UNIVERSAL
LIBRARY

THE CURTAIN ISN'T IRON

By the same author

PATTERN OF CONQUEST

THE CURTAIN ISN'T IRON

By

JOSEPH C. HARSCH

LONDON
PUTNAM & CO. LTD.
42 Great Russell Street

Published in Great Britain 1950

Printed in Great Britain by
UNWIN BROTHERS LIMITED. WOKING AND LONDON

To my parents,
Leila Katherine and Paul Arthur Harsch,
who taught me to search for the way of
patience and understanding

MUCH of the material in this book appeared originally in the pages of *The Christian Science Monitor*, *Harper's* magazine, *The Reporter*, and in broadcasts for the Columbia Broadcasting System. Some was written for a publication of the Foreign Policy Association. Author and publisher acknowledge the gracious permission of these organizations to use the material either in original or in revised form.

Amelia Belle Young contributed substantially to the original thinking and research.

The work of compiling, revising and editing has been done by Helene Hawkins Morse.

book do support two conclusions whic lead to hope for peace, rather than a fatalistic expectation of war. One of these is that the "iron curtain" is in fact neither iron nor a tier of provinces consolidated firmly into the Soviet Russian domain. Rather it is a twilight zone in which many cross currents swirl and struggle. The result is by no means certain to satisfy the wishes of the Kremlin even if there is no war to disturb the Kremlin's plans. The second conclusion, stemming from the first, is that between war on the one hand and appeasement on the other there is room for a middle way out of the present impasse. It involves a realization that the Soviet system contains just as many seeds of its own undoing as communist doctrine assumes are contained in western "capitalism"; and that while these seeds require careful watering and fertilizing on our part if they are to grow and blossom into features of a safer world, yet they do exist and they can be nourished once we recognize their presence.

The import of such conclusions hardly needs underlining. If the curtain is iron and if all Europe is to be seen in terms of a stark contrast between red and white then there is an already frozen situation seriously to the disadvantage of America. Down the end of that road lies the inevitable war which would probably leave not only most of European but also American society unrecognizable. It would seem to me that the above is a false concept and a false context for our political thinking. It would seem to me that eastern Europe is rather a twilight zone, and that to under-

stand the existence of a twilight zone is to appreciate not only that Soviet influence can be contained and contracted, if we are wise enough for the task, but also that in a wise and patient policy of containment we may find the means to our own rescue from what a third world war might do to the world.

This book does not purport to be a conclusive or a complete treatment of its subject. It is based on observations made during two visits to eastern Europe, the first in 1947 and the second in 1949, and on the kind of continuing attention to the subject which a journalist dealing daily with foreign affairs gives to the most active front in the biggest power struggle of our times. The findings "behind the curtain" are not the product of any systematic sampling of mass opinion or experience. The writer had no time to use such an exhaustive technique. They are the product of the journalistic technique which depends for its validity on the ability of the individual reporter to assess accurately the weight of the opinions he collects on his travels. The result is only as good as his own ability to sense the difference between the relevant and the irrelevant fact, the sound and the unsound opinion. On travels such as those which lie behind this book the observer gathers everything he can from every possible source and then does his best to sift, weigh, and evaluate his material. In this case the original sources were the behaviour and chance remarks of people on the streets, the appearance of the countryside, the opinions and assessments by officials of American, British, and oc-

casionally other "friendly" embassies and legations, the statements of local government officials taken with liberal sprinklings of salt, and the views of American and British correspondents permanently assigned to such countries.

Georgetown, D.C.
May 15, 1949

CONTENTS

I

The United States in Eastern Europe—The Problem and the Record

PROBABLY ninety-nine out of every one hundred Americans are quite unaware that they care about eastern Europe. Except on rare occasions they are not consciously interested in that part of the world.

And yet they *are* distinctly concerned about it.

Their real interest was shown by the wave of resentment which swept the country when the Communists clamped down on Czechoslovakia in early 1948. The American people proved on that occasion that they are acutely interested in what goes on in the part of the world known popularly as the Iron Curtain area. The evidence was so impressive and so sudden that it pleasantly startled the diplomats at the State Department. Those diplomats had not appreciated in advance the extent of public interest. Apparently it startled the Russians too. The Russian hand since that date has moved more hesitantly, more cautiously. The old, easy assurance which bespoke an assumption that anything could be done safely no longer existed.

There is other evidence of the American interest. One item is the depth and extent of the feeling that Franklin Delano Roosevelt made a bad deal for his country at Yalta. The agreement at Yalta appeared to give the Russians more or less a free hand in eastern Europe. Mr. Roosevelt has been more consistently and tenaciously and vehemently criticized over Yalta than over any other act of his wartime presidency.

Another item of evidence is supplied in the frustration endured by Americans interested in some other part of the world bordering on Russia. Such persons have attempted to get the American people to turn their gaze to China, or southern Asia, or the Middle East. They have lamented the alleged neglect of those other fronts of the cold war. They have accused Washington of being blind to the danger of communist expansion everywhere except in eastern Europe. Yet these appeals have not yet succeeded in making any other front the subject of as much sustained interest as eastern Europe.

Behind this greater interest in, and awareness of, the struggle for influence over eastern Europe lie many reasons. The simplest and most obvious of them is that millions of American citizens are sons or grandsons of the eastern European peoples. Few descend from Chinese, Malayans, or Persians. Another reason is that the Western world has been accustomed to extensive trade with eastern Europe. That trade has been disturbed by Kremlin policies. The disturbance has been a blow to the economic life of western Europe. It is one

of the reasons why the Marshall Plan was necessary, and it is a continuing reason why Marshall Planners have begun to fear that western Europe will not have achieved economic health by the time the Marshall Plan is scheduled to end in 1952.

Then there is a third and much more basic reason. It is the power-politics consideration that the tier of states extending northward from the Aegean Sea to the Baltic can weight the balance of power in the world decisively in favour of either the West or Soviet Russia. If these states are added permanently to the power domain of Soviet Russia, then western Europe becomes a peninsula jutting precariously from a vast Russian mainland. But if these states incline to the West, or even develop an independent identity of their own which is separate from that of Russia, then Russia's physical power in, and influence over, Europe is contained short of the outer boundaries of the Slavic peoples. If this latter condition prevails, Europe resumes its historic role as a major and independent force in the world.

Nowhere else around the frontiers of Russia is so much at stake as in eastern Europe.

Finally, eastern Europe is the only place where East and West are in close and intimate conflict on plains and along rivers which have been the highways of armies for centuries. Elsewhere geography makes contact tenuous, conflict difficult, and engagements indecisive. The industrial and population heart of Soviet Russia still lies between the Polish marshes and the

Ural Mountains. That area is near to central and western Europe. Russia can most easily and quickly project her power westward through Poland. The shortest road from Washington, London, and Paris to Moscow lies through Poland—not through China or Burma or Persia. And the same holds true in reverse.

The West and Russia could fight each other over China, but it would be difficult for both, because the operation would have to be conducted over long and vulnerable lines of communication. It is clear that it would not be the part of wisdom for the West to allow China, or any other of the remote fronts of the cold war, to become the *casus belli* of a live war. Those other fronts are important, but they are not vital to either side. Eastern Europe is vital. Americans reflect this in their resentment over the communist coup in Czechoslovakia, by their criticism of President Roosevelt's handling of Yalta, by their avid interest in the doings of a man named Tito in a country as small as Yugoslavia, and by their equally avid interest in the fate of Cardinal Mindszenty in Hungary. Americans show by all these things that they are interested subconsciously if not always consciously in anything and everything which affects the future of eastern Europe. Therefore it is a demonstrated fact in to-day's world that the United States is interested—culturally, economically, politically, and strategically—in eastern Europe.

In theory America is committed to the general pro-

position that Russia must not expand her influence anywhere. In practice America is committed to the specific proposition that Soviet Russia must not be allowed to consolidate a total power monopoly over eastern Europe. America has not gone to war to keep communism out of China. America could be involved in war very easily by events in eastern Europe. That is the one place where the cold war is desperately dangerous but also the place which might conceivably breed a resolution of the cold war, for the effective neutralization of that area would relieve both sides of a major reason for their fear of each other.

The question which dominates Washington thinking, looking eastward from Germany, is how Russian influence in eastern Europe can be reduced below the danger line. Or put it this way: how best can American policy proceed toward the end of preventing a consolidation of a Russian power monopoly over eastern and central Europe?

Men may differ, as they do, over whether America should commit itself to this task. The Wallace school of thought contends that eastern Europe is just as much the proper and natural sphere of Soviet influence as Central America is the proper and natural sphere of United States interest. Yet it is plain that majority opinion in America has rejected this concept of a suitable destiny for eastern Europe. American world strategy to-day is directed consciously and deliberately not only toward the containment of Russian influence within its present frontiers, but also toward its enforced

retreat behind those frontiers. What America wants, plainly, is a Soviet Russia whose monopoly of power does not extend beyond the actual, recognized boundaries of Russia itself.

This is a simple and cardinal policy of the United States. That America should seek a contraction of Soviet influence in eastern Europe is no longer seriously controversial either in the councils of state in Washington or in public. But the details of the objective and the means to be employed to the agreed end are still far from being defined. It is one thing to say that Soviet Russia must not be allowed to enjoy a continuing monopoly in eastern Europe. It would be quite another to say that the United States should itself gain the monopoly of influence there. Or, to put it slightly differently, it is one thing to say that Russian influence must be reduced in eastern Europe. It would be quite another thing to say that Russian influence must be eliminated entirely.

Then there is the question of means to the end. Does America think in terms of working to overthrow the governments now serving Moscow's purposes in eastern Europe, or in terms of seeking gradually to encourage those governments to amend their policies and inclinations toward a neutral position between Russia and the West?

These are questions still very much in the domain of controversy. Actual American behaviour in and toward eastern Europe reflects that controversy. It has never been clear-cut, sure of itself, positive. It has

vacillated back and forth between an effort, real though never formalized openly, to pull down the existing governments and everything they have done and a conflicting effort to develop western connections with those governments and by various means to encourage them to become independent of Moscow. Frequently there have been two American hands working in eastern Europe, each cancelling out whatever the other accomplished.

This conflict has been expressed in the behaviour of various American ambassadors. Not until mid-1949 did the American missions in eastern Europe begin to follow anything resembling a uniform line of conduct. Before that time each ambassador behaved as he saw fit. Some, like Arthur Schoenfeld in Budapest, operated on the traditional principle of diplomacy that a diplomatic mission is accredited to the government in power, whether he likes it or not, and should deal with that government and refrain scrupulously from any action which could be interpreted as interference in the domestic affairs of the country. Others, like Arthur Bliss Lane in Poland and Richard C. Patterson, Jr., in Yugoslavia, conducted themselves as though it were America's avowed purpose to bring down the governments to which they were accredited. This duality of approach did not imply insubordination on the part of either group. Each reflected a point of view held strongly in the State Department in Washington. One reflected the possibility that even puppet governments set up by Russia might some day seek their inde-

pendence. The other reflected the theory that a Russian puppet government will always remain loyal to Moscow and that the only way to serve American interests is to attempt to destroy it.

The conflict of approach showed up most graphically in the attitude toward Yugoslavia following Marshal Tito's break with Moscow. The American diplomatic mission in Belgrade, headed at that time by Ambassador Cavendish Cannon, assessed the break almost from the first day as being genuine, as being to the advantage of American interests, and as being a condition which American policy should support by all wise and appropriate means. But while Ambassador Cannon in Belgrade was doing his utmost to sustain and encourage Marshal Tito in his difficult march away from Moscow, other American hands in eastern Europe toyed quite seriously with the idea of using Tito's predicament as an opportunity to destroy him. Those other "hands" were suppressed, but their existence illustrated the duality of the American approach.

The same duality showed up most prominently of all in the American attitude toward trade relations with the Eastern countries. In this field American policy has swung back and forth between encouraging trade on the one hand and applying what are in fact, though not in name, economic sanctions on the other. Two powerful considerations have operated in the background. On the one hand encouragement of trade would speed the industrial recovery of eastern Europe. This would tend to strengthen the regimes with their own people.

It would also tend to enhance the war-making potential of the Soviet orbit. That is a powerful argument against trade with the area. On the other hand the economic recovery of western Europe depends on a resumption of East-West trade. The Marshall Plan itself is built on the assumption that East-West trade will return to something approaching its pre-war dimensions. For example, German industry can never revive even to its pre-Hitler levels until it regains access to Eastern raw materials and Eastern markets. Without Polish coal western Europe's recovery would be set back disastrously. Marshall Plan calculations all called for maximum resumption of East-West trade. When the Marshall Plan was set up all the eastern countries were invited to Paris to join, and while there can be doubt as to the sincerity of the invitation sent to Moscow, there is no doubt of the sincerity of the invitation extended to Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia. They were wanted in Paris—wanted sincerely and vigorously. There was grave concern among Marshall Planners when Poland and Czechoslovakia, after first accepting, declined under Kremlin pressure.

When two such powerful considerations come into conflict it is no wonder that American trade policy has been unable to be consistent. As a result American economic sanctions have irritated the Eastern governments and sometimes caused them real difficulties, but they have never been applied consistently enough or vigorously enough to damage seriously the Eastern economies. Every move in that direction has come up

against retaliations which would have injured recovery in western Europe.

Finally, no summary of actual American conduct in eastern Europe can be complete without a reference to one probably inevitable but unfortunate aftermath of war. The military officers and men who went to Budapest, Bucharest, and Sophia were mostly graduates of the march through Germany. There they had learned the fine art of "liberating." They also acquired the manner of conquerors. While Russian armies did much to make Russian communism unpopular in Austria and Germany, some American officers and soldiers contributed to a weakening of American influence in some places to the east. Budapest was the notorious example. To put it charitably, the American military hand there was clumsy and of small help to the diplomatic mission. The crowning example was a case of two officers sent on a rather obvious intelligence mission toward the Yugoslav frontier. They made themselves so conspicuous by picking up a pair of blondes that the Hungarian police were forced to interfere. When the Hungarian Government requested their recall it said that it did so with regret, since the two men had been such clumsy operators that they had disclosed the identity of several hundred active opponents of the regime. All the Hungarian police needed to do to ferret out opposition was to follow the well-marked trail of the two officers. The episode did not help the American legation in its contention that it did not interfere in the domestic affairs of Hungary or in its protests against

Russian interference. This took place after the retirement of Minister Schoenfeld.

Since early 1949 the duality of American behaviour toward the eastern European governments has declined. Ambassadors Patterson and Bliss Lane have been recalled. They have been replaced by men of the Schoenfeld school of diplomacy. That does not mean that there has been any undignified courting of the satellite regimes or any diminution in American expressions of disapproval of breaches of international law or of the peace treaties. American diplomacy constantly calls attention to such violations and constantly protests against them. But the old chip-on-the-shoulder attitude has been dropped. The practitioners of American diplomacy in eastern Europe now operate quietly and with careful regard for the diplomatic proprieties. Above all, they seek to avoid the indiscretions and the ebullience which in the earlier periods gave their opponents much ammunition to turn against the United States. In early 1949 a new military attache arrived at one of our eastern European missions. We can leave the name and place charitably anonymous. He came with large surplus stores of furniture, clothes, and food. He was warned on the morning of his arrival that his chauffeur was undoubtedly an agent of the local security police. In spite of that warning he immediately sent the chauffeur out to contact the black market and inform the traders of what he had to sell. By the next morning his proposed enterprise was the talk of the town. By evening of his second day he had been

shipped out by his ambassador. His type is no longer tolerated. Nor does American intelligence call attention to itself any more by mixing its work with its wooing. Intelligence work goes on, of course, but it is done more discreetly than of yore.

The Tito revolt against Moscow has influenced the attitude of all American missions in the area toward their work. They all recognize the possibility that liberation is probably more likely to come, if it ever does, through disaffection inside the existing ruling parties than from the old dispossessed classes. More time is now spent in studying and watching the evolution of power inside the regimes than in cultivating the dispossessed classes. But the old duality continues in the field of trade relations. It reflects a controversy at home which is not resolved and which can never be resolved until America can clarify in its own mind precisely what it would like to see emerge in eastern Europe.

Traditionally, that part of the world has always been a twilight zone between East and West. It has never been dominated totally by either one for any substantial period of time. It has an identity of its own which is the product of the conflict of interests which meet and blend, or struggle, within its cultural, social, and economic life.

Since the end of the war it has plainly been Soviet Russian policy to end this established condition, to remould the eastern European tier of states into Russia's image, and, presumably, to merge them ultimately within the formal frontiers of the Soviet Union.

America's difficulties in deciding just what its purpose is, and how to achieve that purpose, spring from confused information as to what Russia has succeeded in doing so far and from a strong tendency to oversimplify the picture of eastern Europe. Thanks to the split between Marshal Tito of Yugoslavia and the Cominform much new light has been thrown on the problem and on the means to its solution.

Until the Tito break with the Cominform there was a strong tendency to assume that Moscow's grip on eastern Europe could be broken only by war. Also until the Tito break, there was a strong tendency to assume that American purposes could be achieved only by a restoration to power of the elements which had controlled the power before the war in each of the Eastern countries.

Whether these assumptions are valid depends partly on a definition of American objectives and partly on a calculation as to whether governments which have taken office under the aegis of the Red Army and in the name of Russian communism will continue indefinitely to govern their countries primarily in the interest of Soviet Russia.

The analysis of these two aspects of the matter begins with precisely what has happened in the "satellite" countries since their "liberation" by the Red Army. There are three principal elements in what has happened. One is the fact of dominant Russian influence which in the beginning was universal throughout the area in the control of the Red Army and still exists

everywhere except in Yugoslavia. The second is a social revolution. The third is the employment of standard Russian police state methods.

The great question is whether these three elements of the pattern in eastern Europe, from the American point of view, are separable or inseparable. Or, to state it differently, are American interests in eastern Europe served adequately if dominant Russian influence is broken, or can they be served adequately only if all three manifestations of the Soviet period are broken?

It would certainly be true to say that if America defines its purpose in eastern Europe to be the breaking of Russian control, the undoing of the social revolution, the restoration of the political *status quo,* and the end of police states, then the American end can be gained only by war. There is a strong doubt that even a quick and successful war could produce all of these changes. It might produce the appearance of them for a short time—the duration of an American military occupation. But it is unquestionable that war is the only method which would offer even a slight hope of achieving such an ambitious American policy in eastern Europe.

Without a war the probabilities are strong that the social revolution will be consolidated throughout eastern Europe, no matter what the future relations of those countries with Russia and the West may be. And without a war it is highly unlikely that there will be early evidences of liberalized police rule in Yugoslavia. Tito has speeded his communist policies since the break, and has been forced, for his own protection, to

tighten his police rule. The only difference in this last respect is that the attentions of his secret police are now directed primarily against Cominform agents instead of against agents of the West and members of the dispossessed class. Of late there has been some relaxation in Yugoslavia of pressure on right-wing survivors of the old anti-communist upper class.

It is axiomatic, of course, that any other eastern European country which breaks from Moscow will also have to intensify its police rule in order to survive the pressures from Moscow and the Cominform.

The problem for America in eastern Europe really comes down to the following: If America wants to wipe out everything that has happened during the past four years it must go to war with Russia, liberate eastern Europe by force of arms, and attempt to reimpose the pre-war *status quo.* The attempt would probably fail. But there is a chance, providing everything went according to plan, that it might be done.

On the other hand, if America is interested primarily in breaking the exclusive control of Moscow there is a fairly good chance of success short of war. It has already happened in Yugoslavia without any effort on America's part whatsoever. It could happen in other places. If America were willing and skilful it might help Tito penetrate those areas where his brand of communism has proved itself to be a more effective instrument for political operations than have Western liberalism, Western free enterprise, and *emigre* groups.

However, the end result of such a process would not

be an eastern Europe totally free from Russian influence or totally dominated by Western influence. A Tito is unlikely ever to subordinate himself to anyone. What would come out of it would be a revival of the eastern European twilight zone in which Western influence would continually vie with Russian influence. The best that might come of it would be a buffer area separating Russia and the West. That might be the most practicable solution. It is certainly the solution which eastern Europe itself would prefer.

2

Russia—A Religious State?

PROLONGED consideration of Soviet Russia does not properly belong within the covers of this book, which is about the countries living under the shadow of Russian influence. But it is not possible to approach an estimate of present conditions and future prospects among those countries without investigating the bulk which throws the shadow. Just what is the true nature of this political phenomenon we call Soviet Russia which so absorbs our interests and sometimes obsesses our attention?

To us Russia seems totally unfamiliar. It bears no real relationship to the kind of political entity familiar to us in the Americas or known to us in Europe. We are frightened by it partly because of the acquisitive power it obviously possesses, but partly also because we have a feeling that we are confronted by the unknown—by something new to history, something which never existed before.

It would, I think, clarify our thinking if we could

appreciate that actually Soviet Russia is not a new thing in this world. It is rather a combination painfully familiar to anyone who reads history. It is the combination of a strong state with a strong philosophy.

In effect it is the religious state, or Church state. In this case its religion is anti-religion, its God is anti-God, its faith materialistic, not spiritual. Yet anti-religion is a form of religion. The French revolutionaries literally worshipped the Goddess of Reason. The Nazis revived the paganism of Wotan. Just so Stalin's Communists have made a cult of atheism, dialectical materialism, and the super state, and combined that cult with the Russian state, and made the purpose of the cult the purpose of the state. The purpose of the cult is the conversion of the world to communism. The avowed purpose of the Russian state is to develop Russia as the physical base for communist world revolution.

All of that is the direct opposite of our own concept of the purpose of government. Among ourselves we Americans disagree as to how our government should serve our interest. But we do agree—most of us—that the function of government should be to govern for our material welfare, not for some purpose beyond our material welfare. Our founding fathers were passionately careful to write the separation of Church and state into our own political foundations and they did it for a reason. The bloodiest pages of history have been written by church states.

What challenges us to-day is not the doctrine of communism alone, or the Russian state alone, but the com-

bination of the two. Communism is not the only universal dogma afoot in the world. In Cairo to-day orthodox Moslems still preach the holy war against all infidels. But their preaching does us not the slightest harm, because Mohammedanism is no longer combined with a power state. It was once, some twelve hundred years ago, just as communism is combined to-day with the Russian state. In those ancient days a united Moslem world made war on all the rest of the world. Islam pushed east and west. To the east it was stopped only by the physical barriers of the Himalaya Mountains and the Pacific Ocean. To the west it was stopped only by the thick walls of Vienna and the strong arms of men like Charles Martel at Tours and Roland and Oliver, the fabulous paladins of Charlemagne, at Roncevalles. After the Christian world had turned back the religious state of Islam, Christians divided themselves into rival religious states. The most destructive wars in Western history were the wars fought between Catholic and Protestant states. It took Germany a century to recover from the awful destruction of life and wealth in the Thirty Years' War. It may take Germany as much as another ten years to recover from her losses in this last war, but probably not so long.

Communism as an idea separate from the Russian state would do us no more harm than a lot of other millennial ideas which circulate freely in our midst. Communism was harmless at Brook Farm outside Concord, Massachusetts, in the days of Emerson and Thoreau. Communism, by itself, is simply one theory

of how to bring about the millennium, like the single-**tax** theory.

And the Russian state separated from communist dogma couldn't do us much harm either. The average Russian is quite as isolationist in his inclinations as we would like to be. He is no world wanderer like the Englishman of Queen Elizabeth's day. The world has found it fairly easy in times past to cope with a Russian state which was just that and no more.

But when you have the two combined—a concept which would bend all men to its dogma and a power base as big as Russia—then you have something like Islam, or the rival Catholic and Protestant states of the period of the religious wars, or the combining of the Roman Empire with Christianity under Constantine. When a leader of a powerful state takes a mystic symbol in his hand and says, "In this sign thou shalt conquer," there always is trouble. Those who disagree with the new faith either accept it or fight for their lives and their own faiths.

We of the West have resolved our older religious wars. Moslems and Christians, Catholics, Protestants, and Jews neither try to slit one another's throats nor are afraid of having their own slit when they live together under a government which is neutral like ours in their religious differences, although Moslems, Christians, Catholics, and Protestants all hold to universal doctrines. The Jews are different. Their faith is exclusive, not universal. They don't care so much about converting the heathen. We might remember, however,

that if the Moslem, Shinto, Catholic, or Protestant faith were to be revived in fanatical form and combined again with a power state we would have the equivalent of what Soviet Russia is to-day—a religious state bent on forcible conversion. Every one of these faiths has done it in the past. In theory, though we trust not in practice, it could happen again.

So long as Soviet Russia remains a religious state bent on conversion of the world we who don't like its religion must defend ourselves as best we can against it. But that does not mean that our salvation requires either putting to the sword every Communist or wrecking the Russian state. We achieve our security if the Communist-Russian combination goes the way of all such combinations in the past. The key to the solution is not to destroy one or the other, but the separation of the one from the other. We must defend ourselves against the combination so long as it exists. But if history proves anything, it is that such a combination tends to fall apart. That can take a long time and a lot of outside help. Islam plagued the world for two centuries. But the time span has not always been that long. The crusading impetus of the French Revolution lasted scarcely ten years.

The history of such combinations of Church and state is that the fanaticism at the centre grows cold around the fringes. Long before the end of the Islamic empire the governors of its border provinces were doing political and commercial business with neighbouring Christian princes. We cannot calculate accurately how

long it will take for the process to work in the Soviet-Russian empire to the point where we can feel comfortable again. Conceivably the Communist-Russian combination is immune to the tendencies which have always weakened such combinations in the past. But they have operated in the past, always. And we have already seen them separate one of Stalin's outer provinces from the orthodox communion.

Perhaps Yugoslavia will be brought back to the Moscow fold by force or by treachery. Even if it is not, Yugoslavia will, in all probability, call itself a communist country for many years to come. But the fact remains that heresy in the classic manner has already done its routine work in Yugoslavia, to our advantage. We know that potential heresy exists in other Soviet provinces. We have good reason to believe that Moscow is seriously worried over how to sustain the purity of the communist faith in the vastnesses of China; we know that even the high priests of communism in the Kremlin have at times compromised the interests of world revolution for the immediate interests of the Russian people.

None of this says that we can afford to let down our guard. There might be no Christian world to-day if Charles Martel's sword had broken on the battlefield of Tours. There might be no Protestant world to-day if Drake had mishandled his ships against the Spanish Armada. Only the presence of the sword and the willingness to use it have held back the onrush of the religious state in its period of crusading ardour. But the

ardour does spend itself in time; the religious state does become either less a state or less militantly religious.

To-day Vatican City is all that is left of the once-powerful Papal State. To-day King Ibn Saud is a Moslem, but he does not consider it desirable to put the infidel to the sword either within or without his borders, no matter what the Koran says. In other words, the will to resist plus time has always before saved the unbelieving world from the religious state; making it harmless does not depend on our own actions alone.

We have allies within the opponents' household, the same allies which have always before helped to keep the world from belonging to one man or to one faith. The greatest of those allies is the very fact that the religious state does not put the material interests of its people first. The time comes when the people demand that their government serve them, not some other purpose.

The Russian-Communist state is not, and never has been, immune to the operations of that rule. The interests of communist world revolution arc not identical with the interests of the Russian people. Time and time again they have been in conflict and that conflict has been resolved sometimes one way and sometimes the other.

It was to the interest of communist world revolution that Russia observe toward her neighbours in this period of history that tolerance and consideration which Lenin practised after 1917 in the period of Russian

weakness. But whereas Lenin granted the independence of Lithuania, Latvia, and Esthonia, Stalin has incorporated those countries into the Russian state and thereby imposed on every Communist party the world around the burden of this evidence that Russia under Stalin is quite as eager to acquire real estate as ever was Russia under the Czars.

It was to the interest of communist world revolution that Russia treat her newly won satellites with generosity and consideration. It would have helped every Communist party organization the world around if Russia had contributed to the economic well-being of those countries. But instead of promoting economic well-being, Moscow sucked them dry of treasure, of consumer goods, and of self-respect.

It was to the interest of communist world revolution that Russia accord to non-Russian Communists the same importance granted to Russian Communists. Yet in the communist world there are two classes of citizenship, and only the Russian belongs to the first class.

On the other hand, it was to the interest of the Russian people that they be granted a respite from their labours of the last war. Such a respite might have been had, easily and happily. The Western world was bursting with good will toward the people of Russia as the two emerged from their great and successful labours of the war period. There was every readiness to welcome Russia into the partnership of free nations in the great task of rebuilding a safe and prosperous world. All that was necessary was that Russia put the interests of her

own people first and forget about world revolution. But Stalin felt it necessary to raise the standard of revolution again as early as March of 1946, and from that time the people of Russia have been straining under the requirements of an ideological struggle which may well lead to another war instead of relaxing in enjoyment of suitable rewards for their wartime efforts.

We of the West are well aware, and rightly so, of the strength and the menace of the Russian state wedded to the universal dogma of communism. But that marriage generates great internal stresses and strains which operate toward its own undoing. Communism makes enemies for Russia of those who would otherwise be her friends. Russia makes enemies for communism of those who might otherwise be interested in her teachings. We need not be totally obsessed by the picture Moscow would present to us of a vast power state joined with a political doctrine of great and demonstrated appeal. There is weakness as well as strength in that combination. History tells us that the formula of the religious state has never satisfied civilized man for long in his search for a means of governing himself and his fellows.

3

The Facts of Life in Europe To-day

M A N does not live by bread alone.

But in Europe to-day the movements of man's daily life are more frequently conditioned by his interest in bread than by his abstract political beliefs.

The morning after our arrival in Trieste the local allied government put a small harbour boat at our disposal. On it we toured probably the busiest small port in the world. That was in the spring of 1949. The first year of the Marshall Plan was in full swing. A dozen ships were steaming in and out. Scarcely a berth was empty around the big docks. On those docks goods of every description were piled so closely together that there was barely room for stevedores and trucks to operate. The figures showed that Trieste was handling more tonnage than it had at any other time since the last lush days of the Austro-Hungarian Empire before 1914.

Later, in the office of the American general commanding the port, we learned some of the political

background. The dock workers are almost to a man political Communists. They belong to either the Tito or the Stalin branch of the Communist party. As Titoists or Stalinists they are political enemies. As Communists both dutifully hate "American capitalism." And as Communists they read in their papers daily that the Marshall Plan is a weapon of "American war-mongering imperialism."

Yet the Allied High Command in Trieste has had almost no serious strike difficulties since the Marshall Plan began to operate. The communist stevedores don't seem to mind handling "capitalist" goods. They accept "capitalist" gold on pry-day without a sign of a qualm. More than that, they obligingly adjust their political "demonstrations" against America to the condition of the port. If a number of ships are at the dock on the official day for a particular demonstration they postpone that demonstration to some day when there is little harbour business. And if work is lost from the demonstration, they make it up on some other occasion.

To the stevedore in Trieste bread takes precedence over doctrine.

This phenomenon is not limited to Trieste. It is to be observed on both sides of the Iron Curtain—the same in eastern Europe as in western or central Europe.

In Italy there are some two million Communist party members—the largest membership in any country in the world except in Russia itself—and in elections about eight million pro-communist votes. These Communists

and their friends have staged many a demonstration against the policies of the West. Yet no Italian Communist on record has refused to eat bread on the ground that it was contaminated by capitalist American wheat. More than that, the Communist party of Italy found it expedient to drop its campaign against the Marshall Plan. Once that plan began to produce food its popularity was too great for the party to challenge.

In Rome I discovered that the American officials of embassy and Marshall Plan headquarters had become more concerned over the need for reform within Italy than over the arrival schedules of American ships. They had solved the problem of raising the Italian standard of living high enough to put Italy temporarily out of reach of communism. But they had come to the conclusion that it could be kept that way after the end of the Marshall Plan only if major reforms could be applied to the Italian social, political, and economic structure.

American policy in Italy does not urge land reform or hydroelectric power developments or payment of taxes by the rich and privileged for any doctrinary reason. American policy is promoting such measures because without them Italy must lapse back into a social and economic condition which will make it easy prey for communism once the Marshall Plan comes to an end. Italy desperately needs good government, and honest government, and a liquidation of the remnants of feudalism and privilege because those conditions are

all blocks on the road to stability. As a result Americans, many of them of strongly conservative political beliefs, put ceaseless pressure on the Italian Government to get on with promised land reforms, to introduce the rich and privileged to the tax collector, to put low-cost housing ahead of movie palaces on the building priority lists. In short, the ultimate success of American policy in Italy depends on the amount of social and economic reform which American officials can induce the Italian Government to carry out.

France has nothing like the need for reform which Italy has. Pre-World War I Italian economy was based on the annual export of surplus population to the outside world—particularly to the United States. No adequate substitute for that annual export of population has been discovered or invented. Italy must either become efficient and modern, and less prolific, or be a continuing burden on other parts of the world. France has no such basic problem. She can feed her own people. All France really needs to become stable, strong, and healthy is to make herself function. Potentially, France is the soundest country in Europe, France falls short of her potential because she, too, needs reforms—including introduction of the rich and privileged to the tax collector.

In both Italy and France the key to soundness is much more orderly government founded on a little more equity and self-confidence than exists to-day. The cure lies not in ideology, but in plain competence.

If you take this condition in western Europe as a

starting point you get one key to a matter of first importance in eastern Europe. It is convenient for our propaganda purpose to represent events in the iron curtain area in terms of illegal seizure of power, of police state systems, or arbitrary ruthlessness, and of communism. But that is not the whole picture. Eastern Europe emerged from the war needing such reforms as Italy needs. Many of those countries were simply not modern in any sense of the word. There is a matter of just plain ordinary government, which involves all sorts of humdrum things, such as keeping streets clean, traffic regulated, and commerce moving between cities and countryside.

If the communist regimes in eastern Europe had neglected these housekeeping functions of government we of the West would not need to give a second thought to the problem of eastern Europe. Unfortunately, from the standpoint of their opponents, the communist regimes are concerned with matters other than the propagation of communism. Of course they never neglect that activity either. But housekeeping has not only been given first attention by them, it has also been their golden opportunity. The end of the war saw eastern Europe cluttered with important housekeeping tasks. First the wreckage of war had to be cleared away, and repairs made. That same task was a first concern of all the countries in the West. Second, eastern Europe, far more than western Europe, was cluttered with overdue reforms. Any new government taking power after the war could have won enormous

public acceptance by just attacking the building of bridges and the modernizing of laws and customs.

When I visited Budapest in 1947 there were still quite a number of bankers and landowners and industrialists and nobility of the old empire in evidence. One could find them and talk to them easily. I met quite a number. The burden of their conversation was, of course, the enormity of the new regime. But every one, sooner or later in the conversation, paid a grudging tribute to the energy of the Communists in getting bridges rebuilt over the Danube. Now of course there is nothing communistic about building a bridge. It is simply an elementary task of government. That bridges over the Danube at Budapest were built in a hurry doesn't prove anything about the soundness or unsoundness of communism as a philosophy of government. But to build bridges is to serve the daily interests of people. The Communists built the bridges —which is one reason why there is less will to resist the new regimes in that part of the world than would be the case if their only concern had been propagating communism.

In a few countries there was relatively little in the way of overdue reform for the Communists to pick up. Czechoslovakia was as modern and well run and honest a country before the war as you could have found anywhere. Courts were honest, justice was just. Abusive privilege had been liquidated with the old Austro-Hungarian Empire. Government was efficient. But Czechoslovakia stood at one end of a pole. At the other

end was Rumania—so corrupt that it is a synonym for corrupt government. In between were many gradations. The feudal system still survived on the great estates of Hungary. Bulgaria was just plain out of date. Yugoslavia had a peasant economy and a peasant culture. Poland was more modern than the Balkan countries but less modern than Czechoslovakia, and very much less modern than western Europe.

If American armies had liberated eastern Europe, then American officials to-day would be goading local governments, as they do goad the Italian Government, to undertake many of the changes which have been carried out in that part of the world by others. Work has been done to tidy up those countries, to give them new industries, to eliminate encrustations of the past which have outlived their usefulness. Men have been given bread and work as we have given men bread and work in Germany, Austria, Trieste, and Italy.

Men have also been given social security after the fashion of the New Deal in America, health schemes after the fashion of the Labour Government in Britain, guarantees against unemployment, and many of the various related benefits which men are beginning to demand in most parts of the world. Call it sugar-coating around the pill of communism if you like. But there is sugar-coating.

I strongly suspect that a large majority in every eastern European country would vote, if it could, to turn the Communists out of government, but I think the vote would be a close one if the question were,

"Do you want to go back to 1939?" The Czechs would probably vote "yes" on that one. Conceivably the Poles might also. But I suspect that the others prefer 1949, even with the Communists, to 1939 without them. The strength of the iron curtain regimes lies not in their communism but in that when they took power they had ready at hand scores of housekeeping tasks and overdue reforms. They did not neglect their opportunities.

Further, because the communist regimes were revolutionary regimes they had a freer hand than we did in, say, Italy. The most easily achievable and useful reform in Italy would be the breaking up of some of the big estates. Not all of them need to be broken up. Some are well-operated, modern farms. Those can serve the community under their present owners just as well, probably better, than if they were divided among their tenants. But many are like the game preserves of Scotland. They are areas deliberately kept unproductive for the sake of hunting. Those must be broken up and resettled both to provide more food and to provide occupation for surplus people. Here we come up against the hurdle that the owners are usually charming people who are on our side. In Italy we must usually injure our friends to achieve land reform. The communist regimes have no such problem to interfere with their land reforms. The landlords are invariably their political enemies.

There is another fact of life in Europe which few Americans understand, but which must be understood

if Europe, eastern or western, is to make any sense. To many Americans such measures as unemployment insurance, guaranteed jobs, pensions for workers, and everything else which comes under the general heading of social security still seem new and radical. They are relatively new and radical in the United States because there is little recognized precedence for them in American history or experience. The idea that government should see to it that every man has a job and a continuing source of income is alien to the American tradition. It is alien because American tradition does not, as a general rule, go back beyond the landing of the Pilgrims at Plymouth Rock.

Europe's background is otherwise. Feudalism was in fact a social-security system. To many Americans the age of free private enterprise is the normal condition, and what has come since is a departure from the normal condition. To a European a much more organized form of society is the normal condition, and the age of free private enterprise was a departure from the normal. And the shorter the elapsed time since feudalism, the greater the willingness to accept all that is involved in social security.

In the feudal period, in theory although frequently not in practice, the individual was both enslaved and protected. Society was organized rigorously and in enormous detail. Everyone had his place, and, barring pestilence, war, or irresponsibility on the part of monarch, prince, or princeling, the individual was sure of his place and his living. The feudal retainer was a

beneficiary of a social-security system. He had obligations. Provided he discharged his obligations to his lord or prince he had the equivalent of a job for life and care in his old age. Europe turned from feudalism, not because Europe was dissatisfied with the theory, but rather because in practice the system broke down and ceased to function.

The most careful students of the Russian Revolution tend to lay responsibility for it to the reforms of the later years of the Czarist regimes. These reforms freed the serf from his feudal obligations, but they also cut him loose from his benefits, and they failed to provide a substitute for those benefits. The newly created freeman was free to go where he pleased and get work where he could find it, but he no longer had the guarantee of employment and subsistence which had been the reverse side of his feudal contract.

This historic background is essential to an understanding of one cardinal fact about events of to-day in eastern Europe. The new communist regimes have, in effect, restored the feudal system. The individual is no longer a free agent. His daily life is overshadowed by an all-seeing secret police. He is told where he must work. The heaviest penalties are exacted for an unauthorized shift from one job to another. Masses of men are picked up bodily from one locality and transferred to another without any consideration of their individual wishes. What they think about political and religious questions is controlled by the state as completely as the state can manage thought control.

Submission to such a condition is unthinkable to an American. By American standards this condition would inevitably lead to violent revolution. And it would lead to such revolution in eastern Europe were there only one side of the coin. That revolution has been avoided, up to this time, is partly owing to the fact of physical power in the hand of the state. As has been pointed out frequently, the machine gun has deprived the peasant of the political power which the pitchfork and scythe once could wield. But that is not the whole story. The modern European state, whether it be socialistic as in Britain, or communistic as in Russia and the satellite countries, has made a major point of restoring to the mass of the people something of the feeling of economic security which they enjoyed under the feudal system. Every iron curtain country has decreed "full employment" and has decreed every other aspect of what is called the New Deal in America or socialism in Britain. That such benefits are decreed does not automatically bring them into functioning existence. In many cases they exist on paper and in propaganda statements rather than in reality. Yet they now exist, at least in theory. The individual worker is "guaranteed" a job, pensions for his old age, state medical care, and access to higher education for his children.

In eastern Europe communist propaganda would make it appear that these benefits are communism, and that only be embracing communism does any worker obtain them. That is so much poppycock, of

course. Social security is the state assuming responsibility for the physical welfare of the individual. It is the state doing for the individual what every feudal prince in theory did for his retainers. It isn't new. It is as old as feudalism. The revival of it represents a revival of the concept of feudalism. But since feudalism was the basis of European society, Europeans are not nearly so horrified by the revival of feudalism as Americans would be.

To understand all this is to understand another reason why one falls into an intellectual trap if one assumes that eastern Europe is seething with potential revolt against its new usurpers. These new regimes, as I will try to explain in more detail in subsequent chapters dealing with particular ones, are governing individuals dissatisfied with their lot in many respects. There are currents and crosscurrents of thought and action. There is resistance. But Americans must appreciate the fact that widespread mass opposition to the actual regimes does not spring from mass disapproval of the social and economic policies of those regimes. Nor are they hated by the mass as much as they would be if the people of eastern Europe were Americans.

4

Some of the Puzzles

I LIKE travelling in eastern Europe. After twenty years of reporting I have acquired a strong taste for places which are changing and where the change frequently fails to fit preconceived notions or intended patterns. Eastern Europe is such a place. Change is all over the lot. But the elements of the change and the tempo vary markedly from country to country, and the results at this interim stage differ both from what we assume and expect them to be and also presumably from what the men in the Kremlin intended them to be. The pattern is by no means uniform or consistent, nor do I think that the end result is going to fit Moscow's plans any more than it will fit our own prejudgments.

I visited the area in 1947 and found it interesting. I visited it again in 1949 and found it even more interesting. I hope to visit it in 1951, because a span of two years is an excellent device for detecting and measuring changes. But whether I shall be able to go back in 1951 is another matter, for the days when the self-

styled "people's democracies" of eastern Europe liked to show themselves off to visitors from the West are probably drawing to a close. Hungary gave me a visa in 1947 but refused one in 1949. The reason may have been personal, but I doubt it. I think it was rather because a regime which finds it necessary in 1949 to purge a Laszlo Rajk, who had been the leader of the communist underground during the war and then Minister of the Interior and police chief in 1947, must be going through internal strains so serious that it hardly wants visiting correspondents snooping around. And Poland and Czechoslovakia are getting stickier about visas. They used to be the easiest. They allege that the reason for the change of policy is that America grants so few visas to their correspondents wishing to travel in our direction. It is a valid argument, since an America which preaches free access for its journalists to all parts of the world practises anything but such freedom for foreign correspondents wishing to visit America. However, I suspect that the chief reason lies deeper below the surface of eastern Europe.

The whole truth about any one of the countries, if uncovered by an enterprising visitor, might embarrass more than one satellite government in its relations with Moscow. Even when one of those countries does break with Moscow, as Tito's Yugoslavia has done, it may still find American correspondents disconcerting. The Yugoslavia I visited on my last trip was in midstream of the most dangerous, difficult, and delicate operation in international affairs—a shift of political

and economic relations from one orbit of power politics to another and rival orbit. If the details of such an operation, and more particularly the enormous problems involved, were to be publicized from day to day the way the American press publicizes a political stery in New York City or Chicago, they could easily jeopardize its success.

To generalize: governments sure of their power over their people and sure of their general direction have little to conceal. But governments suffering from schizophrenia, from serious internal opposition, or from doubts as to the road they actually wish to travel may prefer to keep many things about themselves out of sight. This is a condition which is, I think, on the increase throughout eastern Europe and which makes travel plans for that part of the world in the coming year or two highly speculative.

What made eastern Europe so interesting to me on my last trip was that few of the pat assumptions about it seem to fit the conditions and the trends which one finds there. Almost anything could happen in a part of the world which has already seen Marshal Tito converted from the fair-haired darling of Moscow to the leader of the most dangerous heresy which has challenged Moscow's leadership of the world communist movement since Trotsky—and a part of the world in which to-day a communist regime in Poland is advertising in large newspaper spreads farm collectives which, so far as Western observers in Warsaw can determine, exist only in the newspapers. Is the

Polish Government pretending, for Moscow's benefit, to be marching down the road to communization faster than it actually is marching or wishes to march? That is possible; but certainly no visiting correspondent can pretend to know the true explanation. He can only know that there are many such intriguing mysteries in this twilight zone.

The following are examples of the kind of thing one encounters.

There were three customs officers at the little customs post at the Czech frontier. They went at our baggage at first as customs officers do the world around, acting as though we were undoubtedly trying to conceal something. But then one of them noticed that we were listed on our passports as journalists. I had been expecting that moment and had braced myself for it since Western journalists, particularly American, are usually called spies in all Cominform countries. But the discovery had the opposite effect to what I had expected. Instead of treating us with greater animosity, they became friendly, helpful, and chatty. They didn't bother to complete the baggage inspection. The parting remark of one of them, delivered with a knowing grin, was:

"Of course you will write bad things about us, but try to find one or two nice things to say about our country."

Some of the puzzles are more abstruse. For instance, how really does one assess communism in Yugoslavia? Capitalism has been abolished. By American terms

of reference that means something drastic. You could not abolish capitalism in America without remaking the entire economic and social life of the country. But Yugoslavia never had capitalism as we know it. I have a Yugoslav friend who came to this country just after World War I and became a successful stockbroker in Wall Street. His sister recently came to America as the wife of a communist member of the Yugoslav embassy staff. They had the same family and social background, of course. Their father had been the colonel of a regiment. The family had moved in fashionable social circles. Yet the brother found it almost impossible to explain to his sister how he made his living. Stocks and bonds meant nothing in her economic vocabulary. They never had industrial capitalism in Yugoslavia to begin with. They had farms, and shops, and a few mining enterprises operated as concessions by foreign companies. Mostly the Yugoslavs were peasants or soldiers or government functionaries. A soldier or a government functionary feels nothing when capitalism is abolished. A peasant feels a lot if he really operated his own farm independently. But in Yugoslavia he frequently did not. So what does it mean to say that capitalism has been abolished in Yugoslavia and communism substituted for it? American terms of reference don't fit. The change doesn't mean in Yugoslavia what it would in a Western country.

Two incidents in Poland were intriguing.

I went to church on a Sunday morning in Warsaw. The church was packed. The priest was delivering a

sermon. His voice was vehement and impassioned. The crowd was listening intently but gave no sign that the words were startling or unusual. I asked my companion, who understood Polish, what the priest was saying.

"He's saying the government is wicked and ought to be overthrown," was the reply.

"Will they arrest him?" I asked.

"Oh, they may. They usually keep about ten priests in jail from each parish all the time. They rotate them."

The airport at Warsaw is a busy place. You are kept in a reception room until your name is called for customs inspection. I had flown up from Belgrade where Americans are few and far between even though Tito is more friendly to the West than to Moscow. I expected to hear little of familiar English speech in the waiting room in Warsaw. There were about thirty men in the room when I entered. The first words I heard were in English of unmistakable American accent. They were American business-men who had come over to see about selling some cotton to Poland. Most of the other men were English, Swedish, or French business-men. It was a room full of capitalists come to trade with communist Poland. Their governments were all waging the cold war against Poland in some form or another, but it seemed to make little difference to them.

I was treated with unvarying courtesy wherever I went. In Poland and Czechoslovakia conversations with

government officials were usually either unproductive or were sparring matches which got nowhere because the other person and I were talking from totally different premises. We would disagree on every point. Yet it was done within a framework of personal courtesy. And I do not recall a single instance during which an official of any one of those governments insulted me by assuming that I would accept his view of either politics or history.

No travelling correspondent can pretend to know the explanation of all these things. He can know only that there are many such mysteries and anomalies to be unravelled behind what is too frequently called the iron curtain.

Although we all use the phrase "iron curtain," acceptance of it as a truly descriptive term has done much, I think, to becloud Western thinking and Western high strategy about eastern Europe. Iron is impermeable to ideas. Iron is consistent in texture. The phrase creates a mental picture of something solid and consistent which could be broken only by major external force. But eastern Europe is certainly not impervious to outside ideas. It is certainly not of consistent texture. Its political and strategic complexion has already been altered drastically by the operation of its own internal forces in ways neither planned nor promoted by Western strategists. Examine these three propositions.

Western ideas penetrate the so-called curtain via the channels of trade. Every Western business-man is

a carrier of Western ideas. Western ideas penetrate through the medium of the Voice of America and the foreign-language broadcasts of the British Broadcasting Corporation. The reading rooms and libraries maintained by the British and American governments in prominent eastern European cities are unfortunately being rapidly closed down, due obviously to the popularity of Western books and periodicals, which exceeded anything known before the war. This action testifies to the thirst for information about the West. A Polish government official bitterly complained to me about a certain broadcast of the Voice of America which had commented on an announcement of the Polish Government that it intended to collectivize one per cent of the farm land each year for the next five years. He said that directly following that broadcast guerrilla bands which had been quiescent for months had renewed their activities and killed several government officials.

Western ideas do not need to be newly imported to influence eastern Europe. They exist as a part of the heritage of the past. They show in style of dress, manner of living, and social custom. Private enterprise is older than the West, but it is a marked characteristic of Western life. It clings tenaciously to the commercial life of the satellite countries. Roman Catholic, Lutheran, Hussite, and Jewish churches arc part of the pattern of Western life. The satellite governments have done all they dare to reduce the ties between the Church communities in their lands and the commu-

nities in Western countries. But what they dare to do falls far short of what they would presumably like to do. The churches remain. People attend the services in larger numbers than ever. Priests and ministers travel across the lines maintaining contacts with their co-religionists. The flow of ideas between the West and the satellite countries has been attenuated and blocked off to the limit of the abilities of the satellite regimes, but it remains a strong and vital current.

Eastern Europe is not of consistent texture. Differences between the various countries were monumental before communism attempted to impose a uniform pattern upon them. Differences continue to be monumental. Here is a minor incident of the kind which tells so much. At the Czech frontier, going by train from Czechoslovakia into Poland, I found myself with a residue of Czech currency which would be of no value to me in Poland. The Czech frontier officer noted my predicament, remarked sadly that the currency exchange office was closed, but offered to help me out. He gave me exactly half what he should have given me on the exchange. A Pole who was sharing the compartment with me watched the transaction. After the Czech official had bowed out the Pole snorted with disgust.

"That," he said, "is the kind of thing which could never happen in Poland. Poles are too proud to cheat a traveller."

Call it chauvinism if you like. It also expresses differences between the Eastern countries which com-

munism does not stamp out. Both individuals in this case were Communists. But one was a Czech and one was a Pole, and nothing that has happened since the war has mitigated their sense of being different.

The most significant differences are in standards of living. Czechoslovakia, the most industrialized of the Eastern countries, has the highest. Hungary comes next in the scale. In those two countries consumer goods are relatively plentiful and of high quality. Across the Czechs' southern frontier in Yugoslavia consumer goods are almost non-existent, and what there are could never be sold in any Western country. In Czechoslovakia everyone wears shoes. In Yugoslavia's capital roughly a third of the people on the street go barefooted. But in Czechoslovakia Western clothes do not bring smartness of style in dress. In Hungary they do. In 1947 Budapest was originating women's fashions to the point of rivalling Paris. In Vienna in 1949 I found it difficult to realize that some of my friends from Budapest were refugees. You think of refugee women as wearing tattered shawls. Hungarian refugees reach freedom in Vienna with more stylish clothes than any American army wife has. Communism has enforced some uniformities on the Eastern countries; the uniformity of Communists in government and of busy policemen ferreting out opponents of the regime and sending them to salt mines and labour camps. But communism does not make a Czech look or think like a Hungarian or a Pole or a Yugoslav. Differences remain profound. They result in pliant

submission in Czechoslovakia; effective revolt in Yugoslavia; incipient revolt in Bulgaria; flamboyant but futile resistance in Hungary; a patient smouldering and, probably some day, politically significant spirit of independence in Poland.

Then note what these differences have produced politically and strategically. If you think of the iron curtain area in terms of a political and strategic barrier with solid bastions at either end, then your thinking is even more out of focus. During 1948 both northern and southern bastions passed out of Moscow's control.

At the southern end, Yugoslavia has given birth to a communist heresy which—if the West continues to play its political and economic hand as carefully as it has up to this time—may turn the southern flank decisively and even permanently, in so far as anything is permanent in a constantly changing world. Finland, on the northern flank, never was consolidated and to-day rates as an iron curtain country only in the sense that Moscow could conquer it in a matter of days if it were prepared to use the Red Army for the purpose—a condition equally true of most of central and western Europe. The Russians attempted a Czech-type coup in Finland in the spring of 1948, shortly after the successful coup in Czechoslovakia. The attempt failed completely, with the result that the general Western public is hardly aware that the Finns beat off, easily and decisively, precisely what overwhelmed the Czechs.

Strategically, the curtain area is valuable to Russia either as a base from which offensive operations can be conducted against the West, or as an outer defensive position. For either purpose its flanks must be secure. To-day the flanks arc gone and could be reclaimed only by military operations which would involve the Red Army, and therefore might precipitate a general war. They are not available to-day as launching bases for a surprise attack. Such an attack would have to advertise itself in advance by preliminary operations to regain control of the flanks.

Politically, the curtain area is valuable to Russia as a base for the projection of Soviet ideas westward and as a barrier against the projection of contrary ideas eastward. But to serve that purpose it must be internally harmonious, co-ordinated, and under firm Moscow control. To-day the inner core of the area which still owes allegiance to the Kremlin is under attack not only from the West but also from Yugoslavia; and, furthermore, the countries of the loyal core are plagued by increasing conflicts of interest among themselves.

For example, Poland and Czechoslovakia are supposed to be co-ordinating their economics. Czechoslovakia has an automobile industry which is not good enough to put its product into competition with the rival industries of western Europe. But it might do very well for itself if it could enjoy a monopoly throughout the iron curtain area. Owing to Moscow's political policies, the Czech motor industry has already lost its Yugoslav market. Poland is its best remaining market.

But the Poles, who have never had an automobile industry, think they would like to have one now. They are, in fact, building one. Their present announced plan is to keep it small and use it only for a few specialized types of motor vehicles—farm tractors and special-purpose trucks. But this trend does not make the planners of Prague happy.

Strategically and politically the iron curtain area of to-day falls far short of being what the Moscow planners must have expected it to be at this stage of events.

In the beginning Moscow had six completely dominated satellites—Bulgaria, Rumania, Hungary, Yugoslavia, Albania, and Poland. Finland was in the hollow of her hand. Greece seemed for quite a while to be a most promising prospect. Czechoslovakia was added to the list. And there were certainly high Moscow hopes that all of Austria and Germany would also come to be included in the Soviet line-up.

But at the time of this writing Cominform communism and the will of Moscow have been exorcised from Greece. Finland has asserted her sturdy will to determine her own way of living. Yugoslavia has broken totally away. Austria is all but free. Western Germany has repudiated communism. And what information can be obtained about eastern Germany tends to confirm the suspicion that communism and the wishes of Moscow are nowhere more thoroughly scorned than in the part of Germany which is under Russian occupation.

There are only six satellites left to-day—Bulgaria,

Rumania, Albania, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Poland. If those six were all dependable satellites they would still consitute quite an empire for Soviet Russia. But how dependable are they?

The influence of one country over others is a quantity difficult to measure. Appearances can be deceptive. I was in Java just before the Japanese landed. From all outward appearances Java belonged to the kingdom of the Netherlands. Yet Dutch dominance in Java disappeared in about three days, and it has not been re-established since the war in spite of the fact that all the victors in that war were allied with the Netherlands.

In outward appearance Moscow controls its remaining satellites. Yet is that control a waxing or a waning quantity? And how strong is it?

5

The Twain Shall Meet—Austria

AUSTRIA never was an iron curtain country, and Austria is central Europe, not eastern. But Austria requires mention in this book because it is such a striking example of a small country being unimpressed by either the might or the doctrine of Soviet Russia.

There are in all just under seven million Austrians. Almost two millions, better than one quarter of the entire population, live in the city of Vienna and are mostly Socialists or Communists. All the Communists and most of the Socialists turned out to wave red flags the day the Red Army entered Vienna. But the Austrians don't wave red flags very often these days. Austria belongs to the West now. Part of the reason is the Marshall Plan. Another part is made up of the policies of the Western occupying powers. But that is not the whole reason. Not to be overlooked is the will of the Austrian people themselves. They saw Soviet communism from close up. They liked it less than they thought they might in anticipation. Having decided

that they wanted none of it they have proceeded to assert themselves as Austrians.

The failure of the Russians in Austria grew out of their inability to persuade the rank and file of Austrian labour that communism was better than the socialism they already had. The story is perhaps best illustrated by an episode at one of the factories which had been seized and was being operated by the Russians. The Russian plant manager fired an employee without consulting the union. That would be perfectly proper under Russian law and practice, but it was a violation of Austrian law. A meeting of the factory unit of the union was called. The Socialists who controlled the union insisted that a strike be called to defend labour's rights under the law. The Communists attempted to prevent a vote. But the Socialists carried the day. The strike was called, and the upshot of it was that the Russian manager of the factory had to recognize the rights of the union and reinstate the dismissed employee. The incident illustrates what the Austrians soon learned; namely, that communism brings not new gains, but curtailment of hard-won freedoms. Austrian labour recognized this fact and has, as a result, become the backbone of opposition to communism in Austria.

Like many other parts of Europe, Austria could still be conquered by the Red Army. It is conceivable, although I think not probable, that Austria could be captured by a communist push if the Western armies of occupation should be withdrawn. But the political

fact is that the Russian hand on Austria is even less influential than it was three years ago, and it was already weak then.

The Russians have not openly recognized their defeat, and as a hopeful gesture the fading Red star on the front of the Russian Kommandatura was repainted while I was in Vienna, but the two-story-high pictures of Lenin and Stalin have been taken down for good. Russian soldiers are now few and far between—hard to find and inconspicuous when one does find them. Austrian politicians dare to, and do, travel freely in the Russian zone of Austria, making both anti-communist and anti-Russian speeches. Viennese citizens dare to, and do, interfere with attempted Russian arrests. They have thwarted more than one. Austrian Socialists have retained control of the trade unions in the Russian zone, in spite of Russian efforts to promote communist leadership. Austrian Socialists have called successful strikes in the Russian zone against Russian factory managers—and by striking have forced the Russian employers to recognize the labour laws of Austria.

Marshall Plan supplies have boomed Austrian industry in the Russian zone as well as in the Western zones so successfully that many a Russian-controlled factory is an economic failure, and Austria is reclaiming control over its industry, not by recapturing the Russian factories, but by taking the business away from them. The Russian monopoly of two years ago in sheet metal and glass has been broken by building new Austrian factories.

All of these are the surface facts which tell one of the most exciting stories in Europe. It is the story of a minute country living on the front line of the power struggle, occupied in making good its will to retain its identity as both a free country and as a member of the Western community. Obviously, the victory is not complete. It cannot be until a peace treaty is signed and the Soviet Army, along with the other armies of occupation, withdraws from Austria. There remains one residual danger—the danger that Russia some day may resort to communist insurrection to obtain a control of Austria which has been denied to Russia by all other means.

But with those qualifications Austria does represent the most complete and finished victory yet won by the West against the pressures which spread outward from Moscow. This is a case, and the only case, where the West can yet say that it has in fact reclaimed something which lies behind the front line of the Soviet Army. For while the Soviet Army still sits on top of the eastern third of Austria, the people living in that eastern third are, to a surprising degree, masters of their own destiny. Ironically, they have been beneficiaries of the Russian campaign to acquire Germany. That campaign led to the blockade of Berlin and then the counter-blockade. Russia no longer could obtain Western goods across the zone line in Germany. And Russia needs some Western goods to service its lagging economic plans in the Russian realm. Austria became a principal channel through which those goods flowed.

When I toured central and eastern Europe in 1947 politicians in every country I visited liked to talk about their country becoming the bridge between East and West. Austria is the bridge, or, more accurately, the principal channel through which the remaining residue of east-west trade passes. Presumably Russia hoped to obtain control of this channel. But matters developed in such a way that Moscow faced a choice. It had to choose between controlling the channel and using the channel, for control would have meant stoppage. Had Russia seized it by force, it would have ceased to function. Moscow needed it in functioning condition. So Austria is the beneficiary of the fact that Russia does require some goods from the West.

All the Austrians had to do to remain independent was to insist on being themselves, not Communists or Russians. That they did so, however, is eternally to their credit. They gambled on two things: first, on the Russians not daring to resort to ultimate force; second, on America's risking its goods not only at the front line of the power struggle but also in a Russian-occupied zone as well. That was the winning combination—Russian need for east-west trade, Austrian sturdiness, and American goods risked in a precarious place. The big thing is that the formula is working and winning.

Austria has reformed its currency, revived its industry, and kept its politics clean. The trade unions are solidly in socialist hands. The government and the police are controlled by a coalition of Socialists and Conservatives. Industry is increasingly in Austrian

hands to the point where Moscow no longer possesses the power to throttle it. And with the black market disappearing, Moscow is losing its last weapon both for exploiting and wrecking Austrian economy. Austria is rejecting the foreign ideology of communism and Russian control, and the Russians are perforce adjusting their policies and practices to fit the new condition.

First the Russians looted. But that didn't pay. Then they used the black market. Currency reform checked that. Then they moved into the grey market. The Marshall Plan is checking that. Russian factories no longer pay dividends in Austria. Austrian law is closing around them. So Austria is a great Western success story. No man can say that it is owing more to one factor than to any other. It could not have happened without the Marshall Plan, or the will of the West to hold in Austria, or Russian need for trade through Austria.

Yet it is of importance to notice that the political base in Austria for this victory has been a staunchly anti-communist trade-union movement. Communism did not capture the working classes in Austria. They were Socialist. They remain Socialist. They will have no dealings with communism. They are, in fact, the most resolutely anti-communist element in Austria. Some Americans may find the fact unpalatable, yet it is a fact that without a vigorous Socialist party in Austria this little country, which is the strategic key to south-east Europe, would have been lost to the West.

All in all, Soviet Russia has learned a number of

hard lessons in Austria. One of them is that arbitrary arrest can raise havoc with a local Communist party. Every time the Russians "snatch" someone, the local Communists have to move back another row in the political theatre. Another is that labour has rights.

The Russians are operating three hundred and sixty-five enterprises in Austria to-day—businesses they took over from former German owners as war booty. They have had all kinds of trouble with their business operations. Western ground rules apply here, and Soviet methods don't do too well under Western ground rules. Western officials who keep up with such matters are more than cheerful about the results of two years of competition here between Western and Soviet business methods.

This is the only place in the world where the two systems are competing on anything like equal footing, and the score is all to the advantage of the West.

The Russians have outsmarted themselves in their general business methods. They sold on the black market in the old days when the black market was booming. They acquired a large volume of paper money. They failed to use it to build inventories or stock-pile raw materials. Currency reform caught them long on paper money and short on everything else, including replacement machinery and spare parts. Russian factories are running down now. They haven't been maintained properly. Their market value has steadily declined. There was a time when those three hundred and sixty-five Russian-operated enterprises held decisive

power over the Austrian economy. Those days are gone.

Bargaining power has shifted westward in this little-observed sector of the East-West conflict, just as it has on the great Berlin blockade front. The Russians still can do some chiselling—and do. There isn't the slightest doubt that there is some leakage into Russian economy of European Recovery Programme supplies and some extra-legal traffic through Austria. Some scare stories have been written about this. It's quite impossible to make the system watertight against chiselling.

The most scandalous practice still operating is the Russian-sponsored black market in American cigarettes. Agents buy them in various western European free ports, ship them, legally, to Hungary or Czechoslovakia, and then smuggle them into Austria in Russian army trucks which have complete immunity from the Austrian customs—as do all Allied military vehicles. It is the crudest and most flagrant method whereby the Russians have tried to undermine the stability of the Austrian economy.

Similar deals still take place. And similar deals will continue to take place until the gap between the legal rate of the currency and the black-market rate is closed. As long as Russian agents can buy goods at the legal rate on world markets and sell inside Austria at the black-market rate they always can make some money out of the Austrian economy. But the volume of this kind of transaction is relatively small. Marshall Plan food and goods go into the Russian zone of Austria. But that doesn't mean Russia gets special benefit.

Take food. Under existing four-power agreements all food available to Austria is pooled by the Austrian Government and distributed by the Austrian Government. Available food includes the produce of Russian zone farms. During the past year $10,000,000 worth more Russian zone food went into western Austria and Vienna than ERP food went into the Russian zone. Stated differently, it would cost the Marshall Plan $10,000,000 a year more to feed western Austria if Marshall Plan food were excluded from the Russian zone and the Russians retaliated by keeping back all Russian zone food.

Then there is the matter of Marshall Plan raw materials allocated to factories in the Russian zone. Sometimes such raw materials actually are allocated to Russian-controlled factories. But the finished product from those factories is controlled and checked minutely. Actually, it amounts to a barter deal. A Russian factory gets ERP raw materials in return for finished products delivered to western Austrian economy. If a Russian factory takes ERP raw materials, it takes itself out of the black-market business, for it must pay in finished goods at the same legal rate.

In other words, the Marshall Plan is forcing even Russian-controlled factories into the channels of honest business, and that is where they are getting the worst of competition. Russian managers aren't accustomed to operating on any such basis. It becomes a shoestring operation which lasts as long as the machinery lasts without replacement parts. When the machinery breaks

down, that is the end of the operation—and the chances are better each day that the Austrians some day will be able to buy back all their lost factories at bargain rates.

For the time being it still is advantageous on occasion to farm some ERP raw materials out to Russian-operated factories for processing. But as Austrian-owned factories expand their production and more come into existence, the need for the Russian-operated factories declines. Eventually it will be possible for Austrian economy to get along pretty well without them.

The leakage of ERP materials into Russia by way of the Russian zone of Austria is estimated at less than 2 per cent. The leakage of strategic raw materials through the free ports of Europe is a more serious matter. That has nothing to do with ERP. It is simply the process whereby consignments to such countries as Switzerland get rechannelled to Russian agents. But it is a risky game, and is becoming less profitable daily. Shipments are carefully watched. Any merchant caught in such a deal goes on an American black list. He doesn't get any more American export licences. And the profits are declining so rapidly that in time it won't be worth-while for any merchant who wants to stay in business to take the risks.

Essentially Austria is to the Europe of to-day what Switzerland was to the Europe of World War I. This position has paid dividends to both Austria and the West. To Austria it has meant a progressively weaken-

ing Russian occupation, plus security from the partition of the country. To the West it has meant that the ancient bastion of Vienna is still in Western hands. And the West increasingly controls the flow of East-West trade through Austria.

But there is a reverse side to this coin. With the power struggle seething in Germany to the north and Yugoslavia to the south, Russia obviously does not dare to withdraw its garrison from eastern Austria. As far as Austria itself is concerned, Russia has little to gain by holding on much longer. The Russian occupation has been a losing game from the moment Russian troops entered Vienna and refused to believe workers could live as well as workers do live there. The Soviet Army looted the Karl Marx houses just as they looted the more expensive houses, thereby insuring the resistance of Austrian Socialists to communism. That resistance solidified to become the rock on which communism foundered in Austria.

Let us assume, as many do, that a withdrawal of American troops from Europe is the Russians' first purpose. Russia could achieve part of that purpose by agreeing to a peace treaty for Austria. Further, what is left of communism in Austria would be relieved of a disastrous burden by an end to the occupation. No amount of communist propaganda can conceal from the Austrians the fact that it is the Russians who are perpetuating the occupation and thus retarding Austrian economic recovery.

It is the West which contributes to the Austrian

economy and Russia which holds it down, and that is a disastrous burden for the Communist party to have to carry. Communism here in Austria, as in many other places, is a victim of Russian policy. But a Soviet army garrison in eastern Austria is at this stage almost a vital necessity to the Russians. The moment the Russians remove it, Western influence moves forward and becomes a salient pressing into the Slavic borderland of eastern Europe. Russian withdrawal would uncover the southern flank of Czechoslovakia and the northern flank of Yugoslavia and admit the West to direct contact with the frontier of Hungary.

There was a time when the West had its valid reasons for delaying an Austrian peace treaty. The West did not dare withdraw its troops if the way thereby would be opened for a communist insurrection in Austria. And the West still would not dare withdraw until an Austrian army large enough to cope with insurrection had been established. But the proposed peace treaty provides for such an army. In the meantime, Austria has become so firmly anti-communist and so much the master in its own household that no insurrection could conceivably succeed without the real support of the Russian Army. The Western victory in the moral, economic, and political field in Austria is so nearly complete that it is to the advantage of the West to get a peace treaty and a withdrawal of the occupation forces—particularly since American troops are now a greater embarrassment to American policy than Russian troops are to Russian policy.

But what makes an Austrian peace treaty desirable for the West obviously makes it undesirable for Moscow. In Vienna one feels particularly the surge of the Western cause against Russia's iron curtain. Russian purposes have not yet succeeded in Germany. The blockade of Berlin has backfired. Communism is a broken weapon. To the south the pressure on Trieste has been neutralized by Marshal Tito's heresy. Yugoslavia itself, once the staunchest of Moscow's outposts, has become the scene of a determined struggle for independence. Hungary, to the east, is, according to the best information available here, beginning to feel the burdens of nationalization, collectivization, and communist inefficiencies.

Suppose the Berlin blockade had succeeded and the West had lost Berlin. In that case, Russian influence might have jumped forward at one bound at least to the Rhine. It would have been a disaster for the West. A reporter in Vienna gets the feeling that just such a disaster in reverse is a growing possibility in this part of Europe.

The facts are not all so obvious as the success of the air lift. Quite as important are such little matters as the attitude of the Austrians, who have reacted so violently every time the visiting Russians overstepped the bounds of propriety that the Russians are now treating them with considerable respect—for the Russians! For example, the principal news emanating from Vienna during the past three years has been of Russian kidnapping of Austrians, which has given the

impression of a city cowed and trembling under Russian terror. There have been plenty of kidnappings —some eight hundred and fifty since the occupation began, but increasing resentment against them and increasing resistance to them have resulted in a marked decrease of such incidents. By early 1949 the rate was down roughly to one a month, and it is highly doubtful whether the majority really deserved the label kidnapping. A more accurate label is arbitrary arrest—something which comes naturally to the Russians.

Western authorities who have studied the record are convinced that the Russians believed they had adequate reason for resorting to this practice, natural to them because of its long existence in the Russian social system. There are grounds for believing that in almost every case the person arrested was suspected of serving Western intelligence, abetting the desertion of a Russian soldier, being of technical value to Soviet industrial production, or an important political refugee. Western justice naturally rejects these as insufficient grounds for arbitrary arrest and secret trial, and naturally protests vehemently each time. But the important fact is that when these practices are employed by the Soviets in a fundamentally Western community, there is trouble for the Soviets, and the Soviets are forced from self-interest to reduce the frequency of resort to such tactics.

Public opinion in Vienna, as in many less immediately embattled places, has been alienated by such practices. The net result is that both Soviet prestige

and Soviet terrorism have been steadily and markedly declining. Vienna is not a cowed, terrorized city at all. Vienna is a city gaining both confidence and self-respect steadily; the city is simply the principal place where Austrians meet Russians and express their resistance. Incidentally, tourists hardly need fear visiting Vienna despite the stories of kidnapping—subject to one condition: don't dabble in intelligence matters. The Russians have a spy phobia too!

In just such relatively obscure sectors of the power struggle as this, one appreciates how widely the Soviets have allowed themselves to become engaged and how, when any country lets itself become so widely engaged, it finds itself over-extended. In Austria, Russia is plainly over-extended and plainly it has been suffering steady erosion of its influence in every field—political, economic, and industrial. Yet the Soviets were also engaged heavily and even more disastrously in Yugoslavia, and their purposes have been checked in France, Italy, and now Germany. In addition they are apparently taking on heavy responsibilities in the Far East. The Soviets certainly have not intimidated the Austrians. Although had they concentrated against Austria, the outcome could never have been in doubt. Plainly their total resources are insufficient to permit a successful operation, even in such a small place as Austria, when their commitments are as heavy as they are elsewhere.

6

Civilization, Take It Away—Czechoslovakia

IF you were to land at the airport at Prague by commercial plane from the west, as was still possible when this was written, you would find it difficult to realize that you were entering an "iron curtain" country. Czechoslovakia was, and still is, the most western of the eastern countries of Europe. Everyone wears shoes. Everyone wears Western clothes, except when they dress up for ceremonial occasions or for the benefit of tourists. Customs and immigration inspections at the airport, or at any regular border crossing, are handled as they are in Western countries. The officials frequently speak English. If not, you can always manage with a bit of French or German. From the airport you travel to your hotel as you would in western Europe, by bus or taxi. At the hotel the desk clerks speak English. The first evidence you have of anything unusual is the ration card. After that come the rationed meals. But, then, those conditions existed before the Communists took over the country. They were products of the war.

It is difficult for the average Western tourist to obtain a Czechoslovak visa. But those who do visit this country are certainly made aware of the slogans and placards which advertise the presence of the communist dogma—pictures of Klement Gottwald and Joseph Stalin. For those who knew Prague before the war, the numbers of police are greater. If there is any kind of celebration or demonstration there is another departure. You see rather plump middleaged men in blue denim overalls carrying rifles. These are the workers' militia—the men who rather self-consciously and with many recorded traces of embarrassment and bewilderment made it possible for the Communists to seize the government in the spring of 1948.

Then if you stay in Prague or travel around the countryside for very long you become increasingly aware of what recent history has tried to do to the Czechs. Perhaps you meet some of your pre-war friends. The first meeting may be cordial and easy, but you discover that your acquaintance has become a source of embarrassment to them. You may also discover that among the younger generation there is a strong conscious effort to argue with you that what has happened to Czechoslovakia is for the best.

Some of my own old friends were before-the-war liberals. They had travelled widely. They knew the freedom and tolerance of Western civilization, and they had believed in it. They were certainly not in favour of the communist coup. Yet a year after the coup

they had become apologists for it. Plainly they had deliberately and consciously set themselves the task of convincing themselves that what they had always believed before the war was wrong and that what had happened to their country in spite of themselves was for the best. They showed a nostalgic desire to retain contact with the West through me and others like me. They would like to be able to believe that no barrier had grown up between us—that no great chasm had separated us in our political thinking. Yet they wanted to rationalize their fate and make it seem tolerable to themselves. They were trying to belong at one and the same time to two worlds.

Czechoslovakia is like that. And the reasons go back deep into her history. She is the product of things which have been done to her, much more than of things which she has done to herself. The Czechoslovakia I visited in 1947 was a cheerful place. The Czechs were pleased with themselves. They thought they had discovered the magic formula which would let them belong to both East and West. They were still masters in their own domestic household. They enjoyed the right of habeas corpus. Their judges were honest and non-political. Arbitrary arrest had not become an accepted practice. When tried, it had been repudiated. They traded with the West, and their standard of living was still relatively high—much higher than in any of the neighbouring countries. At the same time they were getting along, as they thought, quite well with the Russians. Their delegates voted

with Russia at the United Nations. Their foreign policy was adjusted to every wish from Moscow. Their armed forces were under the direction of Red Army missions. The Communist party was in the government on the basis of a 38 per cent vote in the first post-war election. The non-communist parties were careful to give the Communists due representation for that 38 per cent. They were hoping to cut it down to 30 per cent at the next election but were most anxious that it did not fall below 30. It was never their purpose or desire to liquidate communism from within their midst. In brief, the Czechs had a formula taken from their past. They were a living compromise between East and West. In 1947 they thought the formula was working.

It didn't work. It wasn't good enough for the Russians. The Czechoslovakia I visited in 1949 was a country in the process of being converted, forcibly, into what the Russians would consider a "reliable" satellite. What had existed before the coup was certainly not "reliable" from the Russian point of view. Whether the end product of the coup will be more reliable is something yet to be determined.

No historian could be quite sure whether the West has let the Czechs down at every crucial turn in their last three hundred years of life because the Czechs are inborn compromisers, or whether they have become compromisers because the West has always let them down.

The Czechs would say that they have always wanted

to lead their own lives according to their own lights. But they have never been a big enough country or a numerous enough people to do it on their own. They have always needed allies for times of trouble. The sad truth is that in their crises they always appear to have been let down by their friends and allies. They made a magnificent effort at the dawn of modern history, but at the crucial moment, at the Battle of the White Mountain in the year 1620, they were abandoned by their allies and friends and went down to defeat. That was a long time ago; yet the fact is important to this day, for it established a pattern which has never yet been broken.

Eleven years ago the Czechs were at the peak of another effort to regain their identity and independence. They were ready to fight the Germans. Again, at the crucial moment, they were deserted by their allies. The agreement at Munich abandoned them to Hitler. Then in 1945 their hopes were high once more. But in 1945 the American Army which might have given them a fresh start along the path of their choosing drew back—why, we still do not know for certain. Again they were disappointed, and out of that fresh disappointment came a mood of pessimism and resignation. What courage their former leaders had was weakened during the next two years by Western policies. In Washington and London and Paris it was simply assumed that Czechoslovakia was lost. We of the West treated her as lost before she was lost. Then the loss became a reality and we were shocked and

angry. The fault lay heavily with us, but by then the damage had been done.

So to-day the Czechs weep bitter tears of disappointment. But let's be realistic about it. They aren't doing much more than weep.

The cruel truth about Czechoslovakia to-day is that her soul may be Western, but, like the mudfish, she waits passively for a turn of the tide to restore her to her natural element, meanwhile casting shy and wistful glances toward sturdier Yugoslavia. In brief, Czechoslovakia is to-day what she has been ever since the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648—a dividend which falls to whatever power or power combination momemtarily controls the surrounding area. She does not make her own history. She records, tardily, the ebb and flow of history made by others. She is unlikely to thrill the West by acts of daring resistance. On the other hand she is hardly a dependable satellite for Moscow. Her prime usefulness to Moscow is as a provider of industrial products, which is what she was to Germany in the days of the Nazi occupation.

During the first year and a half of its existence the communist regime had a relatively easy time of it in spite of certain material problems. It took power in February 1948, at a time when the economy of the country was just feeling the effect of the termination of UNRRA, plus the serious failure of the 1947 harvest. Food was short, terribly short. It was necessary to import large quantities of grain at the expense of raw materials for industry. By the summer of 1949 the

shortage of raw materials was beginning to be felt. There is a price for everything. The price of food in 1948 seems to have been shortage of raw materials in 1949

The regime got through its first year thanks largely to the traditional passiveness of the Czechs before a new form of force—and to the advantages which the regime did bring to the industrial workers, transport workers, and hired labour on the farms. You can hear endless argument in Prague over what material effect the communist regime has had on various classes of the people. But there is a certain amount of agreement on one point: namely, that the workers at least think that their lot has been improved.

The visitor in Prague is impressed at how little life appears to have changed on the surface since the face of communist leader Klement Gottwald replaced the face of former President Eduard Benes on the placards carried in the parades. Actually one is startled to discover how easy it seems to be for an industrialized country to swing from capitalism to a form of nationalized socialism. It might have been a different story if Czechoslovakia had been an agricultural country like Yugoslavia or Poland. In that event the new regime would have been forced to disturb drastically the living pattern of a majority of the population in order to carry out its plans.

As it is, the transition was drastically disturbing to few at first. True, those who have been disturbed have been hurt terribly. The large landowner and the

big industrialist are out in the cold. Most of them have "gone over the hill" since February 1948, if they hadn't before. But their numbers were comparatively small. Most peasants are better off as far as material possessions are concerned. They have more land since they were given not only the benefit of the holdings amassed by the expropriated landowners, but also the benefit of the land released by the expulsion of nearly 3,000,000 Sudeten Germans. The industrial worker certainly thinks he has gained rather than lost.

Even the managerial class was not disturbed so much as refugee stories would seem to indicate. Many persons in this group continue to be managers, but for a nationalized factory rather than for a corporation.

The essential fact about Czechoslovakia is that it was a going concern before the Communists took over, and also a thoroughly modern state. There was no really urgent building or housekeeping task for the new rulers to undertake. The balance between agriculture and industry was sound—almost exactly like that in the United States. There was no blatant privilege to be curbed, no serious problem of social inequality or denial of opportunity leading to a sense of mass grievance. In the other countries of the area such problems existed. In Czechoslovakia there was not even enough war damage to justify a special national effort involving regimentation. In short, there has been nothing in the way of startling innovation either justified or attempted in Czechoslovakia. There was

only the question whether Communists should hold the seats of power in the government. The revolution in Czechoslovakia has been almost exclusively a palace revolution. The new rulers have dressed it up as best they can to make it look like more than that. But as revolutions go, it is a poor show. So far as the bulk of the people are concerned there have been only two changes which affect their lives. The first has been the effort to convince the mass of the workers that they are better off. The second has been the breaking of the economic position and the political influence of the merchant class.

Here is what they have done for the workers.

First, the worker is idolized and glorified in public speeches, posters, and prominent place in parades. He is told that he is king. It is essentially an empty performance. In the beginning some of the workers took it seriously. Their shop committees voted higher wages and shorter hours. That had to be stopped. It even had to be reversed. The reversal was done inconspicuously, but it was done. The workers are a bit sadder and wiser for the experience. But still, on balance, one must conclude from external evidence that the Czech worker rather enjoys this constant glamorization of his unglamorous self.

Second, rationing has been manipulated to the advantage of the worker. His consumption of meat and textiles is up a little. His biggest gain in this area is one of relative position. It isn't so much that he gets more himself, but that the old upper classes get less. One

device to this end was elimination of the black market. The black market in Czechoslovakia before the coup was primarily an edge of advantage for those with more money. It was pretty harmless. It took the form of restaurants accepting money in place of ration coupons and the corner grocer passing out an extra titbit to his regular and richer customers. That is gone. In 1947 I was seldom even asked for a ration coupon in a restaurant. In 1949 I could get nothing without a ticket and what I got was about half as appetizing as before. Still the old gap between the standard of living of the factory employee and those who could earn more money is narrowing. It is a sop to the worker's ego. But again the evidence is that he likes the change. One of them put it to me this way, "Not as many people are better off than I am any more."

Thirdly, the factory worker has been guaranteed a job. As in all the Eastern countries that guarantee is open to many a qualification. It can mean freedom to starve if a man declines the particular job offered to him by the government employment service. The type of job offered is carefully related to a man's political record. But for the time being, at least, the fact of the guarantee is something the workers value. They remember the great depression back in the twenties when many of them had no jobs. They cling at least to the hope that there will never be a repetition now that their jobs are guaranteed. And while it has put a burden on the government, still there has already been one test of the guarantee, and it was made good.

That test came in late 1948 and early 1949 when shortage of raw materials forced several production lines to suspend temporarily. Jobs were continued. If there was nothing else for the men to do they were put to sweeping floors. It cannot be ignored as a major political factor that the bulk of the workers apparently prize this guarantee of work. They count it among their gains and plainly it must be a major reason why they do so docilely whatever they are asked to do by their new masters.

The other side of the coin is the gradual strangulation of the merchant class, the men who owned shops and restaurants and small factories. These have been singled out as the first enemies of the new regime for the obvious reason that they constituted the only capitalist class large enough in numbers to be politically significant. The regime moved against them slowly and almost hesitantly. Not until late 1949 were there any systematic arrests of such people. At the time I last visited the country in the spring of 1949 they were still the backbone of the economy of the country, still living well, still occupying their pleasant modern houses in the new suburbs around the cities. They had done their best to get along with the new state. They practised as long as they could the expediency so frequently imperative in their country's history.

That abiding Czech preference for expedience and compromise is nowhere more accurately expressed than by the outcome of the struggle which was waged through the summer of 1949 between the Roman

Catholic Church in Czechoslovakia and the communist regime. The battle began with the dramatic and courageous defiance of the regime by Archbishop Beran. But it ended with the clergy signing a capitulation to the regime. That clergy faced a choice of two courses of action. I heard some of them debate the question before the showdown came. The issue was a very simple one. Should they continue to accept a state subsidy at the price of submitting to the regime? Or should they reject the subsidy and defy the regime? They ended by continuing to accept the subsidy. The reason was as follows.

The present Roman Catholic Church in Czecho-. Slovakia was established as a result of the Thirty Years' War which ended in 1648. Since that time the Church has been both allied with the government and dependent for a large part of its funds on the government. As the product of that association it operates from cathedrals, churches, seminaries, hospitals, and palaces which the Church itself cannot support out of its own revenues. It has long been subsidized by the state. The physical establishment which the state subsidies make possible is the mechanism whereby the Church has its contact with the mass of the people. The Church could survive if it lost that mechanism of contact. But it would have to survive in a very different form. It would have to go down into the streets and start over again from humble beginnings. Some members of the Czech clergy were in favour of doing this, even of going underground if that

became necessary. They argued that zeal of the faith would burn with a clearer, brighter light under adversity.

But against that argument was another consideration. To lose the physical establishment of the Church would be to lose easy contact with the mass of the people. The advocates of the second course argued that the most important thing of all was that the clergy retain its contact with the masses. If it meant humiliating conditions, so be it. It is not the function of the Church to wage political battles. It is the true function of the Church to keep the comfort of the Church and its promises of salvation as immediately available to as many people as possible.

It was this second argument which won out in the end. The Church in Czechoslovakia did not choose to make itself a group martyr to a political cause. It compromised with the regime, as Czechoslovakia herself has compromised with the present dominance of Moscow's influence in that part of the world.

Add it all up and you come out with something like this. Before the war Czechoslovakia had a few rich landowners and big industrialists. With their families and lawyers and managers they may have numbered ten or fifteen thousand people. Most of them have been dispossessed, and most have left the country. They are no longer a political factor. Then you have the bourgeoisie: the shopowners and small factory operators. They have clung to their property as long as possible. Many still cling to it. Many have com-

promised by accepting positions as managers of their former enterprises. No one knows what the proportion is. Then there is the clergy, which has made its compromise with the state in some form or other. Finally at the bottom are peasants and industrial workers. These are the darlings of the new regime. They have been favoured to the limit of the resources of the state treasury and state propaganda machine. The favours amount to very little when you sift the truth from the propaganda. Yet is is enough to make them mild defenders of the regime.

Out of all this you have a condition which obviously could go on indefinitely provided nothing happens on the outside to disturb the economy of the country. Czechoslovakia produced goods for the Germans all through the war, because Germany provided the raw materials. There is nothing whatever inherent in the internal Czech picture to prevent the regime from running a going concern for the Russians so long as the Russians provide the raw materials and accept the finished products. Dangers to the regime come from outside rather than inside. One example of what might happen was provided by the subordinate effect on Czechoslovakia of the Berlin blockade. That blockade included a Western counter blockade. The counter blockade did not shut off all Czech trade with the West, but it did interfere with that trade. Goods which used to move freely across Germany were forced to move around Germany either through the Polish ports, or by rail through Vienna. The quantity of Czech

exports to the West dwindled and so did the quantity of Czech imports. It set production back. It was responsible for some of the hours spent sweeping factory floors at wages intended for manning complicated machinery. The lifting of the Berlin blockade was nowhere hailed more enthusiastically than right in government offices of Prague itself. That was a case where the Communists in the Czech government felt acutely the disadvantage of being tied to the tail of the Russian kite.

One condition might disturb the relative political stability which the Czech regime had achieved at the time of my last visit. Up to that time the police powers of the state had not been used widely or viciously on the mass of the people. One can only speculate as to the reaction if that power were to be used as is customary in the Soviet realm. The Communists have injected a new element into the Czech social structure. Czechs have often known what it is to be bullied and tyrannized by foreign police. But never until 1948 were they subjected to a secret police made up of their own people. There is evidence that the Czech police have been reluctant to behave like communist police. It runs contrary to the nature and practice of the people. They seem to be slow pupils in the Beria school of mass intimidation. In early 1949, so far as Western observers in the country could determine, they were still treating political prisoners as though they had rights. A number of "deviationists" or persons of "negative attitude" had already gone

through the "labour camps." Their reports were that work was assigned only to the physical capacity of the prisoner and that food was both edible and adequate. Further, most evidence indicated that when a prisoner had fulfilled his due term he was then released.

Perhaps this unprecedented lenience toward "class enemies" has been corrected by this time. There is certainly no precedent for it in any other communist-controlled country. It may be one of the reasons for the purge which swept through the higher offices of government in late 1949. One watches with interest for news of what will happen to the Communists who staged the original coup.

I called on Prime Minister Zapotocky in his office. He seemed to be a man more like William Green of the American Federation of Labour than like a Tito or a Stalin. This first crop of Czech communist leaders hardly seems to be the stuff of which great terrors are made. There was a report in Prague at the time of my visit that Mr. Zapotocky had learned with great disturbance that arrests could be made by the secret police without his knowledge. Perhaps he hadn't been told when he took office that he was not to hold the reins of power in his own hands. Several members of his own secretariat are reported to have been among those taken away in the late 1949 purge. It seems doubtful whether he or his colleagues of the coup are made of the stern stuff Russia demands of her satellite leaders. Certainly they did not of their own will drive

the communist revolution ahead at any breakneck speed. If any driving is done it must, I think, be done by Russian hands and under imperative orders from Moscow. If that happens Czechs will really know what it is like to be bullied by Czech police, and perhaps some iron may develop in their political hearts. But that is only a guess. The Czechoslovakia I saw on my last visit was serving the Russians as docilely, and with as little conviction, as they served their previous German masters, and before that the Austrians.

All of this means that Czechoslovakia is a pliant commodity in Moscow's hands. But it hardly means, I think, that Czechoslovakia can be classed as a dependable satellite. Her bright-coloured glass figures, her shiny pots and pans, her excellent textiles, and her good felt hats all make attractive merchandise on the shelves of Moscow stores to-day. She is extremely useful to Moscow as a source of consumer goods—more useful in this respect than any other of the satellites. The factories of Czechoslovakia produce for her new master as they have produced for all the former masters.

But the Russians have not found it expedient to raise a large Czech army, or equip it with modern weapons. Its size and equipment are just about enough to cope with an internal disturbance which might arise. External evidence would indicate that Moscow does not consider the Czech Army either too reliable or of much potential value should there be a war.

The visitor feels sorry for the Czechs, sorrier than for any of the others. They are so obviously perplexed

and troubled and sad. They sigh so audibly for freer days gone by. And they lost so much worth holding. They knew what civil liberties were—and tolerance and justice. Their civilization and their standard of living were high. They were a gentle people. They were simple people. They were merchants and traders and scholars. They had created for themselves a good life, and a fair one. And then it was all taken away from them overnight, as their freedom had often been taken from them. Now they are trying to adjust themselves as painlessly as possible to the Russian pattern, just as they tried to adjust themselves at other times to an Austrian pattern, an American pattern brought by Thomas Masaryk from Pittsburgh, or a German pattern. None of those other patterns stuck. The Czechs never fought to keep any one of them. They may never lead the van in a march of the satellites away from Moscow, but they are hardly likely to fight to retain the Moscow mould.

My most vivid memory of Prague is watching the May Day parade coming down Wenceslas Square. It was quite a parade. Every stock Communist party line was represented. The invective was directed heavily against Winston Churchill and America. The banners showed bloated American capitalists trying to shoot the dove of peace, Negro lynchings, and all the other themes so dear to the charades of communism. There was some mild applause for these political antics, but the mildness was surprising considering that the square had been packed with only the political reliables. No

one could enter that square without a police pass. The audience was the most loyal to the regime which could possibly be collected. Yet the applause for the party line charades was mild at most. Just once did the crowd let itself go with anything which sounded like a real outburst of honest feeling. That was when a solid phalanx of women came marching down the square. They were dressed in three colours—red, white, and blue. And they had been organized so that they were a living, marching flag of Czechoslovakia.

7

When Strong Men Meet

WHEN I first visited Yugoslavia in the spring of 1947 there was no doubt that I had gone "behind the curtain." I received the brush-off treatment. They let me have a room in one of the two hotels in Belgrade set aside for foreigners. I was free to roam around the streets. I could, if I had chosen, have visited the "Youth Railway" which was their stock window display for visitors. But so far as making contact with government officials and political leaders was concerned I couldn't break through. I made my call at the press office. I was received by a young secretary dressed in Partisan uniform. She took down the list of names of persons I wanted to see. She was all smiles and promises. She told me to come back the next day. I came back, and was told to come again the next day. I came back, and was told to come again the next day. And that is how it went. The Yugoslavs were willing to admit a visiting correspondent from the West. But they weren't talking.

When I went back to Yugoslavia in 1949 the change was the difference between night and day. My every request was granted. I could go where I pleased and see whom I pleased. I did not see Marshal Tito, but that was at the request of the American embassy, not because of any barrier put up by the Yugoslavs. The reason for the request was simple and valid. At the time of my visit the Cominform press and radio were daily shouting that Tito had sold out to the West and had become a stooge of the Americans. And Tito was still not quite sure enough of the loyalty of his own people to want to give them additional ammunition. In those days he was like a tightrope walker above Niagara Falls. He was engaged in the unprecedented process of weaning his own Communist party members away from the idea that the Russians were their brothers. It was a task which had never even been attempted before. During this ordeal the American ambassador had made a point of not seeking any meetings with Tito. It was not necessary, and would only have fed the Cominform propaganda machine. He felt the same way about American correspondents. Later that changed. By the end of 1949 every visiting American saw Tito. Open contact between Tito and Westerners ceased to become a liability to the Marshal. It became an asset. By then Tito's own Communists had been tested under fire. They had been subjected to both the blandishments and the threats of Moscow. They had not stampeded.

Those two personal experiences are merely surface

manifestations of the most dramatic political event of the post-war period of history. The end of the war was a new beginning for every country in the world—more thoroughly a new beginning than is customary after modern wars. America has emerged with enough social awareness to enact legislation which has secured for her the title of "welfare state." Conservative Britain is trying a voyage to a socialist Utopia. The colonialisms of the nineteenth century have gone up in smoke. The Indonesians have a government of their own. Western statesmen defer to the wishes of India as they once deferred only to the ambassadors of His Britannic Majesty. Every ship of state sailed into uncharted seas and Tito's Yugoslavia started that voyage less than five years ago as a cockboat tied to the stern of the Russian man-of-war.

In size and population Yugoslavia is to Russia as a cockboat is to a man-of-war too. There are about sixteen million Yugoslavs. There are more than one hundred and eighty million Russians. But Tito's Yugoslavia no longer trails behind Soviet Russia. By choosing not to trail, this small Balkan country upset all the ponderous calculations of the foreign offices of the great powers. If Moscow was surprised, so, too, were Washington, London, and Paris. A Washington State Department spokesman calculated that Tito might survive for six or eight weeks. That calculation reflected a kind of thinking which had obsessed the statesmen of the early post-war period. They had come to think of the world in terms of the great powers. They had also come to

think of the world in terms of communist and non-communist areas. There was no room in the Truman doctrine of 1946 for a communist country which did not follow the Moscow line. All communist countries, and all Communists, were assumed to be followers of Moscow.

But here in Yugoslavia was a communist country which was not following Moscow any more. And here also was a small country defying one of the two greatest of the great powers. None of the rules, none of the assumptions, none of the calculations or plans fitted this unorthodox event. At first it seemed to be the tendency of the pundits and statesmen to assume that it had not happened, because it shouldn't happen.

How did it happen, and what will it do to the course of history?

To get at the how of it you can, if you choose, examine with a magnifying glass the long and turgid letters exchanged between Belgrade and Moscow. But it would seem to me that the explanation is much simpler and more human. The Yugoslavs are not very complicated or very modern people. Some twelve of their sixteen millions are peasants, and most of the peasants live in the mountains as primitively as their forebears have lived since the Slavic tribes invaded and conquered the middle Danube Valley. The average peasant possesses one suit of clothes which his women make for him from the wool of the sheep he tends. He has never been through what the West calls the bourgeois stage of society. He knows nothing about factory life, or corporations or stocks and bonds. His life is

direct and immediate. He raises his own food, and he eats it. He is accustomed to doing this within his own family community. He accepts the familiar. He rejects, if necessary, violently, the foreign and unfamiliar. That was his reaction when the Germans marched into his country in 1941. His government had capitulated to Hitler. But the Yugoslav people declined to accept that capitulation. They threw out the government and went to war. It was a hopeless cause. But that made little difference. The Yugoslav insisted on going down fighting. He preferred it that way.

Then came the long years of German occupation, which certainly did nothing to appease or reduce the Yugoslav's desire to lead his own life. Resistance began early in Yugoslavia, and reached large and vigorous proportions there sooner than in any other German-occupied country. The Yugoslav really fought for his independence. After that came the peace, but what it brought was not independence for Yugoslavia. The new master was less obtrusive than the wartime master, but his hand was quite as heavy. The new domination took the form of Russians attempting to dictate to the new rulers of the Yugoslav state. Those rulers were Communists, but their idea of applied communism was not the total subordination of their own country to the economic and power interests of Soviet Russia. They had large plans for the remaking of their country. Those plans were not furthered by Russian's idea of trade which siphoned off the wealth of Yugoslavia for the benefit of Russian strength, nor

were those ideas furthered by Russians wriggling their way into all the layers of government and society. The Yugoslav Partisans who had fought in the woods with Tito did not enjoy surrendering their hard-won authority to men from Moscow. They declined to surrender it. When the test came the leaders in Yugoslavia did what you would expect of Yugoslavs, but not what the world had come to expect of Communists. They defied the might, the power, and the influence of Soviet Russia.

Now let us try to get at the picture of the kind of people they are, the colossal problems they face, and their chance of surviving what Moscow is trying to do to them.

Belgrade, their capital, is not a great metropolitan city; not a very beautiful or very modern city; not a centre of good living, or great art, or fashion or philosophy. But when you come here you feel and find a quality not everywhere present in the world. It's just a little matter of courage.

I had travelled a long way from Washington to Belgrade. In all the other places—Frankfurt, Berlin, Rome, Trieste, Vienna, and Prague—people speculated on how long Tito could hold out. In all of them I heard constant reports of his impending doom. In Rome I was told that he could not trust his army. In Vienna I heard that Cominform forces were gathering against him. In Prague I heard that his Communist party was yearning to break loose from his heretical leadership and return to the one true faith of Moscow.

In Belgrade I heard none of it. What is more, I found not the slightest evidence to support any of it.

True, the absence of tangible evidence of trouble impending for Tito does not prove that there is no trouble coming his way. Yet it seems to me that the one most important thing about Titoism is that in its capital there is not a visible or provable trace of excitement, or anxiety or fear or panic. Belgrade is tranquil. And the same goes for what else I was able to see of Yugoslavia. I travelled by car up through the valleys of Serbia to the city of Skoplje, which is supposed to be the danger spot in Yugoslavia. Skoplje is the capital of Yugoslav Macedonia. Bulgaria is just over the mountain ridge on one side, Albania over the ridge on the other. And straight down the Vardar Valley until recently were the Greek guerrillas whose loyalty is to the Cominform. If any part of Yugoslavia was in danger that was it. Yet Skoplje never looked or felt or acted like an embattled front of the Cominform campaign against Marshal Tito.

Back in Tito's capital when I visited it in the spring of 1949 the cause of greatest excitement had nothing to do with Moscow. It was the opening of the first of the new crop of American films. The evening I drove in from the airport the car had to detour to reach the hotel. The street on the direct route was blocked solid by a crowd of the Belgrade equivalent to bobbysoxers trying to get in to see *Tarzan of the Apes.* Britain had sent *Hamlet,* and *Hamlet* was doing well, but not so

well as *Tarzan.* That was not the only evidence of changed attitude toward Westerners. The American ambassador's car was saluted respectfully wherever it went. The same was true for the British ambassador. A large British trade delegation was there. Arrangements were being made for a mission from the International Bank and discussions for an American Export-Import Bank loan (since granted) were under way. The nationalized press and radio were still going through the motions of damning Western "capitalism" along with Cominform "imperialists," but already the venom had been drawn from the words directed at the West while the barbs directed eastward were sharp and earnest. The propaganda line had not yet turned itself all the way around, but it was veering more every day toward the east. Already the Tito press was beginning to pour forth that wealth of documentary material about the behaviour of Russia toward her satellites which had made it clear beyond doubt that there is neither affection nor consideration in the embrace of the Russian bear.

Perhaps more important than all these surface changes, although an intangible difficult to assess correctly, is a new mental attitude on the part of Yugoslav officials and spokesmen toward Western diplomats and correspondents. Candour has crept into these relations. Before the break there was no meeting of minds between East and West here any more than in the other Russian orbit countries. Conversations were carried on as dialectical debates, not as a groping for some common

ground. Such habits do not die easily. I encountered a good deal of party line in my various conversations with Yugoslav government officials and spokesmen. But it lacked the old ardour and the old arrogant assumption that the party line represented absolute truth which had descended from Marxian heavens as revealed gospel. There is a perceptible dawning of doubt; some evidence of a reawakening of the inquisitive mind.

As a visitor from Washington I was asked questions, particularly about the prospects for that famous economic bust so long predicted by the Communist party line. I have no way of knowing whether I convinced my questioners that Moscow could be wrong. But I do know that what I had to say was treated with courteous and respectful attention.

There is, of course, another side to the picture. Private enterprise survives among the peasants. But that is the only place, and it may not last much longer there. In the cities and towns everything has been nationalized except a dozen bootblacks in Belgrade and a few second-hand bookstores in Zagreb. And every popular movement except the Church has been brought into, and put under, the direct control of the People's Front. Of Yugoslavia's seven and a half million hectares of cultivated farm land, 300,000 hectares had been collectivized on January 1st of 1949 into 1,100 “co-operatives." But by March 1st the figure was up to 500,000 hectares. This is supposed to be the result of volunteer action by the peasants. One must remember

that in Yugoslavia, as in all communist countries, the word "voluntary" is a euphemism.

There is no question about who runs Yugoslavia or what kind of government it has. Marshal Tito is at the apex of the ruling triangle. Under him is a small core of pre-war Communists who helped him perfect the technique and the political machinery which placed them in power. Next comes a Communist party of half a million members with an elite of 30 per cent who "fought in the woods" with Tito and a rank and file of 70 per cent who joined up in the days of victory. Under the party are some seven million members of the People's Front who have been brought in through the simple and classic communist process of taking over the leadership of each group—whether it be a political party or the Boy Scouts or the Yugoslav equivalent of the League of Women Voters. Through such devices the leadership at the top already controls directly every phase of political, public, cultural, and social life with the single exception of the churches, where the control is indirect. The peasant organizations have been blanketed in, although a majority of the peasants still own their own property. It is a tyranny in the classic Greek sense of the word, meaning a government which possesses and exercises complete and arbitrary control over the nation.

Its political opponents, when caught, also regard it as tyrannical in the modern sense. Abstract justice exists here no more than it does in Soviet Russia. The communist direction and purpose of the Tito govern-

ment is something no visitor to Titoland can escape or explain away.

This shows up most prominently in the new buildings which you see everywhere in Yugoslavia. The planners of the Tito regime are building many things —houses, factories, a film city, an Olympic stadium, a grandiose addition to Belgrade. But of all the building the most prominent single item is the new farm co-operative going up in every town and village. Travel out of Belgrade in any direction. On the northern plains the old buildings are made of brick and plaster and they are clean and attractively painted, and the villages have big churches and town halls and even hotels. In the south they are made of mud and straw and there are only houses and barns. But in each there is the one new feature injecting a single new element of uniformity into the otherwise varied picture. It is a building of red brick and concrete. Usually it isn't quite finished. But in every community it is the same thing of the same design—a new community centre built by the farm collective and around the farm collective system. It will house the local party officials. It will be the place for the receiving of the grain and the distributing of orders for the new planting. It will be a store for the merchandising of state goods. It will be the centre for the distribution of propaganda. If the party has its way the collective building will become in every sense the centre of community life, taking into itself all the functions of community life which used to centre around the church, the town hall, and the village tavern.

There is some housing under construction, principally in the cities; enough so that government officials and prominent party members are beginning to obtain new accommodations. But every new brick being laid in the country could go into housing and there would still be a shortage. The real emphasis in the new construction work has been not on housing, but on the "co-operatives."

Plainly the core of the Tito programme is the effort to tie the entire national community together through the new farm collective programme. It is intended to be both the unifying and the controlling force. Perhaps it will work. That depends on how it is carried out. Tito's real domestic enemies are not the dispossessed of the old upper class. There never were very many of them. His real enemies are the same which plagued the pre-war rulers of Yugoslavia. They are sectionalism and the backwardness of the country. Some Americans think that their own country is plagued by sectionalism. They should change places for a day with Tito to discover what it really means. Hatred of Croat for Serb is so intense that during the last war they took advantage of disorder to vent their hatred of each other. Seven hundred thousand Yugoslavs died fighting the Germans, but a million Yugoslavs died fighting one another. Each nationality wears its own costume. You know a Serb by his cap and the cut of his breeches and the tip of his home-made shoes. Under the old Austrian empire Croats were used to police Serbs and Serbs to police Croats. Sectionalism was made a police device of

that empire. But Tito, if he is to survive, himself, and if he is to carry on the task of unifying this polyglot realm, must find a key to its true unification. And he must also make its economy function. It can't function much longer by the old devices. Tito inherited a land of some twelve million peasants. But there are only about twenty million acres of arable land. That works out at less than two acres per person actually living on the land. The only way the standard of living can be raised is to take many a peasant off the land and convert him into a city dweller and factory worker. Factories must be built and men trained to work in them, and there isn't time to let this process come gradually and naturally, as it did in the United States. Russia is breathing hard on the Yugoslav neck. Neighbouring countries have higher standards of living, by far.

So there is practical as well as ideological reason behind the farm collectivization programme. The uniform building in each village is the one uniform feature of the national landscape. Perhaps it can become the device for converting Croats and Serbs, Slovenians and Macedonians, Bosnians and Montenegrins into Yugoslavs. Perhaps also it can be a device for channelling a surplus of peoples on the lands to the factories. There is no questioning the need both for unification and for modernization. But can it be done in a manner acceptable to the peasant? In theory the peasant is not being coerced. In theory he does not need to join a collective. In theory there are very few collectives. The word they prefer is co-operative. And there are different types of

co-operative. They range from a state farm which has a manager and hired hands to a co-operative from which each previous landowner derives income proportionate to the amount of land he has contributed to the common pool.

Take a look with me at Janko Chelnik, a village on the Panonian plain north of Belgrade where they are in the process of converting a private ownership into a "co-operative" system. Not all residents of the village have yet joined, although it was explained to me that family units are "joining up quite rapidly." The change from old to new order involves two building projects. In the village there is the inevitable co-operative building, a combination administration building, community centre, and farmers' exchange, as described earlier. The other is the construction outside the village of a collection of communal farm buildings.

We went first to the new farm buildings. There was a stable for horses, a dairy barn, a pig-pen, a granary, a corn crib, and a blacksmith shop.

The workers are divided into brigades. There is a ploughing brigade, a weeding brigade, a teamsters' brigade, a cow brigade, and so on. The buildings were of brick, new and apparently fairly well arranged and designed, although they were having trouble with water seeping into the cellar under the granary. They use the cellar for storing casks of vinegar and wine.

I was surprised at the number of men in the stable. It was explained that there is one man to every eight horses. I asked if the same men drove the horses in the

field. I was told that the stablemen did nothing but tend the horses in the stable—one man to eight horses. Similar proportions were observed in the dairy barn and the pig-pen. And the rule of strict specialization prevails. The workers at the collective buildings sleep in town, but two or three are assigned in rotation to sleep with the animals. The animals seemed to be in good condition and the stables and pens were clean.

Then we went into the village and visited one of the houses. As in many European farm communities, the town house was a complete farm establishment in itself. Each property has a narrow frontage on the main street. There is a big gate leading into a long brick courtyard, with a long row of buildings on either side. The house we visited had four bedrooms with two beds in each and a central sitting and dining room containing the winter kitchen. Extending back from the house was a root cellar, a smokehouse, a stable with one cow and two horses, and various buildings for farm machinery. Across the court was a summer kitchen and pantry, granary, corn crib, poultry pens, a duck pond, and a pig-pen. Beyond the buildings was an orchard and a vegetable garden, all part of the property.

The house itself was spotlessly clean. The men were away, but there was an old grandmother peeling potatoes and the youngest married granddaughter rocking a cradle with her foot while she knitted.

I was told that this family, like all others in the village, keeps possession of its town house with all its buildings, its poultry, one cow, one sow, two horses,

and the orchard and garden directly beyond. **But** the grain fields outside the village had been "contributed" to the collective.

Enough families from the village have "contributed" their outlying lands so that the collective now has 4,250 acres. There are 425 workers on these collective lands. That works out at one worker to every ten acres.

But why the new granaries and stables and dairy barns when the village is already equipped to handle the entire produce and all the livestock of the community? So far as I could see they were duplicating existing facilities with only one major resulting difference. The individual farmer no longer has the grain he raises stored in his own personal granary by his own house. It is stored in the collective where it is under state control.

Incidentally, all the houses in the town were of the same identical design and almost of a size. They were brick houses, plastered on the outside, with tile roofs. There was considerable variation in colour of paint and wall designs, but no external evidence of distinction between rich and poor. That equality, of course, is old, not new.

As we left the house which we visited, the old grandmother said, "It's all wonderful. The only trouble is that I'm too old to enjoy it."

I kept thinking that remark over as we drove away.

Did she mean it literally? If so, perhaps Marshal Tito won't have too much difficulty collectivizing his peasants.

But, then, did she? The manager of the co-operative was with us, and so, too, was an official from the Ministry of Agriculture. Perhaps it was a set speech for the occasion. Perhaps, too, it was double talk. I still wonder.

Janko Chelnik is a model community. There are many others like it in the rich plains of the north where the scale of living is good by eastern European standards, for the farmer lives amidst plenty. This is the bread basket of the country. But even in Janko Chelnik you find the residue of the fierce sectionalism of the past. There is an invisible line running across the main street of the village. On one side of the line live Greek Orthodox Serbs. On the other live Roman Catholic Slovaks brought down in the days of the Austrian empire from another country. The language, costumes, and social life of the two communities are totally different. There has never been any mingling of the two communities, although they live in the same village. The co-operative is the device which is being used to try to bridge this ancient chasm.

When you travel south and upward into the narrowing mountain valleys poverty replaces plenty. Cows and horses disappear and are replaced by the slow, great-horned native buffalo which roamed Europe before the Greeks and Romans. Houses cease to be of brick. You move back into Biblical days, when sun-dried clay bound with straw was the basic building material.In the north most men wore shoes. In the mountains bare feet are as common as shod feet. And

women pull ploughs almost as often as do animals. There is a grinding poverty, and the number of persons per arable acre goes up. In the south one sees the heritage of the centuries of Turkish domination. Skoplje was the southern capital of the old Turkish regime; Belgrade the northern. There are few visible vestiges of the Turkish days in Belgrade, but in Skoplje to-day there are Moslem Turks living scarcely better than animals.

I spoke a bit glibly earlier about the country's being under a communist rule and being subjected to a ruthless process of communization. I haven't the slightest doubt but that, with its present form of government, Yugoslavia will call itself a communist country for generations to come. Yet words like that can be used too freely; and their use can convey implications as to the future which may not hold true.

To-day's leaders in Yugoslavia have a concept which they consider to be communism. They are trying to build a new society and they think of their ideas as being the product of communist doctrine. They have gone further than any other country in the world to liquidate private enterprise and the capitalist system. There is less of both in Yugoslavia to-day than there is in Soviet Russia itself. But what are the essential factors? Yugoslavia never was what the West would call a capitalist country. Most of it, down into modern times, was a colony of the Turks, exploited by Turks. It was liberated from the Turks partly by the Serbians establishing their independence and partly by the Austrians pushing south through Croatia and Slovenia,

and doing some exploiting in the process. Zagreb, the most modern city, was built by Austrians. The coastal cities were built by Italians. The dominant urge of the country has been to throw off all these peripheral influences, unite the country and make it modern. World War I roused and unleashed the spirit of national independence. That spirit is strong in the minds of the men who are running the country to-day. They think of it as being communism, yet in their minds communism and nationalism are so mixed and confused that you cannot tell where the one begins and the other ends. They call things which are just plain modern or rational or arbitrary communistic. Certainly they are practising an extreme form of state socialism. But the battle for national unity and a higher national standard of living is a more real struggle than one between communism and capitalism. Their propaganda battles vehemently against "capitalist exploiters," yet to a large degree this is tilting at a straw man. The real enemies of the regime are poverty and sectionalism, and the character of a regime is moulded more by the struggle against its real enemies than the one against its imaginary enemies.

Just from visual observation I would guess that a third of the people you see on the streets of Belgrade walk barefooted. And another third wear home-made peasant shoes. The pressures by the regime on the churches may have started with communist ideology, but it would have to be maintained regardless of communism as part of the effort to obtain national unification. The Serbian Orthodox Church is identified with

the between-wars concept of a Yugoslavia dominated by the Serbian Kingdom. That Church must be curbed politically if Croat and Slovene and Macedonian are to achieve equality with the Serb. And the Roman Catholic Church is associated with Croat and Slovene separatism and with the memories of the old Austrian dominance in the northern provinces, and it, too, must be curbed if national unification is to be achieved.

The regime itself is made up of Communists predominantly, although in theory the government is still a coalition. The regime practices communism in that it has abolished most private enterprise and moves as vigorously as possible against every sectional and divisive political force. Yet is the motivation behind its actions the dogma of communism? The answer is not clear or certain. Many of the things it does would be done by any regime no matter what its dogma if it set about to unify and modernize the country. What you really have, I think, is a new oligarchy which has replaced the old Serbian oligarchy and which uses nationalization of industry and enterprise and a secret police and party organization as devices for unification. Certainly those devices will continue to be used so long as there are powerful divisive forces operating both from within and from without the country. But is the device more important than the objective, and what will happen to the device if the objective of unity and modernization is achieved?

Marshal Tito regards himself as a Communist. More than that, he thinks of himself as being a much truer

Communist than Stalin. He is like the Protestant who believes that his faith is a return to original Christianity. To Tito, Stalin was the original heretic and Tito himself is the reformer who is bringing back the true gospel in its original form. This is something you discuss endlessly as you sit around the fire of an evening in Belgrade. You search history for parallels which might throw some light. You recall that King Henry VIII of England never knew to his dying day that he was a Protestant. Throughout his reign he continued to burn heretics. He claimed to be a better Catholic than the Pope. The Church of England which he founded still calls itself a Catholic Church. Yet few historians would doubt that Henry VIII had a great deal to do with the founding of Protestantism.

Certainly Tito has started something new in modern politics. Certainly he considers it to be a brand of communism. Certainly his regime wears the ornaments and badges of communism. The Red star is on the cap of every Yugoslav soldier. The Red star dominates every public demonstration. The iconography of the regime puts Tito alongside Lenin, Marx, and Engels. (Stalin has been dropped.) Capitalists have been hounded out of their property and out of their accustomed way of living. The agents of the regime have infiltrated and now dominate, or control, every organization in the country. The secret police watch over all with an attentive eye which misses very little.

This is Yugoslavia. It is confusing. Its meaning and implications for the future are uncertain. No wonder it

has driven Moscow into a passionate frenzy of hatred and anxiety. No wonder, either, that it poses many a dilemma in the capitals of the West. What does each try to do about it and, more importantly, what *can* each do about it?

Take it from the Moscow side first. Moscow was bound from the opening day of the break to attempt to recapture Yugoslavia for orthodox communism. Moscow has made that effort by every device short of open war. The first move was to open every stop on the propaganda organ. Moscow tried to appeal to the Yugoslav Communists to overthrow Tito and reassert their allegiance to Moscow. It has been plain for a long time that that effort was a failure. The reason is important to us of the West. We can only deduce it from events, but in the light of events one can see that Yugoslav Communists were peculiarly insensitive to the call of Moscow. The reason must lie in the composition of the Yugoslav Communist party. I mentioned that composition earlier. Examine it now more carefully in the light of what has happened. Less than one per cent of the party consists of men who belonged to it before the war. They were trained in pre-war communism. They knew their Karl Marx and Lenin as a Methodist minister knows his Bible. Many of them, including Tito, went to Spain to fight for their faith in the Spanish Civil War. Then they came home to fight in their own war; and they went on through the ordeal of Partisan fighting in the woods with Tito. Out of that experience they evolved policies which eventu-

ally led them into open rebellion against Moscow. And this small inner core of the party is the only part of it which ever did have time to study its Marx and Lenin. Around them, in places of secondary responsibility, are the 30 per cent who joined up during the Partisan fighting, and outside of those are the 70 per cent who simply came aboard the victory band wagon at the end of the war. There was little time for Marx or Lenin in the days of Partisan fighting in the woods. There has been little time since for men who have been trying to convert a feudal peasant society into a modern state. If there are other reasons why Moscow propaganda fell on stony ground in Yugoslavia, history has not yet brought them to the surface. All we can be sure of for the moment is that the men who follow Tito have been motivated more by loyalty to him and to the idea of an independent, unified, and modernized Yugoslavia than by any theoretical devotion to orthodox communism.

Moscow tried subversion in the higher levels of the regime. It netted a half dozen or so, no more, and they were not top people.

Moscow tried geographic subversion, with Macedonia. The answer required a bit of purging of the Macedonian Central Committee, but not much. The Macedonians seemed to prefer a Tito who had given them cultural autonomy (a device borrowed from Russia) to any adventuring with the men from Moscow.

Moscow tried assassination. How many times it was tried is a secret of the Yugoslav state police. But we know it was tried. The efforts were never sufficiently

effective to cause great alarm inside the regime. During the first year of the break Tito spent most of his time on the Dalmatian coast where security could be maintained more easily than in Belgrade. But he was back in Belgrade during most of 1949. He changes his residence from time to time as a precaution. But he appears frequently at public ceremonies and demonstrations. Judging by his public appearances he is safer among his own people than Stalin is in Moscow.

The one Moscow attack which has seriously hurt Yugoslavia has been the campaign of economic sanctions. That did hurt, swiftly and seriously. As the reader must have gathered by this time, Yugoslavia is a primitive country in the process of trying to make itself less primitive. Economic sanctions could not make the life of the individual peasant 011 his rocky hillside much worse than it was before. The peasant is too self-sufficient in his accustomed poverty. But the sanctions did strike at every new programme which is being attempted. For one thing, Yugoslav railroads are few and far between. The new economic efforts depend heavily on highway transportation. The roads are wretched by Western standards and play havoc with trucks and buses. A ready supply of spare parts is essential to keep highway transport operating. In the pre-break period the highways were equipped mostly with buses and trucks from Czechoslovakia. With the break spare parts shipments dwindled rapidly and then stopped altogether. Six-wheel trucks came through, as long as they did, with only four tyres. Worse still,

Rumania stopped shipping crude oil up the Danube to Tito's refineries, all but one of which are located on the Danube. If the West had not opened up alternative supplies of oil, spare parts, and machinery to keep the reconstruction effort going the whole new programme of economic development would have collapsed almost overnight. Without Western help Moscow would have held the power of death over the regime and the country would either have reverted to its dependency on Moscow or relapsed into a subsistence-level peasant economy.

Certainly if even a strong minority in the Yugoslav Communist party had been imbued with devotion to Moscow, Tito could have been laid low within the first six months of the Moscow offensive.

Then look at Yugoslavia from the Western point of view. Here was a communist country under a ruthless police-state dictatorship. The regime expressed no affection for the West or Western values or the Western way of life. But it had been cast into outer darkness by the high priests of the Cominform. To aid it was perhaps hopeless anyway, and might end, if successful, in nourishing a new and conceivably even more dangerous form of communism. The temptation in the early days was to offer aid on conditions. Some wanted as a condition that Tito abandon his secret police. Some wanted a written agreement that he would restore capitalism. Some wanted it stated on the dotted line that he would abandon the Greek guerrillas and stop talking about Trieste and Carinthia. All of these proposed conditions reflected a logical assumption in the

West that Tito's Yugoslavia, after the break, was in fact what it considered itself to be: namely, a total anomaly in a power-riven world, a country which had no natural friends or allies and which was doomed, like Job's coffin, to hang suspended through all time in thin air.

But the conditions were not made explicit. Some have even been ignored, for practical if not precisely moral reasons. Nothing was said or done about diminishing the power of the secret police for the practical reason that, their attention having been redirected against the agents of Moscow, they had become the servants of the common cause of the West and Tito against Moscow. No effort was made to induce Tito to relax his drive against capitalism largely because there was no capitalism in the country considered worth reviving. As for the Greek guerrillas, Trieste, and Carinthia, nothing needed to be put in writing. Those conditions have in effect been gradually recognized and honoured. Tito did abandon the Greek guerrillas for the practical reason that they had become a weapon of Moscow turned against him, and while he has never renounced Yugoslav claims to Trieste and Carinthia, and probably never will renounce them formally, they have ceased to be needed as political causes by the Tito regime. What Tito is seeking now from Italy is not Trieste, but Italian friendship. And what he wants from Austria is not Carinthia, but every possible strengthening of Austria to guard his northern frontier against the agents of the Cominform.

There is no reason why the West should help Tito

from love of his methods or his domestic objectives. But there is every reason why, in the present duality of power politics, the West should encourage Yugoslavia to become as independent of Moscow and as self-reliant as possible. There is no assurance whatever that out of a growing association between the West and Tito in the common cause of resisting Moscow the Yugoslav regime will become less communistic in its approach to the daily problems of government. But there is a distinct possibility that the regime and its thinking and its policies will go through a transition toward a point of view less objectionable to Western thinking. Associations have a way of modifying the points of view of the associates. Yugoslavia's hostility to the idea of capitalism is only partly the product of communist doctrine. It derives also in part from national experience. Yugoslavia had almost no native capitalism. What it did know was the type of capitalist exploitation which was represented by foreign companies operating inside the country under concessions. It is not only the Yugoslav Communist who looks with a suspicious eye on Western capitalism. It is also the native patriot to whom capitalism meant economic exploitation. Capitalism did not put its best foot forward in pre-war Yugoslavia. It is suffering from the memory to-day. But times are changing. Western loans have made it possible for Tito to survive the first onslaughts of the Cominform attack. Westerners with capitalist convictions have been welcomed as advisers and business partners.

There is nothing inherent in the situation in Yugoslavia to-day which precludes the possibility that communism as practised in Yugoslavia may move in new and unexpected directions. Industry is being developed by the state and it would seem probable that it will continue to be owned and operated by the state. But in other fields the door is by no means closed to a modification of communist theory. It depends on whether Tito and his top planners act from a burning inner conviction in communism or from a more practical desire to do what is best for their country. If pragmatism enters their thinking, we might well see them temporize with the peasants and with private enterprise. In attacking private enterprise they have already gone so far that they can go no further. There is nothing left in the country to nationalize except those dozen bootblacks in Belgrade and the odd second-hand bookstores in Zagreb. Society changes in every country history knows. If society is to change in Yugoslavia it can change in only one direction: back to some measure of tolerance for private enterprise.

Meanwhile, Whether this prospect is merely a pious hope or a real possibility, the West owes the Yugoslavs both thanks and some support if only for one accomplishment. They have presented to the world a shining and heartening example of the spirit of self-reliance and inability to understand defeatism. The odds were all against them when they decided to break from Moscow's leading strings, yet it never seemed to occur to them that there was any reason why they should be

afraid of Stalin's army, his secret police, his propaganda thunders, or his economic blockade. You can scoff at the Yugoslavs for their New Belgrade, built on a sand-bar in defiance of the rules of engineering; at the economic absurdity of nationalizing flower carts; at the political temerity of attempting to collectivize twelve million peasants. But no man can question their courage.

8

Poland—A Study in Delayed Reaction

THE plot in the story of post-war Russian-Polish relations really began to thicken in November of 1949 when Moscow sent a marshal of the Red Army to Warsaw to command the Polish armies and become Minister of Defence in the Polish Government. The event was dressed up as being the result of a petition from Poland. The marshal in question, Konstantin Rokossovsky, was Polish by birth, and he reassumed Polish citizenship when he assumed his government office in Poland. But no amount of gloss could cover up the basic fact that a marshal of the Red Army had been put in command of all the military forces of the Polish Government. The implication was clear. Four years after Moscow had established a government of its own selection in Warsaw, Moscow could not trust that government to serve the interests of the Soviet state.

What had happened before that event is one of the strangest and least-understood stories of the post-war period. It began at Yalta when the Russians attempted

to persuade Roosevelt and Churchill to turn Poland over to a committee of Poles which had been formed into a Russian-sponsored government-in-exile in Moscow. The West also had its Polish government-in-exile waiting in London to take over. Roosevelt and Churchill fought harder against the Russian-sponsored Polish group than against anything else the Russians tried to sell at Yalta. On paper Roosevelt and Churchill succeeded in obtaining a compromise. It was to have been a new group of Poles. In practice the Russians proceeded to set up their own selections in Warsaw as the new Polish government. This was the first and most blatant violation of the Yalta covenant by the Russians. They got what they thought they wanted. And yet, four years later, this Polish government of Russian choosing had become so weak and unreliable an instrument of the Moscow purpose that a marshal of the Soviet Army had to be sent from Moscow to try to reclaim it.

Poland is not an easy country to bend to Russian will, even when Communists long trained in Moscow are used for the purpose. If it were possible for an intelligent Polish Communist to be frank, he would be forced to admit it, and nowhere is this fact better known than in the Kremlin. Westerners are less inclined to accept this proposition because they are more impressed with another seemingly paradoxical situation. The American traveller in Poland cannot escape the unwelcome fact that communism has two faces, and Poland is a country where one of those two faces

has been more acceptable to the people than we of the West like to believe.

There is first the familiar face of communism, the face we know. Communism comes with the police state and intolerance and hatred. It discards fairness and government by law. It dispossesses people of their property and their birthright. It disregards ancient values. It turns son against father and brother against brother. It uses falsehood shamelessly. It replaces the inquiring mind by a fanatic, medieval dogmatism. It lightly discards the most valuable heritage of civilization—the doctrine of the saered individuality of man. In its place communism erects the doctrine of the state under which the individual has no rights against the state. All that communism is—in Poland and in all the other countries which communism has captured by violence, treachery, or intimidation. In no country has it taken power by consent of the governed. It never once won a majority in an open, free election. It calls itself democracy, yet the essence of democracy is the will of the majority. As it has developed since the revolution in Russia, communism has been a minority movement which has won power by illegal and undemocratic methods.

All of that is one face of communism. But if that were its only face we who oppose communism would have little reason to fear it, for anything so totally evil would breed only hatred for itself and out of that hatred would come its own destruction. We could safely sit on the side lines and watch it reap the fruit

of its own evil. But the men who have seized power in eastern Europe are not so foolish as to bring only evil to those they have captured. If we insist on seeing only that one evil side of the communist governments behind the iron curtain we are deluding only ourselves, and we might quite possibly delude ourselves disastrously.

Poland, more than any other of the countries I visited in 1947 and again in 1949, is a country where the other side of communism has been more apparent to the people it ruled than the evil side which occupies our attention almost exclusively. We should understand that if we are to combat communism effectively we must see it in all its aspects, and assess all those aspects accurately, for unless we do, the policies we devise against it will be founded on false estimates and be doomed to failure. Poland to-day provides a sharp lesson in the importance of reading events within their true context. After the end of the war the West received a steady stream of reports of the process whereby a small minority of Communists in Poland obtained mastery of the machinery of government by devices which violated all the rules of democratic procedure. There was nothing inaccurate in the facts as reported. The reporting was excellent so far as it went. The trouble was that standing by itself it created in the Western mind a picture not only of a people whose government had been usurped, which was perfectly true, but also of a people conscious of the usurpation and actively resenting it, which was not true. At least

it was not true until late in 1949 when the political and military artists of Moscow began busily retouching the Polish scene. The new design was aimed at blocking out any pattern even vaguely resembling that used in Yugoslavia by the hated Tito.

Demanding that "the fight for complete elimination of opportunism, nationalism, and social democracy must be pursued to its end in Poland," the United Workers' party began by dropping former Vice-Premier Wladyslaw Gomulka from the party for "alien political attitudes." At about the same time Rokossovsky was sent by the Kremlin to replace Marshal Michael Zymierski as Polish Minister of National Defence. Zymierski was as popular with the Polish people as he was unpopular with the Russians because of his non-party stand. Either Moscow or the political chore-boys in Warsaw found it necessary to adopt what one Moscow trusty described as "a firm attitude toward opportunists, nationalists, and false people." Although Poles in political circles have become more aware of Russia's interest in Poland's government within recent months, the West must study the picture of the past four years in perspective if it is to assess correctly what is happening in Poland, what can happen, and what policies would most effectively encourage developments in a direction favourable to the establishment of a real people's democracy in the Western sense.

During the years since the war the West has looked at Poland in terms of the story of the usurpation of power by the communist minority. During those same

four years the ordinary Pole hasn't had time to pay much attention to that story. Any human being in any country in the world sees his government in terms of his own personal contact with it. He judges it by what it does or doesn't do to him personally. In Poland the process of communist consolidation within the government has gone on almost unnoticed by the great mass of the people. What has been obvious in the West has been inconspicuous inside Poland. It has been deliberately inconspicuous. The real secret of success of the usurpation has been the unobtrusive manner in which it has been effected.

The screen behind which the Communists have operated has been Poland's overriding need for post-war reconstruction and economic reorganization. At the end of the war her capital city was in ruins. More than half the people who had lived in Warsaw before the war were dead. Although it is generally known that the Germans operated their slaughterhouses on such a mass-production basis as to exterminate all but 100,000 of Poland's 3,500,000 pre-war Jewish population, only the Poles themselves realize the implications of their loss of eight million people, or one quarter of their entire pre-war population. After all, the city of Warsaw alone suffered more casualties than did both Great Britain and the United States combined. The Germans set out with characteristic thoroughness to destroy the Polish people, the Polish culture, and any remains of the Polish economy which might nourish the idea of continued national existence in the minds of patriotic survivors.

Poland's eastern farms, forests, and oil fields had been taken from her, and their replacement by the industrial complex of Silesia served to increase the difficulties of economic readjustment after the war ended. To make Poland function and live it was necessary to rebuild Warsaw, to fill the new territories with people, to train these people to operate the new industries, and to construct an entirely new economy suitable to the shift of Poland's boundaries from east to west.

This was a national task. Its achievement accorded not only with the wishes but also with the need of the entire community. Any Polish government which would attempt this task would enjoy the support of an overwhelming majority of the Polish people in the effort. Whether one likes it or not, the fact must be recognized that the Communists in Poland made this task their first priority. They assigned their best men to it, and thereby put themselves in accord with the will of the Polish people, in so far as they devoted their energies to the task of Polish reconstruction.

In fairness it must be said that whatever the price, Poland has been put together as a working economic unit. Its mines have been supplying coal to Russia and Italy, Czechoslovakia and Sweden, Hungary and France. Its food is flowing to Britain in return for Western manufactured machinery. Poland's trains "run on time." The "recovered territories"—East Prussia and Silesia—have been populated. And Warsaw is rising like the phoenix out of her rubble and ashes.

Warsaw is the most spectacular job of reconstruction to be seen anywhere in Europe. When I visited this city in 1947 it was alive, but it was a life dominated by ruins. The new shops and houses were mostly jerry-built temporary structures dug into the ruins. In 1949 the ruins no longer dominated. Fresh, brightly painted newness is the dominant. In 1947 there were ten buildings standing in the *Street of the New World* and eighty in ruins. In 1949 eighty were new and finished and only ten were still in ruins. Actually the new street is better than the pre-war one, for the buildings have been restored from the original designs and therefore stand out in their eighteenth-century unity and beauty, free from the encrustations of the Victorian period. With all this the Communists have associated themselves, in the meanwhile avoiding those communist exhibitionisms which are so much more prominent in others of the "People's Democracies."

When I last visited Poland, Polish communism had not even figuratively put the Red Star into the heraldry of the Polish state. The hammer and sickle were rarely in evidence. I did not see a single picture of Stalin in Warsaw, although I am sure pictures were to be found if one wished to search for them. Polish troops still marched to church in formation as part of their regular exercises. Private enterprise still flourished in many sectors of the Polish economy. Private ownership was still permitted if the enterprise employed less than fifty persons per shift. Most retail shops in Warsaw were still privately owned. Much of the reconstruction

of Warsaw had been financed by private persons and executed by private contractors.

Collectivization of farm lands existed only as a propaganda Potemkin village. The launching of numerous farm collectives had been announced. But Western observers were unable to locate any save one which amounted to anything more than a manager with a title. The press was not permitted to visit a collective, the reason apparently having been that nothing which could be visited really existed.

In short Poland was, and still is, the least communized of the Russian dependencies, as compared to Yugoslavia, which, ironically enough, was the most thoroughly communized country outside the Soviet itself. That was the condition at the end of four years of gradual and most carefully concealed increase of communist power in Poland.

The story would certainly be different to-day if the Communists in Poland had put the communization of the country at the top of their priority list. Poland is not a "natural" for transformation into a communist country. First, it is 97 per cent Roman Catholic. Second, it is about 98 per cent anti-Russian. Third, it is about 99 per cent passionately Polish. Had the Communists started out to cram orthodox communism down Poland's throat at the beginning there would have been the most extreme and violent trouble, no matter how fruitless for the Polish people. The Communists made no such effort. For four years they concentrated on just

two things—collaborating with the Polish people in the reconstruction of the country as conspicuously as possible, and gathering the reins of power as quietly and inconspicuously as possible. Polish Communists have avoided in every possible way calling public attention to themselves. Technically, there is no such thing as a Communist party in Poland even to-day. The substance of communism is still supposed to be concealed behind the screen of coalition government and the innocuous title, "United Workers' Party."

How effective these four years of restraint had been I learned when I talked with sincerely anti-communist Poles who still argued that the Communists had made reconstruction a more rapid process than would have been possible under a different form of government. There is one valid justification for this theory. The Communists have tolerated no "strikes," and they have "solved" the problem of the slowdown. No communist worker ever strikes against a communist government. Even private employers in Poland have been bemused, as their kind was in Nazi Germany, by a system which eliminates strikes and slowdowns.

The opposite of the slowdown, Stakhanovism, helped the Communists make a fast job of putting Poland on its economic feet. Stakhanovism, the communist factory incentive system, goes wherever communism goes. It had its uses in all war-damaged countries. It is useful to communist plant managers, just as its Western equivalent, the "speed up," has sometimes been exploited by capitalist plant managers. It is a communist

device which is part of the regime to which the workers have gradually become accustomed.

It is easy for the Westerner to listen to the evidences of dissatisfaction coming out of Poland to-day and to over-emphasize them. But whether we like it or not, we must face the truth that the Polish worker, like workers all over eastern Europe, apparently does think that he has gained something from the new regime. The following are, in brief, what he feels he has gained:

1. *Access to free education, to the university level. Granted this is still, for the most part, a paper gain. Polish universities cannot accept anything like the number of candidates who would like to come. Yet free education to a university, even if it is only an empty promise for most, is still a door to opportunity which is open wider for a worker's child than it was before.*
2. *Freedom from unemployment. It remains to be seen whether the Polish Government can deliver on this promise. The kind of employment available is frequently far from what the candidate would like. A dismissed schoolteacher hardly considers a ticket to a coal mine the most desirable freedom from unemployment. Yet on the books every person is guaranteed a job, and that promise is a gain for labour which is valued by many a worker.*
3. *The propaganda of praise and public attention. This is pure fantasy. In no Eastern country is the worker his own master. He works where he is told, and he is under pressure constantly to speed up his work. Yet for*

workers who were regarded as inferior beings in pre-war days this soothing treatment does seem to have value. In Poland, as in the other countries I visited, I was forced to conclude that the worker enjoys his daily dose of praise without appearing even to wonder what is wrong with him that continual dosage is necessary.

4. *Even if many a worker's life is not so easy or pleasant as it was in the days before the war. memory tends to go back to the immediate past rather than to the remote past. The Polish worker tends to compare his living conditions to-day with those under the German occupation rather than with those before the war. The boss in a nationalized plant may be a Communist. He may even be a Moscow-trained Communist. But he is at least a Pole and not a German. Poles who don't like the present regime have a tendency to say, " Well, at least we are among ourselves." The hatred of the German master during the occupation was so great that the new communist master, so long as his claws remained sheathed, seems almost mild by comparison.*

These were reasons why there was no violent mass resistance to the steady advance of communist control in Poland for four long years. Now, however, the time has come when the Polish worker begins to feel disadvantages.

Here is a story. Perhaps it is apocryphal. But if so it is also expressive of the changing times.

Four miners were sent to a newly opened mine. All had good production records. All were Stakhanovites. All were expected to continue to be Stakhanovites. But they talked it over among themselves. They had worked themselves hard before. They had seen several of their even harder-working comrades fall by the wayside from overwork. They decided that Stakhanovism was all very well, but that other things were better. So they pooled their efforts. Each day they chose one of their number to be the Stakhanovite for the day. Each did his minimum daily norm of digging. Then each did enough more to produce the extra weight necessary to make one man a Stakhanovite for a day. On each day it was a different one of the four. That is to say it takes less extra coal to produce one Stakhanovite on any given day than it takes to produce four. The four working together succeeded in developing a technique for a "slowdown" within the framework of the "speed up."

The disillusionment behind this story is one cause for the production slump in Poland in 1949. There were others. The Polish worker had experienced four years of communist trade unionism. He may not have had his freedom of employment before the war, but he did have freedom to strike, and qualified observers here think that one reason the politburo has felt it necessary to assume a heavy hand in Poland was the fact that Polish workers were beginning to realize that the right to strike was something they preferred not to give up permanently. Bonuses for over-production could be converted into extra consumers' goods for a time, but

prices have been rising as fast as income and the incentive has been cancelled out by higher prices.

Without incentive, weariness develops even for the most enthusiastic Stakhanovite. The point of diminishing returns from this kind of super effort seems to have been reached.

These factors have tended to slow down industrial production. On the farms, the reason is a different one. While collectivization has not been pushed, there have been published notices that it is coming. The peasant has met this by cutting his production, even by slaughtering livestock.

Here, then, is the dilemma which faces the Polish Government. It must collectivize and Stakhanovize and organize to the communist pattern to satisfy Moscow that Poland is becoming a reliable dependency. Yet the measures which lead to that end also tend to decrease production. Any decrease in production is bad for Poland and bad for the regime. Poland must increase its present food production to meet commitments under the Anglo-Polish trade agreement. Unless they are met, Poland will not obtain the British machinery necessary to complete the industrialization programme. But collectivization will reduce food production. On the other hand, if the farms are not collectivized, how is the Polish Government to convince Moscow that Poland is on the road to communism?

This is a dilemma that grows more difficult for the regime as time goes on, a dilemma which faces other Soviet dependencies in somewhat less acute degree,

and it is a part of the situation directly responsible for the regime's backhanded protestations of loyalty characterized by violent public denouncements of scapegoat "nationalists" within the ranks of the government.

Then there is a skeleton in Poland's political cupboard which her leaders labour day in and day out to exclude from the consciousness of the Polish people. It is the presence of a substantial chunk of the Soviet Army in Poland's western "recovered territories." Those territories are the very foundation of Poland's remarkable post-war economic recovery. They are the foundation on which the Polish Government plans to build a strong and vital Poland. They also provide an almost indispensable political base for what acceptance the present government enjoys among the mass of the Polish people.

If Russia for the sake of Germany should some day propose to hand back part or all of those western territories to Germany, the result inside Poland would be a catastrophe for both the present government of Poland and very possibly for the Communist party which controls it. That government, with the Communist party behind it, is tolerated by Poland to-day because it is the government which has brought to Poland the mines and industries of Silesia which, in turn, have made reconstruction possible. Communism and the western territories came to Poland together. If one were to go, the other might well have to go too. Poland tolerates its Communists as the price for the western territories, and thence springs the second dilemma which is now beginning to complicate life for

the government and the Communists in Poland. Those western territories represent a down payment against a future delivery. The commodity for which they were advanced at the end of the war was to be a Poland thoroughly reliable and dependable for Moscow. And it is up to the Communists in Poland to make delivery on its promissory note. Their problem is that to-day Poland is certainly not a reliable or dependable adjunct to Soviet Russia.

Here again the need is for perspective. From remote distances the iron curtain countries look to be a solid mass, impermeable by the West and completely under Soviet domination. From inside one begins to suspect that Moscow profoundly wishes the actuality bore more resemblance to the outside appearance. The men who control Poland to-day presumably are loyal to Moscow's cause. So long as they can retain the reins of power they can direct Poland's foreign policies and trade relations to Moscow's satisfaction. Internally they control the police power, which has by this time finally succeeded in stamping out overt internal resistance.

But it is one thing to be sitting on a lid and quite another to have the people under that lid in complete agreement with the government. What lies under the Polish lid is not dependable for Moscow. At the moment it is inactive and passive, but it is also a potential for insurrection whenever conditions might goad or induce it to revolt. Such a situation is hardly likely to satisfy either the Communists in Poland or the men in Moscow. Presumably this is why indications of lack

of confidence between Moscow and the Polish communist regime have multiplied. With the establishment of the Russian puppet government in eastern Germany, the Poles' distrust of Russia has been aroused once more, for they remember too well Poland's past experience as a pawn in Russian-German political matches. Unless the Communists in Warsaw are able to convert Poland into a more recognizable likeness of the Soviet Union, sooner or later Moscow may be tempted to withdraw its down payment on a dependable Poland and bestow those western territories on some other country regarded by Moscow as more dependable or more worthy of its benefactions. Or they might quite possibly be used where Moscow felt they would do the most good.

But, while the price for the western territories has not yet seemed intolerable to the mass of the Polish people, it could well come to seem intolerable if the pace of communization were stepped up too fast. These are the obstacles in the way, and they are formidable obstacles:

1. *Polish nationalism, which is so deep and so strong that the government has not yet dared to expect the Polish Army to wear the Red star. It still wears the Polish eagle.*
2. *Increasing dissatisfaction with economic conditions. The Poles were willing to work long hours under terrible conditions to rebuild Warsaw and get their country going again. But four years of this is a long*

time. The early ardour is beginning to cooL Austerity has its limits. The speed up, alias Stakhanovism, grows burdensome to the workers.

3. *The Roman Catholic Church which believes that it is fighting for its existence. There is some question whether its tactics are realistic or wise. But there is no question about its determination to live as long as it can, or its feeling that it must meet and overcome the communist state if it is to succeed.*
4. *The deep-seated individualism of the Pole, particularly the Polish peasant.*

Until now none of these elements in the Polish nature have been challenged to a degree which would goad them into political action. But all must be challenged if Poland is to be communized and converted into a reliable dependency of Moscow.

The western territories are not the only reward Poland's Communists expect from Moscow if they can convert Poland into a truly reliable dependency. They have large plans for Poland. They want to raise its standard of living, which means more industry; and they want to make it as economically independent of other countries as possible. Right now, in theory, Poland's economy is supposed to be adjusted to that of Czechoslovakia so that the two countries will complement each other. But if they were to be made complementary there would be no necessity for building inside Poland new industries which already exist in Czechoslovakia.

The Polish five-year plan calls for an automobile industry which will in fact duplicate the present automobile industry in Czechoslovakia. And it will take Czech technical aid to build that new industry in Poland.

For Poland to plan such an industry is to assume that Moscow will look with favour on Polish plans, which can hardly seem necessary or desirable in Prague.

These are only two examples. But they illustrate the major point that the government in Warsaw expects advantages from Moscow which can be expected only if one assumes that Poland can be converted into the most dependable of the dependencies. In other words, Poland is expecting Moscow to back Poland against Czechoslovakia on this issue, on the assumption that Poland is the most important of the Eastern dependencies and the most reliable.

There are other examples. But they illustrate the major point that the government in Warsaw expects advantages from Moscow which can be expected only if one assumes that Poland can be converted into the most dependable of the dependencies. In other words, the eventual communization of all Poland is indispensable to the plans on which the Polish Government is now operating.

Offsetting the obstacles to Moscow are two unfortunate realities over which the Poles have no control.

Poland's first misfortune to-day, as for generations, is geography. Poland's second misfortune is the in-

tensification of the cold war and the rising possibility that it might turn into a real war—developments which came in late 1949. If you take only the characteristics of the Polish people and the record of the post-war Polish Government there would be more reason to expect Poland than Marshal Tito's Yugoslavia to break with Moscow. The Poles are less susceptible to communism than the Yugoslavs, and to this day have very much less of it. The Poles have a far deeper inbred hatred of the Russians. No Russian-sponsored government in eastern Europe has dragged its heels on the communization of its country as much as has the Polish regime. No other Eastern country has traded so much with the West as has Poland, or tried so persistently to keep its cultural as well as its commercial ties with the West. The Czech Government which wanted to join the Marshall Plan was a pre-coup government in which Communists were only a minority. The Polish Government which tried to join was a communist government hand-picked by Moscow. And the Poles have every bit as much character and courage as the Yugoslavs.

That there has not been a break must be put down first to the physical position of Poland between Russia and Germany. Yugoslavia has one long open frontier toward the west on the Adriatic Sea, with Italy on the other side. And Austria is to the north and Greece to the south. Yugoslavia was a segment of the outer skin of the original Russian system of satellite states. That segment could peel itself off because it was not

surrounded. It was only bordered on one side by Cominform countries, and Russia herself was not one of those directly touching Yugoslavia. Poland has none of those physical advantages. Her longest frontier marches with Russia. The Red Army is on her frontier, with no physical barrier between. And the Red Army sits in eastern Germany under the terms of the surrender. And so long as there are Red Army forces in Germany Russia has a treaty right to maintain military lines of communication across Poland. Until the Red Army retires behind the Russian frontier Poland is physically in the Russian hand. And not unless Germany and Czechoslovakia both broKe from Moscow controls and regained their independence and re-established ties with the West would Poland enjoy an opportunity for escape equivalent to that which permitted Tito to take his country away. There could never have been a Polish break so long as the Red Army remained in Germany.

Events outside of Poland did much to reduce Poland's potential ability to take advantage of that chance if and when it should come. First was the Tito break and the failure through 1948 and 1949 of Moscow's attempt to bring Tito back to heel. That forced Moscow to increase its control over the remaining satellites. Next was the great measure of Western success in combating communism in all western Europe, including Germany. The tide of communism was falling back; and that forced Moscow to look to its controls nearer home. Third was the failure of the Berlin

blockade, which had the same effect. Fourth was the increase in world strain and tension following the discovery that Soviet Russia had also unlocked the secret of the atomic bomb. Russia could lose Yugoslavia and still have its south-western frontiers covered in depth by Bulgaria and Rumania. But if Poland were to go the same way there would no longer be a satellite cushion between the north-western frontier of Russia and Germany. For these reasons it is inconceivable that Moscow would do anything other than what it did: tighten the reins of control on Poland.

One set of theoretical conditions would give Poland a chance to assert herself. That would be a relaxation of world tensions. If somehow the fear and possibility of a third great war—this one to be waged with atomic weapons—could be exorcised from the world, then the reliability of Poland as a satellite could become less vital to Moscow than it is at present. I am satisfied from my own observations that Poland would take advantage of such an opportunity.

Given the world of 1949 there is no visible prospect for any such reassertion of Polish integrity. Yet the very necessity Moscow is under of tightening its controls on Poland is in itself bound to keep alive the potential will of the Poles ultimately to find a way of escape. Up through the spring of 1949 the controls were neither very apparent to the men of Poland nor to them very onerous. By contrast with the German occupation, those first four years were relatively easy. But every tightening of control is bound to make **the**

fact of Russian power more apparent, and more resented. That will apply, I am sure, not only to the bulk of the Polish people, but also to a majority of the members of the Communist party in Poland. Poland is an unwilling satellite, in so far as she realizes that she is a satellite. When I last saw Poland in the early summer of 1949 most Poles did not have that realization. Presumably more are aware of it now.

9

The Finns Will Always Fight

A FINNISH diplomat recently countered a question on the reason for his country's political and economic health with this statement of Finnish philosophy:

"Who is helping himself, God is helping him!"

There is much in what the gentleman says.

There are two mental pictures one must have to understand the other reasons why this country of only four million can live under the shadow of Soviet Russia and yet be so different from Russia and so vigorously determined to maintain that difference. One is of the city of Helsinki and the other is of the people of the back country—their way of living and their way of thinking.

Helsinki could not be more American than it is and still qualify as a European city. Physically it differs from a progressive Mid-west city mainly in that its people are more effectively concerned about the beauty of their community. Good architecture extends to factories and to inexpensive apartment houses for

workers. Parks are many, beautifully designed, and carefully maintained. There is virtually no sordid or careless ugliness in Helsinki.

Behind this is a citizenry potentially prosperous and actually leading a far better life than one finds in any of the satellite countries. There were hard times in Finland after the war. On June 1 of 1949 Finnish children saw their first chocolate since 1940. Food of all kinds was short until about mid-1947. But it is also a country which enjoys a low density of population, which has great wealth in its forests and which produces 70 per cent of the food it needs. These basic conditions have been put together into a good living standard for the people under private enterprise, with socialist overtones about equal in extent to, although different in character from, those in the United States. They have been kept together in spite of the burden of Russian reparations. The Socialist party which governs Finland to-day does not advocate any major nationalization steps. Not even the Finnish Communists campaign loudly for nationalization.

Then look at the back country, say halfway up near the seaport of Vaasa. There all but the newest buildings are made of great squared logs set on granite foundations, so plentiful is the timber from the forests. The people grow superb crops in the valleys during the almost continuous daylight of the summer and pull timber from the forests in the winter. They can feed themselves from their three months of farm work in the summer and buy what they want from overseas

with their winter lumbering. That is the system—and it has worked so far—and it can continue working so long as the balance between population, land, and timber remains roughly what it is now.

The farmer who can support himself and family decently, as he does in Finland, is a free man devoted to his freedom. Life can be hard, but it is life in the open, and it is vigorous. Communism has nothing to offer these people, and they want none of it. The Finns make this abundantly clear to any visitor.

I was a member of a group invited by the American minister, Avra Warren, to attend the annual song festival. Its official purpose was singing. But in effect it was a ritualistic reaffirmation of Finnish independence. It was a gathering of people who have lived their own lives for generations, who have defended their way of life fiercely through the centuries, and who are as determined to go on defending it to-day as ever before. Two thousand voices chanted the sagas of the past under a grey and spasmodically raining sky. Orators and poets honoured the record of the endless battle for independence and pledged that it would never cease. The chants and words rose and mingled with the smoke and flames from four fires burning on top of four great towers built to commemorate a Finnish hero who, generations ago, had led a revolt for civil liberties.

One theme ran through the entire ceremony—the theme of self-reliance. The Finns ask nothing from outsiders as a precondition of their struggle for inde-

pendence. Their decisions are their own. The basic decision is to continue to be themselves as long as they live. They say to the visitor, in effect: This is what we are, this is what we intend to remain, and if it should become necessary to fight, we trust that you will give us what help you can.

The farmers of Finland always make Americans feel at home, for they are not what the word "peasant" implies. They are farmers in the Pennsylvania or Wisconsin, Michigan, or Minnesota sense. Their houses are solid and big and good to live in. They are well furnished. The tables are loaded with excellent food and plenty of it. The land is cultivated with modern machinery. They have everything to lose by war and by defying the Russians. Having a great deal to lose made the Czechs passive. Having much to lose has had the reverse effect on the Finns.

In order to understand the difference between the reactions of the Czechs and those of the Finns, let us go back to early 1948. The Communists moved in on Czechoslovakia and the Czechs gave up without a fight. The Communists in the north apparently felt that if Czechoslovakia was easy, Finland would be easier, for while the Red Army was on the frontier of Czechoslovakia, it was actually inside Finland. The Russians had obtained a long-term lease on the Porkkala Peninsula under the peace treaty at the end of the war. During the war the peninsula had been a main coastal defence base, equipped with guns which in Finnish hands had closed the entrance to the Baltic

Sea against Russian ships coming from Leningrad. When the peninsula and the guns passed over into Russian hands a potential stranglehold on Finland also passed into Russian hands. The guns of Porkkala bear on the capital city, Helsinki. More than that, the most important single railroad in Finland runs directly through the Porkkala Peninsula. It is the railroad which connects the two most important cities in Finland—Turku and Helsinki. Under the treaty the Finns have the right to send their trains over that railroad through the Russian base. But that means the Russians can stop traffic on the railroad at will. So the Red Army is in a position to destroy Helsinki, break the line of communication between the capital and Turku, and drive a wedge north which would split southern Finland in half. In short, the Red Army has an absolute military stranglehold on Finland.

Under such conditions it is hardly surprising that the Finnish Communists were under the impression that they could do in Finland what their Czech brethren had done under much less auspicious conditions. The Minister of the Interior of the Finnish Government was a Communist and therefore controlled the police. He had followed the approved communist practice of setting up a secret police force for the use of the party in times of emergency. In the early spring of 1948 Finland looked like just another set-up for communism.

To the vast surprise of everyone except the non-communist Finns, the game did not work at all when

the Finnish Communists tried to duplicate the Czech pushover. The utter failure appears especially remarkable considering the make up of the anti-communist front in Finland. There are three parties—Socialist, Agrarian, and Conservative. The Socialists and the Conservatives love each other almost as deeply as the right wing of America's Republican party loved the CIO in early New Deal days. The Finnish farmers have no great regard for the Socialists either. But these three groups united against the common danger of the communist push. They stopped the Communists so decisively and so quickly that we in the West hardly knew that the Communists had tried to capture Finland. The aftermath was quick, firm, and decisive. The Communist Minister of the Interior was tossed out of his job. The Communist secret police were liquidated and the Socialists set about the task of weeding Communists out of key places in the Finnish labour unions. In short, the Finns were not intimidated, in spite of the fact that the Red Army could have crushed them in a week had Moscow given the signal.

Some Finns, in their efforts to explain Moscow's strange hesitancy, will put forth the "romantic theory" —that Russia rather respects them for their sturdiness and enjoys the luxury of allowing one independent country to survive on the Soviet frontier. Perhaps there is something to the notion. Russian logic is a strange thing, frequently unfathomable to a Westerner. Perhaps also Finnish independence is tolerated, as

some Finns think, because Lenin spent part of his exile in Helsinki and is said to have felt an affection for the Finns.

It would seem more plausible that the reason is compounded of somewhat more practical considerations. The first is that Finland is productive for Russia. It is paying its reparations to Russia on schedule; it is delivering commodities Russia needs under a trade agreement. All this would be lost were the iron grip of communism to be fastened on a resentful people. The second is that without the slightest doubt the Finns would fight if they were invaded by the Soviet Army or "co-ordinated[55] by a *coup detat* on the Czech model.

That is to say, Russia could not have so much production out of Finland if Russia had more political control over Finland. The two are mutually exclusive. Moscow has to choose between communist control or Finnish goods. So far she has chosen Finnish goods.

To say that the Finns would fight does not mean they could defend their entire country as they did in the 1939-40 Winter War. With the Finnish Army reduced under the peace treaty to a level of impotence, the Russians could, if they chose to use force, have whatever cities or strategic centres they wanted in Finland in a very short time.

The Finns are not out of danger. There are at least two hazards besides the Red Army which threaten them. The first springs from the degree of their own present confidence. Two years have passed since they

defied Russia by turning the Communists out of their government. Moscow has blustered but has done nothing. Then there was the period of anxiety when Norway and Denmark were brought into the Atlantic Pact. Many people dreaded that Russia would retaliate by clamping down on Finland. Again Moscow blustered, and again Moscow did nothing more.

To many Finns this means that they are safely out of the woods, so safely out that they can indulge in the luxury of long-deferred local politics. So far the non-communist parties have maintained a common front against communism. It has taken the form of a socialist government supported by the Agrarians and the Conservatives.

While the danger from Moscow was obvious, Agrarians and Conservatives gave loyal and unquestioning support to the socialist government. But this has put a strain on their tolerance. No political party enjoys responsibility without a voice in the government, or patronage. Both would like a share now, and political manoeuvring has begun.

If Agrarians and Conservatives should force a government crisis and the Socialists go into opposition, then the Socialists and Communists would be associated at least in that they would be occupying the opposition benches together. And there might well be serious strikes. In that case Socialists and Communists would also be associated on the picket lines. That would be a dangerous association. The Communists would welcome it. Finally, strikes would delay

reparations shipments to Russia, providing Moscow with an excuse for direct intervention.

The other danger is economic. Finland's relatively high standard of living is based heavily on export of newsprint and wood pulp. In times past Finland was able to export these products of her forests at a handsome profit above what she needed to pay for her imports. War and its aftermath have changed the picture. For one thing, the Canadian and American pulp and newsprint industries became much more efficient under wartime pressure. They learned how to process cheaper grades of wood and they developed new machinery to help in cutting production costs. Finland's industry was not able to keep up with this technical improvement. For another thing, during the war and post-war periods Finnish labour demanded and obtained higher wages. Industrial wages in Finland have, for the most part, kept just a little ahead of the rising cost of living.

These two factors so increased the relative production costs of Finnish wood products that by early 1949 American newsprint actually began to undersell Finnish newsprint in European markets. Devaluation of the Finmark partly restored the pre-war situation. Finnish newsprint can again undersell American and Canadian in soft currency countries. But Finland has yet to discover a means of re-entering the hard currency market, particularly the American market. Thus Finland actually has a surplus of her principal products, the problem of disposing of those products which are

surplus, and an internal problem resulting from her inability to regain pre-war markets.

The result is that Finland to-day depends increasingly on trade with Russia, for Russia furnishes the best market for goods which before the war flowed to the West. Russia's terms of trade are less favourable than the old ones, and there are political overtones for a country which must trade with Russia. Those inescapable overtones cause justifiable anxiety in Helsinki.

Those are two big and difficult problems. They must be overcome successfully if Finland is to make good its march away from Soviet influence. It remains to be seen whether Helsinki will overcome them successfully.

As of to-day Finland is morally free, internally independent of Russia, and safe from communism. Finland is an iron curtain country only in that the Russian base at Porkkala and the terms of the peace treaty make Finland militarily indefensible. What saves this country is an almost unanimous will to fight, even though the end result would be inevitable defeat.

I was unable to find any Finn who believed there could be virtue in appeasement. They don't understand the word, any more than the Yugoslavs do.

10

The Dominant in Germany

SHORT of war the policies of, and events in, the Western world can have only an indirect effect on what happens inside the twilight zone of eastern Europe. But what happens in Germany, to-day as for generations in the past, is a near and a powerful factor. What the West sometimes forgets is that for a thousand years the German has been engaged in a systematic subjugation of the Slavic tribes which had settled as far west as the Elbe and down along most of the Danube Valley. Even some of the peoples we think of to-day as being German were originally Slavs. The Prussians themselves were a Slavic tribe, long since Germanized. The inhabitants of the town of Kotbus just south of Berlin speak a Slavic dialect to this day.

The heritage of history has made the German the first enemy of the peoples living on the eastern borders of Germany—Poles, Czechs, Magyars, and south Slavs. From the days of Charlemagne Germans have

been driving east and south-east, colonizing for themselves, and converting Slavs into the peasantry and hard-labour force of their colonies. And never has the German hand been applied to the Easterner so ruthlessly as by the legions of Adolf Hitler.

At the end of this last war the Russian could have come truly as a liberator. Had he come only as a liberator of Slav from German, and had he remained faithful to his declared purpose to help the West stamp out once and for all the menace of German imperialism, there isn't an Eastern people who would not have continued to regard the Russian as blood brother, true friend, and saviour. If the Russian had only known how to make and to be a friend to his neighbours lying between himself and the German tribes, this would be a happier and an easier world to live in to-day.

In the days of victory in 1945 we of the West did not desire hostility between Russia and her neighbours. We expected Russia to have friendly countries on her borders. President Roosevelt spent hours at Teheran and Yalta explaining earnestly to Stalin the technique of American relations with the Latin-American countries, hoping to get across to Stalin the idea that there is a difference between friendship and subjugation and that it is perfectly possible for a large country to have small friendly neighbours without dictating to them and dominating their lives. Whether Stalin understood what Roosevelt was driving at is something we do not know. Certainly if Stalin did, the Politbureau did not. If only they had grasped the idea and been

capable of applying it then to-day there might have been relations between the satellite countries and Russia akin to those between the Latin-American countries and the United States, and all of us together might have been seeing to it that Germany could not again become a threat to the peace. That was the hope of Franklin Delano Roosevelt although there is evidence that he was not too sanguine during his last days about its fulfilment.

History since 1945 has fully confirmed those doubts that clouded Mr. Roosevelt's last days. Perhaps the reason is partly in the nature of the Russian. He has never been deft or generous as a conqueror. Probably another major reason was the obsession of Russia's leaders in this stage of history with their communist ideology. They may be the masters of world Communists but they are also the slaves of communism. Apparently they could not conceive of letting the liberated peoples of eastern Europe determine for themselves their brand of political faith. Like the followers of Mohammed, the commissars of Stalin demanded acceptance of their faith at the point of the sword.

But there is still a third reason—a German reason—why the Russians have, ever since early in 1948, been gradually tightening the noose of control around the necks of their satellites. Remember that the communist *coup d'etat* in Czechoslovakia took place before Marshal Tito's break. And remember that Marshal Tito's break was partly, perhaps largely, owing to

Russia's efforts to increase her control over Yugoslavia. There was a general tendency in the West during 1949 to see the new squeeze on the remaining satellites as representing an effort to prevent a repetition of Titoism.

Undoubtedly Titoism had much to do with the pace and urgency of the process. But the squeeze was under way before Titoism broke into the open. Three things happened, all affecting Germany, before the coup in Czechoslovakia and before the Tito break. One was the decision of the Western foreign ministers in London in early 1948 to break off negotiations for a German peace treaty and, instead, to proceed to set up a western German government. The second was the launching of the Marshall Plan. And the third was the already obvious decline of communism as a political force in Germany.

Of these three developments the first two were Western ripostes to the well-defined Russian attempt to secure dominant Russian influence in Germany. The third was the beginning of the failure of the original German approach to that objective; a failure which became decisive, and obvious to the whole world, during the blockade of Berlin. The three are important to the subject matter of this book because they revolve around, and thereby expose, the depth and extent of Russian policy preoccupation with Germany in the period following the war. And in the light of those three developments we can read the story of how Soviet Russia placed her policies not first on good and friendly relations with her immediate neighbours and

subordinate Germany, but first on securing control of Germany. Russia's relations with her near neighbours were not an end, but always a means to an end, and therefore Russia's relations with her neighbours have been a by-product of Russia's German policy.

No Westerner can say with certainty that if there had been no Germany after this war to tempt the men of Moscow the Russians would have dealt more gently and considerately with their small neighbours. Perhaps the preachings of communism would have driven them just as ruthlessly to apply their way of life to the lands around their borders. But here is a case where the chosen power politics of the Kremlin dovetailed with the ideology of communism. If Germany were to be brought into the Soviet empire it could be done only over the protesting backs of the border peoples. They have lived too long under the whip of Germany to wish to live in the same household with Germans as brothers. No true Pole or Czech or Yugoslav would be a willing party to such a plan. Their idea of their relations with Russia was as a partnership to hold the Germans back and to keep them from further harm; not to see the Russian and the German married together. That marriage has taken place before and it has always meant suppression of the helpless peoples living between. The various partitions of Poland are only dry paragraphs in our history books. But they are living bitter memories in the hearts of Poles, and a warning which no Pole ever forgets.

The Russian obsession over Germany—the desire to

possess Germany alone rather than to join with others in keeping Germany under control—is, I think, the most important single key to the explanation of what has happened in eastern Europe. It may also in the end be the key to Russia's undoing. For in order to obtain Germany it was necessary for the Russians to have their satellites under firm control. A tolerant policy toward the satellites could not have been harmonized with a policy which in the end would bring Germany into the Soviet empire. The pace might have been slower had Russia not met with opposition to her German policies. When the tide of communism was sweeping westward, apparently almost uncontested, the pressure on the satellites was relatively mild. There was time then, ample time, for co-ordinating them at leisure. But 1948 was the turning point of the communist tide and 1948 was also the year in which Russia began to twist the screws of control down upon the satellites. That was the year when the game in Germany was beginning to grow hot and uncertain. It would have been hard enough for Russia to sell communist satellites on the idea that even German Communists were their brothers. It would be infinitely harder if it should become necessary to play the game a different way.

The Russian post-war attempt to possess Germany opened with the use of communism as the implement. The Russians never tried even half-heartedly to root Nazism, nationalism, or militarism out of Germany. They took a more “positive" approach. They invited

any German, whatever his past, to join the Communist party and bring along with him any or all of his stock of beliefs. The communist household had room for it all. It would be reworked to the ends of Soviet communism. But that first Russian move was a failure. It failed for different reasons in different parts of Germany. It failed in the eastern zone probably largely because of Russian heavy-handedness. It failed in Berlin most conspicuously over the blockade. It failed in the western zones for the particular reason that western Germans have political and social habits of their own which are stronger than the attractiveness communism could muster even during the misery and chaos of the first two post-war years. By the summer of 1949, when the blockade of Berlin wavered and finally collapsed, history could record that Russia would never possess Germany through the instrument of communism. That was the end of phase one.

We are now in phase two of Russian policy toward Germany. The purpose is the same, but the instrument is different. If Germany was not to be won for Russia through the instrument of communism, perhaps it could be won by direct appeal to German militarism, nationalism, and commercial interest. Before the blockade of Berlin had been abandoned Russian agents were busy laying the ground for the new approach. Many a German of the old upper class had been kept carefully in reserve in case the first approach should fail and the second become necessary. As the blockade approached its end they were trotted out—generals,

industrialists, diplomats—and sent off to the western zones to make contacts with their kind. What they had to offer was all of a pattern. To the industrialist it would be markets in the East for the factories of Germany. To the diplomat it would be a return to his old job under a revived and reunited Germany. To the general it would be command of troops, already available to any officer willing to join the new police force in the eastern zone. Russia, having failed to take Germany by communism., began the new effort to take Germany by means more native to the German, and the time was the time of the increasing pressure on satellites. If their "co-ordination" was desirable before, it became imperative now. The Germany Moscow was dealing with began to look too much like the old Germany which the Eastern peoples had known to their sorrow over too many generations. A deal between Moscow and a revived Germany of the old style could only mean trouble for the smaller peoples living between the two, as it always has in the past. And if they were to be made the victims of a new Russian-German combination without too much difficulty they would first have to be thoroughly bridled and saddled.

All of this has had a profound influence "behind the curtain." It has transformed the nature of the problem of eastern Europe for the West. Until the time the Russian play for Germany became apparent there was very little base for any Western policy in the twilight zone. During the first two years many a citizen of the satellite countries still saw Russia in the light of

his hopes for a liberator. Many also saw communism as the purveyor of long-overdue reforms. The friends of the West were mostly the residue of the old social orders broken by the tide of war. They were charming, and they could speak English. But they were politically sterile and without power or influence. Those first two years were a period of futility. Western propaganda fell on stony ground.

Now times are changing. It is no longer sufficient to Russian purposes merely to break the backs of the old upper classes. They have had to move against large segments of even the communist parties in every country along the curtain from Bulgaria to Poland. They are making their enemies now not only of archbishops and counts, but also of men who have laboured faithfully for a lifetime in the ranks of socialism and communism. Stalin, like some of the czars before him, is not satisfied to have friendly neighbours to help him against Germany. Above all, he wants Germany, and in the process he must betray his neighbours, for such is the law of the jungle of eastern Europe.

II

The Sum of the Puzzles

NOWHERE else in the world can you find within a comparable area such a colourful and fascinating variety of peoples as you find in those middle lands of central and eastern Europe which separate the lands of the West from Soviet Russia. Each has in its own right a character and a value well worth preserving. Each, in his own separate way, makes a contribution to society as a whole. There is the Czech, perhaps a bit drab but earnest and industrious and capable of making his own way if given only half a chance. There is the Hungarian, flamboyant, incurably romantic, who never saves for a rainy day, but who is one of the world's best companions. There is the Yugoslav, on whom poverty sits like majesty, who never stops to count the odds when he finds himself imposed upon by a foreigner. There is the Pole with his fierce love of country and his extraordinary sense of identity apart from the German to his right and the Russian to his left. There is the Finn, kin to the Magyar

of Hungary in blood but in other ways more nearly kin to the American who, like the Yugoslav, is unimpressed by Russian numbers. These are all people, human beings, trying to live their own lives, wishing profoundly that they might be left alone by outsiders continually seeking to shape them to some pattern other than their own.

They are people we care about, partly unselfishly because we respect their qualities, partly selfishly because what happens to them affects the security of the West and affects the great question as to whether there will be another war. Right now all but the Finns and the Yugoslavs are under the domination of Russia. We wish to see them liberated from that domination, again partly for their own sakes, and partly because their liberation would reduce our Western fear of Soviet Russia.

Some think of the liberation of eastern Europe in terms of war. Such people would have the West go to war with Soviet Russia for the sake of the liberation of eastern Europe. For the West to go to war for such a purpose would, I think, be blind, stupid, self-defeating folly. It would be a cure worse than the disease; more likely to kill the patient than to heal him. If, in such a war, decisive victory went to the Western side, the power of the Soviet state would be broken and Russia separated into fragments. But long before that happened, in all probability, there would be little left in the eastern countries worth saving. Russia would hardly tolerate behind the front lines

of the Red Army such masses of the discontented as now live in those countries. They are not dependable for Russian purpose in the event of war. Russia has an ancient way of dealing with such discontent. As in the past she undoubtedly would pick them up bodily by the millions and scatter them across the length and breadth of the Russian empire. Those who remained alive in the forest of Siberia or on the grazing slopes of Turkestan would be the fortunate ones. The peoples and qualities we would liberate would hardly survive such an ordeal. Even if the prospects were not quite so black the end result could hardly be what those who think war would "liberate" eastern Europe have in mind. To the *émigré,* naturally, there is the hope of returning to his factory, his bank, or his broad lands. He was separated from them by force or political injustice, not by law. He has a right and he would exercise that right, and he sees war as a way to it.

Yet surely during the course of such a war one of three conditions would develop in eastern Europe. In the first case, there would be no factory, no bank, and no peasants left to till the broad lands. In the second case it would be the Germans, called back to arms by the West to provide the infantry of the Western attack, who would return as the immediate and real masters. In the third case it would be people living inside the countries through the ordeal who would organize and lead the local resistance movements and who would come out on top, as they usually do. And in eastern Europe, if there were a war against

Russia, the leaders of the effective resistance would more frequently than not be the Titos, the Rajks, and the Gomulkas—Communists or Socialists, men who would be fighting not to restore the old order which existed before 1939, but to free what they consider to be the true revolution from what they consider to be the Russian distortion of the revolution.

War there may be between the democracies and Soviet Russia. But it should never be brought about from any idea that war is an effective device for the restoration of freedom and independence to the peoples of eastern Europe. What little of those two qualities might survive the ordeal would scarcely balance the fearful cost to the West and the Western way of life. To put that equation in its most brutal terms—what could be revived in eastern Europe after such a war would not be worth what Russian atomic bombs could and probably would do to England, France, and other democracies in western Europe, and perhaps also to some parts of the United States itself.

No, if there is going to be a war we had best say a requiem now over eastern Europe. There might conceivably be some gainers from such a war, but the people we would liberate would hardly be among them.

Their hopes for salvation lie down another road. Granted that road does not look too promising. It will look even less promising if the end result of this period of so-called "cold war" should be a revival of a dominant Germany in the heart of Europe. As this is being written there is already a prototype German

Army in the Russian zone of Germany, and Moscow is preparing to accelerate its conversion into a real army on the excuse that the British, French, and Americans are already creating a German army in their zones. If this is not precisely true yet, it is clear to anyone in his senses that it will be true before very long, perhaps before this book is in print. Two Germanics will probably be armed with the idea on the part of those who do the arming that they can be used against each other. Conceivably that might happen and Germany cancel itself out. But more plausibly the two Germanies would find some means to escape from their respective creators and join each other. If that is allowed to happen all calculations in this book are futile. A reunited, rearmed Germany would take us back to where we started in 1914 and 1939, except that this time such a Germany might choose to remember the advice of Prince Bismarck to his successors and seek its ends by partnership with Russia, rather than by attempting the conquest of Russia a third time. That condition would not solve the problem of eastern Europe to our satisfaction any better than a successful Western war against Russia would solve it. Germany is no more a real friend to the peoples of eastern Europe than is Russia. In Berlin and Bonn, as well as in Moscow, the peoples of the twilight zone are looked upon either as instruments to be used one against the other, the German against the Russian, or as spoils to be divided between the two.

No, the only hope for the liberation and redemption

of these peoples lies down another road. The democracies could help them down that road, and help themselves in the process—could, that is, provided we could see the road with our minds and find the road with policies which are based on appreciating, among other things, that eastern Europe has capacities of its own.

Let's try to define the materials with which such a road can be built and followed.

Of one thing I am persuaded by my travels in, and studies of, the twilight zone. The peoples of those countries are not now, and probably never will be, the willing servants of the Soviet state any more than they were the willing servants of a Nazi Reich. The Russians have much to learn about the technique of winning and holding an empire. The proof of this lies in the record of the two years which saw the launching of the Marshall Plan, Western Union, and the Atlantic Pact. During those two years every country which enjoyed any freedom of movement at all pulled itself free from the domination of Moscow. Germany and Austria, free to choose between East or West, because occupied in part by both, repudiated communism and turned west. In both the communist parties are bedraggled and discredited remnants of a lost policy. Only the continued presence of the Red Army holds the eastern zones under Russian sway. Only the Red Army could revive the communist parties in Germany and Austria. Without the Red Army those branches of the Cominform are lost.

That is only the beginning of the story of what Russia loses whenever people have a chance to assert their own wishes. Finland gambled that the Red Army would not be used to protect communism in Finland, and Finland won the gamble. Yugoslavia, favoured by geography and the absence of the Red Army from its midst, took the bit in its own teeth and regained its independence. Russian policies and Russian ideology failed to win the loyalty to Russia of these countries and peoples. They pulled away when they could, even at great risk to themselves. As for the others, so far they have had no choice. The Red Army was in them or on them. And so long as the Red Army remains on their backs they are almost helpless. But is war the only device which could break the grip of the Red Army? I think not.

Russia is a victim of her own methods and beliefs. I have spoken in earlier chapters of the surprising difference even down through the spring of 1949 between actual conditions in the satellite countries and the prevailing assumptions about them. The pace of communization has been slow. Partly that was because the Russians presumably did not feel under any great urgency until the time they saw their plans failing so drastically in Germany and Austria, in Finland and Yugoslavia. But there was another factor of first importance. Not even the Communists trained in Moscow and sent to rule their native lands at the end of the war proved in practice to be very effective instruments of the Kremlin plan. There was a great dragging

of heels wherever the government had enough leeway to permit it. When I saw Hungary and Poland in 1947 they were communist states in the sense that their governments were dominated by members of the Communist party. But they were not communist states in the sense that their industry had been nationalized, their agriculture collectivized, or their people converted to the communist faith. A pattern was beginning to set, and it was a pattern well short of what we in the West expect an iron curtain country to be or what Moscow undoubtedly desires.

I believe myself that if Moscow had not felt impelled in 1949 to shake up her lagging satellites and order the revolution ahead again a condition would have been solidified which would have ultimately meant the regaining by the Eastern countries of a considerable measure of independence. They were not of their own accord becoming more pro-Russian but rather less pro-Russian.

This poses the dilemma which plagues the policies of Moscow toward her satellites. Left to themselves, even under Communists, they would inevitably have drifted away from Moscow's leading strings. But to prevent that is to make great new segments of their populations hostile to Moscow. All during 1949 a great purge swept up the curtain from Bulgaria to Poland. Not a country escaped. The victims of that purge were primarily the native Communists, the Communists whose roots went deepest among the people—Traicho Kostov in Bulgaria, Rajk in Hungary, Gomulka

in Poland, lesser known names in Rumania and Czechoslovakia, but all men who had led in building the local and native communist movements—and also men who had associations with Tito and Tito's lieutenants in Yugoslavia. More and more Russia is being forced to rely, not on a relatively strong native communist force, but on alien Russian hirelings. Inevitably, much of the native Communist party was alienated by the purges. Thus, Russia, to make herself secure in her empire, is taking measures which must make her less secure. The so-called "people's democracies" of eastern Europe are becoming daily more obviously just colonies of Russian imperialism, and that is a condition which every emperor in history can testify makes for ultimate trouble. The Russians have forgotten Lenin's warning against nationalism, particularly Russian nationalism.

At this point one must begin to consider the free world's attitude toward events "behind the curtain." In the beginning of the post-war period our calculations assumed that the social revolutions imposed by the new Russian-sponsored government were the greatest weakness of those governments. We established embassies and legations in the iron curtain countries. In theory those were diplomatic missions accredited to the existing governments. In practice they were diplomatic missions associating with the dispossessed of the old order. We appeared to assume in our actions and in our propaganda that the majority of the people were loyal to the old order and hostile to the new

regimes. In short, we acted as though we assumed that the social revolutions in eastern Europe were unpopular and that those who opposed everything which happened after the end of the war represented a popular base on which we could operate to break the ties with Moscow.

Events have proved that this was a false assumption. The social revolution has not been the weakness of the regimes. It has been their strength. True, in every one of these countries there is a dispossessed class which is bitterly hostile toward the government. But that class is small numerically. While its misfortunes are mourned by its members, they are not mourned by the general mass of the population, not enough to constitute a feeling of political significance. Western thinking on this matter has been misled by the fact that the social changes which have taken place were initiated in all cases but one by governments which had been imposed by the Red Army. But the exception is more revealing than the majority cases.

Czechoslovakia is the exception. The Czechs did not feel the hand of Moscow directly in their internal affairs until the spring of 1948. But long before that time the Czechs, under a government of their own choosing, which was conservative by Czech political standards, prepared a social revolution quite as drastic as the one which has taken place in Britain, and quite as complete as those decreed under Communists in the other countries. It was not Moscow which imposed it in Czechoslovakia, but the Czechs themselves. The

evidence is strong that the same would have been true in the other countries if no Red Army and no Moscow domination had been in the forefront of the picture. The biggest single difference between the domestic social and economic policies of the pre- and the post-coup regimes in Czechoslovakia is that the former intended to compensate the dispossessed, whereas the latter dispensed with compensation. The only new element which Moscow imposed on Czechoslovakia was the apparatus of the police state and rigid control of the economy of the country to the advantage of the Russian state treasury and the Russian consumer.

The real weakness of the regimes in eastern Europe lies not in their social revolutions but in their subordination to Moscow. It is that subordination which deprives men of their self-respect and of a good life. I know of no satellite country which does not resent the label. Some members of the governments who are solely agents of Moscow may not object in their own minds, but not even those would wear the label openly or proudly. Every government must sooner or later either serve the interests of its own people or lose the confidence of those people. To serve the interests of Moscow first is to disserve the interests of the Poles, the Czechs, the Hungarians, and all the rest.

Here are the ingredients for the ultimate possible liberation of the satellite states. The peoples of central and eastern Europe do not love Russia or Russian overlordship. They were relatively contented with their lot during the first period of reconstruction. Their

resentment develops now not because they are living in a new social order, but because they are being squeezed more and more perceptibly into the status of exploited colonies of Soviet Russia. They resent the label "satellite." But their idea of "liberation" is not quite the one we started with in the early stages of the cold war. They have no great desire to be liberated from their social revolution. On the contrary, they accept most of the domestic changes as being on the whole desirable. They are not so outraged as we would be by the police state apparatus, except in Czechoslovakia, where it is alien to their experience. In Yugoslavia, where they have broken away, the police state system is currently an asset to the Western cause although we may prefer not to talk about it. It has been turned against the agents of Moscow. The existing governments are unpopular primarily and largely because they are agents of Moscow. That unpopularity is bound to be a rising quantity so long as Moscow continues to insist on ever more subordination to Moscow. Out of this process a new political condition is being created. The potential opposition no longer consists of just the old upper classes, now dispossessed. It begins to consist also of Socialists and even Communists, most significantly of Communists. The base of opposition is being broadened by Russia's own actions.

That is a base which America can, if it is willing, begin to build upon for its own purposes as well as for the benefit of the subject peoples. There can be

no general liberation until such time as the Red Army is removed from the backs of the people. War would not remove it immediately. War would only induce the Red Army to make its weight felt all the more heavily, and very probably disastrously, for the people we would liberate before we could liberate them. But other developments could take the Red Army back behind the frontiers of Russia proper. Suppose Stalin should die some day soon. And suppose that there would then be a scramble for power in Moscow so intense that Russia's energies would be absorbed at home. The Russians have not, to our knowledge, solved the problem of political succession as the Western world has solved it. Such things happened under the czars; periods of Russian adventuring outside her borders being followed by periods of absorption in internal Russian problems. Or suppose that both East and West grow weary of the strain of the cold war and enter upon a truce which involves as a primary condition the withdrawal of the Red Army to the Russian frontier. That, too, could happen.

If one had to assume that the satellite regimes were actually selling communism and the joy of serving Russia to the mass of their peoples then such prospects would offer no hope. But such, I believe, is not the case. Russia has steadily made new enemies for herself in all the satellite countries. She has made so many that in my opinion they are all less loyal to Russia to-day than yesterday, and will become still less loyal to-morrow. The best thing we of the West could do

for the subject peoples would be to negotiate a withdrawal of the Red Army to the Russian frontier. If we could manage that we could, I think, leave the rest to the Poles, the Czechs, the Hungarians, the Rumanians, and the Bulgars. The worst thing we could do for them would be to send the Germans in as their new "liberators." That would merely reverse their present predicament, giving them German instead of Russian masters.

All of those possible openings at the end of the road are speculative. They depend on conditions which are neither immediately in sight nor easy to arrange. But even in the process of waiting we can do something to encourage them now that the base of the opposition to Russian domination broadens and begins to be composed of more than just members of the old dispossessed classes. For one thing we can let them know that our purpose is not to re-establish the status quo of 1939, but rather to let them find their own way of life according to their own lights, and that we will give what help we can to anyone whose interest lies in breaking the domination of Moscow over a part of the world which must not be dominated by Moscow if we ourselves are to feel secure.

For another thing we can always be ready to extend the hand of friendship and aid to those who have the courage and the will to make the break with Moscow even though we may not approve of their beliefs or their methods. The Yugoslavs made the break on their own and without any assurance that they would find

friends on the outside of the Kremlin walls. Theirs was an act of desperation. But others have watched to see the result. Others might be more timorous or more calculating. Others can be encouraged if they see the Yugoslavs find warmth and shelter in a new household.

The case of Yugoslavia to-day is totally different from the case of Czechoslovakia in 1948. When Czechoslovakia went under we stood on the side lines. We protested, but we did nothing more than protest. That failure of ours to act in the case of Czechoslovakia was something our friends and well-wishers in eastern Europe could understand. At that time the forces of the West were still in retreat. We were not physically in a position to do anything but protest. Furthermore, our position was compromised by the heritage of the war. At Yalta, and when Patton's army was halted short of Prague, we had in fact, if not in theory, recognized a superior Russian influence in Czechoslovakia. We were neither physically able nor contractually free to challenge the Russian consolidation of influence in Czechoslovakia. But with Yugoslavia to-day the story is different.

First, we have the physical ability to help the Yugoslavs retain their independence. The western retreat is over. Aid to Yugoslavia would not be a hopeless rearguard action. It enjoys every reasonable prospect of success. Second, we are not hobbled by any wartime commitments even of the most vaguely implicit nature. The nearest thing the war ever produced to a Western recognition of a Russian right to special in-

fluence in Yugoslavia was the agreement made between Churchill and Stalin in Moscow in October of 1944. That agreement provided that Russia and Britain should share influence in Yugoslavia "50/50." But the agreement was specifically limited to the war period. It was not supposed to have any validity after the establishment of a new Yugoslav government. And whatever implied continuing validity it might have had was washed out by Russia's own violation of her part of the bargain. Russia never fulfilled the obligation to give the British a 50 per cent share of influence in Yugoslavia. So far as Yugoslavia is concerned the slate is clean.

Thus if Russia moves against Yugoslavia by force it will be a clear and unquestionable case of aggression. The United Nations could be mobilized as in Korea to help the Yugoslavs resist such aggression. The most ancient and established principle of American foreign policy is to resist aggression wherever it occurs anywhere in the world. The principle which would be involved here has nothing to do with ideology. It is the elementary matter of the right of a people to lead their own lives according to their own lights.

The hopes of every friend of the West in eastern Europe and of every patriot in eastern Europe are tied to the fate of Yugoslavia. If we were to let the Yugoslavs be reconquered by Moscow without going to their aid, then our friends would give up hope. They would assume that we had lost interest in eastern Europe; that we were willing to consign it for all time

to the mercies of Moscow. But if we make it clear that we would view aggression against Yugoslavia as seriously as we would view aggression against Denmark or Italy or France or any other country, then we would sustain the hope and confidence of every patriot in every country now under Moscow's domination. An armed attack on Yugoslavia would be the acid test of our desire to sustain the principle of freedom and self-determination among nations. We dare not ask any Pole or Czech, Hungarian, Bulgarian, or Rumanian to assert himself against Moscow unless we stand ready to prove by our attitude toward Yugoslavia that we are ready to help those who help themselves.

That is the element of tenacity which must be present in our policy if it is to contribute to the liberation of eastern Europe. There must also be an element of patience and an element of understanding. It took three years for Titoism to germinate in Yugoslavia; and the circumstances were more favourable than those which prevail in the remaining satellite countries.

At one time, back in 1946, we were so blind to the possibility of Titoism that we very nearly went to war with Tito. We were impatient. Then it is to be remembered that we condemned the Czechs before they were lost and treated them in ways which tended to force them into Moscow's arms. It is doubtful whether Czechoslovakia could have been saved. But little was ever done to try to save it. There remains on our record and on our conscience the failure to explore

the possibility of saving Czechoslovakia before it was too late. We must not repeat that mistake by ever assuming that all who live under the rule of Moscow to-day are people who do so happily and therefore have worked themselves out of a chance for salvation.

Finally, perhaps most important of all, we can decide, and then make it clear by any and every possible means, that our friendship is not based, like Russia's, on a ruthless determination to remake those countries in our own image.

That is not an easy course for us to pursue, but we have taken one step in that direction in lending aid and comfort to Marshal Tito of Yugoslavia. In doing that we do tentatively accept the proposition that our purpose is not to remake eastern Europe in our own image, or attempt to substitute our domination for Moscow's, but rather to break Russian domination.

That move can lead to other and possibly promising developments in time. Bulgaria begins now to occupy a geographic position nearly as favourable as the one Yugoslavia occupied at the time of the Tito break. Bulgaria borders on Yugoslavia, Greece, and Turkey. All three now revolve in the orbit of the West rather than in the orbit of Moscow. Western influence can therefore now wash up to Bulgaria on three sides.

It seems unlikely that the story of Tito will be re-enacted anywhere in exactly the same form, or very soon. But the story of Tito has made the Russians do in other places more of the kind of thing which made Tito himself choose to depart from the Kremlin household.

Thus there is a chance—a real and valid chance—that eastern Europe can be liberated from Russian domination without a third world war. And if that can happen in eastern Europe perhaps it could happen in the other great theatre of Russian imperialist success, China. And if it can happen in those two primary theatres of the cold war conflict, it does not follow, as so many assume, that modern war with its A and H bombs lies inevitably down the road of history before us.

Perhaps that war will come anyway. Perhaps the Russians themselves will choose war rather than see their domination eroded by time on the forefield of both their eastern and western frontiers. But the fact remains that the domination Russia enjoyed in her first area of conquest, eastern Europe, is weaker in 1950 than it was in 1948. Two countries have been lost entirely—Finland and Yugoslavia. Two more, Albania and Bulgaria, are held precariously to-day and could easily revolt in the reasonable future. And in the others the physical grip is tighter and more ruthless, but the popular base grows daily narrower, and the will to resistance spreads. The Kremlin cannot to-day count a single reliable or dependable satellite.

War is not the only way of cutting Russian power down to a level which would permit the rest of the world to breathe comfortably again.

War isn't even the surest or the safest way of doing it, because you can never be sure when you start a war who is going to win it.

The cause of the West has advanced in the cold-war

struggle against Russian domination in eastern and central Europe. The communist coup in Czechoslovakia was the high mark of Russian advance. Since that event the tide has turned decidedly in favour of the West. The victories have been dearly won and the progress has been slow. But there is no doubt that the advantage has gone to the West.

It would make poor sense to discard a winning technique as long as it's winning.