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## THE EUCHARISTIC TEACHING OF WILLIAM OCKHAM

BY

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**TO  
MY MOTHER  
AND  
FATHER**



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## FOREWORD

THE principal primary sources on which this present study of Ockham's Eucharistic teaching is based are the following: (1) Commentaries on the Sentences: (A) *Ordinatio Ockham*, or Commentary on the First Book of the Sentences;<sup>1</sup> (B) *Reportatio Ockham*, or Commentary on the Second, Third, and Fourth Books of the Sentences.<sup>2</sup> (2) Treatises on the Eucharist: (A) *De sacramento altaris*;<sup>3</sup> (B) *De corpore Christi*.<sup>4</sup> (3) Theological questions: *Quaestiones quodlibetales*.<sup>5</sup>

### 1. COMMENTARIES ON THE SENTENCES

The bulk of Ockham's teaching on the Eucharist as set forth in his Commentaries on the Sentences is to be found in his *Quaestiones in quartum librum Sententiarum*, that is, the latter third of the *Reportatio*.

#### *Reportatio*

The text of the *Reportatio* which will appear in the following pages is based on these manuscripts: (1) *Firenze, Biblioteca Nazionale A. 3, 801*, fourteenth century; (2) *Göttingen, Universitätsbibliothek Theologie, 118*, fifteenth century; (3) *München, Uni-*

<sup>1</sup> Reference to this work will be made as follows *Ord* 1, d 36, q. 1, P *Ordinatio*, book 1, distinction 36, question 1, marginal letter P. All references to an *Ord.* in this present study will be to that of Ockham.

<sup>2</sup> Reference to this work will be made as follows *Report* 4, q. 6, K *Reportatio*, book 4, question 6, marginal letter K. Unless otherwise noted, the reference to a *Report.* will be to that of Ockham.

<sup>3</sup> Reference to this work will be made as follows *De sac. alt.*, q. 1 *De sacramento altaris*, question 1. Question numbers will be identical with those of the Strassburg edition, 1491.

<sup>4</sup> Reference to this work will be made as follows *De corp. Christi*, c. 17. All references to this title in the present study will be to Ockham's *De corp. Christi*. Chapter numbers, unless otherwise mentioned, will be identical with those of the Strassburg edition.

<sup>5</sup> Reference to this work will be made as follows *Quodl.* 4, q. 26. *Quodlibeta* 4, question 26. Unless otherwise noted, all references to a *Quodl.* will be to that of Ockham.

*versitatsbibliothek*, 52, late fourteenth century; (4) *Oxford, Balliol College*, 299, before 1368; (5) *Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale fond latin*, 16398, of the fourteenth century; (6) *Paris, Bibliothèque Mazarine*, 893, from the fourteenth century.

Of these MSS, the *Göttingen, Universitätsbibliothek Theologie*, 118, and the *Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale fond latin*, 16398 show the greatest resemblance to the Lyons edition of 1495. This latter, incidentally, is the only known edition of the *Reportatio Ockham*. The *Firenze, Bibliotheca Nazionale A. 3, 801* and the *Oxford, Balliol College*, 299 seem to offer the better texts, although neither give a perfectly satisfactory reading.<sup>6</sup>

## 2. TREATISES ON THE EUCHARIST

In addition to his ordinary scholastic treatment of questions concerned with the Eucharist, which is to be found in the *Reportatio* and in the *Quodlibeta*,<sup>7</sup> Ockham wrote two specialized treatises which concern themselves either directly or indirectly with the Blessed Sacrament. These treatises are known as the *De sacramento altaris*, and the *De corpore Christi*.

An historical problem arises with regard to these two titles: Are these two separate works, or merely two parts of one work? Wadding distinguishes between the *De sacramento altaris* and the *De corpore Christi* in his listing of Ockham's works.<sup>8</sup> Sbaralea, on the other hand, believes them to be but two parts of the same work.<sup>9</sup> T. Bruce Birch, believing himself to have settled the problem once and for all, unites the two works in his edition under the

<sup>6</sup> For further information on some of these manuscripts, see P. Boehner, "The Notitia Intuitiva of Non-existents according to William of Ockham, with a Critical Study of the Text of Ockham's Reportatio and a Revised Edition of *Rep.* II, Q. 14-15," *Traditio*, 1 (1943), 240-5

<sup>7</sup> *Infra*, xvi

<sup>8</sup> L. Wadding, *Scriptores Ordinis Minorum* (ed. novissima, Romae: A. Nardecchia, 1906), 106.

<sup>9</sup> H. Sbaralea, *Supplementum et castigatio ad scriptores trium Ordinum S. Francisci a Waddingo aliisque descriptos* (ed. nova; Romae: A. Nardecchia, 1908), 1, 345.

title, *The De sacramento altaris of William of Ockham*.<sup>10</sup> More recently L. Baudry made a study of this problem and came to a conclusion which favors the two works theory. According to him these two works were separate treatises which were united at the very latest around 1490.<sup>11</sup>

In support of his conclusion, Baudry refers to the fact that the MS *Basel, F. II, 24* contains only the first treatise, the so-called *De sacramento altaris*.<sup>12</sup> The MS *Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale, 15888*, on the other hand, produces only the latter of these two works, namely, the *De corpore Christi*.<sup>13</sup>

Baudry's hypothesis, based on but two MSS, finds further confirmation in a more extensive study of the available manuscripts.<sup>14</sup> With the exception of the *Wien, Dominikanerbibliothek, 153 MS*, which contains both works, none of the other manuscripts used in this comparative study has both treatises. In the face of this more complete evidence, it seems reasonably safe to conclude that the *De sacramento altaris* and the *De corpore Christi* were written as two separate treatises by Ockham and only later edited and published together in the incunabula editions of Paris, 1490; Strassburg, 1491; and Venice, 1504.

### *De Sacramento Altaris*

While the *De sacramento altaris* contains references to the Eucharist, especially in its latter portion, its title is nevertheless

<sup>10</sup> T. B. Birch (ed), *The De Sacramento Altaris of William of Ockham* (Burlington, Iowa. The Lutheran Literary Board, 1930), xix

<sup>11</sup> L. Baudry, "Sur trois manuscrits Occamistes," *Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du moyen âge*, 10 (1936), 140

<sup>12</sup> *Ibid* It should be noted that the *incipit* of the *De sacramento altaris* in the MSS is, "Sicut dicit quaedam glossa," and in the printed editions, "Circa conversionem panis in corpore Christi"

<sup>13</sup> The *incipit* of the *De corpore Christi* is, "Stupenda supernae munera largitatis." This work is designated as the *De corpore Christi* because of the *explicit*s of some of the MSS and editions

<sup>14</sup> See *infra* xiv for a listing of those MSS used in this study which contain the *De corpore Christi*. The known MSS containing the *De sacramento altaris* which were available for this study are the following *Basel, F II, 24*; *Roma, Bibliotheca Angelica, 1017*; *Wien, Dominikanerbibliothek, 153*; *Troyes,*

somewhat misleading. The work seems to be rather Ockham's *ex professo* treatment from a philosophical point of view of this problem: Are lines, points, and surfaces entities different from that of bodies? <sup>15</sup> As such, this treatise is of secondary importance when compared with that of the *De corpore Christi*.

### *De Corpore Christi*

The *De corpore Christi* gives a much richer insight into Ockham's theology of the Eucharist. To be sure, much of it revolves around the discussion of substance, quantity, and quality as these terms find their application to the mode of Christ's presence and that of the accidents of bread after transubstantiation. Without distinguishing between the two treatises, F. Jansen mentions, not without reason, that "it is not exaggerated to maintain that his [Ockham's] treatise *De sacramento altaris* is nothing else but the nominalism of quantity applied to dogma." <sup>16</sup>

In preparing the text of the *De corpore Christi* <sup>17</sup> utilized in this present study, the following MSS were used: (1) *Oxford, Balliol College, 299*, written before 1368; (2) *Oxford, Merton College, 137*, fourteenth century; (3) *Vaticana, Ottoboni, 176*, fourteenth century; (4) *Wien, Dominikanerbibliothek, 153*, fourteenth century; (5) *Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale, 15888*, fourteenth century; (6) *Rouen, 561*, fifteenth century.

In classifying these manuscripts, a general distinction is noticeable between the first four MSS listed and the last two. With the

718, which contains only a fragment MSS *Giessen, 733* and *Vaticana, Borghesa, 151* were unavailable at the present writing

<sup>15</sup> Confer for instance Birch, *op cit*, 2-156

<sup>16</sup> "Eucharistiques (Accidents)," *DTC* 5 (1924), 1394. "Il n'est pas exagéré de prétendre que son traité *De sacramento altaris* n'est autre chose que ce nominalisme de la quantité appliqué au dogme"

<sup>17</sup> The text used in this present study was prepared independently of the Birch edition. For a criticism and evaluation of the Birch edition, see Bas-cour's review in the *Bulletin de théologie ancienne et médiévale*, 3 (1931), 357-9; also Amedeus a Zedelghem's review in *Collectanea Franciscana*, 2 (1932), 273-4.

exception of the manuscript *Oxford, Merton College, 137*, which ends abruptly in chapter thirty-seven with the words, "*et per concilia*,"<sup>18</sup> the other MSS of this first group are of greater length and contain more details than the last two listed MSS. The MSS *Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale, 15888*, and *Rouen, 561*, are shorter treatises which follow those of the first group as to their general plan and contents but not as to form.

F. Baudry has studied the *Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale, 15888*, in an effort to determine whether this MS was an earlier redaction which Ockham later developed to greater lengths; or possibly a resumé made by an anonymous author who sought to condense Ockham's teaching. Baudry favors the second hypothesis.<sup>19</sup>

The *Oxford, Balliol College, 299*, and the extant portion of *Oxford, Merton College, 137* show a greater resemblance to each other than to either the *Vaticana, Ottoboni, 176*, or *Wien, Dominikanerbibliothek, 153*. The *Wien* MS, however, is more like to the two British MSS than is the *Vaticana*.

For a basic text, the *Oxford, Balliol College* MS seems, after a comparative study, to be generally preferable to that of the *Oxford, Merton College* MS. Both of these British MSS seem to be textually more accurate than either the *Vaticana, Ottoboni, 176* or the *Wien, Dominikanerbibliothek, 153*. As was mentioned previously, both the *Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale, 15888*, and the *Rouen, 561* MSS are apparently abridgements of the more complete treatise. Hence they are unsatisfactory as basic texts.

Despite the fact that the *Oxford, Balliol College* MS seemingly is to be preferred as a basic text, several factors are in favor of the *Oxford, Merton College* MS, at least with regard to the extant thirty-seven chapters. This latter is more readable at times, owing to the addition of brief conjunctive and explanatory words which are apparently left to be understood by the *Balliol* MS. Then, too, the *Balliol* MS apparently suffers more from the carelessness of the scribe than does that of *Merton College*, for homoioteleuta are more frequent in the former than in the latter.

<sup>18</sup> This chapter is designated as number thirty-six in the Strassburg edition.

<sup>19</sup> Baudry, *art. cit.*, 135.

## 3. THEOLOGICAL QUESTIONS

Pertinent questions from the *Quodlibeta* were used for the most part as corroborating evidence for Ockham's Eucharistic teaching as set forth in his *Reportatio* and *De corpore Christi*. The relevant questions are to be found predominantly in *Quodlibetum 4*. It is interesting to note that many of the *Quodlibeta* passages agree almost verbatim with parallel excerpts from the *Reportatio*.

In the preparation of the *Quodlibeta* text used in this present study, two MSS were employed, namely, the *Codex Vaticanus latinus, 3075*, written in 1333,<sup>20</sup> and the *Vaticana, Chigi B. VII, 93* of the fourteenth century. The latter, however, does not contain the desired questions of *Quodlibetum 4*, since questions ten to thirty-nine are lacking. In addition to these two MSS, two incunabula editions were also used, namely, that of Lyons from about 1488,<sup>21</sup> and the Strassburg edition of 1491.<sup>22</sup>

There is some question as to the authenticity of the *Quodlibeta*. P. Boehner's study of this problem has led him to the conclusion that up to the present no sufficiently reasonable grounds have been adduced which would warrant that the authenticity of this work be seriously questioned.<sup>23</sup>

For the sake of completeness, it is necessary to make some mention of the *Centiloquium*. The authenticity of this work is seriously questioned. In the face of the evidence known at the present time,

<sup>20</sup> For a brief description of this MS, see P. Boehner, *The Tractatus de successivis Attributed to William Ockham*, Franciscan Institute Publication, 1 (St Bonaventure, N Y The Franciscan Institute, 1944), 21

<sup>21</sup> The *explicit* contains the name of Cornelius Oudenduck as the emendator

<sup>22</sup> There are discrepancies in the numeration of the questions of the *Quodl. 4*. The MS *Codex Vaticanus latinus, 3075* and the Lyons edition are in agreement. These two, however, disagree with the numeration of the Strassburg edition. For the most part the questions of the Strassburg edition are from five to seven numbers in advance of the Lyons edition and the *Codex Vaticanus latinus, 3075*. For example Question 27 of the Lyons edition and the *Codex Vaticanus latinus, 3075* is identified with question 32 of the Strassburg edition. The references to the *Quodlibeta* in the present study will be made to the question numbers as they appear in the Strassburg edition.

<sup>23</sup> "Zu Ockhams Beweis der Existenz Gottes," *Franziskanische Studien*, 32 (1950), 56.

it seems reasonable to conclude that the genuineness of this work is far from proven.<sup>24</sup> As P. Boehner observes, "who wishes to use it in his studies on Ockham must prove its authenticity."<sup>25</sup> However, it is not the purpose of this present study to determine the authenticity of the various works ascribed to Ockham. In accord with the current findings which favor the unauthenticity of the *Centiloquium*, the work will be considered spurious. As such it will have no further bearing on this study of Ockham's Eucharistic teachings.

The author wishes to express his gratitude to all who have assisted in the preparation of this work. The writer is particularly indebted to the Rev. Dr. Eugene Burke, C.S.P., whose interest and direction as the major professor contributed much toward the final form of this dissertation; to the Rev. Dr. Emmanuel Doronzo, O.M.I., and the Rev. Dr. Raphael Huber, O.F.M., Conv., for their reading of the manuscript and their helpful suggestions. Above all we are indebted to the Rev. Dr. Philotheus Boehner, O.F.M., director of the Franciscan Institute, St. Bonaventure, N. Y., for his tireless help and ready assistance without which much of this work would have been well-nigh impossible. Also my thanks to the Rev. Gaudens Mohan, O.F.M., for his aid in the study of the MSS and in the preparation of the pertinent texts of Ockham's works; to the Rev. Dr. Damian Van den Eynde, O.F.M., for his helpful criticism and suggestions; to Dr. Stephan Kuttner for his assistance with some of the canonical sources. Finally, the author wishes to express his appreciation to the Very Rev. Romuald Mollaun, O.F.M., Provincial of St. John the Baptist Province, Cincinnati, Ohio, for the opportunity to pursue graduate studies in Theology.

<sup>24</sup> P. Boehner, "The Centiloquium Attributed to Ockham," *Franciscan Studies*, 22 (1941), 61-5; see also P. Boehner, "The Medieval Crisis of Logic and the Author of the Centiloquium Attributed to Ockham," *Franciscan Studies*, 25 (1944), 167-70.

<sup>25</sup> "The Centiloquium Attributed to Ockham," *op. cit.*, 61

## INTRODUCTION

ALTHOUGH the period of divine, public revelation formally came to a close with the death of the last apostle, Catholic dogma is ever the subject of a real though accidental development and improvement. The Church, as the Spouse of the Holy Ghost, who can neither deceive nor be deceived, is the divinely appointed custodian of revealed truth. While always welcoming sound and healthy development, she is equally protected from the byways of error and pseudo-progress.

The gradual infiltration of the writings of Aristotle into the West was not without profound repercussions on the speculative thought of the day. This was true not only in the field of natural philosophy but in an even more marked degree in the field of logic. Philosophy gained for itself more of an autonomous position without, however, becoming completely divorced from theology, the queen of the sciences.

The great speculative minds of the day began to inquire more earnestly as to just which truths the human mind could demonstrate with certainty. The field of positive theology became more and more distinct from that of speculative theology. This burgeoning forth of speculative thought, because of its possible implication in the field of theological truth, was not allowed to develop without a certain amount of surveillance and suspicion on the part of the ecclesiastical authorities. Enthusiasm for logical speculation ran high at the time, and Church authorities in characteristic fashion were ever alert to check with censures and prohibitions any speculation which seemed to be out of line with tradition.<sup>1</sup>

It could hardly be expected, then, that the ecclesiastical authorities would be first among those who would adopt any new system of thought. Time and more profound study would have to test any new development in speculation. It was only natural, then, that during the latter half of the thirteenth century and the early part of the

<sup>1</sup> J. Koch, "Philosophische und Theologische Irrtumslisten von 1270-1329," *Bibliothèque thomiste*, 14 (1930), 305-29 (*Mélanges Mandonnet*).

fourteenth this new passion for logical speculation should be met with reserve and even suspicion on the part of the heads of religious orders, the bishops, and even the Holy See itself. New ideas were made subject to the rather hasty charge of heresy from ultraconservative quarters. Even such intellectual stalwarts as Sts. Albert the Great and Thomas Aquinas, who did much to encourage the growth of Aristotelianism in the West, remained for a time under the cloud of suspicion. In some instances the suspicions of the ecclesiastical authorities were well grounded in fact, as for example, the condemnation by Étienne Tempier, Archbishop of Paris, of the thirteen principal theses of Averroism;<sup>2</sup> in others they stemmed from a conservative fear of departing from the reigning tradition. Be that as it may, the atmosphere of tension, suspicion, and unrest cannot be overlooked in Ockham's milieu at Oxford.

Thus it is typical of the times that John Lutterell's tenure of office as chancellor at Oxford was by no means a peaceful one. Already in 1317 he had paid a visit to the Papal court at Avignon in connection with a conflict between himself and the Dominicans at the University.<sup>3</sup> In 1322 Lutterell again became the central figure in a conflict with the University which came to the attention of the King and the Bishop of Lincoln and finally culminated in his being deposed as chancellor of the University. Fearful that this struggle, if allowed to continue, would bring disrepute upon the University and the kingdom, especially if it were carried to the continent, King Edward II, in a letter addressed to Lutterell on the twelfth of August, 1322,<sup>4</sup> forbade the ex-chancellor to visit the continent or in any way to carry on the dispute which had stirred up such a furore in and around the University.

One year later, however, in a letter dated the twentieth of

<sup>2</sup> H. Denifle-A. Chatelain, *Chartularium Universitatis Parisiensis* (Paris: Ex typis Fratrum Delalain, 1889-97), 1, 486-7

<sup>3</sup> F. Hoffmann, *Die erste Kritik des Ockhamismus durch den Oxforder Kanzler Johannes Lutterell* (Breslau: Müller & Seiffert, 1941), 4, n 13 (*Breslauer Studien zur historischen Theologie*, new series, 9)

<sup>4</sup> *Calendar of the Close Rolls Preserved in the Public Record Office, Edward II, A. D. 1318-1323* (London: Eyre & Spottiswoode, 1895), 675

August, 1323,<sup>5</sup> the King relented and granted permission for Lutterell to visit the papal court at Avignon for two years. At the expiration of this period Edward commanded his subject to return to England.

Apparently, however, Lutterell had found a protector in the person of Pope John XXII; for in a letter dated the twenty-sixth of August, 1325, the Avignon Pope recommended the ex-chancellor to the favor of the King, politely excused his prolonged stay, and requested that he be permitted to stay on at Avignon in order to prosecute a "pestiferous teaching."<sup>6</sup>

The acts of the process at Avignon make it unmistakably clear that this "pestiferous teaching" to which the Pope referred in his letter was none other than that of William Ockham. Furthermore, we know that Ockham was summoned in person to Avignon, an event which Cardinal Ehrle dates at the very latest in 1324.<sup>7</sup>

That Lutterell's spirit was by no means broken by the reverses which he suffered in his struggle at Oxford to combat the forces of Ockhamism is evident from the two extant writings of his with regard to this contest.<sup>8</sup> The ex-chancellor had drawn up a list of

<sup>5</sup> *Calendar of the Patent Rolls Preserved in the Public Record Office, Edward II, A. D. 1321-1324* (London: Mackie & Co., 1904), 4, 336

<sup>6</sup> The text of the letter as found in the Register of John XXII and preserved in the Vatican archives reads. "Regi Anglie, Dilectum filium Iohannem Lutterell, sacre pagine professorem, super mora, quam causam suam contra quandam doctrinam pestiferam in nostra presencia prosequendo probabiliter, ipsum quem pro huiusmodi et aliis certis negociis usque modo retinuimus, benivolencie Regie uelut ipsius honoris zelatorem sedulum commendamus, volentes regalem excellenciam non latere quod ex hijs, que dictus Iohannes proposuit coram nobis nec tibi nec Regno tuo preiudicium aliquod uel scandalum contingere poterit, sed potius honor et utilitas prouenire sperantur uerisimiliter Ecclesie anglicane. Datum Auinione vij kal septembr anno nono" See *Reg Vat 113*, fol. 24r, as quoted by A. Pelzer, "Les 51 articles de Guillaume Occam," *Revue d'histoire ecclésiastique*, 18 (1922), 246-7, n 3

<sup>7</sup> F Ehrle, *Der Sentenzenkommentar Peters von Candia* (Munster in Westf. Verlag der Aschendorffschen Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1925), 83 (*Franziskanische Studien*, Beiheft 9).

<sup>8</sup> The MSS of these writings, *Basel, F. II 25* and *Prag, C CV*, have been edited and published by J. Koch, "Neue Aktenstücke zu dem gegen Wilhelm

fifty-six suspected articles with appropriate censures to be submitted to the Pope. Quite apparently, the adversary of Ockhamism was doing all in his power to have a large portion of the Venerable Inceptor's<sup>9</sup> teachings officially condemned by the Pope.

A study of the internal arrangement of the list of articles drawn up by Lutterell and submitted to the Pope leaves one at a loss to suggest the plan which its author might have had in mind when writing up this docket of suspected passages.<sup>10</sup> Apparently the ex-chancellor was concerned not only with the supposed theological errors of the Venerable Inceptor but also with those which pertain to the field of philosophy. More particularly, his attention during the composition of his fifty-six articles together with their respective censures seems to have been concentrated on ferreting out the underlying principles which paved the way for Ockham's later philosophical and theological conclusions. As F. Hoffman points out in his study of Lutterell's criticism of Ockhamism, twenty of the ex-chancellor's articles deal with philosophical details and the remaining thirty-six with matters of theology.<sup>11</sup>

Pope John XXII, however, evidently thought it more prudent to constitute a commission of theologians to investigate these teachings and to report on them to remove, as J. Koch observes, the dan-

Ockham in Avignon geführten Prozess," *Recherches de théologie ancienne et médiévale*, 7 (1935), 375-80, 8 (1936), 79-80

<sup>9</sup> The title, Inceptor, was a technical expression at Oxford which was given to two different interpretations. In the wide sense, the term, Inceptor, was employed to indicate the student who was working on the requisite lectures for his doctor's degree. In the strict sense, the term was used to designate the Master who had actually completed the requirements for his degree but who was not yet a *Magister actu regens*. Seemingly Ockham is designated as the *Venerabilis Inceptor* in this latter sense, namely, as one who had completed the requisites for the doctorate but who never exercised this capacity as a *Magister actu regens*. P. Boehner believes the most likely explanation as to why Ockham never became active as a *Magister regens* after having fulfilled the requirements for the doctor's degree is to be found in the accusation of heresy which was leveled at him by Lutterell. This indictment culminated in Ockham's being summoned to the Papal court at Avignon. See P. Boehner, *The Tractatus de successivis*, 2-3.

<sup>10</sup> Hoffmann, *op. cit.*, 13

<sup>11</sup> *Ibid.*, 15

ger of setting up the opinion of a school or even of one man as exclusively representative of the teachings of the Church.<sup>12</sup>

The members of this commission as constituted by the Pope were six in number: three Dominicans, two Hermits of St. Augustine, and Lutterell himself. Raymundus Bequini, Patriarch of Jerusalem. Durandus de St. Porciano, Bishop of Meaux, and Dominicus Grima, Bishop-elect of Pamiers were the Dominican members; Gregory, Bishop of Belluno-Feltre, and John Paynhota were the other religious on the commission.<sup>13</sup>

The details of the acts of the commission are of no immediate concern to us at this point. We are interested here only in the fact that Lutterell himself was a member of this papal commission. More particularly, our interest revolves around the person of the ex-chancellor in as much as he was the key figure in the opposition movement to Ockham at Oxford and the moving force behind the ecclesiastical investigation which was carried on at Avignon.

Unfortunately, particular details on Lutterell's doctrinal background are scarce. An historical study of this factor alone would possibly do much to explain his troubled career as chancellor of the University. However, his list of fifty-six articles, presumably drawn from Ockham's writings, indicates that his enthusiasm for the Thomistic system was by no means concealed, for, as F. Hoffmann notes, Lutterell mentions the opinions of St. Thomas three times with the greatest respect.<sup>14</sup> Furthermore Hoffmann's study of Lutterell's criticism of Ockhamism shows to what extent the ex-chancellor made capital of the teachings of the Angelic Doctor to oppose the system advanced by the Venerable Inceptor.<sup>15</sup> It is difficult to understand how the English theologian, fortified with a strong, personal conviction concerning the exclusive truth content of the Thomistic system, could be positive and objective in his judgment

<sup>12</sup> "Neue Aktenstücke zu dem gegen Wilhelm Ockham in Avignon geführten Prozess," *op. cit.*, 7 (1935), 362

<sup>13</sup> These names appear in the *Rapport des maîtres en théologie chargés par Jean XXII d'examiner 51 articles de Guillaume Occam. Copié par Richard de Londres vers 1333 dans le ms Vat. lat. 3075, fol. 1-5<sup>r</sup>*. [Avignon, 1326]. The report is quoted in full by Pelzer, *art. cit.*, 249

<sup>14</sup> Hoffmann, *op. cit.*, 14

<sup>15</sup> *Ibid.*, *passim*.

and refutation of a system of thought which was rooted in an entirely different spirit.<sup>16</sup>

Lutterell's troubled career as chancellor of the University may be explained in part by the fact that Thomistic teachings were not accepted without reservation at Oxford. This attitude was reflected during the latter part of the preceding century by the opposition of Robert Kilwardby, himself a Dominican,<sup>17</sup> and John Pecham, a Franciscan.<sup>18</sup>

It is apparent from the Pope's letter to King Edward II of England in which he requested an extension of the ex-chancellor's stay at Avignon, that Lutterell and his efforts to combat Ockham's teachings enjoyed papal sympathy. The reason advanced by the Pope for the extension of Lutterell's sojourn was that he might be able to press his cause against a "pestiferous teaching," namely, that of the Venerable Inceptor.<sup>19</sup> Just how much of Lutterell's personality and enthusiasm for his cause went into the molding of John XXII's mind in this matter is difficult to say. The ex-chancellor's winning personality and diplomatic tact may be assumed from the fact that although strongly forbidden by the King to visit the continent or in any way to carry on the struggle after his deposition as chancellor, he had won a reversal of the King's decision in just one year. What influenced the King to change his mind, we can only surmise; but, as F. Hoffmann mentions, Lutterell in all likelihood made powerful friends who supported his cause with the King.<sup>20</sup>

Moreover, there was certainly some common intellectual meeting-ground between Lutterell and the reigning Pope. This seems to go back to the fact that Jacques Duèze in the two years before he became Pope studied at Paris,<sup>21</sup> where he was almost certain to have come under Thomistic influence.

<sup>16</sup> V. Heynck, "Besprechungen," [Review of Hoffmann's *Die erste Kritik des Ockhamismus durch den Oxforder Kanzler Johannes Lutterell*], *Franziskanische Studien*, 4 (1942), 103

<sup>17</sup> M. de Wulf, *Histoire de la philosophie médiévale* (6<sup>e</sup> ed., Louvain: Institut Supérieur de Philosophie, 1943-7), 2, 206.

<sup>18</sup> *Ibid.*, 222.

<sup>19</sup> *Supra*, n. 6.

<sup>20</sup> *Op cit.*, 5

<sup>21</sup> G. Mollat, "Jean XXII," *DTC* 8 (1924), 633

It is an historical fact that John XXII was an ardent admirer of St. Thomas and his system of thought. When, for example, it was objected, on the occasion of the canonization of St. Thomas in 1323, that the Angelic Doctor had worked no, or at least very few, miracles in his life, the Pope replied that this objection was without point in this particular instance since the Saint had worked just as many miracles as he had decided questions.<sup>22</sup> "Thomas alone," John XXII is quoted by Maritain as saying, "has illuminated the Church more than all the other doctors together."<sup>23</sup> And again: "His [St. Thomas'] philosophy can have proceeded only from some miraculous action of God."<sup>24</sup> Mention is also made by Maritain of the fact that after John XXII's canonization of the Angelic Doctor, "on the 14 February, 1324, at the instance of Rome, Étienne de Borretto, Bishop of Paris, withdrew the condemnation of the Thomist theses decreed in 1277 by his predecessor Étienne Tempier."<sup>25</sup>

Another common link between the English theologian and the French Pope was the opinion which John XXII later preached openly and not without grave opposition, namely, that the just do not enjoy the beatific vision before the final judgment but only the vision of the humanity of Christ.<sup>26</sup> Seemingly John Lutterell was also in favor of this unusual conception of the beatific vision, as is suggested by a note in the *Chartularium* attached to one of the letters of the masters of Paris protesting against John XXII's teaching on the state of souls after death.<sup>27</sup>

<sup>22</sup> Joannes Gerson, *Opera et tractatus* (Parisiis: apud Iohannem Parvum et Franciscum Regnault, 1521), p. 2, fol. 218<sup>v</sup>, b. "Unde cum in canonizatione sancti Thomae de Aquino opponeretur quod non fecerat miracula in vita, vel non multa, dictum fuit per papam non esse curandum, nam tot miracula fecit quot quaestiones determinavit." See also P. Mandonnet, "La canonisation de saint Thomas d'Aquin, 1317-1323," *Bibliothèque thomiste*, 3 (1923), 39, n. 1. (*Mélanges thomistes*).

<sup>23</sup> J. Maritain, *St. Thomas Aquinas Angel of the Schools*, trans. J. F. Scanlon (London: Sheed & Ward, 1946), 29

<sup>24</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>25</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>26</sup> X. Le Bachelet, "Benoit XII," *DTC* 2 (1923), 659.

<sup>27</sup> Denifle-Chatelain, *op. cit.*, 2, 432-3. "Quam sententiam et Johannes Lutterell in sua Epistola n<sup>o</sup> 975, not. 3, allata propugnavit."

Subsequent historical study, it is hoped, will shed additional light on the figure of John Lutterell, who holds a place of honor in the annals of the University of Oxford as the first scholarly opponent of Ockhamism, despite the fact that he has the singular and dubious distinction of being the only chancellor to be deposed from his office by the joint action of the University and the Bishop of the diocese.<sup>28</sup>

Lutterell's list of fifty-six articles, supposedly extracted from Ockham's own writings, plays an important role in the early history of the opposition movement to the teachings of the Venerable Inceptor. Of interest to the present study on Ockham's Eucharistic teachings are five articles and the consequent errors as drawn up by Lutterell which pertain either directly or indirectly to the Venerable Inceptor's theology on the Blessed Sacrament.<sup>29</sup>

The following are the articles which are apropos of the present study:

1. Twelfth article: That both the quantity which is continuous and the quantity which is discrete are the very substance itself.<sup>30</sup>

2. Twenty-first article: That fewer *inconvenientia* follow from that explanation of transubstantiation which is rejected by the Church, namely, that the substance of bread remains after transubstantiation, than from the explanation which the Church holds.<sup>31</sup>

<sup>28</sup> Hoffmann, *op. cit.*, 2.

<sup>29</sup> These articles drawn up by Lutterell were edited and published by J. Koch under the caption: "Articuli pertracti inferius reperti in libro nuper domino pape exhibito." See Koch, "Neue Aktenstücke zu dem gegen Wilhelm Ockham in Avignon geführten Prozess," *op. cit.*, 7 (1935), 375-8. The errors consequent upon these articles were published by the same editor under the title: "Hii sunt errores qui sequi videntur ex articulis prescriptis contra veram et sanam doctrinam, sicut apparet in tractatu sequenti." *Ibid.*, 378-80.

<sup>30</sup> *Ibid.*, 375: "Duodecimus articulus Quod tam quantitas continua quam discreta sunt ipsa substantia."

<sup>31</sup> *Ibid.*, 376: "Vicesimus primus articulus. Quod ad illam viam quam reprobat Ecclesia, videlicet quod substantia panis remanet post transsubstantiationem, pauciora inconvenientia sequuntur quam ad viam quam tenet Ecclesia."

3. Twenty-second article: That rarefaction, rarity, and density express nothing absolute beyond the substance of the thing which is rarefied or condensed.<sup>32</sup>

4. Thirty-third article: That the body of Christ as it now exists here sacramentally where previously it did not exist is changed locally.<sup>33</sup>

5. Thirty-fourth article: That the substance of bread in the sacrament is truly annihilated.<sup>34</sup>

From this list of articles Lutterell adds that the following errors may be deduced:

1. From the twelfth article it follows that what is seen with the bodily eye is the body of Christ in the sacrament.<sup>35</sup>

2. From the twenty-first article it follows that what the Church asserts with regard to the sacrament of the Eucharist is false.<sup>36</sup>

3. From the twenty-second article it follows either that there is no transubstantiation of the bread, or that which we see with our bodily eyes is the body of Christ.<sup>37</sup>

4. From the thirty-third article it follows that in transubstantiation the body of Christ leaves the place where it formerly was.<sup>38</sup>

5. From the thirty-fourth article it follows that there is no transubstantiation of the bread, but only annihilation.<sup>39</sup>

<sup>32</sup> *Ibid.*: "Vicesimus secundus articulus Quod rarefactio, raritas et densitas nichil dicunt absolutum ultra substantiam rari vel densi"

<sup>33</sup> *Ibid.*: "Tricesimus tertius articulus. Quod corpus Christi existens nunc hic sacramentaliter, ubi prius non fuit, mutatur localiter."

<sup>34</sup> *Ibid.*, 377. "Tricesimus quartus articulus Quod substantia panis in sacramento vere adnichilatur."

<sup>35</sup> *Ibid.*, 379: "Ad 12<sup>m</sup> quod id quod videtur oculo nostro est corpus Christi in sacramento."

<sup>36</sup> *Ibid.*: "Ad 21<sup>m</sup> quod falsum est quod ecclesia asserit in sacramento eucharistie."

<sup>37</sup> *Ibid.*: "Ad 22<sup>m</sup> quod non est transsubstantiatio panis vel quod id quod videmus oculis nostris est corpus Christi."

<sup>38</sup> *Ibid.*: "Ad 33<sup>m</sup> quod in transsubstantiatione corpus Christi relinquit locum, ubi prius fuit."

<sup>39</sup> *Ibid.*: "Ad 34<sup>m</sup> quod transsubstantiatio panis non est, sed adnichilatio."

With this list of articles and consequent errors at hand, a more detailed study of Ockham's teaching on the Eucharist, it is hoped, will determine whether the Venerable Inceptor was deserving of the suspicion and the blame heaped on his head by the ex-chancellor of Oxford and of the censures subsequently attached to some of his Eucharistic teachings by the papal commission at Avignon.<sup>40</sup>

<sup>40</sup> *Ibid.*, 8 (1936), 81-93; 168-94.



## CHAPTER I

### CHRIST'S REAL PRESENCE IN THE EUCHARIST

#### OCKHAM'S ATTITUDE TOWARD THE STUDY OF THE EUCHARIST

With deep reverence and humility Ockham approaches the study of the Blessed Eucharist in his specialized treatise *De corpore Christi*.<sup>1</sup> Fully conscious of the loftiness of such a study and of the weakness of the human intellect to grapple with the divine truths, the author apologizes for his presumption in daring to undertake the task which he has set for himself.<sup>2</sup> Despite the dangers which attend such an inquiry into the Mystery of the Altar, our author finds encouragement in the promise of a fruitful harvest to be gleaned from such a labor.<sup>3</sup>

Appreciative of the fact that in matters of faith the infallible guidance of the Holy Ghost was promised only to the Church of Christ, Ockham is quick to assert his intentions of holding only what the Roman Church teaches concerning the Eucharist. If through ignorance or human weakness it should be his misfortune to state anything contrary to the doctrine of the Church, it is his wish that it be considered as if it had not been said. This profession of complete faith in all that the Church teaches is evidently intended to counterbalance any false or heretical statement which, contrary to his best intentions, may creep into his writings on this difficult theme.

<sup>1</sup> In the *Report* and *Quodl.* Ockham's treatment of the Eucharist follows the usual scholastic form of questions without any formal introduction to the subject.

<sup>2</sup> *De corp Christi*, Prol.: "Ut autem tanti muneris in nobis iugis maneret memoria ac pro nobis qui quotidie labimur Christus quotidie mystice immolaretur corpus suum in cibum et sanguinem suum in potum in Eucharistiae sacramento sumendum fidelibus dereliquit, cuius ineffabilis altitudo humanae indagini subici dignatur."

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*: "Propter quod de isto summo et excellentissimo sacramento cum omni timore et modestia est loquendum, quia circa nullum sacramentum est error periculosior nec inquisitio laboriosior nec inventio fructuosior."

With some pains the Venerable Inceptor outlines the value of implicit faith. Appealing to the authority of Pope Innocent IV, Ockham argues: If, according to Pope Innocent, someone holds a false opinion with regard to the Trinity, for example, a doctrine which is *de facto* expressly stated in the canonical writings, believing, in his ignorance, that his position is in harmony with the teachings of the Church, such an individual is excused from formal heresy provided his will is implicitly directed toward believing only what the Church teaches; and that despite the fact that his intellect is in error. With even more cause, Ockham argues, one can hope to be excused from the charge of heresy if, through ignorance and despite his good will, he deviates from the path of truth while investigating certain truths relative to the Blessed Eucharist which are not found explicitly either in the canonical writings or in the teachings of approved theologians.<sup>4</sup> Later in the *De corpore Christi* the Venerable Inceptor repeats his protestation of loyalty and fidelity to the teachings of the Church, adding that whatever else he might set forth contrary to these teachings is intended only for the purpose of exercise and to give material for thought.<sup>5</sup>

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, c. 1: "Quicquid enim explicitè Romana credit Ecclesia, hoc solum et non aliud vel explicitè vel implicitè credo. Quantaè autem utilitatis et efficaciae sit fides implicita, explicat Innocentius extra *De summa Trinitate et fide Catholica*, *Firmiter*: 'Tantum,' inquit, 'valet fides implicita ut dicunt quidam quod si aliquis eam habet, quod, scilicet, credit quicquid Ecclesia credit, si false opinatur ratione naturali motus quod Pater maior vel prior sit Filio, vel quod tres personae sint tres res ad invicem distinctae, non est haereticus, nec peccat dummodo hunc errorem non defendat, et hoc ipsum credit quia credit Ecclesiam sic credere et suam opinionem fidei Ecclesiae supponit; quod licet sic male opinetur, tamen illa fides non est fides sua; immo fides sua est fides Ecclesiae.' Si igitur tantaè efficaciae sit fides implicita ut excuset ignoranter errantem circa illa quae in Scriptura Canonica sunt expressa, multo magis excusabit ignoranter opinantem aliquid quod nec in Scriptura Canonica nec in doctoribus approbatis ab ecclesia reperitur expressum." See Innocentius IV, *Apparatus decretalium* (Venetiis, 1481), fol. 2v, *Firmiter credimus*, X:1, 1, 1.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, c. 15. "Replico tamen protestationem praemissam in principio istius opusculi, quod nihil dicam assertive nisi quod Romana docet Ecclesia. Paratus in omnibus propter auctoritatem eiusdem Ecclesiae ingenium meum captivare ac universa quae Romana Ecclesia explicat vel explicabit corde credere et ore fateri; cetera autem recitando tantum, sub quacumque forma

Not to be confused at this juncture are Ockham's enthusiastic attestations of loyalty to the Church and its teachings and his questioning, critical attitude toward the papacy which threads its way through his later political writings. To those acquainted with Ockham only as the stormy political figure, the advocate of limited papal power, these protestations of loyalty to the teachings of the Church of Rome may come as somewhat of a surprise. Ockham's life and writings, it should be noted, fall into two clearly divided periods: the epoch prior to his being summoned to the court of Avignon by Pope John XXII (1324) and the later period comprising the years after his escape from the French city of the Popes. After his flight from Avignon he lived at Munich under the protection of the German King, Louis the Bavarian.<sup>6</sup>

During this first period, namely, at the time of his activity at Oxford, his time and attention were devoted to the development of his conceptualistic system of theology and philosophy. While the call to arms over the question of poverty had already sounded in the Franciscan Order, the Venerable Inceptor, at least judging from his writings at this time, seemed to have been completely isolated from the battle area.

Only during the third year of his stay at Avignon was Ockham drawn into this struggle, for at that time he was brought into association with Michael de Cesena, the General of the Franciscan Order, who had been under papal arrest since December, 1327. This circumstance was to alter completely the trend and tenor of Ockham's later life and work. From then on he was no longer merely the speculative thinker concerned with the problems of logic, metaphysics, and theology, but the polemical writer and theologian bent on defending the position of his General in this struggle over poverty, and later, on opposing the Pope with regard to the extent of papal authority.

Ockham's study of the debate on poverty, undertaken at the request of Michael, brought with it the conviction that Pope John XXII was in error on this question, since some of his statements

verborum expresserim, ratione exercitii et dandi materiam cogitandi proponam in medium."

<sup>6</sup> Boehner, *The Tractatus de successivis*, 9-15.

were at variance with the earlier decretals of Pope Nicholas III. As P. Boehner points out, "he found in these contradictions an excuse to renounce obedience to a Pope whom he considered heretical."<sup>7</sup> This friction with the Pope, followed by Ockham's escape from Avignon in May, 1328, and the subsequent excommunication of the four friars who fled from the French city of the Popes, served to complete the rupture with the papal authority. Further developments in this struggle served only to carry the Venerable Inceptor farther afield in his disagreement with the papal authority, a disagreement which was to reach its culminating point in his vigorous and bitter discussion of the very nature and extent of the papal power itself.

That, in brief, is the story of the latter portion of Ockham's stormy career. Of more particular concern to us here, however, is the fact that despite this long and vitriolic struggle with the papacy, the Venerable Inceptor never denied "the supremacy of the Pope or any defined dogma of the Church—except those defined by Pope John XXII and his successor, because he considered them heretical."<sup>8</sup>

While this disobedience of Ockham can in no way be condoned, the contemporary confusion about the extent of papal power must, in all fairness to the Venerable Inceptor, be kept in mind when examining his position and attitude toward the papacy. P. Boehner's note is much to the point in this regard:

In any case, Ockham does not believe in the infallibility of the Pope, which, at this time, was not yet a defined dogma; nor does he seem to believe in the infallibility of a general Council, but only of the Church, though his discussion on this topic in the *Dialogus* should be more cautiously used than is commonly done. In any case, Ockham did not make the necessary distinction between a definition *ex cathedra* and other statements of the Popes. Hence the unfortunate instances of erroneous statements of Pope John XXII about the beatific vision prevented him from believing in the infallibility of the Pope.<sup>9</sup>

<sup>7</sup> "Ockham's Political Ideas," *The Review of Politics*, 5 (1943), 463.

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*, 465.

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid.*, 472, n. 19.

Be that as it may, apparently Ockham felt fully justified in adopting this attitude of defiance toward Pope John XXII and his successor on these debated points. Withal the Venerable Inceptor felt himself loyal to the teachings of the Church. His frequent protestations of loyalty to these teachings in the *De corpore Christi* must then be interpreted as genuine and authentic and coming from a heart which was sincerely, if not prudently and obediently, devoted to the cause of truth and Catholicity.

Some authors, incidentally, among whom F. Rettberg<sup>10</sup> and T. Lindsay<sup>11</sup> are included, are of the opinion that these statements of Ockham expressing his desire to believe and to teach whatsoever the Church teaches are to be taken as ironical. We find no justification for such an assumption because of the following reasons: First of all, the date of writing of the *De corpore Christi* definitely seems to be anterior to the time of Ockham's political controversy with the papacy, that is, before 1324, or at least before 1327.<sup>12</sup> Secondly, the extensive use of canonical sources<sup>13</sup> in the *De corpore*

<sup>10</sup> "Occam und Luther," *Theologische Studien und Kritiken*, 12 (1839), 77 ff.

<sup>11</sup> "William of Occam and His Connexion with the Reformation," *British Quarterly Review*, 56 (1872), 9.

<sup>12</sup> Boehner, "Ockham's Political Ideas," *op. cit.*, 462.

<sup>13</sup> The principal canonical sources referred to by Ockham are four: (1) *Decretum Gratiani*; (2) *Decretales Gregorii IX*; (3) Glosses on the *Decretum Gratiani*; (4) Glosses on the *Decretales Gregorii IX*. In this study these sources will be referred to in the following manner: (1) The second part of the *Decretum Gratiani* by stating the number of the canon (c.), *causa* (C.), and *quaestio* (q.); thus c. 77, C. 1, q. 1. The third part of the *Decretum* will be referred to by citing the number of the canon (c.), distinction (D), and title; thus c. 1, D. 2, *de cons.* (2) The *Decretales Gregorii IX* may be recognized by the "X" which follows the chapter number (c.) and further specified by the opening words, book, and number of title; thus c 6, X, *Cum Marthae*, III, 41. (3) Glosses on the *Decretum Gratiani* by the name of the glossator, when known, followed by the designation, *Glossa ordinaria*, with a further reference to the glossated part of the *Decretum*. This latter is further specified by the particular word or phrase in question (v) Hence Johannes Teutonicus, *Glossa ord.* on D. 2, *de cons.*, c. 49, v. *Dupliciter*. (4) Glosses on the *Decretales Gregorii IX* by the name of the glossator, when known, and the name of the compiler of these *glossa ordinaria* on X; further specification by the opening words of the chapter; in parentheses the numbers of

*Christi* make it apparent that the author's every effort was directed toward establishing the fact that his notions of substance, quantity, and quality as applied to the Eucharist were not out of harmony with the magisterial teachings of the Church on the Blessed Sacrament. Such efforts would hardly be forthcoming from one who scorned and ridiculed the teachings of the Church. Hence, the charge of irony can hardly be leveled at Ockham, since he took such great pain to study and incorporate into his treatise on the Blessed Sacrament the canon law of his day as the touchstone of truth and orthodoxy from which he did not wish to deviate. In fine, despite his disobedience and disrespect to the Pope, the Venerable Inceptor wished above all to remain faithful and loyal to the orthodox teachings of the Catholic Church.

#### FACT OF CHRIST'S REAL PRESENCE

In keeping with the traditional teachings of the Church, which have been handed down from the very time of the apostles, scholastic theologians believed and taught the reality of Christ's presence in the Blessed Eucharist. Like his illustrious predecessors, St. Thomas Aquinas, St. Bonaventure, and Duns Scotus, Ockham steadfastly held to the fact of Christ's real presence in the Eucharist.

#### *Reportatio*

In point of time, Ockham's *Reportatio* merits first attention as regards his teaching on the fact of Christ's real presence in the Sacrament of the Altar. In the fourth question of the fourth book of this work, our author introduces his subject in the form of a question: "Whether the body of Christ can be really contained under the species of bread?"<sup>14</sup> Following the method common to the scholastic writers, he first sets up the contrary position and then

the book, title, and chapter; finally the word or phrase which is glossed. Hence. Johannes Teutonicus, in Bernardus Parmensis, *Glossa ord.* on X, *De celebr. miss.* c. *Cum Marthae* (III, 41, 6) v. *sanguinis veritatem*.

<sup>14</sup> *Report.* 4, q. 4, A: "Utrum corpus Christi realiter sub speciebus panis contineatur?"

the positive Catholic answer based on the authority of Sacred Scripture.<sup>15</sup>

Later in the same question the Venerable Inceptor, in formulating his reply to the second doubt previously proposed, namely, as to whether a new extension can be in a substance without a new *res* being added,<sup>16</sup> prefaces his answer with the observation that the species of bread are not the cause of Christ's Eucharistic presence, but that His body is immediately and *de facto* present to the place of the host.<sup>17</sup>

Furthermore, in support of his contention that a body can be in a place in which it previously did not exist without there being motion from place to place, Ockham cites the example of the presence of Christ in the Eucharist, which according to the dictates of faith,

<sup>15</sup> *Ibid.*, A-B: "Quod non arguitur quia quae occupant locum aequalem sunt aequalia, quia quaecumque uni et eidem sunt aequalia inter se sunt aequalia; et locatum est aequale loci Sed corpus Christi et species panis occupant aequalem locum; igitur, et cetera. Cum, igitur, ubi unum est reliquum est, unum non continet reliquum. Item si sic, tunc distaret a se, quia quanta est distantia inter loca, tanta est inter locata. Ad oppositum Matthaei 26 [Matt. 26:26]: 'Hoc est corpus meum'; et ad hoc sunt omnes doctores. Conclusio istius quaestionis est certa. Illud tamen ponitur diversimodo"

<sup>16</sup> *Ibid.*, K. "Secundum [dubium] est de hoc quod dicitur, quod extensio nova potest esse in substantia sine omni re nova, quia non potest esse transitus de contradictorio in contradictorium sine omni generatione et corruptione; sed materia potest modo esse non extensa, sicut materia corporis Christi in Eucharistia, et potest post extendi, et constat quod nihil corrumpitur nec deperditur; igitur aliquid acquiritur absolutum vel respectivum. Et econtra quando de materia extensa fit non extensa nihil acquiritur; igitur aliquid deperditur absolutum vel respectivum, ex quo est ibi transitus de contradictorio in contradictorium."

<sup>17</sup> *Ibid.*, N: "Ideo teneo quod idem corpus potest simul esse in diversis locis quia non magis repugnat toti habenti partes esse circumscriptive in diversis locis quam definitive; sed corpus Christi coexistit praesentialiter toti hostiae et cuilibet parti. . . . Ergo corpus Christi cuicumque est praesens est seipso immediate praesens, et per consequens illa species nihil facit ad praesentiam corporis Christi hic, ubi est hostia, quia posset Deus conservare corpus in illo loco, in quo modo est hostia, et destruere hostiam, quia hoc nullam contradictionem includit. Et hoc facto, corpus Christi esset praesens in illo loco immediate. Igitur eodem modo nunc est praesens immediate, non mediante illa specie."

is present to a place in which it previously did not exist.<sup>18</sup> The reference to Christ's presence on the altar is, of course, only incidental to the point under discussion, but it is nevertheless indicative of Ockham's belief that Christ is really and truly present on the altar.

Finally, in the *ad primum principale* of this question, Ockham, when treating of the equality of things which occupy the same place, states explicitly that Christ is really, though definitively, present to the place in which the species are circumscriptively present.<sup>19</sup>

### *De Corpore Christi*

In his specialized treatise on the Eucharist, the *De corpore Christi*, Ockham's references to the real presence are stated with even finer precision. In the prologue the Venerable Inceptor refers to the fact that Christ left His body and blood as food and drink for the benefit of the faithful: "In order that a perpetual memorial of so great a gift (the sacrifice of the cross) might remain to us, and also that Christ might be daily immolated for us who err daily, He left His body as food and His blood as drink to be received by the faithful in the sacrament of the Eucharist."<sup>20</sup> Clearly, this quotation is indicative of Ockham's belief in Christ's real presence on the altar, for food and drink are articles the objective reality of which no one questions. The Scriptural passage to which this citation apparently makes allusion is Christ's promise of the Eucharist as recorded by St. John.<sup>21</sup>

In chapter one of the *De corpore Christi* Ockham employs the

<sup>18</sup> *Ibid.*, O. "Ad aliud dico quod corpus potest esse in loco quo prius non fuit absque hoc quod moveatur ad locum vel locus ad eum; et hoc potest fieri subito sine omni motu; non tamen sine omni mutatione illius corporis. Exemplum: corpus Christi in sacramento Eucharistiae est modo praesens ubi prius non fuit. . . . Dico quod sicut corpus Christi secundum fidem modo est praesens loco cui prius non fuit praesens. . . ."

<sup>19</sup> *Ibid.*, P: ". . . dico quod . . . illae species sunt in loco circumscriptive, sed corpus Christi definitive."

<sup>20</sup> *Supra*, n. 2.

<sup>21</sup> John 6 54-7.

terms *vere et realiter*<sup>22</sup> to designate the actuality of Christ's presence on the altar. By these words, as the context of this passage indicates, is meant that Christ is truly present in the Eucharist, not as if the species of bread were a sign, or figure, or symbol which merely represents Christ's presence, but in such a way that the presence of Christ under the host is a reality as positive and objective as the person of the priest who pronounces the words of consecration. A sign or symbol, to fulfill the purpose of its existence, requires an intelligent being to interpret its significance. The presence of Christ in the Eucharist, as the words *vere et realiter* indicate, would be just as real and objective were there no intelligent being to understand or appreciate the significance of the species of bread.

Berengarius in the eleventh century had maintained that the presence of Christ in the Eucharist was merely figurative.<sup>23</sup> Ockham, who was no doubt acquainted with the condemnation meted out to this teaching by Pope St. Gregory VII in the sixth council of Rome (1079),<sup>24</sup> was alert to remove any like suspicion from his writings on the Eucharist.

### *Quodlibeta*

The *Quodlibeta* reflect the same attitude toward the reality of Christ's presence on the altar as is displayed in the *Reportatio* and in the *De corpore Christi*. Positing the question as to whether the proposition, "This is my body," pronounced by the priest at Mass is true, literally speaking, the Venerable Inceptor answers, according to the customary scholastic method, first of all in the negative. The correct Catholic position, which Ockham endorses, is to be found

<sup>22</sup> "Et non tantum corpus Christi, quod est altera pars humanae naturae, facta transsubstantiatione panis sub specie panis realiter continetur, sed etiam totus Christus integer, perfectus Deus et verus homo, sub tota hostia et qualibet parte simul vere et realiter continetur."

<sup>23</sup> C. Sheedy, *The Eucharistic Controversy of the Eleventh Century against the Background of Pre-Scholastic Theology*, SST 4, 2 ser. (diss. Washington, 1947), 75-6.

<sup>24</sup> *ES*, 355.

in the *contra* where he argues that since there can be no falsehood in any sacrament, the words of consecration cannot be false.<sup>25</sup>

For the most part Ockham assumes the real presence to be a fact authoritatively established and unquestionably accepted by the faithful just as it was believed and professed in the very cradle days of Christianity.<sup>26</sup> To multiply passages in which the Venerable Inceptor refers either directly or indirectly to his belief in the real presence of Christ in the Blessed Sacrament would serve only to confirm a fact which is already well founded by the preceding study of the three main sources of Ockham's Eucharistic teaching.

#### INTEGRITY OF CHRIST'S REAL PRESENCE

In Ockham's specialized treatise on the Eucharist, stress is laid on the fact that the whole and integral Christ, that is, body, blood, soul, and divinity, is present under the sacramental veil. A passage of chapter one of the *De corpore Christi* not only illustrates the case in point but also seems to anticipate even in wording the later definition of the Council of Trent:

Not only is the body of Christ, which is the other part of human nature, really contained under the appearance of bread, transubstantiation of the bread having been effected, but also the whole and integral Christ, perfect God and true man, is truly and really contained under the whole host and under each part thereof.<sup>27</sup>

Just what is meant by the "whole and integral Christ, perfect God and true man" is explained in detail by the preceding lines

<sup>25</sup> *Quodl.* 2, q. 19: "Utrum haec propositio, 'hoc est corpus meum,' prolata a sacerdote in Missa sit vera de virtute sermonis? . . . Contra [positionem quae dicit quod non] Nulla falsitas est in quocumque sacramento; ergo haec non est falsa, 'hoc est corpus meum.'"

<sup>26</sup> *De corp. Christi*, c. 2: "Ex his [scriptores canonici, doctores Ecclesiae, sancti Patres, et expositores Sanctae Scripturae] aliisque pluribus auctoritatibus evidenter ostenditur corpus Christi sub specie panis realiter contineri; et quia illud a primordio fidei Christianae omnibus fidelibus erat perspicuum, ideo circa eius confirmationem nolo diutius immorari."

<sup>27</sup> *Supra*, n. 22. See also *ES*, 883.

which Ockham presents as the opinion of theologians approved by the Church:

Catholic theologians approved by the Roman Catholic Church who have written about the sacrament of the Eucharist intended to say this, that the body of Christ which was taken from the Virgin Mary, which suffered and was buried, which arose, ascended into heaven and sits at the right hand of God the Father, and in which the Son of God will come to judge the living and the dead, is truly and really contained under the appearance of bread.<sup>28</sup>

#### BASIS FOR BELIEF IN REAL PRESENCE

With the fact of Ockham's belief in Christ's Eucharistic presence established beyond any reasonable doubt, further investigation of his reasons for holding to this truth is *apropos*. In keeping with his general teaching concerning the relation between faith and reason, the Venerable Inceptor defends the position that while all truths necessary for salvation are designated as theological truths, some theological truths, even though revealed, can also be known naturally, while others can be known only because God has deigned to reveal them to us. Such realities as God's existence, His wisdom and goodness, belong to the first category of theological truths, while the Trinity, Incarnation, and the like are representative of the second classification, that is, of those theological truths which can be known only because God in His goodness has revealed them to us.<sup>29</sup>

<sup>28</sup> *De corp Christi*, c. 1. "Doctores Catholici a Romana Ecclesia approbati, qui de sacramento Eucharistiae conscripserunt, hoc intenderunt asserere quod corpus Christi quod sumptum est de Virgine Maria, quod passum est et sepultum, quodque resurrexit et in caelum ascendit et sedet ad dexteram Dei Patris, et in quo Filius Dei venturus est iudicare vivos et mortuos, sub specie panis veraciter et realiter continetur."

<sup>29</sup> *Ord*, Prol., q. 1, F: "Aliquae veritates necessariae homini viatori ad aeternam beatitudinem consequendam sunt veritates theologicae. Aliquae veritates naturaliter natae seu cognoscibiles sunt theologicae, sicut Deus est, Deus est sapiens, bonus, et cetera, cum sint necessariae ad salutem; aliquae autem sunt supernaturaliter cognoscibiles, sicut Deus est trinus, incarnatus, et huiusmodi."

Left to his reason alone, theologians agree, man would never arrive at a knowledge of Christ's presence in the Blessed Sacrament. Ockham admits that the reality of Christ's Eucharistic presence is a theological truth which cannot be known naturally. Hence, for a knowledge of this fact we are wholly dependent upon the revelation which the Son of God made to His apostles.<sup>30</sup>

### *Sacred Scripture*

As witness to this divinely revealed mystery, Ockham cites in turn the Evangelists Matthew, Luke, and John, and finally St. Paul. The two Synoptics are quoted by the Venerable Inceptor as recording the words of institution, which, according to their proper signification, show that Christ intended to effect His own real presence beneath the appearances of bread and wine.<sup>31</sup>

The words of St. John, as cited by our author, have reference to Christ's promise that He would give His flesh to eat for the life of the world. The Beloved Disciple indicates, as Ockham mentions, that the Saviour designated His flesh and blood as productive of eternal life, an effect which no material bread could accomplish.<sup>32</sup> From the context of the Gospel as well as from the traditional interpretation of the Fathers, it is evident that this passage from the pen of St. John admits of no metaphorical interpretation. Therefore, since the Venerable Inceptor, referring to this classic section

<sup>30</sup> *De corp. Christi*, c 2 "Quod corpus Christi sub specie panis realiter continetur per rationem naturalem ostendi non potest; et ideo ad istius veritatis notitiam oportet per fidem accedere, de qua dubitare non debemus cum constet ipsam per Unigenitum Dei Filium fuisse revelatum Apostolis. . . ."

<sup>31</sup> *Ibid.*: " . . . teste sanctissimo Evangelista Mattheo, 26 [Matt. 26: 26]: 'Acceptit,' inquit, 'Iesus panem et benedicens fregit deditque discipulis suis et ait: 'Accipite et comedite, hoc est corpus meum'' Quibus consentit Lucas, 22 [Luke 22. 19] dicens: 'Accepto pane gratias egit, fregit et dedit eis dicens: 'Hoc est corpus meum quod pro vobis datur; hoc facite in meam commemorationem.''"

<sup>32</sup> *Ibid.*: "Ioannes etiam Evangelista refert verba Salvatoris simul veritatem et utilitatem illius sacramenti demonstrantis, Ioanne 6 [John 6: 54-5]: 'Panis quem ego dabo caro mea est pro mundi vita'; et sequitur: 'Nisi manducaveritis carnem Filii Hominis et biberitis eius sanguinem, non habebitis vitam in vobis. Qui manducat meam carnem et bibit meum sanguinem, habet vitam aeternam'"

of St. John's Gospel, in no way endeavors to interpret it in a metaphorical or figurative sense, we can infer that he accepts Christ's promise at its face value.

To the testimony of the Evangelists, two selections from St. Paul's *First Epistle to the Corinthians* are added. The Apostle of the Gentiles, in speaking to the Corinthians of the institution of the Eucharist, told them, as Ockham mentions, "that the Lord Jesus on the night in which he was betrayed, took bread, and giving thanks, broke and said, 'this is my body which shall be given for you; do this in remembrance of me.'" <sup>33</sup> Similarly Ockham quotes from the same Epistle a passage wherein St. Paul, discussing the idol offerings as compared with the Table of the Lord, asks the rhetorical question: "And the bread that we break, is it not the partaking of the body of the Lord?" <sup>34</sup>

In fine, the testimony of the inspired writers that the body of Christ was really and truly given to the apostles under the species of bread, and that an injunction was leveled upon them and their successors in the priesthood to the effect that they should offer the body of Christ under the appearances of food and drink, is for Ockham evidence enough of the reality of this fact. <sup>35</sup>

### *Decretum Gratiani*

In support of such a literal interpretation of Christ's words as He instituted the Sacrament of the Altar, Ockham, by citing selections from five of the Latin Fathers, namely, Sts. Augustine, <sup>36</sup>

<sup>33</sup> *Ibid.*: "Similiter Apostolus Paulus ad Corinthios, 11 [1 Cor 11: 23-4]: 'Dominus,' inquit, 'Jesus in qua nocte tradebatur, accepit panem et gratias agens, fregit et dixit. 'Accipite et manducate, hoc est corpus meum. Hoc facite in meam commemorationem.''"

<sup>34</sup> *Ibid.*: "Item [ad] Corinthios, 10 [1 Cor. 10: 16]. 'Panis quem frangimus, nonne communicatio corporis Domini est?'"

<sup>35</sup> *Ibid.*: "Isti sunt auctoritates Scripturae Canonicae qui concorditer affirmant corpus Christi veraciter et realiter sub specie panis fuisse datum Apostolis ac eisdem a Salvatore fuisse praeceptum ut in memoriam passionis Dominicae corpus Christi sub specie panis offerent."

<sup>36</sup> *Ibid.*: "Praedictis etiam scriptoribus Scripturae Canonicae consentiunt doctores egregii sancti Patres, Scripturae Divinae expositores clarissimi ac a

Cyprian,<sup>37</sup> Ambrose,<sup>38</sup> Jerome,<sup>39</sup> and Gregory,<sup>40</sup> as they appear in the *Decretum Gratiani*, aims to show that such has always been the traditional teaching and legal construction affixed by the Church to the words of consecration. Judging these select passages as all sufficient to show that Christ's real presence is not only a divinely revealed truth but a fact which always enjoyed the constant support of the Fathers, of the theologians, and of the canonists of the Church, the Venerable Inceptor wishes to delay no longer in quest of further confirmation of a truth which has always been clear and evident to the faithful for the preceding fourteen centuries.<sup>41</sup>

Romana Ecclesia authenticati, quorum nonnullae auctoritates insertae iuri canonico sunt in medium proponendae. Unde dicit beatus Augustinus et habetur I, quaestione prima, *Intra Ecclesiam*: 'Intra,' inquit, 'Ecclesiam Catholicam in mysterio corporis et sanguinis Domini nihil a bono maius nec nihil a malo minus perficitur sacerdote.' See c 77, C. 1, q. 1, in A. Friedberg, *Corpus iuris canonici* (Lipsiae. Ex officina Bernhardi Tauchnitz, 1879-81), 1, 385.

<sup>37</sup> *Ibid.*: "Item beatus Cyprianus episcopus et habetur *De consecratione*, distinctione secunda, *Scriptura*: 'Quotiescumque,' inquit, 'calicem in commemorationem Domini et passionis eius offerimus, id quod constat Dominum fecisse faciamus.'" See c. 3, D. 2, *de cons.*, in Friedberg, *op. cit.*, 1315.

<sup>38</sup> *Ibid.*: "Item Ambrosius et habetur *De consecratione*, distinctione secunda, *Ante benedictionem*: 'Ante,' inquit, 'benedictionem alia species nominatur, post benedictionem corpus significatur Item in isto sacramento Christus est'" See c 40, D. 2, *de cons.*, in Friedberg, *op. cit.*, 1328.

<sup>39</sup> *Ibid.*: "Item Ieronymus et habetur *De consecratione*, distinctione secunda, *Nec Moyses*: 'Nec,' inquit, 'Moyses dedit vobis panem verum, sed Dominus Iesus ipse conviva et convivum, ipse comedens et qui comeditur'" See c. 87, D. 2, *de cons.*, in Friedberg, *op. cit.*, 1350.

<sup>40</sup> *Ibid.*: "Item beatus Gregorius et habetur I, quaestione prima, *Multi*: 'Polluimus,' inquit, 'panem, id est, corpus Christi, quando indigni accedimus ad altare.'" See c 84, C. 1, q. 1, in Friedberg, *op. cit.*, 388.

<sup>41</sup> *Supra*, n. 26.

## CHAPTER II

### A PRIORI MODES OF CHRIST'S BECOMING PRESENT

The orthodoxy or heterodoxy of any theologian's teaching about the Eucharist is usually intimately connected with his notion about the mode of Christ's becoming present on the altar. For this reason great care and attention must be employed in the examination of Ockham's doctrine on this point which may well be considered the very heart of his Eucharistic teaching. The linking up of Ockham's name with that of Luther as regards their teaching on the Eucharist seems to have its origin in an interpretation of this key doctrine.

The early Fathers and Doctors of the Church appreciated not only the sublimity of this mystery of the conversion of bread and wine into the body and blood of Christ but also the difficulties involved in a study of such a sublime truth. For the most part, however, their attention was focused on combating the Christological and Trinitarian errors which were rampant during the early days of the Church. The scholastics, unhampered by the struggles which demanded the time and attention of the theologians of that earlier era, accepted the challenge contained in the problem raised by Berengarius and discussed by his contemporaries.<sup>1</sup> The passage of time, while it had done much to clarify and crystallize the dogmatic teachings of the Church, did not mitigate the difficulties involved in the study of this mystery of the Eucharist. For the most part, as is evidenced by a statement of Peter Lombard, theologians undertook this study with fear and trembling: "If, however, you seek the manner in which it [namely, how the body of Christ can be confected from the substance of bread] can take place, I answer briefly: A mystery of faith can be believed salutarily but not salutarily investigated."<sup>2</sup> Ockham in the prologue to the *De corpore*

<sup>1</sup> Sheedy, *The Eucharistic Controversy of Pre-Scholastic Theology*, 80-1.

<sup>2</sup> *Quatuor libri sententiarum*, 4, d. 11, c. 2, in *Opera omnia S. Bonaventurae*, 4 (Quaracchi: Ex typographis collegii S. Bonaventurae, 1889), 238: "Si vero quaeris modum, quo id [id est, quomodo corpus Christi confici potest de substantia panis] fieri possit, breviter respondeo: **Mysterium fidei credi salubriter potest investigari salubriter non potest.**"

*Christi*, although not specifically dealing with this problem, likewise indicates his realization of the obstacles to be met with in a study of the Eucharist in general, and, therefore, *par excellence*, in an examination of this key doctrine.<sup>3</sup>

Having established in the previous chapter the fact of Ockham's belief in the real presence, we are now in a position to examine in detail his teaching with regard to Christ's becoming present under the Eucharistic species. At this point he discusses several modes of effecting this presence.<sup>4</sup>

#### SUBSTANCE OF BREAD REMAINS UNCHANGED WHEN CHRIST SUCCEEDS TO AND COEXISTS WITH THE BREAD-SUBSTANCE

The first possible mode treated by the Venerable Inceptor in his *Reportatio* postulates the succession of the body of Christ so that it coexists with the substance of bread. The substance of bread, however, continues to exist in such a manner as to be the one and only subject of inherence of its proper accidents. The body of Christ, while it is veiled by these same accidents of the bread, is in no way affected by them.<sup>5</sup> Ockham likewise refers to this position

<sup>3</sup> *Supra*, c 1, n 3

<sup>4</sup> *Report.* 4, q. 6, D: "Quantum ad secundum dico quod in altari est vera praesentia corporis Christi; sed hoc potest multis modis poni."

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*: "Uno modo ponendo quo remaneat ibi substantia panis, et cum hoc quod corpus Christi coexistat substantiae illi ita quod prima substantia sit differens accidentia, secunda non, sed tantum coexistens"

While the meaning is clear from the context, a paleographical problem arises from the word *defferens*. The *Munchen, Universitätsbibl. Theol.*, 52 MS employs *defferens*. This form also appears in the corrected reading of the *Paris, Bibl. Mazar, 893* MS. The *Firenze, Bibl. Naz. A. 3, 801, Göttingen, Universitätsbibl. Theol.*, 118, *Oxford, Balliol Coll*, 299, *Paris, Bibl. Nat. lat., 16398* MSS use the verb *diferens*. The Lyons edition (1495) employs the word *deserens*.

Lacking a parallel passage to determine the correct reading, the difficulty must be settled from a speculative point of view. Of these three readings, *deserens* seems to be entirely unsatisfactory. According to Forcellini, *Lexicon totius Latinitatis*, (Patavii: Typis Seminarii, 1940), 2, 84: "Deserere . . . est ab alicuius societate solvere, adeoque relinquere, derelinquere . . . ; Angl.: to abandon, leave, forsake, desert." It should be noted moreover that the Lyons edition of the *Report.* is in general not too reliable. Added to this, the edi-

in his *De corpore Christi* as the third of three ancient opinions listed by Peter Lombard, Henricus de Segusio, and by the glossators on the *Decretum Gratiani* and the *Decretales Gregorii IX*.<sup>6</sup>

tion differs from the reading of six manuscripts. Finally, the whole context argues counter to the reading of the edition, for Ockham is here speaking of that opinion which postulates the coexistence of the substance of bread with the body of Christ. If the first substance, namely, bread, deserted its accidents, there would be no coexistence of the two substances, the very point which the author is making.

*Diferens* would be a remotely acceptable reading if we may judge from the context. According to Forcellini, *ibid*, 121, this verb has the meaning: "Active differre est huc illuc ferre, in diversa ferre . . . ; Angl: to carry hither and thither. . . ." Hence, the substance of bread would be carrying over its accidents in such a way that they would veil the substance of Christ's body which coexists with the substance of the bread.

*Deferens* is possibly the misspelling of *deferens*. If we may assume that, we have the best reading. According to Forcellini, *ibid.*, 34: "Defero est . . . aliquid a loco aliquo asporto alioque affero; Angl: to carry down or along, to carry, bring, convey." The *Thesaurus linguae Latinae*, 5 (Editio auctoritate et consilio academiarum quinque Germanicarum; Lipsiae: B. G. Teubneri, 1909-34), 314, gives the meaning: ". . . in alium locum ferre, iacere." This reading seems even better than that of *diferens*.

Granting the hypothesis that *diferens* is the incorrect spelling of *deferens*, we are then in a position to offer a likely explanation of the use of *diferens* by four of the MSS. The speculative supposition just proposed harks back to the medieval use of Latin. With some frequency the spelling *diff*—was interchanged with *def*—. A typical example is the word *diffinitio* for *definitio*. May we not assume that the same principle applies here to the words *diferens* and *deferens*?

<sup>6</sup> *De corp. Christi*, c. 5: ". . . fuerunt antiquitus diversae opiniones sicut recitat Magister Sententiarum, libro quarto, distinctione undecima, et Hostiensis in *Summa extra De consecratione*, et glossa *De consecratione*, distinctione secunda, *In sacramento*, et glossa *De celebratione Missarum, Cum Marthae*. Unde dicunt quod circa conversionem panis in corpus Christi tres erant opiniones. . . Tertia opinio tenet quod remanet ibi substantia panis et vini et in eodem loco sub eadem specie est corpus Christi." See (1) P. Lombard, *op. cit.*, 239: "Alii vero putaverunt, ibi substantiam panis et vini remanere, et ibidem corpus Christi esse et sanguinem; et hac ratione dici, illam substantiam fieri istam, quia, ubi est haec, est et illa; quod mirum est; et ipsam substantiam panis vel vini dicunt esse Sacramentum." (2) The Hostiensis referred to by Ockham is Henricus de Segusio (d. 1271). He is frequently cited as Hostiensis because of his being cardinal of Hostia. Ockham's reference is to Hostiensis' *Summa aurea*, also known as *Summa titulorum*, or *Summa copiosa*. For the

Under this general heading, two different trends of thought can be distinguished: (1) the simple coexistence of Christ's body with the substance of bread; (2) the existence of Christ's body in the host in such a way that it is united with and assumes the substance of bread.

*The Simple Coexistence of Christ's Body With the Bread-Substance*

The Venerable Inceptor readily admits the possibility of the simple coexistence of Christ's body with the substance of bread. It is neither more nor less difficult for God to effect that one substance coexists with another substance than it is to cause a quantity to coexist with another quantity; or a substance with a quantity. But from the fact that two bodies exist in the same place it is evident that one quantity can exist together with another quantity. Likewise, that a substance can coexist with quantity is manifest from the existence of Christ's body in the Eucharist, which, according to the more common Scholastic teaching, is present to the same place as the quantity of the bread, or at least, according to the conceptualistic view of quantity, is present to the same place as the quantified qualities. Consequently, Ockham considers it equally possible for God to effect the coexistence of two substances in the same place.<sup>7</sup>

above reference see *Summa aurea* (Venetiis Ad candentis Salamandriae insigne, 1570), lib 3, "De consec eccle vel altaris," 16, 308. "De corpore autem Christi tres sunt opiniones . . . Secunda asserit quod remanet ibi substantia panis et vini, et in eodem loco, et sub eadem specie est corpus et sanguis Christi arg de con. dist 2, ego [c. 42, D 2, *de cons.*]" (3) *Glossa ord.* on D 2, *de cons.*, c 1, v. *In sacramentorum*, in *Decretum Gratiani* (ed. ultima; Lugduni Apud Haeredes Guilielmi Rovillii, 1606), 1911: "De eo tamen quod dicitur quod panis convertitur in corpus Christi, variae sunt opiniones. . . . Tertia tenet quod remanet ibi substantia panis et vini, et in eodem loco, et sub eadem specie est corpus Christi arg. i ead ego. [c 52, D. 2, *de cons.*]" (4) Johannes Teutonicus, in Bernardus Parmensis, *Glossa ord.* on X, *De celebr. miss. c Cum Marthae* (III, 41, 6), v *sanguinis veritatem* in *Decretales D. Gregorii Papae IX* (Venetiis Apud magnam societatem, unà cum Georgio Ferrario et Hieronymo Franzino, 1584), 1370: "De corpore Christi tres sunt opiniones . . . Tertia dicit, quod remanet substantia panis et vini, et sub eadem specie est corpus Christi"

<sup>7</sup> *Report.* 4, q. 6, D. "Primus modus patet, quia hoc potest fieri per

Although Ockham cites no specific instances to support his contention that two bodies exist in the same place, and consequently that two quantities exist together, the fact of the Virgin birth and of Christ's appearance to His apostles in the closed upper chamber after His resurrection are cases in point. It may well be noted here that while no particular issue is made at this point concerning the nature of quantity, Ockham nevertheless considers quantity not as an absolute thing distinct from substance or quality but only as a concept connoting that a thing, be that substance or quality, has part outside of part.<sup>8</sup> Hence, by the very fact that two extended bodies coexist, as in the examples cited, we have verified, according to his notion, the coexistence of two quantities.

*Fittingness.*—The coexistence of Christ's body with the substance of bread, according to Ockham, is contrary neither to reason nor to the authority of Sacred Scripture.<sup>9</sup>

Moreover, this explanation of how Christ could be present in the Eucharist eliminates some of the difficulties inherent in the other explanations.<sup>10</sup> To Ockham's way of thinking, one of the greatest difficulties connected with the mystery of the Eucharist is that the accidents of bread are existing without a subject of inherence. Postulating the coexistence of the substance of bread with the body of Christ, this one obstacle is obviated.<sup>11</sup>

simplicem coexistentiam substantiae corporis Christi substantiae panis, quia non minus repugnat quantitas quantitati vel substantia quantitati quam substantia substantiae, sed quantitas potest existere in eodem loco cum quantitate alia patet de duobus corporibus existentibus in eodem loco. Similiter substantia potest coexistere quantitati in eodem loco patet de corpore Christi. Igitur aliud est possibile "

<sup>8</sup> *Infra*, c. 4, n. 9 ff.

<sup>9</sup> *Report.* 4, q. 6, D: "Primus modus posset teneri, quia non repugnat rationi nec alicui auctoritati Biblicae." See also *De corp. Christi*, c. 5 "Est autem advertendum, quod quamvis in Novo Testamento reperiatur expressum quod corpus Christi sub specie panis a fidelibus est sumendum in memoriam passionis Dominicae et suorum remissionem peccaminum, tamen quod substantia panis non manet ibi non exprimitur "

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid.*: "Primus modus . . . est rationabilior et facilius ad tenendum inter omnes modos, quia pauciora inconvenientia sequuntur ex eo quam ex aliquo alio modo."

<sup>11</sup> *Ibid.*: "Quod patet [id est, quod pauciora inconvenientia sequuntur ex

He reasons thus: it is no more inconvenient nor more wonderful for two substances to exist together than for substance and quantity to be in the same place. Likewise, the species of a consecrated host are no more compatible with those of another consecrated host than is the substance of an unconsecrated host together with its accidents compatible with another substance.

With due reverence to the consecrated host, a simple experiment will illustrate that there is equal incompatibility, save for God's intervention, between a substance and another quantity as between two substances. Let us assume for the moment the common Scholastic explanation, namely, that the accidents of the bread, quantity included, remain after the consecration together with the body of Christ. In this instance the quantity of a consecrated host will not occupy the same space already occupied by the substance and accidents of a non-consecrated host. Any neutral observer will testify that the quantity of a consecrated host is just as hostile to coexisting with the substance of a non-consecrated host as is the substance of a non-consecrated host to that of another non-consecrated host. This resistance displayed by the consecrated host to the non-consecrated host cannot be attributed to the body of Christ, for external quantities in no way affect His body.<sup>12</sup>

Granting, then, that substance and quantity repel each other with an intensity equal to the repugnance to coexistence found between two substances, the coexistence hypothesis none the less embodies one less difficulty. According to the Catholic explanation of the mode of Christ's presence in the Eucharist, the substance of bread no longer remains after the consecration.<sup>13</sup> The existence of hoc modo] quia inter omnia inconvenientia quae ponuntur sequi ex isto sacramento maius est quod accidens sit sine subiecto; sed ponendo primum modum non oportet illud ponere. Igitur et cetera."

<sup>12</sup> *Ibid.*: "Non est maius inconveniens nec maius mirabile duas substantias corporeas esse simul quam substantiam et quantitatem; et non plus compatitur illa species hostiae secum aliam hostiam quam substantia cum speciebus aliam substantiam, quia videmus quod illa species ita expellit aliam hostiam non consecratam sicut si esset ibi substantia panis; et hoc non contingit sibi ratione corporis Christi quia corpori Christi isti non repugnat alia quantitas sicut nec ista; et ita videtur quod nullum inconveniens sequitur ex primo modo ponendi quod non sequitur ex secundo."

<sup>13</sup> *ES*, 884.

accidents without a subject of inherence is a phenomenon unheard of in the natural order. Postulating, however, that together with the body of Christ the substance of bread remains as the proper subject of its own accidents, this one difficulty at least is eliminated.

Ockham is quick to add, however, after his disquisition on the greater fitness of this hypothetical explanation, that the Church teaches the contrary. Supporting evidence for the orthodox position is to be found not only in the *Decretales Gregorii IX* but also in the common teachings of the theologians. In the face of such authority, the Venerable Inceptor professes his belief that the substance of bread does not remain after the consecration, but only the species to which the body of Christ coexists.<sup>14</sup>

In the *De corpore Christi* Ockham gives an interesting side light on this so-called common teaching of the theologians concerning the non-coexistence of Christ's body with the substance of bread. True, there is harmony in their ranks on the actual mode of Christ's Eucharistic presence. However, there is some discord among them as to just why, speculatively speaking, the coexistence hypothesis must be outlawed. The authority of the Church settles the question in the objective order. Theologians, however, are still at liberty to speculate on this phase of the question, for the Church has never defined why, in the order of intelligibility, one mode must be maintained in preference to another.

In virtue of this privilege, two trends of thought are discernible

<sup>14</sup> *Report.* 4, q. 6, D: "Quia tamen determinatio Ecclesiae est in contrarium, sicut patet extra *De summa Trinitate et fide Catholica*, et *De celebratione Missarum*, et communiter omnes doctores tenent oppositum, ideo teneo quod non remanet ibi substantia panis sed illa species, et quod illi coexistit corpus Christi." See: (1) C. 1, X, *Firmiter*, I, 1 in Friedberg, *Corpus iuris canonici*, 2, 5: "Una vero est fidelium universalis ecclesia extra quam nullus omnino salvatur, in qua idem ipse sacerdos est sacrificium Iesus Christus, cuius corpus et sanguis in sacramento altaris sub speciebus panis et vini veraciter continentur, transsubstantiatis pane in corpus et vino in sanguinem potestate divina, ut ad perficiendum mysterium unitatis accipiamus ipsi de suo quod accepit ipse de nostro." (2) C. 6, X, *Cum Marthae*, III, 41 in Friedberg, *op. cit.*, 2, 637: "Quaesivisti siquidem, quis formae verborum, quam ipse Christus expressit, quum in corpus et sanguinem suum panem transsubstantiavit et vinum, illud in canone missae, quo ecclesia utitur generalis, adiecerit, quod nullus Evangelistarum legitur expressisse."

among Scholastic theologians. One group which Ockham mentions, and to which St. Thomas belongs, believes that it is impossible and contradictory for the substance of bread to remain with the body of Christ under the sacramental species.<sup>15</sup>

A second group, and this includes Scotus, while holding that *de facto* the substance of bread does not remain, maintains that it would not be contradictory for Christ's body to be present together with the substance of bread under the Eucharistic accidents. God, if He so chose, could effect such a state of being for both the body of Christ and the substance of bread.<sup>16</sup>

According to Scotus' way of thinking, the words of consecration would still be true in the event that God had chosen to effect Christ's presence in the Eucharist together with the substance of bread. In that eventuality, the pronoun, *hoc*, would no more designate the substance of bread than it now designates the accidents of bread. For the Subtle Doctor, the infallible magisterium of

<sup>15</sup> *De corp Christi*, c 5 "Catholici autem concorditer istam opinionem mediam approbantes in modo ponendi diversimode opinantur. Quidam enim ponunt, sicut Thomas, libro quarto, distinctione undecima, quaestione prima, quod contradictionem includit quod substantia panis maneat cum corpore Christi sacramentaliter manente sub specie panis" See St Thomas: *Commentum in quatuor libros sententiarum*, 4, d. 11, q. 1, a. 1, qu. 3, sol 1, *Opera omnia* (Parmae Typis Petri Fiaccadori, 1852-69), 7, 631; *Summa theologica*, p 3, q 75, a 2, *Opera omnia*, 4, 344; *Summa contra gentiles*, 4, c 63, *Opera omnia*, 5, 358. N. B.—All citations from the *Opera omnia* of St Thomas will be from the Parma edition. The following shortened forms and abbreviations will be subsequently employed *Commentum* to designate the *Commentum in quatuor libros sententiarum*; *Sum. theol* to signify the *Summa theologica*; *Sum c. gentiles* to stand for the *Summa contra gentiles*. *Opera omnia* will be abbreviated as *Op. omnia*.

<sup>16</sup> *De corp Christi*, c 5 "Et quidam ponunt, sicut Scotus, libro quarto, distinctione undecima, quod quamvis substantia panis de facto non maneat cum corpore Christi, tamen contradictionem non includit quin per divinam potentiam possit manere substantia panis cum corpore Christi" See Scotus: *Opus Oxoniense*, 4, d 11, q 3, *Opera omnia* (ed nova, Parisiis Apud Ludovicum Vivès, 1891-5), 17, 353, *Reportata Parisiensia*, 4, d. 11, q. 3, *Opera omnia*, 24, 113-26. N. B—Hereafter all references to Scotus' *Opus Oxoniense* will appear as *Oxon.*; and to his *Reportata Parisiensia* as *Report. Par.* All citations from his *Opera omnia* will be from the Vivès edition. The abbreviated form, *Op. omnia* will subsequently be used.

the Church is the only sure evidence that the substance of bread is wholly and entirely converted into the body of Christ; not, of course, as if the Church makes the words of consecration to have this specific and exclusive meaning, but because the Church as the custodian of the deposit of faith is the infallible interpreter of revealed truth. P. Albert O'Neill formulates Scotus' position with regard to the words of consecration in three related phases:

(1) The words of institution, taken alone, while demanding the real presence, do not prove in any decisive way the fact of transubstantiation. (2) Interpreted by the Church, the guardian and authentic interpreter of the deposit of faith, these words furnish an incontrovertible proof. (3) The truth value of these words is derived not from the Church itself but from Christ, the author of the Eucharist.<sup>17</sup>

Confronted by these two different positions, Ockham admits a preference for Scotus' view. His deciding reason is that in admitting this possibility we exalt the omnipotence of God, to whom everything is possible which does not imply an evident contradiction.<sup>18</sup>

#### *Christ's Body United With and Assumes Bread-Substance*

With some misgiving as to its very possibility, the Venerable Inceptor proposes another variation of this mode of coexistence. This mode postulates that the body of Christ be united with and assume the substance of bread so that the latter no longer has its own subsistence. The possibility of such a mode hinges on the ability of one creature to support another in existence. Faith teaches us that in the hypostatic union the human nature of Christ was assumed by the divinity. Here, however, the situation is quite

<sup>17</sup> "La preuve Scripturaire de la transsubstantiation, d'après le B. Duns Scot," *Études Franciscaines*, 44 (1932), 403. See also H. Storff, *De natura transsubstantiationis iuxta I. Duns Scotum* (Firenze-Quaracchi. Ex Typographia Collegii S. Bonaventurae, 1936), 228.

<sup>18</sup> *De corp. Christi*, c. 5: "Ista opinio secunda [See *supra*, n. 16] sine praedjudicio alicuius videtur mihi probabilior et magis consona theologiae, quia magis exaltat Dei omnipotentiam nihil ab ea negando nisi quod evidenter et expresse implicat contradictionem."

different, for there is question of one created thing, namely, the substance of bread, being assumed by another created thing, that is, by the body of Christ. In this hypothesis the nature of Christ would be a *suppositum* which assumes and is united with the substance of bread. Before the consecration the substance of bread was itself a *suppositum* having its own nature and its own individuation. After the consecration, however, this bread-substance is no longer a *suppositum*. Consequent upon this peculiar union of the two substances, the nature of bread and the nature of Christ would be supported by the one *suppositum* which is the Incarnate Word. Be that as it may, Ockham thinks that such an hypothesis does not contain a contradiction.<sup>19</sup>

#### UNCHANGED SUBSTANCE OF BREAD WITHDRAWN WHEN CHRIST SUCCEEDS TO PLACE FORMERLY OCCUPIED BY BREAD-SUBSTANCE

The second possible mode proposed by Ockham postulates a two-fold operation: On the one hand, the substance of bread is withdrawn to another place; on the other hand, the body of Christ immediately succeeds to the place formerly occupied by the substance of bread. Christ's mode of existence in this place, however, differs from that of the preceding substance of bread, for the accidents of bread, while remaining, do not inhere in the body of Christ. The relation between the body of Christ and the remaining accidents of bread is limited to mere coexistence.<sup>20</sup>

Ockham readily admits the possibility of such a process if God so chose to effect Christ's Eucharistic presence in such a way. Such an operation would no more tax the omnipotence of God than

<sup>19</sup> *Report.* 4, q 6, D: "Sed utrum corpus Christi ibi posset coexistere per unionem et assumptionem dubium est, et potest dici quod si sit possibile unam creaturam sustinere aliam, ut dicunt aliqui, et credo quod non includit contradictionem, nec potest improbari per rationem naturalem, tunc corpus Christi posset assumere substantiam panis per unionem; et tunc natura substantans erit suppositum, et alia substantata a supposito aliquando et aliquando non, quia utraque potest inniti alicui supposito uni."

<sup>20</sup> *Ibid.*: "Alio modo quod substantia panis recedat subito de primo loco ad alium locum et remaneant accidentia, et eis coexistat corpus Christi."

any of the other possible ways whereby He might cause Christ to be present under the Eucharistic accidents.<sup>21</sup>

Whether such a mode is actually realized in the objective order is not treated by Ockham. However, his attitude toward transubstantiation as the one and only method *de facto* whereby Christ's presence is actually effected on the altar is evidence enough against his holding to this position.<sup>22</sup>

Be that as it may, a number of questions which stem from Ockham's notions of substance and accidents are raised by this hypothesis. The Venerable Inceptor, however, does not treat of these questions here. More detailed attention will be given to these points later on in this study. Suffice it to say for the present that he holds to the common Scholastic notions of substance and accidents. Likewise he admits that accidents are separable from substance, as in the case of the Eucharist. He differs from the common Scholastic doctrine in this that he limits the number of predicaments to which distinct *res* correspond. For example, quantity for him is not a separable *res* from substance or quality. The predicamental notion, quantity, simply connotes that a thing, be it substance or quality, has part outside of part.<sup>23</sup>

As regards the Eucharist, the common Scholastic notion, as expressed, for example, by St. Thomas,<sup>24</sup> is that the qualities of the consecrated host inhere in the remaining quantity of bread as in a subject. Ockham's conceptualistic notion of quantity postulates a different hypothesis. With the disappearance of the substance of bread, as in this second mode now under consideration, the quantity of the bread-substance likewise vanishes. The reason: quantity is nothing else but the concept connoting that the bread-substance has part outside of part. Take away the substance and the quantity of that substance likewise disappears.

However, other quantities remain, namely, those of the qualities

<sup>21</sup> *Ibid.*: "Secundus modus patet, quia sicut non est impossibile Deo subito facere corpus Christi hic sub speciebus hostiae, ita potest facere quod substantia subito sit alibi, remanentibus speciebus in eodem loco, et quod illis coexistat corpus Christi."

<sup>22</sup> *Infra*, 29 ff

<sup>23</sup> *Infra*, c. 4, n. 9 ff.

<sup>24</sup> *Sum. theol.*, p. 3, q 77, a. 2, *Op. omnia*, 4, 358.

of the host. For example, after consecration the quality, color, still remains. Our senses testify that color is extended over the whole surface of the host. According to Ockham, this quality, color, is quantity. To put it differently, the quality, color, is a *res* distinct from substance and other qualities. This quality, color, has part outside of part. Hence this quality, color, can be called quantity. The term *quantity* is purely a concept to describe the particular state of a thing, as for example, of the quality, color. The quantity as such of this color, however, is not a distinct *res* from the color itself; it is only a concept which connotes that this color has part outside of part.<sup>25</sup>

Ockham is again silent as to whether or not the substance of bread, after it has been withdrawn, would have part outside of part, that is, whether it is still quantity. Nor does he speculate as to whether the substance of bread would have a new set of accidents inhering in it. In the light of his philosophical notions about substance, quantity, and quality, we can only say that he would consider all of these various modes as possible.

#### SUBSTANCE OF BREAD CHANGED AS TO ITS FORM WHEN CHRIST SUCCEEDS TO PLACE FORMERLY OCCUPIED BY BREAD-SUBSTANCE

Akin to the second mode is the hypothesis which postulates that the substance of bread be reduced to matter. This could happen in two ways: (1) Either the substance of bread would be reduced to matter existing in itself, namely, without a form; (2) or the substance of bread could be reduced to matter which in turn would be the recipient of a new form.<sup>26</sup>

1. In this first possibility Ockham apparently has in mind that the substance which was formerly bread would be reduced to prime matter, that is, *in materiam per se stantem* without a form. He acknowledges such a possibility, for in his *Summulae in libros physicorum* he states that matter as well as form are distinct

<sup>25</sup> Ockham deals with this problem at great length in his *De corp. Christi*, cc 9-41 For treatment of this matter in the present study see *infra* 67 ff

<sup>26</sup> *Report.* 4, q 6, D. "Tertio modo quod redigatur in materiam vel per se stantem vel aliam formam recipientem, et hoc sive in eodem sive in alio, et tunc illi materiae et accidentibus coexistat corpus Christi."

entities, *res positivae*.<sup>27</sup> Hence, God, if He so chose, could effect a distinct and separate existence for each of them.

2. In the second theory the matter of bread, while losing its form which constituted it as bread according to its former mode of existence, would receive a new form and be reconstituted as a new substance. Hence, the matter which formerly was bread might, after such a transaction, receive the form of wood so as to be constituted in the order of nature as wood. By way of illustration, this particular theory might be compared to the notion of transmigration of souls, according to which the same soul becomes reincarnate in successive bodies.

These two possibilities do not exhaust all the potentialities of this particular third mode. To complete the picture it must be noted that the matter which was formerly that of bread is open to two further possibilities: (1) It can continue to exist (either as naked matter or as the recipient of a new form) in the place now occupied by the body of Christ; or (2) it can (either as bare matter or as the recipient of a new form) be moved to another place.<sup>28</sup> In the first instance the body of Christ would coexist not only with the accidents of bread which remain but also with the matter which was formerly that of bread. In the second case, namely, if this matter were to be removed to a new location under a new form, Christ's body would coexist only with the accidents of the bread.

Ockham admits that this mode with all of its various aspects is wholly within the realm of possibility. His reason for believing so is the same as for the preceding mode, namely, that it is not contradictory to God's omnipotence.<sup>29</sup>

<sup>27</sup> Ockham, *Summulae in libros physicorum* (ed. Venice, 1506), p 1, c 8, fol 3<sup>r</sup>, b "Ostendo quod materia et forma sunt res positivae et quod sunt distinctae, videndum est quomodo se habent ad generationem rei naturalis" See also *Expositio super libros physicorum*, lib. 1, textus Commentatoris 69, ad: *Subiecta autem natura*: "Notandum quod quando Philosophus dicit quod materia non est hoc aliquid et similiter Commentator in diversis locis quod materia non est in actu non debet intelligi quod materia non sit aliqua res determinata et distincta ab omni alio, et quod non sit in rerum natura actualiter existens, sed intelligit quod materia non est hoc aliquid, hoc est, non est forma nec compositum ex materia et forma."

<sup>28</sup> *Supra*, n 26

<sup>29</sup> *Report.* 4, q. 6, D "Tertius modus patet per idem." See *supra*, n 21.

Neither an assertion nor a denial as to the objective reality of this mode is made by the Venerable Inceptor. However, that he does not actually hold to this mode in the real order can be inferred from his attitude toward the first mode, namely, coexistence, to which this present mode is similar, at least in several aspects.<sup>30</sup>

SUBSTANCE OF BREAD ANNIHILATED WHEN CHRIST  
SUCCEEDS TO PLACE OF REMAINING SPECIES

The fourth possible mode of effecting Christ's Eucharistic presence differs radically from the preceding ones. In the previous instances the bread-substance remained either wholly or partially unchanged when the body of Christ became present on the altar. In the present mode, however, the bread-substance in its entirety is annihilated when the body of Christ succeeds to the place of the remaining species. This mode is not only a speculative possibility but corresponds to the actual operation, namely, transubstantiation, which effects Christ's real presence. Because of its importance this topic will constitute the theme of the following chapter.

<sup>30</sup> *Supra*, n. 14.

## CHAPTER III

### TRANSUBSTANTIATION

Within the framework of Catholic tradition one can detect two trends of thought concerning the nature of the action whereby Christ actually becomes present to the Eucharistic accidents. St. Thomas Aquinas may well serve as the spokesman for the first group of theologians who hold to an intrinsic conversion of the total substance of bread into the body of Christ.<sup>1</sup> The term *conversio* is understood by this group in its strict sense. Characteristic of this position is the fact of an intrinsic nexus between the cessation of the substance of bread and the presence of Christ. Hence, in transubstantiation there are not two separable actions but only one operation.

The second group, with which Scotus is apparently associated,<sup>2</sup> agrees on the general principle that the bond between the cessation of the substance of bread and the Eucharistic presence of Christ's body is purely extrinsic and not *ex natura rei*.

Within the framework of these two schools of thought are to be found various nuances which make for a further specification of the precise nature of transubstantiation.<sup>3</sup> It should be noted, however, that in the two above mentioned opinions the Catholic position, in so far as it was later defined by the Council of Trent,<sup>4</sup> is completely safeguarded.<sup>5</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *Sum. theol.*, p. 3, q. 75, a. 2, *Op. omnia*, 4, 345: ". . . non est dare aliquem modum quo corpus Christi verum esse incipiat in hoc sacramento, nisi per conversionem substantiae panis in ipsum: quae quidem conversio tollitur, posita vel annihilatione substantiae panis vel resolutione in praeiacentem materiam."

<sup>2</sup> *Oxon.*, 4, d. 11, q. 4, *Op. omnia*, 17, 457 ff. See also: Storff, *De natura transubstantiationis iuxta I. Duns Scotum*, 85 ff.; E. Doronzo, *De Eucharistia*, 1 (Milwaukee: Ex typographia Bruce, 1947), 267.

<sup>3</sup> For a conspectus of the various opinions see Doronzo, *op. cit.*, 279.

<sup>4</sup> *ES*, 884.

<sup>5</sup> L. Godefroy, "Eucharistie d'après le concile de Trent," *DTC* 5 (1913), 1349.

An examination of Ockham's teaching on transubstantiation, it is hoped, will determine to which orbit of thought he belongs.

#### DEFINITION OF TRANSUBSTANTIATION

Only in the *Reportatio* does the Venerable Inceptor give a specific definition of transubstantiation: "Transubstantiation . . . is the succession of a substance to a substance ceasing to be simply in itself, under some accidents proper to the preceding substance."<sup>6</sup>

It should be noted here that Ockham's definition of transubstantiation revolves around the notion of succession. From this text

<sup>6</sup> *Report.* 4, q. 6, C. "Quantum ad primum potest dici quod transubstantiatio est in proposito successio substantiae ad substantiam desinentem esse simpliciter in se, sub aliquibus accidentibus propriis substantiae praecedenti."

It is well to mention at this point that while the most evident meaning of this definition is that in transubstantiation the substance of bread simply ceases to be, it is not without some misgiving that one arrives at this conclusion. One reason for this hesitancy is to be found in Ockham's solution of the sixth doubt presented in this same question. The proposed doubt is "An posset esse transubstantiatio, posito quod corpus maneret cum substantia panis?" [See *Report* 4, q. 6, E] His brief answer is. "Ad sextum [dubium] potest dici quod sic; tamen de facto non est ita." [See *ibid*, K] The implication seems to be that it is at least possible for transubstantiation to be realized even if the substance of bread were to remain. If that supposition is correct, then the phrase in Ockham's definition which describes transubstantiation as "(the succession of a substance to) a substance ceasing to be simply in itself under some accidents," would have to be given a wider interpretation than is at first apparent. Under these circumstances the above mentioned phrase from the definition would mean that transubstantiation as it affects the substance of bread would not necessitate the annihilation of the bread-substance but only that it cease to be *in itself under its accidents*, that is, that it now have the companionate substance of Christ's body under the same accidents which formerly were proper and exclusively present to the substance of bread. Such a conclusion, however, would apparently run counter to Ockham's solution to the third doubt of this same question [See *infra*, n. 51] as well as to the context of the whole question. As a possible explanation of this apparent discrepancy entailed by the solution of this sixth doubt, we suggest the fact that these questions are part of the *Reportatio*, and as such subject to the shortcomings of notes which were never reedited by their author. Likewise emphasis should be laid on the fact that Ockham's definition is stated, as he says, "*in proposito*". That does not exclude the possibility of his using the term according to a wider meaning elsewhere.

there is no reason to believe that Ockham holds to an intrinsic nexus between the cessation of the substance of bread and the succession of Christ's body to the place of the Eucharistic accidents.

No specific definition of transubstantiation is given in either the *De corpore Christi* or the *Quodlibeta*. Even so, in these two works just as in the *Reportatio*, the term *conversio*, just as *transsubstantiatio*, has the connotation of one substance succeeding to another with no intrinsic nexus between the two termini. Further attention will be given later to the problem of the nexus between the two termini of transubstantiation.<sup>7</sup>

#### POSSIBILITY OF TRANSUBSTANTIATION

Ockham believes that transubstantiation is wholly possible to God, Who has complete dominion over the being and non-being of every created thing. Hence, it is entirely within His power to destroy utterly, on the one hand, the substance of bread while allowing the accidents of bread to remain in existence; and, on the other hand, to cause the body of Christ to succeed immediately to the place formerly occupied by the substance of bread and to coexist with these accidents without being informed by them.<sup>8</sup>

#### REALITY OF TRANSUBSTANTIATION

Sacred Scripture, while expressly asserting that the body of Christ is present under the Eucharistic species, makes no explicit statement to the effect that the substance of bread is converted or transubstantiated into the body of Christ. The constant tradition of the Fathers, however, has always maintained that Christ's real presence on the altar is effected by the transubstantiation or conversion of the substance of bread into the body of Christ; and that this fact is divinely revealed and at least implicitly contained in the pages of Holy Writ.<sup>9</sup> As instances of this tradition, Ockham

<sup>7</sup> *Infra*, 45 ff.

<sup>8</sup> *Report.* 4, q. 6, C: "Possibilitas istius apparet, quia non repugnat potentiae divinae destruere substantiam in se et conservare accidentia, et quod alia substantia eisdem accidentibus non eam informantibus immediate coexistat."

<sup>9</sup> *De corp Christi*, c 3 "Quamvis in Scriptura Canonica expresse tradatur

cites the authority of St. Eusebius,<sup>10</sup> St. Ambrose,<sup>11</sup> and others.<sup>12</sup> The words of these authorities suffice to convince the Venerable Inceptor that it has always been the constant tradition in the Church that the substance of bread is, by divine power, converted or transubstantiated into the substance of Christ's body.<sup>13</sup>

NATURE OF THE ACTION WHEREBY CHRIST  
BECOMES PRESENT IN THE EUCHARIST

Ockham's definition as well as his statement regarding the possibility of transubstantiation already give a fairly representative picture of the action involved. From the standpoint of the *terminus a quo*, the substance of bread, the action is destructive, annihilatory; from the angle of the *terminus ad quem*, the body of Christ, there is a successive action whereby the body of Christ is substituted for the substance of bread which has been relegated to the realm of non-existence.

quod corpus Christi sub specie panis fidelibus est porrigendum, tamen quod substantia panis in corpus Christi realiter convertitur vel transubstantiatur in canone Biblicae non invenitur expressum; sed hoc sanctis Patribus creditur divinitus revelatum vel ex auctoritatibus Biblicae diligenti et solerti inquisitione probatum. Et ideo ad istam veritatem probandam auctoritates sanctorum Patrum adducam."

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid.*: "Unde dicit beatus Eusebius Emisenus, et habetur, *De consecratione*, distinctione secunda, *Quia corpus*: 'Invisibilis Sacerdos visibiles creaturas in substantiam corporis sui et sanguinis verbo suo secreta potestate convertit.' Et subditur: 'Quanta itaque et quam celebranda beneficia vis divinae benedictionis operetur, et, quomodo tibi novum et impossibile esset non debeat quod in Christi substantiam terrena et mortalia convertuntur.'" See c. 35, D. 2, *de cons.*, in Friedberg, *Corpus iuris canonici*, 1, 1325.

<sup>11</sup> *Ibid.*: "Item Ambrosius, et habetur, *De consecratione*, distinctione secunda, *Panis*: 'Si tanta,' inquit, 'vis est in sermone Domini Iesu ut inciperet esse quod non erat, quanto magis operatorius est, ut sint quae erant, et in aliud commutentur? Et sic quod erat panis ante consecrationem, iam est corpus Christi post consecrationem.'" See c 55, D. 2, *de cons.*, in Friedberg, *op. cit.*, 1, 1335.

<sup>12</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>13</sup> *Ibid.*: "Ex quibus aliisque quam plurimis sanctorum et doctorum auctoritatibus constat quod substantia panis virtute divina realiter et veraciter in substantiam corporis Christi transubstantiatur, convertitur, seu commutatur."

## Annihilation

The better to judge Ockham's notion of transubstantiation, we shall first examine this action from the standpoint of how it affects the *terminus a quo*, the substance of bread. In his definition of transubstantiation the Venerable Inceptor asserts that the substance of bread ceases simply to be in itself. When treating of the possibility of such an action, he mentions that God can destroy the substance of bread. In the seventh doubt of this same question, the problem is proposed as to whether *de facto* the substance of the bread is annihilated.<sup>14</sup> The evidence amassed in the solution of this doubt, together with the statements defining transubstantiation and giving its possibility, offer a good insight into his notion of the action involved as it affects the *terminus a quo*.

To grasp the full import of Ockham's answer to this seventh doubt, certain fundamental and related notions must be kept in mind: (1) nothingness; and (2) annihilation.

*Notion of nothingness.*—Apropos of the present problem, "nothing" can be taken in a twofold sense if we set aside its purely logical meaning as a syncategorematic term. It may be understood (1) to signify that something is not, namely, that it does not have real being. By way of example, an angel is said to have been nothing from all eternity, since no being, God excepted, existed from all eternity. Thus also all *possibilia* are "nothing" in this sense of the term. (2) In another sense, "nothing" is taken to mean not only that a thing does not have real being but also that it is repugnant for it ever to have real being. Hence, a chimera is "nothing" in this sense of the term. Man, on the other hand, was not "nothing" from all eternity because at no one time in this sense was it repugnant that he be *in rerum natura*.<sup>15</sup>

<sup>14</sup> *Report.* 4, q. 6, E: "Septimum [dubium], utrum de facto ille panis annihilatur?"

<sup>15</sup> *Ord.* 1, d. 36, q. 1, P: "Nihil multipliciter accipitur. Uno modo syncategorematicè, et sic est unum signum universale negativum includens suum distribuibile secundum modum loquendi logicorum, sicut dicimus: nihil est intelligens. Alio modo accipitur categorematicè pro aliquo quod dicitur unum nihil. Et hoc potest accipi dupliciter, quia uno modo nihil accipitur, et dicitur illud quod non est realiter nec habet aliquid esse reale. Et isto modo dicendum

*Notion of annihilation.*—Also open to a twofold interpretation is the term *annihilation*. (1) In the first sense it is understood to mean that something is reduced to nothingness and is in no sense converted into something else, that is, is not succeeded by something else. With this specification in mind, we can hold with Ockham that the substance of bread is not annihilated, since it is succeeded by the body of Christ. (2) In the second sense it is accepted to mean that something is relegated to the realm of pure nothingness, such as it was before the creation of the world. The notion of succession is not excluded by this sense. Hence, when the substance of bread is succeeded by the body of Christ, Ockham can, with this meaning in mind, refer to the ultimate status of the bread as the result of annihilation.

The first sense might be called annihilation in the strict sense of the term; the second, annihilation in the less strict sense. In both senses, however, the end product, if we may so speak, is nothingness in the first sense of that term, namely, that the thing after annihilation does not now have real being. *De facto*, Ockham holds that the substance of bread is annihilated not in the first sense of *annihilatio* but in the second sense of the word.<sup>16</sup>

The Venerable Inceptor's first argument in support of this contention proceeds by way of analogy. Before the creation of the world, the substance which is now bread had "being" only in the sense that it was not repugnant for it to be in the universe when it would be created. Despite the fact that it was nothing more than a mere possibility within the domain of God's creative power, the bread could still be said to have "being" in a wide and improper sense of the term. In the sense that it had no real being, it was

est quod angelus ab aeterno fuit nihil, quia nullum esse reale habuit ab aeterno, quia nullum esse ab aeterno fuit nisi solus Deus. Aliter accipitur nihil pro illo quod tantum non habet esse reale sed etiam sibi repugnat esse reale; et isto modo dicimus quod chimaera est nihil; et sic non fuit homo nihil ab aeterno, quia numquam sibi repugnabat esse in rerum natura."

<sup>16</sup> *Report.* 4, q. 6, K: "Ad septimum [dubium] dico quod, accipiendo annihilationem sic quod illud quod annihilatur redigitur in nihil et non convertitur in aliquid aliud, sic panis non annihilatur; accipiendo tamen sic quod illud dicatur annihilari quod reducitur in ita purum nihil sicut fuit ante mundi creationem, sic vere annihilatur panis."

correctly designated as "nothing", just as the angel referred to in Ockham's example was "nothing" from all eternity.<sup>17</sup> Similarly in transubstantiation God can annihilate the substance of bread, that is, reduce it to the same sort of nothingness as was proper to it before the creation of the world. The "being" which the substance of bread enjoys after transubstantiation is on a par with its "being" before the creation of the world. This "being" connotes only that it is not repugnant for it to be in the universe even though *de facto* it is not so existing. Consequently, since we can correctly say that the substance of bread before creation was "nothing", so also after transubstantiation it can be called "nothing", that is, a "something" not having real but only potential "being". In this sense Ockham holds that the substance of bread is annihilated.<sup>18</sup>

Secondly, the Venerable Inceptor argues, if, as is actually the case, both the matter and the form of bread are converted into the body of Christ, it is evident that the whole, compositum and parts, has "non-being" after "being". But whatever now is and afterwards is not is said to be annihilated. Hence, the substance of bread can be said to be annihilated.<sup>19</sup>

This sort of total change which embraces both the matter and the form of a substance is one of the mysteries of transubstantiation. Our experience in the natural order is limited to partial changes only in which something receives a new substantial or accidental form, as, for example, in the assimilation of food for bodily nourishment. Such a transition, however, is far different from the total and substantial conversion which is verified in the Eucharist.

Ockham's third proof for annihilation reasons *a pari*. Just as

<sup>17</sup> *Supra*, n. 15.

<sup>18</sup> *Report.* 4, q. 6, K "Quod probatur quia non verius esse nec actualius habet substantia panis in corpore Christi quam in potentia Dei creativa; sed non obstante esse quod habet in essentia divina, sive in potentia Dei sive secundum continentiam virtualem sive perfectionalem sive quocumque alio modo, vere potest panis annihilari, licet habeat esse in potentia divina, quia ante mundi creationem vere fuit nihil; et tunc tamen habuit esse in potentia divina. Similiter vere potest Deus panem annihilare, et tamen tunc haberet esse in potentia Dei. Ergo eodem modo non obstante tali esse quod habet in corpore Christi, vere potest dici annihilari."

<sup>19</sup> *Ibid.*: "Item si tam forma panis quam materia convertatur in corpus Christi, tunc manifestum est quod totum illud compositum annihilatur."

it is impossible for a thing to have "being" after "non-being", except through generation or creation, so by antithesis it is equally impossible for a thing to have "non-being" after "being" except through corruption or annihilation. That corruption cannot account for the ultimate status of the bread is apparent from the fact that neither the matter nor the form of bread remain. The whole and entire substance of bread is converted into the body of Christ. To realize the notion of corruption, it would be necessary for at least the matter to remain, as, for example, in the corruption of a body. Hence, only annihilation remains to explain the ultimate status of the bread.<sup>20</sup>

### *Succession*

Viewed from the standpoint of the *terminus ad quem*, transubstantiation for Ockham is a *successio*. The notion of succession expressed by this term offers no particular difficulty. Apparently Ockham accepts it according to its common connotation, for no specific definition is given. According to one sense, succession has a temporal connotation denoting the passage of time. In this sense it expresses the accidental relation of *prius* and *posterius*. For example: It is now summer; in two months it will be autumn. To express this change of seasons, we may say that autumn has succeeded summer. In another sense succession denotes a local change. When a thing comes to a place, we speak of one thing succeeding to the place of another. When a man leaves a certain room and walks to another room, his movement may be referred to as the succession of his being from one place to another. In this latter sense, and with certain limitations, succession in Ockham's terminology has application to Christ's becoming present in the Eucharist. It connotes simply that Christ comes to the place formerly occupied by the substance of bread. It is evident, both from the

<sup>20</sup> *Ibid.*: "Item sicut impossibile est quod aliquid habeat esse post non esse nisi per generationem vel creationem, ita impossibile est quod aliquid habeat non esse post esse nisi per annihilationem vel corruptionem; sed substantia panis conversa in corpus Christi habet verum non esse post verum esse, et non per corruptionem, quia tunc esset una pars manens, puta materia, quod non est in proposito, quia totum convertitur in totum. Igitur per annihilationem."

definition of transubstantiation and from other passages where the word is employed,<sup>21</sup> that Ockham's use of the term in this connection signifies successive states of being.

### Change

Threading its way through both the notion of annihilation as it affects the *terminus a quo*, and the notion of succession as it characterizes the action of the *terminus ad quem* in transubstantiation, is the notion of change.

It must be noted, first of all, that *mutatio* has several aspects or shades of meaning. In the improper sense, according to Ockham's specification, something is said to be changed when it has *esse* after *non esse*, or vice versa.<sup>22</sup> For example, five years ago Prince Charles Philip of England was not; today he is. Hence, a transition from *non esse* to *esse*, which is change in the improper sense of the term.

According to its proper notion, change is to be further precisioned by what the Venerable Inceptor calls the strict and the most strict sense. In the strict sense, something is said to be changed when it receives that which it did not previously have, or vice versa. An extreme example of change in this sense would be if matter were created and made to exist under a form whereas previously it was

<sup>21</sup> See for example. (1) *Report.* 4, q. 6, E "Substantiae panis ita succedit anima sicut corpus et post triduum et ante. Igitur ita ex vi conversionis transubstantiatur panis in animam sicut in corpus. Item non est aliqua variatio in corpore succedente, nec in eo cui succedit, plusquam si converteretur in animam." (2) *Ibid.*, H: ". . . hoc nomen [transubstantiatio] sic imponitur ad significandum ut primo sit aliqua substantia et post non sit, et quod illi succedat alia substantia." (3) *Ibid.*, L: "Ad aliud dico quod non est inconueniens concedere quod sit ibi transaccidentatio quia substantia corporis Christi sicut succedit substantiae panis ita accidens corporis Christi succedit substantiae. . . ." (4) *Ibid.*: "Aliter potest dici quod sicut non est transubstantiatio nisi quando primo est una substantia et post destruitur illa et succedit alia substantia; et ideo ex virtute vocabuli dicitur transubstantiatio; ita non dicitur transaccidentatio nisi quando primo est aliquod accidens et post destruitur illud accidens, et succedit aliud accidens, et tunc diceretur proprie transaccidentatio, et aliter non."

<sup>22</sup> *Ord.* 1, d. 8, q. 7, B: "Dico mutatio dupliciter accipitur, scilicet, stricte et large: Large et improprie dicitur aliquid mutari quando habet esse post non esse, vel e converso."

not under this form.<sup>23</sup> The stress in this example is not to be laid on the notion of creation—on the fact that the matter has *esse* after *non esse*—but on the fact that the matter receives a form which previously it did not have. Hence, matter *qua* matter is substantially changed when it receives a new form. That this is the notion which Ockham aims to convey in this example becomes increasingly clear from the second example. Matter is said to be changed if the whole composite, matter and form, is annihilated; not, however, only because the matter has *non esse* after *esse* but also because it no longer is informed by its form as was previously the case. In this instance the matter actually lost something which previously it had, namely, its form, even though the matter itself is also annihilated along with its form.<sup>24</sup>

In the most strict meaning, something is said to be changed when it remains according to its essence but with something new “informing” it which previously did not inform it, or vice versa.<sup>25</sup> Change in this sense is only an accidental change, as, for example, a chameleon is changed when it changes color. The term *informans* is not to be taken in its strict sense as when a form informs matter, but in a sense similar to that of something accidental “informing” a subject, as in the example given above.

It should be noted that the various distinctions of meaning of the term *change* are apparently not intended by Ockham as strict divisions. Rather, they are more minute specifications of the same notion. Well might they be compared to the various species included under the more general notion of a genus. Hence, change in the most strict sense also embodies the notion of change in the improper

<sup>23</sup> *Ibid.*: “Aliter accipitur mutari vel mutatio stricte, et hoc dupliciter vel stricte vel strictissime. Primo modo dicitur aliquid mutari quando recipit aliquid quod prius non habuit, vel non habet aliquid quod prius habuit; et isto modo si materia crearetur sub forma, ipsa materia dicitur mutari quia modo est vere sub forma et prius non fuit sub ea.”

<sup>24</sup> *Ibid.*: “Similiter, si totum compositum annihilaretur, ipsa materia diceretur mutari, non tamen quia non est postquam prius fuit, sed etiam quia non habet formam quam prius habuit.”

<sup>25</sup> *Ibid.*: “Secundo modo dicitur aliquid mutari quando aliquid manens secundum suam essentiam habet aliquid in se informans ipsum quod prius non habuit, vel e converso, ita quod subiectum manens prius est sub forma et postea sub privatione, vel e converso.”

sense in so far as here also the notion of *esse* after *non esse* is verified; but with further specifications.

These various divisions of change in some way find their application to both the substance of bread and the body of Christ as the respective termini of transubstantiation. The substance of bread as the *terminus a quo* can be said to be changed in the improper sense since it has *non esse* after *esse*. This is equivalent to annihilation of the substance of bread, which Ockham admits according to a proper understanding of the term.<sup>26</sup>

The notion of *mutatio*, however, also has application to the body of Christ as it becomes present on the altar. Ockham takes up this point in the first doubt of the sixth question of the fourth book of the *Reportatio*: "Is transubstantiation a change, and to what is it terminated?"<sup>27</sup> He concludes that there is also a *mutatio* involved in transubstantiation which is a local change referred to the body of Christ.<sup>28</sup>

Ockham's argument that Christ is locally changed when He becomes present on the altar is formulated in a strict, logical form: local change is nothing more nor less than that something acquires a relation to a place which it formerly did not have. After consecration, however, the body of Christ is in relation to the place of the Eucharistic accidents, whereas formerly such was not the case. Therefore, the body of Christ is said to be locally changed.<sup>29</sup>

Unless the term *local change* be understood correctly, this conclusion is open to misunderstanding. *Local change* can be accepted in a twofold sense: (1) In the wide or improper sense, we say that a body is changed locally when it now exists in a place where

<sup>26</sup> *Supra*, 33 ff.

<sup>27</sup> *Report.* 4, q. 6, E: "Primum [dubium] est an transsubstantiatio sit aliqua mutatio et ad quid terminetur?"

<sup>28</sup> *Ibid.*, F: "Cum igitur corpus Christi transeat de non esse hic ad esse hic, ratione cuius hic est vera mutatio, sequitur quod corpus Christi vere mutatur. Ideo dico quod corpus Christi mutatur localiter, quia sicut immediate est hic per substantiam suam ubi prius non fuit, non per substantiam panis, ita immediate mutatur."

<sup>29</sup> *Quodl.* 6, q. 3: "Mutari localiter est aliter se habere in loco nunc quam prius; sed corpus incipiens esse in altari aliter se habet ad locum quam prius, quia modo est in loco hostiae consecratae et prius non Ergo mutatur localiter."

formerly it was not. The fact as to whether or not this body leaves its former position, or whether it is definitively or circumscriptively present in the place, does not enter into the consideration. Thus, for instance, according to the medieval notion, when fire is extinguished it was thought to be converted into air. Hence, the air acquired a new place, the place occupied by the fire, without losing its former place. If such a notion were correct, we could speak of a local change in the wide sense. (2) In the strict sense, something is said to be locally changed when it deserts its former location and successively passes through space to acquire a new location elsewhere.<sup>80</sup>

With these notions in mind, Ockham says that the body of Christ, as it becomes present on the altar, is locally changed in the improper sense of the term.<sup>81</sup> To prove this assertion he argues that Christ is now in the Eucharist, whereas formerly He was not there. This Eucharistic presence is effected not by a change in the things surrounding the host, for they remain unchanged, but by a change which makes Christ to be present to these local surroundings. Christ, therefore, must be locally changed in order to enjoy this new sacramental *esse hic*.<sup>82</sup> Again, the relation of place and presence to the

<sup>80</sup> *Ibid.*: "Hic primo distinguendum de mutatione locali; secundo ad questionem. Circa primum dico quod mutari localiter accipitur large et stricte. Large dicitur quando corpus vere et realiter existit alicubi in loco ubi prius non fuit, non per mutationem localem alterius, sive deserat locum priorem sive non, sive etiam existat circumscriptive in loco sive non. Isto modo dicimus quod si ignis convertatur in aerem ita quod aer succedat igni in loco, quod aer vere mutatur quia vere est in loco ubi prius non fuit. Stricte autem dicitur aliquid moveri localiter quando aliquid mobile per motum localem deserit unum locum et acquirit alium" See also *The Tractatus de successivis*, ed. P. Boehner, 46: "Et hoc est moveri localiter: primo habere unum locum, et nulla alia re posita postea habere alium locum sine omni quiete media et sine omni alia re praeter locum et corpus et caetera permanentia, et sic continue procedendo."

<sup>81</sup> *Ibid.*: "Dico quod accipiendo mutari localiter primo modo, scilicet, large, sic corpus Christi vere et realiter mutatur localiter"

<sup>82</sup> *Ibid.*: "Quod [nempe, corpus Christi vere mutatur localiter] probo. Primo quia sicut materia non potest recipere novam formam sine mutatione sui, ita nec corpus potest esse ubi prius non fuit sine mutatione illius corporis; sed corpus Christi quando est sub hostia est ubi prius non fuit. Ergo mutatur localiter, non autem per perditionem loci prioris sed per acquisitionem loci prius non habiti."

accidents of bread remains unchanged by transubstantiation. However, after consecration a new relation, namely, that of Christ to this same place occupied by the host, is set up. Such a new relation is consequent solely upon Christ's becoming present in this same place. Hence, Christ must be locally changed to have the relation of *ubi* and *praesentiae* to the place and surroundings of the host.<sup>33</sup>

From these and similar arguments the Venerable Inceptor concludes that Christ is *de facto* changed when He becomes present on the altar. This change, however, is a local change in only the wide and improper sense of the term, namely, in the sense that the body of Christ is now present to a place to which formerly it was not present; and that without its leaving its former place in heaven. For Christ to become present sacramentally while leaving His place in heaven, that is, through local change in the strict sense of the term, Ockham considers heretical and contradictory.<sup>34</sup>

Ockham makes provision for this special eventuality in his earlier treatment of change in the *Reportatio*. Local change in the order of nature requires that the changing thing continuously acquire and lose its *ubi* in successive places. For God, however, it is possible to cause that a thing retain all the new *ubi* acquired without its losing its former locations. This also accounts for the fact that a thing can, *de potentia Dei absoluta*, be in different places at one and the same time.<sup>35</sup>

<sup>33</sup> *Ibid.*: "Praeterea ad variationem fundamenti sequitur variatio respectus; sed corpus Christi et species panis sunt diversa fundamenta. Ergo respectus ubi et praesentiae sunt diversi in corpore Christi et specie panis. Tunc sic illud cui acquiritur respectus mutatur; sed corpus Christi est huiusmodi. Ergo et cetera."

<sup>34</sup> *Ibid.*: "Sed accipiendo mutari localiter stricte, sicut accipit Philosophus, pro acquisitione unius loci et perditione alterius, sic dico quod corpus Christi non mutatur localiter per hoc quod incipit esse sacramentaliter sub hostia Hoc probo, quia si sic tunc desineret esse in coelo quando incipit esse in altari, quod est haereticum. Praeterea si per motum localem proprie dictum inciperet esse sub hostia quando est consecrata, tunc simul et semel moveretur motibus localibus oppositis, quia celebratio simul est in diversis locis oppositis, sursum et deorsum, ante et retro." See Aristotle, *Physics*, in *Opera omnia* (ed. Bekker; Berlin: Apud Georgium Reimerum, 1831-6), 5, 2, 226<sup>a</sup>, 36.

<sup>35</sup> *Report.* 2, q. 9, H: ". . . de potentia Dei possunt omnia acquisita simul manere, quia Deus potest facere quod corpus moveatur localiter et quod

The further question arises: In what sense is this local change a real change in Christ? With good reason we believe that the Venerable Inceptor held that the body of Christ is changed in the most strict sense of the term,<sup>36</sup> in so far as it now has a new and accidental relation to an *ubi* which previously it did not have, namely, the *esse hic* under the Eucharistic species.

When further specifying the notion of change with regard to transubstantiation, Ockham states that the *mutatio* is twofold: (1) acquisitive with regard to the body of Christ, in so far as it obtains a new location without forfeiting its former place in heaven or in other consecrated hosts; (2) destructive in so far as the substance of bread no longer remains.<sup>37</sup> Hence, according to Ockham's notion of change in the most strict sense, Christ's body receives a new "something", a new relation of place and presence which formerly it did not have.

True enough, the Venerable Inceptor's predicamental notion of *ubi* postulates that it is not a real entity or thing separate from the *corpus locatum*, just as the quantity of a body does not, according to him, signify a *res* separate from the body itself. None the less, he can still call *ubi* an *aliquid* in the sense that Christ's body receives a new *esse hic*, a new relation to this place which formerly it did not have, though the relation itself is not an entity.

The Venerable Inceptor reasons further that not only is there a *mutatio* in Christ which may be called, we believe, change in the most strict sense of the term,<sup>38</sup> but that this real and local change in Christ—and not the change in the wide sense as it affects the substance of the bread—is the essential *mutatio* which makes the

semper, quando acquirit novum locum, retineat primum locum et secundum; et sic deinceps quia Deus potest facere idem corpus in diversis locis; et hoc posito, tunc esset motus localis tantum acquisitivus, non deperditivus."

<sup>36</sup> *Supra*, n. 25.

<sup>37</sup> *Report.* 4, q. 6, F. "Ideo dico quod hic est duplex mutatio. una acquisitiva, alia deperditiva. Acquisitiva est in corpore Christi, quia accipit esse hic ubi prius non habuit esse; sed destructiva est substantiae panis ipsius quae non manet et prius mansit" See also *Quodl.* 6, q. 3: ". . . et illa mutatio [corporis Christi] est acquisitiva novi loci prius non habitati, sed non est deperditiva loci prius habitati."

<sup>38</sup> *Supra*, n. 25.

Eucharist to be what it is. He argues that every change in all senses of the term is between two incompatible termini—two primary termini—, namely, termini which cannot be together at one and the same time. Secondary termini as such are not incompatible;<sup>39</sup> consequently, a transition between them is not change in the real and strict sense of the term.

To illustrate the distinction between the primary and secondary termini of change an example is given. Suppose that a change is effected between place A and place B as the two termini of this particular *mutatio*. Place A and place B are not, however, incompatible termini because the same body can be, at least by divine intervention, at one and the same time in different places. Therefore, place A and place B are not the primary, the incompatible termini, but only the secondary termini of this given change. The real and primary termini of this change would be the *esse in hoc loco* and the *non esse in hoc loco*.<sup>40</sup>

With this example in mind, Ockham then turns to the Eucharist for its application. The *mutatio* there likewise must be between two incompatible termini. Speaking purely theoretically, he would say that these two incompatible termini can be either: (1) *ens* and *ens*; or (2) *non ens* and *non ens*; or (3) *ens* and *non ens*.<sup>41</sup>

Ockham argues that *de facto* the first cannot be granted. The termini *ens* and *ens* cannot be identified with anything in the action of transubstantiation except the substance of bread and its accidents on the one hand and the body of Christ on the other. These two substances, however, are not incompatible, for it is possible for the body of Christ to remain with the substance of bread,<sup>42</sup> just as in

<sup>39</sup> *Report* 4, q 6, F: "Omnis mutatio est inter terminos primo impossibiles, licet termini secundarii non sint impossibiles."

<sup>40</sup> *Ibid.*: "Exemplum: Mutatio est inter istum locum et illum tamquam inter terminos; sed quia isti termini non sunt impossibiles corpori, quia idem corpus potest esse simul in diversis locis, ideo non sunt primi termini huius mutationis sed secundarii; sed primi termini istius mutationis sunt esse in hoc loco et non esse in hoc loco."

<sup>41</sup> *Ibid.*: "Quaero: aut ista mutatio habet terminos impossibiles, quorum uterque est ens, aut uterque non ens, aut unus est ens et alius non ens."

<sup>42</sup> *Ibid.*: "Primum [ens et ens] non est dare, quia tales termini non possunt poni nisi substantia panis et species panis ex una parte, et corpus Christi ex

reality the body of Christ coexists with the accidents of bread.

The second possibility, namely, *non ens* and *non ens*, is just as unlikely. According to Aristotle's *Physics*, as Ockham mentions, there can be no change effected between two purely negative termini.<sup>43</sup>

By the process of elimination, Ockham finally concludes that the primary termini of the Eucharistic change must be the third class of terms, namely, between *ens* and *non ens*. To concede this is to grant two positive termini and two negative termini. The one positive and negative terminus refers to the substance of bread, namely, the *esse* and *non esse* of the bread, A duplicate set of positive-negative termini refers to Christ, that is, the *non esse hic* of Christ on the one hand, and the *esse hic* of Christ's body after the consecration on the other hand.<sup>44</sup>

Proceeding further, the Venerable Inceptor points out that by reason of the changing over of the *esse panis*, in the wide sense of the term,<sup>45</sup> to the *non esse panis*, there is no particular reason for the body of Christ to become present on the altar more than for any other body to put in its appearance. The change, however, from the *non esse hic* on the part of Christ to the *esse hic* is the real effect which makes the Eucharist as such. Hence, these two termini are the primary and incompatible termini of the Eucharistic change which make the Sacrament of the Altar to be what it is.<sup>46</sup>

alia parte; sed isti termini non sunt impossibiles, quia corpus posset manere simul cum substantia panis, sicut prius dictum est, et de facto simul manet cum illis speciebus panis."

<sup>43</sup> *Ibid.*: "Nec secundum [non ens et non ens] est dare, quia inter non ens et non ens non potest esse mutatio; quinto *Physicorum*." See Aristotle, *op. cit.*, 1, 225<sup>a</sup>, 10.

<sup>44</sup> *Ibid.*: "Ergo oportet dare tertium [ens et non ens]; sed hoc est [dare add. Ed.] duos terminos positivos et duos negativos respectu quorum potest hic esse mutatio, scilicet, esse panis et non esse panis, esse corporis Christi hic et non esse corporis Christi hic."

<sup>45</sup> *Supra*, n. 22.

<sup>46</sup> *Report.* 4, q. 6, F: "Sed propter istos terminos, esse panis et non esse, non est aliqua mutatio in corpore Christi plus quam in alio corpore; et ideo propter illos non plus habet corpus Christi esse hic quam quodcumque aliud corpus. Potest enim panis non esse post suum esse absque hoc quod aliquod

To admit that is to acknowledge that Christ is truly changed, only locally and accidentally to be sure, but changed nevertheless in the proper and most strict sense of the word when He becomes present in the Eucharist. Such likewise is Ockham's conclusion.<sup>47</sup>

### Conversion

An examination of the nature of conversion in Ockham's notion of transubstantiation is now in order. Frequently in the *Reportatio* as well as in the *De corpore Christi* he employs the words *conversion* and *transubstantiation* as correlative and interchangeable terms. Does he use the term *conversion* in these various passages in the strict sense, namely, as connoting an intrinsic nexus between the cessation of the substance of bread and the presence of Christ? Or is the bond between these two termini only an extrinsic one?

*Reportatio*.—Already in his definition of transubstantiation strong evidence is found in favor of the second supposition. He uses the term *successio* to express the relation between the *terminus a quo* and the *terminus ad quem*.<sup>48</sup> The notion of succession connotes only an extrinsic bond between the thing succeeding and the thing succeeded to.

In the sentence immediately following upon his definition, Ockham, in speaking of the possibility of transubstantiation, mentions that God can destroy a substance and then cause another substance to coexist with the remaining accidents.<sup>49</sup> Here again there is no apparent intention that the relation between the destruction of the first substance and the coexistence of the second substance with the accidents of the first is anything other than that of an external nexus, a succession of the one substance to another.

Ockham's solution to several doubts proposed in the sixth question of the fourth book of the *Reportatio* seems to corroborate this evidence. In the third doubt, for example, Ockham posits the

corpus ibi sit. Ergo primi termini impossibiles illius mutationis per quam corpus Christi est hic sunt corpus Christi esse hic et corpus Christi non esse hic."

<sup>47</sup> *Supra*, n. 28.

<sup>48</sup> *Supra*, n. 6.

<sup>49</sup> *Supra*, n. 8.

problem: "Can a substance remaining in real and substantial *esse* be transubstantiated?"<sup>50</sup> The point which this doubt is seemingly intended to make is this: In transubstantiation the succeeding substance of Christ's body, the *terminus ad quem* of this conversion, remains substantially unchanged. Would it be equally possible for transubstantiation to take place if the substance of bread, the *terminus a quo* of this conversion, were also to remain unchanged as to its substantial *esse*?

The Venerable Inceptor answers in the negative. The difficulty, he mentions in passing, is one of terminology. For transubstantiation it is not required that the *terminus ad quem* of the conversion be substantially changed. It is necessary only that this substance succeed to and replace the former substance without, however, its being affected by the accidents of the preceding substance. But with regard to the *terminus a quo* it is different, for it is necessary that this substance be reduced from *esse* to *non esse*.<sup>51</sup>

Reviewing the solution of this doubt in the light of the present discussion about the nexus between the *terminus a quo* and the *terminus ad quem* of transubstantiation, we find that Ockham's answer to the doubt lends itself admirably to the interpretation that he holds to only an extrinsic bond between the two termini of this conversion. The term *transubstantiation* signifies two separable if not separate operations. The change which Ockham discusses here is not an *unum per se*. Rather there is a twofold change—the annihilation of the substance of bread, and the succession of the substance of Christ's body to the place of the accidents—with only an extrinsic bond making them to be one *per accidens*.

The second argument which indicates that Ockham is in favor of only an extrinsic nexus between the change as it affects the *terminus a quo* and that which touches upon the *terminus ad quem* of transub-

<sup>50</sup> *Report.* 4, q. 6, E: "Tertium [dubium] utrum substantia remanens in esse substantiali et reali posset transsubstantiari?"

<sup>51</sup> *Ibid.*: H: "Ad tertium [dubium] dico quod ibi non est difficultas, nisi in vocabulo, utrum terminus a quo potest manere sicut manet terminus ad quem, et tunc dicitur transsubstantiatio. Et dico quod non, quia hoc nomen sic imponitur ad significandum ut primo sit aliqua substantia et post non sit, et quod illi succedat alia substantia, et vocatur transsubstantiatio sicut prius dictum est."

stantiation stems from his answer to the fourth doubt of this same question. This doubt posits the problem: Is it necessary for the substance which is the *terminus ad quem* of transubstantiation to change its place? <sup>52</sup> His answer is in the affirmative.<sup>53</sup>

Uppermost in Ockham's mind seems to be the notion that the body of Christ succeeds to the place formerly occupied by the substance of bread so that it coexists with the remaining accidents of bread. Hence, in keeping with his definition of transubstantiation as a succession, he must postulate the actual succession of Christ's body to the place of the host.

Those who hold to transubstantiation in the more strict sense, namely, with an intrinsic nexus between the substance of bread and the body of Christ, would seemingly be at liberty to admit the possibility which Ockham here denies. For them the essential factor is that the total substance of bread is converted into the substance of Christ's body. The bond between the substance of bread and the body of Christ is intrinsic, for the change involved is an *unum per se* which effects the conversion of one substance into another. That Christ's body exists in the place formerly occupied by the substance of bread is most assuredly, for those who hold to this position, an essential requisite of the Eucharistic transubstantiation, but it is not the primary and precise terminus of the conversion which formally constitutes transubstantiation as such.

Ockham's answer to the fourth doubt, together with his notion of succession as characteristic of his concept of transubstantiation, indicates that he believes it impossible to have transubstantiation without the substance of Christ's body in some way changing its place. In Ockham's notion it is essential that Christ succeed to the place of the Eucharistic accidents and acquire there a new *esse hic*. Such a conclusion is forced upon him as a consequence of his viewing transubstantiation as a conversion in the less strict sense of the term, namely, as connoting only an extrinsic nexus between the annihilated substance of bread and the succeeding substance of Christ's body.

<sup>52</sup> *Ibid.*, E: "Quartum [dubium] an oporteat substantiam in quam transubstantiatur mutare locum?"

<sup>53</sup> *Ibid.*, I: "Ad quartum [dubium] patet quod sic."

Probably the most convincing argument in the *Reportatio* that Ockham holds to a type of conversion in which there is only an extrinsic nexus between the cessation of the bread and the succession of Christ's body, is found in his discussion of the seventh doubt of this same sixth question: "Whether *de facto* the bread is annihilated?"<sup>54</sup>

After arguing that annihilation is the only explanation which can account for the ultimate status of the substance of bread,<sup>55</sup> he makes the following assertion: "Therefore I say that the substance of bread is truly annihilated, and that there is then a conversion of the substance of the bread into the body of Christ just as from night comes the day and from the morning comes midday; because after night comes the day and after the morning comes noon."<sup>56</sup>

No one will deny that the link between the night, the dawn, and noon is only an extrinsic one. To be sure, this comparison with the times of the day which Ockham uses to convey the notion of one thing being converted into another is only a figure of speech; nevertheless it still serves to emphasize the inescapable conclusion that for Ockham the nexus between the annihilation of the substance of bread on the one hand and the succession of Christ's body to the place of the Eucharistic accidents on the other, is a purely extrinsic bond of a caliber similar to the connection between night and day!

*De corpore Christi.*—In his specialized treatise on the Eucharist, Ockham uses *conversion* and *transubstantiation* as interchangeable terms. Here, as in the *Reportatio*, the word *conversion* seems to have been used in its less strict sense, namely, as connoting the succession of one substance to the place of another with only an extrinsic bond between them. Several instances will serve to illustrate the case in point.

<sup>54</sup> *Supra*, n. 14.

<sup>55</sup> *Supra*, n. 20.

<sup>56</sup> *Report.* 4, q. 6, K: "Ideo dico quod vere substantia panis annihilatur et est tunc ibi conversio panis in corpus Christi, sicut ex nocte dies fit et mane meridies, quia post noctem fit dies et post mane meridies." See W. Lampen, "Doctrina Guillelmi Ockham de reali praesentia et transubstantiatione," *Antonianum*, 3 (1928), 29.

1. When referring to the non-permanence of the substance of bread in transubstantiation, he refers to three ancient opinions which were cited already by Peter Lombard and Henricus de Segusio in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries respectively. According to the first opinion, the substance which was at first bread is afterwards the body of Christ. The second position postulates that the substance of bread ceases to be, its accidents remaining; under these accidents the body of Christ begins to be present. The last opinion asserts that the substance of bread maintains its *status quo*, and that the body of Christ is, after the consecration, in the same place and under the same accidents.<sup>57</sup>

According to Ockham at least, Peter Lombard and Hostiensis advocate the second or middle opinion. To bolster his position, Ockham cites the authority of Pope Innocent III as he spoke in the IV Lateran Council (1215):

There is one universal Church of all the faithful outside of which no one is saved; in which He is both priest and victim, whose body and blood are truly contained in the Sacrament of the Altar under the appearances of bread and wine, the bread having been transubstantiated by divine power into the body of Christ and the wine into His blood.<sup>58</sup>

Whether Ockham is stretching the sense of the words of Pope Innocent so that they support the second position—the one which Ockham personally favors—rather than the first is not of importance here. The first opinion is really the more ancient and the more traditional. Judging from the context, the Roman Pontiff's words seem to accord better with the sense of the first opinion than with the second. Be that as it may, Ockham's whole point in this

<sup>57</sup> *Supra*, c. 2, n. 6.

<sup>58</sup> *De corp. Christi*, c. 5: "Opinionem mediam approbant doctores prae-nominati et videtur esse determinatio Ecclesiae Romanae. Unde extra *De summa Trinitate et fide Catholica, Firmiter*, dicit Innocentius in concilio generali: 'Una est omnium fidelium universalis ecclesiae extra quam nullus omnino salvatur in qua ipse idem sacerdos est et sacrificium, cuius corpus et sanguis in Sacramento Altaris sub speciebus panis et vini veraciter continetur, transubstantiatis pane in corpus Christi et vino in sanguinem potestate divina.' " See c. 1, X, *Firmiter*, I, 1 in Friedberg, *op. cit.*, 2, 5.

discussion is not *ex professo* to determine which of these first two opinions is the more correct formulation of the Catholic position, but rather to show that the third position, namely, consubstantiation, is out of line with Catholic tradition and orthodoxy. Certainly, that was also the mind of Pope Innocent as well as of Peter Lombard and Henricus de Segusio.

The Venerable Inceptor's predilection for this second opinion, while only incidental to the context in which it occurs, does reflect his mind on the problem here at hand. The first opinion quoted by Ockham seems to contain the elements of a conversion in the more strict sense of the term; for that which was bread is the body of Christ. Only an intrinsic nexus between the two could justify such a statement. In the second position we can distinguish two separable, if not separate, operations, namely, the cessation of the substance of bread, and the beginning to be present of the body of Christ. Between these two actions as they affect the respective substances there is only an extrinsic nexus which makes them to be one *per accidens*.

2. The opening and closing sentences of chapter five of the *De corpore Christi* point to the same conclusion:

Now we must consider that this conversion or transubstantiation does not occur through this alone that the body of Christ begins to be under the species of bread, the substance itself remaining; but the substance of bread is so converted into the body of Christ that the substance of bread by divine power no longer remains, but only the body of Christ remains under the accidents, which, before the consecration, were in the substance of bread. However, it (the body of Christ) is in no way affected by these accidents, as will be shown later . . . I say, however, that the substance of bread does not remain but ceases to be, and the body of Christ begins to be.<sup>59</sup>

<sup>59</sup> *Ibid.*: "Nunc illud considerandum est quod ista conversio seu transubstantiatio non fit per hoc solum quod corpus Christi incipit esse sub specie panis, ipsa substantia remanente, sed sic convertitur substantia panis in corpus Christi quod virtute divina substantia panis non manet sub accidentibus quae erant ante conversionem in substantia panis, manet corpus Christi; non tamen afficitur accidentibus illis ut inferius ostendetur. . . . Dico tamen quod substantia panis non manet sed desinit esse, et sub illis speciebus incipit esse corpus Christi."

It must be noted that here again Ockham distinguishes two separate changes, the one whereby Christ's body is made to be present under, that is, succeed to, the species of the bread; the other whereby the substance of bread ceases to be, that is, is annihilated. These two operations do not form an *unum per se* but only *per accidens* in so far as both are involved in effecting Christ's presence under the species, that is, in the conversion of the substance of bread into Christ's body. Hence, the bond between the two substances is only extrinsic since two separable operations, namely, annihilation and succession, are involved with regard to the respective termini.

The rather surprising feature of Ockham's notion of the Eucharistic conversion is not that he maintains this position, for it, like the more strict notion, safeguards the Catholic dogma of transubstantiation, but that he holds it as if it were the only possible explanation. Actually, the opinion which postulates an intrinsic nexus between the cessation of the substance of bread and the becoming present of Christ's body as the one substance is converted into the other is the older and more common teaching. In many instances where he disagreed with his predecessors, St. Thomas and Duns Scotus in particular, the Venerable Inceptor would take up the cudgel against them. Why he remains silent on this point is a question without an adequate solution at the present writing.

Judging from a remark in the *De corpore Christi* with regard to the second opinion cited by Peter Lombard and Hostiensis,<sup>60</sup> one would be inclined to believe that Ockham considered his notion of transubstantiation to coincide with the positions of St. Thomas and Scotus. The impression is given that the only difference between the Angelic Doctor on the one hand and Scotus and himself on the other is that St. Thomas holds to the impossibility of consubstantiation while Scotus and Ockham do not. True, Ockham's principal concern in this chapter was not to emphasize the differences between the two orthodox explanations of the conversive action of transubstantiation, but rather to distinguish the Catholic position from the third and heretical position, namely, consubstantiation. Be that as it may, certainly the following chapter would have been the

<sup>60</sup> *Supra*, c. 2, nn. 15-16.

logical place for a further discussion of the various nuances in the Catholic position. Such a discussion, however, is not forthcoming.

#### FORMAL TERMINUS OF TRANSUBSTANTIATION

##### *Reportatio*

One of Ockham's main concerns in his discussion of transubstantiation is to determine precisely the formal terminus of this conversion. By way of introduction to the problem, he proposes the so called common opinion on the question. Without specifically referring to either the body, blood, soul, or divinity of Christ, he simply states that according to the common opinion "something is there primarily and principally *ex vi sacramenti*; something else only by a certain natural concomitance. The first is called the formal terminus of this conversion; the second is not."<sup>61</sup>

St. Thomas, who is certainly one of the foremost proponents of the common opinion, merits special attention. In his study of the problem a further elaboration of the rather general remarks set forth by Ockham is to be found. For the Angelic Doctor the formal terminus of transubstantiation is that precise thing into which the substance of bread is directly converted. To determine specifically what this particular thing is, he looks to the form of the sacrament, namely, the words of consecration. In virtue of these words and the power of the sacrament the body of Christ first and foremost becomes present on the altar. The body of Christ, therefore, is the formal terminus of the conversion of the bread.<sup>62</sup>

The traditional teaching of the Church, as crystallized in the

<sup>61</sup> *Report.* 4, q. 6, E: "Quantum ad tertium, dicitur hic communiter quod aliquid est ibi primo et principaliter ex vi sacramenti; aliud tantum ex quadam concomitantia. Primum vocatur terminus formalis istius conversionis; secundum non."

<sup>62</sup> *Sum. theol.*, p. 3, q. 76, a. 1, *Op. omnia*, 4, 350: "Sciendum tamen quod aliquid Christi est in hoc sacramento dupliciter: uno modo quasi ex vi sacramenti; alio modo ex naturali concomitantia. Ex vi quidem sacramenti est sub speciebus huius sacramenti id in quod directe convertitur substantia panis et vini praeexistens, prout significatur per verba formae, quae sunt effectiva in hoc sacramento sicut et in ceteris mutationibus; puta cum dicitur: Hoc est corpus meum, vel: Hic est sanguis meus."

first canon of the thirteenth session of the Council of Trent,<sup>63</sup> has always insisted that the whole Christ, that is, body, blood, soul, and divinity, is really and substantially present in the Sacrament of the Altar. How then can this be explained if the substance of the bread is converted only into the body of Christ as such?

St. Thomas teaches that the presence of the blood, soul, and divinity under the Eucharistic species of bread is the result not specifically of the words of consecration, but that they are there with the substance of Christ's body only because of a certain natural concomitance.<sup>64</sup>

Rather than explain at great length and in an abstract manner the significance of the terms *terminus formalis* (*terminus per se*) and *terminus non-formalis* (*terminus per accidens*), Ockham proposes an example to illustrate these terms. When a contractor builds a house, this house *qua* house is the formal terminus of his designs and efforts. He has in mind primarily to construct a place suitable for living purposes. Of relatively secondary and accidental importance to this builder is the color, shape, etc. of this house. These, however, are concomitant with the house *qua* house. Be that as it may, all of these features can be lumped together and designated as the accidental termini of his construction work. They are nevertheless intimately bound up with the primary aim he had in mind, namely, the building of a house. As such, however, they are not his primary objective.

Turning to the Eucharist, and with all due respect to this august sacrament, the body of Christ *qua* body, just as the house *qua* house, is termed the formal terminus of a transubstantiation; the blood, soul, and divinity of Christ, just as the accidents of the house, are termini *per accidens* of transubstantiation through a certain natural concomitance in so far as they are conjoined to Christ's body.<sup>65</sup>

<sup>63</sup> *ES*, 883.

<sup>64</sup> *Sum. theol.*, p. 3, q. 76, a. 1, *Op. omnia*, 4, 350: "Ex naturali autem concomitantia est in hoc sacramento illud quod realiter est coniunctum ei in quod praedicta conversio terminatur. Si enim aliqua duo sunt realiter coniuncta, ubicumque est unum realiter, oportet et aliud esse; sola enim operatione animae discernuntur quae realiter sunt coniuncta."

<sup>65</sup> *Report.* 4, q. 6, E: "Ponitur exemplum quomodo aliquid est terminus

At first glance this illustration and its application seem to make quite clear and definite just what is the formal terminus and what are the termini *per accidens* of transubstantiation. However, even these specifications are, as Ockham insists, open to an incorrect as well as a correct interpretation.

If we understood the body of Christ to be the formal terminus of transubstantiation to the exclusion of His blood, for example, as an equal and proper terminus of this operation, our application, according to Ockham, is incorrect.<sup>66</sup> To return to our illustration of the artisan building the house: If we look upon the color, shape, etc. of the house as something independent of his endeavors so that they follow his efforts to construct a house only in some sort of parallel and concomitant manner, we would have an inexact conception of the true state of affairs. In that sense the builder would be the efficient cause of the house *qua* house but not of the accidents which are part and parcel of the house when it is built. In very truth, however, these concomitant factors are the products, the termini, of his efforts; *per accidens*, to be sure, but still termini in the real sense of the word.

Apparently Ockham sees in the product of the artisan's efforts as many termini as there are realities produced. Hence, the house *qua* house is one terminus; the various accidents of this house such as color, etc. are also termini. Each of these latter termini, even if it be granted that they are only accidental to the house *qua* house, are nevertheless *per se* termini of this particular construction work. Accidents, while by nature destined to inhere in a substance, are nonetheless produced *per se* as things which are distinct from a substance and with their own essence and mode of existence. If such were not the case, when a child is generated it would of necessity have to possess, for example, the accident, whiteness. Certainly

productionis per se, sicut domus respectu aedificationis; sed albedo in domo est terminus per accidens. Et ita in proposito corpus Christi est terminus formalis istius conversionis et per se; sed anima intellectiva est terminus per accidens per quamdam concomitantiam."

<sup>66</sup> *Ibid.*: "Sed haec distinctio potest intelligi bene et male. Si enim intelligitur quod anima intellectiva est ibi ex quadam concomitantia naturali ita quod sit praecise terminus illius transsubstantiationis per accidens et non propria transsubstantiatione, illud est falsum."

such a conclusion cannot be maintained. Consequently, the accident, color, being a distinct reality, must be produced as a separate terminus from the substance of the child's body *qua* body.<sup>67</sup> Hence, in itself the example of the house in relation to its being built does not unequivocally illustrate that even the accidents of a thing are real, though *per accidens*, termini of a production.

In keeping with the same trend of thought, unless the accidents were separable from a substance, and therefore separate termini as in transubstantiation, the mode of existence of the Eucharistic accidents would involve a contradiction. Our faith teaches us that the species of the host exist without a substance as the subject of inherence.<sup>68</sup> This, in scholastic language, would be metaphysically impossible if substance and accidents were not distinct entities.

Ockham argues further that not only can separable termini be distinguished in the product of transubstantiation but also that there are as many transubstantiations involved when Christ becomes present on the altar as there are distinguishable termini. The body and soul of Christ are certainly separable termini. No one but the skeptics will deny, for example, that during the three days between Christ's death and resurrection His soul was separated from His body. If one of the Apostles had said Mass during those three days, there would have been transubstantiation in very truth, but the end product of the conversion of the bread would have been confined to the body of Christ. Hence, during this triduum as well as before and after, Christ's soul is separable from His body. As such the soul can and does constitute a terminus of transubstantiation which is distinct from that of the body. Therefore, the Venerable Inceptor concludes, there is a distinct transubstantiation corresponding to every

<sup>67</sup> *Ibid.*: "Item exemplum non est ad propositum de domo respectu aedificationis et albedine in domo, quia cum accidens sit res distincta a substantia, et vera res habet vere causam efficientem; tunc sic, sicut nihil potest fieri nisi per se, igitur nihil est terminus productionis nisi per se; et sicut accidens est res distincta ab homine, ita distincta productione producit, quia aliter semper homo in producendo hominem produceret albedinem; et etiam quod nihil requiritur ad productionem albedinis quod non requiritur ad productionem [hominis: *add. Ed.*]; et ideo dico quod sicut accidens est res distincta a substantia, ita distincta productione producitur"

<sup>68</sup> *ES*, 884.

distinct and separable terminus.<sup>69</sup> To explain the presence of Christ's soul under the Eucharistic species through some sort of natural concomitance, would not, according to Ockham's way of thinking, bring it within the realm of a real terminus or postulate for it a proper transubstantiation, such as he himself demands.<sup>70</sup>

Ockham's rather novel notion that there are distinct transubstantiations corresponding to the distinct termini which can be distinguished in the whole Christ harks back to the definition of transubstantiation which he has adopted. Transubstantiation for him is the "succession of one substance to that of another which ceases to be simply in itself,"<sup>71</sup> etc. In only the wide sense of the term is transubstantiation a conversion, for there is only an extrinsic nexus between the cessation of the substance of bread and the succession of the body of Christ to the place of the Eucharistic accidents.<sup>72</sup>

In the *compositum* of Christ's human nature we can distinguish several substances: the body and blood of Christ which are material substances, the soul which is a spiritual substance. Every one of these can be separated from the others, as was illustrated at the time of Christ's death. All of them, however, except during the triduum, succeed to the place of the host at the time of the consecration. Therefore, since there is the succession of separable substances, all of them can, according to Ockham's notion, constitute a separate terminus which can succeed to the substance of the bread. But transubstantiation according to Ockham's concept is "the succession

<sup>69</sup> *Report.* 4, q. 6, E: "Illud [quod anima Christi est in sacramento Eucharistiae ex quadam concomitantia et per accidens, sed non praecise ut terminus propriae transsubstantiationis] est falsum. Primo: quia ubi est distinctus terminus ibi est distincta transsubstantiatio; sed anima et corpus Christi sunt distincti termini; igitur et cetera. Secundo: quia ubi unus terminus potest separari ab alio, ibi sunt distincti termini. Sic est de anima et corpore, sicut patet in triduo mortis si sacerdos confecisset convertisset panem in corpus Christi; et tunc fuerunt distincti termini et distinctae transsubstantiationes; igitur et nunc."

<sup>70</sup> *Ibid.*: "Substantiae panis ita succedit anima sicut corpus et post triduum et ante. Igitur ita ex vi conversionis transsubstantiatur panis in animam sicut in corpus."

<sup>71</sup> *Supra*, n. 6.

<sup>72</sup> *Supra*, 45 ff.

of a substance to a substance which ceases to be simply in itself," etc.<sup>73</sup> Therefore, the succession of each of these substances constitutes a distinct transubstantiation.

Postulating separate conversions corresponding to the separable termini of transubstantiation carries with it several difficulties. In the first instance, Ockham advances the problem as to whether the material substance of bread can be changed over into the spiritual substance of Christ's intellectual soul. He cites the authority of St. Augustine as opposing this possibility.<sup>74</sup>

The problem is more apparent than real. True enough, a creature cannot change a material substance into a spiritual substance. In this instance, however, the efficient cause is not a creature with his limited faculties, but the Creator, to Whom all things which do not involve a contradiction are possible.<sup>75</sup> If God can produce both material and spiritual substances out of nothing, with at least equal ease can He cause a material substance to cease to be and a spiritual substance to succeed to its place.

The second difficulty which Ockham envisages revolves around the notion of transaccidentation. Would this not be transaccidentation if the substance of bread were to be converted into the accidents of Christ's body? Since Ockham postulates a proper conversion corresponding to every separable terminus, he must also logically require a separate conversion for all of the accidents of Christ's body as it becomes present on the altar. Transaccidentation, however, is admitted by no theologian of repute.<sup>76</sup>

Theoretically speaking, Ockham admits the possibility of transaccidentation. Practically speaking, he refuses to see any particular difficulty in the real order consequent upon the fact that the acci-

<sup>73</sup> *Supra*, n. 6.

<sup>74</sup> *Report.* 4, q. 6, E: "Octavum [dubium] est: quia videtur quod ista conversio non potest fieri in animam intellectivam, quia secundum Augustinum corpus in spiritum converti non potest."

<sup>75</sup> *Ibid.*, L: "Ad octavum [dubium] dico quod licet corpus non potest converti in spiritum per potentiam creaturae, tamen per potentiam divinam bene potest ita in animam intellectivam sicut in corpus Christi."

<sup>76</sup> *Ibid.*, E: "Item eadem ratione posset converti in accidens Christi, quia accidens succedit substantiae; et tunc esset transaccidentatio, quod tamen omnes negant."

dents of Christ's body *qua* accidents constitute the termini of proper conversions. Just as the substance of Christ's body constitutes the proper terminus of the conversion of the bread, so also the accidents of Christ's body are the proper termini of similar conversions. He does, however, censure the designation of such a conversion of the substance of bread into the accidents of Christ's body as transubstantiation. To realize this notion it is necessary for one substance to succeed to another. Nor can such a conversion be called transaccidentation.

To verify the notion of transaccidentation we would have to have a situation perfectly parallel to that of transubstantiation, save only that accidents instead of substances would be involved. Such, however, is not the case in the Eucharist. The accidents, *qua res*, remain wholly as they were before the transubstantiation, except for the fact that they no longer inhere in the substance of the bread. There is absolutely no question of the accidents of the bread being converted into the accidents of Christ's body. Such a conversion, however, would be required to constitute transaccidentation. The most that can be said is that the accidents of Christ's body become present to and occupy the same place as the remaining accidents of the bread. For a conversion which would be either transubstantiation or transaccidentation, the Venerable Inceptor requires an annihilation of a substance or an accident, as the case may be, and the succession of another substance or accident as the respective circumstances demand. With regard to the accidents of the bread, however, this factor of annihilation is lacking. Hence, we cannot speak of a transaccidentation—of a conversion of the accidents of the bread into the accidents of Christ's body.<sup>77</sup>

<sup>77</sup> *Ibid.*, L: "Ad aliud dico quod non est inconueniens concedere quod sit ibi transaccidentatio, quia substantia corporis Christi sicut succedit substantiae panis, ita accidens corporis Christi succedit substantiae et habet esse ubi prius non habuit esse; et est propria conversio distincta a productione sive conversione in substantiam, sicut prius probatum est, quod est distincta conversio in corpus Christi et animam intellectivam, quia sunt distincti termini. Aliter potest dici quod sicut non est transsubstantiatio nisi quando primo est una substantia et post destruitur illa, et succedit alia substantia; et ideo ex virtute vocabuli dicitur transsubstantiatio; ita non dicitur transaccidentatio nisi quando primo est aliquod accidens et post destruitur illud accidens, et succedit aliud

Counter to the so called incorrect interpretation of the *terminus formalis* and the *terminus per accidens*, Ockham proposes what he considers to be the correct understanding of these terms. He employs the same terminology but with a connotation different from that given above.

In his *Ordinatio* he gives the fundamental notion of just what he understands by the formal terminus of a production. That which obtains simple being through an operation is designated as the formal terminus of that productive activity. As such the term *formal* has in its meaning no necessary connection with a form. For example: If God were to create matter without a form, the matter would be the *terminus formalis* of this activity. Likewise if God were to create matter under a preexisting form, the matter itself, and not the form, would be the formal terminus of this production, since it is the thing which obtained simple being through God's creative activity.

At times, however, it is not easy to determine what is precisely the formal terminus of a production. This is particularly the case when a number of things obtain simple being through an operation, as, for example, in a *compositum*. In such an instance, where the formal terminus is to be distinguished from the rest of the total terminus, the order of dependence in the productive process is the proximate deciding factor. Those things which obtain their simple being consequent upon the simple being of something else are to be considered the termini of that production only *per accidens*.<sup>78</sup>

accidens, et tunc diceretur proprie transaccidentatio, et aliter non. Sed in proposito non remanet, et accidentia panis manent. Ideo non dicitur transaccidentatio, licet accidentia Christi illis accidentibus coexistentibus quibus non coexistebant prius."

<sup>78</sup> *Ord.* 1, d. 5, q. 3, E: "Dico quod terminus formalis productionis est illud quod capit esse simpliciter per illam productionem. Unde, quando terminus formalis et terminus totalis distinguuntur, terminus formalis est aliquid ipsius termini totalis capiens simpliciter esse per illam productionem; et per hoc quod terminus formalis capit simpliciter esse per illam productionem, terminus totalis capit esse simpliciter per ipsam productionem. Et ex isto sequitur quod non dicitur terminus formalis quia est forma, nam Deus crearet ipsam materiam per se existentem ista materia esset terminus formalis, et tamen non esset forma. Similiter si Deus crearet materiam sub forma preexistente, forma non esset terminus formalis sed ipsa materia. . . . dicitur

Perhaps the example of the artisan who builds a house will help to clarify the point. The fruits of his labor are not only the house *qua* house, but also various accidental qualities of this house. Taken together, these various distinguishable termini constitute the *terminus totalis* of his building. Both the house and the qualities of the house obtain simple being—are produced *per se*—by his efforts. Yet we can call the house *qua* house the *terminus formalis*, and the qualities of this house the *termini per accidens*. Why?

According to Ockham's notion of the formal terminus of a production, the house *qua* house obtained simple being as a result of the artisan's efforts. The qualities of the house came into being simultaneously with the house, that is, as part of the total product; their simple being, however, is dependent upon the production of the house *qua* house. In other words, the simple being of the accidents would never have come into being except for the production of the simple being of the house *qua* house. Hence, we can distinguish in the total terminus the simple being of the house as a house, which constitutes the formal terminus of this production; and the qualities of the house, because of their dependence in coming into being upon the house as such, as the *termini per accidens*.

Proceeding even further, Ockham states that the ultimate deciding factor as to which is the first and formal terminus and which are the *termini per accidens* is the intention of the principal cause.

The example of the house and its qualities can again serve to illustrate the point. The artisan intends principally the house *qua* house to protect himself from the inclemencies of the seasons. Hence, the house as such is the formal terminus of this production. The color, etc. of the house are the *termini per accidens* because they are only secondarily intended in so far as the house as such cannot be produced without its having some color, etc.<sup>79</sup>

*terminus formalis illud quod primo et secundum se totum habet esse tali productione; et isto modo materia potest esse terminus formalis.*"

<sup>79</sup> *Report.* 4, q. 6, E: "Exemplum: Producens domum intendit principaliter se defendere ab imbribus et aliis nocivis; et hoc dicitur terminus per se illius productionis. Sed figura vel albedo in domo vel aliquid tale sunt termini per accidens, quia secundario intenti, quatenus primum non potest produci sine aliis. Et sic possunt exponi omnes auctoritates quae loquuntur de productione per se et per accidens."

This theory and this example find practical application in determining the formal terminus of transubstantiation. Except for the three days when our Lord's body was in the tomb, the substance of bread is converted into the whole Christ when He becomes present on the altar. Only the substance of Christ's body, however, is the formal terminus of this conversion, since God, the principal cause, so intends it. The blood, soul, etc. are only the *termini per accidens* in so far as they are united with the body and become present only when the body does. They are only secondarily or *per accidens* intended. This fact relegates them to the classification of *termini non-formales*.<sup>80</sup>

In the moments immediately following the transubstantiation of the bread, the priest speaks the words of consecration over the wine. In that instant the same whole Christ becomes present under the species of wine. The *terminus formalis* and *termini per accidens*, however, are different. In this case the blood of Christ is the formal terminus, that is, the thing primarily intended by the principal cause; the body, soul, etc. only the *termini per accidens*, that is, secondarily intended. Hence, this designation is totally dependent upon the intention of God, Who, in the first instance, wills that the body of Christ *ex virtute verborum* becomes present on the altar; in the second instance He intends the blood of Christ as the formal terminus of the words spoken over the chalice. In both consecrations, however, the rest of the composite united with the divinity are present *per accidens* and through a certain natural concomitance.

<sup>80</sup> *Ibid.*: "Aliter potest ista distinctio intelligi bene, quod illud est primus terminus transubstantiationis quod est primo intentum a convertente sive transsubstantiante, quod, scilicet, existente separato vel destructo quocumque alio, esset transsubstantiatio; et illud dicitur terminus per accidens quod est secundario intentum ab eodem agente, quia, scilicet, non potest transsubstantiare unum sine aliis, maxime quando sunt unita; vel quia non vult transsubstantiare sine aliis. Hoc modo corpus Christi—compositum ex materia et forma præcedente animam intellectivam, quaecumque sit illa, et hoc ponendo plures formas in homine, sicut oportet ponere propter articulum—est primus terminus huius transubstantiationis, quia Deus, qui est agens principale in ista conversione intendit primo convertere panem in corpus Christi, ita quod si anima sit separata, sicut fuit in triduo, tunc solum fieret conversio in corpus Christi. Anima intellectiva est terminus per accidens, quia Deus secundario intendit convertere panem in animam quatenus unitur corpori."

Except for the three days when Christ's body was separated from His soul, this distinction of termini has no tangible import. If, however, Mass had been celebrated during those three days, Christ's body would have become present under the species of bread without His blood and soul; likewise His blood under the species of wine without His body and soul.

In this sense, Ockham, and all those who hold to an extrinsic nexus between the cessation of the substance of bread and the succession of Christ, can subscribe to the common distinction of the *terminus formalis* and the *terminus per accidens* of transubstantiation.<sup>81</sup>

#### *De Corpore Christi*

Without using the words, *terminus formalis* and *terminus per accidens*, Ockham discusses, though more briefly, this same problem in the *De corpore Christi*. His position is essentially unchanged from that of the *Reportatio*. His terminology, however, is more finely precisioned and more easily understandable. The key to this discussion is to be found in the distinction he makes between transubstantiation in its proper and in its improper sense.

In the proper sense, namely, as the Church had specifically used the term in the fourth Council of the Lateran (1215),<sup>82</sup> the substance of bread is said to be converted only into the body of Christ. Neither the blood, nor the soul, nor the divinity is the proper product, the *terminus formalis*, of transubstantiation. Hence, in this sense the substance of bread is specifically converted into that which becomes present on the altar *ex virtute verborum*, namely, the body of Christ. Whether this body be conjoined to something else, that is, the blood, soul, and divinity of Christ, has no direct bearing on the object of transubstantiation in the proper sense of the term. Consequently, the formal terminus, to revert to the terminology of the *Reportatio*, is the same before, during, and after Christ's death and resurrection. The body of Christ alone merits this designation when the substance of the bread is converted.<sup>83</sup>

<sup>81</sup> *Ibid.*: "Et sic possunt exponi omnes auctoritates quae loquuntur de productione per se et per accidens."

<sup>82</sup> *ES*, 430.

<sup>83</sup> *De corp Christi*, c. 4: "Praedicta conversio seu transsubstantiatio, pro-

This division and its application has, as Ockham aims to show by citations from a gloss on the *Decretum Gratiani* and from the words of Peter Lombard, the approval of canonists and theologians in the Church. Both of these authorities state definitely that the bread is changed, in the primary and proper sense of the word, only into the body of Christ, and the wine into His blood.<sup>84</sup>

In the wide or improper sense of the word, we can, according to Ockham, speak of the substance of bread being converted into the blood, soul, etc. of Christ. In this sense the terminus of conversion supposits for and signifies all those things into which the substance of bread is transubstantiated, that is, succeeded by, when the words of consecration are spoken. The distinguishable termini of conversion in this improper sense of the term would vary with circumstances. Hence, if Mass were celebrated during the three days when

prie acciπendo vocabulum, non fit in animam Christi, nec in divinitatem, nec in aliquod accidens substantiae corporis Christi, nec in sanguinem, sed tantum in corpus Christi. . . . Unde sciendum quod in illud proprie convertitur vel transsubstantiatur substantia panis, quod, non quia coniunctum est alteri, sed etiam, si ab aliis separatum, ad prolationem verborum sacramentalium a sacerdote super materia conveniente cum intentione debita divina sic incipit esse sub specie panis. Huius autem est caro Christi et non anima nec sanguis nec aliquod accidens inhaerens carni vel animae; nam si esset anima separata a carne quantumcumque sacerdos cum intentione debita proferret verba sacramentalia super materia conveniente, non ibi inciperet esse anima Christi sed caro tantum. Similiter si sanguis esset separatus a carne, non ibi inciperet esse sanguis sed caro tantum. Et idem iudicium est de accidentibus carnis et animae. Et propter hoc dicunt doctores corpus Christi esse sub specie panis virtute verborum sacramentalium et ex vi conversionis; et propter hoc substantia panis convertitur in corpus Christi, non in animam nec in deitatem."

<sup>84</sup> *Ibid.*: "Quod enim substantia panis in animam Christi vel divinitatem non convertitur, doctorum auctoritatibus persuadetur. Unde dicit glossa *De consecratione*, distinctione secunda, super illo capitulo, *Quid est Christum manducare*: 'Panis in solam carnem convertitur et vinum in sanguinem.' Item Magister Sententiarum, libro quarto, distinctione undecima: 'Licet,' inquit, 'sub utraque specie totus Christus sumatur, tamen non fit conversio nisi in carnem nec vini nisi in sanguinem.' Ex quibus auctoritatibus claret, quod substantia panis, ex quo in solam carnem convertitur, non in divinitatem vel animam rationalem vel sanguinem transsubstantiatur, nec per consequens in accidens carnis nec animae; sed hoc quidem est proprie sumendo hoc vocabulum, *convertitur*." See: (1) *Glossa ord.* on D. 2, *de cons.*, v. *solum*, in *Decretum Gratiani*, 1935-6; (2) P. Lombard, *op. cit.*, c. 4, 240

our Lord's body was in the tomb, the substance of bread would have been converted only into the body of Christ, since at that time the soul was separated from it. After the resurrection as well as before His death, the substance of bread is changed, in the improper sense of the word, not only into His body, but into His blood, soul, etc. as well.<sup>85</sup>

<sup>85</sup> *Ibid.*: "Quamvis improprie et large sumendo hoc vocabulum *conversio* vel *transsubstantiatio*, posset concedi quod panis transsubstantiatur in animam vel accidens corporis Christi, vel sanguinem. . . . Si tamen velit aliquis uti vocabulo *conversionis* vel *transsubstantiationis* magis improprie, ut dicat substantiam panis converti in omne illud quod ad prolationem verborum sacramentalium incipit nunc de facto esse sub specie panis, sic utendo vocabulo potest concedi quod substantia panis convertitur in animam Christi intellectivam, hoc est dictum, ad prolationem verborum sacramentalium incipit anima intellectiva esse sub specie panis. Si tamen in triduo mortis Christi fuissent verba sacramentalia cum debita intentione prolata, non fuisset ibidem anima intellectiva, et ratio huius diversitatis est quia tunc erat anima intellectiva separata a corpore Christi cui nunc est unita."

## CHAPTER IV

### MODE OF CHRIST'S PRESENCE

The mode of Christ's presence in the Eucharist, perhaps more than any other single factor associated with the mystery of the Sacrament of the Altar, makes one humbly acknowledge the limitations of the human intellect and the fathomless depths of God's inscrutable omnipotence.

The words of institution of this august Sacrament assure us, as theologians agree, that the body of Christ is present under the species.<sup>1</sup> Tradition teaches us further that the whole Christ is present under the whole host and under each part thereof. In proof of this Ockham cites passages from the *Corpus iuris canonici* which quote the words of Sts. Jerome and Hilary.<sup>2</sup> From this point theological speculation takes over in an effort to enlighten us further as to how Christ is present on the altar. The general principle of *fides quaerens intellectum*, which prompted much of the scholastics' work on this and kindred theological questions, stimulated them to clarify and classify the traditional thought on the manner of Christ's Eucharistic presence.

Ockham, in harmony with many other theologians, deduces from these traditional facts that Christ is neither commensurate with the parts of the host nor circumscribed by the space which

<sup>1</sup>*Report.* 4, q. 4, A: "Ad oppositum [id est, contra opinionem ponentem quod corpus Christi non continetur sub speciebus panis] Matthaei vicesimo sexto [Matt. 26: 26]: 'Hoc est corpus meum'; et ad hoc sunt omnes doctores."

<sup>2</sup>*De corp. Christi*, c. 6: "Sed totum corpus Christi sub tota hostia et sub qualibet parte hostiae realiter continetur, quod sanctorum patrum testimoniis comprobatur. Unde beatus Ieronimus, et habetur *De consecratione*, distinctione secunda, *singuli*: 'Singuli,' inquit, 'accipiunt Christum Dominum, et in singulis portionibus totus est, nec per singulos minuitur, sed integrum se praebet in singulis.' Item beatus Hilarius, et habetur *De consecratione*, distinctione secunda, *ubi*: 'Ubi,' inquit, 'est pars corporis Christi, est et totum.'" See cc. 77, 78, *de cons.*, in Friedberg, *Corpus iuris canonici*, 1, 1345-6.

immediately surrounds the species.<sup>3</sup> Correlative to his denial of Christ's circumscriptive presence is his positive thesis that Christ is definitively present in the host.<sup>4</sup>

### THE PROBLEM OF QUANTITY

Theologians who speculate on the mode of Christ's presence in the Eucharist are faced with two seemingly contradictory facts: (1) The body of Christ is present in the whole host and in each part thereof, no matter how small; (2) This body is as whole, integral, and perfect in the Eucharist as it now is in heaven and as it once was in Palestine.

Specifically, then, the problem is: How can a human body maintain its unity, integrity, and perfection, and still be present as a whole to a small host and to every part thereof? The precise difficulty, as Ockham is well aware, revolves around quantity.<sup>5</sup>

#### *Common Opinion About Quantity*

Scholastic philosophers and theologians taught for the most part that quantity is a reality distinct from substance and quality. In view of the Catholic teaching that the Christ in the Eucharist is as whole, integral, and perfect as He is in heaven, it is necessary for them to postulate that every reality which He enjoys in heaven accompanies His presence on the altar. Granting the reality of quantity as a distinct entity from substance and quality, those who support this common opinion about quantity must of necessity require its presence together with the substance and qualities of Christ's body in the Eucharist. While they agree in general on the fact that the quantity of Christ's body is present, their explanations

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*: "Ex quibus [auctoritatibus] manifeste colligitur quod totus Christus est in tota hostia et totus in parte. Ex quo sequitur quod loco non commensuratur nec circumscribitur"

<sup>4</sup> *Report. 4*, q. 4, C. "Sed sic [existens in loco definitive] est de quantitate corporis Christi sub illis speciebus." *Ibid.*, P: "Illae species sunt in loco circumscriptive, sed corpus Christi definitive." *Quodl. 4*, q. 36: "Dico quod corpus Christi est in loco hostiae tantum definitive et non circumscriptive"

<sup>5</sup> *Report 4*, q. 4, F: "Difficultas istius quaestionis et multarum sequentium consistit in natura quantitatis."

differ as to how it is present. We shall leave the exposition of their explanation till later. Suffice it to say here that they maintain that Christ is present with His quantity in the Eucharist but not through His quantity as He is in heaven.

### Ockham's Notion About Quantity

The Venerable Inceptor's teaching about quantity differs radically from that of the common opinion. Because of its key importance in his explanation of Christ's Eucharistic presence, it is necessary to study his doctrine on this point with care and at some length.<sup>6</sup>

Employing the principle, "*frustra fit per plura quod potest fieri per pauciora*,"<sup>7</sup> Ockham favors the opinion that the reality of quantity as an entity separate from substance and quality can be disposed of without embarrassment. He insists that everything which can be explained by the hypothesis that quantity is a distinct entity can be salvaged equally well without postulating a distinct entity for quantity.<sup>8</sup>

From a positive point of view, the term *quantity* for the Venerable Inceptor is a connotative term which signifies either a substance or a quality, and connotes that this thing, be it either substance or quality, has part outside of part.<sup>9</sup> To put it differently, a substance or quality is quantity or quantum if there can be motion from one

<sup>6</sup> The discussion of this subject presumes acquaintance with certain terms which Ockham defined and explained at length in his treatises on logic. For an exposition of these terms and the related logical problems, see Ernest A. Moody, *The Logic of William of Ockham* (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1935); and P. Boehner, "Ockham's Theory of Signification," *Franciscan Studies*, 6 (1946), 143-70.

<sup>7</sup> *De corp. Christi*, c. 28.

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*: "Patet quod omnia quae possunt salvari posita tali quantitate [ut res distincta realiter a substantia et qualitate] possunt sine ea aequè bene salvari."

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid.*, c. 31: "Patet . . . quod hoc nomen *quantitas* aliquid connotat vel dat intelligere quod non connotatur nec datur intelligi per hoc nomen *substantia*; quia hoc nomen *quantitas* dat intelligere quod illud de quo praedicatur sit habens partem distantem a parte; hoc autem nomen *substantia* nec in propositione nec extra propositionem connotat quod illud de quo verificatur sit habens partem distantem a parte."

part of it to the other.<sup>10</sup> For example: Christ's body as He lived and moved about Palestine was a quantum. For the holy women to anoint the five wounds in His sacred body after it was taken down from the cross, it was necessary for them to move their hands from one extremity to another. The same requirements hold true today in heaven, if, for example, His Blessed Mother were to successively touch one part of His body after the other.

Quantity for Ockham is not an absolute but a connotative term. An absolute term signifies some entity as such; a connotative term signifies some thing and tells us something about this reality, that is, it connotes something which is not the thing as such. *Whiteness*, for example, is an absolute term. It signifies and supposit for a specific reality, a particular color. *White*, on the other hand, is a connotative term. It signifies some reality, such as a man, and connotes that this man has whiteness. We can also say that the term *white* signifies a subject and connotes the whiteness of that subject.

The predication of terms is either absolute or connotative. One can say, for example: This man is white; although one cannot say: This man is whiteness, for the man is not the color. It is correct to say only that he has whiteness. Quantity, being a connotative term according to Ockham's teaching, also signifies some reality, either substance or quality, and connotes that this reality has part outside of part. If quantity were an absolute term—and this is the position endorsed by the common opinion—it would signify and supposit for a reality separate and distinct from that of substance

<sup>10</sup> *Report. 4*, q. 4, G. "Extensio vel quantitas non dicit aliquam rem absolutam vel respectivam ultra substantiam et qualitatem, sed est quaedam vox vel conceptus significans principaliter substantiam, puta materiam vel formam vel qualitatem corporalem; et connotat multas alias res inter quas potest esse motus localis ita quod significat substantiam vel qualitatem coexistentem multis rebus extrinsecis inter quas potest esse motus localis, si talia essent; tamen quod tota substantia vel qualitas coexistit toti corpori extrinsece, vel toti loco et pars una substantiae uni parti loci et alia alteri, et sic deinceps, ita quod posset esse motus localis inter unam partem substantiae sic coexistentem loco et aliam coexistentem alteri parti loci. Et quando substantia vel qualitas sic coexistit loco, quod totum coexistit toti et pars parti praecise ita uni quod non alteri, tunc dicitur substantia vel qualitas quantitas, hoc est, tunc denominatur ab illo conceptu vel voce quae vocatur quantitas."

and quality. Ockham, however, refuses to admit the absoluteness of this term and insists that it is only a connotative term.

In an effort to clarify his teaching on quantity Ockham compares it with duration. Duration, or time, does not signify any reality different from the thing itself which endures. Duration signifies a thing and connotes that it is the subject of successive moments. If no thing besides God existed, there would be no duration. If, however, we could imagine for a moment, *per impossibile*, that a stone existed before the creation of the world when there was no duration, and that it continued to exist after creation, which marked the beginning of duration, it would not seem reasonable to say that by the very fact that it is now the subject of duration it has acquired some new reality distinct from itself. Duration is merely a connotative term which tells us something about a reality, namely, that it is or has been the subject of successive moments. Quantity likewise is a connotative term which signifies some thing, be that substance or quality, and connotes that this thing has part outside of part.<sup>11</sup>

*Quantity a predicament.*—The fact that quantity is classified by Aristotle among the ten predicaments does not militate against Ockham's designation of quantity as only a connotative term which does not signify any reality different from the other predicamental realities, namely, substance and quality. Relation, for example, another of the predicaments, is, according to many Catholic doctors, not a distinct entity different from the related things, but only a concept designating the order of one thing to another.<sup>12</sup> Therefore, Ockham concludes, with equal right quantity can be a predicament

<sup>11</sup> *Ibid.*: "Dico hic tenendo quod quantitas nullam aliam rem absolutam vel respectivam a substantia et a qualitate dicit; dico tunc quod quantitas non est aliud nisi extensio rei habentis partes a quarum una ad aliam potest esse motus localis, ita quod sicut in secundo dictum est de duratione et de durato, quod duratio nihil positivum dicit ultra rem durantem, sed est quedam vox vel conceptus significans principaliter ipsam rem durantem et connotat successionem actualem vel potentialem, ita quod significat rem coexistentem successionem actualiter vel quae coexisteret successioni si esset." See also Ockham, *Expositio aurea, Super librum praedicamentorum* (Bologna: Benedictus Hectoris, 1496), c. 10, ad "linea vero. . ."

<sup>12</sup> *De corp. Christi*, c. 31: "Dicunt enim multi doctores Catholici quod relatio non est res distincta realiter a suo fundamento."

even though it signifies no reality other than that of either substance or quality but only a distinct concept about either of these subjects. Ockham believes that his notion of quantity is in full accord with Aristotle's teaching on the subject.<sup>13</sup>

*Quantity an accident.*—Not only is quantity a predicament, but it is also an accident. Following, as he maintains, the suggestion of St. Anselm, Ockham, in the *De corpore Christi*, subjects the term *accident* to a threefold division.<sup>14</sup> In the *Reportatio* he is satisfied

<sup>13</sup> *Ibid.*, c. 17 "Constat itaque quod, dicendo quod aliqua quantitas non est res distincta realiter a substantia et quod aliqua quantitas non est res distincta realiter a qualitate, a paternis limitibus non discedo Unde nec unquam legi quod aliquis sanctus vel princeps philosophorum, Aristoteles, distinctionem fecerit inter quantum et quantitatem; immo indifferenter habent pro eodem quantum et quantitatem. Et ideo dico quod apud Aristotelem idem esset dicere Quantum est substantia vel qualitas; et, quantitas est substantia vel qualitas." See also *Report.* 4, q. 4, L: "Ideo dico . . . quod distinctio praedicamentorum non est accipienda in rebus, sed in conceptibus; et propter distinctionem conceptuum, qui vario modo significant res, possunt assignari diversi ordines praedicabilium, non pro se sed pro rebus Et sic potest dici de quantitate, quod est praedicamentum distinctum, non quia distincta res a substantia et qualitate sibi correspondet, sed quia est conceptus quidam significans substantiam realem et qualitatem non absolute sed extensas. Et sic intelligit philosophus "

<sup>14</sup> *De corp. Christi*, c. 32 "Ut autem innitar solido fundamento, incipiam ab una distinctione huius nominis *accidens* quae elici potest ex verbis venerabilis patris Anselmi. Unde hoc nomen *accidens* tripliciter accipi potest, scilicet, stricte, large, et largissime Stricte sumendo hoc vocabulum *accidens* sic accidens signat distinctam rem a substantia inhaerentem illi rei, scilicet, substantiae, et sine qua potest illa substantia, saltem per potentiam divinam, existere, ita quod contradictionem non includit illam substantiam existere et illo accidente distincto realiter non informari. . . . Accidens autem, large accepto vocabulo, vocatur omne praedicabile de aliquo contingenter quod potest successive affirmari et negari ab illo propter realem transmutationem illius et non tantum propter realem transmutationem alterius, quamvis non semper oporteat quod successive verificetur et negetur ab illo propter transmutationem illius, sed possit successive affirmari et negari propter transmutationem alterius. . . . Largissime vero vocatur accidens omne illud quod potest aliquando competere alicui et aliquando non competere sibi, sive posset sibi competere et non competere tam propter mutationem propriam quam alienam, sive non posset sibi successive competere et non competere per mutationem propriam sed praecise per mutationem alienam." Actually St. Anselm makes only a twofold division of accidents, namely, those which effect

with a twofold division of the term.<sup>15</sup> This latter division will suffice for the present discussion.

In the first sense, accident is an absolute term which signifies a reality distinct from substance but destined to inform a substance. Color, for example, is an accident in that sense of the word. In another sense accident is a connotative term which signifies some reality, be that a substance or a quality, and connotes some additional notion which is predicable of that reality. Quantity, according to Ockham, is an accident only in this latter sense and not in the first.

*Substance not per se quantity.*—If it be granted for the moment that substance or quality signify the same reality as quantity, can the conclusion be drawn that a substance or quality is *per se* and necessarily a quantity? That Ockham denies. In other words, it may be true in one instance that substance is quantity and false in another instance. Yet in both instances the substance retains its nature and maintains its identity as a substance, and that without the gain or loss of any reality.

A term is *per se* predicable of another term only if these two terms signify and connote the same thing. An absolute term, however, signifies a reality but connotes nothing further, a connotative term, as for example *quantity*, can signify that same reality, but it connotes some additional notion. The terms *man* and *rational animal* are *per se* predicable of each other. The term *rational animal* connotes nothing further than what is already signified by the term *man*. The terms *substance* and *quantity*, however, are not *per se*

some kind of a change in the subject, those which do not effect such a change. Ockham's division of accident in the wide and widest sense apparently corresponds to the second part of St Anselm's twofold division. See St Anselm, *Monologium*, 25 (ML 158 178).

<sup>15</sup> *Report.* 4, q. 4, L "Dico quod dupliciter accipitur accidens uno modo pro aliqua re informante substantiam; alio modo pro conceptu praedicabili de substantia, qui aliquando praedicatur de ea, aliquando non. Primo modo secundum istam viam non est accidens, quia non est res absoluta vel respectiva alia a substantia et qualitate. Secundo modo est accidens, quia est quidam conceptus qui aliquando praedicatur de substantia, aliquando non. Unde est conceptus connotativus significans substantiam et qualitatem, tamen connotando totum coexistere toti et partem parti, sicut duratio angeli significat angelum connotando eum coexistere alicui successive."

predicable of each other, since the term *quantity*, while signifying the same reality as substance, connotes the additional notion that this subject has part outside of part.<sup>16</sup> This distinction is of importance in the later discussion of the mode of presence proper to the substance of Christ's body in the Eucharist.

*Material substance a quantity through extrinsic causes.*—For a material substance to be a quantity, it is necessary, according to Ockham, only to have an efficient and final cause capable of effecting that such a substance has the local separation of integral parts. Hence, no new reality is required by the extrinsic causes to effect that a material substance have part outside of part. By the mere fact that a material substance is produced in *esse* after being *non esse* it has the aptitude either to be a quantity or not to be a quantity. If God chooses to arrange the intrinsic parts one outside the other, it is by that very fact a quantity; if He chooses to have all these parts exist to one place, the substance is not a quantity. The addition of another reality to effect that this substance have part outside of part seems entirely superfluous to Ockham.<sup>17</sup>

*Quantum immediately and circumscriptively present in a place.*—

<sup>16</sup> *De corp. Christi*, c. 39 "Per se uno modo accipitur quando praedicatum non connotat vel significat aliquid quin aliquid consimile connotetur vel detur intelligi per subiectum. Et ideo quando subiectum est mere absolutum et nihil connotat vel dat intelligere, et praedicatum est connotativum et aliquid dat intelligere, tunc talis propositio non dicitur esse *per se*. Et sic accipiendo *per se*, semper ad hoc quod aliqua propositio sit *per se* requiritur quod propositio non possit esse falsa cum constantia subiecti. . . Et sic accipiendo *per se*, haec non est *per se*: qualitas est quanta; nec ista. substantia est quanta; sed ista est *per se*. quantitas est quanta."

<sup>17</sup> *Ibid.*, c. 28. "Non est necesse ponere talem quantitatem [ut res distincta realiter a substantia et qualitate], et ita frustra poneretur. Omnia enim quae possunt salvari per talem rem possunt salvari sine ea per hoc quod substantia habet partes substantiales distinctas realiter natas distare localiter, quae partes tam substantiae quam qualitatum virtute causae efficientis et finalis, sicut in esse producuntur, ita fiunt distantes. Eadem enim virtute qua diversae partes substantiae et qualitatum de non esse procedunt ad esse etiam in distinctis locis capiunt esse. . . . Ex quo patet quod quantumcumque substantiae illi quae habet partem extra partem esset addita una quantitas alia, adhuc illa substantia per seipsam et per partes suas intrinsecas esset quanta, sicut partes substantiae seipsis et per nihil nisi per suas causas extrinsecas, puta efficientem et finalem, distant localiter." See also *ibid.*, c. 29.

If, as Ockham maintains, a corporeal substance is a quantum by the mere fact that its intrinsic parts were constituted one outside the other by the extrinsic causes, then he can and does just as logically insist that such a substance is thereby equally immediately present in a place with parts corresponding to and commensurate with the surrounding parts of space if there be such.<sup>18</sup> Such a mode of existence in a place is called circumscriptive presence.<sup>19</sup>

If, however, a substance is so present in a place that the whole is present in the whole place and the whole in every part of that place without a correspondence between the parts of the thing and the parts of the place, such a thing is said to be definitively present in a place.<sup>20</sup> An angel's presence in a place and the presence of the spiritual soul in the human body are classic examples of definitive presence.

Ockham argues that an extended substance, a quantum, is immediately and circumscriptively present in a place if it is surrounded by space. Hence, no distinct, intermediate reality like quantity is needed to enable this substance to be present in and commensurate with the surrounding place. The scholastics never taught that a spiritual substance, an angel, for example, needs any additional reality in order to be definitively present in a place. Ockham considers it equally reasonable to maintain that an extended, corporeal substance, a body, for example, can be equally immediately and circumscriptively present in a place by the mere fact that it has extended parts.<sup>21</sup>

<sup>18</sup> *Quodl.* 4, q. 26: "Dico quod substantia materialis extensa per suas partes est immediate in loco circumscriptive." See also *De corp. Christi*, c. 15; *Report.* 4, q. 4, L.

<sup>19</sup> *Report.* 4, q. 4, C: "Quando aliquid est in loco ita quod totum est in toto et pars in parte, est ibi circumscriptive." See also *De corp. Christi*, c. 15; *Quodl.* 4, q. 26

<sup>20</sup> *Ibid.*: "Quando aliquid est in loco sic quod totum est in toto et totum in qualibet parte, tunc est in loco definitive." See also *Quodl.* 4, q. 26.

<sup>21</sup> *De corp. Christi*, c. 15: "Omnis substantia quae per seipsam et per partes suas intrinsecas sibi est praesens alicui quanto habenti partem extra partem ita quod tota substantia est praesens illi toti habenti partem extra partem ita quod tota substantia est praesens illi et pars sua est praesens parti illius totius per seipsam formaliter et per partes intrinsecas sibi, habet partem extra partem et partem distantem a parte; et omne tale per seipsum circum-

*Argument for Conceptualistic Notion of Quantity*

Ockham goes to great lengths, especially in the *De corpore Christi*, to establish the thesis that quantity is not a distinct reality different from substance and quality. Not only in this specialized treatise on the Eucharist, but also in many of his other works, one finds profuse and detailed arguments for his conceptualistic notion of quantity.<sup>22</sup> The discussion of this question, as Ockham himself admits, pertains more to logic than to theology.<sup>23</sup> Suffice it to say, then, that if Ockham's extensive treatment of this problem were to be fractionally distilled off in the laboratory of the mind, the various end products would prompt the conclusion that no real distinction between quantity and substance, or quality, can be proven from either reason,<sup>24</sup> experience,<sup>25</sup> faith,<sup>26</sup> or authority.<sup>27</sup> He even aims to show from the words of those who deny his position that they are logically forced to admit his contention.<sup>28</sup>

APPLICATION OF OCKHAM'S NOTION  
ABOUT QUANTITY TO THE EUCHARIST

If it be presumed that quantity is only a relation of part outside of part, and that it is not a reality as such, the question of whether Christ is a quantum in the Eucharist as He is in heaven resolves

scribitur loco ambienti ipsum Non plus enim requiritur ad hoc, quod aliquid circumscribatur loco per seipsum, nisi quod habeat esse per seipsum formaliter, quamvis ab alio causaliter partem distantem a parte; igitur substantia seipsa et partibus intrinsicis sibi circumscribitur loco" See also *Ibid.*, c 26, *Quodl* 4, q 26

<sup>22</sup> See Ockham. *Report.* 4, q 4; *Quodl* 4, qq. 23-39; *Quodl* 6, q 3, *Quodl*. 7, q 25; *Summa totius logicae* (Venice. Lazarus de Soardis, 1508), p 1, cc 44-8, fol 17<sup>r</sup>-19<sup>v</sup>; *Expositio aurea, Super librum praedicamentorum*, cc 10-11; *De sac all., passim.*

<sup>23</sup> *De corp. Christi*, c 31 "Sed quia hoc [nempe, disputatio de natura quantitatis] pertinet ad logicum magis quam ad theologum, ideo pertranseo"

<sup>24</sup> *Report.* 4, q 4, G; *De corp Christi*, cc 25-26, 28 and *passim*; *Quodl* 4, qq. 23-30.

<sup>25</sup> *De corp. Christi*, c. 37

<sup>26</sup> *Ibid.*, cc. 31, 36; *Quodl.* 4, q. 31.

<sup>27</sup> *De corp. Christi*, cc. 17, 29, 31, 36; *Quodl.* 4, qq. 32, 33.

<sup>28</sup> *De corp Christi*, c. 27.

itself into the following simple form: Does Christ have the relation of part outside of part in the Eucharist? The question can be answered simply by saying that it is impossible for Christ to have part outside of part in the Sacrament of the Altar since He is present as a whole to the whole host and to each part thereof. Therefore, as a necessary corollary to this fact, Christ must exist definitively in the Eucharist and not circumscriptively.

The following brief synthesis based on Ockham's definitions and principles presumes to set forth the logical steps which led the Venerable Inceptor to his conclusion that the body of Christ, precisely as it exists on the altar, is (1) not a quantum and is (2) definitively present. Faith teaches us that the body of Christ is present as a whole in the whole host and as a whole in each part thereof. Hence, He is neither commensurate with the respective parts of the host nor with the space immediately surrounding the species. However, what is not commensurate part for part with the surrounding parts of space, but is present as a whole to the whole space and as a whole to each part thereof, is not circumscriptively but definitively present. Now, if something is not circumscriptively present in space—given that there is surrounding space—then it is not a quantum according to the connotative sense of that term, for whatever is circumscriptively present in a place is by that very fact a quantum, and vice versa. Therefore Christ's body, precisely as it is present on the altar, is neither a quantum nor circumscriptively present but only definitively present after the manner of a spiritual substance.<sup>29</sup>

Ockham's teaching that quantity is not a reality distinct from substance enables the mind to escape from one difficulty with re-

<sup>29</sup> *Report.* 4, q. 4, K. "Et secundum istum modum ponendi [quod duo corpora coexistent uni loco] potest salvari dictum, quomodo est ibi corpus Christi non habens modum quantitativum, quia nec est ibi quantitative nec circumscriptive, quia si sic tunc haberet partes extra partes, et ubi una pars esset, alia non esset; et totum coexisteret toti et pars parti praeise uni ita quod non alteri. Sed non sic existit sub speciebus panis, sed sic quod totum corpus Christi existit sub tota hostia et totum sub qualibet parte, quia una pars corporis Christi non plus repugnat coexistere alteri quam unum corpus repugnat alteri" See also *Report* 4, q. 4, C; *De corp Christi, passim*; *Quodl.* 4, q. 36.

gard to Christ's Eucharistic presence which challenges those who hold to the common opinion, namely, that quantity is a separate reality. For Ockham, the Christ in the Eucharist is equally as perfect, whole and integral as the Christ Who is in heaven, despite the fact that He is present on the altar without quantity. Just as God is equally perfect with or without the external relation of creatures to Creator, so also is the body of Christ in the Eucharist as equally perfect and integral without the relation of quantity as it is in heaven with this relation of part outside of part. Other difficulties there are, of course, which harass our finite minds with regard to the mode of Christ's Eucharistic presence. No one system of thought or combination of systems can be expected to explain the mode of Christ's Eucharistic presence, for the Sacrament of the Altar is a mystery.

#### *Problem of Predication*

Ockham's teaching that substance, or quality, and quantity signify and supposit for the same reality presents a problem of predication with regard to Christ's presence on the altar. A logician *par excellence*, the Venerable Inceptor insists that the rules of this art, which are destined to serve all science and knowledge, be strictly applied to the present problem.<sup>30</sup> Only by faithfully adhering to the rules of logic can one expect to arrive at a correct and precise marshaling of the speculative ideas which pertain to Christ's Eucharistic presence.

In the natural order a corporeal substance is always a quantity, that is, it exists with part outside of part and circumscriptively in a place. God, however, can effect that this same substance exist without its having part outside of part. If He so constitutes a corporeal substance, it would then not be a quantity. When referring to Christ's body in the Eucharist, we are faced with the problem consequent upon the fact that the same identical substance which is a quantum in heaven is not a quantum in the Eucharist. Therefore, while one refers to this same substance, it is possible that in one

<sup>30</sup> *De corp. Christi*, c. 6: "Immo certus sum [quod eadem substantia secundum se totam coexistere alicui corporeo et cuilibet parti illius contradictionem non includit] per regulas logicales quae omni scientiae et notitiae deservire noscuntur"

instance this statement is true: The substance of Christ's Body is a quantum; and in another instance it is possible for that statement to be false. To illustrate: If I point to Christ's body in heaven and say: This substance is a quantum, the statement is true. If again I point to Christ's body in the Eucharist and repeat that statement, my assertion is false *virtute sermonis*. Hence, since a substance, or quality, is not *per se* and necessarily a quantum, care must be exercised in predicating the one term of the other. In general, the confusion which might result from the interchange of these terms may be eliminated for the most part by substituting the phrase, "something having part outside of part," for the connotative term *quantity*.

The Venerable Inceptor makes a dozen or more statements which involve the terms *substance*, *body*, and *quantity* with respect to Christ's presence on the altar. Some of the more representative ones will be given and explained in order to illustrate Ockham's mind on the point. Precision in these statements is of primary importance. For this reason they will be left in Latin lest some nuances of thought not intended by the author be introduced by the translation.

*True statements.*—According to Ockham it is true to say: "*Corpus Christi est quantitas.*"<sup>31</sup> The correctness of this statement is easily perceived if, for the connotative term *quantity* we substitute the explanatory phrase: something having part outside of part. According to this resolution we have the following statement: The body of Christ is something having part outside of part. If, while pointing to Christ's body in heaven, we make this assertion, we are certainly correct, for *de facto* Christ's body in heaven has part outside of part.

Equally true are the following statements: "*Corpus Christi habens partem distantem a parte est in Sacramento Altaris.*"<sup>32</sup> Or again: "*Corpus Christi habens partes distantes situatiter est in Sacramento Altaris.*"<sup>33</sup> Likewise: "*Aliqua substantia circumscripta loco est in Sacramento Altaris.*"<sup>34</sup> Finally: "*Aliqua substantia cor-*

<sup>31</sup> *Ibid*, c 41.

<sup>32</sup> *Ibid*.

<sup>33</sup> *Ibid*.

<sup>34</sup> *Ibid*

*poris Christi et aliqua quantitas sunt idem realiter; et tamen haec est vera: Haec substantia est substantia corporis Christi in Sacramento Altaris.*"<sup>35</sup>

In all substances a quantitative mode of existence describes or qualifies the subject. In all cases the parenthetic expression which describes the subject as having part outside of part is referred to this subject, namely, Christ's body as it exists in heaven. Hence, every statement carries with it the following meaning: The body of Christ, which in heaven has part outside of part and is circumscribed by place, is in the Eucharist. That, of course, is true.

The following statements are more difficult to understand, although no less true. "*Quantitas, quae est realiter corpus Christi, est in Sacramento Altaris.*"<sup>36</sup> Or again: "*Quantitas corporis Christi est in Sacramento Altaris.*"<sup>37</sup>

To clarify the meaning of these statements, substitute for the relative term *quantity* the phrase which it connotes: something which has part outside of part. According to such a resolution the sense of both statements would be this: Something which has part outside of part—which is really the same as the body of Christ—is in the Eucharist. Pointing to Christ in heaven, and keeping in mind that the connotative term *quantity*, not according to its significative but according to its connotative function, characterizes Christ's mode of existence there, the statements are correct. *De facto* Christ's body is a quantum in heaven. Equally true is it that the terms *quantity*, *substance*, and *body* can supposit for the same reality. In the event that these terms actually do supposit for the same thing, it can be said with equal justification: The substance of Christ's body is in the Eucharist, or, the quantity of Christ's body is in the Eucharist. This latter statement, however, is in no way equivalent to saying that the body of Christ, precisely as it exists in the Eucharist, has a quantitative mode of existence or is a quantity. It must always be kept in mind that the term *quantity* in personal supposition signifies a reality, as for example, the body of Christ. The term *substance* according to the same supposition can

<sup>35</sup> *Ibid*

<sup>36</sup> *Ibid*

<sup>37</sup> *Ibid.*

signify the very same reality, namely, the body of Christ. Hence, if the term *quantity* is used specifically according to its significative function in personal supposition to signify the same reality as the term *substance*, the one term can be predicated of the other.

*False statements.*—The position of the connotative term in the sentence structure is of paramount importance. A perversion of this logical word order, when predicating the term *quantity* of the substance of Christ's body as it exists in the Eucharist, gives rise to the following false statement: "*Aliqua substantia est in Sacramento Altaris circumscripta loco.*"<sup>38</sup>

It must be noted, first of all, that the only substance under the species after the consecration is that of the body of Christ. Secondly, if something is circumscriptively in a place, it has by that very fact, according to Ockham, part outside of part corresponding to and commensurate with the surrounding parts of space. Therefore, after resolving this statement into its component factors, we would have the following assertion: The body of Christ which is in the Eucharist has part outside of part and is circumscriptively present on the altar. Ockham holds such a position to be heretical.<sup>39</sup>

For the same reason the following statements, all of which are identical in meaning, are false: "*Substantia corporis Christi est in Sacramento Altaris quantitas*";<sup>40</sup> "*substantia corporis Christi in Sacramento Altaris est quantitas*";<sup>41</sup> "*haec substantia [corporis Christi] est quantitas in Sacramento Altaris*";<sup>42</sup> "*corpus Christi est realiter quantitas in Sacramento Altaris*";<sup>43</sup> "*corpus Christi est in Sacramento Altaris habens partem distantem a parte*";<sup>44</sup> "*corpus Christi est quantitas in Sacramento Altaris.*"<sup>45</sup>

In every instance these statements signify that the body of Christ as it is in the Eucharist has part outside of part and is a

<sup>38</sup> *Ibid*

<sup>39</sup> *Ibid*. ". . . igitur substantia corporis Christi in Sacramento Altaris est habens partem extra partem et partem distantem a parte, quod est haereticum "

<sup>40</sup> *Ibid*

<sup>41</sup> *Ibid*

<sup>42</sup> *Ibid*

<sup>43</sup> *Ibid*

<sup>44</sup> *Ibid*.

<sup>45</sup> *Ibid*. See also *Quodl* 4, q 36.

quantum, which Ockham denies. For him, to have part outside of part is the same as being circumscriptively present in a place. The Venerable Inceptor holds the predication of such a notion about Christ's Eucharistic body to be false and heretical.<sup>46</sup>

It should be noted in contrasting the above false statements with those which are true that whenever the connotative term *quantity* is either the subject of the sentence or determines the subject of the sentence, the statement is true. In all these instances the connotative term *quantity* can and must be referred to Christ's body as it exists in heaven. If, however, this same connotative term is related to the Holy Eucharist and is made the predicate, or allowed to determine the predicate of the sentence, the statement is false, for by that very fact it refers to the body of Christ specifically as it is present in the Eucharist, and implies that precisely as it exists on the altar it has part outside of part. Ockham denies such a mode of existence for Christ's body in the Blessed Sacrament. Hence, the Venerable Inceptor warns, "that it is of great importance whether something is posited on the part of the subject or on the part of the predicate. This is especially true with regard to connotative terms. Quantity is such a name, for it signifies a thing by certifying that the parts of this thing are locally separated."<sup>47</sup>

### *Difficulties Consequent Upon Christ's Eucharistic Presence*

More basic to the theology of the Eucharist than the logical problem of predication are the difficulties consequent upon the fact itself of Christ's being present to the whole host and to each part thereof. Ockham summarizes these difficulties and reduces them to two key problems: (1) How is it possible for many parts of a body to be in one place? (2) How can one part of a body be in many places?<sup>48</sup> If, *per impossibile*, we could understand and explain

<sup>46</sup> *Supra*, n. 39.

<sup>47</sup> *De corp. Christi*, c. 41. "Et ita in talibus multum refert ponere aliquid a parte subiecti vel a parte praedicati, quod maxime verum est de nominibus connotativis; quale nomen est quantitas eo quod signat rem signando partes illius rei distare situatiter. . . ."

<sup>48</sup> *Report.* 4, q. 4, H "Ideo ad videndum quomodo corpus Christi existit sub specie panis apparent duae difficultates una, quomodo idem corpus numero

these two basic problems, the mystery of the Eucharist would be solved.

Despite the limitations of our finite intelligence and our consequent inability to comprehend the mystery of the altar, we can, nevertheless, be persuaded<sup>49</sup> of the possibility of such a mode of existence as is enjoyed by Christ's body under the Eucharistic species. To be persuaded of the possibility of Christ's Eucharistic existence, it is necessary to be convinced that God is omnipotent; that He can do many more things than our finite intellects can understand or explain. Both reason and revelation can and should convince us of this fact. As a matter of fact, everything which does not involve a contradiction is possible to God. To limit God's power to consequences which are in keeping only with natural causes leads to certain error. It fails to recognize that God, Who is the Author of nature and its laws, can set aside these natural laws and forces whenever His wisdom and omnipotence find it fitting. The numerous miracles recorded in the divinely revealed and infallible Word of God are evidence enough that God can and does produce effects which are either contrary to or surpass the physical laws and forces of nature.<sup>50</sup>

The only limitation, if indeed we can refer to it as such, which we can place on God's power is that He cannot do anything which

potest coexistere pluribus locis secundum se totum; alia, quomodo multae partes possunt coexistere uni loco."

<sup>49</sup> A persuasion is to be distinguished from a demonstration. This latter is a proof based on necessary and evident premises and leads to a necessary and evident conclusion. Such a conclusion has the strictest possible certitude. Persuasion, however, is a proof which does not enjoy evident premises or an evident conclusion, and therefore provides only a moral certitude.

<sup>50</sup> *De corp. Christi*, c. 6: "Non enim iuxta modum causarum naturalium divinam potentiam arctare debemus, cum divina potestas virtutem omnium creatorum excedat in infinitum. Nec ad negandum aliquid posse fieri virtute divina experimenta sufficiunt, cum totum ordinem causarum naturalium possit Deus immutare. Et contra communem cursum causarum naturalium constat eum multa fecisse. Quis enim unquam experiebatur naturaliter virginem sine viro concipere, duo corpora simul existere, mortuos ad vitam resurgere, accidentia sine subiecto existere, et alia innumera quae tamen constat divinitus esse facta? Non igitur debemus negare aliqua a Deo fieri posse, quia ipsa naturaliter fieri non experimur."

involves a contradiction. That something is contradictory or non-contradictory can be known to the Christian either from reason or from revelation.<sup>51</sup> Our intellect, first of all, can prove something to be contradictory from principles known *per se*. For example, we know from reason that it is impossible for a part to be greater than the whole, or for the sum of the angles of a triangle to be greater than the equivalent of two right angles. Hence, our reason tells us that even God cannot produce an effect which would contradict those axioms.

Revelation, too, apprises us of certain facts which reason, unaided by revelation, would not so much as conceive of, much less judge to be possible. On the authority of God's infallible word we know that the Trinity, for example, the mystery of the three Divine Persons in one God, is not only not an impossibility or a contradiction but a reality.<sup>52</sup>

Granting that the omnipotence of God can accomplish everything which does not involve a contradiction, reason can be persuaded by a logical process that it is neither impossible nor contradictory for a whole substance to exist as a whole in a place and as a whole in each part thereof. This, it should be noted, is not a demonstration in the real sense of that term, for the proof is not based on principles *per se nota*. Furthermore, the premises of several of the arguments embrace facts which are not known by either reason or experience but only from revelation. Given these facts, we can argue logically to the non-contradictoriness of such a mode of existence as is enjoyed by Christ in the Eucharist. More than that Ockham does not pretend to accomplish.<sup>53</sup>

<sup>51</sup> *Ibid.*: "Nihil enim debet Christianus negare posse fieri virtute divina, nisi quod per rationem ex per se notis, quae nullus poterit dubitare, potest evidenter probari includere contradictionem, vel nisi hoc possit elici ex Scriptura Sacra vel doctoribus ab Ecclesia susceptis."

<sup>52</sup> *Quodl.* 2, q. 3 See also Boehner, "The Medieval Crisis of Logic and the Author of the Centiloquium Attributed to Ockham," *Franciscan Studies*, 25 (1944), 154-67.

<sup>53</sup> *De corp. Christi*, c 6 ". . . aliquam substantiam duobus corporibus coexistere secundum se totam, et per consequens eandem substantiam secundum se totam coexistere alicui corporeo et cuilibet parti illius non includit evidentem contradictionem quae per propositiones per se notas probari potest; immo certus sum per regulas logicales quae omni scientiae et notitiae deservire

*Difficulty I.*—How is it possible for many parts of a body to exist in one place? Experience tells us that a body with integral parts so exists that each part corresponds to and is commensurate with an equal portion of the surrounding space. A wooden block, for example, which measures one cubic inch also occupies a portion of space of equal proportions.

Notwithstanding the above fact of experience, the physical phenomenon of condensation indicates at least the possibility of many parts existing in one place. For the sake of demonstration, take two parts of matter—call them two integral parts, two molecules, or whatever is technically correct. Assume for the sake of the experiment that these two parts of matter occupy two cubic centimeters. If sufficient pressure is exerted on this mass of matter, these two particles can be condensed so as to occupy one cubic centimeter. In this second stage of the experiment the two parts of matter now occupy the same area formerly occupied by only one part of the mass. Physical force can continue to reduce the area occupied by these two particles until it would become infinitesimally small. This physical phenomenon of condensation argues at least to the *a priori* possibility that the physical forces in nature may be able to cause the parts of a body to exist in the same place without local extension. Experimentation, of course, cannot demonstrate the existence of two particles of matter in one and the same place. The fact that the physical forces in nature can so reduce the area occupied by two and more particles of matter to an infinitesimally small space can, however, at least induce the persuasion that God, Who can do more than our limited intelligence can understand, could, if He so chose, effect that the many parts of a body coexist with one another and in one and the same place without any local extension.<sup>54</sup>

oscuntur. Concesso quod eadem substantia secundum se totam coexistat vobis corporibus vel uni corporeo et cuilibet parti eius, potest evidenter omnis contradictio evitari; quamvis non possit evidenter probari ex puris naturalibus quod antecedens est verum. Non ergo debet Christianus negare quin Deus per potentiam suam absolutam possit facere aliquam substantiam coexistere alicui corporeo ita quod tota coexistat toti illi corporeo et cuilibet parti eius; nec oppositum potest probari.”

<sup>54</sup> *Ibid.*: “Si non est impossibile Deo, qui plus potest facere quam nos

Again, it is an accepted philosophical and theological truth that an angel, for example, exists as a whole to a whole place and as a whole to each part thereof; and that man's intellectual soul is present to the whole and to each part of his body. Spiritual substances such as these, of course, have no integral or divisible parts. Hence, they are by nature definitively present in a place. God is, however, the Creator of both spiritual and material substances. Hence, it would seem to be entirely within the realm of His power to effect, if He so chose, that material substances exist after the manner of spiritual substances, namely, as a whole in a whole place and as a whole in each part thereof.<sup>55</sup>

Finally, Sacred Scripture confronts us with several miraculous facts which seem to postulate that two bodies had existed, and therefore can exist, in the same place at the same time. Christ's Virgin birth is one instance in point. His miraculous entry into the upper chamber in Jerusalem, all the windows and doors being closed, seems to postulate the same explanation. According to the laws of nature it is a physical impossibility for two bodies to occupy the same place at the same time, for one body resists another's being present in the same place. To God's divine power, however, this is not an impossible postulate, as the two examples cited from Holy Scripture indicate. Consequently, if it is possible for two bodies to exist in the same place, it is equally possible for two parts of the same body to be in the same place. And if two parts can so exist, then also many parts.<sup>56</sup>

intelligere, facere quod omnes partes corporis Christi eidem corporeo coelegant, nec est sibi impossibile eandem substantiam ponere totam in toto et totam in qualibet parte, sicut patet de anima et angelo." See also *Quodl.* 4, q. 36: "Duae partes corporis possunt naturaliter esse in uno loco quae prius fuerunt in duobus; patet de corpore primo raro et post denso. Ergo non repugnat corpori habere omnes partes simul in eodem loco, saltem per potentiam divinam."

<sup>55</sup> *Quodl.* 4, q. 36: "Hoc [quod corpus Christi est in loco hostiae tantum definitive] etiam concordat rationi, quia non repugnat alicui indivisibili coexistere distinctis localiter. Patet de angelo et anima intellectiva, quae tota sunt in toto corpore et tota in qualibet parte. Ergo non repugnat alicui divisibili quod totum coelegant alicui toti et totum cuilibet parti." See also *Report.* 4, q. 4, K; *De corp. Christi*, c. 6, *ut supra*, n. 53

<sup>56</sup> *De corp. Christi*, c. 6: "Tenemus quod angelus est totus in aliquo loco

*Difficulty II.*—How can the same numerical body, or the many parts of a body which is numerically one, exist in many places? Granted that it is not impossible or contradictory for two bodies, and therefore for many parts of a body, to exist in the same place, it can be shown to be equally possible for God to effect that one body exist in many places. Ockham's argument with regard to this present difficulty proceeds along the same lines as his reasoning in the previous problem.

It is admitted in scholastic philosophy and theology that an angel, whose spiritual substance is numerically one, can be present to a whole place and to every part thereof. Similarly, man's intellectual soul is wholly present to his whole body and to each part thereof. Hence, if an angel, for example, is present to this room, he is wholly present to each part thereof without being commensurate with the respective parts of its space. But when an angel is so present to this whole room he is really present to many places, since the north corner is a different place from the south corner, etc. Consequently it can be said that the angel is really present to many contiguous places.

In treating of the previous difficulty, Ockham showed that it was not contradictory for many parts of the same body to exist definitively in one place without any local extension of parts. This mode of existence enables corporeal substances to exist in exactly the same manner as spiritual substances, God's intervention, of course, being presumed. Therefore, it seems no more contradictory for a corporeal substance which lacks extension of parts to be definitively present to a place and to the many parts of a place after the manner of an angel or man's intellectual soul.

definitive et in qualibet parte eius. Propter idem etiam non debet aliquis fidelis negare quin per divinam potentiam possint duo corpora, tam eiusdem speciei specialissimae quam diversae, simul eidem loco coexistere. Sic enim Salvator Iesus Christus ianuis clausis intravit ad discipulos, et clauso utero Virginis exivit in mundum, et nullo diviso corpore coelesti ascendit in coelum. Si ergo nulla apparet contradictio quin duo corpora simul existant in eodem loco, nulla apparet contradictio quod duae partes eiusdem corporis in eodem loco simul existant. Ex quo patet quod per divinam potentiam, qua ratione duae partes corporis Christi possunt eidem loco coexistere, pari ratione poterunt omnes partes corporis Christi simul eidem loco coexistere." See also *Quodl.* 4, q. 36.

To transpose these data to the present problem relative to the Eucharist, Christ's body, according to Ockham, is definitively present on the altar. Assuming this to be the case, then His body is present as a whole to the many contiguous parts of the host. That it is possible for God to effect such a mode of existence for corporeal substances is argued *a pari* from the fact that an angel can be wholly present to the many contiguous parts of a place. If, then, it is possible for Christ's body to be wholly present to the whole host and to each contiguous part thereof, it is equally possible for it to be definitively present to many discrete particles of the host and to the thousands of hosts throughout the world.<sup>57</sup>

Ockham's analysis of these two difficulties which lie at the heart of the Eucharistic mystery is not to be construed as an effort to demonstrate or explain away the mystery which surrounds Christ's mode of existence on the altar. He aims only at showing that it is neither impossible nor contradictory for a substance to exist without being a quantum, that is, without its having part outside of part. Naturally, of course, and except for God's intervention, a corporeal substance exists circumscriptively in a place. But this is not *per se* necessary, at least according to Ockham's teaching. Hence, it is possible, at least to God, for a substance to exist without being a quantum, and consequently with definitive presence rather than circumscriptive. This definitive presence, according to the Venerable Inceptor, precisely characterizes Christ's presence on the altar. The two difficulties treated above are neither explained away nor mitigated by his hypothesis. The Venerable Inceptor aims only to show that these seemingly contradictory facts are in reality not such.

### *Objections to Ockham's Teaching on the Mode of Christ's Presence*

Granting Ockham's opinion that quantity is not a reality separate from substance and quality, his application of this teaching to the

<sup>57</sup> *Report.* 4, q. 4, I: "Non videtur maior difficultas quod idem corpus numero coexistat pluribus locis secundum se totum quam quod eadem anima intellectiva coexistat secundum se totam in toto corpore et in qualibet eius parte, vel idem angelus existens in aliquo toto loco secundum se totum existit in qualibet parte illius loci; sed unum ponimus secundum veritatem et theologiam et philosophiam; et qui videt unum potest faciliter videre aliud." See also: *De corp. Christi*, c. 6; *Quodl.* 4, q. 36.

Eucharist enables him to elude one difficulty which challenges everyone who grapples with the problem of Christ's Eucharistic mode of existence. For those who hold to the reality of quantity the added problem arises: How can it be explained that the whole, integral, and perfect Christ is present in the Eucharist with His quantity and yet not circumscriptively.

While Ockham's denial of the reality of quantity allows him an avenue of escape from this dilemma, his own explanation is also fraught with difficulties peculiar to itself.

*Objection I.*—The first objection revolves around the distribution of organic parts in a body. According to its natural mode of existence the human body has a certain organic distribution of parts so that the head is superimposed on the neck, the arm connected to the shoulder, etc. If, however, Ockham's explanation of Christ's Eucharistic presence be admitted so that all the parts exist in the same place without local extension and with definitive presence, a certain confusion of parts would seem to result. Consequently, the eye would seem to be in the hand, the ear in the foot, etc. Such a conclusion would lead to the ridiculous and irreverent postulate that Christ would see with His hand, hear with His foot, etc.<sup>58</sup>

Ockham denies that any such consequences follow from the fact that Christ's body is definitively present to each part of the host. For the distinction of organic parts and for the proper physiological function of each of these respective parts the Venerable Inceptor does not require that these various organic parts occupy distinct places but only that each of the organs retain a real distinction of dispositions. Granting that the eye is in the same place as the hand, the eye does not thereby lose its disposition to see, nor the hand to feel. The eye still retains its identity as an eye and the hand as a hand. The cells of the eye are still disposed to function as the organ of vision, and those of the hand to exercise their sensory capacity.

Furthermore, from the fact that all the parts of Christ's body

<sup>58</sup> *Quodl.* 4, q. 36: "Sed hic est unum dubium: Quia corpus Christi habet partes organicas distinctas realiter quarum una non est alia, sicut pes non est oculus; similiter quamvis una pars sit in aliqua alia sicut in toto, non tamen in qualibet alia, sicut oculus, quamvis sit in capite sicut in toto, non tamen est in pede nec e converso. Nunc autem si istae partes non distent localiter, videtur quod pes sit oculus vel saltem in oculo."

are present definitively in each and all the places occupied by the species, it does not follow that the eye, for example, is in the hand, but only that the eye and the hand are in the same place while still retaining their identity and remaining organically distinct. Even though the various organs are in one place, it does not follow that the one organ is the other.<sup>59</sup> Similarly, if two angels are definitively present to the same place it does not follow that the two angels are identical, or that they both exercise the same spiritual functions simultaneously.

*Objection II.*—Another objection which seems to militate against Ockham's position is concerned with figure. A body according to its natural and normal mode of existence has integral parts which are arranged according to a predetermined pattern in the mind of the Creator. Hence, every human body is approximately so long, wide, and thick, and has a certain interrelation of organic parts. Such a local arrangement of organic parts is required and suffices for a body to have figure. If, however, these various parts are not locally distant, there is apparently no question of such a body having figure or even of its being an organized body.<sup>60</sup> Apparently, then, some figure is essential to every body in order for it to be a body. A pile of bricks, for example, is not a house. A certain arrangement of these bricks according to a predetermined pattern is necessary, a certain figure, in other words, before these bricks merit the name of a house. So, too, with the integral parts of the human body. If all the organic parts, the hands, feet, neck, head, etc., are in one place

<sup>59</sup> *De corp. Christi*, c. 6: "Nec illud obstat quod corpus Christi habet partes organicas distinctas realiter, quarum una non est in alia, sicut digitus non est in digito; quarum etiam aliquae sunt in una parte totali et non in alia, sicut oculi non sunt in manu vel in pede sed in capite. Nam ad distinctionem partium organicarum non requiritur localis distantia, sed realis distinctio dispositionum materialium. Nam quamvis manus retentis eisdem dispositionibus poneretur cum oculo ita quod simul in eodem loco essent manus et oculus, adhuc tamen manus esset manus et non oculus, et homo per manum non videret sed per oculum. Et ita tunc possunt organa remanere distincta et nata habere distinctas operationes quantumcumque localiter non distarent. Et ideo hoc a divina potentia non est negandum." See also *Quodl.* 4, q. 36.

<sup>60</sup> *Ibid.*, c. 29: "Et ita manifeste patet quod ordo partium situalis requiritur ad figuram. Unde, si partes non distent localiter, manifestum est quod non est ibi figura."

there is no question of these parts constituting a figure, or, for that matter, of their being a human body. Hence, according to this objection against Ockham's position, the body of Christ in the Blessed Sacrament must be an organic body with a corresponding figure and separation of parts.<sup>61</sup>

Ockham's answer concerning figure parallels his teaching with regard to quantity. Figure, like quantity, is a connotative term which designates that a substance has a certain arrangement and proportion of parts. Just as a corporeal substance for him is not necessarily and *per se* a quantum, so also it is not necessarily a figure. Hence, just as God can, as in the case of the Eucharist, constitute a body present to a place without quantity, without extension of part outside of part, so also He can cause a body to exist without figure. In neither instance is the reality of the body as such affected, for figure, like quantity, is not a reality different from the reality of the substance, or quality, in question. Figure is only a concept, a connotative term which signifies and suppositis for the substance, or quality, and connotes that this thing has a certain arrangement of part outside of part.<sup>62</sup>

#### OPINIONS CONTRARY TO OCKHAM'S POSITION

According to the common scholastic teaching, quantity is a reality distinct from the reality of substance and quality. Accepting this fact, the scholastic theologians are faced with the dilemma either of explaining how Christ is present with quantity and yet not circumscriptively, or of denying that Christ's body in the Eucharist

<sup>61</sup> *Report.* 4, q. 4, K: "Praeterea, corpus Christi habet figuram ubicumque est, quia non est corpus organicum quod non habet figuram; corpus Christi in Eucharistia est organicum; igitur habet figuram, et per consequens partes corporis distant"

<sup>62</sup> *Ibid.*, L "Dico de figura sicut de quantitate, quia significat substantiam vel qualitatem connotando talem et talem distantiam partium, quia ordinem partium in toto et in loco. Nunc autem, quando substantia fit sine quantitate et extensione, sicut est in Eucharistia, non possunt partes sic distare nec ordinari in toto vel in loco. Et ideo sicut Deus facit corpus sine quantitate et extensione, ita sine figura; nec plus est inconveniens de uno quam de alio. Et quando dicis quod corpus organicum non est sine figura, dico quod Deus potest facere corpus animatum sine extensione."

is present with quantity. The teaching of St. Thomas and Duns Scotus on the mode of Christ's presence attempts to explain how Christ is present on the altar with quantity but not through quantity; Durandus, while admitting the reality of quantity, denies that the body of Christ in the Eucharist has quantity.

### *St. Thomas*

The Angelic Doctor teaches that substance without quantity is indivisible.<sup>63</sup> If the whole and integral Christ is present in the Eucharist, it is necessary also for quantity to be present, since that is for him a reality distinct from the reality of substance. How, then, can it be explained that quantity is present with the substance of Christ's body and yet that His body is not circumscriptively present?

Faced with this perplexing predicament, St. Thomas teaches that Christ's body is present *per modum substantiae* and not *per modum quantitatis*. The normal mode of existence for a corporeal substance is, according to the common opinion on the matter, for it to be present circumscriptively through quantity. Through the words of consecration the substance of bread is converted into the substance of Christ's body. Hence the conversion is terminated directly to the substance of Christ's body and not to His quantity. Whatever else is present on the altar besides the substance of Christ's body is there not *ex vi sacramenti* but only through a certain natural concomitance, and exists there only after the manner of a substance. This applies not only to the blood, etc., but also to quantity as well. Hence, while the reality, quantity, is there concomitantly with the substance, it exists as an indivisible entity after the manner of a naked substance.<sup>64</sup>

### *Duns Scotus*

The Subtle Doctor, who also admits the reality of quantity, has to meet the same problem which confronted St. Thomas on this

<sup>63</sup> *Sum. theol.*, p. 1, q. 50, a. 2, *Op. omnia*, 1, 204; *Sum. c. gentiles*, 4, c. 65, *Op. omnia*, 5, 359; *Quaestiones disputatae cum quodlibetis*, 9, q. 4, a. 6, *Op. omnia*, 9, 591.

<sup>64</sup> St. Thomas, *Sum. theol.*, p. 3, q. 76, a. 4, *Op. omnia*, 4, 353.

score. His explanation, however, is somewhat different. To explain how Christ is present in the Eucharist with His quantity and yet not circumscriptively, Scotus distinguishes a two-fold position with regard to the intrinsic parts of a body. According to the first position a body has a certain internal relation or juxtaposition of its parts with regard to the whole. This is quantity in the real sense of the word. Without such quantity a body cannot be a body. Hence, Christ's body in the Eucharist must have this first position, this internal quantity. To illustrate: Given this internal quantity, Christ's head is above His neck, His feet below His ankles, etc.<sup>65</sup>

Over and above this first position, Scotus acknowledges a second position of parts which, while presupposing the first position of parts, corresponds to the predicamental notion of *situs*. This is comparable to external quantity, or to a certain relation of parts to the surrounding space, or to a quantitative mode. As such, this quantitative mode, or local extension, or dimensive quantity, specifies the *ubi* which a particular body enjoys here and now. It is an extrinsic relation common to but not necessary to all corporeal substances. This relation enables a body to be geographically located with regard to all the other things in the universe.<sup>66</sup>

By the very fact that a corporeal substance exists, however, it does not necessarily have this second position, this quantitative mode of existence. If, for example, a body were to be created outside the realm of the universe, it would not have this second position, this relation of parts to the surrounding parts of space, for *de facto* it would be outside of space. Hence, this quantitative mode of existence is not *per se* necessary to a corporeal substance. Furthermore, God can prevent a body, even though it exist within the universe, from having this relation of parts to the surrounding parts of space.<sup>67</sup>

Applying this hypothesis to the Eucharist, Scotus maintains that Christ's body as it exists under the sacramental species has internal quantity, namely, a specific order of parts with regard

<sup>65</sup> Scotus, *Oxon.*, 4, d. 10, q. 1, *Op. omnia*, 17, 184.

<sup>66</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>67</sup> *Ibid.*

to the whole; it does not have, however, by divine power, a co-extension of these integral parts with the surrounding parts of the host. This unique mode of existence constitutes the *ubi sacramentale* of Christ's body in the Eucharist. As a consequence, Christ's body, being present without a quantitative mode, can be and is present whole and entire under the whole host and under each part thereof. Yet it is not locally or circumscriptively present on the altar but only sacramentally.<sup>68</sup>

### *Durandus*

While admitting with St. Thomas, Duns Scotus, and many others that quantity is a reality distinct from that of substance, Durandus denies that the quantity of Christ's body is present in the Eucharist. He admits that only those absolute realities of Christ's body are present on the altar to which the sacramental mode of existence is not repugnant. Quantity to him, however, cannot be such without its having a quantitative mode of existence, that is, without its having parts outside of parts which are commensurate with the surrounding space. Therefore, since a quantitative mode is essential to quantity, it is impossible that Christ's quantity be present in the Eucharist, for He is present there as a whole to the whole host and as a whole to each part thereof. The parts of Christ's body as it exists on the altar, however, are not present as part outside of part. Therefore they must enter into and compenetrates each other. Consequently Christ's body must be present on the altar without quantity. To God this is possible.<sup>69</sup>

It would be interesting to compare briefly the positions of Ockham and Durandus on this question, since both deny that Christ,

<sup>68</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>69</sup> Durandus de Sancto Porciano, *In sententias theologicas Petri Lombardi commentariorum libri quatuor*, 4, d. 10, q. 2 (Antverpiae: In aedibus Viduae & Haeredum Ioannis Stelsii, 1566), 315<sup>v</sup>-7<sup>r</sup>. This Antwerp edition contains Durandus' third redaction of His *Commentarium* in which, as De Wulf mentions, the author returned in part to his earliest theories which had stirred up such a conflict. See De Wulf, *Histoire de la philosophie médiévale*, 3, 19. See also J. Koch, *Durandus de S. Porciano* (Münster in Westf.: Verlag der Aschendorffschen Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1927), 82 ff. (*Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie des Mittelalters*, 26).

specifically as He is present on the altar, is a quantum. Their explanations, however, are vastly different. Ockham denies the reality of quantity as an entity separate from that of substance or quality. Therefore he can admit that even though Christ is not a quantum in the Eucharist, He is still equally as perfect and integral on the altar as He is in heaven. Durandus admits the reality of quantity but denies that He is present on the altar with His quantity. Hence, for him, Christ as He exists in the Blessed Sacrament lacks some reality which He has in heaven.

## CHAPTER V

### CHRIST'S ACTIVITY AND PASSIVITY IN THE EUCHARIST

Definitive presence, such as Ockham postulates to describe Christ's unique and supernatural mode of existence on the altar, leaves in its wake other problems with regard to both His possible and actual actions and passions in the Eucharist. To state the general problem briefly: Can Christ as He exists non-quantitatively and definitively on the altar enjoy the same activity and passivity which are natural to Him as He is present quantitatively and circumscriptively in heaven? <sup>1</sup>

The Venerable Inceptor's treatment of this controversial question is conveniently divided, as he himself suggests, into three general topics: (1) Is it possible for us to perceive with our bodily senses the various absolute accidents which inhere in the substance of Christ's body as He is definitively present in the Eucharist? Do we *de facto* perceive them? Can the body of Christ as it exists in the Eucharist have all those transient actions which would naturally terminate to absolute accidents inhering in bodies which are in the vicinity of the host? Does Christ actually have such actions? <sup>2</sup>

(2) What can be said with reference to Christ and the possibility of those actions and passions which are terminated to place? The principle of these actions and passions, as with the foregoing, is the corporeal nature either of Christ's body or that of the surrounding bodies, as the case may be. <sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *Report.* 4, q. 5, A: "Utrum omnis actio et passio et omne accidens possint inesse corpori Christi existenti in Eucharistia quae insunt sibi localiter existenti in coelo?"

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*: "Videndum est an Christus in hostia potest habere omnem actionem et passionem terminatam ad formam absolutam inhaerentem passo, cuius principium est natura corporalis?"

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*: "Utrum [Christus] potest habere omnem actionem et passionem terminatam ad ubi, cuius principium est natura corporalis?"

(3) What about the possibility of those actions and passions of Christ whose principle is His purely spiritual nature, namely, Christ's intellectual soul? Can Christ, in other words, understand, will, etc.? <sup>4</sup>

#### ACTIVITY AND PASSIVITY WITH REGARD TO ABSOLUTE ACCIDENTS

##### *Absolute Qualities of Christ's Body as Object of Sense Perception*

##### Possibility of Such Actions

To make the treatment of this particular class of actions as concrete as possible, the study of Ockham's teaching on the point will be focused on our potential ability to see with bodily vision the body of Christ as it exists on the altar. The investigation of this specific problem will serve as a test case for all corporeal activities which can and ordinarily would terminate to the absolute accidents inhering in Christ's body if He were circumscriptively present on the altar. The conclusions reached with regard to our natural ability to see Christ as He is definitively present, will, however, be equally applicable, *mutatis mutandis*, to all our sense activities which are naturally directed to the absolute forms inhering in a corporeal substance.

Specifically, then, the point of speculation is this: Could we, naturally speaking, and excluding all supernatural intervention, see Christ with our bodily eyes as He exists on the altar? Ockham answers in the affirmative.<sup>5</sup> For him, neither the circumscriptive nor the definitive presence of an object is an essential factor in our sense perception of it.<sup>6</sup>

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*: "Utrum [Christus] potest habere omnem actionem et passionem cuius principium est natura pure spiritualis?"

<sup>5</sup> *Quodl.* 4, q. 20: "Dico quod Christus in Eucharistia posset . . . videri ab aliis visione corporali nisi esset speciale impedimentum."

<sup>6</sup> *Report.* 4, q. 5, D: "Dico . . . quod, sepositis illis quae sunt fidei, non potest probari per rationem quin omnem actionem et passionem terminatam ad formam absolutam, quam potest corpus habere existens in loco circumscriptive et quantitative, potest etiam habere existens in loco definitive et non quantitative."

Basic to Ockham's defense of this position is his insistence that the general axiom, *agente approximato et passo disposito sequitur actio*, must not be denied unless it is evidently contrary to experience, authority, or reason. But neither experience, nor authority, nor reason can prove that the body of Christ on the altar and the human eye, if they are in the same vicinity, are not properly disposed to interact and affect each other. Therefore, the possibility of Christ's being seen cannot be legitimately denied.<sup>7</sup>

The burden of Ockham's proof rests upon his showing that the body of Christ as it exists on the altar is an active agent sufficiently near—*agente approximato*—to affect the organ of sight; and that the eye in turn is adequately disposed—*passo disposito*—to be acted upon. Experience, of course, tells us nothing about Christ's body in the Eucharist. According to Ockham's hypothesis, God's supernatural intervention prevents the organ of sight from *de facto* attaining its natural objective in this particular instance. Hence, experience can neither affirm nor deny the possibility of Christ's being seen.

Likewise the infallible authority of Sacred Scripture is of no avail in this instance, since it gives no information either pro or con with regard to the possibilities discussed in the present problem.

Finally, reason not only does not disprove this possibility but rather concludes in its favor.

*Argument from reason.*—Ockham admits as an epistemological principle that it is possible for us to have an intuitive, sense cognition of a non-existing thing.<sup>8</sup> If such is the case, then it is equally

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*: "Videtur quod ista propositio communis, quod agente approximato et passo disposito sequitur actio, non est neganda nisi obviet sibi ratio vel auctoritas vel experientia. Experientia autem quam modo habemus de corpore Christi de facto non concludit, quia Deus suspendit actionem istarum qualitatum non coagendo cum illis ut agant; et si coageret, viderentur. Nec est auctoritas in Scriptura ad hoc, ut patet. Nec ratio est ad hoc, sed magis ad oppositum." See also *Ibid.*, A; *Quodl.* 4, q. 20.

<sup>8</sup> P. Boehner, "The Notitia Intuitiva of Non-existents according to William Ockham," *Traditio*, 1 (1943), 223 ff.

reasonable to admit that a really existing thing, even though it is only definitively present, can be seen with the bodily eye.<sup>9</sup>

Again, every effect depends on its essential causes, dispositions, and their proper approximation. A quantitative or non-quantitative mode of existence, however, is neither an essential cause nor a requisite condition for seeing. These modes are only accidental to the object as existing. Moreover, an accidental mode of existence, such as the quantitative one, neither implements nor impedes the action or passion of an existing and naturally active principle. Consequently, a thing can be seen regardless of whether it exists quantitatively, that is, with circumscriptive presence, or non-quantitatively, namely, with definitive presence.<sup>10</sup>

For this argument to be valid, it is necessary to prove further that a quantitative mode of existence is neither an essential cause nor a *conditio sine qua non* for an object to stimulate the senses. Scotus is mentioned by Ockham as holding the opinion that it is necessary for the object of sight to be extended, quantified, and circumscriptively present.<sup>11</sup> Ockham takes exception to this position and sets out to prove his point in the following manner.

Scotus admits, to Ockham's satisfaction, that, naturally speaking, the angel and the separated soul of the blessed are able to perceive the body of Christ as it exists on the altar. The intellect as

<sup>9</sup> *Report.* 4, q 5, D " . . . sequitur quod corpus Christi potest terminare visionem corporalem, quia non magis repugnat alicui existenti realiter terminare corporalem visionem quam non existenti "

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid.*, C. "Modus accidentalis in obiecto non impedit cognitionem illius obiecti; sed esse in quantitate habente modum quantitativum est modus accidentalis coloris. Igitur color potest videri absque hoc quod habeat talem modum quantitativum. . . . Omnes effectus sufficienter dependet ex suis causis essentialibus et dispositionibus et approximationibus earum; sed quantitas non est causa effectiva respectu visionis albedinis. Igitur destructa quantitate et modo quantitativo adhuc potest videri albedo."

<sup>11</sup> *Ibid.*: "Quantum ad primum [cf. n. 2, *supra*] dicit Ioannes quod non . . . quia ad hoc requiritur quod [Christus] habeat modum quantitativum, et sit localiter et circumscriptive in loco. Ideo non est ibi praesens praesentia quae requiritur ad rationem obiecti moventis visum." See Scotus, *Oxon.*, 4, d. 10, q 9, *Op. omnia*, 17, 295 ff.

such perceives a thing accordingly and precisely as it is intelligible and not as it exists with this or that accidental mode of being. Therefore, the angel and the separated soul perceive the substance of Christ's body, and even the color of that body, as something intelligible—as an adequate object of their intellects. Hence, if their intellects perceive an object *qua intelligibile*, and not according to this or that accidental mode of existence, it can perceive equally immediately and adequately the body of Christ as it exists quantitatively in heaven or non-quantitatively in the Eucharist. In other words, accidental modes of existence of an object in no way affect the intellectual cognition of it, for the angel and the separated soul abstract only the intelligible species from the object.<sup>12</sup>

Ockham now argues that if the accidental mode of existence of an object does not impede the intuitive cognition of that object on the part of the angel or the separated soul, with equal right it can be maintained that an accidental mode of existence, for example, Christ's non-quantitative mode of existence in the Eucharist, is not in itself an impediment to corporeal vision. The eye is as equally and naturally disposed to see the color of Christ's body as is the intellect of the angel or that of the separated soul. The perception of the eye is a *notitia intuitiva sensitiva*; the perception of the intellect is a *notitia intuitiva intellectiva*. Hence, Ockham concludes that if an angel and a human being were in the vicinity of the consecrated host, both could, naturally speaking, perceive in their own right the bodily presence of Christ. He is led to this conclusion by reason of the commonly accepted axiom: *Activum respiciens diversa passa sibi sufficienter approximata et aequae disposita, si potest agere in unum et in aliud*. According to his way of thinking, both the angel and the human being are equally disposed to perceive Christ.<sup>13</sup>

<sup>12</sup> Scotus, *Oxon.*, 4, d. 10, q. 8, *Op. omnia*, 17, 286.

<sup>13</sup> *Report.* 4, q. 5, C: "Activum respiciens diversa passa sibi sufficienter approximata et aequae disposita, si potest agere in unum et in aliud; sed color in corpore Christi potest intuitive videri ab angelo, quia secundum eum [Scotum] sensibile potest agere non solum in corpus sed in spiritum, quia angelus accipit secundum eum cognitionem a rebus abstrahendo ab ipsis species. Et igitur idem color quantum est de se potest videri a potentia corporali et

A rather plausible objection to Ockham's application of the above axiom to the angel's intellectual and our sense perception of Christ's body as it exists on the altar lies in the fact that he draws a parallel between the angel and the eye, the *diversa passa*, as being equally disposed to perceive an object. The angelic intellect and the intelligible thing, it must be remembered, are prior to every accidental mode. Hence, any subsequent, accidental mode of existence of the intelligible object cannot impede the intuitive intellection of that object. Consequently, for a *notitia intuitiva intellectiva* of a thing it is required and suffices only to have an intelligible object and a purely intelligent principle, as for example, an angel or a separated soul.

It may be objected, however, that such is not the case with the corporeal vision of an object, for such a sensitive cognition of an object is neither prior to nor independent of the accidental mode of existence of that object. Man's eye, for example, cannot perceive the presence of an angelic spirit, and yet such a spirit is definitively present in the same manner as Christ's body is present on the altar. An angel, however, can perceive, through intuitive cognition, the presence of another spirit. Consequently, it would seem that while the accidental mode of existence of an intelligible object in no way influences the cognition of a pure spirit, a quantitative, though accidental, mode of existence is essential to an object so that it might be a fit subject of sense perception.<sup>14</sup>

organica, cum ipsa sit sufficienter approximata et aequae disposita." See Scotus, *Oxon*, 4, d. 10, q. 8, *Op. omnia*, 17, 286. See also Ockham, *Quodl.* 4, q. 20: "Praeterea activum naturale respiciens diversa passa sibi sufficienter approximata et aequae disposita, si potest agere in unum et in reliquum. Sed color corporis Christi potest intuitive videri ab angelo bono. Igitur idem color potest videri a visu corporali si non impediatur. Sed modus quantitativus non plus potest impedire visionem corporalem quam visionem angeli. Praeterea, modus accidentalis alicuius principii activi non impedit actionem et passionem illius. Sed esse circumscriptive in loco est modus accidentalis coloris. Ergo et cetera."

<sup>14</sup> *Report.* 4, q. 5, C: "Si dicis quod ideo angelus intelligit intuitive, quia intellectus suus respicit omne intelligibile, quia intellectus et intelligibile in se prius est omni modo accidentali, et ideo nullus modus accidentalis, scilicet, non esse in loco quantitative et similes, potest impedire intellectionem intuiti-

The objection postulates the very point which is basic to Ockham's position, namely, that a quantitative mode of existence is accidental to an object, and as such has no essential bearing upon the ability of our senses to perceive or not to perceive that object. If to exist quantitatively is accidental to color, for example, then it is reasonable to hold that color can be actual and objective without existing quantitatively. The organ of sight, however, is constituted to perceive color *qua* color as the primary object of its vision, and not essentially color *qua* extended. The fact that the color is extended is a secondary and accidental consideration.<sup>15</sup>

To put it differently, the fact that a corporeal substance, or an absolute accident, with its intrinsic parts exists either quantitatively or non-quantitatively is accidental to the substance or accident itself. Ockham, as well as other scholastics, admits that a substance retains its identity independently of either a quantitative or non-quantitative mode of existence. Hence, Christ's substance as it exists in the Eucharist, for example, is as equally perfect, whole, and integral as it is in heaven, despite the fact that on the altar it does not have a quantitative mode of existence. Similarly, color is still color whether it exists in an extended or non-extended manner. The eye, however, is adapted to perceive color as such, and that, independently of any accidental mode of existence it may enjoy at the moment. Consequently, Ockham insists that the eye, by a sensitive intuition, is as equally adept at perceiving the color of Christ's body, even though it is only definitively present on the altar, as the intellect of the angel is capable of perceiving this same color with an intellectual intuition.

In an effort to clarify still more the point that a quantitative mode of existence is only accidental to an object and incidental to

vam angeli, sed aliter est de visu corporali, quia non est prior omni modo accidentali."

<sup>15</sup> *Ibid.*: "Sicut modus essendi in loco quantitative est modus accidentalis, sic idem modus essendi est accidentalis colori, quia color est prior omni tali modo existendi accidentali, quia potest esse sine illis. Igitur, cum color sit obiectum primum visus et non quantitas, prius respicitur color a visu corporali quam quicumque modus eius accidentalis; et per consequens potest videri a visu corporali sine omni tali modo accidentali."

its being perceived by the bodily senses, Ockham offers another *a pari* argument. Two active things which have similar modes of existence can produce similar effects. For example, the eye of a man and the eye of a dog can perceive the same material object. In both instances the eyes exist quantitatively with a certain distribution and disposition of cells requisite to receive the stimulus aroused by the external object. Man's soul and Christ's body are both active principles. As it exists in the Eucharist, Christ's body has the same mode of existence as the soul of man in his body, namely, both are definitively present. Despite its non-quantitative existence, its definitive presence, the soul can affect the body, according to the testimony of St. Augustine as cited by Ockham, causing it to be sick, healthy, etc. Hence, if the soul despite its definitive presence, can effect the body which has circumscriptive presence, it is equally reasonable to hold that the body of Christ in the Eucharist, even though it is definitively present, can influence the human body to the extent that it stimulates man's eye which exists quantitatively and circumscriptively.<sup>16</sup>

Finally, Ockham argues, not only should the definitive presence of an object not prevent its being seen, but rather it should facilitate ocular vision. His reason is this: If an object can be seen when it is circumscriptively present, that is, when it is present to the eye only part for part, all the more so should this object be capable of being seen when it is present as a whole to the whole

<sup>16</sup> *Ibid.*, D "Item quando sunt duo activa, quorum unum est ex se acti-  
vum, quod ponitur habere consimilem modum existendi cum alio, potest unum  
agere sicut aliud; sed anima intellectiva potest agere in corpus, non obstante  
quod non habeat modum quantitativum existendi, quia Augustinus, nono,  
*De Trinitate*, dicit quod anima magnam habet immutationem respectu corporis  
sui Igitur, eodem modo qualitates in corpore Christi possunt agere in aliquod  
corpus, non obstante quod non habeat modum essendi quantitativum Et sic,  
ut videtur, corpus Christi potest causare partialiter visionem in oculo non  
glorioso, ita quod ille oculus videat corpus, quia est principium activum ex  
parte obiecti, et principium passivum ex parte oculi; et modus existendi non  
quantitativus non impedit, et alia requisita ponuntur. Igitur potest sequi  
actio." See also *Quodl.* 4, q. 20. N. B.: The references to St. Augustine's  
*De Trinitate* which Ockham makes both in the *Report.* and the *Quodl.* have  
not been located in that work!

eye and as a whole to each part thereof. The same holds true for all the other objects of sense perception.<sup>17</sup>

To illustrate further the point of this argument, Ockham asks us to suppose that we have a white wall before our eyes. As the color exists naturally in this wall it is equally distributed over the whole surface, that is, it is circumscriptively present with parts corresponding to the parts of the wall. Through divine intervention, however, this same color could be made to exist in such a way that it would be present as a whole to the whole wall and as a whole to each part thereof. Experience testifies that in the first instance, namely, when the color is circumscriptively present, our eye is able to perceive the color. Reason persuades us that this same color should be at least equally visible in the second instance, that is, when it is present as a whole to the whole wall and as a whole to each part thereof.<sup>18</sup>

#### Actuality of Such Actions

When the discussion turns away from theoretical speculation about possibility and centers upon what actually takes place in the Eucharist, it takes on a welcome simplicity. The testimony of authority and the empirical data of the senses leave no doubt that we have no sensible knowledge of Christ as He exists on the altar. Faith alone can assure us of His presence.<sup>19</sup>

<sup>17</sup> *Report.* 4, q. 5, D: "Non minus potest aliquod principium activum habere actionem quod se toto est praesens alicui passo, puta calefactibili, quam quod per unam partem est praesens uni et per aliam partem est praesens alteri; sed corpus Christi in hostia est praesens hostiae se toto toti et cuilibet parti. Igitur, calor corporis Christi potest agere in hostiam et calefacere eam. Et per idem potest probari quod corpus Christi potest videri in hostia oculo corporali, quia est sufficienter activum non tantum in medium sed etiam in oculum, quia se toto est praesens cuilibet parti oculi et medii. . . . Eodem modo dico quod non potest probari per rationem quod corpus Christi praesens sub hostia alicui activo sufficienti non potest ab illo pati, quia si potest pati ab agente cui est praesens secundum partem tantum, multo magis potest pati ab agente cui est praesens secundum totum." See also *Quodl.* 4, q. 20.

<sup>18</sup> *Quodl.* 4, q. 20: "Nam si albedo in pariete coexisteret tota toti parieti et tota cuilibet parti parietis, nihilominus videretur tunc quam nunc."

<sup>19</sup> *De corp. Christi*, c. 7: "Hoc itaque corpus Dominicum, desinente substantia panis, incipiens sub specie panis existere, potestate divina non oculo

As is constantly his practice in the *De corpore Christi* Ockham substantiates his position wherever possible with pertinent quotations from the canonical sources. In keeping with this practice, he cites the words of Sts. Augustine,<sup>20</sup> Gregory,<sup>21</sup> and Hilary,<sup>22</sup> as quoted in the *Decretum Gratiani*, to give an authoritative basis for the fact that Christ is not seen as He exists on the altar.<sup>23</sup>

Aside from the authoritative words of these approved authors, experience alone gives us sufficient reason to insist that the body of Christ as it exists in the Eucharist is not the subject of sense perception. If Christ could be seen as He is present on the altar, then He, just like any other sensible object, could be seen by believer and unbeliever alike. The infidel as well as the believer, however, can truthfully attest to the fact that when they look at the consecrated host they see the same unchanged accidents of the bread which were present on the altar before the consecration. Since the organs of sight in both individuals are equally disposed and apt for action, it is immediately apparent that Christ as He exists on the altar is not visible to the naked eye; even though he who has the gift of faith believes in and assents intellectually to

corporali sed fide et intellectu percipitur, quod tam auctoritatibus sanctorum Patrum quam rationibus suadetur."

<sup>20</sup> *Ibid.*: "Unde dicit beatus Augustinus, et habetur, *De consecratione*, distinctione secunda, *Nos autem*: 'Nos autem,' inquit, 'in specie panis et vini, quam videmus, res invisibiles videmus, id est, carnem et sanguinem honoramus.' Item idem Augustinus, *De consecratione*, distinctione secunda, *Qui manducant*: 'Quod videtur,' inquit, 'panis est et calix, quod etiam oculi renuntiant. Quod autem fides postulat instruenda, panis est corpus Christi, calix sanguis. Ista ideo dicuntur sacramenta, quia in eis aliud videtur, et aliud intelligitur.'" See cc. 41, 58, D. 2, *de cons.*, in Friedberg, *Corpus iuris canonici*, 1, 1328, 1336 respectively.

<sup>21</sup> *Ibid.*: "Item Gregorius, *De consecratione*, distinctione secunda, *Quid sit*: 'Magnum et pavendum mysterium est, quia aliud videtur, et aliud intelligitur.'" See c. 73, D. 2, *de cons.*, in Friedberg, *op. cit.*, 1344.

<sup>22</sup> *Ibid.*: "Item Hilarius, et habetur, *De consecratione*, distinctione secunda, *Ubi*: 'Non est,' inquit, 'quantitas visibilis in hoc aestimanda mysterio, sed virtus spiritualis sacramenti.'" See c. 78, D. 2, *de cons.*, in Friedberg, *op. cit.*, 1346.

<sup>23</sup> *Ibid.*: "Ex istis aliisque pluribus auctoritatibus patet quod corpus Christi in Sacramento Altaris non videtur sed intelligitur solum, quamvis species panis realiter videatur."

Christ's presence, while he who does not have this gift denies it. On a purely empirical basis, their perceptions are identical.<sup>24</sup>

Ockham makes no specific mention of the reason why God withholds His co-operation so that we are unable to perceive Christ's presence on the altar. Presumably God withdraws His ordinary concurrence which is given to the actions of men so that we might have the merit of faith which accrues to those who do not see and yet believe. That such an assumed motive for God's intervention would be in accord with Ockham's mind on the point is suggested by the fact that Gabriel Biel, a docile disciple of the Venerable Inceptor, holds precisely to this position.<sup>25</sup>

### *Christ's Sense Perception of Extrinsic Absolute Qualities*

*Possibility of Such Actions.*—The possibility of the Eucharistic Christ's having the various sense perceptions which a body normally has as it exists circumscriptively in a place does not merit a specific treatment independent of Ockham's study of our natural ability to perceive Christ with our senses. The principles applied and the conclusions reached in both instances are the same. In other words, it is as equally possible for Christ, though definitively present, to see surrounding objects as it is for us to perceive Christ.

One will recall from the previous chapter Ockham's postulate that for an organ to have its proper function it is not necessary for it to be extended with part outside of part, but it is required

<sup>24</sup> *Ibid*: "Illud quod in aliquo loco percipitur oculo corporali sine omni auctoritate potest evidenter cognosci ibidem existere. Sed nullus sine omni auctoritate Salvatoris et Ecclesiae teneret corpus Christi sub specie panis realiter contineri. Non ergo ibi videtur oculo corporali. Item visio corporalis omnibus aequè dispositis est aequalis; sed nullus infidelis videt corpus Christi in Sacramento Altaris oculo corporali. Relinquitur igitur quod nullus fidelis percipit ibi esse corpus Christi oculo corporali. Item manifestum est quod nullus percipit ibi aliquam qualitatem sensibilem a quocumque sensu nisi qualitatem hostiae, sicut patet de qualitibus tangibilibus et perceptibilibus a sensu gustus et de qualitibus visibilibus. Non ergo videtur in Sacramento Altaris corpus Christi oculo corporali."

<sup>25</sup> Gabriel Biel, *Repertorium super quatuor libros sententiarum*, 4, d. 10, q. 1, F (Lugduni: Jacob Myt for Symon Vincentius, 1527). See also G. Biel, *Sacri canonis missae expositio*, lect. 45, P (Tübingen: Johann Otmar for Friedrich Meynberger, 1499).

only that it retain its proper organic disposition, that is, the eye to see, the ear to hear, etc.<sup>26</sup> Despite the fact that Christ's body is definitively present on the altar, that is, that all the parts are present in the same place, the proper organic disposition of the various organs is in no way impaired.

From the speculative point of view Ockham finds no reason to deny the possibility of these various actions to Christ, for neither authority, nor experience, nor reason are able to present data which would necessitate our denying the general axiom, *agente approximato et passo disposito, sequitur actio*.<sup>27</sup>

Another problem arises as a corollary to the speculative question about Christ's ability to see objects which surround Him on the altar: Is it possible for Christ to see Himself as He exists definitively under the various parts of the host? <sup>28</sup>

Granting the hypothesis that it is necessary for a thing to be separated from itself in order to see itself in different places (as for example, a body could see itself in a different place if it were circumscriptively present in two places), Ockham finds it no more contradictory for a body to see itself even if it were to exist definitively in two different places. To illustrate: Let us assume for a moment that the body of Christ is circumscriptively present in two different hosts which are three feet apart on the altar. Christ could then see Himself in the respective hosts, for the requisite distance for vision is assumed. Ockham insists that when Christ is definitively present to the whole host and to each part thereof He is likewise sufficiently separated from Himself to be able to see Himself in the various other parts. Take, for example, two parts of the host, parts A and B. Part A is not present in the same place as part B. Hence, the definitive presence of Christ in part A is different from His presence in part B. That distance, if indeed such be required, suffices to enable Christ to see Himself in the respective parts of the host even though He is only definitively present there.<sup>29</sup>

<sup>26</sup> *Supra*, 87-8

<sup>27</sup> *Supra*, n. 7.

<sup>28</sup> *Report.* 4, q 5, H: "Tertium [dubium] est, utrum Christus potest videre seipsum in hostia, sicut si esset in distinctis locis circumscriptive?"

<sup>29</sup> *Ibid.*, L. "Dico quod oculus Christi in una parte hostiae potest se videre in alia parte ita bene sicut si esset in diversis locis localiter Tunc existens

*Actuality of Such Actions.*—Leaving aside the speculative question, Ockham confesses that he is in ignorance as to whether Christ *de facto* can see in the Eucharist. The three possible sources of information, namely, reason, authority, and experience, offer no positive evidence which would warrant a definitive answer. Hence the question of fact is left open.<sup>30</sup>

Without intending to settle the moot question of fact, Ockham suggests as an argument of convenience that it would seem more reasonable and fitting that *de facto* Christ should be able to see as a possible way of His knowing where He is.<sup>31</sup>

To conclude the Venerable Inceptor's treatment of this section, it can be said summarily that naturally speaking we can perceive Christ in the Eucharist with our bodily senses, and vice versa. Because of supernatural intervention, however, at least our sense perception of Christ is not realized.

#### ACTIVITY AND PASSIVITY WITH REGARD TO PLACE

Of the possible corporeal actions terminated to place, Ockham is primarily interested in movement with reference to Christ's body as it exists on the altar. Specifically, he teaches that the body of Christ in the Eucharist can be really, locally,<sup>32</sup> and non-organically<sup>33</sup> moved in the strict sense of this term.<sup>34</sup> Furthermore, this motion is terminated *per se* immediately to the body of Christ, and

in uno potest se videre in alio loco. . . . Sicut idem distat a se quando est in diversis locis circumscriptive distantia requisita ad visionem, ita idem distat a se quando est in diversis locis definitive distantia sufficienti requisita ad visionem corporalem." See also *Quodl.* 4, q. 20.

<sup>30</sup> *Quodl.* 4, q. 20: "Utrum Christus videat oculo corporali illa et visione intellectuali vel non, nescio, quia non habeo ad hoc rationem convincentem, nec auctoritatem, nec experientiam."

<sup>31</sup> *Ibid.*: "Rationabilius tamen est dicere quod sic, loquendo de facto, quia satis videtur mirabile et extraneum quod Christus sit in Eucharistia et tamen nesciat ubi sit."

<sup>32</sup> *Infra*, n. 37.

<sup>33</sup> *Infra*, n. 46.

<sup>34</sup> Ockham mentions in *Report.* 4, q. 5, C, that Scotus admits that the body of Christ is moved in only the wide sense of that term: "Dicit [Ioannes] primo quod [corpus Christi] movetur motu extensivo dicto." See Scotus, *Report. Par.*, 4, d. 10, q. 6, *Op. omnia*, 24, 82-5.

not, as Ockham mentions in referring to the opinion of St. Thomas, *per accidens* to that body through the medium of the species, as the Angelic Doctor maintains.<sup>35</sup> Finally, the efficient causality of this local movement stems either from the soul of Christ as the ordinary, partial, created cause which concurs and is in harmony with the divine will as the first cause, or from the will of God as the extraordinary, total cause. *De facto*, however, no created cause other than the soul of Christ is able to move the body of Christ.<sup>36</sup>

### *Mode of Christ's Movement*

*Christ can be really, locally, and per se immediately moved.*—Ockham insists that the body of Christ as it is present on the altar can be really and locally moved. For him, this follows from the fact that Christ is really, though definitively, present to the place of the host. Hence, if the host can be moved from one side of the altar to the other, for example, so also can Christ's body be moved, for wherever the host is there also is the body of Christ.<sup>37</sup>

Moreover, this movement as it affects Christ is terminated *per se* immediately to His body. This conclusion seems to follow, as Ockham argues, from the fact that Christ is present *per se* immediately to the place of the host. Hence, He can also be moved *per se* immediately.<sup>38</sup>

The burden of proof for this conclusion rests with his establishment of Christ's immediate presence to the place of the host. Ockham cannot verify this empirically. He does, however, reason to it in this way: It does not seem impossible or contradictory

<sup>35</sup> *Report.* 4, q. 5, B: "Dicit [S. Thomas] quod [corpus Christi] movetur per accidens, quia per motum hostiae, sicut est in loco per accidens." See St. Thomas, *Sum. Theol.*, p. 3, q. 76, a. 6, *Op. omnia*, 4, 354. See also *infra*, n. 38.

<sup>36</sup> *Infra*, n. 57.

<sup>37</sup> *Report.* 4, q. 5, E: "Dico quod corpus Christi potest moveri realiter et localiter in sacramento, quia est ubicumque est hostia."

<sup>38</sup> *Quodl.* 4, q. 21: "Dico quod corpus Christi in Eucharistia potest realiter et per se moveri, et non per accidens, et hoc proprie, quia quod est in loco per se et non per accidens potest moveri localiter per se, proprie, et non per accidens; sed corpus Christi sub hostia est huiusmodi, quia immediate est praesens loco hostiae, et per consequens est immediate per se in loco."

for God to destroy the species of the host without the body of Christ in any way being affected. As such, the species have an existence which is independent of and extrinsic to Christ's body in so far as they are neither part of nor inhere in His body. If, therefore, God can annihilate a substance while allowing its accidents to remain unchanged both as to themselves and their presence—Ockham actually holds this with regard to transubstantiation<sup>39</sup>—with equal ease and in a similar way He could annihilate the Eucharistic accidents while allowing the body of Christ to remain unchanged. No one denies, however, that the Eucharistic accidents are really and immediately present to their proper place both before and after the consecration, despite the fact that the substance of the bread is annihilated through transubstantiation. Hence, so also would the body of Christ be equally immediately, though definitively, present both before and after this hypothetical destruction of the species of the Eucharist. That it would be *per se* immediately present after the destruction of the species is apparent from the fact that there would then be nothing else circumscriptively present through which it could be accidentally present. But the destruction of the accidents as such would in no way affect the presence of Christ's body, just as the annihilation of the substance of bread in transubstantiation in no way influences the mode of presence of the remaining accidents with regard to place. Consequently, Christ's definitive presence would be equally *per se* immediate both before and after the postulated destruction. Therefore, if, as Ockham mentions, Christ is *per se* immediately present, He can also be moved *per se* immediately.<sup>40</sup>

<sup>39</sup> *Supra*, 33 ff.

<sup>40</sup> *Report.* 4, q. 5, C "Non videtur quod corpus Christi sit in loco in sacramento per accidens, quia hoc corpus immediate et per se fundat respectum praesentialitatis ad hunc locum. Igitur per se et immediate est in hoc loco. Item non videtur contradictio nec impossibile quin Deus posset conservare corpus Christi omni loco cui est praesens in sacramento, omni alio destructo quod est praesens tali loco circumscriptive. Sed modo realiter est corpus Christi praesens loco hostiae. Igitur Deus potest conservare corpus Christi praesens ibi destruendo hostiam, quae non inhaeret corpori Christi sed est sibi totaliter extrinsecum, sicut corpus assumptum ab angelo est extrinsecum ipsi angelo. Sed destructis speciebus et manente ibi corpore

*Christ Moved Non-Organically.*—This local movement as it affects Christ's body is non-organic as distinct from organic. This latter characterizes all the movement of animals, for example, where one part of the body is moved after the other.

To move non-organically means to move equally immediately the whole movable thing and every part thereof.<sup>41</sup> The movement of a body assumed by an angel exemplifies this type of motion. The angel is wholly and definitively present in an assumed body and in every part thereof *sicut motor in mobili*.<sup>42</sup> When the angel, lacking integral parts, moves, he moves as a whole. Hence, since an angel is wholly present in every part of the assumed body, that body with its integral parts likewise moves as equally immediately as the angel moves.<sup>43</sup>

Organic movement, on the other hand, is realized when first one part of a body is moved, then an adjacent part, etc. For organic

Christi praesentialiter, est immediate et per se praesens illi loco. Igitur, eodem modo est nunc immediate praesens; et sic est immediate per se in loco. Igitur, potest per se moveri."

<sup>41</sup> *Ibid.*, F: "Movere non organice est movere totum et partes aequae primo." See also *Quodl.* 4, q. 22.

<sup>42</sup> By way of contrast, the soul, while also definitively present in the body, is present *sicut perfectio in perfectibili*—as a form which perfects the body. Hence, unlike the angel, the soul cannot move all the parts of the body equally immediately but only part after part, that is, with organic movement. See *Report.* 4, q. 5, F: "[Angelus in corpore assumpto] est, inquam, totus in toto et in qualibet parte sicut motor in mobili, non autem sicut perfectio in perfectibili, sicut anima intellectiva est in corpore hominis. Ideo formaliter, licet anima intellectiva sit tota in toto et in qualibet parte, non tamen aequae primo movet totum et quamlibet partem, sed primo movet unam partem, puta cor, et post, mediante illa, aliam, sicut prius dictum est; quia, licet anima sit tota in qualibet parte et in toto, non tamen sicut motor in mobili, sed sicut perfectio in perfectibili. Et ex hoc patet quod anima intellectiva in nobis non potest movere corpus nostrum non organice, et hoc quia primo movet unam partem et post aliam modo iam dicto; et etiam quia inter partes talis corporis est distantia localis, quia totum non coexistit cuilibet parti."

<sup>43</sup> *Report.* 4, q. 5, F: "Movere non organice est movere totum et partem aequae primo sicut angelus in corpore assumpto, quia est totus in toto et totus in qualibet parte. Ideo aequae primo movet totum et quamlibet partem. Est, inquam, totus in toto et in qualibet parte sicut motor in mobili." See also *Quodl.* 4, q. 22.

movement two things are required: (1) The body must have parts, one of which can be moved after the other; (2) there must be distance between these parts, that is, the body must be circumscriptively present in a place.<sup>44</sup>

Keeping the above definitions and distinctions in mind, Ockham then draws the following conclusions: (1) Christ's body as it exists quantitatively and circumscriptively in heaven can be moved organically by His sensitive soul, for the two requisite conditions for such movement are realized.<sup>45</sup> (2) Christ's body as it is definitively present on the altar can be moved only non-organically, since all the parts are equally present to the same place without distance between them. Hence, if Christ's body is to retain its definitive mode of existence and yet be moved, it is necessary that all parts be moved equally immediately.<sup>46</sup>

<sup>44</sup> *Quodl.* 4, q. 22: "Dico quod movere organice est primo movere unam partem et post, mediante illa parte mota, movere aliam distantem loco et situ a prima parte mota, ita quod movere organice necessario requirit ista duo: Primum, quod primo moveatur una pars localiter et post alia, mediante prima parte. Secundum, quod inter partes corporis moti sit distantia localis. Exemplum: Anima intellectiva movet in motu progressivo primo cor motu locali et reali, et post, mediante motu cordis, alia pars magis propinqua movetur, et post tertia, et sic deinceps. Et hoc est universaliter verum in omni motu composito ex pulsu et tractu, quod primo pellitur una pars et post trahitur alia. Ex isto sequitur quod solum illud corpus movetur organice quod est circumscriptive in loco, quia solum partes illius corporis distant loco et situ." See also *Report.* 4, q. 5, F.

<sup>45</sup> *Ibid.*: "Dico quod anima Christi in coelo potest movere corpus suum ibi solum organice sicut potest anima mea movere corpus suum. Cuius ratio est, quia corpus Christi in coelo est circumscriptive in loco; ideo potest anima sua primo movere cor, et postea alias partes secundum quod potest existens in una parte coeli velle aliquid efficaciter in alia parte coeli; et ita vult corpus suum moveri ad aliud. Sed non organice non potest corpus suum movere in coelo, quia licet anima sua intellectiva sit tota in toto corpore et tota in qualibet parte corporis, sicut angelus est in corpore assumpto, non tamen est in qualibet parte sicut motor in mobili, sed sicut forma in materia; propter quod non potest corpus suum non organice movere sicut potest angelus. Et si quaeras causam illius, dico quod natura rei talis est, quod forma informans corpus existens circumscriptive in loco primo movet unam partem et post aliam."

<sup>46</sup> *Report.* 4, q. 5, F: "Dico quod anima intellectiva Christi sub hostia potest movere corpus Christi non organice, quia organice non potest movere

*Moving Agent*

The question of the efficient cause of this real, local, non-organic movement as it *per se* immediately affects the body of Christ now arises. It can be considered under the two headings of created and uncreated cause.<sup>47</sup>

*Created Causes.*—Within the realm of created causes Ockham considers the twofold soul of Christ as the only created cause capable of moving His body. Before examining in detail the role played by this efficient cause, several distinctions and definitions are necessary.

First of all, Ockham admits that Christ, like other men, has two really distinct souls, namely, the sensitive and intellectual.<sup>48</sup> Secondly, from these two really distinct principles proceed two distinct powers which must be distinguished from each other not only as to source but also as to manner of operation. This twofold power is the *potentia organica* and the *potentia nonorganica*.

An organic power is a potency which uses an organ in its operation, as, for example, the various sensitive powers of feeling, seeing, etc.<sup>49</sup> A non-organic power is one which does not need an organ for its activity, as, for example, the intellect and the will.<sup>50</sup>

With these distinctions and definitions in mind, we can now

in sacramento, eo quod non potest primo movere unam partem et post aliam, mediante prima, quia inter partes corporis hic ut ibi non est distantia localis, quia totum est in toto et totum in qualibet parte. Ideo non potest movere unam partem prius quam aliam, quia quaelibet pars est cum alia. Sed non organice potest movere localiter, quia potest velle, et credo quod vult, de facto corpus suum moveri ad motum hostiae."

<sup>47</sup> This division is not to be considered absolute and exclusive, for in the acts of a created cause the divine concurrence of the First Cause is always to be presumed.

<sup>48</sup> *Report.* 4, q. 5, F: "Ego qui pono animam intellectivam distingui realiter a sensitiva in homine habeo ponere quod anima intellectiva in corpore habet solum potentiam non organicam." See also *ibid.*, q. 7, F.

<sup>49</sup> *Ibid.*: "Potentia organica est illa quae utitur organo corporali in actione sua, cuiusmodi sunt omnes potentiae extensae in materia sicut potentiae sensitivae." See also *Quodl.* 4, q. 21.

<sup>50</sup> *Ibid.*: "Potentia non organica est illa quae non indiget organo corporali in actione sua, sicut intellectus et voluntas." See also *Quodl.* 4, q. 21.

face the question of how Christ's soul is the sole, efficient, created cause capable of moving His body.

Christ's sensitive soul through its organic powers can move His body in two different instances. First of all, the sensitive appetite of Christ can be stimulated by a sense object, namely, by something beautiful, pleasurable, etc. Through its organic powers the sensitive soul of Christ can move its body toward that appetible object, provided, of course, that God's concursus is forthcoming. The movement of Christ's body in this instance is not necessarily, God permitting, in harmony with the movement of the host.<sup>51</sup>

Or again, these organic powers of Christ's sensitive soul can move His body under the command of the will.<sup>52</sup> Our own experience attests to the fact that our will can direct the movement of our organic powers to some extent. So also can the organic powers of Christ's sensitive soul execute the commands of His will with regard to movement, etc.

The intellectual soul of Christ, through the medium of the will, can also effect the movement of His body either in harmony with or separate from the movement of the host. The first instance, namely, when Christ's intellectual soul moves His body in conformity with the movement of the host, typifies Christ's actual and ordinary mode of movement whenever the host is moved. The reason for this harmony of movements is to be found in the fact that God has ordained that the body of Christ be wherever the species are. Christ's human will, because of the hypostatic union, is in perfect accord with this divine decree. The will of Christ, then, is a partial cause concurring with the divine will which contingently causes and contingently disposes Christ's body to be moved as the host is moved.<sup>53</sup>

<sup>51</sup> *Quodl.* 4, q 21. "Per tales potentias [organicas] potest anima Christi sensitiva movere corpus sub hostia, nisi Deus suspendat actionem istarum. Posset enim velle hostiam moveri et appetere appetitu sensitivo propter aliquid pulchrum et delectabile moveri cum hostia, vel forte quiescere, hostia mota."

<sup>52</sup> *Ibid.*: "Potest etiam potentia executiva exsequi imperium voluntatis imperantis corpus illud moveri; et sic potest movere corpus suum per potentias organicas."

<sup>53</sup> *Report.* 4, q 5, F: "[Anima intellectiva Christi] potest velle, et credo quod vult, de facto corpus suum moveri ad motum hostiae, et hoc propter

Christ's intellective soul, unless there be a divine ordination to the contrary, could also move His body independently of the movement of the host. This, however, would constitute an unusual mode of procedure. Be that as it may, the intellective soul of Christ in this case, as in the previous instance, would still be the partial cause concurring with the divine will in effecting this motion of His body which is different from the motion of the host.<sup>54</sup>

In support of his position that the body of Christ can be moved by the organic potency of Christ's sensitive soul as well as by the non-organic power of His intellective soul, Ockham argues as follows: When something, for example, A, has a mode of existence suitable to a moving cause, and another thing, for example, B, has a manner of being apt to allow its being moved, then it is not unlikely that A move and B be moved. But the body of Christ (B) stands in this relation of "being moved-moving" with regard to the sensitive soul with its organic powers (A) and the intellective soul with its inorganic powers (A). Therefore, it is possible for the body of Christ (B), unless God withhold His divine concurrence, to be moved by both the *potentia organica* (A), and the *potentia nonorganica* (A).<sup>55</sup> Nor can it be objected that the quantitative

conformitatem voluntatis suae ad voluntatem divinam volentem illud corpus sic moveri. . . . Ex hoc patet, quod quando movetur hostia, anima intellectiva Christi, mediante voluntate sua, movet corpus Christi sub hostia non organice sicut causa partialis concurrens cum voluntate divina causante contingenter et contingenter disponente illud corpus moveri ad motum hostiae. Et hoc totum est propter conformitatem voluntatis humanae in Christo ad voluntatem divinam. Et sic intelligo quod anima intellectiva Christi movet corpus suum in hostia non organice." See also *Quodl.* 4, q. 22.

<sup>54</sup> *Ibid.*: "Dico quod sic, [i. e., quod anima intellectiva Christi in hostia potest separari ab hostia ita quod non movetur ad motum hostiae] nisi esset ordinatio divina in contrarium, quae de facto ordinavit semper illud corpus moveri ad motum hostiae. Sed non stante ista ordinatione, potest separare ab hostia, et hoc volendo quiescere, hostia mota, vel hostia quiescente volendo recedere et movere ad alium locum; tunc erit causa partialis concurrens cum Deo ad causandum istum motum." See also *Quodl.* 4, q. 22.

<sup>55</sup> *Quodl.* 4, q. 21: "Quando aliqua duo sic se habent quod unum habet modum essendi convenientem mobili, et aliud modum essendi convenientem moventi, potest unum movere et aliud moveri. Sed corpus Christi sub hostia habet modum essendi convenientem mobili, et anima Christi habet modum essendi convenientem moventi, et hoc tam per potentiam organicam quam non

or non-quantitative mode of existence of Christ's body in the Eucharist need change this relation, for, as Ockham showed previously, an accidental mode of existence does not interfere with the activity or passivity of a thing.<sup>56</sup>

Besides this twofold soul of Christ with its organic and non-organic powers, Ockham admits of no other created cause which *de facto* is able to immediately move the body of Christ. These other created causes, as for example, the priest, while they can move the host immediately, cannot so move the body of Christ, since this latter is disproportionately mobile to created causes other than the soul of Christ.<sup>57</sup>

Apparently Ockham denies not only the actuality of such immediate movement of the body of Christ by created causes other than Christ's soul, but also the very possibility of such movement, since, as he mentions, the body of Christ is disproportionately mobile to these causes. No further explanation is offered. However, it would seem that while extension is not an essential requisite for the absolute accidents of a body to be perceived by the immanent action of the senses,<sup>58</sup> an extended mode of existence on the part of the mobile object is required for it to be immediately moved by the transient action of created causes other than the soul of Christ. Hence, it is impossible for created causes, other than Christ's soul, to immediately move the non-extended body of Christ as it is definitively present on the altar.

*Uncreated Cause.*—In addition to the soul of Christ being able to move its body in the Eucharist, Ockham also recognizes that God alone could move that same body non-organically and imme-

organicam, quia modus essendi quantitativus vel non quantitativus nihil impedit hoc. Ergo, anima Christi potest movere corpus Christi sub hostia per utramque potentiam." See also *Report.* 4, q. 5, E. [This *Report.* text seems to be corrupted!]

<sup>56</sup> *Supra*, 96 ff., see also *Report.* 4, q. 5, E.

<sup>57</sup> *Quodl.* 4, q. 21: "Dico . . . quod corpus Christi non potest moveri ab omni virtute creata quae movet hostiam, quia non potest immediate moveri a sacerdote movente hostiam, quia respectu sacerdotis, saltem de facto, est illud corpus sub hostia mobile improportionatum. Et ideo respectu talis virtutis nec movetur eadem motione nec eadem virtute creata."

<sup>58</sup> *Supra*, n. 5 ff.

diately. He postulates God as the sole cause of the movement of Christ's body in two instances. First, if the soul of Christ were to suspend the act of its will by which His body is ordinarily moved in conformity with the host's movement, the body could still be moved by God in harmony with the movement of the host.<sup>59</sup> Secondly, God, as the total cause, could, if He so chose, separate the body of Christ from the host so that when the host were moved the body of Christ would not be moved, and vice versa.<sup>60</sup>

### *Objection*

Of the several difficulties which follow in the wake of Ockham's teaching with regard to those actions and passions of Christ's Eucharistic body which are terminated to *ubi*, one is particularly pertinent. If Christ's body is moved organically in heaven, then with equal merit it should move organically and simultaneously under the host. If this simultaneity of action is denied, it would seem that contradictory statements can be predicated of one and the same subject at one and the same time, namely, the same body of Christ which is moving in heaven is at the same time quiet in the Eucharist and vice versa.<sup>61</sup>

Ockham's solution is to be found primarily in the clarification of terms. If by *quiescere* one understands the absolute lack of any motion as regards a particular body regardless of place or circumstances, then Ockham admits that it is contradictory to say that a body is both moving and quiet in this unqualified sense of the term. If, however, by the term *quiescere* you understand that a body as it exists in one particular place, as for example, A, lacks motion as regards this specific place, without intending to specify

<sup>59</sup> *Quodl.* 4, q. 22: "Dico quod in isto casu [scilicet, si anima Christi sub hostia suspendat actum voluntatis suae nolendo corpus suum moveri ad motum hostiae] adhuc ad motum hostiae movebitur corpus Christi a solo Deo sicut hostia movetur."

<sup>60</sup> *Report.* 4, q. 5, F: "Eodem modo [sicut anima intellectiva Christi potest separare corpus suum ab hostia, Deo volente] potest Deus separare illud corpus ab hostia praedictis modis sicut causa totalis."

<sup>61</sup> *Quodl.* 4, q. 22: "Videtur quod si corpus Christi movetur in coelo organice quod movetur sub hostia organice, quia alias idem corpus numero simul movetur in coelo et quiescit sub hostia, quod videtur falsum."

anything about its motion or lack of it as it exists in another place, for example, B, then it is not contradictory to say that the body in place A is quiet and the same body in place B is moving. Hence, it is not contradictory, when the term *quiescere* is understood in the latter sense, to say that the body of Christ as it exists in heaven is moving, and that same body as it exists on the altar is not moving or vice versa.<sup>62</sup>

#### ACTIVITY AND PASSIVITY OF A PURELY SPIRITUAL NATURE

To Ockham, the problem of those natural actions which stem from a purely spiritual principle offers comparatively little difficulty with reference to Christ in the Eucharist. In particular he is interested in determining (1) whether it is possible both for Christ on the altar to be intellectually aware of things and to be perceived intellectually by others just as if He were quantitatively present; and (2) whether man, *de facto* and as a *homo viator*, can actually see Christ with his intellectual eye?

#### *Possibility of Such Actions*

Ockham maintains that it is naturally possible not only for Christ in the Eucharist to be intellectually aware of all things,<sup>63</sup> but also for Him to be perceived by the intellects of others.<sup>64</sup>

<sup>62</sup> *Ibid.*: "Concedo quod corpus Christi potest moveri organice in coelo et quiescere sub hostia. Et si dicis quod contradictio est quod idem simul moveatur et quiescat, respondeo quod si intelligas per *quiescere* non moveri simpliciter, sic est contradictio quod idem corpus simul moveatur et quiescat; quia illud quod sic quiescit non mutat locum primum nec acquirit novum, et tale quiescens nullo modo movetur. Si autem intelligas per *quiescere* quod corpus existens in aliquo loco et non mutans illum locum quiescit; et per *moveri* intelligas quod corpus existens in aliquo loco et mutans illum movetur, sic potest idem corpus simul quiescere et moveri, quia corpus Christi in coelo potest mutare locum suum et sic ibi movetur localiter; et idem corpus sub hostia potest manere et non mutare illum locum, et sic quiesceret."

<sup>63</sup> *Report.* 4, q. 5, G: "Dico quod Christus in Sacramento Altaris potest intelligere naturaliter et intuitive omnia alia ac si esset ibi quantitative."

<sup>64</sup> St. Thomas denies that it is naturally possible for both the angelic and the human intellect to see Christ intellectually as He exists on the altar. Without specifically mentioning his name, Ockham refers to St. Thomas' opinion in the *Report.* 4, q. 5, B: "Dicit quod non potest naturaliter videri

With regard to His being seen intellectually, Ockham allows the possibility of such a spiritual perception of Christ not only for the angelic intellect<sup>65</sup> and the separated soul, if it be not impeded by God, but also for man as he is constituted in the present life.<sup>66</sup>

The proper object for such intuitive, intellectual cognition is not alone the substance of Christ, or that of the objects surrounding Christ on the altar, but also their respective accidents.<sup>67</sup> For example, it is naturally possible, according to Ockham, for Christ to have an intellectual cognition of both the substance and the accidents of one who approaches the altar rail, and vice versa.

His reasoning as to the natural possibility of such purely spiritual operations follows much the same line of argument he employs with regard to the actions which terminate to the absolute accidents in a corporeal substance.<sup>68</sup> Here, as in the previous instance, it is his conviction that the general axiom, *posito activo sufficiente et passivo disposito et approximato, sequitur actio*, must not be denied unless reason, experience, or authority are to the contrary. None of these, however, can invalidate this axiom as regards the natural possibility of Christ's seeing intellectually or of His being seen.<sup>69</sup>

Then, too, it is not incongruous that Christ in the Eucharist have such an intellectual knowledge of us as we approach the altar,

nec ab intellectu angelico nec humano. Probatur, quia corpus Christi ut ibi est obiectum fidei; igitur non potest cognosci naturaliter." See St. Thomas, *Sum. theol.*, p. 3, q. 76, a. 7, *Op. omnia*, 4, 355.

<sup>65</sup> Scotus likewise admits that the angel can have an intuitive cognition of a sensible thing, the color of Christ's body, for example. See *supra*, n. 13.

<sup>66</sup> *Report.* 4, q. 5, G. "Dico quod Christus in Sacramento Altaris . . . potest etiam intelligi et videri naturaliter et intuitive, non tantum ab intellectu angelico nec anima separata, sed etiam ab oculo corporali, nisi esset speciale impedimentum." *Ibid.*, L: "Dico quod non repugnat intellectui viatoris ex natura rei videre corpus Christi in hostia, si permitteretur, puta si Deus sibi coageret."

<sup>67</sup> *Ibid.*, G: "Et hoc [intellectio intuitiva] non tantum est verum quantum ad substantialia sed quantum ad accidentalia."

<sup>68</sup> *Supra*, 95 ff.

<sup>69</sup> *Report.* 4, q. 5, G: "Haec patent [id est, quod Christus in Eucharistia potest intuitive intelligere et intelligi] quia posito activo sufficiente et passivo disposito et approximato sequitur actio, vel non est neganda, nisi apparet ratio evidens in contrarium vel experientia certa vel certa auctoritas, quorum nullum patet in proposito."

and vice versa, because the accidental, quantitative or non-quantitative mode of existence of the understood object does not interfere with the intuitive, intellectual cognition of that object any more than it does with the intuitive, sense perception of it.<sup>70</sup>

As an argument of fitness, Ockham postulates further that it would be unusual if Christ were to exist on the altar without His knowing in any way where He is.<sup>71</sup> Hence, if one denies that Christ can see with His corporeal eye those things which immediately surround Him on the altar, which denial, however, Ockham himself will not agree to,<sup>72</sup> this present mode of knowing about His surroundings would seem all the more important.

#### *Actuality of Such Actions*

We know for certain that *de facto* we have no direct intuitive intellectual cognition of Christ as He exists on the altar. The proximate reason suggested by Ockham for this deficiency is that God does not permit us this privilege in the present life. Naturally speaking, we could so see Christ; supernaturally speaking, we do not see Him because God withholds His concursus which is necessary for all our acts.<sup>73</sup>

Ockham makes no definite statement as to whether Christ on His part actually sees with an intellectual cognition those objects which locally surround Him on the altar. He does, however, admit that Christ in the Eucharist has every spiritual emotion which He has in heaven, even though it would not be contradictory or impossible for it to be otherwise.<sup>74</sup>

<sup>70</sup> *Ibid.*: "Non repugnat intellectui pati ab aliquo non habente modum quantitativum vel ab habente modum quantitativum. Igitur, ad hoc quod intelligat istud vel illud nihil refert utrum habeat modum quantitativum vel non."

<sup>71</sup> *Ibid.*: "Mirabile enim esset si Christus existens in hostia nesciret ubi esset"

<sup>72</sup> *Supra*, 106

<sup>73</sup> *Report.* 4, q 5, L "De facto non facit [id est, Deus non coagit cum intellectu viatoris ut videret corpus Christi in hostia] quia non permittitur."

<sup>74</sup> *Ibid.*, I: "De gaudio et dolore intellectivo dico quod de facto omnia talia quae sunt in Christo in coelo sunt in eo ut hic in hostia, tamen non est contradictio quin potest fieri oppositum"

## CHAPTER VI

### THE EUCHARISTIC ACCIDENTS

#### SEPARABILITY AND MODE OF EXISTENCE OF THE EUCHARISTIC ACCIDENTS

IF we accept, as Ockham does, the fact of transubstantiation and of Christ's real presence on the altar, several further problems arise with regard to the Eucharistic species. The Venerable Inceptor, as well as the other scholastic theologians, is specifically interested in the separability of the Eucharistic accidents from their natural subject, in their mode of existence after the consecration, and in their activity and passivity when separated.

#### *Accidents Remain*

The data of our senses as well as the testimony of authority assure us that we perceive the various qualities of the host both before and after the consecration.<sup>1</sup> Ockham never questions the reality and objectivity of these remaining qualities.<sup>2</sup> The authority of Peter Lombard is cited to further substantiate this fact.<sup>3</sup>

#### *Accidents Do Not Inhere in a Substantial Subject*

*Accidents not in substance of bread and wine.*—There is general agreement among the scholastics that the accidents which remain

<sup>1</sup> *Supra*, c. 5, nn. 23, 24.

<sup>2</sup> *De corp. Christi*, c. 10: "Manifestum est qualitates sensibiles post consecrationem subsistere, nam nihil est visibile sine qualitate sensibili, sed manet forma ibi visibilis; igitur et qualitas sensibilis. Item sapor ibi percipitur, et albedo videtur, et qualitates tangibiles sensus tactus apprehendit; sed nullus sensus percipit aliquam qualitatem corporis Christi; remanent igitur qualitates sensibiles quae prius erant in substantia panis et modo sunt sine subiecto"

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*: "Unde dicit Magister Sententiarum libro quarto, distinctione undecima: 'Species est ibi panis et vini sicut sapor; unde aliud videtur, aliud intelligitur.'" See P. Lombard, *Quatuor libri sententiarum*, 4, d. 11, c. 2, in *Opera omnia S. Bonaventurae*, 4, 239.

after the consecration do not inhere in any substance as in a subject. That these remaining accidents cannot inhere in the substance of bread and wine is apparent from Ockham's definition of transubstantiation, which postulates the annihilation of these two substances.<sup>4</sup>

*Accidents not in the substance of Christ's body and blood.*—Ockham is likewise in full accord with the common scholastic teaching that the remaining accidents do not inhere in the substance of Christ's body and blood. Two rather brief arguments from reason are advanced in support of this position.

If, Ockham reasons, the Eucharistic species were to inhere in the body of Christ, that body would be the subject of contrary qualities at one and the same time. To illustrate: One host might be perceptibly moist and humid, another might be perfectly dry. If Christ's body were the subject of these qualities, one and the same substance would be the subject of contrary, absolute accidents at one and the same time. This for Ockham is untenable.<sup>5</sup>

Again, if the remaining accidents were to inhere in Christ's body, it would necessarily be changing constantly. Such a change would be accidental, to be sure, but a change nevertheless.<sup>6</sup> The glorified body of Christ, however, is impassible and consequently cannot be changed or affected by these accidents.

To corroborate these arguments from reason, Ockham cites the authoritative words of Peter Lombard. The Master of the Sentences states definitely that the body of Christ is in no way affected by the Eucharistic species.<sup>7</sup>

<sup>4</sup> *Supra*, c. 3, n. 6.

<sup>5</sup> *De corp. Christi*, c. 8. "Ostendatur quod illa accidentia subiective in corpore Christi non existunt; quod patet ex hoc quod qualitates contrariae non sunt simul in corpore Christi. Qua ratione autem qualitates unius hostiae existerent subiective in corpore Christi, eadem ratione qualitates alterius hostiae idem corpus Christi afficerent. Ad sensum autem patet quod aliquando aliquae qualitates diversarum hostiarum sibi contrariantur. Ex quibus relinquitur quod nec istae qualitates nec illae corpus Christi afficiunt."

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*: "Item corpus Christi ad qualitates sensibiles de novo non alternatur, quod tamen contingeret si accidentia panis corpus Christi informarent."

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*: "Hoc [quod accidentia remanentia non sunt subiective in corpore Christi] etiam auctoritate Magistri Sententiarum confirmatur, libro quarto, distinctione duodecima: 'Ibi,' inquit, 'non est substantia nisi corporis et sanguinis

*Accidents not in the surrounding air.*—The possibility of the remaining accidents inhering in the surrounding air is likewise eliminated by Ockham. In opposition to this hypothesis the Venerable Inceptor advances two arguments from reason.

First of all, he maintains, an accident which is *de facto* inhering is never separated from its primary subject. However, if the surrounding air is the primary subject of the Eucharistic species, only those accidents which are on the outer fringe of the host would be in contact with their subject of inherence. To illustrate: The accident, sweetness, is assumed to be characteristic of the whole host and not of just the outer surface of it. But if the air surrounding the host is the subject of this accident, only that sweetness which is on the periphery of the host would inhere in its primary subject, for that sweetness which is in the inner portion of the host is out of contact with the surrounding air. Hence, the air which surrounds the host could not serve as the subject of inherence for the totality of the Eucharistic accidents.<sup>9</sup>

Again, the testimony both of our senses and our reason assures us that an accident never occupies a place different from that of its subject. For example, the whiteness of a man is in the same place as the man's substance. If, however, the air which surrounds the host were to be the subject of the Eucharistic accidents, this generally accepted principle would be denied, for the air and the species are in two different, though contiguous, places. Hence, the Eucharistic species are not subjectively inherent in the surrounding air.<sup>10</sup>

Domini, quae non afficitur illis accidentibus.'” See P. Lombard, *op. cit.*, d. 12, c. 1, 267.

<sup>9</sup> *De corp. Christi*, c. 8: “Nec etiam illa accidentia aerem circumstantem afficiunt, quia nullum accidens, nec secundum se totum nec secundum aliquam sui partem, distat loco et situ a subiecto suo primo. Sed ad sensum apparet quod aliqua pars accidentis hostiae loco et situ distat ab aere circumstante et a qualibet eius parte; non est igitur illud accidens in aere subiective, nec eadem ratione aliquod aliorum.”

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid.*: “Item numquam accidens occupat alium locum a loco sui subiecti; sed manifestum est quod hostia et aer occupant distincta loca; non igitur ista accidentia sunt subiective in aere.”

*Accidents Do Not Inhere  
in an Accidental Subject*

While there is substantial agreement among the scholastics with regard to the above facts, this harmony is shattered by the further question: Do the absolute qualities of the host inhere in some accidental subject as in a substance? Immediately differences of opinion arise. Specifically, there are two principle opinions on the matter. The so called common opinion maintains that the various qualities of the host inhere in quantity as in a subject. Ockham and the conceptualists cannot accept this opinion since they deny that quantity is an entity distinct from that of substance and quality.

It should be noted by way of introduction to the discussion of the two opinions that the basis for this disagreement between the common opinion and that of Ockham harks back to different philosophical notions of quantity. Despite the fact, however, that Ockham's notion of quantity and its theological application to the Eucharist differ radically from the so called common opinion, there is no question, as Coninck points out, of its being contrary to faith or deserving of theological censures.<sup>11</sup>

## Common opinion

According to the common teaching, quantity is a reality distinct from that of substance and quality.<sup>12</sup> With this notion in mind, St. Thomas, for example, held that the Eucharistic accidents inhere in quantity as in a subject,<sup>13</sup> since dimensive quantity as such is the first disposition of matter.<sup>14</sup> Matter, however, is the primary and immediate subject of quantity, and only mediately, through

<sup>11</sup> *De sacramentis et censuris*, q. 77, a. 2 (Rouen, 1630), 210, as found in *DTC* 5, 1395 "Patet hanc sententiam [Nominalistarum] nihil tenere vel apparenter contrarium fidei, ideoque immerite a quibusdam argui tamquam periculosum in fide."

<sup>12</sup> *Supra*, 66-7.

<sup>13</sup> *Sum. theol.*, p. 3, q. 77, a. 2, *Op. omnia*, 4, 358: "Ergo quantitas dimensiva est subiectum accidentium, quae remanent in hoc sacramento."

<sup>14</sup> *Ibid.*: "Respondeo dicendum, quod necesse est dicere accidentia alia quae remanent in hoc sacramento esse sicut in subiecto in quantitate dimensiva panis vel vini remanente . . . quia prima dispositio materiae est quantitas dimensiva."

dimensional quantity, the subject of other accidents.<sup>15</sup> Hence, if matter is removed, the accidents, other than quantity, are not immediately affected. If, through God's intervention, quantity is made in some way to exist *per se*, that is, as a substance exists, it can act as the principle of individuation for the other accidents which then inhere in quantity as in a subject.<sup>16</sup> The Angelic Doctor's conclusion that the Eucharistic accidents inhere in quantity as in a subject is in harmony with his principle of economy with regard to divine interventions.<sup>17</sup> According to his notion of the mode of existence of the Eucharistic species, it is necessary for God to support only quantity so that it exists *per se* and after the manner of a substance. That, in brief, represents the position of St. Thomas,<sup>18</sup> one of the foremost exponents of the common opinion.

#### Ockham's opinion

Ockham, on the other hand, needs to postulate that God cause each of the remaining accidents to exist *per se* without a subject. Quantity for him is not a reality distinct from substance and quality. Rather, the term *quantity* is a connotative term signifying either a substance or quality, and connoting that these things have part outside of part.<sup>19</sup> Applying this hypothesis to the Eucharist, he is logically obliged to teach that the quantity of the bread does not remain after the consecration, since its substance is annihilated.<sup>20</sup>

<sup>15</sup> *Ibid.*: "Et quia primum subiectum est materia, consequens est quod omnia alia accidentia referantur ad subiectum mediante quantitate dimensiona; sicut et primum subiectum coloris dicitur esse superficies."

<sup>16</sup> *Ibid.*: ". . . cum subiectum sit principium individuationis accidentium oportet id quod ponitur aliquorum accidentium subiectum, esse aliquo modo individuationis principium. Quantitas autem dimensiona est quoddam individuationis principium."

<sup>17</sup> *Ibid.*, a 5, 360.

<sup>18</sup> *Commentum*, 4, d. 12, q. 1, a 1, *Op. omnia*, 7, 652-5; *Sum. theol.*, p. 3, q. 77, a. 2, *Op. omnia*, 4, 357-8, *Sum. c. gentiles*, 4, c. 65, *Op. omnia*, 5, 359; *Quaestiones quodlibetales*, 7, a. 10, *Op. omnia*, 9, 560

<sup>19</sup> *Supra*, 67 ff.

<sup>20</sup> *De corp. Christi*, c. 16: "Adducendae sunt aliquae rationes propter quas posset alicui videri. . . quod aliqua quantitas ante consecrationem praecessit quae non erat res absoluta distincta realiter a substantia panis, quae post consecrationem non manet propter hoc quod desinit substantia panis esse." See also. *Ibid.*, c. 24. "Restat nunc aliquas persuasiones adducere propter quas

Each of the qualities, however, in so far as it was extended before the consecration and remains such afterwards, is quantity.<sup>21</sup> But these qualities do not inhere in quantity as in a subject, but subsist *per se* without any subject of inherence.<sup>22</sup>

The logic of Ockham's position is this: Quantity is not a distinct entity separate from the substance and the qualities of the unconsecrated host. Consequently, after the consecration the absolute qualities of the host cannot be subjectively in quantity as in a subject, since quantity as such is not a reality with a distinct and individual existence. Before the consecration, of course, these various quantified qualities inhere in the substance of bread as in their proper subject. After the consecration, however, these same extended qualities continue to exist as previously, save for this that now each, by divine intervention, exists *per se* and without any subject of inherence.

Although Ockham shows a preference for this opinion, he is nevertheless, at least in some of his earlier writings, not without a certain misgiving as to its orthodoxy.<sup>23</sup> To safeguard his teaching

posset alicui videri quod ante consecrationem praecessit una quantitas, quae non erat res absoluta distincta realiter a substantia panis, quae post consecrationem non manet sicut nec substantia panis manet." *Summa totius logicae*, p. 1, c. 44, 17<sup>v</sup>: "Unde de Sacramento Altaris dicunt quod post consecrationem corporis Christi quod una quantitas quae praecessit erat eadem realiter cum substantia panis, et illa non manet."

<sup>21</sup> *Ibid.*: "Adducendae sunt aliquae rationes propter quas posset alicui videri quod quantitas remanens in Sacramento Altaris non est res absoluta distincta realiter a qualitatibus remanentibus cum substantia corporis Christi." See also *ibid.*, c. 23: "Ex praedictis evidenter sequitur quod quantitas remanens in Sacramento Altaris non est res absoluta distincta realiter a qualitatibus remanentibus in eodem sacramento."

<sup>22</sup> Ockham, *Summa totius logicae*, p. 1, c. 44, 17<sup>v</sup>: "Sed praeter illam [id est, quantitas illa quae est realiter una cum substantia panis] manet una quantitas quae est eadem cum qualitate, in qua tamen quantitate non est aliqua qualitas subiective; sed omnia accidentia remanentia post consecrationem remanent simul cum corpore Christi sine omni subiecto, quia sunt per se subsistentia." See also *De corp. Christi*, c. 16 ff.

<sup>23</sup> *Summa totius logicae*, p. 1, c. 44, 17<sup>v</sup>: "Est alia opinio quae mihi videtur de mente Aristotelis, sive sit haeretica sive catholica, quam volo recitare, quamvis nolim eam asserere. . . . Est igitur illa opinio quam multi catholici ponunt et theologi tenent et tenuerunt quod, scilicet, nulla quantitas est realiter distincta a substantia et qualitate."

and to forestall any charges of heresy, he states expressly that he does not wish to hold anything except that which the Church teaches. If, perchance, anything should appear in his writings which is contrary to the orthodox teachings of the Church, he wishes it to be considered only as a purely speculative proposition.<sup>24</sup>

Ockham's rebuttal of common opinion

Even if one grants the philosophical basis for the common opinion, namely, that quantity is an entity distinct from that of substance and quality, Ockham endeavors to show that it is still not necessary for the remaining qualities to be in quantity as in a subject.<sup>25</sup> His arguments can be conveniently divided into two classes, namely, those from reason and those from authority.

*Argument from reason.*—Ockham argues in the first instance that quantity as a reality is more dependent on a substance as a subject of inherence than is a quality upon quantity. Quantity, however, as even the advocates of the common opinion admit, can exist without an actual inherence in a substance, as, for example, in the Eucharist. With all the more reason, therefore, should it be admitted that a quality can exist without any subject of inherence, namely, without being in quantity as in a subject.<sup>26</sup>

For this argument to be valid, it is necessary for Ockham to establish the truth of his major premise, that is, that quantity is more dependent upon a substance as a subject than is quality upon quantity. In support of this position, he appeals to the commonly accepted principle that an effect is more dependent upon a primary cause than upon a secondary one. In the natural order of dependence, a quantity, being an accident, is more in need of a substance as a subject, that is, as a primary cause, than is the accident, quality, in need of the accident, quantity. The reason for this subordinate order of dependence rests on the fact that quantity as an

<sup>24</sup> *Supra*, c. 1, n. 5. See also *De sac. alt.*, q. 1.

<sup>25</sup> *Report.* 4, q. 7, B: "Dico quod si [quantitas] sit accidens absolutum distinctum a substantia et qualitate, quod Deus potest facere qualitatem sine quantitate, sicut quantitatem sine substantia."

<sup>26</sup> *Ibid.*: "Magis dependet quantitas a substantia quam qualitas a quantitate, ponendo quantitatem esse rem distinctam mediantem inter substantiam et qualitatem; sed quantitas potest esse sine substantia; igitur et cetera."

accident is only a secondary cause, that is, the mediate subject between substance and quality. By its very definition, an accident is destined *per se* to inhere in a substance as in a subject. Hence, by nature quantity is more dependent upon a substance, as its primary subject and immediate cause, than is quality upon quantity, since quantity can be considered only the mediate subject and the secondary cause of quality.<sup>27</sup>

Secondly, quality is more perfect than quantity.<sup>28</sup> If, therefore, it is possible, through God's divine power, for a quantity to exist *per se* without a subject of inherence—and this the common opinion admits—all the more so is it reasonable to expect that a quality can exist with a quantity as its subject of inherence.<sup>29</sup>

Finally, if, as the common opinion admits, quantity is an absolute accident distinct from substance and quality, God can still effect that a quality exist without a quantity as its subject. Ockham's argument supposes God's omnipotence. An accident, as the scholastics admit, depends on its subject of inherence only as on an extrinsic cause. If the dependence were intrinsic, the definition of a substance would have to include the notion of accident. God, however, can both suspend the effect of extrinsic causes, and supply for the causality of these created causes. The many miracles recorded in the pages of Holy Writ substantiate this fact. An example of the former is the instance of the men in the fiery furnace,<sup>30</sup> and of the latter, the virginal conception of the Son of God.<sup>31</sup> With equal reason, then, can we suppose that God is able to effect not only that

<sup>27</sup> *Ibid.*: "Maior patet per eos, quia priorem influentiam et vehementiorem habet causa prima super causatum quam secunda. Igitur, potest Deus conservare quantitatem non conservando substantiam, et ideo argumentum potest fieri in proposito de quantitate et qualitate per omnia"

<sup>28</sup> Ockham follows Scotus on this principle, namely, that a quality is more perfect than a quantity. For proofs see Scotus, *Oxon.*, 4, d. 12, q. 2, *Op. omnia*, 17, 568. See also Biel, *Sacri canonis missae expositio*, lect. 44, D.

<sup>29</sup> *Report.* 4, q. 7, B. "Confirmatur [quod qualitas potest esse sine subiecto], quia qualitas est perfectior quantitate Igitur, si quantitas potest esse sine substantia, et qualitas sine quantitate Ideo dico, quod tenendo primam opinionem de quantitate, quod Deus potest facere qualitatem sine substantia, et tunc haberet partes distinctas loco et situ sicut materia"

<sup>30</sup> Dan. 3: 24.

<sup>31</sup> Matt. 1: 22-5.

a quantity exist without a substance, but also that He can cause a quality to exist without a quantity as its subject of inherence. In both instances, God, as the first and incretated cause, can supply for the causality of the created causes. Consequently, if, as the common opinion admits, God can effect that one accident, namely, quantity, exist without a subject, so also can He cause another accident, that is, an absolute quality, to exist without a subject.<sup>32</sup>

*Argument from authority.*—Not only from the dictates of reason but also from authoritative Catholic sources, Ockham claims to find support for his theory that the absolute qualities of the consecrated host are not in quantity as in a subject.

The words of Peter Lombard, both because of their intrinsic merit and their general approbation by the fourth Lateran Council, hold a singular position in the realm of Catholic authority. The Master of the Sentences states that the remaining accidents apparently exist without a subject of inherence. If, therefore, Ockham concludes, these Eucharistic accidents exist *per se* and without a subject, then they are not in quantity as in a subject.<sup>33</sup> Thus he inter-

<sup>32</sup> *Report.* 4, q. 7, B "Probatur [quod Deus potest facere qualitatem sine quantitate], quia accidens dependet a subiecto sicut a causa extrinseca; sed Deus potest suspendere et supplere omnem causalitatem causae extrinsecae, ita quod subiectum nullam causalitatem habeat super accidens, et per consequens, qua ratione potest facere unum accidens sine subiecto et aliud. Igitur, si Deus potest facere quantitatem sine subiecto, et qualitatem."

<sup>33</sup> *De corp. Christi*, c. 21 "Unde dicit doctor egregius, Magister Sententiarum, libro quarto, distinctione duodecima, in principio, cuius doctrinam approbat concilium generale extra *De summa Trinitate et fide Catholica*, *Damnamus*: 'Si quaeritur,' inquit, 'de accidentibus quae remanent, scilicet, de speciebus, sapore et pondere, in quo subiecto fundentur, potius mihi videtur fatendum existere sine subiecto quam esse in subiecto.'" See: P. Lombard, *op. cit.*, d. 12, c. 1, 267; c. 2, X, *Damnamus*, I, 1, in Friedberg, *Corpus iuris canonici*, 2, 6 [This last reference is also to be found in *ES*, 431.] See also *Quodl.* 4, q. 39 "Ideo probo hoc adhuc [quod qualitates remanentes post consecrationem non sunt subiective in quantitate] per dicta doctorum ab Ecclesia approbatorum. Primo, per Magistrum Sententiarum, libro quarto, distinctione duodecima: 'Si quaeritur,' inquit, 'de accidentibus quae remanent, scilicet, de speciebus saporis et ponderis, in quo subiecto fundentur, potius videtur mihi fatendum eas existere sine subiecto quam esse in subiecto.' Ergo, non sunt in quantitate sicut in subiecto secundum eum." *De corp. Christi*, c. 21: "Item nunquam aliquod accidens potest dici per se subsistens quamdiu subsistit in suo subiecto immediate; sed secundum eundem doctorem [Magistrum Sententia-

prets the words of Peter Lombard so as to exclude quantity as the subject of the remaining qualities.<sup>34</sup>

Ockham claims to find further corroboration for his theory in the words of a gloss on that portion of the *Decretum Gratiani* which discusses the penance to be imposed on those who through negligence spill the precious blood. The gloss examines the factor of weight with regard to the Eucharistic species and concludes that while the accidents, heaviness included, remain, there is no thing which is heavy. Only a body, a corporeal substance, has weight.<sup>35</sup> From the words of the gloss, Ockham concludes that the separated qualities do not inhere in quantity as in a subject, for, if they did then there would be some thing which is heavy, cold, etc.<sup>36</sup>

rum] qualitates remanentes in Sacramento Altaris sunt per se subsistentes, nam loquens de qualitatibus, de quibus prius, dixit quod sunt sine subiecto Ait: 'Remanent illa accidentia per se subsistentia ad mysterii ritum, ad gustus fideique suffragium, quibus corpus Christi, habens formam suam et naturam, tegitur.' . . . Unde subdit idem praefatus doctor: 'Ne mireris,' inquit, 'vel insultes, si ibi accidentia videantur frangi, cum ibi sint sine subiecto.'" See P. Lombard, *op. cit.*, c. 1, 267.

<sup>34</sup> *Ibid.*: "Ex quo [id est, verbis Petri Lombardi] patet quod de intentione illius doctoris est quod tales qualitates, sapor, pondus, et huiusmodi remanentes in Sacramento Altaris non sunt subiective in aliquo, et per consequens non sunt in quantitate tamquam in subiecto, quia tunc non essent sine subiecto sed in subiecto."

<sup>35</sup> *Ibid.*: "Nihil remanens post consecrationem in Sacramento Altaris est ponderosum illa ponderositate quae remanet in eodem sacramento, quod plane asserit quaedam glossa *De consecratione*, distinctione secunda, super illud capitulum, *Si per negligentiam*. Unde obiiciens contra hoc quod dixit quod accidentia cadunt in terram, ait sic: 'Sed obiicitur cum sola accidentia manent ibi, et accidentia non habent pondus, quia solum corpus habet pondus. Qualiter igitur accidentia dicuntur cadere cum non habeant pondus?' Et solvens istam objectionem dicit: 'Dic quod ponderositas est adhuc cum aliis accidentibus, et tamen nihil est ibi ponderosum'" See *Glossa ord* on D. 2, *de cons.*, c. 27, v. *In terram*, in *Decretum Gratiani*, 1924.

<sup>36</sup> *Ibid.*: "Ex ista glossa patet aperte quod quamvis ponderositas post consecrationem remaneat cum accidentibus aliis, tamen non est in aliquo subiecto quod possit ab illa ponderositate denominari ponderosum Et eadem ratione non est ibi aliquid album, sed tantum est ibi albedo; et nihil est ibi album sicut est ibi ponderositas, et nihil est ibi ponderosum; et eodem modo, quamvis sit ibi sapor, non tamen est ibi subiectum sustentans saporem de-

The Venerable Inceptor makes bold to assert that the Church herself favors the opinion that the accidents of the host exist without a subject, and hence are not in quantity as in a subject. In support of this contention, he refers to the words of the Divine Office for the feast of Corpus Christi.<sup>37</sup> To interpret these words in support of his opinion seems particularly hazardous in the face of the fact that they were written by St. Thomas, one of the foremost proponents of the common opinion concerning the mode of existence of the Eucharistic accidents.<sup>38</sup>

Be that as it may, the various canonical and theological sources serve to convince Ockham that it is perfectly in keeping with Catholic thought to teach that the qualities of the consecrated host are not inherent in quantity as in a subject. He defies those who oppose this position to cite one approved authority who contradicts this teaching.<sup>39</sup>

nominabile a sapore. Ex quo sequitur plane quod quantitas non est subiectum informatum qualitatibus illis nec denominabilis ab eis. Si enim substaret qualitatibus illis, vere esset ponderosa, calida vel frigida, alba, dulcis vel amara, quod est contra praedictam glossam expresse "

<sup>37</sup> *Ibid* : "Item sancta Mater Ecclesia solemnizans de corpore Christi legit sic: 'Accidentia sine subiecto in eodem existunt ut fides locum habeat dum visibiliter invisibile sumitur aliena specie occultatum, et sensus a deceptione immunes reddantur, qui de accidentibus iudicant sibi notis.'" See St. Thomas, *Opusculum V: Officium de festo corporis Christi*, ad matutinas, lect. 3, *Op. omnia*, 15, 254.

<sup>38</sup> *Supra*, nn. 13-18

<sup>39</sup> *De corp. Christi*, c. 21: "Unde cum ista sit sententia plurimorum doctorum reverendorum, videlicet, Magistri Sententiarum, Hostiensis, Gaufridi, ac aliorum plurimorum glossatorum super *Decreta et Decretales*, videtur consonum fidei catholicae dicere quod omnes qualitates post consecrationem remanentes in Sacramento Altaris non sint in aliquo nec in quantitate nec in alio tamquam in subiecto. . . . Ex quibus omnibus patet quod doctores antiqui et authentici tantum posuerunt qualitates remanere per se sine subiecto; et ideo non posuerunt quod qualitates essent in aliquo subiective Unde et multi ponentes qualitates remanentes in Sacramento Altaris esse in quantitate tamquam in subiecto, multas auctoritates doctorum authenticorum adducunt ad probandum quod accidentia, puta qualitates, sunt sine subiecto. Sed nec unam quidem auctoritatem alicuius doctoris authentici possunt adducere ad probandum quod qualitates in Sacramento Altaris sunt in quantitate sicut in subiecto." See P. Lombard, *supra*, n. 33. Ockham's reference to Hostiensis is apparently to Henricus de Segusio's *In tertium librum commentaria* (Venetiis: Apud Iuntas,

In conclusion, Ockham is firmly convinced that approved authority favors his position, namely, that the absolute qualities of the consecrated host do not inhere in quantity as in a subject, but that all of these sensible accidents exist without any subject of inherence.<sup>40</sup>

#### ACTIVITY AND PASSIVITY OF THE SEPARATED ACCIDENTS

Consequent upon the fact that the Eucharistic accidents exist without inhering in a substance, still other problems arise with regard to their activity and passivity in this supernatural mode of existence. Specifically, can these separated, absolute accidents enjoy every action and passion of which they were capable when they inhered in a substance? This question cannot be answered by a simple affirmation or negation.

It should be noted by way of introduction that the problems connected with the above question are for the most part purely speculative. We know, of course, *a posteriori* that certain phenomena follow in the wake of the action of creatures upon the separated species of the host. We cannot say for certain, however, whether these effects are produced by creatures as the partial causes, or exclusively by God as the total cause. Ockham endeavors to estab-

1581), "De celebratione missarum et sacramento Eucharistiae, et divinis officiis," c. 6, *Cum Marthae et infra*, fol 164<sup>r</sup>. "substantia panis in substantiam corporis Christi divina operante virtute transsubstantiatur, et substantiam vini in sanguinis substantiam, remanentibus ibi miraculose accidentibus praeter subiectum." The Gaufridus mentioned by Ockham is Goffredus de Trano (d. 1245). The reference in question is from his *Summa super titulos decretalium*, liber tertius, "De celebratione missarum sacramento Eucharistiae et divinis officiis," fol. 58<sup>v</sup>.

<sup>40</sup> *Ibid.*: "Ex praedictis auctoritatibus aliisque quam plurimis plane constat quod in Sacramento Altaris non tantum unum accidens existit sine subiecto, sed quod accidentia existunt sine subiecto, puta qualitates omnes de quibus iudicant sensus; quod non esset verum si omnes qualitates essent in quantitate sicut in subiecto. . . . Sed manifestum est ex praedictis locis quod nec directe nec indirecte colligi potest quod qualitates sint in quantitate tamquam in subiecto." See also *Quodl.* 4, q. 39: "Ex quibus omnibus [auctoritatibus approbatis] sequitur quod non solum unum accidens manet sine subiecto, puta quantitas, sed accidentia, quod non esset verum si omnes illae qualitates essent in quantitate subiective."

lish the possibility of the efficient causality of creatures with regard to certain of the activities and passivities of the separated accidents.

### Activity

*Separated accidents as principle of generation and corruption of substances.*—Ockham's treatment of the problem of the separated accidents as the principle of the generation and corruption of a substance is taken up almost entirely with his refutation<sup>41</sup> of Scotus' argument that no accident can effect the generation<sup>42</sup> or corruption<sup>43</sup> of a substance. This argumentation is strictly philosophical and of no immediate concern to the present study. Ockham's analysis of this problem remains inconclusive and without a positive solution. This defect may be due to the fact that this question is a portion of the *Reportatio*, and as such subject to the shortcomings and limitations of this type of work.

Be that as it may, Ockham's position may be inferred from certain principles which he exposes later in his study of the passivity of these separated accidents with regard to the generation and corruption of a substance. As to the Eucharistic accidents generating a new substance, Ockham would apparently hold this to be impossible since matter is creatable only by God.<sup>44</sup> That they could annihilate a substance would seem possible to him, for he believes that while a creature cannot create, it is possible for it to annihilate.<sup>45</sup>

### Passivity

With regard to the passivity of these separated, absolute accidents, Ockham admits, first of all, that they can be locally moved just as immediately as when they were united to their proper substance.<sup>46</sup>

<sup>41</sup> *Report*, 4, q. 7, H-I.

<sup>42</sup> Scotus, *Oxon.*, 4, d. 12, q. 3, *Op. omnia*, 17, 589. See also Scotus, *Report. Par.*, 4, d. 12, q. 3, *Op. omnia*, 24, 154.

<sup>43</sup> Scotus, *Oxon.*, 4, d. 12, q. 3, *Op. omnia*, 17, 596. See also Scotus, *Report. Par.*, 4, d. 12, q. 3, *Op. omnia*, 24, 158.

<sup>44</sup> *Infra*, nn. 62, 63.

<sup>45</sup> *Infra*, n. 60.

<sup>46</sup> *Report.* 4, q. 7, K: "De transmutatione passiva istorum accidentium

There are, however, other passive relations of these separated accidents which are not so easy to determine. Three related problems merit consideration: (1) Can these separated, absolute accidents be altered as to their quantity? <sup>47</sup> (2) Can these accidents be destroyed, and from them a new substance be produced? <sup>48</sup> (3) Can these qualities be either eliminated entirely, or altered as to their intensity? <sup>49</sup>

Passivity of species with regard  
to a change of quantity

The passivity of the species with regard to quantity deals specifically with the phenomena of rarefaction and condensation. Experience assures us that the Eucharistic species can be extended so as to occupy a larger area, or compressed to a smaller space.<sup>50</sup> But how and by whom can these alterations of the quantity of the sacramental species be effected? Ockham's answers are tempered by the particular notion of quantity which is postulated at the moment.

*If quantity is a distinct entity.*—If, as the common opinion holds, quantity is a reality really distinct from that of substance and quality, then Ockham admits that two conclusions are in order. First of all, when these species become rarefied or condensed, the whole preceding quantity is destroyed and a new quantity produced. Secondly, this new quantity is produced not by creatures but solely by God as the total cause.<sup>51</sup>

quantum ad motum localem, dicunt omnes quod accidentia separata possunt moveri localiter sicut quando sunt coniuncta."

<sup>47</sup> *Ibid.*: "Sed est difficultas utrum possunt transmutari ad quantitatem, qualitatem, vel substantiam. Ideo primo videndum est utrum possunt transmutari ad quantitatem?"

<sup>48</sup> *Ibid.*: "Secundo [videndum est] utrum [possunt transmutari] ad substantiam, ita quod posset fieri de illis substantia?"

<sup>49</sup> *Ibid.*: "Tertio [videndum est] utrum [possunt transmutari] ad qualitatem?"

<sup>50</sup> *Ibid.*, L: "Est difficultas de rarefactione et condensatione illarum specierum, quia ad sensum patet quia rarefiunt et condensantur; et dicitur hic quod illae species possunt rarefieri et condensari."

<sup>51</sup> *Ibid.*: "Tenendo tamen aliam opinionem de quantitate, quod sit res

Ockham's insistence that God alone can effect this new quantity of the Eucharistic species is based on his belief that every secondary cause requires a subject upon which to act in the production of an effect. If it were not so, a creature could create. In the ordinary course of events, of course, a substance serves this basic need for a subject of these various quantitative alterations. In the Eucharistic species, however, there is no passive thing to serve as a subject for the proposed rarefaction and condensation. The quantity of the species—assuming that it is an entity which is single and distinct from the qualities—cannot be postulated as the subject of this change, for it is the very thing which is changed in these transmutations.<sup>52</sup>

*If quantity is not a distinct entity.*—If Ockham's conceptualistic notion of quantity is correct, then a different solution is postulated. Consequent upon his notion of quantity, rarefaction and condensation are also only connotative terms which signify either a substance or quality, and connote that these realities are made to occupy a greater or smaller portion of space, as the case may be. Rarefaction and condensation are effected through local motion of the parts so that they are made to coextend with a greater or lesser portion of the surrounding space. With these notions of quantity, rarefaction, and condensation in mind, Ockham insists that a creature can effect the rarefaction and condensation of the species, that is, the local motion of the respective parts of the separated accidents in relation to each other, and that this can be done without the advent of any new, absolute quantity.<sup>53</sup>

distincta a substantia et qualitate, tunc teneo duas conclusiones: Prima est quod in rarefactione et condensatione tota quantitas praecedens corrumpitur et alia de novo generatur; secunda est quod illa quantitas producitur a solo Deo et non a creatura." See the text immediately following in the *Report*. for Ockham's proof of the first conclusion cited above.

<sup>52</sup> *Ibid.*: "Secunda conclusio probatur, scilicet, quod illa quantitas producitur a solo Deo, quia omnis causa secunda requirit passum in quod agat, quia aliter creatura posset creare, sicut dictum est in secundo. Hic autem non est aliquod passum. Igitur et cetera." See *Report*. 2, q. 7, D.

<sup>53</sup> *Ibid.*: "Potest dici, tenendo primam opinionem de quantitate, quod non sit res distincta a substantia et qualitate, quod est ibi rarefactio et condensatio in illis speciebus, et hoc sine qualitate et quantitate absoluta de novo adveniente. Et tunc fieret per istum modum, quod de denso fiet rarum per solam ex-

Destructibility of the species and their passive relation to the production of a new substance

Ockham is interested here in two related questions: (1) Can the separated accidents be destroyed by a created agent? <sup>54</sup> (2) Can a new substance be produced from them? <sup>55</sup>

*Destruction of species.*—Common opinion: As in the previous problem, it is necessary to distinguish the various opinions, since among the scholastics there is no harmonious teaching on this point. According to the common opinion, to which Ockham refers in passing, an accident which is separated from its subject cannot be destroyed by any finite power, since these accidents can be destroyed only by annihilation. But annihilation, just as creation, is commonly held to be impossible to creatures. <sup>56</sup>

tensionem, ita quod rarefieri et condensari nihil aliud est quam quod aliquod corpus per virtutem creatam aliquando occupat maiorem locum, aliquando minorem, sine omni absoluto de novo adveniente; ita quod raritas nihil addit nisi extensionem partium alicuius corporis et coexistentiam pluribus partibus loci quam prius, ita quod hoc nomen *raritas* vel conceptus, significat ipsam substantiam vel qualitatem principaliter sicut quantitas, et connotat multas alias res vel partes loci, quibus partes corporis rari coexistunt; et nullam aliam rem dicit. Densitas, autem, econverso significat eandem substantiam et qualitatem principaliter; et connotat coexistentiam earum partium, quae prius coexistebant pluribus partibus loci, nunc coexistere paucioribus partibus loci, ita quod tres partes forte corporis rari coexistebant tribus partibus loci, nunc autem in denso illae tres partes eadem numero coexistunt uni parti loci. Et hoc totum potest fieri per virtutem creatam et sine aliquo absoluto adveniente de novo vel recedente. Unde secundum istam viam, quando de raro fit densum, illae tres partes prius coexistentes tribus partibus loci nunc moventur localiter per condensationem ad minorem locum et coexistunt tantum uni parti eiusdem loci vel alterius; quando autem econtra de denso fit rarum, tunc illae tres partes nunc coexistentes uni parti loci per rarefactionem coexistunt tribus partibus loci, et sic moventur localiter ad maiorem locum. Et isto modo potest faciliter salvari quod quaelibet pars rari est rarior et densi est densior, quia in primo salvatur per hoc quod quaelibet pars coexistit maiori loci quam prius; in secundo per hoc quod quaelibet coexistit minori loci quam prius."

<sup>54</sup> *Ibid.* M: "Primo videndum est utrum ista accidentia possunt corrumpi ab aliquo agente creato?"

<sup>55</sup> *Ibid.*: "Secundo [videndum est] an de illis potest aliqua substantia generari?"

<sup>56</sup> *Ibid.*: "Dicitur communiter quod accidens separatum ab omni subiecto nulla virtute creata potest corrumpi, quia illa accidentia non possunt corrumpi

Ockham's opinion: In opposition to this common opinion, Ockham teaches that a creature can annihilate<sup>57</sup> even though it cannot create.<sup>58</sup> From this assumption, it is logical to conclude that creatures can, as partial causes, completely destroy or annihilate the Eucharistic species. God's concurrence, of course, is here presumed just as it is with all the other acts of creatures.<sup>59</sup>

Since Ockham's teaching on this point departs so radically from the common opinion, it is fitting that a closer analysis be made of his reasons for insisting that while a creature cannot create it can annihilate.

First of all, with regard to creation he argues that whenever a natural agent is equally indifferent to the production of a number, or even of an infinitude, of effects, it equally immediately produces either all or none of these possible products. A created cause, however, regards with equal indifference the production of all the potentialities of a given species, for example, man, since all possible individuals are pure nothingness with an equal non-approximation to this finite cause. These potential beings, namely, men, could be compared to the infinite number of points on a potential circle, each of which is equidistant from the center, which, in the comparison, is likened to the active, finite agent. But this finite agent is equally disposed towards the infinite number of potential beings of this particular species. Hence, there is no more cogent reason for its producing one of these beings rather than the whole infinitude. A creature, however, by its very nature is unable simultaneously to produce an

nisi per annihilationem; sed nulla creatura potest annihilare sicut nec creare; igitur, et cetera." See, for example, Scotus, *Report. Par.*, 4, d. 1, q. 1, *Op. omnia*, 23, 543; "Dico quod annihilare non est agere aliquid, sed est non conservare aliquid in esse quod habuit; conservare autem, et non conservare, est proprium Deo, ergo et annihilare."

<sup>57</sup> Apparently Ockham is here using the term *annihilate* in its less strict sense. See *supra*, 33 ff.

<sup>58</sup> *Report.* 4, q. 7, M: "Dico quod creatura potest annihilare licet non creare."

<sup>59</sup> *Ibid.*: "Potest dici quod color unus corrumpitur per agens creatum et annihilatur modo praedicto. . . . licet in corrupendo [Deus] sit tantum causa partialis cum creatura concursens." See also *Report.* 4, q. 7, N: "Tenendo quod creatura potest annihilare, tunc potest illa qualitas corrumpi. . . . per agens naturale."

infinite number of effects. Consequently, it cannot create even one thing.<sup>60</sup>

With annihilation, however, it is different, since the finite agent regards one annihilable thing differently from another. In so far as all of these annihilable objects are *in actu*, one thing can be more approximated to the active agent than another. For the sake of comparison, we might liken these annihilable things to the points on the lines of an existing quadrangle. If we assume that all the points on these lines are actually existing realities, then they are not all equidistant from the center, which, in the example, is comparable to the active agent. Hence, those things which are more closely approximated to the active agent are more likely to be acted upon and destroyed than are those which are farther removed from this sphere of influence. Consequently, Ockham concedes that, while it is impossible for a finite agent to create, it is possible for it to annihilate. It would be unusual, he remarks, if a portion of separated coldness, for example, which exists without a substance, could not be destroyed when brought into the vicinity of a fire.<sup>61</sup> Here, indeed, is a reality, namely, a separated portion of coldness, which, through the activity of a created cause is reduced from *esse* to *non esse*. Such a reduction is sufficient for Ockham's notion of annihil-

<sup>60</sup> *Ibid.*: "Dico quod creatura potest annihilare sed non creare. Cuius ratio est quia quando aliquod agens naturale aequaliter et indifferenter se habet ad multa sive infinita, aequaliter et aequè primo facit omnia vel nullum; sed agens naturale creatum aequaliter et indifferenter se habet ad omnes effectus creabiles sub aliqua specie, puta ad infinita individua sub specie hominis, quia cum omnia creabilia sint purum nihil, non plus appropinquat unum creabile agenti naturali quam aliud, et per consequens omnia talia aequaliter respicit. Igitur si potest creare, non potest assignari aliqua ratio quare plus creabit unum quam infinita; et per consequens, quia creatura non potest simul creare infinita, non potest aliquid creare."

<sup>61</sup> *Ibid.*: "Agens creatum naturale aliter respicit unum annihilabile quam aliud, eo quod quodlibet eorum est in actu et unum potest plus approximari agenti naturali quam aliud; et ideo agens naturale potest plus unum annihilare quam aliud. Ideo concedo quod creatura potest annihilare licet non creare. Unde, mirabile esset si hic esset modicum frigus separatum et approximaretur sibi maximus ignis, quod ignis non posset illud frigus destruere. Si dicis quod creatura in omni actione sua exigit materiam et subiectum concurrens, respondeo, verum est in omni actione productiva, sed non oportet in actione destructiva, cuiusmodi est annihilatio."

ation in the less strict sense. Now, each of the absolute qualities of the host, at least according to Ockham's notion, exists as a separate reality without any subject of inherence. Created agents as partial causes can, therefore, annihilate these qualities since they can destroy the coldness, whiteness, etc. of the host.

*Production of new substance.*—Generation: Ockham does not believe it probable that anything can be generated, either by a created or an increated power, from these sacramental species. The underlying reason for this conclusion is to be found in the proper notion of generation. Only that is said to be generated in the strict sense of that term which is produced by an agent which necessarily needs a subject upon which to operate in the production of a thing. A man, for example, is said to generate an offspring. For this operation, however, man requires the presence of certain material causes. God, on the other hand, does not generate the human soul since He produces it out of nothing, that is, creates it. Hence, we cannot speak of a created agent generating anything, as for example, a substance, from the Eucharistic species, for there is no subject upon which it can operate. These various absolute qualities, it must be remembered, exist without inhering in a substance as their subject.<sup>62</sup>

The impossibility of generating a substance from the Eucharistic species can be further seen in the fact that the thing thus generated would be either matter, or form, or a *compositum* of the two. But actually it cannot be any of these things. It could not be matter, for matter can be produced only by creation, an operation reserved exclusively to God. Nor could it be form, for a form as such cannot naturally be produced without matter. Finally, it could not be a *compositum* of the two, for again matter is involved, and that, to repeat, is creatable only by God.<sup>63</sup>

<sup>62</sup> *Ibid.*, N. "Videtur mihi probabilius dicere quod de illis speciebus proprie loquendo non potest aliquid generari nec virtute creata nec increata, quia illud dicitur generari proprie quod fit ab agente necessario exigente passum; et quia hic non est materia nec aliquod passum, ideo nullum agens creatum potest aliquam substantiam ex illis speciebus generare, nec virtute propria nec virtute Dei, sicut in secundo aliquantulum probatum est." See *Report.* 2, q. 7, D.

<sup>63</sup> *Ibid.*: "Hoc probatur ratione, quia si ex illis posset aliqua substantia generari, aut illa esset materia, aut forma, aut compositum. Non materia,

Creation: The improbability of anything being generated from the Eucharistic species does not, however, exclude the possibility of something being produced from them. Production, being a more general term, embraces the notions both of generation and creation. Ockham does not deny that God, *de potentia sua absoluta*, can make matter without a form, or form without matter, or a *compositum* of the two in which these now separated accidents could be made to inhere.<sup>64</sup> These various productions, however, would be beyond the scope of every created power.<sup>65</sup>

#### Passive changes with regard to separated qualities

The present problem has a twofold aspect: (1) those changes which involve the intensification and diminution of the Eucharistic species; (2) those which pertain to the induction or generation of new qualities with a corresponding destruction of one or more of the present qualities. A diversity of opinions again characterizes this discussion.

*If quantity is a distinct entity.*—If we assume that quantity is a distinct entity from that of substance and quality, Ockham considers two conclusions as valid. First, if these absolute qualities of the host inhere in quantity as in a subject, a created agent can make them to be more or less intense. The whiteness, for example, can be made more dazzling, the coldness more intense, etc. Secondly, a creature can also destroy one of the qualities and generate another. To illustrate: A fire kindled in the vicinity of the species can destroy the coldness of the host and generate warmth in it. Ockham's reason for these conclusions is that there is an active agent, namely, the created cause, and a passive object properly disposed, namely, the qualities which inhere in quantity as in a subject.<sup>66</sup> According to this common opinion, the qualities as they in-

quia ipsa est creabilis a solo Deo. Nec forma, quia ipsa non producitur naturaliter nisi in materia. Nec compositum, quia materia a solo Deo creatur."

<sup>64</sup> *Ibid.*: "Deus de potentia sua absoluta potest facere ibi materiam sine forma et formam sine materia, et totum compositum, et quod accidentia illa informant illud compositum vel materiam sicut placet sibi."

<sup>65</sup> *Supra*, n 63.

<sup>66</sup> *Report.* 4, q. 7, N: "Secundum enim viam quae ponit quantitatem

here in quantity as in a subject enjoy, by divine intervention, the same activity and passivity which they had when they informed the substance of bread.<sup>67</sup> Hence, just as a creature can naturally intensify the color of bread as well as destroy and produce other qualities in that substance, so also in the Eucharist if these same absolute qualities inhere in quantity as in a subject.

*If quantity is not a distinct entity.*—According to the opinion which Ockham prefers, however, quantity is only a connotative term which does not signify any reality other than that of substance and quality. If this notion of quantity is correct, then no new quality can be generated from the Eucharistic species, nor can the existing qualities be intensified except by an increated power. These conclusions follow logically from Ockham's notions of quantity and generation. If quantity is not a separate reality from that of the qualities, then these separated qualities cannot inhere in quantity as in a subject. But if there is no subject for these qualities, then generation is impossible, for generation in its proper sense demands that the active agent have a subject upon which to work in the production of a new thing.<sup>68</sup> Hence, from the Eucharistic species a creature can neither produce a new quality nor a greater amount of the present quality, that is, it cannot intensify the qualities as they exist at the moment of the consecration. God, however, can produce via creation both a new quality and the intensification of the present qualities.<sup>69</sup>

If, however, we admit that a creature can annihilate—which Ockham does<sup>70</sup>—then it is equally possible not only that these

differe realiter a substantia et qualitate, dico quod talia accidentia possunt mutari secundum intensionem et remissionem; et potest una qualitas naturaliter corrumpi et alia generari. Cuius ratio est quia est ibi determinatum activum et passivum et approximatum. Igitur potest esse actio ac si esset ibi substantia."

<sup>67</sup> See, for example, St. Thomas, *Sum theol.*, 3, q 77, aa 3, 4, *Op. omnia*, 4, 358-60

<sup>68</sup> *Supra*, n 62.

<sup>69</sup> *Report.* 4, q. 7, N: "Tenendo aliam viam, quod quantitas non distinguitur realiter a substantia et qualitate, tunc non potest ibi qualitas nova generari, nec potest intendi nisi per virtutem increatam Cuius ratio est quia nihil est receptivum actionis acquisitivae creaturae."

<sup>70</sup> *Supra*, n. 60.

separated qualities be destroyed by created causes, but also that they become diminished as to their intensity. This latter conclusion is logical to the extent that if a creature can destroy the whole amount of a separated quality, for example, color, then he is equally capable of annihilating a smaller amount of this reality, that is, of diminishing the intensity of this color.<sup>71</sup> But if a new quality is induced into the Eucharistic species, this can be effected only by creation, and hence only by God. The situation is parallel to that which postulates the production of a new substance from the species.<sup>72</sup> Since there is no subject from which a created cause can generate any new thing, it is impossible for a creature to produce either a new substance or a new quality.<sup>73</sup>

<sup>71</sup>*Report.* 4, q. 7, N: "Tamen tenendo quod creatura potest annihilare, tunc potest illa qualitas corrumpi et remitti per agens naturale."

<sup>72</sup>*Supra*, nn. 62-4.

<sup>73</sup>*Report.* 4, q. 7, N: "Alia qualitas [potest] induci solum per creationem. Nec videtur hoc magis mirabile de qualitate quam de substantia. Et tamen multi dicunt quod forma substantialis non potest produci sub illis speciebus nisi a solo Deo, et hoc quia ibi non est aliquod subiectum in quod agens creatum possit agere."

## SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

The present work does not pretend to exhaust Ockham's teaching about the Blessed Eucharist. It is hoped, however, that it will serve to give some insight into his doctrine and some basis for judging the relative merit or demerit of the Venerable Inceptor's Eucharistic teaching.

The conclusion of this study is divided into four sections: (1) A summary of Ockham's teaching. (2) A comparative study of Lutterell's accusations and Ockham's own doctrine. (3) An analysis of Ockham's teaching in the light of the Council of Trent's doctrine on the Eucharist. (4) A brief evaluation of Ockham as a theologian.

### SUMMARY OF OCKHAM'S TEACHING

Ockham's conclusions on the Eucharist can be conveniently grouped under three headings: (1) Those statements of fact which are concerned with the present sacramental economy which is effected by the *potentia Dei ordinata*. (2) Those speculative conclusions which Ockham holds to be possible *de potentia Dei absoluta*. (3) Those conclusions which are consequent upon the Venerable Inceptor's theological speculations about truths which are hidden from our eyes by the veil of the Eucharistic mystery. Many of these speculative conclusions follow from Ockham's preferred notion that quantity is not an entity distinct from that of substance or quality but is only a connotative term.

#### *De Potentia Dei Ordinata*

*Christ's real presence.*—The whole and integral Christ, true God and true man, is really contained under the whole host and under each part thereof so as to be immediately present to the place of the host.<sup>1</sup>

*Transubstantiation.*—Christ's real presence on the altar is ef-

<sup>1</sup> *Supra*, 6 ff.

fectured by divine power through the conversion or transubstantiation of the substance of bread into the substance of Christ's body.<sup>2</sup>

*Christ's Eucharistic activity and passivity.*—We have neither sensitive<sup>3</sup> nor direct intellectual<sup>4</sup> cognition of Christ as He exists on the altar.

*The Eucharistic accidents.*—(1) The accidents of bread and wine remain after transubstantiation but do not inhere in any substantial subject.<sup>5</sup>

(2) The separated, absolute accidents can be locally moved as equally immediately as when they inhere in their proper substance.<sup>6</sup>

#### *De Potentia Dei Absoluta*

*Transubstantiation.*—(1) God could, if He so chose, allow the substance of bread to coexist with the body of Christ in the Sacrament of the Altar.<sup>7</sup>

(2) It is likewise possible for Christ's body to succeed to the place of the host while the unchanged substance of bread is withdrawn from the place of the Eucharistic species.<sup>8</sup>

(3) It is also possible for Christ's body to coexist with the matter which formerly was that of the substance of bread but which now is deprived of its substantial form.<sup>9</sup>

(4) It is equally possible for God to effect that the body of Christ coexist with the matter which was formerly that of the substance of bread but which is now the recipient of a new form.<sup>10</sup>

#### *Theological Speculations*

*Transubstantiation.*—(1) In transubstantiation the substance of bread is succeeded by the substance of Christ's body which begins

<sup>2</sup> *Supra*, 31-2.

<sup>3</sup> *Supra*, 102 ff.

<sup>4</sup> *Supra*, 118.

<sup>5</sup> *Supra*, 119 ff.

<sup>6</sup> *Supra*, 131.

<sup>7</sup> *Supra*, 16 ff.

<sup>8</sup> *Supra*, 24 ff.

<sup>9</sup> *Supra*, 26 ff.

<sup>10</sup> *Supra*, 27 ff.

to be present under the accidents of the bread. Ockham's notion of transubstantiation involves the annihilation, in the less strict sense of the term, of the substance of bread, and the succession of the substance of Christ's body to the place of the remaining species. The nexus between the annihilated and succeeding substances is extrinsic. These notions are equally applicable, *mutatis mutandis*, to the transubstantiation of the substance of the wine into the substance of Christ's blood.<sup>11</sup>

(2) That possible mode of effecting Christ's Eucharistic presence which postulates that God, if He so chose, allow the substance of bread to coexist with the body of Christ, contains fewer difficulties, humanly speaking, than the traditional explanation of the Church.<sup>12</sup>

(3) The formal terminus of the transubstantiation of the substance of the bread is the substance of Christ's body; and that of the substance of the wine is the substance of Christ's blood.<sup>18</sup>

(4) There are as many transubstantiations involved in the conversion of the substance of bread and wine into the whole Christ as there are separable termini, as for example, His body, blood, etc.<sup>14</sup>

(5) The body of Christ is locally changed, in the improper sense of the term, when it becomes present on the altar through transubstantiation.<sup>15</sup>

*Mode of Christ's presence.*—(1) Quantity is only a connotative term which signifies either a substance or quality and connotes that this thing, be it substance or quality, has part outside of part, and is circumscriptively present in a place.<sup>16</sup>

(2) Christ's body, precisely as it exists in the Eucharist, is not quantity or a quantum.<sup>17</sup>

(3) Christ is definitively present to the place of the host.<sup>18</sup>

*Christ's Eucharistic activity and passivity.*—(1) It is not only

<sup>11</sup> *Supra*, 30 ff.

<sup>12</sup> *Supra*, 19 ff.

<sup>13</sup> *Supra*, 52 ff.

<sup>14</sup> *Supra*, 55 ff.

<sup>15</sup> *Supra*, 37 ff.

<sup>16</sup> *Supra*, 67 ff.

<sup>17</sup> *Supra*, 74 ff.

<sup>18</sup> *Supra*, 74 ff.

possible<sup>19</sup> but even likely<sup>20</sup> that Christ, precisely as He exists in the Eucharist, has intellectual and sense cognition of objects which are in the vicinity.

(2) It is possible not only for Christ's Eucharistic body to be the object of sense cognition,<sup>21</sup> but also for Him to be perceived by an intuitive, intellectual cognition.<sup>22</sup> *De facto* these privileges are denied to us in the present life since God withholds that concursus which He ordinarily grants to other created activities.<sup>23</sup>

*The Eucharistic accidents.*—(1) In keeping with his preferred notion of quantity, it is Ockham's conviction that the separated, absolute accidents of the host do not inhere in quantity or in any other accidental subject.<sup>24</sup>

(2) If quantity is a distinct entity, then, when the Eucharistic species become rarefied or condensed, the former quantity is destroyed and a new quantity is produced solely by God.<sup>25</sup>

(3) If quantity is not a distinct entity but only a connotative term, then a creature can effect the rarefaction and condensation of the Eucharistic species.<sup>26</sup>

(4) Creatures as partial causes can annihilate the various absolute qualities of the host.<sup>27</sup> The production of a new substance in the place of these destroyed qualities, however, is reserved exclusively to God.<sup>28</sup>

(5) If quantity is a distinct entity, and the absolute qualities of the host inhere in quantity as in a subject, creatures can increase or decrease the intensity of these separated, absolute qualities. Likewise they can destroy one quality and generate another.<sup>29</sup>

(6) If quantity is not a distinct entity, neither can a quality be

<sup>19</sup> *Supra*, 104 ff.

<sup>20</sup> *Supra*, 106.

<sup>21</sup> *Supra*, 95 ff.

<sup>22</sup> *Supra*, 116 ff.

<sup>23</sup> *Supra*, 102; 118.

<sup>24</sup> *Supra*, 122 ff.

<sup>25</sup> *Supra*, 132-3.

<sup>26</sup> *Supra*, 133.

<sup>27</sup> *Supra*, 135 ff.

<sup>28</sup> *Supra*, 137-8 ff.

<sup>29</sup> *Supra*, 138-9 f.

generated from the Eucharistic species, nor can the existing qualities be intensified by a creature. God, however, can both produce new qualities and intensify the presently existing ones.<sup>30</sup> But if it be admitted, as Ockham does, that a creature can annihilate, then a creature can also not only diminish the intensity of these separated qualities but also annihilate them.<sup>31</sup>

#### OCKHAM'S TEACHING VERSUS LUTTERELL'S ACCUSATIONS

At this point a brief comparative study of Ockham's teachings and Lutterell's accusations is in order. It is our purpose to have Ockham's doctrine answer for itself if and in so far as it is able. Of the fifty-six articles and suggested censures drawn up by Lutterell, only the five which have bearing on the Eucharist will be contrasted with Ockham's teaching.

(1) Ockham does teach, as Lutterell states in his twelfth article,<sup>32</sup> that substance is quantity if it has part extended outside of part.<sup>33</sup> Ockham, however, makes this distinction: The term *substance* is an absolute term; the term *quantity* is a connotative term which signifies either a substance or quality, and connotes that this reality has part outside of part. Hence, a substance is not *per se* quantity.<sup>34</sup>

Apparently Lutterell overlooked this distinction when, in his list of errors, he concluded from this twelfth article that "it follows that what is seen with the bodily eye is the body of Christ in the sacrament."<sup>35</sup> Ockham taught to the contrary that the substance of Christ's body, precisely as it exists on the altar, is not a quantum.<sup>36</sup> He does believe, however, that despite Christ's non-quantitative, definitive presence, it would be naturally possible for us to perceive Him if God would grant His ordinary concursus to these actions just as He does to our other human actions.<sup>37</sup> Actually, as

<sup>30</sup> *Supra*, 139.

<sup>31</sup> *Supra*, 139-40.

<sup>32</sup> *Supra*, xxv.

<sup>33</sup> *Supra*, 67 ff.

<sup>34</sup> *Supra*, 71-2.

<sup>35</sup> *Supra*, xxvi.

<sup>36</sup> *Supra*, 74 ff.

<sup>37</sup> *Supra*, 95 ff.

Ockham plainly admits, we have no sensible knowledge of Christ as He exists on the altar.<sup>38</sup>

(2) Lutterell's twenty-first article<sup>39</sup> is an accurate presentation of Ockham's teaching, namely, that fewer *inconvenientia* follow from that hypothetical explanation of Christ's presence which postulates that the substance of bread remain with the substance of Christ's body than from the traditional explanation demanded by the Church, viz., transubstantiation.<sup>40</sup>

By no means, however, does it follow from this statement of Ockham, as Lutterell suggests in his corresponding list of errors, "that what the Church teaches with regard to the Sacrament of the Eucharist is false."<sup>41</sup> A study of Ockham's text clearly shows that he accepted the precise teaching of the Church with regard to transubstantiation.<sup>42</sup> The only point which Ockham was making at this juncture was that *humanly speaking* consubstantiation involved fewer difficulties than transubstantiation. God, however, as the Venerable Inceptor is well aware, is not constrained by our human limitations. Whatever is possible is equally possible to God. For Him there is no hierarchical order of possibilities. *De potentia sua absoluta* He could effect Christ's presence just as readily through consubstantiation as through transubstantiation.

(3) Ockham does teach,<sup>43</sup> as Lutterell states in his twenty-second article, that "rarefaction, rarity, and density express nothing absolute beyond the substance of the thing which is rarefied or condensed."<sup>44</sup> However, this statement of the exchancellor does not convey the whole of Ockham's teaching with regard to the terms, rarefaction, rarity, and density. These terms, according to the Venerable Inceptor, are connotative terms. They signify either substance *or quality* and connote that the thing in question, be it substance or quality, has part extended outside of part in greater or lesser degrees. Hence, it does not follow, as Lutterell suggests

<sup>38</sup> *Supra*, 102 ff.

<sup>39</sup> *Supra*, xxv.

<sup>40</sup> *Supra*, 19 ff.

<sup>41</sup> *Supra*, xxvi.

<sup>42</sup> *Supra*, 21; 31-2.

<sup>43</sup> *Supra*, 133.

<sup>44</sup> *Supra*, xxvi.

in the corresponding list of errors, "that either there is no transubstantiation of the bread, or that what we see with our bodily eye is the body of Christ."<sup>45</sup> Lutterell's mistake apparently lies in the fact that he failed to perceive that Ockham's teaching about quantity, rarefaction, etc. as connotative terms had equal application to absolute qualities as well as to substance; and that absolute qualities as well as substance are quantity by the mere fact that they have part outside of part.<sup>46</sup>

After the consecration the substance of bread, according to Ockham's very definition of transubstantiation, ceases to be in itself.<sup>47</sup> But a substance is quantity by the mere fact that it has part outside of part.<sup>48</sup> Hence, since the substance of bread ceases to be, so also is the quantity of the bread-substance no longer present, transubstantiation having been effected, for the terms *substance* and *quantity* supposit for the same reality.<sup>49</sup> The various qualities of the host, however, continue to exist after the consecration, and as *res quantae*, that is, with part outside of part.<sup>50</sup> It is these quantified qualities which the eye perceives.<sup>51</sup> Therefore, contrary to Lutterell's conclusion, Ockham can and does teach without contradiction that there is transubstantiation, and yet that which the eye sees is not the body of Christ but only the extended qualities of the host.

(4) In his thirty-third article Lutterell mentions as one of Ockham's teachings, "that the body of Christ as it now exists here sacramentally where previously it did not exist is changed locally."<sup>52</sup> The thought expressed by this article, although it lacks the further qualification given by Ockham in his study of this problem, is not entirely foreign to the Venerable Inceptor's teaching on this point.<sup>53</sup>

From the fact that Christ is locally changed when He becomes

<sup>45</sup> *Supra*, xxvi.

<sup>46</sup> *Supra*, 67 ff.

<sup>47</sup> *Supra*, 30.

<sup>48</sup> *Supra*, 72.

<sup>49</sup> *Supra*, 67 ff.

<sup>50</sup> *Supra*, 123 ff.

<sup>51</sup> *Supra*, 103.

<sup>52</sup> *Supra*, xxvi.

<sup>53</sup> *Supra*, 39 ff.

present on the altar, it does not follow, as Lutterell charges in his list of errors, "that in transubstantiation the body of Christ leaves the place in which it formerly was."<sup>54</sup> Ockham distinguishes two senses of the term *local motion*. Lutterell seems to have overlooked the specific sense in which Ockham applies this notion to the change which effects Christ's presence on the altar, namely, that kind of local motion which does not necessitate its subject leaving its former place.<sup>55</sup> Hence, while the Venerable Inceptor believes that Christ in becoming present under the Eucharistic species is locally changed, he insists that Christ likewise retains His former place in heaven.<sup>56</sup>

(5) The thirty-fourth article listed by Lutterell as one of Ockham's tenets states that "the substance of bread in the sacrament is truly annihilated."<sup>57</sup> Our study of Ockham's teaching on this point shows that the literal sense of this statement is in keeping with the Venerable Inceptor's teaching on the nature of transubstantiation as it affects the *terminus a quo*.<sup>58</sup> From Lutterell's unqualified statement of fact, however, it does not follow, as he concludes, "that there is no transubstantiation of the bread, but only annihilation."<sup>59</sup> It must be noted that Ockham distinguishes two senses of the term *annihilation*. In one sense something is said to be annihilated when it is reduced to nothingness and in no way succeeded by anything else. In another sense the term *annihilation* is understood to mean that something becomes nothing, without, however, the notion of succession being excluded. When speaking of transubstantiation, Ockham admits annihilation in this second sense but not in the first.<sup>60</sup>

Lutterell's accusation that there is no transubstantiation but only annihilation of the substance of bread seems to overlook this clear-cut distinction which Ockham makes with regard to the term *annihilation*. True enough, the Venerable Inceptor does teach that there

<sup>54</sup> *Supra*, xxvi.

<sup>55</sup> *Supra*, 39 ff.

<sup>56</sup> *Supra*, 40 ff.

<sup>57</sup> *Supra*, xxvi f.

<sup>58</sup> *Supra*, 33 ff.

<sup>59</sup> *Supra*, xxvi.

<sup>60</sup> *Supra*, 34 ff.

is only an extrinsic nexus between the annihilated substance of bread and the succeeding substance of Christ's body.<sup>61</sup> In no sense, however, as his very definition of transubstantiation indicates,<sup>62</sup> does he teach that the annihilation of the substance of bread is the only operation involved when Christ becomes present on the altar.

### Conclusion

After placing Lutterell's articles and accusations side by side with Ockham's teachings, it is bewildering to attempt an understanding or an explanation either of the ex-chancellor's accusations or of his attitude toward the Venerable Inceptor's Eucharistic teachings. That Lutterell did not have first hand information concerning Ockham's doctrine is hardly believable. Possibly he did not fully understand the mind of Ockham in the explanations which the Venerable Inceptor offered. Or, perhaps, Lutterell may have unwittingly been the victim of his own prejudices and preconceived notions. It is not within the scope of this work to settle that historical question. Only extensive research on Lutterell can hope to suggest a solution in keeping with the facts.

It is interesting to note that while the suspected doctrine of Ockham as drawn up by Lutterell was examined by a commission created by Pope John XXII,<sup>63</sup> the teachings apparently never met with an official papal condemnation.<sup>64</sup> The Avignon process was extended over a period of more than three years. Two acts, based for the most part on the fifty-six articles submitted by Lutterell, were drawn up by the commission.<sup>65</sup> It is impossible to advance at

<sup>61</sup> *Supra*, 45 ff.

<sup>62</sup> *Supra*, 30.

<sup>63</sup> *Supra*, xxi-xxii.

<sup>64</sup> E. Amann, "L'Église et la doctrine d'Occam," *DTC* 11 (1931), 895. See also: Boehner, *The Tractatus de successivis*, 5; R. Guelluy, *Philosophie et théologie chez Guillaume d'Ockham* (Paris: J. Vrin, 1947), 11.

<sup>65</sup> J. Koch has published both acts of this commission with a parallel listing of the articles and suggested censures to be attached to the so called teachings of Ockham. See Koch, "Neue Aktenstücke zu dem gegen Wilhelm Ockham in Avignon geführten Prozess," *Recherches de théologie ancienne et médiévale*, 8 (1936), 81-93; 168-94. The five articles which pertain to Ockham's Eucharistic teaching are numbers 19-23 of the second process as listed by Koch, *art. cit.*, 176-9.

the present time a satisfactory explanation, on the basis of available historical data, as to why Ockham's trial at Avignon did not conclude with either an official condemnation or exoneration of his doctrine. At the conclusion of his study of the Avignon process E. Amann significantly asks if the fact that Ockham's teaching never met with a condemnation does not suggest that the Venerable Inceptor was able to successfully defend the position which he had adopted.<sup>66</sup>

#### OCKHAM AND THE COUNCIL OF TRENT

To determine the orthodoxy of Ockham's teaching is an assignment of no little interest or importance. The Venerable Inceptor is often set up by Catholic and Protestant historians alike as the forerunner of many of the heterodox notions which blossomed forth in the so called Reformation. The present study has failed to uncover, at least with regard to the Eucharist, the seeds of the reformers' heretical teachings in the writings of Ockham.

The teachings of the Council of Trent, perhaps better than any other single set of orthodox, Catholic pronouncements, serve admirably as a touchstone for the testing of Ockham's orthodoxy. Chronologically, of course, this crystallization of the Church's teaching on the Eucharist was not achieved by Trent until some two hundred years after Ockham wrote about the Mystery of the Altar. The action of the Council, moreover, was motivated primarily by the desire to combat the errors rampant at the time; not by the desire to settle the many speculative questions which had engaged the attention of theologians for centuries previous to Trent.<sup>67</sup> Furthermore, the Council had no intention of canonizing any one of the several systems of thought, but aimed to be tolerant of all systems of speculation provided only that these safeguarded divinely revealed truths.<sup>68</sup> When due allowance has been made, the precise statements of the Council can nevertheless be used as measures of orthodoxy for the teachings of the Venerable Inceptor. Two

<sup>66</sup> *Supra*, n. 64.

<sup>67</sup> L. Godefroy, "Eucharistie d'après le concile de Trente," *DTC* 5 (1913), 1352.

<sup>68</sup> *Ibid.*, 1348-9.

fundamental points, in fact, will serve to test the agreement or the disagreement between Ockham's doctrine and that of the Church: (1) real presence, (2) transubstantiation.

### *Real Presence*

#### Council of Trent

The Council specifically defined two things with regard to the real presence. The one pertained to the reality of Christ's presence on the altar; the other to the integrity of His presence.

*Reality of Christ's presence.*—In the first instance, the Council anathematized anyone who denied that Christ is "truly, really, and substantially contained in the Sacrament of the Altar."<sup>69</sup>

*Integrity of Christ's presence.*—Secondly, it definitively pronounced that the entire Christ, body, blood, soul, and divinity is contained under the consecrated species.<sup>70</sup>

*Mode of Christ's presence.*—The Council teaches, without, however, including it in its definition, that this particular presence of Christ on the altar is a sacramental presence.<sup>71</sup> The Council does not explain in detail what is meant by the term *sacramental presence*. It is content to leave us with the notion that this particular kind of presence is supernatural and beyond the grasp of our finite intelligence.<sup>72</sup>

#### Ockham

*Reality of Christ's presence.*—Wherever Ockham deals with the fact of Christ's real presence on the altar, there is no question but that he fully subscribes to this dogmatic fact.<sup>73</sup> The phraseology of the *De corpore Christi*, for example, is not only positive in content but remarkably similar to the first canon of the thirteenth session of the Council of Trent.<sup>74</sup> Both Ockham and Trent insist that Christ is *vere* and *realiter* present on the altar.

<sup>69</sup> *ES*, 883.

<sup>70</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>71</sup> *Ibid.*, 874.

<sup>72</sup> Godefroy, *art. cit.*, 1345.

<sup>73</sup> *Supra*, 6 ff.

<sup>74</sup> *Supra*, 8-9 f See *ES*, 883.

*Integrity of Christ's presence.*—Ockham also states in the spirit of the later definition of Trent <sup>75</sup> that “the whole and integral Christ, perfect God and true man, is truly and really contained under the whole host and under each part thereof.” <sup>76</sup>

*Mode of Christ's presence.*—As noted above, the Council teaches, without further defining the term, that the mode of Christ's presence on the altar is a sacramental one, that is, different from the natural mode of existence common to corporeal substances. To this basic fact Ockham fully agrees. In accord with his right as a speculative theologian, however, he draws a further conclusion with regard to this sacramental presence, namely, that Christ is definitively present on the altar. <sup>77</sup> This conclusion seems to be wholly in keeping with the attitude of the Council with reference to these speculative questions, and with the latitude allowed to the theologian, provided only that he safeguard the dogma of the Church. <sup>78</sup> Ockham's explanation of the specific mode of Christ's presence on the altar seems to provide adequately for the dogmatic fact, and, at least from one aspect, to offer an explanation which is more reasonable and acceptable than that of the so called common opinion. <sup>79</sup>

### *Transubstantiation*

#### Council of Trent

The Council in the second canon of the thirteenth session defined two things: (1) After the consecration nothing of the bread and wine remains, save only the appearance of bread and wine. (2) There is a conversion of the substance of bread and wine into the body and blood of Jesus Christ, a change which the Church has appropriately designated as transubstantiation. <sup>80</sup>

*Notion of conversion.*—Transubstantiation, it should be noted, is described in the canon referred to above, as a “wonderful and singular conversion.” <sup>81</sup> This designation singles out, from the

<sup>75</sup> *ES*, 883

<sup>76</sup> *Supra*, 10.

<sup>77</sup> *Supra*, 74 ff.

<sup>78</sup> Godefroy, *art. cit.*, 1345; 1348-9.

<sup>79</sup> *Supra*, 75-6.

<sup>80</sup> *ES*, 884.

<sup>81</sup> *Ibid.*

many different kinds of change, the conversion which effects Christ's presence on the altar. Furthermore, as L. Godefroy points out, this specific designation obliges us to understand by the term *conversion* only what is essential to the notion as such, namely, the succession of two things one of which takes the place of the other.<sup>82</sup>

*Notion of species.*—Furthermore, the Council insists that this wonderful and singular change allows the appearances, the *species*, to subsist. While the term *species* has a technical meaning in scholastic philosophy, it was not the mind of the fathers of the Council to embroil themselves in the technicalities of any particular system of philosophy or mode of thought.<sup>83</sup> Hence, the term *species* must be taken according to its common connotation, namely, as expressive of all those things which are the object of our sense perceptions. In other words, the term is employed by the Council as it is used and understood in common parlance, for, as M. Lebreton aptly observes, "dogma is not formulated by the scholars in technical language for their own exclusive use; it is written in the common language by Christians for the whole of humanity."<sup>84</sup>

*Formal terminus.*—Finally, the Council teaches that "this was always the belief of the Church . . . that the body indeed exists under the appearance of the bread, and the blood under the appearance of wine in virtue of the words [of consecration]; however, the body itself [exists] under the species of wine, and the blood under the species of bread, and the soul under both in virtue of its natural connexion and concomitance."<sup>85</sup>

### Ockham

Ockham's notion of transubstantiation dovetails very satisfactorily with the defined dogma of Trent. He teaches unequivocally that (1) after the consecration nothing of the substance of bread remains; he insists, in fact, that this substance is annihilated according to a specific sense of that term. (2) This bread-substance

<sup>82</sup> Godefroy, *art. cit.*, 1349.

<sup>83</sup> *Ibid.*, 1348-9.

<sup>84</sup> *Revue pratique d'apologétique*, 4 (1907), 529, as found in Godefroy, *art. cit.*, 1349.

<sup>85</sup> *ES*, 876.

is converted into the substance of Christ's body which succeeds to the place of the Eucharistic species.<sup>86</sup>

*Notion of conversion.*—The fundamental notion of conversion which is incorporated into Trent's definition blends harmoniously with Ockham's concept of transubstantiation which postulates the succession of one substance to the place of another, this latter substance ceasing simply to be. That there is an intrinsic nexus between the substance of bread and that of the substance of Christ's body is not defined by Trent. Hence, Ockham's notion of only an extrinsic bond is not contrary to the mind of the Council. Ockham's teaching about the nature of this change<sup>87</sup> retains what is essential to the notion of conversion, which, as was mentioned previously, Godefroy maintains to be "the succession of two things one of which takes the place of the other."<sup>88</sup>

*Notion of species.*—The Council states definitively that the species of bread and wine continue to exist after the consecration.<sup>89</sup> It is clear from Ockham's definition of transubstantiation that he too holds to this fact.<sup>90</sup> He never questions the objectivity and reality of these appearances.<sup>91</sup>

The fact that Ockham designates the term *quantity* as a connotative term without an objective existence distinct from that of the other absolute qualities of the host does not put him at variance with the definition of Trent. The Council, as was noted above,<sup>92</sup> uses the term *species* according to its common acceptance, and not according to any technical and specifically scholastic sense. Ockham, as well as those who support the common opinion about quantity, would subscribe to the statement that all the appearances, the *species*, of bread and wine remain unchanged by the conversion of these substances into the substances of Christ's body and blood respectively. That alone is required and suffices to verify the

<sup>86</sup> *Supra*, 30 ff.

<sup>87</sup> *Supra*, 37 ff.

<sup>88</sup> *Supra*, n 82.

<sup>89</sup> *ES*, 884.

<sup>90</sup> *Supra*, 30.

<sup>91</sup> *Supra*, 119.

<sup>92</sup> *Supra*, 152.

notion of "*manentibus dumtaxat speciebus*" as set forth by Trent.<sup>93</sup>

*Formal terminus.*—The Council taught, without incorporating it into any *de fide* definition, that specifically the body of Christ exists under the appearances of bread, and His blood under those of the wine, in virtue of the words of consecration; and that whatever else is present under these appearances is so present only because of a natural connection with either the substance of Christ's body or that of His blood, as the case may be.<sup>94</sup>

To insist on agreement—except in the widest possible sense—between the opinion of Ockham and the teaching of Trent on this score seems impossible without doing violence to the thought of the Venerable Inceptor. In one sense it could be said, however, in keeping with the mind of Ockham, that the body of Christ is present on the altar *ex vi verborum* if one were so to understand the phrase as not to exclude His blood, etc. as respective, equal, and proper termini of the operation which converts the substance of bread into Christ's body. Christ's body would thus be the formal terminus of this conversion because it is primarily intended as such by God Who is the efficient cause of this conversion. Ockham, however, requires as many transubstantiations as there are separable termini. Hence, when the words of consecration are pronounced over the bread, there are several transubstantiations involved. The product of the one would be the body of Christ which is present *ex vi verborum* and as the formal terminus of the words of consecration. Each of the other termini which are separable from Christ's body are present not specifically *ex vi verborum* but as the products of separable and coequal transubstantiations. They are, according to Ockham's determination, termini *per accidens* because they are only secondarily intended by God Who is the efficient cause. In that sense they could be said to be present *ex vi concomitantiæ* and by reason of a certain natural connection which they have with Christ's body which is actually present *ex vi verborum* and as the primarily intended product of transubstantiation.<sup>95</sup> Such, however, is not the apparent sense of the phraseology of the Council of Trent.

<sup>93</sup> *ES*, 884.

<sup>94</sup> *ES*, 876.

<sup>95</sup> *Supra*, 52 ff.

### *Conclusion*

In virtue of this brief comparative study of Ockham's teaching with that of Trent, it can be said with a great deal of certitude that the doctrine of the Venerable Inceptor is in accord with the *de fide* pronouncements of Trent. With one exception, namely, that treated immediately above, his speculative teachings also seem to be wholly in keeping with the mind of the Council. If, as is often asserted, his teachings laid the foundation for the heretical and erroneous Eucharistic teachings which burgeoned forth at the time of the Reformation, the fault would seem to lie with those who failed to understand Ockham's doctrine rather than with the author of this doctrine.

### OCKHAM THE THEOLOGIAN

Our study of Ockham's teaching on the Eucharist has convinced us that he is neither the skeptic nor the heretic he is sometimes made out to be. Rather, his is the unusual combination of the logician's logician and the theologian's theologian. He insists upon the rigorous application of the rules of logic not only to metaphysical but also to theological speculations which are consequent upon certain revealed facts. Moreover, he has shown the logical limits of speculative theology, and in this he has prepared the road to our modern, less speculative and more positive theology.

Ockham's interest as a theologian extends not only to the real objective, divinely revealed order of things but also to the possible order. At times he speculates about what God could accomplish in a given set of circumstances, or about what creatures, assuming God's concursus, could effect in the same circumstances. Our author is keenly conscious of the fact that the whole present order, both natural and supernatural, is contingent upon the will of God, which, *de potentia absoluta*, can accomplish everything which does not involve a contradiction. At times Ockham prefers to consider things solely from the viewpoint of this divine omnipotence. His is not always a factual study but at times an examination of the purely possible. Failure to appreciate this fact and to bear it in mind while examining his teaching on the Eucharist can precipitate

the accusation that he is a skeptic who questioned the very dogmas of the Church.

On the basis of this study of Ockham's Eucharistic teaching, we readily subscribe to the words of P. Vignaux: "The universe of this Nominalism is the universe of a theologian whom revelation has introduced to the divine point of view; it does not have of the real any different apprehension than the unbeliever, but believing, it affirms specifically theological predicates of the real; in considering these things as submitted to the *potentia absoluta*, it judges of these things as God sees them."<sup>96</sup>

<sup>96</sup> *Nominalisme au XIV<sup>e</sup> siècle* (Paris: J. Vrin, 1948), 96.



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