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THE
PHILOSOPHY OF JAMES WARD

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The Philosophy of James Ward

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PREFACE

IN the following study I have in the first place tried to come to some conclusion on the importance of the philosophy of James Ward, the genial Cambridge thinker. In the second place I have tried to indicate—more particularly for students—some of the implications of the treatment of philosophic problems which Ward offered. I believe that a critical presentation of Ward's views could be of great use to the present generation of students, who are faced with the problem of making place for philosophy in a predominantly scientific world. I am indebted to Professor N. J. Brummer, of the University of Stellenbosch, to Professor R. F. A. Hoernlé, of the University of the Witwatersrand, and to Sir John Adamson, sometime Director of Education in the Transvaal, who read the manuscript and offered valuable criticism; and to my wife for help with manuscript and proofs.

I used the following texts: *Naturalism and Agnosticism*, 2 vols. London, Adam and Charles Black, 1899; *The Realm of Ends*, 3rd ed. Cambridge University Press, 1920; *Psychological Principles*, 2nd ed. Cambridge University Press, 1920; *A Study of Kant*, Cambridge University Press, 1922; *Essays in Philosophy*, edited by Professors Sorley and Stout and posthumously published by the Cambridge University Press, 1927; and articles in *Mind* as indicated in footnotes. Professor Dawes Hicks edited Ward's *Psychology applied to Education*, Cambridge University Press, 1926, but for my purpose these lectures contained nothing new.

INTRODUCTION

The philosophy of James Ward, although perhaps not always as profound as it might have been, yet remains of special interest for us to-day. The reason is that Ward experienced in a vivid and self-conscious way the sense of antagonism or dualism of which most moderns are aware between the theories of science, on the one hand, and their older points of view, religious or philosophic, on the other. The universe held real problems for Ward's keen mind, and he felt mentally ill at ease and disintegrated till he had progressed some way towards finding a point of view which at least promised to remove the worst of the contradictions from his world. The examination or solution of the problems of the relation of science to other aspects of experience involves the activity of philosophic thought or criticism, and Ward's philosophical works (with the exception, perhaps, of the *Psychological Principles*) constitute the biography of a scientist face to face with the deeper problems of things. It is the story of his own intellectual integration. Ward experienced lucidly and consciously what every human being goes through in a blurred and confused way, and it is because he faced these problems in a perfectly conscious and clearly formulated way that a study of his philosophy is interesting and valuable.

To understand and appreciate fully the struggle which Ward went through in order to get some kind of unified and coherent world view it is necessary to keep the disruptive experiences of his childhood in mind. James Ward grew up in a Calvinistic home which must have been considered strict

even when Calvinism was at its hey-day. As a boy he appears to have displayed the characteristics of that class of humanity whose religious convictions are founded rather on emotional intensity than on critical meditation. Ward as a young man seems to have been possessed of all the pride of the humble believer who knows that he is in the right and the rest of them wrong. However, during his later boyhood, the godly head of the family was concerned in somewhat disgraceful business failures, and this experience must have shaken the boy's sense of the fitness and rightness of things considerably. It was only his extraordinary independence of mind, another characteristic which he seems to have inherited from his puritan ancestry, which pulled him through and made him persist in his search for an integrated world view.

Ward's boyhood and youth were spent in the pursuits of natural science in an uncritically religious atmosphere, and it was inevitable that the opposition should have revealed itself at some stage to a nature as sensitive as his. Many years later, when his thought was mature, Ward wrote: 'Religion must thus ever transcend science, which can never prove it false nor yet show it to be true. The infidelity of the present generation which tries to dethrone religion by science is the perfectly logical and natural outcome of the mistaken endeavours of the past generation to establish religion by appeals to science.'¹ It is important, from the point of view of an *apologia* for philosophy, to see how Ward turned neither to pure science nor to religion, but to philosophy, in his search for a coherent view of experience, even though philosophy was not held in high esteem at Cambridge at this time.² The inevitable opposition between science and religion, when the perspective which is offered by a critical philosophy

¹ *Essays in Philosophy*, Memoir, p. 77.

² *Ibid.* p. 92.

is ignored, was too real in Ward's own life and was too clear to an acute mind such as his, for him not to have realised the importance of the problem of the relation between science, religion and philosophy. So it is inevitable that he should have turned to this problem and to the related problem of the method of philosophy in his search for a coherent world view. What he says has increased weight because of his obvious sincerity and intellectual honesty. His philosophic writings are not merely the brilliant expression of a facile and well-trained mind, for he is too deeply interested in the problem.

Ward's natural aptitude for scientific work and his scientific experience, besides helping him to see fully the implications of this problem, influenced his philosophy in two ways. In the first place it led him to adopt as a prolegomenon to philosophy a theory of the nature of mind which was based on genetic psychology. Instead of making a clear distinction between the study of individual mind in its individual setting and the study of mind as such, there is throughout his work a confusion between what may be called the logical or philosophical study of mind and the psychological. The result of this confusion is that he talks psychology when he ought to have been talking philosophy and develops a view which, stressing the limitations of individual mind, curtails the speculative power of mind. In spite of his idealism and his theory of panspsychism, according to which everything is mind, Ward rarely follows the idealistic procedure of studying the nature of mind in order to discover the structure of the universe, and on the occasion when he does so, does not carry his argument to its conclusion. This comes down to saying that when Ward speaks of theory of knowledge as the fore-study of philosophy he really means psychology. It is obvious that his failure to

make this distinction could not but have very serious effects on his philosophic system.

Ward's scientific bent of mind had another serious and unfavourable influence on his philosophy. He was not alone in his wrestling with the problem of the relation between science, philosophy and religion. This problem was in the air during his time, and in Germany Hermann Lotze was bravely trying to make a place for an idealism after a period of thought in which he had become convinced of the shallowness of naturalism. 'Naturalism', says Professor Ruggiero of this period,¹ 'was beginning to feel its own inadequacy and desiring to negate itself and to transform itself anew into thought.' Like Ward, Lotze was divided between the conflicting influences of naturalism and idealism, and his philosophy often contains the sound of idealism with the meaning of naturalism. Thus the psychical monads of his doctrine are but the atoms of naturalism dressed up in their philosophic-go-to-meeting clothes. This, indeed, is the case with most modern monadologies. Lotze was ultimately driven to find a mediation for the conflict in a moral judgment which is the expression of an immediate and unreflective apprehension of a moral unity behind the dualism. Ward, too, was faced with the danger of re-writing naturalism in the words of idealism, and he, too, finds his ultimate unity in a faith-act. This is probably the least satisfactory part of his philosophy.

¹ Ruggiero, *Modern Philosophy*, transl. Collingwood and Hannay (George Allen and Unwin), ch. 1.

CHAPTER I

THE PSYCHOLOGICAL BACKGROUND

One of the serious problems in modern philosophy—and also for modern psychology, in so far as modern psychology is concerned with itself and does not limit itself to experiment with some objective experience—is that of the relation between psychology and philosophy. At the present time this problem has faded into the background. The avoidance or neglect of so important a problem is probably due, in the first place, to the enormous extension of the experimental method in psychology and the natural sciences, which has taken the attention of the world away from the persistent problems of philosophy for the moment; and in the second place, to the vast fields of information that are being supplied to the thinking mind by the employment of these methods. Psychology is so greatly excited at the possibilities of what look like fresh discoveries that it gives itself no time for self-examination and self-criticism. Philosophy has so much fresh material to assimilate and co-ordinate that there is little time for it to analyse and formulate clearly the new relationships which develop in its own changing world view between itself and the experimental sciences, and psychology more particularly.

James Ward lived at a time when the problem of psychology as a separate science, and its relation to philosophy, was becoming acute in England, and as a trained scientist as well as philosopher he clearly saw the true nature of this problem. His clear perception of the closeness of, yet inevitable difference between, philosophy and psychology, and especially

his clear perception of the limitations of so-called 'modern' psychology, made him a force in the scientific and philosophic world of his day and led him not only to write a work on psychology to which later psychologists will turn again and again, but also caused his metaphysical writings to be permeated by his psychological starting-point.

A study of Ward's psychology is therefore important for three reasons. Firstly, for the influence it had on his philosophic position. Secondly, it is necessary for a better understanding of Ward's importance in the history of psychology. It was his generous enemy, Mr Bain, who wrote of Ward's article 'Psychology' in the *Encyclopædia Britannica*¹—which later came to be expanded into the *Psychological Principles*—'When the matters excluded by the narrow limits are filled in, when the illustration of the whole is duly expanded, and when, finally, the exposition of subtleties is transferred from *brevier* to *pica*, Mr Ward will have produced a work entitled to a place among the masterpieces of the philosophy of the human mind.'² And thirdly, a study of Ward's psychology is important in connection with his philosophy for the insight it gives into the very difficult problem of the relation of science to philosophy. A statement by Bain on this point indicates the real nature of the problem: 'We are at this moment', writes Bain, 'in the midst of a conflict of views as to the priority of Metaphysics and Psychology. If, indeed, the two are so closely identified as some suppose, there is no conflict; there is, in fact, but one study. If, on the other hand, there are two subjects, each ought to be carried on apart for a certain length, before they can either confirm or weaken each other. I believe that, in strictness, a disinterested Psychology should come first in order, and that, after going on a little way in amassing facts,

¹ Ninth edition.

² *Mind*, 1886, p. 477.

it should revise its fundamental concepts, and improve its language and definitions: and, when so revised, should resume consideration of the wide field of mental facts of the neutral or disinterested kind—those that deal with practical applications rather than with the metaphysical groundwork. After a few further strides we might come back again to the foundations and so on, alternating between the two lines of research, yet insisting on their being conducted independently. This is necessary in order that we may not fall into a circle. It is said, for example, that if we embark on the promiscuous field of mental facts, with a bad Metaphysics, that is, with wrong notions as to the External Reality, Cause, Substance, and so on, all our results will be vitiated and worthless; nevertheless I do not see any mode of attaining a correct Metaphysics until Psychology has at least made some way upon a provisional Metaphysics, which it returns after a while to rectify and improve.¹ Ward could not but be aware of the problem of the relation between science and philosophy and more particularly of psychology and metaphysics from his standpoint as theologian, scientist and philosopher. His analysis of this relation and of the implications of this relation is perhaps not the least of his gifts to contemporary thought.

I

When James Ward wrote the article 'Psychology' for the ninth edition of the *Encyclopædia Britannica* he both disproved the Association Psychologies of Mill and Bain, and laid the foundations for a new approach to the problems of psychology. In the history of philosophy the replacing of one 'school' of thought by another 'school' of thought is usually a long-drawn-out matter involving considerable

¹ *Mind*, 1887, p. 168.

argument, development of theories, and time. Fortunately for the student of the history of British Psychology, the abolition of the walls of the city of Associationism was accomplished by one article, and it is also fortunate that the main points of attack have been clearly summarised and analysed by the chief victim himself.¹ Bain reviewed the new psychology of the *Encyclopædia* article² and in 1887 wrote an article 'On Association Controversies'³ in which the essentials of his own doctrine and the differences between Ward and himself clearly emerge.⁴

In his review of Ward's article Bain gives a lucid summary of Ward's view and indicates where his is in agreement or otherwise on a number of minor points. One feels, however, that Bain's mind is all the time busy with a deeper problem, namely, the problem of the fundamental difference between this new psychology and his own. He touches on this point only at the conclusion of his review when he writes: 'I will add nothing to the running criticism already bestowed, in the course of setting forth the chief positions, except to advert in a few words to the peculiar stress everywhere laid on Attention. The immense compass assigned to the word is somewhat discomposing.'⁵ This touches the core of the difference between Ward and Bain and indicates the main

¹ Cf. Professor Dawes Hicks, 'Professor Ward's *Psychological Principles*' in *Mind*, 1921.

² *Mind*, 1886, p. 457.

³ *Mind*, 1887, p. 161.

⁴ It is perhaps necessary to point out a small error into which Mr Brett falls in his chapter on 'British Psychology in the Nineteenth Century' (*A History of Psychology*, III, pp. 202 ff.). On p. 203 Mr Brett writes: 'It was in 1886 that Mr Bain reviewed in *Mind* the article by Ward: in the next *number* he wrote a general defence of Associationism.' Read *volume* for *number*: Bain's article appeared *two numbers* later, i.e. in the issue of April, 1887.

⁵ *Mind*, 1886, p. 476.

features in which Ward's psychology was new. Ward sees in attention the activity of the spirit; Bain admits the fact of activity in his psychology but for him it is the brain rather than the mind which is active and forms new associations. Bain's view shows the influence of the chemistry theory of his ancestry, Ward regards mental life as a self-constituting whole containing its own laws; his view of mind approaches the concept of the biological organism. It is true Bain stresses the element of activity in psychological processes and even speaks of spontaneous activity of the brain, and to some extent approaches to the position of Aristotle's psychology of the living organism; yet he does not go far enough: his activity remains mechanical. 'It seems as if we might say', he writes, 'no currents, no mind', and he is never able to overcome the dualism into which this starting-point involved him. He tries to account for the elementary states of mind, the processes of the special senses and instinctive muscular movements on this theory. Motion, sensation and instinct together form the basis of the developed life of conscious beings. Bain shows the influence of contemporaneous German physiology and the physiological psychology of the time. In 1893 Ward wrote a criticism of this physiological and so-called 'modern' psychology, for which he blames Wundt chiefly.¹ The tenor of the article was to prove the necessity of admitting an active agent or subject in psychology. Already in 1886 Bain had written:² '[Ward] says nothing of the sensibility due to the afferent nerve-fibres in muscle, which are not there for nothing. Nor does he either affirm or deny the position that the motor currents are accompanied with consciousness. *Indeed, his references to the physical side of mental facts seem somewhat capricious, his*

¹ "'Modern" Psychology: A Reflexion', *Mind*, 1893, p. 54.

² *Mind*, 1886, pp. 464-5 (italics mine).

tendency on the whole being to discount it as an aid to psychical explanation.' The censure contained in this remark indicates Ward's position clearly.

Bain's remark about Ward's aggrandisement of the subject of psychology is just. When Ward discarded the physiological starting-point in psychology and developed the idea of a mental life to all intents and purposes governed by principles independent of and different from the principles of physiological processes, he was furthering, even more than Bain, the establishment of psychology as an independent and separate science. Bain's fundamental assumption had been that the study of mind starts with sensations as the units of experience, and that all mental experience developed from them. Ward's fundamental assumption is based on an analysis of experience. He finds that all the sciences study the contents or facts of experience. But there are two kinds of experience and on this distinction depends the difference between the physical sciences and psychology. There is the experience of which the facts or contents are public, so that many people can experience it. This experience is studied by the physical sciences. Then there is experience the contents or facts of which are private to an individual consciousness, so that it cannot be partaken of by other minds. This experience is the subject-matter of psychology. It would be better and also closer to Ward's own formulation of the matter to speak of two aspects of experience: the public or trans-subjective aspect and the private or individual aspect. Now in the first instance all experience is individual; in so far as all experience is individual all experience is the subject-matter of psychology. Those elements of experience which can be partaken of by other minds—objects such as stones, trees, ground—are the subject-matter of the natural sciences in addition to being the subject-matter of psychology. In

the last instance, therefore, all experience is the subject-matter of psychology, so that psychology is differentiated from the physical sciences not by subject-matter but by standpoint. If the standpoint from which an element of experience is approached is universal or trans-subjective it becomes the subject-matter for the physical sciences; if it is approached from the private or individual standpoint it is the subject-matter of psychology. Ward defines psychology by standpoint or point of view.

All this certainly entails an enormous aggrandisement of the subject, and it brings about its own difficulties. On the one hand it has the advantage of making psychology independent of physiology in more senses than one. We need no longer 'derive' psychological facts from physiological facts. Nor need psychology follow in the wake of physiology and be retarded when physiology refuses to move. On the other hand Ward's view raises the problem as to whether the subject-matter of psychology is not so private as to be unknowable and without scientific value. This problem reveals itself in an acute form in the concluding chapters of the *Psychological Principles*, when Ward leaves the realm of general psychology for that of individual psychology.

If mental life is regarded as an organic and self-constitutive whole, the problem of its structure and its unity takes on a form quite different from that which it did for Bain. Ward describes the unity of consciousness as a 'continuum' which consists of 'presentations'. The self or subject 'attends' to the presentations. A sequence of presentations, however, can have no unity such as is implied in self-consciousness, so Ward finds that an agent or subject is implied in the fact of the unity of self-consciousness. Bain sees no reason why a series cannot be conscious of itself. By his introduction of a subject Ward introduces a dualism into the very heart of his

unity of self-consciousness. He faces this dualism fairly, admitting that we cannot get to the bottom of it in our analysis. Yet he softens it by regarding the apparently opposing terms of subject and object as distinct but not separate, being two aspects of the same experience, in which the subject has the position of supremacy.¹ Alexander Bain found the exalted position accorded to the elusive self in the new psychology a difficult view to accept. 'But, as we proceed,' he writes, 'we find the properties of the subject gradually extended, until, in the final formula for the ultimate constituents of mind, it absorbs all the three elementary properties—cognition, feeling and conation—and leaves only sensory and motor presentations, or what we should call "sensation", were it not that the element of feeling is withdrawn.'² The relation of presentation, Ward insists, involves a subject and an object. The chief difficulty which the modern presentationist—who will allow only for 'contents of consciousness' and nothing more—has to face, is the implication of a conscious subject and its activity in consciousness, on any theory of presentations. Modern psychology is incomplete because it refuses to admit this problem, and reduces all psychical life to a mere looking-on at physical brain processes.³ The article on "'Modern" Psychology: A Reflexion' in *Mind* of 1893 is important, as it brings out more clearly than either the 'Psychology' article or the later *Psychological Principles* a point on which Ward can be very easily misunderstood. Ward himself regarded his work as being in the tradition of Hume. On this very important doctrine, however, and consequently in

¹ Cf. Professor Dawes Hicks, 'Professor Ward's *Psychological Principles*' in *Mind*, 1921, pp. 3 ff.

² *Mind*, 1886, p. 459.

³ *Mind*, 1893, especially p. 73.

the whole of his psychology, he really inverts the Humian position. While Hume limited his psychology to the observation of processes, as the naturalist limits himself to the observation of data, Ward's psychologist must express himself in the formula: the mind or subject *has* such experiences, or *feels* or *acts*; and not merely: *there are* such experiences, or feelings or acts. Ward stresses the view—which he may have learned from Lotze—that every state of consciousness is an elaboration or extension or expression of the self; thus the self gets to know itself through its modes of consciousness.¹ In his exposition of the relation of subject and object Ward says that presentation may be nine-tenths of the whole. The subject comes to know itself by its presentations, and not through sense knowledge. Knowledge of the self advances by the discernment of new relations and not by the acquisition of new sensations.² Subjective knowledge is unique. 'Now, what I am disposed to maintain is that the Ego is both an unknown and an unknowable for sense: the Non-Ego partly an unknown but not an unknowable, so far as the possibilities of sensational "rapport" are unlimited.... When we pass to intelligible knowledge we have as regards the Non-Ego that shaping, relating, informing of the matter of sense that constitutes phenomenal experience in the Kantian meaning of the words. In this process I am inclined to believe the subject comes to know itself intelligibly: the outward advance is an inward revealing.'

The emphasis placed on the subject in Ward's psychology brings about a further difference between him and Bain. The latter had introduced the concept of activity into his psychology, thereby marking a great advance on Mill. Bain's activity is brain activity and his spontaneity that of the brain.

¹ Cf. Professor Dawes Hicks, *loc. cit.*

² *Mind*, 1893, p. 70.

Ward, too, introduced the concept of activity, quoting not Bain but Leibniz as his authority, and for Ward the activity is that of the spiritual subject. The introduction of the concept of activity, albeit from two different standpoints, by two such widely read psychologists as Bain and Ward could not but give the concept a permanent place in psychology. The failure to recognise a spontaneous or active element in mental life is probably the most serious lack in the psychology of the Associationists. Bain remedies the fact, but does so by introducing an Aristotelian touch into his psychology, according to which mind and body are one, and then over-reaching his Aristotelianism by saying that mind is dependent on body. Yet, in spite of the unfortunate emphasis on activity as being essentially neural in its nature, Bain recognised the importance of the concept; so, for example, he believes that the problems connected with the psychology of Belief are due to regarding Belief 'too exclusively as an intellectual phenomenon and disregarding the existence in it of an active element'. Activity in Ward's psychology is not glandular or neural; every form of activity is referred to a self. He emphasises particularly three kinds of elementary activity of the self: presentation, feeling and attention. The categories, too, are forms of the activity of the self, and he traces out the development of the categories in detail. Bain took exception especially to the importance that was attached to attention by Ward. 'The immense compass assigned to this word is somewhat discomposing', he writes.¹ 'I make the fullest allowance for the need of a general word to express the reaction of the subject upon presentations, etc., yet I doubt if the sum total of the influences that intensify impressions and promote their retention should be comprised under the one word "Attention". A still more general designation, such

¹ *Mind*, 1886, p. 476.

as “mental *tension*”, or “conscious *intensity*”, would be desirable; while “attention” could be reserved for special modes of intensification.’ At bottom Bain’s objection is not merely to nomenclature, as appears at first reading. He is not satisfied that the state of ‘tension’ plays the part in mental life which Ward ascribes to it.

With attention as the most important factor derived from psychological analysis Ward sets out to describe mental development. Through attention there takes place a progressive discrimination and differentiation in the presentational continuum of which consciousness is constituted. It should be remembered that the unity of consciousness is a ‘continuance’ for Ward, and does not consist of the linking together of separate unified entities. The differentiation which takes place in this continuance—what Bain calls ‘association’—is the result of a purely spiritual agency. Bain admits that the word ‘association’ is not really satisfactory,¹ but he claims that two relationships have always survived in every classification, namely, association by contiguity and association by the law of similars. He points out that even Mr Bradley admits the facts of association while criticising the doctrine. Thus Bradley states the law of contiguity as follows: ‘When elements have co-existed they tend to be connected’, or again: ‘Mental units which have co-existed cohere.’ There is therefore no doubt about the facts, only Bradley’s definitions suffer from vagueness. To be really useful there has to be, firstly, a closer specification of the words ‘element’ and ‘unit’, and, secondly, a more particular unfolding of the consequences of being ‘connected’ or ‘cohering’ in his definition. ‘It is’, says Bain pertinently, ‘as if a chemist should say of combustion that a red hot coal tends to become connected with the oxygen of the

¹ *Mind*, 1887, pp. 161 ff.

atmosphere.' Bain describes Association as follows: 'By Association has always been understood in a general way, that the recall, resuscitation or reproduction of ideas already formed, takes place according to fixed laws and not at random.... The name further implies that the mental reproduction is ruled by certain assignable principles of connexion or relationship between our mental elements, such that the one now present restores another not present, yet related according to one or other of the supposed relationships. Thus *one* word recalls the thing named by a law of association founded on the frequent concurrence or proximity of the two in consciousness.' Stated in this way the theory seems plausible enough and Ward of course admitted the fact of laws of association. He differed on detailed points, and Bain criticised his attempt to reduce the law of similarity to the law of contiguity.¹ Bain also discusses, with great acumen from the Associationist point of view, 'Ward's one recognised law of association—Contiguity'. Bain states his final position as follows: 'Indeed without a detailed psychology of Association, I do not see how we can arrive at just definitions of the fundamental terms Impression, Perception, Idea, Representation, Thought.'² Bain builds his whole psychology on Association. For Ward association is only one factor—and a relatively minor one at that—in the discrimination and differentiating activity of the mental agent on the presentational continuum.

Thus the distinction between Ward's psychology and that of Bain is clear. While Bain marks a distinct advance on the professedly 'mental chemistry' psychology of Mill, he still thinks in terms of chemical combinations and does not break completely with his predecessors. Nor does he seem able to get clear of the trammels of physiology in his psychology:

¹ *Mind*, 1886, p. 468.

² *Mind*, 1887, p. 173.

it remains, on the last analysis, a study of currents and glands. The standpoint of Ward marks a complete innovation. Physiology can explain little in the realms of psychology and mental life is a thing separate and apart, with a life and a nature and laws of its own. While Bain works with the underlying concept of chemistry, Ward seems to have the biological concept of organism at the back of his mind.

Thus Ward differs from contemporaneous psychology both in England and in Germany in his view of what psychology is. He himself defines psychology by point of view: the individual approach to experience, and herein his psychology marks a new departure. Yet it is new not only by its approach or point of view but also as regards its contents or subject-matter. His view of mental life as independent and having its own being, that is, as being organic, was new and fruitful of suggestion. The importance of Ward's psychology for the development of the science is various. He offered extraordinarily acute detailed analyses of various psychological phenomena, to which future workers will turn again and again; and he combined with his criticism a clear conception of scientific method and its demands. Even more important in its influence has been his definition of the science of psychology from the angle of 'standpoint'; it offers, and will continue to offer, an antidote to the excessively 'physiological' and the 'presentational' psychology for which Ward blames Wundt. Ward's insistence on what, so far, had been a position unique to him, on the pure ego or subject, has up to the present not received much attention from psychology, excepting from a somewhat superficially critical point of view. One cannot help feeling that psychology has not heard the last of this theory and that it is being shelved for the present, largely on account of the influence of

a purely physiological psychology and because of the difficulties inherent in this problem.

Every man is to a certain extent the child of his time. Thus Bain could not shake himself free of the shackles of chemical ways of thinking in his psychology; and thus Ward's work is permeated by the concept of organism taken over from biology. While the importation of this concept into psychology marked an enormous advance on contemporaneous psychologies, it is not too much to expect that modern psychology will have to develop and deepen this concept considerably before its full possibilities appear. Then it will no doubt lead on to a deeper, more useful, concept. However, this will only happen when modern psychology becomes 'whole' again and also uses a synthetic method, instead of remaining in the present excessively analytic attitude.

II

While on the one hand Ward was introducing amazing innovations into psychology which astounded Bain, he was engaged in controversy both psychological and philosophical with a redoubtable opponent, F. H. Bradley, on the other hand. It is especially in the articles which contain this controversy that we find signs of the influence of Ward's psychology on his metaphysics. In his completed philosophic works the net of the argument is so closely woven that it is difficult to see the place of psychological considerations in his doctrine. The articles in *Mind* on Bradley's philosophy—covering a period of forty years—are a valuable indication of the influence that Ward's psychology had on his philosophy. Ward and Bradley are both idealist philosophers. Bradley regards the psychological fact of immediate experience as the introduction to metaphysics. 'The recognition of the fact of immediate experience opens

up the one road, I submit, to the solution of ultimate problems. But, though opening the road, it does not of itself supply an answer to our questions. And on the other side in itself it gives rise to difficulties.' Both Ward and Bradley were engaged on the psychological aspects of the problem of philosophy during the 'seventies and 'eighties, although both wrote on philosophy at the same time. The articles which are important for an understanding of Ward's relation to Bradley, and which show the place of psychological considerations in his metaphysics, are the following: (a) In *Mind* of July, 1887, Bradley wrote an article entitled 'Association and Thought' in which he criticises Association psychology and makes his own position clear. (b) In October of the same year Ward published in the same journal 'Mr F. H. Bradley's Analysis of Mind', in which he charges Bradley with presentationism and, in a further analysis of elementary states of consciousness, contends that the object-subject relation is fundamental for consciousness. (c) In a final article, on 'Bradley's Doctrine of Experience' in *Mind* of 1925, Ward gives a summary of his previous criticism of Bradley and continues the argument from the psychological background into metaphysics.¹ The writing in these articles

¹ These three articles contain the essential points in the argument between Ward and Bradley. Other articles which touch on the same points, sometimes in greater detail, but which do not contain anything substantially new, are: Bradley, 'Is there a special activity of Attention?' in *Mind*, 1886, p. 305; this article appeared the same year as Ward's 'Psychology' article and is interesting for that reason, although there is little that is polemical in the writing. Ward, 'Critical Note on James's *Textbook of Psychology*' in *Mind*, 1892, p. 531; Ward, '"Modern" Psychology: A Reflexion' in *Mind*, 1893, p. 54. Ward, 'Critical Notice on *Appearance and Reality*' in *Mind*, 1894, p. 109. None of these more or less polemical articles have been included in the posthumous collection of reprints *Essays in Philosophy*. Bradley, 'Consciousness and Experience' in *Mind*, 1893, p. 211.

must be considered amongst the best in modern English philosophy. The expression is always unambiguous and the style is generally completely clear, and even pointed. Bradley was probably the most sharp-tongued of English philosophers, while Ward did not possess a particularly thick skin: these factors add considerably to the lucidity of expression. When the style is not quite clear, it is owing to the inevitable compression due to the journal-form of the articles.

Although Bradley could claim that he was empirical in his mode of philosophic procedure—for all respectable philosophers have to claim at least that—there is more than a half-truth in Ward's accusation that Bradley uncritically adopted certain Hegelian tenets which influenced the whole of his analysis. Like Ward, Bradley starts with an analysis of experience, and the whole controversy between the two writers boils down to their different analyses of the form of elementary experience. Bradley objects to what he considers Ward's identification of experience with consciousness. Consciousness is not original, nor all-inclusive, and it is inconsistent and relational. Elementary experience is non-relational and it is best described by the term 'feeling'. In this feeling-state, according to Bradley, there is immediate experience without distinction or relation in itself; it is a unity, complex, but without relations; there is in this state no difference between the state and its contents, since the experience and the experienced are one. Over against this Ward holds that there must be a relational element—the relation between knowing subject and object known—in the most elementary forms of experience, for what meaning can otherwise be attached to a phrase such as 'the many felt as one'? Experience may be integrally one, yet it does not follow that its two factors are so confused as to make it in fact non-relational. Thus the ways of Bradley and Ward

part from the beginning, although both start in what purports to be an empirical analysis of experience. Finding no relations in experience, Bradley is led to realms where all appearance disappears in an unknowable absolute; and Ward climbs a path of relative probabilities and possibilities to a tentative theism. There is truth in Bradley's remark that Ward seems to identify consciousness with experience: Ward could not do otherwise with his theory of the method of philosophy by which the mind progresses to simpler forms of experience from known forms.¹ Behind their use of the word 'experience' there lies for Bradley and for Ward a theory of reality, and it is their respective theories of reality which influence their analysis of experience. Bradley's reality is a logical reality, a reality in which inconsistency is an *unding*, a formal reality approached and penetrated by thought, and therefore understood by an analysis of thought. Ward's reality is the reality of the scientist, not of the logician, the reality of facts, not of form. It is a space-time reality, in which inconsistency may be very real, although perhaps passing. While Bradley analyses the form of experience Ward analyses its appearance. So it comes that the psychology of Bradley is the psychology of the logician, while the psychology of Ward is the psychology of the scientist.

This does not mean that Bradley confuses psychology and logic and metaphysics—at least not intentionally. His description of psychology and his definition of a psychological 'fact' are as empirical as any psychologist could desire.² 'A psychical fact', he says, 'is anything which is immediately experienced and which has duration, quality, intensity; or is any one of these aspects as a mere distinguishable aspect—so far, that is, as one aspect is taken as belonging

¹ This point is discussed again in ch. iv.

² *Mind*, 1887, pp. 354-5; also footnotes.

to something which possesses the other aspect also; or, again, is any relation as existing between any facts as previously defined.' And later,¹ even more explicitly: 'Psychology is concerned with nothing beyond presentations and its laws, with nothing but the process of given events and the modes of their happening.' Metaphysical considerations are rigidly excluded from psychology, and even if principles are true in the light of a metaphysic and they do not 'work', they are untrue for psychology.² When metaphysical principles clash with practice 'our sole remedy', says Bradley, 'is to consider our data and their laws and to refuse to bring shame upon our honest nakedness by scraps of physiology and rags of metaphysics'.

Yet in spite of all these considerations of policy the difficulty of keeping psychology distinct from and free from metaphysical considerations is perhaps nowhere better illustrated than in Bradley's criticism and modification of Associationism, in his second article on 'Association and Thought'.³ In order to prepare the way for this criticism of Bain's theories, Bradley gives a short prefatory summary of his view of the nature of thought, taken from the *Logic*. The chief characteristics of thought, he holds, are its objectivity, by which is meant the control exercised by the object on the psychical processes, and its individuality, by which is meant that the object retains its identity and independent nature distinct from its existence as a psychical occurrence. Now whatever opinion may be held of the truth of this doctrine of the nature of thought, it seems clear that no psychology that limits itself to the processes of events could make discoveries such as these. And the rest of Bradley's argument shows the impurity of his psychology and, even better, the

¹ *Mind*, 1887, p. 357.

² *Ibid.*

³ *Ibid.* p. 354.

encroachment of his metaphysics into the domain of his psychology. Continuing his criticism of Associationism in the light of his objective theory of thought, he points out that the associative links of thought cannot be mere conjunctions of existence; they must be connections of content; for, as he picturesquely puts it, association marries only universals. Now it is not only to be doubted whether modern empirical psychologists will allow such a word as 'universals' to creep into their laboratory psychology, but it is also clear that Bradley's concluding summary of his improved associationism is far removed from what the present generation understands by psychology. 'We have so far seen', he writes, 'that Association can be reduced to the struggle of each element towards an independent totality by means of sameness in content, and that this principle works by coalescence where the conditions are given, and, again, by redintegration made through the establishment of connexions superior to time.' Such a conclusion could not be arrived at by a psychologist who is concerned with nothing but the process of given events. It looks uncommonly like metaphysics.

The fundamental difference between Bradley's psychology and Ward's comes out very clearly in Bradley's theory of the self, and in his criticism of Ward's theory of the pure ego, also in Ward's counter-criticism. This illustrates the influence that Bradley's metaphysical prejudices had on his psychology. Bradley is very much afraid of ruffling the smooth surface of his absolute by real entities which have an existence in themselves. So he argues against any form of monad or self-existent ego which may be involved in the lower realms of experience. He prefers to envisage this experience as an undifferentiated mass of feelings with no relations in it and suggests that, at the other end

of thought, experience again returns to this undifferentiated state of complete oneness. When experience does give us a reference to self, argues Bradley, that self has a positive content and is never known merely as form. Now if this reference to a subject exists at the beginning of experience, what is the content of the self or subject? There is as yet no experience to give it content. And is it likely that experience should, at its poor and blurred beginning, divide itself into parts with a relation between them? And if this should happen, what fills each part, and what machinery can effect this distinction? Until these questions are fairly met, says Bradley, the introduction of a subject into the early mind is not merely perhaps false, but is not scientific.¹ The onus thus rests upon Bradley to give some account of how the concept of self arises and achieves its contents. He does this in the same article. In the beginning there is nothing beyond presentation, which has two sides, sensation, and pleasure and pain. In this feeling there is no discrimination and no relation; all is feeling in the sense, not of pleasure and pain, but of a whole given without relations. In the flux of sensations, however, there are certain regularities, for without some identity in the given data, our experience could not start and no ego nor faculty could help us. These groups consist mainly of the sensations conjoined by reflex action on the environment. So Bradley writes: 'The way in which these unions come to be made may, I think, be assumed, and what I wish to urge is that at first they are neither subjective nor objective, nor have aspects distinguished. They are felt wholes in which the features all run together.' When once groups or unions of sensations are accepted it is easy to distinguish between body-groups, which give pleasure or pain *immediately*, and other groups; and thus one group of

¹ *Mind*, 1887, p. 368.

sensations grows into the self-group and the concept of self takes its rise from presentations in experience. Bradley is emphatic on this point in his criticism of Ward. Thus he hopes to start experience with a relationless whole so that he may with greater ease end his experience with a relationless whole as his logic demands.

Ward's criticism of Bradley's theory of the self, and of the place of relations in the universe, takes the form of a criticism of the conceptions and of the method of Bradley's psychology.¹ Ward points out, rightly, that there is a big assumption involved in Bradley's attitude of mind when he excludes subject, activity, object and similar terms from psychology as being 'rags of metaphysics'. It is useless to say, Ward goes on, that in science we have to do only with facts, for brute facts can never make a science by themselves; science deals with facts through the medium of ideas, and we cannot get ideas out of facts till we have put them in. Mr Bradley is wise in keeping ontological speculation out of his science of psychology, but this does not relieve him from the necessity of defining his conceptions clearly and from following out the implications of these conceptions within the limits of the science itself. Thus Mr Bradley uses the conception of 'presentation' without analysing it; if he had done so he would have seen that a presentation implies relations. He could also not have failed to see that a physical and a psychical phenomenon are not the same. A psychical phenomenon is not a mere *a* as distinct from a chemical phenomenon which is a mere *b* in so far as it is a mere chemical phenomenon. For *a* and *b* regarded as psychical phe-

¹ The essential points of this criticism are made in the article 'Mr F. H. Bradley's Analysis of Mind' in *Mind*, 1887, p. 564, but the subject recurs in other articles. It is finally discussed in Ward's 1925 article on Bradley in *Mind*.

nomena become part of the experience of the individual and as such are not merely *a* or *b* but *a* or *b*—as-experienced-by-*M*. That is, *M* and his relations to *a* and *b* form an essential part of the psychical phenomenon of *a* and *b*. This, Ward contends, is not metaphysics, it is pure psychology. Similarly, a purely psychological analysis of presentations would have shown Bradley, Ward believes, that presentations involve a subject and relations. The subject and the relations may not be given as a presentation; but they are implied in the conception of presentation and therefore fall well within the limits of the science of psychology. Nor does Ward accept Bradley's account of the rise of the concept of self, because it assumes what it set out to explain. 'Once upon a time there was Nobody and Nothing; but after several adventures Nobody received sundry interesting presents, and picked out several things, albeit he remained Nobody still. By and by, however, thanks to their strange collisions, there somehow supervened a mirror, and then Nobody was able to distinguish himself, and was Nobody no more.' Ward also accuses Bradley of using the term 'relation' without sufficiently penetrating analysis. Relations are not generally events, as Mr Bradley seems to think, and they often do not exist till they are 'made', that is, till activity has been exercised on their production, and this activity must be psychical activity. Much the same line of criticism is brought against Bradley's view that activity is a presentation. The very presentation of activity, as a presentation, already implies, Ward points out, the further activity of the act of apprehension; and thus Mr Bradley seems to be able to get into a basket and carry himself. There are various kinds of activity, but the fact common to them all, and which he calls Attention, Ward believes cannot be known *per se*; for it is neither a presentation, nor a relation among presentations,

nor an unanalysable element in the presentations themselves. 'I see no very serious objection', writes Ward, 'to say that all that we know *about* it is an "intellectual construction", or an interpretation, or even an inference, provided it be allowed that every proposition in psychology, when completely explicated, becomes nonsense when this "inference" is rejected. I allow further not only that it is a most difficult problem for psychology to ascertain how such "intellectual construction" as a *state of mind* has arisen, but also that it is entirely a question for epistemology to determine finally its validity as *knowledge*. But if science is to precede philosophy and to furnish its material, then empirical psychology, in order "to deal with its facts", will have to recognise, and always does recognise, that unanalysable element I mean by attention or psychical activity. It will have also to distinguish and, in fact, always does distinguish, this attention from its objects, the presentations attended to.' This passage is important for an understanding of Ward's view of psychology. Attention is a fact, albeit a derived or inferred fact, and therefore psychology has to do with it as a fact. It is not for empirical psychology to examine the nature or validity of the inference, for that is the work of epistemology; but the result of the inference falls within the scope of psychology.

Setting out from what he believes to be an analysis of the elementary forms of experience based on empirical data, and not on speculation, Bradley builds up his metaphysical construction of reality. 'The object of metaphysics', he says, 'is to find a general view which satisfies the intellect.'¹ Such a view, he says, 'is to regard the world as a single experience, superior to relations and containing in the fullest sense everything which is'.² He is led to this metaphysical theory more

¹ *Appearance and Reality*, 1925 edition, p. 554.

² *Essays on Truth and Reality*, p. 246.

particularly by his analysis of immediate experience which, as we have seen, he held to be relationless and having the form of a given whole. At later stages experience develops into relations and apparent contradictions, but these in their turn dissolve into a relationless Experience which is Reality. 'From such an experience of unity below relations', he writes,¹ 'we can rise to the idea of a superior unity above them.' It is the truth of this presentation of experience that Ward criticises implicitly in all his articles on Bradley's philosophy, and explicitly in 'Bradley's Doctrine of Experience' in *Mind* of 1925.² The tenor of Ward's argument is to deny any form of relationless experience either at its near limits or its far limits.

If, says Ward, the experience below relations appears to be a relationless one it must not be inferred from this that it contains no relations. Such experience is not the experience of a unity necessarily, although it may be a unity of experience. In fact, Bradley's analysis of the presentational state of mind is a travesty of the facts of the situation, for awareness cannot be non-relational. Awareness is cognition, even in its simplest form; and cognition involves at least a subject-object relation, for cognition implies attention *to* a change. Bradley's attempt to define feeling as 'an awareness which is non-relational' must be regarded as erroneous and it does not bring him where he wants to be: behind the dualism involved in experience. Nor is Bradley any more successful in his argument when he tries to unify the disunited elements of later experience by speaking of this stage as a *felt unity* of experience. Ward argues that there is no such felt or presented unity merely, but that such unity as this stage of experience offers is the *synthetic unity of apperception* of Kant,

¹ *Appearance and Reality*, p. 522.

² *Mind*, 1925, pp. 13 ff.

a functional unity created by the activity of mind in presentations. The mind stands in a certain relation to the presentational data of experience and unifies them. And so Ward concludes that we have no *evidence* for assuming any stage of experience without relations.

Nor, on his own showing, does Bradley's careful analysis of immediate experience to prove that it is relationless seem to bring him very far in his attempt to illustrate the relationless nature of the other end of experience, the absolute. Bradley speaks of the upper unity as postulated and not given directly in any experience, and then again as if it is a given fact. So there appears a slight discrepancy between the immediate unity of experience at the lower level and the postulated unity at the higher level. And even if both unities were 'given facts' that does not yet tell us much of their relation to each other. They must be coupled by some further factor, and all that Bradley has written about this further factor, says Ward, is that 'from the first and through-out our finite centre is one thing directly with the all-embracing universe and through the Universe it is indirectly one thing...with all other centres'. 'Coupling this speculative assertion', Ward goes on, 'with his earlier statement that this higher unity is *not* given us directly "as required" in any experience, it seems evident that Bradley's idea of the (supposed) lower unity of merely immediate experience has, strictly speaking, nothing whatever to do with that of the higher unity which we have eventually to postulate.'¹ And so Bradley's vaunted start with an empirical psychological analysis of immediate experience does not bring him as far as a superficial reading would suggest. His theory of an experience which is relationless in its lower as well as in its higher forms, can only hang together by a speculative

¹ *Mind*, 1925, p. 27.

assertion about the oneness of our finite centre with the all-embracing universe, a speculative assertion which contradicts at least a first-glance analysis of experience. So even if Bradley's psychological analysis were correct, it is rather disappointing in its value for his metaphysics. Ward is right when he writes: 'And looking back we shall find—reading between the lines—that Bradley's prime reason was not any indubitable fact actually founded on immediate experience, but a speculative conviction "inherited from others", and notably from Hegel: There is but one Reality and its being is Experience.'¹ Bradley's scientific psychology seems not only to be not as 'scientific' as it professes to be, but, as psychology, seems to be disconnected with his metaphysics.

There is, however, one sense in which Bradley's psychology may be said to be true to its claim of being an empirical analysis, and that is in the emphasis which it places on the unity of experience. Bradley is greatly impressed by this fact of experience and he can the less fail to see it since he starts in what we called above a more formal psychology than that of Ward. Behind their use of the word 'experience' there lies for Bradley and Ward a theory of reality. Bradley's reality is a logical reality, arrived at by an analysis of the forms of thought and therefore understood by thought. His analysis could not therefore but stress the formal tendency present in thought for relations to disappear. Ward has the approach of the scientist and he lives in a space-time world of facts, in which there are present and real all the relational elements of that world. Relations are therefore real for Ward. The question is whether Ward is able to get beyond mere relations, and whether he is sufficiently conscious of the implications of the fact of formal experience which tends towards an integral unity, if not, perhaps, to the disappearance

¹ *Mind*, 1925, p. 29.

of relations. The fact of a synthetic unity of apperception has its own metaphysical implications. The question is whether Ward realises and exhausts the implications of the fact of relations in experience, and whether he does not remain merely in a 'philosophy of the sciences'. It would seem to have been this failure to develop fully the implications of such parts of experience as 'relations' that caused the confusion in Ward's chapters on Theism and their disappointing outcome.

III

As did Bradley, Ward starts his philosophy only after careful consideration of various psychological problems, and it is a significant fact that both these writers spent much time on psychology before they produced their final philosophy. And with Bain Ward agrees that while psychology and metaphysics are closely related, the two are yet distinct and the second cannot proceed without the first. Because of the influence his psychological views had on his general philosophy, and more especially because of his theoretic justification of psychology in the article 'Psychology' and later in the *Psychological Principles*, this latter book has been called a book on philosophy rather than on psychology, or at least has been referred to as a book on 'old-fashioned' psychology. The first criticism could certainly not be upheld. The analyses of mental phenomena which the *Psychological Principles* contains are all based on direct introspection, if not on experiment, and do not involve any preconceived theory of the nature of mind. What give the book an unaccustomed flavour to the 'modern' psychologist are the opening chapters, in which some justification of the science and nature of psychology is offered, and the concluding chapters, in which the implications of the psycho-

logical analyses of the previous pages are presented and worked out. Yet both these sections of the book contain perfectly legitimate scientific procedure, for if science does not justify itself by theory (and not merely by results) it must be uncritical and so much less useful; and if science does not work out the implications of its data and analyses it would be still-born, from the point of view of offering knowledge or explanation. As regards the second charge of 'old-fashioned' psychology, Ward would probably have admitted it, and gladly, for in 'modern' psychology he saw nothing but a re-instatement of Hume and Associationism. 'It is not so long ago', writes Ward,¹ 'that the world was shocked at Lange's *mot* about a psychology without a soul, but the "modern" psychology is a psychology without even a consciousness. "Content of consciousness" as much as you like, but consciousness itself, consciousness as activity, is not our affair; we leave that to metaphysics say our "modern" teachers.' This 'modern' psychology does not exist for Ward; it is physiology. For it starts not with the subject-matter of psychology, but where psychical phenomena are joined to the processes of the nervous system. Psychological analysis must conform to brain-physiology and await its verification from this. A little self-criticism, says Ward in effect, a little time spent in working out the implications of their method, would show these 'psychologists' the real nature of their subject-matter and the limitations of their conclusions.

Regarded from one aspect Ward's psychology is really a phenomenology, for it is essentially analysis of experience as it appears. But it is a phenomenology which is not, like Husserl's, a philosophy by itself, for it forms a fore-study for his philosophy proper. It is from this phenomenological

¹ *Mind*, 1893, p. 55.

analysis that Ward discovers the characteristics of experience, and it is here that we find several important—if not the most important—considerations that lead him to a pluralism of the monadistic type. From this analysis he inherits for his philosophy the view of experience as consisting of interacting monads, of experience as relational and of the fundamental characteristic of appetite or striving of the monad; and he probably owes his cardinal ‘historic principle’ also largely to the psychological or phenomenological analysis, for the presence of this principle is already perfectly clear in the *Encyclopædia Britannica* article. This principle brings Ward before the difficulty which he is not always able to meet, of confusing various contexts or planes of thought, with the result that his work often suffers from a certain ambiguity in the use of terms, and a lack of clearness of issue.¹ And finally the analysis of experience also brings him face to face with the big problem of his philosophy and his life: that of making place for both science and religion in a reasonable view of experience. If the monads or selves are free and conative, with their own laws, it is clear that the deterministic view of things offered by science must be real as far as it goes but insufficient to explain the whole. Religion must therefore go further than science while yet not denying or ignoring science—as it often appears to do. The bridge between the two Ward finds in philosophy.

¹ The most striking example of this kind of confusion of standpoint—in this case between philosophy and psychology—is discussed in ch. VIII below.

CHAPTER II

WARD'S CRITICISM OF ABSOLUTISM

During the latter half of the nineteenth century two directions of thought prevailed in English philosophy. On the one hand there was the naturalistic tendency following on the work of Charles Darwin and Alfred Russel Wallace. Opposed to it was the neo-hegelianism of T. H. Green, the Bradleys and Edward Caird. Ward finds satisfaction with neither movement and it is by a criticism of these tendencies that he develops the fundamental principles for his own contribution to thought.

He criticises naturalism because its synthesis of empirical data into a mechanical universe is untrue to experience, and he objects to the idealism of his day because the plurality of facts which he sees as a part of experience disappears, according to him, in the picture of the static absolute which the idealist paints. Ward tries to offer a synthesis of the apparently chaotic and disjointed facts of life of such a kind that these facts retain their separateness while yet forming an integral part of the whole—a synthesis, that is, which retains the individuality of the parts and yet satisfies the mind by its logical consistency. It is with Ward's criticism of neo-hegelian idealism that this chapter will be concerned.

I

At the time when Ward wrote there was an ever-widening separation between science and philosophy. The widening of this unfortunate gulf was ascribed, firstly, to the influence of the positivism of Comte, with its denial of all metaphysics

and its refusal to attempt any explication beyond the mere statement of an observed regularity in nature, called a 'law'. Secondly, the dualism which Kant had created between the *reine* and the *praktische Vernunft* had added to this development. Thirdly, there was the fact that the natural sciences had progressed with immense rapidity in the immediate past. The scientist had become specialist and was completely engrossed by the demands and possibilities of research in his own domain and had no time, nor, often, the required training, for philosophy. The philosopher, on the other hand, frequently found it difficult to keep abreast of the latest results of science.¹ Science stood at the one extreme in the realm of natural data with all its multiplicity; philosophy stood at the opposite extreme in the realms of what seemed to the layman an abstract and utterly unreal synthesis in which all particularity had lost its individual being.

A reaction against this unnatural state of affairs was bound to come sooner or later and at the turn of the century the cry of *back to life* was raised in England, France and America. Reason came to be limited in its activities and emphasis placed on the active side of man's nature. These movements of thought manifested themselves in the various forms of Voluntarism, Personalism and Pluralism which sprang up in the last quarter of the preceding century. In Germany the Hegelian *Panlogismus* had failed, and when philosophy was bankrupt it was Lotze who called it back to experience unrefined by philosophic doctrine. In England, James Ward was part of this movement.

In the philosophy of T. H. Green, Ward saw a growing severance between the realities of experience and what was considered real in philosophy. The empirical facts of life

¹ See Perry, *Present Philosophic Tendencies*, pp. 35 f.

counted for little or nothing in it; it was thought that would tell what life is. Green was anti-sensationalistic in his psychology. He described his system as 'the idealism which interprets parts as relations, and can only understand relations as constituted by a single spiritual principle'.¹ For Green reality is a single, unalterable system of relations² and he found the criterion of reality in the 'unalterableness of the qualities which we ascribe to it'.³ Here, says Ward, is clearly given the picture of a static universe. For Ward the realm of ends is not out of time. 'Certainly not', he writes, 'as I have already maintained, in the sense that it is, like Plato's world of ideas, an eternal world of immutable essences, a logical world but not a real world at all. In tending to equate "intelligible character" to mere *essentia plus existentia*...Kant's procedure is indefensible as well as inconsistent.'⁴ For Ward both the living God and his living creatures have alike a functional relation to the world's process.⁵

It is clear that the difference between the neo-hegelians and Ward is based on a difference in theory of knowledge and of the place assigned to mind in the universe. Green's system is built on the Hegelian standpoint, that it is thought which will tell what the universe is like. This position Ward scorns. In actual fact, he says, pure thought has been able to tell us very little about the nature of the universe, even in its highest and most daring flights. Thought, says Green, apprehends relations between items in reality which are fundamental to the structure of reality and which are utterly unchangeable. When, asks Ward, did pure thought in the

¹ *Prolegomena to Ethics*, p. 42.

² *Ibid.* p. 26.

³ *Ibid.* p. 29.

⁴ *The Realm of Ends*, p. 305.

⁵ *Ibid.* p. 471; cf. Supplementary Note on 'Temporal and Eternal' in *ibid.* p. 468.

whole history of philosophy discover a relation which was not discarded by subsequent philosophy? Pure thought which is out of touch with our daily experience and the plurality of data which goes to make up that experience is helpless. As soon as thought loses sight of particulars and indulges in abstract flights it loses touch with reality and its flights become merely flights of fancy. Thought is helpful and guides the thinker to truth only when it is curtailed in its activity and is used to show relations between concrete particulars. This does not mean that the universe is not intelligible and mind-permeated, nor that there are parts of the universe which are by the nature of their being unknowable. On the contrary Ward believes in an intelligent universe and he believes in the progressive understanding of that universe. But the understanding must happen through particular minds whose powers of transcending the realms of the merely particular and of synthesising what is at first appearance a plurality into a unity are severely limited—at least as yet, at the present stage of development. The mind of the individual is of a piece with his nature and its use is conditioned by the natural conditions of his space-time existence. Mind, like nature, is in a process of development and it develops as man develops. It is one of the instruments by which man can help himself to develop. It offers short cuts to the solutions of problems so that man is more easily able to conquer a hostile environment. Mind has not been imposed on man *ab extra*. It is part of his nature and the stage of development which it has reached depends on the stage of development of man's whole being. The power of the individual mind to transcend the realms of plurality and multiplicity of data and to synthesise the variety offered by experience into a unity is severely limited by the stage of development which it has reached. The importance of this

view of mind—which can be called the genetic view—in the philosophy of Ward is illustrated by his remarks on the nature of existential and impersonal judgments. He regards these genetically as inchoate judgments which are essential for thought-knowledge but not sufficient for it.¹ To attempt to account for these without taking their origin into consideration is merely to cause perplexity. Thus Ward agrees with Trendelenburg's statement that we think in predicates. He accounts for the so-called subjectless proposition by holding that such propositions imply the objective continuum which always confronts the experient; and that it refers only to such of its changes as interest the experient by furthering or hindering his welfare.² Thought is an aid to life, which develops as life develops.

Ward's criticism of absolutism makes him draw a careful distinction between two aspects of the problem of theory of knowledge. On the one hand theory of knowledge may be regarded from the point of view of philosophic method. This is the position Kant took up, and Ward believes he is in agreement with Kant when he says that epistemology is the propaedeutic to all philosophy. Before we trust the knowledge we have we ought at least to examine the instruments by which we obtain that knowledge. From this point of view it is of course necessary to have a clear idea of the place of mind in nature, its relation to individual experience, and its present power of transcending the merely plural, and of offering a synthesis in which this multiplicity is unified. On the other hand there is the problem of theory of knowledge as an ontological principle. On this point Ward is generally in agreement with all idealistic teaching. Mind, he believes, is the essence of all being and everything that is is permeated

¹ *Mind*, 1919, p. 257: art. 'Sense-knowledge'.

² *Ibid.*

by mind, and everything that happens is directed by mind. The universe is an intelligible universe in its final being. From this, however—and this is the essence of his warning—must not be concluded that any individual mind can penetrate into the recesses of the universe. Each particular in the multiplicity of particulars is the carrier of mind as much as every other, and the intelligibility of the whole can only be realised by a careful scrutiny of the individuals.

It is clear that, for Ward, mind is limited in its powers. Every philosopher, however, seeks a synthesis of some sort of the chaotic data of experience. To the thinking person the appearance of experience as merely a plurality is always disturbing and unreal, and in order to read some significance into the superficially meaningless and aimless flow of daily incidents the mind inevitably tries to unite them into an ever more comprehensive synthesis. It is only when some kind of unified view of the chaotic multiplicity has been developed that the world and his personal experience gets meaning for the individual who finds himself a minute speck in the chaos. If, however, the mind for Ward is severely curtailed in its powers and its activities are limited to the realms of the multiple particulars of experience, he is faced with the problem whether a synthesis of experience is at all possible on this view of mind. If some kind of unified view is not possible, because the mind is by its nature not able to transcend the limitations incidental to the stage of its development, is philosophy and the urge to philosophic speculation then chimerical and unreal? What right have we to believe that there is order and organisation in the universe and that experience is synthesisable if the powers of transcendence of the mind are so severely limited?

Ward raises this problem himself in a quotation from

Lotze:¹ 'It is a true saying that God has ordered all things by measure and number; but he ordered not measure and number but what he needed to have them; not a meaningless, essenceless reality only fit to support mathematical relations and give some sort of concreteness to abstract numbers. On the contrary, the meaning of the world is what comes first and that is not merely something subordinated to a pre-existing order: rather from it alone arises the need of such order and the form in which it is realised. All these laws which we include under the common term mechanical... all these persist, not by their own authority as a groundless destiny to which concrete reality is compelled to bow. They are—humanly expressed—only the final consequences which for the sake of what it wills, the living and active meaning of the world has laid at the foundation of particular realities as a command embracing them all.' The problem for Ward is this: how, with the limited power of mind, do we know that there is this active meaning at the basis of the world? This is the chief problem. There are subsidiary forms of this problem. Has Ward not made the existence of each member of this plural universe so independent that no unity—even of interaction—is possible? If there is a unity, what kind of unity is it: that of democracy, or one of absolute monarchy? And again, how do we know that all this is so?

II

The real importance of the problem with which Ward is faced will appear from his criticism of theories of absolute idealism, which can most conveniently be divided under two heads: firstly, as to the conclusions of this type of philosophy;

¹ *Essays in Philosophy*, p. 174; Lotze, *Metaphysics* (English trans.) p. 535.

and secondly, as to the methods pursued by philosophers of this school.

A. Arguments indicating the unsatisfactory nature of the final synthesis of experience which absolutism offers.

(i) The Absolute, it is said, is non-relative and unconditional, for the relative and conditional which we experience in life, say these philosophers, imply the non-relative and unconditional.

This position, Ward points out, is open to question: does not the relative rather imply the correlative and the conditional its condition? Even the superficially unrelated ideal which we reach when we go back to the meaning of 'absolute' applied to individuals is merely comparative. The most absolute monarchs have been overthrown and the highest judicial functions are liable to *ex post facto* legislation.¹

(ii) Ward does not believe that in experience the same *thing* can contradict itself. 'A proposition, without going beyond it, may by the mere explication, be shown to contradict itself, and similarly two propositions to contradict each other. But no *thing*, I think we may confidently say, ever really contradicts itself, nor does one thing every really contradict another. It is only on the strength of this conviction that we maintain that the universe is at least not self-contradictory. We may call this fact the ontological ground of the so-called "law of contradiction" and it was clearly announced in this form by Aristotle.'² Ward's objection is to the way in which all finite things, with their relations and interactions, are resolved into a tissue of contradictions, for it is this tissue of finite things and their mutual appearances that constitute our real world.³

¹ *Essays in Philosophy*, p. 288.

² *Ibid.* p. 290.

³ *Ibid.* p. 292.

(iii) But it is said that the Absolute *is* its appearances, for there is nothing which it is not; but it is not its appearances *qua* appearances, for these are a plurality. It is its appearances transfigured and transformed.

If this, however, is the true view, Ward points out, it really only increases our difficulties. For it is said that these appearances reveal reality, but they show us firstly existence, then reality. How then can they reveal that which they can only reveal by the negation of their existence and which moreover contradicts their plural nature by being essentially one?¹

(iv) Advancing knowledge with its greater unification and organisation of acts shows no sign of reducing leading categories of thought or the fundamenta of science from the status of actual component entities to that of mere 'adjectiva' of an absolute. Nor does society tend to annihilate personality and self as its structure grows in unity; rather is ever greater value attached to personality, self and character, which all stress the fact of a plurality.²

(v) There are three views which can be taken of the Absolute, all of which Ward discards. (a) The Absolute must not be identified with reality, for the great service Leibniz performed was to make *activity* the fundamental idea of reality; we are more successful in explaining things in terms of an active reality than in viewing them as static. It is a better working hypothesis. Experience implies activity and reciprocal interaction, so that when finite centres of experience are mentioned we must understand thereby individual agents *en rapport* with one another. This *rapport* between subject and object comes first in our experience and forms the basis of our speculation about the absolute. To

¹ *Essays in Philosophy* p. 292.

² *Ibid.* p. 298.

reduce these finite centres to mere appearance means, remarks Ward, the 'disappearance of reality'. Nor can these finite centres be regarded as mere fragments. For does not science everywhere find system, organisation and unity with co-ordinating and complementary functions? 'To reduce the universe to fragments with ragged edges,' says Ward, 'comes perilously near to bringing back the chaos of older ways of thought.'¹ (b) So also the conception of an absolute subject and an absolute object is tried by the test of experience and found wanting. For neither can be completely absolute, since subject and object are essentially correlative. (c) There remains the ideal of an absolute experience. In this ideal there is a unity of an absolute subject and an absolute object and outside this experiencing absolute there would be nothing, while in it there would be nothing imperfect. From this standpoint, however, Ward points out, firstly, the existence of a finite many, that is the sensible world, seems to be impossible; and secondly, if such a finite many did exist, the connection between it and the absolute world would be inexplicable.²

It is on arguments such as these that Ward bases his rejection of the various forms of absolute idealism. He concludes this line of argument: 'An absolute reached by way of abstraction is the lion's den where all plurality disappears. In whatever sense you say absolute in that sense you cannot say many....And if absolute means perfect and complete why should,—nay, how can—what is in itself absolute become splintered up into infinite modes that are neither perfect nor complete? We can imagine them as mutually determining each other, but for it they are "invulnerable nothings" with which it has no concern. This is

¹ *Essays in Philosophy*, p. 292.

² *The Realm of Ends*, ch. 2.

the difficulty which has been especially emphasised by critics of Spinoza.¹

The point to notice is the frequent recurrence of the term 'experience' in this criticism. As soon as the exercise of pure thought leads to conclusions which contradict experience, the conclusions are refused. As Jean Wahl has put it, it is the intellectual hedonism of Bradley's philosophy which is irritating to the pluralists—this intellectual hedonism which seems to consider only the exigencies of thought, which negates the ideal of real relations and which denies time and the finality of human liberty. Ward expects the results of philosophic reflection to be in agreement with experience.

B. Criticism of the philosophical methods of the absolute idealists and of the theory of knowledge implied by this method.

In an address to the Aristotelian Society in 1919 Ward considered the problem of the method of philosophy to be still quite unsettled. He then went on to discuss what he called the method of 'beginning from above', that is, arguing from an assumed unity or oneness to the nature of the plurality which surrounds us. He urged the futility of attempting to explain the nature of our daily experience in all its multiplicity in the light of an assumed unity or absolute about the existence of which we have no shadow of knowledge and about the nature of which we dare hardly even speculate. This method is not only useless, for it is really explaining the known by the unknown, but it is also false to the nature of mind. 'Our knowledge', he writes, 'is acquired apart from any speculation about the absolute, speculation

¹ *The Realm of Ends*, p. 37. This summarises Ward's arguments for this purpose. A detailed criticism of Bradley's position in *Appearance and Reality* by Ward will be found in *Mind*, 1894, pp. 109 ff.; and in *Mind*, 1925, pp. 13 ff.

that first becomes urgent as the limitations and difficulties of the pluralism from which we begin make themselves felt. This procedure our neo-hegelians are bent on reversing.¹

The prolegomenon to every philosophy is theory of knowledge, and in the study of theory of knowledge the mode of the formation of knowledge must not be lost sight of. In a series of articles on 'Sense-knowledge' Ward stressed the necessity for theory of knowledge of observing the genetic method.² As little as theory of knowledge is able to start with our ideals of knowledge not yet attained, just so little can philosophy start—as it did with Plato—from ideas as archetypes to things as their ectypes or imperfect copies. The problem that the universe sets us is an inverse problem, for we cannot start from the beginning but must start in the middle of our search for knowledge.³

The critics of the idealists, Ward says, have often pointed out that even they do not really begin their reasonings with the absolute. Only in their flights of pure thought the atmosphere of empirical fact has become too diffused to be detected. But philosophy cannot have two starting points: what is last in our experience must be first in our philosophising. 'So long as experience is the starting point there can be no finality about philosophy. As experience advances its meaning will unfold itself for reflection more and more; so further progress makes further regress possible, and what is last in the order of experience brings us nearer to what is first in the order of time or knowledge.'⁴

Ward analyses the actual procedure of this method of

¹ *Essays in Philosophy*, p. 298.

² Nos. I and II in *Mind*, 1919, pp. 257 ff. and pp. 446 ff.; and No. III in *Mind*, 1920, pp. 129 ff. It is especially the first article which is important in this connection.

³ *Essays in Philosophy*, pp. 164, 279, 308.

⁴ *The Realm of Ends*, p. 22.

abstractionism, which he condemns, in greater detail. Experience, he points out, offers us three unities: the unity of the object, the unity of the subject, and the unity of the subject with the object in self-consciousness. (a) Objective experience, he points out, even though it is a unity, always consists of a complex of different items. There may be degrees of difference in the extent to which the items are differentiated, and in primitive experience there may be less separation and more homogeneity than in more developed experience. But all experience contains some measure of differentiation. For if there were not this diversity the objective world would be merely a plenum and could not offer experience. Now the method of abstraction, Ward points out, consists exactly in this process of wiping out all diversity and leaving the objective side of experience an undifferentiated plenum. First an abstraction is made which discards all qualitative differences of the bodies, and then a further abstraction is made which discards their separateness or difference of being. Thus a homogeneous, meaningless whole is left. This destroys the reality of the objective aspect completely, for relations and differences—which are, after all, legitimate aspects of reality—are destroyed. (b) The ideal of an absolute subject is reached by a somewhat different, but equally illegitimate, procedure. The empirical subject, which is the Me of which one is conscious, is a complex entity with various functions. But the absolute idealist abstracts one of these qualities, namely activity, and pretends that it contains and explains the full nature of the subject, while he ignores the receptive side, which is part of every subject, altogether. Again the result of this process of abstraction is a false and unreal unity. (c) There is a third kind of absolute which has been proposed as the key to the problem of the multiplicity and plurality in the universe, namely the

absolute consciousness in which both the subject which has the experience, and the object which forms the content of the experience, are unified. If the emphasis in this view is laid on the unity of the objective side, namely the unity of eternal ideas, such as Plato proposed, the fact is that we arrive at a knowledge of these perfect ideas only by a series of abstractions which starts from our daily experience and in the process of which many real elements in experience are thrown aside. Such ideas are not real, they are only pale shadows of reality in which much of the differentiation which makes reality what it is is not represented. If the emphasis is laid on the unity in consciousness of subject and object there again can be no true unity of this nature which represents reality. The very word 'consciousness' implies a dualism in the subject which is conscious of the object. The idea of an absolute subject is reached only by ignoring the one side of experience, namely the objective side. Thus again the error is due to the sin of abstractionism, for there can be no consciousness which is not consciousness *by* a subject *of* an object. One cannot ignore an important fact such as the relation between subject and object, and yet expect the result to give reality.

The thought underlying this line of argument against the philosophic method of absolute idealism is clear. The true method for philosophy is to begin by studying the discrete facts of experience and, keeping the fallibility of thought as it has been demonstrated both by the failure of absolutistic systems in the past and by recent psychological research in view, not to let our conclusions lead us too far away from experience. Too much respect must not be paid to thought and its vaunted powers. 'Intellectual ability', Ward remarks, 'is rather a means than an end.' Reason is there merely to improve as far as it can on the roundabout methods of nature.

The importance of the distinction which Ward makes

between mind as an ontological principle and mind as the subject-matter for theory of knowledge is also clear. To say that the universe is permeated by mind is not yet to say that the individual mind is able to grasp the full meaning of the universe. Mind in the individual has its psychological as well as its ontological side, and it is its psychological nature that restricts its powers of transcendence and impels the philosopher to stay close to discrete details in his search for truth and a satisfactory indication of the nature of reality. Hence follows the importance of theory of knowledge as the prolegomenon to all philosophy.

III

Much of the criticism which Ward brings against Absolute Idealism had already been said before, although he put new vigour into the treatment and his point of view is often fresh. Through his remarks, however, there sometimes runs a confusion, which, when cleared up, threatens to vitiate some of his most telling points. It is the confusion between what we would call a psychological study of mind and an epistemological approach to the problems of mind. This confusion comes out very clearly when Ward makes the point that thought has never, in the whole history of philosophy, discovered a relation which was not discarded by subsequent philosophy. This may be perfectly true, and may be an interesting fact for the psychologist who is busy with the mind of the individual, but it does not affect the philosophical problem of relations at all. The important fact philosophically is that thought works relationally. One suspects the same confusion when Ward, quoting Kant, says that the fore-study of philosophy is theory of knowledge. What Ward appears to understand by his fore-study is the examination

of the limitations besetting the individual mind in its attempts at thinking. Kant obviously was concerned with the philosophical or universal principles embodied in the individual mind. In other words, Kant was concerned with theory of knowledge, Ward with psychology.

This confusion in terminology and standpoint is due to a difficulty—which Ward sometimes overcomes and often does not—in distinguishing between the philosophical and other planes or contexts on which a problem can be discussed. Another similar confusion also occurs in the same criticism. Absolute idealism is a name for various forms of idealism¹ which all in some form or other contain the idea of the absolute, and Ward's criticism is directed really only against the form of it advocated by T. H. Green and F. H. Bradley. Now Bradley may have been a philosopher's philosopher, but much of what he describes and analyses in the tendency to unity inherent in thought is part of the direct experience of thinkers—and of other people—and it will be generally admitted that Bradley had a good nose for 'experience'. It is true, it is not the naïve, first-look experience which Ward might like to call real, but it is the result of a process of critical examination which itself is a perfectly natural and legitimate procedure. Why, then, make naïve, uncritically accepted experience the test of philosophy rather than the other?

In defence of Ward's attempt to identify the psychological and epistemological problems of mind it may be argued that this idea is justifiable on the tenets of his own philosophy. If particulars are real and the relations between particulars and the time in which they exist are real it follows that the principles which govern the being of these particulars must

¹ Cf. R. F. A. Hoernlé, 'The Absolute' in *Idealismus (Jahrbuch für die Idealistische Philosophie* (Band 1), Rascher, Zürich, 1934).

also be real. Thus the historic or genetic principle is a real principle forming an intrinsic part of the universe. It has ontological standing and the limitations which it imposes on mind are therefore directly implicative in the epistemological formulation of the problem of the place and role of mind in the universe. The validity of this argument turns on the success of Ward's attempt to give ontological status to the historic principle which is in its origin purely empirical.¹

A further problem awaits Ward. For him, we have seen, the principles of philosophy are not merely mind-given, such as the law of non-contradiction and the principle of excluded middle. Particulars are real, and it is through them that the universe manifests its nature. The multiplicity of particulars are therefore the bearers or the embodiment of the principles which govern the universe. The problem, however, is to discover these principles, and more, to recognise them when once they are discovered. In other words, the problem for Ward is to indicate clearly when a principle which was first used as a working hypothesis and later becomes a theory, may be raised to the status of an ontological principle. Or, to put the same problem in another way: is Ward able to transcend the realm of working hypotheses and scientific theories and enter the realm of philosophic principles after the limitations which he has imposed on the activity of the mind?

In this connection Ward runs a further danger and later we will have to discuss the extent to which he succumbs to it. When a scientist sees a possible solution to a problem with which he is faced he tries out the solution and if it is successful in explaining the problem he believes that it is the true solution. In other words, for the scientist a solution is true because it works. The philosopher cannot, however, accept a theory as true merely on the ground that it works. The

¹ Cf. ch. iv below.

difficulties in the way are too many and too serious. The philosopher, however, who believes that the principles of the universe are in the multiplicity of particulars around him, and who in addition believes that such principles cannot be discovered by pure thought but that they have to be discovered by the study and the examination of the relations between these particulars, will be sorely tempted to grant an ontological status to a principle which he discovers merely because it works. That the temptation should be there is obvious, because such a philosopher finds himself in the realms of the scientist and would therefore be inclined to use the methods of the scientist. The problem is whether the philosopher who believes that Mind, both in the individual and in the universe, has not come to its full stature can have any criterion of truth other than the pragmatic one that a thing is true because it works.

Philosophy seeks to arrive at some view of experience which shows that there is some kind of order or organisation underlying the whole. If it were not for the deep conviction that experience, which on the face of it looks so confused and chaotic, can by study and investigation be shown to contain order or plan, there would be no philosophy. Absolute idealism offers such a synthesis and Ward criticises and rejects it. At the back of his mind Ward always had the problem of the relation between science, philosophy and religion. For the moment, in the light of Ward's strong plea for the recognition of particularity and discreteness in the universe, it would appear as if he has thrown his weight completely on the side of science to the exclusion of all philosophy.

But Ward established his philosophic reputation by his analysis and criticism of the methods of science. We can now turn to an examination of this part of his work.

CHAPTER III

CRITICISM OF NATURALISM

I

The second tendency in contemporary thought which Ward criticises is that classed under the general name of naturalism. Naturalism is the philosophy of the scientist. To be more exact, naturalism is the name of the method which the scientist uses when he philosophises, and agnosticism is the philosophy which he believes results from this method. Agnosticism in this connection refers both to theology and to theory of knowledge as branches of philosophy, for the agnostic denies the possibility of the knowledge of God, and of knowledge of the real nature or essence of matter.

On the face of it, it appears obvious that naturalism and agnosticism should go hand in hand. Naturalism as the philosophy of the scientist depends for its contents on the empirical methods of the scientist. Now there are three characteristics of scientific method: (i) it remains in the concrete particular and is careful not to generalise regular occurrences into 'laws' too easily; (ii) limiting its operations to concrete particulars its operations are essentially analytic and not synthetic; and (iii) the scientist who as scientist employs the method of science very rarely works out the underlying presuppositions of his methods and does not usually concern himself about the implications of his method for theory of knowledge. Scientific method, nevertheless, involves a complete theory of knowledge in which the possibilities of knowing are severely curtailed and limited. Only that which can be experienced directly can be known,

when by direct experience is understood not direct spiritual experience such as the mystic vision or artistic perception but the direct experience of the senses of the body. It is obvious how it comes about that the doctrine which holds, unconsciously, this theory of knowledge makes a clear cleavage between nature and God in its speculation—in so far as it speculates. To the unmeditative and uncritical scientist a particular object which he thinks he sees before him is of course much more real and *there* than a God, a First Principle, or Spirit. Nor will the scientist realise that when he discovers a law of nature he has really to do with a fact which is of quite another order of existence than the stone or the tree or whichever object it may be of which he discovers this law. Even so important a thinker as Comte realised the true implications of speaking of laws of nature only comparatively late in life. Naturalism is avowedly phenomenal both in its starting-point and in its conclusions. The real world for it is the phenomenal world and the phenomenon is for it the thing *per se*. And because the scientist does not work out the presuppositions of this theory of knowledge, which underlies his method, he does not realise that he is assuming the primacy and the independence of nature without any grounds for his assumption. Nor does he realise that he is taking for granted—without previous consideration or examination—the answer to the question which is the more fundamental standpoint, that which employs spiritual terminology or that which employs materialistic, to be the latter.

Agnosticism, we said, is of two kinds, agnosticism concerning knowledge of God or a First Principle, and agnosticism concerning the real nature of physical things. It is clear why naturalism and agnosticism should appear to go hand in hand. When the scientist operates purely analytically on an object the object appears continually to assume other forms

and to reveal a greater simplicity so that the scientist is compelled to admit that he does not 'know' matter nor substance nor the real nature of things. The same holds for the other aspect of agnosticism. The scientist who remains in the realms of particular and concrete objects and denies the speculative power of mind will sooner or later realise the necessity of a first principle or of a beginning of some sort, in whatever kind of scheme he may come to believe; but he will be compelled by his unconsciously held theory of knowledge to declare his inability to know or to know anything about a God or a First Principle. The unexamined principles of his theory of knowledge necessarily drive him into an agnostic attitude on both points.

It is Ward's argument that, historically, agnosticism does not supply the philosophy for naturalism but that naturalism has led its exponents into idealism rather than into materialism. As example Ward quotes Huxley. Huxley nearly turns a complete somersault in his views, for while he first appears as chief exponent of the philosophy of agnosticism, it later appears that agnosticism holds chiefly for the mechanical spheres in the universe while the teleological and the spiritual appear to him as really truly rational. Early in his life Huxley wrote that 'it is in itself of little moment whether we express the phenomena of matter in terms of spirit or the phenomena of spirit in terms of matter....But with a view to the progress of science the materialistic terminology is in every way to be preferred. For it connects thought with the other phenomena of the universe...whereas the alternative or spiritualistic terminology is utterly barren, and leads to nothing but confusion and obscurity of ideas.' Later the same author writes: 'I take the conception of necessity to have a logical, not a physical foundation...for I am utterly incapable of conceiving the existence of matter if there is no mind in which to

picture that existence.'¹ So we see, says Ward, that the scientist develops his philosophy into idealism when he starts examining the presuppositions and implications of his method. This appears very clearly again in Huxley's writings when he says that 'our one certainty is the existence of the mental world and the existence of *Kraft* and *Stoff* falls into the rank of highly probable hypothesis'. Historically naturalism was not the faithful ally that agnosticism expected to find it, for it develops into an idealism which agnosticism denies.

II

It is in the course of his discussion and criticism of the problems involved in the philosophy of naturalism that Ward develops his epistemology and his theory of the place of mind in the universe. It will be from an examination of this criticism of the philosophy of the scientist that we will discover Ward's theory of the nature of mind and of the place of mind in the universe. This will enable us to appraise and criticise his later philosophy and the solutions to particular philosophic problems which he offers. The method by which Ward approaches the problems of philosophy is especially interesting to-day when science and philosophy are tending to approach more and more closely.

It is necessary to remember that Ward himself was trained in the methods of science and had carried out investigations in physiology. His philosophic campaign was conducted not against science as such but against the excessive claims some scientists make for their branch of knowledge. It is when science advances further than its presuppositions allow it and starts philosophising on the narrow range of facts over which it has control that Ward criticises its presumption. His

¹ See references in *Naturalism and Agnosticism*, II, pp. 213 ff.

argument against naturalism is not an argument against science but against a wrong philosophic method. In the course of it he develops a theory of knowledge for science and philosophy and a theory of the relation between science and philosophy. Naturalism is not a science but a philosophy, he points out, nor is the mechanical theory of nature, which serves as its foundation, science either. Usually physical science knows how to keep within its limits and to mind its own business. Unfortunately naturalism persists in stepping forward as a theory of first principles and claims to be a philosophy.¹

When science develops its conclusions into naturalism, that is, tries to be a philosophy, says Ward, it has to do two things, each of which is as impermissible as the other. Firstly, naturalism considers what are conceptual abstractions as realities. Because naturalism is the philosophy of the scientist, and the scientist does not examine the presuppositions of the method he uses, naturalism has no conscious nor critical theory of knowledge either. The result is that it makes abstractions, removing phenomena from the context which gives them being and meaning, without realising what it is doing. Further, it gives real existence to intellectual conceptions which the mind develops and uses as media to assist thought, without noticing the difference in the nature of the being of such purely intellectual creations, and real facts. Secondly, and partly as a result of this lack of consciously held theory of knowledge, the conclusions of naturalistic philosophy often run directly counter to experience. The very method which it employs, analysis and abstraction, prevents it from becoming aware of certain facts in nature. It is therefore to be expected that the conclusions

¹ *Naturalism and Agnosticism*, Supplementary Note to Part I, 3rd ed. 1906, pp. 303 f.

of this philosophy cannot give a fully orb'd reality such as our experience demands when its method compels it to leave out important elements in experience. This is the reason why naturalism can never account for life and mind, and why it has no place for purposiveness in its scheme of things. Naturalism cannot examine and explain the fullness of reality as it is manifested in experience, as philosophy tries to do.

The real problem with which Ward is faced in this criticism of naturalism and agnosticism is clear. He has to develop a satisfactory view of the relation between philosophy and science. This is a many-sided task. Firstly, there is the epistemological problem of what is the most fundamental standpoint for all knowledge, that which employs spiritualistic terminology, or that which employs the terms of materialism. Secondly, there is the problem we have already formulated, that of avoiding the evil ways of absolutism and denying all particularity and plurality in the final synthesis. At this point a third and opposite problem occurs for Ward: how not to stay in the particular and discrete but to transcend the particular and discrete in such a way as not to destroy its identity and individuality and yet to attain to a synthesis which brings order into a chaos and satisfies the mind which seeks the final view or intuition. Reality presents a complex problem, and it is not easy to discover the silver thread which brings unity into the variety and which at the same time retains the value of the separate parts. Even after the initial question of spiritualism or materialism as starting-point has been settled the philosopher who seeks a satisfactory view of the relation between science and philosophy has to steer a precarious course between the Scylla of a discrete and somewhat chaotic plurality and the Charybdis of an all-engulfing absolute. This is the task with which Ward is faced.

III

Ward's argument against and criticism of the philosophy of the scientists can be divided into two chief classes. As in his criticism of absolutism he points out, firstly, the unsatisfactory solution which naturalism offers of important problems in philosophy; and secondly, he analyses the method pursued by naturalism.

A. Criticism of solutions to philosophic problems offered by naturalism.

(i) Naturalism, says Ward, does not span the gulf between the organic and the inorganic, or the teleological and the mechanical aspects of nature, nor between matter and mind. Ward examines the mechanical theory, the theory of evolution and the theory of psycho-physical parallelism, and points out that none of these theories offers a satisfactory solution of the real problem involved in the apparent 'gulfs' which occur in nature. Their fundamental concepts are nebulous and useless. The 'mass-points' of the mechanical theory cannot be discerned by the physicist, nor can their qualities definitely be ear-marked and described. It is impossible to deal directly with any individual molecule as all the movements of molecules are made in bulk, so that the result is true only as an average for the cluster of molecules and cannot indicate any individual idiosyncrasies of a molecule.¹ 'Individual molecules', says Ward, 'are not known as rubies or palms are known, that is, as instances of species and distinct from diamonds and cedars, instances of other species. The chemical molecule is an hypothetical conception. Such things *may* exist or the hypothesis would not be legitimate. Whether they actually exist or not, they,

¹ *Naturalism and Agnosticism*, I, pp. 100 ff.

at any rate, serve, like certain legal or conventional fictions to facilitate the business of scientific description.¹ Nor has a crucial experiment, or, for that matter, much accumulated evidence, been forthcoming to prove the reality of either. Indeed, the legitimacy of the ether theory has been questioned seriously from early in its existence.

(ii) Mechanism wrongly reduced our activity to an illusion, Ward says next. We do not *infer* the presence of activity. On the contrary it is, *prima facie*, one of the ultimate facts which go to constitute our experience. Yet the mechanical theory expects us to reject this primary fact of experience. For mechanical science there is only inert mass. It does not see that the idea of inertness is only arrived at through the experience of activity: and in reducing activity to inertia by calling activity an illusion the mechanical theorist is destroying the *modus cognoscendi* of his first term.² Again, the slow levelling tendencies which would follow on the dispersal of energy on a mechanical scheme are contradicted by experience. So far from finding the downward, katabolic process prevailing in the world, there appears to be a general speeding up and a developing intricacy and complexity and, as a result of even greater adaptation, an increased efficiency.

(iii) Mechanism also gives us a metaphysical theory. Upon this theory Ward remarks: 'Nature's routine, its perfection viewed statically as a closed mechanism, has had, in fact, to yield in importance to the continued "novelty" which the world, viewed historically, presents. Here it is the open possibilities for development which *der Trieb der Perfectibilität*, the striving for betterment, as Hegel called it, involves, that are continually being realised. In short, what

¹ *Naturalism and Agnosticism*, I, p. 109.

² *The Realm of Ends*, pp. 7, 8.

history presents is what we now-a-days call epigenesis or creative synthesis.¹ Ward emphasises the fact that mind is in evidence everywhere and a satisfactory scheme must make place for it. For mechanism mind is an epiphenomenon, which rather places naturalism in the position of the rustic who sawed off the branch on which he was sitting.²

(iv) Turning to the theory of psycho-physical parallelism Ward finds that this theory has its uses as a working hypothesis but that as a philosophy it introduces a quality into life which is incompatible with experience. Reflection shows us how this dualism has arisen. We use the word 'experience' in two senses. On the one hand we mean individual private experience; and on the other hand we speak of experience in the sense of public or general experience. The first kind of experience becomes the subject-matter of psychology, the second of the natural sciences, and thus a clear line appears to separate the two kinds of experience. To a certain extent there is a difference between these two fields of experience, for in that studied by psychology the subjective reference is still admitted and studied, while in the second case the subjective reference is completely omitted. This distinction is, however, false, and it is because science omits the factor of subjective reference in its analysis of objects that it is so severely limited in the scope of its findings. Life is wholly an affair of the real and the individual, and as soon as the subjective reference is lost sight of, science is out of contact with life, that is, with reality, and the concrete values and interests of life are sacrificed to cold dead theory. The division created by the theory of psycho-physical parallelism is artificial.

¹ *Essays in Philosophy*, p. 227.

² *Ibid.* p. 195.

The problem of the relation between mind and matter in its various forms is one of the fundamental problems which a philosophy of science has to face. To deny the one and to call everything mental is as unsatisfactory to common sense as it is to deny the mental and call everything material. While Ward compares the latter procedure to the rustic who saws off the branch on which he is sitting, one is tempted to describe the former alternative as the ghost of a rustic with the shade of a saw and no branch. Nor have theories of evolution offered much help. It is true that they have been pregnant with suggestions, but on the last analysis they have usually been purely descriptive and hardly explanatory or philosophical. In cases where such theories have attempted to give an explanation, such as, for example, in the case of creative evolution, the explanation has usually tended to be of a purely *ad hoc* nature. The other aspect of this problem, that of the relation between the mechanically governed and the purposive spheres of nature, hardly offers less difficulty. Recently an additional problem has been raised by the advances of science in microscopic realms, namely that of the relation between the microscopic spheres of nature where only laws of statistical averages appear to hold, and that of macroscopic realms where mechanical causality appears to function. Whether the fact that we are at the moment able to express laws operative in microscopic spheres by means of statistical averages only is due to temporary ignorance which further scientific investigation may banish, or whether it is due to real freedom operative in the lowest units of being at the very heart of the universe of nature, is still an open question. The second alternative—which appears to be the less probable one—may ease the wider problems of the relations between the mechanical and the teleological by offering a new view of the meaning of mechanism. Yet it

cannot fail to raise the problem as to the compatibility of individual freedom and mass action according to statistical laws. That is, after all, the old problem; only now the problem is located in the single molecule. Instead of the problem being that of a contrast between a mechanical and a teleological sphere in nature, the question will be whether the same thing can be both really free and independent and yet, without losing its identity, act in such a way as to obey laws which myriads of its neighbours are also following. Whatever subsequent theory may reveal on the question of Heisenberg's principle of indeterminacy it is to be doubted whether it will offer much light on the age-old problem of the mechanical and the teleological aspects of the universe.¹ Finally, there is a third aspect to this problem, that more particularly of the relation between body and mind. Amid much diversity of opinion later psychology of the less physiological and behaviouristic type appears to take the interactionist position on this problem. This acceptance on the part of psychologists raises the interactionist view only to the level of a working hypothesis and does not yet give it much philosophic value and status. Much of the criticism which Ward levels at the solutions of these problems which the scientist offers is perfectly just from the broader standpoint of philosophy and more particularly of theory of knowledge, even though he may not be able to offer any better solutions. The lack of a right solution does not impose the need of accepting, as a working hypothesis, an obviously wrong solution. On the other hand, Ward's criticism of the solution offered by naturalism of these problems burdens him with the task of admitting these problems and of making some sort of place for them in whatever synthetic whole he may offer as a philosophy.

¹ This problem is discussed in greater detail below, ch. v.

The second group of arguments which Ward brings against the philosophy of the scientist pertains to the method pursued by that philosophy. Curiously the line of argument he follows here is very much the same as in his polemic against absolutism, for his criticism is again directed against the method of 'abstractionism' used by these philosophers. He points out that, like the absolutist, the naturalist also takes certain phenomena of nature out of their context and then fondly believes that the phenomenon still has its original being and significance. There is a difference, however, between the process of abstraction as it is used by the absolutist and by the philosopher of naturalism. For the former the abstracted entity becomes more and more vague and more and more meaningless till it disappears into some higher and all-engulfing form of being which is more empty of meaning than the lower forms. For the latter, on the other hand, the abstraction becomes hardened into a fact. What is in its conception clearly an aspect of natural phenomena, which is concentrated on by mind and abstracted, later is given objective existence in a real world. The result is that aspects of nature which are abstracted as the result of over-simplification by the mind are raised to the status of philosophic or real 'principles'.

B. *Criticism of the method which the naturalist philosopher uses.*

(i) Ward points out that many of the conceptions which are fundamental to the philosophy of naturalism never have been and by their nature never can be proved. This argument he applies especially to the concept of the law in nature and to that of the conservation of energy. 'As to the universal reign of law', he writes, 'this never has been, and never can be, empirically established, neither does its denial involve

any contradiction: that is to say, it is neither demonstrable nor axiomatic.¹ A statement from the physicist Ernest Mach is quoted in support of this position: 'In reality the law always contains less than the fact itself, because it does not reproduce the fact as a whole, but only that aspect of it which is important to us, the rest being either intentionally or from necessity omitted.'² The conception of a natural law is in the last instance a pragmatic conception and has only pragmatic value. It should not be regarded as having the value of an ontological principle, as the naturalist philosopher is apt to regard it.

(ii) Science, says Ward, works by a process of abstractions and then 're-ifies' these abstractions into real entities. Science reaches its results by a process of repeated abstractionism. That is all very well, provided that the nature of the process is recognised and its limitations admitted. But because the scientist does not trouble himself about the epistemological implications of the processes which he uses, he does not realise what the process actually is, nor the limitations of the process and of the results of the process. Thus he goes off his beat by considering these abstractions as 'realities', as for instance in the case of the concept of Mass and Force in theoretical mechanics. Even hypotheses which originally were only intended as methods of research are eventually so much concentrated upon that they are considered 'real'. 'We have noticed a tendency', writes Ward, 'to treat statistical means and hypothetical mechanism as concrete realities.'³ Ward repeatedly exhorts against the tendency of allowing abstract simplification to harden into concrete fact and he concludes that the *fons et origo* of the

¹ *The Realm of Ends*, p. 12.

² *Ibid.* p. 17.

³ *Naturalism and Agnosticism*, I, p. 118.

mechanistic philosophy is the prejudice which is held to be the special infirmity of metaphysics—that of ascribing objective existence to abstractions.

So much for Ward's second type of argument against naturalistic philosophy. Put briefly, Ward urges against naturalism that what were abstractions eventually came to be considered as concrete realities by it, and thus also what were originally hypotheses to conduce to regularity and method in scientific investigation afterwards came to be 're-ified'. Consequently the conclusions arrived at by such a philosophy, which is based, firstly, merely on certain parts of the data of experience, and secondly, on intellectual abstractions, could not tally with the facts of our total experience and could not be regarded as a philosophy of the universe. The reason for the employment by naturalism of these fallacious processes and its necessarily erroneous results Ward ascribes to the neglect by naturalism of theory of knowledge. As a result of this omission the scientist becomes absorbed in the objective attitude and commits two errors. Firstly, he forgets himself and the role that he as *knower* plays in all observation; and, secondly, he mistakes his abstract conceptions for realities. Thus the whole examination which leads to Ward's exposure of the abstract and unreal character of the mechanical scheme of things is really an examination of the epistemological processes employed in constructing such a scheme.

Mechanistic philosophy is as old as the hills and the question occurs wherein the fascination of this conception of things lies. Ward's answer is to the point. It lies, says Ward, 'in the intuitive closeness of mathematical form and in the boundless possibilities of geometrical construction. Here and here only, the human intellect seems to be in possession of archetypal ideas and to approximate to the creative

intuition attributed to the Deity.¹ Unfortunately for human dreams, experience contains more than can be expressed in terms of mathematical relations, and it gives us no warrant for the scheme of the universe which pure thought so rapidly and plausibly opens up before us. It is even possible that science has reason, in the results of its own observation, for regarding large chunks of the universe as mechanically construed and this is perhaps quite true as far as it goes. The point is that science cannot tell us that the universe is mechanical as a whole, for science is limited to the narrow bounds of its field of observation and by the limitations inherent in the act of observation itself. Science will always be limited to the examination of parts of experience and direct observation has to do with particulars and plurality. A generalisation from scientific investigation, Ward here suggests, can never be raised to the dignity of an ontological principle. This is tantamount to saying that all truth is mind-given and raises the important problem of what is proof in the philosophy of James Ward. On the one hand it cannot be purely a matter of mind, for Ward's criticism of absolutism is exactly this: that it let mind run away with it and built a universe for which there was no justification in experience. On the other hand proof cannot depend on scientific observation and enumeration, for this process is limited in various ways and the results which are attained cannot be generalised. This is but another formulation of the problem of the relation between science and philosophy.

As *ad hoc* criticism of the ways and conclusions of naturalism Ward's arguments are not only justified but very much to the point. It is quite true that the scientist is apt to raise 'generalisations' to the status of philosophic principles when he leaves the narrow limits of his own branch of

¹ *Naturalism and Agnosticism*, II, p. 88.

investigation; and it is quite true that the terms with which science works are partial and abstracted aspects of larger fields of observation. The problem, however, is whether philosophy can do or ever has done without abstractions in its attempt to attain a total synthesis or world view. A certain amount of abstraction seems to be involved the moment any attempt at synthesis is made. If this is the case the point for Ward is to indicate the difference between the scientific and the philosophic process of 'abstraction' and to indicate wherein the one is an unjustifiable and falsifying process and the other permissible. As *ad hoc* argument against the conclusions of naturalism Ward's remarks may be to the point. However, they leave the real issue untouched, and the problem will be to see whether Ward's final proposals for a synthesis suggest a solution of this problem.

A second remark which may be made in connection with Ward's criticism of naturalism refers to his charge that the conceptions used by this philosophy are 'pragmatic' and have no ontological existence. Again as *ad hoc* argument against an actual historic philosophy there is much to be said for this criticism and Ward is by no means alone in making the charge. It is true that the scientist proceeds on a trial-and-error method and that for him the true hypothesis is the one that works, till another hypothesis is developed which works better. The trouble is that the truth must always 'work', otherwise it could hardly be the truth and would annihilate itself, and the question arises: does the philosopher not also expect the theory which he accepts as the truth and which he weaves into his final picture of the universe to 'work'? Would he accept it if it did not work? This difficulty is all the more important for Ward because he was considered by some of his contemporaries to be a pragmatist and a follower of James in his heart of hearts,

a charge which he hotly denied.¹ For neither Ward nor James is thought *qua* thought reality; the thought-processes, too, have run the gauntlet of natural selection. For Ward they develop through the circuitous ways of evolution, and James remarks: 'Our fundamental ways of thinking are discoveries of exceedingly remote ancestors which have been able to preserve themselves throughout the experience of all subsequent time.'² While for absolutism thought has an independence and individuality *per se*, for Ward as for pragmatism it is essentially instrumental in character. Now if thought is instrumental can it avoid that the test of the truth of its concepts is that they work? Ward's criticism of the method of naturalism on this point is pertinent, but unless he does something about it he stands in danger of himself falling into the category which he criticises. Even his final position, in which he inverts James's slogan by saying that the thing works because it is true, and not it is true because it works, is hardly a satisfactory solution of the problem as it faces him.

In spite, however, of the fact that Ward does not indicate the full epistemological problem in the course of his argument in *Naturalism and Agnosticism* on these points, nor offers a solution in subsequent writings, *Naturalism and Agnosticism* must in the first instance be regarded as a work on theory of knowledge. 'An examination of the "real principles" of naturalism thus secures us a specially advantageous position for discussing the epistemological questions on which the justification of idealism depends', writes Ward,³ and according to him it is the total absence of anything approaching epistemology in his philosophy that makes Mr Spencer the will-o'-the-wisp that he is. Ward

¹ Cf. *The Realm of Ends*, p. 481.

² *Pragmatism*, p. 170. ³ *Naturalism and Agnosticism* 1, p. ix.

considers the results of most importance in the history of philosophy to be those that added to theory of knowledge, and for this reason places Aristotle, Locke, Hume and Kant high in his list of philosophers.¹ It is theory of knowledge that shows us the reasons for the collapse of naturalism. While naturalism took the fragment for the whole and there was for it nothing more than just this mechanical substructure, 'from the epistemological standpoint we can see not only the fragment but the outline of the whole; we can see not only the limitations of science, but also the causes and mistakes into which naturalism falls'.²

IV

From Ward's analysis of the way in which the mind of the scientist-philosopher works we are able to infer more or less directly what the place is which Ward allots to mind in his universe and what role mental activity is able to play in the search for the ultimate synthesis which is the philosopher's goal.

Firstly, *the individual mind must remain close to experience in the course of its argument.* The mind offers short cuts to the solutions of problems in daily life. If one were compelled to solve every problem that occurred by the laborious method of trial-and-error, by which we already have to approach a sufficiently large number of problems, life would hardly be worth living and it would be doubtful whether there would be progress worthy the name of progress in the world. The trial-and-error method indicates lack of insight and understanding which is characteristic of the less advanced stages of life, and if this method did not slowly come to be

¹ *Essays in Philosophy*, p. 160.

² *Ibid.* p. 208.

supplanted by the instrumentality of the mind and the rational insight of the mind it is to be doubted whether there would be any advance beyond a certain limit. It is through developing mental activity that advance in all spheres in life takes place till a stage is reached when the laborious trial-and-error method is discarded in many spheres. Now mind solves problems and brings things together in new ways by means of direct insight into the nature of the relations between them. It discards those elements in a complex situation which have no direct bearing on the problem which must be solved and it subsumes less important details under larger groupings and so forth. It is here that Ward's warning comes in. Often the new groupings into which the mind classifies and organises the data of experience are artificial. The mind itself has sometimes to use the trial-and-error method and has to move things about till the sought-for arrangement is found. The fact that the mind is able to classify things in a certain order is not yet sufficient guarantee for saying that that order is the order of the universe. Nor does the organisation of things into any kind of system—and there are many systems into which the same group of items can be arranged—necessarily imply that that system is rational and expresses the full nature of the data. The danger is that the mind is apt to fasten on any system, so long as it is fairly well ordered, and to regard it as the real system which expresses the relations between the parts as they are in the universe. In an unreal classification of this nature each individual element must inevitably lose some of its qualifications and must necessarily suffer some distortion. In order to be able to fit into any scheme or system which is not the right system the data must be squeezed or chiselled and such a process changes the facts to that extent. The result is that when the system is completed the facts subsumed by mind

under that system have all become distorted and unreal. This is the error which Ward sees in the philosophy of the scientist. It is the mind which sees the various ways in which things can be related; and it often creates connections between things which are not really there. Thus every time a connection is suggested to the philosopher-scientist he thinks it is real. So he goes along merrily building up a system from which all reality disappears because it is built up of relations which have no existence beyond their existence in his mind.

Secondly, *the results of philosophy must not distort experience but must be true to experience*. Every sane person's behaviour implies behind it some kind of philosophy or world view, that is, implies a scheme or way in which his experience hangs together in his own mind. Most people are only half aware of the wholeness or synthesis which is implied in their normal actions and behaviour, but a little reflection reveals it soon enough. Most people's philosophy is a kind of realism or objectivism which ascribes full 'being' or 'existence' to stones and trees and ideas and white rats and everything that comes their way, and it is only after a good deal of practice in the ways of philosophy that normal people come to grasp an ultra-idealistic world view such as Berkeley's—and sometimes not even then. It takes much thought to come to appreciate fully the disturbing distinctions between appearance and reality, and the first reaction on a philosophy based on that distinction tends to be in terms of Johnson's reply to Berkeleyanism when he kicked the stone with his foot remarking: 'I refute it thus'. Ward's position here is very much of the common-sense type with which the term 'the-man-in-the-street' is associated. He in fact states that we all live in a world of a certain kind in which we have to do certain things if we want to keep alive. This world is the real world as far as we are concerned and the best thing

is to adapt philosophy to the world and not attempt to suit the world to philosophy. But Ward has not given much indication of his solution of the ancient problem of the relation of the individual mind to the external world so far. The individual mind remains to a certain extent separate from the world external to it, and it is the examination of this relation which raises the numerous problems of perception and which has driven many thinkers into the unpleasing by-ways of an utterly subjective 'idealism'. Ward objects to this kind of thing and holds that philosophy must stay close to experience in its final synthesis. A philosophy which is completely out of touch with daily experience and the data of experience is false and the philosopher must see that his final synthesis is a live philosophy which is able to offer solutions to the daily problems of life, otherwise it is merely an *undoing*. The problem for the philosopher, however, is this: to what parts of experience must philosophy remain true? Experience is full of contradictions and on the face of it, and without further critical analysis, offers but a bad 'standard' by which to measure the truth of a philosophic synthesis. On the other hand, as soon as one starts analysing and criticising the data of experience one is faced with the problems of perception and the distinction between appearance and reality and the alternative of subjectivism.

Ward is therefore faced with a twofold problem which follows from his criticism of the theory of knowledge of naturalism. On the one hand he is faced with the problem of stating clearly what he understands by 'experience', for it is to experience that philosophy must be true in its final conclusions. 'Experience' is a wide term, only too often vaguely used. In its widest sense experience is probably identical with reality. If every part of reality is connected with every other part any change anywhere in reality will affect the rest

of it and thus also that spot of reality which is me or my consciousness. In a narrower sense experience can mean the contents of an individual consciousness, either at any moment, or in the whole course of its existence. Not only is there this vagueness in the use of the word 'experience', but in either of these meanings experience is, on the face of it at least, riddled with contradictions. This leads to the second problem. If the results of the philosophic process must tally with experience and experience itself appears chaotic and confused, it obviously needs to undergo critical examination and analysis. The problem then is, where must the mind stop in its analysis of experience, and why just there? The answer to this question will depend on the place assigned to mind in the universal scheme of things by philosophy.

Ward's general argument in *Naturalism and Agnosticism* must be admitted. Historically it is true that naturalism as a philosophy has tended towards a spiritualism in the last instance. Also the more detailed argument against the method of abstractionism used by naturalism, and against the unreality of the final synthesis which it offers, must be granted. Finally, his contention that philosophy must be preceded by epistemology is no new one.

From this examination of naturalism Ward then indicates what he expects a satisfactory philosophy to be like, and what the place of the individual mind is in the universe. Firstly, the individual or private mind must not lose sight of the real nature of the entities which it weaves into its philosophic scheme; and secondly, the final synthesis must not contradict experience.

In their turn these claims face Ward with a series of problems which look rather formidable. Firstly, there are some detailed problems. There is, for example, the problem of materialism and spiritualism and how to explain things

like stones and cows, which look material enough, in terms of spirit. Or there is the problem of explaining away the gulf between the inorganic and the organic, matter and mind, the mechanical and the teleological spheres in the universe. A more particular form of this last problem is that of the relation between body and mind. It is on these points that Ward criticises naturalism, and he accuses it of an unsatisfactory solution of these problems. So it is up to him to offer a better solution.

But there is a wider problem with which Ward is faced. This follows on his criticism of the mode of procedure of naturalism. On the one hand the philosopher must not lose sight of the particular and concrete detail in his final result; on the other hand Ward seems to expect a cohering synthesis as the fruit of philosophic labour. This is no mean order and raises all the old difficulties of the relation between the particular and the universal, and of the being of the universal. In its turn this problem is a part of the wider problem of the relation between science and philosophy. The scientist works with experiments and lays down laws of nature which are more or less particular in their bearing. These particular results, however, tell us something about the universe in which we live. They widen our experience. They have to be woven into a pattern or orderly whole in such a way that in the synthesis their particularity is not lost. It is this problem which appears to have been with Ward from his youth up in some form or other and which lies behind his criticism of absolutism and of naturalism.

We have seen that Ward criticises the tendencies in contemporaneous philosophy, firstly, in the question of method and, secondly, on the solutions they offer to philosophic problems. We will now turn to a closer examination of Ward's doctrine on philosophic method.

CHAPTER IV

THE METHOD OF PHILOSOPHY

I

In examining Ward's criticism of the philosophies of absolutism and of naturalism it was clear that he was concerned chiefly with the methods used by these philosophies in arriving at a speculative conclusion. It is to the inefficiency of method, in the last instance, that Ward traces the unrealness and artificiality of their conclusions. The method of the investigation must be suited to its subject. One cannot study stars with a microscope nor molecules with a telescope, and the mutations of organic growth cannot be deduced from preconceived premisses nor expressed in exact mathematical formulae. Thus it is not surprising that physicists themselves came to perceive and proclaim that the explanation of the universe on mechanical principles was but an ideal and abstract explanation; and that the dialectic method of probing the meaning of the universe made place for one more in accord with man's experience of what the nature of the universe was. The first natural demand that everyone makes of his philosophy is that it should be systematic as far as it goes; for while the history of philosophy as well as individual experience teach that no earth-bound philosophical view of the universe can ever be complete and final, the claim for system not only seems to be an inherent demand of human nature but appears also to find support in the history of this discipline. The moment, therefore, it is discovered that there are phenomena in one's universe which do not fit into one's philosophic system the

mind naturally begins to examine and criticise the system. Such examination must at bottom be an examination of the method by which the system was arrived at, and it was only natural, when thinkers found that the schemes offered by naturalism and by absolutism had no place for phenomena which played an important part in their experience, that they should turn to an analysis of the method by which these schemes were developed. Now the method of philosophy is principally dependent on the operations of the mind, so that an examination of the method of philosophy brings one to the problem of Kant: if you want to know what knowing is examine the mind which does the knowing. Ward thought that philosophy had generally ignored this problem far too much, to its own detriment. 'The topic to which I would invite your attention is that of the method of philosophy', he says in a lecture in 1919.¹ 'It is, I think, still an unsettled question what this method should be; though the question is one which was raised at the outset of what we call modern philosophy—and notably by Locke and Kant. It is a question, too, which—till it is thrashed out—seems seriously to bar the way to further progress: I doubt indeed if there is any "prolegomenon to every future metaphysic" which more urgently requires continuous discussion.'

The justness of Ward's contention is borne out both by common sense and by the history of philosophy. Nor is it a very new contention, in spite of its simplicity. It is just possible that philosophers generally have not followed the course indicated by Ward and their own common sense because of difficulties inherent in such a course. Ward's simple advice is that the instrument of knowledge should be examined before it is itself used for further purposes. But the method of studying an object must be more or less suited

¹ *Essays in Philosophy*, p. 277.

to the nature of the object and the simple injunction to study the mind already implies some kind of knowledge or theory as to the nature of the mind. What Ward has really done and continually was doing was to raise the chicken-and-egg problem in theory of knowledge. The study of the mind implies a knowledge of the method suitable for the study of the mind, which in its turn implies a knowledge of the mind by which the suitability of the method can be gauged. If the philosopher busy with the prolegomenon to his work adopts an 'empirical' method in the tradition of Locke or Hume in his study of the nature of mind it is clear that much of the real nature of mind may remain a closed book to him, while if he is inspired by Hegelian fervour he may obviously land in absolutism. The chicken-and-egg problem in philosophy, as in other spheres of experience, can be serious and raises several awkward problems for Ward.

The method which Ward proposes to follow in his philosophy is simple and straightforward and has all the weight of common sense behind it. The phenomena of which we are most sure in the universe, he says, are the facts of our awareness. When a thing is present to my consciousness then I am quite sure of at least one thing: that it is in consciousness. That does not mean that I cannot know anything else besides the immediate facts of consciousness. On the contrary there are many things of which I am also sure, such as my experiences of yesterday and the day before, and the experiences of my friends which I infer them to have by watching their bodily movements, or the existence of a world outside my private consciousness, which I come to know through my experience of movement and by means of the category of causality. But the fact remains that I am never quite as sure of these things as I am of a fact of consciousness. It is when a thing is given in consciousness that

I know it by direct awareness. I may not of course know whether the thing has external existence independent of my consciousness at the same time. But I do know at least this one thing: it *is*, in consciousness. About this piece of knowledge there are no pre-suppositions and no unexamined assumptions. The farther I get away from facts of immediate consciousness or experience the more I have to depend on a process of inference and on past experience to feel sure about things which are seemingly real. Such knowledge is essentially derived knowledge. The nearer I come to my own intimate experience the less derived and the more direct my knowledge of facts becomes. Therefore I have certainty about my individual experience.

Therefore philosophy should start from individual present experience. We are at least sure of the facts of immediate experience. It is the study of individual experience which will indicate to us not only the relation in which we stand to the objects of our external environment but also the course which our further philosophic investigation should follow. It will indicate to us our place in the universe and the place of our minds in the universe, and it is when we have settled these problems of the prolegomenon to philosophy that we can proceed to the real problems. But to start the study of philosophy from the side of the individual does not mean that we can never transcend individual experience and enter into wider realms. The pre-supposition that it is the facts of immediate awareness of which we are certain does not necessarily bring us to a pure subjectivity and does not imply a purely private philosophy cut off from all sharing with others. On the contrary, the very analysis of individual experience shows that we do stand in active relationship to a wider universe and that we are constantly and legitimately acting as if the wider universe, with which we have indirect

contact, is of a certain knowable nature. Indeed, the subjective world of immediate experience itself extends beyond its own immediacy into a past and a future. The order of philosophy, Ward believes, cannot but be from the little to the big, from the individual outwards, for it is only thus that philosophy is able to start with a minimum of pre-supposition. It is the pre-suppositions in philosophy which are always dangerous, for it is they which afterwards lead to the exclusion of certain parts of the universe and the distortion of facts. So Ward writes: 'In the world of history the fundamental fact is the concrete experience of change....The individuals of the historical world have characteristics the diametrical opposite to all this', that is, to the scientific conception of atoms and molecules. 'They remember the past and anticipate the future and have thus a sense of their own unity....It is this unity of self-consciousness that makes the difference of what etymology identifies, the atoms of the mechanical world and the individuals of the world of morals.'¹ So philosophy must start from individual self-consciousness.

II

So much for the starting-point of philosophy. As they stand Ward's statements on this point do not do more than raise the problems of the primacy for philosophy of the data of self-consciousness—the fundamental idealistic assumption. The subjectivity of this idealism is, however, tempered by further doctrines which will be discussed later. But the method of philosophy is not all starting-point. There must also be procedure, and here Ward is on very much more debatable ground. All philosophies have to start with facts of experience. In the course of philosophising certain values

¹ *Essays in Philosophy*, p. 240.

are given to certain facts, and it is here that the differences of opinion between philosophers come in. Ward criticised both absolutism and naturalism on the ground that they left experience or real life out of consideration in the course of their philosophic speculation, and his own rule is that philosophy must not be separated from actual experience at any point in its speculation. It must not only start off from experience, it must also keep close to experience all along the line. Philosophy, however, if it is to be worth its salt, cannot but transcend the realms of pure privacy or subjectivity, which is what experience is in its most direct and immediate form. Thus some view will have to be held about the nature of experience and what it is in its wider realms if philosophy is to be guided by it in her speculations. This consideration is equivalent to saying that some view of the nature of the universe is implied by which the probability of our philosophic speculations can be tested. This does not mean that the view of the nature of the universe that is to be used as the guide to our philosophic speculation need be a purely arbitrary assumption or a purely subjective belief. On the contrary, the principles describing the nature of the universe which Ward himself uses as a guide to his philosophic speculation are principles which have all the sanction of the latest and most up-to-date scientific names, as well as strong backing from common sense and from philosophically schooled thought.

The guiding principle on which Ward bases his philosophic method can be called the historic method, from the point of view of method, or the principle of continuity, from the point of view of the implication behind it. By the historic method Ward means that method by which it is possible to argue from the present state of the object to earlier forms of the same object because one believes that the

object developed in a certain way. To be more exact, Ward believes that there is a definite line along which things have developed, and this line does not only consist of a continuity of identity in time but is also characterised by a direction of development which remains more or less constant. Philosophic speculation should be guided by this line of development and it will not go too far wrong, for the principle which describes the course of development is the principle which describes the facts of the universe. This principle is the principle of continuity. While the first part of Ward's description of the philosophic method, namely, that philosophy should start with individual experience, rests on a common-sense basis, the second part of the description, that philosophy should keep to experience, is made possible by means of the principle of continuity. To justify this part, therefore, the principle of continuity must be justified—in so far as this is possible in metaphysics.

It is worth while, for reasons of interest as well as of clearness, to see how this philosophic method, which starts with the present individual experience and then proceeds on an analysis which presupposes the principle of continuity, works when it is applied to a central philosophic problem. As an example we may take Ward's analysis of the self into its simplest constituents. With his task clearly before him Ward writes: 'From the standpoint then of individual human experience we have now to determine the "irreducible minimum" which all experience involves, that is, to reach a concept applicable to every other form of experience as well as our own.'¹ In this process it is necessary to distinguish between two grades of minima. Firstly, by a process of psychological introspection and analysis we come upon what may be called a psychological minimum. For Ward

¹ *Psychological Principles*, p. 29.

this most elementary of experiences consists of feeling, attention and presentation. These three forms of experience are the most elementary forms of consciousness and out of them all higher and more complex forms of consciousness are constituted. The analysis so far has been of a strictly psychological nature; the evidence is of a direct or empirical kind, somewhat of the nature of the evidence for Kant's empirical *me*, which is an object for the awareness of a consciousness. Secondly, behind this empirical *me*, and beyond the realms of direct observation, lies the pure Ego, the preserver of the identity of the person and the form which gives the flux of the contents of consciousness its direction and unity. In his search for the constitution of this entity Ward starts off with the comparatively complex psychical and biological organism and applies his principle of continuity backwards. He imagines this complexity decreased without limit, for development consists of an increase of complexity and organisation. By this means he reaches the concept of the naked monad whose organism reduces, as it were, to a point and its present to a moment. All the mental characteristics of the fundamental entity have not gone, but we seem to have reached the limit both of mental and material characteristics. 'The physical concept of such a limit', writes Ward, 'is the dynamical concept of a mass-point as a central force. And the corresponding psychological concept answers to what Leibniz happily described as "*mens momentanea seu carens recordatione*".'¹

In their physical aspect—if at this early stage of development the two aspects can already be distinguished—the monads or 'psychoids' are qualitatively distinct and are capable of what in scholastic philosophy was called *actio in distans*. On the psychical side immediacy of content or

¹ *The Realm of Ends*, p. 255.

awareness is again stressed, immediacy being explained by what psychologists call 'pure' sensation, 'an ideal limit to which our simplest sensations never reach'. This psychical immediacy is described as the momentary consciousness of some presentation which appears for the first time as a datum of consciousness. It is with a plurality of such monads as starting-point that Ward has to explain the self or pure ego and the empirical me, and here again he argues from the more to the less complex. At the higher levels of nature and more especially where social organisation becomes a subject of reflection, he says, we see cases innumerable of behaviour consequent solely on 'sympathetic rapport'—between private citizens and public officials, for example. So Ward conceives the pure self to be made up of a system consisting of a dominant monad and subordinate monads, and the relation between the classes of monads is described by analogy with the 'sympathetic rapport' which Ward finds in society. When once development has gone so far as to have formed two or more systems or hierarchies of monads or organisms or selves, each with a dominant monad, there is also a differentiation between the relations of the monads *inter se*. So Ward distinguishes between the relation of a dominant monad to a subordinate monad of its own organism (calling it a functional or internal relation), and the relation of this monad to the subordinate monads of another system. This relation he calls foreign or external. Further, as a society the monads of an organism are not related only among themselves and to their dominant monad but also related to their environment. The environment is the common matrix of all monads and it consists of bare monads in external relation to each other, that is, of the rest of the monads which had not yet formed into organisms by getting into functional or internal relations with each other.

In this way Ward applies the historic method in his philosophic speculation. This method—which arose largely under the influence of Hegel—implies that history is no mere concatenation of events but that there is a continual and gradual development present. There is a thread of spirit running through all apparently separate events. Comparing this view with the theory of naturalism we see that whereas naturalism never reaches the individual the historic method never leaves it; for naturalism spontaneity and initiative are impossible, for the historic method inertia and rigorous concatenation; naturalism has no use for motives of end and value, for the historic method these motives are of primary importance.

Ward's discovery of the historic method is responsible for his views on the limitations of individual mind. Thought-knowledge, he believed, was preceded by sense-knowledge. Sense-knowledge arose from the relation between external movement and sensations and in its turn it gives experience. That is, action is always ahead of experience and sense-knowledge accompanies experience, while thought-knowledge in its turn covers a relatively small portion of sense-knowledge. Thought is a late product in the chain of development. It is only after the system of monads which forms the self has had much experience of action and movement that sense-knowledge can give rise to thought-knowledge. Nowhere is the importance of the historical method for Ward's philosophy seen more clearly than in its application to the theory of the development of mental activity in the individual. Individual thought loses the important place which it had accorded it all through the history of philosophy and is reduced to one amongst others of the phenomena of natural growth. It has to take its place in the chain of evolution and it is continually reminded of its humble origin, albeit its place

is at the head of the development. On account of its lowly origin it is not allowed any free flights of fancy, as had been the case when it posed as the guide to the absolute. On the contrary, it is continually being brought down to earth with a bump for the legitimacy of its flights to be tested by the touchstone of everyday experience. Pure thought has had to surrender much, if not most, of the glories of its former position to the control of 'data', and often it even falls low enough to be contradicted by a mere scientist. Even worse! No longer is the cut of the clothes of thought the model for the universe. Indeed, thought is denied the status of an adult, and unkind people have been heard to say that its old suit is no longer wearable and that it will have to get a new suit much simpler and more practical than its previous coat of many colours. 'Looking broadly at the progress of life', writes Ward,¹ 'as it ascends through the animal kingdom and onwards through the history of man, it seems safe to say that knowledge is always a means to ends, is never an end by itself—till at length it becomes interesting and satisfying by itself. Psychologically, then, the sole function of intellection and perception is to guide action and to subserve volition—more generally, to promote self-conservation and betterment. Knowledge, from this point of view, may even be regarded as the joint product of natural selection and subjective selection: it emerges tainted with—as some may think—but at all events permeated by, a teleological covering.' Ward himself thinks that it is possible that the ultimately satisfying world view will not be given by thought as we know it, but by an experience of the nature of faith or intellectual intuition, in which thought loses much of its discursive nature and therefore much of its identity.²

The method of philosophical empiricism consists, then,

¹ *Essays in Philosophy*, p. 168.

² Cf. *ibid.* pp. 349 ff.

of two points. Firstly, it goes to experience for its data. But so do most philosophies, and the peculiarity of Ward's application of the method is that it makes the meaning of experience as wide as possible. Thus it includes under experience the data directly given by subjective awareness and the data given by intersubjective intercourse (or, as Ward calls it, trans-subjective experience), such as the results of the physical sciences. Secondly, the method of philosophic empiricism means the continuous testing of the conclusions of thought by the bedrock of experience. Philosophy may be reflection, but it is reflection on experience and reflection and experience must ever go hand in hand.

Empiricism has in the past always been associated with the natural sciences. Ward makes of it not merely a scientific but also a philosophic method, and the question is whether empiricism, as Ward understands it, is justified as a philosophic method. Philosophy and science, Ward held, had to do with the same subject-matter, that is, with the facts of experience; only each has a different point of view. Just as science does not fabricate its facts intellectually but goes to experience to find them, so philosophy, too, cannot theorise out of all proportion to its subject-matter or create knowledge. Whether empiricism is justified as a philosophic method in Ward's philosophy depends on what conception Ward has of metaphysics. For Aristotle the supreme task of metaphysics was to discover the ultimate being of things. Ward's conception of metaphysics hangs closely together with the principle of continuity and the historic method. For Ward metaphysics, on the last analysis, has to do with pre-experiential and post-experiential stages of universal experience. This somewhat surprising view of what metaphysics is seems to be a necessary corollary of any philosophy in which the principle of continuity and the principle of epigenetic

development are given metaphysical status. Perhaps this view of metaphysics will lose some of its objectionable quality in the light of a statement made by Lotze: 'Metaphysics will still, however, continue to demand that the results which experience derives should admit of being so interpreted as to fit these ideal forms and to be intelligible as cases of their application.'¹ For Ward each individual consciousness is an item in the process or flux which is universal experience. Each item of consciousness must thus be allotted some place in the flow, and as a large part of this flow is outside and beyond individual experience metaphysics has to include the states either before or after individual experience, where 'before' and 'after' do not necessarily mean before and after in time. The ideal forms which bring order into the chaos of present experience will also officiate in the extra-experiential realms. But the subject-matter which it reduces to order can only be ascertained on principles which are discovered to be present in actual experience, and the only way that such principles can be discovered is by the direct action of mind on empirical data. Mind can only function when it is supported by data. On such a limited view of mind as this, empiricism as a philosophic method is not only justified but seems to be the only way out.

III

Mankind in its search for truth has usually followed one of two paths. It is true that these paths are not completely different and the pursuer of the one cannot help but find himself traversing the other when occasion demands. But the difference is nevertheless there, and even though the contrast has been toned down considerably the difference is yet

¹ *Metaphysics*, Introduction, par. vi.

so clear and distinct that it has been ascribed to difference of temperament or innate psychological constitution in the users.

The one path has been called the 'high *a priori*' road to truth and the other the 'purely empirical'. As a general label these descriptions may stay. As an example of the former the student is often given the name of Plato and as an example of the second Aristotle may be mentioned. Now while it is quite true that Plato did not collect and assiduously study 158 actual constitutions of states before he wrote the *Republic* or the *Laws*, it is also very clear that, in spite of his theory of archetypal ideas, he was a keen observer of the numerous and distinct facts of experience; and while Aristotle criticised Plato for ignoring facts, he nevertheless adopted much of Plato's metaphysic of ideas. However, it is no use denying obvious things, and the fact remains that, in spite of all considerations that can be adduced to show that there is no such method as the 'purely' *a priori* or *a posteriori*, Plato's method of approaching the problems of philosophy differed widely from Aristotle's. The one was *a priori*, the other *a posteriori*.

This distinction of method has continued to persist in too sharp a form all through the history of Western philosophy and science, to the detriment of both. A too close adherence to method may stunt the natural development of any process of investigation, and while the opposite is also true, namely that haphazardness in the application of a method is an even greater danger to sound investigation, to make it a characteristic of philosophy that it is purely 'speculative' and the trade-mark of the natural sciences that 'they stick to facts and eliminate speculation' would be to curtail unnaturally and unnecessarily the endowments of man to unravel the secrets of the universe. It is surely only when mind has

studied the facts of nature very closely that it can lift itself to those higher syntheses which are not given to immediate observation of particular facts; and if it does not lift itself to those higher syntheses, *cui bono?*

This is the point which Ward raises, and he not only raises the point but tries to give a practical solution of it. Unless the question of the method of philosophy is settled philosophy may be seriously retarded in its progress. Ward offers a theory, and in his actual philosophy, a solution to the problem of method. In theory he offers a view of the function of mental activity which has the practical implication that the individual mind cannot indulge in 'pure speculation' but must adhere closely to the facts; and in his own search for a synthesis he puts this implication into practice and follows the method called empiricism. What Ward is actually trying to do is to employ the one method in spheres where generally the other method has been used. Also philosophy, which up till now has been speculative, must follow the methods of the natural sciences and become empirical—so far, that is, as the subject-matter and the purpose of philosophy allow such treatment. The subject-matter of the sciences influences the method which is followed in investigating its nature and it is obvious that the naïvely empirical method used by the sciences could not carry philosophy very far. But it must be remembered, Ward suggests, that the subject-matter of philosophy is not completely different from the subject-matter of the sciences, for the process of evolution which brought forth the latter also brought forth the instrument by which it should be studied, namely mind. It is because the subject-matter of philosophy and that of the natural sciences were unnaturally separated that philosophy could not keep in touch with experience, and the natural sciences never reveal the synthesis underlying nature, the presence of

which has been suspected and sought for by humanity through the ages.

While common-sense considerations as well as philosophic experience seem to commend Ward's treatment of the problem of the method of philosophy, it is at the same time clear that his view in its turn raises problems of far-reaching importance. There is the first and significant question as to the general suitability of this method for philosophy. Whatever else philosophy may do, the one thing it does seek to do is to arrive at an organised and synthetic view of the odds and ends which make up one's daily experience, and the question is whether the empirical method, which lays so much stress on the existence of the particular and the individual, can be expected to bring one far on the road to greater synthesis than that offered by naive experience. The second question is in some ways a reformulation of the first, only with the emphasis placed on a different aspect: while one is willing to admit that the synthesis attained by philosophy need not be complete nor final, there is one thing which one does demand of the synthesis and that is consistency; and the question is whether the empirical method of the natural sciences can show any really satisfactory consistency to exist between the isolated facts which it discovers on its experimental path. Ward himself admits the two general tests or aims of philosophy which we have mentioned. The philosophic view, he says, need not be complete, but to be satisfying it must be consistent.

The question whether Ward's empiricism is suitable as a method for philosophic procedure raises further problems, some of a general nature, others subsidiary. The more general question, namely whether Ward's theory of the relation between mind and matter, and his view of the place of mind in the universe, explains his use of the empirical

method for metaphysical conclusions, has already been answered. It is clear that the place which one gives to mind in the universe and its relation to non-mind must affect one's use of mind as an instrument by which the secrets of nature can be penetrated. On the other hand it is of course also true, as we have already pointed out, that one has to do with the chicken-and-egg problem at this point. While one demands a metaphysical justification for the method, one cannot but employ the method in seeking for the metaphysical justification, and the very employment of the method presupposes the metaphysical justification. The method does not follow from the metaphysical justification, on the contrary it seems to contain the metaphysical background in itself already, and when the question is asked: from where then does the method originate? the reply is, I think, from the natural positivism which we adopt spontaneously in the course of practical life towards the external environment.¹ Hence Ward's view that philosophy must begin in the middle and work backwards. However, admitting for the moment the difficulty of settling the problem finally as to which comes first, knowledge or method, the fact is that we need both chicken and egg, and the point is that Ward supplied both the chicken and the egg. The further point is that Ward supplied the right kind of egg for the desired chicken: he did not hatch a cygnet from a stork's egg, but his metaphysics justified his use of empiricism as a philosophic method. If mind is limited in its activity empiricism is the only way out. But then Ward must be consequent in his metaphysics and owing to a confusion between planes or contexts of thought—a confusion which we pointed out earlier—this is not always the case. On the one hand Ward persists in speaking of the limitations of mind in speculative activity, insisting

¹ This point is discussed further in ch. vii, pp. 168 ff.

that it should stay close to experience; on the other hand he describes the universe as consisting of mind-monads in his pampsychism. The confusion is between mind used in the individual—or psychological—context and mind on the metaphysical plane. It raises the question whether, if Ward had not fallen into this confusion, he ought not to have recognised either that, since the universe consists of psychical monads, the structure of reality can be apprehended, at least in outline, by a single mind, or, alternatively, that there is non-mind in the universe.

Besides this more general consideration there are various detailed points in connection with Ward's method for philosophy which demand discussion. In describing Ward's empiricism above we pointed out that it stood on two legs: the one leg was the principle that all philosophy should start with experience, the other leg was that philosophy should adhere to experience all the way, and this was made possible by the historic view of the nature of the universe. It is clear, however, that the historic principle, by which the empirical method is given its second leg of support, is itself derived from the presence of the first principle, namely, that of starting with an examination of experience. It was this examination of experience that indicated the presence of the historic principle, and if it had not indicated this principle the second leg of Ward's philosophy might have been entirely different. In other words, on the last analysis Ward's method rests only on one principle: that of starting by a direct study of experience. This consideration makes Ward's position somewhat stronger. The nature of the subject-matter should indicate the method to be pursued by the science, and this is exactly what Ward does. A study of present facts indicates to him the presence of the historic principle in those facts, and he thereupon uses the principle in the further study of

those facts. On the other hand one feels that Ward is treading on somewhat dangerous ground in transforming an empirical into a metaphysical principle. The empirical results of the natural sciences very rarely carry their own proof with them and the newest theory is not necessarily the true one. It is true that Ward tries to justify the exalted status which he gives to the historic principle or the principle of continuity in his philosophy by an appeal to Hegel. He shows that Hegel never solved the problem of the relation of dialectic development to the time-process, and by a skilful emphasis of certain passages suggests that for Hegel, too, the development was really an historic development.¹ In addition to the reference to Hegel Ward mentions Leibniz as the source from which the modern pluralist derives the principle of continuity.² This line of argument somewhat strengthens the case, but it does not materially change the nature of the problem. In the last instance Ward bases his acceptance of the principle on his study of the natural sciences, and the very fact that Hegelians find it difficult to bridge the gulf between dialectic and chronological development would seem to indicate the seriousness of raising a principle of natural science to the metaphysical or ontological status. The general inclination of the student of Ward's work will be, I think, to admit the danger of the practice in general while justifying it in the case of the historic principle. After all we must take risks in philosophy, and the historic principle is fairly well accredited. If, however, the practice were extended unduly—as has been done by naturalism—the implications of the introduction of such foreign principles into metaphysics would probably be more troublesome than the principle valuable.

¹ *The Realm of Ends*, chs. VII and VIII, and pp. 468 ff.

² *Ibid.* p. 54.

IV

The principle of continuity in its turn raises various problems.

It seems to have three sides to it. Ward introduces it by the statement of Leibniz: nature never makes leaps, a principle which in Leibniz was used to justify the explanation of the development of higher forms of life from lower forms. Ward does not believe in the pre-formation view. He uses this principle chiefly as an explanatory principle. 'Nature', however, is a wide term, and while it seems to be continuous in some ways it is manifestly discontinuous in others. Ward has to admit this when he introduces his theory of evolution as epigenesis. The first and most obvious meaning of the principle of continuity is, I think, the conception that that which is continuous is continuous in the sense that the same principle governs all the forms of its being. (For example, in the case of Ward's use of the principle, the conception that development is a development in the same direction, namely from lesser to greater complexity, all along the line, wherever you pick up the chain.) In this sense the principle becomes closely akin to Ward's principle of teleology. This is borne out by various explicit statements. 'The principle of continuity', writes Ward, 'indeed almost forces us to posit orders of a higher intelligence than our own.'¹ In the same vein Ward quotes Alfred Russel Wallace's argument: 'Yet the grand law of "continuity", the last outcome of modern science...cannot surely fail to be true beyond the narrow sphere of our vision, and leave such an infinite chasm between man and the great Mind of the universe. Such a proposition seems...in the highest degree improbable.'² And again Ward writes: 'In support of this bold assump-

¹ *The Realm of Ends*, p. 185.

² *Ibid.* p. 188.

tion' (namely of doing away with the distinction between persons and inert things) 'an appeal is made to the principle of continuity, confirmed as it is by the fact that every advance of knowledge so far has only disclosed simpler forms of life and further analogies between the organic and the inorganic.'¹

Something more than teleology, however, seems to be involved in the principle of continuity. The presence of this principle in the universe seems to imply some form of identity pervading the plurality of things of which the world is made. It is difficult to know whether this identity should be regarded as an identity or continuity of substance, which would make the universe a *plenum*, or whether it should be envisaged as an identity of *quality* present in all being. In view of various passages, and more especially in view of the meaning already attached to the principle, I think the principle should be read to involve both continuity of substance and identity of quality. For the internal purpose to be passed on from the one organ to the succeeding—without a very awkward *actio in distans*, or an occasionalism—there should be continuity of substance. On the other hand, the presence of the internal purposiveness in all the monads or items implies at least some structural quality which must be identical to all for the purpose to be common. This seems to be carried out by Ward's description: 'No infinite gap, no complete diversity, between one monad and another.' The first part of this sentence would appear to imply continuity of substance as well as identity of quality. Thus it appears that the principle of continuity really involves three problems: the problem of teleology, the problem of substance and the problem of structural identity and distinctness of individuality. The second of these, the problem of substance, will be better discussed in connection with Ward's doctrine

¹ *The Realm of Ends*, p. 433.

of pampsychism.¹ The first and third, namely the problem of structural identity and its importance for a teleological evolution, should be discussed in relation to a further important principle in Ward's philosophy, that of epigenesis or creative evolution.

Epigenesis plays a very important role in Ward's attempt to account for things. While there is continuity (of some sort or other) between the lowest and the highest forms of existence Ward believes that the higher forms came into being by some form of creative process. Later forms are not the mere development of earlier forms; on the contrary, they are real 'new things'. To the extent that they are new they are of course *sui generis*. The problem can be stated at once and in various forms, one of which is of more importance at the moment than the others. In its simplest form the problem to which the theory of epigenesis gives rise is this: does not the principle of epigenesis annul the value of the principle of continuity? Ward described the principle of epigenesis as follows: 'According to this later theory each new organism is not an "educt" but a "product", to use Kantian phrases: its parts are in no sense present in the embryo but are gradually organised, one after another in due order as the term epigenesis implies.'² In this statement the jump from the old to the new is not emphasised too much, but it is nevertheless there, even though the newness is only a matter of increased organisation (or, as Aristotle might have said, more 'form'). Elsewhere the difference is more clearly put: '[Epigenesis] implies continual new beginnings, the result of the conflict and co-operation of agents, all of whom, though in varying degrees, act spontaneously or freely.'³

¹ Below, ch. v.

² *The Realm of Ends*, p. 98.

³ *Ibid.* p. 270.

If these beginnings are really new, wherein exactly does the continuity lie? To this question there may be three¹ alternative answers. Firstly, the continuity may be in the continuity of substance. That is, the new product may be structurally and in other ways completely different from any previous forms and be akin to the earlier forms in that it is of the same substance. We have already indicated that this aspect of the problem will be discussed more fully later in connection with pampsychism. At the moment we need only make one remark. If the continuity between the lower and the higher form is nothing but one of identity of substance it is to be doubted whether the principle of continuity can bear the burden which Ward imposes upon it, for it then tells us very little of the nature of things and can hardly be used as an explanatory principle. Indeed, it reduces in the last analysis to the old substance theory and does not in effect bring us much further than that theory brought our philosophic ancestors. Secondly, the continuity may be a continuity of quality or structure, and on this interpretation the newly developed form of the epigenetic process will have the same structure or qualities as the previous or lower forms, or will at least have structural qualities which embody the same principles as the lower forms. Now if these newer structural forms are so closely akin to the earlier forms as to be explicable in terms of their relation to the earlier forms it is difficult to see how they can be 'new' and the creations of 'new beginnings', and then the word 'epigenesis' seems unnecessary as a description of this type of evolution. If on the other hand the higher forms are really 'new' it is difficult to see where the continuity comes in. That leaves the third

¹ Professor Arthur O. Lovejoy distinguishes five different senses of the word 'emergence' (Sixth International Congress of Philosophy). The above three meanings are sufficient for our argument.

alternative interpretation by which the continuity is regarded as being an identity of principle which runs through all being (for example, as we said earlier, the principle in Ward that the development is a development in an identical direction, that from lesser to greater complexity). On this view the principle is primarily a heuristic principle by means of which higher can be explained in terms of lower, and lower in terms of higher. The usefulness of this view of the principle of continuity is seriously threatened by the introduction of an element of creative evolution. The effect must be greater than the cause on a theory of epigenetic development such as Ward describes, and it is therefore clear that the cause cannot be regarded as a sufficient explanation of the effect. It may, of course, be argued that the indication of the cause is very rarely a sufficient explanation of the effect. I think it may be said that the causal explanation is intellectually satisfactory to the extent that an identity is felt to be present in the cause and in the effect. Now it is exactly this element of identity which seems to be lacking in the process of epigenetic causality. Not only is the effect more than the cause, it also is *sui generis* different from the cause (as, for example, mind is different from matter). Of course Ward is here faced with the hoary problem of identity in difference. It cannot be said that his attempt to make discontinuity—for that is what novelty is—compatible with continuity has been a shining success.¹

V

In our discussion so far various questions have been raised, some of which have been answered while others are still left standing over. There is the question of what exactly Ward

¹ For further criticism of the principle of continuity and for Ward's reply, cf. *The Realm of Ends*, pp. 483 ff.

meant when he spoke of 'experience'. This question is important, for we saw that Ward held that philosophy must stay close to experience, which makes it necessary to know what this experience is. This question was partly answered; partly it led to the next question as to the place of mind in the universe. This question was also answered, and we saw that the individual mind, manifesting itself as individual mental activity, was put on a level with all phenomena of experience: in fact, it was given a very humble position in the light of the history of philosophy. This question, taken together with the former question as to the nature of the experience which is to guide the path of the philosopher, led to a still further problem: has Ward the right to give a metaphysical or ontological status to principles which are of a purely empirical origin, such as, for example, the principle of continuity? We saw reason to justify this practice in a philosophy such as Ward's, and a discussion of this principle and the problems which it contains brought us to express some serious doubts as to the ability of this principle to sustain the burden which is imposed on it. One of the problems connected with this principle still remains over: whether the principle of continuity should be interpreted as implying the doctrine of identity of substance.

This problem we have already encountered in another form. We saw that Ward criticised absolutism and naturalism because these philosophies did not offer a satisfactory synthesis of the facts of experience in their ultimate view of reality as an absolute spirit or a mechanical universe; more particularly because they offered no satisfactory account of the dualism between matter and mind and the apparent gulfs between the mechanical and the teleological aspects of nature, nor of the gulfs between the organic and the inorganic spheres in nature.

These are essentially formulations of the problem of the identity of being, and we can now turn to the last of these formulations. The task for Ward is to offer a better solution of the apparent jumps in nature than either absolutism or naturalism was able to do.

CHAPTER V

PAMPSYCHISM

Ward avoids the dualism between matter and mind by the view that the dualism is only apparent and that, in the last instance, everything is mind. Also, the gulf between the inorganic and the organic is overcome by calling the inorganic 'stratified' or 'undeveloped mind', while the apparent difference between the mechanical and teleological spheres in nature is solved by making purposiveness present to the whole.

To come to some coherent solution of these apparent dualisms in the world of everyday experience involves the philosophic thinker in no mean task, and the solution at which he arrives will inevitably have important implications affecting the whole of his system through and through. To the lay mind the contradiction between these forms of existence is at first not apparent, and when at last it comes to realise the opposition, the tendency is to accept it docilely as being in the nature of things, as in the philosophy of Mr Squeers: 'She's a rum 'un is Natur', said Mr Squeers, 'Natur' is more easier conceived than described.'¹ It is only when the implications of the dualism have been pointed out that common sense begins to be really troubled. Occasionalism has ever been a difficult pill to swallow for all minds except those already completely perverted by philosophic thinking; and the idea of intermittent acts of creation, and of classes of beings separated from each other in watertight compartments, has proved hardly less unpopular to a genera-

¹ Dickens, *Nicholas Nickleby*.

tion brought up in theories of continuous evolution and functional psychology. Ward approaches these problems with the background of a modern, even though the pampsychistic solution, at which he arrives, dates back to Leibniz and earlier. The question is whether common sense does not jib as much at pampsychism as it does at occasionalism or a *deus ex machina* creationism.

The examination of Ward's position on this group of problems involves two points. Firstly, there is the question why Ward decided to throw his weight on the side of mind, the organic and teleology, instead of on the side of matter; and then there is the further question as to how exactly Ward succeeds in bridging the gulfs and how he explains matter in terms of mind, the dead in terms of the living and the purely mechanical as being permeated by teleology.

I

Ward derives his arguments in favour of a spiritual interpretation of the universe from an examination of the concepts by which science tries to interpret the universe, and from his analysis of the use of the concept of law in nature.

(1) There are especially two difficulties in the way of the mechanical theory of nature which tries to assimilate the biological to the chemical: (*a*) in the inanimate world there is a downward trend in the expenditure of energy; there is a tendency present all through to pass to rest and equilibrium. In the animate world, on the other hand, there is noticeable the steadily growing complexity of organisation and composition which entails the storage of an increasing amount of energy. (*b*) In certain spheres of the animate world, and more especially in the psychological world, there is also clearly noticeable an increasing direction and purposiveness

of the energy used, and Ward asks whether biological evolution will not become clearer if this teleological element is regarded as being present also in it.¹

(2) An analysis of the implications underlying the conception of the struggle for existence carries out this view. A non-teleological or fortuitous adaptation does, it is true, account for some natural phenomena, as, for example, the leopard's skin, the tiger's spots, and the tawny mane of the lion. On the other hand, Darwin himself admits that natural selection does not fully account for the phenomena of adaptation and expressly says that it is aided by 'the inherited effects of the use and disuse of parts'. This admission, says Ward, is tantamount to admitting a teleological factor in evolution, because it presupposes conscious, or at least, sentient activity which is directed to the satisfaction of needs, appetites and desires; it implies an impulse to self-maintenance. A teleological element appears, on Ward's admission, to be present all through the biological world.²

(3) An examination of the theory of psycho-physical parallelism reveals various fatally weak spots in it. In this theory the attempt is made to explain the relation between body and mind as a relation of mutually independent parallelism by which the interaction between body and mind is only apparent and the two have nothing to do with each other in fact. The result of this view is that scientific men give the primacy to the material side, which leads to the unfortunate conclusion that volition is merely a sensation. On this view the concepts of life and sensation offer difficulties. And in any case to imagine a constant parallelism plus a complete separation is a very unstable position. When it is held that consciousness is merely epiphenomenal, Ward points out,

¹ *Naturalism and Agnosticism*, I, pp. 272-7.

² *Ibid.* I, pp. 277-302.

we find that this theory cannot account for the fact of activity either on the side of the physical or the psychical. Thus the attempts to explain mind in terms of mechanism, or to make it subordinate to mechanism, fail.¹

(4) Ward concludes his examination of naturalistic theories of philosophy by an analysis of the attempt to describe the cause-effect relation in mathematical terms. From a merely quantitative point of view it may be true that the cause equals the effect, but such a view is partial. It is when the qualitative aspect of the cause-effect relation is taken into consideration that the internal nature both of the cause and of the effect must also be considered, and then the time-sequence also becomes important. The mechanical view implies a reversibility of the relation between the terms, and this is untrue, for there is no known process by which dissipated energy can be made to return to its source. Ward's examination shows him that there is more in physical causation than can be expressed in dynamical equation. The physicist himself has realised this, for he has himself to haul in an *ad hoc* element called motion to complete the account of the phenomena which causation describes. Ward concludes this line of thought by the suggestion that, from a theoretical point of view, the supposition that all is mind is as reasonable as the supposition that all is matter.²

(5) Finally, Ward examines the implications underlying the conception of natural law and indicates what he calls the teleological nature of this conception. Law, he holds, is a hypothesis, it is an epistemological condition of, rather than a fact of, experience. Achieving knowledge is a teleological activity in so far as it has a purpose to fulfil, namely, that of increasing the chances of preservation of the organism, and

¹ *Naturalism and Agnosticism*, chs. XI and XII.

² *Ibid.* ch. XIII, II, pp. 78-93.

in aiming at this purpose the procedure of mind is to develop a hypothesis which it then finds verified, or otherwise, in nature. In the case of law, however, the hypothesis which the mind develops is not any haphazard theory dependent on a cursory examination of the facts. On the contrary, the hypothesis of law in nature is an epistemological condition flowing from the constitution of the mind and it is of a part with mind because, wherever there is law, mind can control and adapt itself to the phenomena of nature. The mind is constitutionally unable to develop a theory of eternal chaos in nature.¹

Even when one admits a certain bias towards spiritualism these arguments of Ward carry weight and it is necessary to comment only on the last argument, that the conception of natural law is an epistemological condition for the understanding of nature, rather than a fact of nature. The question occurs whether the tenets of Ward's philosophic system need involve him in this 'hypothesis' view of the concept of law in nature. We will remember that experience, which is the source of knowledge, implies two factors, the subjective and the objective, and it implies them not as foreign or opposed to each other, but as organically co-operating members of a single whole. Indeed, objective experience is but an extension of subjective experience and is of a piece with subjective experience. Ward points out that the dualism between mind and matter arises because a false distinction is made between subjective experience, as the subject-matter of psychology, and objective experience, as the subject-matter of the sciences. Elsewhere, Ward insists on the interaction of 'subject' with 'object' and holds that psychology cannot be defined with reference to a special subject-matter. Ward lays emphasis on the oneness or identity of the subject with the

¹ *Naturalism and Agnosticism*, ch. xviii.

object, and the question is whether he is being consistent in holding a 'hypothesis' theory of perception and regarding the discovery of law in nature as an epistemological condition of knowledge rather than the apprehension of an objectively existing relation. Ward wants to avoid the assimilation of the ego to the non-ego, that is, the priority of nature over mind, and so he holds what he calls the daring position of Kant that the intellect makes nature, though it does not create it.¹ Yet he might have avoided the theory of the imposition of law on nature without sacrificing his general position, for idealism is not incompatible with realism.² A consideration of Ward's theory of monads carries out this view. Against Leibniz, Ward held that monads 'interact' or perceive the nature of each other. In other words, an act of direct perception is admitted right in the heart of Ward's system and the question arises: why not admit an act of apprehension by the mind of laws in the universe, instead of adopting the Kantian, and even pragmatic theory, that the mind tries out the law-hypothesis and, presumably, if it fits it is true?

With the exception of this last argument, the implications of which go beyond a mere analysis of the concepts used by scientists, and involve an idealistic substructure to give it validity, the arguments offered by Ward in favour of a spiritualistic interpretation of nature are pertinent and reveal a clear insight into the problems of the relation between science and philosophy.

Ward then proceeds to apply his spiritualistic tenets to his particular problems. From the fact that mind finds that it can interpret nature in terms of law, Ward infers, firstly, that the conception of natural law involves teleology; and

¹ *Naturalism and Agnosticism*, II, p. 242.

² Cf. ch. VI below.

secondly, that the spiritual and the teleological underlie nature and that the material and the mechanical are not concepts fundamental to the nature of things. Natural law is teleological, says Ward, inasmuch, firstly, as it is hypothetical and every hypothesis is a means to an end, a theoretical instrument that may or may not work; and secondly, inasmuch as the hypothesis is that nature will conform to the conditions of our intelligence and our intelligence is by its nature teleological. After this step the conclusion is obvious. If nature will conform to the conditions of human intelligence there must be intelligence in nature. Qualitatively, therefore, nature is one, in so far as it is permeated by intelligence or mind or spirituality. Thus Ward comes to call this part of his philosophy Spiritualistic Monism.

For our purpose we need to follow Ward's exposition of the idealistic position one step farther. At the very end of his lectures on *Naturalism and Agnosticism*, in the third last paragraph, he throws out a suggestion, which is as yet only a suggestion, but which is followed out in his later work *The Realm of Ends*, and which gives us an indication of the way in which he hopes to solve the problems which we formulated at the beginning of this chapter. 'Why then,' he asks,¹ 'if law and order are only intelligible as the outcome of intelligence, may we not regard each individual subject, everything that is anything for itself and in itself, as a living law, or, if you will, as an active essence or character, interacting in its own peculiar manner with other subjects equally determinate?'

As a theory of knowledge idealism has its points; but there is more in philosophy than theory of knowledge, and it is to be doubted whether idealism appears as plausible in ontology as it does in epistemology. Now the problems in connection with which Ward criticised naturalism and to

¹ *Naturalism and Agnosticism*, II, p. 280.

which he has to offer more acceptable solutions are, in the first instance, problems of ontology or the being and nature of things, apart from the problem of their knowability as things. These problems, as we formulated them at the beginning of this chapter, are those of the dualism between matter and mind, the gulf between the inorganic and the organic and the obvious difference between the mechanical and the teleological spheres in nature. To solve these problems Ward has to develop a speculative theory of the substance of things which would have a place for his idealistic theory of knowledge in it. The theory he develops is pampsychism.

II

Pampsychism is the name for that philosophic view which holds that spirit is in the whole of nature down to its lowest forms and even in those forms which appear to be inanimate. In his arguments for mind in nature Ward comes to the conclusion that there is nothing in nature which is incompatible with a spiritualistic view,¹ and this conclusion must be regarded as the first argument which leads him to a pampsychistic philosophy. A second consideration takes Ward a step farther to the position that the world does not consist of a unity in which all separateness disappears, but that the universe is made up of a plurality of things. What can neither do nor suffer, says Ward, what is nothing for itself, is truly nothing at all; and he follows Spinoza in the belief that every individual thing, so far as in it lies, endeavours to persist in its own being. Thus nature resolves itself into a plurality of conative individual beings. Following Leibniz, Ward gives these mental beings the name of monads and he tries to find out what they are like in their simple or 'bare' form. The

¹ *The Realm of Ends*, pp. 20 ff.

simplest form of mental or psychical life Ward believes to be a consciousness or sentiency—as yet vague and dull and undifferentiated—of a something. At the bottom of the scale the consciousnesses of all the monads are probably so vague and undifferentiated that they are all more or less alike. Development consists in the increasing clarity in the consciousness of the monad. With increasing clearness of vision and also of contents of consciousness would come a progressive differentiation of monads, for since each monad was separate from all the others it could not perceive things in exactly the same way as the others, otherwise it would not be different. So we can describe the monad as a psychical thing whose being consists in nothing but a state of consciousness and which reflects its surroundings in its own consciousness from a slightly different angle from that of its neighbours. Although Ward uses the same word as Leibniz for these monads or psychical atoms he does not agree completely with Leibniz's description of their nature. For Leibniz, each monad is cut off from its environment and its neighbours, so that there is no active interaction and communication between them. Ward thinks that, in order to explain higher forms of life the monads must be enabled to interact with each other and with their environment, and they must also have appetites or desires which they want to satisfy. Otherwise he finds it impossible to explain the facts of striving and attainment which are necessary to account for evolution and the progressive realisation of ideals. While Leibniz believed that the monads had no will but agglomerated according to a pre-established plan, Ward's theory of freedom makes him see the monads as ultimately free and striving mental beings.

With these as the simplest type of being Ward has to explain all the phenomena—and more especially the dualism

—of the fully developed universe as we know it. He introduces two further conceptions to help him on his way. Development, or the formation of higher organisms, consists of the clustering together of monads in various groups of greater or lesser complexity, and ultimately the monad with the superior power of perception becomes the dominant monad and thus the leading factor or 'soul' of the organisation. Secondly, there are two types of relations which can exist between monads. The relation of a dominant monad to its subordinate monads Ward calls internal or functional or vital,¹ and it is a much closer relationship than that of a dominant monad to the dominant monad of another organism, which Ward calls external.

The problem for Ward then is to show how, on the pampsychistic theory, matter can be shown to be not what we think it is, but really disguised mind; that the inorganic is an illusion and that everything is filled with mental life; and that what we have regarded as mechanical is pervaded by purposiveness. With a pampsychistic theory behind it, the principle of continuity really becomes a principle of identity. The immediate problem is whether it can bear the burden imposed on it.

The first and less important problem, then, is how the illusion of matter, inanimateness and mechanicalness is created if everything is really mind, purposeful and alive. The common sense of the man-in-the-street jibs at endowing anything as ordinary as a stone with mental qualities, and it is only after long training and much meditation that the scientist would consider the possibility of plants having souls or of a purpose steering the course of things. Ward realises this problem: 'But now the problem has to be faced of interpreting the inanimate world in like fashion', he writes.

¹ *The Realm of Ends*, pp. 257 f.

‘There we can discern, *prima facie* at all events, no signs of active striving or selective preference or progressive organisation: there we find no unique individuals, no competing purposes to be adjusted, no tentative efforts to be followed out at length by success. First and last, everywhere and always, there seems to be only fixity and uniformity.’¹

The simple monad, it will be remembered, consists essentially of a more or less blurred awareness of its immediate environment and of a vague striving or conation. Development and progress consist in the increasing clearness of the awareness of the environment and therefore in a power of selection of its environment and so in the better combination of groups of monads to form higher organisations. All through nature one can detect an increasing complexity and therewith an increasing efficiency. One also notices cases of arrested development both in the higher forms of nature and in the lower. Not only some societies but also some forms of biological life, like the Lamp-Shell, have remained unaltered through the centuries. It is as if there has been a cessation in the increase of organisation and therefore no increase in control of environment, and thus the organisation presents a static or dead appearance. This, thinks Ward, must also have taken place lower down in the scale and the appearance of deadness or mere matter he believes is created by the static relation between the monads which go to make up the apparently inactive object. The being of the monad is dependent on its perception of its environment, and where this perception remains static in an agglomeration of monads their relationship to one another is also static, and thus the illusion of death and the inorganic is given. If it is looked at in another way Ward’s argument has more force. The statistical scientist takes the action of

¹ *The Realm of Ends*, pp. 159 ff.

phenomena in large quantities and then finds that, taken thus *en masse*, they obey certain rules which can be expressed in mathematical formulae. As a statistician he ignores the individual entity or atom in the situation and by taking this bird's-eye view is able to find an appearance of fixity and uniformity in nature and society. It is thus, says Ward, that we find the appearance of uniformity or stationariness or inanimateness in the lower realms of nature. If we could examine the situation more closely we would, on the contrary, detect individuality and separateness. That is, matter is essentially appearance; fundamentally everything is striving mind.¹

This position of Ward is all the more interesting in view of the formulation in 1926 by Heisenberg of his principle of indeterminacy, which, superficially viewed, appears to offer scientific verification for Ward's theory of the illusion of mechanism and the ultimate freedom of things. There is an unfortunate tendency abroad to give the hypotheses and generalisations of science a philosophic dress, and then call them metaphysical principles. The dangers of this procedure were touched upon when we discussed the philosophic status of the principle of continuity in the philosophy of Ward, and the same procedure has been adopted with Heisenberg's principle of indeterminacy. By this principle Heisenberg drew attention to the difficulty or impossibility of exact scientific measurement in the realms of microscopic physics and pointed out that it was impossible to state accurately *both* the position and the momentum of an electronic particle, for in both cases there would necessarily be a certain miscalculation, and the product of the miscalculation is a constant (that is, the more accurately the one was expressed the less accurate would be the expression of the other). General J. C. Smuts followed up this clue in his

¹ *The Realm of Ends*, ch. III.

lecture on 'Some Recent Scientific Advances in their Bearing on Philosophy',¹ and remarks: 'Necessity, predetermination of physical happening, may be an illusion created by the mass, but the physical fact below it is the freedom or indetermination of the individual unit. That is to-day as indisputable a truth as any in the whole range of science.' He then goes on to state that scientific predication is of the same order as the expectation of an insurance company whose calculations are likewise based on the law of averages and probability; and that thus *indeterminacy* is the chief characteristic of things.

The implications involved in this position have been criticised from various quarters, amongst others by Bertrand Russell and Professor R. F. A. Hoernlé. Russell brings up a point pertinent to our discussion:² 'Those who maintain that modern electronic theory has exposed a fundamental indeterminacy in nature by...inverting the roles of primary and secondary isolates are...faced with the necessity of explaining away the determinism that has actually been established on the larger scale. To this end it is asserted—and at present it is little more than a mere assertion—that the apparent large-scale determinism is an illusion that arises from the *fact* that all objects are composed of an enormous aggregate of small particles which statistically, on the average, act in this definite way. The difficulties into which one is led by this assertion are really colossal and have never been faced by those who profess to believe it.'

Professor Hoernlé³ has limited himself to the presentation

¹ *Our Changing World View: Ten Lectures* (University of the Witwatersrand Press, Johannesburg, 1932).

² *The Universe of Science*, p. 165.

³ *Old Truths and New Discoveries, in Our Changing World View*, pp. 158 ff.

of the matter and the conclusions of General Smuts. Referring to the argument that the laws of nature depend on a mode of reasoning similar to that employed by an insurance company, Professor Hoernlé argues that 'the appeal to statistics does not help to show...that facts dealt with statistically are indeterminate, that is, uncaused facts'. 'We certainly can, if we like, describe the fact that over a number of years the average mortality in the population of a given area works out at say, 60 per thousand, as a "mass-effect". But this mass-effect has been discovered by the counting up of individual instances and establishing a ratio between the number of the population and the number of deaths within successive periods of twelve months. We certainly, on this basis, can calculate the probability of any one individual out of a random sample of 1000 of that population dying within the next year, but just as certainly we do not assume that any one of the 60 deaths per thousand has happened without sufficient cause, or that, if the given individual does actually die within the year, his death will have no cause. In short, we are not dealing with uncaused events at all, that is, with events "uncaused" in the sense of being "free" and "essentially indeterminate". The point is that inferences seem to have been drawn from this principle that appear to outrun the facts of the case. Because no reason is found why a particular atom disintegrates it is inferred that there is no reason, and therefore nature at this level must be indeterministic. Then, using this conclusion as a premiss, it is concluded that "one particular implication which it seems difficult to avoid or deny is the involvement of what we call mind or knowledge in purely physical facts".'¹

Superficially regarded, Heisenberg's principle, which

¹ *Old Truths and New Discoveries, in Our Changing World View*, p. 160.

General Smuts develops, seems to come very close to Ward's theory of bare monads. Yet Ward moves on a different level. It is true that Ward raises the principle of continuity, which is a principle 'empirically' discovered, to philosophic or metaphysical status, but he is very careful to justify this by his theory of knowledge, as we have seen. Where the conclusions for the all-pervasiveness of freedom which rest on Heisenberg's principle are drawn from a physical observation of the absence (or apparent absence) of cause in certain specific or particular cases, Ward's pampsychism rests on ethical considerations of the fact of freedom, on logical analyses which showed him the contradictions inherent in the concepts used by science and the implications of these contradictions, and on epistemological considerations. The conclusions which General Smuts and others draw from Heisenberg's principle of indeterminacy are and can be nothing more than generalisations based on empirically ascertained 'facts'. Ward's theory rests on considerations which are essentially metaphysical. Further, Ward's theory of the pervasiveness of mind in nature leads him to a theory, not of indeterminacy and absence of cause at the root of things, but of self-determinacy and an internal causation according to the nature of the monad.

On the other hand, Russell's remarks are still pertinent and Ward is faced with the problem of explaining the determinism which actually has been established on the larger scale of things. It is to be doubted whether a theory of arrested development due to an unsuccessful agglomeration of monads will account for the mathematical and other characteristics of the determinism which shows itself in nature.

III

When one comes to a more direct review of pampsychism as a philosophic doctrine it should be remembered that in the last instance pampsychism involves the empirically discovered principle of continuity, and the best method of approaching the problem is by an examination of this principle. I believe examination makes the following points clear: (1) that the principle of continuity fails as an explanatory principle by which the present or the future can be 'explained' or accounted for in any intellectually satisfactory way by reference to the past. (2) That the principle of continuity does not offer the necessary principle of identity of substance by which the gulfs in nature which Ward had to explain away can be explained away: (*a*) because pampsychism is unsatisfactory on its own account, and (*b*) because the teleology which is involved in the principle of continuity refers back to a God who, by his self-limitation, re-introduces all the gulfs into the universe which Ward tries to avoid by the principle of continuity and pampsychism.

(1) We have already indicated above¹ the reasons why the principle of continuity cannot serve as a principle of explanation, and we need only summarise the position here. We pointed out that it was clear that there was a certain contradiction between the principle of continuity and the principle of epigenesis by which new things are created. On account of epigenesis, all that can be said is that the higher forms *need* the lower forms, and not that the lower forms *explain* the higher forms. It might of course be argued that new entities are not really created and that if we knew enough about matter we would see that the apparently higher forms are only new combinations of old groupings or structures, and

¹ Ch. iv, pp. 90 ff.

that it is really new *values* that are created.¹ But the reply remains the same: the new value, it is admitted, involves a new structure and the value can only be accounted for by the newness of the structure or organisation, that is, by the principle which causes the new structure to be formed, that is, by epigenesis. This comes down to saying that the introduction of epigenesis has largely destroyed the validity of the 'historic method' which Ward employs when he analyses the psycho-physical relation, where it is writ large, and then extends it down to the relations between 'bare monads'. On his own showing so many new values are created in the course of the development from the lowest to the present stage that this method loses all philosophic value.

(2) (a) The real meaning and the somewhat surprising claims of the pampsychistic doctrine have been stated clearly by Professor Hoernlé.² On this view 'consciousness must be supposed to be co-extensive with the realms of living beings; indeed, every living thing must not only have a mind, but a mind sufficiently developed to know in anticipation what it wants. This requires foresight, and foresight, in turn, requires, if not constructive reasoning, at least memory—the recollection of what in previous experience has followed from similar situations. But to distribute mentality of this high order—and nothing else will really do the work of intelligent guidance—throughout the whole realm of life is a speculative venture which has indeed been made by such eminent thinkers as Samuel Butler and James Ward, but against which there are at least two strong arguments. The first is that the hypothesis far outruns the evidence, even in

¹ Cf. R. F. A. Hoernlé, *Idealism as a Philosophy* (Doran, 1927), p. 134.

² *Matter, Life, Mind and God* (Methuen and Co.), p. 118.

animals, let alone in plants. The other is that in man, where intelligent control *is* a factor, a great part of the routine of life is carried on "automatically"—often without consciousness of what is going on and certainly without explicit purpose. Neither of these arguments is indeed absolutely conclusive,' Professor Hoernlé goes on, 'but together they form a strong presumption against the hypothesis that the organisation and behaviour of a living being are due to its own thought and will.'

In its general statement of a criticism against pampsychism Professor Hoernlé's argument is perfectly sound. Only in the emphasis on the presence, not only of mind but of a highly developed form of mind, is his case perhaps somewhat overstated. It is true that consciousness of a sort must be supposed to be co-extensive with the realm of living beings in pampsychism. This is a criticism that Bradley brought against Ward and Ward met it by holding, quite rightly, that the consciousness in elementary forms of being need be nothing more than a momentary consciousness or *sentientcy*. Nor is it quite clear why pampsychism should involve the advanced forms of psychical activity that we call *foresight* and memory in elementary experience, excepting in a very elementary form. A correct reaction on the part of a monad to the monads of the environment may lead to a structure or organisation which is higher than the previous state. This organisation may, it is true, form the structure for what at a very much later stage appears as 'memory' as we know it, but it is not clear to me why developed memory should be involved in the possibility of the first reaction.

The natural unwillingness of common sense to accept pampsychism even as a guiding principle or working hypothesis has been best put into philosophic terms by Bosanquet with the statement 'we must perceive as actual the distinction

which gives life its content' and in the argument which he develops on this point.¹ The account which Ward gives of the illusions of matter, the mechanical and the inorganic is hardly satisfactory. Not only is the description of the cause of the illusion, that it is due to arrested development, incomplete in not offering a sufficient account for the qualities of matter as we perceive them, but Ward's theory does not account for the illusion as illusion. If the perceiving of matter as matter is really an illusion then this illusion is one of the most 'real' things in experience and to account for it in terms of illusion seems hardly fair to facts. When an illusion exhibits positive and active qualities which influence the course of things it seems to be something more than an illusion. While we need not agree with the criticism of L. T. Hobhouse, 'where everything is spiritual the spiritual loses all distinctive significance', it must be admitted that the term 'spirit' threatens to disappear under the burden which Ward's pampsychism has given it to bear.

(b) Ward believes that pampsychism makes place for teleology and indeed offers an explanation of teleology.² The scientist becomes aware of a teleological principle in nature only after he has brought the numerous isolated examples of his subject-matter together and has obtained a bird's-eye view over a fair portion of the field. It is only after a survey of this nature that he is in a position to compare various parts of the field of science and thus become aware of what appears to be some sort of ascending scale in nature. It does appear, however, that contemporary science is admitting this fact to an ever-increasing extent, so that the adherence to teleology or mechanism is not any more a matter of throwing up a penny: heads, mechanism; tails, teleology. Thus the

¹ *Principle of Individuality and Value*, p. 240.

² Cf. *Contemporary British Philosophy*, Second Series, pp. 41 f.

biologist Driesch has been led to formulate a theory of entelechies having will and primary knowledge and teleology to assist him to account for this phenomenon of purposiveness in nature. The question at the moment is not whether Driesch's views are accepted by biologists generally; the point is that Driesch, like other scientists, admits the fact of teleology in nature.¹

The further point is whether the implications of this admission have been realised by scientists and philosophers generally, and that is that at the very least teleology involves minds or a mind in or behind nature, as a planner or designer. This point has, I think, been made abundantly clear both by Professor Stout in his recent volume of Gifford lectures² and by Mr Broad.³

An attempt indeed has been made by Professor Henderson to account for teleology in such a way as to leave design and God out. I owe the following summary of Professor Henderson's argument to Professor Hoernlé:⁴ 'When we compare his *Order of Nature* with, say, Prout's volume in the *Bridgewater Treatises*, we perceive that his argument is in principle that of the *Bridgewater Treatises*—but with the science brought up to date and with God left out.' Professor Henderson was struck by the fact of the economy of nature and argues that it is because natural phenomena have been viewed statically and not in their natural context as part of a larger whole that scientists have missed the element of 'pattern' in it. On the last analysis this 'pattern' consists of a correlation between elements of

¹ Many other names could of course be mentioned, from Claude Bernard to Professor Eddington and Sir James Jeans.

² *Mind and Matter*, 1, pp. 137 ff.

³ *Mind and its Place in Nature* (Kegan Paul), pp. 81 ff.

⁴ *Matter, Life, Mind and God*, p. 124.

hydrogen, oxygen and carbon with the similar elements in the environment, and it is because these fundamental constituents of life 'prepare' themselves for their environment that life is possible. Henderson's argument doubtless has the value that it drives the analysis of the detailed mechanism through which teleology works farther than most and, by avoiding the *ad hoc* entelechy of Driesch, gives experimental science a wider field. On the other hand, one feels that he has left out God because he has not gone far enough, and that if he examined the implications of his 'preparation' view of teleology he would still find minds or a mind somewhere. The very use of the words 'preparation' and 'correlation' indicate this.

Professor Stout's argument that teleology implies mind in some ways bears a strong resemblance to the argument by which Ward infers teleology from the fact of 'laws of nature'. 'I conclude', writes Professor Stout, at the conclusion of his analysis of the animism of common sense,¹ 'that not only does Common Sense interpret teleological order as involving some counterpart of our subjective life but that science itself, in so far as it uses teleological conceptions in its own work, is, directly or indirectly, committed to some form of animism.' If there were not teleology in nature, both Stout and Ward say in effect, there could be no physical science. Stout then pushes his argument further and gives us a glimpse of the possibilities of his second volume of Gifford lectures when he not only shows that teleological order is inexplicable apart from mental agency, but also seems to urge the design argument in favour of God behind teleology.² Ward builds his arguments for theism on a somewhat wider scaffolding although this is one of the chief planks in it.

¹ Stout, *Matter and Mind*, p. 42.

² *Ibid.* pp. 138, 149.

Mr Broad goes further and is more definite.¹ For him the real problem of the organism as a natural phenomenon is that it is a teleological system which yet seems to come into being without any design.² So he moves the burden of the problem of teleological systems to the question of origins, for it is only when we look at mechanism and teleology from the standpoint of origins that we really begin to see that the two types of explanation are inconsistent with each other.³ Every system which is both teleological and mechanical is an artificial system; and it is clear that no organisms are ever made by artificial machines, while artificial machines have been made by organisms, so that the notion of organism or teleology has priority to that of mechanism. So Mr Broad writes: 'It is true, but not the whole truth, to say that in the history of every system which is positively known to be both teleological and mechanistic (that is, of every artificial machine) we come at length to an organism; to a design in this mind; and to the deliberate arrangement of matter in view of this end. And this seems to be an essential for the production of a teleological system out of non-teleological materials.'⁴ Thus Broad finds strengthened a conclusion at which he had arrived a few pages previously, that if organisms be the result of design their designers may fairly be called Gods and then either men are Gods in disguise, or there are superhuman beings who make organisms.⁵ So he comes to his conclusion: 'Thus, in the end, we shall be brought to one organism at least, viz. God's, which presumably has not risen out of non-living matter either spontaneously or by design.'

Now there are three ways in which a God could be present in a universe and the implications involved in each of these

¹ *Mind and Its Place in Nature*, ch. 11.

² *Ibid.* p. 84.

³ *Ibid.* p. 87.

⁴ *Ibid.* p. 88.

⁵ *Ibid.* p. 85.

ways seem to contradict Ward's doctrine, and its principles of continuity, teleology and epigenesis. (*a*) There could be a deistic relation between God and the universe. Not only does this view contradict Ward's theism directly but it is difficult to account for the creation of novelties, and for freedom, on such a view. (*b*) There could be an emergent or occasionalistic relation by which we could imagine that God periodically jumps into world affairs and gives things a push in the right direction (for example, by creating a new organisation of monads, or by giving new values to old organisations and structures). But Ward will not admit any form of occasionalism. He holds that epigenesis comes not from outside but from within the universe itself. (*c*) Or God could be in the world but self-limited. There are two alternative kinds of self-limitation: (i) the self-limitation of God may be regarded as his withdrawal, after he had set the universe going, to a state of deism with only occasional interference, when the above objections will hold; (ii) or the self-limitation of God may be regarded as a real self-limitation of God in the world, that is, the bringing into existence, or the making possible, of the other, or non-God, in the world. On this view undevelopedness and arrested development must be accounted for by the self-limitation of God, on account of which there is absent the working of teleology.

This view leads to the restoration in all its hardness of the dualism between mind and matter, the organic and the inorganic and the mechanical and the teleological which Ward wanted to overcome, in the heart of things. Matter, the inorganic and the mechanical are caused by arrested development in the coming-together or agglomeration of monads, due to erroneous perception. Ward himself saw that his monads partook of a dual nature because his God was limited in his activity, so that part of the nature of the monad is

non-Godness or non-teleological. Thus he writes: 'God's creatures are creators; the pluralist maintains: their "nature" is partly his doing, partly their own: he assigns the talents, they use or misuse them.'¹ Now if the monads making up a piece of matter are of such a nature that the drive of teleology does not function in them, then, to all intents and purposes they are solely matter and mechanical and they will have to be treated as such. To speak of them as psychical is meaningless and to regard them as the arrested development of spiritual entities does not even have the advantage of a good working hypothesis. The mechanical, the inorganic and the inanimate facts of experience may not be quite as they 'appear' to us, but Ward himself has to admit a fundamental distinction between that part of being the nature of which is God's doing, and that part of nature which is not God's doing. The self-limitation of God, and the consequent absence of teleology in certain regions of the universe, have destroyed for all practical purposes the monism which the theory of pampsychism tried to introduce.

Ward adopted pampsychism for two reasons chiefly. Firstly, he wanted a unity or a monism in nature, as that is intellectually more satisfactory than a view of nature which allows gulfs and qualitative difference; and, secondly, because he felt that he could explain purposiveness in nature better on a theory of pampsychism than on any other theory. After the dualism which he has to introduce into the being of his monad his pampsychism serves neither purpose: it cannot supply a qualitative monism nor does it offer any guarantee of teleology in nature.

There is one further point that should be made in this connection. Ward's 'statistical' argument, by which he

¹ *The Realm of Ends*, p. 315. Ward here touches on a point the importance of which he does not seem to have appreciated fully.

tries to account for the appearance of inanimateness and regularity of nature, is probably one of the weakest links in his chain and involves him in implications which he apparently never suspected. When he writes: 'The fixity and regularity which the physicist ascertains, avowedly pertain only to matter as devoid of individuality—to the *materia secunda* which Leibniz referred to as mere aggregation',¹ he would appear to be basing his argument on something more than the statistical view which he himself explains. What he does not see is that Leibniz's theory of *materia secunda* implicates him in a theory of *confused perceptions* both of monads amongst themselves and on the part of onlookers to these monads. 'Strictly speaking,' wrote Leibniz,² '*materia prima* is not a substance, but something incomplete. And *materia secunda* (as for instance, the organic body) is not a substance, but for a different reason: namely, because it is a collection of several substances, like a pond full of fish, or a flock of sheep, and consequently it is what is called *unum per accidens*: in a word, a phenomenon. A real substance (such as an animal) is composed of an immaterial soul and an organic body; and it is the combination of these two that is called *unum per se*.' *Materia secunda* is a relationship of monads which is imperfectly conceived by us, and which may vary from time to time. Leibniz's illustration of the pond full of fish or the flock of sheep shows the similarity of Ward's statistical argument to his theory of *materia secunda* and confused perceptions. Leibniz's theory of confused perceptions is notoriously unsatisfactory.³ Ward fails to explain—and this point may be

¹ *The Realm of Ends*, p. 67.

² *Lettre à Remond* (cf. Latta, pp. 96 ff.).

³ Cf. Norman Kemp Smith, *Studies in Cartesian Philosophy* (Macmillan and Co. 1902), pp. 167–80 especially; also Russell, *The Philosophy of Leibniz* (Cambridge University Press).

brought against Leibniz also—how the obscurity of perception brings about statistical regularity in the conduct of the percipients mutually.

Thus it appears that the qualitative monism which Ward introduced into his philosophy by means of his doctrine of pampsychism is not very successful. To have any philosophic value it involves the principle of continuity and the usefulness of this principle is effectively destroyed by the self-limitation of God. As a consequence of this self-limitation the dualisms in nature, which Ward hoped to overcome by his spiritualistic monism, are re-introduced into the very heart of things. To speak of a monism when there is not only a theoretic dualism caused by the self-limitation of God, but where this dualism makes itself felt in experience as the difference between stones and minds, is to risk robbing monism of its meaning.

CHAPTER VI

PLURALISM

It was seen from the examination of Ward's criticism of the philosophies of naturalism and absolutism that he laid on himself the burden of explaining away what appear to ordinary experience to be obvious gulfs in the world, those between the teleological and the mechanical aspects of the universe, between the organic and the inorganic spheres, and between mind and matter. Further, Ward set himself the task, by his theory of what philosophy ought to be, to account for the universe in such a way that the final picture would not contradict experience too obviously. We have examined Ward's attempts to come to grips with the former problem and we have hardly found his theory of qualitative monism and the principle of continuity, which supports it, satisfactory; and when he attempts to explain things in terms of his pansychistic doctrine he seems to come very near the disappearance of reality of which he accused Bradley.

But there is another aspect to the question of the nature of things and this leads us to the second problem formulated above. The universe of experience has not only its qualitative, but also its quantitative characteristics. Qualitatively Ward tries to account for things in terms of a spiritual monism. If he wants to be true to his own view of what philosophy is he ought to be a pluralist for, superficially viewed at least, our experience of the universe is that it consists of a large number of quantitatively separate things. Our immediate problem then is to see whether Ward succeeds in keeping his universe pluralistic while at the same time

reducing the apparent chaos to a measure of order. To appreciate this problem fully it ought to be placed in a wider context, and we ought to ask: what does Ward sacrifice to a greater degree: coherency in order to safeguard pluralism; or his pluralism in order to retain coherency? This question inevitably leads to the further problem: the place of God in Ward's universe.

I

Ward nowhere brings his arguments in favour of pluralism as the starting-point for philosophy together, and it is only from a knowledge of his whole work that we can infer what the relative weight of the considerations were which led him to this point of view. Ward quotes Nicholas of Cusa's statement, 'there is nothing in the universe that does not enjoy a certain singularity, which is to be found in no other being',¹ and Leibniz's well-known passage, 'there are no two indiscernible individuals'. This, however, is by the way, and a consideration which appears to have had a greater influence on Ward was the ethical aspect of the argument. The argument is never given great emphasis in its ethical form. A man's philosophy is, however, to a great extent the product of his experience, and when one keeps the history of Ward's philosophic development in mind and the emphasis he put on freedom of thought one cannot but conclude that he was fully aware of the ethical implications of this doctrine.² Ward himself lays more emphasis on the conclusions which he makes from his criticism of physical realism, naturalism and

¹ *The Realm of Ends*, p. 64.

² One comes to this conclusion in spite of Ward's own statement: 'I will say for myself that "a laudable desire to save spontaneity and freedom" was not the factor that led me to pluralism' (*ibid.* p. 501).

absolutism. He points out that there was a recoil from these philosophies already in his time and one of the characteristics of the new 'personalistic' philosophy is the emphasis it puts on the realness of the individual.¹ '...the twentieth century', writes Ward, 'opens with the attempt to work out the idealistic interpretation not in the old way as essentially a devolution of the One, but rather—as far as possible—to represent it as an evolution of the Many. In England, in America, in France, even in Germany—once the stronghold of Absolutism—systems of pluralism, more or less pronounced, are rife.'² Yet it is probably Ward's scientific training which more than anything else forced him into a pluralistic position. '...in our speculation about the universe', he says, 'we should never let go the concrete that we envisage',³ and later in the same course of lectures: 'Keeping strictly to the concrete and historical, everywhere we find variety, diversity....'⁴ In 1910 he discusses the wider implications of this empirical attitude: 'It is certain then that the pluralist's standpoint is the more primitive: is it also in itself the more fundamental?'⁵ And in a lecture to the Aristotelian Society in 1919 he says: 'Our knowledge is acquired apart from any speculation about the Absolute, speculation that first becomes urgent as the limitations and difficulties of the pluralism from which we begin make themselves felt.'⁶ It is this realistic bent of mind which seems, after all, to have influenced the course of Ward's thought more than anything else, and it is probably this attitude of mind which makes Ward a pluralist—in so far as he is a pluralist.

Having decided that the world, *prima facie*, at least,

¹ *The Realm of Ends*, ch. III.

² *Ibid.* p. 49.

³ *Naturalism and Agnosticism*, I, p. 180.

⁴ *Ibid.* II, p. 89.

⁵ *The Realm of Ends*, p. 432.

⁶ *Essays in Philosophy*, p. 298.

consists of a plurality of things, Ward is faced directly with two problems: the one is as to the nature of the things which make up the plurality; and the other is the problem of the nature of the relations between each of these items and its next-door neighbours. The two questions are closely related and the one includes the other. If they were not closely related so that the nature of any one item, or atom or monad, had nothing to do with the relation between it and its environment, pluralism would be so rampant that there would be no philosophising. There could then only be an occasion-alistic or a deistic theology. If pluralism does not wish to fall into the sterility of a Leibnizian pre-established harmony it must admit 'internal' relations, that is, relations of such a kind that the nature and being of the relation is closely connected with the nature of the terms which it relates in such a way that, if either of the terms changes, the relation is also affected. Ward realises this and so argues that the fundamental units or items of which the universe is built up cannot be regarded as atoms in the sense of inanimate characterless things which exercise no control over themselves nor their environment. The least that these items must have is their own behaviour, and therefore he calls them monads. Monads are endowed with two qualities: they can 'perceive' or 'become aware of' their environment in such a way as to respond to it or react on it; and they have a life or an energy or a spontaneity of their own by which they react in their relation to each other.

When one keeps Ward's principle of continuity in mind it will be clear how he arrives at this conception. He takes the self as we know it at the level of self-consciousness as the analogy from which to argue. He then tries to analyse the conception of self to its minimum characteristics, and these he finds to be twofold: on the one hand there is behaviour

directed towards self-conservation; on the other hand there is behaviour directed towards self-realisation. Now in a universe which is not deistic, that is, in which the items or monads are the sources of their own behaviour, these two aims of behaviour must inevitably bring the monad into contact with its environment. So we have an answer to the second question as to the nature of the relations between monads. The monads tend to come into contact with each other in such a way that each monad is not only preserved but also has the opportunity for development of itself. In other words, there is an ever-increasing complexity and intricacy in the organisation of monads. In this way Ward believes that we can account for new things or epigenesis.

When Ward describes his monadology in his chapter on Pluralism¹ he makes the remark that it is the pluralism of Leibniz that is usually taken as the type of modern pluralistic theories and he then goes on to show wherein he differs from Leibniz. Yet when one reads Leibniz with the modern pluralists in mind one is inclined to come to the conclusion that Leibniz was no real pluralist. Leibniz's doctrine contains two opposing strains, a rationalism and an empiricism. His rationalism leads him to regard the monad or the self as a self-contained notion from an analysis of which all past, present and future experiences of the self can be deduced.²

¹ *The Realm of Ends*, ch. III.

² Cf. Leibniz, Lettre à Arnauld, 13 mai, 1686: 'En effet, en consultant la notion que j'ai de toute proposition véritable, je trouve que tout prédicat nécessaire ou contingent, passé, présent ou futur, est compris dans la notion du sujet, et je n'en demande pas davantage....' And again in a letter to Arnauld of 14 July, 1686: 'Toujours, dans toute proposition affirmative, véritable, nécessaire ou contingente, universelle ou singulière, la notion du prédicat est compris en quelque façon dans celle du sujet.... Or, je ne demande pas davantage de liaison ici que celle qui se trouve *a parte rei* entre les termes d'une proposition

When, however, we are unable to discover the predicate by our analysis of the notion of the subject we are forced to abandon the purely rational point of view and to appeal to the principle of sufficient reason. The appeal to this principle immediately brings us down from the world of rationalism to the empirical universe and explanation in terms of 'efficient' causes.¹ From the rationalistic point of view Leibniz's monads are eternally complete, spaceless and timeless and containing their whole being in themselves. From the empirical point of view—the point of view of time and space—each monad is a developing and growing thing which comes to an ever fuller fruition under the urge of the tendency to the good.

Ward, it is hardly necessary to point out at this stage, denies the possibility of the former point of view and limits himself to the latter or empirical approach to the nature of the monads and their relations.² Yet his philosophy is not therefore a philosophy of eternal difference and no identity,

véritable, et ce n'est que dans ce sens que je dis que la notion de la substance individuelle enferme tous ses événements et toutes ses dénominations, mêmes celles qu'on appelle vulgairement extrinsèques, c'est-à-dire qui ne lui appartiennent qu'en vertu de la connexion générale des choses et de ce qu'elle exprime tout l'univers à sa manière "puisque'il faut toujours qu'il y ait quelque fondement de la connexion des termes d'une proposition, qui se doit trouver dans leurs notions". C'est là mon grand principe...il s'ensuit que toute substance individuelle exprime l'univers tout entier à sa manière et sous un certain rapport, ou pour ainsi dire suivant le point de vue dont elle le regarde: et que son état suivant est une suite (quoique libre ou bien contingente) de son état précédent, comme s'il n'y avait que Dieu et elle au monde; ainsi, chaque substance individuelle ou être complet est comme un monde à part, indépendant de toute autre chose que de Dieu.'

¹ Cf. Norman Kemp Smith, *Studies in Cartesian Philosophy* (Macmillan and Co.), p. 167.

² Cf. *The Realm of Ends*, p. 468; Supplementary Note by Ward on 'The Temporal and the Eternal'.

eternal change and no self. Like Leibniz Ward believes in the identical unity of the self and, like Leibniz, he insists that there are two opposites in the world, a unity and a variety. Leibniz believed that this unity could only be discovered in the *cogito*, for it is only in the self that we discover a unity that we know to be one throughout the variety of its states. Ward brings out this point in the distinction which he makes between the pure and the empirical ego.¹ Here Leibniz and Ward are on the same ground. Both base their conclusions on an empirical view of inner experience; both are spiritualists.

This, however, comes down to saying that Leibniz has for the moment abandoned his stringent rationalism. It is only because he occasionally abandons his rationalism that he can at all be considered the type of modern pluralism. From the rationalistic point of view all the experience of the self can be deduced from the notion of the self. From this follows that all relations are inherent qualities and that the thoughts of the self are the results solely and only of the nature of the soul. This entails not only that thought is not born of interaction between the monad and its environment, but that all relations are pre-established, being in the logical nature of the monad. This leads Leibniz to the hypothesis of the pre-established harmony, that to every experience in the soul there must exist a corresponding experience in every other. The theology involved in this view of the universe would seem to reduce it to such a mechanical unity that pluralism, applied to this scheme, loses its significance.

This theory and the synthesis which it offers Ward rejects completely. That is, more particularly, he rejects the idea of monads which do not interact, for his empirical standpoint leads him to see that selves do interact and that selves are

¹ *Psychological Principles*, ch. 15.

influenced by their environment; that is, Ward rejects the theory of a pre-established harmony, and also, therefore, Leibniz's theology. On Ward's theory monads interact on two principles, perception and appetition. Ward's pluralism, like all modern pluralism, is thus an empirical pluralism, and since Leibniz is, popularly at least, especially known for the rationalism of his pluralism rather than for the spiritual aspects of it, it is perhaps misleading to say that the Leibnizian monadology is the type of modern pluralistic theories. While it is true that Leibniz uses the empirical experience of the spiritual unity of the self as analogy on which to construct his monads¹—a procedure in which Ward follows him—his theory of pluralism originates from the purely logical argument of the nature of the notion.

Still further consideration will show the difference between Leibniz and modern pluralism. Leibniz and Ward are both pampsychists, but their grounds for this position differ somewhat. The pampsychism of Leibniz appears to be based on rational analysis. He first shows that the notion of the individual must be all-comprehensive and then that spirit is the only form of unity in variety known to us; thereafter he identifies the individual and the spirit.² Ward arrives at his pampsychism along somewhat different lines. Setting out from a critical examination of the theories of natural science he discovers that the concept of teleology is fundamental in the universe, and since only the spiritual can be teleological the universe must be spiritual. He strengthens this argument by a principle which he borrows from Leibniz and which he

¹ Cf. Leibniz, lettre à Arnauld, 13 mai, 1686: 'Je demeure d'accord que, pour juger de la notion d'une substance individuelle, il est bon de consulter celle que j'ai de moi-même, comme il faut consulter la notion spécifique de la sphère pour juger de ses propriétés.'

² Norman Kemp Smith, *Studies in Cartesian Philosophy*, p. 168.

puts to an even wider variety of uses than Leibniz, that is, the principle of continuity.

Yet if there seems to be little in common between the pluralism of Leibniz and Ward, and while the latter can hardly be said to be a development of the former, the two philosophers are faced with the problem with which all pluralism is faced, namely, the question of external and internal relations—to put the problem in a specific form—or, more generally, the question of the final synthesis of the universe. In accordance with the two streams in his philosophy Leibniz has two ways of ensuring an ultimate synthesis for his pluralism. Regarded purely rationally there is always the pre-established harmony which ensures coherence in the multiplicity.¹ From the spiritualistic point of view he speaks of a tendency towards the good urging the development of each monad in accordance with a general principle.² It is clear that the principle of the tendency towards the good does not do away with the need of the principle of pre-established harmony in Leibniz's philosophy. In a letter to Arnauld

¹ In philosophy internal relations are sometimes identified with necessary relations. In an argument with Arnauld Leibniz makes the point that his relations are internal but not necessary: 'Je crois même que cela nous ouvrira une voie de conciliation, car j'imagine que M. Arnauld n'a eu de la répugnance à accorder cette proposition que parce qu'il a pris la liaison que je soutiens pour intrinsèque et nécessaire en même temps, et moi je la tiens intrinsèque, mais nullement nécessaire; car je me suis assez expliqué maintenant qu'elle est fondée sur des décrets et des actes libres. Je n'entends point d'autre connexion du sujet avec le prédicat que celle qu'il y a dans les vérités les plus contingentes, c'est-à-dire qu'il y a toujours quelque chose à concevoir dans le sujet, qui sert à rendre raison pourquoi ce prédicat ou événement lui appartient, ou pourquoi cela est arrivé plutôt que non. Mais ces raisons des vérités contingentes inclinent sans nécessiter' (lettre à Arnauld, 13 mai, 1686).

² *Théodicée*, I, pp. 7-13.

Leibniz points out the mistake that Arnauld makes when he identifies intrinsic or internal relations with 'necessary' relations and holds that there is place for contingency in a universe of internal relations. Ward is fully aware of this problem and agrees with Leibniz, and we will have to see to what extent he justifies his view. He claims that it is the especial merit of pampsychism that it offers an account of internal relations.¹

II

The word 'pluralism' covers a multitude of meanings, and it will be necessary to describe the term in Ward's philosophy much more closely than has hitherto been done if we want to form a judgment of the success or otherwise of Ward's attempt to bring order and coherency and system into his pluralistic universe. It has already been seen that Ward is no rationalist of Leibnizian stamp; indeed, we saw that it was hardly fair to call the Leibnizian pluralism the 'type' of modern pluralism, unless undue stress is laid on the spiritualistic strain in Leibniz's philosophy which in part contradicts his rationalism. Ward's empiricism was a sufficient guarantee against too much Leibniz. The question is whether his empiricism does not lead him to the extremes of pluralism associated with the philosophy of pragmatism, as William James and Professor Schiller believed, or whether Professor Radhakrishnan is right in holding that, on a final analysis, Ward belongs to the fold of absolute idealism.

If there should be any doubt as to Ward's idealism the first chapter of his *Psychological Principles* should dispel it. The subject-matter of psychology, he points out there, is the whole choir of heaven and the furniture of earth treated from one aspect or point of view, namely the aspect of their

¹ *Contemporary British Philosophy*, II, p. 41.

being in the individual's mind. In other words, the world for me is what is in my mind; Ward agrees with Schopenhauer: *Die Welt ist meine Vorstellung*. From this point of view Leibniz, too, was an idealist and at the same time a pluralist, for on this view there will be as many worlds as there are thinkers. Leibniz, however, was also solipsist in so far as he excluded the interaction of monads and made the thoughts of each monad the result of its own nature. Ward comes very close to solipsism but avoids it by his theory of monads with windows which interact, so that the content of a monad's consciousness is not the result of its isolated nature, but springs from the interaction of the monad on the environment. The pluralism neither of Ward nor of Leibniz rests on their idealism. Leibniz's pluralism is based on his rationalism and as such has a mind-dependent existence. Ward is realist and he endows his monads with an objective existence. His principle of individuality has an ontological being and the individuals or monads themselves have so much real existence that they are able to influence their environment in a concrete way. From the point of view of theory of knowledge Ward is idealist, from the point of view of ontology he is realist. He cannot very well be anything else with a theory of interaction and his principle of individuality. On this point Ward carries out a suggestion which he himself made many years earlier when he wrote in 1870: 'A realistic idealism may yet prove the solution of philosophy.'¹

Everybody has had the experience, however, that a thing which on the face of it looks one thing, after a little examination and thought appears to be another thing. The problem is whether the *prima facie* realism of Ward is real

¹ *Essays in Philosophy*, Memoir, p. 37. On the whole question of the meaning of Idealism, cf. *inter alia*, A. C. Ewing, *Idealism*, especially ch. 1.

realism, and in view of the fact that his realism is more than tinged with idealism, to what extent his *prima facie* pluralism which comes from his realism is a real pluralism. When we put the problem in this way we are really confusing two aspects of it. We are confusing the theory-of-knowledge aspect of it with the ontological aspect. From the theory of knowledge aspect the question is whether Ward consistently continues to regard his world from the analytic standpoint and whether he does not ultimately find his principle of explanation in a kind of God in which and through which all things are known, and being known, have their being. This is, in general, the line of criticism that Professor Radhakrishnan brings against Ward. From the ontological aspect we have to do with the belief that the things we observe are really independent of us, and the question then is to what extent Ward's monads are independent entities after he has introduced his theistic connections into the world. James and Schiller believe that he is, or ought to have been, an out and out pluralist and a pragmatist. These two problems are obviously two formulations of what at bottom is the same question. It is necessary for the sake of clearness, however, to keep them separate. For the moment we are especially concerned with the second of these problems.

The form of pluralism which is particularly associated with the school of pragmatism was developed to suit a philosophy and a philosophic method called radical empiricism, and it shows all the characteristics of empirical and the more ultra-realistic philosophies. Whereas the milder type of realism—what we may call philosophic realism—generally tended towards an empirical method of approach, and therefore inevitably towards a pluralism, and believed in the existence of things independent of a knowing of them, it yet stressed the importance of internal relations and as often as

not ended in a spiritualism which affirmed the priority of mind to physical reality. The empiricism of pragmatism stands at the other end of the line of realistic philosophies, and not only starts in pluralism, like most empirical philosophies, but lays especial stress on facts and on the mutual independence of facts. When absolute idealism stresses the unity of the world and the fact of implication, radical empiricism accuses it of sacrificing reality to unity and offering a picture of the universe in which the various distinguishing landmarks have disappeared. Radical empiricism stresses the fact of individuality and plurality and separateness in the world. While it admits the presence of internal or (as it calls them) conjunctive relations in experience, it insists on the fact of external and accidental relations. The present state of affairs, says the radical empiricist, is by no means the inevitable result of some past state, for even with the past as it is, the present could have been quite different from what it is.

The radical empiricist stresses a further factor which he believes he sees in experience and which upsets the system and logical unity which the absolutist would like to find in it. It is impossible to infer the future from the present and the past, not only because of the presence of external relations which are not implicative, but because there are creative agents in the universe. Things are separate and some of the things which are separate can create chains of events of which the only source is their own nature. This comes down to the position of Ward and Leibniz that there may be intrinsic relations which are not necessary. Nature is unique and completely individual, and real novelties can be created in the universe. Contingency and indeterminism are very much facts in the universe of the radical empiricist. Now if there are things which are not known by implication or inference from other things one cannot have logical 'certainty'

or proofs for these events. This, says the radical empiricist, is exactly what happens in daily life, for we are certain of hundreds of things not because we have logical grounds for our certainty, but for entirely different reasons. Logic plays a very small part in our daily experience, and the factor which is important, but which is often left out of account, is the will. In spite of what the intellectualists may say, the will plays a great part in the process by which we get knowledge. What happens when we are not sure what to do in a situation is that we choose one or other course of action which interests us. When we have chosen this course of action the will fixes our attention on it till the idea supervenes over all other ideas and becomes a belief. There is not a conclusion to truth but a will to truth.¹ If the idea is successful when put into practice it is also true. Ideas can be justified or true not because of their logical structure only but on account of the service which they render to the practical interests of the person.

Pragmatism and radical empiricism represent the extreme wing of a philosophic movement which set in towards the end of the previous century and of which James Ward's works form an integral part. As we have seen, Ward criticises absolute idealism for the unreal view which it gives of reality, in his psychology he stresses the role of interest, attention and the will and holds a functional theory of mind, and in his metaphysics he sets out from pluralism and stresses the facts of novelties and contingencies in the world. The question is whether the empirical method, the use of which Ward advocates, and the pluralism from which he sets out lead him into the pragmatic theory of knowledge and the real pluralism of which he has been accused.² Contingency

¹ Cf. *inter alia*, Perry, *Philosophy of the Recent Past*, p. 188.

² Cf. *The Realm of Ends*, pp. 481, 501.

and freedom, which is another aspect of the question of necessary and accidental relations, mark one of the places where the philosopher comes at the parting of the ways between absolutism and pluralism.

From the point of view of man Ward is unwilling to admit pure chance or absolute contingency. 'Though contingent for others', he writes,¹ 'a man's acts are not contingent for himself: if they were we should have to admit absolute contingency or chance.' Thus a man's actions are not necessary in the sense of being predetermined, but they are necessary in the sense of being intrinsically related to his own nature. Man has the power to choose whether to act or not to act, but when he acts he does so according to his own nature. Ward makes man's freedom of choice possible by his theory of the self-limitation of God. God limited his omnipotence by giving some of his causal power to his creatures. This involves the further self-limitation of his omniscience, for if God knew what his creatures were going to create their creation must be determined by his fore-knowledge and they could hardly be considered free individuals. They could of course still be considered free in so far as their creative acts would be in accord with their own nature; only the acts of creation would not be contingent, because, since God was omniscient, they would be predetermined by his omniscience, that is, by his nature. It is clear that contingency involves the problem of knowledge when it is viewed from the point of view of God, while from the point of view of the individual the fact that there is no fore-knowledge is no guarantee of real contingency.

From the point of view of knowing there are always novelties for Ward. Our general concepts are not like a pair of handcuffs on a body of facts once vagrant but now bound

¹ *The Realm of Ends*, p. 455.

together for ever; and we must be ever ready for changing additions as experience progresses. His whole position is perhaps most aptly summarised by a quotation he gives of a comparison by Leibniz of contingent and necessary truths with commensurable and incommensurable numbers. "For as with commensurable numbers", says Leibniz, "resolution into a common measure is possible, so with necessary truths a demonstration or reduction to identical truths can be found. But just as surd ratios...lead to an interminable series, so contingent truths involve an analysis that is infinite, and possible to God alone." This incommensurability of the necessary and the contingent, the scientific and the historical, Ward continues, 'answers to the difference between validity and reality and shows, at the same time, that "reality is richer than thought".'¹ For James as for Ward the relation of mind to its object is conative and dynamic, so that from the point of view of knowing there are always novelties. But there are novelties also from the point of view of being, for each individual is a creative agent. Ward makes the distinction between an occasional cause where the causal relation is postulated between two terms because of the regular concomitance of the terms, and efficient cause which leads us to say that an event has a cause on one occurrence. The former gives us the notion of law; the latter can be determined in one instance if the one instance be our own act. Thus Kant is quoted 'life means the capacity to act or change according to an internal principle'—means, says Ward, the presence of an efficient cause.² Each individual is the creator of a new series, so that nature is not only *natura naturata* but *natura naturans*, that is, nature in the process of making itself.

¹ *Naturalism and Agnosticism*, II, p. 282.

² *The Realm of Ends*, p. 75.

Yet Ward makes a point of distinguishing his view of contingency from the absolute contingency or tychism of Peirce and James. The contingent element which is introduced into history by the fact that individuals are creative agents is by no means identical with a principle of pure chance in history. Pure chance has no place for motivation while the act of the individual agent is determined by his own nature which forms the motive for the act.¹ Ward held, against Peirce, that the original state of the world already had a certain definiteness and thus the actually realised state of the world excluded the possibility of realisation of a large number of otherwise possible states.² Here again pure chance is limited.³

Thus contingency is limited in two ways. Firstly, the range of possibilities is limited by the actual primitive state of the world which cut out the realisation of a large number of possibilities. Secondly, contingency is limited by the nature of the individual as being 'partly God's doing, partly their own'.⁴ But there is a third way in which the free play of absolute contingency is limited. 'Through all', says Ward, 'a steady tendency is apparent to replace this mere contingency by a definite progression; the further we advance, the more we see of guidance and direction.'⁵ He believes that the universe is tending towards the gradual realisation of the co-operative commonwealth. The problem, then, is to what extent these factors, and especially the substitution of 'progress' for contingency, eliminate contingency and make it merely apparent and not real. If ultimately the world must be good—and Ward believes that there is a steady progression towards the good on empirical verification—it means lessened freedom of choice for the

¹ *The Realm of Ends*, p. 76.

³ *Ibid.* p. 502.

⁴ *Ibid.* p. 315.

² *Ibid.* pp. 70-1.

⁵ *Ibid.* p. 434.

later individuals. While the earlier individuals had complete freedom of choice, the choice and deeds of the succeeding unfortunates would be limited and influenced by the nature of the choice of the preceding individuals. As the ideal is being reached there must be a tightening of the screws to curtail the free play of the parts, or, to change the metaphor, as the gateway of the final aim is approached there must be a narrowing of the way.

Or, to put what is fundamentally the same difficulty in a different way: in order to avoid the extreme dualism between matter and mind, or the external and the internal world, Ward posits a relation of sympathetic *rapport*—on the analogy of society—between his monads. Now this condition of *rapport* does not hold indiscriminately among them, for it is possible for wrong combinations of monads to agglomerate, as is shown by the fact of stultified psychical development. Certain monads belong to certain other monads. This view comes uncomfortably near to the pre-established harmony theory which Ward says he rejects. In society, too, an organisation grows up under the direction of a directing mind. So long as there is any specification there must be limitation of freedom, and Ward has introduced no little specification and direction into his universe in the idea of the orientation towards the good with the assurance of the final supremacy of the good, and with the idea of discriminate instead of purely contingent combinations of monads.

Another way of interpreting Ward so as to lessen the emphasis on the role of the pre-established harmony which persists in creeping into this part of his philosophy might be as follows: each individual has the free choice (free in the sense of choice according to his own nature) of partaking or not in the evolution to the good. This would reduce any pre-established influence to co-ordination of effort to a

minimum: to the minimum which makes all the monads to be 'of a kind', as is implied already in their being psychically *en rapport*. But on this interpretation Ward's evidence for the supremacy of the good would be reduced to nothing and would put us in the position of James's mere faith. We seem to stand at alternatives: either we can have evidence for the ultimate supremacy of the good accompanied by a logical conviction of lessened freedom; or the conviction of full freedom with no possibility of any knowledge about the end of the universe. The discussion of freedom in the metaphysics of James Ward explains the psychological fact of our consciousness of freedom but gives no account of real freedom. As long as Ward puts trust in his empirical evidence for the ultimate supremacy of the good he has not shaken himself quite free from the influence of a pre-established harmony which, in his philosophy, takes the form of a pre-established tendency towards a pre-established mode of co-ordination. External relations appear to be merely apparent phases of evolution, the real thing is the internal relations. Even worse: intrinsic and necessary relations threaten to become identified under the urge to the good. So far from joining up with the contingency of pluralism Ward is here on his way to monism.

III

The tendency away from extreme pluralism towards a monism is even more apparent in Ward's theory of knowledge. 'I am not and never have been a pluralist', writes Ward¹ in reply to a critic and goes on to protest that he neither starts nor ends outside the realm of minds. 'We must start', he again insists,² 'where alone reflexion on

¹ *The Realm of Ends*, p. 495.

² *Ibid.* p. 497.

experience can arise, at the level of self-consciousness.' In the *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*¹ he writes of 'speculation which first becomes urgent as the limitations and difficulties of the pluralism from which we begin make themselves felt'. Passages such as these should have warned pragmatists that Ward was neither radical empiricist nor pluralist in his own mind. For us the point is to discover to what degree of monism the limitations of pluralism and his speculative attempts to find a place for pluralism in the universe lead him. This is, after all, the final form of the problem of the relation between science and philosophy. There can be no doubt about it that Ward was no pragmatist. The question is whether he does not land himself in an even more unsatisfactory monism. The question becomes all the more serious if we keep in mind Ward's view of the limitations of individual mind in the exercise of the speculative function. Ward's theory of knowledge with its psychological bias is much better suited to pluralism than to monism.

'But beginning thus with the many', writes Ward in a summary of his position,² 'we are led both on theoretical and on practical grounds to conceive a more fundamental standpoint than this of the Many, namely that of the One that would furnish an ontological unity for their varied ends in being...the one as ultimate source of their being and ultimate end of their ends.' Ward criticises Lotze's 'cheap and easy monism'. Because the Many interact, Lotze said in effect, they are all One. Thus $M = \phi(ABR)$, where M stands for the universe and ϕ for the functional relation of the Reals A , B and R . Ward points out that they are also at the same time Many and the equation gives Lotze no right

¹ 1919, published in *Essays in Philosophy*, p. 298.

² *The Realm of Ends*, p. 442.

to give priority either to the One or to the Many.¹ Discussing what he calls the upper and lower limits of pluralism, he says: 'So then it would seem that as the unattainable upper limit of pluralism points towards an absolute and unconditioned Being transcending the Many, so the unattainable lower limit points towards an indeterminate Being, an *ἄπειρον* that affords no ground for the discrimination of individuals at all.'

One remark should be made in this connection. There is nothing in the pure concept of continuity, or in our experience of it, which could prevent us from postulating an infinite decrease in the complexity of the monad, or, alternatively, an infinite increase. The pluralist Renouvier recognised this and it was his rejection of infinity that landed him into pragmatism. On account of his rejection of infinity he found he had to deny the infinity of God and of nature and thus had to substitute a theory of creation.² Ward does not mention the problems of infinity in this part of his discussion and this omission detracts from the value of his argument.

In order to overcome the difficulties and the limitations involved in the pluralistic position, Ward developed a theory of Theism of which Professor Radhakrishnan contended that it brought Ward back into the absolutism which he had thought to discard. Ward did not regard his theism as an *ad hoc* theory which was more or less superficially stuck on to pluralism in order to complete it. The pluralist, says Ward,³ is led to theism by the principle of continuity. According to this principle he has to assume a hierarchy of intelligences and thus is led to the conception of the highest

¹ *The Realm of Ends*, p. 224.

² Renouvier, *Traité de logique générale et de logique formelle*, première partie; cf. Seailles, *La Philosophie de Charles Renouvier*, ch. 11; Brunschvicg, *Les Étapes de la philosophie mathématique*, ch. xv.

³ *The Realm of Ends*, pp. 435-6.

intelligence, God. Further, the idea of the unity of the world is an idea of the reason, as Kant said, and it is when we have lived long and thought deeply that the idea of the One or the Absolute first dawns.¹ The unity of theism is therefore in and of experience and the world, even though it becomes clear only at a late stage of development and then is not an object of experience but the outcome of speculation. 'We approach theism then as promising to complete pluralism,' he writes, 'not as threatening to abolish it, as providing theoretically more unity in the ground of the world, and practically a higher and fuller unity in its meaning and end.'²

This so-called completion of pluralism by theism involves, according to Professor Radhakrishnan,³ the absorption of pluralism into absolutism. It is true, as Ward points out, that there is an element in the individual which baffles scientific description, an irrational surd or mystery which cannot be expressed in scientific terms, but this, says Radhakrishnan, does not mean that it is contingent or foreign to the orderliness of the universe or has not a law of its own being. Individuality is not contingency nor is law mere sameness, and it is a narrow conception of the self which opposes self to the world, making it *sui generis* and holding that no laws apply to it. The point that Professor Radhakrishnan makes seems valid. Ward based his principle of individuality on the monads, and the difference of perception among the monads. For him the difference between monads and that which constitutes their separateness is just this difference in the mode of approach to or of partaking of the total experience. As soon as two monads had the same experience, that is, approached the universe from exactly the same angle, there would no longer be two monads but only

¹ *The Realm of Ends*, p. 432.

² *Ibid.* p. 437.

³ *The Reign of Religion in Contemporary Philosophy*, pp. 122 ff.

one. The question is whether this difference of approach justifies us in completely separating monads, as the radical empiricist does, or whether the apparent separation is not rather a case of distinction. It is after all the same experience of which all partake and in which all have their being. Although the law of the nature of each monad is its own, yet these laws have their identity in the total experience. Difference of angle of approach, which is after all what the monad's individuality comes down to, cannot mean utter foreignness of being, that is, real plurality.

Professor Radhakrishnan states: 'The paradise is (by Ward) pushed into the past, and not beheld as a vision of the future. Man is born free, though everywhere he is in chains. Only Ward tells us that the chains are of his own forging if that is any consolation.' Finally, Ward reaches the position of the absolutist when he quotes Bosanquet.¹ Bosanquet writes: 'The difficulty of defining the best life does not trouble us, because we rely throughout on the fundamental logic of human nature *qua* rational. We think ourselves no more called upon to specify in advance what will be the details of the life which satisfies an intelligent being as such, than we are called upon to specify in advance what will be the details of the knowledge which satisfies an intelligent being as such. Wherever a human being touches practice, as wherever he touches theory, we find him driven on by his intolerance of contradictions towards shaping his life as a whole.'² 'Reason', Ward declares, 'makes man master of his fate and though slowly, yet surely, urges him on towards the accomplishment of her perfect work.'

It is quite possible that Ward would have admitted, with a few reservations, all the points that Radhakrishnan makes.

¹ *The Realm of Ends*, p. 136.

² Bosanquet, *The Philosophical Theory of the State* (1910), p. 182.

Indeed, it is possible that he might have said, with a patient sigh at various points: 'But I said so myself.' As we have seen, Ward expressly said that he was no pluralist. So at this point we are able to answer one of the questions we put above.¹ Ward is no pragmatist, intentionally or unintentionally, either in his theory of contingency or in respect of his pluralism and his theory of knowledge. Our further reply is that while Ward is idealist he is also realist, for idealism and realism do not exclude each other necessarily. Ward holds that reality is of the nature of mind, and in so far he is idealist; but he does not hold that things have existence by being in mind. Things have a real, objective, mind-independent existence at least from our point of view, and this is realism. The combination of these two views we can call spiritualism. Ward's realism is thus a real realism but his pluralism is no real pluralism.

Yet if this conclusion is correct it is to be doubted whether Ward's claim that 'internal relations' are not to be identified with 'necessary' relations will hold. We saw above that Ward agreed with Leibniz as against Arnauld that intrinsic relations need not be necessary relations and that he believed that it was the especial merit of pampsychism that it gives an account of internal relations which permit contingency.² It now appears, however, that the psychical monads have their being in and through an Experience of which they partake, and that the development of this Experience is their development, and that this development is foredoomed to success. It is clear that all the properties of internal relations which are also necessary relations are present in this situation.

¹ P. 141.

² Cf. pp. 131-2 above, and *Contemporary British Philosophy*, II, pp. 41 ff.

IV

If this analysis of the theistic—or, as we may now say, absolutistic—elements in Ward's philosophy is correct, and if Ward really meant what he said when he averred that he was no pluralist, he is faced with some exceedingly difficult problems. The first question is, what is the status of Ward's pluralism in view of his theism and absolutism? Is there really such a thing as pluralism or is the plurality of things merely an appearance, the result of a partial view of things and in effect a distortion of reality, and therefore to be rejected as firmly by philosophy as was naturalism? This is one form which the problem takes for the student of Ward at this point and this is perhaps the most general formulation of it. But there are other aspects of it also.

'The true method for philosophy', we wrote earlier when summarising Ward's view,¹ 'is to begin by studying the discrete facts of experience and, keeping the fallibility of thought as it has been demonstrated both by the failure of absolutistic systems in the past and by recent psychological research in view, not to let our conclusions lead us too far away from experience.' Thought is helpful and guides the thinker to real understanding only when it is curtailed in its activity and is used to show relations between concrete particulars. The fact that the mind is able to classify things in a certain order is not yet sufficient guarantee to believe that that order is the order of the universe. 'By no effort of thought', writes Lotze,² Ward's philosophic father, 'can we learn how the world of being is made....Experience has shown us that there may happen in reality what we cannot re-create in thought.' Ward held that it was the sign of a

¹ Ch. II, p. 43.

² *Metaphysics* (English trans.), I, p. 322.

sound philosophy not to lose sight of the real nature of the entities which are woven into the philosophic synthesis, which too should not contradict experience. Experience is the test of philosophy. With this view, which Ward repeats over and over again in his writings, in mind, we really cannot blame James for calling him a pragmatist.

Then Ward proceeds to say that at a later stage in human development the concept of unity dawns on us. This concept he describes as 'an idea of our reason, *not an object of our experience*'.¹ Further, we have been told that philosophy need not be final but it must be consistent. Thus an idea of unity *which is not born of experience* appears on the scene; and it is consistency which is the final test of a good philosophy and not adherence to experience. First we are told that thought *qua* thought is not reality and that experience must be the test of our philosophy. Then we are told that the idea of unity is not born of experience and that philosophy seeks unity and consistency. Are we then to conclude that philosophy does not give reality, since neither the idea of unity, nor of consistency, comes of experience? This is the very criticism which Ward brought against the philosophies of absolutism and of naturalism. The final form the problem takes for us is this: what is Ward's criterion of philosophy: speculative consistency and unity, or closeness to experience?

¹ *The Realm of Ends*, p. 432 (italics mine).

CHAPTER VII

THE SCIENTIST, THE PHILOSOPHER AND FAITH

The problem in Ward's philosophy which we have formulated as that of two apparently opposing criteria of philosophy: speculative unity and closeness to experience, is present in all his work and underlies most of what has been said in this study. It is, indeed, the problem that faces all empirical philosophy. The fact remains that experience is discrete and plural on the face of it, and that any attempt to unify it involves a certain amount of distortion and disappearance of reality from the point of view of common sense.

We saw that Ward was up against this problem when he tried to import a unity into his universe by means of an empirically discovered law: the principle of continuity. This principle could not bridge the gulfs in experience between matter and mind, the mechanical and the teleological, the organic and the inorganic, and it could not do this because of the dualism in things due to the self-limitation of God. There can be for Ward no sheer continuity in things because things partake of a dual nature: nature in God and nature outside of God. It is this dualism which corresponds to the dualism in Ward's criteria for a sound philosophy. On the one hand, when God is limited, experience consists of disparate plurality; when God is manifest, there is unity and order. The other side of this pluralism appears in the attempt Ward makes to remain in pluralism while an ethical unity or monism is reached in the realisation of the realm of ends.

The closer the universe approaches to God the farther away do we seem to get from the pluralism of experience.

So Ward does not seem to be able to have it both ways. If the test of our philosophy is that it must be close to experience we seem to remain in pluralism; if the test is speculative unity we seem to finish in a realm far removed from experience. The speculative activity of thought appears to have this unfortunate tendency inherent in it: that it persists in transcending the discreteness of the here and now and in proceeding towards a speculative unity which is often satisfactory intellectually but which removes us far from experience. We criticised Ward earlier for limiting the activity of thought to such an extent that he ran the danger of making even a partially coherent synthesis of experience impossible. Ward admits this criticism when he speaks of the unity of the world as an idea of the reason, not an object of experience, and when he asks: 'It is certain that the pluralist's standpoint is the more primitive: is it also in itself the more fundamental?'¹

Ward's solution of this problem is found in his theory of the relation between science, philosophy and religion.

Ward's view of the relation between science and philosophy is based on a critical examination of the theory of knowledge implied in the making of scientific theories, and on his view, after an extensive examination of modern psychological doctrine, of the nature of philosophy. As regards his theory of the relation between faith and philosophy he believed in faith, firstly, because it 'worked' in experience, secondly, because he could find a place for it in a reasonably coherent system of philosophy, and thirdly, because of subjective experience. 'My position is wrong somewhere', writes Ward as a student from Germany in 1870, 'for it threatens to

¹ *The Realm of Ends*, p. 432.

exclude personal communication with God from the world altogether.¹ In 1883, as a more mature thinker, he remarks: 'As to theology, when those who believe in God at all say God is not a person, what they often mean I think is not that he is less than a person but more and inconceivable and unknowable because the highest life we can grasp is a personal life....Hence in all the higher religions intercourse with God has been represented as a spiritual communion, as internal light or manifestation....Religion must thus ever transcend science, which *can* never prove it false nor yet shew it to be true. The infidelity of the present generation which tries to dethrone religion by science is the perfectly logical and natural outcome of the mistaken endeavours of the past generation to establish religion by appeals to science....Just now the intellectual world has not faith to grow.'²

Religion was a fact of experience and any philosophy worth its name had to find a place for it. In 1873 Ward had put the problem: How is a disciple of modern thought to be religious? And it was because Lotze showed himself acutely conscious both of the demands of exact science and of the claims of moral and religious values that the young Ward found in him his philosophic father.

I

James Ward himself refers to the relation between what he calls the 'two worlds' of science and philosophy—or the historical—as a contradiction,³ and shows that in the rush of life few people feel the need to search for a higher standpoint from which the differences between the two worlds can be

¹ *Essays in Philosophy*, Memoir, p. 31.

² *Ibid.* Memoir, pp. 76 f.

³ *Ibid.* p. 229.

mediated and reconciled. Yet that there must be some kind of reconciliation would appear from the fact that the knowledge both of science and of philosophy are products of the same mind and of the same experience. The very mind which attains these apparently contradictory types of knowledge is itself a product of the experience which contains the contradictions. 'Knowledge', writes Ward in the *Encyclopædia Britannica*,¹ '...may even be regarded as the joint product of natural selection and subjective selection: it emerges tainted with—as some may think—but, at all events, permeated by, a teleological colouring.' Not only so, but also the process or procedure by which the mind gains knowledge is in both cases the same; for the best of men are but men at the best; it is not given to the human intellect to soar, it can only climb. While we can expect philosophy to progress, like science, there can only be progress, nothing more;² philosophy and science are bound by the human imperfection of the instrument by means of which they progress. But, further, the mind does not get knowledge as something foreign or other to it; it creates knowledge in its own form. 'Our entire organon of real categories', says Ward,³ '—substance, cause and end—are anthropomorphic, projections of ourselves. And as these categories form an organic unity within—as we are creative subjects with definite aims—we assume that everywhere in the phenomenal world without we have directly or indirectly the manifestation of such subjects. So far as this fundamental postulate, this demand of reason, is verified, the world is intelligible, and no further.' The same holds for the more speculative activities of the mind. The proper function

¹ Tenth edition, art. 'Psychology'. See also *Essays in Philosophy*, p. 168.

² *Essays in Philosophy*, p. 131.

³ *Ibid.* p. 194.

of speculation is to organise whatever further knowledge we may obtain in conformity with regulative ideas.

Thus the knowledge of science and the knowledge of philosophy are obtained by the same mind exercising itself in an identical way by anthropomorphic projection on the same experience. Yet we have two criteria of truth. In the one case the criterion of whether it works, when we are told that our conclusions should not leave the realms of actual experience, and on the other hand the criterion of 'consistency', when the concept of unity, which is not a concept of experience, is developed, and when we feel that philosophy must be consistent even though it be not final.

In a comparison of modern philosophy with Hegelian philosophy,¹ in which he shows that modern philosophy is as much a new birth as modern science, and that systems built by pure speculation are no longer the fashion, Ward faces the problem of the relation of philosophy to science. Modern philosophy is similar to science, firstly, in its greater carefulness, for it submits to limits in order to gain in stability. No longer is pure speculation, when thought and fancy often become inextricably mingled, the way of philosophy. The conclusions which we get in philosophy to-day may be less imposing and less inclusive in their range, but they are firmer and are built up on more carefully controlled facts. In other words, modern philosophy shows the influence of the discipline of science.

Secondly, philosophy stands close to science in that it is continuous with science in so far as it seeks to unify all our knowledge, and therefore includes science in its scope. Yet philosophy does not offer the finality of conclusion in its wider spheres which science tries to attain in its more circumscribed spheres. There are alternative ways of looking at

¹ *Essays in Philosophy*, pp. 134-9.

things between which it is impossible to choose finally on the ground of existing knowledge; no amount of scientific data can decide the issue between monism and monadism, for instance. Subjective preference will play a role here while it is relatively absent in a purely scientific conclusion.

Thirdly, this difference must not be taken to mean that the difference between philosophy and science is due to lack of knowledge about facts on the side of philosophy. The difference goes deeper. Philosophy has to do with ideas and what it particularly seeks are those ideas or concepts which serve to join the principles which are applied in the particular sciences. Philosophy wants *axiomata media*. It is only by such middle principles or mediating principles that it can hope to arrive at a view of the world in which all the knowledges of the various sciences will form a unified whole which will give intellectual satisfaction on account of its consistency.

Yet, fourthly, the difference between science and philosophy goes further even than this. The having of knowledge is not a matter merely of quantity; there is also the aspect of its quality. A man may know all the scientific principles of his age and he may even have unified them to a certain extent, and yet he may be lacking in depth and profundity of viewpoint. It is only after much meditation and thought that knowledge gets reality and truth. Knowledge can always be greater by being more organised and by having the underlying and implied relations brought to light. The search after the true 'form' of knowledge, which is carried out by thought and meditation, appears to be endless. This search is one of the tasks of philosophy.

Fifthly, the search after a more profound view of the 'form' of knowledge inevitably leads the philosopher to further problems concerning his own experience. Such

questions are those of duty, of optimism and pessimism, questions of what ought I to do, and why is there an ought that must be obeyed; and the question of the future, of an existence after death, and of the conservation of values. This ground cannot be covered by science, for science is limited by its method. Man is driven beyond science and empirical knowledge. It must not be thought, Ward points out, that the problems raised by philosophy are merely speculative and of no use in practical life. It was one of the faults of Locke that he did not realise that our empirical knowledge is insufficient for our practical needs. Speculative knowledge plays a part in the life of every human being, for we are moral and religious and we demand, very often without knowing it, a philosophy which satisfies our moral and religious natures. The philosophic nature of man and the practical needs of life inevitably lead him from the disjointed empirical data of experience to a more speculative view of such experience.

Sixthly, from these considerations it appears that the sphere of experience which is covered by scientific method is comparatively small. Not only does science use abstractions in order to arrive at general laws, whereby it eliminates all that is particular and individual in the phenomena of which it treats, but it assumes, somewhat uncritically, that the qualitative aspects of things are our private affair and only the quantitative aspects are wholly objective and independent of us.¹

Finally, there is always the problem of the limitations of empirical generalisations or induction with which the physical scientist is faced. The physicist may start from empirical data but the 'principles' which he applies to such data belong to the abstract sciences, which are independent of concrete

¹ *Essays in Philosophy*, pp. 191, 229-30.

experience.¹ Not only is there thus a complete break in continuity of method, but individual facts are again reduced to abstractions. It is true, further, that scientists who have come to realise the validity of philosophic formulation of problems and who yet are unwilling to surrender what they imagine to be a purely empirical method, sometimes speak of the unity of the sciences, as if the separate sciences will one day grow into each other and form a unity. This attitude Ward calls 'foolish optimism'.² It is due to the fact that while we can all know what we do know, nobody can estimate what we do not know. 'To do our ignorance justice', he writes, 'we ought to devote whole shelves in our libraries to blank volumes that might be filled.' The expectation that all the empirical sciences will one day fuse into a single philosophy rests on the uncritically accepted assumption that the *orbis scientiarum* is as much a unity as the *orbis terrarum*, only its *terrae incognitae* want exploring. Science treats the world as if it is peeling off the coats of an onion; it does not offer any standpoint, for its concepts are not eternal handcuffs, although we can learn much from it. The concrete world in which we live is not a museum which is arranged in classes and compartments. Primarily we have to do with life, and it is reason, the subjective factor, which helps us to find our bearings in life. The error of the scientist lies in forgetting that analysis is only half the process and that the important point is the re-union and interpretation of what has been separated.³

'Looked at broadly', writes Ward, 'the history of philosophy may be regarded, to borrow an idea from the late Professor Harms, as philosophy experimenting. The experi-

¹ *Essays in Philosophy*, p. 189.

² *Ibid.* p. 151.

³ *Ibid.* p. 185; on the question of science and philosophy cf. also pp. 209-11, 229, etc.

ments were very different in kind from those of physics and chemistry. Still, they are entitled to be called experiments, in so far as they were so many mental manipulations of the theoretical and practical stuff of life with a view to the discovery of its hidden springs and inner unity. In these experiments we observe a twofold procedure, sometimes one, sometimes the other, being the more prominent. At one time, that is to say, philosophy was mainly intent on organising. At another, the failure of such attempts led to a new scrutiny of the material to be organised; in a word, constructiveness yielded to scepticism or criticism.¹

Philosophy is thus a perfectly legitimate function which the human mind performs in interaction with its environment. It is justified by the nature of man as well as by the nature of the universe. The nature of man demands more than the quantitative generalisations which science gives it, and the universe has aspects of quality which cannot be expressed in terms of the so-called natural sciences. The method of philosophy may change with circumstances: sometimes it performs the humbler function of criticising the concepts of science² if it finds that the superstructure which science tries to raise on its concepts is too heavy for the foundation; more often it tries to synthesise the sciences, or some aspect of the same science, by discovering underlying principles common to them—a duty which the specialist scientist is usually too busy to perform; finally, its real task is to attempt to satisfy the natural needs of life and the craving of the human soul by supplementing the meagre knowledge which the sciences give with speculative hypotheses and theories. Scientific knowledge is insufficient for practice. The progress of daily life is a series of ventures on faith and it is philosophy which offers some ground for this faith,

¹ *Essays in Philosophy*, p. 117.

² *Ibid.* p. 186.

thereby guiding the continual selection and choice which everyone has to make. Thus it is clear that modern philosophy stays very near to experience: it proclaims experience to be the one means of its advance and it no longer believes in a reality which is not experience in some sense or other.¹

But if science and philosophy both profess to stay in experience and the conclusions of the one appear to be diametrically opposed to those of the other, must we then conclude that there are two experiences, the one opposed to the other, so that the universe contains a contradiction, or at least mutually exclusive parts? Ward gives the final touch to his argument for philosophy when he discusses this problem.² The historical world, which is the world as we know it, is never mechanical, he writes; it is not even mechanical in appearance. We can express certain aspects or parts of it in terms of mechanism only by a process of abstraction and distortion and even falsification, and then we have a view of a part only of the world. "The solution of the antinomy of freedom and mechanism then is not to be reached by distinguishing between fact and fiction, that seems to be the outcome of the solution you offer", some representative of science may say', writes Ward;³ 'Well, I admit this seems startlingly like a *reductio ad absurdum*; but provided I may put my own meaning on fiction, it is the only conclusion I can attain.' There is thus no hard and fast separation between the worlds of science and philosophy, as some thinkers would suggest; the scientific way of looking at things is merely a partial and therefore somewhat untrue way of seeing things. The problem is not one of science *versus* philosophy; it is a case of science merging into and being superseded by philosophy. This conclusion is startling

¹ *Essays in Philosophy*, p. 164.

² *Ibid.* p. 229.

³ *Ibid.* p. 249.

even in our day when science is beginning to show its consciousness of the limitations of its method and its teaching. It must have been even more so in the Cambridge of which Ward said in 1914: 'I believe in philosophy, though Cambridge doesn't or didn't.'¹

II

Ward draws a clear line between science and philosophy. He shows that the processes of thought involved in each of these methods of approaching reality are distinct both in procedure and in purpose. The procedure of the scientist is purely analytical; nor does he want to do anything else unless he goes off his beat; and he limits himself to a relatively small number of phenomena which he calls facts in his own domain. His purpose is to give a description of these groups of facts from one aspect only, the mechanical. The knowledge that science can offer is, however, so very limited that it is not sufficient for everyday need, nor does it satisfy us intellectually. The historical world is not mechanical and philosophy tries to offer a wider view of the world than science is able to do. Philosophy therefore synthesises and speculates. It tries to discover principles which underlie the historic world in terms of which the expanding universe of experience can be woven into a consistent whole. To do this it may use the data of science, but it goes much further than science, both in the method by which it expresses its conclusions and by its selection of facts. Whereas science takes only the quantitative aspect of things as 'facts' and therefore tries to express its results quantitatively, philosophy realises the limitations of its position and admits as 'legitimate facts' in the world other factors also which play a role in our life and which we think we 'know'. It tries, by testing and

¹ *Essays in Philosophy*, Memoir, p. 92.

examining various principles, to reduce this much wider field of experience to some form of order. When there is order and consistency in a plurality of elements the mind feels that it can grasp and control them better. The function of philosophy is to aid life in those frequent situations where science can offer no 'exact' knowledge. Philosophy cannot, however, take any uncritically accepted viewpoint or principle and try to squeeze the facts to fit it. On the contrary, philosophy, like science, must stay close to experience—at least modern philosophy has learnt this lesson from the history of its ancestry. Ward believes that modern philosophy is as much a new birth as modern science,¹ and its newness consists herein, that it has learnt the shortcomings of purely intellectual operations to give truth from the bitter experience of its own past. Philosophy therefore stays in experience; but, whereas science admits as experience only such data as can be expressed mathematically, philosophy recognises the urge of life. It sees the importance of the problems of optimism and pessimism, of good and bad, of freedom and progress. Above all, it realises the importance of the problem of knowledge, legitimate knowledge, and of the limitations of knowledge. With this theory of philosophy Ward offers a philosophical justification of philosophy and a philosophical justification of Christianity. We turn to the former.

Ward's speculative justification of philosophy depends on the two principles of epigenesis and of continuity. 'Life from beginning to end is a striving for self-conservation and betterment. At first there is only the venture of primitive trustfulness in trying open possibilities—an instinct which precedes knowledge and is the chief means of acquiring and increasing it....But gradually, as knowledge advances, this instinctive trustfulness is supplemented by intelligent pre-

¹ *Essays in Philosophy*, p. 116.

vision till at length, when the age of reason is reached, definite ideals become ends, not peradventure but through deliberate resolve.¹ Philosophy begins where science ends and marks the next stage in man's development towards higher and better things. While the conclusions of the mind are forced upon it in science by the object of its attention, philosophy roams far afield in its search for a wider consistency reaching beyond the narrow limits of science. Knowledge is not sufficient to supply the needs of men, and speculative attempts to find a wider consistency than science can offer are both natural and inevitable. It is clear from this consideration that the conclusions of philosophy are not as purely 'objective' as those of science try to be. The wider field of experience with which philosophy is concerned includes facts both subjective and objective, and the 'principles' by means of which it tries to give a consistent interpretation of the whole range of experience cannot be either as universal as the categories of mind which science employs, or as objective in origin as the hypothesis which science develops. In philosophy a certain number of *isms* or schools of thought are inevitable and perhaps desirable. Experience is infinite in its varied richness, containing depths of goodness and beauty which no single mind can penetrate, much less a mind still struggling with its own incompleteness of development and the limitations due to its own subjectivity. Thus, in philosophy, we enter upon a realm of diversity of principles which very often are but prejudices which may have their origin in an honest attempt to make experience objective and discover real principles, or may be the result of subjective idiosyncrasy and psychological perversion.

Thus in philosophy we are, or try to be, in the realms of reason. Our aim is consistency and our data are derived from

¹ *Essays in Philosophy*, p. 349.

the whole wide field of experience. But reason does not take us very far although it offers some satisfaction as far as it goes and promises better for some distant future date. The exigencies of practical life demand even more than reason can offer. This does not mean that the realm of philosophy, where we search for consistency, is superseded by an anti-rational or even non-rational stage. A friend had written to Ward: 'Whether reason will sanction it or not, the demands of the spiritual nature will not be suppressed.' Commenting on this Ward asks: 'Is this a necessary antagonism? If a man...dares to entertain any and every rational enquiry in this region of things, must he be without a faith, or hold one that is as they say "above reason", that is, non-rational? Is it any solution to say', he goes on to suggest, '(1) that reason is related to this (hypothetical) spiritual nature as intellect is to sense, and therefore our spiritual experience must always be in advance of our rationale of the same, while the probability is that as the world of sense is more than we can intelligibly comprehend though we are continually experiencing it, so might it be with our spiritual life,—faith being thus paralleled with common sense in a common opposition to philosophy—and (2) that this being so, theory must wait on fact, the speculation of reason on the facts of spiritual life: that in other words the conclusions of reason can only be hypothetical, since however truly we have reasoned, it cannot be surely known that we have other than partial premises, and certain necessary truths, as they may some day be called, are missing?'¹ Thus philosophy feels its own limitations and admits the role of faith in the universe. The theory of knowledge of modern philosophy, says Ward, is one that leaves room for faith.²

Ward's philosophic justification of faith is not only a

¹ *Essays in Philosophy*, Memoir, p. 58.

² *Ibid.* p. 181.

philosophic justification of faith as a general phenomenon, but of Christian faith in particular.¹ 'We cannot insist on omniscience as essential to a perfect philosophy,' he writes, 'but it is essential that such a philosophy should satisfy our moral and religious nature. We may even go further, and say that, were our moral reason satisfied, we could acquiesce in a finite knowledge which would not satisfy our merely intellectual nature, abstractly considered....If we cannot have omniscience, then what we want is a philosophy that shall justify faith.'² Ward is thus faced with two problems: the first one is to justify the fact of faith as a state of mind or act of mind in his philosophy; the second is to justify a particular content of the state of mind, or a particular object of the act of mind—namely, what is generally understood as Christian belief.

In his attempt to justify the fact of faith formally Ward uses two types of argument which are in accordance with his philosophy. Ward defines faith as 'that personal trust and confidence in an Unseen Being to which the religious at all ages have attributed their power to overcome the world'.³ Firstly, he points to the principle of continuity: 'When we try to take stock of the world of life, and observe the relation between experience and action, we see at every stage that action is in advance of experience: all things that live seem to learn by doing. A spirit of hopeful adventure seems to possess everything: I might say a spirit of faith....Lungs were not first acquired by water creatures who then proceeded to live on land: birds were not reptiles that first got wings and then began to fly. The function leads to the structure rather than the structure to the function. The world is full of efforts justified only by the results. There was

¹ Cf. *inter alia*, *Memoir*, p. 32.

² *Essays in Philosophy*, p. 139.

³ *Ibid.* p. 101.

nothing, we will say, in past experience, to justify the first attempts at living on land or moving through the air; *also there was nothing absolutely to forbid it*. The attempt was made and practice brought perfection. With a new sphere of life came new experiences and fresh enterprises. Say what we will, the practical man *will* reason back from consequences, and not merely forward from premisses.¹ He summarises the point of view expressed in this paragraph, which was written in 1889, by a clear statement in *The Realm of Ends*, written twenty years later: 'In keeping with the great principle of continuity, everywhere displayed in the working out of the world's evolution, we have found this faith foreshadowed in the upward striving that is the essence of life.'² Secondly, Ward asks: 'Faith on the lower levels was justified by its results: can we here (in the higher spheres of "religious" faith) apply this test of success or failure?'³ The reply is 'Yes', and it seems that Ward even considered this argument from results more important than the argument from the law of continuity. Christ himself, he says, used the text *Beware of false prophets. Ye shall know them by their fruits: do men gather grapes of thorns or figs of thistles?* In one essay⁴ he develops this argument at greater length when he says that the true Christian is influenced neither by hope of heaven nor fear of hell. Thus Ward's argument from results is not the utilitarian argument, nor the merely pragmatic one. Rather is it a rational argument, for developing nature sees the reasonability inherent in its nature in the ideal held before it by faith. For the sake of completeness a third argument to justify faith which Ward uses should be mentioned here, although Ward does not develop it. 'A powerful practical

¹ *Essays in Philosophy*, p. 139.

² *The Realm of Ends*, p. 448.

³ *Ibid.* p. 450.

⁴ 'Faith and Eternal Life' in *Essays in Philosophy*, p. 349.

argument in favour of religious faith might be worked out on the following lines: first we might point to its *universality*. ...Next we might point to its survival....Lastly we might point to the *advance* of religion that has usually accompanied the increase of morality and intelligence.¹

Ward's argument in favour of Christian faith in the last instance reduces to the argument of results. 'To estimate it,' he writes, 'if we know nothing of it by direct experience, we ought—if we were openminded—to judge of it by the lives and the language of those who, for themselves, do know the peace and strength which this "new birth" as they call it has brought to them. Impressive pictures might be drawn of what such men and women were in themselves and of what they accomplished for the world.'² The argument from results is not a good argument in conservative and respectable philosophy. Yet no further proof of any nature would seem possible in this ultimate sphere of experience where the 'facts' are private and the experience ineffable, so that it can only be described in metaphorical terms.³ It is true that this faith often shows the influence of contemporary philosophic conceptions in its expression⁴ and it may even be objected that the ideals of faith and the Christian representation of God are anthropomorphic.⁵ No doubt, says Ward, they are anthropomorphic, but anthropomorphism is the form of expression in consciousness of the flawless ideals of the reason. In the way Ward puts this argument we seem to have a suggestion of the argument of the law of continuity, the pure reason embodying its highest ideals in the contents of faith. On the other hand Ward refers to the fact of a 'new birth', and what he calls God-consciousness, as being

¹ *The Realm of Ends*, pp. 450 f.

² *Essays in Philosophy*, pp. 350 f.

⁴ *Ibid.* p. 181.

³ *Ibid.* p. 350.

⁵ *Ibid.* p. 350.

not merely the result of human development, but of action from God. Unfortunately he does not develop this point in any way.

Because of this lack of considered and clear statement in Ward's writings on the problem of divine intervention in the act of conversion it has been suggested that Ward's view of faith leaves out the very essence of religious faith, namely, the belief in the object of faith as God. So Mr H. Barker writes: 'Religious faith as conceived by the theologian is in truth a totally different thing from the faith of which Ward speaks: it is not any mere "spirit of hopeful adventure" but an intense conviction of the reality of its object.' Mr Barker continues: 'But the fact is that of faith in the theologians' sense Ward had not any left. In a letter from Germany in his critical years he speaks of himself as "admitting the ethical worth of christianity but uncertain as to anything else in it", and in a letter of 1873 he says "The doubting phase is pretty well passed from me now. I reject the whole system of Christian dogma from beginning to end and rationalise the history."' Mr Barker's comment is: 'Such attenuated religious ideas as he retained seem to have become for him speculative hypotheses of greater or less probability rather than assured convictions.'¹ Ward himself is partly to blame for this view, for he nowhere gives a statement which is at all detailed of his final religious position and his views of the meaning of faith are spread through his correspondence and his philosophic essays; and when he discusses faith in his more formal writings it is usually as the logical outcome of his system as a whole rather than from any personal standpoint. It is true, also, that a superficial reading of *The Essays in Philosophy*, without a careful consideration of *The Realm of Ends* and the concluding chapters of *Naturalism and*

¹ *Mind*, 1927, p. 478.

Agnosticism, might create the impression that faith remained for Ward but 'a spirit of hopeful adventure', never developing beyond the stage of 'intense trustfulness'.

More careful examination, however, seems to show that this is a misrepresentation of what was going on in Ward's mind and that his theory of faith and of the relation of faith to religion was not naturalistic, but allowed the divine element a place in experience. The letter from which Mr Barker quotes was written from Germany in 1873. In 1870 Ward had written: 'My position is wrong somewhere, for it threatens to exclude personal communication with God from the world altogether.'¹ In 1872, after he had given up the ministry, he writes: 'All my doubts philosophical and historical notwithstanding, I am sure of this as a practical truth—I have no doubt of God's infinite fatherly patience and love: when I despair of myself I find new hope in what he is.'² In 1873, when Ward is going through the worst of the crisis, he writes: 'The old faith is gone, where am I to find the new, or where will it find me?' Unfortunately, the extracts from Ward's letters given in the excellent Memoir after the time of his joining the University, do not give us much insight into his personal religious views and we are left to read between the lines of his more formal philosophic statements. Yet the tenor of all his later writings testify to the new 'faith' he found. They are the writings of the man who remarked, the day before his death: 'Lord, now lettest thou thy servant depart in peace', and who agreed with Martineau in 1924: 'that Christianity, understood as the personal religion of Jesus Christ, stands clear of all perishable elements and realises the true relation between man and God'.³ Also in his philosophical system Ward makes a clear

¹ *Essays in Philosophy*, Memoir, p. 31. ² *Ibid.* Memoir, p. 46.

³ *Ibid.* p. 364.

place for the object of faith or God-consciousness.¹ 'And now what are we to say of religion?' he asks. 'At first merely a vague sense of "something beyond", and a feeling of helpless dependence—and this much is found among men everywhere—at length religion culminates in the Christian's faith in an *underlying presence* as the source of a *new life*—an experience without any sense of vagueness or isolation.'² Here there is no mere spirit of hopeful adventure. It is the contents of the faith-state which is the source of power. 'Love does not, nay cannot, spring from prudential motives, let them be what they may', writes Ward a few months before his death. 'Moreover, faith and love go together, and no one can trust God without loving Him, or love Him and not trust Him.'³ At this point one is reminded of the words of the unhappy Catholic philosopher Jules Lequier: '*La foi est une victoire: pour une grande victoire il faut un grand combat.*'⁴

III

It has seemed worth while to ascertain Ward's personal position as regards faith in life because, firstly, on his own showing, philosophy and religion become indistinguishably intermingled with practical life in the sphere of daily experience, and secondly, because his philosophic system is so very much a part of his own life. The value of Ward's view on the relation of science to faith lies in this, that he separated faith-knowledge from science, and in that he admits the influence of the knowledge of science on philosophy and even on religion. In this way he guarantees the purity of both the knowledge of science and of faith while yet his philosophy

¹ *Essays in Philosophy*, p. 109.

² *Ibid.* p. 355 (*italics mine*).

³ *Ibid.* p. 363.

⁴ *La Recherche d'une première Vérité* (Colin, Paris), p. 326.

and his faith-knowledge do not escape too easily from the brute facts of experience into the realms of a sickly *a priorism*. 'Religion must thus ever transcend science which *can* never prove it false nor yet shew it to be true', writes Ward. 'The infidelity of the present generation which tries to dethrone religion by science is the perfectly logical and natural outcome of the mistaken endeavours of the past generation to establish religion by appeals to science.'¹ In this way the apparent contradiction between Ward's two criteria for a sound philosophy disappears. On the one hand he held that philosophy must stay close to experience; on the other hand it must be consistent. It is when philosophy builds on a careful scientific basis that it discovers that there is consistency inherent in experience, what ought to be being the key to what is. For faith contains the flawless ideals of the reason.

It is the merit of Ward to have seen that we can make place for the higher experiences in life by practising an honest positivism and that man does not shut himself out of the heaven of the theist by becoming a scientist. 'So far, then—psychologically and historically—there is nothing unique in the faith of theism at all;' writes Ward, 'it is only the full and final phase of an ascending series, beginning in an instinctive belief in the relatively better and ending in the rational belief in the absolutely good; with its corollaries, the existence of God and the life hereafter. The gradual advance through impulse and desire to practical reason runs throughout on all fours with the advance through sensation and imagination to theoretical reason. At every stage the two form one experience, knowledge registering its progress and practical enterprise promoting it. Such enterprises imply faith, but we have this faith not solely "*on account of* the

¹ *Essays in Philosophy, Memoir*, p. 77.

very limited amount of our knowledge and the possible errors in it". In such enterprises our attitude is not cognitive but conative; we are not from "want of knowledge on any subject coming to a particular conclusion on that subject". But as active beings striving for betterment we see that the way is not closed against us and so we try to advance: we do so because such is our nature, and because our past experience justifies our faith.¹ There cannot be a contradiction between a sane religion and a sane science for both are in and of the stuff of which the experience of man is woven. It is only when religion becomes dogmatic—as philosophy was for many a generation—when it adopts, like philosophy, the 'high *a priori*' methods of an effete rationalism, that it becomes untrue to experience and contradicts science. And it is when science in retaliation forgets the humble limits imposed on it by its own method and the frailty of human nature, and goes off its beat, that it comes into conflict with other spheres of man's experience. This is Ward's conclusion, and it is in this that lies his value for the philosophy of the present day.

'These are the two voices—faith and knowledge'—writes Ward, 'how come they to put such different interpretations on the very same facts? Because knowledge is of things we see and seeks to interpret the world as if they were the whole; while faith is aware that now we see but in part, and is convinced that only provided the unseen satisfies our spiritual yearnings is the part we see intelligible—what ought to be being the key to what is.'² On an ultimate analysis it is the satisfaction of man's spiritual yearnings which is the mark of a sound philosophy, and this test is a positive test. It is the test of 'closeness to experience' which is the same as consistency, that Ward uses for all philosophy and it is

¹ *The Realm of Ends*, pp. 416 f.

² *Ibid.* p. 441.

the mark of positivism. The test does not seem to involve an uncritically accepted pre-supposition or a prejudice. Positivism is a fact; it is the most elementary fact of experience. Without it we fall into scepticism which is self-annihilation.

What then is the difference in the operation of the flawless ideal of the reason which leads to the final synthesis on Ward's philosophy and as the absolutist sees it? This, that for the absolutist the ideal is present and self-conscious in individual thought, and can be revealed by the self-examination of thought of itself; while for Ward the flawless ideal of reason operates not, in the first instance, in man's thought, but in his actions and in his life; it is present not as a fully self-conscious conclusion of thought, but as an intuition dimly realised as yet; reason manifests itself increasingly not in thought only, for that is too immature to bear the full weight of the synthesis, but in activity. The flawless ideal of pure reason realises itself progressively in action and after it has realised itself in action it becomes self-conscious to that extent in thought—but only then.

The contradiction between the empirical and the speculative criteria of a sound philosophy is only apparent. Ward is compelled, by his psychological or genetic theory of mind, to tread the path of empiricism; but mind itself and its power of transcendence is an empirical fact of which he finds increasing evidence as he goes farther on his way.

IV

There is a lack both of volume and of profundity in Ward's treatment of religion and the problems of religious experience. Besides the purely psychological analysis of the faith-state in the *Psychological Principles* all he has to say on this

realm of experience is contained in two essays—one early and one late—and in the two concluding chapters of *The Realm of Ends*. What he does say in these sections is said very clearly and forms a consistent part of his philosophy, yet he does not do much more than make place for religious experience in his philosophy and to show that such experience need not be inconsistent with his empirical standpoint. He offers very little discussion of the problems connected with religious experience for the scientific mind; he barely mentions the inevitable anthropomorphic element in all religion. Nor does he offer any of the penetrating analysis which is found on nearly every page of the *Psychological Principles*, either of the faith-act or of the contents of the faith-state; the reader has to be content with a few slender indications of what might have been in his mind on this point.

As a result of this lack of developed statement Ward did not seem to realise that the implications of whatever view he may have had on the nature of religious experience or faith would have exercised a far-reaching influence on other parts of his philosophy. The philosophy of the man whose religion consists of an intellectual love of God cannot but differ fundamentally from that of the man who claims a mystic vision. At one time, indeed, and only once, Ward suggests that in the final religious experience the world view obtained would be a 'world intuition' of such a nature that thought would lose its discursive relational nature in the act of intuition. The point is, however, neither developed nor strengthened by reference to the mystics or religious writers.

At this point we again come across the unfortunate influence of Ward's failure to distinguish between the psychological and the philosophical formulation of a problem.¹ As

¹ Cf. pp. 33, 44 ff., 63 f., 86 ff., 184-5, 186.

Ward was unable to realise the importance of the universal and transcending power of mind because of his naturalistic bias in genetic psychology, so here he did not seem to realise that if the faith-act developed into a God-consciousness there was more in the faith-act than could be accounted for by its history or origin. Because Ward did not see the significance of the philosophical formulation of the problem of the faith-act, which is contained in this 'more', he did not realise that the philosophical analysis of the faith-act would have influenced his philosophy greatly. Here, as in the case of his master Lotze and as we have noticed elsewhere in his work,¹ we again see the numbing finger of naturalism on his thought.

¹ Especially pp. x, 33, 39-40, 186 ff.

CHAPTER VIII

INTERPRETATION OF KANT

It is no doubt true that after the bankruptcy of the Hegelian *Panlogismus* it was necessary for philosophy to come 'down to the sane facts of experience'—whatever may be meant by this expression. A fact, however, has many sides, and the danger of all empirical philosophy has ever been to confuse these—to its own detriment. There is possibly no greater danger to empirical philosophy—and one to which, indeed, all philosophy has constantly succumbed—than the danger of psychologism. Locke wallowed in it and Mill warned against it. This tendency to treat the philosophical formulations of problems by methods which are merely scientific, and often even involve genetic and historic pre-suppositions in their theory, has probably done more to confuse philosophic thought, since the time of the inception of laboratory psychology particularly, than any other contemporary influence. James Ward, physiologist, psychologist and philosopher as he was, was not alone in succumbing in his weaker moments to the temptation of accepting what was at best a psychological description of an event as a philosophical account of it. The historical method and the belief he had—and it was a perfectly justifiable belief—in the light which experience on its concrete side could throw on the whole process and progress of knowledge¹ would make him particularly prone to this fallacy. We have already discussed the dangerous practice in which he indulges when he gives a metaphysical status to what is originally an empirically dis-

¹ *The Realm of Ends*, p. 11.

covered principle, and we have noticed cases where the psychological formulation of a problem is confused with the philosophical. Nowhere do the unfortunate results of this process of 'psychologism' appear as clearly and with as dire effect as in his interpretation of Kant.¹

The tenor of Ward's remarks on Kant may be summarised by saying that Kant was the first to point out the importance of the part which the experient self plays in the process of obtaining knowledge, but that he never really fully saw that this process was a process of anthropomorphic projection, and he did not realise this clearly because, as a child of his time, he was devoid of all historic sense. If he had examined the genesis and development of the categories he would have realised more fully than he did that it was essentially a process of anthropomorphism. 'Summing up what we find underlying Kant's three *Critiques*', writes Ward,² 'and brought to a conclusion in the last: It is our own native spontaneity which leads us to regard the world as made up of living persons—in the widest sense—and of inanimate things. Again it is our own moral character which prompts us to believe in a realm of ends, to which we ourselves—as persons in the stricter sense—belong, and of which the Supreme Head (*Oberhaupt*) is God. Surely all this is anthropomorphic.' Because Kant was not imbued with the historic sense he never asked the question how the transcendental apperception developed out of the lower form of experience, the empirical. If he had paused to investigate this he would have realised that trans-subjective apperception is bound up with the stage of trans-subjective intercourse, and this

¹ *A Study of Kant* (Cambridge, 1922); summarised in the Herz Lecture on 'Immanuel Kant' in the *Proceedings of the British Academy* for 1922, and reprinted in *Essays in Philosophy*, p. 320.

² *Ibid.* p. 132.

involves anthropomorphism. For knowledge does not evolve itself while we merely look on; it implies ends and means: we seek knowledge primarily because it proves an aid to a fuller life. Thus the main structure of our concept of nature is entirely anthropomorphic.¹ Kant came very near to giving this fact its full value: 'In a passage *a propos* specially of causation', writes Ward,² 'Kant takes the dilemma by the horns which he perhaps saw might be awaiting him. Referring to the general position announced above he begins by saying: "This seems indeed to contradict all that has ever been observed concerning the progress of our understanding, viz. that it was only through induction that laws were first discovered, and the concept of *cause* came to be framed." This was Hume's position, of course. "In which case," he then continues, "that concept would be only empirical and the rules which it provides devoid of all universality and necessity. In point of fact, however, as with other *a priori* presentations (e.g. space and time) so here: we can only separate them out of experience as clear concepts, because we had (previously) put them in. It is doubtless true that the logical clearness of this presentation as a concept of cause only becomes possible after we have made use of it in experience (as a rule determining a series of events); but some regard to it (*eine Rücksicht auf dieselbe*) as [a] condition of the synthetic unity of phenomena in time was still the ground of the experience itself and therefore preceded it *a priori*." This not very lucid passage seems important as furnishing—better than many—', Ward goes on to say, 'a central text for comment on Kant's Copernican position, viz. that the pure science of nature is the creation of the understanding, not derived from nature but prescribed to it.'

In Kant's own mind, Ward points out, the categories are

¹ *The Realm of Ends*, p. 11.

² *A Study of Kant*, p. 69.

not so much 'forms' of thought as functions or ways of acting. They are, so Kant tells us in the objective deduction, 'the function of synthesising into a definite unity the manifold items of a given intuition', and it is this view of the categories as essentially active that is the first step to lead us to see that Kant's theory of the categories is really an anthropomorphic theory. We do not recognise other selves by their resemblance to ourselves but rather on account of a certain identity of function; it is behaviour that is the distinction of ejects from mere objects.¹ When Kant, writing about his immanent metaphysics, says that 'we assume that we know *a priori* of things only what we ourselves put into them', Ward's remark is that an immanent metaphysics limited to the projection on the object of attributes pertaining to the self is nothing but anthropomorphism.² The same holds when we pass to the ideas of the reason. Kant held that the transcendental deduction of the ideas of the reason differs widely from that of the categories of the understanding; yet he says himself that all human knowledge begins with intuitions, advances to concepts and ends with ideas, which seems to indicate a clear continuity; there is here a difference of degree, not of kind, and the difference lies herein that the ideas of the reason prescribe a greater unity than the empirical use of the understanding can ever reach. This continuity seems to indicate an unexpressed anthropomorphism. Also in his idea of God the anthropomorphic element in Kant's doctrine is unmistakable. It further comes out especially clearly in the categories of the moral judgment. 'A postulate essential to the realisation of what we ought to be, yet based not on what we know but on what we are,'

¹ *A Study of Kant*, p. 118.

² *Essays in Philosophy*, pp. 336 ff. Cf. *A Study of Kant*, pp. 88 ff.

writes Ward,¹ 'is surely nothing if it is not anthropomorphic....' A similar example occurs in the principle of purposiveness in the critique of judgment, for the conception that nature shall specify its general laws in accordance with a logical system for the benefit of the judgment is surely anthropomorphism. And finally, when Kant seeks for the *a priori* background of the interest or feeling which moves us to act and finds it in the sense of the beautiful which, in turn, he describes as consisting in a 'form' or a 'unity in variety' which is imposed on experience, he again reveals the anthropomorphic implications of his whole position.

Kant did see, Ward contends, that the meaning of the categories of substance, cause and interaction was not derived from nor contained in the bare logical forms of the categorical, the hypothetic and the disjunctive propositions respectively. Already in the *Dissertation* he had distinguished between the logical and the real employment of the intellect and had assigned these categories to the real or practical use of the mind. But whence are they derived? The answer, says Ward, is in what the experient subject is and at the intellectual level knows itself to be. This answer really underlies the whole of Kant's 'transcendental judgment' in its final form.² Thus we find an anthropomorphic vein running through all the philosophy of Kant, namely, the tendency to interpret the world in terms of ourselves, and to orientate the natural from the standpoint of the spiritual. 'But it all turns on the one cardinal truth contained in the transcendental unity of self-consciousness and what that involves.'³

Having proved the anthropomorphism underlying Kant's teaching to his own satisfaction, the next step, to show the

¹ *A Study of Kant*, p. 93.

² *Ibid.* pp. 80 ff.

³ *Essays in Philosophy*, p. 342.

place and activity of the pure ego or Self in Kant's doctrine—agreeing here also with his own psychology—is easy for Ward. 'In the end, however, he came to see directly in the "transcendental unity of apperception" the common source (of all categories)...', writes Ward. 'As Kant himself has said: "*I am* is the original of all objects": on these the permanence and activity of the subject are analogically projected. Here then too, though it is not avowed, the anthropomorphic character of Kant's standpoint is, as I have already urged, unmistakeable.'¹ Thus the source of the categorical function lies in the subject of experience as self-conscious, that is, in the synthetic unity of apperception involved in all judgments when we say 'I think'. Kant's doctrine of the 'inner sense' was a misnomer for something else; what Kant was here vaguely aware of, and tried to express, was the consciousness of self, as expressed in feeling or conation. So Kant's transcendental synthesis more in particular, according to Ward, carries us back to the subject of experience as the source of the real categories, and their origin is not 'logomorphic' but anthropomorphic, not a logical form but a subjective analogy.²

Ward's theory, which he tries to read into Kant, is more than the usual idealistic view of mind creating nature. Like respectable idealism, Ward holds that we do not find causation in the relation of one objective change to another, but that that is where we *put* the cause in order to be the better able to assimilate and synthesise phenomena intellectually. But this act of putting or creation is given a special meaning by Ward, the meaning of anthropomorphic process or 'ejection' in a narrow sense. It is obvious, of course, that the idealistic slogan 'the mind creates nature' means more than this process, which is usually associated with primitive

¹ *A Study of Kant*, pp. 133-4.

² Cf. *ibid.* p. 87.

mentality. Ward realises the narrowness of the term he uses to explain the process by which the categories are called into being. A preferable term, he says, would be 'reflexion', rightly understood. By reflexion he means the Kantian sense of 'transcendental reflexion'. 'The reflexion here meant—epistemological reflexion we might now call it—belongs to a higher plane than that of the abstraction in which we turn away from the objective factor in experience while investigating the subjective', he writes. 'Here, with all the knowledge we have of both sides, we ponder and review the evolution of the whole. And such is very much what the reflective judgment in the end has turned out to be. It is reflexion that leads us theoretically to the idea of an understanding not our own but conformable to ours so far as the limits of our finite being allow. It is reflexion that leads us to subordinate mechanism to teleology, so long as we fail to transcend their seeming opposition.'¹

The interpretation of anthropomorphism as 'epistemological reflexion' throws a somewhat different light on Ward's main contention in his *A Study of Kant*. Two questions immediately occur: the first is whether reflexion—even if it is especially defined for the purpose—is not something different in kind from what we understand by anthropomorphism; and secondly, whether this kind of reflexion is sufficient to account for the rise of the categories—even on Ward's own view. It will be generally agreed that a category has certain qualities—such as, for example, universality—which cannot be accounted for in any way by the apparently anthropomorphic nature of their origin, and this line of thought brings us to suspect that, while there may be present in our awakening consciousness of the categories a certain amount of anthropomorphism, this is a negligible element

¹ *A Study of Kant*, p. 138.

and does not affect the real nature—and therefore the philosophical problem—of the categories in any way. It must be admitted that Kant himself not only uses anthropomorphic expressions when writing about the categories—especially in the subjective deduction—but also meant what he said when he was using these expressions. But then Kant tried consciously—although not always successfully, it is true—to keep two questions distinct in his mind: the one of the *quid facti*, which is after all a psychological question and at which he believed Locke to have stuck; the other of the *quid juris*, the objective deduction, which is the philosophical problem, in Kant's treatment of which there is unfortunately still a lot of psychology. The fact remains—and Ward seems to blur the importance of it—that Kant did actually import an 'inner sense', and the question is whether he did not do this in order to get beyond a merely psychological account of the categories—for example, beyond a purely anthropomorphic account.¹

There can be no doubt about it that anthropomorphic processes play a large part in our experience, and in any purely historic or genetic account these processes should be described and analysed in detail. Ward is also right when he points out that in individual experience the sensible precedes the intelligible, which becomes possible only at the trans-subjective level, and then not till man comes to realise his own personality. The first question for philosophy, however, is not discovery of the fact that the one precedes the other in time, but that there *is* an intelligible character and what we

¹ We are not here concerned in the first place with what Kant really meant: Professor N. K. Smith has indicated the lines which an alternative interpretation of Kant would take in *Mind*, N.S. xxxii, no. 128, p. 479. Our point is to show the unfortunate 'psychologism' in Ward's interpretation, the result, we believe, of his empiricism.

can learn from the intelligible—so far as it is manifest—about the real nature or significance (*der Sinn*) of things. And in this question the account of the genesis and anthropomorphic origin of the categories is really not of very much use. For example, it gives no explanation of the why and wherefore of the sense of ought in moral life, as Ward himself points out. Even if the notion of 'cause' is helped into consciousness by physical experience, this does not yet explain the categorical nature of this notion; the psychological question may have been answered; the philosophical formulation of it has remained untouched by either the psychological or the historical approach.

Ward indeed, as is to be expected of so acute a mind, was generally fully conscious of the distinction between the psychological and the philosophical formulations of a problem, and in his *Psychological Principles* he generally keeps the two aspects clearly separate. The extraordinary thing is that when he writes psychology he is very careful of any 'psychologism', yet when he writes a philosophical critique—as in *A Study of Kant*—he psychologises from beginning to end. So he writes in *Psychological Principles*:¹ 'With the latter two (the principle of causality or the law of causation) psychology is not directly concerned at all: *it has only to analyse and trace to its origin* the bare conception of causation as expressed in (a definite particular case) and involved in both these generalisations.' Yet when Ward criticises Kant he forgets about this distinction and is all the time concerned about the anthropomorphic origin of the categories. It must be plain that, even if Kant uses anthropomorphic expressions and occasionally reveals the undeniable anthropomorphic factors involved in any understanding of experience, the problem with which he is busy is wider and

¹ P. 340 (*italics mine*).

bigger for any light that may be thrown on the categories by their partial genesis in anthropomorphic processes to be of much use. The most that can be said of Kant on this point, I think, is that he occasionally talked psychology when he ought to have talked philosophy. On the other hand, when Ward writes psychology he is fully aware of the philosophical aspects of his problem and keeps these clearly separate, as the following passages show: 'Finally, when upon the basis of such associated uniformities of sequence *a definite intellectual elaboration* of such material supervenes, *the logical necessity of reason and consequence* finds a place, and so far as deduction is applicable cause and reason become interchangeable ideas. Science then finds it can dispense with the anthropomorphism of the causal category, but the place of this in concrete experience is thereby in no way impugned.'¹ In this account the logic inherent in experience and manifest in the categories is given its place. Similarly the situation is somewhat broadened from the worst extremes of anthropomorphism when Ward writes: '[The category of] Unity, then, is the result of an act the occasions for which, no doubt, are at first non-voluntarily determined; but the act is still as distinct from them as is attention from the objects attended to. *It is to that movement of attention already described...that we must look as the proximate source of this category...every act of intuition or thought, whatever else it is, is an act of unifying.*'²

And the anthropomorphism is diluted again after a further consideration.³ 'As regards the real categories, it may be said generally that these owe their origin *in large measure* to the anthropomorphic or mythical tendencies in human thought. ...The formation of these concepts depends primarily

¹ *Psychological Principles*, p. 345 (italics mine).

² *Ibid.* p. 321.

³ *Ibid.* pp. 334-5.

upon the facts of what in the stricter sense we call "self-consciousness"—*implying intersubjective intercourse*—and secondly *upon certain spatial and temporal relations among our presentations themselves*. On the one hand it has to be noted that these spatial and temporal relations are but the occasion or motive—and ultimately, perhaps, we may say, the warrant—for the analogical attribution to things of selfhood, efficiency and purpose, but are not directly the source of the forms of thought that thus arise. On the other hand, it has to be noted also that such forms, although they have an independent source, would never apart from suitable material come into actual use. If the followers of Hume err in their exclusive reliance upon "associations naturally and even necessarily generated by the order of our sensations" (J. S. Mill), *the disciple of Kant errs also who relies exclusively on "the synthetic unity of apperception"*.¹ In statements such as these the anthropomorphism which is so prominent in Ward's interpretation of Kant is relegated to the background and becomes of very much less importance than in the later work.

What must be held as Ward's considered view of the place of anthropomorphism in the development of the categories occurs in a further passage, which again also serves to show the careful distinction he made in his earlier work between the psychological and the philosophical aspects of a problem. 'Such intuitive analogies', he writes,¹ 'have like other analogies, to be confirmed, refuted or modified by further knowledge, i.e. *by the very insight into things which these analogies have themselves made possible*. That in their first form they were mythical, and that they could never have been at all unless they originated in this way, *are considerations that make no difference to their validity*—assuming, that

¹ *Psychological Principles*, p. 336 (italics mine).

is, that they admit, now or hereafter, of a logical transposition which renders them objectively valid. This legitimation is, of course, the business of philosophy; we are concerned only with the psychological analysis and origin of the concepts themselves.'

This passage speaks for itself. One can only lament the fact that Ward did not keep its spirit in mind when he worked at his Herz Lecture on Kant; if he had done so he might have avoided the extremes of 'psychologism' which characterise this work. Nowhere is the confusion in Ward's mind between different planes or contexts of thought—which we have noticed before—more unfortunate than in this 'psychologising' of a philosophy. The only thing that can be said in mitigation of this scholarly *faux pas* is that Ward's psychology is really at bottom a phenomenology, and that his analysis of the origin of the categories of thought into anthropomorphic processes must be regarded as part of this psychology. Even this consideration, however, is not sufficient to save Ward's contention in his *A Study of Kant* from being philosophically useless.

CHAPTER IX

THE PHILOSOPHY OF JAMES WARD

I

As we have seen, Ward lived at a time when there was a growing separation, if not antagonism, between philosophy and science. It was his task to develop a philosophy which took full cognisance of the value of scientific method and theory while it yet avoided the shallowness of a mere 'philosophy of the sciences'. A philosophy of the sciences cannot but be a passing thing: both common sense and the history of philosophy show that. It cannot be doubted that Ward saw the limitations of scientific method clearly, and also saw that philosophy was more than a unifying of the sciences. Yet it is a question whether, in his eagerness to keep philosophy in touch with experience, and to avoid the misty unrealities of absolutism, Ward gave the mind sufficient credit for its powers and realised fully the extent to which philosophy can go before it has to take refuge in an activist 'faith'. The individual mind can, by studying itself and allowing its power of transcendence of the immediate and the particular some play, lay open hidden depths in the universe in which it discovers itself. Under the influence of his psychology—and in the fear of absolutism—Ward curtailed the role of mind to so great an extent that he created for himself the continual danger of slipping back into a 'philosophy of the sciences'.

The role which Ward assigns to individual mind in the function of philosophy is itself the result of a tendency towards a philosophy of the sciences. The genetic view of mind—which must be regarded as belonging to the science

of psychology, and not to philosophical psychology—it is true, shows individual mind as a developing function at present in an as yet incomplete state. So-called scientific psychology involves a naturalistic basis. Nowhere does the unfortunate influence of naturalism exert itself so strongly on Ward as on this important part of his doctrine. Being a theory of the science of psychology the genetic view of mind ignores the transcending and universal power of mind. Unfortunately Ward builds his theory of knowledge—which is the prolegomenon to his philosophy—not on philosophic psychology, but on a theory belonging to the science of psychology. The result is a theory of knowledge which weighs him down to the level of science by its inevitable limitations, preventing him from attaining the possibilities in philosophy which a sane theory of knowledge based on a careful philosophical psychology would have made possible. It is because the organon of Ward's philosophy is scientific or naturalistic, and not philosophical, that he has to take refuge in 'faith' as quickly as he does and that he missed the real depth of Kant, of whom he gives an interpretation which, after all credit has been given for its scholarship, remains pure 'psychologism'.

II

The history of philosophy seems to show that the mind cannot rest at peace in a mere pluralism and that it reaches out after unity and organisation in experience. This does not mean that philosophy sets out from the pre-supposition that the universe is rational or intelligible or anything of the sort. This is the mistake the *a priori* philosophers make and therefore, as Ward points out,¹ they ask puerile questions such as What is the sufficient reason why there is something rather

¹ *The Realm of Ends*, p. 225.

than nothing. Philosophy, it is true, sets out from pre-suppositions, but its pre-supposition is not the one implied in the high *a priori* method which involves the assumption that nothing is the logical prius of something. The pre-supposition of philosophy is the pre-supposition which leads to pluralism in the first instance and then leads away from it, that is the pre-supposition of positivism or radical empiricism. It is the pre-supposition that the universe as we find it, is as we find it at least to a certain extent, whatever further examination may show it to be like. And this very positive approach to the universe shows it as embodying in it elements making towards unity and organisation and oneness. Positivism leads to idealism.¹ Radical empiricism leads beyond pluralism and beyond itself. Pluralism does not sustain itself. Thus it is that we find Ward developing a kind of empirical monadology which differs somewhat from its historical ancestor with its rational pre-suppositions for all philosophy and is a monadology of interaction and co-operation and freedom.

It is on this pre-supposition that Ward builds his philosophy, the pre-supposition that we must start with our experience as we know it and find further guidance as we explore what we know. We saw that this pre-supposition involved Ward in a theory of the place of mind in nature which had its own peculiar difficulties but the unique contribution of which was his theory of the relation between the knowledge of science, philosophy and faith. Nowhere is the positive pre-supposition involved in this philosophy seen more clearly than in the place which is assigned to activity in this interpretation of experience, and nowhere does the theory of activity prove more valuable than in the doctrine of faith and the theory of the place of faith in experience.

¹ Cf. D. Parodi, *Du Positivisme à l'Idealisme* (Vrin, Paris, 1930).

Faith, says Ward in effect, does not offer knowledge, it offers probable grounds for action; and the action justifies the faith, not the faith the action. In this realm of experience we are beyond the reach of creed or dogma. Creeds and dogmas are, after all, belated relics of a period when philosophy was rationalistic and when humans fondly believed that their puny minds could formulate eternal truths in the form of premisses from which the whole construction of religion could be built up. Those were the days when reason, not activity, was the fundamental concept of philosophy. Rationalism has had its day, but its belated relics survive in the form of dogmas and detailed creeds. Ward saw that the modern has a different conception of the place of mind in the universe and believes that action, not thought, is the driving factor in experience. There is little room for dogma on this view. Because he realised this, Ward's treatment of faith and its relation to philosophy and science—although perhaps not very profound—is valuable as coming when it did.

III

Ward's philosophy, as it appears in *Naturalism and Agnosticism* and in the two parts of *The Realm of Ends*, is apt to give the impression of incompleteness, even untidiness, to the casual reader, and one cannot help feeling that there is a certain amount of just cause for the misunderstanding to which especially the later work gave rise. The jump in method of treatment from the relatively close-knit argument of the first part of *The Realm of Ends* to the series of topical discussions of which the second part consists is apt to leave a feeling of unfinishedness in the mind. Ward himself says that this part of his work is speculative. Though it is undoubtedly very sound speculation, it offers very little more than the

outline for a future theism and perhaps, as Professor Sorley suggests,¹ for a future theology. One cannot help wishing, however, that Ward had devoted more consideration to a systematic treatment of the theistic grounds of his philosophy.

A thorough-going study of Ward's presentation of his philosophy tends to remove the first impression of disconnectedness. The underlying unity of thought is unmistakable, and it soon becomes clear that there is a conscious plan being pursued in the argument, even in the second part of *The Realm of Ends*. Ward is still very definitely engaged in the development of his philosophy according to the principles which he explains in his earlier works, in spite of the apparent disjointedness of the discussion. At the same time a deeper disunity becomes noticeable, due not so much to the relative isolatedness of the problem as to a change of focus or point of gravitation in Ward's thought itself. After what must be considered as only a very cursory examination of the possibilities of a pluralistic philosophy, Ward jumps straight into the arms of theism, as the first cause of a coherent universe. This jump, as the critical reviews² of *The Realm of Ends* show only too clearly, is too much for the measured tread of the philosophic mind.

This does not imply that Ward fails to realise that he left the realms of earthbound philosophy for higher flights of speculation when he developed the theistic aspects of his philosophy. He is clearly conscious of the new type of argument which he uses and he refers to theism as an 'ideal' in the light of which the universe of the pluralist achieves unity.³ He develops this argument in the second part of *The Realm of Ends* and it is only necessary to read the text to realise how fully conscious Ward is of the highly speculative nature of

¹ W. R. Sorley, 'James Ward' in *Proceedings of the British Academy*.

² Cf. *The Realm of Ends*, pp. 481 ff.

³ *Ibid.* pp. 228-9.

his presentation of the case. Whatever may be said of the standpoint which he takes up, it will be generally admitted that his arguments are to the point and perfectly clear. The feeling, however, which an examination of the lectures published under this title gives is that the author did not pay sufficient attention to the possibility of a unity amidst plurality as it were on earth, and that he rushed off to a first cause of his unity in too great a hurry.

Perhaps Ward was aware of the jump between the pluralism of the universe and his theism when he wrote:¹ 'On the pluralistic view every one of the finite individuals is related to all the rest but only for himself. In Leibnizian language, each mirrors the whole from a unique standpoint, and therefore *not* the whole but only an aspect of the whole.'² The pluralistic whole, then, is a whole of experiences, not a whole experience, a whole of lives, not a living whole, a whole of beings but without a complete and perfect being. Is such a whole really a unity at all: is it more than a totality? We have a type of a higher unity than this in our own experience of self-conscious subjects. Here there is a unity which is more than the objective related continuum, a unity to which all this belongs and refers. Now remove from such an experience the relativity which "standpoint" implies and you approach the theistic ideal of an absolute experience, the centre of a living and acting spirit whose "centre is everywhere, whose circumference is nowhere", an experience complete at all points and including everyone. The pluralist's universe in the light of this transcendent Being would thus have a unity which it would otherwise lack.'

Now all this may be very true, but the question is whether there is not a unity already present in the pluralistic world, a unity which, it is true, may have as first cause of its being

¹ *The Realm of Ends*, pp. 228-9.

² Cf. footnote, ch. vi, pp. 127-8.

a theistic deity, but which nevertheless can be studied to great advantage without immediate reference to its origin. Following out Ward's own line of thought, there appears to be a unity in the experience of a group or co-operative union which explains itself to a certain extent before it points to its first cause in theism, and this doctrine is not opposed to the teaching of highly respectable idealism. Ward holds that there are internal relations, although he says with Leibniz that such relations need not be necessary relations. It would seem obvious that a universe which is held to be permeated to a great extent by intelligence, and which displays complicated forms of organisation such as national states and societies for international co-operation, should be studied to a great extent at least in the light of its own inherent rationality and self-consciousness without immediate reference to deity. Such procedure would not have invalidated the theism part of *The Realm of Ends* and it might have given light on the relation of God to the world; it would have been consistent with Ward's own theory of the method of philosophy. Ward by no means exhausts the possibilities—nor the problems—of a pluralistic philosophy.

This again would appear to be the result of the unfortunate limitation which Ward placed on mind in its action on its environment—a limitation which we have seen to be due to the 'scientific origin of his theory of knowledge'. Empiricism does not exclude transcendence by mind of the immediate particularity of the environment, for it is an empirical fact that the mind can and does transcend particularity while it is in the presence of the particulars. The mind can still discover a large measure of unity behind the particularity while it is still in the empirical realms of pluralism and before it goes on—as it ultimately must—to faith for the last source of all in theism.

IV

Sir Michael Foster, the scientist, remarked that Ward was a good scientist gone wrong; on the other hand, philosophy claimed Ward for its own. The question arises whether Ward was first scientist or first philosopher. The one need not, of course, exclude the other, but the chances are that the one attitude of mind would predominate and influence the mode of approach to the other side. In his own mind, James Ward was philosopher because he felt that it was by speculative activity alone that he would be able to get the wholeness of world view and integration of personality which is the part of man. Yet there can be no doubt that, in addition to his wide scientific knowledge, his actual scientific training and experience (he spent some time doing physiology in Germany and published a paper on the Weber-Fechner Law) influenced his philosophy greatly, if not unduly. Indeed, the question arises whether Ward was always successful in going beyond the limitations imposed on mind by scientific method and seeing the full import of the philosophic formulation of the question. We have seen that he raises the empirical principle of continuity into a metaphysical principle, a very dangerous procedure. His whole view of the activity of mind in the function of philosophy also seems to suffer from his scientific approach to the study of mind. The genetic account which he gives when he describes the rise of mind in the organism, and even the account of the limitations of mind, may be quite correct. Yet he seems not to have stressed another characteristic, namely, the universality of mind. In some way, one does not know how, mind seems to be able to grasp universals and relations which transcend the immediacy of the given fact. It is this characteristic of mind, known to all thinkers through all the ages, which is important

for philosophy. Scientists often find it difficult to recognise it or to see its implications. When once it is recognised it influences the whole course of a philosophy.

Ward lays so much emphasis on the genetic or historic development of mind that he does not always seem fully aware of the implications of the universal nature of mind, in spite of his pampsychism. It is for this reason that he has to take refuge in a theory of faith with its limited possibilities as quickly as he does. It is possible that he was dimly aware of the dualism in his philosophy between the scientific and the philosophic approach to problems; it is this dualism which permeates his work which prevented him from being more explicit about his theory of faith and from developing it into greater detail. As it stands, Ward's theory of God-consciousness as being the summation of knowledge is so indefinite that it can stand for anything from an intellectual peace of mind to a rather sickly mysticism.

It is due to this antagonism between the good physiologist and the good philosopher that Ward's solution of problems of pluralism in theism is unsatisfactory. However brilliant Ward's presentation of the case may be considered to be, the fact remains that his argument has not offered any solution, nor even materially advanced the solution, of the problem of the relation of pluralism to unity in experience. Ward was too good both as scientist and as philosopher to go all the way in either. If he had not been such a good scientist he might have gone farther along the road of philosophy; and if he had not been so good a philosopher he ought not to have strayed from the path of physiology. Yet if he had not combined to an extraordinary degree the philosophic bent of mind with the scientific, philosophy would have been the poorer by *Naturalism and Agnosticism*.

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