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International Relations Since 1919

PART TWO
(1945—Present Day)
DIPLOMATIC HISTORY

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Government expenditure and 35% by drafts of domestic and foreign capital. In 1939, 63% of Britain's foreign receipts had come from exports of coal, iron, steel, chemicals, machinery and textile and by 1945 these exports were reduced to 41% of the pre-war level. At the same time many markets were lost. The loss of income from foreign investments, the greatly increased liabilities, the accumulating sterling balances of the commonwealth countries, the loss of one-sixth of her gold and dollar reserves, the huge military expenses overseas, the expenditure on relief and rehabilitation, the cost of occupying Germany had all combined to create a dead weight on the British economy. The shortage of man power was acute. Industries like coal and textile became distinctly under-manned; dislocation between industries came to hinder production; lower efficiency and reduced output per man hour in certain industries had undermined the economy. Workers who had left the coal and textile industries for the armed services or other war time jobs refused to go back to their places after the war; and greater rise of productivity in the United States and the industrial growth in other countries which had formerly been large buyers of British manufactures deprived Britain of important markets. These changes added to a shift in the balance of forces within the British Commonwealth of Nations, reduced Britain to a third-rate power and rendered her subservient to the United States with which it had to negotiate a loan of $ 3,750,000,000 in 1946 to be repaid in 50 years at 2% interest. Cynics started saying that Britain had become the 49th state of the United States of America.

For the *United States*, the war proved to be a boon in disguise and the end of hostilities found America at the pinnacle of economic power. If from the position of a debtor nation in 1914 she became a creditor nation in 1919 as a result of World War I, by 1945 her financial power pervaded the entire world. Unlike other belligerents, she had not been invaded or bombarded, and her industrial plants had not suffered such destruction as had befallen the industries of Germany, Britain, Russia and Italy, so that her economic machine was not only intact but on a higher level of production than ever before. Commercially, America led all other nations both in domestic and foreign trade; financially, she became the banker of the world—the only source of capital needed for the reconstruction of bombed-out cities and damaged factories, and for the development of the under-developed areas. Her loss of man-power was comparatively much smaller and the number of casualties was only 325,000. Her industrial production had increased by 50% and agricultural output by 36%. In short, as a cheap supplier of capital goods and of investment funds and as a coveted market for world export, the United States by 1945 became the central pillar and the mainstay of world economy. The leader-

ship of the world was, therefore, passing on from Britain to the United States and was symbolised by her monopoly of atomic secrets and shifting of the world organisation from Geneva to New York.

The losses of the defeated powers were staggering. At the conclusion of military operations which had involved practically the entire territory of *Italy*, every aspect of life there was in chaos and convulsion caused by material destruction and disorganisation of the economic and administrative life. National property, both public and private, had been reduced to one-third of its pre-war value and this amounted to a loss of 10,000 billion liras. Her military casualties were 603,647 and her civilian losses amounted to 783,450. The total damage to public works amounted to 1,457,000,000 liras at 1945 prices. About 90% of her mercantile marine had been destroyed and 40% of the railways were wiped out. Due to lack of fertilizers, decreased productivity, damage to water supply, deterioration of river defence works, uncontrolled deforestation and abandoning of sound methods of cultivation, Italy sustained a damage of 550,000,000,000 liras to her agriculture. The loss in industry was estimated at 450 billion liras and the damage to commercial undertakings was estimated at over 8 billions. In 1945, agricultural production stood at 60% of the pre-war output and as a result of the reduction of live-stock, the production of meat, milk, eggs, and edible fats had considerably gone down so that the average amount of calories per capita dropped to 63% of the pre-war level. Due to lack of supplies, the difficulties of receiving raw materials and fuel from abroad, the decline in electric energy, and the deterioration of plants, the industrial production in 1945 was only 40% of the pre-war level. The drastic reduction in production and the total suspension of trade with foreign countries affected the normal revenues. On account of devaluation of currency and administrative disorganisation, the value of assets, in 1945, was only one-tenth of the pre-war level. Prices had risen to 20 to 30 times of their pre-war level and wages had risen about three times. The inflationary movement had not only provoked increases in the prices of goods but also serious fluctuations in the relation between agricultural and industrial prices and between the prices of various products. Black market was rampant and the level of income was seriously affected. Pressure increased upon the employment market as a result of the demobilisation of the armed forces, the return of prisoners of war, the suspension of immigration throughout the war period, and the flight into Italy of a large number of refugees from the former Italian colonies. This situation led to a high level of unemployment, while decreased productivity gave rise to the so-called nominal unemployment. In 1945 the number of unemployed was 2

millions. Added to these economic difficulties was the disorganisation of public offices as a result of the division of the country into two conflicting parts. The political and moral consequences of this division, the uncertainties as to the validity of juridical ruling, the lack of responsible personnel, and the disorganisation of the transport system had thoroughly undermined the efficiency of the entire governmental system. Administrative and commercial relations became difficult. In short, the Italian economy had been reduced to a series of small closed markets with no communicating links, and the Italian people stood disorganised and worn out. Italy had become a vast power vacuum and one of the theatres of conflict between the Soviet Union and the United States.

More terrible were the losses inflicted on *Germany*. According to one observer, Germany in 1945 "is a country of crushed cities, of pomposities trampled on the ground, of frightened people and also glad people, of horrors beyond imagination". Her main cities had been reduced to ashes; more than three and a half million homes were completely gutted rendering seven and a half lakh of people homeless; historic buildings and monuments had been turned into heaps of rubble; large crowds and displaced persons were swarming the roads and clogging the road-crossings. About 4 million German civilians or soldiers were wounded or killed. The total cost of the war to Germany had been about $ 272,000,000,000 in addition to the burdens of reparations, the cost of the armies of occupation and transfer of her assets to the victorious powers. The whole country including its capital had been divided into four zones; her entire political framework had disappeared; power lines, factories and roads were torned and battered; the people were stunned and forlorn and thought of nothing except food and survival; and the released inmates of the concentration camps added the crowning touch to the German wreckage. Her leaders, thoroughly demoralised, stood charged with the crime of waging and conspiring for war.

With regard to *Japan*, even before the end of the war, her leaders had foreseen the economic collapse which was already under way and which assured the coming military disaster. By August 1945, even without direct air attack, the level of Japanese production would have gone down by 50% as a result of the interdiction of overseas imports. The air attacks inflicted a suffering on Japan equal in scale with that on Germany. About 30% of her urban population was rendered homeless and the number of civilian casualties alone was 806,000. Most of her main cities had been bombed; her normal overseas markets and sources of raw materials had been taken away; her merchant marine had been sunk by enemy action; most of her machinery, railway and factories were either destroyed or worn out. Inflation was aggravated by the collapse of foreign trade. The natural excess of births

over deaths, the demobilisation of millions from the army and navy, and the emigration of millions of refugees from Korea, Manchuria and Formosa had combined to swell the ranks of the unemployed. Defeat in war had brought Japan back territorially to its original status—the Kuriles and Southern Sakhalin had been assigned to Russia, Korea was to become independent in due course and was militarily occupied by the Russian and the American troops, Formosa had been reclaimed by China, and the Pacific Islands mandated to Japan under the League were now transferred to the United Nations under the trusteeship system. Thus Japan had been reduced to the four original Islands: Honshu, Shikoku, Kyushu and Hokkaido. The Japanese economy which was largely based before the war on the raw materials of these areas was now thoroughly paralysed. The soil had been impoverished by their inability to obtain adequate commercial fertilisers; forests had been depleted by heavy cutting; the fisheries had been reduced. Those areas to which the Japanese looked for markets and raw materials and which had been geared up with Japan's economic structure were now lost. China, which could have supplied markets and raw materials to the Japanese economy, offered no relief because of the exhaustion caused by the War and the disorder brought about by the civil war. During the war about 30% of Japan's industrial capacity was thoroughly destroyed, with much greater than average shares lost in particular industries, ranging up to 80% in the important fields of shipping and cotton textiles. The physical exhaustion, the fatigue and the prolonged strain of the war years, the emotional disequilibrium brought about by the explosion of the first atom bomb on the Japanese soil, and the total defeat and the humiliation of her leaders tried and punished as war criminals were, in short, the consequences of the second world war for Japan.

It was not merely the major powers which had suffered but the minor States also had their share of suffering. During the six-year period of occupation and war 250,000 Czechs and Slovaks had lost their lives. The material cost of the damage inflicted on Czechoslovakia amounted to $ 11,500,000,000. Poland lost six million persons in military actions and the total cost of war to her was estimated to be $ 50,000,000,000. Austrian economy had been thoroughly dislocated as a result of Austria being made to serve as "the air raid shelter for German industry". Hungary was in shambles and 70% of her industrial plant had been ruined. Denmark suffered a serious depreciation in capital assets and sabotage in industry. During the war her exports and imports declined by more than 65%. From April, 1940 to May, 1945 Norway, as a result of German occupation, had suffered a loss of $ 2,000,000,000. Neutrality could not save Sweden from the losses incidental to the war. In 1940 Germany had imposed a bloc-

kade of Swedish ports and the German prize courts confiscated 50,000 tons of her merchant shipping, while 1,000,000 tons went into the service of the Allies. In the conflict with Russia as many as 27,000 Finns had lost their lives from 1939 to 1940, in addition to the death of 100,000 Finns from 1941 to 1944. From 1940 to 1945 Belgium lost about 100,000 lives and about 25% of her buildings. The five years of occupation of the Netherlands had rendered 10% of their whole area unproductive and 180,000 hectors of land had been submerged and 50,000 hectors were used for air fields. Switzerland had been able to maintain its neutrality and its people "worked for the Nazis six days a week and prayed for the Allies on the seventh". She had to maintain, throughout the war, a permanent mobilisation of more than 500,000 troops, and her public debt in 1945 stood at $ 1,568,000,000. Five years of war had brought devastation, disorganisation and inflation to Rumania. In Yugoslavia at the close of the war only one rail road line was in working order. The lot of Bulgaria was no better. Greece was almost sandwitched between the Italian and the German army and suffered incalculable losses in the process. Albania was exceptionally unfortunate for she was ravaged first by Italy from 1939 to 1943, and then by the Greco-Italian war from 1940 to 1941 and later by the internal conflict which arose when Germany took over the country after the Italian surrender in 1943. In short, the whole world suffered including Asia and Africa. The feverish preparation for war and the more feverish maintenance of the war efforts had engulfed all aspects of national economics. As far as Europe is concerned, the entire fabric of European economy had been seriously dislocated.

The Passing of Europe. In fact a remarkable effect of the second world war was the transition from the old "world dominating Europe" to the new "Problem Europe". In 1945 Europe no longer enjoyed a monopoly of political power and world leadership. Even during the course of World War I the undisputed hold of Europe over Asia and Africa had begun to crumble as a result of the spread of liberalism, the demand for self-determination and political independence, the growth of socialist ideas, the rapid scientific and technological advance, the spread of education, the military helplessness of the imperialist powers like Britain and France which were obliged to appeal to the natives for help, and the gradual modernisation of the economic and social life of "the natives". The United States of America had emerged in 1919 as the leading creditor nation and the financial centre of the world. Japan, an Asian country, had become a major power. Thus the first world war itself had broadened the area of world political decisions, and at its close, world history was no longer European history and world affairs not merely European affairs. During the period between the two

world wars, a precarious equilibrium had been struck and sustained. But the second world war irrevocably upset this balance. The gigantic loss of capital, the loss of earnings from capital investments, the deficits in tourists and shipping trade, a sharp decline in its capacity to pay for imports badly needed, the low level of production caused by inflationary pressures, disequilibrium in currencies, serious internal barriers to trade, alarming fall in intra-European commerce and severe winters in 1945-46, rising population, scarcity of food, shortage of consumer goods and of dollars—all these circumstances had brought about the eclipse of Europe in 1945. Gradually the Grand Alliance began to disintegrate and the prospects of co-operation in the post-war world became dim. An ideological schism divided Europe into two armed camps and replaced the hot war by the cold war. On the other hand there came about an upsurge of nationalist sentiment in Asia and Africa which brought about a complete re-orientation in international relations.

The Rise of Colonial Peoples. If World War I put imperialism on retreat, World War II put it on rout. The entire structure of relationship between the metropolitan powers and the colonies came to be sundered by 1945. The psychological impact of the Japanese successes, Japanese propaganda and the Japanese occupation of the European colonies in Asia proved to the hilt that the European powers were not in a position to defend their colonies. Indeed, some of the metropolitan powers themselves had been militarily occupied, e.g. France, Belgium and Holland. At Pearl Harbour and elsewhere the hitherto invincible nations of the West saw their prestige shattered by an Asian nation. The slogan of Asia for the Asians was fully exploited by Japan and the nationalist movements all over Asia seized upon the theme and were encouraged by the military reverses which the western powers had suffered. The sharp dislocations in the European economy and the tremendous fillip provided by the war to the industrial development of the colonial areas changed the economic relationship between the industrially advanced West and the economically underdeveloped East. The erstwhile debtors emerged out of the war as the creditors and *vice versa.* Huge sterling balances had been accumulated by India, Burma, Ceylon, Egypt, etc. with the Bank of London. The revolt in Asia and Africa (and even in Latin America) has necessitated a new approach by the Western powers to the problems of international relations, and has introduced new forces in the framework of international politics. We can easily have some idea of the disintegration that has taken place in the colonial system and of the changes the world has undergone as a result of World War II if we remember that whereas before 1945 colonies and protectorates accounted for a population of 690 million out

of the world's total of 2,100 million (or 33%), today the population of these territories amounts to 6% of the world's total, or 150 million people out of 2,600 million. In addition, many dependent countries, e.g. China and Egypt, which, though formally independent, were in fact semi-colonies of foreign powers held in economic, financial, political and military bondage, have in the course and as a result of the War, transformed their formal independence into actual political independence. Thus, after 1945, a total of 1,300 million people, or half of the world's population, have freed themselves from colonial and semi-colonial servitude. These peoples, therefore, from the position of passive objectives of imperialist schemes, have now become a powerful factor in international relations. As Chester Bowles has put it: "The days when a western nation could call the tune and the Asian subject peoples would dance to it have ended in the smoke and fire of revolution across a whole continent". This revolt, as we will see later, was not merely against foreign rule but also against internal social and economic evils. Its positive content was Democracy as well as Socialism.

The Polarization of Power. The second world war resulted in a complete upsetting of the old balance of power. In Europe, as we have seen, Germany and Italy, the two principal Fascist powers, had been completely defeated. France was equally broken. Britain was fundamentally weakened in relation to the continent, to the United States, and to the members of the British Commonwealth of Nations. The only power in Europe which, in spite of colossal damages and losses, had emerged out as a great power is the Soviet Union. During the course of the war the Soviet Union had acquired the Eastern Provinces of pre-war Poland, Karelia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina, Petsamo, Tuva, Northern Prussia, Kuriles and Southern Sakhalin and Ruthenia—a total of 262,533 square miles of territory and 22,162,000 of population. In addition, soon after the war friendly regimes came to be established in Poland, Rumania, Hungary, Bulgaria, Albania, Czechoslovakia and Finland, so that on March 5, 1946 Churchill could say at Fulton that "nobody knows what Soviet Russia and its Communist International Organisation intends to do in the immediate future, or what are the limits, if any, to their expansive and proselytizing tendencies.....From Stettin in the Baltic to Trieste in the Adriatic, an Iron Curtain has descended across the Continent". In consequence of the victorious end of the war vast assets accrued to the Soviet Union by way of transfers and reparations. Moreover, the socialised economy of the U.S.S.R., although grievously injured by the fascist onslaught, demonstrated its vitality and productivity. Victory against fascism created self-esteem and self-confidence. The Communist regime

was more firmly entrenched and the Communist leadership was fully vindicated. The forecasts made by the Western statesmen that the Soviet economy and the Soviet political system would not stand a major test, that the Soviet armed forces were thoroughly weak, that there would be large-scale military desertions on the front line, and that the communist system would collapse as a result of internal revolt were all given a lie. In the Far East, Japan had collapsed and was occupied by the victors. China was in the throes of the civil war. The only power which could meet the Soviet Union with much greater confidence was the United States of America.

The world, therefore, came to be divided between two major centres of power—the Soviet Union and the United States. No other power, either alone or in combination, was able to constitute a third force capable of balancing these two colossi. The nature of the world balance of power, therefore, had been radically changed as a result of the war. In Europe, the Soviet Union was predominant and was in the process of dominating the hungry lands of Asia and the Middle East. Within the countries of Eastern Europe she had replaced Germany as the senior economic partner; and with regard to the countries of Western Europe, particularly France and Italy, she was on the point of capturing complete power. The British Commonwealth of Nations was in the process of a fundamental change and reorganisation; and with the eclipse of British imperialism the lesser imperialist powers like France and the Netherlands were also facing heavy odds. In 1945 France or China could be called a great power only by courtesy. Although the United Nations Charter conceded formal equality to China, France and Britain along with the U.S.A. and U.S.S.R., it was quite obvious even in 1945 that the whole world was virtually partitioned between the two camps. Wherever there seemed to be a Communist threat or wherever the British or the French position was menaced, the United States of America at once appeared on the scene. One part of the world, therefore, was looking to the United States for leadership thinly disguised as a partnership; the other part was looking to the Soviet Union for support. From this polarization of power interesting tendencies and trends emerged which affected the course of international relations since 1945.

In 1945 no vestige had been left in Europe of that older balance of power by which intervals of peace had been achieved and a semblance of security produced. The whole Central Europe from the Baltic to the Adriatic had become a power vacuum. In Asia, as we have noted, Japan had disappeared as a dominating power; the European control had significantly weakened; the American power was widely dispersed in the Western Pacific; China was

unable to play the stabilizing role of a major power in the Far East; and the Soviet forces stood in the maritime provinces of Siberia and in Manchuria. It is important to remember that the situations in Europe and in Asia so reacted on each other that it became difficult for either to be satisfactorily stabilised. The economies of the two regions in the course of the 19th century had become linked up in numerous ways but most of these links had been upset by the war. In the Middle East the war only intensified the old social instability and tensions between Arab nationalism and Western interests. At the end of the war there was a general resurgence of Arab nationalism, and the movement expressed itself through the Arab pressure for "the modification of treaty arrangements concerning the stationing of British forces in the Middle East and financial agreements chiefly involving oil royalties". Moreover, the war had introduced new complications such as the American interests in the commercial and strategic importance of the petroleum resources of the Middle East, the development of a localised power competition between the Soviet Union and the Anglo-American powers and between Britain and the United States themselves, and the development of Zionism into an organised movement prepared to gain its ends by force.

In the American hemisphere the war had intensified the inner social and political conflicts based on the economic exploitation of Latin America by the United States and the anti-American sentiment cleverly exploited during the course of the war by the Germans and the Spanish Falangists. Nevertheless, under the stress of the deteriorating world situation President Roosevelt even before the coming of the world war had introduced the Good-Neighbour-Policy which resulted in a close co-operation offered to the United States by most Latin American countries. As a result of a number of Pan-American conferences, interchange of intellectuals and numerous helpful loans, even a hostile country like Mexico became an active ally of the United States. But, as elsewhere, the second world war and the victory of the United Nations awoke throughout Latin America a hope of freedom which provoked, in late 1944, a series of popular revolutions which overthrew, one by one, the dictators of El Salvador, Guatemala, and Brazil. In 1945 this hope meant the victory of President Bustamante in Peru, and the new regime of the Democratic Party in Venezuela. Indeed, the Latin American political pendulum swang so sharply towards democracy in 1945-47 that by the end of the year 1947 only five dictatorships remained in existence.

Same is true of Africa where Christianity, the slogan of self-determination and the two calamitous world wars, destroyed the European imperial system and gave Africa new hopes. If in the

first world war 200,000 African troops had fought, in the second as many as 500,000 had fought. The Atlantic Charter (even though Mr. Churchill had denied that its provisions could be applicable to non-European areas) and the United Nations Charter confirmed the hopes of the colonial peoples everywhere. The war operations for the first time brought the United States of America to the African theatre, and the State Department did not have an African Division till 1943. The second world war, therefore, introduced factors of power politics in Africa by bringing in the Russo-American tensions operating in a background of colonialism, racial persecution, social and economic backwardness, and a seething discontent and a fervent desire for political independence, social progress and economic liberation.

Indeed, the sharpening of the older conflicts between the Soviet Union and the United States of America now became the focus of world politics. The end of the second world war favoured the growth of communism, for the deepening of the nationalist sentiment, the anti-imperialist movement, the national and social awakening throughout the world and the dissolution of the self-contained village economy, and the equation of patriotism with national liberation, economic salvation and progress of democracy – all fitted in the Communist scheme of things. Then, again, the effect of the second world war on the world market, as Stalin put it in the Economic Problem of Socialism in the U.S.S.R., has been most remarkable. "The disintegration of the single, all embracing world market", he wrote, "must be regarded as the most important economic sequel of the second world war and of its economic consequences. It has had the effect of further deepening the general crisis of the world capitalist system". This disintegration is responsible for the deepening crises of colonialism everywhere and the schism between the East and the West in the post-war period.

We have noted that if the first world war had administered a rude shock to what has been called dynastic imperialism, the second world war inflicted a death blow to colonial imperialism. The British were never to recover ground in Singapore or Malaya or Burma, as the Dutch and the French could never hope to be in their old positions in Indonesia and in Indo-China respectively. Indeed, the colonial world was now rising in revolt against the centuries-old feudal relationship and foreign domination in every form. But the protest, it should be emphasised, was, and is not, confined against imperialism; equally important is the determination to end the old and wretched ways of living and to break the vicious circle of poverty, ignorance and disease which are no longer regarded as inevitable but are held as man-made. Thus more than a billion people since the second world war have been caught up in political and social transformation in Asia and Africa where

the dynamic growth of new political and economic policies and institutions will continue under the impulse of the nationalist idea and the demand for economic and social reform.

Socialism. Socialism, therefore, has come to acquire a special appeal particularly in the backward regions. The war resulted in a great emphasis on planning in almost all countries. The prolonged and total character of the struggle, the objective of unconditional surrender, and the destruction of Fascist dictatorial regimes seriously affected the pre-war social and economic approach. The ideals of social welfare and social security, and the anxiety to prevent a repetition of the economic depression led to an emphasis on state control and detailed regulation of everyday life. Thus every thing "conspired to make the national community into a highly socialised community, with its economic activities and its social life more profoundly than ever a concern of national Government". Soon after the end of hostilities the Socialist Party made a rapid progress and captured power in Britain, Australia and many other countries. An important factor behind the expansion of the socialist movement after 1945 has been the desire of the Big Business to fight communism by socialistic methods. In the world-wide struggle against communism, capitalism has discovered in socialism a new powerful ally.

Humanism. Before and during the war, as we will see later, the minorities had been ruthlessly persecuted. In 1945 it was, therefore, realised that a system more thorough-going, more comprehensive and more fundamental than that evolved after World War I, was necessary to tackle the minority problems. The second world war, therefore, resulted in injecting humanism into the old cut-and-dry formulae so far applied to the question. In all the post-war constitutions the human rights have been given a prominent place. The United Nations by adopting the Declaration of Human Rights took a tremendous step forward in the restoration of the freedom and sanctity of human personality.

Federal Movement. The horrors of the war renewed the anxiety of the world to prevent their repetition. If Nationalism received a fillip in the colonial world, it underwent a change in its basic nature, for it was now realised that Nationalism is not enough. In Europe the movement of a European Federation illustrates the new approach. Even in Asia the desire for closer collaboration is unmistakable but there are serious difficulties in the path of federalism in Europe and almost insuperable hurdles in the Middle East and Asia.

Disarmament in a new perspective. Then, again, the development of nuclear bombs presented a new danger to mankind, and put the problem of disarmament in a new perspective. The tremendous stepping up of the proportions

of force available for use as an instrument of the national policy now lent particular urgency to the problem of scaling down national armaments. It is in this light that we can understand the new conception of the systematic trials of war criminals who were charged with crimes against humanity, crimes against peace and crimes of planning and waging aggressive war. Pointing out the urgency of the situation Mr. Justice Jackson said: "We are put under a heavy responsibility to see that our behaviour during this unsettled period will direct the world's thought toward firmer enforcement of the laws of international conduct, so as to make war less attractive to those who have governments and the destinies of peoples in their power".

In short, soon after the end of the second world war the world realised that like any other previous war this one also had created more problems than it solved—the economic problems of rehabilitation, the social problems caused by famine, transfer of population and disease, and the political problems of satisfying the demands of colonies for independence, of drawing up the peace treaties with the defeated powers, of security, and of learning to live together. The hopes of optimists for an immediate better future were cruelly dashed, while the melancholy forecasts of gloom-mongers seemed to come to be correct.

DISSOLUTION OF THE GRAND ALLIANCE

We have seen in Part I that the story of relations between the Soviet Union on the one hand and Britain, France and the United States on the other from 1919 to 1939 were characterized by mutual suspicion and hostility, and that the policy of appeasement which led to the second world war was materially directed against the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union, on its part, had replied the Munich Pact of September, 1938 by concluding a Non-Aggression Pact with Germany in August, 1939. From this date to the fall of June, 1941 the Soviet Union was at peace with Germany, and the Western powers gave vent to their feelings by expelling the Soviet Union from the League of Nations as a sequel to the Soviet invasion on Finland. Even when the Western powers had declared war on Germany in September, 1939 and were face to face with her most formidable fighting machine, they had a burning desire to "switch the war", and destroy the Soviet Union before dealing with Hitler. Mr. Philip Jordan, the famous British Liberal journalist has written that "in the early month of 1940 when I visited Syria at the invitation of General Weygand to inspect and see for myself something of the French war effort in that country, I found that the old gentleman was infinitely more concerned with the hope of an attack by the Allies on Russia than he was with the necessity of beating the Germans". When Germany invaded the Soviet Union sheer military necessity dicta-

ted an understanding between the common enemies of Germany as symbolized by the Anglo-Russian Alliance, the American Lend-Lease, several personal conferences of leaders, the dissolution of the Comintern, and general agreements on problems of strategy and questions of territorial settlement.

Nevertheless, the alliance was loose, superficial and negative. It was loose because no durable and strong links were forged which could have made possible the strengthening of bonds among the Allies. It was superficial because the Russians remembered the bitter memories of "the ceaseless hostility and perfidy of the Western powers" which attempted to strangle the Russian revolution in its cradle, and because the Western powers did not forget the subversive activities of the communist agents before 1939 and the opportunistic Russo-German Non-Aggression Pact of 1939. It was negative because the alliance was not based on common political objectives of establishing a durable peace based on a desire of co-existence. On the other hand it was based on expediency and was determined by the needs of a total war imposed by one who dreamt of conquering the entire world. As it was, throughout the course of the war there could not develop a genuine understanding and a community of outlook between the East and the West. The whole controversy about a second front keenly pressed by Russia from 1942 onward was deeply influenced by Churchill's politico-strategic concept that Britain and the U.S.A. should land in the Balkans and push up into Eastern Europe in order to keep the Russians from coming westwards. The delay in the opening of the second front was, therefore, one of the most important sources of friction between the Soviet Union and the Western powers. In several countries partisan resistance movements had developed after 1943 and in several cases (Yugoslavia apart) the British Government waged almost a war against them. This naturally roused suspicion. With regard to Italy the Anglo-American 'policy after 1943 was to use Mussolini's police and other Fascist elements to frustrate and checkmate the resistance movement and freeze the social status quo. Again, on August 31, 1943 Churchill announced that the kings of Yugoslavia and Greece would be restored to their thrones. When Marshall Tito protested, relief was stopped. The Anglo-Soviet Agreement with regard to Greece in October, 1944 was not worked out satisfactorily and both sides had complaints to make against each other. The British desire to secure a foothold in Greece was motivated by a policy of halting Soviet advance in Eastern Europe. The Soviet objectives of securing a dominant position in the Baltic and in Eastern Europe were in sharp conflict with the Western policy of establishing free and democratic institutions in these areas. Finally, the development of the atom bomb as a closely guarded secret, and its explosion at Hiroshima

and Nagasaki "blew to pieces the rickety structure of friendship between the Western Allies and the Soviet Union, the foundations of which were already being attacked by the termites of reaction and counter-revolution. The Russians were shocked at what they regarded as the cold-blooded treachery of their Allies in withholding knowledge from them of this vastly important war weapon". Churchill has recorded that Truman had obtained Britain's consent in principle to the use of the atom bomb on July 4, 1945. On July 17, when Truman was at Potsdam, news reached him, and through him to Churchill that a successful experiment of the first atom bomb explosion had taken place in the Mexican desert. Both Truman and Churchill agreed that in the light of this new weapon "we should not need the Russians". Even though by that time the war against Germany had come to an end and Japan was on the verge of collapse, Truman ordered on the 24th that the atom bomb should be delivered on the Japanese targets, apparently to shorten the war but really to impress the Soviet Union with the new power that the United States held, and possibly to deprive the Soviet Union of a share in the victory big enough to give her an important influence in the peace settlement. "At Potsdam, as elsewhere", Truman has written in his Memoirs, "the secret of the atomic bomb was kept closely guarded.....Churchill naturally knew about the atomic bomb project from its very beginning, because it had involved the pooling of British and American technical skill. On 24th July, I casually mentioned to Stalin that we have a new weapon of special destructive force. The Russian Premier showed no unusual interest. All he said was that he was glad to hear it and hoped we would make good use of it against the Japanese" (*Year of Decisions*: 1945, pp. 345-47). Churchill concluded: "I was certain, therefore, that at that date Stalin had no special knowledge of the vast process of research upon which the United States and Britain had been engaged for so long, and of the production for which the United States had spent over four hundred million pounds in an heroic gamble". Stalin, therefore, had sufficient reasons to distrust his Western Allies. Soon after the Japanese surrender the difficulties between the Allies increased and the American Ambassador Pauly in Moscow urged the American Government "quick action in the Far East to prevent Russian excesses".

This was the background in which the second world war came to a close. Beneath the agreements that had been registered in the resolutions of war time conferences, there lurked the sharp conflict of objectives. During the war, disagreements were concealed in the phraseology of broad, general, and vague policy statements which were bound to lead to dispute and trouble when the time for implementation came. The pro-

blems that had to be tackled were many and complicated—the question of displaced persons and refugees, the economic and social rehabilitation of Europe and Asia, the trial of war criminals and the problem of denazification, the drafting of peace treaties with the defeated states, the reorganisation of the social and political life of the liberated European countries, the problem of the atom bomb and of its impact on the conduct of international relations, the question of reparations, trade, and colonies, the problem of territorial readjustment, the general question of peace, disarmament and the United Nations, etc. In many countries Governments-in-exile had been instituted along with the underground resistance movements whose leaders were now clamouring for power. Germany and Austria had been divided into a number of occupation zones and these provided fertile sources of conflicts and discords. Considerations of ideology, the differing concepts of democracy, freedom and peace had all combined to add to the complexity of the situation. If the Americans had suddenly to adjust themselves with their position as the greatest power in the world both militarily and economically, the Russians had also to reconcile themselves with their position as a military and economic power second only to that of the United States and with a power potential which could enable her even to excel the United States. In the flush of victory the Russians came to acquire "an exuberant confidence in international dealings that bordered on the defiant and challenging". Nevertheless, the Russians lacked what the Americans and the British seemed to possess—security and machinery.

During the period between the two world wars the Soviet Union had experienced the bitter phases of intervention and had suffered through the Western policy of isolating her diplomatically and of treating her as an international outcast. In 1945 she was determined not to allow the repetition of the story of the second world war, and to do this she was anxious to build up a huge war potential based on heavy industry, to establish friendly regimes in all the neighbouring states, and to prevent the revival of a strong Germany and a powerful Japan. The immediate post-war foreign policy aims of the Soviet Union therefore were (*i*) to prevent the simultaneous development of threats to her from the East and from the West, (*ii*) to prevent the formation of a Western capitalist coalition against her, and (*iii*) to delay the outbreak of another war. In respect of all these aims Molotov was only carrying forward the traditions set by Litvinov, now reinforced by the Hiroshima explosion which was regarded in the Kremlin as a turning point in international relations.

The Grand Alliance broke down from 1945-47 on several issues. The question of peace treaties with the defeated powers,

the growing differences on the problem of Germany, and the Soviet policies in Eastern Europe, created sharp differences. The conflicting attitudes and policies of the East and the West with regard to the problems connected with the United Nations—problems of organization, disarmament, trusteeship, admission of new members etc. and the conflicting policies of the powers concerned with regard to Persia, Turkey and Greece widened the gulf. The general ideological conflict between Communism and Democracy, and the mutual suspicion and distrust that could be observed in all conferences and in all theatres of world politics—in Europe, the Middle East, South East Asia, and the Far East—were symptoms of the cold war that was becoming more and more intense. Even in October, 1942 Churchill in a secret cabinet memorandum had advocated the theory of a United States of Europe without the Soviet Union. On November 25, 1943 General Smuts, a member of the war cabinet, in a famous speech had warned Europe that after the war the U.S.S.R. would bestride the Continent like a new 'colossus' and that the only way to meet it would be to form a Western bloc around Britain. Earlier in February, the British Ambassador to Spain had promised to Franco that after the war, Britain would not 'shirk our responsibilities to European civilization". In May, 1945 Mr. Churchill, on the one hand was sending warm assurances of friendship to Stalin, and on the other was desiring that the Americans should violate their agreements with the U.S.S.R. by occupying more German territory than they were entitled to and was instructing General Montgomery to prepare to rearm and to use Nazi troops against the Russians in case they violated that agreement. In the spring and summer of 1945 the idea of a United Europe was reasserted in a broader form so that on August 10, 1945 the official organ of the French Socialist Party expressed the opinion that a "Western Regional Entente was indispensable", if Europe was to escape the clutches of the Soviet Union. The suggestion was approved a month later by General de Gaulle who proposed that the Ruhr and the Rhineland should be internationalised as a step towards greater European integration. The Soviet Union drew the inevitable conclusions and on September 20, 1945 the *Izvestia* commented that a "Western bloc would undermine the Russian confidence in the West". The machinery set up at San Francisco to establish a better world came to a dead-end. The Control Council instituted to achieve co-operation on the German problem came to a halt. The Council of Foreign Ministers established to prepare a general peace settlement turned out to be a body for the registration of differences amongst the major powers. To work international institutions (quite as much as national institutions) what is important is goodwill and a desire for understanding. Since neither was forthcoming, all hopes for a better world were submerged in the widening belts of conflicts and acrimony.

CHAPTER 2

Peace Making

Immediately after the German armistice, differences began to appear between the Soviet Union and the Western Powers with regard to the substance of the peace treaties and the manner of drafting them. These differences blocked agreement on substantive problems involved in the treaties with Germany and Austria for a full decade after the end of the war and with Japan until 1951. But even with regard to the minor allies of Germany a good deal of bitterness and heat came to be generated and a full campaign of vituperation was launched by both sides. The fundamental bases of peace with all the defeated powers had been broadly defined while the war was still in progress—in the exposition of Four Freedoms, the Atlantic Charter, the resolutions of the conferences at Casablanca, Moscow, Teheran, Yalta and Potsdam. An additional basis could be the United Nations Declaration and the principles of the United Nations Charter which had been formulated and adopted at the San Francisco Conference. Again, in 1943 a European Advisory Commission of the Big Three had been set up in London in order to study the issues pertaining to the peace settlement. Throughout the course of the war several private study groups like the American Council on Foreign Relations and the Royal Institute of International Affairs were also working on the same problems. Early in 1945 the Allies had decided to avoid a full peace conference like the Paris Conference in 1919. At Potsdam, therefore, the Council of Foreign Ministers was instituted to draft the peace treaties with Italy, Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Finland within two years. It was agreed that the Council of Foreign Ministers was to consist of the Big Five and that the treaties with the five defeated states were to be drafted by the nations that had signed the surrender terms. The difficulty, therefore, was that while the Ministers of France and China were members of the Council, their Governments had not signed the surrender documents with any of the five defeated countries.

The London Meeting. The Council of Foreign Ministers held its first session in London on September 11, 1945 and a compromise was quickly reached that all the five foreign ministers might participate in the discussions on the treaties, provided the final decisions were reserved to the Ministers of the States which had signed the armistice terms and that France and China could

not vote on matters which did not directly concern them. Having settled this procedural matter, the Ministers optimistically turned to the task of considering the peace treaties. The first item on the agenda was that of the Italian Treaty. It was quickly discovered that Molotov on the one hand, and Bevin, Bidault and Byrnes on the other had fundamental differences with regard to (*a*) the Italo-Yugoslav boundary, (*b*) reparations to be charged from Italy, (*c*) disposition of the Italian colonies, and (*d*) disposal of the Italian fleet. Whereas the Soviet Union demanded that the entire Julian March along with its ports of Trieste and Fiume should be given to Yugoslavia which was then friendly to Russia, the Western powers insisted that Trieste should be an open port and that the Julian March be partitioned on ethnic lines between Italy and Yugoslavia. A deadlock having been reached it was decided that the question be referred to the Council of Deputy Foreign Ministers to consider the matter further. On the question of colonies the Soviet Union demanded trusteeship over Tripolitania and a military base on the Dodecanese Islands. This was naturally opposed by the Western representatives on the ground that this would push forward the Soviet influence in the Mediterranean and in the Arab world. Bidault, supported by his Western colleagues, proposed that all the Italian colonies should be entrusted to Italy under the Trusteeship system. On this question, again, the Council was deadlocked and it was, therefore, referred to the Council of Deputy Foreign Ministers for further study. On the question of reparations Russia demanded $ 600,000,000 the bulk of which was to go to the U.S.S.R. The Western ministers opposed this demand on the ground that they had lent huge amounts of aid to Italy and that the economic position of Italy would not permit the payment of reparations. On the question of fleet Russia was interested in some of the Italian ships but had to encounter Western opposition. Thus on all issues pertaining to the Italian treaty the London meeting reached a complete impasse. With regard to other matters Molotov demanded of the West recognition of the regimes in Rumania and Bulgaria. The Western reply was that these regimes had to be broadened to include the representatives of other elements before they could be recognised by them. Molotov accused the Western Ministers of conspiring to turn Eastern Europe against the Soviet Union.

By September 21, the Russians had perhaps decided to leave the conference and Molotov wanted an excuse for it. On September 22, he informed the Western Ministers that "he would attend no further meetings unless France and China were excluded from all matters where they were not directly concerned as signatories of the armistice agreement". Same day Byrnes asked Truman "to intervene personally with Stalin to prevent a break-up of the meeting". Since Truman could not be contacted, Byrnes in the

name of Truman sent a message to Stalin requesting "that you communicate with M. Molotov telling him that because of the bad effect it would have on world peace he should not permit the Council to be broken up". The following day Truman sent a second message asking Stalin "to authorise your delegation to adhere to the decision taken on 11th September. After all it is peace we are endeavouring to establish which is more important than procedure". Stalin's reply of September 24 was categorical: "On my part I have to remind you that at the Berlin Conference neither a decision was adopted nor was it agreed among us that the members of the Council who did not sign the terms of surrender could participate in the discussion but could not vote. I consider that the position of Molotov to adhere strictly to the decision of the Berlin Conference cannot make a bad impression and should not offend anybody". Truman on his part "saw no reason for further immediate communication with Stalin on this subject". Nevertheless, the Western Ministers offered to agree to the Soviet demand on the condition that the draft treaties be submitted to a peace conference attended by all countries which had helped defeating the Axis coalition. Molotov replied that his government could not agree to a general peace conference unless the West recognised Rumania and Bulgaria and agreed to set up an Allied Control Council for Japan. The Council ended its session in utter failure. No treaties could be drafted and the only success achieved was the agreement on a few general principles.

East-West conflict sharpens. In the meantime the relations between the East and the West were sharply deteriorating and in the Pacific the problems of Japan and Korea were sapping all goodwill. On October 19, Truman's representative, Edwin Locke, wrote to Truman about "the underground communist agitation in Japan" and conveyed to him General MacArthur's concern about the situation in Korea where "the 38th parallel.....had become a rigid boundary with the Russians to the north permitting none of our people to see what was going on". In Manchuria, it was reported that the Russians "were stripping the factories and shipping the machinery to Russia". The situation in Greece was viewed by the State Department as thoroughly tense and disturbing. In the Middle East the Russians were reported to be increasing their armed strength in Persia. One of the general principles agreed to at the London Meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers in September was that all foreign troops should be withdrawn by March 2, 1946. Early in September Truman received the reports "of Russian action that appeared to be undue interference in Iran's internal affairs". In October, he received reports of "additional Russian troops being sent in". "Together with the threat of a communist coup in Greece",

Truman writes in Memoirs, "this began to look like a giant pincers movement against the oil-rich areas of the Near East and the warm water port of the Mediterranean". In October the Western powers recognised the provisional Government in Austria set up by Renner and Hoxha's Government in Albania and promised to recognise the government in Hungary provided the elections were held free from external pressure. On October 27, the Navy Day, Truman made a foreign policy statement containing 12 points, the sixth of which stated that "we shall refuse to recognise any Government imposed upon any nation by the force of any foreign power". On November 6, Molotov made a strong speech in Moscow declaring the Soviet determination to root out fascism and affirming that "all roads lead to Communism". On November 7, Bevin in a foreign affairs debate in the House of Commons declared that "one cannot help being a little suspicious if a great power wants to come right across, shall I say, the throat of the British Commonwealth, which has done no harm to anybody but has fought this war". Meanwhile, on the question of atomic energy Truman, Mackenzie and Attlee held a conference in Washington on November 11, and issued a joint communique on November 15, urging the establisment of an Atomic Energy Commission within the framework of the United Nations. In a brief memorandum signed by the three statesmen it was agreed "to continue the war-time collaboration" in the field of atomic energy between the United States, the United Kingdom and Canada. The Soviet Union was left out.

The Moscow Meeting. Towards the end of November, 1945 Byrnes suggested to Molotov that the Council of Foreign Ministers might be held in Moscow before the close of the year and that in this meeting the Chinese and the French Ministers be not invited. Molotov agreed. Knowing full well that the French would be offended at the exclusion of their minister from the council's meeting, Byrnes and Bevin hastened to assure Bidault that they would keep him informed and that no decisions inimical to the interests of France would be made. It was decided that the foreign ministers of Britain, the Soviet Union, and America would meet at Moscow on December 16, 1945, in order to discuss the peace treaties with the five defeated powers, the question of recognition of the Governments of Rumania and Bulgaria, and the control of Atomic Energy, the machinery intended to solve the problems of the Far East and the problem of Iran.

The conference met as scheduled. With regard to the question of procedure it was quickly agreed that the first draft of all the treaties would be prepared by the states that had signed the surrender terms; that these drafts would then be considered by a general peace conference attended by all the states that had waged war against the Axis powers and by the five defeated states; and

that the final texts of the treaties would be written by the Council of Foreign Ministers. The conflicting viewpoints of the Soviet Union and of the Western powers were thus resolved. It was also agreed that after the treaties had been signed the Allied occupation forces would be withdrawn from the countries concerned, but that the Soviet troops would remain in Rumania and Hungary to safeguard the Russian line of communications pending a peace treaty with Austria. With regard to the Far East, the three ministers agreed on the establishment of a Far Eastern Commission to sit in Washington and consisting of Soviet Russia, Great Britain, United States of America, China, France, the Netherlands, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, the Philippines and India; an Allied Council for Japan consisting of Russia, Britain, America and China with the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers in the Pacific as its permanent chairman with headquarters in Tokyo; and a joint Russo-American Commission for Korea to study the problem of a unified Korean political authority. With regard to the atomic energy the ministers agreed to call upon the General Assembly of the United Nations to establish an Atomic Energy Control Commission consisting of the members of the Security Council plus Canada.

These decisions, however, created an interesting situation in the Western camp. On the one hand, they created a rift between Byrnes and Truman, and on the other, a sharp conflict between the United States and Britain. "The conference of the Council of Foreign Ministers at Moscow in December, 1945", Truman has written, "produced a situation that made it necessary for me to make it plain to Byrnes that he was not carrying out the foreign policy I had laid down" (Memoirs, Vol. II, pp. 487-494). Truman complained that the Russians had conceded nothing, that there was not a word in the Moscow decision to suggest that the Russians might be willing to change their ways in Iran, that the successes of the Moscow Conference were unreal, and that Byrnes "had taken it upon himself to move the foreign policy of the United States in a direction to which I could not, and would not agree". Obviously, Truman had now decided to break away from the Roosevelt tradition of the American foreign policy. In a long letter which he later wrote to Byrnes on January 5, 1946 after listing the complaints against Russia, he concluded: "I'm tired of babying the Soviets". Byrnes willy-nilly had to fall in line. He was later replaced by Marshall. With regard to Britain, Bevin returned from the Moscow Conference bitterly complaining that the Americans had "let us down" by coming to terms with the Russians and leaving Britain "in the cold" and accusing Byrnes of weakness and appeasement. Obviously, Britain (now led by the Socialists !) resented the continuation of Roosevelt's traditions of conciliating the Soviet Union; and Bevin had decided to carry on

the policies laid by Churchill. In February, 1946 Bevin made the suggestive offer of prolonging the Anglo-Soviet alliance for 50 years. Eventually the negotiations for the revision of the Alliance broke down because Bevin refused to give the assurances to Stalin that Britain would not join the United States against Russia. On December 22, Bevin asserted that his Government "does not tie itself to anybody except and in regard to its obligations under the Charter". The Soviet Union, however, reminded him of the existence of the Anglo-Soviet Treaty and enquired if he was denouncing it. On January 19, 1947 Bevin protested at this "misinterpretation". On March 5, Churchill made his famous Fulton speech using the ominous phrase "the iron curtain".

The Paris Meeting. In January 1946, while the United Nations was coming to birth, the Deputy Foreign Ministers had started working on the treaties to pave the way for the meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers scheduled to be held on April 25 at Paris. The Council met regularly until July 12, except for a short break from May 16 to June 15. In these sessions the drafts of the five peace treaties came to be hammered out after prolonged and stormy debates. The most thorny problem faced by the Ministers was that of the Italo-Yugoslav boundary about which something might be pertinently said here. The crux of the matter was the disposal of the port of Trieste and its hinterland. In the closing days of April 1945 the Yugoslav army had liberated Trieste from the Germans who had taken it over from the Italians after the Italian armistice of September 1943. On May 2, 1945 the Allied forces entered the city and an agreement was reached between the British and Yugoslav generals dividing the entire area around Trieste along the Morgan Line into two zones of Anglo-American and Yugoslav occupation, zones which corresponded to the zones A and B of the Free Territory. Molotov's argument at the Paris Meeting was that the Julian March was an indivisible whole, and both ethnically and economically forms part of Yugoslavia, and that Trieste, if given to Italy, might serve as a base for aggression against the Balkan states. The argument of the Western Ministers was that on the ethnic basis, the whole region should be divided between Italy and Yugoslavia. In order to strike a bargain, Molotov offered to drop his claim to Tripolitania and to permit Italian trusteeship over her former colonies on the condition that the Trieste and the Julian March be awarded to Yugoslavia. The West, however, declined the offer. Bidault suggested the internationalisation of Trieste to which eventually Molotov agreed. On June 29, Bidault proposed a seven-point programme calling for the establishment of Trieste and its hinterland as a free territory for ten years, its Government to be jointly controlled by Russia, Britain, America, France, Italy, Yugoslavia, the Security Council and the inhabi-

tants of the area, and the responsibility for the territorial integrity of the Free Territory to rest with the Security Council. As a result of further discussions it was decided that a large part of the Julian March outside the Free Territory would be awarded to Yugoslavia. A statute for the Free Territory was drafted by the Big Four and was inserted in the Italian draft treaty. Similarly agreement was reached on the question of reparations. On May 11, Byrnes suggested that the Russian reparations claims could be met from the Italian assets in Hungary, Rumania and Bulgaria, and from the Italian fleet. Molotov showed some interest. Ultimately the agreement was reached that a commission should evaluate the Italian assets assigned to the Soviet Union and that if they were found to be less than $ 100,000,000, the deficit would be met from Italian production over a 5-year period commencing two years after the Italian treaty went in force. On the colonial question, again, Molotov's demand of a Soviet trusteeship over Tripolitania and of military bases on the Dodecanese Islands were only met with the American proposal of a collective United Nations Trusteeship over all the Italian colonies and the British demand of uniting Italian Somaliland and Ogaden with the British Somaliland. Eventually, it was decided to award the Dodecanese Islands to Greece and to postpone the question of the Italian African colonies. On the question of the control of the Danube, Molotov made it quite clear that his Government would insist that the river be controlled exclusively by the riparian states.

The Paris Peace Conference. With the decks having thus been cleared, in pursuance of the decision of the Moscow meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers, a Peace Conference attended by 21 nations was called to meet in Paris on July 29, 1946 which continued to sit till October 15. Here also the story of wrangles and recriminations came to be repeated, and a bitter debate at once ensued with regard to the rules of procedure. Herbert Evatt of Australia proposed that all decisions be taken by a simple majority vote and was immediately opposed by Molotov who argued that "if anybody wants to push through decisions against the Soviet Union and is looking for ways of facilitating it, certainly we cannot be his abettors in it". Molotov charged the Western powers with gross violation of the agreements but on August 9, he lost the battle and it was decided that all recommendations passed by a simple majority were to go to the Council of Foreign Ministers. The Conference, then proceeded to consider the draft treaties. On August 13, De Gasperi of Italy put forth the Italian claims in a spirited attack on the draft peace treaty. Same day Molotov in a fighting speech outlined his Government's policy towards Italy, condemned the old annexationist claims of Italy on Istria and the Julian March and charged the

Italian delegate of continuing the old Fascist policies. "To repeat old claims", Molotov said, "to champion imperialist tradition is not to march in step with the new times. The days are gone when Slav lands were spoils to be divided among European powers, when Slav peoples groaned under the yoke of western and eastern conquerors. Today, we know, the Slav nations have found their place in the ranks of the Allied states, and state life in all the Slav countries is being built on progressive democratic principles. Among the Slav and non-Slav states, Yugoslavia holds a glorious place as a heroic fighter in the ranks of the anti-Hitler coalition". On August 15, Byrnes reminded Molotov of the Soviet expansion in Central and South-Eastern Europe and of the Soviet demands for reparation. Speaking same day, and later on August 26, Molotov gave a long list of the damages done to the Soviet Union "by the brigand attack of Germany and her former satellites". In short, in the nine working committees appointed by the Paris Peace Conference to study the problems of the peace treaties, about 300 changes had been recommended to be introduced in the treaties. On October 7, 1946 in a plenary session, 53 were adopted by a two-third vote and 41 by a simple majority. The Big Four Foreign Ministers agreed to finalise the five treaties in another session of the Council to meet in New York during the sessions of the United Nations. The Paris Peace Conference adjourned on October 15. The most interesting sidelight of the Paris Peace Conference was the ideological struggle between the Soviet Union and the West. The Paris correspondent of the *Times* reported on September 13 the debate over the status to be granted to foreign business interests to Rumania. "In opposing the British proposal to grant foreign interests the same advantages as they enjoyed before the war", he reported, "the Russian delegation have been led step by step to an almost open attack on the capitalist system and to the defence of controlled economy. The British in resisting this attack have been themselves arguing the case of liberalism and free competition.....Between them and the Russian group the gap remains unbridged".

On November 4, the Council of Foreign Ministers resumed its work in New York and it became clear at once that Molotov was not interested in the recommendations of the Paris Peace Conference. Eventually, the differences were got over and in December, 1946 the drafting commission finalised the texts of the five treaties which were initialled in Paris on February 10, 1947 by 21 members of the United Nations and the five defeated states.

FIVE PEACE TREATIES

Italy was to pay reparations amounting to $ 360,000,000 payable in kind over a seven-year period. Of this $ 125,000,000 was to

go to Yugoslavia, $ 105,000,000 to Greece, $ 100,000,000 to the U.S.S.R., $ 25,000,000 to Ethiopia, and $ 5,000,000 to Albania. Her army was limited to 250,000 troops and 200 tanks; her navy was restricted to 25,000 men, 2 battle ships, 4 cruisers and 16 motor torpedo boats; her air force was reduced to 25,000 effective personnel, 200 fighter planes and 150 miscellaneous air-crafts. All permanent Italian frontier fortifications along the French and the Yugoslav borders and the coasts of Sicily and Sardinia were to be destroyed. Italy renounced all claims to Libya, Eritrea and Italian Somaliland whose future was to be determined by the Big Four within one year of the coming into force of the treaty. Failing agreement, the final disposition of Italian colonies was to be left to the General Assembly of the United Nations. (Both Ethiopia and Albania had been freed from the Italian control during the war. In December 1949, the General Assembly declared that Libya would become independent by January 1, 1952. Italian Somaliland was placed under Italian trusteeship for ten years at the end of which it was to become independent. Eritrea was to continue under United Nations control until 1954. Thus the Italian Empire vanished).

The territorial losses of Italy, in addition to the colonies, were considerable. The district of Briga-Tenda was ceded to France; the Dodecanese Islands to Greece; a 3,000 square mile long piece of territory in Eastern Venezia Giulia was given to Yugoslavia; the Island of Saseno was ceded to Albania; and Trieste, as we have seen, became a free territory under the United Nations with the provision of a governor to be appointed by the Security Council. A limited autonomy for the German speaking inhabitants of South Tyrol was also recognised. These terms could be modified by agreement between Italy and the other signatories, or between Italy and the Security Council after Italy was admitted to the United Nations.

Rumania re-acquired Transylvania which Hungary had snatched in 1940, but lost Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina which she had already ceded to the Soviet Union. Southern Dobruja was ceded to Bulgaria. She was to pay reparations amounting to $ 300,000,000 to the Soviet Union payable in kind over eight years. She was demilitarized and her army was limited to 120,000 men and its navy to 5,000 (with the tonnage limit of 15,000), and its air force to 8,000 men and 150 aircraft.

Bulgaria was the only defeated country which lost no territory and which, on the other hand gained, for as we first stated, it acquired Southern Dobruja from Rumania. Nevertheless, she had to pay reparations amounting to $ 70,000,000 to Greece and to Yugoslavia payable in eight years. Her army was reduced to 55,000 men, her navy to 3,500 and her air force to 5,200. She was pro-

hibited from having any fortifications on the Greco-Bulgarian frontier.

Hungary had to transfer to Rumania that part of Transylvania which she had taken from her in 1940, and to Czechoslovakia that land which she had obtained from Slovakia under Ribbentrop's Vienna Award of 1938. She had to pay reparations amounting to $ 300,000,000 to the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia payable in kind over eight years. Her army was to be reduced to 65,000 men and her air force to 5,200 with 70 planes.

Finland was required to reaffirm the transfer of those territories which she had made to Russia under the Treaty of Moscow in 1940 and the armistice in 1944—the Karelian Isthmus, the Salla sector, the Province of Petsamo together with a 50-year lease of Porkhala. She had to pay reparations amounting to $ 300,000,000 to the Soviet Union payable in kind over eight years and her army was reduced to 34,400, her navy to 4,500 men and 10,000 tons of ships and her airforce to 3,000 men and 60 planes.

The treaties with all the five states prohibited them from conducting research in atomic energy and guided missiles, possessing guns of a range of more than 30 kilometers and non-contact type of marine mines. All of them undertook to root out Fascism, to restore whatever they plundered from the invaded areas and to allow the victorious powers to confiscate property belonging to them within the borders of the Allied nations. As a result of the peace settlement of 1947 Yugoslavia emerged as the strongest power in the Balkans and the U.S.S.R. as the chief financial beneficiary.

PEACE TREATIES WITH GERMANY AND AUSTRIA

Germany. Whereas, the task of concluding peace treaties with the minor Axis powers was comparatively easier, the problem presented by Germany and Austria was of a far more difficult nature. During all the meetings of the Council of Foreign Ministers from September. 1945 onward this problem had been eluding solution. In the London meeting the French Foreign Minister had proposed a French plan for the Rhineland and the Foreign Secretaries of Britain and the United States had suggested the appointment of a sub-committee to prepare the groundwork of peace treaties with Germany and Austria. Molotov expressed the opinion that before these treaties could be concluded agreements about the Soviet reparation claims and the Soviet participation in the control of the Ruhr must be reached. By the time the Paris session of the Council was held in April, 1946 the situation in Germany had deteriorated and the four powers were bitterly quarrelling with regard to (*a*) the economic unity of Germany, (*b*) reparation deliveries, (*c*) the question of fron-

tier between Germany and Poland, and (*d*) the demilitarization and the denazification of Germany. At the Paris session, Byrnes proposed a 25-year treaty for the disarmament and demilitarization of Germany in order to allay the Soviet fear of revival of Germany. On July 9, Molotov gave his answer and condemned the proposed treaty as thoroughly inadequate, positively harmful and as a deliberate attempt to revive German militarism. "Despite the complete inadequacy of the measures proposed to prevent new aggression by Germany", Molotov told the Council on July 9, "the draft envisages the possibility of terminating the Allied occupation of the German territory. It thus ignores the aims which guided the Allies when they established the occupation of Germany". On July 10, he was more specific and told the Council that "before concluding such a treaty a single German Government must be set up, sufficiently democratic to be able to extirpate all vestiges of Fascism in Germany, and sufficiently responsible to be able to fulfil all its obligations towards the Allies, including more particularly those in respect of reparation deliveries to the Allies". Meanwhile the United States had decided to give up the policy of weakening Germany in spite of the French opposition. The reply of Byrnes to Molotov was sharp and unqualified. He announced that the United States was ready to join with "any other occupying Government or Governments in Germany for he treatment of our respective zones as an economic unit". Same day (July 12) Bevin told Molotov that unless the Soviet Union quickly agreed to a scheme of economic unity of Germany, Britain would accept the American proposal for an economic merger. Negotiations immediately started amongst the Western powers and on July 20, the American military governor invited his colleagues on the German Control Council to join him in working out a unified economic policy for Germany. Britain accepted; Russia refused and condemned the entire scheme as an imperialist device.

In face of the Anglo-American proposal of an economic merger of their zones, the French had raised their demands relating to the inclusion of the Saar and the Ruhr in the French customs territory and Britain and America agreed to support the French demand. On August 20, at the Minden Conference it was decided to merge the Anglo-American zones and to transfer the administrative responsibility to the Germans so that "the Germans win their way back to an honourable place among the free and peace-loving nations of the world". On September 6, the Anglo-American agreement was signed providing for the merger. The efforts which, in the meantime, continued for a general agreement between the East and the West with regard to Germany did not bear any fruits and on December 2, 1946 in a joint declaration Bevin and Byrnes declared that the aims of the merger

were the pooling of all German resources and the sharing of the costs of all imports. On January 1, 1947 the Bi-zonal Agreement providing for a joint Board, a joint Economic Control Group and a German Executive Committee for Economics, became effective.

In January, 1947 the Council of Deputy Foreign Ministers began working on the German and Austrian treaties as a sequel to the agreement of the Council of Foreign Ministers meeting at New York in November-December, 1946. After some debate the Soviet representative agreed that all the states which had fought Germany might be invited to express their views on the German and Austrian treaties to the Deputy Foreign Ministers on the condition that the treaties would be drafted only by the states that had signed the surrender terms. The Council of Deputy Foreign Ministers, however, broke up "after 50 days of wearying squabbles with virtually nothing accomplished. There emerged no German treaty drafts, no increased political unity and no Austrian treaty. There did emerge more bitterness". On March 4, 1947 Britain and France signed the Treaty of Dunkirk providing for joint action in the event of German aggression. On March 10, the fourth meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers was held in Moscow to hear the report of the Council of Deputy Foreign Ministers. We have already referred to the negative results of this meeting. Molotov bitterly attacked the Bizonia, accused his Western colleagues of reviving Nazism and of protecting German war industry. Charges and counter-charges were made. On March 17, the question of reparations came up for discussion.

The disagreement over German reparation goes back to the Yalta Conference where Russia had demanded $ 10 billion out of a total of $ 20 billion. Final decisions were, however, made at the Potsdam Conference where, as we noted earlier, it was agreed that the reparations should be met from foreign investments and surplus capital goods of Germany and that the total amount was to be determined by the German Control Council. In all future negotiations the Russians insisted that at Yalta the Western powers had agreed to accept $ 20 billion as the total amount of German reparations and that it was to be met out of current production. The Western powers always contended that this was incorrect and that $ 20 billion figure had been accepted by Roosevelt only as a basis of discussion. The Western powers, therefore, refused to concede the $ 20 billion demand and the Soviet Union had continued to veto the treatment of Germany as one economic unit until her demand was met. The Soviet Union, on this issue at any rate, was right because the Potsdam Conference had reached its decisions on reparations "in accordance with the Yalta decision and to carry out the Yalta declaration on Germany". The Soviet Union, therefore, was hardly unjustified in condemning the Bizonia decision of Britain and the United States as a gross viola-

tion of the Yalta decision and the Potsdam agreement. The Soviet Union was fully justified in opposing the Western attempt to raise the level of German industry, to modify the reparations programme and to build up the German war potential. It was in this background that the Soviet Union had rejected the American proposal of a 25-year pact in April, 1946 and it is in this light that the Soviet demand made by Molotov on March 17, at the Moscow session of the Council of Foreign Ministers can really be appreciated. He demanded $ 10 billion reparations (50% of the total of $ 20 billions) for U.S.S.R. to be met out by bulk removal of usable and complete industrial equipment of Germany, by annual deliveries of goods from German current production, by German assets abroad, and by various services. He also demanded four-power control of the Ruhr industry, nationalisation of cartels and combines, the establishment of a Central German Administration for industry, finance, transport, and foreign trade, and the cancellation of Bizonia. Bevin and Marshall, in order to break the deadlock offered to allow Russia to realise reparations from current production on the condition that the actual collection be made only after Germany's internal requirements had been met. Molotov, however, insisted on the immediate realisation of reparations and dismissed the argument of German incapacity to pay. He argued that if "Germany directs even a fraction of these former war expenditures to making partial compensation for the damage she caused to the Allied countries, she will not only be able to ensure the rehabilitation of her economy but also fulfil her obligation to the Allies".

In short, the issues which divided the East and the West on the general problem of Germany and on the question of reparations were: (i) The basically different emotional reactions that it roused in the United States and the Soviet Union. As Molotov told the Council of Foreign Ministers on March 31, 1947: "The question of reparation has one meaning for the United States and another for the Soviet Union. The United States...is in a different position. Perhaps there they do not feel what Soviet citizens feel after having lived through the excruciating atrocities, destruction and plunder, perpetrated by the Nazis in the occupied territories". (*ii*) The Soviet Union did not agree with the West that the Potsdam agreement had cancelled the Yalta agreement. (*iii*) The Soviet Union did not agree with the West that Germany could not fulfil all her obligations. On the other hand it was repeatedly argued by Molotov that if the peace industry of Germany was fully developed, there would not be any difficulty for any party. (*iv*) The Soviet Government protested against the merger of the Anglo-American zones because "it actually leads to the severance of Western Germany from the rest of Germany's territory and practically means split-

ting Germany", and because the Ruhr which is situated in the British zone "is falling under the control of two occupying powers—Great Britain and the United States—while France and the Soviet Union continued to be denied a share in control of the Ruhr". The Soviet Union, therefore, insisted on a joint four-power control of the Ruhr where "the foundation of Germany's war potential is located". (*v*) The Soviet Union disagreed with the West on the question of the form of political organisation to be given to Germany. It opposed a federalized Germany as it would lead to chauvinism "which has such a fertile soil in Germany". (*vi*) There were differences with regard to the level of German industry and land reforms and denazification. (*vii*) There were differences with regard to the disposal of the territories of the Saar and the Rhineland. The Soviet Government did not agree to the Western proposal of separating the Ruhr and the Rhineland from Germany. (*viii*) The Soviet objections to the American proposal of a Four-Power Treaty on the disarmament and demilitarization of Germany (proposed in 1946) continued even at the Moscow meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers (March-April, 1947). The Soviet Union regarded the American proposal as inadequate and suggested three basic amendments to it—the Four Power control of the Ruhr, the liquidation of the German cartels and monopolies, and the confiscation of the land of the German Junkers. It rejected the American proposal of the termination of the Allied occupation before the complete demilitarization and democratization of Germany had been achieved. (*ix*) There were serious differences with regard to the German boundaries, particularly the German eastern boundary. At Yalta the Big Three had agreed to the Curzon Line and at Potsdam to the division of East Prussia between Poland and Russia. There could not be any agreement, however, on the extent to which Poland was to be compensated by Germany for the loss of the territory east of the Curzon Line to the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, the United States and Britain had accepted at Potsdam the transfer of the administration over the territory east of the Oder-Neisse Line to Poland, pending the final decision by the Peace Conference. "The three heads of Government agree" thus ran the Yalta Agreement, "that *pending the final determination of Poland's western frontier*, the former German territories east of a line running from the Baltic Sea immediately west of Swinemunde, and thence along the Oder River to the confluence of the Western Neisse River and along the Western Neisse to the Czechoslovak frontier, including that portion of East Prussia not placed under the administration of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in accordance with the understanding reached at this conference and including the area of the former free city of Danzig, shall be under the administration of the Polish State and for such purposes should not be considered as part of the Soviet zone of occupation in Germany".

The dispute that developed between the Soviet Union and the Western powers was that whereas the former regarded the Oder-Neisse Line as laid down at Potsdam to be the final Eastern frontier, the latter have always regarded it as provisional and a subject to be finally decided by a peace conference. The Soviet argument was that it was in pursuance of the Potsdam Agreement that the German Control Council on November 20, 1945 had drawn up a plan for the transfer of Germans from the territories which had passed to Poland and under which by January 1, 1947 more than 5½ million Germans had migrated from Poland. These facts, Molotov argued, conclusively proved that the eastern frontier of Germany as laid down at Potsdam was final (V. M. Molotov, *Problems of Foreign Policy*, pp. 418-424). All these difficulties continued to prevent the completion of a peace treaty with Germany. The rest of the story of peace making with Germany is discussed in another chapter.

Austria. Similar differences had cropped up with regard to Austrian Peace Treaty, even though Austria counted not as an ex-enemy but as a liberated state, where in April 1945 the Russians had set up a provisional Government under the old Socialist Karl Renner, a government which had been subsequently recognised by the Western powers and was supported by the Austrian people. Although the Council of Deputy Foreign Ministers had made considerable headway on the Austrian treaty, considerations of power-politics very soon entered and rendered the task impossible. We have seen that under the Paris Peace Treaties of February, 1947 it had been provided that the Soviet Union would keep her troops in Hungary and Rumania, pending a final settlement with Austria. Any delay in the conclusion of this treaty was, therefore, an excuse for the Soviet Union to continue keeping its troops in those two states. The Russians thought that the conclusion of the Austrian treaty would also weaken their position in Trieste.

But the most bitter dispute that developed was with regard to the economic clauses, more bitter even than the Soviet demand of an important slice of Austrian territory for Yugoslavia. After Germany had occupied Austria, the Germans had taken over a considerable portion of the Austrian economic assets by fraud and coercion. The Austrian owners had been coerced into selling their property at nominal price to the Germans. In January, 1943 and in October the same year it had been agreed among the Big Three that such German seizures of Austrian property would be regarded as null and void. In 1945 at Potsdam it was decided that the German assets in Eastern Austria would be transferred to the Soviet Union while the German assets in the rest of Austria would be transferred to the Western powers. The Soviet Government renounced its claims

to reparations from Austria at the Moscow meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers (March-April, 1947). Whereas the Western powers took the view that such of the Austrian assets as had been forcibly seized by the Germans after 1938 should be restored to Austria, the Soviet stand was that all German property in Austria be used for the meeting of Germany's reparation obligations. "Austrian or non-Austrian property owners in Austria", Molotov stated on April 24, 1947 in the meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers, "who transacted with the Germans after the Anschluss and reaped big advantage from this by transferring their property to Germans, cannot be allowed to lay claim to this property now and have the protection of the United States of America in their claims. This would be rendering direct support to servitors of the Germans and violating the rights of the Soviet Union and other Allies, rights recognised by the Potsdam Conference. If the proposals of the U. S. A. are designed to safeguard the interests of American and British oil companies in Austria whose property had been transferred to Germans without any objection on the part of the United States and Great Britain, then these claims should be addressed to Germany and should not be met at the expense of the Soviet Union and other Allies". The Western standpoint was sharply opposed to this. Their argument was that if the Soviet point of view was accepted "the result would have been to leave the Austrian state a shell from which the Soviet Union would have picked the kernel".

These differences on Germany and Austria persisted at the Paris Conference of Three Foreign Ministers in June-July, 1947 and at the London meeting in November-December, 1947. By that time the situation in Greece and Turkey had badly deteriorated and Secretary Marshall, in his famous Harvard speech on June 5, had outlined the plan which since then has been called after his name. At the Paris meeting the implications of the Marshall Plan and the so-called Democratic Principles of International Co-operation were considered without achieving any useful results, and at the London meeting the questions of the German and Austrian peace treaties in their multifarious aspects were discussed, but no agreement could be reached. The Soviet delegate charged the Western powers of encouraging militarism and reaction in Germany through large economic aid resulting in the German subordination to the Western powers. The rest of the story of the Austrian peace treaty is discussed in another chapter.

PEACE MAKING IN THE FAR EAST

Japan. The Potsdam Proclamation issued on July 26, 1945 jointly by the President of the United States, the President of

China and the Prime Minister of Great Britain and subsequently adhered to by the Russian Government laid down the surrender terms for Japan, and on August 10, the Japanese Government had accepted it as a basis for surrender on the condition that it did not prejudice "the prerogatives of His Majesty as a Sovereign Ruler". On August 11, America replied that the surrender ad to be unconditional and on August 14, the surrender document was signed. Three agencies were established to control the Far East—the Far Eastern Commission at Washington, the Allied Council for Japan, and the S. C. A. P. (Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers) at Tokyo. On August 30, General MacArthur had been appointed as the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers. Disagreement between the Soviet Union and the West began over this control machinery and continued over reparations, disarmament and certain procedural matters. With regard to reparations there was never any agreement on the actual amount to be charged, partly because the Soviet Union had removed vast quantities of war material from Manchuria and refused to credit this to the reparations account. As the civil war in China progressed, the American attitude towards Japan underwent a basic change and the transfer programme and reparations ceased. Partial rearmament of Japan began and Japan gradually appeared to develop into an American pocket with about 800 American military bases on the Japanese soil.

On the question of the peace treaty it may be stated that in 1946 the United States submitted for the consideration of China, the Soviet Union and Britain a draft treaty for the continued disarmament and demilitarization of Japan similar to the draft treaty for Germany. Negotiations, however, fell through. In July, 1947 the American Government issued a statement proposing a conference on August 19, attended by representatives of the 11 member states of the Far Eastern Commission to discuss a peace treaty for Japan. It was further proposed that the conference be composed of experts rather than foreign ministers, that decisions be made by a two-third majority, and that the views of other states which had fought Japan be considered at a later stage. This proposal was coolly received by Britain and the Commonwealth and they suggested that the conference be held at a later date. But on July 22 the Soviet Government sharply condemned the unilateral decision of the United States to convene a peace conference without prior consultations with the Allies, and proposed that the entire question of a peace conference on the Japanese treaty be thoroughly examined by the Council of Foreign Ministers. In the correspondence that followed, the Soviet Government emphasised the point that the Japanese peace treaty should be drafted by the C. F. M. (Council of Foreign Ministers). With this view-point the United States did not agree,

as "it was inappropriate to refer the preparation of a Japanese peace treaty to the C. F. M., since neither at Cairo nor at Yalta nor at Potsdam was that body given any authority in the matter". The Western powers therefore refused to leave the drafting of the Japanese peace treaty within the exclusive province of the C. F. M. where each power could veto a peace settlement with Japan. This stalemate continued until September, 1950 when Truman asked the State Department to prepare concrete proposals for a Japanese peace treaty in consultation with the members of the F. E. C. The situation had now become urgent as a result of developments with regard to Korea where also a complete deadlock from 1945 onward had now culminated in the Korean war. It may be mentioned that the Japanese peace treaty was eventually signed on September 8, 1952 by 48 states plus Japan. Several states including Russia, China and India had refused to sign it. The details of the treaty will be discussed in a later chapter.

The Korean Problem. Until 1895 Korea had had a tributary status for centuries within the Chinese system. In 1895 Japan forced China, after a war, to recognise the full autonomy of Korea. In 1905, after the Russo-Japanese war, Russia had been forced to recognise Japan's paramount interest in Korea and this was closely followed by the establishment of a Japanese protectorate and in 1910 by outright annexation. From 1910 to December, 1941 Japan's status in Korea was not challenged by any power. But at the Cairo Conference in December 1943, the United States, Britain and China in a declaration pledged that "in due course Korea shall become free and independent". This pledge was reaffirmed in the Potsdam agreement of July, 1945 and was accepted by the Soviet Union when it declared war against Japan in August. This was the beginning of "a great-power solution" of the Korean problem in accordance with the principles of the Atlantic Charter and the United Nations. When the Japanese surrendered, the surrender was accepted, under a military understanding, by the Russian forces north of the 38th Parallel and by the American forces south of it. Thus as a sheer military incident Korea came to be partitioned between two parts—the northern part under Russian military occupation and the southern under the military occupation of America. We have already noted that at the Moscow meeting of the C. F. M. (December, 1945) it had been agreed to set up a Soviet-American Joint Commission to supervise the formation of a provisional Government as a first step towards a united, independent and democratic Korea, and to make recommendations concerning a trusteeship for Korea for a period up to five years. On January 16, 1946 the representatives of the Russian and the American Commands met in Seoul and came at loggerheads at once. Whereas the Soviet representatives insisted on

conferring only with the parties in Korea which had fully supported the trusteeship provision of the Moscow decision of December 1945, the American delegates who knew that a large number of Korean people disliked the trusteeship provision and wanted complete independence, opposed the Soviet point of view on the ground that it would prevent large elements of the Korean people from expressing their views on the future of their country. In March the Joint Soviet-American Commission was established but by May 8, it completely stalemated and adjourned *sine die*. The negotiations between the American and the Soviet Commanders in Korea also failed to resolve the deadlock. In April, 1947 Marshall persuaded Molotov to hold another meeting of the Joint Commission, and in May, the Commission met in Seoul, but it failed to achieve any results. In August, Marshall proposed that the Joint Commission be enlarged to include Britain and China but Molotov refused. Early in September, the Western powers proposed a four-power conference to expedite the establishment of a provisional Korean Government, but the Soviet Union rejected this proposal too.

In these circumstances on September 17, the United States referred the Korean problem to the General Assembly. Russia immediately challenged the Assembly's jurisdiction on the ground that the matter related to the peace settlement. On November 14, however, the Assembly by resolution No. 112 (1947) decided to establish a Temporary Commission to observe elections which it recommended to take place throughout Korea by March 31, 1948. The resulting Government was to replace the zonal administrations and the troops were to be withdrawn. The Soviet Union refused to accept this resolution and refused to grant entry to the Temporary Commission in North Korea. Nevertheless, on the advice of the Interim Committee of the General Assembly, the Temporary Commission decided to hold elections in South Korea alone. As a result of these elections held on May 10, 1948 and "found to be as free as could be reasonably expected", the conservative parties under the leadership of Dr. Syngman Rhee came to power. In South Korea, therefore, the Republic of Korea was established with Dr. Syngman Rhee as President and this Government was recognised by the General Assembly on December 12, 1948 as the lawful Government of Korea. By Resolution No. 195 the Assembly recommended the withdrawal of the occupation troops and the replacement of the Temporary Commission with a United Nations Commission on Korea. Rhee's Government was subsequently recognised by a large number of the members of the United Nations. In the meantime the Soviet Union, having ignored the United Nations action and having refused to recognise the validity of what had been done in South Korea, had created a Democratic People's

Republic in North Korea under General Kim whose Government, like that of Rhee, claimed to represent all Korea. Kim's Government was naturally recognised by the Soviet Union and other communist states. The Russian troops were withdrawn at the end of 1948 and the American forces in June, 1949. Thus Korea was divided into two rigid blocs and the conflict between the East and the West had thoroughly seized that unfortunate Peninsula. In the North the highly organised communist regime, fairly popular among the Koreans, was face to face in the south with the reactionary and feudalistic regime of Syngman Rhee. The U. N. Commission which had replaced the Temporary Commission was powerless and ineffective. From 1948 to June, 1950 the General Assembly and the U. N. Commission tried to pacify the fierce conflict in Korea but to no result. The South Korean application for admission to the U.N. was vetoed by the Soviet Union. Recognizing the acute danger inherent in Korean situation the General Assembly on October 12, 1949 authorised the Commission on Korea to observe and report any developments which might lead to or otherwise involve military conflict there. Thus in the Far East both with regard to the Japanese peace treaty and the Korean settlement a complete deadlock had been reached.

In other spheres also the war-time collaboration between the East and the West completely broke down. The French continued their colonial war in Indo-China and the British helped the French imperialists by granting transport facilities and supplying arms. Throughout 1947 the American interest in Indonesia continued and both Britain and America, through the United Nations, attempted to help the Dutch achieve a compromise through mediation based on the Dutch occupation of part of the country as a result of the initial British help. In China the American intervention continued to deepen, while the Russians evacuated Manchuria in such a way as to help the communists fill in the vacuum created by the Japanese withdrawal. While no direct aid was given by the Soviet Union to the Chinese Communists, the Russians certainly left quantities of captured armament behind, which were fully utilised by the Chinese Communists. On the question of peace settlement with Germany, Austria, China and Korea, therefore, the Grand Alliance, within two years of the surrender of Germany and Japan, came to pieces. In the following we will notice that the friction between the East and the West developed more and more as a result of the establishment of the Communist regimes in East Europe and the developments in Persia, Greece and Turkey.

CHAPTER 3

The Soviet Union and Eastern Europe

The weakness of the Russian strategic position during the period between the two world wars taught the Soviet leaders some important lessons. From 1939 onward the Russian policy was not only directed to the strengthening of Russian defence forces but also to securing direct access to the seas, preventing the revival of a strong Germany and a strong Japan and establishing friendly regimes in the neighbouring states. It was in pursuance of this last aim that the Soviet Union invaded Finland in 1939 and occupied the Baltic states in 1940. During the period between 1943 and 1948 the Soviet Union concluded treaties of friendship, co-operation and mutual assistance with Czechoslovakia, Poland, Rumania, Hungary, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia and Finland. The process of the absorption of the East European States had, therefore, begun on the eve of the second world war. The communist-organised partisan movements were already active in Yugoslavia, Albania and Greece, and they were organised in Poland, Rumania, Bulgaria and Hungary as soon as the Soviet troops arrived on the scene in 1944. In the spring of 1942 Molotov tried unsuccessfully to have the British recognition of the Russian territorial gains in Poland, Rumania and in the Baltic states as a condition to the conclusion of the Anglo-Soviet Alliance. Soon after, the Soviet policy turned to the East European Governments-in-exile and to the conclusion of treaties with them. The Western Allies were quite aware of the implications of these tactics and sought to counteract them. Churchill, for instance, developed the concept of a Danubian and a Balkan Federation as a counterpoise.

In this, however, he failed and was, therefore, forced to seek a foothold for direct British influence as an alternative to the European solution of the East European problem. In October, 1944 he concluded an agreement with Stalin conceding the Russian interest in Rumania and Bulgaria in return for the Soviet recognition of a similar British interest in Greece. In Yugoslavia and Hungary also there was to be joint Anglo-Soviet influence. The American approach was cautious in the beginning and when Roosevelt faced Stalin at Yalta, the over-riding consideration for him was the contemporary military situation: the Red army was across the Oder River and within 40 miles of Berlin; Eisenhower was not yet across the Rhine; Japan was in occupation of Manchuria, Korea, the whole coast of China, whole of

South-East Asia and Indonesia. If Secretary Forrestal's diary is to be believed, MacArthur was calling for the intervention of 60 Red army divisions in Manchuria. That explains Roosevelt's anxiety to pay Stalin's price for his intervention in the war against Japan. To this might be added another factor pointedly made by Walter Lippman in his articles on the Yalta Papers in April-May, 1955 in the *New York Times* that "the over-riding fact was that the Western democracies had become grossly dependent for their security upon the power of the Red army. In February, 1945 they had not yet become able to make themselves secure without, much less against, the Red army. This is the key to Yalta".

The truth is that the domination of the Yalta Conference by Stalin was founded upon the weakness of the Western countries and the strength of Russia before Yalta; and "when Roosevelt and Churchill went to Yalta, Stalin already held in the grip of the Red army virtually all the lands that lie now behind the iron curtain. They went to Yalta compelled to deal with what was an accomplished military fact". Stalin had the power to act; Roosevelt had only the power to argue. The result was that in the last phases of the war Eastern Europe was virtually left to the Russians. The decision to weaken the campaign in Italy in order to invade Southern France in 1944 and to grant to the Soviet High Command the complete power in the armistice terms with Rumania, Bulgaria and Hungary contributed to the same results. The circumstance that from 1941 to 1944 the defence of Western Europe was more or less due to the Russian capacity to absorb the German troops on the Eastern front, and the further circumstance that it was the Soviet troops which occupied Eastern Europe in 1944-45, created the tendency to take the Soviet orbit in Eastern Europe for granted. As C. E. Black has put it, "the Soviet orbit was born in the winter of 1944-45, when the standards of the victorious Soviet armies were firmly implanted by their bearers into the soil of Eastern Europe. By May, 1945 the flag of the Kremlin flew from Stettin in the Baltic to the frontiers of Greece and Turkey". For sometime, in 1945, Britain and America made some futile efforts to reduce, limit and control the Soviet influence in Eastern Europe. But by this time the Soviet Union was fully entrenched in positions of power in these areas and the Western States had lost their bargaining power, once the peace treaties with the five defeated powers had been signed. By the end of the year 1947, Communist regimes had been installed in Bulgaria, Albania, Hungary, Poland and Rumania; and early in 1948 Czechoslovakia was "liberated".

The states which fell in the Soviet sphere of influence during and after the second world war fell in three categories: (*a*) the three Baltic states viz., Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania which were

annexed outright in August, 1940; (*b*) the four states which fought against Nazi Germany, viz., Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Albania and Poland; (*c*) the four states which fought on the side of Germany, viz., Finland, Hungary, Rumania and Bulgaria. To these 11 states were added the Soviet zones of occupation in Germany and Austria. In 1948 Yugoslavia broke away from the Soviet Union but other states except Finland were consolidated into "a closely knit political and economic orbit" based on the concept of what came to be called a People's Democracy.

The Concept of People's Democracy. The concept of People's Democracies as evolved in Eastern Europe is in sharp contrast with the kind of Democracy with which the world was hitherto familiar. It does not lay stress on the formal rights and freedoms known to the individual in the West and it does not rest on the basis of multi-party system in which one party rules and the other (or a coalition of others) opposes. On the other hand, it rests on socialist ownership of the means of propaganda and means of production. It distinguishes a "friendly opposition" (which consists in pointing out mistakes but which does not oppose the fundamentals and the basic principles of State organization) from "a hostile opposition" (which consists in basic criticism intended to secure the overthrow of the regime), and while the former may be tolerated, the latter is promptly liquidated. In the earlier stages it looked a happy blend of parliamentary democracy combined with a gradual levelling up in the economic and social spheres, effected through the redistribution of land and a step-by-step nationalization of the key industries. The Governments (consisting of Liberals, Agrarians, Social Democrats, and Communists) were Popular Front Governments, similar to those established in Belgium, France and Italy at the end of the war, with the difference that whereas in the West, the Communists never succeeded in obtaining the Ministries of War and Home Security, in the East they always insisted on filling those posts with their own followers. In fact, prior to 1948 the notion of "national exclusiveness" was fostered and it was widely believed that each country would be allowed to evolve towards socialism in its own particular way, suited to local conditions and requirements. In the autumn of 1948, however, shortly after the rupture with Yugoslavia, the emphasis shifted. At the beginning of 1949, Dimitrov and Bierut described the People's Democracies as transitory stages on the road to socialism, the ultimate goal of which is identical with that of the Soviet Union. Later, Rakosi defined a People's Democracy "as the dictatorship of the proletariat without the Soviet form (i. e. without Soviets)". The establishment of the Cominform had brought the Soviet Union and East European states closer. The example of the Soviet Union was followed because the road

of the People's Democracies differed only in certain formal aspects, not in essentials, from that of the Soviet Union. It was now freely argued that the pattern of development in the People's Democracies could not vary from that of the Soviet Union, that the preservation of differences would constitute "dangerous dogmatism and criminal stupidity leading to the denial and overturn of the very substance of people's democracy and restoration of capitalism", and that "even greater utilization of Soviet experiences and thus even closer approximation to the Soviet example was one of the main laws of development of the People's Democracies".

This doctrine reigned supreme from 1948 to 1953 until Stalin died and it was under this doctrine that "grave errors" were made by the Soviet Union. National individuality was stultified, traditional values were extirpated, and the superiority of the Soviet values and of the "Soviet man" was extolled. Production of consumer goods was sacrificed for the sake of the industrial and military power requirements of the "bloc." As Paul Zinner has put it, the forced pace of industrialization, with emphasis on producer's goods, in conjunction with the other burdens of "socialist transformation" imposed hardships not only on the peoples but also on the local communist parties, whose capacities to cope with the manifold tasks for which they were responsible were heavily overloaded. The Soviet Government itself admitted some of these mistakes after the death of Stalin as we will note later. Witness a remarkable passage in the statement of the Soviet Government on the "Foundations of the Development and Further Strengthening of Friendship and Co-operation Between the Soviet Union and other Socialist States" issued on October 30, 1956: "In the process of building up the new system and the deep-going revolutionary transformation of social relations there were many difficulties, unfulfilled tasks and outright mistakes, including those in the mutual relations between the socialist countries, violation and mistakes which belittled the principle of equal rights in the relations between the socialist states".

After the death of Stalin, therefore, the Soviet relations with the East European States were given a new direction and the concept of People's Democracy had to be modified here and there. To this we will turn in a later chapter.

GROWTH OF THE SOVIET ORBIT

The development of the structure of the Soviet bloc proceeded along a set pattern and through different phases. So far as the pattern is concerned, in some cases direct political action was used, in some indirect, and in others economic action. In East Germany political action was direct and practically the entire

political life there has been determined by the policies of the Soviet Union. In Poland since 1944 when the Lublin Committee was organised direct action device was used. Similarly in Rumania pressure was exerted on the king to appoint the communist leader, Groza, as the Prime Minister (February, 1945). But in Bulgaria, Hungary and Czechoslovakia indirect political action was used, although in the last case the presence of Zorin, the Soviet Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, in Prague in February, 1948 seems to be connected with the coup of Gottwald. In the case of Rumania, Hungary and East Germany economic pressure has been an important weapon.

Then, again, the Soviet pattern of capturing influence in these states has been to control the Ministries of Interior, Justice, and Industries, and other social and economic organisations. In some cases land reform has been an important instrument of power. In Hungary, for instance, the supervision of the land reform, an extremely popular demand, was entrusted to a Communist. In some cases local units were captured and local government was reorganised on the Soviet lines. In others, the national sentiments of one people against the other were successfully exploited. As Seton-Watson has put it, "the natural hatred of Poles and Czechs for their German oppressors was deliberately magnified by the communists in order to widen the gulf between the Germans and their Eastern neighbours, to make Poles and Czechs feel that their only defence against German revenge was Russia, and so to place them at the mercy of Soviet foreign policy" (*From Lenin to Malenkov*, pp. 248-270). But in every case the dominant influence of the local communist party has invariably been used. The Pan-Slav sentiment which was revived during the second world war was fully utilised. In August, 1941 the Soviet Government called an All-Slav Congress at Moscow where expression was given to "our one, burning desire that the Slavic nations together with all other nations, should live their lives freely and in peace within the boundaries of their countries". The same sentiment was many times expressed by Molotov. (See, for instance, Molotov's speech of August 13, 1946 at the Paris Peace Conference. Problems of Foreign Policy, pp. 13-14). To this Pan-Slav sentiment was added a tremendous admiration for the Soviet war effort. In Yugoslavia, for instance, "the communist party's growing prestige as the war progressed provided the Soviet Union with a great measure of reflected glory as a communist state". On December 8, 1946 another Slav Congress was held in Belgrade where the value of Slavic cultural co-operation was stressed and an organisation for the purpose was set up.

Main stages. So far as the evolution of the Soviet orbit is concerned, at least five stages can be easily discerned. In the *first stage*, the Red army liberated the East European states from

the Nazi persecutors, and, in this, they were actively helped by the local elements which hailed them as revolutionary liberators. With the advent of the Soviet troops the underground communist element rallied round them and joined hands with the expelled nationalists and communists (who had been expelled by the previous regimes in these states). Thus Gomulka returned to Poland, Dimitrov to Bulgaria, Rajk and Rakosi to Hungary, Ana Pauker to Rumania, and Gottwald to Czechoslovakia, and in every case these communist leaders were put in power. Only in Yugoslavia and Albania the communist regimes had been established by the local communist leaders, Tito and Enver Hoxha, before the arrival of the Red Army. In the *second stage* instead of setting up purely communist government, the Russians established coalitions of the parties of left and centre under different names—People's Democratic Front in Rumania, Fatherland Front in Hungary, Independent People's Front in Bulgaria, and National Front in Czechoslovakia. In all cases these included the communists, the socialists, the liberals, and the peasants. The purpose of these coalitions was to expose and discredit the so-called socialist parties and to break up the peasant parties. The former were reactionaries; the latter were tradition-ridden and both had to go. In the *third stage* a genuine coalition was replaced by a bogus one—several parties still nominally sharing power which was really controlled by the communists, as for instance, in the case of Poland and East Germany. In the *fourth stage* the non-communist element was purged and a solidly communist Government was installed. This stage was suddenly reached in Czechoslovakia in February 1948 which we will shortly discuss. In Poland, Gomulka was removed in 1949 and in Rumania, Ana Pauker in 1952. In Hungary, Rajk was executed in 1949 and in Czechoslovakia Slensky and Clementes were done to death in 1952 leaving Gottwald almost a figure-head. In the *fifth stage* direct Russian influence was increased by putting Russians in positions of power. For instance, in Poland a Russian Red army general, Rokossovsky, was appointed Minister of Defence. In other cases policy decisions ware made at Moscow and they were carried out by the governments of the Communist states. For instance, as a result of the Soviet pressure the governments of Finland, Poland and Czechoslovakia had to keep away from attending the conference on the Marshall Plan in July, 1947. Landed aristocracy was liquidated and the Catholic Church extirpated. In Hungary, for instance, as early as 1945 Land Acts were passed under which the land monopoly of a few land owners was completely broken. In December, 1948 Cardinal Mindszenty was prosecuted on the charge of opposing the land reform. In 1945 the Church of Rumania was brought under the control of the Russian Church and by 1949 the communists had started a drive for the collectivization of the peasant's land.

After the death of Stalin in 1953 a new stage developed on which we will comment later.

Chronologically these stages did not follow in a sequence. In 1945 the Soviet Union was in full control of Rumania, Hungary and Bulgaria, under the surrender terms. The control was consolidated within the next two years, on the basis of according a sovereign and independent status. In September, 1947 the Communist Information Bureau (Cominform) was organised with the communist parties of the U.S.S.R., Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Rumania, Yugoslavia, France and Italy. Its aims were to combat the increased American economic and political influence in the world, and primarily to prevent the rehabilitation of Western Europe under American domination; to defend the People's Democracies in the East and in South-East Europe; and to combat right-wing socialism in Western Europe. The creation of the Cominform represented the high-water-mark of the consolidation process of the Soviet bloc and was an answer to the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan. It played a positive role "in developing and strengthening fraternal ties and mutual exchanges of experience among Communist and Workers Parties and in clarifying problems of Marxist-Leninist theory as applied to the concrete conditions in various countries and the experience of international communist and working class movement". This promoted the ideological, organizational and political strengthening of the fraternal parties and an extension of the influence of communist parties among the masses. The Information Bureau started a newspaper, *For a Lasting Peace, For a People's Democracy* and conducted its activities by holding frequent meetings in which the Communist parties of the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Hungary, Italy, Poland, Rumania, Czechoslovakia and France participated.

In short, the development of the Soviet bloc from 1945 to 1953 followed an even course, with the exceptions of Greece and Yugoslavia. The Soviet troops, the local communist party cells, and the Russian advisers were the instruments of the Soviet control. Starting from the coalition cabinets in which they secured key positions for themselves, the communists gradually reduced and eliminated all opposition and made full use of the popular sympathy that existed for them. The safe and docile parliaments then successfully adopted new constitutions based on the Soviet pattern and providing for one party states. A full struggle against religion was launched everywhere and State control was gradually extended to cover fields of national culture, education, literature, art and science. Special attention was paid to the reconstruction of the economic system and its adaptation to the Soviet economy. The economic policies of the East European states developed on the lines of nationalisation

of industries, a radical agricultural reform as the first step towards collectivization, economic plans for several years, and stress on heavy industry.

Yugoslavia. In the early phase of the post-war period Russia had two major setbacks in Eastern Europe: (*i*) the inability to take over Greece in 1946-49; and (*ii*) the Yugoslavian protest and rebellion against the Russian domination in 1948. Greece, since then became a recipient of American aid and has become firmly established as a member of the Western coalition. Yugoslavia was expelled from the Cominform, was denied membership of the Comecon and was led to sever diplomatic relations with other Communist states. It was on June 28, 1948 that the astonishing news was released that the Yugoslav Communist Party had been expelled from the Cominform for misbehaviour for pursuing an "incorrect line on the main question of home and foreign policy" which constituted a departure from Marxism-Leninism, and for following an unfriendly policy towards the Soviet Union. It was alleged that the Soviet military experts in Yugoslavia had been defamed, that the Soviet civilian experts had been shadowed by the Yugoslav Security Police, and that the Soviet Union was discredited. It was declared that the Yugoslav policy towards the peasants disregarded class differences and thus failed to aggravate the class struggle without which Socialism could not be achieved. Finally, it was stated that the Yugoslav Communist Party was being led by a bureaucratic regime created, not elected, inside the party, and that the party as a whole had a secret and semi-legal status. It was declared that the Yugoslav leaders, having refused to attend the meeting of the Cominform to discuss their "errors" were guilty of misbehaviour, had seceded from the United Socialist Front against imperialism, and had ceased to deserve any support or sympathy from genuine Marxists at home or abroad. The Yugoslav reply came on June 29, and it refuted all the allegations "with deep indignation". In the following months a virtual cold war developed between Stalin and Tito. By the time Stalin died (March, 1953) hostility between the Cominform bloc and Yugoslavia had reached a high pitch and frequent border skirmishes (increasing in intensity as well as in their rate of incidence throughout 1952) and vitriolic propaganda exchanges marked a relentless war of nerves on the part of the Cominform, to which Yugoslavia responded in kind.

The defection of Yugoslavia evoked immediate and interesting reactions in the West. It was hailed as the beginning of a widespread revolt in East Europe against the "Soviet Imperialism", and the United States at once proceeded to help Tito's Communist regime. In July, 1948 they released Yugoslav assets amounting to $ 60 million which had been frozen since the end of the war and which included $ 43 million worth of gold. Yugosla-

via, in return, agreed to settle American claims by payment of $ 17 million. Similarly, compensation claims were settled with other Western states and trade agreements were signed with them. Yugoslavia repudiated the concept of the "leading role of the Soviet Union for fraternal role of the Soviet Union" and called for fraternal solidarity between independent equals. Contacts with the non-communist world were established and a number of internal reforms which aimed at winning more popular support for the regime while preserving the principles of one party-control, nationalisation of the industry, and economic planning were introduced. In theory the Yugoslav communists were led to assert that the Soviet Union's "unsocialist urge to dominate alien peoples must be due to reactionary developments and features in Soviet society itself (particularly the growth of a named privileged bureaucratic caste) and that, therefore, the Soviet system could not be a model for Yugoslavia's socialist development. After the death of Stalin early in 1953 Soviet relations with Yugoslavia improved as we will notice in a later chapter.

Hungary. In the the second world war the German forces had occupied Hungary on March 19, 1944 and four days later a pro-German government had been installed in office. In Dec. 1944, the Soviet Union had appointed a provisional government in Debrecen with effective authority over that part of the country occupied by the Red Army. By April 4, 1945 Russian troops had cleared the country of all the German forces. On January 20, 1945 the Debrecen Government of General Miklos (Premier) and Imre Nagy (Minister of Agriculture) had signed at Moscow an armistice with the United Nations under which the Vienna Awards of November 2, 1938 and August 30, 1940 were declared null and void and the frontiers of January 1, 1938 were restored. This decision was confirmed by the Hungarian Peace Treaty of February 10, 1947 under which an area of 61 sq. km. on the right bank of the Danube was ceded to Czechoslovakia. The Peace Treaty went in force on September 15, 1947 and simultaneously the Allied Control Commission also ceased to function. Meanwhile, since the country was occupied by the Soviet army, the communist members of the Miklos cabinet started capturing positions of power. But in the elections of November 1945 the Small Holder's Party came out victorious. In January 1946 Monarchy was abolished and on February 1, the National Assembly proclaimed the Hungarian Republic. The communist leader, Rakosi, demanded the Ministry of Internal Affairs for a Communist and the "government was pressured into accepting his demand". From this position it was extremely easy for them to organise a secret political police according to the Soviet pattern. Several opposition leaders were arrested in February, 1947. On August 31, the second general elections were held and these resulted in a

communist majority. Nevertheless, the opposition was still quite effective. But by March 1948, the Socialist Democratic leadership had been liquidated. In 1947 a 3-year plan was devised for the Hungarian national economy. Nationalisation of industry, the first steps in the collectivization of agriculture, state control of schools and the violent attack on religion—all these measures laid the foundations for a monopoly of communist rule in Hungary. Those who owned more than 15 yokes of land were declared to be kulaks and became subject to additional taxation and were excluded from all benefits of State support and credits, State contracts and the use of State-owned implements. On the other hand, their share in compulsory deliveries was increased. The free sale of land was stopped which enabled the State to use for its own purposes the land which the harassed peasants were compelled to sell. The "fight against capitalism on the land" continued till 1953.

Similarly, relentless battle was waged against the Church. All Church schools were nationalised in 1948. In 1949 compulsory religious instruction was abolished. The trial of Cardinal Mindszenty was the high water-mark of the crusade against the Church. The belief underlying this crusade seems to have been that there exists a long-term alliance between the Holy See and the State Department and that, therefore, "everybody who owed allegiance to Rome must, in the eyes of Moscow, be an active or potential agent of the Imperialist Powers". Further, it was also believed that by weakening the church its influence on peasants—an influence which might jeopardise the success of the campaign prescribed by Lenin -might also be weakened. Eventually, in the elections of May 1949, 97% votes were cast for the communist list. On August 18, 1949 a new constitution of a "republic of workers and working peasants" was adopted modelled on the Stalin Constitution, and based on the unity of legislative and administrative power which is also in control of the judiciary, and the complete subordination of the individual to the worker and the worker to the state. On September 19, 1949 Britain and America protested that the Hungarian Government had denied fundamental rights to its nationals and violated the Peace Treaty. In December 1951, however, the Hungarian Government published a White Paper accusing the United States of having perpetrated, since 1947, 157 acts inimical to Hungary.

Rumania. In 1945 Rumania was a monarchy with King Michael still on the throne when the retreating Germans were followed into the country by the Red Army. The monarchy and the presence in Budapest of the Allied Control Commission were the two obstacles which the Rumanian communists had to overcome with the assistance of the U. S. S. R. before they could succeed in imposing their government on unwilling people. The armistice had been signed in Moscow on September 12, 1944.

On October 5, the cabinet of General Sanatescu (Prime Minister) took the decision to purge all those who had been responsible for the pro-Fascist policy of the war period, and soon after, all the left parties led by the communists established the National Democratic Front (F. N. D.). On November 5, Sanatescu formed his second government in which the F. N. D. increased its representation. In December, however, the communists brought in General Radescu (who had valiantly fought the Germans) who soon became a *persona non grata* with the Russians. On January 16, 1945 the communist party took the decision of overthrowing Radescu's government and installing a purely F. N. D. government. Radescu's decision to organise free parliamentary elections incurred the wrath of the Soviet Union. On February 24, mass demonstrations were organised against the government by the communists. On February 27, Vyshinsky, the Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister, unexpectedly arrived in Bucharest while the Soviet High Command occupied the headquarters of the Rumanian General Staff and disarmed the Rumanian troops in the capital. Vyshinsky demanded that King Michael dismiss Premier Radescu and appoint a F. N. D. government. On February 28, Radescu resigned and when the King tried to appoint Prince Stirbey as Premier, Vyshinsky lost his temper and "as he left the room where the King received him, he banged the door so forcibly that he cracked the plaster round it". On March 6, the King appointed a pro-communist, Dr. P. Groza, as Premier who formed a predominantly F. N. D. government. The tension between Russia and the West heightened. Rumania went closer to Russia, and Stalin, on March 9, agreed to the reincorporation of northern Transylvania into Rumania. Groza introduced land reforms and expropriated all land in excess of 50 hectors belonging to private individuals. On August 4, the diplomatic relations with Russia were established but on August 20, Bevin refused to recognise "this puppet government". Michael asked Groza to resign and make room for a more representative government but had to leave the capital, after refusing to sign decrees. On September 4, Groza and the Council of Foreign Ministers failed to resolve the deadlock and to reach an agreement on the Rumanian Peace Treaty. The issue came up in the Moscow meeting in December when it was agreed that the peace treaty should be drafted by the U.S.S.R., the U. S. A. and the U. K., that the three governments would "give King Michael the advice.....on the broadening of the Rumanian government", that the reorganised government would hold "free and unfettered elections.....as soon as possible on the basis of universal and secret ballot", that a 3-power commission (Vyshinsky, Harriman and Kerr) would proceed to Bucharest for the fulfilment of these tasks, and that

after these have been accomplished, the U.S.A. and the U.K. would recognise the Rumanian government.

The Commission came on December 31. The Groza Government was reorganised in January, and two portfolios were assigned to non-communist ministers. This government promised to hold elections and undertook to guarantee freedom of the press, speech and religion. Nevertheless, the two non-communist ministers could not exert any influence on the government policies and the Anglo-American Protest Note of May 27, 1946 stated that "the two opposition ministers had not been regularly consulted in advance of all current legislation and were unable to carry out their duties and functions satisfactorily owing to the non-co-operation of the Rumanian Government". The election pledge was not redeemed. Press censorship rendered freedom of expression a mockery. The Government denied these allegations. In July, it was announced that the elections would be held on November 19, 1946. More protest notes from the West followed in October-November, but on November 4, the Rumanian Government declared that "since the Soviet Government had not protested, the Anglo-American protests could not be accepted", and that "the Notes were a direct infringement of Rumanian sovereignty". The elections on November 19 gave an overwhelming majority to the communist bloc. On November 21, the two opposition ministers withdrew from the government as a protest against the alleged irregularities of the election. The U.S.A. (on 26th November) and Britain (on 2nd December) declared that the elections had not been free, but this protest did not imply withdrawal of recognition and, therefore, went unheeded. The government now was without any opposition member. On February 10, 1947 as we have noted in the second chapter, the Rumanian Peace Treaty was signed and in July, Rumania applied for membership of the United Nations. In the summer of 1947, a wave of arrests of leaders of the National Peasants Party began. Once again Britain and America unsuccessfully protested against these arrests. On October 4, the Security Council rejected Rumania's application for membership of the U.N. In June, the government had expropriated foreign firms to the annoyance of the British oil companies. In August all Rumanian currency was blocked. Meanwhile, the process of communist consolidation was proceeding and the communists transformed the F.N.D. into the People's Democratic Front, and after a fusion with the Social Democrats they formed the Rumanian Workers' Party. The only obstacle that now remained was King Michael. In November, 1947 he had gone to England for the wedding of Princess Elizabeth and early in December his engagement with Princess Anne of Bourbon-Parma was announced. The Groza Government got annoyed, and on December 30, the

cabinet secured the King's abdication, for, kingship "represents an obstacle to the development of our state towards a popular democratic regime". But on March 4, the King declared from Switzerland that the Act of Abdication had been secured under duress. Rumania had become a People's Republic.

The East-West tension, therefore, continued to mount up. In January, 1948 the Anglo-American protests were again lodged against the fresh wave of arrests. On March 28, elections were held with only a single list of candidates of the People's Democratic Front being presented to the people. The opposition was now practically eliminated. On April 31, the new National Assembly enacted a new Constitution based on the Soviet pattern. On June 11, all industry was nationalised which adversely affected the Anglo-American oil interests in Rumania. Economic and commercial ties with the U.S.S.R. were strengthened. The Church was also attacked and on June 17, the Concordat of 1929 was denounced. The headquarters of the Cominform were transferred from Belgrade to Bucharest. The Russian troops continued to be on the Rumanian soil in accordance with Art. 21 of the Peace Treaty "for the maintenance of the lines of communications of the Red Army with the Soviet zone of occupation in Austria". In September, 1952 a new constitution was adopted which tightened the communist monopoly of power.

From 1948 to 1953 the ties between Rumania and the U.S.S.R. were strengthened. In August, 1951 the entire petroleum industry came under a joint Russo-Rumanian State Combine. Collectivization of agriculture and development of heavy industries were the characteristic features of the 1951-55 five-year plan announced on December 15, 1950. A decree of May 6, 1948 had placed all Rumanian trade under state control and this resulted in the decline of her trade with the West. On July 27, 1951 her Commercial Agreement with the U S A. was terminated and on September 1, the U.S.A. suspended all tariff concessions to the Soviet-bloc countries.

Bulgaria. In Bulgaria, it was on September 9, 1944 that the Fatherland Front had formed a Government. The armistice was signed on October 28. The country had been occupied by the Soviet armies and the Fatherland Front was dominated by the communists. A leader of "one of the fellow-travelling parties", Georgiev, became the Prime Minister and the communists took control of the ministries of Internal Affairs and Justice. A purge of all opponents of communism began immediately and a large number of persons received long sentences and many were executed. The militia, local government and the press were taken over by the communists. The Fatherland Front Government was provisional

and it was agreed in conformity with the Yalta decision, that free elections should be held as soon as conditions allowed. In Bulgaria, however, disputes about the proper conditions for a free election split the precarious unity of the Fatherland Front, as well as the Control Commission. Petkov resigned from the Fatherland Front and formed the main opposition to the Communists. The opposition sought and obtained the support of the Anglo-American representatives at the Control Commission whereas the Communists looked to the Soviet representative for help. The Russian position was, of course, very strong, for, the Soviet troops were not only in occupation of Bulgaria but also of neighbouring states. After months of negotiations, elections were held on November 18, 1945 with the opposition abstaining. On the eve of elections Bulgaria's most eminent Communist, G. Dimitrov, flew in from Moscow. From these elections the Fatherland Front emerged triumphant but was still faced with a strong opposition. The Moscow Conference of the Foreign Ministers (December, 1945) had decided that "the Soviet Government takes upon itself the mission of giving friendly advice to the Bulgarian Government with regard to the desirability of the inclusion in the Bulgarian Government of the Fatherland Front, now being formed, of an additional two representatives of the other democratic groups". It was agreed that after that had been done, Britain and America "will recognize the Bulgarian Government, with which the Government of the Soviet Union already has diplomatic relations".

In pursuance of these decisions, the Fatherland Front and the U.S.S.R. attempted to bring N. Petkov and Lulchev in the government in January, 1946, but a compromise proved to be impossible, for, the latter demanded the removal of the communists from the Ministries of the Interior and of Justice which the Communists would never give up. In September, the plebiscite was held on the issue of Monarchy and on September 9, Bulgaria became a Republic. King Simeon left the country and a Communist, Vassil Kolarov, became the provisional President. On October 27, second elections were held for a Constituent Assembly and the Communists obtained an absolute majority. Nevertheless, the government continued to be selected from all the constituent parties of the Fatherland Front. At last, Georgi Dimitrov became the Premier and set about the final extermination of the opposition. The opposition leaders were rounded and punished. In August 1947, Nikola Petkov was tried and condemned to death. It was a "judicial murder" and the trial ran on political lines. In January, 1948 G. Dimitrov disclosed the real reason of Petkov's death sentence: "If they (Britain and America) had not intervened from abroad, and if some had not ultimately attempted to dictate to our sovereign Court, Petkov's head could have been saved. The death sentence could have been commuted to other

punishment. But when it came to the question of blackmailing the Bulgarian nation and infringing on the right of our sovereign people's Court, the death sentence had to be executed. And it was executed".

On December 4, 1947 a new Constitution, largely designed on the Soviet model, was enacted in face of a mild opposition. By the end of 1948, the Social Democrats had given up their independent identity and were fused with the Communists. Parliamentary opposition had been eliminated and the Communist economic and political plans went forward unhindered. In April, 1947 a 2-year plan had been launched to restore agriculture and industry. In 1947-48 Bulgaria built up a network of bilateral treaties with all the countries in East Europe. With the U.S.S.R., a treaty was signed on July 10, 1947. In 1949 the first 5-year plan was adopted and in 1953 the second 5-year plan went in operation. As in other People's Democracies, in Bulgaria also the Church came in for attack and in March, 1949 it was fully placed under State control. Throughout the period under review, arrests and purges continued. In December 1949, T. Kostov, the most popular leader with the Communist rank and file, was tried and the trial became a big demonstration against Britain. He was hanged on December 16, and in the elections that followed immediately, the Communists won 98% votes. That this reign of terror was proceeding at the instance of Stalin seems to be proved by a remarkable passage in the official message of greetings sent by the Bulgarian Communist Party on the occasion of Stalin's birthday celebrations: "Only thanks to your wise and timely instructions, highly esteemed Comrade Stalin, we managed to uncover the cowardly hidden enemies of our Republic to unmask the agents of the imperialist powers, and to cleanse ourselves of them. Only your deeply penetrating eye could see in time the criminal spy gang of Kostov. On this 70th birthday, we send you our deepest gratitude that you helped us to render harmless the Kostov gang". Thus even though the Russian troops, along with the Allied Control Commission, had been withdrawn from Bulgaria after the Peace Treaty had been signed on February 10, 1947 the country continued to have special political, economic and military relations with Russia. Witness, for instance, the decree passed by the National Assembly on October 25, 1956 under which a special status was voted for Soviet citizens residing in Bulgaria and they were given equal rights with Bulgarian citizens, including the right to hold any public office. Earlier, in March 1948, a 20-year treaty of friendship, co-operation and mutual assistance with the Soviet Union had been signed. On the Russian dictates, the treaty with Yugoslavia, signed on 27th November, 1947, was abrogated on October 3, 1949.

Albania. During the years 1939-44 Albania had been over-

run by the German-Italian armies. Even though, like Yugoslavia, Albania had not been occupied by the Red Army, she continued firmly to be in the Russian orbit, and like Yugoslavia did not sever relations with Moscow. General Enver Hoxha who had been in power in Albania since April, 1944 assumed control of the Government by well-tried methods. On November 10, 1945 Britain, America and .the Soviet Union recognized the Hoxha Government on the understanding that it would hold free elections. The elections were held on December 2, 1945 and these resulted in a communist-controlled Assembly, which on January 11, 1946 proclaimed Albania a Republic. In March, 1946 a Constitution on the Soviet model was adopted and on September 1, 1952 a new Penal Code, modelled on the new Soviet law, went in effect under which for crimes against the State, for sabotage of State property, and for economic sabotage, even 12-year old children are fully responsible. Under clause 83 of this Code, the crimes against the State are extended to offences against the Soviet Union. Mechanization of agriculture, collective farming and nationalization of industry have been the characteristic features of the Albanian economic planning.

In fact Albania, since 1944, was more linked with Yugoslavia than with the Soviet Union. No "treaty of friendship, co-operation and mutual assistance" of the kind signed between Moscow and the People's Democracies linked Albania with the Soviet Union until May, 1955, when Albania was invited to adhere to the Warsaw Pact. Although the Soviet Union was linked with Albania through the Communist Government in that country, through the Greek Civil War (December, 1944—September, 1949) and through common hostility towards Tito (1948—1953), Albania had no formal guarantee of Soviet military assistance. During the war Moscow had neither direct contact with the Albanian communists nor any liaison with the Albanian resistance movement. No Soviet soldiers had been on the Albanian soil during the war. From 1944 to June 1948 the relations between Yugoslavia and Albania were most cordial and Yugoslavia was the first country to establish diplomatic relations with the new Albanian People's Republic. (Soviet recognition of the Hoxha government came only in November, 1945 and the first Soviet diplomat did not arrive in Tirana until 1946). The two countries co-ordinated their economic plans, established a Customs Union, equalized their currencies and set up joint-stock companies. Aid from Yugoslavia constituted about 57% of the Albanian budget in 1947. The Soviet Union gave only a "modest loan".

But when in June 1948 Yugoslavia was expelled from the Cominform Albania did not range herself with Tito but with Stalin. From the Albanian communist's standpoint this seemed to be the more attractive choice. At the time, Tito was not expected

to be able to make good his rebellion. Possibly a number of the leaders of the Communist Party of Albania (C. P. A.) resented the dominant role the C. P. Y. (Communist Party of Yugoslavia) had assumed and feared even further Yugoslavian penetration into the Albanian affairs. Some of them were also opposed to Yugoslavia's continuing domination over the Kosovo area—Albania's "territoria irredenta". From the Russian standpoint Albania was important in the context of the Greek civil war. The Communist rebel forces, led by General Markos, had been operating from Albania as the base. "General Markos had his headquarters, his base, his army, even his wireless station, in Albania. All this was much too valuable to Russia to permit of Albania being allowed to slip into the Yugoslav camp".

Thus soon after Tito's expulsion, the "Titoists" were arrested and tried in Albania as elsewhere. In July 1948, Koci Xoxe, hitherto a trusted lieutenant of Enver Hoxha, was removed from the Ministry of Interior and in September from the post of the Secretary of Cadres. On November 9, he was arrested and his trial began on March 12, 1949. On June 11, he was sentenced to death and hanged. All leading "Titoists" were arrested and sent to prison and the ranks of the Worker's Party were subjected to a thorough weeding. Hoxha was received with honour in Moscow; Russian advisers were sent to Albania in even larger numbers; and Russian and Rumanian ships began to arrive with much greater frequency at Durazzo and Valona. As long as the Greek Civil War continued (December, 1944—September, 1949), Soviet shipments of armaments and food reached Albanian ports regularly. But with the cessation of hostilities in Greece the Soviet aid was cut off almost entirely and this worked out great hardship in Albania. The 5-year plan (1951—55), therefore, laid stress on extractive industries, consumer goods, and the agricultural sectors. The Plan called for an annual expansion rate of 27·7%, and upward revisions during the first three years of the Plan changed the scheduled increase to about 30%. Although the rate of increase during the first year of the Plan was reported to be 47·1%, the fulfilled rate decreased every year thereafter. The summer of 1952 brought a scorching drought to Albania. By early 1953 almost all types of food were in short supply and prices were rising. Serious inflation was indicated early in 1953 by the appearance of large quantities of new currency bills. The third state loan, launched on March 1, 1953 was intended partially to check this trend.

Poland. Poland was re-created as an independent state on November 9, 1918 and on June 28, 1919 the Treaty of Versailles recognised the independence of Poland. In 1926, as a result of a coup, Joseph Pilsudski, the founder of the Polish Legions had become the dictator who soon established a one-party system on

the fascist lines and adopted a positively anti-Soviet attitude. In September 1931 Poland was invaded first by Germany and later by the Soviet Union. The fourth partition followed which lay Poland prostrate. After the German attack on Russia in June 1941, the entire country was occupied by the German armies. An Exile Government was set up in London but soon a rift developed between this Government and the Soviet Union so that in April, 1943 relations were broken off. The government, however, continued to be on friendly terms with Britain and the United States which sponsored the scheme of a closer political and economic association of Poland and Czechoslovakia as "the basis of a new order in Central Europe".

Meanwhile, a rival Polish leadership was being fostered in Moscow. A League of Polish Patriots had been formed under Col. Berling which formed the core of the new Polish army which entered Poland with the Soviet forces and which gradually merged with the underground People's Army. In Moscow, a Polish National Council had been set up under B. Bierut, a Communist, and the League of Polish Patriots joined this body. On July 21, 1944, the Polish National Council set up an Executive Committee of National Liberation with Edward Osobka-Morawski (a socialist) as chairman. On July 22, the Council issued its famous manifesto to "Poles at home, abroad, and in German captivity". On July 25, Lublin was freed and the Council and the Committee moved there. On July 26, the Soviet Government recognised the Lublin Committee and signed an agreement with it "to regulate the relationship between the Soviet Army Commander and the new Polish administration"—the Lublin Administration. This immediately brought the leaders of the Polish London Government to Moscow in order to negotiate on the question of so broadening the Lublin Administration as to include their own representatives The question of the eastern frontiers of Poland, however, proved to be a stumbling block, the Russians insisting on the new eastern frontiers, and the London Government leaders insisting on the 1939 frontiers.

But on December 31, 1944 the Polish Committee of National Liberation transformed itself into a Provisional Government, which was recognised by the U.S.S.R. on January 4, 1945 and which moved to Warsaw on February 1. On February 12, the decision of the Yalta Conference was announced according to which the three powers agreed that the Provisional Government "which is now functioning in Poland should be re-organized on a broader basis with the inclusion of democratic leaders from Poland itself and from Poles abroad". It had already been agreed that the Government would hold "free and unfettered elections" after which the Powers would establish diplomatic relations. In June the ambassadors of Britain and America to Moscow, and Molotov

held discussions with the Poles and reached an agreement on the broadening of the Government. On June 28, a new "Government of National Unity" was formed at Warsaw and it received recognition of Britain and America on July 6. This government consisted of 21 members—16 of the former Lublin Committee, and five new comers—under the Premiership of Osobka-Morawski. At Potsdam, on August 2, the Powers "took note with pleasure of the new government and Britain and America withdrew" recognition from the London Government.

Since its inception, the Government of National Unity failed to work smoothly. The group led by Mikola Jczyk could not see eye to eye with the communists and socialists. The opposition started collaborating with the former fascists and this, naturally, the Communists could not tolerate. Meanwhile Poland had become a subject of the cold war. On May 10, 1946 the United States stopped deliveries against credits of 40 million granted in April on the ground that election pledges had not been redeemed. On May 28, the Soviet Union offered economic and military aid, and on 28th June, the U. K. announced that the Anglo-Polish Financial Agreement signed earlier would not be ratified until elections were held. The elections were held on January 19, 1947 which gave an overwhelming majority to the communist dominated "Democratic Bloc" (Workers, Socialists, Peasant and Democratic Parties). Britain and America immediately protested that the elections had not been free. On February 19, the new Diet passed a Constitutional Act based on Marxist principles. Three days later, a Declaration of Rights and Liberties was passed. In 1948, the Socialist and Communist Parties merged into the United Workers' Party. The legal system was reorganised in July and October, 1950. On April 14, the Roman Catholic bishops concluded an agreement with the Government, by which "the Church accepted the Communist regime in return for guarantees concerning the Papal authority and religious education". Some of the reactionary bishops were arresed and the teaching of reactionary religion was forbidden. Associations like "Patriot Priests" and "Progressive Catholics" were formed. State control was extended to cover cultural, scientific and intellectual life. In October 1951, under a new statute, the Polish Academy of Sciences was reorganized on the model of the Academy of Sciences of the U.S.S.R.

In July 1952, a new constitution was adopted which set up the "people's democratic system", and in October elections were held which gave 99.8% votes to the "National Front". But it is in the economic sphere that brilliant results were achieved. Under the law of January 3, 1946 all industrial undertakings employing over 50 workers were placed under the control of the Central Industrial Boards. After an agrarian reform which parcelled out

all landed properties over 50 hectors in area, the gradual collectivization of agriculture began. The 3-year plan for economic development (1947-49) was followed by a 6-year plan for 1950-55. Schools, health centres and social insurance centres were instituted. The economic relations with the U S.S.R. were strengthened and by 1953, about 67% of Poland's foreign trade was with the U.S.S.R.

Czechoslovakia. Among all the East European states Czechoslovakia was the only predominantly industrial country having a social structure similar to that of a Western country and a firmly rooted parliamentary democracy. Unlike Poland and Hungary it was traditionally friendly to Moscow. The Munich Pact of 1938, fresh in the memory of the Czech patriots, was a symbol of the Western treachery which even their war record had not been able to wipe out. The Munich legend was, therefore, assiduously cultivated by the Communists and readily swallowed by lakhs of Czechs. The Soviet Union, therefore, was eminently fitted to exploit the emotional background of the Czech national life. The partition of Europe brought about by the Marshall Plan, it seems, had determined the fate of Czechoslovakia.

In 1946 elections the communists in Czechoslovakia had emerged as the largest single party in the country and had formed a coalition Government which they utilised in occupying some of the key positions for the eventual take-over of the country. In 1946 the Communist party had one million members but by the beginning of 1948 it had swelled by 50%. In November-December, 1947 the National Socialist members of the Czech Legislature charged the communist Ministry of the Interior of misusing its position and, in January, they accused it of establishing "direct liaison with the secret police of the Soviet Union". In November the communist Minister of Information, after a survey of public opinion, concluded that the chances of the Communists in the elections of May, 1948 were not bright. On February 13, 1948 the Cabinet came to know that the Police Commander of Bohemia, on the orders of Nosek, the communist Minister of Interior, had dismissed eight Prague Police Chiefs who were non-communists. The majority of the ministers objected to their dismissal and asked Nosek to reinstate them. In the meeting on February 17, Nosek did not come, and the communist Premier Gottwald after listening to the angry protest of his non-communist colleagues supported Nosek's stand and adjourned the meeting of the Cabinet. Later, on the protests of the non-communist Ministers, Gottwald gave the assurances that Nosek would attend the Cabinet meeting of February 20, and would explain everything. On February 19, Zorin, the former Russian Ambassador to Prague, and now the Vice-Foreign Minister of the U.S.S.R., arrived in Prague ostensibly to supervise the deliveries of supplies of Russian

wheat, "a strange task for one in his position". On February 20, the Cabinet meeting was held. Till that day Nosek had not reinstated the dismissed police officials. The 12 National Socialist Ministers, therefore, refused to attend the meeting and sent their resignation to Dr. Benes, as a tactical manoeuvre "that would either force the communists to relax their grip on the police or would precipitate immediate elections pending which Benes would ask them to remain in office". On February 21, police units were sent to Prague from other areas; the communists launched a campaign of accusations against the non-communist parties in the Government that they intended to overthrow the regime; action committees became active; the headquarters of the non-communist parties were occupied; and the announcement was made by Nosek that the non-communist leaders were attempting to sell State secrets to the British and the Americans concerning the synthetic gasoline plant. Gottwald urged the Government to accept the resignation of the 12 non-communist Ministers and the Communist Party set in motion the Police, the Mob, the Action Committees, and the Worker's Militia. On February 21, a mass meeting was organised by the Communists in the Town Hall Square at Prague to be addressed by Gottwald. After the meeting a delegation of the workers went to see Benes and demanded the acceptance of resignation of the non-Communist Ministers and their replacement by the representatives of the trade unions. Benes rejected the communist demand that the ministers who had resigned should be excluded from any future Government. On February 22, the Soviet Union lent its full support to the Communists. In the night of February 22 and 23, a number of arrests of high officials were made and the anti-communist students' demonstrations were suppressed. On 23rd February the communists prevented four ministers from entering their offices even though their resignation had not been accepted by the President. Same day Nosek banned the exit of the anti-Communists to other countries. On February 24, virtually the Government authority had passed on to the Central Action Committee. On February 25, the coercive methods of the Communists had succeeded and Benes yielded to Gottwald, accepted the resignation of the 12 ministers and agreed to the formation of a new Government by Gottwald. One authority has thus described the scene of the meeting of Gottwald and Benes which finally resulted in the liquidation of Czechoslovakia:

"Gottwald walked back and forth, perspiring and gesticulating, while Benes again turned to the window and looked down at the city. No one knows what went on in his mind. Perhaps he realised that his fight was really already lost and that the Communists were already in physical control of the country. Still, there were things he might do. He could go to the radio.

He had promised several times that he would explain the situation to the country. No one would dare to prevent him from speaking if he chose to. Or he could now resign. That would, in itself, be an explanation. The country would understand it as a protest against the pressure exerted by the Communists. Or he could appeal to the army. The Communists had already gotten rid of many of the officers who had been in England and France, but there were still a great many on whom he could depend. Any one of these solutions might lead to civil war. Gottwald talked and Benes thought. Suddenly Benes interrupted: "You are talking to me like Hitler", he said, wearily. Then he yielded. Benes accepted the resignations of the Ministers and approved a new government list presented by Gottwald. Gottwald glowed. He bade the President farewell and raced to his waiting limousine. He rushed back to Wenceslas Square and announced his triumph to the howling mob." (Andrew Gyorgy and H. P. Gibbs: *Problems in International Relations*, pp. 31-32).

Thus not a single Soviet soldier appeared on the Czech territory or moved to the frontier and yet Czechoslovakia had lost her independence. On February 27, Dirtina, Minister of Justice, jumped from a window; on March 10, Masaryk, Minister of Foreign Affairs, was murdered; and same day the Czech representative at the United Nations referred the Czech affair to the Secretary-General. On March 17, the Czech question was placed on the agenda of the Security Council. On April 8, the new Czech Government refused to take part in the deliberations of the Security Council. On May 24, the Argentine resolution was negatived by the Soviet veto. On June 7, President Benes resigned his office which now devolved on Gottwald.

The reactions of these developments on world opinion were violent and decisive for, without sending a single unit of the Red Army and without a single threat, Czechoslovakia had fallen. Its immediate reaction in the West was the introduction of the currency reform in Germany which led to the Berlin blockade. The cold war had now started in full blast. The Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan which embodied the doctrine of the containment of communism were now elaborated. A new phase in the contemporary diplomatic history had begun.

In Czechoslovakia, the Communists at once set about consolidating their position. On May 30, 1948 new general elections were decreed. The people were presented with a single list of candidates of the "democratic front" and the people had the option to vote for the Government list or to cast a blank vote. The result was an 89% majority for the Government. On June 9, a new constitution, based on the Soviet pattern, was adopted. The struggle against religion, agrarian reform, nationa-

lization of industry, State control of press, education and culture, adaptation of the Czechoslovak national economy with the needs of the communist bloc—these became the characteristic features of development of Czechoslovakia. A 5-year plan was enacted on October 27, 1948 under which by the end of 1953, the value of industrial production had been increased by 77%. By the end of 1955, 42% of all farm land had been collectivized, 10% of which constituted state farms.

Finland. Finland has enjoyed a unique status as a neighbour of the U.S.S.R. ever since 1945. "Not a satellite, yet far from being independent in its choice of a foreign policy, Finland has led a precariously balanced existence, in part meeting Soviet demands and in part fiercely defying Communist encroachment in its internal institutions and political life". At the end of the war, Finland was ruled by a coalition Government in which the Communists played a vital role. At the elections of 1945 the popular Democratic League in which the Communists dominated, had obtained 48 out of 200 seats, while the Social Democrats got 50 and the Agrarians 49. But it was Pekkala, the leader of the Popular Democratic League, who became the Premier and who appointed a Communist to be the Minister of the Interior. The latter failed to pack the police and in May, 1948 was obliged to resign. Towards the end of the year elections were held again in which the League lost 10 seats while the Social Democrats and the Agrarians gained in strength. The Social Democrats, therefore, formed the Government. Later, in 1950 and 1951, the Social Democrats and the Agrarians formed a coalition. The Communists had retained a degree of influence in trade unions, where too, they had a serious rival in the Social Democrats.

In February 1947, the Peace Treaty with Finland was signed, which, as we have already noted, largely confirmed Russia's gains as recorded in the Treaty of Moscow (1940) and the armistice of September, 1944. In February 1948, the Soviet Union started sounding Finland for a treaty of friendship. On February 27, Stalin sent a note to President Paasikiri of Finland proposing that Finland send to Moscow a delegation to negotiate and conclude a treaty of alliance. After some hesitation on the part of Finland and pressure on the part of the Soviet Union, a delegation was sent and on April 6, 1948 a Soviet-Finnish Treaty of Friendship, Co-operation, and Mutual Assistance was signed—a treaty which departed in several respects from the usual pattern. It was to last for ten years and it obliged the signatories to refrain from interfering in each other's internal affairs. It also stipulated that Finland would fight against aggression only within her land and sea boundaries. On the occasion of the signing of this treaty, Stalin declared: "We Soviet men esteem each nation—great and small—for the distinctive qualities and specialities

which it alone possesses and which other nations lack".

The answer to the question as to how the Finns successfully maintained neutrality, excluded the Communists from power and resisted the Soviet pattern of People's Democracy, is not far to seek. For one thing, it was rather unnecessary for the Soviet Union to dominate Finland. That country does not lie "on the mainland routes to the West" and, then, whatever the Soviet Union wanted, she had already obtained under the Peace Treaty of 1947 and the Treaty of Friendship of 1948. These treaties and the geographical position of the country had put her at the mercy of Russia and there was no cause of alarm or hurry. Non-interference in Finland would go a long way in pacifying Sweden and in enabling her to preserve its neutrality. The establishment of a People's Democracy in Finland would almost at once drive Sweden in the N.A.T.O. Finally, the Finns would be a source of chronic trouble and would resist to the last man any attempt at subjugation. "Social classes are well balanced in Finland, and the habit of parliamentary Government is deeply rooted. The Finns possess the tough individualism of a border Protestant nation". All these factors explain the unique position of Finland in relation to the Soviet Union. On this question, the new leadership of Russia has continued the same policy as that of Stalin and it may, therefore, be pertinently mentioned here.

In September, 1952 Finland's obligations under the peace treaty with the U. S. S. R. were declared settled in full, and soon after she joined the Nordic Council. In February, 1954 the Soviet Union offerred a substantial loan of $10,000,000 to Finland and later that year the former agreed to compensate the latter for a portion of its trade balance with Russia (also amounting to $10,000,000) in convertible currency. The offer was "designed to induce the Finns to raise substantially the annual volume of trade carried on with their eastern neighbour". But the most dramatic move was made in September, 1955 (after the summit meeting at Geneva) when President Paasikiri of Finland visited Moscow. During his visit, it was announced that the Porkkala naval base (a Soviet-held enclave on Finnish territory, which had been leased to Russia for 50 years under the terms of the Peace Treaty of 1947) would be returned to Finland. That this was done without any prodding by the Finns, and entirely of its own accord, by the Soviet Union, suggests that "Soviet leadership was anxious to set a precedent for liquidating bases on foreign soil so that it could then prod the United States to do likewise". In January 1956, Finnish troops entered the evacuated territory. In October 1955 another agreement had been signed which provided for a direct air service between the two capitals and which permitted the Finns to use their own planes—rather an unusual concession. Earlier, the Finn-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Co-operation, and Mutual

Assistance had been extended for another 20 years and it was widely believed that the Russians would permit the Finns to use the Saimaa Canal, a waterway which was ceded to the Russians after the war, but which at one time had been the main artery for the shipment of Finnish wood and pulp. In December, 1955 another agreement was signed under which the Finns were allowed to use a length of railway running through Ladogan Karelia, another territory ceded to the Russians, "whose loss made necessary a large detour for all goods traffic". In February 1957, the Finnish Prime Minister, at the invitation of the Russian Government, visited Moscow and the two countries came closer. But at present, Finland is pursuing a neutral and independent foreign policy and is in no way subservient to the Soviet Union. She sent a military contingent to join the U. N. Force in Suez and since her admission to membership of the U. N. in November, 1955 "she has played her part there with dignity".

It is in this background that we will consider the nature of the bonds between the East European states it and the Soviet Union.

బంధుత్వం BONDS OF RELATIONSHIP

Political. Three kinds of bonds explain the relations of the U. S. S. R. with the East European States: political, economic, and military. The political bonds included the agencies of the Cominform and the solidarity of the Communist parties of the states concerned. Here the friction between the Soviet Union and the Western countries was caused by the refusal of the Soviet Union to concede the Western demands of holding free and unfettered elections as provided in the war-time agreements. In Poland, for instance, even after the Lublin Committee and the Polish Government-in-Exile at London had been merged, the new Government, which had been recognised by Britain and America in July 1945, steadily became a Communist Government. In Yugoslavia where the elections were held on November 11, 1945 Marshall Tito had won by a large majority and proclaimed a People's Republic on November 29, 1945. In Bulgaria the Fatherland Front had seized power on September 9, 1944 and when the elections were held on November 18, 1945 Britain and America protested against the restrictions imposed. The Communists captured power and the Government was recognised by Britain in February, 1947 and in October, by America, but by the end of the year the Communist control in these states had been completed. In Rumania the Communist-dominated National Democratic Front captured power on March 16, 1945. Britain and America protested. The December meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers (1945) recommended free elections and on this basis Britain and America recognised the

Government. The elections were held in November, 1946 under vehement American protest. But in 1947 King Michael had been expelled and by 1948 the Communists had established a People's Republic. In Hungary on the basis of the assurances of free elections given in September 1945, the United States recognised the Government on November 2. Elections were held on November 2, and on February 1, 1946 the Third Hungarian Republic was proclaimed. But by 1947 all opposition had been eliminated and the Communist regimes had been fully installed in power. The existence of the Communist Governments and the exchange of opinions through the Cominform brought all these countries together. The diplomatic representatives, ambassadors and ministers plenipotentiary, like Lebedier in Warsaw or Zorin in Prague, also played an important role. Quite a large number of Russian technicians, scientific workers and military advisers have been additional bonds. In its statement of October 30, 1956 the Soviet Government stressed this point. "It is known," the Soviet Union declared, "that in the first period when the new social system was taking shape the Soviet Union at the request of the Governments of People's Democracies sent to those countries a certain number of its specialists—engineers, agronomists, scientific workers and military advisers. Of late the Soviet Government has more than once raised with the socialist states the question of recalling its advisers". It may be emphasised that ideology seems to have annihilated national frontiers in Eastern Europe. International relations within the Bloc are based not so much on State rights as on party lines and what would be regarded as a gross interference in the internal affairs elsewhere is likely to pass as a routine matter here.

Economic. The economic bonds included several trade agreements between the U. S. S. R. and the East European countries, the existence of joint mixed companies, and the so-called Comecon. These economic bonds were not uniform in the case of all East European countries. We have seen that the eight East European states belonged to two categories—those that had fought against Germany and those that had fought on the side of Germany. In the case of the latter, the Soviet Union realised reparations in kind and the costs of occupation together with the confiscation of the German and the Italian assets there. Thus, the states in this category served as sources of raw material for the Soviet economy. In the case of the former (and later on, in the case of the latter also) trade agreements were concluded under which goods were to be delivered during a specific period of time. As a result of these agreements the Soviet economy and the economies of the East European countries were more or less integrated. The so-called Molotov Plan given out in the summer of 1947 aimed at the hastening of the economic recovery

increasing industrialisation, raising living standards of the East European states and reducing their trade with Western Europe. Whereas the total value of the trade between western and eastern Europe in 1938 was 3·4 billion dollars, in 1947 it fell down to 1·4 billions and after rising to 1·9 billions in 1949 it fell down again in 1950 to the level of 1947. Conversely, the Soviet Union's share of the trade of these states rose from less than 2% in 1938 to more than 50% in 1947 and to 80% in 1952.

This decline of the Western trade and the increase in the Russian was partly due to obstacles created by the East and partly to those created by the West. So far as the Soviet created obstacles are concerned it may be briefly stated, *first*, that the communist economic system is peculiarly anti-pathetic to trade relations with the non-communist world. *Secondly*, the existence of centrally controlled economies in Eastern Europe leads to low level of East-West trade as it involves the extra costs of long negotiations, the fear of arbitrary changes in terms, the problems of a fairly competitive group of suppliers dealing with "monopsonistic" buyers and the constant interference of political factors. *Finally*, the capacity of the East European States or their willingness to export to the West has failed to expand commensurately with their desire for imports. On the Western side it may be broadly said that the Western countries, led and pressed by the United States, adopted measures to shut off from the Soviet Union products that might have contributed directly to its war-making potential. From 1948 onward, as we will note later, the American policy was to reverse the co-operative trend and to restrict its exports to the East. It may be mentioned that in 1947 when the Marshall Plan was launched it was expected that the West would obtain 17% of their imports from East Europe and sell 19% of their exports to them. When the cold war began in 1948 this hope was completely belied.

The trade agreements to which we have referred were concluded with Poland on 6th March, 1941 providing for a loan to Poland of $ 27·875 million in gold for the purchase of foreign food, machinery and raw materials; and with Czechoslovakia on 12th July, 1947 providing for delivery of Russian grains, cotton, fertilizers, metals, etc. in exchange for Czech machinery and manufactured goods. In 1948 the Soviet Union agreed to make a loan to Czechoslovakia in gold and convertible currency. On 13th July, a trade agreement was signed with Hungary and it was followed by another agreement on 2nd October, 1948. Under them the Soviet Union supplied raw textile materials in exchange for manufactured textiles, oils and bauxite. Similarly agreements were concluded with other countries of the region and all of them were based on the same pattern.

Another economic bond of unity between the Soviet Union and the East European States was the joint or mixed companies set up in the People's Democracies. In Rumania, for instance, the oil fields came to be owned by a mixed Soviet-Rumanian company and the Russian representatives on the company board seem to control the majority of votes and are even now in a position to decide policies. Similarly in other states companies were established. And finally in 1949 the Council for Economic Mutual Assistance (Comecon) was established as a reply to the European Recovery Programme (E. R. P.), and as an economic counterpart of the Cominform in order to facilitate economic co-operation among the Soviet Union and the East European States.

The sources of friction in the economic sphere should now be obvious. In the *first place*, East-West trade became the subject "of a constant barrage of propaganda, accusations and counter-accusations, and restrictive action by Governments". *Secondly*, since East Europe has been a traditional exporter of food and industrial raw material to Western Europe, the Soviet control of this region naturally created grave economic problems for West Europe. From 1945 to 1950 the ability to get timber, coarse grain and coal from East Europe was a major factor in the economies of some Western European countries. Several of the Western European nations are dependent to a large extent on imports from the East, including some strategically important commodities like nickel. *Thirdly*, friction had been caused by process of nationalisation of industries, banks, factories, foreign trade and agriculture in East Europe. And *finally*, friction has been caused as a result of the failure of efforts to promote general East-West economic co-operation.

Military. In the military sphere the bonds of relations were largely provided by the treaties of friendship and mutual alliance with the East European states, as a result of which there has emerged what is called as the Soviet Bloc. With its war-time allies—Poland, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia—the Soviet Union had concluded alliances even during the War: on 12th December, 1943 with Czechoslovakia, on 21st April, 1945, with Poland and on 11th April, 1945 with Yugoslavia. With other states treaties were concluded between 1945 and 1948. From 18th March, 1946 to 16th April, 1949 as many as 17 bilateral treaties were concluded among the East European states. All these treaties represent a consistent pattern. They were apparently directed against Germany and were apparently based on Art. 53 of the United Nations Charter. All the Soviet alliances with the East European states are, therefore, operative in case of an attack by Germany or by its allies. These military links were supplemented, during the period under review, by

the exchange of civilities on such occasions as the anniversaries of the Bolshevik Revolution or the signing of the several treaties of friendship, by attacks on the Western powers and their diplomatic representatives in the capitals of these countries, and by the exploitation of the disputes between these countries and the Western powers. The relations between these states and the Western powers extorted the western reaction regarding "the process of lowering the iron curtain which.....prevented normal intercourse after the manner of civilised states".

THEORY OF RUSSIAN IMPERIALISM

As a result of these developments, the Western powers cultivated the theory of "Russian Imperialism". It can certainly be agreed that to the relationship between the Soviet Union and the East European countries the general label of traditional imperialism is not applicable. These countries are not, what the Western colonies have always been, the agrarian reservoirs of food-stuffs and raw materials for the Soviet Union, which has, after all encouraged the development of a balanced economy and heavy industries in these states. Nor has the Soviet Union, in the manner of Western Imperialists, exploited the cheap labour in the People's Democracies. Since 1945 their standard of living has been rising quite rapidly. Whereas these countries were bound to Germany before 1945 by a double bond—as the principal market for their produce and as a debtor who was unwilling or unable to liquidate his debt except by specified exports—their trade with the U.S.S.R. has been on a self-balancing basis. Huge credits were given by the Soviet Union to them. Even about the mixed companies it is difficult to hold that they were a new variety of foreign investing companies of the Colonial Empires, because the capital was divided equally between the two sides, the enterprise had to obey the labour laws of the People's Democracy concerned, their production plans were fitted into the national economic plans, and the bulk of their output went into the market of the People's Democracy and not of the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union did not acquire a single permanent share holding and later on (in 1954-55) the Soviet interests in a large number of these mixed companies were transferred to the states concerned on easy payments over a period of years, e.g., in the case of Rumania, Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria. It is also true that whereas before 1945 most of these states were ruled by dishonest landlords, unscrupulous big business and corrupt bureaucracy, after 1945 the Soviet Union broke the vested interests in these countries and put them on the path of economic and social progress. In all these ways the theory of Russian Imperialism has no legs to stand on. The East European states are independent and sovereign and cannot

be called as the Soviet colonies. However, the Soviet control of their affairs cannot be doubted. As we observed earlier, in 1947 Poland and Czchoslovakia were forced by the Soviet Union to refuse invitations to participate in the preliminary discussions of the Marshall Plan. In January, 1948 the suggestion of the Bulgarian communist leader, Dimitrov, to establish a confederation of East European states was unceremoniously turned down by the Soviet Union. From 1945 onward free elections were nowhere allowed under one excuse or the other and in the light of what happened in Hungary and Poland in 1956-57 one can doubt if the Communist regimes imposed in these countries are really based on the willing consent of the people. The manner in which the Soviet Union behaved in Czechoslovakia in February, 1948 reminds of the tactics of Nazi Germany. On the other side, the Western powers have been equally interfering in promoting counter-revolutionary actions in these states and encouraging and building up anti-communist resistance groups within and outside the Soviet Bloc states.

We have so far surveyed the events and forces which led to a complete deadlock between the East and the West and created a deep rift amongst the war-time allies. It now remains to examine those events which eventually led to a complete collapse of the Grand Alliance and pushed the United States to the dangerous policy of containment of Russia. To this now we turn.

CHAPTER 4

The Cold War Begins

The immediate American reaction to the events since 1945 was one of panic, excitement and irritation. Gradually, the Americans replied the Soviet moves by the Policy of Containment which reflected their irritation as well as their affluence and power. The disturbed conditions in the Near and Middle East were the immediate causes that led to the proclamation of the Truman Doctrine and the enunciation of the Marshall Plan which expressed the concept of containment. The questions of Greece, Turkey and Persia were inter-related. The Western powers felt that if "the Soviets gain Greece, Turkey will be open. If they gain the Middle East, they will hold the cross-roads between Europe and Asia and control the oil which is Europe's life blood, and America's last great reserve".

THE CIVIL WAR IN GREECE

Even normally Greece is poor and overpopulated with a vast majority always living close to subsistence level. During the second world war the Greeks had offered a heroic resistance to the combined forces of Italy and Germany. The Greek resistance crystallized around two groups—the E. A. M. dominated by the Communists and the E.D.E.S. dominated by the King's followers. The stresses and the strains of the War had broken the Greek economy. Even before the War, the cost of imports of food, raw materials and machinery was barely met by earnings on a considerable merchant fleet, emigrant remittances and the highly unstable tourist trade. In 1945, as a result of Nazi occupation the Greek industrial production was merely 60% of its pre-war level; agriculture and transport stood dislocated, and in the absence of an effective political authority, the country was divided between the Royalists and the Republicans. Even in 1943 Churchill supported the King's followers against the E.A.M. In October 1944 the Germans withdrew, the British force landed in Greece and immediately they started a policy of quarrelling with the E. A. M. in order to eliminate "any chance of a dictatorship of the Left" and to impose a King on Greece against the wishes of about 70% of the Greek people. Armed incidents occurred throughout the year 1944. In February 1945 the Varkisa Agreement was concluded by which the Royalists undertook not to exercise reprisals against the defeated and disarmed resistance

movement. But within a week of the signing of the agreement the communists were rounded up.

Earlier in October 1944 Britain and the Soviet Union had reached an agreement under which the latter conceded Greece to the former. The British interest in controlling Greece was to safeguard the lines of communication of the British Empire running through the Mediterranean. A communist-controlled Greece would obviously flank the Straits and would provide a favourable position for the extension of the Soviet influence over Turkey and Italy. The strategic location of Greece, therefore, placed it in the front rank of Western security interests. When, therefore, Britain took over the responsibility for completing the liberation of Greece and the dispute developed with regard to the rights of political groups to continue maintaining armed forces, the British Commander ordered the disbandment of all private armies. A provisional government was established combining representatives of the E.A M., the non-communist elements and the Government-in-Exile from London. However, the E.A.M. soon broke with the non-communist members of the cabinet and a virtual civil war broke out in Athens in December 1944 in which the British army supported the E.D.E.S. Public criticism obliged Churchill to come to Athens on December 25 in order to reach some settlement. Failing this, rebellion broke out again and it was crushed ruthlessly by the British forces. It was in this background that the Varkisa Agreement referred above was signed. A new provisional government was established under the regency of Archbishop Damaskinos in early 1945. Nevertheless, the British repression continued and a large number of communist rebels fled to the northern mountains. Throughout, Stalin, as Churchill himself has admitted, "adhered strictly and faithfully to our agreement of October, and during all the long weeks of fighting the communists in the streets of Athens not one word of reproach came from *Pravda* and *Izvestia*". The elections were held in March 1945 and the Royalists won by an absolute majority. The communists had boycotted these elections. In September a plebiscite was held as a result of which monarchy was restored.

The guerilla warfare had in the meantime been started by the communists hidden in the northern mountains. In December 1946 the Greek Government complained to the Security Council that "outside assistance was being received by the Insurgent Groups". The United Nations sent out a Special Commission of Investigation to Greece in 1947. The Commission found that "Yugoslavia and, to a lesser extent, Albania and Bulgaria had supported the guerilla warfare in Greece by providing training, arms and transportation". Thus the Soviet Union which was formerly indifferent to the developments in Greece had now started taking a keen interest in the communist activities there. This new factor forced the British

Government to review their policy. On February 3, 1947 "a cable to the State Department from ambassador Mcveagh in Athens reported rumours that the British would withdraw their forces from Greece or at least a sizeable part of them". On February 12 Secretary Marshall informed Truman "urging him that we give immediate consideration to supplying aid to Greece". On February 18 the U. S. Investigating Commission in Greece caused a panic in the State Department by sending cable that "all the signs pointed to an impending move by the Communists to seize the country". On February 20 the American Embassy in London sent word that "the British Treasury was opposing any further aid to Greece because of the precarious financial condition in which Britain found herself". On February 21 the British ambassador in Washington sought an interview with Marshall who "was out of town". On February 24 he delivered to the State Department an official note in which the British Government declared that "economic necessity dictated the relinquishment of British financial and military burdens in Greece as from the end of the current financial year, that is to say, in precisely five weeks time". It was another evidence of the fact that Pax Britannia now belonged to history. Immediately the United States alerted the State War-Navy Co-ordinating Committee. Truman asked Marshall, Forrestal and Petterson to study all aspects of the situation and make their recommendations. On February 26 Marshall and Acheson submitted their recommendation that Greece should be given aid in substantial amount for "if Greece was lost, Turkey became an untenable outpost in a sea of Communism". Truman concluded that "America could not and should not let these free countries stand unaided. To do so would carry the clearest implications in the Middle East and in Italy, Germany and France". On February 27 Truman and Marshall held a conference with Congressional leaders of both parties in both Houses itself". On March 12 Truman had taken his decision: the Truman Doctrine was proclaimed.

TROUBLE IN TURKEY

For centuries Turkey had been the focus of great power rivalries in the Eastern Mediterranean. The Dardanelles and the Straits of the Bosphorus form the only water-way connecting the Black Sea with the Mediterranean, and the nation commanding the Straits can limit the shipping that passes through it. To Black Sea Powers—Russia, Rumania and Bulgaria— assured passage through the Straits is therefore of profound economic and naval significance. Control of the harbour of Constantinople and the sea of Marmora implies the capability of launching a naval attack north into the Black Sea or south into the Mediterranean. The Russian pressure towards the Straits therefore has been a permanent feature of her foreign policy. The situation in Greece took a serious turn just at

a time when serious trouble was developing between the Soviet Union and Turkey. The Russo-German relations had been adversely affected by the Russo-German Non-Aggression Pact of August 1939, although despite this the Soviet Union continued to discuss with Turkey a pact of non-aggression to stabilize the Black Sea balance. The Turkish Foreign Minister, Sara Coglu, went to Moscow in September 1942 to conclude such a pact. He, however, found the Russian price too high and returned empty handed. Afterwards the Tripartite Treaty between Turkey, Britain and France was signed. Between December 1939 and June 1941 the Russo-Turkish relations continued "correct but cool". At the time of Stalingrad, the Soviet press, however, became critical of the Turkish policy and its criticism became more pronounced as the prospects of victory for the Allies became brighter. Finally, on March 20, 1945 as the war in Europe drew to a close the Soviet Union denounced the Treaty of Friendship and Neutrality signed in 1925, and the Soviet press began demanding the Eastern province of Turkey—the Kars and Ardahan regions—a new treaty of alliance and bases on the Straits.

In denouncing the Treaty the Russians argued that since conditions had materially changed since 1925, a new treaty in conformity with the altered situation must be negotiated. Turkey, with a sizeable army and an alliance with Britain and France, reluctantly agreed to a modest revision of the Montreux Convention, but otherwise stood firm and rejected the Soviet territorial demands. At the Potsdam Conference the Soviet Union again raised the question of the revision of the Convention, but Attlee and Truman "had stuck firmly by the principle laid down in the Montreux Convention, that the Straits should be open to the commercial shipping of all nations. For that reason nothing more was done about this subject at Potsdam except to agree that each of the power might discuss the subject directly with Turkey. This was entirely appropriate since the agreement, by its terms, was up for review in 1946" (*The Truman Memoirs*, Vol. II, p. 101).

On 2nd November, 1945 the United States proposed four points along which the Convention could be revised: (*a*) The Straits should be open to merchantmen of all nations in time of peace or war. (*b*) The Straits should, in all circumstances, be open to war vessels of the Black Sea Powers. (*c*) Passage through the Straits should be forbidden to war vessels belonging to other powers, except with the consent of the Black Sea Powers or in the execution of a mission under the authority of the United Nations. (*d*) Certain changes should be introduced to bring the new Convention up-to-date, such as substituting the "United Nations Organization" for the "League of Nations", and eliminating Japan from among the signatory powers. These proposals were also communicated to the Soviet Union which kept silent

and to Britain which followed with a similar statement to the Turkish Government.

On August 7, 1946 the Soviet Union made counter proposals : (*i*) The Straits should be open to merchantmen of all nations in time of peace or war. (*ii*) The Straits should be open in all circumstances to war vessels of the Black Sea Powers. (*iii*) Except in special cases, the passage of war vessels belonging to non-Black Sea Powers should be forbidden. (*iv*) The powers to formulate the regime of the Straits should be left to Turkey and the Black Sea Powers. (*v*) The Straits should be defended by the "common means" of Turkey and the Soviet Union. The basis of these proposals was the Soviet allegation that Turkey had not applied the provisions of the 1936 Convention properly and reasonably with regard to the Axis warships, that on July 9, 1941 it allowed a German craft, Seefalke, to pass through the Straits, that in August 1941 an Italian ship, Trevisio, was allowed to pass, and that in June 1944 eight ships of the enemy were allowed to pass from the Black Sea into the Aegean Sea. On August 22 the Turkish Government in a reply denied the Russian allegations, accepted the first three points of the Russian proposals as a basis for discussion and rejected the fourth and the fifth points, as their acceptance would be a gross violation of the interests of non-Black Sea Powers and of the sovereign rights of Turkey over the Straits. The Soviet reply came on September 24 in which the previous allegations were reiterated, satisfaction was expressed at the Turkish acceptance of the first three points and resentment on the rejection of the last two. The Soviet Union, in this note, did not reject the idea of an international conference on the Straits but suggested that the question be examined "as widely as possible" between Turkey and the Soviet Union before the conference was held. On receipt of this note the Turkish Government contacted the State Department and sought their advice. The United States consulted its allies and decided to take "a strong position" and informed the Turkish Government accordingly. Truman asked the Acting Secretary, Acheson, to instruct the American Ambassador in Ankara to inform the Turkish leaders that "the reply was formulated only after full consideration had been given to the matter at the highest levels" and to suggest to them that the Turkish reply to Russia should be "reasonable, but firm". In a note to the Soviet Union the United States warned that in case of Russian aggression on the Straits, the matter would be referred to the Security Council. At the same time the Turkish Government encouraged by the United States rejected the Soviet demands. Towards the end of the year 1946, the American Ambassador in Turkey warned the State Department that "Turkey will not be able to maintain indefinitely a defensive posture against the Soviet Union".

On January 9, 1947, the American Ambassador to Moscow expressed the view in a report to the State Department that without the long term aid of America "Turkey had no hope of surviving". As a result of the Soviet diplomatic pressure the Turkish Government felt obliged to keep its army fully mobilized in order to meet any Russian threat, thus putting its economy to a very severe strain. About 50% of the budget in 1946 was allocated to defence. Nevertheless, a significant effort to modernize the army was impossible without outside aid on a large scale. At the same time the situation in Greece was deteriorating. On February 27, in a conference with Senators, Truman said that he had "decided to extend aid to Greece and Turkey and that I hope Congress would provide the means to make this aid timely and sufficient". By 6th March, the Greek Government had formally asked for American assistance. On March 7, a Cabinet meeting was held to consider the Greek situation and Truman informed his colleagues that he had asked the Congress for a sum of $250,000,000 for Greece and $150,000,000 for Turkey. On March 12, 1947, at 1·0 p. m., Truman addressed a Joint Session of the Congress and proclaimed the "Truman Doctrine".

TROUBLE IN PERSIA

The trouble in Persia was another factor which explains the background of the Truman Doctrine. Persia is doubly important to the major powers of the world: first, because it stands in the path of a Soviet advance towards the Indian Ocean through the Persian Gulf and second, because its wealth of oil resources is tremendous. In August 1941 the Anglo-Soviet troops had occupied the Persian territories in order to protect the Baku oilfields of the Soviet Union, the Anglo-Iranian Company's oil in southern part of the country, and the route to India, in a manner that the Soviet armies occupied the Northern Provinces including Azerbaijan and the British forces occupied the oil areas of the South. Later, the American troops took over the operation of the southern section of the supply line from the Persian Gulf to the Soviet Union. By occupying Persia the despatch of the Anglo-American military supplies to the Soviet Union was made possible. In July 1942, a Tripartite Treaty between Britain, Russia and Persia confirmed the Anglo-Russian occupation in South and North respectively and provided that all foreign forces would leave the country within six months of the end of the war.

During the war the Allies had built up roads and railways and put in huge installations to load and unload and to keep the stream of supplies going. The three occupying powers had agreed that they would jointly help the Persian Government after the war to reform and modernise itself. But during the later stages of their occupation the Soviet and Anglo-American policies

began to pursue markedly divergent lines in North and South Persia. The Russians backed up a radical reform movement led by the communist-dominated Tudeh Party, while Britain and the U.S.A supported the old feudal regime. In the Northern province of Azerbaijan a movement for autonomy was encouraged and it became increasingly clear that the Persian Azerbaijan wished to join the Azerbaijan Soviet Republic of the U. S. S. R. The situation got complicated by the Russian desire to secure an oil concession in Persian Azerbaijan.

The Soviet policy in Persia was guided largely by three considerations: (*a*) To prevent the U.S.A. and Britain from having oil concession in Northern Persia, (*b*) to raise the whole question of Russian participation in a settlement in the Eastern Mediterranean Sea, and (*c*) to establish a "friendly" regime in Persia. Guided by these aims the Russians gave out their intention of retaining their troops in Persia. After the defeat of Germany in May 1945 the Government of Persia demanded the withdrawal of all foreign troops. This question was discussed at the Potsdam Conference and it was agreed that the troops should be immediately withdrawn from Teheran and that the withdrawal of troops from other areas should be considered at the London Meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers to be held in September. At this meeting it was agreed that all foreign troops would be withdrawn from Persia by March 2, 1946. In November 1945 the Tudeh Party in Azerbaijan revolted against the Persian Government and proclaimed their independence. When the Persian Government decided to send its troops there, the Soviet authorities refused to permit entry to them. On November 23, the United States in order to exert pressure on the Soviet Union informed it that they would withdraw their troops by January 1, 1946, provided that all foreign troops withdrew. On 3rd December, the Russians rejected this proposal and in the December meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers refused to discuss the Persian question. On January 19, the Persian Government referred the question to the Security Council. The Soviet Union refused to participate in the discussion on the ground that the matter did not lie within the jurisdiction of the United Nations. The Security Council, therefore, directed Russia and Persia to reach an agreement by direct negotiations. The date on which the Russians had agreed to withdraw their troops, March 2, passed out. On 4th March, the United States sent a note to Russia protesting against the gross violation of the agreement reached at the London meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers. No official reply was given to this note by the Soviet Union. However, early in April, an agreement was reached between Persia and the Soviet Union under which the Soviet troops were to evacuate the Persian territory by May 1, and a joint Soviet-Persian Oil Company was to be established in

which Russia would hold 51% of the shares for twenty-five years. In May, the Soviet troops were withdrawn and in June Azerbaijan returned to the control of the Persian Government. In July, the Persian Parliament, now that the Russian troops had left, refused to abide by the April agreement with the Soviet Union. This whole dispute created a decisive rift between the Soviet Union and the Western Powers and went a long way in the enunciation of the Truman Doctrine.

THE TRUMAN DOCTRINE

At 1·0 p. m. on March 12, 1947, Truman addressed a joint session of the Congress. In this address he said: "I believe that it must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting the attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures. I believe that we must assist free peoples to work out their own destinies in their own way. I believe that our help should be primarily through economic and financial aid which is essential to economic stability and orderly political processes". The President asked the Congress to sanction $ 400,000,000 by June, 1948 for the help of Greece and Turkey and added: "If we falter in our leadership, we may endanger the peace of the world and we shall surely endanger the welfare of our own nation". Early in May, the Congress approved of the bill which was signed by the President on May 22, 1948.

The Truman Doctrine, in the phrase of its author, marks "the turning point in America's foreign policy which now declares that wherever aggression, direct or indirect, threatened peace, the security of the United States was involved". This was a revolutionary departure in the American tradition, policy and political thinking. It implied, *firstly*, that the United States had finally decided to break away from the Roosevelt tradition of reaching a lasting understanding with the Soviet Union. For although Russia was not mentioned in Truman's speech, "no intelligent person could possibly miss the point and the American press saw to it that the unintelligent got the point too". It was thus a recognition of the fact that the world was now divided into two ideologically hostile camps. It was a prelude to the reversion of the world to the old diplomacy of spheres of influence and military alignments. It implied, *secondly*, that the traditional American policy of ignoring Europe had now come to an end, for, Truman now declared that *wherever* aggression takes place the security of the United States was involved. It was, therefore, a sort of a universalization of the Monroe Doctrine. It indicated that the American interest was not merely confined to Greek and Turkish situations but was only a starting point of the deepening American interests. It implied, *thirdly*, that the United States had now decided for a final showdown with the Soviet Union and was only

a prelude to the policy of "negotiating from a position of strength". It implied, *fourthly*, that America was now stepping into the cast off British shoes and was assuming British responsibilities, thus taking on the path of Empire. Truman's message, on the one hand, acknowledged that the British power had been sharply undermined by World War II and on the other, was an admission of the necessity of filling in the vacuum caused by the decline of the British power. The Truman Doctrine, therefore, was a clear recognition of the British withdrawal from the Eastern Mediterranean and the American commitment there and elsewhere. In this it was the precursor of the Eisenhower Doctrine formulated in January 1957.

It was obvious that the Truman Doctrine which claimed to provide huge American aid to Greece and Turkey supposedly engaged in a conflict against totalitarianism in defence of freedom was not based on sound logic. Neither Greece nor Turkey could have advanced any plea of being democratic. It was therefore not the defence of freedom or democracy that constituted the real motive behind the Truman Doctrine. As one authority has put it: "In so far as the Truman Doctrine was motivated by considerations of foreign policy (rather than of domestic policies) its *raison d' etre* lay in the strategic calculation that American control of Greece and Turkey was essential to outflank the Soviet position in the Balkans and to safeguard against a possible Muscovite advance on the oil reserves of the Near and Middle East". And, finally, it also indicated that the United States had now decided to bypass the United Nations. On the one hand, any assistance to Greece and Turkey should and could have been given by, and through, the United Nations and not directly by the United States; and on the other, the United Nations at least deserved to be taken in confidence by the United States before announcing the Truman Doctrine. The truth is that even in 1946 Truman had concluded (from the events in Persia which we have already surveyed) that "Russia was determined to have her way and that she intended to ignore the U. S. and the U. N. alike". What Truman wanted to defend, therefore, was not democracy or freedom or peace or the United Nations but the vast deposits of oil in the Near and the Middle East. "If the Russians were to control Iran's oil", he has written, "either directly or indirectly the raw material balance of the world would undergo a serious change, and it would be a serious loss for the economy of the Western world". This objective was covered up by phrases like "the rights of a small nation", "defence of freedom", and "the permanent peace of the world". Even in the Congress, this aspect was emphasised by many and it was only after Vandenberg's amendment (proposing that the U. S. government would terminate its aid whenever the General Assembly or the Security

Council should decide that action taken by the U. N. made the continuance of such assistante unnecessary) had been accepted that the opposition was quieted.

THE MARSHALL PLAN

With the passage by the American Congress of the Bill providing aid to Greece and Turkey, the United States "had served notice that the march of communism would not be allowed to succeed by default". The relations between the United States and the Soviet Union had gradually come to a dead end, and the roots of anti-Sovietism had gradually fructified. The American contempt for Russia as a land of Jewish pogroms, political terror and feudal social relationship, the traditional Russian record of expansionism in the Far East, the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 and the subsequent Soviet repudiation of the war debts, the active American intervention in the Russian civil war, the activities of the Comintern, the American refusal to recognise the communist regime and their appeasement of Japan and Germany had created an unhappy background. The difficulties in the war-time co-operation, the delay in the second front, Russia's care to avoid involvement in war with Japan and her refusal to hand over bombing bases in Siberia from which the Americans could attack Japan, the American secrecy with regard to the development of the atom bomb, the American complaint of the Soviet concealment of the facts regarding the extension of Lend-Lease Act from the Russian people, and the Soviet attitude towords Poland—led to a serious ideological battle against communism on all fronts. The Truman Doctrine was only a blunt expression of this basic conflict.

After the Bill for the American aid had been passed, the United Nations Balkan Inquiry Commission had formally concluded that Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, and Albania were supporting the uprising against the Greek Government. Early in June the situation in Greece had taken a serious turn so that on June 16 the Greek Government appealed to the United States for immediate military aid. On 9th July the British Government expressed their concern to the American ambassador in London and on July 16 Marshall informed Truman that the Greek situation was grave because the number of guerillas was increasing.

It was in this background that the factors leading to the announcement of the Marshall Plan can be understood. As a result of the attacks on industrial communities during the war, the bombing of transportation and the voracious needs of the armed forces had completely broken the economic life of nations as well as of continents. Even during the years 1945-47 the United States had provided more than $ 15 billions in loans and grants for the relief of the victims of war. But as a result of the

pressure of the Congress Truman was obliged to proclaim on August 21, 1945 that Lend-Lease would cease immediately. Nevertheless, this was compensated by the increase in the funds of the U. N. R. R. A. (United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration) from $ 589 million in 1945 to $ 1,589 million in 1946 and by the distribution of civilian supplies by the armed forces. The winter of 1946-47 was extraordinarily severe in Europe. Britain was compelled to reduce its foreign political commitments and to announce in February 1947 the cessation of its assistance to Greece. The serious economic distresses in France, Belgium, Italy, Western Germany and the Netherlands had created major political and economic problems which called for a bold and systematic approach. Secretary of State Marshall returned to Washington from the Moscow conference on April 26, 1947 "in a pessimistic mood", because of tedious delays and because no understanding could be reached with the Soviet Union. The point which most impressed Marshall was his interview with Stalin in the course of which Stalin remarked that Russia did not worry about these delays for "time would bring about agreement". This chance remark "convinced Marshall that the Russian leaders were certain that time was on their side and the more he reflected on it the more he felt that they were probably right. If nothing was done to arrest the drift in Europe, the continent was slipping towards a major economic upheaval with all the political consequences such an upheaval would entail. Either action would have to be taken to check the catastrophe, or time would deliver the keys of Europe into communist hands. From that moment General Marshall cast about for the appropriate initiative". The unsatisfactory nature of the Polish elections, and the arrest and disappearance of Kovacs had added to the gloom. Consultations immediately began between Truman and his staff to hammer out a practical approach. On May 8, 1947 Dean Acheson delivered a speech at Cleveland, Mississippi, in which he broadly hinted the possibility of American help on a wide scale to bring about the recovery of Europe.

On June 5, Marshall delivered his famous speech at Harvard which initiated the European Recovery Programme. He proclaimed: "Our policy is directed not against any country or doctrine but against hunger, poverty, desperation and chaos. Its purpose should be the revival of a working economy in the world so as to permit the emergence of political and social conditions in which free institutions can exist. Such assistance must not be on a piecemeal basis as various crises develop. Any assistance that this Government may render in the future should provide a cure rather than a mere palliative. Any government that is willing to assist in the task of recovery will find full co-operation .....on the part of the United States Government. Any govern-

ment which manoeuvres to block the recovery of other countries cannot expect help from us. Furthermore, governments, political parties or groups which seek to perpetuate human misery in order to profit therefrom politically or otherwise will encounter the opposition of the United States. It is already evident that, before the United States Government can proceed much further in its efforts to alleviate the situation and help start the European world on its way to recovery, there must be some agreement among the countries of Europe as to the requirements of the situation and the part those countries themselves will take in order to give proper effect to whatever action might be undertaken by the Government. It would be neither fitting nor efficacious for this Government to undertake to draw up unilaterally a programme designed to place Europe on its feet economically. This is the business of the Europeans. The initiative, I think, must come from Europe. The role of this country should consist of friendly aid in the drafting of a European programme and of later support of such a programme so far as it may be practical for us to do so". This speech turned out to be one of the most interesting and epoch-making events of the contemporary diplomatic history and its implications were far-reaching. In course of time it developed into the Marshall Plan and elaborated the thesis of the Truman Doctrine.

Implications. The Marshall Plan was an extension of the principles underlying the Truman Doctrine at least in three respects: (*a*) It dealt with Europe in general and not with specific states as in the case of the Truman Doctrine; (*b*) It was first and foremost an economic plan; (*c*) It was a plan for four years and therefore represented an elaborate programme. The Plan had three basic essentials: (*i*) It put the initiative for reconstruction in the hands of the European countries themselves; (*ii*) It required the maximum of coordination of efforts; and (*iii*) It laid stress on the economic factor as an over-riding consideration.

From an overall point of view, the Marshall Plan implied, in the *first place*, an anxiety on the part of the United States to avert the economic crisis which was apprehended as a sequel to the War. The disequilibrium between America and the rest of the world had been immensely aggravated by the second world war, for her increasing production and efficiency was such as the older manufacturing countries could not keep pace with. After the second world war, as after the first, she had a surplus which the rest of the world needed but for which it could not pay. After the first war the export of this surplus was made possible by the foreign loans between the period 1924-1928. But this could not prevent the economic crisis of 1930 because the borrowing world, in spite of the respite afforded by the American loans, could not increase

its exports so as to pay its way. After the second world war the United States therefore had to devise other methods to avert the apprehended crisis by expanding its foreign markets. In 1946 the economic crisis was deepening daily. The reserves of gold and dollars at the disposal of the European nations were running out with increasing speed and the gap between the imports they needed to stave off collapse and revolt and those they could actually pay for was growing wider with each month that passed. As Molotov put it in his statement on June 28, 1947: "The U. S. A. is interested in using its credit possibility for expanding its foreign markets especially in view of the approaching crisis". The same idea was expressed by Stalin later in his *Economic Problems of Socialism in the U.S.S.R.* where he said, "The sphere of exploitation of the world resources by the major capitalist countries (U. S. A., Britain and France) will not expand but contract; their opportunities for sale in the world market will deteriorate and their industries will be operating more and more below capacity. That, in fact, is what is meant by the deepening of the general crisis of the world capitalist system in connection with the disintegration of the world market. This is felt by the capitalists themselves for it would be difficult for them not to feel the loss of such markets as the U. S. S. R. and China. They are trying to offset these difficulties with the Marshall Plan....." (p. 36).

Secondly, the Marshall Plan underlined the American anxiety and determination to fight out Communism. In September 1946 Truman had already dismissed Henry Wallace for his pro-Soviet views. The conditions of France and Italy were particularly causing serious concern to the American policy-framers. In the French elections of October 1945 the communist party had won 26% of the votes, and at the election of the National Assembly on 10th November, this had increased to 28%. The communists in France had a following of five million voters. Their prestige had risen high as a result of their record during the war. The United States, therefore, felt bound to help the non-communist element in France in stopping the growth of communism and to establish a moderate government there. In 1946-47 the communists had been included in the French Government but in 1947 the United States pressed the French Government to oust them as a condition for receiving American aid after a visit of Blum to the United States to negotiate a loan. Similarly in Italy the communist strength was constantly increasing and in the elections of June 1946 the communists had won 19% of the votes. The American Embassy in Italy was constantly warning the State Department about the need of immediate economic aid to Italy as an alternative to a communist government there. An important aspect of the Marshall Plan, therefore, was to create economic conditions

in the non-communist Europe in which the states in this region might be able to offer a stout resistance to the expansion of communism. Then, again, in order to win the approval of the Congress and the agreement of the Big-Business it was necessary for the American Administration to present the European Recovery Programme as a programme of defence against communism. It was, of course, an immaterial consideration that the Soviet co-operation was so necessary for the economic recovery of Europe.

Thirdly, the Marshall Plan implied a humanitarian aspect of the American policy. It is true that the American motive was not and could not be purely humanitarian and that it was largely to prevent the spread of communism in Western Europe. Nevertheless, the humanitarian aspect cannot be altogether ignored.

Fourthly, an extremely important aspect of the Marshall Plan was the concept of the economic unity of Europe that it involved. As Truman put it: "If the nations of Europe could be induced to develop their own solution of Europe's economic problems viewed as a whole and tackled co-operatively, rather than as separate national problems, United States aid would be more effective and the strength of a recovered Europe would be better sustained". The Marshall Plan thus strengthened the movement of Western European Union which we will survey later.

Finally, like the Truman Doctrine the Marshall Plan also tended to bypass the United Nations. It is difficult to see how "the purposes of the European Recovery Programme are in complete harmony with the purposes of the Charter", and it is difficult to agree that "it is not feasible to carry out the recovery programme exclusively through the United Nations". Under the Marshall Plan at one stage or the other both Germany and Spain become the beneficiaries and it is difficult to see how giving huge aid to these countries was compatable with the purposes of the United Nations Charter.

REACTIONS IN WESTERN EUROPE

In the United States, Marshall's speech was given a rousing reception, for, it was clearly directed against the Soviet Union. In Europe "the Marshall offer was like manna from heaven, and it did not require much imagination to grasp it with fervour". For the U. S. S. R. it was a serious challenge. As we have already seen, early in 1947 the East-West tension had considerably mounted up. The New Year had begun with the creation of the Bizonia. On January 19, the Polish elections had created tension. In February, America and Russia made attacks and counter-attacks on each other and on February 26 Kovacs of Hungary had been detained by the Russians. On March 12, the Truman Doctrine had been promulgated and

it was immediately attacked by the Soviet Union as constituting an intervention in the internal affairs of other states, as a betrayal of the United Nations, as a symbol of American imperialism, and a victory of might over right. In April relations further deteriorated. The timing of the Marshall Plan, therefore, was unfortunate from the point of view of the Soviet co-operation.

In the Western capitals Marshall's speech had created tremendous interest. On June 7, Bidault had conveyed to Washington his Government's interest in this speech and on 14th June he had sounded Moscow and London for a conference. Same day the British ambassador in Paris had informed Bidault that Bevin wished to meet him. Bidault agreed, and on June 17 Bevin flew to Paris. On June 18, the two Ministers announced that they were inviting Molotov to confer with them about Marshall's proposal. On June 22, Molotov accepted the invitation. And on June 27 the three foreign ministers opened their meeting in Paris.

The Paris Meeting. The Paris Meeting was held from 27th June to 2nd July, and during this period the Foreign Ministers met five times. The British and the French Ministers had expressed their approval of the proposals of Marshall on the very first day. On June 28, Molotov made a detailed statement in which he argued that the American offer was motivated by the American anxiety to avert the approaching crisis, that it was not possible to draw up a comprehensive economic programme for the European countries as a whole because each country had a national plan of its own, that the Marshall proposal amounted to foreign interference in the internal affairs of European states, that the question on which European countries should co-operate was to be decided first, and that the problem of Germany was yet to be considered. Molotov, therefore, took the view that each country should present its own needs to the United States and that aid should be distributed on the basis of the contribution which each country made to victory over Germany. He, therefore, demanded an ascertainment of the possibilities, nature and conditions of American aid to Europe without which no progress could be made. Bevin rejected these arguments and presented a plan "which called for the establishment of a General Committee, composed of representatives of France, the U.S.S.R., Britain and four other European countries, to draft and present to the Governments of Europe a programme of recovery for a four-year period". Bidault agreed. But Molotov stood firm and reiterated the Soviet proposals on June 30. On July 1, Bidault suggested that "the General Committee be called the Committee of Co-operation, that it include representatives of all European countries except Spain, and that the recommendation of the General Committee be based on data voluntarily

supplied by the nations that decided to co-operate in the programme". On July 2, Molotov rejected the French proposals.

It is easy to see the logic in Molotov's argument that unless the American intentions were clearly known the European countries could do very little and that under the guise of economic unity of Europe the bigger countries could coerce the smaller ones in following a particular economic policy with regard to production. Eventually tempers flared up. Molotov expressed the fear that the inclusion of Germany in the programme might mean the recovery of Germany with no reparations having been made to Nazi victims. The Western proposal, Molotov insisted, would "lead to Great Britain, France and the group of countries which follow them separating themselves from the other countries of Europe, which would split Europe into two groups of states and create fresh difficulties in the relations between them. In that case American credits would serve not the promotion of the economic recovery of Europe, but the utilization of some European countries against other European countries in a manner which certain strong Powers striving for domination considered advantageous to themselves. The Soviet Government deems it necessary to warn the Governments of Britain and France against the consequences of such actions, which aim not at uniting the efforts of the European countries for their post-war economic recovery, but at entirely different purposes that have nothing in common with the true interests of the peoples of Europe". Bevin and Bidault rejected this plea. The conference broke up.

The Paris Conference. On July 3, Bevin and Bidault sent invitations to 22 countries to join them in a conference at Paris on July 12. Bidault sent a copy of this invitation to the Soviet ambassador in Paris with a letter "expressing the hope that the Russian refusal to participate was not final". On July 4, a committee of co-operation was framed to formulate a reply to the Marshall offer. On July 7, the Government of Czechoslovakia announced that it would attend the Paris Conference. On July 8, the Czech Ministers, who had left for Moscow on 4th July, were warned by the Soviet Union that their participation in the Paris Conference was incompatible with the Russo-Czech Treaty. On July 10, Prague announced that it had decided not to attend the conference. On July 12, the conference met in Paris with representatives from 16 nations: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, and the U.K. All the East European countries in the Soviet bloc (Czechoslovakia, Poland, Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary, Albania, Yugoslavia and Finland) declined. Bevin was elected chairman of the conference. Thus the opening of the Paris Conference in July, 1947 brings to a

close the era of uneasy co-operation between the Soviet Union and the Western Powers. "When Poland and Czechoslovakia accepted the idea of Marshall aid", Attlee has written in his memoirs, "his (Bevin's) hopes for the integration of Eastern and Western Europe rose high. The withdrawal of these acceptances at the orders of the Kremlin dashed this hope. It was, in fact, a declaration of the 'cold war'."

On the opening day of the Paris Conference, Bidault denied the Soviet charges of foreign interference in the internal affairs of European States. The conference immediately set up a Committee of European Economic Co-operation (C. E. E. C.) comprising of one delegate from each of the sixteen states, an Executive Committee and four Technical Committees. The rumour went round that the revival of the Ruhr would be a basic object of the E. R. P. On July 15, the plenary conference adjourned and on 16th July, the C. E. E. C. met to consider the method of collecting the necessary data on which its report could be prepared. Two questionnaires were prepared—one calling for information relating to surpluses and shortages, and the other relating to the problems of payments. Some more technical committees and sub-committees were appointed. On July 18, the Western powers sounded West Germany, and on July 22, the Head of the Bizonal Economic Council announced that Germany was eager to make her "contribution to the restoration of the economic life of Europe". On July 29, the C. E. E. C. decided to send the questionnaires to the military governor of the western zones of Germany.

Legislation in U. S. A. Meanwhile, on June 22, Truman had appointed three committees: (*i*) the Harriman Committee to determine the character and quantities of the sources available for aid to foreign countries; (*ii*) the Nourse Committee to estimate the impact on American economy of aid to other countries; (*iii*) the Krug Committee to investigate the state of natural resources of the United States and the effect of the foreign aid programme on them. In addition, led by Herter, a large committee of Congressmen of both parties visited Europe in the course of the summer in order to master the facts of the situation. Even unofficial groups bestirred themselves and booked passages for Europe. The Communist press was, of course, going wild and on 7th August, Marshall Tito denounced the United States for attempting to isolate Yugoslavia. The tightening of Soviet control on the East European States was going on uninterrupted. As a reply to the Marshall Plan the economic ties of the East European States and with the Soviet Union were tightened and Molotov launched a new trade programme which came to be called as the *Molotov Plan.* (This plan came to be given a more definite shape in January 1949 when the Comecon came to be

created). In the meantime the economic condition of Britain and France was sharply deteriorating so that on 20th August, Britain suspended the conversion of Sterling and on 28th August, France dropped all dollar imports except a few essentials.

On September 10, the Technical Committees of the Paris Peace Conference had submitted their draft reports and on September 20, the report was unanimously approved. On September 22, Bevin as the Chairman of the C.E.E.C. transmitted the report to Marshall. The report running into 690 pages gave a detailed analysis of the nature of the economic crisis and stressed the urgency of providing Europe with sizeable dollar reserves so that by the end of the year 1951 the European States might be able to restore the pre-war levels of food production, the recovery of pre-war merchant fleets and a considerable expansion of coal, steel, electrical power, oil and transport. It pointed out that Europe needed a sum of $ 22 billion to achieve the targets. On September 25, Truman made public the reports of the three committees which he had appointed and on September 29, he invited a number of Congressional and Executive leaders to consider the report of the Paris Conference and informed them that Europe would need $ 580 million to meet immediate needs and to avert the economic disaster which was fast developing. On October 1, Truman asked the Committee Chairmen to consider the summoning of a special session of the Congress on 17th November. On October 23, another conference of the Congressional leaders was called and the nature of the impending action was explained to them. Next day Truman delivered a Radio talk on "the most imminent danger that exists in France and in Italy". On November 10, Marshall summarised the American plans for immediate and long term aid to Europe. On November 17, the special session of the Congress was called and Truman told the Congress that emergency aid was indispensable for the success of the E.R.P. On December 15, the Congress passed the Interim Foreign Aid Bill of 1947 authorising $ 522 million in interim aid to tide over the crisis in France, Italy and Austria until March 1948 and, in addition, the Congress also appropriated $ 340 million to meet the occupation costs in Germany, Japan and Korea.

The interim aid amount of $ 522 millions was raised to $ 577 million in March 1948. The interim foreign aid bill also granted a sum of $ 18 million for China as an anti-communist gesture. Interesting conditions were imposed on the recipient countries and these included the obligation to make efficient use of the commodities given by the United States, to deposit local currency of an equivalent amount in a special fund to be used only for such purposes as may be agreed to between the recipient countries and the United States, to give full publicity about the

American aid, to adjust the export policy with the policy of the United States and to permit the American investigators to observe, advise and report on the distribution of the American aid. It is obvious that these conditions provide for political strings and to a certain extent rob the recipient countries of their political independence and compromise their sovereignty.

On December 19, Truman sent the E. R. P. Bill to the Congress and demanded a sum of $17,000 million over the four-year period. An extensive debate began during which three other titles were added—assistance to the International Children's Emergency Fund, aid to Greece and Turkey, and aid to China. Eventually an omnibus Bill, called the Foreign Assistance Act, was passed and signed by the President on April 3, 1948. The Harvard speech of Marshall which was hailed by Bevin as the greatest speech of modern times had now resulted in an elaborate machine. While the Congress was debating this bill the Governments of the sixteen participating countries of Europe and the Military Governors of the Western zones of Germany had signed a convention containing various multilateral pledges of co-operation and the outline of an organisation for their implementation. In June, the Congress made the necessary appropriations under the Foreign Assistance Act, and on June 28 the President signed the Appropriation Bill and soon after bilateral agreements were signed between the United States and Britain, France, Italy, etc. Of the Foreign Assistance Act, Title (I) was the Economic Cooperation Act of 1948, under which economic aid was given to Europe.

The E. C. A. The Act established an Economic Co-operation Administration (E. C. A.) which was empowered to procure the commodities required for its purpose from any source. The economic aid was made contingent upon the continuous efforts of the participating countries to accomplish a joint recovery programme through multilateral undertakings. The undertakings and the obligations which each recipient country had to accept under the Agreement with the United States were to increase domestic production, to restore financial stability, to co-operate in reducing trade barriers, to make efficient use of all resources, to help the United States in stockpiling, to facilitate transfer of materials available to meet the needs of United States, to establish local currency accounts commensurate with assistance received from the United States and to be used in consultation with the American authorities, to allow access to the American nationals to such of the materials under its control in which the United States was deficient, and to make reports to the American authorities about the working of the programme. We have already stated that on April 16, 1948 the European Economic Co-operation Convention had been signed under which the O. E. E. C. had been set up to ensure co-operation among the participating states. Decisions of

this organisation were to be taken by mutual agreement of all the members. The participating states had to co-operate with regard to the mutual exchange of services and commodities, separation of trade restrictions, the reduction of tariffs and the movement of workers. A continuous study of the customs union was to be made. Thus, the foundations of the Western European Union came to be strengthened.

SOVIET REACTIONS

The reactions to these developments, as we have already noted, were sharp and decisive. In the *first place*, the Soviet press had become extremely angry and the Soviet statesmen gave expression to their resentment in strong language. On September 18, 1947, Vyshinsky told the General Assembly that the 16 European States had become the stooges of American imperialism. On September 30, a vehement attack was made on Truman in the *Russian Literary Gazette* and this led the American Government to lodge an official protest. *Secondly*, as a reaction to the Marshall Plan the Soviet Union under the so-called Molotov Plan cut off "whatever flow of trade and commerce had been resumed between Eastern and Western Europe". Politically, the process of consolidation in Eastern Europe also received an impetus. In July 1947, Maniu of Rumania was arrested and sentenced for life. Towards the end of July Petkof was hanged. In October, Mikolajczy fled from Poland and in November the French and the Italian communists instigated a wave of strikes. In December a Free Government of the Greeks was proclaimed and the Rumanian King abdicated. The London Conference was stillborn. Early in 1948 several treaties of friendship, co-operation and mutual assistance between the Soviet Union and the Eastern European states were signed: with Rumania on 4th February, 1948, with Hungary on 13th February, with Bulgaria on 18th March, with Finland on 6th April. In February, the coup in Czechoslovakia was committed by Gottwald and in June the Foreign Ministers of 8 East European states held a conference at Warsaw. *Thirdly*, at a conference at Wiliza Gora in Silesia on September 22 and 23 which was attended by representatives of the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria, France, Italy, Yugoslavia and Poland the Communist Information Bureau (the Cominform) came to be established with headquarters at Belgrade. The announcement was formally made on October 5. It was announced to be an organization to coordinate the policies of the communist parties of the participating states on the international front. The Cominform established a new journal and it immediately started its crusade against the Marshall Plan. *Finally*, the rift between the East and the West was now complete, the relations between the Soviet Union and the United States were put to the

greatest strain. Early in 1948 the State Department published the official documents bearing on the Russo-German relations during 1939-41. On January 28, the visit of American warship to Italian ports created tension. On February 1, the flight by American air-craft over the Russian ships in Japan added to the strain. On February 2, the Soviet Union protested against the presence of an American military mission in Persia. Towards the end of the month the crisis in Prague was deepening and with the overthrow of the coalition cabinet of Dr. Benes all hopes of an East-West understanding had vanished and the cold war had started with full fury.

NATURE AND TECHNIQUE OF THE COLD WAR

What is the nature of this conflict? Is it merely a struggle for power, a struggle for world supremacy? Or is it, what has been called, "an expression of two incompatible ways of life: those of democracy and totalitarian Communism"? According to the "bi-polar" interpretation of world politics, as given by Arnold Toynbee, there are two and only two powers in the world today and "all the other States...are in some measure dependent—most of them on the United States and a few of them on Russia, but none completely independent of one or other of these two powers". Is it correct to say that it is only these two Powers *that matter in world politics today*? Now, it is true that the effective unit of foreign policy and strategy is no longer the nation state, but the coalition of such states brought together and held together for certain purposes. The United States and the Soviet Union have global objectives and, therefore, global strategy which tends to narrow down progressively the scope of neutrality. The technical character of the modern war, the disappearance of traditional restraints on it, and its remorselessness tend "to force all states to take sides". In a future conflict it is extremely doubtful that any state would be allowed to remain neutral, much less to enforce its neutrality. The argument that "the global character of any future war may make the great powers more reluctant to force all other states to take sides" does not take into account the growing cynicism and ruthlessness which must characterize the next world war. The freedom with which Marshal Tito could rebel against the Soviet Union and the zest with which Mr. Nehru pursues the policy of non-alignment does not represent a choice made but a choice allowed. But this choice may be allowed so long as the day of reckoning does not arrive. When it comes, the theory of global objectives would reign supreme. As Friedmann has put it, "in the next world war...the determination of the two warring sides to win the war would in most cases be more important than respect for other nation's sovereignties or freedom of decision".

What is the nature of this global conflict? Is it purely ideological? And what are the weapons used? Now just as the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 provided economic and social contents to the colonial movements, similarly it introduced the conflict of social philosophies as a major factor in modern international relations. The history of the inter-war period amply bears it out. After the end of the second world war, this conflict became wider and more intense. The United States views the Soviet political system as an international conspiracy using internal subversion as its principal instrument. The Soviet Union, with a bitter memory of intervention and appeasement, regards the western system as scientific exploitation, aggression, and organized depredation. Starting from a clash of social philosophies this conflict permeates all spheres of life, all theatres of world politics and all forums and in order to wage it, all kinds of weapons—political, economic, psychological and military—are used, weapons which sometimes run diametrically opposite to the values they are intended to uphold. Economic aid, for instance, is given by the United States of America to bolster up a Communist Yugoslavia, a remnant of feudalism like Chiang Kai-shek, or a Fascist Spain in order to strengthen Democracy against Communism. There is hardly any Latin American country which can lay claim to democracy and yet each one of these countries is a recipient of American aid. This is really the real nature of the crisis that the West has to face. It is trying to defend democracy with dubious and, occasionally, with anti-democratic methods. Liberalism, which is the mainstay of the Western system, is on a discount and honest differences of opinion are viewed with alarm.

Then, again, espionage on a very extensive scale is used by both powers. Large scale economic and military aid, name-calling, propaganda, display and demonstration of military strength and localised conflicts are harnessed by each side. Facts are invented, suppressed or distorted. Broadcasting, television, film, information bureaus, psychological strategy boards, exchange of teachers, students and statesmen are the usual media of propaganda. Direct economic and financial assistance, aid to under-developed areas, embargo on strategic materials, direct and indirect control of the sources of raw materials, and economic integration projects like the E. C. S. C. and the Comecon are the economic instruments. Economic aid, it is important to remember, is not channelled through the United Nations, but through bodies set up to serve the ends of military alliances. As Rockfeller is reported to have advised Eisenhower, this "should serve to make the alliances themselves more attractive If necessary, certain changes in the form of these alliances should be considered". Ideological principles are used to advance national interests through justifying or disguising policies and deeds in the struggle for power, and to serve as

international links. A systematic attempt is made to influence the attitudes and actions of individuals and groups by means of words and other symbols, to spread a particular doctrine, system, or set of ideas with a view to guiding individual and group action by directing attention, intensifying attitudes favourable to its aims, reversing obstructive attitudes, winning the indifferent to its side, and neutralizing or even frightening the uncontrollable. The Soviet Union attributes all the existing evils and troubles to the misdeeds of the United States, as the United States ascribe all political and economic developments to "Soviet devilry and cunning". Everything is described and evaluated exclusively in military terms as a contest and everything is scored as either a gain for the United States or a gain for the U. S. S. R. It is, therefore, necessary to remind ourselves that there were serious threats to peace and horrible wars even before the Bolshevik Revolution. And, conversely, even if the Soviet Union were to disappear or have a complete change of heart with respect to its avowed objective of world revolution, we should still have to face and solve many problems which we now consider to be aspects of the Soviet threat for "large segments of the world's population would still be struggling for better living standards, economic security, and viable institutions. Hyper nationalism, authoritarianism and other dangers to free institutions would persist. Indeed it is partly because these and other issues exist in the world today that Communism has large opportunities for initiative. The Soviet Union did not create, in Asia, the Middle East, North Africa, and Europe, all of the problems which now confront us".

In short, the strategy of the cold war is based on an effective use of the entire armoury of diplomacy in its most brutal aspects. Military alliances, stock-piling of arms, scientific and technological advances, regional organisations and the United Nations Organisation are all harnessed for the purpose. Class differences and racial hatreds, sentiment of nationalism, industrial unrest, local conflicts, even poverty and starvation are fully exploited for the purpose of the cold war. The Soviet Union banks on the Asian hatred of the West and has encouraged the nationalisation of petroleum resources wherever the opportunity presented itself. In this the Russians attempted to deny petroleum resources to the Western world, in time of emergency, by setting up a system of individual governmental monopolies in each of the producing countries. They apparently believe that such organisations could be easily infiltrated, that they provide an ideal platform from which to fan the flames of nationalism and to provoke misunderstandings and antagonisms on an international scale, and that they create excellent opportunities for stirring up industrial unrest, for undermining the private enterprise system, and for promoting the thesis of State Socialism. The United States makes

full capital of the national uprisings in East Europe. Some statesmen in the United States even went to the length of taking the world "to the brink of war". Local conflicts like Korea, Kashmir and Palestine have all been adjusted in the framework of the cold war. Countries and regions continue to be artificially divided just because the dictates of the cold war do not permit their re-unification. It is, in fact, in this context that one can get comfort in something like the "Panch Sheel" even though there is nothing new or original about it.

CHAPTER 5

The United States And Western Europe

In the last chapter we have seen that the development of events in 1947 and the first weeks of 1948 were both a recognition of the growing cleavage between the Soviet Union and the Western Powers and an expression of firm determination on the part of all of them to consolidate their respective positions for any final showdown. In the 19th century American diplomacy was mainly concerned with the establishment and consolidation "of an independent continentation" and the protection of its position in the Western Hemisphere. This isolationism "did not, by reason of its original motive, extend to relations with countries outside Europe, and it gradually weakened as fear of Europe declined". Thus from 1898 to 1939 the United States is seen groping towards a new relationship with the rest of the world and "from eschewing relations with Europe on the supposition that such relations must be dangerous, American policy passed into a new sphere of seeking a relationship which would be safe". In 1919-20 it appeared that Wilson's dynamism was failing on the hard rock of tradition and that the United States was retreating into isolationism. But the economic depression of the thirtie's, the forces of totalitarianism, the fascist offensive in Europe and the Far East culminating in Pearl Harbour pulled out the United States from its shell and ranged her with a large number of states against the Axis. When the second world war came to a close, it was realized that the policy of isolation followed in the 19th century had been possible because of "the maritime rule of Britannia" which had now passed away. It was also realized that the widening range of weapons of war had completely changed the concept of security. This factor "extended to the United States the traditional British concern to prevent the domination of Europe by any single power". The two world wars had led to the development of the U.S.A. as the greatest power of the world. Nevertheless during the course of the second world war, an idea developed that instead of one power controlling world events, there should be a new world system in which the major powers were to work together. This idea, as Toynbee put it, was "comparable with coalition government at the national level". The product of this idea was the United Nations. The events of 1945-47, however, soon disproved the efficacy of the doctrine of concert of powers and the United States, therefore, "were abruptly faced with the task

of evolving a foreign policy for a world in which coalition government by a concert of powers was impracticable". The outcome of this debacle was the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan.

With the proclamation of the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan, and with the revival of the Cominform and the seizure of power in Czechoslovakia, international tension mounted up and unprecedented war of nerves, waged with well organised propaganda machinery, became a permanent feature of international relations. Every issue came to be hotly contested between the two power blocs and all international courtesies came to be cast aside. Violent expressions alien to the diplomatic parlance came to be flung by each side on the other. Every question seemed to bring the world nearer World War Third and every area of the world acquired a strategic importance not appreciated by the average man who was more and more confused by suppression, distortion and invention of facts by printed and spoken word, television, and film. Every story came to have two versions based on and supported by "facts". Even poverty, hunger and disease came to be utilised in the service of diplomacy. A doctrinal commitment the like of which the world never saw before since the days of counter-reformation came to tie down the mind and the conscience of the intellectuals, so that, either one could be a democrat or a heretic, a communist or an infidel. A neutralist came to be dubbed as a misguided fool or a vainglorious idealist. Free thinking came to be suspected even in societies whose fabric was inter-woven with democratic ideas and values so that witch-hunting and book-burning came to characterise them. A sense of panic, a feeling of uncertainty, a mood of diffidence and a psychology of distrust and suspicion robbed man of any hope in his future; and while the diplomats and politicians hurled abuses on each other, the scientists were harnessing the forces of nature and developing murderous weapons in the service of state-craft, man allowed himself to believe that there is not much he could do to help the situation.

ASPECTS OF CONTAINMENT POLICY

During the period under review, the policy of containment which had been initiated by the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan was given a concrete shape and was only matched by closer discipline in the Soviet bloc. The principal objective of this policy was clearly to prevent the Russian expansion "beyond the internationally recognized limit of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republic" by resisting pressure by counter pressure Hostility to world communism was a basic right and a basic duty and everywhere, therefore, the Americans came in conflict with it. In the first stage, the U.S.A. started giving relief to the Europeans so that the communist threat might

recede. It was expected to be a temporary and brief commitment but gradually it extended farther in time and scope. The economy of the entire free world came to be tied down with the U.S. economy resulting in unprecedented domination by the United States. In the second stage, the military and political bonds were forged and the attempt was made to organize the resources of the entire non-communist world on the base of American leadership. In short, the policy of containment implied the building up of the organization for economic co-operation, the development of western defence organization led by the U.S.A. and directed against the Soviet Union, and the construction of a machinery of social and cultural co-operation involving man-power, health and education. It implied the growth of regional security based on regional alliances. It involved the revival of Germany against communism in Europe and the revival of Japan against communism in Asia, for now not only the Soviet Union was to be "contained", but also the People's Republic of China. It involved a programme of economic and military aid to the under-developed areas which were poor, sensitive and distrustful of all foreign intervention, but which, with their rich and diverse raw materials, valuable strategic bases and sizeable man power, became a bone of contention between the East and the West. It also implied a process of rearmament and the development of both conventional and atomic weapons. And, finally, it involved a maddening search for bases for the encirclement of the enemy so that attack could be delivered on fixed targets.

ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION

It has been noted that following the Harvard Speech of Marshall, the O.E.E.C. and the E.C.A. had been set up in order to put the E.R.P. into effect so that in the minimum time the industrial and agricultural production of the participating states might be increased, the volume of trade both within Europe and between Europe and the rest of the world might be expanded, internal financial stability might be attained and maintained, and the problem of deficit with the dollar area might be solved particularly by increased exports. If these objectives could be realised the march of Communism might be halted, and the internal defences of "the Free World" might be strengthened. The first efforts at economic co-operation among the European countries after World War II were made in 1947 when the three states—Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg (Benelux) joined in a pact to coordinate certain economic activities among themselves. In the first stage, a tariff community was developed in which all three countries would apply the same tariffs to non-Benelux goods. In the second stage, a customs com-

munity was developed in which all the three countries were to apply similar customs legislations. In the third stage, the customs community was to be replaced by a customs union in which same excise duties and consumption taxes would be levied. In the final stage, there was to be a full economic union. In March 1949, the Ministers of the Benelux countries optimistically announced that a pre-union stage would begin on 1st July, 1949, which within a year would be replaced by a full economic union. On January 1, 1948, tariff union had been achieved and the taxes were to a certain extent equalised. But the most important endeavour in the direction of economic co-operation was made after the initiative had been taken by Secretary Marshall in his Harvard Speech.

The O.E.E.C. The O.E.E.C. fostered various co-operative measures, such as schemes for freer trade and payment designed to benefit member countries as a whole. The amount of Marshall aid fund each year was determined by annual votes of the American Congress. The allocation of aid, in the beginning, was undertaken by the Economic Co-operation Administration (E.C.A.), but, later on, this task was entrusted to and carried out by the O.E.E.C. By June 1951, the date when the E.R.P. was brought to an end one year ahead of schedule, an amount of $ 12,500 million had been provided under the Marshall aid of which 76% was in grants, 15% in conditional aid and the remaining 9% in loans repayable over a long period of years. As a result of this aid the O.E.E.C. countries not merely regained but considerably surpassed the pre-war level in most of the main sectors of production and trade.

The Mutual Defence Assistance Programme. Before the completion of the E.R.P. the United States had started another programme—The Mutual Defence Assistance Programme—under which funds were advanced on the authority of the Mutual Defence Assistance Act which became law in October 1949. After the outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950 military assistance greatly increased in importance. In October, 1951 the U. S. Mutual Security Appropriations Act was passed which provided a sum of $ 7,330 million, of which $ 4,819 million was for military aid and $ 1,022 million for economic aid to Europe. The administration of this programme was entrusted to the U. S. Mutual Security Agency which came into operation on January 1, 1952, when the E.C.A. came to an end. Nevertheless, the administration of the military assistance programme continued to be carried on by the American defence department. In August 1953, mutual security and all economic and technical programmes were taken over by a new agency called as the Foreign Operations Administration.

We have noted that on April 16, 1948, 16 states of Europe,

together with the military governors of the Western zones of occupation of Germany, had signed a convention which had set up the O.E.E.C. In October the Anglo-American zone of Trieste was formally admitted to its membership, and in October 1949 the German Federal Republic became a member. In 1950 the United States and Canada joined it as associate members. The O.E.E.C. consisted of a Council responsible for making policy decisions, an Executive Committee to assist the Council, a Managing Board of the European Payments Union, a Steering Board for Trade, Technical Committees and a Secretariat. Although the major task of the O.E.E.C. was to assist in the working of the E.R.P., it was to continue even after the ERP came to an end. One of the most important achievements of the O.E.E.C., however, was the development of the Intra-European Payments Scheme to which we will shortly turn. The Council meets frequently and discusses a wide range of economic problems. In November-December 1956, it discussed the report of a Ministerial Working Party of O.E.E.C. dealing with the economic situation in member countries, and examined the Western Europe's oil situation. It decided to set up a new consultative body—the O.E.E.C. Petroleum Emergency Group—with which representatives of European international oil companies would be associated, and adopted a resolution calling upon member countries to promote the conclusion of agreements between oil companies and shipping firms so as to permit the transportation of oil in the most economical conditions. Every year the O.E.E.C. brings out an annual report on the economic situation of Europe. The 8th Report was made public in April 1957.

The Intra-European Payments Scheme and the E. P. U. As a result of the war the international flow of goods and services in Europe was seriously impeded by a network of quantitative restrictions and exchange controls which created difficulties of payment. With industry employed up to capacity, a country could not afford to divert part of its production from its own use unless it received an equivalent and it would refuse to send supplies to a country in need if the latter had neither sufficient exporting power nor the sufficient monetary reserves to provide that equivalent. If, therefore, the difficulties of payment could be got over, the problem could be eased. The Intra-European Payments Scheme was devised to meet this problem under which "any participating country in a position to send excess exports to another would provide a credit or 'drawing right' for the amount of the excess in favour of the latter. The shares of the two countries in American aid would be assessed on the assumption that one would lose and the other would gain necessary supplies to that amount, and a corresponding portion of the share of the exporting country would be marked as 'conditional aid' only to

be provided if the exports were actually sent".....(*Survey of International Affairs*, 1947-48, pp. 86-87). Several Intra-European Payments Agreements were thus concluded during 1948-49 and 1949-50. The Intra-European Agreements culminated in the European Payments Union (E. P. U.) which was agreed to on September 19, 1950 and went into effect retrospectively from July 1, 1950, in order to facilitate the liberalisation of Intra-European trade.

The E.P.U. is essentially multi-lateral and provides an automatic arrangement whereby each country can trade within EPU on the basis of its net credit or debit position with all O.E.E.C. countries and it operates within the framework of O.E.E.C. by a managing board consisting of seven members appointed by the participating Governments. The E.P.U. "resembles in some respects the Clearing Union proposed in 1943 by Lord Keynes. The net debits and credits incurred by member countries with one another were to become debts to and from the union expressed in terms of a common unit of account". The Payments Union was designed to facilitate to the largest possible measure among the participating states the liberalisation, on a non-discriminatory basis, of trade and invisible transactions. Liberalisation of trade was intended to strengthen the balance of payment of the member countries as a group, by substituting production of certain supplies within the group for imports from outside. But the favourable effect on the balance of payment would disappear if the productive power for providing the supplies were diverted from producing goods for export.

The E.P.U. has been continuously working since July 1, 1950 and the O.E.E.C. Council meeting on May 10, 1957 approved the prolongation of E.P.U. for another year as from July 1, 1957. The rules of operations were to be the same as in previous years. Settlements in E.P.U. as of October 1956, covered a total of net surpluses or deficits of 135·1 million units of account (one unit of account equals $ 1·00), the Federal Republic of Germany being the main creditor. Throughout the following months, the West German surplus and French deficit continued to grow. On June 4, 1957 the Managing Board of E.P.U. met in Basle to discuss this problem. It was suggested that the French deficit would be counteracted by a credit to the E.P.U. from West Germany. But one of the difficulties was a West German demand that the use made by France of the proposed credit should be subject to supervision of the type to which Germany had been subject when its E.P.U. deficit had been met by similar means in 1951. It was, however, reported that France was unwilling to accept such supervision.

The O.E.E.C. also carried on useful work with regard to the allocation of scarce materials and the exchange of technical and scientific information. In 1953 it set up a European Productivity

Agency in order to seek and promote the most suitable effective means of increasing productivity in the various sectors of the economies of the member countries. The expenditure of this agency is met out by the United States and by the allocations from the assets of O.E.E.C. As we will note later, in April 1949 the North Atlantic Treaty was signed and in the following years the N.A.T.O. was developed. In 1950 the N.A.T.O. set up a Defence Production Board, a North Atlantic Planning Board for Ocean Shipping and a Petroleum Planning Committee. In May, 1951 a Financial and Economic Board was formed in order to consider the financial and economic problems arising in connection with N.A.T.O. defence programme. On February 8, 1953 the Council of O.E.E.C. decided that the six-member countries of the European Coal and Steel Community, which we will shortly discuss, should be regarded as a single unit for certain O.E.E.C. decisions.

The European Coal and Steel Community (E.C.S.C.). In order to understand the full implications of the European Coal and Steel Community it is necessary to outline the background of the Franco-German relations since the end of the second world war. From 1792 to 1940 France had been occupied by the German troops six times. During the four years of German occupation from 1940 to 1944 the French suffered a very deep feeling of national humiliation. From 1945 onwards they were haunted by a sort of "complex of the new Stresemann". Then, again, there was still the fear of the German economic power potential. The remarkable quickness of the German recovery and reconstruction increased the French distrust and fear. The possibility of an American conversion which might lead the U.S. to replace France with Germany as its main continental ally un-nerved the French. From 1945 to January 19, 1946 the main lines of the French policy as pursued by General de Gaulle seem to have been (*a*) demand for the French military occupation of the Rhineland and for its detachment from Germany; (*b*) political separation of the Saar from Germany and the internationalisation of the Ruhr; and (*c*) demand of linking the questions of the Western and Eastern frontiers of Germany and of placing the German problem in the framework of the general European problem.

From January 1946 to July 1948 France finally ranged herself in the Western camp, after having attempted a sort of neutrality in the first phase. During this period Bidault sought to offer French support for the Anglo-American plans on Germany and did not object to the creation of Central Allied Board subordinated to the Allied Control Council. Nevertheless, he refused to treat German claims with regard to the Ruhr as legitimate and always emphasised that the Saar should be integrated in the French

economic and monetary sphere of influence. On December 21, 1946 a customs line was established between the Saar territory and Germany, but in the Moscow conference, the French Foreign Minister persuaded Britain and America to agree to an economic union of France and the Saar. Soon after, certain economic and political measures were taken to realise the aims of this policy. In November, 1947 the French Assembly authorised the Government to introduce the franc into the Saar as legal currency in place of the Saar Mark which had been introduced on June 7. On September 28, 1947 the text of a draft constitution for the Saar territory was made public which provided for an autonomous and democratic unit linked with France. On October 5, elections were held and on January 3, 1948 the French Government recognised the autonomous Saar state. On the question of the Rhineland, Bidault practically abandoned the French claims and on the question of Ruhr he had to be satisfied with a simple international control by an "International Authority of the Ruhr" created in June, 1948.

From July 1948 to 1953 the French policy towards Germany, partly guided by Schuman, acquired a new direction as a result of the reconstitution of a government in Western Germany, the outbreak of the Korean War, and general East-West tension. "Faced with the U.S.S.R., French security required the tightening of relationship with the United States, whence the signature of the Atlantic Pact; faced with Germany, French security ought no longer to be founded on coercion but on confidence". This explains the integration of new Germany into the Council of Europe by the Petersburg Agreement of 22nd November, 1949, and this also explains the whittling down of the reparations to be paid by Germany almost to the point of virtually abandoning them. The basic problem for Schuman, therefore, was to mark out a policy based on (*a*) the Russian threat, (*b*) the German threat, and (*c*) the need of French economic recovery. Even in 1946 France had adopted the so-called Monnet Plan to modernise its industrial equipment and to raise the level of production in six major sectors of its economy. Although under this plan and with the help of the Marshall aid the total industrial production in France had been raised, Germany's progress had been greater.

Thus the rich iron and coal deposits of the Ruhr valley, long a source of power, and an implement of economic as well as military warfare for Germany, loomed larger than ever as a threat to the security of France. Britain and America were pressing a policy of leniency towards Germany where a steady political and economic recovery was being achieved; in France they had their chronic political instability and the economic muddle. It was, therefore, necessary, in the interest of Western unity, that the competitive relationship between France

and Germany be drastically altered. Traditionally France had sought alliances against Germany with Russia; but now with the growing communist danger there was no country to which it could turn. The Dunkirk Treaty and the Brussels Pact were only nominally directed against Germany. How could Germany, then, be prevented from obtaining a dominant position on the continent? The answer was given by Schuman on May 9, 1950, when he proclaimed the Schuman Plan. Keeping in mind the problem of security, the question of the Saar, the moral impact of the European idea, the need of common market, the value of coal and steel, and the general needs of Germany, Schuman attempted a Franco-German *rapprochement.* On March 3, 1950, France had entered into a treaty with the Saar Government and had obtained 50-year lease on the Saar mines subject to a final determination at a peace conference. This had raised a stormy protest in Germany and on March 7 the German Chancellor, Adenauer, proposed that France and Germany enter into an economic union to obviate the need for unilateral control over the Saar by either country. It was in this background that on May 9, 1950 Schuman in a press conference read out a memorandum which became known as the Schuman Plan and which later on developed into the E.C.S.C.

The Schuman Plan. Schuman said that "the community of production will clearly show that any war between France and Germany becomes not only unthinkable but in actual fact impossible". He proposed that the final obstacle to European peace could be removed by placing under a common authority the coal and steel industries of France and Germany and of any other country that would be willing to join with them; and that this common authority would modernise and rationalise these industries and would ensure the supply of their products on equal terms to all the participating states without discrimination either by customs duty or by differential transport charges. Thus "in proposing to place the total French and German output under a single high authority, in an organisation open to all European countries, the French Government was taking a first step towards a federation of Europe". The Schuman Plan provided for Germany to surrender her war making capacity and provided for France—notoriously short of coal and thus far at the mercy of coal-rich Germany—access to her on a permanent and equitable basis.

Soon after, Monnet and Schuman went to London to take part in the discussion on Germany. From there Monnet went to Bonn to discuss the plan with the German Government. On May 25, the French Government circulated a note to various European Governments inviting them to participate in a conference in Paris to negotiate a treaty provided they accepted the principles embodied in the memorandum of May 9.

The reactions to the Schuman Plan were diverse and interesting. In France both the extreme left and the extreme right did not view it with favour. In Germany it caused a wide enthusiasm although the business circles were rather critical. On May 23, the Allied High Commission in Western Germany approved the Schuman Plan and asked the French Government to deal directly with the West German Government on the subject. In Italy on May 10, the Foreign Minister, Sforza, had announced the official acceptance of the Plan but in the Netherlands the Government was undecided. In Belgium, on May 27, the Government decided to attend the Paris Conference even though the business section was reticent. The Soviet Union saw in the plan a plot to remove the rich coal deposits of the Ruhr from her reach and *Pravda* wrote: "The French proposal was the result of the influence of United States bankers, and was nothing but a new gigantic cartel, a passive instrument in the hands of armaments manufacturers. It differs from a private cartel only in that it would be completely subservient to the United States". In Britain the official opinion was one of reserved sympathy. On May 11, Prime Minister Attlee stated in the House of Commons that "His Majesty's Government will approach the problem in a sympathetic spirit" and added that "they welcome this French initiative to end the age-long feud with Germany and so bring unity and peace to Europe". On May 25, the British Government informed Schuman that they were studying the plan. On June 4, however, London rejected it and the official communique stated that "there is a substantial difference of approach between the two Governments". As Europe's leading coal and steel producer, Britain had distinct economic advantages in trade with European and Commonwealth countries and did not want to sacrifice either their profitable European export trade in coal or their preferential position as the chief steel exporter within the British Commonwealth of Nations in return for unreal advantages within the European Coal and Steel Community. Britain, therefore, decided to remain technically outside the E.C.S.C. and to participate in its deliberations in an informal manner. In the United States, in a press conference on May 11, Truman hailed the Schuman proposal as "an act of constructive statesmanship" which "provides the basis for establishing an entirely new relationship between France and Germany and opens a new outlook for Europe".

On June 3, 1950 Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands agreed to negotiate a treaty incorporating the Schuman Plan and they met in a conference in Paris on June 20. On March 19, 1951 a draft treaty was concluded subject to its consideration by the foreign ministers. They met in Paris on April 12, to decide matters with regard

to the constitution and organisation of the Community. The formal treaty was signed on April 12, 1951. Part one of the treaty dealt with the general principles of the Community; part two was related to the institutions set up for it; part three laid down the economic and social provisions and part four contained the general provisions and definitions. Article 2 of the treaty stated the purpose of the E.C.S.C.: to contribute to economic expansion, the development of employment and improvement of standards of living in the participating countries through the institution, in harmony with the general economy of the member States of a common market. The institutions set up under Art. 78 were: the High Authority, the Consultative Committee, the Common Assembly, the Special Council of Ministers, and the Court. The Treaty also set up a Commission of Presidents composed of the Presidents of the High Authority, the Assembly, the Council, and the Court. Since the treaty was concluded for 50 years, it easily constituted a major step towards a permanent political integration of Europe. The almost revolutionary character of the community becomes obvious if one bears in mind that the treaty prohibits the application of quantitative restrictions or dual pricing systems and the levying of import and export duties on coal and steel. It implies that the participating states have surrendered their rights to protect their war-making capacities, their right to allocate markets and products, to regulate employment on the basis of nationality. It is, therefore, a major co-operative venture.

The treaty was ratified by the Netherlands on July 17, 1952, by France on July 18 and by Belgium and Italy on July 22, by Germany and Luxemb ourg on July 23. It went into force on July 25 and on August 10 the High Authority began to operate. On July 24 and 25 the ministers of the participating states had met in Paris to decide on measures of implementation. The Council held its first meeting in Luxembourg on September 8, and on September 10 the first session of the Assembly opened in Strasbourg. The inaugural session of the Court was held on December 10, and eleven days later the first judgment was delivered. On December 30, the official journal of the Community was first published and it contained the figures of the levies on coal and steel production. Common markets for coal, iron ore, and scrap were established on February 10, 1953 and for ordinary steel on May 1, 1953, when the licences and tariffs were also removed. By the end of 1954 the Community had advanced huge loans to the industrial concerns of the participating states and had adopted a number of measures in the social field.

Gradually the relations with other non-participating states were established. On August 22, 1952 the British Government

established a permanent mission with the High Authority and on December 21, 1954 a Standing Council of Association consisting of the representatives of the British Government and the High Authority was established. In August, the United States also appointed its representative to the Community and in April, 1954 America had given a loan of $ 100 million to the High Authority. Missions had also been attached by Sweden, Austria, Denmark, Japan, Norway and Switzerland. The Community also developed working relations with the Council of Europe, the O.E.E.C, the Economic Commission for Europe and the I.L.O. Of course, there are still many obstacles in the smooth progress of the Community: the problem of foreign trade policy, the question arising from the fact that important industrial nations are not yet part of the Community, the problem raised by the exclusion of French-African coal and iron ore from the E.C.S.C. pool, and the problem of reconciling the continued existence of sovereign states with the purposes of the Community. It should, however, be remembered that considerable progress was registered by the Community in the spheres of transportation, reduction of tariffs, increase in trade, and elimination of preferential charges. "The European Coal and Steel Community", John Goor Maghtigh wrote in May 1955, "has not only proved its usefulness but also its vitality...Undoubtedly, the course of the organization in Luxembourg will be a difficult one to steer for there are dangerous waters ahead, but the crew is animated with a purpose".

Thus the E.C.S.C. became a going concern and by the end of 1954 it was estimated that in it 241,600,000 tons of coal had been mined. By May, 1955 the cost of freight for coal and steel had been considerably reduced and by the end of the year 1957, a system of direct tappering freight rates seems to be fully established and about $ 2 million a year is being saved of transport cost within the Community. A series of loans totalling $ 59,100,000 had been made by the middle of 1955 and a number of measures have also been taken in the social field. But, as we will notice later, an important counter-part of the E.C.S.C. was the projected European Defence Community and the proposed European Political Community (E.D.C. and E.P.C.). Both had been abandoned by the end of August 1954, and this abandonment seemed to have left the E.C.S.C. "high and dry as the sole trophy of the Federalist movement". This set-back, however, soon proved to be only temporary. The defeat of the E.D.C. only proved to the Western statesmen that the approach to European unity would have to be gradual. On June 1, 1955, the States participating in the E.C.S.C. met in a conference at Messina (Italy) and agreed to work for the development and expansion of the Common Market and to set up a European Authority for the exploitation of nuclear energy.

Euratom and Common Market. Two schemes emerged, one for Euratom (a European Atomic Energy Pool), and the other for a General Common Market. A special committee under the chairmanship of the Belgian Foreign Minister, Herri Spaak, was set up to study them and it submitted its findings to the foreign ministers of the six states participating in the E.C.S.C. on April 21, 1956. On May 30, 1956 the foreign ministers endorsed this report which is now "an official policy statement of the 6 countries". Towards the end of May the Foreign Ministers met at Venice and decided that preparations should be made for the conclusion of treaties incorporating the schemes of the Euratom and the Common Market. The Common Market scheme was to be based on the ideas of the abolition of all barriers to trade and the fusion of several national markets, the drawing up of market rules for the elimination of distortions due to national policy such as restrictive practices, subsidies and monopolies, and finally taking of certain steps which could ensure that the resources of Europe are fully used and developed, such as the Establishment of an Investment Fund to finance projects of general interest (atomic energy plants, etc.), to finance the provision of basic services in the less developed regions of the Common Market, and to help in the implementation of the Government-sponsored reconversion schemes necessitated by the opening of the Common Market. The Fund was to have a basic capital of one million dollars subscribed by member governments.

In October 1956, the Inter-Governmental Committee of the Brussels Conference met and it deliberated on the conditions regarding the harmonization of wages and social charges which France wished to see met in connection with the proposed common market, the question of including overseas territories in the proposed Common Market, and the problem of the ownership and purchase of fissile material. It also set up a Committee of "Three Wise Men" on Euratom, consisting of Armand (Chairman of the French Nuclear Energy Commission), Etzel (Vice-President of the High Authority), and Giordani (Professor of Physics at the University of Naples). This Committee was to submit a report within two months on the amount of nuclear energy which could be produced in the near future by the six member states and on the means which should be employed to achieve this, and to seek information from competent authorities as to the sources of energy and atomic energy programmes. In January-February 1957, agreement had been reached on all questions concerning the setting up of the Common Market with the exception of the problem of the association of overseas territories. The Three Wise Men got a warm response in the United States and on February 8, their talks with the American leaders were successfully concluded. On February 18, the six

foreign ministers met at Paris and on February 19 and 20, the heads of six States met. They announced that the Common Market treaty would contain the principles for the association of the overseas territories and for the contributions of member countries to the economic and social investment in those territories. It was also agreed that the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom) should be given proprietary rights regarding certain special fissile materials. On March 25, 1957, the treaties establishing the European Economic Community (Common Market) and Euratom were signed at Rome by representatives of Italy, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, and Belgium. The resolution attached to the treaties stressed the desirability of a close liaison between the various European institutions as well as the necessity of examining possible organic links with the Council of Europe and Western European Union.

Other Economic Organizations. In addition to the E.C.S.C. there were several other economic organisations based on co-operative endeavour. On January 1, 1948, the Benelux countries adopted common customs tariffs. In September 1946, the Anglo-French Economic Committee was set up in order to review periodically the state of economic relations between the two countries. In December, the Anglo-Italian Economic Committee was established. In October, 1954 an economic committee of Denmark, Norway and Sweden was set up. Earlier in January 1950, Denmark, Norway, Sweden and Britain had signed a declaration in Paris providing for closer economic co-operation. In January, 1953 the Ministers of Transport from eight European countries met in Paris and in October a European Conference of Ministers of Transport was set up which is open to the O.E.E.C. countries except Ireland but with the addition of Spain. In July, 1953 the European Organization for Nuclear Research was established and in December the International Civil Aviation Organization decided to call a meeting of representatives of several European countries to consider the co-ordination of air transport. A European Civil Aviation Conference was instituted in 1955.

POLITICAL AND DEFENCE CO-OPERATION

In this sphere the ideas of a European Union Movement and an integrated defence system gradually materialised in the form of various military alliances and political organs. The basic elements of the defence and political co-operation in Europe from 1948 onward were: (*a*) the desperate economic condition of Europe and the fear of communist expansion, (*b*) the realisation that it was not possible for the Soviet Union and the Western Powers

to co-operate and to co-exist, (*c*) the necessary readjustment in the traditional British policy of balance of power so as to produce "a more firmly welded Grand Alliance", (*d*) the elimination of traditional differences between France and Germany, (*e*) the political instability of Western Europe and the threat of communism from within, (*f*) the necessity of enlistment of American co-operation with any scheme of European defence, and (*g*) the need for adjustment with the processes of the United Nations and with the directions of world public opinion. If one keeps these elements in mind one can easily understand the European anxiety for political and military co-operation after 1945, the American keenness to alleviate this anxiety, the nature of difficulties besetting the achievement of the objective, the question what nations should be invited to participate in this co-operation and the scope and the prospects for the future.

Treaty of Dunkirk and the Benelux. Even during the war the need for Western European Union had been felt by statesmen like Churchill who proposed in June, 1940 a Union of Britain and France. In June 1945, following the collapse of Nazi Germany, the war-weary nations of Europe turned to the newly created United Nations as a machinery for international co-operation. Very soon, however, the world came to be disillusioned. On September 19, 1946 in his famous speech at Zurich, Churchill exhorted that the European Family be recreated in "a kind of United States of Europe". The same sentiment was expressed by Bevin on January 22, 1948 and by Attlee on May 5. Marshall in his Harvard speech had stressed the vital need of economic co-operation as an indispensable condition for European recovery. In March, 1947 the first efforts at military co-operation were made by Britain and France when they concluded the Treaty of Dunkirk which was directed against a revival of German aggressive power, which represented the type of alliance that France had wanted of Britain after World War I, and which was the expression of a policy intended to meet the German threat not so much by making the potential enemy as by securing trusted friends. The treaty, signed on March 4, was concluded for 50 years and was to last indefinitely unless denounced on one year's notice. It provided "for mutual assistance in the event of German aggression", "consultation in the event of a threat of such aggression", or in case Germany failed to fulfil the economic commitments imposed by the surrender terms or any subsequent instrument. In the short run, it "served to allay somewhat French fears that the German policy of the United States and Britain would eventually lead to a new German attack upon France", and "put France in a better frame of mind for co-operating with the new bizonal institutions which had been established in Germany". In the long

run, however, the value of the treaty lay elsewhere, for, Germany soon ceased to be regarded as a threat. The heavy cost of occupation demanded a speedy reconstruction of Germany. The mounting fear of communism uncovered the Anglo-American concern for security against the Soviet Union rather than Germany which was now required to become "a law-abiding member of a united western family of nations". Thus the German content of the Treaty of Dunkirk was soon forgotten and the broad line in which it stood gradually developed into the Treaty of Brussels and the North Atlantic Treaty. On October 29, a Customs Union under the name of BENELUX was forged by Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg.

Treaty of Brussels. The failure of the Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers in March 1947, the events leading to the enunciation of Truman Doctrine, the Soviet rejection of the Marshall Plan, the formation of the Cominform, the coup in Czechoslovakia, and the Soviet-Finnish Treaty negotiations in February 1948 eventually led to the conclusion of the Treaty of Brussels on March 17, 1948 by France, Britain, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg. The Treaty reaffirmed the principles set forth in the Charter of the United Nations and it bound the signatories to a policy of collaboration and mutual assistance in political, economic and military matters. Article 4 provided that, "if any party should be the object of an armed attack in Europe, the other parties will, in accordance with the provisions of Article 51 of the Charter, afford the party so attacked all the military and other aid and assistance in their power". The signatories agreed to co-ordinate their economic activities, to co-operate in raising the standard of living of their people and to establish a Consultative Council consisting of their foreign ministers to meet frequently in order to discuss matters of common interests. Gradually an elaborate organization under the Brussels Treaty developed. On April 17, the foreign ministers of the five powers met in Paris and decided to establish a Consultative Council of the Foreign Ministers as a supreme organ, a Permanent Commission to act on behalf of the Council when it was not in session and consisting of their ambassadors to London, a Defence Committee, and committees of experts on economic, social and cultural matters. The Secretariat of the organization was set up in London.

The Brussels Treaty, signed for 50 years, was a landmark in the diplomatic history of the world. It marked "an abrupt departure from the traditions of most of its signatories. The independence of the Low Countries had long been an axiom of British policy but, except for the guarantees implicit in the Belgian treaties of 1839, Great Britain had not hitherto been bound by any treaty. Nevertheless, the defence of the Benelux area has always

been her paramount interest. On the side of the Low Countries the breach with tradition was even more complete, since no feature of the policy of these countries had been stronger than their faith in neutrality" (*Survey of International Affairs*, 1947-48, pp. 107-108). Again, the mutual military assistance provided for by the Brussels Treaty was collective self-defence and this right was only to last "until the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to maintain international peace and security". Thus the signatories secured a free hand in defending themselves against what they regard as an armed attack up to the stage at which the Security Council intervened. Finally, the Brussels Treaty proved to be the precursor of two wider organizations—the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the Council of Europe—and became the basis of the Western European Union in 1955. The fear of Russia and of Communism were solidly in the background and American help and co-operation was keenly hoped for.

The North Atlantic Treaty. The day the Treaty of Brussels was signed, Truman addressed the joint session of the American Congress and referred to this Treaty as an act whose "significance goes far beyond the actual terms of the agreement itself". He added: "It is a notable step in the direction of unity in Europe for protection and preservation of its civilization. The development deserves our full support. I am confident that the United States will, by appropriate means, extend to the free nations the support which the situation requires. I am sure that the determination of the free countries of Europe to protect themselves will be matched by an equal determination on our part to help them to protect themselves". In fact, Bevin had informed Marshall as early as January 1948 that Britain was planning a series of bilateral defence agreements on the pattern of the Dunkirk Treaty. Truman had authorised Marshall "to inform the British Foreign Secretary that we agreed with them on the urgent need for concerted measures by the nations of Western Europe". It was in this background that the Treaty of Brussels was signed. Meanwhile, full rearmament in the United States had begun and on May 21, 1948 Truman signed the Appropriation Bill which raised the air force to 70 groups. On June 11, 1948 the American Senate passed the famous Vandenberg Resolution (No. 239) by 64 votes to 4 under which military aid was promised to defence pacts made between other members of the United Nations if that aid were in the interest of U. S. A. On July 2 Truman issued a policy statement under which it was said that the Vandenberg Resolution should be implemented to the fullest extent possible and that the United States had decided to send its representatives to London to take part in the five-power military discussions. Meanwhile, the United States was preparing

the Mutual Defence Assistance Programme. Tension was mounting up as a result of the East-West conflict on Germany and the consequent Berlin blockade. On July 6, the State Department began talks with the Brussels Pact Powers in an atmosphere of strict secrecy. In these talks the general situation in Europe was discussed and it was agreed that something was to be done "to counteract the fear of the peoples of Europe that their country would be overrun by the Soviet army before effective help could arrive". It was also agreed that Norway, Denmark, Iceland, Ireland and Portugal should be invited to join the security system and that eventually even Spain and West Germany would have to be considered. Meanwhile, the fighting in Greece had added urgency to the situation.

There were, however, several difficulties in the path of the proposed security system. In the *first* place, although Italy had ranged herself on the anti-communist front, she was still considered outside the Atlantic Community. She was militarily weak and had a considerable neutralist sentiment. The question of Trieste had also kept alive bitter memories and the problem of Italian colonies had not yet been solved to the entire satisfaction of Italy. *Secondly*, the question of Spanish membership had to be answered. Whereas the United States desired an understanding with Franco, the European Allies were still hostile. *Thirdly*, in Northern Europe there were special difficulties presented by Norway, Sweden and Denmark which had proclaimed their neutrality in August 1939. Whereas Norway and Denmark were generally inclined to join the Western security system, Sweden was not. In 1947-1948 these three states unsuccessfully tried to reach some kind of understanding with regard to a Scandinavian Union. At the beginning of 1949 the Norwegian foreign minister had, however, declared publicly in favour of complete co-operation with the West. Norway stood firm to the Soviet pressure and finally decided to fall in. On February 8, 1949, the American Secretary of State, Acheson, met the ambassadors of the States negotiating the Pact. On March 18 the text of the treaty was published and the eight nations that had a hand in drafting it invited Denmark, Iceland, Italy and Portugal to join them in signing it on April 4, 1949.

The North Atlantic Treaty was thus signed in Washington by the foreign ministers of Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, the United Kingdom and the United States. It was professed to be a reaffirmation of the dedication of these powers "to the cause of peace, to the ideal of peaceful settlement of disputes that was represented by the Organisation of the United Nations". It was hailed by the Western policy makers as a shield against aggression and

against the fear of aggression. The primary aim of the treaty as described in the preamble was to ensure international peace and security and promote conditions of stability and well-being in the North Atlantic area. It provided for the peaceful settlement of international disputes and bound the parties to maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack. The parties were to consult together whenever in their opinion their independence or security was threatened. More important was the provision that "an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all; and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognized by Art. 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area". It may be mentioned that this provision was the result of a compromise between the position taken up by the Brussels Pact Nations and the stand of the United States. The former desired a provision that if a member was attacked the other members would supply all the assistance in their power at once and automatically. The latter, on the other hand, was not prepared to accept an obligation outside the framework of its constitutional process. Canada, eventually, suggested the compromise under which in case of an attack on a member state the other members were to consider this as an attack on themselves. This implied that there was an obligation to give all possible aid but subject to the constitutional procedure of each country. An armed attack on one or more of the parties was "deemed to include an armed attack on the territory of any of the Parties in Europe or North America, on the Algerian Departments of France, on the occupation forces of any Party in Europe, on the islands under the jurisdiction of any Party in the North Altantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer or on the vessels or aircraft in this area of any of the Parties". Article VII was a saving provision *vis-a-vis* the United Nations. Article IX established a Council and provided for a defence committee. Any other European state "in a position to further the principles of this treaty" could accede to it. The treaty could be reversed at the end of ten years and a party was entitled to denounce the treaty after twenty years by giving one year's notice of its intention to do so.

Reactions to the Treaty. The North Atlantic Treaty, soon after it was signed, became the most widely discussed issue in the world press. The Western world was, by and large, sympathetic although the critical undertones were soon heard. It

was argued, *first*, that the Treaty created a military alliance and clearly presupposed a military threat which was rather imaginary, for the Soviet Union did not want war. It was suggested, *secondly*, that the Treaty represented the principle of rearmament and was, therefore, a source of international tensions. *Thirdly*, the Treaty was attacked on the ground that it involved the expenditure of vast sums of money on defence at the cost of raising the standard of living in the European countries. It was argued that the threat did not lie so much in Russian expansion as in internal subversion. *Fourthly*, it was stated that it would only constitute a provocation of Russia "which would be driven to attack before Western rearmament could become effective" and that, therefore, the best course was to remain neutral. *Fifthly*, it was suggested that the North Atlantic Treaty "could not by itself prevent war and that its only guarantee was a promise to attempt the liberation of any countries which were over-run". *Sixthly*, and this criticism was largely made in France, the Treaty was thought to be ultimately leading to the revival of Germany and the beginning of German rearmament. *Seventhly*, it was argued that the Treaty was rather an expression of the war hysteria and the Russo-phobia rampant in the United States. *Finally*, the Treaty put a serious strain on the concept of regional security by bringing in powers as wide apart as the U.S.A. and Italy and also strained the meaning of "defence of freedom" by including states like Portugal and, later on, Turkey which could not be called democratic even by courtesy.

The most violent reactions, however, came from the Soviet Union. Between March 31 and April 4 the Soviet Government sent notes of protest to all the states that were intending to sign the Treaty. On April 2, the Atlantic powers rejected these protests. On April 13, Gromyko carried his fight against the Treaty into the United Nations where he told the General Assembly that it was an Anglo-American instrument of aggression wholly contrary to the principles of the United Nations. It is true that the North Atlantic Treaty added to the existing international tensions. It finally brought to an end the hopes of co-operation between the Soviet Union and the West. It increased the war area by making more than a dozen countries commit to accept war-like obligations. To a considerable extent, it by-passed the United Nations. It may even be argued that the Treaty directly contributed to the Korean War in June, 1950. It is obvious that it brought only the appearance of added military security, while at the same time demanded of Europe a permanent financial effort and a primacy for military matters. It made more difficult than ever the problem of reunification of Germany and thereby removed farther the prospects of a lasting settlement in Europe. The real value of the North Atlantic Treaty, therefore, was extremely doubtful.

The Growth of N. A. T. O. On April 12, Truman sent the Treaty to the Senate for ratification which came off on July 21, and on July 25 the President ratified it. On August 24, after the last of seven essential ratifications had been received (U. S. A., Canada, and the five Brussels Powers) the Treaty went in force. In June, 1950 the Korean War broke out and the Western Powers drew the conclusions (*a*) that the cold war could turn hot suddenly and dangerously; (*b*) that the communist strategy in more remote parts of the world could seriously weaken the Western defensive strength in the North Atlantic area; (*c*) that there could be a local war of great importance without causing a world conflict and which would not justify use of the atom bomb considered to be the main deterrent to Communist expansion; and (*d*) that the kind of cold war underlined by the Korean War could not be fought without sufficient ground forces available at the right place and at the right time. It was in this background that the organization of the North Atlantic Treaty came to be gradually developed. Already on September 17, 1949 a North Atlantic Council, a Defence Committee and a Military Committee had been set up. On September 23, Truman announced that an atomic explosion had occurred in Russia during the summer. On October 6, he signed the Mutual Defence Assistance Act, 1949. In January, 1950 eight bilateral agreements were signed with Belgium, Denmark, Luxembourg, Norway, the Netherlands, France, Britain and Italy. In September, the North Atlantic Council decided to create an integrated force adequate to ensure the security of Western Europe. The question of German participation in Western defence was meanwhile discussed and early in November 1949 the foreign ministers of France, Britain, America and the Benelux states had failed to reach an agreement on the role of Germany in the N. A. T. O. defence system because of the Franco-German differences. In October 1950 the French Prime Minister, Pleven, proposed the Pleven Plan under which it was suggested that a European army be formed in which the German armies could participate. To realise this objective, it was proposed to establish a European Defence Community (E.D.C.). In December, the North Atlantic Council finalised the arrangements for an integrated force in Europe comprising of contingents to be contributed by the participating states and to be under the command of General Eisenhower who was appointed as Supreme Allied Commander in Europe in January, 1951. The Council also agreed on the participation of Germany in Western defence and the three Western Powers began discussions with the German Federal Government on this question.

The progress of the N. A. T. O. continued throughout 1951. In December 1950, the Defence Production Board had been

established and this was followed by a Planning Board for Ocean Shipping, an Advisory Group on Raw Materials and an Economic and Financial Working Group. The Supreme Headquarters of the Allied Powers in Europe (S. H. A. P. E.) were established in Paris on April 2. On May 15, America proposed to Britain and France that Turkey and Greece be invited to become full members of the N. A. T. O. On September 15, the North Atlantic Council met in Ottawa and on October 17, the Protocol regarding the accession of Greece and Turkey to the North Atlantic Treaty was signed. The process of admission was completed by February 1952 when the Council met in Lisbon. Plenty of opposition had been raised to the admission of Greece and Turkey because none of them was an Atlantic country, because their democratic character was doubtful, because the Alliance was already too large and cumbersome, because Britain was keen to develop a Middle East Organization with Turkey as its centre, and because some of the smaller members of the Alliance objected to the admission of Turkey or Greece for fear of being involved in wars in the Balkans and in the Middle East. But the United States over-ruled these objections, and Greece and Turkey in their turn rejected the protest of the Soviet Union made on November 3, and 30, 1951. In fact the United States was also keen to include Spain which had an army of about 400,000 men, a navy of 30,000, an airforce of 40,000 and which could provide valuable air bases and supply ports for the North Atlantic allies. On this question, however, the opposition succeeded. In the January meeting of the North Atlantic Council (1951) Portugal had urged the Spanish adherence and on February 16, Acheson expressed the hope that Spain would find a place in the N. A. T. O. Britain opposed. In July, Washington once again sounded Madrid but London and Paris objected. On July 18, Acheson reiterated that Spain was essential to the defence of Europe but Britain and France remained firm.

European Defence Community (E. D. C.) Meanwhile the discussions about the proposed E.D.C. continued. On January 26, 1951 the French Government had called a Conference at Paris attended by all the members of the N.A.T.O. and Germany. The conference met on February 15. Germany demanded, *inter alia*, the establishment of a Ministry of Defence which the French resisted. After prolonged discussions it was agreed that an army of 20 divisions be created by the beginning of 1953 and that the E D C be established with a Defence Commissioner, a Committee of Ministers, an Assembly and a Court. The size of national units was to be determined later. In the meantime, the Soviet Union had started a new diplomatic offensive, abandoned its insistence on the disarmament of Germany and proposed that a united Germany be allowed an army on the condition that it

were pledged not to join any alliance directed against a state which had fought against Germany in the second world war.

In brief, in the beginning of 1952 there were five major difficulties in the path of the E.D.C. Treaty: (*i*) Germany's demand for equality and full sovereignty and for full membership of the N.A.T.O.; (*ii*) the dispute between the Western occupiers and Germany over the amount which Western Germany could and should pay for defence; (*iii*) the question of financing the European army and the problem of the prohibition of production and research of special kinds in Germany; (*iv*) the problem of the Saar where the French economic interests and political actions clashed with the German claims; and (*v*) the German desire for the reunification of the country, the German feeling that this reunification would be prejudiced by German adherence to the Western Alliance and the German hopes raised by the Soviet proposal for a Four-Power Conference to draft a peace treaty and withdraw the armies of occupation.

The attempts to get over these difficulties ran in three directions: (*a*) The continuous discussions in Bonn and Paris in February, 1952 and the deliberations during the same month between Eden, Schuman, Acheson and Adenauer. During these discussions the French fears of the German army and arms industry and the British refusal to join the E.D.C. were matched by German hesitation in accepting loss of the Saar and any limits on the German freedom of action. The Four Ministers conference held at London (referred above) was followed by the Lisbon meeting of the North Atlantic Council on February 20, which wrestled with these problems. (*b*) In March, April and May, 1952, attempt was made to resolve the Franco-German conflict on the Saar and the Soviet proposal for a Four-Power conference was considered. The diplomatic correspondence between Moscow and the Western capitals began on March 10, and continued for about six months. The Russians held out the prospects of a united, independent and neutral Germany with a national army and access to the eastern markets. The Western powers repeated their arguments for holding free elections as the first step in the process of unification and their arguments against discussion of a peace treaty before such elections. The negotiations failed. On the question of the Saar, German and French interests could not be reconciled. The French Government in the meantime started searching for Anglo-American insurance against the German withdrawal from the European Defence Community—a secession which would allow German units to be raised for a European army to be reconstituted as a German army, and would allow the expansion of that army and of German arms production without the E.D.C.'s control on which France had insisted as the price for abandoning occupational

control. America refused to give this kind of guarantee, although Britain was prepared "to do its best to assuage French fears". (*c*) In the final phase the negotiations were carried in Bonn and Paris, attempts were made to find the solution of the Saar and Britain gave a guarantee the text of which was published on April 15. It provided that as long as Britain remained a member of the N.A.T.O, she would be bound to give all military and other aid in her power in accordance with Art. 51 of the U. N. Charter to any member of the E.D.C. subject to an armed attack in Europe.

One final difficulty developed on April 27, when Adenauer stated at a press conference that a united Germany would not necessarily be bound by the E.D.C. Treaty. However, Schuman succeeded in overcoming the internal opposition in France and on May 27, the E.D.C. Treaty was signed by the Foreign Ministers of Belgium, France, the German Federal Republic, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands. On May 26, a Contractual Agreement which redefined the relations between the Federal Republic of Germany and the Western occupation powers was signed, which revoked the Occupation Statute, abolished the High Commission and provided for the conduct of relations through Ambassadors. But relations were not normalised, "for, owing to the division of Germany, the failure to conclude a peace treaty, the conflict between East and West, and the consequent retention of foreign troops in Western Germany, the Western Powers retained their existing rights in relation to the stationing and protection of troops in Germany, to Berlin, and to Germany as a whole".

The E.D.C. Treaty which was to endure for fifty years provided for a supranational community with common institutions and common budgets and prohibited the maintenance of national armed forces except for the purpose of fulfilling international missions. It was also provided that any European country might adhere to the Treaty on the unanimous approval of the Council of Ministers. The E.D.C. Treaty attempted to strike a compromise between the French desire of keeping Germany outside the N.A.T.O. and the German desire of getting a treatment on equal footing; the French desire of preventing the rise of German militarism and the American desire of utilising the man-power and natural resources of Germany for defence against the Soviet Union; the French desire of a full-fledged military commitment on the part of Britain, and the British traditional reserve and hesitation in accepting wide commitments on the continent. As finally signed, the Treaty provided for the establishment of European defence forces made up of national basic units consisting of small divisions integrated at the corps level. The Supreme Command over the defence forces was to vest with the N.A.T.O. The

N.A.T.O. guarantees were given to Germany and parallel German guarantees were given to the N.A.T.O. powers. The British guarantee to the E. D. C. countries was in the form of a treaty to which we have already alluded. Assurances were given by America and Britain that if France was attacked they would regard it as an attack on themselves. The ratification of the E. D. C. Treaty was to be followed by restoration of sovereignty to Western Germany. The organs provided for E. D. C. were similar to those of the E. C. S. C.

French Opposition to the E.D.C. The future of the E.D.C. Treaty, however, proved to be dark because soon after it was signed a good deal of opposition to it developed in France and, combined with the failure of the Saar negotiations, a new wave of anti-German feeling swept off all traces of goodwill for the E. D. C. Throughout the year 1953 the French Government followed a policy of evasion. In brief, it put forward three conditions as pre-requisites for the French ratification of the E. D. C. Treaty: (*i*) Important modifications in the E. D. C. Treaty such as France should be entitled to withdraw forces from Europe of its own accord, that France should be allowed to maintain defence works outside the framework of the E. D. C. Treaty for the supply of its overseas forces, that the number of votes in the European Defence Commission should not vary with each country's contribution in man and materials, and that the French forces in Germany should have a special status even though the occupation of Germany would be terminated; (*ii*) More exact commitments by Britain to the continental defence; and (*iii*) A Franco-German agreement on the Saar.

Regarding the first condition, on March 23, 1953 a compromise had been reached on most of the French demands, although the most important of them—the demand of immutable voting strength in the European Defence Commission—could not be met. The French opposition, therefore, could not be satisfied. Similarly, on the second issue France was disappointed. Neither the treaty with Britain signed in May, 1952 with the members of the proposed E. D. C., nor the British proposals of February 5, 1953, nor the August proposals could satisfy the French opinion because none of them contained any precise commitment. Nevertheless, the British Minister, Anthony Nutting's statement of September 22 that British association with the E. D. C. would be more intimate than with the E. C. S. C. gave some relief. Deadlock ensued on the third question also—the question of the Saar—because France would insist on the Franco-Saar Economic Union which was vehemently opposed by Germany. On September 6 Adenauer made fresh proposals to France suggesting free elections as a prelude to the Europeanisation of the Saar. But it could not be acceptable to the French Govern-

ment. German impatience, therefore, mounted at the French inaction and evasion of the ratification of the E.D.C. Treaty. On October 27 the French Council of the Republic passed a resolution which virtually amounted to a rejection of the E.D.C. On November 17 the French Assembly debated the E.D.C. and Bidault asked for a vote of confidence. Although he got it but the Assembly made it clear that this did not mean the approval of the E. D. C. Thus weakened, Bidault went to attend the Three-Power Bermuda Conference which also declared that "a United Europe including Germany was the best means of achieving greater prosperity, security and stability in Europe, and that a European Defence Community was necessary to the defence of the Atlantic Community". Bidault, however, failed in securing the necessary safeguards from his Western Allies. The Bermuda Conference was followed by the Paris meeting of the North Atlantic Council on December 14. In this meeting Secretary of State Dulles made the famous "agonizing reappraisal" speech and said that if the E. D. C. did not come into effect the United States would be compelled to reconsider the American position and a redistribution of American forces in Europe. In short, by the summer of 1954 the French thinking on the subject of E. D. C. had completely changed and it no longer seemed to offer sufficient protection to the French interests. In August 1954, Premier Mendes-France made proposals for revision of the E. D. C. Treaty which could not be accepted by the other signatories. On August 30, 1954 the E. D. C. Treaty was rejected by the French National Assembly. The rejection of the E.D.C. was followed by the London-Paris Agreements of 1954, which will be surveyed after we have discussed the Council of Europe.

N.A.T.O. forces. Meanwhile the N.A.T.O. forces were being built up and complete command organization was being developed. In September 1951, the North-Atlantic Council appointed a committee to consider the reconciliation of the need of rearmament with the need of economic stability. On the basis of recommendations of this committee the Council laid down in February 1952 the targets for the current year. During this year the command structure in Europe and the Mediterranean was completed and a parallel organization for the Atlantic Ocean was developed. By December, the targets fixed in February had been achieved and in April 1953 projects were agreed "under a Three-Years Infra-Structure programme" involving expenditure of £ 250 million. Subsequent to the rejection of the E. D. C. and the signing of the London-Paris Agreements of 1954 the German Federal Republic was also admitted to the N. A. T. O. in October, 1954. In short, as Lord Ismay, the Secretary General of the N.A.T.O. has assessed, from 1951 to 1954 the air force component of the N. A. T. O. had been doubled and the armed forces had been

increased considerably. By April, 1954 it had 125 air bases in Europe. On the Infra-Structure programme, the N. A. T. O. countries actually spent $ 700 million. Their war budgets increased from $ 18,500 million in 1949 to $ 62,800 million in 1953. The capital invested by the U. S. A. from April 1948 to April 1954 on the N. A. T. O. totalled $ 30,000 million. American armed forces were quartered on the territories of N. A. T. O. countries and these forces were granted privileges and diplomatic immunities which seemed to suggest the political and military hold of the United States on these countries.

THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE

We have referred to the beginnings of the European movement in the period before and during the second world war. The strength of this movement after the second world war was "derived from the wounds inflicted by the Germans and from the fear that worse Russian wounds were to follow". We have already discussed the story of economic cooperation and the cooperative ventures under the Marshall Plan and the North Atlantic Alliance preceded by the Treaty of Dunkirk, the Benelux and the Treaty of Brussels. By 1948 the general feeling was summed up by Costello that "if Europe does not unite, Europe will perish". Efforts to build up a Western European Union were made both officially and unofficially. In March 1947, the two Houses of Congress in Washington had resolved in favour of the creation of a United States of Europe. In December 1947 an international committee was formed to prepare for a European Congress to be called at the Hague in May, 1948. On July 20, 1948 Bidault proposed in the meeting of the Consultative Council of the Brussels Powers the creation of a Federal Parliament of Europe and a European Customs and Economic Union. Bevin sympathised. On August 18, the New French Government made out a new plan of European integration. On October 26, when the Consultative Council of the Brussels Powers met, it decided to appoint a committee of 18 to recommend proposal for European unity. This committee met on November 26, and with a short adjournment from 16th December, 1948 to 6th January, 1949, continued its deliberations on the various official and non-official proposals for a European organisation.

On January 27, 1949 the Consultative Council of the Brussels Powers met in London where it was decided to create a Council of Europe consisting of two organs—a ministerial committee meeting in private and a consultative body meeting in public. The five Brussels powers, on March 7, invited Italy, Norway, Sweden, Denmark and Ireland to meet in a conference and draft a constitution for the Council of Europe. The representatives of ten countries, therefore, met in London on

March 28, and they succeeded in signing the Statute of the Council on 5th May. The original membership of the 10 countries later on increased by the adherence of Greece and Turkey in 1949, Iceland in 1950, West Germany as an associate member in 1950 and as a full member in 1951, and the Saar as an associate member in 1950. It should be noted that the question of adherence of Germany led to a debate between France and other countries concerned. Adenauer made clear on May 25, 1950 that German acceptance of the membership of the Council of Europe implied no recognition of the independence of the Saar. Gradually the German complaint of an unequal treatment was met in 1951 when Germany became a full member.

The Statute of the Council of Europe contained 42 Articles spreading over 10 chapters and declared that the aim of the Council of Europe was to achieve a greater unity between its members for the purpose of safeguarding and realising the ideals and principles which are their common heritage and facilitating their economic and social progress. The seat of the Council was to be at Strasbourg. It provided for two main organs –a Committee of Ministers and a Consultative Assembly. The Assembly was to have 18 members each from Britain, France and Italy, 6 each from Belgium, the Netherlands and Sweden, 4 each from Norway, Denmark and Ireland and three from Luxembourg. The number of representatives from a new member was to be decided by the Committee of Ministers; the Assembly was to meet once a year; and the Committee of Ministers could meet many times. The Committee of Ministers gives representation to the Governments of the participating states; and the Consultative Assembly represents their national legislatures.

We have already surveyed the establishment and growth of the E. C. S. C. and the efforts for the creation of the E. D. C. While the debate for the ratification of the Treaty of E. D. C. was going on, in March 1953 an ad-hoc Assembly of France, West Germany, Italy, and the Benelux countries had drafted a Statute for a European Political Community (E.P.C.) providing for an indissoluble union of the signatories. The organs of this Political Community were to replace those of the E. C. S. C. The proposed Political Community was to be linked up with the Council of Europe. At the time when France rejected the E. D. C. Treaty the draft Statute of the E. P. C. was being considered by the Governments of the participating states. The rejection of the E. D. C. brought the E. P. C. to an end. But the London-Paris agreements of 1954 led to the establishment of another organisation—the Western European Union (W. E. U.) to which we now turn.

The London-Paris Agreements, 1954. Soon after the E. D. C. Treaty was signed the mood of suspicion with regard to the German rearmament had once again engulfed France.

On August 19, 1954, the 6 E. D. C. states met in Brussels on the invitation or Mendes-France who wanted to propose certain amendments to the E. D. C. Treaty in order to win the support of French National Assembly. He proposed that in the event of German reunification or in the event of withdrawal of Anglo-American troops from Europe the members of the E. D. C. must be entitled to withdraw from the E.D.C., that for a period of eight years the members must be entitled to veto the decisions of the E.D.C., that only those troops stationed in the forward and strategic zones of Germany be integrated into the European army, and that the proposed E. D. C. Assembly must not undertake the work of a European Political Federation. The other five powers associated with the E. D. C. rejected these proposals and the conference failed and came to an end on August 22. On August 28 the French National Assembly began the historic debate on the E. D. C. Treaty and on August 30 rejected it on the ground that under E. D. C. "France would lose her position as one of the Big Three by renouncing her sovereignty while Britain and America were determined to keep theirs intact"; and that the E. D. C. would involve the curtailment of the French sovereignty which would fatally weaken France in relation to Germany and in relation to her overseas domain. On September 4, Adenauer reminded Mendes-France that he had played in the hands of French communists in bringing about the death of the E. D. C. Two days earlier Churchill and Eden proposed a conference of Britain, America and the 6 E. D. C. states. On September 11, Eden went out to the Continent to consult the foreign ministers of the E. D. C. states and on September 17, he held discussions with Dulles. On September 19, he invited Canada, America, and the 6 E. D. C. states to a conference in London to be held on September 28, in order to consider some new formula under which Germany could be associated with N. A. T. O. states.

The 9 power conference met at London on September 28, 1954 and after complex debates provisional agreements were reached on October 3, providing for an early termination of the Allied Occupation Regime in Germany, the inclusion of Germany and Italy in the Brussels Treaty, the expansion of the organisation of the Brussels Treaty to make it a centre of European integration, and the association of Germany with the N. A. T. O. It was also decided that another conference should be held in Paris on October 21, to finalise these agreements.

On October 19, Adenauer came to Paris to hold prior consultations with Mendes-France so that the London provisional agreements might be finalized without much difficulty. Mendes-France, however, told his German guests that France would agree

to all the London provisional agreements provided Germany would agree to give the Saar a European status and also recognize its existing economic links with France. This created a difficult situation for Adenauer, and it appeared that the Paris conference would end in a failure. However, on October 23, it was announced that both Adenauer and Mendes-France had reached an agreement on the Saar. On October 23, 1954 a series of agreements called as the Paris Accords were signed. Under *one* agreement (the Protocol amending the Bonn Conventions of 1952) the allied occupation regime in West Germany was terminated, the Occupation Statute was revoked, the allied High Commissions were converted into Embassies, and Western Germany was given "the full authority of a sovereign state over its internal and external affairs". Under a *second* agreement (Declaration Inviting the Federal Republic of Germany and Italy to Accede to the Brussels Treaty) Germany and Italy were associated with the Brussels Treaty, and the Brussels Treaty Organisation was transformed into the Western European Union (W. E. U.) A Council was set up called as the Council of Western European Union which was to make an annual report on its activities to an Assembly composed of representatives of the Brussels Treaty Powers to the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe. Germany was given the right to create an army of 12 divisions, a tactical air force of 75,000 men and a navy of 25,000 men for coastal defence, but German arms industry was placed under proper supervision. Under a *third* agreement Germany was admitted to the membership of the N. A. T. O. and her armed forces were placed under the authority of the Supreme Allied Council. Under a *fourth* agreement Germany and France agreed to give the Saar a European status within the framework of the W. E. U. The Saar was to be politically independent under the W. E. U., but was to retain its economic ties with France. The W. E. U. Council was to appoint a neutral commission to represent the Saar in W.E.U., the Council of Europe, and the E.C.S.C., and to conduct a referendum in the Saar on the basis of the new plan. The Saar question was not to be reopened until the term of a peace treaty with Germany was drafted.

The London Paris agreements also generated bitter debates in the French National Assembly and it was only on December 24, 1954 when Mendes-France made their ratification a question of confidence that the French National Assembly ratified these agreements. On February 27, 1955 Germany ratified them. And when on April 28 the Netherlands ratified the Paris Accords, they went in force. On May 5, 1955 the Occupation Statute was revoked and the Saar Agreement went into force. Thus within a few weeks after rejecting the E.D.C. the French

Assembly voted for the London-Paris Agreement ! It may be asked if the rejection of the E.D.C. was mainly due to the French fear of rearming the Germans. If it was German rearmament which they feared, why, within weeks, did they vote for rearming the Germans (under London-Paris Agreements) even under a German general staff, within the Brussels Treaty Organisation? One answer may be that they agreed to it because the United States of America is not a member of the Brussels Treaty, which, unlike the North Atlantic Treaty, is restricted wholly to European nations. One may thus infer that "the French preferred rearmed Germany under a German general staff and under a treaty that was restricted to Europeans and quarter-backed by Great Britain to a rearmed Germany, even under a European general staff, that, under the E.D.C. protocol to the Nato Treaty, was quarter-backed by the military-minded Pentagon under Admiral Radford, President Eisenhower, and Secretary of State, Dulles". Europe was thus sought to be kept out of the range of American military policies. On this showing, in November 1956, during the Suez crisis, Eisenhower seems to have "returned the compliment by dissociating the United States from the foreign policy of Great Britain and France with respect to communism in the Middle East and Africa".

The West European Union (W. E.U). On May 7, 1955 the Foreign Ministers of the seven countries associated with the modified Brussels Treaty met in Paris and inaugurated the Western European Union. The W. E. U. Council started the preparations to bring the Saar within the framework of the W.E.U. and to link the W. E. U. with the N. A. T. O. On May 9, Germany was admitted to the N. A. T. O. Council. On June 10, the W. E. U. Council set up an international commission to conduct a referendum in the Saar and on July 5 the W. E. U. Assembly was inaugurated in Strasbourg. Meanwhile steps were being taken to set up the Euratom and a Common Market of Europe, the story of which we have already surveyed. On the Soviet side the reply was given in the form of the Warsaw Treaty concluded on May 14, 1955. The W.E.U., however, went ahead with the tasks assigned to it and on July 23 its Council announced that the referendum in the Saar would be held on October 23, to decide whether the Saar-landers were in favour of the Saar Statute concluded at Paris as part of the Paris Accords. In September the pro-German parties in the Saar united together into a national group and decided to condemn the Saar Statute. The referendum was duly held on October 23, 1955 and by a vote of 423,434 to 201,973, the Saar-landers rejected the Saar Statute. On November 13, France and Germany, announced that negotiations on the Saar would begin again. Gradually, as a result of the Anglo-American pressure, both the countries came to

agree that the Saar would be politically joined with Germany on January 1, 1957. On August 1, 1956 German Law had become valid in the Saar, and the social insurance system had been introduced earlier in June. It was agreed that the Saar would remain a part of the French Union until January 1, 1960 after which it would be transferred to Germany. A series of agreements was signed to regulate the incorporation of the Saar in Western Germany on October 27, 1956. Under these agreements the Germans conceded to France the right to 90 million tons of German coal by the end of 1980, and after that the right to purchase 33% of the coal production of the Saar at the market price. The treaty governing the status of the Saar was ratified by the French and West German legislatures in December 1956. On January 1, 1957 it became the tenth state of West Germany.

In other spheres, the Assembly and the Council of the W.E.U. have been making frantic efforts to coordinate policies of the members of the Union, and with this end have held several meetings. Commenting on the work of the W.E.U. at the first part of the second session of the Assembly held in Strasbourg from April 23 to 25, 1956, the Belgian delegate mentioned three conditions for the success of the W.E.U. (*i*) It must make it possible to establish a common foreign policy; (*ii*) it must have its own army with its own atomic weapons; and (*iii*) members must agree to at least a minimum organisation of their markets. In order to stimulate and coordinate work in the political, economic and cultural fields, the Assembly decided to establish a single General Affairs Committee. At the second part of the second session held in October 1956, the Assembly called upon the W.E.U. Council to take an immediate decision about the reorganisation of the Western defence forces, and to retain substantial conventional forces in West Germany. When the Council met at Paris on December 10, this problem was further discussed along with the Italian proposal that the Assembly should be elected directly by the peoples of member countries and that it should have the power to make recommendations and formulate proposals which would enter into effect when approved by the respective national parliaments. Meanwhile the U.K. had actually proposed reduction of its forces on the mainland of Europe from 75,000 to 50,000 men and the Council met in London on February 26, 1957. No agreement, however, was reached until March 18, when the Council met again. It was decided that the U. K. would withdraw about half the proposed total of 27,000 men in the following year, and the remainder would be withdrawn the next year, provided that agreement was reached after further review in the light of military effort of other NATO powers.

Nevertheless, the British government considered that it had national demands which were far stronger than its duties of solidarity

towards the W.E.U. or the NATO even as France was in a weak position in the context of the Algerian problem. On April 4, 1957, the British government unilaterally released a White Paper in which Britain declared her intention to withdraw ground troops from the continent. This was, in a sense, the British reply to the U.S. dubious role in the Suez crisis. In May the first part of the third session of the W.E.U. Assembly was held in Strasbourg and the British decision came in under heavy fire. Mr. Ormsby-Gore, the British Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, replying to the criticism argued that the British contribution to Western defence was not simply that of ground forces and air forces, but of bombers with their nuclear weapons and that the British decision did not mean a retreat from Europe. The Assembly, however, adopted a resolution which, without precise reference to the U.K. action or the French troop withdrawals, reportedly stated that "a reduction of the still too-weak ground forces at present stationed on the continent would destroy the essence of the Western European defence system and was therefore not acceptable". In short, by 1957 it looked as though the W.E.U. was dying.

CRISIS IN NATO

Meanwhile the N. A. T. O. powers made efforts to improve the N. A. T. O. machinery. At the Paris session of the N.A.T.O. Council in May, 1956 the United States sponsored the schemes of directly using the N. A. T. O. as a channel of economic aid to underdeveloped countries. A committee consisting of the Foreign Ministers of Canada, Italy and Norway was appointed to study the problem of extending non-military forms of common action and increasing the unity of the N. A. T. O. The "three wise men" compiled a questionairre of 36 points and suggested "automatic consultation" among the N. A. T. O. members on matters of common concern, elimination of cultural and economic competition and frequent military manoeuvres. But here also the crisis was obvious and could be easily observed in a series of verbose statements stressing the area of agreemant among the NATO powers. Soon after the Suez crisis developed, the annual ministerial session of the NATO council was held in December 1956 in which Mr. Dulles supported by Mr. Lange of Norway criticised Anglo-French intervention in Egypt and declared that force must not be used in the future as an instrument of national policy. There developed a friction on the question of holding prior discussions, in the NATO Council, of issues arising out in the areas not directly covered by the NATO. Mr. Pineau of France agreed that the Egyptian crisis was not referred to the NATO Council because there was no provision in the NATO about it, and that such consultations must be held in future. Mr.

Dulles, on the other hand, contended that "the United States could not subject its policies or actions in all areas of the world, such as Formosa, to prior consultations with the NATO allies. In the context of the Greco-Turkish conflict on Cyprus, the Council decided that national policies in their formative stages and disagreements between members within NATO must be discussed by it and a committee of three permanent members of the Council was set up to apply mediation whenever acceptable to the parties to the disagreement. Friction also arose between the United States and Iceland on the issue of the withdrawal of the American troops from the latter's territory. There was also a report that the United States had asked the Anglo-French governments not to "use for operations in Egypt of United States military equipment supplied to them as members of NATO".

When the NATO Council met in February 1957, the areas of disagreement further widened. The British proposal of reducing their forces in the continent came in under heavy fire and General Norstad expressed serious concern at "the possible effects of such reduction on other NATO members". On the issue of Cyprus, the offer of good offices made by Lord Ismay, Secretary General of NATO, though accepted by Turkey and the United Kingdom was, however, rejected by Greece. In March the Council considered the "Grand Design" of Mr. Selwyn Lloyd based on "the maintenance of the unity of NATO and the expansion of European integration to include not only the federation of France, West Germany, Italy, and the Benelux countries, but also such states as Austria, Yugoslavia, Switzerland, Sweden and Finland". The Council agreed on a new infra-structure programme to be undertaken in the next four years. But the strains and the stresses of the NATO do not lend any hope of its successful creation.

What is the explanation of this crisis in the NATO? Has it failed in building up military strength? In this sphere the expansion of the NATO has not been unsatisfactory. The training centre for experimental aero-dynamics, the NATO Defence College, the NATO Naval Command established on April 1, 1957 and frequent exercises are ample demonstration of the military strength. From April 8 to 12, 1957 a NATO conference on operational research was held at the Palais de Chaillot under the sponsorship of the Advisory Groups for Aeronautical Research and Development and Supreme Headquarters for Allied Powers in Europe (SHAPE). On April 15 Command Post Exercise began which was attended by approximately 270 senior officers and civilian officials of NATO, as well as the permanent representatives to the NATO Council, who met to consider the technical and military problems of Western defence for future. Efforts were made to bring Spain in the NATO. In May, Spaak became the Secretary General and in July three of the twelve Divisions pro-

mised by West Germany joined the NATO forces. But in spite of this expansion the real foundations of the NATO became hollow and the heavy top structure could be seen swinging. Gradually the conditions which created and governed the growth of the Atlantic alliance from 1949 onwards underwent subtle and imperceptible but drastic and permanent changes. After the end of the second world war there were many such conditions and of these the atomic monopoly of the United States, the economic weakness of Western Europe and the unyielding nature of Stalinist policies were more important. The conjunction of these conditions "confronted the nations of Western Europe of the choice between national suicide and the acceptance of the political, military and economic support of the United States. In other words, the Atlantic alliance was for the nations of Western Europe a prerequisite of national survival".

As time passed on, this relation between national survival and the Atlantic alliance started fading out. Firstly, the Soviet Union developed substantial capabilities in atomic weapons, their means of delivery and means of defence and with this development the heart began to go out of the NATO as a ground force establishment. People gradually began to feel that "the capabilities of mutual destruction were such that an all-out atomic war was wholly irrational unless one of the two major atomic powers achieved capabilities sufficient to knock out at a blow the other's retaliatory power; and that, in the context of a Soviet-American atomic stalemate, a ground force war would be impossible to fight in Europe without triggering an all-out atomic war". In this context the burden of defence of Europe and of providing an atomic deterrance against an atomic war would obviously lie on the United States, for, American secrecy regulations precluded effective European participation in the contribution to the deterrance of atomic war. This had led people to believe that if there is a chance for Europe to survive in an atomic war, it may lie in not being too closely identified, or perhaps not being identified at all, with the United States, and thus a wave of neutralism has been slowly corroding the Western alliance. This neutralism in West Europe, it must be pointed out, is different in nature from the neutralism of Asian nations. It is neither the outcome of considerations of prestige and nascent nationalism, nor is it the product of communist propaganda, or of "faintness of heart", or political decadence. It is rather the result of "the new objective conditions under which the nations of Western Europe must live in the age of the atomic stalemate".

A second factor which has deepened the crisis of the NATO is the gradual economic recovery of Western Europe. In 1945 the nations of Western Europe had either to join the United States or go bankrupt and disintegrate. To-day they are in a sounder

position and their dependence on the United States has, therefore, in proportion diminished and they can now "look beyond the wall of containment for new outlets for their energies and products". As their economic development proceeded, their sense of urgency with respect to military assistance from the United States decreased and the pressures for increased economic aid expanded.

Thirdly, whereas the policies of Stalin were rigid and intransigent, those of his successors are flexible and dynamic. Thus the Soviet Union has been making frantic efforts to destroy the Atlantic Alliance and, after the death of Stalin, they have been alternately threatening and tempting, as the occasion requires, but always seeking to hold before the eyes of Western Europe an acceptable or even preferable alternative to the Atlantic Alliance. The rise of Germany and her economic, political and military revival with all the fears and expectations this revival must cause in Western and Eastern Europe, cannot help but add to the opportunity of the new Soviet foreign policy. In the case of Germany, in short, Soviet diplomacy dramatised the idea that German unity could be achieved only by a definitive break with NATO and the United States. The new Soviet strategy which began to shape in 1951 was consolidated at the 19th Party Congress in October 1952, and rapidly gained momentum after Stalin's death, has vitally affected the NATO. This strategy recognised that "whatever the communist gains from the Korean war may have been, the American and United Nations reaction to overt communist aggression was, in the end, exceedingly costly to the communist cause", and that there were greater possibilities for the extension of communism by political, psychological and economic means which would associate communism with peace, nationalism and economic progress. While in Asia, the Middle East and Africa the new Soviet policy met a considerable success, in Europe it convinced Europeans that further military effort within the context of the NATO was not merely of doubtful value but of diminished urgency.

In addition to these three factors, there are some others too which have seriously undermined the foundations of the NATO. The NATO allies have divergent interests not only in Europe but also elsewhere. The United States has many economic, political and strategic interests outside Europe and these have a corrosive effect on the NATO. On the question of colonialism, for instance, the United States has not been able to strike a balance between these interests and those of her allies. On the one hand, the United States is deeply interested in the continuing strength of colonial powers like Great Britain and France as her principal allies, and on the other, there is the vital American interest in preventing the colonial revolutions from falling under the sway of communism. As a recent writer has put it: "If the United States underwrites

the colonial position of Great Britain or France, as she did in Indo-China, she may strengthen, at best, temporarily her principal European allies but will impair her standing with the anti-colonial peoples of Asia and Africa. If the United States sides unreservedly with the Afro-Asian bloc, as she did in the United Nations on the occasion of the Suez crisis of Autumn 1956, she weakens Great Britain and France and, in consequence, the Atlantic Alliance itself. Faced with this dilemma which can only be solved at the price of impairing the vital interests of the United States in one or the other respect, the United States has been inevitably reduced to straddling the fence by supporting half-heartedly on one occasion one side, and on another occasion the other side, or else keeping hands off altogether. Algeria and Cyprus exemplify at present the dilemma and its evasion. In such situations, then, the Atlantic Alliance does not operate at all; for there are no common interests which could support its operation". Again, on the problem of Spain's admission to the NATO the divergence in policy is sharp—Norway, Britain and France opposing and Portugal and the United States urging her admission. With respect to China there is a very wide disagreement between the United States and Great Britain as to the nature of the threat and the proper course to pursue. While the policy of the former has been one of implacable hostility, that of Britain has sought accommodation. Here, indeed, the Atlantic Alliance is not only inoperative but torn with a basic conflict.

If some of the interests of the principal allies are divergent, the manner in which common interests are implemented is defective. The elaborate organisational superstructure with which the reader must have grappled early in this chapter, naturally makes for friction and inefficiency. In the absence of agreement on philosophy and basic policy, the elaborate superstructure is a source of weakness rather than of strength for the Atlantic Alliance. Nor is the leader of the Alliance—the United States—looked upon with confidence. As an American writer has observed: "The allies of the United States have noted the discrepancies between the policy pronouncements of our leaders and the actual policies pursued, which appear to them to have evolved into a consistent pattern of unreliability. Liberation, the unleashing of Chiang Kai-shek, agonising re-appraisal, the 'new look', intervention in Indo-China, the defence of Quemoy and Matsu, the internationalisation of the Suez Canal, the protection of the rights of Israel have been proclaimed as objectives of American foreign policy. Yet, in most instances the foreign policy of the United States appears to our allies to have been completely at variance with these pronouncements or, at the very least, their implementation remains in doubt". In the course of discussions at the International Conference held at Princeton University in June 1957

several European delegates reported difficulty in interpreting American intentions because the United States government so often spoke with many voices and this naturally leads to loss of confidence. They openly suggested that the United States authorities, legislative and executive, were "especially irresponsible". Repeated references were made to "the disparities in attitude between President Eisenhower and Secretary of State Dulles, with the President at times, such as at the Geneva Conference, representing the conciliatory face of American statecraft in dealing with the Soviet Union, while his Secretary of State exemplifying continuing skepticism concerning the possibility of viable East-West agreements". In fact, none has been prepared to defend the public pronouncements of John Foster Dulles and his posture toward international affairs. Whether in this people are right or wrong is immaterial, but the fact that this increases the strains of the NATO cannot be contradicted. Equally straining is the increasing intolerance in the United States. In 1945 when Communism threatened to sweep over Europe, the United States was looked upon as a symbol of democracy by the Europeans and as the champion of freedom by the colonies. That image of the United States has now been tarnished, and there was a market. "decline of freedom" within her borders although during the last two years the position has to an appreciable degree been retrieved. But as Morgenthau has written: "Some of our friends have gone to the extreme of asking whether there was much to choose, in terms of freedom between the United States and the Soviet Union. Yet while this cynicism has subsided under impact of the revival of traditions of American freedom, there have remained a latent skepticism and general malaise, which cast their shadow over the Atlantic Alliance".

The strains on the NATO, therefore, emerge from all four directions. On the one hand the Europeans doubt the consistency of Americans, on the other, the Americans are skeptic about the firmness of the Europeans. The perennial instability of governments in France, the storm which overtook and shook Eden and his government, the futile Anglo-French policies in Cyprus, Algeria and Egypt have all contributed to American misgivings. Again, on the one hand, the three key members find themselves in active opposition to one another in areas outside the Atlantic region and, on the other, they are in open disagreement even on the fundamental problems of European security which NATO was established to solve. In many NATO countries "a morbid form of nationalism" is growing which consumes the spirit of compromise on which any such alliance must rest. There has not only been no compromise within, but also an utter lack of adjustment with the changing pattern of world politics. Sharp and decisive changes have taken place in this pattern since the Atlantic

Alliance began to take shape and yet it has not modified its collective policies to take these changes into account. As an ex-International Secretary of the British Labour Party has recently written: "The United States is still dominated by the impressions it formed during its turbulent birth as a world power in the immediate aftermath of the second world war. The European nations are returning to pre-war patterns of thought and behaviour. Yet the world today resembles the world of the thirties even less than that of the forties. The post-war world was bi-polar—in 1945 Britain was the only European state which still had some power to fulfil external responsibilities in the vacuum that lay between the United States and the U.S.S.R. The world today is poly-centric. But though the pre-war European powers have now revived, the centre of gravity in the middle zone has shifted East. China and India have joined Japan as major Oriental powers, while the whole of Southern Asia, the Middle East and Africa is swarming with new sovereign states".

In the midst of these difficulties whether the Atlantic Alliance would last or perish is a question which cannot be answered with any degree of certainty. It was nearly disrupted by the Suez crisis. But the fact that it survived goes to show that it is built on the base of common interests and represents a core of unity which renders it a community not solely dependent on the existence of a real or imaginary threat from the Soviet Union. The manifest desire for continued co-operation has so far enabled the Alliance to surmount serious dangers created by specific differences in evaluating the nature of the Soviet threat, in adopting policies to meet that threat, and in attitudes toward problems arising outside the NATO area and capable of completely disrupting the alliance.

THE SOCIAL AND CULTURAL CO-OPERATION

Under the Brussels Treaty as well as the North Atlantic Treaty and the Statute of the Council of Europe provisions for social and cultural co-operation had been made. Under the Brussels Treaty four social committees and one cultural committee were set up in August 1948 to implement Articles II and III which provided for the promotion of a higher standard of living and cultural exchanges among the signatories. From March 1948 to 1955 ten bilateral conventions between the member states on social security were signed. These conventions have established the principles that all nationals of the signatories shall be treated alike under social security schemes. Again, the Five Brussels Treaty Powers have also made a study of the application of conventions adopted by the I. L. O. leading to the growth of a common attitude to the question of further ratifica-

tion of the International Labour Conventions. The participating states, in short, have cooperated with respect to the problems of students employees, frontier workers, employment services, industrial safety and health, social and medical assistance, war pensions, rehabilitation and resettlement of the disabled, education, youth activities, films and radio. In 1950, the Brussels Treaty Organisation instituted a cultural identity card in order to encourage travelling and residence abroad for selected teachers, research workers, artists and scientists.

The Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe has a permanent committee on cultural and scientific questions and Inter-Governmental Committee of Cultural Experts which is responsible to the Committee of Ministers. On December 19, 1954 a European Cultural Convention was signed which provides for co-operation between the members of the Council of Europe in the cultural sphere. The Council of Europe had earlier entered into an agreement with the U.N.E.S.C.O. in November 1953 providing for consultation and mutual exchange of information. Under the Council of Europe, therefore, co-operation has been established with regard to education, the development of European ideas, the revision of history text-books, youth activities, social security and medical assistance.

Finally, under the North Atlantic Treaty also, social and cultural cooperation is established on the Trans-Atlantic level and various educational schemes associated with the names of Fulbright, Marshall and Athlong, have been launched. One of the committees of the North Atlantic Council deals with information and cultural relations and in 1955 a N. A. T. O. Fellowship programme was inaugurated. Marshall scholarships were established in 1953 as a token of the British appreciation for the Marshall Aid Plan. Most of the NATO countries have also concluded agreements with one another providing for mutual abolition of visas for nationals of one country wishing to visit the other. In certain circumstances the British subjects visiting the United States get their visas without payment. However, it may be mentioned that mainly the N. A. T. O. activities amount to military measure in a plan to contain the Soviet Union and that the non-military co-operation has only a secondary role. Economic co-operation is largely reduced to finding the means for the military programme of the Atlantic Bloc, as cultural co-operation is only a device to reinforce the doctrinal commitments. The NATO envisages no appropriation for cultural co-operation and all the funds that are available are practically spent on defence.

CHAPTER 6

Revival of Germany and Spain

(A) GERMANY

We have seen that the four-power co-operation on Germany completely broke down between 1945-47 and that the four-power Control Council on Germany and Berlin had stalemated as a result of sharp differences in the basic objectives of the Soviet Union and the Western Powers regarding Germany. With the beginning of the year 1948 one of the most important aspects of the policy of containment was the Western effort to bring about the economic recovery and political integration of Western Germany. The division of Germany between the East and the West became sharper; the old Nazi element was given all possible encouragement by the Western powers; reparation claims came to be scuttled down; the old monopolies and combines were revived; American aid on a large scale poured in; and German industrial production far exceeded the pre-war levels.

The revival of Germany developed along three lines—*economic*, *political* and *military*. Economically the German recovery was considered vital for providing a comfortable position to Germany among the nations of the world, for the alleviation of the sufferings of the impoverished and starving population of Germany, for meeting the heavy cost of occupation by enabling Germany to make both ends meet, and for aiding the general economic recovery of the Continent. Politically, Western Germany was to be unified and, therefore, the existence of two Germanys came to be accepted for a fact. Militarily, Germany was to be rearmed and was to be associated with the Western Defence Organisation as a major ally in the struggle against Communism.

Even before the end of the second world war there was a deep conflict of views in the West as to the future of Germany. In the United States, for instance, there was the famous Morgenthau Plan providing for a full demilitarization and complete political and economic decentralisation of Germany, for the redrawing of German boundaries, for the division of Germany into a northern and southern state, the latter being united in a customs union with Austria, the proposed 30,000 square miles international zone including the Ruhr, the leaving of responsibility for sustaining the German economy to the Germans themselves, and for the withdrawal of American troops at the earliest possible opportu-

nity. As opposed to this Plan were the views held by Hull and Stimson who thought that the German industrial capacity was not merely important to the Germans but was also essential for the economic revival of whole Europe, that the suppression of Germany would breed resentment, would cause starvation to the millions and would renew the dangers of war, that Germany should be as small a burden as possible to the American tax-payer and that she should be subjected to a long period of joint occupation and control. In the end, a compromise between these two positions was struck, and after making the necessary adjustments with the Soviet views, agreements were reached at the Potsdam Conference which decided to divide Germany into four zones and provided for the denazification, demilitarisation and decentralisation of Germany, for joint control and for large scale reparations.

Germany, 1945-47. But very soon Germany became a tension area of utmost importance because of location, partition and war potential and became a major problem again so that the world was reminded of the familiar similes which have been used to describe it: "a problem child, a whole zoo of animals ranging from snakes to apes, a case of retarded development, a young girl led astray, a slab of molten metal ready for the molder and much else besides". For the Western powers Germany ceased to be a threat, for the fear of Russia "both in the present and for the future, had become greater than their fear of Germany". And for the Soviet Union a hostile Anglo-Saxon coalition prevailed over the fear of Germany. In 1946 the strains over Germany were becoming marked and during 1947-48 the division of Germany into two parts came to be accepted as a reality instead of being referred to as a possible future event to be avoided. On July 26, 1946 Byrnes had hinted at an economic fusion of the western zones of Germany. On September 6, he proposed a revision of the Potsdam agreement regarding Germany's eastern frontier. On January 1, 1947 the Bizonia was formally inaugurated. A Bizonal Economic Council was formed with its seat at Frankfurt and it represented "the first step from the absolute authority of the Military Governors to a return to the principle of the division of power". The Economic Council was strictly controlled and its every decision had to be confirmed by Military Government. At the same time a permanent conference of the premiers of the West German Laender was set up and to this the Military Governors turned as the sole accredited representatives of Western Germany. On March 12, the Truman Doctrine was announced. Meanwhile state parliaments were brought into existence by elections in the American zones at the end of June 1946, in the British in April 1947, and in the French in May 1947. On May 26 ex-President Hoover after a visit to Germany spoke in favour of the creation of a West German state with which the Western Powers must

conclude a separate peace. On June 5, Marshall made his Harvard speech and by July the Marshall offer had been rejected by the Soviet Union. On August 29, the British and the American governments announced a plan to raise the permitted level of German steel production in the Bizonia from 5,800,000, to 10,700,000 tons per annum. Twice in 1947, the four foreign ministers tried and failed to agree on the drafting of a treaty of peace with Germany and each time failure was followed by a rigidification of the line dividing Germany in two halves. On November 25 Marshall declared that "we cannot look forward to a United Germany" and that "we must do the best we can in the area where our influence can be felt".

In short, the main features of the German problem from 1945 to the end of 1947 were the collapse of the four power control, the amalgamation of the Western zones, and Western Powers' invitation to the Benelux countries to join their consultations on Germany, a trial of strength in Berlin which, though situated in the Russian zone, was itself occupied by the four powers, and the conversion of the Russian zone into a communist satellite state. In April 1946 the Soviet military administration had united the communists with the social democratic party in Eastern Germany and in October elections were held and large scale land reforms were introduced. In December 1947 a People's Congress was convened in East Berlin and was followed by another on March 17, 1948 which set up a People's Council of 400 to serve as the main organ of governance. On February 9, 1948 the Anglo-American Governments announced the Bizonal Charter for their zones in Germany. On February 25 Gottwald committed coup in Prague. It is in this background that we can understand the events that followed in 1948.

THE BERLIN BLOCKADE, 1948

After the failure of the November-December meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers (1947) the three Western Powers began discussions on Germany in London on February 23, 1948 and were joined by the representatives of the Netherlands, Luxembourg and Belgium on February 26. On March 6, the Soviet Union sent notes of protest against a unilateral discussion on Germany by the Western Powers. On March 13, a four-power commission was set up to discuss the currency reform in Germany but very soon it was deadlocked. On March 20, General Sokolovsky and his staff walked out of the Allied Control Council in Berlin stating that since the Western Powers had abandoned the attempt at four power rule in Germany, the Council no longer served any useful purpose. Five days after, Truman urged upon the Congress the quick passage of the E. R. P. (European Recovery Programme) Legislation and in Europe the Treaty of

Brussels was signed. On March 30, General Dratvin of Russia notified the Western military governors in Berlin that on April 1, new regulations for road and rail traffic between Berlin and the West would be introduced and that the Russians would check all American personnel passing through their zone for identification and would inspect all freight shipment. The Americans rejected these conditions but the Russians began to stop the American trains at the zonal border and to turn them back when the train commanders refused to submit to inspection. After April 1, all highway rail and river traffic into and out of Berlin was sealed off on grounds of "technical difficulties". On April 5, a British-Soviet air coalition took place "which aroused much popular excitement in Great Britain". On April 8, Bevin expressed hopes of the re-establishment of four-power control in Germany. But on June 7, the Western powers announced their decisions that the three Benelux countries and the Western Big Three would jointly deal with Germany, that the French zone would be merged with the Bizonia, that the Western zones of Germany would fully participate in the E. R. P., that an international authority would be established for the allocation of the Ruhr coal, coke and steel between German consumption and export to other countries, and that Western Germany would be given a democratic and federal constitution by an Assembly of Delegates from the Western zones and that this government would be under the supervision of the occupying powers in accordance with the terms of an occupation statute to be drafted later.

Currency reform. The three Western Powers now proceeded to introduce the long awaited currency reforms. "The Russians", Truman writes in his memoirs, "had plates of the currency in use at the beginning of the occupation and had been able to flood the Western zones with money printed in the Eastern zones, thus deliberately adding to inflation which threatened to block Germany's effort at recovery. In due course, we changed the plates, but Russia continued to manipulate the East Mark. Our currency reform was designed to give Germany a sound Mark for use in the West". On June 18, therefore, a new currency, Deutschemark, was introduced and the Reichmark was withdrawn and same day Sokolovsky was informed about it. On June 20, the Russians charged the Western Powers that they were splitting Germany and expressed the hope that the trade between East and West Germany would continue. On July 19, the Russian representative had refused to attend the meeting of the Komandatura. On June 22 the Russians proposed that the currency in whole of Berlin must be the same as that of the Eastern zone of the city. The Western powers accepted it provided the issue and circulation of the currency was subject to joint control. The Russians replied by introducing currency reforms in the Eastern zone and

the next day the Western currency was duly introduced into the Western zones of Berlin. On June 24 all rail, road and water traffic between Berlin and the Western zone was stopped. On July 25 Truman discussed the situation in his Cabinet and on June 30 Bevin declared that the Western powers were in Berlin "as of right and were determined to stay there". Berlin had been blockaded.

Air-lift. On the one hand, the Western powers tried to break the blockade by introducing the "air-lift" and on the other continued diplomatic negotiations with Moscow as a way out of the impasse. The air-lift became an organised operation on June 26, and hundreds of aeroplanes started carrying food, clothing, coal, raw materials and medicines for the 2½ lakh of population of West Berlin. By the end of 1948 the daily average of transport exceeded five thousand tons. Latest radar technique were introduced to make landing possible under worse weather conditions and by the spring of 1949 the daily average was 8,000 tons. The air-lift, as General Clay put it, proved the mechanical efficiency of the Western Powers in the air "in a way that the Soviet Government could understand". "Morally and spiritually it was the reply of Western civilization to the challenge of totalitarianism which was willing to destroy through starvation thousands of men and women in the effort to control their souls and minds".

Deadlock. On the diplomatic level on July 6, 1948 the three Western representatives protested to Moscow and explained the Western case. On July 14, the Russian reply stated that the Berlin problem could only be solved as part of the general problem of Germany. On July 20, the Russians offered to feed the whole of Berlin in a bid to capture German support. On July 23, General Clay reported to Truman that the Russians only wanted "to score a major victory by forcing us out of Berlin". On July 30, the Western Ambassadors to Moscow asked for a conference with Stalin which came off on August 2. Stalin appeared "more amenable to argument than his subordinates had been" and suggested that the blockade could be lifted provided "arrangements were made to have both the Eastern and the Western types of currencies circulated in all of Berlin". The subsequent four meetings between Molotov and the Western Ambassadors led to no results. Another interview with Stalin was sought on August 23, but no agreement could be reached. Ultimately the United States decided on September 9 to refer the question to the United Nations. But, before this, she once again approached the Soviet Government on September 14 requesting them to resolve the deadlock. On September 18 Molotov in a note rejected the Western overtures. The three Western Foreign Ministers then formally notified Moscow on September 26,

that the matter would be referred to the United Nations.

Berlin Blockade and the U. N. On September 29, the American complaint against Russia was submitted to the United Nations under Chapter 7 of the U. N. Charter. In the United Nations the battle was fought in four directions. *First*, there was a discussion about the competence of the Security Council to consider the question at all. However, on October 6, the Security Council decided to consider it and Vyshinsky thereupon announced that he could not take part in the debate but would attend it. *Secondly*, the neutralists in the United Nations tried to mediate but first the Western Powers and then the Soviet Union refused to accept the neutralist solution. *Thirdly*, the President of the General Assembly and the Secretary-General took the initiative. On November 13, they suggested four-power talks. The Soviet Union agreed but the Western Powers declined. *Fourthly*, the neutralists in the Security Council then prepared a new plan and tried to elicit the conflicting views of the four powers on the methods and organisation for controlling the issue and circulation of currency in Berlin. A committee to study the currency problems and "a good office committee" to supervise the execution of the agreed solution was suggested. On November 30, an Experts Committee was appointed but by February 1949 it reported failure.

Settlement. In the meantime the air lift, the counter-blockade of the eastern zone of Germany and the sentiment of the Berlin population of increasing friendliness for the West were softening the rigid attitude of Moscow. On July 29, the Berlin City Assembly condemned the Russian blockade as "a crime against humanity". On January 27, Stalin in an interview to an American correspondent suggested that "there would be no obstacle to the lifting of the traffic restriction in Berlin if restrictions imposed by the Western powers and by the Soviet Union were lifted at the same time and if a Western German Government was not constituted before a conference of foreign ministers had considered the question". Immediately after its publication Acheson met Truman and they agreed that "for the first time since June, 1948 the Berlin blockade was not tied to the currency matter in the Russian statement". The two decided "to instruct Jessup to find out from the Russian Delegation at the U. N. if this had been intentional". On February 15, Jessup, in an informal chat with Malik asked him as to the significance of Stalin's statement. On March 15, the Soviet Union agreed to leave the currency question to the Council of Foreign Ministers. On May 4, the representatives of the four powers met in New York and announced that the blockade and counter-blockade would be lifted on May 12, and that the four foreign ministers would hold a conference in Paris on May 23.

A serious threat to world peace had thus been averted. But the Berlin blockade widened the rift between the Soviet Union and the West, tended to perpetuate the division of Germany, gave an impetus to war hysteria, underlined the weakness of the United Nations, and intensified the cold war. Much more important was its effect on the revival of Germany, for, it facilitated and expedited the West German unification and contributed to the economic and military recovery of Germany. On January 7, 1948 the composition of the German Economic Council for the Bizonia had been changed to create the nucleus of a future German Government, and it had been extended from 52 to 104 members along with a second chamber. On June 7, as we have already observed, the London decisions on Germany had been announced. Following the adoption of the Marshall Plan large-scale economic aid was made available to Western Germany so that in the second half of 1948 the German industrial production had risen from 45% to nearly 75% of the 1936 level, while steel production doubled. The meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers was duly held in May, but produced no agreement so that the measures for the organisation of separate West and East German state continued, and the political recovery in West Germany was further expedited.

POLITICAL RECOVERY

The Basic Law and the Occupation Statute. On January 17, 1949 an Allied Security Board had been instituted to supervise the demilitarization of Germany. But strong German protests continued to be made against the dismantling of German factories, and the Western Foreign Ministers, therefore, in April had to make considerable concessions to Germany. The developments with regard to Germany were proceeding in two directions: (*a*) the drawing up of a Basic Law by the Germans themselves, and (*b*) the preparations of an Occupation Statute to regulate the relations between Germany and the Western occupiers.

So far as the Basic Law is concerned, on July 1, 1948 the Premiers of the West German Laender were instructed by the three Western Military Governors, following the decision of the 6-Power London Conference in June, 1948, to convoke a constituent assembly for all West German States. The Premiers established a Constituent Convention of experts. The Constituent Convention, later called the Parliamentary Council, worked from September 1, 1948 to May 8, 1949 when it voted in favour of the Basic Law. It had already been reviewed by the Western Military Governors on April 22, and was approved by them on May 12. It was finally signed at Bonn and went into force on May 23, 1949. The passing of the Constitution (Basic Law) also marked a new stage in occupation policy in

Western Germany. On April 10, 1949 the three Allied Military Governors proclaimed the "Occupation Statute" which was to give the German people a greater measure of self-government and administrative freedom.

The Occupation Statute involved certain differences between the French on the one hand and the Anglo-Saxons on the other. The French demanded unanimity rule to prevail in the meetings of the High Commissioners and were not prepared to remove all restrictions from Germany. These differences were resolved in a meeting of three Foreign Ministers on April 8, and on April 10 the text of an Occupation Statute was published under which the powers of the German Government were to be exercised in accordance with the Basic Law, nine fields were reserved for the occupying authority, and the occupying authorities retained full freedom of resuming complete authority in Germany on grounds of security and for the preservation of democratic government in Germany and in the discharge of their international obligations. The Statute required the approval of the occupying authorities for any change in the Basic Law and provided for its own revision "after 12 months or in any event within 18 months of the effective date of this instrument". It came into force on September 21, 1949, when the Allied Military Government disappeared in favour of the Allied High Commission. Bonn was selected as the headquarters of the federal offices and the provisional federal capital. In August 1949, the first election for a Federal Diet had been held and on September 15, Dr. Konrad Adenauer was elected Federal Chancellor. Five days later he announced his foreign policy and expressed the German desire to regain sovereign status.

On October 11, the Bonn Government was allowed to appoint its representative to the O.E.E.C. and on November 24, the Allied High Commission, following a meeting of the three Western Foreign Ministers in Paris from November 9 to 11, 1949, concluded a new agreement at Petersberg on November 22—*the Petersberg Agreement*—with the German Chancellor Adenauer. It provided for German membership in the Ruhr Authority and in the Council of Europe, a German declaration on demilitarisation and prevention of the re-creation of German armed forces, the re-establishment of German commercial and consular relations abroad, a German promise of preventing totalitarianism and the German right to build a German merchant marine. It also provided for West German cooperation with the work of the Military Security Board and relaxation of restrictions on ship building in the German Federal Republic. This agreement greatly limited and ultimately stopped the system of dismantling German industrial plant for reparations—a system which the Occupying Powers had introduced during the immediate post-war period.

It was in return for this that the Bonn Republic agreed to associate itself with the Ruhr Statute, under which the U.K., France and the Benelux countries had controlled, ever since 1948, the production and the distribution of Ruhr coal and steel. "Germany's participation in this formerly one-sided Control Authority was the first step towards its ultimate dissolution. Little more than six months after the foundation of the Federal Republic, the first plan for European integration began to gather momentum and to forge closer links between the Federal Republic and France in the field of economic co-operation where differences over the Saar had hitherto tended to keep them apart". The Schuman Plan, therefore, found a lively response in Germany and the Bonn Republic agreed to it on May 9, 1950. This in turn brought a further change in the Western attitude, for, "if the Federal Republic was to be a member of a European Coal and Steel Community, then the Occupying Powers would have to leave the way open to full sovereignty". The Occupation Statute, therefore, had to be revised.

After a meeting of foreign ministers in London in May, 1950 a committee was appointed to consider the revision of the Occupation Statute. In June the Korean war broke out and when the three Western Foreign Ministers met at New York in September they agreed to relinquish some of the reservations in the Occupation Statute. On March 6, 1951, the "little revision" suggested on September 19, 1950 came into force under which the rights of the Allied High Commission over German Central and Provincial legislation, foreign trade and exchange were abolished, and the Federal Government was allowed to establish a Ministry of Foreign Affairs with the right of establishing diplomatic relations with foreign countries. The Federal Republic was now permitted to create a mobile police force, 30,000 strong, under a Central Command; ship building for export was allowed; the regulations continuing hitherto prohibiting industries were revised; and an increase in steel production was sanctioned. The Western Powers also guaranteed the territory of the Federal Republic against armed aggression. The Germans were also promised that remaining allied controls would be progressively relaxed, and that negotiations would soon commence for putting the High Commission's remaining powers into treaty form. The Bonn Government also agreed to cooperate in the production and apportionment of all materials essential to the defence efforts in the West, and to acknowledge liability for the pre-war external debts of the German Reich and in principle the post-war economic assistance furnished by the Allies, which was estimated at about $ 3,500,000,000. While many Germans expressed satisfaction at these concessions, some asked for the complete abrogation of the Occupation Statute and demanded that the Federal Republic be treated as an equal ally by the Western states. Meanwhile on

January 1, India became the first country to bring a state of war with Germany to an end. On July 9, Britain and France and the United States terminated the state of war with Germany.

The next step in the full political recovery and the restoration of sovereign rights to Germany was the conclusion of Contractual Agreements and a defence treaty with her. This matter was discussed by the three Foreign Ministers in Washington on September 9. On September 14, they declared that "the German participation in Western defence entailed the establishment of a new relationship with the Western Powers and the abrogation of the Occupation Statute". The negotiations to this end between Germany and the Western Powers began on September 24, and by November 22, the three Western Foreign Ministers and the German Chancellor had come to a general agreement with regard to the future relationship between their countries under which the Occupation Statute was to be revoked and the Western Occupiers would retain minimum special rights in Germany.

Contractual Agreements: (*the Bonn Convention*). Under the Contractual Agreements Western Germany was to have a new status in international law and a large measure of sovereignty was to be restored to the Federal Republic. In the meantime, as we will shortly discuss, the process of the German rearmament was going on in full swing, and this had not only created certain difficulties and differences between France and the Anglo-Saxons, but it also led the Soviet Union to launch a fresh diplomatic offensive to detach Western Germany from the Western alliance by raising the hopes of reunification of Germany. These difficulties delayed the formal conclusion of the Contractual Agreements. In the first place, a dispute developed between the Western Powers and the Bonn Republic about the amount which Germany could and should pay for defence. The French interest here was obvious. Secondly, Germany demanded full sovereignty. Here also the French interest was involved. Thirdly, there was the question of financing the German army and of regulating a common armament programme. Fourthly, on the question of the Saar, France and Germany had sharp conflict. And finally, there was the German desire for the reunification of Germany and a strong German belief that this reunification might well be prejudiced by German adherence to the Western Alliance.

These difficulties were gradually got over and on May 26, 1952 the Contractual Agreements and the E. D. C. Treaty were signed. The Contractual Agreements included a number of specific agreements. A transfer agreement regulated the liquidation of war and occupation; an armed forces agreement provided for the continued presence on the German soil of the Allied Security Forces; and a finance agreement guaranteed the sums

which the Federal Republic was required to provide for the security forces and for its financial contribution to the E. D. C. The three Western powers also announced that when the Defence Treaty would come into force the Allied controls over German industry would be abolished. Soon after these agreements were signed a measure was mooted in West Germany for compulsory military service. By March 1954, the German Chancellor had secured the passage of an amendment to the Basic Law which established the right of rearmament. We have already noted that the French Assembly failed to ratify the E. D. C. Treaty and the Contractual Agreements consequently fell through. Full political independence was, however, restored to Germany by the Western Powers under the terms of the London-Paris Agreements of September-October, 1954. It may be mentioned here that by September 1955 the Bonn Republic had been recognised by the Soviet Union as part of a fresh diplomatic offensive following the death of Stalin. To this we will revert at the end of this chapter.

ECONOMIC RECOVERY

The political recovery of Germany was proceeding along with her economic revival. The main elements of German economic recovery were: (*a*) the scaling down and the ultimate disappearance of all Western reparation claims; (*b*) large-scale American economic aid; and (*c*) the revival of the German monopolies and combines. The Western objectives behind the German economic recovery were to develop the German capacity to offer tough resistance to the Soviet Union both in the cold war and in any final show-down with world communism, to encourage Germany to seek a re-division of markets and areas of influence to the detriment of the Soviet Union, to encourage East Germany to seek a re-union with West Germany, and to create stable conditions in Central Europe so that the march of communism might be halted. Thus the German economic recovery became an important instrument of the cold war.

On the question of the reparations, the Western Powers gradually modified their policy of making Germany foot the bill of war, a policy that was formulated at Potsdam in 1945. With the adoption of the Marshall Plan it was discovered by the Western Powers that European reconstruction would be assisted by allowing the Germans to retain the capital in their western areas. The conflict between the programme for reparations and that for reconstruction was resolved, first, by reducing reparations (the initial Allied claims being $ 320,000,000,000) to a token amount and then by winding up all reparations payments by 1950. Thus, instead of charging reparations, the Western Powers adopted the policy of the economic revival of Germany so that the total of reparations paid by Germany after World War II was negative.

It was negative because payments to Germany by Western Powers far exceeded receipts from Germany. By March 1950 the Western Powers had advanced to Germany a sum of $ 3,800 million. The ban which had been imposed on the German monopolies in 1945 and the special occupation agency—the Joint Export Import Agency—which was established in 1947, was dropped and the process of decartelisation came to be stopped. At the end of 1949 the German Big Business gained the right to trade in foreign market on their own and the monopolists, convicted of war crimes, were released from prison before their term expired. As a result of hard work, long working hours, low wages, controlled trade unions, the so-called Law on Co-determination and the general encouragement provided by the Western Powers, the total industrial output in West Germany reached the pre-war mark in 1950 and exceeded the 1936 level by 104% in 1955. Between 1951-55 whereas the industrial output in America increased by 16%, in Britain by 15% and in France by 19%, in Germany it increased by 52%. Moreover, the German industrial development by 1955 had advanced to a third place in the Western world, behind only America and Britain. But in certain spheres, viz. iron and steel, sulphuric acid, soda, synthetic rubber and aluminium Germany surpassed even Britain. The capital investment in Germany had been of a very high level, so that, between 1953-55 it totalled $ 24,500 million whereas in Britain it amounted to $ 21, 200 million and in France $ 22,800 million. That explains the equipment in a number of German key industries with the latest machinery to a greater extent than in other countries. Between 1950-55 labour productivity increased by 39%.

An active foreign trade policy also helped German recovery. In 1948 she had trade agreements with only 20 countries, but in 1955 with 51. The export of capital stimulated the exports of goods. Whereas the annual export of capital from Britain in 1956 was estimated to be 2,350 million Marks and from the United States 4,200 million Marks, from Germany it was 457 million Marks. But the rate of increase in capital export is even now higher in Germany than elsewhere. With respect to long term credits also, in 1953 Germany had advanced to third place in the Western world. The Saar province which always strained the Franco-German relations gradually passed under the control of German monopolies and was joined politically to the Bonn Republic on January 1, 1957. In the struggle for world markets Germany had established a dominant position in Latin America and is fast expanding in the Middle East and Africa. A new drive for foreign markets has been launched in the under-developed countries. The rapid drive of West German industries was stimulated by the Korean war as a result of which America, Britain and France were obliged to switch over to war production leaving German industry with good prospects of regaining the world

market. One of the most important elements of the increasing industrial production of Germany is her vast technical progress which has placed her, in a number of branches, even ahead of the United States. The continued extension of the use of chemicals and of agricultural machinery has given a great impetus to the agricultural production, so that while the area under crop had been cut down, the output has yet increased. Along with this economic recovery, the unemployment problem has also eased. In 1950 the number of the unemployed was about 3 million which dropped to 2 million in 1953 and to 4,07,000 in June 1956. Of course, this does not mean that the poor are well off, for at the end of 1954 the share of wages in the national income was only 35% and the share of profits 65%. By the end of 1955 the share of wages had dropped to 26%.

MILITARY REVIVAL

Along with the political and economic recovery of Germany, the process of rearmament has progressively developed on two lines: (*i*) the building up of war industries in Germany with the active assistance and encouragement of Western Powers; and (*ii*) the gradual association of Germany with Western Defence system. The main instruments which Germany has successfully used in her rearmament have been two: (*a*) the existence of the Franco-German discord and the consequent conflict of views between France on the one hand, and Britain and America on the other. Here, the Anglo-American impatience of the French indecision and the French fear of Germany have been successfully exploited by the Germans; (*b*) the existence of the cold war and the increasing tension between the Soviet Union and the Western Powers. Here, the Germans have tried to perpetuate the East-West schism and have played the one power bloc against the other. The cleavage between the two blocs serves as an opportunity for the Germans, and the prospects of the East-West rapprochement makes them uneasy. Dr. Adenauer himself admitted in June 1953: "The danger of a joint Great-Power policy at German expense has existed since 1945; it remained in existence even after the Federal Republic was established. The foreign policy of the Federal Government has, from the outset, been aimed at withdrawing from the danger zone".

At the end of World War II, as we have already noted, the inter-Allied policy with regard to the German disarmament had been laid down in the Potsdam Agreement under which the Allied Control Council was to bring about the complete disarmament and demilitarization of Germany and the elimination or control of all German industry that could be utilised for military purposes. This policy was carried out by the Allied Control Council till March 1948, when the Soviet Union withdrew from

the Council as a result of disagreements on policy with regard to Germany. Between 1948 and the middle of 1950 the Bonn Republic had been established by the Western Powers and the German Democratic Republic had been set up by the Soviet Union in East Germany. The outbreak of the Korean war in June 1950 led the Western Powers to a policy of general rearmament of which German rearmament was an essential ingredient. The justification advanced for the German rearmament was that the defence of Western Europe was impossible without a certain number of German divisions, and that since "German rearmament was inevitable, it was more politic to permit it at a time when the Allies had the power to refuse than to continue to refuse it until this refusal and the will for its reinforcement became clearly incompatible". Whereas the British attitude towards the question of German rearmament was one of caution, and that of the French was one of hostility, the policy of the United States was positively favourable to it. As one authority has put it: "As protagonists in a world-wide cold war, as a people hitherto shielded by geography from the main impact of European politics and history, the Americans were able to move less hesitatingly than Europeans to the conclusion that the hour demanded German rearmament and that they need not fear to face it" (*Survey of International Affairs*, 1949-50, pp. 154-55).

Even before the outbreak of the Korean war, in the defence committee of the N.A.T.O., in April 1950 the question of German contribution to the European defence, though not formally discussed, was informally considered. On May 9, the Schuman Plan had been propounded and on May 14 Acheson, Bevin and Schuman declared that "Germany shall re-enter progressively the community of Free Peoples of Europe". After the Korean war the German Chancellor asked the Allied High Commission on July 3, for strengthening the German defences. On July 22, the American High Commissioner affirmed the rights of the Germans "to defend their soil". In August the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe met and the proposal of a unified European army under a European Minister of Defence was considered. In September Germany was allowed a police force of 85,000 and the American High Commissioner McCloy openly talked of raising ten German divisions. On September 18, the three Western Foreign Ministers met in New York and decided to end the state of war with Germany and to allow German participation in a European army. The level of steel production in Germany was raised and the restrictions on the building of ships for export were abolished. On September 26, the North Atlantic Council decided to create a defence force in Europe with the contribution of Germany. On October 8, the French Government opposed the supply of equipment to Germany

until the French army had been properly equipped but agreed to the principle of a German contribution to the collective European defence. On October 25, the French National Assembly adopted the Plan of Pleven (the French Premier) proposing a European Defence Community, a European Assembly, a European Minister of Defence, and a European Defence Council. Under the *Pleven Plan* the participating states were to contribute units of their armies in a European pool in which those units were to be "merged with one another at the lowest possible level". To this European army Germany was to contribute but she was disallowed a National Army or a National Defence Ministry.

The Pleven Plan was received in Germany with mixed feelings although Adenauer gave it his broad support, asking for some modifications. On December 5, Pleven agreed to modify his proposals on the lines of the suggestions given by Spofford. Under the *Spofford Plan* the German contribution to the European army was not to be more than one-fifth of the total, recruitment of the German units was to be under Allied supervision and Germany was not to have any War Ministry. On December 18, the Defence Committee of the NATO decided on the German participation and agreed to appoint General Eisenhower as the Supreme Commander of the European Army. The German rearmament had begun. "From the Western point of view", it has been suggested, "the decision to disarm Western Germany was a decision concerning Europe, taken on the basis of happenings in Asia, precipitately by the U.S.A., reluctantly by Great Britain, and fearfully by France".

Throughout 1951, as we have noted, the political recovery of Germany continued, the Occupation Statute was revised and the Western powers decided to meet the German demand of equality. On September 14, the three Western Foreign Ministers declared "the Western aim of including a democratic Germany on a basis of equality in a European Community". On November 22, the drafts of the General Agreement and the EDC Treaty had been approved by the three Foreign Ministers and the German Chancellor. On February 8, 1952 the German Bundestag rejected the policy of neutrality and approved the EDC Treaty. On May 26, the convention defining the relations between the three Western Powers and the Bonn Republic was signed at Bonn and the next day the EDC Treaty was initialled in Paris. The Bonn Convention, as we have noted, declared that the mission of the armed forces of the three Western Powers in Germany would be the defence of the free world, of which Germany formed part. Under the EDC Treaty Germany was to contribute to European defence within the NATO framework and the participating states were bound to mutual assistance in the event of an attack. Under two additional protocols the foreign ministers

of the 6 EDC states and the permanent representatives of the NATO members promised assistance to each other. The European defence force was to consist of 43 divisions of which 14 were to be French, 12 German, 12 Italian and 5 from Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg. The peace time strength of an infantry division was to be 13,000 men and the war-time strength 15,600. Thus Germany was to be rearmed by the EDC Treaty within the framework of European defence, and sovereignty was to be restored to her under the Bonn Convention (The Contractual Agreements).

The London-Paris Agreements and Termination of Allied Occupation. We have already commented on the fate of the EDC Treaty and its final rejection by the French National Assembly in 1954. Nevertheless, under the London-Paris Agreements of September-October 1954 the full military rights of Germany were restored. In March 1954 the Basic Law had been amended and the right of rearmament was established. Under the London-Paris Agreements signed on October 3, 1954 and coming into force in March 1955, the Allied occupation regime in Germany was terminated, Germany was admitted into the Western European Union (WEU) with a right to create an army of 12 divisions, a tactical airforce of 75,000 men and a navy of 25,000 men for coastal defence. Germany was admitted to the NATO and the forces of West Germany were placed under the authority of the Supreme Allied Commander.

As part of the drive of the revival of militarism in Germany a major effort of the Western Powers has been to revive the anti-Soviet Nazi elements in Western Germany and to develop the German war industry to the fullest extent. The former Nazi officials have been freely admitted to the Government services and the fascist doctrines are freely circulated. Quite a large number of fascist Youth Societies are freely working. The war industries are developed on an enormous scale by the old monopoly concerns. In 1955, 9 companies accounted for 75% of the steel output in Germany. In the automobile industry 86% of motor vehicles are produced by four firms. About 55% of the entire banking business in Germany is controlled by three banks. In 1956 the output of chemical industries had risen by 137% of the 1936 level, electric equipment by 376% and motor vehicles by 245%, while the production of leather and textile during the same period had risen only by 10%. Thus seen, the level of production in war industries was two to three times higher in 1956 than in 1936. Planes are manufactured on a mass scale and the former Nazi aircraft manufacturers have returned to Germany. In December 1954 a Physical Research Society was set up to carry out research in Thermo-Nuclear Physics and to build up the first atomic reactor.

In short, as a result of the military development in the Federal Republic and the technical progress of its industry it has become a major competitive force in Western Europe. The big West German monopolies are pressing for the earliest possible restoration of West Germany's economic and military might. The strong support is given by the Federal Republic to the idea of a "European Community" and the Common Market Scheme because they open up before the monopolists the prospect of establishing the economic and political domination of Germany in Western Europe and of eliminating even the United States from the European scene. Witness, for instance, the tone in which Adenauer spoke on September 25, 1956 at Brussels: "The European countries, however, will not be able all the time fully to develop their great forces for the good of their peoples and humanity if they continue to seek their welfare and their security solely in United States protection....The vital requirements of the European states are not necessarily the vital requirements of the United States, and *vice versa*. Hence diversity of political views is possible, which can lead to independent political actions. According as the direct impact of the late war upon our times disappears and the war recedes into the past, the European countries must think of their own strength and responsibility". Eventually, therefore, the Federal Republic must launch a campaign of recovering the lost ground. It is true that under the Mutual Defence Agreement between the Federal Republic and the United States (which came in force on December 27, 1955) the latter has placed at the disposal of the former equipment, materials and services in conformity with the Mutual Security Act of 1954 and that the U. S. A. is keeping in the Federal Republic a large group of military advisers who exercise considerable control over the German military machine. It is also true that at the instance of the U. S. A. the Federal Republic agreed in January 1957 to build 29 air bases for N. A. T. O armed forces in addition to the 19 bases already existing on the West German soil. But there seems to be no doubt about the shape events are likely to take. Already a tough competition between Britain and the Federal Republic has begun and the day is not far off when the latter might begin to be a headache to the State Department.

THE GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC

While, as a result of the failure of the co-operation machinery for Germany, the Western Powers were consolidating their zones, in the eastern zone the U. S. S. R. was laying the foundations of a separate German State. Early in June 1947, the Russians had established a German Economic Council consisting of 12 members. In December, the German People's Congress for Unity and a Just

Peace was convened in Berlin, and in January 1948 its standing committee decided to summon a second meeting of the Congress in March. When it met on March 18, it at once resolved to constitute a People's Council of 400 with a presidium of 29, of whom 9 were proposed to be taken from the Western zones. It was decided to hold a plebiscite throughout Germany on the question of a just peace and unity. After the four Military Governors had been informed of this decision the plebiscite was fixed for May-June. The plebiscite was a dull affair but the communists announced that 95% had voted for unity and just peace. In August-October, the Congress considered a draft constitution establishing a People's Republic in Germany. In November, an East German delegation went to Moscow and, on its return, the draft constitution was approved by the People's Council in March, 1949 and it was decided to get it ratified by the Congress to be elected in May. Meanwhile the People's Council also invited the Parliamentary Council in Bonn to join it in setting up a single German state. Adenauer rejected this invitation and declared that "democratic processes were not operative in the Soviet zone and that a free election was impossible".

On May 15 and 16, 1949, elections to the new People's Congress were held in East Germany on the issue: "Are you for the unity of Germany and a just peace?" It was announced on May 7 that about 7 millions have answered "yes" as against 4 millions. On May 29, the 3rd People's Congress met in Berlin. It ratified the draft constitution (prepared by the People's Council) for the German Democratic Republic (G.D.R.) and resolved "to send delegates to the Conference of Foreign Ministers in order to press for a return to the Potsdam agreement as a basis of negotiation and to demand a treaty of peace and the withdrawal of troops within one year". It also elected a Council of 330 members with a Presidium of 38. Thus the Soviet military administration now had a constitution and could, at will, set up an East German State. Meanwhile the Soviet authorities continued to talk of peace and unity and to denounce the new Basic Law as undemocratic and imperialistic. The Berlin Blockade had failed and, as we have seen, all restrictions which the Russians had imposed were officially raised on May 12, 1949. In September, the United Nations General Assembly met and by October the Russians had decided to establish a separate government in their zone.

Establishment of G. D. R. On October 2, 1949, the Moscow radio announced that the Kremlin had informed the West that the creation of the Bonn Republic had created a new situation. On October 3, the East German Communists conferred with the Russian occupation authorities. On October 5, the Presidium of the People's Council summoned the Council and on October 7 the People's Council, under the chairmanship of Wilhelm Pieck (a leading

Communist of the Soviet Zone) proclaimed itself the People's Assembly (Volkskammer) of the G.D.R. The People's Assembly adopted a programme "calling for the restoration of German unity with full German sovereignty, the termination of dismantling, a democratic peace treaty, the withdrawal of occupation troops, and a ceaseless fight against foreign capitalists and warmongers". Pieck was appointed President of the Republic and Otto Grotewohl as Chancellor. Elections for the new Volkskammer were fixed up for October 15, 1950. The new regime thanked the Soviet Union for her assistance, pledged friendship towards her, promised to pay reparations and agreed to accept the Oder-Neisse line as the final frontier between Germany and Poland.

Consolidation of G.D.R. On October 10, the Russians announced that the administrative functions of the Russian military administration would be transferred to the provisional government of the German Democratic Republic "and that the Soviet military administration would be replaced by a Soviet Control Commission composed of civilians. Same day the three Western powers in a statement declared that the so-called G.D.R. had no legal standing. Nevertheless the process of organizing the regime in the G. D. R. went on unchecked. Political parties that opposed the Government were eliminated and it soon became apparent that the new state was to be ruled by the Politburo of the S.E.D. (the German Socialist Unity Party, dominated by the Communists) on behalf of the Kremlin, and that Ministers of other parties, if allowed to remain in office, would be closely supervised by Communists in their departments. The so-called Trotskyists and Titoists were liquidated. In September 1950, the S.E.D. was purged and elections of the Volkskammer were held on the basis of a new electoral law decreed on August 9, 1950. The candidates of the National Front received 99% votes. On November 9, the laws constituting the Provisional People's Chambers and the Provisional Government of the Republic were passed, and on November 15, the new Volkskammer duly met. Throughout 1949-50 the attack on religion continued. In 1949, the Catholic press was gagged, and in 1950 the Church schools were either closed or were used to turn children into atheists. By the end of the year these attacks were intensified. Meanwhile rearmament of East Germany was also launched and early in 1950 it was reported that a considerable police force had been organized and that the Russians had also sanctioned the creation of an air force. It was also reported that the East German police was participating in Red Army's manoeuvres. In May 1950, the Western Powers protested to Moscow "against the creation of a German police force which had the character of an army comprised nearly 50,000 men in military formations (including infantry, artillery, and tanks), performed no normal police duties, received basic military training and military weapons and was commanded by

former senior officers of the German army". The Soviet Union denied these allegations in October and charged the West of rearming the Bonn Republic.

In the economic sphere, in the early phase after the War, the Soviet Union followed the policy of dismantling German industries and transported plant and equipment. Since this policy could neither contribute to the Russian recovery nor could it win the goodwill of the Germans, it was now changed and a new policy was adopted—a policy under which "Eastern Germany was to be milked instead of being turned into an economic desert". Thus dismantling was stopped in several enterprises which were now transferred to newly formed Russo-German Corporation 51% of whose stock was in Russian hands. In November 1951, a 5-year plan was adopted after the 2-year plan ended. The plan called for a 60% increase in labour productivity and an increase of 20% in wages. Large business was nationalized, labour was conscripted, farmers were collectivized and working "norms" or quotas were set up. By the decree of March 16, 1950, the cultural life passed under state control. In short, by 1953 the industrial output in East Germany had increased by 100%, labour productivity had risen by 37%, national income had gone up by 80%, wages had increased by 14%, and foreign trade had expanded by 150%.

G. D. R., 1953-1957. In spite of these achievements in the economic sphere, the standard of living had not risen and the common man was extremely unhappy so that there was a steady flow of refugees to the western zone. The confiscation of land, the shortages of consumers' goods, the excess of labour control, the drive of collectivization, and the unimaginative methods of tax collections had led to frustration, irritation and a revolting mood. On June 16, 1953, an order that production be increased by 10% without the accompanying wage increase, led to demonstrations in East Berlin and other cities and despite the minor reforms announced by the G.D.R, on June 17, "the demonstrations developed into riots, in the course of which Government buildings were set on fire, Russian flags were torn down, some of the German police showed their sympathy with the rioters, and unarmed men attacked the Russian tanks which had to be called in before order could be restored".

The reactions in the Soviet Union were immediate, and while the riots were ascribed to the war-mongers in the West, the lessons of the riots were fully driven home. Towards the end of 1953, Russia returned about 10,000 prisoners of war to Eastern Germany. The firms taken over by the Soviet Union were returned. Occupation costs were limited to not more than 5% of the East German national income. On August 22, 1953 a protocol was signed in Moscow incorporating these concessions and the declaration that all reparations from the G. D. R. would cease as

from January 1, 1954. On March 26, 1954, the Soviet Government decided to establish the same relations with the G. D. R. as with the other sovereign states and conceded her "freedom to make decisions according to its own views in domestic and foreign affairs". Following Adenauer's trip to Moscow and the opening of the diplomatic relations between Moscow and Bonn, the Soviet Union invited Otto Grotewohl to Moscow where, on September 20, 1955, he and Bulganin signed a treaty which granted full sovereignty to the German Democratic Republic, including control of civilian traffic between West Germany and West Berlin and the right to rearm and to play a full role in the Warsaw Pact.

Foreign Policy of the G. D. R. The cardinal principles of the foreign policy of the G.D.R. have been intimate economic, political, cultural and defence relations with the Soviet Union; the demand of unification of Germany with a view to detach the Bonn Republic from the Western Alliance; the integration of Germany as a People's Democracy with the Soviet Bloc; and the establishment of diplomatic and trade relations with as large a number of countries as possible Soon after the establishment of the G.D.R., Grotewohl recognized the Oder-Neisse line as the final Polish-German frontier on October 12, 1949 and six days later, Poland recognized the G.D. R. On October 14, he admitted the German guilt in the invasion of Russia in August, 1941 and two days later it was announced that the Soviet Union and the G. D. R. would establish full diplomatic relations. On October 19, a commercial agreement was signed with Hungary. On November 17, the East German trade missions were sent to Russia, China, Czechoslovakia and Poland. Early in 1950, the relations with Czechoslovakia were normalized. In July, trade and cultural agreements were signed with Poland. Earlier, in June, the G. D. R. disclaimed any German designs on Sudetenland and, at the same time, signed commercial, financial and technical agreements with Hungary. On July 22, the government of the G. D. R. announced its intention to join the Comecon. As a sequence to the Warsaw Peace Conference in November 1950, the G. D. R. enacted a Law on Safeguarding Peace which prohibits propaganda directed at the resurgence of aggressive German militarism and the inclusion of Germany in aggressive blocs.

These developments, particularly the Oder-Neisse-line agreement with Poland (July 6, 1950), hardened the attitude of the Bonn Republic and its Western Allies. Dr. Adenauer denied the G. D. R's right to talk of unifying Germany, attacked its abandonment of German territory beyond the Oder and the Neisse, repeatedly urged the restoration of lost territories to Germany and sought the support of Western Powers in this task. Throughout 1950-51 negotiations on the question of unification of Germany were conducted but bore no fruits. The demands of

the West included the establishment of independent courts in East Germany, the release of political prisoners, return to Germany of Germans deported to Russia, disbanding of the secret police, revocation of the Law on Safeguarding Peace, the annulment of the Oder-Neisse-line agreement and restoration of lost German territories to Germany, "free, general, equal, secret and direct elections for a German Parliament", international supervision of these elections and an international investigation of conditions in both parts of Germany. The stand of the G. D. R. rested on preliminary talks between German leaders from both sides, appointment of a Constituent Council in which the two German states would be equally represented, conclusion of a German Peace Treaty on the basis of a demilitarized, democratic and united German state, free in its foreign trade, free to develop its resources for peaceful purposes, and freed from occupation troops within one year of the signing of the treaty. The reference of the German question to the Assembly of the U. N. in November, 1951 failed to resolve the deadlock which continued indefinitely.

Meanwhile the relations between the G.D.R. and the People's Democracies continued to be closer and trade agreements were concluded with Poland and Czechoslovakia in June and December, 1951. Throughout 1952-53 the rift between the G.D.R. and the Bonn Republic widened and the relations between the G.D.R. and the Soviet bloc became even more intimate. By 1957, the G.D.R. developed diplomatic and economic relations with twelve countries inhabited by about one-third of the world's population—the U.S.S.R., China, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria, Albania, the Mongolian Republic, the Korean People's Republic, the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam and Yugoslavia. It should, however, be noted that these relations are largely governed by ideological considerations and are, therefore, interstate relations of a new type to which accepted norms are hardly applicable. The G.D.R. is also a signatory to the Treaty of Friendship, Co-operation, and Mutual Assistance which was signed by the eight participants of the Warsaw Conference and "is aimed at safeguarding the security of its signatories".

The G.D.R. has also established economic relations with non-communist states so that trade between them and the G.D.R. grew from D.M. 366 million in 1950 to D.M. 1,280 million in 1954. The number of inter-governmental trade agreements increased from 3 in 1951 to 9 in 1953, 17 in 1954 and 24 in 1957. It has bank agreements with France, Greece, Uruguay and Turkey; agreements between Chambers of Commerce with Austria, Holland and Indonesia; and compensation agreements with individual firms in Britain, Belgium, Norway and Sweden. In 1954 it participated in international trade fairs and exhibitions in Paris, Stockholm, Milan, Utrecht, Salonika and Jakarta. It also

concluded technical agreements (postal, telegraph and telephone agreements) with many countries and has special rail-ferry agreements with Sweden and Denmark. In 1953, the G.D.R. and Finland exchanged trade missions which exercise Consular functions and enjoy some of the rights of diplomatic missions. In March, 1955 a trade agreement was signed with France covering the period from March 1, 1955 to February 29, 1956 which provided for trade worth $ 6,000,000 from each side. With the Federal German Republic, agreements on the quantity of trade are concluded annually. With India the first commercial and cultural contacts were established in 1954 when a permanent trade mission exercising consular functions and certain diplomatic rights in Bombay and a trade agency in Calcutta were set up. At the end of 1955 the Deputy Prime Minister of the G.D.R. headed a delegation to India and an agreement was reached under which the G.D.R. was to assist India in the form of economic co-operation—in the construction of a number of major projects and in the study of the problem of mining and utilising India's rich deposits of lignite. Indeed, in September 1955, Otto Groteohl declared that the G.D.R. "has commercial relations with almost a hundred countries in all parts of the world". Finally, the G.D.R. is also participating in the work of more than three scores of international organizations and conventions of the International Chamber of Weights and Measures, the League of Red Cross Societies, the International Union of Railways, the FAO, the UNESCO and the World Meteorological Organization.

THE PROBLEM OF GERMAN RE-UNIFICATION

The problem of Germany, at present, plays a major role in the American policy of containment and in the process the basic issue of reunification is completely lost and even today Germany remains balkanized into the Federal Republic, the German Democratic Republic, West Berlin, East Berlin, the Territory under Polish Administration beyond the Oder and Neisse, and North-East Prussia which had been annexed by the Soviet Union. We have noted that though divided, the process of German rearmament has gone on unhindered. The announced goal of Western policy on Germany is a reunified and rearmed Germany allied with the West. The U. S. S. R., on the other hand, has rejected German reunification on Western terms and refused to consider any reunification of Germany so long as the Western powers ask that Germany should be unified, armed and allied with the Western powers and that the Eastern frontiers of such a unified Germany should be modified in Germany's favour. The assumptions behind the Western policy are that West Europe is threatened by the Russian military menace and that it can be

averted by a rearmed Germany allied with the NATO. The assumptions behind the Soviet policy, on the other hand, are that East Europe is threatened by the Western military attack and "that a rearmd Germany will greatly facilitate such an attack". The slogan of world Communism and the post-war Soviet expansion seem to support the former, and the German military dominance after 1871, her achievements in World War I, and her startling victories in World War II provide it a motiff. On the other hand, the Russian recollection of German military victories in two world wars, and their knowledge of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, and of Western intervention in the Civil War substantiate the latter. Thus "Western and Soviet policy makers alike... are still under the hypnotic spell of the past prestige of German military might, despite German defeat in two world wars". It is not realized that in the light of the new facts of power in our time "these assumptions are unrealistic that the German armies will have hardly any military value against the Soviet Union, that even if they are equipped with tactical or strategic atomic weapons, they will be countered by similar weapons on the Soviet side and that the balance of military forces on the continent will remain exactly what it is" at present. But, howsoever unbelievable the assumptions of a policy may be, they are nevertheless important, for, as Schuman writes, "what men and statesmen believe to be true, however untrue in fact it may be, is true for them in the sense that such beliefs motivate attitudes and actions".

Issues involved. Let us analyse the issues involved in the problem of German unification, and the steps taken by the Western powers and the U. S. S. R. to solve this problem. It is realized on both sides that unless Germany is reunited, there can be no hope for peace and that existing situation constitutes a sort of "time bomb" in the very heart of Europe—a situation producing major international tensions, frictions, and incidents, involving, directly or indirectly, the two great nuclear powers and, therefore, presenting a constant threat to everyone. The real difficulty, however, is the conditions on which reunification is to be brougt about. The Soviet view is that a reunited Germany should not be a threat to the Soviet Union, that it should be detached from the NATO, that it should be neutralized, that all foreign troops should be withdrawn from there, that there may be a broad neutral zone in Central Europe including the whole of Germany, and that there may even be a German confederation of the Federal and Democratic Republics. In the Soviet view the questions of European security and German unification are inter-linked. The Western view is that German reunification was hardly possible without substantial arms reduction, for so long as either side was fully armed, the other would find it necessary to hold fast to its present strategic position on German soil and that the core of the

reunification problem is that neither Russia nor the United States could accept a solution under which a united Germany could be used as a military base by the other. "Russia", thus runs the Western argument, "has a mortal fear of the combination of German location and manpower with United States leadership and material". Russia, therefore, would break this combination before agreeing to reunification. But the West too cannot allow Germany to be taken over by the Soviet Union and, therefore, cannot agree to an unarmed and neutralized Germany which would become a power vacuum and would be filled in by the Soviet Union. Moreover, Germany is much too precious for the NATO and it is thus not at all possible for the West to agree to the neutralization of Germany. If Germany leaves it, the American troops too would have to be pulled out of Europe. Given the specific nature of the NATO infra-structure, it is argued, adequate European defence demanded that "the American troops be in Germany, not just anywhere in Western Europe". It is also suggested by many in the West that the secession of Germany from NATO would do considerable damage to the early warning system now being developed. States like Denmark and Norway, the argument continues, would withdraw from the NATO if Germany were to leave it and that would fatally weaken the Alliance. To the argument that when NATO was created other countries joined the Alliance without German participation and so her membership now should not be considered vital, the answer is given that the international environment had changed greatly since 1949, that even the first defence plan of NATO called for defence "as far forward as possible", that is with German cooperation in Germany itself, and that one of the most generally accepted lessons of the history of NATO since its inception has been that Western security demanded active participation by West Germany.

Concept of a neutral belt. Nor is the West prepared to agree to create a European security arrangement for collective defence, including Germany, Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia. The proposal of disengagement of the major antagonists in the cold war in a broad neutral zone in Central Europe, though mooted by Hugh Gaitskell, Bevan, Sir John Slessor and Lester Pearson in 1954, was first made by Sir Anthony Eden at the Geneva Conference in 1955. He suggested that disarmament, security of Europe and German reunification should be linked up in a plan establishing a zone of limited armaments, under inspection and control by both sides, with a completely demilitarized strip running through the middle of it. Thus the respective forces could be brought out of contact with one another, diminishing the risk of frontier clashes that could develop into a serious war. In October 1957, Adam Rapacki, the Polish Foreign Minister

proposed to the United Nations an agreed ban on the manufacture and maintenance of nuclear weapons in both East and West Germany, and the inclusion of Poland in this atom free zone. The idea was, later on, supported by George Kennan Denis Healey and Captain Liddell Hart The benefits from this plan to the West are obvious. Such a belt would have to be guaranteed by both the United States and Russia. In such a plan, Ruhr would be kept out of the Russian hands and Germany would remain economically and culturally a part of the West. To both Russia and the United States, the greatest advantages would be that from Germany an atomic attack on either could not be launched, for an atom free zone would be a hindrance to an attacker in bringing forward his short-range atomic weapons, of more precision, to stun the defence by surprise. This "would tend to relax the tension that arises from fear of surprise or 'the trigger-happy impulsiveness' of some local commander".

In spite of these advantages, the plan has not found favour in the West. One reason of this has been the difficulty of defining the meaning and conditions of an "atom-free zone". As Captain Liddell Hart has put it: "Atomic weapons have a two-piece composition—the projectile or bomb and its means of delivery. If the restriction is applied only to the projectile or bomb, we have to reckon with the awkward fact that such ammunition might too easily be hidden or stealthily brought forward. If the restriction be extended to the means of delivery it is more possible to keep watch and check on these –but more difficult to pick out for banning those which are capable of delivering an atomic projectile or bomb". While, therefore, an atom-free zone under proper inspection would be a good check on the entry and use of long range strategic missiles and bombers which require elaborate launching sites and large airfields, it would hardly be a check on the shorter range tactical atomic weapons which are powerful enough to destroy whole cities within their range. In addition to this practical difficulty, the dominant feeling in the West is that of suspicion and distrust of the Soviet intentions—a feeling that Russia would not leave alone the suggested European security pact countries, with their wealth and strategic location, that she would inevitably feel impelled to exercise all possible means to bring them under her control, and that *the United States could not afford to let them return to the Russian fold, especially if all the resources and power of a United Germany were included.* Thus the central problem is, once again, that of Germany - the problem of German reunification and German rearmament.

The Soviet policy. To solve this problem, the Soviet Union has followed a double-edged policy—on the one hand it has taken conciliatory measures with a view to offering alternatives to West German rearmament and, on the other, it has taken stiff measures

designed to demonstrate futility of West German rearmament. Thus the Soviet Government offered to join the NATO in March 1954; it announced reduction of Soviet armies in 1954 by 640,000 men, and in 1956 by 1,200,000; it concluded the Austrian peace treaty on May 15, 1955; it proposed, at the Summit Conference in July 1955, German unification, neutrality, disarmament, and a European Security Pact; it established diplomatic and commercial relations with the German Federal Republic in September 1955; and it proposed, in November 1956, aerial inspection of armaments or "open skies" within a 1,000 mile zone in Central Europe. On the other hand, the Soviet Government took a stiff attitude in face of German rearmament. For instance, in February 1955 Malenkov was replaced by Bulganin as the Premier; Zhukov was subsequently appointed Minister of Defence; the Soviet military budget was increased by 15% with emphasis on war industry; the Anglo-Soviet and the Franco-Soviet treaties of 1942 and 1944 were abrogated on May 7, 1955 and the Warsaw Pact was signed on May 14. At the same time, rearmament of Eastern Germany was launched; the Soviet troops in Eastern Germany, Poland, Hungary, and elsewhere were retained; and the Hungarian revolt was suppressed.

It is this spirit which has dominated the course of negotiations between West Germany and Russia on the question of Germany, even after the Soviet Union established diplomatic relations with the Federal Republic. The negotiations for establishment of diplomatic relations were completed in Moscow on September 13, 1955 and the letters exchanged between Bulganin and Adenauer that day contained a non-committal reference to the question of German reunification stating that the opening of normal diplomatic relations between the two countries would contribute to the establishment of a united democratic German state. But on September 14, Adenauer sent an additional letter to Bulganin stating that the establishment of diplomatic relations between the Federal Republic and the U. S. S. R. did not constitute recognition of the present territorial position by either side, that the final determination of German borders must be held in abeyance pending the completion of a peace treaty, and that the agreement implied no change in the juridical position of the Federal Republic which claimed authority to represent Germany as a whole. The Soviet Government promptly rejected these conditions. A *Tass* statement, on September 15, reiterated the Soviet view that the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany represented only West Germany and that the Government of the German Democratic Republic represented East Germany. The statement added that Germany's borders were settled by the Potsdam Agreement signed in Berlin in 1945 which, inter alia, authorized Poland to occupy German territory east of the Oder and Neisse rivers. It was,

indeed, to emphasise the existence of two legitimate German Governments that the Soviet Government received in Moscow a delegation from the East German regime, led by Premier Otto Grotewohl on September 17 (only three days after Adenauer had left) and on September 20, they signed a treaty providing that "the G. D. R. is free to make decisions on matters of domestic and foreign policy including relations with the German Federal Republic and with other states". On January 8, 1956 the first Soviet Ambassador to the Federal Republic presented his credentials in Bonn and on March 12, the Federal German Ambassador came to Moscow. But the relations between the two Governments have been far from friendly and the central question of German-Soviet relations—that of German reunification—is as far from solution as ever. On September 2, 1956 the German Federal Government sent a 15-point memorandum to the Soviet Government, setting out in details their views on the question of reunification and pointed out that the Soviet interest in the question had perceptibly diminished since the negotiations in Moscow in September 1955.

The Soviet Government in its reply of October 22, 1956 reiterated its policy and claimed that it was unrealistic to consider reunification of Germany by means of all German elections, and that the main obstacles to reunification were the entry of the Federal Government into the NATO, the militarization of the Federal Republic and the latter's refusal to negotiate with the G. D. R. The Federal Republic in its reply of May 20, 1957 reiterated its stand and refused to recognise the G. D. R. or to negotiate with it for "this in itself constitutes a decisive step in dividing Germany". It also rejected Soviet allegations of revival of militarism or of aggressive intent. Thus a deadlock had ensued in these diplomatic exchanges. A similar fate met the Adenauer-Bulganin exchanges from February 5 to April 13, 1957. On July 27, 1957, Herr Grotewohl issued a memorandum proposing a confederation of the "two German States" on the condition that the Federal Government should withdraw from NATO and the G. D. R. from the Warsaw Pact; that strict limits should be imposed on armed forces in both parts of Germany and conscription should be abolished in the Federal Republic; that the four Great Powers should be requested to draw up a plan for the withdrawal of their forces from German soil and no nuclear weapons of any kind should be stored in Germany; and that an all-German Council comprising representatives from both German parliaments should be established with advisory powers only and to consider such questions as the development of economic relations, currency, tariffs, communications, the status of Berlin and the lifting of the ban on the communist party in West Germany. The Council would continue in being until agreement was reached on unification by the two Governments. Replying to the Federal Republic

note of May 20, 1957, on September 7, 1957 the Soviet Government in a note recommended the East German proposals to the Government of the Federal Republic. It justified the formation of the G. D. R. as a separate state, and rejected the idea of all-German elections as an idea "reflecting a desire to swallow up the first peaceful German state in German history". The note concluded that "there are only two courses open to the Federal Government: either to leave NATO and to re-establish German unity gradually and peacefully, or to continue the present policy and thereby to assume responsibility for preserving the division of Germany". On the Soviet side, therefore, the negotiations came to a dead end.

The policy of the West. Deadlock also ensued on the side of the Western Powers. Two days after the East German reunification proposals were made public, a comprehensive statement of the common policies of the U. K., the U. S. A., France and the Federal Republic of Germany on German reunification was signed in Berlin (July 29, 1957). It was prepared by a working group which was set up by the Governments of the four countries mentioned above to study the related questions of German reunification and European security and which met in Washington in March, in Bonn in May, and in Paris in June 1957. The Berlin Declaration pointed to the continued division of Germany as "a grave injustice to the German people and the major source of international tension in Europe", and demanded that the Federal Government be regarded as the only Government qualified to speak for the German people as a whole. It justified the German demand of national unity on the basis of the fundamental rights of self-determination and declared that "the reunification of Germany remains the joint responsibility of the Four Powers who in 1945 assumed supreme authority in Germany, a responsibility which was reaffirmed in the directive issued by the four Heads of Government in Geneva in July, 1955". It reiterated the demand of a "freely elected all-German Government" which alone could undertake on behalf of a reunified Germany obligations which would inspire confidence on the part of other countries and would be considered just and binding in the future by the people of Germany themselves. It emphasised that freedom and security of a reunified Germany should not be prejudiced by an imposed status of neutralization or demilitarization, that its government should be free to determine its foreign policy and to decide on its international associations, that it should not be deprived of the right recognized in the U. N. Charter for all nations to participate in collective measures of self-defence and that it should be left free to join or not to join the N. A. T. O. It argued that the re-establishment of the national unity of Germany in accordance with the freely expressed wishes of the German people would not in itself

constitute a threat to Germany's neighbours nor would it prejudice their security. It, nevertheless, renewed the Western pledges that "appropriate arrangements, linked with German reunification", might be made "which would take into account the legitimate security interests of all the countries concerned". The Berlin Declaration continued that "the Western Powers are also prepared as part of a neutrally acceptable European security arrangement, to give an assurance that, in the event of a reunified Germany choosing to join N. A. T. O., they would not take military advantage as a result of the withdrawal of Soviet forces". It linked the question of German reunification with that of disarmament and suggested that the reunification of Germany accompanied by the conclusion of European security arrangements would facilitate the achievement of a comprehensive disarmament agreement. On the other hand, the Declaration added, if a beginning could be made toward effective measures of partial disarmament, this would contribute to the settlement of outstanding major political problems such as the reunification of Germany, and initial steps in the field of disarmament should lead to comprehensive disarmament agreement which presupposed a prior solution of the problem of German reunification. It declared that "the Western Powers do not intend to enter into any agreement on disarmament which would prejudice the reunification of Germany". The Declaration concluded with the expression of desires of the Western Powers "to enter into negotiations with the Soviet Union in order to reach a European settlement and to give evidence that the paramount objective of their policy is the attainment of a just and lasting peace".

Conclusions. Many conclusions follow from this brief discussion of the German problem. *First*, the prospects of a four-power solution of the problem are very dim indeed. The gulf between the Soviet Union and the West is very wide. The policy objective of the Western Powers, viz., a rearmed unified Germany allied with the West seems to be impossible of realization. As Schuman has recently written: "We can have, if we like, a unified Germany which is unarmed and neutral or we can have a divided Germany with West Germany armed and aligned with the West. But the announced goal of Western policy of a reunified, rearmed Germany allied with the West is outside the realm of military and political possibilities".

Secondly, the division of Germany seems to have come to stay and this would continue to delay a satisfactory security arrangement in Europe and might prevent a comprehensive disarmament agreement. Although both sides in the cold war profess to work for a reunited Germany, there is, nevertheless, a deep-seated fear that a reunited Germany as the leader of Central European security arrangement might soon lead to a resurgent and aggressively nationalistic Germany, and for this reason the partition of

Germany seems to have been accepted for an indefinite period "as one of the prices for avoiding the much greater costs of an East-West war".

Finally, in the East-West conflict on Germany, the party that gains is Germany alone. On the one hand, the marvellous economic recovery of Germany and her striking military revival would definitely lead to German military and economic domination in Western Europe. Possibly, in the near future, the Soviet Union may reconcile herself with this fact and despite her "fears and phobias" may acquiesce in it. This would eventually disrupt the Western alliance. A strong West Germany would achieve unification with the Soviet support at a later date. If the Soviet Union and the Western powers have presently accepted partition of Germany as the lesser evil, the Germans have not. Indeed the central position and size of Germany makes partition unacceptable to her. The dilemma of the West, therefore, seems to be that the continued division of Germany leads to the strengthening of West Germany which in its turn brightens the prospects of reunification with the Soviet support.

(B) SPAIN: FROM AN OUTCAST TO A RESPECTABLE PARTNER

During the second world war General Franco of Spain supported the Axis Powers with all aid short of outright participation and the fact that he did not permit the German troops to cross the Spanish territory was more due to his concern for Spanish interest than to his love for the Allies. At the end of the war Spain, therefore, was treated as an outcast, was morally weak and physically vulnerable. At the San Francisco Conference in 1945 the nations assembled resolved to debar Spain from membership of the United Nations and this was confirmed at Potsdam in July by Britain, America and Russia. In March, 1946 in a note the three Western Powers condemned the Franco regime and expressed the hope that the Spanish people would replace it by a democratic Government. Soon after the establishment of the United Nations, Franco applied for membership of the United Nations. But on February 9, 1946 the General Assembly declared Spain ineligible and on December 12, 1946 it resolved that "if within a reasonable time, there is not established a Government which derives its authority from the consent of the governed, committed to respect freedom of speech, religion and assembly, and to the prompt holding of an election in which the Spanish people free from force and intimidation and regardless of party may express their will, the Security Council consider the adequate measures to be taken in order to remedy the situation".

It advised that "all members of the United Nations recall from Madrid their Ambassadors and Ministers Plenipotentiary accredited there".

By the middle of 1947, however, the policy of containment had been enunciated by the United States and it was now thought to be necessary to enlist even the support of the Devil, if the Devil could promise to fight the communists. Franco's record of being consistently anti-communist came to be studied afresh by the American policy framers, and despite the stout resistance offered by London and Paris, the United States decided to shut their eyes to the Fascist nature and the Nazi affiliations of the Spanish regime. In November, 1947 at the instance of the United States, the General Assembly passed another resolution expressing confidence that the Security Council would exercise its responsibilities as soon as required by the situation in Spain. In June 1947, Franco began to hope for the American economic aid following Marshall's Harvard speech and, in the spring of 1948 in the Report of the Banco Urquijo, a Principal Bank of Spain, Spain's economic needs were detailed on the assumption that American aid would be forthcoming. In March, the American House of Representatives voted to include Spain among the recipients of Marshall Aid, although the decision was reversed as a result of the pressure of the Administration which in its turn was pressed by America's Western allies. In 1948, Spain received another blow when the communists failed to achieve success in Italy, for the Italian success there would have raised the stock of Spain in the American eyes. Nevertheless, as the Russian danger grew, in the eyes of the reactionary element of the State Department, the American monopolists, and Catholics, the value of Spain's strategic geographical situation, man-power, and the army (consisting in 1953, of 19 divisions including one armoured division and one independent cavalry division the largest army in Europe outside Russia and Yugoslavia) grew more and more.

In this background during the first quarter of 1949 several resolutions were introduced (but failed to pass) in the United Nations ranging from a proposal that U.N. member states have full freedom of action as regards their diplomatic relations with Spain to a proposal that all U.N. members cease to export arms and ammunition to her and refrain from entering into any agreement with her. The American diplomats started bolstering up the Franco regime with a view to securing bases in Spain. Thus on January 19, 1950, Acheson in a letter to Chairman Connoly of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee said that "the internal position of the present regime in Spain is strong and enjoys the support of many who.....fear that chaos and civil strike would follow a move to overthrow the Government", and added that "there is no sign of an alternative to the present Government".

During 1950, better luck came to Franco, for, now the United States had decided to support the lifting of the ban on diplomatic relations with Spain and on her membership of the specialised agencies of the United Nations. In August, the Congress, in spite of the advice of the administration, voted a loan for Spain. In June 1950 the outbreak of the Korean war sharply reacted on the European security problem and pushed the United States from a policy of containment of Russia to that of encirclement. In December the Chinese entry on the side of North Korea created almost a panic and the United States established diplomatic relations with Madrid. In 1951 the American Government approached Franco for bases and prolonged negotiations continued involving a number of military and economic missions, the waning and waxing of American favour, the tough bargaining on the part of Franco and the bitter comments in London and Paris on American advances to Franco.

Eventually on September 27, 1953, following the relaxation of tension resulting from the new moves of the Soviet Union after Stalin's death and the consequent diminution of Franco's bargaining power, the Defence and Economic Agreements were signed between the United States and Spain providing for the construction and use by America of military bases in Spain, American economic assistance to her and American military assistance. Under these agreements, Franco accepted to allow the Americans information regarding Spain's balance of payment position, the exclusion of monopoly organisation from contracts for the bases and powers of close supervision. Spain became eligible for American economic, technical and military assistance under the Mutual Security Programme. These agreements were ratified by Spain on December 30, 1953 and since these were executive agreements they did not require the ratification of the American Senate. During the year 1954 about 300 military bases of America had been built up on the Spanish soil. On November 1, 1955 Dulles visited Madrid to discuss the problems of mutual defence, bases and economic aid. On December 14, Spain was admitted along with 15 other countries to the United Nations in the famous "Package Deal" by 55 votes to none. Earlier on January 1, 1955 Spain had been granted the statuts of a permanent observer at the United Nations Thus by 1956 Spain had become a respectable partner. From 1948 to 1955 a sum of 232.5 million dollars was given by the United States throug Export Import Bank Loan and the Mutual Security Programme in addition to an undisclosed contribution for defence assistance.

The relations with Britain and France have not been as happy as with the United States and the main difficulties have been the question of Gibraltar and Spanish participation in the Western defence system in the case of Britain and the issues of Morocco

and Spanish association with the NATO in the case of France. Both objected not only to Spain's admission to N. A. T. O. but even to a bilateral pact between Franco and the United States. They believed that the strategic advantages of any close association with Spain were out-weighed by the effect of such an association on the morale of the other members of the Western community. With regard to Britain, the opposition to a Spanish-American understanding created much trouble between London and Madrid from 1951 to 1953. During 1954 the problem of Gibraltar cropped up and the Spanish Government opposed the Queen's visit to Gibraltar. In January serious anti-British demonstrations were staged throughout Spain and British property was looted and destroyed. As a consequence the proposed visit of several units of the British fleet to the ports of Spain and Spanish Morocco were cancelled. The conflict continued in 1955-56.

With regard to France conflict arose from the French opposition to a rapprochement between Spain and the United States and to Spain getting Marshall Aid and membership of the NATO. But more serious trouble developed in August, 1953 when the French Government without consulting Franco deposed and exiled the Sultan of Morocco, Sidi Mohammed Ben Youssef, and nominated Mohammed Ben Arafa to succeed him. In 1954 demonstrations against the latter led to further sharp exchanges between Paris and Madrid. Nevertheless the French Government declared its intention of defending the unity of Morocco including he Spanish zone. In mid-1955 relations, however, improved andtanti-French propaganda from Madrid stopped. On September 26 Spain informed France that it regarded the re-establishment of a legal situation in French Morocco as a matter concerning France alone but that if any change in the French regime implied a revision of existing treaties Spain would demand representation in the negotiations. In October the Riff Tribesmen revolted against France near the frontier of the French and Spanish Morocco and the French-Spanish relations once again deteriorated. But on November 5 Ben Youssef was again recognised by France as the Sultan. Relations continued to be bad in 1956-57.

CHAPTER 7

Revival of Japan

Whereas the Soviet Union was given a relatively free hand in Eastern Europe and had an important share in the joint control in Germany, the United States had a free hand in the occupation of Japan. But just as after an initial phase of disharmony and conflict Germany became one of the major areas of East-West tension, similarly the Allied occupation of Japan became a source of conflict. The revival of Germany became an important weapon of the Western policy of containment of the Soviet Union; the recovery of Japan became an important device of containment of the Soviet Union as well as of China. In fact before the surrender, the proposal was mooted that Japan like Germany should be divided into zones to be occupied and administered by one each of the major powers. But on the insistence of the American military authorities this proposal was given up in favour of the occupation of the whole of Japan by a single authority. This authority was nominally international in character but actually it was completely dominated by the United States.

The control machinery. The control machinery in Japan consisted of a Far Eastern Commission of 11 Powers set up on December 27, 1945 as a result of the Moscow meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers and of an Allied Council for Japan consisting of representatives of the United States, Russia, China, and one member to represent conjointly certain specified British Commonwealth Nations that had fought against Japan. The function of the Far Eastern Commission was to formulate the policies, principles and standards "in conformity with which fulfilment by Japan of its obligation under the terms of surrender may be accomplished", and to review any directive issued to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (S. C. A. P.) as well as any action taken by him. Any policy decision by the Commission required the vote of a majority of the members and the unanimous consent of China, Britain, Russia and America. In order to avoid delay America was authorised to deal with urgent questions by issuing interim directives which theoretically could be reviewed by the Commission but actually continued to be in effect unless the Commission voted otherwise. However, in accordance with the voting procedure the United States could veto any

attempt to change any of the interim directives. Again, the Commission functioned not in Japan but in Washington and had, therefore, no immediate contact with the control machinery. The Allied Council was an advisory body and was presided over by the U. S. representative permanently and the advice given by it remained only on paper.

The real control over the occupation rested in the hands of the S. C. A. P. to which post General MacArthur was appointed on August 13, 1945. As Supreme Commander he controlled all Allied armed forces, British and American, but predominantly American, and he was free from the control of the Allied Council at Tokyo whose members had no veto power over any action by S.C.A.P. No Russian or Chinese troops participated as occupying forces. Precisely why Russia did not occupy any area of Japan is not yet clearly understood although it is well known that the Soviets refused to place their troops under MacArthur's command. In short, everybody in Japan from the Emperor on, was subject to his control and nearly all the persons attached to the Government headquarters were Americans. Thus the occupation of Japan differed in several respects from that of Germany. It was not divided into zones; it was not administered directly by the occupation authorities because here, unlike Germany, the native Governmental organs were preserved in tact and the Allied orders had to be implemented by them under the general supervision of American military teams which maintained close liaison with local Government agencies.

The first phase of occupation, 1945-47. The history of the occupation of Japan can be roughly divided into three phases. In the first phase (running from 1945 to the middle of 1947) the objectives of the occupation were the demilitarisation, democratisation and decentralisation of Japanese political, economic and military life. The initial Post-Surrender Policy Statement issued by the American Government on August 29, 1945 declared that the American objectives were to ensure that Japan will not again become a menace to the United States or to the peace and security of the world and to bring about the eventual establishment of a peaceful and responsible government in conformity with the ideals of the U. N. Charter. It stated that the existing economic bases of Japanese military strength must be destroyed and that there would be a wide distribution of income and the ownership of the means of production and trade. Full reparation payments were to be made and all identifiable looted property was to be promptly restituted. In November 1945, the Basic Occupation Directive elaborated this policy. This policy was a compromise between the views of those who insisted on a kind of Morganthau Plan for Japan and those who were in favour of a soft peace. This compromise rested on the general agreement that it was aggressive Japanese militarism

which had led to the outbreak of the pacific phase of World War II. Thus the specific military actions of the Japanese and half century of aggressive policy, promoted directly or indirectly by military means, justified disarmament of Japan.

In pursuance of the objectives mentioned above the occupation authorities ruthlessly pursued a policy to disarm Japan. The Japanese armed forces were completely demobilised and military equipment was destroyed. Army and navy were abolished. The Japanese forces with the exception of prisoners of war retained by the Russians were repatriated. All general staffs were dissolved and severe measures were taken to punish various types of war criminals. Military commanders, suspected of inhuman treatment of Allied prisoners of war, were tried by special military courts and were punished. Japan was reduced to her home islands and was stripped of "all the Islands in the Pacific which she had seized and occupied since the beginning of the first world war in 1914" and of "all territories that Japan had stolen from the Chinese, such as Manchuria, Formosa and the Pescadores". The Emperor was demoted from the position of a god to that of a human being and was retained as "the symbol of the State and of the unity of the people, deriving his position from the sovereign will of the people". On January 4, 1946 a "purge directive" was issued which specifically sought to eliminate the organisation and leadership of pre-war and war time ultra-rightist bodies. The purge was directed against war criminals, career military and naval personnel, influential members of secret patriotic societies, influential members of specified semi-official bodies, offiers of financial and development organisations involved in Japanese expansion, governors of occupied territories and certain additional ultra-militarists. By January, 1947 about 9,000 persons were screened of whom 1,067 were removed from office. In addition, 1,83,000 personnel of the army and navy were also removed. All the Japanese who had settled in other countries of the Far East were forcibly repatriated partly as a punishment for war crimes and partly to prevent Japan from using their presence as a means of establishing its control on those countries. By 1951, about 4,400,000 persons were brought back to Japan. The properties of the Japanese nationals abroad were transferred to the Governments of the area concerned on account of reparations. The numerous Japanese textile mills in Shanghai were thus given to Nationalist China. Machinery valued at about $35,000,000 was shipped on reparation account to China, the Philippines, the Netherlands, and Britain. In addition, Japan's overseas assets valued at about $ 3,000,000,000 were confiscated as reparations.

In the new Constitution which was given in 1947 a democratic machinery of Government was provided, civil liberties were restored, political parties and local governments were allowed,

authority was decentralised, fundamental rights were guaranteed, the family structure was liberalised and th hereditary aristocracy was abolished. Political prisoners were released and extensive programmes in the field of education were gone through. Under Article IX of the Constitution the Japanese people renounced "war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat of use of force as means of settling international disputes". It also provided that "land, sea, air forces, as well as other war potential will never be maintained," and "the right of belligerency of the state will not be recognised".

In the economic sphere, we have already stated that Japan was to pay full reparations and her industry was to be restricted to the levels necessary to sustain the economy and standards of living fixed in accordance with principles consistent with the Potsdam Proclamation. In November 1945, Truman sent a mission to Japan under Pauly in order to make recommendations on reparations. The Pauly Plan submitted in May, 1946 provided for drastic restrictions on the Japanese iron and steel industry, a reduction of the inventory of machine tools, serious limitations on the chemical industry, and the entire elimination of the aluminium and magnesium industries. Power plants, synthetic oil plants, synthetic rubber plants and oil refineries were to be largely removed and nickel smelters were to be completely removed. The merchant marine was to be limited to 1½ million tons "mostly of the coastal types of vessels". Railroad rolling stock was also to be transferred in the reparations account. Later on, the Pauly Plan was challenged and its provisions were modified to the advantage of Japan. The American President's directive of September 6, 1945 provided for "a programme for the dissolution of large industrial and banking combination which had exercised control of a great part of Japan's trade and industry". In compliance with this directive the occupation authorities adopted measures to break up the famous Japanese combines known as the Zaibatsu. In many cases the securities held by the Zaribatsu families and by the holding companies were taken over and broken into small lots and in some cases the subordinate firms were detached from the Zaibatsu and made a separate organisation. Zaibatsu headquarters were dissolved and its control over enterprises was eliminated. The five largest of the Zaibatsu were forced to turn over to a holding company ilquidation commission their shares in the corporation which lthey controlled and to accept in exchange Government bonds which were not to be sold for ten years. Upto 1945 a large percentage of fertile land was controlled by a few landowners of vast landed estates. In 1946 a legislation was passed under which the Government could buy the holdings of the landlords at fixed and nominal prices and sell it out at equally low prices

to persons who had previously served as tenant farmers. Payments could be made in easy instalments. By 1949, the farm land under tenancy was reduced from 46% of the total cultivated area to about 12%. Stringent laws were passed which limited the amount of rent that the tenants could be forced to pay. In December, 1949 the fishing rights of absentee owners were terminated and the grounds were made free for about a million fishermen. Labour standard laws were passed under which hours of work were limited and rest periods, vacations with pay, rules for safety and sanitation, compensation and unemployment insurance were provided for. The workers were given the right to organise and to strike. The S. C. A. P. encouraged autonomous trade unionism as the chief means for expanding labour's share of national income and securing a voice for the workers equal to that of management in settling terms and conditions of employment. Hundreds of political prisoners who were released joined the labour unions which virtually took over the managerial functions in many cases. Thus Japanese economy was deconcentrated and democratised.

The second phase: 1947-49. The second phase began during the middle of 1947, when the United States suddenly changed its Far Eastern policy in order to adjust it with the principles embodied in the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Aid Plan. The general East-West tension resulting in deadlock on practically all issues, the deteriorating position of Chiang Kai-shek in China, the prospects of an early communist victory there, the anxiety to avert an economic crisis at home, the apprehension of internal subversion in Japan, the need to arrest the march of communism, and the necessity to stabilise the fluid situation in the Far East, dictated a change in the American policy towards Japan. Japan must now be put on the road to recovery and the forward step must now be retraced. This new policy worked in several directions. *First*, the United States now attempted to organise a conference to discuss a peace treaty with Japan. These attempts we have already considered in a previous chapter. *Secondly*, the reparation claims on Japan were scaled down and since Japan had a deficit economy supported mainly by the United States, all reparations deliveries were suspended in May, 1949. To that date Japan had paid a sum of $39 million in addition to an unspecified sum paid out of Japanese assets held in foreign countries. *Thirdly*, the ultra-rightist movement was now given full encouragement so that on February 1, 1947 General MacArthur's order banned a projected general strike. In 1948, an Act was passed on MacArthur's direction, making strikes by Government employees illegal. In the elections of January, 1949 the communists had obtained more than 3 million votes and had captured 35 seats. The

economic and political situation, therefore, called for a new policy and this "meant getting the Japanese to work". Not only the strikes were forbidden but a 48 hours' week was introduced, the Zaibatsu was restored, currency was reformed, export subsidies were abolished, the superfluous employees were dismissed, and the Japanese were forced to produce at competitive prices.

"By mid 1948", Jackson has written, "the United States Government was admitting what would have been foulest heresy and treachery to its allies a short time earlier, that Japan should be helped to win back its pre-war supremacy in industrial production in the Far East". Thus the United States started financing the Japanese straight deficit of about $ 300 million. On January 7, 1948 the American Secretary of the Army declared that the aim of American policy was to develop a self-sufficient Japan as a deterrent to communist threat and this was repeated by the American delegate to the Far Eastern Commission on January 21. On March 2, the report of the Overseas Consultant Mission expressed the opinion that "a strong industrial Japan would be less dangerous to the peace and prosperity of the Far East than a continuance of the present state of instability. On March 20, Major General Draper said in Tokyo that the policy of Army Department of America was to make Japan self-sufficient as from 1952. On April 26, the Johnston report agreed with these views. These developments alarmed Australia, New Zealand and China and created misgivings in Britain.

On June 4, the United States announced that the recovery of Japan was necessary to prevent the re-emergence of a militaristic Japan. In September, the National Foreign Trade Council thoroughly condemned the Deconcentration Law of December 1947, the Anti-Monopoly Law and the Labour Standards Act of April 1947. In the same month the Deconcentration Review Board appointed by MacArthur in May recommended suspension of action on about 300 Japanese concerns. On July 31, the right to strike and of collective bargaining was denied to public employees. On December 10, the Japanese were given full freedom "to maximise production for export". In April 1949, the non-essential expenditure was eliminated and a number of workers were retrenched on the advice of the American expert, Dodge. On May 12, the reparations deliveries were terminated. In June, the Anti-Monopoly Law was materially modified. In July the anti-communist measures were given full consideration, and in September all political activities by civil servants were banned; the communist members of the University staff were dismissed and the University teachers were forbidden to write anything which might be used for political ends. On September 8, the communist-dominated Korean League was dissolved. On June 6, 1950, following the communist

assault on five American soldiers, MacArthur asked the Japanese Prime Minister, Yoshida, to take steps against the communist party. On June 26, the communist newspaper *Akahata* was banned for having supported North Korea against South Korea. Earlier, in February 1949, the Japanese government had set up a Purge Review Commission to review the appeals of the purgees, and by October 1950, more than 10,000 had been released. Meanwhile, the process of political restoration of Japan was continuing. On July 28, 1949 the Military Government Section of U. S. 8th Army had been disbanded. On September 23, the restrictions on travel on the American Forces in Japan were lifted and the American fraternisation with the Japanese began. On January 1, 1950 the United States reached a kind of de facto peace with Japan in the New Year Message. Commercial Agencies of Japan were established (on the initiative of the United States) in America, France, Sweden, Brazil, India and Pakistan. On February 21, Japan was allowed "to participate with other nations . . . . in such international agreements, conventions and conferences of a technical character as Japan may be invited to enter into, ... and as the Supreme Commander shall consider to be in the interest of the occupation".

Third phase: After 1949. The third phase began with the communist victory in China in 1949 and crystallised with the outbreak of the Korean war in June 1950. During this phase the recovery and revival of Japan was pushed forward with ever greater vigour, a Japanese peace treaty was concluded without the Soviet Union, and Japan was fitted in a policy of encirclement not only of the Soviet Union but also of China. If a strong Germany would be a bulwark of the free world against Russia in Europe, a stable and strong Japan would serve as a wall of defence against the Moscow-Peking Axis. Thus the long continuation of Japan's legal state of war with the Soviet Union (which had materially increased its military power in Asia in certain areas within sight of Japan), the victory on the continent of the Chinese Communists (who are possessed of a military strength far greater than that attributed to any Chinese Government for many decades), a military alliance between the Soviet Union and Communist China specifically directed against Japan, the emergence of two new governments in Korea both unfriendly towards Japan and both with greater military strength than modern Korea has ever known, and the increasing American pressure for rearmament ruled out the disarmament of Japan. The anti-communist elements were now, therefore, freely encouraged; the restoration of the Emperor developed into a slogan; rearmament was supported; a movement for the revision of the constitution was encouraged; and a greater emphasis was now laid on pre-war patterns and practices. The first major step away from the American policy of disarmament came in MacArthur's New

Year's Message to the Japanese people on January 1, 1950 in which he declared that "by no sophistry of reasoning can (the renunciation-of-war provision of the constitution) be interpreted as a complete negation of the right of self-defence against unprovoked attack". Here was "the introduction into the policy of complete disarmament and demilitarization, of at least the possibility of a qualification which could lead towards a military establishment of some kind". In June 1950, the Korean War broke out and on July 8, MacArthur then authorized the creation of a Japanese National Police Reserve (NPR) consisting of 75,000 men armed only with light weapons. Simultaneously, the National Maritime Safety Board (established in 1948) was directed to add 8,000 men to its forces. However, neither of these could be considered a true military force or interpreted as a radical departure from the disarmament policy. On January 1, 1951, MacArthur in his message to the Japanese people declared that the ideal of peace "must give way to the overweening law of self preservation".

On September 8, 1951 the Japanese peace treaty was signed, as we will shortly see, along with a Security Treaty between the United States and Japan. Under the latter, Japan accepted the responsibility for the gradual increase of her defence forces and conceded to the United States the right to maintain its forces in and near Japan for an indefinite period. On February 22, 1952 an Administrative Agreement was signed at Tokyo between the United States and Japan, which defined the terms and conditions under which the United States had been granted leases and facilities for her armed forces in Japan and which conferred extra-territorial rights on them. The provision for the extra-territorial privileges led to a widespread dissatisfaction among the Japanese and necessitated another administrative agreement on October 29, 1953 under which these privileges were striken out. On October 15, 1952 the National Police Reserve was converted into the National Safety Force under a National Safety Board already established on August 1. The strength of the safety force for ground operations was fixed at 110,000 men and that of a patrol force for sea operations was fixed at 7,590. In November the United States leased to Japan seven frigates as the beginnings of a navy. In 1952, the ex-soldiers started organizing themselves and in 1953 an ultra-rightist organization, the National Conference for the Restoration Movement, appeared.

In June 1953 negotiations began for the extension of Mutual Security Assistance to Japan and they resulted in the Mutual Defence Assistance Agreement between Japan and the United States on March 8, 1954. The original National Police Reserve was converted into a full-fledged defence force on July 1, 1954 and the National Safety Board into the National Defence Board headed by a Minister without portfolio. The main differences

between the new defence establishment and its less developed predecessors were: the creation of an air arm; the establishment of a more elaborate planning and command organization; and the addition of specific references in the enabling legislation to military means of resisting possible armed attack from without. The new establishment was "far more explicitly military than the former National Safety Agency" though studious efforts were made to avoid an out-and-out military flavour.

In May 1955, the Japanese Government submitted to the Diet a Bill on the creation of a National Defence Council. It was rejected, but on August 2, a 6-years defence plan providing for an army of 1,80,000 men, navy of 35,000 men and 12,000 tons and an airforce of 35,000 men and 1,200 planes was put into effect by the government. In June 1956, the National Defence Council Bill was passed providing for a National Defence Council consisting of the Prime Minister, the Finance Minister, Director General of of Defence Board and the Director of the Economic Planning Board. All these developments took place inspite of Article IX of the Japanese Constitution. The defence allocations in Japan increased progressively. In 1952-53, the National Safety Agency had a total budget of 61,000 million yen (7·2% of the national budget). It increased to 61,400 millions yen in 1953-54 (6·5% of a larger national budget). But in 1954-55, the new defence establishment allocated a sum of 78,831 million yen ($ 219 million) of which 48,284 million yen was for the ground force, 21,813 million yen for the maritime force, and 6,919 million yen for the new air force. This appropriation represented about 8% of the 1954-55 budget. For 1955-56, the defence appropriation was raised to 86,800 million yen (an increase of about 10% over the previous year's appropriation and representing 8·6% of the total budget). Of the 1955-56 appropriations, about 60,000 million yen was for the maintenance of existing forces and the rest was for expansion. By March 1957, the Ground Self-Defence Force had 150,000 men and 11,65e8 civilian employees; the Maritime Force numbered 23,134 officers and ratings; the Maritime Safety Board Organization had 10,673 officers and men; the Air Force had 10,346 men and 1159 civilians. In addition to these forces, the United States has about 750 bases including some 400 miles of coastline.

In the economic sphere the Japanese manufacturing output which was 29% of 1936 level had increased by 120% in 1952, 160% in 1953, 174% in 1954 and 188% in 1955. The pre-war industrial structure was re-established and special emphasis was now laid on coal mining, iron and steel, electricity, and marine transportation. In 1954, 90% of Government funds were allocated to these four industries. Monopolies were revived and subsidies were given to different industries. The companies formerly associated with the Zaibatsu regained leading position; the anti-

monopoly law was revised on September 1, 1953 and cartels of all forms sprang up. The industrial firms consolidated and realigned themselves along the former Zaibatsu lines. On July 1, 1954 the old Mitsubishi Shoji Company was re-established. In most industries the degree of concentration in 1955 was more than 50% than the pre-war times. The important elements behind this rapid industrial recovery have been the longer hours of work, low wages given to the workers, large scale American economic aid, and the boom caused by the Korean war. About the last element it may be pointed out that during the period 1951-53 the industrial output had increased by 71·5%. So far as the American aid is concerned, from 1945 to 1950 the United States had given 2 billion dollars and from 1950 to 1955, 3 billions. After the end of the Korean war there was a serious danger of a crisis striking the Japanese economy. From 1953 on, the number of bankruptcies increased. However, the Japanese monopoly capital survived the reduction in American war orders as a result of greatly increased Government purchases to cover the needs of a regenerated army, the continued renewal of basic capital, the movement for increased productivity of labour and the increased exports at the expense of the convenience of the Japanese worker. Japan closed the year 1956 with a favourable balance of trade amounting to $293 million. Although this is 200 million less than the corresponding figure for 1955 it is, nevertheless, "the result of still mounting exports" (they reached $2403 million plus $823 million invisible exports, making a total of $3,225 million as against $2,931 million payments consisting of $2,470 million worth of imported commodities plus $461 million invisible imports). By the end of the year 1957 Japan's exports are expected to reach $2,770 million. In short, the growth of the volume of annual exports over each preceding year has been: 1954=32%; 1955=27%; 1956=23%. The Suez crisis in 1956 roused the Japanese expectations of huge profits estimated at $ 1 billion by increased sales to South East Asia and by increasing Japanese shipping, although gradually the first exaggerated expectations began to deflate. But in 1957 the Japanese proposed the scheme of an Asian economic zone and of an Asian development fund. In the context of the nationalist and economic sentiment of South-East Asian Nations, one can see the nature of difficulty in the way of these schemes.

Thus in the case of Japan also the story of Germany had been repeated and there is a serious danger of the rise of militant nationalism in Japan. It now remains to see the position which Japan occupies in the cold war after 1948. In a previous chapter we have already surveyed the factors which were responsible for growing differences between the Soviet Union and the Western Powers with regard to Japan. By 1950 the United States had decided to conclude a peace treaty with Japan in spite of the Soviet Union. To this now we turn.

THE JAPANESE PEACE TREATY

We have said earlier that on January 11, 1951 Dulles had been appointed as a Special Envoy of the United States to the Far East to carry out negotiations for a treaty of peace with Japan. In fact, while the Soviet Union and the Western Powers had reached a complete deadlock on the question of Japan in respect of its disarmament, the repatriation and demobilisation of its troops, the trial of its war criminals and the policy measures taken by the United States in complete disregard of the Far Eastern Commission and the Allied Council, the prospects of a peace treaty with Japan had become extremely dim. Towards the end of 1949, discussions had started between Britain, Australia and New Zealand on this question. In January, 1950 the Commonwealth Conference met at Colombo and it appointed a committee to consider it. The Japanese did not desire to conclude any peace treaty until the U.S.S.R. could be one of the signatories. Nor did they favour the retention of American troops in Japan under the so-called Mutual Security arrangement. The outbreak of the Korean War, however, in mid-1950 led the United States to exert the necessary pressure on the Japanese. On September 14, Truman disclosed that discussions on a peace treaty had already started with the members of the Far Eastern Commission. On October 26, a memorandum of the proposed treaty was handed over to the Soviet Government. On November 20, the Russians rejected it and on December 5, Chou En-lai demanded the representation of his Government at any negotiations for a peace treaty with Japan. On December 27, the United States told the Soviet Government that no one nation could be allowed to veto the conclusion of a peace treaty with Japan. It was in this background that Dulles was entrusted with the talk of negotiating a peace treaty on January 11, 1951.

Obstacles. The elements which created obstacles in the way of a peace treaty with Japan may now be stated: (*a*) The general East-West tension—the United States demanding a peace treaty on its own terms, not allowing the Far Eastern Commission to be heckled by the veto of any one power, and the Soviet Union insisting on a peace treaty based on the war-time decisions, opposing the proposed American Trusteeship for the Ryukyu and Bonin Islands, asking for a definite time-limit for the withdrawal of occupation forces, and insisting on Communist China's representation in the negotiations. (*b*) The differences between Britain and the United States, specially on the question of future relations between Japan and China—the United States asking for the Japanese recognition of Nationalist China and Britain insisting on the recognition of the Peking Republic. (*c*) The differences amongst other powers—India asking for the withdrawal of American forces and, in general, "an honourable treaty"; Australia,

New Zealand and Philippines insisting on charging reparations from Japan, and the United States, generally, favouring the cancellation of all reparation claims. The negotiations leading to the conclusion of the Japanese peace treaty will clearly substantiate these points.

Negotiations. Dulles arrived in Japan on January 25, 1951 and on February 2, in a speech to the America-Japan society, he emphasised the American desire of restoring sovereignty to Japan and the American anxiety to place the immense striking power of the United States at her back. On February 3, the workers all over the country passed resolutions in favour of neutrality and disarmament. On February 10, Dulles told the Japanese people that the agreement with their Government had been reached. Three days later Yoshida disclosed that he had accepted the American offer of military assistance. From Tokyo Dulles went to Canberra after a short stay in Manila in order to pacify the growing fear of the people there. To reassure them, Acheson, on February 21, spoke in favour of a security pact with Australia and New Zealand. Dulles came to Washington on February 25, and on February 27, he was authorised to draw up a draft of a treaty. On March 5, the State Department announced that a settlement would be reached in spite of the Soviet Union and on April 10, the United States took the necessary precautionary security measures in Japan. Meanwhile the revival of the Japanese economy and the growth of militarism was causing anxiety in Britain, and the activities of General MacArthur were alarming the British Government. The dismissal of General MacArthur on April 9 eased the relations to some extent. On May 7, the Soviet Union made a protest to the United States accusing it "of arrogating the exclusive rights of framing a treaty of peace for Japan" and declaring that "American forces were already using Japanese territory in the execution of their armed intervention in Korea". Meanwhile the British Government had asked for the submission of the draft treaty to the Peking Government for its consideration, which the United States declined to do. On May 18, the United States protested to Moscow for attempting to divide the West and delaying the peace settlement. On June 10, the Soviet Union replied that the proposed security pact between the United States and Japan was only the continued American occupation in disguise, and asked that the peace treaty be referred to the Council of Foreign Ministers. On July 9, the United States rejected the Soviet proposal.

Provisional Treaty. In the meantime, agreement had been patched up between the United States and Britain, and on June 14, it was officially announced that Dulles and Morrison had agreed to the main provisions of the draft treaty. On July 12, the provisionl treaty was published in London and Washington.

It provided for the Japanese recognition of independence of Korea, renunciation of Japanese claims to Formosa, the Kuriles and part of Sakhalin, and rights to the Pacific Islands over which American trusteeship had been established on April 2, 1947. Japan agreed to the American right of administering other Pacific Islands pending final settlement by the United Nations. Japan agreed to the obligations specified in the U. N. Charter and renounced all its special rights and interests in China and agreed to accept the judgement of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East and of other war crimes courts. The Allied Powers were to be given most-favoured nation treatment for a period of four years. On the question of reparations a compromise was struck between the American views and those held by Philippines and Australia and it was provided that "Japan should pay reparations to the Allied Powers for the damage and sufferings caused by it during the war. Nevertheless, it is also recognised that the resources of Japan are not presently sufficient, if it is to maintain a viable economy, to make complete reparations for all such damage and at the same time meet its other obligations". Japan recognised the obligation to pay the pre-war debts and waived all claims against the Allies for action taken during the war or during the occupation.

San-Francisco Conference. On July 20, the draft was circulated to 51 states which had fought against Japan and invitations were issued to them to participate in a conference in San Francisco on September 4. Earlier, on July 12, Morrison had announced that the draft could not be communicated either to the Peking Government or to the Nationalist China. The draft met a mixed reception in Tokyo and with a feeling of helplessness in London. India regarded it as harsh and dishonourable and in a note to Washington on July 30, Nehru objected to the provision of American trusteeship over the Bonin and Ryukyu Islands which he argued should be restored to Japan. Mr. Nehru insisted on the restoration of Formosa to China and protested against the retention of the foreign troops in Japan even after the end of the occupation. Truman cold-shouldered Nehru and the latter informed him on August 23, that India would not participate in the San Francisco Conference and that she would conclude a separate peace with Japan. On July 23, Burma had refused to approve the draft and on August 23, declined the invitation to the San Francisco Conference.

Fifty States (U. S. A. was the fifty-first) however agreed to attend the conference and they surprisingly included the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia and Poland. When, on August 12, the Soviet Government accepted the invitation, Washington was taken aback and got worried by the prospects of the Soviet Union trying to drive a wedge between the United States and her

associates which had agreed to participate in the Conference after considerable hesitation. To forestall the Soviet move, on August 15, Dulles declared that the Conference was intended only to sign the treaty and not to discuss proposals and counter-proposals and warned the Soviet Union not to send "a wrecking crew". But Stalin knew his job better than Dulles and he refused to withdraw the Russian acceptance of the invitation and announced that the Soviet delegate would, of course, make new proposals on the Japanese Peace Treaty. On September 4, the Conference met and next day Gromyko made his 13-point proposals, providing for the Japanese recognition of the Peking regime, the Japanese obligation to pay reparations, and a pledge that Japan would not enter in any military alliance against any power that had fought against her. The states represented in the conference did not support these proposals and when Gromyko made a last attempt on September 8 to press his proposals, Acheson, the Chairman, ruled him out of order. The U. S. S. R., Poland and Czechoslovakia, therefore, refused to sign the Japanese Peace Treaty that was initialed by 48 participating states. Same day a Security Pact was also concluded between the United States and Japan under which military bases were conceded to the United States and the American troops were authorised to be stationed on the Japanese soil. The Japanese Peace Treaty went into force on April 28, 1952.

Soon after, trouble developed between London and Washington on the publication of Yoshida's letter to Dulles (written on January 16, 1952) in which he disclosed that his Government was considering the recognition of Nationalist China. On January 30, Eden insisted that the relations between Japan and China should be left to the Japanese Government itself. On April 28, the occupation in Japan came to an end and same day the treaty between Japan and Nationalist China was duly signed. On June 9, a treaty of peace between India and Japan was concluded under which they accorded to each other most-favoured nation treatment in respect of customs duty with effect from April 28, and India agreed to restore to Japan all Japanese property which had been under the control of the Government of India, and Japan agreed to return freely all Indian property in Japan within 9 months of the coming into force of the treaty. All reparation claims were waived by India. On April 23, the Allied Council for Japan came to an end along with the termination of the Far Eastern Commission. Throughout the rest of the year the Japanese relations with the Soviet Union and Communist China continued to deteriorate. On June 23, Japan applied for membership in the United Nations but on September 18, the Japanese entry was vetoed by the Soviet Union. The relations with the United States officially continued to be warm

although the dissatisfaction against the presence of American forces, the existence of about 750 U. S. military bases in Japan, the American pressure about restricting the Japanese trade with China continued to mar the Japanese-American relations.

THE U. S.-JAPANESE SECURITY PACT

The Security Pact that was concluded along with the Peace Treaty on September 8, 1951 contained 29 Articles of which Articles 4, 5, 7, 9, 11, 13, 14, 17, 20, 25, were related to the granting of diplomatic immunities and extra-territorial jurisdiction to the United States. The American vessels and air craft were exempted from all tolls and landing charges; the American armed forces were granted the right to use all Japanese public utilities and services; and were exempt from Japanese passports, visa laws, driving tests and fees. All goods to be imported for their official use were exempted from customs duty. The American service courts could exercise within Japan exclusive jurisdiction over all offences committed in Japan by the personnel of the American armed forces, the civilian component and their dependents. The American military authorities could alone remove from Japan any undesirable element in their forces. Against this agreement there was an intense feeling all over Japan. And since similar privileges were not granted to forces of other countries the situation became anomalous. In July 1952, two sea-men of the British vessel, Belfast, were arrested by the Japanese authorities on a charge of robbery and were sentenced to 2½ years imprisonment. This created misunderstanding between Tokyo and London. For these reasons the Administrative Agreement of February 28, 1952 was revised on September 29, 1953, which, broadly, provided for a concurring jurisdiction of the Japanese and American courts in Japan in cases involving the American armed forces. On October 26, a similar agreement was signed between Japan and Britain, Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United States with regard to the U. N. forces.

THE JAPANESE FOREIGN POLICY

The main objectives of the Japanese foreign policy from 1951 onwards were: (*a*) A resumption of diplomatic ties with various countries, particularly in Asia; (*b*) the development of a viable economy in order to achieve economic independence; and (*c*) augmenting its defence power.

(a) Resumption of diplomatic ties. With regard to the first we have seen that in 1952 peace treaties were concluded with Nationalist China and India without much difficulty, for, neither insisted on reparations. With Korea the difficulties on the issue of the "Rhee-Line", a unilateral extension of the Korean territorial

waters some 60 miles off shore, the property claims over the assets in Japan owned by the Japanese firms registered in Korea at the end of the war, and the memories of the Japanese tyranny and exploitation of the Koreans prevented the establishment of normal relations. With the Philippines, Burma and Indonesia there were serious difficulties caused by their reparation claims. Eventually, however, a reparations agreement with Burma was concluded in 1954 (actually signed in 1955) under which the Burmese claim of 10 billion dollars was scaled down to $250 million (payable in goods and services over 10 years), and diplomatic relations were established. With the Philippines an agreement was concluded in May 1956, under which the Philippines claim of one billion dollars was reduced to $800 million (payable in goods, services and loans over 20 years). On July 23, the ratifications were exchanged and normal diplomatic relations were restored. With Indo-China the reparations problem was not acute and the Ambassadors were exchanged without much difficulty. With Indonesia the reparation problem had not yet been solved but with the exchange of consuls in 1955 virtual diplomatic relations had been established. But Indonesia has continued to claim the same level of reparations as the Philippines, while Japan's attitude is that the Burma level should be acceptable. There is one more factor which has obstructed a settlement with Indonesia. During 1955-56 Japan over-exported to Indonesia to the extent of about $177,000,000. This was supposed to be paid or off-set by Indonesian exports to Japan under the trade agreement open account. Indonesia, however, has not fulfilled its obligations under the agreement and has continued to refuse payment of the outstanding credit. In 1957, the two governments were still far apart in their views, and political unrest in Indonesia has caused break down of negotiations.

With India, as we alluded earlier, there were no difficulties and relations were happy from the outset. The dissenting judgment of the Indian Judge Mr. Radhabinod Pal at the Tokyo Trial went a long way in bringing the two countries together. Justice Pal gave vent to the voice of Asia when he said: "If there is an international law which is to be respected by the nations that law does not confer any right on the conqueror in a war to try and punish any crime committed by the vanquished not in connection with the war lost by him but in any unconnected war or incident .....The so-called trial held according to the definition of crime now given by the victors obliterates the centuries of civilization which stretch between us and the summary slaying of the defeated in a war". Our resentment at the dropping of the atom bomb on the Japanese soil, our protest against the stiff provisions of the Japanese Peace Treaty and our readiness to cancel all reparation claims and to establish diplomatic relations at the earliest hour strengthened our bonds. Trade relations were soon restored. The two countries came closer at the Bandung

Conference in April 1955. In May 1957, the Japanese Prime Minister came to Delhi and discussed a wide range of subjects concerning the two countries. This was followed by the visit of Mr. Nehru to Japan in October. In the joint communique issued by the two Prime Ministers on October 13, 1957 they expressed their concern at the piling up of weapons of mass destruction and their anxiety about the development of the Asian countries. The two Prime Ministers expressed the hope that economic co-operation between their countries would be increased in respect of long term arrangements for stabilised supply of iron ore from India to Japan and financing of India's imports of capital goods from Japan.

Since with most of the states in Central and South America, the Middle and the Near East and in Europe there were no particular problems, relations were established with them without much difficulty. But it was different with China and the U.S.S.R. The conclusion of the peace treaty between Japan and the Nationalist China in 1952 naturally precluded Japan from according recognition to the Peking regime. The American pressure with regard to the banning of the exports of strategic materials to China, blockading her coast and preventing her ready communication with the outside world, the problem of repatriation of the Japanese nationals in China, the complications created by the Chinese entry in the Korean war, and the general fear and distrust of the communist regime in Peking have bedevilled the prospects of normal relations with that country. But, on the other hand, the need of expanding trade relations with a neighbouring country with a population of 600 millions and a huge market, the fact of a traditional closeness between the Japanese and the Chinese culture, and the vital necessity of dealing firmly with such an important factor in the world balance of power such as the People's China have been pressing the Japanese forward in the direction of some understanding with Peking. In June 1952 the firt Sino-Japanese Trade Agreement was concluded and it was followed by another in October 1953 and by a third in May 1955. In February 1953, the Chinese Red Cross Society negotiated with the Japanese Red Cross on the question of repatriation of Japanese residents in China. In October 1954, China and the Soviet Union in a joint declaration expressed the wish to normalise relations with Japan and the hope that "the Japanese people will find the necessary strength to take the path of liberation from foreign dependence and regeneration of their home land". In December 1954 Chou En-lie advocated "the development of wide trade relations with Japan on the principles of neutrality and mutual benefit and also the establishment of close cultural contacts".

In 1955, Japan imported from China $ 81 million worth of goods, but sold only $ 29 million in return. During 1956 Japanese imports remained on the same level but her exports to

China doubled and rose to approximately $ 60 million. The main hurdle in the trade relations between the two countries is thrown in by the United States which leads the China Committee of the Consultative Group, an organization with headquarters at Paris (Chincom) which places restrictions on Western trade with communist countries. The trade developments of 1956 took place inspite of the embargo on shipments of strategic goods to China. In fact since the end of occupation, Japan has consistently endeavoured to obtain relaxations of the Chincom embargo, and gradually many of the restrictions have been lifted. Nevertheless, the dependence of Japan on the Pentagon is almost absolute and the Japanese authorities have to move very cautiously. Early in 1957 Prime Minister Kishi, in order to allay the American suspicion, said that "time is not ripe for resuming diplomatic relations with China". Nevertheless, he insisted on the usefulness of increasing trade relations between Japan and China. In 1957 various private organizations entered the field of technical cooperation with China, planned by the International Technical Cooperation Association (a Japanese organisation of capital goods manufacturers and exporters), the Japan Agricultural Machinery Industry Association and a number of other bodies. It is obvious that the establishment of diplomatic relations between China and Japan is inevitable and cannot be long postponed.

The problem of establishing normal relations with the Soviet Union, however, was a difficult one. In Part I of this work we have discussed the Soviet-Japanese relations since 1917 and these were far from being happy. From 1945 to 1951 the Soviet Union had practically no influence on the Japanese politics, for, the Occupation was largely an American concern. In 1949 the communists won the victory in China, and on February 14, 1950, the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance was concluded. This was considered to be directed against Japan and the United States and, therefore, on September 8, 1951, the U. S.-Japanese Security Pact was signed as a reply. The anti-communist measures during and after the Occupation, the depurging programme and the revival of the ultra-rightists, the restoration of the Japanese monopolies and the remilitarisation of Japan, the deadlocks in the Far Eastern Commission in Washington and in the Allied Council in Tokyo had pushed Japan and the Soviet Union afar. The events leading to the convening of the San Francisco Conference and the conclusion of the Japanese Peace Treaty and the Security Pact in September 1951, and the Administrative Agreement in February 1952 added to the strain. The questions of the repatriation of about 3 lakhs Japanese soldiers and civilians who were reported to have fallen in the Russian hands in 1945, the territorial question relating to the Southern Kuriles Islands, the Northern Waters fisheries question,

the problem of trade and the question of the Japanese entry in the United Nations increased the difficulties in the way of normalisation of relations. When on January 2, 1952 Stalin expressed sympathy for the Japanese people who were "suffering under foreign occupation" Yoshida reminded him, on January 8, of the unknown fate of 3 lakhs Japanese and of the communist subversion in Japan. The termination of the Allied Council and of the Far Eastern Commission in April led to a strong Soviet protest and an equally strong rejoinder by Japan. On May 30, the Japanese Government asked the Soviet Union to withdraw its mission since the Peace Treaty had now come into force. The Soviet Union declined to do so on June 12, although a fortnight later a large part of the Soviet personnel had been withdrawn. On September 18, Malik vetoed the Japanese entry in the United Nations although Japan has since joined the IMF, the IBRD, the UNESCO, the ILO, and the ECAFE. Throughout the year 1953, the fishery dispute continued, and bitterness was generated when, on August 9, a Russian ship in Hokkaido was seized by the Japanese.

On October 12, 1954 a Sino-Soviet Joint Declaration affirmed that they were prepared to establish political and economic relations with Japan on the basis of peaceful coexistence on which renewed emphasis was given subsequent to the death of Stalin as part of a new diplomatic offensive on the part of the Soviet Union. In Japan also the acute need of expanding trade relations with the communist bloc was gradually realised. In December 1954, when the first Hatoyama Cabinet was formed, the Soviet Union through its unofficial representative in Tokyo proposed the restoration of diplomatic relations. On January 22, 1955 the Japanese Foreign Minister Shigemetsu in a speech to the Diet expressed gratification that repatriation from Communist China and Viet-Minh was "proceeding smoothly these days" and complained that "little progress is being made towards the solution of the territorial issue and the question concerning the repatriation of the Japanese nationals still detained by the Soviet Union". He, however, declared that "Japan's greatest task today is the earliest possible establishment of an independent state standing on its own feet". On April 11, he condemned the policy of Yoshida who opposed contacts with the communist countries. On May 26, he told the Diet that correspondence had been going on since January 25, and that an agreement had been reached on February 16, between Japan and the Soviet Union to explore measures for the purpose of normalising relations and that it had been decided on April 26, that negotiations would begin at London. On June 1, the negotiations formally began and on June 14, the Soviet delegation submitted a draft peace treaty which was found to be unsatisfactory by the Japanese who submitted a counter draft on August 15. Then it was reported that the United

States had exerted pressure on the Japanese Government not to reach any agreement unless all the Japanese demands had been met by the Soviet Union.

On March 20, 1956 negotiations broke down as a result of the Japanese insistence on the repatriation of her nationals by the Soviet Union and the return of the Southern Kuriles Islands. The Soviet Union replied by putting a ban on fishing in Northern Pacific waters. However, negotiations soon started and in May 1956, the ban was partially lifted and the way was paved for the resumption of the formal treaty negotiations. On October 12, Hatoyama arrived at Moscow and the talks continued from October 13 to 19 resulting in a Joint Declaration by the Soviet Union and Japan and a Trade Protocol. In these documents the two parties agreed to conduct their relations in the light of the United Nations principles and on the basis of economic, political and ideological non-interference. It will be recalled that in December 1955 both Japan and the Mongolian People's Republic had been eliminated from the list of 18 states to be admitted to the U. N. and that in a "package" deal 16 states were actually admitted. In the declaration of October 19, 1956 the Soviet Union agreed to support Japan's application for membership. It was decided to establish diplomatic relations at once and to start negotiations on a peace treaty. The Soviet Union agreed to transfer to Japan the Southern Kuriles Island of Hobami and Shikotan provided that the actual transfer took place after the conclusion of the peace treaty. The Soviet Union also agreed to waive all reparation claims and to release and repatriate all Japanese citizens serving prison sentences there. Japan agreed to establish trade relations on a most-favoured nations basis. Thus the chances of better relations between the two countries became bright.

This Declaration, in broad terms, reflects three changes: (*a*) a change in the attitude of the U.S.S.R. towards Japan, (*b*) a change in the forces controlling Japan's foreign policy, and (*c*) a change in Japan's relations with the United States and the rest of the world. We have noted the Soviet attitude towards Japan at the San Francisco Conference. Unable to win concessions there, the Soviet Union seemed to have decided to wait until they could extract them from the so-called "healthy elements" in Japan, whom they felt sure would rise to power as a result of the "economic contradictions" inherent in the San Francisco settlement. Even after the death of Stalin "the policy of hostile waiting" continued. The "healthy elements", however, did not develop, so that in the summer of 1954, the policy was revised and on September 11, 1954 Molotov used the occasion of a letter from a Japanese newspaper editor to announce that the Soviet Union was now "ready to normalize relations with Japan, provided that Japan shows the same

readiness". This sentiment was again expressed in the Sino-Soviet Joint Declaration of October 12, already noted. When Shigemitsu indicated on December 11 Japan's willingness to negotiate, Molotov replied that his government too was "ready". In June 1955 talks got under way and after much wrangling, Malik offered the "new plan under which the Soviet Union agreed to drop its demands for the neutralization of Japan, the closing of the straits, and the limitation on Japan's right to enter alliances. In short, it was now willing to acknowledge Japan's right to rearm and ally herself with the West as laid down in the San Francisco Treaty, and to give back to Japan the Islands Japan attempted to reserve for herself at San Francisco—Shikotan and the Habomais—in exchange for which it demanded that Japan recognize the Soviet Union's sovereignty over those northern territories which Japan had given up at San Francisco—Southern Sakhalin and the Kurile Islands. This was a complete reversal in the Russian policy. Again, till the end of 1955, the Russian policy insisted on resolving the Russo-Japanese differences before the resumption of diplomatic relations. In January 1956, the "Adenauer formula" was adopted and it was decided to restore diplomatic relations before the existing differences were resolved. Thus the October Declaration can be said to be "a continuation of the 'Adenauer formula' and the Malik 'exchange plan'. It follows the "Adenauer formula in leaving several difficult issues for later negotiations; and, while it says nothing about South Sakhalin and the Kurile Islands, it follows the exchange plan in providing for the eventual return of Shikotan and the Habomai Islands to Japan and in excluding any Soviet demand for a reversal of Japan's military and diplomatic policies".

On the part of Japan also, the October Declaration reflected basic change. The decision to open negotiations (in December 1954) and to make major concessions (in October 1956) reflected the pressures of special interest groups which played a prominent part in the Soviet Japanese rapprochement. Early in 1955 the National Conference for the Restoration of Relations with Communist China and the Soviet Union was established. The use of the Hatoyama faction to power, and its response to certain special interest groups facilitated the problem. Finally, the October Declaration also involves a basic change in Japan's relations with the United States. To the U.S. hostility to the Japanese efforts at an understanding with the Communist world, and to their insistence that Japan should not make any major concessions in the bargain, we have already alluded. In the summer of 1955, the United States advised Japan that while the fate of the northern territories was not finally settled at San Francisco, Japan had no right to make a further settlement herself. In October, the U.S.A. advised Japan that the question of sovereignty over the

Southern Kuriles could be settled by the International Court of Justice. In May 1956, Dulles publicly denounced the application of the "Adenauer formula", and in August, he declared that "if Japan were to cede the northern territories to the Soviet Union, the United States would be free to revise its attitude toward the southern islands it was occupying". On September 7, 1956 apprehending a wave of anti-Americanism in Japan, the State Department in a Note supported Japan's rights to the Southern Kuriles, Shikotan and Habomai Islands but, at the same time, "warned that Japan had no right to cede any of the disputed territories to the Soviet Union". In this context, Japan's decision to sign the Declaration constitutes a new phase in the history of U.S.-Japan relations. While it is incorrect to say that it was "a decision to revolt from America's leadership", it did imply a change in the pattern of international relationship in the Pacific and opened the way of Japan's entry in the United Nations.

By December 1956, the state of war between Russia and Japan came to an end and the Soviet opposition to admitting Japan to the United Nations was withdrawn. On December 12, 1956 the Security Council unanimously recommended to the General Assembly the admission of Japan and on December 18, Japan became the 80th member of the United Nations when the General Assembly accepted the recommendation of the Security Council. In October 1957, Japan was elected to a non-permanent seat on the Security Council. In February 1957, the Soviet Union and Japan exchanged Ambassadors. A peace treaty, however, is yet to the signed. The fishery problem, territorial questions, and the unaccounted disappearance of a large number of Japanese in the Soviet-Union are still the major issues awaiting settlement.

Coinciding with the arrival of the Soviet Ambassador in Japan ending a 12-year technical state of war, diplomatic relations with Poland and Czechoslovakia were also restored. With Poland, the 72nd state with which Japan has restored diplomatic relations, an agreement was signed on Feb. 9, 1957 which normalised relations and under which both countries agreed to begin, as soon as possible, negotiations for the conclusion of a treaty to place their trade and maritime relations on a stable and friendly basis. While the American Government is not happy with Japan establishing close relations with Communist countries, it welcomes, nevertheless, arrangement with Poland in view of the newly achieved contacts between Poland and the United States. With Czechoslovakia, too, Japan signed a protocol on the lines of the Polish agreement.

Early in 1957 the Japanese Government got very much concerned about the evil effects of nuclear experiments in the Pacific waters. On March 9, 1957 the Japanese Ambassador in Moscow formally requested the Soviet Government to discon-

tinue all kinds of nuclear tests in future. In its reply on March 21, the Soviet Union stated that these tests could be discontinued provided "the other powers undertake to do likewise". On April 20, the Japanese Ambassador once again requested Khrushchev to intervene. To this the Soviet reply was given on May 9 in an aide memoir that "the Soviet Union and Japan should join in an appeal to the United States and Britain on the question". But nothing concrete emerged out of the repeated protests made by the Japanese Government until after Khrushchev assumed the office of the Soviet Premier at the end of March 1958. Early in April he announced a unilateral suspension of all nuclear tests in the hope that the United States and Britain would follow suit and, that if this was not done, the U.S.S.R. would be compelled to resume the tests. This declaration was hailed in Tokyo although the fact that it was conditional was regretted.

(b) Economic Revival. With regard to the second problem we have already stated that after 1947 the policy of economic revival of Japan had been pursued by the Occupation authorities and after 1951 by the Japanese Government. As a result of American aid and the Korean war-boom the gap between imports and exports had been greatly narrowed down by 1954 and the process continues to this day. Commercial and trade agreements were concluded with several countries and trade missions were dispatched to various parts of the world. In order to alleviate the apprehension of the British traders Japan invited British experts in cotton textile and ceramics to show them that the Japanese goods were not imitations of British goods or designs. In 1955 Japan joined the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). In order to increase its trade in South East Asia the Japanese Government in 1955-56 adopted certain measures such as the elimination of trade barriers, lowering of production costs, and increasing the purchasing power of the trading countries through payment of reparations, development of resources and investments, setting up joint enterprises and the purchase by Japan of large quantities of raw materials. Trade with the communist bloc has also increased. In 1957, as we have noted, the Japanese attempted to build up an Asian Development Fund.

(c) Defence. Finally, with regard to defence the basic problem before Japan was to remove all misunderstanding about Japanese rearmament in other countries and to regulate its diplomatic relations with the United States with which she had concluded the Security Pact in 1951, the Administrative Agreements in 1952-53 and the Mutual Defence Assistance Agreement in March 1954; and to re-educate the Japanese people in realising the need of building up a defence force. Efforts were made to revise the constitution which had forbidden the use of force. As we have

stated above, the problem of the diplomatic relations with the United States is proving to be a difficult one, for, on the one hand every cabinet since 1954 has followed a friendly policy with the United States, and on the other, the Japanese people have generally been hostile to the U. S. military personnel and have derided the GHQ as "Go Home Quickly". But it is clear that Japan has clearly aligned itself with the Western camp and is "determined to rise or fall together with the group of democratic nations". As the Japanese Foreign Minister put it: "Japan had no intention of compromising, by finding refuge in such a nebulous term as neutralism".

CHAPTER 8

Regional Security and Alliances

The essence of regional security is that the states situated in a particular area or region tend to react in a particular manner to various international situations and, therefore, tend to unite in order to face common threats to their political independence and territorial integrity. Regional alliances, in general terms, represent the attempt on the part of the signatories to strengthen their position through alignments with other like-minded powers and they also provide the means for carrying on their mutual relations. They are important instruments of the cold war. The term 'Regional Organisation' is used to cover all non-universal associations like the British Commonwealth, the SEATO and the Arab League etc. It refers to, more or less, formal associations of independent states and is usually based on permanent or continuous organs. It is related to a particular region. although the definition of a region can be extremely wide and varying.

Regional security was alluded and even encouraged under the League System. Chapter VIII of the U. N. Charter provides for regional arrangements or agencies which are consistent with the purposes and principles of the United Nations. Presumably any regional grouping which exists to further the maintenance of international peace and security, to facilitate the peaceful settlement of international disputes, to develop friendly relations amongst states, and to promote international cooperation on economic, social, cultural or humanitarian problem in the broad sense is not excluded by the Charter. Article 51 of the Charter permits the operation of alliances and regional security arrangements in case of armed attack until the Security Council has taken the necessary action to restore peace. The Security Council must be informed of all steps taken, and later Council action would not be considered prejudiced by prior regional action. Thus Article 51 implies that if, in the event of armed attack, the Security Council were deadlocked by the operation of the veto, regional organisations would not collapse.

In 1945 there were only three regional organisations of some sort—the Organisation of American states under the banner of Pan-Americanism, the Arab League under the cover of Pan-Islamism, and the British Commonwealth of Nations. The impetus to regional security was given by the inaction and frequent deadlocks in the Security Council which was entrusted with the task of preserving world peace. When from 1947 the chances

of East-West cooperation completely faded, regionalism as a source of security was increasingly encouraged. With the enunciation of the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan and with the development of the policy of containment and that of encirclement of the Soviet Union, the search for military strength, economic power, and a global net-work of bases led the Western powers to conclude alliances with various powers, big and small, situated in various regions. Thus regional security started running counter to the basic principles and objectives of the U. N. and became a subordinate ally of a policy of acquiring positions of strength. Regional alliances, therefore, developed into a network in which states of unequal strength were united together on the basis of economic and military aid given by the stronger partner to the weaker. They developed into a technique of the cold war as much as into a device of economic and political domination by the more advanced nations over the less developed areas, and thus have added to the deepening of international tensions and have led to the widening of the war area. During the post-war period the Western attempt at regional alliances in the Pacific resulted in the ANZUS; in South-East Asia, in the SEATO; in the Middle East, first in the Arab League and then in the Baghdad Pact; in the American Hemisphere, in the Organisation of American States; in Western Europe and the Atlantic, in the NATO. Some of them, like the OAS and the Arab League, had started developing before the cold war began but even these were gradually tied down with the logic of the cold war. In addition to these, there remained the British Commonwealth of Nations, which after 1945, became more diverse and more loose and, therefore, does not quite fit in with the exigencies of regional security. Similarly regional security arrangements were made in the Russian bloc. In 1950 the Sino-Soviet Pact was concluded, and in 1955 the Warsaw Treaty was signed.

It may be emphasised that regional organization or regional security is not new. What is new is the stress that has come to be laid on it in recent years. A world divided into blocs is a world living under the shadow of war—"bigger and better" wars. There is very little that the smaller states can ultimately do to save the situation, even though they may be regarded as "active and vital agents of world politics". Power today, therefore, is not simply national power, it is group power. Through the regional alliances, this group power has been institutionalized. That explains the importance of these alliances both in the cold war and in the calculations of a final showdown.

THE ANZUS

The ANZUS Pact was concluded for an indefinite period on July 12, 1951 between Australia, New Zealand and the United

States and was broadly modelled on the North Atlantic Treaty. The communist victory in China in 1949 and the outbreak of the Korean war in June 1950 had awakened the Western statesmen to the need of a Pacific Pact analogous to the NATO, so that the communist expansion in the non-communist world of the Pacific might be halted. To this consideration was added the apprehensions, felt by the Governments and peoples of Australia and New Zealand, of the economic and political recovery of Japan and the restoration of sovereignty to her under the proposed Japanese Peace Treaty. The ANZUS Pact, therefore, was originally conceived both as a defence against the communist danger and the threat of the possible revival of Japanese militarism. The former, of course, coloured the outlook to a larger degree than the latter. Even on January 11, 1951 the Australian Foreign Minister, Spender, had emphasised the need of a Pacific Pact directed against Japan and condemned Japan's rearmament and economic revival. On January 12, the Prime Ministers of the Commonwealth, meeting in London, laid stress on the inclusion of certain safeguards in a peace settlement with Japan, which they affirmed was urgently needed. The United States, therefore, had rightly drawn the conclusion that unless the necessary safeguards had been provided to Australia and New Zealand by the United States, they would not support either the rearmament of Japan or the proposed Japanese Peace Treaty.

On January 23, resolutions were introduced in the American House of Representatives on the subject of a Pacific Pact and on February 7, the American Assistant Secretary of State expressed approval of this idea. On February 21, Acheson openly talked of a Pacific Pact. Throughout February, Dulles continued to sound the Philippines, Australia and New Zealand on the subject. On April 18, Truman announced that he had given instructions for the preparation of a draft pact. London, though kept informed of the negotiations among the Powers concerned, was badly annoyed for having been ignored inspite of the fact that she was a Pacific Power and that her possessions like Singapore, Malaya, and Hongkong were exposed to attack. In June, agreement was reached on the text of a treaty which was initialed and made public on July 12, and was signed in September at San Francisco.

This treaty—ANZUS—came into force on April 29, 1952 and it bound the signatories to settle all disputes peacefully, to develop their defence capacities by self-help and mutual aid, to consult in the event of any one being threatened in the Pacific, and to regard an armed attack in the Pacific area as dangerous to their own peace and safety, and to meet the common danger in accordance with their constitutional processes. Under Article 5, an armed attack on any of the parties is deemed to include an armed attack

on the Metropolitan territory of any of the party or on "the Island territories under its jurisdiction in the Pacific or on its armed forces, public vessels or air-craft in the Pacific". The Pact provided that the signatories recognised the primary responsibilities of the U.N. for the maintenance of peace and security. Under the Pact a Council of Foreign Ministers of the signatories was set up in order to meet from time to time to discuss matters of common interest.

This Pacific Council under the ANZUS held its first meeting in Hawaii during August 4-6, 1952 and discussed "the military and ideological aspects of communist expansion, the consultative relations with other states and regional organisation, and the need for collective defence in the Pacific and the possibility of associating other Governments with it. Organisational problems were also considered and it was decided that the Council of Three Foreign Ministers would meet annually in each of the Capitals in turn, that special meetings could be held in Washington, and that the Council would receive the expert advice of an expert military committee to be set up under the Pact. The misunderstanding already caused between London and Washington was further increased by the Hawaii meeting which Britain requested to attend but which she was refused. The question of British representation was again considered at the Commonwealth Prime Ministers meeting in London held in December 1952. The American opposition to Britain's admission, however, continued for America did not want to make the Pacific organisation unwieldy, or to antagonise other Asian nations by the adherence of Britain and did not wish to make any commitments with regard to Hongkong and Malaya which British adherence would naturally involve. At the same time efforts were made by the Philippines and Japan to join the ANZUS. Bait was thrown to Indonesia in July 1952 to adhere to the Pact but in August the Indonesian Prime Minister declared that Indonesia could continue its policy of independence, neutrality and economic co-operation with other countries. In 1953 feelers were thrown to Rangoon and Delhi for adherence to a general anti-communist Pacific Pact. Since the United States received rebuffs in this effort, the decision to give military aid to Pakistan was taken and preparations were made to conclude a general South East Asian Treaty to which now we turn.

REGIONAL SECURITY IN SOUTH EAST ASIA

An important aspect of the problem of regional security in South East Asia is the sentiment of Asianism in response to which some of the major efforts at regional security arrangements in this region have been made. It is not an unmixed sentiment and has not led to the emergence of a clear pattern or a straight technique. But it is there, and

has been a primary force. For this sentiment the Western contact was partly responsible. The European nations, in emphasising their solidarity, inevitably gave rise to a common feeling of Asian-ness. Even in India where nationals of other European countries enjoyed no political rights, the division was between Europeans and Indians. The exclusive clubs in India were not for Englishmen but for Europeans; so was the case in China and Japan in dealing with whom the Europeans acted as one. In the 19th century there was no feeling of Asian-ness. With the turn of the century it developed. In 1903, a Japanese artist began a book with the startling declaration "Asia is One". Now, as far as non-Islamic Asia is concerned, there is much in common in their religious and social outlook and traditions. Ancestor worship and family relationship are common features. Then, again, there is the common experience of a hundred years of Western rule. "All the Asian countries have had to go through the same suffering, fight the same battle, and meet the same enemy. Their evolution towards political freedom has been, generally speaking, on parallel lines". The racial arrogance of the Europeans, their assumed attitude of intellectual and moral superiority and even the religious propaganda to which all Asian countries were subjected, gave rise to a common political outlook to the modern Asia. The Japanese evolved the formula "Asia for Asians" and the Japanese victory over Russia in 1904-5 was hailed as an Asian victory. It was this sentiment of Asianism which reached a high pitch in 1945, and the dropping of the atom bomb on the Asian soil was an injury inflicted on the Asian Soul. Indeed, in October 1948, Justice Pal of the Tokyo War Crimes Tribunal gave a dissenting judgement and *inter alia* argued that the Japanese did not launch a war of aggression but conducted a war of legitimate defence against Western imperialism on behalf of Asia.

However, this feeling of Asianism had, and even now has, contradictions and limitations of its own. When we speak of Asia, we are referring not to one major cultural community, but to at least three, which profess three major religions, embrace several different racial groups, and speak languages of diverse origin—the Far Eastern community, the Hindu community and the Islamic community. Indeed, Asia has hardly any real existence as a social unit. On the one hand the idea of Asia developed largely "as the negative image" of a relatively clear-cut conception of Europe; and on the other, its evolution as a Pan-Asian sentiment began "not in an integrated Asian reaction against European supremacy but in the separate reactions of the Orient's component tribes, nationalities and civilizations against the influence of particular occidental powers". Thus there could not emerge a common Asian leadership against the common political and cultural threat from the West.

Broadly stated, there have been four main methods in which the search for regionalism in Asia expressed itself: (*i*) Regional cooperation in the economic and social sphere; (*ii*) Regional approach in the United Nations in the form of an Arab-Asian bloc; (*iii*) The various political conferences convened and attended by the Asian countries themselves; and (*iv*) Regionalism in the sphere of security.

REGIONALISM IN THE ECONOMIC SPHERE

Regionalism in the economic sphere is an expression of a common economic background of the Asian countries. Except for India which has a large and growing industry, they are largely producers of raw material and food stuffs, and all are anxious to industrialise. They speak a common economic language, even though their economies are not complimentary. In the post-war period, the earliest regional economic cooperation was the economic organisation of the British Special Commissioner in South East Asia at Singapore, set up to deal with the critical food shortage in the area. Its most important organ was the liaison conference which included the representatives from various countries of Asia and which met monthly to ensure a fair distribution of the available rice supplies to deal with their food problems. It convened several conferences to consider allied questions and gradually it established close working relations with the U. N. agencies working in similar fields. The most important regional effort in the economic sphere was undoubtedly the Colombo Plan which we will discuss later. In addition to this there are the chief United Nations agencies, the Economic Commission for Asia and Far East (ECAFE) established by the Economic and Social Council in 1947. This body is authorised to initiate and participate in measures for facilitating concerted action for the economic reconstruction and development of Asia and the Far East and for maintaining and strengthening economic relations within the area and with the rest of the world. It has to carry out studies of economic and technological problems and developments within its area, and it collects, evaluates and disseminates economic, technological, and statistical information. In short, it performs such *advisory* services as the countries of the region may desire. It is not an executive agency. It operates through consultations, researches, recommendations, committees, ad-hoc conferences, and expert working parties. Its impact has been considerable. The members of its Secretariat have been giving expert advice to member governments on various questions and it has gone a long way in developing a sense of regional unity, and regional approach to the solution of common economic problems. But the ECAFE, it may be mentioned, is largely dominated by the Western Powers. Other United Nations specialised agencies working in

South East Asia include the FAO (Food and Agriculture Organisation), WHO (World Health Orgnisation), UNESCO (United Nations Educational, Social and Cultural Organisation) and ILO (International Labour Organisation).

REGIONAL APPROACH AT THE U. N.

Secondly, there has been a regional approach with regard to the United Nations activities, although it should be remembered that seven states of the region were not members of the United Nations in the initial period but joined later—Burma in 1948, Indonesia in 1950, Ceylon, Nepal, Laos, and Cambodia in 1955, and Malaya in 1957. The Korean war led to an Indian effort to create a neutral bloc of uncommitted nations to act as a kind of shock absorber between East and West in 1950. At one period or another, it included Afghanistan, Burma, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Thailand, Yemen, Lebanon, Liberia, Pakistan, the Philippines, Saudi Arabia and Syria. But here again their mutual strains and differences could be seen. Thailand has held a strong anti-communist position. The Philippines and Pakistan have often splintered off to vote with the U.S.A. On issues of colonialism, racial discrimination, and trusteeship, the Asian bloc has stood united. The Asian-Arab bloc caused a great consternation in Western capitals by voting to include the question of Algeria in the agenda of the U.N. General Assembly on September 30, 1955. This line-up, partly, has been an extension of the Bandung at the U.N. The voting of the coalition of states on the issue of Algeria which reversed the Steering Committee's recommendation that the General Assembly should not discuss the matter, brought out the differences of opinion between the anti-colonial bloc and the West starkly into the open. Following the endorsement of Indonesia's case against the Netherlands over West Irian (Dutch New Guinea) at the Bandung Conference, the Asian-Arab group voted against virulent European and Australian opposition to include Irian on the agenda. Thus, for the first time, a group has been strong enough to challenge the Western powers at the U.N. and to over-ride the powerful Steering Committee.

In short, at the United Nations the Arab-Asian nations have tended to unite on the issues of racial discrimination, disarmament, and colonialism. But this unity could not be maintained on other issues, particularly those involving the cold war. For instance, on the question of seating the People's Republic of China in 1950, Afghanistan, Burma, Pakistan and Israel voted with India; Iran, Iraq, the Philippines and Thailand voted against; and Egypt, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Syria and Yemen abstained. At best, therefore, the Arab-Asian bloc is a coalition for purposes of manoeuvres; it is not a bloc bound together by military or political

alliances. Its aims are principally negative; to oppose imperialism or to mediate, and its composition is unstable. Nevertheless, it does represent a step in the evolution of regional cohesion. The forum provided by the U.N. for discussion of issues of interest to the bloc and the evident necessity of concerted action for the realisation of objectives have had an impact. However, it has no real unifying force.

POLITICAL CONFERENCES

From 1945 to 1957 five important political conferences have been held: The Asian Relations Conference at New Delhi in 1947; the conference of Asian, Australian and Middle Eastern Nations on the Indonesian question at Delhi in 1949, the Conferences at Colombo and Bogor, and the Asian-African Conference at Bandung in 1955.

Asian Relations Conference. The Asian Relations Conference of March 1947 at New Delhi was the first of these conferences. Ostensibly it was a non-official gathering convened and organised by the Indian Council of World Affairs, an un-official organization comprising of university teachers, lawyers and public men. Its obvious objective was to discuss the common problems of the Asian countries and their position in world affairs. The objective was, of course, vague and ill-defined. It was attended by twenty-eight countries, including the Asiatic Soviet Republics belonging to the U.S.S.R. as well as China, Mongolia, the Philippines, Persia, Viet Nam and Indonesia. It sought to represent the nationalist forces of Asia as a whole. India played a leading role and in fact it was felt by some that it was an attempt by the Indian leaders to place themselves at the head of an Asian regionalist movement based on independence of European control. Some delegates espoused the creation of a formal Asian Union but no progress could be made. Although it established two new un-official bodies—an Asian Relations Organisation and an Institute of Asian Studies—none of them, however, could cut much ice. The decision of the Conference to meet again in China in 1949 could not materialise due to the dust and storm of the revolution in that country. This Conference, in fact, was, on the one hand, in response to a kind of vague and undefined widespread sentiment of Asianism, and, on the other, it reflected the various dividing forces working in Asia.

Neither the Chinese nor the Indians were perhaps prepared to concede leadership to the other. However invisible, there is the essential competition between China and India and as a recent writer has said, it is not the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. but China and India which are fighting for the soul of Asia. To bridge this gulf, the sentiment of Asianism may be an inadequate instrument. In this conference, moreover, the Arabs were more

or less uninterested. Even the Muslim League in India had boycotted it. The South Asian countries apprehended that an Asian Organisation might well mean the end of their freedom almost before it had been won. As one Burmese put it, "it was terrible to be ruled by Western Power but it was even more so to be ruled by an Asian Power". In the course of the discussion at the Conference of 1947 large areas of agreement were established not as new discoveries but rather as confirmation of agreements reached in the course of the past two or three decades. These agreements covered such issues as the common struggle for freedom, improvement of living conditions and of the status of women, and increase of information and contacts among Asians. But "in the end the conference accomplished little of a political nature" and despite the effort to avoid topics of known disagreement, the impossibility of creating an Asian Union became manifest.

Indeed, a serious attempt to establish a formal political association had not yet been made. Some South-East Asian delegates on return from the Asian Relations Conference of 1947 were invited by the Burmese leaders to lay down the basis for a regional federation but no progress could be made. The unofficial representatives from Burma, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaya, Thailand and Viet Nam instituted a South East Asia League but it confined its membership to the communist elements and limited its activities to helping the revolutionary activity in Indo-China. A number of proposals for a South-East Asian political association had been put forward but nothing concrete has yet emerged out.

Delhi Conference. The next effort was made in January 1949 shortly after the Netherlands launched its second police action against the Indonesian Republic in December 1948. Mr. Nehru, a consistent opponent of colonialism, convened an emergency conference of 19 countries at New Delhi to discuss the crisis. This Conference was essentially different from the one which met in March 1947. It was more limited in its objective than the latter. It was limited to the representatives of recognised governments only and it was an official meeting. Probably it was due to its limited character that it was more successful. The delegates found little difficulty in reaching agreement on the Indonesian crisis and quickly passed a firm but moderate resolution setting forth their position. Many other resolutions were passed in which the participating countries were urged to maintain close contacts through normal diplomatic channels and at the U. N. until the Indonesian dispute had been satisfactorily solved. The participating states agreed to explore ways and means of establishing suitable machinery, having regard to the areas concerned, for promoting

consultation and cooperation within the framework of the United Nations. This Conference and its resolutions had a definite influence in stirring the U. S. A. to take a positive stand against the Dutch and on the eventual settlement of the Dutch-Indonesian dispute. Its resolution on the establishment of regional machinery, however, led to no positive results. Incidentally, by calling the conference to rally support for the Indonesian cause at a critical moment, India strengthened its claim to be the leader of Asian nationalism against the West.

Colombo Conference. A more limited conference attended by India, Pakistan, Burma, Ceylon, and Indonesia (onwards called as the Colombo Powers) was held at Colombo from April 28 to May 2, 1954 at the instance of the Ceylonese Prime Minister, Sir John Kotelawala. The Conference met at a time when 9 nations were meeting in Geneva to discuss a settlement in Indo-China and other Far Eastern problems. The Colombo Conference did not have any set agenda prepared in advance and the discussions, therefore, were expected to be perfectly friendly and informal. It had been agreed at the very start that "individual problems of the countries, or questions that did not concern all the countries in common, should not find a place on the agenda". Thus the problem of Kashmir and that of the Indian residents in Ceylon was, from the very beginning, ruled out. The Conference, therefore, was to consider subjects of "a broad and universal character": the situation in Indo-China, the hydrogen bomb, colonialism, international communism, and economic cooperation in South East Asia. On the question of Indo-China the Prime Ministers felt that the solution of the problem required direct negotiations between the parties principally concerned and proposed "that France should declare at the Geneva Conference that she is irrevocably committed to the complete independence of Indo-China". On the hydrogen bomb they expressed the view "that no further explosion of hydrogen bombs should take place and that the United Nations and the Powers principally concerned should take steps to publish authoritative information regarding the destructive capacities and the known and probable disastrous effects of these weapons". On the question of colonialism they condemned all foreign domination and decided to give it further thought. On the problem of economic cooperation they affirmed "their adherence to the principles of respecting the sovereignty of each country" and to the principle of mutual aid.

The heated debate, however, ensued on the question of international communism and it appears in the light of disclosures made by Sir John Kotelawala in his Memoirs, that Nehru and Mohammed Ali had some hot exchanges on this question. Sir John has written: "Tempers were short and nerves frayed.....

At another stage one of the premiers lost control of himself, banged the table, and shouted at another, 'You are nothing better than an American stooge'. To which the other retorted with equal heat, 'And you are nothing better than a Russian stooge'. It was at this moment, fraught with tension, that I lost my own temper as Chairman, and exploded.....I asked them to remember that we were Prime Ministers" (Sir John Kotelawala, *An Asian Prime Minister's Story*, p. 124). It was after a good deal of tussle that the Prime Ministers agreed to express "their unshakable determination to resist interference in the affairs of their countries by external communist, anti-communist or other agencies". The Prime Ministers also expressed their agreement on the desirability of the representation of Communist China in the United Nations, and their sympathy with the demands of the peoples of Morocco, Tunisia and Algeria.

The Colombo Conference was held as a great success in the participating countries. It undoubtedly contributed, in some measure, to the success of the Geneva Conference. But from the security point of view or from the point of view of Asian cooperation on political problems its success was practically nil. It not only omitted to discuss the mutual problems of the participating states, but it also brought in a sharp focus the underlying basic differences among them. Nevertheless, it was in this conference that the idea of holding a conference of Asian-African nations was put forward by the Indonesian Prime Minister, Sastroamidjojo.

The Bogor Conference. The Colombo powers were originally opposed to the polarisation of world power into two hostile blocs and to their entanglement with either of them. They held that workable relations could be established with the communist camp and favoured a neutralist approach in the cold war. The future of the Colombo grouping is, of course, uncertain even today and there seems to be no common outlook on international relations. No permanent machinery was established at the Colombo Conference and none is under contemplation. The Indonesian Prime Minister, however, continued his efforts with the other four Prime Ministers to call a much wider conference of all the Afro-Asian nations. It was decided to hold a conference at *Bogor* in Indonesia on December 28, 1954 in order to discuss the bigger conference (that was held at Bandung). In this conference the question of membership, purposes and organization of the proposed conference were discussed. The five Prime Ministers agreed to invite 30 countries including the five sponsoring nations and the Communist China. Among the countries not invited were both Koreas, Nationalist China, Australia, New Zealand, Israel, the Union of South Africa, Britain, the U. S. A., and the U. S. S. R. Of the 30 countries invited, only one—the Central African Federation—did not attend "as they found the time not

convenient". The Union of South Africa, French North Africa and Australia sent unofficial observers to the Bandung Conference. The Bogor Conference agreed on the basic objectives of the proposed conference and these were to promote goodwill and co-operation among Afro-Asian nations; to consider the social, economic and cultural problems and relations of the countries represented; to consider problems of special interest such as those affecting national sovereignty and questions of racialism and colonialism; and to view the position of Asia and Africa in the present world and the contribution they can make to the promotion of world peace and cooperation. It was decided that the acceptance of the invitation by any one country would in no way involve or even imply any change in its view of the status of any other country. The Bogor Conference also made it clear that "in seeking to convene an Asian-African conference, they were not actuated by a desire for exclusiveness in respect of the membership of the conference" and did not contemplate "that the participatihg countries should build themselves into a regional bloc". It was decided that the expenses of the conference would be jointly shared by the five sponsoring governments and that there would be a Joint Secretariat of those five. The conference was to meet at Bandung on April 8, 1955.

The Bandung Conference. The Bandung Conference was, in a way, a reversion to the concept underlying the Asian Relations Conference of 1947 with the difference that unlike the latter it was on the official level and it had a wider geographical representation. The Conference was a reaction against the failure of the Western powers to recognise the importance of Afro-Asian nations and was in the nature of an assertion of their conviction that they have an important place in world affairs. It reflected common concern on the mounting tension between China and the United States and their anxiety to avert an atomic holocaust. It expressed the desire of the sponsoring powers to lay "a firmer foundation for China's peaceful relations with the rest of the world, not only with the West but equally with themselves and other areas of South East Asia peripheral to China". The Bandung Conference, from the organisational point of view, was a three-part gathering: (*a*) formal speeches by heads of delegations at the opening and closing plenary sessions; (*b*) working committees behind closed doors; and (*c*) informal discussions by heads of delegations.

On the question of procedure it had been agreed at Bogor that the Bandung Conference would adopt its own rules and agenda. Interesting developments, however, took place on this subject at Bandung. By noon of April 17, a day before the official opening of the Conference, 22 delegations had arrived in Bandung. In the evening that day Sastroamidjojo held an informal tea party

at his residence and it was there that Nehru suggested that the problem of procedure might be disposed off and that formality should be avoided and the preliminary speeches which would consume lot of time should be dropped. Sir John describing this event writes: "Nehru took a principal hand here, and the meeting reluctantly agreed to the proposition that there should be no opening addresses, and that those who had brought written speeches should merely hand them in. The broad headings of the subjects for discussion at the conference were also agreed upon".

The conference opened next morning, April 18, with Sastroamidjojo in the chair. The Pakistan delegation had just arrived. When the chairman announced that there would be no opening addresses, and stated what had been agreed upon at the previous evening's tea party, Mohammed Ali flew in rage and "indignantly asked why a meeting had been held of which notice had not been given to all". The American professor, George McTurnan Kahin, who unofficially attended the opening meetings of the Bandung Conference, referring to this episode has written: "This stand begot sharp responses from Nehru and Krishna Menon and equally sharp rejoinders from Mohammed Ali and his delegation's principal negotiator, Aziz Ahmad. Stemming from this initial and not entirely unexpected clash, there was manifest an undercurrent of rivalry and often of friction between India and Pakistan that was to colour many of the discussions during the ensuing week" (Kahin, *The Asian-African Conference*, p. 10).

In this protest Mohammed Ali was joined by several others and it was, therefore, resolved that opening addresses would be allowed, but that there would be no formal voting and decisions would be reached by taking the sense of the House and that all undecided procedural questions would be settled by the Chairman. The opening addresses were characterised by a strong defence of regional military pacts by the Philippines, Turkey, Thailand and Pakistan and by conciliatory tone of Chou En-lai of China. In the closed sessions mutual differences were sought to be reconciled and the informal discussions were directed to prevent the cold war, at that time focussed dangerously on the off-shore islands in the Formosa Strait from becoming a hot one. The Conference discussed the colonial problem of West Irian, Aden, Morocco and Tunisia, the question of Palestine, the problem of dual nationality of a large number of Chinese in the countries of South East Asia, the general problem of world peace, racial discrimination, disarmament, the question of economic and technical co-operation and cultural exchanges. The subjects which aroused the most lively debates were those of colonialism and collective defence.

On the question of colonialism several delegates—from Iraq, Thailand, Pakistan, and Ceylon—talked of the new colonialism of the Soviet Union and referred to the Eastern European countries as areas of Soviet colonialism. The most outspoken statement on the subject was, however, made by Sir John of Ceylon: "There is another form of colonialism, however, about which many of us represented here are perhaps less clear in our minds and to which some of us would perhaps not agree to apply the term colonialism at all. Think, for example, of those satellite states under Communist domination in Central and Eastern Europe—of Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria, Albania, Czechoslovakia, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, and Poland. Are not these colonies as much as any of the colonial territories in Africa or Asia? And if we are united in our opposition to colonialism, should it not be our duty openly to declare our opposition to Soviet colonialism as much as to Western imperialism"? This statement brought Chou En-lie to his feet and agitated Nehru. Chou En-lie, who had formerly announced that he would not make a speech, now announced his right to answer this statement. Pakistan, Turkey, Iraq and Lebanon vigorously supported Sir John. Mohammed Ali cleverly pointed out that they were not attacking China which "is by no means an imperialist nation" and that criticism was directed "against the Soviet form of imperialism by which many countries have been made satellites". In the midst of excitement the conference was adjourned and when the statesmen were coming out of the conference hall Chou inquired of Sir John "whether it was my intention to break up the conference" on which Sir John put him a counter question "if it was his intention to do so". Nehru heatedly asked Sir John: "Why did you not show me your speech before you made it"? to which Sir John is reported to have retorted: "Why should I? Do you show me yours before you make them?" This only indicates that the controversies between Mohammed Ali, Nehru and Sir John at Bandung were more bitter than ever and at least some delegations disliked "what they regarded as over-bearing and patronizing attitudes on the parts of Nehru and Menon" (Kotelawala, *An Asian Prime Minister's Story*, p. 157; and Kahin, *The Asian-African Conference*, p. 36).

The other subject which created a stormy controversy was that of the right of collective defence pertaining to a state. Mohammed Ali proposed to add two more points to the principles of Panch Sheel incorporated in the Sino-Indian agreement on Tibet signed in 1954—the right of self-defence exercised singly or collectively and the principle of peaceful settlement of international disputes either by negotiations or arbitration. The former was proposed in anticipation of Nehru's criticism of military pacts such as those to which Pakistan was a party;

and the latter was proposed in order to make it awkward for India to refuse arbitration on the issue of Kashmir. This was the famous Pakistani "Seven Pillars of Peace" but Nehru would have none of it and advanced the familiar arguments that all military alliances tend to shorten the area of peace and widen that of war, that they breed an atmosphere of suspicion and insecurity, and that by committing countries to the protection of *status quo* they tend to be reactionary and to serve as a powerful bulwark of colonialism and foreign domination. To this set of argument the representatives of Pakistan, Turkey, Iraq, Lebanon, and the Philippines replied by pointing out "the great difference in size between India and their countries". Nehru was reminded by them that "more than half the countries attending the Conference were related through pacts with one or the other of the two blocs".

Behind the scenes, the Bandung Conference provided a forum of discussion of the issues dividing China from the United States of America: issues like the Chinese representation in the United Nations, Formosa, the question of airmen prisoners in China, the role of the Cominform, the communist subversive activities, the problem of dual nationality of millions of Chinese in Burma, Indonesia and Thailand, and the general relationship between China and other Asian countries.

The Bandung Conference has been called as "a unique and significant event" for not only its membership was unusual but also the range of problems it considered was wide and varied. It was one of those events in which both participants and the world at large knew that history was being made. It established once and for all the new status of the Asian and African nations in international politics and their claim to a place in the counsels of the nations. It provided a unique occasion for the dispelling of doubts which China had entertained of the rest of Asia and which the non-communist Asia had entertained of China. It acquainted Chou En-lie "with the realities of China's international environment". It enabled some countries to travel a considerable distance towards the establishment of informal *de facto* relationship with China and enabled China to move closer to the rest of Asia. It obtained a statement from Chou En-lie that "the Chinese people do not want to have a war with the United States and that they are willing to sit down and enter into negotiations with them to discuss the question of relaxing tension in the Taiwan area". This statement provided a basis for the negotiations which began at Geneva on ambassadorial level on August 1, 1955. It resulted in the signing of a pact on dual nationality between China and Indonesia. It led to a kind of a non-aggression pact between China and its neighbours—a moral containment, not signed and sealed but clear and

unambiguous. It saw the emergence of China as a great Asian power and not merely as a close ally of Russia and it gave her an added prestige and an added arena of action outside the orbit of Moscow. When Sir John asked Chou En-lie about the desirability of the disbandment of the Cominform, Chou's reply significantly was that it was a Soviet concern and was none of China's business. The remarkably conciliatory tone of the speeches and informal conversation of Chou En-lie, his compromising attitude on all major issues and his readiness to discuss them in an atmosphere of candour and friendliness and his repeated statements before a vast gathering like that at Bandung, his willingness to give specific assurances to particular states like Thailand, Ceylon, the Philippines, etc., and his respectful references to the principles of U.N. Charter had gone a long way in registering a magnificent success of the Bandung Conference. It was the positive result of this Conference that tension in the Taiwan area which was then mounting up came to be considerably relaxed. It is true that the most important problem of adjustment of relations between the United States and communist China was not solved. Nor was China led to be more independent of whatever control Moscow is supposed to exercise on her. If anything, the relations between Peking and Moscow became closer still. Nevertheless, the Chinese sincerity removed the dust of distrust which had blurred the vision of many.

The Bandung Conference, moreover, gave delegates, separated by vast geographical, ideological and cultural differences, an opportunity to work and live together and know one another. Even if it could not create a new bloc—and it was none of its objectives—it did bring the two vast continents and two-thirds of mankind on one platform. Despite an overwhelming diversity of every kind, a unity was patiently constructed which is breathtaking both in its present achievement and future potential. The Conference was symbolic of the change that has come over Africa and Asia and it represented "an effort by these countries to regain their personality and international dignity and was an assertion of their personality *vis-a-vis* the West". That these nations could have held a conference without the benefit of Western aid or Western consultants was in itself a significant fact. The world and the participating nations themselves discovered that Asia and Africa could conduct an international conference as effectively as Europe or America. It was gratifying that the Bandung Conference did not wage a colour war against the White. In the midst of a huge diversity, agreement was reached on anti-colonialism, universal membership of the United Nations, racial segregation and discrimination, disarmament, cultural, economic and technical co-operation among the Afro-Asian nations, and the need of convening another conference of the same type.

It may be mentioned that on the question of colonialism the states committed to the Western military alliances proposed that colonialism "in all its forms" be condemned by the conference. Chou and Menon refused to accept this phrase. Eventually a compromise was found and it was decided to condemn colonialism "in all its manifestations". Similarly on the question of collective defence a compromise was found in the formula that each nation had the right "to defend itself singly or collectively in conformity with the Charter of the United Nations", but that they would abstain "from the use of arrangements of collective defence to serve the particular interests of any of the Big Powers". In the case of the former, the phrase "colonialism in all its manifestations" could be interpreted to include Western as well as Soviet side of colonialism, or it could be interpreted, as Chou indeed did, to mean the political, military, economic, cultural, and social manifestations of colonialism. Similarly on the question of collective defence Turkey and Pakistan could interpret the Bandung decision as a clear endorsement of the SEATO and the NATO, while India, China and Egypt could interpret it as a clear denial of such pacts.

In short, the Bandung Conference gave out a list of ten principles for world peace and co-operation:

Respect for fundamental human rights and for the U. N. principles;

Respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all nations;

Recognition of the equality of all races and nations;

Non-interference in the internal affairs of another country;

Respect for the right of each nation to defend itself singly or collectively in conformity with the U. N. Charter;

Abstention from the use of arrangements of collective defence to serve the particular interests of any of the big powers;

Mutual non-aggression;

Pacific settlement of international disputes;

Promotion of mutual interests and co-operation; and

Respect for justice and international obligations.

But inspite of these achievements the Bandung Conference failed to find general agreement on an independent line in international, and particularly Asian, affairs between the Soviet bloc and the West, and to create an area of peace in the world. The Arab League nations were seen to be badly split partly because of the Turkish-Iraqi Pact. Their only unity was negative,

growing out of a common hatred of Israel. The unity of the Colombo Powers was not as great as many had anticipated. It also became apparent that the African countries were junior partners to the Asian nations. No strong African leadership emerged at the conference, except perhaps Col. Nasser of Egypt but he was more concerned about the Middle East than about African people. With all the talk about world peace and peace making, no new directions of peace making emerged. No major suggestions were made for amending the U. N. Charter. Discussions brought out sharp differences of opinion and the doctrine of neutrality could not win more adherents. Nor did the Conference succeed in settling important issues among the participants. The twin colossi of India and China created a fear. No permanent organisation or secretariat was established and little economic activity among the participating nations has so far resulted in spite of the appointment of liaison officers.

SECURITY ORGANISATIONS: THE SEATO

A search for regionalism in the sphere of security began almost immediately after the communist victory in China in 1949. In July 1949 Chiang Kai-shek and President Quirino of the Philippines met at Baguio and pointing to the communist menace called on the Far Eastern countries to organise themselves into a union for the purpose of achieving solidarity and mutual assistance to contain and counteract the common threat. Except Syngman Rhee, nobody supported this call and even the U. S. was lukewarm. But Quirino went ahead with his plan and in order to induce some Asian powers to join the proposed gathering, he even modified it in some important respects so that communism and military cooperation were entirely excluded from its range. In May 1950, the conference met at Baguio to discuss some economic, social and cultural questions. Its scope was so restricted that eventually Nationalist China and South Korea refused to participate and the conference was attended by Australia, Ceylon, India, Indonesia, Pakistan, the Philippines and Thailand. The discussions were vague and indecisive and no foundation could be laid down for any permanent organisation. In 1951, a Bilateral Defence Pact between the U. S. and the Philippines, the ANZUS, and a U. S. Japanese Security Treaty were concluded which we have already surveyed. But most of the states of South East Asia had consistently refused to join these arrangements.

It was towards the end of 1952 that the United States, guided by the considerations of global strategy, took the lead in organising a defensive coalition in South East Asia. The main obstacle in the way of the United States was that effective

Asian leadership for this purpose was not forthcoming. To remove this obstacle the U. S. took advantage of the position of Pakistan and of the strain in Indo-Pak relations and succeeded in persuading Pakistan to abandon its neutral position. A Pak-U. S. Military Pact was concluded in 1954. In the meantime the French military position in Viet Nam had deteriorated and the U. S. decided to negotiate a South-East Asian Defence arrangement. Burma, Ceylon, India, and Indonesia declined to associate themselves with the project.

Eight nations (America, Britain, France, Australia, New Zealand, Pakistan, the Philippines and Thailand) sent their representatives to Manila in the Philippines and they concluded the South East Asian Collective Defence Treaty on September 8, 1954. The Treaty is on the same pattern as the ANZUS. It has 11 Articles and it provided for peaceful settlement of disputes, effective self-help and mutual aid for the development of collective capacity to resist armed attack and counter subversive activities, and for the strengthening of economic and technical cooperation. Under Article IV each party recognises that aggression by means of armed attack in the treaty area against any of the parties or against any state or territory which the parties by unanimous agreement may hereafter designate, would endanger its own peace and safety, and agrees that it will in that event act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes. If no armed attack takes place and there is only a threat to the peace of the area, the Treaty provides for immediate consultations among the signatories. It also provided for the rudiments of a regional organisation and established a council to consider matters concerning the implementation of the Treaty. The Treaty is supposed to work under the United Nations Charter and is open to any other state in a position to further its objective. The area covered by the Treaty is the general area of South East Asia, including also the entire territories of the Asian parties, and the general area of the South-West Pacific not including the Pacific area north of 21 degrees 30 minutes north latitude. But the parties can, by unanimous agreement, include within the treaty area any territory. The Treaty is of indefinite duration. It was supplemented by an Understanding of the United States of America in accordance with which the United States would be bound to take military action only if communist aggression takes place, but that it would hold consultation in the event of other aggression. The Treaty was accompanied by a Pacific Charter promising aid to nations in achieving self-government and raising living standards, and restating the nation's determination to stop any attempt in the treaty area to subvert freedom.

Implications of the Treaty. In the *first* place, none of the signatories was free from the existing military alliances sponsored by the United States since 1947. Britain, France, and U. S. A. were members of the NATO; Australia and New Zealand were partners in the ANZUS; Pakistan was a recipient of American military aid under the Mutual Defence Assistance Agreement of 1953; and the Philippines and Thailand were bound with the United States in several military and economic agreements. The countries whose inclusion would have made some difference refused to come in. Thus the Treaty did not bring about a change in the existing balance of forces to any major extent, and was only "a continuation of the defensive ramparts the building of which began in earnest with the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty in 1949".

Secondly, it was based on the concept of the containment of the Soviet Union and of Communist China and was intended to stop communism at the line represented by the northern boundaries of Burma, Thailand, Laos and Viet Nam. It was also intended to serve as a reply to the Sino-Soviet challenge to the United States both in Asia and Europe in 1954. In Europe, the challenge was thrown by Molotov in the Berlin Conference when he proposed to join a *purely European* Defence Organisation. In Asia, Chou En-lie outlined his plan in the Geneva Conference that the peace of Asia should be maintained solely by the Asian states themselves through the assumption of mutual obligations. The central aim of these challenges, to the American mind, was one of squeezing the United States out of both Europe and Asia leaving them under the "benign leadership of the strongest power in each continent: in Europe, Russia, and in Asia, China". On this showing, the South East Asian Treaty seemed to be an effort of the United States to entrench more and more in Asia in order to offset China which "is more expansionist now than the Soviet Union". Under the mutual economic assistance provision and in the anti-subversion clauses, the United States has ample opportunities to interfere in the domestic affairs of her junior partner with a view to retain convenient regimes suited to serve the American interests.

Thirdly, the Treaty was intended to put pressure upon the neutralist countries in South East Asia to give up sitting on the fence and to make up their minds. It increased the stresses and strains in the Indo-Pakistan relations. Whereas the United States was primarily guided by the desire of halting communism, Pakistan while concluding this Treaty had obviously the so-called Indian aggression in mind. Zafarullah Khan diligently fought for eliminating the word 'communist' from the phrase 'communist aggression'. Although the United States took pains to make it clear that she was bound to take military action only if communist aggression takes place, it also made it clear that in case of other

threats mutual consultations would be held. Thus the United States directly comes on the side of Pakistan in the latter's conflict with India and to that extent the Treaty disturbs the balance of forces and was regarded by India as the Western attempt to blackmail her and to exert pressure on her to align herself with the Western powers.

Fourthly, although the South East Asian Treaty contains references to the United Nations, it is hardly consistent with its principles. It is difficult to see how the U. K., France and the United States on the one hand, and Thailand, the Philippines and Pakistan on the other constitute "a geographical area". Like any other military alliance it has limited the United Nations jurisdiction in respect of the problems of the area in which it is supposed to operate and will always tend to tempt the signatories to bypass the United Nations and will to that extent decrease the chances of pacific settlement of disputes.

Finally, it puts premium on colonialism and adds to the number of satellites. One of the useful contributions of the Geneva Conference of 1954 was the loosening of the military blocs and the emergence of China as a power in her own right, for, at Geneva the Soviet Union no longer held the centre of the stage and America's associates were compelled, by sheer survival instinct, to evolve their own independent policies. The South East Asian Treaty reversed this process by binding down the minor countries of South Asia to the chariot-wheel of the United States. It sought to declare a kind of Monroe Doctrine unilaterally over the countries of South East Asia and led to misunderstandings and tension. It is based on the policy of negotiating from the position of strength and rests on the assumption that war is inevitable and that peaceful co-existence is not possible. A major trend of our times has been the rise of the colonial peoples in Asia and Africa and their determination to consider and solve their problems themselves without the patronage of their former masters. The South East Asian Treaty attempts to reverse even this trend by inviting the colonial powers to decide Asian problems—problems of security and peace. It was for these reasons that India so vehemently opposed it. In the phrase of Nehru, it brought the cold war right at the door of India. India's growing inclination towards neutralism springs from an effort to survive in an environment growing more dangerous and vitiated. And she believes that China would commit aggression only when Peking is convinced that the West was preparing to attack China. India expects communism to operate through subversive movements in the Asian countries, not by means of direct military attack. She further believes that internal communism can be fought out by each country itself and not by foreigners. India, Burma and Indonesia have dealt with it themselves but France failed to save

Indo-China from it. Any Western aid to an Asian country on the plea of combating communism is, therefore, viewed by India as colonialism by the backdoor and as interference in the domestic affairs of Asian states. By allying themselves to major military powers the smaller countries, in our view, mortgage themselves for in return of guarantees of protection the latter have to conform their policies to those of the former and have to adjust themselves to what they do or do not consider worth fighting for.

In short, the Manila Treaty widened the rift, on the one hand, between the U. S. A. and India, and on the other, between India and Pakistan. Soon after the U. S.-Pak Military Alliance was followed by the Manila Treaty, India took the stand that the entire context of the Kashmir issue had changed and the offer of plebiscite no longer held good. Hidden passions, jealousies, prejudices, fears and suspicions were roused and a complete deadlock had reached in the Indo-Pak relations.

Seato Council Meetings. We have seen that Article V of the Manila Treaty provided for the establishment of a Council. The first meeting of this Council was held in February 1955 at Bangkok after the Treaty had gone into force on February 19. The purpose of this meeting was to establish an organisation for the implementation of the objectives of the Treaty. The signatories designated Council representatives at Bangkok to maintain continuing consultations and to make agreed recommendations to member governments on matters relating to the Treaty. The Council representatives in their functions were to be assisted, where necessary, by expert groups. Each signatory designated a military adviser as its member on the Treaty Council to make recommendations to the Council on military cooperation. The Council representatives meet about twice a month and several expert committees on economic cooperation, information, culture, education, labour activities, and on anti-subversion measures have been appointed. The Military Advisers met at Bangkok in July 1955 and at Melbourne in January 1956. In the first meeting they drew up a programme for the progressive development of collective planning for the defence of the treaty area, appointed a number of sub-committees to study specific aspects of collective defence planning; and in the second meeting they considered the reports of these sub-committees.

The second meeting of the SEATO Council of Ministers was held at Karachi on March 6-8, 1956. It reviewed the progress of the organisation and the general situation in the treaty area. The meeting decided to establish a Permanent Working Group composed of an officer from the staff of each Council representative; to set up a Research Service Centre under the Council of Representatives to report on current developments in communist activities;

to expand the existing Public Relations Office; and to institute a Cultural Relations Office and a full-time Executive Secretariat. All these bodies were to be located at Bangkok. The meeting also reviewed the problems of economic development and decided to appoint an Economic Officer to the proposed Executive Secretariat. The problems of military aid were also considered and the Australian proposal to make a contribution of £2 million towards the programme of defence support aid was considered although no decision was taken. But just as the most interesting part of the Bangkok Meeting of the Council was the discussion of the Bandung Conference programme and the possible briefing of the Asian partners by the Western members on the stand that the former were to take at Bandung, the most interesting part of the second meeting at Karachi was the secret discussions on Kashmir and Pakhtoonistan. This time the occasion was the statements on these issues made by Khrushchev and Bulganin in their Asian tour in December-January 1955-56. The Indian government naturally protested to the SEATO members against the reference of Kashmir in the SEATO Council meeting. Thus the stand originally taken by India on the Manila Treaty was fully justified.

The third meeting of the Seato Council of Ministers was held in Canberra on March 11-13, 1957 and was preceded by the sixth meeting of the Military Advisers from March 10 to 11th. It was revealed in the annual Public Report released by the Council Representatives that the economic development of Asian members of the Seato had been assisted by $ 620 million provided by other member countries; that considerable progress had been made in counteracting communism in the area; that, to achieve military coordination, a Permanent Planning Staff was to be set up at Bangkok, and four joint military exercises had been held during the year 1956; and that the Civil Organization of the Seato had been fully established in Bangkok. It was agreed by members that the Seato should give high priority to an information programme, publicizing the true aims and character of the organization, and to an exposure programme, revealing the real nature of communist subversion. Attention was given by the Council Members to the problem of neutralism and it was noted with concern that some Governments were engaged in active opposition to collective security arrangements such as the Seato. In the economic sphere the Council agreed to consider the execution of specific projects recommended by Seato expert committees to help relieve the economic burden of defence. It approved a budget of $ 787,145 for the year ending June 30, 1958, to cover the cost of the permanent civil and military headquarters in Bangkok and to finance joint programmes approved by it. It was decided to appoint a Secretary General to head the Permanent Civil Organization and a Deputy Secretary-General, a

permanent Military Planning Office in Bangkok, and to hold training exercises. In the cultural sphere, it was decided to carry out a number of multilateral projects which include a Seato fellowship programme and a Round Table meeting of outstanding authorities to discuss Asian civilizations and cultures. Soon after the Council's meeting, a large scale Seato exercise involving more than 5,000 men and 19 ships took place in the Gulf of Siam from April 23 to May 2. According to press reports the primary value of the exercise was felt to lie in the cooperation among participating nations, who would be unable to conduct the large scale operations unilaterally.

From this brief survey several conclusions follow. (*i*) The various Asian conferences have underlined the deep-seated sentiment of Asianism. (*ii*) Beneath this sentiment there are forces and factors which defy any effort to force a full and broad Asian organisation. (*iii*) The Asian countries tend to pick up the regional approach in the economic sphere but feel suspicious of any political or military alliances. (*iv*) Most of the regional efforts have been made in response to outside leadership and the initiative has been seldom taken by the Asian countries. (*v*) Western effort to build up regional alliances or regional security organisation on the basis of hostility towards communism is not very much likely to succeed, for communism is not viewed as a serious threat in Asia. It is for this reason that the most important powers of South and South East Asia have refused to join the Manila Treaty. (*vi*) If the regional approach in Asia is to be a success, three obstacles are to be removed: (*a*) the explosive situations within each country of Asia are to be eliminated; (*b*) each country has to regulate its relations with the other and settle their mutual disputes; and (*c*) each country has to regulate its relations with the great powers of the world.

REGIONAL SECURITY IN THE MIDDLE EAST

The American effort to create a Middle East Defence Organisation proved to be equally difficult, for if there were certain factors which made for unity in the Middle East, there were other forces which pushed the Middle East countries in different directions. It is true that Islam and Arab Caliphate, along with the Muslim law of Shariat and the Canon Law and a common scholastic culture, seem to create the close bonds of cultural unity in the Middle East as much as the common Arabic language and a common way of life. It is also true that the rapidly changing economic and social conditions of this region are drawing its countries much closer to each other and seek to emphasise the possibility of competition and the necessity of cooperation. Politically also in more recent years the people in the

Middle East have begun to realise that although their individual states are insignificant, a combination of well-over 60 million persons and controlling almost half the world's oil deposits could have a considerable role to play in world affairs. All these factors combined with the common backwardness, common domination of the Western world, and a common desire of political and economic deliverance have created an urge for unity which has expressed itself in an organisation like the Arab League.

But, on the other hand, there are forces which militate against the centripetal tendencies. The demographic factors, inadequate communications, lack of social and economic integration and the presence of general backwardness, the wide gap between the town and the country, between the nomadic and settled population, the deep cleavages between religious communities as a result of the intensity of the religious and denominational feelings of the people, the complete economic disintegration brought about by foreign rule have all undermined the foundations of unity. As a result of the Treaty of Versailles the century-old unity of the Ottoman Empire was shattered, and the Middle East was virtually balkanized. The conflicting interests of the Western powers led to the division of the Middle East into several independent entities and zones of influence in 1919 and onwards. From 1919 to 1945 this policy of dividing the Middle East in zones and entities was facilitated by the fact that Russia, after the Bolshevik revolution of 1917, had virtually withdrawn from the Middle East owing to its pre-occupation with internal problems.

The import of nationalism accelerated this process of disintegration. During the inter-war period it inflicted a crushing blow to Muslim unity by attempting to transform the Islamic states into modern constitutional states. By creating popular leadership it was turned into a mass movement and made an over-all attack against those very Western powers which are now trying to link them in a Middle East Defence Organisation. The achievement of independence by these states, on the one hand, broke the monetary and fiscal ties holding some of these areas together, and, on the other, it created an isolationist trend in each state adopting different foreign traditions and methods—French in Syria and the Lebanon, British in Iraq and Palestine, Italian in Libya, and Spanish in Morocco. Thus, opp sed to Pan-Arabism and Pan Islamism, there developed various local movements with different aims and objectives.

Another important factor which has created difficulties for the Western powers in the way of a Middle East Defence Organisation has been the unpopularity of their system and their ideology in the Middle East and a gradual decline in

their prestige. Until 1945 the West stood for exploitation and imperialism, except that the United States was largely regarded as the ally of nationalist aspiration. But after 1947 the exigencies of the cold war have led the United States to support the French colonialism in North Africa and the British oil interests in the Arab world. On the other hand, the record of communist Russia has been comparatively cleaner, although communism as a doctrine was resisted on religious grounds. The rapid industrial progress and the speedy technological advance of the Soviet Union naturally attract the Middle Eastern leaders, keen to improve the lot of their peoples. In any case in the general East-West conflict the average reaction is that of *neutralism.* Determined to assert their newly won independence by pursuing an independent policy and keen to eliminate the surviving element of colonialism, most of the Middle East countries naturally try to play off the East against the West in order to gain certain concrete advantages from both sides. On its part neutralism implies observing a scrupulous single standard of behaviour towards both East and West.

Again, the British policy of establishing a Jewish home in Palestine followed since 1917, the Western sympathies for Jewish cause, the American policy towards Palestine since 1945, the establishment of Israel and the American support of it against traditional Arab rights have added a very complex factor to the Middle Eastern politics which sometimes expresses itself in the form of a united resistance against the Jews, sometimes in the form of a united resistance against the West, and sometimes in the form of internal dissensions.

It is in this background that we will survey the attempts at regional security in the Middle East since 1945. Broadly stated, three such attempts have so far been made: (*a*) the creation of the Arab League in 1945; (*b*) the American aid to Turkey and her inclusion in the North Atlantic Treaty in 1951 leading to the development of the American concept of northern tier defence eventually culminating in the signing of Baghdad Pact in 1955; (*c*) the Western concept of a Mediterranean Pact including Spain, France, Italy, Morocco, Tunisia, Algeria, the Sudan and Libya.

THE ARAB LEAGUE

Efforts to unite the Arab world date back to antiquity when the first Egyptian Asiatic League was formed before 1400 B. C. In the modern era the first popular sentiment for unity developed after the Arab awakening in the latter part of the 19th century. During the second world war Britain tried to achieve Arab unity under the leadership of the Hashimite dynasty but the attempt failed because of the opposition of Egypt and Ibn Saud. On September 25, 1944, after long negotiations

the representatives of Egypt, Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, Transjordan, Yemen and Saudi Arabia met in Alexandria and on October 7, with the encouragement of Britain, agreed to form a loose association and drafted a constitution in the Alexandria Protocol. In it, the participating states announced that "anxious to strengthen and consolidate the ties which bind all Arab countries", they had decided to form a league of the independent Arab states. On this basis, on March 22, 1945, the seven states signed the Pact of the Arab League at Cairo. The Pact established a council, six permanent committees, a permanent secretariat and provided for the pacific settlement of disputes, a loose collective security system and general cooperation in the economic, social, and cultural spheres. The League was further reinforced on June 17, 1950 when the Arab states concluded a Treaty of Joint Defence and Economic Cooperation based on the pattern of the NATO and providing for an automatic collective system, a Joint Defence Council consisting of the Foreign and Defence Ministers, a permanent Military Commission consisting of the representatives of the general staff, an Economic Council of Ministers of Economic Affairs and further providing for fulfilment of obligations arising out of the U. N. Charter. Under Article X of the Treaty the signatories undertook "to conclude no international agreements which may be contradictory to the provisions of this treaty".

It should be noted that the sole objective of the Arab League is external defence, and it is not motivated by any overriding desire to federate. Distrust between Egypt and lesser members has prevailed from the beginning. Iraq for years did not pay its dues and Jordan has always divided the League; Saudi Arabia has been, by and large, indifferent, and the Lebanon, with its large christian population, is ill at large in the League. The positive forces behind it seemed to have been a desire of the recently liberated Arab nations to prevent the return of the erstwhile masters, and the determination to prevent the development of a Jewish state in Palestine. (Ironically the British Government supported the creation of the League in the hope of uniting the now independent Arab states behind a generally pro-British policy in the vital Middle East). The negative Arab attitude is fully reflected in the Arab League organization. Decisions are made by the Council on which each member is represented by one instructed delegate with one vote. Collective action is possible only by a unanimous vote which is not easy. In fact, on the crucial question of collective measures against Israel unanimity could not be obtained. But a majority vote binds merely the states which supported the given resolution. The Council is empowered to "impose pacific settlement awards in disputes between League members who are pledged not to resort to force against each other and to settle all their intra-

League quarrels peacefully". But such compulsory pacific settlement is permitted only in disputes not involving the "independence, sovereignty or territorial integrity" of a member.

With this character and such limitations it is, therefore, hardly surprising that the League's record of common determination and action is rather poor. In short, during the last 13 years of its existence, the Arab League has to its credit the liberation of the Lebanon, a positive role in the solution of the Anglo-Egyptian conflict resulting in the Anglo-Egyptian Agreements in July 1954, and an active part in the settlement of the Anglo-Yemeni dispute resulting in the abandonment by Britain of the proposed federation of the different Shaikhdoms and the Protectorates. The League, however, received a serious set-back on the question of Palestine. Its efforts to stop the Jewish immigration to Palestine, its policy of boycotting the Zionist goods and preventing the development of trade between the Arabs and the Jews, its attempt to bring Palestine into its fold as a full member, its endeavour to create a unified front among the various Arab parties in Palestine and establishing an Arab Higher Executive, its plan of a provisional government of Palestine and its brave fight against the Jews in the United Nations, and its resistance to the United Nations partition plan, could not prevent the establishment of the state of Israel in 1948. On November 29, 1947 the General Assembly voted for the partition of Palestine and same day Britain announced that its mandate in Palestine would terminate on May 15, 1948. In December, open fighting began between Arabs and the Jews and within a few weeks the League had formed a loose Arab Liberation Army to fight the Jews. Mutual differences among the League members, however, demoralised the League army which had to beat a retreat and on May 11, 1949 Israel was duly admitted to the United Nations.

The policy of boycott, nevertheless, continued and the attempt to isolate Israel went on and the League prohibited its members from participating in all international conferences where Israel was present. But a more successful role was played by the Arab League on the questions of Libya which was finally declared independent on December 24, 1951 and was admitted as the eighth member of the Arab League on March 8, 1953. On the question of Morocco, Algeria and Tunis the Arab League encouraged the creation of the "Maghrib Bureau" in Cairo in which the African states were represented by the various liberation movements-in-exile. On the international level the League's attempt was directed through pressure on France to liberate these colonies, pressure on other world governments to bring about an early settlement, and reference of these questions to the United Nations.

Thus seen, the League, though frequently appearing on the point of disintegration, has continued to serve as an agency for calling world-wide attention to the growth of Arab nationalism. Throughout 1954-55 the real nature of the Arab League was thoroughly exposed. "Too loose in organization, too divided by political and personal rivalries and too much of a hostile coalition against Israel, it has failed to become a positive force for peace and stability" in the region. It has failed to strike a balance between Arab nationalism, the fact of the existence of Israel, the Western need of defence organization and the Russian drive in the region. Different states tend to run apart and common aim is usually missed. The Anglo-French support to Israel's aggression in Egypt in October 1956 reactivised the League to fresh efforts and stimulated increased activities. The chiefs of state of the Lebanon, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Syria, and the representatives of the chiefs of state of Yemen, Egypt, the Sudan and Libya met at the request of the President of Lebanon at Beirut on November 13-15, 1956 in order to evolve a common policy with respect to the West, the Soviet bloc, and Israel. Syria was reported to have pressed severance of diplomatic relations with France and the U. K. and declaration of friendship with the Soviet Union. On the other hand, Saudi Arabia, Iraq and the Lebanon favoured preventing further Soviet penetration in the Middle East. Another point of controversy was the question of aid for Jordan. The members of the League were increasingly concerned with the termination of the Anglo-Jordanian alliance of 1948. On November 27, the Jordanian government announced that it would seek to end this alliance, to arrange for the evacuation of the U. K. forces, and to acquire financial aid from Egypt, Syria and Saudi Arabia in place of the annual U. K. subsidy of $ 33,600,000. On January 19, 1957, the chiefs of state of Syria, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan signed in Cairo a ten-year agreement to supply Jordan with money and arms equivalent to almost $ 36,000,000 annually to replace the U. K. subsidy. The Arab heads also rejected the Eisenhower Doctrine, the vacuum theory, "decided that Arab nationalism was the sole basis on which Arab policy could be formulated", and agreed to resist any attempt to impair Egypt's sovereignty in the Suez Canal, to support Yemen in her resistance against aggression and to support the Algerian people. Jordan and Egypt, however, fell apart because of the pro-western attitude of the former. Nevertheless, both Jordan and Saudi Arabia renewed pledges of loyalty to the military and diplomatic agreements entered into with Egypt and Syria.

Another meeting of the Arab heads was held on February 25, 1957 and considered the views of King Saud who had returned from Washington. King Saud tried, here, to re-interpret

the American attitudes and policies towards the region and the conferences agreed not to issue any declaration of approval or disapproval of the Eisenhower Doctrine at this stage. Certain friction was, however, obvious over the fact that King Saud had agreed to accept United States military aid and to extend the Dhahran air-base agreement. On the other hand, Syria was aggrieved over King Saud's conduct and President Nasser's having agreed to yield temporary military and civilian rule of the Ghaza strip to the U. N. Emergency Force. Syria also resented pressure from Iraq, Turkey and the Lebanon against its government and also complained about Jordan's alleged anti-communist statements and its favourable comments on the Eisenhower Doctrine. At the end of the Conference, however, a 6-point communique was issued expressing agreements on some national problems.

On March 18, the Arab leaders met again in Cairo to discuss the Eisenhower Doctrine. Same day the Council of the Arab League also met to prepare and to send a mission to Yemen to inspect border conditions and the effects of the British aggression on southern Yemen villages. On the question of Algeria also a measure of agreement was reached. Indeed, in order to exercise pressure on France on the Algerian issue, the Arab League members had decided on February 4 to ban Air France from using their facilities or flying over their territory. On May 24, 11 Arab Governments—the 9 members of the Arab League plus Morocco and Tunisia—asked the United States to stop aid to France on the plea that this was being used for suppression of freedom in Algeria. On June 28, however, the United States turned down this request.

In the sphere of economic, social and cultural activities, during the 13 years of its life, the League passed several resolutions on problems of currency, preferential trade system among the Arab states, integration of combinations, civil aviation and has collaborated with the United Nations in several seminars intended to bring about social cooperation with a view to securing the objectives of social welfare. Several agreements on economic cooperation were reached on September 7, 1953. On April 9, an Arab Postal Union and a tele-communication union was established by the League. In the cultural sphere, the achievements of the League include a cultural treaty of November 27, 1945, the creation of a cultural committee meeting once a year in different Arab countries, a permanent bureau meeting once a month, and a cultural department for the over-all cultural cooperation. Several cultural conferences, in an effort to establish a common minimum of national cultures, have been convened. In 1950 an Institute for the Revival of Arabic Manuscript and in 1953 an Institute of Higher Arab Studies

were established. More important has been the activity of the League in the legislative and judicial sphere. It maintains a full legal department which has encouraged the development of a sort of an inter-Arab private international law. On October 27, 1949 an agreement on the nationality of citizens of Arab states residing abroad, and three general agreements on October 14, 1952 are among the more important achievements of the Arab League.

On the economic front, a great step forward was recently taken when the Arab League Economic Council met (May 22-24, 1957). The Council formulated plans for group black-listing of foreign concerns selling vehicles, goods and services to Israel and set up a unified boycott system to control imports and exports between Arab states and others so as to prevent the Arab goods from reaching Israel. The Council approved a proposal from Saudi Arabia that an all-Arab company be formed to build a vast network of pipe lines, running from the oilfields of the Middle East to Arab ports on the Mediterranean, the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf. It also agread to build up an Arab tanker fleet, to organize exclusively Arab projects for developing oil production, and to build up Arab refineries that would cut the amount of crude oil being shipped out and resold to the Arabs by major oil companies. It was also reported that Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Syria and Yemen had signed an agreement setting up an Arab Financial Organization with a capital of $ 56 million for Arab economic development and that other Arab League members and Arab countries would also join it.

We have noted that the existing mutual differences among the Arab states, the rigour of the cold war, and the conflicting interests among the so-called Northern Tier States and the Southern Tier States, led to a serious crisis for the Arab League in 1954-55. On April 2, 1954 Pakistan and Turkey had signed an Argeement for Friendly Co-operation, as a sequel to the U. S.-Pak Military Assistance Agreement in 1953. This was followed by the Anglo-Egyptian Agreement on October 19, 1954. This later event led Iraq away from the Arab League and put her on a search for a greater measure of security than that afforded either by the Arab League or by a policy of neutrality. In fact resistance to the idea of collective security under Western auspices had been as strong in Iraq as elsewhere as the cold war progressed. Two important opposition parties, the Popular Front and the National Democratic Party, stood for neutrality but they were suppressed and Nuri el-Said was able to set up a one-man Government. It required an arbitrary decision by a few men at the top in Iraqi affairs to override popular neutralist sentiment and join security arrangement with the like-minded governments. On February 24, 1955 Iraq, therefore, in the teeth of

opposition of other members of the League, signed with Turkey a Defence Pact at Baghdad. To the Baghdad Pact now we turn.

THE BAGHDAD PACT (NORTHERN TIER DEFENCE)

The Pact of Mutual Co-operation signed between Iraq and Turkey on February 24, 1955 providing that the signatories would co-operate for their security and defence embodied the concept of Northern Tier Defence. The Pact was declared to be open for accession to any member state of the Arab League or any other state actively concerned with the security and peace of this region. It was under this clause that Britain joined the Baghdad Pact in April 1955, Pakistan in July and Iran in November. In fact, since the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty, the United States started looking for a Middle Eastern bloc on the NATO pattern. In October, 1951 Britain, U.S.A., France and Turkey had discussed the possibility of a Middle East Command on the basis that Britain would make a token transfer of her military base in the Suez area to Egypt whereupon that base would be used by the troops of America, Britain and Turkey. The scheme failed. In August, 1952 the project of a Middle East Defence Organisation was considered on the basis of a military alliance between Turkey and the Arab countries without the direct participation of the U.S.A. This scheme also failed.

It was after this setback that the focus of American interest in the Middle East shifted from the Arab dominated West to the Turko-Pakistani dominated East. Key role, therefore, came to be assigned to Pakistan. Military assistance was given to her and a Turko-Pakistan Agreement for Friendly Co-operation was signed with the active encouragement of the U.S.A. on April 2, 1954. It was hoped that other states of the Middle East would, sooner or later, join it and gradually Britain and America would also associate themselves. It was at this stage that the concept of the Northern Tier consisting of Turkey, Iraq and Iran was built up by the United States in the hope thas these countries would join the bloc initiated by the Turko-Pak alliance. Thus it was the beginning of active trouble in the Middle East, and the starting point of the sharp divisions in the Arab League. During the closing months of 1954 Nuri el-Said of Iraq held discussions with Nasser in Cairo and with the Turkish leaders in Istanbul on the possibility of a collective defence system for the Middle East. He did not receive any encouragement in Cairo but met a favourable response in Ankara. In was in this background that the Pact of Mutual Co-operation between Iraq and Turkey was concluded at Baghdad.

The Baghdad Pact provided for co-operation among the signatories in the sphere of security and defence; non-interference and peaceful settlement of disputes; and for certain measures

to be taken by the signatories for the implementation of the objectives of security. The Pact was open to other states and was to continue for five years. It was provided under Article VI that a Permanent Council at ministerial level will be set up to function within the framework of the purposes of this Pact when at least four powers become parties to the Pact. "The reactions to the Baghdad Pact were interesting. For one thing, it was regarded as a betrayal of the cause of independence, and affront to the Arab League, and particularly as a challenge to Egypt's leadership in Arab affairs. Iraq's action represented a retreat from the frequently proclaimed Arab goal of an all-Arab security system. The reaction in Cairo was most violent, for the 'Iraqi defection undercut its whole defence premise and at the same time indicated a shift in emphasis in Middle East defence from Suez to the Persian Gulf region'. The Baghdad Pact, therefore, became the rallying point of the West and gradually Britain and the United States associated themselves with its arrangements. Eventually in Egypt, Syria and Saudi Arabia the neutralist attitude became more firm and more pronounced and their relations with the Soviet Union became closer".

On April 4, 1955, Britain and Iraq concluded a Special Agreement under which Britain adhered to the Baghdad Pact and the signatories undertook to co-operate in the sphere of planning and combined training of Iraq's armed forces for the defence of Iraq. Britain pledged to help Iraq in creating and maintaining an effective Iraqi air force, efficient air-fields and an efficient system of warning against air attacks. Provision was made for British technical personnel to be made available to Iraq. Under Article VIII it was provided that "in the event of an armed attack against Iraq or threat of an armed attack which, in the opinion of the two Contracting Governments, endangers the security of Iraq, the Government of the United Kingdom at the request of the Government of Iraq shall make available assistance, including if necessary armed forces, to help to defend Iraq. The Government of Iraq shall provide all facilities and assistance to enable such aid to be rapid and effective". Same day Iraq and Britain exchanged two notes and two memorandums in which detailed provisions for the implementation of the Special Agreements were made. In July, 1955 Pakistan also acceded to the Baghdad Pact.

With the accession of Pakistan Article VI of the Turko-Iraqi Pact came into operation and a Council at ministerial level was, therefore, established. The first meeting of the Council was held at Baghdad on November 21-22, 1955. In this meeting the United States had been invited and was represented by the American ambassador in Baghdad. It was decided to

establish a Military Committee of the Council where the American service representatives also participated. Thus, from the earliest, permanent political and military liaison had been established between the Baghdad Pact Council and the United States. This meeting also decided to appoint an Economic Committee to develop and strengthen the economic resources of the region. Britain "offered to assist Baghdad Pact countries in the application of atomic techniques with special reference to local and regional problems". The Council directed its Economic Committee to consider this offer. This Committee met in Baghdad on January 10-11, 1956 and was also attended by American observers. It was agreed that an atomic energy training centre should be established at Baghdad for the benefit of all participating states, and that special studies of trade relations, communications, agriculture and joint development projects should be made.

The second meeting of the Ministerial Council was held at Teheran in April, 1956. It adopted the Report of the Economic Committee and set up a Working Party in order to consider "means whereby regional economic projects of interests to two or more members could be studied and implemented through economic and technical assistance". The American delegate to the Economic Committee reaffirmed his country's determination "to continue its bilateral technical and economic assistance to Pact members" and indicated that the United States would further assist joint projects undertaken by member states. It was emphasised that the basic aims of international communism had not changed and that "efforts to strengthen the defensive capacity of the Pact powers could not be relaxed". In November Iran joined the Pact and on November 29, the State Department announced that the United States had guaranteed the territorial integrity of the Baghdad Pact countries.

The third meeting of the Ministerial Council was scheduled to be held in Karachi in January, 1957 in which the United States was expected to take a full part and virtually become a member of the Pact. But in July, 1956 the Suez crisis suddenly developed and it seemed to have had very wide and far reaching repercussions. Hostile demonstrations took place in Karachi, Baghad and elsewhere and for sometime it appeared that Iraq was likely to condemn the Pact. Indeed the Pact Council met in Teheran on November 5-8, without the British representative attending. It condemned the Israeli aggression, requested Britain and France to stop hostilities and respect Egypt's sovereignty and integrity, and welcomed the U. N. General Assembly's resolution contemplating the establishment of an international police force. On November 9, Iraq declared that it would boycott any Baghdad Pact Council meetings attended by the United Kingdom.

There was also some tension between Turkey and the rest. Nevertheless, Pakistan attempted to mediate between Turkey and Iraq "to prevent either from undermining the pact by leaving it". Further discussions between the chiefs of state of Iraq, Turkey and Pakistan and the Foreign Minister of Iran, therefore, continued in Baghdad on November 18-23. In the statement published after the end of the meeting the emphasis was on subversion in the Middle East and on the measures to meet this threat. The most important development, however, was the declaration made by the Iraq Foreign Minister that Iraq would continue to adhere to the Baghdad Pact if the United States entered it. This was repeated by the Iraqi premier on November 27, when he said that "entry of the U. S. into the Pact would have a calming and stabilizing effect and might even have the effect of bringing the Arab countries in". He mentioned Lebanon and Saudi Arabia in this connection. On November 29, the United States announced that "it would view with the utmost gravity any threat to the territories or to the independence of members of the Baghdad Pact". On December 7, the Foreign Minister of Pakistan stated that "there was no reason for exclusion of the U. K. from the next meeting of the Council of the Baghdad Pact since it was executing the will of the U. N. with respect to Suez". He expressed the hope that the United States would soon join the Pact.

On January 19-20, 1957 the four Middle East members of the Baghdad Pact met at Ankara. On January 21, a communique was issed in which satisfaction was expressed at the U. N. actions with respect to the Suez crisis. Support was given to the Eisenhower Doctrine and the members urged the United States to give greater support to the Baghdad Pact. It was agreed that the U. K. should be invited to participate in the next meeting of the Council of the Pact. Thus the strains on the Pact caused by the Suez crisis, though sharp, were soon got over and reconciliation between Britain and the Arab members on the understanding that the U. S. would be brought in, was part of the price Britain had to pay for the Suez gamble.

In March 1957, King Faisal of Iraq opened the Baghdad nuclear research centre in Baghdad. The United States offered to join the Military Committee of the Baghdad Pact, but made it clear that it would not become a full member of the Pact. Earlier on January 21, the four Middle Eastern members of the Pact, meeting in Ankara, had announced their support of the Eisenhower Doctrine which we will shortly survey. In April, the United States decided to provide $ 12,500,000 to the Baghdad Pact nations for regional road, rail and tele-communications projects. On May 10, James P. Richards, the special ambassador of the United States to the Middle East announced that he

had committed about $ 120 millions during this tour for the help of the region. Thus gradually the United States, through the Eisenhower Doctrine, adhered to the Baghdad Pact. On May 16, the U. S. A. and Britain pledged financial aid to the Baghdad Pact countries at the meetings of the Economic Committee of the Pact in Karachi. The United States pledged $ 12,570,000 of Eisenhower Doctrine Funds; Britain pledged $ 2 million; and Pakistan contributed Rs. 200,000 for technical assistance projects. On May 23, the Baghdad Pact nations began secret discussion on communist subversion in the Middle East and the ways to combat it. The United States participated in the discussions. By the end of May, Awni Khalidi, Secretary-General of the Baghdad Pact, could declare that the organization "graduated from youth to manhood" during the Suez crisis and that the main factor keeping the four Muslim members together was the keen awareness of communist subversion and the threat of international communism. Thus the background of the third meeting of the Baghdad Pact Council was now fully prepared.

The Karachi meeting of the Baghdad Pact Council was held on June 3, 1957, the first since the Suez crisis to be attended by Britain. In this meeting the United States joined the Military Committee of the Baghdad Pact. Referring to the American participation in this committee, Loy Henderson, the leader of the American delegation, said that it "is a further indication of our continuing strong support for the Baghdad Pact and of our determination to assist the Baghdad Pact states to meet any threat of communist aggression against them". The Military Committee discussed a joint command for the pact area and prepared a report which was submitted to the Ministerial Council on June 5. The British Foreign Secretary announced in the meeting that Britain would contribute upto £500,900 toward building the infra-structure of the five-nation Baghdad Pact. The Pakistan Prime Minister expressed the hope that very soon America would be a full member of the Pact and "will be able to bring to bear on the efficacy of this alliance the full weight of their majestic power and unrivalled influence". He also confirmed the Eisenhower Doctrine for the Middle East. Thus by June, 1957 the United States had joined all the three committees of the Pact—Economic, Counter-subversion, and Military.

Another meeting of the Baghdad Pact Council was held on January 27, 1958 at Ankara amidst reportedly "serious differences" among its members over the nature of military co-operation, and acceptance of United States missiles bases on their territories. One of the most tricky issues facing the Council was the proposal to create a joint command of armies of the pact countries and assignment of defence responsibilities. Iran was unwilling to have her nominee as Commander-in-Chief of the joint command for

fear of strain on her relations with Russia, while the U. S. A. was not in favour of the post going either to Turkey, Iraq or Pakistan in view of its political repercussions in West Asia and the Indian sub-continent. There was also some bitterness on American attitude towards the neutralist countries like India. The Pakistan Prime Minister declared that "of all the threats to which the Baghdad Pact area is subjected the most invidious is from the so-called neutralists. The part which they are playing in supporting subversion and in providing pseudo-moral basis for it constitutes a serious threat. The people of the Baghdad Pact countries are quite bewildered when they find that some of these so-called neutralists are recipients of large-scale aid not only from communist countries but also from Western countries whose policies they are constantly attacking". The Kashmir issue was raised by Nuri-es-Said despite earlier protest of India, and the exercise of veto power in the Security Council by the Soviet Union was, in this context, attacked. The Council called in U. N. members to accept the concept of the U. N. Emergency Force as an instrument for use in areas of disturbance. It urged the cooperation between the pact and other free world regional collective security organizations and announced that a combined staff training exercise would be held soon by the newly established military planning staff.

A few conclusions may now be drawn. Just as the SEATO had brought about a rift between the United States and India, between India and Pakistan, and between the East and the West, similarly the Baghdad Pact also had added to the East-West tension, widened the rift between India and Pakistan and between the Northern Tier group of countries and the Southern Tier group. Addressing the open session of the 61st session of the Congress, Nehru said: "The Baghdad Pact concerns us more closely and affects us. If on our left and on our right armies begin to mobilise or there is stock of military pacts, then we cannot close our eyes to it or remain silent over it. . . . This Baghdad Pact without doubt affects India's security . . . and has greater relation to us than the SEATO Pact. Its effect on India will be more, if not today then tomorrow and the day after. In such a situation we have to express our opinion on these pacts . . . because these pacts increase our burdens. We have to become more alert and make certain arrangements for our security". Thus the Baghdad Pact, like the SEATO, has not added to the security or the confidence of the Middle East and South East Asia. Both have created panic and fear, both are significant milestones in the development of the cold war, both have encouraged a race for armaments, both run contrary to the U. N. principles and both contradict the premises of world peace.

It is indeed doubtful if the professed objectives of the Baghdad Pact have been actually realized. It is obvious that there is no

unity of objectives amongst the members and the purposes that the Asian members have in mind are different from the aims with which Britain sponsored the alliance and which prompted the United States to associate itself with the Pact. The main aim of the Western Powers was to secure control over the oil-rich Middle East and to secure bases in the name of fighting international communism. In the Ankara meeting (January, 1958) Pakistan's Prime Minister frankly confessed that communism posed no real threat to his country and that the real threat was from the neutralists. The Iraq delegate also told the Council that communism was no problem in the Middle East but that the real problem was Israel. Thus, though the professed objective of the Western sponsors of the Baghdad Pact is to combat international communism, the Asian partners have been using the alliance only to buttress their position *vis-a-vis* other non-communist Asian countries. If unity of the Arab Powers was one of the aims of the Pact, it is clear that the Pact has failed, for, those Arab countries which are determined to follow an independent policy tend to regard the Pact as a move to curb their freedom. If the objective of the Pact was to keep away the Soviet Union from the Middle East, the Pact has been a total failure. The Western pressure on independent states in the Middle East has driven them closer to the Soviet Union. It has aggravated Arab-Israeli tensions, as well as Indo-Pakistani relations.

THE EISENHOWER DOCTRINE

If the Suez crisis shook the foundations of the Baghdad Pact in the initial phase, it also exposed the dubious role of the United States in the confused politics of the Middle East. In a sense, the American prestige rose as a result of American criticism of the Anglo-French invasion on Egypt, and the Administration sought fully to exploit the gains. On this showing, the Eisenhower Doctrine resulted from a crisis in which the United States acted through the United Nations against two of its allies, Britain and France, and momentarily with the Soviet Union to compel the two to cease fire and withdraw from Suez. On the other hand, the cracking Baghdad Pact had to be bolstered up. It could easily be out-flanked from the south through Syria, and, possibly Jordan and Egypt. It was, therefore, vital to isolate Egypt from countries which seemed to work together with her for Arab unity and for an independent and neutral policy. The Doctrine was announced specifically as falling within the U. N. Charter, and it is regarded as designed to conciliate the Arab States rather than Britain and France in the interest of security of the Middle East. The Suez crisis was regarded as an exhibition of militant nationalism which had to be curbed. The strategic and economic importance of the area which was partly at the back of the Truman

Doctrine had to be taken into account afresh. In 1956, the U.S.A, controlled more than 60% of the oil produced in the Middle East (as against 12% in 1939), while the British share had dropped to 30% (as against 80% in 1939). The importance of this oil is relevant not only in the context of the Middle Eastern politics but also with reference to the utter dependence of Western Europe on it. The capital invested in the oil industry had to be protected. At one time Britain and France were a stabilizing factor in the region, and now that even the vestiges of influence of these powers have been ejected, the *vacuum* must be filled if Russian power is to be kept in check. The internal nationalist movements, the American reasoning was, are extremists and irresponsible and are likely to fall, indeed in many cases have already fallen, in the hands of subversive international communism. The Syrian situation was viewed with special concern and the Soviet armaments shipment to that country was causing deep anxiety. The existing military bases in the region, therefore, had to be strengthened and the formation of special units equipped with atomic weapons had to be considered. In achieving this task, the United States had a special responsibility. Hitherto, the U.S. Government had followed no consistent policy. The time had now come to act.

This was the background in which Eisenhower, in a special message to the Congress on January 5, 1957, enunciated what has been called the Eisenhower Doctrine. He demanded of the Congress the authority to use the armed forces of the United States in the Middle East at any moment he would consider it necessary without asking for the consent of the Congress, as provided in the American Constitution. The President, thus, sought the authority to use the U. S. armed forces against communist or communist-dominated aggression in the Middle East and emphasised that he would use this authority only (*a*) if U. S. troops were requested by the nation or nations under attack, (*b*) in "hour-by-hour" contact with the Congress, (*c*) in keeping with the treaty obligations of the United States, and the Charter and recommendations of the United Nations. Four days later, he delivered his message on the State of the Union. Reminding the Congress of "the grave concern of your Government over the threat of Soviet aggression in the Middle East", he said, "I say again that this matter is of vital and immediate importance to the nation's and the free world's security and peace. By our proposed programmes in the Middle East, we hope to assist in establishing a climate in which constructive and long-term solutions to basic problems of the area may be sought". The Eisenhower Doctrine immediately led to a storm of protest from a large number of countries, particularly Russia, India, China, Egypt and Syria. On January 15, the *Tass* issued a statement condemning it in an unqualified manner.

Mr. Nehru in a forthright attack called it "a reversion to colonialism". Even in some circles in the United States it was not given a very cordial reception. In Syria it was viewed as an effort "to subdue the powerful movement of the Arab peoples which has shaken Anglo-French imperialism and exposed before the world public the aggressive intentions of Israel".

Nevertheless, on March 9, 1957 the American Congress adopted a resolution approving of the Eisenhower Doctrine. Emphasis was laid on the fact that the United States considers the Middle East an area of vital importance to its national interests. A sum of $ 200 million was sanctioned for military and economic aid to the countries of that region where the President was authorized to undertake military assistance programmes and to use, should he think it necessary, the armed forces of the United States for defence against aggression. In this, the Eisenhower Doctrine was not merely a reiteration of old policies but contained new postulates. While the Truman Doctrine specified the countries to which military and economic aid would be given, the Eisenhower Doctrine introduces the U. S. armed forces, not into particular countries, but into the Middle East as a whole—a region whose boundaries have not been defined—and at any time whenever in the judgment of the President the American interests are threatened. In approving of Eisenhower's message, therefore, the Congress gave him permission to wage war without indicating either the time or the place. Secondly, it amounts to American adherence to the Baghdad Pact and seeks to bypass the United Nations, which in the phrase of Eisenhower, "cannot be a wholly dependable protector of freedom" in the Middle East. It attempts to divide aggression into two types—"communist aggression" and "non-communist aggression"—and seeks to apply two different standards to them. It gives a ready lever to the U. S. A. with which to deal any situation in the region on their own terms and with weapons of their own choice. The despatch of American troops would presumably take place only if requested by a Middle Eastern country faced with an external "communist danger". But it is not difficult to see that subservient, unpopular and unrepresentative governments, ready to serve as pliant tools of foreign pay masters, might invent a "communist danger" and be persuaded to request the U. S. Government to help them. It is in this sense that the Eisenhower Doctrine attempts to put back the wheels of progress, to repel the liberation struggle of the backward peoples, to help the American monopolies in retaining control of the raw materials of the region, and to substitute American influence for the Anglo-French influence. In short, it is the expression of a new policy which, no matter how it is

sugar-coated, puts the United States in the Middle East on a war basis.

The first demonstration of the application of the Eisenhower Doctrine came in April 1957 when Jordan went through a crisis as a result of differences of opinion between King Hussain and his Prime Minister, Suleiman Nabulsi. The crisis came when both clashed over Jordan's attitude towards the mission of Mr. James P. Richards, the U. S. Presidential Envoy, visiting West Asian countries. While the King would like Mr. Richards to come over to Jordan for discussion and would like his country to agree to U. S. aid, the Premier stood violently opposed to this idea. This resulted in the dismissal of Nabulsi. Later, the King asked several politicians to form a new cabinet and, at last, Dr. Hussain Fakhri Khalidi, a Palestine refugee, succeeded in forming a government. Simultaneously the King dismissed his army chief of staff, Major General Abu Nawar, and deported him to Syria. Throughout the crisis the United States sixth fleet in the Eastern Mediterranean gave a successful show of force which demonstrated that the United States had assumed the principal military burden in the Middle East and that its defence line now lay along the Caucasus and Elburz and Zagros ranges. In October-November, tension developed again in Jordan. It was reported that the Jordan Government was carrying on negotiations with Israel, at the instance of the U. S. A., in order to settle the question of refugees from Palestine. It was suggested that the Jordanian authorities had agreed to retain thousands of refugees from Palestine in the southern regions of the country, and to transfer to Israel a number of frontier districts. These reports led to an outburst of popular indignation in Jordan. On November 12, the State Department announced that the United States would support King Hussain and a squadron of the sixth U. S. Fleet entered Beyrouth soon after. The American aid to Jordan was increased from $ 7 million to $ 31·2 million a year and large deliveries of arms were made.

In July-August, 1957 trouble also developed in Oman, a desert territory in south-east Arabia. The revolt which was led by the Imam (spiritual head) was against the suzerainty of the Sultan of Muscat, one of the British Protectorates on the Persian Gulf. While the Imam asserted that Oman was independent of the Sultan of Muscat under a treaty signed some years ago, the latter claimed that the territory at no time enjoyed an independent status. The revolt, however, soon assumed a serious turn and the forces of the Sultan of Muscat no longer being in a position to subdue, Britain intervened. British planes had to be brought in on the plea that the Sultan of Muscat who was a friend of Britain had called for help to suppress an uprising in his territory. This intervention, fully sheltered by the Eisenhower Doctrine,

was condemned by the Arab countries as well as by Russia, and eleven Arab nations sent a complaint to the Security Council to take notice of "British aggression in an Arab territory". The Council, however, could not take up the complaint as the seven affirmative votes needed for the inclusion of the complaint on the agenda were not forthcoming. In this case, under the auspices of the Eisenhower Doctrine, a subordinate partner of the U.S.A. was allowed to take the law in its own hands.

But it was in the case of Syria that the Eisenhower Doctrine was put to an acid test. Just as Richard's tour was followed by the notorious April coup in Jordan, after Henderson's "informative mission" came the "non-informative" offensive of pressure on Syria by her Arab neighbours—Iraq, Jordan and Saudi Arabia. But when a truce in Syrian-Arab relations was established at the Damascus Conference attended by Syria, Arabia and Iraq, threatening concentrations of Turkish troops appeared on the scene. In fact Syrian relations with the Western powers started deteriorating soon after she broke off diplomatic relations with Britain on the Suez Canal issue and was reported to have purchased arms from Russia. She had reacted violently against the Eisenhower Doctrine and her relations with Jordan since the coup of April 1957 were very much strained. This drove the West to conclude that Syria had joined the Russian bloc. In July-August, 1957 the American Embassy in Damascus got involved in the rumours that the U.S.A. was plotting to overthrow the Syrian regime with the help of some Syrian military officers and an ex-dictator of Syria. This was followed by dismissal of certain Syrian military officers. Meanwhile the U. S. A. continued to supply more and more arms to Lebanon, Jordan and Turkey. On September 10, 1957, Bulganin, the Soviet Prime Minister, sent a message to Mr. Adnan Mendres in which the former alleged that "the recent trip of American envoy Henderson to the Middle East was obviously brought about by a desire to organize military intervention from without in Syria's internal affairs", and that "in this connection a certain role is being assigned to Turkey". He expressed his concern at "the report about Turkish troops concentrations on Syria's borders as well as about the shipment of American arms to Turkey to effect an attack against Syria". He warned that Russia could not ignore events so close at hand and that an armed conflict over Syria "would in no manner be limited to that area alone". The Turkish Government replied that these were "normal manoeuvres" having no aggressive intent whatsoever. Meanwhile, Syria requested the United Nations General Assembly to hold a debate on "threats to her peace and security" and to establish a U. N. Committee to investigate these threats. In Washington, Dulles announced that the U. S. A. must be on guard against the possibility of an attack by Syria and Russia

against Turkey. Both the Soviet Union and the U.S.A. warned each other that if Syria or Turkey respectively was attacked, it would mean a wide clash and it seemed that the world was on the brink of war. There were reports of troop movements and heads of States in the Middle East held hurried consultations to prevent the catastrophe. The force of public opinion eventually succeeded in averting a shooting war. Anxious discussions took place in the United Nations and, though the U. N. could not do much about the problem, the over-all result was easing of the tension for the time being.

Several conclusions follow from the operation of the Eisenhower Doctrine. In the *first* place, instead of serving as a factor of stability in a turbulent region, it has created more tensions and promoted the chances of conflagrations. Instead of providing a bulwark against communism and halting the Soviet influence, it has created a more favourable climate for both. *Secondly*, it implies that no appreciable degree of stability in the Middle East can be established unless the West takes into account the basic long term forces which influence events in that region and which dominate all Arab political thinking. These forces are: (*a*) Arab Nationalism, (*b*) Arab hostility towards Israel, (*c*) the social and economic maladies of the people, (*d*) the emotional unity of the Arab masses, and (*e*) the hold of President Nasser upon the street mobs of the Arab countries. The type of thinking which produced the Eisenhower Doctrine is, therefore, inherently faulty. Arab nationalism and the unity of the Arab world in the struggle for independence, for instance, was the force that wrecked American provocation against Syria. Arab hostility to Israel becomes the rallying point of all the Middle Eastern States as is amply demonstrated by the recent events in Jordan and Syria. The social and economic backwardness of the area attracts communist theories and requires a more positive policy Any attempt to ignore or belittle the role of Nasser or of Egypt in the region will remain still-born. A doctrine which attempts to isolate Egypt is bound to rouse suspicions and, is therefore, likely to fail. *Thirdly*, the short period during which the Eisenhower Doctrine has been applied also illustrates the inherent limitations of a predominantly military programme in a backward area. It, therefore, suggests that in the modern world it is not possible to apply a sort of a Monroe Doctrine in respect of areas which are determined to transform their economy and social structure, and where competitive ideological and economic forces provide alternative ways of life and that unless the concept of regional security evolves from below, it is likely to remain a paper scheme only. *Finally*, it underlines the importance of the United Nations and implies that it is dangerous for any great power to bypass the United Nations and arrogate to itself the task of policing of a particular area

regarded by that Great Power's policy framers as strategically important and economically vital. It was on this hard rock that the American scheme of the proposed Mediterranean Pact including Spain, France, Italy, Morocco, Tunisia, Algeria, the Sudan and Libya and on the pattern of the Baghdad Pact failed. And it is for this reason that the Eisenhower Doctrine was regarded as the American adherence to the Baghdad Pact in disguise. Indeed, when on March 22, 1957 the United States offered to join the Military Committee of the Baghdad Pact, the Middle East press criticized it as indicative of American intent to pursue Britain's traditional policy.

THE SOUTHERN TIER DEFENCE

Meanwhile, the states in the Southern Tier Group were coming closer and in October, 1955 defence agreements were concluded between Egypt and Syria and Egypt and Saudi Arabia. On April 21, 1956 the President of Egypt and the Kings of Arabia and Yemen met in a conference at Jeddah (southern Saudi Arabia) and exchanged views on matters of common defence and security and expansion of economic co-operation among their countries. The conference resulted in a tri-partite Arab Defence Pact in conformity with the principles of the Arab League and the U.N. Charter. The Pact provided for pacific settlement of international disputes and for mutual consultations whenever the territorial integrity and independence of any one of the three parties is threatened. In the event of a threat of a war or in emergency, the parties are to take the necessary preventive measures of defence. Article II of the Pact provides that any armed attack against one of the parties will be regarded as an attack against all and that the other two will immediately come to the assistance of the victim of aggression with all the means at their command. The Pact provides for the establishment of a Joint Command, a combined Military Council and a Supreme Council consisting of the three Foreign and Defence Ministers of the signatories. The Joint Command includes a Supreme Commander, a group of staff officers and a unit entrusted with administrative and guard functions, and consists of the military units of the three countries. Thus by the end of the year 1956 Egypt, Syria, Saudi Arbia and Yemen had united themselves in a common defence system as opposed to the Western sponsored Baghdad Pact.

On January 5, 1957, Eisenhower proclaimed his doctrine. Next day, the U. S. officials declared that the area covered by the Eisenhower Doctrine might be extended to include Morocco, Tunisia and Afghanistan. These developments had sharp reactions in Russia and among the Southern Tier Defence group, particularly in Egypt and Syria. On January 9, for instance, the

Egyptian newspapers criticised this Doctrine as "one-legged" and "one-eyed". On January 13, Khrushchev declared that the Eisenhower Doctrine was doomed to failure against the "granite rock" of the U.S.S.R. On January 18, China and the Soviet Union jointly condemned it. Same day, President Nasser of Egypt, King Hussain of Jordan, King Saudi of Arabia and Premier Asali of Syria met in Cairo to consider the Eisenhower Doctrine and its implications. It seems that in this conference no agreement could be reached. Nevertheless, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Syria signed a pact on January 19, to supply Jordan with money and arms to replace the British annual subsidy.

Towards the close of the month, King Saud went to the United States on a visit and was received on January 30 by Eisenhower at the Washington airport in a unique display of honour. What actually transpired between them at the parleys is not clear but on February 6, King Saud endorsed the Eisenhower Doctrine in general terms at a Washington news conference. Same day, the Secretary-General of the Arab League commended the talks between Eisenhower and Saud as "encouraging to Arab-Western relations". But the outcome of Saud's visit together with the developments in Jordan in April 1957, which we have already surveyed, seemed to suggest that the neutralist southern bloc led by Egypt was disintegrating and that a serious rift had come between Egypt and Saudi Arabia, even though the rift was camouflaged. On his return from Washington King Saud along with King Hussain of Jordan and President Quwatli of Syria came to Cairo for talks with President Nasser. Here King Saud attempted to clear up the United States policy towards the region. Nevertheless, the conference of the Arab chiefs of state adopted a declaration of "positive neutrality" in the "cold war", and denounced British aggression against Yemen and pledged Arab support for Algerian rebels against France. In March, the Shah of Iran, Mohammad Raza, made a State visit to Saudi Arabia and the two kings stated that all international problems should be solved through peaceful means in accordance with the U. N. Charter. The crisis in Jordan, in April, led to special Egyptian and Syrian missions to Saudi Arabia.

The most important evidence of the dubious role of King Saud in the Middle Eastern politics came on May 18 when at the end of his Baghdad visit, he and King Faisal of Iraq issued a joint communique which demonstrated that past differences had been buried. It gave a call that no Arab state should interfere in the affairs of another. The two states resolved to strengthen economic and cultural relations and to continue coordination of the policies in all affairs. On the other hand, in June an Arab financial organization was set up by Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Syria and Yemen and King Saud went to Amman

(Jordan) to hold parleys with King Hussain. On June 13, the two chiefs in a joint communique declared an eleven point agreement advocating the strengthening of Arab unity, resistance to foreign-sponsored pacts, support for Arabs under colonial domination and loyalty to engagements made with other Arab states. In short, the role of Saudi Arabia at the end of 1957, seems to be to serve as a bridge between Egypt and Syria on the one hand and Iraq, Iran, Jordan and other states on the other.

Egypt and Syria have, in fact, come closer early in 1958. The plan for their Union was first mooted in July, 1957. In November the Syrian Parliament, together with 40 visiting Egyptian Parliamentarians, unanimously passed a resolution calling on Governments of Egypt and Syria to enter into immediate discussions for a Federal Union. Eventually on February 1, 1958 the two countries, separated by Israel and Jordan and sharing no common border, proclaimed a "United Arab State" of 27,000,000 people and 386,000 sq. miles of area. The United Arab Republic (U.A.R.), at present, has a presidential democratic regime, one flag, one army, one president and it was approved in a popular plebiscite early in March 1958. Col. Nasser has been elected as the President and a Parliament of the U.A.R. has been elected. The experiment will be watched with considerable interest and though its success is faced with a big question mark, the forces at its back are certain. The Arab national spirit, the birth of Israel and the Western support to her, accelerated the Syrian-Egyptian unity. The Baghdad Pact, the Suez crisis, the Eisenhower Doctrine, the air-lift of American arms to Amman, the Turkish concentration on the Syrian border, and the military preparations in Jordan have all contributed to its culmination. On this showing the Union seems to be directed against the West. Again, it is also motivated by a desire to establish a real centre of Arab unity. At an hour when the U. S. proposal for obtaining missile launching bases has made every one of the Arab signatories to the Baghdad Pact highly panicky, the alluring prospect of an all-Arab unity is calculated to cut the ground from under the feet of the existing governments and make for the emergence of truly nationalist administration. Finally, through this union, Egypt may be able to counteract the increasing Russian influence in Syria and will thus widen the area of peace and neutrality.

REGIONAL SECURITY IN AMERICA

In March 1945 the Act of Chapultepec was signed and the American states had announced their intention to conclude a treaty of regional defence and to reorganize the existing system so that it might become a more effective instrument for the solution of inter-American problems. They declared that "any attempt

whether by an American or a non-American state against the integrity or the political independence of an American republic shall be regarded as an act of aggression against the others". Thus neutrality was substituted by collective action. It was also agreed to direct the inter-American Juridical Committee "to prepare a draft document co-ordinating the inter-American peace instruments into a peace plan for eventual adoption by the American republics as a convention". Since the attitude of the government of Argentina was pro-Fascist, it was not invited to attend this conference, although provision was made for it to join the arrangements later.

Now, the Act of Chapultepec was obviously a war measure and was an executive agreement that would lapse after the end of the war and it was, therefore, considered necessary to make it a permanent part of the inter-American system. In this, however, there were several difficulties. To one we have already referred, viz. the attitude of Argentina. This impasse was not resolved until late in the spring of 1947. Another was the apprehension on the part of Latin American states that collective intervention might eventually turn out to be intervention by the most powerful American state, namely, the United States. This difficulty has been ever present in the American scene and even now continues to be at the back of many developments in the American world. Nevertheless, in 1945 and onward, most Latin Americans were perhaps willing to take that chance. Finally, there was the question of the conflict of jurisdiction between the American regional security system and the United Nations. But this problem was solved when appropriate provisions were made in Article 51 on collective self-defence and in the Articles of Chapter VIII of the U. N. Charter. Thus, the Good Neighbour Policy of Roosevelt, the generation of faith and confidence that Latin America could now repose in the northern colossus, the growing need of security against the communist threat, the realization of dangers of neutrality, and the economic inter-dependence of the region created a favourable background for the creation of what is called as the inter-American system in the post-war period.

RIO PACT

In August 1947, the Rio de Janeiro Conference met. In this conference, the Chapultepec principles became permanent policy and the American states agreed to act together in the event of aggression from a non-American or an American power. The Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance signed at Rio provided for mutual defence both in cases of direct attack and in cases of acts of aggression falling short of a direct attack. All states would have the obligation to assist the victim of attack and collective action would include breach of diplomatic relations, application of

economic sanctions, use of force, and would be taken when two-thirds of the American states voted that aggression had taken place. Once this is done all states are bound by the obligation to assist except that no state is required to use armed forces without its consent. The security zone to which the Treaty would apply included the western hemisphere from the North Pole to the South Pole and thus, Canada and Greenland, but not Hawaii, were covered. But although thus protected, neither Canada nor Greenland was a member of the inter-American system. "Aggression" would be what the American Republic by a two-thirds vote defined as such in each particular case as it arose, and each party to the Treaty is obligated to assist immediately in meeting it by whatever action it considers appropriate. This immediate action is to be followed by consultation to decide on concerted action. But in the event of attack on an American state outside of its territory or of the defined area, there is only the obligation of joint consultation on action to be taken to aid the victim of aggression. Consultation is also obligatory in any other situation endangering the peace of the Americas. Thus an effective system of regional security came into existence. All that now remained to be done was to provide an institutional framework to it. This was achieved in 1948 at the Bogota Conference.

THE BOGOTA PACT AND THE O. A. S.

The ninth International Conference of American States met at Bogota (Colombia) in March-April, 1948 and it was here that the Union of the American Republic established at Washington in 1890 was transformed into the Organization of American States (O. A. S.). The entire inter-American system, which had been growing piecemeal, was now integrated and its branches and agencies were formally organized and given a permanent constitutional status. In fact, beginning with the Gondra Treaty of 1923, the American States had adopted eight treaties dealing with the various procedures of mediation, investigation, conciliation and arbitration, the provisions of which were, in some cases, overlapping, and their application uncertain in view of the lack of uniform ratification. At Bogota, a consolidated treaty—the Pact of Bogota—replaced these agreements, and covered all inter-American proceedings for pacific settlement. On April 30, the Bogota Conference adopted the Charter of the Organization of American States which rounded out the new structure of the inter-American system. Let us briefly consider both.

So far as the Charter is concerned, it covered the nature, purposes and principles of the organization, its relationship to the United Nations, the fundamental rights and duties of states, pacific settlement of disputes, collective security, economic, cultural and social standards, and the organic set-up of the orga-

nisation. The specific obligations assumed for the pacific settlement of disputes were provided in the Pact of Bogota (*see* below), and those for collective security in the Rio Pact (*see* above). The 21 American republics (Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El-Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, U. S. A., Uruguay, and Venezuela) are members of the Organization, on a basis of complete equality, each country having one vote in the Council. The organs of the O. A. S. are the Inter-American Conference, the Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, the Advisory Defence Committee, the Council, Inter-American Economic and Social Council, the Inter-American Council of Jurists, the Inter-American Cultural Council, the Pan-American Union, the Specialized Conferences, and the Specialized Organizations. The Conference meets every five years and decides general matters of policy. The Meeting of Consultation considers problems of common interest and of an urgent nature and adopts decisions in matters covered in the Rio Pact. The Advisory Defence Committee consists of the highest military authorities in the member countries and meets whenever necessary, and advises the Meeting of Consultation. The Council, with headquarters in Washington, consists of one representative of each member nation appointed by the respective government with the rank of ambassador. It supervises the progress of the Organization and is assisted by the Social and Economic Council, the Cultural Council and the Council of Jurists. The Pan-American Union, with headquarters at Washington is designated as the central organ and general secretariat of the Organization. Its four departments deal with economic and social affairs, international law, cultural affairs and administrative affairs. The specialized conferences develop specific aspects of inter-American co-operation. The specialized organizations, established by multilateral agreements, have to discharge specific functions in their respective fields of action.

The Pact of Bogota provided the obligations and procedures for pacific settlement among the American states. The parties agreed "to refrain from the threat or use of force, or from any other means of coercion for the settlement of their controversies and to have recourse at all times to pacific procedures". They also recognized "the obligation to settle international controversies by regional pacific procedures before referring them to the Security Council of the United Nations". The procedures laid down in the Pact include good offices and mediation, investigation and conciliation, adjudication and arbitration. It was agreed that the Council's recommendation under the Pact would not be binding, though decisions of the International Court of

Justice or awards under the arbitration would. Unfortunately the signing of the Treaty was accompanied with so many reservations that it was clear from the start that the Treaty might fail in its purpose. The four reservations by the United States rejected the notion of referring disputes to the International Court of Justice and compulsory arbitration, removed from the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court the types of disputes and questions of domestic jurisdiction that the United States had earlier reserved in accepting the Court's jurisdiction, and objected to a provision prohibiting the extension of diplomatic aid by a government to its nationals in the Courts of a foreign country. Consequently the revision of the Pact was put on the agenda of the Caracas Conference in March 1954 although nothing concrete has so far been done about it.

It may be noted that most of the recent controversies between the American states since 1948 have been settled not by the Meeting of Consultation of Foreign Ministers nor by any of the commissions provided for in the existing treaties of pacific settlement. As early as 1940, a committee consisting of the representatives of five countries was organized with the duty to keep watch over disputes between states and to offer suggestions of settlement. This committee now called as the Inter-American Peace Committee has absolutely no authority other than such as may be conferred upon it by the voluntary agreement of the parties to a controversy. Yet perhaps for that very reason its services were utilised in the dispute between Haiti and the Dominican Republic in 1949 and in the conflict between the latter and Cuba in 1951. But on two occasions a meeting of the Organ of Consultation under the Rio Treaty was convoked, in the case of the dispute between Costa Rica and Nicaragua in 1948, and the controversy between Haiti and the Dominican Republic in 1949-50. In both cases the Council of the O. A. S. investigated the facts and successfully brought the parties to an agreement without the necessity of holding the formal Meeting of Consultation that had been called.

In June 1954, the issue of conflict of jurisdiction between the O.A.S. and the U. N. came up, when, following the outbreak of a revolution, Guatemala appealed to the Security Council alleging an act of aggression on the part of its neighbours, Honduras and Nicaragua. Brazil and Colombia asked the Security Council to refer the question to the O. A. S. but the resolution was vetoed by the Soviet Union and the Council was stalemated. Meanwhile the O. A. S., through the Peace Committee, had seized hold of the case. When the Security Council met on June 25, the majority of the members felt it better to leave the question to the O. A. S. On June 26, the Council of the O.A.S. summoned the Meeting of Consultation in accordance

with the provisions of the Rio Treaty, but the events in Guatemala rendered the Meeting unnecessary. Thus the upshot of this case is that "while an American state may appeal to the Security Council of the U. N. in preference to having resort to regional procedures, the Security Council on its part may decide that the issue can better be settled by the regional group and may reserve action while observing the effect of the regional precedure". Although not all O. A. S. members supported the thesis that the Organization has exclusive rights in the area of enforcement measures (indeed Ecuador, Uruguay and Venezuela protested at the inaction of the Security Council), "the O. A. S. took precedence over the Security Council in taking (actually in not taking) collective measures".

The question of collective intervention to counteract the communist activities was raised in the Caracas Conference that met in March 1954 and to which we referred earlier. By applying a good deal of economic and political pressure, the United States could force through a resolution "reaffirming that communism constituted outside interference in the affairs of the Americas and was thus subject to action under the Rio Pact". The resolution did not name Guatemala but its purpose was achieved when Guatemala became the sole American Republic to vote against it.

An important aspect of the O. A. S. is the machinery of social and cultural co-operation and economic collaboration, a principle which was proclaimed at the First International Conference in 1889-90. It was there that a Commercial Bureau, later known as the Pan American Union, was created in order to collect and distribute commercial information. Gradually more agencies were set up. At the Bogota Conference the subject of economic co-operation was fully discussed and it was decided that problems of commercial policy and an inter-American Development Corporation and Bank should be considered at a separate conference. Nevertheless, the Charter of the O. A. S. deals with the economic standards upon which the member states agree to co-operate and it is provided that "any American state which is affected by serious conditions beyond its power to remedy may place its problems before the Economic and Social Council for a satisfactory solution". Similarly, the Charter lays stress on building social and cultural relations, establishing standards with a view to achieving just and decent living conditions, protecting human rights, and securing educational exchange facilities. In these spheres the O. A. S. acts in full co-operation with the United Nations Agencies.

In short, the inter-American system has three basic characteristics. *First*, it is basically a contractual creation for it is not the

result of common language, religion, race, tradition or history. Nor is there any "pressing geographical factor between North and South to make them united", for, Washington and New York are much nearer Paris, London or Berlin, than Santiago, Buenos Aires, Rio de Janeiro or Lima. In the commercial sphere, by and large, Latin America had greater contacts with Europe than with the United States. Thus the phrase "Unity of America" is as unrealistic as the phrase "Unity of Asia". "In the United States", as a recent writer has observed, "the language is English, the religion is predominantly Protestant, the race predominantly of Anglo-Saxon origin, and for many decades its policy regarding its continental neighbours was ruthless and imperialistic. As discordant as it could be, the Latin American Republics speak Spanish and Portuguese; belong to the Catholic faith; their ruling classes are of Latin origin, and until Franklin D. Roosevelt came to power they had serious reasons to be diffident and worried".

Secondly, the leading force behind this structure is provided by the United States of America which has important stakes in the fate of this region. This is partly responsible for a good deal of anti-Americanism which is a marked feature of Latin-American reactions to the North. Thus "the exiles from Peru or Venezuela insist that the United States military attachees in Lima and Caracas encouraged the military coups of Odria and Perez Jimenez in 1948, and they even claim that General Balivian seized power in Bolivia in 1952 under instructions from the Pentagon. A Bolivian will speak about the price of tin, a Chilean about the export of copper, a Guatemalan about the United Fruit Company, and a Brazilian about the price of coffee. The Dominicans are convinced that Washington prefers the dictatorship of Trujillo to a democratic regime. Democrats as a whole are alarmed because of the sending of arms to Latin American dictators". Now this anti-American sentiment is responsible for many weaknesses and contradictions in the inter-American system.

Finally, and it follows from what we just stated, there is "a lack of equilibrium between the reciprocal advantages and engagements that the system should represent respectively for the two groups of associated nations: the United States of America on one side and the Latin American countries on the other". For the United States (from the time when the Latin American peoples freed themselves from Spain, Portugal, and France) their relations with them have been based upon economic, political and strategic considerations: American consular agents of the early 19th century were primarily interested in the expansion of trade and normally the United States depends on Latin American cocoa, coffee, sugar, petroleum, tropical fruits and woods. The second world war amply demonstrated the

dependence of United States industry on Latin American supplies of strategic raw materials including rubber, cinchona, sisal, balsa, abaca, antimony, kapok, tin, nitrate, copper, fats and oils. What the United States is most interested in is that these States remain in friendly hands. Since more than half of them are dictatorships and proclaim themselves as "anti-communists", the United States, in the context of global strategy, naturally prefers "the apparent safety of a dictator who calls himself an ally and an anti-communist to the uncertainty of popular revolutions and governments of popular origin". Any change in the *status quo* might also affect big American companies which for half a century have been investing in Latin America. The apparent identification of the United States Government with certain of these companies which attempt to retain their privileges tends to mar their relations.

What Latin America wants is the development of its economy, change in its economic status, as a supplier or raw materials, financial help, raising of standards, national deliverance, social change and political stability. The countries of this region wish to protect the prices of their natural products and "they complain that the Marshall Plan benefits only Europe". They badly resented the action of Dulles in having left the Caracas Conference immediately after having obtained the resolution directed against the Arbenz government in Guatemala without even waiting to listen to their economic requests. Thus mere anti-communism does not offer anything to peoples who want a better life. The root of disequilibrium that we have suggested is that the Latin American does not usually know any North American other than the ivory-tower diplomat, the big businessman ready to suck away the national wealth, and the itinerant tourist who always behaves abnormally, while "the North American does not usually know the Latin American except by hearsay and ignores his tragic problems, his dreams and his struggles". Since 1945, the most pressing problem confronting the United States with respect to Latin America arises from the policy objective of organizing the free world to meet the threat of Soviet communist aggression and to retain control of the sources of raw materials. This involves gearing the potential—political, economic and military—of the Latin American States to the demands of rearmament, mobilization and collective defence. What Latin America wants is non-intervention, and a better and richer life.

In short, for the U. S. A., the inter-American system is a vital factor in strategic and military security—a zone that cannot be replaced as a source of essential raw materials required for its industries in peace and in war, and 20 states of which are the most trustworthy allies in its diplomatic duel with the

Soviet Union. As Dulles recently put it, "the Monroe Doctrine continues to be the first and most fundamental of all our foreign policies". The United States, it may be added, has attained all its objectives through the inter-American system. Affirmations of common democratic promises have been fairly easily obtained. Bases have been made available to the United States for military, naval, and air action in Brazil, Cuba, Ecuador, Mexico, Nicaragua and in other countries; procedures have been worked out for the pooling of information on subversive agents and their activities; a considerable U. S. control on the raw materials of these countries has been achieved; the principle of collective defence has been institutionalized; anti-communist commitments and obligations have been undertaken; friendly regimes have been strengthened and unfriendly ones have been successfully overthrown in spite of the U. N.; and military collaboration has to a great extent been achieved. As Vandenberg said after the Rio Pact had been signed: "We have had a thousand per cent success".

But what are the objectives of Latin America and to what extent these have been realized through the inter-American system? Their objectives include peace, non-intervention, economic development, popular governments and political stability. And in respect of none of these, the system has been really helpful. There are wars, upheavals, intervention, collective intervention, exploitation, dictatorial, unrepresentative and unpopular governments and a grave political instability. All the economic help given by the U.S.A. to Latin America "has been strictly bilateral, fragmentary and on such a small scale as to be practically negligible". Thus it is all a one-way traffic. Whatever U. S. capital is invested in Latin America is invested for the benefit of the U.S. monopolies and not for the economy of the Latin American countries and, therefore, these monopolies tend to take a special interest in government bodies of these countries in order to ensure what is called political stability" i.e, dictatorial regimes. According to Dr. Jorge Manach, "the task of U. S. inter-American policy was to have a good policeman at the head of Latin American countries". These U. S. monopolies get their main social support in Latin America from the oligarchy of big landowners. As a result there are obvious contradictions and there is an inherent disequilibrium in the inter-American system. As the Harper Magazine recently noted: "Our own diplomacy, however, has been increasingly strained since the war to maintain even the appearance of harmony between us and our Latin American neighbours. . . . At the conference of American Ministers of Finance and Economy, convened outside Rio De Janeiro (in November, 1954) the fact that the U S.A. stood above could no longer be disguised. The conference opened like a meeting between belligerents under a flag of truce". In short, the O.A.S.

experience also suggests, first, that regional organizations should shift their emphasis to economic and social objectives so that regional co-operation might be prompted by the State's interests in the welfare of its citizens, and, secondly, that rule of international intercourse should be evolved and respected so that the host of intimate relationships between states may not result in the undesirable pattern of coercive interference by the most powerful.

THE O. C. A. S.

In addition to the O. A. S., an organization of five central American States (Costa Rica, El-Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua) was formed in 1951. In the 19th century these five states made several efforts to establish some form of a union. Indeed, from 1823 to 1938 they functioned as the United Provinces of Central America but eventually political differences and petty rivalries proved too strong a force and they split. In 1907, however, the Central American Court of Justice was formed which functioned for eleven years and which enjoyed compulsory jurisdiction over disputes which could not be diplomatically settled. It decided about ten cases and foundered in 1918. An effort was made to revive the Court in 1923 but it met the same fate which befell the Treaty of Union of 1921 seeking to establish a Federation of Central America. The General Treaty of Peace and Amity signed at Washington in 1922 at the instance of the United States, was denounced in 1933.

After 1945, regional security organizations were encouraged everywhere and in October 1951, the five states met in a conference at San Salvador which drafted and signed a charter for Organization of Central American States (O. C. A. S.). Provision was made for Panama to join later on. All the participants ratified it and it proclaimed to be in force in December, 1951. The O.C.A.S. is at most a loose co-operative arrangement among states retaining full sovereignty, though in the preamble the Republics are declared "separate parts of one and the same nation". The O. C. A. S. is intended to strengthen the bonds connecting the Central American states, to ensure pacific settlement of disputes, and to promote their economic, social and cultural development on the basis of juridical equality, mutual respect and non-intervention.

Organizationally, the supreme organ of the O. C. A. S. is a meeting of the Presidents of the five states meeting occasionally. But the principal organ is the Meeting of the Foreign Ministers taking place every two years or more often, if necessary. In these meetings each states has a veto power for "decisions on substantive matters must be adopted unanimously. When doubt exists as to whether a question is substantive or procedural, "it shall be decided by unanimous vote". Below the Foreign

Ministers Meeting are the meetings of ministers of other government departments called whenever a problem arises "the solution of which merits collective study and a joint Central American plan". Among these bodies, the most important is the Economic Council, meeting at least once in a year and working on such tasks as are assigned to it by the principal organ which is also empowered to set up other subsidiary councils whenever necessary. It also appoints the Secretary-General who runs the Central American Bureau functioning as the Secretariat with headquarters at San Salvador. The O. C. A. S., it should be noted, works within broad limitations provided by constitutional obligations, obligations arising out of membership of the United Nations and of treaties or agreements in effect. These limitations, together with the veto, do provide "powerful leverage to any state that wishes to be obstructive or is dissatisfied with the way in which regional affairs are being handled". But these factors need not bar progress, for joint action can be taken to the extent the governments can agree and are motivated by goodwill and understanding. Presumably the Charter would continue in force so long as it is not denounced or superseded by any other agreement. References to the U. N. and the O. A. S. suggest that the five states were anxious to be "regarded as remaining loyal to the larger organizations and staying within 'the club' rather than going off to form an exclusive fraternity of their own".

We have noted above that for Panama provision was made to join later. She was invited at the San Salvador Conference in 1951 but did not send full delegates. Her three "observing delegates", however, joined the first Meeting of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs in 1955 and she has also been represented on educational and cultural committees. Possibly Panama's attitude is the result of her unique position at the isthmus of the Americas and her special relations with the United States. The latter's attitude towards the O. C. A. S. is one of "wait and see" and perhaps if the arrangements stabilize it might win over the United States to join it, or it might completely merge with the O. A. S.

The O. C. A. S., from the very beginning had to face a hard task so that it took four years for it to summon the first meeting of the Principal Organ. In 1953, trouble developed in Guatemala and the O. A. S. Council condemned the Arbenz regime. Eventually Guatemala withdrew from the O.C.A.S. An extraordinary meeting of the foreign ministers of the remaining four states was held in April 1953 in which Guatemala was requested to reconsider its action. In July, another meeting was called and it was decided that Guatemala would be readmitted whenever convenient. The meeting condemned communism and resolved to take steps against it. After the Arbenz regime was overthrown, Guatemala re-entered the O. C. A. S.

Another serious problem which the O. C. A. S. had to face was the conflict between Costa Rica and Nicaragua in January, 1955 about "the harbouring of insurgent terrorist forces on the Nicaraguan side of the boundary". The steps taken by the O. A. S., however, saved the situation and the first meeting of the Principal Organ of the O. C. A. S. could meet in August, 1955 at Antigua (Guatemala). After initial deadlock the foreign minister of El-Salvador was appointed unanimously the Secretary-General. The meeting also set up a commission of jurists to codify Central American legislation; and a Cultural and Educational Council. The Central American Bureau was directed to establish customs union in Central America and the Secretary-General was asked to set up a press and information office. Anti-communist resolution was carried. A budget of $ 125,000 was voted and it was proposed to double it next year. It was decided that the Supreme Organ should meet in 1956. A Central American Economic Co-operation Committee was set up with terms of reference and to work in co-operation with the U. N. Economic Commission for Latin America, the U. N. Technical Assistance Board and the inter-American Economic and Social Council.

In 1956, at a meeting of the education ministers, it was decided to establish a Central American Normal School, a Polytechnical School, and an International University of Central America. Same year in a meeting of defence ministers, problems of regional defence were considered. There are certainly geographical barriers, cultural and racial differences, obstacles created by illiteracy, poverty and disease, strong "nationalistic ideas competing continually with regional ideas", internal and external factionalism which is a grave challenge to regional co-operation, frequent recurrence of political disturbances and changes in leadership which lead to complicated relations among these states. These factors are compounded under conditions of the cold war. It is, therefore, difficult to forecast with any degree of certainty as to the future of the O. C. A. S.

THE CARIBBEAN COMMISSION

The Caribbean Commission (C. C.), the third regional grouping in the Americas, covers the territories stretching from America's playground, Jamaica, in the north, about two hours flying distance from Miami, to the colourful and cosmopolitan Trinidad 1,000 miles away in the south and only a few miles off the coast of South America. The areas include Barbados, Jamaica, Antigua, St. Christopher-Nevis-Anguilla, Mont Serrat, Trinidad and Tobago, Grenada, St. Vincent, St. Lucia and Dominica. While a plan for political federation has been evolving gradually, the idea of regional co-operation also developed. In 1924, the Imperial College of Tropical Agriculture, Trinidad, was founded where

research work to meet the needs of the whole of the West Indies is carried out. In 1932, a Central Sugar Cane Breeding station was established in Barbados to serve all the sugar-growing territories. In 1940, the West Indies Development and Welfare Organization for the West Indies was set up.

The most important step was taken in 1942, when the Anglo-American Caribbean Commission was set up. In 1946 this Commission was extended to include the Governments of France and the Netherlands and was renamed Caribbean Commission. It has no executive powers and is concerned with formulating plans and recommending measures for the social and economic betterment of all the territories for which the member governments are responsible. Its biennial West Indian conferences enable West Indians from all these territories to meet and discuss their common problems. Participation in these Conferences has encouraged leaders and politicians from the British West Indies to regard themselves as a group with common interests, a common history, and a common destiny. The 23rd meeting of the Commission was held in December 1956 in Bridge Town, Barbados. It discussed the question of arranging study terms in Puerto Rico, the demographic problems of the area and it decided to hold the West Indian Conference in Curacao in November-December, 1957. The 24th meeting of the Commission was held in St. Thomas, Virgin Islands of the United States in May, 1957 and in this meeting considerable progress on these problems was made.

In 1948, the University College of the West Indies was founded in Jamaica and in 1950 the question of the unification of the public services in the British Caribbean area was considered. In 1951, a commission on the establishment of a customs union was appointed and the first meeting of the British West Indies Regional Economic Committee (R.E.C.) was held. The R. E. C. is a consultative and advisory body on economic matters of common interest. After some hesitation, a common currency for the Eastern Caribbean territories, including British Guiana was introduced. In 1954 a further step was taken and an Air Transport Advisory Council for the area was inaugurated. In 1955-56, a Shipping Service was introduced and a conference of financial officers was held in Jamaica to discuss the creation of a Regional Stock Exchange which came into existence in 1957.

REGIONAL SECURITY IN EAST AND SOUTH-EAST EUROPE

We have given a detailed analysis of the integration of Eastern Europe in a previous chapter and we have also discussed the nature of bonds that relate the East European countries with each other and with the Soviet Union. It now remains to examine the super structure based on the Warsaw Pact signed in 1955. At

first glance it appears that East Europe presents a more fertile soil for regional development than does West Europe, for the former "shares the cultural, linguistic, and philosophic heritage of Pan-Slavism". Nevertheless, the force of nationalism, minority problems, the fact that boundary lines in this region have tended to cut across ethnic as well as economic lines, and the existence of the non-Slavic areas of Hungary, Rumania, and Albania as well as the Western-oriented Czechs have all created centrifugal tendencies which ban regional unity. The fact that East Europe's past economic development has not fostered economic co-operation and that this area, chiefly agrarian and an exporter of food stuffs and raw materials to West Europe, is characterized by "competitive rather than complementary economies", adds to the difficulties in the way of regional co-operation. But after 1945, these centrifugal tendencies weakened under the impact of Soviet thought and power.

We have noted in Chapter 3 that the countries of the East Europe bound themselves together in a network of nearly 20 bilateral treaties of mutual assistance which provided the basis of a regional system in the area. In many of these treaties references are made to the United Nations, pledges are made for general co-operation, and the Comecon and the Cominform provided co-ordinating machinery for the bilateral treaty system. The basic charge of the Soviet Union against the North Atlantic Treaty was that it was an abuse of Article 51 of the U. N. Charter. But by 1955, the Soviet Union itself made use of it (or abused it?) as the foundation for its own alliance system. Just as the Soviet reaction to the Marshall Plan was the Molotov Plan to be directed by the Comecon, the reaction to West Germany's admission to the NATO and the West European Union has been the signing of the Warsaw Pact (a kind of eastern NATO).

THE WARSAW PACT

The Warsaw Pact—the treaty of friendship, co-operation and mutual assistance was sigend in Warsaw on May 14, 1955 by representatives of eight states—Albania, Bulgaria, Hungary, the Soviet Union, the German Democratic Republic, Poland, Rumania, and Czechoslovakia. The signatories decided to set up a unified command of their armed forces and agreed that several questions relating to the strengthening of the defence capacity and the organization of united armed forces of the participating countries would be examined by political and consultative committees. The parties undertook to abstain in their international relations from threats of violence or its use, to settle international disputes by peaceful means, and to consult mutually on all important international problems affecting their common interests and to consult each time in the event of a threat of armed attack against one or several states. Under Art. 4, it was provided that "in case of armed aggression in

Europe against one or several states party to the Pact by a state or group of states, each state member of the Pact. . . will afford to the State or States which are the objects of such an aggression immediate assistance, individually and in agreement with other states, party to the Pact, with all means which appear necessary, including the use of armed force". This provision safeguarded the right to individual or collective self-defence, in accordance with Art. 51 of the U. N. Charter. It was also agreed that the parties would "immediately take joint measures necessary to establish and preserve international peace and securtiy", and that "these measures will be stopped as soon as the Security Council takes measures necessary for establishing and preserving international peace and security".

Art. 5 provided for the joint command and under Art. 6 provision was made for setting up "a political consultative committee" in which each state would be represented by a member of its Government or another specially appointed representative. The Committee was authorized to set up "any auxiliary organs it considers necessary". The parties undertook not to enter into any coalitions or unions or agreements whose aims are contrary to the terms of this treaty", and to act in a spirit of friendship and cooperation in order to develop the economic and cultural ties between them and to be guided by principles of mutual respect and non-interference. Art. 9 was extremely interesting for it threw the treaty "open to other states, irrespective of their social or government regime, who declare their readiness to abide by the terms of this treaty in order to safeguard peace and security of the people". The treaty was to continue in force for 20 years and "in the event of a system of collective security being set up in Europe and a pact to this effect being signed to which each party to this treaty will direct its efforts the present treaty will lapse from the day such a collective security treaty comes into force".

It was also decided that Marshal of the Soviet Union, Konev, would be the Commander-in-Chief of the United Armed Forces and that the ministers of defence and military leaders of the participating states, who would command the Armed Forces of each participating country contributing to the strength of the United Armed Forces, would be deputies to the Commander-in-Chief. It was also agreed that the Commander-in-Chief would set up his headquarters at Moscow and that the location of the United Armed Forces on the territories of the participating states would be decided in accordance with the needs of mutual defence by agreement between these states.

Under the Warsaw Pact, the Soviet Union used its troops in Hungary in 1956 to secure its policy objectives and it was obviously an intervention in the internal affairs of another state and a clear

misuse of the Warsaw Pact provisions. No country had attacked Hungary and there was no threat of armed attack on her. It was plainly an internal revolt against the communist regime—a revolt which had full moral support of the West. The Soviet argument is based on weak hypothesis. In fact, just as the Western alliances sometimes have been used to buttress reactionary regimes against all progressive forces in the backward areas, the Warsaw Pact, too, has been used to keep friendly regimes intact. It is argued by the Soviet experts that "the Warsaw Treaty associated the Hungarian people to resort to the assistance of Soviet troops which, acting on the Hungarian Government's request and fulfilling their international duty to the working people of the Hungarian People's Republic and other countries, helped the Hungarian people to crush the counter-revolutionary conspiracy of international and internal reaction". It is argued further that by so doing "a direct threat of the Hungarian people becoming enslaved and their country turning into a hot bed of Fascist aggression in the centre of Europe was removed, as was a threat to the security of the socialist countries and the cause of peace in Europe" (*News and Views*, Vol. XVI, No. 44, p. 11). Even on these premises it is difficult to refute the charge of Soviet intervention in the Hungarian affairs. The provision under Art. 9 hardly makes any difference between the Warsaw Treaty and the NATO and is as unrealistic as the provision under Art. 11 which envisages termination of the Pact as soon as a general European collective security treaty "comes into force". As Friedmann has put it, "It is part of a new Soviet strategy which is much more flexible and imaginative than the dour and the stubborn Stalin policy. It throws out a new kind of challenge to the West. Hitherto, in the Acheson formula 'negotiate from strength', all the accent has been on the organization of strength. Now, the accent will increasingly have to be on 'negotiate' and that with a most redoubtable and resourceful opponent". In short, regional security arrangements here, as elsewhere, serve as powerful instruments of the cold war and provide a convenient framework in the event of any final showdown. In the process "the logic of overlapping and conflicting regional systems spells the bankruptcy of the idea of universal collective security through universal organization built on global consensus".

Regional security in South-East Europe. In Part I we noted the regional ventures in this region such as the Little Entente and the attempts at a Danubian Federation and the Balkan Entente. After 1945 the Balkan communist leaders, particularly Dimitrov in Bulgaria and Tito in Yugoslavia, openly advocated some kind of Balkan Federation. The proposal, however, was turned down by the Soviet Union. Even after his break from the Soviet Union, Tito continued to work for a Balkan Entente,

"although the hostility of the loyal satellite states made such proposals merely academic". In 1950, however, Yugoslavia signed treaties of friendship and mutual assistance with Greece and Turkey and on this basis on August 9, 1954 the three states concluded a mutual assistance agreement—the Balkan Entente. Under Art. 2 of this Balkan Pact the parties agree that if one of them is subjected to an armed attack, the other two will render assistance to the attacked state, exercising the right of legitimate collective defence recognised by Art. 51 of the U. N. Charter. The post-Stalin rapprochement between Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union and the bitterness between Greece and Turkey on Cyprus, however, has rendered the fate of this alliance rather uncertain.

THE U. N. CHARTER AND REGIONAL SECURITY

Thus we find that about 7 dozen states have chosen to enter in multilateral security arrangements—the O. A. S., the O. C. A. S., the N.A.T.O., the S.E.A.T.O., the A.N.Z.U.S., the Arab League, the Baghdad Pact, the Warsaw Pact and the Balkan Entente and all of them profess to be based on the U. N. Charter. It should be remembered that the Charter contains two different notions of (*a*) collective security, and (*b*) collective self-defence. The principle of collective self-defence is incorporated in Article 51 which recognises "the concept that one or more states may lend assistance to one or more other states, if the latter are being subjected to armed attack". This was recognized largely as a result of the pressures from the regional blocs, especially from the Latin American states, Australia, Canada, Brazil, and even from the major powers which called for the right to take enforcement action under varying circumstances, should unanimity not be reached in the Security Council on matters affecting international peace and security. On the other hand, the central purpose and amalgam of the U. N. is to be found in its provisions for centralized collective security. Now the regional alliances that we have discussed above, have completely displaced "collective security" and established the predominance of the concept of "collective self-defence". Whenever the Security Council has clashed with a "mutual security arrangement" as far as collective measures were concerned, the latter has supplanted the Council in taking, or in not taking, enforcement action. In the Guatemalan case, for instance, the O. A. S. took precedence over the Security Council. Same has happened with regard to the cases taken up by the Arab League. Or witness how concerted efforts by members of the N.A.T.O. sitting on the Security Council have prevented the U. N. from taking action with reference to outbreaks of violence in Morocco, Indo-China, Tunisia and Cyprus.

Again, "the members of the mutual security arrangements rely more upon their respective agencies than upon the Security Council or the General Assembly as instruments to provide them with collective security". That is one of the main reasons why there has not been possible anything like a United Nations Security Force. On the other hand huge bulk of collective forces for military action lie within the framework of the mutual security arrangements like the Nato and the Warsaw Pact. Thus possible action for "collective self-defence" under regional alliances takes precedence over support of possible action for "collective security" under the U. N.

Indeed, these alliances have so much destroyed the meaning of collective security that their sponsors have gone to the extent of arguing that "there is no difference between organization for collective security and organization for collective defence", and that "collective defence" under Art. 51 is the same thing as "collective security" under the Security Council. But, as J. S. Gibson has recently argued, the two concepts are quite distinct and that whereas collective defence is "mutual defence by one group of states against another state or group of states", collective security is "all for one and one for all in the event of aggression". The truth is that even in the context of balance of power at the moment, the majority of states today find collective self-defence much more appealing than United Nations collective security. The provision of Art. 51 is at complete variance with the provisions of collective security in the Charter, and the regional arrangements under the former have destroyed the efficacy of the latter. As Edgar S. Furniss has put it: "In the name of regional arrangements, the U. N. has been placed in a position of inferiority, so that now the links between the regional arrangements and the world organization exist at the practical pleasure of the former. In this situation, slick manoeuvres can take place in the name of security. Examples would be unconscious arrogation by NATO to itself of exclusive organizational competence in respect to half the world, and the paddling of Arbenz's Guatemalan Government like a shuttlecock between the Organization of American States and the United Nations until it fell to pieces while such actions could be justified as emergency measures to meet an emergency situation, they lose much of their appeal as long-range solutions to the problem of maintaining international security during the remainder of the twentieth century".

It follows that the dominant principle of large-scale international organization today is the principle of regionalism. Although the Soviet claim is that the institutional solidarity of "the people's democracies" is consistent with the purposes of the U. N. Charter since it is directed against a resumption of fascist

aggression, its true implications are far otherwise. Similarly, although the Western claim is that the NATO and their regional alliances are intended to strengthen the U. N., they really imply "a shift in motivation and a new determination to seek through narrow but more cohesive regional association". A state may or may not be a member of the U.N. but it is entitled to the benefits of security under these regional arrangements. Indeed, by interpreting "collective self-defence" as an inherent right belonging to all nations and not just to U. N. members, as Art. 51 says, Italy and Portugal were brought into the NATO in 1949 when neither was a U.N. member. When is this right to be exercised? Under Art. 51, it is exercised "if an armed attack occurs". But if it is an inherent right, does not this qualification of "an armed attack" become meaningless? Any step taken by a state may be construed by another as preliminary to "an armed attack" and, therefore, under the doctrine of inherent right, collective self-defence may be applied by any state under almost any conditions. And there is nothing which the Security Council can really do in spite of the provision in Art. 51 that measures taken in individual or collective self-defence "shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council.....to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security". The Council will not be able to take "necessary measures" because there the veto operates. Any permanent member having a vested interest in collective self-defence measures under a regional alliance, would eliminate any chance of the Security Council taking "necessary measures" of collective security and thus the regional alliance would completely supersede the U. N. organization for security. As we noted earlier, on June 25, 1954, the U.S.A. successfully prevented Guatemala from having its complaint of aggression placed on the Security Council agenda and in March, 1954 the U.S.S.R. vetoed a Council resolution which called upon Egypt to end its embargo of Israeli-bound goods through the Suez Canal.

CHAPTER 9

The Commonwealth of Nations

Although the Commonwealth of Nations does not fall strictly within the scope of "regional organizations" for it is not an instrument of regional security, we propose to deal with it here for want of a better and more precise classification. In Part I, we analysed the nature of this body and briefly discussed its role and development till 1945. We have seen that its structure, as we see it today, is the result of a long series of historical occurrences, comparatively few of which represent the fruits of deliberate policy. It is "a sprawling collection of nations with no common obligations, with no co-ordinated line of action in world affairs and at odds with each other (which) makes up an international system, which is a travesty of the word 'Commonwealth". This collection which, at present, includes the four older Dominions plus India, Pakistan, Ceylon, Malaya, Ghana, as well as the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and which has a total population of 550,000,000 is not an international organization like the United Nations. It has no charter, no constitution; it rests on no treaty or agreement; its membership entails no specific obligations as it confers no special rights; it has no standing central institutions of any great significance, no army, no treaty of mutual assistance and its members have absolutely no obligation to go to war in the event of one of them being attacked or threatened.

The greatest event in the immediate post-war years (1945-47) was the culmination of what Sir Ivor Jennings has called "the Commonwealth in Asia", the emergence of India, Pakistan, Ceylon and Burma as free and independent nations. Burma chose to secede from the Commonwealth. In 1948 the British mandate over Palestine was terminated and final steps were taken to establish Ceylon as a Dominion and Burma as an independent state. Statutes and Orders-in-Council were passed for the Federation of Malaya and for a new Constitution for Jersey. The words "Emperor of India" were omitted from the Royal title of King George VI. In October, 1948 the Commonwealth Prime Ministers Conference was held in which Ireland was conspicuous by her absence. On December 12, 1948 Canada and New Foundland signed an agreement under which the latter became just a province of the Dominion of Canada as from March 31, 1949.

The year 1949 witnessed historic events having their bearing on the theory and practice of the Commonwealth. In April, an ingenious formula was devised to accommodate the Republic of India in the Imperial Commonwealth and India and other members agreed to accept the "King as the symbol of the free association of its independent member nations and as such the Head of the Commonwealth". All the members agreed to "remain united as free and equal members of the Commonwealth of Nations, freely co-operating in the pursuit of *peace and liberty and progress*". On April 18, when the Republic of Ireland Act, 1948 came into force, Southern Ireland ceased to be a member of the Commonwealth. Nevertheless, the U. K. and the Irish Republic do not regard one another as foreign countries and the conduct of relations with the Irish Republic continues to be a responsibility of the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations. In 1950, the famous Colombo Conference met and the discussions resulted in the formulation of the *Colombo Plan* for the development of South East Asia. In the sphere of Commonwealth co-operation the important event was the Prime Ministers' Conference to review world problems and exchange views. The continued deadlock on the Kashmir issue imposed some strain and no progress could be registered. In 1952, another such Conference attempted to solve the crisis of the Commonwealth economy arising from a permanent dollar deficit. The communique of the Conference that met in January 1955 recorded with satisfaction "a widening area of understanding". The Prime Ministers agreed, in particular, that all Commonwealth countries should strive to develop further their resources and their earning power. On September 3, 1953 the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland was established but although it enjoys a large measure of independence in its internal affairs, the U. K. remains generally responsible for its international relations. On March 6, 1957 the state of Ghana came into existence when the former colony of the Gold Coast and the trusteeship territory of Togoland attained Dominion Status. On August 31, Malaya became independent. Earlier, on August 2, 1954, Royal assent was given to the British Caribbean Federation Act which provided for the constitution of the Federation to be embodied in an order of the Queen-in-Council. The first federal elections are scheduled to be held in 1958. Thus the process of evolution is by no means complete, for, three groups of dependencies are moving towards full self-government—Nigeria, Central African Federation, and West Indian Islands. These three federations contain about 42 million people. Thus taking the Commonwealth as a whole, about 90% of the people live in independent countries and about 7% in countries nearing independence.

Thus the Commonwealth of Nations contains a wide variety

of people belonging to distant areas, representing different cultures and speaking different languages. In this sense, "it is nothing more than a series of governments linked in a common purpose by the symbolic tie of the common Crown and prepared to use methods of regular consultation for promoting that purpose". The efficacy of the Commonwealth depends on the ability of its several governments freely to carry out the policies they undertake.

Objectives of the Commonwealth. Although there is a wide diversity in the Commonwealth, and its aims and purposes are nowhere defined, one can have a minimum conception of its objectives on which all members are ready to agree at the moment. *First*, there is the ideal of democracy, self-government and basic human rights. If there is no unanimity of views on a particular matter, it is rather a sign of strength for coercion would drive out many partners. It is after all a partnership based on free volition. Even the concepts of democracy may differ, and the forms of government may vary in different parts but they all agree on the value of individual personality and basic freedoms. Indeed, if in some parts discrimination is made on grounds of race and colour, it is in the name of democracy itself.

Secondly, there is the aim of common defence against external threats. It is true that different parts may react to an international situation or factor differently. The mere fact, for instance, that Communist China is considered a threat by Australia but not by India, indicates that a more precise agreement on the nature of a specific threat is no easier in the Commonwealth than in the United Nations. Nor does this mean that one member is obliged to support another in meeting a situation which the latter regards as threatening to itself. Britain, for instance, invaded Egypt to safeguard what the former considered as her vital interests which were jeopardized and encroached upon by the latter. Some members were strongly in favour of Britain (as Australia and New Zealand), some gave half-hearted support to her (as Canada and Pakistan), others were violently against her (as India and Ceylon). Nevertheless, all partners are "willing to combine their efforts and consult more or less regularly to meet threat from countries feared by all".

Thirdly, there is the joint purpose of economic well-being, or common welfare. This is equally difficult to define since to some common welfare means "common investment policies" while to others it merely implies "preferential trade agreements". Nevertheless, the economic ties of the Commonwealth are solid and strong. If India has chosen to stay in the club it is largely because of

considerations of economic benefit. Britain is still a large buyer of foodstuffs and certain raw materials from the Dominions, which she supplies in return for capital equipment and other manufactured goods. In fact, in the Commonwealth "exporters are assured of a market at pre-determined price and importers of reliable sources of supply in countries not demanding scarce currencies for payment. Preferential trade agreements legalize these benefits and membership in the sterling bloc, which usually goes with membership in the Commonwealth, assures all members of access to a desirable currency in their financial relations. This is as true of the new Asian dominions as it is of the United Kingdom and the British-settled Commonwealth members". The best example of the economic ties as well as of the economic benefits in the Commonwealth is the Colombo Plan on which we will comment later. In the sphere of technical assistance and capital investment the richer members help the poorer ones on the basis of mutual profit. Indeed, co-operation is so vital to their separate foreign policies that a permanent information and consultation agency for the Colombo Plan has been fashioned. It may also be pointed out that although every member of the sterling area within the Commonwealth is free to leave the sterling group, the force of economic inter-dependence is strong enough to pull them back.

In fact, the community of objectives is difficult to crystallise in a body to which peoples with different traditions, attitudes, aspirations and experiences belong. It would be true to say that the Commonwealth means a good deal more to Canada, Australia, New Zealand and to the South Africans of the British origin than what it means to India, Ceylon, Ghana, Malaya or Pakistan. As one authority has put it, "the common purpose of the Commonwealth is objective and minimal as far as the 'new' Asian members and the South Africans of Dutch descent are concerned. They are subjective and committed to the perpetuation of ideological and spiritual aspirations in the case of the overseas Britons who people Australia, Canada, and New Zealand". It is not just a family with some family differences. But if some nations of the Commonwealth are linked to Britain by kinship, and others by long association, all are linked by sentiment and beneath the sentiment there are "first order links", for after all by staying in the Commonwealth (none has so far joined it from outside) "each becomes more, has more influence on the course of world affairs, a more effective say in the great political and strategic issues of our time, more opportunity of effective action in international efforts to increase trade and raise the standard of living".

Commonwealth Links and Consultation Organs. We have noted that the Commonwealth has no Charter, much less a central coercive authority or machinery. The nations of the

Commonwealth are free and equal for they are all sovereign states, having their own foreign policies, their national interests, political and economic, and their own spheres in which to operate more vigorously than in others. Britain and Canada are members of the Atlantic Pact, with the United States across the Atlantic and Western European nations across the Channel. India is more inclined towards China and other Asian countries. Pakistan is both in South East Asia and in the Middle East and is in the Seato among others with Britain, Australia, New Zealand and France and in the Baghdad Pact with Britain and Iraq, Iran and Turkey. Canada has 3,000 miles of frontier with the United States, common defence problems, strong ties in finance, trade and industry, "an old, enduring and reciprocrated friendship". Australia and New Zealand joined the Anzus Pact with the United States and this caused strain on the relations with Britain. But obviously, to the mind of Australia and New Zealand, "the first power in the Pacific" is the United States for that was the lesson of the second world war and the Korean war.

It is, therefore, in this context that one can truly appreciate the Commonwealth links. No member can coerce the other to give up a ground or to adopt a policy. Decisions, whatever they are, can only be reached unanimously, and, what is more important, their implementation is absolutely voluntary and this ensures "a minimum of formal obligations and maximum freedom of action" for each member state. What are formal institutions built up on the basis of this formula ? The only formal link is the Crown—the formal ruler of each of the Dominions except India and Pakistan which are republics. But Her Majesty's Government in Canada may act quite differently from Her Majesty's Government in Ceylon, and in opposition to Her Majesty's Government in South Africa, though the same person is the head of each state. An ambassador from Ceylon is Her Majesty's representative quite as much as an ambassador from Britain. Sir Oliver Franks, British Ambassador at Washington from 1948 to 1952 mentioned an interesting episode in the *B. B. C. Reith Lectures*, 1954: "You will remember the visit paid to Canada by Princess Elizabeth with the Duke of Edinburgh before she became the Queen. The Princess was invited by the President of the United States to come to Washington. At first I assumed without thought that a British Princess was coming, but my distinguished Canadian colleague, the late Hume Wrong, made it clear to me that in Canada the Princess was a Canadian Princess and in Canada's view a Canadian Princess would soon be crossing the border....."

Other links have gradually disappeared. The Privy Council is no longer the final court of appeal for the whole Commonwealth as the Imperial Parliament cannot legislate for the Dominions. Common citizenship for all subjects of the Commonwealth coun-

tries is recognised by some members but not by others. Thus to formal links no great significance can be attached. More important than these are organs of consultation. These organs are *ad hoc*, irregular and are not based on any treaty. Prime Ministers' Conferences meet frequently in order to exchange notes and to arrive at some common policy decisions in the realm of defence and foreign affairs. Sometimes foreign ministers and finance ministers confer. In the realm of functional relations of agriculture, shipping and tele-communications, standing committees exist, but "they do not in any sense make law for the member states". At the moment there is no Commonwealth general staff, no secretariat, no defence liaison except by exchanging information and by assigning officers to the staffs of other member states. There is, of course, the "incessant inter-change of intelligence of common interest which is conducted through the U. K. office of Inter-Commonwealth Relations". There or more or less regular meetings of Commonwealth diplomats. Sir Oliver has thrown light on this aspect: "We all know that the Commonwealth is a unity. But in Washington I saw how that unity worked. Every fortnight except in the summer the eight Ambassadors of the Commonwealth meet in our Embassy to exchange views and consult informally together. We discussed every thing: the movement of affairs in the world, the latest phase of American policy and the opinions of our different countries about them. We did not mince words. Even difficulties between individual members, like Kashmir, were regularly talked over by all of us, including India and Pakistan, without conviction but without heat. Further, the discussions took place between like-minded people who shared a common political tradition. No one had to insist on the freedom of his country because no body ever questioned it. We had a common approach. We accepted common standards. We had forbearance, which is essential between members of a continuing club when they differ (*B. B. C. Reith Lectures*, p. 17).

The entire process is thus co-operative although the extent of co-operation is not defined. Attempt is made to coordinate policies as far as possible and if agreement is not possible, every individual country takes others in confidence about the reasons for which it has chosen to pursue a particular course, and for this they continuously exchange information through telegrams, cables and periodical meetings of diplomats and statesmen. These meetings are informal and the brief communiques that are issued usually emphasise the area of agreement and they do not enable an observer to know the divergent opinions that might have been expressed by the participants. It should be noted (and it is important in the context of the criticism often heard in this country about our retaining the membership of the Commonwealth) that an individual member of the Common-

wealth is not at all bound by any policy laid down at the Commonwealth Conference or Prime Ministers' Conference. Indeed, there is nothing like an integrated Commonwealth policy on any subject. Mr. Nehru went to the length of comparing Commonwealth membership with the membership of the United Nations. Just as the latter did not restrict a country's own policies, so he argued, the Commonwealth membership did not interfere with a member's independence. There are differences in approach, divergences in attitudes, even sharp ideological differences, between India and Pakistan, India and South Africa, Nehru and Churchill. Nevertheless, there is an inner unity of purpose on which the Commonwealth rests. Finally, the Dominion High Commissioners in London (rather than the Dominion High Commissioners stationed elsewhere) meet fortnightly and discuss policy issues. It does not imply the supremacy of Britain: it only means that the Mother Country has rather a special position. In fact the change from the expression "British Commonwealth of Nations" to "Commonwealth of Nations" is significant. In 1947, the Burmese Provisional Government raised the question of designation as a matter of substance and they suggested that Burma would continue to remain in the Commonwealth if it were renamed as "the United Commonwealth of Nations". To this, however, the old Dominions seriously objected and when the change was accepted, it was too late to affect Burma's decision. In 1947 the Dominion Office was renamed as the Commonwealth Relations Office and Lord Henderson stated in the House of Lords that to the word "Commonwealth" alone might be attributed the wider meaning of all territories within the Empire. In 1948, the British Nationality Bill of 1948 rendered the terms "British subjects" and "Commonwealth citizens" interchangeable. The authoritative pronouncement on the subject was made by Mr. Attlee in the House of Commons on May 2, 1949: "Terminology, if it is to be useful, keeps steps with developments without becoming rigid or doctrinaire. All constitutional developments in the Commonwealth or the British Empire—I use the two terms deliberately—have been the subject of consultation between His Majesty's Government in the U.K. to do so...I think it better to allow people to use the expression they like best".

Thus within its ranks, Britain might have a special position but has no predominance. Decisions are made on the basis of unanimity and "implementation of a decision is dependent upon the interest and concern of each member government". Questions upon which there is no unanimity are put back for later consideration. That explains why there has not been possible a Commonwealth solution to the problem of racial discrimination in South Africa, or of the Indians in Ceylon or

of Kashmir between India and Pakistan. In the case of South Africa passions rose high and in that of Kashmir hostilities actually broke out but in both there has been the intercession of the United Nations rather than the agency of the Commonwealth. Indeed in January 1951, the Pakistan Prime Minister was reported to have refused to attend the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference and it was not before an assurance was given to him that the Kashmir issue would be informally discussed that he went to join it. The truth is that as the various parts of the Empire emancipate themselves from the overriding rule and control of Britain, the racial national and political diversities of the component parts of the Empire gain in importance.

Commonwealth in the Modern World. Well, then, if the Commonwealth is "neither a constitutional unit, having no joint machinery of government, nor an economic and geographical unit, having no contiguity of territory or self-sufficiency of resources, nor a military unit, consisting as it does of different groups of Dominions and Colonies with widely varying degrees of military commitments", what is its role in the modern world? In a sense it would be correct to say that although the Commonwealth declined in its physical and military power, it has gained a new strength which "rests on the evolution of the principles and ideological foundations which hold its members together". The principles of tolerance, "respect for freedom" and "progressive democracy" are its essential principles. The diversities of races, nations, languages, religions, forms of government, stages of historical evolution and political status of different parts are remarkable. Co-existence is, therefore, the foundation on which such a heterogenous entity can stand. In accordance with the growing consciousness and maturity, different parts have become free and are in a common partnership based on democratic concepts. There are strains, differences, conflicts and even serious threats to the Commonwealth. Racial discrimination practised in the Union of South Africa is, for instance, a major threat to the principles of tolerance, freedom and democracy. Nevertheless, the very fact that the heads of governments of the Commonwealth countries take the trouble of going to an annual (it is practically annual now) conference at London indicates that it is a major force in world politics today. On the one hand the voice of the Dominions and the Republics has some positive influence on the British foreign policy, and through this, on the foreign policy of the United States. It may even be said that Britain's main reason for refusing to join any purely European organization with executive powers, such as the Coal and Steel Community or the abortive European Defence Community, is the fear that any far-reaching political integration of this

kind, leading to federation or some other form of supra-national authority, might interfere with the structure and cohesion of the British Commonwealth" The British policy on Korea, on the issue of recognition of China and even on the Suez crisis has, to a degree, been influenced by Commonwealth considerations. On the other hand, the edge of various aspects of the foreign policies of the Commonwealth countries is moderated in the process of mutual consultations and a greater cohesion is thereby established. Of this cohesion, the most concrete illustration is the Colombo Plan to which we will shortly turn. It is important to remember that the Commonwealth has a definite place in the context of the cold war.

Is it, on the whole, anti-communist? Speaking in the Union Parliament on May 11, 1949, Dr. Malan said: "India, like the rest of the world is today taking her stand with the anti-communist countries. She regards communism in Asia or communism which is trying to gain foothold in India also as danger, just as we regard it as a danger". Now, it is difficult to say what actually transpired between the Indian leaders and other Commonwealth leaders at the Prime Ministers' Conference in April, 1949. But it will not be wrong to say that the nations of the Commonwealth do not approve of the communist ideology. It might even be argued that any nation professing that ideology would, as a rule, be excluded from membership or that it would forfeit its Commonwealth membership by joining a communist bloc alliance. But no case of this kind has yet come about although in one of the states in India, a communist government is in office. It is to avert the communist danger and to stabilize democracy that the Commonwealth co-operation is mainly directed. The Colombo Plan underlines this cohesive and co-operative aspect of the Commonwealth and it is to this that now we turn.

THE COLOMBO PLAN

The origins of the Colombo Plan were interesting. Its first outlines seem to have been conceived by K. M. Panikkar, then India's Ambassador to China. When during the course of Chinese civil war (1947-49) the Nanking regime started collapsing, the Indian Ambassador had been virtually trapped in Nanking. During those days in April, 1949 he devoted himself to the study of the problem of South East Asia and of the communist expansion to the borders of Burma and Siam. "I thought", Panikkar writes in his memoirs, "the time had come to formulate a policy which would strengthen the economic, social and political structure of the area. With this object in view I wrote a memorandum the main argument of which was that without immediate and adequate help in the economic field, the political structure of South-East Asia would

provide no more than a frail barrier to the expansion of communism. I knew that my Government could not move in this matter effectively; so I decided to enlist the co-operation of the British and Australian Ambassadors and put forward the note to the Commonwealth Governments as a joint proposal. Keith Officer, the Australian Ambassador, who for all his conservatism had an imaginative mind, fell in with this idea, as did Sir Ralph Stevenson. Stevenson also showed my paper to Leighton Stuart, who it would appear agreed to recommend it independently to his Government. At the next Commonwealth Ambassador's meeting the memorandum was approved with minor verbal modifications and it was then forwarded to our Governments as a joint proposal. A copy was also sent informally to Malcolm MacDonald, the Commissioner-General in Singapore, to enable him to discuss it at an important conference of the heads of British Missions which was due to meet in Singapore. I was told later by Keith Officer that the proposals in that memorandum formed the basis of the discussions which led to the Colombo Plan" (K. M. Panikkar, *In Two Chinas: Memoirs of a Diplomat*, pp. 55-56).

The Commonwealth Prime Ministers Conference in October, 1948 and the Commonwealth Finance Ministers Conference in July, 1949 had drawn the attention towards the deplorable economic conditions prevailing in under-developed areas. In January, 1950 the Foreign Ministers of Australia, Canada, Ceylon, India, New Zealand, Pakistan and the U. K. met at Colombo to consider the political, economic and psychological problems of nearly 600 millions poverty-striken people inhabiting the vast region of South and South-East Asia and they at once agreed that their economic development is vitally important to the maintenance of political stability in those countries themselves and to the growth of an expanding world economy based on multi-lateral trade. The Foreign Ministers, therefore, set up a committee, called the Consultative Committee on Co-operative Economic Development in South and South-East Asia, to consider in greater details the development plans for the area. This committee met at Sydney from May 15-19, 1950 and was attended by the representatives of Australia, Canada, Ceylon, India, New Zealand, Pakistan, and the U. K. with Malaya and British Borneo. It recommended that the development in the area should proceed by progressive stages under a 6-year plan, to begin from July 1951, that the plans of the country situated in the area should be detailed enough to produce some real advancement but short enough to be able to scale the benefits, and that a Commonwealth Technical Assistance Scheme should be inaugurated. In this meeting it was also decided to invite the non-Commonwealth countries in the area to take a full part in the discussions of the Committee

at future meetings. In July and August the details of the Technical Assistance Scheme were worked out, and the constitution of the Council of Technical Co-operation was formalised.

Thus from the very beginning five elements of the Plan became clear: (*a*) It was to be a co-operative endeavour of the Commonwealth of Nations; (*b*) Non-Commonwealth countries were to be invited to participate in the plan, both as helpers and beneficiaries; (*c*) Emphasis on technical assistance based on the realisation that whatever financial and economic proposals were to be worked out would very largely depend upon the creation of the body of technical experts capable of implementing them; (*d*) The drawing up of separate plans by the individual countries situated in the area; (*e*) The emphasis on agricultural production as an indispensable condition for progressive industrialisation.

The next meeting of the Consultative Council was held at London from September 6 to September 25, 1950 and discussed the various 6-year programmes presented by India, Ceylon, Malaya, Pakistan, Singapore and North Borneo. In October, the plan was finalised and on November 28 it was issued under the title the Colombo Plan. Thus in about 9 months, as Hugh Gaitskell put it, the Commonwealth countries had translated "a revolutionary conception of co-operative development of an enormous area of the world into a series of realistic proposals". It was a 6-year plan and was officially launched on July 1, 1951.

The Colombo Plan stressed that the participating states should make the maximum contribution themselves and should ask for external assistance only if absolutely unavoidable. The targets were that by the middle of 1957 an additional 13 million acres would be brought under cultivation, an additional 13 million acres would be brought under irrigation, an additional production of 6 million tons of food grains and an additional electrical generating capacity of 1·1 million kilowat. The basic concept behind the Plan was that it should provide the capital and technical assistance to pave the foundations on which private enterprise could later on be built. And this foundation consists of irrigation works, extension of communication, the building up of power and harbour installations and the beginnings of social services—in other words the development of facilities which are necessary before private investment can operate profitably. Thus the Plan would create the technical facilities for foreign private capital and would remove the existing economic dislocations and uncertainties. This in its turn would lead to greater political stability and more confidence on the part of the private investor. The main element of the agricultural programme has been the construction of a number of multi-purpose projects, dams, power-houses and irrigation works on the pattern of the Tennesse

Valley in the United States. About 18% of the capital was to be spent on social services and originally the whole Plan was to cost £1,863 million over 6 years of which India was to consume 75%, Pakistan 15%, Ceylon 5% and Malaya and North Borneo 5%. It was estimated that the participating states could themselves finance the programme to the extent of £784 million. The rest would depend upon external assistance obtained through the sterling balances, overseas private investment to private enterprise in the area, overseas private investment to Governments in the area, loans from the IBRD, and finally the overseas finance from one Government to another. Under the Plan external assistance could be arranged independently and bilaterally between giving and receiving countries in the form of capital aid and technical assistance. During 1951-54 the Governments outside South and South East Asia authorised grants and loans totalling £390 million excluding the special sterling balance releases. In addition, the IBRD and the U. S. Export-Import Bank advanced £ 250 million. The programme was further expanded during the year 1955-56.

As we have seen, the Colombo Plan began as a British Commonwealth project. But very soon it expanded far beyond its original geographical scope and in 1956 all countries of South East Asia except North Vietnam were its members. The United States has also been a full member of the Consultative Committees since 1951 and both the IBRD and the ECAFE have been regularly represented at its meetings. It should be remembered that the Colombo Plan is not one plan but refers to the sum of various plans of individual countries, each country devising and executing its own programme and making its own arrangement for financing it. It has no permanent machinery or secretariat and no central headquarters. The greater part of the various plans budgets are financed domestically while foreign assistance is given and received entirely on a bilateral basis. Nevertheless, the Plan has a co-operative aspect and special machinery exists for the handling of technical co-operation. The Consultative Committee is a sort of annual conference of the representatives of participating Governments rather than a continuous organisation, and reviews the progress, analyses the difficulties, assesses the problem of the future and appraises the prospects for external assistance. It has developed concrete and realistic plans for economic developments, has provided a forum for the participants to render mutual help and exchange experience. It meets at a different capital every year.

Apart from the Consultative Committee the Colombo Plan has also developed the Colombo Plan Technical Co-operation Scheme administered by a Council for Technical Co-operation composed of representatives from the participating states, and

operating through a Bureau with headquarters at Colombo. It provides for the knowledge and skill necessary for the development schemes. The Colombo Plan has also an information unit in Colombo in order to assist member Governments to publicize the achievements under the Colombo Plan. The Consultative Committee held its meetings in London (1950), in Colombo (1951), in Karachi (1952), in New Delhi (1953), in Ottawa (1954), in Singapore (1955), and in Wellington (1956). The most significant meeting was that held in Singapore for it was agreed there that the Plan should be extended beyond June 30, 1957 and continue until June 30, 1961, and that the future of the Plan should again be considered by the Consultative Committee at the 1959 meeting.

Achievements under the Colombo Plan, 1951-57. It would be readily agreed that economic development proceeds very slowly particularly in a region where some of the finance, equipment and technical skill has to be imported from other countries. The results, however, are on the whole encouraging. Production of basic food crops has risen for the area as a whole. Tea and rubber production as well reached record level throughout the area covered by the Colombo Plan. In spite of the rise of population in the region a review of economic indicators suggests that national income continued to rise slightly in excess of the rate of population growth. With regard to the capital aid, the U. S. contribution by June 1956 had exceeded $ 2 million and the Canadian contribution amounted to about $ 168 million. Australia had spent £ A. 18·5 million on capital aid by June 1957. In addition to substantial private investment, capital aid from the U. K. has taken the form of grants (mainly to British territories), loans and credits of over £ 80 million and releases of sterling balances including releases from the U. K. contribution to the International Bank. A Commonwealth Development Finance Company has also been set up and the U. K. is willing to allow the Commonwealth countries to approach the London finance market in support of worthwhile projects and programmes. New Zealand allocated £ N. Z. 5 million for capital aid of which £ 2·8 million had been spent by June 30, 1956. In the sphere of technical assistance, all participants had provided 10,453 training awards and 2241 experts by June 1957 and by December 1956 Colombo Plan countries provided equipment for research, training and health services amounting to £ 1,277,000. From outside, the International Bank has made loans to member countries to the value of £A. 218 million by June, 1957. The United Nations and non-governmental organizations such as the Ford Foundation have supplied experts, fellowships, and equipment, and countries such as Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and Norway have provided credits for industrial

projects and technical assistance. It is important to remember that much emphasis is laid on mutual aid. For instance, India has helped Nepal with capital aid and granted 494 training awards by December, 1956. Other countries in the region granted another 97 training awards. Countries in the region have so far contributed about 10% of the total training awards provided by member countries of the Colombo Plan.

In short, the Colombo Plan had provided a kind of meeting ground between Asia and the West and is a fine instance of international co-operation without a Central Administration, based on flexible bilateral arrangements and consultations. It also emphasises the usefulness of the Commonwealth ties. As Sir John Kotelawala put it: "The economic aid that we so gratefully receive from you under the Colombo Plan, for example, is in the nature of a gift within a family, and in this sense differs from aid we may receive from a country outside the Commonwealth. It does not consist of mere goods and services which Canada may export abroad, but wealth and goodwill that moves from one part of our great Commonwealth to another, in order to develop our Commonwealth for the common good of all those who participate in it. In short, the Commonwealth offers an excellent opportunity of bridging the economic gap between East and West, in a spirit of friendly co-operation, rather than in an atmosphere of mutual obligation" (*An Asian Prime Minister's Story*, p. 143).

CHAPTER 10

The Struggle for Power in Russia

Before we analyse the elements and many aspects of the Soviet diplomatic offensive, it would be desirable to deal with the changes in domestic policies as reformulated by Stalin's successors. The immediate question was who would succeed Stalin. G. M. Malenkov who had presented the report of the Central Committee at the 19th Party Congress in October, 1952 almost at once became the Prime Minister and the First Secretary of the Party. If, on the one hand, none of Stalin's colleagues was in a position to assume the position of undisputed leadership which Stalin commanded, on the other, all of them were at least temporarily agreed on the necessity of presenting a united front to the nation and to the world. While outwardly, therefore, there could be no break with the Stalin regime the process of change had already begun. During the first week of the new regime there were indications that Malenkov was seeking to consolidate his position as *primus inter pares*. But on March 21, 1953 *Pravada* announced that a plenary session of the Party Central Committee had voted on March 14 "to grant the request of Malenkov to be released from the duties of the Secretary of the Party Central Committee". N. S. Khrushchev was appointed to this office. The Army was given greater prominence by the appointment of Marshall Voroshilov as Head of the State and Marshal Zhukov as a first Deputy Minister of Defence. The renewed emphasis on "collective leadership" in which the triumvirate of Malenkov, Beria and Molotov were featured as the leading figures of the new regime suggested a determined move "to circumscribe Malenkov's powers and to prevent him from donning Stalin's mantle".

The Beria Affair. Soon, however, Beria made a strenuous effort to expand his authority. A little before the death of Stalin (on January 13, 1953), the arrest of the 15 Kremlin doctors alleged to have cut short the lives of Zhdanov and Shcherbakov and to have sought to destroy the health of leading Soviet military personnel had been announced. This announcement was accompanied by a statement that "the agencies of state security did not discover the doctors' wrecking, terrorist organisation in time". This was a censure of Beria—chief of the Ministry of Interior. Beria was, therefore,

determined to vindicate his position. On March 27, a far-reaching amnesty for many categories of prisoners and a reduction of sentences for others were announced. On April 13, Beria's ministry made the astonishing announcement that the Kremlin's Doctors' Plot had been a hoax. Immediately after, Beria reinstated his close supporters in key positions. This naturally upset the leadership, and on July 10, 1953 the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet briefly announced that Beria was accused of "criminal anti-party and anti-state actions" in a bid to "subvert the Soviet State in the interest of foreign capital", and of "having attempted to place the Ministry of Internal Affairs above the Government and the C. P. S. U". He was removed from his Government and party posts and expelled from the party as an enemy of the people, attempting "to sow friction among the peoples of the U. S. S. R. and to activise bourgeois national elements in the Union Republics" and of "illegality and high handedness". The arrest of Beria was followed by a purge of his supporters in Georgia. On December 17, it was announced that Beria had confessed to all the accusations and on December 24, the Soviet Press announced that Beria and six associates had been executed by a firing squad after a secret trial. The execution of Beria was motivated by the fear of other Soviet leaders that he might prepare the way for the use of a new Stalin. As Mr. Nehru has put it: "With the removal of Beria, there was the first major break (with the Stalin regime). Beria was the embodiment of the worst features of the Stalinist regime, and there is no doubt that there was no love lost between him and the present leaders of Russia. He was tolerated only as long as they were not strong enough to remove him. If they had hit earlier, there was the risk of Beria removing them". In short, Beria's destruction provided a timely peg on which the post-Stalin leadership could pin an assurance to the Soviet citizen that he really need not be afraid, and it necessitated increased reliance upon the Party functionaries and the military.

The Rise and Fall of Malenkov. The liquidation of Beria eliminated a major contestant from the scene, and from this whole affair Malenkov seemed to have emerged with resumed prestige. In the Supreme Soviet session of August 1953, he is reported to have played a major role. But his departure from the Party Secretariat in March, 1953 had already weakened his position and with the entry of Khrushchev, Malenkov's star began to wane. On September 13, 1953, Khrushchev was elected First Secretary of the Party Central Committee and soon after, he started changing the party apparatus to develop a formidable party machine. He attacked Malenkov's economic policies and his report of February 23, 1954 at the plenary session of the

Party Central Committee unveiled a grandiose programme to solve the problem of Soviet grain supply by opening up vast tracts of new land. It was construed as an implied rebuke to Malenkov, who had stated at the 19th Party Congress that "the grain problem has been solved, solved definitely and finally". At the April session of the Supreme Soviet, Malenkov no longer dominated the proceedings. In 1954 it was Khrushchev who led the Soviet delegations to Poland, Czechoslovakia and China. Bulganin accompanied him to China, while Molotov and Malenkov were left out. While Khrushchev was vocal and receiving full publicity, Malenkov was silent and was being ignored. In 1955 the clash occurred on the question of priority to be accorded to the consumers goods campaign, as against renewed emphasis on heavy industry. On January 25, 1955, Khrushchev violently attacked Malenkov's policies in a speech to the Central Committee. "In connection with the measures lately taken for increasing output of consumers goods, some comrades have confused the question of the pace of development of heavy and light industry in our country. These pseudo-theoreticians try to claim that at some stage of socialist construction the development of heavy industry ceases to be the main task and that light industry can and should overtake all other branches of industry. This is profoundly incorrect reasoning, alien to the spirit of Marxism-Leninism—nothing but slander of our party. This is a belching of the rightist deviation, a regurgitation of views hostile to Leninism which Rykov, Bukharin and their like once preached".

The stage was thus well set for the downfall of a man whom Stalin was reported to have combed as his heir. On February 8, 1955, Malenkov sent his letter of resignation. He was relieved from the post of the Prime Minister and was demoted to the Ministry for Electrical Power Stations. In the traditional Soviet fashion, Malenkov acknowledged his administrative "inexperience" and his "guilt and responsibility for the unsatisfactory state of affairs in agriculture". He also paid a tribute to the new agricultural reforms sponsored by Khrushchev, which he admitted were "based upon the only correct foundation—the further all-round development of heavy industry—and only the realization of this programme will provide the necessary conditions for a real increase in the production of all necessary consumer goods". Thus the New Look inaugurated by Malenkov seemed to have been brought to an end and his demotion too appeared to signify an increase in the power of the army and party, and a renewed concentration on heavy industry. The fact that, unlike Beria, Malenkov was retained seemed to imply that the latter posed no real threat to his colleagues, and to

signify to the outside world that the leadership remained monolithic in its unity and singleness of purpose.

Khrushchev, Bulganin and 20th Party Congress. The demotion of Malenkov was followed by a reconstruction of the party and state machine. Bulganin replaced Malenkov as the Premier and the former yielded the Ministry of Defence to Marshal Zhukov. The prestige of Khrushchev was greatly enhanced and both in domestic as well as in foreign affairs he started speaking with a remarkable degree of freedom. Whether he was more than *primus inter pares* was still not very clear but diplomatic observers felt that "junta rule continued to prevail". Police had been completely subordinated to the Party and despite the significant appointment of Zhukov as Minister of Defence, no new military figure was co-opted in the Presidium. On February 14, 1956, the 20th Congress of the C. P. S. U. opened in Moscow and Khrushchev's open Central Committee's Report, delivered to this Congress on February 25, became the most momentous event since the death of Stalin. Delegates of 55 foreign communist parties gave the Congress something of the aspect of a meeting of the old Comintern. All decisions were taken by unanimous vote, and most of the speakers conveyed "the impression of actors reciting their assigned scripts in accordance with cues provided by the Report of the Central Committee.

The most dramatic highlight of the Congress was the *coup de grace* administered to the Stalin cult. It is true that the denigration of Stalin was well under way long before the Congress assembled, and it may, indeed, be said to have begun with the funeral orations over Stalin's bier. The Soviet Press passed his birthday on December 21, 1953 without much notice. In 1954, however, he had been partially restored to grace and on November 6, 1955 Kaganovich paid tribute to "the great Stalin" and his birthday in 1955 elicited the customary press tribute. In his address, Khrushchev gave out a strong denunciation of the "personality cult" but did not openly mention Stalin's name. It remained for Nikoyan to launch the first open attack. He sharply criticized Stalin's short course on the History of the Party, demanded new text tooks to replace it, and called for the rehabilitation of a number of old Bolsheviks who were "wrongly declared enemies of the people". Most of the principal speakers extolled the virtues of collective leadership at all levels and called for free and critical discussion of policies for the purpose of avoiding mistakes and encouraging initiative. Considerable stress was, however, laid, on the unity of the Party, which clearly remains the chief political force in the country, and the speeches of the main leaders contained no suggestion of the schisms and spasms which strained the Congresses after

Lenin's death and which were expected after Stalin's death. Deputies were told to engage in discussion of practical questions instead of making empty propaganda, and electors were told to recall deputies who did not carry out their duties. The need for revision of the judicial system and the criminal codes, and for decentralization in order to promote freedom, efficiency, flexibility, initiative and incentive was emphasised. Emphasis was also laid on heavy industry, the scheme of industrial development in eastern Siberia, the principle that "production must lag behind demand", the development of atomic energy, improvement of livestock and increase in agricultural production.

In his secret report which became known to the world only in June 1956, Khrushchev made sensational revelations and ascribed the worst evils of the Communist regime in Russia to Stalin. He told the Congress that Stalin abandoned the method of ideological struggle for that of administrative violence, mass repressions and terror, and that whosoever opposed him was "doomed to moral and physical annihilation". He charged the late leader of "the mass deportations from their native places of whole nations".

It was in the sphere of ideology that the 20th Party Congress will be remembered. While many of Stalin's notions of forced collectivization, urbanization, extensive priority for heavy industry and many of his theories like "decaying capitalist encirclement with its panoramas of impending crisis, contracting markets, cut-throat competition, businessmen fattening on perpetually impoverished workers, anti-labour legislation and strikes, colonial strife, and the rest" were not repudiated, a few of them have been adapted to "the thermo-nuclear age, the lure of popular fronts, and the psychology of post-colonial neurosis". The Congress provided a platform for a whole series of ideological reformulations which in their collective impact manifested a capacity for fresh manoeuvre, in striking contrast to the rigidities of latter day Stalinism. In the *first* place, the theory of inevitability of war was modified. Khrushchev argued that "the Marxist-Leninist precept that wars are inevitable as long as imperialism exists.....was evolved at a time when (*i*) imperialism was an all-embracing world system, and (*ii*) the social and political forces which did not want war were weak, poorly organized and hence unable to compel the imperialists to renounce war.....Now there is a world camp of socialism which has become a mighty force. In this camp the peace forces find not only the moral, but also the material means to prevent aggression. Moreover, there is a large group of other countries with a population running into many hundreds of millions which are actively working to avert war. The labour movement in

the capitalist countries has today become a tremendous force. The movement of peace supporters has sprung up and developed into a powerful factor. In these circumstances certainly the Leninist precept that so long as imperialism exists, the economic basis giving rise to wars will also be presumed remains in force. That is why we must display the greatest vigilance. As long as capitalism survives in the world, the reactionary forces representing the interests of the capitalist monopolies will continue their drive towards military gambles and aggression, and may try to unleash war. But war is not fatallistically inevitable".

Secondly, the doctrine of peaceful co-existence was now restated to reflect a new awareness of the dangers of thermonuclear warfare and of the realities of the atomic stalemate. This doctrine was now proclaimed without the usual qualifications that it could endure at the most only for a prolonged period. Mikoyan specifically repudiated the view that peaceful co-existence was a mere tactical expedient, not that the Soviet leaders renounced their faith in the ultimate triumph of world communism. Indeed, Shepilov declared that the ideological struggle against capitalism would be waged with the utmost vigour and consistency. It was, however, declared that the Soviet Union would not "plan to interfere in the internal affairs of countries where capitalism still exists". Quoting Romain Rolland, Khrushchev announced: "freedom is not brought in from abroad in baggage trains like Bourbons" and added: "It is ridiculous to think that revolutions are made to order.....our certainty of the victory of communism is based on the fact that the socialist mode of production possesses decisive advantages over the capitalist mode of production".

Thirdly—and this proved to be the most momentous in the light of events in Hungary and Poland after October, 1956—the current theory of "transition to socialism" was now amplified. Two departures were here made from Stalinism. First it was emphasised that there are different roads to Socialism. "In connection with the radical changes in the world arena", Khrushchev declared, "new prospects are also opening up in respect to the transition of countries and nations to socialism". After enlisting the new forms of socialism in the Peoples Democracies, China and Yugoslavia, he added that "it is probable that more forms of transition to socialism will appear". Thus the example of the U.S.S.R. need not be blindly followed and the principle that revolution in each country would be governed by local conditions was emphasised. A second departure was the pronouncement that socialism can be achieved by parliamentary methods and not necessarily by civil wars under all circumstances.

The forms of social revolution, Khrushchev argued, vary, and "it is not true that we regard violence and civil war as the only way to remake society . . . In this connection the question arises whether it is possible to go over to socialism by using parliamentary means. No such course was open to the Russian Bolsheviks, who were the first to effect this transition. Lenin showed us another road, that of the establishment of a republic of Soviets, the only correct road in those historical conditions... Since then, however, the historical situation has undergone radical changes which make possible of new approach to the question. The forces of socialism and democracy have grown immeasurably throughout the world, and capitalism has become much weaker. The mighty camp of socialism with its population of over 900 million is growing and gaining in strength. Its gigantic internal forces, its decisive advantages over capitalism, are being increasingly revealed from day to day. Socialism has a great power of attraction for the workers, peasants, and intellectuals of all countries. The ideas of socialism are indeed coming to dominate the minds of all toiling humanity. The winding of a stable parliamentary majority backed by a mass revolutionary movement of the proletariat and of all the working people could create for the working class of a number of capitalist and former colonial countries the conditions needed to secure fundamental social changes". But the commitment to parliamentarianism is not entirely unreserved, for, it was unequivocally stated that "in the countries where capitalism is still strong and has a huge military and police apparatus at its disposal, the reactionary forces will of course inevitably offer serious resistance", and "there the transition to socialism will be attended by a sharp class revolutionary struggle". Again, the principle of Soviet Union's leadership was not entirely thrown aside and Khrushchev unhesitatingly declared: "Whatever the form of transition to socialism, the decisive and indispensable factor is *the political leadership of the working class headed by its vanguard.* Without this there can be no transition to socialism".

Finally, there was a complete break from Stalinist tradition which branded countries like India, Burma and Ceylon as stooges of the Western powers. "The disintegration of the imperialist colonial system now taking place", Khrushchev told the Congress, "is a post-war development of world historic significance . . . People's China and *the independent Indian Republic* have joined the ranks of the great powers . . . In contrast to the pre-war period, most Asian countries now act in the world arena as sovereign states or states which are resolutely upholding their right to an independent foreign policy". True that these countries had not yet achieved economic liberation but "the winning of political freedom is the first and most important pre-requisite of their full independence".

In the light of these ideological reformulations at the 20th Congress the future directions of Soviet policies as given by the successors of Stalin may now be enumerated:

(1) A degree of liberalization in administration, decentralization in economy, emphasis on heavy industry and development of agriculture.

(2) Emphasis on collective leadership and a war on personality cult.

(3) Peaceful co-existence and relaxation of tension.

(4) Consolidation of the Soviet bloc, rapprochement with Yugoslavia, and strengthening bonds with China on the basis of the theory of "different roads to Socialism".

(5) Strengthening of friendly relations with the uncommitted nations of the East and neutrals of the West, improvement of relations with the West through trade and cultural contacts, and isolating the United States of America.

(6) A vigilant watch on the intrigues of circles which are not interested in relaxation of tensions and the further strengthening of Soviet industrial capacity and the Soviet defensive might.

(7) Ensuring Party supremacy over the Police, the Army and Bureaucracy.

Khrushchev wears the mantle of Stalin, 1956-58. The forces released by the 20th Party Congress were serious as was fully illustrated by the ferment in Poland and Hungary in October, 1956 and for some time it appeared that Khrushchev's fate was hanging in the balance. The struggle for power in the Kremlin was becoming more acute and eventually the outcome of this was Khrushchev's ascent to the summit on March 27, 1958 when he replaced Nikolai Bulganin as the Soviet Prime Minister, retaining the office of the First Secretary of the Communist Party. This struggle was waged in three stages. The first stage was completed on July 4, 1957 when the anti-Party group of Malenkov, Kaganovich, and Molotov was sacked and all three along with Shepilov, Pervukhin and Caburov were deprived of their positions in the highest Party organs and were expelled from the Central Committee. The second stage was completed in November, 1957 when Marshal Zhukov, the Soviet Minister of Defence and the most popular of the Soviet military leaders was summarily and unexpectedly dismissed. The third stage matured on March 27, 1958 when Khrushchev was unanimously elected as the Prime Minister by the Supreme Soviet on a motion made by President Voroshilov.

We have noted that Khrushchev had made violent attacks on Malenkov in 1953-54 and the latter's resignation from the

Premiership in February, 1955 seems to have been engineered by the former. While during his Premiership Malenkov favoured highly centralized Government, Khrushchev, shortly after Malenkov's demotion, has given increasingly wider executive authority to local bodies and dismantled the Central Government apparatus. With Molotov, the basic differences ran on foreign policy. Khrushchev, along with Bulganin and Mikoyan, had increasingly usurped the Foreign Minister's functions in 1955-56, until Molotov's resignation was finally announced shortly before the triumphant visit of his old enemy, Marshal Tito. Molotov's speech to the Supreme Soviet in February, 1955 showed that he had reservations about the rapprochement with Yugoslavia, and that he would object to dangerous talk about different roads to Socialism. Kavanovich was no longer needed by Khrushchev who regarded him as "mischievous superfluousness". These three leaders, then, progressively fell apart from Khrushchev who felt that they were attempting to seize power. In fact after the Polish and the Hungarian crisis the Molotov group gained the upper hand in the Presidium of the Central Committee and, combined with the signs of intellectual ferment among the Soviet intelligentsia and students, a crisis in the world communist movement and strain on the Soviet economy in 1956, these events appeared to have decided Khrushchev's fate. The Molotov group attributed all these troubles to Khrushchev's policy of de-Stalinization and to the forces unleashed at the 20th Party Congress. At this juncture Saburov and Pervukhin also began to oppose Khrushchev on questions of economic planning and administration. In December 1956, therefore, when the Central Committee of the Party held its plenary session, Khrushchev had almost lost the battle. The Committee's decision to appoint a new type of central planning body, with managerial as well as planning powers with a powerful team of Deputy Prime Ministers at its head, and which would be too strong to be overruled by any Party body except the Presidium was a sad disappointment for him. There were rumours that he would be replaced by Malenkov. As late as January 18, 1957, he had to yield to Molotov group and publicly rehabilitated Stalin at the Chinese embassy.

But as the year 1957 proceeded, he started emerging from the eclipse and became the most dynamic figure in the Presidium. He was greatly helped by the bumper harvest in 1956, announced several popular measures, e. g. the termination as from 1958 of the unpopular compulsory state loans, the abolition at the end of 1957 of compulsory deliveries from private plots, and the intensification of efforts to raise the food supply to the American level. He set out on a nation-wide trip presumably to enlist the support of the rank-and-file members of the Central Commit-

tee for the forthcoming plenary session which opened in February, 1957. In this session his first successes were registered and his plan for further decentralization of industrial administration was adopted which implied augmenting Party control. This amounted to "legalized purge" which "deprived the Molotov group of a bureaucratic base in Moscow. The Central Committee (C. C.) also removed Molotov's protege Shepilov from his post of Minister of Foreign Affairs, although a compromise was made by his inclusion on the Secretariat of the Central Committee. Soon after, his plan was published for discussion and in May 1957, the Supreme Soviet incorporated it in a law. The Molotov group became sullen and possibly obstructed the implementation of this law and vehemently opposed his popular measures referred above. Then came Mao Tse-tung's speech on contradictions inside a socialist society which was fatal for Molotov faction. Khrushchev immediately had this speech published in *Pravada*. Such was the situation when Molotov's supporters decided to open the attack on Khrushchev at the meeting of the Central Committee Presidium convened at the former's request, ostensibly to discuss speeches to be made at the celebrations in honour of Leningrad's 250th anniversary. Presumably the Molotov group got wind of Khrushchev's intention of using the Leningrad celebrations as the occasion for denouncing Malenkov, the author of the 'Leningrad Affair', and perhaps other leaders responsible for past purges.

In the Presidium the furious debate continued for three days. Malenkov is reported to have denounced Khrushchev for "right-wing deviationism" because his agricultural policies allegedly favoured the peasants at the expense of industrial development, and demanded his resignation. It was here that Bulganin is reported to have vacillated and this may be a partial explanation of Bulganin's demotion on March 27, 1958. In any case, Khrushchev now decided to carry the battle from the Presidium to the C. C. which alone, according to the Party status, has the right to appoint and dismiss its Secretaries. His demand for calling the C. C. was backed by an extraordinary manoeuvre. "While the Presidium was meeting, members of the C. C. (mostly military members).....appeared outside the Conference chamber and demanded to know what was happening. The opposition at first angrily rebuffed their impertinent and quite unprecedented attempts on the part of the C. C. to assert its rights, and ignored reminders that the Presidium was, after all, responsible to its electors. By June 21, more than a hundred members had joined the agitation for a plenary meeting, and the opposition was compelled to yield to their demand".

At the plenary meeting the C. C. condemned the Molotov

group. A resolution incorporating this condemnation was duly passed. An indictment against Malenkov, Kaganovich, Molotov and Shepilov was drawn out. They were accused of dogmatism, conservatism, and obstructionism to party decisions, infringement of party status, factional struggle, careerism, double dealing, infringement of socialist legality and "ideological disarray". It was alleged that in the sphere of foreign policy, the group had opposed peaceful co-existence, the relaxation of international tension, and the establishment of friendly relations with all peoples. It was pointed out that Molotov had obstructed improvement of relations with Yugoslavia, conclusion of a peace treaty with Austria, the normalization of relations with Japan, and the establishment of closer contacts between the C. P. S. U. and progressive non-communist groups abroad. He was reported to have opposed the theory of different roads to socialism and the doctrine that war is no longer inevitable in modern conditions and he was alleged to have denied the expediency of personal contacts between Soviet and foreign statesmen.

Thus the first stage had been completed. But it seems certain that Khrushchev's triumph was largely the result of the support given him by the military leaders and probably he thought that it might not be easy for him "to appeal again to the C. C. if a majority of his present colleagues, including the important provincial and central Party Secretaries and Marshal Zhukov, opposed him on some issue". Marshal Zhukov, hero of the battles for Moscow, Stalingrad and Leningrad, who halted the German invasion of Russia in 1941 and later launched the decisive counter-offensive through Poland to Berlin, was second in popularity to Marshal Stalin in 1945. On October 4. 1957, he left Moscow for Yugoslavia whence he went to Albania on October 17. On October 26, within hours of his return to Moscow, he was relieved of his post and the Presidium of the U. S. S. R. Supreme Soviet appointed Marshal Malinovsky as the Defence Minister. This clearly indicated that Khrushchev was taking no chances and was doing everything he could to consolidate his position of power. On October 28, Zhukov was excluded from the Presidium. Next day Khrushchev announced at Moscow reception in the Turkish Embassy that Zhukov would be assigned "another post compatible with his capacities". This was interpreted to mean that Zhukov had lost the fight. On November 2, the C. C. formally announced that Zhukov had been expelled from the Presidium as well as the Central Committee for opposing party decisions. The Committee also announced that this decision had been approved by army representatives and high ranking officials of the Party and Soviets who took part in the plenary meeting. The full explanation of Zhukov's dismissal appeared in the *Pravada*:

"The grave erroneousness and perniciousness of the attitude of former Minister of Defence Zhukov, an attitude decisively condemned and rejected by the October plenary session of the Party Central Committee as incorrect and non-party, comprises the fact that he pursued a policy of divorcing our armed forces from the communist party, weakening the party organization, and, in fact, liquidating political organs in the Soviet Army. His activities quite clearly showed a tendency to regard the Soviet armed forces as his own property and to escape supervision by the Party Central Committee; he strove to bar the Party Central Committee from the solution of the most important questions connected with Army and Navy life". In short, he was accused of developing around himself a "cult of the individual".

The dismissal of Zhukov brought Khrushchev closer to the establishment of a personal dictatorship, even though he had not rebuilt the intricate Stalinist mechanism of controls and counter-controls. Bulganin had incurred his displeasure in the June crisis to which we have referred. The real power was now in the hands of Khrushchev. On March 27, 1958, he replaced Bulganin as the Prime Minister. There was hardly any sign of his fall except that in the elections early in March, 1958, he stood as a candidate in the remote Maikop constituency in Southern Russia while for many years past he had represented a Moscow constituency in the Supreme Soviet. It was reported that when Voroshilov proposed Khrushchev's appointment as Prime Minister, "thunderous applause broke out from the 1,378 deputies who rose to their feet almost as one man" and that "Marshal Bulganin clapped his hands in rhythm with the others". On March 31, Bulganin was appointed Chairman of the Gosbank, a job which is included in the Government list of Ministers and which he held before the war. His new government status must arouse questions on his party status, for he continues to be a member of the 15-man Presidium of the Soviet Communist Party. Thus within five years of the death of Stalin, Khrushchev has emerged as the strongest man in Moscow and has, for the first time after Stalin, combined the headship of the Party with that of the Government. His prolonged tirade against the "cult of the individual" has all ended up in his being installed in a position of unrivalled and undisputed supremacy.

Is it correct to say that Khrushchev's appointment as the Soviet Prime Minister is a revival of Stalinism? To say that would be rather rash. His victory does signify the victory of the Party over everything else but it does not mean a sudden end to the process of liberalization and decentralization which now is difficult to arrest or a return to the "Stalinist cult of the

individual". The brute weapons of Stalinist mass terror have not been brought into use and no leader, except Beria, has so far been executed after demotion. It is true that enormous power in the hands of the Party apparatus has been concentrated, but this does not mean that Khrushchev is as unassailable as Stalin was. He not only lacks Stalin's stature and unrivalled experience and prestige at home and abroad, but also Stalin's firm hold in the Communist world. Indeed, to make himself absolute he would probably have to devise some counter-weight to the Party, to channel through a number of different networks to which he alone controlled the master-switch. His ascent to power does not indicate the revival of the personality cult and the end of the era of collective leadership. It only formalizes what in reality has been the position in Moscow. Ever since the death of Stalin he was the most important man in the C. P. S. U. There is nothing surprising in a strong man weiling power in reality gradually getting to the position of authority.

POST-STALIN DOMESTIC CHANGES

Soviet Russia, 1945—1953. We have examined the effects of the second world war on the Soviet Union—loss of 12 million lives with 25 millions rendered homeless, and the destruction of about one-third of the national wealth. Soon after the end of this war, the Soviet Union took up the work of building Communism. The aim of the fourth five-year plan (1945—50) actually launched in 1946 was "to restore the afflicted districts of the country, to restore industry and agriculture to their pre-war level and then to exceed that level to a more or less considerable degree". It called for an increase of 62% in the production of capital goods but only 26% for consumer goods. An unprecedented drought and crop-failure in 1946 obstructed the initial progress of the Plan and in 1947 there were serious shortages of food and housing while the urban population was constantly increasing. (It increased from 61 million in 1940 to 80 million in 1953). Food rationing, reintroduced during the war, ended with the close of 1947. Working hours were lengthened, and efforts involving both rewards and punishments were made to step up labour productivity. A vigorous campaign for larger fcamilies was launched; bonuses were granted for extra children, bahelors and childless couples were taxed; medals of motherhood were awarded for fertility. Marriage and divorce laws were revised so as to strengthen family ties. Fullest emphasis was laid on industrialization. By 1948 gross industrial output had exceeded the 1940 level by 14%, with particularly big increases in the coal, iron, and steel industries which were now being developed in eastern areas, away from the vulnerable Ukraine.

The fifth five-year plan (1950—55) launched in 1950 aimed at an increase of 12% every year in the combined output of the basic industries. In the first year the increase in production was 16%, in the second 11%, in the third and fourth 14%. By the end of 1955, the Soviet industrial output had gone 3-5 times the 1940 volume and the general volume of industrial production in 1957 was 33 times greater than in 1913. The great achievements of the Soviet scientists in mathematics, mechanics, physics, chemistry and electronics have made it possible to solve successfully the most difficult problems connected with the development of electric power production, the engineering, metallurgy and radio engineering automatic production and distance control; to further the use of the latest technique in production and to elaborate highly effective technological processes. Even the Western critics on Soviet affairs have been obliged to admire the Soviet achievements. As Jackson has put it: "Sceptical as one may be about Soviet official statistics and estimate, Russian industrial recovery after the war must rank as an outstanding achievement, particularly in view of the low productivity of labour and the claims on man-power made by the armed forces. The quality of Russian industrial products in general might be low, but in some respects they were remarkably high, as those who suffered from Mig fighting planes in the Korean war had reason to know. It was a surprise when the Russians succeeded in manufacturing atom bombs in 1949, and when Malenkov told the Supreme Soviet in August, 1953 that the United States 'had no monopoly in the hydrogen bomb, few peoples in the Western world believed him, though Western leaders had soon to admit that Russia had not only the bombs but the planes in which to deliver them" (J. Hampden Jackson, *The Post-War Decade*, p. 172).

As for industry, so with agriculture. During the war "when the need was for maximum agricultural output with a minimum of energy-consuming supervision", the government had eased some of its restrictions on the peasants and temporarily halted its campaign for total collectivization. At the end of the war the problem before the Government was three-fold: (*i*) Establishment of stronger party control over the peasants; (*ii*) reduction in the labour-force on the land so as to find recruits for industry; (*iii*) increasing the yield of the collective farms so as to feed the fast-increasing urban population. Since 1945, therefore, the government began to enforce strictly agrarian legislation and efforts were made to regiment the peasants as thoroughly as the urban workers. In 1950-51 the number of collective farms was reduced by 50% in order to make an effective use of agricultural machinery, to release administrative staff which could be diverted to industrial work in the towns, and to ensure easier

political supervision of the farm-workers. The peasants were now required to leave their old dwellings in the villages and shift to the "collective-farm settlement" established in the new amalgamated farms. This meant that there could now be a Party cell in each collective farm. But in terms of production, the results of this amalgamation were not entirely satisfactory and this created serious conflicts after the death of Stalin. In general, however, the progress has been remarkable. In 1957, the Soviet Union had 1,577,000 tractors, 385,000 grain harvester combines and 631,000 lorries. The areas under all crops grew, as compared with 1913, by more than 50%, the area under wheat by almost 100%, under technical crops by 170%, under cotton and sugar beet by 200%.

In other spheres also, the Soviet Union's progress was stable. The armed forces were kept strong. The air force and navy were enlarged and atomic research was pushed. To make up for war-time losses, the government, as we have already noted, pursued a vigorous campaign for larger families. Some changes were made in the governmental structure. The Union Republics, for instance, were given the right to establish diplomatic relations with foreign states and to maintain armies. The Commissariats were changed to ministries and expanded in number. During the war, the "bars to membership" in the Party had been lowered and this pushed up membership from 2,500,000 in 1939 to 6,300,000 in 1947 and 6,800,000 in October 1952. At the 19th Party Congress in 1952, the term "Bolshevik" was officially dropped and the party came to be called as the C. P. S. U. The Politburo and Orgburo were abolished and replaced by a Presidium. It is hardly necessary to comment on the Soviet attitude towards religion. At the end of the war, a conciliatory policy was tried. Organized religion had supported the Soviet war effort and this had to be rewarded. A somewhat more conciliatory religious policy might also remove a continuing source of internal discontent and possibly win new support abroad. Again, in 1944 the Soviet army prepared for invasion of Poland, and the occupation of other countries, entirely or largely Catholic, was in sight. In this situation Stalin thought it opportune to obtain the good will of the Catholic masses and even the neutrality of the Vatican. Hence concessions were made with regard to religious study, worship and organization. A number of "theological seminaries" and monasteries were reopened and shrines restored.

Soviet Union since Stalin's Death: The New Course, 1953-55. It was on March 5, 1953 that Stalin died, and to sense the distance which the new Soviet regime has travelled since this date, it is only necessary to recall the appeal to avoid "disorder and panic" which accompanied the announcement of

the new party and governmental leadership on March 7. Stalin's successors rose up to the occasion, submerged their differences for the time being, and rallied the forces of national unity around party and government. (We have already dealt with the story of struggle for succession and here we are concerned with the manifold changes that followed in the wake of Stalin's death). It was, however, not long before there were signs of a break with many aspects of Stalinism. In his funeral oration on March 9, and his address to the Supreme Soviet on March 15, Malenkov set the pace, and advancement of popular welfare became the key slogans of the new regime. On March 15, Premier Malenkov relinquished the post of Party Secretary in favour of N. S. Khrushchev. On March 27, a far-reaching amnesty for many categories of prisoners and a reduction of sentences for others was announced. On April 1 came the news of a substantial cut in retail prices. On April 3, the Kremlin doctors were released and on April 6, a *Pravada* editorial promised that all cases of official high-handedness and lawlessness would be rooted out and that constitutional rights would be safeguarded. On May 23, for the first time in many years, wheat flour was placed on daily sale in government stores in Moscow and other principal cities. On June 28, the state loan was cut in half. By July, the columns of all Soviet newspapers were filled with articles promising more consumer goods, increasing housing, better restaurant facilities, and closer attention to workers' grievances.

The campaign culminated in Malenkov's address to the Supreme Soviet on August 8, in which he elaborated government plans to expand the production of consumer goods, to improve housing construction, and to provide additional incentives to encourage agricultural output. This new course of the Malenkov government implied, if it did not express, repudiation of the Stalinist legacy of deprivation and sacrifice, and the attack on the cult of the leader, the denunciation of police lawlessness in the Kremlin's doctors' case, and the expression of concern for the welfare of the Soviet citizen carried overtones of anti-Stalinism. It was necessary for collective leadership to make an immediate bid for popularity and the result was the "New Course" with its emphasis on the consumer goods. As *Soviet News* put it: "The Soviet people deprived themselves of many things and the State economised on everything in order to invest bigger sums in the development of heavy industry. This task has now been successfully accomplished and the country can, in real earnest, undertake the development of those branches of the economy which satisfy the consumer demands of the people". Addressing the Supreme Soviet on August 3, 1953, Malenkov said that it was "essential to increase investment in the develop-

ment of light industry and to draw the engineering and heavy industries on a wider scale into consumer-goods production".

The New Course signified to the Soviet peoples more food, clothing and housing; to the People's Democracies an easing of pressure on their own heavy-industrial expansion; and to the West less concentration on armaments production. The reassurance to the West was, as we will note later, encouraged in 1953-54 by talk of peaceful co-existence, freer exchange of delegations, athletes and artists, and promotion of armistice in Korea and Indo-China. The West, nevertheless, continued to increase its armaments and re-armament of Germany. At the same time the plan to produce more consumer goods did not fully succeed. This plan depended on the switching over of part of the existing heavy industrial plant to light industry, but the demands of the armed forces and the needs of the "new lands" made this impossible. It depended also on increased production from the farms, which was not in fact forthcoming. The collective farmers had been given a reduction in taxes and an increase in prices offered for their food stuffs, but all this was no inducement; if there were no more foods for them to buy, there was no point in their having more money.

The New Course modified, 1955-58. The New Course was modified early in 1955 and emphasis was once again placed on heavy industry. The 1955 budget indicated an expenditure of 163,604 million roubles on heavy industry as compared with 133,214 million in the 1954 budget; expenditure on light industry was reduced from 36,570 million in 1954 to 27,935 million; and defence expenditure increased by 12%. The responsibility for this failure was pinned with Malenkov who confessed his mistakes to the Supreme Soviet and resigned from the Prime Ministership which was now given to Bulganin. The real power behind the government now was the Party Chief—Khrushchev. With the ascendancy of Bulganin and Khrushchev, Malenkov's agricultural reforms were intensified, but other parts of his programme were repudiated. The announcement by Bulganin of the annual 1955 Plan targets for industry left no doubt that heavy industry was to continue to receive favoured treatment, and the rate of increase for consumer goods was planned at only about half what had actually been achieved in this field in 1954. Retail price cuts were halted or even reversed in some instances, and the compulsory loan levy was again doubled. However, in order to ensure a rational allocation of scarce resources to competing ends, Stalin's successors were obliged to grant sizable concessions to public demand, especially for better food and housing. Concessions in some spheres—shorter hours, higher pensions, increased maternity leaves, relaxation of restrictions on change of occupa-

tion, and still higher farm prices—were therefore introduced. In 1956-57, greater autonomy was granted to enterprises and collective farms, as well as to republican and local authorities concerned with economic matters. Decentralized planning in agriculture was introduced under which production plans were to be drawn up by the collective farms themselves with the participation of the representatives of the Machine and Tractor Station (M. T. S.) and the collectives were still to receive "assignments (planned quotas) for delivery" of that portion of their produce destined for state purchases. Before becoming effective all plans were to be reviewed carefully and approved by the district executive committees. On July 1, 1957, Khrushchev launched a major reform of the Soviet economy under which the bulk of industrial and building enterprises passed from the control of various central ministries to newly-created Regional Economic Councils in all the 105 economic regions in which the Soviet Union was divided. Soon after assuming the office of the Prime Minister in March 1958, Khrushchev delivered a report "On the Further Development of Collective Farm System and the Re-organization of Machine and Tractor Stations" to the Supreme Soviet. He declared that "the recent merger of the collective farms into larger units, the rapid growth of their economy, the development of the collective farms as major complex agricultural undertakings call for an alternation in the established system of technical services extended to them...Now that the collective farms are in a position to invest sums of money into their production, buy complex machinery and ensure its proper exploitation, the time had come to make radical changes in the pattern of technical servicing of the collective farms". Thus by early 1958, the New Course of Malenkov had been almost abandoned.

Changes in other spheres, 1953-1958. In the administrative spheres also, the post-Stalin changes have been remarkable. The circle of those with power, including those with administrative authority, was reduced by combining existing ministries to establish a smaller Council of Ministers of the U. S. S. R. and by creating an inner Cabinet of five men. By 1955, however, the original number had been restored. The trend toward centralization of State administration was reversed and Ministries have been decentralized since 1954. For several decades the upper ranks of the bureaucracy had remained at their posts into the early morning hours, since Stalin worked at night and he could demand their presence any time. On September 1, 1953, a new working-hours decree provided normal working hours from nine to six in order to bolster the morale of office workers, strengthen labour discipline and increase the efficiency of the bureaucracy. In the amnesty decree issued three weeks

after Stalin's death the Ministry of Justice was ordered to prepare within one month proposals for a revision of the Criminal Code. On August 5, 1954, the criminal penalty previously existing for women who committed abortion upon themselves was removed. Earlier on March 18, 1954, the U. N. Genocide Convention was ratified by the U. S. S. R. subject to the reservation that they would not deem the International Court of Justice to have jurisdiction over a dispute concerning interpretation of the Convention unless both Parties agreed to such jurisdiction. The trend towards relaxation continued in 1955-57. The fact that no political leader other than Beria has been shot is a sign of this relaxation. The death of Stalin was also followed by a reorganization of the top structure of the Party.

In cultural sphere it may be pointed out that Stalin's death was followed by a demand that literature and music should be humanized and that "love and family life and not the need of crop rotation or the technical problems of introducing the Bessemer steel process should become the themes of novels, plays and poems". In art and architecture also a more liberal approach was now adopted. The pressure of the "tutelage system" imposed from above by a few arbiters of taste was relaxed, and freedom of invitation was restored to the artist. In philosophy, translations began to appear of certain foreign works. Soviet journals began to review Western studies in Russian philosophy and intellectual history which were ignored before. A series of relatively objective and critical articles began to appear on thinkers long neglected, e.g., Locke, Kant, Spinoza and Gandhi. The attitude towards earlier Russian thinkers was also liberalized. In science, international contacts of Russian scientists began to increase. While before 1952, the presence of a Soviet delegation at an international scientific conference was a rare event, 14 delegations went out in 1952, 30 in 1953, 65 in 1954, 90 in 1955, 110 in 1956. From July 1 to 5, 1955, the Soviet Academy of Sciences held a Conference on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy. In August, the Soviet Union sent to the Conference on Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy at Geneva a delegation of over 100 scientists, engineers and technicians, who presented 74 papers on various phases of atomic energy. The Soviet achievements in science have really been remarkable and they indicate the extent to which a socialist society can progress in practically no time. When the United States exploded their first atom bomb on July 16, 1945, it was felt by the U. S. scientists that the Soviet Union would take about 20 years in catching up with the United States in atomic bomb development. But the Soviet Union exploded its first atom bomb on September 22, 1949. The United States exploded its first thermonuclear device in November 1952 and they thought that the

Russians would take long in catching up this time. The Soviet Union, however, exploded its first thermo-nuclear device in August 1953. The United States, then, started working on the development of the hydrogen bomb which could be delivered from a plane. But the Russians did the job in November 1955, which the U. S. A. could do in May 1956. Moreover, the most momentous declaration was made on September 26, 1957 that the Soviet Union had successfully tested an Inter-Continental Ballistic Missile. Nine days later, they used the I. C. B. M. rocket engines to launch the first earth-satellite revolving at the heights of 560 miles and making one complete revolution in 95 minutes. On November 3, the second sputnik was launched which was 937·7 pounds more in weight than the first and which went up about 930 miles above the earth and completed one revolution round the globe in 90 minutes. It carried a dog on board in a hermatically sealed container with food and instruments for studying its living functions under cosmic space conditions. These are outstanding achievements for a country as backward as Russia until 1918.

CHAPTER 11

Recession in the Cold War

As the reader must have noticed, by the fall of the year 1952, the E.C.S.C. and the E.D.C. had been set up and the East-West relations had completely stalemated. The cold war, as it were, had frozen the dynamics of international relations. While in Europe "diplomatic sparing was fitful", and both sides seemed to be sure of their strength, in the Far East the negotiations in Korea had come to a dead end, the fighting in Indo-China showed no sign of relaxation, and Formosa had become a very serious danger spot. During the early weeks of 1953, however, a series of events occurred which "foreshadowed not only an increase in diplomatic activity but a shift in policies as well". These events included the drafting of the Balkan Pact, the resignation of Robert Schuman as foreign minister of France, the election of D. D. Eisenhower to the American Presidency, and the death of Joseph Stalin, the most powerful and influential person in the Communist World. In the course of this Chapter, we will examine these events and their ramifications, the changing Soviet scene, the startling changes in Soviet policies and the diverse interpretations which have been advanced to explain them. On many issues on which a complete deadlock had been reached in earlier years, the East-West conflict was resolved, and it was widely believed that with the passing away of Stalin a much better atmosphere had come about. These hopes were, however, soon dashed to the ground and after July 1956, the Suez crisis put the world back on the brink of war. In October 1956, the Hungarian revolt gave a different complexion to the changes in the Soviet policies. The recession in the cold war (1953—56) only proved to be a lull before the storm.

The Balkan Pact and the Problem of Trieste. We have seen that in February 1952, Greece and Turkey had joined the North Atlantic Treaty and earlier, in June 1948, Tito had broken away from Stalin. Since then there had been considerable change in the relationship between Belgrade and the West, and between Belgrade and Greece and Turkey. While these states wanted closer relations with Yugoslavia in order to stabilize the situation in the southern Balkans and the eastern Mediterranean, Tito, still at odds with Stalin and pressed by

Italy for the settlement of the Trieste question, was also ready for a *modus vivendi*. In September 1952 a Yugoslav military mission visited Greece and Turkey and in the same month Eden, the British Foreign Secretary, visited Belgrade. The Turks, the Greeks and the Yugoslavs also decided to draw Italy in the proposed Balkan Pact and on January 8, De Gasperi, the Italian Prime Minister, announced that his government was anxious for a rapprochement with Yugoslavia. The problem of Trieste, however, obstructed settlement and eventually Greece, Turkey and Yugoslavia signed at Ankara a 5 year triple Balkan Pact of Friendship and Assistance. This provided for regular consultation between the three countries and stated their intention "to examine jointly the problems of their security including common defence measures against unprovoked aggression". In May 1953, the Pact was ratified and in July the foreign ministers of the signatories met in Athens and at once set up a committee on economic co-operation and made plans for a meeting of military experts. In succeeding years the Pact was elaborated. On August 9, 1954, the Ankara Pact was strengthened and extended by the signing at Bled (Yugoslavia) of a 20-year collective security pact, and on March 3, 1955 the three states agreed to work toward a Balkan Consultative Assembly roughly patterned on the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe.

We have just noted that Italy could not be drawn in this Pact because of the thorny question of Trieste which had been a source of great friction between Italy and Yugoslavia in the early inter-war period. We have also mentioned the serious difficulties in reaching a decision as to the fate of Trieste in the negotiations which preceded the conclusion of the Italian Peace Treaty. Trieste was, however, created a Free Territory in 1947 and at that time it was occupied partly by the Western Powers (*Zone A*, including the port) and partly by Yugoslavia (*Zone B*). In its draft of the Italian Peace Treaty, the Council of Foreign Ministers placed upon the Security Council responsibility for maintaining the independence and territorial integrity of the Free Territory and for appointing its governor. The consent of the Security Council for these provisions had been obtained already. The Italian Peace Treaty required the Security Council to consult the governments of Italy and Yugoslavia before appointing a governor and provided that he should not be a national of Italy or Yugoslavia or Trieste and that his term should be five years. The West and the Soviet Union could not agree on a candidate and this deadlock prevented the Statute of the Free City from going into effect so that Trieste continued as "an international enclave". With the development of the cold war the West decided to support Italy's claims to

the return of the territory and proposed the return on the eve of the Italian elections in 1948—a move designed to impress Italian voters in the elections in which the threat of a communist victory was viewed with horror. The Soviet Union, still on good terms with Yugoslavia, refused to concur in this and the situation completely stalemated. But although the Western proposals could not materialize, the Italians were increasingly associated with the administration of *Zone A*.

In June 1948 Tito was ex-communicated by Stalin and subsequently Yugoslavia and the West came closer. Italy viewed with distrust these improved relations, and efforts to break the impasse came to nought so that by 1953 charges and countercharges and troop movements had led to a tense situation. In 1949 the North Atlantic Treaty had been signed and to this Italy was a party. The arms limitation clauses of the Italian Peace Treaty had been allowed to fade away. The Soviet Union was no longer supporting Tito but insisted that the Italian Peace Treaty should not be modified without her consent. Meanwhile the Ankara Pact was being negotiated. Thus Yugoslavia, though not a member of the N.A.T.O., was nevertheless moving toward the Western security system as represented by the Ankara Pact to which Greece and Turkey—both N.A.T.O. members—were parties. On this showing Yugoslavia was indirectly being tied with the N.A.T.O. defence structure. But Trieste was a serious obstacle, for, if Yugoslavia got involved in a conflict with Italy (a N.A.T.O. power), Greece and Turkey (on the one hand, members of the N.A.T.O., on the other parties to the Ankara Pact) could not undertake an absolute obligation to come to the help of Yugoslavia. From the point of view of the N.A.T.O. leaders, therefore, some solution of the Trieste problem was absolutely vital. It was in this background that the events in 1953 and thereafter can be really appreciated.

In 1953 both Italy and Yugoslavia were extremely urgent in their demands for Trieste. On October 8, the Anglo-American Governments declared that in view of the deteriorating Italian-Yugoslav relations, they had decided to terminate Allied Military Government in *Zone A* and hand over its administration to Italy. While Italy, though not entirely satisfied with this announcement (for she wanted all of Trieste), nevertheless welcomed it "as a first step towards the fulfilment of the 1948 proposal", the Yugoslav reaction was vociferous and adverse and Tito immediately threatened to send in his own forces should Italian troops enter *Zone A*. The Soviet Union attempted to bring the matter before the Security Council but failed and the Security Council decided to postpone discussion pending negotiations between the parties to the dispute. The Western powers, in the meanwhile, were persuading the Italian and Yugoslav Governments to agree to

a conference. Though bulk of the Anglo-American forces had left *Zone A*, no date for final evacuation had been laid down. In November 1953, there were demonstrations in Trieste which were suppressed. The Allied Commander was a British subject and since it was believed that the British Government was more reluctant to fulfil the October declaration than the U.S.A., the Anglo-Italian relations were seriously strained. The tension, however, was relieved and the troops were withdrawn mutually from the frontier.

Early in 1954, Washington and London were impatient to leave the area and were pressing Italy and Yugoslavia to come to some settlement. Early in August, the Bled Pact had been signed. On October 5, it was announced that a memorandum on Trieste had been signed in London by Britain, the U.S.A., Italy and Yugoslavia. Under it, *Zone B* of the Free Territory of Trieste (subject to a small adjustment of territory around the village of Lazzaretto, located at the southern approach to the Trieste harbour) was turned to Yugoslavia. *Zone A*, including the city of Trieste (and subject to the minor adjustments in the Lazzaretto area) was turned to Italy. An international part for use of all nations, on a non-discriminatory basis, was created at Trieste. About 3,000 persons were transferred from one side of the new line to the other in the vicinity of Lazzaretto with provisions for compensation to the dispossessed. Both Governments promised to respect the rights of minorities in their respective territories and to forbid incitement to national or racial hatred. These rights included maintenance of a press in the mother tongue, freedom to maintain educational and cultural organisation, equality of access to public and administrative office, and equality in occupational and social welfare treatment. By the end of October 1954, the Anglo-American troops evacuated *Zone A* which was now occupied by the Italian troops. The problem of the Trieste was thus settled at least temporarily. In this settlement the U.S.S.R. also acquiesced as part of the campaign to ease international tension. But this settlement can last so long as Yugoslavia remains "Western-oriented". If at any time Yugoslavia should come to terms with the U.S.S.R. and resume her place in the communist bloc, the Trieste question might again become a live issue between the East and the West. The solution of a question like that of Trieste, as one authority has put it, "is a matter of attitudes rather than of inherent conflicts, and whether and in what form Italians and Yugoslavs can live together, despite divided political allegiance, seems to depend predominantly on their, and their leaders' will to do so".

New Leadership in France, America and Russia. On January 7, 1953, in the new Government formed by Rene Mayer, Schuman was replaced by Bidault and this change was significant.

Schuman had boldly followed the programme of a closer European Union and his exit seemed to emphasise the fact "that France was now torn with doubts concerning the European army plan". Mayer at once called for amendments to the E.D.C. Treaty and proposed a new agreement on the Saar. In Bonn, Adenauer, who had developed a good understanding with Schuman, received a jerk but he quickly recovered himself and announced that a sympathetic consideration will be given to the French demands for amendments to the E.D.C. Treaty. The French opposition to the E.D.C., it may be emphasised, was grounded "in the fear that assailed most Frenchmen when they thought of Germans in uniform". The French demands for amendments had been set forth in a document entitled "Additional Protocols to the European Defence Community Treaty". The principal French demand was that France be permitted to shift military units from the continent to the French Union (Empire) at will and to retain a national arms industry sufficient to provide for the defence of the French Union. Many Frenchmen felt that France had neglected the French Union for the sake of the European Union and this, indeed, was one of the reasons why Schuman was eased out of the foreign office.

Thirteen days after the exit of Schuman, Eisenhower took over the U.S. Presidency, with the volatile John Foster Dulles as the Secretary of State. On January 27, the latter in a review of the world situation promised "a more realistic and courageous fight against the forces of Communism", a policy fuller and wider than the containment policy, a policy that is, of liberating "captive peoples" and of "rolling back Communist power". But more important than this change was the death of Stalin on March 5, 1953 which caused the greatest stir in the world. As Stalin's power had grown in range and intensity, he had tended more and more both to concentrate the exercise of power into his own hands and to project even minor preferences and prejudices of his own into the shaping of Soviet policy. The passing of this man, therefore, "left a vacuum in the Soviet Union and opened up the possibility of a struggle for power and of significant shifts in policy". From March 1953 to date, the Soviet Union launched a diplomatic offensive so wide in dimensions that the Western powers seem to have lost diplomatic initiative in the cold war.

POST-STALIN DIPLOMATIC OFFENSIVE OF THE U.S.S.R.

In order to appreciate the implications of the breath-taking diplomatic offensive launched by Stalin's successors after March 1953, it is necessary to recapitulate the basic principles and features of the Soviet foreign policy from 1945 to 1953. It will

then be seen that by the time Stalin died there had come about a complete deadlock between the East and the West from which there seemed to be no way out. The danger of encirclement of the Soviet Union was drawing closer and after Stalin's death, the new leaders of Russia reassessed the entire international situation and inaugurated a new stage in the cold war. The conclusion of a peace treaty with Austria, the evacuation of the Soviet military base in Finland, the reduction of Soviet armed forces by 1800,000 men, the talk of peaceful co-existence, the travel diplomacy, the withdrawal of Soviet troops from China, the temporary settlement of the Korean and Indo-Chinese problems, the agreement to end the state of war with Japan and the establishment of diplomatic relations with her and with West Germany, the settlement of the Soviet differences with Yugoslavia, and the Soviet proposals for disarmament and banning nuclear weapons culminating in the unilateral suspension of nuclear tests on April 1, 1958—these have been some of the aspects of the post-Stalin foreign policy of the Soviet Union. The cumulative effect of these and many other events was a recession in the cold war from 1953 to 1956 when Suez, Hungary and Syria once again heightened the tensions.

Soviet Foreign Policy, 1945-1953. In previous chapters we have touched on many aspects of the Soviet foreign policy from 1945 onward and we have examined the nature, dimensions and the strategy of the cold war. The world situation in 1945 was in many ways favourable from the Soviet standpoint. The westward advance of Soviet power into the heart of Europe, the temporary disappearance of Germany and Japan from the ranks of the Powers, the instability of the post-war governments in continental Western Europe, the unforeseen seriousness of the economic disorganization of the European economy as a result of the war, and of the detachment of East European resources from it, and the widespread ferment and unrest in Asia leading to the disintegration of European colonial empires and the weakening, in particular, of the British position in world affairs—all these factors offered new opportunities to a country chastened in a most horrible war imposed on it by Nazi Germany. The Western camp—gravely weakened by the war, shot through with domestic strife in every country, beset by insoluble economic problems and wallowing in inter-capitalist contradictions—was viewed as being incapable of pulling itself together and bringing about a new period of relative capitalist stabilization comparable to that achieved in the nineteen twenties after the first world war. Thus the Soviet inference seems to have been that by a dynamic policy they could weigh the scales decisively in their favour. The situation, therefore, "dictated a policy not of conservative restraint in foreign affairs combined with consolidation of positions already won, but

of bringing relentless aggressive pressure to bear upon the international environment in order to effect a further and radical improvement of the Soviet position at the expense of the rival camp". Quite significantly, Molotov declared in a speech on November 6, 1947 : "We live in an age when all roads lead to communism".

In order to achieve this objective a three-fold policy was pursued by Stalin: (*a*) Encouragement to pro-Soviet movements in foreign states and in their dependencies. This could be theoretically justified as "support for the foreign proletariat and its class organization in the struggle to realize their legitimate demands and for the national-liberation struggle of the oppressed peoples in the colonial rear of imperialism". (*b*) Exploitation and accentuation of the discords between opponent states in order to obstruct them from joining forces against it. This could be ideologically interpreted in terms of "contradictions rending the camp of imperialist powers". (*c*) Incorporation or inclusion of neighbouring territories or countries within the Soviet orbit in order to bring a greater and greater area of the hostile international environment under control. This could be rationalized by the proposition that the Soviet Union, as the base and homeland of a world-wide proletarian revolution, must give its support to other peoples in their revolutionary struggle for liberation from imperialist bondage. Since expansion is likely to lead to a build-up of states against the Soviet Union, the formula of "peaceful co-existence" of the East and the West was propagated. To Stalin, probably, this meant that although the two systems cannot co-exist in amity, total war should, nevertheless, be excluded as a means of resolving the conflict between them, all lesser means being legitimate. Local wars, as in Korea or Indo-China, were not eschewed and power pressure as in Germany and Austria were effectively used. As a recent writer has stated : "The Stalinist power reflex operated here as in countries wholly occupied by Soviet forces with the result that temporary boundaries of military occupation zones hardened into quasi-permanent lines of partition". Thus, considering only territory annexed outright by Soviet Russia, its size expanded by some 274 million square miles since 1939 and, in addition, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Albania, Bulgaria and Rumania totalling 360 million square miles have been brought in the Soviet orbit. The status of Eastern Germany remains essentially that of a Soviet satellite. Yugoslavia lay within the Soviet orbit for several years; its loss resulted from an open split between Tito and Stalin in June 1948.

We have already dealt with in details Stalin's policies in different parts of the world. Pressures in the Middle East (as in Russian occupation of Persian province of Azerbaijan and the demand for revision of the Montreaux Convention), the civil war

in Greece, the creation of the Cominform, the drive to obstruct the E.R.P., the coup in Czechoslovakia, the whole sequence of Soviet policy moves in Germany culminating in the Berlin blockade, the conflict at the United Nations, the Pact of Mutual Assistance with the People's China in February 1950, and the Korean war were some of the principal features of Stalin's policy which rested on a triple pattern of (*a*) territorial annexation, (*b*) political control over allied elites, and (*c*) subversive activities among hostile elites.

Directions of Stalin's Foreign Policy. From the ideological point of view, Stalin's foreign policy moved in at least five directions. In the *first* place he insisted that the capitalist world was hostile to the Soviet Union and was conspiring to wipe it out. The Marshall Plan, the Truman Doctrine, the Atlantic Pact, the Airlift, the U.N. intervention in Korea, the rearmament of Japan and Germany, the Point-Four Programme, the Schuman Plan and the E.C.S.C. etc., were all viewed as evidence of the inherent hostility of the West towards the U.S.S.R. Assuming this hostility, the Soviet policies tended to be characterized by suspicion. distrust unilateralism and an assumption of conflict with the West. This resulted in an abuse of alliances, an open disregard for traditional diplomacy, and an inveterate impugning of non-Soviet motivation. As a consequence the Western powers tended to regard Soviet motivations with hostility, to ally themselves against the Soviet Union, and in short "to behave precisely as predicted by Bolshevik precepts". This leads to what has been called "the self-fulfilling prophecy in Soviet policy".

Secondly, in spite of a unity manifested in the Marshall Plan, the Atlantic Pact, etc., Stalin continued to hold even in his *Economic Problems of Socialism in the U.S.S.R.* that the contradictions between the leading capitalist states not only continued to exist but were, in practice, even more potent than the contradictions between the two world camps. This implied that the Western unity "was merely superficial and could not long withstand the diversive tendencies in the capitalist system, the unvoiced inference being that it was unnecessary to relieve the pressure and reduce the tension in order to disunite Russia's adversaries".

Thirdly, according to the Marxist analysis, World War II was a second major world crisis. World War I brought the communists to power in Russia, World War II would lead to further proletarian advances at the expense of existing bourgeois regimes and in this the Soviet Union would act in the vanguard of the Revolution. This analysis determined the post-war objectives of the Soviet foreign policies, for, these seemed to go "beyond the usual national objectives of advancing the security and

general welfare of the State". Not that the Russian security interests or economic needs were forgotten or ignored. Witness, for instance, the Russian insistence on installing friendly regimes on their borders and the extensive transfers of capital and other goods from East Germany, Austria and Manchuria to the U.S.S.R. Nevertheless, the supreme objective remained world revolution. It is, of course, impossible to export it but it is possible and desirable to promote it by a proper, flexible and timely selection of means and tools. The importance of defence as well as offence, of retreat as well as attack was, therefore, emphasised. "We have got to understand", Stalin said, "that victory can only be won by those who have learned the proper method of advance and retreat. To wage a war for the overthrow of the international bourgeois, *i. e.* while renouncing beforehand the use of manoeuvering, of playing off the interests of one foe against the other, of entering upon agreements and effecting compromises, would not each renunciation be the height of folly? We might as well, when climbing a dangerous and hitherto unexplored mountain, have to give up the chosen direction in order to test another which may prove easier to negotiate". A fine illustration of this flexibility can be seen in Stalin's attitude towards the Chinese Communist Party. He is reported to have informed the Yugoslav Foreign Minister: "After the war we invited the Chinese Comrades to come to Moscow and we discussed the situation in China. We told them bluntly that we considered the development of the uprising in China had no prospect, and that the Chinese comrades should seek a *modus vivendi* with Chiang Kai-shek, that they should join the Chiang Kai-shek government and dissolve their army. The Chinese comrades agreed here with the views of the Soviet comrades but went back to China and acted quite otherwise...*Now we admit we were wrong*" (Quoted in Haas and Whiting, *Dynamics of International Relations*, p. 332). Again, photographs of the meeting on the Elbe wherein Soviet and American troops embraced victoriously in 1945 were quickly replaced, after 1945, with "crude caricatures of American Generals with Swastikas and bacteriological warfare apparatus". The entire Soviet policy towards Germany—Rapallo, Anti-Comintern Pact, Non-Aggression Pact (June 22, 1941), and the post-war policy statements and moves illustrate in a classic manner the element of flexibility in the Soviet foreign policy. True, this element, in some degrees, is present in the foreign policy of every country, for, there is nothing like permanent friends or permanent enemies. The only thing that is permanent is national interest which has wider dimensions in the case of the Soviet Union than in the case of other non-communist states, even though the latter may have large empires to defend.

Fourthly, assuming that the Western powers were conspiring

to weaken and overthrow the communist regime in the Soviet Union, and probably fearing that deep and wide contacts between the Russians and foreigners might have adverse effect on the former, Stalin opposed any wide exchange between the Soviet Union and the non-communist world. After 1945, the official Soviet attitude towards foreigners became extremely hostile and suspicious. Laws and regulations were put into effect which made social and intellectual contact between Soviet citizens and foreigners virtually impossible. Soviet wives of foreigners were forbidden to leave Russia and a law was issued forbidding Soviet citizens to marry foreigners. This was naturally part of a policy characterized by growing hostility to the West, increasing tendencies toward non-cooperation and isolation, consolidation of the Soviet orbit and general instransigence. It is obvious that these tendencies were encouraged and influenced by the Soviet interpretation of Russian national interests, the desire for security, the strong reaction of the leading non-communist states to Russian moves and techniques, the re-emphasis on Marxist-Leninist doctrines and the subordination of all cultural and intellectual activity in the Soviet Union to the interests of the Party. Drastic measures were necessary to purify and strengthen the Party, to rehabilitate the country and to steel the Russian people to new endeavours and new sacrifices. The cutting of the Russians from the non-communist world gave a point to the phrase "Iron Curtain" from Stettin to Trieste. As one authority has put it: "When a Soviet diplomat had spent too much time abroad or seemed to be on too friendly terms with foreign officials, he was promptly recalled and assigned to other task, or severely disciplined. Western diplomats in the Soviet Union were restricted in their movements and allowed to see only certain Russian officials. Other visitors from non-communist states were usually denied admission to communist dominated areas with the occasional exception of persons like Paul Robeson or the 'Red Dean' of Canterbury, who were notorious apologists for the Soviet regime, or 'peace delegations' of sympathetic fellow travellers. A few newspaper correspondents led a lonely existence in Moscow and some of the satellite states, but they were subject to expulsion at any moment or to arbitrary arrest and imprisonment. The arrest and trial of Robert Vogeler, an American businessman, in Hungary in 1950, and of William Oatis, a correspondent of the Associated Press, in Czechoslovakia in 1951, showed to what extent the communists were prepared to go to seal off their world."

As with diplomacy and press, so with cultural and intellectual activity. Although the post-war purges have been mild compared to those of the thirties, prominent persons in all spheres were repudiated and humiliated. The party determined what is correct

economics, correct politics, correct history, correct international law, correct science, correct philosophy, correct literature, correct music, painting and architecture. The result was a definite decline in the Soviet culture. In October 1953, Ehrenburg frankly discussed the causes of this decline under Stalin and declared: "The writer is not an apparatus that mechanically registers events".

Finally, from the ideological point of view the Soviet Union attacked the capitalist West as war monger. Appeals to peace and the use of peace groups and peace conferences have, therefore, been effective instruments of the Soviet foreign policy. The war-weariness all over the world in 1945, the fear and panic caused by the atomic weapons and the desire for peace provided full field for activity. The World Peace Movement (1948-49), the Stockholm Peace Appeal (1950), the Peace Offensive (1951), as the Movement for Geneva Spirit (1955-56) and the offensive for Summit Conference (1957-58) have been particularly significant. In 1948, a Congress of Intellectuals for Peace was held in Wroclaw (Poland) and in 1949 Congresses were held in Paris, Prague, London, Moscow and Mexico. The Partisans of Peace Movement, with a permanent World Peace Committee, was established at the meetings in Paris and Prague in April 1949. Through this movement the Communists appealed for support to labour, women, youth, and other "peace loving" people. The World Peace Movement tried "to use strikes to close European ports to American shipments of arms under the Mutual Security Programme", and attempted to mobilize world-wide support for a series of peace proposals, *e.g.* mass signatures for peace ballots, protests against H-bomb diplomacy, and attempts to secure formal approval of the peace proposals by various national Parliaments.

The most ambitious venture of the World Peace Movement has been the Stockholm Peace Appeal for banning the atom bomb. It was the outcome of a meeting of the permanent World Peace Committee in Stockholm on March 15-19, 1950. "We", thus ran the Stockholm Peace Appeal, "demand the unconditional prohibition of the atomic weapon as a weapon of intimidation and mass extermination of human beings. We demand the institution of strict international control to enforce this. We shall consider as war criminal that government which first employs the atomic weapon against any country. We call upon all people of good will throughout the world to sign this appeal". By August 1950, 275,000,000 persons had signed this document in different parts of the world and "probably no document in all history has received more signatures than this Appeal".

In 1951 an interesting peace offensive was launched with renewed emphasis on peace, Soviet-U.S. friendship, co-existence, the need of the Korean settlement, cultural contacts, East-West

trade, and a five-power pact for the strengthening of the peace. Eventually all these peace moves were lost in the fury of the cold war. Indeed, the West viewed them as part of the Soviet strategy. The Soviet Union did not stand to lose anything and stood to gain everything. By peace appeal they could win over the support of the masses even in the West and could obtain the approbation of the uncommitted nations of Asia which, in order to consolidate their newly-won freedom, wanted nothing but peace. The Western ruling circles, instead of joining these appeals and thus stealing a march over the communists, opposed them and branded them as communist propaganda. For instance, Leon Dennen thus wrote about it: "Soviet leaders closely consider peace as but a phase of the constant conflict which they are waging against democratic society. Their active support of any 'peace movement' must constantly be viewed as a strategy for gaining the maximum support for Soviet Russia from groups which are generally not in sympathy with communist goals" (*The Soviet Peace Myth*, p. 4). In the psychological plane, the Soviet Union thus seized the initiative and by showing the Western governments as war-mongering demoralized the people there.

One common criticism of the West about these peace appeals used to be that the Soviet professions for peace were not supported by tangible evidences that the Soviet Union was willing to implement their protestations by deeds. After the death of Stalin, this criticism lost the point, for, now it was not merely by word but by deeds that the Soviet Union launched their diplomatic offensive. While Stalin could be described as intransigent, uncompromising and even obstinate, his successors repudiated his technique and achieved a thundering victory over the West. To this now we turn.

POST-STALIN FOREIGN POLICY

In order to appreciate the directions and technique of Soviet foreign policy since the death of Stalin, it is necessary to explain the main results of Stalin's foreign policy. It may be suggested that with the building up of the Soviet bloc in Eastern Europe, the tightening of control following the Czech coup, rejection of the Marshall Plan, encouragement of civil war in Greece, threatening posture towards Turkey, armed intervention in Persia, ex-communication of Tito, gradual evolution of open warfare in the Far East, marked by such grave crises as in Korea and Indo-China, the Soviet foreign policy had entered a sort of a *cul de sac*. In the phrase of George F. Kennen, the Soviet foreign policy, by 1952, had "gone sterile". The rigidity of Stalin, and the so-called dynamism of his policy had roused the Western powers to a sense of peril which had brought them

even closer. The Marshall Plan, the Truman Doctrine, the Dunkirk and Brussels Treaty, the Western European Union, the Atlantic Pact and the NATO were at least partly the outcome of Stalin's dogmatism. In 1945-47, there was a scope for manoeuvre and the West was disunited and unarmed. By 1952, the situation had radically altered and the Soviet extremism stimulated the doctrines of "containment", "encirclement" and "massive retaliation". As one commentator puts it: "The East European glacis had been attained by the Red Army as a fruit of warfare. Moscow's restrictive policies in the satellite states achieved short-term security at the probable cost of long-term durability. The Greek, Turkish and Iranian threats had been liquidated. In Western Europe the success of the Marshall Plan had undercut the menace of communist parties in Italy and France. In Germany the Berlin blockade had been thrown back on Moscow with the success of the Berlin airlift. Soviet aggression had provided the amalgam for creation of NATO and the erection of a genuine counter-weight to Soviet armed strength in Europe. In the Far East the true balance was equally unfavourable to Soviet power. China had gone Communist. But Moscow's role and even her real relationship to the Chinese Communist leaders was a dubious thing. Korea had proved the most dangerous and dubious Soviet experiment of all, failing to win a military success and acting as a touchstone for stimulating unprecedented mobilization of U. S. strength against the Soviet sphere and for the generation of popular anti-Soviet sentiment on a most massive scale".

On this showing, during 1945-52, the real Soviet gains had been achieved as the immediate military product of World War II and they were achieved "in the regions closest to the Soviet gravitational centre". Neutral countries like India were, at best, lukewarm towards the U.S.S.R. and the sharp words used by some of the Soviet representatives for Indians were resented in this country. "At best", Vyshinsky told Krishna Menon in December 1952, "you are dreamers and idealists. At worst you do not know your own position and camouflage the horrible American policy". By visualising the world as divided between the U.S. camp and their own, the Soviet Union had fallen in the grave American error ("Those who are not with us are against us"). By needlessly opposing the Austrian Peace Treaty, they had appeared as hyprocrites. The break with Tito followed by mounting pressure on Yugoslavia had led to the beginnings of national communism which, in course of time, released forces that lent the Soviet Union in serious troubles in 1956-57 and that have not been controlled to this day. The ventures in the Middle East (Persia and Turkey) created grave problems and had earned the Soviet Union good deal of unpopularity. The

unnecessary restraints on foreigners in Russia had deepened the suspicion and distrust of the people who were now determined to negotiate with the Soviet Union from a "position of strength". This, in brief, was the actual *'tupik'* in which the Moscow leadership found itself after March 5, 1953. That this was so can easily be seen from the broad programme of action and change of specifics which was adopted and from occasional comments of the leaders themselves. Stalin's policies had failed to achieve a radical alteration of the world balance of power in favour of the Soviet bloc and had, on the contrary, created a situation "in which further efforts to realize this bold design were fraught with greater danger to the continued maintenance of formal peace between the Soviet Union and the Western coalition". It was, therefore, imperative to call a halt to Stalinist policies in order to allow the war danger to subside, to encourage the Western coalition to drift apart, and to strengthen the Soviet position by winning over the neutral nations. It was, perhaps, thought necessary to have better and wider commercial and economic relations with the rest of the world, for, Stalinism had created serious economic problems to which we referred earlier.

The New Line in the Soviet Union. The first indications of a change in the Soviet foreign policies came in the funeral speech of Malenkov when he announced that a vigorous effort would be made to raise the Soviet standard of living and that peaceful co-existence between capitalist and socialist states was in keeping with the teachings of Lenin and Stalin. On March 15, 1953, in an address to the Supreme Soviet, he declared that Soviet foreign policy would be directed at the expansion of trade and the consolidation of peace, and assured the world that he knew of no dispute or unresolved problem that could not be settled peacefully, and that this applied to Soviet relations with all countries including the United States. Some times later, Vyshinsky, addressing the U. N. General Assembly, asked the West "to meet Russia half way in the tunnel of friendship". At the same time anti-Western propaganda became "less strident" and certain friendly gestures were made, such as the use of Russian good offices for the repatriation of British civilian prisoners in Korea. The subsequent agreement to exchange sick and wounded prisoners of war was believed to be "one of the first fruits of the new look". The official reaction in the West was cautions and guarded and the Russians were challenged "to match their words with deeds". Some actual concessions were, therefore, made, *e.g.* their readiness to abandon the long-standing demand for the forced repatriation of all prisoners of war in Korea. Armistice negotiations, which had deadlocked since October 1952, were now resumed on a limited scale and on

April 10, 1953, an agreement was reached at Panmunjon for the immediate exchange of sick and wounded prisoners. In May, the Soviet Control Commission in East Germany was dropped, the powers of the military commander were reduced and a civilian was appointed to deal with political affairs. Similar changes were introduced in Austria and the Vienna government was invited to raise the consulate in Moscow to the level of an Embassy. Towards the close of May, in a note to the Turkish government the Soviet Union declared that for the sake of good neighbourly relations she was withdrawing her territorial claims and that they had reconsidered the question of the Black Sea Straits and now believed that it was possible to ensure Russian security on conditions acceptable to Turkey. On June 10, the East German Communist Party Politburo announced that the drive to collectivize agriculture would be relaxed and that religious regulations would be revived and clarified. More peaceful gestures were made in the Near East. On June 11, Turkey was formally notified that the Soviet demands on the Kars and Aradhan would be dropped if Turkey could agree to the idea of a conference on the Straits. Diplomatic relations were resumed with Greece, Yugoslavia and Israel and the Soviet Union also agreed to the appointment of a new Secretary-General for the United Nations—Dag Hammarskjold.

This 'new look' or new line of the Soviet foreign policy worked in all directions—in East Europe, West Europe, Middle East, Africa and Asia, as we will shortly see. It had several features. *In the first place*, it was characterized by a psychological approach for it attempted to reduce the intense and pervasive hostility towards the West, to ease the pressure against the international environment and to loosen the compulsive rigidity of Stalinist thinking. It involved a great flexibility in the sphere of tactics, a willingness to pay a substantial diplomatic price for a given diplomatic objective (*e.g.* liquidation of the active military operations in the Far East for establishment of a non-military *status quo*, signature of the Austrian peace treaty in return for the Geneva Big Four Conference, public apology and demotion of satellite chiefs as the condition for the re-adherence of Tito, etc.) and a very decided and clear sense of purpose. As Mikoyan in a major speech delivered at the 20th Congress of the C. P. S. U. said: "Our policy is based upon an evaluation of the specific, concrete characteristics of a given situation, on an assessment of the actual relationship of forces on an accurate appraisal of the differences and shades of the policies of various countries at a given period of time, primarily with regard to the question with which we are most concerned—the question of the struggle for peace". Thus it means that the strategical over-all objective of Soviet foreign policy is the pursuit

of durable security and that within this overall framework Moscow uses a highly differentiated and flexible policy adjusted to the "political-psychological" realities of the individual country with which it deals.

Secondly, the post-Stalin foreign policy was characterized by the use of economic activities as a major weapon, even though the new leaders subordinated economics to political psychology. On the one hand, Khrushchev announced at the 20th Party Congress: "War is not only an economic phenomenon. Whether there is to be a war or not depends in large measure on the correlation of class, political forces, the degree of organization and the awareness and resolve of the people". On the other, he reaffirmed "the Leninist precept that so long as imperialism exists, the economic basis giving rise to wars will also be preserved remains in force". But the difference between Stalin and the New Line may be noted. While in planning Soviet foreign policies, Stalin appears to have let himself be guided by the assumption that economic developments within the capitalist world were inherently propitious to communist goals and that it was more expedient to spend money on such "auxiliary" activities as propaganda and subversion, the new leadership tends to treat economics as an auxiliary of "political psychology" as "one of the means of fostering within the countries of the non-communist world that impatience with the *status quo* which they seek to promote throughout the non-communist world in an effort to intensify peoples' willingness to take a short cut through history". On this showing the economic aid programme to Afghanistan, Burma, India and Egypt can be easily understood.

Thirdly, the new foreign policy has been marked by resistance, adaptability, liberalism, smile and an offensive for peace. This attitude was reflected in an effort to improve relations between the Great Powers, the elimination of the breeding grounds of war that existed in Asia, the adjustment of relations with a number of countries as with Yugoslavia and German Federal Republic, and conclusion of the State Treaty with Austria and expansion in every way of international contacts—personal contacts between Soviet statesmen and those of other countries, greater exchanges of parliamentary, social and cultural delegations, tourist travel and adhesion to various international bodies which the Soviet Union had hitherto been boycotting.

Fourthly, whereas Stalin tended to view the world as divided between a communist and a non-communist world—and that had rendered his policies rather exclusive and rigid—the new leadership reviewed the entire context of world balance of forces. Indeed, even toward the end of the Stalin era there had begun a cautious revision. After his death, the world state system was

envisaged as consisting of five categories: (*i*) the United States on the extreme right; (*ii*) the allies of the United States (members of N.A.T.O., ANZUS, Baghdad Pact and SEATO) slightly to the left; (*iii*) neutralists—as Finland, Austria, Yugoslavia, Switzerland, India, Indonesia Afghanistan, Burma, Egypt and Syria; (*iv*) allies of the Soviet Union still farther to the left; and (*v*) The Soviet Union on the extreme left. The new Soviet policy seems to push one country after another, in the second and third categories, to the left in the fourth. The disintegration of the N.A.T.O. and discord in the Western camp are he.e the objectives. We have analysed the crisis in the N.A.T.O. in a previous chapter. The attempt to neutralize France by playing on the Franco-German accord, the effort to detach Western Germany from the N.A.T.O. by throwing in the bait of unification, the concessions to Japan in the Far East with a view to disrupt the U.S.-Jap. alliance, and the appeals to Britain by playing on the British apprehensions of German competition are some of the many aspects of the policy of disrupting the Western alliance system. Indeed, this policy brought rich dividends soon after the death of Stalin. It made possible, for instance, a feeling of warm friendship between India and the U.S.S.R. Referring to the Soviet welcome to Mr. Nehru in June 1955, our ambassador to Moscow, Mr. K.P.S. Menon, significantly wrote in July 1955: "During the first few months of my stay in the Soviet Union, the name Nehru evoked no special response. Those were the days when the Soviet Government viewed the world in terms of black and white, communist and non-communist. Now they recognise that the world is multi-coloured, that grey, too, has a virtue of its own, and that to attempt to force the whole world Red might, in this atomic age, be to destroy it. The unprecedented welcome given to a non-communist statesman is the most spectacular affirmation yet made by the Soviet Government, of their belief in co-existence".

Churchill and Eden, in order to study the Soviet peace offensive, suggested that an East-West conference be called at a higher level. On May 11, 1953, for instance, Churchill said: "It would be a pity to impede any evolution which might be taking place inside Russia . . . . I believe that a conference on the highest level should take place between the leading powers without long delay . . . . and ponderous or rigid agenda". Eisenhower and Dulles, however, insisted that East-West talks should be postponed until the Russians had given additional evidence of their good faith and peaceful intention. In London, Attlee expressly apprehensioned that "there were elements in the United States who preferred a full-scale-war in Asia to a settlement in Korea". In Washington, Senator Knowland suggested that Britain had

joined other countries in "urging a Far-Eastern Munich" and proposed that the United States should be prepared "to do it alone". Eventually Churchill, Eisenhower, and Mayer decided to confer in Bermuda in the late Spring of 1953 in order to hammer out a common approach to the Soviet moves. Due to sudden indisposition of Churchill, however, the conference had to be postponed, and at the instance of Britain the three Western foreign ministers met in Washington on July 10, 1953, in order to survey the world situation. On European issues they reached a substantial agreement, but on the Far-Eastern questions there was wide disagreement. Nevertheless, it was decided to test the new Soviet peace-offensive on German and Austrian problems. On July 15, the conference ended and the three Western Powers sent notes to the Soviet Union suggesting a conference of the foreign ministers of the four powers to be held in early autumn to discuss the establishment of a unified German Government and the disputed points of the Austrian peace treaty. But at this time the Korean armistice negotiations were proceeding smoothly and the Soviet Union took its time in formulating a reply to the Western proposal.

Finally, in the backward areas the Soviet Union by identifying itself with the popular aspirations for peace and economic development made serious inroads on Western positions. By supporting colonial liberation movements, exploiting the anti-Western sentiment of the colonial peoples, delivering arms and extending loans, grants and technical skill, the Soviet Union threw a serious challenge to the West. It is in this background that we will survey the post-Stalin foreign policy of the Soviet Union in different parts of the world.

CHAPTER 12

Ferment in Eastern Europe

After the death of Stalin the Soviet policies in Eastern Europe were characterised by three principal features : (*a*) the normalisation of relations with Yugoslavia; (*b*) a process of liberalisation in the People's Democracies; and (*c*) The Polish Revolt, suppression of the Hungarian revolt, and combating communism in the region.

RAPPROCHEMENT WITH YUGOSLAVIA

Of all the moves made by the new Soviet leadership in their effort to achieve an international detente none has been so spectacular and significant as the persistent effort to reach an understanding with Marshal Tito. We have already dealt with the Soviet-Yugoslav relations until the death of Stalin. In March 1953 hostility between the Soviet bloc and Yugoslavia was at a high pitch and "frequent border skirmishes and vitriolic propaganda exchanges marked a relentless war of nerves on the part of the Cominform, to which Yugoslavia responded in kind". But within two months of Stalin's death the tone of the Soviet press started changing so that in the May Day celebrations the Soviet leaders for the first time in five years did not use abusive language for Marshal Tito and his bourgeois masters. On April 29, 1953 Molotov received the Yugoslav *charge d' affairs*, presumably to discuss the re-establishment of normal diplomatic ties. In May, a new minister was appointed to Belgrade and in July an exchange of ambassadors was agreed on and Vasilii Valkov was despatched to Yugoslavia. In September Tito sent the Yugoslav ambassador to Moscow. Simultaneously the frequency of border incidents had decreased and by the end of 1953 agreements had been signed between Yugoslavia on the one hand and Bulgaria, Hungary and Albania on the other. Greater progress followed in the second half of 1954. In September 1954 a barter agreement was signed between Russia and Yugoslavia which brought to an end the Cominform's economic blockade against the latter. The Soviet press began to stress the Leninist principle of internationalism and to soft-pedal the "leading role of the Soviet Union". The Yugoslav broadcasts to East Europe, which hitherto used to be jammed by the Soviet bloc, were now allowed. In October Khrushchev led the Soviet delegation to Peking, where

a major reappraisal of inter-communist relations seems to have occurred. On October 13, the Soviet Union had suddenly accepted the Yugoslav-Italian settlement on Trieste concluded with Western mediation and achieved by the London agreement to which we referred earlier.

But so far the normalisation of Soviet-Yugoslav relations had proceeded on strictly non-ideological lines, as part of the general diplomacy of detente between the Soviet bloc and all its enemies. The first sign of "ideological courtship" appeared on October 20, 1954 (after Khrushchev, Bulganin and Mikoyan returned from Peking) when *Pravda*, on the tenth anniversary of the liberation of Belgrade from the Germans, gave fulsome praise, for the first time in six years, to the independent wartime achievements of the partisans "under the leadership of Marshal Tito", acclaimed the role of the Yugoslavs and paid homage to the "best sons" of both countries who had shed their blood jointly on Yugoslav soil. On November 6, Maxim Suburov of the Soviet Presidium urged complete normalization of relations between Moscow and Belgrade and suggested that recent quarrels between the two nations had only benefited "their common enemies"—the enemies of peace. This was followed by gestures of warm friendship and the Yugoslav ambassador, Vidic, "found himself buttonholed by Khrushchev and Malenkov who engaged him in lengthy and animated conversations". On November 28, (the Yugoslav National Day) Malenkov, Molotov and Khrushchev came to the reception of the Yugoslav Embassy and drank to the health of "Comrade Tito and the Yugoslav Communist Party", and Khrushchev is reported to have suggested that "since Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union were guided by Marxist-Leninist ideology, there was no reason why differences in view between them should persist". This reflects the freshness of approach and resilience which characterized the post-Stalin foreign policy of the Soviet Union and which, in course of time, went a long way in relieving the agency of the peace-loving peoples all over the world. It was now evident that the Soviet leadership had risen to the occasion, and were now trying to win back the Yugoslav leaders on the basis of Communist solidarity, by offering them the kind of independent position for which they had once asked and were denied and which China had in the meantime achieved.

Tito, however, still suspicious, steadfastly refused to accept an ideological platform as a suitable basis for rapprochement, denied all suggestions of having committed errors in the past, reiterated time and again that a return to the type of Soviet-Yugoslav relations existing prior to 1948 was not possible, suggested a formula for "active co-existence" between sovereign states, on the basis of mutual respect and non-interference in one another's internal affairs and preferred fruitful cultural and economic exchange

with the Soviet Union to the re-establishment of party ties. Tito, quite obviously, could not disregard the repurcussions a rapprochement with the Soviet Union on party basis would have on his relations with the West and he quite naturally thought that if the West abandoned him or came to distrust him intensely, he would be deprived "of the backing that imparted a large measure of strength to his bargaining position with the Russians". The Russians, on their turn, assured him that normalization of relations with the Soviet Union "in no way implies, and cannot imply, a deterioration of Yugoslavia's relations with other countries" and expressed willingness to improve relations "along the lines of state policy". This, again, is characteristic of the flexibility which has now been closely associated with Khrushchev.

The next step was taken in May 1953, when personal contacts were established between Tito and the new Soviet leadership. In December 1954, the Soviet Government was reported to have invited Tito to Moscow for discussion. But on May 14, 1955 (the day the Warsaw Pact was signed) it was announced that the two governments desirous "for a further improvement of relations and for the consolidation of peace" had agreed to arrange a meeting at the highest level at Belgrade. Evidence of a struggle in the Soviet collective leadership preceding the decision to come to Belgrade may be gleaned in Molotov's speech of February 9, 1955, in Tito's sharp rebuttal of March 7, and in the subsequent publication of the latter by *Pravda*. The meeting, however, was held from May 27 to June 3, 1955, and the Soviet delegation was led by Khrushchev, Bulganin and Mikoyan. Molotov, who had been directly involved in the conflict of 1948, had been significantly left out and the ostentatious leadership of Khrushchev and the presence of the editor of *Pravda*—Shepilov—indicated an intention to raise party issues and this became clear in the first speech which Khrushchev delivered on arrival at Zemun airport wherein he made a forceful appeal for the resumption of full party ties. He laid the whole blame for the conflict of 1948 on the machinations of "enemies of the people, Beria, Abakumov and others who have been unmasked". The joint communique issued on June 2 set forth the principles that were to govern the mutual relations of the two countries. The two governments agreed "to assist and facilitate co-operation among the social organizations of the two countries through the establishment of contacts, the exchange of socialist experiences and a free exchange of opinions". The "inter-state" nature of relations was stressed and Tito gained important concessions, *inter alia* a condemnation of the policy of military blocs, and an undertaking that hostile propaganda and "misinformation" should stop. The most substantial gain was the statement that "questions of internal organization, of different social systems, and of different forms of socialist development are

solely the concern of individual countries". The Soviet Union, in short, had recognized the theory of "different roads to socialism".

This theory was further elaborated at the 20th Party Congress in February 1956. Khrushchev there declared: "In connection with the radical changes in the world arena new prospects are also opening up in respect to the transition of countries and nations to socialism . . . . In . . . . Yugoslavia where state power belongs to the working people, and society is founded on the public ownership of the means of production, specific concrete forms of economic management and organization of the state apparatus are arising in the process of socialist construction. It is probable that more forms of transition to socialism will appear". The condemnation of Stalin in Khrushchev's speech of February 25, 1956, was a complete vindication of the Yugoslav struggle against Stalinism. Tito's warm letter to the Congress referring to the Soviet Union as a "great socialist country" was significant.

Meanwhile, other contacts had developed between Russia and Yugoslavia—reciprocal visits by parliamentary delegations, technical groups, teachers, economists, journalists and officials. On September 1, 1955 a trade agreement was signed providing for an increase in annual trade turnover from nearly 40 million dollars to 70 million dollars in each direction over the next three years, a Russian credit of 54 million dollars, and a Russian loan in foreign currency or gold of 30 million dollars. The Russians offered to assist the Yugoslavs in the development of nuclear energy facilities for peaceful purposes and the Yugoslavs by agreeing to supply Russia with bauxite, lead and other raw materials, departed from their voluntary acceptance of the Western ban on the sale of strategic materials to the Soviet bloc. Another overture to Yugoslavia was the dissolution of the Cominform on April 18, 1956. (This was, of course, part of the general peace offensive and the fact that the announcement was made on the day Khrushchev and Bulganin arrived in England was significant). The dissolution of the Cominform had been demanded by Nehru in his speech in New Delhi on May 30, 1955. "The Cominform", he had declared, "is incompatible with the principles of peaceful co-existenee". The Belgrade communique released on June 2, 1955 had stressed, as we noted above, the principle of non-interference. In August, Veljko Vlahoric, Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Commission of the Belgrade National Assembly had demanded that the U.S.S.R. cease to exercise such power over the working class movement throughout the world. At the 20th Party Congress indirect hints had been dropped about the dissolution of the Cominform. The dissolution of the Cominform in April 1956 was, thus, in line with de-Stalinization, general peace offensive, and rapprochement with Yugoslavia.

In June Tito was to visit the Soviet Union in response to

the invitation extended by the latter in June 1955. Just on the eve of this visit, Molotov—Tito's old adversary—was dismissed from the Foreign Affairs Ministry and Shepilov succeeded him. The talks at Moscow were cordial and resulted in two declarations. One recorded Yugoslav support for many aspects of Soviet foreign policy in return for Soviet promises of further economic aid. The other re-established formal relations between the Yugoslav and Soviet Communist Parties on the basis of "complete freedom, equality of rights, friendly criticism, and an amicable exchange of opinions on questions in dispute between them". But the events in Eastern Europe in June-October 1956 and the general debate on de-Stalinization created difficulties in the way of Soviet-Yugoslav relations. On September 3, 1956, the C.P.S.U. circulated a letter to the Communist Parties of East European countries appealing for Eastern-bloc solidarity and criticising national communist tendencies. This caused resentment in Belgrade. The Soviet Press comments on the punishment given to two former Cominformists by Yugoslav government in August had also annoyed Belgrade. On September 17, Khrushchev unexpectedly flew to Belgrade in order to resolve differences of views on questions of inter-state and inter-party relations. Both sides maintained their positions at the Conference which eventually met at Yalta. The upheavals in Poland and Hungary also strained Yugoslav-Soviet relations. The victory of Gomulka in Poland was a victory for Titoism but the events in Hungary caused a greater set-back to the Soviet-Yugoslav relations. Tito's qualified criticism of Soviet actions in Hungary led to a six months' interruption in the process of rapprochement but "it is a measure of the success of the 'new look' that this disagreement was not allowed to develop into another fundamental rift". In the summer of 1957, Tito and Khrushchev met in Rumania and since then Tito's relations with Kadar have been as cordial as those of Moscow, and Yugoslav support for Soviet foreign policy has been constant even though "Tito's proclivity to put forward his own solution to various problems as a panacea for the entire communist world" has not been liked by Moscow. In 1957, however, the process of rapprochement went so far as to include the recognition of the G.D.R. by Yugoslavia. The Soviet peace offensive has been fully supported by Tito.

But towards the fall of 1957, and as a postlude to the celebrations held in Moscow to mark the 40th anniversary of the foundations of the Soviet regime, a series of talks on the problems facing the communist world took place there on November 14-16, 1957 in which all communist countries participated. While the Yugoslavs were ready to sign the "Peace Manifesto" they refused to sign the Declaration of the Communist and Workers' Parties of all Communist countries. The Declaration stated: "At the

present stage, stepping up the struggle against opportunist tendencies in the workers and communist movement is acquiring considerable significance. The meeting stresses the need to overcome decisively revisionism and dogmatism in the ranks of the workers and communist parties. . . . .It is expedient to hold more representative conferences of communist and Workers' Parties to discuss current problems. . . . .and to concert action in the joint struggle for the common goal". The Yugoslav delegates refused to accept this insistence on "concerted action" and pressed for that complete freedom of action which they won in 1948. Indeed, on December 8, 1957, the Central Committee of the Yugoslav Communist Party stated at a meeting in Brioni that "the Moscow declaration contained incorrect interpretations and evaluations". The Soviet Union, however, has not criticised the Yugoslav refusal. The rapprochement policy, therefore, continued. In April 1958, the U.S.S.R. and the People's Democracies refused to send delegates to attend the Yugoslav Communist Party Congress and this suggested that the ideological differences were persisting.

PEOPLE'S DEMOCRACIES

We have noted in a previous chapter that the evolution of the People's democratic regimes in Eastern Europe from 1945 to 1953 was marked by ever closer imitation of Soviet political, economic, and cultural organization and practice, and subordination of national aims to those of the "Socialist Camp" as formulated by the Soviet leadership. While Stalin's death in March 1953 did not bring any explicit reformulation of the notion of People's Democracy in its wake, the relaxation of internal pressures in the Soviet Union was extended to the People's Democracies as well. The response of these countries to the New Course, however, was not uniform and while some states like Hungary "marked out a fairly ambitious programme of changes", others, like Poland or Czechoslovakia "moved more cautiously". At the same time intellectuals and students began to grope for greater freedom of expression and in this respect Hungary and Poland "showed the most pronounced signs of ferment". The very fact that differences in individual country responses to the new situation were discernible could be interpreted as a sign of "national initiative and departure, at least within certain limits, from a rigidly held pattern of behaviour". The amnesty in the U.S.S.R. was followed by similar measures in the People's Democracies. Following the shifts in the economic policies in the U.S.S.R., in East European states also the consumer's goods and agricultural sectors of the economy were promised increased investments and greater attention. "The

drive for collectivization tapered off. Incentives, including forgiveness of back taxes and of arrears in compulsory deliveries. . . were held out to the peasantry as a means of raising farm productivity. Price cuts were decreed to help the consumer". In order to activate the masses National Fronts were revived. In Hungary peasants were permitted to leave collective farms in large numbers. Here as well as in Poland and Czechoslovakia "cautious groping for a somewhat greater freedom of expression, for a less doctrinnaire adherence to rigid Stalinism, and perhaps even for the assertion of national individuality was discernible". The cult of collective leadership came in vogue and in all countries except Rumania, the office of the Premier was separated from that of the First Secretary of the Party. Reorganizations of the industrial and cultural ministries took place. The economic changes in Russia following the downfall of Malenkov found their echo in Eastern Europe also and "harsher economic policies stressing once more the need for expanding the heavy industrial base of socialist economies and for collectivizing the land were introduced", although the rigid ways of Stalin's days were not restored. A lenient policy towards the church was followed and political exiles were induced to return home.

Nevertheless, the basic relations between the Soviet Union and the People's Democracies hardly changed. With Finland the policies of Stalin were continued with greater emphasis on Finnish freedom and more concessions. This we have already dealt with in details in chapter 3. With other countries except for a change in emphasis, the pattern remains as it was. In July 1955, *Pravda* wrote: "Relations between the Soviet Union and the People's Democracies are built upon the granite foundation of socialist internationalism. The communist party has always willingly shared and still shares its wealth of experience with all fraternal parties, and at the same time Soviet communists are called on to study assiduously and imitate all that is advanced to be found in the People's Democracies in the sphere of management of the national economy, achievements of science, technology and so on". Nevertheless the instruments of Soviet influence in the region are intact. The Soviet troops were not withdrawn from Hungary or Rumania in spite of the Austrian Peace Treaty. The Warsaw Pact brought about a unified command in the region. The volume of trade has continued to rise steadily and "closer integration and a more rational allocation of economic functions among the communist countries were foreshadowed when Hungary and Czechoslovakia deliberately postponed the beginning of their five-year plans so that they might coincide and be co-ordinated with the next Russian plan". In 1956 the U. S. S. R. was aiding the People's Democracies in the construction of 391 enterprises and 90 individual shops and installations

and had advanced long term credits totalling 21 billion rubles. Agreements were concluded between them and the U.S.S.R. on the production and utilization of atomic energy.

In the context of the events in Poland and Hungary that occurred in October 1956 it was believed that a new pattern of relationship between the U.S.S.R. and the People's Democracies would come off. And certain definite changes in this pattern did emerge. As one authority has put it: "The rigid uniformity of the Stalin era is no more. Gone are the days when an order for agricultural collectivization could be issued in Moscow to be implemented unquestioningly in countries as far apart as Eastern Germany and...Albania and the concerted economic exploitation of Eastern Europe by Russia has given way to a fairer arrangement of economic tasks, in which the Russians are not invariably on the winning side". The Soviet-Polish agreement of 1957, for instance, provided for the cancellation of all Poland's outstanding debts on the supposition that they had been covered by more than ten years of Polish coal deliveries. To Hungary also large-scale economic aid in the form of credits and supplies was given. This new policy is based on the realization in Moscow that politics is the art of the possible and that "the peoples of Eastern Europe cannot be wholly converted to communism in this generation". In short, the present Soviet policy towards East Europe may be said to be "to allow the communist parties in the People's Democracies to run their respective countries in accordance with local conditions and their own preferences, provided that their policies do not upset the *status quo* and that they accept the basic tenets of Marxist ideology and Soviet foreign policy". This can be substantiated by what Khrushchev told the Supreme Soviet on November 6, 1957 and by what the aforesaid Moscow Declaration of November 22, 1957 provided. Khrushchev said on November 6 that "the theory of scientific socialism does and must take into consideration the special features of each country... but the abolition of the private ownership of the means of production and the association of the peasantry in co-operatives are common elements, without which the socialist system cannot develop successfully". Emphasising the leading role of the Soviet Union, the Moscow Declaration of November 22, 1957 stated: "The U.S.S.R. is the most powerful socialist state...and the imperialists are afraid of (its) strength and might, are afraid of the ideas of Marxism-Leninism. Therefore they are attempting in every-way possible to discredit the experience of the Soviet Union and thereby discredit the great ideas of Marxism-Leninism". The idea of the communist world as one of solid bloc pursuing common objectives was emphasised by Khrushchev after assuming the office of the Soviet Prime Minister. In his visit to Hungary early in April 1958, he referred to the Soviet role in the events of

October 1956 and said: "The October-November events in Hungary were a test of the Soviet-Hungarian friendship. We can say without exaggeration that all the world was anxious to see what the Soviet Union would do when the forces of international and internal reaction undertook an impudent attack on one of the links of the single socialist camp".

REVOLTS IN POLAND AND HUNGARY

The Western and Soviet explanations of the revolt in East Europe in 1956 differ widely. The Western argument is that the foremost factor in this was economic. The economic discontent in Eastern Europe resulting from war-connected transfers or contributions to the Soviet Union, dismantlement and removal to the Soviet Union of industrial plant equipment, Soviet confiscation of German and Italian assets in Eastern Europe, the flow of reparation payments to the U.S.S.R. and People's Democracies, financial contributions toward the maintenance of Soviet occupation troops had created chaotic conditions. The joint stock companies, the unrestricted Soviet utilization of East Europe's transportation facilities, and the patterning of new industries in the countries of this region after the Soviet model had caused hardships. The bilateral trade agreements between them and the U.S.S.R. had led to a series of unequal trade relations in which the Soviet Union was invariably the winning partner. Prices paid by Moscow for satellite imports tended to be lower than prices prevailing on the world markets, while the average prices of Soviet exports to Eastern Europe were frequently higher. The bargaining power of the U.S.S.R., which could operate fully through the mechanism of bilateral agreements, manifested itself also in Moscow's frequent role as a trade debtor within the orbit. This imposed upon the satellites the additional burden of carrying short-term commercial credits free of interest. For instance, Poland's prices of coal deliveries to the U.S S.R. in exchange for Soviet shipments of German reparations to Poland were generally 90% below world market rates. In Poland as well as in Hungary the bulk of the people, so runs the Western argument, were being driven to desperation by intolerable conditions, low wages, long hours, shortage of food, shortage of housing, shortage of consumer goods. As Mr. W. N. Ewer put it : "Their economic position, so far from improving has been deteriorating, to the point at which hardship without hope had become unendurable". In short, it was a revolt against Communism.

Secondly, it is suggested that the revolt of the Poles and the Hungarians was against Russian domination and was largely inspired by national feeling as well as by national tradition. All of the East European countries, it is argued, have a national

history and some have memories of national greatness. This national past is associated with religious faith. Again, there was not merely a nationalism of the masses, but as Hugh Seton-Watson has put it, there is also the nationalism of the masses. The swift and massive industrialization created a new ruling class—"a state bourgeoisie"—possessing many of the moral and intellectual characteristics of the private bourgeoisie elevated by the industrial revolution in the early stages of West European capitalism. And these leaders naturally resented foreign domination. It is true that nearly all the countries of Eastern Europe with the exception of East Germany are Slav in race and language and thus there is some link and identity of interest between them and Russia. But it should not be forgotten that it was largely the Soviet security interests, the position of great military strength which the Soviet Union had in 1944-45 in the region, and "some of the old Czarist ambitions to spread out, more especially over the Slav areas" which led to the communization of these areas. As Mr. Nehru wrote on his return from Moscow in July 1955: "It (the Soviet Union) also had the desire to protect itself in the future by having as many friendly countries as possible next to its borders. The easiest way to have a friendly country appeared to them to have a communist regime there under their patronage". The desire to liberate themselves from the Soviet patronage therefore was natural. On this showing, therefore, the revolt both in Hungary and Poland can be said to be an essentially revolutionary movement".

Thirdly, it is pointed out that the post-Stalin New Look in Russia, the normalization of relations with Yugoslavia, and the process of liberalization in People's Democracies was a considerable reason of revolt in Hungary and Poland. Thus Richard Lowenthal has argued: "The major common factor in the background of both the Polish and Hungarian events was clearly the weakening of Soviet authority both within the international communist movement in general and within the satellite states in particular. That weakening, which has proceeded slowly and gradually ever since the death of Stalin and the loosening of economic and police controls in the satellites, was greatly accelerated by two major events: the Belgrade Declaration of 1955 by which the Soviet rulers recognized Yugoslavia's right to her 'own road to socialism' and the 'secret' Khrushchev attack on Stalin at the Twentieth Congress of the C.P.S U." Khrushchev's disclosure and condemnation of Stalin's methods of rule and conduct of foreign policy combined with the relaxation policy at home, a peace offensive abroad and the rehabilitation of Tito naturally led to a weakening of Soviet control which "found visible expression in the astonishing outburst of free criticism in the Polish communist and non-party press, in the openly critical discussions

conducted before ever larger audiences of writers, students and young officers in Budapest". All these factors, it is further argued, prevented the Soviet Union from successfully reasserting its authority at least in Poland, for, the use or open threat of force would have jeopardized Soviet efforts to woo the "uncommitted nations'' and would have caused renewed friction with the Yugoslavs.

On the other hand, the Soviet explanation of East European revolt is that imperialist and reactionary Polish underground agents, taking advantage of certain economic difficulties, incited serious disturbances in Poland. Similarly, about Hungary it is suggested that "internal and international reactionary and counter-revolutionary forces launched an attack on socialist gains" and "attempted to utilize the pent-up resentment of the masses of the working people who rightly called for an improvement in the country's guidance and for a rise in the living standards of the population". The Soviet Union also alleged that the former government and party leadership of Hungary headed by Rakosi and Geroe had made "grave mistakes in resolving the problems of socialist construction both in questions of policy and in the field of economic and cultural construction. The Rakosi-Geroe leadership and government bodies showed a lack of vigilance and overlooked both the spread of just resentment among the people and the ever-growing subversive conspiratorial activity of the counter-revolutionary elements".

What, in fact, is the objective explanation? Is it correct to attribute all this to the personality cult and to the system associated with it? It is suggested that if "Stalinism" was wrong and responsible for creating discontent, the process of de-Stalinization and the manner in which it was carried out was responsible for stirring it. It has been certainly carried out "in a somewhat disingenious fashion, without taking the progressive movement in the world into confidence". Moreover, it has been applied "unequally". Break with Stalinism in Moscow at the 20th Party Congress should have been synchronised organically and not merely in an *ad hoc* series of improvisations, with a complete overhaul of the whole structure of the foreign relations of the Soviet Union. Nothing of the kind was done. While the Soviet Union undertook a reorientation with the West and "normalization of relations" with Yugoslavia, the framework of Soviet relationship with the People's Democracies was left almost untouched, and for this a heavy price had to be paid. This might be due to the fact that the Soviet Union was badly informed of the state of affairs in these countries as the "information often came from sychophantic sources who, over the years had become rather like the countries in the story of the Emperor's clothes".

It is in this background that we will briefly summarize the Polish and the Hungarian revolt and their after-effects.

THE POLISH REVOLT

Soon after the death of Stalin, a movement towards liberalization and relaxation had begun in Poland. In October 1953, Beirut declared at a plenary meeting of the Polish Party's Central Committee that the party's aim must be "a rapid use in the living standards of the working people in town and countryside". Investment in agriculture was to be 45% greater in 1955 than in 1953, and investment in consumer goods, housing and social welfare about one-third greater. Aid was to be given to individual peasants as well as to collective and state farms. Detailed plans were to be discussed at a party congress, announced for mid-January 1954. In religious sphere, however, the struggle continued and in September 1953, Cardinal Wages Zynski was arrested. The Soviet security system also remained right possibly because they did not wish to take any chance. Poland, it was realized, lies on the main line of communication with East Germany, where the Soviet weakness had been decisively demonstrated in the workers' uprisings of June 1953. But in April 1954 the Polish Council of Art and Culture condemned the principles of dictation from above, restrictions on the artists' freedom of expression and discouragement of experimentation. In January 1955, the communist Workers' Party Central Committee decided to democratize the security police and to restrict its supreme power. In May, "a soul-searching criticism of managerial and trade union practices" was undertaken and at the same time "the personality cult" came under fire. In February 1956 the 20th Party Congress released powerful forces and the objective of independence from Soviet control was evolved. A demand for freedom for the growth of realism, and schools of art other than socialist, and increased cultural contacts with the West grew and the Polish press started discussing frankly the past practices of parliamentary life in Poland. On March 12, Beirut, leader of the Polish Party, died and his death marked the end of one-man dictatorship in Poland. "There arose a dualism in the Warsaw ruling system, with control divided between the party on the one hand—under the leadership of Edward Ochab, Beirut's successor—and the government on the other—headed by Premier Josef Cyrankiewicz". In April for the first time in many years key economic and social problems were discussed publicly and the government promised a number of economic and social reforms. About 200,000 persons were given amnesty. Many Stalinists were removed from the government and were replaced by adherents of Cyrankiewicz' liberation policy. The pro-Stalin critics were ignored. Earlier on March

27, 1956, Jerzy Morawski, Secretary of the Polish United Workers Party had published an article on "the lessons of the 20th Congress of the C.P.S.U." and condemned Stalinism. On April 7, Ochab acknowledged "the painful and bitter truth about the mistakes of Joseph Stalin". On April 23, Cyrankiewicz addressed the Sesm and expressed his government's firm determination "to carry to the end the investigation concerning those guilty of breaches of the rule of law, of applying illegal investigating methods and of concocting trials". On April 29, Ochab writing in *Pravda* on Lenin's rules and principles of Party life, returned to the theme of the anti-Stalin campaign. Meanwhile, trade unions in Poland were getting stale and they had lost contact with and the co-operation of the labouring masses. Abuses and malpractices were rampant. The state railroads had not issued since 1951 the clothing due to their workers as partial pay. There was evidence of managerial misuse of the enterprise funds allocated to improve the workers' standard of living. The Polish labour resources were thus practically exhausted. The rigorous labour legislation were rigorously enforced and appeals against misuses went unheeded. This was roughly the background of the riots in Poland.

On June 17, 1956 an International Fair opened in Poznan. On June 28, workers of the ZISPO factory (locomotions and heavy machinery) and other plants staged "a demonstration which turned into a riot and finally a pitched battle between the rioters and armed detachments of the police". On June 29, the riots were quelled and a government delegation headed by Cyrankiewicz arrived on the spot. The Government attributed the riots to the "imperialist agents and the reactionary underground.....trying to use the economic difficulties and shortcomings at several Poznan enterprises to incite outbursts against the people's rule". Same day the Trybuno Ludu carried an editorial, "Provocation", and cast aspersions on "one of the American fanatics of the cold war" and Cyrankiewicz issued a proclamation to the people of Poznan and charged the "imperialist centres" of exploiting "the dissatisfaction of a portion of the workers and labourers of Poznan, caused by the difficult material conditions of the working population". Thus the immediate conclusion drawn was that vigilance against "the class enemy from within and subversion by agents from abroad" could not be relaxed. On July 1, *Pravda* declared that "hostile agents carried out a crude provocation in Poznan". Same day the Yugoslav official view was released that "the true meaning of the Poznan disorders must be sought in the attempt of reactionary forces to compromise the process of domestic development in Poland and after long years of Stalinist deformation is now following the path of democratization and concern for the people's everyday needs".

Soon after, however, the Polish official view started changing and the Trybuno Ludu made a distinction between "a legal strike movement by the Poznan workers" and "the illegal acts of violence" which followed, and suggested that "there had been two entirely different movements in Poznan and that all began with a perfectly legal demonstration of workers and in a later phase, hostile forces entered and transformed the demonstration into "an armed provocation". On July 18-28 the Central Committee of the Polish United Workers Party held its 7th plenary session and in a resolution declared that "the Poznan events cannot be treated in isolation from the situation in the country... Dissatisfaction in many workers' centres is being accentuated by prolonged and frequently soulless dealing with the first demands and grievances of the working men. This leads to the upsetting of proper relations between the different sections of the working class and the party and the peoples' power; it gives birth to feelings of mistrust and disappointment". On July 19, Ochab spoke out and completely repudiated the original explanation of Poznan riots: "In investigating the reasons for these occurrences it would be wrong to have mainly in view the machinations of provocateurs and imperialist agents. Rather one must first look for the social roots of what happened". This change must have disturbed Moscow. On July 20, a Soviet delegation headed by Bulganin and Zhukov came to Poland for the celebration of the 12th anniversary of Poland's liberation from Nazi occupation. On July 21, Bulganin in his address revived the theory of imperialist instigation: "The recent events at Poznan, provoked by enemy agents serve as additional proof that the international reaction has still not abandoned its delirious dreams of restoring capitalism in the socialist countries. We cannot forget this for a second. The Western frontiers and Silesia are now for ever Polish".

The Soviet leaders, however, failed in their effort to revive the legend of imperialist instigation of the Ponan riots and in another resolution the Polish Central Committee admitted that "in the course of implementation of the 6-year Plan several disproportions occurred in our national economy" and "that discontent was due to disillusionment over the unfulfilled hopes for a substantial improvement in the standard of living".

Gomulka comes to power. In order to escape from these difficulties, the Polish Government and Party resorted to two methods. One was to promise a swift change of course followed by the dismissal from office of the responsible economic ministers in order to allay discontent. The other was to initiate talks with Wladyslaw Gomulka and to reinstate him as a party member. It may be mentioned that Gomulka was purged in 1949 (after conflict between Tito and Stalin) for advocating an "independent Polish

approach to socialism". Through his punishment, imprisonment and opposition to forced collectivization, he had become "a symbol of resistance to Moscow". The attempt to reinstate Gomulka was naturally unwelcome to the old Stalinists in Poland and to the Soviet Union which would not permit its anti-Stalinism to such an absurd degree. Nevertheless, on August 4, 1956, the Politburo of the P.U.W.P. restored "to comrade Gomulka his rights as a party member". The next step was to entrust him with party leadership in order to stem the rot. But Gomulka held the trump cards and he chose to move them correctly. He laid down his terms: no economic demagogy, abandonment of forced collectivization and enforced agricultural deliveries, devolution of the M.T.S., decentralization of economic planning and acceptance of workers' control, reorientation of Polish-Soviet relations on a basis of equality and removal of Soviet stooges from the party leadership. In September these demands were conceded. On October 15, the Politburo of the P.U.W.P. decided to call the 8th session of the Central Committee on October 19. The Central Committee met that day and co-opted Gomulka. He was re-elected as Secretary-General of the P.U.W.P. and Beirut's co-workers were removed from their positions.

New Poland: October 1956—April 1958. The day the 8th session of the Central Committee met, a Soviet delegation led by Khrushchev, Kaganovich, Mikoyan and Molotov came to Warsaw to discuss with the Polish party leaders "current problems of interest for the two parties". They were obviously annoyed at the turn of events in Poland. It was reported that they called Gomulka a traitor and ordered Soviet troops movement from various parts of the country in the direction of Moscow. The Poles, however, stuck to their guns and all that the Soviet leaders could obtain from the Poles was an agreement that a delegation of Polish leaders would go to Moscow "in the nearest future" to discuss with the Soviet leaders "problems of further strengthening the political and economic co-operation" between their countries and "of further consolidating the fraternal friendship and co-existence of the P.U.W.P. and the C.P.S.U.". The Soviet leaders left Warsaw on October 20. On October 20-21, Gomulka resumed the party leadership, removed the Soviet stooges from it and made changes in the army. Meanwhile trouble in Hungary had begun to which we will turn shortly.

About new Poland, three points deserve special attention. *First*, since Gomulka came to power, the process of liberalization has gone quite far, though not as far as in Yugoslavia. *Secondly*, the relations between Poland and the U.S.S.R. have been uneasy but correct. Poland is, therefore, a symbol of national communism and in spite of the fact that it remains a part of the Warsaw Pact,

it can no longer be regarded as part of international communism. *Thirdly,* the relations of Gomulka's Poland with the West have become closer and more friendly than ever since 1945.

So far as the process of liberalization is concerned, Gomulka soon after assumption of power broadened the popular base of the Sejm and a new electoral law was passed. In his speech on October 20, 1956, he had outlined his programme in details (See *National Communism and Popular Revolt in Eastern Europe,* edited by Paul E. Zinner, pp. 197—234). The stress on heavy industry has since been replaced by emphasis on consumer goods. Forced collectivization has been abolished. Collectives have been allowed to dissolve and repressive measures against private farming have been withdrawn. The educational system has been liberalized; Press censorship has been relaxed; free dissemination of foreign literature has been allowed. The experiments in Yugoslavia as well as Mao's "hundred flowers" have had a catch in Poland. Private initiative is encouraged. The secret police has been neutralized and "the dogma—the official ideology—has compeletely disintegrated under repeated onslaughts from the reawakened intellectuals, from disillusioned youths, from minds finally freed from the silence of fear. Common sense, experimentation and pragmatism are taking its place". Nor does the party maintain "the monolithic facade" so marked a feature of totalitarianism. It is true that Poland is not a democracy. Parliamentary institutions are lacking and rule of law is also missing. There is no rule by the people and a minority decides what is objectively good for the people. Indeed, one authority has described Gomulka's regime as "a Government of National Defence". It has all the contradictions that such a concept implies. There is intellectual freedom but there is also party control. Hatred of Russia exists side by side with military and political alliance with Moscow. It holds an anti-religious ideology yet it has granted the Catholic Church rights denied to it in "pluralistic and democratic" countries, e.g. freedom of religious instructions in the public schools.

So far as the Polish relations with the Soviet Union are concerned, for most part they have been uneasy. We have noted that Khrushchev had invited the Polish leaders to Moscow on October 20, 1956. The visit came off in November. It should be remembered that the background of Polish-Soviet relations has been rather unhappy and the Polish people's experience with their Soviet neighbours since 1939 can have done nothing to improve matters. Indeed, it might even be said that the Poles have become accustomed to equate their hatred of communism with their dislike of all things Russian. Nor has the Polish Communist Party had any reason to feel particularly attached to the "mother land of the Revolution. Gomulka's task was really difficult to contain the widespread and potentially violent anti-

Soviet feeling of the Polish people, while preventing the Russians from using force to retain their position". He wanted to terminate Soviet economic exploitation and political domination without having a complete break with Moscow. The negotiations at Moscow and their results should be appreciated in this context. These yielded an agreement limiting the number, location and movements of Soviet troops within the borders of Poland and providing for Soviet expenditure on their stay in Poland. The Polish debts in the nominal amount of about 2 billion rubles, run up by earlier Soviet credits were cancelled outright and Poland was granted a new advance on goods in the amount of about a third of this sum. The Poles were left free to accept economic aid from the West. Shortly after, negotiations were actually started between Poland and the United States. The concessions which the Poles gave to the Soviet Union were especially valuable for the latter at that moment particularly because just then in Hungary the Nagy government had brought Soviet prestige in jeopardy. For the Poles the alliance with the Soviet Union was valuable "not only because the U.S.S.R. is the only great power to guarantee the Oder-Neisse frontier, but also because the repudiation of this alliance and Poland's secession from the Warsaw Pact is the one thing the Kremlin would not tolerate". For the Soviet Union it was more risky and more difficult to relax their ideological hold over Poland than to surrender some of their economic privileges. For the Poles there was the fear of Germany, West German rearmament and the German demand for alteration of the provisional Oder-Neisse boundary. From the Soviet standpoint a Soviet guarantee of this boundary would "keep Warsaw tied to the Soviet bloc". The Polish independence is therefore precarious. They are friendly to Kadar's Government in Hungary and yet they opposed Soviet intervention there. In a vote on this question in the General Assembly, the Polish representative for the first time in many years dissociated himself from the stand of the Soviet Union by abstaining from voting. On the one hand, Gomulka says that "the road to socialism pursued by the U.S.S.R. under specific conditions is neither fully necessary nor entirely suitable for other nations"—a thesis of National Communism. On the other, he maintains that "Our party most resolutely condemns everything directed against the unity of the socialist camp, everything that undermines Polish-Soviet friendship"—a thesis of unity of the Socialist Camp. In this light one can better appreciate the Polish adherence to the Moscow Declaration of November 22, 1957, to which we earlier referred.

In maintaining this precarious balance, the Poles have been helped not only by Yugoslavia but also by China. The Chinese formula "Let all flowers blossom, let diverse schools of thought

contend" is a very useful argument in support of Poland's National road to Socialism which consists of Workers' Councils, increased administrative autonomy, greater freedom to the peasants and emphasis on co-operation, agreement with the Church, greater political freedom, co-operation with the West and friendship with the Soviet Union and its allies. Poland is not as independent of Moscow as Yugoslavia because Gomulka is not as strong in his party as Tito was in his, because of the greater entrenched power of the Catholic church in Poland, because of the Soviet support—a very valuable support indeed—for the Polish frontiers and because the U.S.S.R. would not tolerate as free a Poland as Yugoslavia. Thus sandwitched between the Germans and the Russians, the Poles can hardly afford a really independent foreign policy. Nevertheless, the Polish relations with the West since November 1956 have been remarkably well. Trade with the German Federal Republic has been considerably expanded. The U. S. loan of 200 million dollars was obtained in the summer of 1957 and credits have been obtained from France and the U. K. As a result of the pressure of public opinion, the convicts at the Poznan trial were released and a "real basis for an exchange of ideas between the Polish legal profession and the legal opinion of the non-communist world developed".

THE HUNGARIAN R EVOLT

The Hungarian revolt of October 1956 was essentially a liberal nationalist uprising against Stalinist communism and foreigners' control, led by the workers and youth and was u ltimately crushed by a combination of such factors as lack of h onest local leadership, the enormous might of the Soviet troops and tanks, general panic and confusion caused by the Suez crisis, uncertainty of a presidential election year in the United States, and the general ineffectiveness of the United Nations. We have summarized in a previous chapter the situation in Hungary from 1945 to 1952. During this period Hungary had grown into a People's Democracy. Rajk had been executed in 1949 as a Titoist and the Stalin constitution had been adopted in 1950. When, therefore, Stalin died there emerged a spontaneous urge for relaxation and the New Course was at once adopted. Ten days after the Berlin revolt—on June 27-28, 1953—the principle of collective leadership was accepted. Hitherto M. Rakosi was the Secretary-General of the Party as well as the Premier. Now, the former post was abolished and was replaced by a secretariat of three so that Rakosi had to share power with two others. On July 2, he ceased to be the Prime Minister and Imre Nagy (the Hungarian Malenkov) was appointed to this office in order to raise the living standards of the industrial workers, to revise the Labour Code, to increase the

production of consumer goods, and to slow down the compulsory collectivization of agriculture. But Rakosi (still the Secretary-General) and Gero—the principal protagonist of economic planning—were rather opposed to these measures announced by Nagy on July 4, and the regime, therefore, felt shaky. Discipline was undermined, peasants started leaving the co-operatives and party ranks were confused. Rakosi and Nagy, therefore, were forced to restate the new policy and no more was now heard of increased freedom in religion and in small trade and the promises made by Nagy remained unfulfilled. In 1954, however, liberalization process went ahead, crop quotas were reduced, peasants were granted cut in income-tax. By March 1955, Rakosi prevailed on the Soviet Union to dismiss Nagy for "having gone too far with his new course". This was followed by tightening of control except that criticism within the Party and comparative freedom of expression continued. In November, Nagy was expelled from they party. Towards the latter half of 1955 a most significant manifestation of intellectual unrest occurred against the maintenance of rigid, arbitrary and stifling party controls over literary activity. The communist students organized the Petofi Circle (after the name of the Hungarian Poet and patriot Alexander Petofi, 1823-49) which in course of time became a centre of intellectual ferment. In February 1956, the 20th Party Congress unleashed powerful forces. The first effect of these forces was visible on March 29, 1956 when Rajk's name was restored to grace and Janos Kadar a former ally of Rajk, was released from prison. In May, anti-Stalinism had gone so far ahead that Rakosi was openly criticized in the Press and on July 18, he was replaced as party chief by Ernoe Geroe. Although Geroe was a no less rigid Stalinist than Rakosi, the former at once called for reconciliation with Tito. In June, the Poznan riots had occurred and on July 21, Mikoyan came to Budapest in order to curb a further extension of the Poznan spirit. In September, a directive is reported to have been sent by the Soviet government emphasising the leading role of the U.S.S.R. This annoyed Tito and this in turn brought Khrushchev to Belgrade and then Tito to Yalta on September 30 for talks in which Geroe also joined. Meanwhile the intellectual climate of the revolt was being prepared and the Petofi Circle evolved the demand for the rehabilitation of Nagy who had become the symbol of reform and freedom. Gomulka's advent in Poland gave a further impetus to the revolutionary tendencies and the progress of de-Stalinization.

On October 3, the Central Committee of the Hungarian Workers Party (H. W. P.) announced the decision to pay "last respects to comrades who, as a result of political trials in past years, have been innocently condemned and executed". On

October 6, Rajk was disinterred and given a public funeral with honours, while an estimated 200,000 Hungarians marched beside his coffin. On October 10, the Government praised Tito for his fight against "Stalinist tyranny", and on October 13, Nagy was reinstated in the party. Same day Gen. Mihaly Farkas, former secret police Chief under Rakosi was arrested for having violated "socialist legality". On October 14, a Hungarian delegation under the leadership of Ernoe Geroe departed to Yugoslavia to formalise the terms of friendly co-operation between the two countries. On October 20, about 3,000 students of the University of Szeged broke with the communist youth organization and same day the party organ declared the need for a "Hungarian way to socialism". Nagy was restored to the Academy of Sciences and the Budapest radio welcomed the rehabilitation of Gomulka. On October 22, the Petofi Circle formulated demands for greater personal and national freedom including the demand that all trade agreements with the Soviet Union be made public and relations with it be established on a basis of equality. Popular demonstrations in Gyor called for the release of Cardinal Mindszenty, for the withdrawal from Hungary of all Soviet troops and for the return of Nagy. The demonstrations organized by the Petofi Circle acquired a mass character on October 23 and the Ministry of Interior had to lift the ban on public assembly under pressure of the demonstrators.

Stages of Revolt. Four clear phases of the Hungarian Revolt can be easily traced: (*a*) From October 23, 1956 to October 29 ending with the defeat of the Soviet attempt to crush the revolt. (*b*) From October 29 to November 3, when Hungary had freed itself from the Soviet control. (*c*) From November 4 to November 11, when the second Soviet intervention began and ended. (*d*) From November 11, 1956 to early January 1957 when the passive resistance stage of the revolution came to an end and the pre-revolt pattern was restored.

The disturbances which began in Budapest on October 23, rapidly spread to the entire country. Geroe's broadcast of October 23, protesting against nationalist excesses and defending the Soviet-Hungarian relations, and the police firing at the demonstrators converted the demonstrations into "violent and uncontrollable riots". In the night of October 23-24, the Hungarian Central Committee met and decided to call in Nagy to head the government. At the same time, without Nagy's knowledge, Geroe requested the Russians for help under Warsaw Pact. On October 24, Hegedus resigned and was replaced by Nagy and the Soviet-Hungarian troops were sent to suppress the riots. On October 25, Mikoyan and Suslov flew into Budapest, ousted Geroe as party secretary and acceded to Nagy's assumption of office. Kadar was appointed as party secretary.

It was decided that "Nagy would announce a series of concessions promising withdrawal of Soviet troops from the city of Budapest" and a review of Soviet-Hungarian treaties. On October 26, Nagy recognized the justice of some of the demands of demonstrations and ascribed the unrest to "mistakes and crimes" of the last ten years, and promised complete Soviet military withdrawal from Hungary. On October 27, he announced his new coalition cabinet including Tildy and Kovacs and next day he conceded victory to the rebels and announced that negotiations had begun with the Soviet Union about the withdrawal of Soviet troops. On October 29, the political police was dissolved and the Soviets began to withdraw from Budapest as requested. On October 30, Nagy denied responsibility for calling in the Russian troops on October 24 and announced that they would completely withdraw from Budapest on October 31. The Hungarian Air Force command published an ultimatum giving the Soviet troops 12 hours to leave Budapest. Free elections were promised by Nagy.

On October 30, it must have been realized in Moscow that the despatch of Soviet troops on October 24 had aggravated the situation in Hungary. That day a remarkable statement was drafted and released the next day under the caption "Settlement of Relations Between Socialist States". In this the Soviet government expressed readiness "to discuss together with the governments of other socialist states measures ensuring further development and strengthening of economic ties among the socialist countries in order to remove any possibility of violation of the principles of national sovereignty, mutual benefit and equality in economic relations". The Soviet government also raised the point of recalling its advisers from the People's Democracies and expressed its readiness "to review with the other socialist countries which are members of the Warsaw Treaty the question of Soviet troops stationed on the territory of the above-mentioned countries". Referring to the Hungarian situation the statement said: "Having in mind that the further presence of Soviet military units in Hungary could serve as an excuse for further aggravation of the situation, the Soviet government has given its military command instructions to withdraw the Soviet military units from the city of Budapest (and) is prepared to enter into negotiations with Hungary and other members of the Warsaw Treaty on the question of the presence of Soviet troops on the territory of Hungary".

On October 31, it was confirmed that the Soviet troops had left Budapest. Same day Cardinal Mindszenty was released. From October 29 to November 3, Hungary had come to its own Nagy formed his new coalition cabinet including the representatives of the Socialist Democrats and the Petofi Party. Local councils

were formed in every factory, municipality, city and county. Workers' Councils had taken over the factories and demands for independence of the Soviet control were raised. Old political parties were re-established. The communists were feeling isolated. Press censorship was removed. But the rift between Nagy and Kadar was widening, the cleavage between people and party had become final and "Nagy had chosen the people, and Kadar the party".

The renewed Soviet intervention. On October 31, Mikoyan and Suslov again came to Budapest and discovered that the revolution in Hungary was almost complete. On November 1, Nagy demanded of Soviet Ambassador to Hungary that Soviet troops newly arrived be immediately withdrawn, gave notice to terminate Hungarian adherence to the Warsaw Pact, declared Hungarian neutrality, and requested the U.N. Secretary General to place the question of Hungarian neutrality on the next agenda of the General Assembly. Same day Tildy told Mikoyan that the Warsaw Pact would in any case be repudiated by Hungary and Mikoyan and Suslov met Kadar. It was, presumably, in this meeting that the decision to form a new government by Kadar which would invite Soviet military intervention, was taken. This decision must have also been induced by the diversion of world opinion to events in the Middle East. On October 30, the Anglo-French ultimatum was delivered to Cairo and in the context of the possible reactions in the United States and in Afro-Asian countries to this ultimatum the Soviet leaders could be sure "that the shock which the use of force in Hungary would cause would be substantially mitigated throughout the world". Possibly Eden's own decision to attack Egypt at this time might have been influenced by the same logic. In any case the two events seem to be inter-related and acted and reacted on each other. On November 2-3 substantial additional Soviet forces moved into Hungary. The Austrian border was sealed. As late as November 3, Radio Budapest announced that in a joint committee of Soviet military leaders and the representatives of the Hungarian Government that day the Soviet delegation had promised that no further moves of Soviet troops would take place across the Hungarian frontier.

On November 4, the Soviet troops attacked Budapest, Nagy was deposed and took refuge in the Yugoslav embassy. Kadar was appointed Prime Minister. He made promises of amnesty of coalition and popular front governments and withdrawal of Soviet troops. The armed resistance of Hungarian troops lasted for six days. From November 11 onward, passive resistance was offered by the industrial workers. Kadar could not fulfil the promises he made. On November 22, Nagy was abducted by the Soviet authorities in spite of safe conduct Kadar gave him. The revolutionary councils were dissolved and workers' councils were made

illegal on December 8. On December 28, the Writers' Union was suspended. On January 11, the Csepel armed rising was suppressed.

Hungary, 1957-58. In January, Khrushchev, Malenkov and Chou En-lai visited Budapest and in order to allay the world opinion roused against the U.S.S.R., a policy of compromise was laid down. The Government was still "too weak to ignore the mood of the masses". The Yugoslavs had been shaken by recent events and the policy of rapprochement received a jerk. But by March 1957 there came a shift and regimentation and Soviet control was re-established. On March 20, a Hungarian delegation led by Kadar came to Moscow and held talks with the Soviet leaders for a week. A Soviet-Hungarian Treaty was signed on March 27 under which the Soviet Union agreed to deliver goods valued at 1,010 million rubles, a long term credit for 1957 amounting to 750 million rubles of which 200 million is in convertible currency. On March 28, a joint declaration was issued which affirmed that the two governments deemed it "absolutely necessary that Soviet troops should be temporarily stationed in Hungary" and that negotiations on the subject would soon begin. On May 27, a Soviet delegation led by Gromyko and Zhukov came to Budapest and signed with Hungary the agreement the same day. It reaffirmed the Moscow Declaration of March 28 and provided for the Hungarian courts jurisdiction over Soviet soldiers in the cases of civil and criminal offences. It makes no reference to the number or location of Soviet troops or to the date of their withdrawal. The agreement is to remain in force as long as Soviet troops are stationed in Hungary. On April 2, Kadar left no doubt on the point and declared that "Soviet troops will remain here as long as their presence is needed". The Russian language has again become compulsory in schools. Collective farms have been revived and taxes on the peasantry have been increased. On August 1, 1957, a flat 10% cut in industrial wages was effected and the workers in a number of factories were ordered to pay back unjustified wage increases. The rebels were arrested and under the martial law decrees of December 8 and December 12, 1956 hundreds of them have been executed. In September 1957 Hungarian diplomatic offensive in the Near East began to forestall the United Nations General Assembly debate. In November, elections were held and the Communists won 99·7% votes. On December 18, 1957, Hungary and the Soviet Union signed a new agreement on economic and technical aid, under which Hungary received long term credit of 300 million rubles. On April 2, 1958, a Soviet Party and Government Delegation led by Khrushchev came to Budapest to attend the 13th anniversary of the country's liberation from Nazi invaders. Khrushchev

declared on April 3 that "the October-November events in Hungary were 'a test of the Soviet-Hungarian friendship' and Kadar and Premier Ferene Muennich assured his guests that 'Hungary will remain loyal to proletarian internationalism'.

The Soviet view of Hungarian revolt. The Soviet view of the events in Hungary is entirely different. They argue that the former leadership of Hungary was responsible for gross mistakes and abuses in general political questions and economic policies, that the demonstrations of October 23 against these mistakes were "quite legitimate but that soon "reactionary fascist elements tried to exploit this healthy movement for their purposes in an attempt to wreck the peoples democratic system and to overthrow it". The use of Soviet troops stationed in Hungary under the Warsaw Treaty and at the express request of the Hungarian Government was proper and valid. Nevertheless, to prevent an aggravation of the situation the Soviet Union decided to withdraw their troops on October 29, 1956. Soon after, however, the reactionaries, internal and external, started a murder campaign "hanging upright patriots on the lamp posts in the streets of Budapest", and pushed the Nagy Government which had lost control of the situation further and further on to the road of conniving at the rebellion". A "Hungarian Committee" was set up in Vienna to render assistance to the rebels. Nagy being a traitor, honest patriots like Kadar quitted his Government and supported by the people formed a popular Government which requested the Soviet Union, on November 4, for assistance in repulsing the onslaught of the fascist forces. The Soviet Union's intervention was perfectly valid because (*a*) it had been sought by a friendly country, (*b*) the Soviet Union had treaty obligations under the Hungarian Peace Treaty to which U.S.A. and U.K. were parties, to suppress fascism in Hungary, and (*c*) because the Soviet Union could not have allowed the victory of reaction on her border. It is further argued that the role of the U.S.A. in these events has been abominable, that the U.S. Congress had authorized the training of special personnel for guiding the resistance movement, for propaganda and infiltration in East Europe, and had sanctioned "hundreds of millions of dollars" not for refugee relief but for "feeding the subversive activities". The Soviet Union, therefore, rejected the allegations of aggression, genocide, and deportation as "stinking newspaper canard picked up on a junk heap of refuted misinformation" and denied the competence of the U.N. to act on the Hungarian developments. With the handling of the Hungarian developments by the United Nations, we will deal in a later chapter.

Conclusions. Meanwhile we can draw useful conclusions from this survey of events is East Europe. Whatever the truth in the Soviet allegations of subversion financed and instigated by

the United States, it is certain that if certain reactionary forces had not come to dominate the uprising in Hungary and if Nagy had been more energetic and less hesitant in acting against these forces, the Soviet Union would have acted in the spirit of the Declaration of October 30. The Soviet decision to intervene on November 4 must have really been a difficult decision and "the Soviet leaders could not have been unaware of the golden opportunities of propaganda it would offer to all the Cold Warriors of the world". The alternative to intervention appeared to be counter-revolution to the Soviet leaders and, therefore, intervention appeared to be a lesser evil. This substantiated the view of Mr. Nehru expressed in July 1955 about East European countries: "Whether these countries are strong or weak, it seems exceedingly unlikely that any change will come to them by external pressure, apart from war and its results. In fact, the whole idea of "liberating" them, as expressed in America, really makes it more difficult for any change to come there peacefully. The Soviet Union will resist to the utmost any pressure tactics in regard to these states because if they go outside its influence, this will endanger the Soviet Union's security. It is possible, however, and indeed probable, that if there is a marked improvement in world tensions and the cold war ceases, then internal developments and changes will take place in these East European states. The Soviet Union may well withdraw its armies where they exist and its political domination will also become less, though its influence will remain."

CHAPTER 13

Rapprochement with the West

The rapprochement boldly attempted by the Soviet leaders after Stalin's death has been the boldest in recent years on the part of any great country. The agreement to conclude the Korean fighting and the Indo-Chinese war, the Austrian Peace Treaty, the Summit Conference at Geneva, the Sino-American talks, the Geneva Conference of Foreign Ministers, the agreement to admit 16 states in the U. N. and the Soviet resumption of active role in many international bodies, the Soviet leader's visit to Britain early in 1956, the diplomacy of letters and exchange of views, and the advances in the direction of disarmament were landmarks of the post-Stalin period and went a long way in easing world tensions until they were again heightened by events in Hungary, Suez and Syria in 1956-57.

THE KOREAN ARMISTICE

We have stated earlier that the Korean armistice negotiations had begun in April 1953. The Soviet Union and North Korea agreed to drop their demand of compulsory repatriation of war prisoners and on July 27, 1953 a Korean armistice brought the fight along the 38th parallel to a halt. This was bound to produce a profound impression everywhere and was the first concrete evidence of a basic change in Soviet policies. Under this agreement a demilitarized zone between the two armies was established. An armistice commission of 5 U. N. officers and 5 Communist officers, a supervisory commission of Czechoslovakia, Poland, Sweden and Switzerland, and a repatriation commission of Czechoslovakia, India, Poland, Sweden and Switzerland were instituted. Prisoners of war who wished repatriation were to be sent home within 60 days and those who did not so wish, were to be turned over to the Repatriation Commission and both parties were to be free to persuade them to change their minds. Within 90 days, a political conference was to settle the question of the withdrawal of foreign troops from Korea and to try to negotiate a peaceful settlement of the whole problem. By September 6, 1953 all war prisoners who wanted repatriation had been exchanged and on September 10, Indian troops began taking over about 24,000 prisoners who refused repatriation. By January 1954 both sides agreed to the release of all prisoners and this problem was resolved. Troops, however,

could not be recalled. It was early in 1950 that the Chinese unilaterally decided to withdraw all their troops from North Korea with an appeal to the United States to follow suit.

THE BERLIN CONFERENCE, JANUARY-FEBRUARY 1954

We noted in a previous chapter that on July 15, 1953 the Western powers had suggested to the Soviet Union that the foreign ministers of the 4-Powers meet to discuss Germany and Austria. The Soviet reply came on August 5. They asked for a 5-power conference (including China) so that all problems causing tension in Asia as well as elsewhere be tackled simultaneously. In order to keep the door for negotiations open, this was followed by another Soviet note on August 16, proposing the formation of a provisional all-German Government (consisting of delegates from the two German legislatures) to hold all-German elections, and the calling of a conference within six months to draft a peace treaty with Germany and the cancellation of reparation payments by, and post-war state debts to, the two German states on January 1, 1954. On August 23, they published the text of a new trade treaty which they had signed with the G.D.R. cancelling reparations and advancing a credit of 485,000,000 rubles. The Western powers insisted on a 4-power conference to be held at Lugano in mid-October to consider Germany and Austria and sent a note on these lines on September 2, 1953. Moscow, however, again insisted on a prior 4-power conference to consider "the causes of international tensions". The West remained firm. The Soviet Union then modified its proposals and suggested on November 3 that the 4-power and 5-power conferences be held simultaneously. But on November 16, the Western Powers declined to accept the Soviet suggestion. Finally on November 26, the Soviet Union agreed to a 4-power conference to be held in Berlin provided that the question of a 5-power conference be kept open. To this proviso the West agreed. The 4-Foreign Ministers Conference, therefore, met at Berlin on January 25-February 19, 1954—the first to be held since 1949.

At the very outset Molotov embarrassed the Western ministers by introducing inconvenient questions of People's China's admission to the U.N. and on Indo-China, and the first week was devoted to them. It was on January 30 that the problem of Germany came up for serious discussion and immediately the Conference deadlocked (*See* Chapter on Germany). The differences ranged on the method of creating an all-German Government, the timing of withdrawal of occupation forces, and the kind of military status a united Germany was to have. The West demanded that free elections be held on the basis of which an all-German Government could be created, that occupation

forces should stay on until the situation was stabilized, and Germany should be free to rearm within the framework of the E.D.C. The U.S.S.R. demanded that an all-German Government should be formed by the parliaments of the two German States, that occupation troops should be withdrawn as soon as the German treaty was framed and signed, and that Germany should be neutralized. The most interesting proposal of Molotov was the creation of a European security system in which (*a*) Germany and Austria would be neutralized, (*b*) all European states including the U.S.S.R. would join on a basis of equality, and (*c*) the United States and China would serve as observers. This implied scrapping the NATO and the E.D.C., and was naturally rejected by the Western Powers. The conference also reached a deadlock on Austria as we will notice later.

The Berlin Conference was meeting at a time when the news from Indo-China was ominous from the Western standpoint. The crisis was mounting every day. The question of Korean elections had not been resolved. At the instance of Bidault and Eden, therefore, it was agreed (Dulles agreeing reluctantly) to call a wider conference at Geneva, including the People's Republic of China and all countries whose armed forces took part in the Korean war, to be held on April 26, 1954. In fact this was the only achievement of the Berlin Conference but it proved to be a solid one.

THE GENEVA CONFERENCE, APRIL 26—JULY 21, 1954

The avowed purpose in calling the Geneva Conference was to secure an agreement on Indo-China. Before we move into its stormy sessions, it is necessary to explain why and how Indo-China had become one of the central themes of the cold war. The French had conquered and occupied Indo-China (an area of 284,000 sq. miles and a population of about 30 millions) piecemeal in the 19th century. The region as a whole had never had any real political, racial or cultural unity and from the point of view of administrative convenience and colonial interests the French had divided it into a direct French colony of Cochin China administered by a French governor, and 4 protectorates of Annam, Tongking, Cambodia, and Laos, ruled by 4 residents-superior. In Annam, Laos and Cambodia native rulers were permitted to remain on their thrones as puppets while Tongking was organized as an administrative region, a kind of protectorate-cum-colony. The French colonial policy has always been dictatorial, harsh, exploitative and the entire peninsula was subject to a French governor-general responsible only to Paris. With its highly centralized government subject to constant change of its party direction, France pursued "a fixed policy of cultural assimilation" with disturbing and destructive effects on the

culture and institution of the Indo-Chinese. Economic development, necessary for exploitation, and modest education created unrest. The profits on French investments contrasted bitterly with the taxation burdens on the debt-ridden, landless peasants and wide discripancies between the values of self-realization as theoretically taught to the people and the denial of self-government in practice naturally inflamed the French-trained and French-educated native leaders. The Indo-Chinese nationalism took the form of repeated attacks on influential minorities (such as the Chinese or Japanese) and on the French hierarchy. But despite the rising tide of nationalism and discontent, including the serious uprisings of 1930-31, France up to World War II made practically no concession.

During the war "the fall of France and the installation of the Vichy regime rocked the French hegemony in Indo-China" and Japan conquered the country and administered it with the help of French colonial administrators under the Hanoi Convention of September 22, 1940, and the French-Jap Mutual Defence Agreement of July 21, 1941. In March 1945, however, with their defeat imminent and the French no longer collaborating, the Japanese removed the French and established outright control, and later, encouraged the rulers of Annam, Cambodia and Laos to declare their independence of France. Bao Dai proclaimed independence of the Empire, Annam and Tongking, on March 11, Cambodia on March 13, and Laos on April 20, 1945. Bao Dai gave his empire the old name of Viet-Nam in order to "capitalize on nationalist sentiment". But Bao Dai could not rally support of ardent nationalists who opposed the Japanese as much as the French. In 1941, Ho Chi Minh, a Moscow trained communist, founded the *Viet-Nam Doc Lap Dong Minh Hoi* (Viet-Minh: the Viet-Nam Independence League) in South China. In Hanoi, Ho Chi-Minh formed a provisional government in which Bao Dai accepted the position of a Supreme Political Adviser. On September 2, 1945, Ho's government (now called as the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam) proclaimed a declaration of independence and claimed authority over Annam, Tongking and Cochin China.

Meanwhile, General de Gaulle had declared the French determination to retain control over Indo-China on March 23, 1945. At the Potsdam Conference in July-August 1945, the British and Chinese were designated to liberate Indo-China so that the British troops were to re-occupy the country south of the 16th Parallel and the Chinese troops north of it. The French were in no position to despatch troops. The British turned over their section to the French by the end of 1945 when the French troops arrived. On February 28, 1946, a treaty was signed between France and China under which the French resumed control of the northern regions. Thus the French now had to work out new arrange-

ments with the three states of Indo-China, Viet-Nam, Cambodia and Laos. They offered these states varying degrees of autonomy within the framework of the new French Union. Negotiations resulted in an agreement with Cambodia on January 7, 1946, and with Laos on August 27, 1946. Thus over these two states pre-war protectorate relationship re-appeared. With Viet Nam, however, it was different for there Ho Chi-Minh was conducting an efficient government and was demanding complete independence and the withdrawal of the French troops from Cochin-China where they had been concentrated. Indeed, clashes between the French and the Viet-Namese began from the moment of Japan's surrender, and by December 1945, the situation had become very tense.

For a while the French were willing to make concessions to the Viet-Minh provided the whole of Indo-China remained in the French economic system. On March 6, 1946, France and Ho's government signed the Hanoi Agreement under which the former recognised the latter as a "free state with its own government, parliament, army, and finances, forming part of the Indo-Chinese Federation and the French Union". But "the agreement was hardly more than a truce to mark time" and negotiations continued throughout the year between France and Viet-Minh concerning the precise status of the Viet-Nam Democratic Republic. In March, the National Assembly of Viet-Nam had elected Ho as President and Prime Minister. The French were getting perturbed and they, in fact, never accepted the spirit of March 6 agreement and tried hard "to clip the political power of the Viet-Nam Republic. In August-September, Ho went to Paris to conduct negotiations which resulted in the agreement of September 14, 1946, providing for safeguards for the French men in Viet-Nam, an Indo-Chinese Customs Union and cessation of all acts of hostility and violence by both sides. The major issues of unity and independence, however, remained unresolved. The delicate balance between Viet-Nam and France broke down on November 23, 1946, when the French colonialists unleashed aggression on the question of the control of the customs at Haiphong. The city was bombed and thousands of Viet-Namese were killed in cold blood. On December 19, the Viet-Namese retaliated in Hanoi and killed a few dozen Frenchmen. The war in Indo-China had begun.

From the very outset the war went badly for the French and in spite of early French victories, they and their stooges failed to rally any substantial native support. In these circumstances they "dug up" the former puppet emperor of Annam, Bao Dai, to rally all disaffected political groups in opposition to Ho. On June 5, 1948, the French signed an agreement with a puppet government of Viet-Nam and recognized its independence. Onwards Viet-

Nam was divided into two parts—in the North, the government of Ho Chi-Minh referred to as "Viet-Minh", in the South, the government of Bao Dai referred to as "Viet-Nam". In March 1949, Bao Dai went to France and concluded the Elysee Agreements which would bring Viet-Nam into the French Union as an Associated State, with practically no power. On December 30, 1949, Bao Dai proclaimed himself as chief of state in Saigon and his government was recognised on February 6, 1950, as the government of Viet-Nam by the United States, the U.K., Thailand and others, while Ho Chi Minh's Democratic Republic obtained the recognition of the Soviet Union, China, and East European states. Indo-China had now become an issue in the cold war, or in the phrase of Sulzberger, "another Spain".

From 1949 to 1954, two factors in the Indo-Chinese situation should be noted. First, the war progressively went against the French and, second, the major powers of the world got seriously involved in the conflict one way or the other. The war cost blood and treasure far beyond the French anticipation and bled the French nation white. As one authority has put it: "A succession of military plans and commanders held out promise of quick and certain victory but eventuated in stalemate and embarrassment. European French and colonial troops, including the Foreign Legion, Moroccans, and Senegalese, augmented by hastily trained Viet-Namese, fought simultaneously at least four different types of heart-breaking warfare against the border of the Viet-Minh. They fought for the control of cities in the important delta areas of the Red and Mekong rivers, they exchanged artillery fire in isolated outposts like Dien Bien Phu, they skirmished along jungle trails and well-marked highways, and they played a cat-and-mouse game with guerilla bands which knew no battle line nor positional front. The guerillas harassed the French throughout the length and breadth of the land, across mountains, plateaus, and rice fields. The rival surrounded each other in a confused melange of fortress, fortified villages, and hostile pockets. French casualties decimated their officer class, reduced their contribution to Korean fighting, and limited their military influence in Europe. Accountable costs approached two billion dollars per year and strained the French national budget. The French spent in Indo-China more than they received in direct aid from the United States".

In the fall of France, the French forces suffered their first severe defeat at the hands of the Viet-Minh, along the Chinese border. By 1953, Viet-Minh superiority became obvious and, in December that year, they struck at the French forces in Central and Southern Laos. In February 1954, they launched a second offensive in North-Eastern Laos which ended in the evacuation of

French forces from Na-san under near-defeat conditions. The French withdrew to a nearby strong point, Dien Bien Phu, deep in Viet-Minh territory and entirely dependent on airborne supply, from where the French hoped not only to protect Laos and harass the Viet-Minh rear but also to lure the Viet-Minh into massed battle on open terrain where they could use French training, artillery and air support to full effect. The strategy, however, backfired and on March 12, the largest Viet-Minh army ever assembled with massed artillery and anti-aircraft weapons brought from China, launched their historic assault and on May 7, (the Geneva Conference had started on April 26) the day before discussion on Indo-China opened in Geneva, 15,000 strong French garrison capitulated. The psychological effects of the fall of Dien Bien Phu both on the French and on the Viet-Minh were decisive. Viet-Minh General, Giap, at once followed his victory with a major campaign to sweep the French from all Tonking "while the French in Paris and Geneva looked for some face-saving device with which to end the war".

Major Powers and Indo-Chinese Problem. In order to understand the complex diplomacy of the Geneva Conference it is vital to understand the interests of major powers in the Indo-Chinese conflict. On the one hand, Indo-China forms an arc which partly envelops the neighbouring state of Thailand, and on the other, Laos as well as China has a large contiguous frontier with Burma, in the very regions where revolt and unrest has plagued the Burmese Government since the country became free in 1947. Thus it is obvious that "the Power which politically controls Indo-China has Thailand at its mercy, can exercise great pressure on Burma, and ultimately isolate the Malayan Peninsula". For instance, General Jean de Lattre de Tassigny, the French Commander-in-Chief in Indo-China declared in September 1951 that if Indo-China fell to the communists, nothing would prevent further communist expansion in Asia until Suez. On April 7, 1954, President Eisenhower characterized the fall of Indo-China as the first in a chain reaction that, like a row of falling dominoes, could lead to the loss of all South East Asia. In fact the United States, in the first phase after World War II remained, for the most part, a comparatively passive observer of Indo-Chinese events. Roosevelt had suggested some kind of trusteeship for Indo-China which "France has milked for one hundred years". As late as February 1947, Secretary Marshall expressed the hope about Indo-China that a pacific basis of the adjustment of the difficulties could be found".

It was after the communist victory in China in October 1949 that the U. S. position began to change. Communist infiltration in Viet-Minh, and Communist revolts in Burma, Indonesia and Malaya had also influenced the U. S. course of action. The

cold war now was in full fury and the containment policy in Europe against Russia now had to be extended in Asia against China. The Chinese troops now appeared to be "knocking at the Indo-China border". The U.S.A., therefore, now decided to support Bao Dai and on February 7, 1950 hastened to recognise Laos, Cambodia and Viet-Nam. To counteract the Chinese and Soviet economic assistance to Viet Minh, Allan Griffin was sent to Indo-China to explore possibilities of U.S. economic aid. He recommended aid and the U.S. Government accepted this with some misgivings. But up to the date of Geneva armistice the U.S.A. had appropriated about $ 2·2 billion for military and economic aid to Indo-China. In June 1950 the Korean War broke out and this brought about almost a revolution in American thinking and rigidified attitudes which hitherto were fluid and flexible. In brief, the U.S. policy in Indo-China now ran on the following lines : To give all possible economic assistance to Indo-China and military assistance to France; to exert pressure on France to give greater degree of freedom to Indo-China so that the people may be induced to fight on; to persuade the French government to build up the national armies of the Associated States which could provide a manifestation of growing Viet-Namese independence, reduce the colonial aspects of the war in Indo-China, and could make feasible the withdrawal of French troops from Indo-China to bolster up Western defences in Europe.

After the Korean war, the U.S. European policy rested on building up the NATO and the E. D. C. which without France would be lifeless. France and French policy on Indo-China, therefore, had to be defended at all costs. A retreat had to be made from the earlier anti-colonial and pro-nationalist sentiments in favour of backing the French military effort and supporting the French policy on Indo-China, even at the cost of alienating the sympathies of Asian countries like India. The U.S.A. thus "soon spun itself into such a web of involvement in Indo-China that inevitably it became a receiver of a bankrupt French policy which was recognised by many officials to be wrong and destined for failure from the very start". The French, therefore, successfully pressured the U.S.A. in extracting more and more aid, in obliging the U.S.A. to accept the thesis that the war in Indo-China was rather a crusade against communism than a colonial war, and that Indo-Chinese and Korean wars were a single military effort. When the U.S.A. accepted this thesis, they also insisted on the French acceptance of its logical corollaries, viz., that the Indo-Chinese problem was not merely a French concern but was an international problem. On this, however, the French were adamant and they constantly refused to internationalize the Indo-Chinese problem since this would limit their freedom of

action in Indo-China and would weaken their position in North Africa. Thus the French policy was to secure as much foreign support on Indo-China as possible while keeping the reins in French hands. The U.S.A., thus, had lost the initiative and acted on the lines more or less dictated by the exigencies of situation which they had not created and over which they had little control. They administered repeated warnings to the Chinese who were materially helping the Viet-Minh. As the prospects of the Korean armistice brightened in March 1953, the danger of Chinese intervention in Indo-China increased, and to forestall this, on July 27, 1953 a 16-power joint warning was issued against the Chinese communist action in South-East Asia.

Meanwhile the war was getting unpopular in France and was straining the French money and manpower at a time when their old enemy (Germany) was gaining in strength. Demands for peace in Indo-China were mounting from the press and the people. A negotiated peace in Indo-China would write off the French Empire elsewhere too. A military victory was eluding them. The U.S.A. was the main hope and it was urging France to strive boldly for victory. In September, 1953, the Navarre Plan (after the French Commander Navarre) was evolved which was based on a temporary increase in French manpower, training of more Viet-Namese troops, more American material, and an offensive strategy spearheaded by French troops. The Plan, however, failed. In January 1954, Dulles laid down the theory of massive retaliation. Meanwhile the French armies were meeting reversals in Indo-China and at the Berlin Conference Dulles could not resist the French demand for a conference to solve the Indo-Chinese deadlock. When Dulles came home from Berlin, he had to face a barrage of criticism which he met by assuring that no appeasement was intended, that Peking regime would not be recognised and that the proposed Geneva Conference would not result in the loss of Indo-China.

From February to April 1954, the United States policy was verging on the brink of open intervention in the Indo-Chinese war, for, whatever optimism Dulles could muster was completely shattered by the Viet Minh offensive. On March 20, Paul Ely, the French Chief of Staff, urged immediate action by the United States to save the disaster otherwise they would negotiate a settlement with the communists. With close to one-third of their national budget expended on the war in Indo-China (which was more than what France got in toto from the U.S.A.) and casualties equivalent to American casualties in Korea, the pressure for a negotiated settlement was increasing in France. At one time the U.S. could argue that they would actively intervene if China actively intervened. But now it became clear that a Viet Minh victory in Indo-China might not require Chinese intervention

beyond the supply of arms and advisers. If, therefore, Indo-China was to be held, who would hold it ? The U.S. reply to Paul Ely was indecisive, vague and divided. Radford, Nixon and Knowland favoured intervention. Dulles favoured it only if other powers would join in—i.e. united intervention. Eisenhower endorsed certain moves towards intervention but he was "reluctant to accept the risks it involved". The evidence that we so far have goes to indicate that on April 3, the U.S. Government had decided to enter the war and that day Dulles asked for "a joint congressional resolution authorising the use of U.S. air and naval forces to save Dien Bien Phu". On April 5, he told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that they would not let Indo-China fall to the communists. On April 7, Eisenhower made the "falling dominoes" speech. On April 16 Nixon declared that U.S. troops must be despatched to face the situation but on April 19 this was contradicted by Dulles.

The upshot of this was that the U.S. diplomacy was now concentrated on united action. But united action meant a joint move—an immediate security pact for South-East Asia including Britain, France, Australia, New Zealand, the Philippines, Thailand and the Indo-Chinese states, and a joint air action by Britain, U.S.A., France and Australia. This the British leaders refused. Both Churchill and Eden argued that (*i*) joint air action would not be effective, (*ii*) that it would destroy the chances of a settlement at Geneva, and (*iii*) that it would lead to a general war in Asia.

The British stand drove Dulles to London and on April 12-18 he conferred with Churchill and Eden who, however, remained firm against joint action or even joint warning. On the Security Pact, they gave limited support and argued that that was not the ripe time for it. They agreed to explore the possibilities of such a pact. On April 14, Dulles came to Paris where "the London formula was repeated". On reaching home, however, Dulles attempted to call a meeting of ambassadors of some states to discuss a South-East Asia Defence Treaty but the British refused to participate. This was roughly the position when the Geneva Conference met on April 26, 1954.

Diplomacy of the Geneva Conference. On April 26, delegations of 19 countries assembled in Geneva. The discussions on Korea soon stalemated and the plan for unification of Korea on the basis of free elections made no headway. Discussions on Korea were, therefore, discontinued on June 15. Meanwhile the sands of time were running out against the French in Indo-China and the tide of battle was running with the communists. While at Geneva the question of recognition of Peking was being debated, Dien Bien Phu was falling to the Viet Minh. The Soviet

Union and China, therefore, were now in a very advantageous position and the schism in the West on the questions of recognition of China and on the issues connected with Indo-China, now fully exposed to the public view added to their advantage. The day the conference turned to the Indo-Chinese problem, the fall of Dien Bien Phu was announced. On the one hand, negotiations for settlement in Geneva were proceeding; on the other, negotiations for united action in Indo-China were going on. On May 12 Joseph Laniel (French Premier) asked the U. S. A. what steps the latter could take if the Geneva talks broke down. The U. S. A. agreed to talk on the subject. On May 13, Laniel's government narrowly escaped defeat in the French Assembly. The relations between France and the U. S. A. had been seriously strained when Dulles suddenly left the Geneva Conference on May 3. On May 17, however, talks began between the French and Dulles. Dulles publicly stated on May 25 and June 11 that the U. S. A. would take military action in Indo-China if the following conditions were met: (*a*) independence was granted to the Indo-Chinese; (*b*) other states participated in military action; (*c*) moral sanction of the U. N. was obtained; (*d*) request for action was made by the present lawful authorities in Indo-China; and (*e*) France would fight on till the end. None of them could be accepted and the Paris talks, therefore, failed.

Nevertheless, Dulles was cherishing his idea of South-East Asia Pact as a lever on the communists at Geneva and this at once exposed the Anglo-American differences. On May 19, Eisenhower expressed the opinion that the British participation in the proposed SEATO was not indispensable. This "startled and distressed" the British officials. On May 20, Churchill attacked the U. S. A. and complained that the Franco-U. S. talks at Paris held on May 17 about which Britain was not informed were "inconsistent with the spirit of the Western alliance". The Anglo-U.S. conflict on the SEATO ranged from the questions of timing to its membership. Other differences were also basic. The U.S.A. was determined to restore the whole of Indo-China to non-communist hands, and was, therefore, indifferent to a compromise at Geneva; the British thought this to be impossible and they, therefore, worked to save part of Indo-China and their policy goal at Geneva, therefore, was a compromise that would end the fighting. The U.S.A. stood for military action in Indo-China; the British opposed this for reasons already stated. The U. S. A. felt that the mere threat of joint military intervention would lead the communists to moderate their demands; the British felt that "the American proposals would antagonise the Asian states and thus ruin any long-run prospect of organizing for security in Southern Asia". The British were, of course, concerned with a security organization in Asia, in the context

or Malaya, Hongkong, North Borneo, and the Dominions. But they felt that in any such organization free Asian countries like India should be associated and that this could be done by more tactful handling of the situation. Nehru had already blown out against the SEATO on April 24. Eden, therefore, thought that "any effort to exert pressure on the Geneva negotiations by menacing gestures such as premature steps towards a military alliance, would make the most unfortunate impression in Asia where French colonialism was highly unpopular and where the Viet Minh enjoyed wide sympathy as a movement for national independence". He, therefore, wanted to match Western reasonableness with communist intransigence, and in case of failure of Geneva Conference, to show clearly that the communists were responsible for it.

The British approach to the Geneva Conference and to the question of a security pact for Asia was, therefore, more flexible than that of the U.S.A. The differences on China policy were also sharp. To the Americans, the Chinese regime was an evil which is to be fought by all means and, therefore, the problem of recognition of China had moral overtones. To the English, the problem was a practical one, for, the regime could not be destroyed except by a total war in which victors would suffer as much as the vanquished. The British thought that in spite of close relations between Peking and Moscow, there were "potential conflicts of interest" and that, therefore, the Sino-Soviet bonds "could be weakened by the passage of time and by patient abrasion". The British were partly influenced by considerations of India's friendly attitude towards China. In short, "what to Americans looked like a compromise with the enemy, seemed to Britons to be merely intelligent political strategy. What Americans saw as a moral crusade, to Britons appeared to be dangerous and irresponsible bravado. Americans feared that Britain sought to entice them into surrendering to the forces of evil; Britishers feared that American policy would drag the world into atomic war". It may also be pointed out that the British attitude must have been influenced by the deliberations of the Five-power Colombo Conference (April 28—May 2, 1954). They asked for a cease-fire in Indo-China and direct negotiations between France, the three Indo-Chinese states, and the Viet-Minh, with other powers as agreed; and they favoured a guarantee of the Indo-Chinese truce by China, Britain, America and Russia, a promise by France of complete independence for Indo-China and good offices of the U.N. to implement the Geneva decision.

For days together the Geneva Conference remained far away from any agreement on cease fire and its supervision and political agreement. The communists had established people's republic both in Cambodia and Loas and they wanted all

three states to be discussed together. The West, however, maintained that Laos and Cambodia should be treated differently from Viet Nam, since in those states there was no civil war but rather a foreign invasion. Eden, tired, flew home for consultations. Mr. V. K. Krishna Menon, meanwhile, came to Geneva and it was due to his activities behind the scenes that the communist demands in Cambodia and Laos were moderated (cf. *Christian Science Monitor*, June 2, 1954). On May 29, Thailand had requested the Security Council to send observers to South-East Asia as the situation in Indo-China threatened her own security. This move was strongly supported by the U. S. A. but was killed by the Soviet veto on June 18. On June 4, France and Viet Nam initialed their treaties giving full independence to Viet Nam within the French Union. The deadlock at Geneva, however, continued and Laniel had to pay the penalty. His government fell on June 12. On June 17, Mendes-France became Premier and he at once declared that if peace in Indo-China had not been attained by July 20, 1954 he would resign. With his advent the atmosphere at Geneva completely changed. On June 23, Mendes-France and Chou En-lai met and reached certain agreements. On June 24, France evacuated part of the Red River delta in order to shorten the French defence line. On June 25-29 Churchill and Eden went to Washington to iron out the Anglo-American differences and this so frightened the anti-China lobby in the U. S. A. that Knowland declared on July 1, that if China were admitted to the U. N., he would mobilise public opinion to take the U. S. out of the U. N. Dulles had to promise the use of U. S. veto to bar China's admission. Simultaneously Chou En-lai had come to Delhi, and here Chou and Nehru declared that the Indo-Chinese settlement "should aim at the creation of free, democratic, unified and independent states which should not be used for aggressive purposes or be subjected to foreign intervention". India thus supported China's reasonable demand for the neutralization of the three states. The famous Panch Sheela was also enunciated.

The U. S. position had by now become ridiculously difficult. Britain and France had decided on the partition of Viet Nam—a policy which the U. S. A. had consistently opposed. Could they now dissociate themselves from the Geneva compromise ? If they did, possibly the whole of Indo-China might fall to the communists! And their dissociation would, in any case, drive France out of the NATO and would widen the Anglo-American chasm. At first Dulles did not come back from Washington where he had gone to talk to Churchill and Eden, and left the Geneva parleys to a minor official. Britain and France resented this move. Eventually it was agreed that Dulles, Eden and

Mendes-France would meet in Paris on July 13-14. What actually transpired between them may remain hidden for many years, but it is certain that an attempt was made here to evolve a formula in order to resolve the conflict. This conflict was between (*a*) American principles, (*b*) French needs, and (*c*) Western coalition. The U.S. principles amounted to a commitment of not condoning any extension of communism. The French need was to strike peace in Indo-China at all costs. Western coalition would break down if Britain and France on the one hand, and the U.S. A. on the other, pulled apart. If the U. S. A. kept up its "principles" the Geneva Conference would break, French needs would not be met, and Western coalition would disintegrate. Indeed, no settlement at Geneva would be worthwhile unless it was guaranteed by the U. S. A. And the U. S. A. would not guarantee a settlement involving communist gains. It could, of course, guarantee non-communist territory against communist attack and could join other powers to do it under the proposed South Asia Pact. Since the communists insisted on the neutralization of the Indo-Chinese states, these states could not be parties to such a pact, but, the pact could, nevertheless, guarantee the territorial integrity of Cambodia, Laos and South Viet Nam. As for Northern Viet Nam, the U.S.A. could not guarantee it against attack but it was prepared to give an undertaking not to use force to upset the Geneva settlement. This was the formula which "permitted the United States both to associate and to dissociate itself from the Geneva settlement".

The Geneva Agreement. The 8th plenary session of the Geneva Conference was held on July 21 and the Viet Nam armistice was signed at 3·42 that night—a few hours after Mendes-France's deadline. Truce agreements for Cambodia and Laos and the final Conference declaration were signed during the day on July 21 by Viet Nam, Laos, Cambodia, Russia, China, Viet-Minh, the U. K. and the U. S. A. The U. S. A. did not concern the Conference declaration. General Smith on July 21, however, declared that the U. S. A. "will refrain from the threat or the use of force to disturb the Geneva agreements". Same day Eisenhower declared: "The United States has not itself been party to or bound by the decisions taken by the Conference, but it is our hope that will lead to the establishment of peace consistent with the rights and the needs of the countries concerned". He also announced that negotiations for a collective defence treaty in South-East Asia were being conducted "actively" (the SEATO became a reality in September, 1954).

At Geneva, eleven documents were signed—three Ceasefire Agreements for Viet-Nam, Laos and Cambodia, one Final Declaration of the Conference concurred in by seven of the nine powers but signed by none, and seven Unilateral Declarations, one by the

U. S. A., two by France, two by Cambodia, and two by Laos. All these agreements provided for the partition of Viet-Nam at the 17th parallel, with all land north of that parallel going to Viet-Minh and all land south of it remaining under the control of the French sponsored Viet-Nam Government. The 17th parallel was not to be considered a political or territorial boundary and the principle of Viet-Namese unity was thus recognised. Within 15 days of the ceasefire, each side was to withdraw its troops in designated regroupment zones and by May 18, 1955 to evacuate them to its own zone. General free elections for a unified democratic Government in whole of Viet-Nam were to be held in July 1956 under the control of an international commission. Consultations on election were to begin after July 20, 1955. The three states of Indo-China were prohibited from allowing foreign military bases on their territory, with the exception of two minor French bases in Laos, and from joining any military alliance. France recognised the independence and sovereignty of Cambodia, Laos, and Viet-Nam and agreed to withdraw its troops from these states at the request of the Governments concerned. During the regrouping period, civilians wishing to move from one zone to the other were to be permitted and helped to do so by the authorities. The agreements made provision for an international Truce Commission composed of India as chairman, Poland and Canada to supervise their execution.

The Geneva Agreements, though imperfect, were nevertheless a codsiderable landmark. Some vital questions were left unanswered. For instance, when exactly after July 20, 1955 the consultations about elections were to begin between the "competent" representative authorities of the two zones? Or who were the "competent" authorities particularly in South Viet-Nam, the French or the Viet-Namese? What would happen if consultations drag out until after July 1956? Since none of the nine participants of the Conference had signed the Declaration its juridical validity was open to question. The U.S.A. had refused to concur and South Viet-Nam vehemently protested against the date of election and declared itself not bound by it. Again, the Geneva Agreements made no reference to the execution and enforcement of the armistice. Neither the International Commission, nor the nine members of the Geneva Conference had any enforcement power. The Geneva Agreements, therefore, were guaranteed by no one and their smooth execution depended on the goodwill of the parties and their ability to enforce them. These were serious defects.

The soul of Geneva Agreements was the provision for elections. In accepting the ceasefire at the crest of their military success and at a time when they could conquer the whole country, the Viet-Minh had accepted a great sacrifice. They accepted

it because they thought their prospects of taking over the country peacefully through general elections were extremely good. The greatest weakness of the Geneva Agreements, therefore, was their failure to provide for enforcement of election provisions. As time passed on, Ngo Din Diem's Government in South Viet-Nam surmounted their difficulties and acquired greater confidence. On July 19, 1955 the Premier of Northern Viet-Nam invited South Viet-Nam to start consultations on the subject of elections. The reply of the South came on July 20 when they organized a demonstration at Saigon against the International Commission. On July 6 they finally ruled out elections, "unless proof is not given us that they (Viet Minh) put the superior interests of the national community above those of communism". On April 6, 1956 the withdrawal of the French troops was announced and in June, it was completed. With the French gone, the main prop of the Geneva Agreements was removed and responsibility for their execution rested on South Viet-Nam's Government which did not sign the Agreements and has never recognised them. Gradually the position of the International Commission became difficult. In their Fourth Report in August 1955, the Commission revealed that further continuance of its "activities and the effective discharge of its responsibilities are in serious jeopardy". The United States and South Viet-Nam have been opposed to elections from the outset: Chinese and Soviet efforts to bring them about have failed; Britain has been helpless and France has not the means to enforce her will in South Viet-Nam. The Anglo-Soviet talks held at London in April-May, 1956 and their messages to the North and South Viet-Nam Governments and the French Government have been of no avail. South Viet-Nam still refused and continues to refuse to regard itself bound by the Geneva Agreements.

However, with all the defects and setbacks in execution, the Geneva Agreements constituted a step forward in the relaxation of tensions. They were enthusiastically hailed in Paris where Mendes-France was widely applauded. The decision to ban foreign bases or alliances in Indo-China was a great victory for peace. Eden's "unmitigated efforts and unlimited patience" were applauded everywhere. The Geneva Conference had averted the danger of a third world war, for, in April-May 1954, the United States had almost decided to intervene in the Indo-Chinese conflict. Even though the Vietnamese unity has not been achieved, for the complete independence of Laos and Cambodia credit may be given to the Geneva Conference. For the first time it brought the Chinese Communists and the Americans face to face, and the U. S. Ambassador to Czechoslovakia, U. A. Johnson here initiated talks with the representatives of the People's Republic of China in an effort to secure the return of American citizens

then held in China and to consider the question of Chinese students in the United States. In short, the Geneva Agreements occupy an important place in the story of the recession in the cold war, and constitute one of the outstanding achievements of the post-Stalin era.

EASING OF TENSIONS IN THE FORMOSAN STRAITS

We have dealt with the background and achievements of the Bandung Conference held in April, 1955. At this time tension was mounting up in the Formosan Straits and it was expected that the Chinese might use force to liberate Taiwan. Following the Sino-Japanese war in 1895, Japan annexed Formosa under the Treaty of Shimonosiki and it continued to be a Japanese colony until her unconditional surrender in 1945. Formosa had made rapid strides under the Japanese by developing its resources, education, health, and transport and communications. They had used this island as the springboard for the drive to the southern regions and the Chinese, therefore, considered Formosa the richest prize of World War II. The Cairo Declaration of 1943 promised, and the Potsdam Agreement of 1945 reiterated, that those territories which Japan had stolen from China at different dates shall be bestowed on China after the defeat of Japan. In 1945, like other areas hitherto occupied by the Japanese, Formosa lay at the disposal of the Allies who had let the Chinese administer the island. The Chinese treated Formosa as a conquered province and its inhabitants as a subjugated people. Thus far, however, the situation was clear. But gradually complications grew with the changing fortunes in the Chinese civil war.

On communist victory in the main land, Chiang Kai-shek retreated to Formosa on December 7, 1949 and the structure of the national government was transferred to the island without any significant modifications. On March 1, 1950 he assumed the Presidency of the Nationalist Government in Formosa. On the one hand, the Peking Government and Chiang's Government, now, vied for recognition as the rightful representatives of China's millions and, on the other, the Formosan authorities continued sporadic belligerent activities against the main land. In regard to recognition, the Peking government was recognised by Russia, Britain, India and other neutral nations of Asia while with the Formosan Government the U.S.A., France, Belgium, Latin American countries and some of the Commonwealth countries continued to deal. Formosa also continued to represent the whole of China at the United Nations. Recognition to Peking by some and its refusal by others complicated the situation. The belligerent activities of the Formosan authorities kept tension high. The closure of mainland ports, the interception of vessels

trading with Peking, bombing raids and reconnaisance flights over the mainland, leaflet raids and the legends of "4" (signifying 4 words: communist bandits must die), incitement of guerilla movements and sabotage were highly irresponsible acts of Chiang's clique.

On June 25, 1950 the Korean War broke out and as elsewhere, it introduced more complications in an already complex situation. On June 27, Truman's orders were issued insulating the island from the Chinese mainland. The Seventh Fleet undertook the defence of Formosa and Pescadores. This led to Sino-Soviet protests against American action. Chou En-lai, the Chinese Foreign Minister (Peking) sent a cable to the U.N. condemning the American actions and expressing firm determination to liberate "from the tentacles of the United States aggressors Taiwan and other territories belonging to China". In November, 1950, the special communist Chinese representative at the U.N. repeated his demands for the ousting of the Nationalist delegation from the U.N. and reiterated his government's policy of liberating Taiwan.

The U.S. government, since 1949, regarded Formosa as the seat of the *de jure* government of China, while the Chinese in the mainland have been regarding it as legally belonging to them and as part of the Chinese territory still to be liberated. The stand of Chiang and the United States has been that since the Cairo Declaration and Potsdam Agreement were not embodied in a formal treaty with Japan, the surrender of Formosa and Pescadores to China cannot be said to have been legalized. The Japanese Peace Treaty only detached Formosa from Japan; it did not transfer it to China. It is further argued that the Cairo Declaration and Potsdam Agreement were concluded by the United States with a government in China which has since been displaced by another government by other than constitutional methods. Since this later government has not been recognised by the U.S.A., they cannot fulfil the Cairo and Potsdam pledges made to a government which has been unlawfully overthrown. Finally, it has been argued that even if it is assumed that Formosa was legally part of China in 1945, the victorious side in the civil war cannot have legal claims on that part of the Chinese territory on which one party in the civil war has effective control. Not only no act of surrender has yet been executed by Chiang but he still maintains huge armies and has what in international law is called a "reconquistadorial intent".

On the other hand the Chinese case has been that the fact that the Allies let the Chinese occupy Formosa in 1945 could not be a matter of chance and, treaty or no treaty, the fact of occupation made it legally a part of the Chinese territory. If

Chiang still has a "reconquistadorial intent" it means that the civil war between the Communists and the Kuomintang was still on and in that case, U.S. aid to Taiwan constitutes intervention which is contrary to international law. Intervention to be legal must be effective. As it is, the U.S. intervention is a clear violation of international law. It is argued further that Formosa is a domestic issue for the Chinese government in Peking to settle. Historically and culturally Formosa and Pescadores are parts of China and 90% of the Formosans are of Chinese birth or descent. The Chinese determination to liberate them, by force if necessary, it is argued was a phase of the Chinese civil war in which other nations had no moral or legal right to intervene.

By 1951 the units of the Kuomintang forces had been able to establish themselves in a number of islands close to the China mainland because of the aerial and naval weakness of Red China. After October 1951, the Kuomintang, therefore, was in possession of offshore island—Quemoy and Matsu—as well as Pescadores and Formosa. Although the U.S.A. refused to commit itself, it nevertheless appeared to have made a distinction between the offshore islands and Pescadores and Formosa for, from the U.S. standpoint, these must remain in friendly hands as long as communist threat existed. Tension continued to mount as the Indo-Chinese war grew in intensity. We have seen that throughout the period of the Geneva Conference the United States was trying with the idea of a collective defence pact for South-East Asia. Military aid was given to Pakistan and the SEATO was established in September, 1954. Negotiations were in progress in 1954, for a Treaty of Mutual Defence between the U.S.A. and Taiwan. On August 22, 1954, a "Joint Declaration of All Democratic Parties and People's Organizations of the People's Republic of China on the Liberation of Taiwan" was issued in which the Chinese declared: "Taiwan is an inseparable part of Chinese territory. Its occupation by the United States cannot be tolerated; and it is equally intolerable to have it placed under U.N. trusteeship. To liberate Taiwan and to eliminate the traitorous Chiang Kai-shek group is an exercise of China's sovereignty. It is China's own internal affair, and we will brook no interference by any foreign countries . . . . (It) is the sacred, historic task of the Chinese people. Only by freeing Taiwan from the tyrannical rule of the Chiang Kai-shek gang can we Chinese people accomplish the complete unification of our great motherland, can we further preserve the peace of Asia and the rest of the world . . . . We pledge ourselves to redouble our efforts, to strengthen our work in every field so as to accomplish this historic task".

The situation had become grave in mid-1954 because the U.S. advanced command Headquarters in Taiwan, established in 1950, had intensified its activities against Peking. A number of

air bases had already been built up. Soon after the Geneva Agreements of July 1954, the U.S. Military Assistance Advisory Group sent to Taiwan, had intensified training for offensive operations with special emphasis on amphibious operations. From July 1950 to June 1954, the U.S.A. had advanced military and economic aid to Taiwan which totalled more than $1400 million. In June 1954, Chiang asked the U.S.A. to help him in counter-attacking the mainland. On July 26, 1954, the U.S. military aircrafts were reported to have shot down two Chinese aircrafts over China's Haidan Island. The Chiang Government had inflicted huge losses on Chinese lives and property and in July 1954 it was estimated that from 1950 onward more than 470 Chinese vessels and 67 foreign vessels suffered molestation. In September 1954, as we have noted, the SEATO had been created. On October 10, 1954 Chou En-lai sent a cable to Dag Hammarskjold (U.N. Secretary General) protesting against the U.S. policies and Chiang's activities and requesting him to take steps to restrain them. On December 2, 1954, the Sino-American Treaty of Mutual Defence (between Taiwan and the U.S.A.) was signed which "plugged up the last gap in the chain of anti-communist defences in Asia and the Pacific". It was interpreted in Peking as an attempt "to legalize its (America's) armed seizure of China's territory of Taiwan, and with Taiwan as a base, to extend its aggression against China and prepare a new war".

In an implied manner Chiang's right to attack the mainland was acknowledged. Under Article 2, the parties agreed "to resist armed attack and Communist subversive activities . . . . against their territorial integrity", and under Article 5, each party recognized "that an armed attack in the West Pacific area *on the territories of either of the parties* would be dangerous to its own peace and safety" and declared that "it would act to meet the common dangers in accordance with its constitutional processes". But under Article 6, the term "territories" as used by Articles 2 and 5 is explained to mean "in respect of the Republic of China, Taiwan and the Pescadores, and in respect of the United States of America, the island territories in the West Pacific under its jurisdiction", and it added: "The provisions of Articles 2 and 5 will be *applicable to such other territories as may be determined by mutual agreement*". Under Article 7, the U.S.A. established virtually its protectorate in Formosa and secured "the right to dispose such U.S. land, air and sea forces in and about Taiwan and Pescadores as may be required for their defence, as determined by mutual agreement". Even in Formosa this Article was resented and was agreed to "with the greatest reluctance and in the face of a deadly enemy". In Peking it was publicized as "a treaty of war and naked aggression", and as a step completely undoing the effect of the Geneva Agreements. On December 8, Chou made a bitter attack on it,

reiterated the Chinese determination to liberate Taiwan and declared his country's firm opposition to such propositions as "independent Taiwan", "neutralized Taiwan", or "Taiwan under trusteeship". On December 21, Chou En-lai attacked the United States policy in the National Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference and on December 25, the National Committee also expressed its 'indignation'.

On January 18, 1955 the problem of Formosa ceased to be academic and the Chinese forces invaded the Kuomintang held Yikiangshan Island about 220 miles north of Formosa. The Island fell easily and the communist forces then attacked the Tachen Islands where about 20,000 Kuomintang troops were garrisoned. On January 24, Eisenhower asked the Congress for emergency authorization to use the armed forces of the United States in the Formosan straits which he obtained. On January 31, the Security Council announced that it would try to arrange a truce between the Chinese Nationalists and the Chinese Communists but it abandoned its endeavour when Peking refused to join in the discussions. Meanwhile, aware that Formosa would not be able to defend the Tachen Islands, Eisenhower ordered the Seventh Fleet to provide convoy and cover for the evacuation of the Kuomintang troops. Within the next few weeks the Kuomintang evacuated all the remaining major offshore islands except Quemoy and Matsu. Meanwhile, in February, the Sino-American Treaty of Mutual Defence was ratified by the U.S. Senate and the SEATO also went in force. Early in March, Dulles warned Peking "not to underestimate the willingness or the ability of the United States to meet a military challenge in the Formosa area."

It was in this background that we can appreciate the role of Bandung Conference in easing tensions in Formosa. India, Burma and Indonesia exercised "an effective calming influence" on Peking. Chou, therefore, did not raise this controversial question at all. On the other hand, he went to the length of making a historic announcement: "The Chinese Government is willing to set down and enter into negotiations with the U.S. Government to discuss the question of relaxing tension in the Far East, and especially the question of relaxing tension in the Taiwan area". Another interesting side-light on Formsa was Chou's proposal of peaceful settlement of the Formosan problem. "As an example of how this could be accomplished, he cited the way in which the communists had taken Peking. He recalled that an arrangement had been made with the local Kuomintang commander, Fu Tso-yi, whereby in return for surrendering he was given a high position in the communist government and his troops incorporated into the communist army. The same thing, Chou agreed, could be done in the case of Formosa". This

suggestion was revived in 1957-58 but came to nothing. Chou's statement on Formosa, however, made a deep impression everywhere so that on April 27, Eisenhower was obliged to declare his readiness to discuss matters of common concern with Peking. Talks actually began in Geneva on August 1, 1955. Thus in summer 1955, Peking did not launch the expected offensive against Quemoy or Matsu and just as cold war was relieved in Europe, it seemed to wane in the Far East also. The problem has not yet been solved and it is quite possible that it will tend to solve itself by Chiang Kais-shek and his clique gradually fading out. Eventually Formosa will have to go to China for no government in Peking with any sense of self-respect or responsibility can tolerate a hostile power there. Possibly the Formosans might like some kind of self-government but it is conceivable only when they, like Tibet, become part of the Chinese state. Before the Sino-U.S. talks began at Geneva, two very significant events took place—the Austrian Peace Treaty in May and the summit talks at Geneva in July 1955. To them now we turn.

THE AUSTRIAN PEACE TREATY, MAY 15, 1955

The conclusion of the Austrian Peace Treaty on May 15, 1955 was another important landmark in the story of the post-Stalin diplomatic offensive of the U.S.S.R. In an earlier Chapter we have referred to some of the points of dispute between the East and the West which had stalemated this problem. In addition to the questions of German assets in Austria and the Yugoslav claims on a slice of Austrian territory, there had cropped up other difficulties with regard to the United Nations property rights and interests, armaments, displaced persons and refugees, payment for relief supplies, elimination of Nazism, and withdrawal of troops from Austria and from its capital. The Soviet Union demanded that Austria should be prohibited from purchasing arms and military equipment from outside, and should be forbidden to employ foreign technicians in the armament industry or in civil or military aviation. The Western Powers argued that this would be inequitable and illogical, that no such provision had been imposed on other enemy states, and that the need to produce all equipment at home would impose an intolerable burden on the Austrian economy. The Soviet Union, eventually, withdrew this demand and the Western powers agreed to the clause forbidding the employment of foreign technicians. On the question of displaced persons, while the Soviet Union insisted on compulsory repatriation of all displaced persons, the West demanded voluntary repatriation. This article was eventually dropped. On the issue of relief supplies, the U.S.S.R, demanded payment by Austria for civilian relief supplies and services ren-

dered to her after May 1945. The West opposed this. This, too, was finally dropped. It is in this background that we will be able to appreciate the course of negotiations on the Austrian Peace Treaty up to the time it was actually signed.

It was not until December 1946 that Molotov agreed to the appointment of Deputies for the Foreign Ministers to prepare the draft treaty. Between January 1947 and December 1950, the Deputies held 258 meetings before reaching a stalemate. The Council of Foreign Ministers (C.F.M.) considered the question at their meetings in Moscow in March 1947, in London in December 1947, and in Paris in May-June 1949. At the Paris meeting, the Foreign Ministers agreed on certain clauses of the treaty. These decisions, involving the withdrawal of Soviet support from the territorial claims of Yugoslavia (which had been expelled from the Cominform in June 1948) and agreement in principle on the German assets, represented a solid advance. The Duputies were instructed to complete the treaty by September 1949, and although they could not do it, they did make some progress, so that by December 1949 agreement had been reached on all but 5 minor articles. The Soviet representative refused to discuss these articles until the Soviet Government had obtained satisfaction of its claim against Austria for post-war relief supplies. When the Austrian Government tried to negotiate on this question with the Soviet Government the latter refused to discuss. In May 1950, the Soviet Deputy introduced a new issue into the negotiations by accusing the Austrian Government and the Western Powers of encouraging the revival of Nazism and of remilitarising the three Western zones of Austria, thus reopening the article dealing with the suppression of Nazi organizations. The West refused to reopen discussion on an article which had previously been accepted. Then, the Soviet Deputy raised another issue and accused the Western Powers of violating the 4-Power Agreement on Trieste and refused to continue discussion of the Austrian Treaty until the Soviet Note of April 25, 1956 had been replied. When a reply was given, it was found to be unsatisfactory and he insisted that there could be no guarantee that the Austrian Treaty would be implemented until the Trieste question had been settled. The negotiations, therefore, stalemated again in December 1950.

In September 1951, the three Western Foreign Ministers met in Washington and decided to reopen negotiations on the subject. In December invitations were issued to the four governments for a meeting of the Deputies in London on January 21, 1952. On January 18 the Soviet Government informed the West that the Soviet Deputy could be sent provided an assurance was given to them that Trieste, the revision of the Italian Peace Treaty, and the Soviet charges of remilitarization and renazification in

the three Western zones of Austria would also be discussed. This was refused and the Soviet Deputy, therefore, did not attend the London meeting. On March 13, 1952, however, the Western Powers proposed for discussion an abbreviated draft treaty "containing only the minimum number of articles required to end the occupation and restore Austrian independence". It provided for a sovereign, democratic and independent Austria and placed a ban on an Anschluss between Austria and Germany. The frontiers as of January 1, 1938 were to be restored and no reparations were to be charged. All property held or claimed by the four Powers as German assets or war booty were to be relinquished by them to Austria. Within 90 days of the treaty coming into force, the four Powers were to withdraw their forces. The U.S.S.R. replied on August 14, 1952, agreed to discuss the subject on the basis of the long draft and rejected the abbreviated draft as being contrary to the Potsdam Agreement, and as failing to provide for free elections, to guarantee basic freedoms, to eliminate Nazism, and to provide for Austria the right to maintain armed forces for national defence. Prolonged negotiations led nowhere and the Soviet Deputy did not attend the meeting on September 29, 1952.

Same day, at the instance of the Austrian Government, the Government of Brazil requested the U. N. Secretary-General to place on the agenda of the 7th General Assembly the question of "an appeal to the four powers who signed the Moscow Declaration of 1943 for an early fulfilment of their pledges towards Austria". The views of the Austrian Government were circulated amongst U. N. members. On December 20, 1952 the General Assembly passed a resolution emphasising "the world-wide support for Austria's plea for the restoration of her full freedom and sovereignty" by 48 votes to none with two abstentions. In January 1953 a meeting of the Deputies was proposed by the Western powers and was held in February. The Western Deputies agreed to withdraw the abbreviated draft "if it proved possible to conclude a treaty on any other basis". The Soviet Deputy, however, insisted on its unconditional withdrawal. An invitation to a further meeting in May was refused by the Soviet Union.

In March Stalin had died. The Soviet reversal on Austria, however, did not come at once. On June 11, 1953 the Western Powers invited the U.S.S.R. "to inform them of the exact text of the treaty which the Soviet Union is prepared to conclude in order to ensure the political and economic independence of Austria". No reply was given to this enquiry until August 30 when the Soviet Union, ignoring the Western invitation altogether, demanded the withdrawal of the abbreviated draft. The Western Powers made this withdrawal dependent on the Soviet

readiness to exclude any question like Trieste from the discussions. Meanwhile the policy shift after Stalin had begun and in a note to the Austrian Government on June 30, 1953, the Soviet Union announced that they would assume all Soviet occupation costs as of September 1. The main directions of Soviet policy on Austria, however, remained unchanged. On July 10-14, 1953, the Western Foreign Ministers met at Washington and decided to propose a meeting with the U.S.S.R. to discuss the problems of Germany and Austria. The Soviet Government replied on August 4, and suggested that "the possible successful solution of the German problem could also help the solution of the Austrian question". The Western powers denied any relation between the German problem and the problem of Austrian Treaty but proposed a meeting to be held at Lugano on October 15, 1953, in which they agreed to hold 4-power talks on Germany and Austria at Berlin. The West accepted the change in the venue on December 8. The Conference was held in Berlin from January 25 to February 18, 1954. The Austrian Foreign Minister, Dr. Figl, participated when the Austrian Peace Treaty came up for discussion.

The Berlin Conference turned to the Austrian Treaty on February 12. Molotov proposed that (*a*) establishment of military bases be prohibited in Austria and Austria be prohibited from entering into any coalition or military alliance directed against any state, the armed forces of which took part in the repulsion of Hitlerite Germany; (*b*) that troops of the four powers, whose legal status should be determined by a special agreement, should remain in Austria until a German treaty was concluded; (*c*) that occupation troops be withdrawn from Vienna; and (*d*) that the Deputies should be instructed to complete the treaty within four months and they should consider the question of Trieste in connection with the proposal of the Soviet Government that the city of Trieste shall not be used as a military base. These proposals were rejected by the West. The most pungent point was made by Dulles when he said that after the withdrawal of Allied troops from Vienna the Austrian capital would be left as "a defenceless island surrounded by a sea of Russian soldiers". On February 13-14, the Western Ministers announced their acceptance of the Soviet version of the five articles which had been in dispute since 1949. Molotov, however, insisted on his new amendments to the hitherto agreed articles. On February 16, Dr. Figl rejected the Soviet proposals and promised non-entanglement in military alliances involving establishment of foreign bases on Austrian soil. He also agreed to allow the occupation by troops of four powers in Austria until June 30, 1955. Molotov, however, was adamant and the Conference failed. On February 19, a tripartite statement was issued by the Western Powers placing

the responsibility for failure on Molotov and expressing the hope that "the renewal of the contracts established at Berlin" may lead to success in future.

During the latter half of 1954, in exchange of notes between the U.S.S.R. and the Western Powers the question of the Austrian Peace Treaty was referred. It was, however, not before February 8, 1955 that the most important step forward was taken. Molotov in his speech to the Supreme Soviet that day referred to the importance of settling the Austrian question and suggested (*a*) ban on Anschluss, (*b*) neutralization of a disarmed Austria, and (*c*) a four-power conference to consider German-Austrian problems. At this time the London-Paris Agreements were coming up for ratification. Molotov, therefore, declared that "in the event of the Paris Agreements, which open the way for the resurgence of militarism in Western Germany, being ratified, a serious danger of an Anschluss would be created and consequently a threat to Austria's independence". This speech was followed by the Soviet invitation to the Austrian Government to express its views on Molotov's proposals of February 8. On March 20, 1955 Julius Raab, the Austrian Chancellor, asked the Soviet Government to amplify its proposals and to define the guarantees which it regarded necessary to insure Austria's military neutrality. Molotov invited Raab to Moscow to discuss the situation, and after considering the Western Powers, Raab accepted the invitation.

On April 6, the Western Powers issued a statement expressing the hope that the Moscow meeting "will result in useful clarification" and suggested that "if the Soviet Government should offer proposals which hold clear promise of the restoration of freedom and independence to Austria these could appropriately be discussed by the four Ambassadors in Vienna with the participation of the Austrian Government". On April 11, 1955 Raab and Dr. Figl went to Moscow and held talks with Bulganin and Molotov. The two Governments agreed that occupation forces should be withdrawn from Austria "after the treaty with Austria enters into force and not later than December 31, 1955". The Austrian Government reaffirmed that it did not intend to join any military alliances or permit the establishment of military bases on its territory. The Soviet Union agreed to join the other occupation powers in signing the Austrian treaty and to return to Austria all of the oilfields, factories and shipping facilities which they had taken after the war in exchange for 10,000,000 tons of oil and goods to the value of something over $150,000,000. The Austrian leaders returned home on April 15, quite happy.

On April 19, Moscow notified to the Western embassies in Moscow about its intention to call an early meeting of the four Foreign Ministers to conclude the Austrian Treaty. On April 22,

the Western powers accepted the Soviet suggestion and proposed that the four Ambassadors should meet in Vienna on May 2 with Austrian participation to do the preparatory work. On April 26, the U.S.S.R. accepted the proposal. On May 1-13, the meeting of Ambassadors was held in Vienna with an Austrian representative participating and it soon agreed on a draft. On May 14, the Foreign Ministers along with the Austrian Foreign Minister met in Vienna and approved the draft. The Treaty was signed on May 15, 1955 and went in force on July 27, 1955. Under it Austria was re-established as a sovereign, independent and democratic state with frontiers as of January 1, 1938. The Anschluss was prohibited. Human rights of minorities were safeguarded. Democratic institutions and the dissolution of Nazi organizations were provided for. The possession of specified types of weapons was prohibited and the disposal of war material of Allied or German origin was provided for. Occupation forces were to be withdrawn within 90 days of the coming into force of the treaty, and so far as possible not later than December 31, 1955. War reparations claims were renounced. Austria agreed to renounce all claims against the Allies, to restore all legal rights and interests in Austria of the United Nations and their nationals, and to grant for 18 months after the coming into force of the treaty most favoured-nation or non-discriminatory treatment in certain matters to any member of the United Nations granting reciprocal treatment to Austria. Danube navigation was to be free and open to all states on a footing of equality in regard to port and navigation charges and conditions for merchant shipping. The four Foreign Ministers announced that their governments would recognise Austria as a neutral state (like Switzerland) as soon as the Austrian parliament issued a neutrality proclamation.

The conclusion of the Austrian peace treaty was hailed in the world as one of the greatest steps forward in the relaxation of international tensions. The Soviet Union added to its laurels as a peace maker, since the final initiative came from Molotov and the treaty was concluded after a visit of Chancellor Raab to Moscow. Meanwhile negotiations were afoot for a Summit Conference of heads of four powers intended to resolve all conflicts between the East and the West.

THE SUMMIT CONFERENCE, JULY 18-23, 1955

The Summit Conference that met in July 1955 was important in many ways. *First*, though no important decisions were reached, the atmosphere was cordial and fresh hopes were raised by the new Geneva Spirit. This was the first meeting of top leaders of the four Powers after Potsdam in 1945, and it "did a tremendous deal in lessening world tension and removing the

spectre of war". *Secondly*, though it reached no definite agreement on any issue, it did underline the proposition that prospects of a thermo-nuclear war make co-existence absolutely essential. The Summit Conference was based on this assumption. It did not, of course, answer the vital question as to the basis on which the two sides could 'co-exist'. But it directed the four Foreign Ministers to meet and explore the answer. *Thirdly*, it vindicated India's foreign policy and was an evidence of the vital role Mr. Nehru played behind the scenes. Mr. Nehru visited the Soviet Union from June 7 to June 22, 1955 and, as we will note, the Summit Conference figured prominently in his conversations with the Soviet leaders. After his Soviet and Yugoslav tour, he went to London and gave a brief account of his assessment of the situation to Sir Anthony Eden and his colleagues. At that time they were hesitant in accepting Nehru's appraisal but what Macmillan told the High Commissioners meeting in London on July 27, 1955 (after the Summit Conference) is really remarkable. He is reported to have said that the British Government "were under a debt of deep gratitude to the Indian Prime Minister whose assessment of the Russian situation had been their guide throughout the talks (Summit talks) and proved correct every time", that he "had taken notes of the conversation at Chequers and was amazed to find how closely the Russian approach followed the line indicated by the Prime Minister", and that "it was of immense importance to have had this guidance of which both he and Eden were deeply appreciative". Mr. Macmillan "described talks with Russians as cordial and sincere on both sides and said the greatest thing that emerged from the conference was the undeniable fact that neither side sought war as a solution of the problems". He mentioned being "struck with the obvious desire of the Russians to be liked, which was also a typical American trait". "This desire", he said, "was very evident in all their dealings with the West in Geneva".

Two months after Stalin's death, Churchill had suggested the romantic idea of a Summit Meet in the service of world peace. Eisenhower and Dulles, however, disliked the suggestion fearing that such a conference might expose Western disunity and might impede the accession of Germany to the NATO. But the idea persisted and gradually won popular approbation. On May 10, 1955 West Germany was formally associated with the NATO. Same day the Western Powers suggested to the U.S.S.R. a conference of heads of four governments accompanied by their foreign ministers proposed to be held in Geneva in mid-July to formulate issues and discuss them and another conference of four foreign ministers to be held after this to explore the issues in detail. On May 15, Molotov met his

opposite numbers from the West at Vienna and assured them of his government's readiness to accept the Western proposals indicating his preference for Vienna to Geneva as the site of the Conferences. On June 13, however, the U.S.S.R. accepted Geneva as the meeting place and July 18, 1955 as the opening date for the Summit Conference, at the same time warning the Western powers that "the talks would come to nought unless both sides made honest and sincere efforts to relax international tensions". The Soviet Union badly resented "the Cavalier way" in which the Western Powers had prepared the agenda. Far Eastern issues had been left out while the problems of Eastern Europe and international communism had been included.

According to K.P.S. Menon, Indian Ambassador to Moscow, in the very first meeting with Nehru, Bulganin waxed hot and complained that "in a military sense the U.S.A. was determined to defend its interest" and that there was "no use" trying "to talk to such people". Nehru's persuasion, however, "had a reassuring effect on Bulganin". Khrushchev told Nehru that he did not "expect much from the coming Four-Power Conference" that in his opinion "the real motive of the U.K., and especially of the U.S.A., in agreeing to a Conference was to assist the Conservatives to win the election in Great Britain"; that "persistent Western propaganda regarding the internal weakness of the Soviet Union showed that their attitude towards the Conference was not positive"; and that "their desire seemed to be to go to the Conference, declare it a failure and throw the blame on the Soviet Government". Mr. Nehru, again, persuaded the Soviet leaders to be hopeful, and told them: "The Soviet Union had no reason to fear that they would find themselves isolated at Geneva. The U.K. and France might throw their weight in favour of peace; and Eisenhower himself was in a more receptive mood than Dulles. Of course no miracles or quick results need be expected from the Conference but personal contacts and informal talks at the Conference might pave the way for positive results". This reasoning of Nehru impressed his hosts and Bulganin at once said: "It would be a good thing for the world if the West would understand you as much as we did". Mr. K.P.S. Menon himself concluded: "This cool analysis of the international situation had a visible effect on Soviet leaders, including Khrushchev. They became slightly more hopeful of achieving something at Geneva. They also agreed that the Prime Minister's visit to London might serve a useful purpose".

In mid-June, Molotov, Macmillan and Pinay went to the United States to join the celebrations of the tenth anniversary of the United Nations. They used this occasion to confer with Dulles about the Summit Conference. The talks were unusually friendly and as he was leaving for home on June 29, Molotov

said: "Here in the United States as well as in the Soviet Union, there are very many people who wish the nations to live together in peace and amity". On July 18, 1955, Eisenhower, Bulganin, Eden and Faure assembled in the frescoed hall of the Palais des Nations in Geneva to open formally the Summit Conference. It was readily agreed by the four foreign ministers that four subjects would be discussed by the heads of four Governments: (*a*) the reunification of Germany, (*b*) the problem of European security, (*c*) disarmament, and (*d*) the promotion of East-West contacts. It was decided to allocate roughly a day to each of them. On none of these problems agreement could be reached.

On the question of Germany, the old position was reiterated by Bulganin: representatives of the East and the West German Governments to participate in any Conference discussing German unification and a German peace treaty; an all-German provisional Government, created by the parliaments of the two Germanies with the co-operation of "democratic Parties and organizations" to draft the electoral law and prepare "free and secret elections" for a national assembly and to help prepare and sign a German Peace treaty; all occupation forces to leave Germany after the signature of the peace treaty; German armed forces to be limited to those required for internal security and frontier patrol; and no foreign bases to be allowed. Bulganin told Eisenhower that conditions would not be ripe for German unity until existing military blocs were dissolved and general system of European security created. In fact, this reasoning implied the Soviet fears of an armed Germany and there is no denying the fact that there are still aggressive tendencies in sections of the German people along with powerful peace forces. To the proposal of Bulganin, Eisenhower reacted sharply and "begged Bulganin and Zhukov to believe that N.A.T.O. was a purely defensive structure and that the forces of West Germany would be so entwined in it that they could do no harm to any one". The Western proposals on Germany, therefore, also ran on old lines: free elections throughout Germany under a law drafted and promulgated by the four occupying powers and supervised by them; the convocation of a national assembly; the drafting of a constitution and the preparation of peace treaty negotiations by this assembly; the adoption of the constitution and the formation of an all-German Government; and the signature and entry into force of the peace treaty; and no restrictions whatever to be placed on German sovereignty or freedom of action in defence or foreign affairs. Thus, while the heart of the Soviet position lies in the precedence granted to the formation of a German Government over elections and in a disarmed and neutralized Germany, the heart of the Western position lies in free elections and a rearmed and Western-oriented Germany.

As Nehru wrote in August, 1955: "The United States are anxious to rearm Germany both as a measure of protection against any possible Soviet attack and in order to influence world problems through Europe and the German armed forces. In other words, they want to weaken the position of their opponents through Germany and thereby influence even the situation in Asia . . . . The Soviet conception of a neutral United Germany was not acceptable to the West". On the Soviet side, if Western Germany is to be armed, they would not give up East Germany and would possibly arm it too. This meant continued division of Germany. Again, it is difficult to disarm or neutralize Germany just by a decision of the four powers, for, Sweden or Switzerland or Austria may well be neutral, but a vital and powerful country like Germany cannot be passive. Thus seen, the question of Germany becomes tied up with the wider question of evolving a system of security in Europe which would give assurance against Soviet aggression and also assurance against German aggression. In effect, even a system of European security has to be on a basis of world security and that again has to be based on a considerable measure of disarmament. On this showing, the German problem and the question of security and disarmament are all tied up together, and there can be no security without settling the German problem and no settling the German problem without adequate security.

But just as the Summit Conference bogged down on the question of German reunification, so it stalemated on that of security and disarmament. On these issues the leaders limited themselves to making proposals. Bulganin reiterated the virtues of the Soviet plan for a general European security system to replace the NATO and agreed that that was "the only practical approach to German reunion". Eisenhower suggested that an adequate system of inspection was essential to effective disarmament and proposed that the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. "exchange complete blueprints of their military establishments and provide each other with facilities for aerial photography and aerial reconnaissance". Eden proposed limitation of forces and establishment of joint inspection in the area where East-West confronted each other in Europe, while Faure suggested "a system of budgetary controls supplemented by inspection" as the safest and surest approach to disarmament. On July 22-23, the leaders discussed the related question of economic, social and cultural contacts, and exchanged pledges of good will. Finally they directed their foreign ministers to meet in October, 1955 to suggest solutions to the problems already discussed. The Conference came to an end on July 23.

The Conference led to some improvement in world situation. Eden followed it up by the announcement that Bulganin and

Khrushchev would visit London in the spring of 1956. The Conference on Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy met at Geneva and this came as a considerable relief. In September, Chancellor Adenauer went to Moscow to talk with Soviet leaders. The latter demanded German detachment from the NATO, while the former defended it as a purely defensive organization, insisted on German reunification on the basis of free elections and demanded the release of all German prisoners of war held by the Soviet. On September 13, however, Adenauer agreed to the establishment of diplomatic relations with the U.S.S.R. and Bulganin agreed to release all German prisoners held in the Soviet Union. But this was followed by the visit of Otto Grotewohl, the Premier of the G.D.R., on September 20, to Moscow where a treaty was signed between the two countries granting full sovereignty to the G.D.R. and authorizing it to negotiate with Bonn on all matters pertaining to German unity. This Adenauer resented and he refused to recognise this treaty. Meanwhile in August, the Sino-Soviet talks had begun and before we turn to the conference of four Foreign Ministers held in October, we must examine the course of these talks.

SINO-U.S. TALKS AT GENEVA

The talks between the U.S. Ambassador in Czechoslovakia and People's China's Ambassador in Poland began in Geneva on August 1, 1955 partly in continuation of the talks which had been going on there intermittently since the middle of 1954 between the consular representatives of the U.S.A. and People's China, and partly as a sequence to the Bandung Conference of April 1955. The talks that had begun in mid-1954 were concerned with the release of U.S. citizens held in China and that of Chinese students in the U.S.A. Following the developments at Bandung, at the instance of the U.S.A., it was announced on July 25, both at Washington and Peking that the consular talks would be raised in level and enlarged in scope and that these would begin at Geneva on August 1, 1955. Meanwhile the Chinese had released 4 out of 15 American airmen imprisoned in China for espionage.

In June, as we have noted, Nehru visited the Soviet Union and *inter alia* discussed this question. According to Mr. K. P. S. Menon the following conversation took place at Moscow between Mr. Nehru and the Soviet leaders: "He (Mr. Nehru) said that, whatever the rights and wrongs, their (eleven American airmen's) continued detention did no good to China and that their release would serve to reduce international tension. The Soviet leaders pointed out that the release of four American airmen had had no such effect; the U.S.A. was still implacably opposed to China. Moreover, one could not ignore the fact that

a large number of Chinese students were being detained in America. Khrushchev argued that while the American airmen in China had committed crimes, the Chinese students in America were entirely innocent. Khrushchev also observed that the Chinese Government was a young government; it naturally set much store by its prestige, which would be shaken by any action taken by them under coercion. The P.M. (Mr. Nehru) pointed out that the release of four American airmen had had a wholesome effect in the U.K. and, to some extent, even in the U.S.A. Thanks to Krishna Menon's efforts, the U.S. Government had released a few Chinese students, and might be releasing a few more. Hammarskjold, the Secretary-General of the U. N., had also been interesting himself in this, so much so that some Americans had called him pro-Chinese. Yes, commented Mikoyan dryly, because, Hammarskjold was not 100 per cent pro-American. *Eventually Bulganin announced that the Soviet Government generally agreed with the Prime Minister's view regarding the advisability of releasing the American airmen and that they would convey the gist of their discussions with the Prime Minister to the Chinese Government*".

Thus here, again, the role of Mr. Nehru seems to have been decisive. On the eve of the Sino-U. S. talks, Peking radio announced that the 11 United States airmen had been released and would be expelled from the mainland of China. In Geneva, Mr. Wang, the Chinese representative at the Sino-U.S. talks, expressed the hope that "this measure would have a favourable effect on our talks". This was also hailed by Eisenhower as a welcome gesture. At their first meeting on August 1, 1955, the Ambassadors agreed on a 2-point agenda for their talks: the return of civilians of both sides to their respective countries, and "other practical matters at issue between the two sides". By September 10, China had promised to release 22 civilians out of 41. That day an agreement was reached on repatriation which took the form of parallel unilateral statements by the two Ambassadors—Wang Pingnan and U. Alexis Johnson—and has become known as the "Agreed Announcement" on Repatriation. Under it China recognised that Americans in China desirous to return to the U.S. were entitled to do so, that the U.K. would be invited to assist in their return, and that China would give wide publicity to the agreement. The United States invited India "to assist in the return to People's China of those Chinese who desire to do so". The U.S. also made it clear that Johnson's announcement "did not accord any degree of diplomatic recognition on the part of the U.S. Government to the Chinese communist regime". Eisenhower, however, welcomed this development while Peking radio announced that "the Agreement reached on the first item of the talks proves that possibilities do exist in the way of outstanding issues between China and the United

States, provided both sides show sincerity and the spirit of conciliation during the talks".

The talks were resumed on September 14 when the Chinese proposed discussion of the second item and pointedly suggested a discussion on the lifting of the Chinese trade embargo and preparations for Sino-American talks at a higher level. But the U.S. proposed that before those matters could be discussed the agreed announcement should be implemented. Subsequently, however, Johnson suggested that both sides agree to announce that they had renounced the use of force generally and particularly in the Formosa area, and agree to settle their differences by peaceful means. He emphasised that this renunciation of the use of force was not designed to commit the People's Republic of China to renounce pursuit of their policies in respect of Formosa by peaceful means. He pointed out that progress in further talks could not be expected in the face of continuing threats from Peking to take Formosa by military force. Since September 14, there has been no progress in these talks. Allegations and counter-allegations have been made with regard to the implementation of the Agreed Announcement—the Americans alleging non-fulfilment of its terms by the Chinese, and the Chinese alleging that "the American side has failed to furnish our side with a name list and information concerning all the Chinese in the United States".

On Formosa, the Chinese alleged on January 18, 1956 that the U.S. was unwilling to enter into any agreement on the question of renunciation of force and had "recently stepped up military activities in the Formosa area to aggravate the tension". The U.S. rejoinder followed on January 21 : "The communists so far seem willing to renounce force only if they are first conceded the goals for which they would use force". On March 4, 1956, the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a long statement containing old proposals and demands and concluded : "The tension in the Taiwan area is created by United States' occupation of China's territory of Taiwan and its interference in China's internal affairs . . . . . .The Chinese side cannot agree to the Sino-American ambassadorial talks being dragged out as it is, nor can it allow those talks to be used by the U.S. as a tool to prevent China from exercising its sovereign rights". The U.S. State Department replied on March 6, repeating old allegations and reiterating their position : "we seek the now overdue fulfilment by the Chinese Communists of their undertaking that the Americans now in China should be allowed expeditiously to return . . . . . .We shall also seek with perseverance a meaningful renunciation of force particularly in the Taiwan area". Since then, except similar charges and counter-charges no progress has been made. The gulf remains wide.

The Chinese position is that (*a*) Formosa is Chinese territory, (*b*) its liberation is their internal affair, (*c*) the U.S. occupation of Formosa is illegal and unwarranted, and is a source of tensions, and must be withdrawn, (*d*) China cannot accept the American claim to a right of self-defence in Formosa for that would forfeit China's right to liberate it, (*e*) the U.S.A. has no reason to refuse a simple declaration of renunciation of force, and (*f*) that on this basis the talks could settle the question of abolishing the trade embargo and prepare for a conference of Foreign Ministers of the two countries. The U.S. position, on the other hand, is that (*a*) it does not ask China to renounce its claims to Formosa, (*b*) that it only asks China to renounce the use of force as a means of attaining them, and that without prejudice to the right of individual and collective self-defence, and (*c*) that the Chinese refusal to apply the renunciation principle to the Formosa area and to accept an American right of self-defence there would permit the Chinese to claim that renunciation did not apply to the very area against which their attacks were directed, and that the United States, which has a mutual defence treaty in respect of Formosa, had renounced the right to defend its "lawful presence" in the area. These issues remain unresolved and the Formosan problem though subdued at present is quite explosive.

We noted that the Summit Conference held in July 1955 had decided to direct the four Foreign Ministers to meet at Geneva in October that year. To this Conference now we turn.

THE FOREIGN MINISTERS' CONFERENCE, GENEVA: OCTOBER 27, NOVEMBER 16, 1955

In compliance with the instructions issued by the Summit Conference, the four foreign ministers, Dulles, Macmillan, Pinay and Molotov, gathered around the same table in the Palais des Nations at Geneva where their Chiefs had sat in July. The issues on the agenda were: (*a*) European security and German reunification, (*b*) Disarmament, and (*c*) Development of contacts between East and West. By this time, however, the Geneva Spirit "had almost been submerged in the East-West rivalries and a new wave of the cold war". The Soviet Union had started its diplomatic offensive in the Middle East and South East Asia which the West was unprepared to meet. By October 11, the Baghdad Pact had become a going concern and the U.S.S.R. and India had intensified their assault on it. In the early autumn, Czechoslovakia began the shipment of arms to Egypt. On September 27-28, the Western Foreign Ministers met in New York in connection with the 10th session of the U.N. General Assembly and they reviewed the preparations for the Geneva Conference. They agreed that "priority should be given to the reunification of Germany within the framework of a plan

for European security and that they would meet members of the North Atlantic Council in Paris before going to Geneva".

Meanwhile the Soviet Union had taken two important steps to strengthen their diplomatic position. One was the visit of Adenauer to Moscow in September 1955 and the subsequent agreement with West Germany to which we have already referred followed by the visit of Herr Grotewohl and the restoration of sovereignty to the German Democratic Republic (G.D.R.) These moves "were designed gradually to force recognition of the Democratic Republic and to further the Russian contention that the reunification issue should be decided directly by the two German Governments". The other step was the visit of President Paasikiri and Prime Minister Kekkonen of Finland to Moscow in September 1955 which resulted in the Soviet abandonment of the military base at Porkkala near Helsinki which they had occupied under the terms of the peace treaty. This was the only Russian base outside the iron curtain and the gesture of relinquishing it was intended, of course, to strengthen the demand for the withdrawal of the Americans from their bases in Europe. Following on the Austrian Peace Treaty it was doubtless also intended further to demonstrate to the Germans the advantages of neutralism. On the other side, a serious set-back occurred to Western unity just on the eve of the Geneva Conference of Foreign Ministers—the rejection by the Saarlanders of the Saar Statute on October 23 by 423,434 votes to 201,973 after which the demands for the incorporation of the Saar into the Federal Republic increased. The Geneva Conference, eventually, began on October 27, 1955 with the opening speeches of the participants in which they reiterated their positions in respect of the items on the agenda.

Item No. I. European security and German unification. On October 28, discussions began on the first item. Mr. Macmillan tabled, on behalf of the three Western powers, a memorandum containing the Western proposals on this subject. The proposals envisaged (*a*) a European security pact, (*b*) a concurrent agreement to unite Germany as laid down in the Eden Plan presented at the Berlin Conference in 1954 and providing for free elections throughout Germany, the convocation of a National Assembly resulting from these elections and drafting of a constitution and preparation of Peace Treaty negotiations, and (*c*) a draft Treaty of Assurance on the reunification of Germany. The draft provided for the renunciation of the use of force, withholding aid or support from aggressors, limitation of forces and armaments in a buffer zone based on the eastern frontier of a United Germany (together with provision for inspection and control) and the obligation to react against aggression. The treaty, of which the membership was not specified, was to come into effect progressively at stages to be agreed and only in conjunction with the reunification of

Germany. The final stages of the treaty would become effective when a reunified Germany decided to enter the NATO and the Western European Union. It was emphasised that the NATO and W.E.U. were purely defensive organisations and far from threatening peace they contributed to the security not only of their members but of all states. This, it was argued, is evident from various limitations and restrictions which the members of the W.E.U. have assumed and from the restraints on individual action which the NATO system imposes on its members. "If", the memorandum ran, "a reunified Germany elects to associate itself with these organizations, the inherent obligation of restraint and control would enhance rather than detract from Soviet security".

Molotov had serious objections to these proposals. *First,* he argued that the Western memorandum had reversed the order of the summit directive which placed "European security" before "German reunification". *Secondly,* it did not fulfil the requirements of an effective security system, for, it would not only perpetuate military groupings but would strengthen them by the accession of a reunited Germany. *Thirdly,* he insisted that the NATO was not a defensive organization since the Soviet Union was refused entry to it. *Fourthly,* he argued that remilitarization of Germany was unacceptable to Russia either immediately or by stages and that a security arrangement should be devised in which Germany would be neither remilitarized nor linked with any bloc. *Finally,* the Western plan prejudged the decision of the German people by assuming that a reunified Germany would wish to join NATO and that this assumption conflicted with the principle of freedom of choice embodied in the Eden Plan.

With these objections to the Western plan, Molotov gave out his own proposals, on October 28, for a general European treaty on collective security on the lines tabled by Bulganin at the Summit Conference. These proposals envisaged a collective security system of whole Europe, pending the unification of Germany, to which the G.D.R. and the German Federal Republic would be parties "enjoying equal rights with other parties thereto". The implication of this proposal was that NATO be dissolved and replaced by another collective security system to which the U.S.S.R. would also be a party and that this should precede unification of Germany. This was, therefore, rejected by the West. As Macmillan put it: "The Western Powers cannot possibly admit that in order to give security to the Soviet Union they must abandon their own".

On October 31, Molotov presented new proposals on European security treaty. The treaty members were here obliged to renounce force and to render mutual assistance in the event of armed attack. *The treaty would not infringe existing treaty commitments* but

would be provisional in that it would remain in force only until the conclusion of a fuller treaty. The parties to the treaty might be the four Powers, other members of the W.E.U. and the Warsaw Treaty, both parts of Germany and other European countries such as Yugoslavia and Denmark. There may be a demilitarized zone in Europe (centring on the present demarcation line between East and West Germany) where any military establishments would be subject to limitation and joint inspection. Although these proposals were an advance on the previous Soviet position in that they did not call for the dissolution of the NATO, but since they predicated the continued division of Germany, they were rejected by the West.

On November 2 Molotov presented another set of proposals suggesting (*a*) the removal of all foreign troops from Germany within three months with the exception of "restricted contingents"; (*b*) an agreement for the limitation of forces of the two German states; (*c*) the establishment of an all-German Council (with representatives from East and West Germany) to provide for co-operation in all fields between the two Germanies and to prepare the way for reunification; and (*d*) mixed committees to consider such matters as currency, finance, customs, and transport under the aegis of the all-German Council. Molotov also reiterated that a reunified Germany must be bound in advance not to join any alliance directed against other states. The Western Powers, however, charged the U.S.S.R. of deviating wide apart from the fundamental requirements of the Summit directive which specified that (*i*) Germany should be reunified, (*ii*) that it should be reunified by free elections, (*iii*) that this should be done in accordance with the national interests of the German peoples and (*iv*) in accordance with the interests of European security.

On November 4, Dulles made fresh proposals providing (*i*) free and secret elections in September 1956 for an all-German National Assembly to draft a constitution for a reunited Germany, and (*ii*) an electoral law to be drawn up and submitted to the four Powers by January 1956 by a Commission consisting of representatives of the four Powers and German experts. Molotov gave a sharp reply on November 8, and said that Dulles' proposals "showed the aim of the West to be the remilitarization not only of Western Germany but also of Eastern Germany, and the inclusion of a reunited Germany in a North Atlantic bloc directed against the U.S.S.R. . . . The elections envisaged by the Eden Plan would be conducted in the presence of foreign troops and this would lead to. . . . . the revival of an imperialist Germany and to the extension of the Paris Agreements to the whole of Germany. Accordingly, only the full recognition that there were two different German States on the territory of

Germany, and recognition that the only way to reunification was through the mutual agreement of the German States, could provide the key to the solution of the German question". By November 9, the conference had completely stalemated on Item No. I and discussions were dropped.

Item No. II: Disarmament. The Summit Conference directive enjoined the Foreign Ministers to take note of the proceedings of the Disarmament Commission, to take account of the proposals advanced by the Heads of Governments, and to consider whether the four Governments could take any further initiative in the field of disarmament. Discussions on disarmament opened on November 10, but there was no advance in the discussion on the positions taken up at the Summit Conference. The Western Plan was Ike's "open skies" Plan under which military blueprints were to be exchanged and aerial inspections allowed. There was also a suggestion for exchange and publication of information regarding military expenditure and budgets. The Ike Plan was unacceptable to Russia for "it did not contribute to disarmament, *it did not cover the foreign bases of the U.S.A.*, its implementation would be a costly and prolonged operation, it would increase suspicion rather than increase confidence, and it provided no guarantees against a surprise attack". The Soviet objections were not entirely pointless, for, it can be seen that the Western Plan is not so much for disarmament as it is for exchange of military secrets and for "peeping into the iron curtain". On the other side, the Soviet Union proposed fixation of armed forces of the U.S.S.R. and U.S.A. at 1,000,000 to 1,500,000 men for each, and for Britain and France at 650,000 men. People's China was to participate in discussions at which ceiling for her forces was to be fixed. Other states were to have not more than 150,000 to 200,000 men. The proposal thus implied a reduction in the present standing armies of various countries. After 75% of envisaged reductions would have been completed, complete prohibition of nuclear weapons was to be enforced. Since no agreement could be reached on the relationship between disarmament and the means to control and supervise it, the discussions deadlocked and were abandoned on November 11.

Item No. III: Development of contacts between East and West. The Summit directive on this item was that the Foreign Ministers should study measures which could (*i*) bring about a progressive elimination of barriers which interfere with free communications and peaceful trade between peoples, and (*ii*) bring about such free contacts and exchanges as are to the mutual advantage of the countries and peoples concerned". The consideration of this item began on October 31. The West proposed 17 measures providing for freer exchange of information and ideas by progressive elimination of censorship; opening of information centres;

free circulation of periodicals; exchange of books; exchange of Government publications; showing of films on a commercial basis; exchange of exhibitions; discontinuation of jamming of broadcasts; exchanging monthly uncensored broadcasts on world developments; removal of limitations on the movements of journalists; increasing private tourism; cultural exchanges; meetings of scientists; reciprocal sporting exchanges; exchange of students; revival of restrictions on the movement of diplomats; and reciprocal exchanges of direct air transport service between the principal cities of the four powers. With regard to "mutual trade in peaceful goods" the Western Powers pointed out that a wide area of trade was already available and that any proposals in this connection may be considered.

The Soviet proposals were markedly different. *First*, they emphasised trade concessions to be secured through the elimination of restrictions on trade and facilitation of the free passage of merchant ships of all countries through straits and canals of international importance and the removal of "existing restrictions on sea communications with certain states". *Secondly* they advocated steps to broaden international scientific and technical relations, particularly as regards the peaceful uses of atomic energy through the holding of conferences. *Thirdly*, they proposed participation in international specialized agencies by all states desiring to join the work of these organizations. And, *finally*, they recommended measures to facilitate the strengthening of contacts between East and West in the sphere of industry, agriculture, cultural relations and in the development of tourism.

The Conference decided to submit both memoranda to a sub-committee of Western and Soviet experts but after holding 18 meetings, it failed to bridge the gap between the West and the East. While the Soviet approach envisaged official exchanges only, the Western viewpoint sought to widen not only the area of official contacts with the Soviet bloc, but also to make possible more spontaneous contacts of an unofficial nature. An acrimonious debate continued for a few days. The Western ministers charged the Soviet of isolating their people in order to prevent any contamination of ideas and any contacts with the outside world. Molotov was equally sharp: "We in the Soviet Union do not disguise the fact that we never have in the past and never will in the future picture to ourselves such a freedom in the exchange of ideas which would consist of free war propaganda or the misanthropic propaganda of atomic attack". On November 14, the French Foreign Minister, Mr. Pinay, proposed a compromise stressing the desirability of cultural, scientific and sporting exchanges between East and West, and advocating the exchange of students and increased tourism. But no agreement was rendered possible. The Conference concluded on Novem-

ber 16, 1955 and the 12 line communique announced that the ministers had a frank and comprehensive discussion of the three items "entrusted to them by the Summit Conference" and that they had "agreed to report the result of their discussions to their respective heads of Government and to commend that the future course of the discussions of the Foreign Ministers should be settled through diplomatic channels".

Thus the hopes raised by the Summit Conference for an understanding between the major powers were dashed to the ground and a wave of subdued pessimism swept over the world. We have seen how the world was taken over by a sort of storm in June-October, 1956 as a result of the Polish revolt, the Suez crisis and the Hungarian revolt and how in 1957 the Eisenhower Doctrine and the Turko-Syrian trouble heightened the tensions. Before this "storm" occurred, two other developments took place which belong to the period of "lull"—the compromise on the membership of the U.N. and the visit of Soviet leaders to U.K. To these, therefore, now we turn.

NEW MEMBERS OF THE UNITED NATIONS

Since 1950 the echo of the cold war could be heard in the corridors of the United Nations also where the doors had been closed to the new members. Indeed, even before the outbreak of the Korean war, the membership issue had been precipitated squarely into the centre of the cold war and neither side was prepared to yield the political advantage of excluding the other's candidates. This indicates the growing importance and value of the U.N. membership. Despite the unremitting efforts of some of the smaller powers, no progress could be recorded until the "political climate" improved in 1955. In November-December, 1955 the Soviet leaders visited India, and while it is difficult to be certain, Mr. Nehru's voice in favour of a compromise on the membership issue seems to have weighed heavily with the Soviet Union. Eventually a formula was evolved involving compromises on all sides. "The Soviet Union would not use the veto against Western-sponsored applicants. France, the U.K. and the United States would not oppose Soviet sponsored applicants, and the U.S.S.R. could be assured of the votes necessary for the admission of its candidates. It was also agreed that only those countries should be considered about which the question of unification did not arise, thus automatically excluding Korea and Vietnam". Thus evolved the formula for the admission of 18 new members as proposed to the General Assembly on December 8, 1955 by 28 countries. Supporting the motion, the Indian delegate, Krishna Menon, declared: "The U.N. is not and should not be a holy alliance or an exclusive club but should, instead, represent, in the words of the Secretary of State of the United States, the world as

it is and not the world as some of us think it should be at the present time". The Assembly passed the resolution by 52 to 2 with 5 abstentions the same day.

On December 10, the Security Council took up the matter and the President set up the tone by declaring that there could be no justification for "the Council or any of its members in disregarding so broad and deep and powerful a current of opinion as flowed through the recent debates of the General Assembly on the question of membership." The delegate from the discredited regime of Chiang, who, like the French Bourbons learnt nothing and forgot nothing, however, opposed the resolution and introduced an amendment providing for the addition of the Republic of Korea and the Republic of Vietnam, while maintaining his opposition to the candidature of the Mongolian People's Republic. To the President's appeal "to contemplate again the consequences of the act which he may be about to take and which I profoundly hope he will not take", the Taiwan representative replied by qouting Luther "*Ich kann nicht anders*" (I cannot do otherwise). The Chinese amendment was *vetoed* by the U.S.S.R. and, when after the Albanian application had been approved, the application of the Mongolian People's Republic came up, it was at once vetoed by China (Taiwan). In reply, the U.S.S.R. vetoed the rest of the Western-sponsored candidates. The "carefully contrived agreement" was thus destroyed and one person, the representative of Formosa masquerading as "the Chinese delegate", "set himself against the will of the whole General Assembly and of the majority in the Security Council and demolished an edifice built up with great patience and effort by a great many members of the U.N."

This was followed by close diplomatic negotiations in which Menon along with Martin of Canada, Belaunde of Peru and Dag Hammarskjold played a notable role. On December 14, the Security Council met again at the request of the U.S.S.R. to consider a new formula under which both Mongolian Republic and Japan had been eliminated on the assumption that their cases would be considered at the 12th Assembly. After an unsuccessful effort by the United States for the inclusion of Japan, the Security Council approved the admission of 16 states and sent its recommendations to the Assembly for approval. That very day, the Assembly decided to admit "the sixteen"—Albania, Jordan, Ireland, Portugal, Hungary, Italy, Austria, Rumania, Bulgaria, Finland, Ceylon, Nepal, Libya, Cambodia, Laos, and Spain. This was the famous "package deal". It took another year for Japan to get in. Early in December 1956 the Soviet and Japanese Governments had ratified an agreement ending the state of war between them and withdrawing the Soviet opposition to Japan's admission to the U.N. On December 12, the Security Council

unanimously approved Japan's admission. On December 18, the Assembly ratified the Council's recommendation and Japan became the 80th U.N. member. A Security Council resolution sponsored by the Soviet Union for admission of Outer Mongolia failed to pass. During the Council debate several representatives voiced support for admission of the Republic of Korea and Viet Nam. On December 11, a delegation from the Republic of Korea presented Dag Hammarskjold with a set of bound volumes containing 8,900,000 signatures petitioning for that country's admission. Nothing, however, has so far been done with regard to states that are awaiting reunification.

SOVIET LEADERS' VISIT TO THE U. K.

We have noted that in the fall of 1955 the British Government had extended an invitation to the Soviet leaders to visit the United Kingdom. Bulganin and Khrushchev stayed in Britain from April 18 to April 27, 1956. The British initiative at the Geneva negotiations on Indo-China and the "undoubted rapprochement between Soviet and British views on a number of questions" at the Summit Conference had created an unexpectedly favourable background. But in their visit to India in November-December 1955, the Soviet leaders had violently denounced the Western policies and this had caused some resentment in Britain. The hope for some improvement in the Anglo-Soviet relations, however, persisted and in the context of sharp differences between Britain and the United States on some of the vital questions in Europe, the Middle East and Far East, the Soviet leaders thought it worthwhile attempting to explore possibilities of Anglo-Soviet co-operation. Again, in 1954-55 British exports to the Soviet Union had risen from £ 10,100,000 to £ 22,900,000. In January 1956, the value of textile machinery Britain delivered to the Soviet Union exceeded the value of that exported to 40 other markets and it appeared, therefore, that great possibilities existed for the conclusion of mutually advantageous economic agreements. In March 1956, at the invitation of the British Electricity Authority, Malenkov, Deputy Premier and Minister for Electricity and Power Station, came to Britain and created a very favourable climate by "kissing babies and patting children's heads" and with his wit, moderation and adroitness. In response to the popular criticism in Britain at the ill-reputed head of the M.V.D., the Soviet Government dropped Ivan Serov from the delegation. After the return of Malenkov, they published an official protest against alleged British refusal to allow Bulganin and Khrushchev more time for direct contact with the British people. Meanwhile the Press, radio and television, launched an unusual campaign friendly to Britain.

On April 18, 1956, the Soviet Press announced the dissolution of the Cominform. Same day Khrushchev and Bulganin along

with about 200 camera-men reached Britain and for over a week they met students, workers and journalists. On April 23, the entire Soviet delegation dined in the House of Commons with the Labour Party's National Executive Committee and "Shadow Cabinet". During the visit, talks were held on several issues of the cold war and Eden "found an encouraging measure of agreement—greater, I admit, than I expected when we began". On April 27, 1956 a joint communique was issued in which it was announced that "the talks have been conducted on both sides in a spirit of candour and realism". The parties expressed their determination "to work for a further relaxation of international tension", and recognised that "one of the important factors in strengthening international confidence consists in personal contacts between leading statesmen which have produced positive results". They agreed to guide their relations by the principles of the U. N. and on the basis of friendly co-operation, peaceful co-existence, respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity and non-interference. They reaffirmed their will to "do their utmost to put an end to the armaments race in all parts of the world" to maintain security in Europe and to promote a solution of the other unsettled international problems. They pledged themselves to do everything in their power to facilitate the maintenance of peace and security in the Near and Middle East, to support the U. N. in its endeavour to strengthen peace in the region of Palestine, to carry out the appropriate decision of the Security Council and to support the U. N. in securing settlement of disputes between the Arab States and Israel. They emphasised that their common objective was the ultimate prohibition of nuclear weapons and the devotion of nuclear energy to peaceful uses, and recognised the necessity of "a substantial reduction under appropriate international control of the armed forces of States (with corresponding reduction in their armaments) beginning with reductions by the five great powers".

The Anglo-Soviet Governments also stressed the importance of the development of trade. The Soviet representatives stated that the Soviet Union could, in the coming five years between 1956-60, if there were no trade restrictions or discrimination, increase purchases in the U. K. to as much as approximately 9-11 billion rubles (£ 800-1000 million) including the placing of orders for various equipment and ships for some 4-5 billion rubles and the purchase of a wide range of industrial goods and raw materials for 5-6 billion rubles. A comprehensive list of machinery equipment and ships which could be ordered by the Soviet organizations from the U. K. was handed to the U. K. representatives. The British representatives pointed out that a part of this list was covered by existing strategic controls but

that there was scope for an increase of trade. Both sides agreed to study further the matter of exchanging consumer goods and facilitating contact between buyers and sellers.

On the question of contacts, a joint declaration was adopted in which both parties agreed to accord to their citizens every assistance in acquainting themselves with their respective experiences and achievements in the sphere of art, literature, cinema, broadcasting, science and technology and public health and emphasised the importance of exchanges in these spheres. It was agreed that both Governments "will take practical steps directed towards ensuring a freer exchange of information by the spoken and the written word". In the diplomatic sphere, it was reported that an agreement was reached that the Soviet Union would not press for the holding of all Vietnam elections by the originally scheduled date of July 1956. But the goodwill generated by the Soviet leaders' visit suddenly disappeared when the clouds burst in July with the beginning of the Suez crisis. Eden was not far from the truth in his summing up of the diplomatic importance of the visit when he said that it constituted at least "the beginning of a beginning" toward improved relations. It was nothing more, and as the events after July showed, it was probably even less.

CHAPTER 14

Soviet Offensive in Asia, Africa and the Middle East

We have analysed the post-Stalin attitudes, policies and actions in Eastern as well as in Western Europe. It now remains briefly to examine the Soviet offensive in Asia, Africa and the Middle East. The Soviet policy towards all these regions is conditioned by many factors: (*a*) the plural character of social structure of these areas with diverse tongues, traditions, religions and social systems, (*b*) the fact that they are non-white and share a common anti-Western attitude born of long colonial rule, exploitation and humiliation at the hands of foreigners; (*c*) an intense national sentiment expressing itself in a general desire to sail in the high seas of world politics, untutored by any body, and to remain aloof from involvement of power blocs, (*d*) a desire for swift economic and social changes in order to achieve in decades what had been achieved by the West in centuries; (*e*) a silent but sure current of admiration for the brilliant achievements of the Soviet Union, a Western but non-colonial country, and latterly of China (an Asian country) against heavy odds and in a surprisingly short period; (*f*) and the fact that most of the peoples and Governments in these areas, wedded to peace, have violently reacted against the American search for bases, military alliances, economic aid with strings, indirect support to French and Portuguese colonialism, irresponsible utterances of a few Americans in high offices, American policy of making Asians fighting Asians, rigid approach towards China, policy of rearmament and building positions of strength. By supporting whole-heartedly the principle of national liberation and neutralism, by opposing racial discrimination practised in many forms in the West, by peace-campaigns, doctrines of peaceful co-existence of differing political, social and economic systems—in one word, by wooing the restless colonial and ex-colonial peoples, the U.S.S.R. launched an offensive which the West was neither willing nor prepared to comprehend or to meet effectively. The Panch Sheel, the Korean Armistice, the Geneva Agreements on Indo-China and the Soviet reactions to Bandung, all fitted in with this line. The Summit Conference, the exchange of visits between Peking, Moscow, New Delhi, Rangoon and Kabul were pieces of this pattern.

In June, when Nehru went to the U.S.S.R., he was given what K.P.S. Menon has called "a people's welcome", "phenomenal welcome", "a flowery welcome" and "warm and boisterous welcome". In a letter which K.P.S. Menon wrote on July 6, 1955 he thus describes the welcome given to Nehru: "The Prime Minister arrived in Moscow on the afternoon of the 7th June. The entire Presidium headed by Bulganin went to the airfield to receive him . . . . All Moscow, it seemed, had turned out to greet him: the streets were lined with throngs of people carrying flowers and at the cross-roads the car had to plough its way through a sea of humanity. Strangest sight of all, Bulganin and our Prime Minister travelled in an open car. To our P.M. that was nothing unusual, but to Bulganin it was a new experience. Normally, the members of the Presidium travel in closed and curtained cars, but this time, to the amazement of the people, Bulganin stood by the side of the P.M. in an open car through the streets of Moscow. Thus, thanks to the P.M.'s visit, the Soviet leaders have come literally closer to their own people. The Soviet Government spared no trouble or money to make the P.M.'s tour comfortable . . . . The Soviet Government had also intended to load the P.M. with presents. Kuznetsov told me privately that it was their intention to present a Zis car to the P.M. and his daughter. After mentioning it to the P.M., I told Kuznetsov that this would make an embarrassing present as the P.M. used a simple car and the Government of India had recently prohibited the import of luxury cars. Pressed to suggest some other present, I said that an agricultural tractor would be more appropriate. May we present ten or fifteen tractors? Kuznetsov asked. No, I said, one would be a symbol, more would be embarrassing . . . . In all the factories workmen gathered in thousands to have the glimpse of the P.M. . . . . At the University on Lenin's Hill, the students left their classes and gave a great ovation to the P.M. . . . . In Crimea the P.M. had a flowery welcome. From Simferopole to Yalta, a distance of some 150 kilometres it was flowers, flowers all the way. Often the car had to be emptied of them. 'Flowers are good', Bulganin had said in Moscow, 'but not when they are flung at you'. The P.M. seemed to enjoy catching the vaulting bouquets of roses from his running car. The security attendant provided by the Soviet Government, stood in front, warding off the *floral attacks* as best he could. Kuznetsov who accompanied us throughout hurt his fingers which bled a little. 'Today', he said, 'I have shed some blood in the cause of Indo-Soviet friendship'."

"The reception in Georgia was equally warm and even more boisterous..... *Envious Westerners, baffled by the phenomenal welcome given to our P.M...seemed to be seeking for some explanation.* Some would say that the people had been so long and so rigidly

shut in by the 'Iron curtain' that when a loophole appeared and a strange figure emerged before their eyes, they were carried off their feet by the very novelty of the spectacle. Others would say that the people were merely following their master's fiat, the word must have gone round to every town, village and factory that inmates should turn up to welcome the P.M.....Organization, in a sense, there undoubtedly was. For many months the ground had been prepared sedulously for the P.M.'s visit though his itinery and even the actual time of his arrival were, for reasons of security, kept a close secret until the last day. All important statements made by the P.M. used to be published in the Soviet papers.....An exhibition of Indian art and culture was inaugurated in Moscow three days before the P.M.'s arrival. The Russian translation of the P. M.'s book, *Discovery of India*, was published just before his arrival and was eagerly snatched by the public. On the whole 'Nehru' had become a household word even before he set his foot in the Soviet Union. It would, however, be wrong to attribute the success of the P.M.'s visit merely to the efficacy of the party machine. The reasons lie deeper. India has always had a quaint appeal to Russia. *Even in Stalin's days, I used to observe that when an Indian appeared in Sadko, a national opera, and sang a plaintive song, a hush always fell upon the audience. India's appeal has been greatly enhanced during the last two years by the visit of our artists, singers, musicians and film stars.* One can hear Russian children in the street singing 'Main Avara Hun'..... All these events had made the Soviet people India-minded. Nevertheless, the secret of the great welcome given to the Prime Minister lies in the fact that the *Soviet people regard him as the architect of Indian independence....(and) that he is determined to protect it against all threats and blandishments....yet another, and equally important, reason for the welcome given to the Prime Minister* is that in Soviet eyes he stands for peace". (Italics mine).

On this showing, the Soviet Union sincerely responds to feelings of nationalism, neutrality and peace which are so much cherished all over Asia, Middle East and Africa. And this explains the success of the Soviet offensive in the under-developed areas. There is no effort made to apply pressures to direct their foreign policy in a particular direction. We have a categorical statement of K. P. S. Menon in a note, dated July 12, 1955: "It must be said that at no time did they try to use the slightest influence, let alone pressure to swing India to their side. They made it clear from the outset that they would leave it to us, as guests, to draft the joint statement. Towards the end, they suggested, somewhat half-heartedly, a certain addition to the statement. *That was to the effect that both Governments condemned the policy of creating military blocs and that neither would participate in any coalitions or actions directed against the other. This, as the*

Prime Minister remarked to us privately, would have amounted to a negative alliance. When our position was explained to Kuznetsov by the Secretary-General he immediately agreed to drop the Soviet amendment. The joint statement was thus entirely Indian in style and in substance" (Italics mine). This diplomacy characterized by flexibility and a psychological approach contrasts sharply from the blunt and unimaginative approach on the part of the United States of America with its slogan "Those who are not with us are against us".

As we noted earlier, in reply to Nehru's visit Bulganin and Khrushchev came to India in November-December, 1955. This was for the first time that top Soviet leaders had gone out of their country to a foreign land and the Indians, with traditional oriental hospitality, had decided to give a greater welcome than what their hero had received in the Kremlin. By common consent no one in all the modern history of India has been given such a resounding welcome to the land as these two Russian leaders. Here too there was some "organization" on the part of the Congress party and the Government but, on the whole, the welcome was spontaneous. In the Press—English as well as Vernacular—every word spoken by them was recorded. The Soviet leaders expressed their devotion to Gandhi and Panch Sheel, and their appreciation of India's role in world affairs. With a Khadi cap on, Khrushchev declared at the Nangal Dam that "the Russi" was prepared to share the bit of his bread with his "Hindi Bhai". On December 13, the Indo-Soviet communique was issued which recorded agreement on various international problems, and arrangements for Soviet aid in construction of a steel plant for India. The Soviet drove the bargain home by supporting India against Pakistan on the Kashmir question, and followed it up, in January 1956, by offering to lend the money and technicians for the construction of an aluminium plant and hydro-elecric works in South India. While the Soviet leaders gave unequivocal support to India on the issue of Goa, the Dulles-Cunha statement, released just at that time, gave an illustration of the Western inability and unwillingness to comprehend and meet the new trends in Asia and Africa.

From New Delhi the Soviet leaders went to Burma and dropped at Kabul en route to Moscow. In Rangoon, they reached agreement with U Nu's government under which the U.S.S.R. would aid in the construction of Burmese industrial plants and the development of agriculture in exchange for Burmese rice. The U.S.S.R. also offered to set up a technical institute in Rangoon as a token of good will. Visiting Kabul on way home, the Soviet leaders extended a $100 million credit to Afghanistan for economic purposes, and voiced support for the Afghan demand for the carving of an independent Pushtunistan

from Pakistan's North West Frontier Province. The Burmese and Afghani Prime Ministers also visited Moscow. At the 20th Party Congress in February 1956, Khrushchev introduced basic changes in the Soviet approach. "As against the slogan of the North Atlantic Pact: 'Let us arm', he said, "We admire the slogan 'Let us trade'." What was now attempted was to push out the Soviet policy from the *Cul de sac*, where Stalin's dogmatism had brought it, to a free field by creating a new polycentric system of communism. Under the new policy, one of the tasks ahead was "to reinforce indefatigably the bond of friendship and co-operation with India, Burma, Afghanistan, Egypt and Syria" and "other states that stand for peace". Thus, "if the new strategy was fostering socialist internationalism", the main areas of operation were in South Asia, the Middle East, and North Africa, and the main instruments were to be psychological and economic. With the Soviet policies in the Middle East we are not here primarily concerned. Here it is enough to point out that the diplomatic offensive became very acute after Stalin's death and its main centres were Egypt and Syria. The main instrument was the doctrine that "national Governments, even when not communist-controlled, must be accepted", that the revilement of nationalist parties must cease and that "the old Stalinist thesis that only the proletariat can truly represent a people's interest must temporarily, at least, be replaced by the maxim that even ex-colonial peoples can well take more than one road to Socialism".

With regard to Africa, it may be pointed out that "the spurt in Russian interest" in this continent seems to have begun in mid-1953. Publications of books, historical records, bibliographies on Africa began to be actively encouraged and the Institute for the Studies of Middle East and Africa were expanded. In addition to intimate and extensive relations with Egypt, the U.S.S R. established wide contacts with other states. In September 1955, diplomatic relations were established with Libya, and an exchange of personal courtesies between Bulganin and the Emperor of Ethiopia in February 1956 was followed by the raising of the two legations to the level of Embassies in June 1956. In Sudan an economic mission in June 1955 brought offers of technical assistance, and soon after independence, diplomatic relations were established in January 1956. Trade and diplomatic exchanges followed in 1956-57. In Liberia, a Soviet delegation visited Monrovia in February 1956 on the occasion of the inauguration of President Tubman for his new term of office, and this was followed by the establishment of diplomatic relations based on equality, non-interference and non-aggression. In April 1956 official greetings were sent to the Sultan of Morocco and to the Bey of Tunis on the proclamation

of independence. In short, the Soviet policy in Africa emphasises four factors : (*a*) Independence, sovereignty and anti-white nationalism of these states, (*b*) the sentiment of neutralism and opposition to NATO bases and the Baghdad Pact, (*c*) the fact that Africa is a continent in its own right and is not a mere extension of Europe, and (*d*) the fact that peoples of Africa have histories and cultures of their own. The usual instruments are diplomacy, trade, cultural contacts, women's and youth organizations, and local communist parties.

Soviet trade policies in backward areas. We have noted that a very important aspect of the Soviet diplomatic offensive has been a tremendous emphasis on trade and commerce. From 1953 to 1958, the Soviet bloc has embarked upon a credit and technical assistance programme in the under-developed areas. Since mid-1954 the Soviet bloc has made loans of more than £500 million. Five countries have received most of these credits: Afghanistan £54 million, Egypt £125 million, India £100 million, Indonesia £36 million, and Yugoslavia £165 million. In addition to these countries, Syria has brought arms on credit, Finland annually borrows more than £3 million to pay for her imports, and several Middle Eastern countries have received bloc loans. In itself this amount is negligible when compared to the investments of the United States or Britain in the under-developed areas. The U.S. aid programme in the post-war period has amounted to more than £18,000 million, and each year after 1945 U.S. foreign aid and credits total many times the amount to which the Soviet bloc has committed itself in 1954-57. The bloc trade is small compared with total world trade. The U.S.A., for instance, conducts as much foreign trade in two months as the bloc does with the rest of the world in a whole year. Even Britain has invested or granted £1,300 million in 1953-57 in the under-developed areas. But while the Western diplomacy with all the huge loans is unimaginative and disregards the sensitiveness of the people in these areas, the Soviet Union makes a "timely and strategically planned use" of small amounts of resources, and the Soviet negotiators have negotiated in a business like manner and have treated the people with dignity and equality. The Soviet Government has tried to identify itself with their nationalistic and anti-colonial feelings and has made much of the fact that the under-developed countries are in an economic position similar to that of Russia before the revolution.

While the process of industrial development in the U.S.S.R. has been similar to that in Britain and the U.S.A., the time span taken has been much shorter. It has been shorter because of the Soviet ability to make use of technological changes already embodied in Western economies and the technical skill which was made available to the U. S. S. R. but which was not

available to the Western countries except gradually. Then, again, the time span was reduced by Soviet willingness to devote one-fourth of the country's product to investment, at the cost of personal consumption. In about 30 years, therefore, the U.S.S.R. has changed from an extremely backward country to a first class industrial power with only the U. S. ahead of it in the world. It is also necessary to bear in mind that in the process of industrialization, agricultural and food production have lagged behind and have not kept pace with the population growth. Until 1954, the traditional pattern of trade of the Soviet Union was the export of raw materials and food stuffs and importing capital goods. After 1945, however, the position started changing and the U.S.S.R. could now export a relatively varied line of capital goods, e. g. trucks, tractors, construction and mining machinery, etc. in order to import food and industrial raw materials such as copper and quality foods, the domestic production of which would require a greater expenditure of resources than is needed for the capital goods which the country produces and exports. On this showing, the Soviet extension of credit and technical assistance to underdeveloped areas and expansion of trade with them, instead of imposing a burden upon the Soviet economy, suits the Soviet requirements as well as the requirements of the recipient countries. To India, the U.S.S.R. is providing a steel mill on a-12 year, 2½%, £ 40 million loan, as well as £ 6 million worth of structural steel, in addition to £45 million for machinery on another 12-year loan. Many resource surveys are at present being conducted by the U.S.S.R. and when they are completed more loans will probably be forthcoming. It is not with India alone that commercial contacts are being established even though, to Soviet Union, India is, as Mr. N. R. Pillai who accompanied Nehru to Moscow in 1955 writes, "of more than ordinary significance, for, if the policy proved successful in relation to India, the way could be cleared for similar contacts with other but more hesitant countries". This is a policy which fits readily into the general pattern of measures now being taken for the promotion of international peace and goodwill. Subversion does not seem to be the aim of this policy, though the hope may be present that satisfaction with the goods and services will in an indirect way "win the admiration of the recipient countries for the Soviet economic system".

Indeed, the loan of £ 36 million to Indonesia amply illustrates the way the U.S.S.R. has stepped in to help an underdeveloped country out of financial difficulties in order to "win the admiration". Despite Indonesia's weariness in dealings with the Soviet Union she accepted the loan. But Indonesia stipulated (and the Soviet Union agreed to this stipulation) that at the

end of three years Soviet projects should be evaluated, and it was clearly indicated that Indonesia might turn to the West for credit if she was not satisfied with Soviet performance. In the case of Egypt, just when the U.S. and the U.K. pulled out of Aswan High Dam venture, the U.S.S.R. got in and promised assistance. As a result of these moves close economic ties have emerged between the Soviet Union and these countries. For instance, Afghanistan in 1957 had a national income of about £ 200 million and owes the U.S.S.R. 25% of that amount. Egypt's principal export, cotton, has a heavy burden to pay off the large debt to the Soviet bloc. In 1956, nearly 40% of Egyptian cotton went to the bloc, which in 1954 took only 14% of Egyptian exports. India has a foreign exchange gap of nearly £ 400 million in its Second Five-year Plan and has already borrowed between a fourth and a third of that amount from the Soviet Union.

It is true that the backward areas are fully conscious of the serious consequences of becoming dependent upon trade with the Soviet bloc and that they know that the Soviet bloc is not a reliable trading partner, is susceptible to political motivation and might withdraw trade unexpectedly for political reasons. Bloc performance on its commercial agreements is not entirely satisfactory and as much has not been exported to Indonesia as had been agreed. Nor are these countries blind to the fact that their favour is being sought by economic temptations and that there are hazards in dealing with countries whose foreign trade is a state monopoly and whose economic leaders are also political leaders. As Mr. N. R. Pillai, Secretary to the External Affairs Ministry in India, commented in a note, dated July 29, 1955: "It must be remembered that dependence on a foreign government as distinct from foreign private interests for important supplies subjects business transactions, more than normally, to the influence of the changing course of political relations. It must also be borne in mind that too sudden or too wide a swing in favour of a new supplier, especially one who does not belong to the same club as the traditional suppliers, carries with it a certain risk, it may tend to shrivel up existing sources of supply".

Nevertheless, there are at least seven factors which make the Soviet trade policies exceptionally tempting to the under-developed areas: (*i*) The Soviet loans and grants are taken as an aid to *rapid industrialization*. (*ii*) The Soviet Union has tried hard to relieve the under-developed countries of their surplus products, e.g. rice from Burma. (*iii*) Repayment terms of the Soviet bloc loans have generally been favourable to the under-developed countries. The main provision is interest at 2 to 3 per cent, which is lower than the rates charged by Western countries and the World Bank. (*iv*) Repayment periods allowed

have been long, ranging up to 30 years with no payment in the initial years. (*v*) The bloc has accepted local currencies. (*vi*) By obtaining capital equipments from the Soviet Union, these areas are in a position to sharpen the competition. Having to earn a reputation in this new field, the Soviet Government could be expected to fulfil their contractual obligations in a manner which could bring them special credit. Competition, thus sharpened, would impel other suppliers to improve on their past performance. (*vii*) There are certain types of equipment which could be procured more readily from a Government than from a private concern, e.g. oil prospecting and drilling machinery.

Interpretation of changes in Russian policy. The changes that have occurred in the Soviet policies after Stalin's death have led to a good deal of controversy in academic and political circles. Has the Soviet regime turned into "a national state, responsive to the aspirations of its own people for a better life and for peace"? Has the revolutionary belief in the world-wide triumph of the communist system given way to a willingness to co-exist indefinitely with other political systems? Are these changes an indication of liberalism and constitutionalism or of inherent weaknesses and contradictions leading towards disintegration? Several explanations of these changes have been put forward.

First, it has been suggested that the changes are not, and could not be, basic and that they only imply a change in tactics, and that the fundamental objective of the Soviet policies are the same. As Robert F. Byrnes put it: "Available evidence suggests that there has been no basic change in Soviet policy or goals, although the tactics used are now different. The Soviet rulers are simply adjusting to life without Stalin and to a new phase in post-war relations, one which assumes a temporary political and military stalemate, avoidance of the cold war by political and economic means which do not involve increasing the likelihood of general war".

Secondly, it has been suggested that the post-Stalin changes reflect a policy that is conducted within a realistic and not a doctrinnaire over-all framework which imparts to it a high degree of cohesiveness without depriving it of realism, and that Moscow is now guided in its policy-planning by an effort to assess the main, long-range impact which the technological revolution is likely to have on men's political psychology, on various phases of human consciousness and in various geo-political settings.

Thirdly, it has been pointed out that de-Stalinization combined real changes of policy with dissimulation and that the "new look' was considerably more "look" than "new". A key-word in the Soviet political vocabulary continued to be "monolithism".

While Soviet officials received bourgeois visitors with gracious hospitality, they bristled or acted evasive if foreigners questioned any of the sacred dogmas of Marxism-Leninism. Nevertheless, it is agreed that these changes indicate a definite trend toward "normalization" and "liberalization" in Soviet society and that, therefore, the policy of the non-communist states should be based on deep study and analysis, reasonable and dignified efforts at negotiation, increasing cultural contacts and reduction of international and social tensions on which communism feeds.

Fourthly, it is pointed out that the post-Stalin changes reflect a universality and simultaneity of the crisis all over the communist world, and that this crisis is sharpened by the economic and social transformation of the Soviet Union, the restoration of the legitimacy of socialism and a general crisis of communist theory itself. It is suggested that the rapid and vast economic development, growth of literacy, better health, and greater confidence have all changed the context of Soviet policies and demand "*a new distribution of power* that will make virtually impossible the maintenance of the ideological totalitarian straight jacket of the past 40 years". Similarly by accepting the polycentric nature of communism at the 20th Party Congress the U.S.S.R. was led to a new set of relationship in the "communist commonwealth". A variant of this view is that the post-Stalin crisis contains three chief elements: (*a*) the internal and external complications resulting from the breakdown of Stalin's terroristic industrialization programme, (*b*) the distribution, control and motivation problems of a stabilizing industrial economy, and (*c*) the problems of juridical defense in stabilizing the authority of a large party oligarchy under conditions of high industrialization and bureaucratization. As successive attempts were made to deal with these problems several latent sources of conflicts, if not "contradictions" were revealed: (*i*) the opposition between the politicals and the economic bureaucracies; (*ii*) possible conflicts between the Khrushchev-led party elite and the army; (*iii*) possible conflicts between the Khrushchev-led party elite and the party rank and file; (*iv*) conflicts between the regime as a whole and segments of the general population; and (*v*) conflicts between the U.S.S.R. and her satellites. (*The Western Political Quarterly*, September, 1957, Harvey Wheeler, *Problems of Stalinism*, pp. 634-74).

Fifthly, it has been suggested by Professor Toynbee that de-Stalinization was a turn for the better and that it would now be easier to live in peace with Soviet Communism. He argues that communism displays the characteristics of a religious movement which rises and wanes. He likens communism with Islam, for, both started out as fighting religions. Islam, having conquered many lands and people, lost its fervour and settled down to

"co-existence" with other religious systems and, at any rate, ceased making new conquests. The West, that is, managed to contain Islam. Toynbee argues that communism is "slated for a similar development and will stop being militant". Thus the non-communist world and the communist world "will be able to find a *modus vivendi*". But this view has been contended recently by Robert Strausz-Hupe: "It is possible that, in the long run, communism will lose its militancy. For the short run Toynbee's analogy is highly misleading. It took Islam several centuries to settle down and before it settled down, it had converted millions of people, killed off other millions and conquerred vast territories. When it did settle down, it did so not because the Muslims believed less ardently in the messages of the Prophet, but because forces outside of the Islamic world had risen and defeated the forces of Islam, pushed them back, contained them and put up against the faith of Islam a more powerful and more militant faith". He puts forward his own view and says: "If, in the light of Stalin's own work, (Economic Problems of Socialism in the U.S.S R.) we trace the developments that culminated in the 20th Party Congress and the denunciation of Stalin, and review the steps taken by the communist leadership to re-align and re-adjust the relationships between the communist party of Russia and the other "national" communist parties themselves, then we must conclude that the entire complex and vast operation can have had only one purpose: the return to what we may call Trotsky's universalism as against Stalin's parochialism . . . . De-Stalinization is thus by no means a move toward moderation. On the contrary, it is a move toward orthodoxy."

Then, again, there is the view of Professor Louis J. Halle who expounded the theory of "convergence" in *The New Leader* (July 9, 1956). This theory implies that the Free World tends to become less free and the communist world tends to become more liberal. Prof. Halle has thus put it: "It appears to me that our evolution and the evolution of our communist antagonists may be tending, over a long period, to reduce the difference between us. The historic trends of our time work on both sides. In addition, the pressure of the communist challenge has made us less easy-going and therefore, in some sense, less liberal. We cannot, perhaps, afford as much freedom for the individual. At the same time, the communists have found, since Stalin, that by appearing more liberal and peaceable to the outside world they invest their system with some of the natural appeal which ours has traditionally had. This implies them to imitate us". Here is, therefore, Free world's hope for peaceful co-existence with communism on "convergence".

Finally, there is the view at one time very popular in the United States, that the Soviet system is cracking up on the

economic front as well as under the stress of political and ideological struggle. But this has been convincingly contradicted by Mr. Nehru after his visit to the Soviet Union. Referring to this question in his note dated July 19, 1955, he writes: "In the Soviet Union machine impinges on every person . . . . At the present moment, the production of engineers and other kinds of technicians in the Soviet Union is prodigious, exceeding, I am told, the numbers produced in the United States. In fact, people in the Soviet Union will gradually all be engineers, technicians or scientists of some grade or the other. There is no doubt that they have already some top-ranking scientists, engineeers, etc. Probably, before long, they will have a vast reservoir of trained people to draw upon, bigger than that of any other country including the U.S. Practically everyone under 50 in Russia, that is, almost the entire active population, has grown up under the Soviet system and has been fully conditioned by it, not only by propaganda but much more so by his entire environment. In the Soviet Union a new type of society (is) growing up. It is a vital society expanding not only in numbers and in the construction of new towns and cities and factories, etc. but fully conditioned to believe in the environment in which it lives. This society is becoming increasingly technical and fairly well read. Its standards will necessarily go up with increasing production.....I imagine that if fear of war and attack goes, there will be a progressive approach to normality and a measure of individual freedom may also come in its train. I do not think that this will lead to the type of individual freedom that is known in..... the West, but a well-read and well-trained society is not likely to submit for long to many restrictions on individual freedom."

It is, in fact, wrong to suggest that the peace moves of the Soviet Union were the result of internal weakness or that "Russia is on the run". Nothing could be further off the mark. It is rather wishful thinking. Nor is there much in the talk of "cracking up on the agricultural frong." The agricultural difficulty is there but it is hardly serious and with millions of acres of virgin land being brought under cultivation, there cannot be any scarcity of food grains. If power is to be measured by scientific advance the sputniks have given the answer. Nehru referring to the Soviet scientific advances wrote : "The recent Air Display in Moscow was evidence of their great advance in the latest types of weapons. Of machinery they produce almost everything. It is possible that American machines are sometimes better, but in quantity the Russians are simply pouring out all kinds of aeroplanes, tanks and every conceivable type of machinery. Marshal Tito, who is a wise observer, told me that for a variety of reasons he was convinced that the Soviet

Union wanted peace but it would be dangerous thinking for the Western Powers to imagine that they can drive the U.S.S.R. too far". The explanation of the Soviet peace offensive in terms of Soviet weakness, therefore, sounds hollow in the context of the Soviet war apparatus, scientific advance, and technologicial progress. The post-Stalin domestic and foreign policy changes, therefore, can be correctly interpreted in the light of social and economic changes that have come over the Soviet Union. And the diplomatic offensive can be appreciated only with reference to "the new generation that had grown up in the Soviet Union which had no personal experience of the revolution and did not possess the rigidity of the old guard". This new generation is essentially of the engineer technical type interested in building and construction as well as in "the good things of life", and with a desire for a lessening of tension in their individual lives and in not having to live continuously at a high pitch of effort.