐν τῇ τῶν ἀγαθῶν συστοιχίᾳ τὸ ἕν [2]· οἷς δὴ καὶ Σπεύσιππος ἐπακολουθῆσαι δοκεῖ.

2. "Man" and "man himself" fall under one definition

Distinction between primary and secondary goods

Ἀλλὰ περὶ μὲν τούτων ἄλλος ἔστω λόγος, τοῖς δὲ λεχθεῖσιν ἀμφισβήτησίς τις [3] ὑποφαίνεται διὰ τὸ μὴ περὶ παντὸς ἀγαθοῦ τοὺς λόγους ποιεῖσθαι, λέγεσθαι δὲ καθ' ἓν εἶδος τὰ καθ' αὑτὰ διωκόμενα καὶ ἀγαπώμενα, τὰ δὲ ποιητικὰ τούτων ἢ φυλακτικά πως ἢ τῶν ἐναντίων κωλυτικὰ διὰ ταῦτα λέγεσθαι καὶ τρόπον ἄλλον. Δῆλον οὖν ὅτι διττῶς λέγοιτ' ἂν τἀγαθά, καὶ τὰ μὲν καθ' αὑτά, θάτερα δὲ διὰ ταῦτα. Χωρίσαντες οὖν ἀπὸ τῶν ὠφελίμων τὰ καθ' αὑτὰ σκεψώμεθα εἰ λέγεται κατὰ μίαν ἰδέαν. Καθ' αὑτὰ δὲ ποῖα θείη τις ἄν; Ἢ ὅσα καὶ μονούμενα διώκεται, οἷον τὸ φρονεῖν καὶ ὁρᾶν καὶ ἡδοναί τινες καὶ τιμαί; Ταῦτα γὰρ εἰ καὶ δι' ἄλλο τι διώκομεν, ὅμως τῶν καθ' αὑτὰ ἀγαθῶν θείη τις ἄν. Ἢ οὐδ' ἄλλο οὐδὲν πλὴν τῆς ἰδέας; Ὥστε μάταιον ἔσται τὸ εἶδος [4]. Εἰ δὲ καὶ ταῦτ' ἐστὶν τῶν καθ' αὑτά, τὸν τἀγαθοῦ λόγον [5] ἐν ἅπασιν αὐτοῖς τὸν αὐτὸν ἐμφαίνεσθαι δεήσει, καθάπερ ἐν χιόνι καὶ ψιμυθίῳ τὸν τῆς λευκότητος. Τιμῆς δὲ καὶ φρονήσεως καὶ ἡδονῆς ἕτεροι καὶ διαφέροντες οἱ λόγοι ταύτῃ ἧ ἀγαθά. Οὐκ ἔστιν ἄρα τὸ ἀγαθὸν κοινόν τι <καὶ> κατὰ μίαν ἰδέαν.

No common good

Whence then the homonymy?

Ἀλλὰ πῶς δὴ λέγεται; Οὐ γὰρ ἔοικε τοῖς γε ἀπὸ τύχης ὁμωνύμοις. Ἀλλ' ἆρά γε τῷ ἀφ' ἑνὸς εἶναι ἢ πρὸς ἓν ἅπαντα συντελεῖν, ἢ μᾶλλον κατὰ ἀναλογίαν [6]; Ὡς

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[1] This is a Platonic principle. Cp. *Laches* 198 d-199 a; *Parm.* 134 a.

[2] ἐν τῇ τῶν ἀγαθῶν συστοιχίᾳ - See our nr. **42**, the Pythagorean table of opposites.— Ar. means: it is more acceptable to range the one in a series of good things than to identify it with the Good itself.

So this text of the *Eth. Nic.* provides evidence for the identification of the Ἕν and the Ἀγαθόν by Plato. Cp. our nr. **364c**.

[3] ἀμφισβήτησίς τις - room for dispute.

[4] Ὥστε μάταιον - "In that case the form will be empty".

[5] λόγον - notion, definition.

[6] Ar. distinguishes three kinds of homonymy. The first is what is called in scholasticism equivocation: mere identity of names, the notions being different (see our nr. **436a**). The second is what is called by Ar. τὸ ἀφ' ἑνὸς καὶ πρὸς ἕν: things are called by the same name because they are related to the same object or the same idea; e.g. we speak of a healthy person (who possesses health), a healthy sleep (which is a symptom of health), a healthy climate (which preserves health), etc.

γὰρ ἐν σώματι ὄψις, ἐν ψυχῇ νοῦς, καὶ ἄλλο δὴ ἐν ἄλλῳ. Ἀλλ' ἴσως ταῦτα μὲν
30 ἀφετέον τὸ νῦν, ἐξακριβοῦν γὰρ ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν ἄλλης ἂν εἴη φιλοσοφίας οἰκειότερον·
ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ τῆς ἰδέας. Εἰ γὰρ καὶ ἔστιν ἕν τι καὶ κοινῇ κατηγορούμενον
ἀγαθὸν ἢ χωριστόν τι αὐτὸ καθ' αὑτό [1], δῆλον ὡς οὐκ ἂν εἴη πρακτὸν οὐδὲ
35 κτητὸν ἀνθρώπῳ· νῦν δὲ τοιοῦτόν τι ζητεῖται. Τάχα δέ τῳ δόξειεν ἂν βέλτιον
1097a εἶναι γνωρίζειν αὐτὸ πρὸς τὰ κτητὰ καὶ πρακτὰ τῶν ἀγαθῶν· οἷον γὰρ παρά-
δειγμα τοῦτ' ἔχοντες μᾶλλον εἰσόμεθα καὶ τὰ ἡμῖν ἀγαθά, κἂν εἰδῶμεν, ἐπι-
τευξόμεθα αὐτῶν. Πιθανότητα μὲν οὖν τινα ἔχει ὁ λόγος, ἔοικεν δὲ ταῖς ἐπιστή-
5 μαις διαφωνεῖν [2]· πᾶσαι γὰρ ἀγαθοῦ τινος ἐφιέμεναι καὶ τὸ ἐνδεὲς ἐπιζητοῦσαι
παραλείπουσι τὴν γνῶσιν αὐτοῦ [3]. Καίτοι βοήθημα τηλικοῦτον [4] τοὺς τεχνίτας
ἅπαντας ἀγνοεῖν καὶ μηδ' ἐπιζητεῖν οὐκ εὔλογον. Ἄπορον δὲ καὶ τί ὠφεληθή-
σεται ὑφάντης [5] ἢ τέκτων πρὸς τὴν αὑτοῦ τέχνην εἰδὼς αὐτὸ τὸ ἀγαθόν, ἢ
10 πῶς ἰατρικώτερος ἢ στρατηγικώτερος ἔσται ὁ τὴν ἰδέαν αὐτὴν τεθεαμένος.
Φαίνεται μὲν γὰρ οὐδὲ τὴν ὑγίειαν οὕτως [6] ἐπισκοπεῖν ὁ ἰατρός, ἀλλὰ τὴν
ἀνθρώπου, μᾶλλον δ' ἴσως τὴν τοῦδε· καθ' ἕκαστον γὰρ ἰατρεύει.

15 Καὶ περὶ μὲν τούτων ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον εἰρήσθω· πάλιν δ' ἐπανέλθωμεν ἐπὶ τὸ **Return to our theme: what is the supreme practical Good?**
ζητούμενον ἀγαθόν, τί ποτ' ἂν εἴη. Φαίνεται μὲν γὰρ ἄλλο ἐν ἄλλῃ πράξει καὶ
τέχνῃ· ἄλλο γὰρ ἐν ἰατρικῇ καὶ στρατηγικῇ καὶ ταῖς λοιπαῖς ὁμοίως. Τί
οὖν ἑκάστης τἀγαθόν; Ἢ οὗ χάριν τὰ λοιπὰ πράττεται; Τοῦτο δὲ ἐν ἰατρικῇ
20 μὲν ὑγίεια, ἐν στρατηγικῇ δὲ νίκη, ἐν οἰκοδομικῇ δ' οἰκία, ἐν ἄλλῳ δ' ἄλλο, ἐν
ἁπάσῃ δὲ πράξει καὶ προαιρέσει τὸ τέλος· τούτου γὰρ ἕνεκα τὰ λοιπὰ πράττουσι
πάντες. Ὥστε εἴ τι τῶν πρακτῶν ἁπάντων ἐστὶ τέλος, τοῦτ' ἂν εἴη τὸ πρακτὸν

In the same way the word "medical" indicates that which is relative to the medical art, the doctor because he possesses it, a treatment because it is a function of it, etc. (*Metaph.* Γ 1, 1003 a^{33}-b^{11}; Z 4, 1030 a^{32}-b^{3}). In scholasticism this is called *analogia attributionis*.—This third kind is the *analogia proportionalitatis*. It is defined in *Poet.* 21, 1457 b^{16} ff. as a transference from analogy, which is possible "whenever there are four terms so related that the second (B) is to the first (A), as the fourth (D) to the third (C); for one may then metaphorically put D in lieu of B, and B in lieu of D." E.g. old age is to life as evening is to day. Now evening may be called old age of the day, or old age the evening of life.—It seems to be the author's intention to qualify the good as homonymous in the second sense.

[1] "Even if the good is universally predicable, or if there is a Good existing separately and absolute",—

Souilhé rightly remarks that the first and the second part of the sentence are not the same: a thing might be a common predicate but not an Idea. The ἤ then must be understood disjunctively, not in the copulative sense.

[2] "But it seems to clash with the procedure of the sciences" (Ross).

[3] "But they do not trouble about the knowledge of the ideal Good" (Rackham).

[4] βοήθημα τηλικοῦτον - sc. if it existed.

[5] ὑφάντης - as in Plato's *Cratylus*.

[6] οὐδὲ . . οὕτως - "not in this way", i.e. not in abstracto.

The supreme good = the supreme end

ἀγαθόν, εἰ δὲ πλείω, ταῦτα. Μεταβαίνων δὴ ὁ λόγος εἰς ταὐτὸν ἀφῖκται [1]. τοῦτο δὲ ἔτι μᾶλλον διασαφῆσαι πειρατέον.

Ἐπεὶ δὲ πλείω φαίνεται τὰ τέλη, τούτων δὲ αἱρούμεθά τινα δι' ἕτερα, οἷον πλοῦτον αὐλοὺς καὶ ὅλως τὰ ὄργανα, δῆλον ὡς οὐκ ἔστιν πάντα τέλεια· τὸ δ' ἄριστον τέλειόν τι φαίνεται. Ὥστ' εἰ μέν ἐστιν ἕν τι μόνον τέλειον, τοῦτ' ἂν εἴη τὸ ζητούμενον, εἰ δὲ πλείω, τὸ τελειότατον τούτων. Τελειότερον δὲ λέγομεν τὸ καθ' αὑτὸ διωκτὸν τοῦ δι' ἕτερον καὶ τὸ μηδέποτε δι' ἄλλο αἱρετὸν τῶν <καὶ> καθ' αὑτὰ καὶ διὰ τοῦθ' αἱρετῶν, καὶ ἁπλῶς δὴ τέλειον τὸ καθ' αὑτὸ αἱρετὸν

Happiness the supreme end

αἰεὶ καὶ μηδέποτε δι' ἄλλο. Τοιοῦτον δ' ἡ εὐδαιμονία μάλιστ' εἶναι δοκεῖ· ταύτην γὰρ αἱρούμεθα ἀεὶ δι' αὐτὴν καὶ οὐδέποτε δι' ἄλλο, τιμὴν δὲ καὶ ἡδονὴν καὶ νοῦν καὶ πᾶσαν ἀρετὴν αἱρούμεθα μὲν καὶ δι' αὐτά (μηθενὸς γὰρ ἀποβαίνοντος ἐλοίμεθ' ἂν ἕκαστον αὐτῶν), αἱρούμεθα δὲ καὶ τῆς εὐδαιμονίας χάριν, διὰ τούτων ὑπολαμβάνοντες εὐδαιμονήσειν. Τὴν δ' εὐδαιμονίαν οὐδεὶς αἱρεῖται τούτων χάριν, οὐδ' ὅλως δι' ἄλλο. Φαίνεται δὲ καὶ ἐκ τῆς αὐταρκείας τὸ αὐτὸ συμβαίνειν. · τὸ γὰρ τέλειον ἀγαθὸν αὔταρκες εἶναι δοκεῖ. Τὸ δὲ αὔταρκες λέγομεν οὐκ αὐτῷ μόνῳ τῷ ζῶντι βίον μονώτην, ἀλλὰ καὶ γονεῦσι καὶ τέκνοις καὶ γυναικὶ καὶ ὅλως τοῖς φίλοις καὶ πολίταις, ἐπειδὴ φύσει πολιτικὸν ὁ ἄνθρωπος. Τούτων δὲ ληπτέος ὅρος τις· ἐπεκτείνοντι γὰρ ἐπὶ τοὺς γονεῖς καὶ τοὺς ἀπογόνους καὶ τῶν φίλων τοὺς φίλους εἰς ἄπειρον πρόεισιν. Ἀλλὰ τοῦτο μὲν εἰσαῦθις ἐπισκεπτέον, τὸ δ' αὔταρκες τίθεμεν ὃ μονούμενον αἱρετὸν ποιεῖ τὸν βίον καὶ μηδενὸς ἐνδεᾶ· τοιοῦτον δὲ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν οἰόμεθα εἶναι, ἔτι δὲ πάντων αἱρετωτάτην μὴ συναριθμουμένην [2]. Συναριθμουμένην γὰρ δῆλον ὡς αἱρετωτέραν μετὰ [3] τοῦ ἐλαχίστου τῶν ἀγαθῶν· ὑπεροχὴ γὰρ ἀγαθῶν γίνεται τὸ προστιθέμενον, ἀγαθῶν δὲ τὸ μεῖζον αἱρετώτερον αἰεί. Τέλειον δή τι φαίνεται καὶ αὔταρκες ἡ εὐδαιμονία, τῶν πρακτῶν οὖσα τέλος.

What is happiness?

Ἀλλ' ἴσως τὴν μὲν εὐδαιμονίαν τὸ ἄριστον λέγειν ὁμολογούμενόν τι φαίνεται, ποθεῖται δ' ἐναργέστερον τί ἐστιν ἔτι λεχθῆναι. Τάχα δὴ γένοιτ' ἂν τοῦτ' εἰ ληφθείη τὸ ἔργον τοῦ ἀνθρώπου. Ὥσπερ γὰρ αὐλητῇ καὶ ἀγαλματοποιῷ καὶ παντὶ τεχνίτῃ, καὶ ὅλως ὧν ἔστιν ἔργον τι καὶ πρᾶξις, ἐν τῷ ἔργῳ δοκεῖ τἀγαθὸν εἶναι καὶ τὸ εὖ, οὕτω δόξειεν ἂν καὶ ἀνθρώπῳ, εἴπερ ἔστι τι ἔργον αὐτοῦ.

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[1] "So the argument has by a different way reached the same point"—i.e. the same as in ch. 1, namely, that the supreme good is identical with the supreme end.
"By a different way"—in ch. 1 the argument was: "Every art and every inquiry etc. aims at some good; therefore, the supreme good is the supreme end, which is aimed at by every human activity". Here the argument runs: "The good and the end are identical in all individual cases; therefore, the supreme good and the supreme end will be also identical" (the stress being laid on τὶ οὖν ἑκάστης τἀγαθόν and τῶν πρακτῶν ἁπάντων).

[2] μὴ συναριθμουμένην - "without being counted as one good thing among others" (Ross); i.e. not as a number of a series.

[3] μετὰ - by the addition of —.

Πότερον οὖν τέκτονος μὲν καὶ σκυτέως ἔστιν ἔργα τινὰ καὶ πράξεις, ἀνθρώπου
30 δ' οὐδὲν ἔστιν, ἀλλ' ἀργὸν πέφυκεν; ἢ καθάπερ ὀφθαλμοῦ καὶ χειρὸς καὶ ποδὸς
καὶ ὅλως ἑκάστου τῶν μορίων φαίνεταί τι ἔργον, οὕτω καὶ ἀνθρώπου παρὰ
πάντα ταῦτα θείη τις ἂν ἔργον τι; τί οὖν δὴ τοῦτ' ἂν εἴη ποτέ; Τὸ μὲν γὰρ ζῆν
κοινὸν εἶναι φαίνεται καὶ τοῖς φυτοῖς, ζητεῖται δὲ τὸ ἴδιον. Ἀφοριστέον ἄρα **Happiness to be defined by the special function of man**
1098a τήν τε θρεπτικὴν καὶ τὴν αὐξητικὴν ζωήν [1]. Ἑπομένη δὲ αἰσθητική τις ἂν εἴη,
φαίνεται δὲ καὶ αὕτη κοινὴ καὶ ἵππῳ καὶ βοὶ καὶ παντὶ ζῴῳ. Λείπεται δὴ
πρακτική τις τοῦ λόγον ἔχοντος (τούτου δὲ τὸ μὲν ὡς ἐπιπειθὲς
5 λόγῳ, τὸ δ' ὡς ἔχον καὶ διανοούμενον [2])· διττῶς δὲ καὶ ταύτης λεγομένης
τὴν κατ' ἐνέργειαν θετέον· κυριώτερον γὰρ αὕτη δοκεῖ λέγεσθαι. Εἰ δ' ἐστὶν
ἔργον ἀνθρώπου ψυχῆς ἐνέργεια κατὰ λόγον ἢ μὴ ἄνευ
λόγου, τὸ δ' αὐτό φαμεν ἔργον εἶναι τῷ γένει τοῦδε καὶ τοῦδε σπουδαίου [3],
10 ὥσπερ κιθαριστοῦ καὶ σπουδαίου κιθαριστοῦ, καὶ ἁπλῶς δὴ τοῦτ' ἐπὶ πάντων,
προστιθεμένης τῆς κατ' ἀρετὴν ὑπεροχῆς πρὸς τὸ ἔργον (κιθαριστοῦ μὲν γὰρ
τὸ κιθαρίζειν, σπουδαίου δὲ τὸ εὖ)· εἰ δ' οὕτως, ἀνθρώπου δὲ τίθεμεν ἔργον
ζωήν τινα, ταύτην δὲ ψυχῆς ἐνέργειαν καὶ πράξεις μετὰ λόγου, σπουδαίου δὲ
15 ἀνδρὸς εὖ ταῦτα καὶ καλῶς, ἕκαστον δὲ εὖ κατὰ τὴν οἰκείαν ἀρετὴν ἀποτελεῖται·
εἰ δὴ οὕτω, τὸ ἀνθρώπινον ἀγαθὸν ψυχῆς ἐνέργεια γίνεται κατ' **Definition**
ἀρετήν, εἰ δὲ πλείους αἱ ἀρεταί, κατὰ τὴν ἀρίστην
καὶ τελειοτάτην. Ἔτι δ' ἐν βίῳ τελείῳ. Μία γὰρ χελιδὼν
ἔαρ οὐ ποιεῖ, οὐδὲ μία ἡμέρα· οὕτω δὲ οὐδὲ μακάριον καὶ εὐδαίμονα μία
20 ἡμέρα οὐδ' ὀλίγος χρόνος.

567—Book II deals with moral virtue in general. It is engendered in us not by nature, but by habit. By nature man possesses a capacity to receive virtues; he receives them actually by the habit of right action.

a. *Eth. Nic.* II, 1103 a^{14}-b^{2}:

Διττῆς δὲ τῆς ἀρετῆς οὔσης, τῆς μὲν διανοητικῆς τῆς δὲ ἠθικῆς, ἡ μὲν δια- **The nature of virtue. Moral virtue results from habit**
15 νοητικὴ τὸ πλεῖον ἐκ διδασκαλίας ἔχει καὶ τὴν γένεσιν καὶ τὴν αὔξησιν, διόπερ
ἐμπειρίας δεῖται καὶ χρόνου, ἡ δὲ ἠθικὴ ἐξ ἔθους περιγίγνεται [4], ὅθεν καὶ
τοὔνομα ἔσχηκεν μικρὸν παρεκκλῖνον ἀπὸ τοῦ ἔθους. — Ἐξ οὗ καὶ δῆλον

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[1] θρεπτικὴν κ. αὐξητικήν etc. - See *De anima* II 3, 414 a^{29}-b^{6}; 415 a$^{1-7}$, on the faculties of the soul (our nr. **639**).

[2] This parenthesis has been condemned by Burnet. Rackham follows him somewhat hesitatingly, and declares the sentence to be "an irrelevant anticipation of ch. 13, 9". Souilhé defends it.

[3] τὸ δ' αὐτό φαμεν ἔργον εἶναι etc. - "and if we acknowledge the function of an individual (τοῦδε) and of a good individual (τοῦδε σπουδαίου) to be generically the same" (τὸ αὐτὸ τῷ γένει). —

[4] περιγίγνεται - results from.

ὅτι οὐδεμία τῶν ἠθικῶν ἀρετῶν φύσει ἡμῖν ἐγγίγνεται· οὐθὲν γὰρ τῶν φύσει ὄντων ἄλλως ἐθίζεται, οἷον ὁ λίθος φύσει κάτω φερόμενος οὐκ ἂν ἐθισθείη ἄνω φέρεσθαι, οὐδ' ἂν μυριάκις ἐθίζῃ τις ἄνω ῥίπτων, οὐδὲ τὸ πῦρ κάτω, οὐδὲ ἄλλο οὐδὲν τῶν ἄλλως πεφυκότων ἄλλως ἂν ἐθισθείη. Οὔτ' ἄρα φύσει οὔτε παρὰ φύσιν ἐγγίγνονται αἱ ἀρεταί, ἀλλὰ πεφυκόσι μὲν ἡμῖν δέξασθαι αὐτάς, τελειουμένοις δὲ διὰ τοῦ ἔθους. — Ἔτι ὅσα μὲν φύσει ἡμῖν παραγίνεται, τὰς δυνάμεις τούτων πρότερον κομιζόμεθα, ὕστερον δὲ τὰς ἐνεργείας ἀποδίδομεν, ὅπερ ἐπὶ τῶν αἰσθήσεων δῆλον (οὐ γὰρ ἐκ τοῦ πολλάκις ἰδεῖν ἢ πολλάκις ἀκοῦσαι τὰς αἰσθήσεις ἐλάβομεν, ἀλλ' ἀνάπαλιν ἔχοντες ἐχρησάμεθα, οὐ χρησάμενοι ἔσχομεν)· τὰς δὲ ἀρετὰς λαμβάνομεν ἐνεργήσαντες πρότερον, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων τεχνῶν. Ἃ γὰρ δεῖ μαθόντας ποιεῖν, ταῦτα ποιοῦντες μανθάνομεν, οἷον οἰκοδομοῦντες οἰκοδόμοι γίγνονται καὶ κιθαρίζοντες κιθαρισταί. Οὕτω δὲ καὶ τὰ μὲν δίκαια πράττοντες δίκαιοι γινόμεθα, τὰ δὲ σώφρονα σώφρονες, τὰ δ' ἀνδρεῖα ἀνδρεῖοι. 1103b

b. Since, then, virtue results from habit, and habit is formed by action, it is incumbent on us to exhibit activities of a certain quality.

Practical consequence

Ib., 1103 b$^{22-25}$:

Διὸ δεῖ τὰς ἐνεργείας ποιὰς ἀποδιδόναι· κατὰ γὰρ τὰς τούτων διαφορὰς ἀκολουθοῦσιν αἱ ἕξεις. Οὐ μικρὸν οὖν διαφέρει τὸ οὕτως ἢ οὕτως εὐθὺς ἐκ νέων ἐθίζεσθαι, ἀλλὰ πάμπολυ, μᾶλλον δὲ τὸ πᾶν.

568—How, then, are we to act rightly?—Ar. answers this question by developing his theory that virtue is the mean between two extremes.

Moral qualities destroyed by excess and by deficiency

a. *Eth. Nic.* II 2, 1104 a$^{11-27}$:

Πρῶτον μὲν οὖν τοῦτο θεωρητέον, ὅτι τὰ τοιαῦτα πέφυκεν ὑπ' ἐνδείας καὶ ὑπερβολῆς φθείρεσθαι (δεῖ γὰρ ὑπὲρ [1] τῶν ἀφανῶν τοῖς φανεροῖς μαρτυρίοις χρῆσθαι), ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τῆς ἰσχύος καὶ τῆς ὑγιείας ὁρῶμεν· τά τε γὰρ ὑπερβάλλοντα γυμνάσια καὶ τὰ ἐλλείποντα φθείρει τὴν ἰσχύν, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὰ ποτὰ καὶ τὰ σιτία πλείω καὶ ἐλάττω γιγνόμενα φθείρει τὴν ὑγίειαν, τὰ δὲ σύμμετρα καὶ ποιεῖ καὶ αὔξει καὶ σώζει. Οὕτως οὖν καὶ ἐπὶ σωφροσύνης καὶ ἀνδρείας ἔχει καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀρετῶν. Ὁ τε γὰρ πάντα φεύγων καὶ φοβούμενος καὶ μηδὲν ὑπομένων δειλὸς γίγνεται, ὅ τε μηδὲν ὅλως φοβούμενος ἀλλὰ πρὸς πάντα βαδίζων θρασύς, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ὁ μὲν πάσης ἡδονῆς ἀπολαύων καὶ μηδεμιᾶς ἀπεχόμενος ἀκόλαστος, ὁ δὲ πάσας φεύγων, ὥσπερ οἱ ἀγροῖκοι, ἀναίσθητός τις· φθείρεται δὴ ἡ σωφροσύνη καὶ ἡ ἀνδρεία ὑπὸ τῆς ὑπερβολῆς καὶ τῆς ἐλλείψεως, ὑπὸ δὲ τῆς μεσότητος σῴζεται. 1104a

[1] ὑπὲρ - in illustration of.

b. Not only man *becomes* virtuous by acting in a certain way, but virtue is also exercised by the same actions.

Ib., 1104 a^{27}-b^{3}: **Virtue exercised in the actions by which it was formed**

'Αλλ' οὐ μόνον αἱ γενέσεις καὶ αὐξήσεις καὶ αἱ φθοραὶ ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν καὶ ὑπὸ τῶν αὐτῶν γίνονται, ἀλλὰ καὶ αἱ ἐνέργειαι ἐν τοῖς αὐτοῖς ἔσονται· καὶ γὰρ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν φανερωτέρων οὕτως ἔχει, οἷον ἐπὶ τῆς ἰσχύος· γίνεται γὰρ ἐκ τοῦ πολλὴν τροφὴν λαμβάνειν καὶ πολλοὺς πόνους ὑπομένειν, καὶ μάλιστα δύναται ταῦτα ποιεῖν ὁ ἰσχυρός. Οὕτω δ' ἔχει καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀρετῶν· ἔκ τε γὰρ τοῦ ἀπέχεσθαι τῶν ἡδονῶν γινόμεθα σώφρονες, καὶ γενόμενοι μάλιστα δυνάμεθα ἀπέχεσθαι αὐτῶν. 'Ομοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς ἀνδρείας· ἐθιζόμενοι γὰρ καταφρονεῖν τῶν φοβερῶν καὶ ὑπομένειν αὐτὰ γινόμεθα ἀνδρεῖοι, καὶ γενόμενοι μάλιστα δυνησόμεθα ὑπομένειν τὰ φοβερά.

569—Pleasure in acting virtuously is a sign that the virtuous disposition has been acquired. For there is an essential connexion of moral virtue with pleasure and pain.

a. *Eth. Nic.* II 3, 1104 b$^{3-11}$: **Pleasure and pain the test of virtue**

Σημεῖον δὲ δεῖ ποιεῖσθαι τῶν ἕξεων τὴν ἐπιγινομένην ἡδονὴν ἢ λύπην τοῖς ἔργοις· ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἀπεχόμενος τῶν σωματικῶν ἡδονῶν καὶ αὐτῷ τούτῳ χαίρων σώφρων, ὁ δ' ἀχθόμενος ἀκόλαστος, καὶ ὁ μὲν ὑπομένων τὰ δεινὰ καὶ χαίρων ἢ μὴ λυπούμενός γε ἀνδρεῖος, ὁ δὲ λυπούμενος δειλός. Περὶ ἡδονὰς γὰρ καὶ λύπας ἐστὶν ἡ ἠθικὴ ἀρετή. Διὰ μὲν γὰρ τὴν ἡδονὴν τὰ φαῦλα πράττομεν, διὰ δὲ τὴν λύπην τῶν καλῶν ἀπεχόμεθα.

b. Again, this view leads to a practical consequence.

Ib., 1104 b$^{11-13}$: **Consequence for education**

Διὸ δεῖ ἦχθαί πως εὐθὺς ἐκ νέων, ὡς ὁ Πλάτων φησίν, ὥστε χαίρειν τε καὶ λυπεῖσθαι οἷς δεῖ· ἡ γὰρ ὀρθὴ παιδεία αὕτη ἐστίν.

570—Against Ar.'s theory that a man becomes virtuous by doing virtuous actions, the objection could be made: How can anyone do just actions when he is not yet just, or temperate when he is not yet temperate? On the contrary, if he does just actions, he is already just.—To this objection Ar. answers: No, only by doing just actions a man is not yet just. Three other conditions must be fulfilled.

a. *Eth. Nic.* II 4, 1105 a$^{17-33}$: **How can a man do just actions when he is not just?**

'Απορήσειε δ' ἄν τις πῶς λέγομεν ὅτι δεῖ τὰ μὲν δίκαια πράττοντας δικαίους γίνεσθαι, τὰ δὲ σώφρονα σώφρονας. Εἰ γὰρ πράττουσιν τὰ δίκαια καὶ τὰ σώ-

φρονα, ἤδη εἰσὶ δίκαιοι καὶ σώφρονες, ὥσπερ εἰ τὰ γραμματικὰ καὶ τὰ μου- 20
σικά, γραμματικοὶ καὶ μουσικοί. Ἢ οὐδ' ἐπὶ τῶν τεχνῶν οὕτως ἔχει; Ἐνδέ-
χεται γὰρ γραμματικόν τι ποιῆσαι καὶ ἀπὸ τύχης καὶ ἄλλου ὑποθεμένου.
Τότε οὖν ἔσται γραμματικός, ἐὰν καὶ γραμματικόν τι ποιήσῃ καὶ γραμματικῶς·
τοῦτο δέ ἐστι τὸ κατὰ τὴν ἐν αὐτῷ γραμματικήν. Ἔτι οὐδ' ὅμοιόν ἐστιν ἐπὶ 25
τῶν τεχνῶν καὶ τῶν ἀρετῶν. Τὰ μὲν γὰρ ὑπὸ τῶν τεχνῶν γινόμενα τὸ εὖ ἔχει
ἐν αὑτοῖς, ἀρκεῖ οὖν ταῦτά πως ἔχοντα γενέσθαι· τὰ δὲ κατὰ τὰς ἀρετὰς γινό-
μενα οὐκ ἐὰν αὐτά πως ἔχῃ, δικαίως ἢ σωφρόνως πράττεται, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐὰν ὁ 30
πράττων πως ἔχων πράττῃ, πρῶτον μὲν ἐὰν εἰδώς, ἔπειτ' ἐὰν προαιρούμενος,
καὶ προαιρούμενος δι' αὐτά, τὸ δὲ τρίτον ἐὰν καὶ βεβαίως καὶ ἀμετακινήτως
ἔχων πράττῃ.

Conclusion

b. Ib., 1105 b$^{9-18}$:

Εὖ οὖν λέγεται ὅτι ἐκ τοῦ τὰ δίκαια πράττειν ὁ δίκαιος γίνεται καὶ ἐκ τοῦ b 10
τὰ σώφρονα ὁ σώφρων· ἐκ δὲ τοῦ μὴ πράττειν ταῦτα οὐδεὶς ἂν οὐδὲ μελλήσειε
γενέσθαι ἀγαθός. Ἀλλ' οἱ πολλοὶ ταῦτα μὲν οὐ πράττουσιν, ἐπὶ δὲ τὸν λόγον
καταφεύγοντες οἴονται φιλοσοφεῖν καὶ οὕτως ἔσεσθαι σπουδαῖοι ὅμοιόν τι
ποιοῦντες τοῖς κάμνουσιν, οἳ τῶν ἰατρῶν ἀκούουσι μὲν ἐπιμελῶς, ποιοῦσι δ' 15
οὐδὲν τῶν προσταττομένων. Ὥσπερ οὖν οὐδὲ ἐκεῖνοι εὖ ἕξουσιν τὸ σῶμα
οὕτω θεραπευόμενοι, οὐδ' οὗτοι τὴν ψυχὴν οὕτω φιλοσοφοῦντες.

571—Ar. now proceeds to define virtue.

a. Its genus is: a state of character, not a passion, nor a faculty.

Virtue defined. Its genus

Eth. Nic. II 5, 1105 b^{19}-1106 a^{12}:

Τί δ' ἐστὶν ἡ ἀρετὴ ἑξῆς σκεπτέον. Ἐπεὶ οὖν τὰ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ γινόμενα τρία 20
ἐστί, πάθη δυνάμεις ἕξεις, τούτων ἄν τι εἴη ἡ ἀρετή. Λέγω δὲ πάθη μὲν ἐπιθυ-
μίαν ὀργὴν φόβον θάρσος φθόνον χαρὰν φιλίαν μῖσος πόθον ζῆλον ἔλεον, ὅλως
οἷς ἕπεται ἡδονὴ ἢ λύπη· δυνάμεις δὲ καθ' ἃς παθητικοὶ τούτων λεγόμεθα,
οἷον καθ' ἃς δυνατοὶ ὀργισθῆναι ἢ λυπηθῆναι ἢ ἐλεῆσαι· ἕξεις δὲ καθ' ἃς πρὸς 25
τὰ πάθη ἔχομεν εὖ ἢ κακῶς, οἷον πρὸς τὸ ὀργισθῆναι, εἰ μὲν σφοδρῶς ἢ ἀνει-
μένως, κακῶς ἔχομεν, εἰ δὲ μέσως, εὖ, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ πρὸς τἄλλα. Πάθη μὲν
οὖν οὐκ εἰσὶν οὔθ' αἱ ἀρεταὶ οὔθ' αἱ κακίαι, ὅτι οὐ λεγόμεθα κατὰ τὰ πάθη
σπουδαῖοι ἢ φαῦλοι, κατὰ δὲ τὰς ἀρετὰς ἢ τὰς κακίας λεγόμεθα, καὶ ὅτι κατὰ 30
μὲν τὰ πάθη οὔτε ἐπαινούμεθα οὔτε ψεγόμεθα (οὐ γὰρ ἐπαινεῖται ὁ φοβούμενος
οὐδὲ ὁ ὀργιζόμενος, οὐδὲ ψέγεται ὁ ἁπλῶς ὀργιζόμενος ἀλλ' ὁ πῶς), κατὰ δὲ 1106
τὰς ἀρετὰς καὶ τὰς κακίας ἐπαινούμεθα ἢ ψεγόμεθα. Ἔτι ὀργιζόμεθα μὲν καὶ
φοβούμεθα ἀπροαιρέτως, αἱ δ' ἀρεταὶ προαιρέσεις τινὲς ἢ οὐκ ἄνευ προαιρέσεως.
Πρὸς δὲ τούτοις κατὰ μὲν τὰ πάθη κινεῖσθαι λεγόμεθα, κατὰ δὲ τὰς ἀρετὰς 5
καὶ τὰς κακίας οὐ κινεῖσθαι ἀλλὰ διακεῖσθαί πως. Διὰ ταῦτα δὲ οὐδὲ δυνάμεις

εἰσίν· οὔτε γὰρ ἀγαθοὶ λεγόμεθα τῷ δύνασθαι πάσχειν ἁπλῶς οὔτε κακοί, οὔτ' ἐπαινούμεθα οὔτε ψεγόμεθα. Καὶ ἔτι δυνατοὶ μέν ἐσμεν φύσει, ἀγαθοὶ δὲ ἢ κακοὶ οὐ γινόμεθα φύσει· εἴπομεν δὲ περὶ τούτου πρότερον. Εἰ οὖν μήτε πάθη εἰσὶν αἱ ἀρεταὶ μήτε δυνάμεις, λείπεται ἕξεις αὐτὰς εἶναι.

b. Its differentia: it is a disposition to choose the mean between two extremes.

Ib. 6, 1106 a[12]-1107 a[8]:

Its differentia

Virtue in general

Virtue of man

It seeks the mean

"Ο τι μὲν οὖν ἐστιν τῷ γένει ἡ ἀρετή, εἴρηται· δεῖ δὲ μὴ μόνον οὕτως εἰπεῖν, ὅτι ἕξις, ἀλλὰ καὶ ποία τις. Ῥητέον οὖν ὅτι πᾶσα ἀρετή, οὗ ἂν ᾖ ἀρετή, αὐτό τε εὖ ἔχον ἀποτελεῖ καὶ τὸ ἔργον αὐτοῦ εὖ ἀποδίδωσιν, οἷον ἡ τοῦ ὀφθαλμοῦ ἀρετὴ τόν τε ὀφθαλμὸν σπουδαῖον ποιεῖ καὶ τὸ ἔργον αὐτοῦ· τῇ γὰρ τοῦ ὀφθαλμοῦ ἀρετῇ εὖ ὁρῶμεν. Ὁμοίως ἡ τοῦ ἵππου ἀρετὴ ἵππον τε σπουδαῖον ποιεῖ καὶ ἀγαθὸν δραμεῖν καὶ ἐνεγκεῖν τὸν ἐπιβάτην καὶ μεῖναι τοὺς πολεμίους. Εἰ δὴ τοῦτ' ἐπὶ πάντων οὕτως ἔχει, καὶ ἡ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ἀρετὴ εἴη ἂν ἕξις ἀφ' ἧς ἀγαθὸς ἄνθρωπος γίνεται καὶ ἀφ' ἧς εὖ τὸ ἑαυτοῦ ἔργον ἀποδώσει. Πῶς δὲ τοῦτο ἔσται, ἤδη μὲν εἰρήκαμεν, ἔτι δὲ καὶ ὧδ' ἔσται φανερόν, ἐὰν θεωρήσωμεν ποία τίς ἐστιν ἡ φύσις αὐτῆς. Ἐν παντὶ δὴ συνεχεῖ καὶ διαιρετῷ ἔστι λαβεῖν τὸ μὲν πλεῖον τὸ δ' ἔλαττον τὸ δ' ἴσον, καὶ ταῦτα ἢ κατ' αὐτὸ τὸ πρᾶγμα ἢ πρὸς ἡμᾶς· τὸ δὲ ἴσον μέσον τι ὑπερβολῆς καὶ ἐλλείψεως. Λέγω δὲ τοῦ μὲν πράγματος μέσον τὸ ἴσον ἀπέχον ἀφ' ἑκατέρου τῶν ἄκρων, ὅπερ ἐστὶν ἓν καὶ τὸ αὐτὸ πᾶσιν, πρὸς ἡμᾶς δὲ ὃ μήτε πλεονάζει μήτε ἐλλείπει· τοῦτο δ' οὐχ ἕν, οὐδὲ ταὐτὸν πᾶσιν. Οἷον εἰ τὰ δέκα πολλὰ τὰ δὲ δύο ὀλίγα, τὰ ἓξ μέσα λαμβάνουσι κατὰ τὸ πρᾶγμα· ἴσῳ γὰρ ὑπερέχει τε καὶ ὑπερέχεται· τοῦτο δὲ μέσον ἐστὶ κατὰ τὴν ἀριθμητικὴν ἀναλογίαν. Τὸ δὲ πρὸς ἡμᾶς οὐχ οὕτω ληπτέον· οὐ γὰρ εἴ τῳ δέκα μναῖ φαγεῖν πολὺ δύο δὲ ὀλίγον, ὁ ἀλείπτης ἓξ μνᾶς προστάξει· ἔστι γὰρ ἴσως καὶ τοῦτο πολὺ τῷ ληψομένῳ ἢ ὀλίγον· Μίλωνι μὲν γὰρ ὀλίγον, τῷ δὲ ἀρχομένῳ τῶν γυμνασίων πολύ. Ὁμοίως ἐπὶ δρόμου καὶ πάλης. Οὕτω δὴ πᾶς ἐπιστήμων τὴν ὑπερβολὴν μὲν καὶ τὴν ἔλλειψιν φεύγει, τὸ δὲ μέσον ζητεῖ καὶ τοῦθ' αἱρεῖται, μέσον δὲ οὐ τὸ τοῦ πράγματος ἀλλὰ τὸ πρὸς ἡμᾶς. Εἰ δὴ πᾶσα ἐπιστήμη οὕτως τὸ ἔργον εὖ ἐπιτελεῖ, πρὸς τὸ μέσον βλέπουσα καὶ εἰς τοῦτο ἄγουσα τὰ ἔργα (ὅθεν εἰώθασιν ἐπιλέγειν τοῖς εὖ ἔχουσιν ἔργοις ὅτι οὔτε ἀφελεῖν ἔστιν οὔτε προσθεῖναι, ὡς τῆς μὲν ὑπερβολῆς καὶ τῆς ἐλλείψεως φθειρούσης τὸ εὖ, τῆς δὲ μεσότητος σῳζούσης), εἰ δὴ οἱ ἀγαθοὶ τεχνῖται, ὡς λέγομεν, πρὸς τοῦτο βλέποντες ἐργάζονται, ἡ δὲ ἀρετὴ πάσης τέχνης ἀκριβεστέρα καὶ ἀμείνων ἐστὶν ὥσπερ καὶ ἡ φύσις, τοῦ μέσου ἂν εἴη στοχαστική. Λέγω δὲ τὴν ἠθικήν· αὕτη γάρ ἐστι περὶ πάθη καὶ πράξεις, ἐν δὲ τούτοις ἔστιν ὑπερβολὴ καὶ ἔλλειψις καὶ τὸ μέσον. Οἷον καὶ φοβηθῆναι καὶ θαρρῆσαι καὶ ἐπιθυμῆσαι

καὶ ὀργισθῆναι καὶ ἐλεῆσαι καὶ ὅλως ἡσθῆναι καὶ λυπηθῆναι ἔστι καὶ μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον, καὶ ἀμφότερα οὐκ εὖ, τὸ δὲ ὅτε δεῖ καὶ ἐφ' οἷς καὶ πρὸς οὓς καὶ οὗ ἕνεκα καὶ ὡς δεῖ, μέσον τε καὶ ἄριστον, ὅπερ ἐστὶ τῆς ἀρετῆς· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ τὰς πράξεις ἔστιν ὑπερβολὴ καὶ ἔλλειψις καὶ τὸ μέσον. Ἡ δ' ἀρετὴ περὶ πάθη καὶ πράξεις ἐστίν, ἐν οἷς ἡ μὲν ὑπερβολὴ ἁμαρτάνεται καὶ ἡ ἔλλειψις ψέγεται, τὸ δὲ μέσον ἐπαινεῖται καὶ κατορθοῦται· ταῦτα δ' ἄμφω τῆς ἀρετῆς. Μεσότης τις ἄρα ἐστὶν ἡ ἀρετή, στοχαστικὴ γε οὖσα τοῦ μέσου. Ἔτι τὸ μὲν ἁμαρτάνειν πολλαχῶς ἔστιν (τὸ γὰρ κακὸν τοῦ ἀπείρου, ὡς οἱ Πυθαγόρειοι [1] εἴκαζον, τὸ δὲ ἀγαθὸν τοῦ πεπερασμένου), τὸ δὲ κατορθοῦν μοναχῶς· διὸ καὶ τὸ μὲν ῥᾴδιον τὸ δὲ χαλεπόν, ῥᾴδιον μὲν τὸ ἀποτυχεῖν τοῦ σκοποῦ, χαλεπὸν δὲ τὸ ἐπιτυχεῖν. Καὶ διὰ ταῦτ' οὖν τῆς μὲν κακίας ἡ ὑπερβολὴ καὶ ἡ ἔλλειψις, τῆς δὲ ἀρετῆς ἡ μεσότης.

ἐσθλοὶ μὲν γὰρ ἁπλῶς, παντοδαπῶς δὲ κακοί [2].

Definition of moral virtue

Ἔστιν ἄρα ἡ ἀρετὴ ἕξις προαιρετική, ἐν μεσότητι οὖσα τῇ πρὸς ἡμᾶς, ὡρισμένῃ λόγῳ καὶ ὡς ἂν ὁ φρόνιμος ὁρίσειε. Μεσότης δὲ δύο κακιῶν, τῆς μὲν καθ' ὑπερβολὴν τῆς δὲ κατ' ἔλλειψιν· καὶ ἔτι τῷ τὰς μὲν ἐλλείπειν τὰς δὲ ὑπερβάλλειν τοῦ δέοντος ἔν τε τοῖς πάθεσι καὶ ἐν ταῖς πράξεσι, τὴν δὲ ἀρετὴν τὸ μέσον καὶ εὑρίσκειν καὶ αἱρεῖσθαι. Διὸ κατὰ μὲν τὴν οὐσίαν καὶ τὸν λόγον τὸν τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι λέγοντα μεσότης ἐστὶν ἡ ἀρετή, κατὰ δὲ τὸ ἄριστον καὶ τὸ εὖ ἀκρότης.

572—This definition applied to the particular virtues.

Eth. Nic. II 7, 1107 a[33]-1108 b[10]:

Table of moral virtues as means between two extremes

Περὶ μὲν οὖν φόβους καὶ θάρρη ἀνδρεία μεσότης· τῶν δ' ὑπερβαλλόντων ὁ μὲν τῇ ἀφοβίᾳ ἀνώνυμος (πολλὰ δ' ἐστὶν ἀνώνυμα), ὁ δ' ἐν τῷ θαρρεῖν ὑπερβάλλων θρασύς, ὁ δὲ τῷ μὲν φοβεῖσθαι ὑπερβάλλων τῷ δὲ θαρρεῖν ἐλλείπων δειλός. Περὶ ἡδονὰς δὲ καὶ λύπας οὐ πάσας, ἧττον δὲ καὶ περὶ τὰς λύπας, μεσότης μὲν σωφροσύνη, ὑπερβολὴ δὲ ἀκολασία. Ἐλλείποντες δὲ περὶ τὰς ἡδονὰς οὐ πάνυ γίνονται· διόπερ οὐδ' ὀνόματος τετυχήκασιν οὐδὲ οἱ τοιοῦτοι, ἔστωσαν δὲ ἀναίσθητοι. Περὶ δὲ δόσιν χρημάτων καὶ λῆψιν μεσότης μὲν ἐλευθεριότης, ὑπερβολὴ δὲ καὶ ἔλλειψις ἀσωτία καὶ ἀνελευθερία. Ἐναντίως δ' ἐν αὐταῖς ὑπερβάλλουσιν καὶ ἐλλείπουσιν· ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἄσωτος ἐν μὲν προέσει ὑπερβάλλει ἐν δὲ λήψει ἐλλείπει, ὁ δὲ ἀνελεύθερος ἐν μὲν λήψει ὑπερβάλλει ἐν δὲ προέσει ἐλλείπει. Νῦν μὲν οὖν τύπῳ καὶ ἐπὶ κεφαλαίῳ λέγομεν, ἀρκούμενοι

[1] See our nr. **42**, the table of Pythagorean opposites.
[2] A quotation of unknown origin.

αὐτῷ τούτῳ· ὕστερον δὲ ἀκριβέστερον περὶ αὐτῶν διορισθήσεται. Περὶ δὲ τὰ χρήματα καὶ ἄλλαι διαθέσεις εἰσί, μεσότης μὲν μεγαλοπρέπεια (ὁ γὰρ μεγαλοπρεπὴς διαφέρει ἐλευθερίου· ὁ μὲν γὰρ περὶ μεγάλα, ὁ δὲ περὶ μικρά), ὑπερβολὴ δὲ ἀπειροκαλία [1] καὶ βαναυσία, ἔλλειψις δὸ μικροπρέπεια· διαφέρουσι δ' αὗται τῶν περὶ τὴν ἐλευθεριότητα, πῇ δὲ διαφέρουσιν, ὕστερον ῥηθήσεται. Περὶ δὲ τιμὴν καὶ ἀτιμίαν μεσότης μὲν μεγαλοψυχία, ὑπερβολὴ δὲ χαυνότης τις λεγομένη, ἔλλειψις δὲ μικροψυχία· ὡς δ' ἐλέγομεν ἔχειν πρὸς τὴν μεγαλοπρέπειαν τὴν ἐλευθεριότητα, περὶ μικρὰ διαφέρουσαν, οὕτως ἔχει τις καὶ πρὸς τὴν μεγαλοψυχίαν, περὶ τιμὴν οὖσαν μεγάλην, αὐτὴ περὶ μικρὰν οὖσα· ἔστι γὰρ ὡς δεῖ ὀρέγεσθαι τιμῆς καὶ μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ καὶ ἧττον, λέγεται δ' ὁ μὲν ὑπερβάλλων ταῖς ὀρέξεσι φιλότιμος, ὁ δὲ ἐλλείπων ἀφιλότιμος, ὁ δὲ μέσος ἀνώνυμος. Ἀνώνυμοι δὲ καὶ αἱ διαθέσεις, πλὴν ἡ τοῦ φιλοτίμου φιλοτιμία. Ὅθεν ἐπιδικάζονται οἱ ἄκροι τῆς μέσης χώρας [2], καὶ ἡμεῖς δὲ ἔστι μὲν ὅτε τὸν μέσον φιλότιμον καλοῦμεν ἔστι δ' ὅτε ἀφιλότιμον, καὶ ἔστιν ὅτε μὲν ἐπαινοῦμεν τὸν φιλότιμον
1108a ἔστι δ' ὅτε τὸν ἀφιλότιμον. Διὰ τίνα δ' αἰτίαν τοῦτο ποιοῦμεν, ἐν τοῖς ἑξῆς ῥηθήσεται· νῦν δὲ περὶ τῶν λοιπῶν λέγωμεν κατὰ τὸν ὑφηγημένον τρόπον. Ἔστι δὲ καὶ περὶ τὴν ὀργὴν ὑπερβολὴ καὶ ἔλλειψις καὶ μεσότης, σχεδὸν δὲ ἀνωνύμων ὄντων αὐτῶν, τὸν μέσον πρᾶον λέγοντες τὴν μεσότητα πραότητα καλέσομεν· τῶν δ' ἄκρων ὁ μὲν ὑπερβάλλων ὀργίλος ἔστω, ἡ δὲ κακία ὀργιλότης, ὁ δ' ἐλλείπων ἀόργητός τις, ἡ δ' ἔλλειψις ἀοργησία. Εἰσὶ δὲ καὶ ἄλλαι τρεῖς μεσότητες, ἔχουσαι μέν τινα ὁμοιότητα πρὸς ἀλλήλας, διαφέρουσαι δ' ἀλλήλων· πᾶσαι μὲν γάρ εἰσι περὶ λόγων καὶ πράξεων κοινωνίαν, διαφέρουσι δὲ ὅτι ἡ μέν ἐστι περὶ τὸ ἀληθὲς τὸ ἐν αὐτοῖς, αἱ δὲ περὶ τὸ ἡδύ· τούτου δὲ τὸ μὲν ἐν παιδιᾷ τὸ δ' ἐν πᾶσι τοῖς κατὰ τὸν βίον. Ῥητέον οὖν καὶ περὶ τούτων, ἵνα μᾶλλον κατίδωμεν ὅτι ἐν πᾶσιν ἡ μεσότης ἐπαινετόν, τὰ δ' ἄκρα οὔτ' ὀρθὰ οὔτ' ἐπαινετὰ ἀλλὰ ψεκτά. Ἔστι μὲν οὖν καὶ τούτων τὰ πλείω ἀνώνυμα, πειρατέον δ', ὥσπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων, αὐτοὺς ὀνοματοποιεῖν σαφηνείας ἕνεκα καὶ τοῦ εὐπαρακολουθήτου [3]. Περὶ μὲν οὖν τὸ ἀληθὲς ὁ μὲν μέσος ἀληθής τις καὶ ἡ μεσότης ἀλήθεια λεγέσθω, ἡ δὲ προσποίησις ἡ μὲν ἐπὶ τὸ μεῖζον ἀλαζονεία καὶ ὁ ἔχων αὐτὴν ἀλαζών, ἡ δὲ ἐπὶ τὸ ἔλαττον εἰρωνεία καὶ εἴρων. Περὶ δὲ τὸ ἡδὺ τὸ μὲν ἐν παιδιᾷ ὁ μὲν μέσος εὐτράπελος καὶ ἡ διάθεσις εὐτραπελία, ἡ δὲ ὑπερβολὴ βωμολοχία καὶ ὁ ἔχων αὐτὴν βωμολόχος, ὁ δ' ἐλλείπων ἀγροῖκός τις καὶ ἡ ἕξις ἀγροικία· περὶ δὲ τὸ λοιπὸν ἡδὺ τὸ ἐν τῷ βίῳ ὁ μὲν ὡς δεῖ ἡδὺς ὢν φίλος [4] καὶ ἡ μεσότης φιλία, ὁ δ' ὑπερβάλλων, εἰ μὲν οὐδενὸς

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[1] ἀπειροκαλία - tastelessness.
[2] ἐπιδικάζονται etc. - the extreme characters lay claim to the middle place.
[3] τοῦ εὐπαρακολουθήτου (ἕνεκα) - so that we may be easily followed.
[4] φίλος - amiable.

Means in the passions

ἕνεκα, ἄρεσκος [1], εἰ δὲ ὠφελείας τῆς αὑτοῦ, κόλαξ, ὁ δ' ἐλλείπων καὶ ἐν πᾶσιν ἀηδὴς δύσερίς τις καὶ δύσκολος. Εἰσὶ δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς πάθεσι καὶ ἐν τοῖς περὶ τὰ πάθη μεσότητες· ἡ γὰρ αἰδὼς ἀρετὴ μὲν οὐκ ἔστιν, ἐπαινεῖται δὲ καὶ ὁ αἰδήμων. Καὶ γὰρ ἐν τούτοις ὁ μὲν λέγεται μέσος, ὁ δ' ὑπερβάλλων, ὡς ὁ καταπλὴξ ὁ πάντα αἰδούμενος, ὁ δ' ἐλλείπων ἢ ὁ μηδὲν ὅλως ἀναίσχυντος, ὁ δὲ μέσος αἰδήμων. Νέμεσις [2] δὲ μεσότης φθόνου καὶ ἐπιχαιρεκακίας, εἰσὶ δὲ περὶ λύπην καὶ ἡδονὴν τὰς ἐπὶ τοῖς συμβαίνουσι τοῖς πέλας γινομένας· ὁ μὲν γὰρ νεμεσητικὸς λυπεῖται ἐπὶ τοῖς ἀναξίως εὖ πράττουσιν, ὁ δὲ φθονερὸς ὑπερβάλλων τοῦτον ἐπὶ πᾶσι λυπεῖται, ὁ δ' ἐπιχαιρέκακος τοσοῦτον ἐλλείπει τοῦ λυπεῖσθαι ὥστε καὶ χαίρειν. Ἀλλὰ περὶ μὲν τούτων καὶ ἄλλοθι καιρὸς ἔσται· περὶ δὲ δικαιοσύνης, ἐπεὶ οὐχ ἁπλῶς λέγεται, μετὰ ταῦτα διελόμενοι περὶ ἑκατέρας ἐροῦμεν πῶς μεσότητες εἰσίν· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ τῶν λογικῶν ἀρετῶν. 1108b

The author presented this table to his students in a διαγραφή. It may have been a scheme such as this:

province	*excess*		*mean*		*defect*
φόβοι κ. θάρρη	<θράσος> θρασύς	←	ἀνδρεία <ἀνδρεῖος>	→	<δειλία> δειλός
ἡδοναί κ. λῦπαι	ἀκολασία <ἀκόλαστος>	←	σωφροσύνη <σώφρων>	→	<ἀναισθησία> ἀναίσθητος
δόσις κ. λῆψις χρημάτων	ἀσωτία <ἄσωτος>	←	ἐλευθεριότης <ἐλεύθερος>	→	ἀνελευθερία ἀνελεύθερος
id. (περὶ μεγάλα)	⟨ἀπειροκαλία⟩ ⟨ βαναυσία ⟩ ἀπειρόκαλος, βάναυσος	←	μεγαλοπρέπεια μεγαλοπρεπής	→	μικροπρέπεια μικροπρεπής
τίμη κ. ἀτιμία (μεγάλαι)	χαυνότης χαῦνος	←	μεγαλοψυχία μεγαλόψυχος	→	μικροψυχία μικρόψυχος
id. (μικραί)	φιλοτιμία φιλότιμος	←	<normal attitude towards honour>	→	ἀφιλοτιμία ἀφιλότιμος
ὀργή	ὀργιλότης ὀργίλος	←	πραότης πραός	→	ἀοργησία ἄοργητος
τὸ ἀληθὲς τὸ ἐν τῇ λόγων κ. πράξεων κοινωνίᾳ	ἀλαζονεία ἀλαζών	←	ἀλήθεια ἀληθής	→	εἰρωνεία εἴρων
τὸ ἡδὺ τὸ ἐν παιδιᾷ	βωμολοχία βωμολόχος	←	εὐτραπελία εὐτράπελος	→	ἀγροικία ἀγροῖκος
τὸ ἡδὺ τὸ ἐν τῷ βίῳ	<ἀρέσκεια ἢ κολακεία> ἄρεσκος ἢ κόλαξ	←	φιλία φίλος	→	δυσκολία δύσερις, δύσκολος
τὰ περὶ τὰ πάθη	— καταπλήξ	←	αἰδώς αἰδήμων	→	<ἀναισχυντία> ἀναίσχυντος
id., sc. λύπη κ. ἡδονή, αἱ ἐπὶ τοῖς συμβαίνουσι τοῖς πέλας γινόμεναι	φθόνος φθονερός	←	νέμεσις νεμεσητικός	→	ἐπιχαιρεκακία ἐπιχαιρέκακος

[1] ἄρεσκος - obsequious.

[2] νέμεσις - righteous indignation. In this instance the application of the theory of the mean is very unfortunate.

573—**a.** By this theory the author is led to a remarkable consequence, namely, that the opposition between the extremes (being two vices) is sharper than that between virtue and vice.

Eth. Nic. II 8, 1108 b$^{11-15, 26-30}$.

1108b Τριῶν δὴ διαθέσεων οὐσῶν, δύο μὲν κακιῶν, τῆς μὲν καθ' ὑπερβολὴν τῆς δὲ κατ' ἔλλειψιν, μιᾶς δ' ἀρετῆς τῆς μεσότητος, πᾶσαι πάσαις ἀντίκεινταί πως· αἱ μὲν γὰρ ἄκραι καὶ τῇ μέσῃ καὶ ἀλλήλαις ἐναντίαι εἰσίν, ἡ δὲ μέση
15, 26 ταῖς ἄκραις. — Οὕτως δὲ ἀντικειμένων ἀλλήλοις τούτων, πλείστη ἐναντιότης ἐστὶ τοῖς ἄκροις πρὸς ἄλληλα ἢ πρὸς τὸ μέσον· πορρωτέρω γὰρ ταῦτα ἀφέστηκεν ἀλλήλων ἢ τοῦ μέσου, ὥσπερ τὸ μέγα τοῦ μικροῦ καὶ τὸ μικρὸν τοῦ μεγάλου
30 ἢ ἄμφω τοῦ ἴσου.

The opposition between the extremes is the sharpest

b. Sometimes the excess, sometimes the defect is more opposed to the mean.

Ib., 1108 b^{35}-1109 a^{19}:

1109a Πρὸς δὲ τὸ μέσον ἀντίκειται μᾶλλον ἐφ' ὧν μὲν ἡ ἔλλειψις, ἐφ' ὧν δὲ ἡ ὑπερβολή, οἷον ἀνδρείᾳ μὲν οὐχ ἡ θρασύτης ὑπερβολὴ οὖσα, ἀλλ' ἡ δειλία ἔλλειψις οὖσα, τῇ δὲ σωφροσύνῃ οὐχ ἡ ἀναισθησία ἔνδεια οὖσα, ἀλλ' ἡ
5 ἀκολασία ὑπερβολὴ οὖσα. Διὰ δύο δ' αἰτίας τοῦτο συμβαίνει, μίαν μὲν τὴν ἐξ αὐτοῦ τοῦ πράγματος· τῷ γὰρ ἐγγύτερον εἶναι καὶ ὁμοιότερον τὸ ἕτερον ἄκρον τῷ μέσῳ, οὐ τοῦτο ἀλλὰ τοὐναντίον ἀντιτίθεμεν μᾶλλον, οἷον ἐπεὶ ὁμοιότερον
10 εἶναι δοκεῖ τῇ ἀνδρείᾳ ἡ θρασύτης καὶ ἐγγύτερον, ἀνομοιότερον δ' ἡ δειλία, ταύτην μᾶλλον ἀντιτίθεμεν· τὰ γὰρ ἀπέχοντα πλεῖον τοῦ μέσου ἐναντιώτερα δοκεῖ εἶναι. Μία μὲν οὖν αἰτία αὕτη, ἐξ αὐτοῦ τοῦ πράγματος, ἑτέρα δὲ ἐξ ἡμῶν αὐτῶν· πρὸς ἃ γὰρ αὐτοὶ μᾶλλον πεφύκαμέν πως, ταῦτα μᾶλλον ἐναντία
15 τῷ μέσῳ φαίνεται. Οἷον αὐτοὶ μᾶλλον πεφύκαμεν πρὸς τὰς ἡδονάς, διὸ εὐκατάφοροί ἐσμεν μᾶλλον πρὸς ἀκολασίαν ἢ πρὸς κοσμιότητα. Ταῦτ' οὖν μᾶλλον ἐναντία λέγομεν, πρὸς ἃ ἡ ἐπίδοσις μᾶλλον γίνεται· καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἡ ἀκολασία ὑπερβολὴ οὖσα ἐναντιωτέρα ἐστὶ τῇ σωφροσύνῃ.

574—In the next chapter Ar. gives some practical rules for attaining the mean.

a. *Eth. Nic.* II 9, 1109 a$^{30-33}$:

Three rules for attaining the mean

30 Δεῖ τὸν στοχαζόμενον τοῦ μέσου πρῶτον μὲν ἀποχωρεῖν τοῦ μᾶλλον ἐναντίου, καθάπερ καὶ ἡ Καλυψὼ παραινεῖ

> τούτου μὲν καπνοῦ καὶ κύματος ἐκτὸς ἔεργε
> νῆα.

33 τῶν γὰρ ἄκρων τὸ μέν ἐστιν ἁμαρτωλότερον τὸ δ' ἧττον.

b. Ib., b 1-7:

Σκοπεῖν δὲ δεῖ πρὸς ἃ καὶ αὐτοὶ εὐκατάφοροί ἐσμεν· ἄλλοι γὰρ πρὸς ἄλλα 1109b
πεφύκαμεν. Τοῦτο δ' ἔσται γνώριμον ἐκ τῆς ἡδονῆς καὶ τῆς λύπης τῆς γινο-
μένης περὶ ἡμᾶς. Εἰς τοὐναντίον δ' ἑαυτοὺς ἀφέλκειν δεῖ· πολὺ γὰρ ἀπάγοντες 5
τοῦ ἁμαρτάνειν εἰς τὸ μέσον ἥξομεν, ὅπερ οἱ τὰ διεστραμμένα τῶν ξύλων ὀρ-
θοῦντες ποιοῦσιν.

c. Ib., b 7-12:

Ἐν παντὶ δὲ μάλιστα φυλακτέον τὸ ἡδὺ καὶ τὴν ἡδονήν· οὐ γὰρ ἀδέκαστοι
κρίνομεν αὐτήν. Ὅπερ οὖν οἱ δημογέροντες ἔπαθον πρὸς τὴν Ἑλένην, τοῦτο
δεῖ παθεῖν καὶ ἡμᾶς πρὸς τὴν ἡδονήν, καὶ ἐν πᾶσι τὴν ἐκείνων ἐπιλέγειν φωνήν· 10
οὕτω γὰρ αὐτὴν ἀποπεμπόμενοι ἧττον ἁμαρτησόμεθα.

Conditions of responsibility for action

575—In book III, ch. 1-5, the conditions of responsibility for action are defined. First, the action must be voluntary (ἑκούσιον), i.e. done (1) not under compulsion, and (2) with knowledge of the circumstances.

The voluntary and involuntary

a. *Eth. Nic.* III 1, 1109 b30-1110 a4:

Τῆς ἀρετῆς δὴ περὶ πάθη τε καὶ πράξεις οὔσης, καὶ ἐπὶ τοῖς ἑκουσίοις 30
ἐπαίνων καὶ ψόγων γινομένων, ἐπὶ δὲ τοῖς ἀκουσίοις συγγνώμης, ἐνίοτε δὲ
καὶ ἐλέου, τὸ ἑκούσιον καὶ τὸ ἀκούσιον ἀναγκαῖον ἴσως διορίσαι τοῖς περὶ
ἀρετῆς ἐπισκοποῦσι, χρήσιμον δὲ καὶ τοῖς νομοθετοῦσι πρός τε τὰς τιμὰς
καὶ τὰς κολάσεις. 35

Δοκεῖ δὲ ἀκούσια εἶναι τὰ βίᾳ ἢ δι' ἄγνοιαν γιγνόμενα. Βίαιον δὲ οὗ ἡ 1110a
ἀρχὴ ἔξωθεν, τοιαύτη οὖσα ἐν ᾗ μηδὲν συμβάλλεται ὁ πράττων ἢ ὁ πάσχων,
οἷον εἰ πνεῦμα κομίσαι ποι ἢ ἄνθρωποι κύριοι ὄντες.

Compulsary acts

b. Ib., 1110 b1-5, 9-11:

Τὰ δὴ ποῖα φατέον βίαια; ἢ ἁπλῶς μέν, ὁπότ' ἂν ἡ αἰτία ἐν τοῖς ἐκτὸς ᾖ καὶ 1110b
ὁ πράττων μηδὲν συμβάλληται; Ἃ δὲ καθ' αὑτὰ μὲν ἀκούσιά ἐστι, νῦν δὲ
καὶ ἀντὶ τῶνδε αἱρετά, καὶ ἡ ἀρχὴ ἐν τῷ πράττοντι, καθ' αὑτὰ μὲν ἀκούσιά
ἐστι, νῦν δὲ καὶ ἀντὶ τῶνδε ἑκούσια. — Εἰ δέ τις τὰ ἡδέα καὶ τὰ καλὰ φαίη 5, 9
βίαια εἶναι (ἀναγκάζειν γὰρ ἔξω ὄντα), πάντα ἂν εἴη οὕτω βίαια· τούτων
γὰρ χάριν πάντες πάντα πράττουσιν.

Acts done through ignorance are involuntary only when regretted

c. Ib., 1110 b18-24:

Τὸ δὲ δι' ἄγνοιαν οὐχ ἑκούσιον μὲν ἅπαν ἐστίν, ἀκούσιον δὲ τὸ ἐπίλυπον
καὶ ἐν μεταμελείᾳ· ὁ γὰρ δι' ἄγνοιαν πράξας ὁτιοῦν, μηδέν τι δυσχεραίνων ἐπὶ 20
τῇ πράξει, ἑκὼν μὲν οὐ πέπραχεν, ὅ γε μὴ ἥδει, οὐδ' αὖ ἄκων, μὴ λυπούμενός
γε. Τοῦ δὴ δι' ἄγνοιαν ὁ μὲν ἐν μεταμελείᾳ ἄκων δοκεῖ, ὁ δὲ μὴ μεταμελόμενος,
ἐπεὶ ἕτερος, ἔστω οὐχ ἑκών· ἐπεὶ γὰρ διαφέρει, βέλτιον ὄνομα ἔχειν ἴδιον.

d. Ib., 1110 b30-1111 a6: **Knowledge of the circumstances required**

Τὸ δ' ἀκούσιον βούλεται λέγεσθαι οὐκ εἴ τις ἀγνοεῖ τὰ συμφέροντα. Οὐ γὰρ ἡ ἐν τῇ προαιρέσει ἄγνοια αἰτία του ἀκουσίου ἀλλὰ τῆς μοχθηρίας, οὐδ' ἡ καθόλου (ψέγονται γὰρ διά γε ταύτην), ἀλλ' ἡ καθ' ἕκαστα, ἐν οἷς καὶ περὶ ἃ
1111a ἡ πρᾶξις· ἐν τούτοις γὰρ καὶ ἔλεος καὶ συγγνώμη· ὁ γὰρ τούτων τι ἀγνοῶν ἀκουσίως πράττει. Ἴσως οὖν οὐ χεῖρον διορίσαι αὐτά, τίνα καὶ πόσα ἐστί, τίς τε δὴ καὶ τί καὶ περὶ τί ἢ ἐν τίνι πράττει, ἐνίοτε δὲ καὶ τίνι, οἷον ὀργάνῳ, 5 καὶ ἕνεκα τίνος οἷον σωτηρίας, καὶ πῶς, οἷον ἠρέμα ἢ σφόδρα.

e. Ib., 1111 a22-29, b1-3: **Voluntary acts**

Ὄντος δ' ἀκουσίου τοῦ βίᾳ καὶ δι' ἄγνοιαν, τὸ ἑκούσιον δόξειεν ἂν εἶναι οὗ ἡ ἀρχὴ ἐν αὐτῷ εἰδότι τὰ καθ' ἕκαστα ἐν οἷς ἡ πρᾶξις. Ἴσως γὰρ οὐ καλῶς 25 λέγεται ἀκούσια εἶναι τὰ διὰ θυμὸν ἢ δι' ἐπιθυμίαν. Πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ οὐδὲν ἔτι τῶν ἄλλων ζώων ἑκουσίως πράξει, οὐδ' οἱ παῖδες· εἶτα πότερον οὐδὲν ἑκουσίως πράττομεν τῶν δι' ἐπιθυμίαν ἢ θυμόν, ἢ τὰ καλὰ μὲν ἑκουσίως τὰ δ' αἰσχρὰ ἀκουσίως; Ἢ γελοῖον ἑνός γε αἰτίου ὄντος; — δοκεῖ δὲ οὐχ ἧττον
1111b ἀνθρωπικὰ εἶναι τὰ ἄλογα, ὥστε καὶ αἱ πράξεις τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ἀπὸ θυμοῦ καὶ ἐπιθυμίας· ἄτοπον δὴ τὸ τιθέναι ἀκούσια ταῦτα.

576—Moral virtue further implies that the action is done by choice.

a. *Eth. Nic.* III 2, 1111 b4-10: **Choice**

Διωρισμένων δὲ τοῦ τε ἑκουσίου καὶ τοῦ ἀκουσίου, περὶ προαιρέσεως ἔπεται 5 διελθεῖν· οἰκειότατον γὰρ εἶναι δοκεῖ τῇ ἀρετῇ καὶ μᾶλλον τὰ ἤθη κρίνειν τῶν πράξεων. — Ἡ προαίρεσις δὴ ἑκούσιον μὲν φαίνεται, οὐ ταὐτὸν δέ, ἀλλ' ἐπὶ πλέον τὸ ἑκούσιον· τοῦ μὲν γὰρ ἑκουσίου καὶ παῖδες καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ζῷα κοινωνεῖ, 10 προαιρέσεως δ' οὔ, καὶ τὰ ἐξαίφνης ἑκούσια μὲν λέγομεν, κατὰ προαίρεσιν δ' οὔ.

b. Ib., 1111b 10-19: **It is neither desire nor passion**

Οἱ δὲ λέγοντες αὐτὴν ἐπιθυμίαν ἢ θυμὸν ἢ βούλησιν ἢ τινα δόξαν οὐκ ἐοίκασιν ὀρθῶς λέγειν. Οὐ γὰρ κοινὸν ἡ προαίρεσις καὶ τῶν ἀλόγων, ἐπιθυμία δὲ καὶ θυμός. Καὶ ὁ ἀκρατὴς ἐπιθυμῶν μὲν πράττει, προαιρούμενος δ' οὔ· ὁ ἐγκρατὴς 15 δ' ἀνάπαλιν προαιρούμενος μέν, ἐπιθυμῶν δ' οὔ. Καὶ προαιρέσει μὲν ἐπιθυμία ἐναντιοῦται, ἐπιθυμίᾳ δ' ἐπιθυμία οὔ. Καὶ ἡ μὲν ἐπιθυμία ἡδέος καὶ ἐπιλύπου, ἡ προαίρεσις δ' οὔτε λυπηροῦ οὔθ' ἡδέος. — Θυμὸς δ' ἔτι ἧττον· ἥκιστα γὰρ τὰ διὰ θυμὸν κατὰ προαίρεσιν εἶναι δοκεῖ.

c. Ib., 1111b 19-30: **Neither wish**

20 Ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ βούλησίς γε, καίπερ σύνεγγυς φαινόμενον. Προαίρεσις μὲν γὰρ οὐκ ἔστι τῶν ἀδυνάτων, καὶ εἴ τις φαίη προαιρεῖσθαι, δοκοίη ἂν ἠλίθιος εἶναι· βούλησις δ' ἐστὶ τῶν ἀδυνάτων, οἷον ἀθανασίας. Καὶ ἡ μὲν βούλησίς ἐστι καὶ περὶ τὰ μηδαμῶς δι' αὐτοῦ πραχθέντα ἄν, οἷον ὑποκριτήν τινα νικᾶν

ἢ ἀθλητήν· προαιρεῖται δὲ τὰ τοιαῦτα οὐδείς, ἀλλ' ὅσα οἴεται γενέσθαι ἂν δι' αὑτοῦ. Ἔτι δὲ ἡ μὲν βούλησις τοῦ τέλους ἐστὶ μᾶλλον, ἡ δὲ προαίρεσις τῶν πρὸς τὸ τέλος, οἷον ὑγιαίνειν βουλόμεθα. Προαιρούμεθα δὲ δι' ὧν ὑγιανοῦμεν, καὶ εὐδαιμονεῖν βουλόμεθα μὲν καὶ φαμέν. Προαιρούμεθα δὲ λέγειν οὐχ ἁρμόζει· ὅλως γὰρ ἔοικεν ἡ προαίρεσις περὶ τὰ ἐφ' ἡμῖν εἶναι.

nor opinion

d. Ib. 1111 b[30]-1112 a[11]:

Οὐδὲ δὴ δόξα ἂν εἴη. Ἡ μὲν γὰρ δόξα δοκεῖ περὶ πάντα εἶναι, καὶ οὐδὲν ἧττον περὶ τὰ ἀΐδια καὶ τὰ ἀδύνατα ἢ τὰ ἐφ' ἡμῖν· καὶ τῷ ψευδεῖ καὶ ἀληθεῖ διαιρεῖται, οὐ τῷ κακῷ καὶ ἀγαθῷ, ἡ προαίρεσις δὲ τούτοις μᾶλλον. — Ὅλως μὲν οὖν δόξῃ ταὐτὸν ἴσως οὐδὲ λέγει οὐδείς· ἀλλ' οὐδὲ τινί. Τῷ γὰρ προαιρεῖσθαι τἀγαθὰ ἢ τὰ κακὰ ποιοί τινες ἐσμεν, τῷ δὲ δοξάζειν οὔ. Καὶ προαιρούμεθα μὲν λαβεῖν ἢ φυγεῖν ἤ τι τῶν τοιούτων, δοξάζομεν δὲ τί ἐστιν ἢ τίνι συμφέρει ἢ πῶς· λαβεῖν δὲ ἢ φυγεῖν οὐ πάνυ δοξάζομεν. Καὶ ἡ μὲν προαίρεσις ἐπαινεῖται τῷ εἶναι οὗ δεῖ μᾶλλον ἢ τῷ ὀρθῶς, ἡ δὲ δόξα τῷ ὡς ἀληθῶς. Καὶ προαιρούμεθα μὲν ἃ μάλιστα ἴσμεν ἀγαθὰ ὄντα, δοξάζομεν δὲ ἃ οὐ πάνυ ἴσμεν. Δοκοῦσί τε οὐχ οἱ αὐτοὶ προαιρεῖσθαί τε ἄριστα καὶ δοξάζειν, ἀλλ' ἔνιοι δοξάζειν μὲν ἄμεινον, διὰ κακίαν δ' αἱρεῖσθαι οὐχ ἃ δεῖ.

Choice defined

e. Ib., 1112 a[13-17]:

Τί οὖν ἢ ποῖόν τί ἐστιν, ἐπειδὴ τῶν εἰρημένων οὐδέν; Ἑκούσιον μὲν δὴ φαίνεται, τὸ δὲ ἑκούσιον οὐ πᾶν προαιρετόν. Ἀλλ' ἆρά γε τὸ προβεβουλευμένον; Ἡ γὰρ προαίρεσις μετὰ λόγου καὶ διανοίας. Ὑποσημαίνειν δ' ἔοικεν καὶ τοὔνομα ὡς ὂν πρὸ ἑτέρων αἱρετόν.

577—Choice having been defined as "the Voluntary preceded by deliberation", the question arises: on which objects does deliberation bear. Ar. answers: (1) We deliberate about things that are in our power and can be done; (2) not about ends, but about means.

Not every thing is object of deliberation

a. *Eth. Nic.* III 3, 1112 a[18-34]:

Βουλεύονται δὲ πότερα πάντων, καὶ πᾶν βουλευτόν ἐστιν, ἢ περὶ ἐνίων οὐκ ἔστι βουλή; Λεκτέον δὲ ἴσως βουλευτὸν οὐχ ὑπὲρ οὗ βουλεύσαιτ' ἄν τις ἠλίθιος ἢ μαινόμενος, ἀλλ' ὑπὲρ ὧν ὁ νοῦν ἔχων. — Περὶ δὲ τῶν ἀϊδίων οὐδεὶς βουλεύεται, οἷον περὶ τοῦ κόσμου ἢ τῆς διαμέτρου καὶ τῆς πλευρᾶς, ὅτι ἀσύμμετροι. — Ἀλλ' οὐδὲ περὶ τῶν ἐν κινήσει, ἀεὶ δὲ κατὰ ταὐτὰ γινομένων, εἴτ' ἐξ ἀνάγκης εἴτε καὶ φύσει ἢ διά τινα αἰτίαν ἄλλην, οἷον τροπῶν καὶ ἀνατολῶν. — Οὐδὲ περὶ τῶν ἄλλοτε ἄλλως, οἷον αὐχμῶν καὶ ὄμβρων. — Οὐδὲ περὶ τῶν ἀπὸ τύχης, οἷον θησαυροῦ εὑρέσεως. — Ἀλλ' οὐδὲ περὶ τῶν ἀνθρωπικῶν πάντων, οἷον πῶς ἂν Σκύθαι ἄριστα πολιτεύοιντο οὐδεὶς Λακεδαιμονίων βουλεύεται. Οὐ γὰρ γένοιτ' ἂν τούτων οὐδὲν δι' ἡμῶν. — Βουλευόμεθα δὲ περὶ τῶν ἐφ'

ἡμῖν καὶ πρακτῶν· ταῦτα δὲ καὶ ἔστι λοιπά. Αἰτίαι γὰρ δοκοῦσιν εἶναι φύσις καὶ ἀνάγκη καὶ τύχη, ἔτι δὲ νοῦς καὶ πᾶν τὸ δι' ἀνθρώπου. Τῶν δ' ἀνθρώπων ἕκαστοι βουλεύονται περὶ τῶν δι' αὑτῶν πρακτῶν.

b. Ib., 1112 b[11-21]: **We deliberate not about ends, but about means**

1112b Βουλευόμεθα δ' οὐ περὶ τῶν τελῶν ἀλλὰ περὶ τῶν πρὸς τὰ τέλη. Οὔτε γὰρ ἰατρὸς βουλεύεται εἰ ὑγιάσει, οὔτε ῥήτωρ εἰ πείσει, οὔτε πολιτικὸς εἰ εὐνομίαν
15 ποιήσει, οὐδὲ τῶν λοιπῶν οὐδεὶς περὶ τοῦ τέλους· ἀλλὰ θέμενοι τέλος τι, πῶς καὶ διὰ τίνων ἔσται σκοποῦσιν, καὶ διὰ πλειόνων μὲν φαινομένου γίνεσθαι διὰ τίνος ῥᾷστα καὶ κάλλιστα ἐπισκοποῦσι, δι' ἑνὸς δ' ἐπιτελουμένου πῶς διὰ τούτου ἔσται κἀκεῖνο διὰ τίνος, ἕως ἂν ἔλθωσιν ἐπὶ τὸ πρῶτον αἴτιον, ὃ
20 ἐν τῇ εὑρέσει ἔσχατόν ἐστιν· ὁ γὰρ βουλευόμενος ἔοικεν ζητεῖν καὶ ἀναλύειν τὸν εἰρημένον τρόπον ὥσπερ διάγραμμα.

578—After these preliminaries choice can be defined more precisely.

Eth. Nic. III 3, 1113 a[9-12]: **Final definition of choice**

Ὄντος δὲ τοῦ προαιρετοῦ βουλευτοῦ ὀρεκτοῦ τῶν ἐφ' ἡμῖν, καὶ ἡ προαίρεσις ἂν εἴη βουλευτικὴ ὄρεξις τῶν ἐφ' ἡμῖν· ἐκ τοῦ βουλεύσασθαι γὰρ κρίναντες ὀρεγόμεθα κατὰ τὴν βούλευσιν.

579—**a.** Since, then, good and bad actions depend on choice, virtue and vice are in our power.

Eth. Nic. III 5, 1113 b[3-16]: **We are responsible for good and for bad actions**

1113b Ὄντος δὴ βουλητοῦ μὲν τοῦ τέλους, βουλευτῶν δὲ καὶ προαιρετῶν τῶν πρὸς
5 τὸ τέλος, αἱ περὶ ταῦτα πράξεις κατὰ προαίρεσιν ἂν εἶεν καὶ ἑκούσιοι. Αἱ δὲ τῶν ἀρετῶν ἐνέργειαι περὶ ταῦτα. Ἐφ' ἡμῖν δὴ καὶ ἡ ἀρετή, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἡ κακία. Ἐν οἷς γὰρ ἐφ' ἡμῖν τὸ πράττειν, καὶ τὸ μὴ πράττειν, καὶ ἐν οἷς τὸ μή, καὶ τὸ ναί· ὥστε εἰ τὸ πράττειν καλὸν ὂν ἐφ' ἡμῖν ἐστί, καὶ τὸ μὴ πράττειν
10 ἐφ' ἡμῖν ἔσται αἰσχρὸν ὄν, καὶ εἰ τὸ μὴ πράττειν καλὸν ὂν ἐφ' ἡμῖν, καὶ τὸ πράττειν αἰσχρὸν ὂν ἐφ' ἡμῖν. Εἰ δὲ ἐφ' ἡμῖν τὰ καλὰ πράττειν καὶ τὰ αἰσχρά, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὸ μὴ πράττειν, τοῦτο δὲ ἦν τὸ ἀγαθοῖς καὶ κακοῖς εἶναι, ἐφ' ἡμῖν ἄρα τὸ ἐπιεικέσι καὶ φαύλοις εἶναι. Τὸ δὲ λέγειν ὡς

15 οὐδεὶς ἑκὼν πονηρὸς οὐδ' ἄκων μάκαρ [1]

ἔοικεν τὸ μὲν ψευδεῖ τὸ δὲ ἀληθεῖ. Μακάριος μὲν γὰρ οὐδεὶς ἄκων, ἡ δὲ μοχθηρία ἑκούσιον.

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[1] With this ancient Greek wisdom (the verse may be of Solon) the Socratic maxim that "nobody does wrong willingly" is implicitly condemned. Cp. our nr. **204c, d.**

This is presupposed by legislation

b. Ib., 1113 b$^{21-30}$:

Τούτοις δ' ἔοικε μαρτυρεῖσθαι καὶ ἰδίᾳ ὑφ' ἑκάστων καὶ ὑπ' αὐτῶν τῶν νομοθετῶν· κολάζουσι γὰρ καὶ τιμωροῦνται τοὺς δρῶντας μοχθηρά, ὅσοι μὴ βίᾳ ἢ δι' ἄγνοιαν ἧς μὴ αὐτοὶ αἴτιοι, τοὺς δὲ τὰ καλὰ πράττοντας τιμῶσιν, ὡς τοὺς μὲν προτρέψοντες τοὺς δὲ κωλύσοντες. Καίτοι ὅσα μήτε ἐφ' ἡμῖν ἐστὶ μήτε ἑκούσια, οὐδεὶς προτρέπεται πράττειν, ὡς οὐδὲν πρὸ ἔργου ὂν τὸ πεισθῆναι μὴ θερμαίνεσθαι ἢ ἀλγεῖν ἢ πεινῆν ἢ ὁτιοῦν ἄλλο τῶν τοιούτων· οὐθὲν γὰρ ἧττον πεισόμεθα αὐτά.

580—a. The truth that character is formed by action is not contradicted by the fact that a vice once formed cannot be thrown off at will.

Ib., 1114 a$^{9-31}$:

Τὸ μὲν οὖν ἀγνοεῖν ὅτι ἐκ τοῦ ἐνεργεῖν περὶ ἕκαστα αἱ ἕξεις γίνονται, κομιδῇ ἀναισθήτου· ἔτι δὲ ἄλογον τὸν ἀδικοῦντα μὴ βούλεσθαι ἄδικον εἶναι ἢ τὸν ἀκολασταίνοντα ἀκόλαστον· εἰ δὲ μὴ ἀγνοῶν τις πράττει ἐξ ὧν ἔσται ἄδικος, ἑκὼν ἄδικος ἂν εἴη. Οὐ μὴν ἐάν γε βούληται, ἄδικος ὢν παύσεται καὶ ἔσται δίκαιος. Οὐδὲ γὰρ ὁ νοσῶν ὑγιής, καὶ εἰ οὕτως ἔτυχεν, ἑκὼν νοσεῖ, ἀκρατῶς βιοτεύων καὶ ἀπειθῶν τοῖς ἰατροῖς· τότε μὲν οὖν ἐξῆν αὐτῷ μὴ νοσεῖν, προεμένῳ δ' οὐκέτι, ὥσπερ οὐδ' ἀφέντι λίθον ἔτ' αὐτὸν δυνατὸν ἀναλαβεῖν· ἀλλ' ὅμως ἐπ' αὐτῷ τὸ βαλεῖν καὶ ῥῖψαι· ἡ γὰρ ἀρχὴ ἐν αὐτῷ. Οὕτω δὲ καὶ τῷ ἀδίκῳ καὶ τῷ ἀκολάστῳ ἐξ ἀρχῆς μὲν ἐξῆν τοιούτοις μὴ γίνεσθαι, διὸ ἑκόντες εἰσίν· γενομένοις δ' οὐκέτι ἔξεστιν μὴ εἶναι.

Vice cannot be thrown off at will, but is formed voluntarily

Οὐ μόνον δὲ αἱ τῆς ψυχῆς κακίαι ἑκούσιοι εἰσίν, ἀλλ' ἐνίοις καὶ αἱ τοῦ σώματος, οἷς καὶ ἐπιτιμῶμεν· τοῖς μὲν γὰρ διὰ φύσιν αἰσχροῖς οὐδεὶς ἐπιτιμᾷ, τοῖς δὲ δι' ἀγυμνασίαν καὶ ἀμέλειαν. Ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ ἀσθένειαν καὶ πήρωσιν· οὐθεὶς γὰρ ἂν ὀνειδίσειεν τυφλῷ φύσει ἢ ἐκ νόσου ἢ ἐκ πληγῆς, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ἐλεήσαι· τῷ δὲ ἐξ οἰνοφλυγίας ἢ ἄλλης ἀκολασίας πᾶς ἂν ἐπιτιμήσαι. Τῶν δὴ περὶ τὸ σῶμα κακιῶν αἱ ἐφ' ἡμῖν ἐπιτιμῶνται, αἱ δὲ μὴ ἐφ' ἡμῖν οὔ. Εἰ δ' οὕτως, καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων αἱ ἐπιτιμώμεναι τῶν κακιῶν ἐφ' ἡμῖν ἂν εἶεν.

The objection that conduct is determined by innate character

b. Ib., 1114 a^{31}-b^{25}:

Εἰ δέ τις λέγοι ὅτι πάντες ἐφίενται τοῦ φαινομένου ἀγαθοῦ, τῆς δὲ φαντασίας οὐ κύριοι, ἀλλ' ὁποῖός ποθ' ἕκαστός ἐστιν, τοιοῦτο καὶ τὸ τέλος φαίνεται αὐτῷ· εἰ μὲν οὖν ἕκαστος αὑτῷ τῆς ἕξεώς ἐστί πως αἴτιος, καὶ τῆς φαντασίας ἔσται πως αὐτὸς αἴτιος, εἰ δὲ μηδεὶς αὑτῷ αἴτιος τοῦ κακοποιεῖν, ἀλλὰ δι' ἄγνοιαν τοῦ τέλους ταῦτα πράττει, διὰ τούτων οἰόμενος αὑτῷ τὸ ἄριστον ἔσεσθαι, ἡ δὲ τοῦ τέλους ἔφεσις οὐκ αὐθαίρετος, ἀλλὰ φῦναι δεῖ ὥσπερ ὄψιν ἔχοντα, ᾗ κρινεῖ καλῶς καὶ τὸ κατ' ἀλήθειαν ἀγαθὸν αἱρήσεται, καὶ ἔστιν εὐφυὴς ᾧ τοῦτο καλῶς πέφυκεν (τὸ γὰρ μέγιστον καὶ κάλλιστον, καὶ ὃ παρ'

ἑτέρου μὴ οἷόν τε λαβεῖν μηδὲ μαθεῖν, ἀλλ' οἷον ἔφυ τοιοῦτον ἕξει, καὶ τὸ εὖ καὶ τὸ καλῶς τοῦτο πεφυκέναι ἡ τελεία καὶ ἀληθινὴ ἂν εἴη εὐφυΐα), εἰ δὴ ταῦτ' ἐστὶν ἀληθῆ, τί μᾶλλον ἡ ἀρετὴ τῆς κακίας ἔσται ἑκούσιον; Ἀμφοῖν γὰρ ὁμοίως, τῷ ἀγαθῷ καὶ τῷ κακῷ, τὸ τέλος φύσει ἢ ὁπωσδήποτε φαίνεται καὶ κεῖται, τὰ δὲ λοιπὰ πρὸς τοῦτ' ἀναφέροντες πράττουσιν ὁπωσδήποτε. Εἴτε δὴ τὸ τέλος μὴ φύσει ἑκάστῳ φαίνεται οἱονδήποτε, ἀλλά τι καὶ παρ' αὐτόν ἐστιν, εἴτε τὸ μὲν τέλος φυσικόν, τῷ δὲ τὰ λοιπὰ πράττειν ἑκουσίως τὸν σπουδαῖον ἡ ἀρετὴ ἑκούσιόν ἐστιν, οὐθὲν ἧττον καὶ ἡ κακία ἑκούσιον ἂν εἴη. Ὁμοίως γὰρ καὶ τῷ κακῷ ὑπάρχει τὸ δι' αὐτὸν ἐν ταῖς πράξεσιν καὶ εἰ μὴ ἐν τῷ τέλει. Εἰ οὖν, ὥσπερ λέγεται, ἑκούσιοί εἰσιν αἱ ἀρεταί (καὶ γὰρ τῶν ἕξεων συναίτιοί πως αὐτοί ἐσμεν, καὶ τῷ ποιοί τινες εἶναι τὸ τέλος τοιόνδε τιθέμεθα), καὶ αἱ κακίαι ἑκούσιοι ἂν εἶεν· ὁμοίως γάρ.

c. Ib., 1114 b[30]-1115 a[3]: **Actions and states of character not in the same sense voluntary**

Οὐχ ὁμοίως δὲ αἱ πράξεις ἑκούσιοί εἰσι καὶ αἱ ἕξεις· τῶν μὲν γὰρ πράξεων ἀπ' ἀρχῆς μέχρι τοῦ τέλους κύριοί ἐσμεν, εἰδότες τὰ καθ' ἕκαστα, τῶν ἕξεων δὲ τῆς ἀρχῆς, καθ' ἕκαστα δὲ ἡ πρόσθεσις οὐ γνώριμος, ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀρρωστιῶν· ἀλλ' ὅτι ἐφ' ἡμῖν ἦν οὕτως ἢ μὴ οὕτως χρήσασθαι, διὰ τοῦτο ἑκούσιοι.

3—THE NICOMACHEAN ETHICS. A PHENOMENOLOGY OF VIRTUE (Books III 6-X)

581—Ar.'s treatment of courage gives a good instance of his method in defining moral virtues. It has been rightly remarked by Ross that this method is the reverse of that followed by Plato. Plato tends to interpret every virtue so widely that it is essentially identified with virtue as a whole—we have seen this in the *Laches* concerning courage (our nr. **210**), and again in the *Republic* concerning justice (nrs. **284-285**)—; by Ar. the spheres of the particular virtues are narrowed as much as possible.

a. *Eth. Nic.* III 6, 1115 a[6-35]: **Courage defined**

Καὶ πρῶτον περὶ ἀνδρείας.

Ὅτι μὲν οὖν μεσότης ἐστὶ περὶ φόβους καὶ θάρρη, ἤδη φανερὸν γεγένηται, φοβούμεθα δὲ δηλονότι τὰ φοβερά, ταῦτα δ' ἐστὶν ὡς ἁπλῶς εἰπεῖν κακά· διὸ καὶ τὸν φόβον ὁρίζονται προσδοκίαν κακοῦ. Φοβούμεθα μὲν οὖν πάντα τὰ κακά, οἷον ἀδοξίαν πενίαν νόσον ἀφιλίαν θάνατον, ἀλλ' οὐ περὶ πάντα δοκεῖ ὁ ἀνδρεῖος εἶναι· ἔνια γὰρ καὶ δεῖ φοβεῖσθαι καὶ καλόν, τὸ δὲ μὴ αἰσχρόν, οἷον ἀδοξίαν· ὁ μὲν γὰρ φοβούμενος ἐπιεικὴς καὶ αἰδήμων, ὁ δὲ μὴ φοβούμενος ἀναίσχυντος. Λέγεται δ' ὑπό τινων ἀνδρεῖος κατὰ μεταφοράν· ἔχει γάρ τι ὅμοιον τῷ ἀνδρείῳ· ἄφοβος γάρ τις καὶ ὁ ἀνδρεῖος. Πενίαν δὲ ἴσως οὐ δεῖ

φοβεῖσθαι οὐδὲ νόσον, οὐδ' ὅλως ὅσα μὴ ἀπὸ κακίας μηδὲ δι' αὐτόν· ἀλλ' οὐδ' ὁ περὶ ταῦτα ἄφοβος ἀνδρεῖος, λέγομεν δὲ καὶ τοῦτον καθ' ὁμοιότητα. Ἔνιοι γὰρ ἐν τοῖς πολεμικοῖς κινδύνοις δειλοὶ ὄντες ἐλευθέριοί εἰσι καὶ πρὸς χρημάτων ἀποβολὴν εὐθαρσῶς ἔχουσιν. Οὐδὲ δὴ εἴ τις ὕβριν περὶ παῖδας καὶ γυναῖκα φοβεῖται ἢ φθόνον ἤ τι τῶν τοιούτων, δειλός ἐστιν· οὐδ' εἰ θαρρεῖ μέλλων μαστιγοῦσθαι, ἀνδρεῖος. Περὶ ποῖα οὖν τῶν φοβερῶν ὁ ἀνδρεῖος; Ἢ περὶ τὰ μέγιστα; Οὐθεὶς γὰρ ὑπομενετικώτερος τῶν δεινῶν. Φοβερώτατον δ' ὁ θάνατος· πέρας γάρ, καὶ οὐδὲν ἔτι τῷ τεθνεῶτι δοκεῖ οὔτε ἀγαθὸν οὔτε κακὸν εἶναι. Δόξειε δ' ἂν οὐδὲ περὶ θάνατον τὸν ἐν παντὶ ὁ ἀνδρεῖος εἶναι, οἷον ἐν θαλάττῃ ἢ νόσοις. Ἐν τίσιν οὖν; Ἢ ἐν τοῖς καλλίστοις; Τοιοῦτοι δὲ οἱ ἐν πολέμῳ· ἐν μεγίστῳ γὰρ καὶ καλλίστῳ κινδύνῳ. Ὁμόλογοι δὲ τούτοις εἰσὶ καὶ αἱ τιμαὶ αἱ ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι καὶ παρὰ τοῖς μονάρχοις. Κυρίως δὴ λέγοιτ' ἂν ἀνδρεῖος ὁ περὶ τὸν καλὸν θάνατον ἀδεής, καὶ ὅσα θάνατον ἐπιφέρει ὑπόγυια ὄντα· τοιαῦτα δὲ μάλιστα τὰ κατὰ πόλεμον.

b. Ib. 7, 1115 b[15-24]:

Γίνεται δὴ τῶν ἁμαρτιῶν ἡ μὲν ὅτι ὃ οὐ δεῖ, ἡ δὲ ὅτι οὐχ ὡς δεῖ, ἡ δὲ ὅτι οὐχ ὅτε, ἤ τι τῶν τοιούτων· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ τὰ θαρραλέα. Ὁ μὲν οὖν ἃ δεῖ καὶ οὗ ἕνεκα ὑπομένων καὶ φοβούμενος, καὶ ὡς δεῖ καὶ ὅτε, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ θαρρῶν, ἀνδρεῖος (κατ' ἀξίαν γάρ, καὶ ὡς ἂν ὁ λόγος, πάσχει καὶ πράττει ὁ ἀνδρεῖος· τέλος δὲ πάσης ἐνεργείας ἐστὶ τὸ κατὰ τὴν ἕξιν, καὶ τῷ ἀνδρείῳ δὲ ἡ ἀνδρεία καλόν· τοιοῦτον δὴ καὶ τὸ τέλος· ὁρίζεται γὰρ ἕκαστον τῷ τέλει. Καλοῦ δὴ ἕνεκα ὁ ἀνδρεῖος ὑπομένει καὶ πράττει τὰ κατὰ τὴν ἀνδρείαν.

Its motive is its own nobility

Again, W. D. Ross [1] has made an interesting remark here: in his actual treatment of the virtues, he says, Ar. somewhat forgets his formal view; (namely, that all human action aims at an end other than itself); he nowhere attempts to deduce the necessity of any single virtue from the supreme end to be attained. He treats the agent as being moved to action by the contemplation of the "fineness" of the good act itself, and thus becomes in his detailed treatment an intuitionist.

582—a. The sphere of temperance is limited to the pleasures of touch and taste, but especially to those of touch.

Temperance

Eth. Nic. III 10, 1117 b[20]-1118 b[1]:

Περὶ μὲν οὖν ἀνδρείας ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον εἰρήσθω (τί δ' ἐστίν, οὐ χαλεπὸν τύπῳ γε περιλαβεῖν ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων)· μετὰ δὲ ταύτην περὶ σωφροσύνης λέγωμεν. Δοκοῦσι γὰρ τῶν ἀλόγων μερῶν αὗται εἶναι αἱ ἀρεταί. Ὅτι μὲν οὖν μεσότης

[1] *Aristotle*, p. 204/5.

ἐστὶ περὶ ἡδονὰς ἡ σωφροσύνη, εἴρηται ἡμῖν (ἧττον γὰρ καὶ οὐχ ὁμοίως περὶ τὰς λύπας ἐστίν)· ἐν τοῖς αὐτοῖς δὲ καὶ ἡ ἀκολασία φαίνεται. Περὶ ποίας οὖν τῶν ἡδονῶν, νῦν ἀφορίσωμεν. Διῃρήσθωσαν δὴ καὶ αἱ σωματικαὶ καὶ αἱ ψυχικαί, οἷον φιλοτιμία φιλομαθία· ἑκάτερος γὰρ τούτων χαίρει, οὗ φιλητικός ἐστιν, οὐδὲν πάσχοντος τοῦ σώματος, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον τῆς διανοίας. Οἱ δὲ περὶ τὰς τοιαύτας ἡδονὰς οὔτε σώφρονες οὔτε ἀκόλαστοι λέγονται· ὁμοίως δὲ οὐδ' οἱ περὶ τὰς ἄλλας ὅσαι μὴ σωματικαί εἰσιν. Τοὺς γὰρ φιλομύθους καὶ διηγητικοὺς καὶ περὶ τῶν τυχόντων κατατρίβοντας τὰς ἡμέρας ἀδολέσχας, ἀκολάστους δ' 1118a οὐ λέγομεν, οὐδὲ τοὺς λυπουμένους ἐπὶ χρήμασιν ἢ φίλοις. Περὶ δὲ τὰς σωματικὰς εἴη ἂν ἡ σωφροσύνη, οὐ πάσας δὲ οὐδὲ ταύτας· οἱ γὰρ χαίροντες τοῖς διὰ τῆς ὄψεως, οἷον χρώμασι καὶ σχήμασι καὶ γραφῇ, οὔτε σώφρονες οὔτε ἀκόλαστοι λέγονται· καίτοι δόξειεν ἂν εἶναι καὶ ὡς δεῖ χαίρειν καὶ τούτοις, καὶ καθ' ὑπερβολὴν καὶ ἔλλειψιν. Ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς περὶ τὴν ἀκοήν· τοὺς γὰρ ὑπερβεβλημένως χαίροντας μέλεσιν ἢ ὑποκρίσει οὐθεὶς ἀκολάστους λέγει, οὐδὲ τοὺς ὡς δεῖ σώφρονας. Οὐδὲ τοὺς περὶ τὴν ὀσμήν, πλὴν κατὰ συμβεβηκός· τοὺς γὰρ χαίροντας μήλων ἢ ῥόδων ἢ θυμιαμάτων ὀσμαῖς οὐ λέγομεν ἀκολάστους, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον τοὺς μύρων ἢ ὄψων· χαίρουσι γὰρ τούτοις οἱ ἀκόλαστοι, ὅτι διὰ τούτων ἀνάμνησις γίνεται αὐτοῖς τῶν ἐπιθυμητῶν. Ἴδοι δ' ἄν τις καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους, ὅταν πεινῶσι, χαίροντας ταῖς τῶν βρωμάτων ὀσμαῖς· τὸ δὲ τοιούτοις χαίρειν ἀκολάστου. Τούτῳ γὰρ ἐπιθυμητὰ ταῦτα. Οὐκ ἔστι δὲ οὐδὲ τοῖς ἄλλοις ζῴοις κατὰ ταύτας τὰς αἰσθήσεις ἡδονὴ πλὴν κατὰ συμβεβηκός. Οὐδὲ γὰρ ταῖς ὀσμαῖς τῶν λαγῳῶν αἱ κύνες χαίρουσιν, ἀλλὰ τῇ βρώσει, τὴν δ' αἴσθησιν ἡ ὀσμὴ ἐποίησεν· οὐδὲ ὁ λέων τῇ φωνῇ τοῦ βοός, ἀλλὰ τῇ ἐδωδῇ, ὅτι δ' ἐγγύς ἐστι, διὰ τῆς φωνῆς ᾔσθετο, καὶ χαίρειν δὴ ταύτῃ φαίνεται· ὁμοίως δ' οὐδ' ἰδὼν ἔλαφον ἢ ἄγριον αἶγα, ἀλλ' ὅτι βορὰν ἕξει. Περὶ τὰς τοιαύτας δὴ ἡδονὰς ἡ σωφροσύνη καὶ ἡ ἀκολασία ἐστὶν ὧν καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ ζῷα κοινωνεῖ, ὅθεν ἀνδραποδώδεις καὶ θηριώδεις φαίνονται· αὗται δ' εἰσὶν ἁφὴ καὶ γεῦσις. Φαίνονται δὲ καὶ τῇ γεύσει ἐπὶ μικρὸν ἢ οὐθὲν χρῆσθαι· τῆς γὰρ γεύσεώς ἐστιν ἡ κρίσις τῶν χυμῶν, ὅπερ ποιοῦσιν οἱ τοὺς οἴνους δοκιμάζοντες καὶ τὰ ὄψα ἀρτύοντες· οὐ πάνυ δὲ χαίρουσι τούτοις, ἢ οὐχ οἵ γε ἀκόλαστοι, ἀλλὰ τῇ ἀπολαύσει, ἣ γίνεται πᾶσα δι' ἁφῆς καὶ ἐν σιτίοις καὶ ἐν ποτοῖς καὶ τοῖς ἀφροδισίοις λεγομένοις. Διὸ καὶ ηὔξατό τις ὀψοφάγος ὢν τὸν φάρυγγα αὑτῷ μακρότερον γεράνου γινέσθαι, ὡς ἡδόμενος τῇ ἁφῇ.

b. Ib., II, 1118 b$^{27-28}$, 1119 a$^{5-11}$: **Excess and defect**

1119a Ἡ μὲν οὖν περὶ τὰς ἡδονὰς ὑπερβολὴ ὅτι ἀκολασία καὶ ψεκτόν, δῆλον. — Ἐλλείποντες δὲ τὰ περὶ τὰς ἡδονὰς καί ἧττον ἢ δεῖ χαίροντες οὐ πάνυ γίνονται. Οὐ γὰρ ἀνθρωπική ἐστιν ἡ τοιαύτη ἀναισθησία. Καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ ζῷα διακρίνει

τὰ βρώματα, καὶ τοῖς μὲν χαίρει τοῖς δ' οὔ· εἰ δέ τῳ μηθέν ἐστιν ἡδὺ μηδὲ διαφέρει ἕτερον ἑτέρου, πόρρω ἂν εἴη τοῦ ἄνθρωπος εἶναι. Οὐ τέτευχε δ' ὀνόματος ὁ τοιοῦτος διὰ τὸ μὴ πάνυ γίνεσθαι.

W. D. Ross[1] remarks on this passage: "Apart from the excessive narrowness of the conception of temperance, the main point to be noted here is the breakdown of the doctrine of the mean".

583—The crown of virtues is, according to Ar., that particular virtue which he calls "greatness of soul". It is described as follows.

Greatness of soul

Eth. Nic. IV 3, 1123 a^{34}-1125 a^{16}:

Ἡ δὲ μεγαλοψυχία περὶ μεγάλα μὲν καὶ ἐκ τοῦ ὀνόματος ἔοικεν εἶναι, περὶ ποῖα δ' ἐστὶ πρῶτον λάβωμεν. Διαφέρει δ' οὐδὲν τὴν ἕξιν ἢ τὸν κατὰ τὴν 1123b ἕξιν σκοπεῖν. Δοκεῖ δὲ μεγαλόψυχος εἶναι ὁ μεγάλων αὑτὸν ἀξιῶν ἄξιος ὤν· ὁ γὰρ μὴ κατ' ἀξίαν αὐτὸ ποιῶν ἠλίθιος, τῶν δὲ κατ' ἀρετὴν[2] οὐδεὶς ἠλίθιος οὐδ' ἀνόητος. Μεγαλόψυχος μὲν οὖν ὁ εἰρημένος. (ὁ γὰρ μικρῶν ἄξιος καὶ τούτων ἀξιῶν ἑαυτὸν σώφρων, μεγαλόψυχος δ' οὔ· ἐν μεγέθει γὰρ ἡ μεγαλοψυχία, ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ κάλλος ἐν μεγάλῳ σώματι, οἱ μικροὶ δ' ἀστεῖοι καὶ σύμμετροι, καλοὶ δ' οὔ)· ὁ δὲ μεγάλων ἑαυτὸν ἀξιῶν ἀνάξιος ὢν χαῦνος (ὁ δὲ μειζόνων ἢ ἄξιος οὐ πᾶς χαῦνος)· ὁ δ' ἐλαττόνων ἢ ἄξιος μικρόψυχος, ἐάν τε μεγάλων ἐάν τε μετρίων, ἐάν τε καὶ μικρῶν ἄξιος ὢν ἔτι ἐλαττόνων αὑτὸν ἀξιοῖ· καὶ μάλιστα ἂν δόξειεν ὁ μεγάλων ἄξιος· τί γὰρ ἂν ἐποίει, εἰ μὴ τοσούτων ἦν ἄξιος;

Ἔστι δὴ ὁ μεγαλόψυχος τῷ μὲν μεγέθει ἄκρος, τῷ δὲ ὡς δεῖ μέσος (τοῦ γὰρ κατ' ἀξίαν αὑτὸν ἀξιοῖ)· οἱ δ' ὑπερβάλλουσι καὶ ἐλλείπουσιν.

Εἰ δὲ δὴ μεγάλων ἑαυτὸν ἀξιοῖ ἄξιος ὤν, καὶ μάλιστα τῶν μεγίστων, περὶ ἓν μάλιστα ἂν εἴη. Ἡ δ' ἀξία λέγεται πρὸς τὰ ἐκτὸς ἀγαθά· μέγιστον δὲ τοῦτ' ἂν θείημεν ὃ τοῖς θεοῖς ἀπονέμομεν, καὶ οὗ μάλιστ' ἐφίενται οἱ ἐν ἀξιώματι, καὶ τὸ ἐπὶ τοῖς καλλίστοις ἆθλον· τοιοῦτον δ' ἡ τιμή (μέγιστον γὰρ δὴ τοῦτο τῶν ἐκτὸς ἀγαθῶν)· περὶ τιμὰς δὴ καὶ ἀτιμίας ὁ μεγαλόψυχός ἐστιν ὡς δεῖ.

It is related to honour and disgrace

Καὶ ἄνευ δὲ λόγου φαίνονται οἱ μεγαλόψυχοι περὶ τιμὴν εἶναι· τιμῆς γὰρ μάλιστα οἱ μεγάλοι ἀξιοῦσιν ἑαυτούς· κατ' ἀξίαν δέ. Ὁ δὲ μικρόψυχος ἐλλείπει καὶ πρὸς ἑαυτὸν καὶ πρὸς τὸ τοῦ μεγαλοψύχου ἀξίωμα. Ὁ δὲ χαῦνος πρὸς ἑαυτὸν μὲν ὑπερβάλλει, οὐ μὴν τὸν γε μεγαλόψυχον.

Ὁ δὲ μεγαλόψυχος, εἴπερ τῶν μεγίστων ἄξιος, ἄριστος ἂν εἴη· μείζονος γὰρ ἀεὶ ὁ βελτίων ἄξιος, καὶ μεγίστων ὁ ἄριστος. Τὸν ὡς ἀληθῶς ἄρα μεγαλόψυχον δεῖ ἀγαθὸν εἶναι. Καὶ δόξειεν δ' <ἂν> εἶναι μεγαλοψύχου τὸ ἐν ἑκάστῃ ἀρετῇ

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[1] *Aristotle*, p. 207.

[2] τῶν κατ' ἀρετήν - sc. ἀξιούντων ἑαυτούς.

μέγα. Οὐδαμῶς τ' ἂν ἁρμόζοι μεγαλοψύχῳ φεύγειν παρασείσαντι[1], οὐδ' ἀδικεῖν· τίνος γὰρ ἕνεκα πράξει αἰσχρὰ ᾧ γ' οὐδὲν μέγα; Καθ' ἕκαστα δ' ἐπισκοποῦντι πάμπαν γελοῖος φαίνοιτ' ἂν ὁ μεγαλόψυχος μὴ ἀγαθὸς ὤν.
Οὐκ εἴη δ' ἂν οὐδὲ τιμῆς ἄξιος φαῦλος ὤν· τῆς ἀρετῆς γὰρ ἆθλον ἡ τιμή, καὶ
1124a ἀπονέμεται τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς. Ἔοικε μὲν οὖν ἡ μεγαλοψυχία οἷον κόσμος τις εἶναι **A crown of the virtues**
τῶν ἀρετῶν· μείζους γὰρ αὐτὰς ποιεῖ, καὶ οὐ γίνεται ἄνευ ἐκείνων. Διὰ τοῦτο χαλεπὸν τῇ ἀληθείᾳ μεγαλόψυχον εἶναι· οὐ γὰρ οἷόν τε ἄνευ καλοκαγαθίας.
Μάλιστα μὲν οὖν περὶ τιμὰς καὶ ἀτιμίας ὁ μεγαλόψυχός ἐστιν, καὶ ἐπὶ μὲν **Attitude towards honour**
ταῖς μεγάλαις καὶ ὑπὸ τῶν σπουδαίων μετρίως ἡσθήσεται, ὡς τῶν οἰκείων τυγχάνων ἢ καὶ ἐλαττόνων· ἀρετῆς γὰρ παντελοῦς οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο ἀξία τιμή· οὐ μὴν ἀλλ' ἀποδέξεταί γε τῷ μὴ ἔχειν αὐτοὺς μείζω αὐτῷ ἀπονέμειν· τῆς δὲ παρὰ τῶν τυχόντων καὶ ἐπὶ μικροῖς πάμπαν ὀλιγωρήσει, οὐ γὰρ τούτων ἄξιος· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἀτιμίας, οὐ γὰρ ἔσται δικαίως περὶ αὐτόν.
Μάλιστα μὲν οὖν ἐστίν, ὥσπερ εἴρηται, ὁ μεγαλόψυχος περὶ τιμάς, οὐ μὴν **towards other external goods**
ἀλλὰ καὶ περὶ πλοῦτον καὶ δυναστείαν καὶ πᾶσαν εὐτυχίαν καὶ ἀτυχίαν μετρίως ἕξει, ὅπως ἂν γίνηται, καὶ οὔτε εὐτυχῶν περιχαρὴς ἔσται οὔτε ἀτυχῶν περίλυπος. Οὐδὲ γὰρ περὶ τιμὴν οὕτως ἔχει ὡς μέγιστον ὄν (αἱ γὰρ δυναστεῖαι καὶ ὁ πλοῦτος διὰ τὴν τιμήν ἐστιν αἱρετά· οἱ γοῦν ἔχοντες αὐτὰ τιμᾶσθαι δι' αὐτῶν βούλονται)· ᾧ δὴ καὶ ἡ τιμὴ μικρόν ἐστιν, τούτῳ καὶ τὰ ἄλλα. Διὸ ὑπερόπται δοκοῦσιν εἶναι. Δοκεῖ δὲ καὶ τὰ εὐτυχήματα συμβάλλεσθαι πρὸς μεγαλοψυχίαν. Οἱ γὰρ εὐγενεῖς ἀξιοῦνται τιμῆς καὶ οἱ δυναστεύοντες ἢ πλουτοῦντες· ἐν ὑπεροχῇ γάρ, τὸ δ' ἀγαθῷ ὑπερέχον πᾶν ἐντιμότερον. Διὸ καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα μεγαλοψυχοτέρους ποιεῖ· τιμῶνται γὰρ ὑπὸ τινῶν. Κατ' ἀλήθειαν δὲ ὁ ἀγαθὸς μόνος τιμητέος· ᾧ δ' ἄμφω ὑπάρχει, μᾶλλον ἀξιοῦται τιμῆς. Οἱ δ' ἄνευ ἀρετῆς τὰ τοιαῦτα ἀγαθὰ ἔχοντες οὔτε δικαίως ἑαυτοὺς μεγάλων ἀξιοῦσιν οὔτε ὀρθῶς μεγαλόψυχοι λέγονται. Ἄνευ γὰρ ἀρετῆς παντελοῦς οὐκ ἔστι ταῦτα, ὑπερόπται δὲ καὶ ὑβρισταὶ οἱ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἔχοντες ἀγαθὰ γίγνονται. Ἄνευ γὰρ ἀρετῆς οὐ ῥᾴδιον φέρειν ἐμμελῶς τὰ εὐτυχήματα· οὐ δυνάμενοι δὲ φέρειν καὶ οἰόμενοι τῶν
124b ἄλλων ὑπερέχειν ἐκείνων μὲν καταφρονοῦσιν, αὐτοὶ δ' ὅ τι ἂν τύχωσιν πράττουσιν. Μιμοῦνται γὰρ τὸν μεγαλόψυχον οὐχ ὅμοιοι ὄντες, τοῦτο δὲ δρῶσιν ἐν οἷς δύνανται· τὰ μὲν οὖν κατ' ἀρετὴν οὐ πράττουσιν, καταφρονοῦσι δὲ τῶν ἄλλων. Ὁ μὲν γὰρ μεγαλόψυχος δικαίως καταφρονεῖ (δοξάζει γὰρ ἀληθῶς), οἱ δὲ πολλοὶ τυχόντως.
Οὐκ ἔστιν δὲ μικροκίνδυνος οὐδὲ φιλοκίνδυνος διὰ τὸ ὀλίγα τιμᾶν, μεγαλο- **towards danger**
κίνδυνος δέ, καὶ ὅταν κινδυνεύῃ, ἀφειδὴς τοῦ βίου ὡς οὐκ ἄξιον ὂν πάντως ζῆν.
Καὶ οἷος εὖ ποιεῖν, εὐεργετούμενος δὲ αἰσχύνεται· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ὑπερέχοντος, **in conferring and receiving benefits**
τὸ δ' ὑπερεχομένου. Καὶ ἀντευεργετικὸς πλειόνων· οὕτω γὰρ προσοφλήσει ὁ

[1] παρασείσαντι - "swinging his arms by his side".

ὑπάρξας καὶ ἔσται εὖ πεπονθώς. Δοκοῦσι δὲ καὶ μνημονεύειν οὓς ἂν ποιήσωσιν εὖ, <ὑφ'> ὧν δ' ἂν πάθωσιν οὔ· ἐλάττων γὰρ ὁ παθὼν εὖ τοῦ ποιήσαντος, βούλεται δ' ὑπερέχειν. Καὶ τὰ μὲν ἡδέως ἀκούει, τὰ δ' ἀηδῶς· διὸ καὶ τὴν Θέτιν οὐ λέγειν τὰς εὐεργεσίας τῷ Διί· οὐδ' οἱ Λάκωνες πρὸς τοὺς Ἀθηναίους, ἀλλ' ἃ πεπόνθεσαν εὖ. Μεγαλοψύχου δὲ καὶ τὸ μηδενὸς δεῖσθαι ἢ μόγις, ὑπηρετεῖν δὲ προθύμως, καὶ πρὸς μὲν τοὺς ἐν ἀξιώματι καὶ εὐτυχίαις μέγαν εἶναι, πρὸς δὲ τοὺς μέσους μέτριον· τῶν μὲν γὰρ ὑπερέχειν χαλεπὸν καὶ σεμνόν, τῶν δὲ ῥᾴδιον, καὶ ἐπ' ἐκείνοις μὲν σεμνύνεσθαι οὐκ ἀγεννές, ἐν δὲ τοῖς ταπεινοῖς φορτικόν, ὥσπερ εἰς τοὺς ἀσθενεῖς ἰσχυρίζεσθαι. Καὶ εἰς τὰ ἔντιμα μὴ ἰέναι [1], ἢ οὗ πρωτεύουσιν ἄλλοι· καὶ ἀργὸν εἶναι καὶ μελλητὴν ἀλλ' ἢ ὅπου τιμὴ μεγάλη ἢ ἔργον, καὶ ὀλίγων μὲν πρακτικόν, μεγάλων δὲ καὶ ὀνομαστῶν.

in speaking and acting openly

Ἀναγκαῖον δὲ καὶ φανερόμισον εἶναι καὶ φανερόφιλον· τὸ γὰρ λανθάνειν φοβουμένου. Καὶ μέλειν τῆς ἀληθείας μᾶλλον ἢ τῆς δόξης, καὶ λέγειν καὶ πράττειν φανερῶς· παρρησιαστὴς γὰρ διὰ τὸ καταφρονεῖν. Διὸ καὶ ἀληθευτικός, πλὴν ὅσα μὴ δι' εἰρωνείαν· εἴρωνα δὲ πρὸς τοὺς πολλούς. Καὶ πρὸς ἄλλον μὴ δύνασθαι ζῆν [2] ἀλλ' ἢ φίλον· δουλικὸν γάρ, διὸ καὶ πάντες οἱ κόλακες θητικοί καὶ οἱ ταπεινοὶ κόλακες. Οὐδὲ θαυμαστικός· οὐδὲν γὰρ μέγα αὐτῷ ἐστίν. Οὐδὲ μνησίκακος· οὐ γὰρ μεγαλοψύχου τὸ ἀπομνημονεύειν, ἄλλως τε καὶ κακά, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον παρορᾶν. Οὐδ' ἀνθρωπολόγος [3]· οὔτε γὰρ περὶ αὑτοῦ ἐρεῖ οὔτε περὶ ἑτέρου· οὔτε γὰρ ἵνα ἐπαινῆται μέλει αὐτῷ οὔθ' ὅπως οἱ ἄλλοι ψέγωνται, οὐδ' αὖ ἐπαινετικός ἐστιν· διόπερ οὐδὲ κακολόγος, οὐδὲ τῶν ἐχθρῶν, εἰ μὴ δι' ὕβριν. Καὶ περὶ ἀναγκαίων ἢ μικρῶν ἥκιστα ὀλοφυρτικὸς καὶ δεητικός· σπουδάζοντος γὰρ οὕτως ἔχειν περὶ ταῦτα. Καὶ οἷος κεκτῆσθαι μᾶλλον τὰ καλὰ καὶ ἄκαρπα τῶν καρπίμων καὶ ὠφελίμων· αὐτάρκους γὰρ μᾶλλον.

Outward appearance

Καὶ κίνησις δὲ βραδεῖα τοῦ μεγαλοψύχου δοκεῖ εἶναι, καὶ φωνὴ βαρεῖα, καὶ λέξις στάσιμος· οὐ γὰρ σπευστικὸς ὁ περὶ ὀλίγα σπουδάζων, οὐδὲ σύντονος ὁ μηδὲν μέγα οἰόμενος· ἡ δ' ὀξυφωνία καὶ ἡ ταχυτὴς διὰ τούτων.

We share the impression of Ross, who states that "as a whole the picture is an unpleasing one".

Justice

584— Book V of the *Nicomachean Ethics* is devoted to justice. Contrary to Plato, Ar. follows the common use of language. Doing so, he distinguishes two main senses of the terms "just" and "unjust".

Two senses of the terms "just" and "unjust"

Eth. Nic. V 1, 1129 a^{32}-b^{1}:

Δοκεῖ δὲ ὅ τε παράνομος ἄδικος εἶναι καὶ ὁ πλεονέκτης καὶ ἄνισος, ὥστε

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[1] εἰς τὰ ἔντιμα μὴ ἰέναι - he does not strive after the things commonly held in honour.

[2] ζῆν πρὸς ἄλλον - living at the will of another.

[3] ἀνθρωπολόγος - a gossip.

δῆλον ὅτι καὶ ὁ δίκαιος ἔσται ὅ τε νόμιμος καὶ ὁ ἴσος. Τὸ μὲν δίκαιον ἄρα τὸ νόμιμον καὶ τὸ ἴσον, τὸ δ' ἄδικον τὸ παράνομον καὶ τὸ ἄνισον.

585—In the first sense "justice" is perfect virtue, containing all other virtues and displayed in society.

Ib., 1129 b[11]-1130 a[8]: **Justice in the general sense**

Ἐπεὶ δ' ὁ παράνομος ἄδικος ἦν ὁ δὲ νόμιμος δίκαιος, δῆλον ὅτι πάντα τὰ νόμιμά ἐστί πως δίκαια· τά τε γὰρ ὡρισμένα ὑπὸ τῆς νομοθετικῆς νόμιμά ἐστι, καὶ ἕκαστον τούτων δίκαιον εἶναι φαμέν. Οἱ δὲ νόμοι ἀγορεύουσι περὶ ἁπάντων, στοχαζόμενοι ἢ τοῦ κοινῇ συμφέροντος πᾶσιν ἢ τοῖς κυρίοις, ἢ κατ' ἀρετὴν ἢ κατ' ἄλλον τινὰ τρόπον τοιοῦτον· ὥστε ἕνα μὲν τρόπον δίκαια λέγομεν τὰ ποιητικὰ καὶ φυλακτικὰ εὐδαιμονίας καὶ τῶν μορίων αὐτῆς τῇ πολιτικῇ κοινωνίᾳ. Προστάττει δ' ὁ νόμος καὶ τὰ τοῦ ἀνδρείου ἔργα ποιεῖν, οἷον μὴ λείπειν τὴν τάξιν μηδὲ φεύγειν μηδὲ ῥίπτειν τὰ ὅπλα, καὶ τὰ τοῦ σώφρονος, οἷον μὴ μοιχεύειν μηδὲ ὑβρίζειν, καὶ τὰ τοῦ πράου, οἷον μὴ τύπτειν μηδὲ κακηγορεῖν, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὰ κατὰ τὰς ἄλλας ἀρετὰς καὶ μοχθηρίας τὰ μὲν κελεύων τὰ δ' ἀπαγορεύων, ὀρθῶς μὲν ὁ κείμενος ὀρθῶς, χεῖρον δ' ὁ ἀπεσχεδιασμένος [1]. Αὕτη μὲν οὖν ἡ δικαιοσύνη ἀρετὴ μέν ἐστιν τελεία, ἀλλ' οὐχ ἁπλῶς ἀλλὰ πρὸς ἕτερον. Καὶ διὰ τοῦτο πολλάκις κρατίστη τῶν ἀρετῶν εἶναι δοκεῖ ἡ δικαιοσύνη, καὶ οὔθ' ἕσπερος οὔτε ἕῳος οὕτω θαυμαστός· καὶ παροιμιαζόμενοί φαμεν

ἐν δὲ δικαιοσύνῃ συλλήβδην πᾶσ' ἀρετὴ ἔνι [2].

Καὶ τελεία μάλιστα ἀρετή, ὅτι τῆς τελείας ἀρετῆς χρῆσίς ἐστιν, τελεία δ' ἐστίν, ὅτι ὁ ἔχων αὐτὴν καὶ πρὸς ἕτερον δύναται τῇ ἀρετῇ χρῆσθαι, ἀλλ' οὐ μόνον καθ' αὑτὸν· πολλοὶ γὰρ ἐν μὲν τοῖς οἰκείοις τῇ ἀρετῇ δύνανται χρῆσθαι, ἐν δὲ τοῖς πρὸς ἕτερον ἀδυνατοῦσιν. Καὶ διὰ τοῦτο εὖ δοκεῖ ἔχειν τὸ τοῦ Βίαντος, ὅτι »ἀρχὰ ἄνδρα δείξει« · πρὸς ἕτερον γὰρ καὶ ἐν κοινωνίᾳ ἤδη ὁ ἄρχων. Διὰ δὲ τὸ αὐτὸ τοῦτο καὶ ἀλλότριον ἀγαθὸν δοκεῖ εἶναι ἡ δικαιοσύνη μόνη τῶν ἀρετῶν, ὅτι πρὸς ἕτερον ἐστίν· ἄλλῳ γὰρ τὰ συμφέροντα πράττει, ἢ ἄρχοντι ἢ κοινωνῷ. Κάκιστος μὲν οὖν ὁ καὶ πρὸς αὑτὸν καὶ πρὸς τοὺς φίλους χρώμενος τῇ μοχθηρίᾳ, ἄριστος δ' οὐχ ὁ πρὸς αὑτὸν τῇ ἀρετῇ ἀλλ' ὁ πρὸς ἕτερον· τοῦτο γὰρ ἔργον χαλεπόν.

586—a. There also exists a sort of "justice" in a special sense, which is a part of virtue in general.

Eth. Nic. V 2, 1130 a[14-34]: **Justice in the special sense**

Ζητοῦμεν δέ γε τὴν ἐν μέρει ἀρετῆς δικαιοσύνην. Ἔστι γάρ τις, ὡς φαμέν.

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[1] ἀπεσχεδιασμένος - if it has been made at random.

[2] Theognis, 147.

Ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ ἀδικίας τῆς κατὰ μέρος. Σημεῖον δ' ὅτι ἔστιν· κατὰ μὲν γὰρ τὰς ἄλλας μοχθηρίας ὁ ἐνεργῶν ἀδικεῖ μέν, πλεονεκτεῖ δ' οὐδέν, οἷον ὁ ῥίψας τὴν ἀσπίδα διὰ δειλίαν ἢ κακῶς εἰπὼν διὰ χαλεπότητα ἢ οὐ βοηθήσας χρήμασι δι' ἀνελευθερίαν· ὅταν δὲ πλεονεκτῇ, πολλάκις κατ' οὐδεμίαν τῶν τοιούτων, ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ κατὰ πάσας, κατὰ πονηρίαν δέ γε τινά (ψέγομεν γάρ) καὶ κατ' ἀδικίαν. Ἔστιν ἄρα γε ἄλλη τις ἀδικία ὡς μέρος τῆς ὅλης, καὶ ἄδικόν τι ἐν μέρει τοῦ ὅλου ἀδίκου τοῦ παρὰ τὸν νόμον. Ἔτι εἰ ὁ μὲν τοῦ κερδαίνειν ἕνεκα μοιχεύει καὶ προσλαμβάνων, ὁ δὲ προστιθεὶς καὶ ζημιούμενος δι' ἐπιθυμίαν, οὗτος μὲν ἀκόλαστος δόξειεν ἂν εἶναι μᾶλλον ἢ πλεονέκτης, ἐκεῖνος δ' ἄδικος, ἀκόλαστος δ' οὔ. Δῆλον ἄρα ὅτι διὰ τὸ κερδαίνειν. Ἔτι περὶ μὲν τὰ ἄλλα πάντα ἀδικήματα γίγνεται ἡ ἐπαναφορὰ ἐπί τινα μοθχηρίαν ἀεί, οἷον εἰ ἐμοίχευσεν, ἐπ' ἀκολασίαν, εἰ ἐγκατέλιπεν τὸν παραστάτην, ἐπὶ δειλίαν, εἰ ἐπάταξεν, ἐπὶ ὀργήν, εἰ δὲ ἐκέρδανεν, ἐπ' οὐδεμίαν μοχθηρίαν ἀλλ' ἢ ἐπ' ἀδικίαν. Ὥστε φανερὸν ὅτι ἔστι τις ἀδικία παρὰ τὴν ὅλην ἐν μέρει.

1. distributive, 2. corrective

b. Justice in this sense is divided into two kinds: (1) distributive, (2) corrective.

Ib., 1130 b^{30}-1131 a^{1}:

Τῆς δὲ κατὰ μέρος δικαιοσύνης καὶ τοῦ κατ' αὐτὴν δικαίου ἓν μέν ἐστιν εἶδος τὸ ἐν ταῖς διανομαῖς τιμῆς ἢ χρημάτων ἢ τῶν ἄλλων ὅσα μεριστὰ τοῖς κοινωνοῦσι τῆς πολιτείας (ἐν τούτοις γὰρ ἔστιν καὶ ἄνισον ἔχειν καὶ ἴσον ἕτερον ἑτέρου), ἓν δὲ τὸ ἐν τοῖς συναλλάγμασι διορθωτικόν.

Corrective justice subdivided

c. Corrective justice again is subdivided into two divisions.

Ib., 1131 a$^{1-9}$:

Τούτου δὲ μέρη δύο· τῶν γὰρ συναλλαγμάτων τὰ μὲν ἑκούσιά ἐστιν τὰ δὲ ἀκούσια, ἑκούσια μὲν τὰ τοιάδε οἷον πρᾶσις, ὠνή, δανεισμός, ἐγγύη, χρῆσις, παρακαταθήκη, μίσθωσις (ἑκούσια δὲ λέγεται, ὅτι ἡ ἀρχὴ τῶν συναλλαγμάτων τούτων ἑκούσιος), τῶν δὲ ἀκουσίων τὰ μὲν λαθραῖα, οἷον κλοπή, μοιχεία, φαρμακεία, προαγωγεία [1], δουλαπατία, δολοφονία, ψευδομαρτυρία, τὰ δὲ βίαια, οἷον αἰκία, δεσμός, θάνατος, ἁρπαγή, πήρωσις, κακηγορία, προπηλακισμός.

587—In a certain sense justice may be called a mean between two extremes. First distributive justice is considered.

Justice a mean

Eth. Nic. V 3, 1131 a$^{9-32}$:

Ἐπεὶ δ' ὅ τ' ἄδικος ἄνισος καὶ τὸ ἄδικον ἄνισον, δῆλον ὅτι καὶ μέσον τί ἐστι τοῦ ἀνίσου. Τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶ τὸ ἴσον· ἐν ὁποίᾳ γὰρ πράξει ἐστὶ τὸ πλέον καὶ τὸ ἔλαττον, ἐστὶ καὶ τὸ ἴσον. Εἰ οὖν τὸ ἄδικον ἄνισον, τὸ δίκαιον ἴσον· ὅπερ καὶ

[1] Prostitution.

ἄνευ λόγου δοκεῖ πᾶσιν. Ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ ἴσον μέσον, τὸ δίκαιον μέσον τι ἂν εἴη.
15 Ἔστι δὲ τὸ ἴσον ἐν ἐλαχίστοις δυσίν. Ἀνάγκη τοίνυν τὸ δίκαιον μέσον τε καὶ ἴσον εἶναι καὶ πρός τι καὶ τισίν, καὶ ᾗ μὲν μέσον, τινῶν (ταῦτα δ' ἐστὶ πλεῖον καὶ ἔλαττον), ᾗ δ' ἴσον ἐστί, δυοῖν, ᾗ δὲ δίκαιον, τισίν. Ἀνάγκη ἄρα τὸ δίκαιον ἐν ἐλαχίστοις εἶναι τέτταρσιν· οἷς τε γὰρ δίκαιον τυγχάνει ὄν, δύο ἐστί, καὶ
20 ἐν οἷς [τὰ πράγματα], δύο. Καὶ ἡ αὐτὴ ἔσται ἰσότης, οἷς καὶ ἐν οἷς· ὡς γὰρ ἐκεῖνα ἔχει, τὰ ἐν οἷς, οὕτω κἀκεῖνα ἔχει· εἰ γὰρ μὴ ἴσοι, οὐκ ἴσα ἕξουσιν, ἀλλ' ἐντεῦθεν αἱ μάχαι καὶ τὰ ἐγκλήματα, ὅταν ἢ ἴσοι μὴ ἴσα ἢ μὴ ἴσοι ἴσα ἔχωσι καὶ
25 νέμωνται. Ἔτι ἐκ τοῦ κατ' ἀξίαν τοῦτο δῆλον· τὸ γὰρ δίκαιον ἐν ταῖς διανομαῖς ὁμολογοῦσι πάντες κατ' ἀξίαν τινὰ δεῖν εἶναι, τὴν μέντοι ἀξίαν οὐ τὴν αὐτὴν λέγουσι πάντες ὑπάρχειν, ἀλλ' οἱ μὲν δημοκρατικοὶ ἐλευθερίαν, οἱ δ' ὀλιγαρχικοὶ πλοῦτον, οἱ δὲ εὐγένειαν, οἱ δ' ἀριστοκρατικοὶ ἀρετήν. Ἔστιν ἄρα τὸ δίκαιον **a sort of proportion**
30 ἀνάλογόν τι. Τὸ γὰρ ἀνάλογον οὐ μόνον ἐστὶ μοναδικοῦ ἀριθμοῦ ἴδιον, ἀλλ' ὅλως ἀριθμοῦ· ἡ γὰρ ἀναλογία ἰσότης ἐστὶ λόγων, καὶ ἐν τέτταρσιν ἐλαχίστοις.

E.g.: the wages of A and B should be in proportion to the merits of A and B. Thus $\alpha : \beta = \gamma : \delta$, and $\alpha : \gamma = \beta : \delta$. Now $\alpha : \beta = (\alpha + \gamma) : (\beta + \delta)$.
This is called g e o m e t r i c a l p r o p o r t i o n .

588—Next, corrective justice is to be dealt with. Here the proportion is *arithmetical,* the same being rendered for the same.

Eth. Nic. V 4, 1131 b[23]-1132 a[19]: **In corrective justice the proportion is arithmetical**

25 Τὸ μὲν οὖν ἓν εἶδος τοῦ δικαίου τοῦτ' ἐστίν, τὸ δὲ λοιπὸν ἓν τὸ διορθωτικόν, ὃ γίγνεται ἐν τοῖς συναλλάγμασιν καὶ τοῖς ἑκουσίοις καὶ τοῖς ἀκουσίοις. Τοῦτο δὲ τὸ δίκαιον ἄλλο εἶδος ἔχει τοῦ προτέρου. Τὸ μὲν γὰρ διανεμητικὸν δίκαιον τῶν κοινῶν ἀεὶ κατὰ τὴν ἀναλογίαν ἐστὶ τὴν εἰρημένην (καὶ γὰρ ἀπὸ χρημάτων
30 κοινῶν ἐὰν γίγνηται ἡ διανομή, ἔσται κατὰ τὸν λόγον τὸν αὐτὸν ὅνπερ ἔχουσι πρὸς ἄλληλα τὰ εἰσενεχθέντα· καὶ τὸ ἄδικον τὸ ἀντικείμενον τῷ δικαίῳ τούτῳ τὸ παρὰ τὸ ἀνάλογόν ἐστιν)· τὸ δ' ἐν τοῖς συναλλάγμασι δίκαιον ἐστὶ μὲν ἴσον
1132a τι, καὶ τὸ ἄδικον ἄνισον, ἀλλ' οὐ κατὰ τὴν ἀναλογίαν ἐκείνην ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὴν ἀριθμητικήν. Οὐδὲν γὰρ διαφέρει, εἰ ἐπιεικὴς φαῦλον ἀπεστέρησεν ἢ φαῦλος ἐπιεικῆ, οὐδ' εἰ ἐμοίχευσεν ἐπιεικὴς ἢ φαῦλος· ἀλλὰ πρὸς τοῦ βλάβους τὴν
5 διαφορὰν μόνον βλέπει ὁ νόμος (καὶ χρῆται ὡς ἴσοις), εἰ ὁ μὲν ἀδικεῖ ὁ δ' ἀδικεῖται, καὶ εἰ ὁ μὲν ἔβλαψεν ὁ δὲ βέβλαπται. Ὥστε τὸ ἄδικον τοῦτο ἄνισον ὂν ἰσάζειν πειρᾶται ὁ δικαστής· καὶ γὰρ ὅταν ὁ μὲν πληγῇ ὁ δὲ πατάξῃ, ἢ καὶ κτείνῃ ὁ δ' ἀποθάνῃ, διῄρηται τὸ πάθος καὶ ἡ πρᾶξις εἰς ἄνισα· ἀλλὰ πειρᾶται
10 τῇ ζημίᾳ ἰσάζειν, ἀφαιρῶν τοῦ κέρδους. (Λέγεται γὰρ ὡς ἁπλῶς εἰπεῖν ἐπὶ τοῖς τοιούτοις, κἂν εἰ μή τισιν οἰκεῖον ὄνομα εἴη, τὸ κέρδος, οἷον τῷ πατάξαντι, καὶ ἡ ζημία τῷ παθόντι· ἀλλ' ὅταν γε μετρηθῇ τὸ πάθος, καλεῖται τὸ μὲν ζημία τὸ δὲ κέρδος.) Ὥστε τοῦ μὲν πλείονος καὶ ἐλάττονος τὸ ἴσον μέσον, τὸ δὲ

In this case, too, justice is a mean

κέρδος καὶ ἡ ζημία τὸ μὲν πλέον τὸ δὲ ἔλαττον ἐναντίως, τὸ μὲν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ πλέον τοῦ κακοῦ δὲ ἔλαττον κέρδος, τὸ δὲ ἐναντίον ζημία· ὧν ἦν μέσον τὸ ἴσον, ὃ λέγομεν εἶναι δίκαιον· ὥστε τὸ ἐπανορθωτικὸν δίκαιον ἂν εἴη τὸ μέσον ζημίας καὶ κέρδους.

589—'Επιείκεια and the ἐπιεικές. *Eth. Nic.* V 10, 1137 a^{31}-b^{27}:

Equity

Περὶ δὲ ἐπιεικείας καὶ τοῦ ἐπιεικοῦς, πῶς ἔχει ἡ μὲν ἐπιείκεια πρὸς δικαιοσύνην τὸ δὲ ἐπιεικὲς πρὸς τὸ δίκαιον, ἐχόμενόν ἐστιν εἰπεῖν· οὔτε γὰρ ὡς ταὐτὸν ἁπλῶς οὔτε ὡς ἕτερον τῷ γένει φαίνεται σκοπουμένοις, καὶ ὁτὲ μὲν τὸ ἐπιεικὲς ἐπαινοῦμεν καὶ ἄνδρα τὸν τοιοῦτον, ὥστε καὶ ἐπὶ τὰ ἄλλα ἐπαινοῦντες μεταφέρομεν ἀντὶ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, τὸ ἐπιεικέστερον ὅτι βέλτιον δηλοῦντες, ὁτὲ δὲ τῷ λόγῳ ἀκολουθοῦσι φαίνεται ἄτοπον εἰ τὸ ἐπιεικὲς παρὰ τὸ δίκαιόν τι ὂν ἐπαινετόν ἐστιν· ἢ γὰρ τὸ δίκαιον οὐ σπουδαῖον, ἢ τὸ ἐπιεικὲς οὐ δίκαιον, εἰ ἄλλο· ἢ εἰ ἄμφω σπουδαῖα, ταὐτόν ἐστιν. 'Η μὲν οὖν ἀπορία σχεδὸν συμβαίνει διὰ ταῦτα περὶ τὸ ἐπιεικές, ἔχει δὲ ἅπαντα τρόπον τινὰ ὀρθῶς καὶ οὐδὲν ὑπεναντίον ἑαυτοῖς· τό τε γὰρ ἐπιεικὲς δικαίου τινὸς ὂν βέλτιόν ἐστι δίκαιον, καὶ οὐχ ὡς ἄλλο τι γένος ὂν βέλτιόν ἐστι τοῦ δικαίου. Ταὐτὸν ἄρα δίκαιον καὶ ἐπιεικές, καὶ ἀμφοῖν σπουδαίοιν ὄντοιν κρεῖττον τὸ ἐπιεικές. Ποιεῖ δὲ τὴν ἀπορίαν ὅτι τὸ ἐπιεικὲς δίκαιον μέν ἐστιν, οὐ τὸ κατὰ νόμον δέ, ἀλλ' ἐπανόρθωμα νομίμου δικαίου. Αἴτιον δ' ὅτι ὁ μὲν νόμος καθόλου πᾶς, περὶ ἐνίων δὲ οὐχ οἷόν τε ὀρθῶς εἰπεῖν καθόλου. 'Εν οἷς οὖν ἀνάγκη μὲν εἰπεῖν καθόλου, μὴ οἷόν τε δὲ ὀρθῶς, τὸ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πλέον λαμβάνει ὁ νόμος, οὐκ ἀγνοῶν τὸ ἁμαρτανόμενον. Καὶ ἔστιν οὐδὲν ἧττον ὀρθῶς· τὸ γὰρ ἁμάρτημα οὐκ ἐν τῷ νόμῳ οὐδ' ἐν τῷ νομοθέτῃ ἀλλ' ἐν τῇ φύσει τοῦ πράγματός ἐστιν· εὐθὺς γὰρ τοιαύτη ἡ τῶν πρακτῶν ὕλη ἐστιν. "Οταν οὖν λέγῃ μὲν ὁ νόμος καθόλου, συμβῇ δ' ἐπὶ τούτου παρὰ τὸ καθόλου, τότε ὀρθῶς ἔχει, ἣ παραλείπει ὁ νομοθέτης καὶ ἥμαρτεν ἁπλῶς εἰπών, ἐπανορθοῦν τὸ ἐλλειφθέν, ὃ κἂν ὁ νομοθέτης αὐτὸς εἶπεν ἐκεῖ παρών, καὶ εἰ ἤδει, ἐνομοθέτησεν. Διὸ δίκαιον μέν ἐστιν, καὶ βέλτιόν τινος δικαίου, οὐ τοῦ ἁπλῶς δὲ ἀλλὰ τοῦ διὰ τὸ ἁπλῶς ἁμαρτήματος. Καὶ ἔστιν αὕτη ἡ φύσις ἡ τοῦ ἐπιεικοῦς, ἐπανόρθωμα νόμου, ᾗ ἐλλείπει διὰ τὸ καθόλου.

The intellectual virtues treated in book VI

590—According to the definition of virtue given sub **571b**, the φρόνιμος has the arbitrium in determining the μεσότης. Therefore, the intellectual virtues, σοφία and φρόνησις, have to be dealt with, too. They are treated in *Eth. Nic.* VI.

The author distinguishes two faculties in the rational part of the soul, namely the ἐπιστημονικόν (which has to do with that which is of necessity, and therefore eternal and invariable), and the λογιστικόν (a deliberating faculty, which has to do with the contingent). The latter has a task towards practical action, since choice must be preceded by deliberation.

There are five qualities by which the soul reaches truth: ἐπιστήμη, τέχνη, φρόνησις, νοῦς and σοφία. The first having been defined as demonstrative knowledge of the necessary and eternal, and the second as a rational quality, concerned with producing, which reasons truly (ἕξις μετὰ λόγου ἀληθοῦς ποιητική), φρόνησις is considered in the following passage.

a. *Eth. Nic.* VI 5, 1140 a$^{24-33}$, b$^{20-21}$:

What is φρόνιμος

1140a Περὶ δὲ φρονήσεως οὕτως ἂν λάβοιμεν, θεωρήσαντες τίνας λέγομεν τοὺς
25 φρονίμους. Δοκεῖ δὴ φρονίμου εἶναι τὸ δύνασθαι καλῶς βουλεύσασθαι περὶ τὰ αὑτῷ ἀγαθὰ καὶ συμφέροντα, οὐ κατὰ μέρος, οἷον ποῖα πρὸς ὑγίειαν ἢ πρὸς ἰσχύν, ἀλλὰ ποῖα πρὸς τὸ εὖ ζῆν ὅλως[1]. Σημεῖον δ' ὅτι καὶ τοὺς περί τι φρονίμους
30 λέγομεν, ὅταν πρὸς τέλος τι σπουδαῖον εὖ λογίσωνται, ὧν μή ἐστι τέχνη. Ὥστε καὶ ὅλως ἂν εἴη φρόνιμος ὁ βουλευτικός.

φρόνησις defined

Βουλεύεται δ' οὐθεὶς περὶ τῶν ἀδυνάτων ἄλλως ἔχειν, οὐδὲ τῶν μὴ ἐνδεχο-
b 20 μένων αὐτῷ πρᾶξαι. — Ὥστ' ἀνάγκη τὴν φρόνησιν ἕξιν εἶναι μετὰ λόγου ἀληθοῦς περὶ τὰ ἀνθρώπινα ἀγαθὰ πρακτικήν.

b. It is neither an art, nor a purely intellectual quality.

Ib., 1140 b$^{21-30}$:

It is neither an art.

Ἀλλὰ μὴν τέχνης μὲν ἔστιν ἀρετή, φρονήσεως δ' οὐκ ἔστιν. Καὶ ἐν μὲν τέχνῃ ὁ ἑκὼν ἁμαρτάνων αἱρετώτερος[2], περὶ δὲ φρόνησιν ἧττον, ὥσπερ καὶ περὶ τὰς ἀρετάς. Δῆλον οὖν ὅτι ἀρετή τίς ἐστι καὶ οὐ τέχνη.

nor a purely intellectual quality

25 Δυοῖν δ' ὄντοιν μεροῖν τῆς ψυχῆς τῶν λόγον ἐχόντων, θατέρου ἂν εἴη ἀρετή, τοῦ δοξαστικοῦ· ἥ τε γὰρ δόξα περὶ τὸ ἐνδεχόμενον ἄλλως ἔχειν καὶ ἡ φρόνησις. Ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδ' ἕξις μετὰ λόγου μόνον· σημεῖον δ' ὅτι λήθη τῆς μὲν τοιαύτης
30 ἕξεώς ἐστι, φρονήσεως δ' οὐκ ἔστιν.

In this passage Ar. rightly distinguishes practical reason from theoretical, as we shall again find in his definition of wisdom (our next nr.). By this distinction he is correcting Plato, who— doubtlessly by the ethico-religious character of his contemplation of the Ideas—mixed them willingly.

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[1] Book X, where the contemplative life is treated, makes clear what the author means by the above formula: "to be able to deliberate well about what is good and advantageous for himself, not in some one department, e.g. what is good for his health or strength, but what is expedient as a means to the good life in general", this is the mark of a man who possesses practical wisdom. For this man acknowledges that the contemplative life is the supreme good for man, because it makes him most happy (by "contemplative life" being meant a life of scientific research).

[2] In Plato's *Hippias Minor* Socrates came to the strange conclusion that the man who does wrong willingly is better than the one who does it unwillingly (our nr. **212**). To this famous theory Ar. replies: *In art*, indeed, the man who errs willingly is to be preferred; in φρόνησις, which is half an intellectual, half a practical quality, less. And so it is in the case of the other virtues. See our explanation of the text.

591—Again, νοῦς having been defined in the next chapter (6) as "knowledge" of the first principles from which science proceeds" (cp. our nr. **465**), wisdom is treated in the following passage.

Wisdom

a. *Eth. Nic.* VI 7, 1141 a$^{9-20}$:

Τὴν δὲ σοφίαν ἔν τε ταῖς τέχναις τοῖς ἀκριβεστάτοις τὰς τέχνας ἀποδίδομεν, 1141a
οἷον Φειδίαν λιθουργὸν σοφὸν καὶ Πολύκλειτον ἀνδριαντοποιόν, ἐνταῦθα μὲν 10
οὖν οὐθὲν ἄλλο σημαίνοντες τὴν σοφίαν ἢ ὅτι ἀρετὴ τέχνης ἐστίν· εἶναι δέ
τινας σοφοὺς οἰόμεθα ὅλως οὐ κατὰ μέρος; οὐδ' ἄλλο τι σοφούς, ὥσπερ Ὅμηρός
φησιν ἐν τῷ Μαργίτῃ

τὸν δ' οὔτ' ἄρ σκαπτῆρα θεοὶ θέσαν οὔτ' ἀροτῆρα 15
οὔτ' ἄλλως τι σοφόν.

ὥστε δῆλον ὅτι ἡ ἀκριβεστάτη ἂν τῶν ἐπιστημῶν εἴη ἡ σοφία. Δεῖ ἄρα τὸν σοφὸν
a combination of intuitive Reason and Science μὴ μόνον τὰ ἐκ τῶν ἀρχῶν εἰδέναι, ἀλλὰ καὶ περὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς ἀληθεύειν. Ὥστε
εἴη ἂν ἡ σοφία νοῦς καὶ ἐπιστήμη, ὥσπερ κεφαλὴν
ἔχουσα ἐπιστήμη τῶν τιμιωτάτων. 20

"The highest objects" were to Ar., at least in the visible world, the heavenly bodies, which he calls τὰ ἀίδια τῶν αἰσθητῶν. They are far superior to man. Therefore, Ar. stresses the speculative character of wisdom, which is illustrated by the instances of Thales and Anaxagoras (our next cited passage).

Speculative character of wisdom

b. Ib., b $^{3-8}$:

Διὸ Ἀναξαγόραν καὶ Θαλῆν καὶ τοὺς τοιούτους σοφοὺς μὲν, φρονίμους δ' 1141b
οὔ φασιν εἶναι, ὅταν ἴδωσιν ἀγνοοῦντας τὰ συμφέροντα ἑαυτοῖς, καὶ περιττὰ 5
μὲν καὶ θαυμαστὰ καὶ χαλεπὰ καὶ δαιμόνια εἰδέναι αὐτούς φασιν, ἄχρηστα δ',
ὅτι οὐ τὰ ἀνθρώπινα ἀγαθὰ ζητοῦσιν.

592—As such, then, wisdom ought to be superior to phrónesis, which has a practical character. And yet, phrónesis, being practical, is directly concerned with those things which can make man happy, and could, therefore, seem to be more important. What, then is the relation of wisdom to phrónesis?

Relation of phronesis to wisdom

Eth. Nic. VI 12, 1144 a$^{1-9}$:

Πρῶτον μὲν οὖν λέγομεν ὅτι καθ' αὑτὰς ἀναγκαῖον αἱρετὰς αὐτὰς εἶναι, 1144a
ἀρετάς γ' οὔσας ἑκατέραν ἑκατέρου τοῦ μορίου [1], καὶ εἰ μὴ ποιοῦσι μηδὲν
μηδετέρα αὐτῶν. Ἔπειτα καὶ ποιοῦσι μέν, οὐχ ὡς ἰατρικὴ δὲ ὑγίειαν, ἀλλ'
ὡς ἡ ὑγίεια, οὕτως ἡ σοφία εὐδαιμονίαν [2]· μέρος γὰρ οὖσα τῆς ὅλης ἀρετῆς 5

[1] ἑκατέρου τοῦ μορίου - he means: of each of the two faculties of the rational soul, sc. the ἐπιστημονικόν and the λογιστικόν.

[2] "In the sense in which healthiness is the cause of health", i.e. wisdom is the *formal cause* of happiness.

τῷ ἔχεσθαι ποιεῖ καὶ τῷ ἐνεργεῖν εὐδαίμονα. Ἔτι τὸ ἔργον ἀποτελεῖται κατὰ τὴν φρόνησιν καὶ τὴν ἠθικὴν ἀρετήν· ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἀρετὴ τὸν σκοπὸν ποιεῖ ὀρθόν, ἡ δὲ φρόνησις τὰ πρὸς τοῦτον.

593—Since, then, man becomes good by doing good actions—if, at least, he does them by choice and for the sake of the good—, practical wisdom, which has the leading part in choice, plays a prominent rôle in the genesis of virtue. But this is not all. Whenever a man is virtuous, he possesses practical wisdom; for there is no true virtue without phrónesis.

In the following passage Ar. explains the relation of practical wisdom (phrónesis) to virtue (in the proper sense) by comparing it to that of a certain intellectual ability (δεινότης), which is the capacity for doing the things that conduce to the aim we propose, to natural virtue. "Cleverness" is not identical with practical wisdom, but practical wisdom implies it. Now natural virtue is related in the same way to Virtue in the proper sense.

a. *Eth. Nic.* VI 13, 1144 b$^{1-32}$:

Relation of phrónesis to moral virtue

1144b Σκεπτέον δὴ πάλιν καὶ περὶ ἀρετῆς. Καὶ γὰρ ἡ ἀρετὴ παραπλησίως ἔχει, ὡς ἡ φρόνησις πρὸς τὴν δεινότητα (οὐ ταὐτὸ μέν, ὅμοιον δέ), οὕτω καὶ ἡ φυσικὴ ἀρετὴ πρὸς τὴν κυρίαν. Πᾶσιν γὰρ δοκεῖ ἕκαστα τῶν ἠθῶν ὑπάρχειν φύσει πως· καὶ γὰρ δίκαιοι καὶ σωφρονικοὶ καὶ ἀνδρεῖοι καὶ τἆλλα ἔχομεν εὐθὺς ἐκ γενετῆς· ἀλλ' ὅμως ζητοῦμεν ἕτερόν τι τὸ κυρίως ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἄλλον τρόπον ὑπάρχειν. Καὶ γὰρ παισὶ καὶ θηρίοις αἱ φυσικαὶ ὑπάρχουσιν ἕξεις, ἀλλ' ἄνευ νοῦ βλαβεραὶ φαίνονται οὖσαι. Πλὴν τοσοῦτον ἔοικεν ὁρᾶσθαι, ὅτι ὥσπερ σώματι ἰσχυρῷ ἄνευ ὄψεως κινουμένῳ συμβαίνει σφάλλεσθαι ἰσχυρῶς διὰ τὸ μὴ ἔχειν ὄψιν, οὕτω καὶ ἐνταῦθα· ἐὰν δὲ λάβῃ νοῦν, ἐν τῷ πράττειν διαφέρει, ἡ δ' ἕξις ὁμοία οὖσα τότ' ἔσται κυρίως ἀρετή. Ὥστε καθάπερ ἐπὶ τοῦ δοξαστικοῦ δύο ἐστὶν εἴδη, δεινότης καὶ φρόνησις, οὕτως καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ ἠθικοῦ δύο ἐστί, τὸ μὲν ἀρετὴ φυσικὴ τὸ δ' ἡ κυρία, καὶ τούτων ἡ κυρία οὐ γίνεται ἄνευ φρονήσεως.

Not all the virtues are phrónesis, but none of them is without it

Διόπερ τινές φασιν πάσας τὰς ἀρετὰς φρονήσεις εἶναι, καὶ Σωκράτης τῇ μὲν ὀρθῶς ἐζήτει τῇ δ' ἡμάρτανεν· ὅτι μὲν γὰρ φρονήσεις ᾤετο εἶναι πάσας τὰς ἀρετάς, ἡμάρτανεν, ὅτι δ' οὐκ ἄνευ φρονήσεως, καλῶς ἔλεγεν. Σημεῖον δέ· καὶ γὰρ νῦν πάντες, ὅταν ὁρίζωνται τὴν ἀρετήν, προστιθέασι τὴν ἕξιν, εἰπόντες καὶ πρὸς ἃ ἐστι, τὴν κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον· ὀρθὸς δ' ὁ κατὰ τὴν φρόνησιν. Ἐοίκασι δὴ μαντεύεσθαί πως ἅπαντες ὅτι ἡ τοιαύτη ἕξις ἀρετὴ ἐστιν ἡ κατὰ τὴν φρόνησιν. Δεῖ δὲ μικρὸν μεταβῆναι· οὐ γὰρ μόνον ἡ κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον, ἀλλ' ἡ μετὰ τοῦ ὀρθοῦ λόγου ἕξις ἀρετή ἐστιν. Ὀρθὸς δὲ λόγος περὶ τῶν τοιούτων ἡ φρόνησίς ἐστιν. Σωκράτης μὲν οὖν λόγους τὰς ἀρετὰς ᾤετο εἶναι (ἐπιστήμας γὰρ εἶναι πάσας),

ἡμεῖς δὲ μετὰ λόγου. Δῆλον οὖν ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων ὅτι οὐχ οἷόν τε ἀγαθὸν εἶναι 30
κυρίως ἄνευ φρονήσεως, οὐδὲ φρόνιμον ἄνευ τῆς ἠθικῆς ἀρετῆς.

b. Nevertheless, this does not prove that phrónesis is superior to wisdom.

Phrónesis not superior to wisdom

Ib., 1145 a$^{6-8}$:

Ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ κυρία γ' ἐστὶ τῆς σοφίας οὐδὲ τοῦ βελτίονος μορίου, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ τῆς ὑγιείας ἡ ἰατρική.

594—Selfrestraint (ἐγκράτεια) and Unrestraint (ἀκρασία) are treated in Book VII, ch. 1-10. The last five chapters of this book (11-15) deal with ἡδονή, a much-discussed subject in the Academy in the later years of Plato. A summary of these discussions is given by Ar. in the following passage.

Three main views about pleasure

a. *Eth. Nic.* VII 11, 1152 b$^{8-12}$:

Τοῖς μὲν οὖν δοκεῖ οὐδεμία ἡδονὴ εἶναι ἀγαθόν, οὔτε καθ' αὑτὸ οὔτε κατὰ 1152b
συμβεβηκός· οὐ γὰρ εἶναι ταὐτὸν ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἡδονήν· τοῖς δ' ἔνιαι μὲν εἶναι, 10
αἱ δὲ πολλαὶ φαῦλαι· ἔτι δὲ τούτων τρίτον, εἰ καὶ πᾶσαι ἀγαθόν, ὅμως μὴ ἐνδέχεσθαι εἶναι τὸ ἄριστον ἡδονήν.

Of these three views, the first is that of Speusippus; the second is Plato's view in in the *Philebus*. The third appears at the end of this dialogue. It is represented by Ar. in book X, infra.

b. For the first thesis it is argued that pleasure is not a good because it is a process (namely the filling of a void).

An argument for the first thesis

Ib., 1152 b$^{12-14}$:

Ὅλως μὲν οὖν οὐκ ἀγαθόν, ὅτι πᾶσα ἡδονὴ γένεσίς ἐστιν εἰς φύσιν αἰσθητή [1], οὐδεμία δὲ γένεσις συγγενὴς τοῖς τέλεσιν, οἷον οὐδεμία οἰκοδόμησις οἰκίᾳ.

c. The same argument is adduced for the third view.

and for the third

Ib., 1152 b$^{22-23}$:

Ὅτι δ' οὐ τἄριστον ἡ ἡδονή, ὅτι οὐ τέλος ἀλλὰ γένεσις.

595—To this argument Ar. opposes that pleasure is neither a process nor always linked up with a process; it is an activity and an end.

This argument refuted

Eth. Nic. VII 12, 1153 a$^{7-15}$:

Οὐκ ἀνάγκη ἕτερόν τι εἶναι βέλτιον τῆς ἡδονῆς, ὥσπερ τινές φασι τὸ τέλος 1153a
τῆς γενέσεως. Οὐ γὰρ γενέσεις εἰσὶν οὐδὲ μετὰ γενέσεως πᾶσαι, ἀλλ' ἐνέργειαι

[1] γένεσις εἰς φύσιν αἰσθητή - "a conscious process towards a natural state" (Rackham).

καὶ τέλος· οὐδὲ γινομένων συμβαίνουσιν ἀλλὰ χρωμένων· καὶ τέλος οὐ πασῶν ἕτερόν τι, ἀλλὰ τῶν εἰς τὴν τελέωσιν ἀγομένων τῆς φύσεως. Διὸ καὶ οὐ καλῶς ἔχει τὸ αἰσθητὴν γένεσιν φάναι εἶναι τὴν ἡδονήν, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον λεκτέον ἐνέργειαν τῆς κατὰ φύσιν ἕξεως[1], ἀντὶ δὲ τοῦ αἰσθητὴν ἀνεμπόδιστον. **Definition of pleasure**

596—a. To the view of Speusippus that no pleasure is a good, Ar. opposes the thesis that pleasure as such is a good.

Eth. Nic. VII 13, 1153 b[1-7]: **Pleasure a good**

1153b Αλλὰ μὴν ὅτι καὶ ἡ λύπη κακόν, ὁμολογεῖται, καὶ φευκτόν· ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἁπλῶς κακόν, ἡ δὲ τῷ πῇ ἐμποδιστική. Τῷ δὲ φευκτῷ τὸ ἐναντίον ἢ φευκτόν τι καὶ κακόν, ἀγαθόν. Ἀνάγκη οὖν τὴν ἡδονὴν ἀγαθόν τι εἶναι. Ὡς γὰρ Σπεύσιππος
5 ἔλυεν, οὐ συμβαίνει ἡ λύσις, ὥσπερ τὸ μεῖζον τῷ ἐλάττονι καὶ τῷ ἴσῳ ἐναντίον[2]· οὐ γὰρ ἂν φαίη ὅπερ κακόν τι εἶναι τὴν ἡδονήν.

b. But not only pleasure as such is a good; against the third view mentioned in ch. 11 Ar. now argues (1) that *some pleasure* may be the supreme Good, and (2) that in fact the supreme Good will be a certain kind of pleasure.

Ib., 1153 b[7-13]: **The supreme Good a certain kind of pleasure**

Τἄριστόν τ' οὐδὲν κωλύει ἡδονήν τινα εἶναι, εἰ ἔνιαι φαῦλαι ἡδοναί, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐπιστήμην τινὰ ἐνίων φαύλων οὐσῶν. Ἴσως δὲ καὶ ἀναγκαῖον, εἴπερ ἑκάστης
10 ἕξεως εἰσὶν ἐνέργειαι ἀνεμπόδιστοι, εἴθ' ἡ πασῶν ἐνέργειά ἐστιν εὐδαιμονία εἴτε ἡ τινὸς αὐτῶν, ἂν ᾖ ἀνεμπόδιστος, αἱρετωτάτην εἶναι· τοῦτο δέ ἐστιν ἡδονή. Ὥστε εἴη ἄν τις ἡδονὴ τὸ ἄριστον, τῶν πολλῶν ἡδονῶν φαύλων οὐσῶν, εἰ ἔτυχεν, ἁπλῶς.

c. This theory is confirmed by the fact that all animals and all human beings pursue pleasure.

Ib., 1153 b[25-26]: **This theory confirmed by experience**

25 Καὶ τὸ διώκειν δ' ἅπαντα καὶ θηρία καὶ ἀνθρώπους τὴν ἡδονὴν σημεῖόν τι τοῦ εἶναί πως τὸ ἄριστον αὐτήν.

The argument is of Eudoxus of Cnidus, who according to *Eth. Nic.*

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[1] "an activity of our natural state".

[2] The argument of Speusippus is more fully exhibited in X 2, 5: "They say, if pain is an evil, it does not follow that pleasure is a good; for evil can also be opposed to evil and to a thing which is neither good nor evil"—(if we follow the reading of Hackforth, who bracketed the word ἄμφω. According to the traditional text the meaning of the last words is: "and both are opposed to the neutral state"—which is, of course, true, but not exactly *ad rem*).

X 2, held that "pleasure is the Good", because "all creatures, rational and irrational alike, seek to obtain it". To this account Ar. adds the remark that the argument was believed more because of the excellence of Eudoxus' character than for its own sake. "For he (E.) had the reputation of being a man of exceptional temperance, and hence he was not suspected of upholding this view because he was a lover of pleasure, but people thought it must really be true" [1].

597—Pleasure is treated again by Ar. in book X, ch. 1-5. The later exhibition goes further than that of book VII. We find the author's final view of pleasure in the following passage.

Pleasure is not a process

a. *Eth. Nic.* X 4, 1174 a^{11-23}, b^{5-6}, b^{10-13}:

Τὰ μὲν οὖν λεγόμενα [2] περὶ τῆς ἡδονῆς καὶ λύπης ἱκανῶς εἰρήσθω· τί δ' 1174a
ἐστὶν ἢ ποῖόν τι, καταφανέστερον γένοιτ' ἂν ἀπ' ἀρχῆς ἀναλαβοῦσιν. Δοκεῖ
γὰρ ἡ μὲν ὅρασις καθ' ὁντινοῦν χρόνον τελεία εἶναι· οὐ γάρ ἐστιν ἐνδεὴς οὐδενὸς 15
ὃ εἰς ὕστερον γενόμενον τελειώσει αὐτῆς τὸ εἶδος· τοιούτῳ δ' ἔοικεν καὶ ἡ
ἡδονή. Ὅλον γάρ τί ἐστι, καὶ κατ' οὐδένα χρόνον λάβοι τις ἂν ἡδονὴν ἧς
ἐπὶ πλείω χρόνον γινομένης τελειωθήσεται τὸ εἶδος. Διόπερ οὐδὲ κίνησίς
ἐστιν. Ἐν χρόνῳ γὰρ πᾶσα κίνησις καὶ τέλους τινός, οἷον ἡ οἰκοδομική, καὶ 20
τελεία ὅταν ποιήσῃ οὗ ἐφίεται, ἢ ἐν ἅπαντι δὴ τῷ χρόνῳ ἢ τούτῳ· ἐν δὲ τοῖς
μέρεσι τοῦ χρόνου πᾶσαι ἀτελεῖς, καὶ ἕτεραι τῷ εἴδει τῆς ὅλης καὶ ἀλλήλων.

neither the result of a process

— Τῆς ἡδονῆς δ' ἐν ὁτῳοῦν χρόνῳ τέλειον τὸ εἶδος. — Ἐκ τούτων δὲ δῆλον b 5, 6
καὶ ὅτι οὐ καλῶς λέγουσι κίνησιν ἢ γένεσιν εἶναι τὴς ἡδονῆς [3]. Οὐ γὰρ πάντων 10
ταῦτα λέγεται, ἀλλὰ τῶν μεριστῶν καὶ μὴ ὅλων· οὐδὲ γὰρ ὁράσεώς ἐστι
γένεσις οὐδὲ στιγμῆς οὐδὲ μονάδος, οὐδὲ τούτων οὐθὲν κίνησις οὐδὲ γένεσις·
οὐδὲ δὴ ἡδονῆς· ὅλον γάρ τι.

b. Positively, pleasure is defined as something which accompanies and completes activity.

Definition of pleasure

Eth. Nic. X 4, 1174 b^{14-34}:

Αἰσθήσεως δὲ πάσης πρὸς τὸ αἰσθητὸν ἐνεργούσης, τελείως δὲ τῆς εὖ διακει-
μένης πρὸς τὸ κάλλιστον τῶν ὑπὸ τὴν αἴσθησιν (τοιοῦτον γὰρ μάλιστ' εἶναι 15
δοκεῖ ἡ τελεία ἐνέργεια· αὐτὴν δὲ λέγειν ἐνεργεῖν, ἢ ἐν ᾧ ἐστί, μηθὲν διαφερέ-
τω), καθ' ἕκαστον δὴ βελτίστη ἐστὶν ἡ ἐνέργεια τοῦ ἄριστα διακειμένου πρὸς
τὸ κράτιστον τῶν ὑπ' αὐτήν· αὕτη δ' ἂν τελειοτάτη εἴη καὶ ἡδίστη. Κατὰ 20

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[1] Translation of Rackham.

[2] τὰ μὲν οὖν λεγόμενα - the current opinions.

[3] τῆς ἡδονῆς is a necessary correction, first made by Ramsauer and adopted by W. D. Ross and H. Rackham. The mss. have τὴν ἡδονήν.

πᾶσαν γὰρ αἴσθησίν ἐστιν ἡδονή, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ διάνοιαν καὶ θεωρίαν, ἡδίστη δ' ἡ τελειοτάτη, τελειοτάτη δ' ἡ τοῦ εὖ ἔχοντος πρὸς τὸ σπουδαιότατον τῶν ὑπ' αὐτήν. Τελειοῖ δὲ τὴν ἐνέργειαν ἡ ἡδονή. Οὐ τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον ἥ τε ἡδονὴ τελειοῖ καὶ τὸ αἰσθητόν τε καὶ ἡ αἴσθησις, σπουδαῖα ὄντα, ὥσπερ οὐδ' ἡ ὑγίεια καὶ ὁ ἰατρὸς ὁμοίως αἴτιά ἐστι τοῦ ὑγιαίνειν. Καθ' ἑκάστην δ' αἴσθησιν ὅτι γίνεται ἡδονή, δῆλον· φαμὲν γὰρ ὁράματα καὶ ἀκούσματα εἶναι ἡδέα. Δῆλον δὲ καὶ ὅτι μάλιστα, ἐπειδὰν ἥ τε αἴσθησις ᾖ κρατίστη καὶ πρὸς τοιοῦτον ἐνεργῇ· τοιούτων δ' ὄντων τοῦ τε αἰσθητοῦ καὶ τοῦ αἰσθανομένου, ἀεὶ ἔσται ἡδονὴ ὑπάρχοντός γε τοῦ ποιήσοντος καὶ τοῦ πεισομένου. Τελειοῖ δὲ τὴν ἐνέργειαν ἡ ἡδονὴ οὐχ ὡς ἕξις ἐνυπάρχουσα, ἀλλ' ὡς ἐπιγινόμενόν τι τέλος, οἷον τοῖς ἀκμαίοις ἡ ὥρα.

598—Consequences of this definition are:

a. Pleasures differ in kind, since activities differ.

1175a *Eth. Nic.* X 5, 1175 a$^{20-28}$: **Consequences of this definition**

20 Ἄνευ τε γὰρ ἐνεργείας οὐ γίνεται ἡδονή, πᾶσάν τε ἐνέργειαν τελειοῖ ἡ ἡδονή. Ὅθεν δοκοῦσι καὶ τῷ εἴδει διαφέρειν. Τὰ γὰρ ἕτερα τῷ εἴδει ὑφ' ἑτέρων οἰόμεθα τελειοῦσθαι. Οὕτω γὰρ φαίνεται καὶ τὰ φυσικὰ καὶ τὰ ὑπὸ τέχνης, οἷον ζῷα καὶ 25 δένδρα καὶ γραφὴ καὶ ἀγάλματα καὶ οἰκία καὶ σκεῦος. Ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὰς ἐνεργείας τὰς διαφερούσας τῷ εἴδει ὑπὸ διαφερόντων εἴδει τελειοῦσθαι. Διαφέρουσι δ' αἱ τῆς διανοίας τῶν κατὰ τὰς αἰσθήσεις καὶ αὗται ἀλλήλων κατ' εἶδος· καὶ αἱ τελειοῦσαι δὴ ἡδοναί.

b. Activities have their own pleasures which stimulate them.

Ib., 1175 a^{28}-b^{1}:

Φανείη δ' ἂν τοῦτο καὶ ἐκ τοῦ συνῳκειῶσθαι τῶν ἡδονῶν ἑκάστην τῇ ἐνεργείᾳ 30 ἣν τελειοῖ. Συναύξει γὰρ τὴν ἐνέργειαν ἡ οἰκεία ἡδονή. Μᾶλλον γὰρ ἕκαστα κρίνουσι καὶ ἐξακριβοῦσιν οἱ μεθ' ἡδονῆς ἐνεργοῦντες, οἷον γεωμετρικοὶ γίνονται οἱ χαίροντες τῷ γεωμετρεῖν, καὶ κατανοοῦσιν ἕκαστα μᾶλλον, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ οἱ φιλόμουσοι καὶ φιλοικοδόμοι καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἕκαστοι ἐπιδιδόασιν εἰς 35 τὸ οἰκεῖον ἔργον χαίροντες αὐτῷ. Συναύξουσι δὴ αἱ ἡδοναί, τὰ δὲ συναύξοντα οἰκεῖα. Τοῖς ἑτέροις δὲ τῷ εἴδει καὶ τὰ οἰκεῖα ἕτερα τῷ εἴδει.

599—Good pleasures are those in which the φρόνιμος takes a delight. **What are good pleasures?**

1176a *Eth. Nic.* X 5, 1176 a$^{15-22}$:

15 Δοκεῖ δ' ἐν ἅπασι τοῖς τοιούτοις εἶναι τὸ φαινόμενον τῷ σπουδαίῳ. Εἰ δὲ τοῦτο καλῶς λέγεται, καθάπερ δοκεῖ, καὶ ἔστιν ἑκάστου μέτρον ἡ ἀρετὴ καὶ ὁ ἀγαθός, ᾗ τοιοῦτος, καὶ ἡδοναὶ εἶεν ἂν αἱ τούτῳ φαινόμεναι καὶ ἡδέα οἷς

οὗτος χαίρει. Τὰ δὲ τούτῳ δυσχερῆ εἴ τῳ φαίνεται ἡδέα, οὐδὲν θαυμαστόν· πολλαὶ γὰρ φθοραὶ καὶ λῦμαι ἀνθρώπων γίνονται· ἡδέα δ' οὐκ ἔστιν, ἀλλὰ τούτοις καὶ τοῖς οὕτω διακειμένοις.

600—In Books VIII and IX friendship is dealt with.

The author proceeds to determine its conditions by answering these two questions: (1) Is friendship only possible between good men? (2) Is it of one kind or of more than one?

Friendship defined

Eth. Nic. VIII 2, 1155 b[17]-1156 a[5]:

Τάχα δ' ἂν γένοιτο περὶ αὐτῶν φανερὸν γνωρισθέντος τοῦ φιλητοῦ· δοκεῖ 1155b
γὰρ οὐ πᾶν φιλεῖσθαι ἀλλὰ τὸ φιλητόν, τοῦτο δ' εἶναι ἀγαθὸν ἢ ἡδὺ ἢ χρήσιμον. Δόξειε δ' ἂν χρήσιμον εἶναι δι' οὗ γίνεται ἀγαθόν τι ἢ ἡδονή, ὥστε φιλητὰ ἂν 20
εἴη τἀγαθόν τε καὶ τὸ ἡδὺ ὡς τέλη. Πότερον οὖν τἀγαθὸν φιλοῦσιν ἢ τὸ αὑτοῖς ἀγαθόν; Διαφωνεῖ γὰρ ἐνίοτε ταῦτα. Ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ τὸ ἡδύ. Δοκεῖ δὲ τὸ αὑτῷ ἀγαθὸν φιλεῖν ἕκαστος, καὶ εἶναι ἁπλῶς μὲν τὸ ἀγαθὸν φιλητόν, ἑκάστῳ δὲ τὸ ἑκάστῳ. Φιλεῖ δὲ ἕκαστος οὐ τὸ ὂν αὑτῷ ἀγαθὸν ἀλλὰ τὸ φαινό- 25
μενον. Διοίσει δ' οὐδέν· ἔσται γὰρ τὸ φιλητὸν φαινόμενον.

Τριῶν δ' ὄντων δι' ἃ φιλοῦσιν, ἐπὶ μὲν τῇ τῶν ἀψύχων φιλήσει οὐ λέγεται φιλία. Οὐ γάρ ἐστιν ἀντιφίλησις, οὐδὲ βούλησις ἐκείνων ἀγαθοῦ (γελοῖον γὰρ ἴσως τῷ οἴνῳ βούλεσθαι τἀγαθά, ἀλλ' εἴπερ σῴζεσθαι βούλεται αὐτόν, ἵνα 30
αὐτὸς ἔχῃ)· τῷ δὲ φίλῳ φασὶ δεῖν βούλεσθαι τἀγαθὰ ἐκείνου ἕνεκα. Τοὺς δὲ βουλομένους οὕτω τἀγαθὰ εὔνους λέγουσιν, ἐὰν μὴ τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ παρ' ἐκείνου γίγνηται· εὔνοιαν γὰρ ἐν ἀντιπεπονθόσιν φιλίαν εἶναι. Ἢ προσθετέον μὴ λανθάνουσαν; Πολλοὶ γάρ εἰσιν εὔνοι οἷς οὐχ ἑωράκασιν, ὑπολαμβάνουσι δὲ ἐπιεικεῖς εἶναι ἢ χρησίμους· 35
τοῦτο δὲ τὸ αὐτὸ κἂν ἐκείνων τις πάθοι πρὸς τοῦτον. Εὔνοι μὲν οὖν οὕτοι 1156a
φαίνονται ἀλλήλοις· φίλους δὲ πῶς ἄν τις εἴποι λανθάνοντας ὡς ἔχουσιν ἑαυτοῖς; Δεῖ ἄρα εὐνοεῖν ἀλλήλοις καὶ βούλεσθαι τἀγαθὰ μὴ λανθάνοντας δι' ἕν τι τῶν εἰρημένων. 5

So friendship is defined by four characteristics:

(1) it is goodwill (εὔνοια), (2) mutual (ἐν ἀντιπεπονθόσι), (3) known to the other (μὴ λανθάνουσα), (4) for the sake of the other (τῷ δὲ φίλῳ φασὶ δεῖν βούλεσθαι τἀγαθὰ ἐκείνου ἕνεκα).

By the last characteristic, strictly speaking, friendships of utility and of pleasure are excluded. They may be called friendship only by analogy, or (as Ar. calls it in the next chapter) *accidentally*.

The point is discussed by Schächer in his work cited sub **565a**, where he compares the passages on φιλία in the three Aristotelian treatises on ethics.

601—**a**. According to the three kinds of φιλητά, three species of friendship are distinguished

Eth. Nic. VIII 3, 1156 a$^{6-24}$: **Three species of friendship**

1156a Διαφέρει δὲ ταῦτα ἀλλήλων εἴδει· καὶ αἱ φιλήσεις ἄρα καὶ αἱ φιλίαι. Τρία δὴ τὰ τῆς φιλίας εἴδη, ἰσάριθμα τοῖς φιλητοῖς· καθ' ἕκαστον γὰρ ἐστιν ἀντιφίλησις οὐ λανθάνουσα. Οἱ δὲ φιλοῦντες ἀλλήλους βούλονται τἀγαθὰ ἀλλήλοις
10 ταύτῃ ᾗ φιλοῦσιν. Οἱ μὲν οὖν διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον φιλοῦντες ἀλλήλους οὐ καθ' αὑτοὺς φιλοῦσιν, ἀλλ' ᾗ γίγνεταί τι αὐτοῖς παρ' ἀλλήλων ἀγαθόν· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ οἱ δι' ἡδονήν. Οὐ γὰρ τῷ ποιούς τινας εἶναι ἀγαπῶσι τοὺς εὐτραπέλους, ἀλλ' ὅτι ἡδεῖς αὐτοῖς. Οἵ τε δὴ διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον φιλοῦντες διὰ τὸ αὐτοῖς ἀγαθὸν
15 στέργουσι, καὶ οἱ δι' ἡδονὴν διὰ τὸ αὐτοῖς ἡδύ, καὶ οὐχ ᾗ ὁ φιλούμενός ἐστιν ‹ὅσπερ ἐστίν›, ἀλλ' ᾗ χρήσιμος ἢ ἡδύς. Κατὰ συμβεβηκός τε δὴ αἱ φιλίαι αὗταί εἰσιν· οὐ γὰρ ᾗ ἐστὶν ὅσπερ ἐστὶν ὁ φιλούμενος, ταύτῃ φιλεῖται, ἀλλ' ᾗ πορίζουσιν οἱ μὲν ἀγαθόν τι οἱ δ' ἡδονήν. Εὐδιάλυτοι δὴ αἱ τοιαῦταί εἰσιν,
20 μὴ διαμενόντων αὐτῶν ὁμοίων· ἐὰν γὰρ μηκέτι ἡδεῖς ἢ χρήσιμοι ὦσιν, παύονται φιλοῦντες. Τὸ δὲ χρήσιμον οὐ διαμένει, ἀλλ' ἄλλοτε ἄλλο γίγνεται. Ἀπολυθέντος οὖν δι' ὃ φίλοι ἦσαν, διαλύεται καὶ ἡ φιλία, ὡς οὔσης τῆς φιλίας πρὸς ἐκεῖνα.

b. Friendships of utility occur most frequently between the old.

Ib., 1156 a$^{24-26}$: **Friendships of utility**

25 Μάλιστα δ' ἐν τοῖς πρεσβύταις ἡ τοιαύτη δοκεῖ φιλία γίνεσθαι (οὐ γὰρ τὸ ἡδὺ οἱ τηλικοῦτοι διώκουσιν ἀλλὰ τὸ ὠφέλιμον).

c. Friendships of pleasure seem to occur mostly between the young.

Ib. 1156 a$^{31-35}$: **Friendships of pleasure**

Ἡ δὲ τῶν νέων φιλία δι' ἡδονὴν εἶναι δοκεῖ· κατὰ πάθος γὰρ οὗτοι ζῶσι, καὶ μάλιστα διώκουσι τὸ ἡδὺ αὑτοῖς καὶ τὸ παρόν· τῆς ἡλικίας δὲ μεταπιπτού-
35 σης καὶ τὰ ἡδέα γίνεται ἕτερα. Διὸ ταχέως γίγνονται φίλοι καὶ παύονται.

d. The perfect kind of friendship is that which is based on virtue.

Ib., 1156 b$^{7-12}$: **Perfect friendship**

1156b Τελεία δ' ἐστὶν ἡ τῶν ἀγαθῶν φιλία καὶ κατ' ἀρετὴν ὁμοίων. Οὗτοι γὰρ τἀγαθὰ ὁμοίως βούλονται ἀλλήλοις ᾗ ἀγαθοί, ἀγαθοὶ δέ εἰσι καθ' αὑτούς·
10 οἱ δὲ βουλόμενοι τἀγαθὰ τοῖς φίλοις ἐκείνων ἕνεκα μάλιστα φίλοι (δι' αὑτοὺς γὰρ οὕτως ἔχουσι, καὶ οὐ κατὰ συμβεβηκός)· διαμένει οὖν ἡ τούτων φιλία ἕως ἂν ἀγαθοὶ ὦσιν, ἡ δ' ἀρετὴ μόνιμον.

e. Friendships of virtue occur rarely, those of utility or pleasure are frequent.

1158a *Eth. Nic.* VIII 6, 1158 a$^{10-18}$: **Perfect friendship occurs rarely**

10 Πολλοῖς δ' εἶναι φίλον κατὰ τὴν τελείαν φιλίαν οὐκ ἐνδέχεται, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ ἐρᾶν πολλῶν ἅμα· ἔοικεν γὰρ ὑπερβολῇ, τὸ τοιοῦτον δὲ πρὸς ἕνα πέφυκε

γίνεσθαι, πολλοὺς δ' ἅμα τῷ αὐτῷ ἀρέσκειν σφόδρα οὐ ῥᾴδιον, ἴσως δ' οὐδ' ἀγαθοὺς εἶναι. Δεῖ δὲ καὶ ἐμπειρίαν λαβεῖν καὶ ἐν συνηθείᾳ γενέσθαι, ὃ παγχά- 15
λεπον. Διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον δὲ καὶ τὸ ἡδὺ πολλοῖς ἀρέσκειν ἐνδέχεται· πολλοὶ γὰρ οἱ τοιοῦτοι, καὶ ἐν ὀλίγῳ χρόνῳ αἱ ὑπηρεσίαι.

602—Self-love the type of and basis for love of others.

Self-love the basis for friendship

Eth. Nic. IX 4, 1166 a[1-33]:

Τὰ φιλικὰ δὲ τὰ πρὸς τοὺς φίλους, καὶ οἷς αἱ φιλίαι ὁρίζονται, ἔοικεν ἐκ 1166a
τῶν πρὸς ἑαυτὸν ἐληλυθέναι. Τιθέασι γὰρ φίλον τὸν βουλόμενον καὶ πράττοντα τἀγαθὰ ἢ τὰ φαινόμενα ἐκείνου ἕνεκα, ἢ τὸν βουλόμενον εἶναι καὶ ζῆν τὸν φίλον αὐτοῦ χάριν, ὅπερ αἱ μητέρες πρὸς τὰ τέκνα πεπόνθασι, καὶ τῶν φίλων 5
οἱ προσκεκρουκότες[1]· οἱ δὲ τὸν συνδιάγοντα καὶ ταὐτὰ αἱρούμενον, ἢ τὸν συναλγοῦντα καὶ συγχαίροντα τῷ φίλῳ, μάλιστα δὲ καὶ τοῦτο περὶ τὰς μητέρας συμβαίνει. Τούτων δέ τινι καὶ τὴν φιλίαν ὁρίζονται. Πρὸς ἑαυτὸν δὲ τούτων ἕκαστον τῷ ἐπιεικεῖ ὑπάρχει, τοῖς δὲ λοιποῖς, ἢ τοιοῦτοι ὑπολαμβάνουσιν 10
εἶναι. Ἔοικε δέ, καθάπερ εἴρηται, μέτρον ἑκάστων ἡ ἀρετὴ καὶ ὁ σπουδαῖος εἶναι. Οὗτος γὰρ ὁμογνωμονεῖ ἑαυτῷ, καὶ τῶν αὐτῶν ὀρέγεται κατὰ πᾶσαν τὴν ψυχήν. Καὶ βούλεται δὴ ἑαυτῷ τἀγαθὰ καὶ τὰ φαινόμενα καὶ πράττει (τοῦ 15
γὰρ ἀγαθοῦ τἀγαθὸν διαπονεῖν) καὶ ἑαυτοῦ ἕνεκα· τοῦ γὰρ διανοητικοῦ χάριν, ὅπερ ἕκαστος εἶναι δοκεῖ. Καὶ ζῆν δὲ βούλεται ἑαυτὸν καὶ σῴζεσθαι, καὶ μάλιστα τοῦτο ᾧ φρονεῖ· ἀγαθὸν γὰρ τῷ σπουδαίῳ τὸ εἶναι. Ἕκαστος δ' ἑαυτῷ βούλεται τἀγαθά, γενόμενος δ' ἄλλος οὐδεὶς αἱρεῖται πάντ' ἔχειν [ἐκεῖνο 20
τὸ γενόμενον][2] (ἔχει γὰρ καὶ νῦν ὁ θεὸς τἀγαθόν), ἀλλ' ὢν ὅ τι ποτ' ἐστίν. Δόξειε δ' ἂν τὸ νοοῦν ἕκαστος εἶναι, ἢ μάλιστα. Συνδιάγειν τε ὁ τοιοῦτος ἑαυτῷ βούλεται· ἡδέως γὰρ αὐτὸ ποιεῖ· τῶν τε γὰρ πεπραγμένων ἐπιτερπεῖς αἱ μνῆμαι, καὶ τῶν μελλόντων ἐλπίδες ἀγαθαί· αἱ τοιαῦται δ' ἡδεῖαι. Καὶ 25
θεωρημάτων δ' εὐπορεῖ τῇ διανοίᾳ. Συναλγεῖ τε καὶ συνήδεται μάλισθ' ἑαυτῷ· πάντοτε γάρ ἐστι τὸ αὐτὸ λυπηρόν τε καὶ ἡδύ, καὶ οὐκ ἄλλοτε ἄλλο· ἀμεταμέλητος γὰρ ὡς εἰπεῖν. Τῷ δὴ πρὸς αὑτὸν [μὲν] ἕκαστα τούτων ὑπάρχειν τῷ ἐπιεικεῖ, πρὸς δὲ τὸν φίλον ἔχειν ὥσπερ πρὸς ἑαυτόν (ἔστι γὰρ ὁ φίλος 30
ἄλλος αὐτός), καὶ ἡ φιλία τούτων εἶναί τι δοκεῖ, καὶ φίλοι οἷς ταῦθ' ὑπάρχει.

603—**a**. An objection to this view is mentioned in ch. 8 of the same book, 1168 a[28-35]:

An objection to this view

Ἀπορεῖται δὲ καὶ πότερον δεῖ φιλεῖν ἑαυτὸν μάλιστα ἢ ἄλλον τινά. Επιτιμῶσι γὰρ τοῖς ἑαυτοὺς μάλιστ' ἀγαπῶσι, καὶ ὡς ἐν αἰσχρῷ φιλαύτους ἀπο-

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[1] Those who have quarrelled.
[2] Secl. Vermehren, followed by Rackham.

καλοῦσι· δοκεῖ τε ὁ μὲν φαῦλος ἑαυτοῦ χάριν πάντα πράττειν, καὶ ὅσῳ ἂν μοχθηρότερος ᾖ, τοσούτῳ μᾶλλον (ἐγκαλοῦσι δὴ αὐτῷ οἷον ὅτι οὐδὲν ἀφ' ἑαυτοῦ πράττει), ὁ δὲ ἐπιεικὴς διὰ τὸ καλόν, καὶ ὅσῳ ἂν βελτίων ᾖ, μᾶλλον διὰ τὸ καλόν, καὶ φίλου ἕνεκα, τὸ δ' αὐτοῦ παρίησιν.

b. Ar.'s reply to this objection. Ib., 1168 a[35]-1169 a[15]: **Aristotle's reply**

Τοῖς λόγοις δὲ τούτοις τὰ ἔργα διαφωνεῖ, οὐκ ἀλόγως. Φασὶ γὰρ δεῖν φιλεῖν μάλιστα τὸν μάλιστα φίλον, φίλος δὲ μάλιστα ὁ βουλόμενος ᾧ βούλεται τἀγαθὰ ἐκείνου ἕνεκα, καὶ εἰ μηδεὶς εἴσεται. Ταῦτα δ' ὑπάρχει μάλιστ' αὐτῷ πρὸς αὑτόν, καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ δὴ πάντα οἷς ὁ φίλος ὁρίζεται· εἴρηται γὰρ ὅτι ἀπ' αὐτοῦ πάντα τὰ φιλικὰ καὶ πρὸς τοὺς ἄλλους διήκει. Καὶ αἱ παροιμίαι δὲ πᾶσαι ὁμογνωμονοῦσιν, οἷον τὸ »μία ψυχή«[1] καὶ »κοινὰ τὰ φίλων« καὶ »ἰσότης φιλότης« καὶ »γόνυ κνήμης ἔγγιον«[2]· πάντα γὰρ ταῦτα πρὸς αὑτὸν μάλιστ' ἂν ὑπάρχοι· μάλιστα γὰρ φίλος αὑτῷ, καὶ φιλητέον δὴ μάλιστα ἑαυτόν. Ἀπορεῖται δ' εἰκότως ποτέροις χρεὼν ἕπεσθαι, ἀμφοῖν ἐχόντοιν τὸ πιστόν.

Ἴσως οὖν τοὺς τοιούτους δεῖ τῶν λόγων διαιρεῖν καὶ διορίζειν ἐφ' ὅσον ἑκάτεροι καὶ πῇ ἀληθεύουσιν. Εἰ δὴ λάβοιμεν τὸ φίλαυτον πῶς ἑκάτεροι λέγουσιν, τάχ' ἂν γένοιτο δῆλον. Οἱ μὲν οὖν εἰς ὄνειδος ἄγοντες αὐτὸ φιλαύτους καλοῦσι τοὺς ἑαυτοῖς ἀπονέμοντας τὸ πλεῖον ἐν χρήμασι καὶ τιμαῖς καὶ ἡδοναῖς ταῖς σωματικαῖς· τούτων γὰρ οἱ πολλοὶ ὀρέγονται, καὶ ἐσπουδάκασι περὶ αὐτὰ ὡς ἄριστα ὄντα, διὸ καὶ περιμάχητά ἐστιν. Οἱ δὴ περὶ ταῦτα πλεονέκται χαρίζονται ταῖς ἐπιθυμίαις καὶ ὅλως τοῖς πάθεσι καὶ τῷ ἀλόγῳ τῆς ψυχῆς. Τοιοῦτοι δ' εἰσὶν οἱ πολλοί· διὸ καὶ ἡ προσηγορία γεγένηται ἀπὸ τοῦ πολλοῦ φαύλου ὄντος. Δικαίως δὴ τοῖς οὕτω φιλαύτοις ὀνειδίζεται. Ὅτι δὲ τοὺς τὰ τοιαῦθ' αὑτοῖς ἀπονέμοντας εἰώθασι λέγειν οἱ πολλοὶ φιλαύτους, οὐκ ἄδηλον· εἰ γάρ τις ἀεὶ σπουδάζοι τὰ δίκαια πράττειν αὐτὸς μάλιστα πάντων ἢ τὰ σώφρονα ἢ ὁποιαοῦν ἄλλα τῶν κατὰ τὰς ἀρετάς, καὶ ὅλως ἀεὶ τὸ καλὸν ἑαυτῷ περιποιοῖτο, οὐδεὶς ἐρεῖ τοῦτον φίλαυτον οὐδὲ ψέξει. — Δόξειε δ' ἂν ὁ τοιοῦτος μᾶλλον εἶναι φίλαυτος· ἀπονέμει γοῦν ἑαυτῷ τὰ κάλλιστα καὶ μάλιστ' ἀγαθά, καὶ χαρίζεται ἑαυτοῦ τῷ κυριωτάτῳ, καὶ πάντα τούτῳ πείθεται· ὥσπερ δὲ καὶ πόλις τὸ κυριώτατον μάλιστ' εἶναι δοκεῖ καὶ πᾶν ἄλλο σύστημα, οὕτω καὶ ἄνθρωπος· καὶ φίλαυτος δὴ μάλιστα ὁ τοῦτο ἀγαπῶν καὶ τούτῳ χαριζόμενος. Καὶ ἐγκρατὴς δὲ καὶ ἀκρατὴς λέγεται τῷ κρατεῖν τὸν νοῦν ἢ μή, ὡς τούτου ἑκάστου ὄντος καὶ πεπραγέναι δοκοῦσιν αὐτοὶ καὶ ἑκουσίως τὰ μετὰ λόγου μάλιστα. Ὅτι μὲν οὖν τοῦθ' ἕκαστός ἐστιν ἢ μάλιστα, οὐκ ἄδηλον, καὶ ὅτι ὁ ἐπιεικὴς μάλιστα τοῦτ' ἀγαπᾷ. Διὸ φίλαυτος μάλιστ' ἂν εἴη, καθ' ἕτερον εἶδος τοῦ ὀνειδιζομένου, καὶ διαφέρων τοσοῦτον ὅσον τὸ κατὰ λόγον ζῆν τοῦ κατὰ

[1] "Friends have one soul between them". Euripides, *Orestes*, 1046.
[2] "Charity begins at home" (Ross).

πάθος, καὶ ὀρέγεσθαι τοῦ καλοῦ ἢ τοῦ δοκοῦντος συμφέρειν. Τοὺς μὲν οὖν περὶ τὰς καλὰς πράξεις διαφερόντως σπουδάζοντας πάντες ἀποδέχονται καὶ ἐπαινοῦσιν· πάντων δὲ ἀμιλλωμένων πρὸς τὸ καλὸν καὶ διατεινομένων τὰ κάλλιστα πράττειν κοινῇ τ' ἂν πάντ' εἴη τὰ δέοντα καὶ ἰδίᾳ ἑκάστῳ μέγιστα τῶν ἀγαθῶν, εἴπερ ἡ ἀρετὴ τοιοῦτόν ἐστιν. — Ὥστε τὸν μὲν ἀγαθὸν δεῖ φίλαυτον εἶναι· καὶ γὰρ αὐτὸς ὀνήσεται τὰ καλὰ πράττων καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ὠφελήσει, τὸν δὲ μοχθηρὸν οὐ δεῖ· βλάψει γὰρ καὶ ἑαυτὸν καὶ τοὺς πέλας, φαύλοις πάθεσιν ἑπόμενος.

604—The question whether friendship is necessary for happiness, is answered by Ar. in the affirmative.

Is friendship necessary for happiness?

Eth. Nic. IX 9, 1169 b$^{3-13}$, b$^{16-22}$, 1170 a$^{11-13}$:

Ἀμφισβητεῖται δὲ καὶ περὶ τὸν εὐδαίμονα, εἰ δεήσεται φίλων ἢ μή. Οὐθὲν γάρ φασι δεῖν φίλων τοῖς μακαρίοις καὶ αὐτάρκεσιν· ὑπάρχειν γὰρ αὐτοῖς τἀγαθά· αὐτάρκεις οὖν ὄντας οὐδενὸς προσδεῖσθαι, τὸν δὲ φίλον, ἕτερον αὐτὸν ὄντα, ποιεῖν ἃ δι' αὑτοῦ ἀδυνατεῖ· ὅθεν

ὅταν ὁ δαίμων εὖ διδῷ, τί δεῖ φίλων;

ἔοικεν δ' ἀτόπῳ τὸ πάντα ἀπονέμοντας τἀγαθὰ τῷ εὐδαίμονι φίλους μὴ ἀποδιδόναι, ὃ δοκεῖ τῶν ἐκτὸς ἀγαθῶν μέγιστον εἶναι. — Εἴ τε φίλου μᾶλλόν ἐστι τὸ εὖ ποιεῖν ἢ πάσχειν, καὶ ἔστι τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ καὶ τῆς ἀρετῆς τὸ εὐεργετεῖν, κάλλιον δ' εὖ ποιεῖν φίλους ὀθνείων, τῶν εὖ πεισομένων δεήσεται ὁ σπουδαῖος. — Ἄτοπον δ' ἴσως καὶ τὸ μονώτην ποιεῖν τὸν μακάριον· οὐδεὶς γὰρ ἕλοιτ' ἂν καθ' αὑτὸν τὰ πάντ' ἔχειν ἀγαθά· πολιτικὸν γὰρ ὁ ἄνθρωπος καὶ συζῆν πεφυκός. Καὶ τῷ εὐδαίμονι δὴ τοῦθ' ὑπάρχει· τὰ γὰρ τῇ φύσει ἀγαθὰ ἔχει. Δῆλον δ' ὡς μετὰ φίλων καὶ ἐπιεικῶν κρεῖττον ἢ μετ' ὀθνείων καὶ τῶν τυχόντων συνημερεύειν· δεῖ ἄρα τῷ εὐδαίμονι φίλων. — Γίνοιτο δ' ἂν καὶ ἄσκησίς τις τῆς ἀρετῆς ἐκ τοῦ συζῆν τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς, καθάπερ καὶ Θέογνίς φησιν. 1169b 5 1170a 12, 13

605—Having dealt with the problem of ἡδονή in the first part of Book X, the author speaks of the happy life in the following chapters (6-8).

Happiness an activity chosen for its own sake

a. Recapitulation of preceding statements on the character of happiness.

Eth. Nic. X 6, 1176 a^{30}-b^{9}.

Εἰρημένων δὲ τῶν περὶ τὰς ἀρετάς τε καὶ φιλίας καὶ ἡδονάς, λοιπὸν περὶ εὐδαιμονίας τύπῳ διελθεῖν, ἐπειδὴ τέλος αὐτὴν τίθεμεν τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων. Ἀναλαβοῦσι δὲ τὰ προειρημένα συντομώτερος ἂν εἴη ὁ λόγος. Εἴπομεν δ' ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν ἕξις· καὶ γὰρ τῷ καθεύδοντι διὰ βίου ὑπάρχοι ἄν, φυτῶν ζῶντι βίον, καὶ τῷ δυστυχοῦντι τὰ μέγιστα. Εἰ δὴ ταῦτα μὴ ἀρέσκει, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον εἰς 1176a 35

1176b ἐνέργειάν τινα θετέον, καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς πρότερον εἴρηται, τῶν δ' ἐνεργειῶν αἱ μέν εἰσιν ἀναγκαῖαι καὶ δι' ἕτερα αἱρεταὶ αἱ δὲ καθ' αὑτάς, δῆλον ὅτι τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν τῶν καθ' αὑτὰς αἱρετῶν τινα θετέον καὶ οὐ τῶν δι' ἄλλο· οὐδενὸς γὰρ ἐνδεὴς ἡ εὐδαιμονία ἀλλ' αὐτάρκης. Καθ' αὑτὰς δ' εἰσὶν αἱρεταὶ ἀφ' ὧν μηδὲν ἐπιζητεῖται παρὰ τὴν ἐνέργειαν. Τοιαῦται δ' εἶναι δοκοῦσιν αἱ κατ' ἀρετὴν πράξεις· τὰ γὰρ καλὰ καὶ σπουδαῖα πράττειν τῶν δι' αὑτὰ αἱρετῶν.

Cp. to this definition that of I 7 (our nr. **566**, at the end).

b. Is not play an activity chosen for its own sake?—To this question Ar. answers that play can never be an absolute end, only a means for further activity. **Is not play chosen for its own sake?**

Ib., 1176 b[10-11], b[32]-1177 a[1]:

Καὶ τῶν παιδιῶν δὲ αἱ ἡδεῖαι· οὐ γὰρ δι' ἕτερα αὐτὰς αἱροῦνται. — Σπουδάζειν δὲ καὶ πονεῖν παιδιᾶς χάριν ἠλίθιον φαίνεται καὶ λίαν παιδικόν· παίζειν δ' ὅπως σπουδάζῃ, κατ' Ἀνάχαρσιν, ὀρθῶς ἔχειν δοκεῖ. Ἀναπαύσει γὰρ ἔοικεν ἡ παιδιά, ἀδυνατοῦντες δὲ συνεχῶς πονεῖν ἀναπαύσεως δέονται. Οὐ δὴ τέλος ἡ ἀνάπαυσις· γίνεται γὰρ ἕνεκα τῆς ἐνεργείας.

c. Serious things contribute more to happiness. **The happy life is serious**

Ib., 1177 a[1-6]:

1177a Δοκεῖ δ' ὁ εὐδαίμων βίος κατ' ἀρετὴν εἶναι· οὗτος δὲ μετὰ σπουδῆς, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐν παιδιᾷ. Βελτίω τε λέγομεν τὰ σπουδαῖα τῶν γελοίων καὶ τῶν μετὰ παιδιᾶς, καὶ τοῦ βελτίονος ἀεὶ καὶ μορίου καὶ ἀνθρώπου σπουδαιοτέραν τὴν ἐνέργειαν· ἡ δὲ τοῦ βελτίονος κρείττων καὶ εὐδαιμονικωτέρα ἤδη.

606—a. Perfect happiness is that activity which exercises the highest virtue, i.e. that of the highest function of man, i.e. the intellect.

Eth. Nic. X 7, 1177 a[12-18]: **Perfect happiness lies in contemplation**

Εἰ δ' ἐστὶν ἡ εὐδαιμονία κατ' ἀρετὴν ἐνέργεια, εὔλογον κατὰ τὴν κρατίστην· αὕτη δ' ἂν εἴη τοῦ ἀρίστου. Εἴτε δὴ νοῦς τοῦτο εἴτε ἄλλο τι, ὃ δὴ κατὰ φύσιν δοκεῖ ἄρχειν καὶ ἡγεῖσθαι καὶ ἔννοιαν ἔχειν περὶ καλῶν καὶ θείων, εἴτε θεῖον ὂν καὶ αὐτὸ εἴτε τῶν ἐν ἡμῖν τὸ θειότατον, ἡ τούτου ἐνέργεια κατὰ τὴν οἰκείαν ἀρετὴν εἴη ἂν ἡ τελεία εὐδαιμονία. Ὅτι δ' ἐστὶ θεωρητική, εἴρηται.

b. The reasons for this statement are given in the next passage. **Reasons**

Ib., 1177 a[20]-b[6], b[26]-1178 a[8]:

Κρατίστη τε γὰρ αὕτη ἐστὶν ἡ ἐνέργεια· καὶ γὰρ ὁ νοῦς τῶν ἐν ἡμῖν, καὶ τῶν γνωστῶν, περὶ ἃ ὁ νοῦς. Ἔτι δὲ συνεχεστάτη· θεωρεῖν τε γὰρ δυνάμεθα συνεχῶς μᾶλλον ἢ πράττειν ὁτιοῦν. Οἰόμεθά τε δεῖν ἡδονὴν παραμεμῖχθαι τῇ εὐδαιμονίᾳ, ἡδίστη δὲ τῶν κατ' ἀρετὴν ἐνεργειῶν ἡ κατὰ τὴν σοφίαν ὁμολο- (1) **It is the activity of the noûs**

γουμένως ἐστίν· δοκεῖ γοῦν ἡ φιλοσοφία θαυμαστὰς ἡδονὰς ἔχειν καθαριότητι καὶ τῷ βεβαίῳ, εὔλογον δὲ τοῖς εἰδόσι τῶν ζητούντων ἡδίω τὴν διαγωγὴν εἶναι.

(2) most self-sufficient

Ἡ τε λεγομένη αὐτάρκεια περὶ τὴν θεωρητικὴν μάλιστ' ἂν εἴη· τῶν μὲν γὰρ πρὸς τὸ ζῆν ἀναγκαίων καὶ σοφὸς καὶ δίκαιος καὶ οἱ λοιποὶ δέονται, τοῖς δὲ τοιούτοις ἱκανῶς κεχορηγημένων ὁ μὲν δίκαιος δεῖται πρὸς δικαιοπραγήσει καὶ μεθ' ὧν, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ὁ σώφρων καὶ ὁ ἀνδρεῖος καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἕκαστος, ὁ δὲ σοφὸς καὶ καθ' αὑτὸν ὢν δύναται θεωρεῖν, καὶ ὅσῳ ἂν σοφώτερος ᾖ, μᾶλλον· βέλτιον δ' ἴσως συνεργοὺς ἔχων, ἀλλ' ὅμως αὐταρκέστατος.

(3) an end in itself

Δόξαι τ' ἂν αὐτὴ μόνη δι' αὑτὴν ἀγαπᾶσθαι· οὐδὲν γὰρ ἀπ' αὐτῆς γίνεται παρὰ τὸ θεωρῆσαι, ἀπὸ δὲ τῶν πρακτικῶν ἢ πλεῖον ἢ ἔλαττον περιποιούμεθα παρὰ τὴν πρᾶξιν. Δοκεῖ τε ἡ εὐδαιμονία ἐν τῇ σχολῇ εἶναι· ἀσχολούμεθα γὰρ ἵνα σχολάζωμεν, καὶ πολεμοῦμεν ἵνα εἰρήνην ἄγωμεν.

(4) a divine life

Ὁ δὲ τοιοῦτος ἂν εἴη βίος κρείττων ἢ κατ' ἄνθρωπον· οὐ γὰρ ᾗ ἄνθρωπός ἐστιν οὕτως βιώσεται, ἀλλ' ᾗ θεῖόν τι ἐν αὐτῷ ὑπάρχει· ὅσῳ δὲ διαφέρει τοῦτο τοῦ συνθέτου, τοσούτῳ καὶ ἡ ἐνέργεια τῆς κατὰ τὴν ἄλλην ἀρετήν. Εἰ δὴ θεῖον ὁ νοῦς πρὸς τὸν ἄνθρωπον, καὶ ὁ κατὰ τοῦτον βίος θεῖος πρὸς τὸν ἀνθρώπινον βίον. Οὐ χρὴ δὲ κατὰ τοὺς παραινοῦντας ἀνθρώπινα φρονεῖν ἄνθρωπον ὄντα οὐδὲ θνητὰ τὸν θνητόν, ἀλλ' ἐφ' ὅσον ἐνδέχεται ἀθανατίζειν καὶ πάντα ποιεῖν πρὸς τὸ ζῆν κατὰ τὸ κράτιστον τῶν ἐν αὐτῷ· εἰ γὰρ καὶ τῷ ὄγκῳ μικρόν ἐστι, δυνάμει καὶ τιμιότητι πολὺ μᾶλλον πάντων ὑπερέχει. Δόξειε δ' ἂν καὶ εἶναι ἕκαστος τοῦτο, εἴπερ τὸ κύριον καὶ ἄμεινον· ἄτοπον οὖν γίνοιτ' ἄν, εἰ μὴ τὸν αὑτοῦ βίον αἱροῖτο ἀλλά τινος ἄλλου. Τὸ λεχθέν τε πρότερον ἁρμόσει καὶ νῦν· τὸ γὰρ οἰκεῖον ἑκάστῳ τῇ φύσει κράτιστον καὶ ἥδιστόν ἐστιν ἑκάστῳ. Καὶ τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ δὴ ὁ κατὰ τὸν νοῦν βίος, εἴπερ τοῦτο μάλιστα ἄνθρωπος. Οὗτος ἄρα καὶ εὐδαιμονέστατος.

1177b 5 1178a

Cp. *Metaph.* A 2, 982 b$^{28-32}$ (our nr. **519**).

c. The life of moral virtue takes the second place.

Moral virtue ranged as secondary

Ib. c. 8, 1178 a$^{9-14}$:

Δευτέρως δ' ὁ κατὰ τὴν ἄλλην ἀρετήν· αἱ γὰρ κατὰ ταύτην ἐνέργειαι ἀνθρωπικαί· δίκαια γὰρ καὶ ἀνδρεῖα καὶ τὰ ἄλλα τὰ κατὰ τὰς ἀρετὰς πρὸς ἀλλήλους πράττομεν ἐν συναλλάγμασι καὶ χρείαις καὶ πράξεσι παντοίαις ἔν τε τοῖς πάθεσι διατηροῦντες τὸ πρέπον ἑκάστῳ, ταῦτα δ' εἶναι φαίνεται πάντα ἀνθρωπικά.

607—Further reasons for superiority of the contemplative life.

Contemplation needs few external goods

a. *Eth. Nic.* X 8, 1178 a$^{23-34}$:

Δόξειε δ' ἂν καὶ τῆς ἐκτὸς χορηγίας ἐπὶ μικρὸν ἢ ἐπ' ἔλαττον δεῖσθαι τῆς ἠθικῆς. Τῶν μὲν γὰρ ἀναγκαίων ἀμφοῖν χρεία καὶ ἐξ ἴσου ἔστω, εἰ καὶ μᾶλλον διαπονεῖ περὶ τὸ σῶμα ὁ πολιτικός, καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα· μικρὸν γὰρ ἄν τι διαφέροι·

πρὸς δὲ τὰς ἐνεργείας πολὺ διοίσει. Τῷ μὲν γὰρ ἐλευθερίῳ δεήσει χρημάτων πρὸς τὸ πράττειν τὰ ἐλευθέρια, καὶ τῷ δικαίῳ δὴ εἰς τὰς ἀνταποδόσεις (αἱ γὰρ βουλήσεις ἄδηλοι, προσποιοῦνται δὲ καὶ οἱ μὴ δίκαιοι βούλεσθαι δικαιοπραγεῖν), τῷ ἀνδρείῳ δὲ δυνάμεως, εἴπερ ἐπιτελεῖ τι τῶν κατὰ τὴν ἀρετήν, καὶ τῷ σώφρονι ἐξουσίας. Πῶς γὰρ δῆλος ἔσται ἢ οὗτος ἢ τῶν ἄλλων τις;

b. Ib. 1178 b[7-23]: **The sole activity conceivable in God**

1178b Ἡ δὲ τελεία εὐδαιμονία ὅτι θεωρητική τίς ἐστιν ἐνέργεια, καὶ ἐντεῦθεν ἂν φανείη. Τοὺς θεοὺς γὰρ μάλιστα ὑπειλήφαμεν μακαρίους καὶ εὐδαίμονας εἶναι· πράξεις δὲ ποίας ἀπονεῖμαι χρεὼν αὐτοῖς; Πότερα τὰς δικαίας; Ἢ γελοῖοι φανοῦνται συναλλάττοντες καὶ παρακαταθήκας ἀποδιδόντες καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα; Ἀλλὰ τὰς ἀνδρείους, ὑπομένοντας τὰ φοβερὰ καὶ κινδυνεύοντας ὅτι καλόν; Ἢ τὰς ἐλευθερίους; Τίνι δὲ δώσουσιν; Ἄτοπον δ' εἰ καὶ ἔσται αὐτοῖς νόμισμα ἤ τι τοιοῦτον. Αἱ δὲ σώφρονες τί ἂν εἶεν; Ἢ φορτικὸς ὁ ἔπαινος, ὅτι οὐκ ἔχουσιν φαύλας ἐπιθυμίας; Διεξιοῦσι δὲ πάντα φαίνοιτ' ἂν τὰ περὶ τὰς πράξεις μικρὰ καὶ ἀνάξια θεῶν. Ἀλλὰ μὴν ζῆν τε πάντες ὑπειλήφασιν αὐτούς, καὶ ἐνεργεῖν ἄρα· οὐ γὰρ δὴ καθεύδειν ὥσπερ τὸν Ἐνδυμίωνα. Τῷ δὴ ζῶντι τοῦ πράττειν ἀφαιρουμένου, ἔτι δὲ μᾶλλον τοῦ ποιεῖν, τί λείπεται πλὴν θεωρία; Ὥστε ἡ τοῦ θεοῦ ἐνέργεια, μακαριότητι διαφέρουσα, θεωρητικὴ ἂν εἴη. Καὶ τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων δὴ ἡ ταύτῃ συγγενεστάτη εὐδαιμονικωτάτη.

c. Ib., 1178 b[24-32]: **It distinguishes man from the animals**

Σημεῖον δὲ καὶ τὸ μὴ μετέχειν τὰ λοιπὰ ζῷα εὐδαιμονίας, τῆς τοιαύτης ἐνεργείας ἐστερημένα τελείως. Τοῖς μὲν γὰρ θεοῖς ἅπας ὁ βίος μακάριος, τοῖς δ' ἀνθρώποις, ἐφ' ὅσον ὁμοίωμά τι τῆς τοιαύτης ἐνεργείας ὑπάρχει· τῶν δ' ἄλλων ζῴων οὐδὲν εὐδαιμονεῖ, ἐπειδὴ οὐδαμῇ κοινωνεῖ θεωρίας. Ἐφ' ὅσον δὴ διατείνει ἡ θεωρία, καὶ ἡ εὐδαιμονία, καὶ οἷς μᾶλλον ὑπάρχει τὸ θεωρεῖν, καὶ εὐδαιμονεῖν, οὐ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὴν θεωρίαν· αὕτη γὰρ καθ' αὑτὴν τιμία. Ὥστ' εἴη ἂν ἡ εὐδαιμονία θεωρία τις.

d. The man who lives for the intellect must be dearest to the Gods and therefore happiest. **Final conclusion**

Ib., 1179 a[22-32]:

1179a Ὁ δὲ κατὰ νοῦν ἐνεργῶν καὶ τοῦτον θεραπεύων καὶ διακείμενος ἄριστα καὶ θεοφιλέστατος ἔοικεν· εἰ γάρ τις ἐπιμέλεια τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων ὑπὸ θεῶν γίνεται, ὥσπερ δοκεῖ, καὶ εἴη ἂν εὔλογον χαίρειν τε αὐτοὺς τῷ ἀρίστῳ καὶ τῷ συγγενεστάτῳ (τοῦτο δ' ἂν εἴη ὁ νοῦς) καὶ τοὺς ἀγαπῶντας μάλιστα τοῦτο καὶ τιμῶντας ἀντευποιεῖν ὡς τῶν φίλων αὐτοῖς ἐπιμελουμένους καὶ ὀρθῶς τε καὶ καλῶς πράττοντας. Ὅτι δὲ πάντα ταῦτα τῷ σοφῷ μάλιστ' ὑπάρχει, οὐκ ἄδηλον. Θεοφιλέστατος ἄρα. Τὸν αὐτὸν δ' εἰκὸς καὶ εὐδαιμονέστατον· ὥστε κἂν οὕτως εἴη ὁ σοφὸς μάλιστ' εὐδαίμων.

4—THE POLITICS

608—In Aristotle's opinion the supreme science in the province of practical reason is not ethics, but politics, since its object is to secure the well-being, not of the individual, but of a whole community or state (*Eth. Nic.* I 2, our nr. **566**).

The first Book of the Politics inquires into the structure and the aims of the state.

Family the germ-cell of the state

a. *Polit.* I 2, 1252 a$^{26-34}$, b$^{9-12}$:

'Ανάγκη δὴ πρῶτον συνδυάζεσθαι τοὺς ἄνευ ἀλλήλων μὴ δυναμένους εἶναι, 1252a
οἷον θῆλυ μὲν καὶ ἄρρεν τῆς γενέσεως ἕνεκεν (καὶ τοῦτο οὐκ ἐκ προαιρέσεως,
ἀλλ' ὥσπερ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ζῴοις καὶ φυτοῖς φυσικὸν τὸ ἐφίεσθαι, οἷον
αὐτό, τοιοῦτον καταλιπεῖν ἕτερον), ἄρχον δὲ φύσει καὶ ἀρχόμενον διὰ τὴν 30
σωτηρίαν. τὸ μὲν γὰρ δυνάμενον τῇ διανοίᾳ προορᾶν ἄρχον φύσει καὶ δεσπόζον
φύσει, τὸ δὲ δυνάμενον ταῦτα τῷ σώματι ποιεῖν ἀρχόμενον καὶ φύσει δοῦλον·
διὸ δεσπότῃ καὶ δούλῳ ταὐτὸ συμφέρει. — 'Εκ μὲν οὖν τούτων τῶν δύο κοινω- 34
νιῶν οἰκία πρώτη, καὶ ὀρθῶς 'Ησίοδος εἶπε ποιήσας »οἶκον μὲν πρώτιστα b 10
γυναῖκά τε βοῦν τ' ἀροτῆρα« · ὁ γὰρ βοῦς ἀντ' οἰκέτου τοῖς πένησίν ἐστιν.

b. Ib., 1252 b$^{15-16}$, $^{27-30}$:

Structure of the state, and its aim

'Η δ' ἐκ πλειόνων οἰκιῶν κοινωνία πρώτη χρήσεως ἕνεκεν μὴ ἐφημέρου
κώμη. — 'Η δ' ἐκ πλειόνων κωμῶν κοινωνία τέλειος πόλις, ἤδη πάσης ἔχουσα
πέρας τῆς αὐταρκείας ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν, γινομένη μὲν οὖν τοῦ ζῆν ἕνεκεν, οὖσα
δὲ τοῦ εὖ ζῆν.

The state exists by nature

609—**a.** Ib., 1252 b^{30}-1253 a^{4}:

Διὸ πᾶσα πόλις φύσει ἐστίν, εἴπερ καὶ αἱ πρῶται κοινωνίαι. τέλος γὰρ αὕτη 30
ἐκείνων, ἡ δὲ φύσις τέλος ἐστίν· οἷον γὰρ ἕκαστόν ἐστι τῆς γενέσεως τελεσθεί-
σης, ταύτην φαμὲν τὴν φύσιν εἶναι ἑκάστου, ὥσπερ ἀνθρώπου, ἵππου, οἰκίας.
ἔτι τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα καὶ τὸ τέλος βέλτιστον· ἡ δ' αὐτάρκεια καὶ τέλος καὶ βέλτιστον. 1253a
ἐκ τούτων οὖν φανερὸν ὅτι τῶν φύσει ἡ πόλις ἐστί, καὶ ὅτι ἄνθρωπος φύσει
πολιτικὸν ζῷον, καὶ ὁ ἄπολις διὰ φύσιν καὶ οὐ διὰ τύχην ἤτοι φαῦλός ἐστιν ἢ
κρείττων ἢ ἄνθρωπος.

Man a political animal

b. Ib., 1253 a$^{7-18}$:

Διότι δὲ πολιτικὸν ὁ ἄνθρωπος ζῷον πάσης μελίττης καὶ παντὸς ἀγελαίου
ζῴου μᾶλλον, δῆλον. οὐθὲν γάρ, ὡς φαμέν, μάτην ἡ φύσις ποιεῖ· λόγον δὲ
μόνον ἄνθρωπος ἔχει τῶν ζῴων· ἡ μὲν οὖν φωνὴ τοῦ λυπηροῦ καὶ ἡδέος ἐστὶ 10
σημεῖον, διὸ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ὑπάρχει ζῴοις (μέχρι γὰρ τούτου ἡ φύσις αὐτῶν
ἐλήλυθε, τοῦ ἔχειν αἴσθησιν λυπηροῦ καὶ ἡδέος καὶ ταῦτα σημαίνειν ἀλλήλοις),

ὁ δὲ λόγος ἐπὶ τῷ δηλοῦν ἐστι τὸ συμφέρον καὶ τὸ βλαβερόν, ὥστε καὶ τὸ
15 δίκαιον καὶ τὸ ἄδικον· τοῦτο γὰρ πρὸς τὰ ἄλλα ζῷα τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἴδιον, τὸ μόνον ἀγαθοῦ καὶ κακοῦ καὶ δικαίου καὶ ἀδίκου καὶ τῶν ἄλλων αἴσθησιν ἔχειν· ἡ δὲ τούτων κοινωνία ποιεῖ οἰκίαν καὶ πόλιν.

610—Since the slave is a part of the household, slavery must be discussed first.

a. *Polit.* I 4, 1253 b$^{23-33}$, 1254 a$^{1-2, 5-8}$:

The slave a living tool

1253b Ἐπεὶ οὖν ἡ κτῆσις μέρος τῆς οἰκίας ἐστὶ καὶ ἡ κτητικὴ μέρος τῆς οἰκονομίας
25 (ἄνευ γὰρ τῶν ἀναγκαίων ἀδύνατον καὶ ζῆν καὶ εὖ ζῆν), ὥσπερ δὲ ταῖς ὡρισμέναις τέχναις ἀναγκαῖον ἂν εἴη ὑπάρχειν τὰ οἰκεῖα ὄργανα, εἰ μέλλει ἀποτελεσθήσεσθαι τὸ ἔργον, [οὕτω καὶ τῷ οἰκονομικῷ] τῶν δ' ὀργάνων τὰ μὲν ἄψυχα τὰ δὲ ἔμψυχα (οἷον τῷ κυβερνήτῃ ὁ μὲν οἴαξ ἄψυχον ὁ δὲ πρωρεὺς
30 ἔμψυχον· ὁ γὰρ ὑπηρέτης ἐν ὀργάνου εἴδει ταῖς τέχναις ἐστίν), οὕτω καὶ <τῷ οἰκονομικῷ> τὸ κτῆμα ὄργανον πρὸς ζωήν ἐστι, καὶ ἡ κτῆσις πλῆθος ὀργάνων ἐστί, καὶ ὁ δοῦλος κτῆμά τι ἔμψυχον. καὶ ὥσπερ ὄργανον πρὸ ὀργάνων
1254a πᾶς ὑπηρέτης. — Τὰ μὲν οὖν λεγόμενα ὄργανα ποιητικὰ ὄργανά ἐστι, τὸ δὲ
5 κτῆμα πρακτικόν. — Ἔτι δ' ἐπεὶ διαφέρει ἡ ποίησις εἴδει καὶ ἡ πρᾶξις, καὶ δέονται ἀμφότεραι ὀργάνων, ἀνάγκη καὶ ταῦτα τὴν αὐτὴν ἔχειν διαφοράν. ὁ δὲ βίος πρᾶξις, οὐ ποίησίς ἐστιν· διὸ καὶ ὁ δοῦλος ὑπηρέτης τῶν πρὸς τὴν πρᾶξιν.

b. *Polit.* I 5, 1254 a$^{17-24}$, b$^{16-23}$:

Some men are slaves by nature

Πότερον δ' ἐστί τις φύσει τοιοῦτος ᾧ οὗ, καὶ πότερον βέλτιον καὶ δίκαιόν τινι δουλεύειν ᾧ οὗ, ἀλλὰ πᾶσα δουλεία παρὰ φύσιν ἐστί, μετὰ ταῦτα σκεπτέον.
20 οὐ χαλεπὸν δὲ καὶ τῷ λόγῳ θεωρῆσαι καὶ ἐκ τῶν γινομένων καταμαθεῖν. τὸ γὰρ ἄρχειν καὶ ἄρχεσθαι οὐ μόνον τῶν ἀναγκαίων ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν συμφερόντων ἐστί. καὶ εὐθὺς ἐκ γενετῆς ἔνια διέστηκε τὰ μὲν ἐπὶ τὸ ἄρχεσθαι τὰ δ' ἐπὶ τὸ
b 16 ἄρχειν. — Ὅσοι μὲν οὖν τοσοῦτον διεστᾶσιν ὅσον ψυχὴ σώματος καὶ ἄνθρωπος θηρίου (διάκεινται δὲ τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον, ὅσων ἐστὶν ἔργον ἡ τοῦ σώματος χρῆσις, καὶ τοῦτ' ἔστ' ἀπ' αὐτῶν βέλτιστον), οὗτοι μέν εἰσι φύσει δοῦλοι, οἷς βέλτιόν
20 ἐστιν ἄρχεσθαι ταύτην τὴν ἀρχήν, εἴπερ καὶ τοῖς εἰρημένοις. ἔστι γὰρ φύσει δοῦλος ὁ δυνάμενος ἄλλου εἶναι (διὸ καὶ ἄλλου ἐστίν) καὶ ὁ κοινωνῶν λόγου τοσοῦτον ὅσον αἰσθάνεσθαι ἀλλὰ μὴ ἔχειν.

c. Ib., 1254 b^{27}-1255 a^{1}:

Βούλεται μὲν οὖν ἡ φύσις καὶ τὰ σώματα διαφέροντα ποιεῖν τὰ τῶν ἐλευθέρων καὶ τῶν δούλων, τὰ μὲν ἰσχυρὰ πρὸς τὴν ἀναγκαίαν χρῆσιν, τὰ δ' ὀρθὰ καὶ

ἄχρηστα πρὸς τὰς τοιαύτας ἐργασίας, ἀλλὰ χρήσιμα πρὸς πολιτικὸν βίον (οὗτος δὲ καὶ γίνεται διῃρημένος εἴς τε τὴν πολεμικὴν χρείαν καὶ τὴν εἰρηνικήν),

Exceptions

συμβαίνει δὲ πολλάκις καὶ τοὐναντίον, τοὺς μὲν τὰ σώματα ἔχειν ἐλευθέρων τοὺς δὲ τὰς ψυχάς· ἐπεὶ τοῦτό γε φανερόν, ὡς εἰ τοσοῦτον γένοιντο διάφοροι τὸ σῶμα μόνον, ὅσον αἱ τῶν θεῶν εἰκόνες, τοὺς ὑπολειπομένους πάντες φαῖεν ἂν ἀξίους εἶναι τούτοις δουλεύειν. εἰ δ' ἐπὶ τοῦ σώματος τοῦτ' ἀληθές, πολὺ δικαιότερον ἐπὶ τῆς ψυχῆς τοῦτο διωρίσθαι· ἀλλ' οὐχ ὁμοίως ῥᾴδιον ἰδεῖν τό τε τῆς ψυχῆς κάλλος καὶ τὸ τοῦ σώματος.

611—In the final chapter of this Book the author raises the question whether the slave can have virtue. He treats it in a larger framework: the same question namely must be asked concerning women and children, since they too are ἀρχόμενοι, though in another sense than slaves.—Ar. gives the answer of Gorgias, who said that the virtue of a woman is different from that of a man, and the virtue of slaves different from that of free-born people (Plato, *Meno* 72 a; our nr. **267b**).

Can the slave have virtue?

Polit. I 13, 1259 b^{21}-1260 a^{2}, a^{10-28}, $^{33-36}$:

Πρῶτον μὲν οὖν περὶ δούλων ἀπορήσειεν ἄν τις, πότερον ἔστιν ἀρετή τις δούλου παρὰ τὰς ὀργανικὰς καὶ διακονικὰς ἄλλη τιμιωτέρα τούτων, οἷον σωφροσύνη καὶ ἀνδρεία καὶ δικαιοσύνη καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν τοιούτων ἕξεων, ἢ οὐκ ἔστιν οὐδεμία παρὰ τὰς σωματικὰς ὑπηρεσίας. ἔχει γὰρ ἀπορίαν ἀμφοτέρως· εἴτε γὰρ ἔστιν, τί διοίσουσι τῶν ἐλευθέρων; εἴτε μὴ ἔστιν, ὄντων ἀνθρώπων καὶ λόγου κοινωνούντων ἄτοπον. σχεδὸν δὴ ταὐτόν ἐστι τὸ ζητούμενον καὶ περὶ γυναικὸς καὶ παιδός, πότερα καὶ τούτων εἰσὶν ἀρεταί, καὶ δεῖ τὴν γυναῖκα εἶναι σώφρονα καὶ ἀνδρείαν καὶ δικαίαν, καὶ παῖς ἐστι καὶ ἀκόλαστος καὶ σώφρων, ἢ οὔ; καὶ καθόλου δὴ τοῦτ' ἐστὶν ἐπισκεπτέον περὶ ἀρχομένου φύσει καὶ ἄρχοντος, πότερον ἡ αὐτὴ ἀρετὴ ἢ ἑτέρα. εἰ μὲν γὰρ δεῖ ἀμφοτέρους μετέχειν καλοκαγαθίας, διὰ τί τὸν μὲν ἄρχειν δέοι ἂν τὸν δὲ ἄρχεσθαι καθάπαξ; (οὐδὲ γὰρ τῷ μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον οἷόν τε διαφέρειν· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἄρχεσθαι καὶ ἄρχειν εἴδει διαφέρει, τὸ δὲ μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον οὐδέν)· εἰ δὲ τὸν μὲν δεῖ τὸν δὲ μή, θαυμαστόν. εἴτε γὰρ ὁ ἄρχων μὴ ἔσται σώφρων καὶ δίκαιος, πῶς ἄρξει καλῶς; εἴθ' ὁ ἀρχόμενος, πῶς ἀρχθήσεται καλῶς; ἀκόλαστος γὰρ ὢν καὶ δειλὸς οὐδὲν ποιήσει τῶν προσηκόντων. — Καὶ πᾶσιν ἐνυπάρχει μὲν τὰ μόρια τῆς ψυχῆς, ἀλλ' ἐνυπάρχει διαφερόντως. ὁ μὲν γὰρ δοῦλος ὅλως οὐκ ἔχει τὸ βουλευτικόν. τὸ δὲ θῆλυ ἔχει μέν, ἀλλ' ἄκυρον, ὁ δὲ παῖς ἔχει μέν, ἀλλ' ἀτελές. ὁμοίως τοίνυν ἀναγκαίως ἔχειν καὶ περὶ τὰς ἠθικὰς ἀρετὰς ὑποληπτέον, δεῖν μὲν μετέχειν πάντας, ἀλλ' οὐ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον, ἀλλ' ὅσον ἑκάστῳ πρὸς τὸ αὑτοῦ ἔργον. διὸ τὸν μὲν ἄρχοντα τελέαν ἔχειν δεῖ τὴν ἠθικὴν ἀρετήν (τὸ γὰρ ἔργον ἐστὶν ἁπλῶς τοῦ ἀρχιτέκτονος, ὁ δὲ λόγος ἀρχιτέκτων), τῶν δ' ἄλλων

ἕκαστον, ὅσον ἐπιβάλλει αὐτοῖς. ὥστε φανερὸν ὅτι ἐστὶν ἠθικὴ ἀρετὴ τῶν εἰρημένων πάντων, καὶ οὐχ ἡ αὐτὴ σωφροσύνη γυναικὸς καὶ ἀνδρός, οὐδ' ἀνδρεία καὶ δικαιοσύνη, καθάπερ ᾤετο Σωκράτης, ἀλλ' ἡ μὲν ἀρχικὴ ἀνδρεία ἡ δ' ὑπηρετική, ὁμοίως δ' ἔχει καὶ περὶ τὰς ἄλλας. δῆλον δὲ τοῦτο καὶ κατὰ μέρος μᾶλλον ἐπισκοποῦσιν. καθόλου γὰρ οἱ λέγοντες ἐξαπατῶσιν ἑαυτοὺς ὅτι τὸ εὖ ἔχειν τὴν ψυχὴν ἀρετή, ἢ τὸ ὀρθοπραγεῖν, ἤ τι τῶν τοιούτων· πολὺ γὰρ ἄμεινον λέγουσιν οἱ ἐξαριθμοῦντες τὰς ἀρετάς, ὥσπερ Γοργίας, τῶν οὕτως ὁριζομένων. — Ἔθεμεν δὲ πρὸς ταναγκαῖα χρήσιμον εἶναι τὸν δοῦλον, ὥστε δῆλον ὅτι καὶ ἀρετῆς δεῖται μικρᾶς, καὶ τοσαύτης ὅπως μήτε δι' ἀκολασίαν μήτε διὰ δειλίαν ἐλλείψῃ τῶν ἔργων.

Only of an inferior kind

612—a. Property is considered by Ar. as an indispensable substratum of the household, and there is a kind of acquisition which he called natural.

Polit. I 8, 1256 a$^{1-5}$, $^{10-21}$, b$^{6-10}$, $^{26-34}$:

Property and acquisition

Ὅλως δὲ περὶ πάσης κτήσεως καὶ χρηματιστικῆς θεωρήσωμεν κατὰ τὸν ὑφηγημένον τρόπον, ἐπείπερ καὶ ὁ δοῦλος τῆς κτήσεως μέρος τι ἦν. πρῶτον μὲν οὖν ἀπορήσειεν ἄν τις πότερον ἡ χρηματιστικὴ ἡ αὐτὴ τῇ οἰκονομικῇ ἐστιν ἢ μέρος τι ἢ ὑπηρετική. — Ὅτι μὲν οὖν οὐχ ἡ αὐτὴ οἰκονομικὴ τῇ χρηματιστικῇ, δῆλον (τῆς μὲν γὰρ τὸ πορίσασθαι, τῆς δὲ τὸ χρήσασθαι· τίς γὰρ ἔσται ἡ χρησομένη τοῖς κατὰ τὴν οἰκίαν παρὰ τὴν οἰκονομικήν;)· πότερον δὲ μέρος αὐτῆς ἐστί τι ἢ ἕτερον εἶδος, ἔχει διαμφισβήτησιν· εἰ γάρ ἐστι τοῦ χρηματιστικοῦ θεωρῆσαι πόθεν χρήματα καὶ κτῆσις ἔσται, . . . ἡ δὲ κτῆσις πολλὰ περιείληφε μέρη καὶ ὁ πλοῦτος, ὥστε πρῶτον ἡ γεωργικὴ πότερον μέρος τι τῆς οἰκονομικῆς ἢ ἕτερόν τι γένος; καὶ καθόλου ἡ περὶ τὴν τροφὴν ἐπιμέλεια καὶ κτῆσις. Ἀλλὰ μὴν εἴδη γε πολλὰ τροφῆς, διὸ καὶ βίοι πολλοὶ καὶ τῶν ζῴων καὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων εἰσίν· οὐ γὰρ οἷόν τε ζῆν ἄνευ τροφῆς, ὥστε αἱ διαφοραὶ τῆς τροφῆς τοὺς βίους πεποιήκασι διαφέροντας τῶν ζῴων. — Ὡς ἂν ἡ χρεία συναναγκάζῃ, τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον διάγουσιν. ἡ μὲν οὖν τοιαύτη κτῆσις ὑπ' αὐτῆς φαίνεται τῆς φύσεως διδομένη πᾶσιν, ὥσπερ κατὰ τὴν πρώτην γένεσιν εὐθύς, οὕτω καὶ τελειωθεῖσιν. — Ἓν μὲν οὖν εἶδος κτητικῆς κατὰ φύσιν τῆς οἰκονομικῆς μέρος ἐστίν, καθὸ δεῖ ἤτοι ὑπάρχειν ἢ πορίζειν αὐτὴν ὅπως ὑπάρχῃ, ὧν ἐστὶ θησαυρισμὸς χρημάτων πρὸς ζωὴν ἀναγκαίων καὶ χρησίμων εἰς κοινωνίαν πόλεως ἢ οἰκίας. καὶ ἔοικεν ὅ γ' ἀληθινὸς πλοῦτος ἐκ τούτων εἶναι. ἡ γὰρ τῆς τοιαύτης κτήσεως αὐτάρκεια πρὸς ἀγαθὴν ζωὴν οὐκ ἄπειρός ἐστιν, ὥσπερ Σόλων φησὶ ποιήσας »πλούτου δ' οὐδὲν τέρμα πεφασμένον ἀνδράσι κεῖται«· κεῖται γὰρ ὥσπερ καὶ ταῖς ἄλλαις τέχναις.

1256a 5, 10 15 20 b 9, 10 26, 27 30 34

A certain kind is natural

b. Wealth pursued for its own sake is unnatural.

Another is unnatural

Ib. I 9, 1256 b^{40}-1257 a^{21}. a$^{31-34}$, a^{41}-b^{8}, b$^{23-24}$, b$^{30-31}$:

Ἔστι δὲ γένος ἄλλο κτητικῆς, ἣν μάλιστα καλοῦσι, καὶ δίκαιον αὐτὸ καλεῖν,

χρηματιστικήν, δι' ἣν οὐδὲν δοκεῖ πέρας εἶναι πλούτου καὶ κτήσεως. ἣν ὡς 1257a
μίαν καὶ τὴν αὐτὴν τῇ λεχθείσῃ πολλοὶ νομίζουσι διὰ τὴν γειτνίασιν· ἔστι δ'
οὔτε ἡ αὐτὴ τῇ εἰρημένῃ οὔτε πόρρω ἐκείνης. ἔστι δ' ἡ μὲν φύσει ἡ δ' οὐ φύσει
αὐτῶν, ἀλλὰ δι' ἐμπειρίας τινὸς καὶ γίνεται μᾶλλον. λάβωμεν δὲ περὶ αὐτῆς 5
τὴν ἀρχὴν ἐντεῦθεν. ἑκάστου γὰρ κτήματος διττὴ ἡ χρῆσίς ἐστιν, ἀμφότεραι
δὲ καθ' αὑτὸ μὲν ἀλλ' οὐχ ὁμοίως καθ' αὑτό, ἀλλ' ἡ μὲν οἰκεία ἡ δ' οὐκ οἰκεία
τοῦ πράγματος, οἷον ὑποδήματος ἥ τε ὑπόδεσις καὶ ἡ μεταβλητική. ἀμφότεραι
γὰρ ὑποδήματος χρήσεις· καὶ γὰρ ὁ ἀλλαττόμενος τῷ δεομένῳ ὑποδήματος 10
ἀντὶ νομίσματος ἢ τροφῆς χρῆται τῷ ὑποδήματι ᾗ ὑπόδημα, ἀλλ' οὐ τὴν οἰκείαν
χρῆσιν· οὐ γὰρ ἀλλαγῆς ἕνεκεν γέγονε. τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον ἔχει καὶ περὶ τῶν
ἄλλων κτημάτων. ἔστι γὰρ ἡ μεταβλητικὴ πάντων, ἀρξαμένη τὸ μὲν πρῶτον 15
ἐκ τοῦ κατὰ φύσιν, τῷ τὰ μὲν πλείω τὰ δὲ ἐλάττω τῶν ἱκανῶν ἔχειν τοὺς
ἀνθρώπους. ᾗ καὶ δῆλον, ὅτι οὐκ ἔστι φύσει τῆς χρηματιστικῆς ἡ καπηλική·
ὅσον γὰρ ἱκανὸν αὐτοῖς, ἀναγκαῖον ἦν ποιεῖσθαι τὴν ἀλλαγήν. ἐν μὲν οὖν τῇ
πρώτῃ κοινωνίᾳ (τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶν οἰκία) φανερὸν ὅτι οὐδέν ἐστιν ἔργον αὐτῆς, 20
ἀλλ' ἤδη πλείονος τῆς κοινωνίας οὔσης. — Ξενικωτέρας γὰρ γενομένης τῆς 31
βοηθείας τῷ εἰσάγεσθαι ὧν ἐνδεεῖς καὶ ἐκπέμπειν ὧν ἐπλεόναζον, ἐξ ἀνάγκης
ἡ τοῦ νομίσματος ἐπορίσθη χρῆσις. — Πορισθέντος οὖν ἤδη νομίσματος ἐκ τῆς 1257b
ἀναγκαίας ἀλλαγῆς θάτερον εἶδος τῆς χρηματιστικῆς ἐγένετο, τὸ καπηλικόν, τὸ
μὲν πρῶτον ἁπλῶς ἴσως γινόμενον, εἶτα δι' ἐμπειρίας ἤδη τεχνικώτερον, 5
πόθεν καὶ πῶς μεταβαλλόμενον πλεῖστον ποιήσει κέρδος. διὸ δοκεῖ ἡ χρηματισ-
τικὴ μάλιστα περὶ τὸ νόμισμα εἶναι, καὶ ἔργον αὐτῆς τὸ δύνασθαι θεωρῆσαι
ποθεν ἔσται πλῆθος χρημάτων· ποιητικὴ γὰρ εἶναι τοῦ πλούτου καὶ χρημάτων.
— Καὶ ἄπειρος δὴ οὗτος ὁ πλοῦτος ὁ ἀπὸ ταύτης τῆς χρηματιστικῆς. — 23, 24
Τῆς δ' οἰκονομικῆς οὐ χρηματιστικῆς ἔστι πέρας· οὐ γὰρ τοῦτο τῆς οἰκονομικῆς 30, 31
ἔργον.

613—Of the second Book the first part (ch. 1-8) is concerned with ideal commonwealths, particularly with Plato's (see our nr. **310**). In the second part (ch. 9-12) the best existing states are discussed (Sparta, Crete and Carthage), and a word is said about the most famous lawgivers.

614—The first part of the third Book (ch. 1-5) is devoted to the citizen and his relations to the state.

a. The citizen is defined as the man who has political power, however acquired.

Definition of a citizen

Polit. III 1, 1275 a$^{22-23}$:

Πολίτης δ' ἁπλῶς οὐδενὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὁρίζεται μᾶλλον ἢ τῷ μετέχειν κρίσεως καὶ ἀρχῆς.

b. Since constitutions differ from one another, the citizens corresponding to each form of constitution will also be different. Hence the definition of a citizen should be formulated more precisely.

Ib., 1275 a$^{38-39}$, b$^{3-21}$:

1275b Τὰς δὲ πολιτείας ὁρῶμεν εἴδει διαφερούσας ἀλλήλων, ... ὥστε καὶ τὸν πολίτην ἕτερον ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι τὸν καθ' ἑκάστην πολιτείαν. διόπερ ὁ λεχθεὶς 5 ἐν μὲν δημοκρατίᾳ μάλιστ' ἐστὶ πολίτης, ἐν δὲ ταῖς ἄλλαις ἐνδέχεται μέν, οὐ μὴν ἀναγκαῖον. <ἐν> ἐνίαις γὰρ οὐκ ἔστι δῆμος, οὐδ' ἐκκλησίαν νομίζουσιν ἀλλὰ συγκλήτους, καὶ τὰς δίκας δικάζουσι κατὰ μέρος, οἷον ἐν Λακεδαίμονι 10 τὰς τῶν συμβολαίων δικάζει τῶν ἐφόρων ἄλλος ἄλλας, οἱ δὲ γέροντες τὰς φονικάς, ἑτέρα δ' ἴσως ἀρχή τις ἑτέρας. τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον καὶ περὶ Καρχηδόνα· πάσας γὰρ ἀρχαί τινες κρίνουσι τὰς δίκας. ἀλλ' ἔχει γὰρ διόρθωσιν ὁ τοῦ πολίτου διορισμός. ἐν γὰρ ταῖς ἄλλαις πολιτείαις οὐχ ὁ ἀόριστος ἄρχων ἐκκλησιαστής 15 ἐστι καὶ δικαστής, ἀλλὰ ὁ κατὰ τὴν ἀρχὴν ὡρισμένος· τούτων γὰρ ἢ πᾶσιν ἢ τισὶν ἀποδέδοται τὸ βουλεύεσθαι καὶ δικάζειν ἢ περὶ πάντων ἢ περὶ τινῶν. τίς μὲν οὖν ἐστιν ὁ πολίτης, ἐκ τούτων φανερόν· ᾧ γὰρ ἐξουσία κοινωνεῖν ἀρχῆς βουλευτικῆς ἢ κριτικῆς, πολίτην ἤδη 20 λέγομεν εἶναι ταύτης τῆς πόλεως, πόλιν δὲ τὸ τῶν τοιούτων πλῆθος ἱκανὸν πρὸς αὐτάρκειαν ζωῆς, ὡς ἁπλῶς εἰπεῖν.

This definition corrected

The author remarks, that this definition is better than the usual formula, which defines the citizen as one of whom both the parents are citizens. For this formula cannot possibly apply to the first inhabitants or founders of a state.

615—Similarly the state is defined by reference to the distribution of political power: when the mode of distribution is changed, a new state comes into existence.

a. In *Polit.* III 3 the question is raised: what exactly is the identity of the state, 1276 a$^{17-20}$:

What is the identity of the state?

... Πῶς ποτὲ χρὴ λέγειν τὴν πόλιν εἶναι τὴν αὐτὴν ἢ μὴ τὴν αὐτὴν ἀλλ' ἑτέραν; ἡ μὲν οὖν ἐπιπολαιοτάτη τῆς ἀπορίας ζήτησις περὶ τὸν τόπον καὶ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ἐστίν.

b. Ib., 1276 b$^{1-13}$:

Ar.'s reply

1276b Εἴπερ γάρ ἐστι κοινωνία τις ἡ πόλις, ἔστι δὲ κοινωνία πολιτῶν πολιτείας, γινομένης ἑτέρας τῷ εἴδει καὶ διαφερούσης τῆς πολιτείας ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι δόξειεν ἂν καὶ τὴν πόλιν εἶναι μὴ τὴν αὐτήν. ὥσπερ γε καὶ χορὸν ὁτὲ μὲν κωμικὸν 5 ὁτὲ δὲ τραγικὸν ἕτερον εἶναί φαμεν, τῶν αὐτῶν πολλάκις ἀνθρώπων ὄντων, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ πᾶσαν ἄλλην κοινωνίαν καὶ σύνθεσιν ἑτέραν, ἂν εἶδος ἕτερον ᾖ τῆς συνθέσεως, οἷον ἁρμονίαν τῶν αὐτῶν φθόγγων ἑτέραν εἶναι λέγομεν, ἂν

ὁτὲ μὲν ἦ Δώριος ὁτὲ δὲ Φρύγιος. εἰ δὴ τοῦτον ἔχει τὸν τρόπον, φανερὸν ὅτι μάλιστα λεκτέον τὴν αὐτὴν πόλιν εἰς τὴν πολιτείαν βλέποντας· ὄνομα δὲ καλεῖν ἕτερον ἢ ταὐτὸν ἔξεστι καὶ τῶν αὐτῶν κατοικούντων αὐτὴν καὶ πάμπαν ἑτέρων ἀνθρώπων.

616—a. The question may be raised whether a good citizen is always a good man. Ar. answers in the negative: the good citizen has some special ἀρετή for some particular purpose; he has not, as such, *the* ἀρετή which is proper to the good man.

The good citizen may be not a good man

Polit. I 4, 1276 b$^{28-34}$:

Τῶν πολιτῶν, καίπερ ἀνομοίων ὄντων, ἡ σωτηρία τῆς κοινωνίας ἔργον ἐστί, κοινωνία δ' ἐστὶν ἡ πολιτεία· διὸ τὴν ἀρετὴν ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι τοῦ πολίτου πρὸς τὴν πολιτείαν. εἴπερ οὖν ἔστι πλείω πολιτείας εἴδη, δῆλον ὡς οὐκ ἐνδέχεται τοῦ σπουδαίου πολίτου μίαν ἀρετὴν εἶναι τὴν τελείαν· τὸν δ' ἀγαθὸν ἄνδρα φαμὲν κατὰ μίαν ἀρετὴν εἶναι τὴν τελείαν.

b. So in general the virtue of the good man and the good citizen is not the same. In one particular case however they are identical, namely in the good ruler.

The good ruler always a good man

Ib., 1277 a$^{12-17}$:

Διότι μὲν τοίνυν ἁπλῶς οὐχ ἡ αὐτή, φανερὸν ἐκ τούτων· ἀλλ' ἆρα ἔσται τινὸς ἡ αὐτὴ ἀρετὴ πολίτου τε σπουδαίου καὶ ἀνδρὸς σπουδαίου; φαμὲν δὴ τὸν ἄρχοντα τὸν σπουδαῖον ἀγαθὸν εἶναι καὶ φρόνιμον, τὸν δὲ πολίτην οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι φρόνιμον. καὶ τὴν παιδείαν δ' εὐθὺς ἑτέραν εἶναι λέγουσί τινες τοῦ ἄρχοντος.

c. The good citizen knows both how to rule and how to obey. Practical wisdom only is characteristic of the ruler.

The virtue of the subject and the virtue of the ruler

Ib., 1277 b$^{13-21, 25-32}$:

Δεῖ δὲ τὸν πολίτην τὸν ἀγαθὸν ἐπίστασθαι καὶ δύνασθαι καὶ ἄρχεσθαι καὶ ἄρχειν, καὶ αὕτη ἀρετὴ πολίτου, τὸ τὴν τῶν ἐλευθέρων ἀρχὴν ἐπίστασθαι ἐπ' ἀμφότερα. καὶ ἀνδρὸς δὴ ἀγαθοῦ ἄμφω, καὶ εἰ ἕτερον εἶδος σωφροσύνης καὶ δικαιοσύνης ἀρχικῆς. καὶ γὰρ ἀρχομένου μὲν ἐλευθέρου δὲ δῆλον ὅτι οὐ μία ἂν εἴη τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἀρετή, οἷον δικαιοσύνη, ἀλλ' εἴδη ἔχουσα καθ' ἃ ἄρξει καὶ ἄρξεται, ὥσπερ ἀνδρὸς καὶ γυναικὸς ἑτέρα σωφροσύνη καὶ ἀνδρεία. — Ἡ δὲ φρόνησις ἄρχοντος ἴδιος ἀρετὴ μόνη. τὰς γὰρ ἄλλας ἔοικεν ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι κοινὰς καὶ τῶν ἀρχομένων καὶ τῶν ἀρχόντων, ἀρχομένου δέ γε οὐκ ἔστιν ἀρετὴ φρόνησις, ἀλλὰ δόξα ἀληθής· ὥσπερ αὐλοποιὸς γὰρ ὁ ἀρχόμενος, ὁ δ' ἄρχων αὐλητὴς ὁ χρώμενος. Πότερον μὲν οὖν ἡ αὐτὴ ἀρετὴ ἀνδρὸς ἀγαθοῦ καὶ πολίτου σπουδαίου ἢ ἑτέρα, καὶ πῶς ἡ αὐτὴ καὶ πῶς ἑτέρα, φανερὸν ἐκ τούτων.

617—Constitutions are good or bad according as the common welfare is, or is not, their aim. There are three good constitutions: Monarchy, Aristocracy and Polity. Of bad ones there are also three: Tyranny, Oligarchy and Democracy.

Polit. III 7, 1279 a^{22}-b^{10}: **Classification of constitutions**

1279a Διωρισμένων δὲ τούτων ἐχόμενόν ἐστι τὰς πολιτείας ἐπισκέψασθαι, πόσαι τὸν ἀριθμὸν καὶ τίνες εἰσί, καὶ πρῶτον τὰς ὀρθὰς αὐτῶν· καὶ γὰρ αἱ παρεκβάσεις
25 ἔσονται φανεραὶ τούτων διορισθεισῶν. ἐπεὶ δὲ πολιτεία μὲν καὶ τὸ πολίτευμα σημαίνει ταὐτόν, πολίτευμα δ' ἐστὶ τὸ κύριον τῶν πόλεων, ἀνάγκη δ' εἶναι κύριον ἢ ἕνα ἢ ὀλίγους ἢ τοὺς πολλούς· ὅταν μὲν ὁ εἷς ἢ οἱ ὀλίγοι ἢ οἱ πολλοὶ πρὸς τὸ κοινὸν συμφέρον ἄρχωσι, ταύτας μὲν ὀρθὰς ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι τὰς πολι-
30 τείας, τὰς δὲ πρὸς τὸ ἴδιον ἢ τοῦ ἑνὸς ἢ τῶν ὀλίγων ἢ τοῦ πλήθους παρεκβάσεις. ἢ γὰρ οὐ πολίτας φατέον εἶναι τοὺς μετέχοντας, ἢ δεῖ κοινωνεῖν τοῦ συμφέροντος. καλεῖν δ' εἰώθαμεν τῶν μὲν μοναρχιῶν τὴν πρὸς τὸ κοινὸν ἀποβλέπουσαν συμφέρον βασιλείαν, τὴν δὲ τῶν ὀλίγων μὲν πλειόνων δ' ἑνὸς ἀριστοκρατίαν
35 (ἢ διὰ τὸ τοὺς ἀρίστους ἄρχειν, ἢ διὰ τὸ πρὸς τὸ ἄριστον τῇ πόλει καὶ τοῖς κοινωνοῦσιν αὐτῆς), ὅταν δὲ τὸ πλῆθος πρὸς τὸ κοινὸν πολιτεύηται συμφέρον, καλεῖται τὸ κοινὸν ὄνομα πασῶν τῶν πολιτειῶν, πολιτεία. συμβαίνει δ' εὐλόγως·
40 ἕνα μὲν γὰρ διαφέρειν κατ' ἀρετὴν ἢ ὀλίγους ἐνδέχεται, πλείους δ' ἤδη χαλεπὸν
1279b ἠκριβῶσθαι πρὸς πᾶσαν ἀρετήν (ἀλλὰ μάλιστα τὴν πολεμικήν· αὕτη γὰρ ἐν πλήθει γίγνεται· διόπερ κατὰ ταύτην τὴν πολιτείαν κυριώτατον τὸ προπολεμοῦν καὶ μετέχουσιν αὐτῆς οἱ κεκτημένοι τὰ ὅπλα). παρεκβάσεις δὲ τῶν εἰρη-
5 μένων τυραννὶς μὲν βασιλείας, ὀλιγαρχία δὲ ἀριστοκρατίας, δημοκρατία δὲ πολιτείας. ἡ μὲν γὰρ τυραννὶς ἐστι μοναρχία πρὸς τὸ συμφέρον τὸ τοῦ μοναρχοῦντος, ἡ δ' ὀλιγαρχία πρὸς τὸ τῶν εὐπόρων, ἡ δὲ δημοκρατία πρὸς τὸ συμ-
10 φέρον τὸ τῶν ἀπόρων· πρὸς δὲ τὸ τῷ κοινῷ λυσιτελοῦν οὐδεμία αὐτῶν.

618—**a**. Against this classification the objection might be made that in a state the majority of the citizens might be wealthy and the minority poor. In this case the distinction which has been made between oligarchy and democracy would not hold good.

Polit. III 8, 1279 b$^{20-26}$: **An objection to this classification**

20 Πρώτη δ' ἀπορία πρὸς τὸν διορισμόν ἐστιν. εἰ γὰρ εἶεν οἱ πλείους ὄντες εὔποροι κύριοι τῆς πόλεως, δημοκρατία δ' ἐστὶν ὅταν ᾖ κύριον τὸ πλῆθος, ὁμοίως δὲ πάλιν κἂν εἴ που συμβαίνοι τοὺς ἀπόρους ἐλάττους μὲν εἶναι τῶν εὐπόρων, κρείττους δ' ὄντας κυρίους εἶναι τῆς πολιτείας, ὅπου δ' ὀλίγον κύριον
25 πλῆθος, ὀλιγαρχίαν εἶναί φασιν, οὐκ ἂν καλῶς δόξειεν διωρίσθαι περὶ τῶν πολιτειῶν.

b. To this objection Ar. replies: not number, but wealth or poverty of the rulers is the specific difference of these constitutions.

Ar.'s answer to this objection

Ib., 1279 b$^{34-36}$, b^{39}-1280 a^{6}:

Ἔοικε τοίνυν ὁ λόγος ποιεῖν δῆλον ὅτι τὸ μὲν ὀλίγους ἢ πολλοὺς εἶναι κυρίους συμβεβηκός ἐστιν, . . . ᾧ δὲ διαφέρουσιν ἥ τε δημοκρατία καὶ ἡ ὀλιγαρχία ἀλλήλων, πενία καὶ πλοῦτός ἐστιν, καὶ ἀναγκαῖον μέν, ὅπου ἂν ἄρχωσι διὰ πλοῦτον ἄν τ' ἐλάττους ἄν τε πλείους, εἶναι ταύτην ὀλιγαρχίαν, ὅπου δ' οἱ ἄποροι, δημοκρατίαν, ἀλλὰ συμβαίνει, καθάπερ εἴπομεν, τοὺς μὲν ὀλίγους εἶναι τοὺς δὲ πολλούς. εὐποροῦσι μὲν γὰρ ὀλίγοι, τῆς δὲ ἐλευθερίας μετέχουσι πάντες. δι' ἃς αἰτίας ἀμφισβητοῦσιν ἀμφότεροι τῆς πολιτείας. 1280a 5

619—a. The next chapter deals with the principles of the distribution of power in democratic and in oligarchic states, i.e. with the conception of justice on both sides.

Justice according to democratic and oligarchic principles

Polit. III 9, 1280 a$^{7-16}$, $^{22-25}$:

Ληπτέον δὲ πρῶτον τίνας ὅρους λέγουσι τῆς ὀλιγαρχίας καὶ δημοκρατίας, καὶ τί τὸ δίκαιον τό τε ὀλιγαρχικὸν καὶ δημοκρατικόν. πάντες γὰρ ἅπτονται δικαίου τινός, ἀλλὰ μέχρι τινὸς προέρχονται, καὶ λέγουσιν οὐ πᾶν τὸ κυρίως δίκαιον. οἷον δοκεῖ ἴσον τὸ δίκαιον εἶναι [1], καὶ ἔστιν, ἀλλ' οὐ πᾶσιν ἀλλὰ τοῖς ἴσοις· καὶ τὸ ἄνισον δοκεῖ δίκαιον εἶναι [2], καὶ γὰρ ἔστιν, ἀλλ' οὐ πᾶσιν ἀλλὰ τοῖς ἀνίσοις· οἱ δὲ τοῦτ' ἀφαιροῦσι, τὸ οἷς, καὶ κρίνουσι κακῶς. τὸ δ' αἴτιον ὅτι περὶ αὑτῶν ἡ κρίσις· σχεδὸν δ' οἱ πλεῖστοι φαῦλοι κριταὶ περὶ τῶν οἰκείων. — Οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἂν κατά τι ἄνισοι ὦσιν, οἷον χρήμασιν, ὅλως οἴονται ἄνισοι εἶναι, οἱ δ' ἂν κατά τι ἴσοι, οἷον ἐλευθερίᾳ, ὅλως ἴσοι. τὸ δὲ κυριώτατον οὐ λέγουσιν. 10 15 22 25

Ar.'s own view

b. The standard should be: the true aim of the state. I.e.: the citizens have a claim to power according to their contribution to the εὖ ζῆν.

Ib., 1280 b^{39}-1281 a^{8}:

Τέλος μὲν οὖν πόλεως τὸ εὖ ζῆν, ταῦτα δὲ τοῦ τέλους χάριν. πόλις δὲ ἡ γενῶν καὶ κωμῶν κοινωνία ζωῆς τελείας καὶ αὐτάρκους <χάριν>. τοῦτο δ' ἐστίν, ὡς φαμέν, τὸ ζῆν εὐδαιμόνως καὶ καλῶς. τῶν καλῶν ἄρα πράξεων χάριν θετέον 1281a

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[1] Ὅτι δοκεῖ ἴσον τὸ δίκαιον εἶναι is the democratic view of justice. Ar. says: It is, but not for everybody—only for equals.

[2] Oligarchs, on the other hand, hold that inequality is justice, namely, that political rights should be unequal and proportionate to wealth. To this view Ar. opposes again: granting that inequality is just, it is so not for everybody, but only for unequals. And by what standards are the qualifications of the persons concerned to be judged?—This is what Ar. calls "the main point", the κυριώτατον, and on this point most people are in error.

εἶναι τὴν πολιτικὴν κοινωνίαν, ἀλλ' οὐ τοῦ συζῆν. διόπερ ὅσοι συμβάλλονται πλεῖστον εἰς τὴν τοιαύτην κοινωνίαν, τούτοις τῆς πόλεως μέτεστι πλεῖον ἢ τοῖς κατὰ μὲν ἐλευθερίαν καὶ γένος ἴσοις ἢ μείζοσι κατὰ δὲ τὴν πολιτικὴν ἀρετὴν ἀνίσοις, ἢ τοῖς κατὰ πλοῦτον ὑπερέχουσι κατ' ἀρετὴν δ' ὑπερεχομένοις.

620—Monarchy is only desirable in one case.

Polit. III 17, 1287 b[41]-1288 a[29]:

Monarchy desirable only in an exceptional case

1288a Ἀλλ' ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων γε [1] φανερὸν ὡς ἐν μὲν τοῖς ὁμοίοις καὶ ἴσοις οὔτε συμφέρον ἐστὶν οὔτε δίκαιον ἕνα κύριον εἶναι πάντων, οὔτε μὴ νόμων ὄντων, ἀλλ' αὐτὸν ὡς ὄντα νόμον, οὔτε νόμων ὄντων, οὔτε ἀγαθὸν ἀγαθῶν οὔτε μὴ ἀγαθῶν μὴ ἀγαθόν, οὐδ' ἂν κατ' ἀρετὴν ἀμείνων ᾖ, εἰ μὴ τρόπον τινά. τίς δ' ὁ τρόπος, λεκτέον· εἴρηται δέ πως ἤδη καὶ πρότερον. πρῶτον δὲ διοριστέον τί τὸ βασιλευτὸν [2] καὶ τί τὸ ἀριστοκρατικὸν καὶ τί τὸ πολιτικόν [3]. βασιλευτὸν μὲν οὖν τὸ τοιοῦτόν ἐστι πλῆθος ὃ πέφυκε φέρειν γένος ὑπερέχον κατ' ἀρετὴν πρὸς ἡγεμονίαν πολιτικήν, ἀριστοκρατικὸν δὲ πλῆθος [ὃ πέφυκε φέρειν πλῆθος] ἄρχεσθαι δυνάμενον τὴν τῶν ἐλευθέρων ἀρχὴν [4] ὑπὸ τῶν κατ' ἀρετὴν ἡγεμονικῶν πρὸς πολιτικὴν ἀρχήν, πολιτικὸν δὲ πλῆθος [ἐν ᾧ πέφυκε ἐγγίγνεσθαι πλῆθος] πολεμικὸν δυνάμενον ἄρχεσθαι καὶ ἄρχειν κατὰ νόμον τὸν κατ' ἀξίαν διανέμοντα τοῖς εὐπόροις τὰς ἀρχάς. ὅταν οὖν ἢ γένος ὅλον ἢ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἕνα τινὰ συμβῇ διαφέροντα γενέσθαι κατ' ἀρετὴν τοσοῦτον ὥσθ' ὑπερέχειν τὴν ἐκείνου τῆς τῶν ἄλλων πάντων, τότε δίκαιον τὸ γένος εἶναι τοῦτο βασιλικὸν καὶ κύριον πάντων καὶ βασιλέα τὸν ἕνα τοῦτον. καθάπερ γὰρ εἴρηται πρότερον, οὐ μόνον οὕτως ἔχει κατὰ τὸ δίκαιον, ὃ προφέρειν εἰώθασιν οἱ τὰς πολιτείας καθιστάντες οἵ τε τὰς ἀριστοκρατικὰς καὶ οἱ τὰς ὀλιγαρχικὰς καὶ πάλιν οἱ τὰς δημοκρατικάς· πάντῃ γὰρ καθ' ὑπεροχὴν ἀξιοῦσιν, ἀλλὰ ὑπεροχὴν οὐ τὴν αὐτήν, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὸ πρότερον λεχθέν [5]. οὔτε γὰρ κτείνειν ἢ φυγαδεύειν οὐδ' ὀστρακίζειν δή που τὸν τοιοῦτον πρέπον ἐστίν, οὔτ' ἀξιοῦν ἄρχεσθαι κατὰ μέρος· οὐ γὰρ πέφυκε τὸ μέρος ὑπερέχειν τοῦ παντός, τῷ δὲ τὴν τηλικαύτην ὑπερβολὴν ἔχοντι τοῦτο συμβέβηκεν. ὥστε λείπεται μόνον τὸ πείθεσθαι τῷ τοιούτῳ καὶ κύριον εἶναι μὴ κατὰ μέρος τοῦτον ἀλλ' ἁπλῶς.

621—In the first part of Book IV (ch. 1-10) the main types of constitutions are dealt with.

a. There are four kinds of democracy, the fourth of which is a perversion. True democracy is described as follows.

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[1] ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων γε - sc. about just and unjust, in ch. 9 (**619a**).
[2] βασιλευτόν - fit for being ruled by a king.
[3] πολιτικόν - fit for what is called by Ar. a polity (constitutional government).
[4] τὴν τῶν ἐλευθέρων ἀρχὴν secl. Immisch.
[5] Sc. according to the right of merit, expounded in ch. 9 (**619b**).

Democracy *Polit.* IV 4, 1291 b^{30}-1292 a^{4}:

Δημοκρατία μὲν οὖν ἐστι πρώτη μὲν ἡ λεγομένη μάλιστα κατὰ τὸ ἴσον. 1291b
ἴσον γάρ φησιν ὁ νόμος ὁ τῆς τοιαύτης δημοκρατίας τὸ μηδὲν μᾶλλον [1] ὑπερέχειν
τοὺς ἀπόρους ἢ τοὺς εὐπόρους, μηδὲ κυρίους εἶναι ὁποτερουσοῦν, ἀλλ' ὁμοίους
ἀμφοτέρους. εἴπερ γὰρ ἐλευθερία μάλιστ' ἐστὶν ἐν δημοκρατίᾳ καθάπερ ὑπο- 35
λαμβάνουσί τινες, καὶ ἰσότης, οὕτως ἂν εἴη μάλιστα, κοινωνούντων ἁπάντων
μάλιστα τῆς πολιτείας ὁμοίως. ἐπεὶ δὲ πλείων ὁ δῆμος, κύριον δὲ τὸ δόξαν
τοῖς πλείοσιν, ἀνάγκη δημοκρατίαν εἶναι ταύτην. ἓν μὲν οὖν εἶδος δημοκρατίας
τοῦτο· [ἄλλο δὲ] τὸ τὰς ἀρχὰς ἀπὸ τιμημάτων εἶναι, βραχέων δὲ τούτων 40
ὄντων· δεῖ δὲ τῷ κτωμένῳ ἐξουσίαν εἶναι μετέχειν καὶ τὸν ἀποβάλλοντα μὴ
μετέχειν· ἕτερον εἶδος δημοκρατίας τὸ μετέχειν ἅπαντας τοὺς πολίτας ὅσοι 1292a
ἀνυπεύθυνοι, ἄρχειν δὲ τὸν νόμον· ἕτερον δὲ εἶδος δημοκρατίας τὸ πᾶσι μετ-
εῖναι τῶν ἀρχῶν, ἐὰν μόνον ᾖ πολίτης, ἄρχειν δὲ τὸν νόμον.

Its perversion **b.** The fourth kind. Ib., 1292 a$^{4-13}$, $^{15-18}$, $^{30-37}$:

Ἕτερον εἶδος δημοκρατίας τἆλλα μὲν εἶναι ταὐτά, κύριον δ' εἶναι τὸ πλῆθος 5
καὶ μὴ τὸν νόμον. τοῦτο δὲ γίνεται ὅταν τὰ ψηφίσματα κύρια ᾖ ἀλλὰ μὴ ὁ νόμος.
συμβαίνει δὲ τοῦτο διὰ τοὺς δημαγωγούς. ἐν μὲν γὰρ ταῖς κατὰ νόμον δημο-
κρατουμέναις οὐ γίνεται δημαγωγός, ἀλλ' οἱ βέλτιστοι τῶν πολιτῶν εἰσιν ἐν
προεδρίᾳ· ὅπου δ' οἱ νόμοι μή εἰσι κύριοι, ἐνταῦθα γίνονται δημαγωγοί. μόναρ- 10
χος γὰρ ὁ δῆμος γίνεται, σύνθετος εἷς ἐκ πολλῶν· οἱ γὰρ πολλοὶ κύριοί εἰσιν
οὐχ ὡς ἕκαστος ἀλλὰ πάντες. — Ὁ δ' οὖν τοιοῦτος δῆμος, ἅτε μόναρχος ὤν, 13, 15
ζητεῖ μοναρχεῖν διὰ τὸ μὴ ἄρχεσθαι ὑπὸ νόμου, καὶ γίνεται δεσποτικός, ὥστε
οἱ κόλακες ἔντιμοι, καὶ ἔστιν ὁ τοιοῦτος δῆμος ἀνάλογον τῶν μοναρχιῶν τῇ
τυραννίδι. — Εὐλόγως δὲ ἂν δόξειεν ἐπιτιμᾶν ὁ φάσκων τὴν τοιαύτην εἶναι 18, 30
δημοκρατίαν οὐ πολιτείαν. ὅπου γὰρ μὴ νόμοι ἄρχουσιν, οὐκ ἔστι πολιτεία.
δεῖ γὰρ τὸν μὲν νόμον ἄρχειν πάντων, τῶν δὲ καθ' ἕκαστα τὰς ἀρχάς, καὶ ταύτην
πολιτείαν κρίνειν. ὥστ' εἴπερ ἐστὶ δημοκρατία μία τῶν πολιτειῶν, φανερὸν
ὡς ἡ τοιαύτη κατάστασις, ἐν ᾗ ψηφίσμασι πάντα διοικεῖται, οὐδὲ δημοκρατία 35
κυρίως· οὐθὲν γὰρ ἐνδέχεται ψήφισμα εἶναι καθόλου.

622—Of oligarchies, too, there are four kinds, of which the fourth is the worst.

Oligarchy *Polit.* IV 5, 1292 a^{39}-b^{10}:

Ὀλιγαρχίας δὲ εἴδη ἓν μὲν τὸ ἀπὸ τιμημάτων εἶναι τὰς ἀρχὰς τηλικούτων
ὥστε τοὺς ἀπόρους μὴ μετέχειν πλείους ὄντας, ἐξεῖναι δὲ τῷ κτωμένῳ μετέχειν 40

[1] The expression μηδὲν μᾶλλον ἤ means simply "as much as" and is in practice often used in places where μηδὲν ἧττον ἤ could be logically expected. Some striking examples of this use have been adduced by L. M. de Rijk in *Mnemosyne* 1950, pp. 314-318.

1292b τῆς πολιτείας, ἄλλο δέ, ὅταν ἀπὸ τιμημάτων μακρῶν ὦσιν αἱ ἀρχαὶ καὶ αἱρῶνται αὐτοὶ τοὺς ἐλλείποντας (ἂν μὲν οὖν ἐκ πάντων τούτων τοῦτο ποιῶσι, δοκεῖ τοῦτ' εἶναι μᾶλλον ἀριστοκρατικόν, ἐὰν δὲ ἐκ τινῶν ἀφωρισμένων, ὀλιγαρχικόν)· ἕτερον εἶδος ὀλιγαρχίας, ὅταν παῖς ἀντὶ πατρὸς εἰσίῃ, τέταρτον δ', ὅταν ὑπάρχῃ τό τε νῦν λεχθὲν καὶ ἄρχῃ μὴ ὁ νόμος ἀλλ' οἱ ἄρχοντες. καὶ ἔστιν ἀντίστροφος αὕτη ἐν ταῖς ὀλιγαρχίαις ὥσπερ ἡ τυραννὶς ἐν ταῖς μοναρχίαις καὶ περὶ ἧς τελευταίας εἴπαμεν δημοκρατίας ἐν ταῖς δημοκρατίαις· καὶ καλοῦσι δὴ τὴν τοιαύτην ὀλιγαρχίαν δυναστείαν.

623—**a.** Of aristocracy in the strict sense there is but one form.

Polit. IV 7, 1293 b$^{1-7}$: **Aristocracy**

1293b Ἀριστοκρατίαν μὲν οὖν καλῶς ἔχει καλεῖν περὶ ἧς διήλθομεν ἐν τοῖς πρώτοις λόγοις (τὴν γὰρ ἐκ τῶν ἀρίστων ἁπλῶς κατ' ἀρετὴν πολιτείαν καὶ μὴ πρὸς ὑπόθεσίν τινα ἀγαθῶν ἀνδρῶν [1] μόνην δίκαιον προσαγορεύειν ἀριστοκρατίαν· ἐν μόνῃ γὰρ ἁπλῶς ὁ αὐτὸς ἀνὴρ καὶ πολίτης ἀγαθός ἐστιν, οἱ δ' ἐν ταῖς ἄλλαις ἀγαθοὶ πρὸς τὴν πολιτείαν εἰσὶ τὴν αὑτῶν).

b. Ib., 1293 b$^{7-19}$: **Mixed forms**

Οὐ μὴν ἀλλ' εἰσί τινες αἳ πρός τε τὰς ὀλιγαρχουμένας ἔχουσι διαφορὰς [καὶ καλοῦνται ἀριστοκρατίαι] καὶ πρὸς τὴν καλουμένην πολιτείαν. ὅπου γὰρ μὴ μόνον πλουτίνδην ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀριστίνδην αἱροῦνται τὰς ἀρχάς, αὕτη ἡ πολιτεία διαφέρει τε ἀμφοῖν καὶ ἀριστοκρατικὴ καλεῖται. καὶ γὰρ ἐν ταῖς μὴ ποιουμέναις κοινὴν ἐπιμέλειαν ἀρετῆς εἰσὶν ὅμως τινὲς οἱ εὐδοκιμοῦντες καὶ δοκοῦντες εἶναι ἐπιεικεῖς. ὅπου οὖν ἡ πολιτεία βλέπει εἴς τε πλοῦτον καὶ ἀρετὴν καὶ δῆμον, οἷον ἐν Καρχηδόνι, αὕτη ἀριστοκρατική ἐστιν, καὶ ἐν αἷς εἰς τὰ δύο μόνον, οἷον ἡ Λακεδαιμονίων, εἴς τε ἀρετὴν καὶ δῆμον καὶ ἔστι μίξις τῶν δύο τούτων, δημοκρατίας τε καὶ ἀρετῆς. Ἀριστοκρατίας μὲν οὖν παρὰ τὴν πρώτην τὴν ἀρίστην πολιτείαν ταῦτα δύο εἴδη.

624—"Polity" or constitutional government.

Polit. IV 8, 1293 b$^{31-38}$, 1294 a$^{15-25}$: **"Polity"**

Νῦν δὲ δεικτέον ἡμῖν περὶ πολιτείας. φανερωτέρα γὰρ ἡ δύναμις αὐτῆς διωρισμένων τῶν περὶ ὀλιγαρχίας καὶ δημοκρατίας. ἔστι γὰρ ἡ πολιτεία ὡς ἁπλῶς εἰπεῖν μίξις ὀλιγαρχίας καὶ δημοκρατίας. Εἰώθασι δὲ καλεῖν τὰς μὲν ἀποκλινούσας ὡς πρὸς τὴν δημοκρατίαν πολιτείας, τὰς δὲ πρὸς τὴν ὀλιγαρχίαν μᾶλλον ἀριστοκρατίας διὰ τὸ μᾶλλον ἀκολουθεῖν παιδείαν καὶ εὐγένειαν τοῖς 1294a εὐπορωτέροις. — Ἐν μὲν οὖν ταῖς πλείσταις πόλεσι τὸ τῆς πολιτείας εἶδος

[1] πρὸς ὑπόθεσίν τινα ἀγαθῶν - good according to some arbitrary standard.

καλεῖται[1]· μόνον γὰρ ἡ μίξις στοχάζεται τῶν εὐπόρων καὶ τῶν ἀπόρων, πλούτου καὶ ἐλευθερίας[2] σχεδὸν δὲ παρὰ τοῖς πλείστοις οἱ εὔποροι τῶν καλῶν κἀγαθῶν δοκοῦσι κατέχειν χώραν· ἐπεὶ δὲ τρία ἐστὶ τὰ ἀμφισβητοῦντα τῆς ἰσότητος τῆς πολιτείας, ἐλευθερία πλοῦτος ἀρετή (τὸ γὰρ τέταρτον, ὃ καλοῦσιν εὐγένειαν, ἀκολουθεῖ τοῖς δυσίν· ἡ γὰρ εὐγένειά ἐστιν ἀρχαῖος πλοῦτος καὶ ἀρετή), φανερὸν ὅτι τὴν μὲν τοῖν δυοῖν μίξιν, τῶν εὐπόρων καὶ τῶν ἀπόρων, πολιτείαν λεκτέον, τὴν δὲ τῶν τριῶν ἀριστοκρατίαν μάλιστα τῶν ἄλλων (παρὰ τὴν ἀληθινὴν καὶ πρώτην).

625—Tyranny, too, must have its place. Two moderate forms of it have been considered before, in dealing with monarchy. A third kind, which is the extreme, is added here.

Tyranny

Polit. IV 10, 1295 a[1-4], [7-23]:

Περὶ δὲ τυραννίδος ἦν ἡμῖν λοιπὸν εἰπεῖν, οὐχ ὡς ἐνούσης πολυλογίας περὶ αὐτήν, ἀλλ' ὅπως λάβῃ τῆς μεθόδου τὸ μέρος ἐπειδὴ καὶ ταύτην τίθεμεν τῶν πολιτειῶν τι μέρος. — Τυραννίδος δ' εἴδη δύο μὲν διείλομεν ἐν οἷς περὶ βασιλείας

Moderate forms

ἐπεσκοποῦμεν, διὰ τὸ τὴν δύναμιν ἐπαλλάττειν πως αὐτῶν καὶ πρὸς τὴν βασιλείαν, διὰ τὸ κατὰ νόμον εἶναι ἀμφοτέρας ταύτας τὰς ἀρχάς (ἔν τε γὰρ τῶν βαρβάρων τισὶν αἱροῦνται αὐτοκράτορας μονάρχους, καὶ τὸ παλαιὸν ἐν τοῖς ἀρχαίοις Ἕλλησιν ἐγίγνοντό τινες μόναρχοι τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον, οὓς ἐκάλουν αἰσυμνήτας), ἔχουσι δέ τινας πρὸς ἀλλήλας αὗται διαφοράς, ἦσαν δὲ διὰ μὲν τὸ κατὰ νόμον βασιλικαὶ καὶ διὰ τὸ μοναρχεῖν ἑκόντων, τυραννικαὶ δὲ διὰ τὸ δεσποτικῶς ἄρχειν κατὰ τὴν αὐτῶν γνώμην· τρίτον δὲ εἶδος τυραννίδος, ἥπερ μάλιστ' εἶναι δοκεῖ τυραννίς, ἀντίστροφος οὖσα τῇ παμβασιλείᾳ. τοιαύτην δ' ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι τυραννίδα τὴν μοναρχίαν, ἥτις ἀνυπεύθυνος ἄρχει τῶν ὁμοίων καὶ βελτιόνων πάντων πρὸς τὸ σφέτερον αὐτῆς συμφέρον, ἀλλὰ μὴ πρὸς τὸ τῶν ἀρχομένων. διόπερ ἀκούσιος· οὐθεὶς γὰρ ἑκὼν ὑπομένει τῶν ἐλευθέρων τὴν τοιαύτην ἀρχήν.

The strict form

1295a

626—Books VII and VIII are devoted to a description of the best state. The material conditions (size of the population, extent and nature of the territory, site of the city and national character of the population) having been determined, the author proceeds to treat the internal structure of the state. First he distinguishes its members (the citizens) from those who are necessary as its servants, but not a part of it.

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[1] The text is probably not sound. Immisch reads καλλωπίζεται instead of καλεῖται. Ross retains καλεῖται and translates: "Now in most states the form called polity exists".

[2] Ross explains rightly: "for the fusion goes no further than the attempt to unite the freedom of the poor and the wealth of the rich".

a. *Polit.* VII 8, 1328 a^{21}-b^{23}:

Not all the necessary elements are parts of the state

1328a Ἐπεὶ δ' ὥσπερ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν κατὰ φύσιν συνεστώτων οὐ ταὐτά ἐστι μόρια τῆς ὅλης συστάσεως ὧν ἄνευ τὸ ὅλον οὐκ ἂν εἴη, δῆλον ὡς οὐδὲ πόλεως μέρη θετέον ὅσα ταῖς πόλεσιν ἀναγκαῖον ὑπάρχειν οὐδ' ἄλλης κοινωνίας οὐδεμιᾶς 25 ἐξ ἧς ἕν τι τὸ γένος (ἓν γάρ τι καὶ κοινὸν εἶναι δεῖ καὶ ταὐτὸ τοῖς κοινωνοῖς, ἄν τε ἴσον ἄν τε ἄνισον μεταλαμβάνωσιν)· οἷον εἴτε τροφὴ τοῦτό ἐστιν εἴτε χώρας πλῆθος εἴτ' ἄλλο τι τῶν τοιούτων ἐστίν. ὅταν δ' ἧ τὸ μὲν τούτου ἕνεκεν τὸ δ' 30 οὗ ἕνεκεν, οὐθὲν ἔν γε τούτοις κοινὸν ἀλλ' ἢ τῷ μὲν ποιῆσαι τῷ δὲ λαβεῖν· λέγω δ' οἷον ὀργάνῳ τε παντὶ πρὸς τὸ γιγνόμενον ἔργον καὶ τοῖς δημιουργοῖς· οἰκίᾳ γὰρ πρὸς οἰκοδόμον οὐθέν ἐστιν ὃ γίγνεται κοινόν, ἀλλ' ἔστι τῆς οἰκίας χάριν ἡ τῶν οἰκοδόμων τέχνη. διὸ κτήσεως μὲν δεῖ ταῖς πόλεσιν, οὐδὲν δ' ἐστὶν 35 ἡ κτῆσις μέρος τῆς πόλεως. πολλὰ δ' ἔμψυχα μέρη τῆς κτήσεώς ἐστιν. ἡ δὲ πόλις κοινωνία τίς ἐστι τῶν ὁμοίων, ἕνεκεν δὲ ζωῆς τῆς ἐνδεχομένης ἀρίστης. ἐπεὶ δ' ἐστὶν εὐδαιμονία τὸ ἄριστον, αὕτη δὲ ἀρετῆς ἐνέργεια καὶ χρῆσίς τις τέλειος, συμβέβηκε δὲ οὕτως ὥστε τοὺς μὲν ἐνδέχεσθαι μετέχειν αὐτῆς τοὺς δὲ 40 μικρὸν ἢ μηδὲν, δῆλον ὡς τοῦτ' αἴτιον τοῦ γίγνεσθαι πόλεως εἴδη καὶ διαφορὰς καὶ πολιτείας πλείους· ἄλλον γὰρ τρόπον καὶ δι' ἄλλων ἕκαστοι τοῦτο θηρεύοντες 1328b τούς τε βίους ἑτέρους ποιοῦνται καὶ τὰς πολιτείας. Ἐπισκεπτέον δὲ καὶ πόσα ταυτί ἐστιν ὧν ἄνευ πόλις οὐκ ἂν εἴη· καὶ γὰρ ἃ λέγομεν εἶναι μέρη πόλεως, ἐν τούτοις ἂν εἴη διὰ τὸ ἀναγκαῖον ὑπάρχειν.

The necessary functions

5 Ληπτέον τοίνυν τῶν ἔργων τὸν ἀριθμόν· ἐκ τούτων γὰρ ἔσται δῆλον. πρῶτον μὲν οὖν ὑπάρχειν δεῖ τροφήν, ἔπειτα τέχνας (πολλῶν γὰρ ὀργάνων δεῖται τὸ ζῆν), τρίτον δὲ ὅπλα (τοὺς γὰρ κοινωνοῦντας ἀναγκαῖον καὶ ἐν αὐτοῖς ἔχειν ὅπλα πρός τε τὴν ἀρχήν, τῶν ἀπειθούντων χάριν, καὶ πρὸς τοὺς ἔξωθεν ἀδικεῖν 10 ἐπιχειροῦντας), ἔτι χρημάτων τινὰ εὐπορίαν, ὅπως ἔχωσι καὶ πρὸς τὰς καθ' αὑτοὺς χρείας καὶ πρὸς πολεμικάς, πέμπτον δὲ καὶ πρῶτον τὴν περὶ τὸ θεῖον ἐπιμέλειαν, ἣν καλοῦσιν ἱερατείαν, ἕκτον δὲ τὸν ἀριθμὸν καὶ πάντων ἀναγκαιότατον κρίσιν περὶ τῶν συμφερόντων καὶ τῶν δικαίων τῶν πρὸς ἀλλήλους.

Six corresponding classes

15 Τὰ μὲν οὖν ἔργα ταῦτ' ἐστὶν ὧν δεῖται πᾶσα πόλις ὡς εἰπεῖν (ἡ γὰρ πόλις πλῆθός ἐστιν οὐ τὸ τυχὸν ἀλλὰ πρὸς ζωὴν αὔταρκες, ὥς φαμεν, ἐὰν δέ τι τυγχάνῃ τούτων ἐκλεῖπον, ἀδύνατον ἁπλῶς αὐτάρκη τὴν κοινωνίαν εἶναι ταύτην)· 20 ἀνάγκη τοίνυν κατὰ τὰς ἐργασίας ταύτας συνεστάναι πόλιν· δεῖ ἄρα γεωργῶν τ' εἶναι πλῆθος, οἳ παρασκευάσουσι τὴν τροφήν, καὶ τεχνίτας, καὶ τὸ μάχιμον, καὶ τὸ εὔπορον, καὶ ἱερεῖς, καὶ κριτὰς τῶν δικαίων καὶ συμφερόντων.

b. Ib. 9, 1328 b^{24}-1329 a^{39}:

Has everybody to share in all of these occupations?

Διωρισμένων δὲ τούτων λοιπὸν σκέψασθαι πότερον πᾶσι κοινωνητέον πάντων 25 τούτων (ἐνδέχεται γὰρ τοὺς αὐτοὺς ἅπαντας εἶναι καὶ γεωργοὺς καὶ τεχνίτας καὶ τοὺς βουλευομένους καὶ δικάζοντας), ἢ καθ' ἕκαστον ἔργον τῶν εἰρημένων ἄλλους

ὑποθετέον, ἢ τὰ μὲν ἴδια τὰ δὲ κοινὰ τούτων ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἐστίν. οὐκ ἐν πάσῃ δὲ ταὐτὸ πολιτείᾳ. καθάπερ γὰρ εἴπομεν, ἐνδέχεται καὶ πάντας κοινωνεῖν πάντων καὶ μὴ πάντας πάντων ἀλλὰ τινὰς τινῶν. ταῦτα γὰρ καὶ ποιεῖ τὰς πολιτείας ἑτέρας· ἐν μὲν γὰρ ταῖς δημοκρατίαις μετέχουσι πάντες πάντων, ἐν δὲ ταῖς ὀλιγαρχίαις τοὐναντίον. ἐπεὶ δὲ τυγχάνομεν σκοποῦντες περὶ τῆς ἀρίστης πολιτείας, αὕτη δ' ἐστὶ καθ' ἣν ἡ πόλις ἂν εἴη μάλιστ' εὐδαίμων, τὴν δ' εὐδαιμονίαν ὅτι χωρὶς ἀρετῆς ἀδύνατον ὑπάρχειν εἴρηται πρότερον, φανερὸν ἐκ τούτων ὡς ἐν τῇ κάλλιστα πολιτευομένῃ πόλει καὶ τῇ κεκτημένῃ δικαίους

Mechanics, traders and husbandmen excluded from citizenship

ἄνδρας ἁπλῶς, ἀλλὰ μὴ πρὸς τὴν ὑπόθεσιν, οὔτε βάναυσον βίον οὔτ' ἀγοραῖον δεῖ ζῆν τοὺς πολίτας (ἀγεννὴς γὰρ ὁ τοιοῦτος βίος καὶ πρὸς ἀρετὴν ὑπεναντίος), οὐδὲ δὴ γεωργοὺς εἶναι τοὺς μέλλοντας ἔσεσθαι (δεῖ γὰρ σχολῆς καὶ πρὸς τὴν γένεσιν τῆς ἀρετῆς καὶ πρὸς τὰς πράξεις τὰς πολιτικάς).

The citizens will be warriors and rulers

Ἐπεὶ δὲ καὶ τὸ πολεμικὸν καὶ τὸ βουλευόμενον περὶ τῶν συμφερόντων καὶ κρῖνον περὶ τῶν δικαίων ἐνυπάρχει καὶ μέρη φαίνεται τῆς πόλεως μάλιστα ὄντα, πότερον ἕτερα <ἑτέροις> καὶ ταῦτα θετέον ἢ τοῖς αὐτοῖς ἀποδοτέον ἄμφω; φανερὸν δὲ καὶ τοῦτο, διότι τρόπον μέν τινα τοῖς αὐτοῖς τρόπον δέ τινα καὶ ἑτέροις. ᾗ μὲν γὰρ ἑτέρας ἀκμῆς ἑκάτερον τῶν ἔργων, καὶ τὸ μὲν δεῖται φρονήσεως τὸ δὲ δυνάμεως, ἑτέροις· ᾗ δὲ τῶν ἀδυνάτων ἐστὶ τοὺς δυναμένους βιάζεσθαι καὶ κωλύειν, τούτους ὑπομένειν ἀρχομένους ἀεί, ταύτῃ δὲ τοῖς αὐτοῖς. οἱ γὰρ τῶν ὅπλων κύριοι καὶ μένειν ἢ μὴ μένειν κύριοι τὴν πολιτείαν. λείπεται τοίνυν τοῖς αὐτοῖς μὲν ἀμφοτέροις ἀποδιδόναι τὴν πολιτείαν ταύτην, μὴ ἅμα δέ, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ πέφυκεν ἡ μὲν δύναμις ἐν νεωτέροις, ἡ δὲ φρόνησις ἐν πρεσβυτέροις εἶναι, ἔοικεν οὕτως ἀμφοῖν νενεμῆσθαι συμφέρειν καὶ δίκαιον εἶναι· ἔχει γὰρ αὕτη ἡ διαίρεσις τὸ κατ' ἀξίαν.

They will possess land

Ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ τὰς κτήσεις δεῖ περὶ τούτους <εἶναι>. ἀναγκαῖον γὰρ εὐπορίαν ὑπάρχειν τοῖς πολίταις, πολῖται δὲ οὗτοι. τὸ γὰρ βάναυσον οὐ μετέχει τῆς πόλεως, οὐδ' ἄλλο οὐθὲν γένος ὃ μὴ τῆς ἀρετῆς δημιουργόν ἐστιν. τοῦτο δὲ δῆλον ἐκ τῆς ὑποθέσεως· τὸ μὲν γὰρ εὐδαιμονεῖν ἀναγκαῖον ὑπάρχειν μετὰ τῆς ἀρετῆς, εὐδαίμονα δὲ πόλιν οὐκ εἰς μέρος τι βλέψαντας δεῖ λέγειν αὐτῆς, ἀλλ' εἰς πάντας τοὺς πολίτας. φανερὸν δὲ καὶ ὅτι δεῖ τὰς κτήσεις εἶναι τούτων, εἴπερ ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι τοὺς γεωργοὺς δούλους ἢ βαρβάρους [ἢ] περιοίκους.

and be priests

Λοιπὸν δ' ἐκ τῶν καταριθμηθέντων τὸ τῶν ἱερέων γένος. φανερὰ δὲ καὶ ἡ τούτων τάξις. οὔτε γὰρ γεωργὸν οὔτε βάναυσον ἱερέα καταστατέον (ὑπὸ γὰρ τῶν πολιτῶν πρέπει τιμᾶσθαι τοὺς θεούς)· ἐπεὶ δὲ διῄρηται τὸ πολιτικὸν εἰς δύο μέρη, τοῦτ' ἐστὶ τό τε ὁπλιτικὸν καὶ τὸ βουλευτικόν, πρέπει δὲ τήν τε θεραπείαν ἀποδιδόναι τοῖς θεοῖς καὶ τὴν ἀνάπαυσιν ἔχειν περὶ αὐτοὺς τοὺς διὰ τὸν χρόνον ἀπειρηκότας, τούτοις ἂν εἴη τὰς ἱερωσύνας ἀποδοτέον.

Ὧν μὲν τοίνυν ἄνευ πόλις οὐ συνίσταται καὶ ὅσα μέρη πόλεως, εἴρηται

(γεωργοὶ μὲν γὰρ καὶ τεχνῖται καὶ πᾶν τὸ θητικόν, ἀναγκαῖον ὑπάρχειν ταῖς πόλεσιν, μέρη δὲ τῆς πόλεως τό τε ὁπλιτικὸν καὶ βουλευτικόν, καὶ κεχώρισται δὴ τούτων ἕκαστον, τὸ μὲν ἀεὶ τὸ δὲ κατὰ μέρος).

627—a. Marriage and procreation ought to be regulated by strict laws.

Polit. VII 16, 1334 b[29]-1335 a[1], a[11-17], [28-35]:

Laws about marriage and procreation

1334b Εἴπερ οὖν ἀπ' ἀρχῆς τὸν νομοθέτην ὁρᾶν δεῖ ὅπως βέλτιστα τὰ σώματα
30 γίνηται τῶν τρεφομένων, πρῶτον μὲν ἐπιμελητέον περὶ τὴν σύζευξιν, πότε καὶ
ποίους τινὰς ὄντας χρὴ ποιεῖσθαι πρὸς ἀλλήλους τὴν γαμικὴν ὁμιλίαν. Δεῖ δ'
ἀποβλέποντα νομοθετεῖν ταύτην τὴν κοινωνίαν πρὸς αὐτούς τε καὶ τὸν τοῦ
35 ζῆν χρόνον, ἵνα συγκαταβαίνωσι ταῖς ἡλικίαις ἐπὶ τὸν αὐτὸν καιρὸν καὶ μὴ
διαφωνῶσιν αἱ δυνάμεις τοῦ μὲν ἔτι δυναμένου γεννᾶν τῆς δὲ μὴ δυναμένης,
ἢ ταύτης μὲν τοῦ δ' ἀνδρὸς μή (ταῦτα γὰρ ποιεῖ καὶ στάσεις πρὸς ἀλλήλους καὶ
διαφοράς)· ἔπειτα καὶ πρὸς τὴν τῶν τέκνων διαδοχήν, δεῖ γὰρ οὔτε λίαν ὑπο-
40 λείπεσθαι ταῖς ἡλικίαις τὰ τέκνα τῶν πατέρων (ἀνόνητος γὰρ τοῖς μὲν πρεσ-
βυτέροις ἡ χάρις παρὰ τῶν τέκνων, ἡ δὲ παρὰ τῶν πατέρων βοήθεια τοῖς
1335a τέκνοις) οὔτε λίαν πάρεγγυς εἶναι. — Ἔστι δ' ὁ τῶν νέων συνδυασμὸς φαῦλος
12 πρὸς τὴν τεκνοποιίαν· ἐν γὰρ πᾶσι ζῴοις ἀτελῆ τὰ τῶν νέων ἔκγονα καὶ θηλυ-
τόκα μᾶλλον καὶ μικρὰ τὴν μορφήν, ὥστ' ἀναγκαῖον ταὐτὸ τοῦτο συμβαίνειν
15 καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων. τεκμήριον δέ· ἐν ὅσαις γὰρ τῶν πόλεων ἐπιχωριάζεται
τὸ νέους συζευγνύναι καὶ νέας, ἀτελεῖς καὶ μικροὶ τὰ σώματά εἰσιν. — Διὸ
28 τὰς μὲν ἁρμόττει περὶ τὴν τῶν ὀκτωκαίδεκα ἐτῶν ἡλικίαν συζευγνύναι, τοὺς
30 δ' ἑπτὰ καὶ τριάκοντα ἢ μικρόν. ἐν τοσούτῳ γὰρ ἀκμάζουσί τε τοῖς σώμασι
σύζευξις ἔσται, καὶ πρὸς τὴν παῦλαν τῆς τεκνοποιίας συγκαταβήσεται τοῖς
χρόνοις εὐκαίρως· ἔτι δὲ ἡ διαδοχὴ τῶν τέκνων τοῖς μὲν ἀρχομένοις ἔσται τῆς
ἀκμῆς, ἐὰν γίγνηται κατὰ λόγον εὐθὺς ἡ γένεσις, τοῖς δὲ ἤδη καταλελυμένης τῆς
35 ἡλικίας πρὸς τὸν τῶν ἑβδομήκοντα ἐτῶν ἀριθμόν.

b. Deformed infants ought to be exposed, and the number of children should be limited by procuring abortion in the case of excess, before sense and life have begun.

Ib., 1335 b[19-26]:

Exposure of infants and abortion in special cases

b 20 Περὶ δὲ ἀποθέσεως καὶ τροφῆς τῶν γιγνομένων ἔστω νόμος μηδὲν πεπηρω-
μένον τρέφειν· διὰ δὲ πλῆθος τέκνων, (ἡ γὰρ τάξις [1] τῶν ἐθῶν κωλύει μηθὲν
ἀποτίθεσθαι τῶν γιγνομένων) ὡρίσθαι δὴ δεῖ τῆς τεκνοποιίας τὸ πλῆθος, ἐὰν
δέ τισι γίγνηται παρὰ ταῦτα συνδυασθέντων, πρὶν αἴσθησιν ἐγγενέσθαι καὶ
25 ζωήν, ἐμποιεῖσθαι δεῖ τὴν ἄμβλωσιν· τὸ γὰρ ὅσιον καὶ τὸ μὴ διωρισμένον τῇ
αἰσθήσει καὶ τῷ ζῆν ἔσται.

[1] ἡ γὰρ τάξις - Wallies. The Mss have: ἐὰν ἡ τάξις - κωλύῃ.

c. Adultery during the time of procreation should be punished with a loss of privileges.

Adultery punished

Ib., 1335 b^{38}-1336 a^{2}:

Περὶ δὲ τῆς πρὸς ἄλλην ἢ πρὸς ἄλλον (sc. ὁμιλίας), ἔστω μὲν ἁπλῶς μὴ καλὸν ἁπτόμενον φαίνεσθαι μηδαμῇ μηδαμῶς, ὅταν ᾖ καὶ προσαγορευθῇ πόσις· περὶ δὲ τὸν χρόνον τὸν τῆς τεκνοποιίας ἐάν τις φαίνηται τοιοῦτόν τι δρῶν, ἀτιμίᾳ ζημιούσθω πρεπούσῃ πρὸς τὴν ἁμαρτίαν.

628—On these and on the following points Ar. is not far from the ideas of his master, Plato.

Physical training of infants and young children should be prescribed by law. Moral education of children up till the age of five years is to be placed under state-supervision.

Education of young children settled by law

Polit. VII 17, 1336 a^{30}-b^{16}, b$^{20-23}$:

Καὶ περὶ λόγων δὲ καὶ μύθων, ποίους τινὰς ἀκούειν δεῖ τοὺς τηλικούτους, 1336a
ἐπιμελὲς ἔστω τοῖς ἄρχουσιν οὓς καλοῦσι παιδονόμους. πάντα γὰρ δεῖ τὰ τοιαῦτα προοδοποιεῖν πρὸς τὰς ὕστερον διατριβάς· διὸ τὰς παιδιὰς εἶναι δεῖ τὰς πολλὰς μιμήσεις τῶν ὕστερον σπουδαζομένων. τὰς δὲ διατάσεις τῶν παίδων καὶ κλαυθμοὺς οὐκ ὀρθῶς ἀπαγορεύουσιν οἱ κωλύοντες ἐν τοῖς νόμοις· 35
συμφέρουσι γὰρ πρὸς αὔξησιν· γίγνεται γὰρ τρόπον τινὰ γυμνασία τοῖς σώμασιν· ἡ γὰρ τοῦ πνεύματος κάθεξις ποιεῖ τὴν ἰσχὺν τοῖς πονοῦσιν, ὃ συμβαίνει καὶ τοῖς παιδίοις διατεινομένοις. ἐπισκεπτέον δὲ τοῖς παιδονόμοις τὴν τούτων διαγωγὴν τήν τ' ἄλλην, καὶ ὅπως ὅτι ἥκιστα μετὰ δούλων ἔσται. ταύτην γὰρ 40
τὴν ἡλικίαν, καὶ μέχρι τῶν ἑπτὰ ἐτῶν, ἀναγκαῖον οἴκοι τὴν τροφὴν ἔχειν. 1336b
εὔλογον οὖν ἀπολαύειν [1] ἀπὸ τῶν ἀκουσμάτων καὶ τῶν ὁραμάτων ἀνελευθερίαν καὶ τηλικούτους ὄντας. ὅλως μὲν οὖν αἰσχρολογίαν ἐκ τῆς πόλεως, εἴπερ ἄλλο τι, δεῖ τὸν νομοθέτην ἐξορίζειν (ἐκ τοῦ γὰρ εὐχερῶς λέγειν ὁτιοῦν τῶν αἰσχρῶν 5
γίνεται καὶ τὸ ποιεῖν σύνεγγυς)· μάλιστα μὲν οὖν ἐκ τῶν νέων, ὅπως μήτε λέγωσι μήτε ἀκούωσι μηδὲν τοιοῦτον. ἐὰν δέ τις φαίνηταί τι λέγων ἢ πράττων τῶν ἀπηγορευμένων, τὸν μὲν ἐλεύθερον μήπω δὲ κατακλίσεως ἠξιωμένον ἐν τοῖς συσσιτίοις [ἀτιμίαις] κολάζειν καὶ πληγαῖς, τὸν δὲ πρεσβύτερον τῆς ἡλικίας 10
ταύτης ἀτιμίαις ἀνελευθέροις ἀνδραποδωδίας χάριν. ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ λέγειν τι τῶν τοιούτων ἐξορίζομεν, φανερὸν ὅτι καὶ τὸ θεωρεῖν ἢ γραφὰς ἢ λόγους ἀσχήμονας. ἐπιμελὲς μὲν οὖν ἔστω τοῖς ἄρχουσι μηθὲν μήτε ἄγαλμα μήτε γραφὴν εἶναι 15
τοιούτων πράξεων μίμησιν. — Τοὺς δὲ νεωτέρους οὔτ' ἰάμβων οὔτε κωμῳδίας 20
θεατὰς ἐατέον, πρὶν ἢ τὴν ἡλικίαν λάβωσιν ἐν ᾗ καὶ κατακλίσεως ὑπάρξει κοινωνεῖν ἤδη καὶ μέθης καὶ τῆς ἀπὸ τῶν τοιούτων γιγνομένης βλάβης ἀπαθεῖς ἡ παιδεία ποιήσει πάντας.

[1] The codd. indicated by Immisch as Π^{2} have ἀπελαύνειν.

629—In Book VIII the treatment of ideal education is continued.

a. That education should be regulated by law and should be a public affair, is generally accepted; but people by no means agree as to what subjects are to be taught. **General remarks on education**

Polit. VIII 2, 1337 a^{33}-b^{3}:

1337a Ὅτι μὲν οὖν νομοθετητέον περὶ παιδείας καὶ ταύτην κοινὴν ποιητέον,
35 φανερόν· τίς δ' ἐστὶν ἡ παιδεία καὶ πῶς χρὴ παιδεύεσθαι, δεῖ μὴ λανθάνειν. νῦν γὰρ ἀμφισβητεῖται περὶ τῶν ἔργων. οὐ γὰρ ταὐτὰ πάντες ὑπολαμβάνουσι δεῖν μανθάνειν τοὺς νέους οὔτε πρὸς ἀρετὴν οὔτε πρὸς τὸν βίον τὸν ἄριστον, οὐδὲ φανερὸν πότερον πρὸς τὴν διάνοιαν πρέπει μᾶλλον ἢ πρὸς τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς
40 ἦθος· ἔκ τε τῆς ἐμποδὼν παιδείας ταραχώδης ἡ σκέψις καὶ δῆλον οὐδὲν πότερον ἀσκεῖν δεῖ τὰ χρήσιμα πρὸς τὸν βίον ἢ τὰ τείνοντα πρὸς ἀρετὴν ἢ τὰ
1337b περιττά (πάντα γὰρ εἴληφε ταῦτα κριτάς τινας)· περί τε τῶν πρὸς ἀρετὴν οὐθέν ἐστιν ὁμολογούμενον (καὶ γὰρ τὴν ἀρετὴν οὐ τὴν αὐτὴν εὐθὺς πάντες τιμῶσιν, ὥστ' εὐλόγως διαφέρονται καὶ πρὸς τὴν ἄσκησιν αὐτῆς). **Present disagreement**

b. Vulgar occupations should be excluded, and likewise all paid employments.

Ib., 1337 b$^{4-16}$: **Vulgar occupations excluded**

Ὅτι μὲν οὖν τὰ ἀναγκαῖα δεῖ διδάσκεσθαι τῶν χρησίμων, οὐκ ἄδηλον· ὅτι
5 δὲ οὐ πάντα, διῃρημένων τῶν τε ἐλευθέρων ἔργων καὶ τῶν ἀνελευθέρων, φανερὸν ὅτι τῶν τοιούτων δεῖ μετέχειν ὅσα τῶν χρησίμων ποιήσει τὸν μετέχοντα μὴ βάναυσον. βάναυσον δ' ἔργον εἶναι δεῖ τοῦτο νομίζειν καὶ τέχνην ταύτην καὶ
10 μάθησιν, ὅσαι πρὸς τὰς χρήσεις καὶ τὰς πράξεις τὰς τῆς ἀρετῆς ἄχρηστον ἀπεργάζονται τὸ σῶμα τῶν ἐλευθέρων ἢ τὴν ψυχὴν ἢ τὴν διάνοιαν. διὸ τάς τε τοιαύτας τέχνας ὅσαι τὸ σῶμα παρασκευάζουσι χεῖρον διακεῖσθαι βαναύσους καλοῦμεν, καὶ τὰς μισθαρνικὰς ἐργασίας. ἄσχολον γὰρ ποιοῦσι τὴν διάνοιαν καὶ ταπεινήν.

630—There might be some doubt as to the paedagogical value of one of the four traditional branches of education, namely music. Ar. defends it, on this ground, that it is highly important that people should be able to use leisure well.

Polit. VIII 3, 1337 b$^{23-35}$: **4 traditional disciplines**

Ἔστι δὲ τέτταρα σχεδὸν ἃ παιδεύειν εἰώθασι, γράμματα καὶ γυμναστικὴν
25 καὶ μουσικὴν καὶ τέταρτον ἔνιοι γραφικήν, τὴν μὲν γραμματικὴν καὶ γραφικὴν ὡς χρησίμους πρὸς τὸν βίον οὔσας καὶ πολυχρήστους, τὴν δὲ γυμναστικὴν ὡς συντείνουσαν πρὸς ἀνδρείαν· τὴν δὲ μουσικὴν ἤδη διαπορήσειεν ἄν τις. νῦν μὲν γὰρ ὡς ἡδονῆς χάριν οἱ πλεῖστοι μετέχουσιν αὐτῆς· οἱ δ' ἐξ ἀρχῆς **Difficulties concerning music**

ἔταξαν ἐν παιδείᾳ διὰ τὸ τὴν φύσιν αὐτὴν ζητεῖν, ὅπερ πολλάκις εἴρηται, μὴ μόνον ἀσχολεῖν ὀρθῶς ἀλλὰ καὶ σχολάζειν δύνασθαι καλῶς. αὕτη γὰρ ἀρχὴ πάντων, ἵνα καὶ πάλιν εἴπωμεν περὶ αὐτῆς. εἰ γὰρ ἄμφω μὲν δεῖ, μᾶλλον δὲ αἱρετὸν τὸ σχολάζειν τῆς ἀσχολίας καὶ τέλος, ζητητέον τί ποιοῦντας δεῖ σχολάζειν.

631—The author warns against a one-sided physical training:

Gymnastics and athletics

a. *Polit.* VIII 4, 1338 b$^{9-16}$:

Νῦν μὲν οὖν αἱ μάλιστα δοκοῦσαι τῶν πόλεων ἐπιμελεῖσθαι τῶν παίδων αἱ μὲν ἀθλητικὴν ἕξιν ἐμποιοῦσι, λωβώμεναι τά τε εἴδη καὶ τὴν αὔξησιν τῶν σωμάτων, οἱ δὲ Λάκωνες ταύτην μὲν οὐχ ἥμαρτον τὴν ἁμαρτίαν, θηριώδεις δ' ἀπεργάζονται τοῖς πόνοις, ὡς τοῦτο πρὸς ἀνδρείαν μάλιστα συμφέρον. καίτοι, καθάπερ εἴρηται πολλάκις, οὔτε πρὸς μίαν οὔτε πρὸς μάλιστα ταύτην βλέποντα ποιητέον τὴν ἐπιμέλειαν. 1338b

b. Our leading principle should be, that what is noble, not what is brutal, ought to have the first place.

The leading principle

Ib., 1338 b$^{29-34}$:

Ὥστε τὸ καλὸν ἀλλ' οὐ τὸ θηριῶδες δεῖ πρωταγωνιστεῖν· οὐδὲ γὰρ λύκος οὐδὲ τῶν ἄλλων θηρίων ἀγωνίσαιτο ἂν οὐθένα καλὸν κίνδυνον, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ἀνὴρ ἀγαθός, οἱ δὲ λίαν εἰς ταῦτα [1] ἀνέντες τοὺς παῖδας καὶ τῶν ἀναγκαίων ἀπαιδαγωγήτους ποιήσαντες βαναύσους κατεργάζονται κατά γε τὸ ἀληθές.

632—The question of the paedagogical value of music is more amply treated in chapters 5 and 6.

What is exactly the paedagogical value of music?

a. *Polit.* VIII 4, 1339 a$^{11-26}$:

Περὶ δὲ μουσικῆς ἔνια μὲν διηπορήκαμεν τῷ λόγῳ καὶ πρότερον, καλῶς δ' ἔχει καὶ νῦν ἀναλαβόντας αὐτὰ προαγαγεῖν, ἵνα ὥσπερ ἐνδόσιμον γένηται [2] τοῖς λόγοις οὓς ἄν τις εἴπειεν ἀποφαινόμενος περὶ αὐτῆς. οὔτε γὰρ τίνα ἔχει δύναμιν ῥᾴδιον περὶ αὐτῆς διελεῖν, οὔτε τίνος δεῖ χάριν μετέχειν αὐτῆς, πότερον παιδιᾶς ἕνεκα καὶ ἀναπαύσεως, καθάπερ ὕπνου καὶ μέθης (ταῦτα γὰρ καθ' αὑτὰ μὲν οὔτε τῶν σπουδαίων, ἀλλ' ἡδέα, καὶ ἅμα παύει μέριμναν, ὡς φησιν Εὐριπίδης· διὸ καὶ τάττουσιν αὐτὴν καὶ χρῶνται πᾶσι τούτοις ὁμοίως, ὕπνῳ καὶ μέθῃ καὶ μουσικῇ· τιθέασι δὲ καὶ τὴν ὄρχησιν ἐν τούτοις), ἢ μᾶλλον οἰητέον πρὸς ἀρετήν τι τείνειν τὴν μουσικήν, ὡς δυναμένην, καθάπερ ἡ γυμναστικὴ τὸ σῶμα ποιόν τι παρασκευάζει, καὶ τὴν μουσικὴν τὸ ἦθος ποιόν τι ποιεῖν, ἐθίζουσαν δύνασθαι χαίρειν ὀρθῶς, ἢ πρὸς διαγωγήν τι συμβάλλεται καὶ πρὸς φρόνησιν (καὶ γὰρ τοῦτο τρίτον θετέον τῶν εἰρημένων). 1339a

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[1] ταῦτα - sc. gymnastics.

[2] ἵνα ὥσπερ ἐνδόσιμον γένηται etc. - "that our remarks may serve as a prelude to further discussions on the subject".

b. Ib., 1339 a^{26}-b^{10}:

Should children be taught to perform music themselves?

Ὅτι μὲν οὖν δεῖ τοὺς νέους μὴ παιδιᾶς ἕνεκα παιδεύειν, οὐκ ἄδηλον (οὐ γὰρ παίζουσι μανθάνοντες· μετὰ λύπης γὰρ ἡ μάθησις)· ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ διαγωγήν [1] γε παισὶν ἁρμόττει καὶ ταῖς ἡλικίαις ἀποδιδόναι ταῖς τοιαύταις (οὐθενὶ γὰρ ἀτελεῖ προσήκει τέλος). ἀλλ' ἴσως ἂν δόξειεν ἡ τῶν παίδων σπουδὴ παιδιᾶς εἶναι χάριν ἀνδράσι γενομένοις καὶ τελειωθεῖσιν. ἀλλ' εἰ τοῦτ' ἐστὶ τοιοῦτον, τίνος ἂν ἕνεκα δέοι μανθάνειν αὐτούς, ἀλλὰ μὴ καθάπερ οἱ τῶν Περσῶν καὶ Μήδων βασιλεῖς, δι' ἄλλων αὐτὸ ποιούντων μεταλαμβάνειν τῆς ἡδονῆς καὶ τῆς μαθήσεως; καὶ γὰρ ἀναγκαῖον βέλτιον ἀπεργάζεσθαι τοὺς αὐτὸ τοῦτο πεποιημένους ἔργον καὶ τέχνην τῶν τοσοῦτον χρόνον ἐπιμελουμένων ὅσον πρὸς μάθησιν μόνον. εἰ δὲ δεῖ τὰ τοιαῦτα διαπονεῖν αὐτούς, καὶ περὶ τὴν τῶν ὄψων πραγματείαν αὐτοὺς ἂν δέοι παρασκευάζειν· ἀλλ' ἄτοπον.

Τὴν δ' αὐτὴν ἀπορίαν ἔχει καὶ εἰ δύναται τὰ ἤθη βελτίω ποιεῖν· ταῦτα γὰρ τί δεῖ μανθάνειν αὐτούς, ἀλλ' οὐχ ἑτέρων ἀκούοντας ὀρθῶς τε χαίρειν καὶ δύνασθαι κρίνειν, ὥσπερ οἱ Λάκωνες; ἐκεῖνοι γὰρ οὐ μανθάνοντες ὅμως δύνανται κρίνειν ὀρθῶς, ὡς φασι, τὰ χρηστὰ καὶ τὰ μὴ χρηστὰ τῶν μελῶν. ὁ δ' αὐτὸς λόγος κἂν εἰ πρὸς εὐημερίαν καὶ διαγωγὴν ἐλευθέριον χρηστέον αὐτῇ· τί δεῖ μανθάνειν αὐτούς, ἀλλ' οὐχ ἑτέρων χρωμένων ἀπολαύειν; σκοπεῖν δ' ἔξεστι τὴν ὑπόληψιν ἣν ἔχομεν περὶ τῶν θεῶν· οὐ γὰρ ὁ Ζεὺς αὐτὸς ἀείδει καὶ κιθαρίζει τοῖς ποιηταῖς. ἀλλὰ καὶ βαναύσους καλοῦμεν τοὺς τοιούτους καὶ τὸ πράττειν οὐκ ἀνδρὸς μὴ μεθύοντος ἢ παίζοντος.

c. Ib., 1339 b^{10}-^{27}:

Music can serve three purposes: 1. relaxation

Ἀλλ' ἴσως περὶ μὲν τούτων ὕστερον ἐπισκεπτέον· ἡ δὲ πρώτη ζήτησίς ἐστι πότερον οὐ θετέον εἰς παιδείαν τὴν μουσικὴν ἢ θετέον, καὶ τί δύναται τῶν διαπορηθέντων τριῶν, πότερον παιδείαν ἢ παιδιὰν ἢ διαγωγήν. εὐλόγως δ' εἰς πάντα τάττεται καὶ φαίνεται μετέχειν. ἥ τε γὰρ παιδιὰ χάριν ἀναπαύσεώς ἐστι, τὴν δ' ἀνάπαυσιν ἀναγκαῖον ἡδεῖαν εἶναι (τῆς γὰρ διὰ τῶν πόνων λύπης ἰατρεία τίς ἐστιν), καὶ τὴν διαγωγὴν ὁμολογουμένως δεῖ μὴ μόνον ἔχειν τὸ καλὸν ἀλλὰ καὶ τὴν ἡδονήν (τὸ γὰρ εὐδαιμονεῖν ἐξ ἀμφοτέρων τούτων ἐστίν)· τὴν δὲ μουσικὴν πάντες εἶναί φαμεν τῶν ἡδίστων, καὶ ψιλὴν οὖσαν καὶ μετὰ μελῳδίας (φησὶ γὰρ καὶ Μουσαῖος εἶναι »βροτοῖς ἥδιστον ἀείδειν«· διὰ καὶ εἰς τὰς συνουσίας καὶ διαγωγὰς εὐλόγως παραλαμβάνουσιν αὐτὴν ὡς δυναμένην εὐφραίνειν), ὥστε καὶ ἐντεῦθεν ἄν τις ὑπολάβοι παιδεύεσθαι δεῖν αὐτὴν τοὺς νεωτέρους. ὅσα γὰρ ἀβλαβῆ τῶν ἡδέων, οὐ μόνον ἁρμόττει πρὸς τὸ τέλος ἀλλὰ καὶ πρὸς τὴν ἀνάπαυσιν.

d. Ib., 1339 b^{42}-1340 a^{23}, a^{40}-b^{13}:

2. the forming of the character

Οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ ζητητέον μή ποτε τοῦτο μὲν συμβέβηκε, τιμιωτέρα δ' αὐτῆς

[1] διαγωγή is used to indicate intellectual enjoyment.

ἡ φύσις ἐστὶν ἢ κατὰ τὴν εἰρημένην χρείαν, καὶ δεῖ μὴ μόνον τῆς κοινῆς ἡδονῆς 1340a
μετέχειν ἀπ' αὐτῆς, ἧς ἔχουσι πάντες αἴσθησιν (ἔχει γὰρ ἡ μουσικὴ τὴν ἡδονὴν
φυσικήν, διὸ πάσαις ἡλικίαις καὶ πᾶσιν ἤθεσιν ἡ χρῆσις αὐτῆς ἐστι προσφιλής), 5
ἀλλ' ὁρᾶν εἴ πῃ καὶ πρὸς τὸ ἦθος συντείνει καὶ πρὸς τὴν ψυχήν. τοῦτο δ' ἂν
εἴη δῆλον, εἰ ποιοί τινες τὰ ἤθη γιγνόμεθα δι' αὐτῆς. ἀλλὰ μὴν ὅτι γιγνόμεθα
ποιοί τινες, φανερὸν διὰ πολλῶν μὲν καὶ ἑτέρων, οὐχ ἥκιστα δὲ καὶ διὰ τῶν
'Ολύμπου μελῶν· ταῦτα γὰρ ὁμολογουμένως ποιεῖ τὰς ψυχὰς ἐνθουσιαστικάς, 10
ὁ δ' ἐνθουσιασμὸς τοῦ περὶ τὴν ψυχὴν ἤθους πάθος ἐστίν. ἔτι δὲ ἀκροώμενοι
τῶν μιμήσεων γίγνονται πάντες συμπαθεῖς, καὶ χωρὶς τῶν ῥυθμῶν καὶ τῶν
μελῶν αὐτῶν. ἐπεὶ δὲ συμβέβηκεν εἶναι τὴν μουσικὴν τῶν ἡδέων, τὴν δ' ἀρετὴν
περὶ τὸ χαίρειν ὀρθῶς καὶ φιλεῖν καὶ μισεῖν, δεῖ δηλονότι μανθάνειν καὶ συνεθί- 15
ζεσθαι μηθὲν οὕτως ὡς τὸ κρίνειν ὀρθῶς καὶ τὸ χαίρειν τοῖς ἐπιεικέσιν ἤθεσι καὶ
ταῖς καλαῖς πράξεσιν· ἔστι δὲ ὁμοιώματα μάλιστα παρὰ τὰς ἀληθινὰς φύσεις
ἐν τοῖς ῥυθμοῖς καὶ τοῖς μέλεσιν ὀργῆς καὶ πραότητος, ἔτι δ' ἀνδρείας καὶ 20
σωφροσύνης καὶ πάντων τῶν ἐναντίων τούτοις καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἠθικῶν (δῆλον
δὲ ἐκ τῶν ἔργων· μεταβάλλομεν γὰρ τὴν ψυχὴν ἀκροώμενοι τοιούτων). —

Εὐθὺς γὰρ ἡ τῶν ἁρμονιῶν διέστηκε φύσις. ὥστε ἀκούοντας ἄλλως διατί- 40
θεσθαι καὶ μὴ τὸν αὐτὸν ἔχειν τρόπον πρὸς ἑκάστην αὐτῶν, ἀλλὰ πρὸς μὲν
ἐνίας ὀδυρτικωτέρως καὶ συνεστηκότως μᾶλλον, οἷον πρὸς τὴν μιξολυδιστὶ 1340b
καλουμένην, πρὸς δὲ τὰς μαλακωτέρως τὴν διάνοιαν, οἷον πρὸς τὰς ἀνειμένας,
μέσως δὲ καὶ καθεστηκότως μάλιστα πρὸς ἑτέραν, οἷον δοκεῖ ποιεῖν ἡ δωριστὶ
μόνη τῶν ἁρμονιῶν, ἐνθουσιαστικοὺς δ' ἡ φρυγιστί. ταῦτα γὰρ καλῶς λέγουσιν 5
οἱ περὶ τὴν παιδείαν ταύτην πεφιλοσοφηκότες· λαμβάνουσι γὰρ τὰ μαρτύρια
τῶν λόγων ἐξ αὐτῶν τῶν ἔργων. τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον ἔχει καὶ τὰ περὶ τοὺς
ῥυθμούς (οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἦθος ἔχουσι στασιμώτερον οἱ δὲ κινητικόν, καὶ τούτων
οἱ μὲν φορτικωτέρας ἔχουσι τὰς κινήσεις οἱ δὲ ἐλευθεριωτέρας). ἐκ μὲν οὖν 10
τούτων φανερὸν ὅτι δύναται ποιόν τι τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς ἦθος ἡ μουσικὴ παρα-
σκευάζειν. εἰ δὲ τοῦτο δύναται ποιεῖν, δῆλον ὅτι προσακτέον καὶ παιδευτέον
ἐν αὐτῇ τοὺς νέους.

About the third purpose of learning music, which was called διαγωγή, Ar. does not speak explicitly. But we may admit that this function of music is implied in the first purpose, or perhaps even in the second.

e. Finally an answer is given to the question whether children should be taught to perform music themselves.

Children should learn to perform music themselves

Polit. VIII 6, 1340 b$^{20-33}$:

Πότερον δὲ δεῖ μανθάνειν αὐτοὺς ᾄδοντάς τε καὶ χειρουργοῦντας ἢ μή, καθά- 20
περ ἠπορήθη πρότερον, νῦν λεκτέον. οὐκ ἄδηλον δὴ ὅτι πολλὴν ἔχει διαφορὰν
πρὸς τὸ γίγνεσθαι ποιούς τινας, ἐάν τις αὐτὸς κοινωνῇ τῶν ἔργων· ἓν γάρ τι

τῶν ἀδυνάτων ἢ χαλεπῶν ἐστι μὴ κοινωνήσαντας τῶν ἔργων κριτὰς γενέσθαι σπουδαίους. ἅμα δὲ καὶ δεῖ τοὺς παῖδας ἔχειν τινὰ διατριβήν, καὶ τὴν Ἀρχύτου πλαταγὴν [1] οἴεσθαι γενέσθαι καλῶς, ἣν διδόασι τοῖς παιδίοις, ὅπως χρώμενοι ταύτῃ μηδὲν καταγνύωσι τῶν κατὰ τὴν οἰκίαν· οὐ γὰρ δύναται τὸ νέον ἡσυχάζειν. αὕτη μὲν οὖν ἐστι τοῖς νηπίοις ἁρμόττουσα τῶν παιδίων, ἡ δὲ παιδεία πλαταγὴ τοῖς μείζοσι τῶν νέων. Ὅτι μὲν οὖν παιδευτέον τὴν μουσικὴν οὕτως ὥστε καὶ κοινωνεῖν τῶν ἔργων, φανερὸν ἐκ τῶν τοιούτων.

[1] τὴν Ἀρχύτου πλαταγήν - "the rattle of Archytas" seems to have been a popular toy in the days of Aristotle.

SIXTEENTH CHAPTER
THE PSYCHOLOGY

1—SOUL AND ITS VARIOUS FUNCTIONS

The aporiai

633—In his first book *De anima*, according to his usual method, Ar. begins by stating the *aporiai*.

a. Is soul a substance, or to which of the other categories does it belong? Is it potential, or rather an actuality?

1. Is soul a substance?

De anima I 1, 402 a^{22}-b^{1}:

Πρῶτον δ' ἴσως ἀναγκαῖον διελεῖν ἐν τίνι τῶν γενῶν καὶ τί ἐστι, λέγω δὲ 402a
πότερον τόδε τι καὶ οὐσία ἢ ποιὸν ἢ ποσὸν ἢ καί τις ἄλλη τῶν διαιρεθεισῶν
κατηγοριῶν, ἔτι δὲ πότερον τῶν ἐν δυνάμει ὄντων ἢ μᾶλλον ἐντελέχειά τις· 25
διαφέρει γὰρ οὔ τι σμικρόν.

b. Can soul be defined in one general formula?

2. Is there one definition of soul?

Ib., 402 b$^{1-8}$:

Σκεπτέον δὲ καὶ εἰ μεριστὴ ἢ ἀμερής, καὶ πότερον ὁμοειδὴς ἅπασα ψυχὴ 402b
ἢ οὔ· εἰ δὲ μὴ ὁμοειδής, πότερον εἴδει διαφέρουσιν ἢ γένει. νῦν μὲν γὰρ οἱ
λέγοντες καὶ ζητοῦντες περὶ ψυχῆς περὶ τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης μόνης ἐοίκασιν ἐπι-
σκοπεῖν. εὐλαβητέον δ' ὅπως μὴ λανθάνῃ πότερον εἷς ὁ λόγος αὐτῆς ἐστί, 5
καθάπερ ζῴου, ἢ καθ' ἑκάστην ἕτερος, οἷον ἵππου, κυνός, ἀνθρώπου, θεοῦ,
τὸ δὲ ζῷον τὸ καθόλου ἤτοι οὐθέν ἐστιν ἢ ὕστερον.

c. Are there any affections of the soul in itself?

3. Is soul capable of separate existence?

Ib., 403 a$^{3-16}$:

Ἀπορίαν δ' ἔχει καὶ τὰ πάθη τῆς ψυχῆς, πότερόν ἐστι πάντα κοινὰ καὶ τοῦ 403a
ἔχοντος ἢ ἐστί τι καὶ τῆς ψυχῆς ἴδιον αὐτῆς· τοῦτο γὰρ λαβεῖν μὲν ἀναγκαῖον, 5
οὐ ῥᾴδιον δέ. φαίνεται δὲ τῶν μὲν πλείστων οὐθὲν ἄνευ τοῦ σώματος πάσχειν
οὐδὲ ποιεῖν, οἷον ὀργίζεσθαι, θαρρεῖν, ἐπιθυμεῖν, ὅλως αἰσθάνεσθαι. μάλιστα
δ' ἔοικεν ἴδιον τὸ νοεῖν· εἰ δ' ἐστὶ καὶ τοῦτο φαντασία τις ἢ μὴ ἄνευ φαντασίας,
οὐκ ἐνδέχοιτ' ἂν οὐδὲ τοῦτ' ἄνευ σώματος εἶναι. εἰ μὲν οὖν ἐστί τι τῶν τῆς 10
ψυχῆς ἔργων ἢ παθημάτων ἴδιον, ἐνδέχοιτ' ἂν αὐτὴν χωρίζεσθαι· εἰ δὲ μηθέν

ἐστιν ἴδιον αὐτῆς, οὐκ ἂν εἴη χωριστή, ἀλλὰ καθάπερ τῷ εὐθεῖ, ἢ εὐθύ, πολλὰ συμβαίνει, οἷον ἅπτεσθαι τῆς χαλκῆς σφαίρας κατὰ στιγμήν, οὐ μέντοι γ' ἅψεται οὕτω χωρισθὲν τὸ εὐθύ· ἀχώριστον γάρ, εἴπερ ἀεὶ μετὰ σώματός τινός ἐστιν.

d. Aristotle decides the question in the negative, and concludes that, since all the affections of soul involve a body, the study of soul must belong to the science of nature.

Ib., a [16-28]:

Ἔοικε δὲ καὶ τὰ τῆς ψυχῆς πάθη πάντα εἶναι μετὰ σώματος, θυμός, πραότης, φόβος, ἔλεος, θάρσος, ἔτι χαρὰ καὶ τὸ φιλεῖν τε καὶ μισεῖν· ἅμα γὰρ τούτοις πάσχει τι τὸ σῶμα. σημεῖον δὲ τὸ ποτὲ μὲν ἰσχυρῶν καὶ ἐναργῶν παθημάτων συμβαινόντων μηδὲν παροξύνεσθαι ἢ φοβεῖσθαι, ἐνίοτε δ' ὑπὸ μικρῶν καὶ ἀμαυρῶν κινεῖσθαι, ὅταν ὀργᾷ τὸ σῶμα καὶ οὕτως ἔχῃ ὥσπερ ὅταν ὀργίζηται. ἔτι δὲ τοῦτο μᾶλλον φανερόν· μηθενὸς γὰρ φοβεροῦ συμβαίνοντος ἐν τοῖς πάθεσι γίνονται τοῖς τοῦ φοβουμένου. εἰ δ' οὕτως ἔχει, δῆλον ὅτι τὰ πάθη λόγοι ἔνυλοί εἰσιν. ὥστε οἱ ὅροι τοιοῦτοι οἷον τὸ ὀργίζεσθαι κίνησίς τις τοῦ τοιοῦδὶ σώματος ἢ μέρους ἢ δυνάμεως ὑπὸ τοῦδε ἕνεκα τοῦδε. καὶ διὰ ταῦτα ἤδη φυσικοῦ τὸ θεωρῆσαι περὶ ψυχῆς, ἢ πάσης ἢ τῆς τοιαύτης.

634—The problem of the affections of the soul is treated again in relation with the problem of its movement. In this passage the author states that it would be better not to say that *"the soul* is angry" etc., but the man.

a. *De An.* I 4, 408 a[34]-b[18]: **Is the soul the subject of its affections?**

Εὐλογώτερον δ' ἀπορήσειεν ἄν τις περὶ αὐτῆς ὡς κινουμένης, εἰς τὰ τοιαῦτα ἀποβλέψας. φαμὲν γὰρ τὴν ψυχὴν λυπεῖσθαι χαίρειν, θαρρεῖν φοβεῖσθαι, ἔτι δὲ ὀργίζεσθαί τε καὶ αἰσθάνεσθαι καὶ διανοεῖσθαι· ταῦτα δὲ πάντα κινήσεις εἶναι δοκοῦσιν. ὅθεν οἰηθείη τις ἂν αὐτὴν κινεῖσθαι. τὸ δ' οὐκ ἔστιν ἀναγκαῖον. εἰ γὰρ καὶ ὅτι μάλιστα τὸ λυπεῖσθαι ἢ χαίρειν ἢ διανοεῖσθαι κινήσεις εἰσὶ καὶ ἕκαστον κινεῖσθαι τούτων, τὸ δὲ κινεῖσθαί ἐστιν ὑπὸ ψυχῆς, οἷον τὸ ὀργίζεσθαι ἢ φοβεῖσθαι τὸ τὴν καρδίαν ὠδὶ κινεῖσθαι, τὸ δὲ διανοεῖσθαι ἢ τὸ τοῦτο ἴσως ἤ ἕτερόν τι, (τούτων δὲ συμβαίνει τὰ μὲν κατὰ φορὰν τινῶν κινουμένων, τὰ δὲ κατ' ἀλλοίωσιν, ποῖα δὲ καὶ πῶς, ἕτερός ἐστι λόγος)· τὸ δὴ λέγειν ὀργίζεσθαι τὴν ψυχὴν ὅμοιον κἂν εἴ τις λέγοι τὴν ψυχὴν ὑφαίνειν ἢ οἰκοδομεῖν. βέλτιον γὰρ ἴσως μὴ λέγειν τὴν ψυχὴν ἐλεεῖν ἢ μανθάνειν ἢ διανοεῖσθαι, ἀλλὰ τὸν ἄνθρωπον τῇ ψυχῇ· τοῦτο δὲ μὴ ὡς ἐν ἐκείνῃ τῆς κινήσεως οὔσης, ἀλλ' ὁτὲ μὲν μέχρι ἐκείνης, ὁτὲ δ' ἀπ' ἐκείνης, οἷον ἡ μὲν αἴσθησις ἀπὸ τωνδί, ἡ δ' ἀνάμνησις ἀπ' ἐκείνης ἐπὶ τὰς ἐν τοῖς αἰσθητηρίοις κινήσεις ἢ μονάς.

b. The case of mind is different.

Mind is impassible

Ib., 408 b$^{18-30}$:

Ὁ δὲ νοῦς ἔοικεν ἐγγίνεσθαι οὐσία τις οὖσα, καὶ οὐ φθείρεσθαι. μάλιστα γὰρ ἐφθείρετ' ἂν ὑπὸ τῆς ἐν τῷ γήρᾳ ἀμαυρώσεως, νῦν δ' ἴσως ὅπερ ἐπὶ τῶν αἰσθητηρίων συμβαίνει· εἰ γὰρ λάβοι ὁ πρεσβύτης ὄμμα τοιονδί, βλέποι ἂν ὥσπερ καὶ ὁ νέος. ὥστε τὸ γῆρας οὐ τῷ τὴν ψυχήν τι πεπονθέναι, ἀλλ' ἐν ᾧ, καθάπερ ἐν μέθαις καὶ νόσοις. καὶ τὸ νοεῖν δὴ καὶ τὸ θεωρεῖν μαραίνεται ἄλλου τινὸς ἔσω φθειρομένου, αὐτὸ δὲ ἀπαθές ἐστιν. τὸ δὲ διανοεῖσθαι καὶ φιλεῖν ἢ μισεῖν οὐκ ἔστιν ἐκείνου πάθη, ἀλλὰ τουδὶ τοῦ ἔχοντος ἐκεῖνο, ᾗ ἐκεῖνο ἔχει. διὸ καὶ τούτου φθειρομένου οὔτε μνημονεύει οὔτε φιλεῖ· οὐ γὰρ ἐκείνου ἦν, ἀλλὰ τοῦ κοινοῦ, ὃ ἀπόλωλεν· ὁ δὲ νοῦς ἴσως θειότερόν τι καὶ ἀπαθές ἐστιν.

The unity of the soul

635—*De an.* I 5, 411 b$^{5-14}$:

Λέγουσι δή τινες μεριστὴν αὐτήν, καὶ ἄλλῳ μὲν νοεῖν ἄλλῳ δὲ ἐπιθυμεῖν. τί οὖν δή ποτε συνέχει τὴν ψυχήν, εἰ μεριστὴ πέφυκεν; οὐ γὰρ δὴ τό γε σῶμα· δοκεῖ γὰρ τοὐναντίον μᾶλλον ἡ ψυχὴ τὸ σῶμα συνέχειν· ἐξελθούσης γοῦν διαπνεῖται καὶ σήπεται. εἰ οὖν ἕτερόν τι μίαν αὐτὴν ποιεῖ, ἐκεῖνο μάλιστ' ἂν εἴη ψυχή. δεήσει δὲ πάλιν κἀκεῖνο ζητεῖν πότερον ἓν ἢ πολυμερές. εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἕν, διὰ τί οὐκ εὐθέως καὶ ἡ ψυχὴ ἕν; εἰ δὲ μεριστόν, πάλιν ὁ λόγος ζητήσει τί τὸ συνέχον ἐκεῖνο, καὶ οὕτω δὴ πρόεισιν ἐπὶ τὸ ἄπειρον.

636—After having discussed in the first Book the views of his predecessors, Ar. now proceeds to define soul in a general formula.

De an. II 1, 412 a^{3}-b^{9}:

Τὰ μὲν δὴ ὑπὸ τῶν πρότερον παραδεδομένα περὶ ψυχῆς εἰρήσθω· πάλιν δ' ὥσπερ ἐξ ὑπαρχῆς ἐπανίωμεν, πειρώμενοι διορίσαι τί ἐστι ψυχὴ καὶ τίς ἂν εἴη κοινότατος λόγος αὐτῆς. λέγομεν δὴ γένος ἕν τι τῶν ὄντων τὴν οὐσίαν, ταύτης δὲ τὸ μὲν ὡς ὕλην, ὃ καθ' αὑτὸ μὲν οὐκ ἔστι τόδε τι, ἕτερον δὲ μορφὴν καὶ εἶδος, καθ' ἣν ἤδη λέγεται τόδε τι, καὶ τρίτον τὸ ἐκ τούτων. ἔστι δ' ἡ μὲν ὕλη δύναμις, τὸ δ' εἶδος ἐντελέχεια, καὶ τοῦτο διχῶς, τὸ μὲν ὡς ἐπιστήμη, τὸ δ' ὡς τὸ θεωρεῖν. οὐσίαι δὲ μάλιστ' εἶναι δοκοῦσι τὰ σώματα, καὶ τούτων τὰ φυσικά· ταῦτα γὰρ τῶν ἄλλων ἀρχαί. τῶν δὲ φυσικῶν τὰ μὲν ἔχει ζωήν, τὰ δ' οὐκ ἔχει· ζωὴν δὲ λέγομεν τὴν δι' αὑτοῦ τροφήν τε καὶ αὔξησιν καὶ φθίσιν. ὥστε πᾶν σῶμα φυσικὸν μετέχον ζωῆς οὐσία ἂν εἴη, οὐσία δ' οὕτως ὡς συνθέτη. ἐπεὶ δ' ἐστὶ σῶμα καὶ τοιονδὶ τοῦτο, ζωὴν γὰρ ἔχον, οὐκ ἂν εἴη τὸ σῶμα ψυχή· οὐ γάρ ἐστι τῶν καθ' ὑποκειμένου τὸ σῶμα, μᾶλλον δ' ὡς ὑποκείμενον καὶ ὕλη. ἀναγκαῖον ἄρα τὴν ψυχὴν οὐσίαν εἶναι ὡς εἶδος σώματος φυσικοῦ δυνάμει ζωὴν ἔχοντος. ἡ δ' οὐσία ἐντελέχεια. τοιούτου ἄρα σώματος ἐντελέχεια.

Definition of soul

The form of a natural body

αὕτη δὲ λέγεται διχῶς, ἡ μὲν ὡς ἐπιστήμη, ἡ δ' ὡς τὸ θεωρεῖν. φανερὸν οὖν ὅτι ὡς ἐπιστήμη· ἐν γὰρ τῷ ὑπάρχειν τὴν ψυχὴν καὶ ὕπνος καὶ ἐγρήγορσίς ἐστιν, ἀνάλογον δ' ἡ μὲν ἐγρήγορσις τῷ θεωρεῖν, ὁ δ' ὕπνος τῷ ἔχειν καὶ μὴ ἐνεργεῖν· προτέρα δὲ τῇ γενέσει ἐπὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἡ ἐπιστήμη. διὸ ἡ ψυχή ἐστιν ἐντελέχεια ἡ πρώτη σώματος φυσικοῦ δυνάμει ζωὴν ἔχοντος. τοιοῦτο δέ, ὃ ἂν ᾖ ὀργανικόν. ὄργανα δὲ καὶ τὰ τῶν φυτῶν μέρη, ἀλλὰ παντελῶς ἁπλᾶ, οἷον τὸ φύλλον περικαρπίου σκέπασμα, τὸ δὲ περικάρπιον καρποῦ· αἱ δὲ ῥίζαι τῷ στόματι ἀνάλογον· ἄμφω γὰρ ἕλκει τὴν τροφήν. εἰ δή τι κοινὸν ἐπὶ πάσης ψυχῆς δεῖ λέγειν, εἴη ἂν ἐντελέχεια ἡ πρώτη σώματος φυσικοῦ ὀργανικοῦ. διὸ καὶ οὐ δεῖ ζητεῖν εἰ ἓν ἡ ψυχὴ καὶ τὸ σῶμα, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ τὸν κηρὸν καὶ τὸ σχῆμα, οὐδ' ὅλως τὴν ἑκάστου ὕλην καὶ τὸ οὗ ἡ ὕλη· τὸ γὰρ ἓν καὶ τὸ εἶναι ἐπεὶ πλεοναχῶς λέγεται, τὸ κυρίως ἡ ἐντελέχειά ἐστιν.

First entelechy

637—This definition implies (1) that soul is the essence of a natural body, (2) that it is not separable from body.

a. *De an.* II 1, 412 b$^{9-15}$:

Soul is the essence of a natural body

Καθόλου μὲν οὖν εἴρηται τί ἐστιν ἡ ψυχή· οὐσία γὰρ ἡ κατὰ τὸν λόγον. τοῦτο δὲ τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι τῷ τοιῳδὶ σώματι, καθάπερ εἴ τι τῶν ὀργάνων φυσικὸν ἦν σῶμα, οἷον πέλεκυς· ἦν μὲν γὰρ ἂν τὸ πελέκει εἶναι ἡ οὐσία αὐτοῦ, καὶ ἡ ψυχὴ τοῦτο· χωρισθείσης δὲ ταύτης οὐκ ἂν ἔτι πέλεκυς ἦν, ἀλλ' ἢ ὁμωνύμως. νῦν δ' ἐστὶ πέλεκυς.

b. Ib., 413 a$^{4-5}$:

Not separable from body

Ὅτι μὲν οὖν οὐκ ἔστιν ἡ ψυχὴ χωριστὴ τοῦ σώματος, ἢ μέρη τινὰ αὐτῆς, εἰ μεριστὴ πέφυκεν, οὐκ ἄδηλον.

638—Soul is characterized by life. Now this term has various meanings, of which the most general is self-nutrition and growth.

a. *De an.* II 2, 413 a$^{20-31}$:

Life

Λέγομεν οὖν ἀρχὴν λαβόντες τῆς σκέψεως, διωρίσθαι τὸ ἔμψυχον τοῦ ἀψύχου τῷ ζῆν. πλεοναχῶς δὲ τοῦ ζῆν λεγομένου, κἂν ἕν τι τούτων ἐνυπάρχῃ μόνον, ζῆν αὐτό φαμεν, οἷον νοῦς, αἴσθησις, κίνησις καὶ στάσις ἡ κατὰ τόπον, ἔτι κίνησις ἡ κατὰ τροφὴν καὶ φθίσις τε καὶ αὔξησις. διὸ καὶ τὰ φυόμενα πάντα δοκεῖ ζῆν· φαίνεται γὰρ ἐν αὐτοῖς ἔχοντα δύναμιν καὶ ἀρχὴν τοιαύτην, δι' ἧς αὔξησίν τε καὶ φθίσιν λαμβάνουσι κατὰ τοὺς ἐναντίους τόπους· οὐ γὰρ ἄνω μὲν αὔξεται, κάτω δ' οὔ, ἀλλ' ὁμοίως ἐπ' ἄμφω καὶ πάντῃ ἐκτρέφεται καὶ ζῇ διὰ τέλους, ἕως ἂν δύνηται λαμβάνειν τροφήν.

Its most general sense

b. Ib., 413 b$^{1-4}$:

Animals characterized by sensation

Τὸ μὲν οὖν ζῆν διὰ τὴν ἀρχὴν ταύτην ὑπάρχει τοῖς ζῶσι, τὸ δὲ ζῷον διὰ

τὴν αἴσθησιν πρώτως· καὶ γὰρ τὰ μὴ κινούμενα μηδ' ἀλλάττοντα τόπον, ἔχοντα δ' αἴσθησιν ζῷα λέγομεν καὶ οὐ ζῆν μόνον.

Mind, or the thinking power

c. Ib., 413 b$^{24-27}$:

Περὶ δὲ τοῦ νοῦ καὶ τῆς θεωρητικῆς δυνάμεως οὐδέν πω φανερόν, ἀλλ' ἔοικε ψυχῆς γένος ἕτερον εἶναι, καὶ τοῦτο μόνον ἐνδέχεται χωρίζεσθαι, καθάπερ τὸ ἀΐδιον τοῦ φθαρτοῦ.

639—A survey of the various psychic powers.

a. *De an.* II 3, 414a ^{29}-b^{6}, b$^{16-19}$:

The five psychic powers

Τῶν δὲ δυνάμεων τῆς ψυχῆς αἱ λεχθεῖσαι τοῖς μὲν ὑπάρχουσι πᾶσαι, καθάπερ 414a
εἴπομεν, τοῖς δὲ τινὲς αὐτῶν, ἐνίοις δὲ μία μόνη. δυνάμεις δ' εἴπομεν θρεπτικόν, 30
ὀρεκτικόν, αἰσθητικόν, κινητικὸν κατὰ τόπον, διανοητικόν. ὑπάρχει δὲ τοῖς
μὲν φυτοῖς τὸ θρεπτικὸν μόνον, ἑτέροις δὲ τοῦτό τε καὶ τὸ αἰσθητικόν. εἰ δὲ τὸ
αἰσθητικόν, καὶ τὸ ὀρεκτικόν· ὄρεξις μὲν γὰρ ἐπιθυμία καὶ θυμὸς καὶ βούλησις, 414b
τὰ δὲ ζῷα πάντ' ἔχουσι μίαν γε τῶν αἰσθήσεων, τὴν ἁφήν· ᾧ δ' αἴσθησις ὑπάρ-
χει, τούτῳ ἡδονή τε καὶ λύπη καὶ τὸ ἡδύ τε καὶ λυπηρόν, οἷς δὲ ταῦτα, καὶ ἡ 5
ἐπιθυμία· τοῦ γὰρ ἡδέος ὄρεξις αὕτη. — Περὶ δὲ φαντασίας ἄδηλον, ὕστερον 16
δ' ἐπισκεπτέον. ἐνίοις δὲ πρὸς τούτοις ὑπάρχει καὶ τὸ κατὰ τόπον κινητικόν,
ἑτέροις δὲ καὶ τὸ διανοητικόν τε καὶ νοῦς, οἷον ἀνθρώποις καὶ εἴ τι τοιοῦτον
ἕτερόν ἐστιν ἢ τιμιώτερον.

b. The higher power cannot exist apart from the lower, the lower can exist apart from the higher power.

Ib., 415 a$^{1-12}$:

The higher ones presuppose the lower

Ἄνευ μὲν γὰρ τοῦ θρεπτικοῦ τὸ αἰσθητικὸν οὐκ ἔστιν· τοῦ δ' αἰσθητικοῦ 415a
χωρίζεται τὸ θρεπτικὸν ἐν τοῖς φυτοῖς. πάλιν δ' ἄνευ μὲν τοῦ ἁπτικοῦ τῶν ἄλλων
αἰσθήσεων οὐδεμία ὑπάρχει, ἁφὴ δ' ἄνευ τῶν ἄλλων ὑπάρχει· πολλὰ γὰρ τῶν
ζῴων οὔτ' ὄψιν οὔτ' ἀκοὴν ἔχουσιν οὔτ' ὀσμῆς αἴσθησιν. καὶ τῶν αἰσθητικῶν 5
δὲ τὰ μὲν ἔχει τὸ κατὰ τόπον κινητικόν, τὰ δ' οὐκ ἔχει. τελευταῖον δὲ καὶ
ἐλάχιστα λογισμὸν καὶ διάνοιαν· οἷς μὲν γὰρ ὑπάρχει λογισμὸς τῶν φθαρτῶν,
τούτοις καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ πάντα, οἷς δ' ἐκείνων ἕκαστον, οὐ πᾶσι λογισμός, ἀλλὰ 10
τοῖς μὲν οὐδὲ φαντασία, τὰ δὲ ταύτῃ μόνῃ ζῶσιν. περὶ δὲ τοῦ θεωρητικοῦ νοῦ
ἕτερος λόγος.

640—The nutritive soul.

The nutritive soul

a. *De an.* II 4, 415 a$^{22-25}$:

Ὥστε πρῶτον περὶ τροφῆς καὶ γεννήσεως λεκτέον· ἡ γὰρ θρεπτικὴ ψυχὴ
καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ὑπάρχει, καὶ πρώτη καὶ κοινοτάτη δύναμίς ἐστι ψυχῆς καθ'
ἣν ὑπάρχει τὸ ζῆν ἅπασιν.

b. This first soul ought to be named the reproductive soul.

Ib., 416 b$^{20-25}$:

Ἐπεὶ δ' ἐστὶ τρία, τὸ τρεφόμενον καὶ ᾧ τρέφεται καὶ τὸ τρέφον, τὸ μὲν τρέφον ἐστὶν ἡ πρώτη ψυχή, τὸ δὲ τρεφόμενον τὸ ἔχον ταύτην σῶμα, ᾧ δὲ τρέφεται, ἡ τροφή. ἐπεὶ δὲ ἀπὸ τοῦ τέλους ἅπαντα προσαγορεύειν δίκαιον, τέλος δὲ τὸ γεννῆσαι οἷον αὐτό, εἴη ἂν ἡ πρώτη ψυχὴ γεννητικὴ οἷον αὐτό.

Cp. *De gen. an.* II 4, 740 b^{34}-741 a^{3}: Ἡ γαρ αὐτή ἐστιν ὕλη ᾗ αὐξάνεται καὶ ἐξ ἧς συνίσταται τὸ πρῶτον, ὥστε καὶ ἡ ποιοῦσα δύναμις ταὐτὸ τῷ ἐξ ἀρχῆς. μείζων δὲ αὕτη ἐστίν. εἰ οὖν αὕτη ἐστὶν ἡ θρεπτικὴ ψυχή, αὕτη ἐστὶ καὶ ἡ γεννῶσα· καὶ τοῦτ' ἐστὶν ἡ φύσις ἡ ἑκάστου, ἐνυπάρχουσα καὶ ἐν φυτοῖς καὶ ἐν ζῴοις πᾶσιν. τὰ δ' ἄλλα μόρια τῆς ψυχῆς τοῖς μὲν ὑπάρχει τοῖς δ' οὐχ ὑπάρχει τῶν ζῴων.

2—SENSE-PERCEPTION

641—Distinction between special and common objects of the senses.

De an. II 6, 418 a$^{10-20}$: **Special and common sensibles**

. . . τὸ μὲν ἴδιόν ἐστιν ἑκάστης αἰσθήσεως, τὸ δὲ κοινὸν πασῶν. λέγω δ' ἴδιον μὲν ὃ μὴ ἐνδέχεται ἑτέρᾳ αἰσθήσει αἰσθάνεσθαι, καὶ περὶ ὃ μὴ ἐνδέχεται ἀπατηθῆναι, οἷον ὄψις χρώματος καὶ ἀκοὴ ψόφου καὶ γεῦσις χυμοῦ. ἡ δ' ἁφὴ πλείους μὲν ἔχει διαφοράς· ἀλλ' ἑκάστη γε κρίνει περὶ τούτων, καὶ οὐκ ἀπατᾶται ὅτι χρῶμα οὐδ' ὅτι ψόφος, ἀλλὰ τί τὸ κεχρωσμένον ἢ ποῦ, ἢ τί τὸ ψοφοῦν ἢ ποῦ. τὰ μὲν οὖν τοιαῦτα λέγεται ἴδια ἑκάστου, κοινὰ δὲ κίνησις, ἠρεμία, ἀριθμός, σχῆμα, μέγεθος· τά γὰρ τοιαῦτα οὐδεμιᾶς ἐστιν ἴδια, ἀλλὰ κοινὰ πάσαις. καὶ γὰρ ἁφῇ κίνησίς τίς ἐστιν αἰσθητὴ καὶ ὄψει.

The same distinction is made by S. Thomas Aquinas, who speaks of sensibilia propria and communia in *S. th.* I, qu. 17, art. 2, and in qu. 78, art. 3.

642—The object of sight.

a. Ib., II 7, 418 a^{27}-b^{3}: **The object of sight**

Οὗ μὲν οὖν ἐστὶν ἡ ὄψις, τοῦτ' ἐστὶν ὁρατόν. ὁρατὸν δ' ἐστὶ χρῶμα μέν, καὶ ὃ λόγῳ μὲν ἔστιν εἰπεῖν, ἀνώνυμον δὲ τυγχάνει ὄν [1]· δῆλον δὲ ἔσται ὃ λέγομεν προελθοῦσι μάλιστα. τὸ γὰρ ὁρατόν ἐστι χρῶμα. τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶ τὸ ἐπὶ τοῦ καθ' αὑτὸ ὁρατοῦ· καθ' αὑτὸ δὲ οὐ τῷ λόγῳ [2], ἀλλ' ὅτι ἐν ἑαυτῷ ἔχει τὸ αἴτιον τοῦ εἶναι ὁρατόν. πᾶν δὲ χρῶμα κινητικόν ἐστι τοῦ κατ' ἐνέργειαν διαφανοῦς, καὶ τοῦτ' ἔστιν αὐτοῦ ἡ φύσις. διόπερ οὐχ ὁρατὸν ἄνευ φωτός, ἀλλὰ πᾶν τὸ ἑκάστου χρῶμα ἐν φωτὶ ὁρᾶται.

[1] He alludes to phosphorescing objects, which can be seen only in darkness.
[2] It is visible, not by its essence, but per accidens.

Light

b. What is light. Ib., 418 b^{3-13}, b^{18-20}:

Διὸ περὶ φωτὸς πρῶτον λεκτέον τί ἐστιν. ἔστι δή τι διαφανές. διαφανὲς δὲ λέγω ὃ ἔστι μὲν ὁρατόν, οὐ καθ' αὑτὸ δὲ ὁρατὸν ὡς ἁπλῶς εἰπεῖν, ἀλλὰ δι' ἀλλότριον χρῶμα. τοιοῦτον δέ ἐστιν ἀὴρ καὶ ὕδωρ καὶ πολλὰ τῶν στερεῶν· οὐ γὰρ ᾗ ὕδωρ οὐδ' ᾗ ἀήρ, διαφανές, ἀλλ' ὅτι ἐστὶ φύσις ὑπάρχουσα ἡ αὐτὴ ἐν τούτοις ἀμφοτέροις καὶ ἐν τῷ ἀϊδίῳ τῷ ἄνω σώματι [1]. φῶς δέ ἐστιν ἡ τούτου ἐνέργεια, τοῦ διαφανοῦς ᾗ διαφανές. δυνάμει δὲ ἐν ᾧ τοῦτ' ἐστὶ καὶ τὸ σκότος. τὸ δὲ φῶς οἷον χρῶμά ἐστι τοῦ διαφανοῦς, ὅταν ᾖ ἐντελεχείᾳ διαφανὲς ὑπὸ πυρὸς ἢ τοιούτου οἷον τὸ ἄνω σῶμα· καὶ γὰρ τούτῳ τι ὑπάρχει ἓν καὶ ταὐτόν. —

Darkness

Δοκεῖ τε τὸ φῶς ἐναντίον εἶναι τῷ σκότει· ἔστι δὲ τὸ σκότος στέρησις τῆς τοιαύτης ἕξεως ἐκ διαφανοῦς, ὥστε δῆλον ὅτι καὶ ἡ τούτου παρουσία τὸ φῶς ἐστιν.

Sound

643—a. *De an.* II 8, 419 b^{9-13}:

Γίνεται δ' ὁ κατ' ἐνέργειαν ψόφος ἀεί τινος πρός τι καὶ ἔν τινι· πληγὴ γάρ ἐστιν ἡ ποιοῦσα. διὸ καὶ ἀδύνατον ἑνὸς ὄντος γενέσθαι ψόφον· ἕτερον γὰρ τὸ τύπτον καὶ τὸ τυπτόμενον· ὥστε τὸ ψοφοῦν πρός τι ψοφεῖ· πληγὴ δ' οὐ γίνεται ἄνευ φορᾶς.

Voice

b. Ib., 420 b^{13}-421 a^{4}:

Φωνὴ δ' ἐστὶ ζῴου ψόφος, καὶ οὐ τῷ τυχόντι μορίῳ. ἀλλ' ἐπεὶ πᾶν ψοφεῖ τύπτοντός τινος καί τι καὶ ἔν τινι, τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶν ἀήρ, εὐλόγως ἂν φωνοίη ταῦτα μόνα ὅσα δέχεται τὸν ἀέρα. ἤδη γὰρ τῷ ἀναπνεομένῳ καταχρῆται ἡ φύσις ἐπὶ δύο ἔργα, καθάπερ τῇ γλώττῃ ἐπί τε τὴν γεῦσιν καὶ τὴν διάλεκτον, ὧν ἡ μὲν γεῦσις ἀναγκαῖον (διὸ καὶ πλείοσιν ὑπάρχει), ἡ δ' ἑρμηνεία ἕνεκεν τοῦ εὖ, οὕτω καὶ τῷ πνεύματι τε τὴν θερμότητα τὴν ἐντὸς ὡς ἀναγκαῖον (τὸ δ' αἴτιον ἐν ἑτέροις εἰρήσεται) καὶ πρὸς τὴν φωνήν, ὅπως ὑπάρχῃ τὸ εὖ.

How produced

Ὄργανον δὲ τῇ ἀναπνοῇ ὁ φάρυγξ· οὗ δ' ἕνεκα καὶ τὸ μόριόν ἐστι τοῦτο, πλεύμων· τούτῳ γὰρ τῷ μορίῳ πλεῖστον ἔχει τὸ θερμὸν τὰ πεζὰ τῶν ἄλλων. δεῖται δὲ τῆς ἀναπνοῆς καὶ ὁ περὶ τὴν καρδίαν τόπος πρῶτος. διὸ ἀναγκαῖον εἴσω ἀναπνεομένου εἰσιέναι τὸν ἀέρα, ὥστε ἡ πληγὴ τοῦ ἀναπνεομένου ἀέρος ὑπὸ τῆς ἐν τούτοις τοῖς μορίοις ψυχῆς πρὸς τὴν καλουμένην ἀρτηρίαν φωνή ἐστιν. οὐ γὰρ πᾶς ζῴου ψόφος φωνή, καθάπερ εἴπομεν (ἔστι γὰρ καὶ τῇ γλώττῃ ψοφεῖν καὶ ὡς οἱ βήττοντες), ἀλλὰ δεῖ ἔμψυχόν τε εἶναι τὸ τύπτον καὶ μετὰ φαντασίας τινός· σημαντικὸς γὰρ δή τις ψόφος ἐστὶν ἡ φωνή· καὶ οὐ τοῦ ἀναπνεομένου ἀέρος, ὥσπερ ἡ βήξ, ἀλλὰ τούτῳ τύπτει τὸν ἐν τῇ ἀρτηρίᾳ πρὸς αὐτήν. σημεῖον δὲ τὸ μὴ δύνασθαι φωνεῖν ἀναπνέοντα πρὸς αὐτήν. σημεῖον

[1] He means his fifth element, the aether, which constitutes the celestial sphere, in which the heavenly bodies move.

δὲ τὸ μὴ δύνασθαι φωνεῖν ἀναπνέοντα μηδ' ἐκπνέοντα, ἀλλὰ κατέχοντα· κινεῖ γὰρ τούτῳ ὁ κατέχων. φανερὸν δὲ καὶ διότι οἱ ἰχθύες ἄφωνοι· οὐ γὰρ ἔχουσι φάρυγγα. **Why fish are mute**

644—Intelligence is, according to Ar., dependent on the sense of touch.

De an. II 9, 421 a$^{20-26}$: **Intelligence and the sense of touch**

20 Ἐν μὲν γὰρ ταῖς ἄλλαις (sc. αἰσθήσεσι) λείπεται (ὁ ἄνθρωπος) πολλῶν τῶν ζῴων, κατὰ δὲ τὴν ἁφὴν πολλῷ τῶν ἄλλων διαφερόντως ἀκριβοῖ. διὸ καὶ φρονιμώτατόν ἐστι τῶν ζῴων. σημεῖον δὲ τὸ καὶ ἐν τῷ γένει τῶν ἀνθρώπων παρὰ τὸ αἰσθητήριον τοῦτο εἶναι εὐφυεῖς καὶ ἀφυεῖς, παρ' ἄλλο δὲ μηδέν· οἱ
25 μὲν γὰρ σκληρόσαρκοι ἀφυεῖς τὴν διάνοιαν, οἱ δὲ μαλακόσαρκοι εὐφυεῖς.

645—Why man smells only when he inhales.

De an. II 9, 421 b^{8}-422 a^{6}: **Smell in man and in other animals**

421b Ἔστι δὲ καὶ ἡ ὄσφρησις διὰ τοῦ μεταξύ, οἷον ἀέρος ἢ ὕδατος· καὶ γὰρ τὰ
10 ἔνυδρα δοκοῦσιν ὀσμῆς αἰσθάνεσθαι, ὁμοίως καὶ ἔναιμα καὶ ἄναιμα, ὥσπερ καὶ τὰ ἐν τῷ ἀέρι· καὶ γὰρ τούτων ἔνια πόρρωθεν ἀπαντᾷ πρὸς τὴν τροφὴν ὕποσμα γινόμενα, διὸ καὶ ἄπορον φαίνεται, εἰ πάντα μὲν ὁμοίως ὀσμᾶται, ὁ δ' ἄνθρωπος
15 ἀναπνέων, μὴ ἀναπνέων δὲ ἀλλ' ἐκπνέων ἢ κατέχων τὸ πνεῦμα οὐκ ὀσμᾶται, οὔτε πόρρωθεν οὔτ' ἐγγύθεν, οὐδ' ἂν ἐπὶ τοῦ μυκτῆρος ἐντὸς τεθῇ· καὶ τὸ μὲν ἐπ' αὐτῷ τιθέμενον τῷ αἰσθητηρίῳ ἀναίσθητον εἶναι κοινὸν πάντων· ἀλλὰ τὸ ἄνευ τοῦ ἀναπνεῖν μὴ αἰσθάνεσθαι ἴδιον τῶν ἀνθρώπων· δῆλον δὲ πειρωμένοις.
20 ὥστε τὰ ἄναιμα, ἐπειδὴ οὐκ ἀναπνέουσιν, ἑτέραν ἄν τιν' αἴσθησιν ἔχοι παρὰ τὰς λεγομένας. ἀλλ' ἀδύνατον, εἴπερ τῆς ὀσμῆς αἰσθάνεται· ἡ γὰρ τοῦ ὀσφραντοῦ αἴσθησις καὶ δυσώδους καὶ εὐώδους ὄσφρησίς ἐστιν. ἔτι δὲ καὶ φθειρόμενα φαίνεται ὑπὸ τῶν ἰσχυρῶν ὀσμῶν ὑφ' ὧνπερ ἄνθρωπος, οἷον ἀσφάλτου καὶ
25 θείου καὶ τῶν τοιούτων. ὀσφραίνεσθαι μὲν οὖν ἀναγκαῖον, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἀναπνέοντα. ἔοικε δὲ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις διαφέρειν τὸ αἰσθητήριον τοῦτο πρὸς τὸ τῶν ἄλλων ζῴων, ὥσπερ τὰ ὄμματα πρὸς τὰ τῶν σκληροφθάλμων· τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἔχει φράγμα
30 καὶ ὥσπερ ἔλυτρον τὰ βλέφαρα, ἃ μὴ κινήσας μηδ' ἀνασπάσας οὐχ ὁρᾷ· τὰ δὲ σκληρόφθαλμα οὐδὲν ἔχει τοιοῦτον, ἀλλ' εὐθέως ὁρᾷ τὲ γινόμενα ἐν τῷ διαφανεῖ· οὕτως οὖν καὶ τὸ ὀσφραντικὸν αἰσθητήριον τοῖς μὲν ἀκάλυφες εἶναι,
422a ὥσπερ τὸ ὄμμα, τοῖς δὲ τὸν ἀέρα δεχομένοις ἔχειν ἐπικάλυμμα, ὃ ἀναπνεόντων ἀποκαλύπτεσθαι, διευρυνομένων τῶν φλεβίων καὶ τῶν πόρων. καὶ διὰ τοῦτο τὰ ἀναπνέοντα οὐκ ὀσμᾶται ἐν τῷ ὑγρῷ· ἀναγκαῖον γὰρ ὀσφρανθῆναι ἀναπνεύ-
5 σαντα, τοῦτο δὲ ποιεῖν ἐν τῷ ὑγρῷ ἀδύνατον.

646—Taste and touch do not take place through an interposed foreign body.

Taste and touch

De an. II 10, 422 a$^{8-10}$:

Τὸ δὲ γευστόν ἐστιν ἁπτόν τι· καὶ τοῦτ' αἴτιον τοῦ μὴ εἶναι αἰσθητὸν διὰ τοῦ μεταξὺ ἀλλοτρίου ὄντος σώματος· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἡ ἁφή.

647—General description of a "sense".

"Sense" in general

De an. II 12, 424 a$^{17-24}$:

Καθόλου δὲ περὶ πάσης αἰσθήσεως δεῖ λαβεῖν ὅτι ἡ μὲν αἴσθησίς ἐστι τὸ 424a
δεκτικὸν τῶν αἰσθητῶν εἰδῶν ἄνευ τῆς ὕλης, οἷον κηρὸς τοῦ δακτυλίου ἄνευ
τοῦ σιδήρου καὶ τοῦ χρυσοῦ δέχεται τὸ σημεῖον, λαμβάνει δὲ τὸ χρυσοῦν ἢ 20
τὸ χαλκοῦν σημεῖον, ἀλλ' οὐχ ᾗ χρυσὸς ἢ χαλκός· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἡ αἴσθησις
ἑκάστου ὑπὸ τοῦ ἔχοντος χρῶμα ἢ χυμὸν ἢ ψόφον πάσχει, ἀλλ' οὐχ ᾗ ἕκαστον
ἐκείνων λέγεται, ἀλλ' ᾗ τοιονδί, καὶ κατὰ τὸν λόγον [1].

3—THINKING

648—In his third Book *De anima* Ar. treats *noûs* or the thinking power. The first stage superior to the senses, namely that faculty by which we distinguish the object of one sense from that of the other, is discussed in the following passage.

The "sensus interior"

De an. III 2, 426 b$^{8-21}$:

Ἑκάστη μὲν οὖν αἴσθησις τοῦ ὑποκειμένου αἰσθητοῦ ἐστίν, ὑπάρχουσα ἐν 426b
τῷ αἰσθητηρίῳ ᾗ αἰσθητήριον, καὶ κρίνει τὰς τοῦ ὑποκειμένου αἰσθητοῦ δια- 10
φοράς, οἷον λευκὸν μὲν καὶ μέλαν ὄψις, γλυκὺ δὲ καὶ πικρὸν γεῦσις. ὁμοίως δ'
ἔχει τοῦτο καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων. ἐπεὶ δὲ καὶ τὸ λευκὸν καὶ τὸ γλυκὺ καὶ ἕκαστον
τῶν αἰσθητῶν πρὸς ἕκαστον κρίνομεν, τίνι καὶ αἰσθανόμεθα ὅτι διαφέρει;
ἀνάγκη δὴ αἰσθήσει· αἰσθητὰ γάρ ἐστιν. ᾗ καὶ δῆλον ὅτι ἡ σὰρξ οὐκ ἔστι τὸ 15
ἔσχατον αἰσθητήριον· ἀνάγκη γὰρ ἦν ἁπτόμενον αὐτοῦ κρίνειν τὸ κρῖνον. οὔτε
δὴ κεχωρισμένοις ἐνδέχεται κρίνειν ὅτι ἕτερον τὸ γλυκὺ τοῦ λευκοῦ, ἀλλὰ δεῖ
ἑνί τινι ἄμφω δῆλα εἶναι. οὕτω μὲν γὰρ κἂν εἰ τοῦ μὲν ἐγὼ τοῦ δὲ σὺ αἴσθοιο,
δῆλον ἂν εἴη ὅτι ἕτερα ἀλλήλων. δεῖ δὲ τὸ ἓν λέγειν ὅτι ἕτερον· ἕτερον γὰρ τὸ 20
γλυκὺ τοῦ λευκοῦ. λέγει ἄρα τὸ αὐτό.

The problem was first formulated by Plato, *Theaet.* 185a [2]. S. Augustine, in *De libero arbitrio* II 3, 8, qualifies that faculty by which we judge "quid ad quemque sensum pertineat, et quid inter se vel omnes vel quidam eorum communiter habeant", as a *sensus interior*, and distinguishes it from reason, because animals too possess it. "Namque aliud est quo videt bestia, aliud quo ea quae videndo sentit, vel vitat vel appetit: ille enim sensus in oculis est, ille autem intus in ipsa anima".

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[1] According to its "form" or formulable essence.

[2] Our nr. **319a**.

649—Difference between thinking and perceiving.

a. Thinking and perceiving identified by the ancients.

De an. III 3, 427 a^{19}-b^{5}: **Thinking and perceiving**

427a Δοκεῖ δὲ καὶ τὸ νοεῖν καὶ τὸ φρονεῖν ὥσπερ αἰσθάνεσθαί τι εἶναι (ἐν ἀμφο-
20 τέροις γὰρ τούτοις κρίνει τι ἡ ψυχὴ καὶ γνωρίζει τῶν ὄντων), καὶ οἵ γε ἀρχαῖοι τὸ φρονεῖν καὶ τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι ταὐτὸν εἶναί φασιν, ὥσπερ καὶ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς εἴρηκε [1]·

»πρὸς παρεὸν γὰρ μῆτις ἀέξεται ἀνθρώποισιν.«

25 καὶ ἐν ἄλλοις· ὅθεν

«σφίσιν αἰεὶ
καὶ τὸ φρονεῖν ἀλλοῖα παρίσταται . . . »

τὸ δ' αὐτὸ τούτοις βούλεται καὶ τὸ Ὁμήρου »τοῖος γὰρ νόος ἐστίν« [2]· πάντες γὰρ οὗτοι τὸ νοεῖν σωματικὸν ὥσπερ τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι ὑπολαμβάνουσιν καὶ αἰσθάνεσθαί τε καὶ φρονεῖν τῷ ὁμοίῳ τὸ ὅμοιον, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐν τοῖς κατ' ἀρχὰς λόγοις
427b διωρίσαμεν· καίτοι ἔδει ἅμα καὶ περὶ τοῦ ἠπατῆσθαι αὐτοὺς λέγειν, οἰκειότερον γὰρ τοῖς ζῴοις, καὶ πλείω χρόνον ἐν τούτῳ διατελεῖ ἡ ψυχή· διὸ ἀνάγκη ἤτοι, ὥσπερ ἔνιοι λέγουσι, πάντα τὰ φαινόμενα εἶναι ἀληθῆ, ἢ τὴν τοῦ ἀνομοίου
5 θίξιν ἀπάτην εἶναι, τοῦτο γὰρ ἐναντίον τῷ τὸ ὅμοιον τῷ ὁμοίῳ γνωρίζειν.

b. Thinking is different from perceiving. It is partly imagination, partly judgment.

Ib., 427 b$^{27-29}$:

Περὶ δὲ τοῦ νοεῖν, ἐπεὶ ἕτερον τοῦ αἰσθάνεσθαι, τούτου δὲ τὸ μὲν φαντασία δοκεῖ εἶναι τὸ δὲ ὑπόληψις, περὶ φαντασίας διορίσαντας οὕτω περὶ θατέρου λεκτέον.

650—Imagination. **Imagination**

a. It is neither sense, nor opinion.

Ib., 428 a$^{5-22}$, b$^{9-10}$:

428a Ὅτι μὲν οὖν οὐκ ἔστιν αἴσθησις, δῆλον ἐκ τῶνδε. αἴσθησις μὲν γὰρ ἤτοι **Neither sense**
δύναμις ἢ ἐνέργεια, οἷον ὄψις καὶ ὅρασις, φαίνεται δέ τι καὶ μηδετέρου ὑπάρχοντος τούτων, οἷον τὰ ἐν τοῖς ὕπνοις. εἶτα αἴσθησις μὲν ἀεὶ πάρεστι, φαντασία
10 δ' οὔ. εἰ δὲ τῇ ἐνεργείᾳ τὸ αὐτό, πᾶσιν ἂν ἐνδέχοιτο τοῖς θηρίοις φαντασίαν ὑπάρχειν· δοκεῖ δ' οὔ. οἷον μύρμηκι ἢ μελίττῃ ἢ σκώληκι. εἶτα αἱ μὲν ἀληθεῖς αἰεί, αἱ δὲ φαντασίαι γίνονται αἱ πλείους ψευδεῖς. ἔπειτ' οὐδὲ λέγομεν, ὅταν

[1] Emped. fr. 106 and 108 (*Gr. Ph.* I p. 61 n. 2, to nr. **113a**).
[2] From Od. XVIII 136 ff.

ἐνεργῶμεν ἀκριβῶς περὶ τὸ αἰσθητόν, ὅτι φαίνεται τοῦτο ἡμῖν ἄνθρωπος· ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ὅταν μὴ ἐναργῶς αἰσθανώμεθα· τότε ἢ ἀληθὴς ἢ ψευδής. καὶ ὅπερ δὲ ἐλέγομεν πρότερον, φαίνεται καὶ μύουσιν ὁράματα. ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ τῶν ἀεὶ ἀληθευόντων οὐδεμία ἔσται, οἷον ἐπιστήμη ἢ νοῦς· ἔστι γὰρ φαντασία καὶ ψευδής. λείπεται ἄρα ἰδεῖν εἰ δόξα· γίνεται γὰρ δόξα καὶ ἀληθὴς καὶ ψευδής.

nor opinion ἀλλὰ δόξῃ μὴν ἕπεται πίστις (οὐκ ἐνδέχεται γὰρ δοξάζοντα οἷς δοκεῖ μὴ πιστεύειν), τῶν δὲ θηρίων οὐθενὶ ὑπάρχει πίστις, φαντασία δ' ἐν πολλοῖς. — Οὔτ' ἄρα ἕν τι τούτων ἐστὶν οὔτ' ἐκ τούτων ἡ φαντασία.

b. What is imagination.

What it is Ib., 428 b[10-17], 428 b[30]-429 a[4]:

'Αλλ' ἐπειδή ἐστι κινηθέντος τουδὶ κινεῖσθαι ἕτερον ὑπὸ τούτου, ἡ δὲ φαν- 428b
τασία κίνησίς τις δοκεῖ εἶναι καὶ οὐκ ἄνευ αἰσθήσεως γίγνεσθαι ἀλλ' αἰσθανομένοις καὶ ὧν αἴσθησίς ἐστιν, ἔστι δὲ γίνεσθαι κίνησιν ὑπὸ τῆς ἐνεργείας τῆς αἰσθήσεως, καὶ ταύτην ὁμοίαν ἀνάγκη εἶναι τῇ αἰσθήσει, εἴη ἂν αὕτη ἡ κίνησις οὔτε ἄνευ αἰσθήσεως ἐνδεχομένη οὔτε μὴ αἰσθανομένοις ὑπάρχειν, καὶ πολλὰ κατ' αὐτὴν καὶ ποιεῖν καὶ πάσχειν τὸ ἔχον, καὶ εἶναι καὶ ἀληθῆ καὶ ψευδῆ. —

Definition Εἰ οὖν μηθὲν μὲν ἄλλο ἔχοι ἢ τὰ εἰρημένα ἡ φαντασία, τοῦτο δ' ἔστι τὸ λεχθέν, ἡ φαντασία ἂν εἴη κίνησις ὑπὸ τῆς αἰσθήσεως τῆς κατ' ἐνέργειαν γιγνο- 429a
μένης. ἐπεὶ δ' ἡ ὄψις μάλιστα αἴσθησίς ἐστι, καὶ τὸ ὄνομα ἀπὸ τοῦ φάους εἴληφεν, ὅτι ἄνευ φωτὸς οὐκ ἔστιν ἰδεῖν.

651—The thinking part of the soul.

Thinking *De an.* III 4, 429 a[10-13]:

Περὶ δὲ τοῦ μορίου τοῦ τῆς ψυχῆς ᾧ γινώσκει τε ἡ ψυχὴ καὶ φρονεῖ, εἴτε χωριστοῦ ὄντος εἴτε καὶ μὴ χωριστοῦ κατὰ μέγεθος ἀλλὰ κατὰ λόγον, σκεπτέον τίν' ἔχει διαφοράν, καὶ πῶς ποτὲ γίνεται τὸ νοεῖν.

A passive faculty **a.** Ib., 429 a[13-29]:

Εἰ δή ἐστι τὸ νοεῖν ὥσπερ τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι, ἢ πάσχειν τι ἂν εἴη ὑπὸ τοῦ νοητοῦ 429a
ἤ τι τοιοῦτον ἕτερον. ἀπαθὲς ἄρα δεῖ εἶναι, δεκτικὸν δὲ τοῦ εἴδους καὶ δυνάμει τοιοῦτον ἀλλὰ μὴ τοῦτο [1], καὶ ὁμοίως ἔχειν, ὥσπερ τὸ αἰσθητικὸν πρὸς τὰ αἰσθητά, οὕτω τὸν νοῦν πρὸς τὰ νοητά. ἀνάγκη ἄρα, ἐπεὶ πάντα νοεῖ, ἀμιγῆ εἶναι, ὥσπερ φησὶν 'Αναξαγόρας, ἵνα κρατῇ, τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶν ἵνα γνωρίζῃ· παρεμφαινόμενον γὰρ κωλύει τὸ ἀλλότριον καὶ ἀντιφράττει· ὥστε μηδ' αὐτοῦ εἶναι φύσιν μηδεμίαν ἀλλ' ἢ ταύτην, ὅτι δυνατόν. ὁ ἄρα καλούμενος τῆς ψυχῆς

[1] The mind "becomes its objects" in actual knowledge. Therefore, the thinking power must be *potentially* identical with its possible objects. *Animus est quodammodo omnia,* as it is formulated later by S. Thomas Aquinas.

νοῦς (λέγω δὲ νοῦν ᾧ διανοεῖται καὶ ὑπολαμβάνει ἡ ψυχή) οὐθέν ἐστιν ἐνεργείᾳ
25 τῶν ὄντων πρὶν νοεῖν. διὸ οὐδὲ μεμῖχθαι εὔλογον αὐτὸν τῷ σώματι· ποιός τις γὰρ ἂν γίγνοιτο, ἢ ψυχρὸς ἢ θερμός, ἢ κἂν ὄργανόν τι εἴη, ὥσπερ τῷ αἰσθητικῷ· νῦν δ' οὐθέν ἐστιν. καὶ εὖ δὴ οἱ λέγοντες τὴν ψυχὴν εἶναι τόπον εἰδῶν [1], πλὴν ὅτι οὔτε ὅλη ἀλλ' ἡ νοητική, οὔτε ἐντελεχείᾳ ἀλλὰ δυνάμει τὰ εἴδη.

b. Since in the above passage thinking is qualified as a passive process, while on the other hand *noûs* is described as being ἀπαθής and ἀμιγής, an objection might arise.

Ib., 429 b$^{22-26}$: **Objection**

'Απορήσειε δ' ἄν τις, εἰ ὁ νοῦς ἁπλοῦν ἐστὶ καὶ ἀπαθὲς καὶ μηθενὶ μηθὲν ἔχει κοινόν, ὥσπερ φησὶν 'Αναξαγόρας, πῶς νοήσει, εἰ τὸ νοεῖν πάσχειν τί ἐστιν. ᾗ γάρ τι κοινὸν ἀμφοῖν ὑπάρχει, τὸ μὲν ποιεῖν δοκεῖ τὸ δὲ πάσχειν.

c. Ar. replies, 429 b^{29}-430 a^{2}: **Reply**

. . . τὸ μὲν πάσχειν κατὰ κοινόν τι διῄρηται πρότερον, ὅτι δυνάμει πώς ἐστι τὰ νοητὰ ὁ νοῦς, ἀλλ' ἐντελεχείᾳ οὐδέν, πρὶν ἂν νοῇ. δεῖ δ' οὕτως ὥσπερ
430a ἐν γραμματείῳ ᾧ μηθὲν ὑπάρχει ἐντελεχείᾳ γεγραμμένον, ὅπερ συμβαίνει ἐπὶ τοῦ νοῦ.

652—Mind is not *only* a passive faculty.

De an. III 5, 430 a$^{10-25}$: **Active mind**

10 'Επεὶ δ' ὥσπερ ἐν ἁπάσῃ τῇ φύσει ἐστί τι τὸ μὲν ὕλη ἑκάστῳ γένει (τοῦτο δὲ ὃ πάντα δυνάμει ἐκεῖνα), ἕτερον δὲ τὸ αἴτιον καὶ ποιητικόν, τῷ ποιεῖν πάντα, οἷον ἡ τέχνη πρὸς τὴν ὕλην πέπονθεν, ἀνάγκη καὶ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ὑπάρχειν ταύτας τὰς διαφοράς. καὶ ἔστιν ὁ μὲν τοιοῦτος νοῦς τῷ πάντα γίνεσθαι, ὁ δὲ τῷ πάντα
15 ποιεῖν, ὡς ἕξις τις, οἷον τὸ φῶς· τρόπον γάρ τινα καὶ τὸ φῶς ποιεῖ τὰ δυνάμει ὄντα χρώματα ἐνεργείᾳ χρώματα. καὶ οὗτος ὁ νοῦς χωριστὸς καὶ ἀπαθὴς καὶ ἀμιγής, τῇ οὐσίᾳ ὢν ἐνεργείᾳ. ἀεὶ γὰρ τιμιώτερον τὸ ποιοῦν τοῦ πάσχοντος καὶ
20 ἡ ἀρχὴ τῆς ὕλης. τὸ δ' αὐτό ἐστιν ἡ κατ' ἐνέργειαν ἐπιστήμη τῷ πράγματι· ἡ δὲ κατὰ δύναμιν χρόνῳ προτέρα ἐν τῷ ἑνί, ὅλως δὲ οὐ χρόνῳ· ἀλλ' οὐχ ὁτὲ μὲν νοεῖ ὁτὲ δ' οὐ νοεῖ. χωρισθεὶς δ' ἐστὶ μόνον τοῦθ' ὅπερ ἐστί, καὶ τοῦτο μόνον ἀθάνατον καὶ ἀΐδιον. οὐ μνημονεύομεν δέ, ὅτι τοῦτο μὲν ἀπαθές, ὁ δὲ παθητικὸς
25 νοῦς φθαρτός, καὶ ἄνευ τούτου οὐθὲν νοεῖ.

Cp. the next nr.

653—With this description of the νοῦς ποιητικός, as it is called later, we might compare the following passage from the *De gen. anim.*, where

[1] The formula τόπος εἰδῶν does not occur in Plato's Dialogues, but it expresses fairly well his view of the soul.

it is argued that no material activity can exist apart from a body, and consequently, that no bodily activity could enter from outside. Exception is to be made for noûs exclusively, for only noûs has no connexion with any bodily activity.

Noûs enters from outside

De gen. an. II 3, 736 b$^{22-29}$:

"Οσων γάρ ἐστιν ἀρχῶν ἡ ἐνέργεια σωματική, δῆλον ὅτι ταύτας ἄνευ σώματος ἀδύνατον ὑπάρχειν, οἷον βαδίζειν ἄνευ τοδῶν· ὥστε καὶ θύραθεν εἰσιέναι ἀδύνατον. οὔτε γὰρ αὐτὰς καθ' αὑτὰς εἰσιέναι οἷόν τε ἀχωρίστους οὔσας, οὔτ' ἐν σώματι εἰσιέναι· τὸ γὰρ σπέρμα περίττωμα μεταβαλλούσης τῆς τροφῆς ἐστίν. λείπεται δὲ τὸν νοῦν μόνον θύραθεν ἐπεισιέναι καὶ θεῖον εἶναι μόνον· οὐθὲν γὰρ αὐτοῦ τῇ ἐνεργείᾳ κοινωνεῖ σωματικὴ ἐνέργεια.

SEVENTEENTH CHAPTER
RHETORIC AND POETICS

1—THE RHETORIC

654—Aristotle's *Rhetoric* is closely related with his logical writings, at least with the *Topics* and *Analytics*. This does not imply, however, that it should belong to the same period of Aristotle's life. Not only the political event mentioned in II 23, points to a date after 339 [1]; indeed, chapters like 12-14 of the same book can hardly be the work of a young man.

a. Against Plato's *Gorgias* Aristotle defends that rhetoric is a τέχνη, which ought to have a special method.

Rhet. I 1, 1354 a$^{1-11}$: **Rhetoric the counterpart of dialectic**

1354a Ἡ ῥητορικὴ ἐστιν ἀντίστροφος τῇ διαλεκτικῇ [2]· ἀμφότεραι γὰρ περὶ τοιούτων εἰσὶν ἃ κοινὰ τρόπον τινὰ ἁπάντων ἐστὶ γνωρίζειν καὶ οὐδεμιᾶς ἐπιστήμης ἀφωρισμένης. διὸ καὶ πάντες τρόπον τινὰ μετέχουσιν ἀμφοῖν· πάντες γὰρ μέχρι τινὸς καὶ ἐξετάζειν καὶ ὑπέχειν λόγον καὶ ἀπολογεῖσθαι καὶ κατηγορεῖν ἐγχειροῦσιν. τῶν μὲν οὖν πολλῶν οἱ μὲν εἰκῇ ταῦτα δρῶσιν, οἱ δὲ διὰ συνήθειαν ἀπὸ ἕξεως. ἐπεὶ δ' ἀμφοτέρως ἐνδέχεται, δῆλον ὅτι εἴη ἂν αὐτὰ καὶ ὁδοποιεῖν· δι' ὃ γὰρ ἐπιτυγχάνουσιν οἵ τε διὰ συνήθειαν καὶ οἱ ἀπὸ ταὐτομάτου, τὴν αἰτίαν θεωρεῖν ἐνδέχεται, τὸ δὲ τοιοῦτον ἤδη πάντες ἂν ὁμολογήσαιεν τέχνης ἔργον εἶναι.

b. Against existing treatises on "the Art of Speech", composed by professional rhetors, he complains that their authors always neglected the argumentative element of rhetoric, which is, in fact, its essential part.

Ib., 1354 a$^{11-18}$: **Defect of existing treatises**

Νῦν μὲν οὖν οἱ τὰς τέχνας τῶν λόγων συντιθέντες ὀλίγον πεπορίκασιν αὐτῆς μόριον· αἱ γὰρ πίστεις ἔντεχνόν ἐστι μόνον, τὰ δ' ἄλλα προσθῆκαι, οἱ δὲ περὶ μὲν ἐνθυμημάτων [3] οὐδὲν λέγουσιν, ὅπερ ἐστὶ σῶμα τῆς πίστεως, περὶ

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[1] See M. Dufour's Introduction to Ar.'s *Rhetoric*, Paris 1932, p. 14 f.

[2] On the meaning of the term *dialectic* in Aristotle see our nr. **435** sub **a** and **b**, and the text of *Top.* I 1 cited there.

[3] The *enthymema* has been defined by Ar. in the *Anal. Pr.* II 27, 70 a$^{10-11}$, as a syllogism from probabilities or signs.

δὲ τῶν ἔξω τοῦ πράγματος τὰ πλεῖστα πραγματεύονται· διαβολὴ γὰρ καὶ ἔλεος καὶ ὀργὴ καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα πάθη τῆς ψυχῆς οὐ περὶ τοῦ πράγματός ἐστιν ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὸν δικαστήν.

655—The use of rhetoric.

a. As means of producing conviction.

Use of rhetoric

Rhet. I 1, 1355 a[20-29]:

Χρήσιμος δ' ἐστὶν ἡ ῥητορικὴ διά τε τὸ φύσει εἶναι κρείττω τἀληθῆ καὶ τὰ δίκαια τῶν ἐναντίων, ὥστε ἐὰν μὴ κατὰ τὸ προσῆκον αἱ κρίσεις γίγνωνται, ἀνάγκη δι' αὐτῶν ἡττᾶσθαι· τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶν ἄξιον ἐπιτιμήσεως. ἔτι δὲ πρὸς ἐνίους οὐδ' εἰ τὴν ἀκριβεστάτην ἔχοιμεν ἐπιστήμην, ῥᾴδιον ἀπ' ἐκείνης πεῖσαι λέγοντας· διδασκαλίας γάρ ἐστιν ὁ κατὰ τὴν ἐπιστήμην λόγος, τοῦτο δὲ ἀδύνατον, ἀλλ' ἀνάγκη διὰ τῶν κοινῶν ποιεῖσθαι τὰς πίστεις καὶ τοὺς λόγους, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐν τοῖς τοπικοῖς ἐλέγομεν περὶ τῆς πρὸς τοὺς πολλοὺς ἐντεύξεως [1].

b. Rhetoric has to draw opposite conclusions.

Rhetoric as ἀντιλογικὴ τέχνη

Ib., 1355 a[29-38]:

Ἔτι δὲ τἀναντία δεῖ δύνασθαι πείθειν, καθάπερ καὶ ἐν τοῖς συλλογισμοῖς, οὐχ ὅπως ἀμφότερα πράττωμεν (οὐ γὰρ δεῖ τὰ φαῦλα πείθειν) ἀλλ' ἵνα μήτε λανθάνῃ πῶς ἔχει, καὶ ὅπως ἄλλου χρωμένου τοῖς λόγοις μὴ δικαίως αὐτοὶ λύειν ἔχωμεν. τῶν μὲν οὖν ἄλλων τεχνῶν οὐδεμία τἀναντία συλλογίζεται, ἡ δὲ διαλεκτικὴ καὶ ἡ ῥητορικὴ μόναι τοῦτο ποιοῦσιν· ὁμοίως γάρ εἰσιν ἀμφότεραι τῶν ἐναντίων. τὰ μέντοι ὑποκείμενα πράγματα οὐχ ὁμοίως ἔχει, ἀλλ' ἀεὶ τἀληθῆ καὶ τὰ βελτίω τῇ φύσει εὐσυλλογιστότερα καὶ πιθανώτερα ὡς ἁπλῶς εἰπεῖν.

c. Its possible abuse is no argument against it.

Why admissible

Ib., 1355 a[38]-b[7]:

Πρὸς δὲ τούτοις ἄτοπον, εἰ τῷ σώματι μὲν αἰσχρὸν μὴ δύνασθαι βοηθεῖν ἑαυτῷ, λόγῳ δ' οὐκ αἰσχρόν· ὃ μᾶλλον ἴδιόν ἐστιν ἀνθρώπου τῆς τοῦ σώματος χρείας. εἰ δ' ὅτι μεγάλα βλάψειεν ἂν ὁ χρώμενος ἀδίκως τῇ τοιαύτῃ δυνάμει τῶν λόγων, τοῦτό γε κοινόν ἐστι κατὰ πάντων τῶν ἀγαθῶν πλὴν ἀρετῆς, καὶ μάλιστα κατὰ τῶν χρησιμωτάτων, οἷον ἰσχύος ὑγιείας πλούτου στρατηγίας· τούτοις γὰρ ἄν τις ὠφελήσειε τὰ μέγιστα χρώμενος δικαίως καὶ βλάψειεν ἀδίκως.

[1] The reference is to *Top.* I 2, 101 a[26-27] ff., where it is said that the subject treated in this book (namely, dialectic) is useful for three purposes: for intellectual training, for causal encounters (πρὸς τὰς ἐντεύξεις) and for the philosophical sciences.

d. Its function is not only to persuade, but to see the possible ways of persuading people about any given subject.

Ib., 1355 b^{9-14}: **Its true function**

10 ... καὶ ὅτι χρήσιμος, φανερόν, καὶ ὅτι οὐ τὸ πεῖσαι ἔργον αὐτῆς, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἰδεῖν τὰ ὑπάρχοντα πιθανὰ περὶ ἕκαστον, καθάπερ καὶ ἐν ταῖς ἄλλαις τέχναις πάσαις· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἰατρικῆς τὸ ὑγιᾶ ποιῆσαι, ἀλλὰ μέχρι οὗ ἐνδέχεται, μέχρι τούτου προαγαγεῖν· ἔστι γὰρ καὶ τοὺς ἀδυνάτους μεταλαβεῖν ὑγιείας ὅμως θεραπεῦσαι καλῶς.

656—Rhetoric, then, is defined by Ar. in the following formula.

Rhet. I 2, 1355 b^{25-26}: **Definition of rhetoric**

Ἔστω δὴ ῥητορικὴ δύναμις περὶ ἕκαστον τοῦ θεωρῆσαι τὸ ἐνδεχόμενον πιθανόν.

657—**a.** There are three modes of persuasion.

Ib., 1356 $a^{1-10, 14-17, 19-20}$: **Three modes of persuasion**

1356a Τῶν δὲ διὰ τοῦ λόγου ποριζομένων πίστεων τρία εἴδη ἐστίν· αἱ μὲν γάρ εἰσιν ἐν τῷ ἤθει τοῦ λέγοντος, αἱ δὲ ἐν τῷ τὸν ἀκροατὴν διαθεῖναί πως, αἱ δὲ ἐν αὐτῷ τῷ λόγῳ, διὰ τοῦ δεικνύναι ἢ φαίνεσθαι δεικνύναι. διὰ μὲν οὖν τοῦ
5 ἤθους, ὅταν λεχθῇ ὁ λόγος ὥστε ἀξιόπιστον ποιῆσαι τὸν λέγοντα· τοῖς γὰρ ἐπιεικέσι πιστεύομεν μᾶλλον καὶ θᾶττον, περὶ πάντων μὲν ἁπλῶς, ἐν οἷς δὲ τὸ ἀκριβὲς μή ἐστιν ἀλλὰ τὸ ἀμφιδοξεῖν, καὶ παντελῶς. δεῖ δὲ καὶ τοῦτο συμβαίνειν διὰ τὸν λόγον, ἀλλὰ μὴ διὰ τὸ προδεδοξάσθαι ποιόν τινα εἶναι τὸν λέ-
10, 14 γοντα. — Διὰ δὲ τῶν ἀκροατῶν, ὅταν εἰς πάθος ὑπὸ τοῦ λόγου προαχθῶσιν· οὐ γὰρ ὁμοίως ἀποδίδομεν τὰς κρίσεις λυπούμενοι καὶ χαίροντες ἢ φιλοῦντες καὶ μισοῦντες· πρὸς ὃ καὶ μόνον πειρᾶσθαί φαμεν πραγματεύεσθαι τοὺς νῦν
17, 19 τεχνολογοῦντας. — Διὰ δὲ τῶν λόγων πιστεύουσιν, ὅταν ἀληθὲς ἢ φαινόμενον δείξωμεν ἐκ τῶν περὶ ἕκαστα πιθανῶν.

b. These then being the means of effecting persuasion, rhetoric is necessarily related with dialectic and ethics.

Ib., a $^{20-27}$: **Relation of rhetoric with dialectic and ethics**

20 Ἐπεὶ δ' αἱ πίστεις διὰ τούτων εἰσί, φανερὸν ὅτι ταῦτα τὰ τρία ἐστὶ λαβεῖν τοῦ συλλογίσασθαι δυναμένου καὶ τοῦ θεωρῆσαι περὶ τὰ ἤθη καὶ τὰς ἀρετὰς καὶ τρίτον τοῦ περὶ τὰ πάθη, τί τε ἕκαστόν ἐστι τῶν παθῶν καὶ ποιόν τι, καὶ
25 ἐκ τίνων ἐγγίνεται καὶ πῶς. ὥστε συμβαίνει τὴν ῥητορικὴν οἷον παραφυές τι τῆς διαλεκτικῆς εἶναι καὶ τῆς περὶ τὰ ἤθη πραγματείας, ἣν δίκαιόν ἐστι προσαγορεύειν πολιτικήν.

658—That rhetoric "proves opposites" (**655b**), might be illustrated excellently by the final chapter of this book, from which we cite the following passages.

On combating and defending written laws

a. *Rhet.* I 15, 1375 a[21]-b[26]:

Περὶ δὲ τῶν ἀτέχνων καλουμένων πίστεων ἐχόμενόν ἐστι τῶν εἰρημένων 1375a
ἐπιδραμεῖν· ἴδιαι γὰρ αὗται τῶν δικανικῶν. εἰσὶ δὲ πέντε τὸν ἀριθμόν, νόμοι
μάρτυρες συνθῆκαι βάσανοι ὅρκος. πρῶτον μὲν οὖν περὶ νόμων εἴπωμεν, πῶς 25
χρηστέον καὶ προτρέποντα καὶ ἀποτρέποντα καὶ κατηγοροῦντα καὶ ἀπολογούμενον. φανερὸν γὰρ ὅτι, ἐὰν μὲν ἐναντίος ᾖ ὁ γεγραμμένος τῷ πράγματι, τῷ
κοινῷ νόμῳ χρηστέον καὶ τοῖς ἐπιεικέσιν ὡς δικαιοτέροις. καὶ ὅτι τὸ γνώμῃ
τῇ ἀρίστῃ τοῦτ' ἐστί, τὸ μὴ παντελῶς χρῆσθαι τοῖς γεγραμμένοις. καὶ ὅτι τὸ 30
μὲν ἐπιεικὲς ἀεὶ μένει καὶ οὐδέποτε μεταβάλλει, οὐδ' ὁ κοινός (κατὰ φύσιν γάρ
ἐστιν), οἱ δὲ γεγραμμένοι πολλάκις· ὅθεν εἴρηται τὰ ἐν τῇ Σοφοκλέους Ἀντιγόνῃ (ἀπολογεῖται γὰρ ὅτι ἔθαψε παρὰ τὸν τοῦ Κρέοντος νόμον, ἀλλ' οὐ παρὰ
τὸν ἄγραφον)· 35

οὐ γάρ τί νῦν γε κἀχθές, ἀλλ' ἀεί ποτε. 1375b
ταῦτ' οὖν ἐγὼ οὐκ ἔμελλον ἀνδρὸς οὐδενός.

καὶ ὅτι τὸ δίκαιόν ἐστιν ἀληθές τι καὶ συμφέρον, ἀλλ' οὐ τὸ δοκοῦν· ὥστ' οὐ
νόμος ὁ γεγραμμένος· οὐ γὰρ ποιεῖ τὸ ἔργον τὸ τοῦ νόμου. καὶ ὅτι ὥσπερ 5
ἀργυρογνώμων ὁ κριτής ἐστιν, ὅπως διακρίνῃ τὸ κίβδηλον δίκαιον καὶ τὸ
ἀληθές. καὶ ὅτι βελτίονος ἀνδρὸς τὸ τοῖς ἀγράφοις ἢ τοῖς γεγραμμένοις χρῆσθαι
καὶ ἐμμένειν. καὶ εἴ που ἐναντίος νόμῳ εὐδοκιμοῦντι ἢ καὶ αὐτὸς αὑτῷ· οἷον
ἐνίοτε ὁ μὲν κελεύει κύρια εἶναι ἅττ' ἂν συνθῶνται, ὁ δ' ἀπαγορεύει μὴ συν- 10
τίθεσθαι παρὰ τὸν νόμον. καὶ εἰ ἀμφίβολος, ὥστε στρέφειν καὶ ὁρᾶν ἐφ' ὁποτέραν
τὴν ἀγωγὴν ἢ τὸ δίκαιον ἐφαρμόσει ἢ τὸ συμφέρον, εἶτα τούτῳ χρῆσθαι. καὶ
εἰ τὰ μὲν πράγματα ἐφ' οἷς ἐτέθη ὁ νόμος μηκέτι μένει, ὁ δέ νόμος, πειρατέον
τοῦτο δηλοῦν καὶ μάχεσθαι ταύτῃ πρὸς τὸν νόμον. ἐὰν δὲ ὁ γεγραμμένος ᾖ 15
πρὸς τὸ πρᾶγμα, τότε γνώμῃ τῇ ἀρίστῃ λεκτέον ὅτι οὐ τοῦ παρὰ τὸν νόμον
ἕνεκα δικάζειν ἐστίν, ἀλλ' ἵνα, ἐὰν ἀγνοήσῃ τί λέγει ὁ νόμος, μὴ ἐπιορκῇ.
καὶ ὅτι οὐ τὸ ἁπλῶς ἀγαθὸν αἱρεῖται οὐδείς, ἀλλὰ τὸ αὑτῷ. καὶ ὅτι οὐδὲν διαφέρει ἢ μὴ κεῖσθαι ἢ μὴ χρῆσθαι. καὶ ὅτι ἐν ταῖς ἄλλαις τέχναις οὐ λυσιτελεῖ 20
παρασοφίζεσθαι τὸν ἰατρόν· οὐ γὰρ τοσοῦτο βλάπτει ἡ ἁμαρτία τοῦ ἰατροῦ
ὅσον τὸ ἐθίζεσθαι ἀπειθεῖν τῷ ἄρχοντι. καὶ ὅτι τὸ τῶν νόμων σοφώτερον ζητεῖν
εἶναι, τοῦτ' ἐστὶν ὃ ἐν τοῖς ἐπαινουμένοις νόμοις ἀπαγορεύεται. καὶ περὶ μὲν 25
τῶν νόμων οὕτω διωρίσθω.

Arguments about witnesses

b. Ib., 1376 a[17]-b[31]:

Πιστώματα δὲ περὶ μαρτυριῶν μάρτυρας μὲν μὴ ἔχοντι, ὅτι ἐκ τῶν εἰκότων 1376a
δεῖ κρίνειν καὶ τοῦτ' ἐστὶ τὸ γνώμῃ τῇ ἀρίστῃ, καὶ ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν ἐξαπατῆσαι

τὰ εἰκότα ἐπὶ ἀργυρίῳ, καὶ ὅτι οὐχ ἁλίσκεται τὰ εἰκότα ψευδομαρτυριῶν. ἔχοντι δὲ πρὸς μὴ ἔχοντα, ὅτι οὐχ ὑπόδικα τὰ εἰκότα, καὶ ὅτι οὐδὲν ἂν ἔδει μαρτυριῶν, εἰ ἐκ τῶν λόγων ἱκανὸν ἦν θεωρῆσαι. εἰσὶ δὲ αἱ μαρτυρίαι αἱ μὲν περὶ αὐτοῦ αἱ δὲ περὶ τοῦ ἀμφισβητοῦντος, καὶ αἱ μὲν περὶ τοῦ πράγματος αἱ δὲ περὶ τοῦ ἤθους, ὥστε φανερὸν ὅτι οὐδέποτ' ἔστιν ἀπορῆσαι μαρτυρίας χρησίμης· εἰ μὴ γὰρ κατὰ τοῦ πράγματος ἢ αὐτῷ ὁμολογουμένης ἢ τῷ ἀμφισβητοῦντι ἐναντίας, ἀλλὰ περὶ τοῦ ἤθους ἢ αὐτοῦ εἰς ἐπιείκειαν ἢ τοῦ ἀμφισβητοῦντος εἰς φαυλότητα. τὰ δ' ἄλλα περὶ μάρτυρος ἢ φίλου ἢ ἐχθροῦ ἢ μεταξύ, ἢ εὐδοκιμοῦντος ἢ ἀδοξοῦντος ἢ μεταξύ, καὶ ὅσαι ἄλλαι τοιαῦται διαφοραί, ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν λεκτέον ἐξ οἵωνπερ καὶ τὰ ἐνθυμήματα λέγομεν.

Περὶ δὲ τῶν συνθηκῶν τοσαύτη τοῦ λόγου χρῆσίς ἐστιν ὅσον αὔξειν ἢ καθαιρεῖν **On contracts**
1376b ἢ πιστὰς ποιεῖν ἢ ἀπίστους, ἐὰν μὲν αὐτῷ ὑπάρχωσι, πιστὰς καὶ κυρίας, ἐπὶ δὲ τοῦ ἀμφισβητοῦντος τοὐναντίον. πρὸς μὲν οὖν τὸ πιστὰς ἢ ἀπίστους κατασκευάζειν οὐδὲν διαφέρει τῆς περὶ τοὺς μάρτυρας πραγματείας· ὁποῖοι γὰρ ἄν τινες ὦσιν οἱ ἐπιγεγραμμένοι ἢ φυλάττοντες τούτοις αἱ συνθῆκαι πισταί εἰσιν. ὁμολογουμένης δ' εἶναι τῆς συνθήκης, οἰκείας μὲν οὔσης αὐξητέον· ἡ γὰρ συνθήκη νόμος ἐστὶν ἴδιος καὶ κατὰ μέρος, καὶ αἱ μὲν συνθῆκαι οὐ ποιοῦσι τὸν νόμον κύριον, οἱ δὲ νόμοι τὰς κατὰ τὸν νόμον συνθήκας. καὶ ὅλως αὐτὸς ὁ νόμος συνθήκη τις ἐστίν, ὥστε ὅστις ἀπιστεῖ ἢ ἀναιρεῖ συνθήκην, τοὺς νόμους ἀναιρεῖ. ἔτι δὲ πράττεται τὰ πολλὰ τῶν συναλλαγμάτων καὶ τὰ ἑκούσια κατὰ συνθήκας, ὥστε ἀκύρων γιγνομένων ἀναιρεῖται ἡ πρὸς ἀλλήλους χρεία τῶν ἀνθρώπων. καὶ τἆλλα δὲ ὅσα ἁρμόττει, ἐπιπολῆς ἰδεῖν ἔστιν. ἂν δ' ἐναντία ᾖ καὶ μετὰ τῶν ἀμφισβητούντων, πρῶτον μέν, ἅπερ ἄν τις πρὸς νόμον ἐναντίον μαχέσαιτο, ταῦθ' ἁρμόττει· ἄτοπον γὰρ εἰ τοῖς μὲν νόμοις, ἂν μὴ ὀρθῶς κείμενοι ὦσιν ἀλλ' ἐξαμάρτωσιν οἱ τιθέμενοι, οὐκ οἰόμεθα δεῖν πείθεσθαι, ταῖς δὲ συνθήκαις ἀναγκαῖον. εἶθ' ὅτι τοῦ δικαίου ἐστὶ βραβευτὴς ὁ δικαστής· οὔκουν τοῦτο σκεπτέον, ἀλλ' ὡς δικαιότερον. καὶ τὸ μὲν δίκαιον οὐκ ἔστι μεταστρέψαι οὔτ' ἀπάτῃ οὔτ' ἀνάγκῃ (πεφυκὸς γάρ ἐστιν), συνθῆκαι δὲ γίγνονται καὶ ἐξαπατηθέντων καὶ ἀναγκασθέντων. πρὸς δὲ τούτοις σκοπεῖν εἰ ἐναντία ἐστί τινι ἢ τῶν γεγραμμένων νόμων ἢ τῶν κοινῶν, καὶ τῶν γεγραμμένων ἢ τοῖς οἰκείοις ἢ τοῖς ἀλλοτρίοις, ἔπειτα εἰ ἄλλαις συνθήκαις ὑστέραις ἢ προτέραις· ἢ γὰρ αἱ ὕστεραι κύριαι, ἄκυροι δ' αἱ πρότεραι, ἢ αἱ πρότεραι ὀρθαί, αἱ δ' ὕστεραι ἠπατήκασιν, ὁποτέρως ἂν ᾖ χρήσιμον. ἔτι δὲ τὸ συμφέρον ὁρᾶν, εἴ πῃ ἐναντιοῦται τοῖς κριταῖς, καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα τοιαῦτα· καὶ γὰρ ταῦτα εὐθεώρητα ὁμοίως.

659—Since persuasion is also concerned with the state of mind of the hearers, practical psychology has its part in rhetoric. In book II, ch. 2-11, Ar. treats the various emotions, in ch. 12-14 the various types of human character in different ages.

The young man

a. The young man's character. *Rhet.* II 12, 1389 a^{2}-b^{12}.

Οἱ μὲν οὖν νέοι τὰ ἤθη εἰσὶν ἐπιθυμητικοί, καὶ οἷοι ποιεῖν ὧν ἂν ἐπιθυμήσωσιν. 1389a
καὶ τῶν περὶ τὸ σῶμα ἐπιθυμιῶν μάλιστα ἀκολουθητικοί εἰσι ταῖς περὶ τὰ
ἀφροδίσια, καὶ ἀκρατεῖς ταύτης. εὐμετάβολοι δὲ καὶ ἀψίκοροι πρὸς τὰς ἐπιθυ- 5
μίας, καὶ σφόδρα μὲν ἐπιθυμοῦσι, ταχέως δὲ παύονται· ὀξεῖαι γὰρ αἱ βουλήσεις
καὶ οὐ μεγάλαι, ὥσπερ αἱ τῶν καμνόντων δίψαι καὶ πεῖναι. καὶ θυμικοὶ καὶ
ὀξύθυμοι καὶ οἷοι ἀκολουθεῖν τῇ ὁρμῇ. καὶ ἥττους εἰσὶ τοῦ θυμοῦ· διὰ γὰρ 10
φιλοτιμίαν οὐκ ἀνέχονται ὀλιγωρούμενοι, ἀλλ' ἀγανακτοῦσιν, ἂν οἴωνται
ἀδικεῖσθαι. καὶ φιλότιμοι μέν εἰσι, μᾶλλον δὲ φιλόνικοι· ὑπεροχῆς γὰρ ἐπιθυμεῖ
ἡ νεότης, ἡ δὲ νίκη ὑπεροχή τις. καὶ ἄμφω ταῦτα μᾶλλον ἢ φιλοχρήματοι·
φιλοχρήματοι δὲ ἥκιστα διὰ τὸ μήπω ἐνδείας πεπειρᾶσθαι, ὥσπερ τὸ Πιττακοῦ 15
ἔχει ἀπόφθεγμα εἰς Ἀμφιάραον [1]. καὶ οὐ κακοήθεις ἀλλ' εὐήθεις διὰ τὸ μήπω
τεθεωρηκέναι πολλὰς πονηρίας. καὶ εὔπιστοι διὰ τὸ μήπω πολλὰ ἐξηπατῆσθαι.
καὶ εὐέλπιδες· ὥσπερ γὰρ οἱ οἰνωμένοι, οὕτω διάθερμοί εἰσιν οἱ νέοι ὑπὸ τῆς
φύσεως· ἅμα δὲ καὶ διὰ τὸ μήπω πολλὰ ἀποτετυχηκέναι. καὶ ζῶσι τὰ πλεῖστα 20
ἐλπίδι· ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἐλπὶς τοῦ μέλλοντός ἐστιν ἡ δὲ μνήμη τοῦ παροιχομένου,
τοῖς δὲ νέοις τὸ μὲν μέλλον πολὺ τὸ δὲ παρεληλυθὸς βραχύ· τῇ γὰρ πρώτῃ
ἡμέρᾳ μεμνῆσθαι μὲν οὐδὲν οἴονται, ἐλπίζειν δὲ πάντα. καὶ εὐεξαπάτητοί εἰσι 25
διὰ τὸ εἰρημένον· ἐλπίζουσι γὰρ ῥᾳδίως. καὶ ἀνδρειότεροι· θυμώδεις γὰρ καὶ
εὐέλπιδες, ὧν τὸ μὲν μὴ φοβεῖσθαι τὸ δὲ θαρρεῖν ποιεῖ· οὔτε γὰρ ὀργιζόμενος
οὐδεὶς φοβεῖται, τό τε ἐλπίζειν ἀγαθόν τι θαρραλέον ἐστίν. καὶ αἰσχυντηλοί·
οὐ γάρ πω καλὰ ἕτερα ὑπολαμβάνουσιν, ἀλλὰ πεπαίδευνται ὑπὸ τοῦ νόμου 30
μόνον. καὶ μεγαλόψυχοι· οὔτε γὰρ ὑπὸ τοῦ βίου πω τεταπείνωνται, ἀλλὰ
τῶν ἀναγκαίων ἄπειροί εἰσιν, καὶ τὸ ἀξιοῦν αὑτὸν μεγάλων μεγαλοψυχία· τοῦτο
δ' εὐέλπιδος. καὶ μᾶλλον αἱροῦνται πράττειν τὰ καλὰ τῶν συμφερόντων·
τῷ γὰρ ἤθει ζῶσι μᾶλλον ἢ τῷ λογισμῷ, ἔστι δ' ὁ μὲν λογισμὸς τοῦ συμφέ- 35
ροντος ἡ δὲ ἀρετὴ τοῦ καλοῦ. καὶ φιλόφιλοι καὶ φιλέταιροι μᾶλλον τῶν ἄλλων
ἡλικιῶν διὰ τὸ χαίρειν τῷ συζῆν καὶ μήπω πρὸς τὸ συμφέρον κρίνειν μηδέν, 1389b
ὥστε μηδὲ τοὺς φίλους. καὶ ἅπαντα ἐπὶ τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ σφοδρότερον ἁμαρτά-
νουσι παρὰ τὸ Χιλώνειον [2]· πάντα γὰρ ἄγαν πράττουσιν· φιλοῦσί τε γὰρ ἄγαν
καὶ μισοῦσιν ἄγαν καὶ τἆλλα πάντα ὁμοίως. καὶ εἰδέναι πάντα οἴονται καὶ 5
διισχυρίζονται· τοῦτο γὰρ αἴτιόν ἐστι καὶ τοῦ πάντα ἄγαν. καὶ τὰ ἀδικήματα
ἀδικοῦσιν εἰς ὕβριν καὶ οὐ κακουργίαν. καὶ ἐλεητικοὶ διὰ τὸ πάντας χρηστοὺς καὶ
βελτίους ὑπολαμβάνειν· τῇ γὰρ αὑτῶν ἀκακίᾳ τοὺς πέλας μετροῦσιν, ὥστ' ἀνάξια 10
πάσχειν ὑπολαμβάνουσιν αὐτούς. καὶ φιλογέλωτες, διὸ καὶ εὐτράπελοι· ἡ γὰρ
εὐτραπελία πεπαιδευμένη ὕβρις ἐστίν. τὸ μὲν οὖν τῶν νέων τοιοῦτόν ἐστιν ἦθος.

[1] The word of Pittacus is unknown to us.

[2] Μηδὲν ἄγαν.

b. The character of elderly men. *Rhet.* II 13, 1389 b^{13}-1390 a^{28}: **Elderly men**

Οἱ δὲ πρεσβύτεροι καὶ παρηκμακότες σχεδὸν ἐκ τῶν ἐναντίων τούτοις τὰ πλεῖστα ἔχουσιν ἤθη· διὰ γὰρ τὸ πολλὰ ἔτη βεβιωκέναι καὶ πλείω ἐξηπατῆσθαι καὶ ἡμαρτηκέναι, καὶ τὰ πλείω φαῦλα εἶναι τῶν πραγμάτων, οὔτε διαβεβαιοῦνται οὐδέν, ἧττόν τε ἄγαν ἅπαντα ἢ δεῖ. καὶ οἴονται, ἴσασι δ' οὐδέν. καὶ ἀμφισβητοῦντες προστιθέασιν ἀεὶ τὸ ἴσως καὶ τάχα, καὶ πάντα λέγουσιν οὕτω, παγίως δ' οὐδέν. καὶ κακοήθεις εἰσίν· ἔστι γὰρ κακοήθεια τὸ ἐπὶ τὸ χεῖρον ὑπολαμβάνειν πάντα. ἔτι δὲ καχύποπτοί εἰσι διὰ τὴν ἀπιστίαν, ἄπιστοι δὲ δι' ἐμπειρίαν. καὶ οὔτε φιλοῦσι σφόδρα οὔτε μισοῦσι διὰ ταῦτα, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὴν Βίαντος ὑποθήκην καὶ φιλοῦσιν ὡς μισήσοντες καὶ μισοῦσιν ὡς φιλήσοντες. καὶ μικρόψυχοι διὰ τὸ τεταπεινῶσθαι ὑπὸ τοῦ βίου· οὐδενὸς γὰρ μεγάλου οὐδὲ περιττοῦ, ἀλλὰ τῶν πρὸς τὸν βίον ἐπιθυμοῦσιν. καὶ ἀνελεύθεροι· ἓν γάρ τι τῶν ἀναγκαίων ἡ οὐσία, ἅμα δὲ καὶ διὰ τὴν ἐμπειρίαν ἴσασιν ὡς χαλεπὸν τὸ κτήσασθαι καὶ ῥᾴδιον τὸ ἀποβαλεῖν. καὶ δειλοὶ καὶ πάντα προφοβητικοί· ἐναντίως γὰρ διάκεινται τοῖς νέοις· κατεψυγμένοι γάρ εἰσιν, οἱ δὲ θερμοί. ὥστε προωδοποίηκε τὸ γῆρας τῇ δειλίᾳ· καὶ γὰρ ὁ φόβος κατάψυξίς τις ἐστίν. καὶ φιλόζωοι, καὶ μάλιστα ἐπὶ τῇ τελευταίᾳ ἡμέρᾳ διὰ τὸ τοῦ ἀπόντος εἶναι τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν, καὶ οὗ δὲ ἐνδεεῖς, τούτου μάλιστα ἐπιθυμεῖν. καὶ φίλαυτοι μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ· μικροψυχία γάρ τις καὶ αὕτη. καὶ πρὸς τὸ συμφέρον ζῶσιν, ἀλλ' οὐ πρὸς τὸ καλόν, μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ, διὰ τὸ φίλαυτοι εἶναι· τὸ μὲν γὰρ συμφέρον αὐτῷ ἀγαθόν ἐστι, τὸ δὲ καλὸν ἁπλῶς. καὶ ἀναίσχυντοι μᾶλλον ἢ αἰσχυντηλοί· διὰ γὰρ τὸ μὴ φροντίζειν ὁμοίως τοῦ καλοῦ καὶ τοῦ συμφέροντος ὀλιγωροῦσι τοῦ δοκεῖν. καὶ δυσέλπιδες διὰ τὴν ἐμπειρίαν· τὰ γὰρ πλείω τῶν γιγνομένων φαῦλά ἐστιν· ἀποβαίνει γοῦν τὰ πολλὰ ἐπὶ τὸ χεῖρον· καὶ ἔτι διὰ τὴν δειλίαν. καὶ ζῶσι τῇ μνήμῃ μᾶλλον ἢ τῇ ἐλπίδι· τοῦ γὰρ βίου τὸ μὲν λοιπὸν ὀλίγον τὸ δὲ παρεληλυθὸς πολύ, ἔστι δὲ ἡ μὲν ἐλπὶς τοῦ μέλλοντος ἡ δὲ μνήμη τῶν παροιχομένων. ὅπερ αἴτιον καὶ τῆς ἀδολεσχίας αὐτοῖς. διατελοῦσι γὰρ τὰ γενόμενα λέγοντες· ἀναμιμνησκόμενοι γὰρ ἥδονται. καὶ οἱ θυμοὶ ὀξεῖς μέν εἰσιν ἀσθενεῖς δέ, καὶ αἱ ἐπιθυμίαι αἱ μὲν ἐκλελοίπασιν αἱ δὲ ἀσθενεῖς εἰσίν, ὥστε οὔτ' ἐπιθυμητικοὶ οὔτε πρακτικοὶ κατὰ τὰς ἐπιθυμίας, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὸ κέρδος. διὸ καὶ σωφρονικοὶ φαίνονται οἱ τηλικοῦτοι· αἵ τε γὰρ ἐπιθυμίαι ἀνείκασι, καὶ δουλεύουσι τῷ κέρδει. καὶ μᾶλλον ζῶσι κατὰ λογισμὸν ἢ κατὰ τὸ ἦθος· ὁ μὲν γὰρ λογισμὸς τοῦ συμφέροντος τὸ δ' ἦθος τῆς ἀρετῆς ἐστίν. καὶ τἀδικήματα ἀδικοῦσιν εἰς κακουργίαν, οὐκ εἰς ὕβριν. ἐλεητικοὶ δὲ καὶ οἱ γέροντές εἰσιν, ἀλλ' οὐ διὰ ταὐτὸ τοῖς νέοις· οἱ μὲν γὰρ διὰ φιλανθρωπίαν, οἱ δὲ δι' ἀσθένειαν· πάντα γὰρ οἴονται ἐγγὺς εἶναι αὐτοῖς παθεῖν, τοῦτο δ' ἦν ἐλεητικόν. ὅθεν ὀδυρτικοί εἰσι, καὶ οὐκ εὐτράπελοι οὐδὲ φιλογέλοιοι· ἐναντίον γὰρ τὸ ὀδυρτικὸν τῷ φιλογέλωτι. τῶν μὲν οὖν νέων καὶ τῶν πρεσβυτέρων τὰ ἤθη τοιαῦτα· ὥστ' ἐπεὶ ἀποδέχονται πάντες τοὺς τῷ σφετέρῳ ἤθει λεγομένους λόγους καὶ τοὺς

ὁμοίους, οὐκ ἄδηλον πῶς χρώμενοι τοῖς λόγοις τοιοῦτοι φανοῦνται καὶ αὐτοὶ καὶ οἱ λόγοι.

Men in their prime

c. The character of men in their prime. II 14, 1390 a^{29}-b^{13}:

Οἱ δὲ ἀκμάζοντες φανερὸν ὅτι μεταξὺ τούτων τὸ ἦθος ἔσονται, ἑκατέρων ἀφαιροῦντες τὴν ὑπερβολήν, καὶ οὔτε σφόδρα θαρροῦντες (θρασύτης γὰρ τὸ τοιοῦτον) οὔτε λίαν φοβούμενοι, καλῶς δὲ πρὸς ἄμφω ἔχοντες, οὔτε πᾶσι πιστεύοντες οὔτε πᾶσιν ἀπιστοῦντες, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὸ ἀληθὲς κρίνοντες μᾶλλον. καὶ οὔτε πρὸς τὸ καλὸν ζῶντες μόνον οὔτε πρὸς τὸ συμφέρον, ἀλλὰ πρὸς ἄμφω. καὶ οὔτε πρὸς φειδὼ οὔτε πρὸς ἀσωτίαν, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὸ ἁρμόττον. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ πρὸς θυμὸν καὶ πρὸς ἐπιθυμίαν. καὶ σώφρονες μετ' ἀνδρείας καὶ ἀνδρεῖοι μετὰ σωφροσύνης. ἐν γὰρ τοῖς νέοις καὶ τοῖς γέρουσι διῄρηται ταῦτα· εἰσὶ γὰρ οἱ μὲν νέοι ἀνδρεῖοι καὶ ἀκόλαστοι, οἱ δὲ πρεσβύτεροι σώφρονες καὶ δειλοί· ὡς δὲ καθόλου εἰπεῖν, ὅσα μὲν διῄρηται ἡ νεότης καὶ τὸ γῆρας τῶν ὠφελίμων, ταῦτα ἄμφω ἔχουσιν, ὅσα δ' ὑπερβάλλουσιν ἢ ἐλλείπουσι, τούτων τὸ μέτριον καὶ τὸ ἁρμόττον. ἀκμάζει δὲ τὸ μὲν σῶμα ἀπὸ τῶν τριάκοντα ἐτῶν μέχρι τῶν πέντε καὶ τριάκοντα, ἡ δὲ ψυχὴ περὶ τὰ ἑνὸς δεῖν πεντήκοντα. περὶ μὲν οὖν νεότητος καὶ γήρως καὶ ἀκμῆς, ποίων ἠθῶν ἕκαστόν ἐστιν, εἰρήσθω τοσαῦτα.

2—POETICS

660—The different kinds of poetry defined as various modes of imitation.

General definition of poetry

Poet. 1, 1447 a$^{13-18}$:

Ἐποποιία δὴ καὶ ἡ τῆς τραγῳδίας ποίησις, ἔτι δὲ κωμῳδία καὶ ἡ διθυραμβοποιητικὴ καὶ τῆς αὐλητικῆς ἡ πλείστη καὶ κιθαριστικῆς, πᾶσαι τυγχάνουσιν οὖσαι μιμήσεις τὸ σύνολον. διαφέρουσι δὲ ἀλλήλων τρισίν· ἢ γὰρ τῷ γένει ἑτέροις μιμεῖσθαι, ἢ τῷ ἕτερα, ἢ τῷ ἑτέρως καὶ μὴ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον.

661—a. The means of imitation. Ib., 1447 a^{18}-b^{20}, b$^{23-29}$:

Means of imitation

Ὥσπερ γὰρ καὶ χρώμασι καὶ σχήμασι πολλὰ μιμοῦνταί τινες ἀπεικάζοντες, οἱ μὲν διὰ τέχνης οἱ δὲ διὰ συνηθείας, ἕτεροι δὲ διὰ τῆς φωνῆς, οὕτω κἀν ταῖς εἰρημέναις τέχναις· ἅπασαι μὲν ποιοῦνται τὴν μίμησιν ἐν ῥυθμῷ καὶ λόγῳ καὶ ἁρμονίᾳ, τούτοις δ' ἢ χωρὶς ἢ μεμιγμένοις, οἷον ἁρμονίᾳ μὲν καὶ ῥυθμῷ χρώμεναι μόνον ἥ τε αὐλητικὴ καὶ ἡ κιθαριστική, κἂν εἴ τινες ἕτεραι τυγχάνωσιν οὖσαι τοιαῦται τὴν δύναμιν, οἷον ἡ τῶν συρίγγων. αὐτῷ δὲ τῷ ῥυθμῷ μιμοῦνται χωρὶς ἁρμονίας οἱ τῶν ὀρχηστῶν· καὶ γὰρ οὗτοι διὰ τῶν σχηματιζομένων ῥυθμῶν μιμοῦνται καὶ ἤθη καὶ πάθη καὶ πράξεις. ἡ δὲ ἐποποιία μόνον τοῖς λόγοις ψιλοῖς ἢ τοῖς μέτροις, καὶ τούτοις εἴτε μιγνῦσα μετ' ἀλλήλων, εἴθ' ἑνί τινι γένει χρωμένη τῶν μέτρων τυγχάνουσα μέχρι τοῦ

νῦν. οὐδὲν γὰρ ἂν ἔχοιμεν ὀνομάσαι κοινὸν τοὺς Σώφρονος καὶ Ξενάρχου μίμους καὶ τοὺς Σωκρατικοὺς λόγους, οὐδὲ εἴ τις διὰ τριμέτρων ἢ ἐλεγείων ἢ τῶν ἄλλων τινῶν τῶν τοιούτων ποιοῖτο τὴν μίμησιν· πλὴν οἱ ἄνθρωποί γε συνάπτοντες τῷ μέτρῳ τὸ ποιεῖν ἐλεγειοποιοὺς τοὺς δὲ ἐποποιοὺς ὀνομάζουσιν, οὐχ ὡς τοὺς κατὰ μίμησιν ποιητὰς ἀλλὰ κοινῇ κατὰ τὸ μέτρον προσαγορεύοντες. καὶ γὰρ ἂν ἰατρικὸν ἢ φυσικόν[1] τι διὰ τῶν μέτρων ἐκφέρωσιν, οὕτω καλεῖν εἰώθασιν. οὐδὲν δὲ κοινόν ἐστιν Ὁμήρῳ καὶ Ἐμπεδοκλεῖ πλὴν τὸ μέτρον· διὸ τὸν μὲν ποιητὴν δίκαιον καλεῖν, τὸν δὲ φυσιολόγον μᾶλλον ἢ ποιητήν. — Περὶ μὲν οὖν τούτων διωρίσθω τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον. εἰσὶ δέ τινες αἱ πᾶσι χρῶνται τοῖς εἰρημένοις, λέγω δὲ οἷον ῥυθμῷ καὶ μέλει καὶ μέτρῳ, ὥσπερ ἥ τε τῶν διθυραμβικῶν ποίησις καὶ ἡ τῶν νόμων καὶ ἥ τε τραγῳδία καὶ ἡ κωμῳδία· διαφέρουσι δέ, ὅτι αἱ μὲν ἅμα πᾶσιν αἱ δὲ κατὰ μέρος. ταύτας μὲν οὖν λέγω τὰς διαφορὰς τῶν τεχνῶν, ἐν οἷς ποιοῦνται τὴν μίμησιν.

b. The objects represented. Ib., 2, 1448 a[1-14, 16-19]: **Objects**

1448a Ἐπεὶ δὲ μιμοῦνται οἱ μιμούμενοι πράττοντας, ἀνάγκη δὲ τούτους ἢ σπουδαίους ἢ φαύλους εἶναι (τὰ γὰρ ἤθη σχεδὸν ἀεὶ τούτοις ἀκολουθεῖ μόνοις· κακίᾳ γὰρ καὶ ἀρετῇ τὰ ἤθη διαφέρουσι πάντες), ἤτοι βελτίονας ἢ καθ' ἡμᾶς ἢ χείρονας ἢ καὶ τοιούτους, ὥσπερ οἱ γραφεῖς· Πολύγνωτος μὲν γὰρ κρείττους, Παύσων δὲ χείρους, Διονύσιος δὲ ὁμοίους εἴκαζεν. δῆλον δὲ ὅτι καὶ τῶν λεχθεισῶν ἑκάστη μιμήσεων ἔξει ταύτας τὰς διαφοράς, καὶ ἔσται ἑτέρα τῷ ἑτέρα μιμεῖσθαι τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον. καὶ γὰρ ἐν ὀρχήσει καὶ αὐλήσει καὶ κιθαρίσει ἔστι γενέσθαι ταύτας τὰς ἀνομοιότητας, καὶ περὶ τοὺς λόγους δὲ καὶ τὴν ψιλομετρίαν, οἷον Ὅμηρος μὲν βελτίους, Κλεοφῶν δὲ ὁμοίους, Ἡγήμων δὲ ὁ Θάσιος <ὁ> τὰς παρῳδίας ποιήσας πρῶτος . . . χείρους. — Ἐν δὲ τῇ αὐτῇ διαφορᾷ καὶ ἡ τραγῳδία πρὸς τὴν κωμῳδίαν διέστηκεν· ἡ μὲν γὰρ χείρους ἡ δὲ βελτίους μιμεῖσθαι βούλεται τῶν νῦν.

c. The manner in which each kind of object is represented.

Poet. 3, 1448 a[19-25]: **Manner of representation**

Ἔτι δὲ τούτων τρίτη διαφορὰ τὸ ὡς ἕκαστα τούτων μιμήσαιτο ἄν τις. καὶ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς αὐτοῖς[2] καὶ τὰ αὐτὰ μιμεῖσθαι ἔστιν ὁτὲ μὲν ἀπαγγέλλοντα ἢ ἕτερόν τι γιγνόμενον, ὥσπερ Ὅμηρος ποιεῖ, ἢ ὡς τὸν αὐτὸν καὶ μὴ μεταβάλλοντα, ἢ πάντας ὡς πράττοντας καὶ ἐνεργοῦντας τοὺς μιμουμένους. ἐν τρισὶ δὴ ταύταις διαφοραῖς ἡ μίμησίς ἐστιν, ὡς εἴπομεν κατ' ἀρχάς, ἐν οἷς τε καὶ ἃ καὶ ὥς.

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[1] An almost certain correction of Heinsius, adopted by newer editors (Bywater, Hardy). The Ms A (Bekker's A[c]) has μουσικόν.

[2] ἐν τοῖς αὐτοῖς - by the same means.

Origin of poetry in general

662—a. The origin of poetry in general and why men take a delight in it.

Poet. 4, 1448 b[4-15]:

'Εοίκασι δὲ γεννῆσαι μὲν ὅλως τὴν ποιητικὴν αἰτίαι δύο τινές, καὶ αὗται 1448b
φυσικαί. τό τε γὰρ μιμεῖσθαι σύμφυτον τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἐκ παίδων ἐστί, καὶ 5
τούτῳ διαφέρουσι τῶν ἄλλων ζώων ὅτι μιμητικώτατόν ἐστι καὶ τὰς μαθήσεις
ποιεῖται διὰ μιμήσεως τὰς πρώτας, καὶ τὸ χαίρειν τοῖς μιμήμασι πάντας.
σημεῖον δὲ τούτου τὸ συμβαῖνον ἐπὶ τῶν ἔργων· ἃ γὰρ αὐτὰ λυπηρῶς ὁρῶμεν, 10
τούτων τὰς εἰκόνας τὰς μάλιστα ἠκριβωμένας χαίρομεν θεωροῦντες, οἷον θηρίων
τε μορφὰς τῶν ἀτιμοτάτων καὶ νεκρῶν. αἴτιον δὲ καὶ τοῦτο, ὅτι μανθάνειν
οὐ μόνον τοῖς φιλοσόφοις ἥδιστον ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ὁμοίως· ἀλλ' ἐπὶ βραχὺ
κοινωνοῦσιν αὐτοῦ. 15

Origin of tragedy

b. The origin of tragedy. Ib., 1449 a[9-29]:

Γενομένης δ' οὖν ἀπ' ἀρχῆς αὐτοσχεδιαστικῆς [1] (καὶ αὐτὴ καὶ ἡ κωμῳδία, 1449a
καὶ ἡ μὲν ἀπὸ τῶν ἐξαρχόντων τὸν διθύραμβον, ἡ δὲ ἀπὸ τῶν τὰ φαλλικά,
ἃ ἔτι καὶ νῦν ἐν πολλαῖς τῶν πόλεων διαμένει νομιζόμενα), κατὰ μικρὸν ηὐξήθη
προαγόντων ὅσον ἐγίγνετο φανερὸν αὐτῆς, καὶ πολλὰς μεταβολὰς μεταβαλοῦσα 15
ἡ τραγῳδία ἐπαύσατο, ἐπεὶ ἔσχε τὴν αὑτῆς φύσιν. καὶ τό τε τῶν ὑποκριτῶν
πλῆθος ἐξ ἑνὸς εἰς δύο πρῶτος Αἰσχύλος ἤγαγε, καὶ τὰ τοῦ χοροῦ ἠλάττωσε,
καὶ τὸν λόγον πρωταγωνιστὴν παρεσκεύασεν· τρεῖς δὲ καὶ σκηνογραφίαν
Σοφοκλῆς. ἔτι δὲ τὸ μέγεθος ἐκ μικρῶν μύθων καὶ λέξεως γελοίας, διὰ τὸ ἐκ
σατυρικοῦ μεταβαλεῖν, ὀψὲ ἀπεσεμνύνθη, τό τε μέτρον ἐκ τετραμέτρου ἰαμβεῖον 20
ἐγένετο· τὸ μὲν γὰρ πρῶτον τετραμέτρῳ ἐχρῶντο διὰ τὸ σατυρικὴν καὶ ὀρχηστι-
κωτέραν εἶναι τὴν ποίησιν, λέξεως δὲ γενομένης [2] αὐτὴ ἡ φύσις τὸ οἰκεῖον μέτρον
εὗρεν· μάλιστα γὰρ λεκτικὸν τῶν μέτρων τὸ ἰαμβεῖόν ἐστιν. σημεῖον δὲ τούτου· 25
πλεῖστα γὰρ ἰαμβεῖα λέγομεν ἐν τῇ διαλέκτῳ τῇ πρὸς ἀλλήλους, ἑξάμετρα δὲ
ὀλιγάκις καὶ ἐκβαίνοντες τῆς λεκτικῆς ἁρμονίας. ἔτι δὲ ἐπεισοδίων πλήθη
καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ὡς ἕκαστα κοσμηθῆναι λέγεται.

Comedy

663—a. Comedy. *Poet.* 5, 1449 a[32-37]:

'Η δὲ κωμῳδία ἐστίν, ὥσπερ εἴπομεν, μίμησις φαυλοτέρων μέν, οὐ μέντοι
κατὰ πᾶσαν κακίαν, ἀλλὰ τοῦ αἰσχροῦ ἐστι τὸ γελοῖον μόριον. τὸ γὰρ γελοῖόν 35
ἐστιν ἁμάρτημά τι καὶ αἶσχος ἀνώδυνον καὶ οὐ φθαρτικόν, οἷον εὐθὺς τὸ γελοῖον
πρόσωπον αἰσχρόν τι καὶ διεστραμμένον ἄνευ ὀδύνης.

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[1] "It certainly began in improvisations" (Bywater).
[2] "As soon as a spoken part came in" (Bywater).

b. Epic poetry. Ib., 1449 b$^{9-20}$: **Epic poetry**

1449b ῾Η μὲν οὖν ἐποποιία τῇ τραγῳδίᾳ μέχρι μὲν τοῦ <διὰ> μέτρου μεγάλου [1] μίμησις
10 εἶναι σπουδαίων ἡκολούθησεν· τῷ δὲ τὸ μέτρον ἁπλοῦν ἔχειν καὶ ἀπαγγελίαν
εἶναι, ταύτῃ διαφέρουσιν. ἔτι δὲ τῷ μήκει· ἡ μὲν γὰρ ὅτι μάλιστα πειρᾶται
ὑπὸ μίαν περίοδον ἡλίου εἶναι ἢ μικρὸν ἐξαλλάττειν, ἡ δὲ ἐποποιία ἀόριστος τῷ
15 χρόνῳ, καὶ τούτῳ διαφέρει. καίτοι τὸ πρῶτον ὁμοίως ἐν ταῖς τραγῳδίαις
τοῦτο ἐποίουν καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἔπεσιν. μέρη δ' ἐστὶ τὰ μὲν ταὐτά, τὰ δὲ ἴδια τῆς
τραγῳδίας. διόπερ ὅστις περὶ τραγῳδίας οἶδε σπουδαίας καὶ φαύλης, οἶδε καὶ
περὶ ἐπῶν· ἃ μὲν γὰρ ἐποποιία ἔχει, ὑπάρχει τῇ τραγῳδίᾳ, ἃ δὲ αὐτή, οὐ πάντα
20 ἐν τῇ ἐποποιίᾳ.

664—a. The famous definition of tragedy. *Poet.* 6, 1449 b$^{24-31}$: **Definition of tragedy**

῾Εστιν οὖν τραγῳδία μίμησις πράξεως σπουδαίας καὶ τελείας, μέγεθος
25 ἐχούσης, ἡδυσμένῳ λόγῳ, χωρὶς ἑκάστου τῶν εἰδῶν ἐν τοῖς μορίοις, δρώντων
καὶ οὐ δι' ἀπαγγελίας, δι' ἐλέου καὶ φόβου περαίνουσα τὴν τῶν τοιούτων
παθημάτων κάθαρσιν.

Λέγω δὲ ἡδυσμένον μὲν λόγον τὸν ἔχοντα ῥυθμὸν καὶ ἁρμονίαν καὶ μέλος,
30 τὸ δὲ χωρὶς τοῖς εἴδεσι τὸ διὰ μέτρων ἔνια μόνον περαίνεσθαι καὶ πάλιν ἕτερα
διὰ μέλους.

There has been much discussion on the meaning of the κάθαρσις τῶν παθημάτων spoken of in this definition. The best interpretation has been given by F. W. Trench, *The place of* κάθαρσις *in Aristotle's aesthetics*, in *Hermathena*, Dublin 1938, p. 110-134. He argues that, in Aristotle's view, the παθήματα are not as such bad and abnormal, but should be ordered and brought to serenity, which is accomplished through melody, rhythm, art-form. Like Pythagoras and Plato before him, Ar. believed in the influence of music and rhythm on the emotions.

This paper seems not to have been known to Fr. Dirlmeier, who, in *Hermes* 1940, p. 81-92, Κάθαρσις παθημάτων, tries again to prove that the genetive παθημάτων is a *separativus*.

Further recent literature on the subject:

M. Kommerell, *Lessing und Aristoteles* (Frankfurter wissenschaftl. Beiträge. Kulturwiss. R. 2) Frankfurt a.M. 1940.

A. Tumarkin, *Die Kunsttheorie von Aristoteles im Rahmen seiner Philosophie*, in *Museum Helveticum* 1945, p. 108-122.

For editions and further litterature, see Bibliography p. 302 and 303.

b. Of the formative elements of tragedy action is the first essential. Ib., 1450 a$^{16-25}$, a^{38}-b^{20}: **Formative elements: 1. action**

1450a ῾Η γὰρ τραγῳδία μίμησίς ἐστιν οὐκ ἀνθρώπων ἀλλὰ πράξεως καὶ βίου καὶ
εὐδαιμονίας <καὶ κακοδαιμονίας· ἡ δὲ εὐδαιμονία> καὶ ἡ κακοδαιμονία ἐν
πράξει ἐστί, καὶ τὸ τέλος πρᾶξίς τις ἐστίν, οὐ ποιότης. εἰσὶ δὲ κατὰ μὲν τὰ

[1] Text of Bywater. The codex A has μέχρι μόνου μέτρου μεγάλου, B μέχρι μόνου μέτρου μετὰ λόγου. Other editors read: μέχρι μὲν τοῦ μετὰ μέτρου.

ἤθη ποιοί τινες, κατὰ δὲ τὰς πράξεις εὐδαίμονες ἢ τοὐναντίον. οὔκουν ὅπως 20
τὰ ἤθη μιμήσωνται πράττουσιν, ἀλλὰ τὰ ἤθη συμπεριλαμβάνουσι διὰ τὰς
πράξεις. ὥστε τὰ πράγματα καὶ ὁ μῦθος τέλος τῆς τραγῳδίας· τὸ δὲ τέλος
μέγιστον ἁπάντων. ἔτι ἄνευ μὲν πράξεως οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο τραγῳδία, ἄνευ δὲ 24, 25
ἠθῶν γένοιτ' ἄν. —

2. Other elements

Ἀρχὴ μὲν οὖν καὶ οἷον ψυχὴ ὁ μῦθος τῆς τραγῳδίας, δεύτερον δὲ τὰ ἤθη. 38
παραπλήσιον γάρ ἐστι καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς γραφικῆς· εἰ γάρ τις ἐναλείψειε τοῖς καλλί-
στοις φαρμάκοις χύδην, οὐκ ἂν ὁμοίως εὐφράνειεν καὶ λευκογραφήσας εἰκόνα. 1450b
ἔστι τε μίμησις πράξεως, καὶ διὰ ταύτην μάλιστα τῶν πραττόντων. τρίτον
δὲ ἡ διάνοια. τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶ τὸ λέγειν δύνασθαι τὰ ἐνόντα καὶ τὰ ἁρμόττοντα, 5
ὅπερ ἐπὶ τῶν λόγων [1] τῆς πολιτικῆς καὶ ῥητορικῆς ἔργον ἐστίν· οἱ μὲν γὰρ
ἀρχαῖοι πολιτικῶς ἐποίουν λέγοντας, οἱ δὲ νῦν ῥητορικῶς. ἔστι δὲ ἦθος μὲν
τὸ τοιοῦτον ὃ δηλοῖ τὴν προαίρεσιν ὁποία τις, ἐν οἷς οὐκ ἔστι δῆλον ἢ
προαιρεῖται ἢ φεύγει (διόπερ οὐκ ἔχουσιν ἦθος τῶν λόγων ἐν οἷς μηδ' ὅλως 10
ἔστιν ὅ τι προαιρεῖται ἢ φεύγει ὁ λέγων). διάνοια δέ, ἐν οἷς ἀποδεικνύουσί τι
ὡς ἔστιν ἢ ὡς οὐκ ἔστιν, ἢ καθόλου τι ἀποφαίνονται. τέταρτον δὲ τῶν ἐν
λόγῳ [2] ἡ λέξις· λέγω δέ, ὥσπερ πρότερον εἴρηται, λέξιν εἶναι τὴν διὰ τῆς
ὀνομασίας ἑρμηνείαν, ὃ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἐμμέτρων καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν λόγων ἔχει τὴν 15
αὐτὴν δύναμιν. τῶν δὲ λοιπῶν [πέντε] ἡ μελοποιία μέγιστον τῶν ἡδυσμάτων.
ἡ δὲ ὄψις ψυχαγωγικὸν μέν, ἀτεχνότατον δὲ καὶ ἥκιστα οἰκεῖον τῆς ποιητικῆς·
ἡ γὰρ τῆς τραγῳδίας δύναμις καὶ ἄνευ ἀγῶνος καὶ ὑποκριτῶν ἐστιν. ἔτι δὲ
κυριωτέρα περὶ τὴν ἀπεργασίαν τῶν ὄψεων ἡ τοῦ σκευοποιοῦ τέχνη τῆς 20
τῶν ποιητῶν ἐστιν.

665—a. A story or plot must be of some length.

Length of the story

Poet. 7, 1451 a$^{9-15}$:

Ὁ δὲ κατ' αὐτὴν τὴν φύσιν τοῦ πράγματος ὅρος, ἀεὶ μὲν ὁ μείζων μέχρι τοῦ 1451a
σύνδηλος εἶναι καλλίων ἐστὶ κατὰ τὸ μέγεθος, ὡς δὲ ἁπλῶς διορίσαντας εἰπεῖν,
ἐν ὅσῳ μεγέθει κατὰ τὸ εἰκὸς ἢ τὸ ἀναγκαῖον ἐφεξῆς γιγνομένων συμβαίνει
εἰς εὐτυχίαν ἐκ δυστυχίας ἢ ἐξ εὐτυχίας εἰς δυστυχίαν μεταβάλλειν, ἱκανὸς
ὅρος ἐστὶ τοῦ μεγέθους. 15

b. Unity of the plot.

Its unity

Poet. 8, 1451 a$^{16-35}$:

Μῦθος δ' ἐστὶν εἷς, οὐχ ὥσπερ τινὲς οἴονται, ἐὰν περὶ ἕνα ᾖ· πολλὰ γὰρ καὶ
ἄπειρα τῷ ἑνὶ συμβαίνει, ἐξ ὧν ἑνίων οὐδέν ἐστιν ἕν. οὕτω δὲ καὶ πράξεις
ἑνὸς πολλαί εἰσιν, ἐξ ὧν μία οὐδεμία γίνεται πρᾶξις. διὸ πάντες ἐοίκασιν

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[1] ἐπὶ τῶν λόγων - in the speeches in tragedy.

[2] ἐν λόγῳ corr. Bywater. Mss. τῶν μὲν λόγων.

ἁμαρτάνειν, ὅσοι τῶν ποιητῶν Ἡρακληΐδα καὶ Θησηΐδα καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα ποιήματα πεποιήκασιν· οἴονται γὰρ ἐπεὶ εἷς ἦν ὁ Ἡρακλῆς, ἕνα καὶ τὸν μῦθον εἶναι προσήκειν. ὁ δ' Ὅμηρος, ὥσπερ καὶ τὰ ἄλλα διαφέρει, καὶ τοῦτ' ἔοικε καλῶς ἰδεῖν, ἤτοι διὰ τέχνην ἢ διὰ φύσιν· Ὀδύσσειαν γὰρ ποιῶν οὐκ ἐποίησεν ἅπαντα ὅσα αὐτῷ συνέβη, οἷον πληγῆναι μὲν ἐν τῷ Παρνασσῷ, μανῆναι δὲ προσποιήσασθαι ἐν τῷ ἀγερμῷ, ὧν οὐδὲν θατέρου γενομένου ἀναγκαῖον ἦν ἢ εἰκὸς θάτερον γενέσθαι, ἀλλὰ περὶ μίαν πρᾶξιν, οἵαν λέγομεν, τὴν Ὀδύσσειαν συνέστησεν, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὴν Ἰλιάδα. χρὴ οὖν, καθάπερ καὶ ἐν ταῖς ἄλλαις μιμητικαῖς ἡ μία μίμησις ἑνός ἐστιν, οὕτω καὶ τὸν μῦθον, ἐπεὶ πράξεως μίμησίς ἐστι, μιᾶς τε εἶναι καὶ ταύτης ὅλης, καὶ τὰ μέρη συνεστάναι τῶν πραγμάτων οὕτως ὥστε μετατιθεμένου τινὸς μέρους ἢ ἀφαιρουμένου διαφέρεσθαι καὶ κινεῖσθαι τὸ ὅλον· ὃ γὰρ προσὸν ἢ μὴ προσὸν μηδὲν ποιεῖ ἐπίδηλον, οὐδὲ μόριον τοῦ ὅλου ἐστίν.

666—Why poetry is more philosophical and of more serious importance than history.

Poet. 9, 1451 a[36]-b[7]:

Poetry superior to history

Φανερὸν δὲ ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων καὶ ὅτι οὐ τὸ τὰ γενόμενα λέγειν, τοῦτο ποιητοῦ ἔργον ἐστίν, ἀλλ' οἷα ἂν γένοιτο, καὶ τὰ δυνατὰ κατὰ τὸ εἰκὸς ἢ τὸ ἀναγκαῖον. ὁ γὰρ ἱστορικὸς καὶ ὁ ποιητὴς οὐ τῷ ἢ ἔμμετρα λέγειν ἢ ἄμετρα διαφέρουσιν· εἴη γὰρ ἂν τὰ Ἡροδότου εἰς μέτρα τεθῆναι, καὶ οὐδὲν ἧττον ἂν εἴη ἱστορία τις μετὰ μέτρου ἢ ἄνευ μέτρων· ἀλλὰ τούτῳ διαφέρει, τῷ τὸν μὲν τὰ γενόμενα λέγειν, τὸν δὲ οἷα ἂν γένοιτο. διὸ καὶ φιλοσοφώτερον καὶ σπουδαιότερον ποίησις ἱστορίας ἐστίν· ἡ μὲν γὰρ ποίησις μᾶλλον τὰ καθόλου, ἡ δ' ἱστορία τὰ καθ' ἕκαστον λέγει.

BOOK IV

THE EARLY PERIPATETIC SCHOOL AND THE EARLY ACADEMY

EIGHTEENTH CHAPTER

THE EARLY PERIPATETIC SCHOOL

1—THEOPHRASTUS

Life and work

667—a. The man and his work. Diog. L. V 35, the end - 36, the beginning.

Τοῦ δὴ Σταγειρίτου γεγόνασι μὲν πολλοὶ γνώριμοι, διαφέρων δὲ μάλιστα Θεόφραστος, περὶ οὗ λεκτέον. — Θεόφραστος Μελάντα Ἐρέσιος. — Οὗτος πρῶτον μὲν ἤκουσεν Ἀλκίππου τοῦ πολίτου ἐν τῇ πατρίδι, εἶτ' ἀκούσας Πλάτωνος μετέστη πρὸς Ἀριστοτέλην· κἀκείνου εἰς Χαλκίδα ὑποχωρήσαντος αὐτὸς διεδέξατο τὴν σχολὴν Ὀλυμπιάδι τετάρτῃ καὶ δεκάτῃ καὶ ἑκατοστῇ.

b. Cp. Simpl., *Phys.* 964, 30 Diels:

Τὸν κορυφαῖον τῶν Ἀριστοτέλους ἑταίρων Θεόφραστον.

c. Prosperity of the School under Theophr. *Diog. L.* V 37:

Ἀπήντων τ' εἰς τὴν διατριβὴν αὐτοῦ μαθηταὶ πρὸς δισχιλίους.

d. He is greatly honoured, both at Athens and abroad.

Diog. L. ib., 37 and 41:

Κάσανδρος γοῦν αὐτὸν ἀπεδέχετο καὶ Πτολεμαῖος ἔπεμψεν ἐπ' αὐτόν· τοσοῦτον δ' ἀποδοχῆς ἠξιοῦτο παρ' Ἀθηναίοις, ὥστ' Ἀγνωνίδης τολμήσας ἀσεβείας αὐτὸν γράψασθαι, μικροῦ καὶ προσῶφλεν. — Καὶ αὐτόν, ὡς ὁ λόγος, Ἀθηναῖοι πανδημεὶ παρέπεμψαν ποσί, τὸν ἄνδρα τιμήσαντες.

Writings

668—*Diog. L.* V 42:

Καταλέλοιπε δὲ βιβλία καὶ αὐτὸς ὅτι μάλιστα πάμπλειστα.

His numerous works covered the whole field of Aristotle's studies: logic, science metaphysics, ethics, politics, rhetoric, poetics. Preserved are his two standard works on botany, the Περὶ φυτῶν ἱστορίας and Περὶ φυτῶν αἰτιῶν, several small treatises

on various subjects of science, fragments of his great *History of philosophy* (Φυσικῶν δόξαι), and of other works. The treatise Περὶ αἰσθήσεως καὶ αἰσθητῶν was a part of the Φυσικῶν δόξαι, and the *Characters* belonged probably to a greater work on ethics.

669—Empirical basis of scientific theories. **Empirical basis**

a. *De caus. plant.* I 1, 1:

Εὐθὺ γὰρ χρὴ συμφωνεῖσθαι τοὺς λόγους τοῖς εὑρημένοις.

b. Applying this principle thoughout his work, he states in the same book, 17, 6:

Ἐκ δὲ τῶν καθ' ἕκαστα θεωροῦσι σύμφωνος ὁ λόγος τῶν γιγνομένων.

c. Cf. *De caus. plant.* II 3, 5:

Περὶ δὲ τῶν ἐν τοῖς καθ' ἕκαστα μᾶλλον εὐποροῦμεν· ἡ γὰρ αἴσθησις δίδωσιν ἀρχάς.

670—Sense-perception provides thought with material, either to use directly or indirectly, by solving the difficulties which perception presents to it.

a. *Metaph.* VIII 19 ed. Ross-Fobes:

Τὸ δὲ ὂν ὅτι πολλαχῶς, φανερόν· ἡ γὰρ αἴσθησις καὶ τὰς διαφορὰς θεωρεῖ καὶ τὰς αἰτίας ζητεῖ· τάχα δ' ἀληθέστερον εἰπεῖν ὡς ὑποβάλλει τῇ διανοίᾳ τὰ μὲν ἁπλῶς ζητοῦσα, τὰ δ' ἀπορίαν ἐνεργαζομένη, δι' ἧς, κἂν μὴ δύνηται προβαίνειν, ὅμως ἐμφαίνεταί τι φῶς ἐν τῷ μὴ φωτὶ ζητούντων ἐπὶ πλέον. — Ib. 25: Μέχρι μὲν οὖν τινὸς δυνάμεθα δι' αἰτίου θεωρεῖν, ἀρχὰς ἀπὸ τῶν αἰσθήσεων λαμβάνοντες.

b. Cf. Clem. Alex., *Strom.* II 362 D:

Θεόφραστος δὲ τὴν αἴσθησιν ἀρχὴν εἶναι πίστεώς φησιν· ἀπὸ γὰρ ταύτης αἱ ἀρχαὶ πρὸς τὸν λόγον τὸν ἐν ἡμῖν καὶ τὴν διάνοιαν ἐκτείνονται.

671—The phenomenology of plants teaches him that empirical facts should not be artificially forged into a theory. **Perception more reliable than theory**

a. *Hist. plant.* I 3, 5:

Speaking of the difficulty of the classification of plants, he says:

Διὰ δὴ ταῦτα ὥσπερ λέγομεν οὐκ ἀκριβολογητέον τῷ ὅρῳ ἀλλὰ τῷ τύπῳ ληπτέον τοὺς ἀφορισμούς.

b. Cf. *De caus. plant.* II 4, 8:

Ἀλλ' ἐν τοῖς καθ' ἕκαστα τὸ ἀκριβὲς μᾶλλον ἴσως αἰσθητικῆς δεῖται συνέσεως, λόγῳ δὲ οὐκ εὐμαρὲς ἀφορίσαι.

672—Logic.

Conversion of propositions

a. Theophr. changes Aristotle's indirect proof of the conversion of universal negative propositions into a direct proof.

Alex. Aphrod. in Ar. *Anal. pr.* 31, $^{4-10}$ Wallies:

Θεόφραστος μὲν καὶ Εὔδημος ἁπλούστερον ἔδειξαν τὴν καθόλου ἀποφατικὴν ἀντιστρέφουσαν ἑαυτῇ· τὴν γὰρ καθόλου ἀποφατικὴν ὠνόμασε καθόλου στερητικήν. Τὴν δὲ δεῖξιν οὕτω ποιοῦνται· κείσθω τὸ Α κατὰ μηδενὸς τοῦ Β· εἰ κατὰ μηδενός, ἀπέζευκται τοῦ Β τὸ Α καὶ ἐχώρισται· τὸ δὲ ἀπεζευγμένον ἀπεζευγμένου ἀπέζευκται· καὶ τὸ Β ἄρα παντὸς ἀπέζευκται τοῦ Α· εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, κατὰ μηδενὸς αὐτοῦ. Οὕτως μὲν οὖν ἐκεῖνοι.

The same is told by Philoponus in *An. pr.* 48^{11-18} W.

b. Theophr. maintains (against Ar.) the convertibility of universal negative propositions of possibility.

Alex. in *An. pr.* 220, $^{9-16}$ W.:

Θεόφραστος μέντοι καὶ Εὔδημος, ὡς καὶ κατ' ἀρχὰς ἐμνημονεύσαμεν, ἀντιστρέφειν φασὶ καὶ τὴν καθόλου ἀποφατικὴν αὐτῇ, ὥσπερ ἀντέστρεφε καὶ ἡ ὑπάρχουσα [1] καθόλου ἀποφατικὴ καὶ ἡ ἀναγκαία. Ὅτι δὲ ἀντιστρέφει, δεικνῦσιν οὕτως· εἰ τὸ Α τῷ Β ἐνδέχεται μηδενί, καὶ τῷ Β τὸ Α ἐνδέχεται μηδενί· ἐπεὶ γὰρ ἐνδέχεται τὸ Α τῷ Β μηδενί, ὅτε ἐνδέχεται μηδενί, τότε ἐνδέχεται ἀπεζεῦχθαι τὸ Α πάντων τῶν τοῦ Β· εἰ δὲ τοῦτ', ἔσται τότε καὶ τὸ Β τοῦ Α ἀπεζευγμένον· εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, καὶ τὸ Β τῷ Α ἐνδέχεται μηδενί.

On the logic of modality in Theophr. see Bochensky, *La logique de Théophraste,* Fribourg (Suisse) 1947, ch. V.

Moods of the syllogism

673—**a.** To Aristotle's four moods of the first figure of the syllogism Theophr. added five others.

Alex., *An. pr.* 69, ^{36} - 70, ^{1} W.:

Θεόφραστος δὲ προστίθησιν ἄλλους πέντε τοῖς τέτταρσι τούτοις οὐκέτι τελείους οὐδ' ἀναποδείκτους ὄντας, ὧν μνημονεύσει καὶ ὁ Ἀριστοτέλης, τῶν μὲν ἐν τούτῳ τῷ βιβλίῳ προελθών, τῶν δὲ ἐν τῷ μετὰ τοῦτο τῷ δευτέρῳ κατ' ἀρχάς.

Bochensky, o.c., p. 56-65, in treating these new moods, states that Theophr. developed Ar.'s indications in a formalistic sense.

b. Later we find the five moods of Theophr. in Boëthius, *De syllogismo categorico,* Patrol. Lat. LXIV, 814 c:

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[1] ὑπάρχον is a species of ἀναγκαῖον, what the schoolmen call the *necessarium ex suppositione.* Cp. Bochensky o.c., p. 73.

Quattuor in prima figura modos in Analyticis suis Aristoteles posuit. Ceteros vero quinque modos Theophrastus et Eudemus addiderunt, quibus Porphyrius, gravissimae vir auctoritatis, visus est consensisse, qui sunt huiusmodi.

Follows a description of the new moods.

674—According to Theophr., in syllogisms in which the premisses are of different modality, the conclusion follows the weaker premiss. **Modality**

a. Alex., *An. pr.* 124, $^{8-21}$ W.:

Οἱ δὲ γε ἑταῖροι αὐτοῦ (sc. Ἀριστοτέλους) οἱ περὶ Εὔδημόν τε καὶ Θεόφραστον οὐχ οὕτως λέγουσι, ἀλλά φασιν ἐν πάσαις ταῖς ἐξ ἀναγκαίας τε καὶ ὑπαρχούσης συζυγίαις, ἐὰν ὦσι συγκείμεναι συλλογιστικῶς, ὑπάρχον γίνεσθαι τὸ συμπέρασμα, τοῦτο λαμβάνοντες ἔκ τε τοῦ ἐν πάσαις ταῖς συμπλοκαῖς τὸ συμπέρασμα αἰεὶ τῷ ἐλάττονι καὶ χείρονι τῶν κειμένων ἐξομοιοῦσθαι· ἄν τε γὰρ ἐκ καταφατικῆς καὶ ἀποφατικῆς προτάσεως, συνάγεται ἀποφατικὸν τὸ συμπέρασμα, ἄν τ' ἐκ καθόλου καὶ ἐπὶ μέρους, ἐπὶ μέρους καὶ τὸ συμπέρασμα. Τὸν αὐτὸν δὴ τρόπον καὶ ἐν ταῖς μίξεσιν ἔχειν· ὑπάρχον γὰρ γίνεσθαι ἐν ταῖς ἐξ ἀναγκαίας καὶ ὑπαρχούσης συμπλοκαῖς τῷ ἔλαττον εἶναι τὸ ὑπάρχον τοῦ ἀναγκαίου. Ἀλλὰ καὶ τῷ λόγῳ τοῦτο δεικνύουσιν. Εἰ γὰρ τὸ Β τῷ Γ ὑπάρχει μὲν παντί, οὐ μὴν ἐξ ἀνάγκης, ἐνδέχεταί ποτε αὐτὸ καὶ ἀποζευχθῆναι αὐτοῦ· ὅτε δὴ τὸ Β τοῦ Γ ἀπέζευκται, τότε καὶ τὸ Α αὐτοῦ ἀποζευχθήσεται· εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, οὐκ ἐξ ἀνάγκης αὐτῷ ὑπάρξει.

b. Again, if one of the premisses is possible, the conclusion will be possible. Alex., *An. pr.* 173, ^{32} - 174, ^{3} W.:

Θεόφραστος μὲν οὖν καὶ Εὔδημος οἱ ἑταῖροι αὐτοῦ καὶ ἐν τῇ ἐξ ἐνδεχομένης καὶ ὑπαρχούσης μίξει φασὶν ἔσεσθαι τὸ συμπέρασμα ἐνδεχόμενον, ὁποτέρα ἂν τῶν προτάσεων ἐνδεχομένη ληφθῇ· χεῖρον γὰρ πάλιν τὸ ἐνδεχόμενον τοῦ ὑπάρχοντος.

Cf. Philoponus, *An. pr.* 205, $^{13-15}$ W. See: Bochensky o.c., p. 79 ff. on "the rule of the *peiorem*".

675—**a.** According to Philoponus, Theophr. and Eudemus introduced the doctrine of hypothetic and disjunctive syllogisms.

Hypothetical syllogisms

Philop., An. pr. 242, $^{14-21}$ W.:

Ἐπειδὴ δὲ ὁ μὲν Ἀριστοτέλης τοσοῦτον εἰπὼν περὶ τῶν ὑποθετικῶν ἐπαύσατο καὶ οὐδὲν ἡμᾶς περὶ αὐτῶν ἐδίδαξεν, ἀλλὰ τὴν πᾶσαν σπουδὴν περὶ τοῦ κατηγορικοῦ συλλογισμοῦ ἐποιήσατο, ἅτε δὴ τούτων μὲν τελείων ὄντων καὶ μηδενὸς ἔξωθεν δεομένων, τῶν δὲ ὑποθετικῶν δεομένων τῶν κατηγορικῶν, εἴπωμεν

ἡμεῖς βραχέα περὶ αὐτῶν. Ἰστέον γὰρ ὅτι πολυστίχους πραγματείας περὶ τούτων κατεβάλλοντο οἵ τε μαθηταὶ τοῦ Ἀριστοτέλους, οἱ περὶ Θεόφραστον καὶ Εὔδημον καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους, καὶ ἔτι οἱ Στωϊκοί.

Is this statement true? Is it true that Theophr., Eudemus and other disciples of Ar. dealt explicitly with hypothetical syllogisms?—The following text of Alexander seems to contradict this communication of Philoponus.

b. Alex., *An. pr.* 389, ^{32} - 390, ^{3}:

Λέγει (sc. Ἀριστοτέλης) καὶ ἄλλους πολλοὺς ἐξ ὑποθέσεως περαίνεσθαι, περὶ ὧν ὑπερτίθεται μὲν ὡς ἐρῶν ἐπιμελέστερον, οὐ μὲν φέρεται αὐτοῦ σύγγραμμα περὶ αὐτῶν· Θεόφραστος δ' αὐτῶν ἐν τοῖς ἰδίοις Ἀναλυτικοῖς μνημονεύει, ἀλλὰ καὶ Εὔδημος καί τινες ἄλλοι τῶν ἑταίρων αὐτοῦ.

Bochensky o.c., p. 110, concludes that, if Theophr. "mentions" these syllogisms, he did not treat them at length.

As to the frequent combination of the names of Theophr. and Eudemus, Bochensky (o.c., p. 125) suggests that Ar. discussed these questions in his School more abundantly than it is done in his written treatises, and that both Theophr. and Eud. represented the views of Ar. in the latest phase of his teaching.

676—Metaphysics.

the First Principle

a. Theophr. admits, with Ar., one first principle of all.

Metaph. I 6 Ross-Fobes:

Μέχρι μὲν δὴ τούτων οἷον ἄρτιος ὁ λόγος ἀρχήν τε ποιῶν μίαν πάντων καὶ 5a 5
τὴν ἐνέργειαν καὶ τὴν οὐσίαν ἀποδιδούς, ἔτι δὲ μὴ διαιρετὸν μηδὲ ποσόν τι λέγων
ἀλλ' ἁπλῶς ἐξαίρων εἰς κρείττω τινὰ μερίδα καὶ θειοτέραν· οὕτω γὰρ μᾶλλον 10
ἀποδοτέον ἢ τὸ διαιρετὸν καὶ μεριστὸν ἀφαιρετέον. Ἅμα γὰρ ἐν ὑψηλοτέρῳ
τε καὶ ἀληθινωτέρῳ λόγῳ τοῖς λέγουσιν ἡ ἀπόφασις.

b. His objections to the Aristotelian theory of the Prime Mover.

Ib., II 7-9:

Τὸ δὲ μετὰ ταῦτ' ἤδη λόγου δεῖται πλείονος περὶ τῆς ἐφέσεως, ποία καὶ 15
τίνων. Ἐπειδὴ πλείω τὰ κυκλικὰ καὶ αἱ φοραὶ τρόπον τινὰ ὑπεναντίαι, καὶ τὸ
ἀνήνυτον καὶ οὗ χάριν ἀφανές. Εἴτε γὰρ ἓν τὸ κινοῦν, ἄτοπον τὸ μὴ πάντα τὴν
αὐτήν· εἴτε καθ' ἕκαστον ἕτερον αἵ τ' ἀρχαὶ πλείους, ὥστε τὸ σύμφωνον αὐτῶν 20
εἰς ὄρεξιν ἰόντων τὴν ἀρίστην οὐδαμῶς φανερόν. Τὸ δὲ κατὰ τὸ πλῆθος τῶν
σφαιρῶν τῆς αἰτίας μείζονα ζητεῖ λόγον· οὐ γὰρ <ἀρκεῖ> ὅ γε τῶν ἀστρολόγων.
Ἄπορον δὲ καὶ πῶς ποτε φυσικὴν ὄρεξιν ἐχόντων οὐ τὴν ἠρεμίαν διώκουσιν
ἀλλὰ τὴν κίνησιν. — Εἰ δ' ἡ ἔφεσις, ἄλλως τε καὶ τοῦ ἀρίστου, μετὰ ψυχῆς, 25, 28
εἰ μή τις λέγοι καθ' ὁμοιότητα καὶ μεταφοράν, ἔμψυχ' ἂν εἴη τὰ κινούμενα.
Ψυχῇ δ' ἅμα δοκεῖ καὶ κίνησις ὑπάρχειν· ζωὴ γὰρ τοῖς ἔχουσιν, ἀφ' ἧς καὶ αἱ 5b

ὀρέξεις πρὸς ἕκαστον, ὥσπερ καὶ τοῖς ζῴοις, ἐπεὶ καὶ αἱ αἰσθήσεις καίπερ ἐν τῷ πάσχειν οὖσαι δι' ἑτέρων ὅμως ὡς ἐμψύχοις γίγνονται. Εἰ δ' οὖν τῆς κυκλικῆς αἴτιον τὸ πρῶτον οὐ τῆς ἀρίστης ἂν εἴη· κρείττων γὰρ ἡ τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ πρώτη δὴ καὶ μάλιστα ἡ τῆς διανοίας ἀφ' ἧς καὶ ἡ ὄρεξις.

677—His difficulties about the teleological explanation of nature.

Difficultie about teleology

a. How should we conceive the first principles? What is the reason of everything? How far does the ordering of the world reach, and why does it stop at a certain point?

Ib., IV 14-15:

Πῶς δέ ποτε χρὴ καὶ ποίας τὰς ἀρχὰς ὑποθέσθαι τάχ' ἂν ἀπορήσειέ τις, πότερον ἀμόρφους καὶ οἷον δυναμικὰς ὥσπερ ὅσοι πῦρ καὶ γῆν, ἢ μεμορφωμένας ὡς μάλιστα δέον ταύτας ὡρίσθαι καθάπερ ἐν τῷ Τιμαίῳ φησίν· τοῖς γὰρ τιμιωτάτοις οἰκειότατον ἡ τάξις καὶ τὸ ὡρίσθαι. Φαίνεται δὲ καὶ ἐν ταῖς λοιπαῖς σχεδὸν ἔχειν οὕτω καθάπερ ἐν γραμματικῇ καὶ μουσικῇ καὶ ταῖς μαθηματικαῖς. Συνακολουθεῖ δὲ καὶ τὰ μετὰ τὰς ἀρχάς. Ἔτι δὲ καὶ κατὰ τὰς τέχνας ὁμοίως αἴπερ τὴν φύσιν μιμοῦνται· καὶ τὰ ὄργανα καὶ τὰ ἄλλα κατὰ τὰς ἀρχάς. Οἱ μὲν οὖν ἀμόρφους πάσας, οἱ δὲ μόνον τὰς ὑλικάς· οἱ δ' ἀμφοτέρας ἐμμόρφους, καὶ τὰς τῆς ὕλης, ὡς ἐν ἀμφοῖν τὸ τέλεον <ὂν>· οἷον γὰρ ἐξ ἀντικειμένων τὴν ἅπασαν οὐσίαν. Ἄλογον δὲ κἀκεῖνο δόξειεν ἂν εἰ ὁ μὲν ὅλος οὐρανὸς καὶ ἕκαστα τῶν μερῶν ἅπαντ' ἐν τάξει καὶ λόγῳ καὶ μορφαῖς καὶ δυνάμεσι καὶ περιόδοις, ἐν δὲ ταῖς ἀρχαῖς μηθὲν τοιοῦτον ἀλλ' ὥσπερ σάρμα [1] εἰκῇ κεχυμένων ὁ κάλλιστος, φησὶν Ἡράκλειτος, [ὁ] κόσμος. — Χαλεπὸν δὲ πάλιν αὖ τὸ τοὺς λόγους ἑκάστοις περιθεῖναι πρὸς τὸ ἕνεκά του συνάγοντας ἐν ἅπασι καὶ ἐν ζῴοις καὶ φυτοῖς καὶ ἐν αὐτῇ πομφόλυγι· πλὴν εἰ συμβαίνει τῇ ἀστέρων τάξει καὶ μεταβολῇ μορφὰς παντοίας καὶ ποικιλίας γίγνεσθαι τῶν τε περὶ τὸν ἀέρα καὶ τὴν γῆν. Ὧν δὴ μέγιστόν τινες παράδειγμα ποιοῦνται τὰ περὶ τὰς ὥρας τὰς ἐτείους ἐν αἷς καὶ ζῴων καὶ φυτῶν καὶ καρπῶν γενέσεις οἷον γεννῶντος τοῦ ἡλίου. Καὶ ταῦτα μὲν ἐνταῦθά που ζητεῖ τὴν σκέψιν, ἀφορισμὸν ἀπαιτοῦντα μέχρι πόσου τὸ τεταγμένον, καὶ διὰ τί πλέον ἀδύνατον ἢ εἰς τὸ χεῖρον μετάβασις.

b. It is sometimes difficult to decide whether a thing exists for a certain purpose or by chance. Many things do not exist for a purpose, and there is much more evil than good.

Ib., IX 28-32:

Ὑπὲρ δὲ τοῦ πάνθ' ἕνεκά του καὶ μηθὲν μάτην, ἄλλως <θ'> ὁ ἀφορισμὸς οὐ ῥᾴδιος καθάπερ πλεονάκις λέγεται (πόθεν δ' ἄρξασθαι χρὴ καὶ εἰς ποῖα τελευτᾶν;), καὶ δὴ ἔνια τῷ μὴ δοκεῖν ἔχειν οὕτως, ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν συμπτωματικῶς

[1] Corr. Diels. Mss. σὰρξ.

τὰ δ' ἀνάγκῃ τινὶ καθάπερ ἔν τε τοῖς οὐρανίοις καὶ ἐν τοῖς περὶ τὴν γῆν πλείοσιν. Τίνος γὰρ ἕνεκα αἱ ἔφοδοι καὶ ἀνάρροιαι θαλάττης [ἢ τίνος αἱ προχωρήσεις][1] ἢ 10b ἀναξηράνσεις καὶ ὑγρότητες καὶ ὅλως πρὸς ἄλλοτ' ἄλλο μεταβολαὶ καὶ φθοραὶ καὶ γενέσεις, [ἢ αἱ μὲν ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ γῇ ἀλλοιώσεις καὶ μεταβολαὶ γίγνονται πρὸς ἄλλοτ' ἄλλο μεθισταμένων][2] καὶ ἕτερα δ' οὐκ ὀλίγα παρόμοια τούτοις; 5 Ἔτι δ' ἐν αὐτοῖς τοῖς ζῴοις τὰ μὲν ὥσπερ μάταια καθάπερ τοῖς ἄρρεσιν οἱ μαστοὶ καὶ τοῖς θήλεσιν ἡ πρόεσις εἴπερ μὴ συμβάλλεται, καὶ πώγωνος δ' ἐνίοις ἢ ὅλως τριχῶν ἔκφυσις ἔν τισι τόποις· . . . καὶ ἕτερα οὐκ ὀλίγα λάβοι 10, 16 τις ἂν τοιαῦτα. Καὶ τὸ μέγιστον δὴ καὶ μάλιστα δοκοῦν περὶ τὰς τροφὰς καὶ γενέσεις τῶν ζῴων· οὐθενὸς γὰρ ταῦθ' ἕνεκα ἀλλὰ συμπτώματα καὶ δι' ἑτέρας ἀνάγκας. Ἔδει γὰρ εἴπερ τούτων χάριν ἀεὶ κατὰ ταὐτὰ καὶ ὡσαύτως. — 20

Ἁπλῶς μὲν ὅτι τὴν φύσιν <εἰκὸς> ἐν ἅπασιν ὀρέγεσθαι τοῦ ἀρίστου καὶ ἐφ' ὧν 11a 5 ἐνδέχεται μεταδιδόναι τοῦ ἀεὶ καὶ τοῦ τεταγμένου· ὡς δ' αὕτως καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ζῴων ὁμοίως· ὅπου γὰρ οἷόν τε τὸ βέλτιον, ἐνταῦθα οὐδαμοῦ παραλείπει, οἷον τὸ ἔμπροσθεν τὴν φάρυγγα τοῦ οἰσοφάγου, τιμιώτερον γάρ. καὶ ἐν τῇ μέσῃ 10 κοιλίᾳ τῆς καρδίας τὴν κρᾶσιν ἀρίστην, ὅτι τὸ μέσον τιμιώτατον. Ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ ὅσα κόσμου χάριν· εἰ γὰρ καὶ ἡ ὄρεξις οὕτως, ἀλλ' ἐκεῖνό γ' ἐμφαίνει διότι πολὺ τὸ οὐχ ὑπακοῦον οὐδὲ δεχόμενον τὸ εὖ, μᾶλλον δὲ πολλῷ πλεῖον· 15 ὀλίγον γάρ τι τὸ ἔμψυχον, ἄπειρον δὲ τὸ ἄψυχον· καὶ αὐτῶν τῶν ἐμψύχων ἀκαριαίου[3] καὶ βέλτιον τὸ εἶναι· τὸ δ' ὅλον σπάνιόν τι καὶ ἐν ὀλίγοις τὸ ἀγαθόν, πολὺ δὲ πλῆθος εἶναι τὸ κακόν. 20

678—Yet he accepts the Aristotelian teleology and professes its principle explicitly.

a. *De caus. plant.* I 1, 1:

ἡ γὰρ φύσις οὐδὲν ποιεῖ μάτην, ἥκιστα δὲ ἐν τοῖς πρώτοις καὶ κυριωτάτοις.

b. Cf. ib. I 16, 11:

ἡ δὲ (sc. φύσις) ἀεὶ πρὸς τὸ βέλτιστον ὁρμᾷ.

Theophr.'s theology

679—a. Cicero reproached Theophr. with the same "inconsistency" in theology which he disapproved of in Aristotle.

Cic., *N.D.* I 13, 35:

Nec vero Theophrasti inconstantia ferenda est; modo enim menti divinum tribuit principatum, modo caelo, tum autem signis sideribusque caelestibus.

Cp. on Aristotle ib. § 33 (our nr. **430**). The same is said by Minucius Felix, *Oct.* XIX 9.

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[1] Secl. Ross. [2] Secl. Usener.

[3] Corr. Ross. Transl.: "of animate things themselves there is only a minute part whose existence is actually better than its non-existence would be" (Ross-Fobes).

b. He considered atheism as an abnormality and a great sin.

Simpl. in Epict. *Enchir.* 38, IV 357 Schweigh.:

Πάντες γὰρ ἄνθρωποι ... νομίζουσι εἶναι θεὸν πλὴν Ἀκροθοϊτῶν, οὓς ἱστορεῖ Θεόφραστος ἀθέους γενομένους ὑπὸ τῆς γῆς ἀθρόως καταποθῆναι.

680—a. The divine order of the universe was to him at the same time Fate and Nature. **Fate and Nature**

Alex. Aphrod., *De an.*, at the end:

Φανερώτατα δὲ Θεόφραστος δείκνυσι ταὐτὸν ὂν τὸ καθ' εἱμαρμένην τῷ κατὰ φύσιν ἐν τῷ Καλλισθένει.

b. Like Plato, he seems to have spoken of ὁμοίωσις τῷ θεῷ.

Julianus, *Or.* VI, 185 a Spanh.: **the contemplative life**

Ἀλλὰ καὶ Πυθαγόρας οἵ τε ἀπ' ἐκείνου μέχρι Θεοφράστου τὸ κατὰ δύναμιν ὁμοιοῦσθαι θεῷ φασι. Καὶ γὰρ καὶ ὁ Ἀριστοτέλης· ὃ γὰρ ἡμεῖς ποτέ, τοῦτο ὁ θεὸς ἀεί.

Cf. Cic. in *De fin.* V 4, 11, who says, referring to Ar. and Theophr.: Vitae autem degendae ratio maxime quidem illis placuit quieta, in contemplatione et cognitione posita rerum, quae quia deorum erat vitae simillima, sapiente visa est dignissima.

681—He corrects Ar.'s conception of movement: movement occurs in every category, not only in that of substance, quantity, quality and place. **Movement**

Theophr. fr. 19 Wimmer (Simpl., *Phys.* 860, $^{19-23}$ D.):

Θ. ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ τῶν ἑαυτοῦ Φυσικῶν καὶ καθ' ἕκαστον γένος τῶν κατηγοριῶν τὴν κίνησιν θεωρεῖσθαί φησι γράφων οὕτως· περὶ δὲ κινήσεως τὸν μὲν καθόλου καὶ κοινὸν λόγον οὐ χαλεπὸν ἀποδοῦναι καὶ εἰπεῖν, ὡς ἐνέργειά τίς ἐστιν ἀτελὴς τοῦ δυνάμει ὄντος ᾗ τοιοῦτον καθ' ἕκαστον γένος τῶν κατηγοριῶν.

682—a. He opposes Ar.'s definition of space. **Space**

Fr. 21 Wimmer (Simpl., *Phys.* 604, $^{4-11}$ D.):

Θ. ἐν τοῖς Φυσικοῖς ἀπορεῖ πρὸς τὸν ἀποδοθέντα τοῦ τόπου λόγον ὑπὸ τοῦ Ἀριστοτέλους τοιαῦτα, ὅτι τὸ σῶμα ἔσται ἐν ἐπιφανείᾳ, ὅτι κινούμενος ἔσται ὁ τόπος, ὅτι οὐ πᾶν σῶμα ἐν τόπῳ, οὐδὲ γὰρ ἡ ἀπλανής, ὅτι ἐὰν συναχθῶσιν αἱ σφαῖραι, καὶ ὅλος ὁ οὐρανὸς οὐκ ἔσται ἐν τόπῳ, ὅτι τὰ ἐν τόπῳ ὄντα μηδὲν αὐτὰ μετακινηθέντα, ἐὰν ἀφαιρεθῇ τὰ περιέχοντα αὐτά, οὐκέτι ἔσται ἐν τόπῳ.

b. He tries to define it himself by the order and place of the bodies in relation to each other.

Fr. 22 Wimmer (Simpl., *Phys.* 639, 15-22):

Καὶ Θ. ἐν τοῖς Φυσικοῖς φαίνεται τὴν ἔννοιαν ταύτην ἐσχηκὼς περὶ τοῦ τόπου ἐν οἷς φησὶν ὡς ἐν ἀπορίᾳ προάγων τὸν λόγον· μήποτε οὐκ ἔστι καθ' αὑτὴν οὐσία τις ὁ τόπος ἀλλὰ τῇ τάξει καὶ θέσει τῶν σωμάτων λέγεται κατὰ τὰς φύσεις καὶ δυνάμεις· ὁμοίως δ' ἐπὶ ζῴων καὶ φυτῶν καὶ ὅλως τῶν ἀνομοιομερῶν, εἴτε ἐμψύχων εἴτε ἀψύχων, ἔμμορφον δὲ τὴν φύσιν ἐχόντων· καὶ γὰρ τούτων τάξις τις καὶ θέσις τῶν μερῶν ἐστὶ πρὸς τὴν ὅλην οὐσίαν. Διὸ καὶ ἕκαστον ἐν αὑτοῦ χώρᾳ λέγεται τῷ ἔχειν τὴν οἰκείαν τάξιν· ἐπεὶ καὶ τῶν τοῦ σώματος μερῶν ἕκαστον ἐπιποθήσειεν ἂν καὶ ἀπαιτήσειε τὴν ἑαυτοῦ χώραν καὶ θέσιν.

Eternity of the kosmos

683—He defends the eternity of the universe against the Stoic Zeno.

[Philo], *De aetern. mundi* 117, p. 510 Mangey:

Θεόφραστος μέντοι φησὶ τοὺς γένεσιν καὶ φθορὰν τοῦ κόσμου κατηγοροῦντας ὑπὸ τεττάρων ἀπατηθῆναι τῶν μεγίστων, γῆς ἀνωμαλίας, θαλάττης ἀναχωρήσεως, ἑκάστου τῶν τοῦ ὅλου μερῶν διαλύσεως, χερσαίων φθορᾶς κατὰ γένη ζῴων.

The following chapters (23-27) contain Theophr.' arguments against these four points.

Thinking a movement of the soul

684—Theophr. explains thinking as a movement of the soul.

Simpl., *Phys.* 964, 29-965, 6 D.:

Ταῦτα δὲ καὶ τὸν κορυφαῖον ἀρέσκει τῶν Ἀριστοτέλους ἑταίρων τὸν Θεόφραστον ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ τῶν Περὶ κινήσεως αὐτοῦ λέγοντα ὅτι »αἱ μὲν ὀρέξεις καὶ ἐπιθυμίαι καὶ ὀργαὶ σωματικαὶ κινήσεις εἰσὶ καὶ ἀπὸ τούτου τὴν ἀρχὴν ἔχουσιν, ὅσαι δὲ κρίσεις καὶ θεωρίαι, ταύτας οὐκ ἔστιν εἰς ἕτερον ἀναγαγεῖν, ἀλλ' ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ ψυχῇ καὶ ἡ ἀρχὴ καὶ ἡ ἐνέργεια καὶ τὸ τέλος, εἰ δὲ δὴ καὶ ὁ νοῦς κρεῖττόν τι καὶ θειότερον, ἅτε δὴ ἔξωθεν ἐπεισιὼν καὶ παντέλειος«. — Καὶ τούτοις ἐπάγει· »Ὑπὲρ μὲν οὖν τούτων σκεπτέον, εἴ τινα χωρισμὸν ἔχει πρὸς τὸν ὅρον, ἐπεὶ τό γε κινήσεις εἶναι καὶ ταύτας ὁμολογούμενον«.

Eudaemonia

685—a. In ethics, he shares Ar.' view of eudaemonia as the final end.

Cic., *De fin.* V 29, 86:

Omnis auctoritas philosophiae, ut ait Theophrastus, consistit in beata vita comparanda; beate enim vivendi cupiditate incensi omnes sumus.

Definition of the good

b. With Ar., he defines the good as that which is praiseworthy in itself.

Cic., *De legibus* I 13, 37 f.:

Ad respublicas firmandas et ad stabiliendas vires, sanandos populos,

omnis nostra pergit oratio. Quocirca vereor committere ut non bene provisa et diligenter explorata principia ponantur: nec tamen ut omnibus probentur — nam id fieri non potest —, sed ut iis qui omnia recta atque honesta per se expetenda duxerunt, et aut nihil omnino in bonis numerandum nisi quod per seipsum laudibile esset, aut certe nullum habendum magnum bonum nisi quod vere laudari sua sponte posset, his omnibus — (and, among others, Theophr.' name is mentioned here) his omnibus haec quae dixi probantur.

686—**a.** He attributes some value to outward circumstances of life. **Value of outward circumstances**

Cic., *Tusc.* V 9, 24:

(Theophrastus) cum statuisset verba, tormenta, cruciatus, patriae eversiones, exilia, orbitates magnam vim habere ad male misereque vivendum, non est ausus elate et ample loqui, cum humiliter demisseque sentiret. — Vexatur autem ab omnibus [1] primum in eo libro quem scripsit de vita beata, in quo multa disputat, quam ob rem is qui torqueatur, qui crucietur, beatus esse non possit.

b. He considers marriage as an impediment to the life of a scholar. **Marriage**

Hieronymus, *Adv. Jovin.* I 47:

Fertur aureolus Theophrasti liber de nuptiis, in quo quaerit an vir sapiens ducat uxorem. Et cum definisset, si pulchra esset, si bene morata, si honestis parentibus, si ipse sanus ac dives, sic sapientem aliquando inire matrimonium, statim intulit: „Haec autem in nuptiis raro universa concordant. Non est ergo uxor ducenda sapienti. Primum enim impediri studia philosophiae, nec posse quemquam libris et uxori pariter inservire.

687—Theophr.' *Characters.*

a. III, 'Αδολεσχίας. **Garrulity**

'Η δὲ ἀδολεσχία ἐστὶ μὲν διήγησις λόγων μακρῶν καὶ ἀπροβουλεύτων, ὁ δὲ ἀδολέσχης τοιοῦτός τις οἷος, ὃν μὴ γιγνώσκει, τούτῳ παρακαθεζόμενος πλησίον πρῶτον μὲν τῆς αὑτοῦ γυναικὸς εἰπεῖν ἐγκώμιον, εἶτα, ὃ τῆς νυκτὸς εἶδεν ἐνύπνιον, τοῦτο διηγήσασθαι, εἶθ' ὧν εἶχεν ἐπὶ τῷ δείπνῳ τὰ καθ' ἕκαστα διεξελθεῖν· εἶτα δὴ προχωροῦντος τοῦ πράγματος λέγειν ὡς πολὺ πονηρότεροί εἰσιν οἱ νῦν ἄνθρωποι τῶν ἀρχαίων, καὶ ὡς ἄξιοι <οὐ> γεγόνασιν οἱ πυροὶ ἐν τῇ ἀγορᾷ, καὶ ὡς πολλοὶ ἐπιδημοῦσι ξένοι, καὶ τὴν θάλατταν ἐκ Διονυσίων πλώϊμον εἶναι, καὶ εἰ ποιήσειεν ὁ Ζεὺς ὕδωρ πλεῖον, τὰ ἐν τῇ γῇ βελτίω ἔσεσθαι,

[1] Doubtless, most by the Stoics; hardly by the Peripatetics.

καὶ ὃν ἀγρὸν εἰς νέωτα γεωργήσει, καὶ ὡς χαλεπόν ἐστι τὸ ζῆν, καὶ ὡς Δάμιπ-
πος μυστηρίοις μεγίστην δᾷδα ἔστησεν, καὶ πόσοι εἰσὶ κίονες τοῦ Ὠιδείου,
καὶ »χθὲς ἥμεσα«, καὶ »τίς ἐστιν ἡμέρα τήμερον;« καὶ ὡς Βοηδρομιῶνος
μέν ἐστι τὰ μυστήρια, Πυανοψιῶνος δὲ Ἀπατούρια, Ποσιδεῶνος δὲ ‹τὰ›
κατ' ἀγροὺς Διονύσια· κἂν ὑπομένῃ τις αὐτόν, μὴ ἀφίστασθαι.

The officious man

b. XIII, Περιεργίας.

Ἀμέλει ‹ἡ› περιεργία δόξει εἶναι προσπυίησίς τις λόγων καὶ πράξεων μετ'
εὐνοίας, ὁ δὲ περίεργος τοιοῦτός τις ‹οἷος› ἐπαγγέλλεσθαι ἃ μὴ δυνήσεται·
καὶ ὁμολογουμένου τοῦ πράγματος δικαίου εἶναι ἀνταναστὰς ἐλεγχθῆναι·
καὶ πλείω δὲ ἐπαναγκάσαι τὸν παῖδα κεράσαι ἢ ὅσον δύνανται οἱ παρόντες
ἐκπιεῖν· καὶ διείργειν τοὺς μαχομένους, καὶ οὓς οὐ γιγνώσκει· καὶ ἀτραποῦ
ἡγήσασθαι, εἶτα μὴ δύνασθαι εὑρεῖν οἳ πορεύεται· καὶ τὸν στρατηγὸν προσελθὼν
ἐρωτῆσαι πότε μέλλει παρατάττεσθαι, καὶ τί μετὰ τὴν αὔριον παραγγελεῖ·
καὶ προσελθὼν τῷ πατρὶ εἰπεῖν ὅτι ἡ μήτηρ ἤδη καθεύδει ἐν τῷ δωματίῳ·
καὶ ἀπαγορεύοντος τοῦ ἰατροῦ ὅπως μὴ δώσει οἶνον τῷ μαλακιζομένῳ, φήσας
βούλεσθαι διάπειραν λαμβάνειν, εὖ ποτίσαι τὸν κακῶς ἔχοντα· καὶ γυναικὸς
δὲ τελευτησάσης ἐπιγράψαι ἐπὶ τὸ μνῆμα τοῦ τε ἀνδρὸς αὐτῆς καὶ τοῦ πατρὸς καὶ
τῆς μητρὸς καὶ αὐτῆς ‹τῆς› γυναικὸς τοὔνομα καὶ ποδαπή ἐστι, καὶ προσεπι-
γράψαι ὅτι οὗτοι πάντες χρηστοὶ ἦσαν· καὶ ὀμνύναι μέλλων εἰπεῖν πρὸς τοὺς
περιεστηκότας ὅτι »καὶ πρότερον πολλάκις ὀμώμοκα«.

The grumbler

c. XVII, Μεμψιμοιρίας.

Ἔστιν ἡ μεμψιμοιρία ἐπιτίμησις παρὰ τὸ προσῆκον τῶν δεδομένων, ὁ δὲ
μεμψίμοιρος τοιόσδε τις οἷος, ἀποστείλαντος μερίδα τοῦ φίλου, εἰπεῖν πρὸς τὸν
φέροντα· »ἐφθόνησέ μοι τοῦ ζωμοῦ καὶ τοῦ οἰναρίου, οὐκ ἐπὶ δεῖπνον καλέσας«·
καὶ ὑπὸ τῆς ἑταίρας καταφιλούμενος εἰπεῖν· »θαυμάζω εἰ σὺ καὶ ἀπὸ τῆς
ψυχῆς οὕτω με φιλεῖς«· καὶ τῷ Διὶ ἀγανακτεῖν, οὐ διότι ‹οὐχ› ὕει, ἀλλὰ διότι
ὕστερον· καὶ εὑρὼν ἐν τῇ ὁδῷ βαλλάντιον εἰπεῖν· »ἀλλ' οὐ θησαυρὸν εὕρηκα
οὐδέποτε«· καὶ πριάμενος ἀνδράποδον ἄξιον, καὶ πολλὰ δεηθεὶς τοῦ πωλοῦντος·
»θαυμάζω« εἰπεῖν »ὅ τι ὑγιὲς οὕτω ἄξιον ἐώνημαι«· καὶ πρὸς τὸν εὐαγγελι-
ζόμενον ὅτι· »υἱός σοι γέγονεν« εἰπεῖν ὅτι· »ἄν προσθῇς· καὶ τῆς οὐσίας τὸ
ἥμισυ ἄπεστιν, ἀληθῆ ἐρεῖς«· καὶ δίκην νικήσας καὶ λαβὼν πάσας τὰς ψήφους
ἐγκαλεῖν τῷ γράψαντι τὸν λόγον, ὡς πολλὰ παραλελοιπότι τῶν δικαίων· καὶ
ἐράνου εἰσενεχθέντος παρὰ τῶν φίλων καὶ φήσαντός τινος· »ἱλαρὸς ἴσθι«,
»καὶ πῶς;« εἰπεῖν »ὅτε δεῖ τἀργύριον ἀποδοῦναι ἑκάστῳ καὶ χωρὶς τούτων
χάριν ὀφείλειν ὡς εὐεργετημένον;«

2—DICAEARCHUS

688—Suidas s.v. Δικαίαρχος (fr. 1 Wehrli): **Life and work**

Δικαίαρχος: Φειδίου, Σικελιώτης, ἐκ πόλεως Μεσσήνης, Ἀριστοτέλους ἀκουστής, φιλόσοφος καὶ ῥήτωρ καὶ γεωμέτρης. Καταμετρήσεις τῶν ἐν Πελοποννήσῳ ὀρῶν, Ἑλλάδος βίον ἐν βιβλίοις γ'. οὗτος ἔγραψε τὴν πολιτείαν Σπαρτιατῶν, καὶ νόμος ἐτέθη ἐν Λακεδαίμονι καθ' ἕκαστον ἔτος ἀναγινώσκεσθαι τὸν λόγον εἰς τὸ τῶν Ἐφόρων ἀρχεῖον, τοὺς δὲ τὴν ἡβητικὴν ἔχοντας ἡλικίαν ἀκροᾶσθαι. καὶ τοῦτο ἐκράτει μέχρι πολλοῦ.

689—Cic., *De fin.* IV 28, 79 (fr. 3 W.): **A later judgment**

...Panaetius ... semperque habuit in ore Platonem, Aristotelem, Xenocratem, Theophrastum, Dicaearchum, ut ipsius scripta declarant. quos quidem tibi studiose et diligenter tractandos magno opere censeo.

690—Naturalistic doctrine on soul.

a. Cic., *Tusc.* I 10, 21 (fr. 7 W.): **Doctrine on soul**

Dicaearchus autem in eo sermone, quem Corinthi habitum tribus libris exponit, doctorum hominum disputantium primo libro multos loquentes facit; duobus Pherecraten quendam Phthiotam senem, quem ait a Deucalione ortum, disserentem inducit, nihil esse omnino animum et hoc esse nomen totum inane frustraque animalia et animantes appellari, neque in homine inesse animum vel animam nec in bestia, vimque omnem eam, qua vel agamus quid vel sentiamus, in omnibus corporibus vivis aequabiliter esse fusam nec separabilem a corpore esse, quippe quae nulla sit, nec sit quicquam nisi corpus unum et simplex, ita figuratum, ut temperatione naturae vigeat et sentiat.

b. Cf. *Tusc.* I 22, 51 (fr. 8 e W.):

Dicaearchus quidem et Aristoxenus, quia difficilis erat animi quid aut qualis esset intellegentia, nullum omnino animum esse dixerunt.

c. Sextus, *Pyrrh.* II 31 (fr. 8 b W.):

Οἱ μὲν μὴ εἶναι τὴν ψυχὴν ἔφασαν, ὡς οἱ περὶ τὸν Μεσσήνιον Δικαίαρχον.

691—Soul a harmony of the four elements.

Nemesius, *De nat. hom.* II, Patrol. Gr. XL, p. 537 (fr. 11 W.):

Δικαίαρχος δὲ ἁρμονίαν τῶν τεσσάρων στοιχείων (sc. τὴν ψυχὴν εἶναι) ἀντὶ τοῦ κρᾶσιν καὶ συμφωνίαν τῶν στοιχείων. Οὐ γὰρ τὴν ἐκ τῶν φθόγγων συνισταμένην, ἀλλὰ τὴν ἐν τῷ σώματι θερμῶν καὶ ψυχρῶν καὶ ὑγρῶν καὶ

ξηρῶν ἐναρμόνιον κρᾶσιν καὶ συμφωνίαν βούλεται λέγειν. Δῆλον δὲ ὅτι καὶ τούτων οἱ μὲν ἄλλοι τὴν ψυχὴν οὐσίαν εἶναι λέγουσιν. Ἀριστοτέλης δὲ καὶ Δικαίαρχος ἀνούσιον.

The same doctrine is attested in a few words by Plut., *Plac.* IV 2, 5; Stob., *Ecl.* I 49, 1, and Theodoretus, *Gr. aff. cur.* V 18 (fr. 12 a-c W.).

Divination

692—In spite of this naturalistic doctrine of soul D. is said to have acknowledged divination in dreams.

a. Galenus, *Hist. phil.* 105 (fr. 13 a W.):

Ἀριστοτέλης καὶ Δικαίαρχος τοὺς ὀνείρους εἰσάγουσιν, ἀθάνατον μὲν τὴν ψυχὴν οὐ νομίζοντες, θείου δέ τινος μετέχειν.

b. Cic., *De div.* I 3, 5 (fr. 14 W.):

Dicaearchus Peripateticus cetera divinationis genera sustulit, somniorum et furoris reliquit.

Human possibilities

693—The following reflexion on the polarity of human possibilities [1] is cited by Cic. from D.' work Π. ἀνθρώπων φθορᾶς.

Cic. *De off.* II 5, 16 (fr. 24 W.):

Est Dicaearchi liber de interitu hominum, Peripatetici magni et copiosi, qui collectis ceteris causis eluvionis, pestilentiae, vastitatis, beluarum etiam repentinae multitudinis, quarum impetu docet quaedam hominum genera esse consumpta, deinde comparat, quanto plures deleti sint homines hominum impetu, id est bellis aut seditionibus quam omni reliqua calamitate. cum igitur hic locus nihil habeat dubitationis, quin homines plurimum hominibus et prosint et obsint, proprium hoc statuo virtutis, conciliare animos hominum et ad usus suos adiungere.

Superiority of the βίος πρακτικός

694—Against Theophr., D. defended the superiority of the βίος πρακτικός to the βίος θεωρητικός.

a. Cic., *Ep. ad Att.* II 16, 3 (fr. 25 W.):

Nunc prorsus hoc statui, ut quoniam tanta controversia est Dicaearcho familiari tuo cum Theophrasto amico meo, ut ille tuus τὸν πρακτικὸν βίον longe omnibus anteponat, hic autem τὸν θεωρητικόν, utrique a me mos gestus esse videatur.

b. Codex Vaticanus 435 (fr. 31 W.):

(The ancient Romans did not strive after cleverness in words, not ever

[1] The fragment is explained by Wehrli in this sense.

in such apophthegmata as those attributed to the seven sages.)

Δικαιάρχῳ δὲ οὐδὲ ταῦτα σοφῶν εἶναι ἀνδρῶν δοκεῖ, μὴ γὰρ δή γε τοὺς πάλαι λόγῳ φιλοσοφεῖν. ἀλλ' εἶναι τὴν σοφίαν τότε γοῦν ἐπιτήδευσιν ἔργων καλῶν, χρόνῳ δὲ λόγων ὀχλικῶν γενέσθαι τέχνην. καὶ νῦν μὲν τὸν πιθανῶς διαλεχθέντα μέγαν εἶναι δοκεῖν φιλόσοφον, ἐν δὲ τοῖς πάλαι χρόνοις ὁ ἀγαθὸς μόνος ἦν φιλόσοφος, εἰ καὶ μὴ περιβλέπτους καὶ ὀχλικοὺς ἀσκοῖτο λόγους. οὐ γὰρ ἐζήτουν ἐκεῖνοί γε εἰ πολιτευτέον οὐδὲ πῶς, ἀλλ' ἐπολιτεύοντο αὐτοὶ καλῶς, οὐδὲ εἰ χρὴ γαμεῖν, ἀλλὰ γήμαντες ὃν δεῖ τρόπον γαμεῖν ταῖς γυναιξὶ συνεβίουν. ταῦτα ἦν, φησίν, ἔργα ἀνδρῶν καὶ ἐπιτηδεύματα σοφῶν, αἱ δὲ ἀποφθέγξεις αὗται πρᾶγμα φορτικόν.

c. Cf. Plut., *An seni gerenda res publica*, c. 26, 796 c (fr. 29 W.).

(Philosophy does not only consist in speaking ex cathedra, like πολιτεύεσθαι does not only consist in crying in the assembly. There is a συνεχὴς ἐν ἔργοις καὶ πράξεσιν ὁρωμένη καθ' ἡμέραν ὁμαλῶς πολιτεία καὶ φιλοσοφία, which escapes the notice of the people).

Καὶ γὰρ τοὺς ἐν ταῖς στοαῖς ἀνακάμπτοντας περιπατεῖν φασιν, ὡς ἔλεγε Δικαίαρχος, οὐκέτι δὲ τοὺς εἰς ἀγρὸν ἢ πρὸς φίλον βαδίζοντας. ὅμοιον δ' ἐστὶ τῷ φιλοσοφεῖν τὸ πολιτεύεσθαι. Σωκράτης γοῦν οὔτε βάθρα θεὶς οὔτε εἰς θρόνον καθίσας οὔθ' ὥραν διατριβῆς ἢ περιπάτου τοῖς γνωρίμοις τεταγμένην φυλάττων, ἀλλὰ καὶ παίζων ὅτε τύχοι καὶ συμπίνων καὶ συστρατευόμενος ἐνίοις καὶ συναγοράζων, τέλος δὲ καὶ δεδεμένος καὶ πίνων τὸ φάρμακον ἐφιλοσόφει, πρῶτος ἀποδείξας τὸν βίον ἅπαντι χρόνῳ καὶ μέρει καὶ πάθεσι καὶ πράγμασιν ἁπλῶς ἅπασι φιλοσοφίαν δεχόμενον.

695—An important work of D. was his Βίος Ἑλλάδος, which is cited rather frequently by later writers (Wehrli, fr. 47-66). **The development of mankind**

a. Varro, *Rerum rustic.* II 1, 3 (fr. 48 W., first part).

Igitur, inquam, et homines et pecudes cum semper fuisse sit necesse natura — sive enim aliquod fuit principium generandi animalium, ut putavit Thales Milesius et Zeno Citieus, sive contra principium horum exstitit nullum, ut credidit Pythagoras Samius et Aristoteles Stagirites — necesse est humanae vitae a summa memoria gradatim descendisse ad hanc aetatem, ut scribit Dicaearchus, et summum gradum fuisse naturalem, cum viverent homines ex his rebus, quae inviolata ultro ferret terra; ex hac vita in secundam descendisse pastoriciam e feris atque agrestibus, ut arboribus ac virgultis [ac] decarpendo glandem, arbu[s]tum, mora, poma colligerent ad usum, sic ex animalibus cum propter eandem utilitatem quae possent silvestria deprenderent ac concluderent et mansues-

cerent. In quis primum non sine causa putant oves assumptas et propter utilitatem et propter <p>laciditatem. maxime enim hae natura quietae et aptissimae ad vitam hominum. ad cibum enim lacte et caseum adhibitum, ad corpus vestitum et pelles attulerunt. tertio denique gradu a vita pastorali ad agri culturam descenderunt, in qua ex duobus gradibus superioribus retinuerunt multa, et quo descenderant, ibi processerunt longe, dum ad nos perveniret.

b. Porph., *De abstinentia* IV 2 (fr. 49 W., the beginning).

Τῶν τοίνυν συντόμως τε ὁμοῦ καὶ ἀκριβῶς τὰ Ἑλληνικὰ συναγαγόντων ἐστὶν καὶ ὁ περιπατητικὸς Δικαίαρχος, ὃς τὸν ἀρχαῖον βίον τῆς Ἑλλάδος ἀφηγούμενος τοὺς παλαιοὺς καὶ ἐγγὺς θεῶν φησὶ γεγονότας, βελτίστους τε ὄντας φύσει καὶ τὸν ἄριστον ἐζηκότας βίον, ὡς χρυσοῦν γένος νομίζεσθαι παραβαλλομένους πρὸς τοὺς νῦν, κιβδήλου καὶ φαυλοτάτης ὑπάρχοντας ὕλης, μηδὲν φονεύειν ἔμψυχον. ὃ δὴ καὶ τοὺς ποιητὰς παριστάντας χρυσοῦν μὲν ἐπονομάζειν γένος

«ἐσθλὰ δὲ πάντα», λέγειν,

«τοῖσιν ἔην· καρπὸν δ' ἔφερεν ζείδωρος ἄρουρα
αὐτομάτη πολλόν τε καὶ ἄφθονον. οἱ δ' ἐθελημοὶ
ἥσυχοι ἔργ' ἐνέμοντο σὺν ἐσθλοῖσιν πολέεσσιν» [1].

ἃ δὴ καὶ ἐξηγούμενος ὁ Δικαίαρχος τὸν ἐπὶ Κρόνου βίον τοιοῦτον εἶναι φησίν.

Political writings

696—Cicero mentions D. with the greatest respect among writers on political subjects.

a. Cic., *De leg.* III 6, 14 (fr. 67 W.):

Nam veteres verbo tenus acute illi quidem, sed non ad hunc usum popularem atque civilem de re publica disserebant. ab hac familia magis ista manarunt Platone principe, post Aristoteles illustravit omnem hunc civilem in disputando locum; Heraclidesque Ponticus profectus ab eodem Platone; Theophrastus vero, institutus ab Aristotele, habitavit ut scitis in eo genere rerum, ab eodemque Aristotele doctus Dicaearchus huic rationi studioque non defuit.

b. Cf. *Ep. ad Att.* II 2 (fr. 69 W.):

Πελληναίων [2] in manibus tenebam et hercule magnum acervum Dicaearchi mihi ante pedes exstruxeram. o magnum hominem, et unde multo plura didiceris quam de Procilio [3]. Κορινθίων et Ἀθηναίων puto me Romae habere. mihi credas, lege te hac doceo, mirabilis vir est.

[1] Hesiodus, *Erga* 116 ff.

[2] Whether this Πελληναίων πολιτεία was a work of D. or not, is uncertain. It may have belonged to Aristotle's collection of 158 πολιτεῖαι.

[3] Procilius is unknown to us.

Ἡρώδης [1], si homo esset, eum potius legeret quam unam litteram scriberet.

697—D. seems to have considered a mixed constitution to be the best. **The best constitution**

Photius, *Bibl.* 37 (fr. 71 W.):

Ἦν δ' αὐτοὶ πολιτείαν εἰσάγουσιν (sc. post-Platonic writers among whom D. is mentioned) ἐκ τῶν τριῶν εἰδῶν τῆς πολιτείας δέον αὐτὴν συγκεῖσθαί φασι, βασιλικοῦ καὶ ἀριστοκρατικοῦ καὶ δημοκρατικοῦ, τὸ εἰλικρινὲς αὐτῇ ἑκάστης πολιτείας συνεισαγούσης, κἀκείνην τὴν ὡς ἀληθῶς ἀρίστην πολιτείαν ἀποτελούσης.

As it appears from a quotation in Athen. IV 141 a ff. (fr. 72 W.), the work in which D. expounded this theory was entitled Τριπολιτικός.

698—**a**. Like Aristotle and Eudoxus of Cnidus, D. taught the spherical form of the earth. **Form of the earth**

Martian. Capella VI 590 f. (fr. 108 W.):

Formam totius terrae non planam, ut aestimant positioni qui eam disci diffusioris assimilant, neque concavam, ut alii qui descendere imbrem dixere telluris in gremium, sed rotundam, globosam etiam [sicut Secundus] Dicaearchus asseverat. namque ortus obitusque siderum non diversus pro terrae elevatione vel inclinationibus haberetur, si per plana diffusis mundanae constitutionis operibus uno eodemque tempore supra terras et aequora nituissent, aut item si emersi solis exortus concavis subductioris terrae latebris abderetur.

Cp. Ar., *De caelo* II 297 a[8] ff., and Eudoxi *Ars astronomica* ed. Blass 1887, p. XI, XVIII-XX.

b. On D.'s calculation of the circumference of the earth, see Wehrli, *Dikaiarchos*, p. 77 ff.

3—ARISTOXENUS

699—Suidas s.v. Ἀριστόξενος (f. 1 W.): **Life**

Υἱὸς Μνησίου, τοῦ καὶ Σπινθάρου, μουσικοῦ, ἀπὸ Τάραντος τῆς Ἰταλίας. διατρίψας δὲ ἐν Μαντινείᾳ φιλόσοφος γέγονε καὶ μουσικῇ ἐπιθέμενος οὐκ ἠστόχησεν, ἀκουστὴς τοῦ τε πατρὸς καὶ Λάμπρου τοῦ Ἐρυθραίου, εἶτα Ξενοφίλου τοῦ Πυθαγορείου καὶ τέλος Ἀριστοτέλους. εἰς ὃν ἀποθανόντα ὕβρισε, διότι κατέλιπε τῆς σχολῆς διάδοχον Θεόφραστον, αὐτοῦ δόξαν μεγάλην

[1] Atticus had an administrator of this name. Probably this person is meant here.

ἐν τοῖς ἀκροαταῖς τοῖς Ἀριστοτέλους ἔχοντος. γέγονε δὲ ἐπὶ τῶν Ἀλεξάνδρου καὶ τῶν μετέπειτα χρόνων, ὡς εἶναι ἀπὸ τῆς ρια' Ὀλυμπιάδος [1], σύγχρονος Δικαιάρχῳ τῷ Μεσσηνίῳ. συνετάξατο δὲ μουσικά τε καὶ φιλόσοφα, καὶ ἱστορίας καὶ παντὸς εἴδους παιδείας. καὶ ἀριθμοῦνται αὐτοῦ τὰ βιβλία εἰς υνγ'.

His life of Pythag.

700—**a**. He wrote a *life of Pythagoras*, traces of which can be found in several later works (Wehrli, fr. 11-25).

In his work on *the Pythagorean bios* he explains the ancient taboos in a rationalistic sense. Cp. our nr. **24b**, **d**.

Life of Archytas and of Socrates

b. He also wrote a *life of Archytas* (Wehrli, fr. 47-50) and another *of Socrates* (W., fr. 51-60), in which he opposes the hot temper and profligacy of the latter to Archytas' self-command.

c. Cyrillus, *Contra Julianum* VI 185 (fr. 54 a, W.) quotes Aristoxenus' *Life of Socr.* as follows:

Λέγει δὲ ὁ Ἀριστόξενος, ἀφηγούμενος τὸν βίον τοῦ Σωκράτους, ἀκηκοέναι Σπινθάρου τὰ περὶ αὐτοῦ, ὃς ἦν εἷς τῶν τούτῳ ἐντυχόντων. τοῦτον λέγειν, ὅτι οὐ πολλοῖς αὐτός γε πιθανωτέροις ἐντετυχηκὼς εἴη, τοιαύτην εἶναι τήν τε φωνὴν καὶ τὸ στόμα καὶ τὸ ἐπιφαινόμενον ἦθος, καὶ πρὸς πᾶσι δὲ τοῖς εἰρημένοις τὴν τοῦ εἴδους ἰδιότητα. γίνεσθαι δέ που τοῦτο, ὅτε μὴ ὀργίζοιτο, ὅτε δὲ φλεχθείη ὑπὸ τοῦ πάθους τούτου, δεινὴν εἶναι τὴν ἀσχημοσύνην. οὐδενὸς γὰρ οὔτε ὀνόματος ἀποσχέσθαι οὔτε πράγματος.

d. Ib., 186 (W., same fr.):

Γέγραφε γὰρ ὡδὶ πάλιν περὶ αὐτοῦ Πορφύριος: »ἐν δὲ τοῖς περὶ τὸν βίον τὰ μὲν ἄλλα εὔκολον, καὶ μικρᾶς δεόμενον παρασκευῆς εἰς τὰ καθ' ἡμέραν γεγενῆσθαι. πρὸς δὲ τὴν τῶν ἀφροδισίων χρῆσιν σφοδρότερον μὲν εἶναι, ἀδικίαν δὲ μὴ προσεῖναι. ἢ γὰρ ταῖς γαμεταῖς ἢ ταῖς κοιναῖς χρῆσθαι μόναις. δύο δὲ σχεῖν γυναῖκας ἅμα, Ξανθίππην μὲν πολῖτιν καὶ κοινοτέραν πως, Μυρτὼ δὲ Ἀριστείδου θυγατριδῆν τοῦ Λυσιμάχου. καὶ τὴν μὲν Ξανθίππην περιπλακεῖσαν λαβεῖν, ἐξ ἧς ἑαυτῷ Λαμπροκλῆς ἐγένετο. τὴν δὲ Μυρτὼ γάμῳ, ἐξ ἧς Σωφρονίσκος καὶ Μενέξενος«.

The same is told by Theodoretus, *Gr. aff. cur.* XII 174, who used the same source. Cp. Plut., *Aristides* c. 27: Δημήτριος δ' ὁ Φαληρεὺς καὶ Ἱερώνυμος ὁ Ῥόδιος καὶ Ἀριστόξενος ὁ μουσικὸς καὶ Ἀριστοτέλης . . . . ἱστοροῦσι Μυρτὼ θυγατριδῆν Ἀριστείδου Σωκράτει τῷ σοφῷ συνοικῆσαι, γυναῖκα μὲν ἑτέραν ἔχοντι, ταύτην δ' ἀναλαβόντι χηρεύουσαν διὰ πενίαν καὶ τῶν ἀναγκαίων δεομένην.

701—Plut., *De Herodoti malign.* 9, 856 c, qualifies this kind of gossip as a species of the genus κακοήθεια. Fr. 55 W.:

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[1] 336-333 B.C.

Ἐγγὺς δὲ τούτων εἰσὶν οἱ τοῖς ψόγοις ἐπαίνους τινὰς παρατιθέντες, ὡς ἐπὶ Σωκράτους Ἀριστόξενος, ἀπαίδευτον καὶ ἀμαθῆ καὶ ἀκόλαστον εἰπών, ἐπήνεγκεν »ἀδικία δ' οὐ προσῆν«[1]. Ὥσπερ γὰρ οἱ σύν τινι τέχνῃ καὶ δεινότητι κολακεύοντες ἔστιν ὅτε πολλοῖς καὶ μακροῖς ἐπαίνοις ψόγους παραμιγνύουσιν ἐλαφρούς, οἷον ἥδυσμα τῇ κολακείᾳ τὴν παρρησίαν ἐμβάλλοντες, οὕτω τὸ κακόηθες εἰς πίστιν ὧν ψέγει προαποτίθεται τὸν ἔπαινον.

Life of Plato

702—The measure of reliability of Aristoxenus as a biographer may appear from what he tells about Plato (fragments of his *Life of Plato*, W. 61-68).

a. Diog. L. III 8 (fr. 61 W.):

Καὶ αὐτόν (sc. Πλάτωνα) φησιν Ἀριστόξενος τρὶς ἐστρατεῦσθαι, ἅπαξ μὲν εἰς Τάναγραν, δεύτερον δὲ εἰς Κόρινθον, τρίτον ἐπὶ Δηλίῳ. ἔνθα καὶ ἀριστεῦσαι.

b. Lucianus, *De parasito* 34 (861). Fr. 62 W.:

Παράσιτος: . . . . ὁ δὲ Πλάτων . . . . ὀλίγας παρασιτήσας ἡμέρας τῷ τυράννῳ (sc. Διονυσίῳ) τοῦ παρασιτεῖν ὑπὸ ἀφυίας ἐξέπεσε, καὶ πάλιν Ἀθήναζε ἀφικόμενος καὶ φιλοπονήσας καὶ παρασκευάσας ἑαυτὸν αὖθις δευτέρῳ στόλῳ ἐπέπλευσε τῇ Σικελίᾳ καὶ δειπνήσας πάλιν ὀλίγας ἡμέρας ὑπὸ ἀμαθίας ἐξέπεσε. καὶ αὕτη ἡ συμφορὰ Πλάτωνι περὶ Σικελίαν ὁμοία δοκεῖ γενέσθαι τῇ Νικίου.

c. Aristocles ap. Euseb., *Praep. evang.* XV 2 (fr. 64 W.):

Τίς δ' ἂν πεισθείη τοῖς ὑπ' Ἀριστοξένου τοῦ μουσικοῦ λεγομένοις ἐν τῷ βίῳ τοῦ Πλάτωνος; ἐν γὰρ τῇ πλάνῃ καὶ τῇ ἀποδημίᾳ φησὶν ἐπανίστασθαι καὶ ἀντοικοδομεῖν αὐτῷ τινας Περίπατον ξένους ὄντας. οἴονται οὖν ἔνιοι ταῦτα περὶ Ἀριστοτέλους λέγειν αὐτόν, Ἀριστοξένου διὰ παντὸς εὐφημοῦντος Ἀριστοτέλην.

d. Diog. L. III 37 (fr. 67 W.):

Ἣν Πολιτείαν (sc. Πλάτωνος) Ἀριστόξενός φησιν πᾶσαν σχεδὸν ἐν τοῖς Πρωταγόρου γεγράφθαι Ἀντιλογικοῖς.

Soul

703—His doctrine of the soul is cited on a level with that of Dicaearchus (our nr. **690b**).

a. Cicero describes Aristoxenus' doctrine of the soul in *Tusc.* I 10, 19 (fr. 120 a W.):

Aristoxenus musicus idemque philosophus ipsius corporis intentionem quandam animam esse dixit, velut in cantu et fidibus quae harmonia dicitur, sic ex corporis totius natura et figura varios motus cieri tamquam in cantu sonos.

[1] Wehrli cites the text up till here.

b. Cp. Lactantius, *Inst.* VII 13 (fr. 120 c, W.):

Quid Aristoxenus, qui negavit omnino ullam esse animam, etiam cum vivit in corpore? sed sicut in fidibus ex intentione nervorum effici concordem sonum atque cantum, quem musici harmoniam vocant, ita in corporibus ex compage viscerum ac vigore membrorum vim sentiendi existere. Quo nihil dici delirius potest.

Musicology

704—In musicology, Aristox. was among the greatest authorities in Antiquity.

a. Cic., *De oratore* III 33, 132 (fr. 69a, W.):

An tu existimas, cum esset Hippocrates ille Cous, fuisse tum alios medicos qui morbis, alios qui volneribus, alios qui oculis mederentur? num geometriam Euclide aut Archimede, num musicam Damone aut Aristoxeno, num ipsas litteras Aristophane aut Callimacho tractante tam discerptas fuisse, ut nemo genus universum complecteretur atque ut alius aliam sibi partem, in qua elaboraret, seponeret?

b. Cic., *De fin.* V 18, 49 (fr. 69 b, W.):

Duci vero maiorum rerum contemplatione ad cupiditatem scientiae summorum virorum est putandum. quem enim ardorem studii censetis fuisse in Archimede etc. . . ., quantum Aristoxeni ingenium consumptum videmus in musicis?

c. Alex. Aphr., in Ar. *Top.* 105 a[34] (fr. 69 c, W.):

Θείη γὰρ ἄν τις ὡς ἔνδοξον τὸ ὑπὸ Ἱπποκράτους λεγόμενον ἐν ἰατρικῇ καὶ τὸ ὑπὸ Ἀρχιμήδους ἐν γεωμετρίᾳ καὶ τὸ ὑπὸ Ἀριστοξένου ἐν μουσικῇ.

4—DEMETRIUS OF PHALERON

Life

705—a. Suidas Δ 429 (fr. 3 W.):

Δημήτριος Φανοστράτου Φαληρεύς (Φάληρον δὲ λιμὴν τῆς Ἀττικῆς), ὃς τὸ πρῶτον Φανὸς ἐκαλεῖτο. φιλόσοφος Περιπατητικός· γέγραφε φιλόσοφά τε καὶ ἱστορικὰ καὶ ῥητορικὰ καὶ πολιτικὰ καὶ περὶ ποιητῶν (fr. 75), ἠκροάσατο δὲ Θεοφράστου καὶ δημαγωγὸς Ἀθήνησι γέγονε. συνέγραψε δὲ συχνὰ βιβλία.

b. Diog. L. V 75:

Δημήτριος Φανοστράτου Φαληρεύς. οὗτος ἤκουσε μὲν Θεοφράστου· δημηγορῶν δὲ παρ' Ἀθηναίοις τῆς πόλεως ἐξηγήσατο ἔτη δέκα, καὶ εἰκόνων ἠξιώθη χαλκῶν ἑξήκοντα πρὸς ταῖς τριακοσίαις, ὧν αἱ πλείους ἐφ' ἵππων

ἦσαν καὶ ἁρμάτων καὶ συνωρίδων, συντελεσθεῖσαι ἐν οὐδὲ τριακοσίαις ἡμέραις· τοσοῦτον ἐσπουδάσθη. ἄρξασθαι δ' αὐτὸν τῆς πολιτείας φησὶ Δημήτριος ὁ Μάγνης ἐν τοῖς Ὁμωνύμοις, ὁπότε φυγὼν Ἀλέξανδρον εἰς Ἀθήνας ἦκεν Ἅρπαλος. πολλὰ δὲ καὶ κάλλιστα τῇ πατρίδι ἐπολιτεύσατο. καὶ γὰρ προσόδοις καὶ κατασκευαῖς ηὔξησε τὴν πόλιν, καίπερ οὐκ εὐγενὴς ὤν.

c. Diodorus XVIII 74, 2 (fr. 13 W., at the end):

Οὗτος δὲ παραλαβὼν τὴν ἐπιμέλειαν τῆς πόλεως ἦρχεν εἰρηνικῶς καὶ πρὸς τοὺς πολίτας φιλανθρώπως.

706—D. was made absolute governor at Athens by Cassander in 318/7, and expelled ten years later by Demetrius Poliorcetes. **Governor of Athens**

a. Pausanias I 25, 6 (fr. 14 W.):

Κάσσανδρος δὲ βασιλεύσας . . . . Πάνακτον τεῖχος ἐν τῇ Ἀττικῇ καὶ Σαλαμῖνα εἷλε τύραννόν τε Ἀθηναίοις ἔπραξε γενέσθαι Δημήτριον τὸν Φανοστράτου [τὰ πρὸς] δόξαν εἰληφότα ἐπὶ σοφίᾳ. τοῦτον μὲν δὴ τυραννίδος ἔπαυσε Δημήτριος ὁ Ἀντιγόνου.

b. Syncellus 274 d, p. 521, [13] Dind. (fr. 17 W.): **Law-giver**

Δημήτριος ὁ Φαληρεὺς ἐγνωρίζετο τρίτος νομοθέτης Ἀθήνησι, οὗτος Ἀθηναίοις ἀποδοὺς τὴν δημοκρατίαν ἦλθεν εἰς Αἴγυπτον.

c. Cic., *De leg.* II 25, 63 (fr. 135 W.) tells us something about D.' measures of legislation. **Limitation of funeral pomp**

Posteaquam, ut scribit Phalereus, sumptuosa fieri funera et lamentabilia coepissent, Solonis lege sublata sunt. quam legem eisdem prope verbis nostri decemviri in decimam tabulam coniecerunt. —

Sed ait rursus idem Demetrius increbruisse eam funerum sepulcrorumque magnificentiam, quae nunc fere Romae est; quam consuetudinem lege minuit ipse, fuit enim hic vir ut scitis non solum eruditissimus, sed etiam civis e re publica maxime tuendaeque civitatis peritissimus. is igitur sumptum minuit non solum poena sed etiam tempore, ante lucem enim iussit efferri. sepulcris autem novis finivit modum, nam super terrae tumulum noluit quod statui nisi columellam tribus cubitis ne altiorem aut mensam aut labellum, et huic procurationi certum magistratum praefecerat.

Wilamowitz, *Ar. und Athen*, I p. 363, speaks of "die segensreiche Verwaltung des Demetrios" and states: "So über Athen zu herrschen hat D. bei Aristoteles gelernt: er ist der νομοθετικὸς ἀνήρ, den die Politik erzogen hat. Gerade an Athen hat sie ihre praktische Probe bestanden".

Honoured by the people

707—The people of Athens showed their gratitude by honouring D. exceedingly.

a. Nepos, *Milt.* 6 (fr. 21 W.):

Idem ille populus, posteaquam maius imperium est nactus et largitione magistratuum corruptus est, trecentas statuas Demetrio Phalereo decrevit.

b. Cf. Plin., *N.H.* XXXIV 12, 27 (fr. 22 W.):

Nullique arbitror pluris statuas dicatas quam Phalereo Demetrio Athenis, siquidem CCCLX statuere, nondum anno hunc numerum dierum excedente, quas mox laceravere.

Cp. also Diog. Laert. V 75, sub **705b**, supra.

Later in disgrace

708—His life was a good example of those sudden changes of Fate which happened not unfrequently in those days.

a. Plut., *Praecepta gerendae rei publicae* c. 27, p. 820 c (fr. 54 W.):

Τῶν δὲ Δημητρίου τοῦ Φαληρέως τριακοσίων ἀνδριάντων οὐδεὶς ἔσχεν ἰὸν οὐδὲ πίνον, ἀλλὰ πάντες ἔτι ζῶντος προανῃρέθησαν.

His own reaction

b. Diog. Laert. V 82 (fr. 122 W.):

Οὗτος ἀκούσας ὅτι τὰς εἰκόνας αὐτοῦ κατέστρεψαν Ἀθηναῖοι, ἀλλ' οὐ τὴν ἀρετήν, ἔφη, δι' ἣν ἐκείνας ἀνέστησαν.

He meets Krates in Thebes

709—Plut., *De adulatore et amico* c. 28, p. 69 c (fr. 59 W.):

Λέγεται δὲ καὶ Δημήτριος ὁ Φαληρεὺς ὅτε τῆς πατρίδος ἐξέπεσε καὶ περὶ Θήβας ἀδοξῶν καὶ ταπεινὰ πράττων διῆγεν, οὐχ ἡδέως ἰδεῖν προσιόντα Κράτητα, παρρησίαν κυνικὴν καὶ λόγους τραχεῖς προσδεχόμενος. ἐντυχόντος δὲ πράως αὐτῷ τοῦ Κράτητος καὶ διαλεχθέντος περὶ φυγῆς ὡς οὐδὲν ἔχοι κακὸν οὐδ' ἄξιον φέρειν βαρέως πραγμάτων σφαλερῶν καὶ ἀβεβαίων ἀπηλλαγμένον, ἅμα δὲ θαρρεῖν ἐφ' ἑαυτῷ καὶ τῇ διαθέσει παρακαλοῦντος, ἡδίων γενόμενος καὶ ἀναθαρρήσας πρὸς τοὺς φίλους εἶπε: φεῦ τῶν πράξεων ἐκείνων καὶ ἀσχολιῶν δι' ἃς ἄνδρα τοιοῦτον οὐκ ἔγνωμεν.

D. in Alexandria

710—a. Cic., *De fin.* V 19, 53 (fr. 62 W.):

Itaque multi, cum in potestate essent hostium aut tyrannorum, multi in custodia, multi in exilio dolorem suum doctrinae studiis levaverunt. princeps huius civitatis Phalereus Demetrius, cum patria pulsus esse iniuria, ad Ptolemaeum se regem Alexandream contulit. qui cum in hac ipsa philosophia ad quam te hortamur excelleret Theophrastique esset

auditor, multa praeclara in illo calamitoso otio scripsit non ad usum aliquem suum, quo erat orbatus, sed animi cultus ille erat ei quasi quidam humanitatis cibus.

Librarian of Ptol. I

b. Aristeae ad Philocr. epist. 9 (fr. 66 W.):

Κατασταθεὶς ἐπὶ τῆς τοῦ βασιλέως βιβλιοθήκης Δημήτριος ὁ Φαληρεὺς ἐχρηματίσθη πολλὰ διάφορα πρὸς τὸ συναγαγεῖν, εἰ δυνατόν, ἅπαντα τὰ κατὰ τὴν οἰκουμένην βιβλία, καὶ ποιούμενος ἀγορασμοὺς καὶ μεταγραφὰς ἐπὶ τέλος ἤγαγεν, ὅσον ἐφ' ἑαυτῷ, τὴν τοῦ βασιλέως πρόθεσιν. παρόντων οὖν ἡμῶν ἐρωτηθείς, πόσαι τινὲς μυριάδες τυγχάνουσι βιβλίων, εἶπεν: ὑπὲρ τὰς εἴκοσι, βασιλεῦ· σπουδάσω δ' ἐν ὀλίγῳ χρόνῳ πρὸς τὸ πληρωθῆναι πεντήκοντα μυριάδας τὰ λοιπά. προσήγγελται δέ μοι καὶ τὰ τῶν Ἰουδαίων νόμιμα μεταγραφῆς ἄξια καὶ τῆς παρὰ σοὶ βιβλιοθήκης εἶναι. τί τὸ κωλύον οὖν, εἶπεν, ἐστί σε τοῦτο ποιῆσαι; πάντα γὰρ ὑποτέτακταί σοι τὰ πρὸς τὴν χρείαν. ὁ δὲ Δημήτριος εἶπεν: ἑρμηνείας προσδεῖται, χαρακτῆρσι γὰρ ἰδίοις κατὰ τὴν Ἰουδαίων χρῶνται .... μεταλαβὼν δὲ ἕκαστα ὁ βασιλεὺς εἶπε γραφῆναι πρὸς τὸν ἀρχιερέα τῶν Ἰουδαίων, ὅπως τὰ προειρημένα τελείωσιν λάβῃ.

Josephus, *Adv. Apionem* II 45 tells that Ptol. Philadelphus sent Demetrius with two other persons to translate the Jewish Law. This story is probably invented by Jewish authors.

Further testimonies in Wendland's ed. of Aristeas' Epist., 1900, p. 90 ff.

Cicero's judgment on D.

711—a. Cicero mentions him as one of the very rare persons who excelled both in philosophy and in politics.

Cic., *De leg.* III 6, 14 (fr. 72 W.):

Post a Theophrasto (sc. doctus) Phalereus ille Demetrius, de quo feci supra mentionem, mirabiliter doctrinam ex umbraculis eruditorum[que] otioque non modo in solem atque in pulverem, sed in ipsum discrimen aciemque produxit: nam et mediocriter doctos magnos in re publica viros et doctissimos homines non nimis in re publica versatos multos commemorare possumus; qui vero utraque re excelleret, ut et doctrinae studiis et regenda civitate princeps esset, quis facile praeter hunc inveniri potest?

b. Again, he praises his double ability, both in forensic eloquence and in philosophical disputation.

Cic., *De off.* I 1, 3 (fr. 73 W.):

Et id quidem nemini video Graecorum adhuc contigisse, ut idem utroque in genere laboraret sequereturque et illud forense dicendi et hoc quietum disputandi genus, nisi forte Demetrius Phalereus in hoc numero

haberi potest, disputator subtilis, orator parum vehemens, dulcis tamen, ut Theophrasti discipulum possis agnoscere.

In his *Brutus* 9, 37, Cicero speaks of the rhetoric style of Demetrius. "Hic primus inflexit orationem et eam mollem teneramque reddidit, et suavis sicut fuit videri maluit quam gravis" (fr. 175 W.).

His works

712—Diog. Laert. V 80 (fr. 74 W., first part):

Πλήθει δὲ βιβλίων καὶ ἀριθμῷ στίχων σχεδὸν ἅπαντας παρελήλακε τοὺς κατ' αὐτὸν Περιπατητικούς, εὐπαίδευτος ὢν καὶ πολύπειρος παρ' ὁντινοῦν. ὧν ἐστι τὰ μὲν ἱστορικὰ τὰ δὲ πολιτικὰ τὰ δὲ περὶ ποιητῶν τὰ δὲ ῥητορικά, δημηγοριῶν τε καὶ πρεσβειῶν ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ λόγων Αἰσωπείων συναγωγαὶ καὶ ἄλλα πλείω.

A fragm. of the περὶ τύχης

713—The following passage from his Περὶ τύχης is cited by Plutarch in his *Consolatio ad Apoll.* c. 6, p. 104 a (fr. 79 W.):

"Οθεν ὀρθῶς ὁ Φαληρεὺς Δημήτριος εἰπόντος Εὐριπίδου

ὁ δ' ὄλβος οὐ βέβαιος ἀλλ' ἐφήμερος

καὶ ὅτι

μικρὰ τὰ σφάλλοντα, καὶ μί' ἡμέρα
τὰ μὲν καθεῖλεν ὑψόθεν τὰ δ' ἦρ' ἄνω

τὰ μὲν ἄλλα καλῶς ἔφη λέγειν αὐτόν, βέλτιον δ' ἂν ἔχειν εἰ μὴ μίαν ἡμέραν ἀλλὰ στιγμὴν εἶπε χρόνου.

5—STRATO OF LAMPSACUS

Successor of Theophr.

714—Successor of Theophr. as the head of the Peripatetic School.

Diog. Laert. V 58 (fr 1 W.):

Διεδέξατο δ' αὐτοῦ (sc. Θεοφράστου) τὴν σχολὴν Στράτων Ἀρκεσιλάου Λαμψακηνός, οὗ καὶ ἐν ταῖς διαθήκαις ἐμνημόνευσεν· ἀνὴρ ἐλλογιμώτατος καὶ φυσικὸς ἐπικληθεὶς ἀπὸ τοῦ περὶ τὴν θεωρίαν ταύτην παρ' ὁντινοῦν ἐπιμελέστατα διατετριφέναι. ἀλλὰ καὶ καθηγήσατο Πτολεμαίου τοῦ Φιλαδέλφου καὶ ἔλαβε, φασί, παρ' αὐτοῦ τάλαντα ὀγδοήκοντα. σχολαρχεῖν δέ, καθά φησιν Ἀπολλόδωρος ἐν Χρονικοῖς, ἤρξατο τῇ τρίτῃ καὶ εἰκοστῇ καὶ ἑκατοστῇ Ὀλυμπιάδι [1], τῆς σχολῆς ἀφηγησάμενος ἔτη ὀκτωκαίδεκα.

715—His succession changed the character of the School.

a. Cic., *De fin.* V 5, 13 (fr. 12 W.):

Simus igitur contenti his (sc. Aristotele, Theophrasto), namque horum posteri meliores illi quidem mea sententia quam reliquarum philosophi

[1] 288-285 B.C.

disciplinarum, sed ita degenerant, ut ipsi ex se nati esse videantur. primum Theophrasti Strato physicum se voluit, in quo etsi est magnus, tamen nova pleraque et perpauca de moribus; huius Lyco oratione locuples, rebus ipsis ieiunior.

In this book and in the *Ac. Post.* from which the next quotation is taken, Cicero follows Antiochus of Ascalon, who finds an essential agreement between the Stoa, the Academy and the early Peripatetic School, namely Aristotle and Theophr., excluding Strato and his successors.

b. Cic., *Acad. post.* I 9, 33 (fr. 13 W.):

Theophrastus autem ... vehementius etiam fregit quodam modo auctoritatem veteris disciplinae, spoliavit enim virtutem suo decore inbecillamque reddidit, quod negavit in ea sola positum esse beate vivere. nam Strato, eius auditor, quamquam fuit acri ingenio, tamen ab ea disciplina omnino semovendus est: qui cum maxime necessariam partem philosophiae, quae posita est in virtute et in moribus, reliquisset totumque se ad investigationem naturae contulisset, in ea ipsa plurimum dissedit a suis.

Works on logic

716—Diog. Laert. V 59-60 mentions several works of Str. on logic. Simplicius, in his Commentary on the *Categories*, mentions a monography Π. τοῦ προτέρου καὶ ὑστέρου (sub **a**), from which he cites an important fragment later in the same work (sub **b**).

a. Simpl. in Ar. *Categ.*, p. 148, [24] Kalbfleisch (fr. 29 W.):

Διὰ τοῦτο οὖν καὶ τοῦ προτέρου πολλαχῶς λεγομένου τὴν διαίρεσιν ποιεῖται (sc. Ἀριστοτέλης), οὐ πάντας τοὺς τρόπους παραδιδούς — καὶ ἄλλους γοῦν οὐκ ὀλίγους προστίθησιν καὶ αὐτὸς ἐν ἄλλοις καὶ ὁ Στράτων ἐν τῷ περὶ τοῦ προτέρου καὶ ὑστέρου μονοβιβλίῳ, — ἀρκοῦντας δὲ πρὸς εἰσαγωγὴν καὶ τοὺς ἐκτεθέντας οἰόμενος.

The same is told in the Scholia in Ar., p. 87 a[37] Brandis (fr. 28 W.).

b. Simpl. in Ar. *Categ.*, p. 423, [1] ff. Kalbfleisch (fr. 27 W.):

Καὶ Στράτων δὲ ὁ Λαμψακηνὸς ἐν τῷ περὶ τοῦ προτέρου καὶ ὑστέρου μονοβιβλίῳ πολλοὺς ἀπηριθμήσατο τρόπους, οὓς νομίζω δυνατὸν εἶναι ὑπὸ τοὺς πέντε τοὺς ἐνταῦθα λεγομένους ἀναγαγεῖν οἷον μερισμὸν ἐκείνων ὄντας. ὑπὸ μὲν γὰρ τὸ τῷ χρόνῳ πρότερον ταχθήσεται τὸ ἀτελὲς τοῦ τελείου λεγόμενον, διότι ἔσχατον ἐν πᾶσι τὸ τέλος· τὸ δὲ αὐτὸ καὶ ὑπὸ τὴν τάξιν. ἔτι δὲ ὑπ' ἄμφω ταῦτα καὶ ὑπὸ <τὸ> τῇ ἀξίᾳ καὶ δυνάμει καὶ τῇ φύσει πρότερόν ἐστιν, οὗ ἐπιστήμη πρότερον, οἷον μονάδος ἢ δυάδος καὶ πλήθους ἢ ἀρτίου καὶ περιττοῦ. ταῦτα γὰρ οὐδὲ ἀντιστρέφει κατὰ τὴν τοῦ εἶναι ἀκολούθησιν ὥσπερ οὐδὲ ἡ ἐπιστήμη αὐτῶν. πρῶτον δὲ καὶ τῷ χρόνῳ καὶ τῇ ἀξίᾳ, ὧν τὸ ἔργον πρότερον,

οἷον τὸ ἀγαθὸν τοῦ κακοῦ. τὸ μὲν γὰρ σωτηρίας, τὸ δὲ φθορᾶς αἴτιον, πρῶτον δὲ τὸ εἶναι τοῦ φθείρεσθαι καὶ χρόνῳ καὶ ἀξίᾳ. πρῶτον δὲ τῇ φύσει ὡς μὴ ἀντιστρέφον κατὰ τὴν τοῦ εἶναι ἀκολούθησιν, ὅπερ δυνατὸν εἶναι θατέρου μὴ ὄντος, ὡς τόπος σώματος καὶ σῶμα χρώματος, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ εἰ θάτερον ἐν θατέρῳ πέφυκε γίνεσθαι, οἷον ἡ οὐσία ποιοῦ καὶ ποσοῦ. οὕτως δὲ καὶ τὸ κατὰ φύσιν πρότερον τοῦ παρὰ φύσιν καὶ ὁ νόμος τῆς παρανομίας καὶ ἡ ἕξις τῆς στερήσεως. ὑπὸ δὲ τὸ τῇ ἀξίᾳ πρότερον καὶ τὸ δυνάμει τάττοιτο ἂν τὰ τῷ τιμιωτέρῳ συγγενέστερα, ὡς τὸ ποσὸν τοῦ ποιοῦ προτάττοιτο ἄν, διότι τὸ μὲν ποσὸν μέρος τῆς οὐσίας, τὸ δὲ ποιὸν οὔ. καὶ εἰ τὸ μὲν μετέχει γενέσεως καὶ φθορᾶς, ὡς ὁ χρόνος, τὸ δὲ οὔ, ὡς ὁ τόπος, καὶ τὸ μὲν χωριστόν, τὸ δὲ οὔ· ἄνευ μὲν γὰρ αἰσθήσεως εἶναι τὴν ψυχὴν ἀδύνατον, ἄνευ δὲ ἐπιθυμίας εἶναι δυνατόν. καὶ τὸ ἀμερὲς τοῦ μεριστοῦ· ἀρχῇ γὰρ ὁμοιότερον, ὥστε καὶ κύκλου τὸ κέντρον. καὶ τὸ μᾶλλον τοῦ προτέρου μετέχον, ὡς τὸ ἀίδιον μὲν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, τὸ φθαρτὸν δὲ τοῦ κακοῦ καὶ τὸ ἄρτιον δυάδος, τὸ δὲ περιττὸν τριάδος. καὶ εἰ τὸ μὲν μένει χρόνον τινά, τὸ δὲ οὐ μένει, οἷον σῶμα κινήσεως καὶ χρόνου. ὑπὸ δὲ τὸ τῇ τάξει πρότερον εἴη ἂν τὸ τοῦ μεταξὺ πρότερον, ὕστερον δὲ τὸ τοῦ μεταξὺ ὕστερον. ὑπὸ δὲ <τὸ ἐν> τοῖς ἀντιστρέφουσιν ὡς αἰτιῶδες πρότερον ἂν εἴη τὸ στοιχεῖον· καὶ γὰρ αὖ καὶ τὸ μέρος τοῦ ὅλου, ὡς τὸ πεπερασμένον τοῦ ἀπείρου, καὶ εἰ θάτερον ἐκ θατέρου, οἷον ὁ χαλκὸς τοῦ ἀνδριάντος· ὑλικὸν γὰρ καὶ οὗτος αἴτιον. ὅτι δὲ καὶ <τὸ> αὐτὸ κατ' ἄλλο καὶ ἄλλο καὶ πρότερον καὶ ὕστερον εἶναι δυνατόν, καὶ αὐτὸς ὁ Στράτων ἐνεδείξατο, τὸν χρόνον καὶ τὸν τόπον πρότερα καὶ ὕστερα ἀλλήλων δεικνύς.

Explanation of the universe

717—He explains the universe by purely natural causes.

a. Cic., *Ac. pr.* (*Lucullus*) 38, 121 (fr. 32 W.):

Negas sine deo posse quicquam: ecce tibi e transverso Lampsacenus Strato, qui det isti deo immunitatem magni quidem muneris. sed cum sacerdotes deorum vacationem habeant, quanto est aequius habere ipsos deos: negat opera deorum se uti ad fabricandum mundum; quaecumque sint, docet omnia effecta esse natura, nec ut ille, qui asperis et levibus et hamatis uncinatisque corporibus concreta haec esse dicat interiecto inani: somnia censet haec esse Democriti, non docentis, sed optantis, ipse autem singulas mundi partes persequens quicquid aut sit aut fiat naturalibus fieri aut factum esse docet ponderibus et motibus. ne ille et deum opere magno liberat et me timore.

b. Lactantius, *De ira Dei* X 1 (fr. 34 W.):

Qui nolunt divina providentia factum esse mundum, aut principiis inter se temere coeuntibus dicunt esse concretum aut repente natura

exstitisse; naturam vero, ut ait Strato, habere in se vim gignendi et minuendi, sed eam nec sensum habere ullum nec figuram, ut intelligamus omnia quasi sua sponte esse generata, nullo artifice nec auctore.

c. Cf. Plut. *Adv. Coloten* c. 14, p. 1115 b (fr. 35 W.):

Καὶ μὴν τῶν ἄλλων Περιπατητικῶν ὁ κορυφαιότατος Στράτων οὔτ' Ἀριστοτέλει κατὰ πολλὰ συμφέρεται καὶ Πλάτωνι τὰς ἐναντίας ἔσχηκε δόξας περὶ κινήσεως περὶ νοῦ καὶ περὶ ψυχῆς καὶ περὶ γενέσεως· καὶ τελευτῶν τὸν κόσμον αὐτὸν οὐ ζῷον εἶναί φησι, τὸ δὲ κατὰ φύσιν ἔπεσθαι τῷ κατὰ τύχην· ἀρχὴν γὰρ ἐνδιδόναι τὸ αὐτόματον, εἶθ' οὕτω περαίνεσθαι τῶν φυσικῶν παθῶν ἕκαστον.

Strato abandons not only the Platonic and Stoic explanation of the universe, but also the Aristotelian principle of teleology.

718—a. By his theory of weight Str. comes near to Epicurus. Simpl. in Ar. *De caelo*, p. 267, [29] Heiberg (fr. 52 W.): **Atomic theory**

Ὅτι δὲ οὐδὲ τῇ ὑπ' ἀλλήλων ἐκθλίψει βιαζόμενα κινεῖται (sc. τὰ στοιχεῖα), δείκνυσιν ἐφεξῆς (sc. Ἀριστοτέλης). ταύτης δὲ γεγόνασι τῆς δόξης μετ' αὐτὸν Στράτων τε καὶ Ἐπίκουρος πᾶν σῶμα βαρύτητα ἔχειν νομίζοντες καὶ πρὸς τὸ μέσον φέρεσθαι, τῷ δὲ τὰ βαρύτερα ὑφιζάνειν τὰ ἧττον βαρέα ὑπ' ἐκείνων ἐκθλίβεσθαι βίᾳ πρὸς τὸ ἄνω, ὥστε, εἴ τις ὑφεῖλε τὴν γῆν, ἐλθεῖν ἂν τὸ ὕδωρ εἰς τὸ κέντρον, καὶ εἴ τις τὸ ὕδωρ, τὸν ἀέρα, καὶ εἰ τὸν ἀέρα, τὸ πῦρ.

b. He differs from Epicurus in his theory of first principles.

Sextus, *Pyrrh.* III 33 (fr. 43 W.):

Στράτων δὲ ὁ φυσικὸς τὰς ποιότητας (sc. ἀρχὰς εἶναι εἶπεν).

Cf. Aëtius I 3, 24 (Dox., p. 288): Στράτων στοιχεῖα <θερμὸν> καὶ ψυχρόν.

719—His theory of the void. **The void**

a. Theodoretus, *Graec. aff. cur.* IV 14 (fr. 54 W.):

Ὁ δὲ Στράτων ἔμπαλιν ἔξωθεν μὲν (sc. τοῦ παντὸς) μηδὲν εἶναι κενόν, ἔνδοθεν δὲ δυνατὸν εἶναι.

The meaning of the above statement may appear from the following passages of Simplicius.

b. Simpl., *Corollarium de loco*, in Ar. *Phys.* p. 618, [20] Diels (fr. 60 W.):

Οἱ δὲ ἰσόμετρον αὐτὸ (sc. τὸ κενόν) τῷ κοσμικῷ σώματι ποιοῦσι, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο τῇ μὲν ἑαυτοῦ φύσει κενὸν εἶναι λέγουσι, πεπληρῶσθαι δὲ αὐτὸ σωμάτων ἀεί, καὶ μόνῃ γε τῇ ἐπινοίᾳ θεωρεῖσθαι ὡς καθ' αὑτὸ ὑφεστώς, οἷοί τινες οἱ πολλοὶ τῶν Πλατωνικῶν φιλοσόφων γεγόνασι, καὶ Στράτωνα δὲ οἶμαι τὸν Λαμψακηνὸν ταύτης γενέσθαι τῆς δόξης.

c. Simpl., *Phys.* 693, [10] Diels (fr. 65 a, W.):

— Ὁ μέντοι Λαμψακηνὸς Στράτων δεικνύναι πειρᾶται, ὅτι ἔστι τὸ κενὸν διαλαμβάνον τὸ πᾶν σῶμα, ὥστε μὴ εἶναι συνεχές, λέγων ὅτι οὐκ ἂν δι' ὕδατος ἢ ἀέρος ἢ ἄλλου σώματος ἐδύνατο διεκπίπτειν τὸ φῶς οὐδὲ ἡ θερμότης οὐδὲ ἄλλη δύναμις οὐδεμία σωματική. πῶς γὰρ ἂν αἱ τοῦ ἡλίου ἀκτῖνες διεξέπιπτον εἰς τὸ τοῦ ἀγγείου ἔδαφος; εἰ γὰρ τὸ ὑγρὸν μὴ εἶχε πόρους, ἀλλὰ βίᾳ διέστελλον αὐτὸ αἱ αὐγαί, συνέβαινεν ὑπερεκχεῖσθαι τὰ πλήρη τῶν ἀγγείων, καὶ οὐκ ἂν αἱ μὲν τῶν ἀκτίνων ἀνεκλῶντο πρὸς τὸν ἄνω τόπον, αἱ δὲ κάτω διεξέπιπτον.

The same argument for the existence of a void is used by Hero in his *Pneumatica* (fr. 65 b, W.).

d. Cp. the following passage in Hero:

Pneum. I p. 26, [13] Schmidt (fr. 66 W.):

Ἔτι δὲ καὶ ταύτῃ φανερὸν ὡς ἐν τῷ ὕδατι ὑπάρχει κενά, τῷ τὸν ἐμβαλλόμενον οἶνον εἰς τὸ ὕδωρ ὁρᾶσθαι κατὰ χύσιν εἰς πάντα τόπον τοῦ ὕδατος χωροῦντα. τοῦτο δὲ οὐκ ἂν ἐγίνετο μὴ ὄντων ἐν τῷ ὕδατι κενῶν. φέρεται δὲ καὶ τὸ φῶς τὸ ἕτερον διὰ τοῦ ἑτέρου· ὅταν γάρ τις πλείους ἄψῃ λύχνους ἅπαντα φωτίζεται μᾶλλον, τῶν αὐγῶν πάντῃ φερομένων δι' ἀλλήλων. [ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ διὰ χαλκοῦ καὶ σιδήρου καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἁπάντων διεκπίπτει σωμάτων, καθάπερ καὶ τὸ ἐπὶ τῆς νάρκης τῆς θαλασσίας γινόμενον.]

Motion

720—Straton's definition of motion.

Simpl., *Phys.* 711, [9] Diels (fr. 70 W.):

Ὁ δὲ Λαμψακηνὸς Στράτων οὐκ ἀπὸ τοῦ μεγέθους μόνον συνεχῆ τὴν κίνησιν εἶναί φησιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ καθ' ἑαυτήν, ὡς εἰ διακοπείη, στάσει διαλαμβανομένην, καὶ τὸ μεταξὺ δύο στάσεων κίνησιν οὖσαν ἀδιάκοπον. καὶ ποσόν δέ τι, φησίν, ἡ κίνησις καὶ διαιρετὸν εἰς ἀεὶ διαιρετά.

Time

721—a. Time differs from number.

Simpl., *Phys.* 788, [36] Diels (fr. 75 W.):

Ὁ μέντοι Λαμψακηνὸς Στράτων αἰτιασάμενος τὸν ὑπ' Ἀριστοτέλους τε καὶ τῶν Ἀριστοτέλους ἑταίρων ἀποδοθέντα τοῦ χρόνου ὁρισμὸν αὐτὸς καίτοι Θεοφράστου μαθητὴς ὢν τοῦ πάντα σχεδὸν ἀκολουθήσαντος τῷ Ἀριστοτέλει καινοτέραν ἐβάδισεν ὁδόν. ἀριθμὸν μὲν γὰρ κινήσεως εἶναι τὸν χρόνον οὐκ ἀποδέχεται, διότι ὁ μὲν ἀριθμὸς διωρισμένον ποσόν, ἡ δὲ κίνησις καὶ ὁ χρόνος συνεχής, τὸ δὲ συνεχὲς οὐκ ἀριθμητόν. εἰ δέ, ὅτι ἄλλο καὶ ἄλλο τὸ μέρος τῆς κινήσεως καὶ τούτων τὸ μὲν πρότερον τὸ δὲ ὕστερον, κατὰ τοῦτο ἔστι τις τῆς κινήσεως ἀριθμός, οὕτω γε ἂν καὶ τὸ μῆκος ἀριθμητὸν εἴη (καὶ γὰρ καὶ τοῦτο ποσὸν ἄλλο καὶ ἄλλο ἐστί) καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν κατὰ συνέχειαν γινομένων

καὶ τὸ μὲν πρότερον τὸ δὲ ὕστερον, ὥστε καὶ τοῦ χρόνου εἴη ἂν χρόνου χρόνος· ἔτι δὲ ἀριθμοῦ μὲν οὐκ ἔστι γένεσις καὶ φθορά, κἂν τὰ ἀριθμητὰ φθείρηται, ὁ δὲ χρόνος καὶ γίνεται καὶ φθείρεται συνεχῶς. καὶ τοῦ μὲν ἀριθμοῦ ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι πάντα τὰ μέρη (μὴ γὰρ οὐσῶν τῶν τριῶν μονάδων οὐδ' ἂν ἡ τριὰς εἴη), τοῦ δὲ χρόνου ἀδύνατον. ἔσται γὰρ ὁ πρότερος χρόνος καὶ ὁ ὕστερος ἅμα. ἔτι τὸ αὐτὸ ἔσται μονὰς καὶ νῦν, εἴπερ ὁ χρόνος ἀριθμός. ὁ μὲν γὰρ χρόνος ἐκ τῶν νῦν σύνθετος, ὁ δὲ ἀριθμὸς ἐκ μονάδων.

Cp. Ar.'s definition of time in *Phys.* IV, 219 b$^{1-2}$ (our nr. **510a**).

b. Again, he criticizes Ar.'s definition by remarking that time is no more the measure of motion than of rest.

Simpl., ib. 789, ^{15} D. (fr. 77 W.):

Καὶ τοῦτο δὲ ἀπορεῖ (sc. Στράτων): τί μᾶλλόν ἐστιν ὁ χρόνος ἀριθμὸς τοῦ ἐν κινήσει προτέρου καὶ ὑστέρου ἢ τοῦ ἐν ἠρεμίᾳ; καὶ γὰρ ἐν ταύτῃ ὁμοίως ἐστὶ τὸ πρότερον καὶ ὕστερον.

A fact which, for the rest, did not remain unobserved by Ar. Cp. *Phys.* IV 221 b^{7}, where he says: Ἐπεὶ δ' ἐστὶν ὁ χρόνος μέτρον κινήσεως, ἔσται καὶ ἠρεμίας μέτρον κατὰ συμβεβηκός· πᾶσα γὰρ ἠρεμία ἐν χρόνῳ.

c. Time is the quantitative element in actions.

Simpl., ib. 789, ^{33} D. (fr. 76 W.):

Καὶ ἄλλα δὲ πολλὰ ἀντειπὼν πρὸς τὴν Ἀριστοτέλους ἀπόδοσιν ὁ Στράτων αὐτὸς τὸν χρόνον τὸ ἐν ταῖς πράξεσι ποσὸν εἶναι τίθεται: πολλὸν γάρ, φησί, χρόνον φαμὲν ἀποδημεῖν καὶ πλεῖν καὶ στρατεύεσθαι καὶ πολεμεῖν καὶ ὀλίγον χρόνον, ὁμοίως δὲ καθῆσθαι καὶ καθεύδειν καὶ μηδὲν πράττειν καὶ πολὺν χρόνον φαμὲν καὶ ὀλίγον. ὧν μέν ἐστι τὸ ποσὸν πολύ, πολὺν χρόνον, ὧν δὲ ὀλίγον, ὀλίγον. χρόνος γὰρ τὸ ἐν ἑκάστοις τούτων ποσόν. διὸ καί φασιν οἱ μὲν βραδέως ἥκειν οἱ δὲ ταχέως τὸν αὐτόν, ὡς ἂν ἑκάστοις φαίνηται τὸ ἐν τούτοις ποσόν. ταχὺ μὲν γὰρ εἶναί φαμεν, ἐν ᾧ τὸ μὲν ποσὸν ἀφ' οὗ ἤρξατο καὶ εἰς ὃ ἐπαύσατο ὀλίγον, τὸ δὲ γεγονὸς ἐν αὐτῷ πολύ· τὸ βραδὺ δὲ τοὐναντίον, ὅταν ᾖ τὸ μὲν ποσὸν ἐν αὐτῷ πολύ, τὸ δὲ πεπραγμένον ὀλίγον. διό, φησίν, οὐκ ἔστιν ἐν ἠρεμίᾳ τὸ ταχὺ καὶ τὸ βραδύ· πᾶσα γὰρ ἴση ἐστὶ τῷ ἑαυτῆς ποσῷ καὶ οὔτε ἐν ὀλίγῳ τῷ ποσῷ πολλὴ οὔτε ἐν πολλῷ βραχεῖα. διὰ τοῦτο δέ, φησί, καὶ πλείω μὲν εἶναι καὶ ἐλάττω χρόνον λέγομεν, θάττω δὲ καὶ βραδύτερον χρόνον οὐ λέγομεν. πρᾶξις μὲν γὰρ καὶ κίνησίς ἐστι θάττων καὶ βραδυτέρα, τὸ δὲ ποσὸν τὸ ἐν ᾧ ἡ πρᾶξις οὐκ ἔστι θᾶττον καὶ βραδύτερον, ἀλλὰ πλέον καὶ ἔλαττον ὥσπερ καὶ χρόνος. ἡμέρα δὲ καὶ νύξ, φησί, καὶ μὴν καὶ ἐνιαυτὸς οὐκ ἔστι χρόνος οὐδὲ χρόνου μέρη, ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν ὁ φωτισμὸς καὶ ἡ σκίασις, τὰ δὲ ἡ τῆς σελήνης καὶ τοῦ ἡλίου περίοδος, ἀλλὰ χρόνος ἐστὶ τὸ ποσὸν ἐν ᾧ ταῦτα.

Definition

d. Sextus, *Math.* X (= *Adv. phys.* II) 177 (fr. 79a W.):

Διόπερ Στράτων ὁ φυσικὸς ἀποστὰς τῆσδε τῆς ἐννοίας ἔλεγε χρόνον ὑπάρχειν μέτρον πάσης κινήσεως καὶ μονῆς.

Unity of the soul

722—a. He rejects Ar.'s doctrine of the noûs.

Tertullianus, *De anima* 14 (fr. 108 W.):

Specta portentosissimam Archimedis munificentiam, organum hydraulicum dico, tot membra, tot partes, tot compagines, tot itinera vocum, tot compendia sonorum, tot commercia modorum, tot acies tibiarum, et una moles erunt omnia. sic et spiritus, qui illic de tormento aquae anhelat, non ideo separabitur in partes, quia per partes administratur, substantia quidem solidus, opera vero divisus. non longe hoc exemplum est a Stratone et Aenesidemo et Heraclito, nam et ipsi unitatem animae tuentur, quae in totum corpus diffusa et ubique ipsa, velut flatus in calamo per cavernas ita per sensualia variis modis emicet, non tam concisa quam dispensata.

Mind identified with the senses

b. Cp. Sextus, *Math.* VII (= Adv. log. I) 350 (fr. 109 W.):

Καὶ οἱ μὲν διαφέρειν αὐτὴν (sc. τὴν διάνοιαν) τῶν αἰσθήσεων, ὡς οἱ πλείους, οἱ δὲ αὐτὴν εἶναι τὰς αἰσθήσεις, καθάπερ διά τινων ὀπῶν τῶν αἰσθητηρίων προκύπτουσαν, ἧς στάσεως ἦρξε Στράτων τε ὁ φυσικὸς καὶ Αἰνησίδημος.

Rejection of an a priori

723—He explains knowledge as a movement of the soul.

Simpl., *Phys.* 965, 7 Diels (fr. 74 W.):

Καὶ Στράτων δὲ ὁ Λαμψακηνὸς ὁ Θεοφράστου γεγονὼς ἀκουστὴς καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἀρίστοις Περιπατητικοῖς ἀριθμούμενος τὴν ψυχὴν ὁμολογεῖ κινεῖσθαι οὐ μόνον τὴν ἄλογον ἀλλὰ καὶ τὴν λογικήν, κινήσεις λέγων εἶναι τὰς ἐνεργείας καὶ τῆς ψυχῆς. λέγει οὖν ἐν τῷ περὶ κινήσεως πρὸς ἄλλοις πολλοῖς καὶ τάδε· ἀεὶ γὰρ ὁ νοῶν κινεῖται ὥσπερ καὶ ὁ ὁρῶν καὶ ἀκούων καὶ ὀσφραινόμενος· ἐνέργεια γὰρ ἡ νόησις τῆς διανοίας καθάπερ καὶ ἡ ὅρασις τῆς ὄψεως. καὶ πρὸ τούτου δὲ τοῦ ῥητοῦ γέγραφεν: ἐπεὶ οὖν εἰσιν αἱ πλεῖσται τῶν κινήσεων αἱ αὐταί, ἃς ἡ ψυχὴ καθ' αὑτήν τε κινεῖται διανοουμένη καὶ ἃς ὑπὸ τῶν αἰσθήσεων ἐκινήθη πρότερον. δῆλον δέ ἐστιν· ὅσα γὰρ μὴ πρότερον ἑώρακε, ταῦτα οὐ δύναται νοεῖν, οἷον τόπους ἢ λιμένας ἢ γραφὰς ἢ ἀνδριάντας ἢ ἀνθρώπους ἢ τῶν ἄλλων τι τῶν τοιούτων.

One central organ

724—His doctrine of one central organ.

a. Plut., *De libidine et aegritudine* c. 4, p. 697b (fr. 111 W.):

Οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἅπαντα συλλήβδην ταῦτα τῇ ψυχῇ φέροντες ἀνέθεσαν, ὥσπερ Στράτων ὁ φυσικὸς οὐ μόνον τὰς ἐπιθυμίας ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰς λύπας, οὐδὲ τοὺς

φόβους καὶ τοὺς φθόνους καὶ τὰς ἐπιχαιρεκακίας, ἀλλὰ καὶ πόνους καὶ ἡδονὰς καὶ ἀλγηδόνας καὶ ὅλως πᾶσαν αἴσθησιν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ συνίστασθαι φάμενος καὶ τῆς ψυχῆς τὰ τοιαῦτα πάντα εἶναι, μὴ τὸν πόδα πονούντων ἡμῶν ὅταν προσκρούσωμεν, μηδὲ τὴν κεφαλὴν ὅταν κατάξωμεν, μὴ τὸν δάκτυλον ὅταν ἐκτέμωμεν. ἀναίσθητα γὰρ τὰ λοιπὰ πλὴν τοῦ ἡγεμονικοῦ, πρὸς ὃ τῆς πληγῆς ὀξέως ἀναφερομένης τὴν αἴσθησιν ἀλγηδόνα καλοῦμεν. ὡς δὲ τὴν φωνὴν τοῖς ὠσὶν αὐτοῖς ἐνηχοῦσαν ἔξω δοκοῦμεν εἶναι, τὸ ἀπὸ τῆς ἀρχῆς ἐπὶ τὸ ἡγεμονικὸν διάστημα τῇ αἰσθήσει προσλογιζόμενοι, παραπλησίως τὸν ἐκ τοῦ τραύματος πόνον οὐχ' ὅπου τὴν αἴσθησιν εἴληφεν, ἀλλ' ὅθεν ἔσχε τὴν ἀρχὴν εἶναι δοκοῦμεν, ἑλκομένης ἐπ' ἐκεῖνο τῆς ψυχῆς ἀφ' οὗ πέπονθε. διὸ καὶ προσκόψαντες αὐτίκα τὰς ὀφρῦς συνάγομεν, τῷ πληγέντι μορίῳ τοῦ ἡγεμονικοῦ τὴν αἴσθησιν ὀξέως ἀποδιδόντος, καὶ παρεγκόπτομεν ἔσθ' ὅτε τὸ πνεῦμα· κἂν τὰ μέρη δεσμοῖς διαλαμβάνηται, <ταῖς> χερσὶ σφόδρα πιέζομεν, ἱστάμενοι πρὸς τὴν διάδοσιν τοῦ πάθους, καὶ τὴν πληγὴν ἐν τοῖς ἀναισθήτοις θλίβοντες, ἵνα μὴ συνάψει πρὸς τὸ φρονοῦν ἀλγηδὼν γένηται. ταῦτα μὲν οὖν ὁ Στράτων ἐπὶ πολλοῖς ὡς εἰκὸς τοιούτοις.

b. Plut., *De sollertia anim.* 3, p. 961a (fr. 112 W.):

Καίτοι Στράτωνός γε τοῦ φυσικοῦ λόγος ἐστὶν ἀποδεικνύων ὡς οὐδ' αἰσθάνεσθαι τὸ παράπαν ἄνευ τοῦ νοεῖν ὑπάρχει· καὶ γὰρ γράμματα πολλάκις ἐπιπορευομένους τῇ ὄψει καὶ λόγοι προσπίπτοντες τῇ ἀκοῇ διαλανθάνουσιν ἡμᾶς καὶ διαφεύγουσι πρὸς ἑτέροις τὸν νοῦν ἔχοντας· εἶτ' αὖθις ἐπανῆλθεν καὶ μεταθεῖ καὶ διώκει τῶν προειμένων ἕκαστον ἀναλεγόμενος· ᾗ καὶ λέλεκται·

νοῦς ὁρᾷ καὶ νοῦς ἀκούει, τἄλλα κωφὰ καὶ τυφλά [1]).

ὡς τοῦ περὶ τὰ ὄμματα καὶ ὦτα πάθους, ἂν μὴ παρῇ τὸ φρονοῦν, αἴσθησιν οὐ ποιοῦντος.

6—LYCO AND ARISTO OF CEOS

725—Strato was succeeded in the School by Lyco. **Strato succeeded by Lyco**

a. Diog. Laërt. V 65:

Τοῦτον (sc. Στράτωνα) διεδέξατο Λύκων Ἀστυάνακτος Τρωαδεύς.

b. Ib. 68:

Ἀφηγήσατο δὲ τῆς σχολῆς ἔτη τέτταρα πρὸς τοῖς τετταράκοντα, Στράτωνος αὐτὸν ἐν ταῖς διαθήκαις καταλιπόντος κατὰ τὴν ἑβδόμην καὶ εἰκοστὴν καὶ ἑκατοστὴν Ὀλυμπιάδα (270/268).

726—He is described by his contemporary Antigonus of Carystus as a man of the world, even of rather extravagant inclinations.

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[1] Epicharmus, B 12 Diels VS.

His character

a. Athenaeus, *Deipn.* XII 69, 547d-548b (fr. 7 W.):

Καὶ Λύκων δὲ ὁ περιπατητικός, ὥς φησιν Ἀντίγονος ὁ Καρύστιος [1], κατ' ἀρχὰς ἐπιδημήσας παιδείας ἕνεκα ταῖς Ἀθήναις περὶ συμβολικοῦ κώθωνος [2] καὶ πόσον ἑκάστη τῶν ἑταιρουσῶν ἐπράττετο μίσθωμα ἀκριβῶς ἠπίστατο. Ὕστερον δὲ καὶ τοῦ περιπάτου προστὰς ἐδείπνιζε τοὺς φίλους ἀλαζονείᾳ καὶ πολυτελείᾳ πολλῇ χρώμενος. Χωρὶς γὰρ τῶν παραλαμβανομένων εἰς αὐτὰ ἀκροαμάτων καὶ ἀργυρωμάτων καὶ στρωμνῆς ἡ λοιπὴ παρασκευὴ καὶ ἡ τῶν δείπνων περιεργία καὶ ὁ τῶν τραπεζοποιῶν καὶ μαγείρων ὄχλος τοσοῦτος ἦν ὥστε πολλοὺς ὀρρωδεῖν καὶ βουλομένους προσιέναι πρὸς τὴν διατριβὴν ἀνακόπτεσθαι. — Οὐ γὰρ ἵνα συρρυέντες ἐπὶ τὸ αὐτὸ τῆς ἕως ὄρθρου γενομένης τραπέζης ἀπολαύσωσιν ἢ χάριν ἐξοινίας ἐποιήσαντο τὰς συνόδους ταύτας οἱ περὶ Πλάτωνα καὶ Σπεύσιππον, ἀλλ' ἵνα φαίνωνται καὶ τὸ θεῖον τιμῶντες καὶ μουσικῶς ἀλλήλοις συμπεριφερόμενοι, καὶ τὸ πλεῖστον ἕνεκεν ἀνέσεως καὶ φιλολογίας. Ἅ δὴ πάντα γέγονεν δεύτερα παρὰ τοῖς ὕστερον τῶν τε χλανίδων καὶ τῆς πολυτελείας τῆς εἰρημένης· οὐ γὰρ ἔγωγε τοὺς λοιποὺς ὑπεξαιροῦμαι. Ὁ δὲ Λύκων ὑπ' ἀλαζονείας καὶ ἐν τῷ ἐπιφανεστάτῳ τῆς πόλεως τόπῳ ἐν τῇ Κόνωνος οἰκίᾳ εἶχεν εἰκοσίκλινον οἶκον, ὃς ἦν ἐπιτήδειος αὐτῷ πρὸς τὰς ὑποδοχάς. Ἦν δὲ ὁ Λύκων καὶ σφαιριστὴς ἀγαθὸς καὶ ἐπιδέξιος.

b. Cp. Diog. Laërt. V 67 (fr. 8 W.):

Ἦν δὲ καὶ καθαρώτατος τὴν στολήν, ὡς ἀνυπερβλήτῳ χρῆσθαι μαλακότητι ἱματίων, καθά φησιν Ἕρμιππος. ἀλλὰ καὶ γυμναστικώτατος ἐγένετο καὶ εὐέκτης τὸ σῶμα τήν τε πᾶσαν σχέσιν ἀθλητικὴν ἐπιφαίνων, ὠτοθλαδίας [3] καὶ ἐμπινὴς ὤν, καθά φησιν Ἀντίγονος ὁ Καρύστιος. διὰ τοῦτο δὲ καὶ παλαῖσαι λέγεται τά τ' ἐν τῇ πατρίδι Ἰλίεια καὶ σφαιρίσαι.

Political influence

727—a. He often gave political advice to the Athenians.

Diog. Laërt. V 66:

Πολλάκις τε πολλὰ συμβουλεύσας Ἀθηναίοις τὰ μέγιστα αὐτοὺς ὠφέλησεν.

Liberality

b. And showed liberality towards the Athenian state as well as to the sanctuary of Delphi. The last point appears from a decree of the Delphic amphiktyones who honoured him with a laurel wreath etc. for the sake of his great εὔνοια and φιλοτιμία towards the God and the sanctuary at Delphi (Dittenberger, *Sylloge*[3], nr. 461); the first from a list of

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[1] Cp. Wilamowitz, *Antigonos von Karystos*, p. 78 sqq.
[2] Symposia on common account.
[3] A boxer with cauliflower ears.

those who ἐπέδωκαν εἰς τὴν σωτηρίαν τῆς πόλεως καὶ τὴν φυλακὴν τῆς χώρας κατὰ τὸ ψήφισμα τοῦ δήμου (*ib.* nr. 491).

Wehrli sees in this liberality a feature of the μεγαλόψυχος of Aristotle, an ideal which was certainly before Lyco's eyes. I think it would require a great deal of benevolence to see in L. a true representative of the μεγαλόψυχος. Certainly L. displayed a kind of μεγαλοπρέπεια; yet, as it seems, not without avoiding the extreme of χαυνότης, as he was judged by his contemporaries. Whether his personality and behaviour offered a desirable antidote to the type of one-sided erudition represented by Strato, may seem to us rather problematical.

728—Lyco seems to have been more a rhetor than a philosopher. **More a rhetor than a philosopher**

a. Diog. Laert. praises him exclusively as a φραστικὸς ἀνήρ and for a certain paedagogical talent.

Diog. Laërt. V 65-66:

— Λύκων Ἀστυάνακτος Τρωαδεύς, φραστικὸς ἀνὴρ καὶ περὶ παίδων ἀγωγὴν ἄκρως συντεταγμένος. ἔφασκε γὰρ δεῖν παρεζεῦχθαι τοῖς παισὶ τὴν αἰδῶ καὶ φιλοτιμίαν ὡς τοῖς ἵπποις μύωπα καὶ χαλινόν. τὸ δ' ἐκφραστικὸν αὐτοῦ καὶ περιγεγωνὸς ἐν τῇ ἑρμηνείᾳ φαίνεται κἀνθένδε· φησὶ γὰρ τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον ἐπὶ παρθένου πενιχρᾶς· »Βαρὺ γὰρ φορτίον πατρὶ κόρη διὰ σπάνιν προικὸς ἐκτρέχουσα τὸν ἀκμαῖον τῆς ἡλικίας καιρόν.« διὸ δὴ καί φασιν Ἀντίγονον ἐπ' αὐτοῦ τοῦτο εἰπεῖν, ὡς οὐκ ἦν ὥσπερ μήλου τὴν εὐωδίαν καὶ χάριν ἄλλοθί που μετενεγκεῖν, ἀλλ' ἐπ' αὐτοῦ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου καθάπερ ἐπὶ τοῦ δένδρου τῶν λεγομένων ἕκαστον ἔδει θεωρεῖσθαι. τοῦτο δὲ ὅτι ἐν μὲν τῷ λέγειν γλυκύτατος ἦν· παρὸ καί τινες τὸ γάμμα αὐτοῦ τῷ ὀνόματι προσετίθεσαν.

We have a fragment of L. in the work of the rhetor Rutilius Lupus (II 7; Wehrli, fr. 26), which is indeed remarkable from a stylistic point of view.

b. Cf. Cic., *De fin.* V 13:

Lyco, oratione locuples, rebus ipsis ieiunior.

729—His view of the highest good appears from a passage in Clemens, *Strom.* II, c. 21, 129, 9 (Stählin II, p. 183), fr. 20 W.: **What he called "the end"**

Λύκων ὁ Περιπατητικὸς τὴν ἀληθινὴν χαρὰν τῆς ψυχῆς τέλος ἔλεγεν εἶναι, ὡς Λεύκιμος τὴν ἐπὶ τοῖς καλοῖς.

Wehrli rightly remarks that, for Lyco, the "true joy of the soul" is surely not the Aristotelian contemplation.

730—Probably Lyco was succeeded by Aristo of Ceos, the author of a great characterological fragment preserved in Philodemus' Περὶ κακιῶν X.

a. He is mentioned by Cicero in the above-cited passage, *De fin.* V 13 (after Lyco): **Aristo of Ceos**

Concinnus deinde et elegans huius (sc. successor), Aristo, sed ea quae desideratur a magno philosopho gravitas in eo non fuit. Scripta sane et multa et polita, sed nescio quo pacto auctoritatem oratio non habet.

b. Strabo X 6, 486, mentions him among those who came from Iulis in Ceos and calls him an emulator of Bion of Borysthenes:

Ἐκ δὲ τῆς Ἰουλίδος ὅ τε Σιμονίδης ἦν ὁ μελοποιὸς καὶ Βακχυλίδης — καὶ τῶν ἐκ τοῦ περιπάτου φιλοσόφων Ἀρίστων, ὁ τοῦ Βορυσθενίτου Βίωνος ζηλωτής.

731—After Lyco, whose chief interest seems to have been in rhetoric, A. develops another side of Aristotle's inheritance, namely, the description of types of character. The first part of the fragment in Philodemus' Π. κακιῶν X (col. X-XXIV; first part till XVI 27) deals amply with ὑπερηφανία.

This quality is not dealt with by Ar., either in the *Eth. Nic.* or in the *Eth. Eud.* Theophr., *Char.* 24, defined it as καταφρόνησίς τις πλὴν αὑτοῦ τῶν ἄλλων.

As to A., he considers ὑπερηφανία as a great fault, because it underestimates our dependence on τύχη and on our fellow-men. Thus, he protests against the Stoic idea of autarkeia of the individual.

The first part of our fragment seems to have been written in a protreptical style, as may appear from the following passages.

A fragment from the work "On relieving from arrogance"

a. Philodemus, Π. κακιῶν X, col. X 30-XIII 8 (fr. 13 I-IV W.):

Ἐάν ποτε συναισθάνηται μετεωριζόμενος, μεταρίπτειν τὴν διάνοιαν ἐπὶ τὰς ἔμπροσθε ταπεινώσεις ὑπὸ τῆς τυχῆς, εἴποτε γεγόνασιν — — καὶ λαμβάνειν πρὸ ὀφθαλμῶν τὸ τῆς τύχης ἑτεροκλινὲς [1] καὶ ὀξύστροφον· καὶ ἐπὶ πάγου πορευομένους τὸ Εὐριπίδου [2] λέγειν [1], ὃ καὶ Διονύσιος οὐ κακῶς ἐπιφωνεῖν ἐκέλευέν τινα δὶς τῆς ἡμέρας· Col XI

ὁρᾷς τυράννους διὰ μακρῶν ηὐξημένους;

καὶ μνημονεύειν ἐναργῶς, ὅν τρόπον αὐτὸς διετέθη [1] πρὸς ὑπερηφανήσαντα, — — καθάπερ καὶ Δίων πρὸς Πτοιόδωρον τὸν Μεγαρέα, ὃς [1] πολὺν χρόνον ἐπὶ τῆς θύρας περιμένων πρὸς τὸν ἀκόλουθον· »ἦ που καὶ ἡμεῖς«, εἶπεν, »ἐκεῖ πολλὰ τοιαῦτ' ἐποιοῦμεν.« Καὶ ὅταν ἐπὶ τὰς εὐκληρίας ἐφιστάνῃ, μὴ προσεπιρητορεύειν αὐταῖς πρὸς τὸ μεῖζον, ἀλλ' ἀποσπᾶν ὅτι δύναται, κουφίζειν [3] τῆς ἰσχνότητος πεφυκυίας [1] . . . ὡς καὶ Περικλῆς ταπεινουμένους μὲν ἐξῆρεν Ἀθηναίους, μεγαλαυχουμένους δὲ συνέστειλε. — — καὶ παραμετρεῖν ἑαυτὸν μὴ πρὸς τοὺς πενεστέρους ἀλλὰ πρὸς τοὺς καθ' ἕκαστον Co XI

[1] Restitution of Wehrli.
[2] Fr. 420 Nauck².
[3] To relieve from.

εἶδος ὑπερέχοντας, ἐπειδὴ τὸ μὲν ἐξαίρει, τὸ δὲ συστέλλει, τοῦτο μὲν ἐπ' ἀγρῶν κτήσεως, τοῦτο δ' ἐπ' ἀρχῆς καὶ βασιλείας πόλεων καὶ ἐθνῶν· παρυπομιμνήσκεσθαι δὲ καὶ τοῦ συναντᾶν εἰωθότος φθόνου τοῖς ὑπερηφανοῦσιν, ὃς ὀφθαλμία τίς ἐστιν ψυχῆς, ὥστε καθάπερ τοὺς ὀφθαλμοὺς ἡ τῶν συναντώντων γεγανωμένη χλανὶς ἐνοχλεῖ, κωφότερον δ' ἥπερ ἐὰν παριὼν καὶ ἀναβαλλόμενος διατινάξῃ, παραπλησίως καὶ τὸν φθονερὸν λυπεῖ μὲν τἀλλότρια τῶν ἀγαθῶν, οὐχ οὕτω δ' ὥσπερ ὅταν οἷον ἀναπτερυγίζοντά τινα καταμάθῃ δι' αὐτὰ καὶ πρὸς ὕψος ἐξαιρόμενον· τότε δὲ προσφὺς ἔδακεν. Ὅσαι δ' ἀπώλειαι διὰ φθόνον γίνονται, βλέπεται τοῖς ἅπασιν. — Ἐννοεῖν δὲ καὶ τὴν ἐπιχαιρεκακίαν, ὅταν εἰς ἀτυχίαν μεταπέσῃ· λυπηρὰ γάρ, ἅτε συνεπιτιθεμένων εὐλόγως τῷ τῆς τύχης πταίσματι τῶν πολλῶν κατ' ἐχθρῶν ὁμολογουμένων — — ὅτι τῆς
Col. XIII πρότερον ὑπερηφανίας ἀνεμίμνησκεν. διὸ καί φασιν ἀχθόμενον αὐτὸν ἐπὶ τῷ σχεδὸν πάντας ἐπιχαίρειν πρὸς Ἀρχέλαον ἀπελθεῖν [1]. —

b. "Greatness of soul" [2] is to be separated from arrogance.

Philodemus, ib., col. XV, l. 22-33 (fr. 13 VI W.):

Καὶ διαιρεῖν μεγαλοψυχίαν ὑπερηφανίας, ἀλλὰ μὴ συμφύρειν ὡς ἓν καὶ ταὐτόν· διαφέρει γὰρ ὅσον καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ σώματος οἰδήσεως εὐεξία, καὶ ἔστιν τοῦ μὲν μεγαλοψύχου τὸ καταφρονεῖν τῶν τυχηρῶν ὑπερέχοντα τῷ τῆς ψυχῆς ὄγκῳ, τοῦ δ' ὑπερηφάνου τὸ διὰ κουφότητα ταύτης ἐκπνευματούμενον ὑπὸ κτήσεως ὑπερορᾶν ἑτέρους.

c. Arrogance may turn to madness.

Philodemus, ib., Col. XVI, l. 15-27 (fr. 13 VII W.):

Ἐννοεῖν δ' ὅτι καὶ εἰς μωρίαν ἐνίοτε τὸ νόσημα περιίστησιν ἢ μανίαν, εἰ μὴ τὰ Ξέρξου τῶν δυεῖν οὐκ ἔχεται ἢ θατέρου, τὸ ζευγνύειν τὸν Ἑλλήσποντον καὶ καθιέναι πέδας εἰς τὴν θάλατταν καὶ τἆλλα ποιεῖν ἃ περὶ αὐτοῦ λέγουσιν· ἢ τὸ θεοὺς ἐξ ἀνθρώπων ἑαυτοὺς γεγονέναι δοκεῖν καὶ τἆλλ' ὅσα γίνεται περὶ τοὺς ἀνέδην ὑπερηφανοῦντας.

The fragment of Aristo's Περὶ τοῦ κουφίζειν ὑπερηφανίας [3], preserved by Philodemus, is, as Wehrli remarked, our oldest example of Hellenistic protreptic litterature.

732—The rest of Philodemus' fragment shows a very different style and character. Wehrli considers it on good grounds as being taken from another work of A.

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[1] It was Euripides who, by the φθόνος of his enemies which had passed over into ἐπιχαιρεκακία, was driven to Archelaus.

[2] Which is often translated by "pride".

[3] The title is mentioned by Philodemus in col. X, l. 10-11.

The αὐθάδης

a. Description of the αὐθάδης.

Philodemus, Π. κακιῶν X, col. XVI l. 29-col. XVII, l. 17 (fr. 14 I-II W.):

'Ο δ' αὐθάδης λεγόμενος ἔοικε μὲν εἶναι μεικτὸς ἐξ οἰήσεως [1] καὶ ὑπερηφανίας καὶ ὑπεροψίας, μετέχων δὲ καὶ πολλῆς εἰκαιότητος [2]. Τοιοῦτος γάρ ἐστιν, φησὶν ὁ 'Αρίστων, οἷος ἐν τῇ μάκ<τ>ρᾳ [3] θερμὸν ἢ ψυχρὸν αἰτεῖν μὴ προανακρίνας τὸν συμβεβηκότ', εἰ κἀκείνῳ συναρέσκει, καὶ — — παῖδα πριάμενος μηδὲ τοὔνομα προσερωτῆσαι μήτ' αὐτὸς θέσθαι, καλεῖν δὲ παῖδα καὶ μηθὲν ἄλλο, καὶ τὸν συναλείψαντα μὴ ἀντισυναλείφειν· καὶ ξενισθεὶς μὴ ἀντιξενίσαι· καὶ θύραν ἀλλοτρίαν κόπτων, ἐπερωτήσαντος τίς ἐστιν, μηδὲν ἀποκρίνεσθαι, μέχρι ἂν ἐξέλθῃ· καὶ ἀρρωστοῦντ' αὐτὸν ἐπισκεπτομένου φίλου μὴ λέγειν πῶς ἔχει, μηδ' αὐτὸς ἐπισκεπτόμενός τινα τοιοῦτό τι προσερωτῆσαι· καὶ γράφων ἐπιστολὴν τὸ χαίρειν μὴ προσγράψαι μηδ' ἐρρῶσθαι τελευταῖον. Col. XVII

The αὐθέκαστος

b. Description of the αὐθέκαστος. Ib., col. XVII 17-XVIII 11 (fr. 14 II-III W.):

'Ο δ' αὐθέκαστος οὐ πάνυ μὲν εἰκαῖός ἐστιν οὐδ' ἄλογος ὥσπερ ὁ αὐθάδης, δι' οἴησιν δὲ τοῦ μόνος φρονεῖν ἰδιογνωμονῶν καὶ πειθόμενος ἐν ἅπασιν κατορθώσειν, ἁμαρτήσεσθαι δ', ἂν ἑτέρου κρίσει προσχρήσηται, μετέχων δὲ καὶ ὑπερηφανίας· οἷος μηδενὶ προσαναθέμενος ἀποδημεῖν, ἀγοράζειν, πωλεῖν, ἀρχὴν μετιέναι, τἄλλα συντελεῖν· κἂν προσερωτήσῃ τις, τί μέλλει ποιεῖν· »οἶδ' ἐγώ« λέγειν· κἂν μέμφηταί τις, ὑπομειδιῶν· »'Εμὲ σύ;« καὶ παρακληθεὶς ἐπὶ συνεδρείαν βουλευομένῳ μὴ βούλεσθαι τὸ δοκοῦν εἰπεῖν, εἰ μὴ τοῦτο μέλλει πράττειν· καὶ πάντ', ἐν ὅσοις ἀποτέτευχε, — — τελεῖν καὶ μὴ ἐπιτεθυμηκέναι γενέσθαι φάσκειν· καὶ μὴ δυσωπεῖσθαι τοὔνομα καλούμενος ὡς αὐθέκαστος, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἔτι παιδάρια λέγειν εἶναι τοὺς ὡς παιδαγωγοῖς ἄλλοις προσανατιθεμένους· καὶ μόνος ἔχειν πώγωνα καὶ πολιάς· καὶ ζῆν δυνήσεσθαι γενόμενος ἐν ἐρημίᾳ. Col. XVIII

The παντειδήμων

c. Ib., col. XVIII 11-38 (fr. 14 III W.):

Τούτου δ' ἔτι χείρων ἐστὶν ὁ παντειδήμων, ἀναπεπεικὼς ἑαυτὸν ὅτι πάντα γινώσκει, τὰ μὲν μαθὼν παρὰ τῶν μάλιστ' ἐπισταμένων, τὰ δ' ἰδὼν ποιοῦντας μόνον, τὰ δ' αὐτὸς ἐπινοήσας ἀφ' αὑτοῦ. κἄστι τοιοῦτος οὐ μόνον οἷον 'Ιππίαν τὸν 'Ηλεῖον ἱστορεῖ Πλάτων, ὅσα περὶ τὸ σῶμ' εἶχεν, αὐτῷ πεποιηκέναι λέγειν, ἀλλὰ καὶ κατασκευάζειν οἰκίαν καὶ πλοῖον δι' αὑτοῦ καὶ χωρὶς ἀρχιτέκτονος· καὶ γράφειν συνθήκας ἑαυτῷ δεομένας ἐμπειρίας νομικῆς· καὶ δούλους ἰδίους ἰατρεύειν, μὴ μόνον ἑαυτόν, ἐπιχειρεῖν δὲ καὶ ἄλλους· καὶ φυτεύειν καὶ φορτίζεσθαι τὰ μάλισθ' ὑπὸ τῶν τεχνικωτάτων κατορθούμενα· καὶ ναυαγῶν ἐν ἅπασι μηδ' οὕτω παύεσθαι τῆς ἀποπληξίας· οἷος δὲ καὶ τῶν μαθημάτων ἀντιποιούμενος πάντων ἀσχημονεῖν· καὶ τοὺς καταγελῶντας ἀπείρους λέγειν. –

[1] Presumption. [2] Thoughtlessness. [3] Bathing-tub.

Wehrli remarks that the list of characters dealt with by A. was probably longer than our fragment in Philodemus, and that, in this case, the work of A. gave a complete description of human characters, which formed "ein bedeutendes Zeugnis peripatetischer Erfahrungswissenschaft auch auf ethischem Gebiete".

733—Plut., *De audiendis poetis* 14e, mentions, on a level with the *Abaris* of Heracl. Pont., the *Lyco* of A., as a writing in which τὰ περὶ τῶν ψυχῶν δόγματα were treated μεμειγμένα μυθολογίᾳ. Cp. our nr. **782**.

7—ARISTO OF COS

734—While we found in Lyco rhetoric accepted and cultivated as a part of philosophy, Aristo of Cos, a pupil of Aristo of Ceos and his successor, probably the author of the great fragments on rhetoric preserved by Philodemus, went back to Plato's view in the *Gorgias*.

Aristo of Cos

a. Strabo, XIV, 19, 658:

Οὗτος (sc. Hippocrates) τε δή ἐστι τῶν ἐνδόξων Κῷος ἀνήρ, — καὶ καθ' ἡμᾶς Νικίας ὁ καὶ τυραννήσας Κῴων, καὶ Ἀρίστων ὁ ἀκροασάμενος τοῦ περιπατητικοῦ (i.e. Aristo of Ceos) καὶ κληρονομήσας ἐκεῖνον.

He is probably the same who is mentioned by Sextus Emp., *Adv. math.* II 61, as a γνώριμος Κριτολάου, and by Quintilianus II 15, 19 as *discipulus Critolai*.

b. Philodemus, *Volumina rhetorica* ed. Sudhaus I, p. 360, col. LXXI, l. 7-8:

τὸ βιβλίον τἀρίστωνος.

His rejection of rhetoric

735—a. The rhetor is not worthy to pretend to be a governor.

Philodemus, o.c. p. 361, col. LXXII l. 12-18:

Φησὶ δὴ πρῶτον ἀποτρέπων ὅτι κελευστοῦ καὶ οὐ κυβερνήτου δόξαν ἔχων ὁ ῥήτωρ οὐκ ἄξιός ἐστι προσποιεῖσθαι κυβερνήτης εἶναι.

b. Since rhetoric as a whole has to do with falsehood, the man who seeks truth has to avoid it.

Ib., col. LXXIII 1-4:

Φησὶν ὅλην τὴν σύστασιν ἔχειν ἐκ τοῦ ψεύδους, ὥστε φαίνεσθαι τῷ φιλαληθεῖ φευκτέαν.

c. In what sense rhetoric, in Aristo's opinion, does not achieve truth, may appear from the following lines, in which we are reminded of Plato's definition of rhetoric as a kind of κολακεία — ὅτι τοῦ ἡδέος στο-

χάζεται ἄνευ τοῦ βελτίστου (Gorg. 464 e-465 a). Cp. 464c: οὐ γνοῦσα λέγω ἀλλὰ στοχασαμένη [1].

Philodemus, ib., p. 362, col. LXXIV, l. 5-15:

Εἰ δὲ τὸ κατεστοχασμένον εἰκότως ἢ τἀληθεῖ συνεγγίζον πιθανὸν ἔλεγεν, ὥσπερ ἀδυνατοῦν ἀληθὲς εἶναι καὶ ἀποβαίνειν, ὃ [πι]θανῶς [2] λέγουσιν οἱ ῥήτορες, αἰσχύνομαι περὶ τοῦ μηδ' ὁποιανοῦν ἀπόδειξιν εἰσενεγκεῖν.

d. A. denies the rhetor the right of uttering praise or blame, since he is not able to judge.

Philod., ib., p. 367 f., col. LXXXIV, l. 5-10, 12-13:

Ἢ γὰρ οὐδὲ τὸν πολιτικὸν ἐροῦσιν (sc. τὸ ἐγκωμιάσαι καὶ ψέξαι δυνατὸν εἶναι [3]), ἢ τοῦτον ὁμολογοῦντες πῶς οὐ δεδείχασιν ἕτερον ὄντα τῆς τῶν ῥητόρων ἐμπειρίας; — Ὥστ' οὐδ' ἐγκωμιάζειν καὶ ψέγειν — —

As Plato did in the above-cited passage of the *Gorgias*, he speaks of ἐμπειρία of the rhetores, as opposed to the knowledge of the πολιτικοί.

e. The Socratic-Platonic distinction between those who know their subject and the mass of ignorant people is seen in the following lines: the author speaks of ἄτεχνοι and ἔντεχνοι πίστεις, the first of which are the common property of everybody, while the latter are proper only to those who have some special knowledge.

Philod., o.c. p. 369 f., col. LXXXVII, l. 3-19:

Ἄξιον δ' ἐπιστάσεως [4] τὰς μὲν ἀτέχνους (sc. πίστεις) κοινὰς ἁπάντων ὑπάρχειν, τῶν δ' ἐντέχνων [5] τὸ εἰκὸς καὶ τὸ σημεῖον καὶ τὸ τεκμήριον οὐθὲν αὐτοῖς προσήκειν, ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν σημεῖον εἶναι τοῦ παρηκολουθηκότος [6] ἴδιον, οἷον τὸ μὲν ἐν νόσοις ἰατρῶν, τὸ δ' ἐν τοῖς περὶ τὸ πλεῖν χειμῶσιν κυβερνήτου, παραπλησίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων· τὸ δ' εἰκὸς τοῦ παραθεωρήσαντος [6] πῶς — —

f. The rhetor, by his lack of knowledge, might even be harmful to the state.

Philod., o.c. p. 375 f., col. XCVIII, l. 4-16:

— τῷ δὲ μήτε ποῦ μήτε πῶς μήτε πότε πλευστέον εἰδέναι προσβλαβὴς ἂν γένοιτο μᾶλλον οὐκ οἶδ' εἰ καὶ ὁ ῥήτωρ. Περὶ γὰρ ὠφελίμων τε καὶ βλαβερῶν

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[1] Our nr. **198c**. [2] Text of Wehrli. [3] Col. LXXXIII, l. 8-10.
[4] Attention.
[5] Ar., *Rhet.* 1355 b[35] makes the distinction between ἔντεχνοι and ἄτεχνοι πίστεις (our nr. **657a**), and deals with εἰκός, σημεῖον and τεκμήριον as means of proof
[6] The man who knows his subject is here indicated by the terms ὁ παρηκολουθηκώς and ὁ παραθεωρήσας.

ὡς τοιούτων οὐκ ἂν δύναιτο παρακολουθεῖν, εἰ καί τις αὐτὸν ἐνάρκησε [1] νοεῖν παντάπασι διδακτὴν τὴν πάντων δύναμιν. —

g. The art of persuasion is perfectly useless if knowledge is lacking.

Philod., o.c., p. 379 f., col. CIV, l. 6-16:

Καὶ πρὸς τὸ τρίτον δὲ λεγέσθω τὸ κἂν πάνυ πειστικὸς ὁ λόγος ᾖ, ὁ μὴ τὸ πῶς καὶ τίνας δεῖ πείθειν καὶ πότε κατέχων πάντων ἂν ἀχρηστότατος εἴη καθάπερ καὶ πηδάλιον· ὃ συμβέβηκε καὶ τῷ τοῦ ῥήτορος, ὅτι λόγος μέν, οὐ ῥήτορος δ' εἶναι λέγοιτ' ἄν.

7A—NOTE ON THE MAGNA MORALIA

The Magna Moralia

736—To the remains of the early Peripatetic School doubtless belong the *Magna moralia*, attributed to Ar. by tradition. See our nrs. **561**, **565b**, supra.

[1] "hypnotized".

NINETEENTH CHAPTER

THE EARLY ACADEMY

1—SPEUSIPPUS

List of members of the Academy

737—Diog. Laert. III 46 gives the following list of disciples of Plato. Μαθηταὶ δ' αὐτοῦ Σπεύσιππος Ἀθηναῖος, Ξενοκράτης Χαλκηδόνιος, Ἀριστοτέλης Σταγειρίτης, Φίλιππος Ὀπούντιος, Ἑστιαῖος Περίνθιος, Δίων Συρακόσιος, Ἄμυκλος Ἡρακλεώτης, Ἔραστος καὶ Κορίσκος Σκήψιοι, Τιμόλαος Κυζικηνός, Εὐαίων Λαμψακηνός, Πύθων καὶ Ἡρακλείδης Λίνιοι, Ἱπποθάλης καὶ Κάλλιππος Ἀθηναῖοι, Δημήτριος Ἀμφιπολίτης, Ἡρακλείδης Ποντικὸς καὶ ἄλλοι πλείους, σὺν οἷς καὶ γυναῖκες δύο, Λασθένεια Μαντινικὴ καὶ Ἀξιοθέα Φλειασία, ἣ καὶ ἀνδρεῖα ἠμπίσχετο, ὥς φησι Δικαίαρχος.

Cf. Index Herculanensis col. VI, Mekler p. 33-37.

Organisation of the School

738—The Academy seems to have been organized as a θίασος for the cult of the Muses.

Diog. L. III 25:

Ἐν δὲ τῷ πρώτῳ τῶν ἀπομνημονευμάτων Φαβωρίνου φέρεται ὅτι Μιθραδάτης ὁ Πέρσης ἀνδριάντα Πλάτωνος ἀνέθετο εἰς τὴν Ἀκαδήμειαν καὶ ἐπέγραψε· »Μιθραδάτης Ὀροντοβάτου Πέρσης Μούσαις εἰκόνα ἀνέθετο Πλάτωνος, ἣν Σιλανίων ἐποίησε.«

Cp. Wilamowitz, *Philol. Unters.* IV 263 ff., and our next nr.

Speusippus

739—a. Speusippus, successor of Plato. Diog. L. IV 1:

Διεδέξατο δ' αὐτὸν Σπεύσιππος Εὐρυμέδοντος Ἀθηναῖος, τῶν μὲν δήμων Μυρρινούσιος, υἱὸς δὲ τῆς ἀδελφῆς αὐτοῦ Ποτώνης. Καὶ ἐσχολάρχησεν ἔτη ὀκτώ, ἀρξάμενος ἀπὸ τῆς ὀγδόης καὶ ἑκατοστῆς Ὀλυμπιάδος [1]· Χαρίτων τ' ἀγάλματ' ἀνέθηκεν ἐν τῷ μουσείῳ τῷ ὑπὸ Πλάτωνος ἐν Ἀκαδημείᾳ ἱδρυθέντι. καὶ ἔμεινε μὲν ἐπὶ τῶν αὐτῶν Πλάτωνι δογμάτων.

Zeller remarks rightly that the last sentence might prove something too much.

b. When struck by an incurable disease, he gave up the direction of the School voluntarily. Diog. L. IV 2:

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[1] 348-345 B.C.

Ἤδη δὲ ὑπὸ παραλύσεως καὶ τὸ σῶμα διέφθαρτο, καὶ πρὸς Ξενοκράτην διεπέμπετο παρακαλῶν αὐτὸν ἐλθεῖν καὶ τὴν σχολὴν διαδέξασθαι.

c. His reply to Diogenes, who told him that life was not worth living in such a bad state of health.

Stob., *Ecl.* IV, c. 52ᵃ, 17:

Σπευσίππῳ παραλυθέντι τὰ σκέλη Διογένης ἐξαγαγεῖν αὐτὸν τοῦ βίου παρῄνει, ὁ δὲ »οὐ τοῖς σκέλεσιν«, ἔφη, »ζῶμεν, ἀλλὰ τῷ νῷ«.

740—a. Speus. believed in the unity of science. Diog. L. IV 2: **The unity of science**

Οὗτος πρῶτος, καθά φησι Διόδωρος ἐν ἀπομνημονευμάτων πρώτῳ, ἐν τοῖς μαθήμασιν ἐθεάσατο τὸ κοινὸν καὶ συνῳκείωσε καθόσον ἦν δυνατὸν ἀλλήλοις.

The method here referred to was applied by Speus. in his Hómoia and had the purpose of dividing things into genera and species.

b. Speus.' Ὅμοια were, as it appears from fragments in Athenaeus, a survey of the different kinds of plants and animals, in which similar phenomena were combined and dissimilar separated. Lang, fr. 5-26. **The Ὅμοια**

741—a. In the following passage of the *Anal. post.* Ar. is polemizing against Speus. **Definition and division impossible**

Ar., *Anal. post.* II 13, 97 a$^{6-11}$ (fr. 31a Lang):

Οὐδὲν δὲ δεῖ τὸν ὁριζόμενον καὶ διαιρούμενον ἅπαντα εἰδέναι τὰ ὄντα. καίτοι ἀδύνατόν φασί τινες εἶναι τὰς διαφορὰς εἰδέναι τὰς πρὸς ἕκαστον μὴ εἰδότα ἕκαστον. ἄνευ δὲ τῶν διαφορῶν οὐκ εἶναι ἕκαστον εἰδέναι· οὗ γὰρ μὴ διαφέρει, ταὐτὸν εἶναι τούτῳ, οὗ δὲ διαφέρει, ἕτερον τούτου.

b. Cf. Philoponus in *Anal. post.*, p. 405, ^{27}, Wallies (fr. 31c Lang):

Τοῦτο λέγει ἀναιρῶν τοὺς λόγους δι' ὧν ἐπεχείρει ὁ Σπεύσιππος ἀναιρῆσαι καὶ τὴν διαίρεσιν καὶ τοὺς ὁρισμούς· ἐπεχείρει γὰρ οὗτος δεικνύειν, ὡς οὐκ ἔστιν ἀποδοῦναι ὁρισμόν τινος, λέγων ὡς ὁ θέλων δι' ὁρισμοῦ παραστῆσαι τὴν φύσιν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ἢ τοῦ ἵππου ἢ ἄλλου τινὸς ὀφείλει γινώσκειν πάντα τὰ ὄντα καὶ τὰς διαφορὰς αὐτῶν καθ' ἃς διαφέρουσιν ἀλλήλων· οὕτως γὰρ παρίσταται ἡ φύσις τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ἢ τοῦ ἵππου ἢ ἄλλου τινὸς ἐν τῷ χωρίζεσθαι τῶν ἄλλων πάντων· τὸ δὲ χωριζόμενον διά τινων διαφορῶν δεῖ χωρίζεσθαι. ἐπεὶ δὲ ἀδύνατον πάντα τὰ ὄντα γινώσκειν ἢ τὰς διαφορὰς αὐτῶν, λοιπὸν δι' ὁρισμοῦ παραστῆσαί τι ἀδύνατον.

742—He attributed more to sense-perception than Plato did. **Theory of knowledge**

Sextus, *Math.* VII (*Adv. Log.* I) 145 (Fr. 29 Lang):

Ὧδε μὲν καὶ Πλάτων· Σπεύσιππος δέ, ἐπεὶ τῶν πραγμάτων τὰ μὲν αἰσθητά,

τὰ δὲ νοητά, τῶν μὲν νοητῶν κριτήριον ἔλεξεν εἶναι τὸν ἐπιστημονικὸν λόγον, τῶν δὲ αἰσθητῶν τὴν ἐπιστημονικὴν αἴσθησιν. ἐπιστημονικὴν δὲ αἴσθησιν ὑπείληφε καθεστάναι τὴν μεταλαμβάνουσαν τῆς κατὰ τὸν λόγον ἀληθείας. ὥσπερ γὰρ οἱ τοῦ αὐλητοῦ ἢ τοῦ ψάλτου δάκτυλοι τεχνικὴν μὲν εἶχον ἐνέργειαν, οὐκ ἐν αὐτοῖς δὲ προηγουμένως τελειουμένην ἀλλ' <ἐκ> τῆς πρὸς τὸν λογισμὸν συνασκήσεως ἀπαρτιζομένην, καὶ ὡς ἡ τοῦ μουσικοῦ αἴσθησις ἐνέργειαν μὲν εἶχεν ἀντιληπτικὴν τοῦ τε ἡρμοσμένου καὶ τοῦ ἀναρμόστου, ταύτην δὲ οὐκ αὐτοφυῆ, ἀλλ' ἐκ λογισμοῦ περιγεγονυῖαν, οὕτω καὶ ἡ ἐπιστημονικὴ αἴσθησις φυσικῶς παρὰ τοῦ λόγου τῆς ἐπιστημονικῆς μεταλαμβάνει τριβῆς πρὸς ἁπλανῆ τῶν ὑποκειμένων διάγνωσιν.

Doctrine of the first principles

743—a. He separated the One from the Good and took the evolutionary point of view: the Good can, according to his teaching, not be at the beginning but only at the end of being, as its perfection, reached by a process of development.

Ar., *Metaph.* Λ 7, 1072 b^{30}-1073 a^{3} (Fr. 34a, Lang):

"Οσοι δὲ ὑπολαμβάνουσιν, ὥσπερ οἱ Πυθαγόρειοι καὶ Σπεύσιππος, τὸ κάλλιστον καὶ ἄριστον μὴ ἐν ἀρχῇ εἶναι, διὰ τὸ καὶ τῶν φυτῶν καὶ τῶν ζώων τὰς ἀρχὰς αἴτια μὲν εἶναι, τὸ δὲ καλὸν καὶ τέλειον ἐν τοῖς ἐκ τούτων, οὐκ ὀρθῶς οἴονται. τὸ γὰρ σπέρμα ἐξ ἑτέρων ἐστὶν προτέρων τελείων, καὶ τὸ πρῶτον οὐ σπέρμα ἐστίν, ἀλλὰ τὸ τέλειον· οἷον πρότερον ἄνθρωπον ἂν φαίη τις εἶναι τοῦ σπέρματος, οὐ τὸν ἐκ τούτου γενόμενον, ἀλλ' ἕτερον ἐξ οὗ τὸ σπέρμα.

b. The One itself is not even being.

Ar. opposes again this view of Speus. in *Metaph.* N 5, 1092 a^{11}-^{15} (Fr. 34 e Lang):

Οὐκ ὀρθῶς δ' ὑπολαμβάνει οὐδ' εἴ τις παρεικάζει τὰς τοῦ ὅλου ἀρχὰς τῇ τῶν ζώων καὶ φυτῶν, ὅτι ἐξ ἀορίστων ἀτελῶν δὲ αἰεὶ τὰ τελειότερα, διὸ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν πρώτων οὕτως ἔχειν φησίν, ὥστε μηδὲ ὄν τι εἶναι τὸ ἓν αὐτό.

c. A reason why he denied that the One is the Good, was that, in this case, multiplicity would be the bad.

Ar., *Metaph.* N 4, 1091 b^{30}-^{35} (fr. 35 a Lang):

Ταῦτά τε δὴ συμβαίνει ἄτοπα, καὶ τὸ ἐναντίον στοιχεῖον, εἴτε πλῆθος ὂν εἴτε τὸ ἄνισον καὶ μέγα καὶ μικρόν, τὸ κακὸν αὐτό. διόπερ ὃ μὲν ἔφευγε τὸ ἀγαθὸν προσάπτειν τῷ ἑνὶ ὡς ἀναγκαῖον ὄν, ἐπειδὴ ἐξ ἐναντίων ἡ γένεσις, τὸ κακὸν τὴν τοῦ πλήθους φύσιν εἶναι.

d. Meanwhile, he seems to have placed the One on the side of the good things in his scale of values.

Ar., *Eth. Nic.* I 4, 1096 b$^{5-7}$ (fr. 37 a, Lang):

Πιθανώτερον δ' ἐοίκασιν οἱ Πυθαγόρειοι λέγειν περὶ αὐτοῦ (τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ) τιθέντες ἐν τῇ τῶν ἀγαθῶν συστοιχίᾳ τὸ ἕν· οἷς δὴ καὶ Σπεύσιππος ἐπακολουθῆσαι δοκεῖ.

744—He seems to have identified Plato's principle of the infinite Dyad or the Great and Small with multiplicity.

Ar., *Metaph.* N 1, 1087 b$^{4-9}$ (fr. 48 b Lang):

Οἱ δὲ τὸ ἕτερον τῶν ἐναντίων ὕλην ποιοῦσιν, οἱ μὲν τῷ ἑνὶ τῷ ἴσῳ τὸ ἄνισον, ὡς τοῦτο τὴν τοῦ πλήθους οὖσαν φύσιν, οἱ δὲ τῷ ἑνὶ πλῆθος. γεννῶνται γὰρ οἱ ἀριθμοὶ τοῖς μὲν ἐκ τῆς τοῦ ἀνίσου δυάδος τοῦ μεγάλου καὶ μικροῦ, τῷ δ' ἐκ τοῦ πλήθους, ὑπὸ τῆς τοῦ ἑνὸς δὲ οὐσίας ἀμφοῖν.

745—a. From the One and Multiplicity he derives mathematical numbers, which in his system take the place of the Ideas in Plato. **Mathematical numbers instead of Plato's Ideas**

Ar., *Metaph.* M 9, 1086 a$^{2-5}$ (Fr. 42 c Lang):

Οἱ μὲν γὰρ τὰ μαθηματικὰ μόνον ποιοῦντες παρὰ τὰ αἰσθητά, ὁρῶντες τὴν περὶ τὰ εἴδη δυσχέρειαν καὶ πλάσιν, ἀπέστησαν ἀπὸ τοῦ εἰδητικοῦ ἀριθμοῦ καὶ τὸν μαθηματικὸν ἐποίησαν.

b. Ar. criticized this explanation of the universe at the end of his book Λ of the *Metaph.*, 1075 b^{37}-1076 a^{4} (Fr. 33 c Lang):

Οἱ δὲ λέγοντες τὸν ἀριθμὸν πρῶτον τὸν μαθηματικὸν καὶ οὕτως αἰεὶ ἄλλην ἐχομένην οὐσίαν καὶ ἀρχὰς ἑκάστης ἄλλας, ἐπεισοδιώδη τὴν τοῦ παντὸς οὐσίαν ποιοῦσιν (οὐδὲν γὰρ ἡ ἑτέρα τῇ ἑτέρᾳ συμβάλλεται οὖσα ἢ μὴ οὖσα) καὶ ἀρχὰς πολλάς· τὰ δὲ ὄντα οὐ βούλεται πολιτεύεσθαι κακῶς. »οὐκ ἀγαθὸν πολυκοιρανίη· εἷς κοίρανος ἔστω«.

c. In *Metaph.* M 6, 1080 b$^{11-18}$ Ar. states the difference between Speus. and Plato on the one hand, and between Speus. and Pythagoreanism on the other. From the latter Speus. differs in this way, that Pythagoreans did not separate their numbers from sensible things, while Speus. did (Fr. 42 c Lang).

Οἱ μὲν οὖν ἀμφοτέρους φασὶν εἶναι τοὺς ἀριθμούς, τὸν μὲν ἔχοντα τὸ πρότερον καὶ ὕστερον τὰς ἰδέας, τὸν δὲ μαθηματικὸν παρὰ τὰς ἰδέας καὶ τὰ αἰσθητά, καὶ χωριστοὺς ἀμφοτέρους τῶν αἰσθητῶν· οἱ δὲ τὸν μαθηματικὸν μόνον ἀριθμὸν εἶναι τὸν πρῶτον τῶν ὄντων κεχωρισμένον τῶν αἰσθητῶν. καὶ οἱ Πυθαγόρειοι δ' ἕνα, τὸν μαθηματικόν, πλὴν οὐ κεχωρισμένον ἀλλ' ἐκ τούτου τὰς αἰσθητὰς οὐσίας συνεστάναι φασίν.

Next geom. magnitudes, next soul

746—a. In his hierarchy of being, then, there followed after the One the numbers, then geometrical magnitudes, and next soul.

Ar., *Metaph.* Z 2, 1028 b[18-24] (Fr. 33 a Lang):

Ἔτι παρὰ τὰ αἰσθητὰ οἱ μὲν οὐκ οἴονται εἶναι οὐδὲν τοιοῦτον, οἱ δὲ πλείω καὶ μᾶλλον ὄντα ἀΐδια, ὥσπερ Πλάτων τά τ' εἴδη καὶ τὰ μαθηματικὰ δύο οὐσίας, τρίτην δὲ τὴν τῶν αἰσθητῶν σωμάτων οὐσίαν. Σπεύσιππος δὲ καὶ πλείους οὐσίας ἀπὸ τοῦ ἑνὸς ἀρξάμενος, καὶ ἀρχὰς ἑκάστης οὐσίας ἄλλην μὲν ἀριθμῶν, ἄλλην δὲ μεγεθῶν, ἔπειτα ψυχῆς· καὶ τοῦτον δὴ τὸν τρόπον ἐπεκτείνει τὰς οὐσίας.

b. Asclepius in *Metaph.* 377, [35] and 379, [12] Hayduck (Fr. 33 d Lang) adds to this:

Noûs

καὶ πάλιν ἄλλην οὐσίαν νοῦ καὶ ἄλλην ψυχῆς.

Noûs called God

747—a. Aëtius, *Plac.* ap. Stob. I 1, 29[b], p. 35, [3] W. (fr. 38 Lang):

Σπεύσιππος (θεὸν ἀπεφήνατο) τὸν νοῦν οὔτε τῷ ἑνὶ οὔτε τῷ ἀγαθῷ τὸν αὐτόν, ἰδιοφυῆ δέ.

b. He seems to have localized this Mind or ruling power of the universe in the centre of the earth, as it appears from a rather obscure text of Theophr. [1].

Theophr., *Metaph.* IX 32 ed. Ross-Fobes (fr. 41 Lang):

Τὸ δ' ὅλον σπάνιόν τι καὶ ἐν ὀλίγοις τὸ ἀγαθόν, πολὺ δὲ πλῆθος εἶναι τὸ κακόν, οὐκ ἐν ἀοριστίᾳ δὲ μόνον καὶ οἷον ὕλης εἴδει, καθάπερ τὰ τῆς φύσεως, ἀμαθεστάτου. Εἰκῇ γὰρ οἱ περὶ τῆς ὅλης οὐσίας λέγοντες ὥσπερ Σπεύσιππος σπάνιόν τι τὸ τίμιον ποιεῖ τὸ περὶ τὴν τοῦ μέσου χώραν, τὰ δ' ἄκρα καὶ ἑκατέρωθεν. τὰ μὲν οὖν ὄντα καλῶς ἔτυχεν ὄντα.

c. In Cicero, and later by Minucius Felix, he is charged with atheism, in that he qualified this ruling Force of the universe as an animal power.

Cic., *N.D.* I 13, 32 (Fr. 39 a Lang):

Nec multo secus Speusippus Platonem avunculum subsequens et vim quandam dicens, qua omnia regantur, eamque animalem, evellere ex animis conatur cognitionem deorum.

Cf. Minuc. Felix 19, 7.

Immortality of the soul

748—He considers the soul as immortal, even its irrational part. Olympiodorus in Plat. *Phaed.* p. 124, [13] Norvin (Fr. 55 Lang):

[1] I give the text as it is read by Ross-Fobes. Several corrections have been made in it.

Ὅτι οἱ μὲν ἀπὸ τῆς λογικῆς ψυχῆς ἄχρι τῆς ἐμψύχου [1] ἕξεως ἀπαθανατίζουσιν, ὡς Νουμήνιος· οἱ δὲ μέχρι τῆς φύσεως, ὡς Πλωτῖνος † ἔνι ὅπου [2]· οἱ δὲ μέχρι τῆς ἀλογίας, ὡς τῶν μὲν παλαιῶν Ξενοκράτης καὶ Σπεύσιππος, τῶν δὲ νεωτέρων Ἰάμβλιχος καὶ Πλούταρχος.

749—Speus. wrote several works on ethics. A few traces of them have remained in later writers. **Ethics**

a. Clem. Alex., *Strom.* II 22, 133; p. 186, [19] Stählin (Fr. 57 Lang): **eudaimonia**
Σπεύσιππός τε ὁ Πλάτωνος ἀδελφιδοῦς τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν φησὶν ἕξιν εἶναι τελείαν ἐν τοῖς κατὰ φύσιν ἔχουσιν ἢ ἕξιν ἀγαθῶν, ἧς δὴ καταστάσεως ἅπαντας μὲν ἀνθρώπους ὄρεξιν ἔχειν, στοχάζεσθαι δὲ τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς τῆς ἀοχλησίας. εἶεν δ' ἂν αἱ ἀρεταὶ τῆς εὐδαιμονίας ἀπεργαστικαί.

b. Like Aristotle and other Academics, Speus. did not consider outward goods as indifferent things, though he held that virtue is in itself sufficient for happiness. **its relation to virtue**

Cic., *Tusc.* V 10, 30 (fr. 58 a Lang):
Non igitur facile concedo neque Bruto meo neque communibus magistris nec veteribus illis, Aristoteli, Speusippo, Xenocrati, Polemoni, ut, cum ea quae supra enumeravi (paupertas, ignobilitas, humilitas, solitudo, amissio suorum, graves dolores corporis, perdita valetudo alia similia) in malis numerent, iidem dicant semper beatum esse sapientem.

c. Cp. Cic., Tusc. V 13, 39 (fr. 58 b Lang):
Hic (humanus animus) igitur si est excultus, etsi eius acies ita curata est, ut ne caecaretur erroribus, fit perfecta mens, id est absoluta ratio, quod est idem virtus. Et, si omne beatum est cui nihil deest et quod in suo genere expletum atque cumulatum est, idque virtutis est proprium, certe omnes virtutis compotes beati sunt. Et hoc quidem mihi cum Bruto convenit, id est cum Aristotele, Xenocrate, Speusippo, Polemone. Sed mihi videntur etiam beatissimi.

d. Seneca summarizes Speus.' doctrine shortly in the following sentence. *Epist.* 85, 18 (fr. 58 c, Lang):
Xenocrates et Speusippus putant beatum vel sola virtute fieri posse, non tamen unum bonum esse, quod honestum est.

Cp. also Plut., *De comm. not.* c. 13, p. 1065a (fr. 59 Lang).

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[1] Lang reads ἀψύχου (a conjecture of Bernays).
[2] The meaning of these words is uncertain.

pleasure not a good

750—Speus. denied that, because pain is an evil, pleasure must be a good.

a. Ar., *Eth. Nic.* VII 14, 1153 b[1-7] (fr. 60 a Lang):

Ἀλλὰ μὴν ὅτι ἡ λύπη κακόν, ὁμολογεῖται, καὶ φευκτόν. ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἁπλῶς κακόν, ἡ δὲ τῷ πῇ ἐμποδιστική· τῷ δὲ φευκτῷ τὸ ἐναντίον ᾗ φευκτόν τι καὶ κακόν, ἀγαθόν. ἀνάγκη οὖν τὴν ἡδονὴν ἀγαθόν τι εἶναι. ὡς γὰρ Σπεύσιππος ἔλυεν, οὐ συμβαίνει ἡ λύσις, ὥσπερ τὸ μεῖζον τῷ ἐλάττονι καὶ τῷ ἴσῳ ἐναντίον· οὐ γὰρ ἂν φαίη ὅπερ κακόν τι εἶναι τὴν ἡδονήν [1].

b. How Speus. meant his thesis, appears in the following passage of Gellius, *N.A.* IX 5, 4 (fr. 60 i Lang):

Speusippus vetusque omnis Academia voluptatem et dolorem duo mala esse dicunt opposita inter sese, bonum tamen esse, quod utriusque medium foret.

2 - XENOCRATES

The man and his character

751—**a.** Diog. L. IV 6; 7-8:

Ξενοκράτης Ἀγαθήνορος Χαλκηδόνιος· οὗτος ἐκ νέου Πλάτωνος ἤκουσεν, ἀλλὰ καὶ εἰς Σικελίαν αὐτῷ συναπεδήμησεν. Ἦν δὲ τὴν φύσιν νωθρός, ὥστε λέγειν τὸν Πλάτωνα συγκρίνοντα αὐτὸν Ἀριστοτέλει, »τῷ μὲν μύωπος δεῖ, τῷ δὲ χαλινοῦ.« — »Σεμνὸς δὲ τά τ' ἄλλα Ξενοκράτης καὶ σκυθρωπὸς ἀεί, ὥστε αὐτῷ λέγειν συνεχὲς τὸν Πλάτωνα, »Ξενόκρατες, θῦε ταῖς Χάρισι.« — Ἦν δὲ καὶ ἀξιόπιστος σφόδρα, ὥστε μὴ ἐξὸν ἀνώμοτον μαρτυρεῖν, τούτῳ μόνῳ συνεχώρουν Ἀθηναῖοι. Καὶ δὴ καὶ αὐταρκέστατος ἦν. Ἀλεξάνδρου γοῦν ποτὲ συχνὸν ἀργύριον ἀποστείλαντος αὐτῷ, τρισχιλίας Ἀττικὰς ἀφελὼν τὸ λοιπὸν ἀπέπεμψεν, εἰπὼν ἐκείνῳ πλειόνων δεῖν πλείονας τρέφοντι. ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ ὑπ' Ἀντιπάτρου πεμφθὲν μὴ προσέσθαι, ὥς φησι Μυρωνιανὸς ἐν Ὁμοίοις.

b. Cp. *Index Acad.* col. VI, Mekler p. 39:

Οἱ δ' ἐν Ἀκαδημείᾳ λέγονται προκρῖναι τὸν Ξενοκράτην ἀγασθέντες αὐτοῦ τὴν σωφροσύνην.

His works

c. Diog. Laërt. IV 11:

Καὶ πλεῖστα ὅσα καταλέλοιπε συγγράμματα καὶ ἔπη καὶ παραινέσεις.

Follows a long list, in which are mentioned: a work περὶ φύσεως, several works on logic, theory of knowledge (such titles as π. ἐπιστήμης, π. τοῦ ψεύδους, π. τὴν διάνοιαν), metaphysics (π. τοῦ ὄντος, π. εἱμαρμένης, π. ἰδεῶν), on geometry, on numbers, on astronomy, and rather numerous works on ethical subjects.

Head of the School during 25 years.

d. Ib., 14:

Διεδέξατο δὲ Σπεύσιππον καὶ ἀφηγήσατο τῆς σχολῆς πέντε καὶ εἴκοσιν ἔτη.

[1] "that pleasure is essentially evil".

752—**a**. With Speusippus he shared a predilection for Pythagoreanism. Iambl., *Theol. arithm.* p. 61 g.E.:

Παρὰ Ξενοκράτους ἐξαιρέτως σπουδασθεισῶν ἀεὶ Πυθαγορικῶν ἀκροάσεων, μάλιστα δὲ τῶν Φιλολάου συγγραμμάτων.

b. Diog. L. IV 10 (fr. 2 Heinze): **Mathematical studies a necessary propaedeusis**

Πρὸς δὲ τὸν μήτε μουσικὴν μήτε γεωμετρίαν μήτε ἀστρονομίαν μεμαθηκότα, βουλόμενον δὲ παρ' αὐτὸν φοιτᾶν· πορεύου, ἔφη (ὁ Ξενοκράτης)· λαβὰς γὰρ οὐκ ἔχεις φιλοσοφίας. οἱ δὲ τοῦτό φασιν εἰπεῖν· παρ' ἐμοὶ γὰρ πόκος οὐ κνάπτεται.

753—**a**. Tripartition of philosophy.

Sextus, *Math.* VII (= Adv. Log. I) 16; (fr. 1 H.): **Division of phil.**

Πλὴν οὗτοι μὲν (οἱ διμερῆ τὴν φιλοσοφίαν ὑποστησάμενοι) ἐλλιπῶς ἀνεστράφθαι δοκοῦσιν, ἐντελέστερον δὲ παρὰ τούτους οἱ εἰπόντες τῆς φιλοσοφίας τὸ μέν τι εἶναι φυσικὸν τὸ δὲ ἠθικὸν τὸ δὲ λογικόν· ὧν δυνάμει μὲν Πλάτων ἐστὶν ἀρχηγός, περὶ πολλῶν μὲν φυσικῶν πολλῶν δὲ ἠθικῶν οὐκ ὀλίγων δὲ λογικῶν διαλεχθείς· ῥητότατα δὲ οἱ περὶ τὸν Ξενοκράτη καὶ οἱ ἀπὸ τοῦ περιπάτου ἔτι δὲ οἱ ἀπὸ τῆς στοᾶς ἔχονται τῆσδε τῆς διαιρέσεως.

b. Practical purpose of philosophy.

[Galenus], *Hist. phil.* 8, p. 605, 7 Diels; (fr. 4 H.): **Practical purpose**

Αἰτία δὲ φιλοσοφίας εὑρέσεώς ἐστι κατὰ Ξενοκράτη τὸ ταραχῶδες ἐν τῷ βίῳ καταπαῦσαι τῶν πραγμάτων.

754—Tripartition of knowledge. **three kinds of Knowledge**

Sextus, *Math.* VII 147 (fr. 5 H.):

Ξενοκράτης δὲ τρεῖς φησιν οὐσίας εἶναι, τὴν μὲν αἰσθητὴν τὴν δὲ νοητὴν τὴν δὲ σύνθετον καὶ δοξαστήν, ὧν αἰσθητὴν μὲν εἶναι τὴν ἐντὸς οὐρανοῦ, νοητὴν δὲ πάντων τῶν ἐκτὸς οὐρανοῦ, δοξαστὴν δὲ καὶ σύνθετον τὴν αὐτοῦ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ. ὁρατὴ μὲν γάρ ἐστι τῇ αἰσθήσει, νοητὴ δὲ δι' ἀστρολογίας. τούτων μέντοι τοῦτον ἐχόντων τὸν τρόπον, τῆς μὲν ἐκτὸς οὐρανοῦ καὶ νοητῆς οὐσίας κριτήριον ἀπεφαίνετο τὴν ἐπιστήμην, τῆς δὲ ἐντὸς οὐρανοῦ καὶ αἰσθητῆς τὴν αἴσθησιν, τῆς δὲ μικτῆς τὴν δόξαν· καὶ τούτων κοινῶς τὸ μὲν διὰ τοῦ ἐπιστημονικοῦ λόγου κριτήριον βέβαιόν τε ὑπάρχειν καὶ ἀληθές, τὸ δὲ διὰ τῆς αἰσθήσεως ἀληθὲς μέν, οὐχ οὕτω δὲ ὡς τὸ διὰ τοῦ ἐπιστημονικοῦ λόγου, τὸ δὲ σύνθετον κοινὸν ἀληθοῦς τε καὶ ψευδοῦς ὑπάρχειν. τῆς γὰρ δόξης τὴν μέν τινα ἀληθῆ εἶναι τὴν δὲ ψευδῆ. ὅθεν καὶ τρεῖς Μοίρας παραδεδόσθαι, Ἄτροπον μὲν τὴν τῶν νοητῶν, ἀμετάθετον οὖσαν, Κλωθὼ δὲ τὴν τῶν αἰσθητῶν, Λάχεσιν δὲ τὴν τῶν δοξαστῶν.

Cp. Ar., *Metaph.* E 1, our nr. **432b**.

the categories

755—He reduced the categories to two, namely the καθ' αὑτό and the πρός τι.

Simpl., in Ar. *Categ.* γ 6 b; Schol. in Ar. 47 b[25] Brandis (fr. 12 H.):

Οἱ γὰρ περὶ Ξενοκράτην καὶ 'Ανδρόνικον πάντα τῷ καθ' αὑτὸ καὶ τῷ πρός τι περιλαμβάνειν δοκοῦσιν, ὥστε περιττὸν εἶναι κατ' αὐτοὺς τοσοῦτον τῶν γενῶν πλῆθος.

the First Principles

756—His doctrine of First Principles.

a. Aetius, *Plac.* I 7, 30; *Dox.* p. 304 b[1] (fr. 15 H., first part):

Ξενοκράτης 'Αγαθήνορος Καλχηδόνιος τὴν μονάδα καὶ δυάδα θεούς, τὴν μὲν ὡς ἄρρενα πατρὸς ἔχουσαν τάξιν ἐν οὐρανῷ βασιλεύουσαν, ἥντινα προσαγορεύει καὶ Ζῆνα καὶ περιττὸν καὶ νοῦν, ὅστις ἐστὶν αὐτῷ πρῶτος θεός· τὴν δὲ ὡς θήλειαν, μητρὸς θεῶν δίκην, τῆς ὑπὸ τὸν οὐρανὸν λήξεως ἡγουμένην, ἥτις ἐστὶν αὐτῷ ψυχὴ τοῦ παντός.

b. Aetius, *Plac.* I 3, 23; *Dox.* p. 288 b[15] (fr. 28 H.):

Ξενοκράτης συνεστάναι τὸ πᾶν ἐκ τοῦ ἑνὸς καὶ τοῦ ἀενάου, ἀέναον τὴν ὕλην αἰνιττόμενος διὰ τοῦ πλήθους.

The same doctrine of Xenocr. is mentioned by Theodoretus, *Graec. aff. cur.* IV 12, p. 158 Gaisford.

His hierarchy of being

757—From these two principles proceed first Numbers, not ideal but mathematical Numbers, identified by Xenocr. with the Ideas; next geometrical, finally physical bodies.

a. Ar., *Metaph.* Z 2, 1028 b[24] (fr. 34 H.):

Ἔνιοι δὲ τὰ μὲν εἴδη καὶ τοὺς ἀριθμοὺς τὴν αὐτὴν ἔχειν φασὶ φύσιν, τὰ δὲ ἄλλα ἐχόμενα, γραμμὰς καὶ ἐπίπεδα, μέχρι πρὸς τὴν τοῦ οὐρανοῦ οὐσίαν καὶ τὰ αἰσθητά.

b. Asclepius, p. 379, [17] Hayduck, explains this passage in the following lines:

Ἐντεῦθεν εἰς τὸν Ξενοκράτην ἀποτείνεται, καί φησιν ὅτι τὰ εἴδη τῶν πραγμάτων τοῖς ἀριθμοῖς προσηγόρευεν, ἐπειδή, ὥσπερ οἱ ἀριθμοὶ περιοριστικοί εἰσιν ὧν εἰσιν ἀριθμοί, οὕτω δὴ καὶ τὰ εἴδη περιοριστικὰ τῆς ὕλης ὑπάρχουσιν· εἶτα μετὰ τὰς ἰδέας δευτέρας οὐσίας ὑποτίθεται τὰς διανοητάς, τουτέστι τὰ μαθήματα, γραμμὰς καὶ ἐπίπεδα· τελευταῖα δὲ τὰ φυσικά.

Between geometrical and physical bodies, doubtless the celestial bodies were interposed (τὴν τοῦ οὐρανοῦ οὐσίαν, Ar. l.c.; cp. our nr. **743**, supra).

Xenocr.' identification of mathematical numbers and Ideas is referred to in several other places of Ar.'s *Metaphysics*, namely: Λ 1, 1069 a[33]; M 1, 1076 a[19];

M 6, 1080 b^{21}; M 8, 1083 b^{2}; M 9, 1086 a^{5}; his doctrine of geometrical magnitudes in M 6, 1080 b^{28} and N 3, 1090 b^{21}.

On the place of Soul in this hierarchy, see nr. **748**.

758—a. His doctrine of indivisible lines. **Theory of indivisible lines**

Ar., *Metaph.* M 8, 1084 a^{37}-b^{2} (fr. 41 H.):

Ἔτι τὰ μεγέθη καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα μέχρι πόσου (γεννῶσι), οἷον ἡ πρώτη γραμμὴ ἄτομος, εἶτα δυάς, εἶτα καὶ ταῦτα μέχρι δεκάδος.

The meaning of this doctrine is, that all geometrical bodies should be finally reduced to very small and indivisible lines. Thus, Simplicius says, commenting on Ar.'s *Phys.* I 3, p. 142 Diels:

Ὡς οὖν ὁ Πλάτων ἐπίπεδα εἶπεν εἶναι τὰ πρῶτα καὶ ἐλάχιστα σώματα, οὕτως ὁ Ξενοκράτης τὰς γραμμὰς, ἀδιαιρέτους μὲν διὰ σμικρότητα, διαιρετὰς δὲ καὶ αὐτὰς οὔσας τῇ φύσει.

b. Ar. opposes this theory in several places, e.g. *De caelo* III 1, 299 a^{6} (fr. 41 H.):

Ἔπειτα δῆλον ὅτι τοῦ αὐτοῦ λόγου ἐστὶ στερεὰ μὲν ἐξ ἐπιπέδων συγκεῖσθαι, ἐπίπεδα δ' ἐκ γραμμῶν, ταύτας δ' ἐκ στιγμῶν· οὕτω δ' ἐχόντων οὐκ ἀνάγκη τὸ τῆς γραμμῆς μέρος γραμμὴν εἶναι· περὶ δὲ τούτων ἐπέσκεπται πρότερον ἐν τοῖς περὶ κινήσεως λόγοις, ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν ἀδιαίρετα μήκη.

Cp. [Ar.], *De lin. insec.* 968 a^{1}-b^{21} (fr. 42 H.).

c. Philoponus in Ar. *Phys.* I 3, p. 84, ^{15} Vit., says that Xenocr. admitted his hypothesis of indivisible lines in order to avoid Zeno's consequences of indefinite division (Fr. 44 H.):

Ὅτι καὶ τῇ Ζήνωνος ἀπορίᾳ δι' ἧς κατεσκεύαζε καὶ ἓν εἶναι τὸ ὂν καὶ ἀκίνητον ἐκ τῆς ἐπ' ἄπειρον τομῆς τῶν μεγεθῶν, κακῶς ἐνέδοσαν ψευδῶς ὑποθέμενοι, μὴ εἶναι ἐπ' ἄπειρον τὰ μεγέθη διαιρετά. ἐνδεδώκασι γὰρ ὅτι εἰ ἐπ' ἄπειρον τὰ μεγέθη διαιρετὰ εἴη, μήτε κίνησιν εἶναι μήτε εἶναί τι κυρίως ἕν, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο μηδὲ πολλά, ἐπειδὴ τὸ πλῆθος ἐκ πολλῶν μονάδων. ἔνθεν ὁ Ξενοκράτης ἀνῄρει τὴν ἐπ' ἄπειρον τῶν μεγεθῶν τομήν.

759—Soul is defined by Xenocr. as a self-moving number. **Definition of Soul**

a. Ar., *De an.* I 2, 404 b^{27} (fr. 60 H.):

Ἐπεὶ δὲ καὶ κινητικὸν ἐδόκει ἡ ψυχὴ εἶναι καὶ γνωριστικόν, οὕτως ἔνιοι συνέπλεξαν ἐξ ἀμφοῖν, ἀποφηνάμενοι τὴν ψυχὴν ἀριθμὸν κινοῦνθ' ἑαυτόν.

b. The commentators are unanimous in attributing this definition to Xenocr. E.g. Alex. Aphr. in Ar. *Top.* II 4, p. 162, ^{4} Wallies:

εἰ δὴ κατὰ Ξενοκράτην ψυχή ἐστιν ἀριθμὸς ἑαυτὸν κινῶν, —

c. Cp. Philoponus in Ar. *De an.* I 1 (402 a^{22}) A 15:

Οἱ δὲ ὑπὸ τὸ ποσόν (sc. ἀνάγουσι τὴν ψυχήν)· ὧν ἐστι καὶ Ξενοκράτης· ἀριθμὸς γάρ φησι κινῶν ἑαυτόν ἐστιν ἡ ψυχή.

This definition explained

760—a. This definition is first explained as indicating that soul takes an intermediate place between the Ideas (Numbers) and sensible things.

Simpl., in Ar. *De an.* I 2 (404 b^{27}) p. 30, ^{4} Hayduck (fr. 64 H., the beginning):

Ξενοκράτους ὁ τῆς ψυχῆς οὗτος λόγος βουλομένου τὴν μεσότητα αὐτῆς τῶν τε εἰδῶν καὶ τῶν εἰδοποιουμένων ἅμα καὶ τὸ ἴδιον αὐτῆς ἐνδείξασθαι· ὁ γὰρ ἀριθμὸς τὸ εἶδος, τὸ δὲ κινητὸν τοῖς εἰδοποιουμένοις προσήκει. ἐκ μὲν οὖν τῶν ἄκρων μόνον δηλοῖ ὅτι οὔτε ἀριθμὸς ἁπλῶς ἔσται οὔτε κινητόν· τοῦ μὲν γὰρ ὑφεῖται, ᾗ τοῦ ἀμερίστου ἐκβέβληται, τοῦ δέ ἐστι κρείττων, ᾗ τοῦ μεριστοῦ ὑπερέχει· τὸ συναμφότερον οὖν ἄν πως εἴη ὡς ἀμφοτέροις κοινωνοῦσα, ἀριθμὸς κινητός.

b. A similar explanation is given by Philoponus, in Ar. *De an.* I 4, (408 b^{32}) E 11 (fr. 65 H., l. 24-29):

Ἔλεγεν οὖν ἀριθμὸν μὲν τὴν ψυχὴν διὰ τὸ πλήρωμα εἰδῶν εἶναι τὴν ψυχὴν καὶ λόγου· ἐκ τῶν λόγων πάντων γὰρ ἐν ἑαυτῇ τοὺς λόγους ἔχει ὡς εἴπομεν· ἀριθμοὺς δὲ τὰ εἴδη ἐκάλουν ὡς εἴρηται, καὶ αὐτὸς γοῦν ἐν τοῖς ἑξῆς φησιν »καὶ εὖ δὴ οἱ λέγοντες τὴν ψυχὴν τόπον εἰδῶν«. ἀριθμὸν μὲν οὖν διὰ τοῦτο· κινοῦντα δὲ αὐτὸν διὰ τὸ αὐτοζωὸν αὐτῆς· οὐ γὰρ ὑφ' ἑτέρου αὐτῇ τὸ ζῆν, αὐτοζωὴ γάρ ἐστιν.

c. Plutarch (*De animi procr.* 1, p. 1012 d) derives the two elements of soul in the definition of Xenocr. from the composing elements in Plato's *Tim.*, 35 a (Fr. 68 H., l. 11-16, 18-23).

Οἱ μὲν γὰρ (sc. those who follow Xenocr.) οὐδὲν ἧττον γένεσιν ἀριθμοῦ δηλοῦσθαι νομίζουσι τῇ μίξει τῆς ἀμερίστου καὶ μεριστῆς οὐσίας· ἀμέριστον μὲν γὰρ εἶναι τὸ ἕν, μεριστὸν δὲ τὸ πλῆθος, ἐκ δὲ τούτων γενέσθαι τὸν ἀριθμὸν τοῦ ἑνὸς ὁρίζοντος τὸ πλῆθος, καὶ τῇ ἀπειρίᾳ πέρας ἐντιθέντος, ἣν καὶ δυάδα καλοῦσιν ἀόριστον. — Τοῦτον δὲ μήπω ψυχὴν τὸν ἀριθμὸν εἶναι· τὸ γὰρ κινητικὸν καὶ τὸ κινητὸν ἐνδεῖν αὐτῷ· τοῦ δὲ ταὐτοῦ καὶ τοῦ ἑτέρου συμμιγέντων, ὧν τὸ μέν ἐστι κινήσεως ἀρχὴ καὶ μεταβολῆς, τὸ δὲ μονῆς, ψυχὴν γεγονέναι, μηδὲν ἧττον τοῦ ἱστάναι καὶ ἵστασθαι δύναμιν ἢ τοῦ κινεῖσθαι καὶ κινεῖν οὖσαν.

761—a. The soul's immateriality was proved by Xenocr. by the following argument.

Nemesius, *De nat. hom.* 30, p. 72 Matth. (fr. 66 H.):

Ἔτι, ἡ ψυχὴ, εἰ μὲν τρέφεται, ὑπὸ ἀσωμάτου τρέφεται· τὰ γὰρ μαθήματα τρέφει αὐτήν· οὐδὲν δὲ σῶμα ὑπὸ ἀσωμάτου τρέφεται· οὐκ ἄρα σῶμα ἡ ψυχή· Ξενοκράτης οὕτω συνῆγεν.

We find the argument back in Tertull., *De anima* c. 6: "De insignioribus argumentationibus erit etiam illa, quod omne corpus corporalibus ali iudicant, animam vero ut incorporalem incorporalibus, sapientiae scilicet studiis."

b. Xenocr. held the immortality of the soul, not only of its logical part, but of the whole. Ar. opposes X. in the following lines of his *De anima* (Fr. 73 H.):

Ἔτι δὲ πῶς οἷόν τε χωρίζεσθαι τὰς ψυχὰς καὶ ἀπολύεσθαι τῶν σωμάτων, εἴ γε μὴ διαιροῦνται αἱ γραμμαὶ εἰς στιγμάς;

Philoponus comments on these lines (E 14; Heinze ib.):

Ξενοκράτης ἅτε δὴ Πλάτωνος ὢν μαθητὴς χωριστὴν ἔλεγεν εἶναι τὴν ψυχὴν τοῦ σώματος.

Cp. our nr. **737** on Speus.

762—Xenocr. seems to have held that Soul penetrates the universe, descending from the higher regions of being to the inferior ones, so that not only the heavenly bodies are ensouled, and therefore divine beings, but also the elements of the sensible world. Moreover, he admitted the existence of half-divine beings (daemons) in the lower world, which take an intermediate place between the gods and men. **Gods and daemons**

Aetius, *Plac.* I 7; *Dox.* 304 b (fr. 15 H., second half [1]:

Θεὸν δ' εἶναι καὶ τὸν οὐρανὸν καὶ τοὺς ἀστέρας πυρώδεις Ὀλυμπίους θεούς, καὶ ἑτέρους ὑποσελήνους δαίμονας ἀοράτους. ἀρέσκει δὲ καὶ αὐτῷ <θείας τινὰς δυνάμεις> [2] καὶ ἐνδιήκειν τοῖς ὑλικοῖς στοιχείοις. τούτων δὲ τὴν μὲν <διὰ τοῦ ἀέρος Ἅιδην ὡς> ἀειδῆ προσαγορεύει, τὴν δὲ διὰ τοῦ ὑγροῦ Ποσειδῶνα, τὴν δὲ διὰ τῆς γῆς φυτοσπόρον Δήμητρα. ταῦτα δὲ χορηγήσας τοῖς Στωικοῖς τὰ πρότερα παρὰ τοῦ Πλάτωνος μεταπέφρακεν.

763—Molecular theory. **The elements composed of molecules**

Aetius, *Plac.* I 17, 3; *Dox.* 315 b[23] (Fr. 50 H.):

Ἐμπεδοκλῆς καὶ Ξενοκράτης ἐκ μικροτέρων ὄγκων τὰ στοιχεῖα συγκρίνει, ἅπερ ἐστὶν ἐλάχιστα καὶ οἱονεὶ στοιχεῖα στοιχείων.

764—a. Xenocr. held the eternity of the kosmos, and, accordingly, defends a non-literal interpretation of the *Timaeus*. **Eternity of the kosmos**

[1] The first part of this fragment has been cited supra, under nr. **756a.**

[2] Better: <θείας τινὰς εἶναι δυνάμεις>.

Ar. *De caelo* I 9, 279 b[32] (fr. 54 H.):

"Ην δέ τινες βοήθειαν ἐπιχειροῦσι φέρειν ἑαυτοῖς τῶν λεγόντων ἄφθαρτον μὲν εἶναι γενόμενον δὲ (τὸν κόσμον), οὐκ ἔστιν ἀληθής· ὁμοίως γάρ φασι τοῖς τὰ διαγράμματα γράφουσι καὶ σφᾶς εἰρηκέναι περὶ τῆς γενέσεως, οὐχ ὡς γενομένου ποτέ, ἀλλὰ διδασκαλίας χάριν ὡς μᾶλλον γνωριζόντων, ὥσπερ τὸ διάγραμμα γιγνόμενον θεασαμένους· τοῦτο δ' ἐστίν, ὥσπερ λέγομεν, οὐ τὸ αὐτό . . . . . ἐξ ἀτάκτων γάρ ποτε τεταγμένα γενέσθαι φασίν, ἅμα δὲ τὸ αὐτὸ ἄτακτον εἶναι καὶ τεταγμένον ἀδύνατον.

The commentators explain the passage as referring to Xenocr.

b. One of the scholia mentions Xenocr. and Speus.:

Schol. cod. Reg. 1853, p. 489 a [9] Brandis (Heinze, p. 180, l. 12-15): Ὁ Ξενοκράτης καὶ ὁ Σπεύσιππος ἐπιχειροῦντες βοηθῆσαι τῷ Πλάτωνι ἔλεγον ὅτι οὐ γενητὸν τὸν κόσμον ὁ Πλάτων ἐδόξαζεν ἀλλὰ ἀγένητον, χάριν δὲ διδασκαλίας καὶ τοῦ γνωρίσαι καὶ παραστῆσαι αὐτὸ ἀκριβέστερον ἔλεγε τοῦτον γενητόν.

Plut., *De an. procr.* 3, p. 1013 a mentions Xenocr. and Crantor.

Ethics

765—Xenocr. wrote a considerable number of works on ethics. Cp. our nr. **742b**. He was known in Antiquity as a severe moralist, though he taught, with the whole Academy, that virtue is not the only good.

Virtue and the other goods

a. Cic., *De fin.* IV 18, 49 (fr. 90 H.):

Aristoteles, Xenocrates, tota illa familia non dabit (bonum omne esse laudabile), quippe qui valetudinem, vires, divitias, gloriam, multa alia bona esse dicant, laudabilia non dicant. et hi quidem ita non sola virtute finem bonorum contineri putant, ut rebus tamen omnibus virtutem anteponant.

b. Cp. Seneca, Epist. 85, 18 (fr. 91 H.):

Xenocrates et Speusippus putant beatum vel sola virtute fieri posse, non tamen unum bonum esse, quod honestum est.

c. Cic., *Tusc.* V 18, 51 (fr. 86 H.):

Quid ergo aut hunc (Critolaum) prohibet aut etiam Xenocratem illum gravissimum philosophorum, exaggerantem tantopere virtutem, extenuantem cetera et abicientem, in virtute non beatam modo vitam, sed etiam beatissimam ponere?

Plutarchus, *Comp. Cim. c. Luc.* 1, opposes Xenocr. together with the Stoa to Epicureanism.

766—In what Xenocr., and the Academy in general, differed from Stoicism, may appear from the following passages of Cicero.

a. Cic., *De leg.* I 21, 55 (fr. 89 H.):

Si ut Chius Aristo dixit solum bonum esse quod honestum esset, malumque quod turpe, ceteras res omnis plane paris ac ne minimum quidem utrum adessent an abessent interesse, valde a Xenocrate et Aristotele et ab illa Platonis familia discreparet (Antiochus), essetque inter eos de re maxima et de omni vivendi ratione dissensio; nunc vero, cum decus, quod antiqui summum bonum esse dixerant, hic solum bonum dicat, itemque illi summum malum, hic solum, divitias, valetudinem, pulchritudinem commodas res appellet, non bonas, paupertatem, debilitatem, dolorem incommodas, non malas, sentit idem quod Xenocrates, quod Aristoteles, loquitur alio modo.

b. Cic., *Ac. pr.* (*Lucullus*) 44, 136 (fr. 93 H.):

Atrocitas quidem ista tua (Antioche) quo modo in veterem Academiam inruperit nescio; illa vero (παράδοξα de sapiente) ferre non possum, non quo mihi displiceant — sunt enim Socratica pleraque — mirabilia Stoicorum, quae παράδοξα nominantur: sed ubi Xenocrates, ubi Aristoteles ista tetigit? hos enim quasi eosdem esse vultis. Illi umquam dicerent sapientes solos reges, solos divites, solos formosos? omnia, quae ubique essent, sapientis esse? neminem consulem, praetorem, imperatorem, nescio an ne quinquevirum quidem quemquam nisi sapientem? postremo solum civem, solum liberum? insipientes omnes peregrinos, exules, servos, furiosos? denique scripta Lycurgi, Solonis, duodecim tabulas nostras non esse leges? ne urbes quidem aut civitates, nisi quae essent sapientium?

767—He declared that the virtuous life is always happy, keeping to Plato's view in the *Gorgias*, the *Republic* and the *Laws* (cp. our nrs. **275a**, **b** and **374a**).

a. Ar., *Top.* VII 1, 152 a$^{7-10}$ (fr. 82 H., l. 19-22): **The virtuous life is happy**

Ξενοκράτης τὸν εὐδαίμονα βίον καὶ τὸν σπουδαῖον ἀποδείκνυσι τὸν αὐτόν, ἐπειδὴ πάντων τῶν βίων αἱρετώτατος ὁ σπουδαῖος καὶ ὁ εὐδαίμων· ἓν γὰρ τὸ αἱρετώτατον καὶ μέγιστον.

b. Alex. Aphrod. in Ar. *Top.* II 6, 112 a^{32} (fr. 81 H., l. 11-13):

Εἰ δὴ δαίμων ἑκάστου ἡ ψυχή, καθ' ἃ Ξενοκράτει δοκεῖ, εἴη ἂν εὐδαίμων ὁ εὖ τὴν ψυχὴν ἔχων· εὖ δὲ τὴν ψυχὴν ἔχει ὁ σπουδαῖος· ὁ σπουδαῖος ἄρα εὐδαίμων.

768—Virtue not only in actions, but in the intention of the heart.

Interior character of virtue

Ael., *Var. hist.* XIV 42 (fr. 95 H.):

Ξενοκράτης ὁ Πλάτωνος ἑταῖρος ἔλεγε μηδὲν διαφέρειν, ἢ τοὺς πόδας ἢ τοὺς ὀφθαλμοὺς εἰς ἀλλοτρίαν οἰκίαν τιθέναι. ἐν ταὐτῷ γὰρ ἁμαρτάνειν τόν τε ἐς ἃ μὴ δεῖ χωρία βλέποντα, καὶ ἐς οὓς μὴ δεῖ τόπους παριόντα.

769—Xenocr. a friend of animals.

Stories about X.

Ael., *Var. hist.* XIII 31 (fr. 101 H.):

Ξενοκράτης ὁ Καλχηδόνιος ὁ ἑταῖρος Πλάτωνος τά τε ἄλλα ἦν φιλοικτίρμων καὶ οὐ μόνον φιλάνθρωπος ἀλλὰ καὶ πολλὰ τῶν ἀλόγων ζῴων ἠλέει· καὶ οὖν ποτε καθημένου ἐν ὑπαίθρῳ διωκόμενος βιαίως στρουθὸς ὑπὸ ἱέρακος ἐς τοὺς κόλπους αὐτοῦ κατέπτη· ὁ δὲ ἀσμένως ἐδέξατο τὸν ὄρνιν καὶ διεφύλαξεν ἀποκρύψας, ἔστε ὁ διώκων ἀπῆλθεν. ἐπεὶ δὲ ἠλευθέρωσεν αὐτὸν τοῦ φόβου, ἁπλώσας τὸν κόλπον ἀφῆκε τὸν ὄρνιν ἐπειπὼν ὅτι μὴ ἐξέδωκε τὸν ἱκέτην.

770—Xenocr. as an ambassador.

Diog. L. IV 9 (fr. 109 H.):

Ἀλλὰ καὶ πρεσβεύων πρὸς Ἀντίπατρον περὶ αἰχμαλώτων Ἀθηναίων κατὰ τὸν Λαμιακὸν πόλεμον καὶ κληθεὶς ἐπὶ δεῖπνον πρὸς αὐτὸν προηνέγκατο ταυτί [1]·

ὦ Κίρκη, τίς γάρ κεν ἀνὴρ ὃς ἐναίσιμος εἴη
πρὶν τλαίη πάσσασθαι ἐδητύος ἠδὲ ποτῆτος,
πρὶν λύσασθ' ἑτάρους καὶ ἐν ὀφθαλμοῖσιν ἰδέσθαι;

καὶ τὸν ἀποδεξάμενον τὴν εὐστοχίαν εὐθὺς ἀφεῖναι.

3—HERACLIDES PONTICUS

A disciple of Plato

771—a. He is mentioned among Plato's disciples in Diog. Laert. III 46 (our nr. **726**), in the *Index Acad.* col. VI, p. 33 Mekler, and by Strabo XII 541.

b. He edited, as others did, Plato's lecture π. τἀγαθοῦ.

Simpl., in Ar. *Phys.*, p. 453 D., l. 25-30 (fr. 42 W.):

Ἀρχὰς γὰρ καὶ τῶν αἰσθητῶν τὸ ἓν καὶ τὴν ἀόριστόν φασι δυάδα λέγειν τὸν Πλάτωνα, τὴν δὲ ἀόριστον δυάδα καὶ ἐν τοῖς νοητοῖς τιθεὶς ἄπειρον εἶναι ἔλεγεν ἐν τοῖς περὶ τἀγαθοῦ λόγοις, οἷς Ἀριστοτέλης καὶ Ἡρακλείδης καὶ Ἑστιαῖος καὶ ἄλλοι τοῦ Πλάτωνος ἑταῖροι παραγενόμενοι ἀνεγράψαντο τὰ ῥηθέντα αἰνιγματωδῶς, ὡς ἐρρήθη.

Head of the Academy in 361

c. Suidas says that Plato left him as head of the School during his third stay in Sicily (fr. 2 W.):

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[1] *Od.* X 383-385.

Ἡρακλείδης, Εὔφρονος, φιλόσοφος, Ἡρακλείας τῆς Πόντου, — Πλάτωνος γνώριμος· ἐκδημήσαντος δὲ Πλάτωνος εἰς Σικελίαν, προεστάναι τῆς σχολῆς κατελείφθη ὑπ' αὐτοῦ.

Speus. and Xenocr. accompanied the Master to Sicily (Plut., *Dio* 22; Diog. L. IV 11).

d. In this light we have to read the account of Diog. L., V 86 (fr. 3 W.):

Ἡρακλείδης Εὐθύφρονος Ἡρακλεώτης τοῦ Πόντου, ἀνὴρ πλούσιος. Ἀθήνησι δὲ παρέβαλε πρῶτον μὲν Σπευσίππῳ· ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν Πυθαγορείων διήκουσε καὶ τὰ Πλάτωνος ἐζηλώκει· καὶ ὕστερον ἤκουσεν Ἀριστοτέλους, ὥς φησι Σωτίων ἐν διαδοχαῖς.

Supposed that the statement is true, the meeting with Speusippus here mentioned must have taken place during Plato's second stay in Sicily (367-364), while the τὰ Πλάτωνος ἐζηλώκει certainly implies that he knew Plato and heard him lecturing. That he heard Aristotle too, refers doubtless to Aristotle's lectures in the Academy. Cp. Strabo XIII 610, who says of Hermeias: γενόμενος δ' Ἀθήνησιν ἠκροάσατο καὶ Πλάτωνος καὶ Ἀριστοτέλους.

772—a. When, after the death of Speusippus, Xenocrates was chosen as the head of the Academy (338), Heracl. returned to Pontus.

Index Acad., col. VI, p. 38-39 Mekler (fr. 9 W.):

Οἱ δὲ νεανίσκοι ψηφοφορήσαντες ὅστις αὐτῶν ἡγήσεται (sc. after the death of Speusippus) Ξενοκράτην εἵλοντο τὸν Καλχηδόνιον, Ἀριστοτέλους μὲν ἀποδεδημηκότος εἰς Μακεδονίαν, Μενεδήμου δὲ τοῦ Πυρραίου καὶ Ἡρακλείδου τοῦ Ἡρακλεώτου παρ' ὀλίγας ψήφους ἡττηθέντων. Ὁ μὲν οὖν Ἡρακλείδης ἀπῆρεν εἰς τὸν Πόντον, ὁ δὲ Μενέδημος ἕτερον περίπατον καὶ διατριβὴν κατεσκευάσατο.

Probably, after his return to Pontus, Heracl. held a school there, as may appear from Diog. Laert. VII 166, where it is said of a certain Dionysius, called ὁ Μεταθέμενος:

ἤκουσε δέ, καθά φησι Διοκλῆς, πρῶτον μὲν Ἡρακλείδου τοῦ πολίτου, ἔπειτ' Ἀλεξίνου καὶ Μενεδήμου, τελευταῖον δὲ Ζήνωνος (fr. 12 W.).

b. Later doxographi treat him sometimes as a Peripatetic, as by Diog. L. his bios is placed at the end of the 5th book, after that of Demetrius of Phaleron. Thus, among modern scholars, Wehrli treats him in Heft 7 of his *Schule des Aristoteles*, and Heath in ch. XVIII of his *Aristarchus of Samos*.

Proclus *in Tim.* 281 E (fr. 106 W.) does not deny that H. was in fact a disciple of Plato. What he denies is, that he was *legitimately* called a Platonist, since he held the rotation of the earth round its axis, while Plato made it unmoved (see our nr. **352** and note 2 to εἰλλομένην):

Ἡρακλείδης μὲν οὖν ὁ Ποντικός, οὐ Πλάτωνος ὢν ἀκουστής, ταύτην ἐχέτω τὴν δόξαν, κινῶν κύκλῳ τὴν γῆν· Πλάτων δὲ ἀκίνητον αὐτὴν ἵστησιν.

Instead of the οὐ in the first line of this text Fabricius conjected ὁ, Taylor τοῦ. Schneider, in his edition of Proclus' Commentary of 1847, notes: "Fortasse Proclus non auditum esse Platonem, sed intellectum ab Heraclide negat".

Character

773—a. H.' character and writings. Diog. L. V 86 (fr. 3 W.):

Οὗτος ἐσθῆτί τε μαλακῇ ἐχρῆτο καὶ ὑπέρογκος ἦν τὸ σῶμα, ὥστ' αὐτὸν ὑπὸ τῶν Ἀττικῶν μὴ Ποντικὸν ἀλλὰ Πομπικὸν καλεῖσθαι. πρᾷός τ' ἦν τὸ βλέμμα καὶ σεμνός. Φέρεται δ' αὐτοῦ συγγράμματα κάλλιστά τε καὶ ἄριστα.

Follows a long list of his works, among which many dialogues on ethical subjects are mentioned.

Ethical dialogues

b. Diog. describes these dialogues in the following lines. Ib., 88-89 (fr. 22 W.):

Τούτων τὰ μὲν κωμικῶς πέπλακεν, ὡς τὸ περὶ ἡδονῆς καὶ περὶ σωφροσύνης· τὰ δὲ τραγικῶς, ὡς τὸ περὶ τῶν καθ' ᾅδην καὶ τὸ περὶ εὐσεβείας καὶ τὸ περὶ ἐξουσίας. ἔστι δ' αὐτῷ καὶ μεσότης τις ὁμιλητικὴ φιλοσόφων τε καὶ στρατη-

Other works

γικῶν καὶ πολιτικῶν ἀνδρῶν πρὸς ἀλλήλους διαλεγομένων. ἀλλὰ καὶ γεωμετρικά ἐστιν αὐτοῦ καὶ διαλεκτικά. ἄλλως τ' ἐν ἅπασι ποικίλος τε καὶ διηρμένος τὴν λέξιν ἐστὶ καὶ ψυχαγωγεῖν ἱκανῶς δυνάμενος.

Soul

774—Soul is defined by Heracl. as an aetheric body, shining, something like light.

a. Stob., *Ecl.* I 49, 6 (Dox. 388) = fr. 99a W.:

Ἡρακλείδης φωτοειδῆ τὴν ψυχὴν ὡρίσατο.

We find this doctrine mentioned in Tertull., *De anima* 9, and in Macrobius, *Somn. Sc.* I 14.

b. Philoponus, *De an.* A 4 (Dox. 214) = fr. 100 W.:

Οἱ μὲν εἰρήκασιν αἰθέριον εἶναι σῶμα (ταὐτὸν δέ ἐστιν εἰπεῖν οὐράνιον) ὥσπερ Ἡρακλείδης ὁ Ποντικός.

775—a. Before entering bodies, souls abide in the milky way. Iambl. ap. Stob., *Ecl.* I 49, 39 (I, 378 Wachsmuth) = fr. 98 W.:

Καὶ τούτους (sc. the places whence the soul comes when it is incarnated in a στερεὸν σῶμα) Ἡρακλείδην μὲν τὸν Ποντικὸν ἀφορίζειν περὶ τὸν γαλαξίαν, ἄλλους δὲ καθ' ὅλας τοῦ οὐρανοῦ τὰς σφαίρας, ἀφ' ὧν δὴ δεῦρο κατιέναι τὰς ψυχάς· τοὺς δὲ περὶ σελήνην ἢ ἐν τῷ ὑπὸ σελήνην ἀέρι λέγειν αὐτὰς κατοικεῖν καὶ ἀπ' αὐτῶν κάτω χωρεῖν εἰς τὴν περίγειον γένεσιν, τοὺς δὲ ἀπὸ σωμάτων ἀεὶ στερεῶν πίπτειν εἰς ἕτερα σώματα διισχυρίζεσθαι.

Cp. Pl., *Tim.* 41 d e (our nr. **354a**).

b. He shares Plato's view that the universe, the planets, the earth and the heaven are gods.

Cic., *N.D.* I 13, 34 (fr. 112 W.):

Ex eadem Platonis schola Ponticus Heraclides puerilibus fabulis refersit libros, et tamen modo mundum tum mentem divinam esse putat, errantibus etiam stellis divinitatem tribuit sensuque deum privat et eius formam mutabilem esse vult, eodemque in libro rursus terram et caelum refert in deos.

776—a. The universe is infinite. **Cosmology**

Stob., *Ecl.* I 21, 5 (*Dox.* 328, b 4) = fr. 113 W.:

Σέλευκος ὁ Ἐρυθραῖος [1] καὶ Ἡρακλείδης ὁ Ποντικὸς ἄπειρον τὸν κόσμον.

b. Each star is also a universe or world, suspended in the infinite aether and comprising an earth, an atmosphere and an aether.

Aët., *Plac.* II 13, 15 (Dox. 343, a[7]) = fr. 114a W.:

Ἡρακλείδης καὶ οἱ Πυθαγόρειοι ἕκαστον τῶν ἀστέρων κόσμον ὑπάρχειν γῆν περιέχοντα ἀέρα τε καὶ αἰθέρα ἐν τῷ ἀπείρῳ αἰθέρι. Ταῦτα δὲ τὰ δόγματα ἐν τοῖς Ὀρφικοῖς φέρεται· κοσμοποιοῦσι γὰρ ἕκαστον τῶν ἀστέρων.

c. The moon is earth surrounded with mist.

Stob., *Ecl.* I 26 (Dox. 356, b[25]) = fr. 115a W.:

Ἡρακλείδης [καὶ Ὄκελλος] γῆν ὁμίχλῃ περιεχομένην.

777—Heracl. held the rotation of the earth round its own axis. **Rotation of the earth**

a. Aët. III 13, 3 (Dox. 378 a[10]) = fr. 105 W.:

Ἡρακλείδης ὁ Ποντικὸς καὶ Ἔκφαντος ὁ Πυθαγόρειος κινοῦσι μὲν τὴν γῆν, οὐ μήν γε μεταβατικῶς, ἀλλὰ τρεπτικῶς, τροχοῦ δίκην ἐνηξονισμένην, ἀπὸ δυσμῶν ἐπ' ἀνατολὰς περὶ τὸ ἴδιον αὐτῆς κέντρον.

The text has been reproduced under **44b**, and is cited here again for the sake of its utmost interest.

Heath, *Aristarchus of Samos* p. 252, suggests that the views attributed by the Doxographi to Ecphantus the Pythagorean (who is, for the rest, unknown to us) were expressed in a dialogue of Heracl. and put into the mouth of Ecph., represented as a Pythagorean.

b. Cp. Simpl. in Ar. *De caelo*, p. 444 l. 31 - 445, 2 Heiberg (fr. 109 W.):

Ar. admitted the possibility that both the heaven of the fixed stars and the fixed stars themselves are at rest διὰ τὸ γεγονέναι τινάς, ὧν Ἡρακλείδης τε ὁ Ποντικὸς ἦν καὶ Ἀρίσταρχος, νομίζοντας σώζεσθαι τὰ φαινόμενα τοῦ μὲν

[1] The astronomer Seleucus of Babylon.

οὐρανοῦ καὶ τῶν ἄστρων ἠρεμούντων, τῆς δὲ γῆς περὶ τοὺς τοῦ ἰσημερινοῦ πόλους ἀπὸ δυσμῶν κινουμένης ἑκάστης ἡμέρας μίαν ἔγγιστα περιστροφήν.

Also ib. p. 519, $^{9-11}$; 541, $^{28-29}$; schol. in Ar. p. 505 b$^{46-47}$ Brandis. Cp. Simpl. in *Phys.*, p. 292, ^{20}, infra, sub **768**.

Copernicus refers to Heracl. in his dedicatory epistle to Paul III and in I 5 of his work *De revolutionibus orbium caelestium.*

Rotation of Mercury and Mars

778—Heracl. seems to have held also the theory that Mercury and Mars rotate round the sun, a theory which occurs later combined with that of the epicyclia, as it may be seen in Theon of Smyrna, p. 186, 17-187, 13 Hiller.

The passage is explained by Heath, *Aristarchus* p. 257 f. The same theory is mentioned by Chalcidius, *Tim.* c. 110, pp. 176-7 Wrobel. It occurs again in Macrobius, *Somn. Sc.* I 19; Vitruvius, *Architect.* IX 1 (4), 6; Martianus Capella VIII 854, 880, 882.

779—That he held the Copernican system, was defended by Schiaparelli [1], and again by Staigmuller, on the ground of Simpl., *De caelo* 444 and 452 Heiberg, and chiefly of *Phys.* 292 Diels. It is not accepted by Heath, who follows Tannery in rejecting the name Ἡρακλ. ὁ Ποντικός in l. 21 of the last mentioned passage of Simplicius, as a gloss [2].

The text of Simpl., *Phys.* 292, $^{15-23}$ (fr. 111 W.), runs:

Διὰ τί ἀνωμάλως ἥλιος καὶ σελήνη καὶ οἱ πλάνητες φαίνονται κινούμενοι; 15
Ὅτι, εἰ ὑποθώμεθα ἐκκέντρους αὐτῶν τοὺς κύκλους ἢ κατ' ἐπίκυκλον πολουμένα τὰ ἄστρα, σωθήσεται ἡ φαινομένη ἀνωμαλία αὐτῶν, δεήσει τε ἐπεξελθεῖν, καθ' ὅσους δυνατὸν τρόπους ταῦτα ἀποτελεῖσθαι τὰ φαινόμενα, ὥστε ἐοικέναι τῇ κατὰ τὸν ἐνδεχόμενον τρόπον αἰτιολογίᾳ τὴν περὶ τῶν πλανωμένων ἄστρων 20
πραγματείαν. Διὸ καὶ παρελθών τίς φησιν Ἡρακλείδης Ποντικός, ὅτι καὶ κινουμένης πως τῆς γῆς, τοῦ δὲ ἡλίου μένοντός πως δύναται ἡ περὶ τὸν ἥλιον φαινομένη ἀνωμαλία σῴζεσθαι.

By the τις in l. 21, according to Tannery and Heath, Aristarchus of Samos is meant.

Atomic theory

780—His atomic theory differed from that of Democritus in that Heracl. makes his ὄγκοι παθητοί, i.e. capable of being worked on by each other.

a. Dionys. ap. Euseb., *Praep. ev.* XIV 23, 3 (Dox. 252) = fr. 119 W.:

Ταύτης δὲ τῆς δόξης (sc. atomism) Ἐπίκουρος γεγόνασι καὶ Δημόκριτος. Τοσοῦτον δὲ διεφώνησαν ὅσον ὁ μὲν ἐλαχίστας πάσας καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἀνεπαισθή-

[1] *I precursori di Copernico nell' Antiquità*, Milano 1873.
[2] Heath, *Aristarchus*, pp. 276-283.

τους, ὁ δὲ καὶ μεγίστας εἶναί τινας ἀτόμους ὁ Δημόκριτος ὑπέλαβεν. Ἀτόμους δὲ εἶναί φασιν ἀμφότεροι καὶ λέγεσθαι, διὰ τὴν ἄλυτον στερρότητα. Οἱ δὲ τὰς ἀτόμους μετονομάσαντες ἀμερῆ φασιν εἶναι σώματα τοῦ παντὸς μέρη, ἐξ ὧν ἀδιαιρέτων ὄντων συντίθεται τὰ πάντα καὶ εἰς ἃ διαλύεται. καὶ τούτων φασὶ τῶν ἀμερῶν ὀνοματοποιὸν Διόδωρον γεγονέναι. Ὄνομα δέ, φασίν, αὐτοῖς ἄλλο Ἡρακλείδης θέμενος ἐκάλεσεν ὄγκους.

On Diodorus, cf. our nr. **232** (Diodorus Cronus).

b. Sextus, *Math.* X (= *Adv. Phys.* II) 318 = fr. 121 W.:

Ἐξ ἀπείρων δ' ἐδόξασαν τὴν τῶν πραγμάτων γένεσιν οἱ περὶ Ἀναξαγόραν τὸν Κλαζομένιον καὶ Δημόκριτον καὶ Ἐπίκουρον καὶ ἄλλοι παμπληθεῖς, ἀλλ' ὁ μὲν Ἀναξαγόρας ἐξ ὁμοίων τοῖς γεννωμένοις, οἱ δὲ περὶ τὸν Δημόκριτον καὶ Ἐπίκουρον ἐξ ἀνομοίων τε καὶ ἀπαθῶν, τουτέστι τῶν ἀτόμων, οἱ δὲ περὶ τὸν Ποντικὸν Ἡρακλείδην καὶ Ἀσκληπιάδην ἐξ ἀνομοίων μέν, παθητῶν δέ, καθάπερ τῶν ἀνάρμων ὄγκων.

Asclepiades of Prusa was a medical man, who lived at Rome in the first century B.C. He was influenced by Epicurus and Heracl. Pont., and is mentioned by later authors as an adherent of the atomic theory.

c. Heracl. held that the atoms are joined together to a universe by divine Reason. See our nr. **775b** (Cic., *N.D.* I 13, 34).

781—One of the chief works of Heracl. was his books Π. μουσικῆς. **Musicology**
An important fragment of these is preserved in Plut., *De mus.* § 25-103. Another passage is cited in Athenaeus XIV 624 C-626 A. For the rest, Philodemus, *De mus.* col. XXIII 30-XXIV 4 may give us some idea of the contents of Heracl.' work (fr. 163 W.). The text runs:

Ἃ μέντοι Διογένης φησίν, κατανοήσαντας ἡμᾶς <τ>ἀναγεγραμμένα παρ' Ἡρακλείδῃ περὶ πρέποντος μέλους καὶ ἀπρεποῦς καὶ ἀρρένων καὶ μαλακῶν ἠθῶν καὶ πράξεων ἁρμοττουσῶν καὶ ἀναρμόστων τοῖς ὑποκείμενοις προσώποις, οὐ μακρὰν ἀπηρτημένην τῆς φιλοσοφίας ἡγήσεσθαι τῷ πρὸς πλεῖστα ἐπὶ τοῦ βίου χρησιμεύειν τὴν μουσικὴν καὶ τὴν περὶ αὐτὴν φιλοτεχνίαν οἰκείως διατιθέναι πρὸς πλείους ἀρετάς, μᾶλλον δὲ καὶ πάσας, ἐκθέντες ἡμεῖς ἐν τῷ τρίτῳ τῶν ὑπομνημάτων, καὶ τὰ παρ' ἄλλοις δὲ συγγενῶς εἰρημένα παρεδείξαμεν ὅσης ἐστὶν γέμοντα ληρείας.

H., like Plato and Aristotle before him, held apparently that music should have a moral value and influence on men, a thesis which was violently opposed by the Epicurean Philodemus.

782—Heracl.' *Abaris* was a kind of life of a saint, which became the **The Abaris**
prototype of later lives of Pythagoras. It was adorned with spiritistic stories, which made it very popular in Antiquity.

Plut., *De audiendis poetis* 1, p. 14 E (fr. 74 W.):

Ὅτι δὲ τῶν ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ λεγομένων οἱ σφόδρα νέοι τοῖς μὴ δοκοῦσι φιλοσόφως, μηδὲ ἀπὸ σπουδῆς λέγεσθαι χαίρουσι μᾶλλον καὶ παρέχουσιν ὑπηκόους ἑαυτοὺς καὶ χειροήθεις, δῆλόν ἐστιν ἡμῖν. Οὐ γὰρ μόνον τὰ Αἰσώπεια μυθάρια καὶ τὰς ποιητικὰς ὑποθέσεις, καὶ τὸν Ἄβαριν τὸν Ἡρακλείδου, καὶ τὸν Λύκωνα τὸν Ἀρίστωνος διερχόμενοι, [ἀλλὰ καὶ] τὰ περὶ τῶν ψυχῶν δόγματα μεμιγμένα μυθολογίᾳ μεθ' ἡδονῆς ἐνθουσιῶσι.

H.' name in Antiquity

783—On the whole, Heracl. was a celebrated and much read author in later Antiquity, up to the Christian era. Varro was greatly influenced by his dialogues; Cicero and Atticus admired him.

a. Cic., *Tusc.* V 3, 8 praises his erudition (fr. 89 W.):

auditor Platonis Ponticus Heraclides, vir doctus in primis.

Cp. also *Div.* I 23, 46.

b. Timaeus rebuked him for his mysticism. Diog. L. VIII 72 (fr. 85 W.):

Timaeus opposes the stories of the miraculous disappearance of Empedocles.

Τοιαῦτά τινα εἰπὼν ὁ Τίμαιος ἐπιφέρει· »Ἀλλὰ διὰ παντός ἐστιν Ἡρακλείδης τοιοῦτος παραδοξολόγος, καὶ ἐκ τῆς σελήνης πεπτωκέναι ἄνθρωπον λέγων«.

Cp. Plut., *Cam.* 22; *De aud. poet.* 1.

c. Epicurus and his disciples covered him with invectives.

Plut., *Contra Epicuri beatitudinem* 2, p. 1086 E (fr. 20 W.):

Compared with Epicurus and Metrodorus, Colotes was very moderate in his language. Τὰ γὰρ ἐν ἀνθρώποις αἴσχιστα ῥήματα βωμολοχίας, ληκυθισμούς, ἀλαζονείας, ἑταιρήσεις, ἀνδροφονίας, βαρυστόνους, πολυφθόρους, βαρυεγκεφάλους συναγαγόντες Ἀριστοτέλους καὶ Σωκράτους καὶ Πυθαγόρου καὶ Πρωταγόρου καὶ Θεοφράστου καὶ Ἡρακλείδου καὶ Ἱππάρχου καὶ τίνος γὰρ οὐχὶ τῶν ἐπιφανῶν κατεσκέδασαν.

4—EUDOXUS, PHILIPPUS OF OPOUS AND THE EPINOMIS

784—Another famous disciple of Plato and teacher in the Academy was Eudoxus of Cnidus, philosopher, mathematician, astronomer, medical man and lawgiver.

Eudoxus of Cnidus

a. Diog. L. VIII 86-88:

Εὔδοξος Αἰσχίνου Κνίδιος, ἀστρολόγος, γεωμέτρης, ἰατρός, νομοθέτης. οὗτος τὰ μὲν γεωμετρικὰ Ἀρχύτα διήκουσε, τὰ δ' ἰατρικὰ Φιλιστίωνος τοῦ Σικελιώτου, καθὰ Καλλίμαχος ἐν τοῖς πίναξί φησι. Σωτίων δ' ἐν ταῖς διαδοχαῖς

λέγει καὶ Πλάτωνος αὐτὸν ἀκοῦσαι. γενόμενον γὰρ ἐτῶν τριῶν που καὶ εἴκοσι καὶ στενῶς διακείμενον κατὰ κλέος τῶν Σωκρατικῶν εἰς Ἀθήνας ἀπᾶραι σὺν Θεομέδοντι τῷ ἰατρῷ, τρεφόμενον ὑπ' αὐτοῦ· οἱ δέ, καὶ παιδικὰ ὄντα· καταχθέντα δ' εἰς τὸν Πειραιᾶ ὁσημέραι ἀνιέναι Ἀθήναζε καὶ ἀκούσαντα τῶν σοφιστῶν αὐτόθι ὑποστρέφειν. δύο δὴ μῆνας διατρίψαντα οἴκαδ' ἐπανελθεῖν καὶ πρὸς τῶν φίλων ἐρανισθέντα εἰς Αἴγυπτον ἀπᾶραι μετὰ Χρυσίππου τοῦ ἰατροῦ, συστατικὰς φέροντα παρ' Ἀγησιλάου πρὸς Νεκτάναβιν· τὸν δὲ τοῖς ἱερεῦσιν αὐτὸν συστῆσαι. — Ἐντεῦθέν τε γενέσθαι ἐν Κυζίκῳ καὶ τῇ Προποντίδι σοφιστεύοντα· ἀλλὰ καὶ παρὰ Μαυσωλὸν ἀφικέσθαι. ἔπειθ' οὕτως ἐπανελθεῖν Ἀθήναζε, πάνυ πολλοὺς περὶ ἑαυτὸν ἔχοντα μαθητάς. — Ἀπεδέχθη δὴ ἐν τῇ πατρίδι μεγαλοτίμως, ὡς τό γε περὶ αὐτοῦ ψήφισμα γενόμενον δηλοῖ. ἀλλὰ καὶ παρὰ τοῖς Ἕλλησιν ἐπιφανέστατος ἐγένετο, γράψας τοῖς ἰδίοις πολίταις νόμους, ὥς φησιν Ἕρμιππος ἐν τετάρτῃ περὶ τῶν ἑπτὰ σοφῶν, καὶ ἀστρολογούμενα καὶ γεωμετρούμενα καὶ ἕτερ' ἄττα ἀξιόλογα.

b. He died at the age of 53, before Plato. Diog. L., ib., 90:
Ἐτελεύτησε δὲ τρίτον ἄγων καὶ πεντηκοστὸν ἔτος.

c. His celebrity. Diog., ib. 91:
Τοῦτον ἀντὶ Εὐδόξου Ἔνδοξον ἐκάλουν διὰ τὴν λαμπρότητα τῆς φήμης.

785—He rejected the theory of the Ideas in its Platonic form. **Interpretation of the theory of the Ideas**

a. Ar., Metaph. A 9, 991 a$^{8-18}$ (our nr. **529a**).

b. Alex. explains the passage as follows:
Εὔδοξος τῶν Πλάτωνος γνωρίμων μίξει τῶν ἰδεῶν ἐν τοῖς πρὸς αὐτὰς τὸ εἶναι ἔχουσιν ἡγεῖτο ἕκαστον εἶναι, καὶ ἄλλοι δέ τινες, ὡς ἔλεγε . . . μίξει τῶν ἰδεῶν τὰ ἄλλα.

786—In ethics, too, he held a view very different from Plato's, namely that pleasure is the supreme good. We found it in Aristotle's *Ethics* (our nrs. **594-596**) and shall find it again in Epicurus. **Pleasure the supreme good**

a. Ar., *Eth. Nic.* X 2, 1172 b$^{9-18}$ [1]:
Εὔδοξος μὲν οὖν τὴν ἡδονὴν τἀγαθὸν ᾤετ' εἶναι διὰ τὸ πάνθ' ὁρᾶν ἐφιέμενα αὐτῆς, καὶ ἔλλογα καὶ ἄλογα, ἐν πᾶσι δ' εἶναι τὸ αἱρετὸν ἐπιεικές, καὶ τὸ μάλιστα κράτιστον· τὸ δὲ πάντ' ἐπὶ ταὐτὸ φέρεσθαι μηνύειν ὡς πᾶσι τοῦτο ἄριστον (ἕκαστον γὰρ τὸ αὑτῷ ἀγαθὸν εὑρίσκειν, ὥσπερ καὶ τροφήν), τὸ δὴ πᾶσιν ἀγαθόν, καὶ οὗ πάντ' ἐφίεται, τἀγαθὸν εἶναι· ἐπιστεύοντο δ' οἱ λόγοι

[1] The passage referred to sub **596c**.

διὰ τὴν τοῦ ἤθους ἀρετὴν μᾶλλον ἢ δι' αὐτούς. Διαφερόντως γὰρ ἐδόκει σώφρων εἶναι· οὐ δὴ ὡς φίλος τῆς ἡδονῆς ἐδόκει ταῦτα λέγειν, ἀλλ' οὕτως ἔχειν κατ' ἀλήθειαν.

b. Plato himself was brought by this theory to write his *Philebus* and to revise his own view of the best life (our nr. **348**).

Theory of the celestial spheres

787—As to astronomy, Eudoxus' theory of concentric celestial spheres preceded that of Callippus and Aristotle's theory of a plurality of unmoved Movers, expounded in *Metaph.* Λ 8.

Our nr. **517**.

See on Eudoxus' hypothesis: Heath, *Aristarchus*, p. 193-211.

Geometry 1. His theory of proportion

788—a. An important part of Euclides' *Elementa* has been taken from Eudoxus. It was Eud. who invented and elaborated the theory of proportion expounded in *Elem.* V. The essence of this theory is its applicability to incommensurable as well as commensurable quantities.

Eud.' conception of equal ratios is embodied in Eucl. V, def. 5:

Ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ λόγῳ μεγέθη λέγεται εἶναι πρῶτον πρὸς δεύτερον καὶ τρίτον πρὸς τέταρτον, ὅταν τὰ τοῦ πρώτου καὶ τρίτου ἰσάκις πολλαπλάσια τῶν τοῦ δευτέρου καὶ τετάρτου ἰσάκις πολλαπλασίων καθ' ὁποιονοῦν πολλαπλασιασμὸν ἑκάτερον ἑκατέρου ἢ ἅμα ὑπερέχῃ ἢ ἅμα ἴσα ᾖ ἢ ἅμα ἐλλείπῃ ληφθέντα κατάλληλα.

On the importance of this definition see Heath, *Aristarchus* p. 191.

2. His method of exhaustion

b. Secondly, he discovered the method of exhaustion, which is at the root of all Archimedes' further developments in the mensuration of plain and solid figures. The fundamental thesis has come down to us by Eucl., *Elem.* X 1.

The method is explained in Cantor's *Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Mathematik* I² 229, 254, 257 f.; Heath, *Works of Archimedes* p. XLVIII ff.; Zeuthen, *Hist. des math.*, 136 ff.

3. His curve for doubling a cube

c. He solved, by means of a complicated curve, the problem of doubling the cube.

Eutocius in Archim. *Sphaer. et cyl.* 66, 12 Heiberg:

(Εὔδοξος) φησὶν ἐν προοιμίοις διὰ καμπύλων γραμμῶν αὐτὴν (τὴν εὕρεσιν) ηὑρηκέναι.

Cf. Proclus' account of the problem, *in Eucl. Elem.* I 213, 3-7. A reconstruction of Eud.' method has been ventured by Tannery, Mém. de la Société des Sciences de Bordeaux, 2e série, II (1878), 282 f., and by Künssberg, *Eud. von Knidos* II, 55 f.

Heath treats the question shortly in his *Aristarchus*, p. 190 f., and again, in his *Apollonius of Perga*, p. XXII f.

789—A less dissentient Platonist and member of the Academy was Philippus of Opous. **Philippus of Opous**

a. He is mentioned among Plato's disciples in the list of Diog. L. III 46 (our nr. **726**).

b. He is said to have transcribed the *Laws* and to be the author of the *Epinomis*. **Author of the *Epinomis*?**

Diog. L. III 37:

Ἔνιοί τέ φασι ὅτι Φίλιππος ὁ Ὀπούντιος τοὺς νόμους αὐτοῦ μετέγραψεν ὄντας ἐν κηρῷ. Τούτου δὲ καὶ τὴν Ἐπινομίδα φασὶν εἶναι.

Cp. *Index Acad.* 13, where he is called ὁ ἀστρολόγος and ἀναγραφεὺς τοῦ Πλάτωνος καὶ ἀκουστής.

Suidas says: ὃς τοὺς Πλάτωνος Νόμους διεῖλεν εἰς βιβλία ιβ' · τὸ γὰρ ιγ' αὐτὸς προσθεῖναι λέγεται.

The authenticity of the *Epinomis* has been lately defended by J. Harward (*The Epinomis of Plato*, Oxford 1928), by

A. E. Taylor (Proceedings of the Brit. Acad. XV, 235), by

H. Raeder (Kgl. Danske Vidensk. Selskab, Hist. filol. Medd. XXVI 1, Kopenhagen 1938), and by

E. des Places (Revue des Et. grecques XLIV, 153 ff.), while many others reject it.

I personally think the authorship of Philippus probable, though there is no decisive evidence for it.

c. The list of his works presented by Suidas contains chiefly mathematical and astronomical treatises, but also ethical writings. **Works**

790—Doubtless, certain features in the *Epinomis* may be mentioned as being characteristic of the first generation of the Academy, during Plato's old age and after his death. **Wisdom in the *Epinomis***

First, Wisdom is in the *Epinomis* essentially conditioned by the knowledge .of number.

Epin. 976 c-977 d:

976 Ἀλλὰ μὴν δεῖ φανῆναί γέ τινα ἐπιστήμην ἣν ἔχων σοφὸς γίγνοιτ' ἂν ὁ σοφὸς
ὄντως ὢν καὶ μὴ μόνον δοξαζόμενος. ἴδωμεν δή. χαλεπῷ μὲν γὰρ λόγῳ παντά-
d πασιν ἐπιχειροῦμεν, ἑτέραν πάρεξ τῶν εἰρημένων εὑρεῖν, ἣ σοφία μὲν λέγοιτ'
ἂν ὄντως τε καὶ εἰκότως, ὁ δὲ λαβὼν οὔτε βάναυσος οὔτ' ἠλίθιος ἔσται, σοφὸς
δὲ καὶ ἀγαθὸς δι' αὐτὴν πολίτης τε καὶ ἄρχων καὶ ἀρχόμενος ἐνδίκως ἔσται
5 πόλεως ἅμα καὶ ἐμμελής. κατίδωμεν δὴ ταύτην πρώτην, τίς ποτ' ἐκ τῆς
ἀνθρωπίνης φύσεως ἐπιστήμη μία διεξελθοῦσα ἢ μὴ παραγενομένη τῶν νῦν
παρουσῶν ἀνοητότατον ἂν καὶ ἀφρονέστατον παράσχοιτο ζῷον τὸ τῶν ἀνθρώπων. οὐ δὴ τοῦτό γε πάνυ χαλεπὸν τὸ κατιδεῖν. μία γὰρ ὡς εἰπεῖν πρὸς μίαν ἡ
τὸν ἀριθμὸν δοῦσα παντὶ τῷ θνητῷ γένει τοῦτ' ἂν δράσειεν· θεὸν δ' αὐτὸν
μᾶλλον ἢ τινα τύχην ἡγοῦμαι δόντα ἡμῖν σῴζειν ἡμᾶς. ὃν δὲ θεὸν ἡγοῦμαι,

φράζειν χρή, καίπερ ἄτοπον ὄντα, καί πως οὐκ ἄτοπον αὖ· πῶς γὰρ τὸ ἀγαθῶν
αἴτιον ἡμῖν συμπάντων οὐ καὶ τοῦ πολὺ μεγίστου, τῆς φρονήσεως, αἴτιον 97
ἡγεῖσθαι δεῖ γεγονέναι; τίνα δὴ καὶ σεμνύνων ποτὲ λέγω θεόν, ὦ Μέγιλλέ τε
καὶ Κλεινία; σχεδὸν Οὐρανόν, ὃν καὶ δικαιότατον, ὡς σύμπαντες ἄλλοι δαίμονες
ἅμα καὶ θεοί, τιμᾶν τε καὶ εὔχεσθαι διαφερόντως αὐτῷ. τὸ δὲ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων
αἴτιον ἀγαθῶν πάντων ἡμῖν αὐτὸν γεγονέναι πάντες ἂν ὁμολογοῖμεν· δοῦναι
δὲ ἅμα καὶ ἀριθμὸν ἡμεῖς γε ὄντως αὐτόν φαμεν, ἔτι δὲ καὶ δώσειν, ἐάν τις
θέλῃ συνακολουθεῖν. ἐὰν γὰρ ἴῃ τις ἐπὶ θεωρίαν ὀρθὴν τὴν τοῦδε, εἴτε κόσμον b
εἴτε ὅλυμπον εἴτε οὐρανὸν ἐν ἡδονῇ τῷ λέγειν, λεγέτω μέν, ἀκολουθείτω δὲ
ὅπῃ ποικίλλων αὐτὸν καὶ τὰ ἐν αὐτῷ στρέφων ἄστρα πάσας διεξόδους ὥρας
τε καὶ τροφὴν πᾶσιν παρέχεται. καὶ τὴν ἄλλην δὲ οὖν φρόνησιν, ὡς φαῖμεν ἄν,
σὺν ἀριθμῷ παντί, καὶ τἆλλ' ἀγαθά· τοῦτο δὲ μέγιστον, ἐάν τις τὴν ἀριθμῶν
αὐτοῦ δόσιν δεξάμενος ἐπεξέλθῃ πᾶσαν τὴν περίοδον.

Ἔτι δὲ σμικρὸν ἐπανελθόντες πως τοῖς λόγοις ἀναμνησθῶμεν ὅτι καὶ μάλ'
ὀρθῶς ἐνοήσαμεν ὡς, εἴπερ ἀριθμὸν ἐκ τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης φύσεως ἐξέλοιμεν, c
οὐκ ἄν ποτέ τι φρόνιμοι γενοίμεθα. οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἔτι ποτὲ ψυχὴ τούτου τοῦ ζῴου
πᾶσαν ἀρετὴν λάβοι σχεδόν, ὅτου λόγος ἀπείη· ζῷον δὲ ὅτι μὴ γιγνώσκοι δύο
καὶ τρία μηδὲ περιττὸν μηδὲ ἄρτιον, ἀγνοοῖ δὲ τὸ παράπαν ἀριθμόν, οὐκ ἄν
ποτε διδόναι λόγον ἔχοι περὶ ὧν αἰσθήσεις καὶ μνήμας [ἔχοι] μόνον εἴη κεκτη-
μένον, τὴν δὲ ἄλλην ἀρετήν, ἀνδρείαν καὶ σωφροσύνην, οὐδὲν ἀποκωλύει. d
στερόμενος δὲ ἀληθοῦς λόγου σοφὸς οὐκ ἄν ποτε γένοιτο, ὅτῳ δὲ σοφία μὴ
προσείη, πάσης ἀρετῆς τὸ μέγιστον μέρος, οὐκ ἂν ἔτι τελέως ἀγαθὸς γενόμενος
εὐδαίμων ποτὲ γένοιτο.

Moral purpose of astronomical studies

791—Second, the greatest virtue is, according to our author, piety,—and it is learned by learning astronomy. To this purpose mathematical studies are necessary.

a. *Epin.* 989 b[1]-990 b[2]; 990 c[5]-991 a[1]:

Μεῖζον μὲν γὰρ ἀρετῆς μηδεὶς ἡμᾶς ποτε πείσῃ τῆς εὐσεβείας εἶναι τῷ 98
θνητῷ γένει· τοῦτο δ' ὅτι δι' ἀμαθίαν τὴν μεγίστην ἐν ταῖς ἀρίσταις φύσεσιν
οὐ γέγονεν, λεκτέον. ἄρισται δ' εἰσὶν αἱ χαλεπώτατα μὲν ἂν γενόμεναι, μέγιστον
δὲ ὄφελος, ἂν γίγνωνται· τά τε γὰρ τῆς βραδείας τε καὶ τῆς ἐναντίας φύσεως
μετρίως ἀποδεχομένη ψυχὴ καὶ πρᾴως, εὔκολος ἂν εἴη, τήν τε ἀνδρείαν ἀγαμένη,
καὶ πρὸς τὸ σωφρονεῖν εὐπειθής, καὶ τό γε μέγιστον, ἐν ταύταις ταῖς φύσεσιν
δυναμένη μανθάνειν καὶ μνήμων οὖσα, εὖ μάλα χαίρειν τούτοις αὐτοῖς δύναιτ' c
ἂν φιλομαθὴς ὥστ' εἶναι. ταῦτα γὰρ οὔτε ῥᾴδια φύεσθαι, γενόμενά τε, καὶ
τροφῆς καὶ παιδείας τυχόντα ἧς δεῖ, τοὺς πλείστους αὐτῶν καὶ χείρους κατέχειν
ὀρθότατα δύναιτ' ἂν τῷ φρονεῖν καὶ πράττειν καὶ λέγειν περὶ θεοὺς ἕκαστα ὡς
δεῖ τε καὶ ὅτε δεῖ, περὶ θυσίας τε καὶ καθαρμοὺς τῶν περὶ θεούς τε καὶ ἀνθρώ-

πους, οὐ σχήμασι τεχνάζοντας, ἀλλὰ ἀληθείᾳ τιμῶντας ἀρετήν, ὃ δὴ καὶ μέ-
d γιστόν ἐστι συμπάντων πάσῃ τῇ πόλει. τοῦτο δὴ οὖν τὸ μέρος εἶναί φαμεν
φύσει κυριώτατον καὶ δυνατὸν ὡς οἷόν τε κάλλιστα καὶ ἄριστα μαθεῖν, εἰ
διδάσκοι τις. ἀλλ' οὐδ' ἂν διδάξειεν, εἰ μὴ θεὸς ὑφηγοῖτο· εἰ τ' οὖν διδάσκοι,
5 κατὰ τρόπον δὲ μὴ δρῷ τὸ τοιοῦτον, κρεῖττον μὴ μανθάνειν. ὅμως δ' ἐκ τῶν νῦν
λεγομένων ἀνάγκη μαθεῖν ταῦτα καὶ ἐμὲ λέγειν τὴν τοιαύτην τε καὶ ἀρίστην
e φύσιν. πειρώμεθα δὴ τῷ τε λόγῳ διεξελθεῖν ἅ τ' ἐστὶν καὶ οἷα καὶ ὡς δεῖ μανθά-
νειν, κατὰ δύναμιν τήν τ' ἐμὴν τοῦ λέγοντος καὶ τὴν τῶν δυναμένων εἰσακοῦσαι,
990 θεοσεβείας ᾧτινι τρόπῳ τις τίνα μαθήσεται. σχεδὸν μὲν οὖν ἐστιν ἄτοπον
ἀκούσαντι, τὸ δ' ὄνομα αὐτοῦ λέγομεν ἡμεῖς γε, ὅ τις οὐκ ἄν ποτε δόξειεν δι'
ἀπειρίαν τοῦ πράγματος — ἀστρονομίαν — ἀγνοεῖ τε ὅτι σοφώτατον ἀνάγκη
5 τὸν ἀληθῶς ἀστρονόμον εἶναι, μὴ τὸν καθ' Ἡσίοδον ἀστρονομοῦντα καὶ πάντας
τοὺς τοιούτους, οἷον δυσμάς τε καὶ ἀνατολὰς ἐπεσκεμμένον, ἀλλὰ τὸν τῶν
b ὀκτὼ περιόδων τὰς ἑπτὰ περιόδους, διεξιούσης τὸν αὐτῶν κύκλον ἑκάστης
οὕτως ὡς οὐκ ἂν ῥᾳδίως ποτὲ πᾶσα φύσις ἱκανὴ γένοιτο θεωρῆσαι, μὴ θαυ-
c 5 μαστῆς μετέχουσα φύσεως. — Διὸ μαθημάτων δέον ἂν εἴη· τὸ δὲ μέγιστόν
τε καὶ πρῶτον καὶ ἀριθμῶν αὐτῶν ἀλλ' οὐ σώματα ἐχόντων, ἀλλὰ ὅλης τῆς τοῦ
περιττοῦ τε καὶ ἀρτίου γενέσεώς τε καὶ δυνάμεως, ὅσην παρέχεται πρὸς τὴν
d τῶν ὄντων φύσιν. ταῦτα δὲ μαθόντι τούτοις ἐφεξῆς ἐστιν ὃ καλοῦσι μὲν σφόδρα
γελοῖον ὄνομα γεωμετρίαν, τῶν οὐκ ὄντων δὲ ὁμοίων ἀλλήλοις φύσει ἀριθμῶν
ὁμοίωσις πρὸς τὴν τῶν ἐπιπέδων μοῖραν γεγονυῖά ἐστιν διαφανής· ὃ δὴ θαῦμα
5 οὐκ ἀνθρώπινον ἀλλὰ γεγονὸς θεῖον φανερὸν ἂν γίγνοιτο τῷ δυναμένῳ συννοεῖν.
μετὰ δὲ ταύτην τοὺς τρὶς ηὐξημένους καὶ τῇ στερεᾷ φύσει ὁμοίους· τοὺς δὲ
ἀνομοίους αὖ γεγονότας ἑτέρᾳ τέχνῃ ὁμοιοῖ, ταύτῃ ἣν δὴ στερεομετρίαν ἐκά-
e λεσαν οἱ προστυχεῖς αὐτῇ γεγονότες· ὃ δὲ θεῖόν τ' ἐστὶν καὶ θαυμαστὸν τοῖς
ἐγκαθορῶσί τε καὶ διανοουμένοις ὡς περὶ τὸ διπλάσιον ἀεὶ στρεφομένης τῆς
δυνάμεως καὶ τῆς ἐξ ἐναντίας ταύτῃ καθ' ἑκάστην ἀναλογίαν εἶδος καὶ γένος
991 ἀποτυποῦται πᾶσα ἡ φύσις.

b. Knowledge of the heavenly bodies is at the top, for its object is divine. 1b., 991 b^{5}-c^{1}:

Ταῦτα μὲν οὖν δὴ ταύτῃ γιγνέσθω τε καὶ ἐχέτω σύμπαντα· τὸ δ' ἐπὶ τούτοις τέλος, εἰς θείαν γένεσιν ἅμα καὶ τὴν τῶν ὁρατῶν καλλίστην τε καὶ θειοτάτην φύσιν ἰτέον, ὅσην ἀνθρώποις θεὸς ἔδωκεν κατιδεῖν, ἣν οὔποτε ἄνευ τῶν νῦν διειρημένων μὴ κατιδὼν ἐπεύξηταί τις ῥᾳστώνῃ παραλαβεῖν.

792—These things are certainly not against the spirit of Plato's philosophy, at least in his later years. Cp. the following passages:

a. *Epin.* 981 c$^{3-6}$: **The souls of the celestial bodies**

Νομίσαι δὲ δὴ δεῖ πάλιν τὰ κατ' οὐρανὸν ζῴων γένη, ὃ δὴ πᾶν χρὴ φάναι

θεῖον γένος ἄστρων γεγονέναι, σώματος μὲν τυχὸν καλλίστου, ψυχῆς δ' εὐδαιμονεστάτης τε καὶ ἀρίστης.

Cp. Plato, *Nom.* 898 d-899 c (our nr. **391**).

Evil overcome by good

b. *Epin.* 988 d^4-e^4:

Διὸ καὶ νῦν ἡμῶν ἀξιούντων, ψυχῆς οὔσης αἰτίας τοῦ ὅλου, καὶ πάντων μὲν d 5
τῶν ἀγαθῶν ὄντων τοιούτων, τῶν δὲ αὖ φλαύρων τοιούτων ἄλλων, τῆς μὲν φορᾶς πάσης καὶ κινήσεως ψυχὴν αἰτίαν εἶναι θαῦμα οὐδέν, τὴν δ' ἐπὶ τἀγαθὸν e
φορὰν καὶ κίνησιν τῆς ἀρίστης ψυχῆς εἶναι, τὴν δ' ἐπὶ τοὐναντίον ἐναντίαν, νενικηκέναι δεῖ καὶ νικᾶν τὰ ἀγαθὰ τὰ μὴ τοιαῦτα.

Cp. Plato, *Nom.* 904 a b (our nr. **392a**).

Gods and daemons

c. *Epin.* 984 d^3-e^3:

Θεοὺς μὲν δή, Δία τε καὶ Ἥραν καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους πάντας, ὅπῃ τις ἐθέλει, d
ταύτῃ κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν τιθέσθω νόμον καὶ πάγιον ἐχέτω τοῦτον τὸν λόγον· θεοὺς δὲ δὴ τοὺς ὁρατούς, μεγίστους καὶ τιμιωτάτους καὶ ὀξύτατον ὁρῶντας 5
πάντῃ, τοὺς πρώτους τὴν τῶν ἄστρων φύσιν λεκτέον καὶ ὅσα μετὰ τούτων αἰσθανόμεθα γεγονότα, μετὰ δὲ τούτους καὶ ὑπὸ τούτοις ἐξῆς δαίμονας, ἀέριον e
δὲ γένος, ἔχον ἕδραν τρίτην καὶ μέσην, τῆς ἑρμηνείας αἴτιον, εὐχαῖς τιμᾶν μάλα χρεὼν χάριν τῆς εὐφήμου διαπορείας.

This, too, can be placed quite well in the Platonic view of the universe. And yet, there is a nescioquid in these things which does give us the impression that they are rather the work of the next generation than that of the Master himself. Indeed, they fit in excellently with what we know of the character of Philippus of Opous. Cp. Zeller, *Ph. d. Gr.* II 1[5], 1044 f.

5—POLEMO, CRATES AND CRANTOR

Polemo

793—The next generation of the School turned from mathematics to ethics.

Conversion to philosophy

a. Polemo and his conversion to philosophy by Xenocrates. Diog. L. IV 16:

Πολέμων Φιλοστράτου μὲν ἦν υἱός, Ἀθηναῖος, τῶν δήμων Οἰήθεν. νέος δ' ὢν ἀκόλαστός τε καὶ διακεχυμένος ἦν οὕτως, ὥστε καὶ περιφέρειν ἀργύριον πρὸς τὰς ἑτοίμους λύσεις τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν· ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν τοῖς στενωποῖς διέκρυπτεν. καὶ ἐν Ἀκαδημείᾳ πρὸς κιόνί τινι τριώβολον εὑρέθη προσπεπλασμένον αὐτοῦ διὰ τὴν ὁμοίαν τῇ προειρημένῃ πρόφασιν. καί ποτε συνθέμενος τοῖς νέοις 5
μεθύων καὶ ἐστεφανωμένος εἰς τὴν Ξενοκράτους ἦξε σχολήν· ὁ δὲ οὐδὲν διατραπεὶς εἶρε τὸν λόγον ὁμοίως· ἦν δὲ περὶ σωφροσύνης. ἀκοῦον δὴ τὸ μειράκιον κατ' ὀλίγον ἐθηράθη καὶ οὕτως ἐγένετο φιλόπονος, ὡς ὑπερβάλλεσθαι τοὺς

ἄλλους καὶ αὐτὸς διαδέξασθαι τὴν σχολήν, ἀρξάμενος ἀπὸ τῆς ἕκτης καὶ δεκάτης καὶ ἑκατοστῆς Ὀλυμπιάδος [1].

His ἀπάθεια

b. His further life and behaviour. Diog., ib. 17-18:

Τοσοῦτον δὲ ἐπιτεῖναι τὸ ἦθος ἀρξάμενον φιλοσοφεῖν, ὥστ' ἐπὶ ταὐτοῦ σχήματος τῆς μορφῆς πάντοτε μένειν. ἀλλὰ καὶ τὴν φωνὴν ἀναλλοίωτος ἦν· διὸ καὶ θηραθῆναι Κράντορα ὑπ' αὐτοῦ. κυνὸς γοῦν λυττῶντος καὶ τὴν ἰγνύαν [2] διασπάσαντος μόνον μὴ ὠχριᾶσαι· καὶ ταραχῆς γενομένης ἐπὶ τῆς πόλεως πυθομένων τὸ γεγονὸς ἄτρεπτον μεῖναι. ἔν τε τοῖς θεάτροις ἀσυμπαθέστατος ἦν. Νικοστράτου γοῦν ποτε τοῦ ἐπικαλουμένου Κλυταιμνήστρα ἀναγινώσκοντός τι τοῦ ποιητοῦ αὐτῷ τε καὶ Κράτητι, τὸν μὲν συνδιατίθεσθαι [3], τὸν δ' ἴσα καὶ μὴ ἀκοῦσαι. καὶ ὅλως ἦν τοιοῦτος οἷόν φησι Μελάνθιος ὁ ζωγράφος ἐν τοῖς περὶ ζωγραφικῆς· φησὶ γὰρ δεῖν αὐθάδειάν τινα καὶ σκληρότητα τοῖς ἔργοις ἐπιτρέχειν, ὁμοίως δὲ κἀν τοῖς ἤθεσιν.

c. His main interest was more turned to practical life than to theory.

Diog. L. IV 18:

Ἔφασκε δὲ ὁ Πολέμων δεῖν ἐν τοῖς πράγμασι γυμνάζεσθαι καὶ μὴ ἐν τοῖς διαλεκτικοῖς θεωρήμασι.

794—His ruling principle in ethics was: living according to nature.

Living according to nature

a. Clem. Alex., *Strom.* VII 6, 32, 9 (Stählin III p. 25, l. 2): Πολέμων ἐν τοῖς περὶ τοῦ κατὰ φύσιν βίου συντάγμασι.

b. Cic., *Acad.* II 42, 131:

Honestum autem vivere fruentem rebus iis quas primas homini natura conciliet, et vetus Academia censuit (sc. finem bonorum), ut indicant scripta Polemonis.

c. Plut., *Comm. not.* c. 23, p. 1069:

Τίνας δὲ Ξενοκράτης καὶ Πολέμων λαμβάνουσιν ἀρχάς; Οὐχὶ καὶ Ζήνων τούτοις ἠκολούθησεν, ὑποτιθέμενος στοιχεῖα τῆς εὐδαιμονίας τὴν φύσιν καὶ τὸ κατὰ φύσιν;

795—The doctrine of the πρῶτα κατὰ φύσιν is expounded more fully by Cicero in *De finibus* II 11, 33 f., with reference to Polemo:

The theory of the πρῶτα κατὰ φύσιν

Omne enim animal, simul et ortum est, et se ipsum et omnes partes suas diligit duasque, quae maximae sunt, in primis amplectitur, animum et

[1] 316-313 B.C.
[2] The hollow of the knee.
[3] Came under the impression.

corpus, deinde utriusque partes. Nam sunt et in animo praecipua quaedam et in corpore, quae cum leviter agnovit, tunc discernere incipit, ut ea, quae prima data sint natura, appetat asperneturque contraria. In his primis naturalibus voluptas insit necne, magna quaestio est. Nihil vero putare esse praeter voluptatem, non membra, non sensus, non ingenii motum, non integritatem corporis, non valetudinem, summae mihi videtur inscitiae. Atque ab isto capite fluere necesse est omnem rationem bonorum et malorum. Polemoni et iam ante Aristoteli ea prima visa sunt quae paulo ante dixi. Ergo nata est sententia veterum Academicorum et Peripateticorum, ut finem bonorum dicerent secundum naturam vivere, id est virtute adhibita frui primis a natura datis.

Cp. also *De fin.* IV 6, 14 f.

Virtue the first condition to happiness

796—Virtue was, according to Polemo, the first and absolute condition to happiness, while exterior goods were considered by him as being not absolute conditions.

Clem., *Strom.* II 22, 133, 7 (St. II, p. 186, ^{28}-187, ^{2}:

Ὁ γὰρ Ξενοκράτους γνώριμος Πολέμων φαίνεται τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν αὐτάρκειαν εἶναι βουλόμενος ἀγαθῶν πάντων ἢ τῶν πλείστων καὶ μεγίστων. Δογματίζει γοῦν, χωρὶς μὲν ἀρετῆς μηδέποτε ἂν εὐδαιμονίαν ὑπάρχειν, δίχα δὲ καὶ τῶν σωματικῶν καὶ τῶν ἐκτὸς τὴν ἀρετὴν αὐτάρκη πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν εἶναι.

Crates

797—Of Crates, Polemo's successor in the School, we know very little for certain. Diog. speaks about his intimate friendship with Polemo and his relations with Crantor.

Diog. L. IV 21-22:

Κράτης πατρὸς μὲν ἦν Ἀντιγένους <Ἀθηναῖος>, Θριάσιος δὲ τῶν δήμων, ἀκροατὴς ἅμα καὶ ἐρώμενος Πολέμωνος· ἀλλὰ καὶ διεδέξατο τὴν σχολὴν αὐτοῦ. Καὶ οὕτως ἀλλήλω ἐφιλείτην ὥστε καὶ ζῶντε οὐ μόνον τῶν αὐτῶν ἤστην ἐπιτηδευμάτων, ἀλλὰ καὶ μέχρι σχεδὸν ἀναπνοῆς ἐξωμοιώσθην ἀλλήλοιν καὶ θανόντε τῆς αὐτῆς ταφῆς ἐκοινωνείτην. ὅθεν Ἀνταγόρας εἰς ἄμφω τοῦτον ἐποίησε τὸν τρόπον·

Μνήματι τῷδε Κράτητα θεουδέα καὶ Πολέμωνα
ἔννεπε κρύπτεσθαι, ξεῖνε, παρερχόμενος,
ἄνδρας ὁμοφροσύνῃ μεγαλήτορας, ὧν ἄπο μῦθος
ἱερὸς ἤϊσσεν δαιμονίου στόματος,
καὶ βίοτος καθαρὸς σοφίας ἐπὶ θεῖον ἐκόσμει
αἰῶν' ἀστρέπτοις δόγμασι πειθόμενος.

ἔνθεν καὶ 'Αρκεσίλαον μετελθόντα παρὰ Θεοφράστου πρὸς αὐτοὺς λέγειν ὡς εἶεν θεοί τινες ἢ λείψανα τῶν ἐκ τοῦ χρυσοῦ γένους. — Συσσίτιον δέ φησιν αὐτῷ ὁ 'Αντίγονος εἶναι παρὰ Κράντορι, ὁμονόως συμβιούντων τούτων τε καὶ 'Αρκεσιλάου. τὴν δὲ οἴκησιν 'Αρκεσίλαον μὲν ἔχειν μετὰ Κράντορος, Πολέμωνα δὲ σὺν Κράτητι μετὰ Λυσικλέους τινὸς τῶν πολιτῶν.

798—Something more is known to us about Crantor. **Crantor**

a. Diog. L. IV 24:

Κράντωρ Σολεὺς θαυμαζόμενος ἐν τῇ ἑαυτοῦ πατρίδι ἀπῆρεν εἰς 'Αθήνας καὶ Ξενοκράτους διήκουσε Πολέμωνι συσχολάζων. Καὶ κατέλιπεν ὑπομνήματα εἰς μυριάδας στίχων τρεῖς, ὧν τινά τινες 'Αρκεσιλάῳ προσάπτουσι.

b. As we saw before, he lived together with Arcesilas. He died before Polemo and Crates.

Diog. IV 27:

Καὶ κατέστρεψε πρὸ Πολέμωνος καὶ Κράτητος.

799—**a.** Proclus *in Tim.* 24 A mentions him as the first to write commentaries on Plato, at least on the *Timaeus*: **His commentary on the *Timaeus***

(Κρ.) ὁ πρῶτος τοῦ Πλάτωνος ἐξηγητής.

b. Plutarch cites this commentary in his *De an. procr.* 2, p. 1012 f.: **The creation of the soul**

Οἱ δὲ περὶ τὸν Κράντορα μάλιστα τῆς ψυχῆς ἴδιον ὑπολαμβάνοντες ἔργον εἶναι τὸ κρίνειν τά τε νοητὰ καὶ τὰ αἰσθητά, τάς τε τούτων ἐν αὐτοῖς καὶ πρὸς ἄλληλα γινομένας διαφορὰς καὶ ὁμοιότητας, ἐκ πάντων φασίν, ἵνα πάντα γινώσκῃ, συγκεκρᾶσθαι τὴν ψυχήν· ταῦτα δ' εἶναι τέτταρα, τὴν νοητὴν φύσιν ἀεὶ κατὰ τὰ αὐτὰ καὶ ὡσαύτως ἔχουσαν, καὶ τὴν περὶ τὰ σώματα παθητικὴν καὶ μεταβλητήν· ἔτι δὲ τὴν ταὐτοῦ καὶ τοῦ ἑτέρου, διὰ τὸ κἀκείνων ἑκατέραν μετέχειν ἑτερότητος καὶ ταυτότητος.

800—He cites it again in the same work, a few lines further, on the eternity of the world and the non-literal interpretation of the *Timaeus*. **The eternity of the world**

Plut., *De an. procr.* 3, p. 1013 A:

Τὰ δ' αὐτὰ καὶ περὶ τοῦ κόσμου διανοούμενον, ἐπίστασθαι μὲν ἀΐδιον ὄντα καὶ ἀγένητον· τὸ δὲ ᾧ τρόπῳ συντέτακται καὶ διοικεῖται καταμαθεῖν οὐ ῥᾴδιον ὁρῶντα τοῖς μήτε γένεσιν αὐτοῦ μήτε τῶν γενητικῶν σύνοδον ἐξ ἀρχῆς προϋποθεμένοις, ταύτην τὴν ὁδὸν τραπέσθαι.

801—A fragment of his ethics is preserved in Sextus, *Math.* XI (= *Adv. Eth.*) 51-58: **Ethics**

Some authors have been cited who call health the highest good. S. continues:

The highest good

'Αγαθὸν δ' εἶπαν αὐτὴν ὑπάρχειν, οὐ μὴν καὶ πρῶτον, οἵ τε ἀπὸ τῆς 'Ακα- 51
δημείας καὶ οἱ ἀπὸ τοῦ Περιπάτου. δεῖν γὰρ ὑπέλαβον ἑκάστῳ τῶν ἀγαθῶν τὴν οἰκείαν τάξιν τε καὶ ἀξίαν ἀπονέμειν. ἔνθεν καὶ ὁ Κράντωρ εἰς ἔμφασιν τοῦ λεγομένου βουλόμενος ἡμᾶς ἄγειν πάνυ χαρίεντι συνεχρήσατο παραδείγματι. εἰ γὰρ νοήσαιμεν, φησί, κοινόν τι τῶν Πανελλήνων θέατρον, εἰς τοῦτό τε ἕκα- 52
στον τῶν ἀγαθῶν παριὸν καὶ τῶν πρωτείων ἀντιποιούμενον ἥκειν, εὐθὺς καὶ εἰς ἔννοιαν ἀναχθησόμεθα τῆς ἐν τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς διαφορᾶς. πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ ὁ 53
πλοῦτος παραπηδήσας ἐρεῖ· »ἐγώ, ἄνδρες Πανέλληνες, κόσμον παρέχων πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις καὶ τὰς ἐσθῆτας καὶ τὰς ὑποδέσεις καὶ τὴν ἄλλην ἀπόλαυσιν χρειώδης εἰμὶ νοσοῦσι καὶ ὑγιαίνουσι, καὶ ἐν μὲν εἰρήνῃ παρέχω τὰ τερπνά, ἐν δὲ πολέμοις νεῦρα τῶν πράξεων γίνομαι«. τούτων γὰρ δὴ τῶν λόγων ἀκού- 54
σαντες οἱ Πανέλληνες ὁμοθυμαδὸν κελεύσουσιν ἀποδοῦναι τὰ πρωτεῖα τῷ πλούτῳ. ἀλλ' ἐὰν τούτου ἤδη ἀνακηρυττομένου ἐπιστᾶσα ἡ ἡδονή,

> τῇ ἕνι μὲν φιλότης, ἕνι δ' ἵμερος, ἐν δ' ὀαριστύς,
> πάρφασις, ἥ τ' ἔκλεψε νόον πύκα περ φρονεόντων [1],

λέγῃ δὲ εἰς μέσον καταστᾶσα, ὅτι αὐτὴν δίκαιόν ἐστιν ἀναγορεύειν 55

> (ὁ δ' ὄλβος οὐ βέβαιος, ἀλλ' ἐφήμερος
> ἐξέπτατ' οἴκων, μικρὸν ἀνθήσας χρόνον [2],

διώκεταί τε πρὸς τῶν ἀνθρώπων οὐ δι' ἑαυτόν, ἀλλὰ τὴν ἐξ αὐτοῦ περιγινομένην ἀπόλαυσιν καὶ ἡδονήν), πάντως οἱ Πανέλληνες, οὐκ ἄλλως ἔχειν τὸ πρᾶγμα ἢ οὕτως ὑπολαβόντες, κεκράξονται δεῖν τὴν ἡδονὴν στεφανοῦν. ἀλλὰ καὶ ταύτης τὸ βραβεῖον φέρεσθαι μελλούσης, ἐπὴν εἰσβάλλῃ ἡ ὑγεία μετὰ τῶν 56
συνέδρων αὐτῇ θεῶν, καὶ διδάσκῃ, ὡς οὔτε ἡδονῆς οὔτε πλούτου ὄφελός τι ἐστὶν ἀπούσης αὐτῆς

> (τί γάρ με πλοῦτος, < . . . . > ὠφελεῖ νόσον;
> μίκρ' ἂν θέλοιμι καὶ καθ' ἡμέραν ἔχων
> ἄλυπον οἰκεῖν βίοτον ἢ πλουτῶν νοσεῖν) [3],

ἀκούσαντες πάλιν οἱ Πανέλληνες καὶ μεταμαθόντες, ὡς οὐκ ἔνεστι κλινοπετῆ 57
καὶ νοσοῦσαν ὑποστῆναι τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν, φήσουσι νικᾶν τὴν ὑγείαν. ἀλλὰ καὶ τῆς ὑγείας ἤδη νικώσης, ἐπὰν εἰσέλθῃ ἡ ἀνδρεία πολὺ στῖφος ἀριστέων καὶ ἡρώων ἔχουσα περὶ ἑαυτήν, καταστᾶσά τε λέγῃ· »ἐμοῦ μὴ παρούσης, ἄνδρες 58

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[1] *Ilias* XIV 216.
[2] Eur., *Phoen.* 558 and *Electra* 944.
[3] Eur., fr. 714 Nauck.

Ἕλληνες, ἀλλοτρία γίνεται ἡ κτῆσις τῶν παρ' ὑμῖν ἀγαθῶν, εὔξαιντό τ' ἂν οἱ πολέμιοι περιουσιάζειν ὑμᾶς πᾶσι τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς ὡς μελλήσοντες ὑμῶν κρατεῖν«, καὶ τούτων οὖν ἀκούσαντες οἱ Ἕλληνες τὰ μὲν πρωτεῖα τῇ ἀρετῇ ἀποδώσουσι, τὰ δὲ δευτερεῖα τῇ ὑγείᾳ, τὰ δὲ τρίτα τῇ ἡδονῇ, τελευταῖον δὲ τάξουσι τὸν πλοῦτον.

802—**a**. Cr. was the author of a Περὶ πένθους, which became the pattern of many later *Consolationes*. Plutarchus quotes it in the following passage of his *Consol. ad Apollonium*, 3, p. 102: **The** πς πένθους

Οὐ γὰρ ἔγωγε συμφέρομαι τοῖς τὴν ἄγριον ὑμνοῦσι καὶ σκληρὰν ἀπάθειαν, ἔξω καὶ τοῦ δυνατοῦ καὶ τοῦ συμφέροντος οὖσαν· ἀφαιρήσεται γὰρ ἡμῶν αὕτη τὴν ἐκ τοῦ φιλεῖσθαι καὶ φιλεῖν εὔνοιαν, ἣν παντὸς μᾶλλον διασώζειν ἀναγκαῖον. Τὸ δὲ πέρα τοῦ μέτρου παρεκφέρεσθαι καὶ συναύξειν τὰ πένθη παρὰ φύσιν εἶναί φημι, καὶ ὑπὸ τῆς ἐν ἡμῖν φαύλης γίνεσθαι δόξης. Διὸ καὶ τοῦτο μὲν ἐατέον ὡς βλαβερὸν καὶ φαῦλον, καὶ σπουδαίοις ἀνδράσιν ἥκιστα πρέπον· τὴν δὲ μετριοπάθειαν οὐκ ἀποδοκιμαστέον. Μὴ γὰρ νοσοῖμεν, φησὶν ὁ Ἀκαδημαϊκὸς Κράντωρ, νοσήσασι δὲ παρείη τις αἴσθησις, εἴτ' οὖν τέμνοιτό τι τῶν ἡμετέρων, εἴτ' ἀποσπῷτο· τὸ γὰρ ἀνώδυνον τοῦτο οὐκ ἄνευ μεγάλων ἐγγίνεται μισθῶν τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ· τεθηριῶσθαι γὰρ εἰκὸς, ἐκεῖ μὲν σῶμα τοιοῦτον, ἐνταῦθα δὲ ψυχήν.

How far the quotation goes, may be seen in Cicero, *Tusc.* III 6, 12:
Nec absurde Crantor ille, qui in nostra Academia vel in primis fuit nobilis, 'minime', inquit, 'adsentior iis, qui istam nescio quam indolentiam magno opere laudant, quae nec potest ulla esse nec debet. ne aegrotus sim; si' inquit 'fuero, sensus adsit, sive secetur quid sive avellatur a corpore. nam istuc nihil dolere non sine magna mercede contingit inmanitatis in animo, stuporis in corpore'.

b. Again, Cicero quotes the same work of Crantor in the following passage.

Acad. pr. (= Lucullus) 44, 135-136:
Sed quaero quando ista fuerint Academia vetere decreta, ut animam sapientis commoveri et conturbari negarent: mediocritates illi probabant et in omni permotione naturalem volebant esse quendam modum. legimus omnes Crantoris veteris Academici de luctu; est enim non magnus verum aureolus et ut Tuberoni Panaetius praecipit ad verbum ediscendus libellus, atque illi quidem etiam utiliter a natura dicebant permotiones istas animis nostris datas, metum cavendi causa, misericordiam aegritudinemque clementiae; ipsam iracundiam fortitudinis quasi cotem esse dicebant — recte secusne alias viderimus; atrocitas quidem ista tua quomodo in veterem Academiam inruperit nescio.

Cr.'s name as a moralist

803—Horatius, *Epist.* I 2, 4 mentions him as a moralist on a level with Chrysippus:

> qui quid sit pulchrum, quid turpe, quid utile, quid non,
> planius ac melius Chrysippo et Crantore dicit.

His view of life

804—Crantor's view of life, as it appears in Plutarch's *Consol. ad Apoll.* 27:

Πολλοῖς γὰρ καὶ σοφοῖς ἀνδράσιν, ὥς φησι Κράντωρ, οὐ νῦν, ἀλλὰ πάλαι κέκλαυσται τἀνθρώπινα, τιμωρίαν ἡγουμένοις εἶναι τὸν βίον, καὶ ἀρχὴν τὸ γενέσθαι ἄνθρωπον συμφορὰν τὴν μεγίστην.

Plut. quotes it together with the young Aristotle's tale of Midas and Silenus in the dialogue *Eudemus* (see our nr. **417a**).

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ERRATA

419 b, l. 8: τί οὖν ὑμῖν ὄφελος — read: ἡμῖν
424 b, fourth al.: See also *Metaph.* Λ δ — read: Λ 8.
Sub **429 b**: the final passage of *Metaph.* Λ 8 — read: Λ 10.