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CALIPHATE AND SULTANATE

by

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*Dean, Faculty of Arts,
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Dedicated

To my bosom friend

Dr. W. H A. Shadani

Dean,

Faculty of Arts.

University of Dacca

East Pakistan

FOREWORD

In the political theory of Islam as a world-historic movement, the Caliphate as an institution occupies the central position. Dr. Amir Hasan Siddiqi's short but brilliant treatise is the best study of the subject during the Middle Ages that has yet seen the light.

The author is not concerned with the theories evolved from the inner consciousness of the latter-day thinkers, but with the Caliphate as a historic fact. The Civilization of Again, one aspect of which he carefully surveys, is the connecting link between these civilization of ancient Rome and Parsia and the civilization of modern Europe. By the end of the ninth century the lands of Islam had become too extensive to be governed from a single centre [and the Caliph inevitably ceased to be the 'administrative head' of the faithful. He represented, nevertheless, the unity and brotherhood of Islam. How was this unity, the basis of Islamic culture and social life, to be reconciled with the 'administrative decentralization' with the exigencies of practical life ?

Dr. Amir Hasan's work, a contribution of permanent value to the study of Islam, tells us how Muslim Asia strove to answer that question during a period of four hundred years. Both the Caliphate and the Sultanate were necessary institutions, and on their proper co-ordination depended the peace and prosperity of Muslim nations. The careful array of facts which the author has put together from the original authorities and his balanced critical judgement, will, I am sure, win for him the gratitude of all sane and sober students of Oriental institutions.

Mohammad Habib,
 PROFESSOR OF HISTORY.

Aligarh.

INTRODUCTION

The subject treated in this book was presented as a thesis for the degree of Ph. D. at the London University in 1934. The original purposes with which this subject was undertaken were : (1) to survey the development in the eastern Islamic provinces of the theory of the Sultanate and its relations with the Caliphate, from the time when the classical theory of the undivided temporal sovereignty of the Caliphs had broken down, to the establishment of the Safavid dynasty (2) to correlate the theoretical expositions with the actual course of events, showing to what extent theory and practice were in agreement or in opposition and reacted on one another.

While the general outlines of such a survey are already to be found in the standard works of Barthold, Caliph and Sultan, published in Russian in Mir Islama. (St. Petersburg 1912) and Arnold. The Caliphate, (Oxford 1924), neither work deals with these particular aspects of the subject with the fulness which is desirable for a satisfactory conclusion on the problem.

After a survey of the subject in general and of the materials already available, I found it necessary to divide the work into three sections : (1) a historical survey of the relations between the Caliphate and the independent dynasties in Persia down to 1258 A.C. (2) a similar survey of the functions of the Sultanate between 1258 and 1500 A.C. (3) the development of the theory of the Sultanate. The wide extent of the ground to be covered compelled me to limit myself for the present to the first section alone, together with a preliminary discussion of the contemporary development of political theory.

The final object of the present book, therefore, is to show the circumstances and the steps by which the provincial Amirs in Persia became independent of the Abbasid Caliphate : how as a necessary consequence of the curtailment of the temporal power of the Caliphate by the Shi'as, the Sultanate was created by the Sunnis ; and how the inevitable conflict between the two institutions brought about their downfall in Persia.

The absence of all the official records both at the centre and the provinces, paucity of information regarding the actual subject, and the extraordinary length of the period, have rendered my task extremely difficult. In fact, without the official records, it is impossible to establish the true relations between the central and provincial Governments; but an effort has been made to throw some new light on the subject by collecting from a variety of sources all the materials bearing on it, in much fuller detail than has previously been done.

In treating the subject, certain minor dynasties, especially of the Shi'as, have been left out, since they had no direct bearing on the subject. On the other hand, in order to comprehend the true significance of the relationship between the Caliphate and the Tahirids, I have traced the latter's relations from the very beginning of the dynasty, although my period begins from 232/846—a date from which definite signs of weakening of the Caliphate are evident.

I should like to acknowledge my deep gratitude to Professor H. A. R. Gibb whose able guidance enabled me to produce this work; and to express my thanks to Mr. V. F. Minorsky for kindly looking through the chapters and suggesting numerous improvements.

My thanks are also due to my friend and colleague, Mr. Sheikh Abdur Rasheed, M.A., L.L.B. (Alig.) for going through the proofs and making necessary corrections.

It will not be out of place to mention that Urdu version of the book has already been published by Darul-Mussnanaaffin with a foreword by Allama Syed Sulaiman Nadvi. I am deeply grateful to my friend Mr. Sibtain Ahmad who has by his excellent translation made it accessible to Urdu-knowing people.

AMIR HASAN SIDDIQI.

Aligarh,

28th February, 1942

PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION

Caliphate and Sultinate was out of print for the last so many years. Students of Islamic History were pressing for its republication. In view of the incessant demand the book was serialised in the *Voice of Islam* and is now being published in book form. I have utilized this opportunity to revise the book and have added three new chapters on Caliphate. In its present form the book attempts to present a concise but exhaustive study of the political developments of Islam upto the fall of Baghdad. In the end I am grateful to Mr. Khurshid Ahmed the editor of the *Voice of Islam* for going through the manuscript and to Mr. M. W. Gazder, Manager of *Voice of Islam* for assisting me in the compilation of the index and for going through the proofs of the book.

Dr. Amir Hasan Siddiqi.

CONTENTS

			Pages
Dedication	..	...	i
Foreword by Prof. Mohammad Habib		...	li
Introduction	...	...	iii
Introduction to the Second Edition	...	...	v
Chapter I. Orthodox Caliphate	...	...	1
„ II. Caliphate under the Umayyads		...	13
„ III. Caliphate under the Abbasids		...	21
„ IV. Decline of Abbasid Caliphate		...	35
„ V. Caliphate and Tahirids	...	...	53
„ VI. Caliphate and Saffarids	...	...	66
„ VII. Caliphate and Samanid	...	...	76
„ VIII. Caliphate under the Buwayhid regime and its relations with the Persian Rulers		...	85
„ IX. The Ghaznavids	...	...	125
„ X. Relations of the Caliphate with the Saljuqid Sultanate	...	...	143
„ XI. Relation of the Caliphate with the Khwar Zam Shahs	...	...	193
Bibliography	...	...	212
Index	...	...	217

CALIPHATE AND SULTANATE IN MEDIEVAL PERSIA

CHAPTER I

The Orthodox Caliphate

After the demise of the Holy Prophet Muhammad, it was considered necessary to have the institution of the Caliphate in order to provide leadership in succession to the Prophet for the preservation of religion and the administration of temporal affairs ; and it was obligatory on the people to appoint an Imam by the consensus of the community.

The chief objective of the Caliphate was to protect Islam and to promote its cause both within and without the jurisdiction of the State ; and to administer all the affairs of the community in accordance with the Quranic injunctions and the traditions of the Holy Prophet.

The immediate successors of the Holy Prophet, called the rightly guided or orthodox Caliphs, had evolved the institution of the Caliphate on sound Quranic principles and the noble traditions of the Prophet and their regime was noted for the following characteristics :-

During the Orthodox Caliphate, the administrative and legislative affairs were carried on in accordance with the Quranic injunctions and the traditions of the Holy Prophet. In the absence of any direction in both these sources, the Caliph in consultation with his Advisory

Council used to enunciate new laws. Thus the Caliph in-Council possessed partial and restricted right of legislation. He could not make any law contrary to the clear injunctions of the Quran which are noted for their universal applicability. In this sense, it may be said that the Caliph and the members of his Advisory Council were not really law-makers ; as such they were not above the law, and could not possibly claim any exclusive privilege for themselves. The Caliph, in fact, along with the members of his Advisory Council was the executor of the divine law and as such stood at par with the ordinary citizens so far as the application of the law was concerned.

Since sovereignty in that State was restricted to the four corners of Shariah, whose principles are universal and equally applicable to all, the first resultant characteristic of such a state naturally was equality. It is, however, a mistaken notion that Islam sanctions absolute equality which is denied by nature as no two persons are equal in any respect. Any amount of effort on the part of a State to equalise the mental faculties or even physical capacities of different persons will prove fruitless. Consequently a well known verse of the Quran says, "Verily we have given preference to some over others". However, the question arises, what is the concept of equality in Islam ? It means equality before law and in matters of civic rights and obligations to the State. Above all it means affording equal opportunities to all irrespective of caste, creed, colour, race, sex or birth. Only merit and devotion to the cause of Islam enabled a person to occupy the highest position in the State. A person's worth was not to be judged by birth

but by efficiency, character and service to the cause of Islam.

The second characteristic of that State was liberty which in its true perspective was, for the first time, presented by Islam to humanity. A Muslim was free as he was required not to obey any other authority than that of God. In other words it meant he was free within the limit prescribed by Shariah. None could encroach upon the rights of others but at the same time could feel free within his or her own rights. Even an ordinary citizen of the Caliphate could criticise and take account from the highest in the state. But at the same time liberty was not allowed to degenerate into licence to slander people or to ridicule the authorities concerned. Hence there was a wonderful reconciliation between law and liberty. ✕

The third characteristic of the Caliphate was fraternity. All the believers were regarded as brethren to one another, and such was the force of this Islamic brotherhood that even blood-relationship counted for nothing as compared with it. Master and slave, white and black, rich and poor, Arab and non-Arab stood together in the brotherhood of Islam. The thing that counted most was piety and nothing else.

The fourth characteristic of the Caliphate was justice which was meted out impartially to high and low, to the master and the servant, to the white and the black and even between a Muslim and a non-Muslim. Recording of deposition of influential persons through a commission was not allowed and no preferential treatment was permitted even in regard to the highest

dignity in the Law Courts. Even a Caliph could not claim exemption so far as appearance before the Court was concerned. The judges who applied divine law considered themselves responsible not only to the Caliph but also to God and as such dispensed justice equitably and fearlessly. The independence of the judiciary was upheld above everything else. The dual responsibility was the fifth characteristic feature of the Caliphate where everyone from the Caliph down to an ordinary citizen was doubly responsible, i.e. to God and at the same time to some kind of earthly authority. In public no one could dare commit any act of commission or omission on account of the fear of the Censor of Public Morals (Muhtasib) and in private also everyone abstained from committing any wrong as one was conscious of the presence of God Almighty. Hence there was no gap between the public and the private life of a citizen during the Orthodox Caliphate.

Another feature of the early Caliphate was toleration towards the members of other faiths. In accordance with the well known verse of the Quran, 'No compulsion in matters of faith,' the Caliphate did not believe in forcing its religion, culture and traditions on others or adopting coercive measures under the cloak of nationalism for merging the culture of the non-believers into that of the believers. It, thus, provided full scope for the growth of their cultures and traditions and the administration of their civil affairs in accordance with their own religious laws. Nay, it went one step further and regarded all the non-believers as its own responsibility and as such guaranteed full liberty of conscience, protection of property, of life and honour,

and freedom of religious beliefs to all the non-believers.

As the non-believers were not obliged to defend the Caliphate, they were required to pay a small tax in the form of Jizia but the moment they showed their willingness to render military service they were at once exempted from the payment of this tax. There was no distinction between believers and non-believers so far as the dispensation of justice and the enjoyment of civic rights were concerned. It is significant to note that all the conquered land was left in the hands of non-believers on very easy terms and that the Muslim were not even allowed to acquire such lands from the hands of non-Muslims. Even the Government could not acquire such lands from non-Muslims without their consent.

Since the Caliphate was regarded as a trust from God in the hands of the believers, the latter for administrative purposes entered into a sacred and solemn contract with the best person in the State. The people by taking an oath of allegiance to the Caliph had to assure him of their cooperation and loyalty, the latter had to bind himself to administer the affairs of the Caliphate in accordance with the Quranic principles and the traditions of the Holy Prophet. In case of non-compliance of the above mentioned conditions, the oath of allegiance (bayah) was not binding upon the people who could rebel against and depose him. But so long as he was carrying on the administration of the Caliphate in accordance with his pledge, his authority was supreme in demanding allegiance and enforcing the laws of the Shariah upon the people.

In accordance with the injunction of the Holy Quran the Caliph must be from among the Muslim. It is noteworthy in regard to the various modes of succession which were adopted for the selection of the Caliph during the early Caliphate that the element of election was common to all these, and that Hazrat Umar by debarring his own equally capable son from contesting the office of the Caliphate had cut at the very root of hereditary succession. Since the early Caliphate was an ideological State, it necessitated that the best person or persons should have been allowed to administer its affairs. For this purpose the whole population was considered to be divided into two categories, one from which was chosen the Caliph or the Legislators and the other constituted the electorate. This meant higher qualifications for the Head of the State and the legislators than the voters. However, all Muslim adults were required to take oath of allegiance to the Head of the State.

Since the Caliphate was a trust in the hands of the chosen Caliph, the latter was not a master but a whole-time servant of the people required to carry on the affairs of the State in accordance with the laws of the Shariah for the good of the people. He was not allowed to devote any part of his time to his personal occupation, but in order to maintain himself he was allowed to have fixed allowance just sufficient to maintain himself and his family in accordance with the decision of his Advisory Council.

In accordance with the injunction of the Quran the affairs of the state had to be carried out by mutual consultation. For this purpose there existed an Advisory Council (Majlis-i-Shura) consisting of all pro-

minent Companions of the Holy Prophet. The appointment of this Council was made by the 'Caliph himself from among the most important, virtuous and competent men from among the principal companions of the Prophet, the only criteria for appointment being their intimate knowledge of the Shariah, their previous service to the cause of Islam and their character. Several members of this Council were also assigned certain portfolios and all problems of legislation and administration were put before it and thoroughly discussed and decided. Since final decisions were made in the light of the Quran and the traditions of the Prophet every member had to be convinced by pleas advanced from the above two sources. The decision used to be usually unanimous and the Council had a sense of collective responsibility.

Since the Caliphate was designed partly for religious purposes and partly for temporal functions, and had been brought into existence through a contract with the individuals who had surrendered certain of their rights and had agreed to fulfil certain obligations, the Caliphate was nothing but an organism in order to fulfil the aspirations of the individuals themselves. Hence the institution was not marked by any controversy between the State and the individual. According to the ideals of Islamic polity, the State, the Caliph and the Ummah (Muslim Community) were all animated by an ethical ideal and it was the duty of every one connected with the state to achieve that ideal. In this State, neither was the personal liberty of the individual lost nor was the political power concentrated in the hands of one person. Every individual believer was committed in this State to dedicate his life to the achievement of the ideal.

That is why military service was made compulsory upon every Muslim and not even the highest could be exempted from it. They were regarded as great Mujahids, fighting in the way of God and as such migrators from place to place. In return for all these services, the Caliphate had guaranteed to every Muslim soldier and his family due provision from the Public treasury (Baitul Mal).

Another feature of the Early Caliphate was centralisation in matters of administration. The very nature of the State, which was based on Quranic principles, demanded that there should be uniformity in administration. All power emanated from the Caliph who used to appoint governors, Military Commanders, Judges and all other high officials in the State, of course in consultation with his Council.

The economic policy of the Caliphate was also based on some of the verses of the Quran and some positive injunctions in this behalf. The Quran lays down the basic guiding principle of Islamic economy in a verse which explains the purpose of some Quranic injunctions of economic significance in these words : "so that the wealth should not circulate only among the rich from among you". Hence the distribution of wealth among all classes of believers has been institutionalized in the form of a tax on hoardings known as Zakat, restriction on the process of testamentary disposition, laws of inheritance and the prohibition of usury etc. The Caliphate did not believe in class conflict nor did it undertake complete socialisation. It did allow the individuals to acquire private property so that their incentive may be lost ; but on the

other hand it did not allow the concentration of wealth in a few hands lest it led to the perpetuation of the harmful effects of unbridled capitalism.

Character of the Caliphate :

Since all the guiding principles of the Caliphate were derived from the Quran, which, according to the belief of the Muslims, is a divinely ordained book, some people assert that it was a religious state. In reality the Caliphate was not a religious state in the sense of medieval Christian theocracy in which certain Ecclesiastical Authorities had arrogated to themselves almost the absolute right of law-making thus putting themselves above the law and creating inequality and social injustice. It may also be regarded as temporal since it was required to administer the affairs which were temporal in character, and not heavenly ; but it was not temporal in the modern sense of the term in so far as the state was guided and regulated by religious laws and as such did not lack moral conscience or the moral basis for the administration and application of its law. It may, however, be concluded that it was religious as well as temporal and since all its laws were to be derived from the revealed book i.e., the Quran, it becomes difficult to separate the religious from temporal functions. But it must be confessed that the state religion was Islam for whose protection and promotion the state had been established. However, it was neither a Monarchy nor Oligarchy, nor Democracy, nor Dictatorship, nor a state patterned on the model of the present-day Communist States. It was an ideological state wedded to the cause of Islam and in the same way as Islam is unique, so was, the Islamic State, a class by itself. It may be termed as

Theo-democracy where the people had been vested with limited right of legislation under the paramountcy of God.

The Objectives of the Caliphate :

The objectives of the Caliphate in accordance with the famous verse of the Quran were to establish prayer and pay zakat; and enjoin good upon the people and to restrain them from committing wrong. In another similar verse, the Muslims have been referred to as the best people who are committed to the task of bidding what is good and forbidding what is evil. The first part of the first verse relates to the duties that have been imposed upon the Muslims that they should assemble in the mosque five times every day in order to practise the lessons of equality, liberty, fraternity and obedience to the leader and then refers to financial obligations with a view to establishing their State on those fundamentals. The first part of the second verse regards Muslims as the best people and as such incapable of doing wrong. They are, therefore, required to order others to do good and restrain others from committing wrong. This express Quranic injunction entailed enormous responsibilities upon the Caliph as well as the citizens of the Caliphate ; and this involved the Institution not only to carry out these orders within its own jurisdiction but also beyond it if occasion arose. It was on account of this imperative injunction contained in the above mentioned verse of the Quran that the Muslims were sometimes required to wage Holy war (Jihad) on other foreign powers. But it may be noted that this Holy war was not to be fought for personal aggrandisement or national glorification but always for the establishment of the Rule of God and to terminate the rule

of some human beings over other human beings, in order to liberate humanity from all shackles of slavery, be that mental, physical, economic or cultural.

The seat of this short lived Ideal Caliphate (632-661) was Medina, the city of the Prophet. The conduct of these Caliphs was unostentatious, patriarchal, and mostly inspired by religious motives. During the reign of Abu Bakr (632-634) the entire Peninsula was brought under the sway of Islam. Arabia had to conquer itself before it could conquer the world outside.

During the reign of the second Caliph Umar (634-644) who was the ablest of the group, the Caliphate reached the apex of its glory. During this period the banner of the new faith was carried triumphantly eastward to Persia, westward to Barqah in North Africa, and northward to the Taurus.

Although the boundaries of the Caliphate were further extended on all sides during the rule of the third Caliph, Uthman, yet owing to the mutual rivalry of the two most important branches of the tribes of Quraysh viz, the Hashmites and the Umayyads, the Caliphate lost its universal character and began to decline. However, the enduring achievement of the third Caliph Uthman (644-656) was his having insured the authenticity of the Holy Quran for all times to come by an assiduous collection of all its verses and a large scale distribution of the copies of the Holy Book.

On account of the unfortunate martyrdom of Uthman at the hands of the Muslims themselves the unity of the Muslims broke down forever; and the

whole reign of the fourth pious Caliph, Ali, was occupied in civil war.

Such rapid and brilliant successes at the expense of the two world powers of the day, Byzantine and Persian were astounding not only in themselves but in their results. They ultimately changed the entire course of history.

However, this ideal Caliphate was possible only so long as there was a virtuous society to bear its burden and responsibility. But the moment the majority of this class of virtuous people disappeared, the Caliphate began to degenerate slowly and gradually. The Caliphate in its ideal form lasted only till the end of the reign of the fourth pious Caliph, Ali, who was followed by Umayyad rulers whose rule witnessed a marked change in the Character and the tenor of the Caliphate.

CHAPTER II

Caliphate Under the Umayyads

With the advent of the Umayyads to power, the Caliphate was shorn of a number of its virtuous characteristics.

(The elective aspect of the Caliphate disappeared altogether and the Caliphs began to nominate their successors on dynastic considerations.) The Caliphate was confined to the house of Banu Umayyah. However the people were required to take oath of allegiance to the successor designate during the life time of the reigning Caliph, and the oath of allegiance had to be renewed at the time of the succession of the new Caliph. The assumption of office was still considered a contractual affair between the Umayyad Caliph and the people at large, who could depose the Caliph if the latter violated the laws of shariah flagrantly.) The Convention that a minor should not be nominated for the Caliphate remained in force; and as such, even the claims of the son of the reigning Caliph were ignored and some senior member of the Umayyad house, more often the brother of the reigning Caliph, was nominated for succession in the first instance.) This system of nominating two successors in succession led to disastrous results.)

Let us examine in the light of historical criticism, whether this nomination system could have been avoided in the changed circumstances or a better al-

ternative could be substituted for it. ¹ It is an established fact of history that after the martyrdom of Uthman the unity and solidarity of the Muslim Community had broken ; and in consequence thereof, the Caliphate had lost its universal character. In such circumstances, it was not possible to extend the choice of the Caliph to the entire tribe of Quraish. The Caliph had to be appointed from either of the two most important branches of the tribe of Quraish, i.e. the Banu Umayyah or Banu Hashim. As the power lays in the hands of the Umayyads, it was but natural that the choice of the Caliph should have been confined to this dynasty until the political power was wrested from their hands. But in any case the hereditary succession which is bound to bring about degeneration among the successors should have been avoided and the best person available from among the Umayyad dynasty should have been elected by the Advisory Council (Majlis-Shura) headed by the Caliph. This system based on dynastic claims should have worked as well as the modern democratic governments are being run.

Shura.

Under the changed circumstances, due to the above mentioned causes, the nature of the Shura had also undergone a substantial change under the Umayyad Caliphate. In fact after the murder of Uthman, it was not possible even for Ali to compose his advisory Council (Shura) on the basis adopted by the first two Caliphs and thus maintain its universal character. Such worthy companions of the Prophet as Talha and Zubair who should have been the prominent members of Ali's

Advisory Council (Majlis-Shura) were opposed to his very Caliphate. In such circumstances there was no question of their inclusion in Advisory Council (Majlis-i-Shurah). As all the prominent Umayyads headed by Muawiya were against the Caliphate of Ali, the Council (Shura), even during the latter's Caliphate, had to be confined to Hashmites and their supporters. Muawiya for the same reason could not even be allowed to function as Governor of Syria.

In the same way, it was not possible for Muawiya and his successors to include the members of the Hashmite family or of any other opposition group in their Advisory Council (Majlis-i-Shura). This is quite in consonance with the practice of modern democratic party governments. Unfortunately, since the tragedy of Karbala, even the sympathies of the scholars (Ulema) had been alienated ; and as such their services could not also be utilized. In such circumstances, the Caliphal Council under the Umayyads had to be composed of the members of the Caliph's family, and the important officials and courtiers of the Caliphate. This body did not reflect the legal wisdom of the entire Muslim community, nor did it stand for the entire people. Umar II formed a regular Council of the leading doctors at Medina when he became the Viceroy of al-Hijaz. He again endeavoured to establish a regular Council representing the legal wisdom of the entire Muslim community at the time of his accession as Caliph at Damascus. However, during his short reign of two and a half years he could not realise this objective as he could neither bring together all the Ulema from the various Islamic Countries to Damascus nor could he transfer his Capital

from Damascus to Medina. After the death of Umar II no more effort was made by any of the Umayyad Caliphs to establish the Advisory Council purely on grounds of merit and character. Once more under the later Umayyads the Central Council became a Royal Council consisting of members of the royal family and the staunch supporters of the Umayyad Caliphate.

Privy Purse :

The pious Caliphs had contended themselves with their annuities and did not misuse the Public Treasury (Baitul Mal). Even their own share within the one fifth of the booty which fell under their jurisdiction was spent on public needs. But with the advent of the Umayyads to power, the Caliphs began to utilise more money from the Public Treasury for their personal needs and for the maintenance of their courts. Muawiyah had a big estate at his disposal and gave portions of them to his supporters. Most of the estates possessed by Muawiyah passed into the hands of Abdul Malik. His son, Hisham, was the greatest landlord in the whole of the Empire.

Court :

It was quite natural that with the full control over the resources of the Caliphate, a Court should have sprung up during the Umayyad Caliphate. It was Muawiya who made a beginning by erecting a throne for himself and sitting on it like a King. His successors excepting the solitary example of saintly Umar II also emulated his example.

Pension List :

The Umayyad Caliphs are also accused of effecting

certain alterations in the pension list fixed by Umar in his Diwan. Under the changed circumstances, it was but natural that the form in which Umar had left it should have undergone certain changes at the hands of the Umayyad Caliphs. In the Circumstances in which Muawiyah inducted himself into power, he had to face continuous opposition both at the hands of the Alids as well as the Kharjites : and as such he and his successors must have struck off the names of those persons from the pensions list who were in constant rebellion against his regime.

The second and the chief cause for meddling with the regular annuities was that the recipients began to regard the pension as subsistence allowance rather than as salary given for military service. In fact during the Caliphate of Umar I everyone got the pension as a subsistence, but there was not a single person who could have dared to refuse rendering military service to the state. But after the great Umar and with the lapse of time, the people while accepting the pension as a subsistence allowance refused openly to render military service. Consequently Hajjaj had to compel them to go on war. In such circumstances, the Umayyad Caliphs were perfectly justified in striking off the names of all such defaulters. It was the Caliph Hisham who put a stop to the abuse of granting pension as a benefice. He did not make any exception whatsoever in this behalf.

However, with the advent of the Umayyad Caliphate the worst change was effected in the social, economic and political conditions of the new converts known as Mawali (new foreign converts to Islam).

During the vast conquests millions of people embraced Islam ; and as such could not attach themselves to Arab families.) The Mawalis who were affiliated to some Arab families could assert their rights through their affiliated families ; but for those ones who remained unaffiliated to any Arab family, it was difficult in the absence of any constitutional machinery to get their rights asserted.) Being Muslims they were required to pay the *Jizyah* and the *Khiraj* (land tax). There was some justification for charging *Khiraj* (land tax) from those Muslims who bought the land from non-Muslims against the Ordinance of Umar and thus trying to convert the *Khiraj* land into *Ushr* land ; but there was no justification for charging *Jizyah* from the new converts. Even when the latter fought in the wars of Islam, they received no stipends. To make matters worse, Hajjaj forbade their migration into the towns where they could enlist themselves into the pension list of the government. However, Umar II, realizing the injustice done to the *Mawali* cancelled those unjust orders. He solved the question of the payment of *Khiraj* equitably and forbade the payment of *Jizyah* by the *Mawali* and granted them all those rights and privileges which were being enjoyed by other Muslims. But the reforms introduced by Umar II, were of a short duration and his successors did not follow any definite line of policy.) Nor was it possible during the latter troubled period of Umayyad regime to lay down any fixed rule in this behalf.) Consequently the *Mawali* continued to suffer, more or less, from all kinds of disabilities, and in consequence thereof rose in revolt along with the Abbasids and contributed, in no small measure, to the downfall of the Umayyad dynasty./

In spite of all these defects, it is not, however, true that under the Umayyads the Caliphate of the Holy Prophet was converted into a *de facto* kingship as the Umayyads could not and would not call themselves sovereigns in the modern sense of the term. Even the right of further legislation which was enjoyed by the Pious Caliphs in Council was taken away from them and was now exercised by the learned scholars (Ulema). As such, the Umayyad Caliphs were not above the law and were subject to the laws of *Shariah* in the same way as an ordinary man in the street. The Caliph considered himself responsible for the dispensation of justice.

The religious organisation under the Umayyads remained almost the same as under the Pious Caliphs. Religious dogmas still remained elastic. The other important institution of Islam namely *Zakat* continued to function exactly in the same way as during the Pious Caliphate. The collection of *zakat* remained a state duty and all the *zakat* collected used to be set apart in the Public Treasury and spent on those items which are specifically mentioned in the Quran.

The other most important duty of waging war against the infidels was performed with greater vigour than before ; and the Umayyads succeeded in effecting vast conquest in all directions and spreading the light of Islam within their jurisdictions.

The spirit of toleration shown to the members of other faiths was in accordance with the famous verse of the Quran : No compulsion in matters of faith ! The Umayyad rulers regarded the non-Muslim subjects as

their own responsibility ; and guaranteed them full liberty of conscience, protection of their property, life, honour and freedom of religious belief. Besides, they provided full scope for the growth of their culture and traditions and the administration of their civil affairs in accordance with their own religious laws. In fact they treated the subject races much better than they were treated by their own kings and this accounts for the vast conquests made during this period.

In spite of their vast conquests, extending from Kashghar, the confines of China to Narbonne in France, this dynasty could not survive long and fell to pieces within less than century at the hands of the Abbasids, as they had foolishly alienated the sympathies of all sections of the Muslim community.

CHAPTER III

Caliphate Under the Abbasids

The Abbasid success was due to the foresight, statesmanship and military genius of Abu Muslim Khurasani, who on the one hand succeeded in combining all the opposition forces against the cause of the Umayyad dynasty ; and on the other hand, did not allow the Arabs themselves to unite in Persia. The Abbasid Imam, Abu Abbas al Saffah, with the help of Abu Muslim Khurasani also succeeded in completely deceiving the Alids; to the chagrin of the latter, was unexpectedly declared as the first Caliph in the very city of Kufa which was considered as Alid's impregnable bastion.

The task which confronted the first Caliph of the Abbasids was to ward off the danger from the vanquished dynasty of the Umayyads and their supporters, the Syrians; and to lay the foundations of their dynasty on a sound and sure basis. Abu Abbas al-Saffah succeeded during his life, time in warding off the danger from the Umayyads by destroying them root and branch. In order to restore order internally, he had, no doubt, to demolish altogether the Umayyad power, but he had little justification for the ruthless persecution and utter destruction of the royal house of the Umayyads. This ruthless policy of Abul Abbas not only earned him the title of al Saffah, the blood-shedder, but also destroyed the unity of the Caliphate itself. As one of the Umayyad

Princes, Abdur Rahman, I, escaping their fury, and after many vicissitudes, ultimately founded an independent kingdom for his own house in Spain. Not only an important province was thus cut off from the Centre, but also a rival, albeit glorious Caliphate was founded in that land by Abdur Rahman III.

The conflict between the Hashmites themselves, i e., between the Abbasids and the Alids further destroyed the unity of the Muslim world. The Alids rightly felt that they were deceived by their cousins, the Abbasids, and therefore, repeatedly and energetically tried for the assertion of their claim to the Caliphate. Although vanquished each time, the Alids yet could never be reconciled; and continued to rise in revolt against the Abbasid regime : No wonder the Abbasids now launched upon a policy of persecution. In any case, the cumulative effect of all this was that the Alids founded an independent Fatimid Caliphate in Egypt, and the Islamic Commonwealth stood further dismembered. The Abbasid Caliphate was therefore, not co-extensive with the limits of Islam, and had to confine its activities to the eastern land only.

The only course now left for the Abbasids under the circumstances was to found the Caliphate on religious basis so that they could survive in spite of this division and mutual rivalry. The originator of this scheme was al-Mansoor who is rightly regarded as the real founder of the Abbasid dynasty. A great scholar, well versed in religious literature, Al-Mansur patronised Ulema and by enlisting their sympathies impressed upon the public mind that the Caliphate belonged to the house of Abbas, the uncle of the Holy Prophet Muhammad. He succeeded

in replacing the famous tradition of the Holy Prophet 'Al-Ayimma min al-Quraish by 'Al-Ayimmamin al-Abbas'. Al-Mansur thus succeeded in laying the foundations of his house on what he considered permanent and sure grounds. On account of this belief among the Muslims that the Caliph must be chosen from the house of Abbas, the dynasty lasted for centuries after it had lost all temporal power when it was destroyed by the infidel Mongols in 656 A.H/1258 A.D.

Since the Abbasids had come to power with the help of the new Persian converts; and as defenders of an Islamic State against the Arab State of the Umayyads, it was but natural for them to accord equal treatment to the new converts (mawali) in economic, political and cultural fields ; and thus every office, even the highest one e.g. office of the Grand Wazir was thrown open to them. Nay, the Abbasids committed a political blunder of the first magnitude by ignoring even the legitimate claims of their own race, i.e. the Arabs. During the early period of the Abbasid Caliphate almost all the important posts were monopolised by the Persians to the exclusion of the Arabs; and this naturally created a feeling of rivalry and jealousy between the Arabs and the Persians

However, by conceding equal treatment to the new converts all over the empire, the Abbasids laid the foundation of an Islamic State anew. Although as among the Umayyads, succession was hereditary yet it was not hereditary, pure and simple, as was in vogue among the contemporary states.

Although the Caliph nominated his successor, the

right of the successor was not based on the nomination by the preceeding Caliph, but on the homage he received by the people (Muslims). The principle that each Caliph should be elected and that he should hold office during his good behaviour was recognised throughout, but no machinery was evolved or could be evolved at that stage of society by which the votes of millions of Muslims could be taken as often as the rulers changed or had to be changed. However, Bay'at was taken for the acceding Caliph by as many as possible at the hand of the Caliph himself at the centre and at the hand of his representative in the provinces. In the words of Ameer Ali, "The oath of allegiance to the elected possessed a sacramental virtue, and imparted a sacredness to his personality. The sacramental virtue attached to the Ba'yat was based upon the following idea. All the rules and Ordinances which regulate the conduct of the general body of Muslims are the utterances of the voice of God. This is in substance the Ijma-ul-Ummat, the consensus of the people and when they unanimously, or almost unanimously chose a spiritual leader and Head of the Congregation of Islam, a divine sanction is imparted to his spiritual authority, he becomes the source and channel of legitimate government, and he alone has the right of ordaining deputies entitled to rule, decide, or to lead at prayers. It was due to this conception of the sacramental character of the Caliphs' election that long after he had lost every vestige of the temporal power, conquerors and chieftains like Mahmud of Ghazna solicited from him the consecration of their power. The Caliph's confirmation legitimised their authority, vested in them the lawful government of their states, and made every popular rising against them illegal and impious,

This ordination was effected by the grant of a formal diploma which was invariably accompanied with jewels, swords and banners.

The right of the people to choose and confirm the Caliph, also gave them the corresponding right of deposing him if he flagrantly violated the laws of the Shariat. That very small group of people consisting of religious leaders, Qadis, military commanders and other high officials who had taken the ba'yat in the first instance also took the initiative in matters of deposition which will ultimately be confirmed by the people at large.

During the early period of the Caliphate the only insignia of sovereignty were the Mantle, Rod and Signet of the Holy Prophet which were considered as precious possessions of every Caliph who used to don them on ceremonial occasions. Later on, other insignia of sovereignty found their way into the Islamic polity. The most important of them was the inclusion of the Caliph's name in the Khutba (prayers).

The Head of the State also being the leader of Salat (prayer) it became necessary for him to lead the congregational prayers at the Capital and to deliver Khutba (Sermon) on Fridays and the two Eids. In this capacity he had to appoint Imams as his representatives in the various units of the State for conducting the prayers on his behalf. These Imams while leading congregational prayers as representatives of the Caliph in the various mosques of the State, after praising God Almighty and invoking blessings on the Holy Prophet also had to include the name of the reigning Caliph in the Khutba, for the purpose of invoking prayer also for him. The inclusion of Caliph's name in the Khutba

thus become one of the chief insignia of sovereignty and served as the only visible symbol of his recognition as the Head of the State. Although in the beginning it was a part of the religious function, in due course of time, it assumed a great political significance.

The inscribing of the name of the Caliph on the coinage became also the exclusive prerogative of the Caliph during the 'Abbasid Caliphate.

The grant of a deed of investiture was the most important political prerogative enjoyed exclusively by the Caliph. Since the latter was regarded as the chief source of power, no Governor could be recognised as a legally constituted ruler unless he had obtained this Deed from the Caliphate.

The Abbasids not only enjoyed their annuities but also shared in the booty (that of the Banu Hashim). Besides, they owned huge royal estates so much so that a separate department, Diwan ud-Diya, had to be established to administer the private estates of the Abbasid Caliphs.

The Court.

The colour of the early Abbasids was black; black too was the colour of their banner bearing in white the inscription, "There is no god but God and Muhammad is the Messenger of God".

The Investiture ceremony was marked by Arab simplicity. The Caliph wore a black *Kaftan* (a flowing garment) and a black turban. On him rested the mantle of Muhammad (peace be on him) and in his hand was placed his staff. Uthman's copy of the Quran was kept

before him. One after another the nobility first and then the others kissed the hand of the Caliph, and this was the form of paying homage.

Shura.

In accordance with the explicit injunctions of the Quran, the Abbasid Caliphs tried to carry on the administrative affairs with mutual consultation. Under the early Abbasids, the members of the royal family and the members of those families who were faithful to the dynasty like the Barmekides was always consulted by the rulers.

Al-Mamun was the first Caliph to constitute a regular Council of State representing every community which owed allegiance to him. These representatives enjoyed full freedom in the expression of their opinions and were not hampered in their discussions. But that was a solitary example ; and it was not possible under the circumstances, to set up an Advisory Council representing all section of the Muslim community, as the Alids and the Kharijites were always opposed to the Abbasid Caliphate and could never be reconciled. However, with the institution of several Diwans headed by a separate Wazir, it was usual for the Caliph to consult the Head concerned and thus this system served the purpose of an Advisory Council.

Caliph and Legislation

After the period of Khilafat-i-Rashidah, the function of legislation was taken away from the Caliph,—in Council and assumed by the learned scholars of the day (Ulema). However, the sources of legislation remained

the same, viz., (1) Quran, (2) Sunnah, (3) Ijtihad and Ijma.

In order to facilitate legislation, the meanings of the verses of the Quran were made more or less definite and the great mass of the traditions of the Holy Prophet were collected and arranged during the early period of the Abbasid rule. Further, Muslim law was codified and regulations regarding the various religious duties and ceremonies fixed by the four great schools of Muslim law. Hence no immediate need was felt for further legislation during this period.

Caliph and Judiciary

The administration of justice was a subject of extreme importance and was regarded as a religious duty as laid down in the Quran. The Caliph being the head of the Islamic State was naturally regarded as the foundation of justice.

Judiciary was further developed during the Abbasid Caliphate. Hitherto the Caliph or his representative in the provinces used to appoint Qadis but from the time of the Caliph Mehdi, the office of the chief Qadi was also instituted and the entire judicial functions were entrusted to him.

The Qadis were highly qualified, competent and responsible persons and in most cases possessed the following qualifications :

- (1) Sound knowledge of Muslim Jurisprudence.
- (2) Irreproachable character.
- (3) Full mental faculties and were sound of sight and hearing.

(4). They were free citizens.

(5). They were Muslims.

(6). They were male.

The Qadis performed the following duties.

- (1) Settlement of disputes and restoration of rights.
- (2) Administration of the properties of minor, the insane, etc., supervision of endowments and execution of wills.
- (3) Encouragement of and arranging the marriages of widows; and execution of the prescribed punishments.
- (4) Removal of public encroachments.
- (5) Control over his subordinates and watching their conduct.

Since the Qadi's court was considered a religious institution, where divine law was applied to all irrespective of status, race, sex, and nationality, nobody, not even the highest in the state could secure or demand any preferential treatment. There are several examples in which even the Caliph had to appear in person before the Qadi's court as a mere defendant.

In order to assist the Qadis in the administration of justice another class of officers analogous to the notaries public of modern times, and called Aadils was established. Formerly only witnesses known to be of good repute were accepted. Others were either openly rejected or enquiries were made regarding them from their neighbours. But from the time of Mansur, a list con-

taining a permanent body of witnesses was prepared by the Qadis, who were considered fit to be summoned to the court as witnesses. The result was that not only reliability but inclusion in the prepared list was considered to be the pass-port to the witness box. From these witnesses some were chosen as assessors to help the Qadi, in his task. Selection of witnesses became one of the duties of the Qadis and on a Qadi vacating his office, the assessors appointed by him ceased to continue in that capacity.

So far as the dispensation of criminal justice is concerned, the Caliph's court constituted the highest court in the Caliphate. The Abbasid Caliphs also continued the practice of investigating personally into the grievances of the public and fixed a particular day for the purpose. Even an ordinary person could have easy access to the Caliph or his representative on this particular day. The function of this institution was to set right cases of miscarriage of justice which occurred in the administrative and judicial departments, and to initiate proceedings *ex-officio*, even if no complaint was made.

It was during the Caliphate of the Abbasids that a regular office of M'uhtasib was created. It was an office that lay between the office of the President and the Qadi. His chief duty was to see that the religious and moral precepts of Islam were obeyed; and to detect offences and punish the offenders. Essentially the duties of the Muhtasib related to the safeguarding of public morals and the prevention of commercial knavery. In fact, the chief function of this officer was to achieve the chief objective of the Islamic State namely, to enjoin

good upon the people and to prevent them from committing wrong.

As it was an Islamic State, the non-Muslims could not be subjected to the Shariat Law. Hence the settlement of disputes among the non-Muslim subjects was left to their own ecclesiastical authorities. However, in punishing crimes against humanity such as adultery, murder, theft, robbery, assault, etc., the same law was applied against all. Whenever a dispute arose between a Muslim and a non-Muslim, the case was decided by the Qadi and the principle adopted was 'The Dhimmi is just like a Muslim in wordly matters.'

Under the Abbasids, the administration was conducted on definite lines analogous to modern civilized system ; in some directions it may be said to have been in advance of our own times. For the efficient running of the state, several Boards, corresponding to modern departments were created and placed under efficient and expert officials both in the centre as well as in the provinces. Above all, in order to centralize the administrative machinery, the office of Grand Wazir was also created during this period. In short, the Abbasids brought greater order into the government, especially into the taxation system and the administration of justice.

The new era was essentially distinguishable from the previous one in its attitude towards religion. The Abbasids prided themselves upon the fact that they brought into power Islam which had been suppressed during the Umayyad period.

It was, therefore, in the religious field, that greater

achievements were made during the Abbasids Caliphate; that fact alone gave it an Islamic character. The learned scholars (Ulema) were taken into confidence and were greatly patronised. As a consequence, marvellous work was done in the collection of religious literature. In first century of Islam there was a large number of living witnesses from whom traditions were collected, committed to memory and orally handed down. No book of traditions, written before the Abbasids, has come down to us. The work of collecting and reducing the Prophetic traditions to writing was begun and completed during the Abbasid Caliphate. All the four great schools of Muslim law flourished under the early Abbasids; and Muslim Law codified. Scholars were likewise patronised and encouraged in their scholarly pursuits. The result was that progress was made in almost all the branches of knowledge history, literature, science, law, etc. The cumulative result of all this was that Muslim civilization came to maturity in Baghdad, blossomed forth as never before, and shone all the more so lustrously that Baghdad became the foremost seat of culture and civilization in the world.

In order to promote the cause of Islam which is the chief objective of an Islamic state, arrangements for the conduct of prayers throughout the Caliphate were made during this period and thousands of mosques were built. The Hajj ceremony was organised by the government and not only caravan routes were made secure but every facility was provided for the pilgrims in the performance of this religious obligation.

In order to champion the cause of Islam, the Ab-

basids removed all discrimination between the old and new Muslims, and provided equal opportunities to all in every field of activity; and thus provided incentive for the non-Muslims to embrace Islam

In treating the non-Muslim subjects, the Abbasids strictly adhered to the famous Quranic verse; "No compulsion in matters of faith." They were just and tolerant, in fact generous towards their non-Muslim subjects who enjoyed the right to life, property, religious freedom and to exemption from rendering military service on payment of a light tax known Jizia. The growth of their culture and traditions was encouraged and the administration of their civil affairs in accordance with their own religious laws was provided for. Nor were they discriminated against in the conferment of civilian post whereas they enjoyed the right to pursue any avocation they liked. In fact the most amazing feature of the Abbasid Caliphate had been the preponderating number of non-Muslims in civil administration. It seemed that in their own state, the Muslims were being ruled by the *Dhimis* (non-Muslim).

All this considered, the Abbasid Caliphate, even as our foregoing discussion covers, was primarily an Islamic State which replaced the Arab kingdom of the Umayyads. Furthermore, the Abbasids succeeded in founding their State on the chief characteristic of an Islamic State viz, equality, liberty, fraternity, social justice, and toleration. It will, therefore, be a fallacy to call it an absolute monarchy after the pattern of a Persian or Byzantine monarchy, where no doubt absolutism; reigned supreme.

However, the Abbasid Caliphate could not be

compared with the ideal Caliphate that existed during the Khilafat-i-Rashidah. Owing to changed circumstances, the Abbasids also maintained the ill-defined system of hereditary succession which besides leading to wars of succession also brought about degeneration among its successors. The success of the dynasty depended solely upon one fact that so long the dynasty produced energetic, capable and efficient rulers, it could cope with the centrifugal tendencies which were bound to exist in those days when means of communication were medieval and hence dilatory.

A century after its existence the signs of decline began to set in ; and with the lapse of time, the institution of Caliphate was reduced to a mere farce. In such circumstances, it was but natural for some stronger power to snatch the de'facto authority at the centre and for the Provincial governors to assert their own independence by stopping the payment of revenues to the centre.

CHAPTER IV

Decline of the Abbasid Caliphate

IN order to form a correct estimate of the relations between the Caliphate and the Minor Dynasties of Persian down to the establishment of the Buwayhid power, it is necessary to give a general survey of the political condition at Baghdad, which had reduced the already corrupted institution of the Caliphate into a mere formality.

The period under review opens with the deplorable reign of the Caliph Mutawakkil (232-47/847-61), and is characterised by two significant features:—

1. Reaction against the Mu'tazilite doctrines and its repercussions in the sphere of politics.
2. The ascendancy of the Turks and the consequent weakening of the authority of the Caliphate.

The enlightened and progressive spirit of the Caliph Mamun (198-218/813-33) that favoured rationalization and the free discussion of so many beliefs was not followed by his immediate successors, who, misunderstanding the spirit of free thought, dogmatized those views and made non-subscription to them punishable. So it was that Caliph Wathiq (227-32/842-47), though luxurious and devoted to his own pleasures, yet was

determined to see that the people did not believe in the doctrine of an 'Uncreated Quran,'. His zeal in this matter was so great that he actually instituted a sort of permanent inquisition¹ to enquire into the conduct of the public in respect of this particular belief, and severely punished those who persisted in this view.² The sudden reversion to orthodoxy during the reign of the Caliph Mutwakkil—a bigoted Sunni was due to strong reaction against the Mu'tazilite doctrines; and led to indiscriminate persecution of every other sect. The time and circumstances also suited the policy of persecution. It was quite in keeping with the proclivities of the less enlightened Turkish pretorians who were in ascendancy during this period³. The general public had also a stern way with any one who was suspected of advanced views.⁴ The policy of persecution which was directed especially against the Shi'as also found its expression in vexatious enactment passed against the Jews and Christians.⁵ The Caliph Mutawakkil had conceived such hatred against the Shi'a sect that in 236/850, he ordered the demolition of the tomb of the Prophet's martyred grandson, Husayn, son of 'Ali, at Karbala;

1. Levy, Baghdad Chronicle, p. 102.

2. Tabari, III, p. 1348. Ahmad Ibn Nasr al-Khuzai's head was struck off by Caliph Wathiq himself on this question in 231/346. So great was Wathiq's zeal for his doctrine of the 'Created Quran that he exchanged with the Byzantine Emperor only those prisoners who believed in his doctrine. Cf. Tabari. III. p. 1335.

3. Levy, Baghdad Chronicle, p. 104.

4. Ibn Athir, VIII. p. 98. The great historian Tabari, who died in 310/922 could only be buried by night in his house because the mob assembled and would not allow his body to be buried by day, declaring that he was a Rafdi (Shia) and even a heretic.

5. Tabari, III. p. 1389.

and all other buildings around it.¹ A man, who was reported to have reviled Abu Bakr, Umar, 'Aishah and Hafsa, was ordered by him to be whipped to death. The order was publicly carried out and his body was thrown into the Tigris without even having prayers offered for him.² The supporters of the orthodox tradition, who had been the victims of religious persecution during the period of the immediate successors of the Caliph Mamun, had the upper hand now and were in a mood for revenge. They formed themselves into a reforming committee and paraded the streets, carrying on a door-to-door enquiry into the beliefs of the people and inflicting summary punishment upon dissenters. The persecution did not stop at Shias but was also directed against the members of rival Muslim sects differing from their own in minor points.³ In Gibbon's words, the reformers "invaded the pleasures of domestic life, burst into the houses of plebians and princes, spilt, the wine, broke the instruments, beat the musician and dishonoured, with infamous suspicions, the associates of every handsome youth."⁴ This religious intolerance was not stopped till the reign of the Caliph Radi (324-29/934-40), who considering the reform a greater evil than the original malpractices, issued a manifesto against the Hanbalis.⁵

1. Tabari, III. p. 1407 ; Ibn Athir, VII. p. 36.

2. Tabari, III, p. 1424.

3. Levy, Baghdad Chronicle, p. 149, Shafis were sometimes beaten with sticks almost to the point of death.

4. Gibbon, Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire, vol. VI. LII, p. 62, quoted from Ibn Athir, VIII PP. 229-30.

5. Levy, Baghdad Chronicle pp. 149-50.

The ruthless persecution against the Shias stirred up their latent hatred against the 'Abbasid rule and must have furthered their dissemination. In the words of E.G. Browne, "It seems to have encouraged rather than repressed the development of several most remarkable religious and philosophical movements, notably amongst the former the Qarmatian or Ismaili propaganda which culminated in the establishment of the Fatimid Anti-Caliphate of North Africa and Egypt and amongst the latter the philosophical fraternity known as the Ikhwanu's Safa or 'Brethren of Purity'." ¹

The Zanj rebellion which was the outcome of the Zaydite propaganda² soon showed how successfully an 'Alid revolt might be launched and how the local conditions in the south of 'Iraq favoured such an undertaking. It was by far the most formidable rising that the 'Abbasids had ever had to deal with. For nearly fourteen years (256-70/869-83) this great rebellion caused the utmost alarm and anxiety to the Caliphate, especially at a time when the Persian provinces were in revolt. It would have been quite possible for the strong hand of Muwaffaq and his son Abu'l 'Abbas to suppress the rebellion of the Saffarids, and restore the Caliphate to its original glory and grandeur but for this prolonged and stubborn resistance.

During the progress of this rebellion, a Shia movement more formidable in its aims and objects and fraught with more serious consequences to the 'Abbasid

1. Browne, *Lit. Hist. of Persia*, vol. 1, p. 339.

2. Tabari, III, p. 1742 ; Ibn Athir. VII, p. 139,

Caliphate—was started by one of the votaries of the Ismaili sect, named 'Abd Allah b. Maymun al-Qaddah in 260/873-74¹. In 297/909 his grandson Said b. Al-Husayn, on the receipt of favourable reports from North Africa, crossed over thither and succeeded in founding the Fatimid Caliphate thereby overthrowing the Aghlabid dynasty. In 356/969 his followers wrested Egypt also from the house of al-Ikhshid.² Thus the Shia propaganda ultimately succeeded, if not in overthrowing the 'Abbasid Caliphate, at least in setting up a rival Caliphate. The establishment of a rival Caliphate, which included even the holy cities, was a serious blow to the prestige of the 'Abbasid Caliphate and in consequence of this, its spiritual monopoly was broken.

The movement did not stop at this but left its legacy at work in the territory of the 'Abbasid Caliphate itself. The Ismaili doctrines were also espoused by a certain Hamdan b. Al-Ash'ath nicknamed Qarmat (from whose surname the term Qaramitah is derived). The Qarmatians succeeded in founding a State independent of the 'Abbasid Caliphate in Al-Ahsa; and their missionaries formed lasting hotbeds of agitation in Khurasan, Syria and Yaman.³ They had become a political pest ever ready to attack the possessions of the Caliphate; and to plunder the caravans of pilgrims. During the whole of the Caliph Muktafi's reign (289-95/902-908) they made several attacks upon pilgrims

1. Browne, *Lit. Hist. of Persia*, vol. 1., p. 394; quoted from *Fihrist*, pp. 186-87.

2. *Ibid.*, p. 397; quoted from *Fihrist*, p. 187.

3. Masignon, *Art. on Qarmatians in the Encyclopaedia of Islam*.

returning from Mecca, and carried their plundering raids to the very gates of Baghdad¹. A series of victories that enabled them to subdue Syria brought them within reasonable distance of the Metropolis of Islam. In 317/929 they invaded Mecca itself, and, to the great horror of the Muslims, carried off the sacred Black Stone which they kept for twenty years.² Ten years after they were reported to be still levying black-mail on pilgrim caravans. Their unceasing and dangerous activities always kept the Caliphate busy, indirectly encouraged ambitious governors to raise the standard of revolt; and thus, in no small measure, contributed to the downfall of the Baghdad Government.

The second characteristic of this period was the ascendancy of the Turks, who, through sheer force of circumstances, had become absolute masters of the 'Abbasid Empire. It was an evil day for the Caliphate when Mu 'tasim (218-27/833-42) introduced the Turkish element into the army. The tyranny, lawlessness and the ever-increasing number of the Turks obliged the Caliph to remove the seat of government from Baghdad to Surra Man Ra 'a³ (Samarra) in 221/836⁴. The transfer of the seat of government made the position of the Caliph more precarious than before. Being cut off from the people of Baghdad and surrounded by these

1. Ibn Athir, VII, p. 387.

2. Miskawayh, I, p. 201; Eclipse, trans. IV, p. 226; Ibn Athir, VIII, p. 153.

3. It means 'gladdened is he who hath beheld it,' though a Baghdadi interpretation of the phrase ran; "Whosoever saw it (with the Turks settled there) rejoiced at Baghdad's being rid of them Cf. Muir, Caliphate, p. 59.

4. Ibn Athir, VI, p. 319.

savage and self seeking men of violence, the Caliphate stood in greater danger of being subordinate to the ever-growing power of the Turkish generals than would have been the case at Baghdad. There it became easy for them to assume the role of Caliph-makers and with each new succession they contrived to arrogate increasing authority to themselves. The mischievous seeds sown by the Caliph Mu'tasim were soon to bear bitter fruits which were reaped by the Caliph Mutawakkil. The latter, by his unscrupulous policy of religious persecution, had alienated the sympathies of various sections of his people, and by his harsh treatment even drove his own son to enter into a conspiracy with the Turks. This cost him his life in 247/861.¹ Though the parricide did not long survive to reap the fruits of the conspiracy, his mischievous act was fraught with evil consequences for his successors. This was the first occasion that an attack was made on the person of a Caliph by the Turks; and this act served as the overture to a series of arbitrary appointments, depostions, blindings and murders. This precedent dealt a fatal blow to the traditional respect that was felt for the person of the Caliphs,² who were now treated in a most humiliating way.³ That the Turks had become the virtual masters of the Caliphs can well be illustrated by

1. Tabari, III, pp. 1459-60.

2. But the institution must not be too closely linked with the misfortunes of its holders.

3. The Turks dragged the Caliph Mu'tazz (251-55/866-59) by the feet and stripping off his shirt, exposed him to the burning sun, Oppressed by the severe heat, he lifted his feet alternately and the Turks slapped him with their hands. Finally they put him to death. Cf. Tabari, III, p. 1710.

a story related by the author of *Kitab al-Fakhri*, Ibn at-Tiqtaqa, who says: "When Mu'tazz was appointed as Caliph, his courtiers held a meeting and, summoning the astrologers, asked them how long he (the Caliph) would live and how long he would retain his Caliphate. A wit, present in the gathering, said, "I know this thing better than the astrologers." Being asked to specify the time, he replied. "So long as the Turks please," and everyone present laughed"¹.

Even the re-transfer of the Caliph's court to Baghdad and the short-lived revival of the power of the Caliphate due to the strong personalities of Muwaffaq and his son, the Caliph Mu'tadid (279-89/892-902) could not for long suppress the power of the Turks. No doubt their influence was much lessened; nevertheless, their support was sought by various prominent Wazirs who attained great distinction during this period. Owing to the insecurity of their position, all the Wazirs, with the single honourable exception of 'Ali Ibn' Isa, used their position more to serve their own ends than the interests of the State. The first object of the Executive was the amassing of wealth. Dismissal on account of charges of corruption and consequent confiscations had become the rule, so much so that, in an indirect way, it constituted a new source of income to the State; and a new department had to be opened to deal with it.² The views of one of the greatest Wazirs of the time, Ibn al-Furat throw sufficient

1. Ibn at-Tiqtaqa, p. 333.

2. Zaydan, trans. Margoliouth. p. quoted from Hilal al-Sabi, *Kitab al-Wuzara*, p. 306.

light on the character of most of the high officials of the State. He used to say, "It is better to remove the affairs of the king in a wrong direction than to let them stand still aright."¹ In short, the whole administration had become so corrupt that it was almost impossible for an honest person to serve the state. In spite of the fact that the Empire so badly needed the services of a statesman like 'Ali Ibn 'Isa, the latter was made to vacate his position several times through the undue influence that worked on the Caliph Muqtadir.²

The final decline of the 'Abbasid dynasty set in after the murder of Muqtadir in 320/932. The Turkish party came again into power and the same scene was repeated which had occurred after the murder of the Caliph Mutawakkil in 247/861. Such a state of things encouraged many a ruling Amir to extend his influence over Baghdad itself, and by making the Caliph a puppet, virtually, govern the whole Empire. A Keen conflict arose between various competitors for the mastery of Baghdad, and, one after the other, several of these aspirants held the post of Amir al-Umara-an office especially created for them. Since most of the powers of the Wazir were taken over by the Amir

1. Ibid., p. 232 ; quoted from Hilal al-Sabi, Kitab-Wuzara, p. 119.
2. Miskawayh, I, pp. 40. 41 ; Eclipse, trans. IV. p. 45. One of the charges which led to the dismissal of 'Ali Ibn 'Isa from the Wazirate, on one of these occasions, was that he had not been able to exact the customary fines from discharged officers. Cf. Bowen, 'Ali Ibn 'Isa, p. 145 ; quoted from Hilal al-Sabi Kitab al-Wazara, p. 79. His reply to such demands was, "I will not behave unjustly with officials whom I have trusted." Cf. Miskawayh, I, p. 48 ; Eclipse, trans. IV. pp. 48.

al-Umara, the Wazirate lost its importance and glamour. The jurisdiction of the Wazir was restricted to suits between persons unconnected with the Government; cases in which officials or soldiers were involved were no longer tried by the Wazir as the representative of the Caliph but by the Secretary of the Amir.¹ These ambitious Amirs fixed a daily allowance for the Caliph, and appropriated all the revenue themselves.² Besides, they also introduced the innovation of having their names conjoined along with that of the Caliph in Friday prayers and coinage.³

Although very little actual power was left with the Caliphs by this time, yet since they still commanded the respect and prayers of all pious Muslims, it was not safe for any one openly to defy their orders, as that would have entailed the alienation of the sympathies of the public. For this reason, the acquisition of power necessitated a judicious compromise between real authority and seeming obedience. In fact, the Caliphs, though responsible for the administration, were no longer in a position to carry it on in their own way. Nevertheless orders were still issued in their names while their hands were being continually forced by influential Amirs.

1. Bowen, 'Ali Ibn 'Isa, p. 365 ; quoted from Hilal al-Sabi, p. 317.

2. Miskawayh, 1.352 ; Eclipse, trans. IV, p. 396.

3. Ibn Athir, VIII, p-241. Ibn Raiq's name was ordered to be mentioned from all pulpits. Both Bachkam and Tuzun's names appear on the coinage minted at Baghdad. Cf. Lane. Poole, Coins of Muhammadan Dynasties, p. 190, and Additions, p. 256, respectively.

That this anomalous position at the Metropolis of Islam had turned the institution of the Caliphate into a mere figure-head can be easily understood by a glance at the juridical position that the legists of Islam have assigned to the institution; and an examination of its actual working at this time. It is one of the difficulties in the way of the student that no earlier exposition of the office of the Caliphate was written or if written has survived, than that of 'Ali Ibn Muhammad al-Mawardi (381-450/991-1058) whose *Al-Ahkam al-Sultaniyah* or 'The Laws concerning Rulership' was published in the first third of the fifth century. Nevertheless, an examination of Mawardi's book will show that, although it was written at a time when very little political power was left with the Caliph, yet the theoretical exposition of the institution which it contains relates in fact, in its main principles, to an earlier period. Since he bases his arguments and conclusions on historical practice and the opinions of earlier jurists, we are justified, in the absence of any strictly contemporary exposition of the functions of the Caliph in accepting his theory (shown of those peculiar features which evidently reflect the usage of his own times and which will be dealt with later) as representing the juridical view of the pre-Buwayhid period jurists.¹

1. The analysis of the exposition given by Mawardi and the investigation of the sources and materials from which it was derived is one of the most urgent tasks which requires to be done in the field of Islamic political thought. It forms no part, however, of the subject of the present essay which begins with the institution already fully developed both in theory and practice. For our purposes it is immaterial whether the main principles of Mawardi's exposition go back to the
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According to Mawardi, the institution of the Caliphate is considered necessary to provide leadership in succession to the Prophet for the preservation of religion and the administration of temporal affairs.¹ And it is obligatory² on the people to appoint an Imam by the consensus of the community. Although, during this period, the people, as a whole, actually speaking, had not even the slightest hand in the appointment of a Caliph, yet, to preserve the form, a show of public ratification was made. The election of a caliph by the consensus of the community was reduced only to an oath of allegiance taken by the whole of the people, either by their consent, or otherwise, to an already appointed Caliph. The ceremony may be considered quite formal, but it was essential for the completion of the election. More importance was attached to the oath of allegiance by important personalities like Qadis. Such persons, on the other hand, were very careful about their oath of allegiance, and they were averse to doing anything which was against the strict letter of the law.³

The author says that on the occasion of a vacancy

first, second or third century—since it must be assumed, (i) that a definite juridical view of the Caliphate existed by the third century, and (ii) in the absence of any attempt to controvert Mawardi's exposition that the latter did in fact represent that juridical view. However, the very fact that Mawardi introduced *Amirs by Force* shows that his main theory regarding the office of the Caliphate did not belong to his own period but to the pre-Buwayhid period.

1. Mawardi p.2. From the above description it is evident that the institution had a double function to perform, religious as well as temporal.
2. Mawardi, p.3.
3. Ibn Athir, VII. 93. Qadi Abu Ahmad b.Rashid refused to pay homage to the Caliph Mu'tazz on the ground that he had withdrawn himself previously.

there are two categories of people in the community, the first comprising all those who possess the right of electing the Imam and the other consisting of those who put forward a claim to sovereignty. The electors are supposed to possess the following three qualifications:

(1) Uprightness in all its respects;

(2) Capacity to judge the qualifications that a leader must possess ;

(3) Discretion and good judgment enabling them to choose the persons most deserving of the office.¹ The real electors were in the most cases, either the Turkish general or the Wazirs; and most of them being unscrupulous and ambitious men were devoid of uprightness in any form; in consequence of this they could not make proper use of the second and third qualifications which, in most case, they were possessed of. In selecting the Caliph they were actuated by their own personal motives rather than the qualifications of the candidates.²

As regards the qualifications necessary for the office of the Caliph, Mawardi names the following :—

(1) Uprightness in all its respects;

(2) Requisite juridicotheological knowledge to determine the significance of points of Shari'ah in difficult cases;

1. Mawardi, p.4

2. Examples will be found below.

(3) Freedom from defects of hearing, sight and speech;

(4) Freedom from physical infirmities;

(5) Intelligence and sagacity which provide insight for governing the people and conducting the affairs of the State;

(6) Courage and boldness to defend the boundaries of the State and to fight the enemies of Islam;

(7) Descent from the tribe of Quraysh.¹ Since the hereditary system generally prevailed, the field of choice was very limited and the electors had, in practice, to select from amongst the sons or the brothers of the deceased or dethroned Caliph. Even within this limited circle, no due consideration was paid to the above qualifications in selecting a candidate. To give a colour of legitimacy and regularity a formal proceeding was carried out and the chief dignitaries of the court, military commanders and religious heads were invited to deliberate on the determination of the above points but the choice used to be made by influential persons long before such an assembly was held.² The qualifications Nos. 3 and 4

1. Mawardi, pp. 4-5.

2. Miskawayh, 1,p.3; Eclipse, trans. IV, p. 2. While electing the successor of the Caliph Muktafi the Wazir asked the opinion of important persons, amongst others of Ibn al-Furat, who said, "Why should you introduce a man who will govern, and knows our resources, who will administer affairs himself, and regard himself as independent? Why not deliver the empire to a man who will leave you to administer it?" It was owing to such considerations that the candidature of Abu'l-'Abbas 'Abd Allah son of Mutazz was rejected, and Muqtadir who was of tender age was elected. In the same way when Munis urged the candidature of the son of Muqtadir, Abu'l-'-'Abbas,
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were duly observed throughout the whole of this period. They were so deep-rooted in the minds of the people that the blinding of a claimant was considered quite enough to prevent him from succeeding to the throne. The seventh qualification was the most essential and was most rigidly observed. The strict adherence of the Sunni sect to his last qualification was due to several supposed traditions attributed to the Prophet Muhammad.¹ The claims of the 'Abbasid family' were further strengthened by various supposed traditions put forward in their favour.² It was chiefly due to these settled traditions that the Turks, though masters of everything, could not conceive of putting up a candidate outside the family of 'Abbas. This limitation caused the 'Abbasid family to be regarded in some sort as sacred in the minds of all Sunni people and it was primarily due to this that an appearance of political unity was preserved throughout the Sunni Muslim world excepting Spain.

Mawardi holds the indivisible character of the Caliphate when he says, "That at one time there cannot be more than one Imam."³ This principle was strictly

he was successfully opposed by Abu Ya'qub Ishaq b. Ismail Nubakhti in the following words, "After all the trouble which we have taken to get rid of a sovereign with a mother and an aunt and enuch are we going to have the same thing over again?" Miskawayh, I, p. 242; Eclipse, trans. IV.p.273.

1. Suyuti, trans, Jarrett, p. 8 "The Princes shall be of the Quraysh the just among them rulers of the just, and the wicked rulers of the wicked."
2. Suyuti, trans. p. 13. It is related from Abu Hurayrah that the Messenger of God said to 'Abbas, 'In you shall rest prophecy and sovereignty.'
3. Mawardi, p. 7.

observed by the Sunnis and its observance gave further stability to the institution of the Caliphate. Again, in order to legalise the despotic character of the institution which resulted from the hereditary system, the author upholds the practice by which the reigning Caliph appoints his own successor.¹

According to Mawardi, there are ten duties to be performed by a Caliph:

(1) To uphold the fundamental principles of the Muslim religion;

(2) To decide law-suits and to settle disputes;

(3) To defend Muslim territories;

(4) To administer the penal law;

(5) To guard the frontiers by keeping garrisons and making preparations for war;

(6) To fight those who refuse to accept Islam or to submit upon terms laid down for non-Muslims;

(7) To levy taxes and imposts according to law;

(8) To pay the annuity from the State treasury;

(9) To appoint trustworthy men and councillors for the administration of different districts and for fiscal purposes;

(10) Personally to inspect and control the administration.² If the Caliph discharged and fulfilled these

1. Ibid., p. 5.

2. Kremer, *The Orient under the Caliphs*, trans. Khuda Baksh, pp. 265-66. quoted from Mawardi, p. 15.

duties the people were required to discharge two duties on their part:

(1) To render him obedience; and

(2) To render him assistance.¹ It is obvious that no Caliph, during this period of degeneration, did or could fulfil all the conditions laid down by the jurists, but the provision for deposing a defaulting Caliph could not be made operative owing to the lack of power to enforce it, and to support of the interested persons who were responsible for raising a candidate to the throne of sovereignty. The two chief causes which involved forfeiture were deterioration of morals and physical infirmities.² The provision for deposition due to the first cause was a useful instrument in the hands of the interested parties. As long as the Caliph complied with their demands no one questioned his morals, but the moment he did not agree with them his morals were called in question; and he was asked to vacate the throne by self-deposition. His consent was taken forcibly and attested by the Qadis before he was brought before an assembly to declare his own deposition. If the Caliph did not agree to the arrangement settled by the interested parties, he was threatened with death, or blinded.³

Under such conditions the absolute obedience claimed on behalf of the Caliphate from the governors

1. Mawardi, p. 16.

2. Ibid., p. 16.

3. Misk, 1, pp. 290—291, Eclipse, trans. IV, pp. 330-31. On the occasion of the deposition of the Caliph Qahir, the Qadi who was sent to attest the document declaring the former's abdication, was very much upset, when the Caliph refused to submit.

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could not be expected. The first minor dynasty which arose in Persia was that of the Tahirids whose relations with the Caliphate we will now trace.

The Qadi said, "What use was it to summon us to a man who had not been forced to submit?" On hearing this, 'Ali Ibn 'Isa remarked, "His conduct is notorious and therefore he must be deposed." To this the Qadi replied "It is not for us to establish dynasties—that is accomplished by the men of the swords. We are only suited and required for attestation." The next morning the Caliph was found blinded.

CHAPTER V

Caliphate and Tahirids

The founder of the Tahirid dynasty; as its name implies, Was Tahir Dhu-l-Yaminayn who descended from Raziq who was in the service of Abu Muhammad Talha b. 'Abd Allah al-Khuzai, Viceroy of Sijistan. His son, Musa'b governed the town of Bushang in the province of Hirat, and was secretary to Sulayman Ibn Kathir al-Khuzai, the chief of the Abbasid mission.¹

He was succeeded in the government first by his son Husayn (199/814-15) and then by his grandson, Tahir who subsequently passed into the service of the Caliph Mamun.²

It is an established fact that Mamun's victory over Amin was achieved through the supreme effort of Tahir as general, and therefore it was quite natural on the part of Mamun to give high positions to Tahir and other members of his family. After Mamun's accession to the Caliphate in 198/813. Tahir was appointed the Governor of Al-Jazirah and financial administrator of the Sawad with the position of Military Commander at

1. Ibn Khallikan, *De Slanne*, trans. 1, pp. 649-50.

2. Barthold, *Turkestan*, p. 208.

Baghdad,¹ and his son 'Abd Allah was entrusted with the duty of pacifying the western parts of the Empire. In 206/821-22, 'Abd Allah was appointed Governor of the regions between Al-Rakka and Egypt, and at the same time received the supreme command in the battle against one of Amin's followers named Nasrb, Shabath who surrendered to 'Abd Allah in 209/825.² In the same year 210/825-26 he went to Egypt by order of the Caliph Mamun, easily succeeded in restoring order there, and conquered Iskandariyah for the Caliphate.³

Since both the conquest and consolidation of the 'Abbasid Empire were due to the loyal and valuable services of the Tahirids, the latter were allowed to play the role of partners in the Empire. But although he recognized their services and amply rewarded them by assigning important positions to them. Mamun was shrewd enough to keep them away from their home in Khurasan where their influence, if misused, would have endangered the safety of the Empire, much though their presence was needed in those troublesome regions which demanded closer attention for pacification.

Tahir being ambitious, was not satisfied with his position at Baghdad and naturally wanted to be the Governor of his own province, Khurasan. This is best explained in Tahir's own words. When someone said to him, "May you well enjoy the rank which you now hold and which none of your rivals in Khurasan have ever reached," he replied: "That is what I am unable to enjoy since I cannot see the old women of Bushang

1. Tabari, III, p. 1039.

2. Ibid., III, p. 1067, Ibn Athir, VI, p. 256,

3. Ibid., III, p. 1091.

climbing up to the roofs of the houses that they may get a sight of me as I pass by.”¹ However, it was Mamun himself who provided the cause which led Tahir to make a successful effort to get away from Baghdad. It is a well-known story that one day Mamun, on seeing Tahir, was reminded of his brother Amin who was killed by the former, and burst into tears.² This created some suspicion in Tahir’s mind, and when he found out the cause of Mamun’s weeping³ and also that the latter had conceived a violent hatred against him (Tahir), he, with the assistance of the Wazir, got himself transferred to Khurasan where he had influence and dynastic support. That Mamun had lost all confidence in Tahir is proved by the fact that he at first was unwilling to send him to the eastern provinces, and it was only through the Wazir’s deception that he consented to appoint Tahir as Governor of Khurasan on condition that the Wazir would himself stand guarantee for Tahir’s good behaviour.⁴ Obviously it was the extreme hostility displayed by Mamun towards Tahir that led the latter to drop the former’s name from the Khutbah in 207/822,⁵ thus signifying his independence at a time when the ‘Abbasid Caliphate was at its height. The desperate attempt of Tahir was

1. Ibn Khallikan, De Slane, trans. 1, p. 650.
2. Tabari, III, pp. 1041-42, Ibn Athir VI, p. 255; Ibn Khaldun, III, p. 251, Ibn Khallikan, De Slane, trans. 1, pp. 652-53.
3. Ibn Khallikan, De Slane, trans. 1, pp. 652-53. Mamun was reported to say the following words: “Tahir shall not escape me”.
4. Tabari, III, p. 1042. The Wazir made Mamun believe that there were disturbances in Khurasan which could not be quelled by any one but Tahir.
5. Ibid, III, p. 1064, Ibn Athir, VI, p. 270.

nipped in the bud by the sudden and premature removal of Tahir himself from the scene, either from some natural cause or from poison believed to have been administered to him by a slave-girl who was presented to him by Mamun with such instruction.¹

The appointment of Talha in his father's place was perhaps intended to hush up the suspicion that was aroused on the sudden death of Tahir,² The third appointment of 'Abd Allah b. Tahir in his brother's gave the dynasty a hereditary character and local authority and position which previous governors had never enjoyed. It may be noted here that 'Abd Allah's appointment was not based on favouritism but on his own personal merits. Besides, Mamun placed in him the highest confidence and treated him with the utmost consideration.³ But during the time of 'Abd Allah b. Tahir, the dynasty reached its zenith and had so firmly established itself that it was not easy to transfer them to any part of the Empire. Even the Caliph Mu'tasim (218-27/833-42) who bore some grudge against him did not dare dismiss him, but in order to remove him could only encourage secret plans of murder.⁴ On the other hand 'Abd Allah fulfilled the expectations of the 'Abbasids and never betrayed the trust reposed in him. Even when he found out the evil intentions of Mu'tasim

1. Ibn Khallikan, De Slane, trans, 1, p. 653.

2. Barthold, Turkestan, p. 208.

3. Ibn Khallikan, De Slane, trans. 2.II, p. 49.

4. Gardizi, p. 7. It is related that Mu'tasim had conceived a hatred for 'Abd Allah before he became Caliph. During his Caliphate, he sent a slave girl to 'Abd Allah with instructions to poison him, but the slave girl being infatuated by him, disclosed the secret.

against his own life he did not adopt the absurd plan taken by his own father under similar circumstances. However he took care not to leave his country for long periods and always considered himself safe only within his own dominions. For this reason 'Abd Allah, though a man of religious character, had to forego the pleasure of fulfilling the sacred duty of performing the pilgrimage.¹

After the death of 'Abd Allah b. Tahir in 230/844 the Caliph Wathiq appointed Ishaq b. Ibrahim al-Mus'abi, as Governor of Khurasan but, for certain reasons, this appointment was cancelled before the departure of the new governor, and Tahir b. Abd Allah was appointed in his father's place.² The last appointment of Muhammad b. Tahir in 248/862 was made in consideration of the services rendered by 'Abd Allah and his family.³ Thus we see that it was through force of circumstances that the government of Khurasan remained in the family of Tahir till it was extinguished by Ya 'qub b. Layth in 259/872.

The Tahirids paid a fixed amount of annual tribute to the Caliphate regularly. According to Ibn Khurdadh-bih⁴ the tribute paid by 'Abd Allah in 211-12/826-27 consisted of 44,846,000 dirhams thirteen thoroughbred horses, 2,000 sheep, 2,000 Ghuzz slaves, valued at 600,000 dirhams, 1,187 pieces of stuff, and

1. Gardizi, p. 2.
2. Barthold, Art. on 'Abd Allah in *Encycl. of Islam*.
3. Tabari, III, p. 1506. Ya'qubi ed. Houtsma, II p. 604 says that Muhammad b. 'Abd Allah, Military Commandant at Baghdad declined an offer to go to Khurasan as he knew that his brother Tahir had intended his son to succeed him.
4. Bib. Geog. Arab, VI, p. 38 p. 250, Barthold, *Turkestan*, p. 220.

1,300 pieces of iron. In the year 221/836, according to Qudama, 'Abd Allah bound himself to pay in all thirty-eight million dirhams out of an annual income of forty-eight million dirhams which, according to Tabari,¹ was the amount received in the year of the death of 'Abd Allah b. Tahir, 230/844 from all sources.

The Tahirids remained, on the whole, loyal supporters of the Abbasid Caliphate. They did not even take any advantage worth the name of the sudden decline of the Caliphate after the murder of Mutawakkil at the hands of the Turks in 247/861. Their passive attitude might be accounted for three facts:

Firstly, as already mentioned, the Tahirids had become a sort of junior partners in the Empire. They had the best provinces under their control and were quite independent as far as their internal administration was concerned. Their territory comprised Rayy and Kirman in addition to Khurasan proper and the lands east thereof as far as the Indian frontier and northward to the boundary of the Caliph's Empire.² They were in sole enjoyment of the whole of the one-fifth of the booty raised in their wars against the non-Muslims, and received thirteen million dirhams from 'Iraq independently of gifts.³ Besides holding the important province of Khurasan. The post of the Military Commander at Baghdad was also occupied by one of the members of this family. The monopoly of this post had raised their

1. Bib., Geog. Arab, VI, p. 250, Barthold, Turkestan, p. 220.

2. Tabari, III, pp. 1338-39. Yaqubi puts the taxes from Khurasan at forty two million dirhams. See Bib. Geog. Arab, VII, p. 308.

3. Barthold, art. on Tahirids, Encycl. of Islam.

4. Ya 'qubi, Bib, Geog. Arab, VII. p. 308,

position so much that at one time they had become, in measure, protectors of the Caliphate when its fate hung in the hands of the Turks. In 251/865, Muhammad b. 'Abd Allah b. Tahir was so important at Baghdad that he was actually playing the role of a Caliph-maker and shared in deciding the fate of the Caliphate between Musta'in and Mu'tazz. Thus we see that the Tahirids had become a party with the Turks to the exploitation of the revenues of Caliphate.¹ Secondly, it was only during the reign of 'Abd Allah b. Tahir that any possible successful effort could be made for independence, but the Caliphate though showing some signs of decline, was not yet so weak as to ensure the success of such an effort. 'Abd Allah was prudent enough to continue his dependence on the Caliphate and reap the best advantage he could within the limits of his own rights. Moreover, he and his son Tahir, being good Muslims, might not have liked the idea of figuring as heretics in the public eye by severing all their connections from the Caliphate.

Thirdly, the sudden weakening of the authority of the 'Abbasids coincided with the degeneration of the Tahirids. The last of them, Muhammad b. Tahir, who succeeded his father in 248/862, was of tender years and was a weak ruler devoted to his own pleasures. His own territories were not safe in such a weak ruler's hands. It was during his reign that the 'Alid Hasan b. Zayd captured Tabaristan in 251/866 and renounced

1. Tabari III, p. 1640 ; Ibn Athir, VII, p. 107, Ibn Khaldun, II, p. 290.

2. Muhammad B. 'Abd Allah was one of the parties with the Turks in deposing Musta'in and raising Mu'tazz to the Caliphate. One-third of the whole of the revenue was to be appropriated by Muhammad, and two-thirds between the Turks and Mawali.

his allegiance to the Caliph Musta'in,¹ and finally Muhammad himself was defeated by Ya'qub and taken prisoner in 259/837.² Under such circumstances, it was to the advantage of the Tahirids themselves that they kept up the connection with the 'Abbasid Caliphate.

The Tahirids generally obeyed the orders of the Central Government and carried them out with all sincerity and honesty of purpose. If needed, the Baghdad government would send some support from the Capital to the help of these governors. At the time of the appointment of Talha in 207/822 to the government of Khurasan, the chief of Ushrusana' Kawaus who had consented to pay tribute to Mamun revolted against the authority of the Caliphate, consequently a force was sent from Baghdad under the command of Ahmad b. Abu Khalid for the subjugation of that country. Talha was pleased to receive such assistance from the central government and with its help was able to achieve his object.³ Sometimes these governors would take the initiative themselves and suppress such revolts. When a certain 'Alid, Muhammad b. Al-Qasim appeared as pretender to the Caliphate, 'Abd Allah b. Tahir took proper steps against such pretensions, defeated Muhammad b. Qasim who surrendered to 'Abd Allah and was sent by to the Caliph Mu'tasim in 219/834.⁴ One of the greatest revolts during this period came from Mazyar b. Qarin who had embraced Islam and was appointed Governor of Tabaristan, Ruyan and

1. Gardizi, p. 10.

2. Ibid.

3. Tabari, III, p. 1066

4. Ibid., p. 1166.

Dunbawand by the Caliph Mamun.¹ After the latter's death in 218/833, Mazyar began to show signs of returning to heresy and of revolting against the central authority. 'Abd Allah b. Tahir had denounced to the Caliph the "misdeeds, tyranny and apostacy of Mazyar."² The open breach between the Caliphate and Mazyar occurred in 224/838-39 when the latter refused to pay tribute to the Tahirids, and would not listen to the representations of the Caliph's ambassador. Meanwhile, he conferred various honours on Babak, on Mazdak and other Magians who had ordered the demolition of places of worship of Muslims.³ The famous Afshin, being covetous of Khurasan, secretly encouraged Mazyar's resistance to his rival 'Abd Allah b. Tahir.⁴ As soon as the Caliph Mu'tasim heard that Mazyar had had homage paid to himself and levied Kharaj, he despatched urgent orders to 'Abd Allah to fight against him and sent considerable forces from Baghdad to his assistance. The combined forces of the Caliph and 'Abd Allah proved too much for Mazyar who was arrested and brought by 'Abd Allah personally to Baghdad where he was ordered to be given 400 lashes under which he died and his body was exposed.⁵

The two religious movements, those of the 'Alids in Tabaristan and Kharijites in Sijistan, which were opposed to the Caliphate were always put down by the Tahirids.⁶ In carrying out the orders and serving the

1. Minorsky, Art. on Mazyar in *Encycl. of Islam*, p. 436.

2. Isfandiyar, trans. Browne, p. 152.

3. *Ibid.*, p. 153.

4. Tabari, III, p. 1268. Isfandiyar, p. 155.

5. *Ibid.*, Isfandiyar, p. 154.

Gardizi, pp. 5 and 8.

cause of the 'Abbasid Caliphate, the Tahirids were also promoting their own interests. Being Sunnies, their religious interests coincided with those of the 'Abbasids, and thus the enemies of the Caliphate were naturally their enemies. The suppression of any other religious movements in their dominions was also a political necessity, and the conquest of new territories was more to their own advantage than to that of the Caliphate.¹ Besides, the Tahirids were amply rewarded for their loyalty by the Caliphs and they were always favoured in their eyes. It was due to the Tahirids' influence at Baghdad that Ya'qub, the Saffarid was denounced as a heretic and rebel against the lawful government,² and the government of Khurasan, Rayy, Fars, Qazwin and Zurjan along with the post of the Military Commander of Baghdad was entrusted to the incapable and pleasure-loving ruler, Muhammad b. Tahir as soon as the latter was set free from the hands of Ya'qub in 263/876.³ The last named post continued to be held mainly by the members of the Tahirid family.⁴

The Tahirids ruled Khurasan in accordance with the maxims of government recommended to 'Abd

1. Ya'qub, *Bib. Geog. Arab*, VII. p. 308. The whole of booty was appropriated by Tahirids. All the lands conquered by them were also given to them. 'Abd Allah sent his son Tahir on a campaign into the Ghuzz country and conquered several places for Caliphate to where none had penetrated before him see Barthold, p. 212.

2. Tabari, III. p. 1887.

3. *Ibid.*, p. 1895, Ibn Athir, VII. p. 201.

4. Barthold, art. on Tahirids, in *Encycl. of Islam*. The last of the Tahirids to hold the office of Military Commander at Baghdad was 'Ubayd Allah b. 'Abd Allah who died in 300/913. His son Muhammad b. 'Ubayd Allah was for a period Commandant of the eastern half of Baghdad and was dismissed from office in 301/913. See *Arab*. p. 45.

Allah by his father Tahir when he was appointed to the government of Dayar Rabia in 206/821.¹

There is very scanty information regarding the actual administration of the Tahirids, but whatever information has come down to us goes to prove that they, being very pious Muslims, always tried to rule their country in accordance with the strict laws of the Shariah. To settle the quarrels amongst the inhabitants over the use of water for artificial irrigation for which the Muslim books did not provide any definite laws, 'Abd Allah invited the Faqihis of Khurasan and instructed them to work out, in consultaion with some Jurists from Iraq, the legal principles regarding the use of water. The book of "Canals" (*Kitab al Quniy*) composed by them served as a guide in similar matters.² This shows that the Tahirids were anxious to act in accordance with Islamic laws, and, in the absence of definite laws, they did not use their autocratic powers. As regards 'Abd Allah b. Tahir's equity, justice and efficiency of government, if we are to believe Yaqubi, "he ruled Khurasan as none had ever ruled it before."³

Tabari, III, pp. 1046-62, Ibn Khaldun, *Muqaddimah*, pp. 304—11. The maxims of government presented by Tahir to his son have been taken as a model of good government. According to Mamun's remark, Tahir did not leave out anything. A copy of these maxims was sent to every governor with instructions that he should rule the province accordingly. Tabari says that 'Abd Allah always acted upon it. Obedience to God and the Prophet's commands, allegiance to the Caliph and practice of Shariah in governing the country are especially enjoined. Free access for the subjects and their well-being in every respect is much insisted upon.

2. Gardizi, p. 8.

3. Barthold, p. 213, quoted from Yaqubi 11, p. 286.

He was greatly concerned in the public welfare irrespective of classes. He especially took up the cause of the agriculturists, and introduced free universal education. He used to say "knowledge must be accessible to the worthy and unworthy, it will look after itself and not remain with the unworthy."¹ Tahir b, 'Abd Allah is also spoken of as a beneficent ruler and a pious person.² The Tahirids took great care in providing comforts to the caravans for pilgrimages.

In conclusion we can say that the Tahirids being orthodox Sunnies were staunch supporters of the 'Abbasid Caliphate. They helped the institution of the Caliphate in all its activities, and by crushing all anti-Caliphate movements in their territories, alleviated their troubles to a great extent. They waged wars against non-Muslims, provided due facilities to the pilgrim caravans and ruled their territories justly and efficiently. Having thus won the best opinion of the ruling Caliphs from Mamun downwards, they enjoyed peacefully the government of the richest province of the Caliphate, but continued paying the tribute though with slight variations, to the central government in accordance with terms agreed upon by both parties.

By adhering to the cause of the 'Abbasids at a time when the Caliphate was being robbed of all its temporal authority, they fulfilled the expectations of the 'Abbasids and justified the confidence reposed in them.

1. Barthold, p. 213, quoted from Gardizi, p. 8.
2. Gardizi, p. 9. He was so pious and unassuming that he did not like to be addressed by the title "Rashid" as he thought he did not deserve such an epithet.

No doubt, through various circumstances, they had become hereditary governors, irremovable from their position. but in no way should they be regarded as independent of the 'Abbasid Caliphate, as most of the modern writers on Islamic History have tried to assert. The first dynasty that openly contested the political supremacy of the 'Abbasid Caliphate in Persia, was that of the Saffarids whose relations with the Caliphate are now being traced.

CHAPTER VI

Caliphate and the Saffarids

The last ruler of the Tahirid dynasty was Muhammad b. Tahir (248-59/862-72) who ruled Khurasan and also Sijistan as one of its appendages. He was a prince of tender years and was more devoted to his own pleasure than the administration of the country.¹ The Central government at Baghdad was also paralysed by the tyranny and dissensions of the Turks. The political condition of the Caliphate being thus weakened at the centre as well as in the Persian provinces, the Kharijites resumed their activities and robbed the people of the peace and security to which they had been accustomed during the rule of the Tahirids before Muhammad b. Tahir. Although the details of the situation in Sijistan are not clear, it would seem that a band of volunteers, called Mutawwia was formed to protect the people from the depredations of the Kharijites. At the head of these volunteers stood one Dirham b. Nasr b. Salih, who seized Zarang, drove out the Tahirid prefect Ibrahim b. Husayn from Sijistan and ultimately made himself the master of the province¹. These volunteers had set up a sort of democracy and the most able and deserving person from among themselves was

1. Gardizi. p. 10.

elected as their chief. Thus this organization gave an opportunity to any person possessed of real talent to come to the fore. Ya'qub, the son of a coppersmith and the founder of the Saffarid dynasty, belonging to the town of Qarnin in Sijistan near Zarang, was one of the volunteers of the Mutawwia; and through his intrepidity, boldness and organizing capacity, found his way to the leadership². When once Ya'qub became the leader he soon showed his organizing capacity and administrative ability. His energetic suppression of the robber bands and the security he obtained for traffic won for him the admiration of all, and his exercise of the principles of equality amongst his followers enabled him to win the support of the poor Sijistanis, whose national pride was, no doubt, gratified by the emergence of a leader from among themselves.

Though the 'Abbasid Caliphs stood in theory for the principle of impartiality, they did not treat the Muslims on the whole on terms of equality. As the Umayyads had favoured the Arabs, so the 'Abbasids

1. Noldeke, p. 177.

2. According to the usual account, Ya 'qub, by killing in a single combat the most dreaded captain of the Kharijites named Amman, gave the first practical proof of his bravery, which led him to such eminence among his fellows that Dirham thought it expedient to leave the leadership to Ya 'qub by setting out for Mecca for the pilgrimage and finally settling down in Baghdad. Noldeke, p. 178. According to Ibn A'hir, VII, p. 124, Dirham was captured by the Tahirid governor and sent to Baghdad where he served the Caliph,

favoured the Khurasanis and neglected the interests both of the Arabs' and of the other peoples of Persia. This partiality was hardly to be tolerated; and thus we see this new movement, originally started to suppress the Kharijites, eventually turned against the weak administration of the Tahirids themselves, and ultimately against the Caliphate which supported them in all their doings.

Ya'qub and his brother Amr had no religious compunction in opposing the 'Abbasid Caliphate when it could not establish justice and equity in Sijistan. Their attitude towards the institution of the Caliphate can be well explained by the reply of Ya'qub when he was asked by Muhammad b. Tahir for a deed of investiture from the Caliph at the time of his conquest of Khurasan. Yaqub drew his sword from under his prayer-mat and told the messenger of Muhammad that that was his deed and authority². The same attitude was shown by Amr at the time of his receiving the deed of investiture for the province of Mawara al-Nahr. When the deed was presented to Amr, the latter asked the messenger what it meant. On receiving the envoy's explanation that it was the thing he had asked for from the Caliph, Amr replied, 'Of what use will it be to me? The province cannot be taken from the hands of Ismail the Samanid except with aid of a hundred thousand naked swords'. No doubt Ya'qub and his brother

1. The 'Abbasids, owing to the support given to them by the Khurasanis were bound to give them all high position in Persia and the government of other provinces.

2. Gardizi, pp. 12-13.

3. Gardizi, p. 13; The Khurasanis, p. 13; The Khurasanis, p. 13.

Amr caused prayer to be offered for the Caliph as the general Commander of all the Faithful, and inserted the latter's name on the coins current in their dominions, but this signified only a sort of religious recognition of the institution. Even this much was, perhaps, not due to their belief in the religious significance of the Caliphate, but was the outcome of political motives. At this time, when the Caliph's authority was considered infallible, and he was, in fact, as well as in theory, the head of the Islamic empire, it was very difficult for any governor to hold his own against the Caliphate; and still more for a usurper who had nothing, but the sword upon which to base his right. Hence for the success of their policy, the Saffarids required to have some sort of nominal relationship with the Caliphate, otherwise there was every danger of alienating the sympathies of their own subjects, which were their main support in their struggle against the Caliphate. The importance of a deed of investiture from the Caliph cannot better be gauged than by the fact that Amr, who succeeded his brother Ya'qub, was only given recognition as lawful ruler by the 'Ulema and the volunteers for the faith, when he had secured his patent of sovereignty from the Caliph¹, and to gain public opinion Amr, on another occasion, exhibited the standard despatched from Baghdad in the court of his dwelling-house for three days at Nishapur². For these reasons the Saffarids were obliged to come to terms with the Caliphate and ask for the confirmation of their

1. Gardizi, pp. 14--15.

2. Tabari, III, p. 2133.

claims over those territories which they had conquered even against the wishes of the Baghdad government; and to continue the name of the Caliph in the Khutbah and coinage even after they had come to a final breach with the central government, and were declared heretics and usurpers against the lawful government¹.

How ambitious were the brothers to curtail even this nominal authority of the Caliph is evident from the fact that Ya'qub was the first to introduce his name in the Khutbah along with that of the Caliph,² and Amr was the first ruler to have his name inscribed on gold coins³. The latter innovation on the part of a governor in the East almost signified his independence. There is no evidence to show that the Saffarids ever paid any regular tribute to the Baghdad government, although Ya'qub, if Khallikan⁴ is to be trusted, agreed

1. There is no historical evidence to show that the Saffarids ever discontinued the name of the Caliph in the Khutbah and there is no coin which does not bear the Caliph's name during their regime. Cf. Lane-Poole, *Coins of Muhammadan Dynasties*. Upon Ya'qub's conquest of Khurasan against the wishes of the Caliphate, he was declared a heretic and a rebel against the legitimate authority before the caravan of pilgrims which was at that time in Baghdad on its return journey in 261/875.

(Tabari, III, p. 1887).

Amr was also declared a heretic before the pilgrims and orders were issued throughout the Islamic empire that he should be cursed from the pulpits. (Tabari, III, p. 2106).

2. Narshakhi, p. 77. It is related that in 261/875, the Caliph ordered the exclusion of the name of Ya'qub from the Khutbah and the inclusion of that of Nasr, the Samanid at Bukhara.

3. Lane-Poole, *Coins of Muhammadan Dynasties*, Add IX, p. 177. On a gold coin minted in the year 275 A.H. Amr's name appears along with his father's. It should be noted that the Tahids were not allowed to put their names on gold coins in Persia.

4. Ibn Khallikan, De Slane, trans, IV, p. 320.

to pay in two-thirds of the taxes furnished by all the provinces which he governed. Their insatiable nature and want of moderation would not allow them to be content with what they had already gained, but they were bent upon excluding the temporal power of the Caliphate from Persia, and, if possible from Baghdad itself.¹ In fact they were trying to anticipate the Buwayhids by taking over all the political power into their hands and allowing the Caliph to remain as a nominal religious head.

Whatever their actual intentions, the Suffarids did certain things which made them appear as the

1. In 261/875 the Caliphate tried to reconcile Ya 'qub by granting him the government of Khurasan, Tabaristan, Jurjan, Rayy, and Fars as well as the military governorship of Baghdad. (Tabari, III, p. 1892) But Ya 'qub insisted on coming to Baghdad to settle the terms of the treaty. The Caliph was well aware of his intention of capturing Baghdad itself and consequently made preparations to oppose him and ultimately by giving the colour of holy war to his movements against the Saffarid, succeeded in repelling the attack. Ya'qub was defeated near Dayar al-Aqul in 262/876 and after this never condescended to come to terms with the Baghdad government which made one more effort to come to a good understanding with Ya 'qub; but the latter's reply to the Caliph's messenger again shows his attitude towards the Caliphate. He said, "Take back the answer that I am ill; if I die then we will have peace from one another, but should I recover, nothing shall settle matters between us except the sword. If I lose all my territory, I shall return to the coarse bread and onions which was the food of my youth." 'Cf. Ibn Athir, VII, p. 226. Ibn Khallikan, De Slane, trans. IV, p. 321.

Amr was not only confirmed in all his brother's possessions, but was also given the honour of getting his name inscribed on the standards, lances and shields in the government office at Baghdad. Cf. Tabari, III, p. 2115. But his insatiable nature led him to oblige the Caliph to grant him the deed of investiture for the province of Mawara al-Nahr which was under the Samanids. This led him to a war with Ismail who defeated him and sent him a prisoner to Baghdad in 287/900 Cf. Tabari, III, p. 2194.

champions of the orthodox faith and faithful allies of the Caliphate. Both Ya'qub and Amr waged wars against infidels in the East and sent magnificent presents to the Caliph. Ya'qub enlarged his dominions by conquests in the mountainous region to the East and contributed much to the gradual rise of Islam in the country now known as Afghanistan¹. But the object of the holy war was perhaps to extend their territories and to secure booty; and the despatch of costly presents to the Caliph only to keep him in good humour in order to secure recognition or to plead their cause for a fresh province upon which they had closed their greedy teeth; and also perhaps to figure as the champions of Islam in the public eye.

The Saffarids also fought against both the Kharijites and the 'Alids and with the same political objects in view. Ya'qub' though he himself is supposed to have been a Kharijite in the beginning of his career,² yet came into prominence by fighting against them as has been shown above. After the defeat of Muhammad the Tahirid, when he was making his case for the government of Khurasan, in token of his profound attachment to the Caliphate, he sent the head of a Kharijite captain who, in the neighbourhood of Hirat, for

1. Noldeke, p. 182. In 258/871, Ya'qub sent an embassy to the Caliph Mu'tamid with the idols which he had captured in Kabul or the neighbouring lands. Amr also carried his arms into the eastern heathen lands as is shown by the large presents he sent to Baghdad in 283/896. Besides 400,000 dirhams, he sent a number of camels and especially a bronze image richly decked with precious stones of a goddess having four arms. There were a number of other idols upon the car on which it was borne. Cf. Noldeke p. 200.

2. Barthold, *Turkestan*, p. 216.

thirty years had dared to call himself 'Commander of the Faithful'. When Hasan, the ruler of Tabaristan, gave refuge to Ya'qub's opponent 'Abd Allah, he declared war against him and defeated him. He sent a most deferential account of his victory over the 'Alid dynasty of Tabaristan to the Caliphate and announced to the Commander of the Faithful that he had in his custody sixty members of the family of 'Ali in 260/873.² Amr also took the field against Rafi when he revolted against the authority of the Caliphate and by joining the 'Alid prince of Tabaristan had embraced the Shia creed and caused the public prayer to be offered for the 'Alid. He hunted Rafi from place to place and finally sent his head to the Caliph in 284/897.³ In both cases the object was to secure the possession of Khurasan.

The revolt of the Saffarids against the 'Abbasid Caliphate should, by no means, be considered as a Persian revolt against Arab domination. That there was not even the vestige of Persian nationalism in those times is evident from the absence of any concerted action of various Persian rulers against the Caliphate. As has already been shown, the Saffarids were always busy fighting the other Persian rulers, and on several occasions they allied themselves with the Caliphate against them. That Ya'qub was a Muslim first off all cannot be illustrated better than by his refusal of an alliance with the leader of the Zanj against their common enemy, i. e., the Caliphate. Ya'qub's despatch of a

1. Tabari III, p. 1882; Noldeke, p. 184,

2. Ibid p. 1884

3. Ibid., p. 2160

Qur'anic verse in reply to the peace overtures, "Say to infidels, I do not worship that which you worship," is characteristic of his orthodoxy.¹ Nor were the Saffarids inspired by any ideal of a pre-Islamic king in Persia. In the absence of any settled government they could not establish a regular system of administration; but whatever principles they applied in governing their dominions were more in keeping with the teachings of Islam than with the pre-Islamic idea of kingship².

They considered themselves equal to their soldiers; formed all their plans themselves and directed their executive personally as far as possible. Even a ruler of extensive dominions, Ya'qub continued to live as a simple soldier. In this tent he slept upon his shield without any attendants. Both the brothers supervised the administration of their country and delivered justice personally. As regards any fixed rules for revenue collection, they had none; they applied their own laws in accordance with their needs.³

In short, the relations of the Saffarids with the 'Abbasid Caliphate were not so anomalous as they appear. The Saffarids were willing to show the traditional regard for the religious institution of the Caliphate,

1. Ibn Athir, VII, p. 201.

2. The Sasanid king remained hidden, inaccessible and invisible even to the highest dignitaries of his court. Cf. Christensen, p. 97; Huart, p. 145. The king showed himself in public only on rare occasions amidst great pomp and show which was intended to impress the onlookers, for nobody durst raise his voice in the presence of the king. Cf. Christensen, p. 98; Huart, p. 147. In great battles which were directed by the king himself, a throne of considerable grandeur was set up in the centre of the army. Cf. Christensen., p. 63; Huart, p. 15,.

4. Noldeke, pp. 193; Mir Khwand, p. 710,

but the exigencies of right and justice and the weak rule both at the centre and in the provinces prompted them to set up a new rule. Their want of moderation came in the way of their achieving any permanent results for the dynasty.¹ But they were the first in Persia to contest the political supremacy of the 'Abbasids and were bent upon reducing their temporal power to the minimum. Fortunately for the Caliphate, the emergence of these dissenters coincided with the period of Muwaffaq and his son Mu'tadid who were strong enough to curb their ambition. They themselves also contributed to this result by antagonising both the Kharijites and 'Alids at the same time. Although both the brothers were defeated and died without fulfilling their ambition, yet they succeeded in asserting the right of the subordinate princes to share with the Caliphate the two outward insignia sovereignty, e.g., the inclusion of their names in the Khutbah and on the coinage in their dominions, and moreover, established a precedent in governing their territories without any regular payment to Baghdad. Thus the Saffarids set the example for the curtailment of the temporal power of the Caliphate in Persia. These concessions once extorted from the Caliphate, had to be *nolens volens* bestowed by the Caliphs themselves upon their successors, i.e., the Samanids whose relations with the Caliphate we shall trace in the following pages.

1. But the strength of the ties uniting the Saffarids with the population of Sijistan is shown by the reappearance and maintenance of the dynasty (except for a short interval under Ghaznavids and Saljuquids) down to the fifteenth century. Cf. Zambaur, p. 200.

CHAPTER VII

Caliphate and the Samanids

The relations of the Samanids¹ with the Caliphate naturally fall into two periods ; the first from 261/874, when they first come into direct relationship with the Baghdad government, till 333/944 ; the second from 334/945, when the Caliphate came under the tutelage of the Buwayhids, till their downfall at the hands of Mahmud of Ghazna in 384/999. Since their relations during the second period from part of the next chapter they will be dealt with later.

Ruling as subordinates to the Khurasani government, the Samanids came into direct relationship with the Abbasid Caliphate only after the conquest of Khurasan by Yaqub, when in 261/874 the Caliph Mutamid granted to Nasr, founder of the dynasty, the patent of sovereignty to govern the provinces of Mawara al-Nahr which he had already been governing under the Tahirids². The Caliph gave an order for the exclusion of the name of Yaqub from the Khutbah in those regions and the inclusion of Nasr's name instead.³ Thus the concession of mentioning the governor's name in the Khutbah after that of the Caliph, which, had been extorted by Yaqub, was voluntarily given by the Caliph himself to the Samanid Amir. On the death of Nasr in 279/892, his brother Ismail was installed in his place and in addition to Mawara al-Nahr, Ismail after his victory over Amr in 287/900 was given the government of Khurasan which by right of conquest already belonged to him.

1. See article on the Samanids in the *Encycl. of Islam*.
2. Ibn Athir, VII, p. 193.
3. Narshakhi, p. 77.
4. Tabari, III p. 2195; Ibn Athir, VII, pp. 346-47.

There is no evidence as to any regular tribute paid by the Samanids to the central government from the time of the grant of the province of Khurasan to them after the defeat of Amr. In fact ever since the defeat of Muhammad b. Tahir in 259/871 neither of the governors who were given the government of Khurasan paid any regular tribute nor were they willing to do so. The defiant attitude of various governors had involved the Baghdad government in costly wars. Under such circumstances the Caliphate was, perhaps, glad to have the opportunity of entrusting the government of this province to one of its loyal governors on the same conditions as it was ruled by the defiant ones. Since the inclusion of the name of a governor on a gold coin in the East signified his independence, we can date the political independence of the Samanids, so far as any regular tribute is concerned, at the latest, from the year 295/907 in which year there appears a gold coin on which the name of the Samanid Amir Ahmad b. Ismail appears along with that of the Caliph.¹ By the year 396/918, however, it becomes quite clear that the Samanids did not pay any regular tribute for the provinces of Khurasan and Mawara al-Nahr, as the budget drawn up for Ali Ibn Isa, the wazir of the Caliph Muqtadir, in that year does not contain any revenues from the above provinces². Thus the Samanids were now in full enjoyment of the three concessions extorted by the Saffarids from the Caliphate, i. e., the sharing of the two insignia

1. Lane-Poole, *Coins of Muhammadan Dynasties, Additions*, p. 179.

2. Kremer, *Ueber das Einnahmehudget des Abbasidenreichs*, (Monograph on Ali Ibn Isa and his statesmanship.)

of sovereignty, and the appropriation of the whole of the revenues.

The Samanids, being staunch Sunnis, needed the sanction of the Caliphate to govern their territories so that their possessions might be placed on a legal basis, and their civil administration carried on in accordance with the *Shari'ah*. It was this religious necessity that compelled them to ask for a deed of investiture for the possessions whose *de facto* rulers they had become by right of conquest. The acceptance of a deed from the Caliphate was in form a declaration of their political subordination to the former, to which a sort of sanction was attached by the necessity of its renewal on the demise of the grantor and the grantee. The possession of this right by the Caliphate made it the custodian of the sovereignty *de jure*, and the Samanids were left with the possession of the sovereignty *de facto* alone. On the other hand the Caliph had no hand in the appointment of an Amir, which was the concern of the Samanid government alone. On occasions of successions to the throne, the new ruler applied to the Caliph for the deed of investiture, which was then duly issued by the Caliph. With their political influence waning, the Caliphs began to attach a touch of sacredness to the ceremony by sometimes tying the banner with their own hands.¹ It is very regrettable that there is no copy of such a deed in existence within our knowledge, but from the contents of a copy of an oath of allegiance taken by Masud to the Caliph, we gather that this document was

1. Ibn Athir, VIII, p. 4.

not a blank cheque given to the government to rule their kingdoms as they liked ; there were certain religious as well as political obligations to be fulfilled by the rulers, who used to bind themselves with formidable oaths to perform them¹. Although there was no sanctioning authority to enforce these obligations on the rulers, yet it seems still to have been understood that they were morally bound to abide by them, and there seems to be no hint in any of our sources that orthodox public opinion in Khurasan was prepared as yet to admit any severing of the link with the Caliphate.

So far as their internal administration was concerned, the Samanids were quite independent of the central government, but the report of every revolt, every new conquest, and all the movements that were going on in their dominions, was sent to the Baghdad government ; and the Samanid Amirs were expected to act in accordance with the instructions received from Baghdad. In addition, they had to render help to the Caliphate by suppressing all religious revolts, waging Jihad, arranging for the pilgrimage, etc.

When Tahir b. Muhammad b. Amr the Saffarid entered Fars and expelled the prefect of Caliph in 288/901, Ismail wrote to him that the Caliph had given him the province of Sijistan with all its appendages, and therefore he should abstain from capturing it. In consequence of this, Tahir returned and the Caliph appointed his own client Badr to Fars.² In 296/910 Ahmad b. Ismail sent

1. Bayhaqi, pp. 384-89.

2. Ibn Athir, VII, p. 352

a despatch to Baghdad announcing the conquest of Sijistan and the capture of Muhammad b. Ali b. Layth who was a rebel against the Caliphate.¹ This was followed by a despatch announcing that he had captured Subkara who had captured Fars against the wishes of the Baghdad government.² In accordance with the orders received from the Caliphate, the two prisoners were despatched to Baghdad and the messengers of the Samainds were sent back with robes and scented Jewel for the governor of Khurasan.³ In 309/921 an envoy of the ruler of Khurasan brought to Baghdad the head of Layla b. Numan, the Daylamite, who had rebelled against the authority of the Caliphate in Tabaristan;⁴ and in 330/941 Makan b. Kaki's head was sent with some presents to the Caliphate.⁵

The Samanids were so loyal to the authority of the Caliphate that they did not oppose it even if their own rights were infringed. They took all such things in good part and were quite content with what they could get out of the Caliph by peaceful means. When Baris Kabir who was the governor of Rayy, Tabaristan and Jurjan on behalf of the Samanids, made his way to Baghdad on the death of Ismail in 295/907 with all the revenues he had collected, the Samanids government condemned the action of the Caliph Muqtadir who welcomed the traitor and gave him the government of Diyar-Bakr.⁶ Again in

1. Misk, I, p. 19; Eclipse, trans. IV, p. 21; Ibn Athir, VIII, p. 46.

2. Ibid.

3. Misk, I, p. 20 : Eclipse, trans. IV, p. 22.

4. Misk, I, p. 76, Eclipse, trans. IV, p. 84.

5. Ibid., II, p. 23; bid., V, p. 24.

6. Ibn Athir, VIII, pp. 5-6; Mir Khwand, p. 717.

303/915 Muhammad b. Ali b. Suluk, a cousin of the governor of Khurasan who came to Baghdad demanding protection, was welcomed by the Caliph and presented with a robe of honour.¹

When the people of Sijistan revolted against the authority of the newly appointed Samnid ruler, Nasr II. and paid homage to Muqtadir, the Caliph assigned the province to his own men who imprisoned the officials of the Samanid ruler and sent them as prisoners to Baghdad in 301/913.² Even then the Samanids did not lift a finger against their legitimate suzerain, the Caliph, whom they considered justified in granting a piece of territory which they themselves had governed on payment of tribute to whomsoever he chose.

Whenever an opportunity arose, the Samanids waged holy war against the infidels. In 291/903 when the Turks entered Mawara al-Nahr, Ismail persuaded the Muslims to wage war against them, and with the help of the warriors for the Faith, he practically destroyed them. He sent a despatch relating these proceedings to Baghdad.³

The Samanids, being staunch Sunnis, were naturally opposed to any anti-Sunni movement during their jurisdiction, as it was also detrimental to their political interest. When Muhammad b. Zayd, governor of Tabaristan, attacked Jurjan in 289/991, Muhammad b. Harun, the general sent by Ismail, not only expelled the

1. Misk. I, p. 39; Eclipse. trans. IV, p. 43.

2. Ibn Athir, VIII, pp. 59-60.

3. Tabari, III, p. 2249; Ibn Athir, VII, p. 368.

Alids from Jurjan, but brought his own country Tabaristan under the jurisdiction of the Samanids, and caused the Khutbah to be read in the name of the Abbasid Caliph.¹ In 290/902 when Muhammad b. Harun, who had been appointed by Ismail as governor of Tabaristan rebelled against him, and threw off the allegiance of the Abbasids by defying the authority of the Caliphate and occupying Rayy against its will, Ismail, under instructions from the central government, proceeded to restore order in Rayy and expell the rebel.² He occupied Rayy whose government was assigned to him by the Caliphate on the stipulation of a regular payment of tribute³

The Qarmatian propaganda won several adherents amongst the Samanid officials and finally Amir Nasr himself became a convert to their teachings.⁴ The Ulama naturally resented the conversion of the Amir to heresy and they invoked the help of the Turkish guards who formed a plot to depose the Amir and offer the throne to the great Sipahsalar. The plot being discovered, the Amir's son Nuh ordered the leader of the conspirators to be executed, and Nasr announced his abdication in favour of his son, Nuh, against whom there was no

1. Ibid., p. 2208; Ibid, p. 357.

2. Ibn Athir, VII, p. 365.

3. Kremer, Ueber des Einnahmebudget des Abbasidenreichs, p. 28. The revenue of Rayy appears in the budget of Baghdad government for 306/918-19. In 314/926 when Ibn Abul Saj was given the government of Jibal and was ordered to fight the Qarmatians the government of Rayy was given to the Samanids and a person was sent to settle the Kharaj. See Misk. I, p. 149; Eclipse, trans. IV. p. 166. This clearly shows that Ismail had not annexed Rayy as it is mentioned in the article on Ismail in the Encyclopaedia of Islam by Barthold.

4. Nizam-ul-Mulk, Siyasatnamah, pp. 188-189; Al-Nadim, Fihrist, p. 188 ;

accusation of heresy. Nuh gave orders to imprison his father and put him in chains. Afterwards he ruthlessly persecuted the heretics, and their property, including the treasure of the deposed heretic Amir, was transferred to the orthodox. Hence forward the Shiites were completely suppressed and continued only as a secret sect.¹

The Samanids were not as ambitious as their predecessors, the Saffarids; and were content with what they could get out of the Caliphate by peaceful means. As the strongest Sunni power in Persia their opinion was invited even in the matter of an election of a Caliph.² They had inspired so much confidence through their loyalty that the Caliphs regarded their dominions as the last place of refuge in case of danger. When the Caliph Muqtadir was hard pressed by the Qarmatians, Ali Ibn Isa addressed the Caliph thus: "If another thing come about, then do thou depart to the remotest part of Khurasan."³

The Samanids were in return duly rewarded for their loyalty by the Caliphate. Without the least remonstrance, the central government granted them the very concessions which were grudged to others. So much was the Caliphate sure of their loyalty that the government of all those parts which were supposed to be on the verge of revolt was invariably assigned to

1. Ibid.

2. Misk. I, p. 4; Eclipse, trans. IV, p. 4.

At the time of the election of Muqtadir in 295/907, the wazir Abbas was waiting for the arrival of the chamberlain of Ismail b. Ahmad, ruler of Khurasan.

3. Misk, I, p. 181; Eclipse, trans. IV, p. 204.

them; while they, on their part, suppressed all such revolts, pacified the country and held it, if the Caliphate so desired, or else made it over to the Caliphate. In short, it can be concluded that perfect mutual harmony existed between the Abbasid Caliphate and the Samanid Amirs in their relations during this period.

CHAPTER VIII

Caliphate under the Buwayhid regime and it's Relations with Persian Rulers

With the capture of Baghdad by the Buwayhids¹ a new chapter opened in the history of the Caliphate. Almost all the temporal power of the Caliph was already taken over by various Amirs who had risen to power at Baghdad before the Buwayhids. The most important symbol of sovereignty, i.e., the coinage, had already been shared by them and many of the functions of the Wazir were taken over by the secretary of the Amir al-Umara. Even the revenue realized from several parts of the empire was not received directly by the Caliph, who was given an allowance just sufficient to meet his necessary expenses.² In spite of all this the Caliph was still considered the temporal as well as

1. See art. on Buwayhids in the *Encycl. of Islam*. After strengthening his position. Abul-Hasan Ali applied in 322 A.H. to the Caliph Radi, to invest him with the provinces which were already in his possession. The Caliph consented on condition of payment by him of eight million dirhams. Ali forcibly took the robe of honour and the standard from the Caliph's messenger and did not pay even a single penny. Cf. *Misk. I*, pp. 299-300. This shows the necessity of securing a deed of investiture from the Caliph; and also the attitude of the Buwayhids to recognize the Abbasid Caliphate.

2. *Misk. I*, p. 353; *Eclipse*, trans. IV, p. 396.

religious head of the Islamic community and orders were issued in his name. He still retained the right to appoint his own wazir, whose existence could not be ignored, especially when there were so many competitors for the rank of Amir al-Umara.

But with the advent of the Buwayhids to power at Baghdad, still worse was to come. Being Shias, they did not acknowledge the Caliphate to the Abbasids whom they considered as usurpers;¹ It was only for political motives that Muizz al-Daulah recognized the institution. His position in the beginning was not safe at all. After his peaceful occupation of Baghdad, he had to meet his rivals, the Hamdanids, who had already held the post of the Amir al-Umara. They nearly turned the scales of victory in their favour and it was only stroke of fortune that, by a mere stratagem. Muizz could retain possession of Baghdad in 334/945.² Besides he had to deal with the Baridis and the Qarmatians.

Muizz al-Daulah was aware of this opposition and therefore did not think it politic to alienate the sympathies of the majority of the population at Baghdad who were Sunnis.³ Perhaps he had a mind to replace the Abbasid Caliphate by an Alid one after completely establishing himself. He expressed desire to transfer the Caliphate to the family of Ali immediately after deposing the Caliph Mustakfi on a mere suspicion of

1. Ibn Athir, VIII, p. 399.

2. Ibid., p. 341.

3. Misk. II, p. 328; Eclipse, trans. V. p. 355.

intriguing against his authority. But he was checked in his design by the advice of one of his courtiers who pronounced it to be unsound policy, remarking, 'If trouble were to arise between yourself and the Abbasid Caliph, your followers who do not believe him to be the rightful claimant, will not hesitate even if you order them to kill him, but in case of an Alid Caliph, they will not hesitate to carry out his commands even if it be to kill you. These words appealed to Muizz who being actuated by personal considerations, dropped the proposal. Political considerations outweighed his religious sentiments and thus the choice fell on an Abbasid Caliph, Muti. Thus the Abbasid Caliphs obtained recognition at the hands of those who did not believe in their rights.¹

When the Buwayhids took charge of the administration of the Caliphate, a permanent Amirate with hereditary rights was established, and by these Amirs the Caliph was practically stripped of his remaining sovereign functions and privileges. Formerly the Caliph had wazir and the Amir al-Umara a secretary, but now it was the other way about. The Caliph had no hand in the actual appointment of the wazir and even the right of appointing the wazir and the governors in theory was shared by the Amirs.² The Caliph

1. Ibn Athir, VIII, pp. 339-40. This conversation is probably to be regarded not as a historically founded fact, but rather as a summing up of Ibn Athir's own reading of the situation. Nevertheless, in the present state of our knowledge, it appears to be a justifiable view.

2. Eclipse, trans. V, p. 399; quoted from Sabi's collections, 222-23.

Mustakfi was granted a daily allowance of five thousand dirhams,¹ but it was further reduced to two thousand on the appointment of his successor, the Caliph Muti² and that too was at the mercy of these Amirs. His personal estate, which yielded a yearly income of 200,000 dinars, was put in charge of a secretary;³ but this revenue, like the personal allowance, depended on the goodwill of the Buwayhid Amirs who might confiscate it if they so desired.⁴ Sometimes, when the Amirs were hard pressed for money, it was not unusual that a demand was made of the Caliphs to advance some money from their personal income towards the common exchequer; and the Caliphs being not in a position to resist such abnormal demands for fear of deposition, had to accede to them.⁵

The provincial governors or rulers who recognized the Abbasid Caliphate as a religious institution mentioned the Caliph's name in the Khutbah on Fridays and other ceremonial occasions, and this signified (as has been shown in the previous chapter) the religious recognition of the Caliphate by the rulers who were otherwise independent. But the Khutbah at Baghdad was also,

1. Ibn Athir, VIII, p. 338. Not dinars as mentioned in the History of the Saracens by Amir Ali, p. 303.

2. Misk. II, p. 17; Eclipse, trans. V, p. 91.

3. Ibid, p. 108; Ibid., p. 111.

4. Ibid., p. 344; Ibid., p. 377.

During the period of Muizz al-Daulah much of the personal property of the Caliph was confiscated and given to the soldiers.

5. Misk. II, p. 308; Eclipse, trans. V. 330. In 361/971 Bakhtiyar under the pretext of waging jihad realized 400,000 dirhams from the Caliph Muti, who, it was given out, had to sell some of his jewels and furniture, to meet this abnormal demand.

before the advent of the Buwayhids, a symbol of their political supremacy. During the regime of the latter, this prerogative of the Caliph also was encroached upon and the custom was started of having the name of the Amir conjoined with that of the Caliph in the Khutbah at Baghdad. Adud al-Daulah was the first to introduce the innovations,¹ and henceforward it became the usual practice for the subsequent Buwayhid Amirs. Although this prerogative was more under the control of the public than of either the Caliph or the Buwayhid Amir, yet Adud al-Daulah could show his high-handedness when he caused the omission of the name of the Caliph Tai for two whole months from all the pulpits under his control.² Generally, however, a request was made by the Amir to the Caliph for the inclusion of his name in the Khutbah at Baghdad, and this was usually granted. Since it was the most decisive sign of recognition of an Amir by the Caliph, great importance was attached even to the order in which the names followed after the name of the Caliph. One of the conditions of peace between Sharaf al-Daulah and his brother Samsan al-Daulah was that the former's name should be mentioned in the Khutbah at Baghdad after the Caliph's and before Samsan al-Daulah's name.³ The exclusion of the name of a certain Amir from the Khutbah at

1. Misk. II, p. 396; Eclipse, trans. V, p. 435; Ibn Athir, VIII, p. 597 Ibn Ra'iqs name was ordered to be mentioned in the Khutbah in all pulpits, (Cf. Ibn Athir, VIII, p. 241); but it is quite clear that these did not include the pulpits of Baghdad. It is noteworthy that this came about gradually, as distinct from that in the provincial cities.

2. Arnold, Caliphate, p. 62.

3. Misk. III, p. 124; Eclipse, trans. VI, p. 127.

Baghdad meant *ipso facto* the termination of his sovereignty at Baghdad. A striking illustration of this is furnished by the repeated inclusion and exclusion of the name of Jalal al-Daulah from the Khutbah at Baghdad.¹

In all these provinces which were under the political control of the Buwayhids the Khutbah contained not only the name of the Amir al-Umara at Baghdad alongside that of the Caliph, but sometimes those of other members of the Buwayhid family as well.² In those provinces, of course, where the rulers were politically independent of the Buwayhids, the latter were not included in the Khutbah, and only the name of the Abbasid Caliph was mentioned to signify the religious recognition of the institution.

In regard to the coinage, the Buwayhids not only shared but monopolised this symbol of sovereignty to such an extent that even the epithet Amir al-Muminin after the name of the Caliph was omitted.³ Only the name of the Caliph, generally on the reverse side, was kept on, whereas not only the name of the Amir al-Umara with his titles and kunya but also the name and title of the head of the Buwayhid family and sometimes that of the heir-apparent were inscribed on the coinage

1. Ibn Athir, IX, pp. 288 and 308-309.

2. Misk. II, p 115; Eclipse, trans. V. p. 118. In 337/948 in a treaty with Nasir al-Daulah, the Hamdanid, Muizz al-Daulah agreed at that his name as well as those of Imadal-Daulah and Bakhtiyar should be mentioned in the Khutbah recited in the territories.

3. Lane Poole. Coins of Muhammadan Dynasties, II, pp. 200-206.

minted at Baghdad.¹ Since the coinage was directly under the control of the Buwayhids, they could put on it even those titles which not granted to them by the Caliph.² It is very interesting to note that even the title Shahinshah appears on coins minted at Baghdad, although there is no historical evidence to show that such a title was ever granted to any of the Buwayhid rulers.³ before Jalal al-Daulah. The controversy that arose on the request of the latter for the grant of the title Malik al-Muluk, and which led to the setting up of a tribunal of Qadis to consider the legality of such a grant.⁵ It has an ample proof of the above statement. A study of the coinage shows how the pendulum of sovereignty swung from the Amir to the Caliph and vice versa. During the regime of powerful Amirs, the name of the Caliph appears generally on the reverse side, whereas during the reign of weak Buwayhids, it appears on the obverse side; and with the decline of the Buwayhid power, the Caliph Qadir succeeded in having even his

1. Lane-Poole. Coins of Muhammadan Dynasties, II, pp. 194-220. There is no coin minted during the Buwayhid regime, which bears the epithet. Amir al Muminin after the name of the Caliph.

2. Lane-Poole, Coins of Muhammadan Dynasties, II, pp. 200-206.

3. British Museum Catalogue A coin minted at Baghdad in the year 370 A.H. bears the title Shahinshah after the name of Adud al-Daulah. The above epithet is very frequent after the name of Baha al-Daulah. Even the title Malik al-Muluk appears on a silver coin minted at Hamadan in the year 406 A.H.

4. It is wrongly stated that Baha al-Daulah obtained the title of Shahinshah from the Caliph; and that the controversy with regard to Jalal al-Daulah was concerned with the recital of the above title in the Khutbah. Cf. Minorski, *La Domination des Dailamites* p. 18.

5. Ibn Athir, pp. 312-13,

son's name struck at the coinage minted at Baghdad.¹

Another prerogative hitherto exclusively reserved to the Caliph, that of having the drums sounded at his gate at the prayer times, was encroached upon by Aduḍ al-Daulah who compelled the Caliph to give orders that the drums should be sounded at his gate three times a day, morning, sunset and nightfall.² Henceforward it became the usual practice for the Buwayhid Amirs to have the drums sounded at their gates. Both Sultan al-Daulah and Jalal al-Daulah in spite of the remonstrances of the Caliph succeeded in having the drums sounded at their gates five times a day.³

The Buwayhids, ambitious as they were to rule, still found it expedient to allow the Caliphate to retain its sovereignty *de jure*. Consequently the functions of issuing the deed of investiture both on the change of a Caliph and an Amir remained intact and in force. Though it was a purely formal proceeding and the Caliph had no alternative but to issue such a deed to the winning party, yet its importance cannot be minimised as, in order to satisfy the public mind, the proceeding had to be gone through and there is not a single instance in which a deed was not asked for by a Buwayhid Amir. A formal assembly used to be held to which the high officials, various dignitaries of the court, commanders of the army and religious head, i.e., Qadis and Faqihs, were invited. The recipient of the

1. Lane-Poole, *Coins of Muhammadan Dynasties*, p. 219.

2. Misk. II, p. 396; *Eclipse*, trans. V. p. 435 Ibn Athir, VIII, p. 507.

3. Ibn Athir, IX, pp. 215, 255.

deed of investiture presented himself most humbly and solemnly before the Caliph whose hands he would kiss and then place the robes of honour on his head as a mark of reverence. Then the contents of the deed of investiture would be read aloud, and both the recipient Amir and the Caliph would bind themselves with mutual oaths, that of allegiance on the part of the former and fidelity on the part of the latter.¹ The public attached so much importance to this deed of investiture that at this period, it seems, it was still difficult for any ruler to establish his rights permanently without securing it. In cases of contending parties and usurpers it was considered a chief factor in establishing their claims.² But during the Buwayhid regime everything depended upon the reigning Amir, without whose consent the Caliph could not issue any such patent of sovereignty. In fact most of the governors and usurpers applied to the Buwayhid Amir for such grant rather than to the Caliph, who sometimes used to issue such deeds even if they were against his

1. Misk. III, pp. 84, 241 and 140; Eclipse, trans. VI, pp. 85, 146 and 254, respectively.

The words *بالوفا و خلوص التبع* have been misinterpreted as loyalty and fidelity; while the words *صدق الطاعة* have been mistranslated as fidelity. Cf. Misk. III, p. 240; Eclipse, trans. V, p. 254.

2. Misk. II, p. 239; Eclipse, trans. V, p. 254. After the imprisonment of his father by Abu Taghib, the Hamdanid, in 357/968, his right was contested by his brothers and in order to strengthen his cause, Abu Taghib offered 1, 200, 000 dirhams a year to Bakhtiyar for the renewal of the deed. Cf. the story told in Misk. III, p. 89; Eclipse, trans. VI, p. 91, that Muzaffar b. Ali, the Chamberlain of Abul Mali, governor of Marshes, bade his clerk write a letter in the name of the Caliph entrusting him with the administration.

own wish.¹ Not only the Amir al-Umara but any powerful Buwayhid ruler could render the whole proceeding a more mockery. When Bakhtiyar wanted to conciliate Fakhr al-Daulah in order to win his support against Adud al-Daulah, he had the Caliph Tai issue a deed of investiture to him and his commander, Sahlan b. Musafir, for the territories in their control as governors appointed by the Caliph and not as deputies of Adud al-Daulah as previously arranged. Sahlan was also granted the title of Ismat at-Daulah and was called by his kunya. But both these persons, owing to their fear of Adud al-Daulah could not even venture to don the robes of honour neither did Sahlan dare to assume his title.²

Another prerogative of the Caliphate was to bestow honours and this was the only thing left to them by which they could flatter or please a certain Amir. Since there was a regular craze amongst the Amirs to obtain flattering titles from the Caliphs,³ the latter were very careful about the grant of them and great ingenuity was exercised in devising a suitable title in each case. Even the use of the kunya by the Caliph was considered to be an honour and sometimes persons

1. Misk, II, pp. 156, 57; Eclipse, trans. V, p. 167. Ibn Muhtaj secured the deed of investiture through Rukn al-Daulah, for the province of Khurasan which was in the possession of Sunni rulers, the Samanids.

2. Misk, II, pp. 364-65; Eclipse, trans. V, pp. 398-99.

3. Ibid., p. 321; Ibid., p. 346.

* When peace was made between Bakhtiyar and Abu Taghib, it was also agreed that the latter should receive a title. Bakhtiyar secured the title of Adud al-Daulah from the Caliph.

of high rank insisted on receiving this honour.¹ In this respect too the Caliphs were prevailed upon by their Buwayhid masters to grant them high sounding titles beyond all proportion to their merits; whilst, much as they would have liked to do so, they could not grant any title worth mentioning to the Samanids, who were more loyal to the Caliphate than any contemporary Persian ruler. Usually a request for the grant of a title was made not to the Caliph direct but to the Buwayhid Amir at Baghdad who generally secured the title demanded for his favourites. In this respect, too, a new practice was adopted by the Buwayhids; not being content with the titles conferred on them by the Caliphs, some of them assumed titles of their own accord.²

For political reasons, the Buwayhid Amirs had various important orders issued in the Caliph's name and bearing his seal of which he was the sole custodian. His signature was also required on all important correspondence that was carried on with the provincial governors,⁴ and even on contracts made with the officials effecting the assessment.⁴ But this appears to have been a purely formal proceeding; the Amir made what-

1. Misk. II, p. 346; Eclipse, trans. V, p. 376. When Adud al-Daulah wanted to conciliate Bakhtiyar's wazir, the latter demanded the confirmation of his title and the use of his kunya by the Caliph.

2. As already stated the Buwayhids assumed the titles of Shahinshah and Malik al-Muluk which were definitely not granted to them.

3. Misk. II, p. 844; Eclipse, trans. V, p. 373.

4. Ibid., p. 129; Ibid., p. 132.

ever arrangements suited him and sent the documents to the Caliph for signature.

Being Shias, the Buwayhids had no respect for the Abbasid Caliphs and this explains the humiliating treatment accorded to the Caliphs by them. It was during their regime that the Caliphs, on formal occasions, visited the Amirs in person.¹ Even the formal ceremony of election was done away with and the Buwayhids nominated whomsoever they would from amongst family and could depose the Caliphs at will.²

The whole position of the Abbasid Caliphate under the Buwayhid regime can be best described in the words of the Caliph, Muti (334-63/946-74) who being asked by Bakhtiyar to contribute to the expenses of the Sacred War out of his personal income, replied: "The Sacred War would be incumbent on me if the world

1. Misk. II, p. 396; Eclipse. trans. V, p. 435.

In 363/978 the Caliph Tai went out to meet Adud al-Daulah with the whole of the resident army. The Caliph Tai also went to offer condolence to Baha al-Daulah. Cf. Misk. III, p. 152-53; Eclipse, trans. VI, p. 158-59.

2. Misk. II, p. 36; Eclipse, trans. V. p. 90; Ibn Athir, VIII, pp. 333-39. In 334/946 Muizz al-Daulah deposed the Caliph Mustakfi on a mere suspicion that he was maintaining a secret correspondence with the Hamdanids against him (Muizz). When the Caliph was holding an assembly to receive an envoy from Khurasan two Daylamites at Muizz's instigation entered the assembly, dragged the Caliph from his throne and took him on foot to Muizz's palace where he was confined. Muti, who had sought protection with Muizz owing to his enmity with the late Caliph Mustakfi and is said to have excited Muizz against him, was raised to the office of the Caliphate.

In 381/991 Baha al-Daulah actuated by his greed for the supposed wealth of the Caliph Tai, deposed the latter and installed his cousin Qadir in his place. Misk. III, p. 201; Eclipse, trans. VI, p. 213.

were in my hands, and if I had the management of the none and the troops. As things are, when all I have is a pittance insufficient for my wants, and the world is in your hands and those of the provincial rulers, neither the Sacred War, nor the Pilgrimage, nor any other matter requiring the attention of the Sovereign is a concern of mine. All you can claim from me is the name which is uttered in the Khutbah from your pulpits as a means of pacifying your subjects ; and if you want me to renounce that privilege too, I am prepared to do so and leave everything to you".¹ No doubt these words were written in a state of utter despondency and in order to avoid the unjustifiable payment of money, yet they show the utter subservience of the Caliph to his merciless masters. The position of the Caliphs, however, was not so utterly hopeless as is represented by the above words. The same Caliph who was unwilling to part with some of his wealth to be spent on the Sacred War and the Pilgrimage, could find money to spend on the erection of three palaces which were of such considerable size that in the following century together with the remains of the old palace of the Taj in whose grounds they were created, they are said to have occupied about a third of the total area of East Baghdad.²

In spite of the insignificance to which the Caliphate at Baghdad had fallen, and the utter disregard in which the Caliphs were held by their Shia masters,

1. Misk. II, pp. 307-308; Eclipse, trans. V, p. 330; Ibn Athir, VIII, p. 456.

2. Levy, Baghdad Chronicle pp. 162-63.

their prestige as the religious head of the Sunni Muslims was such that even the Buwayhids felt proud to offer their daughters and sisters in marriage to them; and could never get one in return.¹ In this capacity, they received deputations from various independent Muslim (Sunni) rulers to whom they issued deeds of investiture and from whom they received costly presents on various occasions;² and they addressed the pilgrims on their way to or from Mecca.³ Even the Buwayhid Amirs, in order to impress on men's minds the majesty and dignity of the Caliphs exalted office, considered it politic to display great pomp and show on ceremonial occasions.⁴ Besides, the Buwayhid Amirs considered it one of their duties to maintain the prestige and integrity of the Caliphate in the eyes of the Muslim princes by asking them to pay homage to it by mentioning the name of the Caliph in the Khutbah and coinage in their territories.⁵ Even the Buwayhid rulers in Persia, Shias

1. Eclipse, trans. V, p. 454. In the year 369 A.H., it is mentioned that Adud al-Daulah arranged an alliance between himself and the Caliph Tai by marrying the Caliph's eldest daughter. It is obviously a mistake in the translation as it is Adud al-Daulah's daughter. The context makes it quite clear on p. 14, VI (Eclipse) where it is mentioned that in the year 371 A.H., on his return to Baghdad, Adud al-Daulah, was told that Tai disliked his daughter.

2. Bayhaqi, p. 361. It was customary with the Sunni independent rulers to send costly presents to the Caliph.

3. Misk. III, p. 250; Eclipse, trans. VI, pp. 265-66.

4. A vivid description of a grand assembly that was held to receive the Egyptian Ambassador is given by Prof. Arnold in the Caliphate, pp. 66-67.

5. When in 402/1010 the Uqaylid Amir Qarwash b. Muqallad mentioned the name of Hakim, the Alid Caliph of Egypt, in the Khutbah in all his provinces, Mausil, Anbar, Kufa and Madain,

thought they were, continued to recognize the Abbasid Caliphate by fulfilling the above obligations:¹ and in order to impress on the public mind the legality of their claims received deeds of investiture from the Caliph² and put on the robes of honour sent by the latter with great pomp and show.³

At Baghdad there were certain religious obligations which could only be fulfilled by the Caliphs themselves; and in spite of the efforts of the Buwayhids to usurp those functions, the Caliph succeeded in retaining them. For instance, the appointment of the Qadis remained a prerogative of the Caliph even during this period of degradation. It was impossible for any Qadi to hold his office unless he was directly appointed by the Caliph. When Muizz al-Daulah in 350/961 not only appointed the chief Qadi without the sanction of the Caliph but actually farmed the post for 200,000 dirhams

etc., the Caliph Qadir protested against it and sent the Qadi Abu Bakr to Baha al-Daulah asking him to take action. The latter sanctioned one hundred thousand dinars towards the expenses of the army and ordered one of his commanders to bring Qarwash to his senses. The latter was compelled to drop the name of the Egyptian Caliph from the Khutbah and re-inserts that of the Abbasid Cf. Ibn Athir, IX, p. 157. Being a Shia, Baha al-Daulah was placed in an awkward situation and to justify his action in having the name of the Egyptian Caliph dropped from the Khutbah he caused a document (Madhar) to be drawn up in 432/1011 by the Qadis and the Shia Ulama in which the claims of the Egyptian Caliphs were denounced Cf. Ibn Athir, IX, p. 166.

1. The name of the Abbasid Caliph appears on all the coins minted in the territories administered by the Buwayhids in Persia. Cf. Lane-Poole, *Coins of Muhammadan Dynasties*.

2. Misk. II, pp. 364-65; Eclipse, trans. V, pp. 398-99.

3. Ibid., p. 119; 1bid., p. 123.

Rukn al-Daulah when he received the robes of honour for the Provinces of Khurasan, donned them in public and read his deed in the public mosque,

a year,¹ things did not pass off quite smoothly for him. The Caliph declined to receive his nominee and would not permit him to be presented to him even on reception days; and two years later, when he was removed, his successor set aside all his judgments on the ground that he had bought his office.² When Baha al-Daulah wanted to place the judicial system under the Shia chief judge, he could not succeed owing to the refusal of the Caliph to nominate him. Consequently the otherwise all-powerful Buwayhid Amir had to content himself with a separate office-holder, called Naqib, to administer justice amongst the Shias according to their code of law.³

A transcript of the letter of appointment of the chief Qadi in the name of the Caliph in 366/976 in the *Rasail as-Sabi*⁴ is of interest as indicating the substantial independence still enjoyed by the officers of justice. Since most of the Qadis received a very meagre allowance, just enough to maintain themselves and their family, or sometimes even no salary at all,⁵ they were little inclined to yield to political pressure and

1. Misk. II, p. 189; Eclipse, trans. V, p. 205; Ibn Athir, VIII, p. 399.

2. Misk II, p. 196; Eclipse, trans. V, p. 212; Ibn Athir, VIII, p. 407.

3. Ibn Athir, IX, p. 129.

4. Mez, *Renaissance of Islam*, trans. Khuda Bakhsh, pp. 229-30; quoted from *Rasail as Sabi*, pp. 118-27, The Qadi is enjoined to study the Quran constantly and offer prayers punctually. He is to show impartiality in matters of justice between Muslim and non-Muslims. He is authorised to select Attestore discreetly and to employ an experienced legally trained Katib, an incorruptible court usher (Hajib) and a trustworthy deputy for work if he cannot personally attend to it.

5. Misk. II, p. 196; Eclipse, trans. V, p. 212.

feared neither Caliph nor Amir.¹

Besides delivering justice, one of the chief duties of the Qadis was to prepare a list of Attestors (public notaries) who should be of irreproachable character. The Qadis were punctilious in filling up this list; every six months fresh nominations were made and undesirable names were removed.² From among those Attestors were chosen a fixed number of persons to constitute a body of assessors to assist the Qadis.³ The assessors were appointed personally by the Qadis and had to vacate their posts automatically on the removal or dismissal of the Qadi who had appointed them.⁴ That in the selection of the Attestors the Qadis were not influenced by the temporal authorities, can be illustrated by the fact that when Adud al-Daulah's general asked him to direct the Qadi to include a name in the list of Attestors he gave the following reply. 'You should speak about the promotion of soldiers. The inclusion of names in the list of Attestors is the Qadi's business. Neither you nor I have any voice in the matter.'⁵ The Caliph as the religious head could intervene if in his opinion any person of doubtful character was included in the list of Attestors. Yet

1. Mez, *Renaissance of Islam*, trans. Khuda Bakhsh p. 213. The Baghdad Qadi al-Isfaraini (d. 406/1016) could say to the Caliph Qadir that he dare not dismiss him. On the contrary he—the Qadi—need only to write to Khurasan to shake the Caliph's throne. Cf. also the well-known instance of Mawardi's decision against Jalal al-Daulah receiving the title of Malak-ul-Muluk (Ibn Athir, IX, pp. 312-13).

2. Mez, *Renaissance of Islam*, trans. by Khuda Bakhsh, pp. 227-28.

3. Ibid. 4. Ibid. 5. Ibn Athir, IX, p. 15.

sometimes the position of a Qadi was rendered very precarious if pressure was brought to bear upon him by the reigning Amir; and in such cases usually a compromise was effected.¹

The Imams of the mosques were directly responsible to the Caliph and generally had to carry out his orders. Of course the Buwayhid Amirs could, if they so desired, prevent the Caliph's orders from being carried out; nevertheless, they generally did not interfere with them owing to public sentiment. The Imams were also responsible for seeing that no innovations were introduced in the Khutbah. In 420/1029, when the Shias introduced a innovation in the Khutbah at Karkh, the Caliph appointed a khatib and although he was stoned and prayers were stopped, yet subsequently the Shia leaders apologized to the Caliph and asked his permission to read the Khutbah in his name in the usual manner, which was done.²

1. Misk. III, pp. 270-80; Eclipse, trans. VI, pp 205. Two traders while in Mecca on pilgrimage had employed a person who was not officially recognized as Attestor. When the purchaser invoked the help of the Buwayhid Amir (Baha al-Daulah) who issued orders to his representative at Baghdad to see to the ratification, the Qadis were placed in a very awkward situation. One of them who did not carry out the instructions of the Buwayhid Amir was rebuked by the representative of the Amir and had to leave his place; while the other three were summoned by the Caliph who severely rebuked and detained them in his palace. The Caliph also issued orders that the names of those Qadis and the Attestors be strack off the list and their discharge be proclaimed from the pulpit. The whole matter was compromised only by bringing to the Caliph's notice that his orders could very well be stopped from being carried out; and that one of the Attestors in question was the only respectable living marginal witness to the deposition of the late Caliph.

2. Ibn Athir, I. p. 278.

That the religious functions were still under the control of the Caliph is borne out by the fact that when the Caliph Qaim in 426/1034 felt annoyed with Jalal al-Daulah, he, in order to bring the latter to his senses, issued orders to the Qadis, Faqihs, Imams and persons in charge of marriages to suspend their functions.¹ .

It was during this period of degradation that systematic exposition of the theoretical position of the office of the Caliphate was given by one of the most important jurists of Islam, Ali Ibn Muhammad al-Mawardi (381/450/991-1058). The motive of the latter in propounding a theory which stands in such glaring contrast to the actual facts and practice may perhaps be found in the fact that at this time not only the Buwayhids (who being Shias had no real respect for the Abbasids) but also the Muslim Sunni independent rulers, out of the political necessity, had begun to ignore the existence of certain Caliphs at Baghdad.² In such circumstances there was grave danger of the utter destruction of the institution with the consequent result of the disappearance of that semblance of Islamic unity that existed between the various Sunni States owing to their common bond of allegiance, however nominal, to their religious head. It is quite possible that Mawardi may have written this treatise on the institution of the Muslim State at the instigation of the Caliph with the object of showing the importance of the Caliphate and

1. Ibn Athir, p. 300.

2. The Samanids, as will be shown later, did not recognize the Caliph Muti for about ten years and the Caliph Tai at all.

bringing the necessity of its existence before the notice of the Buwayhids, the Sunni public and the Sunni Muslim independent rulers, notwithstanding the apparent weakness of its actual situation.¹ But is it not more likely that it was the very fact of the excessive weakness of the Caliphate that instigated him to write his work as a reminder to the Sunni Muslim world and its rulers that the Caliphate was not a casual political institution which had outlived its day, but a divinely ordained institutions which formed an integral part of the religious structure of Islam. It is absurd to suppose that a man of the intelligence of Mawardi should have composed such a treatise as a mere essay in theoretical idealism. Hence he sets out to show that the Caliphate ought to be, and ignores its actual weak and degraded position in bondage to the Buwayhids; at the same time, like all Sunni jurists, he is concerned to rebut the argument that the community has been living in sin, and hence finds it necessary to give legal sanction to a variety of practices which to a certain extent are in conflict with the religious ideal. Thus, in consideration of the practice of his time, he devises a category of temporal governors whom he calls Amirs by force within which the Buwayhids and other independent princes of his time such as the Ghazanavide can be placed, but endeavours to mitigate this concession and brings it within the principles of the Islamic Law by laying down

1. The high regard in which Mawardi was held by the Caliph is shown by the fact that he was the first to bear the title 'Aqdal-Qadat (Yaqut, *Irshad*, V, p. 467). Mawardi was several times employed on diplomatic service by the Caliph; and his chief mission was to induce the Muslim rulers to pay homage to the Abbasid Caliphate Cf. Ibn Athir, IX, p. 234.

certain conditions to be fulfilled by them for the validity of their claims.

An Amir by force, according to Mawardi, is a person who, without the knowledge or consent of the Caliph, takes possession of certain territories by force of arms; and the Caliph, being powerless to prevent his seizure of temporal power, entrusts him with the entire administration of those possessions.¹ In this case, says Mawardi, "The Amir would be a permanent ruler but the Imam or Caliph, by the nature of his position as religious head, would be considered the source of all orders relating to religion so that an illegal and unconstitutional Amirate may be validated as legal and constitutional". For the installation of such a usurper, seven conditions are then laid down which he must needs fulfil.

1. He should preserve and respect the dignity of the Caliph as the supreme religious head of the entire Muslim community.

2. He should make open religious submission to the Caliph so that there may not be any suspicion of opposition to him.

3. He should remain on good terms with the Caliph, and render him assistance in all common matters of Islam in order to maintain the prestige of Islam in the eyes of strangers.

4. He should maintain religious rights and should

1. Mawardi, *Ahkam al-Sultaniyah*, p. 32,

see that orders and decisions relating thereto are not set aside.¹

5. He should collect revenue in accordance with the laws prescribed by the Shariah, and should exercise justice and equity therein.

6. He should watch that criminal justice is administered with fairness.

7. He should protect the faith and encourage it, and should abstain from all forbidden things. If he finds people obedient to the religious laws, then he should give them their religious rights, if on the other hand, he finds them indifferent, he should extend to them the invitation of Islam.²

It has already been shown that the Buwayhids, being Shias, had no belief in, and consequently no regard for, the religious claims of the Abbasid Caliphate; therefore they could not sincerely comply with those obligations which were of a purely religious character. They did show outward respect to the office of the Caliphate and tried to maintain its prestige in the public eye; but that was mainly to serve their own political ends. On the other hand, they did certain things which further degraded the position of the Caliph; and gave much offence to the Sunnis at Baghdad.

1. This clause is rendered in *Orient under the Caliphs*, trans. by Khuda Bakhsh, p. 277, as 'To respect the Caliph's nomination to religious offices, e.g., Qadis and Imams'. This is a gross misinterpretation of the fourth condition given on page 33 of *Ahkam al-Sultaniyah*.

2. Mawardi, *Ahkams Sultanio*, 230-33.

As soon as Muizz al-Daulah thoroughly established himself at Baghdad, he tried to bring the Shia element, which constituted only a small portion of the population¹ into prominence at the expense of the Sunni majority. The State encouragement given to the Shias emboldened them to the extent of writing the following words in bold letters on the mosques and houses of the Sunnis in 351/962, 'May God curse Muawiyah Ibn Abi Sufyan who usurped the Caliphate; those who confiscated Fadak from Fatimah, those who prevented Hasan from being buried by the side of his maternal grandfather, those who banished Abu Dharr al-Ghifari and those who turned out Ibn Abbas from the Council. When it was found effaced during the night, Muizz al-Daulah was advised to replace them with, "May God curse the doers of wrong against the family of the Prophet of Allah, not mentioning the name of anybody except Muawiyah."'²

1. Misk. II, p. 326 ; Eclipse, transe. V, p. 355,

2. Ibn Athir, VIII, p. 403,

In the following year (352/963) Muizz al-Daulah introduced the ceremony of the tenth of Muharram. All the shops and market were ordered to be closed on that day and people were made to put on clothes made of hair cloth to lament the event of the martyrdom of Husayn. The women were made to come out with dishevelled hair and blackened faces, and go round the city and its suburbs beating their faces in mourning.¹ The other chief festival of the Shias, namely Idal-Ghadir, was celebrated with great rejoicings. The official quarters were illuminated and shops were kept open all night.² With Muizz al-Daulah at the helm of State affairs, the Caliph was unable to stop these innovations which were hurting the sentiments of the Sunnis, and in spite of the resentment of the latter they were carried on by the Shias.

Even the two most important religious functions of the Caliph, i.e., waging of Jihad and supervision of the Pilgrimage were neglected during the Buwayhid regime. The Caliph shirked the responsibility for fulfilling the above obligations by saying that these duties belonged to those who had undertaken the administration of the Empire, whilst the Buwayhids, being Shias, did not care to discharge them as they involved expenditure without any definite personal advantage to them.

During this period of irresponsibility especially when the Hamdanids attention was divided between

1. Ibn Athir p. 407.

2. The sacred cities at this time being in the hands of the Fatmids,

fighting with the Byzantines¹ on the one hand and the Buwayhids on the other, the former were able to raid the Muslim territories and cause incalculable damage to Muslims lives and property. The horrors committed by them touched the heart of every Muslim save those of the Caliph and the Buwayhid Amir.² In the year 361/972, when the Byzantines raided Nisibin, took possession of the place and burnt it down, killing men and taking children captive, a number of people from Diyar Rabia and Diyar Bakr came to Baghdad summoning the Muslims to arms in the public mosques and in the streets. It was only then that a number of people of Baghdad joined them and they all went to the

1. In 351/962, the Byzantines entered 'Ain Zarba and massacred about 660,000 Muslims; the Domesticus remained on Islamic territory for twenty-one days, took fifty-four forts, and massacred 400,000 citizens of the town of Tarsus. Cf. Misk. II, pp 190-91. In 353/965 about 200,000 men, women and Muslim children were dragged to the Byzantine country, the public mosque of Tarsus was turned into a stable and many Muslims were forcibly converted to Christianity. Cf. Misk. II, p. 211, Eclipse, trans. V, p. 225.

2. Misk. II, p. 202; Eclipse, trans. V, pp 216-17. In 355/966 about 20,000 Khurasanis including various jurists and Shaykhs, proclaiming themselves bent on the Sacred War, asked the permission of Rukn al Daulah to cross the frontier. Such permission being given to them, they demanded a huge sum of money, saying, 'We require the entire land tax of the province which is in your hands, for you may only collect it for the Treasury of the Muslims, to be used in case of emergency; and there can be no greater emergency than the ambition of the Byzantines and Armenians to conquer us and gain possession of our frontiers, and the inability of the Muslims to resist them'. They also demanded that an army should be sent out to join them, but when their demands were not met, they proceeded to quarrel with the Daylamites whom they cursed as unbelievers. Their quarrel with the Daylamites led to a conflict with Rukn al-Daulah who, through a stratagem, defeated them. Thus they all were dispersed and went back to Rayy whence they had come. Cf. Misk. II, pp. 222-27; Eclipse, trans. V, pp. 234-41; Ibn Athir, VIII, pp. 421-22.

palace of the Caliph Muti and succeeded in gaining admission to him by breaking through the windows. They employed insolent language to him, telling him that he was incompetent to discharge the duties which God had enjoined upon the Imams. The leading men of Baghdad came to remonstrate with Bakhtiyar who though ostensibly visiting the martyrrium was really on a hunting expedition. They addressed him in the following words. "You are neglecting the interests of the Muslims and, instead of devoting your energies to an attack on the Byzantines, you are wasting them on a fight with Imaran who is one of the people of the Qiblah." Bakhtiyar promised to return, make peace with Imaran and come back to the frontiers. On his return to Wasit, he sent orders to Abu Taghlib, governor of Mausil, asking him to prepare sufficient provisions and fodder for himself and his army since he intended to make a raid on the Byzantines. He also sent an order to Sabuktakin, the Chamberlain who was in Baghdad, to join in the Sacred War with him. Although the latter found an unexpected response from the public to his hypocritical call, yet, being undesirous of leading them, he kept them as a sort of reserve for himself, in consequence of which they became a serious source of trouble. Being inactive they began to quarrel with each other, killing each other, plundering each other, plundering each other's goods and violating each other's women-folk. The matter assumed grave proportions and instead of using their energies in the Sacred War for which they were assembled they devoted them to the devastation of Baghdad itself.¹ It was

1. Misk, II, pp. 303-305 ; Eclipse, trans. V, pp. 326-27.

not without irony that Bakhtiyar under the pretext of waging Sacred War extracted 400,000 dirhams from the Caliph Muti on this occasion.¹

It is no wonder that during this period the route of the pilgrim caravans was not safe.² Such was the neglect of both the Caliph and the Buwayhid Amirs in this wise that Badr b. Hasanwayh, a Kurdish chief, transmitted five thousand dinars with the caravan from Khurasan to be spent in guarding the road. Later on he increased the sum to nine thousand, finally raising his contribution to the sum of 20,000 dinars annually. When he died in 405/1014, this stoppage seriously affected the beneficiaries ; whereupon the pilgrimage came to a standstill.³

The utter subservience of the Caliphs to the Buwayhids, who had taken over all the powers without any corresponding duties or responsibility, was also to affect the relations of the Caliphate with those Sunni

1. Misk. II, p. 308 ; Ibid., p. 330.

2. In 353/964 the Kurds made a united attack on the pilgrim caravan that was returning to Khurasan, and seized and plundered it near Hulwan whither the pilgrims returned. Cf. Misk., II, p. 203 ; Eclipse, trans. V, p. 217. Again in 355/966 a vast caravan consisting of pilgrims, merchants and refugees from Syria to Iraq who were migrating for fear of the Byzantines, was robbed by the Banu Sulaym. Some of the people returned to Egypt but most of them perished. Cf. Misk. II, p. 215, trans. V, p. 228.

3. Misk. III, p. 287 ; Eclipse, trans. VI, p. 306. In addition to this he transmitted a sufficient amount of money to be expended in repairing the road or to be given to the descendants of the Refugees and Helpers in the two sanctuaries, or to the nobles, ascetics, Quran readers and members of distinguished families in Baghdad ; thus raising his contribution to the sum of 20,000 dinars annually.

independent rulers who were the political rivals of the Buwayhids. In this category fall the Samanids whose relations shall now be traced.

With the establishment of the Buwayhid power at Baghdad, the relations between the Caliphate and the Samanids could not have been the same they were before. The Samanids were well aware of the fact that, as the political rivals of the Buwayhids in Persia, they would be required continuously to wage war against over the possession of Rayy, Jibal, Tabaristan, and even Khurasan ; and that the Caliph, being a puppet in the hands of the Buwayhids, was a mere instrument to serve their ends. Therefore any orders of the Caliph affecting the political position of the Samanids in Persia could not very well be obeyed. To send any tribute or even presents to the Caliphate¹ under such circumstances was to fill the coffers of the Buwayhids, and it would be used against the Samanids themselves.² Even realizing all these factors, the Samanids did not hesitate to recognize the Caliph Muti who was set up by the Buwayhids after their most insulting deposition of the Caliph Mustakfi on the occasion of a grand assembly which was held in honour of the reception given to the Khurasani ambassador.³ This humiliating treatment meted out to the Caliph coupled with the insult done to their own ambassador should have been a

1. Misk. II, pp. 307-308 ; Eclipse, trans. V, pp. 330 ; Ibn Athir, VIII, p. 466.

2. Misk. II, pp. 143-44 ; Eclipse, trans. V, p. 151. In 341/952 on the occasion of the invasion of Rayy by the Khurasanis, Rukn al-Daulah received a million dirhams on demand from Muizz al-Daulah in addition to other help given in the shape of forces,

3. Misk, II, p. 86 ; Eclipse trans. V, p. 90.

sufficient cause for the Samanids to break off all relations with the Caliphate by not recognizing the Caliph Muti, who by means of an intrigue against the late Caliph Mustakfi and currying favour with the Buwayhids, was raised to the Caliphate.¹ But the Samanids waited till their own political interests were in jeopardy. For about two years they continued to recognize the Caliph Muti² but afterwards they ceased to pay homage to him. There is no definite historical evidence to show the real cause that led the Samanids to take this abrupt step. Most probably it was the outcome of the rebellion of Abu Ali Ibn Muhtaj, the commander of the Khurasani forces, instigated by the Buwayhids³ in alliance with Ibrahim, the Hamdanids at Mausil. In 334/945, Abu Ali invited Ibrahim b. Ahmad to Khurasan informing him that he (Abu Ali) had appointed him sovereign and obtained allegiance for him from his followers. Ibrahim was also supported by Nasir al-Daulah who sent him robes of honour and tied a

1. Cf. p. 60 above.

2. Misk. II, pp. 156-57; Eclipse, trans. V, p. 167; Ibn Athir, VIII, p. 381. Both the above historians state that the Caliph Muti was not recognized by the Samanids from the time of his accession to the Caliphate, and Ibn Muhtaj was the first to introduce his name in the Khutbah in 343/954 in Khurasan. But in view of the fact that there exists a coin No. 359 minted at Bukhara in the year 355 A. H. bearing the name of the Caliph Muti, it becomes difficult to accept their statement. Cf. Lane-Poole, *Coins of Muhammadan Dynasties*, p. 98.

3. Misk. II, pp. 100-101; Eclipse, trans. V, p. 106.

One of the conditions of peace between Rukn al-Daulah and Nuh was that Imad al-Daulah would help the former against Abu Ali. Imad al-Daulah at the same time instigated Abu Ali by sending him a missive that he (Imad al-Daulah) remained constant in his attachment and alliance with him and warned him against the treachery of Nuh,

a banner for him in the name of the Caliph Muti.¹ Rayy was evacuated by Abu Ali Ibn Muhtaj for Rukn al-Daulah who also occupied Jibal in the year 335/946. The same year Nuh was routed by the combined forces of the opposition, and Abu Ali and Ibrahim entered Bukhara where they captured the stores and treasures that were there, and had homage paid to Ibrahim. On this occasion Abu Ali, communicating the joyful intelligence to Imad al-Daulah, asked the latter to secure a deed of investiture with the government of Khurasan for Ibrahim.² It was perhaps to nullify the importance of such deeds that Nuh decided on this action, and continued not to recognize the Caliph Muti for full nine years.³

The position in which the Samanids, who were staunch Sunnis, now found themselves was most embarrassing. As a religious institution of the Sunni community the Abbasid Caliphate had to be recognized by mentioning the name of the Caliph in the Khutbah on Fridays and other ceremonial occasions, and by having the name of the Caliph inscribed on the coinage current in their dominion ; and they had in return to secure the renewal of the deed of investiture on the demise of every Amir in order to legalise their administration. Since Nuh b. Nasr held the deed from the

1. Misk. pp. 101-102 ; Eclipse, trans. V, p. 107 ; Ibn Athir VIII, p. 344.

2. Misk. II, pp. 101-102 ; Eclipse, trans. V, p. 107-108 ; Ibn Athir, VIII, p. 344.

3. Lane-Poole, Coins of Muhammadan Dynasties, pp. 99-102. All the coins minted from 336 to 344 A. H. in the territories of the Samanids bear the name of the Caliph Mustakfi who was deposed and blinded by the Buwayhids in 334/945.

late Caliph Mustakfi, he could very well afford not to recognize the Caliph Muti set up by the Buwayhids. In order to fulfil the other obligations, i.e., the offering of the prayers in the name of the Abbasid Caliph and inscribing his name on the coinage, the Amir hit on the ingenious device of continuing to mention the name of the late Caliph in the Khutbah and inscribing it on coinage as well. But the position became ridiculous when the deposed and blinded Caliph died in 338/949,¹ and the Samanids continued to put his name on the coinage till 344/955. This was the first occasion when political necessity compelled the rulers to devise such an expedient by which they could ignore the orders of the Caliphs but at the same time could satisfy the public sentiment by putting the name of the dead Caliph in the Khutbah and on the coinage;² thus recognizing the necessity of the institution and yet disregarding the sacrilegious moves of wire-pullers. It was this example, first set by the Samanids, that was followed later on, though in modified form, by the Mongols who, when converted to Islam, needed such an expedient.³

1. Ibn Athir, VIII, p. 338.

2. Ibid., p. 341. As a temporary expedient Nasir al-Daulah also adopted the same line of action. While at war with Muizz al-Daulah in 334/945, he prohibited any transaction with the coins bearing the name of the Caliph Muti, and had the new coins struck with the die bearing the name of the Caliph Muttaqi.

3. For political reasons, the Mongols, when converted to Islam, did not want to recognize the Egyptian Caliphate but at the same time they wanted to satisfy their own consciences as well as those of the public by mentioning the name of some Caliph in the Khutbah and coinage. Consequently they hit on another noble device by giving this honour to the first four Caliphs or, if Shias, to the twelve Imams whom they considered the only lawful Caliphs. Cf. Lanc-Poole, *Coins of Muhammadan Dynasties*, pp. 47-48.

The period between 336/947 and 344/955 when the Samanids did not recognize the Caliph Muti was full of political rivalry between them and Rukn al-Daulah who, actuated by the disturbed political condition, was bent upon carving out as big an independent State as possible. Ever since the death of Mardawij in 323/934, and later on of Makan in 329/940, there had been a scramble for power between various claimants amongst whom the Samanids and Rukn al-Daulah played an important part by encouraging and welcoming each other's rivals to gain their own political ends. It was therefore natural for the Samanids to discontinue their recognition of Muti who was made to issue various orders against the Samanids during this period, Rukn al-Daulah went so far as to ask his brother Muizz al-Daulah to obtain a deed of investiture for him for the government of Khurasan in 337/948 which was actually done by the latter.¹ Rukn al-Daulah donned his robes of honour and appeared in public to convince them of his rightful claims ; and recited his deed of investiture with the government of Khurasan in the presence of the judges, military commanders and notables.² Again in 343/954 Abu Ali Ibn Muhtaj when dismissed by the Samanid ruler Nuh b. Nasr, raised the standard of revolt against the Khurasani government, sought the help of Rukn al-Daulah and asked him to secure a deed from the Caliph. Muizz al-Daulah received the envoy of Abu Ali with great honour and introduced him to the Caliph Muti, who issued a deed of investiture to

1. Misk. II, p. 118 ; Eclipse, trans. V, p. 122.

2. Misk. II, p. 119 ; Eclipse, trans. V, p. 123.

Abu Ali in place of Nuh b. Nasr. Muizz al-Daulah also despatched Abu Mansur Lashkarwaz to reinforce Abu Ali. The latter omitted the name of the ruler of Khurasan from the Khutbah at Nishapur in the year 343/954 and inserted that of the Caliph Muti.¹ But such actions had no effect on the minds of the public who knew very well the abject position of the Caliph, and that he was a mere tool in the hands of the Buwayhids; and were persuaded also of the validity of the claims of the Samanids, who had ceased to recognize that Caliph. Nor did the Samanids, under the circumstances, have any scruples in disobeying these orders. The new Amir Abd al-Malik who succeeded Nuh in 343/954 marched against Nishapur and, after expelling Abu Ali, took possession of it. Abu Ali fled to Rukn al-Daulah but soon after died with his son. In the following, the Khurasani army marched towards Rayy and took possession of Isfahan. The Samanid general grew so bold after this victory that he pursued the son of Rukn al-Daulah and plundered his belongings; only the skill and courage of Ibnul-Amid, Rukn al-Daulah's wazir, saved him from complete annihilation.²

But the new ruler of Khurasan, Abd al-Malik although recognized as *de facto* Amir, did not hold any legal title to his territories from any of the Abbasid Caliphs. He was, in consequence, anxious to come to terms with Rukn al-Daulah in order to obtain a deed of investiture from the Caliph, without which the appoint-

1. Misk. II, p. 119 Eclipse, trans. V, pp. 156-57; Ibid., p. 167.

2. Ibn Athir, VIII, pp. 383-84.

ment of Qadis and other religious officials was not considered valid. Besides being a religious obligation, it was also a political necessity. How much importance the rulers attached to the securing of a deed from the Caliph even during this period can well be seen from the reply of Nasir al-Daulah, the Hamdanid to his employee, Ibrahim b. Ahmad, the uncle of Nuh. When the latter, on an invitation of Abud Ali in 334/945 to dethrone Nuh, the Samanid, asked the permission of his master, Nasir al-Daulah, the latter replied in the following words. "We are just about to start for Baghdad, so wait till we enter it, when the Caliph will invest, give you a robe of honour from his place, and tie a banner for you ; this will add to your glory and strengthen your cause."¹

After making peace in 344/955 with Rukn al-Daulah, on condition that the latter should have Rayy and Jibal on payment of a certain sum of money to the ruler of Khurasan.² Abd al-Malik next sent his sister's son along with a representative of Rukn al-Daulah to the Caliph Muti, requesting the latter to grant him (Abd al-Malik) the deed of investiture for the government of Khurasan.³ The Caliph delivered the robes of honour to the envoy for Abd al-Malik and tied the banner for him. He added to the robes a governor those of a messmate ; and presented him with a horse.⁴

1. Misk. II, p. 101 ; Eclipse, trans. V, p. 107. Nasir al-Daulah actually sent him the robes of honour and tied a banner for him, in the name of the Caliph Muti.

2. Misk. II, p. 161 ; Eclipse, trans. V, p. 172

3. Ibid.

4. Misk. II, p. 161 ; Eclipse, trans. V, p. 173.

Another and final breach was brought about in their relations with the Buwayhids which led the Samanids not to recognize at all the Caliph Qadir set up by them. This was over the deposition of the Caliph Tai in 381/991 by Baha al-Daulah who, actuated by his greed for the supposed wealth of the Caliph, deposed him without any fault of his.¹ Again as in the previous case, the Samanids continued to offer prayers for the deposed Caliph Tai, and, as their coinage shows, to inscribe his name on the coins,² refusing to recognize the new Caliph Qadir in spite of the efforts which he made through the pilgrims whom he addressed on this subject in 388/993. The Khurasanis undertook to bear a message and letters to the Samanid ruler, but nothing came of it.³

These two incidents show very well the attitude of the Samanids towards the recognition of the Abbasid Caliphate. In fact, their ties with the institution were loosening day by day. The last two Samanid rulers Mansur (387-89/997-99) and Abd al-Malik, who ruled for a few months, carried on the government without obtaining any legal title, but the putting of the names of the deposed Caliphs of the Abbasid house in the Khutbah and coinage gives proof of their loyalty to the cause of the Abbasid Caliphate. That the Samanids were genuinely devoted to the institution

1. Misk. II, 161 ; Eclipse, trans. V, p. 213 ; Ibn Athir, IX, p. 55.

2. Lane-Poole, Coins of Muhammadan Dynasties, p. 114.

3. Misk. III, p. 250 ; Eclipse, trans. VI, pp. 265-66.

Ibn Athir, IX, page 103. As late as the year 388 A. H. the name of the Caliph Tai appears on a coin minted at Herat. Cf. Art. 297-Indian Numismatic Supplement, published from proceeding of the Arabic Society of Bengal.

can be known also by the fact that they not only recognized it throughout their regime, but also considered it as one of their duties to get it recognized by the Buwayhids. In 372/983 after the death of Mu'ayyad al-Daulah and the establishment of Fakhr al-Daulah in his place, Ibn Sadan, his wazir, tried to bring about a reconciliation between him and Samsam al-Daulah. Amongst other things, he wrote to the former about the arrival of an envoy from Khurasan conveying the terms of which the first condition was to be the submission to the Abbasid Caliphate (a religious obligation and a qualification for worldly success).¹

The Samanids had a great regard for the institutions of the Caliphate and it was chiefly due to this that, in spite of the fact that their rivals, the Buwayhids, were arrogating to themselves high-sounding and flattering titles irrespective of whether they were bestowed upon them or not, they on their part never assumed any such titles, and were content with Wali of the commander of the Faithful—a title which was granted to them by the Caliphate itself.² No doubt they granted high-sounding titles to their subordinates, but such titles were not considered so respectable as those granted by the Caliphate. How much importance was attached to the latter can be seen from the fact that one of the conditions of peace of Abu Ali Simjuri with the Samanid Amir was that the former should be granted the same title which the (the Samanids)

1. Misk. III, p. 98 ; Eclipse, trans. VI, p. 101.

2. Narshakhy, p. 160. The epithet 'Malik' often appears on the coinage of the Samanids. Cf. Lane-Poole, Coins of Muhammadan Dynasties.

3. Narshakhy, p. 160.

themselves had from the Caliphate ;¹ although he had already received from Nuh, the Samanid, a much more high-sounding title, i.e., Divinely aided Amir of Amirs.²

In compliance with the conditions laid down in the deed of investiture, the Samanids, like other Sunni governors, were expected to rule their territories in accordance with the laws of the Shariah ; and this explains the organization of their government on the same model as that of the Caliphate itself. The Caliphs had no hand from the very beginning of their rule in the appointment of the Samanid Amirs beyond sanctioning it by issuing a deed after their accession to the throne. Hereditary succession was the general rule. Like most of the Caliphs, the Samanids used to nominate their successors and some of them designated two or three successors in succession.³ In the absence of such nomination, the notables and religious head chose the successor from amongst the members of the family.⁴ As in the case of the Caliph, so in the case of the Samanids, an oath of allegiance was taken by the electors and *ba'yat* was done by all the people afterwards. Practically the same system was in vogue as in the case of election of a Caliph with one exception that in the case of Amirs, even minors might succeed without any difficulty.⁵

Though the Samanids were aristocrats by origin,

1. Barthold, *Turkestan*, p. 223.

2. Gardizi, p. 39.

3. *Ibid.*, p. 25.

4. *Ibid.* Amir Nasr was only eight years old when he succeeded to the throne.

5. Barthold, *Turkestan*, p. 232.

they never figured as autocrats in their rule. They bound themselves by the laws of Shariah and thus did not hold themselves above the law. Most of them were pious Muslims, easy of access to the public and noted for their justice, equity and moderation. For the administration of justice there was a Qadi of Qadis with various subordinates under him,¹ Like most of the Caliphs, some of the Amirs or a member of a royal family held the court of Mazalim to investigate legal disputes especially complaints of oppression on the part of officials.² The learned and the theologians enjoyed great honours in the Samanid dominions. Once, in order to show respect to a learned and pious man, Ismail moved seven steps backwards.³ The most learned and worthy man was selected from amongst the Faqihs of the Hanafi School at Bukhara and important matters were decided according to his instructions.⁴ There was also in existence an office corresponding to the office of a Mufti or Shaykh al-Islam of later times : the holder of which bore the title of Ustad.⁵ There was also the post of the Muhtasib which was entrusted to an influential person who treated cases without any partiality or fear. His duty was the same as under the Caliphate, i.e., to punish all those who openly violated the Sacred Law, attempted to cheat a customer or failed to pay the established taxes.⁶ In matters of

1. Siyasat-nama, p. 17.

2. Mir Khwand, p. 715.

3. Barthold, Turkestan, p. 232 ; noted from Bib. Geog. Arab, III, p. 339.

4. Ibid.

5. Ibid., p. 231.

6. Mir Khwand, p. 716 ; Ibn Khaldun, III, pp. 334-35,

weights and measures such strictness was observed that when Ismail heard that certain measures with which the corn for Kharaj used to be weighed were heavier than they ought to have been, he sent for them to Bukhara, and cut the additional weight ; and made it a punishable offence.

The model of government being the same, it is not surprising to find that the Samanids were in the long run to meet the same fate at the hands of their governors as the Caliphate met at their own hands. In both cases, with the decline of the central authority, the provincial governors assumed independence and only kept up a semblance of unity by putting the name of their overlords in the Khutbah and on the coinage. In the absence of any national movement in medieval times, the Samanids, in spite of their good government, could not rally any national support to their cause against either the Qarakhanids or Mahmud of Ghazna who divided their territories between themselves and put an end to the first independent Persian dynasty. When the Samanid possessions were threatened in 390/1000 by the Qarakhanids, the Samanid preachers in Bukhara ascended the mosque pulpits calling on the people to enlist, and saying in the name of the Samanids'¹ : "You are aware how well we have conducted ourselves and how cordial have been the relations between us This enemy now menaces us, and it is your manifest duty to help us and fight on our be-

1. Misk, p. 773, Elipse, Trans. VI, p. 400. The above historians hold that the most people of Bukhara and Transoxania were bearers of art,

half. So ask God's grace in succouring our cause. When the common people heard this, instead of listening to the appeals of the Samanid agents and helping them, in their hour of need, they consulted the Muslim jurists on the subject of fighting. The latter dissuaded them, saying : "If the Khans followers were at variance with you on religion, it would be a duty to fight them. But where the object of dispute is temporal, no Muslim has a right to risk his life and expose himself to bloodshed. These persons (i.e., the enemy) are well-conducted, and orthodox; it is better to keep away from the fray." "This", says the historian "was one of the chief causes of the victory of the Khanites, of the rout of the Samanids, and the extinction of their empire."

In Persia proper, the Samanid possessions were conquered by Amir Mahmud of Ghazna, whose relations with the Abbasid Caliphate it now falls to us to trace.

CHAPTER IX

The Ghaznavids

With the disappearance of the Samanids as rulers, the legal title by which they were authorized to rule the country also ended and it reverted to its grantor, i.e., the Central government which was the sovereign *de' jure*. Likewise the authority delegated to the Samanids by the Caliphate to appoint Qadis and other religious officials lapsed, and the mandates of the Qadis were in theory annulled until the new ruler was lawfully established. Mahmud of Ghazna, after his victory over the Samanids, required a legal title to hold the country which he had already conquered; and had to have delegated authority from the Caliphate to carry on the administration of justice in accordance with the Shariah.¹ Hence it follows that Mahmud in his relations with the Caliphate was guided by political as well as religious motives.

The very fact that he recognized the Caliph Qadir instead of the deposed Caliph Tai, who was still recognized by the Samanids and whom Mahmud himself had recognized while serving them,² at once shows his

1. It would be a mistake to believe that the Caliphate as a religious institution only was entitled to bestow any part of the Islamic empire on anybody it chose. Most writers have completely ignored the other aspect of the question, i.e., that the Caliphate was the custodian of the sovereignty *de' jure* which it never parted with, and went on renewing it both on the change of the Caliph and the ruler. Of course it was chiefly due to its being a religious institution that the Muslim rulers respected that right.

2. Lane-Poole, *Coins of Muhammadan Dynasties*, II, p. 131. On a gold coin minted at Nishapur in 385 A.H. appear the names of the Caliph Tai and Nuh b. Mansur on the reverse side, and that of Mahmud on the obverse side.

motive. It was not because he considered the Caliph Qadir as the rightly elected Caliph that he recognized him in preference to the deposed Caliph Tai, but because otherwise he could have obtained neither the legal title to rule the country nor the delegated authority to administer justice in accordance with the laws of the Shariah.

The first thing which Mahmud, after his victory over the Samanids in 389/999, did was to draft a petition¹ to the Caliph Qadir in the most humble terms, calling himself and his brother slaves of the Commander of the faithful, and heaping prayers on him, ascribing every possible virtue to him. He states in this petition that the sole cause of his fighting against the Samanids was that, in spite of every exhortation on his part, they would not recognize the Caliph. "I appealed to Mansur b. Nuh, and urged him with my utmost strength thereunto, only he would not listen to dutiful admonition, nor attend to enlightening exhortation². He then describes the course of the war in detail and speaks of his victory and the steps subsequently taken by him in the following words: "And now, when I write this letter, God has opened to the Commander of the Faithful all the territory of Khurasan, and caused its pulpits to rival one another in mention of his name; in him the cause of right triumphs, and desires vie in embracing his side. Further I have taken no steps so as to bind or loose, ratify or annul, till I should

1. The petition of Mahmud to the Caliph Qadir is printed and translated in Misk, III, pp. 341-45' and Eclipse, trans, VI, pp. 366-70, respectively.

2. Misk, III, p. 342; Eclipse, trans. VI, p. 367.

obtain from him some exalted order which should serve as a basis for my building as a call for me to follow, by God's grace and favour."¹ After describing his victory as the victory of the Commander of the Faithful, Mahmud makes out his case for the Amirate of Khurasan and outlying provinces already conquered by him in the following words, "And if our lord and master, the Commander of the Faithful, think meet to deign peruse this letter and employ his slave on his orders and prohibitions, let him do so if God will."²

On receiving the petition of Mahmud, the Caliph Qadir granted him a patent of sovereignty and a crown, and confirmed him in all the possessions which he had already acquired. The Caliph also bestowed upon him the title of Yamin al-Daulah wa Amin al-Millah³. As shown by the above petition Mahmud had already ordered the Caliph's name to be mentioned in the Khutbah all over his territories; but on the Caliph's asking him to recognize the right of his son, Ghalib, by conjoining his surname with that of the Caliph in the Khutbah, he made it a matter of obligation, and on all days of festivals and congregations caused the Khutbah to be read with these two surnames.⁴ The name of Ghalib was also put on the coinage minted at Nishapur.⁵

1. Misk. p. 344; Ibid., p. 369.

2. Ibid.

3. Utbi, p. 234.

4. Ibid.

5. Lane-Poole, Coins of Muhammadan Dynasties, p. 133. It is only the coins minted at Nishapur which bear the name of Ghalib, son of the Caliph Qadir.

Besides serving his own political ends Mahmud, by recognizing the Abbasid Caliphate, helped its cause a great deal, raised its prestige in the eyes of the Muslim world and revived its authority in Persia. The acceptance of a deed of investiture by Mahmud in 389/999 and another diploma in 417/1026 confirming him in possessions newly conquered¹ re-established not only the religious but also the political supremacy of the Caliphate, which had broken down at the end of the Samanid period. Mahmud's successor, Masud (421-32/1030-40) also asked for and received deeds of investiture both on his accession to the throne² and on the death of the Caliph Qadir in 422/1031.³ The renewal of the deed of investiture to the Ghaznavids bound them with formidable oaths to abide by the conditions laid down therein,⁴ and necessitated the despatch of large sums of money and numerous gifts to the Caliph and his officials on such occasions.⁵

According to Mawardi's classification of Amirs, the Ghaznavids also fall within the third category, i.e.,

1. Gardizi, pp. 87-88.

2. Bayhaqi, pp. 45-46.

3. Ibid. p. 86.

4. Bayhaqi, pp. 384-89. There is a copy of an oath of allegiance taken by Masud to the Caliph. The chief obligations are that he should rule his territory strictly in accordance with the laws of the Shariah, and render unconditional obedience to the Caliph.

5. Bayhaqi, p. 46. On the occasion of the renewal of the deed, a grand reception was given to the Caliph's ambassador; and everything was put into good order so that favourable reports should be communicated to the Caliph. Presents in kind and coins were despatched to the Caliph and his officials. Cf. Bayhaqi, p. 361.

Amirs by force. And it will be interesting to see how far the seven conditions,¹ laid down by Mawardi for such Amirs, were complied with in actual practice by Mahmud and his successor, Masud, in their relations with the Abbasid Caliphate.

Both Mahmud and his son Masud maintained a respectful attitude towards the Abbasid Caliphate, and always considered the Caliph as their supreme religious head. In 391/1001, Wathiq, a descendant of the Caliph Wathiq, after conspiring with the jurist Abul Fadl Tamimi, forged a letter in the name of the Caliph Qadir appointing Wathiqi to the succession. Harun b. Iiak Bughra Khaqan, being convinced of his claims, warmly supported him and ordered that prayers should be offered for him throughout his dominions after the name of the Caliph. This action of Bughra Khaqan created great uneasiness at the Caliph's court, and led the Caliph Qadir to repudiate Wathiqi's claims and to appoint his own son, Abul Fadl (Ghalib) his successor. On this occasion, Mahmud not only recognized the claims of Ghalib by putting his name in the Khutbah and on the coinage, but when Wathiqi came to Khurasan to invoke Mahmud's help, the latter had him arrested and sent him as a prisoner to a fortress where he remained till his death.² But the greatest service that was rendered by the Ghaznavids to the Abbasid cause was in counteracting

1. Whether this category was not explicitly designed to cover the position of Mahmud?

2. Misk. III, p. 393; Eclipse, trans. VI, p. 424,

the active propaganda of the rival Fatimid Caliphate ;¹ and it was only through Mahmud's whole-hearted support of the Abbasid Caliphate that the Fatimids, in spite of all their efforts, could not secure a footing in Persia. When in 403/1012-13 Hakim, the Fatimid Caliph, sent a letter to Mahmud, perhaps to procure his allegiance. The latter sent the letter to Baghdad to be publicly burnt.² A little later in the same year Mahmud, on hearing of the arrival of an emissary Taharti, who was supposed to have been despatched by the Fatimid Caliph to him with the same object in view, had him arrested ; and set up a court of eminent theologians to investigate his conduct and deliver their judgment on him. In compliance with their decision, Mahmud ordered Taharti to be put to death.³

II

As regards open religious submission to the Caliph, Mahmud tried his utmost to maintain a compromising attitude. Although in some cases where personal interests were involved it was difficult, yet Mahmud overcame this difficulty by adopting a conciliatory attitude. The case of Abu Ali Hasan, commonly known as Hasnak, is a good example of Mahmud's attitude of mind in such intricate cases.

1. Utbi, p. 296; Reynolds' trans. pp. 439-40. Mahmud commissioned spies to make investigations into the conduct of those who professed to adhere to the cause of the Fatimid Caliphate. He uprooted and annihilated all of them. Most of them were impaled or stoned.

2. Nazim, Sultan Mahmud, p. 164.

3. Utbi, pp. 296-99; Gardizi, p. 71.

In 414/1023 Hasnak, while on his way back from pilgrimage to Mecca, received a Khilat from the Fatimid Caliph Az-Zahir. This greatly annoyed the Abbasid Caliph Qadir, who naturally suspecting that it was done with the knowledge and consent of Mahmud, addressed a strongly worded letter to the latter, in which he charged Hasnak with Qarmatian beliefs and demanded his execution. Much correspondence passed about the matter, and Mahmud, being greatly annoyed and vexed, said one day, "Write to this doting old Caliph, that out of regard to the Abbasids, I have meddled with all the world ; I am hunting for the Qarmatians, and whenever one is found who is proved to be one he is impaled. If it were established that Hasnak is a Qarmatian, the Commander of the Faithful would soon learn what had happened to him. But I have brought him up and he stands on an equality with my sons and brothers. If he is a Qarmatian so am I also". After much consideration it was decided that the robe of honour which Hasnak had received, and the presents which the Egyptian Caliph had sent to Mahmud should be sent with a messenger to Bagbdad to be publicly burnt.¹ If, on the other hand, under the guise of the orders of the Commander of the Faithful, some ulterior motive of the ruler could be served, much outward importance was attached to it. The same Hasnak was stoned to death by the order of Masud, who bore him a grudge on account of his arrogant behaviour and opposition

1. Bayhaqi, pp. 312-13; trans. Elliot & Dowson, Vol. II, p. 93.

to Masud's succession to the throne.¹ In order to remove him, the old charge of heresy was brought up against him once again on behalf of the Caliph ; and to make the people believe in its truth, two men were dressed up as messengers coming from Baghdad, bearing a letter from the Caliph to the effect that Hasnak being a Qarmatian should be executed and stoned to death, so that no one else, in defiance of the Caliph, might dare to accept the khilat of the Egyptian Caliph. When Hasnak was being executed, the following message from Masud was delivered to him, "This is your own wish, for you desired me to bring you to the scaffold when I became king. I wished to have mercy on you, but the Commander of the Faithful has written that you have become a Qarmatian and by his order you are led to the scaffold."²

III

As long as their own personal interests were not affected both Mahmud and his son Masud remained on good terms with the Caliph, and always tried to render him assistance in all common matters of Islam. Both of them obliged the Caliph to grant them the deeds of investiture of countries which had not yet been

1. Bayhaqi, pp. 203, 210. So great was Hasnak's power during the time of Mahmud that he occasionally offended and sometimes insulted Masud with impunity.

2. Bayhaqi. pp. 217-18, trans. Elliot and Dowson, Vol II, pp. 97-98.

conquered by them ;¹ and both of them entered into a treaty with the Caliph by which the latter bound himself not to enter into direct relations with the Qarakhanids.² Any title or robe of honour granted to the latter was to be bestowed through the agency of the Ghaznavids. So emphatic was Mahmud in this matter that Abul Abbas Mamun, the Khwarazmshah, out of regard for the sentiments of Mahmud, did not openly accept the robes of honour sent by the Caliph nor did he assume the title granted to him.³ To serve their own purposes sometimes the help of the Caliph was also invoked. When Mahmud, displeased with Masud, wished to nominate another son, Muhammad, in preference to Masud, he asked the Caliph to give precedence to his name over that of Masud in official

1. Haig, art, on Mahmud in *Encycl. of Islam*. Habib, *Sultan Mahmud of Ghaznin*, p. 33. In 403/1012-13, Mahmud compelled the Caliph Qadir to hand over to him the districts of Khurasan which were still in his hands ; Muhammad Habib relates that the Caliph stoutly refused Mahmud's further demand that Samarkand should also be given to him. "I will do no such thing," he replied, "and if you take possession of Samarkand without my permission, I will disgrace you before the whole world." Mahmud was furious, "Do you wish me to come to the capital of the Caliphate with a thousand elephants," he threatened the Caliph's ambassador, in order to lay it waste and bring its earth on the backs of my elephants to Gaznin?" But in the words of Muhammad Habib, "The policy of plundering the centres of Muslim and Hindu civilization simultaneously was too bold even for Mahmud, and he had to apologize humbly to the power which, even in its hour of weakness, could have shattered the moral foundation of the Ghaznavid kingdom."

Masud also insisted on the inclusion of certain provinces in the deed of investiture before he accepted it. Cf. Bayhaqi. 359.

2. Bayhaqi, p. 369.

3. *Ibid.*, pp. 838-39.

correspondence.¹ When Masud heard of the order of the Caliph giving preference to Muhammad over him, he declared, "The sword is a truer authority than any writing".²

But as soon as he heard the news of his father's death in 421/1030 he most courteously replied to the Caliph's letter interceding for the ruler of Isfahan, Ala al-Daulah b. Kakawyh, which had till then lain unanswered; and pleaded his cause for the bestowal of a deed of investiture³ which was, as a matter of course, granted to him.

As regards helping the Caliph in all common matters of Islam, since both the Ghaznavids and the Caliph belonged to the Sunni sect, their religious interests coincided and therefore no difficulty was encountered in this respect. The persecution of the Qarmatians, Batinis and Mutazilis, which was in accordance with the wish of the Caliph, also served the political motives of the Amirs in rooting out all these elements which were endangering the peace and safety of the country. Mahmud was particularly ruthless in his persecution of the Batinis. Thousands of them were gibbeted, stoned to death, or carried in chains to Ghazna. A hundred camel-loads of books

1. Bayhaqi, pp. 258-59.

2. Jurjani, *Tabaqat-i-Nasiri*, trans. Raverty, p. 92.

3. Baybaqi, pp. 14-17; Ibn Athir, IX, p. 279. When Masud, after his conquest of Rayy, proceeded to complete the conquest of Hamdan and Isfahan, he put 'Ala al-Daulah to flight and occupied both places. Thereupon the latter prevailed on the Caliph, through his kinsman, Jalal al-Daulah, to ask Masud to let him remain his deputy at Isfahan.

dealing with their heretical beliefs were cast into the flames.¹ The imperialistic policy pursued by Mahmud likewise served a double purpose. In the eyes of the Caliph and the Muslim public he figured as a champion of the Islamic faith, when he waged wars against the infidels of Hindustan. In fact the wars to which he had given this religious colour were the outcome of his insatiable greed for money, and the necessity of providing funds required to maintain the magnificence of his court. The policy of Mahmud in this respect has been well described by Professor Muhammad Habib in the following words: "His persecution of the heretics, apart from the pressing demand of the orthodox, may have been due to his conviction that their immoral doctrines would shake the foundations on which Muslim society was based, and a greed for money and power, not an enlightened desire for the spread of Islam, was the motive of his Indian campaigns".² However, he gratified the Caliph by notifying³ his victories over the infidels, but here too he achieved his other object, the enhancement of his prestige in the eyes of the Buwayhids, his political rivals at Baghdad. On the other hand, the prestige of the Caliphate was raised also and they now began to feel more secure than before under the bonds of the Buwayhids. About the close of his reign, Mahmud

1. Ibn Athir, IX, p. 262.

2. Habib, Sultan Mahmud of Ghaznin, p. 19,

3. Victories of Mahmud were officially notified to the Caliph, Cf. Sibṭ Ibnul Jawzī, f. 204-b; Gardizi, pp. 87-88. When the news of the Somnath victory reached the Caliphate, the Caliph heaped titles and honours on Mahmud, his sons and his brother; Mahmud received the title of *Kahf al-Daulah wal-Islam*.

seems to have resolved to rid the Caliphate of the Buwayhids. Masud, when left at Rayy in 420/1029, was instructed to conquer Isfahan and then to release the Caliph from the bondage of the Buwayhids, but before Mahmud's plans could materialise, he died.¹ Both Mahmud and Masud provided facilities for the pilgrims. Mahmud offered large sums to the Beduins to let the caravans pass unmolested,² and Masud likewise held himself responsible for the safety of the pilgrim caravans. In 423/1032 he drew the attention of the Caliph's messenger who had been sent for the renewal of the deed on the death of the Caliph Qadir, to the point that he should convey a warning to the Buwayhids to provide similar facilities.³

In order to maintain religious rights, Qadis chosen from among Muftis and Faqihs of established reputation for learning and character were appointed all over the kingdom.⁴ There was a Qadi for every town and a Qadi al-Qudat or Chief Qadi for every province.⁵

The Qadis received handsome salaries and, according to Nizam al-Mulk, were removed only for grave misconduct in the discharge of their duties.⁶

1. Bayhaqi, pp. 83, 359.

2. Ibn Athir, IX, p. 229.

3. Bayhaqi, p. 360. The Caliph sent Masud a satisfactory answer saying that he had drawn the attention of the Buwayhids, and arrangements were being made to render the route of the pilgrims safe. Cf. Bayhaqi, p. 441.

4. Nazim, Sultan Mahmud, p. 148.

5. Bayhaqi, p. 246; Nazim, p. 147.

6. Nizam al-Mulk, pp. 38, 77.

Besides the administration of justice the Qadis had various other duties to perform.¹ The Qadi's position was very important and he was said to have power over the life and property of the Muslims. His orders were executed with the help of the local governors, and defaulters were severely punished.²

IV

Little is known in detail of the financial system of the Ghaznavids, but it is doubtless that the main sources of revenue were the same as those of the Caliphs, the chief permanent sources being the land revenue, the Zakat (i.e., two and a half per cent. tax on the accumulated property of Muslims at the end of the year), tribute and presents from the dependent princes, the produce of gold and silver mines,³ and the duties levied on articles of import and export that passed through the frontiers of the Ghazna kingdom. Whether any of the other illegal taxes called by the jurists *Mukus* were levied in the Ghaznavid kingdom seems not to be known. In any case this income was supplemented by the huge amount of booty that was captured during Mahmud's successful wars in India. But his continuous raids, though they brought rich booty for himself and his guards and soldiers, proved ruinous to his subjects. He devoted most of the money he brought from India to magnificent

1. *Suluk al-Muluk*, f. 42-a. The various duties of a Qadi are given.

2. *Nizam al-Mulk*, p. 40.

3. *Nizim*, p. 133.

buildings in order to give the impress of dignity to his court, and consequently he was in constant need of money to carry on his Indian campaigns. Before one of his campaigns Mahmud ordered the indispensable sum to be collected within two days, which was actually achieved from the officials, who, in the words of the court historian, Utbi, were "fleeced like sheep".¹ It goes without saying that those officials must have realized from the poor more than they paid to the Amir. In consequence of heavy taxation, "the agricultural districts were to a great degree deserted, and the irrigation works in some places had fallen into decay, in others had ceased altogether."² During the reign of Masud, the people had to suffer all the more. Even the peace that prevailed during the previous reign disappeared with the removal of the powerful personality of Mahmud. Abul Fadl Suri, the civil governor of Khurasan, from whom the Amir received large presents, shared the spoils of the robbers who quietly continued their activities and robbed the people to their fill. The population was reduced to despair and the aristocracy began to invoke the help of the leaders of the Turks in Transoxiana.³ Hence the second part of Mawardi's fifth stipulation was certainly not scrupulously observed. However, genuine complaints of the people were sometimes listened to by the Amirs and in times of unforeseen calamity their sufferings were, to a certain extent, alleviated. When for the upkeep of his magnificent garden, Mahmud

1. Barthold, *Turkestan*, p. 293.

2. *Ibid.*

3. *Ibid.*

imposed an extra tax, the people remonstrated and stopped him in one of the streets of Balkh, and Mahmud had to yield to their complaints and remit the heavy obligation.¹ In 401-1011, when crops failed owing to early frosts, the wazir remitted the land revenue, and issued loans to cultivators to enable them to buy seed and cattle.²

V

For the administration of criminal law, the court of Mazalim was held by the Amirs daily, and impartial criminal justice was dealt out to high and low alike. Besides, all the princes, wazirs, commanders of provincial armies and other high officials held their courts and decided such cases as did not involve intricate questions requiring expert knowledge of the law, or were connected with their own departments.³ Amir Mahmud had a strong sense of justice and in order to keep himself informed of the doings of the State officials and provincial governors, he employed spies and newswriters throughout the whole empire. Nobody could plead rank or birth as an excuse for leniency or special treatment before Mahmud,⁴ who enforced respect for the law by all the means at his disposal.

1. Hafiz Abru, f. 184; Awfi, f. 173.

2. Utbi, p. 247.

3. Bayhaqi, pp. 40, 181.

4. Nizam ul-Mulk, p. 208. Even Prince Masud had to pay his debts when sued by a merchant of Ghazna. Ibid, p. 42. Ali Nushtigin, a high military officer, was stopped and lashed in public for open defiance of the Muslim law. The Amil of Nishapur, on the complaint of a woman whose property was seized by him, was flogged and dismissed. C. Ibid., p. 66.

However' the cases that were tried by the Amirs were few, and no general effort was made to suppress the robber chiefs whose castles blocked all inter-communication between the various parts of the empire.¹

VI

Amir Mahmud and his successor Masud did not tolerate any deviation from belief in the orthodox Sunni sect; and they protected the faith by rooting out all the heretical elements from their territories. A censorship of the religious beliefs of the Muslim subjects was instituted, and there was an officer appointed to punish heretics, Qarmatians, Batinis and Mutazalis,² and all their literature dealing with heresy was ordered to be destroyed wherever found.³ This policy must have encouraged the faith to which they as well as the Caliph belonged. Though the Amirs were not their chief object, yet they were not devoid of missionary spirit altogether. We often find preachers in the wake of Mahmud's army extending the invitation of Islam to non-Muslims.⁴ Mahmud also appointed teachers to instruct the converts in the rudiments of their new faith⁵ and ordered mosques to be built all over the country. Very little is known about their private lives but it can be said that they lived more or less in

1. Habib, p. 69.

2. Nazim, p. 160.

3. Ibn Athir, I, p. 362.

4. Nazim, p. 162.

5. Gardizi, p. 72.

accordance with the Muslim code of morality.¹ They were quite punctilious in the performance of their religious obligations; offered the usual prayers regularly and read the Quran; and also used to give Zakat.² In addition to this they devoted large sums of money to giving alms to the poor, and settled handsome allowances on scholars and disabled persons.³ However, they indulged in wine-drinking, but their bouts were limited to a select cricle and their companions had to walk out sober for fear of being punished by the Muhtasibs.⁴

In conclusion one is forced to admit that both Mahmud and Masud generally complied with Mawardi's conditions to a much greater degree than the Buwayhids. They revived the Abbasid Caliphate and raised its prestige in the eyes of the Muslim world.⁵ Like the Samanids, they felt it their duty to see that the Abbasid Caliphate should be respected and recognized by the Buwayhids.⁶ But, as compared with the first Samanids, the Ghaznavids were generally more overbearing in their dealings with the Abbasid Caliphate though always ready to compromise in the end. They had acquired a sort of legal authority from the Caliph to conquer any

1. Ibn Athir, IX, p. 262. Amir Mahmud did not exceed the prescribed limit with regard to the number of wives.

2. Nazim, p. 159.

3. Bayhaqi, p. 330.

4. Nizam al-Mulk, pp. 41-42.

5. The victories of Mahmud announced from the pulpits of the Caliphate must have raised the latter's prestige.

6. Bayhaqi, pp. 359-60. In his letter to the Caliph Qaim in 423/1032 Masud wrote that the Buwayhids should make it a point to keep up the prestige of the Caliphate.

land they liked, and set up a sort of central agency through which the Caliphate was required to deal with other powers. Both of them assumed the title of Sultan, though out of religious regard for the Caliphate they did not put it on their coinage as it was not officially granted to them by the Caliphate¹—a privilege which was first accorded to their political successors, the Saljuqs, whose relations with the Caliphate shall from the theme of the next chapter.

1. Kremer, art. on Sultan, in *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, says that according to Ibn Athir, IX, p. 92, the title Sultan was granted to Mahmud by the Caliphate but the actual words do not show that it was granted by the Caliphate.

CHAPTER X

Relations of the Caliphate with the Seljuqid Sultanate

At the time of the appearance of the Saljuqs as a political force in Persia, the temporal power of the Caliphate had been reduced to its lowest ebb both in Baghdad and the neighbouring provinces by the Buwayhids, and in Persia by the Ghaznavids. It is true that, with the decline of the Buwayhid's power at Baghdad, the Caliphs were making some tentative efforts to assert their importance either by figuring as champions of good government against the misrule of the later Buwayhids, or by interposing themselves as arbitrators between the Sunnis and Shias in their religious quarrels². But, in fact, during the later period

1. See art. on Saljuqs in *Encyclopaedia of Islam*.
2. Ibn Athir, IX, pp. 235-36. The religious innovations introduced by the Buwayhids at Baghdad resulted in a series of bitter quarrels between the Sunnis and Shias, and offered an opportunity to the Caliph to assert his authority. In 415/1024 in a quarrel between the Abbasids and the Alids at Kufa, the former lodged a complaint with the Caliph who compromised the matter temporarily. The Abbasids being dissatisfied, came to Baghdad, did not allow the Khutbah to be read on Friday, and insisted on the removal of the prefect at Kufa; and appointed the one whom they wanted. When the Caliph complied with their request, the wazir Abul Qasim, owing to his relationship with the deposed prefect, began to take hostile action against the Caliph. Thereupon the latter issued an order for the expulsion of the wazir from Samarra, which was duly carried out.

of the Buwayhids neither the Caliphs nor the Amirs were in a position to assert their authority against the turbulent Turks who always needed a strong hand to control them. The Turks themselves were neither able to produce any capable leader to manage the affairs of the State, nor would they allow any capable Buwayhid Amir to control the machinery of the Government. In 418/1027 they approached the Caliph to appoint some commander over them to take charge of affairs: but when Jalal al-Daulah was called by the Caliph they several times revolted against his authority, besieged his house, maltreated his family and subjected him to various indignities; and obliged the Caliph on several occasions to drop his name from the Khutbah¹. Both the Amirate and the Caliphate during this period of inactivity had become politically ineffective, and in the absence of a strong hand to curb the activities of evil-doers, misrule, anarchy and licentiousness reigned supreme².

Though the Buwayhids had usurped all the temporal power of the Abbasid Caliphate in actual practice, yet in theory they found it necessary that certain functions, for political reasons, should be fulfilled under the signature of the Caliph. As already shown, the latter was still required to issue orders under his name affecting certain temporal affairs and even the partial right

1. Ibn Athir IX, pp. 288, 308-309.

2. A robber named al-Burjumi terrified the citizens in 425-26/134 so much that they had to call him The Chief Abu Ali. He had fixed tribute paid to him by the citizens, caravans, and several professionals; and even the Sultan had to surrender some of his revenues Cf. Levy, Baghdad Chronicle, pp. 173-74.

of appointing the wazir and the governors was allowed to be retained by him. The ceremony of issuing the deeds of investiture to individual rulers enabled the Caliph to enter into direct political relations with them. Besides, the Buwayhids, being unable to fulfil the obligations of the Caliph were not granted the title of Sultan. Thus the Sultanate set up by them, though an accomplished fact, had not yet reached the stage of full emancipation, and was never completed in the eye of the law.¹ Likewise, though the Ghaznavids had actually assumed the title of Sultan, they too, owing to the exclusion of their political authority from Baghdad, could not obtain official recognition of the title. The Sultanate in fact existed, but as an usurped authority, lacking any legal sanction, and unrecognized in official correspondence and coinage. Nothing short of the combination of the functions of the Ghaznavids and the Buwayhids by a Sunni ruler would form the basis of a legally constituted Sultanate. Such was the situation and the position of the Abbasid Caliphate at Baghdad and in Persia when the Saljuqs burst like a storm on the scene and displaced both the Ghaznavids and the Buwayhids.

It is an established fact that the Saljuqs, being recent converts to Islam, were orthodox Muslims, and as such they considered it their duty to recognize the institution of the Caliphate. In a petition which they sent

1. No Buwayhid Amir was ever granted the title of Sultan; and none of them even assumed it as their coinage shows. It is wrongly stated by Amir Ali that Muizz al-Daulah received the title of Sultan, vide *A History of the Saracens*, p. 503.

to the governor of Khurasan requesting him to ask Masud to allot them the districts of Nasa and Farawa, they called themselves proteges of the Commander of the Faithful.¹ The Caliph, on the other hand, never hesitated to assert his authority and claim obedience from them, whenever an opportunity was offered. In 429/1038 when Tughril was declared king at Merw and Nishapur, and his name was mentioned in the Khutbah in all the places which fell to him, his brother Daud carried on such ravages in these provinces that rumours of his malpractices reached the ears of the Caliph Qaim who, realizing his responsibility for the welfare of the people, despatched an ambassador to Tughril forbidding him to tyrannise over the people. The mission of the Caliph had the desired effect, since Tughril, after paying due respect and honour to the ambassador, stopped the malpractices complained of.²

It was, however, after the defeat of Masud at the hands of the Saljuqs at Dandanqan in 431/1040 that, for the first time, the latter came into direct relationship with the Abbasid Caliphate. The Saljuqs, after their victory over Masud, held a consultation among themselves and wrote a letter to the Caliph Qaim saying that they were a people always obedient and well-wishing to the Caliph as well as to the Prophet and that they had always carried on jihad and performed pilgrimage to the Kaabah. They complained against Mahmud for imprisoning their uncle Israil, without any provocation on their

1. Bayhaqi, p. 583.

2. Bundari, p. 7 ; Ibn Athir, IX, p. 312.

part, and emphasised the negligence exhibited by Masud in the affairs of his government and his indulgence in wine-drinking, luxuries and enjoyments. They also pointed out that the nobles and great men of Khurasan requested them to stand by them in overthrowing the power of the Ghaznavids. Then they mentioned their victory over Masud which was attained through divine aid and, in order to thank God Almighty, they were administering the country with justice and equity and were refraining from exercising any sort of tyranny. At the end there was a request to the Caliph to bestow on them the sovereignty of the already conquered lands in order that they should be able to rule the country according to the Shariah and the command of the Commander of the Faithful.¹ The contents of the above letter show very well the motives of the Saljuqs, which obliged them to approach the Caliph for authorization to rule the country. In making this request, they fulfilled a religious obligation. It was still believed that, without such sanction from the Caliphate, the religious institutions, i.e., the appointment of Qadis, etc., would not be considered valid from the point of view of the Shariah. However, it seems that it was done more to satisfy their own conscience than the public mind, which had already accepted them as their rulers by mentioning their names in the Khutbah and by calling Tughril

Rawandi, p. 1031 ; Bundari, p. 8.

Browne and Sykes wrongly put the despatch of this letter at the defeat of Masud at the hands of the Saljuqs, i.e., three years later. Cf. *Literary History of Persia*, II, p. 172 ; Sykes *History of Persia*, II, p. 30.

Sultan al-Muazzam.¹ That the sanction from the Caliphate was necessitated purely from the religious point of view is evident by the fact that, immediately after they despatched the messenger, they proceeded to divide up the vast territories which had so quietly passed under their control.² When the latter reached the Caliph he sent one of his trusted officers to Tughril with kind messages and charged him to ask Tughril to come to Baghdad.³

Tughril could not find time to pay attention to the affairs at Baghdad till 447/1055 when, with the permission of the Caliph, he paid his first visit to the metropolis of Islam, where he was received with great honour, and orders were given to mention his name in the *Khutbah* and on the coinage in preference to that of Malik al-Rahim; and he was granted the title of *Rukn al-Daulah*.⁴ In spite of this, relations between the Caliph and

1. Although Tughril was addressed by the people and even mentioned in the *Khutbah* in different places that had fallen into his possession, as Sultan al-Muazzam in 428/1036 (Cf. Ibn Athir, IX, p. 328; *Zubdat al-Iwarikh*, p. 6) yet this title does not seem to appear on his coinage till the year 439/1047. Such coins in addition to the above title also bear the title of *Shahinshah*, a title whose bestowal to one of the Buwayhid rulers had been a subject of controversy and had led the celebrated Qadi al-Qudat, Al-Mawardi, to vote against its award. The times were so changed that such important and even objectionable titles were assumed by the Sunni rulers without any commotion. There is no historical evidence to show whether and when such titles were granted to Tughril. According to Ibn Athir, IX, pp. 312-17 the Caliph, in his letter of 429 A.H. mentioned above, addressed them by "exalted titles". Raverty holds on his own authority that in 452 A.H. Tughril obtained the Caliph's consent to his assuming sovereignty, and the title of Sultan. Cf. Jurjani, *Tabaqat*, trans Raverty, p. 132.
2. Rawandi, p. 104; Bundari p. 8.
3. *Ibid.*, p. 105; *Ibid.*, p. 9.
4. *Ibid.*, p. 105.

Tughril Beg were not very cordial owing to the turbulence of both the Ghuzz troops and the citizens. The population suffered very severely and Malik al-Rahim, in spite of the protests of the Caliph, was sent to the fort of Sirwan to be interned there.¹

In 449/1057 Tughril, in reward for his signal services in defeating Dubays b. Mazayd and Bassasiri, a Shiite Turkish general who had revolted at Musil against the authority of the Abbasid Caliphate and had recognized that of the Egyptian Caliphate, was received with the most elaborate ceremony at Baghdad,² and was entrusted with the affairs of the State in the following words : "The Commander of the Faithful,"

1. Ibn Athir, IX, p. 421. The ceremony was marred by an unfortunate incident which led to a fight between the citizens headed by Malik al-Rahim and the army of Tughril Beg. The Ghuzz troops committed all sorts of atrocities. Even the tombs of the Caliphs were spoiled and the envoy of the Caliph, who was sent to effect a compromise between Tughril and Malik al-Rahim, was robbed. In consequence of this, Tughril, during the thirteen months of his stay, did not once meet the Caliph personally. Owing to the presence of a huge Turkish army at Baghdad, the people experienced great sufferings. The Caliph sent word to Tughril to remove his army from the city. The latter, expressing his apologies for the misbehaviour of the troops insisted on maintaining them in the city. Only a censure by the Prophet in a dream obliged him to comply with the order of the Caliph. Cf. Ibn Athir IX, p. 431.
2. The Rais al Ruasa was sent by the Caliph to receive Tughril. On the latter's request for admittance into the presence of the Caliph, a grand assembly of court dignitaries and other high officials was called. One of the Caliph's horses was given to Tughril to ride. The latter, amid a great procession, presented himself before the Caliph who was seated on the royal throne dressed in the Prophet's mantle and holding his staff. On Tughril's approach, the curtain behind which the Caliph was seated was lifted and the latter was disclosed. Tughril Beg kissed the ground before the Caliph who asked him to sit down. Cf. Ibn Athir, IX, pp. 235-36 ; Bundari, pp. 13-14.

proclaimed Rais al-Ruasa, "thanks you for your efforts and appreciates your services. He delegates to you authority over all the countries whose government has been bestowed on him by God, and transfers to you the care of God's people. It is incumbent upon you to be God-fearing in what he has entrusted to you. Acknowledge the favours of God, strive to exercise justice abroad, to prevent wrong-doing and to benefit the subjects." The Caliph then invested him with a robe of honour, a collar and bracelets, and also with a scented gold embroidered turban symbolizing the combination of the Arab and non-Arab crowns. He was also presented with two swords by the Caliph and addressed as 'King of East and West'. Tughril in token of servitude kissed the Caliph's hand and laid it upon his eyes".¹ This memorable document was the first of its kind of which we have any knowledge in the history of the Caliphate. No one before Tughril had been given jurisdiction over "all the countries whose government had been delegated to the Caliph by God." The Sultanate now at last received legal sanction from the Caliphate itself.

The prestige of the Sultanate was further raised when Tughril paid his third visit to Baghdad in 451/1059, and reinstated the Caliph Qaim who, during the former's absence from Baghdad, was imprisoned by Bassasiri who had proclaimed the recognition of the Egyptian Caliphate at Baghdad.² The Caliph, on this

1. Bundari, p. 14 ; Ibn Athir, IX, p. 436 ; Levy, Baghdad Chronicle, p. 188.
2. In 450/1056 Bassasiri, a Shiite Turkish general who had not been on good terms with the Caliph, came to Baghdad, defeated his forces, arrested him and sent him to Ana. He

occasion,¹ presented to the Sultan the only sword which was left with him : and substituted the title of Rukn al-Din for Rukn al-Daulah.²

Tughril had not even conceived the idea of taking over the administration of Baghdad, but, in fact, had thought of leaving it with the Caliphate. It was only due to the lack of aspiration on the part of the Caliph and the wit of Tughril's wazir in detecting it, that Baghdad was thrown into the direct possession of Tughril.³ Thus, as far as the temporal power of the Caliphate was concerned, it was now left in as sad a plight as it was during the Buwayhid regime. Be that

caused the Khutbah to be read for the Egyptian Caliph, Mustansir, at Baghdad and had dinars struck in his name. The Sunni formulae in the Adhan was replaced by that of the Shia, and the black standard of the Abbasid was changed to the white. Cf. Rawandi p. 108 ; Ibn Athir, IX, p. 441 ; Ibn Qalanisi, pp. 88-89 ; Zubdat al-Tawarikh f. 13. As soon as Tughril heard of this, he rushed back to Baghdad, defeated Bassasiri and re-established the Abbasid Caliphate. Cf. Ibn Qalanisi, p. 90 ; Ibn Athir, IX, p. 448 ; Zubdat al-Tawarikh, f. 13.

1. It was a strange and unprecedented scene when the Caliph and the Sultan met on this historic occasion in an uncere-
monious manner, the Caliph presenting to the Sultan his
sword, the latter giving proof of the utmost humility by lead-
ing the horse of the Caliph by the bridle to the palace ; Cf.
Rawandi, p. 110 ; Bundari, p. 13 ; Zubdat al-Tawarikh, f. 13 ;
Ibn Athir, IX, p. 446.
2. Rawandi, p. 110.
3. A few days after the re-establishment of the Abbasid Caliphate
Tughril asked his wazir Amid al-Mulk to approach the Caliph
for the allotment of a certain portion of territory in the neigh-
bourhood of Baghdad to meet the expenses of his army as he
would be required to come so often to Baghdad in connection
with administrative affairs. The quick-witted wazir asked
Tughril to wait as he expected a move by the Caliph himself
to provide him with a fixed grant for his own upkeep. Actually,
as it happened, Amid al-Mulk, on his way to the Caliph, saw
the latter's wazir coming to the Sultan. Guessing the mission
of the Caliph's wazir Amid al-Mulk hurriedly retraced his steps

as it may, the Sultanate created by Tughril was of a higher status than that enjoyed by any before or after him.¹

With the establishment of a Sunni Sultanate at Baghdad a new era was inaugurated in the history of the institution of the Caliphate. The Saljuqs, by conquering Persia, Mesopotamia, Syria and Asia Minor, once more re-united the scattered provinces of Islam, belonging to different dynasties hostile to each other, under one sovereign. In the words of Lane-Poole: "They put a new life into the expiring zeal of the Muslims, drove back the re-encroaching Byzantines, and bred up a generation of fanatical Muhammadan warriors to whom, more than to anything else, the Crusaders owed their repeated failure."² The rise of the Saljuqs also meant the victory of the Sunni creed, as far as their power extended, over the Shia tendencies which had been gaining more and more ground under the Buwayhids and the Fatimids. Since the Saljuqs regarded the Abbasid Caliphate as the head of orthodox Islam, they constituted themselves the champions of the Abbasid Caliphate and

and informed the Sultan about the approach of the Caliph's wazir, advising him at the same time that if the Caliph's message was to the same purpose as he had anticipated, the Sultan should welcome it saying that he was already concerned about it. By chance it happened that the Caliph's message was to the same purpose as was anticipated by Amid al-Mulk, and naturally the Sultan sent the same reply to the Caliph as was suggested to him by his wazir. Shortly afterwards the Sultan sent for the record-book from the Diwan and noted down therein the personal allowance of the Caliph. Cf. Rawandi, pp. 110-11; *Tarikh i-Guzida*, p. 435.

1. A gold coin minted at Baghdad in 455/1063 bears the following inscription on the reverse side: Al-Sultan al-Muazzam Shahu-Shah Tughril Beg. The word Sultan does not appear on the Baghdad coinage after Tughril. Cf. *British Museum Catalogue*.
2. Lane-Poole, *Muhammadan Dynasties*, p. 150.

were naturally the declared enemies of the Fatimid Caliphate.¹ They took energetic steps against the 'dangerous activities of the Ismailians and furthered the interests of Sunni theologians.²

With the rapid conquests of the Saljuks, the religious authority of the Abbasid Caliphate was established in all lands that fell under their political control. Besides, the prestige of their power promoted many an independent prince to reject the religious authority of the Fatimids and recognize that of the Abbasids instead.³ It was during this period that the name of the Abbasid Caliph was inserted in the Khutbah in the sacred cities of Mecca and Madinah, whose inclusion within the sphere of the Abbasids control must have raised the prestige of the Caliphate.

1. The Damascus Chronicle, trans. H.A.R. Gibb, pp. 19-20.
2. Ibn Athir, X, p. 24. When Alp Arslan was engaged in the war with Qutubmish, Nizam al-Mulk said to the former. I have brought soldiers from Khurasan who will assist and not desert you, and who will shoot arrows that never miss, viz., the Ulama and the ascetics, whom by my favour I have made your best auxiliaries.
3. In 462/1070 an envoy from the Amir of Mecca came to Alp Arslan informing him that he had established the Khutbah for the Abbasids and discontinued it for the Egyptian Caliph Mustansir, whereupon the Sultan bestowed upon him thirty thousand dinars and an annual salary of fifty thousand dinars to the Amir of Madinah if the latter followed the same example. Cf. Bundari, p. 36; Ibn Athir, X, p. 41. In 463/1070 the Khutbah was read for the Caliph Qaim and Sultan Alp Arslan at Halab when the people there beheld the supremacy of the Saljuqs authority, and the decline of the sway of the Egyptian Caliph. Cf. Bundari, p. 37; Ibn Qalanisi, p. 98; Ibn Athir, X, p. 42.

As regards the institution of the Caliphate itself, the Saljuks, considering it a religious institution, left it to run its normal course. In the election of the Caliph a formal sort of consultation took place between the wazir, qadis and other high officials and usually a son of the deceased Caliph was raised to the Caliphate. Since most of the Caliphs nominated their successors in their own lifetime, there was little choice. It, therefore, became practically a matter of hereditary succession based on nomination by the late Caliph.¹ Paradoxical as it may appear, the election of the Caliph was not influenced by the Saljuq Sultans.² Henceforward the Caliphs were not deposed arbitrarily³ by the Sultans as was the case during the time of the Buwayhids. They were now left in the peaceful enjoyment of their allowance and the income of their personal estate without the fear of any demand being made or their estate being

1. Ibn Athir, X, p. 65. The Caliph Qaim nominated Muqtadi during his own lifetime.

The Caliph Mustadhir nominated Mustarshid during his own lifetime. Cf. Ibn Athir, X, p. 376. The Caliph Rashid was also nominated. Cf. Ibn Qalanisi, p. 251; Ibn Athir, XI, p. 17.

2. In spite of all his efforts, Sultan Masud could not set aside the election of Rashid whom he did not want to succeed owing to his enmity with his father. Cf. Ibn Qalanisi, p. 251.
3. The committal of the Caliph Rashid in a document that if he waged war against the Sultan he should be considered as deposed, gave an opportunity to Sultan Masud to secure a fatwa from the Ulama to this effect after the Caliph had fled from Baghdad. Cf. Ibn Athir, XI, p. 26.

confiscated.¹ Besides the Sultans despatched huge sums of money and costly presents to the Caliphs on different occasions.²

The Caliph was also allowed to appoint his own wazir. But since the *de facto* position of the Caliph had not improved, the functions of the wazir remained practically the same as those of the Secretary in the past regime; and the change effected therefore merely meant a change of title. However, such prestige was attached to this office that persons were desirous of occupying it even without any remuneration.³ Nor were the Sultans unmindful of its importance, because smooth relations between the Caliph and them largely depended upon the Wazir; consequently they tried as tactfully as they could to interfere in the appointment of the Wazir. Most of the Wazirs were appointed and dismissed under instructions from the Sultan.⁴

1. Ibn Athir, X, p. 209. Barkyaruq being hard pressed for money asked and secured from the Caliph Qaim fifty thousand dinars.

2. Ibn Athir, IX, p. 397. In 443/1050 Tughril sent 10,000 dinars to the Caliph, 5,000 dinars to his officials and 3,000 to Rais al-Ruasa; and some precious jewels and other valuable presents to the Caliph.

Malik Shah despatched precious presents to the Caliph on his first visit to Baghdad in 479/1086. Cf. Ibn Athir, X, p. 103.

3. In 433/1061 Abul Fattah Mansur Ahmad was appointed wazir on condition that not only would he not accept an Iqta but that he would pay something to the Caliph. Cf. Ibn Athir, X, p. 9.

4. Ibn Athir, X, pp. 74-75. In 471/1078 wazir Fakhr al-Daulah Abu Nasr Ibn Jahir was dismissed on the Sultan's request. The next appointment was made on the recommendation of the Sultan, and the person who, in the meanwhile, had already been appointed, had to vacate the position for the nominee of the Sultan.

With regard to the Caliph's prerogatives, the latter was more independent in exercising them during this period than under the Bawayhids. At Baghdad the coinage not only bears the name of the Caliph on the obverse side but also with the epithet Amir al-Muminin which had disappeared during the Buwayhid regime; and no coins minted at Baghdad after Tughril bear the title Sultan. This shows that the temporal authority of the Saljuqs was not legally recognized at Baghdad. In other parts of the Saljuqid empire the Caliph's name with the same title appears on the obverse or reverse side indiscriminately.¹

In the case of the Khutbah, the Saljuqid Sultans were punctilious in mentioning the Caliph's name in the Khutbah all over their empire. Though several times the Sultan's name was dropped from the Khutbah at Baghdad,² the Sultans could never retaliate by omitting his name.

Even in granting titles³ the Caliph was more free

1. Lane-Poole, *Coins of Muhammadan Dynasties*, III, pp. 30-37.
2. Ibn Athir, XI, p. 23. Sultan Masud's name was dropped from the Khutbah at Baghdad.

Sultan Sanjar's name was also omitted from the Khutbah in the whole of Iraq in 526/1131. Cf. Ibn Athir X, p. 476.

3. Ibn Athir, X, p. 57; Arnold, *Caliphate*, p. 83. When in 479/1086 the prince of Ceuta and Morocco, Yusuf b. Tashifin recognized the Abbasid Caliphate, the Caliph Muqtadir, on the prince's insistence, granted him the title of Amir al-Muslimin—a much more flattering title than any granted to a Saljuqid Sultan.

than before, though he was obliged to grant high-sounding titles even to minor Sultans.¹

The Caliph was now shown more reverence by the Sultans not merely out of political consideration, but as being their religious head. With the curtailment of his temporal power, the Caliph began to attach more sacredness to his office and person²; and not only laymen but the Sultans themselves believed in his spiritual powers, and sometimes attributed mere accidents to his supernatural powers.³ Owing to his eminent position it was considered a great honour if the daughters and sisters of the Sultans were accepted in marriage by the Caliphs.

The existence of a Sunni Sultanate was not wholly without a disadvantage to the Abbasid Caliphate. Since the institution, as already shown in the first Chapter, had become a mere figurehead, it could not be left alone by the stronger and more capable rulers. But its existence was tolerated on the one hand because of the reverence attached to the Abbasid family and its claim to the office based on supposed traditions, and on the other hand the absence of any line of demarcation between

1. Ibn Athir, X, p. 145. Muhammad, whose age was only four years was granted the title of Nasir al-Daulah wal-Din.

In 498/1104. Narluuariq, a four-year-old son, was granted the same title which was given to his grandfather, Malik Shah Cf. Ibn Athir, X, p. 260,

2. Bundari, p. 81; Ibn Athir, X, pp. 103-104. In 479/1086 Malik Shah was not allowed to kiss the Caliph's hand. His request to kiss the Caliph's ring only was granted.
3. Bundari, p. 70; Suyuti, trans. Jerrett, p. 446. Malik Shah's death in 485/1092 was taken to have been caused by the prayers of the Caliph.

In 521/1127, Sultan Mahmud attributed his illness to his war against the Caliph. Cf. Bundari, p. 152.

the religious and temporal duties of the Caliphate had made the whole politico-legal structure so complicated that there was no way but to maintain the institution. The above argument can very well be supported by the remarks of one of the greatest philosophers of Islam, Imam Ghazzali, who lived during the early Saljuqid period. The learned Imam says : "There are those who hold that the Imamate is dead, lacking as it does the required qualifications, but no substitute can be found for it. What then ? Are we to give up obeying the law ? Shall we dismiss the Qadis, declare all authority to be valueless, cease marrying and pronounce the acts of those in high places to be invalid at all points, leaving the populace to live in sinfulness ? Or shall we continue as we are, recognizing that the Imamate really exists and that all acts of the administration are valid, given the circumstances of the case and the necessities of the actual moment.¹ If there had been a real election, the fittest and most competent person might have been definitely designated to the office of the Caliphate; but in its absence, the natural forces came into play and the man who possessed most strength asserted his authority and claimed the power. In fact the Sultanate was the necessary consequence of the kind of institution which the Caliphate had become. In such circumstances, the Caliphate had to be maintained, but at the same time the Sultanate had to be accommodated. To get out of this awkward position, a *via media* was sought. The Sultanate was legalized by means of a legal fiction, i.e., by the issue of a deed of investiture to the Sultan by the Caliph himself—a mere

1. Levy, *Sociology of Islam*, Vol. I, p. 306.

formality created in order to give a show of legitimacy to the Sultanate, which was in fact based on force.

Now, for the first time in the history of the institution, there stood by the side of the Caliph a legally constituted Sultan, whose power depended on the sword and could not very well be set aside by any means other than the sword itself. A Sunni Sultan was not only required to fulfil certain obligations as prescribed by the Muslim jurists to an Amir by forces, but he was expected to take over and fulfil entirely the duties set forth for the Caliph himself. As long as the Sultan fulfilled these obligations, administered the country according to the laws of the Shariah and thus gave peace and security to people, there was none to lift a finger against him.

During the Saljuq period, the word Sultan¹ assumed a new significance. There is an attempt to confine its meaning to the sole possessor of the temporal power of the Caliphate.² In theory there should now be only one Sultan and down to the reign of Muhammad b. Malik Shah the other ruling princes of the dynasty in Persia contented themselves with other titles of less importance, e.g., Malik, etc.³ It was perhaps for the justification of the above interpretation that Nizam al-Mulk, in order to place the Sultanate on a legal basis, made an effort to formulate the theory of the Sultanate in his celebrated 'Siyasat-namah'.

Nizam al-Mulk, according to the well-known story, had been asked, amongst others, to write a book dealing

1. See art. by Kremer, on "Sultan," in the *Encycl. of Islam*.
2. Barthold, *Caliph and Sultan*.
3. The Saljuquids of Kirman called themselves Malik, while the Saljuquids of Rum styled themselves Sultan al-Muazzam. Cf. Lane-Poole, *Coins of the Saljuqs*, Vol. III, p. 48.

with administrative problems so that the principles enunciated therein might serve as a model in governing a Muslim State. Though primarily a book which deals with administrative problems and conduct and the deportment of kings from a strictly practical point of view, yet the author devotes a few pages to the origin of kingship and to the duties and responsibilities of kings. He does not even acknowledge the Caliph as the ultimate source of the temporal authority of the Sultan; but instead he substitutes a short of divinely-ordained kingship when he says that in every age God Almighty selects one from amongst his creatures, and adorns him with kingly attributes ; and entrusts him with the peace and welfare of His subjects. His fear and grandeur is created in the hearts of the people, so that the latter may live peacefully under the banner of his justice.¹ As regards the duties of kings, he requires that they should deal with their subjects with justice and equity and tempts them with the double reward of perpetuating the sovereignty in their own family and of enjoying the fruits of their justice in the next world.² Though not expressly, yet by giving interesting and instructive anecdotes, he holds the Sultans responsible for the slightest injustice, injury or even negligence shown not only by themselves but even by their officials.³ He in no way holds the rulers responsible to their subjects, and by a mystic argument seeks to prove that as long as the people obey the laws of the Shariah, God will continue to grant them a good ruler. "If the people

1. Siyasat-namah, p. 5.

2. Ibid., pp. 8-9.

3. Ibid., p. 9.

show any sign of disobedience or contempt towards the Ordinances of the Shariah or if they fail in their duties towards God, then His displeasure manifests itself in the disappearance of the just king from amongst them. Consequently disorder prevails, blood is shed and whosoever is powerful snatches the power into his own hands, and rules over the subjects despotically and does as he pleases. In consequence of this, the sinners are destroyed and with them the pious people as well. Ultimately one of the people, through God's grace, get the power and control, and God grants him sufficient wisdom and intelligence to carry on the affairs of the State.¹

To a superficial observer, the theory of kingship as propounded by Nizam al-Mulk gives the impression of a sort of Divine Right of Kings, and misleads one into thinking that it bears a close resemblance to the theory of pre-Islamic kingship in Persia, more especially as he frequently quotes anecdotes of the Sasanian kings as examples ; but a critical study dispels any such misunderstanding. For example, while the pre-Islamic kings in Persia called themselves gods², and as such considered themselves above the law, our author ties the Sultan hand and foot to the observance of the Shariah.³ Any opposition to the orders of a pre-Islamic Persian king was inconceivable and punishable with death.⁴ But our

1. Siyasat-namah, p. 6.
2. Christensen, p. 88. Khusru II called himself an immortal man among gods and a very illustrious god among men.
3. Siyasat-namah, p. 54.
4. Christensen, p. 98 ; Huart, pp. 147-48. When Khusru I reformed the system of taxation and established new principles of collection he assembled his council and invited their opinion. A man asked respectfully whether the king meant to establish a certain tax for property which, in his opinion, as time went

author, in dealing with the administration of justice, gives some instructive anecdotes suggesting that in this respect rulers stand on the same footing as ordinary men. On the other hand, his theory is in complete contrast to that of Mawardi, who also wrote at a time when the Caliphate had scarcely a vestige of temporal power. While Mawardi suggests that a Caliph should be elected and should be responsible to the people, who had the right to depose him in case of the non-fulfilment of his duties, Nizam al-Mulk entertains no such ideas and develops an argument by which he tries to prove that it is entirely the faults of the people themselves if they do not have good rulers, whom he makes responsible only to God. His departure from the established Islamic theory can be explained by the fact that the very nature of the situation he was in made it impossible for him to follow the lines of Mawardi; and if he had done so it would have defeated his own object. The chief aim of Nizam al-Mulk was to establish a justification for the Sultanate in its own right without any external agency being responsible for it; while recognizing at the same time the Abbasid Caliphate as a religious institution. Since in theory the Sultan derived his power to rule from the Caliph, his office could neither be made elective, nor could he be made responsible to the people. That Nizam al-Mulk was prepared to acknowledge the Caliphate as a religious institution only is easily proved

on, would lead to injustice. "Accursed and rash man," cried the monarch, "to what class do you belong?" The man replied that he was one of the secretaries. The king ordered him to be beaten to death with a writing-case. This was done and the beholders exclaimed, "O king, we find all the taxes which you have imposed on us are just".

1. Siyasat-namah, p. 39.

by the fact that while in the case of temporal power he ignores the Caliph as the source of the Sultan's authority and attributes it to God, he acknowledges the Caliph as the ultimate source of religious authority to the Sultan, when he says, "The Qadis are the Baibs (representatives) of the Caliphs and, as such, possess their ways, and they are appointees and deputies of the Sultan, and as such perform his duties."¹ In other words he commits himself to the fact that the Sultan has been delegated authority to appoint such officials from the Caliph. Again, on the chapter of Titles, he acknowledges the legality of the titles that were bestowed by the Caliphs on the Saljuqid Sultans.² In fact his was an effort to find a *via media* that the Caliph was the religious head and yet the Sultan too held divinely ordained authority.

It may seem even more extraordinary that much the same views are expressed by Imam Ghazzali : Know that God hath chosen from among the sons of men two groups, (1) The Prophets to make clear for His servants the way to His service and illuminate for them the way to knowledge of Him, and (2) He hath chosen kings to protect His servants from injuring one another, and hath given them possession of the rein of binding and unloosing, (اهرام نفص) and hath bound upon them the well-being of His creatures in their lives by His wisdom, and established them in the most

1. *Siyasat-namah*, pp. 41-42.

2. *Ibid.*, p. 136. How is it possible for Nizam al-Mulk to talk about the titles of the successors of Malik Shah when he himself died during the former's lifetime. Cf. *Siyasat-namah* p. 137. It shows that this chapter was not written by Nizam al-Mulk himself.

honourable place by His power ; as it is to be heard in the Traditions (السلطان ظل الله في الارض) wherefore it is fitting that it should be known that he to whom God hath given the degree of kingship and hath made His shadow upon earth, the love of him is incumbent upon all men, and they are bound to follow and obey him, nor is it lawful for them to disobey him or oppose him, and it is fitting that every man to whom God hath given the Faith should love the kings and Sultan and obey them in what they command.¹

In his later work² he returns to this subject and attempts to define the relationship between Caliphate and Sultanate. "An evil-doing and barbarous Sultan, so long as he is supported by military force, so that he can only with difficulty be deposed and that the attempt to depose him would cause unendurable civil strife, must of necessity be left in possession and obedience must be rendered to him, exactly as obedience must be rendered to Amirs. For in the Hadiths³ regarding the duty of obedience to the Amirs (اسمعوا واطيعوا استعمل عليكم عمده جشي) and the prohibition of withdrawing one's hand from assisting them there are expressed definite commands and restraints. We consider that the office of the Caliphate is contractually assumed by that person of the Banu Abbas who is charged with the responsibility of it and that the function of government in the various lands is carried out by means of Sultans, who owe allegiance to the

1. Ghazzali, *At-Tibr al-Masbuk*, pp. 40-41.

2. Ghazzali, *Ihya al-Ulum*, Vol. II, p. 124.

3. Remarkable that the author transfers to the temporal princes the Hadith which were invoked by early writers to claim obedience to the Caliphs.

Caliph . . . For if we were to decide that all governments are now null and void, all institutions of public welfare would also be absolutely null and void, thus the capital would be lost in straining after the profit. Nay, but government in these days is a result solely of military power, and whosoever he may be to whom the holder of military power gives his allegiance, that person is the Caliph. And whosoever exercises independent authority, so long as he shows allegiance to the Caliph in the matter of his prerogatives of the Khutbah and the Sikkah, the same is a Sultan, whose orders and judgments are valid in the several parts of the earth.

Nothing could have been more fatal, however, to the smooth working of this dual system than the arrangement suggested by Amid al-Mulk to Sultan Tughril, i.e., the occupation of Baghdad by him. Outside Baghdad the conflict of authorities might be avoided ; within the city any harmonious solution was an utter impossibility. In the presence of the Caliph at Baghdad, no Sultan could exercise unquestioned authority in the city, especially through a subordinate. The absence of any clear line of demarcation between the religious and temporal powers in Islam gave an opportunity to any energetic Caliph to play at Baghdad the role of the temporal as well as the religious head of Islam ; and it was natural that his interference was more effective than that of a Sultan who was always absent from the place. Again, as during the Buwayhid occupation, there were certain things connected with the personal office of the Caliph, which could be performed by no other. Such obligations could be transferred to any lieutenant of the Caliph in a far-off territory, but the delegation of such

powers at the residence of the Caliph had no justification. For instance, the appointment of Qadis, Khatibs, Imams and all other religious functionaries had to be made by him personally at Baghdad. Whether the Qadis drew their salaries from the Caliph's or the Sultan's exchequer, they were not subject to any outside influence in the exercise of their duties. Some of them were so independent and fearless in the discharge of their duties that they did not spare even the Sultans from fulfilling certain obligations.¹ Even the Mudarris of the Nizamiah Madrasah could not hold the office without the permission of the Caliph. For not having obtained such permission the Mudarris Yusuf al-Dimishqi was excluded from the mosque on Friday, and even the substitute sent by Sultan Masud was not allowed to undertake his duties until the Sultan himself had interceded with the Caliph.²

1. In a particular case the Qadi Abu Bakr Muhammad b al-Muzaffar al-Shami, refused to accept the testimony of a witness on the ground that he was dressed in silk. When the complainant protested that on similar grounds the evidence of the Sultan and of his minister, Nizam al-Mulk, should be disallowed, the Qadi agreed with him and said that he would not accept their testimony either. Cf Ibn Athir X, p 173.
2. Ibn Athir, XI, p. 100.

The Caliph was also held responsible for the moral and sanitary conditions of the city. In the year 466/1073, before the inundations, petitions had been sent by prominent citizens to the Caliph Qaim, complaining of the excess of wine-drinking and vice in the city and requesting him to abolish the places of ill-resort. The Caliph Muqtadir enacted several laws in order to safeguard the morals of the people. Singing women and prostitutes were banished from the city and their houses were sold, people were forbidden to enter the public baths without wearing a cloth ; and the removal of various structures of reed and high towers used ostensibly for bird houses, but in reality for the unlawful purpose of spying on the private quarters of the people, was ordered. Lastly, the Caliph issued an order forbidding the ferrymen to carry men and women across together in their boats.¹ In the religious quarrels which broke out sometimes between the Shiites and Sunnites and other times between the Hanbalites and the Asharites, the Caliph's help was invoked, and his authority was regarded as supreme.² In all other matters connected with

1. Ibn Athir, X., p. 156; Levy, Baghdad Chronicle, p. 203.

2. Levy, Baghdad Chronicle, p. 202.

religion, his was the chief authority that could not be easily gainsaid.¹

That the Caliph did not divest himself of his temporal power at Baghdad is evident from a study of the coinage. After Tughril, no Suljuqid Sultan was allowed to add the title Sultan after his name on the coins minted at the metropolis of Islam.² The fact that the Caliphs were still able to levy tax on the people at Baghdad also goes to prove this statement.³ On the other hand the Sultans farmed the revenue of Baghdad and held themselves responsible for the government of the city. For this purpose they appointed a prefect (Shihna) at Baghdad who was charged with the duty of maintaining peace and the security of the citizens. The position of this prefect was most precarious. On the one hand he was the representative of the Sultan and must therefore carry out his duties in accordance with his orders; on the other hand he had to deal with a still higher authority than that of the Sultan, i.e., the Caliph, who still considered himself the supreme authority in all matters at Baghdad at least. In cases of negligence or malpractices started by the prefect, the people, instead of complaining to the Sultan, approached the Caliph who was at Baghdad and thus easily

1. Ibn Athir, X, p. 123. Over the Jew Abu Sad Ibn Simha's high-handedness with a huckster, Caliph issued an order that all Dhimmis must mark themselves with special tokens and wear the garments prescribed for them by the Caliph Umar.
2. Lane-Poole, *Coins of Muhammadan Dynasties*. Vol. III, pp. 30-37.
3. Ibn Athir, X, p. 435. The Caliph Mustarshid, in order to meet the expenses of construction of a wall, levied a tax on all exports leaving the city through its gates.

accessible.¹ Thus a sort of dual government was established at Baghdad and sooner or later it was to bring about a serious conflict between the two authorities.

No serious rupture in the relations of these two authorities took place, however, during the Nizam al-Mulk period. This was due partly to the occupation of the Sultans in their wars with non-Muslims and partly to the wise administration and good counsel of Nizam al-Mulk, whose chief aim was the unity of the Islamic world under the guidance of the Caliph.² During this period, the occasional interference of the Caliph in temporal affairs at Baghdad was met with a compromising attitude adopted by Nizam al-Mulk.³ The Caliph, on the other hand, adopted a similar attitude ; and did not like to create trouble over petty things. Even the assumption of the royal prerogatives, e.g.,

1. Several times the Caliph, by sending the Qadis, stopped the malpractices started by the Shihnas. Cf. Ibn Athir, X, pp. 163, 231.
2. Houtsma, art. *Indian Journal*, September, 1924.
3. An illustration of this can be found in the following case. Aytakin al-Sulaymani, the prefect at Baghdad, who was appointed by Alp Arslan had left his son to officiate for him during his absence. He maltreated the people and killed one of the servants of the Caliph Muqtadi. The people of the Caliph's Diwan complained against him to the Sultan asking him to remove the prefect from his post. Since his father was in great favour with Nizam al-Mulk, the request of the Diwan was not favourably considered. Nizam al-Mulk sent the prefect Aytakin to Baghdad in 464/1071 and requested the Caliph to forgive him. When the Caliph rejected the request of Nizam al-Mulk, the latter sent him to Takrit and granted him an *Iqta* there. On hearing this, the Caliph sent orders to the governor of Takrit not to allow him admittance into his country. This affair opened the eyes of Nizam al-Mulk and the Sultan and they had to remove Aytakin and send Sad al-Daulah in his place to Baghdad. Cf. Ibn Athir, X, p. 47.

the sounding of drums, by the shihna as representative of the Sultan at Baghdad, was tolerated by the Caliph.¹ But it required the greatest political prudence to maintain concord between the two authorities, and the ability of Nizam al-Mulk to achieve this is illustrated by the fact that for so many years no serious quarrel arose. Even the rupture between the Caliph and Malik Shah was not caused by any political incident, but was the outcome of the unhappy marriage of Sultan Malik Shah's daughter with the Caliph Muqtadi.²

The death of Nizam al-Mulk, shortly followed by that of Sultan Malik Shah, in 485/1092, gave the signal for a long struggle for the succession to the Sultanate between the sons of the Sultan. These wars offered an

1. In 471/1078 Sad al-Daulah had drums beaten at his gates at prayer times (five). This was the first innovation introduced by a prefect. Cf. Ibn Athir, X, p. 72.
Muayyid al-Mulk b. Nizam al-Mulk did the same thing in 475/1082. Cf. Ibn Athir, X, p. 83.
2. The unhappy relations between the Caliph and his wife, the Sultan's daughter, brought about their separation, and ultimately the premature and tragic end of the princess caused Malik Shah to conceive hatred against the Caliph, whom he looked upon as the author of his misfortune. He completely ignored the Caliph's presence during his visit to Baghdad in 484/1091 and showed his public displeasure by not even seeing him. This was bad enough; but worse was to follow, for the Sultan ordered the construction of various buildings for the use of himself and his officials, indicating thereby that he intended to make Baghdad his winter resort for the future. (Cf. Ibn Athir, X, p. 135). Any serious step against the Caliph at this juncture was avoided by the wise counsels of Nizam al-Mulk, but, after the latter's death, the way was open to the Sultan to give vent to his feelings. He sent instructions to the Caliph to retire from his residence to Basra or, if he desired, to the Holy Cities in Arabia; and to nominate the little Jafar as his successor, without even realizing the consequences of such an unwise step as to declare a child as Caliph.

unexpected opportunity to the Caliph to assert his independence; but it seems that his temporal power during the Nizam period was so weakened that he was incapable of taking advantage of these long and bloody wars. The Caliph's position can be realized from the fact that he had to delegate the temporal power even to minors.¹ A strange and ridiculous position had arisen in Muslim politics. A minor could not be elected as Caliph, though the Caliph, during this period, was not the actual ruler of the Islamic State; while the Sultans, who were supposed to have delegated powers from the Caliphate to manage temporal affairs, might be little more than babes.² As a matter of fact both Barkyaruq and Muhammad, who succeeded Mahmud on account of his sudden and premature death, were minors though not of very tender age, but there was no way of preventing their succession to the Sultanate as their power mainly depended on the right of the sword. Whosoever came out successful of the war of succession had his name mentioned in the Khutbah at Baghdad and also on the coinage, with, of course, the permission

1. Ibn Athir, X, p. 145. The Caliph Muqtadi, under the pressure of Turkan Khatun, had to grant the deed of investiture to her child of four years of age. In 498/1104, after the death of Barkyaruq, his shihna Amir al-Ghazi, had the Caliph mention Barkyaruq's five-years-old son's name in the Khutbah at Baghdad and also on the coinage (Ibn Athir, X, p. 262).
2. This state of affairs was neither in keeping with the doctrines of the Islamic jurists nor with the views of Nizam al-Mulk. Imam Ghazali objected to the Caliph's granting the deed of investiture to the four-year-old son of Sultan Malik Shah (Ibn Athir, X, p. 145).

of the Caliph, which was quite formal and nominal.¹ The prayers for the Sultan at Baghdad had become almost as necessary as for the Caliph. People used to offer prayers for them automatically as soon as they heard the result of the war, and in case of doubt they mentioned the word Sultan in the Khutbah without mentioning any particular name.² The Caliph realizing his incapacity, adopted a passive attitude and calmly watched the progress of the war between the two brothers, Barkyaruq and Muhammad. The latter went on fighting, settling terms and even dividing countries with rights of mentioning their names in the Khutbah and informed the Caliph afterwards.³

Both the Caliph and the Sultan tolerated each other in spite of their personal recriminations and animosities; the former owing to his inability to adopt any other course and the latter, out of religious regard, did not think it worth while to involve himself in any quarrel with the Caliph.⁴ If any Sultan did not behave with

1. Ibn Athir, X, p. 155. In 487/1094, after his victory, Barkyaruq came to Baghdad and asked the Caliph for the inclusion of his name in the Khutbah which was done. And the Khutbah was read for Muhammad at his request, when the latter defeated Barkyaruq (Ibn Athir, X, pp. 195-96).
2. Ibn Athir, X, p. 285. In 498/1104 Muhammad reached Baghdad and encamped on the west side where his name was mentioned in the Khutbah, whereas in the east the Khutbah was read in the name of Malik Shah. In the mosque of Mansur, the Khatib contented himself with naming the Caliph and offered prayers in the name of "the Sultan of the World" without mentioning any personal name.
3. Ibn Athir, X, pp. 254-55.
4. Ibid., pp. 209-10. In spite of Barkyaruq's misbehaviour with the Caliph, the latter had to grant him the deed. In the same way, in spite of his denunciation by the Caliph, Barkyaruq had to put up with the same Caliph.

respect to the Caliph or oppressed the people, he ran the risk of alienating the sympathies of the public.¹

In the absence of any stable Government at Baghdad during this period, owing to the continuous wars of succession, the shihna instead of maintaining peace and security began to govern more despotically and to oppress the people. The Caliph felt his responsibility for stopping these malpractices, but, unable to assert his will except by sending Qadis² to intercede with the oppressors, took the fatal step of inviting Sayf al-Daulah Sadaqah, an Arab Shia chief of Hillah, to intervene. The latter seized the opportunity to plunder the people and sometimes even imposed conditions on the Caliph before he would stop pillaging the city.³ The rapid changes of temporal authority at Baghdad had also rendered the position of the shihna insecure. Since the change of the Sultanate from one candidate to another also meant a change of the shihna at Baghdad, it sometimes led to a war between the two rival claimants. This further worsened the lot of the citizens who were always the victims in such struggles. In such wars

1. Ibid., p. 209. When Barkyaruq oppressed the people and confiscated the property of the Qadi Salim, the people sided with Muhammad.
2. Ibid., p. 163. In 487/1094 Aytaking, the shihna at Baghdad, set fire to the entire Bab al-Basrah because his hajib Muhammad was stoned to bleeding. The Caliph, through the intercession of the Qadi, stopped him from further injuries to the citizens. The men of al-Ghazi showed their high handedness by murdering a boatman because he was slow in bringing a boat for their use (Ibn Athir, X, p. 231).
3. Ibn Athir, X, pp. 245-46. Sayf al-Daulah stopped plundering on condition that the shihna sent by Barkyaruq should be turned out and Muhammad's name should be mentioned in the *Khutbah*.

the help of the Caliph was sometimes sought and was given to the one who happened to be at Baghdad.¹

On the whole, however, the Caliph, realizing his incapacity to assert his position, left matters in *status quo* and contented himself with the affairs of Baghdad, the enjoyment of his personal income free from all responsibilities, and his own private affairs. Neither the Caliph nor the Sultan stirred a finger at a time when the Crusaders were gaining victory after victory in Muslim lands. Appeal after appeal was made to the Caliph who neither cared to send help himself, as head of the Muslim community, nor could he force the Sultan to fulfil the obligation of waging jihad or at least of protecting the lives and property of the Muslims.² Only in 504 A.H. the Caliph and the Sultan were obliged to comply with the request of a mission which was headed by a good many of the learned scholars of the Metropolis who were anxious to uphold the prestige of Islam.³

1. Ibn Athir, X, p. 374. In 512/1118. Aqsunqur with the help of the Caliph turned out the new shihna sent by Hamud.
2. Even the population of Baghdad, beyond shedding tears, were not moved by the news of the advance of the Crusaders on Jerusalem in 492/1092. The city did not take any practical step even when a delegation came to secure help after the fall of Jerusalem (Ibn Athir, X, p. 192). In 501/1108 a delegation arrived at Baghdad, headed by the ruling chief of Tripoli himself. The latter was received with great honour and consideration by both the Caliph and the Sultan, and was promised troops; but not a single man went out of Iraq to give battle to the enemy (Ibn Qalamisi, p. 161; Ibn Athir, X, pp. 305-306).
3. The men of Aleppo and their supporters, on the Friday after their demonstration, went to the mosque in the Caliph's palace with a view to enforcing their appeal. They were joined by many citizens. When their entry was prevented by the guardian
(Next page)

A new step was taken in the development of the Sultanate when, after the defeat of Sultan Mahmud at the hands of Sanjar, the latter was acknowledged as suzerain at Baghdad in 513/1119.¹ Henceforward Sanjar became the official Sultan and his name was mentioned in the Khutbah as well as on the coinage not only at Baghdad² but also in all those countries which were under Saljuqid control in Persia.³ This was the first occasion in the history of the Caliphate that a ruler was allowed this honour without having possession of Baghdad, and set an important precedent, which was subsequently invoked by powerful rulers, who demanded as a right that their names should be mentioned in the Khutbah at Baghdad. The position was further campli-

of the gate, they pushed aside the guard, forcibly entered the building, tore down the grille surrounding the part of the mosque attached for the Caliph's private use, broke the pulpit and caused the abandonment of the public service. The Caliph was thus obliged to refer the matter to the Sultan in strong words, with the result that the Sultan sent orders to Mausil and to other cities within his sphere of influence, commanding the governors of those places to prepare themselves to partake in the Holy War against the Franks (Ibn Qalanisi, p. 173; The Damascus Chronicle, p. 111; Ibn Athir, X, p. 339 Levy, Baghdad Chronicle, p. 211). This occasion coincided with the arrival of the Sultan's daughter, the Caliph's wife, who entered the city with great pomp and magnificence; but as the ceremony was marred by the disturbances the Caliph instituted an enquiry to find out the real authors of the trouble so that condign punishment should be meted out to them, and was only prevented from doing so by the timely intervention of the Sultan. (The Damascus Chronicle, pp. 111-12).

1. Ibn Athir, X, p. 388.
2. It should be noted, however, that at Baghdad, Sanjar's name appears on the coinage without the epithet Sultan.
3. Lane-Poole, Coins of the Saljuqs III. No coins of Sanjar's period are known from Kirman, but even in earlier times the Saljuqid maliks of Kirman did not strike the Sultan's name on their coins.

cated by the fact that the rulers who were in possession of Baghdad also called themselves Sultans, as their coinage shows.¹ It consequently became necessary that their names should be mentioned in the Khutbah also and inscribed on the coinage at Baghdad by virtue of their being *de facto* sovereigns. The only difference between the two categories of Sultans was that, while Sultan Sanjar's name was mentioned in the Khutbah and inscribed on the coinage in the territories administered by the Sultans of Iraq, the latter did not enjoy the same privilege in Sultan Sanjar's dominions.²

As soon as Sultan Sanjar made peace with his nephew Mahmud he appointed him his heir-apparent and ordered the inclusion of his name in the Khutbah all over the Islamic Empire, and afterwards informed the Caliph to this effect.³ This was the limit of encroachment upon the prerogatives of the Caliph by the Sultan. It was now Sultan Sanjar who gave the Government of Iraq to whomsoever he liked; but, since the Government of Baghdad was also involved, the prince concerned had to take an oath of allegiance to the Caliph and to receive a deed of investiture from him in return. The situation had become extremely complicated and was made worse by the wars of succession that were to follow the death of Mahmud. The help of both Sultan Sanjar as *de facto* Suzerain of Iraq of the Caliph as the holder of the *de jure* sovereignty was invoked by the conflicting parties. The unity of the Saljuq dynasty

1. Lane-Poole, *Coins of Muhammadan Dynasties*. III. pp. 43-44.
2. *Ibid.* Sultan Sanjar's name appears on all coins minted in Iraq; while no other Sultan's name appears on the coinage the dominions of Sultan Sanjar.
3. Ibn Athir, X, p. 389.

broke down on the death of Sultan Muhammad, in 511/1117 and the accession of his son Mahmud, whose authority at Baghdad was intermittent, being challenged first by his uncle Sanjar and then by his own brother, Masud, who ruled at Mausil. This fraternal conflict was due to the intrigues of Dubays, son of the famous Sadaqa, and gave an opportunity to the Caliphs to assert their temporal power by trying conclusions with the Saljuqid Sultans.

Thus, it was the activities of Dubays which gave a chance to the Caliph Mustarshid (512-29/1118-35) to organize the forces which later on proved useful to him and to his successors against the Saljuqid Sultans. Dubays was a mere plunderer and was most unscrupulous in his actions. He would neither listen to the Caliph nor to the Sultan and, if it suited his purpose, he would tender his apologies to both of them.¹ Since he had been continually raiding Baghdad and harrying the surrounding districts, the Caliph had to assume the role of a defender. In order to meet this common enemy, Caliph and Sultan had to act in concert, and Sultan Mahmud rendered all necessary help to the Caliph against Dubays. When, however, in 516/1122, the latter made peace with the Sultan by giving his brother Mansur as a hostage for his good conduct, the Caliph did not approve of the peace and wrote to Sultan Mahmud that under no circumstances should peace be made with him as he was intending to come to Baghdad to avenge his father's death.² The Caliph also asked the Sultan

1. Ibn Athir, X, pp. 397-98.

2. Ibn Athir, X, p. 422.

to recall Aqsunqur Bursuqi from Mausil in order to assume charge of Baghdad and Iraq as prefect.¹ A desultory war went on for some time between the joint forces of the Caliph and Bursuqi and those of Dubays but the Caliph finally defeated him by leading a huge army personally against him in 517/1123, and returned to Baghdad in triumph. This victory had a great moral effect on the public mind and re-established the prestige of the Caliph.² After getting rid of Dubays, it was the turn of the prefect, Aqsunqur, with whom the Caliph got displeased and so had him retransferred from his post.³ Another prefect, Yarqutash, was sent to Baghdad, but now the growing powers of the Caliph Mustarshid would not allow him to tolerate any prefect of the Sultan at Baghdad. Mustarshid was an able and energetic Caliph who generally commanded the respect of the Sultan and others, and he was the first Caliph who seriously thought of translating his family's theoretical rights into actual practice. His ideas can be judged from the following speech which he delivered after the Friday sermon just before giving battle to Sultan Mahmud in 520/1226: "We entrusted our affairs to the house of Saljuq, but they rebelled against us, and time lengthened over then and their hearts were hardened, and many of them were Sinners".⁴ The continuance of a dual government at Baghdad under such an imperious

1. Ibid.

2. Ibid., pp. 428-30.

3. Ibid., p. 431.

4. Nizami Arudi, *Chahar Maqalah*, trans. Browne, *Anecdote VIII*, pp. 23-34.

Caliph was out of the question. The struggle that had long been brewing broke out openly in 520/1126 when the Caliph was involved in a quarrel between his wazir and the prefect of the Sultan at Baghdad. The latter, on a threat from the Caliph, left Baghdad and fled to the Sultan, before whom he laid his complaint, warning him that the Caliph's power was on the increase and, unless he took proper steps immediately, the Metropolis would be lost to the Saljuqs. Acting on this advice, the Sultan mobilised his forces and proceeded towards Iraq. The Caliph remonstrated and requested him to turn back, on the ground that the country and its inhabitants were impoverished as a result of the ravages of Dubays and not in a position to supply the needs of the Sultan's army. In asking him to put off his visit until the city had been restored at least to some of its former prosperity, the Caliph promised that no opposition would then be made to his coming. In return for this consideration, he offered the Sultan some money, which so strengthened the suspicions of the latter that he insisted on coming to Baghdad. This led to the actual rupture between the two.¹ In the ensuing struggle the people, exasperated by the plunder of the Caliph's crown and private dwelling by the Sultan's army, enthusiastically took the part of the Caliph who was enabled to raise a huge army of about thirty thousand. But the desertion of a Kurdish chief to the Sultan and the intervention of Zangi, then governor of Wasit, turned the scale in his favour.² The Caliph, seeing the

1. Ibn Athir, X, p. 448.

2. Ibid, p. 450; Bundri, p. 152. It is noteworthy that Ibn Athir's sympathies are rather with the Sultan, Bundari's against him,

prospects of war against him, made overtures for peace, which were accepted by the Sultan. who contented himself with a present of money and other gifts from the Caliph and retired from Baghdad in 521/1127 after a bout of illness.¹

On the death of Sultan Mahmud in 525/1131, the Caliph Mustarshid took advantage of the quarrel between Daud, the son of Sultan Mahmud, who was recognized as Sultan in Jibal and Adhrbaijan, and his uncle Masud, who revolted against his authority. Both of them applied to the Caliph for the inclusion of their names in the Khutbah at Baghdad, but he refused their requests with the remarkable words (if Ibn Athir is to be trusted): "The decision regarding the Khutbah rests with Sultan Sanjar ; whomsoever he wants, the Khutbah will be read in his name,"² During the troubled years which followed, when various princes of the Saljuqid dynasty tried to gain the mastery of Iraq, the Caliph Mustarshid played off the claimants against one another, welcoming the defeated party and often helping it with men and money. This attitude at once involved him in a conflict with Sultan Sanjar, and relations between Caliph and Sultan became so straitened that the former dropped the Sultan's name from the Khutbah in 526/1131.³ Upon this, Sanjar gave Hillah to Dubays and invited him to advance towards Baghdad. The joint advance of Imad al-Din Zangi and Dubays on Baghdad compelled the Caliph, who was heading an

1. Ibn Athir. X, p. 474.

2. Ibid.

3. Ibid., p. 478,

army with Malik Saljuq Shah and Masud against Sultan Sanjar, to retrace his steps. Sultan Sanjar, after defeating the combined force of Malik Saljuq Shah and Masud, reinstated Malik Tughril in Iraq; the Caliph, on the other hand, having defeated the force of Zangi and Dubays,¹ again helped the refugees, i. e., Malik Daud and Masud, with men and money, inserted their names in the Khutbah and sent them twice to fight against Malik Tughril. He was unable, however, to instal his nominee in Iraq against the nominee of the Sultan, and only Tughril's death in 629/1134 allowed Sultan Masud to succeed him.² But no sooner was Masud installed than Mustarshid's determination to get rid of Saljuqid control led him to a decisive struggle with the new Sultan of Iraq, which caused his defeat and capture and cost him his life. When Sultan Masud occupied Hamdan, several of the leaders of the Saljuquids turned against him. The Caliph not only welcomed the rebels as usual but, to make matters worse, dropped the name of Sultan Masud from the Khutbah at Baghdad.³ In the ensuing campaign of 529/1134, the Caliph was refused help from the governor of Basrah,⁴ and many of his leaders deserted to Sultan Masud, with the result that his forces were defeated and he was personally captured with all his remaining officers. The Sultan appointed as prefect at Baghdad Beg Abah al-Mahmudi who confiscated all the personal property of the Caliph and also plundered his palace. Upon this

1. Ibid., pp. 476-78.

2. Ibn Athir, XI, p. 11.

3. Ibid., p. 14; Ibn Qalanisi, p. 248.

4. Ibn Athir, XII p. 15.

the people at Baghdad were deeply grieved and gave expression to their feelings not only by breaking the minbar of the mosque and preventing the khatib from reading the Khutbah but also by fighting against the prefect.¹ In the meanwhile news arrived of the revolt of Malik Daud and, in consequence of this, the Sultan hastened in that direction, with the imprisoned Caliph in his wake.² Peace was made between the Caliph and Sultan Masud on the following terms :

That the Caliph shall pay a sum of money to the Sultan ; that he shall not again assemble armed forces ; and that he shall not leave his place.³ These terms show very clearly that the Sultan was determined to prevent the Caliphate from assuming the functions of temporal rulership. As the Caliph was making arrangements for his return to Baghdad, however, he was murdered by some Batinis in his tent, though it was naturally suspected at Baghdad that the murder had been instigated by the Sultan.⁴

In spite of the humiliation which attended Mustarshid's efforts to free himself from the control of the Sultans, the spirit of independence which he had displayed fired his successors and after one more attempt the Caliphs at last succeeded in realising their ambition when the Saljuqids were quarrelling over the fragments of their empire. The struggle was renewed immediately

1. Ibid, p. 16.

2. Ibn Qalanisi, p. 349; Ibn Athir, XI, p. 16.

3. Ibn Athir, XI, p. 16.

4. Bundari, p. 178. It was also rumoured that it was at the instigation of Sultan Sanjar,

on the succession of Mustarshid's son, Rashid, who refused to adhere to the terms of the treaty, and would not pay the sum demanded. On a mere suspicion, he expelled the prefect from Baghdad, and dropped the name of Sultan Masud from the Khutbah.¹ This was sufficient for the reopening of war between the Caliph and the Sultan. The former mobilised his forces and allied himself with Malik Daud b. Sultan Mahmud, who came to Baghdad with all his forces from Adharbaijan in 530/1135; and for whom the Khutbah was read at Baghdad.² Relying upon the strength of his combined forces, and with the advice of his counsellors, the Caliph rejected the peace overtures of the Sultan who had offered obedience and submission to him.³ Sultan Masud consequently proceeded to Baghdad, and besieged it for about fifty days. When he was on the verge of raising the siege, he received some boats from the governor of Wasit, with which he succeeded in crossing the Tigris. The Caliph fled with all his allies to Mausil and the Sultan triumphantly entered Baghdad in 530/1136.⁴ His first business on entering was to summon an assembly of the Qadis, Faqihs, public notaries and other high officials and lay before them the document of the Caliph in which he had declared himself deposed if ever he went out to fight against Sultan Masud. Thus the Sultan secured Fatwas from the Qadis and Faqihs for the deposition of Rashid, and issued an order intimating the deposition of the Caliph and the exclusion of his name

1. Ibn Athir, XI, p. 23.

2. Bunduri, p. 179.

3. Ibn Athir, XI, p. 24.

4. Ibid., p. 26.

from the Khutbah.¹ Afterwards he consulted the late Caliph's wazir and agreed with him to the election of Muqtafi (530-55/1136-60) as the new Commander of the Faithful, a man who was to deal a hard blow to Saljuq power. Ibn Athir relates that when the Sultan sent a messenger or to the new Caliph with regard to an estate belonging to the privy purse, he received the following reply; "Eighty mules are used for bringing water from the Tigris. Let the Sultan see that those who drink this water have their needs supplied." This unexpected reply led the Sultan to realize that he had elected too strong a man for the Caliphate.²

The Caliph Muqtafi, although a creation of the Sultan, assumed a more independent attitude than many of his predecessors. He entered into a plot to murder the Sultan while at Baghdad, but it did not materialize owing to the incessant rain that fell that day and prevented the Sultan from coming out of his house for prayers.³ It was well for the Caliphate that Sultan Masud died in 547/1152. With his death the temporal power of the Saljuqs disappeared from Baghdad and the surrounding territories for ever; the libertine Masud al-Bilali, the prefect at Baghdad, fled,⁴ and the Caliph proceeded to ransack the houses of the Saljuq officials who were quartered in the city.⁵ In accordance with the oath taken by the Caliph at his accession, he banished from the city those Turks and Persians who had any

1. Ibid., pp. 26-27.

2. Ibn Athir, XI, p. 28.

3. Rawandi, p. 238.

4. Zubdat at-Tawarikh, p. 72.

5. Ibn Athir, XI, p. 106.

connection with the Saljuq regime,¹ and appointed Greek and Armenian mamluks to be Amirs in their places. All the estates formerly held by the Sultan's minister were now given to his own wazir. In the same year, the Caliph occupied Iraq as far as Takrit, Hulwan, Hillah, Kufah and Wasit. Some forces sent by Malik Shah were defeated by the Caliph's army and the latter two places came under the direct control of the Caliphate.²

After establishing his temporal power in Baghdad and the surrounding provinces, the Caliph considered it a stigma and a mark of subordination to continue to insert the Sultan's names in the Khutbah at Baghdad. Since prayers had been offered for them at Baghdad only by virtue of their *de facto* occupation of the city, with the disappearance of their sovereignty their names could no longer be included in the Khutbah. But the Sultans were not to accept this view without challenge. It appears from historical evidence that the Caliph was still willing to mention the name of the official Sultan in the Khutbah, and as long as Sultan Sanjar continued to exercise effective rule, his name was mentioned in the Khutbah and inscribed on the coinage at Baghdad.³ The Caliph paid the same honour to Sulyman Shah b. Muhammad who had been made heir-apparent to Sanjar when the former after his defeat by the Ghuzz came to Baghdad in 551/1156⁴; on the other hand, he refused the request of Muhammad, who had succeeded in Persian

1. Zubdat at-Tawarikh, p. 72; Levy, Baghdad Chronicle, p. 222.

2. Ibn Athir, XI, p. 106.

3. Ibid., p. 147.

4. Bundari, p. 240; Ibn Athir, XI, p. 136.

Iraq, for the inclusion of his name in the *Khutbah* at Baghdad.¹ This furnished a pretext to Sultan Muhammad to start siege operations against the Metropolis; but the shrewd Caliph was quite prepared to withstand an attack. The Sultan unnecessarily delayed the siege operations in spite of the fact that he was supplied with continual reinforcements of ships. For certain reasons, he continued to send messages to the Caliph assuring him of his loyalty if only his own claims were acknowledged. It must remain uncertain whether this was due to the fact that his only aim in fighting with the Caliph was to establish his right to inclusion of his name in the *Khutbah* at Baghdad, or to the fact that some of the besiegers had scruples about warring against the Caliph and the "Heart of Islam." In the meanwhile, the Caliph's wazir was secretly trying to wing the Sultan's officers by sending them secret gifts of money accompanied by warnings that it was "contrary to the teachings of Islam to rebel against the Caliph, or to attack Baghdad, which was his abode."³ To some extent the wazir's propaganda proved effective, but the real help came from the other direction. By the time the Sultan was ready to attack in earnest, the diplomatic efforts of the Caliph and his wazir bore fruit in persuading Malik Shah and other claimants of the Saljuqid throne to move hostile troops against the Sultan's base at Hamadan. Afraid of more serious trouble at home, he had to raise the siege; the city was saved, and never again did any Saljuqid Sultan forcibly attempt to claim Baghdad as his own.³

1. Ibn Athir XI, p. 140.

2. *Zubdat al-lawarikh*, p. 75 ; Levey, *Baghdad Chronicle*, p. 225.

3. Ibn Athir, XI, pp. 140-42 ; Bundari, p. 246,

On the death of Sultan Muhammad b. Mahmud b. Muhammad b. Malik Shah in 554/1159, Sulayman Shah b. Muhammad was reinstated as Sultan, and, since the latter had already been accepted by the Caliphate as the successor of Sanjar and his name had been mentioned as such in the Khutbah, no trouble arose. But when Malik Shah, gathering some followers at Isfahan, sent to the Caliph demanding the inclusion of his name in the Khutbah at Baghdad and threatening at the same time that in case of non-compliance he would attack Baghdad, the Caliph's wazir sent a slave-girl to poison him in 555/1160.¹ After the murder of Sulayman Shah, who had given himself up to pleasure and luxury, by his own wazir Sharaf al-Din the Saljuqid Sultanate at Baghdad came to an end.² When his successor Arsalan Shah b. Tughril (556-73/1161-77) sent a request for the inclusion of his name in the Khutbah at Baghdad, the messenger was disgracefully turned out.³ The efforts of the last of the Saljuqid Sultan, Tughril, to revive the claims of the Sultanate at Baghdad, i.e., to deprive the Caliphate of its temporal power, led him into a sharp collision with one of the most energetic of the Caliphs, Nasir, who had the satisfaction of seeing Tughril's head hung at the gates of his palace in 590/1194 in Baghdad.⁴

2. Ibn Athir, XI, p. 174.

3. Ibid., p. 175.

4. Ibid., pp. 177-78.

5. Zubdat at-Tawarikh, [p. 110; Juwayni, II, p. 32; Ibn Athir, XII, p. 70.

From its long drawn out struggle for temporal power with the Saljuqs, the Abbasid Caliphate thus emerged successful up to a point. The Caliphs were able to create a small independent State for themselves, in which they enjoyed not only religious authority, but also held the temporal sovereignty. This small State was by no means created through the right of their religious authority, but at the point of the sword. No doubt, the Caliphs still commanded the sympathies of the public more than the Sultan,¹ some of whom with their commanders hesitated to oppose an army personally led by the Caliph.² But these factors were not so important as to enable incapable Caliphs to assert their temporal authority. Their success was mainly due to the continual wars of succession between the Saljuqid claimants, coincident with the emergence of a line of energetic and ambitious Caliphs.

On the other hand, during the Saljuqid period, the Caliph's temporal power in Persia vanished entirely. Since the Caliph had vested absolute temporal power in the Sultan, who could bestow any part of the Islamic Empire in his possession on whomsoever he chose, the

1. Rawandi, p. 346. The Caliph was held in such esteem in the public eye that when the last Saljuqid Sultan, Tughril, defeated the forces of the Caliphate and much booty fell to him, people did not purchase an Arab horse even for a dinar out of their regard for the Caliphate.
2. Rawandi, p. 284. Muhammad b. Mahmud was told that, if the Caliph led the army personally, the Amirs would not have courage to oppose him. Sultan Muhammad b. Mahmud considered the war against the Caliph inauspicious (cf. Bundari p. 236). Some of the besiegers apparently had scruples about warning against the Caliph and the "Heart of Islam." Cf. Levy, p. 226.

Caliphate was completely cut off from relations with other Persian rulers. It has already been noted that Tughril and his brothers immediately after writing their letter to the Caliph in 432/1040 divided up the possessions which had fallen to them by conquest. To Qavurd b. Chagri Beg's share fell the government of Kirman. When Tughril was recognized as Sultan, the Saljuqs of Kirman set themselves up as independent rulers and they gave little heed either to the Caliphate or to the Great Saljuqs, with whom they were often at war. When Qavurd in 465/1072 contested the succession to the Sultanate of Malik Shah, he was defeated, captured and poisoned by order of Malik Shah: but afterwards his son Sultan Shah, who also had fallen into the hands of the Sultan (Malik Shah), managed to effect his escape to Kirman, where he installed himself as Malik in 467/1074 without taking the trouble to approach either the Caliph or the Sultan for a deed of investiture.¹ In 472/1079 Malik Shah marched towards Kirman and on the submission of his nephew Sultan Shah was welcomed to his own country and invested with the possession of all the territories that were ruled by him.² Since these Maliks were never granted any deed of investiture directly from the Caliphate, they had no political connection with the institution whatsoever. During their intermittent wars of succession they never approached the Caliph, even in order to strengthen their position against one another, and seem to have ruled their country solely by right of conquest.

1. Muhammad Ibrahim, *History of the Saljuqids of Kirman*, ed. Hourman, p. 17.
2. Ibn Athir, X, pp. 74-75.

Khurasan likewise was politically cut off from the Caliphate since the ceremony of the renewal of the deed of investiture fell into disuse. After Sanjar received his deed, from the Caliphate, it was never renewed even on the death of a Caliph. It seems that the renewal of this deed, both on the change of the Caliph and of the ruler, was required only in those cases where the Sultan happened to be in possession of Baghdad itself. That Khurasan was still in touch with the Caliphate can be explained by the fact that its ruler had become the official Sultan and, as such, had to deal with the central government. However, the paucity of correspondence regarding important matters between the governors and the Caliphate shows the extent of their independence. The successors of Sultan Sanjar, Malik Sulayman Shah and Mahmud Khan b. Muhammad b. Bughra Khan, who were in turn raised to the Sultanate during the captivity of the Sultan in 549/1154, did not approach the Caliph for the renewal of the deed of investiture.¹ Even after Sanjar's death in 551/1155, Mahmud Khan, who finally succeeded Sanjar in accordance with the will of the latter, did not trouble to approach the Caliph for renewal of the deed. He seems to have succeeded and ruled only by right of testament.²

Since various governors in Persia held their appointments directly from the Saljuqid Sultans, they either maintained a semblance of allegiance to them or freed themselves from their yoke whenever it became possible

1. Ibn Athir, XI, pp. 119 and 121, respectively.

2. Ibid., p. 147,

for them to do so.¹ No doubt all these rulers kept on mentioning the Caliph's name in the Khutbah and inscribing it on the coinage current in their territories; but this recognition was now an automatic traditional usage—it was not coupled with any formal profession of allegiance and receipt in return of other insignia of temporal sovereignty. It was purely to the force of religious tradition that these practices owed their survival. Hence it can safely be said that, at this time, an implicit distinction was made between the religious and temporal recognition of the Abbasid Caliphate by the rulers in Persia.

To sum up, the Saljuq period, so far as the Abbasid Caliphate is concerned, is characterised by two significant features:

I. It was during this period that the renewal of the deed of investiture to individual rulers fell into disuse; and its necessity was felt only on the change of the dynasty instead of the ruler in the same family. Thus the Caliphate was politically cut off from Persia altogether and even that semblance of political control that existed during the preceding regime came to an end.

II. The other and the most important significance of the Saljuq period, as far as the Caliphate is concerned, is the complete severance of the temporal and religious

1. Ibn Athir, XI, p. 121. Al-Mueayyad, one of the slaves of Sanjar, occupied Nishapur, Tus, Nasa, etc., without possessing any legal title. With great hesitation he acknowledged Sultan Mahmud as his overlord. In 558/1163, when he became the master of the greater part of Khurasan, he acknowledged Arsalan as his overlord and mentioned his name in the Khutbah (of. Ibn Athir, XI, pp. 192-93).

functions of the institution. For the first time in its history, the Caliphate had delegated the temporal functions of its own free will to a Sultan who was hence forward considered as the head of the temporal affairs of the Caliphate. The following ideas expressed by the Atabeg of the last of the Suljuqid Sultans were the outcome of the delegation of the temporal affairs of the Caliphate to the Sultans: "The Caliph, in the capacity of an Imam, should occupy himself with the performance of namaz (prayers) and religious leadership, as it is the foundation of the faith and the best of deeds. As regards temporal affairs, they should be delegated to Sultans".¹ These ideas are not based on exaggeration, but only describe the position that had actually arisen. On the other hand, as soon as a strong and capable person occupied the Caliphate, it was natural on his part not to admit the Sultanate, but to revert to the earlier position, as actually happened in the case of the last three successive holders of that position during the Saljuqid period. But one thing which cannot be denied is that an innovation had taken place with all legality of a practical sort behind it, which the Caliphate could not refuse to a strong Sultan if only he was capable of claiming it, and which he could hold once he had obtained it, with all show of legality and the authority of a precedent. It was on the strength of this precedent that the Khwarazm Shahs claimed the privileges previously enjoyed by the Saljuqs, and carried on a continual struggle with the Caliphate that was brought to an end only on the destruction of both dynasties. The next Chapter shall be devoted to this development.

1. Rawandi, p. 334.

CHAPTER XI

Relations of the Caliphate with the Khwarzmshahs

With the advent of the Khwarazm Shahs' to power in Persia, the final step was taken in the development of the institution of the Sultanate. They were the first sovereign rulers in Persia to dispense with the traditional policy of approaching the Caliphate for the confirmation of their temporal rights when the intermediate power from which they had derived their authority had ceased to exist. Al-Arsalan (551-68/1156-72), the son and successor of Atsiz, had secured a deed of investiture from Sultan Sanjar after the latter's escape from his captivity at the hands of the Ghuzz in 551/1156.² But after Sanjar's death in 552/1157, he neither approached the Abbasid Caliphate, as he ought to have done in the absence of any intermediate authority, for the legitimation of his rights, nor did he take any steps in this direction in his dealings with Mahmud who had succeeded in Iraq as the head of the Saljuqid dynast.³ Al-Arsalan

1. See art. on Khwarazm Shahs in *Encycl. of Islam*.
2. Ibn Athir, *XI*, P. 138.
3. Although Al-Arsalan welcomed Mahmud Khan as the successor of Sultan Sanjar in Khurasan and informed him that he had ordered the observance of three day's mourning in his territories on the death of the Sultan, he placed him on the same official footing as other minor rulers of

may perhaps be taken as a legally constituted ruler since he had secured the deed to rule his country from Sultan Sanjar; but after his death in 568/1172, his two sons, Takash and Sultan Shah, who had been struggling for the succession, did not entertain the idea of appealing to the Caliph even to strengthen their claims, instead of approaching the Abbasid Caliphate for its moral and material support, both brothers in turn invoked the assistance of the infidel Qara Khitays.¹ By this time, in fact, a deed of investiture from the Caliphate had lost even its moral value; and for the determination of such rights only military strength was of any consequence.

In the same way, the Ghurids, though they were political rivals of the Khwarazm Shahs in Persia and

Khurasan when he called himself "sincere friend" (mukhlis) It should be noted here that Atsiz in his letters to Sultan Sanjar used to call himself "slave" (bandha). On the other hand, in his correspondence with the person who was to represent the Khawazm Shahs at the court of Ghuyath al-Din Muhammad b. Mahmud, the ruler of Iraq, and the head of the Saljuqid dynasty, he addressed the latter as "Sovereign of the World, supreme Sultan, Commander of all the Earth" (of Barthold, *Turkestan*, pp. 332-333). This appears to convey a formal acknowledgement of his subordination to the Saljuqid Sultan, but in actual practice he tried to play the role of mediator between the Sultan and the Caliph Muqtaffi. In the Khwarazm Shah's letter to the wazir of the Caliph, it is stated that "only Sultan Muhammad could rid Khurasan of highway robbers and Transoxiana of the yoke of the infidels, that the inhabitants of these provinces await his arrival with impatience and that at such a time the Caliph's government must forget its enmity to the Sultan, for which indeed it had no serious cause, and afford him support. (of. Barthold, p. 332).

1. Juwayni, II, pp : 17 and 20.

noted for their amicable relations with the Abbasid Caliphate, in accordance with the spirit of the time, limited the recognition of the Caliphate simply to the mention of the Caliph's name in the Khutbah and its inscription on their coinage.¹ There is no historical evidence to show that they ever approached the Caliphate for a deed of investiture; and notwithstanding the fact that they were never granted the title of Sultan, the epithet was duly assumed by them, as is shown by their coinage.² There was, no doubt, an exchange of embassies between the Caliphate and the Ghurids, who received robes of honour from the Caliphs on several occasions.³ But they were favoured by the Caliph only because they were quite content with their position and did not make a demand; like the Khwarazm Shahs, for the inclusion of their names in the Khutbah at Baghdad and the grant of the Sultanate. Thus it can safely be concluded that by this time no ruler in Persia held a direct authority to rule his territories from the Caliphate. Even the outward form of a deed of investiture from the Caliph to validate their personal position or to legalise the working of the religious institutions had disappeared with the lapse of time. No question seems to have arisen as to the legality of the appointment of Qadis and other religious functionaries by Sultan who possessed no delegated

1. Lane-Poole, *Add.* IX, pp. 5, 8 and 9.

2. *Ibid.*

3. Juzjani, trans. Raverty, p. 383. On the arrival of the robe of honour from the Caliph Nasir, the Sultan assumed the prerogative of having drums sounded at his gates five times a day.

authority from the Caliphs to this effect,¹ as had been disputed by the legists of the time of Imam Ghazali. We still find the Caliph trying to retain their hold on these rulers by sending them "Sultanian robes", but the Sultans set no store by them and even refuse to accept them if they cannot have their own way. On the other hand, they might accept them with all outward show of joy and satisfaction in order to show the public that they had received some sort of recognition from the Caliphate. In fact the Sultanate was established now in its own right, and it had not only taken over the temporal authority of the Caliphate but also its religious functions in their territories. Nay, not content even with this state of things, the Sultans would try to assert their right over the Caliphate itself at Baghdad. By this time, however, the Caliphs, having retrieved their old position to some extent, were not only unwilling to accede to their demands but were persistent in extending their political authority over as wide an area as possible. This situation created a bone of contention between Caliph and Sultan.

As soon as the Caliph Nasir had got rid of the last Saljuqid Sultan with the help of Takash, he found in the latter a far more formidable opponent than the crumbling house of the Saljuquids, and realized that his ambition to occupy Persian Iraq would be seriously challenged. Having defeated Tughril, Takash proceeded

1. The Saljuquids of Kirman, no doubt, had set an example in this respect ; but their case was quite different either from the Khwarazm Shahs or the Ghurids. They had inherited their territories from their ancestors who had secured a deed from the Caliphate.

to occupy Hamadan; the Caliph, being informed, sent his wazir with "Sultanian robes" and rich presents to Takash, with instructions to settle terms with him. There might have been some compromise between the Caliph and the Sultan, but the demands of the wazir were phrased in so haughty a manner that they were not acceptable to the Sultan. The wazir announced that since the Sultan owed his throne to the Supreme Diwan, i. e., the Baghdad government, he would be the first to come forward to meet him and should dismount from his horse.¹ Since these pretensions were taken to be a ruse, they were firmly rejected, and only the wazir's hasty retreat avoided a collision on this occasion. Takash, after disposing of the government of the various newly conquered provinces, retired to Khorezmia.² But the uncompromising attitude of the wazir soon involved the Caliphate in a war against the Sultan. In 591/1195, the wazir, who had all along been extending the territory of the Caliphate, attacked Hamadan and captured it.³ The messenger sent by Takash to settle the terms of peace was summarily dismissed by the wazir who would not agree to anything less than the occupation of the whole of Persian Iraq. The Sultan was thus obliged to take arms against the Caliph's forces, and utterly routed them and reoccupied Hamadan. The body of the hated wazir (who had died in the meanwhile) was exhumed

1. Juwayni, II, p. 33 According to Ibn Athir, the wazir demanded that the Sultan should present himself in his tent to receive personally the robe of honour ordered for him (cf. XII; p. 70).
2. Juwayni, II, p. 34.
3. Ibn Athir, XII, p. 73.

and his head hacked off and sent to Khorezmia in 592/1196.¹ While the Sultan was at Hamadan, the Caliph sent Mujir al-Din Abdul-Qasim Mahmud b. al-Mubarak al-Baghdadi, Faqih of the Shaiites at Baghdad, to him, warning him to be content with the territories which were held by his father and grandfather and to retire from the newly conquered places: or else steps would be taken to turn him out. The Sultan, instead of listening to the demand of the Caliph, in his turn, demanded the province of Khuzistan as well.² Thus the messenger returned disappointed and for the time being the status quo was maintained. In 594/1198, Takash made a definite request to the Caliph that he should be granted the Sultanate, and that his name should be included in the Khutbah at Baghdad.³ Though apparently this demand in itself did not mean the temporal power over the Caliphate at Baghdad,⁴ it was surely a prelude to it. The Caliph, after the unhappy experience of his predecessors, was reluctant to revive the grant of this privilege, and in order to remove the menace of a fresh occupation of Baghdad, incited the Ghurids⁵ to fight against the

1. Rawandi, p. 383 ; Juwayni, II. {p. 38 . Ibn Athir, XII, p. 73.
2. Rawandi, p. 385.
3. Ibn Athir, XII, p. 81
4. Cf. Barthold, Turkistan, p. 373.
5. To the Ghurids, the commands of the Commander of the Faithful would be doubly welcome. On the one hand, they did not wish the Khwarazm Shah to assume a position of pre-eminence among the Muslim princes ; and on the other, they would enlist the sympathies of the public against the Khawarazm Shah. This, to a certain extent, accounts for their close alliance with the Abbasid Caliphate.

Khwarazm Shahs and occupy his possession.¹ It was only the serious defeat of the Qara Khitays, the allies of Takash, by the Ghurids, that obliged the Khwarazm Shah to come to terms with the Caliphate,² and, as the result of this intervention, peace was made between them. In 595/1199, "Sultania robes" were sent to Sultan Takash and his son, Qubt al-Din Muhammad, by the Caliph.³ Thus the Caliphate succeeded from the time being, with the assistance of the Ghurids, in evading the demand of Takash, which was, however, to be renewed by his son Muhammad in still stronger terms.

As soon as Muhammad, the son of Takash, had rid himself of his rivals⁴ and stood pre-eminent among the eastern Muslim rulers, he openly aspired to the restoration in his favour of the universal Sultanate. He assumed the title of "Second Alexander" and allowed himself to be called by the name of Sultan Sanjar,⁵ and already at this time had the words "Shadow of God on Earth"

1. Ibn Athir, XII, pp. 88-89.
2. Ibn Athir, XII, p. 90.
3. Ibid., p. 100.
4. Muhammad continued his struggle against the Ghurids whom he expelled from all their positions by the year 604/1207. Ghiyath al-Din Mahmud, the Ghurid ruler, remained only in possession of Ghur, and here too he was compelled to acknowledge himself the vassal of the Khwarazm Shah by reading the Khutbah and coining money in Muhammad's name (cf. Juwayni, II. p. 65). The next step on his part was to shake off the yoke of the Qara Khitays with whose assistance he had been able to overthrow the power of the Ghurids (cf. Barthold, p. 363).
5. Barthold, p. 87. The adoption of Sultan Sanjar's name by the Khawarazm Shah might have been in order to gain the same popularity and respect among the Muslim community : or perhaps he desired to attain the same position in his relation to the Abbasid Caliphate.

engraved on his seal.¹ He then turned his attention towards the Cliphate in order to assert his right as Sultan over Baghdad itself. Though the Khwarazm Shah had many grievances against the Caliphate, there can be little doubt that the main object of his hostilities against the Baghdad government was his desire to attain the same status at Baghdad that the Saljuqids had enjoyed before him. Since the Khwarazm Shah considered himself superior in power to the Bawayhids and at least equal to the Saljuqids, he naturally desired to exercise the same rights in his relations with the Caliphate as the two previous dynasties had done.² At first, however Muhammad sought to achieve his object by diplomatic means, and sent Qadi Muji-al-Din b. Umar b. Sad to the Caliph with a request that the Khwarazm Shah's name should be mentioned in the Khutbah at Baghdad.³ To a certain extent, Muhammad was justified in demanding this privilege as there was a precedent set by Sultan Sanjar; but he knew very well that his demand was sure to be rejected by the Caliph, just as his father's had been. As expected, the Caliph would not listen to the arguments of the Qadi, and explained to him the situation which had obliged the Caliphate to grant this privilege to the Saljuqi Sultan Tughril Beg.⁴ The Caliph also despatched Shaykh Shihab al-Din to the Khwarazm Shah to dissuade him from pressing his claims. The envoy of the Caliph was paid due honour and the

1. Barthold, *Turkestan*, p. 364.

2. Juwayni, II, p. 121.

3. Nasavi, p. 12.

4. *Ibid.*

Sultan went on his knees to listen to a hadith, which was to the effect that the Prophet warned the Faithful against causing harm to the family of Abbas. The Sultan answered; 'Although I am a Turk and possess very little knowledge of the Arabic language, yet I have understood the sense of the hadith recited by thee: I have not harmed a single descendant of Abbas; nor have I endeavoured to do them evil. On the other hand, I have heard that a good many of them are always to be found in the prison of the Commander of the Faithful, and even multiply and increase there: if the Shaykh were to recite the same hadith in the presence of the Commander of the Faithful, it would be more to the point and would serve a better end.'¹ "The Shaykh tried to justify the action of the Caliph in imprisoning individuals in the interests of the Muslim community, as a whole, but the embassy failed to achieve its ends, and the hostility between the Caliph and the Sultan increased. According to Juwayni,² the Sultan did not want to be spoken of as having for the sake of his ambitious objects made an attack on the Imam the fealty to whom constitutes one of the fundamentals of Islam and thrown his faith to the winds; and was obliged to contrive a more plausible pretext for war than the question of the Khutbah. In the unscrupulous proceedings of the Caliph Nasir against him, he saw an opportunity for the realization of his long—cherished aim. Owing to the rebellious nature of the dynasty' the Caliph had always looked upon them as rivals, had incited the

1. Nasavi, p. 13.

2. Juwayni, II, p. 121

Ghurids against the Khwarazm Shah and even suggested the alliance of the Qara Khitays against him. Unfortunately for the Caliphate, all this correspondence was found by the Khwarazm Shah when he triumphantly entered Kirat in 612/1215.¹ These documents Muhammad now published, and at the same time disclosed the treacherous action of the Caliph in instigating the murder of Aghalamish, viceroy of Muhammadi n Iraq, and also of the then Amir of Macca.² In this way he succeeded in obtaining a fatwa from the Ulama of his kingdom to the effect that an Imam who committed much undesirable and unbecoming acts, was unworthy of his office, and that a Sultan who proved himself a supporter of Islam and devoted much of his time to war for the Faithful, pursued by the intrigues of the Imam, was justified in deposing such" an Imam and appointing another finally that the Abbasids had forcibly seized the Caliphate which, by right, belonged to the descendants of Ali"³ On the basis of the above fatwa, he rashly declared the Caliph Nasir deposed, omitted the mention of his name in the Khutbah, and on the coinage,⁴ and proclaimed as Caliph the Sayyid Ala al-Mulk al Tirmidhi.⁵ Thus prepared for drastic action, the Khwarazm Shah marched on Baghdad in 614,1217. Unfortunately for the

1. Juwayni, II, p. 121. Another cause of his resentment against the Caliph; Muhammad found in an insult done to him by the preference given to Jalal al-Din Hasun, the Chief of the Ismailities, in leading the pilgrims on the occasion of the Hajj (of. Juwayni, II, pp. 120—121).
2. Juwayni, II, p. 121.
3. Ibid., pp. 121-22,
4. Ibid., p. 97.
5. Ibid., p. 97; Ibn Athir, XII, p. 207.

Sultan, a division led by him from Hamadan to Baghdad was overtaken by snowstorms in the mountains of Kurdistan and sustained heavy losses; its remnants were almost exterminated by the Kurds, and only a small portion returned to Khwarazm. Thus a serious blow was dealt to the prestige of Muhammad, the more so because the people regarded this defeat as a punishment from above for his sacrilegious campaign. According to Nasavi,¹ Muhammad after his misfortune expressed his repentance and tried to make peace with the Baghdad government, but, according to Ibn Athir, he did not cease his feud with the Caliphate and on his way back to Khwarazm to meet a projected invasion, he gave out that the Caliph was dead and caused his name to be omitted from the Khutbah in various places.²

The action of Muhammad shows the climax of the claim of the Sultanate to assert its supreme rights and dictate its terms to the Caliphate. That the Khwarazm shah failed in his attempt is due to a number of circumstances. The most fatal and foolish mistake he committed in this respect was to declare a Shia as an Imam thus antagonizing not only the Abbasid House but the whole of the Sunni community. It was little wonder, under such circumstances, that he did not succeed in having the Caliph's name excluded

1. Nasavi, pp. 20-21.

2. Ibn Athir, XII, p. 207. This version seems to be more correct than that of Nasavi as one of the terms of the treaty made between Jalal al-Din and the Caliphate in 623/1228 was that the former would insert the name of the Caliph in Khutbah in those places where it was excluded by Sultan Muhammad (cf Howorth, III, p. 12),

from the Khutbah in various places.¹ Were Baghdad in his possession, he would easily dictate terms to the Caliphate ; failing that, the second best alternative for him would have been to instal in the Caliphate some claimant from the Abbasid House itself. However, the impending Mongol invasion did not give him much time to put his plans into practical shape. In any case it cannot be denied that this move on the part of the Khwarazm Shah was an open assertion of that right over the Caliphate, which, with all decency of secrecy, had been exercised during the Saljuqid period. Matters had now reached such a stage that the Sultan could retaliate upon the Caliph by omitting his name from the Khutbah in his territories, if the latter was not willing to mention his name in the Khutbah at Baghdad ; and, more than this, while the Caliph could not depose a Sultan, from his positions, the latter could depose the Caliph by securing a fatwa from 'Ulama'.

So long as the Abbasid Caliphate survived, however, the Sultanate had still to reckon with the force of public opinion. How much veneration was still felt for the Caliphate as a religious institution can be gauged from the attitude of such contemporary writers as Ibn Athir and al-Isfahani. Ibn Athir, for example, in referring to the pre-eminence of the noble House of the Abbasids, goes so far as to say: "Any one who sought to bring evil upon it was punished for his action or for his evil intentions".² Even writers who were in the service of the Sultanate could not afford to ignore the

1. Ibid.

2. Ibn Athir, XII, p. 307.

existence of the Abbasid Caliphate, but, recognizing the necessity of the latter institution, only tried to find a new place in it for the numerous independent monarchs that had arisen in dominions once belonging to the Caliphate. Nizae al-Arudi, a writer of the twelfth century, while assigning relative positions to Caliphate and Kingship, prepounds a theory to suit the exigencies of the time. The author says : "So long as such a man (Prophet Muhammad) lives, he points out to his problem what things conduce to well-being in both worlds by the command of God, glorious is His name. communicated to him by means of the angels. But when, by natural dissolution, he turns his face towards the other world, he leaves behind him as his representative a code derived from the indications of God Almighty and his own sayings. And assuredly he requires, to maintain his Law and Practice, a vicegerent who must needs be the most excellent of that community and the most perfect peroduct of than age, in order that he may maintain this law and give effect to this code : and such an one is called an Imam. But this Imam cannot reach the horizon of the East, the West, the North and the South in such wise that the effects of his care may extend alike to the most remote and the nearest and his command and prohibition may reach at once the intelligent and the ignorant. Therefore must he needs have vicars to act for him in distant parts of the world, and not every one these will have such power that all mankind shall be compelled to acknowledge it. Hence there must be an administrator and compeller, which administrator and compeller is called a Monarch, that is to say, a king ; and his vicarious functions (niyabat) sovereignty. The king, therefore is the lieutenant

(naib) of the Imam, the Imam of the Prophet, and the Prophet of God (Mighty and Glorious is He)".¹ The above theory clearly does not justify any monarch in ousting the Caliph altogether from the temporal power : more so if the Caliphs could rule territories as efficiently as the Sultans themselves. Were any Sultan to try to do so, he must run the risk of alienating all these sympathies of Ulama, Muslim princes and the general public. The Khwarazm Shahs, in consequence, could reply upon little support from any direction in their attempt to secure the supremacy of the Sultanate. To make matters worse, they were known to be in constant alliance with the infidels, i. e., the Qara Khitays,² against the Ghurids, who were backed up by the moral support of the Caliphate. The sentiments of the Muslim public towards the family for its inveterate hostility to the Caliphate and disgraceful alliance with the Qara Khitays, were vigorously expressed by Maulana Zahir al-Din Faryabi, addressing Sultan Takash, in the following strophe;

"O Shah, since Ajam, by the sword, to thee has
been consing'd.

Towards Mustafa's place of repose, an army send,
Then lay the Kabah desolate, and a fan bring,¹
And like unto useless atoms, to the winds the
dust, of the Haram send.

1. Nizami Arudi, *Chahar Maqalah*, p. 10; trans. Browne, p. 11.
2. Juzjani, *Tabaqat-i-Nasiri*, trans. Raverty, p. 244. Sultan Takash, while dying, had enjoined on his son Ala-al-Din Muhammad that the latter should never quarrel with the Khitays if he desired to preserve the safety of his dominions,

Within the Kabah the drapery crumbleth away :
place it in the treasury,

And, for the Prophet's tomb, two or three ells of
matting send,

When thou shalt have a perfect infidel become,
rush on Karkh,

And then, the Khalifah's head to Khita send."¹

So hostile were the people towards the Khwarazm Shahs that they even preferred to live under the protection of the Qara Khitays. When Takash in 594/1197 was besieging Bakhara, according to the uncorroborated statement of Ibn Athir, the inhabitants sided with the Qara Khitays and showed strong resistance. They expressed their contempt of the Sultan by taking a one-eyed dog (Takash was one-eyed) and dressing it up in a caftan and high-peaked cap, exhibited it on the wall, calling it the Khwarazm Shah, after which they threw it into the Sultan's camp, crying, "here is your Sultan".² Instances are not wanting when the inhabitants of different provinces invited the Caliph Nasir to substitute a nominee of his own for the ruler of the Khwarazm Shah : ³ and the murder of all the Khwarazmian soldiers by the people of Hamadan after the death of Takash in 596/1199 is a sufficient proof of their hatred of the dynasty.

1. Juzjani, *Tabaqat-i-Nasiri*, trans. Raverty, p. 243.

2. Ibn Athir, XII, p. 90.

3. Ibid., p. 76. In 591/1195 the people of Isfahan, not tolerating the rule of Khawrazm Shahs, invited the Caliph to send his representative, which was done.

4. Rawandi, p. 399.

On his return from the Baghdad campaign, the opposition to Muhammad came to a head—on the one hand, the military class headed by his mother Turkan Khatun were, for reasons of their own, openly hostile to the Sultan; on the other, the 'Ulama' could hardly forgive him for the fatwa extorted from them authorizing the deposition of the Caliph. Even his war with Chingiz Khan could not be represented in the colour of a religious war, since it was the slaughter, by Muhammad's governor, of a caravan consisting of none but Muslims that supplied the immediate pretext for hostilities.¹ Not only had he himself to pay the penalty for his treacherous and unscrupulous conduct, but it affected also the fortunes of his gallant son, Jalal al-Din, who certainly deserved a better fate. The latter with the same hostility as his father by the Muslim public and rulers, and even by the Abbasid Caliphate. When pursued by the Mongols, Jalal al-Din reached Zauzan from Nishapur in 618/1221 and desired to fortify himself in the citadel of the town, he was forced to leave the place owing to the hostile attitude of the inhabitants.² When he approached the Caliphate for help against the Mongols, he not only failed to secure it, but had even to face an army sent by the Caliph to drive him out.³ On the other hand, after the death of the Caliph Nasir, peace was made between him and the Caliphate in 623/1226, on the terms that the Sultan would not exercise

1. Juwayni, II, pp. 60-61; Juzjani, *Tabaqat-i-Nasiri*, trans. Raverty, p. 27.
2. Juwayni, II, p. 134.
3. *Ibid.*, p. 154.

any rights of suzerainty over certain princes who were to be considered as the feudatories of the Caliph ; and that he would reinsert the Caliph's name in the public prayers in Persia whence it had been excluded by his father. The Caliph in return sent the deed of investiture for Persia to Jalal al-Din, together with some rich presents. He was styled as Khaqan, and also Shahinshah, but the title of Sultan was not granted to him. Thence forward he called himself "servant of the Caliph" in his letters, and addressed the latter as his Lord and Master.¹ The peace was made too late and it did not serve any useful purpose for the Sultan, as the Caliph could not, and the other Muslim rulers did not, give him any substantial support when he was attacked by the Mongols. In 627/28-1231, he made his last and final effort to induce the Muslim rulers of Rum and Sham to form a league against their common enemy, the Mongols, but jealousy and mistrust on their part prevented them from making any such useful alliance.² Finally, fleeing from the Mongols, the gallant prince was murdered in Kurdistan in 628/1231.³ Thus ended the dynasty of the Khwarazm Shahs who had united under their rule most of the countries incorporated in the empire of the Saljuqs.

Though it seemed that the Abbasid Caliphate had thus emerged victorious and successful in its struggle

1. Nasavi, p. 247: Howroth, III, 12: D'Ohsson, III, pp. 35-37, but Ibn al-Futi (p. 14 ; A. H. 627) does not say more than that Jalal al-Din received robes of honour and sent an ambassador to the Caliph.
2. Juzjani, *Tabaqat-i-Nasiri*, trans. Raverty, p. 298.
3. Juwayni, II, pp. 189-90.

with the Sultans it is clear in retrospect that it had lost all control over the temporal rulers in Persia. The fact that the Caliphs were now in possession of a comparatively larger area than before should not mislead one into thinking that they had retrieved their lost position. They had acquired these possessions as temporal and not, by any means, as the religious head of Islam. The legal theory of the Caliphate had never in fact corresponded to the realities of the situation. By the doctrine of the election and the assertion of a supreme religious authority it concealed the fact that the historical Caliphate had become a temporal authority supported by military force. It was thus a natural consequence that stronger powers should in time seize the temporal functions of the Caliphate. Then, as always happens, a semblance of the past, a fiction, is persisted in, in order to avoid a violent wrench with the past and the shock that each innovation gives to the conservative mind. Thus, as the real power passes from the hands of the Caliph, the insignia of the suzerainty for the sake of form are still kept intact. A deed of investiture is issued by the Caliph on the occasion of every new ruler, his name is placed on the coinage and recited in the Khutbah. With the lapse of time, the necessity of such a deed of investiture is felt only with the change of a dynasty and, before long, that too is dispensed with; and some sort of bare recognition, e.g., the receipt of "Sultanian robes" from the Caliph, is considered enough. This last stage was reached during the time of the Khwarazm Shahs. The Sultanate that had risen through its incompetence, on the other hand, had to remain; Nizam al-Mulk justifies its existence like a courtier; while Ghazali

puts up with it as an indispensable necessity. Hence it is safe to conclude that before it came to an end, the Caliphate had ceased to exercise any influence whatsoever on the political organizations which arose in Persia. The violent end that overtook the Caliphate at the hands of the Mongols did little more than remove a phantom authority, even though, in order to appease the tender consciences of the Muslim public, the name of the Caliph had still survived in the Khutbah and coinage. A study of the political factors, which obliged the Muslim Mongol rulers to reject even this privilege to the Cairine Caliphate, will be very interesting but it must form the theme of an independent work.

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INDEX

- Abbasid Caliphate, 21, 22,
 26, 38, 40, 54, 56, 57, 59,
 62, 68, 73, 74, 76, 84, 88,
 96, 99, 106, 115, 119, 125,
 128, 129, 142, 146, 148,
 152, 153, 157, 162,
 Abd al-Malik, 117, 119
 —Allah b. Maymun al-Qad-
 dah, 39
 —Allah b. Tahir, 54, 56, 57,
 61, 64
 Abu 'Ali Hasan (Hasnak),
 130, 131
 —'Ali Ibn Muhtaj' 113, 114,
 116
 Abul—'Abbas, 38
 —'Abbas Mamun (The Khwa-
 razmshah), 133
 —Fadl Tamimi, 129
 Abu Bakr, 37
 Adharbaijan, 180, 182
 'Adud al-Daulah, 89, 92, 101
 Afghanistan, 72
 Ahmad b. Ismail Amir, the
 Samanid, 78
 Alshah, 37
 Al-Abkam al-Sultaniyah, 45
 Al-Jazirah, 53
 'Ala al-Daulah b. Kakawayh,
 134
 'Ali, 86
 —Ibn 'Isa, 42, 43, 78, 83
 —Ibn Muhammad al-Mawardi,
 see Mawardi
 'Alid Hasan b. Zayd, 59
 Amin, 53, 54
 Arslan Shah b. Tughril, 180
 Az-Zahir, Caliph, 131
 Baghdad, 35, 40, 43, 54, 55,
 58, 62, 66, 70, 79, 81, 85,
 86, 88, 91, 95, 99, 103, 106,
 109, 110, 130, 136, 143,
 145, 148, 151, 158, 178
 Baha al-Daulah, 100, 119,
 Black Stone, 40
 Browne, E. G., 38
 Bukhara, 113, 123, 124
 Buwayhids, 76, 85, 88, 90,
 92, 95, 98, 99, 102, 106, 111,
 112, 119, 121, 136, 141,
 145, 154
 Chingiz Khan, 207
 Dirham b. Nasr b. Salih, 65
 Egypt, 38, 39, 54

- Fakhr-a-Daulah**, 93
Faryabi, Maulana Zahir al-Din,
Fatimid Caliphate, 39, 130, 131, 149
Gibbon, 37
Ghaznah, 134, 137
Ghaznavids, 104, 125, 128, 133, 137, 143, 145, 147
Ghazzali, Ima'm, 158, 163, 195
Ghurids, 197
Hafsah, 37
Hakim, Caliph, 130
Hamdan b. Al-Ash' ath (Qarmat), 39
Hamdanids 86, 108
Hirat, 53
Husayn, son of 'Ali, 36
Ibn al-Furat, 42
—Athir, 180, 184
—at Tiqtaqa, 42
—Khurdadhbih, 57
Ibnu'l-Amid, 117
Ibrahim b. Ahmad, 113
'Imad al-Daulah, 113
—al-Din Zangi, 180, 181
'Iraq, 38, 58, 176, 179, 181, 182
Isfahan, 117, 134, 136, 187
Ishaq b. Ibrahim al-Mus'abi, 56
'Ismat al-Daulah 94
Jalal al-Daulah, 91, 92, 103, 144
—al-Din, 205, 206
Juwayni, 201
Khurasan, 39, 54, 58, 62, 63, 66, 68, 73, 77, 80, 81, 113, 115, 119, 126, 138, 146, 190
Khwarazm Shahs,
Kirman, 58
Kitab al-Fakhri, 42
Lane-Poole, 152
Mahmud (of Ghaznah), 76, 124, 136, 137, 138,
Malik Da'ud b. Sultan Mahmud, 183
—Shah (Sultan) 170, 171, 185, 188, 190
Mamun, Caliph, 35, 37, 53, 56, 60
Mansur b. Nuh, 118, 121, 126,
Masud (Sultan) 181, 185
Mausil, 110, 149, 177, 185
Mawardi, Ali Ibn Muhammad 45, 47, 103, 105, 129, 139, 141, 162, 163
Mecca, 40, 98
Merw, 146

Muawiyah Ibn Abi Sufyan,
107

Mu'ayyad al-Daulah, 118

Muhammad (Prophet), 49, 205

—b. Al-Qasim, 60

—Habib, Prof., 135

—Sultan, 177

Mu'izz al-Daulah, 86, 87, 98,
107, 115, 116, 126

Muktadi, Caliph, 41

Muqtadi, Caliph, 168, 191

Muqtadir, Caliph, 184, 185

Muqtafi, Caliph, 258, 259

Mustakfi, Caliph, 86, 87, 113,
116

Mustarshud, 177, 178, 180,
183

Mutadid, Caliph, 42, 74

Mu'tamid, Caliph, 75

Mu'tasim, Caliph, 41, 42, 57,
58

Mutawakkil, Caliph, 35, 36,
43, 58

Mu'tazz, Caliph, 42, 58

Muti, Caliph, 87, 88, 108, 109,
111, 115, 117,

Muwaffaq, 39, 42, 75,

Nasavi, 203

Nasir, Caliph, 188, 197, 202,
203, 206, 208

—al-Daulah, 113, 118

Nishapur, 117, 146, 208

Nizam al-Arudi, 205

—al-Mulk, 136, 162, 170, 210

Nizamiah Madrasah, 164

Nuh b. Nasr, 114, 115, 117

Persia 66, 63, 74, 98, 112,
128, 143, 145, 176, 188,
196, 208, 209, 210, 214

Qaim, Caliph, 146, 150, 166

Qadir, Caliph, 91, 119, 126,
128, 131, 136

Qarakhanids, 123, 133

Quvurd b. Chagri Beg, 189

Radi, Caliph, 38

Rukn al-Daulah, 104, 106,
109, 149

Saffarids, 62, 65, 66, 68, 75,
77

Said b. Al-Husayn, 39

Saljuqs, 143, 145, 147, 152,
153, 210

Samnids, 76, 84, 112, 117,
119, 125, 141

Samsam al-Daulah, 89, 119

Sanjar, Sultan, 175, 177, 182,
187, 193, 195, 196, 197

Sayf al-Daulah Sadaqah, 173

Sayyid 'Ala' al Mulk al-
Tirmidhi (Caliph), 202

Sharaf al-Daulah, 150

—al-Din, 187

Sijistan, 53, 61, 65, 66, 81,

Siyasat-namah, 160

Sulayman Ibn Kathir al-Khuzai, 53

—Shah b. Muhammad, 185, 187, 190

Sultan al-Daulah, 92

Syria, 38, 39

Tabaristan, 59, 61, 72, 81, 82

Tahir, 53, 55

—b. Muhammad b. Amr, the Saffarid, 79

—Dhu l-Yaminayn, 53

Tahirids, 53, 54, 58, 66, 76

Tai, Caliph, 89, 94, 119, 126

Tigris, 37

Tughril Beg (Sultan), 147, 149, 167, 168, 181, 196

'Umar, 37

'Utbi, 137

Wathiq, Caliph, 35, 37, 129, 132

Yusuf al-Dimishqi 166

