Damage & Text Problem &Page Missing Within The Book

UNIVERSAL
LIBRARY

OU_156932

UNIVERSAL
LIBRARY

OUP--880—5-8-74—10,000.

OSMANIA UNIVERSITY LIBRARY

Call No. 320 9
C361

Accession No. 30913

Author

Title

This book should be returned on or before the date last marked below.

A HISTORY OF THE POLITICAL PHILOSOPHERS

by GEORGE CATLIN

The Science and Method of Politics

The Principles of Politics

J. S. Mill's Subjection of Women
(edited and introduced)

Thomas Hobbes

Thomas Jefferson (in *Great Democrats*)

Liquor Control

Durkheim's Rules of Sociological Method
(edited and introduced)

Preface to Action

New Trends in Socialism
(edited)

Studies in War and Democracy
(edited with E. F. M. Durbin)

Anglo-Saxony and Its Tradition

In the Path of Mahatma Gandhi

CONFUCIUS

A HISTORY OF THE POLITICAL PHILOSOPHERS

BY

GEORGE CATLIN
M.A. Oxon, Ph B.
Sometime Professor of Politics,
Cornell University.

GEORGE ALLEN AND UNWIN LTD
RUSKIN HOUSE
MUSEUM STREET LONDON

FIRST PUBLISHED IN GREAT BRITAIN
IN 1950
COPYRIGHT IN THE U.S.A.

956 *This book is copyright*
No portion of it may be reproduced by any process without written permission. Inquiries should be addressed to the publishers

First published in the U.S.A., 1939
Reprinted 1940, February 1947, followed by a Popular Edition in 1947
A Spanish translation was published in 1947

PRINTED IN GREAT BRITAIN
BY BRADFORD AND DICKENS
LONDON, W.C.1

To H. G. W., H. v. L.
encyclopædists, humanists

Preface

IN THIS book I have endeavoured to provide a guide to political theory intelligible to the common reader, with quotations from the original sources sufficiently extensive to enable him to sample for himself the "taste" and "colour" of these writings. This history of theory has been placed against brief descriptions, as background, of the civilization of the times, as the reader passes down the avenues of thought from age to age.

The stress, however, is upon modern times and upon past thought and problems so far as they bear upon the rival philosophies of these times. The scholar will know that I have said nothing new—it is not my intention—but the student will, I hope, find the book sufficiently complete, even if it is a general public for which it is written, which requires some guidance in the adventure of living as citizens in these perilous, astounding and decisive days through which we are now passing.

I am well aware that too little attention is given here to, for example, Hooker and Burke, Coleridge and Kingsley, not to speak of Jurieu or Bayle or Condorcet, Southey or Disraeli. Reluctantly, from mere considerations of space, I have laid aside a manuscript chapter on Godwin, Shelley and Mary Wollstonecraft. They must wait for some other time. I have consoled myself with the thought that several of them will receive some attention in my *Anglo-Saxony and Its Tradition*, where I have tried to do in some slight manner for that tradition what M. Jacques Maritain has done so eminently for French Christian Humanism.

This present book is a history of political thought set against the background of the history of civilization. But that thought is also displayed in the setting of the characteristics and biographies of the thinkers, whose minds we search and whom we seek to know familiarly, however long ago gone to dust. Some light story about Plato tells us more of the prejudices of the philosopher, and, hence, of his own shaping of his own philosophy than a rotund and barbered phrase. The tale of Antisthenes walking with muddy feet on Plato's sumptuous carpets and remarking, "Thus do I trample on the pride of Plato," and of

his interchange with Plato—"A horse [man] I see, but horsiness [humanity] I don't see." "That is because you have eyes but no intelligence"—tell me more than all of, for example, Cicero's dull, typical dictum, "Quid est enim civitas nisi iuris societas?" Moreover, although there is a dateless wisdom in the history of human thought, of recurrent validity, and although all is *not* relative and truth a fable, yet most thought is not so wise but that it is, not only conditioned, but even coloured by the time and place of the problem and the status and temperament of the thinker.

As I contemplate the work of my friend and late colleague, Professor Sabine of Cornell University; of Professors Cook and Coker and Dr. Joad—not to speak of Dunning and earlier writers ascending to Herder, as well as the great encyclopaedic works of Wells, Spengler and Van Loon—I am filled with humility about what I have rashly undertaken. Although, however, this book wears the fleece of a history of political philosophy, it is but fair that I should warn the reader that it is written as a philosophy of political history, a "tiger burning bright" at enmity with other current philosophies.

It discovers in the social history of mankind a certain agreement among rational men upon the objective good, upon the means of its expression in social life, and upon the arts of statesmanship and subterfuges of citizenship whereby this expression may be facilitated or frustrated. We discover, I have come to believe, a rational Grand Tradition of Culture and also (quite distinct) the beginnings of a Science of Politics. These may be our guides during these years of whirling confusion of values and of means, and of teachers pointing many ways. That philosophy I hope to develop more explicitly elsewhere. The first task, discussed in *The Principles of Politics*, has been one of method. The second, attempted here, has been to study the facts, including the facts of thought about the political acts. I have endeavoured to mount upon the bastion of three thousand years a searchlight that may project forward a ray for a few decades towards the horizon of the human future.

It should be added that the use of italics in material quoted in the text does not necessarily imply this use in the original. It is employed merely for the guidance of the eye. Readings are put at the end of some chapters, since they may be convenient to those who have the laudable intentions of reading the original texts. Other readers can ignore them. After hesitation, the system of recapitulation at the end of each chapter has not been adopted, as distracting to those whose interest is that of the general reader for pleasure.

Despite admonitions from my publishers, the spelling of proper names follows no special rule other than common usage where common usage seems to me to be decisive. Comments in square brackets are my own.

My debts are too numerous for specific acknowledgments. Some of them I have been able to note in the brief bibliographical lists, inserted for convenience rather than as a homage to learning, attached to the various chapters (in which books of especial interest to the common reader have been asterisked). Where books have gone through several editions, the date of publication is not inserted.

I am greatly indebted to Dr. C. H. McIlwain, Eaton Professor of the Science of Government, Harvard University; to Mr. R. H. S. Crossman, late Dean of New College, Oxford; to Mr. E. F. M. Durbin, of the London School of Economics; and to Dr. George Simpson, for most generously reading parts of the typescript of this book, for the faults of which they are, needless to say, in no wise responsible. I am also indebted to my indefatigable secretaries, Mrs. Katherine Nixon-Eckersall, for the preparation of the index, and Mrs. R. Drake, for checking the manuscript. Especially I wish to thank, for reading, for comments and for encouragement, my friend Professor H. H. Price, Wykeham Professor of Logic, University of Oxford, and, for my debts to him past and present, Dr. Ernest Barker, Burton Professor of Political Science, University of Cambridge. To my views and to my more extravagant endeavours to shake the shoulders of the common reader, they, of course, stand quite uncommitted. I hope, however, that I have not let the common reader off too lightly. One part of my task will have been fulfilled if I have held his interest, in what I humbly believe it to be to his interest to know.

GEORGE GORDON CATLIN.

NOTE TO BRITISH EDITION

WHEN a British edition was called for of this book, which had been subjected, in several impressions, to ten years of criticism from readers in America, the question arose whether it should be published unchanged or should be revised throughout in order to bring it up to date. Great, however, although events have been in these ten years, they have not upset the trend of the argument of the centuries. And there is a certain interest in seeing how the more subjective judgments passed at the end of this book have stood the test of a decade. The present edition is, therefore, issued with certain minor corrections of detail and with one small addendum of a few hundred words. G. C.

Acknowledgments

The author wishes to acknowledge the kindness of the following publishers and authors in permitting the use of quotations from material of which they control the copyrights.

Henry Holt and Company and Thornton Butterworth, Ltd.: J. L. Myres, *Dawn of History.*

G. P. Putnam's Sons and Constable & Company, Ltd.: F. A. Voigt, *Unto Caesar.*

Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., and Victor Gollancz, Ltd.: G. D. H. Cole, *What Marx Really Meant.*

Harper & Brothers and Faber & Faber, Ltd.: H. J. Laski, *Liberty in the Modern State.*

University of North Carolina Press and George Allen and Unwin, Ltd.: H. J. Laski, *Democracy in Crisis.*

Fabian Society: H. J. Laski, *Socialism and Freedom.*

Random House, Inc., and Victor Gollancz, Ltd.: John Strachey, *What Are We To Do?*

John Strachey and Modern Age Books, Inc.: John Strachey, *Hope in America.*

Ivor Nicholson & Watson, Ltd.: George Catlin, *Great Democrats.*

H. G. Wells and The Macmillan Co.: H. G. Wells, *Men Like Gods.*

The B. V. F.: Oswald Mosley, *Greater Britain.*

Harcourt, Brace & Company, Inc.: Morris R. Cohen, *Law and the Social Order.*

Golden Cockerel Press: Sappho poem by Poseidippus, from *The Greek Anthology.*

CONTENTS

	page
PREFACE	ix
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS	xiii
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS	xvii

PART I

I. Introductory	3
II. Plato	35
III. Aristotle	72
IV. The Hellenistic Age and the Coming of Rome	105
V. The Roman Law and the Christian Fathers	126
VI. The Middle Ages	146
VII. Renaissance and Reformation	187
VIII. Thomas Hobbes	221

PART II

IX. Locke and the Social Contract	259
X. The American and French Revolutions: Montesquieu, Jefferson, Burke and Paine	300
XI. The Early Utilitarians: Jeremy Bentham	342
XII. The Later Utilitarians. James and John Stuart Mill	381
XIII. Individualists and Anarchists	405

PART III

XIV. Jean Jacques Rousseau	435
XV. Georg Hegel	475
XVI. The Post-Hegelian Conservatives: Carlyle to Bosanquet	497
XVII. The Post-Hegelian Conservatives: Treitschke	525
XVIII. Marx and His Predecessors	543
XIX. Kautsky, Lenin, Trotsky, Stalin	602
XX. Laski and Strachey	649
XXI. Internationalism and Fascism: Benito Mussolini, Adolf Hitler	700

PART IV

XXII. Conclusion and Prospect	745
INDEX	785

ILLUSTRATIONS

Confucius (551–479 B.C.)	*frontispiece*
	facing page
Aristotle (384–322 B.C.)	74
Niccolò Machiavelli (A.D 1469–1527)	192
John Locke (1632–1704)	282
Jeremy Bentham (1748–1832)	356
Speculum Mentis or Political Mirror	404
Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770–1831)	480
Bertrand Arthur William Russell (1872–)	756

Part I

Chapter I

Introductory

1

If man's proper study is man, politics is especially his concern since it is the study of the control of man. Like chemistry and the natural sciences, but also like economics, politics is a study based on observation of the way things actually happen. It is a study also of how to gain control over these things. It is a study of power. But, like the humanities, it involves discussion and assessment of values. The first of these fields is that of political science. The second is that of political philosophy.

The two subjects together are Politics, which is the study of the control of creatures who have will and choice—or, more exactly, who have some energy of will and some range of choice, however limited by instinctive impulses, rational checks and material determinants. Politics, then, is something very much wider than the study of the State, which is a recent social form. It is the study of social relationships and of the human (and even non-human) social structure. It is nothing less. It is identical with Sociology.

In the Renaissance of the fifteenth century the interest of students, and of those mentally alive, centered upon the Humanities and upon the assessment of human values as touching the art and ends of living, as distinct from the logical proofs about these ends offered by those great reasoners, the Schoolmen. In the seventeenth and until the nineteenth century, men were preoccupied with their discoveries in Mathematics, the inorganic Physical Sciences and Biology. They were stimulated by the hope of effecting control of Nature. As in Ancient Greece, so in the Modern World, to the epic period, when man sang of his own life, had succeeded the age of the physicists, when men inquired into the world without. Moreover, the contemporary Despots were not always benevolent to those who pried into politics and secrets of state. Astronomy was much safer. With the twentieth century has come an overwhelming interest in the Social Sciences: in Economics or the study of the relation of man and material in the

pursuit of wealth; in Genetics or the study of the relation of man and man in their generations in the pursuit of health; and in Politics or the study of will and will in the relationship of power.

Politics has become the overwhelming interest of our own generation, since it is becoming ever more acutely realized that man who has made such strides in the conquest of nature has, by reason of prejudice and passion, lingered behind in the conquest of man himself and his civilization; and that this weakness may have consequences fraught with catastrophe. A man may decide that he is uninterested in poetry and art or in chemistry and mathematics and no one may be the loser save himself nor will anyone trouble him. But, although a man may decide that he is uninterested in politics and may prefer to have the provincial mind, the practice of politics will not be uninterested in him, whether in peace or in war. If he will not pull his weight, he will most certainly be pulled.

The organization of our human life is perhaps a negligible matter, an idiotic gesture of self-importance, in the perspective of eternity. It is said that beyond the constellation of the Sculptor, a new group of stars has been discovered, estimated to be 250,000,000 light years away. The speed of light, however, is that of the ether wave. More tardy is that of a broadcast message which, dispatched at one instant, will yet circle this earth and be received again two-fifteenths of a second later. In such immensities of the universe, not only any individual among the 1,900,000,000 inhabitants of the earth, but the human race itself shrinks to less than the worm that is man, told of in the Bible. It is impossible to attach importance to a race, related in animal origins to the lemur and tree-creeping spectral tarsier; a descendant of one of several branches of speaking anthropoids who lived over 300,000 years ago; who emerges in the late Pleistocene Age, about 25,000 years ago, his fortune literally in his mobile hand and in that tongue attachment of the jaw; and whose 5,000 years of recorded history counts for only a few seconds in the day-clock of the history of this subsidiary planet. He descended from the trees or emerged, troglodyte, from the caves to which, in this last decade, in time of war he again returns. Or it would be impossible to attach importance, were not he who knew all this precisely an individual man, himself astronomer or archaeologist.

Before the majesty and the potential power involved in this knowledge, the dynastic wars of kings, the fights of Guelph and Ghibelline, of Montagu and Capulet, the party faction of Whig and Tory, even of Catholic and Protestant, even of Fascist and Marxist,

seem to become fantastic squabbles of ill-tempered children. What alone seems, in this perspective, to matter is science, the limitless increase of the knowledge that is power, its significance for increasing the power of the human race and for improving its breed, the passionless mood of the man of science, in brief, the enlargement of Civilization, of which this knowledge is the seal like the signet of Solomon. Was Faust concerned with the politicians? Or Buddha or Christ with party membership? Were they "dividers of goods"? Is not civilization, progress, science itself endangered by these lethal factions? If there were a war, would it not be good for men of science to conspire to kill off the politicians? In the perspective of knowledge is not politics abysmally unimportant, on a level with incantations and witchcraft?

Throughout the millennia there is detectable a conflict between interest in Civilization and interest in Human Happiness or, again, between the interest of Society and the interest of justice for the Individual. In each case, the two are inseparable; but the stress is different. The trouble is that the advance of civilization, of the sciences and arts, has been due not only, or chiefly, to pure speculation or to disinterested love of beauty, but to motives of utility and to the desire for an effect upon the glory of some group or in furthering the ambition of some man. The humanist and philosopher could not, if he would, cut himself adrift from these passions and contest, nor does it help to call them battles of kites and crows. As Aristotle said: Intellect alone moves nothing.

The quarrel is not about who is to know, but about who is to enjoy. In this quarrel we all count among the ill-tempered children, seeking a material share-out favourable to ourselves or explaining that Civilization matters nothing to us if we are not to satisfy our own appetite by eating the fruits of its achievement, grown on the tree of knowledge. Good men in their own eyes feel themselves called upon to organize physical force to prevent bad men from attaining power—and rightly, for, as Plato pointed out, this is the only reason why a good man should engage in politics and seek power and dominion. Having, however, become preoccupied in strife, it may easily happen that the *clerici* and men of science forget their learning and that the torch of science is extinguished amid the animal conflicts of these risen apes that are men, as that torch for one thousand years in Europe was almost extinguished before, save in a few monasteries, during the last of those Dark Ages that appear periodically to descend on the world.

The appetites of man, the ape, on the one hand, and the non-attached pursuit of power over nature, through science, on the other

hand, are not easily to be reconciled. As the clash between the claims of immediate Happiness and of Civilization, this constitutes the first problem of politics. It involves economic justice in the distribution of the fruits of a science fertile in applications, so that the health and power are increased of the race itself and so that there is not poverty in the midst of plenty.

The initiative, liberty and high hope, beyond conventions of good and evil, that fertilize science itself, on the one hand, and the discipline and morality that strengthen allegiance to a society and its culture, or to the concept of human civilization throughout the centuries, on the other hand, are not easily reconciled. As the clash between Liberty and Authority, this constitutes the second problem of politics.

The art and practice of politics have examples that can be gathered, like examples from business practice, over the five millennia of recorded history. *The science of politics*, on the other hand, like that of economics, is so immature as scarcely to be born. Politicians, like evil stepmothers, have stood at its cradle, ready to suffocate it, the saviour of our civilization. Nevertheless, the pace of history moves ever more rapidly. The nemesis of wilful ignorance comes. Biological time moves more quickly than geological time. Economic change may radically affect biological development; and economic change has its own time scale. That change may be controlled by human knowledge, but the Ancient World in large part fell to ruin in the Occident from lack of adequate economic knowledge alike in agriculture and in taxation. This control, however, is a concern, not only of the economists, but of the politicians who can frustrate the wisest experts. (And who shall control the politicians? Who shall educate their masters? It is Bernard Shaw who says of political science that it is "the science by which alone civilization can be saved.")

Lord Kelvin, the natural scientist, said, in describing the nature of scientific knowledge:

> When you can measure what you are speaking about, and express it in numbers, you know something about it; but when you cannot measure it, when you cannot express it in numbers, your knowledge is of a meagre and unsatisfactory kind: it may be the beginning of knowledge, but you have scarcely, in your own thoughts, advanced to the stage of *science*, whatever the matter may be.

Sir Arthur Thomson continues:

> It is very interesting that Clerk Maxwell should speak in one sentence of "those aspirations after accuracy in measurement, and justice in action, which we reckon among our noblest attributes in men!"

Professor A. North Whitehead states: "Science was becoming, and has remained, primarily quantitative. Search for measurable elements among your phenomena, and then search for relations between these measures of physical quantity." "The scientific man," writes Karl Pearson, "has to strive at self-elimination in his judgements." Nor shall we disagree when an eminent Marxist, Professor Levy, speaking of social matters, says: "The results of measurement will be entirely independent of any religious, ethical or social bias."

The art of politics throughout the ages provides instances of recurrent social behaviour and of the constancy of psychological reactions. Mass observations of social phenomena increasingly approximate to objectivity of judgement and to verifiable measurement. Sociology today perfects this technique. Nevertheless, there are those who will put aside this book with the unreasoned assertion that detached judgement of means in social matters is impossible; and others again who will, for their own reasons, deny that it is desirable. Political science is still embryonic, because its development has been too dangerous to the powers that be; and because man's indolence prefers habitual thought and rhetoric to technical thought that gives, not *belles-lettres*, but power and control.

Political philosophy, however, with its appraisals of social ends, has matured over two millennia. It may be said by the practical man of affairs that, in that time, it has made small advance. Neither have the human judgements on the beautiful and the good. It is yet no small matter to make a survey, through the ages, of the history of human society where it has been touched up to luminousness and self-consciousness in the greatest reflective minds of each epoch. Philosophy is a critical revision, ever going on, of tradition in the light of current experience. Thus we study history, not from the angle of heaped-up granules of fact, but from that of the evaluating intelligence. We view the drama, in each age, through the eyes of the greatest minds of that time. We shall, however, in this book forget neither the background, in the history of mass forces, nor the personal foibles that colour the views of these philosophers. We shall arrive at a conspectus of the history of civilization in terms of the thoughts of the men who thought about it. We shall cite their words. Thus far, at least, we shall reach objectivity, if in no other way. If their evaluations differ, we shall reflect that the essence of education lies, as Diderot said, in the stirring of doubt and of wonder.

In some cases these philosophies of social action, and of individual action in society, will be found to have arisen, reflectively and after the event, to justify action to reason and conscience. Such is the case

of the social philosophy of John Locke in its relation to the English Revolution of 1688–1689. In other cases the philosophy provokes and shows the way to action. Such is the case with Locke's philosophy, through its influence on Jefferson, in its relation to the American Revolution. Writings of a philosopher, such as Locke, unsuited by their style and close reasoning to stir action, mediated by a man of letters, such as Voltaire, himself in turn publicized in his ideas by a journalist, such as Brissot, can have popular and revolutionary effect. We note the same thing in the influence of the writings of Aquinas upon Catholic conduct and of Marx upon Communist conduct.

The survey of the thought of these thinkers may be more than an educational enrichment, a leisured feast of reason. It may not only be itself a piece of civilization: it may have utility by enlarging civilization. We may be able, by the survey of the history of philosophy, to reinforce our philosophy of history and to strengthen political science. We may perhaps detect, among the opinions of the thinkers, certain recurrent themes and a leitmotiv. We may find traditions in thought, or a Grand Tradition of culture with variants. That may provide, not merely antique analogies and far-away critics, but a norm and canon whereby to judge new theories. We may recognize these novelties as indeed new explorations of old workings, which human experience has, with good cause, marked "no thoroughfare." Or we may find that hopeful experiments of the past, under modern conditions, have novel chances of success. Neither Communism nor Fascism will seem to us in all their characteristics entirely new. The advocacy, again, of the class war has been accepted and tried out before. But the Industrial or Mechanical Revolution, the Discovery of Electricity and the Control of Population introduce new differentiae with wide-spread, unprecedented effects.

This human philosophy and tradition are not to be traced only in literary exercises put together by fallible men. (A valuable distinction can be made between Political Theory and Political Thought. *Political Theory* consists of such set treatises. But *Political Thought* is twofold and earlier. In part, it is a matter of the popular proverbs of the day. In this sense every man is a political thinker, even although he goes no further than to repeat the rhyme:

> When Adam delved and Eve span,
> Who was then the gentleman?

The common man cannot avoid having political thoughts. Untrained, however, there is no guaranty that his common-sense opinions may

not be uncommon nonsense. Further, there is an even more primitive thought, less articulate and of which no record remains, but which we may legitimately conjecture from the institutions of a people of which we have record or the buildings that house those institutions which are their own record.

We may believe, with the philosopher Benedetto Croce, that "the chief meaning of history is the victory of freedom." Or we may have a different interpretation of this history of human thought about social action, which is political theory, in this dramatic and tragic age when we hesitate, about to enter the phase of the cycle of history which is analogous to the Empire of the Caesars—but still conscious of free will and of the right to create anew. The glory of the Renaissance was its explorers, stimulating an age to new thought by opening up vast vistas in geographic space and conjecturing the unknown from the known. The Columbus of today must stimulate adventure in ideas by surveying historic areas in time of economic and social organization; and so must move on, through record of revolution, to a prognostication and view and control of things to come.

2

The early historical, the proto-historical and pre-historical periods of the human race are epochs of what may be termed *Frozen Political Thought.* Man lived a social life—a social life more enveloping even than he was to live later. There is adequate evidence that he thought, reflectively, about this life and meditated upon its requirements and suppositions. But, in these days before social maxims were written down in Sacred Books or in Mosaic Ten Commandments, the political thought of a time must be conjectured from the analysis of the institutions of the age, of which we have either record or material remains in the institutional buildings. Into these institutions, as it were moulds, the thought of the time congealed. At least equally frequently, however, this thought is rather secreted by the friction in the functioning of the institutions.

The more primitive the society, the more completely are the institutions shaped by the hammer of the simplest vital needs for food beating upon the anvil of rock and land and geographic configuration determining economic supply. As Professor Myres says, in *The Dawn of History,* speaking of the pastoral phase of civilization when (in Aristotle's phrase) man "cultivated a migratory farm":

> Under these circumstances, industry can hardly pass beyond the replacement of things worn out or lost; and these are all things which anyone can

make and everyone does, if he cannot pass on the task to another: and as everyone can and does make everything as it is needed, exchange of products and specialization of skill are alike out of the question. The raw material is always to hand, so that there is no use in accumulating it in advance; and to manufacture in advance of demand is simply to cumber the baggage each time the camp is moved on. . . .

The institutions of pastoral peoples are of the simplest. Everywhere these societies have been observed to consist of small compact groups of actual relatives, each living as a single "patriarchal family" without other apparatus of government. The "patriarchal family" consists of a father, some mothers—the number of these depends principally on the supply—and some other animals and children.

This type of human society, with its state limited to a single family, its government vested in a single elderly man, and its conception of women and children as desirable kinds of highly domesticated animals, is simply man's ancient and habitual clothing, in a political sense, against a particular kind of weather. It will wear indefinitely and unchangeably as long as external conditions remain the same; and it will begin to wear out, and be discarded, in the event of any serious change.

In lands, however, suitable rather for hunting than for pasturage, the man, as hunter, goes off by himself, returning in due course to a particular spot. The children cannot keep up, and the family lives on roots or berries or, at a later time, on the cultivated "fruits of the earth." Cain's wife becomes the first agriculturalist; and agriculture, unlike hunting and shepherding, is a woman's job. At a later stage, the seed grain is scattered on the mud of rivers' banks and the river becomes the father of the land.

Certain societies, although not all, pass through an early so-called "matriarchal stage." In many cases this word is a misnomer, for the woman does not "rule." Merely, on the Roman law principle of *pater incertus*, the institution of marriage not yet being fully established, lineage traces through her. The man to whom the younger generation looks up is the maternal uncle. In the Malabar Coast a man mourns more ceremoniously for his maternal uncle than he does for his own father. Often the husband on marriage (Beena type) comes into the family of his wife. More rarely, as among the Iroquois Indians, who are huntsmen, the elder women as the guardians of the stable encampment, have become genuine matriarchs. They, not merely the maternal uncle, decide issues. The chief rules by their assent.

Sir Henry Maine, in his book *Ancient Law*, took his examples too exclusively from two areas, Europe, especially Rome with its "paternal power" (*patria potestas*), and India. Nevertheless, as agriculture

spreads, a change takes place. The matriarchal type of family yields to the patriarchal. Rule increasingly is in the hands of the eldest "agnate" or male relative. In marriage (Baal type) the wife joins her husband's family. But social organization has spread beyond the family to the clan. The eldest male may be judge and priest and ruler, but he is not therefore always fitted to be war-lord. Moreover, matriarchy with its stable *hearth* has not merely yielded to the society typified by the *shepherd-king*. On the contrary, with the spread of agriculture and when the huntsman stays at home, it is the hearth that wins, as symbol of the unity of the clan and tribe, against the solitary hunter's individualism and the nomadism of pastoral peoples. The hearth, as de Coulanges shows in his *Cité Antique*, wins and its ritual. As clan replaces family, priest replaces mother; but the ritual remains as strong or stronger in its binding force. Survival requires "the brave," the leader of the war-expedition, the *dux* or *duce* or *duke*. But survival also requires cohesion and the *priest-king* of his people, "the sacred King."

In a small community, like that of which Sir James Fraser tells us around Italian Nemi, the priest-king rules until another comes to challenge, kill and replace him. The priest-kingship never grows old and dies; but each incarnation is sacrificed for the good of the people. So the lives of the early Pharaohs were overshadowed by this demand for their periodic human sacrifice, *because* divine and symbolic of the whole people, to appease the gods of the land. The sense of guilt and the need for ascetic discipline, *if* the tribe is to survive, grip the people. When, however, a large community grows up, as that which the Nile united into Egypt, an organized priesthood develops. Its members have no intention of being personally sacrificed, "lest the people perish." As in Aztec Mexico, slaves or foreigners could be found for that purpose or, as in Carthage, children. Nor need the dilemma any longer be faced of priest-king *or* war-lord. The war-lord or Pharaoh can be one of the priests, hereditary and one of the greatest but, nevertheless, powerless against the priestly institution.

The Divine Kingship is one of the earliest and one of the most persistent of institutions in human civilization. Sometimes, as with the high priests and the kings of Israel, the pontiffs and the consuls of Rome, the Popes and the kings of Europe, the priestly and royal offices divide (although seldom entirely). But in China the Emperor has always been the Son of Heaven; in Persia the kings were god-descended and even today are inspired directly by Allah; in the Babylonian cities reigned the priest-kings; in Egypt Pharaoh was god; the *rex* in Rome and the *basileus* in Athens held priestly office; in

Imperial Rome Caesar was god in death, divine Augustus; even the petty Gothic kings were descended from Odin; in Peru the Inca rulers were priests; to this day the Mikado is priest and god. These have been the symbols of community alone powerful and august enough to battle against the disruptive egoism of the human ape. They were symbols of conservative strength against disruptive scepticism and individual innovating initiative.

Priest-kingship was not an isolated institution. It was often part of a massive socialist organization of the community, although a socialism functional, pyramidical (not democratic-equalitarian) in structure, based on massed slave labour. In Peru, the Proto-Chimu culture from about 200 B.C. is succeeded by a dark age from A.D. 500–1100. Our records are inadequate about the social structure of this civilization; but of the succeeding Inca civilization we know that the socialistic-paternal form obtained, under which the labourer had security. In turn, however, he worked, if in part for himself, in part for the Inca ruler and for the gods. In Egypt the records are ample. Analogies between Egypt and Peru are hazardous and a quite inadequate basis for any assertion that human culture passes through a common cursus or cycle of civilization. But the temples of Egypt and Pharaoh are the great landowners; and, in this system of landownership, the peasant has assurance of tenure. Ships voyage from the Nile to Syrian Byblos carrying goods furnished by the Egyptian government in order to procure, in return, cedar-wood for the temples. The civilization massively endures, based upon cheap slave labour and forced labour. It is significant that the first great monument of human civilization is a grave, costing the death of thousands of slaves. It is a memorial connected with the death of a king, the Pharaoh Kheops, in ca. 3900 B.C., but asserting and assuring his immortality. It is the symbol, *aere perennius*, of the immortality of the community in which he was god-king.

Between 6000 and 3000 B.C. man has learned, in the area between Nile and Indus, in addition to the making of fire and clothes and cooked food and stone weapons, to harness the force of oxen and winds, to use the plough (with the male ploughman), the wheeled cart, the potter's wheel, and the sailing boat. Bricks were invented. By 3000 B.C. cotton is being grown in the Indus Valley and wool is used in Mesopotamia Copper is being smelted in the East by about 4000 B.C. Perhaps in 4236 B.C. or perhaps in 2776 B.C. the Egyptian calendar, connected with the rising of Sirius, with all its implications for calculation of the Nile flood and Egyptian agriculture, begins. Priest-kings know the calendar. But along with these developments and the demand for a

richer, more settled agricultural life, often involving concerted irrigation, goes the need for, and recognition of, a stronger cohesive authority.

Cities arise from India to the Nile. They do this, moreover, at about the same time and perhaps for reasons not disconnected. By 1500 B.C. learned men were travelling from Egypt to Mesopotamia, and employing one literary writing, a cuneiform script. The god of the city, for example in Babylonia, and his priest-king and priests, had a complex economy to supervise, involving accountancy. The god was the first saver or capitalist who could afford to go beyond subsistence to bedeck civilization with ornament and luxury. In Erech (Babylonia) before 3000 B.C. the first figures and writing on tablets are used to keep these temple accounts. Literacy has begun and the privileged position of the priestly scribe and *clericus*. In Egypt arises Thebes, as Homer says, "with mighty stores of wealth, a hundred gates."

A papyrus of the early New Kingdom in Egypt (ca. sixteenth century B.C.) contains the advice:

> I have seen the metal-worker at his task at the mouth of his furnace with fingers like a crocodile. He stank worse than fish-spawn. Every workman who holds a chisel suffers more than the men who hack the ground; wood is his field and the chisel his mattock. . . . Put writing in your heart that you may protect yourself from hard labour of any kind and be a magistrate of high repute. The scribe is released from manual tasks; it is he who commands.

It is a very early illustration of class snobbery for the most practical of reasons. It has its antithesis in a voice from a simpler civilization:

> Publish in the palaces in the land of Egypt . . . they know not to do right who store up violence and robbery in their palaces . . . that lie on beds of ivory and stretch themselves upon their couches. (*Amos*, 3: 6; ca. 760 B.C.)

The scientific inventions spring from the *practical* arts and from labour-saving devices. In such devices scribes able to employ forced labour—not machine labour but slave labour—had small interest. Rather their interest was to consolidate, even by keeping learning secret, their own power. Not the Egyptian priest, with his hieroglyphs (*sacred* script), but the Phoenician trader moved on to the invention and use of the alphabet.

The very binding force of the religious tradition in Egypt, hard-shelled and crustacean, while consolidating the community as homogeneous, suppressed invention and initiative and culture. Its effect was to check the adaptability of man and to stunt his cultured evolu-

tion even by the very magnificence and grandeur of its protective devices. It is perhaps for this reason that the private tombs of dynastic Egypt have a poetic interest that is lacking in the overwhelming size of the temples which annihilate man before their massiveness. The values of the sublime and immemorial confront the values of the beautiful and of the intelligent. Egypt used up inventions rather than renewed them. It gave a stagnant security to its workers. A static civilization, with its demands, stands over against all impulse to enlarge the happiness of the common mass by the routes of invention and of the devices that make for personal freedom.

Migration, commerce, conquest under warrior-kings involve a clash of cultures and serve to break up the cake of custom in the profoundly conservative, pious, ritualistic, socialistic, paternal, priest-ruled societies with their peculiar economic systems. The merchants are the innovators, where sheer economic need does not force invention on the pious timidity and natural indolence of man. After all, if the psychologists are right, the use of intelligence is not natural to man but very unnatural, due to pain and some breakdown in a happy, indolent social equilibrium. Mind itself is a painful, disease-like product of the struggle for survival—as Lord Balfour said, like the pig's snout, a food-finder.

In about 2525 B.C. Sargon of Akkad, as a military ruler, united Babylonia. Later the Assyrian and Hittite empires (as also the Persian and still later the Tatar and Turkish) are to be examples of primarily military, mechanical, non-organic empires, symbolized by the recruiting-sergeant and press-gang and by the tax-gatherer. Such empires, unlike the priestly kingdoms, were normally autocratic monarchies, whose rulers sprang from warlike folk in a more backward state of culture, living in lands where man had been less stimulated by the vagaries and wealth of nature to inventive resourcefulness. These military empires gave a peace of desolation; but there is little indication that they, when consolidated, any more than the priestly—indeed even less—advanced invention or new forms of material civilization (even when amassing a concentrated wealth), save in the art of war, or promoted more humane standards of conduct.

Where, however, the conquering peoples settle down in the land (as the Aryan invaders in India) and make it their own, they invoke religious sanctions to sanctify an authority founded on force. A new stable society of castes is, later, set up ranging from priest and warrior to slave, from pure Brahmin to outcast, in which the religious myth is that each performs a special function, in his station to which the

gods have called him hereditarily, within the total society. The Caste Myth, like Priest-kingship, is one of the more firmly seated traditions of human history. It fuses mere force with specific social function and finds a sanction in the will of the gods, *i.e.*, in those very influences that make, *against violence*, for peace and stability. In a less marked form than in India the caste system appears in Egypt (but not in China). We shall later note the influence of its implicit "philosophy of function" on Plato.

It is not to be supposed that the priestly oligarchies remained unchallenged or were challenged only from without or by ambitious warrior-kings within. In some cases the reduction by law to writing is purely an affair of convenience. In these cases (as with the earliest Anglo-Saxon law codes) it is merely a matter of memoranda on the customary tariff of fines. So much to be paid for a broken head. . . . In other cases (as with the Hindu sacred Laws of Manu, ca. A.D. 500 or later) a priesthood may have sought to increase its own power by outlining in sacred writ—and writing itself is here a priestly, magic art—an ideal system. But in other cases there is reason to suppose opposition to the reduction to writing of the immemorial unwritten tradition; and it only takes place because a faction is challenging the current interpretation of the ritual tradition of the ancestors, "the silent ones," and is demanding the almost profane step of codification.

Another challenge may be made to priestly morality from a quarter that is less connected with sectional resentment and suspicion. A heretic king may arise, such as Amenhotep IV (Akhenaten) of Egypt. Prophets may denounce an empty ritual as did the Hebrew prophets, especially in ca. 800 B.C. Buddhism owes its origin to an Indian prince, Sakyamuni (560–480 B.C.), who carried one stage further the speculations, against the background of the Hindu Nature-religion, of the Brahmin metaphysicians and who led one of the greatest of all religious secessions. A route away from the oppressions and injustices in caste-organized society was found in the theme that, from individual contemplation of ultimate Being, the individual might, without social ritual, save himself. By study of "the noble, Aryan Path," and perception of the claim of inevitable cause and consequence, the way was found to disinterestedness or non-attachedness to pain-breeding, egoistic desire.

The Buddhist sage strove for neither power nor wealth—was a monk, pacifist, communist, mendicant. He was uninterested in war and in calls of "justice and honour" between nations. He was uninterested in money and in "social justice" as a matter of dividing

wealth between men. He was uninterested in "liberty" and caste position or servitude or emancipation. He was uninterested even in the striving to perpetuate human life, whether of the individual or the species. Bliss was Nirvana, which is the recognition of the identity of ultimate Being with that which has no differential characteristics and is also Not-being. The Self discovers itself by its right to contemplate Reality and, thereby, has peace. And the Self, merging in Reality, ceases to seek to perpetuate the separated Self. The perfection of the goodwill is the end of striving. That was the practical message; nor was primitive Buddhism interested in any talk of gods or spirits, immortality or sacred writings, that had no bearing on this emancipation *in this life and in this world.*

The problem in civilization of how to preserve at once acceptance of authority, which binds men together, and the mood of liberty, curiosity and initiative, which is the matrix of material invention, is solved. Authority is indifferent to the saint who passively obeys; and material invention and lust for the tools of power are also interests without real importance. Buddhism is the beginning of individualism as against the Brahminical Nature-worship; but it is also its end, since the new consciousness of personal value leads out to no material consequences. It revolves within itself. Only the goodwill matters, liberated and non-attached. This doctrine, religious (although denying personal gods) and philosophical, of the monastic contemplative self, perpetually recurs as an undertone amid the chorus of the philosophies of Society and Tradition, of the gods of the land and of the divine kings of their people, whether worshipped in Tokyo or in Egyptian Thebes. It is as extreme and transcendental a doctrine of *soul liberty* as the unvarying worship of Pharaoh, the priest of his people, implies a doctrine of *social authority.*

The extremes omit the mean of mundane, material, orderly advance in the conquest of power for humanity. Neither in India nor in Egypt do thinkers concern themselves with the mundane, day-by-day conduct of human affairs in a fashion that is useful to the common mass and, because useful to man, perhaps obligatory on men. Under Buddhism civilization and social life are alike regarded as a seduction, an opulent veil of illusion. In Egypt moral obligation is to this agelong Civilization; and not to the contemporary Human Society. Where their interests clash Civilization comes first. The conception is essentially priestly. What matters is *not* human happiness at the time, but immortality with the gods in the unpassing glory of their temples. The first Utilitarians are to be found in China, whose classic thinkers based

conduct upon useful ritual, and obligation upon that which preserved through the ages the life and fair name of each man's own family—father and mother and grandparents, with their shrine blessed by the spirits of the locality.

3

The civilization of China, using the ox, the plough and the potter's wheel, in the days of the Chou dynasty (1122–248 B.C.), centered on the Hoang-Ho or Yellow River. It is uncertain whether the Chinese reached these lands, including Shantung, by following the course of the great river from the West or from the South. Japan was unheard of or was rumoured as a land of dwarfs. Buddhism had not yet arrived from India. The lands on either side of the Yangtze were still areas of reed-covered swamp amid which barbarian tribes were beginning to set up some primitive government. A chief of the land of Chu, here, boasted that "I am only a barbarian savage and do not concern myself with Chinese titles"—but added that his ancestor had been suckled by a tigress. However, self-sufficient and proudly conscious of already over a thousand years of culture, the emperors of China held court in Loyang in Shantung. In the sixth century the policy of the Chou dynasty of extending their borders against primitive barbarism, by giving autonomous power to their nobility and even suffering the erection of castles, had issued in a feudal epoch. Fifty-two rulers, all in nominal and ceremonial allegiance to the Sacred Emperors, contended among themselves. It was not until 221 B.C. that the Emperor Chi Wang-ti endeavoured to inaugurate an improved civilization by his famous Burning of the Books. The force of tradition, however, prevailed against him.

CONFUCIUS (K'ung Fu-tze or Master Kung) was born, an ugly child with a wen on its head, in the feudal duchy of Lu, in Shantung, in 551 B.C. about the time that Nebuchadnezzar died in Nineveh. He was the son of a soldier, poor but of ancient lineage, by his second wife (the first wife having presented him with daughters only and a mistress with a cripple), espoused by him at the age of seventy. The earliest historians speak of the marriage as not a ceremonial one and, hence, of Confucius as illegitimate. The father dying, the boy was brought up by his widowed mother—a woman singularly free from beliefs in spirits and omens—and displayed in his earliest years a specialist's interest in ceremonial. Matter-of-fact outlook, absence of superstition concerning "the other world," punctilious concern with the art of

living in this world were to remain the characteristics of the great teacher. China was a land of no Sacred Books. Confucius contributed only classical writings.

At the age of seventeen Confucius obtained employment in the baronial family of Chi, as an estate supervisor and tithe collector. He married and had a son from whom a numerous progeny traces to this day; but there is no reason to suppose that the marriage was a success and there is a tradition that tells of an early divorce. Of his parents, unusually enough in the case of the Chinese, he is recorded to have spoken scarcely at all; but he built them a tomb and, on that occasion, significantly enough declared, "I am a man who belongs equally to the north and the south, the east and the west. I must have something by which I can remember this place." His relatives abstained from becoming his disciples.

On his mother's death he decided to become a scholar, a *clerc*. His knowledge of ritual brought him to the attention of the ducal ministers. It was improved by a visit to the court at Loyang of the Chou emperors. And it moulded the teaching that he offered at the various feudal courts when he went into exile with his duke, and during the years of exile that followed. He found, however, in his wanderings that, oddly enough, despite knowledge, he was not loved by other scholars. Before all, Confucius was a political philosopher, his individual ethics and his views on religion being elaborations of his beliefs concerning the due conduct of society.

Unlike Lao-tze, "the Old Philosopher," the mystic and individualist, Confucius rejected the doctrines of non-resistance, non-interference and flight from the world, with their implications of a philosophic anarchism, trust in intuitive guidance and distrust of government, that have so pleased recent philosophers, such as Bertrand Russell, who have visited China. The godlike philosopher of Ritualism and of Morality *comme il faut*, all these years ago Confucius sought to refute the doctrine of the free, fantastic scamp which Mr. Lin Yutang has recently expounded so pleasantly.

Lao-tze, on the contrary, held that Power is the root of vice. "Only that government has value which is in accord with Nature or the *Tao* (or *logos*, Reason). All other civilization is corrupt error." A disciple of Lao-tze continued:

> In the days when natural instincts prevailed, men moved quietly and gazed steadily. . . . But when sages appeared, tripping people up over charity and fettering them with duty to one's neighbour, doubt found its way into the world. . . . Destruction of the natural integrity of things, in

order to produce articles of various kinds—this is the fault of the artisan. Annihilation of *Tao* [intuitive wisdom] in order to organize charity and duty to one's neighbour—that is the error of the Sage.

The animadversion is directed against Confucius; it is he who is "the Sage." The issue, basic in thought, to this day remains an unsettled enigma. To it we shall return.*

The corruption of contemporary politics was the pre-occupation of Confucius and the theme of his instructions to his disciples. On this matter he had practical experience since, after returning from his first exile, he had acted for a short while as governor of the town of Chung-tu. His régime, we are told, was one of strict sumptuary and funeral laws; and of enforcement of just standards, even including the prohibition of the manufacture of fake curios. The dying pious practice of suttee or human sacrifice was severely frowned on by the rationalist sage. Subsequently, but before the Duke of Lu's exile, he held positions as Minister of Public Works and of Police, which in fact made him chief minister of that duchy. Whatever his moral maxims, in this latter office the moralist sage did stern justice in a time of chaos and apparently held that most sins warranted the death penalty. He left Lu again for fourteen years, thanks to a court intrigue and to the preoccupation of the Duke with his women. He then resided in Wei where, perhaps to avoid future humiliation, he scandalized his followers by calling on the Duke of Wei's *maîtresse en titre*. It was to no purpose and, exclaiming "I have never known anyone who will work so hard on behalf of virtue as for a beautiful face," the philosopher temporarily left for the feudal state of Sung, where he took the occasion to lay down the principle that oaths made under duress have no binding force.

Confucius, a patriot concerned with the return of the cultural glories of the society which, as then known from the vantage point of the Yellow River, comprised the whole world, made like a merchant his tour of courts, seated on his dignified wheeled conveyance and offering his philosophic goods. "If there were any of the princes who would employ me, in the course of twelve months I would accomplish something considerable. In three years the government would be perfected." Lao-tze, however, had commented:

Those who know a great deal about practical affairs, and do things on a large scale, endanger their persons, for by their action and their knowledge they reveal the mistakes of mankind. He who is only the son of another has

* *Cf.* pp. 338, 476.

nothing for himself, for he owes all to his father; he who is only the official of another has nothing for himself, for he owes all to his superior.

Confucius, however, replied to the recluse who followed the precepts of Lao-tze and urged withdrawal, since none could control the flood of disorder:

If I do not associate with mankind, with whom shall I associate? If order and right principles prevailed throughout the world there would be no reason for me to change anything.

Nor was Confucius to be deterred by the statement that he was the man who kept on trying to accomplish what he knew to be impossible. Confucius, however, the First Political Philosopher, adds:

My doctrines make no headway. I will get on a raft and float about on the sea. . . . The sage suffers because he must leave the world with the conviction that after his death his name will not be mentioned. . . . Am I an empty gourd. Am I to be hung up out of the way of being eaten? . . . From these and many other examples it is definitely made known that whether or not a scholar has an opportunity to serve his ruler depends, not on himself alone, but on the time in which he lives. To be a gentleman one has only to be versed in learning and serious-minded in thought. . . . Before I was born there were many men of scholarship and virtue who were destined, as I may be, to live and die in obscurity.

Some of the maxims of Confucius show no marked difference from those of Lao-tze, the pacifist. Such are these:

Sir, in carrying on your government why should you kill anyone at all? Let your evinced desires and your example be for what is good and it will not be necessary to punish anyone.

To find *the central clue to our moral being which unites us to the universal order*, that indeed is the highest human attainment. People are seldom capable of it for long.

Among the means for the regeneration of mankind, those made with noise and show are the least important.

To fulfil the law of our being is what we call the moral law.

But Confucius, both in the book generally called *The Doctrine of the Mean* (or *The Common Sense of Right*), compiled by Kung Ki, his grandson, and elsewhere, says, with stress on family, heredity and society:

The moral law takes its rise in the relation between man and woman; in its utmost it reigns supreme over heaven and earth. . . . The moral sense is the characteristic attribute of man . . . the sense of justice is the recogni-

tion of what is right and proper. To honour those who are wealthier than ourselves is the highest expression of the sense of justice. . . . The relative degrees of natural affection we ought to feel for those who are nearly related to us and the relative grades of honour we ought to show to those worthier than ourselves; these are that which gives rise to the forms and distinctions in social life. *For unless social inequalities have a true and moral basis, government of the people is an impossibility.*

By nature men are nearly alike.

Intelligence, moral character and courage: these are the three universally recognized moral qualities of man. . . . Some exercise these moral qualities naturally and easily; some because they find it advantageous to do so; some with effort and difficulty. *But when the achievement is made it comes to one and the same thing.*

The moral law is not something away from the actuality of human life. *When men take up something away from the actuality of human life as being the moral law, that is not the moral law.*

There is in the world now really no moral social order at all.

Confucius, having returned to his native state, settled down to write the history of the duchy of Lu and to collect the ballads of ancient and feudal China, some dating from the Shung dynasty (1761–1122 B.C.). He did this with a strict eye for decorum and exercising the censorship of propriety. "The three hundred odes," he says himself, "may be summed up in one sentence: thought without depravity." Of the four remaining great Chinese classics, two containing the teaching of Confucius were written down by disciples and two contain the teaching of these disciples themselves. In the summer of the year 479 B.C., at the age of seventy-three, surrounded by his disciples but not his kin, and honoured by his duke, Confucius died.

The greatest of the disciples of Confucius was Meng (Latinized as Mencius, 372–288 B.C.), who lived in Shantung one hundred years later, an advocate of public education; of the public ownership of land with allocation of a certain acreage to each; and of pacifism save in self-defence or in destroying a domestic oppressor. "There has never been a good war, though some may be considered as being better than others." This pacifism of Confucianism has impregnated the whole culture of China so that perhaps in our own day it will be destroyed by Japan. However, this Empire is the oldest state on earth; and it already counts three thousand years among the yesterdays of its distinguished civilization.

Mencius' works are occupied with a balanced refutation of Mo-ti, who held that we should love all men, and of Yang Chu, who held that we should love only ourselves. Nevertheless, Mencius held that

man was naturally good, but added, "*That whereby man differs from the lower animals is but small. The mass of people cast it away, while the superior men preserve it.*" Nor was Mencius, despite his belief in man's natural goodness, a critic like Lao-tze of civilization and an advocate of the return to nature. The manner of the working of things must be scientifically studied; and the handicraftsman and skilled artisan had their place beside the simple-life worker on the land.

The mystic anarchists believed in the doctrine of letting alone, of non-intervention, non-resistance and non-attachment, and of developing the Self according to Nature. Lao-tze said: "Requite hatred with goodness." His follower Chuang-tze commented, in derision of those who had the lust of power on which political action is built: "Therefore it is written, 'Who is bad? Who is good? He who succeeds is the head. He who does not succeed is the tail'. . . . A petty thief is put in jail. A great brigand becomes a ruler of a state. And among the retainers of the latter men of virtue will be found." The hit is at Confucius, the pilgrim salesman of political wisdom. Lao-tze and Chuang-tze esteemed only wisdom and spoke of the rest of the people as "the children." "Wisdom," however, would detect the spirit of the people and of their customs—the essential *nature* of the folk into which ordinance and ruler alike must fit and which would also shape them from *within*. The spirits of men as diverse as "Chou Kung and the monkey" could not, all alike, be shaped from *without* by the etiquette of morals and by the law and institutions of the country. Wisdom, however—*Tao*—could be shared, Lao-tze and Chuang-tze held, by all who willed, Emperor or hermit. These are doctrines that we shall find recurring throughout human history.*

Mencius, however, asserted (against this individualist preaching of the pure religion of equality and of the return to Nature) the importance, in civilization, of government and order, for the sake of the governed themselves.

> The destruction [he wrote] of the poor is their poverty. In such circumstances they only try to save themselves from death and are afraid they will not succeed. What opportunity have such to cultivate propriety and righteousness?
>
> Therefore an intelligent *ruler will regulate the livelihood of the people* so as to make sure that, first, they shall have sufficient to save their parents, and, second, sufficient wherewith to support their wives and children; that in good years they shall always be abundantly satisfied, and that in bad years they shall escape danger of perishing.

* *Cf.* p. 112.

However, Mencius added: "The superior man has three things in which he delights, and to be a ruler over the kingdom is not one of them." The superior man wills service, not dominion or will to power. In the words of the *Shu-King:*

> It was the lesson of our great ancestor:—
> The people should be cherished;
> They should not be downtrodden;
> The people are the root of the country;
> The root firm, the country is tranquil,
> When I look throughout the empire
> Of simple men and simple women,
> Anyone may surpass me.

The problems of political obligation in China are solved in terms of a system paternalistic but unmarked by a class status, ritualistic but utilitarian, pious but rationalistic and without religious revelation. Above all, it is solved in terms not of the Space-scale but of the Time-scale; of obligation not to contemporary humanity but to the generations; in terms not of the country-wide Empire but primarily of the particular family as the true Community. Like Egypt it tended to put the interests of Civilization in value before those of Contemporary Society (the current Human Majority) but, unlike Egypt, Confucius judged Civilization by its fruits not for the generations of the Few but for the lot through the decades, of simple men and simple women, the inventors of the useful, manual arts. China was a land of scholars, but not of a privileged class.)

4

The traditional date of Homer is in the middle of the ninth century B.C. Four centuries later, in the days of Confucius in Shantung, Cyrus the Persian was occupied in the extension of his empire which, by the defeat of Croesus of Lydia in 546 B.C., he carried down to the Aegean Sea. In 539 B.C. Babylon fell to him. In 527, Cambyses the Persian, successor of Cyrus, occupied Egypt and terminated the twenty-sixth dynasty of the Pharaohs.

In about 1375 B.C., in the late Bronze Age, the grandeur of Knossos, in Crete, had ended in the days of Amenhotep III of Egypt. Mycenaean pottery is already to be found in El Amarna, the city of his successor, Akhenaten, the Heretic Pharaoh. The great age of Mycenae, at its height in the fourteenth century, follows that of Knossos. Probably in

the twelfth century, on the verge of the Iron Age and the ascendancy of Doric Argos, occurs the Siege of Troy.

In Hellas, emerging from the Dark Ages that followed the heroic period of Mycenae and Troy, in the seventh century, we find the epoch of the Seven Sages, Thales, Pittakos, Bios, Solon the Athenian, Kleobulos, Cheilon and Periander of Corinth. Of these, Thales of Miletos, in Ionia (624–546 B.C.), Solon (640–558) and Periander (625–585), whom Plato excluded from the list, as a tyrant, are figures that stand out as more than names. Ionia, at this time, is the focus of Hellenic civilization. Towns such as Smyrna and Miletos had a population that was large and a commerce that was brisk. Merchants travelled between them and Tyre and Egypt, as they had done between Crete and Egypt in the days of the Shepherd-kings of Egypt one thousand years before. The arts and poetry flourished. Alkaeos and Sappho sang. As Poseidippos wrote:

> . . . the white page of Sappho lives on and lives for ever,
> Proclaiming your name also, your name thrice blest, the while
> That Naukratis shall remember while ships shall breast her river
> Standing in from seaward to the long lagoons of Nile.

This growing Hellenic civilization was moulded by certain determinant factors. Primarily it was a seaboard civilization and its people were fishermen and sailors. Further, especially in European Hellas, the configuration of the land, with inlets and mountains running down to the sea, shaped the life of the people into a series of relatively small communities, stamped by all the intensity of local life—an intensity confirmed by religious ritual. If, during certain seasons, the inhabitants were sailors, they were also agriculturalists. These communities were, from their nature, militarily weak and difficult to unite. Their characteristic form was the *Polis*, which it is permissible to translate as "City-state" or "Township," but which certainly must not, without risk of gross deception, be translated as "State."*

The Polis appears to be an almost universal form of human community at a certain state of human civilization. Families, having gathered into clans, are beginning to settle down on empty land and to acquire a certain level of stable civilization. It is a form that occurs from India to Spain. Peculiarly it is liable to take shape where the land is not plain-land, the natural home of large-scale military empires, or joined up by a river such as the Hoang-ho, Euphrates or Nile,

* We shall retain, throughout this work, the technical word Polis, without attempt at translation. From it, of course, the word "Politics" derives.

but is mountainous country where the community can gather for defence, in hill-towns, on some rise or *acropolis* (as at Athens, Corinth—and Dumbarton) or, as at Tyre, on some jutting rock. Granted that commerce is sea-born, a wealthy community can grow without any attempt (save at Carthage, founded on a hill in flat country) to develop an empire in the hinterland. Further, whereas advancing civilization and wealth terminate the nomad life of the tribe, mountainous country breaks up that tribe; confirms the clan-form (as in mediaeval Scotland); and prevents the shaping of a nation.

The Polis is neither a City nor a State, however translated "City-state." It is not a City, at least in European Hellas, because it is primarily an agricultural community, as indeed were, later, the Italian hill-towns. Emphatically, as we shall see, in its normal condition it is not a *metropolis* and repudiated the title. Nor was it a State, since it was at once less, in size, and more, in the sense that here civic life and government, in the modern usage of these terms, were bound up with kindred, with economic life and with religion. Rather it was an enlarged family—at once its normal development, and as we shall also see,* its rival. The whole problem-theme of Sophokles' play, *Antigone*, is whether the moral ties of the family or the regulations of the polis and its rulers are to take precedence. Because the structure of society tends to be a clan structure, it emerges in Hellas as aristocratic, a structure of the polis ruled by the family or clan (Greek, *phratry*) elders. (In ancient Italy its structure, *e.g.*, at Rome, is that of rule by the heads of the *gens*—the "gentlemen.") For the same reason, its law is customary; its customs are religious; and its religion the worship of the family hearth and ancestral spirits. *The origin of politics is in religion.* For the same reason, also, its manners are profoundly conservative and, even in Athens in the days of Pericles and after (as Aristophanes knew full well), so remained. This is not unexpected. What is unexpected is that a progressive civilization should have developed out of such ancestral custom and not merely a static civilization as in ancestor-worshipping China and in the Egypt of the priests.

The thought of Hellas takes its character from its distinctive, not its customary, conditions. Hellas is not European. It is a Euro-Asiatic bridgehead, a veritable Bosphorus ferry, a Levantine clearing-house. If, on the conservative side, the Greeks were agriculturalists, on the radical side they were sailors. They now produced for export; had a coinage; and money (*nomisma*) perturbed law (*nomos*) and upset all traditions—introduced new tyrannies and new philosophies. If Hesiod

* *Cf.* p. 60. *Cf.* also Aristotle, *Politics III*, ix.

can tell us of the life of the farm, with the man acquiring his house and his ox and his wife (in that order), Herodotus, the First Anthropologist, the Father of History, can tell us of far countries and ask the radical question: since men's religious customs differ so widely, which is right? Some men bury their parents and others think it more respectful to eat them. Strabo later, I regret to say, records that the Irish of his day were especially addicted to the latter practice as more pious. Is there anything "really right"? The farmers are conservatives, but the sailors are radicals—and they are often the same men. Discussion, then, over the wine is inaugurated. Geography gave to the Greek Freedom including Freedom of Thought.

Thus speaks Hekataios of Miletus. I write all this in accordance with what seemed to me to be the truth; for the legends of the Greeks are, in my opinion, contradictory and ridiculous.

Moreover, the religion of the Greek was his family religion. There were indeed tribal gods of all the Greeks, remote and abstract on Mount Olympus, but the gods that touched his heart were the little family gods with their household rite and the shady gods of the underworld, Erinyes. They did not rule or try to rule his theories on Nature. Unlike India and Egypt, Babylon and Judaea, the Greeks had no Sacred Books, no revelation, save for the soothsayers at Delphi. Speculation, then, about Nature is secular speculation. Doubtless there are gods in things. But how? Whereas the Egyptian, who never left his country, did not let his thought stray beyond the immensely ancient, overwhelming, oppressive, sacred tradition of the Nile, the wandering Hellene had no such tradition but only tales of far lands, not only of wise Egypt but of wise Babylon. He developed, in his speculation on Nature, not a Theology but a Physics.

This, at least, is what Thales, astronomer and cosmologist, did, who may have learned a few things from the Babylonians by way of Lydian Sardis and some practical geometry from Egypt, but whose triumph was to get the world afloat in the universe instead of being the saucer-foundation of sky's inverted bowl. "All is water," said Thales—the earth a disk of frozen water afloat in ocean and in vapour (not yet "a globe of condensed and mould-covered dust, with a molten core, afloat in gaseous ether.") Thales, further, had thereby discovered or asserted the existence of a "single principle" in Nature or Reality. About that we shall hear much more.*

* *Cf.* pp. 114, 251, 618.

If thought was secular, not theological, scientific-experimental, not piously mythical, then profane men, not priests, could take a share. And government, the supreme mystery, might also be profaned and secularized. Government need not only be by "the silent ones." Those affected might put queries about what the silent ones in fact had said; insist that the tradition be written down in the early codes (like the Roman XII Tables); and even query the expediency of this or that application. Moreover, the seafaring life and the making of new wealth led to confusion of classes and to a direct challenge of the old, self-conscious clan aristocracy. Democracy itself became discussible as a principle of government—ceased to be an abominable profanity. In Hellas first it was launched on its course.

The importance of Hellenic thought is often affirmed. It is seldom grasped. It has this historic importance of being a pioneer. We shall see that it is not enough to say that it has the freshness of pioneer thought, just as early poetry has an unrecapturable beauty as "near the founts of song." What has been said once cannot be said with the same effect twice; and the old discussions are less encumbered with recent prejudice—more direct. However, mere past importance would be of little account in contemporary discussion, if for no other reason than because of the risk of false analogy. We no longer live in the Beginning of the Iron Age.

Hellenic thought, however, has moulded our own Western Tradition. First it has done this indirectly, conjointly with Judaism, through the Church Fathers and the Christian Church. Secondly, since the twelfth-century Resurgence and the fifteenth-century Renaissance—and still more since the early nineteenth century—it has done this directly through the influence of the original Greek authors, whose thought has been appropriated by modern thinkers. Moreover—peculiarly in politics—these authors have coined for us our technical terms, coloured and defined them.

Nevertheless, even this moulding influence of Hellas on Western Civilization, its legacy to us, is not the chief ground why this thought is important. To understand this third consideration we must accustom ourselves (as Copernicus did in visualizing the sun as having the earth go round it) to a strange correction in our normal perspective on the spiral of history. In the chronological history of events we see a movement on, century by century. And in the history of material civilization, although we may detect great recessions and may conclude that this march *on* is rather a spiral march *up* in which standards of well-being are found, lost and returned to at a higher, more opulent

level, yet the conviction of progress is never shaken but is indeed confirmed. If we looked, indeed, at the *quality*, not extent and massiveness, of these achievements we might be less confident. In the fine arts, even in the useful handicrafts, from the point of view of taste is the advance so sure? When we have surveyed Western history we shall resurvey these considerations.* Enough now to note a strange phenomenon when we look to the history of thought.

The theatre of events in ancient Hellas (even in ancient Egypt) is so small, so miniature. But the miniature is very perfect, much simpler than our own theatre; and the thinkers were at least as capable of thought as ourselves. Hence Greek thought on these miniature problems is as it were microscopic, not telescopic, but astoundingly clear and, in specific details, *in advance of our own*. Let us phrase it that they were further round, saw further round, the bend of the spiral, at their level, than we are and do at ours.

Let us illustrate this point. What do the great Greek political philosophers discuss? Here is a list: Democracy, the freedom of writing and thought, censorship, the relation of democracy and the expert, feminism, eugenics, abortion, the problem of leisure, whether the prolongation of life by medicine cannot be carried to excess, nudism, psycho-analysis, revolution, the proletariat, the class war, what comes after popular dictatorship. Let us ask ourselves what meaning all this had to Mr. Mitford, the English historian of Greece, writing at the end of the eighteenth century, or even to Mr. Grote writing, as a good utilitarian Liberal, in the middle of the nineteenth. And have we ourselves yet settled whether Plato, who shaped political thought through Catholicism for two millennia, was a Communist (and in what sense) or a totalitarian National Socialist? Have we begun yet the discussion, in our political forum, of his problems of eugenics and of the subordination of the family to the race?

It is not merely the case that, if we bisect recorded history, we find Euripides and Plato nearer to us in time than they were to the Pyramid Builders. Euripides and Plato are our contemporaries and a bit more —more precisely, *our* grandchildren will, on the chart of civilization, be somewhere about *their* contemporaries.†

In the days of Heraclitus (Herakleitos, flourished in the early fifth century), of Ephesus, we see the beginnings of that democratic struggle

* *Cf.* Chap. XXII.

† I do not accept the strict cyclical theory of civilization; but this I have explained elsewhere. It does not interfere with my belief in the power of political science to predict and control as much as, but no more than, does economic science.

which we note in the Britain of C. J. Fox and the Duke of Wellington, in the France of Mirabeau and Louis XVI and in Spain, abortively, from Soult to our own day. An aristocrat of priestly family, founder of that Ionic school of vitality and Flux that held Fire as the primal principle and that "all things flow, one cannot step twice into the same river"—whirlwind king; and no stability even in the rule of Zeus the Law Giver and of eternal Reason—Heraclitus was a political, as well as a natural, philosopher. How can there be a Rule of Law? God, the Beginning, is beyond Good and Evil. Is it, then, the conclusion that the masses are to rule? No: they are incompetent.

> The Ephesians would do well to hang themselves, every grown man of them, and leave the city to beardless lads; for they have cast out Hermodoros, the best man among them, saying: "We will have none that is best among us; if there be any such, let him go elsewhere and among others." . . . What wisdom or sense have the masses, many are evil, few are good.

There is a *logos* or "wisdom"; but it is not that of peace and static law. It is this that, beneath dynamic tension, there exists an immortal reality, the fire or world-soul. But, superficially, all is tension of life and death, good and evil; and "war is the father of all things." The excellent, wise and strong should, then, rule. But what if, in war, the many have strength? Till Darwin, till Nietzsche, the question was to be set and set again. To this question the wisdom of Heraclitus gave no answer—how the excellent should be also the strong and whether might was not also right? Was man excellent, first, as a social animal, collectively strong, or excellent as the variety, the individual, the adaptable initiator? Should he seek to identify himself with the society of numbers in space or of generations in time?*

THE SOPHISTS, not physical philosophers or mathematicians like Pythagoras in Hellenic Italy, Magna Graecia, the New World America of those days, nor mystagogues like Heraclitus, were primarily educators. They performed in their day the great functions that, in the sixteenth to eighteenth centuries, the Jesuits performed. Like the Cynics, the Epicureans, the Jesuits themselves and the casuists, the name Sophists came to have a derogatory sense. Trainers in argument, having a commercial value among an argumentative, litigious people in a land of large juries and popular courts, they became the bagmen of learning, advertising that they would put a man wise for a few dollars. What, after all, could not be taught? They were the contemporary popular exponents of the craze for Mental Efficiency and of How to

* *Cf.* pp. 332, 529.

Begin Life at Forty. Logic was in its infancy. Disputers for any side of any question they became, by their "dialectic" (discussion, technically conducted by the rules), trainers of radicals. Above all they developed the issue (of which we shall hear so much) touched on by Heraclitus: the distinction between the Natural and the Conventional. Below custom and conventional peace lay—what? Perhaps the "war of all things," struggle, conflict.

What could not be taught? Did heredity, tradition, convention matter, when all depended on the right educational environment? Could character be taught? The very Greek word *typos*, "type" or [Hellenistic] *character*, both used as "impression of a seal," implied that it could. The Greeks ever tended to intellectualism and cleverness. Virtue was wisdom; and wisdom could be taught. Were yet, said the conservatives, the Sophists the men to teach it? They were empirics, pragmatists—but more, very nearly sceptics. Protagoras (ca. 480–ca. 411 B.C.), the early anticipator of pragmatism, had said, "of all things two views may be taken." Truth was relative. Was there yet not a fundamental Law, even in Nature itself, stable, resting on reason and instinct? (Centuries later the Papacy was to place its stress, as catholic legislator, just on these points: instinct and reason.)*

5

SOCRATES (Sokrates, 470–399 B.C.) was the greatest of the Sophists and their greatest enemy. Like them, he had turned his attention away from the natural philosophies and the mathematicians, students of the objective, and had sought, according to the Delphic maxim, to "know himself." He had made his interest man and the education of man by dialectic, the humanities and moralities.

A laudatory tradition has gathered round Socrates, largely due to the loyal work of his great disciple, Plato, and *his* disciple, Aristotle. To the early Christian Fathers he was a "Christian before Christ," the saint and martyr of philosophy. In their enthusiasm they, as it were, baptized him. His contemporaries viewed him with a different eye. The son of a sculptor and a professional midwife, ugly as a satyr with (as Aristophanes said) the waddling gait of a waterfowl, he was primarily a bore, even if a sincere one. Never at home looking after his family or his vocation (scandalmongers said he was a bigamist), he was, as it were, a frequenter of coffee-houses who boasted of seldom going into the country. A coffee-house politician, his habit was to buttonhole people, to whom he had scarcely been introduced, in the market place, and pertinaciously to ask them inconvenient and dis-

* *Cf.* p. 168.

courteous questions. Anyone, soldier, prostitute, priest was a fit subject for his inquisitive curiosity. A heavy drinker, he could be guaranteed to drink the rest of his boon friends under the table. A plebeian, although with private means, he was, to the conservative mind, doubtless an "original," but a pernicious one.

Socrates claimed the guidance of a "voice"; arrogated to himself a special message from the Delphic Oracle to give him local importance; gathered round himself a clique of disciples which included even some noblemen. Who were they? Flash, drinking, fast-living, perverted young men, such as Kritias, Charmides and Alkibiades (Alkibiades, for one, had in him the elements, speaking in terms of our own times, both of an Oscar Wilde and of a Winston Churchill), they were suitably found later mixed up with the Thirty Tyrants of Athens, along with their kinsman Plato. Not without probability the charge was made against Socrates of impiety towards the gods and of corrupting the youth—that is, of criminal immorality and seditious blasphemy. After all, his tutor and "friend," Archilaos, of Athens, who believed the earth to be a sphere, had been indicted and banished from that city for atheistic impiety. It is not at all surprising that a common jury of ordinary Athenian citizens condemned Socrates to death, as the associate of the reactionaries, by a substantial majority (281 to 220) in a popular court of over 500 members. The Roman Cato the Elder, a classic representative of the sound Roman virtues, after being persuaded to acquaint himself with the life and execution of Socrates—and not being at all the kind of man to be swayed by the views of a comic dramatist such as Aristophanes—passed the final comment: "He seems to have been a meddlesome fellow."

That is one side of the case; and it is formidable. It is not silenced by the fact that it all happened long ago and that there is "much truth" in Socrates' doctrines. Nor is his unblemished record as a soldier, his refusal to "break jail," and the voting of this friend of oligarchs against the popular judgement (which decided in its democratic anger to execute generals suspected of cowardice and treason) a sufficient answer. Nor is it satisfactory—although doubtless correct—to say that Truth often chooses very odd vessels through which to manifest itself. The contrary case really rests upon two things: the opinion of certain of his friends (all strong conservatives) that Socrates was a man of remarkable personality, a man of integrity and courage, sincerely and disinterestedly inquiring after truth; and the intrinsic value of some of the ideas that he, whether sage or disreputable reactionary, succeeded in starting running, including whether it be not better to be a great bad man than a small good one (*cf. Hippias Minor*, of Plato).

The picture indeed of the true Socrates is not easy to arrive at. It is made from a composite of the views of these friends, Xenophon, the bluff squire-soldier, Alkibiades, the flash aristocrat politician (for whose views we must yet rely on Plato) and Plato himself, the well-born young poet who later became the philosopher of genius. Socrates himself wrote nothing. All that we have of him is the views of his disciples. And, needless to say, these far from agree. In Plato's *Dialogues* we come across a character called Socrates. But, at least in the later dialogues, there is reason, from the character of the views expressed, to suppose that "Socrates" here is more particularly the mouthpiece of Plato himself. Moreover we tend to move in a circle, since the dating of the *Dialogues* is (if partly a matter of style) partly a matter of our opinion of whether the views are those of Plato, and the dialogue late, or those of Socrates—views which, *ex hypothesi*, we do not know and are trying to find out—and the dialogue early. The "Socrates" of Plato is a philosopher. The "Socrates" of Xenophon is another good-hearted Xenophon—but conceded to have been, in his early days, quite a good philosopher too, in the natural science tradition. The "Socrates" of Aristophanes, the comedian, is a sardonic, irreverent fellow, smart but gloomy, full of himself and of fantastic ideas and surrounding himself with a school of which the effect was disturbing even to Athenian morals.

Who then is the real Socrates? Perhaps it is too problematical to matter. We seem, however, to detect the head of a small school or group, that makes something of a scandal in the small-town life of Athens, the tiny metropolis, who had been interested, like all his predecessors, in physics but who is now primarily interested at getting to the root of things in ethics. He feels that he has a mission to do this—a mission which others regard as no more than warranting him to be regarded as a "character." He was a kind of Cyril Joad of those days. His inquiries and discussion, so far as we can judge from the early Platonic dialogues—the simpler ones—appear to have been almost entirely negative; and, if those whom he questioned were shocked, he seems to have taken a satiric, intellectual pleasure in that fact. In brief, he was often just naughty. The mock profession of ignorance, to lead the victim on, was the Socratic "irony." Thus hypocrisy, bombast, stupidity and even good-intentioned slow wits were exposed to make a feast for the group—those youths in whom Socrates delighted, who "tore arguments like young puppies."

Socrates did not regard himself as a reformer. His object was to destroy fallacy and to do it by the use of the most commonplace of

instances. He is indeed the announced apostle of plain man's common sense. He finds it a means to upset, like Mr. Shaw, many a lofty apple-cart. But his object, in fairness, was not merely this. A core of constructive thought appears amid the negative wreckage. Nietzsche discovered in him the beginning of the Greek degeneration; and there is no reason to see in him a plaster-cast saint. His reaction against his early studies in the natural sciences (fortunately not able to counter the influence later of Aristotle) may be considered to be precisely reactionary. Men, under this influence, all too readily began to build up constructions of what ought to be, instead of painfully studying what is. But Socrates yet effectively turned men's attention to the proper study of man which is man. His very individual negativism produced in Plato a reaction towards stress on constructive society, its importance and virtues. There is then this, on the positive side, in Socrates that he provokes an inquiry, more systematic than any preceding Sophist, into social relations. He is the godfather of Western political philosophy, as well as the founder of speculative ethics.

Socrates, moreover, discovers the Self. The discovery indeed is not complete. The initiates of the Orphic mysteries had anticipated it, with their symbols of immortality. It does not become the basis of a coherent philosophy until the Stoics, although it had been anticipated by those Delphic gnomic maxims which were the household sayings of ancient Hellas. It has, however, been said that Hellenic civilization was still barbaric in the sense that it—the civilization of a traditional intense community unself-consciously worshipping its local gods had singularly little recognition of the value of the individual. In the famous declaration in the *Crito* (*Kriton*) Socrates declares, as a true Hellene, that a man has no right to break the laws of his polis or to seek to escape the penalties they impose. The Hellene is a profoundly communal being.

Let me put it like this. Suppose we meant to run away—or whatever one ought to call it—and suppose the laws and the Polis were to come and stand over us and ask me, "Tell us, Socrates, what is it you mean to do? Nothing more nor less than to overthrow us by this attempt of yours—to overthrow the laws and the whole commonwealth so far as in you lies. Do you imagine that a city can stand and not be overthrown, when the decisions of the judges have no power, when they are made of no effect and destroyed by private persons. . . . Now that you have been born and brought up and educated, can you say that you are not ours—our child and our servant—you and your descendants? And, if this is so, do you think your rights can equal ours? . . . still we offer full liberty to any Athenian who likes, after he has seen and tested

us and all that is done in our city, *to take his goods, and leave us*, if we do not please him, and go wherever he would. *Only if he stays with us, after seeing how we judge our cases and how we rule our city, then we hold that he has pledged himself by his action to do our bidding.* If we mean to kill you because we think it just, must you do your best to kill us in your turn? Can you claim that you have a right to do this, you, the lover of virtue? . . . You act as the worst of slaves might act, preparing to run away, *breaking the contracts (tas synthekas)* —the pledge you gave to accept our government.

Plato, through the historical example of Socrates, preaches a stern doctrine of political obedience. No doubt is expressed whether the polis may not be an aggregate of warring economic groups or, again, whether (as later with the Stoics) some wider society may not transcend the polis. But it is asserted that it is *a free community that a man may quit at will;* and that it is based on the free consent of each of its citizens. Its law rests, not on force or blood and racial custom alone, but on the tacit social contract of these choosing selves.

Individualism, however conditioned by civic obligation, had clearly shown itself. The secular, intelligent, curiosity-governed democracy of Athens confronted the barbarous civilization of Persia, the mechanical empire. It defeated it. It confronted also, as type, the civilization of Egypt. The Athenian democracy, secular, grossly licentious, adaptable, unstable, a brilliant "variant" in human evolution, lasted from the fall of Hippias (511 B.C.) to the rise of the Thirty Tyrants (404 B.C.), that is, for a century. Its subsequent restoration scarcely gives ground for altering this judgement. The rule of the dynastic Pharaohs, priestly, traditional, stable, self-contained, largely an autarky or "closed economy," lasted for four and a half millennia. But radical Athens, in the century, contributed more, not necessarily to placid happiness in sloth, but to later human civilization than the wisdom of conservative Egypt in the five millennia. As in all biology, so in human biology the problem is that of the fit balance between variability and stability. In political terms, it is that of the balance between Liberty, as a social temper, and Law.

READING

J. L. Myres: *Dawn of History*, Chaps. I–IV.

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE

*W. J. Perry: *The Growth of Civilization*, 1924.
V. Gordon Childe: *Man Makes Himself*, 1936.
G. Catlin: *Science and Method of Politics*, 1927.
R. H. Lowie: *The Origin of the State*, 1928.

Chapter II

Plato

1

IN THE preceding chapter the peculiarly confusing character of the history of political thought was pointed out. The historian, starting his narrative with the dynastic Pharaohs, is able to record an advance, as judged by most tests, material and moral, when he reaches the history of our own times. The recession of the Dark Ages is but an interlude, almost an irrelevancy. The historian of political thought, finding his first Occidental texts in the full sunlight of Hellenic civilization, is in the odd position of reaching his most developed, his most mature and most "modern" thought at the beginning of his period. The reasons for this we have explained. The fact is startlingly exemplified in the case of Socrates' greatest pupil, Plato.

PLATO (428–348 B.C.), philosopher, politician, mathematician, poet, rich, broad of figure and weak of voice, cousin of Critias and kinsman of Solon, was brought up in a slave civilization and in an aristocratic household which yet, by marriage connections, was politically favourable to Pericles and to his democratic experiment. He was the most famous of Socrates' circle of pupils. It is, however, said that, on hearing Plato reading his dialogue *Lysis*, Socrates commented: "What a pack of lies this young man is telling about me"—a comment which bears out the remarks made earlier* about the difference between the actual and the "literary" Socrates.

Plato's letters, many of them almost certainly authentic, are preserved. Apart, however, from what we learn from them, much of his biography is conjectural. It is stated that, as a young man, he travelled in Cyrene, where he visited Theodorus, the mathematician, and later, (after Socrates' death) in Egypt. We know that in 388 B.C. he visited Sicilian Syracuse—the New York of its day—on the invitation of the ruler Dionysius I and of Dion, uncle of Dionysius II; and that he

* *Cf.* p. 32.

found the habits of these wealthy Greek colonials too luxurious for his approval.

> No one whose life is spent in gorging food twice a day and sharing his bed at night, and so on, can ever attain real wisdom.

Later Dionysius asked Plato, after their quarrel, to bear him no ill will; but received the terse reply that Plato had not the leisure to keep Dionysius in mind.

Some poems are preserved which are probably Plato's, about his mistress, Archianassa, and on germane topics.

> A kiss; and touch of lips; not strange my Soul should cling,
> Strive to cross, weep to turn, and starve with me, poor thing.

And,

> Star-gazing Aster, would I were the skies,
> To gaze upon thee with a thousand eyes.

There is not only "modernism" but an interesting sidelight in the inscribed lines:

> An apple am I, thrown by one who loves you.
> Nay, Xanthippe, give consent,
> For time is short and we too burn low.

We are told that he wrote more erotic poetry in his youth (which may well be, from the evidences of his *Dialogues*) but later thought better to burn it, as he did, a tragedy. Ausonius preserves a specimen or two—about the Cyprian and the Cnidian Venus. He, Plato, first popularized in Athens the light character sketches of Sophron. A copy, it is said, was found under his pillow.

We have Plato's letters. We have some of the comments of his contemporaries—of Alexis, the dramatist: "You don't know what you are talking about; run about with Plato, and you will know all about soap and onions." And from Kratinos, in dialogue:

> "Clear, you are a man and have a soul."
> "In Plato's words, I am not sure but suspect that I have."

In 387 he founded his school in Athens, in the Academy, because he was an Athenian rather than because he loved the Athenians—this was before his second and third visits to Sicily, and his attempts there to put into practice his philosophy, which nearly cost him his life. Plato died, at the advanced age of eighty-one, at a wedding feast. As he said truly of himself: "A man must first make a name, and then he will

have no lack of memoirs." In his will, he left, among other things, a gold signet-ring and ear-ring, weighing together over four drachmas.

In the Academy, a gymnasium outside the walls of the city, in the olive grove of the hero Hekademos, his chief work was done. It was, as it were, a New School of Research. In accordance with the Pythagorean tradition, especial attention was given to mathematics. Here was to be found Thaeatetus, founder of solid geometry. A beginning was made with conic sections. At the entrance, it is said, was a warning that none should enter who had not mastered the mathematical elements. Jurisprudence also was a study there. Botany was not neglected. Plato's nephew and successor in his chair, Speusippus, was a classifying botanist such as Linnaeus was in modern times. Among his pupils were counted two women, Lastheneia of Mantinea and Axiothea of Phlius, of whom the latter is reported to have worn men's clothes. It throws a significant, if horrid, light on the limitations of the life of the times that Speusippus is said to have died boiling with lice.

The age was one dominated by the advances in the mathematical and natural sciences. Socrates had insisted upon turning attention to social studies and ethics. Pythagoras, however (he of the "Pythagorean Theorem"), and his followers whose names were famous in Hellenic thought, were quite accustomed to associate the notions of mathematics and politics. It was, then, no novelty for Plato. To put it briefly, if roughly, the early Pythagoreans were technocrats—although Archimedes (287–212 B.C.) had not yet been born to develop engineering; and slave labour discouraged its application beyond the stage of scientific toys or, at most, the technique of slave-owning Egypt. According to this technocrat tradition, rule should rest in the hands of the educated. It was a prejudice confirmed by the lapse into theology of the later Pythagoreans. The exact discipline of mathematics (not uncomplicated by a religious or astrological theory of numbers such as the Egyptians had) was the test of such education. It must never be forgotten that Greek civilization grew against the background of the priestly civilizations of Egypt and the East, with their respect for learning and their association of it with all the arts of government save those of the warrior. That philosophers should be kings was a theory not remote from the fact that kings were, as a bald matter of fact, temple priests.

The significance of Athenian slavery in its bearing on Athenian thought, must not be exaggerated. It does not invalidate the applicability of that thought to our own days. It was a slavery, in small industries or semi-domestic occupations, of men for the most part not

deeply divided by race from their owners and sometimes Hellenes. The slaves, who never (before the fourth century) were a majority of the population, retained certain rights in law. The Athenian system was unpermeated by the terror under which the Spartan helot dwelt. Such occupations as that of seaman, agricultural worker in skilled crafts, or manual labourer were usually filled by free men. There was a free proletariat playing as extensive a role in Athenian democracy as the white proletariat plays in American democracy, while the position of the slave was midway between that of the American negro of the South today and of a century ago. The Athenian philosophers related themselves to problems of democracy not decisively dissimilar, in this respect, from those of today, especially in countries of negro population.

Actually, democracy in Hellas had been carried to a conclusion—by the equalitarian use of the lot in selection for executive offices (save those of military command)—with a more relentless logic than in any contemporary representative democracy. It was a "pure democracy." Citizens in the market place—although not resident aliens—took part (as in New England "town meetings" and in some Swiss cantons) directly in the work of government. Under a rota system every citizen might expect not only to serve on a jury (with judicial powers) but on the civic Council and even to be chairman. All were politically equal and "took it in turn to rule and be ruled."

Over against the democratic system, with its problems of over-population, demands for distribution of public moneys in payment for jury service and the like, equalitarianism, licence of morals, alleged inefficiency and demagogic devices, was the oligarchic system led by Sparta, ruled by kings and ephors, military, disciplined, but built on terrorization of the helot and semi-alien population. Without pressing any analogies with this policy of terrorization by secret police, it is worth note that the Spartan system presented specifically modern problems. It also was confronted with a population problem—that of under-population. It had a race theory and a eugenic problem. The issue of feminism was a live one alike in Athens (as the plays of Euripides shew) and in Sparta.

The conflict between the two systems led by the two cities related itself, in city after city among their respective allies, bound together for collective security, with an internal and embittered class war between wealth, landed and commercial, and the proletariat (in, *e.g.*, Corcyra, actively supported by the slaves). Long before Disraeli, it was Plato who referred to the two cities of the rich and the poor. In *Republic* IV, Plato says:

For there are always in them [cities] two parties at war with each other, the poor and the rich . . . so long as the city in its increase continues to be one, so long it may be permitted to increase, but not beyond it.

And, in *Republic* III:

But whenever they shall possess lands and houses and money in a private way, they shall become bailiffs and farmers instead of guardians, hateful lords instead of aids to the other citizens, hating and being hated, plotting and being plotted against, they will pass the whole of their life, oftener and more afraid of the enemies within than of those without—they and the rest of the city hastening speedily to destruction.

The situation in this small Greek city of Corcyra (Korkyra, Corfu) is described, in a memorable passage, by Thucydides.

In war, with an alliance always at the command of either faction [those of the oligarchic or of the proletarian ideology] for the hurt of their adversaries and their own corresponding advantage, opportunities for bringing in the foreigner were never wanting to the revolutionary parties. The sufferings which revolution entailed upon the cities were many and terrible, such as have occurred and always must occur, as long as the nature of man remains the same; although in a severer or milder form, and varying in their symptoms, according to the variety of the particular cases. In peace and prosperity states and individuals have better sentiments. . . . Revolution thus ran its course from city to city, and the places which it arrived at last, from having heard what had been done before, carried to a still greater excess the refinement of their inventions [*cf.* Spain], as manifested in the cunning of their enterprises and the atrocity of their reprisals. Words had to change their ordinary meanings and to take on that which was now given to them. . . . Indeed it is generally the case that men are readier to call rogues clever than simpletons honest, and are as ashamed of being the second as they are proud of being the first. The cause of all these evils was the lust for power arising from greed and ambition; and from these passions proceeded the violence of the parties once engaged in contention. The leaders in the cities, each provided with the fairest professions, on the one side with the cry of political equality of the people, on the other side of a moderate aristocracy, sought prizes for themselves in those public interests which they pretended to cherish, and, recoiling from no means in their struggles for ascendency, engaged in the direst excesses. . . . Meanwhile the moderate part of the citizens perished between the two, either for not joining in the quarrel, or because envy would not suffer them to escape. Thus every form of iniquity took root in the Hellenic countries by reason of the troubles. The ancient simplicity, into which honour so largely entered, was laughed down and disappeared. . . . *In the confusion into which life was now thrown in the cities, human nature, always rebelling against the law and now its master, gladly shewed itself ungoverned in passion, above respect for justice, and*

the enemy of all superiority; since revenge would not have been set above religion, and gain above justice, had it not been for the fatal power of envy.

In another passage Aristotle provides us with the scanning oath taken by conspiring oligarchs: "I will be a foe of the commons and will devise whatsoever ill I may against them" [although, as Aristotle comments, an intelligent aristocrat should rather seek to be on the side of the commons].

The same attitude, in more complacent language, is to be found in the terse statement of the conservative author—known as "the old oligarch"—of the *Athenian Constitution*, falsely ascribed to Xenophon. "In every country the better class of people is adverse to a democracy" ("better class" meaning the traditional holders of power and the moneyed class).

From this problem of class war Plato is led on to the discussion of the technique of revolution and of communism of property and the revision of the family system, as a property system. Personal liberty and the right to freedom of speech and writing; the relation of theory and practice; the need for leadership and the problem of social discipline and education, including religious education—all are in turn discussed. So too are feminism, abortion, communism, psycho-analysis.

It was said above that Plato's discussion is "modern." That is an understatement. In no point is it more difficult to get the perspective of history than here. Plato and even the common-sense Aristotle have been bowed to, in recent centuries, as very great philosophers, but they were persistently regarded as "idealists," dreamers of utopias, who were scarcely imagined to have supposed, even themselves, that their prescriptions had practical bearings. Today we can begin to see that these men wrote from experience and that their suggestions, however drastic, were grimly practical, founded on an experience that was often bitter.

We may go further. Hellenic civilization is a kind of jewel microcosm of our own "great society" or macrocosm. In this little urban world, built up from barbaric and demi-feudal, Homeric antecedents, through priestly and monarchical ages, to the mature flower of its culture, we can see (and this without any mystic theory of history, but because social conditions are sufficiently similar) our own—not present—but future world foreshadowed. It is a tiny working model. Allowing for scale, the problems reproduce themselves of geography and trade; of population; of the relations of rich and poor under the play of the unaltering human instincts; of free speculation and religious decline. Before the re-establishment of satisfactory communications

and transport, the growth of national populations, the urbanization of living, the termination of feudalism (just over a century ago in France, yesterday in Russia) and the decline of theological influence, no parallel to Hellenic conditions, on *any* scale, has been possible, just as it was not possible in the preceding millennia of Egyptian, Babylonish and Chinese civilization.

In so far as it is true that we can conjecture our own future from the history of Hellenic civilization, the conclusion is not exhilarating. The internal class wars and the rivalry of the two systems of government, oligarchic and proletarian, ended in the weakening of both sides and the establishment of an empire under Alexander, foreshadowing those of the Caesars and of Napoleon. The cycle of world history moves on into military dictatorship and declines into the luxury and decadence of the imperial courts. To Julius, the radical choice of the people, succeeds Augustus, the administrator; to Augustus succeeds Tiberius, the sullen autocrat; to Tiberius succeeds Caligula, who was merely mad; to Caligula succeeds Nero, who was both tyrant and mad. Utopia does not descend; the golden age does not return. The malignant Machiavelli counts up the grim record of the violent deaths of the emperors from Caesar to Maximinus (A.D. 235) and reaches his total of sixteen out of twenty-six.

The problems, then, which we have to confront have been confronted in a more advanced form by Plato. His thought has interest as that of one of the most brilliant of our younger contemporaries.

From the point of view of the student of political theory that thought can be studied in its clearest, if not in its most mature, form in *The Republic* or, as it is very significantly entitled in some of the early texts, the dialogue *On Justice*. The Greek word, however, has implications which would also permit the translation of the title as "On Righteousness." Along with this should be compared the discussion in the earlier dialogues, such as the *Gorgias*, and in the later *Statesman*. In the Platonic dialogues, as has been pointed out above in the case of Socrates, the characters appear to have been historical. Such men as Protagoras and Gorgias lived. Glaucon and Adeimantos were Plato's brothers. But the form of composition is purely literary. This style often involves digressions that are confusing and irritating to the reader today. The jocosity of the literary Socrates sometimes becomes intolerable. Like a train travelling on a subway or underground system, stations are reached of brilliant illumination followed by tunnels of obscurity not always explicable by the corruption of the text. Plato is emphatically a writer who requires to be read three

times. He will be found to improve with keeping and on each tasting.

The *Dialogues* were not Plato's choicest contribution to knowledge. This was, it would seem, given orally to the inner circle of his school. They were merely brief literary compositions to interest the outside educated world. Of them only two—one of the middle period, before the second Syracusan venture, and one of the late period—*The Republic* or *On Justice* and *The Laws*, are of adequate length to be denominated books.

The specific background of Plato's writings must be borne in mind: the defeat of Athens in the Peloponnesian War; the death of Socrates; his own wanderings; his residence in Athens during the period of the Thirty Tyrants in Athens; the Peace of Antalkidas; the decline of the city-state and its strong traditional morality. He wrote during "depression years," not only for his country but for his civilization.

In his reaction to these circumstances, Plato, an aristocrat by birth, is more conservative and, therefore, in many ways, more a typical Greek than Socrates. His initial task, taken over from Socrates, may have been to discover the constitution of a commonwealth in which a reasonable man, such as Socrates, might live. He proceeded to draw up a scheme of a commonwealth in which a certain type of reasonable man should securely rule. These men were to be true aristocrats and the problem assumed the form: By what means, however radical, to conserve an aristocracy? It was a question Sparta had tried to solve and to Sparta, successful working model, Plato was inclined to look for clues.

Plato, also a true Greek, tends to identify those habits or *mores* which were *morals*, eternal values, and those *mores* which were social *customs* of the polis. He tends to identify his ethics and his politics. As a consequence—deplorably enough—he starts political science off along a road in which its study is, and is to remain for two millennia, thoroughly moralistic—he "ethicizes" his politics. As has been well said: "The Greeks wrote their political science in the imperative mood"—or, better, in the optative, not in the mood of observation. "Wishful thinking" besets it. The Delphic oracle had told Socrates to know himself—it was a command to the individual conscience. Socrates turned from natural science to the morality of the inner man. Plato turned again outwards and discovered that the man could only know himself fully in society (Plato added "his" society, his "city") and that this society is the individual consciousness writ large. The individualist scepticism of Socrates passes over into the magistral social dogmatism of Plato

2

The Republic is an ethical treatise and, although an example of Socratic dialectic, is dogmatic in its conclusions, involves psychological investigations and contains an educational prospectus and a political constitution.

The ethical argument, on justice, runs true at the beginning to the customary Socratic form. What really is justice? It uses the customary gambits of current Sophistic discussion. The Nature versus Convention argument, anticipated by Heraclitus and the Sophists, is here clearly set out. It will accompany us throughout the development of political thought, down to our own days. Its statement was yet peculiarly appropriate when made by the Greeks—agriculturalists tied by every bond of habit and religion to a narrow clan morality and yet also seafaring men accustomed, as Herodotus sets forth, to meet strange people who regarded the manners of the Greek cities as outlandish and whose own moral code was, for Greeks, barbarous. Briefly the argument amounts to this: Does morals (*mores*, customs) mean "the customary," which cements by its tradition a particular society—the Conventional, the Etiquette *comme il faut* of Confucius? Or does it mean that which is really valuable in all times and places and whenever human nature is confronted with the problem of what it ought to do and what is its true or rational self—the Natural? (Even the Instinctive and Intuitive, of Lao-tze?) It involves two different ways of answering the question: Why *should* I be moral?

The moral is just or righteous. But what *is* the just? Those who answer that the just or moral is what tradition from age-old time declares to be so, so that the memory of man runs not to the contrary, have actually a good argument at their disposal—the moral *is* the habitual, that which long practice has shown to be to the advantage of a society in survival. There is no "reason" in it or about it. The issue is, however, rapidly (and unfairly) restated by Plato. Is the just that which is to the advantage of the stronger nation? Or, domestically, that of the stronger group or man? The "strong man" Thrasymachus, the anti-intellectual (probably sketched from Dionysius I, also used in Book IX),* is introduced into the dialogue in order to brush aside all moralizing refinements of philosophers and to state roundly, What is conventionally called justice is the advantage, here and now, of the stronger.

Socrates leads Thrasymachus on to the statement that he here means what is really to his advantage. What he merely capriciously

* However, Thrasymachus is an historical character.

wills may of course prevail—but, as touching systems of order, we are presumably to understand that to be "just" which the strong man, deliberately and not by mistake, decides to be to his advantage. We must not suppose the strong man a fool. What then is *real* advantage? Plato here skilfully steers away from what men actually hold to be to their advantage or good—away from some empiric definition of the just—on to a discussion of the real advantage or *ideal* good. Thrasymachus is delivered into his hands.

The case for the superman who wills his own pleasure and proposes to get it, against the guardians who would impose the shackles of duty, is stated more subtly in the *Gorgias*. Here Callicles does not argue that justice *is* the device of the strong. He reflects that a combination of the weak may often defeat the superman. The devil of it is that the superman is so often defeated. Callicles' argument is that justice *ought* to be this *fiat* of the superman. In the class war, the few ought to win.

What kind of few? asks "Socrates." The excellent—but in what sense? Apparently not just the men of brawn. Callicles is a radical—is even prepared to bring the proletariat to consciousness and to supply them with an enlightened dictatorship. But he is himself no proletarian. Does Callicles mean more than that those who ought to win ought to win? Callicles might answer that he meant to argue (like General Göring) for the survival of the fittest, *i.e.*, of the survival of those fittest to survive, *i.e.*, fittest to cause others not to survive—although why these not only will, but ought to, survive (since "ought to" would seem to mean only "succeeds in")* might not be so clear. But Callicles takes another route.

•

I cannot say very much for [Polus'] wit when he conceded to you [Socrates] that to do is more dishonourable than to suffer injustice. . . . For the truth is, Socrates, that you, who pretend to be engaged in the pursuit of truth, are appealing now to the popular and vulgar notions of right, which are not natural, but only conventional. Convention and nature are generally at variance with one another. . . .

For the suffering of injustice is the part, not of a man, but of a slave, who indeed had better die than live; since when he is wronged and trampled upon, he is unable to help himself, or any other about whom he cares. The reason, as I conceive, is that the makers of laws are the majority, who are weak; and that they make laws and distribute praises and censures with a view to themselves and to their own interests; and they terrify the stronger sort of men, and those who are able to get the better of them; and they say, that dishonesty is shameful and unjust; meaning, by the word injustice, the desire of a man to

* *Cf.* Spinoza's treatment of this issue, p. 252.

have more than his neighbours, for knowing their own inferiority, I suspect that they are only too glad of equality. And therefore the endeavour to have more than the many, is conventionally said to be shameful and unjust, and is called injustice, whereas nature herself intimates that *it is just for the better man to have more than the worse*, the powerful than the weaker; and in many ways she shows, among men as well as among animals, and indeed among whole cities and races, that justice consists in *the superior ruling over and having more than the inferior*. . . .

But if there were a man who had sufficient force, he would shake off and break through, and escape from all this; he would trample under foot all our formulas and spells and charms, and all our laws which are against nature: *the slave* [an unhappy choice of a word, that, for the Shackled Superman, this Prometheus on Caucasus] *would rise in rebellion and be lord over us, and the light of natural justice could shine forth.*

"Socrates" replies:

Of the frankness of your nature and freedom from modesty I am assured by yourself, and the assurance is confirmed by your last speech. Well, then, the inference in the present case clearly is, that if you agree with me in an argument on any point, that point will have been sufficiently tested by us. . . . Once more, then, tell me what you and Pindar mean by natural justice. . . . Are the superior and better and stronger the same or different? . . . The laws of the many are the laws of the superior? . . . And are not the many of opinion, as you were lately saying, that justice is equality? . . . Please to begin again, and tell me who the better are if they are not the stronger?

Then Callicles, like Thrasymachus, makes his fatal slip:

Most assuredly I do mean the wiser . . . that the better and wiser should rule and have more than the inferior.

In a moment, "Socrates" has pointed out that this involves "the superman" in a knowledge of true wisdom. All Platonism, all Catholicism and all Hegelianism follow from that admission. Whether *anyone* knows *true* wisdom, Plato (with a reservation to which I shall return*) does not inquire.

At least we have come near to the kernel of a vital argument. The "superior man," according, *e.g.*, to some biological standard, may be a valuable "variant" on the normal but far weaker than the normal or

* *Cf.* p. 57. Neither Socrates (so far as can be judged) nor Plato identifies true wisdom with *intellectual* ratiocination. Experience (*e.g.*, in moral wisdom, and of the good) is required. *Cf.* S. Anselm, p. 174. They are rationalists or not according to the interpretation of the word, but they are more mystics than intellectualists, either of the logical or of the utilitarian variety. Socrates, however, lacks a doctrine of moral *will*.

even sub-normal individuals collectively, if it comes to a contest of brute force. The route of superior survival value, in the short term, is pre-empted now by those who can take *collective* action, not by the *individual.* "Superior men" will have no chance unless either by a miracle they can so breed and multiply as to acquire superior collective might or they can, by persuasiveness and skill, win leadership of, or divide, the collective mass. Let us assume that this "variant" superiority is not *only* biological, but *also* aesthetic or touched by a sense for sublime values, and Plato's question of how by wisdom to control the mass becomes relevant and a genuine answer to Callicles. The argument reacquires relevance and has a force of gigantic significance in its contemporary applicability. It will be noted that both Callicles and "Socrates" are admitted *inequalitarians.*

3

The Republic is not only a treatise on justice. It is an exemplification of the dialectical method. It follows, in its dialogue, a particular method which exhibits, as illustrated above, the Socratic dialectic (or logical argumentation by cross-examination and the exposure of contradiction), lit up in many passages by the Socratic irony or profession of ignorance. It is, as we have seen, a negative method which reaches truth as the residue after the demolition of pretension and falsehood. To the physics of the earlier philosophers and the ethical stress of Socrates, Plato added the development of this Socratic dialectical method—and his own poetic dogmas in ethics. The dialectical demolition, however, was by no means always completely fair and often involved mental sleights-of-hand.

Plato's dialectical method is logical at a time when logic, as a science, was novel and fascinating and before even the first text-book on it had been written, by Aristotle. Thus, where Plato is discoursing on Communism, influences, *e.g.*, of competition, which might militate anti-civically, against communal interests, are excluded with logical precision. Aristotle later protests against this highly logical or mathematic concept of unity in society, replacing it by the more organic concept of self-sufficiency. Hence, perhaps, it is that the poets (despite Plato's own poetry) and the imaginative writers fare ill at Plato's hands. Even as a logical treatise, however, *The Republic* is incomplete, since sections of the working-out of the scheme, *e.g.*, the essential sections on the conditions of the classes other than the rulers, are often omitted on the ground, apparently, that they are not required in a literary demonstration.

This logical quality is both the strength and weakness of *The Republic* and of the other Platonic dialogues. It is questionable how far Plato hoped to see the practical fulfilment of his scheme. For reasons already indicated, it used to be customary to assume that he did not. As we shall later see, there are reasons to suppose that view entirely wrong. Plato himself explains that at least it is possible that his scheme should be realized in practice—but he does not propose to be deterred, by practical considerations of politics, in his logical pursuits in morals. "We must follow the argument whithersoever it may carry us." As a consequence the Platonic dialogues "date" very little. The problems Plato discusses are again with us to-day for treatment, because logical and unencumbered by local sense," is fresh. The issue, "What is Justice?" so treated, has come for our age also.

The logical method, however, has the defect that, like geometry, it is static. Best has no better. This has certain consequences for Platonic doctrine to which we shall return.*

The dialectic is, moreover, thoroughly Sophistic in the bad sense. Macaulay, for all his intellectual "Bruce," was not entirely wrong when he accused Plato of being chiefly anxious to get trophies after empty victories. In a case when he says, "Somehow or other you always contrive to appear to me to be good words; and yet, to tell you the truth, I am not quite convinced by them." "Socrates sets a trap; but too often it is only a verbal trap. The dialectic rests upon the practical notion of competition (a kind of ruthless but tricky *tour de force*, into which it degenerates, is "a war of all against all," which is later given a precisely opposite sense) for Hobbes.

Two thousand years later, Friedrich Nietzsche accused Socrates and Plato of being the fathers of the decadence in Hellenic life. European culture, in brief, according to Nietzsche, had only just begun when these men infected it—with intellectualism and doubts of the native Homeric confidence, and with other-worldliness. Plato, twisting Callicles into the admission that it is better to suffer injustice than to commit it, is the kind of demi-pacifist whom Nietzsche especially disliked and against whom he restated Callicles' argument.†

It is at least true to say this that most of political thought since Plato has been concerned with exploring the truth of Plato's conclu-

* *Cf.* p. 58. There is no valuable liberty in the right to say that $2 \times 2 = 5$.

† *Cf.* p. 529.

sions and with reexamining those pleas raised by his opponents which his sophistic argument and ironic wit appeared to destroy. Above all it has been concerned with the fundamental problem raised by Callicles, quoting the poet Pindar:

> Law . . . makes might to be right, doing violence
> With highest hand, as the deeds of Heracles shew.

›roving Callicles wrong, Plato explicitly declared that he proved
'ın democracy and the common man at fault. (Callicles, it is
·d, claimed to be of the "popular party" although a critic
ıcy," as much as Napoleon or any Fascist.) They displayed
·hat Callicles displayed in particular, admiration for an
uncontrolled, irrational disposition, that of *l'homme*
el, with a contempt for "mere speculation." Plato, the
sophy, viewed them with ascetic distaste. His superior
›riests of a disciplined church and commissars with a
ʼns that there are problems of the modern temper—
'on, imagination, initiative, personality and non-
ºr—which it is difficult to hold that Plato has
ʻs had not, in typical Hellenic fashion, admitted
d better he meant "the wiser," and had con-
·ting that it was (biologically) good for the
ıgh should rule, *i.e.*, that those who do rule
as Hegel was later to see, would have been
ious one. Instead he admits the Platonic
ought, and ends in the absurdity of
strong "ought to be" strong but are not.
ubtle, makes a better running with his
ce laws, define morality—and ought to do
ʏy confes hat strength involves intelligence, that is,
ıte wisdom, instead of merely asserting that it involves
ı, Machiavellian cunning. Neither Callicles nor Thrasymachus
.ı probably have been right had they taken the other route—but their argument would have been more formidable.

4

The Republic, however, is not only a dialectical treatise on ethics. It is a dogmatic treatise. It embodies a teaching and conclusions. And this teaching involves a system upon which much of the philosophic structure and hence (why "hence" we will show later*) much of the

* *Cf.* p. 135.

social structure of Western civilization is to rest. Plato, like an artist, strikes out an idea which embodies itself and expresses itself in the material world. As he declared of his 'philosopher' (*Republic* VI,) "I am a painter of republics." Why does Plato's idea, in answer to the question, "What is Justice?" assume this social form, this form of a dogma seeking to mould, not only the individual, but whole societies? Let us go further: Why is it precisely true to say that if Plato had not been, Europe—Occidental civilization as a cultural unity—would not have been?

Let us look back a stage. Thrasymachus should perhaps have argued that what is is what ought to be; and that the strong man does, will, must and should rule, if not by force then by cunning. Thrasymachus tripped up. But does Plato give an answer, in replying to Thrasymachus, to the more substantial argument? Briefly (anticipating a little), we may say that his answer is the end of *laissez faire*. The answer is that cunning is an individualist quality, fitted for saving the individual. What, however, ultimately makes strength—if mere strength be the test—is union, that is, co-operation which involves moral qualities, including harmony and social justice, among those who co-operate. Co-operation then is the principle of power; cunning exploitation is the principle of division, egoism, anarchy and ruin. Assuming a static world, it is a good answer.

But it will be noted that Plato nowhere argues that co-operation should be maintained "for the good of the race." Otherwise "races" or "nations" would, as final entities, be entitled to engage in Machiavellian cunning against each other; and would be entitled, with Thrasymachus, to call this good or, with Callicles, to call the success of the winner, as long only as he is "the right sort" of winner, good. Plato argues that co-operation is produced by, but is also required by, justice —justice being the principle of harmony—and that social harmony or peace is a value in itself, an idea which the individual knows to be a value, which gives peace of soul *to that individual* and which civilization acquires in turn value and beauty by serving. There is no evidence that Plato is concerned with the survival either of the individual or of the race; but there is evidence that he is concerned with the beauty of civilization and with the peace of soul of *the individual* who grasps for himself that humane ideal or divine beauty. If, beyond the Happiness of the Many, is Civilization, beyond Civilization are the rational Eternal Values. "The Divine Plato" is the greatest of Humanists (save on one point only, his dogmatism) and, at least, the best of Theologians. Out beyond the notion of co-operation as (against the

Thrasymachi) the guaranty of force, is the notion of the moral (or good) as the harmonious (or true); and of the harmonious as the beautiful, grasped as such by the masters, which beauty is absolute value, irrelevant to all temporal interests, even of this globe itself.

5

The Republic is a psychological treatise. Over against co-operation, as logical alternative, Plato puts the *bellum omnium contra omnes*—"war of all against all." Sometimes men may admit a boxing ring-master—the law—and permit unbridled competition only within that ring. But the fundamental question yet remains, Why obey the law? Society will be chaotic with unbridled competition, but why, if I am thieving, trouble about society? And so Plato passes behind logic to psychological experience. Society is the individual writ large. But, conversely, the individual is society writ small. If society is chaotic, diseased, unhappy, so will the individual be. The soul of an Ishmael is an unhappy soul. And here the genius of Plato introduces a prophetically modern touch. (It will be found at the beginning of Book IX of *The Republic*.) The Ishmael may brazen it out in his conscious life. Even the successful Ishmael, the tyrant, "all his life long he is beset with fear and is full of convulsions and distractions." Is he happy when alone? Sodden with fear, his inner life also suffers from that chaos which his outer life promotes. Here is the real ground for not being seduced by the temptations of Gyges, the man who could become invisible, and whom no society or law could control. In sleep he betrays himself and the vices which make him Ishmael and fear-sodden. Appetites of the tiger and ape, which he refuses to check in life, however much he may excuse them, show their true shape in sleep when man re-enters the jungle from which he came.

> I mean those appetites which are awake when the reasoning and human and ruling power is asleep; then the wild beast within us, gorged with meat and drink, starts up and having shaken off sleep goes forth to satisfy his desires; and there is no conceivable folly or crime—not excepting incest or any unnatural union, or parricide, or cannibalism—which at such a time, when he has parted company with all shame and sense, a man may not be ready to commit.

Let us examine this formidable argument of Plato's against undisciplined vitality, irrational initiative and criminal excess. To anticipate a later term, emphatically Plato is a believer in Original Sin. The

appetites, although perhaps in essence neutral, unchecked by discipline are evil.

It is popular today to call Plato a forerunner of Fascism. On the contrary, he is a forerunner of Catholicism. Belief in individual immortality, whether fact or myth, is cardinal for him.* It will be noted that (with a reservation later to be remarked†) he is, in the very core of his philosophy, a rationalist. He is the prophet of Reason by which together with an educated will, the passions may be controlled. Although "Platonic love" is wrongly so called and, in a world where (as in the Orient and in some military communities) perversion was rife and fashionable, Plato only counselled against excess, nevertheless the Platonic philosophy is definitely one of discipline, if not of asceticism. Plato viewed the customs of the wealthy Sicilians, innovators, the Americans of his day, with fascinated disapproval. He could not keep away from Sicily; but he went to rebuke. In so far as clinical psychology may show that these natural impulses, "animals of the jungle," are good animals, as animals, and require to be understood and tamed rather than repressed, the Platonic teaching (which tended to ignore and treat as not really existent, if not to repress, "evil impulses") will be found to have a weakness. It is necessary, however, to be clear that Platonism, involving discipline, is not Puritanism. Its watchword is temperance, social, sexual, personal. Its repeated analogy is that of the instincts to racehorses which are needed to draw the chariot of life, but require to be reined in, and even whipped, as well as spurred. Platonism is grandly sane as perhaps no subsequent philosophy has ever been.

If weakness there be, it shows itself in Plato's distrust—we noted the same in Confucius—of a morality built up from within outwards, save in the case of a few demigods and philosophers of a rational insight. He distrusts the unredeemed, common, unenlightened "inner man." Morality is and must be determined by environment and by education through environment. Men, to be good, must be brought up in "a good pasture." Hence the attention to literature and music, to city life and even geographic position. Plato has little interest in "the beautiful soul" and "the sacred conscience" as individualistic expressions—certainly as individualistic expressions apart from a self-imposed but rational discipline. Who then should mould this environment and control it? Man. But man guided, not by his spiritual private conscience or caprices, but by Reason. Now Reason, for Plato,

* But *cf.* p. 66. Also p. 137, 721.

† *Cf.* p. 57.

like mathematics is "outward," objective, real apart from Smith or Jones. We hear, in the later dialogues, little of the "voices" and "demons" of Socrates.* And, against Reason, there are *no* natural rights. Plato is the antithesis of an anarchist. Profoundly, he is an authoritarian. Ethic—*ethos*, *i.e.*, the total ethical system in practice—is imprinted. The very (late) Greek word "*charactēr*" implies it: "a sealmark."

This objectivity, non-subjectivity, is carried further and makes yet more plain its great historical defect, its one defect. Excellence, for Plato, as an idea is something capable of being grasped by reason, demonstrated and taught. The idea once rationally grasped, it cannot be surpassed. Progress consists solely in realizing it in practice. But, if the reasoning is once correct, there is no reason to suppose through all the ages improvement in the conception of the idea. Change is utterly contrary to its nature. Through all the centuries two times two equals four, and will so remain. The excellent cannot, from mere lapse of time, be replaced by the more excellent, since time is irrelevant and the ideas do not change. Either I grasp the idea or do not; but there is no more reason why John Dewey, after twenty centuries, should grasp it than Plato. Plato is an opponent of Heraclitus who "made whirlwind king." There is no conception of Progress in Plato because there is none, substantially, of Time. Time is not Real, but of the very nature of the incidental. Human Nature is real—and the values it apprehends, true, beautiful and good.

Hence Plato is uninterested in progressive individuals—in challenge, new moral insights, rebellion and initiative for their own sake. Once the truth is grasped by timeless logic, he who differs from it is merely wrong—a fool and perhaps an obstinate one. Better educate him if humble and punish him if proud—good Catholic doctrine. There is, for Plato, no sacred liberty to be wrong. Human morality has always tended to be retrospective, like that of the "wisdom of Egypt," not progressive. Plato stands in a middle position. The realization of the idea *can* be progressive. But the idea is transcendent to the time-process and, as it were, latently was "in the beginning before all worlds." Plato has no spark of sympathy for a character such as Ibsen's "Brand," the idealist rebel, or for Henry James, with his passion for freedom even from the cloy of Brook Farm Utopia—with this reservation, that, in the *Hippias Minor*,† Plato states that he prefers a great evil man, capable of achievement for good, to a little good man ca-

* But *cf.* p. 57.

† I am presuming that this Dialogue is genuine.

pable of nothing. But, for the rest, man in opposition, with his "freeman's worship," is for Plato neither happy nor good. Plato's thought here has dominated classical Christianity—we shall later see how.* Plato, the great conservative, has not taken account within his ideal world of the real significance of error, that is, of expanding experience.

Certain reservations, dubious but of immense potential importance, must be made. We have said that Plato in the *Hippias Minor* finds a place in his moral scheme (as, long after, sociologists such as Durkheim will do) for the criminal. The problem of the life and death of Socrates, the criminal, is, after all, the start of Plato's own thinking. Perhaps beginning as Socrates' dedicated vindicator, the true conclusion of Platonism is agreement with the jury: Socrates died justly. (Did he not himself say that he owed filial obedience? Pity that the jury was not wiser—but the executioner did his duty.) Further, in the *Letters*, in certain places Plato the dogmatist seems to hint at a basic scepticism whether man can know that he knows truth. And it will be noted that his assessment of ultimate value is no logical assessment (despite the so-called Cambridge Platonists of the eighteenth century) but an agreement among those whom we agree to be masters concerning what the beautiful may be. It is then arguable (we cannot here argue it) that there is a core of probabilism, of scepticism in Plato, which would make him transcend the dogmatists and father also the other major tradition in human thought, the empiric. Merely Plato thinks fit to be (almost) silent about it as "dangerous thoughts."

The Republic is one of the world's greatest political treatises, both by right of seniority and also by inherent value. Its only serious rival is Aristotle's *Politics*. Rousseau's *Social Contract* is too tenuous and uneducated, and Hobbes' *Leviathan* and Marx's *Capital* are both too specific to come within the same category. The socio-political treatment is a consequence of Plato's social conception of ethics and is, therefore, for him a necessary aspect of any discussion of justice. Justice is more than a balancing of contracts between individuals. It has implicit in it the principle of a social scheme.

6

Plato has shown himself a great Co-operator in his opposition to the principle of pursuing self-interest; a great Socialist in his opposition to all private interests that distract attention from putting society

* *Cf.* pp. 64, 143, 182.

first. His society is the city and his ethics are civics. Let us turn to his social plan.

Plato, the Social Rationalizer, in outlining his social plan, turns again to his psychological divisions. In the *psyche* or soul, Reason is like a charioteer controlling and driving the Instincts, both the spiritual instinct or will power, the *Élan vital*, and the bodily instinct of Lust, which horses show their true shapes in untamed dreams when the charioteer, the censor Reason, sleeps. Metaphor and dreams apart, there are three great psychological principles in man: Reason; Spirit, *Esprit*, principle of will and emotion; and the Appetites or Passions, corresponding to the digestive faculties in physiology, as the others do to heart and brain. Those guided by these last, businessmen and the like, are merely the mob, even if ὁ τῶν πλοίτων πλῆθος (ho tōn ploutōn plēthos)—"the mob of the wealthy." There is a splendid arrogance about Plato's *aristocratisme*.

Corresponding, then, to these three psychological functions are three sociological types: those who love the best for itself, those who love the best for its personal glamour and glory, and those who love the best for what materially it will get us—those apart who do not love the best at all, perverted types.

Corresponding, again, to those three sociological types, according to which constitutes the governing class, are three political constitutions, the aristocratic, the timocratic (*timē*—"honour:" the military principle) and the oligarchic (merchant class). Where, however, the object of the ruling class is merely to maintain and increase their profits and spoils, and no ideal principle is involved, a degeneration sets in in which each pushes against each for these spoils and swag. In that competition the spirit of disciplined aristocracy, with its honour, is broken and mere force triumphs. The many, if led, have this force; and democracy, *i.e.*, sharing out the spoils, succeeds as a constitution. But what the many—still without any principle apart from gain, which (negatively put) is greed and envy—lack is continuous leadership. This popular leadership they must have if they are to maintain their gains. Demagogues are not enough: "the leader" must have the will to power, as well as a popular capacity to please.

Hence arises tyranny, which may be benevolent—most Greek tyrants (it is highly important to note) were. However, it knows no law save its own will—the will of "the leader," or chief "comrade," as prophet, being above formal law—and hence is irrationalist and the subversion of Reason, the assassination of the charioteer. Plato, as we have seen, is not only a logician but a rationalist. Monarchy is

either regulated by constitutional law or hereditary. Tyranny is the rule of one man, using illusion or force. Plato, however, it must be noted, does *not* exclude a *Führer-princip* ('principle of leadership') where one man arises of supreme and *disinterested* rational intuition.

Later, in *The Statesman*, Plato provides us with a neat division of constitutions into categories, taken over by Aristotle and itself derived from Herodotus, divided by number of the rulers and by principle of government. The unperverted are three—by the one (Royalty), few (Aristocracy), many (True Democracy), and the perverted, unrestrained on principle by law, are three, by the one (Tyranny), the few (Oligarchy), and the many (False Democracy). The change is immaterial save that it places Democracy among the possible sound forms and heads the list with rule by the supremely wise one man, if he can be found. Hence Plato outlines a philosophic justification for Papacy.

What has all this to do with Justice? The answer is that the well-educated or temperate man is a man in whom reason is permitted to rule. To each faculty of the psyche—Mind, Spirit and Senses—is allowed its equitable function. In a sound human existence the principle that is equitable in the psyche is also equitable in society. Only if it exists in society, and is acquiesced in, can the individual be trained in sound principles himself and be happy. On this principle, discovered by introspection (and by logic) to be sound in our own souls, must be cast a society which will reimpress it, as a "character," upon the souls of future citizens. In this social order everyman must mind his own function or business, which he is fitted to do well. To observe this harmonious order is justice by one's neighbour, who is *doing his job.* Social justice then is each man minding his own business. Two millennia later we shall hear of it in the form of "My Station and Its Duties" and, yet earlier, in the Pauline injunction, "Ye are all members of one body." Plato even, in *The Laws*, XII, (and he is the first in the West) uses the organic analogy, speaking of the "trunk" of the body politic and of the guardians as the "head."

The Republic is a treatise on the art (which also involves a science) of Government. In the Just Society who shall be the ruling class?—for, in a differentiated, organic society, men apprenticed in the science of rule there will be. Clearly, the Rational, the Wise. Who are these? Plato sagely observed that they are few. That is the nature and limit of excellence. How are we to detect them? By ability. Plato is quite clear that his ruling class is *not* a caste and is not *necessarily* hereditary. The "golden-born" need not always—certainly until eugenic arrangements were improved—be of gold in parentage. Here we mark a great

historic advance from the major political systems which had hitherto obtained and which had acquired a philosophy (implicit in theological writing) in Egypt and in India. His system deeply resembles these Theocracies when compared with modern government; but his system is not the same.

Ability, however, is not to be found full grown and created spontaneously and haphazard. It is not a substance, like a pound of tea, but a quality of plastic human nature moulded by environment. Plato fully recognizes the duty to provide *every* citizen with such material well-being as will enable him, by nurture, to develop to their rational perfection the powers latent in his nature. That falls within the Platonic notion of justice. Human nature, however, is not entirely plastic. "The golden-born" may have "silver-born" children, who should be deposed or "demoted" and the "silver-born" may have "golden-born" children who must be promoted. Especially is this likely to happen in a haphazard society. But in a just society appropriate stock will be selected. And it will be eugenically bred, thanks to a full sense of the grave public responsibility to humanity involved.

A good inherited nature must be improved by a good formal education, physical and intellectual. But formal education is not enough. The significant education which a man receives is that from the society in which he grows up. If, then, we seek just-minded citizens, not men made criminal by their environment, those who have the power have also the responsibility to mould a just society. Men do not finish their education with school, or always cease to be children on reaching adolescence. All one can say is that the power of education to change and correct, but not to preserve and guide, grows smaller. Plato is a paternalist in his plan of government.

How then is the climate of environment to be maintained at the temperature appropriate for justice? The answer is to be found in the outline of a gigantic anticipation of the Catholic Church. As Professor Ernest Barker says, speaking as a Protestant, of one side of Platonism and Catholicism: "All evil clericalism is to be found in germ in Plato." The connection, however, as we shall see later, between Plato and Catholicism is nothing miraculous; but the consequence, in part, of direct influence and, in part, of common tradition. It is true that *The Republic*, save by rumour and scattered reference, was a lost book from Proclus (fifth century) to Pico della Mirandola (fifteenth century). Only the *Timaeus* was preserved for reference in the early Middle Ages. The Early Fathers, however, of the Christian Church, not least St. Augustine (despite his imperfect acquaintance with Greek writers),

were steeped in late Platonism. In order to fill in adequately the details of the plan we shall here also draw on *The Laws*, the later and less radical treatise, written by Plato in his late period after his second visit to Syracuse and unfinished at his death.

The Republic and *The Laws* are in effect, if the paradox may be pardoned, tractates in defence of the Catholic hierarchy. As we have seen, the best form of government obtainable is by the *basilikotatos aner*—"the most kingly man"—the wisest of the wise, the Platonic Pope. Truth, in the last resort, is not (we learn in *The Laws; cf.* also Letter VII) to be discovered by logic and syllogism but by mystic revelation, the appreciation of it being by an Areopagus of wise men, "required to meet daily between the hour of dawn and the rising of the sun," consisting "in the first place of the priests who have obtained the rewards of virtue." These are those who

> know these two principles—that the soul is the eldest of all things which are born, and is immortal and rules over all bodies; moreover . . . . have contemplated the mood of nature which is said to exist in the stars, and gone through the previous training, and seen the connexion of *music* with these things, and harmonized them all with laws and institutions . . . . able to give a reason of all things that have reason. (*The Laws*, XII, 967.)

Truth, however, is no subjective vision. Its touchstone is the agreement (as in music among masters) of those adjudged competent to judge. It is to be grasped not by logic (which only exposes falsehood) but yet by those grounded in metaphysics—one almost adds (in the most philosophic sense) theology. The final council is that of the Elders—those who know why they know. We may compare this with the ecclesiastical *presbyteroi*, "elders" (Presbyters, Priests). But the general work of government rests with a select body of rulers or governors. This is the class or function of society that corresponds with Reason in the individual: it is the trained group of rational men. These are the Platonic Governors. We may compare this with the *clerōtoi*, "selected" (clergy)—those in Holy Orders—in contrast with the *laicoi*, "populace" (laity).

In addition to the Governors or Clergy, Plato has two other Orders corresponding to the physiological and psychological functions in man of heart or *esprit*, and of digestion or appetite. These are the Warriors and the Workers for Profit. We may compare them with the Chivalry of the Middle Ages (Crusader Knights, Orders of the Temple and St. John) and the Merchants, Farmers and the rest. Plato, however, is preoccupied with the education of his Governors or Spiritual Directors

and spares little space in outlining any detailed scheme for the flock of followers.

There may, however, be rebels against the rational rule of the directors—obstinate heretics who do not understand true metaphysics. They are to be reasoned with—we compare the Holy Inquisition—in a place ingeniously called a Sophronisterion or place-for-making-men-wiser, *i.e.*, a concentration camp. If they relapse, they may be dealt with vigorously by those who know how to use force—the secular arm—lest the public order be disturbed. This does not apparently violate, in his own eyes, Plato's priestly principle that it is better to suffer injustice than to inflict it. It is not injustice.

Literature also may poison the climate of the good state. There will certainly be no "free press." On the contrary, literature will be censored. We may compare the Papal Index.

7

The Republic was maintained, by Rousseau in his *Émile*, to be the finest treatise extant on education. Rousseau was himself something of a Platonist,* and had read Plato—perhaps to his own disadvantage—in a translation. Whether Rousseau was right each must form his own opinion. But certainly Plato, as an educationalist, is thorough with the courage of his convictions. Where he is perhaps most valuable is in his escape (easier in his day of private tutors for the few) from the conception that education means little boys going to school.

The Greeks used the word *mousikē* in a much wider sense than our "music." It was everything to do with the Muses—including even, odd though it may seem to scholars today, History. Briefly, it embraced all culture. And, by inquisition and index and spiritual directors, it was culture that Plato proposed to mould. A weakness in Plato to which we have already called attention—his disrespect for the imagination and its work, dynamic, demonic—here comes to the front. According to his own lights Plato, with his distrust of poets (as we must distrust Mr. Shaw today) and condemnation of the liar Homer, was right. The imaginative genius is extra-rational, too often in alliance with unchecked emotion, undisciplined, non-ascetic, dangerous. Solemnly the ex-poet, Plato, examines the poets and the musicians. The ancient equivalents of Shaw and Schnitzler are utterly banned—although Shaw might be allowed to possess a serious intent corrupted by an unphilosophic early training and an individualistic demagogic tendency to play *largo di basso* or big bassoon to everybody else's fiddle.

* *Cf.* p. 444.

The Lydian equivalent of immemorial African jazz was utterly taboo as stimulating the lower passions. To be frank, humour and suffering buffoons patiently were not Plato's forte. Unlike David, he thought it bad theology to dance before the Ark.* Degenerate art, inspired by dangerous ideas, poisoned education, defeated propaganda, weakened the salutary myth. He proposed to stamp it out.

8

The Republic and *The Laws* are Communist tractates. Plato—apart from the Egyptian priests, and the Hindu Brahmins and the Peruvian pre-Incas and many primitive peoples—is the first Communist. Unlike the priests, with their demand to be sustained in common wealth by the alms of the labouring, competing merchants and masses, he is a highly articulate Communist, although it must be noted that his communism also is only for the few, the spiritual directors, and apparently in some less precise measure for the military men. He takes the entirely common-sense point of view, later adopted by the Church, that those who want power must pay for it (and avert envy) by asceticism and frugality; but that the mass of men prefer money and their material share-out, whole product of their labour, to power. Granted a just modicum of security, they can only be driven to effort by hope of lucrative gain. Such a pursuit, is perhaps (as Dr. Johnson said) harmless—but harmless as long as such men are not permitted to pretend that gains, irrelevant to moral quality, constitute a social claim to power.

Plato is not—it is highly important to point out—a Marxian Communist. There has been, obviously, much Communism before Marx, and no little Communism since Marx is also non-Marxian. Plato is not, even by anticipation, a Marxian Communist for other reasons than that his communism is neither universal nor international. It is also not founded, as its rock basis, on the Economic Interpretation of History. It culminates in the Classless Society in the economic sense. But it certainly does not aim at the functionally undifferentiated society. (Perhaps neither does Marxism; but to that we shall return.†) Above all, it rests on the antithesis of the Class War and nowhere supposes that the establishment of Social Justice presupposes victory in the Class War. The defect of Plato's position, it must be pointed out, is that his Republic (but *not* the Communist Benedictine monasteries) remained unestablished and "utopian"—in brief, does not exist.

* Metaphorically. Actual dancing Plato regarded as a high form of art.

† *Cf.* p. 643.

In order to evoke the satisfactory environment for social justice it is not enough to regulate culture. Plato freely admits that one must regulate civilization, social and economic institutions, and technological and material conditions. The art and science of government is emphatically a whole-time job. It, therefore, requires leisure from industrial employment. Hellenes anyhow ought not to be used as cogs in a slave technology—animated tools; but many freemen engaged in *banausikai*, *i.e.*, mechanical, occupations were not suited to share in rule. Indeed the pursuit of any other occupation must necessarily exclude a man from political *expertise*. There must be no "part-timing." How, then shall a man get this leisure? He cannot get it by earning it. Can he get it by inherited private wealth? No, replies Plato. The self-made man will be occupied with profit and the heir with defending a private wealth not necessarily connected with ability and social service. Both will have their eye on their main chance, their pile—at least must defend it from inroads—and will be preoccupied, if not competitive. If the common wealth is to come before private wealth, at least for the directing group the two must be the same. Sparta, in its better days, with its property reallocations and common regimental messes, had shown the way. There must be thorough communism of property as touching everything that was likely to create rivalry or to distract attention from the public aim—not, of course, in clothes, wine glasses and the like, but in everything that might divide comrades. "To friends," Plato quotes a saw, "all things are common." The Spartans, in large part, did it; the Cretans did it; and it had succeeded in more than Prussian fashion—and this although a Spartan was taught in childhood, as part of his military training, how to steal and get away with it.

How about community of wives? The issue, Plato recognizes, through the ironic mouth of "Socrates," cannot be shirked. Whether or not monogamy, supplemented by concubinage, is or is not substantially an extension of the private property system, at least here in the family was the especial centre of those interests and affections, nobler than love of pelf, which a man might put in front of the public weal. As the French proverb (and the French are experienced) later ran: "Ces pères de famille sont capables de tout."* Discipline here might check even the military men—if the necessity of philosophic training did not—from aspiring to be governors when they had no ambitious wives before whom to display their personal glory and dignities.

* "These family men are capable of anything."

Plato, moreover, like Euripides, had faced the problem of feminism. Hellas had seen the emancipated Aspasia and the yet more emancipated Sappho—neither inglorious. (Sappho's poems were later destroyed by the horrified Byzantine bishops—whereas Plato had destroyed his own.) Plato saw no reason why women of ability, even if usually not quite so good as the men, should be precluded from sharing in that public work and research of truth which alone gave significance to life, just because of their sex, any more than because of colour of hair or skin. It mattered more that they should be men (the Greek word has no sex implications like the more barbaric Gothic)—fully conscious "humans"—not mere mob members. For the domestic joys and virtues which the dissolute Rousseau praised, Plato, when the art of controlling civilization was at issue, had no more sympathy than a naval officer on duty or the General of the Jesuits. It was very admirable for the lower orders. The population question, it should be added, was never far, at this time, from the Greek mind.

If, however, sex was not to matter, then this issue must be taken seriously. Women could not have it both ways and jealously maintain private property in their husbands. There was to be one big community in which public and scientific pursuits were to count first, but where eugenic considerations dictated the maintenance of a population of high ability and where, among competitors in a friendly way, the bold were to deserve the fair. It is clear that Plato, without encouraging his bugbear "appetite," does not disapprove of such cohabitation as must remove the edge from competitive rivalry, provided that there is no offspring or that the offspring is eugenically fit. The phrase "community of children" is correct, but the phrase "community of wives" applied to Plato may be misleading. He seems to have thought of parenthood, as distinct from cohabitation, as being by one selected man with one selected woman. But, apart from stress on eugenic selection, the text is not clear. Where children are involved, he is a rigid moralist about the obligation of the individual to respect his biological obligations towards race and *polis*. This apart, Plato is "temperate."

The Catholic Church did not balk at facing rigorously the same problems. For its priesthood—not the lay vulgar—it ordained poverty and, as touching monastic communities (often wealthy corporately), community of goods. The Order came first. As touching wives, inflamed by a Syrian tradition which regarded sex as intimately related to *the* original sin by which Eve tempted Adam, the Catholic Church found

another solution of the problem: not to marry at all—unless, as Paul grudgingly says, the alternative were sexual mania. The early Christians believed that the end of the world would come before they had gone around the cities of Judah. The population question, therefore, did not trouble them anyway. Later, the principle of celibacy was made rigorous for the mŏnastic orders only and, in the Western Church from the twelfth century, for the two senior orders of the clergy (out of seven).

The obvious objection to the Catholic solution of this problem (apart from human lapses of which Protestant critics made the most) is that stocks of ability became self-exterminating. It is, however, arguable that Plato's prescription would produce too grave racial difference between one class and another (even greater than today exists owing to the inadequate nourishment of the poor) and would end in a species of Huxleian Brave New World with its World Controllers or Sacred College. The Catholic supposition is the more democratic one: that high quality stock is very generally distributed and that as good children can be produced from the priest's brother, or from a pious layman, as from the priest or bishop. There is indeed no reason why the Platonic policy of eugenics should not be applied to all occupational groups in society. It must be admitted that the chances are greater that it will be begun in a limited number of groups —Commissars and Stakhanov workers, let us say. A Russian Soviet scientist has recently (1936) gone so far as to state that masses of men are, biologically speaking, slaves. This, however, seems to be an unproved dogma natural to totalitarianism.

The Catholic argument, however, for the biological extinction of the ablest, in the present stage of society, is not an easy one. On the other hand, it is clearly undesirable that women of ability should be left, as in the modern, secular world, with children stigmatized as illegitimate. According to Plato's system the community becomes responsible for all children desirable for the community. It is not necessary to call up before the mind a Russian system of communal crêches, communal nursery schools and communal eating places. Human parents, not a State Corporation without body or soul, could be responsible in human relations. But jealousy and private proprietary rivalry are excluded, to the point that parents will not claim, because they will not know, their own children—Plato is here being Shavian or thinking of a Reichsführer-schule—and the community countenances and finances the children which it requires. The system envisaged by Plato is apparently, not so much the *mari complaisant*,

as something comparable to Noyes's Oneida Community in New York State (suppressed by the Baptist denomination, influencing a hesitant legislature). Malinowski, the anthropologist, insists that it is a natural enough form of living for primitive man, justified by the "law of Nature and Nations"—*ius naturale et gentium*.

Anyhow Plato is here discussing problems well ahead of our present stage of public opinion and requiring for their solution cultural controls that even Occidental civilization does not now command. Plato's argument is usually read with a shudder or followed by a hasty endeavour to explain that he did not quite mean what he said or was building a Cloud Cuckoo Land. However, through our numerous and increasing public institutional provisions for children, we have moved immeasurably far in his direction since the early Education Acts of the last century The Catholic solution remains with us but, in Protestant countries, as an unintelligible religious idiosyncrasy, the legacy of a past age. The Protestant solution is an obscure compromise between Catholic asceticism (for which Plato provides an intelligible explanation), Syrian sex fear and Judaic patriarchalism. The feminist movement, of which Plato visualized one outcome, has as yet only begun, in the modern world, to reveal its serious moral and social—as distinct from its merely symbolical and vote-hunting—implications.

Plato, in the second-best community which he outlined in the *Laws*, was prepared to make certain concessions:

> The first and highest form of the state and of the government and of the law is that in which there prevails most widely the ancient saying, that "Friends have all things in common." Whether there is anywhere now, or will ever be, this communion of women and children and of property, in which the private and the individual is altogether banished from life. . . . I say that no man, acting upon any other principle, will ever constitute a state which will be truer or better or more exalted in virtue. Whether such a state is governed by Gods or sons of Gods, one, or more than one, happy are the men who, living after this manner, dwell there. . . . The *polis* which we have now in hand, when created, will be nearest to immortality and the only one which takes the second place.

Plato insisted on community of goods among the aristocracy. There is a certain ambiguity about this in the case of a suggestion from the Thebans that he should act as legislator for Megalopolis. Pamphila, writer of Memoirs, says in her twenty-fifth book (the statement is given by Diogenes Laertius, at the beginning of the third century A.D.) that Plato, when he discovered that they were opposed to equality of

possessions, refused to act. However, on the evidence of his own writings, Plato seems to have had no objection to competition and profit-making among the bourgeois and proletarian orders. For him, therefore, the great problem of maintaining private initiative under any thorough socialist system among common men swayed by the profit motive and piece-rate wages does not apply. To each according to his needs and from each according to his ability applies to party-members only—the Platonic clergy, governors, or what Mr. Wells calls Samurai. The Catholic Church similarly insisted on poverty for the religious by vocation, specifically those in Monastic Orders.

Plato and the Catholic Church alike insist on unconditional obedience. The Catholic Church indeed admits the moral obligation to follow a bona fide conscience, even if erroneous. Plato is not so sure. But both are sure that there is on principle no liberty to err. *Extra ecclesiam nulla salus.* Outside the community there is no safety. Socrates, in one of his most certainly authentic utterances—he, the great Pioneer of Private Conscience—had himself insisted on this at his death. As much as Aristotle later, Plato believes that morals depend upon the way one is brought up. In the dialogue, *The Statesman*, Plato says that the politician, who is also politicist or political scientist, is like the physician, who is a physiologist, and his prescription must be followed—nor does it matter to the public weal "whether he cures us against or with our will." In the later words of Cromwell: "It is not what they want but what is good for them—that is the question." In the words of Mr. Bernard Shaw: "It is a simple historical fact that cultural institutions have to be imposed on the masses by rulers or private patrons enlightened enough to know that such institutions are neither luxuries nor mere amusements but necessities of civilized life." Hence Plato's stress on education and on "music."

Obedience was not only to be an act of duty: it was to be induced by the very air one breathed. Plato's communism is not materialist, but monastic (care is needed about the word "materialist:" we shall revert to it*—and the Marxists are also in practice monastic or disciplined in a hierarchy and "commissaristic"). Plato's sexual morality is not lax, but eugenic. He is not a sensualist, although sensually temperate or indifferentist, but idealist—and an idealist who knows that he knows the ideal and is entitled to demand obedience to it.

Such obedience involved—as in a monastic community—homogeneity in society. Plato decisively accepts this condition. He will

* *Cf.* pp. 573, 620, 630.

exclude aliens and race mixture. He will regulate population. He will limit its size to that of a small Swiss canton or less—or of Weimar or Rousseau's Geneva or a lesser Florence or Rome in its earliest republican days. The polis was to be of 5,040 landowning citizens (*Laws*)—let us say a total population of 30,000—*i.e.*, the smallest number (and here, as history was to prove, was the unknown variable) suitable for competent defence.

Plato goes further. He is not only an exponent of the Fascist closed economy. Although he would permit a certain number of trusted delegates, almost elder statesmen, to tour abroad and report on ideas and curiosities in the world without, nevertheless Plato—remembering the corrupting effect of the Sophists, the anthropologists like Herodotus, even the seafaring men, restless tellers of tales—would have the young men at home taught that no country was finer than their own country. Here Plato was the complete moral jingo—as it were, Italia finest and Mussolini always right; Russia unexcelled and Stalin right; "Deutschland über alles" and Hitler right; and Britannia ruling the waves. Plato, the mathematician, is drawing out swiftly the consequences of "known" and absolute truth, in unquestioning obedience and in the compromise of lesser truths, by the needs of practice, in myth. The very fruit of the original dogma betrays the need for scepticism.

9

How was the Platonic polis to be brought into being? And how maintained? The first, best by a demigod—a Divine Revelation. Doubtless the Revealer, perfectly just, would suffer and be put to death. Failing this, frankly, by capturing a tame dictator and hypodermically injecting philosophic notions. Hence the visits (in 388) to Dionysius I and (in 367 and 361–360) to Dionysius II of Syracuse.† How to maintain? It is here that we get the core of Platonism. The Myth is the Executive Clause of the Platonic Plan. It is the doctrine of the *gennaion pseudos*—the "genuine lie" or ideological Myth, to which mankind is found by experience to take kindly. This is how the wise man, the superior men, will conquer the empty masses whose might they require. Here are Plato's *Capital* and *Mein Kampf*.

Plato had turned the poets out of doors as liars. But that was because they might interfere with his own lie or propaganda. They were bad, black liars; he, white. Art and Science must be the servants of Theology, and of the Communist Commonwealth—not their masters.*

* *Cf.* pp. 174, 182.

† Or perhaps by a Commission on Constitutional Law.

Truth embodied in a tale
Shall enter in at lowly doors.

Plato, like Fletcher of Saltoun, proposed to provide the tales. It was a high moral imperative that the masses should sacrifice themselves to the community, to civilization and to its ideals, understood, of course, by the orthodox spiritual directors, Plato's communist philosophers. That meant, indeed, sacrifice of individual liberties, interests, ambitions in this life. What could persuade men to this sacrifice? Only the belief that, if not entirely happy here, in a totalitarian community, they would be elsewhere, in the Next World or after the Five-year Plan or the Four-year Plan—if they behaved themselves. Of course, the philosophers would understand what all this really meant—the truth. But the rest could be persuaded that they were individually immortal. This is the Myth of Er the Pamphylian. Not that they would just wake up in Heaven or Hell. On the contrary, they would be reincarnated on earth—moreover, they had had, as the Hindus also thought, many previous incarnations. That Myth would teach them to observe, contentedly or in God-fearing, the principles of Social Justice. A few could be trusted to be guided by their own altruism, sense of duty and grasp of metaphysical truth. Plato was among them.

How did Plato's scheme work in practice? We are not, I think, at all entitled to say that it was some More's *Utopia*, some dream never expected to work in practice. On the contrary he visited Sicily in 367 B.C., when nearly sixty, at no small risk to himself in order to put his plan into action.

Twenty years before, in 388 B.C., he had visited what was, for the Greek colonists, the America of those days and its Manhattan, Syracuse—largest city of the Western world.

I was [he writes] by no means content with the "blissful life" which I found there, consisting, as it did, of incessant debaucheries . . . The human constitution cannot stand the strain of that sort of life for long. Nor would he ever be likely to learn self-control or any other virtue. What is more, no Polis, however good its laws, can retain any stability if its citizens believe in mad extravagance and exert themselves only in the pursuit of eating and drinking and in the vigorous pursuit of their amours. Inevitably in such a state there is a constant succession of tyrannies, oligarchies, and democracies; and the politicians cannot endure the mention of *just government or equality before the law.*

The last clause is an interesting stroke. It must never be forgotten that Plato, aristocrat, came of a pro-democrat family. Disgusted with

his kinsmen among the oligarchic Thirty Tyrants he would even have favoured the democrats, for their moderation, had it not been their voices that condemned Socrates. His major charge against democracy is yet precisely that it is too tolerant; allows "even the asses to walk on the footpath"; has no standards of value; produces a piebald civilization, very varied; and denounces with fury as anti-proletarian, through the mouths of mere unself-conscious workers, those who insist on the new, disciplined, communist, vanguard puritanism; boasts of its sovereign power.

"Above all men the law" was with him a prime maxim. The law itself was Reason (not necessarily the Constitution). Nevertheless, it was precisely in opulent, vital Syracuse that Plato—partly from personal reasons and from friendship with Dion, son-in-law of the local boss or autocrat, Dionysius I—decided to make his experiment. After all, up north in Tarentum, they were accustomed to Pythagorean scientifico-political, as it were "freemason," technocrat experiments.

10

To Syracuse Plato, therefore, returned to "run," in collaboration with the able but puritanical Dion, the young man, Dionysius II, open to ideas, dilettante, *doré*, who had succeeded to the reins of government. The attempt was a failure—conspicuously so in the further venture of 361–360. The natural cue of the Platonists has been to blame the immoral weaknesses of the young man of thirty, not the political weaknesses of the sexagenarian sage. The matter, however, is not so simple. Dion, the puritan, although a man of ability, displayed the major error of an intellectual, the inability to conceal his own offensive cleverness. The chief fault of Dionysius appears to have been that of taking to philosophy as a young man about town takes to Buchmanism. To his credit be it said that he continued his studies of philosophy and mathematics (science and engineering, if one will) after Plato had, for the second time (361 B.C.) been sent about his business. What Plato and his friends did not grasp was that the Socialist commonwealth, as any other state, is conditioned in how it lives by what the neighbours will permit. Reforms, admirable in themselves, that provoke opposition and faction are only feasible, when the enemy is at the gate, if carried through with singular skill. They require caution unless their certain effect is to increase, not diminish, military force. And for the Sicilian Greeks, the Carthaginian was always at the gates. Philistos and the anti-Dion faction had the simplest patriotic argument at their command for opposing the alien visitor Plato.

Plato, who had carefully considered the menace of *stasis*—faction—within a closed economy, had failed to consider the bearing of faction upon the positions of rival states. His politics is singularly innocent of consideration of the power problems of state relations; of all adequate consideration of the meaning of foreign alliances; and even of such internationalism as existed in the Hellenic world. This is the more odd since Plato visited Sicily and legislated for Syracuse precisely owing to the reality of an Hellenic internationalism which he ignored. Moreover, a prescription for bringing the Just Commonwealth to birth through an Aristocracy that could command the support of neither proletarian Left nor oligarchic Right, but rested on the will of a reformed and inspired tyrant—in brief a Caesarean or Napoleonic or Mussolinian prescription for Communism—although not ridiculous, was scarcely satisfactory.

In 357 B.C., Plato was asked by Dion, who proposed himself to play the Cromwell, to set sail yet a fourth time. Dion's plan was ostensibly for a council of Elder Statesmen. Plato, nearly seventy, declined; some of his pupils, including Herakleides, went. Again it was discovered that politics is power and that the ideal requires power for its vehicle. The ideal, which was to be realized, became lost in mismanaged faction. One thing Dion did *not* do: to institute communism among the wealthy ruling Thirty-Five and to spread property more evenly among the proletariat. One thing he did do: to put his hand to approval of the assassination of Herakleides, the pro-democrat. In 353, Dion was murdered, at his own dinner-table, by the democrats led by Kalippos, the Athenian.

Plato was seventy-five. And suddenly the image of "the Divine Plato," writer of *The Republic*, fades and we see a bearded old man, with gold ear-rings, living in a pre-Christian age in a country where human sacrifice was not unknown, remote from us in time and place, garb and manner, excusing himself. He looks out towards the dictatorship of Rome and to the Dark Ages. The Golden Age of Greece is behind him, Athens a beaten state. Nevertheless, we still have the authentic letters—read, after two millennia, the lines from Plato's hand. The court, he writes, of Dionysius the Elder was sodden with suspicion. Not much could be done with Dionysius the Younger—and he had dared to put out a book which was an unforgivable travesty of Plato's own philosophy. "In my struggle with the slanderers I was worsted." The Athenians could not be blamed for Dion's murder; Kalippos was a nobody. He, Plato, gave advice only when asked. He was a humanist, concerned with ultimate truths—and a pacifist.

"Better to suffer unrighteousness than to practice it." No man ought "to apply violence to his fatherland in the form of a political revolution, whenever it is impossible to establish the best kind of polity without banishing and slaughtering citizens, but rather he ought to keep quiet and pray for what is good both for himself and for the Polis."

Not that he is any complete Pacifist. If Dion's policy had been followed, *after* reform, Syracuse—he is quite confident—would have been in a position, as in the days of Gelon, to throw back and reduce the Carthaginians. But "chance, stronger than man," had been against. The Sicilian experience had been bad enough; certainly he, Plato, had been "enraged"; but what really rankled was that book. Serious men impart wisdom orally, but do not put down, in vulgar writing, the real secrets of their philosophy—play to the vulgar, as it were, by commonplace intelligibility. Why did Dionysius treat "the leading authority on the subject with such disrespect. . . . Does he regard my doctrines as worthless? . . . If so, he will be in conflict with many, vastly more competent than he, who maintain the opposite."

Plato, who once had regarded democratic politics as cheap, now tends to regard all politics as contemptible compared with speculation about eternal, other-worldly truth. It is an interesting comment that his followers became sceptics. Here, indeed, was what Nietzsche called the degeneration. Perhaps Plato misconceived the nature of his own Academy. Existing to broaden exact knowledge, when current politics failed to fit the Academy's prescriptions, Plato turned away in disgust from objective experience itself. However, Speusippos, the botanist, succeeded him.

11

The old man is dead, twenty-two centuries ago, and, unlike the Pharaohs, we do not know where he is buried. But an odd thing has happened. Human nature does not die and precisely his love of abstract truth about that nature has saved him. The old problems have all come round again. The old answers are still true. Eugenics, nudism, abortion, feminism, communism, proletarian democracy, division of labour, class war, scientific *expertise*—all the problems are here. The Platonic vision grows again—some will think, far from pleasant, too like a Brave New World. But it insists again, as in the old days, on our answer to its Socratic queries. . . . "The Divine Plato"—Fascist, Communist . . . what?

The differences are, of course, great. It goes without saying. The world, in the beginning, was theological; and Plato also is a theologian —whereas the sense for theology, perhaps thanks to lack of attention to the meaning of ideas, the thinking of thought, has departed from us. Or perhaps our theologies are now "practical" and political, our demigods are boss politicians. (If so, the same thing happened in Rome —Marius, Sulla, Catiline, Julius and the rest—not so long after Plato died.) (Plato obstinately tried to solve the problems of politics in terms of the small, intensive polis, not the cosmopolis. Even the internationalism that he knew, he ignored; and foreign affairs he overlooked to his cost.)

(He is the Philosopher of the Intensive Community—a completed society in which there is "community of pleasures and pains." It is precisely the functions of the intensive community which today, nationalists or cosmopolitan-minded, we ignore at a cost to our culture and happiness.) In brief, let us be careful lest our criticism of Plato does not amount to this, that he is more modern and civilized than ourselves —that, in the grand cycle of history, we have not yet caught up with him, even if we be materially on the spiral ring above him. (At least he has left us, as a challenge, with his scheme plainly set forth of the Just Society. Social Justice—on which individual justice depends—seems to require functionalization and authority; authority in turn demands discipline and obedience; willing obedience demands cultural and social homogeneity—which excludes universality and internationalism. A wrong solution, perhaps. But where?)

Is it perhaps that the task of philosophy and science is not to provide cultural homogeneity, quickly through myths, to small communities, but by exploring facts to provide it slowly for a whole world—to create an international culture centred on assured, non-mythical knowledge? The task may be to invite all to understand, rich or poor, who will. Is this the New Academy that can save our civilization from the contemporary anarchy and civil war that Plato would have pointed out to us? Did Plato ever create anything that more truly expressed himself than his Academy—and do we not better find him here, questing for mathematico-political truth, than in Syracuse, fusing theory and Sicilian practice? Is there any such institution functioning today? Perhaps my friend Dr. Flexner's Institute of Advanced Studies, aided by a great mathematician, Einstein, alone can make a claim. I should think the responsibility of feeling that the world pivots on him must well-nigh crush him. At least this, I suggest, emerges: that if Plato was at all right, then we too must have, in order

to focus and integrate our civilization (a civilization of more than the polis; cosmopolitan), an Academy—a World Academy.

The genius of Plato, the technocrat, has been such that men have preferred to treat him as a god—to assert that no letter of his can be genuine unless it reads like one of the Pauline Epistles—in order not to admit the applicability to themselves of his queries. But still the Socratic voice is urgent—has become, after Dark and Middle and Liberal Ages, again urgent. And, first, why not an Academy? (It is a theme to which Comte* reverts.)

At least, until the tale of human civilization is made up, as Meleager, of Gadara, wrote (A.D. 60):

> The Golden Bough of Plato, in all ways Divine,
> [Is] guide through the Universe for Good and Wise,
> Light that by its own virtue cannot cease to shine.

Perhaps not so good or wise. On that it may be that the assessment of two millennia will enable us to form a judgement.

READING

Plato: *The Republic* (ed. Jowett), Books IV–V, 441–473.

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE

*Ernest Barker: *Greek Political Theory, Plato and His Predecessors*, 1918.
J. Burnet: *The Greek Philosophers, Thales to Plato*, 1914.

* *Cf.* p. 746.

Chapter III

Aristotle

1

TEN years after the death of Plato, in 347 B.C., Philip of Macedon, at Chaeronea, defeated the Athenians. An epoch of international empire was to begin which differed from its Chinese, Assyrian and Persian predecessors in this, that it included, within its sweep, the history of a vital part of Europe. The vision of internationalism, of the world-empire, was never again to fade from the scene until 1815 when Napoleon Bonaparte, would-be Caesar and once crowned Emperor in the presence of the oecumenical Pope, sailed for St. Helena. Our own days have seen its revival.

The Macedonians, occupying the fringes of what is today Bulgaria, were not promising paladins of a world-culture. Greeks by dialect, still living in the Homeric age in their manners, no man sat down at their feasts until he had killed a boar, or removed the cord he wore round his waist until *il a tué son homme*—he had killed his man. Assassination, it should be added, was almost a normal incident of the Macedonian court. However, the courtiers were conscious of the deficiencies in manners of their countrymen. The Macedonian kings, flattered to be admitted within the ambit of Greek affairs, were striving hard after culture. Euripides paid them the tribute of dying in their capital city. They took professional advisers from Hellas proper. Such was a Hellene from the small island of Stagira, the court physician to Amyntas II, King of Macedon, Philip's father. The physician's son, Aristotle, became tutor to Philip's heir.

Philip's son was Alexander, whose reputed sarcophagus can still be seen in the Constantinople Museum, but whose dust, as Shakespeare says, may stop a bung-hole. As a pupil he had the disadvantage that he believed himself to be directly descended (like the Mikado) from a god —in this case, Hercules or Herakles. Also, his decision to murder the rightful heir, in order to assume for himself the succession, does not argue docility. A world-conqueror is not an easy pupil—even if, in Alexander's case, the flag probably followed the trade.

ARISTOTLE, the Stagirite (384–322 B.C.), pupil of Plato in Athens from about his seventeenth to his thirty-seventh year, had then no lighter problem with his pupil than Plato had with the Younger Dionysius. Aristotle, having left Athens on Plato's death and spent three years teaching in Assos, on the Asia Minor coast, must have been about forty-one when he left for Macedonia to take on this work. His success, however, was greater perhaps because his method was less exacting. After Confucius, Aristotle is the supreme apostle of Common Sense and of the Golden Mean. Even virtue, even culture, might be excessive. Living in the post-Peloponnesian War age as it slips from class war into dictatorship, enthusiasm is for Aristotle an ill, a plague, to which men of balance will not succumb.

Aristotle went his way, analyzing the theory of the only culture that seemed to him to matter, that of the polis—even if the Age of the Polis was over and the Athenian polity a museum specimen. He left to Alexander without censure the job of becoming Lord of the World, *i.e.*, of the barbarians, as no concern of a cultured man. Not that he was without interest. His late treatise, *On Colonies*, suggests to Alexander the dangers of promiscuous race-mixture; opposes Alexander's attempts at race-equalization; and maintains the theory that Greeks should be governed by constitutional measures, but that non-Greeks may perhaps be best ruled, as they are accustomed, despotically as lesser breeds. Chiefly, however, he occupied himself in collecting together all available scientific information. He preferred the truth that could be stabilized by a fact. The chair of Plato he, Plato's greatest pupil, left to others; and, after a sojourn in Assos and in Macedon, he founded his own rival school, the Lyceum, in Athens, where he and his followers—the Peripatetics—walked and talked. However, there is authority for the statement that Aristotle was the only one of Plato's pupils pertinaciously to sit out the public readings, by the master, of the *Phaedo*.

The Peripatetics were practical men. The scientific life, Aristotle taught, was better than that of its only serious rival, the life of practical politics. But speculation must not turn its back on or lose touch with practice. Aristotle's whole career and his missions for his friend Hermias, ruler of Atarneus on the coast of Asia Minor, to Macedon illustrate his attitude. Incidentally, then, Aristotle was a practising politician. Shocking although it may seem to the scholarly mind, Aristotle clearly entertained the ambition of exercising practical political influence. He was not an academic hack who, "being unable to do, taught." The psychological character studies, however, of

his pupil, Theophrastus and his *History of Plants*, the 158 histories of *Constitutions*, of which Aristotle himself had set the model in his *Constitution of Athens*—these were what mattered.

Plato, if a technocrat, was also by temperament no little of a theologian; Aristotle, in his later years, not at all. Later critics said that he was a materialist. Anyhow his First Cause had the quality of the necessary limit of an argument, more than of an Almighty Creator. The cardinal Aristotelian doctrine of the eternity of the universe rather perhaps argues that universe's deification, "the great and visible God," subject to the supreme, transcendent form, the Unmoved Mover, and supplemented by those strange Aristotelian beings, the souls of the stars. The history of Aristotle's development, alike in Ethics and in Metaphysics, is one of movement towards empiricism and objective study and away from the ideal, a priori theological view of his early years in the Platonic Academy. In the end, Persian or Magian star-worship is one of the few residues left over, now that the transcendental Platonic real harmonies or Pythagorean mystic numbers, the mathematical "essences"—the ideas—have been criticized out of existence . . . this, and worship of the remote Unmoved Mover, beyond the furthest empyrean, or perhaps the worship of not *one* but *many* "movers of the spheres." In the final phase of his development even the star-souls became detached from his system of physics; and Aristotle stands out as an entire empiric and complete non-theologian. The relapse into theology, on his death, with the Stoics is almost immediate.

Greek philosophy is no native or autochthonous growth. Aristotle, like his master, Plato, is an admitted admirer of Egyptian wisdom—Egypt with which Hellas was in constant commercial contact. Aristotle's second successor, Strato, the physicist, established touch with Alexandria, of which the great Museum became the intellectual capital of the Western World. Aristotle, further, aided by Philip of Opus, was a keen student of the Babylonish or Magian science, and his tendency to star-worship as well as many of his theories in physics may well derive directly therefrom.

Finally, the wisdom of Zoroaster (Zarathustra, ca. 660–583 B.C.), the Persian, with his dualistic doctrine of the two fighting principles of Good and Evil, Light and Darkness, is specifically referred to by Plato in the *Laws*. He is generously placed by Aristotle 6,000 years before Plato; influences Plato's doctrine of good and bad world-souls; and determines Aristotle's doctrine of historical cycles, ending in physical catastrophe. It is no exaggeration to say that, for a while, in the Academy Zoroastrianism was the vogue—the new discovery.

The self-hypnotizing theory of periods of ruin of civilization and of degeneration (later redeveloped, in a small way, by Spengler) comes from this quarter; and the thesis that truth is found, lost and is found again. It is perhaps of no small importance that Europe thus early tended to accept (although this tendency was intensified by Christianity) the fighting dualist, moralist tradition, emphasized also by the Old Testament, and not the pacifist, pantheist, monistic tradition of India and of Buddhism.

Greek thought at this time was as intoxicated by the results of astronomical discoveries (due to Babylonian data) as, two millennia later, European thought was by the mathematical discoveries of Descartes and by the physical discoveries of Newton. It is important to bear in mind this preoccupation of the great Greeks with the wisdom of the East. Human culture is continuous. The grain of our minds today still tends to be set by the hypotheses of the Persian Zoroaster and of the Babylonish priests.

Aristotle was the greatest of the Encyclopaedists of learning—and the first. Astronomy, natural history, obstetrics, metaphysics, economics, ethics, politics, rhetoric and the fine arts, the first text-book on logic—nothing came amiss. What he did not do with his own hand, he allocated to his school. Such allocated works probably were the little treatise on economics, and many of the studies of constitutions. Research workers gathered these from Corinth and Sparta, even from Carthage and from Byzantium. The master was the organizer of research. Occasionally Alexander the conqueror, in India or the Middle East, would remember to send a rock or a mineral to add to the natural history collection. In return treatises were prepared for him, as a gift, *On Monarchy*, after his accession, and *On Colonies*. Alexander, however, had also other uses. Aristotle, born in small Stagira, with *entrée* to the Macedonian court, resident in the cultural centre of Hellas, Athens, was in a happy position for a many-angled, detached scientific outlook in politics. But practical politics are never detached. The Athenians, for good reason, did not love the Macedonians, And he, whom Dante later called "the Master of Them That Know"—he who was, throughout the Middle Ages, *tout court* "the Philosopher," depended for his secure residence in Athens upon the influence of Alexander and of his viceroy, Antipater. The master was also the *protégé*. Alexander dead, Aristotle, suspect in Athens as a member of the Macedonian faction, the "internationalists," ended his life as an exile.

We have a few letters attributed to Aristotle. We have a few fragments of poems—one beginning, "Daughter of a mother blessed with fair offspring." On his own telling, he was no lover of the sea and

no traveller like Plato. Vain, concerned with the arrangement of his hair, tending to baldness, lisping, spindle-legged and fond of wearing rings is the description of him by one biographer. But it is difficult to resist the belief that, like writers of lesser works, when Aristotle wishes to sketch his hero he is not innocent of a side-glance at himself. And there is no reason to suppose irony when he sketches his *megalopsuchos aner*—his "man of personality"—in the lectures on *Ethics* dedicated to (or, better, edited by) his illegitimate son, Nichomachos.

Moreover, he is not a man to incur little risk, nor does he court danger, because there are but few things he has a value for, but he will incur great dangers, and when he does venture he is prodigal of his life as knowing that there are terms on which it is not worth his while to live. He is the sort of man to do kindnesses but he is ashamed to receive them. . . . Further, it is characteristic of the large minded man to ask favours not at all, or very reluctantly, but to do a service very readily; and to bear himself loftily towards the great or fortunate, but towards people of middle station affably; . . . And again, not to put himself in the way of honour, nor to go where others are the chief men; and to be remiss and dilatory, except in the case of some great honour or work; and to be concerned in few things, and these great and famous. It is a property of him also to be open, both in his dislikes and likings (because concealment is a consequence of fear) Likewise to be careful for reality rather than appearance, and talk and act openly (for his contempt for others makes him a bold man, for which same reason he is apt to speak the truth, except when the principle of reserve comes in), but to be reserved towards the generality of men. And to be unable to live with reference to any other but a friend; because doing so is servile, as may be seen in that all flatterers are low and men in low estate are flatterers. Neither is his admiration easily excited . . . nor does he bear malice, since remembering anything, and especially wrongs, is no part of large mindedness, but rather overlooking them; nor does he talk of other men; in fact he will not speak either of himself or of any other; he neither cares to be praised himself nor to have others blamed; nor does he praise freely, and for this reason he is not apt to speak ill even of his enemies except to show contempt. . . . Also slow motion, deep voice and deliberate style of speech are thought to be characteristic of the large minded. For he who is in earnest about few things is not likely to be in a hurry nor he who esteems nothing great to be very intent. And sharp tones and quickness are the result of these.

It appears to be a prescription for an extraordinarily unpopular character and, therefore (it might be argued), for a bad citizen. At best, it is a description of a hero in one of Disraeli's novels. This type of aristocratic dandy has marked characteristics that are qualities of Renaissance man. Tact is obviously a quality heavily at a discount—

almost immoral. Aristotle, however, apparently admired this type; and one of the most famous men that the human species has hitherto produced is presumably entitled to his own moral judgement, especially when he writes as a professional moralist. If, of course, he is right, most of modern civilization, with its democratic standards, is servile and wrong. How admiration for this T. E. Lawrence-Lindbergh type fits in with his general notions on civilization we shall see later.

Diogenes Laertius reports a rumour that Plato said, "Aristotle spurns me, as colts kick out at the mother who bore them." About his bitter difference with other students of the Academy, antiquity had no doubt. The feud lasted for three centuries in endless malicious gossip among the learned. However, towards Plato himself, Aristotle seems to have entertained a respect not inconsistent with increasing intellectual disagreement. After the master's death, this amounts to conscious opposition and the revision of Aristotle's work takes place in this spirit. However, "Socrates'" discoveries are referred to as always exhibiting "grace, originality and thought." In brief, Plato's work was poetry. In a votive offering dedicated to Eudemus, Aristotle describes Plato.

> He piously set up an altar of holy Friendship
> For the man whom it is not lawful for bad men even to praise,
> Who alone or first of mortals clearly revealed,
> By his own life and by the methods of his words,
> How a man becomes good and happy at the same time,
> Now no one can ever attain to these things again.

Apart from the pessimism of the disjunction of goodness and happiness, and the tribute to the divine Plato, the inscription is also interesting for the line about "the bad men." One suspects (as does his recent commentator, Werner Jaeger) that these were Aristotle's critics, the other Platonists. Still the *odium academicum*—academic jealousy—burned on, even in the tribute. What is also interesting is the length of Aristotle's period of tutelage to Plato and the lateness of the great philosopher's own development.

2

The writings of Aristotle, as we have them, are in a sharply different category from those of Plato. The elder philosopher appears to have sufficiently shared the ancient hieratic or priestly attitude to have objected to reducing to writing the inner core of his doctrine. He speaks of writing, if at all, in riddles. We shall find the same attitude

in the Gospels, with their dark sayings and private instruction to the disciples. Hence what we have of Plato's are his literary writings and no lecture notes have come down to us. The tradition of the Academy was exclusive. On the contrary, at the Lyceum, outside the gate of Diochares, under Mount Lycabettus, Aristotle seems to have taught freely, for thirteen years, to all who would be "peripatetic" with him.

From early catalogues, we know that Aristotle published writings in dialogue form. But none is preserved entire, although sufficient fragments, especially of the dialogue *On Philosophy*, have been discovered to enable us to judge the character of this early work while Aristotle was still under the influence of Platonic idealism and theologism. What we have are, not so much his lecture notes by students (although in the versions of the *Ethics* and in perhaps the *Metaphysics* this may be the case), but his own revision of his notes. The *Politics*, which belongs to Aristotle's middle period (Books II, III, VII, VIII in about 345 B.C.; IV–VI later, after the study of constitutions; Book I added last, as introduction) is of this type. These were not published at the time and, hence, did not exercise their influence until it was too late for them to be effective in the ancient world. The editor was Andronicus, in the first century B.C.

Taken, however, as a whole, few writings in the world have probably had quite such great influence. In part the reasons for this are accidental. The number of scientists who can be so happily born as to come of age just when a science is in its first stages—not to speak of several sciences—must be few. There the Greeks, and above all Aristotle, had the advantage of us. The very terminology that we use in many of these fields—for example, in politics, the terms democracy, aristocracy and the like, as well as politics itself—is Greek. And the definitions that we recall are Aristotle's. Much of Aristotle's work reads familiarly for precisely the same reason that Shakespeare's writings are, as the old lady complained about *Hamlet*, "full of quotations." Moreover—a point we shall stress later—Aristotle, the physician's son, approached the social sciences in the same mood as he approached the natural sciences and gave to their treatment thoroughly empiric characteristics, even if not unsuffused by the Hellenic teleologism.

Further, Aristotle has been a favourite of history. Through translation of his writings, Western Europe in the Middle Ages became reacquainted with Hellenic thought. Emphatically a Greek, although attached to the court of a "semi-barbarian," he had for the unqualified barbarians of the Middle Ages an exotic fascination. From "the

Philosopher" they learned, not only metaphysics, but the beginnings of the civic and secular, as distinct from the churchly attitude in politics. Even on that remote front of time, the Later Middle Ages, Aristotle challenged the Platonists—and defeated them.

The writings have, however, intrinsic and not merely accidental importance of the first order. No Platonist, it has been said, can properly understand an Aristotelian. During his lifetime Aristotle was charged with being disrespectful to his old tutor, Plato. It is not, therefore, astonishing when we find Professor A. E. Taylor saying that "No Aristotelian book is quite so commonplace in its handling of a vast subject as the *Politics*." Professor Taylor is, of course, an eminent metaphysician and his opinion about politics is not a professional one Anyhow it is almost certainly wrong (unless he gives much higher comparative ranking to other Aristotelian books than is general). It is, however, worth noting that the *Politics* may be argued to fall into two sections, one of four books (II, III, VII, VIII [traditional numbering, followed by Jowett]) belonging to the earlier Platonic period and occupied with discussions of the ideal state; and the other, more mature, section of three books (IV–VI) comprising the results of the empiric labour of the last period on the actual historical Constitutions, concerned with methods and disregarding discussion of ultimates.

(The greatest single influence upon political thought—certainly academically and, in derivative fashion, popularly—during the last century and a half has been the revival of Hellenism, with its socialist implications. It permeated Hegel and, through Hegel, both Marx and Fascism. Of this influence a good half was Aristotelian, since it could make a contact with the Protestant individualist tradition which Platonism could not. Ruskin's and Green's belief that the Polis or the State "remains in being for the sake of the *good* life," the basis of much nineteenth-century Social Reform, is Aristotle's explicit teaching.)

(Aristotle is the greatest of Plato's critics. Nevertheless, both being Greeks, both have common assumptions, socialist in character—and in Plato's case carried to the point of opposing the private ownership of property—that would be challenged by a modern individualist. Aristotle's criticism of Plato is more limited in scope than criticism would be today. And it is captious almost to the point of deliberate misunderstanding.)

Probably well before his second stay in Athens (ca. 335–323 B.C.) and even before he became tutor of Alexander (342), in his lost dialogue *On Philosophy*, Aristotle began that repudiation of the Platonic doctrine of pre-existent or real Ideas (*i.e.*, Mind as ultimate reality) and

asserted the eternity of Matter (*materia prima*). In his *Physics* Aristotle develops the notion of substrata or substances, contrary manifestations differing in respect of the substrata by excess or deficiency. Aristotle, however, apparently differs from the later doctrine of Spinoza* by asserting the permanent plurality of substances. Moreover, it is matter that individualizes beings. The significance of this, so far as it concerns us in its connection with the doctrine of the common-sense "middle way" and in its connection with political individualism, we shall see later.†

Rightly or wrongly, Aristotle accused the transcendentalist Plato of asserting ideas or universals to be (*e.g.*, in Mind, here opposed to Matter) entities apart from the particulars which they specify. These points are not negligible, even practically, since the acceptance of Plato's supposed thesis has certain theocratic associations from which Aristotle's empiricism is free. Plato is an idealist to the point of being a priestly mystagogue in politics. Aristotle, as time passes, becomes even less of an idealist, even in political philosophy, and more of a believer in the value of the empirical and instrumental, not the utopian, dogmatic study of the field.

Into Aristotle's peculiar dualism of Form (active structural plan or creative energy—which *might* exist pure) and of Matter ("dead" matter, never discoverable "in the abstract," pure, apart from form) and into the question of whether his notion of the final substrata makes Aristotle really a dualist, a pantheistic materialist (eternity of *materia prima*) or a creative evolutionist by anticipation (immanent form as essence, subject to final cause), it is not our task here to enter. The issue has been considered thus far because Plato thought it important to Politics. Therefore, Aristotle's refutation of this theory is important. We are entitled to suppose cohesion between the metaphysics and the practical doctrine of any first-class philosopher. And, indeed, we are here seeing, in some not insignificant fashion, the antithesis between transcendentalism and immanentism, theology and natural science, papal ecclesiasticism and secular empiricism, dogma and experience, so far as they concern us in politics. These terms will become clearer later.‡ Let us merely say that there is more individualism implicit in

* *Cf.* p. 251.

† *Cf.* p. 286.

‡ In this paragraph I have been compelled to use technical terms which the student of philosophy will recognize but which it would overburden this chapter to explain fully. The reader who is unacquainted with them will find them all in every good dictionary or text-book of philosophy.

Aristotle's philosophy than perhaps even Aristotle himself, being a Hellene, recognized. Towards the end, when the emancipation was complete, it tended to be almost entirely the individual, *the superior individual*, who mattered.)

(Aristotle's criticism of *The Republic* is detailed and not very important. As might be expected, he fastens on the least "common-sense" portions of Plato's work: his communism of property and children. Apart from detecting in Plato's system some remote risks of incest and other practices religiously objectionable, his substantial criticism is that what is everybody's interest is nobody's interest. To which the answer must be: all depends upon the circumstances. Whereas the vulgar criticism of Plato's family communism is that it would mean an orgy of dissipation, Aristotle raises the interesting objection that, whereas the whole responsibility of government is left to be borne on the shoulders of a few, these few are allowed no adequate personal happiness to tempt them, whether as men of property or as family men. For the rest—and here Aristotle strikes nearer the mark—Plato is substituting mathematical uniformity for organic unity. He is, Aristotle asserts, omitting to allow for a variety in life which enriches it. (An old plea for private wealth—enriches whom?) In brief, Plato has carried his plan for an homogeneous society to logical, monastic extremes; and Aristotle turns back to the contemplation of normal, heterogeneous, varied secular society as he finds it.)

3

(Aristotle, in his *Politics*, is the Philosopher of Middle-class Common Sense. The prejudice in favour of this class is hereditary. By middle class is here meant, not the small trader, but that of the middling man of property, the peasant proprietor and the professional man. That class is best—a doctrine to find echo in the nineteenth century and, again, in German National Socialism. It was Aristotle's own class, as the son of a medical practitioner—Aristotle who, incidentally, had married the daughter of a freed slave who had become a local prince. Every polis without exception, he asserts, has in it the very rich, the very poor and the intermediate. He quotes Phokulides:

> The middle clan within the State
> Fares best, I ween;
> May I be neither low nor great
> But e'en between.

Further, the prejudice fitted in with Aristotle's entire philosophy, and

with his famous ethical doctrine, reminiscent of the civil servant, Confucius, of the Golden Mean—"nothing in excess." Such expressions themselves seem to imply a personal, temperamental preference, rationalized into a system. Moreover, it appealed to Aristotle's shrewdness about the practical. This government of a Middle Class, equal and similar, not too low for good culture or too proud for co-operation, could be made to work. It reminds one strikingly of the consistent Aristotle's preference for Hellas as a place to live in, neither too hot and effeminate nor too cold and barbarous—therefore, capable of being demonstrated to be the world's best country.

Aristotle is not laying down rules, he points out, for creatures *e therion e theos*—either beast or god—but for ordinary men. And within this middle group the rule of equity for freemen—"neither to rule nor be ruled"—would be practicable, by the simple expedient of alternative rule, every man having an expectation of being a city councillor in due turn.

The practical Aristotle, confident that Hellas is "over all," does not look beyond the bounds of his own world. As much as Plato, he is the philosopher of the polis. His scientific curiosity leads him to inquire into the constitution of Carthage and to allude to Babylon. But his only discovery there is that Babylon, the great "metropolis," its outer walls 42 miles round,* its population so vast that Cyrus held its walls three days before some of its inhabitants knew, is patently not a "polis"—and, therefore, is merely inferior. As with his contemporary and rival Isocrates, so with Aristotle, it is not to be dreamed that any culture is higher than that of the polis. His pupil, Alexander, did not impress him. Heir of the civilization of a few centuries—no more than that of the United States—he confronted the majestic civilizations of Egypt and Babylon, already in their fifth millennium. And with glorious insolence, from his New World of Athens (or was it Stagira?), he decided that the political doings of the barbarous were, philosophically speaking, of no importance. Incidentally he was right. He gives a passing word of favourable notice to the distinction between the military and agricultural classes in Egypt; and to the institution of common meals by kings in Italy. What alone really mattered in these lands were the notions on physics of the priests and the Pythagoreans.

(*a*) Aristotle is a *conservative*, in the typical Hellenic fashion in which Plato is a conservative. Character depends upon the way in which a man is brought up; morals upon the social *mores*. Hence the

* The inner walls, however, only demarcate a city with diameter of about 2½ miles.

attention which Aristotle, like Plato, gives to education. What should give form to these social *mores* is the tradition of the country, sacred legal traditions or constitutions, unwritten laws (*nomoi*), not subject to change as are the mere regulations or popular votes (*psephismata*) passed in some citizen assembly on the impetus and general will of the moment. Here then lies the interpretation of the great phrase that there must be a rule of laws rather than of men. It is neither constitutional, in the American sense, nor anthropological in Montesquieu's sense—as we shall later see*—but traditional and almost religious, familial and ritualistic. Socrates' old faith holds true also for Aristotle, that the citizen is the child of his fatherland, owing reverence and eschewing all impious radical change of the basic, sacred laws of the forefathers.

The philosopher is not only a conservative but the member of a slave-owning civilization, himself a slave-owner. The comparison between classical slavery—where the slaves were usually Mediterranean peoples and sometimes Hellenes, war-captives—and negro slavery, to the advantage of the former, has often been made. It is not especially convincing—least of all where principles are concerned. The clauses of Aristotle's will governing the treatment of his slaves, and the emancipation of some of them, show him to have been a peculiarly humane man; and his alliance with a concubine or mistress after the death of his wife, of whom he is said to have been excessively fond, is not such as to indicate class prejudice. Aristotle, however, having very properly begun his *Politics* by an excursus in anthropology, displays no doubt that slavery is not only an immemorial custom of the human race but that it is an entirely justifiable one.

In his justification of slavery he uses the now familiar functional argument, already used by Plato. Brawn must serve brain. (Oddly enough, Aristotle does not apply this maxim when discussing the relations of men and women, where he is far more conventional than Plato.) Mere brawn is no more than "an animated instrument," a "hand," that is, a human machine.

The habits of Greek philosophic thought, especially Platonic (and the early Aristotle), with its talk of "ideas," "forms" and "species," tended to obscure the question, "brain for what?" I do not think, however, that Aristotle's answer even to this question is obscure. I have already mentioned the Soviet biologist who, at the time of the Stakhanovist movement, asserted that masses of men, *Lumpenproletariat*, were, biologically speaking, followers and slaves by nature and would so remain. Aldous Huxley has indicated (if not agreed with)

* *Cf.* p. 302.

the same argument, although the characters in his tale are preoccupied with how to condition the slaves to their chains and to make a follower prefer to be a follower. There is nothing in Aristotle to indicate that he would have viewed with disapproval either argument. "These persons are natural slaves and for them as truly as for the body or for animals a life of subjection is advantageous." The only thing that troubles him is that there are slaves in law as well as slaves by nature and that some who are slaves in law are not such by nature. Aristotle here is a progressive, an abolitionist. He notices the argument that superior force implies some strong (= good) quality (comforting doctrine: that the slaves or poor are really vicious); but he yet concludes that slavery, unjustified by nature, has no superior claim to respect than mere force. It leaves him with a residue of embarrassment from which he is unable to free himself.

Aristotle, indeed, vacillates between the treatment of the polis as the theatre of a play of social forces and as the matrix of the good life, between politics as a matter of purpose (as in the earlier books) and as a matter of anthropology and of historical means (as in the later books). This issue between the politics of the ideal and the politics of power, unsolved by Aristotle, save in terms of tension, remains unsolved to this day. Historically, the Greeks found their solution in flight from actual civic life, with its problems of power and whether the good man could always be a good citizen or every man in a harmoniously working polis be a "superior man." Men found refuge in flight, into the personal good life, in increased self-consciousness, in the route of individualistic philosophy, in the morality of the good will; and, then, in the individualist approach to a salvation which, during the Catholic period, still retained community sense and, during the Protestant period, did not. It is a route from which Western civilization is now in reaction, vainly trying to forget self-consciousness in totalitarianism.

In another direction, however, Aristotle proposes to go disconcertingly further than the slave-owners. Some men are quite servile, "only so far a rational being as to be able to understand reason, without himself possessing it"; others are still only partly cultured. And—as is to happen in later ages—Aristotle proposes to make distinctions of degrees of freedom. Many even of those who may be free and not slaves, have yet not the leisure or culture to be full citizens. Aristotle, therefore, briskly lumps in, for certain purposes, with the classical equivalent of the negroes, all traders, shopkeepers and small business men. "The fact is that we cannot regard all who are indispensable to the existence of the State as being citizens." The *hauteur* with which this

friend of the drinking, fighting Lord of the World deals with his fellow mortals takes one's breath away. His theme substantially is one that we shall meet again, with the decline of Christianity, *e.g.*, in George Bernard Shaw—that what matters is civilization, not men; culture, not humanity.

It is interesting to speculate what his judgement would have been upon a world in which, on high matters of public policy, the press headlines the opinions of film stars and singers. That this is the final self-exposure of the pretensions of democracy, in a degeneration heralding tyranny, would probably have been the comment. It is yet arguable that a civilization is impoverished that cannot accommodate a Chaplin or a Toscanini, and that these are entitled, as artists, to take the headlines, even in their opinions on morals and politics about which their public is interested—not to wait for the verdict of an Areopagus of Aristotles. The public, of course, feels that it knows intimately a Robert Taylor and naturally wants, as a matter of "human interest," his opinion on peace, war and philosophy of life rather than that of John Dewey. Moreover, in the present position of philosophy, the odds are that other philosophers would hold Dewey wrong anyway. The public might as well, therefore, listen to Coughlin or Taylor. Like all Greeks Aristotle overestimates the importance of intelligence—especially technical intelligence in politics as against the opinion of the empty amateurs who command publicity. The contemporary moral is that the expert must command publicity: the Philosopher who would be a King must first get a Goebbels and be a pressman. Aristotle draws the opposite conclusion: that the amateur and advertiser must be suppressed. Plato recommended a concentration camp.

It is neither frivolous nor trivial to point out that no one has yet worked out a philosophy of the press; and that, in so far as the great Greeks make any contribution in this matter, it is, almost entirely, implicitly hostile to the freedom of the press as a matter of commercial enterprise. The publicity men, as the crossing sweeps of popular tyranny, would be put down into a very humble place. In that, I suggest, the great Greeks were not only undemocratic, but unimaginative and wrong. Their good taste got in their way, and their arrogance. As Hobbes later was to comment, "learning is small power"—but publicity is an instrument of power, which those who will the end must use as means. The public can only grasp a certain number of ideas and personalities at once. The booking list for immortality in the reserved stalls of history is already longer than most men can carry in their heads.

The successful business man, especially by speculation, is Aristotle's bête noire. Here he anticipates the French eighteenth-century school of Physiocrats.* The dutiful farmer who grows crops genuinely increases the country's wealth. The man who gets money in return for industry has earned it. Even when got in return for disposing in the market of the bounty of nature, it corresponds to real wealth. But money made of loaning other money at interest is artificial wealth—the owner is richer by speculation; but nothing has been put into the world that can be touched or seen, in return for these riches. The alleged social function of stock exchange and "curb exchange," even in the embryonic form in which they were then known as the money-lender, is disregarded. Also, since money is fluid, unlike land or industries, such a man has no stake in the country. Aristotle tends to regard him as potentially a bad citizen. Speculation is an artificial and unhealthy activity which should be checked (as Social Credit writers hold today) by criminal law. That "unseen services" may be rendered in connection with the organization of exchange, Aristotle ignores. His theory on speculation or usury had immense influence because it became the basis of the regulation of interest and capitalism embodied—and still embodied—in the Canon Law of the Catholic Church.

If Aristotle had been confronted with the theory of the function of exchanges, presumably his reply would have been that the free exchange is not indispensable and in a conservative, rural society may not even be desirable, since it may interfere with the economic symmetry of the local society; and, further, that much speculation in fact finds no justification in terms of even this social function.

(*b*) Aristotle is a *democrat.* The statement is challenging after what has been said. It has appeared that Aristotle's major and temperamental fault is the possession of far too low an opinion of the intelligence of man as man, negro as well as white, barbarian as well as Greek. When, however, we make allowance for Aristotle's prejudice against all who live by working for profit and we exclude from the politically active workers what Marx was later to call the *Lumpenproletariat,* we cannot fairly deny to Aristotle this title—although he, for reasons of terminology which we shall discuss later, would have repudiated it himself. He is not a proletarian or majority democrat or a believer in the *functionless,* as distinct from the *classless,* society. But he is a liberal democrat as against any dictatorship, even of the proletariat. He is a bitter enemy of all stress on the division of the community into classes pursuing primarily their class interest. He is

* *Cf.* p. 370.

yet quite free from Plato's hieratic and hierarchic tendencies. He would give every peasant owner full citizenship. And if (unlike Plato) he excludes women, so does the great, progressive French Republic which is usually, although technically falsely, called a democracy.

Far from distrusting the judgement of the "common man," within an electorate thus drastically but not capriciously limited, Aristotle constitutes himself his defender.)

It is possible that the Many, of which each individual is not a man of talent, are still collectively superior to the few best persons. . . . As the total number is large, it is possible that each has a fractional share of virtue and prudence. . . . It is thus that the Public is a better judge than the critics even of musical and poetical compositions; for some judge one part, some another, and all of them collectively the whole. . . . According to this [opponent's] theory then it is inadvisable to entrust the masses with final authority either in electing officers of State or in holding them responsible. It is probable, however, that there is some mistake in this mode of argument, partly—unless the character of the masses is absolutely slavish—for the reason already alleged, that, although individually they are worse judges than the experts, yet in their collective capacity they are better or at least as good, and partly because there are some subjects on which the artist himself is not the sole or best judge, *viz.*, all subjects in which the results produced are open to the legitimate criticism of persons who are not masters of the art. Thus it is not the builder alone whose function it is to criticize the merits of a house; the person who uses it, *i.e.*, the householder, is actually a better judge, and similarly a pilot is a better judge of a helm than a carpenter or one of the company of a dinner than the cook (*Politics* III, xi.)

Aristotle here is open to the academic criticism that he appears to think that many bad judgements and tastes added together make a good judgement and taste. But, as is his custom, he has safeguarded himself by excluding those below a certain standard of culture. And he is not discussing the Executive Council. With common sense he allows for the eccentricity and departmentalism of experts—and his argument comes to be an embroidery on the old theme that he who wears the shoe can best tell where it pinches.

Sound judgement, however, is not divorceable from practical experience. It is clear that Aristotle attaches the highest importance to this direct experience of the responsibility of rule:

The virtue of a citizen may be defined as a practical acquaintance, both as ruler and subject, with the rule characteristic of a free community.

To put it in other words, everybody who is competent to vote ought to

have a chance in life of being a town councillor and learning what government means. Similarly every tax-imposer should be a tax-payer.

(c) Aristotle is a *socialist.** He was this as was every Greek brought up in the strong civic tradition of the polis whose claims invaded every field of life, religion, business and family. Socialism is, of course, not inconsistent with the deepest, even feudal, conservatism. In the economic field we have already commented on Aristotle's bias in favour of the regulation of wealth and suppression by law of capitalist (*i.e.*, interest-taking) developments. But he was a socialist whose socialism was heavily modified by aristocracy and by an ethical individualism whose implications he scarcely perceived himself. Marx, as will become apparent, would have met with his vigorous disapproval as an apostle of political perversion. The extent, however, and limitations of Aristotle's socialism will become apparent when we inspect his actual scheme of political and social organization.

Characteristically he discusses types of polity, not necessarily best absolutely and in theory, but practically and under the circumstances. And his discussion turns not on the type of society that illustrates Social Justice but upon the type of society calculated actually to conduce to Man's Happiness. Aristotle, the moralist, is unable to divorce his discussion of politics from the prior issue: What does man want of life? "It is plain that the best polity is necessarily the system under which everybody can do best and live happily." Even in his later, empiric years, when he revises his thesis in politics (or his notes), he is content to leave this earlier treatment untampered with.

If the answer be happiness, what do we mean by happiness? Here Aristotle has the courage to admit that one constituent of the conditions of happiness is Chance, *i.e.*, the accidental presence of external goods. It was a conclusion from which, as we shall see—and it was of the first importance for civilization—most of his successors revolted with unhappy results. Happiness, however, is not only or chiefly my material happiness here and now with a good (material) standard of living. Aristotle tends to ignore the extent to which this material standard for the masses is the pre-condition of their spiritual independence and personality—nor indeed, as a Hellene, is he too fond of abstract independence. The concept rather is artistic [*cf.* Goethe] —and there are authorities, he reminds readers, on taste. Happiness is "an energy of spirit well directed" ("according to virtue") "in a complete life." The best life, whether for each individual separately or for the Polis collectively, is one which possesses virtue, furnished

* The terms Socialist, Communist, etc., are more precisely defined on pp. 557–558.

with external advantages to such a degree as to be capable of actions according to virtue." This theory of "virtue," as well as happiness, depending upon certain external conditions has somewhat sinister implications which we shall consider later.*

Happiness, however, also depends upon nature, habit and reason. Habit and the use of reason depend, again, upon education. Accidental animal happiness is . . . animal. Education, properly considered, involves the entire environment and nurture of the man as individual, social being and citizen—and, hence, the constitution of the Polis in which he lives. In all this Aristotle's answer is characteristically Greek, and the approach is that which Plato had taken before him. Let us first consider the political organization which Aristotle regards as desirable.

4

Political constitutions Aristotle, following a precedent set in one place by Plato, holds can be placed in categories according to the two principles of number and of quality.

All governments may be divided according to whether they are by the one, the few or the many. They may be cross-divided by whether they are government "for the benefit of the community" or "for the benefit of the governing class." The latter group is stigmatized as perverted. We thus get the classification: Sound forms—Monarchy, Aristocracy, Polity; Perverted forms—Tyranny, Oligarchy, Democracy. The hall-mark of Aristocracy is virtue; of Oligarchy, wealth; of Democracy, freedom. The Democrat believes that "persons, if equal in any respect, are equal absolutely"; the Oligarch believes that "persons, if unequal to others in a single respect, are wholly unequal." It is this issue that is the chief single cause of revolution. Mass numbers are the strength of a Democracy; discipline of an Aristocracy. Whereas Plato, with his theocratic leanings, is clear that Monarchy—government by the one best, if discoverable—is theoretically the most desirable and Tyranny the *corruptio optimae pessima*, the worst form, Aristotle is not sure that a monarchic form, which excludes "subjects" or "flock" from a share in the responsibilities of supreme rulership, is politically masculine or healthy.

Of more importance are Aristotle's views on Democracy and Tyranny. It will be noted that Democracy is listed among the perverted forms of constitution. The question-begging name of Polity or Constitutionalism is selected for the sound form, where the many

* *Cf.* p. 99.

exercise sovereignty for the benefit of the whole, *i.e.*, democracy as generally understood today, but in a mixed constitution which allows for degrees of quality. It is not, however, obvious that the actual will of the majority—Rousseau tended to assume this—must be the general or real will of the whole. Here is that issue of the morality of Minority Rights that is to vex us for two millennia. It is worth while to repeat that Aristotle, like Plato, lived his life against a background of conscious class war. The Marxist school today would deny that there was any *one* community and would assert that difference of class was substantively deeper than unity of country. As against a superficial bourgeois concept of democracy, it would assert the claim of a proletarian democracy which, in order to attain the true community of a classless society, must pass through the phase of the dictatorship of the proletariat during which non-proletarian sections, resisting assimilation, must be liquidated. Aristotle, in his age, was faced with democratic [Athenian] and oligarchic [Spartan] "fronts," each with their foreign alliances. Democratic government, in the sense in which he condemns it as "perverted," is specifically government *by* the free proletariat *for* the proletariat.

Is there not a flaw in Aristotle's assumptions? Are we not entitled to say that the majority is empowered to settle what is the good of the community? Therefore, when the majority governs according to its *own* will and for its *own* good it governs in accordance with the will and for the good of the community—since it itself is alone competent to decide that will and good. There will of course always be minorities dissentient against the law: such men are criminals. Aristotle's response would appear to be that it is dishonest to confound a minority, protesting against iniquity by natural standards, with criminals who have offended against law, not only conventional, voted as *psephismata* [popularly voted regulations], but *nomoi* [constitutional laws] fundamental, traditional and even natural. And, although Aristotle shifts his interpretation of "natural" from his early one as the rational type to his later one of the empiric norm, this does not affect his attitude, as a scientist, to temporary "sovereign" decisions. Further, it is *not* the case that the majority is competent alone to decide upon the will and good of the community, since it may well be that the more intelligent—by any natural, impartial criterion—and more rational are part of the minority. In that case, rationally the minority, and not the majority, would have the better right in equity to decide upon the good of the community. And it is cardinal to the argument that Aristotle asserts the historical existence of a real community as well as postulating its

ideal need. Equality is an equitable principle. But, then, what does equality mean?

(Equality is to render equal things to the equal and unequal things to the unequal.)

A Labour Party may then rule, truly constitutionally, for the rational benefit of the whole community. Or it may rule as a group dictatorship for the benefit of, *e.g.*, weekly wage-earners, and without consideration of those who have small investments or plots of land. If so, as a proletarian democracy, it is a perverted form. *Supposing* that men have a *rational* right to small investments or to their own plot of land, then it is unequal to refuse to render them their share in the community goods or to liquidate them—as it is patently unfair for oligarchs or tyrants to do the same at the expense of the sections *they* exclude. This rational equality may of course be overruled by force. But mere force does not always reside with democrats any more than always with oligarchs.

But what reply can be made if it be asserted that no one can be impartial about the "reasonable" or rational rights of others, and that the issue is merely one of which section of society will be better organized for fighting the issue out? It is not enough to comment that a rational man can have no moral interest in the issue of such a fight. An active, ethical thesis is here maintained: that what matters is the power to apply force. That thesis Aristotle is still Platonist enough to repudiate. The fight itself—the class war or *stasis*—Aristotle unequivocably condemns as a damage to the community and to good morality. About the moral damnability of gratuitous stirrers up of *stasis* Aristotle and Plato are entirely at one. But how then shall the democrats stir their followers to adequate fighting resentment against the oligarchs? How shall they resist them, without class consciousness?

Is, then, Aristotle not in fact an oligarch or a plutocrat or—to use, in a loose sense,* modern terminology—like Plato, just a Fascist? Does he not speak of nobility as ancestral wealth and virtue, and add that virtue is rare? In view, however, of his expressed and high-handed attitude to the claims of private wealth, the charge of being a plutocrat may be dismissed. That of being a friend of rule by a traditional, middle class is far more serious. In objecting to *stasis* is not Aristotle objecting to those changes that can only come by force? And if so is he not a conservative, an oligarch, ready in fact (whatever the theory) to accept the oligarchic interpretation—the "upper-class"

* *Cf.*, however, p. 51.

interpretation—of what "the good of the community" is? Or a Fascist? Does his stress on the unity of the polis amount to more than this? Or is he discussing an ideal polis, and have the relations between the ideal and the actual (with its consequences for the theory of unconditional political obedience) never been satisfactorily settled by him? Probably not.

In an unsatisfactory criticism of the *Laws*, Aristotle complains that Plato here finds his "second-best" constitution in something between democracy and oligarchy. Aristotle, against this, desires some aristocratic form after the Lacedaemonian or Spartan model. To be frank, Sparta—although both complain of its militarism—had a fatal fascination for both philosophers. So far the charge would seem to be proven, and even the charge of Fascism is tenable. Certainly it is no great reservation to point out that Aristotle recognized that the relation between Spartiate and helot, with its Terror, was a source of weakness, and even military weakness, in that constitution. Here surely was an oligarchy at its worst morally, if not at its most corrupt—suffering perpetually from the evil of class war or *stasis*, which the Athenians set out to exploit for their own political ends. We are left with the passages, which are perhaps the crux of the whole matter, where Aristotle asks (but does not answer) the question whether, in some corrupt community, it is possible for a "good citizen," *i.e.*, law-abiding, to be a good man. It is the old issue, restated, of Sophocles' *Antigone*.* It is Aristotle's weakness that he did *not* radically answer this.

Aristotle's own treatment is academic and unhelpful; and turns on his belief that a "virtuous man" (*n.b.*, the Greek *aretē*, like Italian *virtù* = "virtue" *or* "talent") is a "superior man," whereas not all citizens can be superior men.

> It is clearly possible to be a virtuous citizen without possessing the virtue characteristic of a virtuous man. . . . The functions proper to people of this description [servile work] are not such as should be learned by any good man. . . . The fact is that we cannot regard all who are indispensable to the existence of the State as being [full and active] citizens . . . the subject may be compared to a flute-maker and the ruler to a flute-player who uses the instrument.†

Not until the coming of Christianity and monasticism, following the Cynics and Stoics, was dignity assigned to manual (menial) labour, and

* *Cf.* p. 25.
† *Cf.* p. 720.

the distinction denied between those necessary to culture and those who shared in it.* Aristotle's discussion "dates." It is that of a writer of the slave age, not of the machine age. Its relevance lies only in the doubt whether third-class minds, in *any* economic strata, can share directively in a first-class culture—a doubt to which Aristotle, as also Plato, had an answer. The answer was "no." The wealthy, added Plato, frequently had third-class minds.

Discussion whether Plato, the Communist, and Aristotle can intelligibly be called Fascists is best deferred until we have analyzed Fascism.† Crude comparisons easily lead to false analogies. This much, however, can now be said, that Aristotle is a vigorous exponent of the doctrine of the dominance of constitutional law and of the judiciary and an opponent of the methods of force and *coup d'état*. And he is no friend of dictatorship. Also, he is a *minimalist* in legislation (*i.e.*, a believer in custom as the bond of society, suspicious of all self-conscious lawmaking and increase of statutory regulation), relying upon the levers of education and of voluntary co-operation within a customary social scheme.

Tyranny is the usual term for one of Aristotle's constitutiona divisions (*turannis*). But it is a misleading one. It carried, to Greel ears, no necessary implication of misrule. We are dealing with technica terms about which it is essential to be clear, since only so can Greel thought and conclusions be brought to bear on modern conditions. A Benevolent Despot could be, for Aristotle, a Tyrant *save that "despot"* for a Greek meant a master of subjects or slaves and was a term applicable to, *e.g.*, a King of Persia, *and that* the eighteenth-century dynastic Benevolent Despot or Autocrat, as hereditary and recognized by law and custom, was what Aristotle would have called a "dynast."

A *Dictator* technically (*i.e.*, for the Romans, who invented the term) was a strictly constitutional ruler, entirely constitutionally invested with extraordinary powers during a limited period. In this sense alone —and then only by stretching of terms—could Mr. Roosevelt be described, as he was once by the pro-Communist press in New York, and later in other quarters, as a "dictator." Any notion of *coup d'état*, despite the cases of Sulla and Julius, was rather excluded than included. Today a dictator, making his own "constitution" (*psephismata*, not *nomoi*), may well be such by *coup d'état*. What he relies upon is that he is there, or declares that he is there—as Napoleon I and III de-

* *Cf* pp. 137, 143.

† *Cf*. pp. 722, 743.

clared—by popular will. He is not usually an hereditary Dynastic Autocrat. He is an autocrat by popular choice, unlike those claiming to be such (as Czar and Mikado) by divine will alone. He may be benevolent; but he is precisely a popular Tyrant.

It is important to note that Peisistratos of Athens and Periander of Corinth were both great and even benevolent rulers, and that Peisistratos was largely responsible for great public works which were among the glories of Athens. It is important, also, to note that the *popular origins* of tyranny are especially stressed by Aristotle—an Ivan the Terrible, a Henry VIII, a Nero or Caligula are *not* typical tyrants in the technical Greek sense of this word, but rather bad dynastic autocrats. Tyranny was reached when democracy had passed over into a demand for government by "the people's choice"—"popular government" (which is sharply distinct from "democracy"). Everything that Aristotle said, twenty-two centuries ago, as a political scientist, about the historical conditions of the arising of tyranny, as a *popular* form of government, has (to the horror of Liberals) in our own days been astonishingly shown to be true. The tyrant, unlike the autocrat, is a species of the demagogue, relying on plebiscite or vote but without *organized* opposition or permitted alternative.

It usually happened in ancient times, whenever the functions of demagogue and general were united in the same person, that Democracies were revolutionized into Tyrannies. *The great majority of ancient tyrants had been demagogues. . . . They were able to do so in all cases by possessing the confidence of the commons, the ground of this confidence being their detestation of the wealthy classes.*

Aristotle continues, referring to Elective Dictatorship (Aesymnetic) and to Despots, such as the Persian:

No doubt there are certain points of difference between these two forms; but they both approximate to Monarchy in their constitutional character and the voluntary obedience of the subjects, while they resemble a Tyranny in the despotic and autocratic nature of the rule. There is a *third* species of Tyranny which may be regarded as Tyranny in the strictest sense, being the counterpart of absolute Monarchy. A Tyranny of this kind is necessarily realized in the form of Monarchy which is an irresponsible exercise of rule over subjects, all of whom are the equals or superiors of the ruler, for the personal advantage of the ruler and not of the subjects. And hence the obedience is in this case involuntary; for no free person submits willingly to such rule. . . . For Tyranny is one-man rule for the good of the one man; Oligarchy of the few for the good of the wealthy; and Democracy of the many for the good of the poor; none of them subserves the interest of the community

at large. . . . Kings are guarded by the citizenry in arms; tyrants by a professional force [or police].

In this description, Aristotle becomes vague again in his definitions.

Is it, then, equitable to describe the rule of Peisistratos and Periander, as Aristotle does, as tyrannies, since these men doubtless benefited their communities? They got things done. They were brought to power as democrats. *Were* they only ruling for the good of themselves? The answer seems to be that they were interested primarily in maintaining the prestige of their own régimes. "The good of themselves" does not necessarily mean graft and corruption. There was no constitutional method of replacing them if they were not wanted. There was no constitutional opposition; only one party was tolerated, their own.

If, then, we ask the question, of high practical importance, whether in technical terminology the régimes of Hitler, Mussolini and Stalin, or of the Caesars, should be classed as Tyrannies, it certainly does not mean that we are discussing these rulers as political Al Capones. We may indeed chop scholarly straws by asking whether the Dictators do not more nearly correspond to what Aristotle calls Heroic Rule, popularly acclaimed. Here, however, Aristotle means no more than the family, traditional leadership, especially in war, of the Homeric Kings.

Perhaps, it may be argued, the comparison is closer with what Aristotle calls *Pambasileia*. But this closely corresponds with Plato's theocratic supreme Kingship or (better) Papacy or Mikadoate. Where there is genius, Aristotle indicates, it is improper that it should be subordinate. Here is the "Leader-principle." Aristotle, however, points out that this supreme talent is not hereditary. Aristotle concludes, in normal circumstances, against this monarchic form, however voluntary in its basis, and in favour of the rule of law, as intelligence without passion, and of the "constitutional" system of popular share in the responsibilities of rule. Aristotle, then, speaking with the impartial authority of that distant, experienced age is our support as constitutional democrats [bourgeois democrats].

Does Aristotle favour the Leader-principle? The individual statesman, he maintains, is never free from bias; may well fall into the hands of a clique, with vested interests of its own and more capable of corruption than the electorate; and has, after all, only a human and limited capacity. With none of the spectacular imagination of a Plato in his day or the demigod back-slapping, coruscating, mentally cavorting

qualities of a Bernard Shaw in ours—not to speak of the crossing-sweepers of dictatorship—nowhere does Aristotle better display the essential sobriety of his judgement than here. Like most sound judgements, it unhappily is emotionally flat and tends to dullness.

Aristotle, however, is not free from the charge of being more than a little oligarchic in his own bias. One would have liked to see his examination of the constitution of Venice. Oligarchy, however, he verbally maintains without qualification, is a *bad* form of government, corrupted by respect for money making, and defending its own privileges. He is merciless on the men of business enterprise. He has a weakness (explicable in terms of his times) for agriculturalists—like Herr Hitler. He states his preference for a mixture of aristocracy with constitutional democracy (*politeia*), with its rule of law and popular share in responsibilities, in language that anticipates Harrington.*

> The legislator in his political system ought always to secure the support of the middle class . . . *it is only when the numbers of the middle class preponderate either over both the extremes or over only one of them that there is a possibility of a permanent polity. For there is no danger of a conspiracy of the rich and the poor against the middle class,* as neither rich nor poor will consent to a condition of slavery, and if they try to find a polity which is more in the nature of a compromise, they will not discover any other than this.

Aristotle, then, visualizes the permanence of unequal wage rates and savings, and a kind of pragmatic balance of social power. He is not pro-capitalist; but (indeed like Marx later†) he is non-equalitarian. It is not the case that his judgements are valueless because he could only think of a slave civilization, and not of a machine civilization, since most of his remarks are directed to the free population. Nor is it true that he ignores the economic aspects of social life. It is not the case that he condemns *stasis* because he is an obstructionist to all change. The reasons for this moral condemnation, and the significance of the part he expects his aristocratic element to play, are indicated when we turn to his scheme of social organization.

5

(*a*) Social organization is one factor in educational practice. It is a factor in the education of character that is essential for the happy life, which is a life social and energetic. The Greeks had a habit of taking

* *Cf.* p. 300.

† *Cf.*, however, p. 642.

their politics seriously. To control that all-important factor Aristotle was prepared to go to remarkable lengths. The control of the size of the territory and of the population is accepted with a matter-of-factness that is astonishing. Such schemes would arouse against any modern democratic statesman insuperable objections. Here, however, Plato and Aristotle are in entire agreement. As has been indicated earlier, the relation of "the master of them that know" and the "divine" Plato was not a happy one. The charge that Aristotle makes against Plato here is only that the size of the population suitable for the Polis, suggested by Plato, in the *Laws*—a modest 5,000 citizens (or, say, 30,000 total, including slaves)—is ridiculously *large*. The same consideration governs Aristotle's suggestions for *limiting*—not enlarging—the size of the population and his suggestions on matrimonial arrangements. Memories of food shortage apart in sparsely cultivated Hellas, the dominant consideration is the typical one of homogeneity, and manageability of the community. The polis is to be *eusunoptos*—"all easily to be seen at one view." Its citizen democrats should all be capable of being addressed at one time in one meeting (a problem now easily overcome by modern technical inventions). About this social homogeneity—which has no little cultural similarity to a doctrine of race purity—Aristotle appears to feel passionately because this is the very basis of his social ethics—of that unifying sentiment which excludes *stasis* and class war. Legislation can be applicable "to none but those of the same race." Indeed it must be stated that the modern German doctrine of racial purge and cultural *gleichanschaltung* or homogeneity is consonant enough with the ethical belief of the great Greeks. To this day it is unsettled whether democracy means decision of the majority of adult inhabitants (as in Czechoslovakia) or of voters (as in France) or of blood-nationals.

What is here meant by ethics? In the Christian era, and especially in Protestant countries, the question "What is ethical?" raises associations of problems for the individual and his conscience. Although there are some anticipations of this attitude in Socrates, for the Greeks—and not least for Plato and Aristotle—the association called up is that of *ēthē*, like the Latin *mores*—"social customs"—and especially of *ēthos*—the system or integration of customary morality. In brief, the immediate reference is social. Put in another way, the great Greek teachers, at this epoch, took it almost for granted that an *ethos* involved a community, a Polis. To be more precise, just because the notion was coming under challenge with the break-down of the family system and with incipient individualism, they affirmed it the more vigorously.

The object of civil society is no maintenance of a contract of individuals (Plato discusses this theory in order specifically to reject it, and Aristotle, in set phrase, concurs), but a social condition under which it may be possible for the citizen "to live happily and well." It is moreover a socialistic condition—religion, matrimony, family life and, of course, business life, trade and interest-taking: all lie under its paternal surveillance. With Plato the scheme is socialistic in the full economico-political sense. In Aristotle's case (as later in Proudhon's*) it is socialistic in a distributivist sense, and by virtue of its rigorous regulation of wealth. Even Socrates did not challenge the need for this.

Let us mark well Aristotle's significant words: "*The Polis comes into being for the sake of life; it remains in being for the sake of the good life.*" It is "a community for the sake of good life . . . for the sake of the perfect and *self-sufficient* life." Briefly, Plato and—despite all talk of "variety"—Aristotle are fairly complete totalitarians, with affiliations of thought with modern Communism and Fascism. Of the two, Aristotle, with his empiricism and stress in variety, is a far better democrat than the communist Plato. We shall later see that there is a direct connection between these modern movements, the decline of the influence of the Christian churches, and the revival of Hellenic, non-churchly thought. The Polis—frequently, if most incorrectly, today translated "State"—was for the Hellene his all. Thus Aristotle concludes (here in thoroughly Platonic fashion):

> As the end of the state as a whole is one, it is clear that the education of all the citizens must be *one and the same*, and the superintendence of it a public matter rather than in private hands as it is now.

The Greeks assert that the individual finds his moral life in the community. It is therefore very important to note the exact nature of this community. Examination will show it to be very distinctive: quite unlike the modern state. Aristotle insists with reiteration that the Polis must be small and homogeneous. The historical examples of which he approves were such. Such a metropolis as Babylon was not a polis. Today if Aristotle had been confronted with the National Socialist expulsion of the Jews from Germany or with the liquidation of the non-proletarian classes in Russia, he would have faced a dilemma. In the first case, we may logically conjecture that he would have praised the Hitlerian concept of cultural homogeneity but he might, I think, have condemned the *stasis* involved in Hitler's methods. In

* *Cf.* p. 554 *ff.*

the second case, he would certainly have condemned the *stasis* incited in the native Russian population, but he would have had reluctantly to admit an unsolved problem in his own philosophy. Aristotle visualizes cultural education as the great check on class war. Himself a "resident alien," he nowhere inquires whether the need for cultural homogeneity as the basis of moral education justifies the elimination of non-assimilable classes or national groups or whether his condemnation of *stasis* is to be carried to the point of admitting permanent cultural heterogeneity. In brief, the communist liquidator, on this point, may be a better Aristotelian than Aristotle. The probable answer is that Aristotle held to the faith that a unified, rational, middle-class culture could be caused to permeate, voluntarily, the entire free population across economic divisions. This voluntary permeation, however, would have been actively assisted by the censors of "good morals." Plato had, of course, another technique of dealing with these divisions—the total divorce of wealth and power, and the priestly technique of "the myth."

(*b*) The worst of Aristotle, the slave-owner, appears at this point. Because he is a great man, it appears in a form so deceptively attractive that it has had followers throughout history. There is, implies Aristotle, a "good culture" or *ethos* which some people *know* and which they are entitled to inculcate. Inculcation is not a mere matter of schooling but of the regulation of the whole social (and the selection even of the physical) environment. Thus such immoral disturbing proletarian elements as seafaring men are to be kept at a distance; and the community is to be small, homogeneous and governed by profound respect for traditional, constitutional law. Even, however, granted law as a norm, social morality must embody itself in certain persons as examples and leaders. Here, for Aristotle, is the function of an aristocracy and that aristocracy is a middle, leisured class.

It is here that Aristotle shows himself a stupendous snob, although an intellectual snob. Unlike Plato, he is not a natural dogmatist. The ethos is *known*, but not in some final, syllogistic or mystic fashion. It is a matter of sense and taste: of probability as well as of truth. But the sense and taste of whom? Here Aristotle reverts to the famous maxim of the Sophists that virtue can be taught. Virtue, let us remember, means much more than the condition of a clear conscience. It is an active condition of exercised talent and developed culture. This takes time—virtue takes time; culture takes time. "Banausic," *i.e.*, trading and industrially employed, men have no time for more than a tincture of culture. The uneducated are damned in their sins. Only the leisured

are virtuous—*Kaloikagathoi*, "beautiful and good." It is the antithesis of the Christian belief, which is individualistic, resting on the "immortal soul," eternally individual—but it is not, therefore, negligible. If virtue is *social* (as Aristotle and many writers today have said) then either the virtuous condition is that of brotherly commonplaceness or it is an excellence of the few. If so, then the moral society will differ from Plato's hierarchical ordering only in degree.

Aristotle elaborates his position with reference to the arts. His social philosophy—as we saw in the case of "the man of personality"—is a "gentleman philosophy" and that in the bad, arrogant sense. And a gentleman must not occupy himself in servile, manual works. He must not even occupy himself too much with study of the technique of the arts—be a scribbler or a school "dominie" or a man in an orchestra—or carry the practice of that technique beyond the point necessary for forming a competent artistic judgement. In his sharp division between gentlemanly knowledge of theory and vulgar practice, the spindle-legged Aristotle of the many rings is, as an educationalist, merely wrong. The product would be dilettante. Such a man as Michelangelo, the craftsman, knew better.

There is, however, just enough truth in this arrogant master-attitude—so long as it is the individualistic corrective of that inquisitorial collectivism that Plato praises—to make Aristotle, the democrat, one of the subtlest foes of democracy. It may be that science will show that only the man in health, of a good stock and nature, nurtured on a good diet physical and emotional, free from anxiety and with his natural confidence unbroken—the *natural* aristocrat—is capable of the highest excellence, mental and spiritual, and of raising the level of civilization itself. The answer, nevertheless, to Aristotle surely is threefold. There is no such divorce feasible between pure, dignified speculation and impure, vulgar practice. Moral knowledge, again, is *not* the static perquisite of the selected leaders of society; but is something growing and experimentally attainable, in which every individual's contribution matters. The contrary is the old error of Plato—and of Egypt; *its correction is the chief glory of the Anglo-Saxon Tradition.* Further, natural aristocracy is no perquisite of plutocracy and even if—as Aristotle resolutely asserts—full powers, as a civilized man, depend upon material goods, *i.e.*, the virtuous are the moderately rich, there is no reason in distributive justice why, in an ever wealthier civilization, all men or most should not have their quota of these material requisites of the cultured life. Here Plato had shown the way. Here Aristotle, from precisely the same premise, about the economic

conditioning of the valuable life, reaches (wrongly*) the opposite conclusion from Marx.

Let us, however, observe—since no question in all politics is more critical—that this answer is not so clearly decisive, but that most of the world's history has not been constructed upon the dogmatic (and here Aristotle is dogmatic and Platonic) hypothesis. The curse of social experimentalism, as Plato and Aristotle insisted, is ethical nihilism, criminal anarchy, democratic vulgarity in its motley, inefficiency and low standards. In brief, liberty and variety have to be paid for—but the payment is perhaps the price of progress. However, we do well to recall that Aristotle is a very dubious basis, if *uncorrected*, for public education in a modern democracy. He poisons the wells with a slave doctrine before youth has begun on its journey. This stricture does not mean agreement with his contemporaries, Timon and Theokritos of Chios, who called him "futile" and "the empty-headed Aristotle"—*kenophrōn Aristotelēs*. Precisely the contrary. If Plato is (which I doubt) "the Christian before Christ," Aristotle is the great pagan, superb in his mercilessness to common clay. Also there is reason to suppose that, in his later years, Aristotle—once the dogmatic disciple of Plato—had changed to an experimentalist (even social), himself.

6

Aristotle, son of a physician, is a scientist. It is when we turn to this field that we perceive the real grandeur of "The Philosopher." Science for the Greek—slowly struggling to get loose from theology and ethics before Socrates—is, since Socrates, unfortunately permeated with a priori ethical conceptions. The theory that nature is rational—a theory often fusing with pantheism—forms a bridge. Aristotle, exponent of the doctrine of so-called "final cause," views all physical nature in his observations, in the perspective of "purpose." This holds true despite the fact that his concept of "the natural" changes from the Platonic "typical" to the scientist's statistical "normal," in the course of his own development as a natural philosopher. His treatment of physics is teleological, looking to the shaping of the final "form" or "*gestalt*" of the genus or species, its alleged "end" or "perfection." So is his treatment of politics and social phenomena—neither more so nor less. We must disentangle, in his social science, this prejudice from the rest of his work. It is that remainder which deserves attention. The important thing to note is that as Aristotle grew older, and rewrote

* *Cf.* p. 773; also pp. 552, 599.

his lecture notes in the light of increased experience, his idealism dropped more and more away; scientific precedence is assigned to empirical research, although this might discover from amid the multifarious a norm; and he himself became ever more the political scientist, not the moralist—and the father of political science.

The study of political—or, to be more precise, social—principles, is based upon observation. First, Aristotle notes the physical environment, the geographic position, its economic potentialities, the climate as ultimate background of human social life and politics. The historical evolution of the Polis from family and village is discussed. Comment on developed constitutions is based on study of over 158 from Byzantium to Carthage, of which the *Constitution of Athens* we still have, from Aristotle's own hand. These studies are concrete enough and Aristotle, as a politicist, is careful to distinguish between ideal constitutions (*haplōs aristē*); constitutions best for the mass of cities (*pasais tais polesin harmottousa*); and the best constitutions practicable under the actual circumstances (*ek tou hupokeimenou*) and under hypothetical circumstances (*ex hupotheseōs*). He fully recognizes that the good constitution lies within the intersection of the good surveyed by ethics and the psychologically viable surveyed by political science.

As a politicist, and not only a political philosopher, he has the courage to survey with dispassionate interest constitutions that, as a philosopher, he condemns as perversions and even, in Book VI, to note the technique by which they may be maintained. This may be termed mere study of the art of politics. But the description, in Book VIII, of the causes of revolutions and that of the metamorphoses of constitutions, although entirely undisfigured by the historical mysticism which we shall later find in the Stoics and still later in Spengler, makes the fundamental scientific assumption of such a constancy in human affairs that a science of social conduct based upon these psychological permanencies becomes conceivable.

It is important to note that his word "Politics" has an exact, and not the vulgar current, sense. It is the study of the community—a scientific sociology. It has no reference to the State, which indeed, in the modern sense, did not exist. It is in the light of this that we must understand Aristotle's famous remark "man is *politicon zōon*, a political animal." He elsewhere explains that man, among all animals, is one of the most evil and difficult to control. It is interesting to note that he assigns, as the causes of revolutions, mixture of race (a remark that would please the Germans), disproportionate increase of one class and—a favourite stroke—weakness of the middle class. With the

exception perhaps of this last, Aristotle's methodical observations are undisturbed by "wishful thinking." Non-evolutionary, despite his anthropological studies of human origin, there is yet an astringent Darwinianism in his treatment of the human fauna.

Aristotle's *Politics*, if a companion study to his *Ethics* (much more definitely separated in later versions, although never divorced), is also an appendix to his *Historia Animalium*. He points us, across a gulf of two millennia of half-civilized history, on to the establishment of a science of man and society, thanks to which man may study himself objectively and thereby master the art of control of his own civilization and self.

It is possible to discuss Aristotle as a great bourgeois, the apotheosis of the bourgeois. Such intelligence, however, knows no class. His common-sense philosophy provides a compass to sanity for the human race. His scientific approach (incomplete although it necessarily was on the quantitative side) is the only hopeful one if we are to understand human social nature, although it is an approach that, after him, will hear no footfall on its path of inquiry until two thousand years have gone by.

His belief that there can be "no culture without kitchen maids" may be monstrous error, but we have not yet worked out an equalitarian remedy. Mr. Aldous Huxley suggests a college of cardinals (or world-controllers), and biological conditioning to contentment with the lot suitable for an ability scientifically assessed. It is an answer not so remote from the facts of modern Russia. Is this the true answer or is the answer a Lincolnian (and rural) individualist democracy? Aristotle's aristocratic challenge to proletarian democracy cannot be ignored. Perhaps an empirical, hit-or-miss democracy alone suits the large, heterogeneous cosmopolitan order of society. Aristocracy may be only appropriate (as Aristotle himself confessed and insisted) for the small homogeneous polis or community. This will be a clue worth watching as we study the centuries to come until our own day. Perhaps we must seek a return to that Polis, and shall have to conduct a new scrutiny of what today we mean by "the community"—is it State, Church, Commonwealth, World-league, Village, or Party?

Aristotle had no interest in, or theory of, cosmopolis. An admission of the common culture of Hellas was as far as this Philosopher of the Polis got to a theory of civilization. But, as the Founder of Political Science, he has laid down for us the earliest rules showing how we can develop such a theory for ourselves when we have the patience and talent.

These matter perhaps more than the common-sense political utopias of a lonely man. In one of his letters, preserved for our eyes by the commentators, we read, "The more solitary and isolated I am, the more I have come to love myths." Perhaps there might be something to be said for the star-souls . . .

In 322 B.C., at the age of sixty-two, Aristotle died, an exile alike from the home of his birth and of his adoption, immortal for all time as "the Philosopher," "the master of them that know." Some say he died by his own hand as a suicide, by drinking aconite, others—less strikingly but not inconsistently—from an intestinal complaint. In his will he makes provision for his concubine, whose affection for him he puts on record; for his children; and for the manumission of his slaves. Of his epigrams some sufficiently reveal the man to be worth putting on record. To a chatterer who asked whether he bored him, Aristotle replied: "No; for I was not attending to you." To the question, how we should behave to our friends, "As we should wish them to behave to us." Distinguishing the educated and the uneducated, he declared that they differed "as much as the living from the dead." Beauty he declared, with unexpected humour and humanity, to be a greater recommendation than any letter of introduction. Asked what advantage he had ever gained from his philosophy, he replied, "This, that I do without being ordered, what some are constrained to do by their fear of the law." The epigram characteristically omits to mention the issue that obsessed him, as it had troubled Plato: whether the good *man* might not be driven *not* to do, thanks to his philosophy, what the good *citizen* did in obedience to law, so that the good was *not* the happy. Had he not declared, in his epitaph on Plato, that no one again should be both "good and happy at the same time"? And, adds his biographer, asked "What is it that soon grows old?" he replied, "Gratitude."

READING

Aristotle. *Politics* (ed. Jowett) Book I, i–x; Book VII, i–v. (order of books varies in different editions).

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE

A. Zimmern: *The Greek Commonwealth*, 1911.
Werner Jaeger: *Aristotle*, 1923, trans. Robinson, 1934.

Chapter IV

The Hellenistic Age and the Coming of Rome

1

ALEXANDER the Great, Aristotle's pupil, built up the widest flung empire the world has seen, stretching from Adriatic to Ganges, until Britain built her Commonwealth and the United States linked two oceans. The master was uninterested. Although we do not know the full contents of the tractates Aristotle presented to Alexander, Aristotle seems to have regarded this Empire as barbaric in culture, inferior in spiritual value, mechanical in its principles of administration, not to be compared in significance with Sparta and Athens. It must be confessed that Aristotle had his excuses. His kinsman, Kallisthenes, whom he recommended to Alexander, fell under suspicion of sedition, perhaps owing to a frankness excessive in the presence of leaders who were persuaded that they were demigods. Suspicion was enough. He was promptly put in an iron cage and forgotten there for so long that he became neglected in his person, lousy and verminous. In this unappetizing condition he was turned out of his cage by Alexander's orders and thrown to the pet lions who habitually accompanied that monarch to solace him on his travels.

This lack of interest was, nevertheless, a strange distortion of perspective due to the ethical disregard of quantity in the name of quality. The history of the next fifteen hundred years, after this epoch of *intensive* Greek culture, is to be an improvisation on the theme of *extension*. It is for this very reason that, from this time forward, until a century ago, so much Greek political thought appeared irrelevant. The mechanical theory of government succeeds to the cultural. To the polis-society succeeds the police-society.*

The rule of Alexander is followed by that of the Diadochoi ("leaders" in the succession after Alexander) in the kingdoms of Macedon, Syria

* The etymology of polis and police is, of course, the same, although the implications of the ideas are so different.

and Egypt under the Antigonids, Seleucids and Ptolemies. This is the Hellenistic Age, with its culture centered in Alexandria, Antioch and Athens. Aristotle was right in thinking that Alexander's empire was mechanical, without organic life. But the system suited the epoch. Already civilization, after its Hellenic bloom, is moving down to the Great Recession. The finest age is in the past. To the perfidious intrigues and assassinations of the Seleucids in Antioch succeeded the corrupt, extortionate rule of the Roman proconsuls of the Republic. In the Alexandria of the Ptolemies the old system lasted on, royal brother marrying royal sister and continuing the succession of the godlike Pharaohs.

The social scene of Pericles and Plato has passed away. The intensive culture of the polis, with its quota of 5,000 fully armed troops or maybe twice that number, is defenceless in a world where imperial armies are on the march. The polis is, militarily speaking, obsolete. The world moves forward into a period of military grandeur where force is the test. Concurrently, the almost family life of the polis is broken up by the new trade developments. A cosmopolitan culture replaces the intensely civic life. Against this world background an individualism and (as ever, with it) an internationalism appear which know no local roots. The current political philosophy takes colour from the social facts.

Within three centuries this new Great Society of the Mediterranean and the Middle East receives its appropriate organization, not in the Empire built by the personal genius of the erratic Alexander, but in the solid mass of the Roman Caesardom.

Rome, even in the imperial days, remained head of a confederation of City-states. The Roman Empire was urban. Until the late Byzantine period (ninth century) the classical world did not depart from its city-state (or poli-tical) form. For these thickly populated lands of the hill-towns, with their farming and small trading population, the civic form was as natural as the form of a realm, national or tribal, was appropriate in the almost unexplored forests of the barbaric North or a military despotism in the open plains of the torrid Middle East, with their effects of unlimited space. Rome preserved this small-scale civilization as the unit in its own vast agglomeration. It became effective, unlike the kingdoms of Seleucus and Mithridates in Syria and Asia Minor, because it was able to weld these units together.

The Roman Empire, however, was an agglomerate of City-states under a Military Government. Literally and etymologically, its Emperors were *imperatores*, *duces*, field marshals—who had the

additional advantage of having learned in the East to be divine. According to Aristotle's classification, at least after Octavian, they were benevolent tyrants, since they were not constitutionally removable and were primarily concerned to maintain their own regime. The fatal weakness, however, of the moralistic element in Aristotle's classification here shows, since it would be as difficult to show that Aurelius did rule for the good of himself, not the whole, as that Nero did not. The Emperor is concerned to maintain *his personal regime*, and the succession, unlike that in a dynastic monarchy, is seldom certain—and yet it can well be argued that his concern is to maintain the imperial *system*, with its selection of rulers by ability (including ability to survive). In terms of Roman political theory, the Emperors were the successors of the entirely constitutional dictators, deliberately appointed for a time for the better safety of the commonwealth. Their power was partly tribunician (*i.e.*, popular) and partly military, and either way constitutional. Octavian, above all, stickled on these constitutional points. At least the Emperors were as constitutional as the absolute Benevolent Despots of the eighteenth century whom generically they resembled. And, even if the system of the Roman Empire were unconstitutional, unstable, dying, assuredly it took longer dying than any known system in the world, save the Chinese, has taken to live.

The Roman Empire had such powers of endurance because it was a system capable of giving Peace and Law. Often the so-called peace given by the Roman legions was, as Tacitus said, a desolation. But it did not remain such. The Empire, although soulless compared with the life of Athens and Sparta, is not merely mechanical. It is organic—organized on the principle of Law. The Law, based on prescription and on natural justice, does not have to take cognizance of persons, localities and sentiments. It centres itself round no traditional, ancestral altars, like the Greek Ethos. It is merely the expression of the impartial will of the armed empire for its subjects and citizens. It is formal Authority. But for these citizens it is nevertheless equitable. Later, it will be found that impersonal impartiality, the abstract form of authority, is not enough to satisfy the human spirit—or even, as personification of that authority, the worship of field marshals. A search begins again for intensiveness, intimacy, a personal religion that is not detached form or abstract civic duty. The civic religion of the polis is now dead. The Empire becomes the world-vehicle for carrying to triumph world-religions, Mithraism and others, but chief among them Christianity.

The nature of the civilization and culture of Rome must be grasped before we can comprehend the impact of the political philosophies of Hellenistic and later Imperial periods upon the minds of the hearers. The new civilization was cosmopolitan, in the limited sense of the whole area, European, Asiatic, African, laved by the Mediterranean Sea. Its two great languages, Latin and Hellenistic Greek, never national, had ceased to be merely local and had become the languages of a supra-national culture.

The new civilization was, moreover, proletarian. I do not merely mean that occasionally slaves such as Epictetus, and frequently freedmen, in the Roman civil service—men of Aryan or Levantine extraction—played an important part in moulding its culture. Whereas the thought of Plato and Aristotle was through and through aristocratic, the Roman Empire placed, in dazzling eminence, the Emperor, frequently himself an uneducated soldier, and, on the other side, the flat, equal mass of the citizenry which, after the Emperor Caracalla (A.D. 211–217), meant the entire body of adult male freemen, *i.e.*, citizenship had ceased to mean much. It was an equalitarianism against which the historian Tacitus, speaking for the patricians, protested passionately but in vain. It was confirmed by the appointment of freedmen to high places and was deliberately encouraged by the emperors as a matter of jealousy and policy. The stream was not reversed until the late Byzantine days, with their counts and marquesses. Local magnates abounded; but even here taxation was so directed as to grind down the *curiales* to the general level. Caesar, the embodiment of the Empire, and his soldiers, officials, bureaucrats, all appointees at will, alone stood out.

The economy of the empire was, so far as it suited the bureaucrats (for purposes of taxation) and the equality-loving, jealous Emperors, a "planned economy," in which the propertied *curiales* could not change status and escape from their obligation to hold office and be taxed, and the peasants and old soldiers, settled on the land, for the better convenience of administration and civic services became "tied to the soil," *glebae ascripti*, and entered into that relationship, technically known as emphyteutic, which was the beginning of feudalism and of the class system of the modern world. Commercially, however, it was a free-trade empire.

2

The Hellenistic culture that corresponded to this social scheme is, on the whole, well tinged with pessimism. The optimism of Herodotus,

standing at the threshold of the Age of Exploration, is no longer characteristic. Religious certainty and even the stability given by the established *ethos* of the Polis have gone.

The old religion of the farmer republic of Rome, with its agricultural rites and temples that resembled butchers' slaughter-houses, no longer had power in a more sophisticated and cosmopolitan world.

The tendency towards a new heroic, patriotic faith, deriving its force from the habits of the idolatrous East and the bureaucrat's uneasy feeling that some sentiment must cement the Empire, gathered momentum. The Roman populace had saluted, in a sudden burst of passion, dead Caesar as a demigod. Octavianus Augustus had to consent to sacrifices being offered to his genius—but that staid citizen made the reservation that it should only be outside Italy, in Pola. The conquest of Egypt involved the introduction of Egyptian manners. Caesar, as the godlike Pharaohs before him and the Mikado today, was saluted as "prince of princes, elect of Ptah and Nun the father of the gods, king of Upper and Lower Egypt, lord of the two lands, autocrat, son of the sun, lord of diadems, Kaiser, ever living, beloved of Ptah and Isis." It is a far cry from the prose of Aristotle to this salutation of the Roman *duces*. Vespasian, dry sceptic, dying accepts in duty his official fate. "Vae, puto deus fio," he exclaims. "Bah! I see I'm becoming a god." Diocletian takes the appellation Jovius—"of Jove" —and Maximian that of Herculius. Aurelian, in the third century, states the matter bluntly in his title: "Aurelian, lord and god." The political consequences of this Egyptian doctrine of the divinity of kings, at the time and for two thousand years, are incalculable.

The new official religion of Rome, however, could have little more sway over men's hearts than the old. A tolerant polytheism—and polytheism, unlike monotheism, could afford to be tolerant—was adorned, like a pillar with decorated capital, by the worship of Rome itself and the "divine Augustus." This official religion of the Empire was supposed to replace in men's hearts the fire of affection for local gods and the local patriotism. The religious cults could flourish, as a private matter, for all any Roman magistrate cared, luxuriantly or rankly, provided the public imperial rites were maintained. But, as Professor Gilbert Murray says, it was spiritually unsatisfactory to deify only emperors and millionaires. Nero was unimpressive as an incarnation of Apollo.

The disgust of the aristocrats at this orientalization of manners in place of the Roman puritanism can be found souring the pages of Tacitus and Juvenal. The "greedy Greeks" had come, and strange

worships of the barking Anubis and of Cybele, wherein piety and morality varied in inverse proportions. "Into Tiber," writes the indignant Juvenal, "now flows the Syrian Orontes." All citizen *ethos* and sober morals had gone amid this welter of cults. Uneconomic taxation, political exclusion from office by imperial jealousy, spiritual orientalization and moral degeneration, partly from the old luxury, partly from the new loss of self-respect, resulted in what the German historian, Otto von Seeck, has called the "rotting away of the best." Cosmopolitan, proletarian Rome, for Tacitus, with its "spawn of Romulus," clamouring for bread and circuses, has become "the sink of the world." What the proletarians thought of Tacitus or of the drinking aristocrats and their new plutocratic rivals, gorging Trimalchio and the rest, is not recorded. The common citizenry, descendants of farmers who (under the new economics) could no longer run their farms for profit, held that they too had a right to be fed; and politicians, for the sake of the vote or to prevent revolt, were prepared to throw in the butter of circuses and races to add to the bread, which belonged to a true Roman citizen by civic right. Before we accept Tacitus at face value, let us remember that his (first-century) reference to Christianity is as "a lethal superstition which broke out not only throughout Judaea, the origin of the evil, but through the city (Rome) where flow all atrocious and shameful things." For Tacitus Rome is scarlet with the sins of Apostolic Christianity.

If we ask, apart from Tacitus with his Rembrandt colours, what reasonable men made of the culture of their age and how they looked upon this imperial cult, we shall find help in the rationalizations of an Emperor, Marcus Aurelius, who may have been, as his enemies said, "*philosophica anicula*"—"a philosophizing old woman"—but who undeniably had a sincerity superior to sham. For him the official Roman religion was a religion of patriotism which had the singular merit of being a religion of polytheistic tolerance, except to the intolerant, and of being a religion of patriotism of a singularly enlightened, world-wide kind. The old Greeks had clung to their local altars and found in their cities the stuff of their moral life. Marcus Aurelius felt himself a citizen of the world, not to speak of being its Emperor. He would have been happy in modern Geneva. "The poet has said, Dear City of Kekrops [Athens]. Shall I not say, Dear City of God?" The Emperor was the high instrument of the Divine Reason ordering the world, a *nomos empsuchos*—"incarnation of law." Such was the theory. Every man had a claim to respect for his *individual personality* as a citizen of that supernal city. The plain man too often—

the proletarian—failed to discover that this philosophizing was a religion at all. He asked for assurance, revelation, sacred books such as the East and the Egyptians had, and the already ubiquitous Jews. Too late and in vain the Emperor Julian, in the fourth century A.D.—"the Apostate"—sought to revive the human quality of the old religion and, casting around to find a sacred text, discovered it—in Homer. It was too late. *Tu vicisti, Galilaee.**

The old religion had been one of fears and terrors, panics sent by the Nature-god, Pan. The great Lucretius (98–55 B.C.) wrote one of the finest philosophic poems in human literature, *De Rerum Natura*, to rid men of this fear of death, this superstition which wrought so great ill—and died a suicide. The Greek had faced death with the pathos of resignation without hope—accepting fate without even the consolation of the myth of the Egyptians, those great tomb-builders. "Here his father Philip has laid his twelve year old, his very high hope, Nikoteles." It is an Hellenic inscription of centuries before our era. To the undying simplicity of this epitaph, worthy of David's lament over Absalom, succeeds the more sophisticated, half-humorous pessimism of Hadrian, poet and emperor of the world.

Animula vagula blandula,
Hospes comesque corporis,
Quae nunc abibis in loca
Pallidula, rigida, nudula
Nec, ut soles, dabis jocos.†

The mood was one of philosophic doubt. The old Roman *ethos* had gone and the age was too cultured to be moral. The background of the new manners was social confusion and, to this again was added, after Marcus Aurelius, not "dictatorial efficiency" but the violence of the legions and the murders of the empurpled dictators, their chiefs.

3

Against this background let us observe the fate of such of the so-called "Ten Schools of Philosophy" as here concern us. The Academic and Peripatetic Schools we have already discussed in terms of

* "Thou hast conquered, o Galilaean."

†Humane little soul, little wanderer,
Guest and friend of the body,
Now shalt thou depart forth into places
Pallid and stark and bare,
Nor ever again reply, as thou wast wont,
With some merry joke.

their founders, Plato and Aristotle. The Cynic School was founded by Antisthenes the Athenian, contemporary and admirer of Socrates, rival of "the conceited Plato." It deserves attention because of its influence on Stoicism. The Cynics were the "simple-lifers" of their day—"dog-men," as the etymology signifies: my brother, the dog*—like Antisthenes' pupil Diogenes, the banker's son, preferring (metaphorically speaking) to live in a kennel. The comment is worth recalling of Socrates on Antisthenes, studiously displaying the hole in his cloak: "I see your love of fame peeping through." The Cynics were, by anticipation, the Rousseauites, protesting in the name of honest virtue, against the vices of a sophisticated, over-elaborated Athenian civilization. More, they were the Salvation Army men of their day, bluffly buttonholing their acquaintances and asking the *jeunesse dorée* whether it had been saved. Salvation was by plain virtue. Virtue, however—in characteristic Hellenic fashion—was by wisdom, the sagacity of the sage. Only the sage was saved. But wisdom is an individual characteristic which is no privilege of the rich (let the leisure-class, conspicuous-consumptionist Aristotle say what he liked). Any plain man could attain the wisdom of virtue which was the true virtue of wisdom.

Classes and rulers are conventions contrary to nature. By nature man is an individual, "a man for a' that," and individuals by nature are equal in their chances of pursuit of virtue. The Cynics were universalists, not men of any parish; progressives; anti-ritualists; even nudists; levellers. They have, then, two political claims to fame: as the first philosophic equalitarians and (connected therewith) as the first, not excluding Socrates, to substitute an individual morality of virtue and self-development, "liberty," for a civic morality of duty to the free polis and *its* liberty.

The Cyrenaic School, founded by Aristippos of Cyrene, also a pupil of Socrates, is at the opposite pole to the Cynics, asserting that moral life is an art† and refurbishing the Aristotelian argument that the artist requires materials for his art, even precious metals. Aristippos' retort to the censure of Diogenes, washing vegetables—"If you had learnt to make these your diet, you would not have paid court to kings"—if not logically consummate, yet sufficiently indicates the outlook. "And if you knew how to associate with men, you would not be washing vegetables." One suspects Aristippos of snobbery: the Cyrenaics, it may be, liked to talk about frugality at the tables of the rich—naturally going first, as has been also seen in modern times, to

* However, the name comes from the place of teaching, the gymnasium of Cynosarges.
† *Cf.* p. 19.

those most in need of the preaching. The attitude yet earned for Aristippos the praise of the princely Plato: "You alone are endowed with the gift to flaunt in robes or go in rags." It was expressed in Aristippos' own dictum that what he had gained from philosophy was "the ability to feel at ease in any society." It is the philosophy which we shall much later find, less adequately, in the eighteenth-century writings of Shaftesbury. There is a pleasant modesty in its claims. As the Cynics form a bridge of thought to the Stoics, so do the Cyrenaics deserve note as making a bridge to the Epicureans.

The two philosophic schools that dominated the thought of the early Roman Empire were those of Zeno of Citium and of Epicurus, of the Porch and the Garden, the Stoics and the Epicureans. Both asked themselves questions, not put in pre-Socratic philosophy, novel even in post-Socratic: What is the Way of Life?

The pre-Socratic philosophers, Ionian or (like Pythagoras) Greek-Italian, had been concerned with nature, mathematics and the objective world—What is the nature of Nature? Even when Socrates had forced to the fore the question, What is Ethics? the answer about the Good Life had been given by Academic and Peripatetic alike, by Plato and Aristotle, in social and civic, not in individual terms. Plato had glanced at the social contract of individuals and thrown it aside. The individual mattered—but as the servant of social and supra-social, eternal values. In the beginning, said Aristotle, was the Polis. Society, temporally, logically and morally, was prior to the Individual. Now the Polis is broken up; the internationalist Empires have replaced it; and men are asking themselves, How shall a man act in the World? Dean Inge has called the resulting philosophies the "Don't Care Philosophies."

As the cloud of pessimism and trouble descended on the ancient world, not unnaturally men became preoccupied with the question: How should a man live and die with dignity in the midst of it all? It is interesting to note the preoccupation with death in a world of cultivation unfurnished with adequate medical or any anaesthetic facilities and where old age must have been painfully miserable. No wonder there is shadow amidst the lights of the poet Horace. Nevertheless, "don't care" is an inadequate description. These men cared very much about the right life, which had become a matter not of god-given tradition but of individual choice. It is, however, true that these philosophies are "escapist" and, for that very reason, have in them the seeds of subjectivism and defeatism. And, for all the southern delight in life, the outstanding men had little doubt that it was a vale

of trouble, tyranny, corruption and violence, in which it was necessary to fortify the heart.

The Stoic School owes its foundation to Zeno of Citium, in Cyprus, (270 B.C.) who taught in the Painted Porch or Stoa of the market place at Athens, a man, we are told, flabby, thick-legged and fond of basking in the sun. This gossiping description, inspired by native Athenian malice, of Zeno, "the Phoenician," like Antisthenes no pure Athenian but of Asiatic ancestry, probably Semite, is interesting since his teaching as it has come down to us has some of the quality of a Hebrew prophet. We are told that he harangued, clenching his fist, maintaining that when a man has the real intuition of the truth it seizes him as it were by the hair of his head and drags him with conviction so that he cannot escape. Timon's description appears less than just: "A Phoenician too I saw, a pampered old woman ensconced in gloomy pride, longing for all things: but the meshes of her subtle web have finished and she had no more intelligence than a banjo." The Greeks, being Greeks, had no particular kindliness for their neighbours, even if philosophers.

The watchword of the Stoic School was *apathia*—which cannot be translated "apathy," but "non-suffering." Whatever may have been the character of Zeno, who seems to have added Greek vices to Levantine passion, the School laid stress rather on conviction and *character* than on that metaphysical and epistemological *speculation* which was ending, in the Middle Academy, in scepticism. It took over some of that tradition earlier identified in Hellas with Sparta and thus prepared the way for its own acceptability in Sparta-admiring Rome. Stoicism was a training school of the firm upper lip and discipline under pain, not because it sought woodenness as its ideal or denied the existence of pain, but because it asserted as central in its philosophy that Man, as autonomous in his Will, was master of his soul and hence captain of his fate. The right to suicide—in the final need, the right to turn the keys of the portals of death—was at once a theoretical concession and a practical corollary. Not stupid tolerance of pain, but the resolve to do nothing save on one's own moral choice and at one's own will, was the core of the philosophy.

It will be noted that such a philosophy of the mighty human atom maintaining its freeman's worship is highly individualistic. It followed that it was cosmopolitan—man related himself to no city, county or little platoon but to humanity and to the world of which he was a citizen. Zeno, it is significant, comes after Alexander the Great and is an immigrant to Athens. The Stoic tended, like the Quaker later, to

detach himself from public life lest he lose spiritual self-mastery. Seneca, squeezing his millions by speculation, serving Nero and yet posing as the Stoic, found before his suicide that the moral problem of public life under the dictator Caesars was a very real one. Unlike Plato and Aristotle, the true Greeks, Zeno and his Stoics had not the citizen ideal. Their work was explicitly directed against the Platonic civic ideal as narrow and "conventional."

Like the Cynics and later the Puritans, the Stoics were at once equalitarians and aristocrats, profound spiritual snobs, as is shown by the excesses of the slave-philosopher Epictetus and by the priggery which disfigures the practical outlook of that admirable, worthy man, cursed with a criminal wife, the Emperor Marcus Aurelius. Slave and Emperor, they rejected unphilosophic, artificial, conventional distinctions of class. They were equalitarian on this worldly plane. It was blasphemy to assert—and the point, against "empty-headed" Aristotle, is important—that any man, granted a will, *could not* be virtuous. Salvation by Will was open to all. They were, however, both profoundly convinced—which comforted the proud teaching slave in his slavery and the humble self-conscious Emperor amid his business routine—that they belonged to a select spiritual, international aristocracy of those who grasped the identity of wisdom and virtue. No longer, however, do we draw the humdrum, if potentially revolutionary, conclusion that social virtue can be taught by dialectic; but rather the conclusion that wisdom—moral wisdom—is reached by conversion of morals. Meanwhile the dangerous, individualistic, moralistic but anti-political tenet is permitted, as a sign of ethical "high-souledness" that worldly status "does not matter"—a tenet of which Plato and Aristotle would never have been guilty, a tenet that bears the marks of world-flight and "escapism."

The Stoics, individualists, cosmopolitans, and social equalitarians, are not anarchists. Members of a school Greek in origin they accepted that identification of Nature and Reason—Divine Reason: the Moulding Mind of Anaxagoras—which was natural for a pantheistic people that believed that the gods were to be found amid, and even in, the forces of Nature. They were pre-eminently natural philosophers impressed almost mystically by the consideration, common ever since Pythagoras, that the *abstract* conclusions of mathematics correspond *necessarily with natural fact.* Predominantly the Stoic philosophy was pantheist and (like Heraclitus) monistic, unifying, with this interesting consequence that Nature, put into opposition to passing convention, was a rational Cosmos or Order. Law was its principle. This Law was

above men and—for the Stoics, unlike Platonists—above and separate from the local sacred tradition, finding its only adequate expression in the world and in world-wide society, a convenient theory for the Roman Empire. History was rational and ever repeated itself in "grand cycles" of civilization, epochs of culture. Despite its moral discipline for the individual in *apathia*, Stoicism, thanks to this identification of the course of civilization with reason, is liberal and optimistic about history. The gods guide everywhere. The Stoic view is memorably expressed in the hymn to Zeus of Kleanthes (331–232 B.C.):

> Supreme of gods, by titles manifold
> Invoked, O thou who over all dost hold
> Eternal dominance, Nature's author, Zeus,
> Guiding a universe by Law controlled,
>
> Whereby thou guid'st the universal force,
> Reason, through all things interfused, whose course
> Commingles with the great and lesser lights—
> Thyself of all the sovereign and the source.

Later we shall have to concern ourselves with the doctrine of Natural Law which took its rise from this Stoic School. Here it is important to notice that, despite all its ethical quality, this Order of the Universe was (as ever since the days of early Ionian philosophers) identified with the law of physics. The common term, linking both, is mathematico-logical necessity. Sound ethics was, for the Stoics, demonstrable like geometry because it sprang in first principles from the very (rational and divine) nature of things. Over against the natural was—our old friend of the Sophists—"the conventional." Seneca, the Spaniard statesman Stoic (3 B.C.–A.D. 65), was prepared to call human government an artificial thing and to look back upon a golden, heroic age of primitive innocence. Later, with the Christian writers, we shall hear much of this Garden of Eden, before Original Sin came into the world. The Stoics, unlike their forerunners, the Cynics, were prepared to put the feasibility of the "simple life" into the past.

It is difficult to exaggerate the importance of the influence of Stoicism on human thought. I am not here concerned with whether it is right. There is no proven connection between truth and influence: the assertion of it is an act of faith. But Stoicism had the luck of history on its side. *Its background is the break-down of the Polis and the rise of Empire.* It was the dominant philosophy at a time when two

of the greatest instruments in the control of civilization were being forged: the Roman Law and Christianity. And it stamped both of them with the impression of its own ultimate optimism, rationalism, asceticism, internationalism, equalitarianism. It offered a stern but hopeful alternative to the relaxed pessimism of the Roman Imperial age. It was too stern to be Liberal and too optimist to be Puritan; but (through Aquinas and through Augustine) it was the remote mother of both. It should be added, in warning, that its strong moral quality had its drawbacks. If ethics was like geometry, alas! geometry was too like ethics. Typically enough, it was Kleanthes the Stoic who, with that singular intellectual arrogance which besets good men conscious that they know the good, demanded that Aristarchos should be prosecuted—because he impiously suggested that the earth on an inclined axis moved round the sun. We cannot imagine the colder blooded Aristotle demanding any such prosecution—he had been the victim of a prosecution for impiety himself.

The great rival School is that of Epicurus (341–270), the schoolmaster's son, typically enough called "the School of the Garden," where Epicurus taught at Athens. In this garden purchased for eighty minae ($1,320 or £260) Epicurus lived with his group—"content with half a pint of thin wine and were, for the rest, thoroughgoing waterdrinkers." His life, even from the accounts of his detractors, seems to have been no more immoral and somewhat less perverted than that of his opponents. In a later age Epicureanism tended to be the intellectual refuge of every sensual scoundrel. Its disciple, Horace, gives it in jest no good name by referring to *porci Epicuri*—"the pigs of Epicurus." The division is thin from Trimalchio and suchlike vulgarians mirrored for us in the *Satyricon* of Petronius. So difficult is the Aristotelian road of Temperance. Actually, however, alike by prescription and practice, the early Epicureans were not epicures. A better comparison is with a body of Cathedral canons living lives placid, scholarly, respectable, harmless. Like the Stoics, the Epicureans asked the question: What is the key to rational living? But, instead of the Stoic slogan *apathia*, they gave their followers the maxim *ataraxia*—contented "undisturbedness," "untroubledness."

The answer clearly involved far more of wish and contingency, less of a discipline competent to meet all emergencies. The Epicurean was not so much a pleasure-lover as a pain-fleer. Temperance was the route. Not even pleasures too much. From the Cyrenaics they had learned stress on the Art of Living. But, for that, much depended upon human forbearance. Just as Zeno was an immigrant, so Epicurus had

been an exile, living with a band of fellow exiles in Colophon. In surroundings where the ethical *background of the Polis was no longer to be found*, what mattered was the friendly attitude of individual to individual. It was something that, later, the ordinary Roman official moving from place to place, mixing with a cultured cosmopolitan society drawn from all known lands, himself in fear of the caprice of imperial displeasure, could well understand. Joy-pursuing, Epicureanism yet had a sober notion of what joys were obtainable and ultimately it was tinged with pessimism. Epicurus, the school-teacher's son, is author of the salutary epigram: "Hoist all sail, my dear boy, and steer clear of all 'culture'" (*paideian*—"school-teaching"). It offered, as Way of Life, not a faith, even Stoic, but a cultivated man's philosophic resignation. All depended on the civilized temperance of the individual.

Epicureanism yet had its own humane theory of society. Going back on Plato, it discovered the basis of the social order in a kind of contract—*synthēkē tis*—a mutual give-and-take, doing as one would be done by (the phrase is Aristotle's as a maxim among friends) and forbearing as one would be the recipient of forbearance.

The poetic pessimism of Epicureanism, its diffidence about the right way of life, the contingency of its own suggestions, its basing of the social order, not on reason or social organism, but on the chancy wills of individuals working in some kind of gentleman's agreement for a tolerable life in the interest of all, its liberalism, has its background in an ultimate metaphysic. That philosophy was not one of rationalism, determinism, incipient Stoic Calvinism, necessity—still less of the Platonic idealism or of the early Eleatic School with its stress on space and stability—but of free will, probability, chance and of the School of Heraclitus with its stress, that Plato hated, on time and flux. Demokritos, the physicist, with his dance of the atoms, was its forerunner and apostle. Chaos might be king. But man had to live by the temperate common sense of considering probabilities. Here then are the beginnings—thoroughly individualistic, be it noted—of the later famous doctrine of Social Contract. (There is, however, no direct lineage, although Hobbes is, in much, an unconscious Epicurean.) If, however, the Epicurean had a modest philosophy of life, he had also one of death. It is expressed in the words of Dionysius of Oenanda (flourished A.D. 200) "God is not to be *feared*. Death is easy. The good we need is easily obtainable. The evil is easy to be borne." The pleasure philosophy in the end had to lose its phantasies and hopes in wishful thinking. Nevertheless, it had the confidence that Nature, if too much

were not expected of her, was not to be feared and guided by instinct all her creatures in the search towards pleasure—Nature whom Lucretius, the Epicurean and humanist, saluted:

Aeneadum Genetrix, hominum divomque voluptas.*

Platonism had become a memory. However, at the very beginning of the Roman imperial era, a strange conglomerate of philosophy, Platonic, Stoic, Neo-Pythagorean, with apologies to Polybius, was brought to literary expression by Cicero, successful lawyer, self-made country gentleman, admirer (in the best circles) of the new culture just coming over from Greece.

4

Polybius (204–122 B.C.), hostage to Rome for the Achaean League, had taken the opportunity of his Italian sojourn to praise his hosts. In the Sixth Book of his *Universal History*, he links the classification of the Greek political theorists, Plato and Aristotle, with the actual constitutional system of Rome. He elaborates the Aristotelian theory of revolutions, as part of a process that ends in the dying off of civilizations. The normal process of change and decay could, however, be slowed by a corrective mixture of constitutions. This happy mixture of the monarchic, aristocratic and democratic constitutions, occurred, remarked the ingratiating Polybius, in Republican Rome, like Sparta of old, with its consuls, senate and comitia. Polybius, in short, first enunciates the doctrine of the constitutional balance of power; and, it will be noted, he does this in the interest of that conservative stability which was Rome's excellence. A little later, it may be noted, Titus Livy (59 B.C.–A.D. 17), in his *Histories*, set forth that parable of Menenius Agrippa which compared the bodies physical and political.

Marcus Tullius Cicero (106–43 B.C.) exploring, as a liberal constitutionalist—as Liberal as a Roman could be—the way to maintain the Roman republican system between the impassioned forces of optimate or rich man's dictatorship, under a Sulla or Pompeius, and proletarian dictatorship, under a Gracchus, Marius or Julius Caesar, reverted to Polybius' defence of it as a mixed constitution, and therefore one of the best that had yet been seen. This defence was the task of his dialogue *De Republica*. Here, however, and in the *De Legibus*, we find certain definitions and theories of society and law which are not to be without subsequent influence on the Roman jurists. Indeed

* "Mother of us, Aeneas' children, joy of gods and men."

Cicero's treatment of the social order is from the standpoint—not Greek—of a theory of law. "What is a *civitas* except a society under law?" ("Quid est enim civitas nisi iuris societas?")

Society or a people (*populus*) is not a mere aggregate. It is "a gathering associated by a common sense of right (*iuris consensu*) and by community of utility (*communione utilitatis.*)" The commonwealth is a *natural* congregation of men. Following Aristotle, Cicero affirms that the human race is not one of solitaries or lone wanderers. This naturalness of civic life is important for Cicero since he agrees with the Stoics that our moral duty is to live according to nature (*ex natura vivere summum bonum*), *i.e.*, by the rational precepts of healthy human psychology. What then is law? Basically law is this rational rule discoverable by observation of nature, and a sound jurisprudence is to be drawn from this observation (*ex intima hominis natura haurenda est juris disciplina*).* I suppose that this is the profoundest thing that Cicero ever wrote; and we shall see later its implications. In a moment of cynical resignation Cicero, the Roman, remarks that no government would be such a fool as not to prefer to rule unjustly rather than serve justly; but he does not doubt that what ties a society together into a commonwealth is precisely its sense, and respect, for law. But (the whole thought is Stoic) "true law is right reason consonant with nature, diffused among men, constant, eternal." Local statute law is law only by courtesy, and when it infringes the basic, objective moral law, it is intrinsically void juristically—mere force. No one was less of an anarchist than Cicero. It is necessary, then, when we meet what is superficially a mere confusion of law with subjective morality, to bear in mind this Stoic belief that the rational law of human nature is as certain, objective, indisputable as that of gravitation.

Every rational being is entitled to his own moral choices, is so entitled as of right—hence all have rights, Cicero holds, before the law. Note, please, the resting of equality before the law on this quality of reason and of the rational being's moral judgement. Reason, of course, is regarded not as subjective, but as something objective, written in the heavens, apprehensible by the individual. Cicero's argument will collapse if the Cosmic Reason is reduced to a subjective rationality admitting of degrees. Here he is a Stoic—or Platonist—not an Aristotelian. Further, he maintains that all men do not differ among themselves under given circumstances as much as each man differs from himself at different times. Cicero's equalitarianism is

* "The discipline of law is drawn from the innermost nature of man." *Cf.* Lao-tze, p. 18.

partly—like most equalitarianism—environmentalist; partly due to positing a general human nature. Men are equal *in se*—whatever that may mean. Unlike both Plato and Aristotle he—the self-made man—minimizes heredity. Probably he is right. At least his position and that of his masters, the Stoics, is corrective of that of the earlier philosophers of the leisure class. If slightly muddle-headed, he urgently recommends, as a good liberal, the virtues of reasonableness. He adds: "No species of society is more deformed than that in which the wealthiest are thought to be the best. . . . One thing ought to be aimed at by all men; that the interest of each individually, and of all collectively, should be the same; for if each should grasp at his individual interest, all human society will be dissolved." Cicero omits to notice that, in this last passage, he states a problem rather than solves it. However, it was a gallant ethical protest against the actual political conditions of the corrupt Republic.

Professor Dunning, the commentator, writes: "The circumstances under which the great orator lost his life surround with an air of pathos his efforts to find the elements of rational perfections in the moribund institutions of the Republic." The institutions of Tiberius, Caligula, and Nero, not to speak of gloomier tyrants, were obviously, for Professor Dunning, to be preferred. The fate of beheaded Cicero may well be that, mankind being what it is, of constitutional Liberals today caught in the political game of *Rouge et Noir* between the Fasces and the Hammer, Red and Black. It is a warning.

5

The later Roman Empire saw a change of scene as the gilded age of the Adoptionist Emperors, Trajan, Hadrian and the Antonines, did not return. As the times grow darker, Epicureanism, with its suppositions about the cultivated life, disappears and even Stoicism, with its aristocratic appeal, loses influence. Men desire, not discipline but salvation, not apathy but sympathy. Platonism takes a new lease of life; but in the very different and theologically preoccupied form of Neo-Platonism. Plotinus (ca. A.D. 203–262), the Egyptian, enunciates his ultra-individualist, spiritual-ascetic, but reason dominated doctrine of the "flight of the alone to the Alone"—the Absolute or Mind that rises above the "emanations" and "creations," and star-souls, partly divine, partly natural, proceeding from the Absolute and governing "the spheres" and all material things. The issue no longer becomes that of finding a Rational Way of the Happy Life in the World but of finding a poppy Way, an opiate Way, from the Evil World to Eternal Life.

Even Indian Brahmin influences may have been at work. That route, under the guidance of the philosophers, Porphyry, the Syrian (A.D. 233–305), author of a lost or destroyed criticism of Christianity, and Iamblichus, also of Syria, (died ca. A.D. 333), becomes almost as complicated as that along which the soul is piloted in the Egyptian Book of the Dead.

Meanwhile, from a congeries of conflicting cults, those of Isis, Mithras, Serapis, Christianity arises into prominence—flowing by Syrian trade routes from Jewish colony to Jewish colony, falsely confounded by Roman governors with Judaism. The early comments are by members of the governing class. Tacitus' words I have already cited. The younger Pliny takes note of the cult—"a depraved, immoderate superstition. . . . I did not doubt that, whatever their precise creed, a pertinacious and inflexible obstinacy [against authority] ought to be punished." It is *they* who were intolerant, so it seemed . . . of the imperial worship—although in Egypt strange things took place, mixings of the worship of Christ and pagan Serapis. Marcus Aurelius holds up to respect those who have an undramatic faith, "not in a sheerly obstinate manner like the Christians." A century later, Celsus (whose works the Christians thought it unnecessary in the cause of literature to preserve) attacks the Early Church as unpatriotic, while Rutilius Namatianus finds the epithet, "the root of folly." Briefly, the early Christians were fanatics and, in the eyes of the governing classes, uncultivated fanatics who might, for example, if they saw a statue of one of the gods, smash it. Most of them were Oriental slaves although a few, systematic pacifists, were to be found in Caesar's household, such as Flavius Clemens, a cousin of Domitian. Although not (until the days of Julian) physical-force men, they were, so to speak, the Communists of those days. Not until later was it discovered that systematic thinking had been done, almost from the first, in these proletarian quarters. The Emperor Aurelius—however, as a Stoic, he held the thesis of human equality—did not socially know St. Justin Martyr.

Jesus ben Miriam, the Nazarene, of the stock of David, did not long remain the spiritual rebel, peasant preacher, centre of stories of miracles, mastering hearers by his personality, preaching a doctrine of absolute pacifism for those who had ears to hear and who, unlike Herod's soldiers, sought the Way of Eternal Life through the purification of abnegation of wealth and of ambition and of self. By the time of the Fourth Gospel the influence of Philo and the Platonists shows itself. The Idea has taken charge of the man. In Egyptian Alexandria a

school is at work well accustomed to speculating on demigods and absolutes. "*Aut deus aut non bonus*" is soon the cry.* The entirely good man is the perfect man, typal and archetypal—the true Reality or essence of Man, the "Idea" of Man, and the idea of man proceeding from the mind of the final reality, the Absolute Idea.

As Prince Sakyamuni became Buddha, the Enlightened, so Jesus became Christ, the Anointed. The great drama of the Trinitarian Procession of the Godhead was developed. The Absolute Godhead displayed its three facets, of Power, Wisdom and Love. Was Christ, the Jewish Messiah, of one nature, and that less than divine? That was the Arian heresy. Was he of one nature and that only divine? This was the Docetic and again the Monophysite heresy. The Church affirmed the truth only by denying the false, as Communism does today. Duophysite, Duothelite, the Christ was Perfect Man and Perfect God, perhaps the one because the other, but not less the one than the other. "Light of Light, very God of very God," existing before all worlds, of one substance with the godhead; and He, the Logos or Reason, proceeding as Creative Idea from the Godhead. Also, revealing Himself really and truly under the chosen symbols of Bread and Wine. This is a greater thing than any local Hebrew prophet. It is the Drama of the Second Person of the everlasting Godhead—an unveiling of Reality through a new mystery—a drama with all the weight of Greek philosophy, as well as of Hebrew prophecy, behind it.

How little of Christian theology is intelligible save against the background of Neo-Platonic philosophy. To the Judaean revival Hellenic philosophy gave an explanation cosmic, not physical but metaphysical. The time, in the third century, had come to brush away tepid common sense and liberal, epicurean moderation—tasting as secular as the worldly maxims of Aristotle. The times demanded an idealism more drastic, Messianic, total—as some think we do today.

The Christian Religion was other-worldly. The revolutionary cataclysm would soon come; and it profited little to make plans and acquire worldly science about what should happen after that Judgement. Cultivated admonitions to avoidance of sensual excess had seeped down, in society, into excuses for sensuality and were now checked by the more than Platonic myth of hell-fire. The Christian religion sprang from, and understood, the proletariat. It placed, like any Cynic, the morality of the Ten Commandments before refinement. Its gospel was for those convinced of weakness and sin, and asking for redemption of will. But the route to salvation for the spiritually

* "Either god or not good"—because claiming the impossible.

elect was, not by revolution and the sword, but by passive-resistance. The treasure was within.

St. Paul of Tarsus (died ca. A.D. 64–69) declares that the ruler, therefore, "bears not the sword in vain" against the non-elect, as a correction for evil-doers. And to the ruler *in his own public realm*, although here alone, passive obedience was due. As St. Paul says, in Romans 13:

> Wherefore ye must needs be in subjection, not only because of the wrath, but also for conscience sake. . . . Let every soul be subject unto the higher power. For there is no power but of God: the powers that be are ordained of God. Whosoever, therefore, resisteth the power, resisteth the ordinance of God: and they that resist shall receive to themselves damnation.

It cannot be said that the lead which St. Paul gave to Christianity in the matter of slavery, witches, women and the advancement of science was, morally speaking, a fortunate one. Happily, religion is greater than St. Paul. But the political guidance of St. Paul and St. Peter alike cannot be accused of ambiguity. Obedience to legitimate power, since temporal life was of little moment, is counselled without reservation and in a fashion far more than pacifist because passivist. "Honour the King." And "render to Caesar the things that are Caesar's." Pay tribute to Caesar in respect of those things of minor moment that Caesar controls. Also slaves obey your masters, and wives your husbands. As St. Peter says (I Peter, 2):

> Submit yourself to every ordinance of man for the Lord's sake: whether it be to the King as supreme, or unto governors, as unto them that are sent by him for the punishment of evildoers, and for the praise of them that do well. For so is the will of God, that with well doing ye may put to silence the ignorance of foolish men: as free, and not using your liberty for a cloak of maliciousness, but as the servants of God. Honour all men. Love the brotherhood. Fear God. Honour the King. Servants (slaves) be subject to your masters with all fear; not only to the good and gentle, but also the froward. For this is thankworthy, if a man for conscience towards God endure grief, suffering wrongfully."

It is difficult to over-estimate the political effect of these words.

Wisdom is virtue and alone matters. And wisdom is this: that the elect live in love among themselves, well content to be an example of the good life but imposing their ways on no man not of the free brotherhood, disinterested in the noisy, superficial strife about liberty and power and the just or unjust sharing of worldly goods which matter nothing. And that the elect show their light to the world by displaying

charity in principle towards their enemies as a new technique of conquest of this world and its evil, in order to enjoy true goods of the soul in the immortal society of the elect. The citizenry of Faith and the fraternity of the Future succeed to the old citizenry of Polis and Empire and to the patriotism (not unriven by class war) of the mundane community. For the first time in the West *individualism* is born as a popular force, with the notion of the incalculable value of my soul—"The treasure is within"—although its expression is otherworldly *and* it is emphatically held in leash by the obstinate Judaeo-Hellenic insistence upon salvation being *in the community*. St. John had no tolerance for the heretic Cerinthus bent on irrationally finding the way of Life in his own fashion. Moreover, the background of the Roman Empire, guaranteeing Peace and Law, tends to be presumed. An adequate Christian political theory has to wait until the Church can no longer presume this as given, but has regretfully herself to confront these problems of the *social order* fit for the run of common, unregenerate men and not only for the elect and the religious.

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE

E. Bevan: *Stoics and Sceptics*, 1913.

The Legacy of Rome, intro. by Henry Asquith, 1923.

Cicero: *On the Commonwealth*, trans. and intro. by George H. Sabine and Stanley Barney Smith, 1929.

Chapter V

The Roman Law and the Christian Fathers

1

THE Roman Empire maintained the World Peace. If it was dying, it was an unconscionable time a-dying. The years between Romulus and Julius were more than doubled in the period between Julius and its formal demise in the days of Constantine XIII. In the East, it remained until the Fall of Constantinople in 1453, the names of Rome and Caesar being perpetuated in the Sultanate of Rum, in Rumania and in the Czars. In the West a Kaiserdom that claimed direct succession from the Caesars did not lay down its nominal claim to be Holy and Roman—"the Holy Roman Empire of the German People"—until 1806. In 1938 Adolf Hitler revived in imperial Vienna the Third Empire of the German People. Charlemagne was crowned in Aachen as sixty-seventh Augustus since Octavian. The Hofburg in Vienna is still decorated with statues of German Kaisers, with the pedestals inscribed "Caesar, semper Augustus." Both the Napoleons and the Italian Duce of our own day have sought to revive not only the Roman Empire's glory but its name.

If it endured through time, it extended through space. If a man walked from Rome West, he could go on walking round the Mediterranean until he returned to Rome from the East and, if he would but take a ferry over the Bosphorus, he would not have left the Empire of the Caesars. If he walked from York to Damascus, he need not leave the protection of the Roman eagles. In the words of the poet Claudian (flourished A.D. 400),

"The ages shall see no limit to Roman rule"*

—which "provides the human race with a common name."

* "Nec terminus nunquam Romanae ditionis erit."

The Roman Empire *was* civilization—standing in awful, in awe-inspiring isolation. Outside its boundaries to the North was the forest barbarian and to the South the desert nomad. Far to the East indeed lay the yet more august civilizations of China and India—scarcely more ancient, since Egypt gave its diadem to the Caesars. Every second week, indeed, a boat left the Red Sea ports for India. The Emperor Huang Ti at Loyang dispatched a trade embassy, we learn from Chinese records, to the Emperor Antun (Antoninus) of Ta Tsin. But between the Euphrates and the Roman Empire, walled on the North, on the one side, and the Yang-tze Kiang and the Chinese Empire, walled on the North, on the other, was interposed, not only India, but a Parthian Empire whose notion of Greek culture was to enliven the tragedies of Euripides by bowling the decapitated heads of conquered Roman foes into the midst of the theatre stage.

The Roman Empire was not sustained by the citizens of the city of Rome, *proles Romuli*. Even the Emperors for the most part, after the Julian line had expired, did not come from there. It was sustained by provincial legionaries serving in distant parts—provincial levies seldom trusted, as a matter of policy, in their own provinces. Racially cosmopolitan—with its Spanish, Dalmatian, Arabian, Thracian Emperors; Syrians brought up in Gaul; Constantine born in York of a British barmaid*—without colour consciousness or any seditious talk about purity of blood or even class consciousness—the Roman Empire was mentally cosmopolitan. It was indeed itself the cosmos ("order"); and it was natural enough that the writers of the New Testament should refer to Augustus as ruler of the world. "And Augustus Caesar sent out an order that all the world should be taxed."

The field marshals gave Peace. Rome was a proletarian, equalitarian, cosmopolitan Empire, ruled by these field marshals under apologies for democratic forms. It was precisely a popular government. But like the old Empires of Assyria and Persia and Lydia, as later of Turkey, it was a mechanical affair of the tax-gatherer and the recruiting-sergeant. It represented, against Hellas with its intensive, qualitative culture, the triumph of the essentially barbaric idea of the external, extensive, quantitative force of the military organization. Essentially it stood, not with Hellas, for the Community, but for Government—not Polis, but Police. Nevertheless, it thereby gave stretching space for the individual. If the characteristic of Hellas was organic inequality, that of Rome was mechanical equality. Rome had no soul—and uneasily knew it (as its anxiety about its official religion indicates)—but it had a mind. That mind lay behind its law.

* According to a not undisputed tradition.

2

The Roman Law was Rome's greatest gift to humanity after the Roman Peace. The Law Code typically begins by stating that the Roman Emperor holds his power by the dual claims of war and of law. The Roman Law was, as it were, the mental and articulate expression, the conscious spirit, of the Roman Empire. The Roman Law, however, as we customarily refer to it, was not so much the working system of the Empire in its heyday as a last will and testament to humanity, embodying principles that were rather a guiding hope than a daily fact. By the time that the compilation or Codex was complete, the dominating notion of the military Empire, the divinity of Rome and Augustus—*Roma et divus Augustus*—had been modified, so far as the legal system was concerned, by a Stoicism familiar with Greek jurisprudence and by Christianity.

The Roman Law begins, like most ancient tribal law, as the religious prerogative of born clansmen, citizens of the city, Quirites. It is the Quiritanian law which, at first no plebeian, and later no non-citizen is entitled, without sacrilege, to claim for himself. It was the perquisite of those who shared the patriotic religious rites of the *urbs* or polis. Rome, however, spiritually isolated from surrounding gentiles and self-sufficient, had perforce economic relations with the neighbouring Latin and Tyrrhenian world. It had even at Ostia a flourishing port. It was on the north-south trade route where it crossed the Tiber.

It was, then, the duty of the appropriate police magistrate, the Praetor for aliens or Praetor Peregrinus, to lay down publicly, in an edict, the principles by which he would administer justice to those traders who were not *gentiles* (gentlemen, men of the *gens*) or in suits between citizen and alien. Inter-nation law ever grows out of the needs for commercial law. And, although the Praetor might be guided in his decisions by private judgement and none could say him nay, elementary considerations of reciprocity led to the finding of those principles in the common customs of the trading peoples of the Western Mediterranean basin—the *jus gentium* ("right of nations," or, equally, "law of peoples") of those trading with Rome. Common convenience, again, and private alike decided that, although not bound, he should follow the principles embodied in the edicts of his predecessors. As Rome grew, those who fell within the jurisdiction of the Praetor increased in number and importance, and proportionately the importance of the Quiritanian Law, modified in popular *comitia* or assembly, decreased. The last *lex* of the *comitia* was passed at the end of the first

century A.D. in the days of the Emperor Nerva, Trajan's predecessor. The Praetorian Edict has become an established core of law, by the days of the Emperor Hadrian, Trajan's successor, as the Perpetual Edict. The *Edictum Perpetuum* has become the Roman Law, supplemented by new edicts of the Emperors, "novels" or *novellae* (up to the days of Charles V, of Hapsburg, and beyond) exercising their police or praetorian power.

Rome, however, was no less lawyer-minded than police-minded. The imperial edicts, as "statute law," were supplemented by a peculiar species of case law, the legal opinions of eminent counsel, the *responsa jurisprudentium*. The point here was not that the court had decided, since appeal or edict could override it and the co-ordination of decisions was incomplete, but that "masters" of wide experience, relying upon their own reputation alone, ventured opinions on difficult issues—opinions not always of detail but often of guiding principle—which the courts were prepared to accept as pointers and the codifying emperors to authorize as having the weight of case-law. Since learned counsel were sometimes learned men, from this source an immense amount of philosophy, especially Stoic, was injected into the Roman law and jurisprudence. The soldierly Romans became practising philosophers, although their philosophy was Greek and second-hand.

Various codifications, or reductions to system, of this body of law took place, for example under the Emperor Theodosius II (408–450) and under the Emperor Basil (867–886). The most famous and the earliest complete codification is the *Codex Justinianus* or Codex of the Emperor Justinian, completed in A.D. 592 by a group of Jurists headed by Trebonian. Nothing so monumental has been produced since, until the *Code Napoleon*, drawn up under the directions of the jurist Cambacères. Here, in the Codex, the Perpetual Edict and subsequent edicts of the Emperors were co-ordinated and condensed. Supplementing the Codex were the Pandects or Digest of the *Responsa Jurisprudentium*, including Greek material of as much as 1,300 years earlier—106 volumes condensed into five and a half—and the Institutes. The latter was an introduction or manual for law students in four books, largely based on the earlier work of the eminent jurisprudent Gaius, at the close of the second century A.D.

Peculiarly in the Pandects and Institutes can be detected the influence of Stoicism with its Cynic equalitarianism. Here is to be found the famous maxim, as basic to just law: "*Quoad ius naturale omnes homines aequales sunt*" (Ulpian)—"So far as natural law

pertains, all men are equal." The old Sophist distinction between Nature and Convention has come through to legal recognition. It is worth noting that Roman *Civil Law* (being the law of the *civis* or citizen, and so emphasized not in contrast to "criminal law," which it includes, but to Ecclesiastical or *Canon Law*) is distinctive from the great rival legal system, Anglo-Saxon *Common Law*, in that it is only too anxious to repose law, not on mere competent authority or established precedent about *what actually is*, but upon philosophic or moral first principles of *what ought to be*. The distinction dear to lawyers of the school of Austin, which we shall discuss,* between law and morals is, in essence, inapplicable to the Roman Law system and its derivatives today, the codes of the Latin countries, of Scotland, South Africa and, in part, of Germany. This adds to the difficulty, in language, of distinguishing "right" (*ius*) moral and legal; or German *Recht* and French *droit* as law and as moral right. The *responsa*, moreover, of academic authorities, as much philosophers as lawyers, sometimes carried a weight in the courts under the Roman system quite unlikely to obtain in courts swayed by the spirit of the Common Law. The effect is important upon the discipline of jurisprudence and upon later discussions.

Jus gentium has already been referred to. Alongside it, in the Imperial epoch, and in writings of earlier students, such as Cicero, of Greek jurisprudence, occurs the phrase *Jus Naturale*, "law of nature." The essentially practical Roman lawyer had proceeded by a method basically anthropological, in compassing his practical difficulty of administering justice to aliens. He sought to discover the highest common factor among local customs and then declared that he recognized in this a non-local, universal law common to peoples (*scil.* of the Mediterranean). The abstract-minded Greek looked within and by introspection discovered psychological principles which, as permanent to human nature, he put in contrast to the curious customs of barbarous tribes recorded by Herodotus. These basic principles, such, *e.g.*, as parental affection, rationally formulated, the Stoics had acclaimed as Nature's own law in accordance with which it was the moral man's duty to live—"*secundum naturam vivere.*"

Gaius, in the second century, identified the universal Law of Nations (common to peoples; *not* International Law or mere Treaty Law *between* peoples) with the rational Law of Nature. Substantially this identification, thanks to Roman practical sense and Greek philosophy, continues, from this time on, to hold good. The positive *lex*

* *Cf.* p. 246.

(law), in so far as justifiable in jurisprudence, derives from this basic *ius* in the double moral and legal sense. Subsidiary variations, however, occur. Thus, in the third century, the lawyer Ulpian brings the *ius naturale* back to its psychological origins; and asserts that the test of the *ius naturale* is the approval of instinct; whereas the *ius gentium* is mere general human custom, as distinct from local custom, and no more necessarily rational or truly natural than cannibalism or slavery. But even the animals recognize Natural Law. We have here an answer to the issue "Does human nature change?" or "Does human nature not change?" St. Isidore of Seville, the encyclopaedist (seventh century), and later writers will follow Ulpian here.

In view of the fierce later discussions on this issue and the tremendous influence, from the pre-Socratic Sophists right through to our own day, exercised by this concept of Natural Law, it is well to recall the intimate connection for the Stoics that existed between Natural Law for men—or, phrased differently, the Laws of Human Nature—and Natural Physical Law. Galen, the great physician, in the days of Marcus Aurelius explained that God's law was not arbitrary, but revealed through Nature—adding, "in this matter our view . . . differs from that of Moses." Physics, Psychology, Jurisprudence, in this order form a continuum for those necessitarian, monistic schools of the Greeks, such as the Stoic (not Aristotelian), in which *one* principle was seen as underlying the universe. The same rules govern all. This is exceedingly important in view of later moralistic attempts, under ascetic, anti-materialist, dualist and free-will influence (with *two* contrasted principles, *e.g.*, Light and Darkness, Mind and Matter, underlying the universe), to assert that law and politics cannot be approached by the methods of the natural sciences because social man is somehow supernatural. It is also necessary to note—in view of the professional objection that so-called "natural law" is not, technically speaking, real law, but a mere misleading analogy—that etymologically "real," *i.e.*, positive law, is a concept derivative from natural, physical law. This last is the older, basic notion. The gods, in nature, "found" true law before capricious, curious-customed man made the attempt. Later, we shall have to note the transition to the identification of Natural Law, via the concept of "the rational," with Divine Law. Thus the (? tenth century) legal *Fragmentum Pragense* (*i.e.*, "Fragment of Prague") declares that Natural Law "is nothing other than God." And Pope Gregory IX, in the thirteenth century says, more precisely, that breach by whomsoever (positive legislator or otherwise) of the fundamental Natural Law "risks the

imperilling of the transgressor's salvation," *i.e.*, is mortal sin—an interesting basing of ethics on a Reason also underlying physics. To these points we shall return later.*

It is necessary here to note that the concept of Natural Law has a double edge. On the one side, it is an instrument of conservatism. It asserts that there are certain fundamental principles holding true of all human beings in all times and in all places. Any attempt to violate these principles is as sure of nemesis as any attempt to violate those of physiology and sound health—they *are* indeed the principles of psychology and of the rational psyche. They abide permanent throughout the ages. All sound politics is a therapeutics of the body politic designed to bring it *back* to health by those principles. All chatter of reform and revolution contrary to them is mere fever; and the so-called doctors who talk in this way must themselves be regarded as gravely ill patients, if not lunatics. On the other hand, the doctrine of Natural Law is the very river that waters, across the map of history, the gardens of Radicalism. Any legislation that flies in the face of this law is merely noise, entirely fatuous and without claim to respect from law-abiding men. Much positive law, therefore, by legislators of low "intelligence quotient," is inherently mere error and ethically void. To the double consequences of this profound doctrine, accepted by implication in the massive Roman Law, we shall also return later.

The Roman Law, be it added, was not incapable of contradictions which, affirming the pre-eminence of natural law, also (apparently subordinately) affirmed the dictatorial principle: "*Quod principi placuit legis habet vigorem*"—"What pleases the *princeps* (prince, chief, *capo del stato*) has the force of law." The two positions were reconciled by reference to the so-called *lex regia*, that is, to the theoretical derivation of the absolute imperial power, especially as based on the old power of the tribunes, from the vote or plebiscite of the Roman popular *comitia*. It thus sought to reconcile the "*Führer*-principle" with constitutionalism based on law.

Whatever its philosophic inconsistencies (and they are few), the codified Roman Civil Law presented a logical system infinitely more coherent than any of the systems—if such they could be called—of customary law of the barbarian tribes that were destroying the old, and perforce building the new, Europe. Even where it was not the law of the land, it was—when the educational stage had been reached, with the coming of the universities—the discipline of the lawyers, moulding their concepts of jurisprudence. Outside the lands of the Eastern

* *Cf.* p. 167.

Roman Empire and the Latin lands, it was "received" in the German Reich in the early sixteenth century. It was a major element in shaping, from Gratian in the eleventh century onwards, the Canon Law of the Catholic Church which was actually administered in church courts—the so-called Courts Christian—throughout Western Europe.

3

Catholicism itself—whether universal or (in years of schism) of the Latin or the Greek Orthodox variety—supplied the spirit to this vast bulk of the Roman Empire. It was strictly its other-worldly, spiritual counterpart. The Roman Empire of the Caesars was a mechanism providing Equality before the Law and under Caesar, and Liberty collectively from the barbarian, but in obedience to the Law, the "powers that be" and the Genius of Caesar. It was so jealous of those small, voluntary organizations that were the heart-blood of Greek cultural life, that Trajan viewed with suspicion even fire brigades; and the early Christians had to register their churches as burial clubs. Fraternity it was left for Christianity to supply—a fraternity based on neither blood nor land (although Judaism illustrated the influence of both, and in Armenia there was a perceptible tendency for the headship of the Church to come into the hands of those claiming descent from the brothers of Christ), but based on an ideal principle, on "the Word." This emphasis upon fraternity, not unparallelled in earlier religions such as Mithraism and the Orphic mysteries, was something inconspicuous, if not new, in the teaching of the recognized philosophies.

The Roman Empire, failing in its attempt to maintain respect for the imperial religion, official, desiccated, heartless and without affection, compromised under the Emperor Constantine (279–337) with Christianity for its own advantage. The Emperor saw to it that he did not lose gravely by the bargain. The Emperor ceased to be god but, even although unbaptized until on his deathbed, he became "bishop in externals"—and the universal Church, still undivided between East and West, became loyal. The Roman Empire drew—or imagined that it drew—the life-blood of sentiment which it required to hold its fleshly bulk from corruption. Soon the Emperor had reachieved official position as "Isapostalos"—"equal of the apostles." Elsewhere the ruler was to become "Most Catholic," "Most Christian," "Most Religious." The days were over when the churchman Tertullian could say: "What have we to do with the Empire?" The Church Council of Chalcedon (A.D. 451) saluted the Emperor with the words: "Thou

art at once priest and emperor, conqueror in war and doctor of the faith." We have returned to the old creed, in a form merely decently veiled, of the Caesars, the Pharaohs and the Mikados—the theory of the divine King or, at the least, of the King by divine right. It was one of the merits of the Papacy that it was to end by breaking this tyranny. In the days of Justinian, an eminent churchman could enunciate the doctrine: "God has need of none, the Emperor only of God." Heresies, then, were acts, not only of rebellion against the Church, but of sedition against the Emperor. And, in practice, they were frequently the cloak of local discontent or, for example, in Egypt, of national separatism. The spirit of the Empire was one that insisted upon the political importance of religious uniformity. The Emperor, "shining image of the Most High," took on, as All-highest, some of the attributes of God. Still more dangerous, God took on the attributes of the Roman Emperor, autocrat, absolute, alone, administering hell-fire for sin as the Roman Law administered earthly fire for parricide.

The Catholic Church, like the Roman Empire, was universal, unique, outside it no security—*nulla salus*. The Catholic Church, like the Roman Empire, was everlasting. Voltaire might say, of the still existent Roman Empire of his day, that it was neither Holy nor Roman. Goethe might exclaim: "The dear old Roman Empire, How does it hold together." But still it went on, to get itself lost in the entanglements of the rise and fall of Napoleon. Nevertheless, it was written in the Book of the Prophet Daniel that the Fifth Empire shall last until the Last Judgement and the end of the world. Even when bereaved of its mundane, secular sister, the immemorial Catholic Church, *semper eadem*—"ever the same"—like some ancient woman when her elder house-mate dies, fails to recognize to this day the demise. In the Catholic Missal, in the Good Friday service, still occurs the prayer:

> Let us pray also for our most Christian emperor, that God and our Lord may render all barbarous nations subject to him, for our perpetual peace. Almighty and everlasting God, in whose hands are the powers and rights of all governments; look favourably on the Roman Empire; that the nations which trust to their own fierce might may be overcome by the hand of Thy power.

The Catholic Church, however, was much more than the Empire's chaplain. It was the organization of Roman citizens through baptism in the Christian community. No less cosmopolitan than the Empire, it did not limit its frontiers with the Empire. If it questioned whether the heretic, in a Christian Empire, could enjoy full citizenship, the

historian Orosius, pupil of St. Augustine, could declare that the Christian Goth, outside the imperial limits, was also a comrade and a brother. Both Empire and Church were theoretically unique, universal—but perhaps with different frontiers penetrating into black barbarous space.

The Church, moreover, like the preceding philosophies, asked and answered the question: What is the Way of Life? The gospel of the developed Church came from Semitic Judaea, but its organization came from Rome, bishops being mitred prefects—and its philosophy came from Hellas. The Stoa supplied the systematic moral theory which reached expression in St. Ambrose of Milan (ca. 340–397).* Plato supplied the theory of the community. The Neo-Platonics supplied the systematizing ideas for the theology.† The Church moved on, enriched by the treasures of the ages, not even forgetting titles and phrases and festivals that recalled Isis, and the gods of Egypt. Briefly, the way of life was salvation by rational faith. The ancient Church, however, was truer to the classical mood than it is easy now to recognize. Its thought, Platonic, was essentially *social*. Salvation was in and through the community, with its sacraments, and accompanied by social works. The love of the brotherhood was to be more than a good intention or a gift of grace unfructified in deeds.

It fought for Orthodoxy, and was intolerant, precisely because the social bond mattered and, therefore, heresy as revolt against that social bond of the common faith was a treason against the community in and through which men prepared themselves for the final community or communion of Saints. Like Cynic and Stoic and even Epicurean, it contemned (less wise than Aristotle?) worldly circumstance, goods and respect of persons. It campaigned against neither war, slavery nor private wealth.

Its primitive spirit was Pacifist and Communist. Ananias and Sapphira had been blasted by Peter, spiritually electrocuted, for giving only part of their possessions to the common stock. In the early days, the Church in the Holy Land had all things in common, as had the disciples of the Lord. Slowly "the great Church" (= Lord's House, *Kuriou oikos;* or *Ecclesia*, the "called-out" and "chosen") had made precise its belief in these matters. The elect, the fully religious, those of vocation, must not bear arms. A monk of St. Basil, who served in the army, before he could return to his Order, must do protracted penance. The clergy (clerōtoi—"elect") must not fight. And, as we have seen,

* *Cf.* p. 139.

† *Cf.* p. 121.

an Orosius could insist that even the enemies of Rome were brothers as being also Christians.

A restricted Communism was maintained. If Clement of Alexandria could make his appeal to the rich, St. Ambrose could declare that "he, who having a superfluity, leaves his brother in want is a thief." The doctrine was evolved that wealth is a trust. But matters were carried further. The fully religious, of vocation, accepted the life of poverty. This Communism certainly was not Marxist—and no worse service to clarity of thought has been rendered than by the assumption that Marxism and Communism are synonymous. But the voluntary Benedictine monastic communities were the most successful working experiments of Communism in history until the coming of coercive Marxist Russia. Later, we shall discuss the attempt of the Popes to regulate more precisely the Church's authoritative attitude to community of property. Briefly, the Church dealt with these issues by making a clear distinction between those especially chosen, by vocation, to live the ideal life of religion—and incidentally to act as spiritual directors to the rest—"regulars" who practised pacifism and communism, and the bulk of the *massa peccatrix*, "the sinful mass" of humanity, which could only be expected to keep the letter of the minimal moral law and who might fight out their quarrels and quest after gold. The distinction is startlingly Platonic.

The Greek, especially the Peripatetic, was fully conscious that men were animals, and frequently unpleasant animals. Civilization was an entity, in which most must serve as tools and instruments in order that the glorious social structure of culture might be raised to its peaks. The mass was negligible mess: matter that did not matter. The proletarian Church could adopt no such attitude. That was its innovation. All were "members of one body"; and the least of the faithful, no less than the proudest, served to the greater glory—not of luxurious pomp—but of Him, the Eternal Maker. To all salvation was freely offered, although not all had grace to answer. But, for the animal nature, the Church substituted Original Sin—and never forgot to remember its part in human affairs. As much as Plato (with certain reservations) the Church was social-minded. And, as much as Plato, the Church was aristocratic—but *neither* by birth *nor* ability in success, but by talent and grace to serve. So the Pope took his title: "*Servus servorum Domini*"—"Servant of the servants of God"—but of them only.

The Way of Life was that of Sympathy, not Apathia. The outstanding contribution of the Church, despite all its socialism, was its

equalizing individualism. The point is important. Socialism for Aristotle was inequalitarian: the mass were animated instruments of society and morally, because socially, bound to be such. If we like to put it so (I have already shown the grave limitations of such a phrase*) Aristotle was a Fascist. Society (*not* the State) was Leviathan. The individual *as such* (especially in Aristotle's early Platonizing period) had no claim, but only in terms of his immediate power to contribute to the social good here and now. The object indeed of the polis is the life of the citizens; but their best life (the "best" determined by independent values, not caprice or "votes") *in* that polis. The epoch-making, if not novel, contribution of the Church was the assertion—so much wider than in the case of Socrates—of the immortality of the soul, *i.e.*, the incalculable value of the *individual*. And this it asserted, however superficially fantastically, against pantheism and "fusionist" theories—"fusing all the skirts of self again, should fall remerging in the general soul." He was immortal *in* the community but, nevertheless, immortal *as* an individual. He was an individual living member of the Brotherhood; not a cog in a society. In his own right he was entitled to co-suffering, sym-pathy, sympathy. He had a natural, moral right to this as a human soul. Hence, under all its Platonic hierarchic order, the Church remained profoundly equalitarian, as being in the logic of respect for *human dignity* (as distinct from civic or national glory)—the dignity of *all* human beings as such.

Whereas, again, Plato had too often spoken as if he presumed that justice is *social* (and had thereby made it "static"), the humble man having no right save to mind his business in his actual humble job, the Christian idea found its essence in its doctrine of salvation. It saw each man for what he potentially might be. It insisted that the true, divine justice is *individual*, rendering in earth or heaven, now or ultimately, to each man severally and alike, honour according to what he had the will to be, even if crushed down in circumstance. It found in immortality the myth—not of course so un-Platonic—against which it could set forth the central doctrine of the right before God of each man alike, lowly or of high degree, to justice as a "dynamic" soul of incalculable value, entitled to respect even from rulers and commonwealths. The Communism of the Church was vocational, like indeed Plato's, not bureaucratic and shaped like Leviathan, as is the Webbs'.† Its doctrine of equality, however, was central, individualistic, revolutionary, "dynamic."

* *Cf.* p. 91.

† *Cf.* p. 652.

The Church was equalitarian because it was a brotherhood, but even in a brotherhood there are diversities of gifts. More profoundly it was equalitarian because it moved the focus of observation of value from this world, with its civic utilities, to the next and to the eye of God. In His eyes all were sons; all immortal; all individuals; all having value enough to merit the supreme redemptive act. They had sonship by sacrifice. This equalitarianism was then thoroughly other-worldly, unconnected with and apart from convenient, conventional rank—not even equality by nature, but by ideal grace or spiritual potentiality (*i.e.*, supernatural, transcendental). The Platonic "natural" (*rational*) becomes the Christian supernatural (*non-material*) way of life. The doctrine was connected with repudiation of this world as unimportant. It was ascetic. It was deplorably bound up with hostility to this world and to the body. But it understood the meaning of discipline (*askesis*).

The Church, defending its equal, proletarian community against the "cultured" argument of Aristotle, pledged itself to fight against the world, the flesh and the devil—public business life, the body's demands and intellectual pride. Briefly, more cynical than the Cynics, it damned the Hellenic idea of civilization from its foundations; and arrayed spirituality against that civilization and its works. The Church alone met Aristotle by a total repudiation of his common-sense assumptions. "*Credo quia absurdum*," said Tertullian: "I believe because absurd." Despite all claims of reasoners and dead culture, the Church knew that she had spiritual power to move history. The faith worked. And respect was claimed for the simple man against the proud as being more than all Aristotle could see in his knowledge, more than an *organon empsuchon*—"an animated instrument."

During the early centuries the Church so far had the mentality of a persecuted body and again was so far chiliastic—that is, believing that "at the end of the thousand years'" cycle, the Second Coming was now at hand—as to give little serious attention to a political and social theory of this world. The serious thought of the theologians only slowly overtakes the literalistic, Messianic revivalism of the masses. Slowly the School of Alexandria, led by St. Clemens Alexandrinus, constructs its elaborate neo-Platonic theology over against the more factual School of Antioch. It is not, however, until after the conversion of the Emperor Constantine that the Church begins to elaborate a theory of the relation of Church and Empire. Gradually the Church had begun to accommodate itself to the notion of remaining on the earth indefinitely, having mundane responsibilities and therefore having obligations, as the supreme supernatural community, of

exercising mundane control. Instead of enthusiastic discussion about what Christ did, we have reasoned dogma of what the Church taught.

4

ST. AUGUSTINE (AURELIUS AUGUSTINUS, died 430), Bishop of Hippo, in what is now called Tunisia, old Carthaginian territory, a Numidian born in Thagaste of North African parents, was the man who provided the Western Church, along with many volumes of theology and the memorable *Confessions*, with this needed political theory of a Church now recognized by the Empire.

Augustine had especial qualifications for the task. The son of a country gentleman accustomed to responsibilities, with no little of the resentment of a passionate provincial against the alien metropolis, Rome, he yet owed, if not his conversion, at least his early religious instruction to the great Ambrose, aristocrat, Roman Governor of Liguria, who had been made, almost under compulsion, Bishop of Milan, the Northern Imperial residence. In the *Confessions*, Augustine tells of his early attempts to gain the intimacy of the great bishop.

> Often when we had come (for no one was forbidden to enter nor was it his custom that any callers should be announced), we saw him reading to himself, and never otherwise. And having long sat silent (for who would dare intrude on anyone so intent?) we had to leave, thinking that, in the small interval which he obtained from the turmoil of business to refresh his mind, he was in no mood to be taken off.

Rebecca West may be right in asserting that "a fundamental determination to take and not to give explains why [Augustine] never performed any action during his seventy-six years which could possibly be held up as a pattern for ethical imitation." He was yet a genius who contrived to impress his personality, after being in turn pagan, Manichee heretic and Catholic, upon the faith of his last adoption.

Perhaps this determination to take, and dependence upon his dominating mother, may explain alike the intensity of his quest, among competing faiths, for spiritual security and the moral irresponsibility with which he permitted this lady to send packing his mistress of fourteen years' association, the mother of his son, when, as it seems on such evidence as is available, a promising financial match was in the offing. He explains that "his heart was wounded, yea, and blood drawn from it"; but took no further action. Later he came to reflect that she had been an impediment attaching him to the world. It is, however, a commentary on the odd incoherence of Augus-

tine's attitude that he elsewhere states that prostitutes are necessary in these times lest "everything be disturbed by lust."

The Church, for Augustine, is something apart from "the World"—primarily an invisible Church of the true saints, although not lacking a visible organization, with disciplinary power, in this world. It fights against "the World"—"this age," with its secular ambitions and sensual pleasures. Augustine, artist, full of the African passionate immoderation, is preoccupied with this contest. His views find expression in what, it must be confessed, is a somewhat dull book, *De Civitate Dei*—"Concerning the City of God"—which nevertheless had not only a wide, but a prolonged and profound, influence and was used as a bed-book by the semi-literate Emperor Charlemagne.

Primarily, the *De Civitate Dei* is a devotional book as much as seventeenth-century Richard Baxter's *Saints' Everlasting Rest.* But, secondarily, it carries on the old controversy which one finds earlier in the pages of the works of St. Cyprian, Bishop of Carthage, concerning whether the pacifist Christians were the cause of the decay of the civic spirit and military vigour of the Romans. Actually the historian Gibbon, with his allegation that bishops and barbarians destroyed Rome, may be partially right, but only partially, in this matter—the Christian *non-civisme* was only a symptom of a condition due to the mechanical nature of the Roman Empire. In it men were bureaucratically regimented, from the wealthy *curiales* or gentry down to the peasant increasingly regarded as tied to the land, in their place and function (from which after the days of the Emperor Diocletian there was increasingly small prospect of escape), in a mercilessly planned and totalitarian society, Socialist in the worst possible sense, a veritable nightmare of Bernard Shaw's. The citizen was tailored to fit the taxative system and the need for metropolitan doles, and not conversely. Not unnaturally, Christians—Cyprian and Augustine among them—were highly sensitive, even if African provincials from the region of Carthage, to this charge of anti-patriotism—as sensitive as any German Lutheran pastor or Catholic priest today.

Augustine's reply to the gentile writers is that it is justice alone which holds a society ethically together—a good Platonic reply—and that justice is not possible when men are only seeking paltry interests and have no grasp upon eternal values (still Platonic) and the true, Christian faith. Hence Christianity, far from destroying any Roman commonwealth worth preserving, offers the only principle upon which a sympathetic and organic community, as distinct from mere crass, exploitative imperialism, can be founded. It is an attractive

piece of theorizing—nor could bishops gallantly substituting for Roman officials, and leading the military defence of their flock against the barbarians, be accused of failing, albeit at a late hour, to put their civic principles into practice. We shall later note* how Augustine is among the first clearly to abandon pacifism and to begin the development of the Christian theory of "the just war." Also Augustine is one of the first to hold that the Church could recommend (of course, for civil reasons) to the Emperors the persecution of obdurate heretics as a public menace.

In the third place, however, Augustine had to produce a positive theory of his own. This he does, although it occupies only a small portion of this one among his many books. It is a theory, however, which will be dominant for a millennium. It starts out from a quite non-Hellenic dualism between the secular and the spiritual communities. This dualism, however, it should be noted, certainly does not mean that Augustine and his successors contemplated a schism between the political and the ethical aspects of life. All Catholic thought forbids that conclusion, even if Protestant thought occasionally gives colour to it.

There was indeed, for St. Augustine, in the phrase of Marcus Aurelius, a "dear City of God." It was universal, in space extending beyond the Roman Empire, and also in time, eternal. It had, for Augustine, two aspects: the City Triumphant of those who had gone beyond and were now known to be of the communion of saints and those, in the City of Pilgrim, the Church in this present vale of tears, whose salvation by grace was yet under probation. And ever against these two spiritual cities was the city of this world. Like Plato, Augustine—last of the Romans but also introvert, "first modern"—turns to psycho-analysis. The Cities Triumphant and Pilgrim are held together by a common living principle; they are one *voluntary* City of Other Love. And—this is what is crucial—it is patent that the principle of the first City, of Other Love, is more sublime and valuable than the principle of the second City, of Self-love and of This World. Allegiance to the first city takes precedence of all allegiance to this second worldly city. Here is indeed the new philosophic world-citizenship of the Stoics with a vengeance recoiling on the old, local citizenship of Aristotle with his civic pagan gods of Acropolis and hearth.

The City Triumphant is alone satisfying to the immortal individual soul, merely temporarily resident here, but heaven-bent on salvation. "There are two loves"; and love of it and its brotherhood in

* *Cf.* p. 701.

Christ is the true love. What then is Rome? From the context it clearly appears that pagan Rome, guided by its ambitions and lust, without true faith, is the City of Other Love. It can indeed maintain a kind of fist-right order—but only like a brigand gang under its chief. "Justice being removed, what is a commonwealth but a great robber's nest," with its taxation and recruitings. And Augustine enunciates principles conspicuously similar to those of the early Messianism. "The earthly power will not be eternal. . . . It has its good here, which it enjoys so far as that kind of thing can be enjoyed." But this competitive, capitalist, military world is yet damned. "The first founder of the mundane commonwealth was a fratricide," Cain.

Can this fratricidal system of force and property be saved? It can. Although without an eternal principle in itself and bearing the coercive sword only because man, steeped in original sin, needs the discipline of force to check him—a discipline based on sin and existing because of it—nevertheless the Commonwealth can be saved if it accepted (as Cicero himself had said) the principle of justice as its guiding principle: a justice informed by grace of the faith, and that the True Faith. Briefly, the Empire was saved when it obeyed the spiritual directives of the true Church. Otherwise, it was a mere association of selfish, aggressive men to defend their own forcible acquisitions, and was damned in its sins. Those may note who care the similarity—and the difference—between Augustine, one of the eight Doctors of the Universal Church, and Marx. At least in this they agree, that some day the imperialist State will wither away like a scroll in the fire.

St. Benedict of Nursia (died 543), in Italy, another Father of the Church, deserves our attention not so much for what he wrote as for the political thought frozen into what he did. A century later, St. Isidore of Seville, the encyclopaedist, was to write that, "by natural law all possession is common." Benedict it was who gave practical realization to Platonism—was the first practising Communist in the West after that style of Communism of Noyes and Brook Farm, in nineteenth-century America, which we find set out in the pages of Nordhoff's *Communistic Societies of the United States*. But Benedict, not without precedent in the money fleeing hermits of the Egyptian Thebaid and in St. Basil in the East, established his settlements on the basis of religious zeal. The wandering individualistic hermit and solitary monk he regarded with suspicion. In his *Rule* he lays down for his monks—the world-famous Black Monks of St. Benedict, carriers of civilization over barbarian Europe—three principles: conversion,

obedience, stability in one place, the basis of community life. For him the community came first, took charge, was the necessary environment for the fully religious life. His monasteries were to be "workshops of (and for) souls." In the Benedictine community, small, centring round its church and its abbot (*abba*—"father,") with religious culture of jewel-like intensity, the Platonic Republic came to life in a shape that made it capable, amidst the ruins of a dying Roman civilization, of confronting the oncoming Dark Ages.

5

"The world itself," wrote St. Cyprian of Carthage, in the third century, "announces its approaching end by its failing powers." Africa, granary of the Mediterranean, was becoming desiccated—and the practical Romans were no agricultural chemists, neither were the Christians. "*In occasu saeculi sumus*," wrote the great Ambrose—"We are in the decline of the age"—the end of the "great cycle" of which, Spengler-wise, the Stoics had written. Nevertheless, the moral world has conspicuously changed for the better. In Christian circles asceticism by reaction has replaced the erotic orgies of Syrian ritual and the homosexual vices that were the commonplace of ancient Hellas and, not least, of its Puritan city, regimental Sparta. Even in non-Christian circles a new, more exacting standard of manners has replaced the old violent luxury—a preparation for the meticulous, mandarin scholarship of the Byzantine epoch, incredibly erudite if entirely unoriginal.

The late fourth-century nobles of Rome, still pagan, piqued themselves on their better morals; visited each other; constituted a cultured society; spent quiet hours in a library. A mild Romanticism was in the air. Symmachus, pro-pagan Governor of Rome, writes from the country, "now we rusticate here at our ease and in a thousand ways enjoy the autumn." He will not even be severe about the Christians. They moved in quite good social circles and included even the Emperor (although reported to be what these Christians called "a heretic") in their ranks. Symmachus was tolerant. "It is not possible to arrive at so great a secret by exploring one way only." Another great magistrate and landowner, a Dalmatian, St. Paulinus of Nola, declares, "I have sought much and far but found nothing better to believe than in Christ." Maybe the best were dying out, as Tacitus had foretold. Maybe the world, with new manners and a more mildly cultured aristocracy, was moving on to Byzantine placidity. St. Augustine reflects that "to abstain from all assent to faith is to

abstain from all action." One must have the will to believe. There must be a unity of theory and action. But, for all that, he will be a reasonable man and a (neo-) Platonist. "The clear and luminous face of Plato has shone forth, free of the mists of error which had hidden it, most clearly in Plotinus." "I feel sure that I shall find among the Platonists all the truth that can be attained by the subtlest reason and then I shall follow *so long* as their teaching does not conflict with our religion." There is a wistfulness in the common tone. As has been written of the pagan philosopher, poet, huntsman, later Bishop of African Cyrene, Synesius—"the man's hope flickers upwards towards the last and most adorable figure in his pantheon," the Risen Lord.

O Christ, Son of God Most High, have mercy on thy servant, a miserable sinner who wrote these hymns. Release me from the sins which have grown up in my heart, which are implanted in my polluted soul. O Saviour Jesus, grant that I may hereafter behold Thy Divine Glory.

The barbarians were coming. Orosius could look over the frontiers and salute them also as brothers. Were not many of them being drawn, and that for many a year, into the Roman mercenary army? As we today, so the Roman provincial then, was optimist. Had not the eminent and cultured Sidonius dined with Theoderic II, the Goth, and found him not so intolerable? The barbarians were flattered to converse at dinner with a Roman. There was talk of establishing a school of studies at Bordeaux with salaried professors.

On New Year's Day, 406, the Vandals, announced foes of Caesar, not mercenaries, crossed from the East the frozen Rhine, moved South through Gaul and Spain, leaving their vandal track, and on into Africa. In 410 Alaric, the Visigoth, sacked Rome. In Alexandria Theon the mathematician had died—Alexandria of the Museum and the Library, Athens' heir. The fanatic, dirty monks murdered Hypatia, pagan Theon's daughter. The light of science became extinct and, apart from kindling in infidel Bagdad and Cordova, mathematics did not blaze forth again until twelve centuries had nearly run their course. In his city of Hippo, besieged, surrounded by the Vandals, in 430, died Augustine, its bishop, saint and doctor of the Church. In 476, Romulus Augustulus, the little Augustus named after Rome's first king, fled Rome to offer his diadem to Zeno, co-emperor in Constantine's great city on the Bosphorus. For the while, the Western Roman Empire had fallen. As the deacon Salvian said, early in the fifth century, "the Roman world was laughing when it died." Half a century and a Gallic

bishop writes, as one might write today of Spain and China: "All Gaul is one vast funeral pyre."

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE

J. N. Figgis: *S. Augustine's City of God*, 1921.
G. Ferrero. *The Ruin of Ancient Civilization and the Triumph of Christianity*, trans. Whitehead, 1921.
P. Vinogradoff *Roman Law*, 1909.

Chapter VI

The Middle Ages

1

THE Middle Ages were not merely a gigantic irrelevance interposed into the course of history. Classical civilization, broken, was like a precious box of spikenard of which the contents were now spread abroad. Civilization, in the West, ceased to be Mediterranean and became European. Exception made of the separate Chinese sphere of influence and, in part, of India, all humanity outside Africa, south of the Sahara, was now brought under the Romano-Hellenic sway. Arabian civilization acknowledged the debt. The price paid for this involuntary diffusion of the civilization of the Walled Empires was six centuries of barbarism. When the process had been completed, with the Christianization of the Slavs and the rule in Russia of the successors of Rurik, there was no longer in the globe a barbarian outside the gates. Civilization finally ceased to be merely a matter of river bank and seaboard strips. The Dark Ages represent an advance, just as perhaps our own coming Dark Ages will do in building a World Sovereign.

The Middle Ages roughly falls into two periods, which may be termed the Dark Ages and the Resurgence of Learning. As long as it is clearly understood that all attempt at precision in dividing into periods —since man does not live by periods like school text-book writers— is misleading, then we may say that the Dark Ages is the six centuries from the mid-fifth to the mid-eleventh, and the Resurgence is the following three passing on into the High Renaissance.

The distinctive mark of these Dark Ages—we may also speak of earlier Dark Ages before 3000 B.C. in Egypt, as Spengler does, or after Agamemnon in Greece—is ruralization. The outstanding phenomenon is the break-down of communications. The courier no longer ran from York to Rome. The Roman roads were overgrown with bush and their passage no longer safe. The Greek and the Italian and the Phoenician had been town dwellers. The German and the Slav, like neolithic man, were hamlet or farmstead dwellers—their township was not a city (*civitas*) but a village (*villa*—farm). When the Greek had gone out as a

trader and colonist, typically he had established himself on new land and built up his commonwealth round some acropolis or hill-town. The relation of the aristocratic Spartan to the Messenian stock is an interesting exception. Even the Celtic Remi around Rheims and the Parisii around Paris had, with increasing civilization, tended to assume that city-state life which appears natural to humanity from Cadiz to the Indus.

Why, then, is Northern Europe not a land of the city-state? Because the Teutonic invader found (save in his native Germany with *its* hill-towns or fortified places) a Roman provincial population already in possession of higher civilization than himself. Least in the case of the Anglo-Saxon; more in that of Frank, Burgundian, Visigoth; especially in that of the Norman, they tended to spread themselves thin over the land as a stratum of conquerors, protected against attack by forming a military upper class, furnished with privileges for better self-defence. We get, not a city-state society, with its typical political problems, but a class society based, not on capital, but on race and the sword.

To the coming of the Barbarians we have already referred—for example, to the Vandals who entered Gaul in 406 and whose name to this day is a byword. No less notorious are the Mongolian Huns, strange emissaries from that other sphere of civilization where China dominated, defeated by the Chinese Emperor Wu-ti, "the Chinese Trajan," who appear on the horizon, on the Volga, about 374 and, despite their employment as mercenaries and, later, defeat, in 451, by Aëtius and the Visigoths on the Mauriac Plain near Troyes, remained a menace until the death of Attila (453). The Mongolian inroads, indeed, continued (excluding the mongoloid Turks) until the days of Genghis Khan, who raided west to the Crimea and who, eastwards, took Peking in 1215, establishing that Mongolian dynasty of which Kublai Khan was the most outstanding Emperor. It is, however, unnecessary to search further than the German tribes for manners strange and peculiar which give lurid significance to the "barbarian." Thus Alboin, the Longbeard (Langobard), conquered Lombardy from his barbarian predecessor, married his daughter, Rosamund, made a drinking cup out of his skull, and invited his bride in the friendliest fashion to drink from it. Perhaps Sidonius had been mistaken in his charitable opinion about the barbarians. It is not surprising that, a few centuries later, scourged by the Viking raids of the Northmen, the French monks added a new clause to their litany:

"*A furore Normannorum libera nos, Domine.*"*

* "From the fury of the Northmen (Normans), deliver us, O Lord."

In the Emperor's city, indeed, Constantinople, as in Damascus, Bagdad and Cordova, all was different. These were Manhattans of those days—Babylons. Luxury unheard of by the barbarian stirred the occasional wanderer from Northern lands to awe and greed. Here was the last refuge of the Romans—Greek-speaking now—the subtle men, the Niebelungen, whose learning was magic. But as Professor Bury says, by the middle of the sixth century, the Eastern Empire was "touched with the dispiritedness of the Middle Ages." Men occasionally shivered with the cold of the approaching shadows. "A conviction that the limits of human knowledge had already been reached began to prevail universally." The Eastern Empire was crustacean; even contented; very scholarly and marvellously erudite, bejewelled, full of craftsmanship—but it had lost its nerve. Rumour spread that the great Emperor, Justinian, walked his palace in ghostly form. For the outside Norsemen, to whom tales of it came, Constantinople was "the Great City," Mickelgarth, the magic city where the Roman Emperor, King of the Niebelungen, reigned.

Along with physical ruralization went mental rustication. The barbarians were "pagans" in a precise sense, for the word "pagan" means men of the tribe (*pagus*, or countryman). Just as Catholicism in Protestant England, so paganism lasted on in portions of the country, in a Europe slowly becoming Christianized during the period of the great seventh-century missions. The process of Christianization itself was patchy, making necessary concessions to rural obstinacy and to the rough sensuality of primitive warriors. On the one side the Church, fighting against the rural superstition of the village, of goblins and wishing wells, took over these wells as saints' wells; identified Christmas with the Druid Yuletide feast; only drew the line when the villagers took to worshipping the bones of the saint-dog Gellert—then with bishop and bell and candle would exhume the bones. On the other hand, it fought desperately against those more sophisticated, dangerous gods—those of the Roman upper classes, by no means "pagan" country-rustics. The Church might use statues of Jupiter as statues of Peter, statues of Apollo and the Wolf as statues of the Shepherd and the Lamb, but Apollo himself became the demon Apollyon, and all these gods—not unreal, but very real—devils.

The literature of "pagan" antiquity was soaked with these references to the false gods, these devils of the heathen. How then could a Christian read Virgil? As the Dark Ages drew on and men became less sure of themselves, increasingly they suffered from bad conscience. They dreamed of the books of the heathen transforming themselves into

pots of vipers. Even the great scholar, St. Jerome (346–420), who translated the Bible into Latin, as the Vulgate, dreamed of being refused by the irate Peter access into Heaven. "Thou art not a Christian. Thou art a Ciceronian." Illiteracy increases. Virgil becomes pre-eminently a great magician. The Emperor Charlemagne, in the ninth century, Frankish barbarian that he was, could only just sign his own name. In the eleventh century a more literate Emperor played a prank on one of his bishops by obliterating from the prayer-book the "fa," where the bishop was to pray for all God's manservants and maidservants—"*pro famulis et famulabus.*" The bishop accordingly prayed for the "he-mules and she-mules."

Authoritatively, the attitude and fears of the Church are expressed, in the sixth century, by St. Gregory of Tours: "Let us shun the lying fables of the poets and forego the wisdom of the sages at enmity with God, lest we incur the doom of endless death by sentence of our Lord." And, in the same century, a great Roman, acclaimed as "the last"—an educated man of high birth—Pope St. Gregory I, the Great, said:

> The place of prepositions and the cases of nouns I utterly despise, since I deem it unfit to confine the words of the Celestial Oracle within the rules of Donatus [the grammarian]. . . . Let us, therefore, with all our soul scorn this present world as already brought to nought. Let us close our yearnings for this world at the least, at the very end of the world's existence.

The Pope may have had a sense of humour. But his contemporaries did not take him so.

The age is obsessed with the idea of death. Not life and hygiene; but death and salvation matter. The Way of Life towards eternal salvation lies through death, the vale of tears and judgement. It is an ascetic path. Happy, it has been said, is the age that has no history; but this can scarcely be said of the Dark Ages. They had a history; but men were for the most part too busy slaughtering each other to record it. In the country men tilled the fields of Northern Europe in their one-piece shirt as their only garment. In the towns, when at last superstitious fears of town life and Roman-haunted ruins were overcome, the refuse gathered in the stinking streets. Plagues swept the land. Death came early. Only in the monasteries and in the Church civilization kept alight its torch—save in the East and in the paynim lands of the Arab and Moor. On weather-beaten, wind-swept isles, Celtic monks gathered to their prayers and illuminated their missals. Sometimes a warrior, converted from violence, would join them in the ascetic life and win God's peace.

Ipse post militiae cursum temporalis,
Illustratus gratia doni spiritualis,
Esse Christi cupiens miles specialis,
In hac domo monachus factus est claustralis.
Ultra modum placidus, dulcis et benignus
Ob aetatis senium candidus ut cignus.*

The mood of the age found late expression, but in supreme form, in the thirteenth-century hymn, *Dies Irae.*

Dies irae, dies illa
Solvet saeclum in favilla
Teste David cum Sibylla.
Quantus tremor est futurus
Quando iudex est venturus
Cuncta stricte discussurus.†

Of this Mediaeval period in Western Europe there are, politically speaking, three key-notes: Feudalism, Romanism and Catholicism.

2

Feudalism is not so much a theory about a system as a chaotic fact, not uncustomary in the world's history, not without parallel in ancient Egypt, not unanticipated (as emphyteutic tenure) in the Later Roman Empire, but stamped distinctively by the institution of "knight-service," *i.e.*, the tenure of land from a feudal lord in return for military services rendered or due. If, however, no man of letters worked feudalism up into a political theory, the lawyers in a litigious age did not fail to give to the current system a theoretical and legal coherency. If the theory by no means always corresponded to the facts,

*He, after his temporal warrior's course,
Illumined by the grace of spiritual gifts,
Desiring to be the especial soldier of Christ,
Became an enclosed monk of this house,
Entirely placid, gentle and benign,
His hair by age as white as a swan.

†O Day of wrath, O dreadful day
When this age shall pass away,
Witness David and the Sybil.
How great the trembling will there be
When He, the Judge, shall present be,
All things then to settle strictly.

Note the reference to Hebrew David and pagan Roman Sybil—here regarded, not as devilish but as magically inspired.

that is no more than is to be expected of a romantic age. It corresponds almost precisely with the character of Romanticism, in contrast to the defined and limited Classical assurance.

Feudalism, no more than the Middle Ages, is an irrelevancy, although it is the very negation of the later *Stato* or State, and of the former *Imperium*. It is conditional anarchy, in which a congeries of baronies and free cities are lightly tied together, which has almost lost the very remembrance of the Caesarean totalitarianism and of the Greek *civisme*. But it is not a disease. It nurses a cooperative individualism. It is an institution which admirably corresponds with the economic situation and military needs of the period. That situation, as we have mentioned, is the break-down of communications, ruralization, the agricultural self-sufficiency of the village and its farm lands or manor.

However, no more than the old Greek polis—even less, since not every manor has its fortified hill—is the village militarily self-sufficient. It has its keep or church-tower as the first point of defence against a barbarian raid; but it needs to have the right to call in outside assistance from the county, the duchy, even from the realm. On the other hand, the first defence must be local—locally organized and locally supported. The duke cannot, conditions being what they are, arrive for five days and the king for twenty. By that time the marauders will have vanished. And there is certainly no money to sustain a standing army nor any indication that it would be more efficient under the current conditions of material decentralization, when, moreover, the men of Northumberland, as late as the fifteenth century, were to claim that they admitted no king but a Percy.

Exchange of Services is of the essence of the feudal institution. According to a theory in many ways admirable, all land was held in return for work done. The symbol of the feudal system is a three-sided pyramid. On the side of craftsmanship the lowest tier is the apprentice, rising to journeymen, master craftsmen, worshipful masters of craft guilds, worshipful mayors. But this is the face upon which the sun of feudal glory shines least.

The knightly or military face is of those who held land, lords who were land-lords. Below the knight (*Knecht*) ranked the peasants who hold "by the plough" (*per carucam*), being free peasants; free peasants holding by servile tenure; serfs; even a few slaves (in England freed by the eleventh century). Above the knight, holding his land "by the spear" (*per hastam*) range barons, earls, dukes, culminating in the king of the realm and—for the real feudal visionary—above the king

in Christendom, ranged against the Paynim, the Emperor himself. This then was the earthly face.

There was also the unearthly face of those who hold "by prayers" (*per preces*). And if they too became lax and ceased to serve, there could be a writ for ejectment—its ground, that they had "ceased to sing:" the writ *de cantare non cessando* ("concerning not ceasing from singing"). Here in the lowest tier is the laity which merely is bound to fulfil the moral law. Above them the lofty structure rises—those having vocation, spiritual directors. First, the five minor orders; then the two major orders of deacons and priests. Then bishops, archbishops, metropolitans, patriarchs. Finally the top stone is the Holy Father, Pope, Patriarch of the West, Metropolitan of Italy, Archbishop of Latium, Bishop of Rome. Whether he also was coping stone of the whole pyramid as Vicegerent of God, or whether the structure, with Pope and Emperor, here soared to Heaven itself, was, as we shall later see, one of the prime political conundrums of the Middle Ages.

Contract, not Dominion, is consequently also of the essence of feudalism. Although the logic broke down when the landlord had to deal with his serf, over whom he exercised a measure of dominion, as between "fully free" men no one had any claim to services who did not render them. It will, however, be noted that (unlike the nineteenth century), despite all talk of contract, feudalism yet *also* talks in terms of *status* and of contract between *corporative groups* associated by mutual *customary* obligations. The constitution, as the historian Maitland says, was an appendix to the law of real property. And under this law (with certain minor reservations to which we shall return) there is a relation of suzerainty and vassals but not of sovereignty and subjects. The baron is *baro*, etymologically *homo*, just "a man"—the first human who is "a man," because he is entirely, Homerically, anarchically free, save under his own voluntary contract. One recalls Homer's phrase about the slave who is only half a man. When, therefore, Robert of Gloucester rebels against his liege, King Stephen of England, the contemporary complaint is not so much against his rebellion as against the fact that he rebelled without going through the solemn form of *diffidatio*, or "casting off of faith." In brief, he was not a gentleman. A Count of Flanders, invited by Henry II of England as Duke of Normandy, to rebel against his liege, Philip Augustus of France, explains that he owes to the king feudal service in so many horse and this sworn duty he will duly perform. But the rest of his forces he may send to the assistance of the other side. A century earlier a Sieur de Puiset may, on ground of some grievance, obstruct success-

fully the passage of the King of France from Paris to his country estates until later the Sieur de Puiset chooses to go on Crusade. Two centuries later, a German baron will declare private war on the City of Cologne because his niece has been insulted at a city dance. But in Germany private war, like the duel, is a habit.

The formula of the feudal contract is phrased by Bracton [or Bratton], Archdeacon of Barnstaple (died 1268), in his *Concerning the Laws and Customs of England*, a work written under the influence of the Civilian, Azo of Bologna, and being the earliest attempt at the systematization of the Common Law of England (*i.e.*, legal custom—"*sola Anglia usa est . . . non scripto*"—"in England alone use . . . not written"), common to all parts of the realm (or most of them), save for the treatise *On the Laws of England*, ascribed, perhaps wrongly, to Ranulf Glanvill, chief justiciar of England from 1180 to 1189. "There is," says Bracton, "such a connection established by homage between lord and tenant that the lord owes as much to his tenant as the tenant to his lord, saving only reverence" ("*quod tantum debit dominus tenenti quantum tenens domino praeter solam reverentiam*"). Bracton has his own way of dealing with the absolutist dicta of Roman law. The ruler's will may have the force of law, but this is to be interpreted in the light of the conclusion that we are not rashly to presume what is the king's will but to understand it in the light of his intention to do justice. However, the dictum has value because, as Glanvill points out, it gets over the difficulty whether English common law can rightly be considered such, not being written. The answer is affirmative because, unlike mere custom, it is sustained by the will of the king. Bracton, however, has a way of dealing with tyrants and is clear that the king, although under no man, is

> . . . under God and under the law because the law makes the king. For there is no king where arbitrary will rules and not the law.

The Crusading Kingdom of Jerusalem was the finest example in structure of a feudal kingdom. More developed than the mere marauding band of a German chieftain and his companions, it is yet an affair of warrior ventures of which the king is little more, save in reverence, than first among equals. Like William the Conqueror and his very mixed company of Normans, French and Flemings, the crusading kings were presidents of a joint-stock company—and none too sure of their position at that. In England, by Roman law dictum, "all land is the king's," but it is thought best to supplement this abstract maxim by

an original contract. By the oath of Salisbury, in 1086, William assured himself that all his tenants in chief, and even their tenants, admitted their contractual obligation of service in return for royal protection.

In the East, where the king even more obviously depended upon the support of his nobility, not native to the land but there on conditions and by their own choice, a yet more elegant expression of the prevailing theory is possible—although, as is often the case with political theory, it comes late and in the works of a jurist writing after the Lusignan dynasty of kings of Jerusalem had left that city for Cyprus.

JEAN D'IBELIN, in his *Assize of Jerusalem*, at the end of the thirteenth century, writing in Cyprus, again lays down the feudal principles which were later to develop as those of governmental contract, constitutional checks and balances, and constitutional monarchy. "*L'ome deit tant plus au seignor par la fei que il li est tenus que le seignor à l'ome, que l'ome deit entre un ostage par son seignor*," etc. The tenant owes just this much more to the lord, than conversely, that the tenant must be prepared to act as hostage for his lord, to give him his own horse in battle and to act as security for his lord's debts. On the other hand, if the lord or king breaks faith, the high court may take action by process of law even against the king, for "lady or lord is seigneur only by reason of right." And if he will not submit to justice, allegiance is at an end.

More striking but more dubious is the oath stated to have been administered in Spain to the King of Aragon before coronation by his nobles. "We, who are of as much worth as you, and have more power than you, choose you king upon these and these conditions, and there is one between you and us [the Justiciar of Aragon] who commands over you." Certainly the very existence of a Coronation Oath implies a contract between the king and those entitled to administer the oath. And even the Germanic Roman Emperor, elected to the headship of the Holy Roman Empire, when crowned in Aachen (Aix-la-Chapelle), was asked by the ministering prelate, the Prince Archbishop Elector of Cologne, "if he will maintain the Church, if he will distribute justice, if he will defend the Empire, and protect widows, orphans and all others worthy of compassion;" and so takes oath. Legal checks fade away into moral—but not without the stern sanction of licensed rebellion to give them force.

The principle of licensed rebellion or conditional anarchy is enshrined in the Great Charter of Andreas of Hungary, 1222. It is

enshrined in the earlier Great Charter or Magna Carta of John of England, 1215.

> If we shall not have corrected our abuse within forty days . . . those twenty-five barons, with the whole commonwealth of the realm, shall distrain and press us in any fashion that they care.

It is, however, interesting to note that this licensed feudal anarchy—this conditional anarchy—so scandalous to the modern lawyer, is never merely such. The contractual obligation or feudal covenant is between men who, whether individually in their consciences or by a specific relationship on oath, are already under law, the prime, natural moral law of God and reason. This law of God, moreover, is not something only subjectively determined by private conscience. There is a rational law, of which the consensus of men and the moral judgement of the Church is interpreter. The very notion of contract comes from God's law, positively expressed in the Old Covenant. In Chap. IX of the Book of Genesis we read of the Covenant made by God with Noah, as sign of which He set His rainbow in the sky, and again in Chap. XVII, of the compact of God with Abraham for the benefit of the Chosen People. Joshua made a covenant with the people. Saul also was rejected from the kingship of Israel because of disobedience (in not massacring Agag) and David was anointed in his place by Samuel, the priest.

This notion of a basic covenant, back of the temporary feudal covenant, between God and man is a commonplace of the period. It is, however, worked up into striking theoretical form, in the midst of the controversy between Pope and Emperor, by the eleventh-century German ecclesiastical writer, Manegold of Lautenbach. Here the Emperor, as supreme secular ruler, is agreeably compared with a swineherd. Sound contractual theory, indeed, is to some extent departed from by the implication that the governed are the swine. But the contract in which the ruler is involved is clearly brought out. If the swineherd does not tend the pigs but maltreats or kills them, then the owner "*a porcis pascendis cum contumelia illum amoveret*"—will remove him from pig-feeding with contumely. "It is one thing to reign, another to exercise tyranny in the kingdom . . . for in the greatest empire is least licence." The metaphor is mixed, since it is not clear whether God, the superior, shall remove this swineherd or the swine themselves shall dismiss him. This at least is clear that the pact to obey a ruler, when he abuses his office, becomes null—and this precisely because of the ethical dignity of that office by reason of which the pact has obligatory force. Actually the Papal See and the Synod of

Rome declared the Emperor Henry IV deposed; but this was merely for the court to proclaim the pre-existing fact that Henry, by his own abusive action, had released his subjects from that pact of allegiance which, like all pacts, was two-sided.

WILLIAM WYCLIF (died 1386), Master of Balliol College, Oxford, so far as his political theory is concerned is almost unintelligible except in terms of this feudal background which indeed, to the student of political theory, he is chiefly important as illustrating. Perhaps no writer, from Plato to today, with whom we shall have to concern ourselves is more remote from the modern outlook than Wyclif. For that very reason he is an arresting and angular example of a past world-view, a genuine primitive. It is interesting to note that Wyclif was condemned for his ecclesiastical views in 1377, five years before the condemnation of his doctrinal, sacramental views. Whereas the citizens of London backed their bishop and lampooned John of Gaunt, Gaunt and his aristocratic faction, including Joan of Kent, were backing Wyclif for the benefit which these astute politicians imagined might be derived from a priest who could irritate the bishops. An extra chaplain or two were cheap at the price when the game was, not evangelic truth, but fourteenth-century politics.

Wyclif is a very learned man, which perhaps explains the tortuousness of his thought, who derives his ideas from three major sources. Wyclif is an Augustinian in the sense that, like the later Calvinists, he follows St. Augustine in placing stress on the evangelical notion of Election by Grace. In a moment we shall see the part played in Wyclif's thought by the notion of an "elect" or society of saints—the perpetually recurrent notion of a spiritual aristocracy. Wyclif, also, in his earlier days, was profoundly under Franciscan influence and especially of what we may call the Franciscan Left, with its extreme stress upon the spiritual value of material poverty. Further, Wyclif was under the influence of the new philosophic School of Occam, which was not only Nominalist (*i.e.*, atomizing and individualizing) but also anti-curialist, *i.e.*, critical of the part played by the Papal Court or *curia*. To these elements—and unlike the imperialist or internationalist Occam—Wyclif adds a peculiar nationalism of his own, entirely politically acceptable to Gaunt and to Richard II against Catholic, internationalizing bishops. The work for which he will be remembered, the new translation of the Bible into English (it has been done before), just as St. Jerome had translated it from Greek into the "vulgar" Latin (Vulgate), fits in alike with his nationalism, if in the

fourteenth century one may begin to use such a phrase, and with his genuine concern for the lay folk of the non-possessing classes. Although he did not commit himself deeply (any more than Luther later), he is part of that social movement which also threw up such fruits as John Ball, the preacher of the days of the Peasant's Revolt in England. The Franciscan friars, later his enemies, also looked for the influence of their preaching to the same quarters.

The clue to Wyclif's peculiar doctrine is his theory of "Dominion," in which indeed he is not so much original as the follower, fairly closely, of FitzRalph, Archbishop of Armagh (died 1360), author of *The Poverty of the Saviour* and himself a critic of the Franciscans. Dominion is of two kinds, "by grace" and "civil." In what follows it is necessary to bear in mind that Wyclif was an academic and a Schoolman, that is, someone brought up in the philosophic schools of the time with all their peculiar qualities, for good or evil, of abstraction and logical nicety. Dominion by Grace is, says Wyclif, the only "true" dominion. It is the dominion or rule which God Himself exercises through his elect or saints. Theirs is the vineyard of the earth. The Church Fathers had held that dominion of one man over another, like slavery and private property, is only "conventional" and not "by natural law." This notion Wyclif develops. The only "true" priority is that of righteousness. The rest is not natural, but usurped. As the eleventh-century pro-imperial *York Tractate* had said: "The reprobate and sons of the Devil of whom the number is greater, are not members of the body of Christ. . . . Thus there are two Roman Churches, one of Satan, the other of Christ."

Do not then the unrighteous bear rule? They do apparently—but *false et pretensum:* "a false and pretended rule." Nay more: that the wicked, ripe for damnation and hell, had a free use of God's vineyard to profit by it and bear rule in it, that they had this of right and could enforce the right, might be law but it was the law of the Prince of This World and of Darkness. It was a diabolic law. Here then the radical consequences of natural law doctrine appear again, which are later to wash up Jean Jacques Rousseau. Wyclif's doctrine, however, is extreme to the point of anarchy. There is no reason why non-moral rulers should be obeyed. Only the saints were entitled to reverence—and presumably Poor Priests like Wyclif's. At the same time, a principle of rulership does remain. The Roman Curia, full of lawyers and corrupt men, cannot decide who the saints are. That is determined by Predestination and Grace. But, nevertheless, the earth is quite literally the Lord's and his rulership as real as any feudal baron's. There is in

Wyclif a strong vein of what can only be described as Seventh Day Adventism. (One recalls other Churches of Latter Day Saints, who marched to find a land where they could live by a pure rule.) It is not remarkable that the doctrine made some secular rulers raise their eyebrows, not least when it moved over to Czech Bohemia (native country of Richard II's queen) and came under the leadership of John Hus.

There is, however, also a *Dominium Civile*—a Civil Dominion. Wyclif, the evangelist, has gotten himself into difficulties. But Wyclif, the Schoolman, will pull him out. The Virgin Mary obeyed Augustus Caesar. Nay, more (the illustration is Wyclif's), did not God Himself obey the Devil?—by being crucified? Wyclif hastily swings back into line with received ecclesiastical political theory. Sin is in the world which is sodden with it from its origin. And the secular rule, with its coercive sword, is by reason of sin—and must so remain. Wicked Roman Emperors are tolerated of God—not of course of right but of sufferance—to chastise the more wicked. If the Civil Law of Rome pretends more than this (the Emperor's alien law, not good English law) then the Civil Law is wrong. For what is it, after all, but "paynim mannes law"—a law of Roman pagans, damned in their sins. Nor is the Pope's Canon Law much better, since it is irrelevant to grace.

How then are sinful men to be ruled, since ruled they must be? . . . and even the saints must tolerate this sad necessity whereby sinners chastise sinners. The answer is to look at the Bible, the [written] Word. The country must be governed by the Bible. Now, the Bible is not very favourable to earthly kings. As we learn from the holy Samuel, it prefers oligarchs or Judges. Who shall interpret the Bible? Lawyers? Clearly not—but theologians, who alone are competent to interpret the Word of God. The country then must be governed, under God as recognized Overlord in Chief, whose earth and land this world is (and all land is the heavenly King's), by Judges—that is, by saint-befriending noblemen (such as John of Gaunt) guided by Biblical-minded theologians (such as Wyclif)—and governed straight from the Bible itself.

Feudalism, lawyers apart, did not lend itself, even in a logical age, to strict and systematic exposition. It was too much the product of circumstances. Wyclif's doctrine, which was to have great influence among the Bohemians, with their dislike of Emperor and Germans, was a mixed brew of feudalism and theology. William Stubbs, the historian, was not, however, entirely paradoxical when he insisted that the Middle Age was the period alike of liberty and of ethical right (before the Machiavellian power-politics took the stage again).

Slightly differently, it was the epoch of rights rather than right, privileges rather than *leges*, liberties rather than liberty. Its doctrine of the rights, against the ruler (scarcely, yet, "Government"), of the *baro*, the freeman—vassal but not subject, against suzerain but not sovereign—fitted in practically with the wider but less tangible Churchly claim of the individual worth and immortality of every soul, whether that of King Robert of Sicily or of his jester. "*Deposuit potentes de sede*"—"He hath put down the mighty from their seat"—declared the Church in *Magnificat*. "We being as good as you," declared to their king the privileged barons, descendants of free German and Norse barbarians, free by their sword.

Like the Roman Empire with its Code of Law, so Feudalism reaches its fullest theoretical expression after its own effective demise in Europe. Actually it lasts as a system longer in confederate Germany, where dukes have become autonomous kings, than in centralized England and France where the New Monarchies have made dukes into subjects. And it is in the German free town of Emden that we get the last flower of this theory. In order to make clear the connection, tenuous but genuine, between feudal thought and modern, we shall therefore take two steps, of centuries, forward to modern times. It is perhaps permissible, in this fashion, to emphasize that the story of political philosophy is not a mere chronological matter of a list of dates but one of following out those skeins of human tradition in thought that bind together the ages and assure us that no century or epoch is entirely "dead" and irrelevant to our own.

JOHANN ALTHAUS (Latinized as Althusius, 1557–1638), magistrate of the city of Emden, wrote there his *Systematic Politics* (1603). It is intelligible against the background of a Germany where the *theory* of feudalism, with its counties, free knights and free cities, is passing over into the theory of federalism. Some alternative was ever more urgently needed, as the *facts* of feudalism recede, to that centralization of the empire as conceived by the Roman lawyers, which was yet still utterly unacceptable, at that time, to the German mind.

Supreme power, says Althusius, is merely a matter of brute *de facto* dominion or even something capriciously constituted; any government. Power, however, deserving allegiance, *true constitutional* power, is power to fulfil the *purpose* of the commonwealth. This constitutional power is a form of *law* (*ius regni*—"law of the realm"—or *ius majestatis*) established by "the whole associated body"—*universatis consociatio symbiotica*. Thus feudalism, including the group corporative

notion in feudalism, passes over into constitutionalism. The commonwealth itself is a federation, *communitas communitatum* ("a community of communities"), made up of associations ascending in pyramidical form from the basic unit up. This basic unit (as Aristotle indeed had said) is the family. The whole is a co-operative commonwealth of which the virtue is work done God-fearingly and of which the blessing is material prosperity. Althusius is a Protestant, a strong Calvinist, reinforcing his argument in the fashion of that post-Reformation age by no less than two thousand texts from Inspired Writ. The incentive to this co-operation among sinful men is the fear of damnation.

Kings are not unrestricted landlords, exercising absolute dominion, but functional agents exercising sovereign power on behalf of the whole. This ultimate power, being used for the purpose of the commonwealth, inheres in the entire people which it is designed to serve. It should be added that Althusius enunciates certain general principles of politics which will be discussed in their proper place.*

It cannot be asserted that Althusius' theory was of any immediate or profound interest. His *Systematic Politics* would today be a mere literary curiosity had it not been for the great revival of interest in Mediaeval History which characterized the nineteenth century, partly under the influence of the Romantic revival, partly under the mistaken notion that the charters of Teutonic liberalism were to be found behind the Saxon stockades at Hastings or in the heart of the German forests. Further, the nineteenth century saw a revival of the agelong lawyers' fight between the exponents of Civil Law principles and the defenders of Common Law or native German custom. In the process of that very practical fight, Professor Otto von Gierke, a "Germanist" and author of *The German Theory of Association Law* (1881), published a small tractate entitled *Althusius*. The subsequent struggle, and the influence of Gierke upon English thought owing to the work of Professor F. W. Maitland, with his *Theories of the Middle Ages* (1900), translated from Gierke, and of Professor Ernest Barker, with his further translation from Gierke, are matters appertaining to the history of our own times. It is enough to note that Althusius, even as a "bottle-neck" connecting the Mediaeval with the Modern age, had played his part. It is absurd to dismiss Mediaeval Feudalism as an irrelevancy when one of the most important movements in contemporary politics—Pluralism and Guild Socialism in its various forms†—derives from it. It would be truer to say that it is only irrele-

* *Cf.* p. 653.

† *Cf.* p. 653.

vant to the Hellenic tradition. It indeed colours the dominant Western European tradition until the revival of Hellenism, in the political field at the close of the eighteenth, and especially during the nineteenth, century. All Federalism and much Constitutionalism and Individualism look back upon it for their roots.

3

Catholicism, whether the Eastern and Western Churches were in union or schism, was now dominant, moulding the history of the Middle Ages. But it moulds those Ages, as it were, externally; it is in them, but not of them. When the Emperor Gratian (375–383) removed the "pagan" Altar of Victory from the Senate House in Rome as offensive to the Christian faith, Catholicism had become established and was no longer the tolerated religion which it was under the Edict of Milan (313) of Constantine the Great. It soon even lost the character of a purely voluntary, if no longer persecuted, society. By the time of the Emperor Theodosius II (408–450), heresy became so far identified with civil sedition as to earn civil prosecution. Catholicism became, in one aspect, the sustaining vehicle of the Roman idea.

The Dark Ages and the centuries following are penetrated, as it were, by two great tunnels that convey, as aqueducts through barren mountains, the purest waters of classicism into our own age. Whereas feudalism is genuinely characteristic of the post-barbaric age—a form of society natural for the free fighting man, *Knecht* and Knight, *comes* and count, after he has become a conqueror—the Roman Empire and the Roman Church remain witnesses of a totally different, non-romantic but Roman, civilization. Hence we get the phenomenon of theory being discussed in the Middle Ages, only capable of explanation by tradition and only related to the historical conditions of the day in the connection of moulding transcendent idea and brute material. Whether the etymology be or be not sound, the Roman Pontiffs (*ponti-fices: ? pontis factores*) were "bridge-builders" in the most precise sense from an immemorial past into the present.

The Holy See, at least from the days of Pope St. Leo the Great (440–461) had been rapidly consolidating its position, which by the second century had acquired recognized pre-eminence, as appears from the testimony of St. Irenaeus. In a Mediaeval World of nobility by blood, the Chair of the Fisherman could alone among thrones be occupied by a man of humble birth, a student living by alms such as the English Breakspear, Pope Hadrian IV, or a carpenter's son, such as Hildebrand, St. Gregory VII, as much as by any Orsini or Colonna or

Medici. The custom has lasted to this day, when the brother of Pius X could continue to go his postman's rounds in Milan. Nevertheless, as we have said, the Pope constitutionally was very much Plato's philosopher king and the Cardinals of the Sacred College his Areopagus. He was head of a community that regarded itself as complete to itself—*communitas perfecta*—at least in every sense in which Plato's Guardians constituted a complete community. The controversy of the eleventh and twelfth centuries about Lay Investiture turned upon the issue whether bishops were to be primarily territorial lords, the nominees of those who gave them land and who expected in return feudal dues and the performance of civil offices, or the elected servants of the Church. The issue was complicated by the claim, set forth by St. Augustine, of the eternal Church-society (which perhaps also was the visible Church) to a superior allegiance, unless Caesar were to be placed before God.

The Church, as a community of all Christians, naturalized to this citizenship by baptism, had then, in the Clergy, its own officers. It had its own law in the Canon Law. It had, in excommunication and penance, its own penalties. In annates, Peter's pence, tithe and the like, it had its own direct taxes imposed on the faithful. In the crusaders it had its own armies, and in the Military Orders of the Temple and the Hospital. As its Canon Law was infinitely preferable in system and enlightenment to most current common law, so its civil service at the Papal Court stood head and shoulders in efficiency above anything of the kind to be found elsewhere west of Constantinople. In the Papal legates it had, before any modern nation, its own diplomatic corps. The universities of Europe were primarily schools for the clergy (I except medical Salerno and legal Bologna, after Irnerius, with its Civil as well as Canon Law) and the educational system was the Church's. As Lord Morley, no partial witness, stated, the Mediaeval clergy might be ignorant and but little ahead of their flock, but that little meant all the difference between stagnation and leadership in progress.

The Papal Church had three problems to solve, one of domestic and one of external relations, and also one of its own guiding law. Dr. Poole, the mediaeval historian, says: "The history of the Middle Ages is the history of the Latin Church." Dr. Harnack, the great German historian of Christian dogma, adds: "The history of monasticism is the history of Latin Christianity."

The first problem of statesmanship was to harness Monasticism to Papalism within the Catholic Church—to harness a waterfall of

spiritual energy so that it should do useful work in the control of men in this world. Dr. Troeltsch, the eminent German historian, puts the matter neatly: "World-flight in the service of the world-dominating Church: world-domination in the service of world-renunciation—that was the problem and the ideal of the Middle Ages." God might indeed serve the Devil but it was a voluntary act, not contemplated as a permanent relationship. Obedience was due to the Powers that Be, but God did not design that these should remain pagan but accept the yoke of Christ. Thereby, his Church, as spiritual director, also became one of the Powers. As such it had to deal with sinful men and their secular princes. The monk, on the other hand, exclusively dedicated to the religious life, was in flight from the world.

How, then, to use these reservoirs of spiritual energy in the monasteries to keep the Church clean from the contaminations of secular life and responsibility? The answer is the history of the regular orders, the monks and canons, and of the friars, from SS. Augustine and Benedict, through the Monastic Revivals and the work of SS. Francis and Dominic and their friars, on to St. Ignatius Loyola and the Society of Jesus. Thanks to these movements, the Church retained a measure of spiritual integrity, even in years when the Papal Curia had become almost entirely secularized in outlook, preoccupied as it was, not with sentiment and enthusiasm, but with the concrete problems of law and of government. The result was the majestic institution which is the Catholic Church, that is, a realized Platonism.

The character, however, of the ecclesiastical hierarchy must not be associated with mere secularism: it represented realism, responsibility and even charity. The vice of the monk and the elect was exclusiveness. It is a significant piece of symbolism that, today in Belgium, crucifixes made under the puritan Jansenist influence, have the body drooping and the arms half closed, Y-shaped, whereas the more orthodox crucifixes have the arms wide open, the Church insisting that she is more than a congregation of "religious" or known "elect," and is catholic, offering salvation to all.

The second problem was the agelong one of the relation of Church and State. Indubitably there was an *imperium in imperio*—"an empire in an empire." The Church has its claim to final allegiance. The real issue of the Middle Ages and even later was, which empire enclosed which. Did a barbarous kingdom, emerging from tribalism, enclose the Catholic Church, whose Pontiff drew his title from the priests who functioned from the very foundation of Rome, and from the High Priests of Israel; or did the Catholic Church include these

petty, recently civilized kingdoms of Saxon and Frank and Visigoth? As Dr. Troeltsch says, the Middle Ages had "no feeling" for the State—and not unnaturally, since the State, in the modern sense, did not yet exist. The reality was feudalism and the king as first baron among his peers—*primus inter pares*. To represent, however, the relationship of Pope and Empire (or Pope and Kingdoms) as one of perpetual conflict is misleading. Apart from a brief period during the reign of the Emperor Charles V, the only gap in the good relations between Papacy and Empire from the ninth to the nineteenth century was between the late eleventh and early fourteenth century. The relations were good when neither was stimulated by the ambition for power to push legal logic too far. It was the lust for power—later degenerating into the lust for local power, first of the Kings of France issuing in the Great Schism, and then of other national Kings—that broke up the reality, such as it had, of the Platonic Christian Republic. Let us examine the orthodox theory of representative and moderate men on this issue.

The Christian Republic, *Respublica Christiana, Civitas Dei,* was the prime object of every Christian man's allegiance, on peril of his eternal salvation. *This* was the society, and no other, in which that salvation had to be worked out: this was the "dear City of God" on earth. The implications of this allegiance had been developed by St. Augustine, and later writers were less hesitant about clear identification with the visible Church, although it was admitted that many of the tares of Satan were to be found as well as the wheat of the "true Church," and that in the highest places, in Rome or Avignon. Society, then, *tout court,* was the Church. As the chaplain and biographer of the Emperor Frederick I, the Red-bearded (Barbarossa), Bishop Otto of Freising, of the twelfth century—no partial Papalist—put it: "History is not of two cities, but of *one only Church,* instituted of two elements, divine and human." In the same century, the canonist, Stephen of Tournai, in the Low Countries, writes in the same vein:

> The commonwealth is the Church. The King of the commonwealth is Christ. There are two orders in the Church . . . two lives . . . two principles . . . a double jurisdiction. . . . If each has its due rendered to it, the whole will fit together.

The specific relation of Church and Empire ("State" is still an anachronism) is amply dealt with in the pamphleteering of the Age of the Investiture Controversy (eleventh–twelfth centuries). The orthodox position is classically defined in the famous formula of Pope

Gelasius I (died 496). There is "one body with two aspects. . . . The Christian Emperors need the Pontiffs for their eternal salvation; [for outside the Church Society there is no assurance of salvation—it is the old Platonic argument] and the Pontiffs use the Imperial administration for the oversight of temporal things." However, the Emperor, at least in internal matters, is flock, not shepherd. Caesar is "*non praesul sed filius*"—"not governor but son"—in the Church. (This throws an interesting light upon the demand of Henry VIII of England to be Head of the Church of England.) The Pope, in his coronation ceremony, was told by him who administered the oath: "Remember that thou art set to be the Father of Kings and Princes, Lord of the World, Vicar of Christ." But it was orthodox to recognize that if the Pope had his especial spiritual function, involving final direction in society for salvation, the Emperor also had his legitimate secular function in the coercive regulation of sinners for the protection of well-doers.

Pope St. Gregory the Great (died 604) had no more doubt than his predecessors that "coercive government has been made necessary through sin." If, that is, all men would come to grace and be converted from their sins, these Emperors, Kings and their henchmen would all be rolled away—but Pope and Bishops, pacifist overseers in the saintly flock and wiser than the rest, would remain. The temporal power was also a temporary power. The substantial thought is very Marxian.

Pope St. Gregory VII (1073–1087), that striver after righteousness who declared on his deathbed, "I have loved justice and hated iniquity, therefore I die in exile," makes that comparison even more forcible. In the famous letter to Bishop Herman of Metz, he writes (1081):

> Who does not know that kings and duces derive their origin from those who, ignoring God, have striven in blind lust and intolerable presumption, to dominate over their equals, that is, other human beings, by pride, rapine, perfidy, homicide, and indeed by almost all kinds of crime, being stirred up by the prince of this world, the devil?

Such indignant outbursts, however, must be put in the context of Gregory's remarks elsewhere that the ecclesiastical and temporal powers were, if in agreement, like two eyes and the general clerical doctrine that they were like sun and moon—the moon indeed being the lesser light used in our dark sojourn here and deriving its light from the greater.

There were indeed two swords, spiritual and temporal. No one denied the customary delegation of the temporal sword to princes to

exercise coercive justice. But was the temporal sword delegated by the spiritual power?—or both swords by Christ alone and *not* by his Vicar or Vicegerent? There lay the issue. It was the merit of the Patristic and Churchly theory that, for it—as much as for any Anarchist later (and there is something of the anarchist in the early Fathers) —*the temporal authority is essentially coercive and, for that very reason, non-ideal or incompletely ideal.* Innocent III, in writing to one of the German Elector Archbishops, is frank enough to confess that he personally prefers the same man, a bishop, to exercise both powers—but that it was a matter of local arrangement.

Difficulties are reached only when the dependence of the temporal upon the spiritual, international power is emphasized and, by a logical mind, carried to its conclusion. When so carried, as by Pope Boniface VIII, in the Bull *Unam Sanctam* ("One Holy"), 1302, the result is an early enunciation of the cardinal political doctrine of Sovereignty. It will, then, be noted that this doctrine was first enunciated by the Church. The Church, Boniface VIII asserted, must have one head—*non duo quasi monstrum*—"not two as if a monster." Hobbes himself could not have put the matter better. A theory of sovereignty emerges inevitably from applied Platonism.

John of Salisbury (died 1180), less well known as John Small, illustrates well enough in his writings, such as the *Policraticus*, the attitude of the ordinary "high" churchman. John of Salisbury, secretary of St. Thomas à Becket and later Bishop of Chartres, was one of the Humanists or pre-Humanists living during that early period of the resurgence of learning, prior to the great Schoolmen, and connected with the names of Abelard and Anselm and the founding of the Universities of Paris and Oxford. It is an age not without dignity. The letter in which Peter the Venerable, Abbot of Cluny, announces the death of Abelard to the Abbess Heloïse is one of the most beautiful in all literature. Apart from pleasant literary excursions that show a mind not yet broken to the logic of the Schoolmen, John is preoccupied with such age-old questions as the relation of "free will" to the nature of God. His political views—apart from a significant little tractate *Concerning the End of Tyrants*—appear as asides. The prince, he says, in words worthy of bishops of the Eastern Church, is an image of the Divine Majesty on earth. But, if such an image, then he must behave in a fashion worthy of it. If not, he may be distinguished as a tyrant and the moral source of his authority has gone. And this also is true of law. "Vain is the authority of all law unless it bears the image of the divine law: and unless it is conformable to the decrees of the Church."

In the *Policraticus* John of Salisbury writes:

> This [temporal] sword, then, the prince receives from the hand of the Church, although she herself in some sense holds the sword of blood. She, nevertheless, possesses this sword but she uses it by the hand of the prince on whom she confers the coercive power over the body, reserving the authority over spiritual things for herself in the pontiffs. The prince, therefore, is in a sense the minister of the priestly office, and one who performs that part of the sacred functions which seems unworthy of the hands of the priesthood. For every office concerned with the sacred laws is religious and holy, yet this is a lower office because it consists in the punishment of crimes, and seems to bear something of the character of the executioner.

It is interesting to set beside this the authoritative statement of Pope Innocent III (1198–1216) to Philip Augustus of France:

> No one of sane mind is ignorant that it pertains to our office to snatch every Christian from mortal sin; and, if he despises correction, then to coerce him by ecclesiastical censure.

Here lay the bases of the powers of excommunication, interdict, dispensation from allegiance, and deposition. They followed from the premises like a demonstration in Euclid.

It is worth pointing out here, by anticipation, that this view of the relations of Church and State is in no fashion substantially different from that later adopted by that logical-minded Frenchman, the Reformer, John Calvin (died 1564), of Geneva. Although Calvin substituted a black-gowned papacy at Geneva for that at Rome, and his system was (his own position apart) rather oligarchic and consistorial than monarchic, he did not deflect from the traditional notion that the Temporal Power sanctified itself by subserving the higher purposes of the Spiritual Power.

The Development of Natural Law is the third political issue—besides the internal and external relations of the Church—of this epoch. It is the issue of the rule—of what shall be the norm—under which the Church itself is to grow as the dominant society of baptized humankind. Natural Law, in the condition in which it was taken over by the Church Fathers from the Stoics, we have already discussed. It was, in the beginning, indistinguishable from physical law—it was the Law of Nature and Human Nature—but much rationalized and, nevertheless, confounded by the Roman, with the anthropological principle of "universal" human custom. It now, resting upon an a priori, non-experimental basis, undergoes a phase (lasting to this day) of being heavily moralized. We have already quoted the passages

from the *Fragment of Prague* and from Pope Gregory IX which identify it with the moral law of God. As such it was self-evidently superior alike to royal decrees and to local custom. It was not, of course, a code of statute law any more than the laws of psychology are a code of positive law. (Later some Canonists—and, emphatically, the Calvinists—were to develop the notion of this moral law as "command." However, all attempts to divorce law commanded by faith from the law of Reason have been damned, as late as the last century, by the Papacy as heresy.)

Although the Canonists were not free from citing the Ten Commandments as a concrete example of Natural Law, it was indeed rather thought of as a set of Maxims of Jurisprudence, such as was to be found alike in the Institutes and the Digest of Roman Law. But it exercised a dominant influence in moulding the positive Canon Law which had been growing up, since the days of the [probably] Jewish monk, Gratian, in the eleventh century, from a mixture of Bible, Church Council decrees, Papal rescripts and Roman Civil Law. This Canon Law, of course, required interpretation; but the Church had at its disposal the finest body of lawyers of the age. Indeed most lawyers of the day were clergy; but the best lawyers were not only clergy but canonists. And, from the point of view of the Church, the Natural Law and the derived Canon Law had the supreme merit that they had a final interpreter and arbiter in the Pope. It will be noted that the assumption of this final law is that it could not be overruled by any subsequent statute law, clerical or lay. Unlike the secular "sovereignty" systems, which we shall discuss later, in a very genuine fashion (and by direct connection with Greek thought), for the Canonist, above all men was the law.

Azo of Bologna (died 1230), himself a Civilian (*i.e.*, professor of the Civil Law), makes the interesting and, from him, significant assertion that the imperial rescripts, or edicts, if contrary to Natural Law, are void. This law itself—and here Azo hedges, but entirely in traditional fashion—is based upon instinct and upon reason. It is a rational psychological law. It will be noted, therefore, that a doctrine of conditional obedience as touching positive law is (unlike some Protestant and some modern Pluralist doctrine) in no sense basically anarchist, since this norm of Natural Law and reason is fully admitted. It is *only* by the test of that norm that the positive law is declared void. However, for the most complete expression of orthodox Catholic doctrine we must turn elsewhere.

ST. THOMAS AQUINAS (1225–1274), Neapolitan nobleman, Dominican friar, Doctor Angelicus, fifth doctor of the Western Church, having

written his *Summa Theologiae* in eight volumes, his *Summa Contra Gentiles*, his *Commentaries on the Politics of Aristotle* and various minor works, about seventy in all—written, it will be recalled, in manuscript —as well as various poems of eminence, the whole entitling him to be placed alongside Aristotle, died at the age of forty-eight. These incredible labours sprang from a single-hearted devotion to his vocation which produced irritation rather than praise in his family. His brother, Arnalfo, the poet, even adopted the crude expedient, in order to confound the young student's equanimity, of intruding a lady of scant dress and less virtue into his castle apartment; but, the biographer records, plucking a brand from the burning, the Dominican saint drove her therewith fierily forth shrieking. So poet and philosopher (as through all time), emotion and reason, confronted each other. Such trifling, edifying, pre-Boccaccioan stories, with their quaint, antique flavour, must not allow us to deflect attention from the rigour of thought and timeless value of the man. His work covers the fields of logic, theology, metaphysics, ethics, economics, politics, and law. The method adopted is the strict scholastic one, magnificent in its accuracy although unreadable to a discursive-minded and "literary" age—first the question, the arguments *pro* and *contra*, with authorities cited; then the conclusion; then the refutation of the arguments rejected, all done concisely and marching as from question to question, from part to part, *pars prima secundae* ("first of the second"), *pars secunda secundae* ("second of the second"), through the compact whole of the eight-volume *Summa*. If the work of Aristotle, as later of Diderot (a mere editor), is more encyclopaedic, perhaps no work of man is more systematic. It has remained the intellectual backbone of all subsequent Catholicism, although reset in some vertebrae by the Jesuits.

That Aquinas is merely Aristotle rewarmed was a statement fashionable in many liberal circles of the last century. It is a statement misleading and grotesque. The attempt (and even, for his time, the achievement) of St. Thomas was to fuse what without exaggeration may be termed the two great traditions of human thought. The one is idealist, transcendentalist, dogmatic, dramatic, static, authoritarian. The other is common-sense, pluralist, empirical, utilitarian, scientific, stressing initiative, dynamic, libertarian. With many grave reservations we may say that the first finds its early expression in Plato, the second in Aristotle. (For clarity, I am greatly simplifying the position.) Later, we shall find that this struggle goes on to our own day. Hegel and Marx represent, by and large (and subject to reservations later explained), the first tradition against what is termed the Empirio-

criticism of the Anglo-Saxon philosophic tradition, which has kinship with Aristotle.

St. Thomas, as a Churchman, was brought up in a Patristic school of doctrine compounded of two elements, neither friendly to Aristotle, *viz.*, the Bible and Platonism (including Neo-Platonism). The Church had always suspected the worldling Aristotle, "the Philosopher." Thomas, however, had the advantage (it was about the only advantage yielded by the Fourth Crusade, which took Constantinople) of living in an age when "Frankish" scholars, sometimes residing as Bishops in the new Crusaders' Empire of the East, were able to study the Greek text which hitherto had only percolated through in Latin translations from the Hebrew (in Toulouse), from the Arabic (in Spain), from the Greek. Thomas counted among his friends such a scholar, as William of Moerbeke (died 1286), Archbishop of Corinth and translator (on Thomas' instigation) of Aristotle. To reconcile the truth in "the Philosopher" with the Patristic tradition was Thomas' self-appointed task, in the midst of the other works of this energetic man in organizing Dominican studies, a college in Naples, another in Rome, and in attending Councils at the summons of the Pope.

Plato had insisted that the final sanction of the social order must be found in a philosophic myth. The Church, led by instinct and philosophy, had found that truth in the Word, both living and written as Holy Writ. That writ Thomas had perforce to accept (as much as any Protestant later) as inspired by Divine Wisdom or Reason itself, the Incarnate Logos, and as, therefore, final. He could not challenge the Sacred Book, unlike the Greeks who had none but who (*e.g.*, Plato) only said that one had to be invented. But he could—and did—interpret this Writ. And, in that interpretation of doctrine (to the no small scandal of later Reformers), "the Philosopher," who had already established his own position firmly as a great logician in the universities, counted for Thomas almost as much in weight, and fully as much by the test of frequency of quotation, as the Church Fathers themselves. It was a bold thing to do, and shows the amazing rationalism and unsentimentality of the best Scholastic tradition.

Unfortunately the theistic element of metaphysics so preoccupies Thomas that his observations on law and politics, always in the context of ethics, become little more than asides. Moreover, of one of his chief tractates on politics, *Concerning the Rule of Princes*, most of the third (after III, vi) and remaining books are not his but by a student hand—probably that of Peter of Auvergne. It is interesting to compare in the work of Thomas those elements that are part of the Greek

tradition with those that are novel, or specifically ecclesiastical, in their character.

St. Thomas makes the extremely important admission that man is naturally "political," *i.e., society* is natural. (This does not, as we shall see, mean that the Temporal Power or State is natural.) Monarchy is best and tyranny the worst form of government. Tyrants may be overthrown. The *civitas* or commonwealth is best when small. Education is an essential task of government. The object of government is to assure the good life (a piece of straight Hellenism, almost verbally Aristotle). There is nothing new in all this: any Hellene might have said the same. Merely it is whimsically unreal against the background of the England of Henry III and even the France of St. Louis IX.

There are, however, new elements which one finds neither in Plato nor in Aristotle. Man is depraved and, therefore, requires a coercive *temporal power*, which is only so far natural as sin is natural but which, as man attains spiritual gifts, will disappear; and the order regulative of spiritual matters is superior to this temporal, criminal-catching order. There is no division between ethics and politics, but an ethical control of politics through specific social institutions. Kings are indeed the images of God; but the hierarchy is higher as the supreme authority in faith which is the linchpin of all society. *Tyranny, monarchy, democracy and the like are mere forms; what matters is the purpose of society in seeking to achieve unity and peace.* If tyrants are to be overthrown it must be, not by private revolt against the Powers that Be (every man his own judge), but by the public authorities or magistrates. And, that these may be able to proceed constitutionally, an Elective Monarchy (like the Holy Roman Empire) is best. The small commonwealth is good because there is therein a desirable moral community in society of manners and customs. But, for the same reason, nationality and national realms have value and should be respected. (A dangerous doctrine this, as we shall see, for an upholder of the universal Papacy.) It is the concern of authority that there shall be education; but also that none shall suffer want—a specifically Christian, non-Greek, equalitarian and "fraternal" addendum. Finally, *authority must not only assure the good life, but the good life as defined in terms of its object,* i.e., *to secure salvation and man's lasting blessedness, not mere passing happiness.*

It pertains to the office of a king *so* to procure the good life of the many as is congruous with their attaining eternal beatitude.

Therefore, the Pope may excommunicate princes from the final society

of the faithful, of which he is Vicar, who pervert the purposes of temporal, subordinate government.

In brief, the Church knows (as Plato knew that he knew) what is the good life. It knows it on the basis of Revelation by the *Logos* (or Divine Reason), sacred tradition (*nomoi*, Aristotle would say) and continuing inspiration, final in faith and morals. It is not *a* Church but is *the* Church, speaking without diversity of voices since it has one head and arbiter. It is true (and Thomas' concession is significant) that it is a voluntary society; those outside it through "invincible ignorance" may perhaps be pardoned; and each individual is under obligation to obey his own conscience, *sive errans sive non errans*—"errant or not errant" (*Summa* I, 2, *q.* 19, *art.* 5). What, however, precisely does Thomas mean by conscience? We are told that it is "not a special power higher than reason, but a certain natural habit in matters of action as intellect is in matters of speculation." The obligation then to obey the habit of conscience is an obligation derivative from our duty to obey reason, which we must seek and which is expressed in Natural and Divine Law. And we are *only* under an obligation to obey an erroneous conscience, *i.e.*, erroneous reason, when involuntary ignorance excuses us from knowing the true reason. Thus in the *Summa, Prima Secundae, Quaestio* 94, *Articulus* 1, *o. ad* 2, Thomas says,

> Conscience is called the law of our intellect just in so far as it is a habit containing the precepts of natural law which are the first principles of human activity [in pursuing good and avoiding evil].

Also (*q.* 96, *art.* 4, *concl.*)

> *Just human laws oblige men by conscience, by reason of the eternal law from which they derive.*

This doctrine of political obligation we shall do well to remember when we come to later discussions, including those of our own days. The frequent change of law, he adds, is not to the advantage of public security, and change should only be made by reason of evident necessity or *maxima reipublicae utilitas* (the maximum *utility* of the commonwealth). Hence custom, if not abusive, may have the force of law. Thomas' distinctions between laws eternal, natural (*i.e.*, applied to man), human (positive) and divine (revealed) are of no great significance; and his introduction of the concept of "will" into the definition of law—the Natural Law being the command of a very personal God, a super-Caesar—is unfortunate. The early concept of law as primarily physical law bearing its own sanction is being forgotten. The consequences, in *Real-politik*, will soon be apparent in the

irrationalism about ultimate ends of the Scotists, of the Calvinists and of Machiavelli. There is, however, another more valuable aspect in Thomas' teaching. Natural law, Thomas still maintains (as orthodoxy since has maintained), although the rule of ethical actions, is itself no matter of custom or of capricious moral intuitions, but is the law of reason. And (here we revert to the basic Stoic concept) this law of reason itself is but part of that eternal law that governs the universe, as law for the physical and ideal worlds and, indeed, for all reality.

Natural law is a derivative of eternal law, and the impression of the divine light on the rational creature, whereby he is inclined to fit acts and purposes.

Apart from his work as an organizer, St. Thomas is the author of about thirty-eight works (of which the *Summa* is one) and, in addition, about forty tractates. Yet at the beginning and the end of a life so methodical, we find signs of a man of emotions. They are to be seen in the young man, already displaying a prodigious memory, who preferred to suffer imprisonment at the hands of his family than abandon his intention of joining the new Dominican friar movement, although this involved a vow of poverty. And it shows in the strange year and a half at the end, before his final journey towards Lyons, to the Council of Gregory X, during which he died. During these last months he wrote nothing; replied to questioners that "all he had written was no more than straw." He appears to have been seized, perhaps from very exhaustion, by the sense of some concept incapable of translation into terms of scholastic logic—we get hints of the same problem in Plato, where he discusses ultimate truth in the metaphors of music. For the interpretation of this last phase in St. Thomas Aquinas we must turn to the poems, and especially to the immortal hymn before the Host, *Adoro te devote.**

*Adoro te devote, latens Deitas,
Quae sub his figuris vere patitas,
Tibi se cor meum totum subjicit,
Quia te contemplans totum deficit.

Credo quidquid dixit Dei Filius:
Nil hoc verbo veritatis verius.
In cruce latebat sola Deitas:
At hic latet simul et humanitas.

Jesu, quem velatum nunc aspicio,
Oro fiat illud quod tam sitio;
Ut te revelata cernens facie
Visu sim beatus tuae gloriae.

Hidden God, devoutly I adore Thee,
Truly present underneath these veils:
All my heart subdues itself before Thee,
Since it all before Thee faints and fails—

I believe it, for God the Son hath said it,
Word of Truth that ever shall endure.
On the cross was veiled Thy Godhead's splendour
Here Thy manhood lieth hidden too.

Contemplating, Lord, Thy hidden presence,
Grant me what I thirst for and implore,
In the revelation of Thine essence,
To behold Thy glory evermore.

If St. Thomas built with straw, it yet made bricks of a pyramid higher in human civilization and thought than any yet raised by a single man since Aristotle and than any, or almost any, have raised since. It was indeed a pyramid based on Revelation and upon the Neoplatonic theology of the Nicene Creed. It had no meaning unless Jesus was very God and the Bread and Wine the veils of a Reality that was immanent Deity. Upon that pyx and that belief the Platonic-Catholic concept of politics pivoted. The Reason was not abstract but incarnate, and yet did truly govern all nature and creation. Reality was rational. The Neoplatonic theology perhaps had its ample justification if it could produce so great a vision. It could even, at least within the fold of that voluntary society which was the Church, be forgiven its dogmatic conviction that it knew, and could infallibly teach, the final truth beyond all experiment.

It may be that the cardinal error was that the leaders of the age held, with St. Bernard of Clairvaux, that "faith is not an opinion, but a certainty"—a suspect variant of the experimental truth enunciated by St. Anselm of Canterbury, that we must first experience before we can profitably reason and discuss: "we must first know belief in the profundities of the Christian faith before we can presume to argue about them by reason." Nevertheless, here, in the succession of Plato, we have the supreme answer to date—clericalist as Plato was clericalist—to the problem how society should be ordered, given along the positive lines of command, exhortation and vision (static *because* vision, as Plato's vision was static) and not along the negative lines of striving, resistance, pressure groups and dynamic energy pushing liberally all ways.

With the fifteenth century the feud of Papacy and Empire had reached an accommodation. Each might have united Europe, but the trouble was how both might. It is felt that the logic of Boniface VIII had been carried too far. Pope Nicholas V (1447–1455) on the threshold of the High Renaissance, declares that, if each power would mind its own function, peace could be ketter kept. There is a tendency to return after a thousand years to the Gelasian Compromise with, if not the Emperor, then the new kings in a rather better position than a millennium before. The Temporal Power is there to stay. Political dualism is now the social basis. The only question is: What shape shall the Temporal Power take?

4

The days of the great Julius, brisk pro-proletarian aristocrat, dictating to four secretaries at once, were long since past. But his system, grown crustacean, vast, hypnotizing, continued on. . . .

The Roman Empire remained. Across all the Middle Ages it cast a gigantic shadow, unsubstantial but even more immense than its mighty self. In the East, despite a consummate strategic system of defense, the "Roman" legions were being forced back behind the walls of Anastasius and behind the battlements of Constantinople. In the West, the Germanic Kaisers periodically descended like a hurricane through the valleys of the Alps, cantered down on Rome, received the imperial crown and a hasty blessing from the Pope and, bidden good riddance, departed with the Roman plague at their Teuton heels. With sparse intervals, not until Hapsburg Charles V in the sixteenth century was the Imperial power in Italy a reality, save for the half-Sicilian Frederick II von Hohenstauffen, "Marvel of the World," with his anti-clerical, blaspheming court, his Arabian science, and his curious habit of cutting up the bellies of criminals to see how the digestive system worked. Even twelfth-century Frederick I, the Red-bearded, the Popes had successfully kept in check.

Theoretically the Roman Empire is still one; the Emperors of the East and West, Greek and Frankish, are partners. There are times, as under Frederick I, when this is uneasily recognized. National Kings are told bluntly that they are mere "Kinglets." The Roman Law is still being elaborated by such "civilians" as Bartolus of Sassoferrato (died 1357), with their subtle distinctions between imperial proprietorship and private possession. Normally, the Popes are in the happy position of being one (whatever schismatics might say) while the Emperors were two and their Empires regarded, each by each,

as usurpations. The Pope, however, although he might protect himself from the hug of too intimate a relation with the Kaiser, patently could not temporally rule and unite Italy. Who was to do so? Still less could he bring temporal peace to the world. Who was to do this? And there were still Italian patriots to be found who replied: the Roman Emperor.

DANTE ALIGHIERI (1265–1321) is one of these. Son of a notary, inscribed (but not practising) in the medical guild, a magistrate or prior of his native city of Florence, caught in the fierce feuds of Guelphs and Ghibellines and of "Blacks" and "Whites" into which the former were subdivided, driven from Florence in 1300, his goods confiscated and he, absent, condemned to death by burning, he spent his life as an exile, finding in most Italian cities a similar prevalence of sadistic, fanatical feuds. No wonder he laid high stress on world order and on the Empire as an instrument of peace. Amid his wanderings, at one time there seemed hope of a return to Florence in the train of the Emperor Henry VII, of Luxemburg; but the expedition was as luckless as many of its predecessors.

For Henry VII, however, Dante's tractate *De Monarchia* (1310–?), is intended. Dante is, of course, primarily the poet. Like the Chinese scholar today, Hu Shih, who is departing from the tradition that poems must only be written in mandarin Chinese and who is writing them in the language of the people, so Dante first finds fame as the pioneer who explores the use of the "vulgar speech," Italian, as a literary language, instead of Latin. This fame, however, is overshadowed by that of the author of *The Divine Comedy*, the dramatization in poetry of that which St. Thomas, his master, had taught in the syllogistic theology of the schools, the greatest didactic poem since Lucretius and indeed of all history, not excluding Milton's great work.

The argument of the *De Monarchia* is essentially scholastic, and is an elegant example of the style's strength and defects. It is complicated by a distinctively mediaeval confusion. The Empire had not always brought peace. For by what title did the German Kaisers now bear rule? As the successors of those Romans who had conquered all their predecessors in *ordeal of battle*. "It is manifest that the Roman people prevailed over all competitors for the rule of the world; therefore they prevailed by divine judgement and consequently obtained it of right." Dante, however, desires to draw a very different conclusion from that of the universal rule of fist-right.

"*Maxime unum est maxime bonum*"—"what is most one is most good," he starts off with as his premises, sufficiently abstract. He

reinforces it with the entirely sound argument that the purpose of human civilization is the fullest development of man's powers of thinking and acting, and that this work of civilization demands peace. Civil power exists, then, to procure peace—which is best effected by the elimination of a factious plurality, and the substitution of unity. "When many things are ordained to one end, they are best ruled by one authority." In brief, if the object of the state is peace, plurality defeats that object and is an imperfection in the state. Therefore the perfect state is one, universal and, in fact, the Roman Empire. Does then this imperial authority depend upon God or upon his Vicar? Unlikely though it may seem, the *Nicomachean Ethics* of Aristotle are brought in to prove that it is from God alone, for so the imperial power has unity in its own species . . . there is no interference. Each is "type" in his own province. It is contrary to nature, and unwilled by God, that the Church and Pope should have direction in temporals.

> The quality of controlling the kingdom of our mortality is contrary to the nature of the Church, and therefore is not among the number of its qualities. . . . For man needs a double direction to his twofold end, to wit, the Supreme Pontiff who leads the human race to eternal life by Revelation; and the Emperor who directs the human race to temporal felicity by the counsels of the secular philosophers.

The division between the mundane and the eternal, always acute in Christianity, is being carried to the point where the Church is propelled upwards into a purely supernatural and miraculous sphere, soon to become artificial, unnatural and impotent. Unfortunately, as Dante found, there was still nothing there to fill the vacuum. The restored Roman Empire of Henry VII vanished in summer miasma. Dante, disillusioned, turned back to the sublimation of his love for the lady he had met, before his unhappily married wife, when he was nine and the lady was eight and who had died sixteen years later (when the poet was twenty-six)—*la gloriosa donna della mia mente*, "the glorious lady of my mind," the divine Beatrice Portinari. Nevertheless, in this brief excursus into the theory of politics, the great poet had not only written the epilogue of the Roman Empire; he had by mixed logic and insight arrived at writing the prologue of the League of Nations, if not of the Third Reich of Adolf Hitler and the Rome-Berlin axis. He had supplied the Genevan League with its most cogent argument: that a state, to fulfil the prime function of a state completely, that is, to keep peace, must be a world-state.

PIERRE DUBOIS, *avocat* at Norman Coutances, at the turn of the thirteenth century, in the days of Philip the Beautiful of France, is a very different character, one of the early pamphleteers and publicity men for the policy of that unpleasant monarch against the Papacy and its agents, the friars, who commanded the prime organ of contemporary publicity, the pulpits. There is something significant of a new age in this conflict of pamphlet versus pulpit; in the fact that Dubois (like Dante, for that matter) is no *clericus* but a layman, and moreover a lay lawyer; and in the fact that (so unlike Dante) it is on behalf of a national king, and not of the Holy Roman Emperor, that he writes. In his tractate *Concerning the Recovery of the Holy Land*, a traditional crusading theme appears. One yet notes that it is the *French* who are again to lead a united Europe against the Turk; and the fact that the kings of France, rather than the Emperors, had taken the lead against the infidel shows that the French, rather than the Germans, are the true imperial race. The king will, of course, reasonably enough, expect some slight recompense for the pains of France in the service of Civilization. These are still days when the "natural frontier" of France is the Rhone; but Dubois suggests the addition of Provence (not yet in France), Savoy, Lombardy and up to the Left Bank of the Rhine as a modest guerdon. Hereby Dubois shows himself to have foresight.

Dubois, with tact, dedicated the book to Edward I of England, who had his own difficulties with the Papacy and an interest in crusading. Dubois suggested that the Pope might be suitably and adequately occupied in saying his prayers, preaching and inviting Christian peoples to appeasement. In order to sustain him in this office he might be put on the civil list of the Most Christian King. It should be added that Philip le Bel's outstanding contribution to the cause was the suppression of the chief Military Order (of the Temple) which bore the Christian white man's burden under the Syrian sun and the burning alive of its Grand Master. In conclusion, it may be pointed out that Dubois notices the influence of climate on politics. There is no reason to suppose that, except among recent antiquarians, Dubois has had himself great influence.

MARSIGLIO (Marsilius, died 1343?) of Padua, physician, Rector of Paris University, who quit that post some say because of the persecution of the clergy and others say because of his creditors, in order to offer his pen to true religion and the Emperor, was a far more influential figure. His *Defensor Pacis* ("Defender of the Peace"), of which it

may be that Jean of Jandun shares the authorship, was written under the influence of that great English Schoolman, the Franciscan William of Occam, in Surrey, also one of the "antagonists of the Papacy." The *Defensor*, however, was far more lucid than the involved work of Marsiglio's master.*

William of Occam, whose general writing technique was to conceal his own opinion behind that of weighty but opposite opinions, became involved in the affair of the famous "Ugly Duchess," Margaret Maultasch, as part of his defence (*a*) of the sacred poverty of the Franciscans, and (*b*) of the Emperor Ludwig IV, the Bavarian, then his protector (for his own purposes). The Emperor proposed personally to arrange for the divorce and remarriage of this lady, his feudatory, for reasons connected with her estates; but found the Papacy uncomplaisant. Occam, thereupon, proceeded to supply a learned argument in effect in favour of civil divorce. This general line of argument, hesitantly advanced by the devout Occam, is carried much further by the secularist Marsiglio.

Marsiglio flatly maintains the doctrine of secular supremacy in secular things, not excluding matrimonial causes. As he caustically remarks, "to trade, steal and murder are not spiritual offices," and, if a cleric engages in them (the old issue with Thomas à Becket), the case should come before the secular court. Again the Papacy might claim that it did not interfere in secular matters of government "by reason of the fief but because of sin." But, on these grounds, to tell the Electors of the Emperor that they must not elect a heretic to be temporal head of Christendom was like saying to a man, "I will not injure you," and then knocking his eye out. The task of the temporal ruler was (*cf.* Dante, but also Augustine†) to keep the peace. This required coercive power. And the ruler must not be interfered with in exercising it. "The ruler" for Marsiglio, Italian-born Rector of Paris residing at a German court, was the Emperor. But Marsiglio, a genuine secularist, is far more anti-Papal than pro-Imperial. The essence of Marsiglio is that he does not accept the Catholic "myth" or "ideology." In modern terms, he is a *saboteur*.

Who then shall control the Emperor, if not the Vicar of Christ? Marsiglio here shows the influence of Occam, spokesman of the

* The famous phrase, however, is Occam's: "Domine Imperator, defende me gladio et ego te defendam calamo"—"Lord Emperor, defend me with the sword and I will defend you with the pen."

† *Cf.* p. 142. It is an argument recurrent with the imperialist writers during the Investiture Controversy.

democratic Franciscans, who is maintaining the pure Congregationalist theory that Church officials should be elected by all the Christian people, male and female—Occam, the first feminist since Plato. Marsiglio, however, boggles at this. The ruler is a "regent," not absolute. He bears power as the instrument of the whole people or, he adds cautiously, of the *valentior pars* (the weightier or more significant part—a traditional mediaeval phrase for recognizing distinction of quality). But shall then Christendom be ruled by the appointees of unfaithful men and heretics? Marsiglio, the first secularist, shrinks from the logic of his own secular argument. Those who choose are to be "the faithful people." How shall we know who are faithful? A knotty point, to which he vouches no answer.

What then of the Church and its authority as arbiter? The Church must be poor and pray. Its clergy should not be arrogant directors. They should be elected—by the faithful (no: not women—that is going too far). It must be a Church humble—and, in fact, impotent.

Has not, however, the Church its own law and discipline for its flock? It may have, but should only apply its penalties in the confessional. It has no right to impose civil penalties. Nor should the civil magistrates at its behest. What then about Christian uniformity in the society of the faithful? There must be toleration. The Court of Heaven in Kingdom-come will doubtless see to a man's intentions. A secular court below must not be presumptuous and is only concerned with concrete disturbances of the civil peace. The very core of the Imperialist argument is always that civil *order* matters more than all other goods or values—even the ideals for "the better standard" of the Churchmen. Civil Society exists not to give the "good"—still less the "happy"—life to devotee or to worker, but to give *peace and order as by law established*—an argument against Utopian fanaticisms from that day to our own.

Further, it will be noted that probably no more straightforward argument for secularism has been penned since, than this by Marsiglio. The demand for a "faithful legislator" (*legislator fidelis, i.e.*, orthodox), even if sincerely put forward, is but a thin veil.

Almost more important, at least in immediate influence, is the bringing back to life of the influence of Aristotle's *Politics*. The *Logic* had been influential for a couple of centuries, and the *Metaphysics* since St. Thomas. But, although St. Thomas had commented on the *Politics*, and Aristotelianism had shown itself in the able work of St. Thomas' successor, Aegidius Romanus, the very development of a

papal doctrine of sovereignty by the latter shows the limits of its claim to be political Aristotelianism. It is now that Aristotle's non-ecclesiastical or pre-ecclesiastical thought begins to show its full implications in the justification of a purely civil commonwealth, perhaps Roman but not Papal, and to show them by the pen of Marsiglio, citizen of the city-state of Padua, exponent of mixed imperial and city-state philosophy, almost Greek. The process now begins—while eviscerating the State of that ethical content with which Aristotle had endowed the Polis—of making for it all the ethical claims on the individual which the great Greeks presumed for their own intimate and cultural community.

5

We are now nearing the end of the period which may be termed that of the Christian Social Dominance. Patently this does not mean that after the fifteenth century Christianity is no longer the dominant religion in Europe. It is—and its only rival in the Mediterranean, Islam, recedes. But what is true is that the Platonic, disciplinary system of the Church is from this time broken. It is impossible to build up a social system, international and overruling particular kingdoms and states, upon three hundred or more different views of what that social system should be. And unity of discipline was of the essence of the scheme.

What had happened? The laymen no longer believed, as in what has been called "the Ages of Faith," that the priest *knew*—the Platonic governor was no longer respected by warrior or trader. The farmer distrusted his parish priest—perhaps had his own views on the Bible. The farm labourer distrusted the mendicant friar; paid money for pardons; but was not quite sure that what he or his wife got in return for the cash was worth while. In brief, the Myth had broken down. Its haloed glory had departed. The prince distrusted the Pope's legate—at least, had no intention of subordinating the interests of his trans-Alpine kingdom or Italian tyranny to some prince like himself, for all His Holiness' scheme of being international Vicar of Christ and lord of the world. The monarch was clear that if his subjects were to be members of an earthly society, it was to be one of which *he*, not the Pope, was top.

What weapons should the Pope use to restore a respect that was fast being lost ever since the Avignonese Captivity and after Philip

le Bel had shown at Anagni that even Popes were mortal? Heretic rebels could, in the past, be suppressed. When the Bohemian Hussites discovered, *inter alia*, in the jealousy between Czech and German, that it was really essential for their salvation to take the sacrament in two kinds, and not only in one, they could be suppressed after bloody wars. The Church properly insisted that what it was interested in was obedience, discipline, and that on the trifles of ceremonies it was willing enough to compromise. But the time was now coming when the secular powers would, *for their own ends*, support, not suppress, heretics. This danger from lust of power Plato himself had foreseen. So the vision—presuming on dogmatic knowledge, inconsistent with the new freedom as men understood freedom, inconsistent with lay initiative in moral experimenting, inconsistent with the Faustian spirit,

> Ist es der Sinn, der alles wirkt und schafft?
> Es sollte stehn: Im Anfang war die Kraft*—

so this vision faded of the Platonic World-community. To Faith succeeded Life; and to the cult of virtue, excellence and stability, the enjoyment of vice, progress and change.

Clericalism had become obnoxious. And clericalism is the natural form (however concealed by other names) of any society in which a limited group, Catholic or Jacobin, Fascist or Communist, claims—as Plato urged they *must* patently claim—to *know* truth and securely to judge values. The human frailty of priests and the human obstinacy of princes is only a very partial explanation of why this remarkable system of Christ's Kingdom on Earth had broken down. Let us enumerate other factors. The issue is of grave current interest, since this system was the most successful totalitarian scheme (with certain reservations to be made later†) that history has seen—certainly since the end of the priestly traditional system of Pharaonic Egypt. The Church was compulsive. Beginning as a *voluntary* society, for those who sought salvation, in the days of Augustine it admitted the coercion of heretics by the secular arm lest the Christian *social order* (which must involve law and rule) be disturbed in education and morals. The Church was secularized. And this even through the very titanic attempt, not

* Does the mind work, create and with life dower?
It ought to stand: "In the beginning was the Power."
—Goethe: *Faust*, I.

† *Cf.* p. 615. *But* let me add three sharp distinctions between Catholic Platonism and modern Totalitarianism stress on personality; rationality as against force; moral choice of the voluntary society. *Cf.* J. Maritain's *True Humanism* (1939).

solely to withdraw from, but to control the world and the empire. Legalism grew as the Church had to confront practical problems of control and of conflict of rights, and declined to take refuge in vague sentimental generalities about first principles. Clericalism, in the bad sense, of the exclusive *esprit* of a privileged body, haunted the Church as much as bureaucracy haunts the modern state. Above all, it was, upon its very suppositions of Revelation, static. Human performance might improve. The vision might grow clearer in the quest of the Sang Real—the "Grail." But the Myth did not change.

An economic explanation of the change has been given—the lust of the lords for the lands of the Church. This may competently serve to explain why these lords finally declined to co-operate with the Churchmen in suppressing the heretics. Behind Protestant defiance the lord saw hedges broken down that protected, for monastery and abbey, broad acres richer far, thanks to good husbandry, than that warrior's own lands. The explanation, however, is inadequate in giving a reason —not for Protestant victory, but for the existence of the original Protestants at all. Strange, revivalist sects were, of course, no novelty with views on baptism or even on nudity. Here, however, a movement triumphed thanks to a circumambient anti-clericalism, explaining Reformation and Renaissance alike, which itself needs explanation.

A material explanation may carry us further than the narrowly economic. Sewerage was being disposed of. Plagues were decreasing. The death rate was falling. Life was becoming more enjoyable; men more pleasure-loving. Break-down of communications was at an end. Communications were being established and commerce opened up. An urban civilization, centred in great trading cities, was resuming its sway. Living was more opulent. Men were ever less tolerant of ascetic checks. Fear, as the leitmotiv of life, was less natural. The Day of Wrath seemed remote, with the barbarians themselves good bourgeois. Religion had become again rather an aspect than a background of life. God Himself, whose miraculous hand had been seen in everything, was now becoming (as Gierke says) philosophic *causa remota* ("remote cause"). The growing education of the lay wealthy was inclining them to ask strange questions and to challenge their masters. Man felt himself good. "Jeshurun waxed fat, and kicked."

Spiritually, stirrings of education and science increasingly resented a clerical curb. The plain man asked what the clergy made out of their rule, and why. The religious enthusiast demanded a direct way to voluntarily chosen, "free" salvation, past a worldly, cynical priesthood, blocking the road with its monopoly, that was admittedly the agent of the current social order—an order which, because historical, was, by

that fact, obviously imperfect. The ideal reconfronted the actual as it had done in the early days of Christianity itself. But this time it was a private ideal, although evangelic in mode, with its background in the feudal individualism of the free, fighting, obstinate barbarian, not in the social piety of the servile, cosmopolitan, classical world.

Christianity, as a prophetic mood (distinct from the classical world and from Catholicism in form so far as the latter had been injected with the communal spirit of the earlier classical world), encouraged individualism—although distinctly evangelic and other-worldly. Feudalism, as distinct from Roman Imperialism and its law, encouraged individualism checked by custom. Neither force, however, had been strong enough, hitherto, to turn the scales against the allied spirits of Rome and of Catholicism. Now localism, assuming a less mean form as "the loyalty of the realm" (scarcely yet "nationalism"—but hatred of the foreigner), came to the support and overthrew universalism; it began the liberation of the sectional interest and, later, of the individual and of his individual pursuit of happiness as legitimate aim, as distinct from the greater glory of civilization, God and the Emperor as integrally united. The process was rendered possible by the concurrent subordination of feudal sectionalism to the social demands of the realm, which now became the appropriate organ of law and order.

Further, increasing education, presupposing peace and opulence, had brought an entire new civilization into ken—a culture the more seductive because it did not reject, but merely ignored, Christian and Papal claims, knew nothing of them. The Christian Fathers were not fools when they called the gods of the heathen devils, for they had power. As objects of lovely verse and of august rhetoric, as beautiful statues, alluringly they came back in the wake of the New Learning. "Alas, the gods of the heathen," might exclaim the sixteenth-century Pope Hadrian VI as he went through the Vatican Museum. But the gods were back—merely, of course, as models of good taste. Asceticism and monkery were in disfavour. The Popes themselves were seduced, leading the new heathenism, called Enlightenment. Aristotle, too, the Philosopher, was back, under the very best auspices, making some very strange suggestions, not at all consistent with prime allegiance to a Universal Church.

The change of intellectual climate shows in the poetry early and late in our period. From the early period, the time of the Romances of the Rose, of Parsifal, of King Arthur, of the cathedrals of Salisbury (thirteenth century) and of Chartres (thirteenth century), let us select two hymns. The first is by twelfth-century Bernard of Cluny:

The hour is late; the times are evil; we await.
Lo! he comes, he comes in wrath, the Judge Avenger.
. . . . . .
He removes the rough, the crushing weights from the loaded mind,
Rewards the prudent, punishes the evil, both alike justly.*

And, again, a little earlier, a hymn by King Robert of France:

O best consolation,
Sweet host of the mind,
Sweet calm.
In labour quiet,
In heat coolness,
In woe solace.

O most blessed light
Fill the intimate places of the heart
Of thy faithful.
Without thy divinity
In man is mere inanity,
In man is only evil.†

But even by the thirteenth century, in the romance of *Aucassin and Nicolette*, we get another note:

For none go to Paradise but I will tell you who. Your old priests and your old cripples who are down on their knees day and night, who cling to the

*Hora novissima, tempora pessima sunt, vigilemus.
Ecce minaciter imminet Arbiter Ille Supremus.
. . . . . .
Auferat aspera, duraque pondera mentis inustae,
Sobria munerat, improba puniat, utraque iuste.

(Even the reader who "has no Latin" may still be interested in the music of this majestic verse.)

†Consolator optime,
Dulcis hospes animae,
Dulce refrigerium.
In labore requies,
In aestu temperies,
In fletu solatium.

O lux beatissima,
Reple cordis intima
Tuorum fidelium.
Sine tuo numine
Nihil est in homine,
Nihil est innoxium.

altar stairs, and in old crypts; those also who wear mangy old cloaks, or go in rags and tatters, shivering and shoeless . . . and who die of hunger and want and misery. Such are they who go to Paradise; and what have I to do with them? Hell is the place for me. For to Hell go the fine churchmen and the fine knights, killed in the tourney or in some grand war, the brave soldiers and the gallant gentlemen. With them will I go. There also go the fair, gracious ladies who have lovers two or three besides their lord. There go the gold and silver, the sables and the ermines. There go the harpers and minstrels and the kings of the earth. With them will I go so that I have Nicolette, my most sweet friend, with me.

The same note echoes in the song of the troubadour of the same century, or minnesinger, Walther von der Vogelweide, perhaps crusader, certainly German anti-papalist poet:

> Most blessed God, how seldom dost thou hear me praying.
> Lord, Son and Father, let thy spirit give my heart correction.
> How should I ever love a man who treats me ill?
> To him who's kind I needs must bear a better will.
> Forgive my other sins!—in this I'll keep the same mind still.

We now come to this poem of a ruler, by no means lacking in piety, the fifteenth-century Florentine, Lorenzo the Magnificent:

> How beautiful is youth,
> Which flies so swift away.
> Let him who will be glad.
> Who knows tomorrow?*

The Speculum Mentis, the single mirror in which all experience is focussed with spiritual unity, this magic mirror of Shallott, has been shivered into fragments. What matters is not the mystic society of the one Catholic Church, but what is relative to the creative individual. What matters is not eternity, which dwarfs man, but "the now" which he enjoys or curses—not eternity but time, not spiritual authority but personal power. We are in the midst of the Renaissance.

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE

Mirbt, Carl: *Quellen zur Geschichte des Papsttums*, 1911.

* Osborne Taylor: *The Mediaeval Mind*, 2 Vols. 1911.

* C. H. McIlwain: *Growth of Political Thought in the West*, 1932.

A. W. and A. J. Carlyle: *History of Mediaeval Political Theory in the West*, 1903 (a classic in several volumes).

O. Gierke: *Political Theories of the Middle Age, trans.* F. W. Maitland, 1922.

*Quant'è bella giovenezza
Chi si fugge tuttavia.
Chi vuol esser lieta, sia;
Di doman non c'è certezza.

Chapter VII

Renaissance and Reformation

1

THE first characteristic of the Renaissance is opulence—an opulence relative to the standards of the times and limited to the merchant and noble classes, but marked by contrast with the centuries that had preceded it. With that opulence go higher standards of demand; improvement in polite manners; technological improvements; developments of invention; new and unabashed curiosity; in brief, Progress.

It was an unoriginal epoch. Such a statement needs justification. More precisely, then, despite all its vitality, there is something disappointing about it. As Professor A. North Whitehead says: "In the year 1500 Europe knew less than Archimedes, who died in 212 B.C." When Mediaeval man entered upon the Renaissance of classical culture, he did so as a child overawed by the ancient models to which he was learning to give attention. He had not discovered that the way to imitate the Greeks was not to imitate those who themselves imitated nobody. Hence he was most successful in those fields, such as painting, in which those models were irrecoverable. In literature, freedom of expression was increasingly hampered, as the decades went by and the original vitality died down, by a willingness to become "an ape of Cicero." Actually, the Renaissance was definitely rather of Latin culture, with which Italy had common bonds (even Constantinople was the Eastern Rome), than of Greek.

The Renaissance even represented, it may plausibly be argued, a mental relaxation or retrogression. Certainly we may suppose that it was felt to be such by the great Universities, Bologna, Paris, Oxford, which were dogged opponents of the New Learning. And not without reason. Instead of the strict scholastic logic, which it regarded as *démodé*, worthy of a Dunce (otherwise of Duns Scotus, the "Subtle Doctor"), it substituted an admiration for *belles-lettres* which, at heart, was a relaxation from excess of theology. Instead of this "divine science" was put literature. For the exact study of Aristotle's meta-

physics was substituted the imaginative mixture of Plato and the Jewish Cabala, by Pico della Mirandola. And the age was not untouched by a recrudescence of superstition and magic, such as St. Thomas had solidly condemned.

For the discipline of asceticism it offered in substitute the cult of aestheticism. The daughters of Poggio, the humanist, might enter a convent, but monkery is out of fashion. The fashionable world reverted to Cyrenaic or Epicurean standards and not always to the most rigorous and genuinely Epicurean at that.

The Renaissance leaders were romantic about the Classical epoch of the ancient world, especially the Roman epoch which alone they understood. The Mediaeval Church had been massively classical and self-sufficient in its rule of the romantic mediaeval world of aspiring barbarians. Nevertheless, the leaders of the New Learning aspired to the apparent self-sufficiency in living of the old pagan masters. The interest in the "next world," or eternity, as predominant factor in one's scheme for living, declined. The Renaissance, typically, was non-salvationist.

The Renaissance, however, adds to its cult of the ancient world one note of its own: the cult of the individual. The feudal individualism of the Middle Ages had been held in check by Churchly morality. The Renaissance emancipated man from those checks. Even an Alkibiades or a Themistokles in Hellas was curbed by his sense for the City and for the traditional morality of the Polis. The Middle Ages had little sense (a remark to be qualified in Italy and especially in such Hellenizing writers as Marsiglio the Paduan) for *civic* virtue. The residuum, after Renaissance man has finished with the criticism of Mediaevalism, is the individual, the superman universal in his talents, the *universale uomo*, complete and balanced as a work of art, uninhibited by Churchly or Socratic conscience. For the old anthropocentricism of the pious, that was shocked by Copernicus' discovery that man's earth was not the centre of the Universe, the Renaissance substituted a narcissistic anthropocentricism of its own, not undermined until Darwin.

There is no known connection between the Ages of Progress and those of Morality. The golden age of Hellas was not one of conventional morality, any more than that of today's America. We shall later discuss the sociological connection between crime and progress.* Perhaps for this reason, every age of progress is very short-lived. The Renaissance was a non-moral and non-theological age. Its predecessors

* *Cf.* p. 774.

being times of theological morality, it was non-moral because it was non-theological—but also because the wine of opulent success and the strong waters of aggressive individualism had gone to its head. The age was no longer interested in the fight against the world, the flesh and intellectual pride which had interested its predecessors (although Dr. Coulton of Cambridge has made it a labour of piety to show that these Christians were not so moral as has been generally supposed). The new age was on excellent terms with all three. The sadistic pleasure of ascetic idealism had no longer attraction. The old morality appeared "anti-this-world" and anti-vital. The new emancipation released vitality. That vitality issued in progress, material and intellectual.

Megalomania was released as well as vitality. The antithesis of the Churchly fear of God was to be found in Alberti's dictum: "Men can do all things if they will." A more fantastic expression of the same spirit is to be found in the case of the tyrant of an Italian town who, having entertained together Pope and Emperor and taken them up on to his tower, died with one regret on his conscience: that he had not won immortality by throwing both of them down to death with his own hands. An inferiority feeling in relation to the ancient Romans was compensated by moral licence; by the cult of notoriety and individual eccentricity; and by the belief that scrupulosity was not merely no virtue but a contemptible vice. The Age of the Italian Renaissance, following that of Catholic orthodoxy, is of peculiar interest to us since it is so like our own, when the vigour of Protestant orthodoxy has spent itself—especially like our own in America, which can only be fitly judged by Renaissance standards.

King Ferrante of Naples exemplifies the macabre eccentricity of the time—King Ferrante who, after dinner, would take his guests through his private museum where he had on show, stuffed but in excellent preservation, the corpses of his enemies. These were days when men took their own wine and drinking glasses when they went to dine with the dangerously great—as being safer. Nor could the Holy See, itself taking a lead in progressive culture, offer any moral bulwark against this flood in the days of Innocent VIII and Alexander VI. On the walls of Rome the citizens, going to morning work, found an inscription lampooning the Pope. "He hath sold the priesthood, he hath sold the bishoprics *et Corpus Domini*—and the body of the Lord. And rightly, for he bought them." In 1476, Galeazzo Maria Sforza, Duke of Milan, was assassinated in the church of San Stefano. In 1478 the Archbishop of Florence became involved in a conspiracy against

the Medici rulers, Giuliano and Lorenzo the Magnificent. Giuliano Medici was assassinated; but the Archbishop was hanged in his robes. Earlier Giovanni Maria (died 1412), Duke of Milan, had forbidden the priests to say in the mass, "give us peace"—*dona nobis pacem*—but they must substitute "tranquillity" instead. A criminal passion for the colossal pervaded all—criminal but splendid, a kind of Satanism.

The Renaissance must be clearly distinguished from the period I have differentiated as the Resurgence of Learning—the period of John of Salisbury and Abelard, of the growth of the Universities and Teaching Orders, of St. Thomas and of Dante, of the building of the Scholastic Philosophy against the background of Catholic Faith. The Renaissance is a period of reaction against the raking over of the ponderous, wordy volumes of the Patristic writers (the Church Fathers) and of the definitions of Aristotle with his Logic and Metaphysics. It is a period of reaction to Imagination, Art, Plato (misunderstood—rather Neo-platonism) and what Plato loathed but practised—fine literature. The writings of Plato, such as *The Republic*, just before the days of Pico della Mirandola, are being circulated again. It is the age of Polizian (1454–1494), Titian (1477–1576), Aretino (1492–1557), Cellini (1500–1571).

In 1464 Schweinheim set up the first printing establishment in Italy. The brisk, mechanical work of the printing press replaces the painstaking, artistic care of the monastic scribe and the illuminator. Learning itself has become secularized, a matter of wheels and machinery.

Sure advance, moreover, was made in the field of the sciences. In 1543, dying, Nicholas Koppernigk (Copernicus), Canon of the cathedral of Frauenberg, in Old Prussia, brought himself to publish his *De Revolutionibus Orbium Coelestium*, dedicated to Pope Paul III. He readvanced the old Pythagorean theory, not heard of since Aristippus, that not the earth, but the sun, is the centre of the planetary universe. Adam fell from his place of being centre of creation. Man began again to conceive, since Socrates led them astray, of some other proper study for man besides man and his salvation in an anthropocentric world. The placing of the sun in the centre, itself one among the "fixed" stars, was far more than a discovery in astronomy. Meanwhile the pilgrimage to Jerusalem became provincial as the discoveries of Columbus widened the boundaries of the world both of geography and (still more) of imagination and avarice. In the same year, 1543, Vesalius, the physician, published his revolutionary work on anatomy.

Definitely the centre of gravity in culture had shifted from the next world to this; and from theology to politics. The increasing prosperity

was not only cause but consequence of strong government—except in Germany, which had neither the one nor the other. It gave protection to the merchant and even could afford (and happily, unlike today, regarded it as an adornment to its glory to afford) patronage to scholars and to talent. In adjudging strong government, upon which the new progress as against the feudal anarchy depended, accomplishments, not intentions, entered into the reckoning. Aggressive individualism, adventure, strong government at home, meant an ambitious policy abroad. *Il faut grandir.* State, like individual, must magnify itself. No longer is there question of the Mediaeval ethical rule derived from the law of cosmopolitan, universal Rome, itself impregnated with an equalitarian philosophy: *jus suum cuique reddere*—"to give to each man his due." The due of the lion is not that of the sheep; the lion and fox will take what they can. A new Natural Law: Survival is Nature's law. Already we are in the age, not only of the New Monarchies of France, England and Spain, but also of an incipient New Nationalism, however still disguised by local spirit or personal loyalism to a monarch.

It is possible to divide the history of political thought into epochs that, for convenience, may be called, perhaps not too frivolously, "hard-boiled" and "soft-shell" periods—or, in William James's terms: "tough-minded" and "tender-minded." The thought of Hellas had been permeated with the notion of *well-being:* that of Rome with the notion of will, force and law—what it is now fashionable to call (if trivially and misleadingly), *power-politics.** The thought—not necessarily the practice—of the Middle Ages was again permeated with the ethical notion of what conduct *ought* to be and of spiritual well-being. The following age, that of Machiavelli, is the most "hard" and "tough" in its opinions of any that had reached literary expression yet.

2

NICCOLO MACHIAVELLI (1469–1527) was, in 1492, Secretary of the Second Chancery of the Florentine Republic and Secretary of the Council of Ten. A nobleman by birth and a republican by conviction, he was Ambassador of his native city-state to the court of France.

* The term is justifiable if we mean a *macht-politik* that seeks to solve political problems chiefly in the relationship of dominion and subjection. It is misleading if it obscures recognition that *all* politics is a study and practice of power-relations, even if by the route of co-ordination. The only person entitled to question this is a systematic anarchist—who believes only in power to follow his own will.

In 1512 took place the Medici *coup d'état* and the restoration of that ruling house. In 1513, Machiavelli found himself in prison on suspicion of conspiracy. His release was procured by the aid of Cardinal Julian de'Medici. Machiavelli rewarded this patron of scholars and prince of the church in a fashion very typical of the Renaissance. He sat down and wrote for private circulation a book, which was *The Prince*, which contains a useful little chapter entitled "Concerning the Secretaries of Princes." And he dedicated the book to a member of the ruling Medici family, Lorenzo the Younger. Prudence, however, delayed its general publication until 1532, after the author's death. As Professor Hearnshaw says, "Those who read it should realize that they were not meant to do so."

The Prince was followed, in 1516–1519, by Machiavelli's *Discourses on the First Decade of Livy*. In 1525, the *Florentine History* was dedicated to the Medici Pope, Clement VII, who apparently decided that Machiavelli was more suited to be a man of learning and letters than a practical man in the harsh world of politics. However, in 1526 Machiavelli was employed by Clement in making a report on the fortifications of Florence. He has also to his credit some plays, including *Mandragola*, a farce brilliant but obscene, written doubtless with a moral purpose, and some poems. His style was improved in freshness by his fortunate ignorance of the works of his predecessors: like Hobbes, he made no profession of being a schoolmaster of bookish information.

Machiavelli is a definite Renaissance type. He, living in the native land of the *condottiere*, has the Renaissance admiration for the man of poise and of varied talents, the "adventurer" in every sense, the *universale uomo*. *Virtù*, for Machiavelli, is a word used as in English the word "virtue" is used when speaking of a medicine or herb. It is a quality that makes it "good for something." It is "talent in use." Machiavelli's respect is for the man who can "deliver the goods." But these goods have little to do with moral value, everything to do with success for the purpose in hand.

Thus Machiavelli's contempt is reserved for Pietro Soderini who, holding public office, was too scrupulous a man to take those legally dubious methods which would have frustrated the Medici *coup*—Soderini being (in the words of the Anglo-Saxon Chronicle, about King Stephen) "a good man and weak, who did no justice." His admiration, equally naturally, is reserved for that amazing soldier of fortune, Cesare Borgia, Duke of Valentino, son of the Pope, Alexander VI (the progressive Renaissance Papacy having discovered, as against

the obscurantist monks, that, since St. Peter was married, so could the Popes be). The only disadvantage here, from the standpoint of Machiavelli's political success cult, was that Machiavelli was backing the wrong horse. Instead of ending the Papacy (what Wyclif called "Anti-Christ") by establishing a hereditary Papal State or a decent Roman princedom, Cesare Borgia died unsung from a wound received when besieging a city in that Spain from which his unpleasant family had sprung. As Machiavelli wistfully remarks, the Duke had allowed for everything save that he should be ill when his father, the Pope, died —doubtless owing to an Act of God.

Machiavelli has his justification in protesting against an indulgent good nature or a legalistic scrupulosity (such as that of George III, of Britain, in refusing to sign an act for Catholic Emancipation as contrary to his coronation oath) which subordinates concentrated and ruthless attention to the public good to its own caprice of formal friendships. A man may be a bad citizen because a good man or a personally pleasant man.* It is not, however, clear that Machiavelli is always thinking in terms of public duty. Perhaps, living under a regime which was not his choice, he found it convenient rather to treat the issue as one of incompetent scrupulosity in antithesis to that master spirit that demands personal obedience. Living in an age of the personal tyrannies in the Italian states, it is not the abstract concepts of Commonwealth or State, but the concrete notions of Prince or People, that dominate his thinking. It may be that the prosperity of the State is the (true) interest of the Prince, as was argued until the days of Charles II of England and of the Treaty of Dover. But Machiavelli's prime concern, at least in *The Prince*, is the technique of success in personal rule.

Sharply Machiavelli distinguishes between politics and religious principles. More precisely, he treats religious institutions as the instruments of the politician for giving sentimental support to the stability and bravery of the State. He is a secularist but, unlike the foolish, pedantic secularists, he does not boggle to recognize the influence of religion. "The rulers of kingdoms and commonwealths . . . should countenance and further whatsoever tells in favour of religion, even should they think it untrue; and the wiser they are, and the better they are acquainted with natural causes, the more ought they to do so." In these comments on religion, thoroughly Erastian in tone (as we shall later explain),† it is perhaps not fantastic to detect the note

* *Cf.* p. 92.

† *Cf.* p. 204.

of the disappointed idealist. He adds, "To the Church, therefore, and to the priests, we Italians owe this first debt, that through them we have become wicked and irreligious." The divorce, however, between the principles of religion and those of politics, in the writings of the secularist Machiavelli, is more apparent than real. The truth is that, in the background of his mind, what he disapproves of is not religion (*e.g.*, that of the Polis), but the cosmopolitan Christian religion.

> Our religion places [the highest good] in humility, lowliness and contempt for the things of this world; or if it ever calls upon us to be brave, it is that we should be brave to suffer rather than to do. This manner of life . . . seems to have made the world feeble, and to have given it over as a prey to wicked men to deal with as they please; since the mass of mankind, in the hope of being received into Paradise, think more how to bear injuries than how to avenge them.

It is the anti-Pacifist argument that will later be used by J. J. Rousseau.* For these reasons Machiavelli's own name has gathered round it a lurid legend. Nicholas may convey associations of the devil, but of the associations of Machiavellianism there has been no doubt. The early sixteenth-century Popes, over-cultivated Renaissance gentlemen, were deprecatingly compelled to disclaim his *Prince* and its dedication. Among Protestants his works were a cause of horror to the pious and hence were early commented upon and denounced, *e.g.*, by Gentillet in his *Antimachiavel*, 1576. Several early translations were made, into French (1553) and Latin (1560), to gratify the malice of realistic thinkers.

Machiavelli's reputation is, in large part, misleading. It is true that he gives critics a handle against him by his startling literary manner. Thus we find one literary piece headed, *Description of the Methods Adopted by the Duke Valentino When Murdering Vitellozzo Vitelli, Oliverotto da Fermo, the Signor Pagolo, and the Duke di Gravina Orsini.* It is the kind of thing to make those brought up on the political theory of Thomas Aquinas open their eyes. Again, one chapter of *The Prince* is inventoried as being *Concerning the Way in Which Princes Should Keep Faith.*

> A wise lord cannot, nor ought he to, keep faith when such observance may be turned against him, and when the reasons that caused him to pledge it exist no longer. If men were entirely good this precept would not hold, but because they are bad, and will not keep faith with you, you too are not bound to observe it with them. Nor will there ever be wanting to a prince legitimate

Cf. p. 459.

reasons for this non-observance. . . . Therefore it is unnecessary for a prince to have all the good qualities I have enumerated, but it is very necessary to appear to have them. And I shall dare to say this also, that to have them and always to observe them is injurious, and that to appear to have them is useful. . . . Let a prince have the credit of conquering and holding his state, the means will always be considered honest, and he will be praised by everybody; because the vulgar are always taken by what a thing seems to be and by what comes of it; and in the world there are only the vulgar, for the few find a place there only when the many have no ground to rest on. One prince of the present time, whom it is not well to name, never preaches anything else but peace and good faith, and to both he is most hostile, and either, if he had kept it, would have deprived him of reputation and kingdom many a time.

(*Qui nescit dissimulare, nescit regnare*—"who knows not how to dissimulate, knows not how to reign"—is the maxim, later quoted by Cromwell. In brief, a politician is a quick-change artist, who frequently has to appear resplendent in religion and loving-kindness—but it is highly inconvenient if this garment happens to be his skin. The point that Machiavelli, not having lived in modern times, appears to have overlooked is the superior efficiency of self-deception to dissimulation.)

(Machiavelli is a patriot.) Not unnaturally Benito Mussolini, that great actor and realist, has written an essay on Niccolò Machiavelli, which was his doctoral thesis on the occasion when he, once vagrant, honoured the University of Bologna by accepting from it a Doctorate of Law.* Mussolini shows Machiavelli in this light as the great—and perhaps the first—Italian patriot. An examination of the *Discorsi*, written under less trying personal conditions than *Il Principe* and perhaps more just to his actual views, reveals him rather as a democrat than as a supporter of autocracy. His opinion is caustic rather than high of the great Julius. The details of his career display him as definitely a republican. These points will be discovered by the student who goes behind sensationalism and prejudice; and who studies the first politicist since Aristotle with the attention that he deserves.

(Machiavelli is the first political scientist.) To an extent that Aristotle, his great predecessor, emphatically does not, Machiavelli makes a distinction between ethics and political science. By the same token he makes a distinction between religion (which the Schoolmen had, quite rightly, bound up with ethics) and political science. Machiavelli was able to force home these distinctions (which, although obvious, had been piously overlooked by preceding centuries which insisted on

* *Cf.* p. 718.

keeping eyes fixed on political "ultimate" *ends*) owing to the flagrant discrepancies, characteristic of the Renaissance, between religio-ethical professions and human political practice—and this even in Papal Rome itself. The great Greeks had ignored this distinction because, for philosophic reasons, they wished to do so—since by education they wished to ethicize politics just as they also ethicized natural history and physics itself as the manifestation of immanent reason. It is Machiavelli's merit that he brings his readers back from a moralo-philosophical discussion, long become formal and empty, upon how men *ought* to behave to a sociological study, aided by history ancient and contemporary, of how they *do* behave, persistently and despite all fine exhortations, universally approved, to the contrary. He brings them back from man's maxims to man's nature. This is the significance of his interest in history; and of his commentary on *Discourses on the First Decade of Livy* and of his *Florentine History*. Machiavelli gives us that reverse of the ethical medal of the Schoolmen which is necessary for the complete understanding of the subject.

Machiavelli is a political scientist, not a political philosopher. That is, he is a student of *means*, not *ends;* of efficiency where the objective is assumed, not of the value of the objective itself. Even *The Prince* (and, certainly, the more solid, if less sensational, *Discourses*) cannot be dismissed as some mere "manual for diplomats." It is, moreover, *not* only a study of the "art" of politics. And Machiavelli himself tells us this. He tells us that his task has been (*Prince*, Chap. XV) "to go through to the effectual truth of the matter"—the efficient causes. Elsewhere (*Discourses*, I, Chap. XVI) he explains that he has made his study from the point of view of the governors, because the rest only ask passively for security. *The politically conscious groups are the determinant forces in the social order.*

Machiavelli does not, of course, entirely live up to his professions. He is not so detached as he professes to be. That, in view of the novelty and pioneer nature of his position, is not surprising. Indeed, like that oddly discrepant personality, Dante, he is an idealist, but a disappointed one. Mussolini is not entirely wrong in seeing in him the Italian patriot who looks for a strong man to unite torn Italy against the foreigner, and who is not interested whether that strong man has the morals of a Borgia or the temperance of a Rechabite. Let us recall that *The Prince* concludes:

> This opportunity, therefore, ought not to be allowed to pass for letting Italy at last see her liberator appear. Nor can one express the love with which

he would be received in all those provinces which have suffered so much from these foreign scourings, with what thirst for revenge, with what stubborn faith, with what devotion, with what tears. What door would be closed to him? Who would refuse obedience to him? What envy would hinder him? What Italian would refuse him homage? To all of us this barbarous dominion stinks. Let, therefore, your illustrious house (the Medici) take up this charge with that courage and hope with which all just enterprises are undertaken, so that under its standard our native country may be ennobled, and under its auspices may be verified that saying of Petrarch:—

> "Virtue will take arms against the Fury
> And will battle him:
> For the antique valour of Italian
> Hearts yet burns alive."

Once again the City-state, even in the most glorious days of Florence, Urbino, Venice, Genoa, demonstrated its fatal incapacity, although a gemlike microcosm of intensive culture, to keep out foreign foes commanding the strength of nation states, French, Spanish, German. (Machiavelli is the harbinger of nationalism and, especially, of the national state. With him the fifteenth-century word *Stato* ("the State," the con-*stitu*tion, the static, the *esta*blished order, that which "stays put") comes into authoritative use. The State is with us.)

Machiavelli has other prepossessions, typical of his time, which, even if unvoiced, yet intrude into his discussions of means certain tacit assumptions about ends. He respects the "universal man," the man of talent, who is entitled to his gratification in power. The study of those qualifications, and the means to them, is Machiavelli's especial subject. Machiavelli does, however, apparently admit a moral rule overriding individual egoism. He takes it as unchallenged that "the safety of the people is the supreme law" (*salus populi suprema lex*)—it is a good old Roman maxim. Actually he interprets it often in a Renaissance fashion by identifying it with the grandeur and strength of the prince, as a *person*, from whom flows popular security. But negatively, he throughout adheres to it, whether it be prince or republic that he is admonishing. This safety is never to be sacrificed to other ideals. In brief, the wisdom of Machiavelli's "realism" comes to this: the welfare of humanity, for a Florentine, must be morally subordinate to the local interests of the municipality of the Florentines. This is the "new learning" as against the old Catholic universal morality and Roman cosmopolitanism. Machiavelli tacitly takes this as self-evident and as not calling for discussion. It is an object on which all would agree; and the only task is to discuss the

means. Perhaps not Florentines, but Italians. That would be the only question.

After all, men do think and behave like this—not by the mathematical law of moral logic. Everywhere what matters, as a basis of loyalty and morals, is the "we-group." What is the "we-group" men take from tradition.

(As political scientist Machiavelli's importance is twofold. He is the theorist of force. And he is the student of methodology—of the science and method of politics.)

(The power-theory of politics is not new. We must, however, scrupulously distinguish between it as the theory of what does happen and as the theory of what should happen.) As the latter it had been vigorously stated by "Callicles," eighteen hundred years earlier. "Callicles" reply to "Socrates" is, once again, in this "hard-boiled" age, coming to the fore.* (The statesman has no right to conduct himself as a private individual or to be swayed from attention to the major public interest by minor concessions of generosity, mercy or even by desire for show, in response to the appeals of private persons to his affection or benevolence. So much had been established by the example of the consul Brutus at the beginning of the Roman Republic. Are we, however, to assume that Roman virtue and standards of honour (as in the case of the return of the hostage Atilius Regulus) govern the conduct of the State itself? Or govern the conduct of a great man or *duce* who thinks he alone can save the State?—save it, for example, from the "unnatural" rule of weak men? Or is the strong man, who ought to rule, to make up his own moral rule about how he shall deal with weak pretenders?)

In a passage compact of truth and falsehood, Machiavelli writes (*Discourses*, III, Chap. XLI):

√ When the entire safety of our country is at stake, no consideration of what is just or unjust, merciful or cruel, praiseworthy or shameful, must intervene. On the contrary, every other consideration being set aside, that course alone must be taken which preserves the existence of the country and maintains its liberty. √ And this course we find followed by the people of France, both in their words and in their actions, with the view of supporting the dignity of their king and the integrity of their kingdom; for there is no remark they listen to with more impatience than that this or the other course is disgraceful to the king. For their king, they say, can incur no disgrace by any resolve he may take, whether it turn out well or ill; and whether it succeed or fail, all maintain that he has acted as a king should.

* *Cf.* p. 44.

When Catherine de' Medici became Queen of France and adviser to her royal sons, and in the "thorough" days of the Bartholomew Massacre, the French may have had more strain put upon their alleged belief that there was nothing disgraceful that a king could do. At least the Italians did not lose the opportunity to comment on French honour. We see abundant examples of the same mood today.

In brief, the issue that Machiavelli presents is the very old one that troubled Aristotle and, in different fashion, the Christians: How can a good man in a bad world be other than a bad citizen? To put the matter differently: Morality is based upon co-operation. If a good citizen owes ultimate allegiance to his own state in a world where there are many competing or warring states, how can a good citizen be other than a bad man? Machiavelli's answer is: A good citizen *ought* to be a bad man—or (phrased differently) there is no such thing as a moral law but only patriotism; or, again, patriotism is the final moral law and patriotism means applauding the leader, *i.e.*, the leader is the incarnate moral law. The issue is one that has not been solved from that day to this. Christian morality, with its pacifist presuppositions, postulates universal brotherhood. The State postulates the perpetual potentiality of war. Dante had foreshadowed the only solution—not fantastic in the days of the Roman Empire. That solution was the world-state or the international federation. With the rise, during the Renaissance, of the national sovereign State, pledged by implication to the methods Machiavelli so logically exposed, that solution faded from the field of practical politics.

Machiavelli's work is the more impressive since he is not to be understood as a mere defender of despotism to save his own skin, or an ironic glorifier of force and fraud. He is bitterly opposed to mercenary troops as sapping the military vigour of the nation that employs them. "It is not gold, as is vulgarly supposed, that is the sinews of war, but good soldiers." He gives warning that mere additions of territory, far from spelling real additions of strength to a country, may in fact weaken it. Without illusions about the fickle populace—*chi fondà in sul popolo fondà in sul fango:* "who builds on the people builds on mud"—he was no lover of the nobles who lived in their castles, engaged in feuds and sapped the strength of the city.

One cannot by fair dealing, and without injury to others, satisfy the nobles, but you can satisfy the people, for their object is more righteous than that of the nobles, the latter wishing to oppress, whilst the former only desire not to be oppressed. It is to be added that a prince can never secure himself

against a hostile people, because of their being too many, whilst from the nobles he can secure himself as they are few in number. (*Prince*, Chap. IX.)

Nor has Machiavelli more use for the wealthy, with their privileged and special interest:

To make it plain what I mean when I speak of gentlemen, I say that those are so to be styled who live in opulence and idleness on the revenues of their estates, without concerning themselves with the cultivation of their estates, or incurring any other fatigue for their support. Such persons are very mischievous in every republic or country. . . . It follows that he who would found a commonwealth in a country where there are many gentlemen, cannot do so unless he first gets rid of them. (*Discourses*, I, Chap. IV.)

—one of the most outspoken arguments that I know for class liquidation.

Elsewhere I have shown that no ordinance is of such advantage to the commonwealth, as one which enforces poverty on its citizens. And although it does not appear what particular law it was that had this operation in Rome (especially since we know the agrarian law to have been stubbornly resisted) we find, as a fact, that four hundred years after the city was founded, great frugality still prevailed there; and may assume that nothing helped so much to produce this result as the knowledge that the path to honour and preferment was closed to none, and that merit was sought after wheresoever it was to be found; for this manner of conferring honours made riches the less courted.

Machiavelli's ideal emerges as the Aristotelian one of a middle-class oligarchy or (since wealth is specifically subordinated) aristocracy—although in particular circumstances the dictatorship of some able man, competent to take the helm, is welcomed. A chapter of *The Prince* is entitled *Concerning Principalities Which Are Acquired by One's Own Arms and Ability*. A chapter of the *Discourses* (I, Chap. lviii), however, is entitled *That a People Is Wiser and More Constant Than a Prince*. And later (II, ii) we get a comment on personal government, striking from Machiavelli, even if not entirely accurate. It is doubtless stimulated by the thought that the so-called Roman Empire in fact achieved *most of its expansion under, not the Empire, but the Republic.*

It is easy to understand whence this love of liberty arises among nations, for we know by experience that States have never signally increased, either as to dominion or wealth, except where they lived under a free government. And truly it is strange to think to what a pitch of greatness Athens came during the hundred years after she freed herself from the despotism of Peisistratus; and far stranger to contemplate the marvellous growth which Rome

made after freeing herself from her kings. The cause, however, is not far to seek, since it is the well-being, not of individuals, but of the community which makes a State great, and, without question, this universal well-being is nowhere secured save in a republic. . . .

The rule of a people is better than the rule of a prince. . . . Nor let anyone finding Caesar celebrated by a crowd of writers, be misled by his glory; for those who praise him have been corrupted by his good fortune, and overawed by the greatness of that empire which, being governed in his name, would not suffer any *to speak their minds openly* concerning him.

One may welcome Machiavelli among the Liberals in this Fascist age.

Machiavelli is not only no *enragé* defender of personal leadership. He is not even a defender of fraud except within well-defined limits. The chapters of his works have lurid captions: "That promises made on compulsion are not to be observed"; "How women are a cause of the ruin of states"; "That we are not to offend a man, and then send him to fill an important office or command"; "That fraud is fair in war"; "Why it is that changes from freedom to servitude, and from servitude to freedom, are sometimes made without bloodshed, but at other times reek with blood." On the last point he makes the observation, relevant to contemporary revolution, that it all depends upon whether the government thus challenged, itself began in violence and revolution. Machiavelli, however, having observed (I, Chap. lix): "As to engagements broken on the pretext that they have not been observed by the other side, I say nothing, since that is a matter of everyday occurrence," yet continues:

This, however, I desire to say, that I would not have it understood that any fraud is glorious which leads you to break your plighted word, or to depart from covenants to which you have agreed; for though to do so may sometimes gain you territory and power, it can never, as I have said elsewhere, gain you glory. The fraud, then, which I here speak of is that employed against an enemy who places no trust in you, and is wholly directed to military operations.

Machiavelli had not advanced so far as the contemporary theory concerning the negligibility of bourgeois morality.

Machiavelli's fame, however, for the student of Political Science must rest finally upon the fact that he is the first modern master of this subject. In his eyes, human nature throughout the ages does not significantly change—and, what men have done, they are, on equal provocation, liable to do again. No talk of religion or ideals alters this fact, since both alike rest on this same human nature. "Men seldom

know how to be wholly good or wholly bad." The ideal for the politician moves within the field of the practicable for human nature. And what is permanently practicable, because in accordance with this nature, is not to be discovered by observing winds of doctrine and thunderings of ideology, but is open for all to study in history as in an open book.)

> Men are born, and live, and die, always in accordance with the same rules. . . . Anyone comparing the present with the past will soon perceive that in all cities and in all nations there prevail the same desires and passions as always have prevailed; for which reason it should be an easy matter for him who carefully examines past events, to foresee those which are about to happen in any republic, and to apply such remedies as the ancients have used in like cases.

Machiavelli held (in the words of Dr. Arnold of Rugby) that "the history of Greece and of Rome is not an idle inquiry about remote ages and forgotten institutions, but a living picture of things present, fitted not so much for the curiosity of the scholar, as for the instruction of the statesman and the citizen."

Two things will be noted. Machiavelli is not saying that "history repeats itself" or that what happened in ancient Rome will happen again, in just the same way, in modern Italy. There is, for example, no antique parallel to Italian nationalism. Nor (we shall return to this*) was he committing himself, like Vico later, to some mystic doctrine of recurrence or cycles in history. All he is saying is that human "desires and passions" remaining the same, where the incidents of life are comparable, humanity will tend to find the same remedies and repeat the same conduct. There will be recurrent behaviour patterns upon which (so long as it is always recalled that the incidents must be comparable) a social science can be founded, alike by economist and politicist. Machiavelli's entire *Discourses on the First Decade* is a labour to this end. Its incomparable importance and the rarity of the genius that attempted it, we shall perceive later, when we come to discuss the later development of this science. Today statues are erected to Machiavelli the patriot. Some day, they may be unveiled to Machiavelli the scientist, disinterested, so little the plotting egoist that at the end of his life he was poorer than at the beginning.

3

The period after Machiavelli is marked by an intellectual relapse into unoriginality. The Renaissance when it crosses the Alps, having

* *Cf.* p. 467.

no longer the same basis of urban economic prosperity, has lost its bloom. The glories of the court of Lorenzo de' Medici in Florence are replaced by the intrigues of the court of Catherine de' Medici, Queen Mother of France. Responsible for the massacre of the Protestants on St. Bartholomew's day (1572), acquiescent in the assassination of the Catholic Guises, accused by the Protestants of being a woman of blood, one of those who maintained "a Monstrous Regiment" ("regimen"—Knox's phrase), and by the Catholics of being pro-Huguenot, in her day practical "Machiavellianism," as a technique of domestic government, attained its fine, ill-scented flower. The comment upon her of Henry IV of France, Henry of Navarre, is interesting: "What could the poor woman do with five little children in her arms, after the death of her husband, and two families in France, ours and the Guises, attempting to encroach on the Crown? Was she not forced to play strange parts to deceive the one and the other and yet, as she did, to protect her children, who reigned in succession by the wisdom of a woman so able? I wonder that she did not do worse!"

"Machiavellianism," which had sprung up as a policy in countering the envenomed feuds of Italian city-states, was carried over, North of the Alps, to cope with the dying throes of feudal selfishness and with the fanaticism, not of class but of religion, which led the Pope, good man, to illuminate St. Peter in the ecstatic belief (false) that the Massacre of St. Bartholomew was piously premeditated; which led Knox to bless with the authority of his unpleasant, primitive, Hebrew prophets, the assassination of Cardinal Beaton; and which converted first France and then Germany into a shambles and a desolation.

Nous sommes las, became the watchword in France—"tired of it all." Henry IV found the taking of Paris and the unification of his kingdom well worth a Mass. It would have been well if the heavy Germans could have learned the same lesson. The Popes, reformed, religious and fanatical—these are the days of Pope St. Pius V (1566–1572)—placed Machiavelli's works among the first upon the Index of prohibited books, instituted in 1557, and resolutely kept them there. "Machiavellianism" had become a legend of horrors, perhaps to be practised, but never to be mentioned. The charge against Catherine was that she had taught her children "*surtout des traictz de cét athée Machiavel*"—"especially the writings of that atheist, Machiavel." But it was left for a prince of the Church, Cardinal de Richelieu, to support the Protestants in Germany in order to defeat the encirclement of France by the Habsburgs—as though Il Duce today might support Stalin in order to retain his hold on the Italo-German Tyrol

or Adolf Hitler support Stalin in order to beat the French. The intricacies of these distressed times produced two major political developments, the Doctrine of Religious Toleration and a new Theory of the State.

The Doctrine of Toleration, which ended the Christian Catholic domination, anticipated by Marsiglio and mothered by the Catholic Catherine de' Medici in 1562, was confirmed by the ex-Protestant Henry IV in 1598 by the Edict of Nantes. It marks the end of that epoch of domination of politics by Religion which can appropriately be said to begin with the Emperor Constantine's Edict of Milan, of 313. It was essentially a political doctrine springing from the lassitude and disillusion which ever follow uncontrolled idealism and unleashed fanaticism when Pope and Reformer alike were ready to advocate the assassination of opponents. It sprang from such a mood of reluctant compromise under pressure of facts as were later to dictate the Declaration of Indulgence (1687) of the Catholic James II. Toleration for conscience' sake, when not advocated by a persecuted minority, comes later—unless we see its foreshadowings in the secularism of Marsiglio and (with reservations) of Machiavelli.

Erastus (died 1583), the Rhineland Calvinist, had done no more than advocate that civil magistrates should concern themselves only with civil, not religious, offences and differences. He was only one more Protester against Lutheran persecution. Erastianism, although deriving its name from him, is a very different matter. It is indeed the theory which governed the famous formula of the Peace of Augsburg, of 1555—*cuius regio, eius religio:* the lord of each territory will settle the religion of the land where he is landlord. In case of dispute, it is for the civil authority, *concerned with the public peace*, to intervene, decide and regulate. It is little more than the theory of the pro-Imperialists in the Investiture Controversy and Marsiglio's theory applied to circumstances where the issue had become morbid and inflamed.

The group known as the *Politiques*, in France, maintained an intimately related position. Outstanding in the group is the Sieur Michel de l'Hôpital, chancellor of Charles IX. Their task was to explain to men of one Christian sect why they should obey a monarch belonging to another—why, in brief, inside Christianity, it was no longer true, as Augustine had said, that the brotherhood of faith had the first claim to allegiance. We shall return to an explanation of the individualizing and atomizing of religion and of this supernatural brotherhood.*

* *Cf.* p. 218.

All that here requires note is that it was the task of the *Politiques* to reintroduce, to the Modern World, the supreme allegiance of the State, if not yet the religion of the State. That last was to come later. At the moment all that was asserted was that the State, new born in the days of Louis XI of France, Henry VII of England, and Ferdinand and Isabella of Spain, was not to be ruined for the sake of any religion, however divine. Loyalty, for the first time since the Emperor Theodosius II (408–450), has become disjoined from orthodoxy.

Men ceased to be interested in Platonically saving (if necessary by burning) the soul of the heretic in this world lest he should burn in the next. The days, at least North of the Pyrennees, of good sincere men like the Inquisitor Torquemada (1388–1468) were over. (It may be added that the records of execution after due process by, *e.g.*, the Inquisition of Toulouse, compare very favourably, as touching numbers, with those of illicit negro lynchings in America. It cost about $150 to burn a heretic. The numbers were economical.) The distinction between the position of the *Politiques* and that of the signators at Augsburg is that now, instead of inter-national toleration, *i.e.*, diversity within the total *respublica Christiana*, which is a fading concept, there is to be intra-national toleration and diversity within the secular realm. As J. N. Figgis has put it: "Dissent is put in the category of unrecognized but permitted vice." Protestant "temples" are, as it were, "*maisons tolérées*." It is worth while to note that essentially the *Politiques* (one is reminded of Pierre Dubois) are a group of lawyers, and those lawyers "civilians."

The development of a new Theory of the State is well illustrated in the works of another of the *Politiques*.

Jean Bodin (Latinized as Bodinus, died 1596), Councillor of State, attached to the court of Henry III of France, at one time a Huguenot, as early as 1572 a defender of toleration, is from the point of view of political theory the most outstanding of the group. In his *Heptaplomères*, with its discussion between representatives of seven creeds, there is a foreshadowing, apparently, of that religious agnosticism which we find in that Legend of the Three Rings which recurs from Boccaccio to Lessing's *Nathan the Wise*. As a consequence Bodin was attacked by all partisans alike. His *De la République* (1576)—ten years later (and this in itself is highly significant of the break-down of clerical internationalism) translated into Latin as *De Republica Libri Sex*—lacks, with its conventional, legalistic preoccupations, the fresh originality of Machiavelli. It is the book of a lawyer, not of a politician.

It was, therefore, naturally enough, used as a text-book within a generation in the universities (*e.g.*, Cambridge, England), whereas Machiavelli's book was put on the Index. And, although Bodin is the first to use the words "Political Science," and declares that Machiavelli "*n'a jamais sondé le gué de la science politique*," it is in fact Machiavelli who refounds it after Aristotle. The *De Republica* is confused by its traditionalism and its conservation of the idea of an earlier, more liberal, less despotic age which is so different from the new "conservative realism." Bodin is concerned with Legitimacy and Sovereignty; Machiavelli with Power. The secularist theory, of the State or Empire, of Marsiglio, continued by Machiavelli with a difference, is carried further by Bodin, with a difference.

The traditional elements in Bodin appear in his theme that the family is the basic social unit; provides a natural basis for authority; and that this authority is a natural (*i.e.*, instinctive and rational) right. In the line of traditional Scholasticism is the position assigned to reason, which discovers the purpose of the State, and regulates it in the light of that rational purpose. Bodin will even admit—and the admission is, of course, conservative and traditional—that the "republic" or "commonwealth" (there is [*n.b.*] no Latin word for "state" —*imperium* could not be used by any loyal Frenchman: the days of the imperialist writers are over) is subject to the restraint of law. It is restrained by laws revealed, natural and universal—"*divinae, naturales et gentium.*" Thus "to keep a contract" is demanded by natural law. The whole doctrine, however, of Natural Law is in a condition of degeneration. Thanks to the rapid development of physics, Nature is beginning to resume a material quality but without the Stoic implication of immanent rationality. It is matter of which the uses, under Providence, are to be explored by laboratory experiment. "Nature" is not God but a laboratory specimen. On the other hand, although Bodin, as a "civilian," retains the notion of the rationality of law, this Natural Law is becoming merely moral and disconnected from the Scholastic notion of a rational law actually observed in the universe. It is becoming the Law that the God of the Bible wills, or would like, to be observed and for breach of which He will send men to hell; not the Law which they are predestined to observe. There is now a clear dualism of Ideal and Real which characterizes the age. And what practically matters is the real. Similarly Bodin renders formal homage to a *Respublica mundana*, the old *Respublica Christiana*—but the homage is without political significance.

The real argument of Bodin is to be found in the novelties which he tries, lawyerwise, to pretend are not novelties and to square with a tradition that he is too timid to reject. These novelties are not so valuable as the older values of the Hellenic and Scholastic tradition. But for the next three centuries the political thought of the West will be preoccupied with these ideas, with a new theory of the State and with the concept of Sovereignty.

The State, for example, Bodin maintains (and Gregory VII had maintained it, in his wrath, before him), is characterized by coercion and conquest. Civil associates, guilds, cities and the like, are associations at will so that a man is free to come and go as he chooses. Bodin avoids the thorny question whether churches and families are also such associations at will, although he advocates a new freedom of divorce.

The State stands above all ranks of society and all individuals. The notion of the feudal pyramid and of the contractual relation of classes has gone, and one of legal dominion, more congenial to the Roman law, has superseded it. Bodin, it will be noted, has here made the decisive transition—he has definitely begun the identification (however hedged around) of superiority in the social order with superiority of force, which is the precise ground upon which St. Augustine had allocated to the Temporal Power or City of Self-love inferiority in the social order, *i.e.*, imperfection, remoteness from the ideal order and absence of moral claim to ultimate allegiance. It is a typical *politique* attitude. The Renaissance "toughness" has done its work. The local State, which is of this world, is *en route* to take effective precedence of the Church, which is an eternal society of all men past, present and future (since even the infidel is also, willynilly, in Christ's flock and potentially under His shepherd). And this is done without reference to the Empire. As Richard II of England had claimed, every ruler is *entier empereur* within his own dominions. Bodin's notions are theoretically monstrous but they will prove dominant for several centuries. Like feudalism, state sovereignty has its evolutionary significance. In the new age of "the realm," while sowing war abroad, these notions do, in fact, make for peace and stability at home—even more than the shadow of the Roman Empire, which is alone theoretically satisfactory.

Sovereignty replaces suzerainty. The sovereignty is not deduced from the Roman notion of universal law but from the notion of civil peace and hence the need for a final authority within a given area or

realm (not yet nation or people). The problem, faced by Dante, of the civil peace between areas is ignored, or rather sovereignty reverses itself and becomes the right to inter-national anarchy (always, Bodin, the traditionalist, would add, under Natural Law).

The Greeks had a strong sense of the priority of society, of the community or Polis. Like Machiavelli later, they had the notion of personal power. This is expressed in the speeches at Melos of the Athenian delegates. But there is here no notion of state sovereignty—on the contrary we have the exact opposite notion of the priority of immemorial law, not subject to human sovereignty. That is the theme of Sophocles' *Antigone* and of Aristotle. The Roman law, with its doctrine of *imperium* and of "the will of the prince" comes nearer to the concept. But although we have here a strong doctrine of centralized authority, the will of the prince is still subject to universal law, and there is no developed notion of sovereign relations with external states. For Rome there is no claim to a right to its own will within civilization, since it identifies itself with civilization and indeed is in the primitive stage of admitting no law but its own (after its absorption of Greek law). It is yet thanks to Rome's own universality that countries deriving from Rome admit the validity of each other's domestic law, as resting on a common traditional basis in jurisprudence.

Feudalism, as was later to be pointed out, is the negation of the concept alike of State and Sovereignty. Since, however, the Church is far the most highly developed political body in early Western civilization, it is to it that we must look for the forms of all those political ideas which later develop in the field of that more recent and upstart organization, the State. Here, then, there are anticipations. Attention has already been called* to the doctrine of the unity of authority in the encyclical of Boniface VIII, *Unam Sanctam*. Earlier, in the thirteenth century, the great canonist who was later Pope Innocent IV had developed the doctrine, of which we shall hear more, of the *persona ficta* or "personality in law."† Some personalities, natural and corporate (legal), were "real" personalities. Such was the Church. Others, like guilds and chapters, were personalities at law, but only by the pretence and mandatory will of the "real" societies or persons. By the time of Marsiglio the Empire or State ("a state") is to be that "real person," although no one yet dares to suggest that the Church ("a church") is only *persona ficta*. Marsiglio refers to a civil authority "*superiore carens*"—"lacking any superior."

* *Cf.* p. 166.

† *Cf.* pp. 653, 712.

Briefly, the State (or "the Modern State,") was begotten of the New Monarchies and conceived by Bodin. In *De la République* occurs the decisive word, *souveraineté*. In the Latin version we get the definition: *maiestas est summa in cives ac subditos legibusque soluta potestas*—"majesty (*souveraineté*) is the supreme power, not bound by the laws, over citizens and subjects." Greek and Roman lawyer and Schoolman alike would have repudiated, horrified, any notion of a power "not bound by the laws." St. Thomas talks of this claim to self-sufficient power as "the insolent claim of that Nicanor," the Greek tyrant who boasted of his powers against the Almighty—a claim patently blasphemous. Bodin himself is half afraid of his own temerity—explains that of course all authority is subject to natural and divine law. But he continues (ostensibly about municipal or domestic positive law but by implication about all law recognized in the courts), "law depends upon the will of him who holds supreme power in the state."

Absolute monarchy replaces feudal kingship *inter pares* or "among the peers (equals)." The majesty and sovereignty of the State (the word still used is the classical one: "Commonwealth," used by Queen Elizabeth, *respublica*, *république*) are represented through the government—Marsiglio's "regent." And this authority of government may reside in a monarch. Moreover the monarch is no less a sovereign if he is a tyrant. Bodin, in an age when the problem of tyranny was being widely discussed and when Henry III of France was soon to fall a victim to an assassin, could not entirely avoid the issue of what relief a country might expect from tyranny. He introduces the amusingly conservative and legalistic suggestion (so contrary to his own doctrine of sovereignty, so reminiscent of the older *respublica mundana*) that a tyrant might be put down by his peers, the neighbouring princes. Bodin, after all, is a legitimist, not a Machiavelli.

The notion of the citizen as it existed in the antique world, at least North of the Alps and outside a few free towns, is dead. The notion of the vassal, of the Mediaeval world, is being replaced by that of the "subject." The difference is not one in words only. There is a fall in stature from the proud *civis Romanus* to the rank of one of the conquered people under Rome. The notion of the rights of the national by blood as against his ruler has not yet appeared, while that of the king as feudal father is fading. The "subject" is the mere lay figure of civil administration. The Chinese philosopher, Mencius, in the beginning of civilization, put his finger-nail on the kernel of fallacy in this lawyers' doctrine by his maxim: "If the ruler considers the people as

blades of grass, then the people will consider their ruler as a robber or enemy." Bodin does not visualize this subject as participating in government as the Greek and even Roman citizen had actually or theoretically participated, or as holding feudally by his oath and equal contract. Dominion has replaced compact. The subject is distinguished from the slave by the fact that he is juristically free.

Democracy, Bodin holds (and looks far away, South of the Alps, to Florence) is unstable. What matters is Government. And he stops to extinguish a dangerous heresy (not unsupported by St. Thomas). What if somebody says that the king is head of a race or a nation or that his realm should embrace only those of one style of culture, customs, institutions? On the contrary, is the King of France not to rule in Provence, Brittany and Navarre? The State may embrace all kinds and conditions and recks nothing of cultures. The State is Administration. Must then the State not be universal Administration —the Empire? (Always an inconvenient question to a Frenchman.) Bodin, demi-realist, turns back to the facts. France is. The Empire, save in name, is not. The main thing is that *men must be governed* and disturbing influences put down. Religion indeed had got out of hand and therefore Bodin, anti-fanatic, recommends toleration—not because he likes it but because he hopes that fanaticism, ignored by the State and by patriots, will wither.

4

The thought of Bodin is overshadowed by the conflict of ideas and of men in the Age of the Reformation and the Counter-reformation. The clear, harsh light of the Renaissance has given way to smoke. Shocked by the immorality of a progressive age, men are assassinating each other to the glory of God in the intervals of seeking a new way to salvation by grace. It is an age, not of Faith constructing a society, but of passionate faiths, too often burning to destroy each other—of multiple denominations and hydra sects. If this had its fruit in toleration, such toleration was no part of the intention of the dogmatic leaders. It has been said, by Professor Becker, that St. Thomas wrote twenty volumes, to reassure a world on the verge of doubt, to say that it was really right that things should be wrong, God only knew why. The Reformers did not see the reason for the twenty volumes—since they had the Bible and their primitive consciences to guide them.

The relation to the Renaissance of the Reformation—in part trans-Alpine, provincial continuation, in part anti-Italian, obscurantist reaction—is not a simple one to understand. In two centuries a Ger-

man, contemporary of Goethe, Wieland, looking back on the wreckage of all Erasmus has stood for, commented: "The Reformation was an evil and retarded the progress of philosophy for centuries. Luther ruined everything by making the populace a party to what ought to have been left to the scholars. Had he not come forward with his furious knock-down attacks on the Church and excited a succession of horrible wars in Europe, liberty, science and humanity would have slowly made their way. Melanchthon and Erasmus were on the right road, but the violence of the age triumphed." Wieland forgot that the mass of mankind prefers fighting to reason, as showing greater moral indignation. As Professor Whitehead says, "The Reformation and the scientific were two aspects of the historical revolt which was the dominant intellectual movement of the later Renaissance." He continues, "It is a great mistake to conceive this historical revolt as an appeal to reason. On the contrary, it was through and through an anti-intellectual movement."

The Schoolmen (granted their presuppositions) were thorough rationalists, a-priorists—"School-Divinity, which, in all difficulties, useth reason," as its exponents stated. The experimentalists in the sciences of matter and the Reformers were not a-priori rationalists. (About the Counter-reformers we shall be able to judge when we come to the Jesuits.) The stress of the Reformers is, not on the Reason (the *Logos*), but upon the inscrutable Will of God as the sustainer of man's destination and salvation by grace or damnation to hell. The Reformers, moreover, introduce a new stress upon Sacred Books, infallible beyond all challenge of human reason and not aided by the logical disputations of the Schoolmen. The matter is further complicated by the cross-current between the religious reformers and the experimental scientists whom the former readily consigned to perdition as materialists and atheists.

Martin Luther (1483–1546), damning Copernic for presuming to declare, contrary to Holy Writ, that the earth moves round the sun, illustrates, by his act, the charge of Erasmus: "Where is Luther, there is noise." Luther's reply was characteristic of his attitude: "Erasmus, an enemy of all religions and especially hostile to that of Christ." It was only after four generations of religious (*i.e.*, idealistic) wars envenomed by sectarianism, that Goethe's circle could then declare, in the Germany of the Enlightenment, that the Reformation in the fields of culture had spelled reaction. An exhausted Europe, bled white and in a hot-bed for looting criminals, awoke from its illusions of idealism and discovered how little Catholic oppression, human nature

being ever the same in the mass, differed from Protestant oppression. The charge of Goethe and Wieland, as we shall later see,* is, however, only partly true.

The sectarianism which Luther had unleashed he had unleashed unwittingly. When he declared "I can no other" and appealed to his own conscience (without Socrates' reservations of filial, pious obedience or the Schoolman's confidence in the logical reason), he had yet a profound belief that conscience and Word alike led back to one, more certain, no less objective authority—that of the primitive Church. It was Luther's misfortune and historical illusion that, as Dean Inge says, he sought for the primitive Church, not in the socialistical-minded, even communistic, sacrament-habituated Hellenistic world, but "in the forests of primaeval Germany." Later, when enthusiasts arose holding strange views on Baptism, anarchists recovering the true primitive communism, Jan van Leyden ruling and persecuting (by revelation) in Münster, peasants declaring that "Christ has freed us all"—each man holding that the unmistakable Bible was on his side — Luther, terrified for the success of his own sect, could only range himself with the secular powers, fulminating, exhorting "stab, kill them like dogs." The world, he added, had reached such a pass that a man might win most grace thereby.

Augustinian canon, masterful and pugnacious fighter of the priests, obsessed with the sense of his own morbid sin, seeking salvation from predestined damnation through Christ's liberal grace, denouncer of the secular Renaissance culture, husband of a nun advising carnal intercourse three times a week (Frau Luther complained that, as the years passed, grace did not advance), evangelic hymnwright, his great (if uncontemplated) work was that, by freeing the Christian from the discipline of the priest and his Church, he emancipated immortal man from temporary society. Socrates had contemplated the work but with Hellenic piety had turned back. Later Protestant bodies, especially the Quakers, guided by their inner light, were to carry the matter further. Luther, like Machiavelli but so differently, gave us the individual. The secular Renaissance gives us the secular egoistic individual, *universale uomo;* the Reformation gave the spiritual individual, with an emphasis of which the judicious Erasmus was incapable. What stirs the world, in the short run, is not truth, but truth publicized in tickling slogans—not the sober truth of philosophers and scholars, but truth made gaudy and tricked out with highly coloured, hell-fire doctrine

* *Cf.* p. 220.

and appeals to animal emotion. Later we shall have to assess the value of the gift.

Luther himself, a spiritual Henry VIII, contributes no coherent political theory. His *dicta* vary with the occasion. As touching the Church hierarchy, he was the last man to preach the moral sublimity of passive obedience. But in order to attack that Church he had to win over the secular princes. He generously made a present of passive obedience to them. For a consistent theory we must turn to Luther's colleague, the scholar Schwartzerd (Hellenized as Melanchthon). The Lutheran Reformation might proclaim the emancipation of the individual from that ordered society which was the hierarchic church. It might denounce the corruption and put a check on the cynical abuses of that hierarchy. But the concrete condition of its own success was the support of the lords and princes who had their own quarrel with that wealthy, interfering body. If then the soul is to be emancipated, expedience requires that the body shall be bound.

We may conveniently divide the Protestant Reformers into two groups: the civil-minded and the ecclesiastical-minded. The Lutherans and the divines of the Established Churches of England and Sweden belong to the former group. The Calvinists and (in a sharply different sense) the Brownists or Independents [Congregationalists] and the Quakers, to the second.

The phrase "civil-minded" is misleading if it be understood as implying that Luther or Melanchthon has "a sense for the state," any more than Augustine. Merely their temporal circumstances were different. The counter-balance of spiritual emancipation, in order to reassure the secular power, was the doctrine of Passive Obedience. In entire despite of their intentions, the Lutherans replaced—as much as did Machiavelli—the dominant Church by the dominant State. The excuse was that temporal matters so little concerned a spiritual man that he was happy to be entirely passive in these trivial regulations—an entirely non-civil, if not anti-civil, doctrine.

> The temporal regiment has laws that reach no further [writes Luther] than body and goods and what mere things of earth there are besides. For over souls God neither can nor will allow that anyone rule but Himself only. . . . For no man can kill a soul or give it life or send it to Heaven or to hell.

The doctrine of Passive Obedience was already maintained in its most emphatic form by the early Reformer and translator of the Bible, Tyndale (died 1536). In his *Obedience of a Christian Man and how Christen rulers ought to govern, wherein also (if thou mark diligently)*

thou shalt fynde eyes to perceave crafty conveyance of all jugglers (1528), Tyndale wrote, in a fashion characterized by the most offensive form of pacifism or passivism:

> He that judgeth the king judgeth God; and he that resisteth the king resisteth God and damneth God's law and ordinance. . . . The king is, in this world, without law, and may at his lust do right or wrong and shall give accounts but to God only . . . though he be the greatest tyrant in the world yet is he unto thee a great benefit of God. . . . The greater number of men are and always will be unchristian, whether they be baptized or not. . . . It is God, not man, who hangs and breaks on the wheel, decapitates and flogs: it is God who wages war.

Philip Melanchthon (1497–1560), professor of Greek at Wittenberg at twenty-one, educationalist, colleague and adviser of Luther, holds, as much as St. Thomas, that the object of government is that the multitude may look, "*non ad quaerenda et fruenda ventris bona*" ("not to seek and enjoy the goods of the stomach,"—as Marx wanted), but the goods of life everlasting, here understood as "Kingdom-come." Sound government rests on the Jewish Decalogue or Ten Commandments and on certain principles declared to common sense. The right to property follows from the commandment against stealing, but does not preclude confiscation of monastic properties. Nor does the right to freedom preclude slavery. The prince must be obeyed, although restricted in his own conscience by the law of God. The prince indeed had duties such as the extirpation of heresy, especially, the mild Melanchthon insists, when this amounts to overt blasphemy and gross scandals such as masses for the dead and the celibacy of the popish clergy. But if the princes misconducted themselves—as indeed the German princes frequently did, tearing Germany apart so that almost the rule of the old bishops was to be preferred—it was the duty of a Christian man to obey and, at the most, practise passive resistance.

Pacifism, indeed, emphasizing passive obedience but not excluding passive resistance, appears to have been the creed of both Luther and Melanchthon, in their more philosophic moments, and of many of the Protestants, as of the early Church. Two points, however, have to be noted. If these men are pacifists, Luther regarding force as futile in all matters of grace, their pacifism, and even their passive resistance (about which they are liable to make the most amazing *volte-faces*), is not a technique in civil society but is merely non-civil, and the consequence of a desire to withdraw from an order which did not concern Christians under grace anyhow. (The position here is so similar to Wyclif's that Melanchthon goes to great pains to refute him.) It

recalls early Christian Chiliasm. It is the kind of irresponsible non-civility which, as we shall see, it has taken Europe three centuries to grow out of. Further, where these men were precluded from escaping into the non-political and had to face civil obligations, they took, with however many lookings-back, precisely the road that St. Augustine more resolutely took, of countenancing persecution as a check on public scandal and as a corollary of the moral function of the prince or ruler. In this fashion, partisans in a time of transition, they betrayed alike the causes of authority and of liberty.

The doctrine of the Godly Prince formed a convenient bridge. The prince or ruler was entitled to be obeyed also because, if a Protestant prince, he was under a gospel obligation to be an example to his people as David (save for some minor homicidal and adulterous aberrations) had been. Luther was even in doubt whether the Old Testament did not authorize the godly prince to commit bigamy. It is this prepossession of the age with the godly David which explains such an oddity as the frontispiece of the "King's Bible," of Henry VIII of England, when a large, crowned Henry in the foreground receives from a less conspicuous Almighty and Dove above, a Bible handed to His Majesty, which His Majesty hands on to the attendant bishops, and lords, to give to the swinish but expectant multitude.

The Divine Right of Kings was a corollary. It was not, of course, in any sense a new doctrine. All kings, even ungodly princes, ruled, not absolutely, but by God's will, as Paul had said, since God willed other corrupt men, in a vale of tears, to be ruled. That was a commonplace since Paul's *Epistles*. What was new was the stress: kings seemed more to rule by Right Divine since Popes had been repudiated. The specific doctrine of the Divine Right of Kings (as once of Emperors—and Melanchthon wistfully becomes convinced that there must be none of this, the Emperor being an obstinate Catholic) is the reply to the Divine Right of Popes.

The Duty of a Godly Prince, however, put—as it had done ever since the days of John of Salisbury—a limit on his right. Divine Right and Absolute Right were not synonymous nor did Luther ever think them so. The ruler had the obligation to be pious. He was not a secular, profane prince, after the style of Machiavelli. He had the obligation to persecute, if at all, *because* he was moral and a minister also of God's Word. Religious Acts of Uniformity were a plain deduction from the certainty of that Word.

The ecclesiastical-minded Reformers, such men as Calvin and Beza, did not here differ. They merely were indignant with Melanchthon's

backsliding moderation in dealing with the counterparts in those days of Anarchists and Trotskyites today.

JOHN CALVIN (1509–1564), as was pointed out in the last chapter,* continues the scholastic Catholic tradition with only this major change, that for Rome must be read Geneva, and for a "Pelagian" Romish doctrine of works and free will must be read grace and predestination, even to damnation. If Luther is the Danton of the Reformation, Calvin is its Robespierre. He represents Augustinianism, in theology, carried to its final and cruel limit. God was not Reason (or the Reason was inscrutable) but was Will. The logic of this Frenchman, who adopted Geneva as his home, had a clarity such as the German Luther never attained. *The Institutes of the Christian Religion* is marked by all the clear-cut dogmatism of the man, aged twenty-eight, who wrote it.

Unlike those of Luther, Calvin's political principles emerge clear. The first is the aversion of the great disciplinarian, pessimist about sinful human nature, from anarchy. More emphatically than the Church Fathers, he maintains that there must be rule—coercive rule and secular rule. The Fathers were doubtful whether private property or slavery or even dominion of man over man was "according to nature." But if the original nature of man is evil the difficulty is removed. The correction of sin is not incidental but natural to human life. Paradise was finally Lost long ago. There must be government.

There are (and here Calvin displays himself a strict traditionalist) two separate powers—spiritual, seeking its ultimate ends in salvation and imposing spiritual penalties; and secular. Salvation is not membership by sacraments of the society of the Church and communion of saints past, present and to come. It is a more miraculous result of special divine interposition by grace with the individual, inscrutable, not to be prognosticated or controlled, issuing in life, not only of eternal value but of everlasting duration. Of these two powers the Church, as Augustine said, is superior. After the flunkeyism of the minor, civil-minded reformers and even after the pathetic tragedy of Luther, it is refreshing to turn back to this masterful doctrine with its still nervous determination to control the world. The business of the State is to protect religion—Calvin asserts it as strongly as any Papalist —and to enforce Christian morality.

As touching this civil order Calvin, even more than Melanchthon, is a natural oligarch (or aristocrat), not intolerant of an admixture of democracy although close to sedition, and looking to the city-states

* *Cf.* p. 167.

(Geneva, Basle, Strasbourg) for his model. Monarchy, however, least pleasing to mere men, has the commendation of God. Against democratic anarchy, Calvin insists on the duty of passive obedience—to the princes in their various realms, whatever the character of those princes. He includes in his condemnation religious anarchists with an "inner light." "Persons," he writes, "who, abandoning the Scripture, imagine to themselves some other way of approaching God, must be considered as not so much misled by error as actuated by frenzy." The unaided reason of man would have only produced carnal and foolish things. Princedoms exist because God so wills it. The servile quality of primitive Christianity reappears.

It is a vain occupation of private men to dispute about the best kind of constitution . . . *spiritual liberty may very well consist with civil servitude.* . . . Since the insolence of the wicked is so great, and their iniquity so obstinate that it can scarcely be restrained by all the severity of the laws, what may we expect they would do, if they found themselves at liberty to perpetrate crimes with impunity, whose outrages even the arm of power cannot altogether prevent. . . . *To hurt* and *to destroy* are incompatible with the character of the faithful: but to avenge the afflictions of the righteous at the command of God, is neither to hurt nor to destroy. . . . How did David, who discovered such humanity all his life-time, in his last moments bequeath such a cruel injunction to his son respecting Joab; "Let not his hoary head go down to the grave in peace:" and respecting Shimei; "His hoar head bring down to the grave with blood." But Moses and David, in executing the vengeance committed to them by God, in this severity *sanctified their hands*, which had been defiled by their former lenity.

The native cruelty of idealism again displays itself. Calvin's "God" is the Chief Pardoner exempting men from the dictates of the moral law of their own unbaptized and unsophisticated natures. Calvin continues:

Wherefore, if we are cruelly vexed by an inhuman Prince or robbed and plundered by one prodigal or avaricious or despised and left without protection by one negligent: or even if we are afflicted for the Name of God by one sacrilegious and unbelieving, let us first of all remember those our own offences against God which doubtless are chastised by these plagues. And secondly let us consider that it is not for us to remedy these evils; for us it remains only to implore the aid of God, in whose hands are the hearts of kings and charges of kingdoms.

God sometimes aided by a plague himself, as of Pharaoh, or by a foreign war.

However, as against the unrighteous, Calvin is not to be supposed to mean that non-resistance to a prince is the same as obedience to

ungodly demands. In Geneva itself under Calvin, after 1542—and in a fashion somewhat inconsistent with Calvin's own separation of the powers—the ecclesiastical Venerable Company (composed of professors of theology and ministers) and the Consistory, which united powers ecclesiastical and temporal, dominated the secular councils. Whereas the Catholic Church had offered a centralized discipline, Calvinism or Presbyterianism (the "invisible Church" apart) could only offer an aggregate of churches and presbyteries within the respective cities and states. The Church was atomized. Nevertheless Geneva under Calvin's own rule constituted a model. The true faith was upheld and, to that end, the heretic Calvin, with his doctrine of justification, not by faith *also*, *caritate formata* ("formed by charity,") but by faith *alone*, by personal intervention procured the burning of the Unitarian heretic Servetus, in 1553, to the greater damnation of heresy. A monastic discipline was enforced on the model republic so that Calvin's own daughter was disciplined for immorality. Blasphemy was punishable by burning. The styles of clothes and the details of cohabitation in matrimony were alike regulated. Pinchbeck Geneva claimed all the authoritarianism of Rome in order to impose the rigid regulation of a Carthusian priory upon the common laymen.

Outside Geneva and its Model Church of the Saints, Calvin's writ could run in no such fashion. But it was still true that ungodly commands were not to be obeyed, although active resistance to a prince was resistance to God until God removed him (as was resistance to a husband by a wife). There could be no question of a conditional contract limiting obedience. Who argues thus, *il argueroit perversement*—"he would argue perversely."

> But to the obedience which we have shown to be due to the authority of governors, it is always necessary to make one exception, and this is entitled to our first attention, that it do not seduce us from obedience to Him, to Whose will the desires of all kings ought to be subject, to Whose decrees all their commands ought to yield. And indeed how preposterous it would be for us, with a view to satisfy men, to incur the displeasure of Him on Whose account we yield obedience to men.

We must suffer rather than deviate from piety. What then shall determine when a law is unrighteous? The Word of God. And who shall interpret it? It is always clear, and it is damnable to deny this. (The point is important. Servetus died for a Left-wing deviation about this.) Who then knows what is its clear meaning? Briefly, the Calvinist professors of theology. Calvin knew personally all about the Will and

Word. Like Chillingworth, later, Calvin was prepared to assert that "the Bible is the only religion of Protestants"; and, like a humble follower, one Gabriel Powel, that their doctrines are "the only word of God."

The superiority of the Kirk to the king has conclusions, despite all talk of non-resistance, not dissimilar from those in the Catholic Church, when the professors of theology felt themselves strong enough. Not unnaturally James VI of Scotland left for England, as James I, never to return, after the unmannerly treatment from the ministers of the Kirk, as for example from Andrew Melville, with his comment to his king—"Ye are but God's silly vassal." New presbyter was but old priest writ large.

Should then a Catholic magistrate (or Mary Stuart) persecute for his or her true faith? Certainly not, says Calvin.

> God does not command us to maintain any religion, but that only which He hath ordained with His own mouth. . . . He condemns the presumption of all those who go about to defend with fire and bloodshed a religion framed to fit the appetites of men.

Shall then Protestants not persecute? God forbid. A Scottish observer to the Long Parliament writes back home: "They have here a strange monster called toleration." In the Scottish Solemn League and Covenant (1638) it is declared:

> That we shall in like manner . . . endeavour the extirpation of Popery, prelacy, superstition, heresy . . . lest we partake in other men's sins, and thereby be in danger to receive of their plagues; and that the Lord may be one and His name one in the three kingdoms.

At least on one matter, ecclesiastical-minded and civil-minded reformers could agree—the future of the heathen (*e.g.*, Plato and Aristotle):

> Works done before the grace of Christ, and the inspiration of his Spirit, are not pleasant to God . . . yea rather, for that they are not done as God hath willed and commanded them to be done, we doubt not but that they have the nature of sin. (Article XIII of the Church of England.)

The obsessive meditation on death which overshadowed the Dark Ages had lifted with the Renaissance. It descends again as a religious pall with the renewed emphasis on Original Sin and man's utter corruption.

Protestantism has come to stay and to play a role of importance for three centuries. If it is scarcely a dominant role, this is because the

ideological crusade—*either* Protestant *or* Catholic: Geneva black or cardinal red—is seldom permitted to take sole charge of the draughtboard of history. Statesmen trained in the *Politique* tradition cut across it. Elizabeth gives assistance to a Catholic France; Cromwell refuses it to a Protestant Holland. Above all, Cardinal de Richelieu supports the German Protestants in order to check the encirclement of France by the House of Habsburg.

The effect of the specifically Protestant doctrine of Justification by Faith, condemned as heresy like that of Arius by the sixteenth-century Catholic General Council of Trent (1545–1563), we shall be able to judge when we come to the origins of European Liberalism. Basically, like the original Pauline doctrine, it was extra-rational and deeply anti-rationalist. The Council maintained that the saved "grew in righteousness, *cooperante fide bonis operibus* (faith co-operating with good works) and are in a greater degree justified." In brief, Catholicism held fast to the social notion. Like Luther and like Augustine, pursued remorselessly by a haunting sense of sin and only hoping to escape from the Just Judge by grace, the Protestants were religious individualists. The elect were aristocrats, not partners of any worldly society or even of an earthly, centralized Church. They were saved by, as it were, a gift or talent (not theirs by work or merit) capriciously bestowed by Divine Grace transcending society and vindicating the Elect. God held private intercourse with each several, immortalized individual—immortal in his own right, and not by right of society. The Individual, needing no priest, was sanctified. The Roman-Hellenic idea of the priority of society to the actual individual, secularly ended by Feudalism, was spiritually ended by Protestantism. The Ego has come into its own.

READING

N. Machiavelli: *The Prince*, trans. W. K. Marriott, Chaps. VIII, XV–XIX, XXVI.

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE

*N. Machiavelli: *Discourses on the First Decade of T. Livius*, trans. Thomson, 1883.
J. W. Allen: *Political Thought in the Sixteenth Century*, 1928.
*J. Burckhardt: *The Civilization of the Renaissance in Italy*, trans. Middlemore, n.d.

Chapter VIII

Thomas Hobbes

1

IN THE Bodleian Library, the University library, at Oxford, hang two pictures of the Restoration period, at first glance almost indistinguishable. They are pictures of Charles I of England, and of Christ. Such a comparison did not shock the Cavalier mind any more than it would have shocked the mind of a Byzantine churchman. As has been explained, the scholasticism of St. Thomas shared much of the rationalism of the earlier Greek philosophy. Duns Scotus had emphasized the element of will—inscrutable will in a God transcending human intelligence. The Reformers, by the doctrine of grace without pretence of human merit, had tended to stress the same notion—of the Will of a Personal God, monarch of the universe, who had revealed this final and unchangeable will in Sacred Texts. It was but a short step to assert—and there was an established Patristic tradition for asserting—that kings were like God. Calvin quoted the text "I have said, Ye are gods" (*Ps.* lxxxii, 6, *cf. Exod.* xxii, 28) to that effect—although it rests on a play on the Hebrew word *elohim* which may be "gods" or "judges." Even if kings in their morals scarcely resembled God, nevertheless "all authority is from on high"; and they ruled by right divine. Nor would the civil-minded churchmen accept the restrictions of Isidore and Bracton and of the Papalists' corollary that what was by the Church declared *not* to be from on High was *not* authority.

Even Luther's Passive Resistance was too strong meat for some ecclesiastical stomachs. Passive Obedience would alone suffice. Some such as Mainwaring, the Caroline divine, carried the exaltation of monarchy to a point that earned rebuke from a Parliament still conscious of its mediaeval rights and of liberties dating from that age of Feudalism that had preceded the New Monarchies. Clearer even than such theorists of the fusion of national State and Church (anticipators of Dr. Arnold of Rugby) as Archbishop Laud in his claims for kings, as partners in the alliance of Church and State, bishop and

"godly prince," is a writer who has the advantage of being a king himself.

JAMES I, of England, and VI, of Scotland (1566–1625) wrote, while still in Scotland, his *Trew Law of Free Monarchy or the Reciprock and Mutuall dutie betwixt a free king and his natural subjects*. Long ago, in the days of the Emperor Nerva, it had been observed that it was better to have a ruler who permitted nothing than one who permitted everything. This is the thesis of James when dealing with the argument that subjects must have some recourse against tyranny. He recedes from the liberal attitude of St. Thomas on the ground that anything is better than anarchy. It must be recalled that James Stuart wrote from bitter experience, not only of the murderous, nation-weakening feuds of the Scottish clans, but of the treatment of his mother, Mary, Queen of Scots, and of his own bondage to the Presbyterian divines and nobles—not least his tutor, George Buchanan. If there were a contract between ruler and ruled, not one party to the case but (no, not the Pope—for Protestants) God in Heaven alone could be the umpire. Paul himself had said that all authority was from above. Briefly, the True Law was that only monarchs were free. The "Reciprock Dutie" of king and subject was for the one to wield godly rule and for the other to obey.

The *Basilikon Doron*, or "Kingly Gift" intended for his elder son, Henry (who died before accession), shows yet more clearly, because in a fashion less hampered by argumentation, the views of the pompous monarch of whom the witty Henry IV, of France and Navarre, observed that he was "the wisest fool in Christendom." It will be found among his works, along with studies on "Demonologie" and on the Vice of Tobacco, which shocked his moral conscience. It begins with a brief poem to his heir, composed by the royal hand (the Stuarts ran to the arts):

> God gives not kings the stile of Gods in vaine
> For on his Throne his Sceptre do they swey.

James gives various pieces of personal advice to Henry: the duty of training his talent (*ingenium*) or—as James puts it—"to exercise his engine." The duty of being fitly clothed:

> Be also moderate in your raiment, neither over superfluous, like a deboshed waster; nor yet ever base, like a miserable wretch . . . not over lightly like a candie soldier [chocolate soldier] or a vain young courtier, nor over gravely like a minister. . . . [Yet] a king is not mere *laicus*.

In selecting his wife, he will consider well before he picks on wealth or beauty; "what can all these worldly respects avail, when a man shall find himself coupled with a devil to be one flesh with him."

Most significant, however, is his political advice about the estates of his realm. He has no high opinion of any of them. The Scottish merchants "buy for us the worst wares and sell them at the dearest prices." The nobility were moved by a "fectlesse arrogant conceit of their greatness and power; drinking in with their very nourish-milke that their honor stood in committing three points of iniquitie, to thrall by oppression, the meaner sort that dwelleth neare them, to their service and following, although they hold nothing of them;" and "maintenance" in courts of justice; "and (without respect to God, king or commonweale) to bang it out bravely, hee and all his kinne against him and all his."

Above all, he warns him about the Presbyterian ministers:

> Some of them would sometimes snapper out well grossly with the trewth of their intentions, informing the people that all kings and princes were natural enemies to the libertie of the Church. . . . Take heade therefore (my sonne) to such Puritans, verie Pests in the Church and Common-weale, whom no deserts can oblige, neither oathes nor promises bind, breathing nothing but sedition and calumnies, aspiring without measure, railing without reason, and making their ounce imaginations (without any warrant of the Word) the square of their conscience.

It was of a piece with this that James should declare, at the Hampton Court Anglican Conference, in 1604: "No bishop, no king"; and, in 1616, "It is atheism and blasphemy to dispute what God can do . . . so it is presumption and high contempt in a subject to dispute what a king can do, or say that a king cannot do this or that." Subjects "rest in that which is the king's revealed will in his law." "Kings," James said to Parliament in 1610,

> are also compared to fathers of families: for a king is truly *parens patriae*, the politic father of his people. And, lastly, *kings are compared to the head of this microcosm of the body of man* . . . do not meddle with the main points of government: that is my craft: *tractent fabrilia fabri;* to meddle with that, were to lesson me.

James further compares himself to an old stork, and his subjects to the pious young in the nest.

The view of the metaphysical James was that which Shakespeare ascribes rightly enough, to Richard II, son-in-law of the Roman Em-

peror, Wenceslaus of Bohemia [then in the Reich]. Richard's head was full of imperial notions.

> Not all the water in the rough rude sea
> Can wash the balm from an anointed king;
> The breath of worldly men cannot depose
> The deputy elected by the Lord.

It is desirable here to call attention to a book of no especial importance at the time, published in 1680, after the author's death, but made famous as the object of that attack by Locke which established the power of Whiggery and of Liberalism—the *Patriarcha* of Sir Robert Filmer (died 1653). His *Observations Concerning the Originall of Government*, less well known, is abler. Filmer, with his fantastic comments on Adam the first father and Nimrod the first king, can be spitted on the sword of Locke's argument, on the ground that he traces the divine right to rule of James I by primogeniture from Adam and his elder son. Actually all that the encumbered Filmer is seeking to do is to assert that from the beginning, men were not equal, but the elder ruled the younger. Filmer has, moreover, the singular merit for his time of being, as it were, an anthropologist, although born out of due season. He asserts that human society like animal is natural, but naturally unequal; that authority originates from the family relation; that rule is customary; and that traditional custom, not deliberate and rational consent, is the basis of rule; that *authority always has lain and should lie in the hands of less than all, and here, among those in control, a majority can make out no better claim than a few.* "If it be tyranny for one man to govern arbitrarily, why should it not be far greater tyranny for a multitude of men [*e.g.*, a 'sovereign' Parliament] to govern without being accountable or bound by [traditional or constitutional] laws?" The pardoning power and equity are proofs that men—the executive—are and should be above laws. Filmer, although more inclined to use "natural reason" and slightly less heavily armed with proof texts than his sectarian contemporaries, yet actually has significance by his attempt, in vain, to turn the thought of the age from abstract principles to observation of human history, although in a less cynical fashion than the Italian school.

It is scarcely possible to cap a doctrine of kingship so high as that of James I. However, it was attempted in France, as she emerged from the wars of the Ligue and Fronde. Fénélon was to instruct the young Louis XIV, by his *Télémaque* (1699) in those moral checks on absolutism dear to the Catholic tradition; but the Gallican bishops, led by

Bossuet of Meaux, piled adjective on adjective in praise of the sacred character of the Most Christian Kings, if not precisely of their flagrant moral lapses. (After all, Louis XV was not guilty of the offence of marrying Mmes. de Pompadour or du Barry.) The general view, however, is adequately expressed earlier (in 1625) by the then Bishop of Chartres:

> Kings are ordained by God, and not only they are so ordained, but also they are gods themselves . . . not in essence but by participation, not by nature but by grace.

In the following century, in 1770, Louis XV of France was to declare: "We hold our crown of God alone: the right to make laws appertains to us without dependence upon or share with another." Yet a century later the theme that crowns were held by inheritance and divine right was maintained by the Kaiser William II in a speech at Königsberg. It will be noted that the Continental doctrine of divine right, subject to certain traditional restrictions of Catholic theory, tends to pass over to Absolutism in a fashion that is not, for historical reasons, true of English theory.

As touching British theory a caution, of some subtlety but some importance, is required. We have stressed the later scholastic and Protestant notion of super- or ir-rational, inscrutable Divine Will. But the more orthodox Catholic doctrine, which passed over into Anglicanism, emphasized the notion of rational Law. We thus find the Caroline writers following the tradition of John of Salisbury who had clearly subordinated the "divine right" of rulers to the divine law of a rational God. There is a division in their minds, not clear but firm, between rule by divine right and arbitrary rule—which was indeed its perversion or antithesis. "I was never such a fool," declares Laud, Archbishop of Canterbury, "as to embrace arbitrary government." What their doctrine did exclude is a human contractual theory of authority.

More difficult is it to say (and what emerges is that the thought of these writers before the English Civil War was *not* clear) whether the *rational and natural law* of which Bishop Andrews talked included the allegedly historical, but vague, "*fundamental constitutional law*" of England. If not—and Laud asked, against Coke, whether such a law, superior to the King, existed—then was this undoubted subordination to law to be understood as a subordination of the King's divine right to the *actual laws* and legislature of England? The King, argued Sir Robert Berkeley in the Hampden case (1637–1638), has *iura summae*

majestatis ("sovereign rights"), but his government is to be *secundum leges regni*—"according to the laws of the realm." (These transient laws, however, *e.g.*, Field held, must be "profitable and beneficial to the society of men to whom they are presented.") This subordination Filmer denied; but it is noteworthy that a practical statesman such as Laud, in the context of English local constitutional custom, did not deny it. At the most an emergency power is claimed for the king as ruler. So far the Parliamentarian fiction of an English parliamentary constitution established in the fifteenth century, in the style sketched by Fortescue, was not challenged, at least by Laud, on Tudor precedents The real ground, however, of the quarrel with Laud, the High Churchman, was a different one. As much as John Robinson, the Congregationalist, Laud would have agreed that there are no things indifferent or irrelevant for religion. Laud drew the conclusion that "the Commonwealth can have no blessed and happy being but by the Church"—*i.e.*, the totalitarian conclusion of the need for national, cultural homogeneity which is the issue in our own days.*

Francis Bacon (1561–1626), Lord Verulam, Lord Chancellor of England, expelled from that post for taking bribes, philosopher and essayist, found it expedient to support the claims of King James I. The king's judges, he declared, were lions but lions under the throne. He probably excused himself in the name of an efficiency which counselled support of a central authority, against the popular relics of mediaeval confusion. The justice, for example, of the Star Chamber was quick and cheap. His comment on tyrants by *coup d'état* was certainly caustic enough: "He doth like the ape that, the higher he clymbes, the more he shewes," etc. Perhaps Bacon had studied Machiavelli not wisely but too well—of whom he records, "We render thanks to Machiavelli and writers of that sort, who openly and without hypocrisy declare how men are accustomed to act, not merely how they ought to act." It is true, as Bacon confesses, that the sciences are "far from being equal to the complexity of human affairs." It is presumably from Machiavelli that he learned the maxim, which he says was wrongly condemned by "some of the Schoole-men," that "there is no Question but a just Fear of an Imminent danger, though there be no Blow given, is a lawfull Cause of a Warre." The greatest protagonist, however (since his namesake, thirteenth-century Roger

* Nevertheless Laud's conclusion, like Hooker's, is rather churchly [*vide* p. 164] than secular-totalitarian, although like its rival in stressing cultural homogeneity. *Cf.* Richard Hooker: "with us *one society is both Church and commonwealth*"—and note the order of priority.

Bacon), of the empirical method firmly directs our attention to the objective study of political phenomena, and away from the theological bombast and incantations which tended to serve as the political principles of his age. It is, however, his contemporary, Thomas Fitzherbert, in 1606, who specifically deplores as avoidable, "the imperfection of all *political science*"—not that Fitzherbert, with his plea for true religion, is any politicist or social scientist.

In passing, Bacon's comment, which aligns him not only with Aristotle and the Canonists but also with Machiavelli against a nascent capitalist individualism, is worth note:

> Above all things good policy is to be used, that the treasures and monies in a State be not gathered into few hands. For otherwise a State may have a great stock and yet starve; and money is like muck, not good except it be spread.

2

THOMAS HOBBES (1588–1679), of Malmesbury, was Francis Bacon's secretary. From that position he passed on to be tutor to the member of the Cavendish family who later became second Earl of Devonshire. He enjoyed the patronage of these Earls until his death. He was, for a while, mathematical tutor to Charles II, when in Paris, and perhaps encouraged in that intelligent monarch interests that resulted in the foundation of the Royal Society.

The son of the Reformed parson of Westport, in Wiltshire, whose chief reputation was for "ignorance and clownery" and who subsequently disappeared under a cloud, Thomas Hobbes proceeded to Oxford University, a stagnant institution, where no little of his time in those days of the Explorers, not spent in bird catching, was occupied in "gaping on mappes." A little later, a friend of Ben Jonson's, he was "much addicted to musique and practised on the base-violl." However, it was not until 1610 that he first saw the great world when he went on Continental tour with his pupil. These tours—there were several—brought him into touch with the best minds in Paris and even with Galileo, in Florence. That, however, of 1640 had another incentive than learning. His "little treatise" of 1640, *Elements of Law Natural and Politic*, had raised a storm; the Long Parliament was about to assemble; and, the circumstances well considered, Hobbes (in the words of his own verse autobiography),

> Stocked with five hundred pounds of Coin,
> Did desert or leave [his] native shore.

He was, however, also one of the first of those to come back, in 1651, since demonstrably the principles of *Leviathan* (1650–1651) were not inconsistent in any fashion with the dictatorship of Oliver Cromwell. He could even pride himself on having retained "a thousand gentlemen in conscientious loyalty to the government of the day." Before he left Paris his "realistic" views had already made him intensely unpopular with the legitimist and church-minded Cavaliers. As he remarks, "then I began to ruminate on Dorislaus' and Ascham's fate"—the assassinated ambassadors of the Protectorate. Having ruminated, he quit Paris. The graver problem arose when the Restoration came. His great book, *Leviathan*, presented to Charles II, after his return from the battle of Worcester, by his old tutor, could be squared with the Protectorate. But how to square himself with the Restoration? Hobbes had no option but to write a new book, *Behemoth*, attacking the Long Parliament. Charles II forbade (until 1679) its publication. Hobbes' defence of Monarchy was all too embarrassing. The tolerance, however, of that monarch availed more. Hobbes, after publishing, in 1662, *Considerations on the Reputation, Loyalty, Manners and Religion of Mr. Thomas Hobbes*, and engaging in mathematical controversy, solaced his declining years with translations, including one of Homer. He played a game of tennis at the age of seventy-five; was accustomed to sing aloud for his health's sake; and died, in full possession of all his faculties, aged eighty-nine. Aubrey, the biographer, tells us that in the later years, he was bald and his greatest trouble was to "keepe off the flies from pitching on the baldnes." He adds that Thomas Hobbes "had a good eie"; and that, when stirred by discourse, "their shone as it were a bright live-coale within it."

Among his earliest work had been a translation of Thucydides, of whom he gleefully (if falsely) writes:

> He says democracy's a foolish thing,
> Than a Republic better is one king.

Hobbes was perhaps not a poet, although not from lack of perspiration since he translated Euripides' *Medea* into Latin verse at the age of fourteen; but he was one of the greatest of English stylists. It is his misfortune as a philosopher and has led to much misunderstanding and speculation among learned and literal-minded, rather than literary-minded, commentators. It is a matter for reflection that Hobbes and Plato are the only philosophers who have been lucid and good stylists—the rest have preferred to approximate to the symbols and letters of algebra, in their passion for accuracy, rather than to *belles-lettres* in

any pursuit after a popular and aphrodisiac lucidity. Rational philosophy is the sworn enemy of pleasant imagination as is sacred love the enemy of profane.

During these later years he was able to attack his *bêtes noires*, the Puritans, the Churchmen, the Jesuits, the universities and the Common lawyers. All these men were sowers of anarchy, each in his several way challenging the final authority of the sovereign. The Puritans believed themselves to be guided by a private revelation which took precedence of man-made law. Even Cromwell's son-in-law, General Ireton, had been tried when he found individuals who had private revelations about which way the army should march or whether taxes should be paid or not. Hobbes complains that "every boy or wench thought he spoke with God Almighty." Hobbes himself had been near death from illness (and had then insisted that Bishop Cosin, of Durham, should pray over him strictly according to the formula as by law established, exclaiming to officious clerics, "let me alone or else I will detect all your cheates from Aaron to yourselves"). He notes an instance of prophecy by a pious Puritan. "Nor do I much wonder that a young woman of clear memory, hourely expecting death, should bee more devout than at other times. 'T was my own case."

The Churchmen forget that "neither is a clergy essential to a commonwealth. . . . There is no nation in the world whose religion is not established and receives its authority from the laws of that nation. . . . If he, that commands me to do that which is sin, is right lord over me, I sin not." (The priesthood, it should be added, must be more scrupulous, and is, indeed, paid to undergo martyrdom.) As for the Calvinists and the Jesuits, they both brew sedition with their pretence of a Church above the [State's] law. "Calvin looketh asquint in the same fashion that Bellarmin doeth."

The universities, resurrecting the writings of the Greeks and Romans that praise tyrannicide, introduce the wooden horse of Troy and hatch treason. There may be a case for a rival institution in London. "Mr. Hobbes will instruct the young men of Gresham College [London] in mechanics, if they will ask him," and deal civilly with him. "In the meantime Divinity may go on at Oxford and Cambridge to furnish the pulpit with men to cry down the civil power."

The Common Law men, however, the very priests as they should be of the temporal power, are the chief stone of offence, with their talk of above all men, *i.e.*, the sovereign, being the law. And, above all, Coke. Who should interpret this law, if not men? And, if men, why the judges and not the sovereign? In the *Dialogue on the Common*

Laws (1667, pub. 1681), Hobbes remarks of Sir Edward Coke's *Institutes:* "Truly I never read weaker reasoning." Proof texts from inspired Writ were the order of the day; but the irrelevances of the proof texts nauseate Hobbes, for Coke "meant none of this but intended (his hand being in) to shew his reading or his chaplain's in the Bible." "But you know that in other places [Coke] makes the common law and the law of reason to be all one; as indeed they are. Why, by it is meant the king's reason." Coke, on the other hand, regarded himself as based on the "fundamental law" of Magna Carta, of whom a wit has remarked that he was, by his interpretations, "the inventor."

Hobbes's method as a political thinker merits attention. It is not to be inferred that his writings are mere *livres de circonstance.* His philosophy is expounded in a series of works (issuing from the *First Principles* of ?1630) that fit into a strictly logical order, although Hobbes himself deplores, in his letters, that he was compelled to publish them in the reverse chronological order. He excuses himself on the ground that the basic political principles are, anyhow, sufficiently well known from direct experience—as Burton, in his *Anatomy of Melancholy* (1621), also held. There are "two maxims of human nature"—the "concupiscible part, which desires to appropriate to itself the use of those things in which all others have a joint interest; The other proceeding from the rational, which teaches every man to fly a contra-natural dissolution [fear of death] as the greatest mischief that can arrive to nature." These writings of Hobbes are the *De Cive* (1642: or *Philosophical Rudiments Concerning Government,* 1651, the English version); *De Homine* (1658: or *Human Nature,* 1650); and *De Corpore* (1655). The first two are anticipated in the *Elements of Law* of 1640.

The temper of the age was mathematical. Just as the fifteenth century had been dedicated to the humanities, so the seventeenth century was overwhelmed by a sense of the significance of mathematics as an instrument of discovery and invention. Tycho Brahe (died 1601) had completed his great work on astronomy. It was the age of Galileo (died 1643), Torricelli, Harvey and Gassendi. Descartes (died 1650) was developing that legacy of Arabian civilization, algebra. Symbolic logic, Mathematics, in this age played the role that syllogistic logic had played in the thirteenth century. Hobbes records his coming across his first book of geometry almost as though it had been a religious conversion. "By God, is it possible?" he exclaimed of the Forty-seventh Proposition—and found it was not only possible but

certain. There seemed to be nothing that, by aid of mathematic precision, could not be reduced to rule and reason. Here then, although equally concerned with *things*, Hobbes departs from the empiricism and "psychologism" of his master, Bacon. As political scientist, he maintained that what he wrote he "demonstrated." The influence of Bacon, however, must not be underrated. Dogma about human "moral characteristics," in the style of Theophrastus and Bacon and Burton, makes a basis for the hypotheses of Hobbes's science. In so far as Hobbes falls into the line of the English tradition in philosophy, he owes this to the influence of Bacon.

Weighing the justice of these things you are about, not by the persuasion and advice of private men, but by the laws of the realm, you will no longer suffer ambitious men through the streams of your blood to wade to their own power; that you will esteem it better to enjoy yourselves in the present state, though not perhaps the best, than *by waging war endeavour to procure a reformation for other men in another age*, yourselves in the meantime either killed or consumed by age. . . . For though I have endeavoured, by arguments in my tenth chapter [*Concerning Government*], to gain a belief in men, that monarchy is the most commodious government; which *one thing alone I confess in this whole book not to be demonstrated*, but only probably stated; yet everywhere I expressly say, that in all kind of government whatsoever there ought to be a supreme and equal power . . . they are not so much spoken for the maintenance of parties as the establishment of peace, and by one whose just grief for the present calamities of his country may very charitably be allowed some liberty.

Elsewhere, Hobbes produces the important observation that political science

consisteth in certain rules, as doth Arithmetique and Geometry, not (as Tennis-play) in practice only. . . .

From the principal parts of Nature, Reason and Passion, have proceeded two kinds of learning, mathematical and dogmatical. . . . *To reduce this* [political] *doctrine to the rules and infallibility of reason, there is no way, but, first, put such principles down for a foundation, as passion, not mistrusting, may not seek to displace;* and afterwards to build thereon the truth of cases in the law of nature (which hitherto hath been built in the air) by degrees, till the whole have been impregnable.

It will be noted that Hobbes's method is placed by himself in direct antithesis to what he calls the "dogmatic." "The immediate cause . . . of indocility, is prejudice; and of prejudice, false opinion of our knowledge." He goes so far as to out-Jefferson Jefferson and out-Jackson Jackson with the radical assertion that aristocrats cannot

claim to rule from superiority of knowledge concerning social values, since "*right reason is non-existent.*" It will be noted that his radical scepticism, on which he bases in part his equalitarianism, attempts to torpedo the whole Hellenic aristocratic tradition of the right to rule of the more enlightened, a philosopher caste—and is not followed by Milton or indeed by Locke. It is not a necessary hypothesis of the Liberal tradition. Actually he is guilty of no more than of the a priori argumentation of the Schoolmen whom he criticized, and of substituting a tidy logical system of materialism for that empirical use of hypothesis which is the instrument of scientific illumination.

Hobbes was a psychologist, perhaps the first observational psychologist. Very properly and significantly he bases his politics on his psychology. But his psychological theory is permeated with the passionate controversies of the times. His misfortune is that he becomes the dogmatist—the counsel for the defence—of his own psychologico-moral hypotheses, instead of regarding them with detachment. And they happen to be crude, inadequate and misleading. In the issue of free will and determinism, he is a militant determinist, thinking of the "motions of the mind," after the plan of the mechanics of Descartes, as rather like balls on a billiard table striking each other on impulse from a cue. In his famous controversy with Bishop Bramhall, later Archbishop of Armagh, he writes (with select malice):

> He the Schools followed, I made use of sense,
> Whether at God's or our own choice we will.

Human liberty "doth not consist in determining itself but in doing what the will is determined unto . . . no man can determine his own will, for the will is appetite."

Hobbes revives the atomic materialism of Democritus and, in a crude form, the moral philosophy of Epicurus, discussing the latter and Lucretius by name, although cautiously. (For Luther, any rationalist, and even Erasmus, had been an Epicurean.) Hobbes, for obvious reasons, was naturally concerned to deny for himself the damning charge of materialism, as atheistic, although he maintains ambiguously that God has "the being of a spirit, not a spright, an infinitely fine spirit and withal intelligent," corporeal, extended—and comparable, as Hobbes says, to a mineral water that can change ordinary water to white where no whiteness was before.

Hobbes was a "sensationalist," who had hypotheses about the fundamental springs of human action. These are the axioms of his psychological mechanics. The fundamental sensations are pain that

repels and pleasure that attracts. More permanently, in memory, the basic sensations are fear and desire for power (including power to obtain particular pleasures, sensual and non-sensual). As the devil said in the Book of Job, "skin for skin, yea, all that a man hath will he give for his life." Stated yet again, they are fear of violent death (which is the sobering and rational guide, leading men to attend to *facts*) and vanity or "vaine-glory" (which puffs men up with wishful thinking and *imagination*). Or it is the claim to life and limb against the claim to triumph over all comers—to boast.

> The object of man's desire is . . . to assure for ever the way of his future desire. . . . So that in the first place, I put for a generall inclination of all mankind, a perpetuall and restless desire of Power after power, that ceaseth onely in Death. (*Leviathan*, xi.)
>
> Good is to everything that which hath power to attract it . . . agrees well with Aristotle who defines Good to be that to which all things are moved, which hath been metaphorically taken but is properly true. (*First Principles.*)

Hobbes's doctrine of law, crime and punishment directly depends upon his atomism and mechanistic theory of the nervous system. Men may be deterred from those acts of crime to which their determined impulses force them if greater weights of punishment be, as it were, hung on the other side as deterrents. The law must have the sanction of a sovereign and absolute power capable of imposing decisive and unquestionable deterrents. "The cause of appetite and fear is the cause also of our will: but the propounding of rewards and punishments is the cause of our appetite."

Hobbes necessarily, on the assumptions of his psychology of self-defence and self-assertion, is an individualist. Rightly, he bases politics on psychology—but much of his bad political philosophy is due to his bad psychology (an error in which, as we shall see, he is not alone among political philosophers). It is necessary to bear in mind how fundamental is this individualism, since in the *Leviathan* (and indeed in the very title) Hobbes uses for his own ends the metaphors of a body politic and of the political organism—already in use in pamphlets of the period (and, *e.g.*, in the writings of Hooker and James I) and deriving from the Church Fathers and St. Paul or from Livy's fable of Menenius Agrippa. Indeed, the famous frontispiece of the *Leviathan* displays the body politic, compounded of human beings as corpuscles, wielding in either hand sceptre and bishop's crook and crowned with the head of (in later editions) Charles II. Hobbes, as we shall see later, is always clever at using any argument that tells in his favour.

Hobbes's method, then, is logical, aspiring to mathematical precision, deliberately schematic, and with an argument which bases his sociology on psychology, his psychology on physics, and his physics on metaphysics. We must not, however, overlook the pressure of historical factors on his political theory—and this not only in the sense of an opportunism which made him keep an eye in writing on his personal career. (Not that Hobbes can be accused of being a time-server; he was all too liable to offend his own party for that.) But his political theory is biased by a double experience of the break-down of order, in the England of the Civil War and in the France of the Fronde (1648–1652), as well as by experience of such outstanding men as Richelieu, Mazarin and Cromwell. And, as touching his later writings, they have background in the reflection that the best comment upon the Puritan Revolution was the demand for the Restoration.

3

Hobbes's political science—and with him, as with Machiavelli, we are entitled to use this term since his concern is with means, not values—is built up, however crassly, in an endeavor to answer a simple question. How shall man, being selfish, be saved from anarchy? Aristotle had said that man, of all animals, had the greatest capacity for evil. Hobbes is prepared to work on the basis of the great Stagirite—of man as a subject of natural history. Sir Robert Filmer had stumbled, half unwittingly, on considerations of anthropology and psychology that could have eased Hobbes's task. But he chooses to discard these props.

Hobbes accepts (for which he is severely chided by Filmer) the religious thesis, also expressed by the Levellers, of the natural equality of man—not, however, on any religious basis, but just because brawn plus wit in all men about balanced out as equal, or at least as of unpredictable inequality, when it came to a fight, man to man, with knives in hand. "I know that Aristotle . . . for a foundation of his philosophy maketh men by nature, some more worthy to command, meaning the wiser sort such as he thought himself to be for his philosophy; others to serve." But Hobbes had a low opinion of Aristotle. In a state of nature, he asserts (wrongly—Cicero could have put him right), the condition of man is "solitary, short, brutish and nasty." It is a condition wherein *homo homini lupus*—"man is to man a wolf." A Lord Shaftesbury was not yet forthcoming to point out that even wolves have a herd instinct. After all, urges Hobbes with astounding cogency, are not States still in a condition of nature to each other—

"in the posture of gladiators?" Hobbes, indeed, has seized the whole of a half-truth. How, from such disorder, to produce order? There is the heroic problem.

Authority is the child of fear. Progress emerges from men's terrors. The state of nature is intolerable in which a man must watch all night against his enemies. He, therefore, is driven and bludgeoned into a bargain: he will surrender some of his chances of getting the better of his fellow—his "fist-rights" or, if one will, natural rights—if his fellow will do the same and join with him in mutual defence.

The social contract, as collective security, emerges from men's fears. The sanction of this contract is terror—"the arrow that flies by day." Hobbes, here, with characteristic effrontery, again takes for his own use a weapon of his opponents—for Contract, as we shall see,* is a choice weapon of the opponents of absolute monarchy. The contract is, moreover, irrevocable. A new order of civil society has emerged and, if a man would quit it, he relapses into the condition of a wolf who may be killed at sight. There is no question here of moral obligation but of patent private advantage. It will be better to kill him since then the advantage will be obvious even to the most selfish. The Social Contract, we must carefully note, is a contract of each man with each—*not* with the ruler or government. Later we shall have occasion to point out that Hugo Grotius, the Dutch internationalist lawyer, in 1625, also bases civil rights on *stare pactis*—"standing by one's pact"—and an "obligation from consent"; but will only admit that private utility reinforces Natural Law.† This last, Grotius contends—as against Hobbes—springs from a human nature which is blessed with *societatis appetitu excellente* ("an excellent appetite for society": the Aristotelian thesis).‡

What advantage, however, can it be to a man to pledge himself to fight and die as a soldier? Hobbes faces the issue and replies blandly: None. A man is under no civil obligation when he is sure, by giving evidence against himself or awaiting execution or being a conscript or obeying a king in a losing cause, that the fate of him and his will be

* *Cf.* p. 275.

† *Cf.* p. 702.

‡ *Cf.* p. 102; and Aristotle's *Eudemian Ethics*, 1242a: "Man is not a lonely being, but has a tendency to partnership with those to whom he is by nature akin." And contrast Cicero's *De Republica*, III, 13: "But since one fears another, and no one dares trust to himself, a sort of compact is made between the people and the powerful men, and it is from this that exists that form of united state which Scipio was praising." Cicero as usual endeavours to have a foot in both positions.

worse, if he obeys, than if he looks after the integrity of his own skin. In view, however, of the onrush of anarchy, Hobbes points out that these occasions will be rare. Normally, of course a man will wish to keep in well with public opinion. "There can be no greater argument to a man of his own power, than to find himself not only able to accomplish his own desires but also to assist other men in theirs."

What advantage (if we follow the argument of Hobbes as contrasted with that of Grotius) can any State, being in a condition of nature in relation to its neighbour, have in collective commitments if thereby it is liable to suffer in a war more than by disentanglement? Some states, in such collective obligation, may have the satisfaction of playing a dominant role. But social obligation must always be proportionate to proximity of threat, not absolute. Men will keep their social and treaty obligations when they fear not to do so.

Natural Law is the law of reason. Reason dictates, not categorically but prudentially, that we consult our own good. "Everyone calls that good which he desires and evil which he eschews." The Sermon on the Mount or the Decalogue is natural law so far as intelligent. It will be noted by the student that it is, according to Hobbes, especially difficult to carry out the rational Natural Law in an anarchic State of Nature. Civil Society permits a better observance—save so far as the Law of Nature reduces itself to the simple principle: "To seek peace when we may have it and when not to defend ourselves." Natural Right—or claim; the unalterable claim of our human nature—precedes the rational regulation of Natural Law. The latter is law miscalled, as Hobbes is among the first to assert with his customary impiety. "Law, and Right, differ as much as Obligation, and Liberty." It is important to note that Hobbes, the only begetter of the high sovereignty theory of the lawyers, is the very man who insists that law depends on my right (= natural claim, prior to laws, moral or social), *not* my right on law. Hobbes is a master of paradox; but here, granted his definitions, paradox involves no contradiction. Almost Hobbes is a Liberal!—because certainly he is an individualist, although one that believes in Original Sin. He is the father of utilitarianism.

How then shall men, having seen the convenience of foregoing some measure of their natural fist-right, and having entered into a social compact for collective security, be induced to maintain their contract or undertaking? By terror of anarchy. But what if anarchy, however disadvantageous to most, be to the advantage of particular persons, natural or corporate?

Here Hobbes develops his peculiar doctrine of the sovereign. Not for a minute can men be trusted to maintain their undertakings against their own interests. Therefore, simultaneously with the resignation of the full "right of self-defence" (or offence) a power is set up competent to hold *in terrorem* those who are tempted to abuse that resignation. It must be a power that is competent to make the life of the seceder or criminal much less pleasant than his life would be if he yielded obedience to the universal authority—to break him. It holds the sword of blood. There are obviously no legal rights against it. It is bound by *no* Contract, natural or social or governmental. There are no natural "rights" against it save the right to secede and take the consequences. There being no rights against it, what it does is by definition just. Hobbes has taken over Bodin's notion, without his reservations.

The sovereign is final, supreme and loose from restraint of the laws, itself being the source of laws. The Executive is not there (as Aristotle thought) to execute the decisions of the Judiciary declaring immemorial common law or custom. The Judiciary is there to apply acts of a legislature which is itself but one aspect of the Will of the Executive.

The only way to erect such a Common Power, as may be able to defend them from the invasion of Forraigners, and the injuries of one another, and thereby to secure them in such sort, as by their owne industrie, and by the fruits of the Earth, they may nourish themselves and live contentedly; is, to conferre all their power and strength upon one Man, or upon one Assembly of men, that may reduce all their Wills, by plurality of voices, unto one Will: which is as much as to say, to appoint one Man, or Assembly of men, to bear their Person. . . .

This is more than Consent, or Concord; it is a reall Unitie of them all, in one and the same Person, made by Covenant of every man with every man, in such a manner, as if every man should say to every man, I authorise and give up my Right of Governing my selfe, to this Man, or to this Assembly of men, on this condition, that thou give up thy Right to him, and Authorise all his Actions in like manner. This done, the Multitude so united in one Person, is called a Common-wealth, in Latine *civitas*. This is the generation of that great Leviathan, or rather (to speak more reverently) of that Mortall God, to which wee owe under the Immortall God, our peace and defence. . . .

And he that carryeth this Person, is called Soveraigne, and said to have Soveraigne Power; and every one besides, his Subject. . . .

Every one, as well he that Voted for it, as he that Voted against it, shall authorise all the Actions and Judgements, of that Man, or Assembly of men, in the same manner, as if they were his own, to the end, to live peaceable amongst themselves, and to be protected against other men.

It will be noted that Hobbes's sovereign is not necessarily an individual, although he expresses his preference for monarchy or dictatorship—autocracy—as providing unity of natural will. Nor can Hobbes be taxed with leaving unsolved the problem of the man who, entering a community without choice by birth, declines to subscribe to the original Contract which lies at the origins of immemorial society. Hobbes in effect does not base authority merely on Consent. Authority is based on a consent compelled by Fear, not by conscientious or fastidious choice. The individual has the full natural right of resuming his place in the state of nature as a wolf and of being lynched. As Tom Paine later observed, it is hard to argue against the old rascal. And yet even in sovereignty by Conquest or Acquisition (the alternative to Contract) there is a measure of contract—"obey me and I promise to spare your lives."

His paradox of power is produced by ignoring those emollient forces of custom, sociability and general community feeling upon which Aristotle and Grotius build their theories, assuming man to be instinctively a social animal. The experiences, however, of Hobbes's own time, in Britain and France, with its revelation of the contempt for co-operation and of the latent hostility between province and province, group and group, sect and sect, class and class, even man and man, declared Hobbes rather than Aristotle the practical man. Not the class war, but the war of each impersonal human atom against each, in competition, is the basis of his thinking. He saw before him societies tending to relapse into "the state of nature." Aristotle deplored *stasis*. Hobbes accepted it as part of his problem. Not unnaturally the result was a philosophy of the Terror and of Tyranny, eminently applicable to the *stasis* of our own days. Incidentally, the logic of Hobbes's argument issues in the most powerful justification yet of a new, universal Roman Emperor, a new Charlemagne or Napoleon, or of a mail-fisted League Council of Geneva, smashing down by armed force those who dare to secede or even to stay out. This interesting speculation, however, is one upon which Hobbes, for obvious reasons, lays no stress. *Leviathan* is, for him, a beast that swallows all only in home waters. The radical contradiction in Hobbes's theory of security, collective at home but not abroad, is hushed up. Grotius alone here opens up a line of thought, to which we shall return.*

Must Sovereignty be indivisible? Hobbes's answer is brief and to the point. If we admit of disputes without a sovereign arbiter, "then

* *Cf.* p. 702.

the private sword has place again." If we admit of two arbiters or authorities both claiming sovereignty, we must reflect that

> If two men ride on an horse, then one must ride in front.

But must not the People be sovereign? If so, like the old Athenian democracy, they must govern themselves directly, by referendum or plebiscite. In the alternative, we do but "stir up the multitude against the people." When a multitude has chosen its government (or found it or had it imposed on it), then "the democracy is annihilated and covenants made unto them void." And no loss, for what is called democracy is but "an aristocracy of orators." This is all mere anti-parliamentary invective. The kernel of the theory is rather to be found in the remark: "In a monarchy, the subjects are the multitude and (however it may seem a paradox) the king is the people." This is an early and more cautious variant of a modern theory that could be phrased: The subjects are the multitude and the Leader is the voice of the State (or the Nation).

Hobbes cannot be dismissed as an apostle of tyranny. It is true that he refuses (as was convenient in the days of Oliver) to distinguish *de jure* ("by right") and *de facto* ("in fact") rule, and declares bluntly that by tyranny men merely mean a strong monarchy or dictatorship that they dislike. His theory could (although wrongly, as shown) even be defended as organic or as a theory of a corporative state. For corporations themselves, however, as for all groups or sects or unions or guilds that might be nuclei of dissidence, he displays a profound distaste. Vividly he describes them as "worms in the body politic." As for the notion of a Spiritual Church organized over against and above the State (even claiming that men have a higher interest than civil peace and self-preservation):

> Their whole Hierarchy, or Kingdome of Darknesse, may be compared not unfitly to the Kingdome of the Fairies. . . . The Ecclesiastiques are Spiritually men and Ghostley fathers. The Fairies are Spirits and Ghosts. Fairies and Ghosts inhabite Darknesse, Solitudes and Graves. The Ecclesiastiques walke in Obscurity of Doctrine, in Monasteries, Churches and Church-yards. . . .
>
> When the Fairies are displeased with anybody, they are said to send their Elves, to pinch them. The Ecclesiastiques, when they are displeased with any Civill State, make also their Elves, that is, Superstitious, Enchanted Subjects, to pinch their Princes, by preaching Sedition; or one Prince enchanted with promises, to pinch another. The Fairies marry not: but there be among them Incubi, that have copulation with flesh and bloud. The Priests also marry not.

The Ecclesiastiques take the Cream of the Land, by Donations of ignorant men, that stand in aw of them, and by Tythes: So also it is in the Fable of Fairies, that they enter into the Dairies, and Feast upon the Cream, which they skim from the Milk. . . .

For it is not the Romane Clergy onely ["the Papacy . . . the Ghost of the deceased Romane Empire, sitting crowned upon the grave thereof"] that pretends the Kingdom of God to be of this World, and thereby to have a Power therein, distinct from that of the Civill State.

The Sovereign is the source of law, as of all authority, and has authority over the law to interpret it, since neither law nor Holy Writ interprets itself. The sovereign is "the public conscience"—*i.e.*, Charles II is the public conscience, as "God's lieutenant." Charles II was to interpret the Bible and, as it were, to decide whether the world had been created in seven days or not; and whether Elijah had behaved respectfully to Jezebel. "For when Christian men take not their Christian sovereign for God's prophet, they must either take their own dreams . . . or be led away by some foreign prince or a fellow subject," *i.e.*, Pope or Prelate. Although, however, there is no unjust law, Hobbes, as will be seen, does not tyrannously multiply laws. He believes in Liberty.

Hobbes, by implication, denies the existence of a Moral Law. Law for him emanates as the expression of the sovereign will of a Body Politic or Leviathan. He does not choose to consider whether such a competent Body Politic can be smaller than a universal World Commonwealth (as Kant will later argue) or, at least (as Dante argued), than the Roman Empire. He dismisses (Marsiglio had given a lead) Catholicism as an Elfin Kingdom, incompetent to check civil disorder. The moral law then reduces itself to the patriotic maxim of Machiavelli: *salus populi suprema lex.** And the *populus* reduces itself to the Sovereign individual or assembly that "bears its person" and executes its judgement. *Jus est quod jussum est.* "That," precisely, "is right which is commanded."

In order to leave no doubt upon the issue, Hobbes enumerates the six diseases of a Commonwealth. These are (1) that a ruler, to obtain a kingdom (*e.g.*, Henry IV of England) is sometimes content with less than absolute power; (2) "that every private man is Judge of Good and Evill actions"; (3) "that whatsoever a man does against his Conscience is Sinne† . . . for a man's Conscience and his Judgement

* "The safety of the people is the supreme law."

† *Cf.* p. 170.

is the same thing; and as the Judgement, so also the Conscience may be erroneous . . . the Law is the publique Conscience"; and "that Faith and Sanctity, are not to be attained by Study and Reason, but by supernaturall Inspiration, or Infusion"; (4) "that he that hath the soveraign Power, is subject to the Civill Lawes"; (5) "that every private man has an absolute Propriety in his goods; such, as excludeth the Right of the Soveraign"; (6) "that the Soveraign Power may be divided." Also, "the constitution of man's nature, is of it selfe subject to desire of novelty"; and in this men are much encouraged by reading about the policies (*cf.* the Girondins of the French Revolution) of the Greeks and Romans. Also, the setting up of a spiritual Supremacy against Sovereignty; Canons against civil Laws; and Ghostly Authority against Civil—a problem of the totalitarians, Nazi and Marxist, today.

Hobbes, however, admits of reservations to despotism. As he is an entirely consistent theorist, these reservations acquire importance. First, the law is never wrong—but there is no wisdom in multiplying vexations and restrictions. "Laws are for dykes," not dams. The sovereign legislator is never "wrong," but he may be foolish. Second, there is a Natural Law of reason, which counsels the legislator not to be foolish. There are Natural Rights, indicated by reason, such as the right to life. Are we not then entitled to protest against law, as immoral, in the light of Nature and her rights? Not at all, replies Hobbes: we always have the right to choose Nature rather than a foolish sovereign. We have our alternative—and must not complain. But Nature gives no more "right" than that to die fighting unless we have the wit to escape. Thirdly, we have no obligation to obey a sovereign who is not so *de facto* (a dangerous admission at a Stuart exile court, although convenient in the England of the Protectorate) and whose protection of us is mere pretence. For we obey him because he protects us. We need not obey if he can neither protect—nor punish.

Hobbes, fourthly, favours toleration in thought and religion. "An oath is but a gesture of the tongue." No civil power can bind the mind; and it is futile to try. But we must not build too much on this thesis. The old atheist naturally preferred religious toleration because persecution about matters negligible seemed to him a waste of civic energy. For the rest, the defence of toleration, apart from personal temperament, only rests on the preceding (third) argument that a sovereign is limited by his power.

Fifthly, Hobbes remains, not a worshipper of despots, but an individualist to the core. His doctrine of monarchy (although designed

to inculcate obedience, not show wit) is not so far different from that of his friend and contemporary, the lawyer Selden, who maintained that kings, like cooks, are "a thing men have made for their own sake, and for quietness' sake." For the rest, said Selden, Sovereignty is but the civil version of Papal Infallibility. "The Pope is infallible, where he hath power to command, that is, where he must be obeyed; so is every supreme power and prince." For the rest, if any talk of infallibility in Church Councils, as Selden said: "the odd man at the count is the Holy Ghost." Hobbes and Selden are the first Utilitarians.

4

Hobbes's theories, scarcely ingratiating with any party, as was natural, met with such bitter criticism in his own day as almost effectively to discredit him in his homeland. He was the Bernard Shaw of his day—but the English of his day were less tolerant than now. John Locke, it will be noted later, chose the incomparably less profound but more representative Filmer as his easier and especial target of attack. He leaves Hobbes to suffocate in his own unpopularity, after a pompous reference to "Hobbes and Spinoza, those justly censured names."

Aubrey, the biographer, records "that in Parliament, not long after the king was settled, [in fact it was 1667,] some of the bishops had a notion to have the good old gentleman burned for a heretique." The explanation appears to be that respectable people were looking round for the causes of God's wrath as displayed in the Plague and Great Fire of London, and none better occurred than the alleged atheism of Mr. Hobbes. So a committee was appointed and Hobbes had quickly to write a book *Concerning Heresy* (1667, pub. 1680) to prove that he could not legally be burned. Even so he had the courage to begin by a quotation from Lucretius about superstitions, no more to be dreaded than what boys fear in the dark—but found it expedient to attend daily divine service in the Devonshires' private chapel. He would not, however, stay on for the sermons, because he knew the contents. The Bible, a Hobbist informs us, he believed to be written "by a sort of innocent, harmless men." The Bishops he did not view in the same light and, although the issue was uncertain, Hobbes demonstrated that the day had dawned when he could bait them (under Charles II) and not they, with their faggots, him.

Tenison, later Archbishop, provides a summary of the Hobbist creed:

I believe that God is Almighty matter; . . . that it is to be decided by the Civil Power whether He created all things else; . . . that the prime law of Nature in the Soul of Man is temporal Self-love; . . . that whatsoever is within in these books [of Scripture] may lawfully be denied even upon Oath (after the laudable doctrine of the Gnosticks) in times of Persecution.

A contemporary writer describes the matter more luridly in the very title of his pamphlet: *The true effigies of the Monster of Malmesbury: or T. Hobbes in his popular colours* (*Mr. Cowley's verses in praise of Mr. Hobbes oppos'd*). *By a lover of truth and virtue* (1680). The philosophers were not much kinder. Descartes had written as far back as 1648, with that light gesture of patronage touched by malice which marks a watchful senior colleague, "his whole purpose is to write in favour of monarchy, which could have been done more advantageously and more solidly than he does, by taking more tenable and virtuous maxims." Leibnitz, in a letter of 1670, accused Hobbes of licensing men to do what they pleased, "which is only possible in a Utopia of atheists." Nevertheless, to Leibnitz he was "a prince of the new philosophic age." Bishop Burnett summarized the matter, as touching *Leviathan*, in his *History of My Own Time:* "A very wicked book with a very strange title."

Lord Chancellor Clarendon, in the days of Charles II, passed beyond invective to the central criticism: "the doctrine of self-interest is the seed of sedition." The trouble was that Hobbes and his friends were much too clever, as well as truculent. Hobbes indeed had nowhere shown why any individual (or state) should obey who, by interest or temperament, was inspired to be a gunman or Capone. Neither indeed had Machiavelli nor perhaps Bodin—which the former would have admitted, and the latter not. Hobbes attempts to disguise the issue by much semi-dishonest talk about a social contract or promise; monarchs "bearing the person" of all; and membership of the body politic. Hobbes, however, is essentially too honest a thinker not to admit frankly, between times, that these matters are mere trimmings of his individualistic argument, which is always one of conditional anarchy. He gets his effects by a dramatic reinforcement of the passion of fear—terror of aggression. Here, surely, the moral would seem to be, *sauve qui peut.* Make treaties, yes—as Machiavelli said—but don't keep them when inconvenient. Plato, long ago, saw this route, from which the spirit of cooperation is remote and sectional interest all; and discarded it as mothering *stasis.* Has Hobbes really any reply?

Let us summarize the complicated argument. For Aristotle, let us recall, the self-interest of the majority as a basis of a constitution, as

much as of a minority, issues in perversion. There is no right divine or utilitarian of either minorities *or* majorities. The rational interest of the whole was the sole legitimate basis. Who, however, is to decide this rational interest—an interested few or an interested many? Plato replies: "Neither; but the wise." Who, however, shall decide on the wise or (if we reply, "eminent men of knowledge"), give them power? Marsiglio says: "The majority *or* weightier part." Hobbes says: "Those who have power by conquest or acquisition"—not necessarily (or, with Hobbes, even desirably) the majority but the power-holders. Has not, then, the majority a *moral* right? Plato and Hobbes, for opposite reasons, would agree in replying, "None." Has not, then, the majority an *expedient* or utilitarian right to select its wise leaders? Is not the peace and progress of a society best advanced on the basis of give and take? (Plato would agree, with reservations, if we mean, not compromise, but co-operation.) And does not give and take mean compromise, in which it is simpler for the many minorities to yield to the one majority? That is true if we admit (as Aristotle, in his more democratic moments, comes near to admitting) that every thinking man has about an equal claim, so far as we can ascertain the truth, to a judgement on ends and values, or—more precisely—that we have no philosophical ground for excluding any sane man (adequately informed) from essaying a judgement that may be as good as the Pope's own. The Pope's judgement, Aquinas would admit, is only final in faith and morals because a churchman voluntarily admits as his own choice, for the sake of the weal of the Church, the argument from reason and revelation upon which this finality rests. Similarly, Hobbes argues about the finality of the Sovereign, for the sake of the order of the State. It is, however, only true that it is expedient for the majority to decide in so far as the majority also *expediently compromises or co-operates, in give and take, with the minority since the moral bond is not assurance of the public interest (a matter for the few wise) but merely the utilitarian one of keeping the public peace.*

Compromise, then, by *all* sections is the principle of any social order which does not *either* believe that it can first select and then follow an aristocracy of final knowledge (such as was visualized in the Platonic and Catholic schemes) *or* else is not content to admit the tyranny of force and to find a justification for it. This last Hobbes—with whatever hedgings—does. Tyranny, briefly, however unwise and atrocious, is still better than anarchy. Hobbes's argument is the only possible one for those who base the "right" to rule on the vindication

of group self-interest, whether plutocratic or proletarian, and discard alike utilitarian and co-operative compromise and co-operation based upon a reasoned scheme of social justice. Thus far Hobbes anticipates Marx's theory of the state as an instrument for the suppression of certain classes by dictatorial force.

Clarendon is, then, right in pointing out that *no* ground for civil obedience can be found in self-interest alone, once the edge of fear is removed, or unless that self-interest be reinforced by considerations of some rational scheme or of respect for the judgement of others, strength apart. The nearest that Hobbes comes to this last position is when he bases contract upon the supposed equality of individual man with individual man, in physical strength and in wits taken conjointly. This supposition is palpably false; and is only used to show that no man is *so* superior as to be fearless and able with impunity to dispense with the contract. Hobbes, however, the pre-Utilitarian, is more illuminating than the traditional moralist and High Churchman, Clarendon, in the issue how to *compel* the mood of *compromise*—a neat and knotty political antinomy or paradox.

No significant advance will be made, beyond this discussion excited by Hobbes, until we reach the Utilitarian school, which will raise the question whether (even granted that they both be tyrannies of group-interest) a proletarian is not preferable to a plutocratic tyranny; and whether it is not for the majority to decide what is the true or good or best-working social system and to enforce it. Of the Utilitarian philosophy, Hobbes, we shall later see,* is an historical pioneer. We shall also discover that Utilitarianism does not end by adding to the three choices in social order: the Philosophic (or Scientific) Good; Empirical Compromise, with federal implications; the Force or Tyranny of the Many or Few, according to *de facto* capacity to organize, plot and use this force. Hobbes's system in the final analysis is not merely (we have discussed, above, the reservations), but is substantially, a defence of Tyranny—not in the opprobrious sense, but in that of a Despotism that may find it prudent to be Benevolent. His cult is that of the Efficiency That Gets Things Done. Its worship is that of the Strong Individual or Class.

The Doctrine of Sovereignty, it should be added, of which we have seen the ecclesiastical foreshadowings in the rulings of Gregory IX and Boniface VIII, taking shape in the writings of Marsiglio and Bodin, reaches full expression in those of Thomas Hobbes, so that this doctrine itself sometimes is called by his name.

* *Cf.* p. 349.

It will, however, be noted that Hobbes's doctrine, although one of an Absolute Sovereign, is not (contrary to common belief) necessarily one of an absolute monarch. Hobbes, with such states as Venice in mind, carefully makes the reservation that the sovereign may be "an assembly of men." Hence this adaptable theory could suit not only the rule of Charles I and the protectorship of Cromwell. When James II fled, it could suit the rising power of Parliament. It was a theory of power for those who actually held it—whether king or king-in-parliament. Hobbes expresses his private preferences for autocracy, but this does not affect his formula.

Hence, as we shall see,* the Swiss historian De Lolme was able to apply this theory of absolute power, in the most uncompromising terms, to the British parliament; and the great eighteenth-century jurist Blackstone, while making, like Bodin, conventional reservations about Natural Law, was able to make a statement about parliamentary power directly consonant with Hobbes's statement. Elaborated by Bentham, the theory received its final shaping at the hands of the nineteenth-century jurist John Austin and, hence, in contemporary discussion is usually referred to as the Austinian theory of sovereignty.

The statement by Austin (1790–1859), professor of jurisprudence in the University of London, where he defines sovereignty—a statement almost verbally identical with one by Bentham—is so far classical as to merit quotation:

> If a determinate human superior, not in a habit of obedience to a like superior, receive habitual obedience from the bulk of a given society, that determinate superior is sovereign in that society, and the society (including the superior) is a society political and independent.

The danger of this famous *Austinian Doctrine of Sovereignty* is twofold: (a) that it provides a definition of a 'society political,' in terms of the Modern State, which previous ages (as Maitland was to show) would not have recognized; and (b) it made no inquisition into the limits of "habitual obedience," but substituted a lawyer's fiction of absolute authority for a sociological observation of conditional authority, to the extent of overshadowing the moral limits of actual obedience by a juristic abstraction about theoretical power. It put government, in effect, in front of law and denied, in the name of ephemeral sovereignty, the reality of Natural Law as formula of social fact. It is permissible to cite the warning of the Chinese Zenni philosopher, of the

* *Cf.* p. 305.

ninth century, A.D., who said: "Pray never substantialize that which does not exist."

We shall further see in due course* that the Fathers of the American Constitution, following Locke (who never uses the word "sovereign"), rejected so far as in them lay *any* theory of sovereignty, and substituted for it the doctrine of the Division of Powers. So far as the word "sovereign" was used, it was used in a non-Hobbesian sense and in the face of Hobbesian logic. Thus a sovereignty was asserted to inhere *both* in the United States *and* in New York State, each (phrase reminiscent of the old ecclesiastical or Gelasian doctrine) within its own sphere. Professor H. A. Smith goes so far as to say:

> Since the Declaration of Independence, the theory of parliamentary sovereignty has never found a place in American political thought, and it is universally held that neither a legislature nor any other agency of government is a complete expression of the sovereignty of the people. . . . The people of the United States are *a greater sovereign* than are the people of any particular State, and they claim the right, through their judicial organs, to determine all cases of conflict between the various agencies of government.

These words are necessarily to the Hobbesians as foolishness.

The heart of the trouble appears to be that Hobbes rightly affirmed that, within any given sphere of government, there must be an arbiter to settle disputes. Whereas, however, the sphere of this arbiter may be settled by a constitutional morality or custom, which is the ground for obedience, Hobbes typically assumed that it was settled by force. Hence he proceeded from the correct doctrine that in any given political society a final judicial arbiter is required for the adjudication of disputes under law, to the fictitious doctrine that in all political society there must be an executive authority with absolute physical power to make law, compel obedience and decide the sphere of control between one political society and another.

Since (short of a universal emperor) no executive authority exists competent to settle disputes between state and state, and yet each state, on Hobbes's assumption, must claim to determine for itself its own limit, Hobbes's theory, if not indeed an incitement to perpetual war, at least does nothing, in external affairs, to maintain that peace and order which is his avowed object. He falls into patent contradiction.† It is a doctrine of *internal* authority only; and even here unsatisfactory. Developed two centuries earlier it would have been a theory

* *Cf.* p. 310.

† *Cf.* p. 238, also 204.

justifying each baron as *souverain dans sa baronie.* A sister doctrine was used by the Popes to justify their infallibility. It merely happens to come to maturity at a time when it could serve as a justification of the New Monarchies and their States. It is definitely inferior, as theory, to the old Imperial Theory, which (as in principle universal) presented no such contradiction between internal and external authority.

Another line of argument, similar to that of Hobbes, is essayed at this time. There is this difference that, whereas Hobbes (as Thrasymachus of old) said that the strong do rule and we save our skins by obeying quietly, the new argument alleges (like Callicles) that the strong ought to rule because this is the nature of things. Unlike Callicles, however (and more forcibly), we take the step of asserting that we know who ought to rule by discovering who does. God and "the big battalions" are synonymous. This brings us to the study of a philosopher whom Hobbes applauds and describes as "going beyond him a bar's length"—whatever that may mean—adding that he [Hobbes] "Durst not write so boldly."

5

Baruch de Spinoza (Benedictus de Spinoza, 1632–1677), was a member of a family of Spanish Jews who escaped that persecution in Spain from which the Moslem Moors of Granada had abstained but in which the baptized Christians (being more morally totalitarian) indulged. It had settled in Amsterdam. A junior contemporary of Hobbes who yet predeceased him, Spinoza was a tradesman's son who made his living as an optician by polishing lenses, a man well acquainted with the mathematical and scientific thought of his day, a correspondent of the newly founded Royal Society of London, a non-Aryan who declined an invitation to the chair of philosophy in German Heidelberg on the ground that it would restrict his freedom of opinion.

Even as it was, the evil effects of persecution could be seen in Spinoza's life history. In tolerant Holland, the Calvinists were busy excommunicating the Arminian exponents of Free Will, putting an interdict on their worship and contriving the imprisoning or worse of the leading men of the faction. Inside Jewry, which had been taught the discipline of intolerance by persecution, Spinoza's views were found insufferable. "The heads of the Church Council have for some time been aware of Baruch de Espinoza's evil opinions and doings, they have tried by various methods and promises to withdraw him from his evil ways . . . they have decided, after full investigation, in the

presence of the learned Rabbis and with their assent, to anathematize the said Espinoza and cut him off from the people of Israel. Herewith accordingly they place him under anathema"; and no one is to hold commerce with him by speech or pen, enter the same house or come within six foot of him, do him kindness or read his writings.

Expelled from the synagogue and drawn to the Arminians and to the Anabaptists or Baptists of the Mennonite section, Spinoza had the opportunity of observing the internecine persecutions of the Christians. Certainly philosophy did not escape. That of Descartes was especially obnoxious to the Calvinists and, although the Dutch presbyters could not touch the soldier-philosopher, who could snap his fingers at them from France, they could make life hot for academic followers who, in 1675, were deprived of their positions. Arminians and Cartesians alike found support in the leader of the oligarchic republican party of the wealthy burgher, Jan de Witt, in whom Spinoza felt that he had a protector and who, in fact, provided a pension. Even so, the *Ethics*, which might arouse persecuting tendencies, was held up by Spinoza from publication until his death and he did not scruple to publish, as a business matter, expositions of Descartes, without comment, which may have been faithful to Descartes but which Spinoza himself, with more dangerous doctrines, regarded as exploded. After all, the doctrine of "two truths" was a philosophic commonplace (if heretical) since the Middle Ages; and neither Plato nor the Gospels had hesitated to distinguish between the teaching for the disciples and the tales "for the multitude." Scepticism, indeed, about the intelligence of this last may have appeared to Spinoza justified when Jan and Cornelius de Witt were lynched and kicked to death, in 1672, by the anti-French patriot populace of the Hague. On this occasion, Spinoza contemplated affixing handbills of protest near the prison but was considerately locked in by his landlord. Later he seems to have been used as a go-between with the French by certain Dutch factions. He thus was drawn into the fringes of the life of an active politician—if being himself nearly lynched by the mob as a spy can be described as the fringes. Instead of the *Ethics* the great philosopher turned his attention to the *Tractatus Theologico-Politicus*, which was intended to have immediate bearing on the political fray, and promptly published this in 1670. It will be noted that neither Hobbes nor Spinoza—nor any of their predecessors—were philosophers of the chair and that both, not content to be overgrown and titled schoolmasters, deliberately chose to immix themselves in politics. Spinoza, solitary bachelor, pipe-smoking, liked (as Renan emphasized) by

children, died at the age of forty-five, of consumption perhaps aggravated by under-nutrition. His work, in effect, was done at the age of thirty-eight. His sister Rebecca, who disapproved of his notions, put in a claim to his few chattels but withdrew when it seemed probable that the debts would exceed the assets. His desk, with his manuscripts locked in it, was sent to his bookseller. His *Tractatus Theologico-Politicus* was amiably described as "a wicked instrument forged in hell by a renegade Jew and the devil, and issued with the knowledge of Mr. Jan de Witt."

The doctrine of toleration, with Spinoza, comes out into the open. The basis, however, chosen for it, is a narrow one, already anticipated by Hobbes and by the *Politiques*. Indeed the philosopher Leibniz (1646–1726), who refers to Spinoza's *Tractatus Theologico-Politicus* as "an unbearably free-thinking book," also expresses the hope that Bodin's agnostic *Heptaplomeres*, which is now "flitting about from land to land," in manuscript, will "never be published." Spinoza declares that "the right of dominion is limited by power only." Here is the expedient basis of toleration. This, however, has a corollary, already seen in Hobbes. Where, from the nature of the case, there can be no power, as in the control of thoughts, there can be no rational dominion. The thinking of the *Politiques* was essentially legal, Roman and mechanical; and Spinoza here makes no advance. Plato's great problem of Education is not discussed. Inquisitorial methods, leading to hypocrisy, are merely brutish and stupid. Spinoza, however, also advances an ethical plea. It is the duty of man to worship God with true religion and to mind his own business. Books probably written under Spinoza's influence stress, as Marsiglio had done, the supremacy of the civil power and allow the clergy no rights of civil interference beyond those assigned to them by law. Religion, in brief, is a matter of the individual; and by Spinoza, as by Machiavelli, it is set forth with a clarity not discoverable elsewhere that the state is secular. The duty of the State, then, is to maintain the civil peace and put a check on the fanatical, peace-disturbing churches or sects (not, as of old, the Church to put check on the warring states or murdering factions).

Spinoza, however, in his *Tractatus Theologico-Politicus* advances to a much more remarkable position as its kernel. We are to think what we will, guided by reason, and to speak what we think because *reason will lead to order*. Truth will prevail. In brief, the recognition of a rational law in the universe is inconsistent, not with spiritual individualism, but with disorderly anarchy. "The loss of public peace and

religion itself must necessarily follow were liberty of reasoning taken away." This position is not so profound as the early pacifist, Patristic one that truth will prevail *even* under, and because of, persecution, martyrdom and concentration camps. It is however, a practical argument, inspired by the customary optimism of rationalism. It will be noted, however, that Spinoza's plea for toleration does not depend upon sceptical indifferentism, but upon a doctrine of the ultimate self-evidence and harmonizing power of reason. Left alone, the rational will find its own level—the top. We are confronted by a species of metaphysical *laissez faire.*

Spinoza's *Ethics* raises the Theory of Power in a new form and one inadequately considered by Hobbes, the materialist. Spinoza here shows himself as a pantheist and a monist. God *is* because Reality *is;* "Reality" equals "God"; and Nature is but Extended Reality which is God. Dualism had hitherto been the order of the day in philosophy. Both Mind and Matter were real. Even Plato, who took over from the Heracliteans his theory of matter but treated it as, because in flux, therefore impermanent, trivial, nevertheless accepted its reality. So did Aristotle; and Aquinas. Even the Stoics, who affirmed the divine permeation of the Creation, and may be styled pantheists, did not fail to assert a distinction of Creator and created. The Democriteans, with their materialist theory of all as a conglomerate of atoms, came nearer to a pure materialism. This is not the place to discuss the difference between the "matter" of the Stoics and the "matter" (*quantitate signata*) of Descartes. With Spinoza, however, we have the affirmation of the unity, Reality, of which Mind and Matter are the aspects. This has an interesting ethical consequence, especially for a determinist such as Spinoza. No longer is it possible to place in convenient duality and disconnection what is and what ought to be. Either What Ought to Be is an empty phrase, or What Is is illusion, or What Is and What Ought to Be are identical. "The Law of nature," writes Spinoza, "is the power of nature." Nature is God—or at least, God is, in one aspect, Nature. The survival of those fittest to survive in Nature, is as it ought to be. Spinoza can prove it. Let us, therefore, "wait and see."

Spinoza is an optimist about the Logic or Dialectic of Nature.* It cannot be said that he is an optimist (or indeed had ground to be) about human individuals. About pretty-pretty morality he is refreshingly disconcerting. "Men are so much the more to be feared as they are more crafty and cunning than other animals. And because men are in the highest degree liable to *true* passions, therefore men are naturally

* *Cf.* p. 576.

enemies." Shape and vigour are given to Spinoza's thought by the fact that he makes no attempt, with Leibniz, to suppose any Pre-established Harmony in the best of all *possible* worlds. As with Hobbes, so by Spinoza, we are confronted with the stark conflict of human appetite for power, will against will.

The purpose of the State Spinoza, not unnaturally under the circumstances, finds (along with Dante, Marsiglio and Hobbes) in the maintenance of peace and security. What maintains this peace is *eo ipso* right. The right, *i.e.*, the right to decide what is right, is the will of the multitude *or* [*n.b.*] its stronger part. Consistency leads Spinoza on to the quite logical paradox: the citizen's right grows less as that of the commonwealth grows greater. There is no need and therefore justification in self-help where collective security, which can command so much greater power, is effective. "The more [? stronger] they are that combine together, the more right they possess." The same argument should be applicable to states; but Spinoza, in the Low Countries, (like Hobbes) shrinks from the old imperialist argument. States rather are natural enemies; they must each seek "the welfare of its own dominion"; and any statesman who is trapped by a treaty into action against his interest is a fool. On the contrary there is a natural right of each individual (and state) to the fulfillment of himself, that is, of that power which gives right.

Spinoza is essaying the famous *pons asinorum*—the bridge in politics which leads across from Might to Right. Both the teaching of Hobbes, whom he does not quote but whose *De Cive* he had clearly read with attention, and his own monistic philosophy compel him to cross this bridge. The clue is found in an analysis of the nature of Might. The more who cooperate the greater the might *and* right. Might then is not subversive of right. Might requires co-operation. Moreover the truer might is that which endures. True might is displayed by peace. But the real central term of the equation is to be found in reason. Might is based on reason (intelligent, planned might). Now reason is a principle of order, the unity that makes force, co-operation and peace. And reason is the basis of right. Might = Reason (which will prevail) = Right. Reality displays two facets, as the actual and the ideal.

Spinoza's motives for advocating toleration are patent enough. His reason for applauding "the stronger ruler" with totalitarian tendencies (especially as a Republican at a time when this spelled burgher oligarch opposition to the popular monarchical faction of the House of Orange) is not so clear. In part it is the logical product of a

mystic mind reared on the teaching of the Jewish philosopher Maimonides, which teaching again connects, through Arabian thought, with the totalitarian monism of the East. In part, it may be due to the desire of the persecuted and weak to find somewhere a strong arm to avenge and vindicate; and to the cynicism about human sentimental goodness that persecution breeds.

Does Spinoza succeed in his attempt? Yes: in the sense that the Good must not be assumed to be merely abstract, an "horizon ideal," didactic, possible but not actual, detached from history, "in the mind" or "conscience." (Hegel later develops this argument). No: in the sense that—even granted that rational faith which some of us prefer—the present "irrational" often occupies (even for centuries) the historical foreground before it reveals its fallacies and yields to the permanently "rational." And no, quite clearly, if we reject this rational faith, since then the connecting link in Spinoza's equation is broken. There are many mights; and it is quite impossible to know what might will prove right until the end of history—just as Solon spoke of calling no man happy until he be dead. But it is not impossible to analyze what is rational, even if ultimately we must end, like Spinoza, "that God-intoxicated man," in a faith.

It is not clear, in surveying the history of thought, that even centuries of conquests by this or that people have seriously shifted our sense of values by which we judge these centuries. By those canons of value we judge Jamshid and Khaikhosru, Alexander and Julius—although applications once thought consistent may now seem inconsistent. This only we can say, that the strong man as efficient is rational as touching *means*, although it may be for others to judge ends; and the rational man is *pro tanto* strong. "Efficiency," obviously, answers no questions on *ends*.

Does Spinoza succeed in his synthesis of might and right as touching ends? Let us admit his assimilation of might, order, reason, and co-operation or harmony; and let us admit that harmony is *an* end of action. There are other ends. Truth might perhaps be identified with logical harmony and, in some remote Miltonic fashion, with power. It is not clear that the beautiful can be so identified. The realm of power *may* serve the realm of ends; but the realm of ends is *not* necessarily connected with the realm of human power—not even in the perspective of history. Spinoza, when he moves on the plane of human historic events, as do Hegel and Marx later, affronts my moral judgement. What matters is, as Plato said, social justice—and this cannot be equated anyhow with successful force, which is merely its empiric

tool, good when properly used. The pomp of world-history, in the short run, is not world-justice; and, in the long run, is empty words. But beauty remains clear and luminous. And so do values tested, not by success in history, but by the consensus through history of men of genius, thus shaped into a Grand Tradition.

Spinoza gave much attention to method. On this ground alone his posthumously published *Tractatus Politicus* merits reading. Here is his triumph. In the *Ethics* he out-Hobbes Hobbes and, in that mathematical age, proceeds by the route of strict geometrical proof from axioms and definitions. He is an anti-Baconian who believes that, not experience teaches with certainty about the future, but only logic and deduction. Nevertheless, he has a balancing contempt for the plaster cast moral types of the Schoolmen and lesser theologians, removed from study of actuality. Machiavelli is "that most far-seeing man." As for those others,

> . . . such as persuade themselves that the multitude of men, distracted by politics, can ever be induced to live according to the bare dictate of [abstract] reason, must be dreaming of the poetic golden age, or of a stage play. . . .
>
> For they conceive of men, not as they are, but as they themselves would like them to be, whence it comes to pass that, instead of Ethics they have generally written satire, and that they have never conceived a theory of politics worth serious turning over.

Spinoza most rightly, with Machiavelli and Hobbes (and for that matter Bacon), prefers to base himself for axioms, on the observed principles of human nature and the verified constants detectable in the way in which men do actually behave. His psychological observations recall the manner of La Rochefoucauld. A contemporary anonymous pamphlet, *Homo Politicus* (1671), professedly supported and actually satirized the political theory of Hobbes and Spinoza. Spinoza contemplated an anonymous reply to this attack on his abstract method, explaining the unimportance of the gross pursuit of wealth and honours; but this pamphlet, which would have brought out the difference between his own position and that of the materialist sage of Malmesbury, Hobbes, was never written. The method, however, despite its excessive a priorism, and a tendency to confuse hypothesis with fact, makes Spinoza a significant contributor, after Machiavelli and Hobbes, to the building up of a Political Science.

READING

Thomas Hobbes: *Leviathan*, Chaps. XI–XVII, XXIX, XLVII.

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE

*J. N. Figgis: *The Divine Right of Kings*, 1896.
J. W. Allen: *English Political Thought, 1603 to 1660*, 1938.
C. H. McIlwain: *The Political Works of James I*, edit., 1918.
Leslie Stephen: *Hobbes*, 1904.
G. P. Gooch: *Political Thought from Bacon to Halifax*, 1914.
*G. P. Gooch: *English Democratic Ideas in the Seventeenth Century*, 1927.

Part II

Chapter IX

Locke and the Social Contract

1

ST. THOMAS AQUINAS was the first Whig. In the alternative it has been suggested that the Devil was the first Whig. The first thesis, of St. Thomas as a radical, is maintained by Lord Acton in his famous essay on "Freedom in Christianity" in which, taking some liberties, he abridges the views of St. Thomas as follows:

> A king who is unfaithful to his duty forfeits his claim to obedience. It is not rebellion to depose him, for he is himself a rebel whom the nation has a right to put down. But it is better to curtail his power, that he may be unable to abuse it. For this purpose the whole nation ought to have a share in governing itself; the Constitution ought to combine a limited and elective monarchy, with an aristocracy of merit, and such an admixture of democracy as shall admit all classes to office, by popular election. No government has a right to levy taxes beyond the limit determined by the people. All political authority is derived from popular suffrage, and all laws must be made by the people or their representatives. There is no security for us as long as we depend on the will of another man.*

Like St. Thomas à Becket before him, he is a protagonist against secular absolutism and says (or his editor for him) of autocratic sovereignty that "nomen istud a supremo dominio fastuose et elate trahit originem, unde et ille superbus Nicanor," etc.†

Besides these constitutional doctrines of St. Thomas which, enunciated on behalf of the Pope as universal arbiter or supreme *judge*, were developed during succeeding centuries against the theory of the absolute sovereignty of kingly autocrats or *executives*, his theory on two other points on which the Christian Church held decisive views—war and pacifism: property and communism—merit attention. To

* *Cf.* also the discussion of the humanism arising from the position of St. Thomas in M. Jacques Maritain's *Freedom in the Modern World* and *True Humanism*, with the theme that variety of thought must needs be—*oportet haereses esse*.

† " . . . that name takes its origin pompously and loftily from supreme dominion [which is God's alone], wherefore also that proud Nicanor," etc.

the former of these, and to St. Thomas' delimitations of "the just war," we shall return later.* On the second point, property, St. Thomas adhered—while belonging to a friar Order which imposed the surrender of all private property whatsoever as a condition of entrance—to the Trustee Doctrine of wealth already outlined by St. Ambrose. Wealth, he points out, is not the purpose of economic activity; the purpose is well-being. Riches are the cause of ills of attachment, pride and anxiety avoided by poverty. Is poverty, then, a ground for absence of anxiety? Under certain circumstances, yes. Pride of life is renounced by obedience; sensuality by perpetual chastity; and wealth (an obvious evil) by poverty for those dedicated to the discipline of the religious life.

Perfectioni religionis repugnat divitias vel facultates proprias habere, non autem eas in communi ad necessarios vitae usus possidere. (*Summa*, II, 2, q. clxxxviii, art. 7, *c.*)†

Nevertheless, it is possible to use well what also may be used ill, and to show a good disposition of liberality and charity as touching those things that Providence has sent our way. Generosity is not therefore a vice because those who have nothing cannot display it and vicious men can display it. This, then, is the interpretation put by Thomas, with his characteristically Catholic-Platonic distinction between those with vocation to act through discipline as spiritual guides and those without vocation, upon the statement by Gratian in that *Decretum* which is the basis of the Canon Law:

The common use of all things which are in this world appertains to all men.

The Scholastic tradition is anti-trader and—following Plato, Aristotle and the Fathers—quite definitely anti-capitalist, in the sense of "anti-interest-taker." The *Decretum* declares:

Whosoever buys a thing, not that he may sell it whole and unchanged, but that it may be a material for fashioning something, he is no merchant (usurer). But the man who buys it, in order that he may gain by selling it again unchanged and as he bought it, that man is of the buyers and sellers who are cast out from God's temple.

What then of the socially useful function of transporting and distributing goods? The answer is that the reward for this comes under the legitimate heading of wages for work done. The wages of management

* *Cf.* p. 701.

† It is repugnant to the complete religious life to have riches or private means, but not to possess such in common as are requisite for the needs of life.

are also legitimate. Annuities are permissible. The indication (not necessarily fixing) of fair or normative prices—"measuring rods"—is desirable. Nor does St. Thomas object to the legitimate wages of the importer and exporter,

> . . . when anyone enters on trade for the good of the community, that there may be no lack of what is necessary for a country, and seeks his gain not as an unconditional end but merely as the wages of labour.

What then of the interest on investment when there is grave risk for what is invested, *e.g.*, in a ship's cargo? Here the doctrine is developed of *damnum emergens:** he may take a fair rate to compensate him for probable loss. Also the doctrine of *lucrum cessans:*† money that might, *e.g.*, have been put into a farm, and had produce, may reasonably be compensated for, according to the measure of expectation, if loaned to another,

This is a large concession, but it still excludes two important categories of capitalist profit. (*a*) The taking of interest by legal bond where there is, therefore, no risk, but where there is no indication that the money could otherwise be employed at the same or a higher profit (*e.g.*, insistence on payment of debt by farmers at a rate fixed under other economic conditions and protest against reductions of this rate as confiscatory) is condemned as sin. (*b*) Speculation where the interest is not calculated upon any basis of probability of loss in a sound investment, but upon mere gambling hope of the maximum gain the market will yield, is sin. Either course involves the unnatural vice of attempting to live without labour. The money-lender was in effect, under the decrees of the Third Council of the Lateran (1175), Lyons (1274) and Vienne (1312), an outlaw. Positive institutions and law to the contrary are null. As St. Thomas says:

> Every law framed by man bears the character of a law to exactly that extent to which it is derived from the law of nature. But if on any point it is in conflict with the law of nature, it at once ceases to be a law; it is a mere perversion of law. (*Summa*, II, q. xcv, a. 2.)

It is that great Canonist, Innocent IV, who states (*De usuris*) that, if usury were general,

> men would not give thought to the cultivation of their land, except when they could do naught else, and thus there would be so great a famine that the poor would die of hunger; . . . the rich, for the sake both of profit and security,

* "Loss emerging."
† "Profit ceasing."

would put their money into usury rather than into smaller and more risky [but socially more desirable] investments.

In brief, the flow of investment solely in accordance with the play of the stock market and irrespective of more permanent social interests may result in unemployment, asymmetry in production and grave social damage to institutions vital to the life of a nation. St. Thomas lays down the rule that a man, in secular life, cannot be regarded as immoral if he charges such interest, as wages, for his services as enables him to maintain his secular status. (It will be noted that the clergy, like the Communist and Fascist parties today, had their own hierarchy which was unregulated by secular status and which treated their members, at least theoretically, and largely actually, without respect to wealth.) A fourteenth-century Schoolman, Henry of Langenstein (*De contractibus emptionis et venditionis**) continues:

He who has enough to satisfy his wants and nevertheless ceaselessly labours to acquire riches, either in order to obtain a higher social position, or that subsequently he may have enough to live without labour, or that his sons may become men of wealth and importance—all such are incited by a damnable avarice, sensuality and pride.

A certain section, however, of the Franciscan Order of friars or Minorites—"Spirituals," Fraticelli, a "Left-wing"—sharing St. Francis' (1182–1226) emphasis on self-abnegation and *voluntary* poverty as a disciplinary virtue, traversed the position of the great Dominican, St. Thomas, and asserted that poverty was a moral obligation on *all* Christians who would go through that "eye of the needle" of salvation that leads to the Kingdom of Heaven.

The controversy, which started off from discussion on whether and in what fashion the Franciscans themselves might hold property, shook the Papacy and was a contributing cause of the Great Schism. For the first time, regular clergy were—on this issue of the obligation of poverty—prepared in an organized fashion, to challenge obedience to the Papacy. Pope John XXII (1316-1334) had to declare that the virtue of obedience of spirit took precedence of the virtues of poverty of goods and chastity of the flesh. He made the significant claim—on which the Friars Minor and Occam seized, as tinctured with heresy, to attack the Pope himself—that one Pope might withdraw the declarations delivered "by the key of science [knowledge]" of his predecessors. Nicholas III (1277–1280) in the Encyclical or Bull

* *Concerning Contracts of Purchase and Sale.*

Exiit qui seminat had declared that the Franciscans followed the example of Christ in having property neither collectively nor individually.

In 1323 John XXII, in the decretal *Cum inter non nullos*, declared that it was heretical to assert that Christ and his apostles could possess no private property jointly or severally and could not use this, to sell or give, as they chose. It was on this issue that Duns Scotus' great successor, the Schoolman William of Occam, offered the Emperor Ludwig IV the services of his pen against the Pope. The effect of the Decretal was to confirm the acceptance of the thesis that voluntary renunciation of private property (not inconsistent with communal possession by an Order) was an evangelic counsel and admirable as an example in the religious life; but that it was not so laid down by Christ as a moral obligation that the layman who declined to follow it was guilty of sin and the Church that owned corporate property was thereby corrupt.

It is not until the nineteenth century that confessors in the Catholic Church were instructed not to disturb the minds of penitents by questions, in accordance with the Canon Law, on the subject of the taking of interest.

Aegidius Colonna Romanus, Archbishop of Bourges, and the greatest of the immediate pupils of St. Thomas, published in 1301 his *De ecclesiastica potestate*, which it is relevant to mention here as an authoritative statement of another aspect of the Canonist's position on property. If private men only held property on *trust*, and the perfect example was of the *renunciation* to the common good of private property, who had a final title to property, not merely in use but in proprietary *right*? The argument is that somewhere a right, as distinct from the mere fact (such as any thief might have), to property must lie. It can lie only (we have already noted this argument pursued along more anarchistic lines in Wyclif) in God and those holding by right of obedience under him, *i.e., property rests on a basis of recognition within the framework of the moral scheme.* It is not an inherent indefeasible right of any man; but derives from the social order. That somebody has the happy accident of being somebody else's son sets up a mere casual and convenient claim; but establishes no ethical and social claim as such.

The right then inheres in that supreme and ideal community which is the universal Church (and here Aegidius develops a doctrine of sovereignty of the Pope as the Church's administrator). This does not interfere with the derivative enjoyment of possession by princes and proprietors, whose title is indeed improved once this moral basis is

recognized. But it does mean that any prince or proprietor in rebellion against, or challenging, this moral order which is the Church, is thereby destitute of all *right* to property whatsoever. The book is patently, not only important but (as Professor McIlwain points out) profound; and marks the high-water level of the Catholic theory of the *respublica Christiana*, the Christian Commonwealth.

Sir John Fortescue (died ca. 1476), an eminent layman, Chief Justice of England in the days of Henry VI (although for the most part in exile as a Lancastrian), well illustrates the political liberalism of the great Dominican, St. Thomas, whose authority he is prepared to accept on issues of principle. The suggestion of Professor Ernest Barker is worth attention that the parliamentary constitution of England as shaped under Simon de Montfort may owe no little to the influence of the constitution of the Dominican Order.

The title of Fortescue's work of 1470, *De laudibus legum Angliae* ("Concerning the Praises of the Laws of England"), is itself significant. In his later book, *On the Governance of England*, at the very time when the absolutist New Monarchy was being built up in England by the adequately unscrupulous rulers of the Houses of York and Tudor, Fortescue drew a distinction between a *regimen politicum et regale*—a "government constitutional and monarchical"—and a *regimen tantum regale*—a "realm absolutely monarchical." France was the second; England the first. France, however (under Louis XI), had only recently passed into this absolutist phase—perhaps, the exile adds, from "lakke of hartes and corage wich no Ffrenchman hath like to an Englishman." The distinction is that, under the *dominium tantum regale*, the people are governed by a king, by "lawes as he makyth himself" and "imposicions such as he wol hymself, with owt thair assent." Fortescue did not foresee the success of the Tudor New Monarchy in utilizing the reaction against the Wars of the Roses to make the English "subjects" (a Roman term, *subiecti*)—a title which lawyers fantastically retain for the English to this day.

Fortescue rests positive law (very rightly) on the law of nature which is the law formulating the order of *all* created things, incidentally including human beings, and to which positive law is supplementary and elucidatory. It is a profound doctrine, involving none of the difficulties of Hobbes's arbitrary theory of government and law. Fortescue then quotes with approval St. Thomas' maxim (itself an adaptation of St. Isidore in the fifth century, and followed also by Bracton in England), "*Rex datur propter regnum, et non regnum propter regem*"—"The king is there for the sake of the realm and not the realm

for the king." However, he admits that a king, guiltless of arbitrary exactions, must yet tax—a sore point in the Middle Ages when the baronage were inclined to regard the royal government as a private charge on the royal estate just as the gouvernance of their own estates was a charge on their own privy purse: "que notre seigneur le roy vive de soen"—"that our lord the king live on his own." Government "wol not be done with owt grete costes." However, Fortescue consoles himself. "Oure commons be riche."

2

Natural Law in the Middle Ages—despite the reservations of St. Thomas, who, with his keen logical mind, had insisted on the strict rational element in natural law, which rational element also permeated under Providence the objective world—had become ever more closely identified with some presumed "moral law." It lost its objective basis, and was no longer either the law of the rational physical order of the Stoics or the universal custom of the Romans: it became fairly closely identified with the moral system taught (and enforced) by the Church, based on the Jewish Decalogue. Men were beginning no longer to look at the order of the starry world above, which Cleanthes had apostrophized, and its Creator Logos, but at the heart within and its monitions. This unhappy and misleading identification with conventional ethics—in effect with the law of the Jewish Tribes—Natural Law (which began as the antithesis of Convention) from now on never loses.

Cardinal Nicholas of Cues (Cusanus, died 1464), who played a distinguished part at the General Church Council of Basle, Switzerland, in 1431–1433, produced in his *De concordantia catholica* a theory of originality and profundity which preserves relics of the older, more rationalist type of thought. Philosophically the thought of Cusanus in interesting ways, as we shall see,* anticipates Leibnitz; but it is suffused by mysticism. The thesis is that there is an order or pre-established harmony (organized rather than social-organic) in the universe, which is or "should"—physiologically speaking, *i.e.*, for its good health or normality—be reproduced in human Society, and especially in that society that is the *respublica Christiana*. This international commonwealth is, for Cusanus, still a reality. The Cardinal has what (if we may anticipate our own times) we may call essentially the "Genevan mind." His thought about society is not feudal, but also not Roman; it

* *Cf.* p. 704.

is federal. His notion of good government is, as is Fortescue's, not absolutist but constitutional. And, as ever in Western history, ecclesiastical thought anticipates secular, and the ecclesiastical struggles anticipate those in the more immature lay government.

The attempt of Cusanus and the Council men, the Conciliarists, was to substitute a federal, constitutional and oligarchic, *i.e.*, episcopal, or (with Cusanus as with Occam and the Franciscans) democratic theory for the demi-Hobbesian theory of sovereignty anticipated in the Papacy by Boniface VIII. The Papacy is merely allowed by Cusanus the position not of constitution-maker (as with John XXII) or law giver, but of federal executive or *cura praesidentialis*. As Dr. J. Neville Figgis says: they argued "from the idea of a society to its consequences"; their theory "decides upon the best form of government in general, and *lays down the lines which controversy took until Whiggism succumbed to the influence of Rousseau.*" They were indeed true churchly Whigs. It is significant that at this point the doctrine of *Natural Law*—of a universal objective Order; the order of the macrocosm—passes over into the doctrine of *Natural Right*, of a natural claim of the particular unit, federated in this harmonious order; of the individual microcosm. Still, however, a relation is presumed—certainly by Cusanus—between this claim of the microcosm on the one side, and God, the causer of law, and the order of this macrocosm, on the other side.

Protestant individualism—of which the rise is in no small measure due to the non-success of Conciliar federalism—gives new impetus to the tendency, found in St. Paul, towards a species of subjectivism in which man is not co-ordinated with the objective world, but in which there is an antithetical dualism between man, as immortal supernatural soul, and matter. The Patristic doctrine of Equality was based on the Christian doctrine of equal salvability, "without respect of persons," and ultimately, through the Stoics, on the Cynic doctrine of the capacity of *intelligent men, apart from all social status*, to grasp truth, which is wisdom, which is virtue. Cusanus, it is interesting to note, elevates this claim to equality into a natural *right*.

The Natural Rights to Equality of men, as monads in the universal concordance, and to Freedom, are the convenient bases for Cusanus' doctrine that government rests on consent; and are corroborated by his semi-mystic thesis that God works through the people—His voice theirs. This conveniently gets over the great stumbling block—the Pauline-Petrine excessively clear dogma that all power comes from above. The Holy Spirit of Reason works in the latent capacity of the

mass, as on the day of Creation. The mass, the community, the whole—that is what counts. Consent, including the consent implied in custom, is the sole basis of political obligation. The magnates, however, may be representatives, having agency for the rest. The effect of this ecclesiastical doctrine, here systematized by Cusanus, upon subsequent secular thought, through Conciliarism and Protestantism, is too patent and startling to require labour in pointing it out.*

It is interesting to note that Cusanus become a supporter of the Papal See when the tendencies, not so much individualist as separatist and national separatist, of Conciliarism became apparent as also of that Czech Hussite movement which the Councils themselves condemned.† This was the logical issue of a theorist whose basic principle can perhaps best be called (in Professor W. Y. Elliott's phrase) "co-organic"—a belief in the combination of the federal with the organic and in that stress upon variety in unity, as against uniformity, upon which Aristotle had insisted in his criticism of Plato. The Platonic element itself in Cusanus is far too strong to permit him to encourage any atomizing tendencies in the Catholic Church or any of what, by anticipation, we may call "Balkanizing" tendencies in that German Roman Empire in which he still affirmed his belief.

With the Jesuits, we pass to a school of theorists of the Counter-Reformation that never at any time wavered in their allegiance to the Papacy; that constructed the first system since St. Thomas that was to have wide practical political influence at the time; and that deliberately worked out a doctrine of democracy for its own purposes. Once again ecclesiastical theory anticipated secular, but in this case the theory was not one—as with the Conciliarists—of the Church and *Society*, but of the *State*, developed by Churchmen. Whereas, however, the Thomist school was one of a victorious and established Church, universal and in possession, the new school stated the case of a Papal Church militant and fighting for its existence in a world divided between opposing fronts. The new school is that of the Society of Jesus, the Jesuits, whose founder was the sixteenth-century Spanish Knight, St. Ignatius Loyola (perhaps compensating for the sins of the Spanish Borgias), whose missionaries went from Paraguay to China with St. Francis Xavier, and whose educators taught Catholic Europe—including Voltaire—for the next two and a half centuries. The defeat of the Society and its (temporary) dissolution by Pope Clement XIV, in 1773, when the General of the Society declared "either it shall be as it is or

* *Cf.* pp. 269, 273, 278.

† *Cf.* p. 158.

not be," was perhaps chiefly due to its own efficiency in militancy for an order of things that no longer corresponded with the individualist secular ideology of the eighteenth century or the national-state secular ideology of the nineteenth century.

FRANCISCO SUAREZ (1548–1617), the flower of Jesuit theology, which in some quarters superseded Thomism in orthodox Catholic teaching, professor at Salamanca and Coimbra, Doctor Eximius, born in Granada, died in Lisbon. We are told that he was "laborious, modest and given to prayer." Colour is given to these monumental phrases by the praise he received from the Protestant unprejudiced Grotius: "one of the greatest of theologians and most profound of philosophers." His philosophic task was again to achieve the Thomist fusion of secular science and of faith. In politics his excursions stirred the world of thought and provoked to stuttering wrath the learned James of England and Scotland. His *Catholic Defence against the Errors of the Anglican Sect*, especially animadverting on the inquisitorial oath of allegiance demanded from all subjects by James in 1613, was burned in Britain by the common hangman and in the name of Protestant liberty its perusal was forbidden by their dread lord to the king's subjects under the severest penalties. James went further and appealed to the *esprit de corps* of his (Catholic) fellow monarchs against the book, including Philip III of Spain, on the ground that it contained doctrines contrary to the prerogative powers of sovereign princes. In 1614 the Parliament of Paris obligingly also prohibited the book. The reason for the stir is not far to seek in that odd circumstance that makes the Jesuits the avowed nursing fathers—like the Communist Party members today—of democracy.

In his doctrine of Natural Law, elaborated in his *De legibus ac Deo Legislatore* (1613), Suarez follows St. Thomas. Since the task of these theologians was to construct a system, and a system of law, they proceeded by the route customary with lawyers, *i.e.*, the appeal to authority, that is, precedent and common usage. Natural law is not only rational but is commanded. There is an imperative to follow reason lying in the nature of things as willed by Absolute Deity. Suarez is obviously here troubled by the notion that law to be truly such must involve command—a semi-error (philologically, an entire error) which we have already discussed when dealing with the Stoics.

Natural law, however—command apart—is drawn in its outlines, by reason and by instinct. As such it is immutable. Outlined by reason, *i.e.*, logic, its conclusions (as, for example, in the prohibition of fornica-

tion and of capitalists from taking interest on investments) may be too complicated for the untrained lay intellect immediately, and by the light of mere impulsive nature, to grasp. "*Ignorari possunt invincibiliter, praesertim a plebe*"—"it can be a matter of invincible ignorance, especially by the common folk."

Natural Law, then, is distinct from the merely expedient *ius gentium*, or general custom of peoples, under which alike slavery and private property are authorized. Community of goods and liberty of the person are "natural," not in the sense of being enjoined by natural moral law, but as normative. The natural law is indeed eternal, as logic and instinct are eternal, but . . . Suarez distinguishes between principles of jurisprudence and methods or applications of positive law. The Natural Law has a variable content, that is, as it passes over into the maxims guiding positive law, it properly is conditioned by the circumstances of the people, the time and the place.

There is, further, a *Natural Right* to do what *Natural Law* bids, even against positive enactment (which in this event is not just; and, therefore, by definition, not law); and positive law, even by the Pope, contrary to natural law is null. The question immediately arises: Who then is to decide when it is contrary and null?

The Pope, Supreme Pontiff, is this arbiter. In the spiritual realm of faith and morals, which presupposes choice of conscience, the authority accepted by the faithful is final. Its directive must be taken as final since there cannot be a multiplicity of patterns of salvation. This finality lies in the nature of revelation (or, as a Platonist—not, of course, Suarez—would say, of a single governing myth). The community of the faithful, or Church, wills this as necessary to salvation. In the secular community the depository of power lies in this community itself—not in any princes, claiming an independent divine right. The people may, as by the Roman *lex regia*, transfer their power and the transfer may be unreserved. But it is not, thereby, to be presumed that they have transferred any power to the ruler to demand obedience in sin. In the total Great Community, the Pope as judge of sin, *ratione peccati*, must act as arbiter, with power to release the several communities from their allegiance to rulers who break natural law.

The Jesuits are, along with Hobbes, the first Utilitarians. The appeal to *utilitas* is, of course, not new.* But, as much as John Selden, they treated secular authority as existing for the convenience and happiness of the masses—although not, needless to say, in a fashion inconsistent with orthodoxy and eternal values. Of these, however, the

* *Cf.* p. 172. *Cf.* also Cicero, p. 120.

Church was judge and guardian. For Suarez (following a sound Patristic tradition), *dominium* of man over man could not be claimed as natural; it was socially expedient. Princes were neither divine, as the Mikado, nor all-wise. Certainly they must not (in the words of the historian, Bishop William Stubbs, about the Tudors, including such a lecherous tyrant as Henry VIII) be permitted to regard themselves as "the Pope, the whole Pope and something more than the Pope." Secular rule was permitted by God and indeed justifiable; but it did not attain to the level of a spiritual or ideal principle. *Secular rule is a mundane utility.* Suarez, along with most writers from the sixteenth century on, assumes the mechanical division or dichotomy of society into ruler and people. But he retains the feudal notion of a ruler's contractual obligation to the people, "according to the pact or convention made between kingdom and king." Nor must the king exceed the "measure of the transfer or convention" or the limits set by custom. Against tyrants a just war must be waged.

The people then, it is reaffirmed (*cf. lex regia*), is the source of power, which people is a kingdom or indeed *unum corpus mysticum*—"one mystic body" (a Pauline phrase less misleading than the pseudo-exact "social organism")—thanks to the consent of the individuals who make the aggregate. It is constituted "from individual men by their own proper consent" ("*a singulis hominibus per proprium eorum consensum*"). The Jesuits, after the ineffective Occam, are the first democrats of the modern world. But they are this because they sought to bring in the people to redress the balance of the papacy against the kings. Of more profound importance for the future is Suarez' distinction, which is quite vital in political theory, between the ideal principles of the voluntary society seeking ultimate ends, values or goods and the utilitarian principles of the coercive society seeking immediate and mundane advantages or goods. This is almost the core of political wisdom.

Cardinal Robert Bellarmine (1542–1621), Jesuit, Hobbes's aversion, is not a writer of the same originality as Suarez. His comments on a mixed constitution, as being best owing to human corruption, are commonplaces of political thought since the days of Polybius. He was held by some to be guilty—a peculiar position for a Jesuit—of having unduly restricted the power of the Pope by explicitly denying him direct power in temporals, outside the estates of the Church. At the same time, Bellarmine had no doubt that the Pope had a universal jurisdiction over all governments where sin was involved, *i.e.*, as international guardian of morality. The interesting point in Cardinal

Bellarmine's theory is his further elaboration of the age-old doctrine of the separation of the spheres, spiritual and secular, and his assertion that the claim to obedience of a prince is not an absolute moral imperative, but is founded on the public convenience. Therefore (against Wyclif's doctrine) the prince did not lose authority *eo ipso* if his own morality was bad. The prince, as such, was not concerned with salvation.

This is a theory which would make a bridge across to the recognition, not only of infidel princes outside Christendom (nothing new), but of heretic princes within, and even to James II's Declaration of Indulgence in Britain. It re-emphasizes, however, as against, *e.g.*, Laud and, in certain aspects, the Lutherans, the Jesuit thesis of the non-ideal quality of secular, coercive power. It reaffirms against Hobbes the old Augustinian thesis that *the secular Leviathan or State had no ultimate, but only a derivative, secondary and expedient claim to obedience.* And Bellarmine brings in Democracy to confront the Divine Right of Kings. It was his odd fate to have his books burned—not that it would have troubled much the Jesuit prince of the Church—by the Anglican University of Oxford, in 1683, in the harlequin company of those of John Milton, Richard Baxter, John Knox and Thomas Hobbes.

3

The second re-dressing of Natural Law is when it appears, not as identified with scholastic and post-scholastic theories of the Moral Law, but as identified with the Law of Custom—not with the *ius gentium*, universal in space, but with tradition uncontroverted in time.

For example, in England, ever since the days of the reply of Henry I to the papal claim to temporal suzerainty, there was assumed to be a common law, distinct from the local peculiarities of districts and from the statute law, which common law was the formulation of the governing constitutional morality of the realm. So far as the barons of Magna Carta had a theory, this was their theory and that of Cardinal Stephen Langton. These were the "*libertates et liberas consuetudines*"—"liberties and free customs" of the realm. Far more influential, however, than the facts of Magna Carta in English History have been its fiction and myth. The myth of a fundamental custom of the realm, formulated by Magna Carta and kings as a contract, lasted on into the nineteenth century as a halo of the ark of English liberty. It was the theory of Bracton and Fortescue. There was a national constitutional law above ordinances. It was that to which Sir Thomas More appealed—although he also appealed to the custom of Christendom—as rendering unconsti-

tutional the legislative and executive acts of Henry Tudor. It reappears in Coke's doctrine of a supreme law of which only the judges, and especially Coke, were the interpreters. And where natural law is referred to in the courts, it is usually this local constitutional morality. It was under this "natural law" that, as late as the early eighteenth century, as Professor McIlwain points out, positive statute law was occasionally voided by the Courts in England. Even Blackstone pays it formal homage. It throws a brilliant light upon the theory of the United States Constitution and the function of the Supreme Court. Few, nevertheless, went as far as Coke and asserted that "if any statute be made contrary to Magna Carta, it shall be holden for none." Even this obstinacy, however, showed an appreciation of the drift of the Hobbes-admiring Harrington's remark: "wherever the power of making the law is, there only is the power of interpreting the law so made"—a dictum definitely repudiated in United States constitutional law [*cf.* I Cranch 43, 51 (1815)].

This local lawyers' natural law, this fusion of *ius naturale* and *usus* ("use"), was not peculiar to the land of the Common Law and its spirit. The identification of *ius naturale* and *usus* is connected with the stress on national tradition by historians writing, not in the style of the monastic chroniclers, but polemically against the innovations of the New Monarchies. The study of history takes new life with the emergence of propaganda: the historians of modern Europe begin, it is well to remember, as propagandists.

In Scotland George Buchanan, the very other than well-beloved Presbyterian tutor of James VI (of Scotland) and I (of England), wrote his *Rerum Scoticarum historia*—"History of Scottish Affairs"—and then summarized his political and legal wisdom in his *De jure regni apud Scotos*—"The Right of the Kingdom among the Scots" or "Scottish Constitutional Law" (1579). In his *History*, Buchanan quotes the saying of the Regent Morton, in 1578, to the Scottish Parliament: "It is evident that government is nothing more than a mutual compact between the people and their kings." In the *De jure regni*, Buchanan makes the interesting (and un-Aristotelian) assumption of men living solitary and lawless, like Scottish crofters, in a primitive state. However, natural impulses and *utilitas communis* (the "common utility") lead them together. What, by anticipation, we may call a constitutional morality (already discussed in connection with Hobbes and sovereignty*) results; and a law takes shape. This law is prior to

* *Cf.* p. 247.

any king and the king derives his authority from the law. He is such on the *condition* that he obey the civil laws which are prior to him. We have here, in Buchanan's theory, the four notes of custom, priority of law, individualism and contract, the first and the last in an alliance (resting on feudal suppositions) which will later fall apart.

In Spain, a collection of kingdoms now being centralized under the New Monarchy of Ferdinand, Charles von Habsburg, the Emperor, and Philip II, Juan Mariana, of the Society of Jesus, wrote in 1592 his *History of Spanish Affairs*, which stressed the part played by the feudal Estates in the growth of the Spanish State—a part, especially in the case of Catalonia and Aragon, issuing in the vindication of liberties verging on conditional anarchy. In his *On Kingship and the Education of a King* (1599), dedicated to Philip III of Spain, Mariana drew together the conclusions of his reading. Like Suarez later, he holds that just war may be waged against a tyrant and, where constitutional assemblies are forbidden, assassination may be necessary. (He thoughtfully adds that it is undesirable by poisoning, because this involves constructive suicide if the victim gives himself the poisoned cup.) The doctrine is no new one. The Old Testament apart, with its fierce assassinating saviours such as Ehud, it will be found in the writings of John of Salisbury. But the Jesuits had to do a great deal of apologizing for this dictum of one of their number. The authority of the commonwealth in its people and estates, princes must learn, is greater than that of themselves; and this ultimate authority of the people, well based in Spanish history, justifies them in resistance. Civil society springs up thanks to human weakness—*not* merely crime—and incapacity for individual self-defence, which thus has its providential compensation; but, adds this typical Spaniard, laws may easily become far too many. What we must rather trust to is that "certain voice of nature speaking in our minds." Civil society then is grounded on the best of grounds: it satisfies self-interest—an item prophetic of later Utilitarian faith.

In France a book intrinsically less important, but more significant of a general trend during the disturbed years as the House of Valois drew to its end, was the Huguenot François Hot[o]man's *Franco-Gallia* (1573). Just as later, in England, a school of Whig historians developed the notion of Anglo-Saxon liberties suppressed by Norman privilege, so in France there is a theory of Gallic liberties suppressed by the Frankish (German) nobility. Hotoman's research convinced him that historically the monarchy in "Franco-Gallia" had always been constitutional and limited. He quotes with approval the feudal oath of

Aragon cited in a previous chapter.* An absolute monarchy is fit only for slaves or brutes; not for rational and free men. It will be noted that the absolute monarchy visualized is one in which rulers and ruled are in separate and opposed categories: not a "popular dictatorship" of the Octavian-Napoleon-Fascist model. Hotoman's answer then to the New Monarchy in France and to Bodin is a strictly conservative, although also liberal, one—France had never been an absolute monarchy and to make it one was an innovation. It is a line of argument later taken by the Parliamentarian constitutional lawyers of the school of Coke, in England.

The disadvantage of argument from custom and precedent was that it was common ground that some customs, even although richly ancient, might be bad. Who then should discriminate between good and bad custom? The great Jesuit school did not get itself involved in this Huguenot difficulty. It never asserted that individual consent was necessary for the maintenance‡ of secular government, but only general assent. It was not concerned to work out a theory of perfect moral obligation in the case of the State, which itself merely moved in the realm of the expedient. And as to the realm of perfect moral obligation, *i.e.*, the Church, the Pope as Voice of the Church not only had power of sovereign arbitration within it but the power of arbitration between it and other spheres, so that he could adjudicate when the primitive (feudal) contract between people and ruler was broken, being himself no party to the case. Protestant theorists, however, were in no position to take this route in the adjudication between executive sovereign and free people.

4

The theory of Natural Law, during the Protestant Reformation and post-Reformation period, progressively passes over into the theory of primary Natural Rights organized in civil society through a Contract. As has already been pointed out,† this doctrine of contract or covenant is as old as the Old Testament and corresponds with the facts of the Middle Ages—for example, the feudal oath taken by all tenants in chief to William the Conqueror at Salisbury, in 1086, and the Coronation Oath. As it develops it is a compound of the covenants of the Bible, itself the Old and New Covenant, with the Roman law-books' theory of contract, set against the historical background of the relation of the

* *Cf.* p. 154. Yet another version of Hotman's name is Hofman.

† *Cf.* p. 155

‡ As distinct from the origin, *cf.* p. 279.

feudatories and of the estates of the realm. This last must be contrasted with the relation of subjects and State, which depends upon the Imperial notion in Roman law wherein the pleasure of the prince has the force of law. The harsh hard-boiled doctrine of Power and Sovereignty of Machiavelli, Bodin and Hobbes (especially the last two) provoked, as its counterpart, an equally harsh, angular doctrine of individualism—Rights of Freemen over *against* Government—of the school called by Barclay the Monarchomachi (Monarch-fighters). It was against these that Barclay wrote his book *De regno et regali potestate, adversus Buchananum, Brutum, Boucherium et reliquos Monarchomachos* (1600).

Whether the monarch-fighting writers were Protestant or Catholic depended upon whether, especially in France, the centre of the controversy, the monarch or legitimist claimant to be fought, was Catholic (Henry III) or Protestant (Henry IV). Opportunism at this stage entered deeply into theory. Persistently writers embarked upon an elaborate system, filling in details to choice, in order to prove something of which they were already convinced for other and more personal reasons. The function of reason was well exercised in its capacity of supplying rationalizations for those things of which the justice stated bluntly might not have so plausible and wide an appeal.

Governmental Contract, i.e., a covenant, compact, contract or quasi-contract, between ruled and ruled is the earlier form of the Contract Theory. Theodore Beza, John Calvin's immediate successor, who dominated Geneva after him, "refuter" of Castellion (one of the earliest advocates of toleration), is the probable author of a pamphlet (1550) declaring that ruler and ruled lived in a relation that was a "contracted obligation"—"conditions to which the ruler had sworn" and by breach of which he becomes a tyrant. Beza here, however, like Calvin, is only following the early High Catholic (*i.e.*, non-imperialist or ultramontane) tradition. Even King James I admitted a "Reciprock Duty." The question arises who was to decide upon its details and to proceed against him who broke it. The Catholics had an answer: they invoked the Pope—although Boucher and Mariana are also freer with other answers, besides invoking the Papacy, than the Huguenots. The Protestants waver and hesitate. George Buchanan, however, who has insisted that the king must function in accordance with the popular conception of justice embodied in the common law, gets almost as far as Mariana with a theory of deposition and, if necessary, assassination. A tyrant breaking the contract may be slain—although he discreetly cites the case of, not a king, but Cardinal Beaton, whose murder re-

ceived Knox's approbation. The Calvinist minister, Lambert Daneau, writing his *Christian Politics* in Geneva in 1596, is also prepared to condone assassination. The outstanding Protestant instance, however, of due procedure in checking tyranny is that of the revolt of the Protestant Netherlands' magistrates and estates assembled against Philip II of Spain and the Low Countries. They declared, Motley quotes, that

> The contracts which the king has broken are no fantasies but laws planted by nature in the heart of mankind, and expressly acquiesced in by prince and people.

Vindiciae contra tyrannos (1579) is the most famous treatise during this phase of Contract Theory. The identity of the author, "Brutus," is in dispute; but it is almost certainly either Hubert Languet or Duplessis-Mornay, both Huguenots—and is probably Languet. The book summarizes the work of previous Huguenot pamphlets and can be taken as representative of them. It presupposes, rather than states, the existence of a governmental contract. But it leaves no doubt about the right to resist. It is, however, no more democratic than the writings of the Catholic Boucher and less so than at least the words of Mariana, Suarez and Bellarmine. In a style reminiscent of Luther, and anticipating Milton and Baxter, the *Vindiciae* dismisses the common mass as a "beast of many heads," apt to "run in a mutinous disorder."

In effect two covenants are involved. There is a covenant between God and man—both prince and people joining—the covenant of the rainbow. Religious anthropomorphism apart, such as disfigures the thought of this literalist Bibliolatrous period, what purpose is served by introducing this Covenant? A very specific one. It turns the front of the theory of the divine right of kings and, by providing a prior contract, and that divine, gives a prior moral ground for rebellion.

Further, there is implied (not verbally stated) a contract between king and people. This is broken by tyranny, since royalty is an institution for the benefit of the community. If the tyrant breaks what moral monition advises is the law of God and true religion, then there is a moral duty, not mere permission, to resist. How is this to be undertaken? The eyes of the writer turn to Elizabeth of England and to the German Protestant princes. He follows the line indicated by Calvin. The respectable magistrates and Estates—the magnates, not the multitude—may authorize resistance; and outside princes and republics may assist, correcting the tyrant in the sacred names of humanity and Christianity. We have here one of the last, but by now self-contradictory, appeals to the Christian Republic.

There were, however, difficulties in the way of Governmental Contract as a theory. First, what precisely constituted the contract? Was it the coronation oath? An historically correct answer could have referred to the elective origins of most European monarchies and to this oath, which in mediaeval days was most certainly taken seriously and constituted a ground, where the sin of perjury was alleged, for the deposing power of the Pope. Apparently, however, to this lay lawyers favouring a high theory of monarchy had an effective reply. The king was such before he was crowned. "The king is dead: long live the king." Secondly, who was to be judge of breach of the contract? Even King James I was prepared to accept the theory of Governmental Contract provided that he, *his* conscience and God alone remained judges of the breach. As he remarks, in his customary moralizing (and inconclusive) fashion:

> Whereas the proud and ambitious tyrant doth think his kingdom and people are only ordained for satisfaction of his desires and unreasonable appetites, the righteous and just king doth, on the contrary, acknowledge himself to be ordained for the procuring of the wealth and property of his people.

—a piece of pure Thomism. King James continues (1609):

> The king binds himself, by a double oath, to the observation of the fundamental laws of his kingdom—tacitly, as by being a king, and so bound to protect as well the people as the laws of his kingdom; and expressly by his oath at his coronation; so as every just king, in a settled kingdom, is bound to observe that paction made to his people, by his laws, in framing his government agreeable thereunto, according to that paction which God made with Noah after the deluge.

Thirdly, if this contract was to be taken as historical, then it was merely one historical way in which royal government had been established. Conquest was, as Hobbes said, another; and conquest was the more common. The only secure alternative was to allege that *all* government was contractual and so in its very basis and *by logical or "moral" necessity*—not by searching "in musty records." Fourthly, an objection could be raised that any contract required two or more persons, natural or corporate, with whom to contract. But how could any king of government contract with an unorganized multitude? Rather it was the government that paternally organized the multitude and made it into a people, nation or state.

The theory of *Social Contract* is developed in part to overcome these difficulties. Unlike Governmental Contract and the appeal to Use and Custom (with the drawback that admittedly there are bad customs), it does not necessarily make drafts upon the credit of history. It is questionable whether either Hobbes—who anyhow uses the theory dishonestly as a tour de force against his Puritan opponents—or Locke or Rousseau considered the state of nature and the entering upon the social contract to be historical conditions. Hobbes exemplified pre-contract man ably enough, by the contemporary analogy of the relation of sovereign states to each other. For the rest the state of nature was merely a primitive condition, sordid, brutal and reminiscent of the Homeric Cyclopean age. Locke freely admits that

> there are no instances to be found in story of a company of men, independent and equal one amongst another, that met together, and in this way began and set up a government.

Locke appeals to the absence of records of these pre-historic events; to the actual relations contemporarily of "a Swiss and an Indian in the woods of America"—and to reason. Rousseau, whose talent was that of a novelist, leaves his attitude towards the historicity of a state of nature more dubious. He could enter the plea that it had as much to be said in its favour as in that of the Biblical Garden of Eden. For both Locke and Rousseau the blight of Original Sin, in which the malignant Hobbes had rejoiced, flees away from the State of Nature which, if imperfect, is yet one of roseate innocence such as that of which Virgil and the pastoral poets had told.

The heart of the Social Contract doctrine is, against absolutism and the New Monarchies, that all civil order and *a fortiori* all government rests on consent. The relation of each with each in political or "civil" society is one of reciprocal duties and obligations, not of servile obedience and passive subservience even to the community or society—not to speak of any particular ruler—like an "animate tool" or cog. I refer to the pure doctrine, not violated by the tricky Hobbes. For Locke it was taken in conjunction with a species of governmental contract or (more precisely) fiduciary relation with the Government, for which trust, discharged by this Government, it provides a foundation by *incorporating the "people" as trustor.*

It will be noted that this Government is a subordinate, involved, as Professor Barker says, in a unilateral obligation to carry out the

trust, "limited to the good of society." We may speak, with Sir Frederick Pollock, of a double contract in Locke—social and governmental—but, precisely, Locke, does not use the concept of Governmental Contract (with its conundrum: Who is the Arbitrator if the contract is broken?) but the safer one of Trusteeship. It is in Germany that we get the full formal elaboration, *e.g.*, in the early work of such a minor writer as Thomasius (1655–1728), professor of Leipzic and advocate of toleration, with his (*a*) social compact to settle the claims of dissentient minorities: "You came in"; (*b*) a *decretum* or constituent and constitutional law; (*c*) a governmental contract, under the constitution, of protection in return for obedience. Thomasius hopefully outlines this legal day-dream as a middle way—*media via inter Hobbesianos et Scholastico-Aristotelicos*. For Locke, it will be further noted, the trustee is the Legislature (really, of course, he means the British Parliament). As for the Executive, it is

> placed anywhere, but in a person that has also a share in the legislative is visibly subordinate and accountable to it

—so much for James II and his claims. For Rousseau, the Government is merely the delegate and functionary of the people, not even a swineherd but an office clerk. There is, in Rousseau, no Governmental Contract.

The phrase "Social Contract" is identified with the name of Rousseau, as the title of his famous book. Hobbes uses "Institution by Covenant." Locke, with many references to consent, speaks of an "original compact." In 1544, the Spaniard Marius Salamon, in a treatise dedicated to Pope Leo X, had referred to law as "*pactio quaedam*" among the citizens, but he is clearly following Augustine, who declares that there is "*generale quippe pactum societatis humanae obedire regibus suis.*"* Aegidius Colonna and Pope Pius II, a century earlier, had anticipated, as an historical suggestion of the origin of the state, the social as well as the governmental contract theory. The Jesuits, such as Suarez, psychologists with no illusions about human egoism and therefore strong authoritarians, had developed it—"by individual men through their own consent." The famous and judicious English divine, Richard Hooker, in his *Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity* (1594), had, like Colonna, bridged the Aristotelian and the *individualistic* Contract Theories:

* "As it were a general pact of human society to obey its kings"—it is not clear here whether a social pact is presupposed before the governmental The phrase is one that Hobbes could have accepted. *Cf.* p. 235.

Two foundations there are which bear up public societies; the one, a natural inclination, whereby all men desire sociable life and fellowship; the other, an order expressly or secretly agreed upon, touching the manner of their union in living together.

In November, 1620, the Pilgrim Fathers, having landed in what was to be Massachusetts, declared:

We do solemnly and mutually, in the presence of God and one another, covenant and combine ourselves together into a civil body politic.

If there had never been a formal social contract before, there was historically one now. The foundation of the State of California by the pioneers offers highly interesting analogies of an original contract. Following the precedent, in the constitution of Massachusetts of 1780, it is declared:

The body politic is formed by a voluntary association of individuals; it is a social compact by which the whole people covenants with each citizen and each citizen with the whole people that all shall be governed by certain laws for the general good.

The connection with the democratic theory of government is made plain in the earlier (1776) constitution of New Jersey:

Whereas all the constitutional authority ever possessed by the kings of Great Britain over these colonies, or their other dominions was, by compact, derived from the people, and held of them for the common interest of the whole society, allegiance and protection are, in the nature of things reciprocal ties, each equally depending on the other, and liable to be dissolved by the others being refused or withdrawn.

In the English Civil War debates, a noticeably different theme is that of the Parliamentarian Ireton: Social contract is becoming a bolster, not of liberty, but of restraint and authority.

Here comes the foundation of all right that I understand to be betwixt men, as to the enjoying of one thing or not enjoying of it; we are *under a contract*, we are under an agreement . . . to that general authority which is agreed upon amongst us for the preserving of peace and for the supporting of this law.

Cromwell, at Putney, in 1647, gets as far as vigorous affirmation of Governmental Contract, the official Parliamentarian theory. "I think the king is king by contract." John Milton, in his *Tenure of Kings and*

Magistrates (1649), asserts that kings only hold office at popular will. For the rest, "men agreed by common league to bind each other from mutual injury, and jointly to defend themselves against any that give disturbance or opposition to such agreement." But the theory finds its clearest expression in the words of the Leveller, Wildman, at Putney:

> I conceive that's the undeniable maxim of government: that all government is in the free consent of the people. If so . . . there is no person that is under a just government . . . unless he by his own free consent be put under that government.

The very nerve of this theory of the *Voluntary Society* is exposed in remark, at the same time, of another Leveller, Rainborow:

> Really I think that the poorest he that is in England hath a life to live as the greatest he: and therefore truly, Sir, I think it's clear that every man that is to live under a government ought first by his own consent to put himself under that government: and I do think that the poorest man in England is not at all bound in a strict sense to that government that he hath not had a voice to put himself under.

It is the seventeenth-century re-expression of the Stoic Roman Law maxim, quoted at the beginning of Parliamentary history by Edward I of England: *quod omnes tangit ab omnibus debet approbari*—"What touches all ought to be approved by all"—to which Peter des Roches, Bishop of Winchester, had, in the previous reign, given such strict interpretation that he declined to be bound to pay a tax consented to in his personal absence and which, in Poland (as today in the League of Nations), had spelled the anarchistic doctrine of unanimous consent.

We shall have occasion later to trace the break-down of the Myth of Social Contract, just as in due course the Myth of Social Organism will break down in our children's days. It is a sobering reflection that good men are so seldom good thinkers because they substitute ideals for ideas—what they know they ought to think for what they ought to know they think. The extraordinary stir, however, over three centuries, almost unintelligible today, on this subject of Social Contract, may appear more intelligible if we reflect that what these men were taking so seriously is what today we, all collectivists nowadays, are taking too lightly: the moral basis of obedience to government by coercion. *Why* should *I* obey a government, bourgeois, Fascist, Communist, of which *I*, member of the minority, vigorously and conscientiously disapprove?

JOHN LOCKE (1632–1704), the man who justified by his philosophy Whigs in Revolution, was educated at Oxford, a fact that he regretted.

Whatever be the cause, Locke, like most great philosophers, was no stylist. The mane of hair brushed back, the high forehead, the wild eye betoken other graces. Perhaps the fault lay in himself and in his contempt for meretricious attractions.

> Montaigne [he writes] by a gentle kind of negligence, clothed in a peculiar sort of good language, persuades without reason . . . . he reasons not, but diverts himself, and pleases others; full of pride and vanity.

Locke's compensation is that, more than any other man, he fixed and determined the character of Anglo-Saxon thought in philosophy and culture, looking back on Bacon and Hooker and, ultimately, on the other Bacon—Roger Bacon—and on Scotus, and looking forward to Jefferson, Bentham, the Mills and William James.

A close student of medicine (like Aristotle, be it noted), Locke rejected alike that profession and the church, to become secretary to Sir Walter Vane, envoy to the Elector of Brandenburg, and later secretary to Lord Shaftesbury, the effective founder of the Whig Party. Having inherited from his father, a captain in the Parliamentary Army, independent means, he was able to reside in Holland in the years after he had been deprived of his university preferment at Christ Church by James II. He returned with King William and lived, an asthmatic, as the friend and guest of Sir Francis and Lady Masham, after a short period during which he held an office in the Board of Trade, until his death. As early as 1677 he is writing

> my health, which you are so kind to in your wishes, is the only mistress I have a long time courted, and is so coy a one, that I think it will take up the remainder of my days to obtain her good graces.

It is typical of the man that his most famous book, the *Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, was written in 1671 but not published until eighteen years later (1690), for which book he received from his publisher £30. Interesting as supplying an early key (1660) to his thinking is the title of his first work, the essay "Whether the civil magistrate may lawfully impose and determine the use of indifferent things in reference to Religious Worship." The answer, which anticipates his later (1685–1692) *Three Letters for Toleration*, is a negative. Locke writes in the preface:

I would men would be persuaded to be so kind to their religion, their country, and themselves, as not to hazard them against the substantial blessings of peace and settlement, in an over-zealous contention about things which they themselves confess to be little, and at most are but indifferent. . . . I have not therefore the same apprehension of liberty that some have, or can think the benefits of it to consist in a liberty for men, at pleasure, to adopt themselves children of God, and from thence assume a title to inheritances here, and proclaim themselves heirs of the world, *nor a liberty for ambitious men to pull down well-framed constitutions, that out of the ruins they may build themselves fortunes.*

These are interesting words from the philosophical father of Liberalism, just after he had passed through the experience of the English Revolution.*

A new mental atmosphere prevails. Locke tells us, from Cleves in Germany, that "I have not met with any so good-natured people, or so civil, as the Catholic priests"; and, from Montpellier in France, that "the Protestant live not better than the Papist." We are on the road to the new Humanism of Goethe. The entry in the *Journal*, for May 16, 1681, is significant:

The three great things that govern mankind are Reason, Passion and Superstition; the first governs a few, the two last share the bulk of mankind, and possess them in their turns; but superstition is most powerful, and produces the greatest mischiefs.

Locke is one of the most eminent of the advocates of religious toleration. He does not advance so far as Spinoza, but this toleration is yet more integral, as we shall see, to his philosophy; and he advances far beyond such Huguenots as Jurieu.

John Milton, the poet of *Paradise Lost* and *Paradise Regained*, had already made his protest against censorship in the *Areopagitica* (1644). Books, writes Milton,

are not absolutely dead things, but do contain a potency of life in them to be as active as that soul was whose progeny they are; nay, they do preserve as in a vial the purest efficacy and extraction of that living intellect that bred them. I know they are as lively, and as vigorously productive, as those fabulous dragons' teeth; and being sown up and down, may chance to spring up armed men. And yet, on the other hand, unless wariness be used, as good almost kill a man as kill a good book. Who kills a man kills a reasonable creature, God's image; but he who destroys a good book, kills reason itself, kills the image of God, as it were in the eye.

* *Cf.* the remarks of another observer of revolution, Thomas Hobbes, p. 231.

Milton dismisses by name the supervisory system of Plato as well as of the Catholic Church.

> He that can apprehend and consider vice with all her baits and seeming pleasures, and yet abstain, and yet distinguish, and yet prefer that which is truly better, he is the true wayfaring Christian. I cannot praise a fugitive and cloistered virtue. . . .

Most of this is magnificent bombast. The obvious question is what is to happen with the man who *cannot* apprehend and abstain? Here the *aristocratisme* of Milton, to which we shall later refer, shows itself. It is a Puritan religious pride. "God sure esteems the growth and completing of one virtuous person more than the restraint of ten vicious." Why should we "deprive a wise man of any advantage to his wisdom, while we seek to restrain from a fool that which being restrained will be no hindrance to his folly?" We have here the germ (as usual, in the beginning ecclesiastical or religious) of laissez-faire and the doctrine of "the devil take the hindmost." The Platonic concept of the Polis as educator is not transferred—rightly indeed—to the Stuart State. "The State shall be my governors, but not my critics."

Milton passes from the individualistic moral argument to utilize the expedient and pragmatic. He quotes Francis Bacon. "The punishing of wits enhances their authority and a forbidden writing is thought to be a certain spark of truth that flies up in the faces of those who seek to tread it out." He adds that it is censorship that has "damped the glory of Italian wits." In that great battle between individual Intelligence and social Convention, Milton favours Intelligence and Plato Convention; and Milton is presumably (one wonders at this Puritan) prepared to pay the cost in Renaissance licentiousness and crime in lieu of Counter-Reformation morality. Civilization matters more than the masses—those whom Richard Baxter, the Puritan divine, denominated the "God-damn-me's." Milton and his friends will be guided by inner light. The same attitude shows itself in Milton's tractates advocating greater latitude of divorce. The issue is one of the most basic in human history: Superman versus Common-man.

> Give me the liberty to know, to utter, and to argue freely according to conscience, above all liberties. . . . Let (Truth) and Falsehood grapple; who ever knew Truth put to the worse, in a free and open encounter. . . . I fear yet this iron yoke of outward conformity hath left a slavish print upon our necks; the ghost of a linen decency yet haunts us.

This thesis Milton ably contrived to bind up with the tradition and pride of England as "the mansion house of liberty." In an age of

commercialized publicity, of disbelief in objective truth and of a propaganda inspired by a rancour that puts the Inquisitors to shame, it is necessary to point out that Milton did *not* assert that "truth is great and will prevail" except on certain specific conditions of "free and open encounter." The freedom of commercial or party press proprietors and editors to suppress what they choose by no means follows from it, or their liberty to select only "what the public wants." What does follow is the mood of toleration, of experiment and of welcoming the new until it is found to be worse than the old.

Locke reinforces Milton's expressed belief in mental and cultural variety. As touching religion (which was quite rightly perceived to be the core of the whole moral matter), Locke asks the question, in his *Letters for Toleration:*

> You may say the magistrate is obliged by the law of nature to use force to promote the true religion; must he stand still and do nothing until he certainly know which is the true religion? If so, the commission is lost, and he can never do his duty, for to the certain knowledge of the true religion he can, in this world, never arrive.

Locke accepts the premise that man cannot here arrive at certain knowledge of truth in religion and morals, and concludes that the magistrate has no duty to enforce that about which he cannot be certain. From his famous philosophic *Essay concerning Human Understanding,* it appears, not that Locke denied the accessibility of truth, but that truth remained for human apprehension approximate, a matter of experiment and of increasing gradual apprehension. His contempt is reserved for a species not unknown today, those "who are sure because they are sure."

The profound philosophic difference between the two great traditions of thought that have dominated the human mind here shows itself. The Platonic-Thomist tradition, which we shall later see in new forms in Hegel and Marx, assumes that there is a truth, either capable of being reached by man or which may be dogmatically asserted to have been reached by man or through revelation, which truth is so final that those who deny can be confidently said to be in error. This truth exists in the field of morals and of the social order. Being one and final, the social order can be built up round it. Those in error, who persist in their ways which issue in evil-doing, it is a duty to punish or "liquidate." The rest must be educated according to the dogmatic standards of what is right—whether that the State is All or the Church infallible or whatever it may be. It is highly interesting,

but is not immediately relevant, whether Plato, in putting forward his dogmatic teaching, did not do so against a background of personal scepticism, for the sake of social expediency, just as many eminent Catholics have done.

The opposite tradition, of which Bacon and Locke are the foster-parents, frankly accepts social expediency, and experiment as guide concerning what is expedient. It nevertheless is not basically sceptic but, on the contrary, reprobates dogma as obstructing the detached search for a clearer vision of truth. It is significant that Locke counts Robert Boyle, "the father of chemistry," among his intimates and refers to Sir Isaac, who deeply influenced him, as "the incomparable Mr. Newton." The movement is under the influence of believers in a rational order who are also great empirics and individualists. Whereas Platonism runs to Collectivism, communist or fascist, and a closed social order, Empiricism runs to Individualism and to belief in experiment, toleration, personal liberty and "an open world." Both traditions are rationalist, but both traditions are capable of alliance with irrationalism, the first from praise of mystic intuition, the second from distrust of abstract logic.

The position of Locke, which is of incomparable importance as the philosophic basis of the distinctive culture of the Anglo-Saxon world, can be summarized in a series of theses, not easily grasped by the inattentive mind, but highly important to understand. The emancipating effect of the first is obscure to the modern mind unless we recall the influence of the doctrine of Original Sin (or of the inherited Curse of Race), in which Augustine, Luther and Calvin passionately believed, and which—since, unlike modern race doctrines, it affected all humanity, without privilege of birth, save the redeemed saints—lay like a blight on the better minds of the age.

First, then, Locke maintained that men, not even entering into the consciousness of Adam, cannot be held answerable for the supposed sin of Adam; nor should men be counted cursed; since curse depends upon responsibility and responsibility is individual and for conscious acts (*cf. Essay concerning Human Understanding*, Book II, Chap. 27).

Secondly, Reason supplied with content by new individual experience, and not by innate, racial or divinely implanted intuition, is able to control the natural inclinations; and in that power of control lies the freedom of man.

Thirdly, the Emotions *should* be controlled by intellectual judgement, and it is the distinction and glory of man to be able so to con-

trol them. (The latent *aristocratisme* of this thesis, comparable to the position of Milton, is significant. Like the Stoics, also aristocrats, Locke, the Whig, believed in the potential salvability of all, and the actual superiority of some.)

Fourthly, Rational Judgement is founded on Probability, inferred from Experience, and not on Dogmatic Certitude; and that which arrogantly lays claim to Absolute Truth in empiric matters by that act shows itself probably False.

Fifthly, Human Judgement being of its nature approximate, unclear, but yet capable of assessing approximations to truth, it is unjust that any man, prince, president or pope, who desires freedom to announce his own supposed infallible conclusions should refuse like toleration to his neighbour.

Sixthly, man has a natural impulse to freedom; and a right, in an uncertain world, to liberty, in opinion and speech, to seek the truth in his own way.

Seventhly, every right of Civil Government over men depends upon a prior right conferred upon government by free men, unanimously constituting a civil society and, by majority, authorizing government to act in particulars. A government resting upon such consent is alone free, and all else is despotic.

It will be noted that Locke is not a sceptic about the reality of a truth which his very exploratory method presupposes. Scepticism is rather historically connected with the opposite dogmatic school of the Platonic New Academy, of Tertullian, of Pascal, of Newman—and of Trotsky—perhaps on the principle of the association of opposites. Locke goes well beyond Newman's "illative sense"; and affirms the capacity of the mind of man by reasoning—but about experience—to arrive at increasing approximation to truth. His treatment of his projected science of morals does not indicate that he recognizes, even to that extent which it has since become plain is necessary, the limitations of logical inquiry about ultimates.

It follows that a Liberalism that traces from Locke is not condemned to sceptical impotence. Liberalism is not the negation of doctrine but of coercive doctrine—it is an alternative doctrine which affirms only the duty to coerce the coercer. It is entitled to preach and organize society in accordance with its own truth, and to militate, even by force, against dogmatism and despotism, so long as it recalls that tolerance and experiment are part of that truth for the sake of which it undertakes to be militant and to use the implements of law, government and force. Whether we should tolerate the intolerant is an issue

to which we shall return, but which Milton and Locke replied to with a clear, persecuting negative—although this on expedient, political grounds. The ultimate Liberal opinion was that the issue here—of the need to persecute the fanatics: Catholics, Fascists and Communists—depended upon the proximity of the danger to a peaceful and tolerant society. Many, of course, will disagree with this Liberal claim to a right to persecute and coerce on behalf of a liberal *status quo*. The issue must be studied in connection with the Whig-Liberal doctrine of physical rebellion.

7

In his *Two Treatises on Civil Government* (1689–1690) Locke sets forth his theory of government. The *First Treatise* is concerned with a detailed refutation of Sir Robert Filmer, in which John Locke follows much the lines already taken by Sir Algernon Sydney (or Sidney, executed 1683) in his *Discourses concerning Government*, published in 1688. Government, for Sydney, is something expedient, for the common good, resting on consent and to be tested by reason in its success, not something prescribed to subjects by a king as a father endeavours to prescribe for his children. It is capable of being examined by the critical judgement; and old prescription or habit is no bar to that examination. Sovereignty lies in the people; but power should be exercised through some constitution, not so much democratic, as of the old Roman Republican model. These classical examples, as Hobbes complained, since the learned Milton and even earlier, were entirely the fashion. Sydney writes:

> The base effeminate Asiatics and Africans, for being careless of their liberty, or unable to govern themselves, were by Aristotle and other wise men called "slaves by nature," and looked upon as little different from beasts . . . the whole fabric of tyranny will be much weakened, if we prove, that nations have a right to make their own laws, and constitute their own magistrates; and that such as are so constituted owe an account of their actions to those by whom, and for whom they were appointed . . . why did Caligula wish the people had but one neck, that he might strike it off at one blow, if their welfare was thus reciprocal . . . the liberty asserted is not a licentiousness of doing what is pleasing to everyone against the command of God, but an exemption from all human laws, to which they have not given their assent.

Locke's refutation of Filmer and his texts is, if possible, even more learned:

> Firstly, that this donation (*Gen.* 1, 28) gave Adam no power over men, will appear if we consider the words of it. For since all positive grants convey

no more than the express words they are made in will carry, let us see which of them will comprehend mankind or Adam's posterity; and those I imagine, if any, must be these—"every living thing that moveth"; the words in the Hebrew are *khăyyāh hāromeset, i.e., bestiam reptantem,* of which words the Scripture itself is the best interpreter. God having created the fishes and fowls the fifth day [etc.].

The *Second Treatise,* licensed for printing on August 23, 1689, is a very different matter from the *First Treatise.* Here we have that State of Nature, Natural Right and Social Contract which we have already discussed. Locke invents a State of Nature different from that of Hobbes and more reminiscent of Eden and the poetic Golden Age —a condition only defective by reason of a certain inefficiency and because men were not good enough to be trusted to be just judges in their own case. Out of a different hat from Hobbes, Locke produces a different rabbit. The practical utility of a State of Nature, for Locke, is that it provides as it were a cushion for revolutions, especially if moderate ones. Revolution might mean a temporary measure of anarchy, but this state of natural anarchy, as in Spain today, is not so intolerable—more tolerable than tyranny.

Political power is ordained "only for the public good"; and is better dissolved than used as an instrument of absolutism. As Jephtha says, "the Lord the Judge" is judge in the issue here who has broken the contract or exercised force without right; and we may "appeal to Heaven" on it, presumably by ordeal of battle. Whether I shall make that appeal, in a situation extra-legal or when positive law is contrary to its own basic principle of being for my preservation, "I myself can only be judge *in my own conscience,* as I will answer it at the great day to the Supreme Judge of all men." Indeed a ruler, *not* in a relation of contract or trusteeship with his people, is in a state of nature to them. Locke, however, makes it quite clear that this resort to arms only lies where there is no "common judge," constitutionally provided, or when the aggressor flouts this constitutional authority or when he takes the initiative in resorting to force in despite of that authority. These reservations from the great philosopher of the English Revolution require pondering. "Absolute monarchy," . . . however, "is indeed inconsistent with civil society," and by Hobbes's own principles might be destroyed.

The Arcadian State of Nature is one of equality—"men being by nature all free, equal and independent."

This equality of men by Nature, the judicious Hooker looks upon as so evident in itself, and beyond all question, that he makes it *the foundation of*

that obligation to mutual love amongst men on which he builds the duties they owe one another.

It is "a state of liberty, yet not a state of license." With an eye on Hobbes, Locke adds that the State of Nature is as far different from being a state of war as one "of peace, good will, mutual assistance, and preservation" is from a state of enmity. In brief, it is an Anarchist's Paradise. It is a state regulated by the moral law or "Law of Nature which obliges everyone" and "which willeth the peace and preservation of all mankind." Under that moral law there are duties and rights—Natural Rights. Natural Rights are the moral claims of the individual, as a moral being, on his fellows—moral claims under the moral or Natural Law "which willeth the peace and preservation of all mankind"—the Law which is the rule of "reason and common equity." The State of Nature is a social condition.

The Social Contract does not inaugurate primitive society. It inaugurates a polity or civil society. Men address themselves to the need for government. In brief, it inaugurates government, not society. "I easily grant that civil government is the proper remedy for the inconveniences of the state of Nature." Not of course that this inconvenience is worse than absolute monarchy. On the contrary, men enter into the civil order for the sake of "an established, settled, known, law." "All men are naturally in that state [of nature], and remain so till, by their own consents, they make themselves members of some politic society." Then, having decided so to make themselves members, as a second step some particular Legislative is set up as trustee, with an Executive, whether monarch or otherwise. To Locke is due, in an early form, the famous doctrine of the Division of Governmental Powers. Chapter XII is "Of the Legislative, Executive and Federative [Treaty-making; Foreign Office] Power of the Commonwealth." "The legislative and executive power are in distinct hands . . . in all moderated monarchies and well-framed governments."

Conquest constitutes no title.

It is plain that he that conquers in an unjust war can thereby have no title to the subjection and obedience of the conquered. . . . Paternal power is only where minority makes the child incapable to manage his property; political where men have property in their own disposal; and despotical over such as have no property at all.

Locke owes his popularity and reputation as a political thinker to the fact that he justified to their own consciences, after the event, the Whigs who had engaged in the Revolution of 1688. He showed them

that James II, who could scarcely claim to rule by conquest as heir of William the Bastard, had broken his trust and was a civil official discredited and suitably dismissed. The almost bloodless "Glorious Revolution" of 1688–1689, unlike the Puritan Revolution and the Commonwealth, had no reaction and aftermath in a Restoration, despite Jacobite attempts. It was a good, unimpassioned revolution, not romantic. Further, Locke showed to the Parliamentarian yeomen, to the Puritan gentry of means, and to the Whig nobles—who had vague reminiscences that gathered round the myth of Magna Carta and of the feudal repudiation of *all* taxation save by almost individual consent; and who strongly objected to increased taxation—that the sacrosanctity of property was a natural right.

8

Locke is at his most unsatisfactory here, on this issue of property. Logically he should have stood for the natural right of all to property—a "three-acre and a cow" doctrine. This can legitimately and, indeed, alone consistently be drawn from his position. But indubitably the Whig lords understood him as meaning that each man's hereditary property was so sacrosanct; and Locke does not disillusion them.

> The great and chief end, therefore, of men uniting into commonwealth, and putting themselves under government, is the preservation of their property; to which in the state of Nature there are many things wanting.

The Whig-Liberal preoccupation with private property—alien to the Catholic and unmarked even with the Tory absolutist—dates from this time, although Mr. Tawney traces back the lineage to Calvin and the Reformed divines who took the multiplication of goods (like Abraham's sheep) as a visible sign of Divine favour and who, unlike the Catholic fathers of an earlier age, were not prepared to tempt Providence by scrutinizing too closely by what uncharitable means the money had been made. Indeed, there is this ambiguity, that Locke appears to assert that the natural right is, not of goods to each according to his needs, but to the whole product to each of his labour. It is in the course of this discussion that Locke makes use of what are later to become famous phrases, the corner-stones of even more famous doctrines, such as that "it is labour indeed that puts the difference of value on everything"; and that "whatsoever [a man] removes out of the state that Nature hath provided and left it in, he hath mixed his labour with it, and joined it to something that is his own, and thereby makes it his property." God "gave the world to men in common"; but

he gave it for the benefit of those who would develop it, that is, "to the use of the industrious and rational (and labour was to be his title to it)."

Locke, as we have already pointed out in discussing his attitude to the first Puritan Revolution, was an apostle of toleration, moderation, free experiment. In settling the philosophy of the second, "Glorious" Revolution, he displays the same qualities. These perhaps made him the suitable draftsman of a constitution which he was requested to shape for the tolerant Carolina planters in America. Locke, in fact on the subject of property, speaks with a lucid obscurity befitting a philosopher faced with the difficulty of having to contradict himself. It is "very easy to conceive" of a time when "as a man had a right to all he could employ his labour upon, so he had no temptation to labour for more than he could make use of." But "it is plain that the consent of men have agreed to a disproportionate and unequal possession of the earth," thanks—an Aristotelian touch this—to the convention of recognizing the value of that which has small consumptive utility, silver and gold. There appears to be an oblique hit at usury here.

I dare boldly affirm that the same rule of propriety—*viz.*, that every man should have as much as he could make use of, would still hold in the world, without straightening anybody, since there is land enough in the world to suffice double the inhabitants, had not the invention of money, and the tacit agreement of men to put a value on it, introduced (by consent) larger possessions and a right to them.

The clue is perhaps to be found in the rights of the "industrious and rational." All start, but all do not end, with an equal chance. Locke's conclusion appears to be a modified distributivism, conditioned by the rights of industry and intelligence.

As much as any one can make use of to any advantage of life before it spoils, so much he may by his labour fix a property in. Whatever is beyond this is more than his share, and belongs to others. Nothing was made by God for man to spoil or destroy.

9

Locke, judiciously supporting himself on Hooker, proceeds to explain what he means by equality.

I cannot be supposed to understand all sorts of "equality." Age or virtue may give men a just precedency. Excellency of parts and merit may place others above the common level.

What man has a natural right to is his "natural freedom, without being subjected to the will or authority of any other [individual] man." Man as such is governed by the "law of reason"; and *on his capacity to comprehend that reason his right to be considered equal depends.* "We are born free *as we are born rational;* not that we have actually the exercise of either; age that brings one, brings with it the other too." In brief, equality is the birthright of a potential rational being, so far as he matures as rational.

If this is equality, what then is freedom? The answer is markedly similar, and an anticipation, as we shall see, of that later given by Rousseau.

> There only is political society where every one of the members hath quitted this natural power, resigning it up into the hands of the community in all cases that exclude him not from appealing for protection *to the law* established by it. . . . Wherever, therefore, any number of men so unite into one society as to quit everyone his executive power of the law of Nature, and to resign it to the public, then and then only is a political or civil society. . . . No man in civil society can be exempted from the laws of it. . . . Though men when they enter into society give up the equality, liberty and executive power they had in the state of Nature into the hands of the society, to be so far disposed of by the legislative as the good of the society shall require, yet it being only with an intention in everyone the better to preserve himself, his liberty and property (for no rational creature can be supposed to change his condition with an intention to be worse), the power of the society or legislative constituted by them can never be supposed to extend farther than the common good.

Locke here quotes his great conservative counterpart, Richard Hooker, a man of moderation like himself. Hooker (1554–1600), in his *Ecclesiastical Polity,* writes:

> Civil law, being the act of the whole body politic, doth therefore overrule each several part of the same body [the social-organic analogy is noteworthy] . . . The public power of all society is above every soul contained in the same society, and the principal use of that power is to give laws to all that are under it, which laws in such cases we must obey, unless there be reason showed which may necessarily enforce that the law of reason or of God doth enjoin the contrary.

Locke concludes:

> Freedom of men under government is to have a standing rule to live by, common to everyone of that society, and made by the legislative power erected on it. A liberty to follow my own will in all things where that rule prescribes

not, not to be subject to the inconstant, uncertain, unknown arbitrary will of another man, as freedom of nature is to be under no other restraint but the law of Nature. *This freedom from absolute, arbitrary power is so necessary* to, and closely joined with, a man's preservation, that he cannot part with it but by what forfeits his preservation and life together.

The significance of Locke as a political philosopher lies in his stress —not on revolution and force, for his mood with its distrust and contempt of the "enthusiast" is not that of the temperamental revolutionary—but on personal liberty. It lies also in his work of raising men to fuller consciousness of the value of that liberty, both as the attribute of a being dignified by the power of moral choice and as the guaranty of toleration, initiative, experiment and progress in society and civilization.

This personal liberty is not that of a Robinson Crusoe (who anyhow owes his mental stock to his society), nor was it so thought of by Locke. The Social Contract is indeed rather a Political Contract conducting men from a simple but social life into one of organized civil society. The fiction is indeed a logical more than an historical one. And it corresponds to certain truths: that the social order rests, not on force, but on a consent (even if passive) which presumes the recognition of mutual obligations; that every law imposes new social duties and rights; and that, normally, each generation incurs new obligations unknown to the preceding generations and enters a more elaborate system of law compared with which that of its predecessors was almost an original, anarchic state of nature. Further, that it would be preferable by revolution to cast off these new obligations and to revert to the fashions of our forefathers, than to have these new obligations imposed by a tyranny itself unrestrained by established law or constitutional morality. These propositions are by no means nonsense, empty myth or exploded fallacy. They are of the first significance in our contemporary society.

10

Are there, then, Natural Rights? We shall see later* that this doctrine is attacked, *e.g.*, by T. H. Green, on the ground that either these rights are legal, in which case they presuppose and are not the basis of a system of positive law, or they are moral, in which case they still presuppose a society to which we have obligations as such, and do not precede it. This, however, appears to involve a misreading of

* *Cf.* p. 511.

Locke, especially perverse in the light of Locke's quotations from Hooker. Locke's State of Nature is *not* pre-social; and his Natural Rights are such under a moral law of man's being as a social animal, dictated by his inmost nature and formulated by reason. But these rights are prior, in logic and history, to any *particular* organized society and system of law and provide a norm of judgement whereby to test these. In brief, there is a touchstone, which Locke prefers to call Natural, rather than either rational or ideal, for the testing of every actual, historical and ephemeral social order.

Since Locke carefully associates Natural Rights with rational right, claimed by man as a rational being, he cannot be accused, it should be noted, of Anarchism (of the instinctive brand). His use of the term "Rights" is to be understood against the background of his use of Natural "Law"—a usage, later to be severely criticized, but (as we have seen) fully, scientifically and etymologically justifiable. Much of the criticism arises from an error of lawyers who presume that their own departmental definitions must be accepted in the face of the history of law, as it arises from custom, and in disregard of the perspective of philosophy which recognizes natural law as possessing a more basic and ancient meaning than any positive law as conceived of, *e.g.*, by Hobbes and Austin. Statute law is a late, minor and derivative thing. Any picture of law taken from it is utterly opposed, for example, to the Aristotelian and Stoic notion of basic law, or to Bracton's notion of common law. But Hobbes, Blackstone (in part) and Austin imposed on the lawyers their own peculiar philosophy.*

Locke's greatest difficulty is with the problem of the dissentient minority. If government rests upon consent, what about those who dissent? But they have agreed to accept the majority decision. But what if, at least on certain issues, they deny that they have agreed? An *Original* Contract may have virtue as indicating the force of tradition into which each child enters: society is not newly created every nineteen years. But I cannot yet be said to give free consent merely by the accident of being born. "*Salus populi suprema lex* is certainly so just and fundamental a rule, that he who sincerely follows it cannot dangerously err." But how far will Locke carry this principle much echoed by Machiavelli? Only to the point of insisting that government must be by majority legislative decision, unless a number larger than the majority is specifically stipulated. This follows from the intention of the Social Contract or "original compact." But how

* *Cf.* pp. 245*ff*.

are we to understand that a man enters into this compact? By a declaration express—or tacit. And what is the sign of tacit compact? The answer is residence; the compact lasting so long as does the residence. "He is at liberty to go and incorporate himself into any other commonwealth, or agree with others to begin a new one *in vacuis locis.*"*

But is he? This was good enough in the days of the Pilgrim Fathers. But what reality has it today in Russia, Germany, Italy—or for the unemployed man elsewhere? Appreciating the difficulty, the philosopher Kant later introduced, logically enough, a "natural right" of emigration. The moral claim is by no means without significance, especially in issues of moral judgement. The only alternative seems to be the natural, moral right to go to jail—*and* to be treated as a political prisoner, not a criminal. (As distinct from Hobbes's thesis that such a one becomes a "wolf's head" or pariah.) It gives the moral right to protest. What ultimately is at stake is no less than this: the moral claim of the Private Conscience to judge the State—Socrates' old claim and Luther's (as touching the Universal Church). The better opinion is that that claim is beyond refutation when *rationally, i.e., not* merely subjectively and capriciously, urged—although it may not always be expedient to give it civil recognition. The chief challenge to this comes from the Leviathan or Social-organic theory of the State, which we shall have occasion to discuss later when we come to the post-Hegelians. The right of a minority to resort to arms, except under aggression and when no protection is offered by due process of law, Locke certainly does *not* contemplate.

Whosoever uses force without right—as every one does in Society who does it without law—puts himself into a state of war with those against whom he so uses it, and in that state all former ties are cancelled, all other rights cease, and everyone has a right to defend himself, and to resist the aggressor. . . .

Whenever the legislators endeavour to take away and destroy the property of the people, or to reduce them to slavery under arbitrary power, they put themselves into a state of war with the people, who are thereupon absolved from any further obedience, and are left to the common refuge which God hath provided for all men against force and violence. Whensoever, therefore, *the legislative shall transgress this fundamental rule of society,* and either by ambition, fear, folly or corruption, endeavour to grasp themselves, or put into the hands of another, an absolute power over the lives, liberties and estates of the people, by this breach of trust they forfeit the powers the people had put into their hands for quite contrary ends, and it devolves to the people,

* "In the wide open spaces."

who have a right to renounce their original liberty. . . . *Thus to regulate candidates and electors, and new model the ways of election, what is it but to cut up the government by the roots, and poison the very fountains of public security?* . . .

People are not so easily got out of their old forms as some are apt to suggest.

Those in power are most tempted to abuse it and must most closely be watched. Magistrates may be resisted. It will be noted that, in Aristotelian style, Locke specifically contemplates the possibility of a democratic (or Parliamentarian) dictatorship and condemns alike it and (by implication) a Jacobin so-called "proletarian" dictatorship, *i.e.*, dictatorship by a group on behalf of the proletarian majority, as much as any Jacobite absolutism. The test which Locke uses is a very conservative one: the observance of the law and constitution. This constitution, however, is not mere use. It is that to which the people have assented. "*Wherever law ends, tyranny begins.* . . . I will not dispute now whether princes are exempt from the laws of their country but this I am sure, they owe subjection to the laws of God and Nature." Who is to be the judge? God is the judge, but each must be his own adviser whether he is justified in conscience in appealing to God by the ordeal of force. What touchstone shall guide conscience? "Force is to be opposed to nothing but unjust and unlawful force." Are we not here, with the words "unjust" and "unlawful" in an argument *in circulo*? Not quite. First, there must be *no force save against force.* (We have already seen this in our study of Locke's theory of toleration and of justifiable persecution.) Further, force is *then only legitimate where natural rights, indicated by reason, are violated.* And government is unjust which is contrary to the principles, recognizing natural rights, assented to "by the body of the people." Reason is corroborated by this assent of the body of the people; just as reason asks, "what is the interest of the body of the people?" "Those who set up force again in opposition to the laws, do *rebellare*—that is, bring back again the state of war," even though they be the legislators (abusing their trust) or the magistrates. Catholic Barclay says that tyranny even must be resisted with respect. But, sardonically comments Locke,

He that can reconcile blows and reverence may, for aught I know, deserve for his pains a civil, respectful, cudgelling wherever he can meet with it. . . .

How to resist force without striking again, or how to strike with reverence, will need some skill to make intelligible. . . . This is as ridiculous a way of resisting as Juvenal thought it of fighting: *Ubi tu pulsas, ego vapulo tantum.**

* "Where you strike, I merely get a flogging."

And the success of the combat will be unavoidably the same as he there describes it:

> Libertas pauperis haec est;
> Pulsatus rogat, et pugnis concisus, adorat
> Ut liceat paucis cum dentibus inde reverti.*

Locke has been described as a second-rate political thinker. That is certainly not the case. His better thought, however, lies in connection with the wider presuppositions of politics and must be extracted (as indicated in the theses outlined above) from his *Essay concerning Human Understanding*. It will be noted that the old harsh dichotomy, Roman but without the Roman concept of citizenship, of the absolute Tory thinkers—Hobbes, rather than King James—the division between sovereign ruler and subject, which reappears inverted in the harsh Whig concept of a joint-stock company, with the individual shareholders watching the government as managing director for defalcations, is smoothed over by Locke. On the one side stands, not "the ruler," but the legislative as trustee; on the other, not the individual "ruled," but "the people" as testator.

What Locke does not satisfactorily clear up is what he means by "the interest of the body of the people." Here his reference is deplorably vague. He is not to be supposed to think (whatever he says) that it is decided by "law," often made by dead aristocracies. If the legislators are not competent to decide this interest, who is? Locke is clearly a minimalist in government, believing in the minimum of new legislation (as did Aristotle, oddly enough). "Freedom of men under government is to have a standing rule to live by." Is fundamental law, then, the measure for the protection of those natural rights modified, as agreed, under the social contract, which represents the basic interests of the body of the people? The answer, surely, is: Yes. And these rights are discovered by common assent, reason and the study of human nature. The individual, the rational individual, the scientific student, the political physician is judge. Locke is an exponent not of the revolutionary, but of the scientific, attitude in political science. He is the forerunner not so much of Marx—and certainly not of Rousseau—as of Bertrand Russell.

* "This is the poor man's freedom;
That beaten he begs, and struck with the fist, he prays
That he may be allowed to get away with a few teeth in his head."

Typically Locke is more backward than Juvenal in showing any full appreciation of this other aspect of property and its rights.

READING

John Milton: *Areopagitica.*

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE

J. W. Gough: *The Social Contract*, 1936.
Bede Jarrett: *Social Theories of the Middle Ages*, 1926.
H. J. Laski: *Political Thought from Locke to Bentham*, 1920.
H. J. Laski (ed.): *Vindiciae contra Tyrannos*, 1924.
*John Locke: *Second Treatise on Civil Government.*
R. H. Tawney. *Religion and the Rise of Capitalism*, 1926.

Chapter X

The American and French Revolutions: Montesquieu, Jefferson, Burke and Paine

1

In 1656 James Harrington, Parliamentarian officer and allocated companion of Charles I during his captivity, a man regarded by his contemporaries as more brilliant in his views than weighty in his judgements, wrote *The Commonwealth of Oceana*. He deliberately bases himself on tradition in political science—the traditions of Aristotle and Machiavelli, "the only politician of later ages." From Aristotle he takes his first principle of government that it must be—as against the opposite thesis which he ascribes to Hobbes—"the empire of laws and not of men," what has irreverently been called the rule of "Judge & Co." It is, as we have seen, also the thesis of Locke; but Harrington is rather the would-be political scientist than the political philosopher and propagandist, and in the succession that passes on to Montesquieu rather than to Locke. His reference to the political scientist of Malmesbury is significant as coming from a practising Parliamentarian: "I believe that Mr. Hobbes is, and in future ages will be accounted, the best writer in this day in the world."

Writing after the Civil Wars and under Cromwell, it is both interesting and significant that Harrington selects stability, or permanence, as the test of a sound constitution. This is achieved—and here is Harrington's novelty, anticipating Locke's stress on property, Marx's economic determinism—where there is a direct *relation between economic and political power*. Absolute monarchy, mixed monarchy and commonwealth correspond to the holding of property mostly by the one, few or many. Tyranny, oligarchy and anarchy are perverted forms when, by violence, those try to rule who do not hold the balance of property, which is also "the balance of dominion."

This thesis might of course be used as an argument for a plutocracy holding both economic and political power. Actually Harrington does not use it so—any more than does Aristotle. He is a champion of the

yeoman farmer, who is the beneficiary of this first economic interpretation of history. The distribution of property by the Tudors cut away the economic bases in England of both feudal aristocracy and absolutism (*cf.* the Stuart need for taxes). The future necessarily, therefore, lay with a commonwealth—a conclusion undoubtedly sound in the long run, and scientifically profound, but from which Harrington drew the theorist's conclusion that the monarchy would not be restored.

As much as Hobbes and Spinoza, Harrington sets himself the problem of how to adjust the diverse interests of man the egoist with his fellows. The answer given is aristocratic. The few, who are originators of ideas, must propose. The many will pass judgement. It is Aristotle's thesis. There is "*a natural aristocracy diffused by God throughout the whole body of mankind.*" These should correspond with constitutional bodies: a senate and a general council. These together with the magistracy, or executive, make up one of those triple divisions of powers of which we shall hear so much, not least from those Founding Fathers of the American Constitution, such as John Adams, who were students of Harrington's works.

To CHARLES SECONDAT, baron de MONTESQUIEU (1689–1755) is due the classical formulation of the doctrine of checks and balances, and of the division of powers, although anticipated by John Locke. To his work as a sociologist we shall have occasion to revert later.* Montesquieu, a French provincial lawyer and nobleman, made his *début* in Paris society with his *Lettres persanes* (1721), one of the earliest of those essays in literary comparative anthropology, as a means of satirizing the home government and yet getting past the censor, which was fashionable at the time. In the *Lettres persanes* Montesquieu makes that oblique criticism upon contemporary manners and politics, as Voltaire did later in *Candide*, such as alone was possible in the age of Louis XV. It is a work characterized by a pretty wit which was less conspicuous in his subsequent and more famous *Esprit des Lois* (1748).

The comment upon the *Esprit des Lois* by Madame du Deffand, that it would more appropriately have been entitled "*De l'Esprit sur les Lois*,"† seems to do a somewhat dull and prolix production undue honour. Indeed, the *mot* seems rather to have been based upon his preceding reputation. The book is characterized by little of that cynical sagacity which made remarkable the work of his predecessor

* *Cf.* p. 751.

† "Wit on the laws," not "spirit of the laws." Perhaps Mme. du Deffand did not read the book.

and countryman, Montaigne. D'Alembert, the encyclopaedist, declared that Montesquieu occupied himself less with laws that have been made than with those that ought to be made—a comment more appropriate, however, to Montesquieu's polar opposite, Rousseau. Despite the moral enthusiasm with which Montesquieu's treatment of the subjects of slavery and civil liberty is endowed, the work on the whole rather deserves the criticism of Rousseau himself, that Montesquieu is concerned rather with how things happened than with asking why.

We have, indeed, here the beginning of the famous so-called "historical method." The anthropological discussion which had been introduced into the *Lettres persanes*, in order to provide a satire on French life in an age of censorship, here, in the *Esprit des Lois*, becomes a serious and scientific technique. Indeed, his definition of law itself, as the necessary relations sprung out of the nature of things has, not only a Natural Law background, but sociological implications that will be discussed when we come to the criticism of the writers of the Sociological school.

Montesquieu derives his political theory, as distinct from his large museum of political illustrations, from the writings of Locke and the theorists of the Roman constitution. *L'Esprit des Lois* appeared in 1748 and was preceded, in 1734, by his study entitled *The Grandeur and the Fall of the Romans*, an anticipation in title of Gibbon's great work. The British constitution appeared to Montesquieu to preserve a primitive spirit of liberty and, in words reminiscent of Tacitus, Montesquieu declares the British constitution was "found in the woods." His distinctive contribution, however, consists in his discussion of those qualities in this constitution which he, along with Voltaire, found peculiarly praiseworthy. Liberty is preserved by the balance between the parts of the constitution, of which he declares that "the one enchains the other and," he adds optimistically, "so the whole moves together." It would perhaps have occurred to him that it was rather a prescription for dead-lock if he, like Locke, had not been a convinced minimalist in legislation, believing that the least administered is best, with presuppositions about the work of the legislator better founded in civilized tradition than those of our own collectivist and maximalist (*i.e.*, law-multiplying) age, but entirely alien to these latter. "It is necessary," he continues, "from the very nature of things, that power should be a check to power." Montesquieu's discovery of the virtues of the British constitution achieved for him a reputation which, not unnaturally, was even larger in Britain than in France. His influence spread to the American colonies, where his interpreta-

tion, however unduly simple, was received as correct and had a profound influence upon the theory and practice of the Founding Fathers of the American constitution, whose prime object was to save the liberty of the citizen by reducing, if necessary, the mechanism of the government to a standstill.

Montesquieu, in developing his theory of governmental balance, formulates the classical doctrine of the triple division of constitutional powers. Locke has indeed referred to the legislative, federative (*i.e.*, treaty-making and foreign) and executive functions of government. Montesquieu takes over this terminology, but immediately changes it into that which has now become famous—legislative, executive and judicial. The preservation unimpaired of this distinction and balance, which guarantees personal liberty through a conservative and jealous suspicion of disreputable innovation by government, has been the chief object, through the last century and a half, of American constitutionalists. It explains the difficulties, not very long ago, of the President of the United States with the Supreme Court of Justice, and the grounds for the volume of conservative sentiment which lies behind the rulings, however inconvenient to the Executive, of those who have been called the Nine Old Men.

The doctrine also, for a brief period, had its influence in France—that is, so long as the Anglo-phile vogue lasted. The *Declaration of the Rights of Man*, of 1789, declared:

> Any society in which the guaranty of rights is not assured or the separation of powers is not determined does not have a constitution.

It is worth while also noting that in the establishment of the American Congress, the theory of checks between the constitutional powers, of Harrington, Locke and Montesquieu, was so far adhered to that a second balance was further contemplated between the Senate, representing the influence of wealth, seniority and locality, and the public House of Representatives. It was profoundly believed that, in the words of George Washington, "the spirit of encroachment tends to consolidate the powers of all departments in one and thus to create, whatever the form of government, a real despotism. . . . The concentration of powers in one hand is the essence of tyranny. . . . "

Montesquieu, it should be remarked, follows the thesis of Harrington in asserting that the distribution of the balance of power must be concurrent with, and will be dependent upon, the distribution of the balance of property. Only by this method has political power the means

to give effect to its more fundamental decisions. As Locke had said, property is decisive.

Montesquieu, as sociologist, also advances the theory, reminiscent of Plato, that the form of constitution, whether republican, aristocratic, monarchist or despotic, depends upon those psychological characteristics which dominate in a given society. The characteristic in human nature dominating in a despotic state is fear, although Montesquieu does not make it clear whether this is causative or consequent. In a famous phrase, he asserts that the characteristic of a republican constitution, "the human passion which makes it act," is what he chooses to term virtue, defined as "love of country and of equality." With Aristotle, Montesquieu is tempted to conclude that virtue is rare, and, anyhow, that this love of equality is only a motive force in small communities and over limited areas. He thus maintains the theory generally accepted in the eighteenth century (and a serious obstacle, as we shall see, to those who undertook the task of constituting the United States in opposition to Tory Loyalists) that republics must necessarily be small in territory. He seeks, however, to overcome this difficulty by indicating the possibilities for them of a federal solution.

The general effect of Montesquieu's sociological and anthropological treatment of his subject—in which, despite imperfect anticipation by Machiavelli and Vico and the remote work of Aristotle, he was a pioneer—was to substitute a naturalistic treatment of politics for the ethical treatment which had been in vogue for over a millennium. The nature of constitutions, he maintains in a fashion that anticipates the theories of the later school of the economic interpretation of history, is contingent upon factors of climate and upon the physical structure of the country. The climatic theory has already made its appearance in the writings of Dubois, Bodin and others, but from now on becomes part of the received tradition of political theory. Montesquieu, however, besides occasional digressions of an ethical quality such as those on which D'Alembert comments, hesitates between a naturalistic theory of politics and a theory which explains social conduct from the character of the governmental constitution of a country. Thus, the political liberty (as distinct from that civil liberty which is the negation of chattel slavery) upon which he lays such stress, is held to be the consequence of, and to be preserved by, a particular mode of political constitution. That mode is one in which a government, owing to its interior divisions, is unlikely to set up a bureaucratic tyranny

over the life of the individual. It is here that the full significance of Montesquieu's theory of the division of powers becomes apparent.

It is noteworthy that the eminent nineteenth-century historian of political theory, Sir Leslie Stephen, in commenting upon the work of a later writer of the same school, De Lolme, criticizes him for not observing that the balance between Parliament and Crown, *i.e.*, legislature and executive, upon which Montesquieu and De Lolme alike laid such great stress, was a balance that was being destroyed in De Lolme's own day. The supposition of Sir Leslie Stephen is that the power of the Crown is, under the British constitution, being progressively subordinated to those of the Legislature, and hence that the famous theory of division of powers, so far at least as Britain, as distinct from America, is concerned, is academic, hurtful and misleading. It is an interesting comment on the profundity of Montesquieu's insight that any writer on the British constitution today would almost certainly have to agree with him rather than with Sir Leslie Stephen. The outstanding fact of the present day in Britain is the swing-back of the pendulum, and the increase, in the perpetual balance between functions, of the importance of the executive, aided by its civil service and experts, at the expense of the parliamentary or congressional Legislature.

J. L. De Lolme (1740–1807) was a lawyer of Swiss extraction, a member of the Council of the Two Hundred in the Republic of Geneva, who possessed all Montesquieu's enthusiasm for the British constitution and who possibly expected to share in some measure that favour with which Montesquieu was received by the British nation. He therefore visited Britain, where he became a resident for several years, and in 1770 published in French, and five years later in English, his *Constitution of England*. If these were his hopes he was grievously disappointed, since, as he says, had he put the question to the English nation and its ministers that "he was preparing to boil [his] tea-kettle" with the manuscript, their answer, from all the contemporary notice that was taken, would apparently have been, "Boil it." From the accounts of the unhappy Swiss, the manners of the English were as rude in his day as they are today. Later, however, the author was rewarded by the appearance of several editions of his book in England and on the Continent.

De Lolme views the nature of any sound constitution as comparable to "a great ballet or dance in which, the same as in other ballets, everything depends on the disposition of the figures." Characteristically

enough, he takes as the motto of his book the words of Ovid, "Balanced in its Weights"—"*Ponderibus librata suis.*" It will be observed that both of De Lolme's metaphors are artificial if not mechanical, and he nowhere penetrates beneath a static, mechanical theory of government to a comprehension, as did Montesquieu, of these dynamic and psychological forces. De Lolme's fame, in point of fact, rests not so much upon his theory of government, in which the ideal is the preservation of liberty through ever-present possibilities of governmental dead-lock, with a consequent minimalist theory of the duty of legislators, as upon an observation on the powers of the British Parliament which have quite other implications. When De Lolme produced the statement, in one of his panegyrics of the British constitution, that the British Parliament had such sovereign power that it could do everything save "turn a man into a woman or a woman into a man," he in fact produced a singularly striking exposition of that principle of the British Parliament's sovereignty which is the exact converse of any theory of checks and balances.

In the hands of some writers, however, the theory of checks and balances is presented not merely as one of a balance between the functions of a constitution or, again, the departments of government but, thirdly, as an equipoise of the constituent parts of society. In some cases this equipoise is regarded as established in the past and unalterable. In others, following the tradition of Harrington, a moving balance is to be sustained. Thus, in 1783, Mr. Justice Braxfield gave classical expression to the doctrine of a permanent order as basic when he said:

> The government in every country is just like a corporation and in this country it is made up of landed interest which alone has the right to be represented. . . . The British constitution is the best that ever was since the beginning of the world and it is not possible to make it better.

A more moderate expression of the belief in the perfection of the British constitution as striking a permanently satisfactory balance between social groups is to be found (as we shall see later in this chapter) in the writings of Edmund Burke—who, however, is prepared to admit that "a constitution made up of the balanced powers must ever be a critical thing."

2

If in Montesquieu and De Lolme the philosophy of Hooker, Milton and Locke found its Continental admirers, in America it had direct progeny.

John Cotton, leading light of Massachusetts, was as anxious as ever was Richard Hooker to refute Independency (Congregationalism or Brownism). His ideal was a Presbyterian theocracy.

> Democracy I do not conceive God ever did ordain as a fit government, either for Church or Commonwealth. If the People be governors, who shall be governed? . . . the meanest and worst form of all forms of government. . . . That is a civil law whatsoever concerneth the good of the city and the propulsing of the contrary. Now religion is the best good of the city, and therefore laws concerning religion are truly civil laws. . . . If the heretic persisted in his errors after admonition [*cf.* Plato], it would not be out of conscience. . . .

The antithesis, typical of the Modern State, of governors *versus* governed, persists.

In Connecticut a freer doctrine obtained. Here Thomas Hooker, in his *Survey of the Summe of Church Discipline* (1648), provided an early exposition of the theory of social contract as the basis of church government. It was, however, peculiarly in Rhode Island, where the statue of The Common Man to this day dominates the Capitol at Providence, that Independency found its leader in Roger Williams—"less light than fire," commented Cotton Mather—and the frontier forces of democracy surged over the aristocratic prejudices of Calvinist Puritanism.

"The form of government established in Providence Plantations is democratical; that is to say, a government held by free consent of all or the greater part of the free inhabitants." For the rest, as Roger Williams wrote to Sir Francis Vane: "We have drunk of the cup of as great liberties as any people we can hear of under heaven." This did not prevent an older Roger Williams, in 1656, twenty-five years after his arrival in America, finding it impossible to tolerate with any happiness the Quakers, some of whom were reported as guilty of nudism and whose founder Williams described as "a filthy sow." Others than Governor Spotswood of Virginia had ground to complain that "*the liberty of doing wrong is none of the least contended for here.*" It says much for Williams that he held by his principle that none should be excluded who did not disturb the civil peace. He held to his thesis in his *Bloudy Tene[n]t of Persecution for Cause of Conscience* (1644), against Cotton and the ministers. He had advanced so far towards individualism and the "inner light," as against the Platonic-Catholic concept, that he ventured to describe the Church as

> like unto a corporation, society or company of East India or Turkie merchants, or any other societie or companie in London which may . . . wholly break up and dissolve into pieces and nothing, and yet the peace of the citie not be in the least measure impaired or disturbed.

Such sentiments, when inspired by genuine piety and not by a Machiavellian or Erastian* statecraft, were still rare. They are the steps in the development of a sound doctrine of Community or Voluntary Society.

In Pennsylvania the Quakers, spiritual forerunners of the philosophic anarchists such as Kropotkin and Russell,† with their assertion that the only religion was that "of spirit and truth" and their denial that human nature was inherently corrupt, came into their own under William Penn. The early Quakers went among the common people and, like the later Salvationists, reclaimed them. Despite the free allegation of their enemies in England that they would "soon be ripe to cut throats," and that "some thought the Anabaptists and Quakers were coming to cut their throats," the Quakers, whatever their implicit anarchism, were, on principle, no antinomians or contemners of law. "Any such," declared the founder, Fox, "as cry, away with your laws, we will have none of your laws, are sons of Belial." It is to be feared, however, that some of the early Quaker enthusiasts—and this is Roger Williams' excuse—were precisely such, howbeit they considered themselves Second Adventists and, as it were, Latter-day Saints. Penn himself lays down a civic principle of the later soberer element that differed from the quaking Quaker as Baptist differed from Munster Anabaptist.‡

> They weakly err that think there is no other use of government than correction, which is the coarsest part of it.

The function of government is also, as Scripture says, to encourage those that do well. "Any government is free to the people under it . . . where the laws rule and the people are a party to those laws."

American political thought, with one or two exceptions, has been a matter of pamphlets and speeches, and has not expressed itself in systematic political theory. Benjamin Franklin (1706–1790), leading scientist of the eighteenth century, became a kind of Old Moore, embodying his political wisdom in an annual, called *Poor Richard's Almanack*. John Adams admitted the dependence of the colonies on the king, but declared that he was king in Massachusetts and denied the dependence of the colonial assemblies on the British Parliament —the post-war Dominion thesis expressed in the Statute of Westminster. "Taxation without representation is tyranny." That all

* *Cf.* p. 204.
† *Cf.* pp. 425, 431.
‡ *Cf.* p. 212.

should be consulted in what touches all was laid down as the Englishman's right. The British Parliamentarians, apart from Burke and those who shared his views, looked askance at independent bodies who might make grants to the king, just as their predecessors had looked askance at individual "gifts" in the fourteenth century. They —not only Tories but Whigs, obsessed by the issue between king and commons—saw the control of the king by the power of the purse weakened, and the sovereignty of the [British] Parliament, in the sense of Commons as distinct from King-in-Parliament, disappearing. It was "a great constitutional issue," and it was significant that it was Burke, founder of modern British Conservatism, who was most vocal in the pro-colonist minority. On the other hand, Stephen Hopkins put briefly the common-sense case for the colonists:

> There would be found very few people in the world, willing to leave their native country and go through fatigue and hardship of planting in a new and uncultivated one for the sake of losing their freedom.

As during the English Civil War, so during the American Revolution the first line of attack was constitutional, and turned on the relation of the colonial legislatures to the British Parliament and on the constitutional theory of representation and taxation. This argument, however, tended to become bogged in the learned arguments of the lawyers as the Parliamentarian argument itself had become bogged in the issue between Sir Edward Coke and his opponents.* Popular emotion demanded resort to a more lucid, forcible and "philosophical" second line—to those "primary principles" about which every layman has always felt himself entitled to argue, although usually found too difficult by philosophers who have devoted a lifetime to their consideration. Actually the statements offered by the colonists rested pretty solidly upon the philosophic foundations profoundly enough and deliberately offered by Locke.

Samuel Adams returned to the argument that kings and magistrates may be guilty of treason and rebellion against the rule of law, including natural law. American political theory throughout at this time was more "conservative," in the sense of representing an earlier phase of political and legal thought, than the contemporary English theory which had "advanced," in a Hobbesian direction, beyond the assumption of a distinction between natural law and sovereign positive law.

* *Cf.* p. 230.

It is true, as Professor McIlwain shows, that the thesis that a court could void statute law as contrary to natural law (now equated with a "constitutional" or immemorial common law) died out in Britain after decisions at the very close of the seventeenth century. But the notion was still alive in the mind of the colonists and was entirely consistent with Whig theory, if not with the practice of Whigs in office. It was to have a decisive influence on moulding the United States constitution; in the rejection of the British doctrine of Parliamentary Sovereignty; and in the assigning of legal priority to the constitutions as against legislative acts. These results are the legacy of Natural Law to America.

The practical Alexander Hamilton (1757–1804) went farther. He asserted:

> The sacred rights of mankind are not to be rummaged for among old parchments or musty records. They are written as with a sunbeam in the whole volume of human nature, by the hand of the Divinity itself and can never be erased or obscured by mortal power. . . . Civil liberty cannot possibly have any existence, when the society for whom laws are made have no share in making them.

Nothing can be a clearer admission of the importance of "theory" (unless we are to say "rhetoric") to a "practical" man. The significance of what today would be called the influence of propaganda upon public opinion by a rationalization of motives is shown, again, by Thomas Jefferson's resort to first principles in his appeal, in the Declaration of Independence, to a candid world. The revolutionary constitution of New Hampshire declared that the doctrine of non-resistance is "slavish, absurd, and destructive of the good and happiness of mankind."

The right to revolt—such was the influence of the Glorious Revolution of '88 and of Whig philosophy—as distinct from its expediency, was not usually challenged. When it was, the challenge took the shape of the argument of Jonathan Boucher, the loyalist, who deplored the irreverence of children in a modern day, the infidelity to the marriage relation, the attitude of the rich to the poor, democracy and the absurd supposition of universal individual consent to government, the theory of a parliamentary opposition and party government, the fallacy of human equality, the destruction of all motive to initiative in industry, the doctrine of rebellion begotten of Lucifer, and indeed any challenge to the doctrine that sovereign power comes, as Paul said, from on high. "A non-resisting spirit never made any man a bad subject."

The Revolution over and independence achieved, the tendency towards "normalcy" set in. The distance travelled is all the way from the landmark of the Declaration of Independence to that of the United States Constitution. The mood of the Constitution is best discovered, apart from the document itself, in the series of expository articles by men—Madison, Hamilton and Jay—who had no small share in framing it, published in *The Federalist*, these articles originally appearing in *The New York Packet*. Samuel Adams had declared, before the Revolution, of the British constitution:

> In none that I have ever met with is the power of the governors and the rights of the governed more nicely adjusted, or the power which is necessary in the very nature of government to be intrusted in the hands of some, by wiser checks prevented from growing exorbitant.

Mr. Justice Braxfield could scarcely have said handsomer. After the Revolution this temper again became in fashion, reinforced by the lessons of the dangers of merely confederate liberty as any basis for the necessary discipline of war. For its effect upon the constitution it was rewarded by the reciprocal compliment offered by Mr. Gladstone, the great Liberal Premier:

> As the British Constitution is the most subtle organism which has proceeded from the womb and long gestation of progressive history, so the American Constitution is, so far as I can see, the most wonderful work ever struck off at a given time by the brain and purpose of man.

The Federalist shows a slight tendency to depart from the doctrine, sacred since Aristotle, of the primacy of laws over men. The experience of war has done its work. Law comes first; but involves not only opinion, but a coercive power for its execution. As that Tory Revolutionary, George Washington, observed, "opinion is not government." As President Andrew Jackson was to remind Chief Justice Marshall, law to be effectual requires an effective Executive. If indeed "men were angels, no government would be necessary." Further, a representative *republic*, such because all its powers were derived "from the great body of the people" and because it was "administered by persons holding their office during pleasure, for a limited period or during good behaviour" (as against a *monarchy*), was, Madison held (*The Federalist*, no. 39), to be preferred to a pure *democracy*. Madison writes (no. 39):

> It is *essential* to such a government that it be derived from the great body of the society, not from an inconsiderable proportion or a favoured class of it. . . . It is *sufficient* for such a government that the persons administering it be

appointed, either directly or indirectly, by the people; and that they hold their appointments by either of the tenures just specified; otherwise every government in the United States, as well as every other popular government that has been or can be well organised or well executed, would be degraded from the republican character. . . . Could any further proof be required of the republican complexion of this system, the most decisive one might be found in its absolute prohibition of titles of nobility, both under the federal and the State governments; and its express guarantee of the republican form to each of the latter.

The electorate was to be the broadest yet known in any major state—far broader than in most states of the Union, many of which retained a property franchise. It was to be a universal white male adult franchise. But the representatives were to be chosen bearing in mind "the aim of every political constitution . . . first *to obtain for rulers men who possess most wisdom to discern, and most virtue to pursue the common good of the society.*" "The elective mode of obtaining rulers is the characteristic policy of republican government." Will, then, this electorate be corrupted?

This cannot be said, without maintaining that five or six thousand citizens are less capable of choosing a fit representative, or more liable to be corrupted by an unfit one, than five or six hundred.

Nor is the danger to the many from corruption real. Even in oligarchical Britain, "it cannot be said that the representatives of the nation have elevated the few on the ruins of the many."

A republic, moreover, as representative, *The Federalist* argued, overcame the difficulty raised by Montesquieu (and by Rousseau, although his influence was negligible) that democratic government postulated a small area or polis. The task was to persuade the suspicious colonists that to substitute one federal American government for thirteen separate legislatures, nominally dependent upon the King of England, was not to replace King Log by King Stork.

The answer lay in the acceptance of the Harrington-Locke-Montesquien doctrine of the division of powers; but stated in a cautious and moderate form. As George Washington had said: "The concentration of powers in one hand is the essence of tyranny." But the contributors to *The Federalist* are satisfied if they prevent that concentration; they abandon what may be called the "three jealous watch dogs" theory of the relations of Legislative, Executive and Judiciary. The danger to national strength lay, certainly in the opinion of Hamilton, in the rash presumption of the Legislatures; and the

argument of *The Federalist* is weighed in favour of a competent Executive. Perpetual vigilance might be the price of liberty; but "liberty may be endangered by the abuses of liberty as well as by the abuses of power."

However useful jealousy may be in republics, yet when like bile in the natural, it abounds too much in the body politic, the eyes of both become very liable to be deceived by the delusive appearances which that malady casts on surrounding objects. (Jay, *Federalist* no. 64.)*

The writers trimmed carefully on the first issue in political theory: the just ratio of liberty and authority or, as F. W. Maitland put it, "finding a theory which will mediate between absolute dependence and absolute independence."

The writers of *The Federalist* introduce, further, a fourth constitutional balance, between federal and state rights. The balance here is weighted by the federal obligation of providing for defence—as Hobbes had shown, the first and overruling duty of any secular state. "Government . . . is only another word for political power and supremacy."

Is there not a manifest inconsistency in devolving upon the federal government the care of the general defence, and having in the State governments the effective power by which it is to be provided for. . . . A government, the constitution of which renders it unfit to be trusted with all the powers which a free people ought to delegate to any government, would be an unsafe and improper depositary of the national interests. [Hamilton, no. 23.] Assent and ratification is to be given by the people, not as individuals composing one entire nation, but as composing the distinct and independent States to which they respectively belong.

The third, or class, balance, however (already mentioned in our discussion, *cf.* p. 306), is contemplated, generally reminiscent of Harrington, to which we shall have occasion to recur in the discussion of Burke.

The idea of an actual representation of all classes of the people, by persons of each class, is altogether visionary. . . . Mechanics and manufacturers [artisans] will always be inclined, with few exceptions, to give their votes to merchants, in preference to persons of their own professions or trades. . . . They know that the merchant is the natural patron and friend. . . . They are sensible that their habits in life have not been such as to give them those acquired endowments, without which, in a deliberative assembly, the greatest natural abilities are for the most part useless. . . . With regard to the learned

* *Cf.* pp. 383, 471, 656.

professions, little need be observed: they truly form no distinct influence in society. . . . Nothing remains but the landed interest. . . . But where is the danger that the interests and feelings of the different classes of citizens will not be understood or attended to by these three descriptions of men? . . . Will not the man of the learned profession, who will feel a neutrality to the rivalships between the different branches of industry, be likely to prove an impartial arbiter between them, ready to promote either, so far as shall appear to him conducive to the general interests of society?

This is from the pen of Alexander Hamilton (no. 35). It is a thesis, foreshadowed by Aristotle, that we shall discover again in James Mill.* It is interesting to note how a practical man is so prepossessed by prejudice or theory as to state as actual, without further analysis, something that he merely wishes to be actual.

The Federalist, however, although it runs true to the doctrines of natural rights, social compact and division of powers, states these honoured revolutionary theses with great caution. There is "an original right of self-defence, which is paramount to all positive forms of government." Here and in the representative system are guaranties of liberty. "No political truth is certainly of greater intrinsic value" than that of the division of powers. But "parchment barriers against the encroaching spirit of power" (Madison, no. 48) are not enough. The two best specific guaranties are the *federal* nature of American government; and—as between the "different interests" that "necessarily exist in different classes of citizens," so that the rights of minorities become insecure—the *variety* of interests. We shall get the same thought in John Stuart Mill.† "In a free government the security for civil rights must be the same as for religious rights." The divine right of majorities is implicitly denied; and the division of powers developed as a bulwark against it.

John Adams, second president of the United States had, in his younger days, not hesitated to assent to Locke's maxim that all the principles of government could satisfactorily be reduced to one sheet of paper. He was guilty of the assertion (than which Aristotle, with his theme of democratic judgement and executive initiative, had long before shown a better way) that government is "a plain, simple, intelligible thing, founded in nature and reason, quite comprehensible by common sense." By 1787, Adams had revised his views in favour of checks and balances, and of aristocracy. His definition of aristocracy was liberal. "*There is a voice within us, which seems to intimate that*

* *Cf.* p. 384.
† *Cf.* p. 397.

real merit should govern the world, and that men ought to be respected only in proportion to their talents, virtues and services"—to realize this was the major constitutional problem. Adams' practice was conservative. As against John Adams, we find such men as John Taylor, of Caroline, arguing the old Aristotelian thesis in favour of rotation in office and against "the monopoly of experience."

Not less conservative in mood is James Wilson, of Philadelphia, signator of both the Declaration of Independence and of the Constitution, one of the most powerful advocates, up to the last moment, of colonial autonomy as distinct from independence. His conservatism is coloured by optimism—as when he declares: "I could never read some modish modern authors without being, for some time, out of humour with myself, and at everything about me. Their business is to depreciate human nature, and consider it under its worst appearances." It is interesting to note that Wilson, an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court, nevertheless maintains, in his lectures *On General Principles of Law and Obligation*, against Blackstone, a Whig doctrine of natural law of singular purity.

> Can there be *no* law without a [social or civil] superiour? Is it essential to law, that inferiority should be involved in the obligation to obey it? Are these distinctions at the root of *all* legislation?

Uncompromising assertions of the overriding force of Natural Law, as laying limits not only on statute law but on sovereign legislatures, are not uninteresting in the last decade of the eighteenth century.

3

Thomas Jefferson (1743–1826), third president of the United States, is the most eminent of the native-born sons of America who were systematic political theorists during the Revolutionary and post-Revolutionary period. If John Locke illustrates the function of political theory as justifiative after the event, providing rationalization for what men of action propose to do or have already done, Thomas Jefferson shows how that theory may influence the thought and, in turn, the action, of a new generation and determine the set of its problems and their solutions. He above all men is the legitimate heir of the English Revolution—the man in the midstream of the Anglo-Saxon Tradition.

The great Virginian, of Welsh descent, related to the Randolphs of Roanoke, began his political life at the age of twenty-two, when he heard Patrick Henry denounce Grenville's Stamp Act. In 1769, George Washington (another Virginian landowner), Henry, Jefferson

and others met, in the Raleigh Tavern, Williamsburg, to discuss opposition to George Townshend's duties on colonial goods. Jefferson was one of the originators of the Committee of Correspondence which organized collective colonial action; he outlined, as a member of the Virginian Convocation, a "New Model Constitution of Virginia"; and became draftsman of the Declaration of Independence. His subsequent career is that of Governor of Virginia; ambassador of the new state to France; Secretary of State; third President; and founder of the University of Virginia. This last, the Declaration of Independence and the Virginia statute for Religious Toleration he regarded as his claims to fame. "By these as testimonials that I have lived, I wish most to be remembered."

Bertrand Russell speaks of Jefferson as "a democrat for the people, not of the people." There is indeed in him a happy and genuine combination of true democrat and great gentleman. It is a combination of radical love of liberty with appreciation of discipline so rare that Jefferson demands earnest attention in the history of political thought. He, more than any Englishman in England, is the fine flower of the Lockian philosophy. There is a pretty story that well illustrates Jefferson's conception of good manners. A negro bowed to the ex-President when he was out riding with his grandson, Thomas Jefferson Randolph. Mr. Jefferson returned the bow: the grandson did not. "Turning to me, he asked," records Randolph, "'Do you permit a negro to be more of a gentleman than yourself?'" Russell excellently describes the relations of Jefferson and Hamilton. "Jefferson, secure in his estates and among his cultivated friends, believed in the common man; Hamilton, who knew the common man, sought out the society of the socially prominent." It is an interesting comment on the Marxian *credo* of the class war.

In 1794, Jefferson expressed the hope that the French would "bring, at last, kings, nobles and priests, to the scaffolds which they have been so long deluging with human blood." His considered statement, however, in his autobiography, about his days as ambassador in the France of 1789 must be weighed against this. It is the voice of the American Revolution upon the French Revolution, by which we in our turn may judge the Russian Revolution.

> I was much acquainted with the leading Patriots of the Assembly. . . . I urged, most strenuously, an immediate compromise; to secure what the government was now ready to yield, and to trust to future occasions for what might still be wanting. They thought otherwise, however, and events have proved their lamentable error. For, after thirty years of war, foreign and

domestic, the loss of millions of lives, the frustration of private happiness, and the foreign subjugation of their own country for a time, they have obtained no more, or even that securely.

However,

> The appeal to the rights of man, which had been made in the United States, was taken up by France, first of all the European nations. From here, the spirit has spread over those of the south. The tyrants of the north have allied indeed against it; but it is irresistible. Their opposition will only multiply its millions of human victims; their own satellites will catch it, and the condition of man, through the civilized world, will be finally and greatly ameliorated.

"Ameliorated"—this is the essential Jeffersonianism.

His party, Jefferson declared at the end of his life, believed "that man was a rational animal, endowed by nature with rights, and with an innate sense of justice." In 1815, he declared to John Adams:

> The moral sense is as much a part of our constitution as that of feeling, seeing, or hearing, as a wise creator must have seen to be necessary in an animal destined to live in society. . . . Every mind feels pleasure in doing good to another. . . . The essence of virtue is in doing good to others.

The extent to which Jefferson and Adams, comrades in arms with such different prejudices, could in their old age reach agreement is a significant pointer in the philosophy of political thought. This may, however, be because in those days and that country of widening horizons, despite their Puritan ancestry (or, at least, Adams'), both had forgotten the doctrine of Original Sin, sapped by Locke's critique of innate qualities, but foundation of all reasoned doctrines of coercive authority. This optimism is the converse of General Ireton's dictum: "Men as men are corrupt and will be so." The advance made in amelioration during Jefferson's lifetime is clearly indicated by a comment of his biographer, Tucker. "There were probably twice or thrice as many four-horse carriages [in Virginia] before the revolution as there are at present; but the number of two-horse carriages may now be ten, or even twenty times as great as at the former period."

The practical and intuitive demand for "amelioration" in the lot of the common man, at the expense of traditional and vested interest, Jefferson regarded as a social imperative, resting upon the foundation of the natural rights of humanity, basic to law and morals. Those rights, which, in a fashion that any politician will appreciate, had all the revolutionary appeal of extremism but which in the greyer light of reflective thought appear unnecessarily doctrinaire—those "immortal

principles" which today excite Fascist humour—Jefferson proclaimed in the well-remembered words of the Declaration of Independence:

> We hold these truths to be self-evident: that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable Rights, that among these are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness; that to secure these rights, governments are instituted among men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed; that whenever any form of government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the right of the people to alter or abolish it.

The full responsibility of Jefferson for that Declaration can be taken as established.* John Adams, one of the drafting committee, in his old age wrote,

> The essence of it is contained in a pamphlet, voted and printed by the town of Boston, before the first Congress met, composed by James Otis, as I suppose in one of his lucid intervals, and pruned and polished by Samuel Adams.

To this charge Jefferson had the effective reply that he had never seen Otis' pamphlet. He added, in words that carry conviction: "I did not consider it as any part of my charge to invent new ideas altogether, and to offer no sentiment which had ever been expressed before." Jefferson's statement is that the Declaration was written without consulting books or pamphlets. His debt, however, in thought to Locke and Algernon Sidney, champions of "natural liberty," is obvious and acknowledged.

On the other hand, it is a popular error to suppose any debt to exist upon the part of the authors of the American Revolution to Rousseau or the Encyclopaedists. The debt is all the other way. This Lafayette symbolically acknowledged when he placed a copy of the Declaration of Independence conspicuously in his library, with a vacant space beside it for a comparable French Declaration. The debt of the "Patriot" group personally to Jefferson is indubitable.

Already in the *Summary View* of 1774, Jefferson had struck the distinctive note of the Declaration. The detailed and legalistic arguments of John Dickinson are abandoned. The right, admitted even by Washington, of the British Parliament to tax the colonies in specific cases, "with moderation," is no longer conceded. "The young," writes Edmund Randolph, "ascended with Mr. Jefferson to the sources of these rights." Jefferson substituted, for a temporary quarrel, eternal issues. That is his fame.

* The pages immediately following will be found in a more expanded version in my *Thomas Jefferson*, in *Great Democrats* (Ivor Nicolson & Watson, 1934).

King George, "as Chief Magistrate of the British Empire," is invited to hear "the united complaints of His Majesty's subjects in America." Deputies from "the other states in British America" were invited, in the *Summary View*, to concert in presenting an address. The jurisdiction of the British Parliament over these states is denied. The king rules in Virginia, by the same title, although in a different fashion, as he rules in Hanover. The union with Britain is a dynastic union and no more—but he is yet the king of free Englishmen who, exercising the natural right of free emigration, have brought with them to the shores of a new country those liberties that they had enjoyed since the days of their Saxon ancestors. The quarrel is with the British Parliament. But the king does not, in the *Summary View*, escape censure. "Open your breast, Sire, to a liberal and expanded thought. Let not the name of George the Third be a blot on the page of history."

When Jefferson came to write the Declaration of Independence he pursued, with more emphasis, the same policy. Fundamental claims are substituted for legal complaints. Again he "ascends to the source of rights." This source is no longer historical or traditional but a fount of truths esteemed to be self-evident. The complaint against the Parliament of Great Britain has been broadened into an indictment also against its king. The indictment, however, is framed, not in the legal and constitutional terms of a petition of right, but as an inevitable deduction from the first principles of all political philosophy. Rebellion cannot be supplied with a legal permit—nor would the French Ministry have been interested in a dispute that was to remain merely domestic and constitutional.

Jefferson framed an argument that could appeal to men of all nationalities in a candid world. It was not merely one that might have force with Englishmen trained in the free traditions, and acquainted with the legal principles, of their country. The Declaration is an international document in conception and appeal. Like the Germans with Lenin in 1917, so the French, in 1776, demanded a sweeping policy—which in the event, damaged the empire of Britain but demolished the social system of France; just as the plotters of the Wilhelmstrasse, with their "sealed train," destroyed the monarchy of Russia but swept away that of Germany.

There were many who were prepared to say, with such a Tory as John Lind, that Jefferson had "put the axe to the tree of all government." Charles James Fox could indeed claim that the Americans "had done no more than the English had done against James II." It was, however, clear that Congress had advanced, in fact even if

reluctantly, to the enunciation under Jefferson's guidance of philosophical and practical principles much more far-reaching than those to which the Whig Revolution of 1688–1689 had committed itself. It was not for nothing that Condorcet exhorted the French to consider the principles of liberty and "to read them in the example of a great people" or that Mirabeau referred to the way in which the claims of the Declaration were "very generally applauded."

The Parliamentarians, in the days of James I and the early days of Charles I, had made humble pleas as subjects to their rightful sovereigns. The Whigs, in 1689, had effected a constitutional compromise with an executive magistrate who was also their liege lord. The Declaration placed, not only laws above men, but *irrefragable principles of society above positive laws*. It thereby prepared the way for the French Revolution that made magistrates the delegates and functionaries of the general will. But, of the two, the Declaration, by exalting the laws of human nature rather than the arbitrary will of a majority, adhered to the sounder principles.

Jonathan Mayhew, in 1766, wrote:

> Having been initiated, in youth, in the doctrines of civil liberty, as they were taught by such men as Plato, Demosthenes, Cicero, and other renowned persons among the ancients, and such as Sidney and Milton, Locke and Hoadly among the moderns, I liked them; they seemed rational.

Mayhew is representative enough of the average. There must have been many among those educated in the American colleges in the mid-eighteenth century, impressed by the radicalism of Locke and the rational system of Newton, who would have echoed Mayhew's judgement and approved his taste. Certainly Jefferson was among them. The writings of Cicero, Sidney, Locke, Montesquieu, Priestley and Malthus are all on the short list of books he later recommended to a grandson. Among these, Locke must count first in influence.

In his brilliant *Declaration of Independence*, Professor Carl Becker summarizes the attitude of Locke towards the problem of governmental authority. "Government ought to have the authority which reasonable men, living together in a community, considering the rational interests of each and all, might be disposed to submit to willingly." Primary among these rational interests are what the Lockians called men's "natural rights." Professor Becker happily quotes from the writings of William Ellery Channing, the great Unitarian and opponent of slavery, to show what the men of the generation after Jefferson understood to be the character of these

natural rights that Hooker adumbrated, Locke enunciated and Jefferson proclaimed. "Man has rights by nature. . . . In the order of things they precede society, lie at its foundations, constitute man's capacity for it, and are the great objects of social institutions."

Today, when it is popular to describe both the theory of natural rights, preceding civil government, and the more mature theory of natural law as being discredited, we hear of the rights of women, urged on more than utilitarian grounds, and of the ordinary man's "right of continuous initiative" as the basis of a workers' democratic movement. Substantially these claims are not different from those urged by Jefferson on behalf of life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness.

The points in which Jefferson marks an advance upon Locke, in the history of thought, are that he discards any reference to an original social contract, and that he derives all "just powers" of government solely from the consent of the governed.

In the Lockian theory there is a double contract—the contract between members of society to conduct themselves as social and civil beings, and the trusteeship of a ruler or legislative for purposes of authoritative government. In the Jeffersonian theory no ruler stands out, over against the people, as an independent party to some contract, tacit or avowed. In the first draft of the Declaration man is described as being born "equal and independent." He is untied by any traditional or "original" social contract. The men of each generation maintain a government for its utility for themselves and their heirs, of which utility they are the judges. They recognize no obligation to any government that claims to derive its powers from a non-popular source or that endeavours to negotiate or enforce a contract, as a party independent of the people. They admit no vice-regent of God, or symbol of the eternal nation, or group claiming to rule others "for their good, as a moral obligation." Executive officers are functionaries entrusted with power by the people.

Jefferson, as is well known, carried this rejection of any tradition or "*original* contract" so far as to maintain that no generation was entitled to bind its successor. Statisticians assured him that a new generation arose every nineteen years. After each such period, therefore, he demanded a "revolution," an entire overhauling of the constitution, in order that it should again receive popular authorization. Force was given to this demand by the restriction imposed, in the American States, on the will of democratic legislatures by written constitutions. Such "revolutions," he held, like thunderstorms, cleared the air. "*A little rebellion, now and then, is a good thing.* . . .

The spirit of resistance to government is so valuable on certain occasions that I wish it to be always kept alive."

The objections to Jefferson's and Channing's theories of man's natural equality and independence are clear on the surface. "All men are born free? . . . No, not a single man," says Bentham, "not a single man that ever was, or is, or will be." In the days of the slavery issue in the United States, reverend gentlemen could point out that these were notions tainted by French infidelity, and that "a God-fearing people" would reject them. Today, every biologist, without calling in God's curse upon Ham, can riddle the argument about human equality. Every critic of Whiggery and Liberal individualism can point out the folly of regarding men as born, or as living, "independent." They are born as babies—and live as men—dependent and social beings.

The argument, however, dies hard—and properly so. The Cynics and the Stoics, who first elaborated the theory, did so as a protest against artificial and irrational inequalities, which had no basis in such values as sincere men could accept. It was on this basis that the theory was maintained by the Church as true "according to the law of nature." A rigid doctrine of predestination and of original corruption tended to undermine it. If all men were worms, it might well be that the more miserable worms had no ground of complaint against God's will which condemned them to servitude as children of damnation. It was the great work of Locke to free men from this bondage by declaring that the mind of each man at birth was *tabula rasa*, instead of bearing blazed upon it, with other innate ideas, the adverse decree of fate. Sensations, environment, enlightenment, education, would determine the future. Thomas Jefferson, no less than Robert Owen, was to draw the deductions. Men were to be assumed equal until it was known what a favourable environment could do to improve them, or an adverse environment had done to retard them. Equality, for Jefferson, was no herd-levelling, but an elaboration of the full meaning of liberty.

When he is discussing education, Jefferson states his principles in a form far less sweeping. It is highly important to note these reservations. In his proposals for elementary instruction in Virginia he writes:

> Of the boys thus sent in one year, trial is to be made at the grammar school for one or two years, and *the best genius of the whole selected, and continued six years, and the residue dismissed. By this means twenty of the best geniuses will be raked from the rubbish annually*, and be instructed at the public expense.

Repeatedly, however, Jefferson insists that the common man can be trusted: he "was not one of those who held fourteen out of every fifteen dishonest."

> The form of government which we have adopted [he writes in 1826 in perhaps his last letter] restores the free right to the unbounded exercise of reason and freedom of opinion. . . . The general spread of the light of science has already laid open to every view the palpable truth that the mass of mankind has not been born with saddles on their backs, nor a favoured few booted and spurred [Jefferson is quoting Rumbold's phrase from the days of the Civil Wars], ready to ride them legitimately, by the grace of God.

At the back of all Jefferson's metaphysic of inalienable rights, of which the only true grounding is to be found in the permanent qualities of human nature, lie a practical common sense and an anticipation of the importance for liberty of the right of experiment and of the danger of thrusting common men into class pigeon-holes, because they mischose their fathers, or at the arbitrary will of complacent, curmudgeon bureaucrats. It is a theory that protests against forejudgement of man by man. "Judge not . . . "

Jefferson's doctrine of equality, in brief, is one more protest against unjust equality, on behalf of a condition in which innate ability may be able to take its just place. There is, however, in the Jeffersonian doctrine little of the harsh ill manners of a society where the open career is being avidly seized upon by self-made men of talent. The social atmosphere desired is one that places the burden of proof upon the man who requires pre-eminence and unequal rights.

> What a satisfaction have we in contemplation of the benevolent effects of our efforts compared with those of the leaders of the other side, who have discountenanced all advances in science as dangerous innovations, have endeavoured to render philosophy and Republicanism terms of reproach, to persuade us that man cannot be governed but by the rod. . . . The room being hung around with a collection of the portraits of remarkable men, among them being those of Bacon, Newton, and Locke, Hamilton asks me who they were. I told him they were my trinity of the three greatest men the world had ever produced, naming them. He paused for some time. "The greatest man that ever lived was Julius Caesar," he said. Mr. Adams was honest as a politician, as well as a man; Hamilton was honest as a man, but, as a politician, believing in the necessity of either force or corruption to govern men.

The contrast of outlook and of personalities is age-long and ever-recurrent in politics.

Thomas Jefferson rode his horse until within three weeks of his death at the age of eighty-three. He died in the early morning hours of

July 4, 1826, having lived until the jubilee of the Declaration that he had fashioned and which had created the American nation. The admiration which all Englishmen must feel for him is an indication of the negligibility of political interests when balanced against the lasting values of civilization and humanity.

In Jeffersonianism the principles of social democracy were enunciated in their older and more individualistic form, appropriate for a republic of small farmers. Jeffersonian policy, as against the merchant interest bolstered by Hamilton, was prorural. It was the task of President Andrew Jackson (1767–1845), still inspired by the spirit of the frontier (but a frontier receding from respectable New England), to give to that social democracy further content. Jackson, like Lincoln, was a democrat for the people and of the people. Unfortunately, he proceeded to develop that error, excusable on the frontier but disastrous later, countenanced by Locke and of which John Adams had been guilty in his early days, of assuming the simplicity of the task of government. Politically it was a natural error when opposing those Benevolent Despots who claimed—in some cases, such as that of Frederick the Great, not without excuse: in others, such as Louis XV, most falsely—to be technicians in the art of government. Like Taylor of Caroline, Andrew Jackson asserted:

> There are, perhaps, few men who can for any great length of time enjoy ffice and power without being more or less under the influence of feelings unfavourable to the discharge of their public duties.

Power is poison; power corrupts. Jackson's aim was to "destroy the idea of property in office now so generally connected with official station."

> The duties of all public officers are, or at least admit of being made, so plain and simple that men of intelligence can readily qualify themselves for their performance; and I cannot but believe that more is lost by long continuance of men in office than is generally gained by their experience.

It is the defence of the amateur in politics. It is a case not without strength, but it contains latent within it, through undue simplification of the difficulties of political practice, the possibilities of error and of dangerous error. Its danger we shall have occasion to explore when we discuss the sentimental philosophy of Rousseau. The opposite range of truths from those enunciated by the libertarian individualism of Jefferson and Jackson, and the first serious break in the Anglo-Saxon political tradition from the classical statement by Locke, will be found

in the pages of a great orator, the father of modern Conservatism, Edmund Burke, himself in his own opinion a loyal follower of Locke.

4

EDMUND BURKE (1728–1797), an enthusiastic Irishman, throughout most of his life in debt, began his political career relatively late, first in an Irish post and subsequently as secretary to Lord Rockingham. Of Lord Rockingham Burke declared that he found that "party was [for him] the depository of living principle." Burke is not without importance as one of the first men in English political life who was prepared openly to advocate the party system (condemned by De Lolme as encouraging rancour) on the principle that "when bad men combine, the good must associate." Burke's career arouses in his admirers an enthusiasm comparable to his own oratory which Lord Morley declared was one of unrestrained passion and decorated style. It is the essayist Hazlitt who says, "If there are greater prose writers than Burke, they lie out of my course of study or are beyond my sphere of comprehension." Matthew Arnold endorses this judgement. Sir Leslie Stephen says of Burke that "he was incomparably the greatest in intellectual power of all English politicians, as well as the life and soul of his party for some thirty years." The fact remains that Burke, although the prophet of political common sense against theory, was not in practice an especially good politician, partly owing to his impetuousness and partly because, in the words of Oliver Goldsmith,

> . . . he went on refining
> And thought of convincing when they thought of dining.

It is an interesting, but perhaps not entirely damning, comment upon the British electorate that, during the thirty years of the parliamentary life of the man whom Lord Morley described as "the largest master of civil liberty in our tongue," for only six did he sit for the great city of Bristol and, for the rest of the time, had to be content as the nominated member of a rotten borough. His views, although doubtless right, on Ireland, Catholic emancipation and America, together with his famous declaration that a Member of Parliament owed the electors "his unbiased opinion, his mature judgement, his enlightened conscience," not servile acquiescence in their opinions, were altogether too much for the free electors of Bristol.

Under the British constitution, in Burke's view,

> . . . the people, by their representatives and grandees were entrusted with a deliberative power of making laws; the king, with the control of his negative.

The king was entrusted with the deliberative choice and the election of office; the people had the negative in a parliamentary refusal to support.

For Burke, as much as for Polybius, the glory of a constitution was that it was mixed; and that this mixture corresponded to a certain balance in the compound of the society itself, a compound which yet was organic, not mechanical. According to Burke, the object of the Revolution of 1688 had been not to make a revolution but to prevent it. In brief, he attributes to the Whig nobility of the days of King William the same intention which Fascists today claim for themselves as against Communist policy. The object was to prevent dangerous innovation. Burke was no unmixed admirer of the monarchy as he found it. Henry VIII he described as "a levelling tyrant"; and he refers to "that series of sanguine tyrants, the Caesars." He was among that group which George III, in a famous message, described as "not the king's friends but his enemies"; and Burke did not hesitate to refer to what he called "the low and pimping politics" of the court and "the insect race of courtly falsehoods."

On the other hand, while protesting against those who "gave themselves under the lax and indeterminate idea of the honour of the Crown, a full licence for all manner of dissipation and all manner of corruption," Burke was a steady opponent of parliamentary reform and of the enlargement of the electorate. In all disputes between the people and their rulers, Burke held that the presumption was "at least upon a par in favour of the people." He quotes the words of Sully, the great minister of Henri IV; "Revolutions do not happen in great states by chance nor from popular caprice. . . . The populace does not revolt from any desire to attack but from impatience in its misery." It did not, however, follow that the people should be indulged. His belief was in *parliamentary sovereignty, not in popular sovereignty.* He held that owing to "the prostitute and daring voracity, the corruption of manners, and idleness and profligacy of the lower sort of voter, no prudent man would propose to increase such an evil if it be, as I fear it is, out of our power to administer to it any remedy." There was such a thing as a natural representative of the people. Those of tolerable leisure and of some means of information above "menial dependence"—in all about 400,000—were these natural representatives of the whole population.

This [declared Burke] is the British public and it is a public very numerous. The rest, when feeble, are the object of protection; when strong, the means of force. . . . When you separate the common sort of man from their proper

chieftains so as to form them into an adverse army, I no longer know that venerable object called the people in such a disbanded race of deserters and vagabonds.

This last passage occurs in Burke's *Appeal from the New to the Old Whigs* (1791). Although we may be confident that the phrase does not come from Languet or Hobbes, the concept is reminiscent of them.

This *Appeal*, made under the influence of emotions due to the impact of the French Revolution, is, in effect, the initiation of modern Conservatism as distinct from the old loyalist and Jacobite Toryism of the preceding century. Along with William Pitt the younger, Burke can claim to be the father of the Conservative party, although he had begun his literary career by criticism of the cynicism of the past hope of the Tory party, the brilliant but unstable Bolingbroke. As much as Mr. Justice Braxfield, but expressing himself in a language incomparably richer in emotion and incomparably deeper in thought, Burke finds his ideal in the British constitution. "This constitution," he said, "in former days used to be the admiration and the envy of the world." In dealing with the problem of the revolted American colonies, he urges mediation on the grounds that conciliation was in accordance with the temper of that constitution. "I am sure that I shall not be misled when, in a case of constitutional difficulty, I consult the genius of the English constitution." The constitution for him is not a matter of laws or of governmental departments, but of a spirit almost personal and of a tradition. "We want," he continues, "no foreign examples to rekindle in us a flame of liberty; the example of our own ancestors is abundantly sufficient to maintain the spirit of freedom in its full vigour."

These statements about liberty, in the writings of Burke, are not mere rhetoric. His whole moral attitude, his conduct of investigations into corruption in India and into the administration of Warren Hastings and, above all, his attitude towards the American colonies demonstrate this fact. The liberty, however, in which Edmund Burke was interested was not an abstract and theoretic liberty, or even a liberty that involved profound social change in vindication of some natural rights of man, but a liberty, traditional, attested by legal documents and well-established customs and (it would be no exaggeration to represent Burke as feeling) tracing back, in Montesquieu's words, to those woods in which we found our constitution or, at the least, to the "iron barons" of King John and to Cardinal Langton.

His whole argument on American affairs has the very same basis. The American claims which were being challenged by Lord North

were claims well established in the domestic history of Britain, of which the justice had especially been vindicated by the revolution—a revolution, not anarchical or some mass *émeute*, but solely corrective of the Stuart usurpation and innovation before 1688.

> The ablest pens . . . took infinite pains to inculcate, as a fundamental principle, that in all monarchies the people must, in effect themselves, mediately or immediately, possess the power of granting their own money, or no shadow of liberty could subsist. The colonies draw from you, as with their lifeblood, their ideas and principles. Their love of liberty, as with you, is fixed and attached on this specific point of taxing.

An Englishman, Burke held, was the unfittest person on earth to argue another Englishman into slavery and, he adds with effective force, "are not the people of America as much English as the Welsh?"

> In order to prove that the Americans have no right to their liberties, we are every day endeavouring to subvert the maxims which preserve the whole spirit of our own. To prove that the Americans ought not to be free, we are obliged to deprecate the value of freedom itself and we never seem to gain a paltry advantage over them in debate without attacking some of the principles or deriding some of those feelings for which our ancestors have shed their own blood.

England was then, for Burke, a nation which, in his own words, respected and formally adored her freedom. Alongside, however, the notion of freedom, Burke places the notion of duty. He anticipates almost in the same words the doctrine of the nineteenth-century Oxford School which spoke of "our station and its duties." He maintains that the Almighty, "having disposed and marshalled us by a divine tactic, *not* according to our will but according to His . . . virtually subjected us to act the part which belongs to the place assigned to us."

In his *Vindication of a Natural Society* (1756), which is a satire on the writings of Lord Bolingbroke written some years after Rousseau's *Discourse on the Arts and Sciences* (1751), Burke laid down that, in a state of nature, it was an invariable law that a man's acquisitions are in proportion to his labours.

> In a state of artificial society, it is a law as constant and invariable, that those who labour most enjoy the fewest things and that those who labour not at all have the greatest number of enjoyments. A condition of things this, strange and ridiculous beyond expression.

Burke, however, does not draw the conclusion that this condition of things should be altered, because he does not believe that it can be

altered. To a high degree he had the conservative, religious mind: a century before he would have been temperamentally all for obedience. Burke draws the precisely opposite conclusion that the *civil* order can be impiously undermined by the same sceptical arguments of supercilious wit by which Bolingbroke had endeavoured to undermine current *religion* and theology. Hence the arguments, which proved too much, were false. The conclusion that Burke draws (in 1756) is not the need for a revolution in the social order, but the folly and impiety of Bolingbroke's argument for a revolution in orthodox religion. There is, throughout Burke's argument (as much as in that of Pascal and Newman), a profound pessimism, a deep belief in the original sinfulness of man. To flatter the poor and to tell them that they can greatly change their state is, in Burke's view, nothing less than fraud and wicked folly.

> I have some times been in a good deal more than doubt whether the Creator did ever really intend man for a state of happiness. He has mixed in His cup a number of natural evils (in spite of the boasts of stoicism they are evils), and every endeavour which the art and policy of mankind has used from the beginning of the world to this day, in order to alleviate or cure them, has only served to introduce new mischiefs or to aggravate and inflame the old.

Already the doctrine of Progress, with Priestley and Condorcet, has become the darling of the liberals. Reactionism against it, as a principle, can scarcely go farther.

The offenders, in Burke's view, who were guilty of perpetrating this confidence trick upon a pathetic toiling humanity were the abstract theorists, and especially the *philosophes* of France, forerunners of modern Marxists. It is a theme that he develops in his most famous work, his *Reflections on the French Revolution* (1790). He comments that these were men with "nothing but *douce humanité* in their mouth," but the conclusion of the argument was revolution and massacre. Men of science, with "their great lights about progress," were inspired by the philosophy of

> the geometricians and the chemists, bringing, the one from the dry bones of their diagrams, and the other from the soot of the furnace, dispositions that make them worse than indifferent about those feelings and habitudes which are the supports of the moral world. Ambition is come upon them suddenly . . . these philosophers consider men in their experiments no more than they do mice in an air-pump, or in a recipient of mephitic gas. Whatever His Grace [the reference is to the pro-Revolution Duke of Bedford] may think of himself, they look upon him and everything that belongs to him with no more regard than they do upon the whiskers of that little long-tailed animal that has been

the game of the grave, demure, insidious, spring-nailed, velvet-pawed, green-eyed philosopher, whether going upon two legs or upon four.

The substance of Burke's argument is the importance of experience as against abstract theory. He is tireless in his denunciation of the coxcombs of philosophy. As for their more serious teachers, he comments: "Nothing can be conceived more hard than the heart of a thoroughbred metaphysician. It comes nearer to the cold malignity of a wicked spirit than to the frailty and passion of a man."

Consistent with his pessimistic estimate of human nature and with his distrust of the "great lights" of illumination and progress, Burke is a minimalist in his theory of government, that is, he believed that the task of government is to interfere as little as possible with human nature as it displays itself in the day by day conduct of society. His attitude towards government is throughout empirical—the doctrine of passive obedience is a "dangerous exploded principle" (*i.e.*, contemporarily, ironically enough, it had the implications of Jacobite rebellion).

What is government more than the management of the affairs of a nation? . . .

The state ought to confine itself to what regards the state, or the creatures of the state, namely, the exterior establishment of its religion; its magistracy; its revenue . . . in a word, to everything that is truly and properly public, to the public peace, to the public safety, to the public order, to the public prosperity.

It will be noted that religion and morality, at least so far as they affect the outward order of society, are included by Burke within the proper function of state action, but apparently the regulation by legislation of the economic life of a people is not so included. The view is, of course, not novel. The expression, however, of this transitional error is striking.

It will further be noted that Burke's conservatism is, in his own eyes, bound up with defence of governmental non-interference—although not with individualism on moral principle. Burke and Jefferson here still shake hands on the practice of government.

The leading vice of the French monarchy, he holds, was "a restless desire of governing too much." A perfect democracy, in which the majority of the people is conscious of its own strength and admits of no limits to its power, is "the most shameless thing in the world."

It is not necessary to teach men to thirst after power, but it is very expedient that by moral instruction they should be taught, and by their civil constitution they should be compelled, to put many restrictions on the immoder-

ate exercise of it and the inordinate desire. The best method of obtaining these two great points forms the important, but at the same time the difficult problem to the true statement.

It was inevitable that Burke, holding these views, should regard with abhorrence the French Revolution, which Charles James Fox was acclaiming when he spoke of the constitution of 1791 as "the most stupendous and glorious edifice of liberty which has been erected on the foundation of human integrity, in any time or country." Burke viewed it in a quite other light. The moderates who conducted it through its early stages he regarded as "men who would usurp the government of their country with decency and moderation." The French society that came into being in the later stages of the Revolution, he regarded as having the resemblance of

a den of outlaws upon a doubtful frontier; of a lewd tavern of revels and debauches, of banditti, assassins, bravos, smugglers and their more desparate paramours, mixed with bombastic players, the refuse and rejected offal of strolling theatres, puffing out ill-sorted verses about virtue, mixed with the licentious and blasphemous songs proper to the brutal and hardened course of lives belonging to that sort of wretches.

Jacobins were inspired by "determined hostility to the human race." The Revolution was a "hideous phantom; . . . One of the greatest calamities that has ever fallen upon mankind." Its authors were "the revolution harpies of France, sprung from night and hell"; its mood was "a drunken delirium from the hot spirit drawn from the alembic of Hell." There was a danger, he maintained, of Britain being led,

through an admiration of successful fraud and violence, to an imitation of the excesses of an irrational, unprincipled, proscribing, wasting, plundering, ferocious, bloody and tyrannical democracy. . . . *It is with an armed doctrine that we are at war.* It has, by its essence, a faction of opinion, and of interest, and of enthusiasm in every country. To us it is a Colossus which bestrides our Channel. It has one foot on a foreign shore; the other upon British soil. Thus advantaged, if it can exist at all, it must finally prevail. . . . England is not left out of the comprehensive scheme of their malignant charity.

For Burke, the inevitable conclusion urged through the pages of the *Letters on a Regicide Peace* (1796) was that Britain "must maintain her intervention," until the threat of this Jacobin International was destroyed.

His moral objections to the French Revolution, alike when specifically French and when international, and his economic anti-collectivism show Burke, as has been said, as the father of modern conservatism, although the doctrine of enlightened self-interest and the stress on liberties appear frequently enough to show the Whig in him. His *Reflections on the French Revolution*, although imbued by admiration for tradition and loyalty, do not display to equal advantage another of Burke's contributions to the enrichment of political thought. He is, however, although no compeer of Robertson or Hume as a professional historian, thanks to the mood he engendered, the co-founder of the Historical school. His entire treatment of political problems is suffused by an historical sense, if often a distorted one. Burke found in the immense slowness of history a corrective of radical ideas of individual Natural Rights, such as stimulated a revolutionary haste. His mood, in its faults and its virtues, was the precise opposite of that of Mr. Henry Ford. As with Bossuet, so with Burke, history displayed the decrees of God and, even better than the study of theology, checked an impious impatience. History was theology reduced to detail, a Book of Kings and Chronicles. If not the forerunner of Savigny and Gneist in Germany, and later of Maine and Stubbs in Britain, Burke, when not obsessed by rhetoric, at least did much to encourage a temper in Western civilization congenial to their labours.

5

If Burke was the great protagonist of the conservative protest against the French free-thinking Illumination and radical Revolution, there was no lack of antagonists, admirers of the French Revolution. Among these, who include the members of the London Corresponding Society and the Society of the Friends of the People (founded by Lord Grey and Erskine, the advocate) was Dr. Richard Price, minister, economist and author of a tractate famous in its time on the National Debt and Sinking Fund, and Dr. Joseph Priestley, Unitarian Minister and scientist. Price, moreover, was the object of Burke's attack by name in the *Reflections;* and a sermon of his, on the principles of the French Revolution, was the pretext for the writing of that pamphlet. The corner-stone of the offence of Dr. Price, whom Burke compares to Father John Ball, of the Peasants' Revolt, and to Dr. Hugh Peters, of the Commonwealth, was that, in a sermon at Old Jewry chapel, London, he said that George III was "almost the only lawful king in the world, because the only one who owes his crown to the choice of his people." Price's name, however, is chiefly connected with his

pamphlets setting out the American case at the time of the War of Independence. The right of "Civil Liberty," as Price uses the term, is equivalent to a right of self-determination. He reverts, in his treatment, in his *Observations on the Nature of Civil Liberty* (1776), to the stock problem of Social Contract. The right to the observation of the contract "is a blessing which no one generation of men can give up for another; and which, when lost, a people have always a right to resume."

"If," Price continued, in order to preserve the unity of the British Empire, "one half of it must be enslaved to the other half, let it, in the name of God, want unity." Representation was the guaranty against imperialist enslavement. Every independent agent should have a share in government. "Here," in Britain, he adds somewhat naïvely, "it is impossible that the represented part should subject the unrepresented part to arbitrary power, without including themselves." In the colonies it was possible, and had been done. The people of America were no more the subjects of the people of Britain than those of Yorkshire were the subjects of the people of Middlesex. Price writes:

> Government is an institution for the benefit of the people governed, which they have power to model as they please; and to say that they can have too much of this power, is to say, that there ought to be a power in the state superior to that which gives it being, and from which all jurisdiction is derived. Licentiousness . . . is government by the will of rapacious individuals, in opposition to the will of the community, made known and declared in the laws. . . .
>
> All civil government is either the government of a whole by itself, or of a whole by a power extraneous to it, or of a whole by a part; the first alone is Liberty, and the two last are Tyranny.

Dr. Joseph Priestley, in his *Essay on the First Principles of Government* (1768), is concerned to draw a distinction between political and civil liberty, the first being the power of arriving at public office or voting, the second being power over their own actions which the members of the State reserve to themselves. Once again we are told that these civil liberties are rights, not to be resigned by any generation for and on behalf of its descendants, since

> it is manifestly contrary to the good of the whole that it should be so, but reassumed in virginal freshness by each generation as it attains years of discretion and rational maturity. . . . All people live in society for their mutual advantage; so that the goodness and happiness of the members, that is, the majority of the members of any state, is the great standard by which everything relating to that state must finally be determined.

As to those theologians who urged the words of St. Paul that the powers that be are ordained of God, "it is a sufficient answer to such an absurd quotation as this, that, for the same reason, *the powers which will be will be ordained of God also.*" The comment, in an agelong controversy, is an interesting and shrewd anticipation of later Hegelianism.

The idea of Progress, slowly developed since the Abbé de Saint Pierre (1658–1743), is beginning to take hold upon the human mind and is clearly expressed by Priestley.

> Were the best formed state in the world to be fixed in its present condition, I make no doubt but that, in a course of time, it would be the worst. History demonstrates this truth with respect to all the celebrated states of antiquity; and as all things (and particularly whatever depends upon science) have of late years been in a quicker progress towards perfection than ever; we may safely conclude the same with respect to any political state now in being.

In politics Priestley was a believer in personal liberty; in religion he believed in equal freedom (something more than toleration); in education he believed in experiment.

> From new, and seemingly irregular, methods of education, perhaps something extraordinary and uncommonly great may spring. . . . Pity it is then [wrote this Unitarian divine], that more and fairer experiments are not made; when, judging from what is past, the consequences of unbounded liberty in matters of religions promise to be so very favourable to the best interests of mankind. . . . Of all arts, these stand the fairest chance of being brought to perfection, in which there is opportunity of making the most experiments and trials.

Here we have a foreshadowing of John Stuart Mill's argument.

The forerunner of the Utilitarians lays down that riches are held for the good, not only of the individual but also of the state, which may demand their surrender. But he is typical of his century when he adds that "civil liberty has been greatly impaired by the abuse of the maxim that the joint understanding of all the members of a state, properly collected, must be preferable to that of individuals," whereas, in truth, the greater part of human actions are of such a nature that it is better to leave them to the arbitrary will of individuals than to regulation by society through law.

6

Among Burke's antagonists, however, Thomas Paine and William Godwin are outstanding.

THOMAS PAINE (1737–1809) was born at Thetford, England, the son of a Quaker stay-maker. Like the poet Burns, he found employment as an exciseman. He went to America on an introduction from Benjamin Franklin and first achieved fame in connection with his pamphlet published in January, 1776, entitled *Common Sense*, in which he advocated the separation of the colonies from Britain. After a stormy career, he returned to England and then proceeded to France. There he was elected a deputy of the National Convention but was imprisoned and under sentence of death during Robespierre's regime. Freed, he returned to America and died in New Rochelle, New York.

His chief claim to fame, however, is his book *The Rights of Man* (1791–1792), which was a vigorous criticism of Burke's *Reflections on the French Revolution*, written with that irreverence which was most calculated to be offensive to the rhetorical moralism of Burke. He quotes the passage where Burke says, "It looks to me as if I were in a great crisis, not of the affairs of France alone but of all Europe, perhaps of more than Europe. All the circumstances taken together, the French Revolution is the most astonishing that has hitherto happened in the world." Paine mordantly comments, "as wise men are astonished at foolish things, and other people at wise ones, I know not on which ground to account for Mr. Burke's astonishment; but certain it is that he does not understand the French Revolution." It is in denunciation of Burke's treatment of the Reverend Dr. Price that Paine writes a famous passage, commenting on Burke's declaration that the age of chivalry had departed.

> It is painful to behold a man employing his talents to corrupt himself. Nature has been kinder to Mr. Burke than he is to her. He is not affected by the reality of distress touching his heart, but by the showy resemblance of it striking his imagination. He pities the plumage but forgets the dying bird. Accustomed to kiss the aristocratical hand that hath purloined him from himself, he degenerates into a composition of art, and the genuine soul of nature forsakes him.

Burke the rhetorician had become, in Paine's eyes, merely one "mounted in the air like a balloon, . . . [a] genius at random." It was, in Paine's opinion, power and not principles that Burke venerated.

"My country is the world," declares Paine, "and my religion is to do good." He added, with truth and without false modesty, that he possessed more of what is called consequence in the world than anyone in Mr. Burke's catalogue of aristocrats. Burke's reverence for the British constitution was an affectation and a dangerous affectation.

Governments were of two kinds, either that springing up out of the people or that over the people. If of the latter kind, they partook of the nature of tyranny. Government arose from a compact of man with man, and not from any compact between men and governments, since there must have been a time before governments existed. Burke had "set up a sort of political Adam [*cf.* Filmer*] in whom all posterity are bound for ever; he must, therefore, prove that his Adam possessed such a power or such a right." Elsewhere Paine distinguishes governments under three heads; it is of priestcraft; it is of conquerors; or it is of reason. The first two, however, tend to enter into alliance. "The key of St. Peter and key of the Treasury become quartered on one another, and the wondering cheated multitude worshipped the invention." The prejudice, therefore, of Englishmen in favour of their own government by kings, lords and commons, arose as much or more, in Paine's opinion, "from national pride, than reason." As for the monarchy, it could trace its claim to no higher source than the power of the sword of William the Conqueror, "a French bastard landing with an armed banditti, and establishing himself King of England against the consent of the natives"—which was, "in plain terms, a very paltry, rascally original."

If, however, Paine had no high opinion of "the son of a prostitute and the plunderer of the English nation," his opinion was not much higher of "the House of Brunswick, one of the petty tribes of Germany." His *Rights of Man* was a protest against "the romantic and barbarous distinction of men into kings and subjects." Government had been too long "made up of mysteries," and he protested against Burke's "idol" which would be "as good a figure of monarchy with him as a man." Monarchy was "a silly, contemptible thing, . . . *the popery of government.*" As he had said earlier in his *Common Sense*, "virtue is not hereditary. . . . Through all the vocabulary of Adam there is not such an animal as a Duke or a Count."

If Paine protests against monarchy and hereditary aristocracy, he is not any believer in the sovereignty of parliament. These were the days when the demand for annual parliaments, ultimately to be made one of the points of the Chartists, was being formulated. Paine's whole argument is directed towards the effective establishment of the sovereignty of the People as against that of Parliament. "The continual use of the word Constitution in the English Parliament shows that there is none; and that the whole is merely a form of Government without a Constitution, and constituting itself with what powers it

* *Vide* p. 224.

pleases." On the other hand, Paine, somewhat inconsistently, maintained "the American Constitutions were to Liberty what a grammar is to language: they define its parts of speech and practically construct them into syntax."

Paine maintained that he was not a revolutionary by preference, or rather that he believed in producing *revolutions "by reason and accommodation rather than commit them to the issue of convulsions."* It is true that his practice, in 1776, when he urged the colonists to declare their independence, was not entirely consistent with this maxim of moderation. Presumably, he was then confirmed by the opinion that he elsewhere expressed that, "when it becomes necessary to do a thing, the whole heart and soul should go into the measure, or not attempt it." Revolution, at least, was not worth while unless it was to be for some great national benefit, and then the danger would be for those who opposed. It was, he held, not difficult to perceive from the enlightened state of mankind that hereditary governments were verging to their decline, that revolutions on the broad basis of national sovereignty and government by representation were making their way. Nevertheless, he looked forward to a time, presumably subsequent to these revolutions, when "for what we can foresee, *all Europe may form but one great Republic, and man be free of the whole.*"

Paine's power to inspire his readers depended upon the vigour of his indignation against current abuses, the journalistic skill of his pen and the vividness of his vision of the future.

> Lay then the axe to the root, and teach Governments humanity. It is their sanguinary punishments which corrupt mankind. . . .
>
> *Man has no property in man* [nor, presumably, has a society composed of men] neither has any generation a property in the generations which are to follow. . . .
>
> There is a morning of reason rising upon man on the subject of Government that has not appeared before. . . .
>
> When it shall be said in any country in the world, my poor are happy; neither ignorance nor distress is to be found among them; my jails are empty of prisoners, my streets of beggars; the aged are not in want; the taxes are not oppressive; the rational world is my friend because I am the friend of its happiness: When these things can be said, then may that country boast its Constitution and its Government.

William Godwin (1756–1836) is too definitely an eccentric to be put among the builders of the Anglo-Saxon tradition. He provides, however, a corrective to Burke. Above all, the popularity of his *Political Justice* is an index of the vigour of the individualism in that tradi-

tion in the late eighteenth century. It is an ingredient of our tradition which it is easy, in the twentieth century, to overlook.

Godwin had read his Rousseau and Helvetius. Specifically he admits that these French writers have recognized, as Locke and Paine did not, the moulding effects of political institutions upon the minds of citizens. This temper of a constitution "insinuates itself into our personal dispositions, and insensibly communicates its own spirit to our private transactions." Having, however, made that admission, Godwin draws an unexpected conclusion—although one entirely consonant with the argument of Paine: it is imperative to reduce this influence. "Rousseau was the first to teach that the imperfections of government were the only permanent source of the vices of mankind; and this principle was adopted from him by Helvetius and others." But government, as Paine recognized, however reformed, "was little capable of affording solid benefit to mankind."

Godwin was little disposed to follow Rousseau into the realms of Book Four of the *Contrat Social*. Rousseau underestimated the rational obligation of social benevolence that rests on a good man. But he grossly over-estimates the part that can usefully be played, not only by government, but even by any particular society.

> Society is an ideal existence, and not on its own account entitled to the slightest regard.* The wealth, prosperity and glory of the whole are unintelligible chimeras. Set no value on anything, but in proportion as you are convinced of its tendency to make individual men happy and virtuous.†

It was a further complaint against Rousseau that his followers spent their time seeking to prove that men must be governed by something other than reason. The point is important and well-taken.

Godwin's views upon what he meant by reason are interesting but vacillating. There was, he asserted in various *obiter dicta*, an "immutable voice of reason and justice." There are matters on which we have "an irresistible persuasion." But Godwin is an enemy of the dogmatists. There is no infallible judge of controversies.

> To dragoon men into the adoption of what we think right, is an intolerable tyranny. . . . Every man thinks himself in the right; and, if such a proceeding were universally introduced, the destiny of mankind would be no longer

* *Cf.* J. Bentham: *Principles of Morals and Legislation*, ed. 1876, p. 3: "The community is a fictitious *body*, composed of the individual persons who are considered as constituting its *members*. The interest of the community then is, what?—the sum of the interests of the several members who compose it. It is in vain to talk of the interest of the community, without understanding what is the interest of the individual."

† *Cf.* pp. 349, 355, 547; and also Hobbs and Locke on happiness.

a question of argument, but of strength, presumption or intrigue. . . . He that speaks of [truth's] immutability, does nothing more than predict with greater or less probability . . . human science is attended with all degrees of certainty . . . but human beings are capable of apprehending and weighing all these degrees.

Men, moreover, who have been awakened to truth will not relapse.

Godwin's positive position appears to be a good Lockian one, that there are "laws of the universe" which we can approximately, but with growing clarity, apprehend. The laws of a determined human nature are among these general laws which a student of the Puritan theologian, Jonathan Edwards, is a priori prepared to accept. "*Politics is a science.* The general features of the nature of man are capable of being understood, and a mode may be delineated which, in itself considered, is best adapted to the condition of man in society." These basic rules are uniform to the whole human race. The duty to apprehend these laws is a check upon individual caprice. This, as against utility, is the element of truth in the obscure maxim that we should do good regardless of the consequences. "The universal exercise of private judgement is a doctrine unspeakably beautiful." But it is subject to this interior check. "Immutable reason is the true legislator."* Otherwise we have mere enthusiasm and fanaticism. "The most determined political assassins, Clement, Ravaillac, Damiens and Gerard, seem to have been deeply penetrated with anxiety for the eternal welfare of mankind. . . . The authors of the Gunpowder Treason were in general men remarkable for the sanctity of their lives and the austerity of their manners. . . . They were sincere enthusiasts; but had not recognized that there was a rational duty not to 'labour under prejudice.'"

The freedom of private judgement, illumined by reason, is a freedom in relation to external authority, especially government, and to all manifestations of the irrational brute fact of mass force. Is not, yet, the majority most likely to be right—to be rational? Of this Godwin is far from sure—and hence the quasi-anarchism of himself and his followers. "Truth cannot be made more true by the number of its votaries." "Truth disdains the alliance of marshalled numbers." On the contrary, all the great steps of human improvement have been the work of individuals—seeking alone after the apprehension of truths. Congregations of enthusiasts, heady Parliaments, proud of their numerical support, become insolent in their pretensions to power. "Gentlemen, you are not, as in the intoxication of power you have

* *Cf.* pp. 169, 268.

been led to imagine, omnipotent; there is an authority greater than yours, to which you are bound assiduously to conform yourselves."

"Nothing can be at once so unreasonable and hopeless as an attempt"—it is a remark to be echoed by the Economists—"by positive regulations to supersede the unalterable laws of the universe. . . . " Nothing can be more unquestionable than that the manners and opinions of mankind are of the utmost consequence to the general welfare. But it does not follow that government is the instrument by which they are to be fashioned." On the contrary, government is "the perpetual enemy" of rational and scientific change and innovation. Now innovation is good—adjustment in a moving civilization.

That Godwin should be a humanist, not a revolutionary, follows from his liberal premises. "If conviction of the understanding be the compass which is to direct our proceedings in the general affairs, we shall have many reforms, but no revolutions"—this conviction is making a "calm, incessant, rapid, and auspicious progress." There is no time-serving in his declaration that he "deprecated scenes of commotion and tumult."

> The legitimate instrument of effecting political reformation is truth . . . Let us not vainly endeavour by laws and regulations to anticipate the future dictates of the general mind, but calmly wait till the harvest of opinion is ripe . . . make men wise, and by that very operation you make them free.

In his praise of "innovation," in his declaration that, even if the mass of men is contented, he is "not contented for them," Godwin shows himself no temperamental conservative. On the contrary, he has a belief, highly progressive and well in advance of our own age, in what can be achieved under the guidance of a political science unobstructed by censorship and passionate prejudice.

What Godwin ignores, and Bentham later is to point out, is the importance of a pressure, calculated but constant and menacing, upon men in power, who are emotional and selfish as well as rational and benevolent beings. Bentham, moreover, was to point out, with insight, the "occupational disease" of philosophy, the vocation mostly of a sedentary kind of men, to wit, intellectualism. Godwin, nevertheless, has it to his credit, for good or ill, that he contributed by his influence, along with Wesley, to divert Britain from the course of revolution as followed in France and towards that of the Reform of 1832. The Parliamentary and Electoral reforms of 1832, a prescient Godwin could have claimed, were permanent; those of the French Revolution were not. The French paid an infinitely greater cost to win, in terms of

bourgeois democracy, no greater prize. Humanism was justified of her children.

READING

Edmund Burke: *Address to the King*, 1777.

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE

C. L. Becker: *The Heavenly City of the Philosophers*, 1932.
*Edmund Burke: *Reflections on the Revolution in France.*
Alexander Hamilton, John Jay and James Madison: *The Federalist.*
James Truslow Adams: *The Living Jefferson*, 1936.
Kingsley Martin: *French Liberal Thought in the Eighteenth Century*, 1929.
*Thomas Paine: *Rights of Man.*
T. V. Smith: *The American Philosophy of Equality*, 1927.
Leslie Stephen: *English Thought in the Eighteenth Century*, 2 vols. 1876.

Chapter XI

The Early Utilitarians: Jeremy Bentham

1

THE END of the eighteenth century found Utilitarianism, if not as a philosophy then as an assumption, in the air in Britain. Rousseau's religion of enthusiasm made small headway, in that damp island, against the increasing and consolidated belief that utility was the proper test of policy. The mental climate was congenial to the belief. The Deists, the Unitarians and the demi-Unitarians, enemies of clericalism, had done their work in weakening the influence of a morality with supernatural sanctions. Sir Isaac Newton, strongly orthodox in religion, had thereby shown how piety could be allied with the most modern insight into an orderly world, rationally comprehensible. The fanaticism of the seventeenth century had been succeeded by respect for common sense. The classic calm of Addison and Pope was not congenial to "enthusiasm." The solid prosperity of the century in Britain, the improvement of conditions in France, led to a sophistication and relaxation of manners.

The "Glorious Revolution," of 1688, had inoculated the English, unlike the lands of benevolent despotism, against any desire for political excesses. The view, across the Channel, of the French Revolution was adequate to deprive them of such appetite as they might have. Wesleyanism confirmed their distaste and gave an alternative emotional outlet. The pro-Revolutionary London Corresponding Society, London Revolutionary Society of 1688 and Society of the Friends of the People—the first a workers' organization; the others patronized by the peerage—lived their brief career and collapsed, not without handing on their torch. The Tories came to power. The son of Chatham, that great Whig, became the Tory "young master." In reaction against Robespierre and Bonaparte came Burke and his practical disciples, the politicians Sidmouth and Castlereagh and Percival (Coleridge's "best and wisest statesman this country has possessed" since the

English Revolution). The Whig party of Fox and Lansdowne and Grey lay in hopeless eclipse. Men had to choose whether to side with Toryism, Church, State and Landlord or to work out some policy of progress uncontaminated by the Jacobins.

Meanwhile technology advanced. Watt and Arkwright took the place of Calvin's God. The effects of their inventions, even when deplored by squire and craftsman and admirer of the yeomanry of Merrie England, worked on to their predestined conclusions—acclaimed by the new men as providentially progressive—first in the British Isles, then in lands less blessed by the marriage of natural wealth and innovating wit. Britain became the workshop of the world—as Professor Clapham shows, not abruptly. There was no *der Tag* of the Industrial Revolution. Beginning well back in the eighteenth century, the factory system arose and made headway against the old guild restrictions, once the protection of the free worker, now the privilege of the "freeman" and liveryman of oligarchic companies. Between 1700 and 1801 the population of Britain grew from about 5,500,000 to 8,892,536; and to 12,000,236, in 1821. The cities grew. Children are thrust by parents, who want wages (from their human investments), not education and "ideas," into factories. An urban proletariat arises. This is the physical, technological and economic background of the New Epoch.

The manufacturers of Britain appreciate that this world is their oyster and that Free Trade is economic truth—and moral truth, too. The mills grind faster. No longer is there the unemployment that enraged the Luddite *saboteurs*, ignorant Luddites; but employment increases, as the Economists had said. The world is Britain's market. She has a mission to other nations: Trade and the Bible. No longer are the mills the poet Blake's "Satanic Mills," at least for the man making dividends. The factory wheels are going ever quicker introducing Jerusalem into a green and pleasant land, no longer rural England. Regrettable gin shops—but still a soberer nation than in the port wine and "Geneva gin" century. Nevertheless a compromise must be made with God, who had given the fatness and the increase.

Mr. Percival went to church; he was not a Jacobin. Paine and Godwin* of course did not go to church. Even Mr. Godwin, however, after hearing from Coleridge, thought better of it—at least, so the old Godwin said (his posthumous papers had rather another story). With Byron we have the mood of the Regency; but with Wordsworth, recovered from his ardours for the French Revolution, we have the

* Godwin, however, had begun as a Unitarian.

prophet of the coming Victorian period. We enter not only a new century but a new age.

In the 1830's, in England, the stage-coach still competed with the train. Travellers by coach were advised to take "a pair of pistol holsters covered with black fur and attached to the coach box" as defensive weapons. There was no harm in letting the landlord of any roadside inn at which one might stay see that one was armed. Not until the days of Sir Robert Peel was a regular police force established in London—"Bobbies" in silk top hats—and then only a small one. Sir Robert, when he assumed the premiership in 1834, took just the same time to return from Rome to London that the Emperor Constantine, fifteen centuries before, had taken to travel in the opposite direction. The London to Birmingham Railway was opened in 1838, following the Stockton and Darlington in 1825; the South Carolina Railroad was operated in 1829.

The "sanitary idea," largely due to the Utilitarians, was yet only just born. In about 1844, the average expectation of life for an infant of the manual working classes, in the great provincial cities, was no more than from twelve to fifteen years. In 1839 Dr. Southwood Smith reported of London:

> While systematic efforts on a large scale have been made to widen the streets, to remove obstructions to the circulation of free currents of air, to extend and perfect the drainage and sewerage, and to prevent the accumulation of putrifying vegetable and animal substances in the places where the wealthier classes reside, nothing whatever has been done to improve the condition of the districts inhabited by the poor.

Even so, in the mansions of the wealthy West-end cesspools "were regarded as equally sacred with the wine cellars." In the other areas,

> several families usually had to share a common privy, and empty it when and where they could . . . this fosters habits of the most abject degeneration and tends to the demoralization of large numbers of human beings, who subsist by means of what they find amid other noxious filth accumulated in neglected streets and bye places.

Homeless children flocking to outhouses to sleep were a common sight. The private-capital Water Companies took in water from a Thames contaminated by sewage. As late as 1853 and 1865, London had grave visitations of cholera. Nevertheless its condition was better than that of Hamburg.

In 1767 a Committee of the House of Commons reported:

That taking the Children born in the Workhouse, or Parish Houses or received of or under Twelve Months old, in the year 1763, and following the same into 1764 and 1765, only seven in a Hundred appear to have survived this short Period.

The reports of the investigators prior to the passage of the Second Factory Act in Britain, of 1819—there was a Health and Morals of Apprentices Act in 1802 and a Society for the Suppression of Vice established in the same year- -give no great ground for congratulation on the improvement over fifty years. As late as 1842 the report of the Royal Commission in Mines contained this statement of an underground mine worker, woman:

I have a belt around my waist and a chain passing between my legs, and I go on my hands and feet. The water comes up to my clog tops, and I have seen it over my thighs. I have drawn till I have the skin off me. The belt and chain is worn when we are in the family way.

Children under five work in the darkness of the mines, alone. These things were the price of Victorian civilization.

The lot of the adult labourer was one hedged by restrictions such that Adam Smith declared that it was harder for a poor man to cross the boundaries of his parish—lest he become chargeable to parish relief elsewhere—than to cross a mountain ridge. "A violation of natural liberty and justice," free-trading Adam Smith called it. For a century before, pregnant women, when the children would have been illegitimate, were hounded from village to village, lest the child become chargeable on the parish. Over in America, Alexander Hamilton put a novel construction on freedom of contract, natural liberty and utility.

Women and children [Hamilton wrote with complacency] are rendered more useful, and the latter more early useful, by manufacturing establishments, than they would otherwise be. Of the number of persons employed in the cotton manufactories of Great Britain, it is computed that four-sevenths, nearly, are women and children; of whom the greatest proportion are children, many of them of a tender age.

In 1816 only one Londoner in four could read. The poetical tract-writer, Hannah More, thought that the poor should be educated, although not enough to cause them to read the worthless works of Thomas Paine. Dr. Parr, D.D., agreed; but held that we must recall how "the Deity Himself had fixed a great gulph between them and the poor." Dr. Parr probably did not refer to that described in Holy Writ between the Rich Man in Hell (in the English Bible considerately still

Latinized as "Dives") and Lazarus in Heaven. Beggars abounded; drunkenness was rampant. There was a public house or saloon to every hundred inhabitants in London, in which city Patrick Colquhoun states, probably with exaggeration, that one woman in every six was living, directly or indirectly, on immoral earnings.

The legislators, alarmed by the excesses of the wretched population they regulated, had made with the passage of the centuries penalties more, not less, severe. Ignorant physicians, unable to diagnose the disease, they determined to suppress the symptoms. In May, 1833, a boy of nine, convicted of "breaking and entering" a dwelling house and stealing two pennyworth of goods, was by Mr. Justice Bosanquet sentenced to death. The judge had no choice. Again, although in practical abeyance, in law it was a capital offence to steal any material goods of over the value of five shillings. At the close of the eighteenth century in England there were two hundred capital offences. Gibbetting continued until 1832. In 1810, when a bill was laid before the House to abolish the capital penalty for stealing goods to the value of five shillings, or slightly over a dollar, not only the Chief Justice but the Archbishop of Canterbury and six bishops voted against it. Meanwhile the complexity of the law brought in money to the lawyers. Prisoners merely sentenced to deportation were sent to the penal settlements in plague-ridden hulks, but were aided on their way by libraries containing the works of Archdeacon Paley entitled *Moral and Political Philosophy*. Charles Dickens' *Household Words* was rejected because "the chaplain objects to it."

Attempts to ameliorate the law were almost as unpopular as attempts to improve education. The mobs which joined in the "No Popery" riots of Lord George Gordon (repeated by bigots in Edinburgh on a small scale within the last few years) and in the anti-Jacobin riots which sacked Dr. Priestley's Birmingham house, had as their natural descendants the mobs which pelted, in 1854, the Home Office messenger who carried from Palmerston a reprieve from hanging of a man of eighty-four—the lynch mob had been deprived of its show, the public execution. However, the condemned prisoner, in a world marked by the natural depravity of Cain's children, had his compensations. In 1840 the Rev. Mr. Carter, addressing a prisoner due for hanging, at Newgate, said:

> To you, my dear young friend and fellow sinner, it has now happened that for the last time you are here treading the courts of God's house of prayer. Before to-morrow's sun shall have set, your eyes will have closed on this world. But pray remember, my dear young friend, that, should you leave it

penitently (as I hope and believe you will) a choir of 10,000 angels will welcome you to the heavenly abode where you will then become a trophy of sovereign grace, and add yet one more jewel to the diadem of mercy.

It is impossible to understand the ferocity of Paine and even Bentham —or Marx—in their criticism of the customs of their times, except one first comprehends what was the mental attitude, normally engendered by this environment. Mr. Carter meant no harm—but it seems at least probable that Mr. Carter would not have voted, against his Archbishop, for abolishing the death penalty for children who stole five shillings.

There is a passage in a recent book of Professor W. Y. Elliott's which describes, briskly, the change which yet had taken place between the accession and the death of George III, seventeen years before the accession of Victoria.

> The old, old, old King had begun his reign in an Empire which passed loyal Addresses to the Throne in New York and Massachusetts, an Empire which had never seen a steam engine and scarcely a metalled road, before the great Enclosure Acts, before the Highway Acts. His accession was only fifteen years after the march of the Highland swordsmen to Derby, through an England of 7 million souls, when Lancashire was still the picturesque home of lost causes. This King died in 1820, when already twenty years had passed since the foundation of Tennant's Chemical Works and the fortunes of Margot Asquith.

The figure however who best symbolizes in his death the passing of the able, sceptical, morally latitudinarian, pre-industrial, aristocratic, conservative eighteenth century, is the Iron Duke, the Duke of Wellington. That funeral has been memorably described by Mr. Guedalla. The thud of the guns. The ranks at attention. "Duke of Wellington . . . Prince of Waterloo . . . Duke of Ciudad Rodrigo . . . Grandee of the First Class in Spain . . . Marshal of Russia . . . Knight of the Garter . . . Knight of the Sword of Sweden . . . of the Annunciado of Sardinia . . . Lord High Constable of England . . . Warden of the Cinque Ports." So the pomp passed.

> Bury the Great Duke
> with an empire's lamentation,
> Let us bury the Great Duke
> to the noise of the mourning of a mighty nation.

Till 1852, till within sight of Cecil Rhodes and Joseph Chamberlain, "Radical Chamberlain," he, the Great Duke, that shadow of Waterloo, the old man whose conversation shocked good Sir Robert Peel, had

lasted on. The international age was over; the little family of crowned heads who made the politics of their peoples was being reduced; the curtain had fallen at Vienna on the agelong Roman Empire. The age of nationalism comes in; of industry and commerce, evangelicalism and prosperity; strike and revolution; war and dictatorship. The Victorian Age of Britain. The Gilded Era of America. And out beyond to Versailles. And beyond . . . Danton and the Corsican look forward. The Duke looks back. On Napoleon, his comment was, "the man was not even a gentleman." The Duke belonged to that epoch of which Talleyrand had said that no one who had not lived then could imagine how pleasant life could be—for the fortunate classes.

The philosophy which rendered these generations, at the turn of the century and into its middle, articulate to themselves was, in part, that of Coleridge and Southey—and John Wesley and the evangelist, Simeon. More, perhaps, than any other this conservative, evangelic pietism was representative of the thought of the age—if it did not lead it, much less change it. Later it was to acquire prophetic vision and come to vigorous life guided by the sage of Chelsea, Thomas Carlyle. In most respects antipodal, but not without unexpected agreements, were the Radicals *du sang pur*, lineal descendants of Paine, from William Cobbett (1762–1835), in his second phase, to the more intellectual and more shocking Bradlaugh (1833–1891). Forced by political fortune to share with these Radicals a couch but with garment unsoiled by the contact, were the Whigs and their brisk young Liberal allies, men to whom all things had been made clear and who remained undismayed by the revelation, such as Macaulay, who baldly maintained that "law was made for property alone." Whereas Coleridge at least attempted a philosophy, these men, well content with their own piecemeal observations and post-prandial complacencies, can scarcely be said to have felt the need for one. Fourth, and sharply distinct, are the "Philosophic Radicals," the Utilitarians. If not the most representative, this school (which retained the radicalism while rejecting the "natural rights" prejudices of the admirers of the French Revolution) was the most intellectually eminent. Moreover it moved in loose alliance with the rising school of the Economists.

The new industrial entrepreneurs required a philosophy to justify themselves—an economic philosophy. The holder of the Glasgow chair of Moral Philosophy, Adam Smith, with a contribution here and there from his French friends, came to their rescue. The hand of Providence points to the Division of Labour as the route of human advance to a

well-pleasing condition—the Division of Labour between nations even—Free Trade: Britain to make the goods; other rustic peoples to buy them.

2

The remoter origins of the Utilitarian school we have already had occasion to indicate.* The school had four cardinal notes. The first was *utility*. If, however, one asked: Utility for what? the reply was, secondly, pleasure or *happiness*. Whose happiness? The third point: *the greatest number*. Why, however, should I consult the happiness of others? The pill, then, of egoism was coated with an instinct, *benevolence*, exercising a major influence in every breast.

Utility, first, was a concept familiar, as a moral key, to Dr. Samuel Johnson and to Archdeacon Paley, from whom for a century Anglican clerics drew moral wisdom—Paley, who jocularly remarked, apropos of the XXXIX Articles, that he "could not afford to keep a conscience." After Bentham's earlier publications utility was readily taken up by Godwin. It is central to the moral philosophy of David Hume.

Secondly, the Pleasure or Happiness principle—the achievement of an enduring balance of pleasure over pain—is the final legacy of Hobbes to his countrymen. The spiritual bones of the philosopher had long wandered in exile, especially among the congenial countrymen of La Rochefoucauld. Mandeville, of *The Fable of the Bees*, had merely shocked the eighteenth-century Englishman as Hobbes had shocked even the England of the Restoration. Lord Rochester had no need for cold systems and Lord Clarendon had no use for this one. In France the reception of Hobbes had been different: the influence on the Encyclopaedists, Helvetius and Condillac, was great. Through Helvetius and Bentham, the Hobbesian ethic, reclothed and sobered, but still the same, logical, militant, returned in triumph. As touching the charge of egoism it is interesting to note a remark—as significant of the temper of the age—of Hobbes's antithesis, the idealist philosopher, George Berkeley (1685–1753), Bishop of Cloyne. "Self-love being a principle of all others the most universal, and the most deeply engraved on our hearts, it is natural for us to regard things as they are fitted to augment or impair our own happiness; and accordingly we denominate them good or evil." Paley declared that, "virtue evidently consists in educing from the materials which the Creator has placed under our guidance the greatest sum of human happiness." Hobbes, however, unlike the Bishop of Cloyne and Archdeacon Paley, drew

* *Cf.* pp. 245, 272.

inconvenient conclusions. The solemn Utilitarians felt the need to socialize, baptize with the faith of progress, this heathen.

Thirdly, the sacred phrase, "the Greatest Happiness of the Greatest Number," Bentham, founder of the formal Utilitarian school, tells us he derived from Dr. Priestley. Priestley had, however, been anticipated by an academic exponent of the (later on, bitterly opposed) doctrine of "the moral sense," Francis Hutcheson (died 1747), Professor of Philosophy in Glasgow. The moral evil, he had said, of an action "is as the Degree of Misery, and the Number of Sufferers; so that, that Action is best, which accomplishes the Greatest Happiness of the Greatest Number." How precisely one was to count the greatest number—in what society in space and through how many generations in time—the Utilitarians, as we shall see, never answered. It was their great weakness.

Lastly, the principle of Benevolence will be found affirmed in the *Sermons* of the great and admirable Bishop Joseph Butler (1692–1752), son of a dissenting shopkeeper in a nation of shopkeepers, Rector of Stanhope, Bishop Palatine of Durham. Having lived the life of a conscientious parish priest, until promoted on the instigation of Queen Caroline—the queen to whom George II was so much attached that he proclaimed that after her death he would only have mistresses —and having written his famous *Analogy*, concluding with Sir Isaac Newton "a happy alliance between faith and philosophy," he died in his sixtieth year, and in the middle of the eighteenth century, amid the waters of Bath. "Pius, simplex, candidus, liberalis . . . mortui haud facile evanescet memoria," they truly wrote on his gravestone, "reverendi in Christo patris."* This good man is one of the ablest critics of Hobbes, and by implication of the Utilitarians; and, while providing these philosophers indirectly—they may never have read him—with one of their principles yet puts posers that, to the end of the days of the school's vogue, its disciples never answer, although poor John Stuart Mill tries his best.

> There is [says Butler] a natural principle of *benevolence* in man. . . . If, by a *sense* of *interest*, is meant a speculative conviction or belief that such and such indulgence would occasion them greater uneasiness, upon the whole, than satisfaction, it is contrary to present experience to say that this sense of interest is sufficient to restrain them from thus indulging themselves. And if, by a *sense* of *interest*, is meant a practical regard to what is, upon the whole, our happiness, this is not only coincident with the principle of virtue, or moral

* "Pious, simple, frank, liberal . . . the memory of this reverend father in Christ, although he is dead, will scarcely pass away."

rectitude, but is a part of the idea itself. And it is evident this reasonable self-love wants to be improved, as really as any principle in our nature. . . . So greatly are profligate men mistaken when they affirm they are wholly governed by interestedness and self-love; and so little cause is there for moralists to disclaim this principle. . . . We plainly consider compassion as itself an original, distinct, particular affection in human nature.

Maintaining the view of "plain common sense," without overgreat refinements, Butler argues that the varied impulses of man are not so simple as all to be capable of reduction to one. Hitting at Hobbes, he continues:

Could anyone be thoroughly satisfied that what is commonly called benevolence or good will was really the affection meant [by love of power], but only by being made to understand that this learned person had a general hypothesis, to which the appearance of good will could not otherwise be reconciled? . . . These are the absurdities which even men of capacity run into when they have occasion to belie their nature, and will perversely disclaim that image of God which was originally stamped upon it, the traces of which, however faint, are plainly discernible upon the mind of man.

Despite Berkeley and Hobbes and Helvetius, is "my interest" or "my pleasure" enough to explain moral obligation? Or shall we accept with Butler a plurality of "values" or "ends" to which (assessed by "conscience" or intuition) man is drawn? Before endeavouring to answer this question of political philosophy from the writings of the received Utilitarians, it is necessary to digress briefly in order to look at the work of their very nursing father, the Scottish philosopher-historian, David Hume. The famous sceptic is wholly a figure of the eighteenth century, an adornment of the glorious Enlightenment, meriting to be treated along with Jefferson and Franklin, D'Alembert and Diderot, and the great Frederick. Nevertheless his principles form a link with the nineteenth century perhaps even more—the fashions of thought being quicker in Europe—than did those of his junior, Thomas Jefferson, spiritual son of Locke.

3

David Hume (1711–1776) is the philosophic initiator, if not the popular founder, of Utilitarianism as a system. One of the most eminent philosophers that has adorned human civilization, and a judicious historian, his dull essay on a "Perfect Commonwealth" would have provided a theme to demonstrate that men of intellectual genius are inept as men of affairs. However, actual office in the British

Embassy at Paris showed him to be *capax imperii*, a shrewd and competent Scot (although not above lamenting the fact that he did not possess that apparent passport to success, "a true genuine natural impudence").

A bachelor, who had decided that a wife was "not indispensable," sustained by a trivial annuity, he produced at the age of twenty-five that *Treatise of Human Nature* which established his position among the immortals, achieved no significant sale as a book, and earned from the insolent conceit characteristic of anonymous young reviewers the comment that it was immature. His fame, however, spread, especially in France, and during his sojourn in Paris he was received by the whole *beau monde* and especially by the Dauphin. The last, with Gallic enthusiasm for intelligence, caused his sons, the future Louis XVI, Louis XVIII and Charles X, to recite verses in honour of this elder contemporary of Benjamin Franklin. It was not irrelevantly that Hume protested against colleges and the academic monopoly of the humanities, thanks to which "every part of what we call *belles lettres* became totally barbarous, being cultivated by men without any taste for life or manners." Indeed singularly few great men of intelligence have been well-read after adolescence.

Like the author of *The Decline and Fall*, Edward Gibbon, and equally typically of his era, Hume believed that bishops and barbarians were the prime enemies of humane culture. This otherwise great man suffers from the deplorable fashion of habitually referring to priests as bigots. He even goes further, and asserts that they have a vested, pecuniary interest that men should not inquire closely what precise and indispensable social function the clergy perform: they have an interest in the docile mind. Hume does not reflect that these often devoted men, did they but turn their energies to the cure of souls and become psycho-therapists and professional psychologists, would perform an admirable function in society.

One of Hume's chief claims to fame, as a political philosopher, is his flat assertion, in his *Essays*, that government rests, not on some Original Contract and the obligation *in vacuo* "to keep one's word," but on interest, on habit and on opinion—including even tyrannous government, as of a Henry VIII. Nevertheless he writes that liberty of the press "is attended with so few inconveniences, that it may be claimed as the common right of mankind, and ought to be indulged almost in every government except the ecclesiastical, to which, indeed, it would be fatal." In his defence it is perhaps worth observation that our current vital priesthoods, those of the Holy Trinity [Marx, Engels,

Lenin] of Moscow and of the Mahomets of Potsdam and Rome, do in fact place that great invention of the press under the control of their party bosses and "ward heelers," recognizing that orthodox religion is necessarily totalitarian in culture.

It is told that Hume, a mountain of a man, fell into a bog outside Edinburgh. Sinking like Peter, the philosopher begged a passing countrywoman to aid him. "My good woman, does not your religion teach you to do good, even to your enemies?" Representative of respectable opinion, suspicious of eminent deviators from the narrow road of Calvin, she replied: "That may be; but ye shallna get out of that till ye become a Christian yersell: and repeat the Lord's Prayer and the Belief"—by her Scottish simplicity and pious ignorance putting to shame alike the pride of philosophy and the lax flattery of the Most Christian King and his Court.

Hume, using Archbishop Tillotson—Tillotson famous as the writer on the Popish "Real Presence"—as a supporting peg, wrote his essay on *Miracles*, elegantly to show that only thanks to the happy interposition of Providence could man have been brought to believe so great absurdities. He demonstrated that the orthodox argument for the immortality of the soul was identical with "the hideous hypothesis of the famous atheist Spinoza." He wrote his essay *On Suicide.* "*Agimus Deo gratias, quod nemo in vita teneri potest,*" he quotes from Seneca.* And he died, with great fortitude and exemplary good humour, at the age of sixty-five, firmly disbelieving in individual immortality. With Hume the ghostly cloud of Predestination to Damnation that had overshadowed and haunted Cowper and the great soul of Johnson, and was even to fascinate Byron, began to lift over Northern Europe. David Hume, illumined by the dry daylight of his philosophy, had seen through all that.

It is intelligible that the attitude of this radical sceptic should have been intolerable, a maddening irritant, to a noble fanatic, a dogmatic atheist, of the cast of Lenin. Hume becomes posthumously of prime importance in political philosophy as a leader of that empiric, anti-dogmatic school which Lenin (necessarily, from his own point of view) selected for attack in his *Materialism and Empirio-Criticism.* To this issue we shall revert later.† Humane scepticism and dogmatic materialism cannot dwell together—or Hume's empiricism and the Hegelian theory of causes basic to the philosophy of Marx.

* "We give thanks to God that no one can be held in life (against his will)."
† *Cf.* p. 618.

Hume's philosophy, however, is something very other than the complacent rationalism of the Augustan Age of eighteenth-century letters. That type of intellectualism (although dominant, for example, in Godwin) commits suicide when tempted into rigorous logic by Hume and Kant. It is not the case that Hume is a sceptic *either* of reason as an instrument of inquiry *or* of the existence of causal laws. But, like Locke, he is a sceptic of the a priori way in which this instrument had been used, of the current interpretation of causation and of vasty intellectual constructions. He is the great empiric. Further, the stress with Hume is upon habit, interest and, oddly enough, emotion. Hume bridges the gulf in anthropology between Montesquieu and Buckle and, like most men with a respect for sociological fact, acquires a reputation for conservatism. "Obedience," he writes, "is a new duty which must be invented to support that of justice"—itself the basis of peace and order. To inculcate this obedience, to maintain a tolerably impartial order, is to the interest of rulers. "Habit soon consolidates what other principles of human nature had imperfectly founded." Actually Hume lays a very adequate stress on liberty; but he does not scruple to recognize its sociological inseparability from licentiousness and crime.

Hume perceives the tempting, if illusory, connection, which reappears from Pascal to Newman, between scepticism and respect for authority. He quotes, as Godwin might have quoted, with approval the apothegm on non-intervention of a certain Pope: "Let us divert ourselves, my friends; the world governs itself." In the eyes of a political scientist that maxim is precisely an entire half of the whole truth. However, Hume's Scottish sanity rescues his Scottish metaphysics and substitutes *the utility of interest*—not without a backward look upon the aesthetic judgement of values—for the refined scepticism of Catholic Modernism. Hobbes, throughout the eighteenth century, is a scarecrow for boys to beat the dust out of; but the robust cynicism of the old man reappears in Hume's phrases.

> Political writers have established it as a maxim, that, in contriving any system of government, and fixing the several checks and controls of the constitution, every man ought to be supposed a *knave*, and to have no other end, in all his actions, than private interest.

It is useful, because stable, so to base government as to allow for this principle. Hume (even in this last passage) is a Utilitarian in his positive philosophy, although he asks, as Bentham never would, "Why Utility pleases?"*

* *Cf.* pp. 369, 383.

Lastly, the imperturbable Hume is the philosopher of passion, so unlike in all else yet, in this, in touch with Rousseau, the philosopher of sentimentality. "Reason is and ought only to be the slave of the passions, and can never pretend to any other office than to serve and obey them." By this incendiary paradox Hume merely states the truth that the imagination of our desires determines our ends and that the speculative reason is limited to calculating means. Indeed, in his treatment of reason, that is, in the nominalism of his theory of general ideas, the basis of his limitation of rationalism, it may be asserted that Hume is, not only misusing good words, but merely wrong and in error. He is nearer the mark in his doctrine of the passions which are, for Hume, feelings capable of being placed in orderly and systematic perspective, in terms of ultimate values aesthetically appreciated in a fashion reminiscent of Shaftesbury. This direct unarguable judgement on morals supplies for Hume that datum from which reason must syllogize which Revelation provides for the Catholic Schoolman. Hume is no Rousseauite. He is a consistent enemy of "enthusiasm." He is the forerunner of the Utilitarians but, in terms of his theory of "ultimates," far wiser than any of Bentham's school.

It is said, Hume writes, that

> All morality is founded on the pain and pleasure which arises from the prospect of any loss or advantage that may result from our own characters or those of others. . . . [However], it is only when a character is considered in general, without reference to our particular interest, that it demonstrates such a feeling or sentiment as denominates it morally good or evil. It is true, these sentiments from interests or morals are apt to be confounded, and naturally run into one another. But this hinders not but that the sentiments are in themselves distinct, and a man of temper and judgement may preserve himself from these illusions. . . .
>
> To be endowed with a benevolent disposition and to love others, will almost infallibly procure love and esteem, which is the chief circumstance in life, and facilitates every enterprise and undertaking, besides the satisfaction which immediately results from it.

One further comment. Scepticism is frequently regarded as the peculiar manifestation of the detached philosophic temperament. Metaphysics and epistemology—how we know that we know what we know—are for Hume, as for Hobbes, only of interest as preparatory to the study of morals and politics, "the architectonic science." Like Plato, like Aristotle, Hume refuses to be a little blown-up schoolmaster, separating theory from practice. With this prince of philosophy there is no ivory tower, no academic chair, no contempt for the vulgarity of politics in contrast to pure thought. Hume in effect de-

preciates reason and the exact science of mathematics—his commentator, Mr. Lindsay, thinks Hume depreciates mistakenly—while crying up the social sciences. Like Machiavelli, Hobbes and Spinoza, Hume believes, as the title of one of his essays shows, "that politics may be reduced to a science." To this subject also we shall revert.* Enough to mention here that, like all the great writers on this subject, Hume seeks to found this science upon a constructive study of a "human nature" presumed psychologically observable and stable.

4

JEREMY BENTHAM (1748–1832), son of a lawyer, great-grandson of a pawnbroker, was the recognized founder of the Utilitarian School or (as it was, in its early days, somewhat misleadingly called) the school of Philosophical Radicals.

In manner and style of life Bentham, whether living like a recluse in Queen's Square, Westminster, or perambulating his garden at Ford Abbey, Somerset, face like Benjamin Franklin, straw hat on head, amid his cats, was certainly no stage radical. His most dangerous recreations were games of battledore and shuttlecock. At intervals of twenty years he indicated an inclination to propose to a lady who as regularly rejected him. Nevertheless he was, as he said, in a state of "perpetual and unruffled gaiety."

It is true that he showed—as did several of the Utilitarians—signs of being an infant prodigy. He wrote Latin at the tender age of five and three-quarters; and entered Queen's College, Oxford, at twelve, in which place of learning he profited no more than did Hobbes and Gibbon. His early literary exercises seem to have had no effect upon his tendency to write in a style progressively heavier as the years went by—a tendency shaped by his quest of accuracy. Unlike writers on politics today, he had the scientific courage to prefer the cultivation of precision even to *belles-lettres*, journalism and the distillation of literary aphrodisiacs. It was an insolence for Hazlitt, a man of microscopic intellectual proportions compared with Bentham, to adjudge that Bentham's works, translated into French, ought first to be translated into (Hazlitt's) English. There was, however (as we shall see later), perhaps point in Hazlitt's declaration that to the devil was left all the best tunes—"all the taste, sentiment and fancy of the thing to Mr. Burke's *Reflections on the French Revolution*."

Bentham spent his last years in placid and almost monastic calm, presiding over his teapot, called "Dick," or prescribing laws for

* *Cf.* p. 759.

Hindustan "as readily as for his own parish." Major Parry told Byron, the poet, a story—a source of great merriment in Byron's rakish circles—of how he, Parry, visited the philosopher for breakfast (at 3 P.M.) in order to satisfy his interest on the subject of war supplies for the Greek War of Independence. Before breakfast, the morning walk.

> Very much to my surprise, we had scarcely got into the Park, when he let go my arm, and set off trotting like a Highland messenger. The Park was crowded, and the people one and all seemed to stare at the old man; but, heedless of all this, he trotted on, his white locks floating in the wind, as if he were not seen by a single human being. As soon as I could recover from my surprise, I asked the young man, "Is Mr. Bentham flighty?" pointing to my head. "Oh no, it's his way," was the hurried answer; "he thinks it good for his health. But I must run after him;" and off set the youth in chase of the philosopher.
>
> Fortunately the chase did not continue long. Mr. Bentham hove to abreast of Carlisle's shop, and stood for a little time to admire the books and portraits hanging in the window. At length one of these arrested his attention more particularly. "Ah, ah," said he in a hurried indistinct tone, "there it is, there it is!" pointing to a portrait which I afterwards found was that of the illustrious Jeremy himself.

Normally, however, Bentham did not encourage promiscuous visitors and had little esteem for literary celebrities. Madame de Staël he declined to see and dismissed her as "a trumpery magpie."

Bentham gathered round him a band of disciples, the honest Swiss pastor, Dumont, abused as "a lazy fellow," the dour James Mill, Sir Samuel Romilly, the law reformer, John Austin, the jurisprudent, Bowring, even Brougham—even Sydney Smith. He offered his advice, through the Abbé Morellet, to Revolutionary France (in his sober *Political Tactics);* and, in 1792, was acclaimed by her National Assembly as a "citizen." He offered it to the United States, in the person of President Madison; and actually influenced, through Edward Livingston, the legal system of Louisiana. He offered it to the Spaniards; and George Borrow later found Spaniards treasuring the works of "the great Baintham" and comparing him to Plato and even to Lope de Vega. In 1822, he was asked by the Portuguese Cortes to give advice to Portugal. Among his works *Leading Principles of a Constitutional Code for Any State* jostles *On the Liberty of the Press, to the Spanish People, by Jeremy Bentham.*

He spent his time, in his own phrase "codefying like a dragon"—as his diplomatic visitor, Talleyrand, said: "pillé de tout le monde . . .

toujours riche." He died, at the ripe age of eighty-four, upon the breast of his faithful friend and editor, Bowring, having written nine large volumes and left behind him 148 boxes of manuscript, including (1830–1831) "a history of the war between Jeremy Bentham and George III." (The order is typical.) His mummified body, stuffing the clothing in which he walked and talked, can still be seen, a tutelary figure, in the library of University College, London.

Bentham, the *practical reformer*, had his share in effecting the mitigation of the Criminal Laws—his theory of punishment was singularly similar to that of Hobbes—and the abolition of Colonial Transportation; the repeal of the Usury Laws and of the Catholic Disability Acts; the systematization of the Poor Laws; and the Reform of the Parliamentary Representative system. He was the prophet of Free Trade, Women's Suffrage, the Secret Ballot, Sanitary Regulations, National Education and of International Peace through organization, including a World Court. Above all, he was an advocate of Publicity in all affairs called public. It is an impressive list.

Like many elderly men of placid lives, his tongue did not lack edge. It is reasonable to suppose that his formidable early education had produced in him the misproportions and the sensitiveness of the ungainly intellectual. In his early days he was content to criticize, for example, Blackstone whom, as a student of fifteen, he heard lecture at Oxford, immediately detecting Blackstone's "fallacy respecting natural rights." The patronage, however, later, of noble lords, such as "Malagrida" Shelbourne, Marquess of Lansdowne, both exalted and humiliated him—the first, because they listened to his theories; and the second, because they did not act on his suggestions. Bentham must be listed among the inferior-feeling people, although his is not a virulent case. The younger Pitt, we are told, was as frightened of him as he was frightened by the presence of the younger Pitt. Two incidents, however, revealed to him the array of what he called "the Sinister Interests," and made of Bentham a radical.

"I was," he writes, "a great reformist, but never suspected the 'people in power' were against reform. I supposed they only wanted to know what was good in order to be able to embrace it." The first shock came from a chance remark of Wedderburn, Lord Loughborough, and later Lord Chancellor. Wedderburn, consulted on Bentham's pet theory of "utility," had declared it "dangerous." How, argued Bentham, could *utility* be dangerous?—"The greatest happiness of the greatest number"—How? There could be only one reply: a Sinister Interest. . . .

Further, Bentham confronted, from official dilatoriness, continual disappointments in his scheme for prison reform, his "Panopticon" scheme. Under this scheme the convicts were to busy themselves in a building—"a mill to grind knaves honest"—where they could be employed in useful work under the all-seeing, panoptic eye of an overseer, which useful work could be sold, the whole concern being farmed out, without expense to the state, to an undertaker, *e.g.*, Mr. Bentham. The official commission, at long last, preferred to build Millbank Penitentiary on more orthodox lines. Moreover, Lord Shelbourne, with more wit than tact, suggested that the author of certain articles directed against this scheme was no other than George III. As a consequence that solid monarch became the object of Bentham's especial wariness and "the monarchy and its creatures" were detected as peculiar sources of corruption. The chief ramparts of injustice, however, were "the Church" and "the Law."

"The Church," Jeremy Bentham pointed out, did but mean "the churchmen." What then did the churchmen, and Church-of-England-ism, stand for? The Anglican churchmen were those who had perjured themselves by swearing to the Thirty-nine Articles—thirty-nine chains to bind intelligence and to hoist up insincerity. These were members of an immoral organization for promoting insincerity. Only those who kissed their chains could expect preferment.

> To a man thus circumstanced [it is to the Bishops in the House of Lords that Jeremy Bentham is referring] to talk reason would have something ungenerous in it and indecorous: it would be as if a man should set about talking indecently to his daughter or his wife. In vain would they answer, what has been so often answered, that neither Jesus nor his Apostles ever meant what they said—that everything is to be explained and explained away.

Bentham continues with an allegory:

> In virtue and knowledge—in every feature of felicity, the empire of Montezuma outshines, as everybody knows, all the surrounding states, even the commonwealth of Tlascala not excepted.
>
> Where (said an enquirer once, to the high priest of the temple of Vitzlipultzli), where is it that we are to look for the true cause of so glorious a preeminence? "Look for it!" answered the holy pontiff—"where should thou look for it, blind sceptic, but in the copiousness of the streams in which the sweet and precious blood of innocents flows daily down the altars of the great god."
>
> "Yes," answered in full convocation and full chorus the archbishops, bishops, deans, canons, and prebends of the religion of Vitzlipultzli: "Yes," answered in semi-chorus the vice-chancellor, with all the doctors, both the

proctors and masters regent and non-regent of the as yet uncatholicized university of Mexico:—"Yes, in the copiousness of the streams in which the sweet and precious blood of innocents flows daily down the altars of the great god."

Bentham attacked "Church-of-Englandism" for its sinecure offices, its wealthy bishops and starved curates, above all for its obstruction of the work of men like the Quaker Lancaster for national education. It was, he asserted, not the cause of the enlightenment and progress of the country: it was the champion of a self-interested and hypocritical conventionality that strangled the country's young vitality. Old vampire bats in lawn sleeves. There is a "class of persons who habitually exalt the past for the express purpose of depressing and discouraging the present generation."

I am a priest (says a fifth), who having proved the pope to be anti-christ to the satisfaction of all orthodox divines whose piety prays for the cure of souls, or whose health has need of exoneration from the burthen of residence, and having read, in my edition of the Gospel, that the apostles lived in palaces, which innovation and anarchy would cut down to parsonage houses; though grown hoarse by screaming out, "No reading!" "No writing!" "No Lancaster!" and "No popery!"—for fear of coming change, am here to add what remains of my voice to the full chorus of "No Anarchy!" "No Innovation!"

Evil although the eighteenth-century Church in England was, it is doubtful whether, even when it did little or nothing to support slavery emancipation or used Bible texts to support the enslavement of the negro sons of Ham, it was quite as reactionary as Bentham asserted. A Church is from its nature committed to support the recognized *mores* —whether intolerance of witches (on the basis of the Old Testament) in the sixteenth century or tolerance of slavery (on the basis of St. Paul) in the eighteenth century or opposition to property law reform today. Bentham found a more justifiable object of attack in the Lawyers.

The corruption of the Law, in eighteenth-century Britain, was greater than the corruption of the Church. A traditional and highly complicated procedure (much of which survives in the United States, especially Massachusetts) served to enrich the lawyers with fees, while the multitude of sinecure offices, for which the litigants had ultimately to pay, were consolation prizes for their friends. In the words of Sir Samuel Romilly: "The state of the court of Chancery is such, that it is the disgrace of a civilized society." In 1798 the Keeper of His Majesty's Hanaper-in-chancery, the Earl of Northington,

received for this important function £1,811. In 1808, he received £2,070.

Why [writes Bentham, in his pamphlet *Truth v. Ashhurst*] is it that, in a court called a court of equity, they keep a man the whole of his life in hot water, while they are stripping him of his fortune? . . . "We will deny justice"—says King John—"we will sell justice to no man." This was the wicked King John. How does the good King George? He denies it to ninety-nine men out of a hundred, and sells it to the hundredth. . . . Under English law, not to speak of other systems, the sort of commodity called *justice*, is not only sold, but, being like gunpowder and spirits made of different degrees of strength, is sold at different prices, suited to the pockets of so many different classes of customers.

Despite Bentham, in England to this day one still buys the bar. A successful counsel makes £40,000 a year, and £1,200 on a two-weeks case. In America it is often not the bar that one buys. Even in Soviet Russia, competing Trust lawyers make fees considerable, if not astronomical—but, be it added, without burden on the private litigant.

To the attack on pecuniary abuses Bentham added an attack on the abuses of legal fictions, which conspired to the same end of the delay and denial of justice.

When an action is brought against a man, how do you think they contrive to give him notice to defend himself? Sometimes he is told that he is in jail; sometimes that he is lurking up and down the country, in company with a vagabond of the name of Doe; though all the while he is sitting quietly by his own fireside: and this my Lord Justice sets his hand to. At other times they write to a man who lives in Cumberland or Cornwall, and tell him that if he does not appear in Westminister Hall on a certain day he forfeits one hundred pounds. When he comes, so far from having anything to say to him, they won't hear him: for all they want him for, is to grease their fingers.

It must be recalled that, at the period when Bentham was writing (and talking, not entirely jocosely, about the possibilities of the hangman's knife in his bowels), in 1801, a boy of twelve was hanged for stealing a spoon; while in 1786 one Phoebe Harris was burned alive for coining. Between 1810 and 1830 the consumption of spirits doubled. The Church encouraged education "to check the growth of popery" but, as Hannah More observed, education should not go so far as to enable the common folk to read Tom Paine. In 1819 a certain Carlile was sent to prison for three years and fined £1,500 for printing Paine's works.

The Early Utilitarians: Jeremy Bentham

The work of the early Utilitarians was especially a practical work. The activities of Bentham, Romilly and their circle were memorable as a successful achievement in that reform of the law, and above all of the procedure of the courts, which was even more required in their day than prison reform is required today. They began the work, which still has to be completed, of making justice accessible to the purses of all. The very word "codification," as also "international law," was of Bentham's invention.

5

The Utilitarians, however, as their name implies, were not mere experimental tinkerers and political artisans. They had an architectural idea of society, and achieved coherent notions through a philosophy, as well as being grounded on study of fact. The word "Utilitarian," used by John Stuart Mill for the society he founded in 1822, had been used by Bentham in 1781 and was proposed by him, with typical lack of smart advertisers' sense, as a substitute for "Benthamite," as a name for the school.

Bentham's *philosophy of society* was individualistic and, on the economic side, *laissez-faire*. "*Laissons nous faire*," or "be quiet," were terms, and theory, which he had taken over from Adam Smith. Taxes, for example, should not be used to compel men to labour, when they preferred to enjoy; or to labour for others. This would be unjust and adverse to human initiative. There is, indeed, Bentham maintained, a constant social pressure against initiative. "Common-place men have a common interest, which they understand but too well [could Bentham logically allow that anyone understood his interest too well? or was it only—one recalls Socrates' argument—an 'enlightened interest' that a man could not understand too well], it is that all should be common-place like themselves."

Laissez-faire, however, was not an absolute principle. It had to be tested and retested in its applications, from generation to generation and place to place, by the sovereign touchstone of "utility." It might be appropriate in Britain; inappropriate in Russia. One could only say that, the more opulent the community, the more could be left to private and voluntary enterprise. Of economic institutions, such as capitalism, and political institutions, such as the "matchless British constitution," he asks one question only: "What is the use of them?"

For Burke, with his defence of the unreformed House of Commons, Bentham has an unmeasured contempt. He is "the Rhetorician." "Erasmus wrote an eulogium on folly: but Erasmus was in jest:

Edmund Burke wrote an eulogium—he wrote this eulogium on peculation—and Edmund Burke was serious." He was, when he spoke of the French Revolution, "a madman . . . an incendiary, who contributed so much more than any other to light up the flame of that war." Bentham's *Book of Fallacies* (1810-1824) is a painfully painstaking attempt to oppose the principle of Utility to the fallacious appeals to, *e.g.*, Authority—from which fallacy the United States Congress suffered less than most—to Antiquity—"the virtue of barbarian ancestors"—and to Procrastination—"the hydrophobia of innovation."

Bentham, as leader of the Philosophical Radicals (and especially after the Wedderburn incident) insisted that Authority was usually but a cloak for the above-mentioned "sinister interests." Law must be obeyed—but it must be tested for signs of the fraudulent machinations of interested persons.

> In this, as in every country, the government has been as favourable to the interests of the ruling few, and thence as unfavourable to the general interests of the subject many—or, in a word, as *bad*—as the subjects—many have endured to see it—have persuaded themselves to suffer it to be. No abuse has, except under a sense of necessity, been parted with—*no remedy, except under the like pressure, applied.*

Bentham, however, conceded that the government of the United States was a felicitous exception to the general rule that government is conducted for the privy interest of the one or of the few. Here government was "better in every respect than in England"—it was a "radical" system of government which, nevertheless, had not subverted the rights of property in any respect. In Britain, especially, the Crown was the "fount of honour"—honours and corruption. Not unnaturally, Bentham was the recipient of complimentary references from President Andrew Jackson.

Bentham's doctrine of "Sinister Interests" is worth examination, in view of its *superficial similarity* to the more recent doctrine of "class war." Three distinctions stand out. Bentham holds that each man—not only those of a privileged class—places his own interests first. These are "sinister" from the angle of those who have other interests. Secondly, it is the characteristic of men in power, of the "ins," that they will always use their opportunity to extend their interest—not that of their "class," but of their "group," as power-holders and officials; and especially of themselves in that group. The story of the fight between Stalin and Trotsky provides an interesting commentary. Thirdly, this intent is only sinister from one angle. From

another, it is for the *benefit* of humanity that each man should look after, and develop, his own interests. "Generally speaking, there is no one who knows what is for your interest, so well as yourself." The opposite thesis—always putting B's interest—which is little known—before A's, instead of A's—which is known—before B's, Bentham dismisses as "ridiculous in idea . . . disastrous and destructive in reality."

The pressure of interests is, then, historically speaking, beneficial, the spring of progress, and a "classless" (or, at least, group-interest-less or profession-interest-less) society hurtful. If Marx's psychology suffers from the fault of laying improper stress upon inevitable mutual aggressiveness and conflict, Bentham's has the same fault. But Bentham, unlike Marx, does not operate with the concept of a class; does not magnify the conflict into "inevitable" war; nor, as a political scientist, anticipate its ultimate utopian rolling away at a revolutionary "last judgement," ushering in society without group conflict. On the contrary, he lays bare what he believes to be characteristics, not of capitalism or socialism, but of human nature as such. And he finds the correction in the *power to press*, the right to discuss, choose and oppose. Here he provided the classic definition of democracy according to the Anglo-Saxon tradition—a definition never of more vital significance than today, amid totalitarian popular tyrannies, all claiming to be democratic:

> The characteristic, then, of an undespotic government—in a word, of every government that has any tenable claim to the appellation of a good government—is the allowing, and giving facility to, the communication [of opinion]; and this not only for instruction but for excitation—not only for instruction and excitation but also for correspondence; and this, again, for the purpose of affording and keeping on foot every facility for eventual resistance—for resistance to government, and thence, should necessity require, for change of government.*

* Recently several writers such as, for example, Leonard Barnes, and V. Gollancz have endeavored to stress Marx-Stalinism as "the *crowning* of individualism" and attacked the classification of it as totalitarian, as "muddle-headed stupidity" or worse. "Intellectual independence," indeed (not to speak of organized opposition) "*has* to be curbed, as a transitional method." It will, however, be noted that, if we depart from objective definitions about methods, to subjective definitions and claims about ideals ends, even Mussolini claims (*cf.* p. 721) that his regime is a democracy. If the test is to be neither form nor end but material achievement for the common man, then all these regimes have far to go before they are in a position to instruct the Western democracies. Certainly Russia's pathetic wage level warrants no position as instructress;

There is another side to Bentham's social philosophy besides that which reveals itself in the radicalism of the *Book of Fallacies* or in his wanderings around the social institutions of his time, rapping them with his stick and asking "What Use?" This other side appears clearly in the *Anarchical Fallacies* (1791) and the earlier and better known *Fragment on Government* (1776). The former is a meticulous analysis of the French Declaration of the Rights of Man; the latter a confutation of certain remarks of Sir William Blackstone, in his *Commentaries*. The American Declaration of Independence was "jargon"—a hodge-podge of confusion and well-intentioned nonsense. The French Declaration of Rights was much worse—full of "bawling on paper."

It is here that he criticizes decisively the doctrines of Original Contract and of Natural Rights, following Hume and Godwin. There was more to be said for Hobbes than was generally supposed; but as for Rousseau, "Let us leave geegaws to children. . . . I bid adieu to the original contract"—governments come not from contracts, but contracts from governments. "When society is once formed, government results of course, as necessary to preserve and keep that society in order" (*Fragment on Government*).* As to natural rights, "natural rights is simple nonsense: natural and imprescriptible rights, rhetorical nonsense—nonsense upon stilts."

With these hoary companions, then, of political theory of the schools through the ages, we now part company. In so far as they continue to live it is as revivified by Kant, but they never recover their old vitality from this time on. To the radical question: "On what does the right of Government to 'order' us rest save on consent?" Bentham answers, "Utility." The distinction is significant (although it is questionable whether Bentham fully recognized the implications of his own argument) when we have to consider minority rights and have to answer the question "Minority and majority of whom?"

As to those who arrogate to themselves a natural right to resist laws, because their conscience holds those laws to be unjust, of those

---

nor do the German and Russian popular beliefs that now it is *their* State-machine, their very own peculiar Moloch. In Russia, however, a measure of cooperative activity, not limited to members of the one Party (or "true Church"), upon local public committees, factory committees, etc., exists, and has been remarked by the Webbs, which is not equally conspicuous in Germany and which fits in with both the democratic and the Aristotelian concept of good government. It is perhaps a little similar to what Lenin called "democratic committeeism" (*cf.* pp. 634, 636). "Polity" is *not* majority rule (*cf.* p. 89).

* *Cf.* p. 237.

anarchists says Bentham (in his *Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation*, 1789):

> The fairest and openest of them all is that sort of man who speaks out and says, I am of the number of the Elect: now God himself takes care to inform the Elect what is right; and that with such good effect, and let them strive ever so, they cannot help not only knowing it, but practising it. If, therefore, a man wants to know what is right and what is wrong, he has nothing to do but to come to me.

When we survey the thought of the early Utilitarians, three things stand out. To begin with, Bentham is not so much a political philosopher as a *political scientist*, in the succession of Hobbes, through d'Holbach and Helvetius. He and Godwin are among the first to use, in any precise sense, the actual name "*Political Science.*" [Works, ed. Bowring, II, p. 400, ca. 1810; Godwin: *Political Justice*, Vol. I, p. 274, ca. 1793.]* His object, like that of Macchiavelli and Spinoza is to expound what he calls "a logic of the will." His treatment of social struggle is typical. This struggle is not a temporary misfortune, produced by evil intriguers, priests and capitalists and kings, to be messianically removed amidst the hosannas of the toiling masses. This struggle is a *permanent characteristic* of human nature, which the political scientist takes into account as a *datum*, a tendency always present.

Bentham (like his countryman of four centuries earlier, Occam) is, in scholastic terms, a nominalist. That is, where the Irishman, Edmund Burke, finding a collection of peers and landowners, soldiers and tallow chandlers, bakers and navvies, acclaims it as a mystic entity with a matchless constitution, and where Marx, the German Jew, found chosen classes, the Englishman, Jeremy Bentham, being confronted with words about Law, Church, Government, asks to what these practically amount, and discovers, hidden under these façades, tricky lawyers, fallible churchmen, ambitious "members of the governmental body."

Bentham's horror of abstract ideas let loose shows in his remarks on liberty and equality.

> Absolute equality is absolutely impossible. Absolute liberty is directly repugnant to the existence of every kind of government. . . . All men are born free? All men remain free? No, not a single man. . . . All men, to the contrary, are born in subjection.

* But *cf.* pp. 206, 227.

As much as Bacon or Locke, Bentham is an experimentalist. Like Hobbes, he is a student of the mechanics of society. The theory of social pressures is characteristic of this objective, positivist and pragmatic approach, which has been adopted again by contemporary politicists, especially of the Chicago School.* The political theory of the early Benthamites is pertinaciously objective.

The second note of the Benthamites is, of course, their stress on *Utility*. The stress is not new: it will be found (as has been said) in Samuel Johnson and in Hume. Bentham, a more honest character than Hobbes, uses his methods without reaching Hobbes's conclusions or sharing his prejudices. Despite his vehement suspicion of abstractions about equality and liberty, no man had a keener eye than Bentham for the menace of useless privilege or did more for practical reform and for the demolition of traditional restrictions on the legitimate conduct of individuals. This reform—as swift as but no swifter than the circumstances would allow—was to be undertaken in the name of utility. It was in the name of utility that the philosopher –or *philosophe*—rapped on the portals of august doors and asked what good their owners were to the world and who would be the worse if they were buried along with Kheops and Kephren.

What, however, precisely was meant by Utility? Let us admit, with Bentham, that no honest and disinterested man would oppose the "arguments of authority, antiquity and delay" to a genuine and convincing case based on social utility. We are yet entitled to ask: Useful for what? It is at this point that we pass beyond Benthamism as practical (and especially legal) reform, and beyond Benthamism as a social philosophy, to Benthamism as an *ethical philosophy* with its own psychology.

The third note of the Benthamites was that *Hedonism*, which Bentham derived from the *De l'Esprit* of Helvetius which he studied so avidly in his youth—and indirectly from Hobbes. It is unprofitable to discuss here Bentham's *Table of the Springs of Action* or his Hedonistic Calculus, with its cataloguing of pleasures by degrees of intensity, duration, certainty, propinquity, fecundity and purity (*i.e.*, unmixed quality: a mineralogical, rather than a sex-moralistic term). The psychology was neither sounder nor subtler than that of Hobbes. "Quantity of pleasure being equal," Bentham maintained, "pushpin is as good as poetry." This at a time when the House of Hanover expressed its preference of "bainting" to "boetry," and held (not unjustly in Mr. A. E. Housman's opinion) that Shakespeare was "terrible stuff." Pleasures were enjoyed in "lots"; and the greatest

* *Cf.* p. 753.

total of "lots" (intensity and other measurable factors allowed for) was the greatest pleasure. Of pleasure and pain men had direct experience; the rest was derivative. Happiness was pleasure of high duration. Unselfishness was the pleasure of benevolence; altruism usually the pleasure of good expectation. Asceticism and discipline were often the pleasures of cruelty or malignity, or the pleasure of knowing myself to be better than the Joneses. Men's actions, strictly speaking, were never disinterested—never could be, or they would lack motive. I will that which I wish, and wish that which I shall enjoy to have. As Professor John Dewey says: "Happiness was for them a matter . . . of industry guided by mathematical book-keeping." Not unnaturally Hazlitt, in his *Essays* commented that the Utilitarians "proceed by rule and compasses, by logical diagrams, and with none but demonstrable inclusions, and leave all the taste, sentiment, and fancy of the thing to Mr. Burke's *Reflections on the French Revolution.*"

The "useful," then, in institutions and conduct, is that which makes for happiness. Whose happiness? Bentham has his answer ready, derived with acknowledgement from Priestley and anticipated by Hutcheson. The way had also been prepared by Hume, the third volume of whose *Treatise on Human Nature* had, in Bentham's words, caused "the scales to fall from my eyes." The answer is "*The greatest happiness of the greatest number.*" Why not just the greatest happiness —of society? Because there must be distribution. Each had his claim on the general happiness; and "*each to count for one* and nobody for more than one." But why so? There is, in this phrase, something reminiscent of the much derided doctrine of Natural Rights. And yet Bentham had written: "I bid adieu to the original contract: and I left it to those to amuse themselves with this rattle, who could think they had need of it."

The answer is that, in the last analysis, Bentham is taking the other horn of the dilemma. He is not concerned about the happiness of some "real entity" called society. He is concerned with the claim—and observes in mankind the will to push the claim—of each individual. He is a democrat *because* he is an individualist—just as were Jefferson and the members of Natural Rights School before him. The legislator must allow for all individuals, without respect of persons. Hence "of the greatest number." If, however, we ask Bentham why *should* A subordinate his pleasure to that of B, C and D, he has no effective answer. He can only appeal, with Bishop Butler, to benevolence, or love of reputation, or say that A *will*, in fact, be punished if he does not subordinate his interest.

In the last analysis, Bentham does not genuinely believe that "each is to count for one" (and, hence, is indeed consistent in his opposition to Natural Rights in the abstract, equalitarian sense). He may– and does—cut out the words "of the greatest number"—not, however, in the interests of society, but of minorities. There is, in fact, *no* reason, no rational argument, why A should totally subordinate himself to B. No "tyranny of the majority." That subordination will often not lead to the greatest total of human happiness: better a share to each. Accommodation. Granted accommodation, however, it would still seem to follow that there is a natural "right" (not equalitarian)—or natural power—appertaining only to the stronger and abler. A beneficial power. It is the old Thrasymachean argument. Laissez-faire: society—in the long run—will be benefited if the strong man– or able man—uses his full power . . . accommodatingly and rationally. It is at this point that Bentham's philosophy tends to become bankrupt, since the meaning of "rational" is not developed. We are back where Plato began.

The legislator, certainly, must seek the greatest happiness of the greatest number. That is an affair of balancing and of social mechanics —one pressure against another. But the individual—*does* press, prudentially *should* press. Bentham does, and logically can, believe nothing else. Will then the greatest number find its greatest happiness in accommodation to the minorities' obstinacy, pertinacity and strength? We do not, it seems, subordinate ourselves to the happiness of the greatest number—that is not the pursuit of happiness. "Nature has placed mankind under the governance of two sovereign masters, pleasure and pain. It is for them to point out what we ought to do, as well as to determine what we shall do." If we can, we defy penalties and make the greatest number find their happiness in equilibrium with ours. These are awkward conclusions. They are the Neo-Darwinian conclusions that shocked J. S. Mill.

To the question, however, What is Utility? a precise answer can be given. Utility is *my* pleasure, duration, intensity and the like all duly, and enlightened-wise, considered.

Are there then no "higher" happinesses—pleasure of quality not distinguishable solely by duration, unmixedness and so forth; social pleasures—which *should* be pursued first? Are happinesses, or (as Carlyle said) "blessednesses," to be found chiefly in seeking "the good of society?" Hobbes and Helvetius said "no." That was the philosophic problem which was to haunt the later Utilitarians—but not until much of the practical benefits of "utilitarian" reform, advocated by Bentham,

had already been garnered in. If their metaphysics were unsound—their resolute nominalism—the practical work of the early Utilitarians is definitely to be placed on the credit side, when the balance sheet of civilization is drawn up by laborious historians.

An understanding of the Utilitarians as social and moral philosophers involves also some understanding of the economic thinkers who formed their mental entourage and were often—as in the cases of Ricardo, McCulloch and Malthus—attached to what critics called their "sect." Conversely the effect of the Utilitarian leaders upon these so-called Classical Economists was profound, by providing them with a philosophic background and cohesion to their own ideas.

6

The Physiocrats, of France, were the spiritual parents of the British school of economists. Quesnay, the elder Mirabeau, Turgot, Mercier de la Rivière, Dupont de Nemours, were Free Traders, like Adam Smith, but with this difference that, in days of (as Voltaire said) a different system of law every time one changed one's stage-coach in France and with a local *douane* to every sizable town, they insisted upon free trade *inside* the Kingdom. They further demanded release both from feudal interference with commerce and from the antique and now obstructive regulations of the Guilds described by de Tocqueville, in his *Ancien Régime*. To effect these changes they looked frankly to the royal power and respected a benevolent despot as much as did Voltaire. "Give me a good government," declared Turgot (1727 1781) in the spirit of Hume, "and I will make good men." Reacting against the mercantilism of Colbert, they nevertheless proposed to use, in the cause of enlightenment, the methods of Colbert. Royalists, in the over-centralized France of the eighteenth century, it was yet Gournay, among them (the object of Turgot's *Eulogy*, 1760) who framed the famous watchword: *laissez faire, laissez passer*.

The Physiocrats were practical men, concerned especially with taxation and fiscal reform. They were single-taxers and the first article of their faith, which gave the name in agricultural France to their "nature rule" school, was that all wealth (and power) came from the land—a theory anticipated definitely enough by Locke and hinted at by Harrington. There was, as Mercier de la Rivière asserted in the title of his book, an *Ordre Naturel et Essentiel des Sociétés Politiques* (1767). The mood was not so remote from Rousseau and his "back-to-Nature" call. The very term which they used for their new "science," Political Economy (etymologically, Community Household Manage-

ment), was significant. Very literally their concern was the farm management of the state. Their enemy was the spendthrift absentee landlord. But Quesnay, in *Le Droit Naturel* (1765), while developing a theory of exchange, was far from an adequate theory of value. Labour which did not assist Nature in producing for man the raw material, or did not, by its admixture, obviously modify its nature for consumption, was dismissed as "sterile." Agriculturists therefore, the natural lords of creation, hold an especially prominent value, with their increase of fruits four—or ten—or an hundred-fold. To agriculture and the farmer the Physiocrats gave—as did the farmers' friend, Arthur Young—an almost mystic prominence. It is a theory of which we shall hear more—with its over-simple disregard of "invisible" increments in value

The "laissez-faire" principles, entertained by the Physiocrats in the economic field, more hesitatingly they applied in the political. As much as Godwin* they asserted that the basis of political wisdom was Justice. Now justice consists in respect for the rights of others: their personal rights—liberty—and their material or real rights—property. For this doctrine, suspicious of interference, they provided an important basis, by a revival and restatement, of quite cardinal importance, of the theory of Natural Law.

Natural Law appears reclad as Economic Law, but still guided on its way, as of yore, by the finger of Providence. Men do not *make* basic laws. They *find* them. Laws contrary to these natural laws—"*lois essentielles de l'ordre social*"—are void. As Dupont de Nemours says, in his *Origine et Progrès d'une Science Nouvelle*,

> Il y a donc un juge naturel et irrécusable des ordonnances mêmes des souverains et ce juge est l'évidence de leur conformité ou de leur opposition aux lois naturelles de l'ordre social.†

Public education was desirable—and religious tolerance—as giving men the freedom and ability to detect these eternal laws that described the frame of things.

7

ADAM SMITH (1723–1790) is the founder of Political Economy in Britain, although anticipated in researches by such students of social statistics as Sir William Petty. The cosmopolitanism of approach and

* *Cf.* p. 337.

† "There is a natural and final judge of the ordinances even of sovereigns, to wit the evidence of their conformity or opposition to the natural laws of the social order."

the individualism which he shares, for example, with Benjamin Franklin, make Economics a more appropriate title for his new science. A Britain which was already in the current of the Industrial Revolution and beginning, with the aid of sea power, to trade abroad, unlike France, was prepared to look with favour on Free Trade as a principle, not merely of local, but of international application. The pre-Adamite darkness ends, and Smith converted Pitt to the light. Moreover the objection to regulation of the Laissez-faire School—*pas trop gouverner*—wears, with Smith, the typically Anglo-Saxon suspicion of executive government as such.

With Adam Smith, Professor of Moral Science in the University of Glasgow, a quiet man of books little given to disputation or witty conversation, we are still in the mental climate of Bishop Butler. In his *Theory of Moral Sentiments* (1759), in the section entitled, "Of the Sense of Propriety," turning back from the chapter, "Of the Amiable and Respectable Virtues" and that headed, "Of the Pleasure of Mutual Sympathy," we find one that begins:

> How selfish soever man may be supposed, there are evidently some principles in his nature, which interest him in the fortune of others, and render their happiness necessary to him, though he derives nothing from it, except the pleasure of seeing it. . . . The greatest ruffian, the most hardened violator of the laws of society, is not altogether without it.

But a little chance, and Dr. Adam Smith would only have been known for this, at the time, much praised and, in general estimation, acute work, enlarging upon the themes of Locke, Hutcheson and Hume. However, the sociological influence of Hume ("by far the most illustrious philosophic historian of the present age"), in his *Essays*, and the fortunate circumstance that the young Duke of Buccleuch was wealthy enough and (encouraged by Hume) desirous enough of a tutor to induce Smith to resign his professorship and go on that great tour where he met Quesnay and Turgot, ensured (after ten years' cogitation in solitude with his old mother) the publication of *The Wealth of Nations* (1776). On this Hume wrote: "*Eugel Bellel* Dear Mr. Smith: I am much pleased with your performance. . . . It has depth and solidity and acuteness, and is so much illustrated by curious facts, that it must at least take the public attention."

Although popularly described as the founder of Economic Science, Adam Smith in fact rather took over the work of the Physiocrats, especially Turgot's *Reflections on the Formation and Distribution of Wealth;* added many illustrative, curious facts; and substituted for

the all-too-brilliant logic of a tour de force a treatise where truth wrapped herself in the clouds of conditional clauses and circumambient detail. Not seldom, the wood is quite obscured by the trees. However, the result was truth, not fallacy; a more developed theory of value, which allowed for both intrinsic value and value in exchange; and an economics, still systematic, and adequately historic, based upon the analysis of the division of labour. There was, then, a natural law which expressed itself also in economic law; and a divine tactic which the reverent optimist could see in the consequences necessarily developing from this useful division and from "the natural effort of every individual to better his own condition." For Buckle, the historian of civilization, *The Wealth of Nations* was, briefly, "probably the most important book which has ever been written." Here, however, also we learn from Dr. Smith that the object of religious toleration is the production "of philosophical good temper and moderation with respect to every religious creed." For the rest, "the difference of natural talent in different men is, in reality, much less than we are aware of* . . . the effect of the division of labour . . . [and] the vanity of the philosophers."

When we come to the epigoni, abstract theory again takes the reins. There is, moreover, a remarriage between economics and philosophy, as there had been between the Physiocrat group and the Encyclopaedists. Utilitarianism provided a considered connection between the natural effort for self-betterment and benevolence. On the other hand, the economists kept the Utilitarians in touch with a natural right to increase property, and "every man to count for one" in laying claim to the produce of labour; and with a natural law—speedily becoming an evil, thin abstraction replacing observation—which, as touching the social order, could be formulated by the economists.

David Ricardo (1772–1823) was the son of a Dutch Jew who had settled in England. Having made a large fortune and bought an estate —whether or not, as Cobbett suggested of others, concerned to trace his descent from the Normans—he turned a brilliant intelligence to economic theory and political practice, and entered parliament. His friend James Mill, chief Apostle of the Utilitarians, persuaded him to publish, in 1817, his *Principles of Political Economy and Taxation.* Logic with Ricardo—as is the habit of logic—and a certain complacent

* *Cf.* Confucius' dictum: "By nature we nearly resemble one another; condition separates us very far."

love of paradox, brought out in his economic theory several somewhat unexpected conclusions.

Locke, a century and more before, had declared labour to be the source of wealth; and had stated that every man had a possessory right to that in which he had (solely?) admixed his labour. We have here the germs of the theory, alluded to by Godwin, of the right to "the whole product of labour." Adam Smith had gone farther, in his *Wealth of Nations:*

> Civil government, so far as it is instituted for the security of property, is in reality instituted for the defence of the rich against the poor, or of those who have some property against those who have none.

It is the converse statement to that of Rousseau that whoever appropriated to himself a plot of land, called it "mine" and found others fool enough to believe him, instituted private property. We shall revert to this theme in the controversy between James Mill and Macaulay, save that Macaulay will try to bind up the rich, who "have a stake in the country," with the cause of civilization.

Ricardo, however, enlarging on the Physiocrats, and turning bottom-up their argument, puts landlord's interest and that of the community in the most violent opposition. Writing with the absentee rich landlord and the mining royalty owner in his environment, if not before his mind's eye, Ricardo says: "the interest of the landlord is necessarily opposed to the interest of every other class in the community." The Classical Economy made paradox worse confounded when Ricardo subsequently added that this opposition, although necessary, was not permanent. Sir Leslie Stephen aptly comments that Ricardo's opponents could affirm that such a system as he described, if as he described it, was the embodiment of injustice and ought to be radically destroyed. Ricardo, in his paradox to arrest attention, outlined the case for class war. It is one of the issues which John Stuart Mill will be forced to confront, and upon which Marx built his theory and makes his observations. Actually, the Classical Economists can be fairly represented neither as oppressors of the poor nor (despite the gruffness of the Utilitarians) as conscious pioneers of revolution; but only as men trying to state the contemporary truth in systematic form and hesitating, no more than Hobbes, before a mordant definition.

It is necessary to point out that the Classical Economists assuredly did not belong to the school of Miss Hannah More, who wrote tracts to show that the poor should bear their inevitable afflictions patiently and, indeed, that they should be grateful since, properly considered,

they really had none. Although Archbishop Whately is not free, in his economic popular writings, from advocating kissing the rod that strikes one, under the name of Economic Law willed by Providence, the economist Archbishop, nevertheless, is of the genuine and reasonable belief that a knowledge of these laws will encourage prudence, thrift and forethought.

Ricardo, it must be recalled, is making a debating point against Malthus and, in fact, is opposing the interest of the *agriculturalist* as against that of the free-trading *manufacturer*, as well as expounding the monopoly theory of rent, which is his distinctive contribution to Economics.

Actually Ricardo stated, in his correspondence with Malthus, in rebuttal of Say and in entire accord with the Utilitarian theory, that he regarded the low income groups, the majority, as "of far the most important class in society." He proposed that their status could and should be raised by good education—and by matrimonial prudence as a technique of population education. This may be counted among what J. S. Mill calls, "the superior lights of Ricardo." This did not prevent him from stating—at a time when (following excursions by Chadwick and others) attention was beginning to be given to the Poor Law; and following the indications of Locke and Turgot—what was later called the Iron Law of Wages. To this we shall revert.*

J. R. McCulloch, "whiskey-swilling McCulloch," Professor of Economics at the new University College, London, continued Ricardo's work; trimmed the edges; stressed the dogma. McCulloch, moreover, made an interesting statement about the theory of intrinsic value. It was, he maintained, a "fundamental Theorem" that the value of freely produced commodities depends upon the quantity of labour required for their production.

McCulloch could, with most of the school, argue in favour of public education, even compulsory, and could himself approve of the early Factory Acts. The general political outlook, however, of the school is adequately expressed by a phrase of Nassau Senior's: "*A state is nothing more than an aggregate of individuals . . . who inhabit a certain tract of country . . . whatever is most advantageous to them, is most advantageous to the state.*"

8

THOMAS ROBERT MALTHUS (1766–1834), however, was the true *enfant terrible* of the Economists. This quiet, demure and even venerable clergyman, defended in writing by his Archbishop, was in his youth

* *Cf.* p. 581.

ninth mathematical wrangler of Cambridge University. He had appeared in the unexpected role of a rash optimist when Ricardo had accused him of treating rent as a gift of beneficent Providence—a natural bounty of the earth thrust into the pockets of the landlord—not the spoils of monopoly. Malthus, vicar of Albury, compensated for this generous lapse in his other work.

Since the days of the Abbé de Saint Pierre (1658–1743), in France, the doctrine of Human Progress had been developing. It had reached fine flower in the writings of the Abbé Raynal and of Condorcet and Godwin. The fruits of the earth more evenly shared, and limitlessly expansible, mankind would live in peace and prosperity, limitlessly perfectible. The malicious Hume, it is true, had put flies into the spikenard of Reason—had suggested doubts about Natural Rights, Original Contract and a rational world of cause and effect. Hartley (1705-1757), the psychological philosopher, had stuck together again, by "the Principle of Association," the world that Hume's critique of causation had laid or seemed to lay in philosophical tatters. Mind, Benjamin Franklin was briskly confident, was omnipotent over matter—he himself had invented a lightning conductor. He had made Jove's thunderbolt a bauble of science. Although Bentham with his lips denied natural rights and natural law, it was to the dogmatic moralists that he was in fact being offensive. Confidently Bentham affirmed, "each to count for one"—why, God and the theologians alone really knew. His friends the Classical Economists were most heartily assured that a natural sociological or economic law had merely to be found. Certainly the Utilitarians were not pessimists. But Ricardo had, as we have seen, reached some very strange conclusions. And now came Malthus.

The natural increase of the soil is, roughly speaking, by arithmetic progression. There is even a law of decreasing returns. But the human species, unchecked, increases by geometrical progression. Characteristically Godwin had asserted that there is some principle in human society by means of which "everything tends to find its own level and proceed in the most auspicious way, when least interfered with by the mode of regulation." But, for "the most auspicious way," there was no warranty save the assertion. The vicar of Albury watched his flock increase, the cottages become more numerous, the farm holdings creep up the hills opposite the vicarage—and wondered what would be the end of it all. He was not comforted by reading the tractate of the well-named Herr Süssmilch, *Göttliche Ordnung* (1761), which showed how Providence itself had taken care that the trees should

not grow into the sky—although the illustration of how Providence caused the cork trees to grow to convenience the wine-drinkers is not his. Malthus had not met those who could demonstrate that, granted the wonders of science and peptonized, tabloid food, there was no inherent reason why population should not comfortably increase until, amid the beauties of the countryside, there was just space for each human mortal to turn round and breathe. Such demonstrations were left for later critics, a later generation of patriotic optimists. Merely he recorded,

> A man who is born into a world already possessed, if he cannot get subsistence from his parents on whom he has a just demand, and *if the society do not want his labour, has no claim of right* to the smallest portion of food and, in fact, has no business to be where he is. At Nature's mighty feast there is no vacant cover for him. She tells him to be gone and will quickly execute her own orders.

Malthus understated his case. In any social arrangements human, physiological and psychological need always sets up moral relations of duty and right, and these are the natural bases of law. But, with Malthus, we are back at the old basic argument of Aristotle, that in the good state there must be *limitation or regulation* of population. Briefly, there is a right and duty—it is the right of society and duty of the individual—that redundant population shall *not* be there. It is not only the case that no man has a right to subsistence which his labour will not purchase; he has no right to children whose labour will not be wanted. There is save, perhaps, in terms of the social regulation of population no *right* to labour, male or female, since it may amount to a right to deprive others of their union standard of living. Infanticide was the Greek cure. Mr. Malthus had other checks, discovered to be ordained by Nature and scarcely more pleasant. They were War, Famine, Vice.

The vicar—"parson Malthus," for Cobbett—later Professor of history and political economy at Haileybury College, did not precisely advocate vice or even war. He said, however, that under Providence they were Nature's cure for the improvident increase of population. Not so much shocked by his own conclusions, in his *Essay on Population* (first ed. 1798), as driven by a naturally inquiring mind, he travelled for three years through Europe gleaning statistics and then published a second edition (1803). In the first edition, it has been said, the paradoxes were striking, but the logic not watertight; in the second

the logic was soundly grounded on fact, but truth converted to truism, by one noteworthy addition, was dull. The objection may be overdone. The effect of both editions was identical in pointing out that the future of natural progress was, not comfort for all, but penury all round and food scarce—*homo homini lupus*. Moreover, although benevolence was "the source of our most refined pleasures," the passion of self-love was "beyond expression stronger than the passion of benevolence" ("my family" being included in self-love).

Malthus made, however, (in his second edition) one concession to a disconcerted humanity – his addition. These horrors were the results of improvidence. But improvidence was not necessary. Malthus did not look forward to Bradlaugh and the Neo-Malthusian Societies or express agreement with the Stopesian conclusions of his defender against Godwin, the Utilitarian, Francis Place. When he said "moral," he meant it in the customary acceptation. There was then, he said (as an afterthought of this second edition), the Moral Check of intelligent forethought and self-control. But, as a friend of the Utilitarians if a Whig, Malthus attached no undue importance to a remote consideration unsupported by present pleasure. This Moral Check remained something that people *ought* to apply. As an economist he considered the sociological facts.

In these present days, when such authoritative bachelors as Sir William Beveridge are speaking of the instant importance of mothers producing more children (females: such as alone, demographically speaking, matter) lest the people—or the nation—perish, it is difficult to recover the perspective of Malthus' argument. Our alarm now is of the opposite order. Malthus urged it as a lethal *objection to Owenite communism that it would increase population*. Now the threat is that we, the Anglo-Saxons, or the Italians under Duce Mussolini or the Germans under Führer Hitler, will not be able to keep pace with the babies quick enough in the great baby war to populate the world faster than Communist Russia. Responsible Marriage Malthus had added to Private Property—both involving inequality—as a check on increase. The facts bear him out in the Soviet Union, where irresponsible marriage has actually been associated with the increase desiderated but not achieved in disciplined Germany and Italy. Even, in the period of reference, instruction on birth control, the relaxation of morals and the licensing of abortion seem to act almost as incentives (which will doubtless have to be considered by our population increasers) in the growth of the Soviet Union—now, moreover, emerging from agricultural penury into its industrial revolution. At least the more orthodox

encouragements of Fascist governments—pursued contrary to Malthus —do not appear, pragmatically, equally successful.

The clergy, including Archbishops Sumner and Whately, heard Malthus unperturbed. His theory served to remind men that life here was, pending the Last Judgement, in a vale of tears, if not a den of damnation and chamber of horrors: a salutary warning. Some complacent contemporary writers were even prepared to accept infant mortality as a providential check.

What Malthus' doctrine upset was the utopia of the free-thinking optimists and of honest "Merrie England" radicals such as Cobbett. Even Franklin, in 1751, had pointed out the dangers of unrestricted human breeding—the tendency to breed to the limits of subsistence—and, in 1756, the elder Mirabeau had frankly used the illustration of rats in a barn. In his tempered second edition Malthus merely asserts a "tendency" of population to outstrip subsistence. With Free Trade (an attitude pleasing to the Utilitarians) even an increase of population might increase comfort—so long, of course, as population elsewhere did not also seek this comfort, outstrip subsistence and divert foodstuffs from export. Did not Malthus merely put off the evil day, as his opponents did by reference to wide-open spaces? Or did he underestimate what J. S. Mill, following Thomas Carlyle, was to call "the extraordinary pliability of human nature?" Did he do so less or more than our contemporary reverse Malthusians, with their prophesies, not of human rats in a barn, but of the last of the Nordics dying alone in a desert traversed by triumphant mulattoes?

Malthus, in conclusion, follows Archdeacons Tucker and Paley (1742–1805), quoting the latter.

> Human Passions [wrote Paley] are either necessary to human welfare, or capable of being made, and in a great majority of instances are in fact made, conducive to its happiness. . . . This account, while it shows us the principle of vice, shows us at the same time the province of reason and self-government.

Malthus comments,

> Our virtue, therefore, as reasonable beings, evidently consists in educing from the general materials, which the Creator has placed under our guidance, the greatest sum of human happiness; and as natural impulses are abstractly considered good, and only to be distinguished by their consequences, a strict attention to these *consequences* and the regulation of our conduct conformably to them, must be considered as our principal duty.

He repudiates Paley's notion of "a laborious frugal people ministering to the demands of an opulent luxurious nation," as uninviting

and tending to privileged abuse. If a country, he comments, "*can only be rich by running a successful race for low wages, I should be disposed to say, Perish such riches.*" Poverty does but palsy virtue. And he concludes that an increase of population is indeed good if each parent had first made provision of subsistence for the children he proposed to bring into the world. As Sir Leslie Stephen remarks, with malicious exaggeration: Add to the Ten Commandments the new law, "Thou shalt not marry until there is a fair prospect of supporting six children." The conclusion is one counselling prudence, self-help, like that last of the old school, Mr. Samuel Smiles (1812–1904), individual advancement—man progressing through struggle; the improvident eliminated by Nature. Malthus brought the Perfectionists up against human biology. The cry, "bad government," of Paine and Godwin and even of Hume, was to be no alibi. In alliance with the Radical Perfectionists he smites the sentimental Tories such as Southey. Malthus is the precursor of Darwin; but a precursor who, in his lighter moods, assumed that every man who practised thrift and providence could discover the provision adequate to warrant him in increasing the world's population. "Hard as it may seem in individual instances, dependent poverty ought to be held disgraceful." How to discover this provision was a problem he bequeathed to trouble the later Utilitarians.

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE

Jeremy Bentham: *The Book of Fallacies.*
E. Halévy: *The Growth of Philosophical Radicalism*, 1928.
David Hume: *Essays.*
G. de Ruggiero: *The History of European Liberalism*, trans. Collingwood, 1927.
*Leslie Stephen: *The Utilitarians*, Vol. I, 1900.

Chapter XII

The Later Utilitarians: James and John Stuart Mill

1

For Jeremy Bentham, Utilitarianism was the dry evangel of a self-described "comical old man." For James Mill, it was a faith that could render a reason for itself such as might satisfy even a Scotsman. Contemptuously the elder Mill rejects the allegation that there was a "Benthamite school." The dispute recalls current controversy in America about a "Brain Trust." Perhaps the "school" never met; all were independent geniuses. The fact remains that James Mill, in his Encyclopaedia Britannica article on *Government*, wrote their political manual and testament.

James Mill (1773–1836) was a Scot from Angus (*Anglicé*, Forfarshire), the son of a village shoemaker, also named James Mill before him, his mother a domestic servant of farming stock. Like many ambitious young Scotsmen he started in the Presbyterian Kirk, and was licensed to preach in 1798. Whether owing to some defect of manner or to a rebellious logic in disquisition, he received no "call"—came South of Tweed with his patron and countryman Sir John Stuart, and got work as a journalist. A temporary success as an editor was followed by years of stern frugality. Quite contrary to the principles of his future co-worker Malthus, he produced nine children, not too healthy. During these years, with the young John Stuart Mill at the other end of his desk being drilled in his lessons—"the man's hard and persevering labours to supply the wants of his child . . . his virtuous though painful course," says Mill, Sr., elsewhere in a discourse on social virtues—Mill wrote his *History of British India*.

By now the disciple, confidant and colleague of Bentham, he maintained in relation to his master, in these years wealthy, a manly

independence. Self-help was rewarded, and James Mill ended his life most appropriately as chief Examiner of India Correspondence for the East India Company, full of useful official duties. By an influence characteristic of a laxer moral world, his son, John Stuart, was able, without any such apprenticeship of poverty, to begin life in the office of the "John Company," the old East India Company, which ruled an Empire as an after-thought to balancing its business accounts.

Besides the history of India, the elder Mill wrote an *Analysis of the Phenomena of the Human Mind* (1829), which is a milestone on the route between the formal and epistemological psychology of Kant or John Locke's *Essay* or David Hume's *Treatise of Human Nature*, and modern experimental psychology. The abstractness of the psychology, which is in accord with the style of the school, is perhaps fortunately, as Macaulay comments, not repeated in the history, where Mill displays a conservatism not infrequently resulting from the impact of India on British radicals and displayed also in the case of Mill's greater son. The writings of James Mill of significance most relevant to our purpose are his *Fragment on Mackintosh* (1835), and his article on *Government* (1814). His work, along with Bentham, in aiding in the foundation of London University, also deserves a place of honour in our memory.

Sir James Mackintosh was a Scotsman, a Member of Parliament, didactic, an eloquent historian and, at least in his own estimation, a philosopher, who rose to prominence as the author of *Vindiciae Gallicae* (1791), a defence on moral principles of the French Revolution against Tories. "The king of the men of talent," said Coleridge of him, meaning that he was not a genius like himself. A good Whig, like many another more eminent than he, when the Terror developed Sir James took fright and even communicated to the sage of Beaconsfield, Edmund Burke, a solemn retractation and apology. Mackintosh went so far as to declare that he lived to "wipe out the disgrace of having been once betrayed into that abominable conspiracy against God and man." The misguided man, however, was guilty of a yet worse offence. He ventured to criticize—nay, to treat with contempt—the systematic exposition of Utilitarianism by James Mill, and thus became the patent ally of Sinister Interests. He wrote: "They who have most inculcated the doctrine of utility have given another notable example of the very vulgar prejudice which treats the unseen as insignificant." Thomas Macaulay speaks of Sir James as having "a venerable countenance" and as showing in his writing, "the vivacity and the colouring of Southey." It availed nothing. James Mill dourly takes up his metaphysical dirk and rope and goes on the trail after

this alien clansman, in the spirit of Knox against Beaton or the Campbells at Killiecrankie, with neither mercy nor quarter in his heart. He lassoes Sir James with the *Fragment on Mackintosh.*

Sir James had dared to take beauty, not utility, as the test in morals—mere feelings. He had criticized the Utilitarians for excessive stress on conscious motive, not intuition or habit. Habits were "the unseen." Was it not just the vulgar, says Mill, who were afrighted by—who stressed—the unseen? Are we to be told, as wisdom, that "a set of good habits is a very good thing?" Away with these "macaroni phrases" about "a heart converted to heaven." Mackintosh relies on Brown, the moralist. Mill writes:

> Brown was but poorly read on the doctrine of association. Had he known it better he would have easily answered himself. It is no rare thing, in the higher cases of complex association, for an ingredient, and a main ingredient, to be concealed by the closeness of its union with the compound. Nor does it follow that the general idea of utility is not present to the mind in moral approbation, because Dr. Brown was unable to trace it. Before the discovery of Berkeley, he would have been equally insensible of the presence of ideas of touch in the perception of figure and magnitude by the eye. . . . Sir James would have known the value of these things, had he read, as he pretended to have done, Mr. Mill's *Analysis.* . . . Acts are objects of importance to us, on account of their consequences, and nothing else. This constitutes a radical distinction between them and the things called beautiful. Acts are hurtful or beneficial, moral or immoral, virtuous or vicious. But it is only an abuse of language to call them beautiful or ugly.

The principle of Utility *is* the dictate of a well-informed conscience.

Behind, however, all this fine idealism, the "delicious feeling principle," there is a deeper flaw in Mackintosh. Like Hezekiah striking against the idol, James Mill strikes Mackintosh in fragments. He is one of those "who write for an aristocracy"—the Whigs. On the other hand—and the comment from the Radical Mill is highly significant—Sir James is capable of the contemptible act of seeking to curry favour with vulgar prejudice against the thinkers—naming as "very singular notions" that which, as Mill says, "differs from the common herd." What was his grievance against the Benthamites? That

> . . . they would not repose confidence in public men. That was the complaint. The not reposing confidence in public men, is another name for *requiring that their interests should be identified with the interests of those whom they govern.* And the confidence itself is another name for scope to misrule. The author of *Hudibras* said well; all that the knave stands in need of is to be trusted; after that, his business does itself. Sir James stood in the first rank

of those who called out for confidence in public men, and poured contumely on those who sought the identity of interest. The words on which Sir James has unfolded his sapience [etc.] . . .

Mill, incidentally, makes specific acknowledgement to Hobbes. Hobbes had grasped the principle of utility. Hobbes was, the Chief Examiner concludes, "a very unpretending writer; and Sir James one of the most offensively pretending that ever put pen to paper."

Another Scotsman came to the rescue of the distressed Mackintosh. Thomas Macaulay (1800–1859) had not yet reached the stage of fame as historian of the Glorious Whig Revolution or as Minister of War, darling of the young Whigs, in the Melbourne administration, nor had he been invited to Windsor Castle or sat up all night writing letters to his friends on Castle note paper. The speech on Confidence in the Ministry of Lord Melbourne, avowing preference for the secret ballot, repudiating universal male suffrage, enunciating the doctrine of "a stake in the country," glorying in the noble principles of Milton and Locke, was still unspoken. Macaulay was a young man still with his reputation to make—which he was fast accomplishing by articles in the *Edinburgh Review*. Here he wrote (1829) his criticism of Mill, "an Aristotelian of the fifteenth century, born out of due season." Braving "the reproach of sentimentality, a word which, in the sacred language of the Benthamites, is synonymous with idiocy," Macaulay continues:

It must be owned that to do justice to any composition of Mr. Mill is not, in the opinion of his admirers, a very easy task. They do not, indeed, place him in the same rank with Mr. Bentham; but the terms in which they extol the disciple, though feeble when compared with the hyperboles of adoration employed by them in speaking of the master, are as strong as any sober man would allow himself to use concerning Locke or Bacon. The essay [on Government] before us is perhaps the most remarkable of the works to which Mr. Mill owes his fame. By the members of his sect, it is considered as perfect and unanswerable. Every part of it is an article of their faith; and the damnatory clauses, in which their creed abounds far beyond any theological symbol with which we are acquainted, are strong and full against all who reject any portion of what is so irrefragably established. . . . He seems to think that, if all despots, without exception, governed ill, it would be unnecessary to prove, by a synthetical argument, what would then be sufficiently clear from experience. But as some despots will be so perverse as to govern well, he finds himself compelled to prove the impossibility of their governing well by that synthetical argument which would have been superfluous had not the facts contradicted it.

So much for Mill's method. Mill argues for universal male suffrage, as alone a guaranty of "identity of interest" of rulers and ruled. But has he—*reductio ad absurdum*—considered women's suffrage? "Except in a few happy and highly civilized communities, [women] are strictly in a state of personal slavery." Mill says that the middle class will lead. Is that identity of interest? Will they be permitted? The whole people may vote, but only the majority will govern. Is the interest of majority and minority identical? Granted "self-interest," will it not oppress? And what is this great principle of "self-interest?" It is no novelty that "a man had rather do what he had rather do." But no man knows what another will do until he has done it. Then Macaulay, a Whig unwittingly reverting to Burke, lets fly a lethal shaft.

If there were a community consisting of two classes of man, one of which should be principally influenced by the one set of motives and the other by the other, government would clearly be necessary to restrain the class which was eager for plunder and careless of reputation: and yet the powers of government might be safely intrusted to the class which was chiefly actuated by the love of approbation. Now it might with no small plausibility be maintained that, in many countries, *there are two classes* which, in some degree, answer to this description: that the poor compose the class which government is established to restrain, and the people of some property the class to which the powers of government may without danger be confided. . . .

We do not assert all this. We only say that it was Mr. Mill's business to prove the contrary. . . . We are rather inclined to think that it would, on the whole, be for the interest of the majority to plunder the rich. If so, the Utilitarians will say, that the rich *ought* to be plundered. We deny the inference. For, in the first place, if the object of government be the greatest happiness of the greatest number, the intensity of the suffering which a measure inflicts must be taken into consideration, as well as the number of the sufferers. In the next place, we have to notice one most important distinction which Mr. Mill has altogether overlooked. Throughout his essay, he confounds the community with the species. He talks of the greatest happiness of the greatest number: but, when we examine his reasonings, we find that he thinks only of *the greatest number of a single generation*. . . . The greater the inequality of conditions, the stronger are the motives which impel the populace to spoliation. As for America, we appeal to the twentieth century.

They may as well be Utilitarians as jockeys or dandies. And, though quibbling about self-interest and motives, and objects of desire, and the greatest happiness of the greatest number, is but poor employment for a grown man, it certainly hurts the health less than hard drinking, and the fortune less than high play; it is not much more laughable than phrenology, and it is immeasurably more humane than cock-fighting.

Macaulay, after two further essays on the theme, rested from his work of detonating Benthamism. As Macaulay maliciously remarks, quoting Molière, "Hippocrate dira ce que lui plaira, mais le cocher est mort." Macaulay exaggerated. The great disciple, Mill, hesitates—decides to be magisterial, declines to refer to Macaulay by name, wraps him up in a fragment of Mackintosh.

> Sir James says, and [this is a master-stroke of the Style *putide Schmellfungus*] according to him, "the writer of a late criticism in the Edinburgh Review" says, that this "overthrows the whole fabric of Mr. Mill's political reasoning," [*i.e.*, that men do not always act in conformity with their true interest].
>
> I am not at all disposed to quibble with Sir James, about the meaning of the word "interest." It is very obvious, to anyone who has read Mr. Mill's Treatise, in what sense he uses it. He uses it, neither in the refined sense of a man's best interest, or in what is conducive to his happiness upon the whole; nor to signify every object which he desires, though that is a very intelligible meaning too. Mr. Mill uses it, on the rough and common acceptation, to denote the leading objects of human desire; Wealth, Power, Dignity, Ease; including escape from the contrary, Poverty, Impotence, Degradation, Toil.

And so the philosopher rode away, firing quotations from Berkeley, Hume, Blackstone and—Plato. Despite, however, all Macaulay's pyrotechnics, the practical consequences of the Benthamite campaign were more important than anything Macaulay had to show. Nay more, if dominie James Mill was not intellectually worth more than Macaulay, Bentham and the two Mills were worth more than Macaulay even if multiplied by three. Had it been true that the Benthamites achieved their success because of the dogmatic scholasticism for which Macaulay attacked them, it would have been a chastening thought. That dogmatism, however, was not of the "enthusiastic" variety, but a genuine attachment to the schematism necessary as an exploratory instrument of science—even of political science. Despite his contempt for this, Macaulay's own theorizing shows that when the rigidity of logical hypothesis is rejected, the pressure of personal prejudice, motivated by interest, comes into play.

James Mill hesitated. Perhaps he calculated. Anyhow he relented; in 1834 Macaulay became legal adviser to the Supreme Council of India; Mill did not obstruct and Macaulay was grateful. The essays on Mill, during Macaulay's life, were not republished. As for Mackintosh, he died.

Let us now turn to the famous essay itself, among others on Education, Liberty of the Press, Prison Discipline, about which there was

this pother. It is brief, as befits an *Encyclopaedia Britannica* article—but it became the vade mecum of all good Utilitarians.

James Mill begins with an economic statement about which much more will be heard before many decades.

> To obtain labour in the greatest possible quantity, we must raise to the greatest possible height the advantage attached to labour. It is impossible to attach to labour a greater degree of advantage than the whole of the product of labour. Why so? Because if you give more to one man than the produce of his labour, you can do it only by taking it away from the produce of some other man's labour. *The greatest possible happiness of society is, therefore, attained by insuring to every man the greatest possible quantity of the produce of his labour.*
>
> How is this to be accomplished? for it is obvious that every man, who has not all the objects of his desire, has inducement to take them from any other man who is weaker than himself: and how is he to be prevented?
>
> One mode is sufficiently obvious; and it does not appear that there is any other: The union of a certain number of men, to protect one another. . . .
>
> The reason for which Government exists is, that one man, if stronger than another, will take from him whatever that other possesses and he desires.

In brief, government is the collaboration of the weak against the strong.* Mill goes on, from this good social contract doctrine, to prove, by a "chain of inference . . . strong to a most unusual degree," that Terror will be the grand instrument of a ruler or ruling group, constitutionally unchecked and confronted with opposition to its will. Despite the witticisms of Macaulay at the expense of Utilitarian pedantry, the experience of a century has shown Mill more right than the early Victorian optimists allowed for. Mill, however, makes an *experimentum crucis*, not without sardonic satisfaction.

> An English Gentleman may be taken as a favourable specimen of civilization, of knowledge, of humanity, of all the qualities, in short, that make human nature estimable. The degree in which he desires to possess power over his fellow creatures, and the degree of oppression to which he finds motives for carrying the exercise of that power, will afford a standard from which, assuredly, there can be no appeal. Wherever the same motives exist, the same conduct, as that displayed by the English Gentleman, may be expected to follow, in all men not further advanced in human excellence than him. In the West Indies, before that vigilant attention of the English nation, which now, for thirty years, has imposed so great a check upon the masters of slaves, there was not a perfect absence of all check upon the dreadful propensities of power. But yet it is true, that these propensities led English Gentlemen, not only to

* *Cf.* pp. 44, 235.

deprive their slaves of property, and to make property of their fellow-creatures, but to treat them with a degree of cruelty, the very description of which froze the blood of their countrymen, who were placed in less unfavourable circumstances. The motives of this deplorable conduct are exactly those which we have described above, as arising out of the universal desire to render the actions of other men exactly conformable to our will.

The present British Royal Commission in Jamaica will please note.

A Monarchy or Aristocracy then must be restrained or it will encroach for its own interest upon others. Only a Democracy can be trusted to safeguard the interests [and here Jas. Mill oddly drops into Rousseau's fallacy*] of the whole community throughout the generations, *i.e.*, as he supposes, its own. But a direct democracy is today impracticable. What then is the remedy? "The divine principle" of representation.

In the grand discovery of modern times, the system of representation, the solution of all the difficulties, both speculative and practical, will perhaps be found. If it cannot, we seem to be forced upon the extraordinary conclusion that good Government is impossible.

How are the representatives to be checked? By frequent elections—not necessarily recall or annual elections, as the Chartists said, but frequent.† And would not the majority oppress the minority? The answer here deserves attention. The benefits of good government accruing to all might be expected to outbalance "the benefits of misrule peculiar to themselves," *i.e.*, the Majority. Not only have we a risk that must be taken on the greatest happiness principle, *but* the majority has a vested average interest in good government for *all*, since it itself is so nearly all, *i.e.*, *most.*

It is better, argued Mill, to be governed by the many which may occasionally be mistaken about its own interest—and he declines to refine on the phrase "true interest"—than by an oligarchy or privileged class which has a separatist interest, not identified with the mass of the community. He wins a resonant and quick victory over Aristocracy, as a form of government, by identifying it with those nobles and gentry whose names are in Burke's *Peerage* and in de Brett. He is more tender to those who figure in the columns of *Who's Who*. Mill rashly concedes

* *Cf.* p. 454.

† The demand of the British Chartist movement (1838–1858) was for (i) universal manhood suffrage; (ii) vote by ballot; (iii) payment of members of Parliament; (iv) members need not be property owners; (v) equal electoral districts; (vi) annual Parliaments. The first four points have been peacefully won; and for the last there is today no popular demand.

that an aristocracy, in the philosophic sense, "the wise and good in any class of man" do, to all general purposes, govern the rest. Who, briefly, are these "wise and good?" As Machiavelli ends his detached *Prince* with a passionate appeal for Italian national resurgence, so Mill ends with an appeal for the Middle Class:

> that intelligent and virtuous rank . . . to whom their [the poor's] children look up as models for their imitation, whose opinions they hear daily repeated, and account it their honour to adopt. There can be no doubt that the middle rank, which gives to science, to art, and to legislation itself, their most distinguished ornaments, the chief source of all that has exalted and refined human nature, is that portion of the community of which, if the basis of Representation were ever so far extended, the opinion would ultimately decide.

One recalls the argument of Hamilton in *The Federalist.**

James Mill took very seriously his science of government or political science—hence the crusading fury of his zeal against the deceiver Mackintosh. He had not the advantage of living in an age when a letter to the press recommending the removal of tariffs, or an article on foreign policy, by some best-selling writer of fiction, is in demand to the exclusion of those who may happen to have made a life study of these subjects. It is today patent that Miss X's music-hall sketches give her an especial influence in a democracy to move the electorate in the appropriate direction. The press and magazines are at the disposition, to sway opinion, of those who are eminently well known, it is immaterial for what. When James Mill outlined his scheme of representative government or sketched the future of education, in the days of the influence of the *Edinburgh* and the *Quarterly* magazines—looked forward to the guiding influence of the sober and reflective middle class—he did not contemplate these brisk developments. He was, indeed, a heavy fellow and, as Sir Leslie Stephen observes, it is not remarkable that his death was less lamented than that of the dissipated but amiable pillar of Church and State, Samuel Taylor Coleridge—who nevertheless took his German philosophy even too seriously.† Coleridge roundly damned those who demand "a French style . . . for those to comprehend who labour under the more pitiable asthma of a short-witted intellect." Both men tended to scold the Public. And, to put it briefly, James was bad-tempered.

* *Cf.* p. 314.
† *Cf.* p. 497.

2

JOHN STUART MILL (1806–1873), his son, was the chief sufferer. His education (which, nevertheless, in his *Autobiography*, he loyally defends as the best that could be done for an average sort of boy) has been happily compared to the refinements of the Spanish Inquisition. The unhappy child, in a household which held to the maxim that the mind is determined by the fit environmental stimulus, began Greek at the age of three under the watchful eye of James Mill, "one of the most impatient of men." At eight he records that he had completed all Herodotus, much of Diogenes Laertius' *Lives of the Philosophers* and Isocrates' *Ad Demonicum*. He had also read Plato's *Thœatetus*, "which last dialogue, I venture to think, would have been better omitted, as it was totally impossible I should understand it." "Of children's books, any more than of playthings, I had scarcely any, except an occasional gift from a relation or acquaintance." Aged eleven, the young Mill had begun "a History of the Roman Government, compiled from Livy and Dionysius."

The child was father to the man. At the age of twenty-three he withdrew from the Debating Society that he had been largely instrumental in founding. "I had enough of speech making." At the age of thirty-two he had already been an editor of the *London and Westminster Magazine*, and had resigned that post. In 1841, having completed his *System of Logic* he offered it to the publisher, Murray, but had the mortification of having it rejected; it was, however, published in 1843 and, oddly enough, came to be referred to, presumably in praise in the days before Green and Bradley, as "the Oxfordman's Bible." Until J. M. Keynes' *Treatise on Probability* it was to remain the major work on inductive logic. More immediately successful was the *Principles of Political Economy* (1848). At thirty-six, in the East India Company's offices and before long to become chief Examiner in his turn, he writes in his *Autobiography*, "From this time, what is worth relating of my life will come into a very small compass; for I have no further mental changes to tell of, but only, as I hope, a continued mental progress."

He had three sessions of Parliament, as Member for Westminster, still ahead of him. Having, however, firmly informed the party managers and electors that he did not propose to contribute to the funds of the former (although he did contribute to those of the unpopular pioneer, Bradlaugh) or to "undertake to give any of my time or labour to their local interests" or jobbing demands, it is not surprising

that, in 1868, the said electors repented themselves of electing anyone so high-minded. What is perhaps surprising is that Mill was ever elected at all. Apparently, Mill, having told a large working-class audience that the British workers (although better than those abroad) were generally liars, this statement so startled the voters with delight that they put him in. In Parliament he was concerned with the Irish question and the condition of the peasantry; women's suffrage and suffrage for manual workers; the paying off of the National Debt before the coal supplies of Britain were exhausted; and—an admirable cause—the prosecution of Governor Eyre for his treatment by court martial of the disturbances in Jamaica.

It was, he tells us in his *Autobiography*, on mounting the steps of the Capitol at Rome, in 1855, that Mill decided to publish as a volume his famous essay *On Liberty* (1859), to be followed by the *Considerations on Representative Government* (1861) and by the writing of *The Subjection of Women*, only published (in 1869) after his parliamentary defeat. The first and last of these books, as well as the famous chapter "On the Probable Futurity of the Labouring Classes," in *Principles of Political Economy*, were, Mill assures us, written under the influence of Mrs. Helen Taylor, later Mill's wife. Although it has been customary, among Mill's admirers, to minimize this influence over him which he ascribes to Mrs. Taylor, I see no reason to doubt that this impression of an obviously able and intellectually integrated woman upon a highly susceptible and over-educated man was very great indeed.

The amazing education to which John Stuart Mill had been subjected by his father had two uncalculated effects. One was to produce—at the age of twenty—what Mill dignifies as "a crisis in my mental history." The other was to produce a conscience which was to affect his philosophy. Mill had indeed, by a precocity which his contemporaries confused with conceit, completely exhausted his nervous system. A cloud of melancholia descended upon him. He, who had hoped to be "a reformer of the world," asked himself gravely whether, could all the Benthamite changes to which he had been looking forward be effected as by a miracle, he would then be full of joy and happiness—the greatest number acclaiming with hallelujahs the greatest happiness according to the felicific calculus. "And an irrepressible self-consciousness distinctly answered, 'No!' At this my heart sank within me: the whole foundation on which my life was constructed fell down."

Mr. John Taylor was a dry-salter or druggist. His grandfather had lived in the next house to James Mill in Newington Green, London. John Stuart Mill rediscovered Mr. Taylor—and incidentally discovered

Mrs. Taylor—in 1830. Taylor was "a most upright, brave, and honourable man, of liberal opinions and good education, but without the intellectual and artistic tastes which would have made him a companion for her." Mrs. Helen Taylor, daughter of the lord of the manor of Birksgate, was such that "in thought and intellect, Shelley, so far as his powers were developed in his short life, was but a child compared with what she ultimately became." John Stuart was also an honourable man, and most high-minded. She was twenty-three and he was twenty-five, just recovering from Bentham. Mr. John Taylor obligingly took to the habit of dining out every Tuesday evening, and John Stuart dined with Mrs. Taylor. Later Mrs. Taylor lived alone in a cottage in the country with her daughter and occasionally she and Mr. Mill travelled together. Mill states that the relation was purely platonic and, since Mr. Mill was a man who would have despised a lie, the evidence may be taken to be convincing that this was in fact the case.

The psychological effects were as might have been anticipated. "Was the private life of Mill on the whole praiseworthy, or was much of his conduct in the highest degree reprehensible?" asks, in a biographical note, his step-granddaughter. If praiseworthiness is won by pain of good intentions, the answer is not in doubt. In his youthful writings—one easily forgets how youthful—Mill has a high-flown immaturity of sentiment. But Mill was never really young; nor, again, ever quite mature. All his life he was a middle-aged middle-class mid-Victorian. And, as time passes, he becomes almost oppressively noble. The romantic, intellectual, dissatisfied Helen made John Stuart Mill not only a feminist but the Marcus Aurelius of the nineteenth century. After twenty-one years (Taylor being dead) he married the lady. The Mill family (James also being dead) coolly disapproved. John Stuart chivalrously quarrelled with them.

Mill, we have said, developed a conscience; and this affects his philosophy. A conscience, and above all a virulent conscience (of which the utility was undemonstrable), was not explicitly allowed for by the Utilitarian philosophers. They were the dour book-keepers of pleasure —Scotsmen, suspicious of such intangibilities. It was, however, an inevitable product of their mood. Of James Mill, John Stuart writes,

> He would sometimes say, that if life were made what it might be, by good government and good education, it would be worth having: but he never spoke with anything like enthusiasm even of that possibility. He never varied in rating intellectual enjoyments above all others, even in value as pleasures, independently of their ulterior benefits. . . . For passionate emotions of all sorts, and for everything which has been seen or written in exaltation of them,

Chapter XIII

Individualists and Anarchists

1

JOHN STUART MILL marks the end of an epoch and is himself, although but partly consciously, transitional to a new age. Not all, however, were aware that the epoch was closing and that Cobden and the Manchester School—the politicians and economists who stood for one hundred per cent laissez-faire at home and Free Trade abroad—were not immortal.

In 1848, the editor of the *Economist* wrote about the Public Health Act, "suffering and evil are nature's admonitions; they cannot be got rid of; and the impatient attempts of benevolence to banish them from the world by legislation before it had learned their object and their end, have always been productive of more evil than good." It was in this spirit of economic orthodoxy that Gladstone's colleague, the great, religious and philanthropic politician, John Bright, maintained the "right" of children, of thirteen years and over, to work for longer than from 6.30 A.M. to 8.00 P.M.; and also argued against the placing of duties on slave-grown sugar imports.

The watchwords of the Manchester School were individual initiative: intelligent self-interest sanctioned (as said Paley and Whately) by God Himself; the natural and providential laws of economics; the right of a man to do what he will with his own; distrust of government; no interference with property; no government in business; and that the greatness of a nation depended on its industrial and commercial leaders, not its soldiers and politicians.

The mood persisted in the United States later than in Britain. It was directly connected with the Locke-Jefferson tradition. It was left for Mr. Justice Holmes to point out, to his colleagues of the Supreme Court of the United States, that their function was not to "enact M. Herbert Spencer's *Social Statics*."

HERBERT SPENCER (1820–1903) wings his solitary, individualistic flight across the scenes, after the rest of his breed have flown. His is the spirit of the classical economy—of Dupont de Nemours who declared that Natural Right is the right of a man to do that which is to his own advantage: "We are charged with our own preservation under penalty of suffering and death . . . the final degree of punishment decreed by this sovereign law is superior to every other interest and to every arbitrary law." It was on this basis that Spencer, in the days of and after Darwin, reconciled his individualism with his belief in a social organism and in sociology as a super-biology. To Herbert Spencer as exponent of political methodology and co-founder of sociology we shall return later.* Here we are only concerned with his political philosophy—begotten on the spirit of the classic economy by late Victorian Philistinism. "How, Mr. Spencer," asked George Eliot, "is it that there are no wrinkles on your forehead?" His reply was that he was never puzzled. His commentator's remark is that whenever he was confronted with a problem where solution was not obvious to him he would push it aside, and "abandon all conscious effort to solve it . . . no conscious effort, no weary drudgery or labour, nothing that education can ever supply; simply a succession of sudden inward flashes illuminating the whole of the darkened field."

Spencer was a self-educated man. In his case indeed the Almighty was relieved of a great responsibility. And he was precocious. A trained engineer at the age of seventeen, he was sub-editor of a journal called *The Pilot* at twenty-four. By the age of thirty he was editor of *The Economist*, and had published his *Social Statics*, in which he maintained the right of the law-abiding individual to "ignore" the state. His subsequent writings, in which he developed his Synthetic Philosophy, covered the fields of metaphysics and physics, biology, psychology and sociology. His broad biological knowledge and sudden inward flashes enabled him to detect the similarity between Mr. Gladstone, at once the Liberal leader (whom he respected) and the High Churchman (whom he detested) and an amphibian or frog, sometimes on dry land and sometimes sliding back into "the slimy waters of ecclesiasticism." Also he wrote his *Autobiography* in three volumes.

Frankly, the Bulwer Lyttons, who took him with them to Egypt, found him rather a bore. I cannot, however, agree with Mr. Keith Feiling that he was substantially without influence on his own times. Indeed no less a person than Somerset Maugham records his indebtedness. It is true that Spencer records, with horror, that the Cobden Club Prize of 1880 had been awarded to an essay referring to truth as

* *Cf.* p. 747.

being clouded over "by the *laissez-faire* fallacy!" Although the tide was running against him (and it would be grossly unfair to Spencer to conceal that he admitted this), his influence in Britain as a priest of Manchesterism and, still more, in America, was very far from inconsiderable.

The *Social Statics* (1850) of his earlier days—to which we shall revert—he declared later did not do justice to his more mature political thought. However, in the introduction to the articles republished as *The Man versus the State* (1884), Spencer stated that the views contained in this last were those he had held for twenty-four years unaltered. They may, therefore, be presumably taken as authoritative.

> Regulations have been made in yearly-growing numbers, restraining the citizen in directions where his actions were previously unchecked, and compelling actions which previously he might perform or not as he liked; and at the same time heavier public burdens, chiefly local, have further restricted his freedom, by lessening that portion of his earnings which he can spend as he pleases, and augmenting the portion taken from him to be spent as public agents please.

The Liberals had become Tories, if of a new type. Social legislation was pouring from the legislative mill—Bakehouse Regulation Act, Seed Supply (Ireland) Act, Cheap Trains Act—all of a kind with the bad, restrictive regulations of the Middle Ages against which Adam Smith had arisen in judgement. All, interferences with the law of supply and demand. "Everyone must see," observes Spencer in irony, "that the edicts issued by Henry VIII to prevent the lower classes from playing dice, cards, bowls, etc., were not more prompted by desire for popular welfare than were the Acts passed of late to check gambling."

Frankly, Spencer has no use for this legislation to protect the morals or—which is different—even to improve the condition of what he, the self-made man, refers to without inhibition as "the lower classes." Here he parts company with Mill. For Spencer there *are* lower classes, and these by Nature's law and Darwin's gospel—"good-for-nothings, who in one way or other live on the good-for-somethings." The notorious Jukeses—two hundred criminals from one "gutter-child," Margaret—are brought into the argument. Why there should be "gutter-children," and whether the two hundred came from the gutter or the child, disturbed the Blessed Thomas More but not Herbert Spencer.

Spencer is horrified that someone had even referred to the need for organizing pleasure as much as work. This social legislation has a

momentum. Where will it end? Certainly in a rise in taxes . . . ultimately in slavery. For "all socialism involves slavery." See Rome, and its fall. "Increase of public burdens may end in forced cultivation under public control. . . . Liberties must be surrendered in proportion as their material welfares are cared for." "Surely," exclaims an objector, "you would not have this misery continue!" But this sentiment is moved by three ideas, all wrong: that all suffering ought to be prevented [it is not Nature's way]; that evils moved from one place are not moved into another; that the State is the appropriate instrument for reform. It is a delusion that an "ill-working humanity may be framed into well-working institutions."

There is more than a touch of belief in Original Sin in Spencer—as it were, economic original sin. But if man is salvable, the Collective Bureaucrat is not. "It is not to the State that we owe the multitudinous useful inventions from the spade to the telephone." The communal régime appropriate for the family of young, the Family Ethics, must be grown out of and repudiated in mature life, when to further the inferior individual is to degrade the species. No society "will be able to hold its own in the struggle with other societies, if it disadvantages its superior units that it may advantage its inferior units." There is a "discipline pitiless in the working out of good." Interfering benevolent social legislation penalizes the Poor Richards, the "widow who washes or sews from dawn to dark to feed her fatherless little ones," the thrifty, the hard-working self-helpers who are Nature's favourites. And the very people who use this humanitarian argument are quite unshocked by sending thousands to be slaughtered in a war.

For Spencer the forces of reaction are the forces of militarism—as a Sociologist he scientifically knows this. And the forces of progress are those of industry. Before we listen to the objections of men who talk of the oppressiveness of healthy industrial competition, let us know whether they will or will not recruit men to be slaughtered in a war or a class civil war. Malthus and Darwin are right: we must have some selective agencies. Which?

Will not, however, the majority take the bit between their teeth—make regulations, whatever sociologists may say, to suit their own immediate convenience? Spencer himself condemns a "political serfdom of the unrepresented." What about the sovereignty of Parliament?

There we come round again to the proposition that *the assumed divine right of parliaments, and the implied divine right of majorities, are superstitions.* While men have abandoned the old theory respecting the source of State-authority, they have retained a belief in that unlimited extent of State-

authority which rightly accompanied the old theory, but does not rightly accompany the new one. Unrestricted power over subjects, rationally ascribed to the ruling man when he was held to be a deputy-god, is now ascribed to the ruling body, the deputy godhood of which nobody asserts. . . . The function of Liberalism in the past was that of putting a limit to the power of Kings. The function of true Liberalism in the future will be that of putting a limit to the power of Parliaments.

This sovereignty of the majority is the Great Political Superstition which leads to the Coming Slavery. It is not so in primitive societies: "the peaceful Arafuras" recognize the rights of property without there being any authority over them; there is "scrupulous regard for one another's claims among the Todos, Santals, Lepchas, Bodo, Chakmas, Jakuns, etc.," even among "the utterly uncivilized Wood-Veddahs." In Ashantee [far Ashantee] the attempt to change some customs, doubtless matrimonial, has caused a king's dethronement.

The Tory and the Socialist are yoke horses pulling towards this slavery—both militarists at heart. Now,

by the survival of the fittest, the militant type of society becomes characterized by profound faith in the governing power, joined with a loyalty causing submission to it in all matters whatever. And there must tend to be established among those who speculate about political affairs in a militant society, a theory giving form to the needful ideas and feelings; accompanied by assertions that the law-giver if not divine in nature is divinely directed, and that unlimited obedience to him is divinely ordered . . . in Russia, where that universality of State-regulation which characterizes the militant type of society has been carried furthest, we see this ambition pushed to its extreme. Says Mr. Wallace, quoting a passage from a play: "All men, even shopkeepers and cobblers, aim at becoming officers, and the man who has passed his whole life without official rank seems to be not a human being."

That, although not unanticipated by Plato, was not a false prophecy on Spencer's part. What, then, can make headway against this human tendency to fetish worship? Only the principles of an industrial civilization—peaceful if competitive (the next evolutionary stage on in the biological struggle). "In the absence of an agreement, the supremacy of a majority over a minority does not exist at all. . . . The real issue is whether the lives of citizens are more interfered with than they were; not the nature of the agency which interferes with them." There are indeed natural rights. And, although there was no Original Social Contract, common sense indicates that the limits of state action lie in agreement—*not* majority agreement, but the agreement of all, *i.e.*, the terms upon which men would *now* be prepared to

enter upon civil society (not the same thing, as Locke showed long ago, as natural society) if a Social Contract were instantly proposed to them. Spencer, as a sociologist, knows that the Quakers are dying out. Therefore measures for defensive (not offensive) warfare, and for domestic security, including the enforcement of contracts, would win universal consent. So also, oddly enough, assent would be given to the thesis: that the will of the majority should prevail on "the use of the territory . . . the modes in which, and conditions under which, parts of the surface or sub-surface, may be utilized . . . the terms on which portions of it might be employed for raising food, for making means of communication, and for other purposes."

What then of utility? The utilitarians are at fault, as customarily expounded. Immediate utility is no adequate touchstone of legislation. There are, adds Spencer, with more wisdom than is his wont, natural laws. How can the ultimate rights of the people flow from a popular sovereign which this people has created, as Matthew Arnold seems foolishly to maintain?

> The changes of law now from time to time made after resistance, are similarly made in pursuance of current ideas concerning the requirements of justice: ideas which, instead of being derived from the law, are opposed to the law. For example, that recent Act which gives to a married woman a right of property in her own earnings, evidently originated in the consciousness that the natural connexion between labour expended and benefit enjoyed, is one which should be maintained in all cases. The reformed law did not create the right, but recognition of the right created the reformed law.

Might not then social legislation be dictated by a recognition of the "requirements of justice" and by an attempt to give expression to the natural rights of man based on his instinct for freedom to develop, for good health, and for adequate play? Spencer is at pains to insist that the Course of Evolution is not some external Fate—would be different if, *e.g.*, the philanthropic impulses were not there. What is required is the "uniting philanthropic energy with philosophic calm"—this presumably would lead to the maximum integration of personality with the minimum dissipation of force. What precise shape that philanthropy would take is not quite clear; but undoubtedly it would facilitate the survival of the fittest—that is, of those fittest to survive, or the success of the successful. Which, in itself, is a glittering prize. But to Mr. Hyndman's Social Democratic Federation notion of "agricultural and industrial *armies* under State-control," however immediately successful as a competitive instrument, Spencer took the

strongest exception. "Be it or be it not true that Man is shapen in iniquity and conceived in sin, it is unquestionably true that Government is begotten of aggression [this is not Pope Gregory VII, but Herbert Spencer] and by aggression."

Herbert Spencer never contemplated the possibility that the extension of economic security might be the guaranty of day-by-day liberty. He could only see that the final political liberties were not worth sacrificing to subordinate economic securities. In his *Principles of Ethics*, Part IV (1891), Spencer provided a formula of just liberty which he had anticipated in *Social Statics*. "Every man is free to do that which he wills, provided that he infringes not the equal freedom of any other man." In the *Social Statics* Spencer had claimed this formula as an original discovery. Professor F. W. Maitland pointed out that Kant had said it a century earlier, and in the *Principles*, appendix, Spencer handsomely admits that "among the tracks of thought pursued by multitudinous minds in the course of ages, nearly all must have been entered upon, if not explored," although of course Kant was only an a-priori philosopher.

Nor could Spencer see that the law of supply and demand is no less interfered with by the graining and directing of supply, arbitrarily in certain societies, in accordance with the demands of the rich—whether the law tolerates the rich made such by creative gifts and by hard work only; or also by speculation and by confiscation; or even by straight brigandage and (as among moss-riders) honest theft—as it is by the encouragement of demand by man-made social arrangements. Concerning such minutiae of social "pull" the laws were apparently to be silent.

"*Administrative Nihilism*" was the name that the great scientist, Thomas Huxley (1825–1895), gave to Spencer's scheme. However, the criticism of Herbert Spencer's political theory is best left until we have reviewed the opposing collectivist movement which was receiving inspiration from Germany. It was to Germany that Herbert Spencer himself turned, with his appeal to the *Natur-recht* philosophers, as it had been to Germany that the younger Mill, as well as Coleridge and Carlyle, turned. Let us, then, view the development, first, of individualistic philosophy in that land of Luther and of the claim of the Protestant conscience.

2

IMMANUEL KANT (1724–1804), Scotsman by descent, son of a Königsberg saddler, is almost the first of a long line of philosophers of the

chair. In the history of political theory, professional academics have hitherto been conspicuous by their absence. The great philosophers have been even soldiers, such as Descartes; men of the world, such as Hume; have, like Leibnitz, moved at courts. Kant scarcely wandered outside his own town, and after two applications for professorial rank had been refused, in 1770 settled down as Professor of Logic at Königsberg, with the reputation of a taste for astronomy and ethnology.

Twice he contemplated marriage but was unable to discover an appropriate formula of proposal. He contented himself with developing, in his anthropological lectures, the theory that the human baby must once have been very different since, had it howled in the jungle as loudly as it howled in Königsberg, it would assuredly have been devoured by wild animals. He also held that, in this rational universe, the other planets were probably inhabited. There was no reason to suppose, in these earlier days, that Dr. Kant would ever set either Thames or Pregel afire. He was a methodical man who, according to the poet Heine, took his afternoon "constitutional" so punctually that Königsberg citizens could set their clocks by him; practised breathing through the nose; and would place his handkerchief on the other side of the room in order to have perforce the exercise, when he desired to blow his nose, of walking across his room. A man of whimsical humours, Immanuel Kant was profoundly shocked by Hume, who had taken the lynch-pin of Cause out of the world, and left only Association—no *necessary* cause and effect; only *probable* association; no logic; no syllogistic reason; no rational universe; perhaps no God . . . although Hume, with customary bravura, had said that only a sceptic about truth could be a loyal member of the Church of England. Now Hume had rested his argument on Locke's thesis that knowledge is ultimately derived from the senses. "My question," says Kant, "is what we can hope to achieve with reason, when all the material and assistance of experience are taken away." That is the topic of the *Critique of Pure Reason* (1781).

Kant established to his own satisfaction the *a priori* moulding power of mind; but incidentally admitted that, although there was a Thing-in-itself (not only Berkeley's God on the other side of the veil, throwing upon the screen of mind the Universe itself as one great Fantasy), man could not know it. What then? Has not Kant himself shown that we cannot know God, how He exists, where He exists, perhaps if He exists? "They say," melancholically explained Kant to his friend, confidant and man-servant Lampe, "that, in my book, I have taken away God." "Do not trouble, Herr Professor," replied Lampe, "write

another book and put him back again." Kant's mother had been a religious rigorist of the German Pietist persuasion. Never had her son doubted these values or that there was a moral order of the universe. Dr. Kant took up his pen. There was a Practical, a Moral Judgement. In his *Critique of the Practical Reason* he showed God as the Author of the Moral Universe, nay as the guarantor that there was that universe. God must be because a moral world must be: and the moral world must be because God was. Briefly, Kant returns to the Protestant moral sense. Man *knows* that justice is good; and the world is worthless to him unless his value is realized—at least in the long, long run. We are not far from St. Thomas' doctrine of the implanted promise of immortality and divine justice.

The moral sense is then the key word, conscience: its categorical imperative, duty. What application has this to Politics? For one thing, a categorical imperative to build a League of Nations, and without delay. To this theme we shall revert.* For another, a basic, *a priori* theory of Liberty and Right. Kant must go carefully here. He is a salaried German professor, *i.e.*, a civil servant of the Prussian Government. The *Critique of Pure Reason*, scandalous to the orthodox, was published under the great Frederick. His nephew was of a pettier mould. And, categorical imperative or no categorical imperative, Frederick William II was King of Prussia. "If everything you say has to be true, it is yet not your duty to tell the whole truth in public," writes Kant on a revealing slip of paper—but also "To deny one's inner convictions is mean." Not until Rousseau's *Social Contract* had come by the mail-coach to Königsberg and, for once, the afternoon "constitutional" had been interrupted, had Kant ever been interested in politics. Cursed fate that he, metaphysician and humanist, had this categorical urge to write on these impassioned issues of politics and religion.

It is a fashionable belief today, much encouraged by journalists, that lucidity is the test of a great mind. The history of great minds unfortunately does not bear the thesis out. They have preferred accuracy. Kant, who scarcely achieved correct grammar, certainly cannot be accused of lucidity. In a pamphlet on *Principles of Political Right* (1793), marvellously contorted in style and written against Hobbes, all the machinery of the *a priori* metaphysical steam hammer is used to show that resistance to the Head of the State, who is above the law, is the worst of crimes. It conduces to Anarchy, with all its abominations. Indeed if those who had led the revolutions in Britain,

* *Cf.* p. 700.

Switzerland and so forth had only failed, they would have been regarded as great political criminals. So much for the demolition of one Dr. Achenwall, who had seemed to maintain the opposite—and not much here with which Hobbes would disagree.

What then? There are, Kant says, certain rights, founded on rational principles, which the Head of the State *ought* to respect. Such rights are: liberty as a man and equality as a subject, *i.e.*, equality before the law. "Right in general may be defined as the limitation of the freedom of any individual to the extent of its agreement with the freedom of all other individuals, in so far as this is possible by a universal law." There is no right where a violation is involved of this principle of impartiality. A pyramidical society built with the hierarchy of *ability* is right and proper: a nobility, exercising power, with status determined by *birth*, violates the principle of right. If, of course, the ruler does not in fact respect these rights, at least we have the satisfaction of knowing that the ruler is doing what is "not done."

What of progress? For one thing, this will be aided by the Liberty of the Press which Kant, as a bold pioneer out there in East Prussia, thinks the ruler ought to respect. But there is another guaranty. It is sometimes asserted that no one has expressed a belief in automatic Progress. This, however, is precisely what Kant, in *The Principle of Progress*, does express.

*Fata volentem ducunt, nolentem trahunt.** Under the Nature of things, Human Nature is also to be taken into account; and as in human nature there is always a living respect for Right and Duty, I neither can nor will regard it as so sunk in evil that the practical moral Reason could ultimately fail to triumph over this evil, even after many of its attempts have failed.

Briefly, for Kant the Moral Reason is a substance, a presiding entity, otherwise called Providence. No wonder, therefore, that rebellion is superfluous.

What matters, for Kant, is Duty, *not* Happiness. It is the opposite thesis to that of Locke and his followers. Happiness is the lax, chaotic, experimental principle, not at all logical, like Duty. It is interesting in this connection to observe how Kant treats social or civil Liberty.

No one has a right to compel me to be happy in the peculiar way in which he may think of the well-being of other men; but everyone is entitled to seek his own happiness in the way that seems to him best, if it does not infringe the liberty of others in striving after a similar end for themselves when their

* "The Fates lead the willing, drag the resisting."

> Liberty is capable of consisting with the Right of Liberty in all others according to possible universal laws. . . . Such a Government would be the greatest conceivable despotism.

This strangely involved, anti-utilitarian formula is not to be taken as reactionary. It is a covert attack upon Benevolent Despotism—and, incidentally, upon Catholicism and Platonism, both of which claimed to know, better than the individual, how each man should avoid that true unhappiness and slavery which is sin. When a Government decides to ensure not Justice but Happiness for its people, it is on the road to Despotism—a thesis not without relevance to contemporary Moscow, Berlin and Rome.

Kant argues that each man, exercising his own Protestant spiritual freedom—and Kant is, even unwittingly, the man who gave Protestantism a belated philosophy—must make the discovery of what is sin for himself, guided by rational maxims and the intuitive light of conscience. Intimately connected with this is Kant's famous maxim that *each man must be treated* (being an immortal, free soul, having value because of that freedom of will) *as an end in himself and not as a means*. No wonder Kant proceeds to a denunciation, bitter for him, of war and of the spending of money on arms. His doctrine is the antithesis of the Catholic one of the Social Organism.

Wilhelm von Humboldt describes Kant's political writings as "on the whole, not very important." Bertrand Russell has gone farther and has described him as "a mere misfortune." There is, however, one brief pamphlet, not less obscure in diction than most of Kant's writings, of which every word requires to be weighed. The place to discuss this profound little study is in a work on methodology. Shortly, however, the argument is again one of inevitable development. Again we are told that Nature—which is a *sobriquet* for Bishop Bossuet's God—has "designs" in history. But the point of the argument is that the social order (as indeed Hobbes said) comes out of men's egoistic natures. Even without their conscious collaboration or any formal compacts (and Kant restates a doctrine of a rational, tacit contract) men have to discover, if life is to be tolerable, a *modus vivendi* in civil society through government. Their very natures goad them on. But—and this is the contribution—this original egoistic nature is not merely nasty and brutish. On the contrary, it is precisely man's claim, of infinite value, to Liberty that is the original motive force which constructs Authority as that sanction of Law which regulates just Liberty.

The means which Nature employs to bring about the development of all the capacities implanted in men, is *their mutual Antagonism in society*, but only so far as this antagonism becomes at length the cause of an Order among them that is regulated by Law.

Kant here comes as near as any writer to insight into the essential relation of Liberty and Authority. It is a theme developed later, at great length, by Professor Rudolf von Ihering in his *Law as a Means to an End* (1877).

Kant's views on happiness so far colour his political theory as to demand comment. Not happiness but duty, ordered by the categorical imperative of conscience and delineated by reason, is the true guide for individual conduct. It must be remembered that the whole background of the German thought of this period, from Leibnitz on through Wolff, is mathematical and abstract. This and Protestantism are the dominant influences.

Reason prescribes to men so to behave as they could suppose it would be good if all behaved in the same fashion—*ceteris paribus* (but Kant did not add *ceteris paribus*).* No privilege in morals, no indulgence. What, however, is the final object of the performance of duty—what object for society? Moral progress, is Kant's answer, thanks to life in accordance with reason. Admit that we have eternity before us in which immortal souls will have the justice done them which they lacked in their lifetime, what yet is the content of this justice and moral progress? Is it not, for example, the development of benevolence and the enjoyment of it? The answer is that, the enlargement of human happiness apart, Kant visualizes, as the end of progress, the development of human powers as such, of the creative rational powers, and especially of the rational respect for justice. However removed from the manners of the ape, this may seem an arid and cheerless prospect; but of justice Kant says, "*If justice perishes it is of no value any longer that man live on the earth.*" It is an heroic affirmation of the importance in civilization of values.

Injustice, however, still lived on the earth. There was Kant—but there was also Frederick William II. In 1794 the King of Prussia issued his decree. The great formalist philosopher was accused of desecrating the dogmas of Scripture. What now was Kant's "duty"? He collapsed —promised to write and speak no more on religion. The Delphic Oracle of conscience had given forth an uncertain sound—should *all* deny the truth that was in them? or, again, should *all* resist their lawful sov-

* "Other things being equal."

ereign? It was poor Archbishop Cranmer's old problem. A fortunate but irrational accident solved the high moral dilemma, most informally. Frederick William died; and Kant lived to fight again and write the *Contest of the Faculties*. The social battle of liberty and authority had reproduced itself—but conveniently, *inside* the mind of Kant, as between its faculties. Kant, after all, was a critical idealist.

WILHELM VON HUMBOLDT (1767–1835) was the especial source of inspiration, as we have said, of John Stuart Mill in his third phase. Like Kant, von Humboldt had read his Rousseau and had been profoundly influenced by the romantic individualism of the author of *Émile*. The important line, however, of spiritual inheritance is to Mill through von Humboldt from his friend, the poet, Wolfgang von Goethe (1749–1832). The school, growing up at the end of the age of Lessing and Winckelmann, in its wider circle includes Novalis with his cult of "the beautiful soul" and comes to terms with the Christian religion through a revived mysticism. In England, in its more strictly classical form, it finds expression in Matthew Arnold and his group and even in Walter Pater with his famous injunction "to burn always with this hard, gem-like flame."

The great Goethe himself was a pacifist who yet recognized in Napoleon a world-spirit; a poet who felt that some new Cervantes was needed to write some new *Don Quixote* ridiculing the duellings about honour of the nations; an administrator who frankly preferred order to liberty with disorder. It was, after all, always possible to retire to one's estate and "cultivate one's garden" under tyranny (but not under mass violence), although Goethe was philosopher anarchist to the point of objecting to growth of regulation, at least for creative minds.

Goethe's thought was developed against the background of Benevolent Despotism—and of the French Revolution. Frankly, he preferred the despotism to the popular revolution, provided the despotism were enlightened. As Voltaire had said, rather be governed by one lion than by "a hundred subaltern tigers." Thomas Carlyle, we shall see, was Goethe's, perhaps wrong-headed, disciple. The Goethean attitude tends to develop as a belief that "politics" is relatively unimportant; as a belief that there are more important things "beyond politics"; as mysticism or even as that poor bungle, "art for art's sake." So far as this will bear examination it is a view close to that of St. Thomas, that the Catholic Church is unconcerned about forms of secular government, provided that the Church might live its own

[corporate] life in its own way. The Goethean view is based upon a profound cynicism concerning the slogans for which men fight—"justice," "liberty," "nationality," "democracy"; upon a magnificent indifference to how they earn their bread and still more their butter; upon a belief that one could be tolerant of any civil regime that did not poke its secular dirty fingers into the development of a creative civilization; and upon a contempt for fools who indulged in the otiose sport of making themselves objectionable to the men of blood and the government. It could appreciate Schiller's apostrophe of Wallenstein as the hero; but, for the mass, it was best for them to recognize that they could not draw the bow of Ulysses and there was much to be said for Bishop Berkeley's doctrine of passive obedience, the little flaccid brother of non-violent resistance.

The outlook is through and through aristocratic—concerned with freedom for the creator, the genius, the world-controller, but not troubling its head about the mass, Mr. Aldous Huxley's "betas" and "gammas." It has not confronted the Catholic issue, as St. Thomas had, of the ordering of the corporate life and of the objective, actual relations between spiritual and temporal, eternal and secular, the few concerned with ideal vocation and the many concerned with food and drink. It had a "good view" of human nature and hoped for the best. When disappointed, philosophic anarchism tended to change its tune, as we shall see. In Goethe's case, however, the combination of individualism and tradition, individualism enriched into personality by the nourish-milk of tradition in culture—the recognition of a Grand Tradition along with Faustian quest—is so profound as to save Goethe from this fate. Although riding a Teutonic horse of Imagination—*furor teutonicus*—restive under the rein, Goethe maintained Reason, the Reason of Hellene and Schoolman, Humanist and Scientist, still as charioteer. Another generation, and the charioteer is thrown.

The Prussian nobleman, ambassador, minister of Public Instruction, von Humboldt, shares with the French nobleman, Mirabeau, a horror of "*la fureur de gouverner, la plus funeste maladie des gouvernements modernes.*" With Goethe, and after the style of the English Lord Shaftesbury, the stress is on the civilized cultivation of the personality. The emphasis in this philosophy has shifted from the abstract reason to the creative individual. There is a tendency to stress the meaning of chance, and a reaction against the French influence and its doctrine of rational progress. There is an immensely significant beginning of a reaction, following Rousseau, against systematic reason or the understanding; but still the development of personality

s to take place in accordance with "the eternal and commendable dictate of reason."

Von Humboldt writes to a feminine friend:

> In the events of the world and the events which whole states experience, the intrinsically important thing remains that which relates to the activity, the intellect and the feelings of individuals. Man is the centre everywhere and each human being remains in the end solitary.

Wilhelm von Humboldt is in many ways the rural solitary, interested in birds, engaging in politics in despite of himself. His admiration is for what Kant would have called the "self-dependent" peasant farmer. The bureaucrats of Berlin were upstart intruders. What matters is that individuals should learn, through their own choice, experience and discipline, how to live. So far as social aid was required, that of village and family was less injurious than that of the state. *The provision of security, and this alone, is the business of the state.* Von Humboldt's views on the end of man in the integration of a personality of developed powers was quoted by J. S. Mill and has already been cited here.* Happiness, in the Benthamite sense, this nobleman rejects, as the end of social action, in favour of a doctrine, semi-Kantian but far more Shaftesburian and aesthetic. He writes to Madam de Staël: "*L'homme n'est pas fait pour être précisément heureux, mais pour remplir l'existence telle que le sort l'a lui donnée.*"† In his *Ideas to Determine the Limits of State Activity* (1792, but discreetly not published in full until 1851), he writes:

> The happiness for which man is plainly destined, is no other than that which his own energies enable him to secure; and the very nature of such a self-dependent position furnishes him means whereby to discipline his intellect and cultivate his character. . . . This individual vigour, then, and manifold diversity, combine themselves in originality; and hence, that on which the consummate grandeur of our nature ultimately depends,—that towards which every human being must ceaselessly direct his efforts, and on which especially those who design to influence their fellow men must ever keep their eyes, is the individuality of Power and Development. . . . The evil results of a too extended solicitude on the part of the State, are still more strikingly manifested in the suppression of all active energy, and necessary deterioration of the moral character. . . . Any State interference in private affairs, not directly implying violence done to individual rights, should be absolutely condemned.

* *Cf.* p. 397.

† "Man is not made to be precisely happy, but to fulfil such an existence as his lot has given him." On this aesthetic judgment, *vide* Hume's *Treatise.*

Although von Humboldt is right in saying that state measures cannot always meet individual cases, it cannot be said that the recent flight of the Soviet aviators over the North Pole demonstrates that a regime of state solicitude necessarily destroys active energy, although it may, of course, liquidate unwanted variety.

This "rich variety" was the foundation stone of the political structure of von Humboldt and his followers. Unlike Hume he was not prepared to welcome a strong, authoritarian government, inculcating certain habits. And, unlike Hume, individualists of the type of von Humboldt regard the business of constitution-making with indifference, as mechanical. They would assert that their concern is with culture, not constitution-mongery. They would have approved of Aldous Huxley's "Savage," that "world-controller" *manqué* in *Brave New World* (1932), although of course a savage of a very cultivated order.

The influence of German Classical thought of the Goethe circle (deeply permeated indeed by Rousseauite Romanticism and specifically German non-classical influences) crossed, not only the Channel, but the Atlantic. Here it found an individualistic Protestantism of the eighteenth century, that was profoundly suspicious of the State but that had lost its early religious grip, awaiting refertilization. German immigrants were bringing their ideas, although more especially after 1848. Ralph Waldo Emerson (who, like Schopenhauer, was looking as far afield as India for inspiration) was listening for sounds of the Over-soul.

3

Henry Thoreau (1817–1862) was another of the bird-loving brethren. Son of the local pencil-maker in Concord, Harvard student, he took a room in the Emerson house until he decided, in 1845, to build a hut at Walden, fifteen feet by ten, with a borrowed axe and at a total cost of $28.12. Thoreau—flitting through the woods at nightfall, with a ledge inside his hat for botanical specimens; taking the reluctant Hawthorne down to the swamp's edge to look at the flora; daring to ask the fundamental question: "Why community?"

Thoreau had little patience even with the mild utopian (and not unsuccessful) experiment of Brook Farm. "I had rather keep bachelor's hall in hell than go to board in heaven." "Doing good," reforming others, was a foul thing. The aristocrat Jefferson had, like the aristocrat von Humboldt, praised the rural life. Henry Thoreau still found it feasible to practice it self-sufficiently. At other times Thoreau was

writer or township schoolmaster. Wilhelm von Humboldt had been minister of public instruction. It is interesting to note how many of these near-anarchists are educators—trying to form a theory of politics on the deeper basis of a theory of education.

Not that Henry Thoreau produces anything, in his *Essays*, very systematic. Disliking reformers, he yet found a hero in John Brown, the Slavery Abolitionist. Henry Thoreau, like Herbert Spencer, aspired to ignore the State. He was fastidious about paying taxes (others had a habit, being New Englanders and sympathetic, of paying them for him); he disapproved of too much that governments spend their money on. "Men," said William Penn, the Quaker, "must either be governed by God or they must be ruled by tyrants." The implicit belief, however, in that remark, in a natural "candle of reason," was not entirely appreciated by the whimsical Thoreau.

That government is best which governs not at all; and when men are prepared for it, that will be the kind of government which they will have. . . . *A government in which the majority rule in all cases cannot be based on justice, even as far as men understand it.* . . . I think we should be men first, and subjects afterward. It is not desirable to cultivate a respect for law, so much as for the right. . . . If a thousand men were not to pay their tax-bills this year, that would not be a violent bloody measure, as it would be to pay them, and enable the State to commit violence and shed innocent blood. . . . Under a government which imprisons any unjustly, the true place for a just man is also a prison. . . . Let your life be a counterfriction to stop the machine.

So Thoreau wrote in his essay on *Civil Disobedience* (1840). He adds, in a style reminiscent of Kant: "The character inherent in the American people has done all that has been accomplished; and it would have done somewhat more, if the government had not sometimes got in its way."

Thoreau returned to the thought and feeling of Rousseau, in his first phase of praise of the simple life.* "This world is a place of business," complains Thoreau, "there is no Sabbath." But Henry Thoreau was equally capable of praise of Thomas Carlyle. He is markworthy as an expression of the grand New England spirit, with its stress on personal liberty. There is a radical challenge in the phrase, "I feel that any connection with and obligation to society are still very slight and transient . . . The community has no bribe that will tempt a wise man." But it cannot be said that Thoreau has attained intellectual coherence. The statement, even today, has a certain vogue, "What is called politics is comparatively something so superficial and inhuman,

* *Cf.* p. 447.

that, practically, I have never fairly recognized that it concerns me at all." It is periodically echoed by literary critics. But it is not a wise saying, save in the one sense that civilization matters more than nation or class or party. Plato had better ideas.

The stately Emerson, friend of the Boston Brahmins, in his essay on Politics went to the extent of agreeing with his protégé Thoreau that "we live in a very low state of the world, and pay unwilling tribute to governments founded on force . . . with the appearance of the wise man, the State expires."

> Not the less does nature continue to fill the heart of youth with suggestions of this enthusiasm, and there are new men,—if indeed I can speak in the plural number,—more exactly, I will say, I have just been conversing with one man, to whom no weight of adverse experience will make it for a moment appear impossible, that thousands of human beings might exercise towards each other the grandest and simplest sentiments, as well as a knot of friends, or a pair of lovers.

4

Count Leo Tolstoi (1828–1910) lived in a different world from the schoolmaster of Concord. It was, however, also an agricultural world and one strongly impregnated with religion and the sense of sin. As Puritan Independency and Quakerism were in the air of America so Nihilism was (as we shall see*) in the air of the Russian Empire. In both countries the decay of conventional religion was leading to a re-examination of the basis of Christianity. Tolstoi, like Thoreau, was led by his meditations to a violent conviction of the iniquity of war, a distrust of the military state and an objection to the payment of taxes for these purposes. With this, moreover, for Tolstoi, as for Rousseau, was conjoined a reaction against an over-cultivated courtly civilization. Further, of learned exposition to the effect that Tolstoi's cure for social evils was founded upon, and limited by, his acquaintance with the Russian *mir* (village community) Thoreau's like theme is sufficient refutation.

Not that the Russian is not dominant in Tolstoi. There is in him a strongly masochistic vein, appearing in *The Kreutzer Sonata;* in *Resurrection;* and in his correspondence. (It shows in his countryman Dostoievski.) It affects his attitude—utterly un-Greek and un-Humanist—to civilization. The criticism of the Greek ideal must include consideration of the great Russian who maltreated his wife and returned to primitive Christianity.

* *Cf.* p. 427.

In his book *What Must We Do Then?* (1885) Tolstoi begins with a macabre description of the evils of contemporary society, peculiarly Russian. The life of the drunken prostitute, the penniless, consumptive laundry-maid is described. One could admire the imaginative human sympathy displayed, could one rid one's mind of a certain sense of zest in the description.

"I want to help my father by my labor," says a common un-learned man. "I want also to marry; but instead, I am taken and sent to Kazan, to be a soldier for six years. I leave the military service. I want to plough the ground, and earn food for my family; but I am not allowed to plough for one hundred versts around me, unless I pay money, which I have not got, and pay it to those men who do not understand how to plough, and who require for the land so much money, that I must give them all my labour to procure it: however, I still manage to save something, and I want to give my savings to my children; but a police sergeant comes to me, and takes from me all I have saved for taxes; I earn a little more, and am again deprived of it. All my activity is under the influence of state demands; and it appears to me that the bettering of my position, and that of my brethren, will follow our liberation from the demands of the state." But he is told, such reasoning is the result of his ignorance.

It is the *Ancien Régime*. What is its defence? The economists discuss supply and demand, but never ask the fundamental question: Why the State? They recognize the influence of the oppressor as a natural condition of the life of a people.

So-called science supports this superstition with all its power, and with the utmost zeal. This superstition resembles exactly the religious one, and consists in affirming, that, besides the duties of man to man, there are still more important duties towards an imaginary being, which theologians call God, and political science the State.

The state is then a system for raising taxes to protect property. But this property system is largely built up because some men free themselves from the labour, *the manual labour*, proper to all, and impose it on others. They are only entitled to do this if these, the few, regard themselves as beings of a different clay or at least having a special function; or if all men recognize this especial task as socially useful. But neither is true: there is no evidence of this special function. Ask the working man if he recognizes the utility of the priest, artist, royalty owner, shareholder, hereditary rich man, or civil servant. Let us have the simple life *au* Rousseau (*first* phase) and primitive communism which shall yet be so primitive as to be free and anarchist.

What is it, then, that confirms the theory that state activity is useful to men? Only the fact that those men who perform it, firmly believe it to be useful, and that it has been always in existence; but so have always been not only useless institutions, but very pernicious ones, like slavery, prostitution, and wars. . . . The lie is the same, because the men who justify themselves are in the same false position. The lie consists in the fact that, before beginning to reason about the advantages conferred on the people by men who have freed themselves from labor, certain men, Pharaohs, priests, or we ourselves,—educated people,—assume this position, and only afterwards excogitate the justification for it. . . .

Comte's positive philosophy and its outcome, the doctrine that mankind is an organism; Darwin's doctrine of the struggle for existence, directing life and its conclusion, the teaching of diversity of human races, the now so popular anthropology, biology, and sociology,—all have the same aim. These sciences have become favorites because they all serve for the justification of the existing fact of some men being able to free themselves from the human duty of labor, and to consume other men's labor.

Tolstoi, convinced of the sinfulness of his present life, renounced the title (although not always the manner) of a count, divested himself of his estate, being ultimately persuaded to make it over to his wife as guardian for the children—women's rights were "astounding nonsense": what mattered was the simple life; no competition for careers; and large families—and lived, so far as a count in Russia could, the life of the unwashed peasant, near to the soil.

What then was to happen to science, art and education? In each case their object was the benefit of the *moujik*. But with the peasant and worker they had—being so grand—lost all touch. These no longer understood. "Should we satisfy their want of knowledge by giving them spectrum analysis?" What is needed, remarks the world's greatest novelist in remorse about his fame, is proletarian art and science.

Food is, indeed, necessary, but perhaps what I offer is not food at all. This very thing has happened with our science and art. And to us it seems that when we add to a Greek word the termination *logy*, and call this science, it will be science indeed; and if we call an indecency, like the dancing of naked women, by the Greek word "choreography," and term it art, it will be art indeed.

But, however much we may say this, the business which we are about, in counting up the insects, and chemically analyzing the contents of the Milky Way, in painting water-nymphs and historical pictures, in writing novels, and in composing symphonies, this, our business, will not become science or art until it is willingly accepted by those for whom it is being done.

As for engineering developments, these might be well enough, but "owing to some unlucky chance, recognized, too, by men of science, this progress has not as yet ameliorated, but it has rather deteriorated, the condition of working men."

It is possible, and even justifiable, to dismiss Tolstoi's attitude to advance in civilization through science as (with Rousseau's, in his earlier phase*) frankly reactionary. Tolstoi, however, it will be observed, unlike Kant, is interested in happiness. But his trust, like that of those who lived in the great, still rural Republic of the West, is still in an agricultural happiness, discovered in pursuing the vocation of serving other people. And manual work. Before we dismiss this theory of culture which includes manual work in the regimen of the complete life, it is well to recall the like belief of those pioneers of civilization and beautiful buildings, beautiful music, beautiful painting, the Benedictine communists, with their prudent Rule.†

Prince Peter Kropotkin (1842–1921), the junior contemporary of Count Tolstoi, is more definitely connected with the explicitly political movements of the time. In Switzerland, in 1872, he came into touch with the Anarchist movement of Count Michael Bakunin; sacrificed a scientific career; was imprisoned; lived in England; and returned to his now Bolshevist homeland to die in the bitter distresses of those first Revolutionary years.

It is not perhaps merely accidental that so many of the leaders of philosophic anarchism have been noblemen. Possibly an aristocratic upbringing especially inclines a man, otherwise radical, to view the prejudices of vested interests, not with fear or ferocity and a sense of the need for collective attack, but with undisturbed contempt.

Kropotkin retained his technical interests. Much of his best known book, *Fields, Factories and Workshops* (1898), consists of an exposition of technological discoveries, especially in food and agriculture, and the possibilities they hold in store for lessening the servile and merely mechanical labour of human beings. The elaboration of machinery may indeed lead to such division of labour as to reduce human beings to automata. Here Kropotkin, as humanist, challenges Adam Smith. This division of labour must go no farther. There must be a reintegration especially between hand and brain—*éducation intégrale*. More sanely than Tolstoi, Kropotkin states the case, in education and in adult-life, for manual training and an admixture of manual work;

* *Cf.* p. 446.

† *Cf.* p. 143.

for a departure from the Free Trade principles of national division of labour and international exploitation of finance; and for a return of the worker to the countryside.

Again the theme is education. The Moscow Technical Institute, which is more satisfactory than President White's liberal scheme at Cornell University,

> perfectly well proved the possibility of combining a scientific education of a very high standard with the education which is necessary for becoming an excellent skilled labourer. . . . Under the pretext of division of labour, we have sharply separated the brain worker from the manual worker. . . . The parents either stupidly paralyse the passion [for invention], or do not know how to utilize it. Most of them despise manual work and prefer sending their children to the study of Roman history, or of Franklin's teachings about saving money, to seeing them at a work which is good for the "lower classes only." They thus do their best to render subsequent learning the more difficult.

Kropotkin is concerned, however, not only with a theory of education, but with one of psychology and of society. If all took their due share in production, the hours of labour could be greatly shortened; the standard of living raised—and this without drudgery, but by the development in communities, garden-factories, of the co-operative spirit. Men suffer from mental cowardice. What is required are

> factories and workshops into which men, women and children will not be driven by hunger, but will be attracted by the desire of finding an activity suited to their tastes, and where, aided by the motor and the machine, they will choose the branch of activity which best suits their inclinations.
>
> Let these factories and workshops be erected, not for making profits by selling shoddy or useless and noxious things to enslaved Africans, but to satisfy the unsatisfied needs of millions of Europeans. And again, you will be struck to see with what facility and in how short a time your needs of dress and of thousands of articles of luxury can be satisfied, when production is carried on for satisfying real needs rather than for satisfying shareholders by high profits or for pouring gold into the pockets of promoters and bogus directors. . . . Communist individualism is not a war of each against all; it is an opportunity for a full expansion of man's faculties, the superior development of whatever is original in him, the greatest fruitfulness of intelligence and will [*Cf.* von Humboldt and J. S. Mill, as also R. Owen].

It is noteworthy that Kropotkin also, towards the end, reverts to a line of Goethe's. "*Greift nur hinein in's volle Menschenleben*"—"Do but grasp full human life." It shows a different but a profounder insight than that of Spencer.

5

COUNT MICHAEL BAKUNIN (1814–1876), influential in forming Kropotkin's views, yet wearing his anarchism with a difference, has little in common with the pacifist Tolstoi, and Thoreau, and much with the Russian Nihilists. In the case of Tolstoi one finds an emphatic repudiation of violence. Kropotkin is hesitant. The new society, co-operative, using the full results of technology, not so dissimilar from that visualized by the Count de St. Simon, might require for its inauguration a pressure against oppressors amounting to violence. Bakunin, inspired by the 1848 risings in Europe (and perhaps, it has been suggested, by dislike of his mother . . .), with bitter experience of the Russia of the Czardom, having been condemned to death both by Saxons and (for inciting the Czechs) by Austrians, and having tasted Siberian exile, is clear that oppression would require the purgation of force.

Michael Alexandrovich Bakunin, however, Russian, aristocratic, erratic, discontinuous, always in debt, was not only—he was indeed not at all—the organizer of force, although he intrigued in conspiracy. His greatest practical achievement, except in terms of personal inspiration, was so to alarm Marx about the possibility of a revolt of non-German Socialists against Marx's own stern patriarchate, that Marx preferred to kill his own child, the First Socialist International, by transferring the General Council (1872) to New York, rather than endure the humiliation of seeing it fall into the hands of Bakunin, as foster-parent. The euphemistically named "League of Peace and Freedom" (1867), to stir men to arms against war and tyranny, in which Bakunin was the leading spirit, was rather a secularistic than a socialistic organization. He is the exponent of a theory—when that theory can be disentangled from his obsessions about God, explicable but reminiscent of the preceding century—profound in its implications as an antidote to Plato. Bakunin is the father of Anarchism.

In his best known book, *God and the State* (posthumously published—an incomplete manuscript) he remarks, typically enough:

> I have wandered from my subject, because anger gets hold of me whenever I think of the base and criminal means which [governments] employ to keep the nations in perpetual slavery, undoubtedly that they may be the better able to fleece them. Of what consequence are the crimes of all the Tropmanns in the world compared with this crime of treason against humanity committed daily, in broad day, over the whole surface of the civilized world, by those who dare to call themselves the guardians and the fathers of the people? I return to the myth of original sin.

Bakunin is much preoccupied with Original Sin—but in a novel manner. The Anti-God zeal which consumed the recent rulers of Russia finds its explanation in his writings. He regarded a church as a temperance reformer might a gin-shop. It is obvious that, for Bakunin, God is very like the Czar. Thus he is able to explain quite simply how the Czar is like God, a tyrant.

The materialists, Bakunin alleges, start with matter and there is an evolution steadily upwards to humanity: an ascent of man. The idealists, he asserts, begin with God or the Idea; then by a *salto mortale* God makes matter and then the matter (it is the Hegelian philosophy Bakunin is sketching) is impregnated with divine mind: but God who fell down into matter takes several millennia to recover consciousness. And even when man has the divine grace in him, he is still a miserable worm compared with the Omnipotent; and most of his kind (although a few may "find salvation") are damned to hell. Now this religion, says Bakunin, is designed to humiliate humanity, and menaces liberty. Bakunin, as much as Rousseau or Tolstoi, is a romantic about the simple life and an irrationalist. Specifically Bakunin praises, against sophistication, "the solid, barbarian elements." Instinctive Nature plus Benevolence plus Courage—that is the prescription.

Bakunin points out, in passing, [and probably rightly] the intimate connection between much so-called idealism and cruelty. The basis of all advance is the power to think—eating the Tree of Knowledge or Science—and the desire to rebel—Liberty. Religion represses both. Against religion—but also be it noted, against Marx—Bakunin declares himself a man without a dogma. "I cleave to no system. I am a seeker." This did not prevent him from expressing very odd sentiments about the moral importance, for an anarchist, of *voluntarily conforming* to [the right] public opinion and a strange hankering admiration of the Jesuits. His excuse must be that the other great sentimental romantic, Rousseau, had the same tendencies.

Having flayed, in the spirit of Paine, priests and kings Bakunin, the irrationalist, passes on to a third and fresher Tolstoiian assault—against the pontiffs of science itself. What he has to say is highly important. Apparently he feels that a free man is not abbreviated in his liberty by admitting the authority of "natural laws." They are indeed (why not God also?) "inherent in us."

As to the pressure upon individuals of "Public Opinion"—that "Public Opinion" or Herd Feeling of which J. S. Mill walked in fear, and of which the final, violent expression is lynch-law—apparently public opinion would be improved, granted only the social condition

of "equality, the supreme condition of liberty and humanity." Then it would be possible "to make *all needs really solidary*, and cause the material and social interests of each to conform to the human duties of each." Solidary, instinctive anarchism . . . There was, however, a real danger, not in "science," but in men of science assuming the technological prerogative of direction, being a new priesthood and commissarate; as Comte suggested—yes, and for that matter, in Marx assuming it . . .

> The Church will no longer call itself Church; it will call itself School. . . . The State will no longer call itself Monarchy; it will call itself Republic: but it will be none the less the State—that is, a tutelage officially and regularly established by a minority of competent men, men of virtuous genius or talent, who will watch and guide the conduct of this great, incorrigible, and terrible child, the people. . . . We accept all natural authorities and all influences of fact, but none of right. . . . *Of all despotisms that of the doctrinaires or inspired religionists is the worst.* They are so jealous of the glory of their God and of the triumph of their idea that they have no heart left for the liberty or the dignity or even the suffering of living men, of real men. . . . The government of science and of men of science, even be they positivists, disciples of Auguste Comte, or, a few, disciples of the *doctrinaire* school of German Communism, cannot fail to be impotent, ridiculous, inhuman, cruel, oppressive, exploiting, maleficent. We may say of men of science, *as such*, what I have said of theologians and metaphysicians: they have neither sense nor heart for individual and living beings.

Bakunin pursues the elaboration of his doctrine in his thesis on *Federalism, Socialism and Anti-theologism*, submitted to the Central Committee of the League of Peace and Liberty, in 1867, and in his *Historical Sophisms of the Doctrinaire School of German Communists* (1872; significantly still unpublished). He has the merit of being one of the first to point out the dangers of a *political* theology—one of the first after Burke!

In his argument, however, against the priests of science, Bakunin is guilty of ambiguity. He apparently believes that economic and social equality will harmonize—all ambition and will to power forgotten—the divergent interests of human beings. He admits, however, explicitly that human beings will *not* be equal in intelligence or knowledge. Why should not then the man who knows more, the more conscious worker for human well-being, guide the man who knows less? In effect, Bakunin admits that human ambition and love of exercising authority will play their part—even with men of science, as with the Jesuits of Paraguay—and that, as Mill said, no man can be trusted not

to abuse irresponsible power, least of all a priesthood, least of all a soviet of savants, an omniscient, intolerant priesthood of science.

Behind the screens of noble abstractions, Bakunin detected at work a new species of sinister interests, vampires.

> What I preach then is, to a certain extent, the revolt of life against science, or rather against the government of science, not to destroy science—*that would be high treason to humanity—but to remand it to its place* so that it can never leave it again. Until now all human history has been only a perpetual and *bloody immolation of millions of poor human beings in honour of some pitiless abstraction*—God, country, power of State, national honor, historic rights, judicial rights, political liberty, public welfare . . . devouring abstractions, *the vampires of history*, ever nourished upon human blood. . . . By a judicious criticism which [natural science, as distinct from metaphysics] can and finally will be forced to pass upon itself, it would understand, on the contrary, that it is only a means for the realization of a much higher object—that of the complete humanization of the *real* situation of the *real* individuals who are born, who live, and who die, on earth.

If Michael Bakunin had written nothing else but these words, for their wisdom the great Anarchist would deserve a place in history.

Bakunin has direct political influence in Russia and in Spain to this day. His federalist theories agreed with the federal nationalism of such writers as Pi y Margal, whose *Nationalities* merits attention. His proletarian theory inspires the theory of proletarian evolution of Anselmo Lorenzo. In the uplands of Spain in 1937 small village communities, run on Kropotkinite co-operative principles, were to be found as curiosities. But Spanish and, especially, Catalan Anarchism became a force by fusion with Syndicalism, to which we shall return.* Contemplating Spanish Anarchism and Communism, the Spanish Anarchist Minister of Justice of 1937, Garcia Oliver, said to the writer: "We co-operate now; but the problem for the politics of the future is —Liberty or Authority?"

We return to the query of Lao-tze at the beginning of the ages of history: "Why are the people so restless? Because there is so much government."

It is significant that the same American publishing house, Emma Goldman's, which published Bakunin, published the writings, somewhat different in their political progeny, of Max Stirner and of Friedrich Nietzsche. To these, in a different context, we shall return; as we shall to the Pragmatist exponents of liberal humanism and to the

* *Cf.* p. 653.

philosophic humanism of Earl Russell (Bertrand Russell).* It is, however, impossible to appreciate these philosophies until we have studied that great Collectivist Movement—confronting the classical individualism of Milton, Locke, Jefferson, Paine and the Mills—which culminated in Michael Bakunin's revolutionary colleague but philosophical and personal enemy, Karl Marx.

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE

Michael Bakunin· *God and the State.*
Van Wyck Brooks· *The Flowering of New England,* 1936.
W. Hastie *Political Philosophy of Kant,* 1891.
*P. Kropotkin *Fields, Factories and Workshops,* 1898.
*Herbert Spencer· *The Man versus the State,* 1884.
H. D. Thoreau. *Essays.*

* *Cf.* p. 756.

Part III

Chapter XIV

Jean Jacques Rousseau

1

With Herbert Spencer and the coming of the twentieth century, laissez-faire individualism, and the species of Liberalism that had historically been associated with it, had played themselves out. Apart from appeals to Darwinism and the struggle for survival, better utilized by other schools, the answers to the current problems of the new age that individualism gave were distressing by their inadequacy. Its kernel of truth was unseparated from a husk of false suppositions. It had no satisfying answer to give to the demand for social justice by those whom education had rendered vocal; whom the new industrial system had rendered indispensable; whom the manners of the age prevented from being dragooned; and whom the spirit of liberty—of laissez-faire itself—indignant against despotism, permitted to organize.

There was indeed a contradiction in laissez-faire. Historically directed against guild, as well as governmental, restrictions, the question arose whether its principles enjoined or precluded freedom of organization of employers—and employees. It precluded monopoly by the economically strong. Did it preclude organization for protection of the weak who did not otherwise enjoy equality of status? Did not the passage (which Sir Henry Maine detected as the distinctive mark of modern history) from status to contract imply the abolition of status, *i.e.*, approximate equality, not only in name and law, but in fact and bargaining power? Already J. S. Mill verged on this discovery. Did the disappearance of "status" imply the coming of the trade union and the "closed shop" or the individual protest against this?

Moreover, the very Protestant individualism which, on the one side, encouraged business initiative, on the other, inculcated a sense of moral responsibility for the prevention of vice. Progressively it became clearer—with Paine, with Owen, with Ruskin, with the Quaker campaign against the slave trade, with Shaftesbury's activities for regulation in factory conditions, with the movement for extended education—

that morals and social surroundings could not be dissociated. However much it might be alleged that Man had entered by free choice into a Civil Society, children in fact were born, without their consent being asked, into social conditions that, in time, conditioned their lives for good and, often, for evil. As social sympathy became quickened by general education and a new passion for human liberty, and embraced wider ranges, the fashion of society as moulding everyday life assumed a new moral importance. The spring of human action might lie in individual initiative; but the release of that spring might depend upon social conditions and inequality of opportunity. What mattered in civilization might be the free powers of man. But institutions that cabined and cramped the expression of these natural powers might themselves—whether as the work of priests or kings—be unnatural. Institutions, therefore, were important. Not even Spencer denied that (merely he wished to have as few as possible). The Utilitarians were confident of it.

Further, the checks placed upon despotic executive power and the growth of representative government led on to the development of democratic power. J. S. Mill and Spencer alike were alarmed about whither it might lead, although neither developed an adequate doctrine of minority rights. The mood of the majority, as it came to claim and use the suffrage, changed towards political power. It became less sure, even in America, of the importance of a Balance of Powers and of jealousy of the Executive. It might be that it was *their* Executive and that popular jealousy was better directed against other parts of the government, such as the Judiciary, which rather represented the restraints imposed by the old traditions of the nation—or of class or personal prejudice.

The State had ceased to be synonymous with the Ruler by Divine Right and his officials, over against whom the majority were "subjects." The State had become the possession—its Government, the instruments—of them, the citizens; and its facilities were their facilities for their happiness. There was a reidentification of State and citizens, citizens and population or populace, slow but steady in Britain, more rapid but equally sure in America, swift but fickle in the French Revolution. Those who remembered the old republican city-states, built on the model of the ancient polis, led the way—and not least (because most amusing to read and, hence, with the widest public and influence), Jean Jacques Rousseau, citizen of Geneva.

The old mechanical dualism, that had endured ever since late Roman times and had been encouraged by the Christian tension be-

tween 'the elect" and the "world"—endured ever since Roman citizenship had ceased to be significant and what had mattered had been Caesar, his governors and legions—this was swiftly passing away. The days were gone by when the Emperor Septimius Severus could say: "Remain united; pay the soldiers; and take no heed of the rest." A new conception of the State, as not the enemy Leviathan but the friend and Motherland, was coming into currency. It was a conception aided when disorganized Populace no longer had, by some Contract, to be artificially united into the State, but found itself already constituted by blood and habit into an integral cultural unit as Nation. The oldest political notion of all—that of the Family or Clan and Blood—comes back, after being subordinated by Empire and conquering Aristocracy and cosmopolitan Religion. Nationalism answered Hobbes' old query how a populace apart from government could be other than a mob. Later, class-theory was to supply another answer.

The new theory of the State was Greek rather than Roman. But—although, for the most part, undetected—it had this major difference. Greek theory had been theory, not only of some or other society, but of a community in a precise sense, small, *homogeneous*, of citizens almost personally known to each other, the homeland to be seen from a hill "at one glance," a veritable "community of pleasures and pains." The new theory was of a society which had Roman characteristics—not indeed cosmopolitan; but vast, *heterogeneous*, held together as much by coercion and legal contract as by custom and tradition. It, nevertheless, sought (how trickily we shall note) to ascribe to itself the moral claims to allegiance that had been valid in the case of the Greek *polis*. Long ago, Marsiglio, nominally the defender against the Papacy of the revolted Franciscans with their early Christian pacifist-communist notions, had reintroduced into the Catholic world the purely secular thought of the pagan Aristotle, who could quite well dispense with a Church because he had never known one. Superficially Marsiglio had agreed with the Franciscan brethren about the need for a Church poor and pious. Actually he had wedded the Aristotelian notion, of the almost unqualified ethical allegiance due to the Polis, to the Imperial notion of the far-flung rule of a Government. The birth of Leviathan was a foregone issue from such a match. The elder Leviathan, however, of Hobbes, had been, as it were, primarily a Roman Leviathan, shaped by Renaissance lawyers trained in Roman law. Its characteristics were primarily power and coercive authority.

It is accurate to say that the Modern State was begotten of the New Monarchies of Louis XI of France, Henry VII of England and Ferdinand and Isabella of Spain; that it was born at a precise date, 1648, being the date of the Peace of Westphalia which recognized the *de facto* disruption of that Roman Empire which finally disappeared (or perhaps *not* finally) in 1806; and that its godparents were Bodin and Hobbes. "State" is an anachronism—an unknown political form—before Machiavelli.

The change, however, does not end there. The younger Leviathan is born of the mating of the old Leviathan or "Modern State" with Nationalism. First, however, old Leviathan had to be civilized, Hellenized—and this was the work (begun long ago by Marsiglio) carried out by men such as Rousseau who, at least so far as intention went, were humanists and internationalists. The essential other-worldliness of apostolic Christianity, with its basic antithesis between the children of light, who "resisted not evil," and the children of wrath, with their militarism and acquisitiveness, was abandoned in favour of this-worldliness. Civic virtue was, for the future, to be an adequate virtue not requiring to be supplemented by the solitary flight of the saints, of the Christ and the Buddha. Even Aristotle's inconvenient problem about the difference between good men and good citizens was brusqued and thrust on one side.*

The new men put Leviathan into the dress of Greek culture. By doing so they made an important contribution to the destruction of humanism and Liberalism (as Marsiglio did to the destruction of Catholicism), since young Leviathan –like old—was an enemy alike of individualism and of internationalism. It was indeed much *more* of an enemy of individualism than its predecessors, since Hobbes's "Sovereign" and eighteenth-century Benevolent Despotism in practice had left the individual normally free to follow his own judgement subject to capricious interventions for "reasons of state." Old Leviathan had not aspired to be ethicized; it had not been totalitarian, had grown in formal religion almost tolerant; in brief, it was not a "planned society," whether for good, in social freedom, or for evil, in despotism.

The great pendulum of history had swung from the Asiatic conception of divine rulers to the Greek conception of the self-regulating community under divine tradition. It had swung back from this small, intensive life of the community, as sufficient, to the Roman conception of world rule under law and divine Caesar, a mechanical utilitarian notion, later rendered tolerable by the holy catholic and sufficient

* *Cf* p 92

Church. It had swung from the authoritarian, infallible Church, weakened by local separatism and ambitions, to the self-regulating faith of Protestantism, secularized as individualism. Now it swings back to the authoritarianism of society, in revulsion against enlightened self-interest and its egoistic indifference to social ills. The new form is, however, not Greek but large-scale, realistic, inspired by desire for power. The new form, moreover, is not Roman, but plural, bound up with plural State and Nation, although transfused with notions of democracy and of class. Here however, is not the place* to discuss whether there is any law or process in history or whether merely like circumstances produce, human nature being constant, like results.

At the time when the last swing began (and a century of dominance still lay before Liberal individualism) men already had begun to stop regarding Government as although necessary, an evil. It was Paine who said the old things: Burke, the new. They had begun to repudiate the need for ruling men, like animals, "scurvily" for their good, and to discover, under Greek influence, ideals in "civic virtue," as well as in the independence of the noble savage. Rousseau, like Goethe as author of *The Sorrows of Werther*, was a romantic. He is, by praise of passion, the spiritual disciple of the Baroque. But the father of Romanticism was also, in political thought, the first classicist (the conflict penetrates his writings) and the pioneer for the class which first stood to benefit through that citizen ideal and by its triumph over the old feudalism. His importance lay in that pioneering work. In Britain a strong middle class, growing rich in business, followed a different route from that of France; transformed landowning into industrial feudalism; and, for another century remained staunch advocates of the liberties of property, the privileges of enterprise and the individualism that was a natural right appertaining to superior initiative. In a still predominantly agricultural America this remained even more emphatically the case. A new stress was yet placed, by collectivists, even in these two countries, upon the claims of society in return for what it provided. It began to be held that society, organized through the State, provided, not necessary evils, but essential moral benefits.

2

JEAN JACQUES ROUSSEAU (1712–1778) was the son of a Swiss couple, a Genevan clockmaker and his wife, happily remarkable for

* *Cf.* p. 760.

the passionateness of their emotional attachment. The mother died at the birth of Rousseau and, in later years, the father, Isaac Rousseau, would say, "Let us talk of your mother," and Jean Jacques would reply, "That means that we are going to weep." Father and son would sit up until dawn, when Jean Jacques was still a child, reading romances. Then Isaac, ashamed of himself, would say, "I am a bigger baby than you." This did not, however, prevent Isaac in later years, when he had married a new wife, from seeing the advantages for his son of leaving Switzerland, especially as a small income belonged to Jean Jacques if he remained and was to be enjoyed by Isaac if he left. It is not far-fetched to see in the easy indulgence of these early years, in contrast with the severity of pastor Lambercier to whom he was sent for schooling, the emotional basis for Jean Jacques's attitude to any authority or regime of manners not designed by himself.

The philosopher's career as a happy, self-respecting Swiss craftsman was blighted at an early age, and the innocence of his character carkered, by a hard and unjust employer, a master engraver for the clock industry, a brutal young man. At home and under the tutelage of M. Lambercier, Jean Jacques had imbibed a love of Plutarch, whose pages like those of Shakespeare he could recite, and a devotion to the country-side. He felt himself "a Roman" at the age of eight. Under the sordid tyranny of his employer and oppressor, he became indifferent to virtue and, little by little, stole first apples and then bric-à-brac. Moreover, he lied.

He discovered himself in a class-divided society where a raw apprentice could not sit at table with a master-craftsman and where his best friend and cousin german would no longer speak to him at ease. The cousin german's mother had pointed out to her son that they lived "up-town" and Jean Jacques was only an apprentice boy, living "down-town" in Geneva. This left an indelible impression on Jean Jacques's youthful mind, which, afterwards, displayed itself in a passion for asserting, in the company of marquises, the equality of the human race. At the moment, the effect was that Jean Jacques decided to leave home for an uncertain destination.

After spending some days on the road—"*Rousseau vagabonde quelques jours*"—he appealed to the curé of Confignon, who recommended him to become a Catholic convert, adding to this a letter of introduction to Madame Louise-Élénore de Warens, of the noble family of La Tour de Pil, herself a convert as well as a divorcée. Madame de Warens was a pensioner of the King of Sardinia. His Majesty was Catholic and impressionable, but not usually generous.

After meeting Madame de Warens, the pleasing Swiss, who tells us that he had "*une jambe fine, la bouche mignon*" (but adds, in one version but not in another, "*avec des vilaines dents*") was sent by her, with money in his pocket, on the road to Turin.

In Turin he became a Catholic convert and left the hospice with twenty francs in his pocket. He promenaded the streets; had an almost entirely Platonic affair with a Madame Basile; was chased away by the outraged husband; became lackey to the Countess of Vercelli; stole a riband; accused the housemaid of the theft; and both were shown the door. We know the later history of the philosopher but not of the housemaid. The thought of this action troubled Rousseau in his dreams. He returned, aged twenty-eight, to his "*chère maman*," Madame de Warens and spent the next twelve years in reverie on the country-side, observations on music and in her embraces until such time as she fell in love with the gardener.

The further record of his career as a spiritual Casanova, or, rather, as the victim of feminine Casanovas, does not concern us here—his affair (under the name of Dudding, an Englishman) with Madame de Larnage on the journey to Montpellier; and his dispatch by Madame de Warens to become tutor to the family of Monsieur de Mably, grand provost of Lyons. Having discovered his ineptitude as a tutor, but with introductions in his pocket from the de Mably family, Rousseau left for Paris.

Already patronized, as interesting, by the Marquis de Bonac and the Comte de Charmettes, but with no other claims to attention than a novel scheme of musical notation, in Paris Rousseau met Denys Diderot, the Encyclopaedist. The meeting was decisive. Rousseau was soon something more than the charlatan music teacher from Lausanne who knew no music. He had, however, still to earn a living. His introductions, however, were good and his facility remarkable. Taking to heart the advice of an acquaintance—"*on ne fait rien dans Paris que par les femmes*"—he made the Platonic conquest of Madame la marquise de Broglie (although her mother had little appreciation of "the respect due to talent").

Rousseau, instead of penniless, became private secretary and admirer, at a distance, of her friend Madame Dupin, daughter of a famous banker. Madame de Broglie also was responsible for procuring for her unconventional admirer a post (in place of an appointee who had fallen through) as secretary to the Comte de Montaigne, French ambassador to Venice. Before long Jean Jacques was instructing this incompetent diplomat in his duties, and complaining to Paris about

His Excellency. The association was not long lived. Rousseau came back to Paris as a teacher of chemistry. He reacquainted himself with Diderot, for whom he was no longer an unknown young man. Moreover, they both had mistresses which, as Rousseau notes, constituted an additional bond in common . . . but Diderot was foolish enough (Rousseau hints) to marry his lady. Soon Rousseau could style himself, thanks to commissions undertaken for Diderot, "one of the Encyclopaedists." Before many years had elapsed, he was to be giving advice to the Polish nation and to the Genoese Republic.

There is no space here to detail Rousseau's relations with Madame d'Épinay, a friend of Grimm, the Encyclopaedist, who provided him with a refuge at the Hermitage in the forest of Montmorency, or his spiritual passion for Madame la Comtesse d'Houdetot. Madame d'Épinay he repaid by discussing her most intimate medical life in his *Confessions*, revelations eagerly awaited by the whole world, from which he gave readings in 1770. The other situation was complicated by the fact that Mme d'Houdetot had, not only the Count, but also a lover, the poet Saint-Lambert; and although Jean Jacques was attached to Mme d'Houdetot, Mme d'Houdetot was more attached to her lover. Rousseau poured himself out in his book *La Nouvelle Héloïse*, in which he depicted himself, not indeed as a new Abelard, but as Saint-Preux, the virtuous hero, whereas the heroine, Julie, was married to an atheist, Wolmar. By this time, however, the provincial Genevese in Rousseau was beginning to reassert itself; and not only in this matter. A sentimental and sensuous anti-feminist who believed in the natural superiority of men, the correspondence of Rousseau shows him now, in the d'Houdetot-Saint-Lambert affair, a didactic, if jealous, puritan. He lectured the unhappy infatuated lady upon the impropriety of her relations with her erstwhile lover, with whom she had been naturally happy and who chanced to have the sentiments of a gentleman. Various academic commentators, neophytes of the heart, take perhaps too seriously these exhortations of an exhausted and sentimental sensualist. Rousseau further fouled the situation by periodically forgiving the lady.

The record at least of the earlier part of Rousseau's life will be found in the famous *Confessions*, of which half were written amid the "*sol triste*"—"the sad earth"—of Staffordshire, incongruously enough as the guest of David Hume. The history of Rousseau is the history of a sentimental tramp. Whenever there was trouble Rousseau consistently ran away from it. The commentators, however, suffer from

the disadvantage that it shocks their moral consciousness to admit that a character that has won general acclaim can, in fact, be so despicable.

Rousseau, it should be added, by the time of his second residence in Paris, had children by a domestic for whom he disclaimed romantic love and whom he regarded as beneath the moral conscience of a free soul to marry—named Thérèse La Vasseur. Naturally public feeling has been with the genius, compelled to live amid such unsympathetic surroundings; but Rousseau, feeling that he owed himself to the world and not to the duties of a tawdry domesticity, sent his children at birth to the foundling hospital, according (as he most falsely alleged) to the philosophic prescriptions of Plato. The course might not have been so simple if they had been legitimate. Their future history is unknown and doubtless unimportant in the record reserved for genius. Their compensation was to have as parent a great penitent, whose regrets, expressed in immortal writing, make literature. Genius itself on analysis is discovered to be an infinite capacity for believing in one's own importance, coupled with a gift for plausibly convincing the public. History, it must be recalled, is a snob's almanac. Rousseau is, in the annals of little caddery as distinct from great villainy, a classical instance of what it is possible to commit and, if successful, still be applauded. The French society of the eighteenth century, although it had many pleasing and unexpected qualities—thus Madame la Maréchale de Luxemburg writes to Rousseau of Thérèse: "I embrace her"—was a corrupt society. Rousseau was the pus-head of its corruption. He was the brilliant apologist of the undisciplined.

This contemptible character, sodden with his own conceit, described by honest Dr. Johnson briefly as a rascal, was nevertheless one of the most influential writers in the history of human thought. The comparison obviously challenged by his *Confessions* is with St. Augustine. It is an insult to the great African Augustine, who, although not innocent of unexpected complacencies when he feels that he or his mother had God's approval, is guiltless of Jean Jacques's viscous and quivering sentimentality and exhibitionism.

The perspective of the man is most fairly to be discovered from the views of his contemporaries. He regarded the Encyclopaedists as his persecutors, but there is no evidence that they were such and the comment of one of them, D'Alembert, is shrewd.

> Jean Jacques is a madman who is very clever, and who is only clever when he is in a fever; it is best therefore neither to cure nor insult him.

The less friendly Grimm says:

> He is a poor devil who torments himself and who does not dare to confess the true subject of all his sufferings, which is his cursed head and his pride.

Hume, Rousseau's friend at Wootton, is more kindly:

> He has only *felt* during the whole course of his life and in this respect his sensibility rises to a pitch beyond what I have seen any example of: but it still gives him a more acute feeling of pain than of pleasure.

Poor Hume, however, who had the misfortune to be Rousseau's host, felt it necessary for him to defend himself from the pen of this self-pitying quarreller, by publishing their correspondence, full length, in *A Succinct Exposé*.

Rousseau always had in him something of the child and the unpleasant child. For the great Scottish philosopher of genius, the stress was on the fact that Rousseau could not *think*. But Rousseau knew that man, being a sensual animal, prefers his feelings to his thoughts.

"Le genre humain avait perdu ses titres; Jean-Jacques les a retrouvés."* It would be truer to say that painfully the human race had been brought to revere reason until Rousseau, drunk with sentiment, went to indulge himself with feeling and led the human race to go lusting with him. The influence of this disordered, half-educated man, whose philosophy was founded upon sentimentality untrained, uncontrolled and undisciplined, is one of the major catastrophes in the history of human thought. Part of the irony is that such intellectual influence as he had—for example, upon the arid and thirsty minds of certain professors such as Kant—was due to his pioneer work in appropriating Hellenic political thought, just beginning to come into popular vogue, before he had understood it. As we have said, the Renaissance was primarily a Latin Renaissance. Even Kant imperfectly understood his Greek philosophers, nor is appropriation complete until Hegel. But the age of Winckelmann (1717–1768) and of Lessing (1729–1781) is dawning and translations of the Greek into the French are common. Rousseau succeeded in misinterpreting Plato for his generation before anyone else.

In the process of misinterpretation, Rousseau occasionally contradicted himself, but apparently without being aware of the fact. As his admirer, Professor C. E. Vaughan, writes:

* "The human race has lost its title deeds; Jean Jacques found them again."

The title of the *Contrat social* is familiar. But to most men it suggests an extreme form of individualism. It stands, that is, for ideas which are either expressly repudiated by the author, or saluted hurriedly from afar.

This does less than justice to Rousseau's readers. Rousseau's writings in part fall into two, if not three, phases: the first, those of the young Rousseau, as natural savage, utopian anarchist; the second (phase of thought rather than period in time), when Rousseau expounds the Lockian doctrine of "consent to make themselves members of a politic society," and provides this with a precise name, *i.e.*, the title of his book, *The Social Contract;* and, third, the collectivist theory of the older Rousseau, ending with a gospel of a Secular or Civic Religion. The third phase may briefly be described as one part Plato and three parts mush. However, political Platonism in the days of Adam Smith and of Voltaire was novel and refreshing. Especially was this so, if it were represented in the drapery of belles-lettres by a writer soon well known for his style and amorous *contes*—indeed by a new, if unscholastic, Abelard, a wandering jongleur of ideas.

Platonism was not the only attraction. Rousseau, as later Schleiermacher, in Germany, represented a reaction of popular religion against the *cérébral* and supercilious ridicule of those who, with Voltaire, regarded churchly religion as superstition and superstition as infamy. Further, Rousseau was the apologist of the people not only for the people, as was Jefferson, but by one of the people. The son of the Genevan clockmaker who made expeditions to Constantinople, himself privately educated (however badly) by a local pastor, Rousseau was no proletarian. But, nevertheless, criticism of Rousseau has tended to be frowned upon in progressive circles because Rousseau has been regarded as the prophet of democracy. As he writes: "It is the rich who are always the first to be touched by corruption, the poor follow, the middle class are the last to be attainted."

That Rousseau spiritually prepared the way for the Revolution in France is indubitable. That the slightness of his influence in Britain as much as the greatness of that of John Wesley, methodical emotionalist pursuing his proper avocation in the proper place, is in part responsible for the avoidance of revolution in Britain is also highly probable. Thanks, however, to the Whig and Liberal tradition of Locke and Bentham, democracy was as far, if not further, advanced in Britain without revolution as in France with it. It is, of course, arguable that this tradition arises from the partial success in England of the Parliamentarians, thanks to the civil wars of the seventeenth

century, and that this success had produced in Britain a thoroughly wrong habit of suspicion of Government and State, and individualism, whereas the civil wars in France of the seventeenth century had ended in the beneficent victory of a centralizing despotism. Deferring discussion of this issue, at least we are entitled to say that Jean Jacques Rousseau more than any single man confused, weakened and ended by destroying the liberal tradition of Locke and Bentham. The whole issue of European Liberalism (as distinct from Anglo-Saxon Liberalism) turns upon whether it is to be understood in the sense of Locke and Montesquieu or in the sense of the relaxed and debased Platonism of Rousseau. That Rousseau himself believed that he was in the school of Locke does not affect this conclusion.

3

In Rousseau's first phase, of anarchism, the ex-petty thief protests against the restrictions and corrupt sophistication of civilization in the name of a noble and virtuous savagery. He is the tender barbarian. This phase is illustrated by two essays both written in response to public notices of a competition, in accordance with the custom of the time—the one by the University of Dijon (1749, pub. 1751); the other by the French Academy (1753). The first, *The Discourse on the Sciences and Arts*, was written in response to an invitation for a thesis on the theme: "Has the restoration of the sciences contributed to purify manners?" Jean Jacques Rousseau was the prize winner. He took the occasion to praise the state of nature, not as described by Hobbes, but rather as attributed by Tacitus to the virtuous Germans in their forests. With this he contrasted, like a Juvenal, the manners and morals of his contemporaries. Rousseau was always highly sensitive and conscious of the *gaucherie* of his own manners. He reflected that he would have found those of the early Germans (for example, the Lombards) more congenial, at least as he pictured them.

The argument of the *Discourse*, in which Rousseau sought to be "the great declaimer, the new Quixote," fortified by a little knowledge of Greek, the authority of Plato and a comparison of himself to Socrates, was threefold. With the development of Civilization men had not improved in their vision or practice of moral good. Science had brought wealth and luxury, these in turn had brought pride, human inequality and a suffocating complexity in living. The men of virtue, and talent . . . (talent in what mattered, *i.e.*, virtue) had no opportunity in a world of class and money. A man of ability and admirable

intentions such as Rousseau was held back by poverty and snobbery. His reaction was a declamation, not a discipline.

Like wise men before him and in accordance with the churchly tradition, Rousseau denounced "inequality sprung from the fount of pride." But, being young and impassioned, he wanted something done about it. And he concluded that what was required was a return to the simple life. No man being less of a cynic, he expounded the Cynic gospel. However, he testily explained to probing questioners that he meant, *not* equality of men and goods, *but* before the law. The Cynics had gone one better than he there. He preached the wisdom of ignorance in a prize essay and the virtue of equality in a competition for entry upon the road to world fame.

Success led him to turn over in his mind the project of a work surveying all the field of political science. Immediately, however, he proceeded to the *Discourse on Inequality* which, although not a prize winner, received acclaim on publication. An aristocratic theory of society is usually not acceptable to those who, for any reason of modesty, humour, resentment or status, believe that they would not be included in the ranks of this aristocracy. Rousseau, with plausible and lucid self-deception, tells men the lies that they *felt* were delectable and that they wished to be told; he is the genius of political wish-fulfilment. Rousseau discovers that human inequality is "the first source of all evils." It is artificial. He sketches a State of Nature, after the mode of Locke, not Hobbes. Its governing principle, in the relations of man and man, was not force and war but family attachment. One recalls the historical description of the growth of society by Aristotle. This has more concreteness than Rousseau provides. But Rousseau's description displays more anthropological awareness than Locke. Men are depicted as living in families, but these are in isolation. Whether Rousseau believed in the historicity of his Arcadian State of Nature is a matter of learned dispute. At least it serves the purpose of his argument.

Men, in this condition, enjoy a natural liberty which is their birthright and of which no man freely disposes. It is "unreasonable to suppose . . . that the first expedient which proud and unsubdued men hit upon for their common security was to run headlong into slavery." This Liberty is a Right; but in a peculiar sense. It is nowhere treated by Rousseau as a right issuing (as with the Stoics and even St. Thomas) from a Rational Moral Law. It is merely a lawyerly name for a claim based on instinct, just as Hobbes had based on instinct his notion of "natural right." This introduction of natural claim, with basis in

emotion but without regulation by the criterion of reason, demands careful note. The most Rousseau admits (1756), in an incidental passage, are the authorities of God, Natural Law, "derived from the constitution of man," and honour. Even these time-honoured admissions are important; but they are a whittling away of the older tradition. Rousseau here shows the symptoms of his philosophy of irrationalism. Unlike Hobbes, who remains a qualified rationalist, Rousseau does not introduce fear as an instinct bidding men to reason and authority. Optimism indicates hopes of growth in unbounded freedom.

The State of Nature, however, is not free from venial vice nor is Rousseau more than hopeful in this phase of his optimism. Men's errors lead them to seek a new route. But, for rhetorical effect or to cover the confusions in his own mind, Rousseau relapses into a cosmic fatalism, a belief in a cycle in history.

> The vices which make civil institutions a necessity are the same vices which, at a later stage, make the abuses of them inevitable.

The lust for inequality and power is about to take charge. Government inevitably passes over into tyranny (a reminiscence of the Platonic-Aristotelian theory of the cycle of constitutions, which Rousseau here "writes up"). There is

> a return to the law of the strongest, and so to a new state of nature, differing from that we set out from: for the one was a state of nature in its first purity, while this is the consequence of excessive corruption.

While depicting this degeneration of humanity into government, Rousseau, in a famous passage, incidentally mentions the origin of private property. Man, in the State of Nature, is innocent and easily deceived. Superstition does its fell work—although, if man is naturally good, why priests and kings are by temperament evil is not explained by Rousseau much better than by Condorcet. Rousseau produces a paradox with the requisite flavour of literary cynicism.

> The first man who, having enclosed a piece of ground, bethought himself of saying *This is mine*, and found people simple enough to believe him, was the real founder of civil society.

It is a theme later elaborated by Babeuf and especially by Proudhon in a book—no more representative of Proudhon than the *Discourse* is of Rousseau—entitled *What Is Property* (1840), to which we shall return later.*

* *Cf.* p. 555.

Against this rule by despotism, political and economic, there is a course available, the course of the morally indignant and emotional man *avec le coeur sensible*—the course of insurrection.

Voltaire, on receiving a presentation copy of the *Discourse*, made the comment, entirely characteristic of that great, if fickle, rationalist and humanist:

> I have received your new book against the human race and thank you for it. Never was such cleverness used in the design of making us all stupid. One longs in reading your book to walk on all fours. But as I have lost that habit for more than sixty years I feel unhappily the impossibility of resuming it.

It is not astounding that relations between Rousseau and the Encyclopaedists became something less than cordial. They smelt afar off the irrationalism and basically reactionary quality of their man. This was the case, despite the possibility that the fertile brain of Denys Diderot, in that group, stimulated Rousseau in undertaking (if he did not suggest) the first Essay on the Arts and Sciences, and although some of Rousseau's earliest paid literary work, when he came to Paris, was ordered for the Encyclopaedia and gave him thereby, through that postern gate, access to fame.

Rousseau, when he came to write the *Contrat Social* (1762), itself the first portion of an unfinished work, had changed his mind in certain significant points. The governmental contract binding magistrates—"a real contract between the people and the chiefs"—which appears in the *Discourse*, has been abandoned. Civil society is no longer regarded as a necessary evil, provided only that it is founded on free consent and not illegitimate—like almost all the governments of Europe. (Rousseau put his own democratic notion of legitimacy over against the foundations of dynastic, divine-right legitimacy, and brought the latter down under a dust of stucco.) On the contrary, Rousseau has decided that only in society—full, organized society—does man "taste the sweets of civic virtue." Thanks to this prospective, and even more luscious, sweet-tasting, Rousseau optimistically makes the decisive change, pregnant with consequences in history and philosophy, of putting the Garden of Eden and its Golden Age into the future of man instead of into his irretrievable past. The immemorial cloud of Original Sin at last lifts, and the sun of illumination shines out. That is Rousseau's greatest work and claim to gratitude.

4

Rousseau's actual statement of the Social Contract does not require elaboration at this stage. It was of the customary Lockian order; and

has that value which appertains to an influential, if apocryphal, Myth. It is no better and no worse than the subsequent Myth of Social Organism. Rousseau, as we shall see, builds the bridge from the one fallacy to the other.

To find a form of association which defends and protects with the full common force the person and goods of each associate, and whereby each, uniting with all others, yet obeys only himself, and remains as free as before. Such is the fundamental problem of which the social contract provides the solution.

The clauses of the contract are so determined by the nature of the act, that the least modification renders them vain and null; so that, even if they have perhaps never been formally enunciated, they are everywhere the same, although only tacitly admitted and recognized. Hence, the social pact having been violated, each one then resumes his initial rights and regains his natural liberty, while losing that conventional or civic liberty for which he made the renunciation.

These clauses, properly understood, all reduce themselves to one: to wit, the total making-over of each associate, with all his rights, to the entire community; for, in the first case, each giving himself entire, the condition is equal for all; and the condition being equal for all, no one has any interest in rendering it onerous for others [*i.e.*, men are like units].

Further, this making-over having taken place without reserve, the union is as perfect as it can be and no associate has anything more to demand. If any rights remained to private individuals, as there would be no common superior who could adjudicate between them and the public, each being in some point his own judge would soon pretend to be this in all. The state of nature would supervene, and the association would necessarily become tyrannous or vain.

Finally, each by giving himself to all gives himself to no individual, and as there is no associate over whom one does not acquire the same right as one has ceded to him over oneself, one gives the equivalent of what one loses, and more power to conserve what one has.

If then one puts on one side such part as is not essential, one will find that it reduces itself to the following terms: each of us puts in common his person and all his faculties under the supreme direction of the general will; and we receive again each member as an individual part of the whole.

•

The passage, with its appearance of mathematical elegance, is full of sophistries and demands careful analysis. What is involved is the nature and validity of the Collectivist philosophy which traces from it. For Rousseau himself, the neurotic solitary who wanted to be liked, the philosophy is of the nature of a compensation. It must, however, be examined as philosophy, not biography.

It will, first, be noted that there is mention of the possibility of a resumption (with its insurrectionary implications) of "natural liberty." This fits in with the famous opening words of Chap. I of the *Contrat Social:*

> Man is born free, and everywhere he is in chains. . . . How did this change take place? I do not know. What can make it legitimate? I believe I can answer that question.

The endeavour to reconcile justice and interest; the appeal to "man as he is" as the basis of right government; the form of the social contract itself; the later elaboration of the doctrine that Kings and their Ministers or government officials are not equal parties in a governmental contract, but mere functionaries; the talk of man as "born free" —all these are themes characteristic of the Lockian democratic tradition of European liberty.

It will, however, be noted that Rousseau, perhaps by a lapse, explains that his object is, not to free men from their chains, but to explain how legitimately they may *continue* in chains. "What can render it legitimate?" The sovereign organization which will continue to demand the total surrender—*l'aliénation totale*—of the individual's primitive rights of "wild, lawless freedom" [Kant], will also now, thanks to Jean Jacques, be able to provide the title deeds for the bondage, and elegant reasons.

In his treatise of the same year (1762) on Education, the tedious *Émile*, Rousseau is a pioneer against the Jesuits in stressing the notion of self-development of the powers of the ego, not manners, in the training of the young. He displays one of his happiest characteristics—his willingness to study rather than to dictate to human nature. But, as the argument of the *Contrat Social* is unfolded, the individual is presented with the obligation, civil and moral, of subjection to the General Will of a society, as alone voicing that human nature "really." To be more precise, there is a civil obligation—the original contract once made—and a moral impulse, alike of interest and of pleasure (since man is naturally a social animal). As the theory develops, the latter (non-Whig) part of the argument will play a dominant role. The Platonic-Aristotelian thesis is revived. Society becomes "prior to" (whatever that may mean) the individual. Democracy is not basically understood.

The Social Contract, as has been said earlier, is a fiction but not an empty fiction. It is in fact the case that, if we seek a moral, as distinct from an anthropological, basis for government, we must find it in

consent, and that men grow from the tacit acquiescence of childhood in the "original" common consent of their elders and forbears to a conscious and articulate assent (or dissent) of their own. It is further true that—emigration apart, an empty thesis mentioned by Locke and later Kant—it is always, at least theoretically, possible for men to recede from the more complicated web of legal duties and rights in a new social form to the simpler web of a less complicated civilization which (compared to the more complex form) may be called a State of Nature. Rousseau, as we shall see, probably saves the theoretical validity of his whole position by insisting on the reality of this free assent, which, he believes, gives a moral basis to government that, in the alternative, is brute fact—or miraculous Will of God. The revolutionary anarchist element, which persists in Rousseau from the earlier writings, will be noted. Apparently the Social Contract—which is not a mere otiose elaboration on the theme that man is a political animal—is broken, and insurrection *justified*, wherever there is social inequality, *i.e.*, universally. Rousseau's writing can then be read as a clarion call to the common man, the world over, to revolt. Everywhere the existing chains are illegitimate.

5

After revolt, what then? Rousseau has his own doctrine of authority and of the reconciliation of liberty with authority, the master problem of politics. It is here that his mystical doctrine of the General Will, rendered more plausible by mathematical trappings, comes into play. Society having been organized as a civil order, a general will develops. *La volonté générale n'est pas la volonté de tous*—the General Will is not the will of all. It neither involves unanimity nor is a mere aggregate of units, factional wills of individuals or groups. It is not merely some average or compromise or highest common factor among these actual wills of individuals or groups.

There may of course be minorities, but their will must be or ought to be, as that of good citizens, only provisional until the majority is discovered. They are justified so long as doubt is justifiable about what the majority will is. Once this is discovered, their civic duty is to acquiesce in it, so that there ceases to be a minority will. The majority will, then, recognized as General Will, becomes totalitarian.

This thesis of the dominance of the General Will as the guide to civic virtue does not keep house too easily with Rousseau's early beliefs. As late as 1764, in *Letters Written from the Mountain*, he is repeating that "Liberty consists less in doing one's own will than in not

being subjected to that of another." The individualist in Rousseau's soul, perpetually in conflict with the collectivist and hence stung to fury by Diderot's chance remark that "only bad men like solitude," had openly expressed its view in a letter of 1762 to Malesherbes: "The least duties of civil life are unbearable . . . . as soon as it is a case of 'must' these are all torture to me." Rousseau was one of these men who found it intolerable to admit himself in the wrong; and yet a voice within told him this attitude was evil. Hence he sought for an intellectual reconciliation or rationalization.

In the *Letters*, of 1764, he writes: "There is no liberty whatsoever, then, without laws." He then adds the stress phrase: "or where anyone is above the laws. . . . A free people obey, but they do not serve . . . . they do not obey man." And, elsewhere, the favourite of marquises continues: "I have a violent aversion to the social classes that dominate others. . . . I hate the great . . . and I would hate them more if I despised them less." He, Jean Jacques, at the time the guest of a Duke, at the Château de Montmorency, could yet afford to despise them. He had committed only one fault, "my only serious one" [was it theft? was it the abandonment of his children? or which disloyalty?].

But he would write his *Confessions*, and say there, "I can scarcely believe that anyone of my readers will dare to say to himself: 'I am better than that man was.'" Frantically, shamelessly, he clutched on to his immortality amid posterity as a man of Roman virtue. In the *Social Contract* he tells society how that virtue may be achieved—in and through free society, moving as a homogeneous whole. Not indeed impeccability under the conventional law, but "goodness," simple goodness in loving, mystic mergence in simple society—a state of civic grace—that is what mattered. Jean Jacques was not blameless . . . but he was good, indefinably good, and civically "saved," *bon citoyen*. (We shall return to this doctrine with Heard and Macmurray, but in a less objectionable, non-State form).*

Why the *majority will* alone—that of the numerical majority—should be the index of the General Will is a question not so much answered as brusqued. It is, we are given to understand—contrary to

* *Cf.* p. 711. Heard seems to me to have seized upon the substance of the matter here: the deep religious desire of many men to "return to the womb" of a parent society, to be born again "social," "at-oned" and at peace—losing the miserable, divided personality of an excessive self-consciousness, but yet taking this course by *voluntary*, religious choice. This appeal is the secret of the success of most great religious, and contemporary fanatico-political movements. Heard's analysis, thanks to his advantages of background in anthropology and psychology, seems to me here to merit, to-day, more attention than Rousseau's and to be more significant.

the opinion alike of Aristotle and of Montesquieu—the best practical way. All must be accounted equal. The General Will, which is something organic, *not* the mathematical aggregate of all and yet indicated by that mathematical aggregate which is the majority, evolves from the will of all because (so Rousseau assumes) wills in opposition to the common good, to right and to left, must (like plus and minus quantities) cancel each other out. The resultant is the General Will.

Rousseau, as is shown in the passage quoted above, has the belief that there is a profound difference between the position of Jean Jacques when he submits himself to the authority of *e.g.*, Louis Capet, ruling by custom, and when he submits himself to the authority of the French nation, or its Will, ruling him without any restriction whatsoever—and that this difference is all to the advantage of the latter relation. As was later said, the Frenchman was one forty-millionth of a sovereign, and one whole slave. The logic appears to be as follows. No man does what is contrary to his own (actual) interest. No five men do what is contrary to the (actual) interest of these five men. No "nation" or "public" does what is contrary to the (actual) good of that nation or to the public good. France never does what is contrary to the good of France. But Jean Jacques is part of that nation or public. The good of the whole is the [real] good of the part. Therefore what France decides is for the [actual] national good, about which it cannot err, must be for the [real] good of Jean Jacques. We move inevitably to the conclusion:

La volonté générale est toujours droite, mais elle n'est pas toujours éclairée.

Once this mathematico-mystical bridge of asses had been crossed, all the rest is easy marching. The argument, however, has not the geometric dispassionateness of Hobbes: it is one of belles-lettres and *bon coeur*. The General Will is the new sovereign. All legitimate power flows from the General Will of the people. No man can legitimately protest against that which he himself has willed: who does through another, does by himself—it is Hobbes's theme, save that "the blasphemer, Hobbes," made the beneficiary Charles Stuart or Oliver Cromwell. Blackstone made it Parliament. Rousseau, however, kept to the democratic majority principle. He conveniently, however, called the beneficiary "the People."

Beyond the primary contract, the voice of the greatest number binds all the others. It is a consequence of the contract itself. But one asks how a man

* "The general will is always right, but it is not always enlightened." There may be a play on the word *droite*—"correct;" "morally right;" "legally right."

can be free and yet forced to conform to wills other than his own. How can those in opposition be free *and* subject to laws to which they have not consented.

I answer that the question is badly put. *The citizen consents to all the laws, even those passed in his despite,* and even to those which punish him if he dares violate them. The constant will of all the members of the State is the general will. It is by it that they are citizens and free.

Citizenship follows from the existence of a communal will and *freedom follows from citizenship, provided the citizens remain equal.* What man had, in the pre-contractual state of nature, was not freedom (Rousseau shows some verbal inconsistency here) but equality. This statement of Rousseau's is, of course, historically untrue and (if the Social Contract is not a matter of history) it is logically inferior to the argument that there is, in society, a perpetual tacit contract—"do as you would be done by"—of potentially free men. Is Equality a consequence of Liberty or Liberty of Equality? It is unproven that men will not accept an unequal society: they usually, on Rousseau's own admission, have done so. It is quite arguable that there are practical limits to their acceptances of a social order that menaces their life and personal freedom and only offers chattel slavery. Rousseau, however, may be here arguing that *there can be no "perfect obligation" in an irrationally unequal or amorally privileged society such as that of contemporary France.* The argument, if so, is sound but scarcely clear. There may be Equality without Liberty—an equality of ants or sheep—but there is no full Liberty where there is irrational inequality. It is easier to suppose that Rousseau, as often, obscures rather than illumines the truth, although his heart is warm and in the right place.

The Sovereign Majority (or People; the two have been shown to be really the same) employs functionaries to carry on the work of government. They can be chosen by lot. It is absurd to suppose, with Hobbes, that these functionaries should have authority against the people, organized by social contract into an entity. If two ride on a horse, it is the People or General Will or Majority that rides in front.

This Sovereign, *i.e.*, the people unified by a general will expressed through the majority, exercises then a sovereignty inalienable and indivisible. It is restricted only by the considerations that it can neither, from its nature and logic, submit itself to another, alienate its territory, will anything contrary to the utility of the community (this follows by definition) or institute privileges or unequal laws. This follows from the nature of the Social Contract into which *all* have entered equally, and is a cardinal point in Rousseau's thought.

Rousseau is the professional "citizen of Geneva," vindicating the thesis that all ranks must come onto the plane of his rank, which (as appears elsewhere) is, apparently, the bourgeois level.

Rousseau is a man of letters; Jefferson is a statesman. Their treatment of the problem of equality is proportionately different. For Rousseau, for reasons based on personal resentment coupled with an intelligible contempt for aristocratic pretension, superiority of talent mostly only leads to corruption. Executive officials are best chosen in popular meetings, under the village tree, by lot. Rousseau, it will be noted, does not simply attack an aristocracy as lacking ability, but attacks ability itself if divorced from rustic simplicity. For Jefferson, ability has to be sought for, and selected, in the educative process. It is merely true that no men are so superior in all that goes to make personality as to be entitled, even if they would wish it, to ride "booted and spurred" on the backs of the rest. As Abraham Lincoln put it (very contrary to the philosophy of Rousseau's General Will), no man is so good as to be competent to lay down a moral design of life for the rest. Inequality, for Jefferson, is of function, not status; and all are under the moral injunction to enter into practical sympathy, based on common nature, with all, each of whom is an entire moral personality. The reputation of Rousseau is largely as the Apostle of Equality. Nevertheless, more than any man, by his reactionary attitude to a rationally developed civilization, he has contributed to confuse the issue. What he attacked was evil. That is his strength and glory. What he affirmed was not too good. . . .

Rousseau's doctrine of Sovereignty is connected with his foreshadowing of the doctrine of Social Organism which is, in analysis, the very negation of the Social Contract theory. Rousseau writes:

> So far as a number of men united consider themselves to be one single body, they have only one will which looks to the conservation of the whole and to the general well-being.

Rousseau objects as strongly as Hobbes, against Locke, to the Division of Powers as weakening sovereignty. He objects more strongly than Hobbes to representative government or Committee Democracy.

> The English people thinks itself free. It quite deceives itself. It is so only during the election of members of Parliament. So soon as they are elected, it is a slave. It is nothing.

His contention—that of a Swiss accustomed to canton government and especially influenced by that of Geneva (not necessarily by the

Geneva Charter of 1387, as has been alleged; or by Althusius), as well as by the theories of Plato, Locke and Montesquieu—is for pure or primary democracy; for legislation after the Greek model by the people in assembly; and for magistrates as mere executive functionaries who carry on administrative work between assemblies. There is no discussion of referendum; and Rousseau, therefore, accepts the conclusion (to which his respect for classical models also led him) that the only valid government was that of a small or cantonal community. In this Eden the People was King.

As for himself, Jean Jacques Rousseau, the individual, what actually happened was that he renounced his citizenship of Geneva in a rage when the city fathers condemned and burned his books, the *Émile* and *Social Contract;* stirred up a division in that community so serious that the Powers contemplated intervention ("I am tired of being treated as a child," he wrote); took refuge, first, with that well-known democrat Frederick, King of Prussia ("Let the parsons who make for themselves a cruel and barbarous God be eternally damned as they deserve," comments Frederick to objectors on religious grounds), and, later, with the Prince de Conti; and suggested to the Duc de Choiseul that, in compensation, France should present him with a civil pension. Rousseau did not follow the injunction to civil obedience of Socrates—nor was he executed. On the contrary, he died in peace on the estate of the Marquis de Girardin at Ermenonville, and his disinterred bones were reburied with grateful pomp by revolutionary, Marseillaise-singing France in the Pantheon. Where the bones of Socrates are, no man knows.

6

Rousseau drew other conclusions more portentous than those about pure democracy. Along with Hobbes he views with suspicion all challenges to the sovereign authority. Since it is *toujours droite*, all challenge to it is wrong or invalid, probably immoral, even seditious. Rousseau, the theorist of organic society, as much as Hobbes, the theorist of a mechanical society and, the Totalitarians later, is concerned with the challenge, to the Sovereign, of Religion. Unlike Hobbes, who is saved by his fundamental individualism, Rousseau, more tyrannous, cannot admit that any man has a moral right to his own religion. Muddle-headed, he seems to reason that surely he, Rousseau, in his description that he is meditating, of the *Vicaire savoyard*, with his generous religion of humanity, has sketched as liberal a religion as any sane man can desire. All therefore that remains is to

illiberalize it by making it compulsory—for the real social good. The argument proceeds apace to its more than Platonic conclusions in Chap. VIII of the Fourth Book of the *Social Contract.*

Here Rousseau declares that there are three kinds of religion. There is the Religion of Man, of humanity, an affair of the heart, without altars, or rites, which Rousseau romantically chooses to denominate—in defiance of the words of Scripture about fulfilling the law and of the historic practice of the early church—"the true and simple religion of the Gospel." The second is the Religion of the Citizen, such as that of the early Romans.

> There is a third sort of religion, more bizarre, which, giving to man two laws, two chiefs, two countries, submits them to contradictory duties and prevents them from being at the same time pious and citizens. [In brief, the religion that admits obligations both to God and to Caesar.] Such is the religion of the Lamas, of the Japanese [sic] and of Catholic Christianity. . . . This third sort is so evidently bad that one loses time in amusing oneself in the demonstration of it.

So much for a millennium and a half of belief at the hands of the ex-pilferer of Turin with his smattering of learning.

Learning, however, and the facts are irrelevant to Rousseau. Rousseau can exclaim, like De Bougainville, "To find the duties of the legislator I descend into the abysses of my heart; I study my sentiments." Pre-eminently Rousseau is one of those dangerous men who, in Locke's words "is sure that he is sure." His is the very spirit of irrationalism, although more reactionary irrationalists, *e.g.*, De Maistre, succeed to him. He is a rhetorician who knows well what part of an argument to deal with only by invectives.

The civic form of religion has suffered hitherto, Rousseau maintains, from being cruel and founded on superstition. The religion of humanity and the gospel—the one Rousseau has told us about himself in his book *Émile*, through the mouth of the *vicaire savoyard*—is sublime. However,

> Further, far from attaching the hearts of the citizens to the state, it detaches them from it as things of the earth. I know nothing more contrary to the social spirit. We are told that a truly Christian people would form a more perfect society than one can readily imagine. I see in this supposition only one great difficulty, that a society of true Christians would be no longer a society of men. . . . In order that society should be peaceable and harmony maintained, it would be necessary that all citizens, without exception, should equally be good Christians; but if one single man of ambition is to be found, a single

hypocrite, a Cataline for example, or a Cromwell, he will certainly make short work of his pious compatriots. . . . The oath of the troops of Fabius was to my liking: they did not swear to die or win; they swore to return conquerors, and kept their oath. The Christians would never have done anything like that: they would have thought that it tempted God.

But I deceive myself in speaking of a Christian republic; each of the two words excludes the other. Christianity preaches only servitude and dependence. Its spirit is too favourable to tyranny for tyranny not always to have the profit. True Christians are made to be slaves; they know it and it scarcely moves them; this short life has too little value in their eyes. . . . Without disputing the valour of the Crusaders, I would remark that, far from being Christians, they are soldiers of the priest, that is, citizens of the Church. . . . When the Cross chased away the Eagle, all the valour of Rome departed.

Rousseau here, repeating his teacher, Machiavelli, makes a vigorous attack upon pacifism. As we saw, when discussing St. Augustine, it is not irrelevant. It is not untrue to say that, according to the doctrine of the Christian Church, forms of Government, fascist, communist and the like, do not matter so long as these governments do not persecute that Church (and not much, even if they do; since discipline through martyrdom is thereby acquired). Early Christianity was indeed not interested even in liberty as against slavery; or, perhaps, even in social justice. "Who made Me a divider among you?" Justice is, after all, one of the most entirely and merely human of the virtues. In its *own* community of the elect, Christianity gave freedom, peace, communism. But it did not strive against men of wrath, to rebel by violence. The Christian slave remained a slave.

Rousseau, however, has failed to explain—in his reference to the "pious compatriots"—an historic fact: how the pacifist Christian Church not only triumphed but, like pacifist Confucianism, outlasted the barbarian, bellicose states. It will, also, be noted that Rousseau has first chosen to identify Christianity with pure pacifism, as distinct from the "obviously bad" religion of the priests (as in Japan . . .), and then demolishes pacifist Christianity as a menace to the bonds of society. The anti-clerical argument of Marsiglio and the anti-evangelical argument of Machiavelli are both reasserted with new force but the old tendency. With these two pincers the Catholic compromise of "just war" is torn part.* It is noteworthy that Rousseau repeatedly quoted Machiavelli, whom he terms "an honest man and good citizen."

If Rousseau had intuition, had he judgement? What is the conclusion of his argument? It is religious persecution. It is the Inquisition

* *Cf.* p. 701.

without Catholicism; and Plato without reason. We can watch its practical consequences in the contemporary world about us.

There is then a profession of faith, purely civil, the articles of which it appertains to the sovereign to fix, not precisely as dogmas of religion but as sentiments of sociability, without which it is impossible to be either a good citizen or a faithful subject. Without being able to oblige anyone to believe them, it can banish from the state whoever does not believe them. It can banish them, not as impious but as unsociable, as incapable of sincerely loving the laws and justice and, at need, of sacrificing his life to his duty. Further, if anyone, after having publicly accepted these same (civic) dogmas, conducts himself as if he did not believe them, he may be punished by death. He has committed the greatest of crimes: he has lied before the laws. . . . The existence of a powerful god, intelligent, benevolent, with prevision and with providence; the life to come; the happiness of the just; the chastisement of the wicked; the sanctity of the social contract *and of the laws*, these are the positive dogmas.

With irony Rousseau adds: one dogma only is to be excluded, intolerance. Whoever believes others damned in the next world cannot live in peace with them. He must be put in a concentration camp in this world. Where theological intolerance exists, there also will be intolerance in civil matters.

The sovereign is no longer sovereign, even in temporals. Forthwith the priests are the true masters, and kings are only their officers.

In brief, Rousseau admits no intolerance, with capital punishment, save his own, just as Luther believed that men should be freer in conscience than ever—to support Luther. It will be observed that Rousseau states again the problem of Socrates and, in effect, answers it, in the opposite sense to the great Athenian. It matters little that the disobedient must die. The supreme crime of Jean Jacques is that he denies the morality of the man who questions the sanctity of laws that the general will of the sovereign popular majority has willed. If he does not mean this, then he does not make himself clear. This, in fact, is how Rousseau was understood in the Revolutionary days when the poet Chénier was talking about destroying the shards of superstition and having one only worship, that of the altar of the country.

Rousseau's political scheme is, indeed, not inconsistent with the logic of an ill-considered, half-educated, rhetorical Platonism. The menace of Rousseau is indeed the menace that Plato himself has

ascribed to, and denounced in, the rhetoricians—that of the prostitution of thought which sells a meretricious idea alluringly.

Like Plato, Rousseau places great and proper stress on education but, like Plato, he is not content with that alone. He completes education by building up the right social environment and, with the great Greeks, he insists that this shall be homogeneous in culture and mood. There must be "assimilation," *Gleichanschaltung*. There is here absolutely none of the Whig and Liberal passion, since Milton, for variety. Merely he will tolerate a multiplicity of religious sects as he will of sports clubs and such negligible associations. Rousseau quite rightly sees that his General Will, that may acquire mystic reverence as it stirs the primeval herd instinct in men, can only take shape in a culturally homogeneous—never in a utilitarian, heterogeneous, liberal—society.

Rousseau has the merit of seeing that the religious impulse of reverence and love of the brotherhood is so deep in man that it cannot for long be frustrated. It seeks to incarnate itself in some society or church or fatherland. He, moreover, grasps that the anarchic spirit of liberty, which rises in insurrection against mechanical organization and soldiers and officials and laws, is only to be laid to rest by wooing and appeal to the still integrated unconscious nature of man, which has deeper seats than the psychological grounds of these revolts of the disintegrated and unhappy personality. Rousseau has the merit of pointing out that man is, in one part of him, social and, in one part of him, desires to lose himself in the onward march of his own self-chosen society. Rousseau is on the verge of discovering the function of the free society, perceived by Heard, as indeed by monasticism and religious communism. He perverts his argument in favour of the sovereign coercive state.

In one incidental passage—in a footnote—Rousseau seems to save himself. He explains that his argument about social contract applies only to *un état libre*—a free state. It fits in with Rousseau's preference for pure democracy and a small state. It apparently means—as Locke had said—that there must be free emigration. Rousseau endeavours to give reality to this desideratum. His canton democracy or *polis* should be genuinely a voluntary society. For Rousseau perceives that *the whole structure of his argument from moral right to the actual power of society rests in this supposition of free choice.* Otherwise the Social Contract is a sepulchre of dead bones, a lair of Leviathan.

It would be interesting to attach central importance to this passage (*Social Contract*, Book IV, Chap. II). But, if so, Rousseau's political

work would become a literary exercise like More's *Utopia;* it would be totally disconnected with the presuppositions of the French Revolution; and his conclusions would be irrelevant, if not opposed, to it. The better opinion would appear to be that Rousseau's paradoxical work is indeed a literary exercise but, as a star of letters, he had no intention that it should remain such and, therefore, although he had the honesty to note the fatal flaw in his argument, he proceeded to ignore it.

Rousseau does not solve the problem of political obligation: why am I in duty bound to obey and reverence that social order which I have not chosen myself and which happens to violate my reason and conscience? Rousseau does not, because he cannot. He cannot, because I am not so bound. I am only bound when reason compels. And Rousseau has no philosophy of reason, not having thought out a philosophy. Nor has he refuge in some more adequate psychology.

Rousseau, indeed, hesitates and changes his mind upon the nature and object of this ethical allegiance which he regards as so imperative compared with the poor claims of the individual. Is it an allegiance to Society? And if so, to what society? In the first draft of the *Social Contract* Rousseau devotes his efforts to showing (as Bosanquet and the Fascists were to show after him) that allegiance can be due only to "organized society"—or *an* organized society. Only when a civil order has been established by social contract has [a] society any claim. As he writes in his correspondence (Sept. 12, 1761)—and, as with many other writers, the best thing Rousseau ever wrote was his correspondence—

> A man who would be protected by the human race would be very badly protected because *the human race is simply nothing at all:* the only societies that amount to anything are the Powers.

But this Hobbesian conclusion shocked at once his theism and his moralism. And so Rousseau, in the *Social Contract* just finished (Aug. 9, 1761), takes such ground as not to exclude an innate moral sense of right (displayed in simple, personal and home relations) which had obligatory force for all humanity apart from contract (and, indeed, as Hume and Godwin showed, rendered that contract nugatory). Perhaps then there are, not only contractual obligations to small civil societies, but also general obligations to humanity. But to these obligations Rousseau gives no civil content—or political content wider than family and private worship. In his first draft of the Social Contract, while rebutting Hobbes by name, had he not also scored against the

humanist, Diderot? Had not one chapter been entitled: *That there is naturally no general society whatsoever among men?* He had continued:

> We see what we are to think of these pretended cosmopolitan spirits who, justifying their love of their country by that for the human race, boast of loving all the world, in order to have warrant for loving no one dearly.

It was a shrewd personal thrust at men he thought were persecuting him, and at their vaunted humanism. It was a shrewder thrust (along the lines of Clarendon against Hobbes) against the confidence of the Éclaircissement that "reason leads us to work together towards the common good by perception of our interest." Why should the noble—or ignoble—savage submit to the social yoke? But, unfortunately, it upset Rousseau's own argument about man's natural goodness. And, in the completed work—although, as above shown, he harks back in a later letter to his village pumpery—these offending chapters were cut out. Instead he set to work to attack, as a good anarchist, authority inspired by force. However, those who later followed Rousseau were also to follow out his reaction against humanist internationalism, with its belief in the imperative sanction of a reason coincident with the general good.

7

A brief review and analysis of democratic theory, at this turning point, are perhaps here in place. Platonism has technocratic implicattions, which unfailingly show themselves. Plato thought that the majority of men do not think—not so much because they *cannot* as because, from sensuality or indolence, they *will not* think and prefer to eschew this troublesome ambition. Rousseau desires to accept the Platonism without the core of Plato. He rightly perceives that reluctance to think is confined to no one economic class. His heart is lost to the simpler folk such as he imagined himself, because of his bad manners, to be. He, therefore, supposes that wisdom will be reached by the general will of the common folk that is infallible. Its heart is always in the right place, although he conceded that its mind may be misled by charlatans. His conclusion, however, is that, to avoid charlatans and remain the common folk, it must trust to its heart.

The comment is obvious and is that of Anatole France: if forty million Frenchmen will a foolish thing, it still remains a foolish thing. That is clear enough if we substitute let us say, four hundred for forty millions so that we are not dazed by numbers. The trouble is that, in

the heated days of revolution, it may take quite a long while before the error is found out, by which time catastrophe is no longer avertible. The only alternative, then, is the doctrinaire denial that catastrophe in the shape of war, famine and the impoverishment of civilization is indeed such. To the issue between the Jeffersonian belief, on the one side, in dynamic liberty, initiative and confidence in the duty to leave the common man alone as a personality in his own right, and the Platonic belief, on the other side, in static authority established by the knowledge of the most knowledgeable people and regulating the less knowledgeable, Rousseau contributes many words but little guidance. He merely contrives to obscure the difference between totalitarianism, which we shall later discuss, and utilitarian democracy. It is not an unexpected result that his school debouches into the dictatorial tyranny of the Jacobins.

Rousseau, however, introduced a new element into the discussion. Hitherto it had tended to range itself as one of liberty and the cause of the individual as, however humble, "a man for all that," against authority and the cause of "the best." Those who rested authority merely on power had either to resort to the Will of God as an argument for obedience—and meet the objection that "the power that *will* be is also of God"—or to abandon any attempt to answer the question "Why" and to fall back on brute fact and custom. The argument had indeed been hinted at, that obedience to authority makes for the survival of the race, and the alternative argument that the habit of initiative invigorates the species. It was for Rousseau to bind the cause of the common man with that of authority, by taking him *en masse*, not severally, on the ground that he represented numbers and that the assent of numbers was necessary to power and civil peace; and, further, on the romantic ground that simple virtue dwelt in aggregated numbers and massed units.

Rousseau bound up his cause with that of the common man; and, moreover, promised him power through numbers. Thereby, more than Hobbes and Spinoza, because without their rationalism, he confounded mere power with social justice. Not unnaturally the common man was seduced, and forgot that mere numbers do not even make power. Reason was deserted on the one side and political realism on the other. Moreover, Rousseau, not content, like Aristotle, with attributing to the common man judgement, must needs attribute to him infallibility, thus affronting knowledge and science. To make good his thesis, he had to attribute infallibility to a good heart and to rob —turning Socrates on his head—virtue of the quality of intelligence.

It is on these grounds, as we shall see, that he is criticized by his disciple Hegel, who definitely takes the route of Totalitarianism and thus resolves the riddle of collectivist democracy.

Bentham took the opposite route, repudiating with ridicule Rousseau's course. Whether in a small voluntary society—such as the Jesuits—a collective spirit or *esprit de corps* might not be endowed for the members with a mystic quality as it were of local infallibility, comforting to the human quest for certainty, was a problem with which the Philistine patriarch of the utilitarians did not concern himself. When this claim was arrogated to itself by State or Majority, Bentham's disciples saw it as another name for tyranny. The decision of the majority was, for the Benthamites, no index of infallibility before which men should prostrate themselves in crowd rapture; but a practical expedient for avoiding greater inconvenience. The Rousseauites immersed the individual in the redeeming waters of this or that society. The Benthamites proposed to vindicate the right of each individual to that open road that leads to his greatest actual happiness and development of powers.

It weakens (and led in J. S. Mill to bankruptcy) but does not destroy the argument of the Benthamites that, when calculating the way out, they computed only the contemporary generation. It was an error for which—with Burke—Hegel and Nietzsche were to overcompensate. Fundamentally, Bentham was not concerned with the majority, save as mechanism, but with every common man as individual. This was the foundation of his democracy. The rock-bottom of his science was certain hypotheses about human nature, as much as it was for Aristotle and Machiavelli, the great empiricists, as well as for Bacon's disciple, Hobbes, and for Spinoza. Human Nature made certain demands upon society, which it was highfalutin to call natural rights, but which provided criteria thanks to which the utility of any social order could be judged. From the point of view of Benthamite Democracy that social order was unhealthy which involved the denial of these demands, whether by populace, proletariat or oligarchy, to any common man, sharing the common nature, save so far as his demands clashed with the claim to happiness of the greater number. Let us add the words—"even if calculated through many generations." The onus of proof was on Society and on Governments.

8

Rousseau's argument has yet this in common with Bentham and with Locke. At least in his earlier writings, Rousseau's injunction is

to study human nature. It is the reasonable basis of his anarchism, as of his (imperfect) theory of natural law. The Romantics as readily turned to optimism and confidence in *Nature* (primitive and instinctive, rather than impregnated with Reason), as the Classicists turned to law, discipline and urbane belief in *Manners* and disbelief in Man. It is, however, futile to turn to the Romantics for the patient study and humble assiduousness of an Aristotle or of the graver empiric philosophers. They were superior to all that, finding enough to interest them in their own hearts. Rousseau expresses this injunction to consider Nature in his *Discourses on Inequality*, when he reaches the disconcerting and crass conclusion that only those inequalities are in accordance with natural right which are authorized by physical superiorities and that all the rest are due to civilization and perversion.

> I have attempted to disclose the origin and progress of inequality, and the establishment and abuse of political societies, so far as these things can be deduced from the nature of man by the unaided light of reason, and independently of the sacred dogmas that give to sovereign authority the sanction of divine right.

The phrasing is unsatisfactory but the conclusion that political science rests upon a study of human nature (of the empirical investigation of which, save as a romancer and writer of confessions, Rousseau was incapable) is the only sound one. It is not, however, original to Rousseau.

The Baron d'Holbach, the Encyclopaedist, in his admirable *Natural Politics* (1770) elaborates the political consequences to be drawn from the study of the nature of man. He properly builds political science on psychology. It will, however, be more appropriate to discuss the implications of his work at a later stage.*

The Marquis de Condorcet's *Outline of a Picture of the Progress of the Human Spirit* (1794) is more in accord with the general spirit of Rousseau's later writings. The importance, however, that it assigns, in tracing the developments of this good spirit upward towards the light of the future, to the illumination of reason making clear the traps and gins of priests and kings, who are like Bunyan's demons, shows that the actual influence upon Condorcet was that of Voltaire. This noble work, which is the converse of Winwood Reade's later, famous *Martyrdom of Man* (1872), is the bloom of that idea, recent in the eighteenth century but of wide significance, already expressed by the Abbé de Saint-Pierre, that history neither remained on an

* *Cf.* p. 751.

even plane, as for Bossuet (1627–1704) nor moved, as the Stoics and Vico (1668–1744) thought, in cycles, but moved spirally upwards. Time was a factor in Reality. The notion of evolution was born, although it was regarded as automatic and due to ideas—the presiding, benevolent fate being Reason which, automatically, broke through the jungle of royal barbarism and the swamps of priestly superstition. The only defect of Condorcet's rational theory is that (save by allusions to the poison of power) it failed to explain the historic existence of either priests or kings. Before, however, we criticize Condorcet we do well to recall that this salute to progress was written in a French Revolutionary prison by a man upon whom, in 1794, the sentence of death was carried out. Surely the human spirit boasts few greater triumphs.

9

Although the War of the Austrian Succession and the Seven Years' War took place during the period of Rousseau's literary activity, in that less democratic age of standing armies and of humanist detachment, these wars make no imprint upon Rousseau's writings. As for Owen and Fourier later, in the case of the Napoleonic War, almost the wars might not have occurred. Rousseau, however, by his far-flung words on popular sovereignty (of small states), but also by his appeal to emotion, by his doctrine of amiable savagery and by his glorification of humanity in the mass, uncorrupted by civilization, logic and discipline, provided the leaders in the Revolutionary war to come with the watchwords and arguments for which they were searching.

In 1789 the Revolution broke in France as a financial crisis. Men of the type of Meunier and Bailly, who in retrospect could be called Parliamentary Liberals, were in charge of the demand for reform. Forty-two years before, d'Argenson had prophesied the coming of a republican revolution. Chesterfield had done the same. The country folk suffered under *taille* and *capitation* and *vingtième, gabelle* and *corvée*. These taxes would have been less resented if their incidence had been more equitable and their utilization more efficient. In the days of Louis XV, ironically called Bien-Aimé, Madame de Pompadour put face patches on the maps to indicate the places that the French Generals should take. In the days of the virtuous Louis XVI, more dangerously Calonne gambled with the revenues. The ruling classes of France, unlike those of Prussia, no longer commanded respect.

It might yet be that, as Talleyrand later said: "No one who had not lived before '89 could know how sweet life could be"—for those

in the right circles. It was the grandmother of George Sand who exclaimed, "It is the Revolution that brought old age into the world." Even (as we have seen in the case of the Luxembourgs and Thérèse La Vasseur) class insolence was singularly abated. The current philosophy had reduced itself to the maxim:

Riens des préceptes sauvages
De nos censeurs rigoreux,
Nous serons toujours assez sages
Si nous sommes souvent heureux.*

Even the Church, containing much devotion and much corruption, despite excesses such as drove Voltaire to the fury that elevated him almost to grandeur, was growing more accommodating. It was no longer interested in burning heretics, although it could persecute a Calas, but rather in preventing miracles by the Jansenist heretics.

De par le roi, défense à Dieu
De faire miracle en ce lieu.†

But the enlightened self-interest advocated by the tolerant liberals, who led the *Éclaircissement*, the Enlightenment, against the savage intolerance of an earlier age, provided no such moral discipline as might compel men to surrender their private indulgences on the altar of social justice. A seigneur writes to the King's brother: "Monsignor, your kindly heart [*coeur sensible*] will surely never consent that a head of a family of my station shall be strictly taxed on the vingtièmes like one of the commonalty." As La Casa exclaimed, less appropriately, of the Italian Renaissance, there was *nimia humanitatis suavitas*—"too much humanitarian sweetness." But it did not extend to the puritanical disciplining of their own pockets.

On May 5, 1789, the Estates General met in Paris as a feudal gathering, the first since 1614—an emergency gathering such as might have been held in England in the days of Henry III. By June 16, the Third Estate had declared itself in session as a National Assembly and had claimed the full power of the purse. The constitutional lawyers of the *cahiers* were put in countenance by the assent of the King given after the event. But the revolution had begun. The old constitution was at an end. The obstinate feudal pig-headedness of the nobility, by slamming the door on obvious reform, had deprived the constitutionalists of foothold. The startling act of August 4, 1789, by which a

*Let us laugh at the savage precepts of our puritan censors.
We shall always be wise enough if we are often enough happy.

† "By order of the King, God is forbidden to perform miracles in this place."

privileged nobility, under the influence of emotion and by voluntary act, renounced its feudal privileges, came too late. Concession came too late to assure co-operation. The physical-force men on both sides had the upper hand. The dismissal of Necker and the appointment of the Marshal de Broglie, on July 12, were met by the Fall of the Bastille on July 14, and were to be followed by the compulsory bringing of the King to Paris in October. Later the imprisoned King exclaimed:

> M. de Malesherbes, for two hours I have been trying to discover whether in the course of my reign I have deserved the least reproach from my subjects. Well, I swear to you in all truth as a man about to appear before God, that I have always wished for the happiness of my people, that I have never formed a wish opposed to them. I refused to shed blood when it might have saved my throne and my life. . . . And I do not repent. No, Monsieur, I do not repent.

The tragedy of Louis XVI was that of the ordinary good man. He had meditated on the obstinacy of Charles I and had determined to substitute, for the obstinacy of the Stuarts, concession—but an uncertain and vacillating concession. With some injustice to Charles but little to Louis, Turgot had told him: "Weakness, Sire, laid Charles I's head on the scaffold." It was the misfortune of Louis XVI that Louis XV had declared (1766):

> It is in my person alone that sovereign authority resides. . . . It is to my person alone that the legislative powers, without dependence or share, appertain. The public order emanates solely from me. I am the supreme guardian. My people is one through me; the rights and interests of the nation, of which one dares make a body separate from the monarch, are necessarily united with mine and remain in my hands alone.

Louis XVI could never quite decide whether he wished to change that or not—and how. The intrigues of the Austrian-born Queen with members of her class, abroad, and the flight to Varennes, far from proclaiming unity of interest, separated king and a national patriotism newly sprung up in a still international world.

The Constituent Assembly gave way to the new men of the Legislative Assembly. Brissot, journalist and deputy, who had learned maxims from Voltaire, and who thought war between France and Austria inevitable (and better sooner than later), instructed the Girondin deputies, Left Wing Progressives, men of a phrase. This, however, was an epoch of Clubs, and the Jacobin Club extremists could win more listeners among the young deputies. Here there was no patience with a Girondin "reign of social equality where Madame

Roland would be leader." The Montagnards, Jacobins, had a plan. As Buzot, the Girondin, confessed: "It must be granted that they understood better than we the mass of people whom they govern." The Montagnards, "the Holy Mountain," did not seek for majorities. They had learned the secret that all government is by the control of the appropriate minorities. They claimed to know within themselves the "true interest" of the people. The general will was their private property. They did not follow, but made, public opinion and justified their action after the event. They were Bolsheviks before the Bolsheviki.

Under the Convention, beginning on the day of the battle of Valmy, Sept. 30, 1792, the Jacobins came into their own. There was no longer question of making war under a king. The Jacobins organized; disciplined party members; could afford themselves to take the lead in war. Longwy had been met by the September Massacre in the prisons, incited by Marat. It was Marat who had said to Desmoulins at this time:

> If the faults of the Constituent Assembly had not created for us irreconcilable enemies in the old nobles, I persist in believing that this great movement might have advanced in the world by pacific methods; but after the absurd edict which kept these enemies by force amongst us, after the clumsy blows struck at their pride by the abolition of titles, after violently extorting the goods of the clergy, I maintain there is now no way of rallying them to the Revolution. . . . We are all in a state of war with intractable enemies: *we must destroy them.*

And on Sept. 25, 1792, Marat, whom Robespierre called "une mauvaise tête," wrote a note in his journal:

> Fifty years of anarchy await you and you will emerge from it only by the power of some dictator who will arise—a true statesman and patriot. O prating people, if you did but know how to act . . .

and

> Begin by hanging at their doors the bakers, the grocers and the tradesmen.

In the following placid century, when men even thought that massacre required justification, Louis Blanc wrote:

> Between Danton concurring in massacres because he approves of them and Robespierre not preventing them although he deplores them, I do not hesitate to say that the more culpable is Robespierre.

A thousand and eighty-nine were massacred in Paris. Edmund Burke is stirred to uncontrollable denunciation because, not common folk, but his friends, who can make themselves heard in the world, are suffering. (Fifty years later, and the sage of Chelsea, Thomas Carlyle, Bismarck's admirer, is finding excuses for "action"—*c'est la guerre.*) Then the king's head—the execution of Louis. The Jacobins for war. Danton stamps with his foot and French armies arise. Modern militant nationalism is born from democracy and its conscript forces. The Jacobins stirred the war fever; assured their own popularity as "the patriots"; challenged the kings of all countries by an appeal to their peoples to universal insurrection. In April, 1793, Danton's child, the First Committee of Public Safety, followed on the Second Revolutionary Tribunal. "No, no truce for any traitor . . . The weapon of the Terror against our internal enemies" (Aug. 12, 1793).

The Terror turning inwards. Théroigne de Méricourt, speaking in the Tuileries on behalf of her friend Brissot, stripped by the Jacobin women. Less well-known women, commoners, burned over hay fires (there is no smoke here to suffocate, such as the Inquisition allowed). Robespierre, with "self-love excessive and intolerant," lasts on as the priest of the Revolution, the Mahdi of Rousseauism.

> I have maintained, in spite of persecution and unsupported, that the people are never wrong (1793). . . . The motives of the people are always pure; they cannot do otherwise than love the public good.

However, "the inequality of wealth is a necessary and incurable evil" (April, 1791). The Revolution is proceeding on to the Disillusion.

Rabaut de St. Étienne can declare (Jan. 8, 1793), "Political equality established, the poor soon feel that it is vitiated by the inequality of fortunes." But Levasseur, the Jacobin, procures from the Convention the declaration that it decrees the death penalty against whosoever shall propose the agrarian law or any other law subversive of territorial, economic or industrial property. Robespierre continues:

> The equality of property is a chimera. The right of property is limited like all other rights . . . . it must not endanger either the security, liberty, existence or property of others.

The *loi le Chapelier* forbids all associations. That of the 22 Frimaire, year II, declares that in army factories, "all coalitions or assemblies of workmen are forbidden." The law of April 14, 1791, declares:

> The annihilation of all kinds of corporations of citizens belonging to the same trade or profession being one of the fundamental bases of the French

constitution, it is forbidden to reestablish them on any pretext or under any form whatsoever.

As Rousseau has said, the Sovereignty of the People must be indivisible. No trade unions.

The dirty work is left by Robespierre (a great lover of bird life) to the *jupons gras*. Nor must writers presume—they are "the most dangerous of the people." The total of those who die in the Terror is about four thousand, a quarter of them women. The Government "will remain revolutionary until the peace." Already Marat has been stricken by Charlotte Corday—the first of the great Jacobin triumvirate has gone. As Camille Desmoulins writes: "*Les dieux ont soif.*"* First Robespierre, with Barrère, strikes against the anarchist Left—Hébert, Clootz, Chaumette.

Chaumette himself, potent Procureur, Agent National as they now call it, who could "recognize the suspects by the very face of them," he lingers but three days; on the third day, he too is hurled in. Most chapfallen, blue, enters the National Agent this limbo whither he has sent so many. Prisoners crowd round, jibing and jeering: "Sublime National Agent," says one, "in virtue of thy immortal Proclamation, lo there! I am suspect, thou art suspect, he is suspect, we are suspect, ye are suspect, they are suspect!"

Then a blow to the opportunist Right. Danton to execution on April 5, 1794 (and Camille Desmoulins with him), "guilty of a conspiracy to reestablish the monarchy and destroy the Republican government."

Those, however, who aided Robespierre in his purge did not propose themselves to be among the purged. The friends of Danton and the members of the Committee of General Security rally. Robespierre is arrested and, with his jaw broken, was on July 28, 1794, guillotined, being the ninth Thermidor. The real workers of the Committee of Safety, Carnot, Lindet last on. To their defence they call Augustin Robespierre's friend, Captain Buonaparte of Toulon, a Corsican, of Tuscan extraction, even technically a British subject, now French brigadier. On the 13th Vendémiaire the defence is achieved, with a whiff of grapeshot. "Damn liberty, I hate its very name," cry some. *Buveurs de sang*—"blood drinkers!"—cry others. Boissy d'Anglas, Thermidorian, declares, "We have compressed six centuries into as many years. Let us hope that so costly an experiment will not be lost on you. Equality consists in the fact that *the law* is the same for all, whether it punishes or protects."

* "The gods thirst."

The four thousand aristocrats guillotined or liquidated, Rochefoucauld of the model farms among them, the four hundred or less whose heads were paraded on pikes—save for its effect on the psyche of the people, what was it but a bagatelle?

But the end is not yet. Last is put under him who has put all things under. "Happiness is the highest possible development of *my* talents," says Napoleon, quoting Robespierre's Constitution of 1793 and also quoting Rousseau. The talent of Napoleon is for death. The legitimate autocrats, the Benevolent Despots, efficient, impartial between parties—the Joseph II's had failed. They aroused no enthusiasm from their mulish peoples. But an illegitimate despot, as Aristotle had said of the tyrants of old—one who is the People's Choice—that was different. Napoleon developed his talent, he the Jacobin; war raged from Moscow to Cadiz; and the French people followed the tricolour in pursuit of glory for *la patrie*. Napoleon ended the old Roman Empire and founded a new Caesardom. The French had entered on the Revolution for bread, but this was another older story which illustrates the theme that the web of politics is the pursuit of power.

At last Caesar fell. The vision faded. The height of the men of France was, on an average, an inch and a half shorter than it had been. The fine young men were dead. The Republic passed to Empire, passed back to Monarchy, to Republic, to Empire, to Communism, back to Republic. When the Revolution began Britain had more liberty. Britain, therefore, had no Revolution. It heeded Locke, not Rousseau. And when the last waves of the French Revolution died down, Britain, without revolution, still had more liberty and more democracy.

It may be that the French would have been wiser to take Jefferson's advice.* Or it may be that the French were not a nation of Jeffersons. They preferred Rousseau, and the evangel of Jean Jacques; "The people always right"; the Terror in revenge for the Ancient Régime; and Napoleon the Greater and the Less, Jena and Sedan. But, nevertheless, the countrymen of France, thanks to the Revolution, secured their plots of land and the common man ate better. In France, the Revolution, if not in the graces, then in bread and meat—and freedom from seigneur and intendant—was justified in its fruits. Frenchmen, however, turned, not from Napoleon to Revolution, but from the universal suspicions, hates and uncertainties of Jacobin Revolution with relief and satisfaction to death and national glory under Napoleon the Emperor.

* *Cf.* p. 316.

READING

J. J. Rousseau: *Social Contract*, Book I; Book II, Chaps. II–III; Book IV, Chap. VIII.

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE

C. W. Hendel: *Jean Jacques Rousseau, Moralist*, 1936.
*J. J. Rousseau: *Confessions.*
J. J. Rousseau: *Letters* (selection Hendel).
C. E. Vaughan: *The Political Writings of J. J. Rousseau*, 2 vols., 1915.

Chapter XV

Georg Hegel

1

THE Holy Roman Empire in the eighteenth century was a Republic of Princes with an elected head, in which the Emperor, to be prevented from doing harm, was prevented from doing anything. Germany, nevertheless, was, for those who were not princes, pre-eminently the *terra obedientiae*—"the land of authority and obedience"—where Frederick II of Hesse Cassel sold his subjects to England as soldiers, for £15 a head, and the Margrave of Ansbach-Bayreuth sold his state outright for hard cash to Prussia. In Württemberg, its ruler, Karl Eugen, summarized the situation: "What is that? I am the fatherland." Lessing provides the comment: "Do not talk to me of your liberty of thought and the press. It reduces itself to the liberty to let off as many squibs against religion as one likes. Let somebody but raise his voice for the rights of subjects or against exploitation and nepotism and you will see which is the most slavish land in Europe."

The Rhineland states, ruled by prince-bishops, indulgent, sometimes indolent, but often liberal, welcomed the French and the brotherhood of man. "We must defend to the death the liberty and equality offered to us by our Frank brothers" (Förster). The French left amid curses. "Their reign of Saturn is a Saturnalia . . . once swallowed, the deadly draught makes black look white; virtue and piety become empty words, oaths a fleck of foam, obscenity wit and folly wisdom" (Stolberg). As Görres wrote: "We expected defenders of the rights of man—indeed a sort of philosophers—and we found soldiers in whose dictionary the world 'discipline' was lacking." "As far as my experience goes there was scarcely an honest man among the French officials," exclaims Venedry. But the real trouble was that the good Germans found that the French, even when exclaiming, "Liberty, equality, fraternity," still remained Frenchmen, less cosmopolitan than those whose emancipation they proclaimed.

Schiller declared: "I write as a citizen of the world who serves no prince; I lost my fatherland to exchange it for the great world."

Goethe, in 1773, had asked, "Wherefore the vain striving for a feeling of nationalism, which we cannot and indeed do not desire to entertain, which is the result of special circumstances in certain people and at certain times?" But, later,

> That which the Lutherans did, today is done by the Frenchmen.
> In such barbaric times tranquil culture recedes.

The conscript soldiers* of the French Revolution, to the accompaniment of singing the Marseillaise in the name of Nationalism and the glory of France, had effectively drowned in cold water the international humanism of the Renaissance about which Germany was dreaming.

Briefly, France in the name of the Emancipation of Humanity sought to weaken her rival, the over-large German Empire and, as sequel, to worsen the condition of the German workers, however much temporarily their lot might be improved by the removal of feudal dues (although not always by the French, *e.g.*, in Prussia). In Prussia these dues were removed by Hardenberg, who had learned from Burke to "damn Metaphysic," but who chose to do by Government, thanks to sagacity pressed by fear, what the French had done by revolt. It is not remarkable that the immortal Goethe, no potential fascist like Shakespeare, but a humanist, adds: "I hate every violent upheaval because as much good is destroyed as is gained by it." But Field Marshal Gneisenau learned his lesson: "One cause above all has raised France to this pinnacle of greatness. The Revolution awakened all her powers and gave to every individual a suitable field for his activity." The step was short to Bismarck and the glory of Germany. That achievement of power had hitherto been frustrated, in the days of the making of the nations, by the bitter ideological divisions of religion, introduced into the heart of Germany, between Lutherans and Catholics. It left a war-bearing legacy of thwarted nationalist ambition for the future. At such a price ideological orthodoxy was purchased by the sects.

JOHANN GOTTLIEB FICHTE (1762–1814), son of a weaver, is preeminently the philosopher of the transition of thought. He started in a fashion typical of his age under the influence of the great Revolution of his day, the French. "Peace be on Rousseau's ashes and blessings on his memory; for he has kindled fire in many souls." Fichte even

* Danton was responsible for reviving the levy *en masse;* the Directory for the beginning of conscription.

begins as an exponent of the faith of the young Rousseau, the anarchist "My system," writes Fichte, "from beginning to end is nothing but an analysis of the concept of freedom." A civil society could morally only be founded on contract or consent.

The life in the State cannot be counted among the necessary aims of man; but it is only an expedient applied under certain circumstances for the foundation of a perfect society. The State, as all human institutions, aims at its own destruction: it is the aim of every government to make government superfluous [*cf.* Paine, Godwin and Bakunin]. . . .

The State in itself is nothing but an abstract notion, only the citizens as such are real persons.

For E. von Hartmann* (1842–1906) Fichte was the representative of anarchism. The tortuous and subtle mind, however, of Fichte moves from this position to its opposite. At the beginning of an evil process, one recalls the warning:

> Zu fragmentarisch ist Welt und Leben.
> Ich will mich zum deutschen Professor begeben,
> Der weiss das Leben zusammenzusetzen,
> Und er macht ein verständig System daraus.†

The Absolute Ego being rational, Fichte asserted that it, by its inherent nature, followed rational law; and of this the empirical instrument is the State. Despotism, however, is lawless and anti-moral. This is Fichte's second phase: the appropriation of Kant. "There is a very sure means of preventing violent revolution, but there is only one, and that is to instruct the people thoroughly in their rights and duties." This system of law, however, is something external to the essential, free individual; different from ethics; not universal as ethics; and bound up with the particular state. Law, in brief, is the regulation of the non-ideal, real, actual, sensual, *unfree*, and *accidental* side of man. Fichte's uncompromising idealism (idea-ism) is at this point taking its revenge on him: the ideal or substantial has other laws than the phenomenal and actual. Empty "spirituality" has betrayed its own fortresses by renouncing the actual. In the field of actual law Fichte grants a monarchy: throws in an "ephorate" to check and balance it; then washes his hands of a people who will not sustain the "ephorate." To understand this "spirituality" or "subjective idealism" of Fichte, the Kantian, is to comprehend the reason for the

* *Cf.* p. 526.

† "Too fragmentary is the World and Life. I will hie me to a German professor, who knows how to put Life together and make an intelligible system out of it."

reaction of Hegel towards an "objective idealism" and of Marx towards materialism.

For the Romantic German writer at this time (such as F. von Schlegel and Novalis) truth was found in epigrams and contradiction. It is not folly but design to affirm contradictions; and if we can extract some *tief* principle from this it is felt to be the greater intellectual triumph. In his third phase, then, Fichte holds that, in a totally moral world (such as substantially the world is), the State *must* have a moral function, *viz.*, to defend liberty, and this not only negatively, but positively. "Civilization means exercising all forces for the sake of complete freedom"—including the liberty of the worker to work, and *freedom of the German peasant from an international industrial economy that threatened to ruin him.* The State's task was not, then, (as Locke had seemed to hint) only the defence of the existing order of property. In his Utopia of this transition, which yet Fichte took seriously, and which has since been put into practice, *The Closed Commercial State* (1800), Fichte insisted that, of the *actual* State,

> its true aim is to procure for its subjects that which is their due as members of mankind and to maintain them in possession.

He drew the conclusion that what was needed was a Planned Economy; isolation as against Free Trade [Fichte was a man of the people, who had never been outside Germany]; and *autarkie* or self-sufficiency.

Fichte here has seized two notions, one true and one partly false. He has discovered that the freedom of the individual may be a natural right, but has to be safeguarded by law against other individuals—and this not only *negatively*, as touching individual life and personal liberty, but *positively*, in matters of economic livelihood and of culture. There is a right to work, although also a right to private property as "whole product of labour." In brief, Fichte (and here he is important) shows the passage into Socialism from, and as logically consequent upon, Individualism. Further, Fichte has traced some tortuous mental course from the Ego to a distinction between actual, selfish ego and ideal, rational Ego; this latter then becomes identified with God whom perfect society serves; and then the State (at first classed as actual and temporary) is redeemed as the chosen instrument of society. The fateful change-over has been made from godly society (or humanistic concept of humanity) to actual State-and-Government. It was a change-over stimulated by the German reaction against nationalist,

revolutionary France, which had turned into an imperialist, dictatorial France.

In the fourth and last phase, of the *Patriotic Dialogues* and the *Addresses*, Fichte has entirely turned from the ego as actual "I" to the Ego as God. But at the same time the professor's confidence in reason, his cosmopolitanism, his humanism, his liberal, even Babeuvian* socialism has undergone eclipse. In irrational time of war the significance of the State-and-Government tends to impress, even excessively. It was so with Fichte. And, although Fichte's *Addresses to the German People* (1808) had no great contemporary influence, his fame becomes permanently connected with them. On the one hand, there is a new note of pseudo-realism, the "realism" of a disappointed arm-chair idealist. "Everyone who wishes to organize a republic or a state for that matter, must assume the maliciousness of man." Like Rousseau, he praises and deliberately reintroduces the influence of Machiavelli; and disconsolately, "toughly," decides from his professor's chair that, between States, only the law of the stronger holds. However, he was sure that "ideally" something else was better; but Natural Law was not "free" or "ideal" enough. Here Fichte cuts himself, to his loss, adrift from the great Natural Law tradition of Western civilization. On the other hand,

> Cosmopolitanism is the will to attain the purpose of life and of man in all mankind. Patriotism is the will to attain this purpose first of all in that nation of which we are members and the wish that this light may radiate from this nation over all mankind.

Elsewhere, Fichte observes:

> Man becomes man only among other human beings [pure Rousseau]; if there are to be human beings at all, there must [? by a necessity of Fichte's logic] be a number of them.
>
> Man is destined to live in society, he must live in society, he is no complete human being and contradicts his nature if he lives in isolation.

There is, Fichte had asserted even in his earlier phase (in his discussion on Social Contract, omitted altogether in his late *Political Theory*), a true civil, or "unification," contract going beyond protection of property or person:

> it is that by which all converge into one whole; and are no longer united in an abstract sense into a *compositum*, but virtually into a *totum* . . . . each individual becomes a part of an organized whole and melts into one with it.

* *Cf.* p. 552.

Emphasizing Rousseau, Fichte had made Social Contract vanish into smoke and leave, as residue, its opposite, Social Organism. The pietist Fichte concludes:

The individual man sees in his country the realization of his earthly immortality.

The step to the rejection of Christianity—from the most ideal motives—is a short one.

J. G. Fichte is (all national differences being allowed for) the German Rousseau. Humanist, cosmopolitan, anarchist; liberal; liberal socialist; collectivist, nationalist, national-socialist—the agony of Fichte's doubts and changes expresses, more clearly than it is expressed in any other writer, the crisis in civilization for his age. It is an example of striking interest for our own age. For Fichte, the purely German arm-chair idealist with an itch for action and a background of privation and class humiliation, what is born out of his thought, although abortive at that time, is something closely akin to national socialism. With Schlegel and the literary Romantics, with Adam Müller, the founder of the Social Organic school in opposition to Natural Law teachings, and even with the Historical School in its reaction against cosmopolitan Humanism, Fichte must be reputed one of the fathers of fascism. Immediately, however, he prepares the way for a philosopher of more catholic range and wider influence.

2

Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770–1831) was born in Suabian Stuttgart, capital of Württemberg, son of a small governmental official such as was Adolf Hitler's father. The boy, although in no wise remarkable, thanks to assiduous German care spent by the family on his education was a school prize winner. He displayed no peculiar capability until he started "cutting" lectures, for the better pursuit of his studies, when at Tübingen University. Although the tradition is untrue that, when there, he went with his contemporary the philosopher Schelling, to plant a tree of Liberty, it is true that, like most young Germans of the early nineties, he fell under the spell of the French Revolution; declared it "a glorious mental dawn"; read (like the old Kant in Königsberg) his Rousseau; was even prepared to acknowledge that fact; and incubated ideas unexpected in an Evangelical theological student.

The theological student lapsed into the private tutor in Berne and Frankfort, writing a life of Christ but reaching the disconcerting

conclusion that Christianity was a moral error. In this epoch of Goethe's neo-paganism and of Winckelmann's exposition of the classical art—this last wave of the Renaissance—Hegel discovered that only the Greeks had a fine grasp upon ethical truth. It is of the utmost importance that Hegel, brought up on the poet Sophocles, is the first eminent political philospher since Augustine—or since Cicero—who really knew his Greek thinkers adequately and first hand. Certainly neither Rousseau nor Kant did.

In 1800 Hegel, having abandoned a plan of a year of quiet study in some (preferably Catholic) German city that boasted *ein gutes Bier,** went to Jena. In 1806 the French army did the same thing. Hegel, with the proofs of his *Phenomenology* before him, heard spasmodic sounds from the transitory world—the cannon bursts of the battle of Jena. Putting the last pages in his pocket he walked across the pillaged and burning town to take refuge in the house of the Herr Pro-Rector. He contemplated, with detachment not only philosophical but Suabian, the spectacle of the Prussian rout and wrote to a friend his impressions.

I saw the Emperor, that world-soul, riding through the city to reconnoitre. It is in truth a strange feeling to see such an individual before one, who here, from this point, as he rides his horse, is reaching over the world, and remoulding it.

Hegel, a German looking at the great Italian Emperor of the French, shows himself still a *clerc* of the old international world of learning, a man of the *Éclaircissement*, or *Aufklärung*, for whom nationalism is barbaric, Gothic—a kinsman of Goethe and Gibbon and Voltaire, a cosmopolitan, admiring only "*la génie*," "*der Meistergeist.*"

Hegel continues, in a letter to a student—and the passage in these present war-cursed and revolution-haunted years has interest—

Science is the only theodicy; it alone can keep us from taking events with the stupid astonishment of an animal, or, with short-sighted cleverness, ascribing them to the accidents of the moment, or of the talents of an individual, and supposing that the fate of empires depends on a hill being or not being occupied by soldiery,—as well as from lamenting over them, as at the victory of injustice and the defeat of justice. The French nation [Hegel goes on, mixing his metaphors] by the bath of its revolution, has been freed from many institutions which the spirit of man has left behind like its baby shoes, and which therefore weighed upon it, as they still weigh upon others, as lifeless

* "A good beer."

fetters. . . . Hence especially comes their preponderance over the cloudy and undeveloped spirit of the Germans, who, however, if they are once forced to cast off their inaction, will raise themselves to action, and perceiving in their contact with outward things the intensity of their inner life, will perchance surpass their teachers.

Hegel had none of the arrogance of flash precocity. He was a solid, sober German, content for years to annotate his reading before making his remarks. It is true that, unlike Dr. Kant, he did not jot them down and put them in a drawer to make a book of them when he was fifty-seven. But, specifically, Hegel objected to the younger Schelling's habit of "thinking in public." He had left Tübingen with a certificate from his wise tutors that he was a man of good parts who had bestowed no attention on philosophy. After Jena, penniless, save for a few dollars in his pocket from the great Goethe, he made shift as a local editor; then became a school headmaster in Nuremberg. It is comforting to reflect that, at the age of forty-seven, the academic world took notice of the greatest philosopher save one since Aristotle and advanced him to the chair of philosophy in Heidelberg (the chair that was offered to the non-Aryan Spinoza), where he lectured, first to four, but ultimately to thirty students.

Frankly, he mumbled and the lectures were dull. Hegel, like Kant, Spinoza, Aquinas and a few others, had fallen into the error of forgetting the moral imperative to talk A.B.C. like a yellow journalist. He believed that truth had to be sought—could not be served on the table with milk like a breakfast food—and even perhaps thought that a few roughnesses might discipline the mind and be good for the intellectual digestion. Hegel, tradition has it, on his death-bed exclaimed that only one man had adequately understood him, and added—"and even he didn't." His expositor Stirling, writing on "The Secret of Hegel," had little better luck, since he was congratulated on keeping the secret so well. The substance of the Hegelian system, however, is as perfectly lucid as mathematics itself for those who will have the humility to try to understand it. As Hegel's student, Hotho, writes: "An ability of a merely formal kind is able to chatter away with cheap attractiveness, without rising above the region of commonplace." The cult of "lucidity" is indeed a form of ignorant arrogance which merits the excommunication written over the doors of Plato's Academy. About the implications, however, of the Hegelian system opinions legitimately may and do differ. They range through the whole gamut of totalitarian political opinions from Fascism to Stalinism, all of which call Hegel "master."

The core of Hegel's philosophical system is the Hegelian idealism and the Hegelian Logic. The system, thus developed, is offered to the world as complete. Full though the writings of the British philosophers of the seventeenth and eighteenth century—especially Locke—had been of quotations from the Sacred Book, anxious although they—especially Isaac Newton—had, in several cases, been to bolster the Word of God by the evidence of profane science, they had not (with the exception of Bishop Berkeley) been so concerned as their Continental brethren to produce from philosophy a kind of lay theology. To put it differently, the Continental philosophers, more than Hobbes, Locke, Hume or Bentham, had been concerned with problems of ontology or the philosophy of Being. It is incumbent upon us, although the task cannot be simple, so that he who runs may read, to comprehend the line of this thought.

Even Kant, after he claimed to have demolished by his Critical Philosophy the so-called dogmatic systems of Spinoza, Malebranche and Leibnitz, not only rode across hedges and ditches to establish speedily a Moral System with a categorical Imperative, but left behind him a scheme according to which the natural, objective world took necessary form from the categories of the perceiving mind. Alarmed by Hume's dissolution of cause, logic and the reason that has its very juice or essence in logic, Kant rediscovered a necessary, rational world formed through the mental categories, which were the a priori conditions of the objective world being known at all. What the nature may be of the "accidental" content of experience, framed by these categories of necessary spatiality, temporality and the like, is not left by Kant equally clear. Apparently, however, a necessary category of thought having restored Cause to Nature, the detail of this objective world moves in a necessary or determined order so far as we perceive it. But the unperceived Being-in-itself, underlying the phenomenon—a being which Kant inexplicably knew existed and which is kin of Bishop Berkeley's God—is free just as that being-in-myself, which is my perceiving consciousness or soul, is also free. Thus freedom and necessity are elegantly reconciled, by moving on different planes. There is a certain similarity with Descartes's duality of Matter and Mind; but, whereas with Descartes God alone knew how to bridge the two, Kant has got Mind, the percipient's Mind, with its talons, the categories, well fixed upon Matter. Without the categories no perception, no knowledge—therefore *not*, as with Locke, *only* knowledge from experience; but a priori knowledge (formal, of course) also.

For Kant, a priori knowledge is still merely the condition of knowledge for the percipient mind—Smith's perceptions. Kant's religiously minded disciple, Fichte, theological student of Jena and Leipzic, is not content with this. Mind becomes the universal mind, not Smith's but God's, and yet remains my mind. How so? All experience is by perception, my perception, dependent (as Berkeley had shown) on my mind and, as Kant had shown, necessarily so dependent. In the beginning of knowledge was the mind—not Smith's mind, for Smith is as yet unperceived, but Mind. How then—and this is Fichte's triumphant discovery—did Smith's mind awake to a consciousness of Smith? Only by perceiving that which was not Smith, not at Smith's free disposition but moved by causes other than Smith. And how did Mind awake to consciousness of Mind as Self? Only by the coming into being of a Not-self moving in accordance with a law, not of freedom, but of otherness or mechanical necessity. Therefore Mind (or God) created Matter or Nature for Self-consciousness to arise. A new Trinity or Triad. It could not arise any other way. It has arisen. Therefore Fichte presents us with a system which he assures us is demonstrably complete, perfect, closed. It is the supreme insolence of a good man.

It is, however, foolish to dismiss the system as fantastic. Millions of human beings in India have accepted a faith of which the philosophy is that the Natural Universe is an illusion or Maya set up by the Divine Being or Brahm in a mirage to dazzle the eyes of Hindu Ganges-bathers. We shall later see that the opposite thesis that the Natural Universe set up mind as an illusion to baffle all but the brains of true Marxists is not patently more easy to digest. The trouble, however, with Fichte's system was that, whereas Bishop Berkeley at least took the Almighty as a partner with Bishop Berkeley in constructing the sun, the stars, George II and contemporary English society, Fichte gave no reason why God the Mind was any other than Johann Gottlieb Fichte. This system is called Solipsism. However, as we have explained,* subsequently Fichte discovered Germany. Schelling, Fichte's opposite number (with whom, in early days, Hegel collaborated in the criticism of Fichte), went to the other pole with the affirmation—from the same Kantian premise and equally logical—that, not I am All, but All is I; and ended in an aesthetic Pantheism. Mind so permeated Nature, which it required Mind to be able to perceive, that Nature and Mind tended to be indistinguishable. A

* *Cf.* p. 479.

step, and the mystic position would have been reached of Smith's mind being a spark intuiting and fusing with the Universal Nature-mind.

The early collaboration of Hegel and Schelling is significant. Hegel takes the "All is I" horn of the dilemma—the objective horn, not the subjective horn. But Hegel is obstinate against following Schelling up the path of mystic intuition of the Nature-all. Knowledge is to be by Logic. In the beginning was the Idea. True, this idea or "reason" is something far finer and wiser and deeper than some English shopkeeper's book-clerk's "understanding." This Logic is cosmic—not such as later came to be expounded in Professor Jevons' little logic text-book. But still Reason proceeded by, as it were, a cosmic syllogism. Professor Hegel, of Heidelberg, who wrote poetry but never very well, was not in favour of finding the key of life in his friend Schelling's artistic ecstasy.

It is, further, highly significant that Hegel was a close student of Aristotle and the Greeks. Aristotle was a cautious man, increasingly sceptical about Plato's Ideas; and his doctrine of the Logos is far from clear, although certainly the Arabian Averrhoists, his Moslem admirers, later gave it a pantheistic and hypostatic (or substantive) interpretation. But at least several of the Greek philosophic schools, especially the Stoics, taught quite seriously that the material universe was impregnated animistically by the primal fire, the spirit of the gods; the divine spirit; the rational spirit such as also moved man when he lived according to his mother Nature; the Reason, Word or Logos; the immanent Logic. "In the Beginning was the Word." Goethe had glossed: "In the Beginning was the Act." That philosophy (complete with Kantian proofs drawn from Smith's perceptions) Hegel redelivers to the modern world.

Hegel's secret, then, was this, which he darkly announced—that in the beginning was Mind (Smith's mind comes later; is just contingent detail); that Mind grasps Material Nature precisely because Mind first begat or created her; that, in the process of grasping and mastering that which is thus rational (if "negative" and with a "hard husk"), Mind, permeating through Matter, develops Self-consciousness, the evolution of which self-consciousness in turn, towards the perfection that is complete Freedom, is the cursus or track of human History. To establish the connection between Mind, the Absolute Idea, and God, or again between the struggle to freedom through the objective world and recognition of a duty of sacrifice of the individual to the authority of that divine Tactic, presented no difficulties. The Humean thunderstorm had been reduced to a Kantian

cloud; and now even that cloud had been quite blown away. Voltaire was dead. All was well in the best—because only—possible world.

Professor Hegel went to Berlin University: and his philosophy achieved the popularity of being almost recognized as the official Royal Prussian government's philosophy. He denounced his critics, and even grew so strong as to be able to complain to the Government when he was denounced in turn.

There in Berlin he lived and expounded, from his professor's chair, the nature of Knowledge and of God, the Universe and the State. It was said, untruly, that he made world history culminate in Hohenzollern Prussia and, unkindly but more truly, that God Almighty reached full acquaintance with Himself in the pages of Professor Hegel's philosophy. He died full of years, of cholera, and was buried next to Fichte by the Oranienberg Gate. He enjoyed few diversions from his academic work; but was a dignified frequenter of social gatherings, and made a good fourth in whist and suchlike card games of intellectual skill and chance.

3

What, however, of the Absolute Idea? How did it happen that it was not content to remain by Itself? And why did it need to create or grasp a material nature that obviously and obstinately was there, and in which it, the Idea, had to struggle up through stone and tree and beast—and, as Bakunin added, fetishes of wood and rags—up to self-consciousness in Man? The answer lies in the Logic, in the famous Hegelian Dialectic.

It is not perhaps irrelevant to say that the Hegelian is a Fifty-fifty Philosophy. Aristotle had indeed said, apparently without grave temerity, that every finite thing is itself and no other. Hegel, however, had a new interpretation of the law of contradiction. Let us turn back to his own biography. Hegel was the theological student who had learned from study of the Greeks that Christianity was a negative, abstract, individual-soul-saving, unsatisfying religion. He had written (but being politic, not published) all this. Further, Hegel was the admirer of the French Revolution and even of Napoleon, who had yet (like Napoleon) learned to be tired of disorderly revolutionary catch phrases and superficial French fashions of thought. Even when writing in association with Schelling, he took precautions to distinguish his own thought from that of Schelling. It was not that his own first, but unpublished, views were wrong; but there was right in the traditional view also. Both were right. The wise truth—not the super-

ficial clever half-truth—sprang from the union of the contradictions. All history, indeed, was like this. And, on reflection, so was the very process of thought itself—Smith's thought, and God's thought in history, the divine dialectic or logic.

Conventional critics asked whether the Hegelian God, the Absolute Idea, was indeed Christian. It was the kind of small-town criticism that moved the great soul of Hegel to petulant emphasis. "The assertion is ill supported by the fruits they (the critics) exhibit—the monstrous insolence with which they reprobate and condemn." Hegel took a look at the Catholic University of Louvain—wondered whether he should migrate there. "The Roman Curia would be a more honourable opponent than the wretched cabals of a miserable boiling of parsons in Berlin." Hegel was not even prepared to concede that the clergy were good men except when they tried to think. But he preferred to keep to his chair at Berlin; to stress the conservative and state-respecting elements in his system; to dismiss the *Aufklärung*—the German *Éclaircissement* or Renaissance—and its works as *passé;* to call for a hero who, by blood and iron, would renew Germany, the philosophic and spiritual nation; and, nevertheless, thanks to the good Hegelian dialectic, to be able to declare (bringing in Luther as his example):

> There was raised the last banner around which the nations gather—the banner of the *free spirit* which, in apprehending the truth, still abides with itself, and which, indeed, can only abide by itself as it apprehends the truth. This is the banner under which we serve, and which we carry.

What then, in detail, is the Hegelian Dialectic?

Thesis, antithesis, synthesis—here is the graph of the movement of thought, and of "real" thought, not abstract but concrete, impregnating history and motivating history. First a truth; thesis. Then, this truth grasped, and because grasped, its limits perceived and moved away from to what is outside its limits, the antithesis or counter-truth. Then, since both are truths, a further movement to the reconciliation of these truths in a new truth, the synthesis—which itself is thesis of a new rosary of dialectic movement in its turn. A triad. A Trinity. Not since the Egyptian Plotinus, Iamblichus and the Neo-Platonists, had speculative thought taken such grand flights.

The Absolute Idea: Nature: Spirit. Here is the first triad. In the exposition (Hegel's) of the Idea: the Logic, or study of the pure Idea; the Philosophy of Nature; the Philosophy of Spirit. In reality, first Being; overpassed in the concept of Nirvana or Not-being; then

Becoming. In philosophy, Spinoza, the philosopher of Unity: Leibnitz, the philosopher of individuality; reconciliation found in Kant, with his unity imposed by the percipient self; selfhood universalized to embrace the All by Fichte; corrected by the mergence of the self in the All by Schelling; the synthesis in Hegel. In religion, the naïve worship of the gods of the actual city-state by Classical Greece; the abstraction of the individual soul seeking salvation, from the community, in Christianity; the reconciliation of the religious self with the State, again seen as sacred, in the Modern Age. In history, the unity of the city-state growing out to the Roman Empire still under the tutelage of Roma; the anarchistic independence of Feudalism; the reconciliation in the Modern State. In politics, happy prime synthesis, prime trinity, the Family; then, on the one side, Church, asserting pure spirituality, as thesis against mere blood kinship; on the other, Civil Society, mechanical, safeguarding abstract rights of person and property; then, as synthesis, the State. In ethics, Personal Morality; coercive Law; Social Ethics.

It is an amusing intellectual exercise to break up experience into these triads. It is not valueless as a gymnastic; but it is treacherous as an interpretative principle. It rests on the grounded observation that, only when we have grasped a truth, do we grasp its limitations and, when we have exhausted it as mere half-truth, we swing to the opposite which it excluded, until we are ripe for a reconciliation. Hence the dialectic embraces the philosophy both of revolution and of conservatism.

It is highly important that one of the latest of Hegel's interpreters of the Right, Benedetto Croce, while maintaining, in his *Philosophy of the Spirit*, that Hegel's idealism is sound and, indeed, necessary, repudiates his dialectic as an unnecessary encumbrance and as, partly, what is "dead in Hegel." Significantly enough, as we shall see later, his interpreters of the Left do the precise opposite. For them it is the Prussian conservatism, and religious idealism, that are "dead."

The Dialectic exhibits the Heraclitean principle of movement or revolution; the idealism, it may be alleged, exhibits the static or Eleatic principle. The point is that the Dialectic gives scope for the human intellectual love for symmetry and pattern-making—we are solving God's cross-word puzzle. And assuredly Hegel's system has a true, if grandiose, majesty in systematizing experience, without parallel since Aquinas reduced Christianity to a demonstrated intellectual system and improved on the neat Trinitarian pattern-makings—

Father: Son: Holy Ghost:: Power: Wisdom: Charity—of the Neo-Platonists and early Schoolmen. Even Spinoza's neat geometrical Q.E.D.'s in Ethics were bagatelles compared with Hegel's work.

4

The idealistic principle and the dialectic together provided Hegel with all the keys he needed for the interpretation of politics. The movements of history were "the march of God" in the world—the divine tactic of the evolving idea. Here was the philosophy of progress. *What is*, therefore, is *what ought to be now*—for it is the will of the Absolute itself made manifest. But what *is* is not what would (or ought to) *continue to be*, since the future necessarily will be the overpassing of the present. Here, then (although Hegel did not say so explicitly), was a triumphant justification for Conservatism—but also for Revolution. And the terminus, in this cycle, of this inevitable evolution is the Idea struggling up through mechanical, determined, atomistic, individualistic Nature, mere aggregate and negative, lacking a spiritual uniting principle of itself, to self-consciousness, which is consciousness of the Idea in Progress or Process, which is the freedom of *knowing* the course of necessity.

Here then is the reconciliation of Freedom and Necessity, Liberty and Authority—for the free individual is not only determined by history and society (which he is anyhow) but, as conscious, he will respect them. Understanding, he pardons this history as the will of God which has no alternative—indeed it is his own "real will" as particle of the Absolute Idea, particle of history—even when it strikes him dead. Indeed it is yet impertinence for him to pardon all, knowing all—let alone, to condemn or fight against it. He must revere. God, the totality of the determined, being All, is alone free, but has no alternatives. The Individual is free in the cognizance of the free God's no-alternative: he is free to know that he is not free to do otherwise: he is not merely a brute or stone hurtled about, he knows how he is hurtled about, and why. That is Freedom, really understood.

What, then, is the position of the individual? In so far as individual —"for himself"—bad. As Hegel says, in passing, "Individualism is the hall-mark of the devil." The individual in abstraction ("for himself") is something like Nature-Matter with its chaotic ununited atoms, however held together by energy; it is the Counter-thesis, the Negative, only not to be called evil because, in the Hegelian determined system, there is no real evil, only misplaced negation. The individual is frequently misplaced negative—especially when he is asserting

himself against his proper milieu, Society. Hegel identified, *nota bene*, Society with *a* society, actual societies, especially Monarchical States. But the individual is condoned in his individualism, if society, as mere Whig Civil Society, Society *au Locke*, *bürgerliche Gesellschaft*, makes no claim on him.

Hence the integrated State arises, again inspired with the spiritual principle of which the Church had, during the middle centuries, robbed it and appropriated for herself alone. (Hegel does not love the Church; but can explain her misdeeds by the Divine Logic. The State is assimilated with the Roman Empire, although it is capable of higher perfection.) A moral claim is re-established over the individual, not a mere claim of private morality, but a social and ethical claim. The "guilt" of Christ—Hegel said this in the early (unpublished) writings —is his "innocence" of the conflict of actual forces; the speculative pacifist, contemplative life withdraws men from the struggle; history is and should be spotted, corrupt, dusty with the conflict and combat; the Idea only ultimately turns in on itself and is lost in contemplation; immediately it is dialectic, activity—going out. It is not the Word only, but the Act. The citizen must adopt the *staatlich*, the stately, not the churchly, morality. The kernel of the whole matter is that, where the Platonist had written the Philosopher's Republic, and the Catholic had written voluntary *Church*, Hegel wrote *Coercive State*.

Howbeit, Hegel in Berlin was a philosopher: he felt himself under no obligation (save by an occasional note of protest against criticism) to enter into the sordid conflicts of politicians. On the contrary, his concern was with "the passionless stillness of a science of pure thought." He could indeed turn aside to criticize the English Parliamentary Reform movement that culminated in the Act of 1832 and show how it offered a merely empiric solution for the irrational complexities of the British constitution with its false, abstract, individualistic concept of liberty and its reactionary aristocracy. His concern, however, was to develop an unprecedented political philosophy, a *Staatswissenschaft*, or *Rechtsphilosophie*, like geometry in its coherence, in which human philosophical thought would reach systematic expression, *i.e.*, the idea in History could reach new self-consciousness. Certainly no writer got further away than Hegel, for all his abstract stress on concrete "objectivity," from the modest empiric study of the world around him.

It is easy to dismiss Hegel's philosophy as one of the most presumptuous and pretentious pieces of arrogance ever struck off by the mind of man. Especially is it easy to do this after one has considered

that he outlined a Philosophy of Nature in which all would be reduced to Hegelian logic, merely leaving to the hodmen of natural (as of social) science the task of breaking through the obstinate "husk," *i.e.*, of reducing the material facts to systematic form in laws, such as those of Kepler and Newton, so that the philosopher could come along and connect these laws together by a priori guidance. Granted that such laws are never merely a posteriori—always involve hypotheses, hitherto unrefuted—we can yet say that the whole function of scientific imagination, not to speak of verifying experiment, is ignored by Hegel in favour of a dogmatic construction. Such an a priori construction any genuine scientist would regard as his first obligation to reject, pending illumination from experiments undertaken on the clue of hypotheses, accepted as if they were true, but only most tentatively tolerated.

Nevertheless, Hegel did more than provide the tender minded with a system showing how objects of reverence and poetry, which had seemed in danger of iconoclasm in the last century, might be saved; bureaucrats with a cosmic justification for the rule of the King of Prussia; and, despite all this, revolutionaries in religion and politics with a loophole for escape, with weapons of attack and with the cloaks of a dark and *tief* profundity. Hegel had exposed the intolerable abstractions of Kant's ethical system. And he had brought back into the life of current politics, albeit with dangerous additions, the political ideas of the great Greeks.

What is the relation of the individual to society? Plato and Aristotle had explained this in terms of the small, family-minded, city Community—had insisted on its homogeneity and had, therefore, limited its population. The Catholic Church had not limited population; it embraced all races and colours; but it remained homogeneous because it was, in principle, a voluntary society, entered by a free act. Within this community all were "members of one body," in the Communion of Saints. Still, in Hegel's day, the Catholic theory confronted the Liberal individualism of Paine and Ricardo. One feels that Aristotle—perhaps not Plato—would have been nonplussed on meeting a Pope, and confounded on confrontation by a Lutheran pastor or even by an Archbishop of Canterbury. Hegel hustles all these priests out of the doors of his academy, dedicated to *Staatswissenschaft*. He offers an object of worship which the Greeks could at least have recognized. It is not the old homogeneous city-communities of Athene and Zeus Lakedaemon. The demand—critical for the Greeks—for homogeneity and purified population has gone by the board, at

present and until Hitler, despite Rousseau's and Fichte's yearnings. But all that the Greeks claimed for their polis, including a political religion, Hegel claims for his—not Society (a term dismissed as *bürgerlich*, shopkeeping)—but State.

Hegel is the philosopher who perverts the Greek worship of the intimate Society—"community of pleasures and pains"—of the Polis, to the service of the large-scale, external, coercive Hobbesian State, a transference that the Greeks had never themselves made, even in the case of the large-scale, world-wide Roman Empire. The Romans, as also the Stoics and Epicureans their teachers, knew too well what the Greek polis had stood for at its best, "dear City of Cecrops," to confound with it what the Roman Empire provided. The force of Hegel's philosophic deductions flows from this fallacious identification. Hegel naturally had little use for preferences for social forms that had no contemporary, actual historic content. He worshipped as gods the big battalions on the march. That made him to himself a *real-politiker*. He has this excuse, that the great Greeks, who refused to do this, although defying Persia, as a matter of brute fact fell (and necessarily fell, maybe deservedly fell) before the might of Macedon and Rome. Approaching the riddle of the relations of right and might, better than Hobbes or Spinoza he justified the powerful to themselves, and briefed God Almighty in their and his own defence.

How then do Hegel's Power and Idea differ from the theory of Rousseau, with his claims for the Majority and for the General Will of which the majority is spokesman? The answer is that the Majority is no depository of eternal values, but is only internal power, within the State, and may not even be that. Moreover the Majority is only an aggregate (since this may be held unfair to Rousseau, Hegel's own words will be quoted) and lacks permanent ideal continuity, in the State Nation, between the years and between the generations. The sense of futurity and the consequent social obligation to generations unborn—as Burke said "between the living, the dead and the unborn"—is lacking. Hegel writes in his *Philosophy of Right* (1820):

> To Rousseau is to be ascribed the merit of discovering and presenting a principle, which comes up to the standard of thought, and is indeed thinking itself, not only in its form, such as would be a social impulse or divine authority, but in its very essence. This principle of Rousseau is will. But he conceives of the will only in the limited form of the individual will, as did Fichte afterwards, and regards the universal will not as the absolutely reasonable will, but only as the common will, proceeding out of the individual will as conscious. There the union of individuals in a State becomes a contract, which is founded

upon caprice, opinions and optional, explicit consent. Out of this view the understanding deduces consequences, which destroy the absolutely divine, and its absolute authority and majesty. Hence, when these abstractions attained to power, there was enacted the most tremendous spectacle which the human race has ever witnessed. All the usages and institutions of a great state were swept away. It was then proposed to begin all over again, starting from the thought, and as the basis of the state to will only whatever was judged to be rational. But as the undertaking was begun with *abstractions void of all ideas*, it ended in scenes of tragic cruelty and horror. . . .

As against the principle of the individual will, we must bear in mind the fundamental conception that *the objective will is in itself rational* in its very conception, whether or not it be known by the individual or willed as an object of his good pleasure.

This criticism is cogent provided that one has gone as far as Rousseau in fact had done in rejecting empiricism and utilitarian tendencies and in accepting, as substitute for individual rational choice, collective emotion. Hegel raises the collectivity onto a rational level again—"rational" in the Platonic sense of great poetry rather than of the merely "intelligent." Hegel elaborates his thought in his *Philosophy of History* (lectures delivered 1823–1830, published posthumously):

This is the absolute right of personal existence—to find itself satisfied in its activities and labour. . . . A State is, then, well constituted and internally powerful, when the private interest of its citizens is one with the common interest of the State; when the one finds its gratification and realization in the other—a proposition in itself very important. . . . We may affirm that nothing great in the world has been accomplished without passion. . . . I here mean nothing more than human activity as resulting from private interests—special, or if you will, self-seeking designs—with this qualification, that the whole energy of will and character is devoted to their attainment [? a side glance here, perhaps, at Napoleon, in Jena; and at Frederick the Great, in Berlin].

Two elements, therefore, enter into the object of our investigation; the first the idea, the second the complex of human passions; the one the warp, the other the woof of the vast arras-web of Universal History. The concrete mean and union of the two is Liberty, under the conditions of morality in a State.

The State is the Idea of Spirit in the external manifestation of human Will and its Freedom. It is to the State, therefore, that change in the aspect of History indissolubly attaches itself; and the successive phases of the idea manifest themselves in it as distinct political *principles*. . . .

History is to depict the passions of mankind, the genius, the active powers that play their part on the great stage; and the providentially determined

prowess, which these exhibit, constitutes what is generally called the "plan" of Providence. . . . The common belief in Providence . . . denies the possibility of discovering the plan of Providence. . . . But in the history of the World, the *Individuals* we have to do with are *Peoples;* Totalities that are States. We cannot, therefore, be satisfied with what we may call the peddling view of Providence, to which the belief alluded to limits itself. . . .

The destiny of the spiritual World, and—since this is the *substantial World,* while the Physical remains subordinate to it, or, in the language of speculation, has no truth as against the spiritual—the final cause of the World at large, we allege to be the consciousness of its own freedom on the part of Spirit, and *ipso facto,* the reality of that freedom. . . . This result it is, at which the process of the World's History has been continually aiming; and to which the sacrifices that have ever and anon been laid on the vast altar of the earth, through the long lapse of ages, have been offered.

Hegel is peculiarly the Philosopher of History. Through Gentz and Adam Müller the work and influence of Edmund Burke made an impression greater in Germany than in England itself. Hegel, however, gives philosophic cohesion to the intuitions and *dicta* of Burke. But Hegel is also, in a deeper sense than Hobbes the individualist, the Philosopher of the Modern State, New Leviathan. Freedom, of which the other aspect is necessity, only realizes itself, not in the petty event of the "immortal human soul," but in the march of the State through History towards clearer consciousness in civilization. Does not, however, Hegel allow an escape from the State? Is the State not itself a specific form that will itself, in history, be overpassed, and have end as it surely had beginning? Hegel sees and approaches the problem. There is indeed a "claim of the World Spirit that rises superior to all particular claims." How yet does he continue in the *Philosophy of Right?*

The destinies and deeds of states in their connection with one another are the visible dialectic of the finite nature of these spirits. Out of this dialectic the universal spirit, the spirit of the world, the unlimited spirit, produces itself. It has the highest right of all and exercises its right upon the lower spirits in world history. The history of the world is the world's court of judgment. . . .

To the nation [Volk], whose natural principle is one of these stages, is assigned the accomplishment of it through the process characteristic of the self-developing self-consciousness of the world-spirit. In the history of the world this nation is for a given epoch dominant, although it can make an epoch but once. In contrast with the absolute right of this nation to be the bearer of the current phase in the development of the world-spirit, the spirits

of other existing nations are void of right, and they, like those whose epochs are gone, count no longer in the history of the world.

There is, then, a World Spirit superior to any particular State. Thus far the dialectic advances beyond the State-phase. But (contradictorily enough for Hegel) this World Spirit does not seek, apparently, any objective development in, as even Kant had suggested, a World Commonwealth. On the contrary, having reached the State-phase in history, later history for Hegel merely plays changes on the old tunes. However, he fortifies the Hobbesian notion of State-atoms —"units in the posture of gladiators"—with the liberal notion of the distinctive spirit of their culture and laws as a nation or *Volk*. Hegel, with the French Revolution and Danton behind him, anticipates the nationalism of the coming age, although with a conservative, law-and-government caution. Each nation [Volk] has its single principle. However, "civilized nations may treat as barbarians the peoples who are behind them in the essential elements of the State. . . . Modern wars are carried on humanely . . . International law remains a good intention." The World State is, for him, associated with the Roman Empire of which the characteristic is, on the one hand, abstract, mechanical universalism and, on the other, the extreme spiritual individualism of private persons, such as the early Christians, "degraded to the level of that equality in which they have only formal rights."

Kant's idea was that eternal peace was to be secured by an alliance of states. This alliance would settle every dispute, make impossible the resort to arms for a decision, and be recognized by every state. This idea assumes that states are in accord, an agreement which, strengthened though it might be by moral, religious, and other considerations, nevertheless always rested on the private sovereign will, and was therefore liable to be disturbed by the element of contingency.

A lame refutation, that ignores Kant's sovereign "Cosmopolitical Institution." The real answer is that Hegel arbitrarily *chose* to say

each self-dependent State has the standing of a particular will. . . . Sacrifice for the sake of the individuality of the State is the substantive relation of all the citizens, and is, thus, a universal duty.

There is indeed a vague concluding hint at a Fourth Empire, a German Empire, that will fuse the divine [State] and the human [Lutheran self-conscious individual]—characterized by "the feeling, trust and fellowship of free men." It is, however, all very obscure. One negation yet appears clear.

The so-called Representative Constitution is that form of government with which we connect the idea of a free constitution; and this notion has become a rooted prejudice. On this theory People and Government are separated. But there is perversity in this antithesis; an ill-intentioned ruse designed to insinuate that the People are the totality of the State. . . . * We have, not seldom, experienced in recent times [*apropos* of the British Reform Bill movement] that the demands of public opinion are impracticable or undesirable and that the general voice often violently attacks what it recently with equal violence demanded. The Ancients who themselves lived in democracies, thought very differently of the popular voice that is now the fashion . . . hostility to the power of the Crown is the most inveterate of English prejudices.

Like Rousseau, but in a different sense, Hegel would, in Rousseau's words, "compel them to be free." Like the Jacobins, Hegel is no democrat, if democrat means advocate of bourgeois representative and parliamentary democracy. Finally, one affirmative flashes through the clouds: the *Führer-prinzip*, the "Leader Principle," that shows how spiritually the man from Corsica had won.

At the summit of all actions, including world historical actions, stand individuals.

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE

R. Aris. *History of Political Thought in Germany from 1789 to 1815*. 1936.
*G. W. F. Hegel: *Philosophy of History*, introduction.
G. W. F. Hegel: *Philosophy of Right*.
J. M. E. McTaggart. *Studies in Hegelian Cosmology*. 1918.
J. T. Merz: *History of European Thought in the Nineteenth Century*. 1914, Vols. III and IV.

* *Cf.* pp. 327, 455, 477.

Chapter XVI

The Post-Hegelian Conservatives: Carlyle to Bosanquet

1

THE implications of Hegelianism become more apparent in the *epigoni*, the followers of Hegel. These do not so entirely as the majestic philosopher obscure their heads in the clouds. Smaller and more one-sided men, the magnificent seesaw between thesis and counter-thesis, which justifies all from Francis of Assisi to Maximilien Robespierre, is by them periodically forgotten. Prejudices are permitted to appear. Hegelianism breaks definitely into an Hegelianism of the Right and of the Left. The Hegelianism of the Right, reaching Britain late, had more philosophic influence there than in the German fatherland. Here S. T. Coleridge, the poet, had already, with Southey, "philosophized" the thought of Burke by adding to it notions of Schelling's and Hegel's. Coleridge indeed, full of dangerous nonsense about "society" as an entity or substance, had brought to a point the issue between two schools of thought when he remarked to the Utilitarian, Harriet Martineau: "But you seem, Miss Martineau, to regard society as just an aggregate of individuals." "Of course; what else should it be?" For Harriet Martineau, as for Bentham, the individual parent, not the politicians and generals and their State, was the proper guardian of the future. For Coleridge it was a corporative something that was a guardian, a group. The mood of Coleridge was to reappear in America, in an even less defined but generally humanistic fashion, in the writings of Ralph Waldo Emerson. A new writer, even better acquainted with the Germans, was now to attain a popular vogue, if not a profundity, which Coleridge never achieved.

THOMAS CARLYLE (1795–1881), admirer, translator and correspondent of Goethe, son of a Calvinist stone-mason and a domestic help, daughter of a small farmer, came of a stock that the local gossip of his native village of Ecclefechan described as "pithy, bitter-speaking

bodies, and awfu' fighters." Carlyle, ex-theological student, ex-schoolmaster and ex-law-student, made his way south of Tweed to London and fame via a private tutorship and good introductions, and thanks to Edward Irving, himself protégé of Sir James Mackintosh and of Canning. Throughout life Carlyle remained a half-barbarian, worshipping a Jewish tribal god of like character with himself and, with guffawing sadism, treating humanity, "mostly fools," as his battling uncles had treated, on the village common, the Annandale lads up north of Tweed and Solway. He was not an equalitarian but an authoritarian, prophesying the vengeance of his god on "the whole infernal caudle of things," the "damned race" of mankind. His wife, Jane Welsh Carlyle, doctor's daughter, was of superior social station and did not hesitate to say so. Moreover, when courting, he "kicked the fire-irons." In later days the vulgar, commercial *snobisme* of exploiting lion-hunters showed its contempt for both by asking only Carlyle, like a performing monkey, to its Belshazzar feasts—and thereby nearly broke up the family. Carlyle's typical remedy, however, was to claim descent from the Barons Carlile. For the rest, he recked little of women and commented that it was "an eternal axiom" and law of nature that the man should bear rule in the house and not the woman.

Carlyle was not so much a philosopher as a preacher, not so much a preacher as (like Samuel Johnson) a character—but, being a Scotsman, more superior and less human than Johnson. Unlike Rousseau in his Dumfriesshire abhorrence of sentiment—stern child of Ecclefechan in his contempt for the mawkish sentimentality of the "Werther" of his admired Goethe—Carlyle, the son of the soil, pleased the fashionable feminine world of his day, by mere contrast, rather as Rousseau had done. He believed in a Protestant and Old Testament militancy and indeed militarism. Despite much noise on the cult of Robert Burns' plain man—"The man's the gowd for a' that"—Carlyle was a *poseur* as was neither Rousseau nor Johnson. He had the mind of a pushful foreman who has become boss.

The French Revolution is clearly the vengeance of the God of Sinai on decadent civilization, corrupted by philosophers and the "Strumpetocracy." One feels that Oliver Cromwell impressed Carlyle because he starkly triumphed over his enemies, attained magnificence as Lord Protector, and yet was the kind of man who might be expected "to kick the fire-irons." As for Frederick the Great, he also displayed the connection between Right and Might, behaved as a kind of grander Baron Carlile, and knew how to settle issues by "cannon law."

Besides his memorable studies of these two heroes, in *Sartor Resartus* (1836) Carlyle was able to fell the walls of Intellectual Doubt by blowing on the trumpets of the "Everlasting Yea." In *Heroes and Hero-worship* (1841) he displayed Goetheanism energized by the gospel of action—"the end of Man is an Action." In *The Latter-day Pamphlets* (1850), he showed that, whereas the eighteenth century believed in man and his rights, the nineteenth century doubted this optimism. A contemporary of Charles Darwin, Carlyle believed, like the men of his age, in competition; but he marks a new departure in using the flail of his indignation against non-military, commercial competition. He is the antithesis of Spencer.

Carlyle preached—not without all warrant—that there are more things in heaven and earth than were dreamed of in Voltaire's philosophy (or even Archdeacon Paley's); that the natural *is* the supernatural, permeated with marvel, mystic, wilful; that human life or its happiness is a very trivial thing in this immensity; and that the one duty is to reverence the Cosmic Fire known to the seer and mystic. This fire also, at great moments in history, blazes up in the lives of great men, heroes and prophets, princes or men of the people, men like Frederick or men like Carlyle, but always supermen. Carlyle talked freely of Kant and Fichte, alluded to Hegel, misunderstood Goethe the Humanist; but was an Hegelian even without knowing it. Even his "dour-Scottish" individualism, thanks to which he influenced Walt Whitman, had an Hegelian coloration. He Scottified Hegel.

In his essay on *Chartism*, he makes his political position more explicit. His suggestion that the cure for the Chartist troubles, the English aftermath of the French Revolution, is emigration and the abolition of illiteracy would appear to show something less than the wisdom of a Solon. However, despite much Scottish Burnsean epigram-writing about "the Sans-potato is of the selfsame stuff as the super-finest Lord Lieutenant," Carlyle follows an overdue attack upon laissez-faire by his real, pre-Fascist remedies. He has no use for "Benthamee" recipes.

> Would to God our Ducal *Duces* would become Leaders indeed; our Aristocracies and Priesthoods discover in some suitable degree what the world expected of them, what the world could no longer do without getting of them! . . .
>
> Napoleon was not president of a republic; Cromwell tried hard to rule in that way, but found that he could not. These, "the armed soldiers of democracy," had to chain democracy under their feet, and become despots over it, before they could work out the earnest obscure purpose of democracy

itself! . . . Cannot one discern, too, across all democratic turbulence, clattering of ballot-boxes and infinite sorrowful jangle, needful or not, that this at bottom is the wish and prayer of all human hearts, everywhere and at all times: "Give me a leader; a true leader, not a sham-leader; a true leader that he may guide me on the true way, that I may be loyal to him, that I may swear fealty to him and follow him, and feel that it is all well with me!" The relation of the taught to their teacher, of the loyal subject to his guiding King, is, under one shape or another, the vital element of human Society.

If the common ruck merely desire to feel that all is well with them—and let us add that Carlyle does not exclude the possibility of taught becoming teacher; rightly stresses the desire of every true aristocrat to find his better—the leader has quite another office. His task is, not to follow his followers, but to be mighty. The Elijah of Ecclefechan continues:

What can we say but that the cause which pleased the gods has in the end to please Cato also? Cato cannot alter it; Cato will find that he cannot at bottom wish to alter it. Might and Right do differ frightfully from hour to hour; but give them centuries to try it in, they are found to be identical.

In *Latter-day Pamphlets*, Carlyle demanded "a Downing Street inhabited by the gifted of the intellects of England."

The kind of heroes that come mounted on the shoulders of the universal-suffrage, and instal themselves as Prime Ministers and healing Statesmen by force of able editorship, do not bid very fair to bring Nations back to the ways of God. . . . Madame Dubarry's petticoat was a better seine-net for fishing out Premiers than that. . . . Democracy clamours, with its Newspapers, its Parliaments, and all its Twenty-seven million throats, continually in this Nation forevermore. I remark, too, that the unconscious purport of all its clamours is even this, "Find us men skilled,"—*make* a New Downing Street, fit for the New Era!

He concludes his *Pamphlets* with a final fling at the talking-shop, the Houses of Parliament, newly rebuilt by the architect Pugin, a "wilderness of stone pepper boxes."

Carlyle, honoured member of the Prussian Order of Merit, forerunner of the German National Socialists, was the enemy of the Utilitarian philosophy, which he regarded as materialistic, although the good personal friend of poor J. S. Mill. The "monster *Utilitaria*," with "her broad hoof" is permitted, in *Sartor Resartus*, to trample down cant; but she is a one-eyed Apocalyptic beast, going before the reign of the Valhalla heroes. "Benthamee" had no insight. Heroic Morality matters more than mere "impartial" intellectual curiosity.

Character . . . that's the thing—personal, national, racial character. Thus, too, natural science falls under the ban. Although Carlyle damns, as an insult to Scottish cotters, the monkey-science of Darwinism, his only conclusions are singularly neo-Darwinian. What he disliked was Darwin's methods, the methods of natural science, as materialistic, without "intuition." Carlyle, in his fascist dislike of rational analysis, was the perfect instance of Bentham's man moved by sympathy and antipathy. Profoundly he was an "irrationalist" in the eighteenth-century, intellectualist sense. He offers himself, however, as a rationalist, in Hegel's sense of a power philosopher, who makes the dangerous and part-true distinction between reason and intellect.

Before turning to the English Hegelians, one other great figure, also a man of sympathy and antipathy but better grounded in the great tradition of European philosophy, must detain us—John Henry, Cardinal Newman. Carlyle, the Jeremiah against Sham, is in some measure stucco himself, an egoist, an irascible talker for effect. One turns to the great Cardinal to discover a man.

JOHN HENRY NEWMAN (1801–1890), fellow of Oriel College, Oxford, curate of Littlemore, priest of the Birmingham Oratory, poet author of "The Dream of Gerontius," theologian, may too easily be brushed aside by those out of sympathy with him as unworthy of the attention of "modern-minded" men. The comfortable Macaulay considered that he had "the intelligence of a rabbit." Such empty arrogance is merely a commentary on the puerile judgement of the critic.

Newman's doctrine of the "illative sense" in effect amounts to little more than this, that possibilities may be regarded as probabilities and probabilities as certainties where our "intentions," *i.e.*, prejudices and antipathies, are strongly involved. In its most respectable form it is the old doctrine of the Stoics against the Sceptics of the ineluctable perception of the truth (*kataléptiké phantasia*) granted to man. In a less satisfactory form, as calculation of probabilities, it is advanced by Bishop Butler as the common-sense method by which common men, who do not syllogize, reach their opinion of truth. It is the obvious basis for a philosophy of faith along with Anselm's famous argument that knowledge rests on the experience of faith, and not faith on abstract knowledge (or infidelity on lack of proof) *in vacuo*. The argument has respectable Aristotelian antecedents. Further, Newman as much as Hobbes, although in a very different sense, appealed to the deepest instinct in humanity—fear. As a refuge from it, Hobbes

advised men to turn to their sovereign prince on earth, Newman to faith in heaven. In Newman, moreover, scepticism ended in dogmatism. Scepticism about the intellectual constructions of the French *philosophes* ended in preaching faith, as with Tertullian, in truth reached by the only remaining channel, revelation—ourselves not infallible about its infallibility but pragmatically sure. There is, however, a more arresting aspect in Newman's philosophy, of grave social significance.

With whatever strange topics of damnation pulpits might still concern themselves, and although Dean Mansel was still using Job's old argument that the morality of man could not judge the morality of God, the lowering cloud of Original Sin had by now largely risen and left the mental landscape clear. Although every Anglican clergyman entered upon his holy office by the mild perjury of a general assent to the Thirty-nine Articles (being a schedule to that Act of Parliament, passed under the bloody Tudor despots, by which the Established Church of England has its being), few indeed believed that most of mankind was by Original Sin damned to everlasting fire, they lacking Grace, and that the good works of the heathen, *e.g.*, Plato's and Buddha's, "before justification, . . . have the nature of sin" (*Thirty-nine Articles*, Art. xiii). The moral monstrosity of this doctrine was too strong even for stomachs brought up on Luther's emancipating faith. The Catholic Church, being accustomed not only to minister redemption to the world but also to seek to rule it, had laid less stress, among those in communion with her, on the Saints Elect by Grace, and had embraced within the fold of salvability both those who sought to work out their salvation by the vocation of religion and those in the world, who merely humbly observed the moral laws of obligation. The Great Church, however, never doubted, and Newman at no stage ever doubted, that this life was a Vale of Tears in which the Church, at enmity with the world, with pleasure and with intellectual pride, sought the Eternal City of God through prayer and suffering.

To put the matter in other language, Newman, a Catholicism revived from the fires of the French Revolution, and the Oxford Movement still in the Anglican Church, all alike insisted that discipline, abstinence and acceptance of suffering were of the essence of a right conception of life. Although alike Cardinal Manning and Bishop Gore might concern themselves—as Bishop Gore's friend, R. H. Tawney, does concern himself—with social reform, neo-Catholicism was poles apart from the Utilitarian gospel of the greatest temporal happiness. No more could it reconcile itself with Hegel's acceptance

of world and state. Ultimately it did indeed preach a doctrine of happiness—or what Carlyle called "blessedness"—but it was that of the *visio Dei* reserved to the pure in heart.*

In his encyclical of 1891 on the Condition of Labour, *Rerum Novarum*, Pope Leo XIII deplored the abolition, in the previous century, of the workers' unions or guilds; condemned speculative usury; and reprobated such a concentration of capital and power that "a small number of very rich men have been able to lay upon the teeming masses of the labouring poor a yoke little better than slavery itself." Leo, however, also condemned the denial of the right to hold, as the reward of labour, private property—

> a working man's little estate thus purchased should be as completely at his free disposal as are the wages he receives for his labour.

(It is interesting that even in Soviet Russia the right—the hereditary right—to the peasant's farmstead and surrounding acre is not refused.)

In 1927, in their Lenten Pastoral, the Catholic Hierarchy of Scotland, on the "overcrowding" issue, wrote:

> One thing we know, that the trouble is not with the children or with the parents—in other words, with Nature—but with the inhuman economic and social conditions in which they are condemned to live.

In the Encyclical *Quadragesimo Anno*, of 1931, Pius XI declares:

> The immense number of propertyless wage-earners on the one hand, and the superabundant wishes of the fortunate few on the other, is an unanswerable argument that the earthly goods so abundantly produced in this age of industrialism are far from rightly distributed and equitably shared among the various classes of men.†

The Catholic distributivist social philosophy has been stated during the last century with sufficient clarity and elaboration. The stress, however, always—here as (yet more emphatically) with the Calvinists—is that man may hope for happiness but cannot demand it; that his best ground for expectation of it is by humble accord with that permanent plan of things, deeply natural but also divinely willed, which manifests the just order but which brings its satisfactions only by transcending, not only the life of individuals (of which the Utilitarians talked), but also of the States of the Hegelians; that the disciplined man must be prepared to practice self-cruelty and ascetic discipline, if thereby he can advance the Christian warfare. Wealth and Immediate Happiness (in present enjoyment, not imagination

* *Cf.* p. 173.

† *Cf.* p. 260.

of the future) alike are merely accidental to the purposes of life. The deep wells of aggressive cruelty by discipline have their waters, gushing from the very foundations of our animal nature, here turned into Catholic channels which may nourish the fields of charity and humanity, not for the sake alone of the immediate grain but for the glory of the Harvester who sees so many harvests.

It may be doubted whether the doctrine, in dignity or ethical profundity, has been transcended. The danger, as Hegel said, is that all may end in empty contemplation, not a doctrine of salvation by works, works of charity. At least it is profounder than Hegel's Prussianized Hellenism, on the one hand, or the deplorable subjectivism of Luther, which Hegel damned, on the other. Otherwise put, the danger is that contemplation may be offered as an alibi to life, that is, to energetic virtue, indignation for justice and a consuming sympathy for suffering here and now—and the "illative sense" may be brought in to convert an alluring probability into a sufficient certainty. This discipline needs fastidious and scrupulous use or it will result in empty pietism and purposeless abuse. Today the major issue for world-culture is between Christian Humanism—Catholicism, Christianity—and Fascism, to which Marxism* is but prelude and thesis in the historical dialectic [*Cf.* Aristotlean revolutions].

2

In the American Civil War Carlyle, typically enough, expressed his sympathy with the South. In the South itself his views were quoted. In 1854 George Fitzhugh, of Virginia, deplored that Carlyle should be so right in saying of American institutions that they were "anarchy plus a street constable." Fitzhugh expatiated on the governmental and moral catastrophes that flowed from laissez-faire. He continued (going a little too far even for Southern stomachs):

> Our only quarrel with Socialism is, that it will not honestly admit that it owes its recent revival to the failure of universal liberty, and is seeking to bring about slavery again in some form. The little experiment of universal

* Not Communism—which is as old as Plato and St. Benedict and which has, maybe, another and more glorious future, as is already indicated in the modern settlements in the Plain of Esdraelon. I would add that one great contemporary issue of thought for democracy is to bridge the gap, in terms of personality, between Protestant Democratic Christian values and Catholic humanist Christian values. *Cf.* the work of M. Jacques Maritain. The synthesis, however, will not be, I submit, merely that of St. Thomas (as Maritain seems to suggest), an ancient pre-Protestant, pre-Secularist synthesis of long ago, but something that satisfactorily brings the concept of Power, power over man and nature, within the ambit of civilized values. *Cf.* also pp. 54, 94.

liberty that has been tried for a little while in a little corner of Europe, has resulted in disastrous and appalling failure. Slavery has been too universal not to be necessary to nature, and man struggles in vain against nature.

Meanwhile such writers as Professor Dew appealed, not to Nature, but to Nature's God, and quoted passages from Holy Writ to show that the Almighty (considering the ultimate, rather than the trivial, individual and immediate, happiness of man in this vale of tears) had provided us in the Old Testament with approved examples of slavery and had, in the New, entirely declined to condemn it. Moreover, as Edmund Burke had said, slave-owners fought more bravely than other, less aristocratic, men for their personal liberties.

JOHN CALDWELL CALHOUN (1782–1850), however, is by far the most eminent of these Southern writers. He lacks the provocative zest of Fitzhugh and his style is reminiscent of the authors of *The Federalist*. But his first *Disquisition on Government* (pub. 1851) is one of the few systematic political treatises issuing from nineteenth-century America. Society, he holds with Aristotle, is natural. The Lockian-Jeffersonian theory of governmental origins is not only unfounded but false, not only false but dangerous. There was no individualistic "state of nature," nor (it follows) equality in that state; nor are men born free and equal. Government exists to curb men's natural preference for their own interests, even in the social state. But the holders of power themselves will practice tyranny unless restrained by the suffrage of the electorate and the need for re-election. Even so, the majority—*which is not the People**—will tyrannize unless the decision is taken by an aggregate of majorities, the majorities of each major *interest*. Otherwise we have the community divided into two classes: a majority that consumes the taxes and a minority that is made to produce them.

Calhoun appears as though he were here forecasting the Corporative State. Actually he is leading up, not only to the venerable theory of the Division of Powers, but still more to that of State Rights. He cites, significantly enough, the history of Poland with approval and recommends rule, not by the numerical, but the "concurrent," majority. The assent by the majority of interests or unanimity, *i.e.*, legislative and executive minimalism—is here the panacea. Here Calhoun speaks in the eighteenth-century American political language. On the other hand, Calhoun is all in favour of authority (will go with

* *Cf.* pp. 276, 327, 496.

neo-collectivist Fitzhugh when it comes to that)—for the other fellow.

> Liberty, when forced on a people unfit for it, would, instead of a blessing, be a curse; as it would, in its reaction, lead directly to anarchy,—the greatest of all curses. . . . It is necessary to bear in mind, that *the main spring to progress is, the desire of individuals to better their condition.* . . . It is, indeed, this inequality of condition between the front and rear ranks, in the march of progress, which gives so strong an impulse to the former to maintain their position, and to the latter to press forward into their files. This gives to progress its greatest impulse. To force the front rank back to the rear, or attempt to push forward the rear into line with the front, by the interposition of the government, would put an end to the impulse, and effectually arrest the march of progress.

The interesting point is that J. S. Mill could have written all this. The difference of interpretation, however, is manifest. The open career for individual exertions does not, by a slight lapse in practical logic (an application of common sense), mean for Calhoun that the status of slavery by birth should be abolished. On the contrary, "this great institution" is itself "the most safe and stable basis for free institutions in the world."

> It is impossible with us [Calhoun said, a century ago, in 1838] that *the conflict can take place between labor and capital, which makes it so difficult to establish and maintain free institutions* in all wealthy and highly civilized nations where such institutions as ours do not exist. The Southern States are an aggregate, in fact, of communities, not of individuals. Every plantation is a little community, with the master at its head, who concentrates in himself the united interests of capital and labor, of which he is the common representative. These small communities aggregated make the State in all, in whose action labor and capital are equally represented and perfectly harmonized.

One can almost hear Edmund Burke making such a speech—reaching his conclusion by the "illative sense." It is a startling instance of the seductive dangers of rhetoric and even of coherent philosophy when pursued in abstraction from the impact of obstinate and unpleasant experience, such as can so easily be avoided by men of delicate minds or disregarded by practical politicians, such as Calhoun, of robust digestions and common sensibility.

In Britain, J. S. Mill's liberalism was being subjected, not by Carlyle alone, to incisive criticism. Sir James Fitzjames Stephen was maintaining, in his *Liberty, Equality, Fraternity* (1873), against John Morley and against Frederick Harrison, followers of Comte,* that

* *Cf.* p. 745.

the wise minority are the rightful masters of the foolish majority, and that it is mean and cowardly in them to deny the right to coerce altogether for fear of its being applied as against themselves

—Stephen having already demonstrated to his own satisfaction that he had a practical personal knowledge who the wise might be. Benjamin Disraeli, in a *Vindication of the English Constitution* (1835) had already dismissed Utility as a mere phrase and (elsewhere) the Utilitarians as miserable successors to the Girondins—an attitude which he maintained during that long political life which was reaching its climax in the 1870's. Professor Thomas Huxley, the physiologist, exposed Herbert Spencer's atomism in a brilliant essay, *Administrative Nihilism* (1871).

If my next-door neighbour chooses to have his drains in such a state as to create a poisonous atmosphere, which I breathe at the risk of typhoid and diphtheria, he restricts my just freedom to live just as much as if he went about with a pistol, threatening my life; if he is to be allowed to let his children go unvaccinated, he might as well be allowed to leave strychnine lozenges about in the way of mine; and if he brings them up untaught and untrained to earn their living, he is doing his best to restrict my freedom, by increasing the burden of taxation for the support of gaols and workhouses which I have to pay. The higher the state of civilization, the more completely do the actions of one member of the social body influence all the rest, and the less possible is it for any one man to do a wrong thing without interfering, more or less, with the freedom of all his fellow citizens. . . .

It is said: there must be hewers of wood and drawers of water, scavengers and coal-heavers, day labourers and domestic servants, or the work of society will come to a standstill. But, if you educate and refine everybody, nobody will be content to assume these functions, and all the world will want to be gentlemen and ladies. One hears this argument most frequently from the representatives of the well-to-do middle class; and, coming from them, it strikes me as peculiarly inconsistent, as the one thing they admire, strive after, and advise their own children to do, is to get on in the world, and, if possible, rise out of the class in which they were born into that above them. . . . *

That which is to be lamented, I fancy, is not that society should do its utmost to help capacity to ascend from the lower strata to the higher, but that it has *no machinery to facilitate the descent of incapacity from the higher strata to the lower.*

The last statement is one of the most profound in the range of political philosophy, and basic to much that has been written on the theme of equality. John Morley, later Viscount Morley of Blackburn, admirer of Carlyle but friend of J. S. Mill, endeavoured to argue,

* *Cf.* p. 262.

against Stephen, Mill's distinction, cardinal to his philosophy of liberty, between "self-regarding" and "other-regarding" acts by explaining that, as a practical matter, we all so well know the difference that the matter is not worth arguing.* This, in his famous essay, *On Compromise* (1874). Walter Bagehot, in *Physics and Politics* (1869) enabled the laymen to study political science without tears by the aid of analogies, lucid if erroneous, chosen from the natural sciences.†

3

Hitherto we have been discussing those who, living after Hegel, betray little of his influence although, in the cases of both Carlyle and Newman, the influence of Coleridge is apparent, and in Carlyle's case an atmosphere of thought if not a coherent philosophy can be said to have travelled across the North Sea. Actually Carlyle is more naturally sympathetic with Hegel than with his own especial master, Goethe. It is now necessary to turn to that school of thinkers, generally referred to as the Oxford Idealists, who were explicitly under Hegelian influence.

THOMAS HILL GREEN (1836–1882) was the earliest and the most English in style of thought, the least under the Hegelian sway, of this group. The actual work of introducing Hegel to the general reading public of Britain was that of the Cairds—Edward Caird, Professor of Moral Philosophy in Glasgow University and later Master of Balliol College, Oxford, whose brief biography of Hegel (settling satisfactorily that he was a Christian) was published in 1883, and John Caird, Principal of Glasgow University.

With T. H. Green begins the custom, hitherto strange in Britain although not in Germany, whereby political theory which had been the province of men of affairs such as Burke and Paine or men of the court such as Hooker and Hobbes, Machiavelli and Leibnitz, became the province of college dons. Green's career—scholar of Rugby, Fellow of Balliol, White Professor of Oxford University—is one of normal academic distinction. A certain nineteenth-century liberal religious independence led him, although as it were one of nature's clergymen, to decline to take Anglican orders. It might well have retarded, in the 1870's, his university career. Actually he was the first layman to be elected a tutor of his College. Like Bosanquet and Hobhouse later, he strained at the Thirty-nine Articles of Religion of the church-as-by-law-established. His biographer records that, being invited as an

* *Cf.* p. 512.

† *Cf.* p. 710.

undergraduate to join a university rifle corps to keep down the Chartists, he replied that he would "like to learn the use of the arm in order that he might desert to the people if it came to such a pass." It is not, however, recorded that he did learn the use of "the arm"; but he did declare that he thought Lord Palmerston had done "about as much harm as it is possible for an individual Englishman to do," and later broke all precedent by becoming a Town Councillor of the City of Oxford. It is part of the natural goodness of the man, and part of his cult of "doing good to realize an idea of perfection," that he took this scarcely national post because it was a station in which a duty was waiting to be fulfilled and because, like John Ruskin and the eminent historian Stubbs, he realized that the basis of the sound government of Britain was its local government.

In his *Lectures on the Principles of Political Obligation* (delivered 1879–1880), perhaps in order to avoid an un-Oxfordian display of erudition, Green makes no reference whatsoever to Marx, although he does gravely discuss the growth of a "proletariate" and whether impoverishment is a consequence of a capitalist system of private profit. He criticizes incisively what we shall have later to discuss as the "quantum theory of wealth" and provides the customary correctives to the theory of the classical economists. One man's wealth is not another man's deprivation and poverty. Property is (following here Hegel) an extension of a man's personality. Gifts are unequal and the rewards of their application will naturally be unequal. To interfere with acquisition and with a man's desire to provide for his family through acquisition *and* through free testamentary bequest, is to interfere with an impulse by which a man "at once expresses and developes the sense of family responsibility, which naturally breeds a recognition of duties in many other directions." Green comes here very near to that fallacy of Aristotle (there are few fallacies of Aristotle . . .) whereby a social situation, *e.g.*, differences of wealth and poverty, is justified because it encourages virtue, *e.g.*, generosity, and not virtue found to be such because it produces a good social situation. To this point we shall return.*

> Once admit, [Green continues] as the idea of property that nature should be progressively adapted to the service of man by a process in which each, while working freely or for himself, *i.e.*, as determined by a conception of his own good, at the same time contributes to the social good, and it will follow that property must be unequal. . . . Either then the various apparatus needed for various functions must be provided for individuals by society,

* *Cf.* pp. 624–625.

which would imply a complete regulation of life incompatible with *that highest object of human attainment, a free morality;* or we must trust for its provision to individual effort, which will imply inequality between the property of different persons.

Green nowhere exhaustively makes clear what he means by "a free morality." The misery of the poor Green ascribes to the fact that the ancestors of most of them were rural serfs; that they had entered into a legal system which in fact deprived them of the opportunity of free contract; the absence of free land; an absence of "that sense of family-responsibility which might have made them insist on having the chance of saving"; lack of provision for health, housing and schooling [a significant admission] so that they were "freely victimized by deleterious employments, foul air, and consequent craving for deleterious drinks"; above all the habit of "keeping bringing children into the world at a rate which perpetuates the evil" of poverty. This last point about population restraint will be noted in connection with contemporary campaigns for population increase on high moral grounds. The poor must indeed find it hard to keep up with the changing fashions about the moral obligations of the lower classes set forth by the eminent professors of moral philosophy.

When we consider all this, we shall see the unfairness of laying on capitalism or the free development of individual wealth the blame which is really due to the arbitrary and violent manner in which rights over land have been acquired and exercised, and to the failure of the state to fulfill those functions which under a system of unlimited private ownership are necessary to maintain the conditions of a free life.

Green recommends, as a trump card, the abolition of rights of primogeniture in land (entail being an improper interference with testamentary liberty); and even thinks that the moral value of the peerage is dubious. It should be added that he soundly favours that distributivist conclusion, probably implicit in Locke, of private property for all.

To speak frankly, Green's treatment both of the property relation and of the family relation is on the whole very conventional—the fundamental questions remain unasked. He was described by his friends as a "religious radical." The first epithet is justified, not only in terms of his lay sermons on faith and the witness of God, but in the light of the essence of the moral theory of his major work, *Prolegomena to Ethics.* The second epithet is not so obvious in its justice.

According to Green's ethical theory, with its rather eclectic, Kantianized Hegelianism, the applications must be deduced from the a priori principle of pursuit of perfection. Institutions and interests have fortunately filled in for us the contents of morality; and the man who "pursues duty for duty's sake" will be at no loss at all, Green sanguinely affirms, to say what in particular his duty is. It is legitimate to criticize Green by taking his particular applications, which share that inadequacy and blindness to experience for which Hegel rightly criticized Kant, and then to inquire whether his lofty first principles, which bear such shrivelled fruit, are indeed satisfactory—or whether the Jesuits whom he criticizes with Anglican self-righteousness were not confronting problems that Green, in his college quadrangle, underrated and misconstrued.

Green is a semi-Hegelian. Natural Law he admits as the system of moral obligation so far as it admits of enforcement and should be enforced. But of Natural Rights he is one of the most effective critics. There can be no legal rights against law. But moral rights (whether or not recognized by law) are only such because conducing to the good of society and not against society. It will be noted that, unlike Locke and his legitimate successors, the semi-Hegelian Green regards obligations as obligations of an individual to some "real" entity called society, *not* as obligations of an individual to other actual individuals. He is (scholastically speaking) a realist, not a nominalist or neo-realist.

> No one therefore can have a right except (1) as a member of society, and (2) of a society in which some common good is recognized. . . . "Natural right," as = right in a state of nature which is not a state of Society, is a contradiction. *There can be no right without a consciousness of common interest on the part of members of a society.*

What society Green does not state. About what right a slave has—the question was of contemporary importance—to a liberty not recognized by his society, Green is vague. The point is of basic importance.* Elsewhere Green says that there can be no higher motive to virtuous action "than that civil spirit, in the fullest and truest sense, on which they [the Greeks] conceived it to rest."

Green's Hegelianism, however, is subject to heavy qualifications, partly due to his English and Protestant tradition, partly to Kantianism with its thesis of duty and of "self-devotion to the work of developing the perfect character." Typically, Green sees, as he says in his *Lectures on the English Revolution*, in the Civil War, something of which

* *Cf.* pp. 490, 656, 723.

the justifying fruit was that England was saved from Catholic reaction and the "dissenting bodies" or Free Churches were created. This admiration for the Puritan "free conscience," and distrust of a "christianity of ordinances," is in the best Anglo-Saxon tradition and explains Green's attitude towards the state. He finds a new and better variant of J. S. Mill's famous distinction between "self-regarding" and "other-regarding" acts as the criterion for the legitimacy of state interference. This is the distinction between the field of what socially is better done even if done from a wrong motive, and the field of what derives its value from its motive. Mere laissez-faire is wrong.

> The true ground of objection to "paternal government" is not that it violates the "laissez faire" principle and conceives that its office is to make people good, to promote morality, but that it rests on a misconception of morality. The real function of government being to *maintain conditions of life in which morality shall be possible, and morality consisting in the disinterested performance of self-imposed duties, "paternal government" does its best to make it impossible by narrowing the room for the self-imposition of duties and for the play of disinterested motives.*

Professor Green's *Prolegomena to Ethics* is fully occupied with an attack on the earlier Utilitarian doctrine of pleasure. It is difficult to conceive of two men more different than Green and Voltaire, the hedonist. It is open to doubt whether, in practice (and we are entitled to demand a connection between theory and practice), Voltaire did not do more good—was not the more useful citizen in the world—of the two. To ask which was the better man would be to state a false dilemma: both erred, but differently. It is yet open to doubt (although it would be strenuously denied) and is relevant, whether a contempt, recommended by Green, for the pleasure motive, does not lead to an indifference to pleasure for others and hence to an anaesthesia about social-economic reform.

Green scores a significant point by showing that Bentham's theory of moral conduct, as responding to the pleasure or displeasure of the majority, is no more than an illogical gloss on Hobbes, and on the earlier Greek theory of moral conduct corresponding to the pleasure, and of justice being the interest, of the stronger, *i.e.*, a cult of success. The pleasure principle is wrong: the greatest [contemporary] number principle right. Green, however, accepts J. S. Mill's later (if contradictory) theory, derived from Goethe, of self-development, although he wears the doctrine with a difference and in the light of an absolute and ultimate moral good:

the full realization of the capacities of the human soul . . . a thought of which the content is never final and complete . . . but which for practical purposes . . . may be taken to be the thought of a social life . . . of which the distinction, as a social life, shall be universality of disinterested goodness.

The arts and sciences, he adds, are not ultimate goods, if developed in isolation. Perfection for oneself is perfection in society, through self-denial, in order that all may partake in that disinterested perfection. Again, a moral arabesque, a piece of Kantian abstract schematism.

If it was a personal misfortune it was a philosophic gain that Green's brother was interested in alcohol to an excessive degree. Temperance is a recurring theme in Green's work—but the personal problem gives a peculiar reality to Green's treatment of moral freedom. With Locke he asserts that the question, Is the will free? is unmeaning, but still "to an untaught and under-fed denizen of a London yard with gin-shops on the right hand and on the left . . . it would have been a mockery to speak of the state as a realization of freedom." Freedom, then, for a man lies in being reconciled to the law of his being, which he obeys as being the law of "the realisation in himself of the idea of perfection," and in the discipline, "through inheritance and education," of natural impulses militating against this law. A conception, not dissimilar from but more obscure than Hegel's; owing something to St. Paul. If correct, as touching "inheritance," it apparently invalidates Green's own peculiar objections to hereditary privilege and makes us doubt whether Plato, who allowed privilege of stock, was not, after all, more profound—whether indeed Green had said anything Plato had not said better.

Green was the original of the "Mr. Gray" of Mrs. Humphry Ward's *Robert Elsmere* (1888). Green's wife compared him with Sir Bors, of *The Idylls of the King*, and his editor Nettleship continues the comparison.

> Sir Bors it was
> Who spake so low and sadly at our board,
> A square-set man and honest: and his eyes
> An out-door sign of all the warmth within.

There is indeed something Tennysonian about Green: the sheen of the ideal of "purity of heart"; the conscientious advocacy in lecture and town council of conscientious citizenship; the, quite unwitting, lack of imaginative perception of human situations, actual miseries and their technical remedies. And yet, this Green did: it is not an exaggeration to assign to his influence, direct and indirect, on young men those

qualities of integrity which have distinguished the British Civil Service (although not alone: also the German) during the last fifty years—and some, at least, of its defects, including a certain contempt for the concrete, scientific and technical. His writings shaped not only the political philosophy taught in Oxford University but that practised in the British Commonwealth for half a century.

4

FRANCIS HERBERT BRADLEY (1846–1924), son of the Dean of Westminister, Fellow of Merton College, Oxford, has none of Green's reservations. His *Ethical Studies* (1876) contain extensive extracts from Hegel. His political philosophy is specifically Hegelian. Discussion of the *Studies* is hampered by the fact that Bradley refused, during his lifetime, to permit their re-publication on the grounds that they were *juvenilia*. There is, however, no indication in his later relevant ethical work that he in fact recanted or that they must be treated as indiscretions. On the contrary, they were, for some years, the staple teaching for Oxford undergraduates.

Bradley himself was a man of mystery. He appears to have been, in his own eyes, "a right English bull-dog." Idealists are by constitution quarrelsome. With Bradley starts an Oxford tradition of bad manners —a truculence in Bradley's case perhaps due to his failure to attain the coveted academic distinction of a "first." According to a generally received account, when first at the age of seventy-six, he was suggested as recipient of the Order of Merit by Lord Haldane, it caused a certain dismay to the then Premier, Mr. Lloyd George, and to King George V, neither of whom had ever heard his name before. There was, however, no intrinsic reason why English students should not have associated his name with that of Rudyard Kipling as German students associated Hegel and Goethe.

The Church of England catechism refers to our obligation to do our duty in that state of life to which it *shall* please God to call us. (The "shall" is ambiguous.) The core of Bradley's doctrine will be found in the Essay entitled "*My Station and Its Duties*"—a phrase *later* used by Green. Like Green, again, Bradley makes play with the notions of self-development and the idea of perfection. But Bradley decisively rejects "duty for duty's sake"—that "last peevish enemy" of the contentment which the healthy, moral man feels—and Kantianism, which he justly charges with being abstract and "subjective."

Bradley's own exposition of Hegelianism is perhaps the crudest presentation of tribal morality set forth by any reputable English

writer, even in the age of Disraeli. He begins by pouring contempt on "thinkers," especially "advanced thinkers." Moral decisions are a matter of intuitive judgement. Political philosophy does not exist to establish values, "securely judging the world"—"has not to play tricks with the state, but to understand it." "What we call an individual man is what he is because of and by virtue of community." However, Bradley modestly adds, "I do not, like some more gifted thinkers, suppose that the limits of my own intelligence are the necessary bounds of human reason. . . . "

> Practical morality . . . means what in other spheres would be the greatest narrowness. Point out to a man of simple morals that the case has other sides than the one he instinctively fixes on, and he suspects you wish to corrupt him. And so you would if you went on. Apart from bad example, the readiest way to debauch the morality of any one is, on the side of principle, to confuse them by forcing them to see in all moral and unmoral acts other sides and points of view . . . to warp their instinctive apprehension.

In brief, right moral judgment consists in our immediate prejudices learnt in infancy and, not philosophers, but our nursemaids are our kings. We may dismiss these remarks of prefascist Mr. Bradley as twaddle—dangerous twaddle.

Bradley continues:

> The child is not merely the member of a family; he is born into other spheres, and (passing over the subordinate wholes, which nevertheless do in many cases qualify him) he is born a member of the English nation. It is, I believe, a matter of fact that at birth the child of one race is not the same as the child of another; that in the children of the one race there is a certain identity. . . . It is the opinion of those best qualified to speak on the subject that civilization is to some not inconsiderable extent hereditary.

The State is a moral organism, an individual *social organism*, "which, even in England, we are now beginning to call by that name." Whether the "organism" is England or Great Britain or the British Empire, or is a series of organisms within organisms, is not made clear. But then, as Bradley says in his preface, his task demanded "an acquaintance with the facts of the world which he does not possess." Green had insisted that the test of morality is devotion to the widest possible society—hence the American Union had a moral claim against the particular Southern States. Comte had urged the moral claims of humanity. What is Bradley's view?

He begins by saying that with M. Comte's own views "I am not acquainted." The books were possibly in Oxford's libraries; but

Mr. Bradley preferred not to step across the "quad." After this display of spiritual arrogance, he proceeds to an attack on Comte's disciple, Frederick Harrison. "How are we to go from the organism of the state to the organism of humanity?" Perhaps some day, we know not when. Does history verify the belief that "all or most of the perished millions who have covered this globe have entered into the main stream of civilization?" Mr. Bradley, in Merton College, does not think so. There seems to be an allusion to Comte (who had a mistress for whom he entertained a passion chiefly spiritual) in the passage where Mr. Bradley's doctrine, in the oddest of taste, is made to "laugh" at sentimentalism's frenzied apotheosis of the passion it calls love,

> with its kindness for the genius too clever in general to do anything in particular, and in its adoration of star-gazing virgins with souls above their spheres, whose wish to be something in the world takes the form of wanting to do something with it, and who in the end do badly what they might have done in the beginning well.

Is then the "Community" or "Society" civilization? Apparently not.

> We have thus seen *the community to be the real moral idea*, to be stronger than the theories and the practice of its members against it, and to give us self-realization. And this is indeed limitation; it bids us say farewell to visions of super-human morality, to ideal societies, and to practical "ideals" generally . . . [The Bradleian] sees the true account of the state (which holds it to be neither mere force nor convention, but the moral organism, the real identity of might and right) unknown or "refuted," laughed at and despised, but he sees the state every day in its practice refute every other doctrine, and do with the moral approval of all what the explicit theory of scarcely one will morally justify. . . . The belief in this real moral organism is the one solution of ethical problems. It breaks down the antithesis of despotism and individualism; it denies them, while it preserves the truth of both.

"What is moral in any particular case," Bradley states, "is seldom doubtful." "Society pronounces beforehand." There is no fixed code or rule of right. "The morality of every stage is justified for that stage." World history is world justice, as Hegel had said.

> What is that wish to be better, and to make the world better, which is on the threshold of immorality? What is the "world" in this sense? . . . The moral world with its social constitutions, etc., is a fact; it is real; our "ideals" are not real. . . . We should consider whether the encouraging oneself in having opinions of one's own, in the sense of thinking differently from the

world on moral subjects, be not, in any person other than a heaven-born prophet, sheer self-conceit.

One feels that if F. H. Bradley had met the Second Person of the Everlasting Trinity, he would have rebuked His presumption—as Treitschke (of whom more later) explicitly did.* There is, I have pointed out, a doubt how far Bradley later repudiated his early writings. Subject to this reservation, Mr. Bradley is merely a wicked man.

This is my direct moral intuition, reinforced by Green's criteria—although, as Mr. Bradley demonstrates, of itself final and beyond need of argument or explanation. It is, however, time to turn back from the hunting of that strange animal, the authentic British curmudgeon. It is necessary to point out that Bradley's thesis of "my station and its duties" is charged with real moral content, however *gâté* by contact with his theory of the State Organism; that the thesis that "to be moral is to live in accordance with the moral tradition of one's country," although dangerous, is significant; that there is integrity in his denunciation of a "cynical contempt for what deserves only pity, sacrifice of a life for work to the best of one's lights, a sacrifice despised not simply because it has failed, but because it is stupid, and uninteresting, and altogether unsentimental." There is an integrity in Bradley that is lacking in Voltaire, of whom De Maistre made the remark, true if one-sided, that whoever admired him must have a corrupt heart. However perverse and even evil, there is moral grandeur to Bradley—the Diogenes of some infernal circle. But most of what Bradley had to say was said much better by the Greeks, not least by Plato, with his doctrine that social justice is minding one's own business. The Greek theory of civic *ethos* is there fresh and untainted by an Hegelianism feeding on the decaying body of ecclesiastical Christianity.

There is one further point, in connection with F. H. Bradley, to which attention should be called. It is his thesis that the practical moral judgement should be guided by one's "society," by its tradition, by what *hoi phronimoi*, as he says, "men of sound judgement," decide is the right judgement. This thesis, that the musician must settle what is good music, is important. It is interesting to note how, not only in Bradley, Hegel, Thomas Aquinas and Plato, but even in the asides of Mill, Bentham and Jefferson, not to speak of Milton, these essentially aristocratic suppositions, this hierarchic view of society, recurs. The consensus among "the men of sound judgement" themselves is impressive—it can scarcely be dismissed as occupational bias.

* *Cf.* p. 535.

5

BERNARD BOSANQUET (1848–1923) continues the Bradleian tradition and, incidentally, the tradition of professorial politics. He had, however, the human hobby of assiduous reading of novels—such as, for example, the novels of the Baroness von Hütten, whom he greatly admired—and quotes novels to illustrate his points. Like Bradley he endeavours to combine the duties of his station as a metaphysician with those of a politicist or political scientist. The result is not always happy. In his philosophical work Bosanquet maintains the Hegelian thesis that the part finds significance through the whole; and that the finite is necessarily only a part of the Absolute, incompletely comprehensible save in terms of the Incomprehensible. In his Gifford Lectures, *The Value and Destiny of the Individual* (pub. 1913), he remarks that "the universe is the magnificent theatre of all the wealth of life, and good and evil are within it. This, I think, we are aware of when at our best." He continues,

> The mere increase of comfort, convenience and physical security, even if taken, as must be presupposed, to extend to all classes, will not bring us any nearer satisfaction

—real satisfaction. In a foot-note this light of British philosophy gravely discusses whether "the lower animals have religion"—a theme undoubtedly important, but much less important than any for which, so far as I can recall, the maligned Schoolmen have been rebuked.

Making all allowance for the fact that Dr. Bosanquet is something of an old woman, there is an obvious danger to the nerve of social reform in the creed that "we can have no good without evil"—everything will depend upon the application of this dogma. When we turn to Bosanquet's essays in *Aspects of the Social Problem* (1895), edited by himself, we find him laying the same stress on "character" as did Green and, for that matter (it gives pause to reflect), Carlyle. Such stress is, of course, unexceptionable although, as touching its prescription of training in "character" to others, it is well to recall that Carlyle, like Cobbett, was a genuine proletarian (if a snob), which Green and Bosanquet equally certainly were not. Within a few pages we find Bosanquet considering cases of conscience. He here prescribes to the ladies, who are voluntary nurses, that they should not medically attend "hopeless" cases where the families should be dealt with by the Poor Law, which exists to regulate the relief of

"destitution"—families, many of whose members would otherwise "be confirmed in idle and vicious habits."

At least Dr. Bosanquet does not, as do the preachers, enunciate fine a priori principles and then indignantly claim an alibi when simple laymen, labouring over the heavy work of application, draw conclusions therefrom that are morally peculiar. Fine principles too often repudiate their offspring in bad deeds, and fine philosophers mouth empty words about "casuistry" that exempt them from half the work of practical judgment. Bosanquet attacked William James for *not* discussing the particular—society, rather than the Absolute. But Dr. Bosanquet's own practical applications, although he is man enough to make them, do betray him. "Social reform" is brought into discredit by a static school that quite lacks the brusque vigour given to these words by that great radical and great conservative, Bentham. It preferred to reiterate that at the heart of the civic virtues is the thought that, in the Absolute, the balance of things—although there is doubtless a beautiful striving to perfection as well as a dutiful performance by citizens of orders—is as it should be because it must be.

Bosanquet, apropos of Shelters, of the Salvation Army type, quotes with approval a complaint that "these refuges appear to us to make it easy for husbands and wives to avoid their mutual responsibilities, and to neglect the education and proper bringing up of their children." The hard-worked Jukes family of progressive degenerates* is brought into play again. Starting from spiritual principles, Dr. Bosanquet decides that if Socialism meant—as indicated by Bellamy, Blatchford, Shaw and Wallas—the total suppression of the personal struggle for existence, "and the collective guarantee of support to all children," or *still worse* to all adults, without enforcing the (unspecified) responsibilities of parents and sons and daughters,

> it really is in hopeless conflict with the universal postulates of the struggle for existence and natural selection, as justly interpreted of human society.

(This argument had an odd, but doubtless illusory, similarity to the views of Herbert Spencer rather than to those of the Father of Idealism, Plato—but then Plato had heathen values.) Dr. Bosanquet continues that Morris and Bax† (Marx is nowhere mentioned) throw "a painful light on the attitude of some Socialists to the family."

> Now the general conclusion which I desire to draw is not in the direction of recurring to severity against the helpless, but it urges the absolute necessity

* *Cf.* p. 407.

† *Cf.* p. 550.

ding all those interferences as unavoidable evils and not as precedents
· general action. . . . We should avoid in every way the protrusion
rous interference into the healthy life of the industrial class [*sic*].

on, for example, should be taken to relieve the father of the
obligation, good for character, to support wife and children, or
ildren of the obligation to demonstrate family independence and
.al freedom by supporting with their last penny their invalid or
stitute father.

It is reasonably clear that a philosophy of this order must essentially be one, not of radical reform, but of conscientious administration. From challenging any social order, its impulse must be to accept remove abuses—not to change but to improve. This is not ily any condemnation granted that the impulse to improve olute. With many, however, of the disciples of this idealist ism but of a meaner clay, the impulse to a probing social curiy, unrequired and probably unpleasant in its consequences, is too ikely to be regarded as, not a duty, but a nuisance. Progress after all, it may be said, is not anything grossly material, but perfection in union with the Absolute—the only serious doubt being whether Time is infinite and hence Progress an infinite *process* or Time is finite and hence Progress terminated in a goal on the other side of time. These speculations are soporific—they have been called opiate. Anyhow it may be doubted whether, of speculations of this order (proper in their place), the mystics Eckhart and Boehme were not profounder exponents.

It is an interesting commentary to note Dr. Bosanquet's own treatment of the state in *The Philosophical Theory of the State* (1899). No virile, radical, inconvenient questions are asked. The individual, Bosanquet holds, is related to the state as the idea in a man's mind is related to that mind—a theme perhaps even less helpful than Green's stress on the social duty of connecting the private with the main drainage. In accordance with the tradition already expressed by the Church Fathers, Bosanquet declares that

> our loyalty to [the social system] makes us men and citizens, and is the main spiritualising force of our lives. [Dr. Bosanquet, however, no more than Bradley or Hegel, was any friend of Churches. . . .] But something in all of us, and much in some of us, is recalcitrant through rebellion, indolence, incompetence or ignorance. And it *is only on these elements that the public power operates as power*, through compulsion or authoritative suggestion. . . . It may be noted in passing that the insecurity of life, which many seem to attach to dependence on the vast system of wants and work, is *more and more seen*,

as modern economic relations develop, not to be insecurity at all, except in as far as "culture" in the form of industrial training is absent.

One feels at this point inclined to close the page, and comment that really the less said about Dr. Bosanquet the better. Let us, however, manfully continue. To quote Dr. Bosanquet himself (from Ariosto):

> Che'l Volgare ignorante ogn'un' riprenda
> E parli più di qual che meno intenda.*

By the State, then, we mean Society as a unit, recognized as rightly exercising control over its members through absolute physical power. . . . The Nation-State, we have already suggested, is the widest organization which has the common experience necessary to found a common life. . . . *It has no determinate function in a larger community, but is itself the supreme community; the guardian of a whole moral world, but not a factor within an organized moral world.* Moral relations presuppose an organized life; but such a life is only within the State, not in relations between the State and other communities.

Bosanquet does not indeed say, with Hobbes (and even Hobbes admitted "the pernicious" and "the unwise" in State action—is a Liberal compared with some), that the state can do no wrong. There is indeed the sharpest of differences between Hobbes's absolutism based as an expedient on individualism and the more dangerous Hegelian State—absolutism which denies the "true reality," as an integer, of the individual. The criminal "asks his own punishment," that is, "really" wills it. But Bosanquet asserts that the immoral acts of a State-agent may not be ascribed to the State (an issue arising where, under order, an air officer bombs an open town, and decided by the moral conscience of juries, after the late war, in the opposite sense to Dr. Bosanquet). He admits indeed (and italicizes, in 1919) that a state may be—is—judged before the tribunal of humanity and history. Hegel did this and went farther by admitting the "superior claims" of world history. But it is difficult to see what all this amounts to.

If the state, moreover, is not ultimate nor above criticism, no more is any given idea of humanity; and reference to "the interests of mankind" only names the problem, which is to find out what those interests are, in terms of human qualities to be realized. . . . This being so, it seems to follow that *the object of our ethical idea of humanity is not really mankind as a single community.*

* "That the ignorant vulgar reproves everyone, and talks most of what it understands least."

In brief, humanity is merely an aggregate; but the State is an "organism" (whatever that may be). Bosanquet adds (I suggest correctly):

> Art, philosophy, and religion, though in a sense the very life-blood of society, are not and could not be directly fashioned to meet the needs and uses of the multitude, and their aim is not *in that sense* "social."

It was the misfortune of Dr. Bosanquet to live through a period during which his own Nation-state, Britain, (which moulds his morality) was in life and death conflict with the chief exponent, Germany, of the tradition of his philosophy. The results are interesting, and will be found scattered in foot-notes (labelled "1919") throughout *The Philosophical Theory* and in the "Introduction to the Second Edition Part Two" (*i.e.*, third edition, 1920), which begins bravely with the words, "Then all the old things were true."

The war, Bosanquet says, was due to inadequate subordination of the parts to the whole. Sovereignty, however, is the attribute of any "genuine whole." The state may not be supreme, but is still a *more* sovereign body (by "finding itself" in a whole, presumably) than any other social organization.

> It is ridiculous to ask if sovereignty and the state are favourable to war. . . . I believe in the League of Nations as the hope and refuge of mankind; but I do not believe that any moral being [= State, here] can divest itself of moral responsibility, or limit that responsibility's *ultima ratio.*

Suppose a League of Nations decided to enforce slavery—"Is it not plain that a liberty-loving nation would be bound to resist it to the last drop of its blood?"

Let us assume that Bosanquet genuinely means to substitute world community for nation community, what then happens, on the basis of this last remark, to the Hegelian moral theory and to the thesis that the true community provides its fragments with the stuff of their morality? Is this doctrine of State self-sufficiency not immoral treason? "We see it so constantly; two ideas, both excellent, both, indeed, necessary. Yet in times of excitement they are set against each other." This, in 1918. A pitiful, hop-scotching theory. To be pierced by either horn of the dilemma would be painful enough: Bosanquet contrives to be pierced by both, the God-State *and* Wilson's League as *Summum Bonum.*

Bosanquet's sparsity of reference to Marx in discussing the social situation has been remarked on. In *The Philosophical Theory* the name

is mentioned once without comment, along with Le Play, and there in a brief foot-note. Mr. H. W. B. Joseph, Fellow of New College and author of *An Introduction to Logic*, devoted a little treatise to this subject, entitled *The Labour Theory of Value in Marx* (1923), which is thorough in its exposure of Marx, very typical of the Oxford School, and painstakingly abstemious in positive conclusions. "Such a conclusion"—the one hazarded is that the economic effects of strikes are obscure—"may displease" (ends Mr. Joseph); "but it is of no use to pretend that facts are other than they are (p. 174)."

In *The Metaphysical Theory of the State* (1918) Professor L. T. Hobhouse, of London, points out that what really shocks Dr. Bosanquet is the presumption of human beings in believing in the possibility of abolishing evil, which is mystically part of the glory of the Absolute.

> Dr. Bosanquet tells us that he personally believes in a nobler future, but since the Absolute is perfection and since evil exists, evil is necessary to perfection and its evanescence seems "altogether contradictory."

Whether absolutely Bosanquet is right (as he perhaps is) it is impossible to discuss here. As touching his theory of the actual state, Hobhouse undertakes an elegant exposure of this "fashionable academic philosophy." His dedication of this book to his aeronaut son has a peculiar pathos and deserves to be better known by all who would ponder on the connection between theory (as rationalization; but also as possessing directive force) and action in politics.

> As I went back to my Hegel my first mood was one of self-satire. Was this a time for theorizing or destroying theories, when the world was tumbling about our ears? My second thoughts ran otherwise. . . . In the bombing of London I had just witnessed the visible and tangible outcome of a false and wicked doctrine, the foundations of which lay, as I believe, in the book before me. . . . With that work began the most penetrating and subtle of all the intellectual influences which have sapped the rational humanitarianism of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, and in the Hegelian theory of the god-state all that I had witnessed lay implicit.

READING

F. H. Bradley: *Ethical Studies*, "My Station and Its Duties."

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE

* E. Barker: *Political Thought in England from Herbert Spencer to the Present Day*, 1915.
B. Bosanquet: *The Philosophical Theory of the State*, ed. 1920.
Crane Brinton: *English Political Thought in the Nineteenth Century*, 1933.

*T. Carlyle: *Sartor Resartus.*
S. T. Coleridge: *Collected Political Writings*, 1938.
Ralph Waldo Emerson: *Essays.*
*T. H. Green: *Lectures on the Principles of Political Obligation*, ed. 1913.
*L. T. Hobhouse: *The Metaphysical Theory of the State*, 1918.
C. E. Merriam: *American Political Theories*, 1924.

Chapter XVII

The Post-Hegelian Conservatives (*cont.*): Treitschke

1

THE anarchism of Thoreau and Kropotkin, already discussed, or of Bertrand Russell is not the only type. There is also an anarchism which is a militant egoism. The first kind, opposing the control of man by man through superior wealth and advocating co-operationism, fuses into pacifist communism. The second kind, demanding the right of each man to exercise his own powers without fear of God, man, or devil, ends by taking the might-cultivating nation into partnership and in fascism. When it has reached this debouchment it shows itself clearly as not only "post-Hegel," but as Hegelian. Its sources, however, in Germany are, in part, even anti-Hegelian and colour the Hegelian conclusions with a non-Hegelian irrationalism.

Rousseau had begun, until tamed by Plato, by challenging eighteenth-century Rationalism and the Humanist tradition of civilization. At last, bridled and bitted by Hegel, the Rousseauite General Will subdued itself to drawing the state chariot of the Cosmic Idea. But Hegel was not unchallenged.

Arthur Schopenhauer (1788–1860), in *The World as Will and Idea*, laid stress upon the reality of the active and non-rational. However, Schopenhauer remained at heart a rationalist and found an escape by discovering much good in the Hindu philosophies of escape from the chain of activity, including those of Sankara and Buddha. With aggressive truculence he advocated sad resignation, compensated by a belief in the ineradicable superiority of all men to all women. The irrational is, nevertheless, admitted by this thinker to be an unescapable part of the metaphysical substance of Being or, more precisely, of Existence. His direct political contributions are negligible beyond the relegation of the state to the category of an especial activity of the sorrow-causing Will and to the advocacy of having a private income

and a room of one's own. He was the son of a banker and an authoress. The irrationalism, however, which his philosophy, in its later days as a fashionable cult, did some little to stimulate, nurtured also by the Romantic movement, did not die down.

Goethe indeed, Schopenhauer's master, had given the impetus of poetic genius to this question whether the net of speculative reason can capture that which holds most of value in experience. *Faust* is the tragedy of the bankruptcy of science falsely so called. Superficially, it is the story of the yearning of the scholar for experience of life. Ultimately, it records the mediaeval, "Gothic" fear of the alliance of the learning of the Egyptians with the godless, devil spirit of adventuring doubt and denial. Goethe, great German and great Humanist, Goth and Greek, paused for fifty years over the answer and then gave it, haltingly, in terms of faith—but not irrational—and, above all, of the value of the venturous courage of the human spirit.

Eduard von Hartmann (1842–1906) carried the Schopenhauerian theory a stage further by developing an explicit doctrine of the unconscious mind, in his *Philosophy of the Unconscious*—a triumph of rationalism, formally, since the irrational was subjected to rational analysis and an attempt made to reconcile Hegel and Schopenhauer; a triumph of irrationalism, substantially, as insisting upon the part played by a mind not subject to the logic of the intellect. Von Hartmann, nobleman, philosophic precursor (at a distance) of the empiric Viennese psychological school, maintained that it would have been better for the world if it had not existed; held that pessimism was alone legitimate when one considered the pain inevitably caused by the Life-spirit. He committed suicide at the age of sixty-four.

Max Stirner (1806–1856), disciple of Schopenhauer, discussed by von Hartmann and asserted by his own followers to have shaped Nietzsche, comes nearer to our subject. As perhaps befits that of an anarchist of the militant school, Stirner's doctrine, which had some appeal in an America that respected Thoreau and the "frontier tradition," is not singularly coherent. Brandes, the great Scandinavian critic, and my friend Victor Basch have done no little to clear up the difficulty. Those who feared conventional tyrannies more than unvarnished egoism welcomed a doctrine that carried anarchism beyond the customary field of opposition in church and state, into the field of morals and even of abstract reasoning. The title of Stirner's book, *The Ego and His Own*, is reminiscent of the poem, *Der Einzige*, of Hölderlin, whom Nietzsche admired so much and who died, insane, in 1843. In this book Stirner writes:

What! am I in the world to realize ideas? To do my part by my citizenship, say, towards the realization of the idea "State," or by marriage, as husband and father, to bring the idea of the family into an existence? What does such a calling concern me! I live after a calling as little as the flower grows and gives fragrance after a calling.

The Kantian individualism is combined with protest against the algebraical, abstract Kantian morality. The conscience is "an eavesdropper." There is a "stern life-and-death combat with reason." What matters is the transitory ego and its power.

I am free from what I am rid of—owner of what I have in my power or what I control. *My own* I am at all times and under all circumstances, if I know how to have myself and do not throw myself away on others. . . . Because in society the most oppressive evils make themselves felt, therefore the oppressed especially, and consequently the members in the lower regions of society, think they find the fault in society, and make it their task to discover the right society. This is only the old phenomenon—that one looks for the fault first in everything but himself.

Such truth as there may be in these dicta may be thought to have been said better by the Stoics—or by Dostoievski, in *The Possessed*, when depicting the suicide of Kirilov. But Stirner continues:

According to the liberal way of thinking, right is to be obligatory for me because it is thus established by human reason, against which my reason is unreason. . . . *And yet none is real but this very "unreason."* Liberalism appears as the last attempt at a creation of the liberty of the people. . . . Liberty of the *people* is not *my* liberty. . . . How can I be my own when my faculties may develop only so far as they "do not disturb the harmony of society." . . . The people is dead—Up with *me!*

The Ego and His Own (*Der Einzige und sein Eigentum*) is dedicated to another, "my sweetheart, Marie Dähnhardt." We are, however, assured editorially that she was not worthy of association with "the unique." Stirner also, like von Hartmann, committed suicide, in 1856. Whatever may be the value of enunciating the uniqueness of each human being, end in himself, against doctrines of Man the Cog and Man the Phagocyte, the nuclear wisdom of Goethe's philosophy—

> Nur der verdient sich Freiheit wie das Leben,
> Der täglich sie erobern muss*—

seems scarcely to have been mastered in this case.

* "Only he merits Freedom, as Life, who daily can master himself."

FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE (1844–1900), the son of a clerical household on both sides, who asserted a putative ancestry tracing from one Nicki, a Polish nobleman, and who was author of *Anti-Christ* and other studies, makes a more serious contribution to individualist political thought. His sister, Frau Förster-Nietzsche, remarks of his mother that "when she married, her father gave her carriages and horses, a coachman [in this order], a cook, and a kitchenmaid, which for the wife of a German minister was then, and is still, something quite exceptional."

The youthful Nietzsche, after prodigies of learning displayed at school, proceeded to the universities of Bonn and Leipsic, at which latter he came across the works of Schopenhauer. "Here I saw a mirror in which I espied the world, life, and my own nature depicted with frightful grandeur." At the age of twenty-four he proceeded, straight from undergraduate status, to the University of Basle as professor, his studies being those of the humanities and especially classical philology. Earlier he had met Wagner with whom, in friendship and enmity, his name was to be associated as Hegel's was with Goethe's. Besides Schopenhauer, Hellas and Wagner, a fourth influence was to come into play in moulding his mind—interest in Darwinian biology. Like (as he himself points out) most of the great philosophers—Heraclitus, Plato, Aquinas, Descartes, Spinoza, Hobbes, Locke, Leibnitz, Kant, Bentham, Schopenhauer—he was not married.

In Nietzsche, as in Stirner, we have a protest against the supposed tyranny of abstract reason.

> Christian morality itself, the ever more rigorously conceived notion of truthfulness, the father-confessor *finesse* of the Christian conscience, translated and sublimated into scientific conscience, into intellectual cleanliness at any price . . . Christian truthfulness, after having drawn inference upon inference, will finally draw its strongest inference, the inference against itself. And this will happen when it puts to itself the question: "What does all will to truth mean?" . . . That [is the] grand drama in a hundred acts, which is reserved for the next two centuries of Europe—the most terrible, most questionable and perhaps also most hopeful of all dramas.

Along with this negation, prophetic of certain aspects of both later Marxism and of Fascism, went a negation of the Kantian morality. Not the "law of the universal"—each to count for one—but the opposite maxim—*quod licet Jovi non licet bovi:* "what Jove may do the ox may not"—was the "truth." No more could one add human characters, one to one, and make two than add elephants and ink-pots. All depended upon the situation—and the man. "Autonomous" and "moral," he declares, are mutually exclusive terms.

What then is the positive position? We seek (aided by neo-Darwinianism) the Carlylean, the Wagnerian hero—the superman. Has indeed Nietzsche rejected the old, the ascetic, the altruistic morality? Only in part. By discipline, by sacrifice, by subordination of each generation to its "over-going" successor, we produce from the labour of civilization the superman. Actually Nietzsche has substituted for the altruism of space—"my duty to my neighbour"—the altruism of time—"my duty to my descendant." *Why*, then, the sacrifice? Nietzsche has talked of "joy," this-worldly, but he has not made explicit a doctrine of duty. "Not Plato, but Homer," he writes: not Apollo but Dionysus. He has talked of the morality of the masters, who aspire to excellence, as against that of the slaves, who seek by sympathy to make a bad world tolerable. But *why* sacrifice oneself to the excellence of those who come after? The moral fulcrum appears to be a certain animal pride, a pride capable of self-sadism (the old idealist trait) as well as of sadism. (As Nietzsche says, even of "the old Kant," his "categorical imperative smells of cruelty.") Truth is not abstract, but is lived, is "artistically true."

The final truth, then, Nietzsche finds in the mediaeval Syrian Order of the Assassins . . .

> the lowest grades of which lived in such strict obedience as no order of monks ever attained. . . . They [the Order's discoverers] received in some way or other among other things a hint as to that symbol and tally-word which was reserved for the highest grades only as their *secretum;* "Nought is true, all is permitted."

Nietzsche had, in short, discovered, as the back side of the gospel of the superman, the philosophy of the gunman or the Assassins. The only relevant commentary is that, as supermen, the Assassins do not seem to have had one important qualification, survival value—save, indeed, as *revenants* in our own days.

There are then the servile and the masters, nobles, *notabiles* (like Nicki). Nietzsche writes, in *The Genealogy of Morals:*

> The instinct of the born "masters" (*i.e.*, the solitary beast-of-prey species of man) is by organization provoked and alarmed from the bottom. Beneath every oligarchy—all history teaches this—the *tyrannic* lusting is always hidden. All oligarchies constantly tremble from the strain which each individual member requires to check this lusting. . . . The sickly are the great danger of man: not the evil, not "the beasts of prey."

"Sickly" is not defined. Nietzsche himself suffered from constant ill-health; was "botched," to use his own phraseology. However, one

learns that Christian, sickly and obscurantist ideals are linked, as are "Christians, cows, women and other democrats." Life was better when mankind was not ashamed of its cruelty. "The welfare of the greatest number and the welfare of the smallest number [a stronger type] are antithetical points of view."

Nietzsche was no pro-Semite. The servile philosophy of resentment, which breaks and denies the equation basic to aristocratic morality, that the good = the noble = the powerful = the bountiful = the happy = the beloved of God—this is a Jewish philosophy. But the most contemptible exponents of the false philosophy are precisely

> the anti-Semites, who today distort their eyes in Christian-Aryan-goodman fashion, and who, by an abuse (such as will exhaust all patience) of the cheapest means of agitation, moral attitude, endeavour to work up all the block-head elements of the people.

Nevertheless, this must not be exaggerated. Despite his abuse of his own people—"this race of cattle"—his affirmation that he was "a good European," and that he ought to have been born in France, his peculiar hatreds are reserved for what he believes to be the enemies of Germany. "Deep antagonism to Christianity? Why? The degeneration of the Germanic spirit is ascribed to its influence." It should be added, in explanation of his seeming inconsistency, that his brother-in-law, whom he detested, was a leader of anti-Semitism.

Nietzsche, the individualist-for-himself, did not pass beyond this wisdom:

> Wherever I found a living thing, there found I Will to Power; and even in the will of the servant found I the will to be master. The Will to Power—the unexhausted, procreating life-will.

Church, State, revolutionaries—he liked none of them. Socialism he described as "the younger brother of almost absolute despotism . . . seeking the downright destruction of the individual, who is regarded as an unjust luxury of nature to be improved so as to become a serviceable organ of the collectivity." In *Thus Spake Zarathustra* (written in about forty days), to the revolutionary he says:

> "Like thyself the state is a dissembling dog; like thee doth it like to speak with smoke and roaring—to make believe, like thee, that it speaketh out of the heart of things. For it seeketh by all means to be the most important creature on earth, the state; and people think it so." When I said this, the firedog acted as if mad with envy. . . . Ye preachers of equality, the tyrant-frenzy of impotence crieth thus in you for "equality": your most secret tyrant longings disguise themselves there in virtue-words! . . . A state, is

called the coldest of all monsters. Coldly lieth it also; and this lie creepeth from its mouth: "I, the state, am the people." . . . *Many too many are born; for the superfluous ones was the state devised* . . . Yea, a hellish artifice hath here been devised, a death-horse jingling with the trappings of diverse honours! Yea, a dying for many hath here been devised.

Nietzsche, then, was not as Hobbes. But he did wisely to take Plato, "the first degenerate" (or Socrates), for his opponent. For precisely Nietzsche is Callicles—although a Callicles that can also use the argument of Thrasymachus—and in Plato is his best refutation. But of Nietzsche's doctrine of sacrifice in time, sacrifice for the generations, there is no refutation, and least is it to be found in Plato's theory of the family.

"Since humanity came into being, man hath enjoyed himself too little: that alone, my brethren, is our original sin." That is the positive side of Nietzsche. "How much blood and horror is at the bottom of all 'good things.'" That is the negative side.

At the age of forty-four he became insane. The berserker hero of a new Valhalla whose habit was to propose, not directly to the lady of his choice but through third parties, was absorbed by the thought of triumphs over women.

Nietzsche had done little to solve the relation between "society" and the individual beyond uttering a curse. Like Diogenes he asked "society" to stand out of his light; but, unlike Diogenes—unlike Thoreau and the philosophic anarchists—he was not prepared to stay in his tub. His demand as an individual (bachelor) for the recognition of duty to the next generation is appropriated by those who demand recognition of duties by the next generation on behalf of, not a "good Europe," but the Nation, the *Volk* (which Nietzsche despised).

In the case of the thinkers we have discussed the influence of Schopenhauer, Hegel's bitter personal rival, is dominant. We shall watch the influence of Hegel reassert itself.

2

First, however, a digression is necessary to the field of constitutional law and of what in Germany (begging the question most egregiously of the role of the state in society) is unhappily called *Staatswissenschaft*—"State science." Here we shall discover the less articulate, more departmentalized and specialized presumptions of German thought.

In Britain two influences had conspired to develop, against academic antagonism (the first chair of history established in Oxford was only founded in the days of George II), the study of history in the

universities. On the one side then was the Romantic movement; but purged by Walter Scott and Edmund Burke of all abstract, revolutionary Rousseauite implications. On the other side, there was the odd Whig belief of Professors Freeman and Goldwin Smith that the charters of Anglo-Saxon liberties were to be discovered in the forests of Germany or of Wessex and were almost lost behind the stockades at the battle of Hastings. For the second time, the historians achieved popularity as the footmen of propaganda. The "why?" of historical studies was answered and a popular school flourished.

In Germany, KARL FRIEDRICH VON SAVIGNY (1779–1861), professor at Berlin, Minister of Justice and author of the *System of the Present Roman Law*, developed the notion of an *esprit des lois* which, however (unlike Montesquieu's sociological notion), was specific to the people from the matrix of whose civilization this system of law had sprung. This spirit of a people—*Volksgeist*—unites that folk and finds specific expression in its language and law. From this living tradition is born the State, which is no creation of any aggregate of individual units but the materialization of a tradition, rooted in history and unique. The influence of Fichte is clear, but the French Revolutionary "Nation," which Fichte rediscovered in Germany, has become, for Savigny, the conservative German State.

The Germany, however, of Savigny was still a Germany of numerous states, Prussia, Bavaria, and the rest, in which legal confusion had become worse confounded by the dissolution of the Holy Roman Empire (1806). No adequate theory of federalism had yet been developed. And the German princes, stepping into the shoes of Caesar, still demanded recognition of their own personal divine right to rule.

Georg Waitz, leader in the Frankfort parliament of 1848 and author of *The Essence of the Federal State* (1853), attempted to develop a liberal theory, consonant with the work of Savigny's historical school, of a division of functions in federal government, the States exercising a sovereignty limited in extent but not in content and *pro tanto* legally equal to the Federal authority. Against this, Max von Seydel, Bavarian and author of *The Concept of the Federal State* ("Bundesstaat"), 1872, stressed the entire sovereignty of the component confederated States. The centralized State as described by Bodin was merely one species among many possible forms of state. The source of controlling authority lay in the States and was accorded to the federation by treaty concession.

Carl Friedrich von Gerber, author of the *Foundations of German Constitutional Law* (1865), and indeed father of that subject, at last

laid the mediaeval ghost of a personality of the state inhering in the personality of the prince-by-God's-grace, and enunciated juristically the doctrine of state personality divorced from individual monarch and crown. Following him, Professor Paul Laband, author of *The Constitutional Law of the German Reich* (1876–1882), struck out a new mediating conception. The States had an underived and primary right to rule. But the Federal Government, the Reich, had *Kompetenz-Kompetenz, i.e.*, it was (and Hobbes would have drawn immediate conclusions) its own judge of the limits of its own jurisdiction. It, moreover, held the residuary powers (as does the Dominion Government of Canada). For Professor Laband the Reich was only the composite of its member States. Professor Georg Jellinek (1851–1911), of Heidelberg, went beyond this. He dared the assertion that the Reich had the potentiality of a totality of power. It exercised, indeed, a self-abnegation or auto-limitation in the use of its full sovereignty. At one time, he asserted that the States were, juristically, the creation of this sovereign but, having raised a storm, he retreated to the position that the Reich had confiscatory and prerogative powers over the member States. His theory, thus, goes well beyond the federal theory (even as held since Lincoln) of the United States. There is an interesting interrelation at this point between German and American theory.

These steps in a unitary or "monistic" direction were aided by certain other theoretical developments. F. J. Stahl (1802–1861), endeavored to improve on Fichte and Kant in the direction of Hegel (from whom he was self-importantly at pains to differentiate himself), by *endowing the state authority (federal or local) with personality.* Stahl moves on the Hegelian, moral plane. A new and unhappy turn, however, is given to the doctrine when Professor J. K. Bluntschli, of Heidelberg, responding to the Comtist and biological ideas of the age, developed the peculiar myth, later to play such an important role, of *the political organism,* taken by Bluntschli so literally that he even assigned to it sex—to the State, male sex; to the Church, female sex. Interestingly enough, Bluntschli—whose *General Theory of Law** (1852) is, in many ways, excellent—visualized as the final culmination of organic evolution humanity itself, thus capping Comte. The immediate beneficiary, however, and legatee of Bluntschli's phantasy was the national state, whose Hegelian-metaphysical and Savignesque-juristic claims to personality, as an "entelechy," were now reinforced by the bio-psychological claim.

* English edition (1892), under title, *The Theory of the State.*

It is, however, abundantly clear that the professors' theories, too departmental to be decisive in moulding political thought as Paine and Rousseau or even Fichte had done, although not uninfluential in the formation of the new German law, indeed followed the historical current, changing (as indeed befitted members of the historical school) their heavy learned terms with praiseworthy virtuosity as the current changed, rather than canalized and controlled it. The work of Laband, after 1871, is determined by the preceding work of Bismarck. Epiphenomenalists, theirs to interpret what, not to reason why. More influential by far, because more universal in appeal and significance, was the work of those who—even if from an historian's chair—preached a political philosophy. Von Ranke is described by Nietzsche as "this born *advocatus* of every *causa fortior* [strong-armed cause]; this cleverest of the clever 'matter of fact' men." Von Ranke is, however, the very coryphaeus of the pure historical school, concerned only to know "the actual detail of the case." With the great German historians Mommsen and von Sybel, and especially with Treitschke, political prepossessions give a colour to historical presentation. The egoistic morality of the German individualists fuses with a new juristic and historical theory of the individual "strong" state, which had more possibilities of egoism and power than any physical individual. Individual gratification would be found by self-identification with this social individual.

3

HEINRICH VON TREITSCHKE (1834–1896), author of *The History of Germany in the Nineteenth Century*, and, at the time of his death, Professor of Modern History in the University of Berlin, was not only an historian but a politicist—and a politicist with personal views of the strongest possible order. A Saxon, and the son of a Saxon officer, a tutor at Leipsic and professor at Freiburg and Heidelberg, his career is representative of that of many Germans of this epoch who could see no great future for Germany save in the abandonment of the local allegiances, residues of the disruption of the "Kaiserzeit"—the time of the Holy Roman Empire—and the adoption, in lieu of the culture of Weimar and of the Free Cities, of a "grand-State" culture of a revived German Empire, welded into unity, by blood and iron, under the hand of Prussia.

In his little pamphlet on *Freedom*, von Treitschke developed, against von Humboldt's early theories, the notion of freedom as

freedom in the State, not from it. The State was the Folk organized as a unity and permeated by a consciousness of the interdependence of its members. It is, however, in his *Politics*, published posthumously from his lectures, that von Treitschke fully developed his theories.

Treitschke begins, reassuringly enough, by chiding Hegel for going too far in his state-idolatry. Kant suffers from the restricted mentality characteristic of the eighteenth century but Hegel, Treitschke says, is really wrong in asserting that the State is absolutely the people's life. No Christian could, he says, live for the State alone: he must cling first to his destiny in eternity. The atheist, he says, the unbaptized person and suchlike French liberal freethinkers are anomalies in the State. Treitschke hesitates about—ends by rejecting—compulsory baptism; but a father is not entitled to allow children to grow up without any religion at all. It may be added that Treitschke's general treatment of moral and social issues is placidly conventional, save when challenged. "Heaven preserve us from the fashionable vapourings of the present day, which would fain prevent Protestant children from hearing of the glorious deeds of Luther, and would suppress all open and honest mention of Jesus Christ out of consideration for a few Jews." Treitschke was a leading anti-Semite.

What, however, precisely does this freedom of Luther and, incidentally, of Christ amount to? Christianity is the religion "through which we realize that man can never be merely a member of the State when he is free to *think* as he will of God and the Kingdom of God." The stress word here is the Lutheran one, "think." Do not let us imagine, however, that a doctrine is tolerable which makes the State, for Christians, a subordinate temporary authority of Caesar compared with God's Church. Those who talk thus "display their total lack of reverence for the objectively revealed will of God as unfolded in the life of the State." (There is no falling short of Hegel in this.)

The State, not the Church, is now the standard-bearer of culture. At the Reformation, the Temporal Power took over the civilizing mission of the Catholic Church. Let us remember that "hand in hand with religion walks fanaticism: the prophets are only intelligible to political thought when considered as demagogues. . . . Politically the first Christians were no other than rebels"—an impiety of attitude on their part little short of anti-Christian (in the sense in which Treitschke means Christianity, *i.e.*, poor man's morality). It was unfortunate that "St. Augustine should have employed his genius to establish upon a logical basis the anti-Christian doctrine of the *Civitas Dei*."

The very heart of Christian morality, *i.e.*, the doctrine of "grace," is to recognize that *si duo faciunt idem, non est idem*—"if two do the same thing, it is not the same thing." The Professor of Berlin, from his exalted chair, is saying much the same thing as Nietzsche, the ex-Professor of Basle. But what the responsible Professor of Berlin chooses to call Christianity the irresponsible Professor of Basle is entitled, more truthfully, to call anti-Christianity. How, yet, does this doctrine of extreme moral individualism fit in with Treitschke's doctrine of obedience to the State?

It may be that "the State is not the whole of a nation's life, for its function is only to surround the whole, regulating and protecting it." But only through the State can men's "moral development be perfected, for the living sense of citizenship inspires the community in the same way that a sense of duty inspires the individual." The answer to the enigma is to be found in the one word: heroes—or Frederick the Great, "the greatest King who ever reigned on earth." Here, again, Treitschke and Nietzsche, superficially opposites, meet. It is individual men who make history such as Luther, Frederick the Great or Bismarck. "This great heroic truth will endure for ever."

What, then, Fritz Schmidt—or for that matter Maria Theresa—may not morally do, "*der grosse Friedrich*" may do. States, however, are, in the ordinary evolutions of history, the great individuals. What matters is their freedom and life. The State is concerned "with external order alone"; but that external order leaves little uncontrolled. Did not Philip Melanchthon admit that it had *custodia utriusque tabulae*?—the guardianship of religion and morality, both obedient wards. It will not construe its task leniently: the State "*will attempt to dominate the outer life of its members so far as it is able to do so.*" The State is only the people as a force, but it is yet the framework of all national life. It is no mere agency of force to which the individual owes no higher—no highest—allegiance. "The State does not identify itself with physical power for its own sake: it is Power, in order to protect and to further the highest welfare of the human race." *Der Staat ist Macht.* The State is Might.

What then of the human race? Is the State perhaps some instrument for the advancement of its universal well-being or gradual progress? On the contrary—Kant's notion of a World Federation or Cosmopolitan State is a prime heresy. Even Hegel erred. The State is an individual. (It has, by moral right and as a social organism, all the attributes of the Nietzschean individual: for Stirner's "Ego," Treitschke writes "my State.") What matters to the individual is its life,

power to grow, liberty.* There can be no permanent treaties, permanent *status quo*, even permanent international law that excludes the legitimacy of war. The most hopeful field in international law is that *de jure belli*, the regulation of the customs of war itself, especially the bad English customs in naval war. "The whole trend of political life has come into the open to such a degree that any gross breach of international law immediately causes great irritation in every civilized country." Wars will, doubtless, become rarer.

However, "politics must never discount the free moral forces in the national life. No State in the world may renounce the 'I' in its sovereignty. . . . Only if the State is aware that all its treaties only apply conditionally will it go to work prudently in making them. No Courts of Arbitration will ever succeed in banishing war from the world." Frontiers must fluctuate.

Again we must repeat—*the arbitrament of force is the logical outcome of the nature of the State*. The mere fact of the existence of many States involves the necessity of war. The dream of eternal peace—said Frederick the Great—is a phantom, which each man rejects when the call of war rings in his own ears. It is impossible to imagine—he went on to say—any balance of power which can last. War, however, is the very sphere in which we can most clearly trace the triumph of human reason. . . . War is politics *par excellence*. . . . War and the administration of justice are the chief tasks even of the most barbarous of states [sic]. . . . The statesman has no right to warm his hands with smug self-laudation at the smoking ruins of his fatherland, and comfort himself by saying "I have never lied"—this is the monkish type of virtue.

So much for consistent pacifism or even the moral law. Briefly, since *the State* (despite all finessing critique by Hegel) is the concrete embodiment of the highest morality, that which is done in its service (trickily identified with the service of "*the*" *community* or *society*) cannot, by definition, be immoral. It is (*pace* the Catholic Church, etc., and the old Roman Empire, of which Treitschke disapproves) the largest single organization of human society—and a living, powerful, moral or super-moral, superhuman individual.

War will endure to the end of history. The laws of human thought and of human nature forbid any alternative, neither is one to be wished for. . . . The God above us [a use, here, for theism] will see that war returns again, a terrible medicine for mankind diseased. . . . *Sacrifice for an alien nation is not only immoral but contradictory to the idea of self-maintenance, which is the highest content of the State* . . . many duties which are incumbent on the individual have no claim upon the sovereign. . . . Society has no single will

* *Cf.* p. 397.

and we have no duties to fulfil towards it. . . . Submission is what the State primarily requires.

Before we lightly dismiss von Treitschke, it is necessary to recall that he left his native Saxony because the road to promotion was barred to him as an energetic Liberal who looked forward to the unification of Germany under parliamentary forms; and that, before moving, as a professor, from Heidelberg to Berlin, be became a member of the Reichstag, where he sat as a National Liberal. The man, therefore, knew German Liberalism from experience, and wrote from bitter disappointment in its power as a unifying force. The reaction, however, is not merely a matter of personal biography. In his later phase, Treitschke develops more fully but typically the implications of right-wing Hegelianism—while omitting those saving clauses which rescued from the rigidity of State-worship the system of the master and of some of his British disciples.

OSWALD SPENGLER (1880–), German schoolmaster, writer, author of *The Decline of the West* (1918–1922), despite the humour with which his massive books were regarded by the professors of the chair—who regarded him as an historian among the sociologists and philosophers, and as a sociologist among the historians or, as it has been briefly put, "no scholar"—carried the tradition exemplified by Treitschke yet one stage further. It was, however, done with a difference. To the robust optimism of von Treitschke, especially about the destiny of the Hohenzollerns, succeeds the cosmic pessimism of Spengler. Whereas von Treitschke is a conventional historian, a successor (by however long an interval) of von Ranke, Spengler contrives to educe, from his erudition, conclusions which strike the unscientific mind as scientific and from which he is able to prognosticate the future of the world like a Persian Magus. For the Spenglerian it is not true that, from the nature of the case, there can be no science of history or that sociology is, not a science that can predict recurrence, but only a science that can say that certain events will recur *if* certain contingent conditions are fulfilled. To the comparison between social life and that of the animal organism—the root of the fallacy—we shall recur.* The author apparently has access "by analogy" to the secret of the future course of history which Providence has hitherto preferred to keep to itself; but, unhappily, Spengler's knowledge is not equally sure about the facts of history which are more generally known to the vulgar. It is sufficient

* *Cf.* p. 710.

to note here that Spengler is in the enviable position of presenting himself to his admirers as both scientist, who knows, and as prophet, who foretells.

The great cycle or wheel of history, of the Stoics, is brought forward again and Dr. Spengler can tell us, like an augur or palmist, from the inspection of the past what must happen in the future. Von Treitschke was anti-Semitic, but Spengler can point out the precise effect of Jewish culture as a corrosive force. The method has cogency, thanks to its combination of shrewd and wide observation with the quite sound demonstration (hitherto too little attended to) of sociological nexus of cause and effect. The method had its forerunners, not only in Herder, Hegel himself and the philosophers of history, but in such archaeologists as Professor Sayce. It becomes dangerous where it rejoices in almost Marxist claims of inevitability. And Spengler knows that the fall of democracy in the West and the coming of Caesarism is inevitable. "*The Caesarism that is to succeed approaches with quiet, firm step.*" We, in the West, are living in the period of our cycle contemporary, in the stage of other cycles, with the days of Marius and Sulla, of old Rome; of the Hyksos Pharaohs; and of "the imperialist statesmen of Tsin." The prospect is both grand and reassuring. If the downfall of "the West" (undefined) is assured, at least it will have as long as the Caesars for the dying.

The basic force of history is not reason (no: not even as the human hand that can hold fast the wheel of a great ship on its course) but the sea of passion. Hence Spengler is a writer who has produced a work of great learning, extending for about nine hundred pages and full of great words about "Apollonian," "Magian" and "Faustian" civilizations, the Time-dimension and 'the Indian zero,' in order to prove that writers and learning are futile. He conforms to the growing romantic tendency since Rousseau to irrationalism. But this position is complicated by Spengler's alliance of "technical thought" with "blood" against "money-thought."

> The coming of Caesarism breaks the dictature of money and its political weapon, democracy. . . . The *private* powers of the economy want free paths for their acquisition of great resources. No legislation must stand in their way. They want to make the laws themselves, in their interests, and to that end they make use of the tool they have made for themselves, democracy, the subsidized party machine. Law needs, in order to resist this onslaught, a high tradition and an ambition of strong families that finds its satisfaction not in the heaping up of riches, but in the task of true rulership, above and beyond all money-advantage. *A power can be overthrown only by another*

power, not by a principle, and no power that can confront money is left but this one. *Money is overthrown and abolished only by blood. Life* is alpha and omega, the cosmic onflow in microcosmic form. It is *the* fact of facts within the world-as-history. Before the irresistible rhythm of the generation-sequence, everything built up by the waking-consciousness in its intellectual world vanishes at the last. Ever in History it is life and life only—race-quality, the triumph of the will to power—and not the victory of truths, discoveries, or money that signifies. World-history is the world court. . . . Always it has sacrificed truth and justice to might and race, *and passed doom of death upon men and peoples in whom truth was more than deeds, and justice than power*. . . . The bright imaginative Waking-being submerges itself into the silent service of Being, as the Chinese and Roman empires tell us.

In his recent, briefer studies, on *Man and Technics* (1931) and *Years of Decision* (1933), Oswald Spengler has become more explicit. The present is a period of anarchistic, liberal transition from the monarchical idea to Caesarism, which knows no parties and finds a protagonist in Mussolini, whose "prototype" was Lenin. There is no longer room for "Oppositions"—only for choice: either decadent liberalism or Caesarism and to follow "the rare men." The pursuit of comfort, however, will be replaced by that of danger. Admirably, "*das uralte barbarentum*," primal barbarianism will awake again. History has nothing to do with human logic, but with race and power. Idealism and materialism are *both* rationalistic folly.

A vein of Rousseauism enters into Spengler's thought. Technology is the great achievement of our culture in its full bloom. *But* "all things organic are dying in the grip of organization. An artificial world is poisoning the natural." An ambiguity here creeps into Spengler's system. We have the old problem of Callicles. There is no "ought," only might; and yet might (*our* kind of "healthy" might) "ought" to rule. The Eastern masses, not men of race, of technology, of creative invention, can yet copy our inventions. In the late war, not Germany alone, but the West lost to "colour." There is an Anglo-American culture but it is swamped by alien immigrants, with their fortress, Chicago. And yet, force, the will to power—that is all, morally, biologically. Man is a carnivore. (This stated, not biologically, but dogmatically—the facts don't matter.) Strong breeds [?alien gangsters] have kept the characteristic of beasts of prey.

History, of old as now, is war-history. Politics is only a temporary substitute for war that uses more intellectual weapons. . . . The character of the free beast of prey passes over, in its essential features, from the individual to the organized people, the animal with one soul and many hands. . . .

Finally, there is a natural distinction of grade between men born to command and men born to service, between the leaders and the led of *life*. The existence of this distinction is a plain *fact*, and in healthy periods and by healthy peoples it is admitted (even if unwillingly) by everyone. In the centuries of decadence the majority force themselves to deny or to ignore it, but the very insistence on the formula that "all men are equal" shows that there is something here that has to be explained away.

And yet . . . perhaps the leaders no longer have the appetite to lead. Perhaps, the born men of force, carnivores, will themselves be eaten up in battle, a twilight of the Gods, *Götterdämmerung*.

All this is changing in the last decades, in all the countries where large-scale industry is of old standing. The Faustian thought begins to be sick of machines. A weariness is spreading, *a sort of pacifism of the battle with Nature*. Men are returning to forms of life simpler and nearer to Nature. . . . Out of satiety of life [sic], men take refuge from civilization in the more primitive parts of the earth, in vagabondage, in suicide. The flight of the born leader from the Machine is beginning.

Perhaps the yellow races will win. It is odd that the chief war for civilization, the heroism of science, invention and discovery, is precisely the war and heroism of which Spengler announces that German man has tired—but not Caesarism, legions and battles.

Such an ally is inconvenient. No wonder Dr. Goebbels refers to "*alle diese Spenglerei*" with disapproval and that Spengler, like his rival Keyserling, is under a cloud. There is merit in teaching—which Oswald Spengler asserts to be "the Prussian virtue"—that those who command must first obey. But what, then, of classes "born" to obey, or command? And if the commanding races exist, why this fatalism, this abnegation of choice in moulding history (or is there choice? is it decadence *or* anti-Semitic Caesarism? or is one destined), this pessimism, this Twilight of the Nordic Gods? "Downfall" or ripe, imperial maturity of high culture—which? And are the gangster carnivores "high culture"? The weakness of Spengler is not in his observations, which are acute, or in his erudition, which is at least vast, but in his personal prejudices (which hold the strings of all his puppets and which are foisted off as an Hegelian Destiny, so that his bile is his God) and in this Hegelian determinism, this unscientific presumptuous foreknowledge itself. As Schopenhauer said: science of history is contradiction in terms. Science of society there may be; but not by Spengler's crystal-gazing. It is Count von Keyserling who epitomizes Spengler's philosophy as that of a *Tatsachenenmensch* yet

"mystical in the worst sense"—and so puts a pin through his thorax.

The early Nineteenth century romantic cult of self-expression that chose the course of virile aggressiveness, and went into partnership as power-theory with the "Social Organism," thus reached its implicitly predestined conclusions.

To discuss the political philosophy of Moeller van den Bruck,* who committed suicide in 1925, would be to carry ourselves out of the epoch, if not of time, at least of thought which we have been discussing into developments post-Marxian rather than post-Hegelian. To understand these developments we have to turn over from Right-wing to Left-wing Hegelianism and to Marx himself.

READING

H. von Treitschke: *Politics*, trans. Dugdale, 1916, Book I, Chaps. I–III.

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE

R. Emerson: *State and Sovereignty in Modern Germany*, 1928.
F. Nietzsche: *The Will to Power*, trans. Ludovici, 1909.
O. Spengler: *The Decline of the West*, trans. Atkinson, 1928.

* *Cf.* p. 727.

Chapter XVIII

Marx and His Predecessors

1

In 1516 Sir Thomas More (1480–1535), later Lord Chancellor of England and in due course beatified and canonized saint, whom John Colet called "the one genius which Britain possesses," wrote his *Utopia*. Significantly, it was published, not in England, but in Latin at Louvain. It is the last authentic production of the *Respublica Christiana*, "the saddest of fairy tales," comparable to *Gulliver's Travels*. It is one of that series of imaginative sketches, since Plato 'painted" his Republic, that includes Campanella's *City of Sol* (1623) and Francis Bacon's *New Atlantis* (1627), as well as more practical Tudor tracts, and that ends in the "Persian Letters," and stories of 'the Chinese" which were the delight of the eighteenth century. It was a Platonic exercise in the days of the Platonic Renaissance. If, however, Plato never intended his *Republic* as a Utopia but as a practicable scheme, More never intended his *Utopia* as a republic, although "like to Plato's city," but as a satire on contemporary perversities of government and manners, cloaked from the suspicious eye of absolutism by the charm of its story and literary style. Essentially it is a morality play.

> I doubt not that either the respect of every man's private commodity [utility] or else the authority of our Saviour Christ . . . would have brought all the world long ago into the laws of this weal public, if it were not that one only beast, the princess and mother of all mischief, pride, doth withstand and let it. She measureth not wealth and prosperity by her own commodities, but by the misery and incommodities of other (Robinson's trans., 1556).

This perspective, and his own keen mind, permits More to pursue through to the end strange questions. The religious toleration that More, the Chancellor, did not practice in his lifetime but did not demand should be extended to him in his death, this he advocated in his ideal republic. Suicide is permitted by licence. Gold is held in infamy. There are common dining halls—the old Spartan *syssitia* or

regimental mess. All citizens labour manually, save when specially exempt for the purpose of learning or the work of government.* There is an international priesthood.

And verily one man to live in pleasure and wealth, while all other weep and smart for it, that is the part, not of a king, but of a jailor.

Attention is drawn to the causes of crime in the world as it is.

What other thing do you than make thieves and then punish them?

St. Thomas More concludes by these words on the social condition of the poor.

Their daily wages is so little, that it will not suffice for the same day, much less it yieldeth any overplus, that may daily be laid up for the relief of old age. Is not this an unjust and an unkind public weal, which giveth great fees and rewards to gentlemen, as they call them, and to goldsmiths, and to such other, which be either idle persons, or else only flatterers, and devisers of vain pleasures; and of the contrary part maketh no gentle provision for poor ploughmen, colliers, labourers, carters, ironsmiths, and carpenters: without whom no commonwealth can continue? . . . And yet besides this the rich men not only by private fraud, *but also by common laws*, do every day pluck and snatch away from the poor some part of their daily living. So whereas it seemed before unjust to recompense with unkindness their pains that have been beneficial to the public weal, now they have to this their wrong and unjust dealing (which is yet a worse point) given the name of justice, yea and that by force of a law. Therefore when I consider and weigh in my mind all their commonwealths, which nowadays anywhere do flourish, so God help me, *I can perceive nothing but a certain conspiracy of rich men procuring their own commodities under the name and title of the commonwealth.*

Allowance being made for the mediaeval habit of unmeasured social denunciation, More's final phrase is an accusation that will become, with the passage of the centuries, very far from some mere philosopher's folly.

Attention has already been called to the work of William Godwin.† Especially noteworthy is the section on Property, in his *Political Justice* (1793), with its plea for a system of property equally distributed among all. The book, despite its scarcely popular price, had no little vogue and influence in its day. It is noteworthy that, distributivist in economics, it was individualist, essentially anti-collectivist in politics. Godwin objects by name, *e.g.*, to any system of common labour or common

* *Cf.* p. 143.
† *Cf.* p. 337.

meals. Specifically, nothing can be less Platonic. Even Adam Smith's division of labour is too much for him.

Godwin declares that

> the division of labour, as it has been treated by commercial writers, is for the most part the offspring of avarice. . . . This refinement is the growth of luxury. The object is to see into how vast a surface the industry of the lower classes may be beaten, the more completely to gild over the indolent and proud.

Charles Hall, later, was the author of a book, not especially noted, entitled *Effects of Civilization on the People in European States*, 1805. In this he called attention to the increase of the wealth of the rich; and that four-fifths of the population enjoyed only one-eighth of the product of labour. Man—each man—Hall argued, ought to enjoy the "whole fruits of the produce of labour"; and indeed to work only so much as might be necessary for his family's consumption and security. He advocated the abolition of primogeniture and a luxury tax, as well as a redistribution of land in more equal lots, each receiving some allocation. This careful piece of scientific economic work was influential among, and recommended by, the Socialists who followed the lead of Robert Owen.

In 1824, a better known book was produced by William Thompson, also an Owenite, an Irish landlord, who sought to promote the co-operative movement, called an *Inquiry into the Principles of the Distribution of Wealth*. Here Thompson maintained a thesis at once more radical and more technical. All labour ought to be free and voluntary, based on free contract. The whole product of labour ought to be secured to the producers. Thompson here accepts Ricardo's doctrine (1817) of the labour basis of wealth and Adam Smith's earlier thesis that interest on capital was in the nature of a monopolistic deduction from what the artisan could otherwise claim as his own. It will be noted that Thompson and Hall do not contemplate, and are even in specific opposition (as is Godwin) to, large-scale industry. The capitalist gets between the craftsman and the money for *his*—the craftsman's—wares. All exchanges also should be free and voluntary. Through Owenite equality, Thompson hoped to promote the Benthamite principle of the greatest happiness of the greatest number.

Robert Owen (1771–1858), most outstanding of these writers, closest to the spirit of More and yet withal a man of practical acquaintance with economics, founded in 1825 the most striking, although by no

means the most successful, of those co-operative or communist settlements in North America, of which Nordhoff tells us in his great work, *Communist Societies of the United States*. Noyes's Oneida Settlement in New York was much more satisfactory and was finally terminated, not by economic failure (on the contrary it flourished), but owing to the representations of the American descendants of the old Anabaptists or Baptists who—having caused scandal in their own day themselves—were now scandalized by its sexual theories. New Harmony, on the banks of the Wabash, in Indiana, was started by Owen in 1825 and, by 1827, had shown itself a fertile field of ineradicable disputes. Owen had been too busy to give it, as patriarch or abbot, his undivided attention. Twice he left it for visits to England. The error was to cost Owen four-fifths of his whole private fortune. No careful examination was made of the strange folk who flocked there. No organized and disciplinary authority, on the one hand, and no common religious fanaticism or faith, on the other, held these motley units together. Equalitarian anarchy confronted the rigours of the American winter.

This hopeful experiment in "a new social system," through mere naïve bad management, had failed where others, less famous and less potentially influential, succeeded (usually with a religious basis). Owen was forced to the conclusion that men could only be fitted to live in community by preliminary training. This conclusion was in accordance with his earlier theories. At the age of seventy Owen became governor of a more pathetic attempt at a community settlement at Harmony Hall, in Hampshire. Again the issue of the experiment, in 1839–1845, was loss of money for those who had embarked upon it and the revulsion of Owenites such as G. J. Holyoake to the preaching of secularism and rationalism—of the eighteenth century, Thomas Paine model—and of co-operation. If we examine the grounds for the failure of Owen's attempts, we must assign as major causes the conjunction of too many mutually unhelpful ideas—for example, Owen's militant anti-church rationalism with a plan for settlements hitherto chiefly successful in the hands of religious communities; the individualism characteristic of the age in conjunction with communist plans, the two inadequately linked together by the principle of "co-operation"; and sheer bad management, in which the dove of vision excluded the serpent of judgement.

This last cause is the more odd since Owen, son of a Welsh small tradesmen, in his early life had shown himself a singularly successful business man. Owen left school at the age of nine, having already been a pupil teacher for two years. At the age of eighteen he went into busi-

ness on his own; and at the age of twenty-eight he purchased a share in the New Lanark Mills, of which he was resident managing director. There, under his "government," projects for the social well-being of the workers and for the education of their children had been undertaken highly successfully. High wages were paid and dividends in capital limited, and still the business flourished. On that basis of solid and successful experience, he had been able to gain the ear of all ranges of society, just as later he was able to advise, as an equal, Andrew Jackson, President of the United States. He proposed to the father of Robert Peel, the premier, the introduction of the Factory Act of 1819, including suggestions for factory inspectors, and was listened to with respect. In the previous year, he presented suggestions to the Aix international congress of the Holy Alliance, in favour of the limitation of the working day. His denunciation of the hypocrisy of organized religion not only terminated, in a brief time, his general influence among the ruling classes and in those Methodist circles in which he himself had been brought up; it also coincided with a change in his own attitude, so that the manner of the prophet replaced that of the social reformer. His later schemes, such as the Grand National Guild of Builders and the Grand National Consolidated Trade Union, were not blessed with any immediate success.

The Co-operative Movement in an especial sense, and to a far greater extent than the modern Trade Union Movement in Britain, traces from Robert Owen. Although, however, the idea is central to his system and the actual movement initiated by the Rochdale Pioneers owes much to his inspiration, since the Pioneers were keen Owenites, the Rochdale enterprise yet owed nothing to his personal intervention. Owen's name, nevertheless, will be remembered in connection with that movement and with his writings.

A New View of Society (1813–1814) asserts, in the tradition of Locke and the manner of the age, that "the end of government is to make the governed and the governors happy." His "New View" Owen proposed to submit to "dispassionate and patient investigation," not "to the fashionable or splendid in their appearance; for these are from infancy trained to deceive and to be deceived, to accept shadows for substances, and to live a life of insincerity, and of consequent discontent and misery."

The better scheme of society is to be built up on a sound education, itself prepared to lead men not to fancies and utopias, but to *facts*. It is the environment that makes the man—*but* the environment itself conditioned by the nature of man and indeed by the energy of partic-

ular men. Crime, for example, is to be explained in terms of circumstances. Owen breaks away from the Methodist moralizing and rushes to the opposite extreme.

> The character of a man is, without a single exception, always formed for him; . . . it may be, and is, chiefly, created by his predecessors; . . . they give him, or may give him, his ideas and habits, which are the powers that govern and direct his conduct. Man, therefore, never did, nor is it possible he ever can, form his own character. . . . Man is born with a desire to obtain happiness, which desire is the primary cause of all his actions, continues through life, and, in popular language, is called self-interest. . . . The misery which he experiences, and the happiness which he enjoys, depend on the kind and degree of knowledge which he receives, and on that which is possessed by those around him. False notions have ever produced evil and misery in the world . . . *the sole cause of their existence hitherto has been man's ignorance of human nature.* . . . The far greater part of the population belong to or have risen from the labouring classes; and by them the happiness and comfort of all ranks, not excluding the highest, are very essentially influenced.
>
> Any general character, from the best to the worst, from the most ignorant to the most enlightened, may be given to any community, even to the world at large by the application of proper means; which means are to a great extent at the command and under the control of those who have influence in the affairs of men.

This statement combines all the eighteenth-century belief in reason with a new interest in education; the utilitarian doctrine of self-interest with something more than Hume's belief in what could be done by government—with an acceptance of collectivist ways and means; an interest in the individual with a recognition of the environmental conditioning of the lives of the manual workers; and withal a recognition that the first study of man is human nature.

Co-operation, not Class, is Owen's key-note. Unfortunately the extraordinary importance of his attempt to solve one of the most difficult problems in political science—a problem of which we shall hear more in our own days—namely, how to combine economic communism with political liberty, is obscured by his (unnecessary) practical failures in New Harmony. The experiment of communism in voluntary societies, quite devoid of the taint of dictatorship, although monasticism had provided abundant precedents, failed (until we turn to recent experiments in Palestine), partly from sheer bad management and partly from an excess of the vice opposite to dictatorships, *viz.*, undisciplined individualism and anarchy.

The influence of Owen and the failure of Chartism after 1842, with the nerve taken out of the movement for electoral reform through revolution when a substantial measure of reform by evolution (not without "pressure" from Birmingham in the shape of a threat of refusal of taxes) had been pushed through in the Reform Bill of 1832, were succeeded by a period of prosperity, "the Golden Age" of Victorian England, from 1850 to the middle 1870's. Men made money. The manual workers improved their level of living. Thought assumed a new colour. German thought, by the influence of S. T. Coleridge as well as of Burke, penetrated into circles anxious for social progress. Romanticism replaced rationalism; respect for tradition and the organized throng of society replaced reverence for reason and the individual. The ground was being prepared for that Oxford Idealist school which we have discussed, as well as for Newman.

The Christian Socialists, clergymen such as Frederick Denison Maurice, Charles Kingsley and others, preached a social gospel of the moral obligations of citizenship, as against the Cobdenite Free Trade School, also attacked by Carlyle. The issue between the older Liberalism and the new Socialism was set—the Socialists not being without debt to Conservative as well as to Utilitarian thought, to Coleridge as well as to Owen. Although the Christian Socialist co-operative workshops were not successful, they gave valuable aid to the consolidation of the Co-operative Movement that traces from the Rochdale Pioneers, and contributed writings, respectability, idealism and ideas to the growing Socialist movement, hitherto suspect owing to the secularism that Owen took over from Paine and the infidel eighteenth century.

Meanwhile John Ruskin, the art critic, persuaded the young men of Oxford to make roads. He and William Morris, the poet, abandoning the attempt to gather together a few into some communistic settlement, as Owen had done, preferred to direct the mind of contemporary society as a whole to production for beauty rather than for profit, for weal rather than for wealth. Whereas, however, the Christian Socialists had been prepared for practical work, had given an impetus to thousands of sincere social workers, influenced through T. H. Green the training of the Civil Service and, although evangelicals in religion, passed on their inspiration to the social side of the Anglo-Catholic movement, to such men as Bishop Charles Gore, Mr. R. H. Tawney and even Mr. George Lansbury, the movement associated with the names of Ruskin (1819–1900) and Morris (1834–1896), despite the building of the commemorative Ruskin Hall, an Oxford College, remained chiefly literary and artistic. Ruskin with Miss Octavia

Hill, however, undertook pioneer work in housing, as well as opposing —in *Unto This Last* (1860), *Munera Pulveris* (1862) and later writings, with the encouragement of his friend Thomas Carlyle—the Cobdenite School's application of the classical economy.

William Morris had more pretensions as a politician, both by his association with and secession from the Social Democratic Federation led by H. M. Hyndman. His name, however, in the history of political thought will remain connected with his Utopia-sketching, in the Thomas More style, in *News from Nowhere* (1890, first printed in America). Its *obiter dicta* are even more striking than its theme. The Morrisian Utopia of arcadian content and contempt of money has, it seems, to be ushered in by civil war.

> Whatever the Government might do, a great part of the upper and middle classes were determined to set on foot a counter-revolution; for the Communism which now loomed ahead seemed quite unendurable to them. Bands of young men, like the marauders in the great strike of whom I told you just now, armed themselves and drilled, and began on any opportunity or pretence to skirmish with the people in the streets. The Government neither helped them nor put them down, but stood by, hoping that something might come of it. Then "friends of Order," as they were called, had some successes at first and grew bolder. . . . It was too late. All ideas of peace on a basis of compromise had disappeared on either side The end, it was seen clearly, must be either absolute slavery for all but the privileged, or a system of life founded on equality and Communism. The sloth, the hopelessness, and if I may say so, the cowardice of the last century, had given place to the eager, restless heroism of a declared revolutionary period. . . . Indeed, from all I have read and heard, I much doubt whether, without this seemingly dreadful civil war, the due talent for administration would have been developed amongst the working men . . . the world was being brought to its second birth; how could that take place without a tragedy?

William Morris, whether working at his printing press in his beautiful manor-house at Kelmscott or seceding from the Social Democratic Federation, which he helped to finance, in the name of opposition to parliamentary action, was consciously Marxist, alike in antagonism to the Anarchists, a sub-division in his own secessionist Socialist League, and in criticism of British working men as organized in, and expressing themselves through, the existing Trade Unions with their non-revolutionary mentality. This Marxist view is set out in *Socialism, its Growth and Outcome*, written by Morris and Belfort Bax. It has not prevented Morris from finding an announced admirer in Earl Baldwin of Bewdley. As distinct from this view, and with a political self-

consciousness that the Trade Union movement and the Co-operative Movement, since Owen, both lacked, the Fabian Society (1883) and the Independent Labour Party (1893) began their career. To discussion of them we shall return.*

In America, Henry George (1839–1896) with extraordinary lucidity criticized, not so much the classical economy (which contained, as we have seen, surprisingly socialist admissions), as the practical assumptions of the capitalist system, in his famous work *Progress and Poverty* (1879). His positive remedy, reminiscent of the Physiocrats, in terms of a Single Tax on Land, was less adequate. To the Physiocrats, Quesnay, Dupont and others, George dedicated his book on Free Trade.

> It is at first glance evident that the economic meaning of the term wages is lost sight of, and attention is concentrated upon the common and narrow meaning of the words, when it is affirmed that wages are drawn from capital. For, in all these cases in which the labourer is his own employer and takes directly the produce of his labour as its reward, it is plain enough that wages are not drawn from capital, but result directly as the product of labour. . . . Production is always the mother of wages. Without production, wages would not and could not be. It is from the produce of labour, not from the advances of capital, that wages come.

It is interesting to compare this argument with the old Aristotelian argument, with similar presuppositions, about the artificiality of the taking of interest. It will be noted that neither argument precludes the wages of management, including the management of funds. They alike rest on the assertion that wealth is primarily goods.

The custom of outlining the shape of things to come is continued by Edward Bellamy (1850–1898), in his *Looking Backward*, 2000-1887. More concretely, William George and followers established in upper New York State a colony for the young, giving educational training to boys in self-government and self-discipline, called the George Junior Republic. The most eminent of the "outliners" is, of course, Mr. H. G. Wells (1866–) in his works of science and imagination, followed by Mr. Aldous Huxley (1894–).

2

France is the especial home of the theory of voluntary Communism, if North America is of its practice by religious sects, following in the footsteps of the monks and of the Jesuits of Paraguay. In 1755 Morelly,

* *Cf.* p. 650.

in his *Code de la Nature* advocated, as natural, a communist society and also sang its praises in verse. There were to be no private possessions beyond what might be acquired for personal comfort; every citizen was to be a public servant, with his needs supplied by the community; and each was to contribute to the commonweal according to his power. Here, then, we have an anticipation of the later famous doctrine of "to each according to his needs and from each according to his power." Here also is the beginning of the (French) school of Utopian Communism properly so called. The Abbé de Mably (1709–1785) merits attention for his singularly clear exposition of the fundamental doctrine of equality:

> *The sentiment of equality is nothing else than the sentiment of our own dignity;* men have become slaves by letting it grow feeble, and only by revivifying it will they become free.

As we have noted, the Revolutionary journalist Brissot had spoken of a conspiracy of the rich and the barrister Linguet had outlined the nature of a war of classes.* Suppressed by Robespierre during the height of the Revolution, discussion of an Agrarian Law was revived by Babeuf, "tribune of the people, put to death by the Directoire for having told the truth," who organized the communist rising of 1796, in favour of abolition of inheritance and, as against the peasantry and shopkeeper classes, in favour of the nationalization of the land.

The Comte de Saint-Simon (1760–1825) is a man more of the temper of the Marquis de Condorcet than of Babeuf. "The citizen Charles Henri de Saint-Simon, a former nobleman, declares his desire of purifying by a Republican baptism the stain of his original sin" (1790). His earliest practical suggestions are along lines that we shall later recognize as also those of his private secretary, Comte—a "positive" government not indeed of philosophers, but of scientists, guided by a study of history.† There must be a World-parliament resting, in the first instance, on an Anglo-French *entente*. The system must end under which

> the poor must be generous towards the rich. . . . The law of property depends upon the general system of public utility. . . . *The summary of my life-work is to give to all members of society the fullest latitude for the development of their faculties.*

One recalls that Saint-Simon is a contemporary of Goethe and von Humboldt.

* *Cf.* p. 592.

† *Cf.* p. 745.

Saint-Simon has made the discovery of the attachment of the propertied classes to their property under all forms of government. It is property tenure that determines the social structure. Like Herbert Spencer later, he opposes military and destructive forms of society to those industrial and productive forms of which he made himself the prophet. His heroes are *les savants, les artistes et les artisans.* His objection is both to *functionless property,* performing no work for which a moral justification could be found, and to *competition under no social control.* "There can be no change in the social order without a change of property." What was to be the means?

In his *Reorganization of European Society* (1814), Saint-Simon maintained that Europe, since Luther, had been looking for a new form of society. It was futile, with such conservatives as de Maistre and de Bonald, to look back on the past. The new organization must be one that valued the scientists and the entrepreneurs, the captains of industry. Against a static economic order, what was required was a theocratic state-socialism in which the scientists would be the theocrats or ideocrats. The object was the happiness of the masses; but Saint-Simon, no more than Bernard Shaw, believed in equality—not even, like Shaw, in economic equality. No more did he believe especially in liberty or in popular sovereignty. He believed in the communist dictatorship, but for the people rather than only of them. Inheritance was to be abolished. The means of production must be in the hands of those whose function was to use them and who could do so expertly, under a controlling tripartite legislature, which would contain representatives of the major aspects of society—guilds or co-operatives functioning directively, whether as touching invention, science or organization, in social life. The object was:

> To realize and maintain the association of all men on the surface of the globe, in which each shall be placed according to the capacity that he shall have received from God, and rewarded according to his works.

Charles Fourier (1772–1837) was more specific in his prescriptions. In order to check the privileged from thrusting the more unpleasant work of the world upon the backs of their fellows, Fourier designed an organization of society into a multiplicity of small independent groups, rather of the Brook Farm type, each numbering for some mystic reason 1,620 persons, named a Phalanstère or phalange. Each (by a slight contradiction) was to do the work he would enjoy best, *i.e.*, best suited to him. Fourier, however, seriously addresses himself to the solution, in his wageless society, of the problems of vocational adaptation or

pleasure-in-work (as did Kropotkin) and of the distribution of drudgery and leisure. Governments would disappear.

Unlike Saint-Simon and Comte, who spiritually trace from Condorcet and the Encyclopaedists, Fourier had no respect for science and such distinctive functions as a ground for government or regulation. His trend is anarchist. One not inconsiderable contribution to thought is his opposition of passion to reason (as well as to liberal free trade competition) and his praise of the former. He thus adds his quota to the evil work of breaking down the eighteenth-century rationalism. Saint-Simon's successor, Enfantin, with his new emotional religion, contributes in the same direction. The trend is of great significance, although these particular works are unimportant straws. The seeds of Rousseau flourish. The impious irrationalism exalted by Byron has replaced, however, the pious irrationalism of Jean Jacques.

However, Fourier is still sufficiently a child of the eighteenth century to believe that the walls of the Competitive Jericho would fall before the trumpets of this very Reason, of Persuasion and of Education. Like Owen, and unlike aristocrats such as Shelley and Byron, he is uninspired by the French Revolution, which he ignores. He did not even go to the length of Robert Owen and venture £40,000 on an experiment in founding the new society, and this for the excellent reason that he did not possess the money. In the alternative, he, the small merchant's clerk who had first been shocked by the throwing of thousands of tons of rice into the sea because the price was too low, would stay in his house until a certain hour, waiting for someone to come along who would finance his scheme for the benefit of mankind. The benefactor did not come, but the ideas of Fourier were not infertile. He supported the co-operative movement in France and denounced the four great disorders—economic, of poverty; social, of inequality; political, of war; and moral, of the failure of family life as a matter of private property rights. He had his reward in that, despite his anti-Semitism, he obtained a defender in Karl Marx, who found Fourier's work useful in his battle against Proudhon.

Pierre Joseph Proudhon (1809–1865), printer, journalist, member of the French Constituent Assembly of 1848 and for three years in prison for criticizing Louis Napoleon, is one of the Fathers of Modern Socialism and, along with Bakunin, one of the critics of Marx—or targets of Marx's criticism. Although not sharing with the "voluntary Communists" or Co-operators, Owen, Saint-Simon, Fourier, their optimism and belief in the goodness of human nature, Proudhon's thought is distributivist—*i.e.*, the object of socialism is equal property

rights for all: "three acres and a cow"—and looks rather to the artisan and small agriculturalists than to unskilled labourers (or what Marx later called the *Lumpenproletariat*) for support. Emphasis is placed by Proudhon on the conditions of self-respect and human dignity. Socialism is a social means for safeguarding the individualist natural rights of the common man against the monopolist. It is an attitude towards Socialism, as the fourth or economic stage in the realization of Democracy, which is of prime importance and to which further attention will be called later.*

The well-known dictum in Proudhon's first famous book, *Qu'est-ce que la Propriété* (1840)—"What is Property? Theft"—is almost as misleading, as a guide to the whole, as the opening words of Rousseau's *Contrat Social*. The objection of Proudhon was not to unequal private possession, of which he emphatically approved as a bulwark against the State-Leviathan he so deeply distrusted. Society, for Proudhon, is founded on the individual and is sharply to be distinguished from the coercive State administered by power-holding men whom one called a Government. Like the men of the eighteenth century, he is anti-Executive. Proudhon's concept of property is, like William Godwin's, a concept of it as the system of inequality by inheritance under which one man has power over another. As against the smug righteousness of the Manchester School, Proudhon pointed out that (in words used by Leroux) "a worker forced to choose between starvation or working for fourteen hours a day could not be said to be free in the consent he gave to the latter." In the later words of a great American judge, Mr. Justice Holmes, "where there is no equality of status, there is no freedom of contract." Proudhon, therefore, continues the tradition of Babeuf by insisting that the movement to democracy is not complete without such equality in wealth as removes the power, due to accident, not social purpose, of man over man. Proudhon's attitude is no superficial objection to the function of management. His objection is to power based on wealth and legal title to property, in turn based on accidental advantage and privilege without basis in social morality. But every man will be, and should be, left in *possession*, as it were, of his own olive and vine, his own three acres and cow, as guaranties against collective despotism.

Proudhon's answer to the problem of industrial organization, where the healthy craftsman-and-peasant economy is no longer possible, is in terms that anticipate later syndicalism or Guild Socialism. *Syndicats* or public utility companies are to be set up, with an adequate workers'

* *Vide* p. 651.

control in the policy which will affect those producers' lives and livelihood. The Syndicats will not be under state control. These syndicats, co-operatives or workers' soviets, not territorial constituencies, are the proper basis of political representation which should be based on vocation, not territorial contiguity.* We shall hear more of this idea in Russia and Italy. State Communism and State Capitalism alike are Proudhon's bugbears. "Property is the exploitation of the weak by the strong. Communism is the exploitation of the strong by the weak." This last statement would have wrecked Proudhon's own argument for economic equality unless Proudhon, a lover of paradox, had meant here *not* the Communism of Fourier and Owen but the proletarian dictatorship advocated by Marx and already being discussed in revolutionary circles in France and Germany. Proudhon, consistent with the general approach of the Co-operative school, is not a revolutionary. He may agree with Blanqui when the latter said, in the trial in 1831,

> the Chamber of Deputies is a pitiless machine that crushes twenty-five million peasants and five million workers, in order to extract out of them a substance that is transfused into the veins of the privileged classes. Taxes are the robbery by the idle of the workers.

But he does not become, like Blanqui, the advocate of terrorist attempts, nor, like Marx, the advocate of organized rising leading to the Dictatorship of the Proletariat. He still retains belief in reason and makes a criticism of the alternative of violence, later again made by Bertrand Russell.

> There is no need for the catastrophe of a revolution in order to succeed. One must not insist on revolutionary action as a means of social reform because this means would be simply an appeal to force, to arbitrariness—in brief, a contradiction.

Social justice, Proudhon insists, in the great tradition since Aristotle, cannot arise from social hate.

Proudhon seeks to solve the problem of government, and to adjust the balance between authority and liberty by his theory of Federalism —no new theory in France and one in which the Girondins may have been under some debt to Jefferson. Like all systems of balance of power it provides a check on central government, and gives a safeguard to personal liberty. It is of one pattern with that objection to the towering fortunes of the wealthy, under Louis Philippe and the Liberals, and

* *Cf.* p. 653.

to the misery of the unemployed, which provided the stimulus and goad for Proudhon's denunciation of capitalism and for his theory of the history of human society in terms of the forms assumed by property.

Proudhon is a Socialist and a Democrat in the tradition of French thought, critical of the centralizing Jacobins, and in the tradition of Godwin, with many points in common with Owen, the Co-operator.

3

It is important in dealing with a field that is a stricken battle ground of definitions to be careful about one's use of terms and where possible to stabilize these by adhering to received usage. Liberalism is a term coming to England from Spain in the second decade of the nineteenth Century—a bequest from one individualistic country to another. Ruggiero, in his great book on *European Liberalism* connects Liberalism with

> that liberty which universalises privilege to the point of cancelling it as such.

Liberalism, Lord Balfour (no prepossessed witness) observes,

> as used in its original name is a name for principles of constitutional liberty and representative government, which have long been the common property of all parties throughout the English-speaking portions of the world.

There is a recognition that a man's acts are his own, spring from his own personality and should not be coerced, save to protect the equal rights of others. Ruggiero's commentator, Collingwood, adds (gilding the lily somewhat to his own taste):

> This freedom is not possessed at birth; it is acquired by degrees as man enters into the self-conscious possession of his personality through a life of discipline and moral progress.

Socialism, the abstract noun, is a French term first defined, by a critical witness in 1830, P. Leroux, as "the exaggerated expression of the idea of association or of society." This yet has the merit of showing clearly that a social scheme which is not primarily economic or which, like Platonism, is only concerned with social control, not social ownership, is yet properly called Socialism, and that any definition which excludes this usage is improper. On the other hand, a system which excludes or ignores social economic control, however much "exaggerated expression" it may give to the idea of society, may be

totalitarian or State Capitalist, but is not Socialist. Both forms, however, Totalitarian and Socialist or Communist, *can* be brought under the general heading, Collectivist. Some writers, for their own reasons, object to this being done for fear lest the individualist or even anarchist element, in Socialism of the type of Proudhon's, should be obscured. The answer seems to be that some Socialism is not only collectivist but also aims at a completion of individual liberty in the liberal-democratic tradition. It is collectivist so far as the appropriate means to achieve this liberty for common men require socio-collectivist measures.

Socialist, the concrete noun, is an English term. It occurs first in 1827, in an article by the editor of *The Co-operative Magazine*, where he writes that there are Socialists or Communists who take the second alternative in the discussion "whether it is more beneficial that this capital should be individual or common." This emphasizes the economic aspect of Socialism. It can indeed be described (in *some* of its forms) as the fourth or Economic Phase, as we have said, of the Democratic Movement, following the Civil Phase, concerned with personal liberty; the Religious Phase, concerned with toleration; and the Political Phase, concerned with franchise and representation.

With time a distinction of primary importance grows up between Socialism and Communism. According to earlier distinctions, the Socialist was concerned with "the social control of the means"— or "essential means"—"of production"; the Communist with the "common ownership of the product." This brings "voluntary Communism," of the monastic, Owenite and Fourierist types, well within the definition of Communism.

This distinction connects with the discussion whether the object is to give to every man "the whole produce of his labour," a task obviously involving social control against exploitation, or "to give to each man according to his needs and to receive from each according to his ability."

In modern technical Communist usage, however, a distinction is drawn between the first, Socialist, phase in the social revolution, where the capitalist is crushed out by the dictatorship of the proletariat, and the final, Communist, phase of a classless society where each may receive according to his needs. It will therefore be noted that according to this technical Communist usage the present condition of Russia is "Socialist," assuring to the worker—or to *his* State—the (unequal) product of his labour, but *not* "Communist." It is a distinction, based on Marx, utilized by Strachey.

A simpler but equally valid use, consonant with general Party usage, defines Socialists as those who believe in the social control of the essential means of production as a way to inaugurate the classless society on the assumption—not indeed of mere piecemeal and opportunist Social Reform—but of evolutionary methods as probable; and the Marxian Communists as those who believe in the classless society on the assumption that the use of physical force and revolutionary methods will be probable or inevitable in its inauguration. Today, the rider is added by Marxian Communists that these physical-force methods will be thrust on Communists by capitalist or Fascist violence. The Socialist will only use force if his Party is the democratically elected government, in which he will meet challenge of *coup d'état* by the full sovereign force of that government. The Marxian Communist will prepare to use force against that force, which he regards as probable to the point of inevitability, that the capitalist (or Fascist) will use against him. This is the characteristic Marxist thesis.

To put the matter yet more briefly (and inexactly), the Socialists are in collaboration through the Second [Berne] or Amsterdam International Federation, founded in 1889 and re-established in 1919. Marxian Communists receive directives from the Third or Moscow International, established in 1919. There has also been a post-war (1921–1923) Vienna International, referred to by its enemies as the "Two-and-a-Half," which maintained doctrines critical of Lenin-Stalinism.

The last two descriptions of Communism, although convenient in practical politics, are highly misleading since they obscure (which is, of course, not inconvenient to Marxists) the existence of non-Marxian, voluntary Communism, which is referred to derisively by Engels as "Utopian" but which has a far longer history then coercive or Marxian Communism and which, in the case of Owen, was very far from Utopian.

Collectivism is usually opposed to individualism. (Those who object to this antithesis can substitute, for the term "collectivism," the term "totalitarianism.") Leroux's further phrase, which he wrongly applies to Socialism, is admirably descriptive of Collectivism or Totalitarianism—"the theory of a government concentrating in itself all intelligence and all morality." Rousseau is an excellent instance of a Collectivist. So is Hegel, the great totalitarian, for all his reservations about Freedom (which Rousseau shared) and the claims of the World-spirit. None of these men would, of course, admit that they excluded personal freedom, but only that they sought to realize it on some far higher plane. The same remark applies to the Hegelian derivatives, Marxian Communism and Fascism.

P. J. Proudhon is indubitably an equalitarian, not in the sense of aiming at a functionless society without division of labour but in the sense of objecting to inequalities of status and power disconnected from such function and, hence, without moral basis in the general well-being. He is a Socialist since he aims at a classless society achieved by economic redistribution and control. His Socialism is specifically of that non-Hegelian variety which is the third phase of Democracy. It is of the liberal and empirical, not the authoritative and totalitarian, variety.

He is not a Totalitarian or Collectivist (as defined). He is an instance in point to show that a Socialist need not be such. His attitude to Rousseau provides the test. Rousseau's *Contrat Social* he describes as "a masterpiece of oratorical jugglery." On the other hand, he separates from the Anglo-Saxon tradition (Carlyle, the Germano-phile, apart), and draws close to Continental Anarchism, Blanqui and later syndicalism, by his mistrust (not unjustified) of all Parliamentarianism as played under the constitutional, Liberal, bourgeois-banker monarchy of Louis-Philippe. As he loathes Rousseau and the Jacobins, so also he is anti-Marx—a sentiment reciprocated by Marx with interest, Proudhon being "pretentious and useless," with "the feelings of a grocer." To an attempt to demolish him, Marx devoted his *Poverty of Philosophy*, since Proudhon said those things which were most inconvenient to Marx, just as Lenin later devoted his *Materialism and Empirio-Criticism* to the demolition of Kant and Hume.

Proudhon through his followers, and along with Bakunin, left his impress on the First and again on the Second International. His ideas deserve comparison, not only with Godwin and Owen, but with that whole English stream of empirical thought which ends in Bertrand Russell but also, through rather different channels, in Keir Hardie's Independent Labour Party and in the syndicalist mood that fitfully shows itself in Trade Unionism, with the stress on Trade Union freedom against *any* central State authority. The weakness of Proudhonian thought, as of all libertarian and small-state schemes since the days of the Polis of Hellas, is that it does not fashion a good war-machine. Marxism, on the other hand, does—in fact, as we shall see, several.* Proudhon, however, not an outstanding thinker but a thinker of outstanding significance, merits the most earnest attention of anyone, in these present days, concerned with political issues, wi' liberty, equality and the future of the workers.

* *Vide* pp. 596, 598.

4

KARL MARX (1818–1883), author of *Das Kapital*, was the son of Herschel Marx, a respectable Jewish lawyer of Trier, the old Roman egionary city in the Rhineland. Herschel Marx came of a long line of rabbis but was himself, although officially Christian, of no particular religious profession. Born a subject of the last Prince Archbishop Elector of Trier, he passed his early life as a French subject to become, with the defeat of Napoleon and the German reappropriation of this area, a Prussian. Karl's mother was born and brought up in Holland—according to Karl a hard, bigoted woman. The son's early environment was, therefore, one of detachment from all national influence save that of Judaism.

At school the teachers of the young Marx expressed the hope that "he will fulfil the favourable expectations that are justified by his abilities"; and a school essay of his own declares,

> When we have chosen the position in life in which we can best work for humanity, then burdens cannot crush us, for they are sacrifices for all. Then it is no poor, narrow egotistical joy which we experience; our happiness belongs to millions, and our deeds live on, silently and effectually, and our ashes are watered by the glowing tears of noble men.

Karl Marx, let it be admitted, was as good as his word, allowance being made for his own construction of "humanity." The sentiments, however expressed, seem rather to bear the mark of the influence of Herschel Marx, a born placator, a man of duty, co-operative goodwill, humility and sentiment. The letters from father to son, during the time that Karl was a young student at the University of Bonn, have been preserved.

> My heart often revels in thoughts about you and your future. And yet at times, I cannot free myself from gloomy, apprehensive, terrifying ideas, when like a lightning flash there breaks in the thought: Is your heart equal to your head, to your capacities? Has it room for these tender, earthly feelings which bring so much consolation in this vale of tears to the man of feeling . . . Your first successes, the flattering hope of seeing your name in high renown, are not only, like your earthly welfare, dear to my heart, they are illusions which I have long nursed and which are deeply implanted in my being.

In a later letter:

> As if we were made of gold our high and mighty son gets through almost 700 thalers in one year against all our agreements, against all custom, though

the very richest do not spend 500. And why? I will do him the justice to admit that he is no waster, no spendthrift. But how can a man who invents a new system every week or fortnight and has to tear up what he had previously worked at with so much pains, how can he, I ask, be bothered with trifles? How can he submit to petty regulations? Everyone has his hands in his pocket, and every one cheats him.

And later:

Though I love you above everything (your mother excepted), I am not blind and still less do I mean to be blind. I make every possible allowance for you. But I cannot altogether throw off the idea that you are not free from egoism, more of it than is necessary for self-preservation. I cannot always drive away the reflection that in your place I should have treated my parents with greater consideration, with more unselfish love.

Karl Marx, in later life, was to stress "servility" as the vice he detested most; and for which he psychologically over-compensated by aggressive pugnacity. The Christian was depicted as characterized by "compliance, self-contempt, self-abasement, submissiveness and humility"; the proletarian, meaning himself, was characterized by "courage, self-respect, pride and sense of independence." There is perhaps, in these descriptions, a reflection of the contest between father and son.

With nothing worse to his credit at Bonn than one day's confinement for "nocturnal drunkenness," Karl Marx proceeded to the University of Berlin. While there the young man proposed, with success, to his sister's school friend Jenny von Westphalen, daughter of a Prussian official, the Baron von Westphalen, and of his Scottish wife, a Campbell. As a consequence, Marx later was to be the brother-in-law of the Prussian Minister of Interior, Ferdinand von Westphalen, and a remote kinsman by marriage of the Duke of Argyll. These things were small compensation—or that Karl would make Jenny sign the hotel register with the words "Jenny Marx, *née* baroness von Westphalen"—in the bitter years of poverty that were to follow. As Marx said, the profits of *Das Kapital* would not pay even for the cheap cigars that he smoked while he wrote it. Perhaps no small part of Marx's bitterness, his sniffing out of corruption, his self-righteousness in controversy, is the consequence of this galling contrast and its effect upon a man conscious of his superior intellectual powers. Ferocity of style had always been his. Years of disappointment made the style mould the man and his philosophy: he, Karl Marx, would teach his world what was wrong with its complacency.

Marx's doctoral thesis at Jena, in 1841, was *On the Difference between the Natural Philosophy of Democritus and of Epicurus.* He liked the materialist in Epicurus but disliked his doctrine of chance, its undogmatic probabilism, its untidiness. The student of twenty-three was the father of the man. He began as he ended, materialist but anti-empiric. One thing Marx took over from the "enlightenment" of the eighteenth century—its Secularism. "I hate all the gods," he announced, in the words of Aeschylus' superman, Prometheus. This is the essential revolutionary sentiment in Marx. Concern for the workers and economic theories, inspired by Engels, came later. Religion—theology; metaphysic—was first. With the humbler Engels it was otherwise.

In 1835 Strauss had published his critical *Life of Jesus.* In 1841 Ludwig Feuerbach published a book that was to do much to "fix" Marx's thought, his *Essence of Christianity*—in which he maintained *inter alia* that the substance of the right religion was a nutritious diet, chiefly beans. Despite his later vagaries, and his apothegm about "man is (*ist*) what he eats (*isst*)," Feuerbach in fact is maintaining the entirely intelligible proposition that hunger determines religion, not religion hunger; that the essence of Christianity is brotherly love; and that this becomes thin on an empty stomach. It is a doctrine patently true that yet shocked the idealists of the "beautiful soul" type, such as the nobleman Novalis, the Romantic, who tried to commit suicide from a broken heart on a full diet by mere act of will—without any success.

In 1842 Marx became a regular contributor to the new *Rheinische Zeitung.* He thus started his career as a journalist, the dismissal from Bonn of his friend Bauer having destroyed his chance of being a professor. His friends admired in him the clear-cut, dogmatic confidence of his thought—"imagine Rousseau, Voltaire, Holbach, Lessing, Hume and Hegel united in one person," commented one of them. He, on the other hand, at twenty-four, noted in his friends their "vapourings full of world revolution and void of sense, sloppily written, mixed with a dash of atheism and communism (which these gentlemen have never studied)." While declining to admit even the theoretical validity of communist ideas "in their present form," Marx made his name as an outstanding journalist by a defence of the freedom of the press and by descending to the concrete work of fighting the laws which mixed feudal privilege and capitalist property right by punishing peasants for taking wood from the forests. Marx, from the beginning, made a happy union in his life work of theoretical ability with practical

interest. Marx was always willing to do the spade work. It was the great secret of his success. The following year the journal was suppressed by the Prussian censorship.

The *Deutsche Jahrbücher* was a monthly to which Marx occasionally contributed. It also was suppressed. Its editors decided to restart it in Paris. In 1843 Marx left Germany, by choice, never (save for a few months) to return. He left stocked with the philosophy of Hegel and Feuerbach; with a reputation as a fighting political journalist; and with a guaranty of work as an associate editor on the new *Deutsch-Französische Jahrbücher.* The eminent Frenchmen who had promised to contribute approved of advanced thought and a new civilization, but not of association with Germans. It was no compensation that Heine, the exile, wrote "a revolutionary and antinational poem."

The new *Jahrbücher* had precisely one issue, to which Marx contributed, significantly, an article on the economic basis of law. Economics was not Marx's field; he was trained as a lawyer. But criticism of his purely political and philosophical contentions, when a journalist, had taught a quick mind that it must attend to this subject. A new revolution in France would precede one in Germany. "In Germany *no* kind of servitude can be broken without breaking every kind of servitude," writes Marx with characteristic sweep and assurance. And, elsewhere, to his editor, Ruge, he speaks of "the revolution which lies in front of us." He, already a revolutionary exile, was in reaction against the Germans who make "a pious illusion (not political revolution) the driving force of history." Soon he was in reaction against Ruge, who describes him, in bitterness, as "a common fellow"—and without the money that had been so flush in the bourgeois years at Bonn. Hitherto Marx's career had been one, for his age, of striking success loudly acclaimed in his own circle. He now had to face the ot of the common man.

Marx in Paris met Proudhon, as profound a believer as himself in he dialectical method of antitheses, so that truth for Proudhon was ı paradox, just as, for the contemporary Romantics in literature, it vas an epigram. Moreover, Proudhon, thanks to Bakunin, was a ecent convert to Hegelianism and undertook to interpret the economic ystem (which determined politics) in terms of it and to discover the rue roots of the rivalry of capital and labour. Superimposed on this nfluence on Marx came a contribution in the *Jahrbücher,* an *Outline of ı Critique of Political Economy,* by one Friedrich Engels, son of a vealthy merchant of Barmen, Germany, and of Manchester. The *Outine* (to be distinguished from Marx's own later *Critique*) had a

profound influence on Marx, who welcomed Engels—a conduct not customary in his treatment of newcomers, normally aggressive-defensive—on the occasion of their second meeting in Paris in 1844. Engels had given Marx the economic clue for which he had been looking to his own materialist and revolutionary philosophy. Marx described the contribution as "a work of genius." Marx the Hegelian revolutionary became Marx the economist champion of the workers. Engels refers to this "cheerful" ten days. It was one of the most decisive ten days in history.

Engels returned to Barmen to complete, with full references to the blue books obligingly supplied by a bourgeois British Government, his indictment, *The Condition of the Working Classes in England in* 1844, written under the influence of admiration for Thomas Carlyle and for his Chartist friends; and to join in the work of "advanced" societies in Germany, engaged *inter alia* in reading Shelley. Meanwhile, Marx, for certain articles urging German revolt in the Paris German-emigrant paper *Vorwärts*, had been honoured by the request of the French authorities, on Prussian instigation, to leave France. In the spring of 1845, he made his second hegira or flight, to Brussels. Although French journals continued, in editorial ignorance, to describe him as a "cobbler," these police attentions, if unwelcome, were a tribute to his influence or nuisance value. Friedrich Engels supplied funds. In turn, merchant-capitalist Engels, the father, supplied funds to Friedrich.

It was, however, in England that Marx first made contact with organized working men. In 1845, with Engels, he visited that country; was introduced to a Workers' Education Union of German residents, already known to Engels; and was impressed by their technique of sober study, uncomplicated in England by political intrigue. Marx returned to found in Brussels a Working Men's Association, of which the original members were himself, complete with frock-coat, a schoolmaster, a nobleman and a Prussian ex-officer. For Weitling, a warm-hearted agitator, a working tailor of illegitimate birth who combined preaching of class war and "shooting without mercy all enemies of communism" with a religious Saint-Simonianism, Marx, the university-trained Hegelian, had no patience whatsoever—although at the beginning, he received, as an agitator, some praise. Weitling was only a man who deprived the poor of "their jobs and their crusts of bread." Marx was a far greater master of words than poor Weitling—and he meant his hates, whereas Weitling only talked about them. The distinction already drawn in Paris between communists and drawing-

room socialists is redrawn—with Weitling on the wrong side of the line. Marx gathered the local Brussels true-believers to confirm the decision. Communists *are* Marxists. Those whom Marx did not like, including the communists of all past ages, were "utopian socialists." Marx had seized on a concept dear to the business man, Engels—the concept of "the scientific." Thirty years later, Engels was to lay down the true belief, in his *Socialism, Utopian and Scientific* (in *Herr Eugen Dühring's Revolution in Science,* known briefly as *Anti-Dühring*). A little later, in 1846, Marx established the Communist Correspondence Committee, which could at least afford the inexpensive luxury of sending letters of congratulation, as it did to the Chartist Feargus O'Connor, when he won the Nottingham election of 1846. Marx and Engels, as "German Democratic Communists," wrote:

> The ground is now cleared by the retreat of the landed aristocracy from the contest; middle class and working class are the only classes betwixt whom there can be a possible struggle.

Later Marx, in acknowledging his debt to the British Chartists, remarked that, at least, they were

> a political party whose battle cry is not republic *v.* monarchy, but the rule of the working class *v.* the rule of the *bourgeoisie.*

In the summer of 1847 a Communist League, on the joint initiative of Engels, the German group in London, and certain Chartists, was started up in London; Marx attended its second session; and for Engels' projected "catechism" was substituted Marx's draft of the *Communist Manifesto.* Before it had been sent to the booksellers—and therefore, quite unconnected with it—the revolution of February, 1848, broke out in Paris and Louis Philippe fled. A happy luck, for Marx, thus identified the Manifesto of a tiny group with the Revolution of 1848, both produced from a common discontent and looking to common consequences. The revolution had also a personal consequence. Marx was arrested and ordered by the Belgian authorities to leave. Within twelve hours he was en route for London.

A visit by invitation to Paris fell flat. Marx never had much of a following in France, which had its own revolutionary theories, Babeufian in origin, and a sublime contempt for German or even Jewish ones. Marx crossed to Germany; ever the would-be editor, he founded the important *Neue Rheinische Zeitung,* "an Organ of Democracy"; and watched the proceedings of the Frankfort Assembly with increased contempt for parliamentary democracy. Moderation had proved its

worthlessness—despite which (and most contrariwise to Marxist theory) a *bourgeois* Rhineland jury acquitted him on a charge, by the Prussian authorities, of sedition. Banished from Germany, on twenty-four hours' notice, and given the option in France of moving on or of residence in Brittany, he returned, in 1849, to a backward land, revolutionary speaking, which still imposed no restrictions, England.

5

Marx now enters upon his second period, whether at 28 Dean Street, Soho, London, or in Grafton Terrace, Haverstock Hill, London. In this second thirty years of Marx's life, his task is the compilation of the Koran of Communism, *Das Kapital*. A quieter Europe offers few opportunities for revolutionary activity, except during the brief period of the Paris Commune, which he observed and approved without contributing to initiate. It is on the record of these years that the thesis of Marx as the evolutionist rests. He rebukes premature revolution. Gladstone, however, the "G.O.M.,"* is denounced as "hollow profundity, unction which does not lack poisoned ingredients . . . pietistic casuistry." Charles A. Dana, of the New York [*Herald*] *Tribune*, who had met Marx in his glory as editor of the *Neue Rheinische Zeitung*, acquires him as a correspondent (at $5 an article) for that journal. Engels supplies the rest of the means—more abundantly later. In 1859, the brief *Critique of Political Economy* is published. Not until 1867, after labouring over his notes and revision, did Marx complete, amid the dunning of creditors and as a victim of carbuncles, what in impatience he described as "the damned book," the first volume of his *magnum opus*, *Das Kapital*, which the London *Saturday Review* unexpectedly saluted by declaring that "the presentation of the subject invests the driest economic questions with a certain peculiar charm."

The optimism of the ambitious and intellectually arrogant lawyer's son at the university, with expectations of a university post; the happiness of the marriage to Jenny von Westphalen after years of waiting; even the *réclame* of the brilliant radical editor, baiting the censors, and of the young revolutionary earning the attentions of the police of three countries, of Guizot and of Alexander von Humboldt, are things of the past. To those early years belongs Annenkov's description of Marx, aged twenty-eight, when at Brussels:

> With a thick black mop of hair on his head, with hairy hands and crookedly-buttoned frock-coat, he gave the impression of one who has the right and the

* "Grand Old Man."

power to command respect, whatever his appearance and whatever he did. . . . His manners defied the accepted forms of social intercourse, and were haughty and almost contemptuous. His sharp metallic voice suited remarkably well the radical verdicts which he was in the habit of pronouncing on men and things. Even at this term Marx invariably spoke in the form of judgements without appeal.

A little later, Carl Schurz, one of the reformers of 1848, whose monument decorates Morningside Heights, New York, writes of Marx, when editor of the *Neue Rheinische Zeitung:*

Marx' utterances are indeed full of meaning, logical and clear, but I have never seen a man whose bearing was so provoking and intolerable. To no opinion which differed from his own did he accord the honour of even condescending consideration; every argument that he did not like he answered either with biting scorn at the unfathomable ignorance that prompted it, or with opprobrious aspersions upon the motives of him who had advanced it. I remember most distinctly the cutting disdain with which he pronounced the word *bourgeois:* and as a *bourgeois*—that is, as a detestable example of the deepest mental and moral degeneracy—he denounced everyone who dared to oppose his opinions.

The days had gone by when, for a bet, Karl Marx, at the beginning of his permanent stay in London, along with Wilhelm Liebknecht and Edgar Bauer, undertook to visit all the public houses between Dean Street and Hampstead Road; and when the three engaged, before the night was out, in the sport of breaking all the gas-lamps in sight. Marx's personal optimism was not a good guaranty of sound family finances—as Henriette Marx, his mother, is reported to have said: "It would have been better if Karl had made some capital instead of writing about it." The pawnbroker was a too frequent refuge. In Camberwell Marx's goods were distrained upon, even to the baby's cradle, to pay the rent. Days in the British Museum cost little but brought in little. Two children, Guido and Francesca Marx, ill nourished, died in infancy. The generosity of another alien like Marx himself, a Frenchman, alone enabled Francesca's funeral expenses to be met. Then eight-year-old Edgar—"Musch"—died. Frau Marx never quite recovered. The brutal fact of poverty bore down on romance, on fine theories—insisted that men and even children are not equal in their chances; that not titles—even von Westphalen—or brains, or natural goodwill, but *money*, chiefly matters. Marx wrote to Lassalle:

Bacon says that men of real worth have so many relations with nature and the world, so many objects of interest, that they easily get over any loss. I am not one of these men of worth. The death of my child has profoundly shattered my heart and brain, and I feel the loss just as fresh as on the first day.

Only the New York *Tribune* (now *Herald Tribune*) and Friedrich Engels, of Ermen, Engels & Co., cotton merchants, stood between Marx and the workhouse. Later matters improved. To the neighborhood children, Karl Marx is "Daddy Marx" of the frock-coat, who gave them little gifts of sticky sweets. To his own children, in the intimate devotion that is one of the pleasant things of a Jewish home, he was just "old Nick." Meanwhile, the great revolutionary indictment of Mammon went forward, in the British Museum, to its conclusion in the demonstration of the inexorable class war that was to liquidate the bourgeoisie in blood. However, France, England, the United States—perhaps these three—might be saved from that wrath to come which Marx, like a new Elijah of his race, prophesied for the oppressor Ahabs who ground the face of the poor and stole Naboth's vineyard, that is, stole the surplus value made of the labour of the workers' hands. Marx's interest in the workers was in them, not so much as human beings, as rather primarily instruments of that world-revolt for which his own temperament drove him to long and for which his philosophy had provided an irrefutable justification. Without the class war, however, hope of world-revolt was empty. It had power behind it because enough men had grievances, under free competitive capitalist exploitation, to feel as he did.

6

Together Marx and Engels, by a combination of Jewish rabbinic subtlety and German industry, built up a philosophy which in its involved consistency has no compeer since St. Thomas laid down his pen. For it the Communist Manifesto provided the Prophecy and *Das Kapital* provided the Torah, the Law. Here is "the Book." Since then commentators have added line to line and precept to precept. This Marxian philosophy is a coherent whole. It is massive because revolutionary action is built upon class-war theory; the class war upon the economic theory of surplus value; this economic theory upon the economic interpretation of history; this interpretation upon the Marxo-Hegelian logic or dialectic; and this upon a materialistic metaphysic. In the discussion of the system it is, then, advantageous to start with that which is most remote from action, the metaphysic,

first. It is the more relevant because Marx repeatedly insists that "the criticism of religion" is the necessary first step in his philosophy. "The people cannot be really happy until it has been deprived of illusory happiness by the abolition of religion." Marx declines to permit the religious to say that material conditions in the present world, being a vale of tears, do not matter to a pious [but not wealthy] man or to those with empty stomachs. The religious sometimes had tended to say this. And Marx would not be himself not to make the most of the case.

(a) *The Metaphysic of Marxism is Materialism*—is a Physic. That is, Marxism can be stated by the controversialist to be a denial of metaphysic in the sense of a study of that which is *other* than the material universe. There is nothing other; and that which is other is no thing, nothing. But, if by metaphysic we mean the logical discussion of the nature of being, then there is most definitely a Marxist metaphysic which affirms that this nature can dogmatically be stated to be material. As with Hobbes so with Marx, materialism points to a conclusion in non-theism which Hobbes endeavours to deny and which Marx unflinchingly admits. These conclusions are especially elaborated by Lenin and to him, and his entire discussion of the materialist issue in its later form, we shall return.*

Marx's thought here derives from his earliest speculation, in the thesis on the materialist Epicurus and the atomist Democritus. It also flows from the writings of Feuerbach, which had so strikingly supported the arguments of his own erstwhile friend and hero, Bruno Bauer, with whom he had collaborated in a treatise which proved, to the embarrassment of the orthodox, that Hegel was an atheist. Marx was acute enough to perceive that Hegel, in his reaction from Kantianism, had so entirely objectified the Idea that the Idea and Objective Reality had become identified. It little mattered then, for a strict Hegelian, whether one said that the Idea was the Totality which was God or that God as "spirit" was a ghost, placed as "the subjective" in opposition to Total Objective Reality, and, therefore, was Anti-Existence and non-existent. The same problem had arisen in the case of the enigmatic Spinoza, atheist or pantheist.

Four reasons could be urged for taking the materialistic interpretation. To a clever mind it appealed as offering a straightforward, arresting systematic explanation; in the days of Strauss' Higher Criticism it was modern and in vogue, although boasting an intellectually respectable lineage, in reaction against Schleiermacher and Schelling;

* *Cf.* p. 617.

it scandalized the smug priests of good society; and it had consequences, in religion and in history, which would blow the amiable presuppositions and unamiable social malpractices of the conventional conservatives sky-high.

In 1886–1888, Engels published a little sketch, *Ludwig Feuerbach and the Outcome of Classical German Philosophy*, in which he elaborated a portion of an incomplete joint work of 1845, *German Ideology*, and also gave to the world Marx's hasty jottings of memoranda, *The Theses on Feuerbach*. Engels here writes:

> Did God create the world or has the world been in existence eternally? The answers which the philosophers gave to the question split them into two great camps. Those who asserted the primacy of spirit to nature and, therefore, in the last instance, assumed world creation in some form or other . . . composed the camp of idealism. The others, who regarded nature as primary, belong to the various schools of materialism. . . . Then came Feuerbach's *Essence of Christianity*. With one blow it pulverised the contradiction, in that without circumlocutions it placed materialism on the throne again. Nature exists independently of all philosophy. It is the foundation upon which we human beings, ourselves products of nature, have grown up. Nothing exists outside nature and man, and the higher beings our religious phantasies have created are only the fantastic reflection of our own essence. . . . Ultimately, the Hegelian system represents merely a materialism turned upside down in method and content.

Marx himself stated this last position in the second German edition of *Kapital*: "The ideal is nothing else than the material world reflected by the human mind and translated into forms of thought." In a briefer phrase, which Marx used of Feuerbach, he found Hegel, the idealist, standing on his head, and stood him right side up on the ground. "Consciousness," he wrote in *The German Ideology* (1845–1846) "does not determine life, but life determines consciousness."

Two points will be noted. Engels divides the philosophers into two opposed schools, both dogmatic. Some knew the gods created the world; others knew they did not. Engels, however, allows in his *On Historical Materialism* (and Lenin, later, allows still more) for those who affirm neither position dogmatically and who only dogmatically decline to be dogmatic. These—the school of Locke, Hume and Kant—Engels dubs agnostics; and rebuts by the breezy comment, "To this Hegel has replied long ago." We shall later see if this rebuttal by Engels and Marx, the Hegelians is itself satisfactory. Certainly Locke, Hume and Kant are keener philosophers than they. This is a

dangerous galaxy of philosophers for even Hegel to dismiss as "replied to."

Further, in this apparent dilemma of metaphysics the horn of Materialism is chosen because it seems to place man firmly in the arms of Nature, his mother. Marx asserts that there is a "necessary connection of materialism and communism." It offers man an explanation of his own nature and bids him look to his origins if he would consider how he should develop, instead of looking away to some other world of gods and spirits. The anti-theologism of Marx—the secularism which traces from eighteenth-century France into the Germany of the Enlightenment; the reaction against the clergy in France and bad theology in Germany—has much to do with the explanation of the choice. With Lenin the real argument will become clearer. The clergy mean reaction; therefore, God does not exist.

The questions remain *how we dogmatically know* that the ultimate nature of being corresponds with what is generally meant by matter; what reason we have to suppose that energy, vitality and conscious will are not a series of manifestations of Being coeval with, or prior to, matter, organic bodies and human life; and whether the consequences of denying a free realm of ends, including the values of social justice, are not socially worse than the risks—in mere pious intentions and dreaming "other-worldliness"—in asserting it. Practical men, not interested in philosophy, are under no obligation to answer these questions. Marx, by choosing to bolster and reinforce his program by a philosophy—which indeed had interested him, as a student, before he had thought of the program—was obliged to give his philosophy a philosophical defence. The questions then remain: How do you *know* that the basis of reality is matter alone? And what advantage is this anyhow—if it be faith, not knowledge—to the cause of truth or of social justice?

7

(*b*) *The Dialectic*—the word used in the Hegelian sense already defined—is an essential part of this philosophical defence. Marxian Materialism is Dialectical Materialism. The damaging objection to the old mechanical materialism, of the ancients, of Hobbes and of Condillac, is that the element of free will and indeed of will and dynamic energy was denied, ignored or not accounted for. It offered explanations in terms of a static world of impinging and propelling forces and of neural stimuli. The basis of morals for Hobbes—*mores* or customs apart—was the impulse, intestinal in origin, of fear. No one

would wish to deny that there is "much truth" in all this; the trouble is that there is not enough truth. The materialism, however, of Marx and his early friends is not what is called a crude materialism. Indeed he later accused his teacher, Feuerbach, of idealism. Feuerbach, at bottom, was a positivist who wanted, by materialist criticism of "other-worldliness," to call attention to the true "essence of Christianity" which was the worship of the god in man, and to preach the *love* of man. Feuerbach's thesis that a man's soul was moulded by his diet, preferably beans (potatoes being the evil, anaemic principle), was a private eccentricity which the respectable Pythagoreans had been guilty of before him.

The philosophic good fortune of Marx is that, by a happy legerdemain, he linked Hegel to Feuerbach. The sentimental Feuerbach had indeed himself endeavored to carry out their espousals, but unsuccessfully. As Marx writes, "in so far as Feuerbach is a materialist, he ignores history; in so far as he takes history into account, he is no materialist." Marx is not guilty, as was Feuerbach, of merely writing the word "Matter" where the idealists wrote "Absolute Idea"; and then sentimentalizing Matter, in the style of the French romantic writers, by discourses on erotic love. Marx's position begins to show itself clearly in the *Theses on Feuerbach*, of 1845.

The chief defect of all hitherto existing materialism—that of Feuerbach included—is that the object, reality, sensuousness, is conceived only in the form of the object of contemplation, but not as *human senuous activity, practice, not subjectively*. Thus it happened that the *active* side, in opposition to materialism, was developed by idealism—but only abstractly, since, of course, idealism does not know real sensuous activity as such. Feuerbach wants sensuous objects, but he does not conceive human activity itself as activity through objects. Consequently, in the *Essence of Christianity*, he regards the theoretical attitude as the only graciously human attitude, while practice is conceived and fixed only in its dirty-Jewish form of appearance. Hence he does not grasp the significance of "revolutionary," of practical-critical, activity.

In practice man must prove the truth, *i.e.*, the reality and power, the "this-sidedness" of his thinking. . . . The materialist doctrine that men are products of circumstances and upbringing and that, therefore, changed men are products of other circumstances and changed upbringing, forgets that *circumstances are changed precisely by men* and that the educator must himself be educated. Hence this doctrine necessarily arrives at dividing society into two parts, of which one towers above society (in Robert Owen, for example). . . . Social life is essentially *practical*. All mysteries which mislead theory to mysticism find their rational solution in human practice and in the com-

prehension of this practice. . . . The philosophers have only *interpreted* the world in various ways; the point however is to *change* it.

The importance of will and human effort is abundantly stressed in these notes jotted down two years before the drafting of Marx's Communist Manifesto (1847–1848). The trouble lay in the tying up of materialism with a doctrine of human will. There is, to say the least, a paradox in asserting that what alone really exists is the *predetermined* movement of matter in history (human mind being epiphenomenal—the glow from the corporal furnace) *and* to say that there is an imperative *moral obligation* to will and wage the class war even at the cost of civil war and perhaps of our individual imprisonment in a concentration camp, torture or death. In fact the two great interpretations of Marx, those of Kautsky and of Lenin, come to rest on opposite horns of this contradiction. The Hegelian philosophy, of which Marx's head was full and in which he (like Bakunin) was endeavouring to instruct poor Proudhon, seemed to do the trick. Hegel had ingeniously shown that "real" free will consisted in the ability to contemplate consciously one's own necessary determination. An objectively determined will was not, then, inconsistent with the reality of this will—with the obligation to direct our human energy. If so materialistic determination and a doctrine of individual will—man's will in society—changing history were not inconsistent.

The principle had a neat but disastrous consequence. If what matters is Matter, than the test of a theory is its effect upon matter. Indeed, in objective consequences lies the criterion of truth. Theory and truth are not self-contained and self-sufficient. That is true which has the right effect, *i.e.*, the effect which produces the desired material consequences. There is no significant truth apart from what is *true for us*—desirable. There must always be a union of theory and practice. Speculative truth is idealistic self-indulgence and bubble blowing. Like religion, such truth is an opiate. It will be noted that this theory of truth is *not* simply pragmatic. Absolute truths are banished—but in the name of one social value, equality (to which, unfortunately, as we shall see,* Marx does not finally adhere himself). Marx as an Hegelian has a clear concept of ends—or of the procession of ends: the idea of the historical process. "The desirable" is, for him, no mere empirical matter. It will later become apparent that the desirable is the classless society. The true is dogmatically that which conduces to success in our class war. But from the philosophic argument it is

* *Cf.* pp. 600, 648.

not clear why *anything* is not true that materially succeeds—although this conclusion Marx, in the very name of his [materialist] Metaphysic would almost certainly have denied.

There is no space here to inquire whether Hegel himself would at all have admitted as legitimate this second phase in the Marxian philosophy, this appropriation of his Dialectic of the Idea, even if he had granted, for argument, that the Absolute = Matter. To say that the development of the Idea (= Absolute Mind) does not nullify eternal values, or stultify human wills in choosing, as individuals, these values—that the moral significance of man's action is consistent with a divine or moral or intelligent determinism—is one thing. Values are manifestations of the spiritual Idea. To say that the evolution of Matter, as *alone* real [a position sharply distinct from Objective Idealism and even from that Monistic Realism which perhaps Marxism *seeks* to be,* despite its phraseology], leaves space for the reality also of human values as distinct from an Hobbesian fear of hell and punishment—*and* imposes an obligation to choose them—is quite another thesis. This is so *unless* we arbitrarily fill Matter with all that content which in common parlance we ascribe to will and mind, and *not* (by contradistinction) to matter. It may be that Mind can masquerade as Matter and still behave quite satisfactorily as Mind. But if so, there is perhaps little profit and only intellectual obfuscation in calling it Matter. It is not a matter for much noise and dust about materialism. A philosophic changeling is scarcely any legitimate child of philosophy.

Men may, however, be as prepared, in fact, to choose freely and to fight passionately under the banner of God Almighty Matter as of God Almighty Mind. And it may be argued that the former faith will make men healthy, socially minded extroverts, and the second faith will make them introverts, speculative "escapers" from society with its moral obligations, and monks. The dispute becomes scholastic—an issue, that is, between those who think that philosophic accuracy matters and those who feel that it does not. We shall return to this issue when we discuss Lenin, with his war against the Christianity of the Orthodox priests. Spinoza, it may be pointed out, offered a possible solution which neither side discussed—as did also, emphatically, the great Empiric School. It is perhaps possible that *neither* Hegel *nor* Marx was right—neither those who dogmatized on Absolute Mind nor on Absolute Matter.

* The reader is referred to philosophic text-books for further discussion of these technical terms.

One further comment on the Dialectic. The Germany of the early nineteenth century was under the influence of the Romantics, such as Novalis, with their passion for epigram and paradox and their belief that truth could only be expressed in these—often contradictory—flashes. It was also under the influence of Hegel, with his contemporary discovery of a dialectic which asserted that truth arose from the statement of opposites. Everything must be stated formally as conceptual opposites. Meanwhile Schopenhauer had introduced the West to the abstract profundities of Indian metaphysics, with its discussion of Being and Not-being. The intellectual impetus of the time was towards putting everything into neat categories. There is moreover a tendency in Occidental thought (partially overcome by both Hegel and Schopenhauer) which traces directly from Zoroastrianism through its admirer Aristotle, but which also has had influence on Jewish Talmudic thought, of dramatizing the history of the world as a ghostly Armageddon between Good and Evil, Light and Darkness, as it were between Stalin and Hitler. Hegel consciously transcended this Dualism by his doctrine of the synthesis between thesis and antithesis. But it is not clear that Marx developed any philosophy of the synthesis in dialectic. Rather he depicted an apocalyptic triumph of Light over Darkness, and a new classless Paradise. "Proletariat and wealth are opposites. As such, they form a whole." Even if this triumph of the antithesis be regarded as the synthesis, the Dialectic of Reality apparently comes to a stop at this stage. After the classless society is reached, what happens to the "inevitable dialectic" or dynamism of history? Is Fascism the antithesis of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat as thesis? Or is the development of a Party aristocracy of ability *precisely the synthesis* emerging from the conjunction of the idea of a classless society with pre-existent capitalist divisions? The same objection cannot be raised fairly to Hegel's own treatment—although it will be noted that the Dialectic is that part of Hegel which is dismissed by his commentator Croce as "dead."

8

(c). *The Economic Interpretation of History*—or, as Karl Kautsky pointed out that it should more precisely be called, the Materialist Interpretation of History—is the final contribution of the Dialectic. Marx took History seriously and found Evolution in it, as did all the Hegelians. In Hegel's hands, it will be recalled, the dialectic was used as a technique—*inter alia* but, especially, for historical interpretation. It provided the thread or mode which explained the whole rationally

and in its inner necessity. Marx discovered this dialectic working in matter and in human society, itself in the matrix of the material universe. When, then, Marx and Engels say "economic," according to a strict interpretation they primarily mean "material." It is this tricky identification that seems to give the whole philosophy consistency.

The notion of determination by economic and social environment was no new one. It was the major theme of Robert Owen. Harrington had made it his central thesis and Hume had pointed in the same direction. In 1826 G. Spence wrote his *Origin of the Laws and Political Institutions of Europe*, with this theme. A little later, in 1858, H. T. Buckle was to make the thesis of determination (although *not* sole determination) by geography the basis of his *History of Civilization in England*, the brilliant work—if static in its economic conceptions—of a youthful author who challenged the academic historians as lacking the equipment to interpret history except as annals of wars and courts —those "who from indolence of thought or from natural incapacity [are] unfit to deal with the higher branches of knowledge."

In 1843, however, at the age of twenty-three, Engels wrote his *Sketch for a Critique of Political Economy* in which, with the vigour of confident youth, he criticized Adam Smith, Ricardo and Malthus and showed that social forms were the product of the economic conditions under which private property was held. In the course of demolishing his opponents Engels was able to show the advantages of the dialectical method and that communistic ownership lay in the inevitable development of events. The power to use the word "inevitable" is an indubitable advantage arising from knowledge of Hegelian dialectic.

The *Critique* came as a revelation to Marx. Hitherto Marx had been more conspicuous as a revolutionary radical, saturated in German philosophy and defending materialism, than as either a communist or socialist. He had been piqued when, as editor of the *Rheinische Zeitung* he had been accused of ignorance by his rival the *Augsburger Allgemeine Zeitung* and had bluffed with the reply:

> while communism is a natural phenomenon in France and England, it can find no ground or foothold among us . . . his studies hitherto had not allowed him to pass any judgment on the content of these French movements.

A perusal, however, of Lorenz von Stein's *History of the Socialist Movement in France* had convinced him that there was something

here to study. Voluntary exile in Paris gave him the opportunity. However in his contribution, published along with the *Critique*, in the one number of the *Deutsch-Franzòsische Jahrbücher*, entitled *Towards a Critique of the Hegelian Philosophy of Law*, Marx had not got far beyond the development of the implications of his evolutionary materialism.

> The criticism of heaven is transformed into a criticism of earth, the criticism of religion into a criticism of law, the criticism of theology into a criticism of politics. . . . The criticism of religion ends with the doctrine that man is the highest being for man; it ends, that is to say, with the [idealist] categorical imperative that all conditions must be revolutionized in which man is a debased, an enslaved, an abandoned, a contemptible being. . . . A radical is one who cuts at the roots of things. Now, for man, the root of things is man himself. . . . The weapon of criticism cannot replace the criticism of weapons. Physical force must be overthrown by physical force; but *theory, too, becomes a physical force as soon as it takes possession of the masses.*

All this shows Marx as the physical-force man in revolution, but it certainly does not display a clear view of economic determinism. His genius lay in discovering in Engels' theory the piece which could complete the system of his own philosophy.

The full exposition of the "material" or "economic" interpretation will be found in a late book, *Herr Eugen Dühring's Revolution in Science* or *Anti-Dühring* (1876), being a criticism of Dr. Dühring, of Berlin University, of which a portion was published in 1880 as *Socialism, Utopian and Scientific*. Here, in an English introduction, Engels called in the names of Bacon, Hobbes and Locke—ignoring the empiricism of the first and last and even, psychologically, of the second—to reinforce by authority his own materialism. He proceeded to explain the "scientific," *i.e.*, economic scientific, *i.e.*, materialist, view of society as distinct from the idealist or moralist or "utopian" view of such men as Owen, Fourier and Cabet. It is interesting to note that Engels' theme met with no favour at the annual conference of the German Socialists, leaders of a rapidly growing party constituted in 1875, at Eisenach. Engels here wrote:

> I use the term, "historical materialism," to designate that view of the course of history, which seeks *the ultimate cause* and the great moving power of all important historic events in the economic development of society, in the changes in the modes of production and exchange, in the consequent division of society into distinct classes, and in the struggles of these classes against one another. . . .

The materialist conception of history starts from the proposition that the production of the means to support human life and, next to production, the exchange of things produced, is the basis of all social structure; that in every society that has appeared in history, the manner in which wealth is distributed and society divided into classes or orders, is dependent upon what is produced, how it is produced, and how the products are exchanged. From this point of view the final cause of all social changes and political revolutions are to be sought, not in men's brains, *not in man's better insight into eternal truth and justice, but in changes in the modes of production and exchange.* They are to be sought, not in the philosophy, but in the economics of each particular epoch.

It will be noted that Engels precisely refers to the "materialist" interpretation of history. This rids the theory of one superficial objection, *viz.*, that many other factors beside the economic—geographic, climatic, ethnographic—also determine the social structure and course of human history. The materialist interpretation appears to include but decisively to go beyond the special economic interpretation. It derives, however, much of its attractiveness from this special aspect, elaborated by many eminent economists and historians especially in America today, with considerable advantage to the elucidation of history.

A more substantial difficulty is that, although the materialist interpretation appears to include the economic, one of the strongest arguments for the latter is the influence in shaping society of the greed for gain and of the so-called acquisitive instinct. What, indeed, is acquirable or acquired is materially determined. But to assert that the impulse to acquire, which is a species of the impulse of self-security or egoism, is solely "material," an "afterglow" of the material, or materially originated, brings us back to the old argument of the validity of materialism *alone*, *i.e.*, of dogmatic materialism. Economic interpretation may be sound as one interpretation—partly psychological, not physical—among many. Materialistic determination claims, however, to be the *only* valid interpretation. But economic interpretation is, in part, illuminating for reasons *radically inconsistent* with pure materialistic determination. The comment, on these issues, of Bertrand Russell, one of the greatest of living philosophers, is worth attention:

Before going on to economics one is inclined to ask, first, whether materialism is true in philosophy, and second, whether the elements of Hegelian dialectic which are embodied in the Marxist theory of development can be justified apart from a full-fledged Hegelianism. Then comes the further question whether these metaphysical doctrines have any relevance to the

historical thesis as regards economic development, and last of all comes the examination of this historical thesis itself.

To state in advance what I shall be trying to prove, I hold (1) that materialism, in some sense, may be true, but it cannot be *known* to be so; (2) that the elements of dialectic which Marx took over from Hegel made him regard history as a more rational process than it has in fact been, convincing him that all changes must be in some sense progressive, and giving him a feeling of certainty in regard to the future, for which there is no scientific warrant; (3) that the whole of his theory of economic development may perfectly well be true, if his metaphysic is false, and false if his metaphysic is true, and that but for the influence of Hegel it would never have occurred to him that a matter so purely empirical could depend upon abstract metaphysics; (4) with regard to the economic interpretation of history, it seems to me very largely true, and an important contribution to sociology; I cannot however regard it as *wholly* true, or feel any confidence that all great historical changes can be viewed as developments.

Russell, however, concludes with the exceedingly interesting comment that, whereas Engels, and Lenin after him, were orthodox materialists, Marx has unreconciled pragmatic elements in his philosophy—as suggested by John Dewey's disciple, Sidney Hook. Here Russell relies upon certain passages, in criticism of previous Materialism, by Marx in the *Theses on Feuerbach*. It may be that the truth in Marx can be saved at the expense of Marxist consistency. It was Marx himself who said, "I am not a Marxist"—but it is questionable whether he meant it in this sense. The issue in fact turns upon whether Marx, like Dewey, believed in an "open world" and in both the class war and the classless society as conditions that must justify themselves in practice as probable goods; or whether he had a scheme of the historical process thanks to which he could say beforehand, dogmatically and unpragmatically, with "a feeling of certainty in regard to the future" that is religious and the real clue to his power as a prophet, that the classless society was self-evident good and that the class war was the inevitable and necessary means to its achievement.

This much at least may be said for the dogmatic materialist position of Engels and Lenin that it had *the clear-cut confidence, which simplifies all things, of which religious faiths and bigotries are made.* It may be urged that it has the authentic quality and force of superstition, just as Tacitus alleged that Christianity had this force. Indeed, Marxism has become a talismanic word against which critical analysis is powerless, as it is against Christianity. The comparison is indeed obvious between Marxism, that has absorbed Hegelianism, and the Christianity, that had absorbed the Neo-Platonic philosophy of the

Fourth Gospel and the Alexandrine School. In both cases they must be judged, not only by their logic, as an intellectually cogent or tenable form of belief, but by their fruits. Unfortunately, Marxism by its fruits in conflict does not appear to show itself as psychologically sound as Christianity or as suitable to replace it as the creed of ideal justice and of the oppressed. Marxism has, moreover, here patently common assumptions with Fascism and most doctrines of the Leviathan-state as touching its theory of Truth. The ultimate value has something to do with the practical, concrete, contingent victory of *mine*—my class or nation.

9

(*d*) *The Theory of Surplus Value* supplies a linchpin to the Material or Economic Interpretation of history. This interpretation shows *how* the distribution of wealth had determined the social structure. The producer of wealth is labour. But, in the distribution, others than those who have laboured, have appropriated, either by direct force or by legal force and monopoly, part of the product or the proceeds of the sale of the product. It is about this distribution that the basic contest has gone on throughout history. What, however, precisely is this part of the product which has been withheld and about which the contest has raged? Karl Marx gives an answer in the pages of his *Capital*. Of this book, the first volume was published in 1867; the second and third volumes were published, from Marx's notes, by Engels in 1885 and 1894 respectively.

The answer is, briefly: Surplus Value is the part withheld by the class possessing power from those who are dispossessed of it and exploited. What then is Surplus Value?

It is necessary, first, to recall the position actually held, whether erroneously or not, by the respected and academic economists of early nineteenth-century England. *Das Capital*, it will be remembered, was written in Highgate, London. John Locke had declared that a man has a natural right to that in which he has mixed his labour. McCulloch laid it down that labour is the sole basis of wealth. The quantum or wage-fund theory was generally accepted, according to which what one man took another lost. Ricardo asserted that there is a necessary opposition between the interest of the landlord and all other sections of the community. There is, for Ricardo, a Law of Wages (Lassalle called it "iron"*) according to which the unorganized labourer is forced to take as little as the capitalist, driving him down

* *Cf.* pp. 591, 602.

towards subsistence level, could compel him to accept in the capitalist's determination to cut (labour) costs and to buy in the cheapest (labour) market. It is a law patently conditioned by the long-distance phenomena studied in Population Theory. Adam Smith himself had gone to the point of declaring that civil government was instituted for the defence of the rich against the poor.

Proudhon declared (1840): "Here is my proposition: The worker retains, even after having received his wage, a natural proprietory right over what he has produced." J. K. Rodbertus (1805–1875), German landowner, deputy and economist, in *On the Understanding of Our Economic Condition* (1842), writes that income divides into wages and rent, according to whether the owners

> are entitled to it by virtue of a direct participation in its production or only by accidental possession. Rent is therefore the income which an individual draws by reason of his possessions without any resulting personal obligation to work.

A dispute later arose whether Marx borrowed his ideas from Rodbertus. Neither author indeed was urgent to express gratitude to the writers from whom he had borrowed. The correct answer appears to be that Rodbertus had borrowed them from Proudhon, although Sismondi, the historian, uses (1819) similar phraseology about "surplus value" ("mieux-value"); and that Marx had borrowed from William Thompson. The latter writes (1824) of "surplus value," but differs from Sismondi in regarding it as an excessive toll exacted under the countenance of the law but contrary to equity.

These arresting statements had contained a high enough percentage of truth to make them of practical value in the building up of economic theory. They had an acid tang in contact with assurances (as by sixteenth-century Sir Thomas Smith) that the definition of a gentleman was that he did no work. The economists were not concerned, at this stage, explicitly to include managerial and intellectual labour—even in the organization of exchange—along with manual labour. And the wage-fund theory sufficiently corresponded with day to day facts, in an era when laissez-faire in competition was the vogue, without inquiry whether invention could not increase alike productivity, total wealth and that fund. Thomas Carlyle, Engels first hero, was only just beginning to deliver his frontal attack on "pig's trough" economy and his satire on laissez-faire—"liberty to die of starvation." The divines, with their "Providential" economic natural law, had not yet been blown sky-high. Karl Marx, following Engels, took over

the presuppositions of the Classical Economists but—like Thomas Hobbes, before him, in dealing with the Social Contractualists—he used their assumption for his own purposes.

The value of a product is then the value of the labour put into it. This labour may be measured in labour units or hours. (In the case of complicated and skilled labour, indeed, these labour units may be compounded since educational labour has gone into the labourer.) The effects, upon price, of rarity, etc., of raw materials; of fluctuations of demand; and of the character of the market, are left on one side. Further, Marx, while rejecting with contempt Malthus' theory that labourers, thanks to the pressure of population against means of subsistence, must always compete with each other and undercut to the limit of subsistence, yet accepts the conclusion so far as to state that, under the capitalist system of (pure) workers' competition, wages must always be driven down to a subsistence level—a conclusion which assumes a pure employers' monopoly against labour. The misery of the proletariat increases as capital becomes, by its own inherent tendency to economic domination, more concentrated. Organized Trusts replace small business and, by their power, still further drive down wage labour (visualized as unorganized). Forces making for the free organization of labour or neutralizing some of the effects of the concentration of capital are ignored for purposes of the discussion. There will then be a measurable difference between the real labour value of the product and the wages the depressed labourer gets for that which he has created. Or to put it differently, the labourer will be compelled—if he wishes to retain his job—to work a certain number of hours over and beyond those for which he is paid the value. This surplus value is that which the capitalist appropriates or steals. How is he able to do this? Because he owns the means of production and, therefore, insists that the product shall be his to sell. And *the law*, the police, the army and the bourgeois statesmen uphold him in his ownership. The bottle-neck of trade is his, however industrious the labourer.

There is *ambiguity here* (*as we shall see later when we come to the discussion of John Strachey**) *whether Marx is saying that labour units ought to be the measure of exchange value; or whether he is saying* (*which is hard to justify*) *that it is the measure* and, hence, that the measure of the capitalist's theft is now assessable. If it *is* the measure, then it is only so because surplus value (which goes to make the total of market price) varies to labour value in direct proportion—and Marx does not

* *Cf.* p. 688.

explain how. The surplus value, it would rather appear, would fall to a minimum under free capitalist competition leading to the "breaking" of small capitalists, whereas in a market of restricted competition it could rise in a fashion that bore no relation whatsoever to labour put into the product, *i.e.*, profit arises from the condition of the market, in part, if *also* from the possibility of "cutting" labour costs. Mr. Maurice Dobb has indeed here attempted a defence of the surplus-value theory both on the assumption of a monopoly market and some curious assumptions about the stabilization of demand over a long period, a stabilization which seems to substitute averages for the salesman's actualities and to lead again to escape to values that *ought* to be and even to surplus values that *ought* to come in from the capitalist's standpoint. This argument is the more interesting since Marx used the law of averages, in the third volume of *Capital*, to explain away his embarrassment that surplus values and actual profits become, in practice, divorced. Also raw materials directly used—not only air and water but land, surface crops of coal, and the like—presumably have value, but (for Marx) they have no labour value. "Uncultivated land," writes Marx, "is without value, because no human labour has been incorporated with it." Marx is, as it were, a Physiocrat of the Industrial Revolution. As the Physiocrats found the source of wealth in nothing but land, so Marx (with distinguished predecessors) finds it only in labour.

Marx, however, writes:

> The price-form, however, is not only compatible with the possibility of a quantitative incongruity between magnitude of value and price, *i.e.*, between the former and its expression in money, but it may also conceal a qualitative inconsistency, so much so, that, although money is nothing but the value-form of commodities, price ceases altogether to express value.

Marx is, then, not offering to us a theory of value based on price and exchange.

What then is he offering save an utopian economic ideal of what value *ought* to be, in a system where indeed there is no exchange value (such as makes the same labour, put in in good land and in bad, result in produce exchanging at different prices) but only a society paying to each man a reward directly proportioned to labour hours? It is an ethical desideratum and not a superscientific hypothesis about actualities. Such would be a system not of "to each man the whole product (in exchange) of his labour," nor quite of "to each man according to his needs"—but of "to each man according to work done." This last,

it will be noted, is a piece-work principle, not precisely the same as the maxim "to each according to his (human) needs and from each according to his ability"—and the converse of the "one man, one wage" principle of the Gospel Parable of the Labourers in the Vineyard. It corresponds rather, in technical terms (Marxist usage) to the socialist than to the communist condition of society. But it has obvious propaganda value in exposing a system where the labourer is paid *neither* in accordance with human needs *nor* in accordance with hours of honest work put in *but* in accordance with an impersonal international money exchange system based on consumers' needs or fancies *and* on the power of those superior in economic status to make empty a legal freedom of contract because of superior bargaining power. It is worth noting, in passing, that Engels gloats over the approaching collapse of the Free Trade faith, even in Manchester.

The Theory of Surplus Value, in an immensely long-winded and roundabout three-volume exposition, in Marx's *Kapital*, was a statement of, and served to reinforce recognition of, the need to increase bargaining power for the weaker economic units. It could have been said more lucidly and more briefly. It did this by an analysis, partly accurate, partly fallacious (or unduly simplified—it is the same thing in effect), of the capitalist system. It reached Proudhon's conclusion that capitalism is theft and showed why. It provided a massive, and therefore to many impressive, argument of which the potent implication was this detection of theft. The indictment for exploitation was driven home by ample and damaging quotations supplied from the scathing reports of a capitalist Government, *i.e.*, of His Britannic Majesty's bourgeois factory inspectors. Why the bourgeoisie, on the class-war hypothesis, should spend money exposing and denouncing their own system Marx neither chose nor stayed to inquire. Nor did he draw with emphasis any perhaps redundant distinctions between employer-managers and mere dronelike investing capitalists. Anyhow industrial capitalism, with such managers, was giving way to trusts and finance capitalism. Marx showed the workers that the employer stole and how. He naturally, therefore, has never lacked supporters for his formulae.

Kapital, despite its mathematical paraphernalia, was not so much science, as polemic; and *ethical* polemic. It was political through and through, "theory debouching in practice." Its basic argument was that of the men whom Engels admired, but later dismissed as utopian; it was that of Owen and of Carlyle, in his mood of denunciation of the economists and Cobdenites. But it was heavier, more detailed and,

therefore, for its purpose better and more lasting than these. It claimed, however, to be "Science" because it was a systematic (although scarcely verifiable) plan of what economics might be if combined with a new treatment of economic method, from the angle of the producer not the consumer; and was conjoined with a verifiable denunciation of the existing economic system, citing chapter and verse. It was also claimed by Engels as "scientific" (*wissenschaftlich*) because it could be fitted into a "science" (*Wissenschaft*), in the non-English German sense, as philosophy—that of Hegelian dialectic of history, operative through the class struggle.

The well-known Marxist commentator, Mr. G. D. H. Cole, summarizes the matter in the course of a longer study:

> The Marxian theory of value remains untouched by the criticisms which have been levelled against its fundamental validity, though there is much in its expressions and in its secondary doctrines that is either invalid or of no importance today, sometimes because Marx never escaped from the invalid assumptions which he took over from his predecessors, partly because circumstances have so changed that provisionally valid criticisms of an earlier phase of Capitalism have lost their meaning now, and partly because Marx never completely straightened out his own thinking, or escaped from ambiguities and uncertainties in his own mind.

Among those whom Marx denominated "the vulgar economists," Marx has been esteemed as a philosopher. Even his most complete economic critic, Böhm-Bawerk, says of Hegel and Marx "both of them were philosophic geniuses." Among the philosophers he has fairly uniformly been regarded as an economist. The opinion of such an indubitable philosopher of the highest brilliance as Bertrand Russell has been cited above concerning his philosophy. The remark of the economist, James Bonar, intended as encomium, is sufficient comment. "The charm of the writings of Marx lies, perhaps, chiefly in the tenacity and confidence with which he applies his key to lock after lock. . . . He never doubts his key will open all locks."

Marx, most certainly, is a philosopher of a high order, thanks to his systematizing talent by which he linked up materialism, Hegelian dialectic and the class war, with the theory of surplus value as a neat rider to the economic interpretation of dialectical history. Whether this link-up is right or wrong is a separate issue. Nor is it any criticism to comment that each point had been stated by someone before, and nothing was original. It had not all been said by anyone before; that was original. Many philosophers have been wrong. Marx is not alone

in that respect. He was moreover an economic writer (however fallacious in detail) of singular provocative force. He was right in many points, peculiarly in drawing attention to the unquestionable fact of exploitation of unorganized labour as a commodity.

It is not, however, enough to say that Marx is right on many points, that "there is much good in Marx." So there is in most writers of eminence from Mahomet to Swedenborg, including Machiavelli. The issue is whether there is enough good to justify men following him. Essentially Marx is neither a great metaphysician nor a scientific economist. Essentially he is great as a prophet founding a new religion, like Christianity, of the oppressed. He is a great religious leader, like Swedenborg, or a great propagandist. His theory is an elaborated system, metaphysical, logical and economic, which provided justification for *action* good in itself. That action is the union of the workers to produce the classless society, but to produce it by certain *methods* shown to be inevitable by "the system"—his "system" which Marx put over against the capitalist-bourgeois philosophy and "system." The system stands or falls as ethical; and its ethical value turns precisely upon the validity of these highly distinctive methods, so impassionedly urged.

10

(*e*) *The Classless Society* was also no novelty, among ideals, when it was developed by Marx. It was a commonplace of Rousseau and of the equalitarians of the French Revolution. It was the common heritage of all Socialists. No one had depicted it in more glowing colours than precisely those Socialists, of the tradition of Owen and Fourier, whom Engels denounced as "utopian." It was rather Marx and Engels, with their inequalitarianism, who bring difficulties into the conception of it. Is Marx, the Utopian, as good a Utopian as the rest, with as clear ethical vision?

A distinction, although never developed until our day, can indeed be discovered between those who believed in a society, communistic but functional, and those who believed in a society that was not only classless but undifferentiated in function. Plato, the early father of communism of property, explicitly condemned social inequalities due to accidents of hereditary position. Plato, however, would have been in entire disagreement with Rousseau and with Andrew Jackson that any man is, equally with any other, competent to do any political job. He would have regarded the use of the lot in selecting for political office as the logical consequence—and reduction to absurdity—of this belief.

With this use of the lot, with no nonsense about superior merit in it, he was quite well acquainted in his own day and categorically condemned. Plato (while admitting the importance of eugenics) is an opponent of hereditary classes but a plain proponent of groups specializing in different functions, some more socially indispensable than others.

Marx –unlike such people as Abraham Lincoln, with whom (against the background of his personal experience) this theme of equality verged on a religious belief—did not seriously assert present human equality. The classless society was not to be, for a long present, the equal wage society, nor was it to be the equal power society—that is the interesting point. And the reason?—because the real goal of all striving for Marx is Revolt, is the successful revolution which demanded discipline, authority and inequality. The doctrine of equality, derived from the immortality of the individual soul or the instant moral rights here and now of a rational person, did not appeal to him. The popular masses, who were for the present not politically conscious and who were apathetic about fighting for their own interests in the class war, he dismissed peremptorily as the "*Lumpenproletariat.*" The agricultural workers—a large element in most countries—were, for Marx, "native barbarians," "troglodytes," not forming a class and therefore not able to defend their class interests. For the present, "they cannot represent themselves, they must be represented." For Engels they were "working machines, not men." This formed an interesting contrast to the theme of J. S. Mill that each man is the only safe guardian of his own rights and is entitled to follow his own *actual* wishes, even if stupid, until he educates himself; not what some proletarian "leader" alleges are his *real* wishes, ascertained to be such by the Dialectic.

In his book, *The Holy Family* (of which Engels, the joint author, commented, "the book is brilliantly written and makes one burst one's sides with laughing"), Marx writes:

> When socialist writers ascribe this rôle in universal history to the proletariat, they are far from doing so because they regard proletarians as gods. It is very much the other way. Because, in the fully developed proletariat, the withdrawal of all humanity, and even of the semblance of humanity, has been practically completed; because, in the living conditions of the proletariat, all the living conditions of contemporary society are comprised in their unhuman climax; because, in the proletariat, the human being has lost himself, but has gained something more than the theoretical awareness of this loss, for he has gained this in addition, that it has become an imperious necessity for him to revolt against unhumanity—for all these reasons, the

proletariat can and must liberate itself. Yet it cannot liberate itself without abolishing its own living conditions, without abolishing all the nonhuman living conditions of contemporary society, the conditions that comprise the situation of the proletariat.

We are not concerned, therefore, with what this or that proletarian, or even the proletariat as a whole, may regard as an aim. What we are concerned with is, what the proletariat actually is; and what the proletariat will, in accordance with the nature of its own being, be historically compelled to do.

The thesis, then, of Marx is precisely the old one of the revolutionary French Jacobins. It is not that of the Anglo-Saxon democrat. A disciplined minority, which during the period of revolutionary action remains a minority, may yet interpret the Real Will of the people or of the proletariat and comprehend what, by theoretical necessity, that people or proletariat will "be compelled to do," even although that people is actually unconscious of this Will or Process. "We are not concerned with what the proletariat may regard as an aim." Marx was perhaps an equalitarian as touching a post-revolutionary future; but he was a strong party functionalist as touching the revolutionary present.

A difference no less relevant to the nature of Marxism than that between equalitarians and functionalists may be detected. There were, as we shall see, Socialists such as the British Fabians who hoped to use existing administrative machinery to increase the range of the public ownership of the essential means of production and exchange through nationalization or municipalization. Even non-Socialists, such as Joseph Chamberlain, established, *e.g.*, in Birmingham, England, municipal banks. Further, there were Communists of the old style, such as Owen and Noyes, who actually established communities in which the product was shared. Thirdly, Marx and Engels, advocated "communism" as an end but "socialism" as a means, meaning thereby the capture of administrative machinery, including the army, but its capture in order to smash it and institute—except in France, Britain and the United States—revolutionarily, the communist classless order. By a confusing use of terms, they yet denominated this whole scheme "communist," but "scientific communist." This scheme involved the revolutionary stress, distinctive of the later Communist Parties and Communist International. It is, therefore, highly misleading and inaccurate, to use the word Communist—except for popular electioneering purposes—without the distinctive adjunct "scientific" or "Marxist," as distinct from other forms. Briefly, it is better to distinguish between evolutionary [or Fabian] Socialism; co-operative

[or Owenite] Communism, such as today exists most successfully in free Palestinian communities; and revolutionary Socialism or revolutionary Communism, briefly called Marxism. The *method* with Marxism is the distinctive note.

Nothing can be more sharply distinct than this method, distinctive of the Marxian gospel, from the method of the earlier Communists, dismissed as Utopian. This dismissal was unfair since the practice of Owen and Noyes is something very different from the paper plans of Fourier or even the idylls of Cabet, the imitator of Thomas More (even although also the founder of the settlement called Icarie), or of the Pantisocrats, Shelley and Southey. Marx and Engles, lawyer's son and business man's son, had a rooted objection to sentimentalism. The quarrel of Marx and Weitling has already been discussed. Marx was nauseated by Weitling's, and even Feuerbach's, discourses on social love. Engels regarded with amusement the moral preoccupations of the British workers who followed Owen, as distinct from the "physical-force" left-wing (whose leaders were chiefly Irish) of the Chartists. The point that the reformists of 1832 succeeded, and the "physical-force" men did not, was missed by Engels. The key-note of Owen's movement, the spirit of co-operation inspired by belief in the universality of the sense of justice if led out and educated, seemed to Marx and Engels the recipe for pious failure and the formula of class collaborationism. The divergence of mood, about the route to the classless society, was fundamental.

Two points remain unexplained in Marx's thesis concerning this route. If the object is the classless society, which will be built up, not by idealistic appeal to the sense of justice, but by pursuing the interest of the largest class, the proletariat, it appears that a perception of material interest is what has to be developed. If, however, this is so, it is not clear how a minority can be trusted—against all maxims of democratic vigilance—with the safeguarding, *not* of their own material interests or power interests, but *only* of the interests of the majority for whom they speak. Contrary to J. S. Mill's teaching, a few are, without control or power of recall, to claim that they represent the "true interests" of the many and to demand power on their behalf. It is no commendation of a philosophy to say that Marxist idealists will be better than their announced principles. Nor is it the practical teaching even of contemporary Russian and German history, or even that of Puritan England and Revolutionary France, that men who have acquired power by bitter fighting are, in fact, anxious to distribute it equally with others.

The further question is, how a regime of communist co-operation, equity and equality is to be introduced by the inflammation of hate, not only between capitalist and non-capitalist nations, but within the former, and until liquidation of opponents is complete, also within the latter. Marx temperamentally was antipathetic to the charitable gospel of Weitling, and even (on this point) of Feuerbach and of Owen —as well as of Marx *père*. He found more satisfaction in the teaching, to which vogue had been given by the poet Byron, sadist turned pilgrim penitent, that there was something to be said for hate. Hate has the advantage of insuring persecution, making martyrs, inciting to sacrifice and discipline and, hence, of being a good principle of organisation.

11

(*f*) *The Class Struggle* is, for Marx, the manifestation of the material or economic dialectic in history. It has always existed. It is the firing line of political action, and the rest of Marx's philosophy and economics are brought in as explanatory or justificatory of it. It is the kernel of all his case. In the present capitalist epoch, when the classes involved are no longer the feudal nobility and the merchants (an Hegelian antithesis), but the bourgeoisie and the proletariat, the incentive to this struggle is found in two economic factors, to the existence of which Marx points. These are the concentration of capital and, as corollary, the *inevitably* increasing misery of the workers. These follow mathematically from the static, quantum conception of wealth and the "iron law of wages" (as Lassalle, mixing Goethe and Ricardo, later called it) which Marx took over from his precedessors. The growth of limited liability companies and trusts—the displacement of industrial employers' capitalism by "finance-capital"—indicated the former tendency. And, since what one took another lost, the increase of misery mathematically followed from this growth in concentrated power of Mammon. From that increase of misery *must* spring revolt and the overturning of the Capitalist System.

Whether, in fact, an expanding economy might not permit an absolute increase of both profits and wages, with constancy of proportions, or even an increase of the proportion held socially or by wage earners, are questions that we shall discuss when we consider John Strachey.* Here also we shall discuss how far the concentration

* *Cf.* p. 693. The great department stores are "concentration of Capital" *par excellence*, a proof text for Marxist theory. Actually we find porters and waiters as capitalists among the occupational groups of, *e.g.*, Woolworth's shareholders. *Cf.* Berle and Means: *The Modern Corporation and Private Property*—a book of basic importance.

of capital has in fact led to the elimination of middle economic or skilled artisan groups.

The thesis that there is a divergence of interests between economic groups deep in the structure of every economically unequal society (as between power groups in every politically inequalitarian society), that there is, in brief, a latent or overt Class Struggle is no new one. It was recognized by the Greeks. It was recognized, for example, by outstanding writers of the American Revolution, commenting on Locke's ambiguous thesis of the natural right (whose?) to property. It is patently true. Locke it was who (patently untruly) declared "government has no other end than the preservation of property." He corrected himself elsewhere by assigning an end in popular happiness. Linguet, in 1767, wrote "the spirit of the laws is property."

It was the second American President, John Adams, who wrote:

> Two such parties (rich and poor) therefore always will exist, as they always have existed, in all nations, especially in such as have property, and most of all in commercial countries. Each of these parties must be represented in the legislature and the two must be checks on each other. But without a mediator between them, they will oppose each other in all things, and go to war until the one subjugates the other. The executive authority is the only mediator that can maintain peace between them.

President Madison wrote in his early days, in *The Federalist:*

> The only durable source of friction is property.

Daniel Webster declared:

> If the nature of our institution be to found good government on property, and that it should look to those who hold property for its protection, it is entirely just that property should have its weight and consideration in political arrangement.

In his Thanksgiving Speech, he continued:

> Universal suffrage, for example, could not long exist in a community where there was great inequality of property. The holders of estates would be obliged in such case either in some way to restrain the right of suffrage, or else such right of suffrage would ere long divide the property.

Noah Webster writes, in a pamphlet on the Constitution of the United States:

> Wherever we cast our eyes, we see this truth that property is the basis of power; and this being established as a cardinal point, directs us to the means of

preserving our freedom . . . A general and tolerably equal distribution of landed property [*cf.* Harrington] is the whole basis of national freedom.

The distinctive position of Marx certainly did not consist in describing or first supposing this divergence of interest or class struggle. Proudhon, moreover, and Lorenz von Stein (in 1844) had found in it the clue to the interpretation of social history. What was distinctive was the metaphysician's precision that Marx gave to the word "class," as distinct from group interest (there were precisely *two* classes); the notion of class struggle as no mere divergence of economic interests but as a civil war with the implications of universal physical revolution; and—as against Stein—the metaphysical notion of this war as inevitable (saving certain problematic exceptions) and, even when latent and not detectable by the casual eye, as always present.

The Marxist argument of Class War, then, turns upon the existence of sharply defined classes to be stirred to revolt and to engage, on one side or the other, in this war—units corresponding to the requirements of the dialectic. There must be substantially only these two classes, capitalists and proletariat, exploiters and exploited, thesis and antithesis. Let Marx explain the matter himself, which he does in *The Holy Family* (1844):

Proletariat and wealth are opposites. As such they form a whole. . . . Private property as private property, as wealth, is compelled to maintain its own existence, and therewith the existence of its opposite, the proletariat. It is the positive side of the contrast, private property satisfied with itself. The proletariat, on the other hand, is compelled as proletariat to abolish itself, and therewith to abolish private property, the opposite that has determined its own existence, that has made it into a proletariat.

The position of the middle class in this dialectic of history—this "algebra of revolution": Herzen's phrase—is not clear. Theoretically, a third class cannot be admitted. Attention has already been called to the "either-or-ness" of the system, to which much of its neatness and propaganda value is due. If a middle class exists—or if, in fact, a multitude of social groups exists—it must yet be held to have a role of decreasing importance, to be without essential or future historical significance and, in fact, to be dependent upon one or the other of the antagonists—exploiters and exploited—that confront each other across the battle line.

Actually—and the issue is of practical importance—Marx hesitates on which side of the line to place the middle class of monthly and quarterly salary earners with small investments. They are not

proletariat. Of the proletariat Marx has provided as a definition in the *Communist Manifesto* which he drafted (as a German Jew and in German):

> The proletariat is that class of society which derives its subsistence solely from selling its labour and not from any profit on capital. . . . The proletarian has no property; its relationship to wife and children is utterly different from the family relations of bourgeois life; modern industrial labour, the modern enslavement by capital . . . have despoiled him of his national characteristics. Law, morality, and religion have become for him so many bourgeois prejudices, behind which bourgeois interests lurk in ambush.

Marx, with his philosophy made in Germany and his practical experience derived from revolutionary and secularist France, did not understand, any more than Engels, and was too contemptuous to try to understand, British moralism about what Godwin called Social Justice. Anyhow such understanding would have taken the edge off his logical argument. For the moralism of the founders, such as the Owenites, of the British Socialist movement, with its co-operative temper, and the empiricism of British philosophy were, for Marx and Engels, not theories, but the absence of theory as they conceived it. So far as they understood this entirely non-Hegelian or anti-Hegelian outlook, they regarded it with amused contempt. The Englishmen from whom Marx had learned were the Classical Economists—the working classes he studied in the British Museum—and, as Ricardo's "economic man" walked abroad, so did Marx's "proletarian worker." The result is a singular proof that the idea is mightier than the fact and the theorist mightier than the practical man.

In several passages Marx appears to identify the Bourgeoisie or Middle Class, the successors and supplanters of the Feudal Landlords, with the capitalist enemy. That is, as will be seen later, of immeasurable practical importance.* The Middle Class, historically regarded, is the foe. This Middle Class, however, of merchants and small employers is itself disrupted. In other passages, therefore, we find a limited group of trusts, large employers and (especially) international financiers, on the one side, and a functionless aggregate of bankrupt employers, depressed into a managerial condition, and white-collar wage slaves, on the other, with no future save that of the proletariat, which has no savings and only its labour to sell, even more uncertain than was the mediaeval serf on one day what it should do on the next. Although, therefore, in certain rash passages, Marx appears inclined to present

* *Cf.* p. 717, 755.

the bourgeoisie or middle class to the capitalists, ranged over against the proletariat, Marx does not consider the possibility that the middle class and small investors may increase in importance with economic development. His argument presumes the opposite.

What, however, about those people, by descent and economic circumstance obvious bourgeois, who yet join and even lead the proletariat, enabling them to separate themselves, as self-conscious, from the brainless "*Lumpenproletariat*"? What about Marx himself, who derived his funds, partly as the employee of the capitalist press by the personal favour of a capitalist editor, partly from Engels—from the profits extracted by a German firm from exploited Manchester proletarians—but derived these funds only a little from his hired intellectual labour and not at all from manual labour? The answer is that, although acute class self-consciousness is essential in order to sharpen class lines, yet class for Marx is a matter, not of economic fact alone but of outlook. Certain members of the exploiting class, contrary to their immediate economic interests, may choose to share the proletarian ideal, thanks to a comprehension of the deeps of Marxist philosophy and of the inevitable course of history or to an ideal sentiment unreckoned in the heaven and earth of Marx's philosophy.

Marx shared the belief, not only of his compatriot Ricardo, but of the generality of English and Scottish economists, under the influence of the eighteenth century, about enlightened self-interest being the guide of human conduct. Intellectual contempt for co-operationism and for belief in a social instinct, as philosophic slackness, was a corollary. Marx yet made the change of substituting class material interest for that of disunited individual workers. "Union makes force." But periodically Marx lapses into Hegelian idealism and into the belief that man may be guided by intellectual conviction and insight, contrary to economic interest, to a stand in life's battle. He could scarcely offer in explanation that power interest or the qualification of envy might be the guide in these middle-class crossings of class boundaries, where economic interest was lacking. In Marx's own case, however, the desire for intellectual dominance cannot be ruled out. He needed the masses to enable his theory to prevail, if it came to force, by force. He was determined to teach the other fellows.

What Marx did was to provide a movement with a creed, a movement which hitherto had had no adequate theory. Owen, Saint-Simon and Proudhon may have expressed truths of the first order, neglected by Marx. But their theories had been intellectual patchwork. Marx gave the movement whole-cloth Hegel. He did more. The workers had

had leaders who dreamed beautiful dreams of brotherly love. Marx did for the socialist movement what Machiavelli did for state theory. As Machiavelli spat on the beautiful comforting maxims of the Schoolmen, unrelated to actual human conduct, so Marx expended his contemptuous wit on those who hesitated to tell the capitalists just where armed revolt would place a limit to their power. Marx's concern was to build up in effect a military machine. He returned to the study of politics as the science of power. The drawbacks were that his policy of action was primarily—and this agreed with his whole temperament —negative, destructive, bellicose; and that Marxism turned away from the peaceful, constructive schemes of Owenites and Cooperators, and of the Quakers, the monks and the early Christian communities before them.

Controversy has turned upon a distinction between Class Struggle (*Kampf*) and Class War (*Krieg*). The former is Marx's technical phrase. Building oneself upon passages in his later writings, after the revolutionary wave of the 1848 had gone by, third in its wash from the French Revolution, it is possible to depict Marx as a social evolutionist, asserting that radical social change is only possible when in the slow dialectic of history the right moment comes—and that, when it is possible, it is also determined. We shall later discuss Kautsky and the German Social School that would have re-Hegelianized Marx into an evolutionist.* Indubitably Marx indulges in numerous condemnations of rash and immature attempts at revolution, organized by others than himself, or of mere individual terrorism such as Blanqui advocated. There is, moreover, as we have seen, a contradiction in the Marxist philosophy (although no new one in the history of thought) between determinism and the will for action. Marx, at least, if not Engels, saw the difficulty. And there is clear reason (as we shall later see) to suppose that Lenin was right in his interpretation of Marx as essentially a physical-force revolutionary, although blessed with a sense for history.† If so the attempted distinction between the assertion of class struggle, *i.e.*, divergence of group economic interests, and the waging of class war, *i.e.*, latent or patent civil war, although wholly sound in itself, breaks down so far as Marx is concerned. An inconsistency is, however, noticeable here. If the Proletariat was, as an entity, in the dialectic of history, to overcome the Bourgeoisie just as the Bourgeoisie earlier had overcome the Feudal Nobility, then it is noticeable that (France perhaps excluded on one interpretation of the Revolution) the Bour-

* *Cf.* p. 606.

† *Cf.* p. 626.

geoisie, as a class, had *not* overcome the Landed Class by physical, civil, or class war. Why then must this method alone be sound and "scientific" for the Proletariat?

The words of Marx's most famous early work (at the age of thirty), the *Communist Manifesto*, are unambiguous enough:

> Every class struggle is a political struggle. . . . The communists everywhere support every revolutionary movement against extant social and political conditions. . . . Communists scorn to hide their views and aims. They openly declare that *their purposes can only be achieved by the forcible overthrow of the whole extant social order.* Let the ruling classes tremble at the prospect of a communist revolution. Proletarians have nothing to lose but their chains. They have a world to win.
>
> Proletarians of all lands unite.

Marx had learned declamation from Rousseau. From Hegel he had learned dogmatism. From the British Economists he had learned that the clue to the social order lay in self-interest. A great socialist, he was not a good socialist since this arch-individualist doctrine was embedded by him in the foundations of his system. To state a brief paradox, Marx with his doctrine of class self-interest was not a socialist at all. As well make Hobbes a socialist, because he was a totalitarian absolutist, as Marx, the class individualist. He could not visualize the inauguration of the classless society save through civil war and the triumph of one class. But Marx had also learned the eighteenth-century optimism, raised by him to a Messianic level. Force must be met by force. The end would be triumph. In that the true believer had cosmic faith.

Revolution as a temporary pragmatic expedient was counselled by Churchill in 1688 and by Washington and Jefferson in 1776. Marx, however, advocated revolution as a principle—world revolution permanent until the classless society was introduced through the crashing of the state system. "Not criticism, but revolution, is the motive force of history," writes Marx. What happened to the dialectic of history—and whether the group struggle of ambitious men for power might not continue—after the Proletarian Revolution, he did not explain. About what happened to the famous triad—thesis, antithesis, synthesis—if Nationalist-Capitalist-Individualism were thesis and Revolutionary Socialism were antithesis; or whether National Socialism might not be the logical synthesis; or what else *was* the synthesis . . . on these last things he did not enlighten his followers. The Dialectic ended in static and apocalyptic glory. It was, however, Marx himself who said to Hyndman, "To leave error unrefuted is to encourage intellectual

immorality." Marx was a fanatic of his own vision. Marx was an Utopian Socialist of his own special Hebrew prophetic brand.

The great Greeks declared that *stasis* was the first curse of the community. They knew it from experience. Marx elevated *stasis* into a first principle of action. Had not Adam Smith himself declared that, in the law-courts, the cards were stacked against the exploited? How then could there be any community? His compatriot Disraeli—the cynical creator of British Imperialism in its most egoistical, most exploitative and least pleasing aspect—had said, at this very time, in *Sybil*, that, in England, there were two nations, rich and poor, "between whom there is no intercourse and no sympathy." It is odd that Disraeli had also said: "My mind is a Continental mind. It is a revolutionary mind." The phrase, however, about two nations was no new one. It was Plato who used it. *The Republic* was Plato's answer; *The Communist Manifesto* was that of Marx. Marx, on the Hegelian Left, like Treitschke on the Hegelian Right, adds, in despite of Hegel and in the style of Thrasymachos, to the growing Irrationalism and realistic or neo-Machiavellian force-mentality characteristic (as against, *e.g.*, Benthamism) of the nineteenth century as it passes into the twentieth. I accuse Marx, by dialectical reaction, of being the own father of Fascism and of conflict, cause of so bitter miseries in this twentieth century—*tantum religio potuit suadere malorum.**

12

The *Manifesto*, which would have been abortive without the 1848 revolution, was also abortive with it. In the revolutionary years in France of 1870–1871 Marx played rather the part of the sociological observer. But on July 23, 1863, English and French trade unionists, interested in the cause of Polish independence, met in the Bell Inn, Old Bailey, London. Contacts had already been established, in 1862, when a delegation of French workers, their expenses defrayed by Napoleon III, had come over to view the great London International Exhibition, inaugurated by Victoria and Albert as a tribute to the spirit of Industry, Progress and Peace. At the Bell Inn meeting the possibility was discussed of "an international working men's alliance." On September 28, 1863, Professor Beesley, of University College, London, with two English trade unionists, met foreign delegates in St. Martin's Hall, London. Marx came as a German delegate. Marx said he sent the other German delegate, from the German Workers'

* "To so great evils may theological faith persuade men."

Educational Union. Lessner, of that Union, said they sent Marx The other delegate, Eccarius, alone spoke. Marx, however, became the draftsman. His *Address* was accepted as a declaration of principles. "The thing was not quite so difficult as one might imagine," wrote Marx to Engels, "because one has only workers to deal with." A phrase about justice, truth and morality was "so placid that it can do no harm." The First International Working Men's Association was founded.

Marx, however, reckoned without Bakunin.* The great Russian Anarchist was no organizer. But he had a section of the League of Peace and Freedom—called by Marx "the Geneva wind-bag"—behind him, later organized separately as the International Social-Democratic Alliance. In 1868 Bakunin joined the Geneva section of the First International. Marx sent him a copy of *Kapital*, but the Russian overlooked the need to acknowledge it. The followers of Proudhon, who had no relish either for the personal dictatorship of Marx or for his alien theories, found in Bakunin a rallying point. By 1872, Eccarius having fallen away, "a fool and a knave as well," there was grave risk that, at the Hague Conference of the International, the Bakuninists would control the vote. Marx played his final cards. He accused Bakunin of embezzlement and of founding a secret Alliance; and he moved the seat of the Council of the International to New York. Within four years it had died out, saved pure from the embraces of Bakunin, but bereft of vitality and finally dissolved in 1876. The American Marxists themselves proceeded to split—apart from later post-Lenin factional divisions, with the followers of Lovestone, not to speak of Trotsky, pursuing a line of their own.

In 1882 Marx's health was failing, thanks to lung trouble. Bakunin had died in 1876. Marx went to Algiers to recuperate and came back via Monte Carlo. He had torn to bits, in 1875, the unification programme of the German Workers—the Gotha Programme—detecting in it "the stale stink" of Lassalle (to whom we shall return).† It was his last major declaration. Here incidentally he again defined his attitude towards equality.

> One man will excel another physically or intellectually and so contribute in the same time more labour, or can labour for a longer time; and labour, to serve as a measure, must be defined by its duration or integrity, otherwise it ceases to be a standard measure. This equal right is an unequal right for

* *Cf.* p. 427.

† *Cf.* p. 602.

unequal work. It recognises no class differences because every worker ranks as a worker like his fellows, but it tacitly recognises unequal individual endowment, and thus capacities for production, as natural privileges. It is therefore *a right of inequality in its content*, as in general is every right.

However, in a full communist society, when "all the springs of cooperative wealth are gushing more freely together with the all-round development of the individual," then the principle could be applied, "from each according to his capacity, to each according to his need." The doctrine was elaborated further, in 1876, by Engels in *Anti-Dühring*.

The real content of the proletarian demand for equality is the demand for the abolition of classes. *Any demand for equality which goes beyond this, of necessity passes into absurdity.*

So much for the philosophy of Jackson and Lincoln.

In 1883 Marx died. The death of his daughter Jenny, wife of Charles Longuet, Georges Clemenceau's collaborator on *Justice*, had made him worse. His grave is at Highgate, London. *Kapital* was still unfinished. Engels, in his funeral oration, pointed out that he was another Darwin, who had discovered "the law of evolution in human history." Marx always stressed the coupling of his name with Darwin. To Marx is attributed the comment: "Nothing ever gives me greater pleasure than to have my name thus linked with Darwin's. His wonderful work makes my own absolutely impregnable." The outlook of both was dominated by the notion of the deadly battle for survival—in Marx's case, of classes as units. Later it was to be of Nation-states. The fact that Marx would become more influential than Darwin, but was quite unlike that detached seeker after natural truth, escaped Engels. In 1885 the pious Engels published the second volume of *Kapital* and in 1894 the third. Save when the self-centered egoism of Marx, induced by preoccupation with his financial troubles, had led him to offer Engels only perfunctory condolences on the death of his mistress, Mary Burns, their friendship had, despite all trials, never been interrupted.

In 1895 Engels himself died and, after a funeral ceremony at which John Burns was present, was cremated. His ashes were buried at sea by his own request. The twin thinkers of revolutionary communism had left behind them a gospel; but also texts open to a multiplicity of interpretations. It was now the turn of the Talmudists and commentators.

READING

K. Marx: *The Communist Manifesto. Critique of the Gotha Program* (*ed.* 1933).

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE

*Böhm-Bawerk: *Karl Marx and the Close of His System*, trans. A. MacDonald, 1898 (critical).

E. H. Carr: *Karl Marx*, 1934 (critical).

*F. Engels: *Socialism, Utopian & Scientific* (part of *Anti-Dühring*), trans. E. Aveling, 1892.

K. Marx: *Das Kapital*, 3 vols.

G. Mayer: *Friedrich Engels, Eng. Ed.* 1935 (laudatory).

Franz Mehring: *Karl Marx, the Story of His Life*, 1918.

R. Owen: *A New View of Society.*

R. Soltau: *French Political Thought in the Nineteenth Century*, 1931.

Leopold Schwarzschild; *The Red Prussian*, 1948.

Chapter XIX

Kautsky, Lenin, Trotsky, Stalin

1

THE immediate influence of Karl Marx was far more pronounced on the Continent of Europe, from which he had come, than in Britain, where he resided. In Britain his most enthusiastic supporter, apart from resident Germans, was H. M. Hyndman (1842–1923), who organized the Social Democratic Federation. That Federation proclaimed its indebtedness in theory to what Hyndman called, in *The Historical Basis of Socialism in England* (1883), "the famous German historical school of political economy headed by Karl Marx, with Friedrich Engels and Rodbertus immediately following." However, it exercised a smaller influence in the building up of the British Labour and Socialist Movement than, *e.g.*, the non-Marxian Fabian Society, and certainly than organized Trade Unionism or than Keir Hardie's Independent Labour Party (founded in 1893). At the date when Hyndman wrote his *Historical Basis* no translation of Marx's *Kapital* was available in English; and Hyndman had to refer readers to the French or German editions.

Just as Marx, in 1870, had declared that "the French need a hiding" (which would have, as consequence, "the preponderance of *our* theory over Proudhon's"), so, in 1914, the S.D.F. was convinced that the Germans must be beaten, as exponents of reactionary militarism. Just as Marx, in the *Communist Manifesto*, had demanded, when the proletariat came to power, "the establishment of industrial armies, especially for agriculture," so the S.D.F. urged the establishment of national military service or conscription—"arms for the workers"—even under the existing social system. It emerged from the Great War of 1914–1918 with its prestige gravely impaired in relation to a semi-pacifist Labour Party.

In Germany the position was very different. The fusion of national or imperialist ideas with the political power of the workers was advocated, with a rhetorical power possessed by neither Marx nor Engels, by Ferdinand Lassalle (1825–1864) who, through his personal influence,

converted an obscure movement into a great party. He launched the General Union of German Workers (1862) from which the United Social Democratic Party of Germany was, later, in large part to spring. However personally friendly Lassalle might seek to be, Marx welcomed no such eclipse of his own influence, and Lassalle remained, to Marx and Engels, "the Jewish nigger." They had their justification in the favour with which Prince Otto von Bismarck looked upon this young apostle of the Hegelian State and enemy of the Liberal industrialist employers. Lassalle's attitude towards laissez-faire, and towards the existing form of State, is illustrated in his *Science and the Working Man:*

> The course of history is a struggle against nature, against ignorance and impotence, and consequently, against slavery and bondage of every kind in which we were held under the law of nature at the beginning of history. The progressive overcoming of this impotence is the evolution of liberty, of which history is an account. In this struggle humanity would never have made one step in an advance, had man gone into the struggle single, each for himself. *The State is the contemplated unity and cooperation of individuals in a moral whole*, whose function it is to carry on this struggle, a combination which multiplies a million-fold the forces of all the individuals comprised in it, and which heightens a million times the powers which each individual would be able to exert singly.

The life, however, of Lassalle, always complicated by emotional distractions especially with feminine members of the aristocracy, was terminated in a duel with the lover of Fraülein Helen von Doeniges, who had been chagrined because her desire to elope with Lassalle was not gratified by him.

Wilhelm Liebknecht (1826–1900) and F. August Bebel (1840–1913) were men of a different order from Lassalle. Both were humble followers of Marx, although Marx freely described the former as "a poor devil," while admitting Bebel to be "useful and energetic." Bebel belonged to the old secularist school of atheism, while his interest in feminism was bound up with theories of free love that shocked not only bourgeois but workers. Such associations did not encourage trust of Marxism in Britain. Liebknecht fell by the way in following his allotted path of an obedient disciple, frankly disregarding much of Marx's criticisms of the Gotha programme. Trust was rather reposed in Bebel, who had achieved at Gotha that strategic victory over the General Union of German Workers which had ensured that the new and united Social Democratic Party should be Marxist rather than Lassallean. In 1890 Engels wrote, of the Emperor William II:

Willie is threatening to abolish universal suffrage—*nothing better could happen for us! Even as it is, we are pressing on fast enough either to the world war or to the world revolution or to both.*

Bernstein, on Engels' suggestion, was publishing criticisms (until his expulsion—to London—from Germany, in 1888) of the Kaiser's national-social policy of that period. Meanwhile, in Kautsky's *Neue Zeit* (for some time published in London), Engels succeeded in effecting publication of Marx's bitter criticisms of the Gotha compromise, although not without resentment from Wilhelm Liebknecht. As Engels explained a little oddly:

What is the difference between you people and Puttkamer, if you pass anti-socialist laws against your own comrades? You—the party—need socialist science, and such science cannot exist *unless there is freedom* in the party.

Eduard Bernstein (1850–1937), Karl Kautsky (1854–1938) and Karl A. F. Liebknecht (1871–1918) dominated, by their work, the next generation of Socialists, the epigoni, in Germany. Of these, the first, who had fallen under the influence of the Fabians in London, was the father of what is termed Revisionism. His position is set forth in his *Evolutionary Socialism* (1899; English translation from German, 1909).

Engels himself, in 1891, had expressed reservations about the doctrine of the increasing misery of the workers.

The organisation of the working class [Trade Unions] and their steadily growing resistance will *possibly* act as a check on the growth of their misery. It is the uncertainty of life which *is* certainly increasing.

This comment indicates a significant shift of emphasis.

Bernstein goes farther. The prophesies of an early Coming and Last Judgement by proletarian revolution, made in the Communist Manifesto of fifty years earlier, had not been fulfilled. Marx himself, despite his enthusiasm, after the event, for the French Commune of 1871, had discouraged revolutionary "adventure." Socialists, Bernstein insisted, had to make their choice between a revolutionary myth, based on abstract Hegelian metaphysics, which might stir enthusiasm but had no relations to the social facts or—unkind cut—a "scientific" socialism, properly so called, which took into account sociological and statistical research. That research indicated that there was no foundation for asserting an "inevitable crisis" in capitalism, since the number of holders of capital was increasing (instead of a concentration of capital in even fewer hands). There was a difference—not noted by Kautsky—

between concentration of *capital* in the control of, *e.g.*, department stores, and the reduction of the circle of *capitalists*. Indeed the shareholders of these stores were increasingly numerous. The number of those with moderate incomes was also increasing, instead of the disappearance of the middle class between the upper and nether millstones of exploiter class and exploited class. And the standard of living and of real wages of the weekly wage-earners was rising.

The Theory of a Catastrophic Development of Society, as Bernstein endeavoured to show in an article with that title, was not justified by the available evidence. It was the younger, not the older, capitalist countries that suffered from the acutest booms and depressions. He pointed out that Marx himself was not an "under-consumptionist" in his economic explanation of crises. Bernstein obviously visualized the possibility of flattening the trade cycle of boom and depression. Bernstein demanded the *revision* of this catastrophic theory in the name of practical progress, and attention to *Gegenwartarbeit*—"present work"—and objective achievement.

Bernstein writes, in his *Evolutionary Socialism:*

> It is thus quite wrong to assume that the present development of society shows a relative or indeed absolute diminution of the number of members of the possessing classes. . . . Socialism, or the social movement of modern times, has already survived many a superstition, it will also survive this, that its future depends on the concentration of wealth or, if one will put it thus, on the absorption of surplus value by a diminishing group of capitalist mammoths. . . . It is as though someone said that the number of proletarians was shrinking in modern society because, where the individual workman formerly stood, the trade union stands today. . . . If the working class waits until "Capital" has put the middle classes out of the world, it might really have a long nap. "Capital" would expropriate these classes in one form and then bring them to life in another.

Bernstein also ventured upon a criticism of the orthodox Marxian theory of surplus value. The value in exchange of *the product of a particular labourer* was not conditioned only by labour units put in, *i.e.*, by subsistence wage plus surplus value appropriated by the profiteer or profit-taker, but was *also* conditioned by demand and utility and, further, by the conjunction of the work of many labourers in labour of different degrees of complexity. *But* no more was the value of *the total product of society* a matter of labour units, as providing a measure for just reward, even if labour in "services," as distinct from manual labour, were included, since

from this point of view—that is, taking production as a whole—the value of each single kind of commodity is determined by the labour-time which was necessary to produce it under normal conditions of production up to that amount which the market—that is, the community as purchasers—can take in each case. Now, just for the commodities under consideration, there is in reality no exact measure of the need of the community at a given moment; and thus value conceived as above is a purely abstract entity, not otherwise than the value of final utility, of the school of Gossen, Jevons, and Böhm-Bawerk.

Bernstein, however, pointed out that the rich, at the beginning of the nineteenth century, had not even troubled to represent their riches as being the fruit of their own work. Also,

income statistics show us that the classes not actively engaged in production appropriate, moreover, a much greater share of the total produced than the relation of their number to that of the actively producing class. The surplus labour of the latter is an empiric fact, demonstrable by experience, which needs no deductive proof.

Bernstein also turns to Materialism and seeks to show that, according to Engels' explanations, the interpretation of history is *not* purely materialistic. "The materialist is a Calvinist without God." Indeed Bernstein, claiming to be a Marxist (but being, indeed, rather a Fabian), threatens to bring the whole top-lofty structure of Marxo-Hegelianism, by his empiric criticism, to the ground. That criticism yet showed wealth to be disproportionately appropriated.

KARL KAUTSKY, the Austrian leader of Marxist orthodoxy, editor of Marx and associate in London of Engels, in 1899 protested against this empiric attitude, as also (more reasonably) against Bernstein's appeal, "back to Kant and ethics." Orthodoxy, however, in the German-speaking world meant a Marxism based upon the later, more academic writings of Marx. The prime article of faith was that the social revolution was inevitable, springing out of increased capitalist crisis. To recognize this was alone "scientific." Bernstein, in Kautsky's eyes, had abandoned the fundamental principles of scientific (*i.e.*, Marxist, anti-Owenite) socialism. According, however, to orthodox theory the revolution must inevitably come in those lands where capitalism was most fully developed. The outbreak of the revolution in agrarian Russia was contrary to the theoretic plan; and found Kautsky ready to demonstrate its utterly unsatisfactory nature. These Marxist disputes thereupon attained a bitterness only comparable to—or

surpassing—those between the followers of Athanasius and of Arius in the early Christian Church.

In 1918 Kautsky wrote his *Dictatorship of the Proletariat.*

> For us Socialism without democracy is unthinkable. We understand by Modern Socialism not merely social organization of production, but democratic organization of society as well. . . . No Socialism without democracy.

What does Kautsky here mean by democracy? It becomes clear when we note that he puts it into opposition to political revolution. The Social Democrats, winning power at an election, might be opposed by force—but it is precisely *democracy* of which the possessing class would be afraid and of which the liberties would be defended by the proletariat with all possible vigour. Kautsky quotes Marx, at The Hague, in 1872:

> We know that the constitutions, the manners and customs of the various countries must be considered and we do not deny that there are countries like England and America, and, if I understood your arrangements better, I might even add Holland, where the worker may attain his object by peaceful means. But not in all countries is this the case.

Kautsky does not minimize the importance of Will—"the will to Socialism is the first condition for its accomplishment." But, full of "economic interpretation," he adds: "This Will is created by large-scale industry. . . . Socialism postulates special historical conditions which render it possible and necessary." He campaigns against the notion of a guiding Communist aristocracy or oligarchy. It is argued that

> there were particular sections which had shewn strength and courage to fight against poverty. This small fraction would do what the Utopians were not capable of doing. By a sudden stroke it would capture the power of the State, and bring Socialism to the people. This was the conception of Blanqui and Weitling. The proletariat, which was too ignorant and demoralised to organise and rule itself, should be organised and ruled by a government comprised of its educational *élite*, something like the Jesuits in Paraguay who had organised and governed the Indians.

Kautsky, however, comments:

> Masses cannot be organised secretly, and, above all, a secret organisation cannot be a democratic one. It always leads to *the dictatorship of a single man or of a small knot of leaders* . . . it would further the Messiah-consciousness of leaders and their dictatorial habits. . . . The absolute rule of bureaucracy

leads to arbitrariness and stultification. . . . The suppression of the new ideas of minorities in the Party would only cause harm to the proletarian class struggle and be an obstacle to the development of the proletariat.

A class, Kautsky added, could not dictate—unless Dictatorship of the Proletariat were understood in the sense of the Paris Commune as an elected rule by universal suffrage.

Should it be said, after the example of the middle-class revolutions, that the Revolution is synonymous with civil war and dictatorship, then the consequences must also be recognized, and it must be added that *the Revolution would necessarily end in the rule of a Cromwell or a Napoleon.*

Peculiarly Kautsky was alarmed by Theses 10, 18 and 19 of "The Social Revolution," of the Russian Communist Party, by now (1918) in power, which ran as follows:

(10) The Revolution itself is an act of naked force. *The word dictatorship signifies in all languages nothing less than government by force.* . . . (17) The former demands for a democratic republic, and general freedom (that is, freedom for the middle classes as well), were quite correct in the epoch that is now passed, the epoch of preparation and gathering strength. (18) Now we are in the period of the direct attack on capital, the direct overthrow and destruction of the imperialist robber State, and the direct suppression of the middle class. It is therefore absolutely clear that in the present epoch *the principle of defending general freedom (that is, also, for the counter-revolutionary middle class) is not only superfluous, but directly dangerous.* (19) This also holds good for the Press, and the leading organizations of the social traitors.

Pathetically Kautsky explains that "the younger generation of Russian Social Democrats have done me the honour of counting me, together with Plekhanov and Axelrod, among their teachers." In 1919 he published his *Terrorism and Communism;* in 1921 his *From Democracy to State Slavery.* In *Bolshevism at a Deadlock* (1930), he stigmatized the Russian Marx-Stalinist Communists as "Counter-revolutionary."

Sadly I saw, ever more clearly, that the Bolsheviks completely misunderstood the situation; that they thoughtlessly set themselves a task for the fulfilment of which all the necessary conditions were lacking, and that in their endeavour to achieve the impossible by brute force they were employing means which, instead of improving the economic intellectual and moral position of the working masses, were undermining it worse than Czarism and the War had already done.

What distressed Kautsky was that Lenin had ceased to be an orthodox Marxist, believing that social development progresses "in

accordance with iron laws"—Socialism following, in a logical fashion, upon a highly developed industrial capitalism. Lenin's dazzling success in the Russian Revolution "went to his head." The correct scheme was quite different.

> The isolation of Fascist Italy will have to be accomplished in order to force *disarmament* upon it as well [through the League]. This would be the beginning of the suppression of Fascism by democracy. Bolshevism is the stumbling block preventing this much-to-be-desired development. Once it can be overcome and replaced by democracy, the way will be clear, not only for the progress of Russia but for that of the whole of Europe.

For the rest, Kautsky was sure that "it may be confidently said that a people is not yet ripe for Socialism so long as the majority of the masses are hostile to Socialism, and will have nothing of it." That a hot emotional propaganda, not too scrupulous in petty bourgeois style about mendacity, rather than economic factors of material production, might greatly alter what men would "have nothing of," did not enter into Karl Kautsky's calculations. It was left for Lenin and Trotsky to try to show him—even if they proved him, in his own eyes, to be right and themselves to be despots.

2

N. LENIN, the political and pen name of VLADIMIR ILYITCH ULIANOV (1870–1924), was the second son of Ilya Ulianov and Maria Blank. As an inspector of schools Ilya Ulianov acquired, although of trader ancestry, the status of nobility in pre-Revolutionary Russia. That status his son inherited. Thus on April 20, 1900, we get a petition, concerning change of residence when in exile, to the Director of the Department of Police, "presented by the hereditary noble, Vladimir Ilyitch Ulianov, residing in the town of Pskov." The decisive event in Lenin's early life was the arrest and hanging, for conspiracy against the life of the Czar Alexander III, of Lenin's elder, handsome and admired brother Alexander, in May, 1887. Alexander II, the emancipator of the serfs, had been assassinated six years before. Those who believed that the Russian autocracy could be constitutionalized only by force, such as the members of the "People's Will" or Populist Party, among them Alexander Ulianov, proposed to meet the weapons of the police spies and to temper autocracy by the terror of assassinations. Although essentially middle-class conspirators, such as Mazzini had been in Italy, the Populists were supported by resentment against a system of government worthy of the France of the *ancien régime*, such as made,

for no abstruse reasons of dialectic, revolution only a matter of time, and against taxation more burdensome upon the emancipated peasantry than the earlier exactions had been upon the unemancipated.

Four months after this execution Lenin was permitted to enter Kazan University as a law student. In December he was expelled by the authorities for partaking in student disturbances. Exiled to his maternal grandfather's estate, he began the study of Marx's *Kapital*. In 1891 he passed his final examinations as an external law student of St. Petersburg University. Within three years he is working with a political propagandist group in that city and has produced a pamphlet on "The Reflection of Marxism in Bourgeois Literature." In April, 1895, he is abroad and arranges for the transport to Russia of banned literature. In December he is arrested; and sentenced to fourteen months' imprisonment, followed by three years' Siberian exile.

Life in Shushenskoye, within the Arctic Circle, was rendered tolerable by hunting and shooting; marriage to Krupskaya; and the translation of *The Theory and Practice of Trade Unionism*,* the work of those Fabian patriarchs of British Socialism, the Webbs. There was, however, little sign of Alexander Ulianov's brother becoming a Fabian. His life was already dedicated to Vengeance on the Czardom.

In 1900, his period of Siberian exile ended, Lenin left Russia and founded *Iskra*, "The Spark," in Munich, a small journal circulating among Russian refugees, organized as the League of Russian Revolutionary Social Democrats Abroad. *Iskra*, whose editorial office was the room of the refugee, then moved to London, where Lenin lived in Sidmouth Street, Tottenham Court Road (the concern of the landlady being whether he and Krupskaya were duly married); and then to Geneva—"this damned Geneva, a sordid hole." It was in the Sidmouth Street rooms that Leon (Bronstein) Trotsky introduced himself to Lenin.

To any outsider the control of this journal, *Iskra*, must have seemed a matter of infinite unimportance. Nevertheless, the issue of its control between the (temporary) majority—in Russian, Bolsheviki—and the minority—or Mensheviki—is the beginning of the division, at a London meeting in 1903, between the two great Russian Marxist parties. Today in Russia one even disputes whether Aristotle was not a Menshevik. The situation was subsequently reversed. Lenin was left in control of neither the new *Iskra* board nor the Congress of the League. Protesting himself in favour of peace—"of course, I did not want personally to prevent peace"—on his own terms, Lenin, who already had the reputation of being, in Trotsky's words, a *frondeur* and a mas-

* The Russian title of *Industrial Democracy* (1897).

ter stirrer of strife in committees, carried on with fanaticism the internecine war. After all, nothing less than whether there was to be shooting down of workers (such as, in 1905, under Father Gapon, actually occurred before the Winter Palace in St. Petersburg) seemed to him at stake, not mere bourgeois temperances and tolerances.

> Either the Central Committee will become an organization of war against the Central Journal's Board, war in deeds and not in words, war in Committees, or the Central Committee will be a worthless rag fit only for the dustheap. . . . For Christ's sake do understand that centralism has been irrevocably torn by the Martovites. Give up idiotic formalities, capture the Committees, teach *them* to fight for the Party against circles abroad.

Later, in a letter to "Papa" (Litvinov), Lenin writes, on Dec. 3, 1904, jocularly:

> Send money here, murder anyone you like, but produce the money. . . . It is madness to start an Organ [journal] in Russia with the help of the Central Committee, pure folly or treachery, this is proved and will be proved by the objective logic of events, because the organisers of the Organ or of a popular paper will inevitably find themselves fooled by all sorts of disgusting vermin, such as the Central Committee.

The issue at this time between Menshevik and Bolshevik turned upon an issue of policy and upon a bitter issue of personnel reliable for carrying out this policy. The Menshevik group, including Martov, Axelrod, Vera Zasulich and, later, Plekhanov, were prepared to admit all workers who were sympathizers to party membership and vote. The implication was that of *a democratic organization;* and the policy connects with the subsequent willingness of the Mensheviks to enter the Duma as a Marxist party. On the contrary, the Bolshevik group, led by Lenin, proposed to admit to party membership and vote only those who were prepared to do active party work (of which the veterans would judge the character), *i.e., a "disciplined" aristocracy of revolutionaries.* Lenin was concerned, not with a workers' defence party, but with a revolutionary party—thus far sharing Populist or Nihilist ideals —and this an *industrial workers' revolutionary party,* although it was dubious whether in peasant Russia any industrial proletarian revolution [such as the later October Revolution] could, at one step, be carried through.

In Lenin's eyes the Party meant the small circle of active conspirators—and nobody else. Even in the unfavourable conditions obtaining in Russia, Martov wanted to uphold the principle of the right of self-determination for the masses. Lenin was of a directly contrary

opinion. Martov was anxious to give to Russian Social Democracy the character of a Western European Labour movement. Lenin repudiated any such proposal. With him Party first becomes a Church or Order.

> Comrade Trotsky shows that he has completely misunderstood the basic idea of my pamphlet, "What is to be done?" by saying that the Party has no conspiratorial organization. Others have also reproached me similarly. . . . He has forgotten that the Party is only an advance post and the leader of the great mass of the working class which in its entirety, or virtually in its entirety, *works under the supervision and direction of the Party organization without, however, belonging or being able in its entirety to belong to the Party . . . a man who can respect his opponents and who reminds one of a Trade Union official rather than a tribune of the people—such a man, I tell you, is no revolutionary but only a contemptible amateur.* . . . The party which under the rule of the bourgeoisie has not admitted this to this day and which does not carry on systematic, all-sided, *illegal* work, in spite of the laws of the bourgeoisie and of the bourgeois parliaments, is a party of traitors and scoundrels, which deceives the people by the verbal recognition of revolution.

The secret of Lenin's power was that he combined Marxism, which had in Germany become an arm-chair philosophy, with the revolutionary but middle-class, radical tradition of the Russian Nihilists or Social Revolutionaries who conspired against a Czardom still in the political and social condition of the France of Louis XVI. It is this *ancien régime* background, with the resentment that it aroused, which provides an explanation of Lenin's political approach. Lenin engineered at once a French Revolution in the East *and* a Marxist revolution such as had not hitherto succeeded in the West, for which it was designed.

The opportunity occurred with the Great War. The revolutionary movement in Russia of 1906-1907 had collapsed. The war of 1914 rescued Lenin and his associates from the depression which they felt. It was a joyful event, since Russian participation could be seen to be the prelude to Revolution. Lenin moved from Galicia to Zürich and there, along with Zinoviev—like Kamenev, one of the original Bolsheviks—he edited *The Social Democrat.* In 1915 he published his *Imperialism*, drawing for his facts in large part upon Mr. J. A. Hobson's book of the same title.

In September, 1915, the small Zimmerwald Conference of about thirty delegates met. The British delegates were refused passports. The Russians mustered seven—Lenin and Zinoviev for the Bolsheviks; Martov and Axelrod for the Mensheviks; Trotsky, for his own group; and two Left-wing Social Revolutionaries. Lenin here found himself outvoted on a direct revolutionary policy and commanded only seven

votes, the Mensheviks being anxious to support any revolutionary movement arising from the war but not being willing to split the Marxist movement at the present juncture. Lenin viewed, however, with peculiar satisfaction the situation in Italy and Russia, in both of which countries the revolutionary section had expelled the "opportunists" from their ranks.

He denounced, as "bondsmen of the Czar," Plekhanov and Kerensky, the Populist, for their talk of taking charge of the war and waging it efficiently—"Revolution for Victory." He did not desire peace but civil war; and regarded all pacifist talk, which he vigorously assailed, as confusing the workers. Especially he denounced with vehemence those of the workers' leaders who were striving to avert the defeat of their respective countries—such as Arthur Henderson—by supporting the existing governments in the imperialist war waged against (or by) Germany. Such men, non-revolutionaries, were Social Chauvinists. Even if Zimmerwald had failed for this purpose, the time for the foundation of the Third International would certainly come.

If the outside bourgeois world declined to take Lenin seriously it was not remarkable; so did the German Revolutionary Marxists or Spartacists led by Karl Liebknecht and Rosa Luxemburg. The Bolsheviks were leaders of a great international movement in their own eyes alone. On Jan. 22, 1917, Lenin said: "We who are already old may perhaps not live to participate in the decisive battle of the coming revolution."

March, 1917, changed all this. The Russian ruling class had waged an unsuccessful war against Germany which covered them with ignominy and destroyed their prestige just as the leaders of the Western Democracies may well do in the event of another war. The liberal, middle classes fondly believed that they could overthrow the Czar and continue the war to victory; and were not unencouraged by the Entente Powers in this delusion. The peasants wanted peace and bread. The Bolsheviks wanted neither peace nor victory, but bided their time. But, in April, 1917, seeking to check the Liberal-Social-Revolutionary initiative, the German General Staff permitted Lenin with twenty-seven companions to leave Berne secretly for Russia. They did not, however, arrive until after the Social Revolutionaries or Populists [Radicals and Agrarians], with Liberal and Menshevik assistance, and signalled by the St. Petersburg workmen, had started the April Revolution and deposed the Czar. The Social Revolutionaries, under Kerensky, and the Mensheviks were at one in relying upon the spontaneous democratic local parliaments or soviets of Workers, Sol-

diers and Peasants, and in desiring a continuation of the war. Lenin, in disagreement with Zinoviev and with Kamenev, the editor of *Pravda* (whose influence rivalled his own), and by an abrupt change of policy, decided to abandon the non-democratic exclusiveness of Bolshevik policy; to welcome the Soviets on the analogy of the Paris Commune; and to declare "All power for the Soviets," as well as "The Land for the Peasants! An End to Imperialist War" and "Peace, Liberty, Bread and Land"—which last he was convinced the Liberals could not give. In 1916, Lenin had declared:

> It is a fact that *a middle-class Labour Party has made its appearance* as a political factor in all progressive capitalist countries. Hence it is useless to talk of a war against Imperialism, or of Marxism and a Socialist Labour movement, *without being prepared for a ruthless struggle with these Parties*. . . . Nothing leads us to suppose that these Parties will disappear without a Socialist Revolution.

Nevertheless, in September, 1917, after publishing *The State and Revolution*, Lenin set forth his theses on policy which were tactically astoundingly moderate. The first thesis was that the banks should be nationalized. "The blame for the confusion of nationalization of Banks with confiscation of private property lies with the middle-class Press whose interest it is to deceive the reader." The small traders would *not* be expropriated. "Socialism is nothing else than the next step forward from the stage of monopolistic State Capitalism." It was on the basis of the appeal to the functionally democratic Soviets *and* of the support of the Petrograd Soviet military Committee (including the Petrograd garrison), organized by Trotsky, that the Bolshevik Party was able to seize the Central Petrograd telephone exchange on November 7, 1917, to confront the Soviet Congress with a *fait accompli* and to receive the emphatic approval of its majority.

The period that immediately follows is that of what is called "War Communism." The National Constituent Assembly, called—although after procrastination—under Kerensky but assembling under the Bolsheviks, was an Assembly in which the peasant-supported Social Revolutionaries received 21 million votes and the Bolsheviks only 9 million. Lenin, however, had got the favourable vote of the Soviets, resting on a functional or corporative basis, and had no intention of having this decision upset by an Assembly, elected under his rival and resting on a parliamentary-territorial basis. The Assembly, after the Bolshevik minority and Left Social Revolutionaries had seceded, was forcibly dispersed in January, 1918. The Left Social Revolutionaries

remained in support until the Brest-Litovsk Peace, of March, 1918, the necessary consequence of reversal of the Kerensky policy, ended in the cession under German pressure, not only of Poland, Finland and the Baltic provinces but also of the whole Ukraine, including Kharkov, Kiev and Odessa. The bitter cup was drunk. It was not, however, the end of troubles. Civil war followed, in which Trotsky—after fourteen years, now loyal to the Bolsheviks because Lenin accepted the Soviets—organized the Red armies. In his correspondence, amid letters to "my dear darling Mimosa," his sister, we find, on Sept. 8, 1918, Lenin telegraphing to the V Army Headquarters:

> Excellent progress towards recovery. Convinced that quelling of Kazan Czechs and White Guards and their bloodthirsty Kulak supporters will be model of mercilessness. Best greetings.

The end, however, was not yet. The Red Armies moved on Warsaw but were turned back by French support of the Poles at the Pripet Marshes. Slowly, however, the White armies of Denikin, Kolchak and Wrangel were demolished; anarchists were shot off like pariah dogs. The facilities of civilization broke down. Men used furniture for household fires and staved off hunger by black potatoes mixed even with clay—bartered a mirror for a potato. Lenin writes of a scheme of economic planning, in February, 1921: "I am very much afraid that, even though you approach the matter from another angle, you too do not see it. We are poor, starving, ruined beggars. A complete, a complete and real plan for us now would be a bureaucratic Utopia." In all, by execution, starvation or in the civil war about five million human beings had died. It may be, however, since human beings must die, that death [even by starvation?] does not matter. Slowly, however, the Russian people, reduced to a "state of nature"—and this, more that of Hobbes than of Locke—with heroic Slav capacity for sacrifice, was building up a new world and new civilization. The human will to live was asserting itself.

In March, 1921, Lenin, as Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars, instituted his New Economic Policy. On November 29, 1920, all industrial enterprises employing more than ten (or in certain cases, five) persons had been communized. By December 10, the engines of War Communism had begun to be reversed and denationalization started. On February 28, 1921, came the revolt of the Kronstadt garrison, which had contributed so much to the initial success of the revolution, with their slogan "the Soviets without the Bolsheviks." As Trotsky writes:

The working masses, who had gone through three years of civil war, were more and more disinclined to submit to the ways of military rule. With his unerring political instinct, Lenin sensed that the critical moment had arrived. . . . The party was arguing feverishly about "the school of communism" whereas the thing that really mattered was the economic catastrophe hanging over the country. The uprising at Kronstadt and in the province of Tambov broke into the discussion as the last warning. Lenin shaped the first and very guarded thesis on the change to the New Economic Policy.

Thereby Lenin, who had been carried forward by the rush of popular revolution, retreated no farther than his own position of September, 1917, when he returned to Russia. The N.E.P. permitted again the opening of stores, by government licence, and trading for private profit especially in smaller establishments. Foreign capital was also invited to invest, under Soviet control, in the larger concerns. It was "capitalism plus Socialism" [Lenin]. The economic crisis was tided over and the Soviet Republic saved. That was the object of the new policy and what justified it in the eyes of Lenin who, like Marx, had never hesitated about adapting means to ends. But the unemployed, even with a giant work of reconstruction at pitiful wages on hand, numbered a million [Rosenberg]; children, flotsam of the civil war, still begged in the streets; and the kulak—the farmer employing hands for wages and lending money—again showed his head in the country-side.

"Socialism is Electrification and Power to the Soviets." This was Lenin's slogan for the harnessing of Nature to the purposes of organized Civilization and the organization of Civilization in accordance with the will of the one surviving class, the Proletariat, which by process of elimination was now the Classless People—or would be when the kulak and *saboteur*, the opposition, were again liquidated. Since 1921 Lenin had been turning over this idea of the final economic control of the country peculiarly through the government control of electricity for industry. He examined schemes for the great Dnieprostroy dam. But on May 26, 1922, strain and the wound from the bullet fired on August 30, 1918, by the Social Revolutionary, Fanny Kaplan, brought on the first stroke, due to arteriosclerosis, and partial paralysis. He had to oppose the War Commissar, Trotsky, to whom he had been reconciled since 1917 but whose policy meant "degeneration of centralism and militarised forms of work into bureaucracy, pig-headedness, departmentalism." He also had to watch Stalin.

He is [wrote Lenin, on January 4, 1923] too rough-mannered, and this defect, which is quite tolerable among us Communists, becomes intolerable in the function of General Secretary. That is why I propose that the Comrades

reflect on the means of replacing Stalin in this post and nominating in his stead a man who, in all respects, is distinguished from Stalin by being superior to him, that is to say, by being more patient, more loyal, more polite, more considerate towards his comrades, less capricious, and so on. . . . This may seem a small matter, but it may, in view of the relations between Stalin and Trotsky, acquire a decisive importance.

On January 21, 1924, Vladimir Ilyitch Ulianov died, the little man with the Mongolian eyes, the pointed reddish beard and the grim, humorous face—the man with something of Lincoln's touch but with a quite Muscovite ferocity; the man who loved the workers much but hated the Czar, his brother's executioner, more and hated the bourgeois most; the most influential man in human history since Jesus Christ and Julius Caesar; the hammer of world revolution—through the civil war of rich and poor. Dead, Lenin's embalmed body was placed in the mausoleum outside the Kremlin to be an object of reverence to the thousands of faithful who pay pilgrimage to the red tomb, while his face upon ten thousand banners is placed along with those of Marx and Engels in a new unchallengeable Trinity of Salvation.

3

Lenin has claims to be a philosopher in his own right, if not original yet vigorous, as well as an exponent of one of the most significant political philosophies of our day. Lenin is a "stiff" writer and this present section must necessarily be "stiff" reading. The student who is uninterested in the topic is advised to omit it. After all, it is only Lenin who regarded the issue as basic to world-revolution. Ever filled with a biting contempt for Socialists contemptuous of theory, Lenin sets out his metaphysics in his *Materialism and Empirio-criticism* (1908). It is substantially an attack on Hume and Kant, although two nineteenth-century German philosophers, Avenarius and Mach, receive most of the attention for their philosophies of experience, and Thomas Huxley, James Ward and President Hibben of Princeton also receive notice. Avenarius, in 1876, had maintained that "only sensation exists in the world," and Mach that "bodies are complexes of sensations." Mach, in point of fact, had maintained a position of the type now technically known as neutral monism, which derives both the physical and psychical from a common substance that is neither. Of more interest to us than elaboration here is the nature of Lenin's attack. It will, however, be noted that it is heresy to save the philosophic bacon of Marxism itself by interpreting it (as has been attempted) as neutral monism.

Lenin accepts the position (largely, if not entirely correct) that it is not the consciousness of men that determines their mode of existence, but on the contrary their social existence [an ambiguous, pseudo-material word] that determines the nature of their consciousness. Further, Lenin appeals to the pre-Kantian materialism of Diderot and the French Encyclopaedists and to Feuerbach who, although far from a clear materialist, is at least a pertinacious anti-Kantian (or, in the eyes of Kantians, a dogmatic pre-Kantian). The basis of the Marx-Leninist position is to be found in the following almost excessively simple statement:

> Did Nature exist prior to Man? We have already seen that this question is particularly repugnant to the philosophy of Mach and Avenarius. Natural Science positively asserts that the earth once existed in such a state that no man or any other creature existed or could have existed on it. Organic matter is a later phenomenon, the fruit of a long evolution. It follows that there was no sentient matter, no "complexes of sensations," no *self* that was supposedly "indissolubly" connected with the environment in accordance with Avenarius' doctrine. Matter is primary, and thought, consciousness, sensation are products of a very high development. Such is the materialist theory of knowledge, which natural science instinctively prescribes.

Lenin continues by quoting with agreement Engels' statement, in *Anti-Dühring*, that "thought and consciousness are *products* of the human brain"; and citing with approval, on this occasion, the statement of Plekhanov, author of *Fundamental Problems of Marxism*, in his study of Feuerbach, that "idealism says that without subject there is no object. The history of the earth shows that the object existed long before the subject appeared."

It may be doubted whether any idealist would be prepared to admit that "mind" was merely Jones's mind (preoccupied with how the forest was known to exist when there was nobody there in the forest) or the mind of all the Joneses. He would further deny that mind was *merely* the product of brain and inquire how materialism came by a *theory* of knowledge. Materialism and metaphysical idealism apart, three routes appear open—to assert the permanent duality and coexistence of mind and matter; to declare an inevitable ignorance; or to assert the existence of a common substance underlying mind and matter. All three routes Lenin firmly declares closed. Idealism he identifies with the (religious) position of Bishop Berkeley. And, with Engels, he insists that *both* Hume and Kant are agnostics; and his *Materialism and Empirio-criticism* is written to prove that agnosticism

is concealed idealism—as is also the doctrine of neutral substance which he identifies with Machism, "a pauper's broth of Eclecticism."

What position then does Lenin himself take? He is too careful to identify himself with Feuerbach who, although highly inconsistent (as Marx saw), is yet in most passages an old-fashioned materialist of the crasser order who, admiring Liebig (of meat-extract fame), genuinely believes that "*mann ist was er isst*" ("man is what he eats"— a position doubtless containing a modicum of medical truth); and that thought was, as it were, the emanation of a brain nourished on the right porridge. Engels has a claim to philosophic understanding which Feuerbach has not; and Lenin elaborates Engels. Thought is the glow of the furnace of brain. More exactly it is "a copy" of the external world. [How may a "theory" be a copy?]

Does, then, Lenin hold what may be termed the cast-iron-and-cement conception of Matter? Or, again, Hobbes's materialism wherein thought is due to a neural motion in the brain, like billiard balls set going by the cue of external stimulus? The answer is: No. Lenin, like Engels, specifically dissociates himself from what he calls "metaphysical materialism," in favour of "dialectical materialism." He points out, *therefore*, that he is unconcerned with modern physicists' developments in their theory of the nature of matter, although he notes that some (he cites Karl Pearson and Henri Poincaré—he could better have cited Jeans and Eddington) are illicitly exploiting these new theories in the interests of idealism or spiritualism. So long as we do not affirm that there can be motion without matter, it matters nothing that "light and electricity are only manifestations of one and the same force of nature." Motion, he quotes from Engels, is the mode of existence of matter; and the reduction of all substance to *one* substance fits in well with his dogmatic materialism which is neither pluralist (*many* substances) nor dualist (mind and matter *both* ultimate substances) but monistic (matter the *only* substance). This exposition is worth carefully noting by those who cling to a "common-sense materialism," and believe Lenin to be affirming it.

Materialism and idealism differ in their respective answers to the question of the *source* of our knowledge and of the relation of knowledge (and of the "psychical" in general) to the *physical* world; while the question of the structure of matter, of atoms and electrons, is a question that only concerns this "physical world." When the physicists say that "matter is disappearing," they mean that hitherto science reduced its investigations of the physical world to three ultimate concepts; matter, electricity and ether, *whereas now*

only the two latter remain. For it has become possible to reduce matter to electricity.

Lenin then is *a materialist who believes that matter no longer remains*—in the old cast-iron-and-cement or cannon-ball-atoms sense.

What then *does dialectical materialism, with motion as a mode of matter, mean?* The following is the decisive passage:

> The *sole* "property" of matter with whose recognition philosophical materialism is bound up is the property of *being an objective reality*, of existing outside *our* mind. The error of Machism in general, as of the Machian new physicists, is that it ignores this basis of philosophical materialism and the distinction between metaphysical materialism and dialectical materialism. The recognition of immutable elements, "of the immutable substance of things," and so forth, is not materialism, but *metaphysical, i.e., anti-dialectical materialism.* . . . In order to present the question in the only correct way, that is from the dialectical materialist standpoint, we must ask: Do electrons, ether *and so on* exist as objective realities outside the *human* mind or not?

There is, then, a materialism that is *anti-dialectical*, and rejected. And we reach the startling conclusion that *the true, dialectical materialism is objective realism.* Moreover, we note from Marx that this reality is heavily impregnated with the quality of will moving through history. But Hegel would never have denied that "electrons, ether and so on exist outside the human mind." He would have asserted it. Is then the so-called Marxist materialism significantly distinct from Hegelianism since it is a patent criticism of Hegel that his objective idealism is indistinguishable from a form of objective realism? The answer, I suggest, is "no." So-called Marx-Leninist Materialism *is* Hegelianism subject to one superficial reservation, *i.e.*, that Hegel chooses to call that Reality which rises to self-consciousness at a late stage in historical evolution by the characterless first name of Mind-being, whereas Lenin prefers to call that Reality, which rises to sentience as the "fruit of a long evolution," by the characterless first name of Matter-being (although he immediately explains that his Matter is *not* what is ordinarily called matter). There is a highly illuminating passage in which Lenin writes:

> The sum total and résumé, the last word and the sense of Hegel's *Logic* is the dialectical method. . . . And still another thing—in this idealistic work of Hegel's there is very little of idealism, but more than anything else, materialism. This is contradictory, but a fact.

Have we then been drawn by the obstinate Marxist insistence on philosophy into an empty dispute on empty words? Not entirely. It

is perhaps not indifferent to a consistent doctrine of Creative Will whether we place the series energy, bio-chemical activity, sentient life [*e.g.*, in plants], consciousnes [*e.g.*, in animals] as prior to, and causative of, the series corporal-matter, organic-matter, animal-existence, human brain—in brief, mind-life preceding the human body in historical evolution; and non-corporeal energy preceding corporal existence. It may be that Hegel is a profounder interpreter of Hegelianism than Lenin. Will is assigned by Hegel a new and *consistent* role in relation to Environment, such as eliminates the Marxist contradiction between the all-importance of Economic or Material Environment (Marx-Kautsky) and the all-importance of Creative Will (Marx-Lenin).

On the other hand, the reason why Lenin attaches such fanatical importance to this superfine issue is twofold, (*a*) he believed he was defending the claims of natural science against reactionary superstition —science against religion—and (*b*) he believed that Humeans, Kantians, Machians sold the pass to the idealists, such as Berkeley and Fichte, *and* that these, in turn, delivered their supporters over to his bête noire, fideism. What is fideism? It is the doctrine which "substitutes faith for knowledge," *i.e.*, which declares that, besides *verifiable*, systematic knowledge, there is also knowledge resting on experience which presupposes (as swimming for the swimmer) the faith to have the experience. It is a theme which we find from St. Augustine and St. Anselm to William James. In brief, the real objection to idealism is the objection to religion (apart from Lenin's own brand)—and, ironically enough, this objection is extended to Hume as well as, justifiably, to Kant. Lenin writes: "Non-partisanship in philosophy is only a contemptible cloak of servility to idealism and fideism."

Two comments are permissible: (*a*) it may be that *dogmatic* materialism *or dogmatic* Hegelianism, with all its fantastic "dialectic of nature" (Engels refers to this without qualms: there is "a dialectical law of motion") is *not the friend, but the enemy, of empirical research and of advance in the natural sciences*—which owe more to Huxley, whom Lenin attacks, than the somewhat dusty figure of Haeckel whom he seems to believe represents modern advance; (*b*) in the insistence on action for revolution, in the belief that the results of revolution "in the long run" *must* be good, *Marx himself is both a utopian and a fideist.* Even more guilty are the fideists who say, with Professor Sidney Hook, that we must try out, in this long run, whether the results are good; and, then, after the revolution, the revolutionaries will know whether Marxism is right and whether they ought to have begun revolution.

What it comes to is that Lenin is extricating himself from commitment to the out-of-date dogmatic materialism of a Feuerbach who had not understood Kant's critique, in order to commit natural science to the fetters of an almost equally out-of-date dogmatic Hegelian dialectic of nature, which is without empiric basis. Further, he is (which is not infrequent) damning fideism where it is a case of the *fides* or faith of other people, in order to insist upon a revolutionary social fideism of his own. On both counts, his position would appear to be reactionary from the empiric standpoint. Lenin meets this charge by a counter-onslaught on empiricism.

Why, however, could Lenin not have been content to remain an empiric—to say that men have expended their energies on delusions, other-worldliness, superstitions; and should attend to verifiable, this-worldly truth as discoverable from slow experience and patient experiment? His practical impulse comes out clearly enough in the conclusion of *Materialism and Empirio-criticism:*

> Behind the epistemological scholasticism of empiriocriticism it is impossible not to see the struggle of parties in philosophy, a struggle which in the last analysis reflects the tendencies and ideology of the antagonistic classes in modern society. . . . idealism . . . is merely a subtle, refined form of fideism, which stands fully armed, commands vast organisation and steadily continues to exercise influence on the masses.

The answer is, then, that he is so far a "believer" as to insist that materialism and the Hegelian dialectic must be dogmatically asserted *because* it will do good in the class war. The scepticism and detachment, antiseptic of myth, of Hume irritate him more even than the priests, as the characteristics of a man who will, like the men of Meroz, not come down to the help of the Lord. The class war allows no side-seats to any man, not even in science or philosophy. There is no room for humanism and detached inquiry. It is "either-or." As Lenin reiterates: there is "this inevitable philosophical alternative (materialism or idealism)." "Both Berkeley and Diderot start from Locke," but the one line ends in solipsism* and the other in objectivism.

> We materialists follow Engels in calling the Kantians and Humeans *agnostics* . . . hence the denial of objective truth by the agnostic and the tolerance—the philistine, cowardly tolerance—of the dogmas regarding sprites, hobgoblins, Catholic saints and the like.

The empiricists, like the humanists, are to be taken by the shoulders and rushed forth to say that they *know*, without need for experiment,

* *Cf.* p. 484.

that certain dogmas are wrong and *must not be tolerated.* It is not permissible to say that one has "found the truth outside materialism and idealism." "*All* Humeans deviate from materialism," including J. S. Mill and Thomas Huxley. They are dead in their sins and have the stink of Social Chauvinists.

The Marx-Leninist doctrine of truth here becomes important. The pro-Machist, Bogdanov, had rashly affirmed that "as I understand it, Marxism contains a denial of the unconditional objectivity of any truth whatsoever, the denial of all eternal truths." Now this is agnosticism. Lenin attacks him. Hegel is used to demolish Kant. "Materialism affirms the existence and knowability of things-in-themselves." Sensations are "the true copy of this objective reality." The Marxist does not, as Plekhanov thinks, deny, but must dogmatically affirm, the existence of objective truth, revealed by our sense-organs, and of absolute truth as a compound of relative truths—*not* merely an "organising form of human experience."

> From the standpoint of modern materialism, *i.e.*, Marxism, the limits of approximation of our knowledge to the objective, absolute truth are historically conditional, but the existence of such truth is unconditional, and the fact that we are approaching nearer to it is also unconditional.

I see nothing whatsoever to criticize in this proposition, which seems to me to be in the grand philosophic tradition but which, I suggest, as it stands would be denied by neither Locke nor Hume. Lenin continues:

> Thus the materialist theory, the theory of the reflection of objects by one mind is here presented with absolute clarity: things exist outside us. Our perceptions and ideas are their images. Verification of these images, differentiation between true and false, is given by practice. . . . The recognition of theory as a copy, as an approximate copy of objective reality, is materialism.

Here I fail to see how knowledge (which Lenin affirms) of the thing-in-itself or of the Hegelian dialectic can be given *by practice*, unless we *define* the thing-in-itself as that ultimately discovered by practice, in which case we seem to adopt precisely that Humean pragmatism which Lenin condemns. This attempt to affirm that we know "by practice" more than we can know by practice alone, and so alone can be saved, is obviously of no little importance in its effects upon scientific development (the intellectual prestige of Marxism apart), just as the endeavour to exclude all religion save the worship of the dialectic moving in history is cramping to the human spirit and to a free man's worship.

Lenin, incidentally, is diamond clear on his attitude to religion. His criticism of Tolstoy has wit and incisiveness—"the Tolstoyan, *i.e.*, the

exhausted hysterical, misery-mongering Russian intellectual, who, publicly beating his breast, cries: 'I am bad, I am vile, but I am striving for moral self-perfection; I no longer eat meat but live on rice cutlets!'" Nor is there to be question of some reformed religion—"helping the exploiters to substitute new, viler and more despicable religious prejudices for old and rotten ones."

"Fear created the gods." Fear of the blind forces of capital—blind because its action cannot be foreseen by the masses—a force which at every step in life threatens the worker and the small business man with "sudden," "unexpected," "accidental" destruction and ruin, bringing in their train beggary, pauperism, prostitution, and deaths from starvation—this is *the* tap-root of modern religion [The English edition of Lenin's *Religion* is preceded by an introduction by another hand that adds: "Marxism cannot be conceived without atheism. We would add here that atheism without Marxism is incomplete and inconsistent."] . . . The party of the proletariat demands that the [capitalist] government shall declare religion a private matter, but it does not for a moment regard the question of the fight against the opium of the people—the fight against religious superstition, etc.—as a private matter. . . . We demand that religion be regarded as a private matter as far as the State is concerned, but *under no circumstances* can we regard it as a private matter in our own party.

Lenin adds one passage, in a letter to Gorki, that strikes home against the religion of the pharisees.

Like the Christian Socialists (the sorriest sort of "Socialism" and its vilest perversion) you employ a trick which (in spite of your best intentions) is on all fours with the hocus-pocus of the priests. . . . What you intended remains an intention—your own subjective "innocent desire." Your words being written down went to the masses and their meaning was determined, not by these your good intentions, but by the correlation of social forces—by the definite, objective inter-relation of classes. Consequently these relations being what they are (whether you wish it or do not), what you have actually done has been to embellish and sweeten the idea of the clericals, of Purishkevich, of Nicholas II and Struve.

The route, however, is not to educate the masses to higher religion, but to refuse to tolerate and to liquidate the religionists. For the rest, the agnostics are damned because they deny that there are final truths that may be known, among which the existence objectively of matter as the producer of consciousness and, hence, the dogmatic truth of materialism as the appropriate tool in the class war against priests are to be counted.

Lenin, however, is more occupied with what he calls "historically conditioned" truths; and his position here is of great practical importance. He follows holy writ in Engels' *Anti-Dühring* closely; and Engels has conceded that the statement, "Napoleon died on May 5, 1821," is an irrefutable and final truth. But Engels is highly contemptuous of men such as Dühring who indicate that they have in their bag final truths, "eternal morality and eternal justice." Engels continues—and this transition to relativism from non-pragmatic dogmatism must be noted:

> We therefore reject every attempt to impose on us any moral dogma whatsoever as an eternal, ultimate and forever immutable moral law on the pretext that the moral world too has its permanent principles which transcend history and *the difference between nations*. We maintain on the contrary, that all former moral theories are the product, in the last analysis, of the economical stage which society had reached at that particular epoch. And as society has hitherto moved in class antagonisms, morality was always a class morality. . . . That in this progress there has on the whole been progress in morality, as in all other branches of human knowledge, cannot be doubted. But we have not yet passed beyond class morality.

There is here a hesitation between the affirmation that there is a morality which contains "durable elements" or lasting, classless values and the assertion that all current morality is a product evolved from class conditions. Lenin amplifies the latter position, so far as it concerns the rising proletariat. Engaged in the class war, these new moralists are as little concerned with static moral imperatives of bourgeois morality as is a soldier in the field when dealing with the enemy. The moral is the expedient in terms of class success; and the end justifies the means. That the downfall of capitalism is automatic, without ruthless exercise of will, is an illusion: capitalism need not collapse of itself. In 1920, Lenin says:

> But is there such a thing as Communist ethics? Is there such a thing as Communist morality? Of course there is. It is frequently asserted that we have no ethics, and very frequently the bourgeoisie says that we Communists deny all morality. . . . We say that our morality is wholly subordinated to the interests of the class struggle, of the proletariat. We deduce our morality from the facts and needs of the class struggle of the proletariat. . . . At the basis of communist morality lies the struggle for strengthening and completing communism. . . . For us morality is subordinated to the interests of the proletarian class struggle.

It is a war-time morality, such as statesmen have practised for "reason of state."

4

The essence of Leninism lies in the stress upon the dynamic and revolutionary elements in Marx—the return to the Marx of the *Communist Manifesto* of 1848—as distinct from the thesis of slow economic determination, the inevitability of gradualness and the scientific impracticability of radical change until technological conditions are ripe, which can be extracted from the writings of the Marx of the 1850's. Lenin's opposition, therefore, to Kautsky was basic. He essayed his demolition in several pamphlets, of which *Kautsky the Renegade and the Proletarian Revolution* is representative. It is decisive in the statement of Marx-Leninist views on democracy. The question at issue is the interpretation, *inter alia*, of a phrase of Marx used in 1875:

> There lies between the capitalist and communist society a period of revolutionary transformation of one into the other. This period has a corresponding political period of transition during which the State can be nothing else than a revolutionary dictatorship of the proletariat.

Kautsky endeavours to explain this away on the ground that anyhow dictatorship cannot be of a whole class; that Marx is, therefore, not here to be taken literally; that Marx referred doubtless not to a "form of government" but to a "state of things." The Webbs use the same argument.

Lenin begins his attack with a chapter entitled, "How Kautsky turned Marx into a Hackneyed Liberal":

> At present we must deal with the main point, with the great discovery made by Kautsky, of the "fundamental opposition" between "democratic and dictatorial methods." . . . The question of the dictatorship of the proletariat is the question of the relation between the proletarian State and the bourgeois State, between proletarian democracy and bourgeois democracy. This, it would seem, ought to be as plain as noonday. . . . It is by such twaddle that Kautsky has to gloss over and to confuse the question at issue, for he formulates it in the manner of bourgeois Liberals as if it were a question of democracy *in general* and not of *bourgeois* democracy, and even avoids using this precise class-term, speaking instead of a "pre-Socialist democracy" . . . a dictatorship does not necessarily mean the abrogation of democracy for that class which wields it against the other class, *but it necessarily means the abrogation, or at least an essential restriction (which is but one of the forms of abrogation) of democracy for that class against which the dictatorship is wielded. . . . Dictatorship is an authority relying directly upon force, and not bound by any laws. The revolutionary dictatorship of the proletariat is an authority maintained by the proletariat by means of force over and against the bourgeoisie, and not bound by any laws.*

Nothing can be clearer. Kautsky has been guilty of "the obvious nonsense" of declaring that Marx meant that the desiderated dictatorship of the proletariat "does not connote revolutionary violence, but merely 'the peaceful conquest of a majority in a bourgeois'—mark you—'democracy.' . . . Thanks to such a trick revolution disappears, to everybody's satisfaction." It is historical nonsense to treat the Paris Commune as a "pure democracy," since it took very non-majoritarian and dictatorial action against the authorities of the rest of France. Kautsky's "pure democratic," majoritarian chatter—the bourgeoisie not being deprived of the franchise—deserves to be "annihilated by laughter." "In fact, 'pure democracy' is the mendacious phrase of a Liberal who wants to dupe the working-class."

Have these gentry (the anti-Authoritarians) ever seen a revolution? *Revolution is undoubtedly the most authoritarian thing in the world.* Revolution is an act in which *one section of the population imposes its will upon the other by rifles, bayonets, guns and other such exceedingly authoritarian means* . . . the revolutionary dictatorship of the proletariat is violence in respect of the bourgeoisie, and the need of such violence is caused especially, as repeatedly explained by Marx and Engels in detail (particularly in *Civil War in France* and the preface to it) by the fact that there exist an army and bureaucracy. But just these institutions in the '70s of the last century, when Marx was making his observations, did not exist in England or America (*though now they do exist*). . . . But now the murder is out; we see that *the opposition is between a peaceful and a forcible revolution. That is where the issue lies. Kautsky needed all these distortions, evasions and sophism, in order to "back out" from a forcible revolution,* and to screen his repudiation of it, his desertion, bag and baggage, to the Liberal-Labour, that is, the bourgeois camp. . . . As long as classes exist, the liberty and equality of classes is a bourgeois deception. The proletariat takes power, becomes the ruling class, smashes bourgeois parliamentarianism and bourgeois democracy, suppresses the bourgeoisie, suppresses *all* the attempts of all other classes to return to capitalism, gives real liberty and equality to the toilers (which is made possible only by the *abolition* of private ownership of the means of production), gives them not only "the right to" but the *real* use of that which has been taken away from the bourgeoisie. . . . That is why our only aim should be once and for all to push the incorrigible reformists. *i.e.*, nine-tenths of the leaders of the Berne [Second] International, into the cesspool of the lackeys of the bourgeoisie.

There can be no equality, even of vote, between exploited and exploiters. Proletarian democracy is democracy of the poor, not the rich. It is "a million times more democratic than any bourgeois democracy. . . . Freedom of the press ceases to be an hypocrisy because

the printing presses and the paper are *taken away* from the bourgeoisie." Lenin quotes Engels:

> As the State is only a temporary institution which is to be made use of in the revolution, in order forcibly to suppress the opponents, it is a perfect absurdity to speak about the free popular State: so long as the proletariat still needs the State, it needs it, not in the interest of freedom, but in order to suppress its opponents, and *when it becomes possible to speak of freedom, the State as such ceases to exist* [*cf.* the Anarchist theme].

Bourgeois Parliaments are institutions essentially foreign to the workers. A dictatorship is needed, *even* when a majority has been obtained, in order to maintain the authority of the armed people against the bourgeoisie; in order that the proletariat may forcibly suppress its enemies. Kautsky talks of the protection of minorities:

> It is incredible, but it is a fact. In the year 1918 of our Lord, in the fifth year of the strangulation of internationalist minorities (that is, not such as have infamously sold Socialism, like, for instance, the Renaudels and the Longuets, the Scheidemanns and the Kautskys, the Hendersons and the Webbs, etc.) in all democracies of the world, the learned Mr. Kautsky sweetly sings the praises of the "protection of minorities." Those who are interested may read this on p. 15 of Kautsky's pamphlet. And on p. 16 this learned personage tells you about the Whigs and Tories in England in the 18th century. Oh, this wonderful erudition. Oh! this repaid flunkeyism before the bourgeoisie. Oh! this civilized way of crawling on the belly before the capitalists and of licking their boots! If I were a Krupp or a Scheidemann, a Clemenceau or a Renaudel, I would give Mr. Kautsky millions, would cover him with thousands of Judas kisses, would press him upon the workers, and recommend "Socialist unity" with respectable men like him.

According to the Leninist school, the essence of Marxist philosophy is action (not contemplation, religion or detached research); and the bull's-eye of action is the dictatorship of the proletariat. The justification for this forcible dictatorship with rifles and bayonets is the emancipation of the economically exploited and those stinted and starved of material goods; and the reason for this method is that no other is realistic and other than delusion. The core of the matter is a psychological supposition. We can trace it from Hobbes's aggressive egoism to the "self-interest" basic to the theories of the Classical Economists and, thence, to the tacit suppositions of Marx. With Lenin this supposition assumes the form that *no ruling class or* [*bureaucratic*] *group whatsoever abdicates power unless expelled by force or without trying the arbitrament of force.* The apparent exceptions of England and America rested upon

the situation, *no longer obtaining*, that there was in these places no bureaucracy. Hence no emancipation was conceivable unless the workers, breaking the old State government by force, itself took over the State—which then, in Marx's words, became "the State, that is, the proletariat organized as the ruling class." [Whether, in turn, to inaugurate "equalitarian Communism," after the "transitional Socialism," by another forcible revolution to displace the vanguard bureaucracy of the proletariat or new commissar power-class, is not explained. But human nature remains constant.*] As Lenin writes:

> The State is nothing but the machine for the suppression of one class by another . . . to suppose that in any serious revolution the issue is decided by the simple relation between majority and minority is the acme of stupidity . . . *never*, except in the sentimental Utopia of the sentimental Mr. Kautsky, *will the exploiters submit to the decision of the exploited majority* without making use of their advantages in a last desperate battle, or in a series of battles.

It will be noted that the governmental system described by Lenin as "a million times more democratic" than parliamentary democracy with its middle-class franchise, is precisely what is described by Aristotle as "democracy," as distinct from "polity" or constitutional government with its superiority of laws to men; and is classified as a "perverted form," historically ending, according to the empirical laws of political evolution, in popular tyranny. Whether and in what sense "laws" can be impartial and not the tools of "men" we shall discuss later.†

The essence of Lenin's position is that a dictatorship by force of the many, led and organized by a "revolutionary vanguard," must be attempted, when it has prospect of success, as the sole means that is not *mere trifling* with the equitable work of emancipating the workers from being despoiled of the full product of their labour. It will further be noted that the loyalty of the weekly-wage workers‡ to their class is supposed, on the ground of common economic interest. The bourgeois will inevitably fight for their competitive self-interest in an inequitable

* *Cf.*, on this, the relevant comment of Aristotle (*Politics* II, V): Such "legislation has a specious appearance of benevolence. A public accepts it with delight, supposing especially when abuses under the existing system are denounced, that under Communism everyone will miraculously become everyone else's friend. . . . But the real cause of these evils is not private property [? only] but the corruption of human nature."

† *Cf.* p. 761; but also p. 544.

‡ *Cf.* p. 593.

measure of profit, but they will yet far-sightedly fight as a class or socially loyal group: and the workers also will both consult their self-interest and be loyal to their group.

The Platonic argument that material self-interest and loyal co-operation are inconsistent principles is ignored in favour of the Hobbesian argument that even economic self-interest (in the long run) dictates the union that makes force. Hobbes limits this to my own skin and my own lifetime. Lenin does not; and emotionally supplements the materialist argument by that of militancy for social justice, despite the fact that Engels has defined *social justice as merely the interest of the largest class.* That interest is identified with the interest of humanity. We recall T. H. Green's argument that there *are no* natural rights against humanity and the general will (or historical will) of actual society [societies]. And the means to the end is one only: force.

If the establishment of the proletarian dictatorship, instead of parliamentary democracy, is the essence of Marxism, what are the conditions in political science for its success? Lenin explains this in his *Left-wing Communism, an Infantile Sickness* (1920), a pamphlet directed against anarchistic tendencies and the lack of disciplined organization characteristic of the old Social Revolutionary movement in Russia. The pamphlet is dedicated to "the Right Hon. Mr. Lloyd George," "not a petty bourgeois, but a very big bourgeois," for reasons that are speedily apparent.

The fundamental law of revolution, confirmed by all revolutions and particularly by the three Russian revolutions in the twentieth century, is that it is not sufficient for revolution that the exploited and oppressed should understand that they cannot go on living in the old way and that they should demand a change: for revolution it is necessary that the exploiters should not be able to govern in the old way. Only when the "lower classes" do not want the old and when the Upper-classes cannot continue in the old way, only then can the revolution be victorious. This truth can be expressed in other words, *viz., revolution is impossible without a national crisis affecting both the exploited and the exploiters.* This means that for revolution it is necessary: (1) that the majority of the workers (or at all events the majority of the class-conscious, thinking, politically active workers) should fully understand the necessity for a revolution and be prepared to sacrifice their lives for the sake of it; (2) that the ruling class should experience a government crisis which draws into politics even the most backward masses (a symptom of every real revolution is: the rapid tenfold and even hundredfold increase in the number of hitherto apathetic representatives of the toiling and oppressed masses capable of waging the political struggle), renders the government impotent and makes it possible for the revolutionaries quickly to overthrow it. *In England,* as can be seen

incidentally from Lloyd George's speech, *both conditions for the successful proletarian revolution are obviously maturing.*

Where the workers are *not conscious of their interests in the class struggle they are to be raised to self-conscious discontent with their conditions,* so that this discontent may impel them to activity in the class war, for the proletarian dictatorship. A policy of appeasement and of the temporary remedying of injustices is counter-revolutionary. The prophecy is of the self-justificatory order since clearly, in so far as the inevitability of social or civil war is accepted, the feasibility of citizen collaboration towards reform and economic equalization is destroyed.

Everybody will admit that [E. D.] Morel is nevertheless a bourgeois, and that his phrases about peace and disarmament remain empty words since without revolutionary actions on the part of the proletariat there can be neither a democratic peace nor disarmament.

About the prospects of revolutionary action in the special case of Britain, Lenin, in *Imperialism: the Last Stage of Capitalism* (1917), makes reservations. The workers here, for historic reasons, tend to be in a privileged position in relation to the workers in more industrially backward countries:

Here are clearly indicated the causes and effects. The causes are:

(i) Exploitation of the whole world by this country.
(ii) Its monopolistic position in the world market.
(iii) Its colonial monopoly.

The effects are:

(i) A section of the British proletariat becomes bourgeois.
(ii) A section of the proletariat permits itself to be led by people who are bought by the bourgeoisie, or at least are in their pay. . . .

Development is slow because the British bourgeoisie is in a position to create better conditions for the aristocracy of labour and by that to *retard* the progress of revolution. . . . Today, in 1917, in the epoch of the first great imperialist war, this exception [from physical revolution] made by Marx is *no longer valid. Both England and America,* the greatest and last representatives of Anglo-Saxon "liberty," in the sense of the absence of militarism and bureaucracy, have today plunged headlong into the all-European dirty, bloody morass of military-bureaucratic institutions to which everything is subordinated and which trample everything under foot. Today, both in England and in America, the "precondition of any real people's revolution" is the *smashing, the shattering* of "the ready-made state machinery."

The support of their respective governments, including governments in which Socialists were in coalition, by weekly-wage workers

and their leaders during the Great War, is termed by Lenin Social Chauvinism. The workers should have refused to move and seized the revolutionary opportunity. [*N.B.*, in relation to the next "War for Liberty."] War is the occasion of proletarian revolution.

Unity with social-chauvinists is treachery to the revolution, treachery to the proletariat, treachery to socialism, desertion to the side of the bourgeoisie, because it is a "unity" with the *national bourgeoisie* of "one's own" country *against* the unity of the international revolutionary proletariat, it is unity *with* the bourgeoisie *against* the proletariat. The war of 1914–18 definitely proved this. Let those who have failed to understand this remain in the yellow Berne International of social traitors.

Granted a national crisis (*e.g.*, war), a ruling class that has lost confidence, an army that has suffered reverse or disintegration, a popular movement excited, then revolution is possible *if* the leaders have for long been disciplined and know how to act.

Dictatorship of the proletariat means that one class, the proletariat, teaches all the toilers, *item*, leadership. *To lead.* The ruling class = the proletariat alone. Ruling excludes liberty and equality. . . .

Comrade Tanner and Comrade Ramsay tell us that the majority of the British Communists do not agree to unite; but must we always agree with the majority? . . .

The history of all countries bears witness to the fact that the working class by its own powers alone cannot achieve more than the trade-union consciousness. . . . The working class is unable to develop a [Marxist] socialist consciousness of its own. It can be impregnated with it only from the outside. . . .

To deny . . . this same revolution indeed in the interests of [Marxist] Socialism demands the absolute subordination of the masses to the single will of the leaders of labour. . . .

The idea of historical necessity does not a bit undermine the rôle of the individual in history. In fact all history is composed of the actions of individuals.

Lenin here states those conclusions from theory which, according to the dialectic, issue in practice and deeds. He, the great anti-opportunist on ends, is however not unwilling to adopt any compromise on means, however remote, that in fact furthers those ends.

Only those who have no reliance in themselves can fear to enter into temporary alliances with unreliable people. (*What is to be Done*, 1902).

"To march forward without compromise, without turning from the path"—if this is said by an obviously impotent minority of the workers who know (or at all events should know) that very soon, when the Hendersons and

Snowdens will have gained the victory over the Lloyd Georges and Churchills, the majority will be disappointed in their leaders and will begin to support communism (or at all events will be neutral towards it, and a large section will adopt a position of friendly neutrality towards it), then this slogan is obviously mistaken. (*Left-wing Communism*, 1920.)

In order to forward the end of producing national crisis, *a common front even with bourgeois or social chauvinist sections is to be advocated* (as against the "infantilism" of such people as Sylvia Pankhurst and Will Gallacher).

The Communist Party should propose to the Hendersons and Snowdens that they enter into a "compromise" election agreement, *viz.*, to march together against the alliance of Lloyd George and Churchill . . . while the Communist Party retains complete liberty to carry on agitation, propaganda and political activity. . . . Very often the British Communists find it hard to approach the masses at the present time and even to get them to listen to them. If I as a Communist come out and call upon the workers to vote for the Hendersons against Lloyd George, they will certainly listen to me. And I shall be able to explain in a popular manner not only why soviets are better than Parliament and why the dictatorship of the proletariat is better than the dictatorship of Churchill (which is concealed behind the signboard of bourgeois "democracy"), but I shall also be able to explain that I wanted to support Henderson with my vote as a rope supports the hanged.

5

Leon Davydovich Bronstein or Trotsky (born in 1879) was the son of a Jewish tenant farmer with land in the province of Kherson, in south Russia. Lunacharski provides a description of him quoted by Trotsky himself:

I looked with great disapproval at that dude, who swung his leg over his knee and dashed off with a pencil the outline of his impromptu speech. . . . A tremendous imperiousness and . . . an absence of that charm which always surrounded Lenin. . . . I always considered Trotsky a big man.

Arrested in 1898 for circulating revolutionary literature and a Menshevik from the date of the split over the control of *Iskra*, Trotsky rose to importance in the 1905 rising, as president of the St. Petersburg Soviet of Workers' Deputies. Sentenced to penal servitude for life, he escaped; came to Vienna; led, like a Winston Churchill of revolution, his own political group; and joined the Bolshevik Party in July, 1917, when Lenin temporarily accepted (as against Zinoviev) the wider and more popular scheme of revolutionary party membership and welcomed the Soviets.

Member of the Council of People's Commissars, and Commissar for Foreign Affairs, he first protracted negotiations and ultimately arranged the catastrophic but only feasible peace, that of Brest-Litovsk (1918). He then became Commissar for War in the civil war. Already in 1905 he had enunciated his distinctive doctrine of Permanent Revolution. Like Lenin—and even more so for racial reasons—Trotsky was and is an internationalist. His theory was and is that of world revolution. His practical contention is that Communism is safe in no one locality unless revolution is stimulated against its adversaries in all other significant countries. It will be carefully noted that we are *not* dealing here with some mere agitation or mere opportunist party program. We are dealing with *a new theory of Society*, one denying permanence of the State; and with *a new theory of popular government*, repudiating parliamentary democracy. The goal is the withering away of the State; and the means is the Dictatorship of the Proletariat.

Trotsky takes (legitimately enough) the writings of the unhappy Kautsky, and his book *Terrorism and Communism*, as his theme. Kautsky wrote:

> The type of dictatorship as a form of government lies in personal dictatorship. Class-dictatorship is pure nonsense. Class-rule without laws and regulations is unthinkable . . . turning the cause of humanity into a mere cause of the manual workers.

Trotsky, as much as Lenin, is a bitter critic of what the latter called "Democratic committeeism." The basic reason is strategic. The abolition of parties and oppositions is a necessary corollary of waging permanent war, class war. Trotsky conducts his attack in his book *Dictatorship v. Democracy* (1920).

> Perhaps Kautsky wishes to say that execution is not expedient, that "classes cannot be cowed." This is untrue. Terror is helpless—and then only "in the long run"—if it is employed by reaction against a historically rising class. But terror can be very efficient against a reactionary class which does not want to leave the scene of operations. *Intimidation* is a powerful weapon of policy, both internationally and internally. War, like revolution, is founded upon intimidation. . . . At all events, *our problem is not at every given moment statistically to measure the grouping of tendencies; but to render victory for our tendency secure.* . . . The dictatorship of the proletariat, in its very essence, signifies the immediate supremacy of the revolutionary vanguard, which relies upon the heavy masses, and, when necessary, obliges the backward tail to dress by the head. . . . If the waging of war is not the strong side of the proletariat, while the workers' International is suited only for peaceful epochs, then we may as well erect a cross over the revolution and over Social-

ism; for the waging of war is a fairly strong side of the capitalist State; which without a war will not admit the workers to supremacy. . . . The counter-revolutionary degeneration of parliamentarism finds its most perfect expression in the deification of democracy by the decaying theoreticians of the Second International. . . . The Soviet régime, which is more closely [than the parliamentary], straightly, honestly bound up with the toiling majority of the people, does achieve meaning, not in statistically reflecting a majority, but in *dynamically creating it*. Having taken its stand on the path of revolutionary dictatorship the working class of Russia has thereby declared that it builds its policy, in the period of transition, not on the shadowy art of rivalry with chameleon-hued parties in the chase for personal votes, but on the actual attraction of the peasant masses, side by side with the proletariat, in the work of ruling the country in the *real* interests of the labouring masses. Such democracy goes a little deeper down than parliamentarism. . . . The revolutionary supremacy of the proletariat presupposes within the proletariat itself the political supremacy of a party, with a clear program of action and a faultless internal discipline. [The proletariat will indorse action, by plebiscite, *after* the event.]

In his book *Whither Britain?* (1923), in which he stresses the supreme importance of that country for policy elsewhere, and which includes chapters on "The Decline of Britain" and on Mr. Baldwin, Trotsky reiterates the traditional dogmatic position:

As the bourgeoisie will not, under any circumstances, renounce their ownership-right of their own free will, a boldly revolutionary force must inevitably be put in motion.

In his *My Life*, Trotsky continues:

From the point of view of the absolute value of human personality, revolution must be "condemned," as well as war, as must also the entire history of mankind taken in the large. Yet the very idea of personality has been developed only as the result of [violent] revolutions, a process that is still far from complete. . . . Whether this method is good or bad from the point of view of normative philosophy I do not know and I must confess I am not interested in knowing. But I do know definitely that this is the only way that humanity has found thus far.

Lenin, in *The State and Revolution* (August, 1917), before the October Revolution and while the Social Revolutionaries under Kerensky were in power, delivered an onslaught—not only on "the monstrous oppression of the labouring masses by the State"—but upon the whole concept of the State itself. He quoted Engels' letter to Bebel: "We suggest that everywhere the word *State* be replaced by *Gemeinwesen* (Commonwealth)"; and again the passage where Engels said

that tne Paris Commune was "no longer a State in the proper sense of the word." The trouble with the Anarchists was that they were muddle-headed and *non-revolutionary*. "The unity of the nation is to become a reality by the destruction of the State," said Marx. There certainly *might be centralism*, but it would be *voluntary*, not bureaucratic.

What does this precisely mean? There is, on the one hand, the immensely important voluntary principle apparently admitted here. This seems in effect to signify not the Contractualist's notion of free, individual consent, but the notion of organic spontaneity, as against the old mechanical system. There is a Rousseauistic optimism; and neither by Marx nor by Lenin are the details provided of the conditions when the State shrivels away like a scroll at the Last Judgement. Spontaneous uprising, communist fraternity seem to be the notes. Lenin writes:

> *By ourselves*, we workers relying on our own experience as workers, must create *an unshakable and iron discipline* supported by the power of the armed workers; we must reduce the rôle of the State officials to that of simply carrying out our instructions; they must be responsible, revocable, moderately paid "managers and clerks."

There is a definitely Rousseauistic note in this passage, but the vision is scarcely that of Rousseau, still less of Jackson. There is a confidence in skill—but skill in other fields than those of administration. And yet . . . the Revolution will require singular skill in administration, and apparently so also will the days that come after. We have here an as yet unsolved paradox, of which later we shall see the solution. Trotsky, faithfully elaborating the thought of Lenin, indicates the magnitude of the task.

> The road to Socialism [Communism] lies through a period of the highest possible intensification of the principle of the State. And you and I are just passing through that period. Just as a lamp, before going out, shoots up in a brilliant flame, so the State, before disappearing, assumes the form of dictatorship of the proletariat, *i.e.*, the most ruthless form of State, which embraces the life of the citizens authoritatively in every direction. . . . No organization except the army has ever controlled man with such severe compulsion as does the State organization of the working class in the most difficult period of transition. . . . Democratization does *not* at all consist—as every Marxist learns in his ABC—in abolishing the meaning of skilled forces, the meaning of persons possessing special knowledge, and in replacing them everywhere and anywhere by elective boards. . . . The working class, under the leadership of its vanguard, must itself reeducate itself on the foundations of Social-

ism. Who ever has not understood this is ignorant of the ABC of Socialist construction.

What then comes after? Trotsky recalls a principle laid down in Marx's *Communist Manifesto.*

The very principle of compulsory labor service is for the Communist quite unquestionable. "He who works not, neither shall he eat." And as we all must eat, all are obliged to work. Compulsory labor service is sketched in our Constitution and in our Labor Code. . . . It is necessary once for all to make clear to ourselves that the principle itself of compulsory labor service has just so radically and permanently replaced the principle of free-hiring as the socialization of the means of production has replaced capitalist property. . . . And *this is the essence of compulsory labor service, which inevitably enters into the program of the Socialist organisation of labor as its fundamental element.* If organized economic life is unthinkable without compulsory labor service, the latter is not to be realized without the abolition of the fiction of freedom of labor, and without the substitution for it of the obligatory principle, which is supplemented by real compulsion.

Somewhere in the interstices of this compulsion, perhaps because the compelled wills his own compulsion through a *volonté générale*, a new liberty is discovered. This liberty, however, is not one of freedom from the basic competition for power. Economic equality will not give political equality. But it will sublimate the struggle *idealistically.*

At the bottom of rivalry lies the *vital instinct*—the struggle for existence [Marxist Darwinism]—which in the bourgeois order assumes the character of competition. Rivalry will not disappear even in the developed Socialist society; but with the growing guarantee of the necessary requirements of life rivalry will acquire an ever less selfish and purely idealist character.

However, within the ambit of practical reference, another system will prevail. Trotsky writes of Lenin, "in questions of theory he recognized no such thing as indifference or indulgence." Moreover, during revolution, which is "the inspired frenzy of history,"

our "truth," of course, is not absolute. But as in its name we are, at the present moment, shedding our blood, we have neither cause nor possibility to carry on a literary discussion as to the relativity of truth with those who "criticize" us with the help of all forms of arms. . . . As for us, we were never concerned with the Kantian-priestly and vegetarian-Quaker prattle about the "sacredness of human life." We were revolutionaries in opposition, and have remained revolutionaries in power. To make the individual sacred we must destroy the social order which crucifies him. And this problem can only be solved by blood and iron. . . . In revolution the highest degree of energy is the highest degree of humanity.

When Lenin died of a fourth stroke, it was the lot of fate that Trotsky should be in the South of Russia, in bed, ill, having caught a cold stepping a hundred yards from a canoe through bog to his car, in October, 1923, on a duck-shooting expedition. The fate of Russia and World Revolution was thereby tipped in the scales. Zinoviev, the old Bolshevik, with Stalin, Zinoviev's appointee as Party Secretary, led the conspiracy; a committee of the Politbureau was formed including all official members—save the duck-shooter, Trotsky. In January, 1925, Trotsky was relieved of his office of Commissar for War. In January, 1927, he was sent into exile in Siberia. On Feb. 12, 1929, he was deported to Constantinople. Since then, on the isle of Prinkipo, in Norway, in Mexico, he, the Jewish Danton of Revolution, has been alleged by the official government of the U.S.S.R. to be a ringleader of counter-revolution, a social-chauvinist and inciter of fascist conspiracy. There is grim irony in a statement of his, of September, 1927:

> A dictatorship of officialdom is terrorizing our party, which is supposed to be the highest expression of the proletarian dictatorship.

JOSEPH VISSARIONOVITCH STALIN (born DJUGASHVILI, in 1879), the son of a Georgian shoe operative, was educated for the priesthood at the Seminary at Tiflis, an unpleasant place where tutors spied on pupils, from which he was expelled for lack of "political balance." Already he had acquainted himself with works on sociology, socialism and Marxism. As his biographer, Barbusse, says, he was the kind of man, like Lenin, who would make a malcontent of one who was apathetic and a revolutionary of a malcontent. "Everyone would understand," thanks to his propaganda, "that Democracy, although it was quite capable of sweeping away the Empire, might itself one day constitute a barrier against Socialism which would have to be broken down."

In 1898 he joined the Tiflis Marxist organization, and in 1902 was arrested and sent to Siberia, to escape (he had a gift for escaping), return to Georgia and lead the Bolshevik faction there. In St. Petersburg, he was associated with Molotov as a founder of *Pravda*. From now the underground revolutionary who would plan with Kamo, the Armenian, bank hold-ups such as that on the Tiflis Bank in order to replenish Party funds, merged in the Party official. Exiled again in 1913, he returned to Petrograd in March, 1917. Put into the Politbureau of the Central Committee, in 1920, on Zinoviev's proposal he was made Secretary of the Party. The egoist Trotsky, brilliantly

articulate, who described mankind as "malicious tailless apes," felt that he had "hit off" Stalin with the comment, "Stalin is the outstanding mediocrity in the party." A more significant comment is that of Kaganovitch: "A typical Bolshevik of the old school." Nevertheless he had something in store for others of the old school.

Stalin's policy bears an interesting resemblance to that followed by Robespierre in the French Revolution. He ousted Trotsky with the aid of Zinoviev and Kamenev, the "old Bolsheviks," in 1925. Stalin then, in 1927, supported by Rykov and Bukharin, dealt with the traitors, Zinoviev and Kamenev themselves, who had been organizing a "New Opposition" in alliance with Trotsky's supporters. Having struck at the Left, in 1927—but having nevertheless adopted in the Five Year Plan of 1929 Trotsky's scheme of a systematic economic plan—Stalin struck at the traitors to the Right, in 1930. Rykov, the premier, and Tomsky, secretary of the Trade Unions, were removed from office for opposition to this economic unification and for too hasty an attempt to return to normalcy. But those officials who had been too indiscreet in the process of "liquidating" the kulaks (farmers employing labourers) were rebuked in a speech by Stalin, as "dizzy with success." The Party Secretary pursued his course along the line which he peculiarly contributed to define. There was clearly no opportunism in that. Nevertheless he was able to strike down deviators first to the Left, when it was necessary to indulge the peasants, and then to the Right, when it was possible to deal sternly with the wealthier among them.

The attitude, moreover, to the Communist International—or, more precisely, to the advocacy, reminiscent of Danton and identified with Trotsky, of international revolution—swung in the same fashion, first against Left and then against Right. Over against Trotsky's doctrine of "permanent revolution," Stalin, who is the final interpreter of Lenin and has ambitions as a Marxist theoretician (as it were sitting as a teacher in the chair of Marx, in succession to Engels and Lenin), has enunciated the doctrine of "Socialism in at least one country first." On the other hand, Bukharin, once secretary of the Communist International, was rebuked for a species of "revisionism"—for too obviously treating the world revolution as an enthusiastic myth. The "united front" policy between Communists and Social Democrats in Germany in 1923–1924 had broken down, thanks to this reluctance of the Soviet Union (which was yet Russia under another name) to engage forces outside its own frontiers. With the rise of Hitler and the direct threat to Russia, Dimitrov was put in as secretary of the Third

or Communist International (1935) and, for the empty myth of revolution, which doctrinally damned the bourgeois and imperialist League of Nations, a realistic and considered policy of penetration, intervention, alliances and increased collaboration with the League (since1934) was substituted, intervention being limited by Russian strength and policy. Collaboration, further, was urged with such bourgeois Liberals as could be induced to accept a comradely embrace, nor were the faithful even forbidden to sit down at table with Cardinals if such could be found. Bukharin and Rykov, in 1938, were shot, following the discovery of an alleged "Trotskyite" plot, involving Hitler, in which Marshal Tukhachevsky, Yagoda, the head of the G.P.U. [secret police], successor of the keen musician and police-chief, Dzerghinsky, and many others were implicated. Trotsky has freely responded with accusations of a Russian Thermidor [or Brumaire]. Of the seven men of the Politbureau at the time of Lenin's death, only Stalin remains. Tomsky is a suicide; Trotsky an exile; and Zinoviev, Kamenev, Bukharin and Rykov have been shot. Even "Papa" [Litvinov] has been dismissed. On the other hand, Russia has returned to the comity of even bourgeois nations, perhaps as a necessary member of a Triple Entente, always subject to the reservation that a (alternative) revolutionary policy abroad—or even an alliance with Germany—may have advantages as the best protection of Russian frontiers. Trotsky makes an interesting comment, of which he has himself experienced the edge:

> Revolution is a great devourer of men and character. It leads the brave to their destruction and destroys the souls of those who are less hardy.

He continues, in a striking passage, that some are miserable through having been born in a revolutionary age, but being unable to rise to its heights. Stalin is not among these wretched ones.

Stalin expounds his interpretation of Lenin straightforwardly. Lenin had said: "Is the emotion of national pride foreign to the Greater Russian class-conscious proletariat? Certainly not." But both Lenin and Stalin, a Georgian, proposed to fill the form of national culture with the content of Marxist values. As late as 1924 Stalin maintained that "an effort on the part of a single country, especially a peasant country like Russia, is not sufficient to achieve the final victory of Socialism [therein] and the Socialist organization of production." But the *practical requirements of consolidating the revolutionary strength* of the Russian land against intervention, so as to have an established pivot for later leverage of world revolution, *momentarily* dictated another course.

Stalin, in *Problems of Leninism*, lays it down:

One must not see in the triumph of revolution in a single country a purely national fact. But neither must one think that the Russian Revolution is an inert thing that can only be helped from outside.

He continues, in criticism of Trotsky (Report to XVI Communist Congress):

The problem of the day is the implacable fight against deviations from the line of Lenin. . . . The essence of Trotskyism is, above all, negation of the possibility of building [Marxist] socialism in the U.S.S.R. by the strength of the worker and peasant class of our country alone.

The stress upon dictatorship of a group *for* others, coupled with impeccable doctrinal orthodoxy laid down in accordance with tradition as a condition of office in the aristocratic vanguard, explains why the Webbs speak of the actual government of the U.S.S.R. as government by a party or group most comparable to the system (*e.g.*, in Paraguay) of the Society of Jesus or Jesuits. Stalin supported this thesis by an argument of quite startling interest, which yet remained undeveloped—a doctrine of revision, almost Bernsteinian:

One must discard the antiquated idea that Europe only can show us the road. There is such a thing as dogmatic Marxism and creative Marxism. I stand on the latter ground.

However, in his earlier *Theory and Practice of Leninism*, Stalin laid down his position, which has not been rescinded:

Lenin has indeed revived the revolutionary content of Marxism, suffocated by the opportunists of the Second International. . . . Imperialism has made the revolution a practical necessity. . . . Could the Russian Communists, in such a situation, confine themselves to a narrow national framework of a Russian revolution? Of course not. . . . They were forced *to smash social-patriotism and social-pacifism;* finally to overthrow capitalism in their own country, and hammer out a new weapon—the theory and tactics of the proletarian revolution.

The opportunists of the Second International have a series of dogmas on which their whole attitude hinges. First dogma: the proletariat cannot and ought not to seize power if it is not a majority in the country. . . . Isn't it obvious that the experience of the revolutionary struggle of the masses undermines more and more this out of date dogma? . . . "We are the Party of the working class which in consequence should act almost wholly (in time of civil war, wholly) under the direction of our Party, and should be grouped to the greatest possible degree around it. But it would be wrong to believe that under

capitalism the whole class or nearly all of it is able to raise itself to the consciousness and activity of the vanguard, of its Socialist [Communist] Party" [Lenin].

The tendency of the practical people to turn up their noses at theory runs counter to the whole spirit of Leninism and involves serious dangers to its practice.

Stalin reaffirms Lenin's position on the corporate dictatorship of and by the executive vanguard of the proletariat and for those workers and peasants not yet consciously part of that industrial proletariat:

The dictatorship of the proletariat is the rule of the proletariat over the bourgeoisie, a rule unrestricted by law, based upon force, enjoying the sympathy and support of the labouring masses.

He quotes Lenin: "The dictatorship of the proletariat must be a state that embodies a new kind of democracy, *for* the proletariat and the dispossessed." He continues (December, 1927):

We start from the premises that the party, the Communist Party, is the basic instrument of the dictatorship of the proletariat, that the leadership of *one party, which does not share and cannot share this leadership with other parties, constitutes that fundamental condition* without which a more or less lasting and developed dictatorship of the proletariat is inconceivable.

An important issue arises here. To what end the dictatorship? The *classless* society? But in what sense is the classless society an *equal* society? This is peculiarly critical in a country such as the U.S.S.R., where the government pays interest on state bonds; encourages the "speed-up" and Stakhanovism; and pays piece rates in order to extract from every man according to his powers for the benefit of the Whole but paying rather according to work done (with profit only to the State as Owner) than in accordance with the needs of the individual worker. In this connection Marx wrote a crucial passage in his *Critique of the Gotha Program* (1875):

The right of the producers is proportional to the amount of labour they contribute, the equality consists in the fact that everything is measured by an *equal measure*, labour . . . * Right can by its very nature only consist in the application of an equal standard; but *unequal individuals* (and they would not be different individuals if they were not unequal) are only measurable by an equal standard in so far as they can be brought under an equal observation, be regarded *from one definite aspect only, e.g.*, in the case under review, they must be considered *only as workers*, and nothing more must be seen in them, everything else being ignored.

* *Cf.* p. 599 for the completion of this passage.

There is nothing of Jacksonian democracy in this. It may be said that Marx is here only referring to the stage of society, technically called "Socialist,"* which emerges from bourgeois society and is historically conditioned in its evolution by it. It may yet be asked what symptoms we have here of the withering away of the State (any more than of the dictatorship itself) and whether this "natural privilege" disappears when it does wither. Nor is it entirely satisfactory to say [H. F. Ward]: "The highest possible development of the power of the state with the object of preparing the conditions for the dying away of the state. Yes, it is contradictory but this contradiction is a living thing and completely reflects Marxian dialectics"—since this minimizes the material appetite of the unequal (even under economic equality) to retain power once attained. If power is poison and absolute power absolute poison (as the academic historian, Lord Acton, said), then Stalin indeed and his group must be well poisoned. Nor does this "contradiction reflecting Marxian dialectics" throw light on the question of economic equality along with the psychology of enlightened material interest and the admission of natural privilege. Engels, however, in *Anti-Dühring*, is much more straightforward:

> The demand for equality in the mouth of the proletariat has, however, a double meaning. It is either—as was the case at the very start, for example, in the peasants' wars—a natural reaction against the crying social inequalities, against the contrast between the rich and the poor, the feudal lords and their serfs, surfeit and starvation; as such it is the simple expression of the revolutionary instinct, and finds its justification in that and indeed only in that. Or, on the other hand, the proletarian demand for equality has arisen as a reaction against the bourgeois demand for equality, drawing more or less correct and more far-reaching demands from this bourgeois demand, and serving as material for agitation in order to rouse the workers against the capitalists on the basis of the capitalists' own assertions; and in this case it stands and falls with civil equality itself.†

It is in a fashion entirely consistent with this that Stalin, putting an end to Zinoviev's "demagogic chatter about equality," put forward in a speech to the Moscow Congress of Leaders of Industry, in 1931, the following statement:

> Marx and Lenin said that the difference between skilled and unskilled work would continue to exist even under Socialism, *and even after classes have been*

* *Cf.* p. 558.
† *Cf.* p. 472.

annihilated; that only under Communism* would these differences disappear, and that therefore, even under Socialism "wages" would be paid according to labour performed and not according to need. But our industrialists and trade union equalitarians do not agree with this, and opine that that difference has already disappeared under our Soviet system. *Who is right, Marx and Lenin, or our equalitarians?* We may take it that Marx and Lenin are right. But if so, it follows that whoever draws up wage scales on the "principle" of equality, and ignores the difference between skilled and unskilled labour, is at loggerheads with Marxism and Leninism.

Stalin continues elsewhere:

> The sort of Socialism in which everyone receives the same wages, the same quantity of meat, the same quantity of bread, and receives the same products in the same quantity—such a Socialism is unknown to Marxism. Marxism only says: until the final annihilation of classes, and until labour, instead of being a means to existence, has become the first necessity of life—voluntary labour for society—everyone will be paid in accordance with the work done. . . . *Equalization in the sphere of consumption and personal life is reactionary petty-bourgeois nonsense,* worthy of some primitive set of ascetics, but not of a Socialist society.

So much for the Benedictine communism. So much also for the "petty-bourgeois" (*cf.* B. Shaw, with his economic equality). For the rest, Marxist Socio-communism appears to be jam tomorrow but never jam today. Lunacharski, commissar for education, further said: "No society can hope to continue without the aristocratic principle of higher education."

What then is the present goal of the classless, but wage-differentiated and vanguard-organized, society, sceptical of bourgeois democracy and of freedom to assemble and speak in Parties, this side of some future phase in the dialectic of history? Lenin said: "Electricity and power to the masses." Power to the masses, however, is subject to the strategic direction of the party hierarchy with its unequal gifts. It may be, love of political power being as vivid as love of economic power, that only the Next Revolution on beyond could dispossess this hierarchy. Trotsky commenting on Stalin says that his attitude is expressed in a phrase once used by him: "Give the mujhiks (peasants) tractors and see where we shall get." Trotsky himself says:

> The passion for mechanical improvement, as in America, will accompany the first stage of every new Socialist society. The passive enjoyment of nature will disappear from art. Technique will become a more powerful inspiration for

* This use of terms is, of course, technical. *Cf.* p. 558.

artistic work, and later on the contradiction itself between technique and nature will be solved in a higher synthesis.

Lenin gives a simpler, but not disconnected objective: "The struggle for bread is the struggle for socialism."

How far this has been achieved without famine,* or to a higher level than in the social democratic world, is a matter of record. How far it will be achieved is one of prophecy. Other variants of the theme of the future emerge, including (besides the power of the orthodox Communist bureaucracy, within a total U.S.S.R. Communist Party membership of about 2,000,000 in a total population of about 160,000,000) the adulation of Stalin, the saviour.

On this theme the following poem, published in the Moscow *Pravda* (Aug. 28, 1936), is interesting:

> O great Stalin, O leader of the peoples,
> Thou who broughtest man to birth,
> Thou who purifiest the earth,
> Thou who restorest the centuries,
> Thou who makest bloom the spring,
> Thou who makest vibrate the musical chords.
>
> . . .
>
> Thou, splendor of my spring, O Thou,
> Sun reflected of millions of hearts.

To the anthropologist, of course, and political philosopher this development will be recognized as, not new, but very old.† Aristotle again is justified in his wisdom.

Of the XVIII Communist Party Congress of the U.S.S.R. (1939), *Pravda* wrote editorially:

> Our party comes to the congress united, monolithic and mighty as never before. . . . [In the Soviet Fatherland] Stalin is the symbol of victorious Socialism [Marxist Communism], the banner of coming battles for the victory of communism in our country and throughout the world. Stalin is the personification of the moral and political unity of the Soviet people.

No one would argue that revolution is always to be condemned, in seventeenth-century England or in eighteenth-century America and France. Two moral issues arise. Is it the only effective route to remedy a greater injustice? It appears to be the chronic misfortune of most

* *Cf.* p. 615.
† *Cf.* p. 109.

revolutions to be "betrayed"—and the Russian Revolution is perhaps no exception. Will, in fact, the particular revolution succeed? Stalin here makes an interesting comment:

> In 1917 the chain of the Imperialist world-front happened to be weaker in Russia than in the other countries. . . . Why? . . . because the revolution had Tsarism for its opponent, the most hideous representative of Imperialism, deprived of all moral authority and hated by the whole people.

The next revolution, he suggests, may be in India [or in poverty-stricken, broken-down, proletarian Spain]. In Russia, as Arthur Rosenberg comments, "the equality of man was achieved through Communist starvation." But the revolutionary operation was successfully achieved, even if some patient masses died; and the revolution consolidated itself. The comment of Trotsky also is relevant, in his *History of the Russian Revolution:*

> In Russia the proletariat did not arise gradually through the ages, carrying with itself the burden of the past as in England, but in leaps, involving sharp changes of environment, ties, relations, and a sharp break with the past.

How then to succeed in those industrially developed and progressive countries where the achievement appears necessary if there is to be final Marxist success? As Stalin and Dimitrov have recognized, as clearly as Trotsky but in different fashion, the political situation is dominated by foreign policy. In an economically inter-connected world it is not easy for any country to detach itself. Entangled because peace and war alike are indivisible, it becomes a strategic necessity for each country, however would-be "isolationist" or "liberal," to look for allies and to ask few questions. The iron imperative of war permits no questions to be heard save "for or against?" In this case the Marxist thesis, "for or against Fascism?" bites home; and supporters of the most unexpected, "blue Tory" character may be found holding up the banner of revolution and of the dictatorship of the proletariat. Isolated bourgeois groups must either obviously support their countries' foes—if a war atmosphere can be induced—or embark upon a route that makes them defenceless against disciplined organization. This must end by promoting their own forcible liquidation if the battle against the enemy is won—or even lost, but in such fashion that the enemy choses not to check the disruption.

George Dimitrov, Bulgarian Marxist, secretary of the Comintern [Communist International], in his report to the Seventh World Congress in Moscow, in 1935, entitled *The Working Class against Fascism,* gives an answer to this issue:

The Social-Democratic workers are able to convince themselves ever more forcibly that fascist Germany, with all its horrors and barbarities, is in the final analysis the result of the Social Democratic policy of class collaboration with the bourgeoisie.

What is the test of this anti-Marxist collaboration? Rejection of a united front with the Communists. Its converse is a popular front and the peaceful penetration of the "backward organs of the proletariat"—even the statement of the case in such a way as to allay the objections of Liberals and intellectuals, by presenting them with the pro-Fascist *or* pro-Marxist dilemma.

The establishment of unity of action by all sections of the working class, irrespective of their party or organisational affiliation, is necessary even before the majority of the working class is united in the struggle for the overthrow of capitalism and the victory of the proletarian revolution. . . . Joint action by the parties of both Internationals against fascism, however, would not be confined to influencing their present adherents, the Communists and Social-Democrats; it would also exert *a powerful influence on the ranks of the Catholic, anarchist and unorganised workers*, even on those who had temporarily become the victims of fascist demagogy . . . pointing out to the masses the only right path—the path of the struggle for *the revolutionary overthrow of the rule of the bourgeoisie* and the establishment of a Soviet government—the Communists, in defining their immediate political aims, must not attempt to leap over those necessary stages of the mass movement, in the course of which the working masses by their own experience outlive their illusions . . . And here it must be said that under *American conditions* the creation of a mass party of toilers, a Workers' and Farmers' Party, might serve as such a suitable form. Such a party would be a specific form of the mass peoples front in America that should be set up in opposition to the parties of the trusts and banks, and likewise to growing fascism. Such a party of course, will be *neither* Socialist *nor* Communist. But it *will have to be* an antifascist party and not an anti-Communist party.

READING

N. Lenin: *Kautsky the Renegade & the Proletarian Revolution.*

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE*

H. Barbusse: *Stalin*, trans. V. Holland, 1935 (laudatory).
E. Bernstein: *Evolutionary Socialism*, trans. E. Harvey, 1909.
G. Dimitrov: *The Working Class against Fascism*, 1935.
R. Fox: *Lenin*, 1933 (laudatory).
K. Kautsky: *The Dictatorship of the Proletariat*, trans. H. Stenning, n.d.

* Also of interest in making an assessment are:
W. P. and Z. K. Coates: *From Tsardom to the Stalin Constitution*, 1938 (laudatory,

*N. Lenin: *The State and Revolution.*
N. Lenin: *Letters*, ed. Hill & Mudie, 1937.
*A. Rosenberg: *A History of Bolshevism*, trans. I. Morrow, 1934.
J. Stalin: *The Theory and Practice of Leninism.*
*L. Trotsky: *My Life*, 1930.

---

by the secretary of the Anglo-Russian Parliamentary Committee).

P. Sloan: *Russia without Illusions*, 1938 (laudatory, by a broadcaster in Russia).

S. and B. Webb: *Soviet Communism: A New Civilization?*

W. H. Chamberlin: *Russia's Iron Age*, 1934 (critical, by the correspondent, 1922–1934, of the *Christian Science Monitor*).

M. Muggeridge: *Moscow Nights* (critical, by the correspondent of the *Manchester Guardian*).

Eugene Lyons: *Assignment in Utopia*, 1937 (critical, by the correspondent, 1928–1934, of the United Press).

Walter Citrine: *I Search for Truth in Russia*, 1936.

C. B. Hoover: *The Economic Life of Soviet Russia*, 1931 (painstakingly impartial).

Chapter XX

Laski and Strachey

1

THE Victorian Age in Britain was one of moral confidence, not without questionings; its typical poets Tennyson—and Browning. It was an age of growing prosperity, but not without unevenness of rate of growth, both as between decades and between classes.

The Factory Act of 1847 is the great landmark showing the emergence of a new social conscience. It and the Public Health Acts were the best fruits of a Reformed Parliament. The success of the Free Trade League and the failure of physical-force Chartism were significant. Still more so was the slow but sure growth of Trade Unionism on from the recognition of Unionism as legitimate, and other than "conspiracy," in the Acts of 1871–1876, until the days of the Taff Vale injunction of 1900 against the Railway Servants Union. This Taff Vale case turned the mind of trade unionists to politics—and incidentally made the Labour Party. The regularization followed of the position of Trade Unions, including the safeguarding of their funds in time of strike, by the subsequent overruling legislation of 1906.

In 1838 only 55 per cent of those married signed the marriage register; the rest marked it. Nevertheless, whereas in 1730, of every four children born in the metropolis of "Merrie England," three failed to reach their fifth birthday, by 1830 the proportions in London had been reversed. The subsequent course is one of increased aliveness to the importance of citizen health and the need for reform. The concept of the nation as a unity, in which if one suffers all suffer (or rather if many suffer so do the upper few), emerges more luminously amid the squalors of laissez-faire, uninhibited competition and wealth distributed in only the crudest proportionate relation to service.

In America, after the Civil War, explorers opened up an area between Kansas and the Coast equal to all the Eastern States combined. An economic development began only comparable to that of modern Russia. In this heyday of capitalism, this Gilded Age, the Vanderbilts, Goulds, Carnegies and Harrimans built their fortunes,

thanks to keenness of eye for the opportunities of their country. Where in 1861, it has been estimated that there were only three millionaires, in 1900 there were 3,800. In a year of depression, 1897, a ball was given in New York at which "Bradley [Martin], as Louis XV, wore a court suit of brocade. . . . The suit of gold inlaid armor worn by Mr. Belmont was valued at ten thousand dollars." Over against this lived abject poverty in immigrant tenements, but not unillumined by ambition.

The twentieth century saw a world materially improved, by social services for the common man, if compared with a century before. In Britain medical surveys show in food values, between 1909 and 1934, a 6 per cent calory increase; but still exhibit 30 per cent of the entire population *below standard in food* and 10 per cent seriously undernourished. They show the stature of children in schools varying in relation to the poverty of the surroundings and a crude death rate of 31 per 1,000 in the poorest households as against 9 per 1,000 in the best-off. Especially this difference applies to infant mortality. The picture is ably drawn in G. D. H. and Margaret Cole's *The Condition of Britain* (1937). Nine-tenths of the community works to receive in return one-half of the national income; 6 per cent of the population holds over 80 per cent of the total national property; .03 per cent holds 21 per cent of this total. The costs of the social services have not, in fact, redistributed income.

In the United States the divisions are less glaring. Rather over six out of seven persons in America as distinct from nine out of ten in England have working-class incomes ($2,500 or under, in U.S.A.). The same gross sum is received in income by 0.1 per cent of families, those "at the top," as by 42 per cent, those in the lower ranges.

Against the immorality of wealth without return in ascertainable social service the public conscience aroused itself in the Owenite movement,* the Christian Socialists, the followers of Henry George and in more diffuse sentiments of social justice.

Outstanding among those who gave precision to this demand for social justice were the founders of the British Fabian Society (1884), springing from an earlier ethical group. Named after the Roman general Fabius Cunctator, who won his victories by patience (as contrasted with Spartacus, the slave leader, with his direct methods†), the Fabians adopted as their distinctive policy one of peaceful permeation, believing that a *reasoned argument*, meticulously supported by detail, must slowly but surely have effect. They despised rhetoric and applied

* *Cf.* p. 545. † *Cf.* p. 613.

themselves to an efficient understanding of the minutiae of social reform.

They proposed to win victory by the same methods by which the Factory inspectors earlier in the century had pushed forward reform, entirely in the very British tradition of the energetic social worker. Moreover, they counted among their numbers some of the ablest publicists and most respected research workers of the day, Bernard Shaw, the Webbs, Annie Besant, Pease, Graham Wallas, Olivier (Governor of Jamaica) and, for a time, H. G. Wells. The novels of Wells, the plays of Shaw publicized their ideas. Their world was one of expanding horizons and of scientific development. Their influence was international. Thoroughly native to the soil, they focussed non-Marxian Socialism in English-speaking countries; earned the outraged indignation of the *émigré* philosopher, Engels, as "snooty bourgeois" (*hochnäsige bourgeois*) and inspired Bernstein and the great Revisionist movement in Germany. In so far as they compromised with Marx it was with the later Marx in Sidney Webb's phrase, "the inevitability of gradualness." The State was to be the tool of reform, although Olivier stated, in *Fabian Essays*, that "Socialism is merely Individualism rationalised, organised, clothed, and in its right mind."

The very empiricism of their methods and beliefs placed these non-Marxist or, so-called, "British Socialists" at a disadvantage compared with the Marxians, since they were unable to demonstrate their sincerity by an equally violent advocacy and intolerant dogmatism. They were not among those whom Locke described as "sure because they were sure." They could, however, point out that the most flagrant violation of humane sentiment, the Slave Trade, had yet not been remedied by the methods of a Roman Spartacus, leader in the Servile Wars, whose imitators were the German Marxian Spartacists, but by the more Fabian methods of the Quakers and Wilberforce. Even in the case of American Slave Emancipation no one could cite Lincoln's methods as Spartacist or other than a resolute, astoundingly fair-minded empiricism. Cromwell earlier had been an empiricist, if ever a man was, trying in succession a series of remedies. The history of the English Great Reform Bill, of 1832, carried under organized pressure, and itself finest fruit of the movement that ended with the collapse of physical-force Chartism, had been sharply different from that of the French Revolution. The issue, however, for democracy had not been conspicuously less favourable than in the case of France. It can be argued (as my late colleague, Professor Carl Becker, has argued) that it had been on the record actually more favourable. Force is the

social nemesis of egoistic stupidity; but virtue lies not in violence but in the adjustment of pressure to resistance. He who would found the Kingdom of Heaven on earth by force must beware lest he also found the Kingdom of Hell on earth.

Moreover, according to the Marxist dialectic, *the capitalist class itself had supplanted, inevitably, the feudal and landowning class.* Here also, then, there had been class conflict (although of a different kind from that of today)—conflict between industrialist and landowner. Nevertheless, the great landowners themselves were often Whigs; the earlier Parliamentarian leaders were often landowners; and this great class transformation had taken place in a fashion that would serve to prove the thesis of evolution by pressures rather than the thesis of catastrophe and revolution.

The Marxist theory had, however, this supreme advantage that it was a prophecy that fulfilled itself. Fabians attached importance, in the use of compulsion, to the processes of law and to the form of majority vote. Like Bentham, they tended to find the kernel of democracy in the right to differ, to discuss and to choose and organize alike cooperation and opposition—although the Webbs, with their doctrine of "the vocation of leadership," tended to differ by their emphasis upon the administrative state. The success, however, of this procedure, and the willingness of a minority to acquiesce, depended upon a large measure of social confidence in it. The system had to be worked in good faith; and this with great courage and resolution. Even the technical issue between Marxism and Fabianism, whether capitalism could as a matter of economic fact be replaced piecemeal and transformed, without civil war, by measures of social planning towards a more equal society, could only be solved one way—and that the Marxian—if essential elements declined to collaborate in the co-operative attempt. The race was necessarily one between reform and revolution. Every mischance was on the side of revolution. Reason *alone*, as Aristotle said, moves nothing—although the great philosopher prefaced his *Metaphysics* with the comment: "All men by nature desire to know." Only the feeble impetus of human goodwill and social duty assures reform and construction. How weak that impetus is these pages have shown—and how it yet distinguishes civilization from a veneered barbarism.

With the third decade of the century a new scene supervened. The cult of efficiency led Mr. Shaw to bless all tyrannies provided that they knew how to administer—for forms and shirts let fools contest. The cult of the State led Beatrice Webb to see the vision of a new

civilization upon the Volga, hovering above the inspected Soviet blue books. Mr. Wells, that great humanist, had long gone off on courses of his own, with a vision of technological things-to-come in his eye. The epigoni, the men of the later vintages, had not the courage, were not the men, to restate the Fabian case. So far as there was a fresh movement it was attributable to the Pluralists, the Coles and Laski. Douglas Cole later explained that Sidney Webb had omitted to observe that the happy mood of British constitutionalism depended upon an historic accident. Presumably Lenin did not overlook the point, although perforce he had to hold this accident to be dialectical necessity. The luck would not hold; and no longer, Milton-wise, was it Anglo-Saxony's mission to teach the nations. Germans and Russians could do that. Byronic pessimism supervened and masochistic gloom.

Syndicalism, the belief in direct industrial action and the refusal to co-operate with or utilize bourgeois government agencies—profound political distrust—was a peculiarly French and Spanish phenomenon, having affiliations with Proudhon. In America its characteristic features appeared in the I.W.W. The notions, however, of society as a composite of groups, both regional and occupational (*syndicats* or unions), and of function rather than mere territorial residence as the proper basis for representation in government—as the next step in democracy—had a wider vogue. In Germany it fitted in with federalism and with a certain concept of law expounded by Gierke, with allusion to Althusius, and popularized in England by the influential professor of law, F. W. Maitland.* In England also adherents of the ecclesiastical Oxford Movement, such as Dr. J. N. Figgis, sought to vindicate the community rights of the Church.

Students of trade unionism, S. G. Hobson and men of such eminence as Cole, developed a theory of guilds and of producer co-operatives. The theory was not without similarity to the notion of the Soviet. It was not, as Guild Socialism, without influence upon the short-lived German Economic Council and even upon Corporative State theory. As a theory of the State, as a bond of associations each with a life of its own, it was known as Pluralism. It had effect upon the Webbs themselves, in their *Constitution for the Socialist Commonwealth of Great Britain* (1920), with its advocacy of separate parliaments or councils representing the consumer's or citizen's interest and the producer's or functional interest.

* *Cf.* p. 160.

2

HAROLD JOSEPH LASKI (1893–1950) was also, at first, a continuator of the tradition of J. S. Mill in that last phase of *The Principles of Political Economy* which leads on to Fabianism. Laski's work, moreover, was marked by more stress than was placed by the Fabian majority on the individual, even to the point of "conditional anarchism." In the end, however, he identified his position with Marxism far more closely than did this majority. He resigned from the Fabian Executive Committee on the ground of lack of sympathy with them in their traditional positions as exponents of an Anglo-Saxon "gradualist" brand of Social Democracy.

His father, Nathan Laski, hailing from Hungary, settled in Manchester and established for himself an honourable and distinguished position, not only in the orthodox Jewish community, but in the civic life of that city. The home background was one of praiseworthy social activity, entered upon by a wealthy merchant engaged in the Indian trade. That activity was recognized when a Palestinian community was named after him. Harold Laski, after first unsuccessfully seeking an outlet for his brilliancy in biology, proceeded from Oxford in 1914 to McGill University as lecturer in History. Volunteering, he was rejected for service on the first day of war and replaced an Oxford "don" returning to the war from McGill. In Montreal he early attacked Lloyd George's "to-the-bitter-end" speech and policy.

In a preface of September, 1916, to his first book, *Studies in the Problem of Sovereignty* (1917), he expressed his indebtedness to Professor (now Mr. Justice) Felix Frankfurter, then of Harvard, and to that university he proceeded from Canada at that date as instructor (subsequently lecturer) and tutor in History and Political Philosophy. To Frankfurter and his eminent predecessor on the Supreme Court, Mr. Justice Holmes, the second book, *Authority in the Modern State* (1918), was dedicated, although certain soldier students of the Great War were associated in the dedication. "We who are left are trying in some sort to understand the problems of the state they died to make free."

In September, 1919, the Boston police struck on the issue of the right of the policemen's union to affiliate with the American Federation of Labor. The police commissioner dismissed the leaders; there was a small outbreak of looting; the Governor of Massachusetts, Calvin Coolidge, supported the commissioner, using the statement, "There is no right to strike against the public safety by anybody, any time,

anywhere." And President Wilson condemned the action of the police. However, Mr. Laski intervened vigorously in their favour in the pages of the *New Republic* in protest against the support of the city by the university. Both he and President Coolidge may be accurately said to date their public importance from that moment. He was sustained, in the face of financial threats and criticism on the ground that he was not an American citizen, by President Lowell on the ground of academic freedom. He was not denied the meed of moderate martyrdom, including, on a more trivial level, an attack at his expense in an issue of the Harvard *Lampoon*. This had its accustomed consequence in favourable attention in other quarters, as "well up in the vanguard."

In 1920 Laski returned to England as lecturer in the London School of Economics, and, when Graham Wallas resigned, after an interval, succeeded him as Professor of Political Science. His reputation for encyclopaedic memory and as a *diseur* of repute had preceded him and, within a short time, there were few men in public life with whom he had not become acquainted. Talks with Lord Morley and Mr. Henry Nevinson reconnected him with the great Liberal tradition; Lord Haldane, organizing the British Institute of Adult Education, found in him "a highly gifted writer and publicist"; he became president of the Rationalist Press Association; Mr. H. G. Wells tells, in a fantasy, in *Men Like Gods* (1923), how

> Mr. Barnstaple tacitly declined that task [of explaining to Mr, Burleigh, *i.e.*, (?) Lord Balfour, who the Guild Socialists were]. 'The idea is quite familiar to our younger people,' he said.
>
> Laski called it the pluralistic state, as distinguished from the monistic state, in which sovereignty is concentrated. Even the Chinese have it. A Pekin professor, Mr. S. C. Chang, has written a pamphlet in which he calls it 'Professionalism.' . . . Much as we seem to find it here [in Utopia, where 'decisions in regard to any particular matter were made by the people who knew most about the matter'] . . . Decidedly the germ of what you call Anarchism here is also in the air we come from.

Even the slower minds of the Labour Party were impressed, while, when he accompanied Mr. Sidney Webb to his Durham constituency, the Durham miners were swayed by his rounded phrase and argument. First a close friend and then a bitter denouncer of Mr. Ramsay Macdonald, whose major vice he detected to be an unmeasured vanity, he was also an outspoken critic of George V in the British Monarch's constitutional policy in 1931 and a valued publicist, especially in swaying American opinion, in connection with the abdication of the

next King of the House of Windsor. In 1937, although the policy he advocated, along with Stafford Cripps, of political association with the Communist Party was rejected at the Bournemouth Labour Party Conference by delegate votes representing over 2 million voters against 336,000, he was himself elected on to the National Executive of the latter Party, as representing a doubtless distinctive view.

In *The Problem of Sovereignty* Laski is preoccupied with the double problem of the relation of particular groups, minorities, especially religious minorities, such as the English Catholics, the members of the Oxford Movement and the Free Church of Scotland, to the State with claims to exclusive allegiance as Sovereign. Also—and naturally enough during that period of accession of authority to Government which is a consequence of war and conscription—he is concerned with the right of the individual to set conditions to his obligation of obedience to the State. In stating this problem Laski was aided by the preceding work, then stirring the English universities, of Figgis, on the churches, of Gierke, on groups, and of Maitland, on the history of the theory of sovereignty, as well as by Professor Ernest Barker's striking article on "the Discredited State" (February, 1915). The distinctive positions occupied by Laski, in his earlier phases, of accentuation of the Mill tradition in the individualist-anarchist direction are here laid down. *The theory is anti-State* and opposed to the centralization of Government. The ideal of the autonomous individual is the fulcrum of leverage.

> It is from the selection of variations, not from the preservation of uniformities, that progress is born [pure Mill]. . . . *We shall make the basis of our State consent to disagreement* . . . you must place your individual at the centre of things. . . . The will of the State obtains preeminence over the wills of other groups exactly to the point where it is interpreted with sufficient wisdom to obtain general acceptance, and no further . . . our allegiance is not as a fact unified.

Broadening his ground from a discussion of the lawyer's thesis of State sovereignty over all groups, including even Churches claiming to be "perfect societies," Laski, in his *Authority in the Modern State*, passed on to the discussion of the wider problem of political authority. He saw in the Modern State the offspring of the Reformation, made possible by the Reformation, and indeed old Papalism reborn as modern Sovereign. He confirmed his theory from a study of the French reactionary theorists of the early nineteenth century, especially de Bonald (1754–1840) and Lamennais (1782–1854); he concluded with

a highly significant chapter on French syndicalism; and he reaffirmed his own earlier principles. The Catholic de Bonald had said in his *Essay on Social Order:* "Unless we have a religious and political unity man cannot discover truth nor can society hope for salvation." It was Lenin who said: "There can be no salvation apart from Communism." But Laski, not yet a Marxist, maintains, against the background of world war, the exact opposite position to this demand for disciplined politico-moral homogeneity. He does not even stop with Jacques Maritain's more recent pluralist position of cultural homogeneity conjoined with political federalism.

> The state is only a species of a larger genus . . . government dare not range over the whole area of human life. . . . [The state] deserves his allegiance, it should receive it only where it commands his [the citizen's] conscience . . . the only real security for social well-being is the free exercise of men's minds. Otherwise, assuredly, we have contracted ourselves to slavery.

Laski primarily was concerned to deny that the "sovereign state was a necessary article of faith." The theme was the opposite of that of Treitschke. But constructively he tended to affirm federalism; the division of powers; the importance of local government; internationalism; a perpetual adjustment between groups representing the producer and the state as representing the consumer; democratic self-government in industry. His position is distinctly that of Pluralism. It champions minorities. Liberty is defined as "the full opportunity for active citizenship wherever there are men with the will to think upon political problems."

In his *Grammar of Politics* (1925) the State is described as "an organization for enabling the mass of men to realise social good on the largest possible scale." The notion, however, of this social good has a libertarian content and State is properly and decisively distinguished from Society. In this book theory is reinforced by an exhaustive examination of existent institutions and of desirable reforms.

> The starting-point of every political philosophy is the inexpugnable variety of human wills . . . The will of the State is the will which is adopted out of the conflict of myriad wills which contend with each other for the mastery of social forces . . . we have not the right to attach any special moral attribute to the will of the State until we have estimated the results of that will at work . . . The State fulfils a function in the community just like every other association; its powers are set by the nature of that function . . . *If popular sovereignty simply means the paramountcy of public opinion, this is an abstraction of the most vicious kind.* For we need to know when public opinion is public

and when it is opinion . . . It is the historic nature of ideal right to gather power unto itself that, in the end, it may cease to be merely ideal . . . My duty, therefore, to the State, is, above all, my duty to *the ideal* the actual State must seek to serve.

It should be noted that Laski, who had never accepted the group-personality theory (whether in its "meta-biological" or in its legal-metaphysical form) which Maitland tended to take over from Gierke, in his *Grammar of Politics* no longer used the phrase "pluralist state" and became noticeably critical of the position of downright pluralists such as Cole. This transition is noted in K. C. Hsiao's critical study, *Political Pluralism*. Professor Morris R. Cohen, in a review subsequently reprinted in *Law and the Social Order* (1932), while criticizing Laski's *Foundations of Sovereignty* on the ground that "his main ideas as to the nature of sovereignty are by no means clear or convincing," had pointed out the danger in pluralism of raising a "communal ghost" of corporations, with a "real personality of the group," and the risk that local tyrants would be the worst tyrants of all. His charge seems to me unproven that Laski had indeed ever accepted this organic concept for the Group (as Gierke had tended to do) any more than for the State. Shrewder were the comments that Laski lacked sense for the community, whereas Gierke had [indeed excessive] "reverence for the state" and that Laski did "not seem willing to urge his program as a working hypothesis, to be tried when it serves vital needs."

In the main . . . I think the limitations of both Mr. Laski's and M. Duguit's books are due to an *unavowed craving for absolute distinctions*, which is apt to be strongest in those not devoted to technical philosophy. The public demands it of those engaged in political discussion. People generally cannot get enthusiastic about tentative policies and reserved statements. They crave *absolute certainty* from the statesman as well as from the physician and priest. That is why the most influential factors in the world's political discussion have been absolute theologians like Calvin, doctrinaire Hegelians like Karl Marx, or classificatory zoölogists like Aristotle—not to mention certain non-political but disturbing remarks in a famous Sermon on the Mount. But in justice to Mr. Laski it should be mentioned that he recognizes that man is no less a solitary than a social creature.

Laski, then, at this stage, passed from his first phase of Pluralism —justified in terms of ideals but not uncoloured by the "hard-boiled" sociological positivism of Duguit*—into his second and more orthodoxly individualist phase in the interpretation of what was called "con-

*Cf. pp. 663, 750.

ditional anarchism." Community, as actually existent, anyhow plural and resolved into groups, was now more heavily qualified by and subordinated to the claims of the individual. Laski's thought became even more definitely individualist. "In relation to the Modern State each man is, in this department [of religion] or elsewhere, *ultimately an Athanasius*"—standing "against the world"—although he is also "an associative animal of his group" and a unit in the civic sphere. Authority is declared to be federal and the doctrine of substantive consent is made more profound. Liberty is emphasized as—taking a phrase from Graham Wallas—"a right of continuous initiative."

> Will that is made by activity as distinct from consent that is inferred from reception is the foundation upon which authority must be based . . . It is the record of all history that no class of men can retain over a period sufficient moral integrity to direct the lives of others. [*Cf.* Lincoln.] These others cannot achieve happiness vicariously.

Laski's theory at this time, Proudhonian (by the route of Syndicalism) in some of its implications, was blameless of Marxism. The astounding propaganda value of Marx's prophecies he does not deny. But, in his brief Fabian pamphlet, *Karl Marx* (1921), he writes tersely: "Upon Marx's theory of value it is not necessary to spend much time. It has not stood the test of criticism." The passage of the Factory Acts was "hardly due to the type of influence Marx had in mind." There is no reason, in Laski's opinion, to suppose that the Marxian dictator will be more willing than any other to surrender power. Laski rightly points out the importance for the First International in the fact that Mazzini, the idealist nationalist, withdrew from it. (I would wish to stress that importance as immense.)

> *There is no room in Marx's thought, save perhaps as an ultimate, for any democratic system. Revolution opposes counter-revolution, and a reign of terror is the path to triumph* . . . Once a really vital point is touched by the workers' demands, they are met by armed resistance. That means, of course, that *only by conscious violent intervention can communism be realized. The proletariat must seize a propitious moment for the revolution.*

All this, Laski held, was to show lack of appreciation by Marx of historic and, not least, of military experience—although Marx, moved by a passion for justice, had always been a source of inspiration and prophecy for those working in the cause of progress. This very just estimate displayed a sound Fabian mood—although scarcely the organizing temperament of the Webbs or of Shaw—but was perhaps characterized by undue detachment, in one just returned from America,

from the European scene of blood and revolution, with war's fatal psychological residues and sequels. Anyhow the estimate of the historic process was to be violently reversed later.

In an entirely admirable Fabian pamphlet, entitled *Socialism and Freedom*, after referring to "the grim henchmen of Lenin and Trotsky," Laski continues:

> In the hours of work, I must live under conditions which I assist in making. I must have the sense that they are intelligible in the same way that the orders of a medical man or a sanitary engineer are intelligible; they must be referable, that is to say, to principles which can be established as rational by scientific investigation. I must feel that the State recognizes my equal claim with others, in the things essential to the good life; and that no one is admitted to an equal claim save as he pays for it by personal service. There must be equality in these essential things for all before there is superfluity for any; and the differences that exist between those words of men must be differences that do not weigh the scales unduly in favor of those above the minimum level. It is the socialist case that without these things there cannot be freedom. Broadly, they imply equality; and their argument is that freedom and equality are inseparable . . . The Socialist does not dogmatize as to the forms such social ownership should take. All that he insists is that until they are effectively the possession of the community, they cannot be fully administered in the interest of the community . . . *Implied in all this, of course, is the insistence that the true Socialism is a libertarian, and not an authoritarian, socialism.*

I find myself quite unable to improve upon the happy rectitude of vision, the wisdom, of this passage. The problem remained of the means to broaden and complete this libertarian socialism. The concept of community, uncustomary and here unanalysed, will have to be given more precise content. The time is not yet reached when the route away from "the system of grab," which means "eternal war between classes and external war between nations," will be found only through the channels of force and the only community be discovered in economic class, instead of through moral faith in adjustment among all neighbours. The warning of Morris Cohen, at this stage, about the lure of dogmatism still awaits vindication.

In his *Communism* (1927), Laski seized upon the nature of Communism as a new religion; criticized the rarity of the conditions postulated by Lenin for success; first pointed out, incidentally, the strategic significance of the Fascist exploitation of violence—"that is the risk men run when they desert the path of reason"—and concluded that history offered a race between revolution and reform. These

expositions, it should be added, moved Marxian Communists to such uncontrolled wrath that the de Leon section in America denounced the earlier pamphlet as "an atrocity," the work of an "unscrupulous or utterly incompetent and reckless commentator." The de Leon "splinter" had its own views on genuflections at the religious shrine of Karl Marx.

Laski's basic views at this time are those of moral idealism in all its virtues and vices. The political structure, he holds, is the reflection of the current ideas of an epoch. Politics is a branch of ethics. There is indeed a passing allusion to a need to restate the doctrine of Natural Law; but the statement shows that the meaning of this Natural Law is understood by Laski solely in the Mediaeval and post-Mediaeval ethical fashion. "Laws," he comments, "are *not*, as Montesquieu said, the necessary relations of society." Laws he here construes as merely positive but adds that there are deeper social relations. But these again are taken as conditions of the moral life.

There is indeed, in all Laski's thought in this "Athanasian" period, an acceptance of certain axioms which are indeed presuppositions of Natural Right and are assumed to have moral ultimacy in such rights as, for example, the "right of continuous initiative." The acceptance of this position explains his lapse into an individualism—entirely unapproved by that dogmatic and damnatory rationalist St. Athanasius—which has the social disadvantages and the implicit irrationalism of anarchism. Laski never asked himself whether conscience must not be reasonable; rather, he appealed to some unregulated concept of the "progressive" as "dynamic"; thus he put himself on the road to betraying the whole position, even from pessimistic despair, into the hands of the apostles of force with the prayer that the "physical force men" of his own side might be the winners. This stage, however, is reached later. Professor W. Y. Elliott was, nevertheless, not ill-advised in classifying the Pluralists as exemplified by Laski with the Irrationalists, and this for a much deeper reason than mere invocations by Laski of the Pragmatic philosophers. Laski is patently, at this stage, an opponent of force (chiefly thought of as Government or "ruling class" force) and a believer in "reason" as synonymous with "reasoning" and "discussion." He does here validly describe, in this phase, an aspect of the Anglo-Saxon tradition in political philosophy. But there is a hiatus in his consistency which later proves dangerous. The conscience of the individual remains for him merely the guide that moves in accordance with ideals founded on *private experience*, and on this alone.

A doctrine of *rational objective Natural Law* (although nevertheless of a Natural Law not fully or dogmatically known) would have saved him from this irrational atomism in principle, which ends by betraying him to the opposite "force" school of political philosophy. But—despite a proper appeal to the instructed conscience and, again, an obvious belief in the worth-whileness of persuasion—the notion that reason is *never merely private* remains undeveloped. Hence, also, the related notion of "the common good" remains unmatured.

We have, therefore, to observe, in Laski's theory, private ideas *plus* "the conflict of myriad wills," with (on analysis) no arbiter save force. Here—doubtless deplorably for a quiet journalist and academic—empiric compromise does not succeed. As a description of the "tough" *coercive* State, this has cogency; as a valid description of Society and a basis for a theory of Authority, it is inadequate. The distinction is perhaps fine but appears to me an important deficiency in any philosophy and a source of weakness in Laski. It is the explanation (by direct revulsion against a prevalence of "tough" force that outrages him in the sovereign "ruling-class" State) of his romanticism; and of an essentially irrationalist Conditional Anarchism. Later, it is the explanation of his passage on, through an inevitable pessimism and through irrationalist force theories, first to demi-Marxism and then to explicit Marxism. Brilliant and learned in his writings, in his conversation he left his auditors even more spellbound by his mental elegance. But no adequate philosophy was provided to make the whole cohere, as by Locke, Mill and indeed Marx. The result was a Liberal-party political philosophy brought up to date in Socialism and then surrendering to a contemptuous Marxism; but not a systematic philosophy brought up to date such as had been at the back of Liberalism and the ensuing Social Democracy. Could, of course, this be supplied, it might be possible for Laski to rewrite Marxism which, it may be, he aims to do. As touching Stalinism, it certainly requires doing. Laski's condemnation, however—although orthodox enough by Lenin's canons—of Professor Sidney Hook's attempt to work out a synthesis between Dewey's pragmatism and Marxism, will not make this undertaking any the easier.

It is in his books, *Liberty in the Modern State* (1930), with its basic statement that man's "experience is *private* [even the idealists went beyond the thesis of 'private worlds,' a psychopathic condition] and the will built out of that experience personal to himself," and *The Dangers of Obedience* (1930), that these difficulties become clear. That "men think differently who live differently" is a significant truth on the

social plane but a dangerous half-truth on the philosophical plane. In *The Dangers of Obedience* there is an appreciation of Rousseau that finds the essence of him in "an affirmation of himself." Laski is becoming the modern Rousseau, as sensitive as the original, and the comparison of spiritual pilgrimages becomes interesting. Again, "freedom means self-expression"—and yet it is only "rational desires" that a government is to satisfy. A coherent theory, including the notion of *objective* reason, struggles to the birth but refuses to be born.

Reference has been made to Harold Laski's acknowledgments to Pragmatism. He makes, in his early *Problem of Sovereignty*, a specific declaration of indebtedness to William James (1842–1910), the great pragmatist philosopher. This pragmatism is the clue to—or consequence of—Laski's consistent social scepticism (rather than empiricism) to which his distrust of dogmatic anti-individualist schemes prepossesses him. It connects closely with his appreciation of the work of Dean Léon Duguit, of the Bordeaux Law School, whose *Law in the Modern State* was translated, with introduction by him, in 1919. This is the high watermark of his positivism. This pragmatic positivism provided him with an intellectual instrument in explaining the State, not as a sacred Entelechy or Organism, but in terms of the dull, human civil servants who "run" Government Departments and of actual and not always too noble politicians and "lobbyists" who actually determine decisions. Although "the real rulers are undiscoverable [John Chipman Gray]," yet "the modern state is at every turn an *economic organisation*." Harold Laski declined to be deferential to a bunch of politicians, called The State. Modern politics too closely resembled, in its mumbo jumbo, heathen priestcraft, and reverence for its pomps was, in its sceptic eyes, like awe at the miracles of the Sacred Image of Walsingham.

3

In 1931 takes place the great change. Not so much perhaps the rise of the Hitler party in Germany (still generally discounted at that time) as the economic crisis of 1929, emphasized in 1931, and the defection from the Labour Party of Ramsay Macdonald, may be assigned as causes. The monstrous financial exactions from Germany under the agreement of Versailles to meet loans, reparations and indemnities; rash American lending followed by a no less ill-considered refusal to lend; political manoeuvres (including those in the World Court itself at The Hague) against Austro-German union; and the Kredit-Anstalt Bank collapse in Vienna had produced a major economic crisis

that, ironically alike, Mr. Macdonald, the Labourite, and Mr. Hoover, the Republican, were unable to remove—but which lifted, in part, under the administrations of Baldwin the Tory and Roosevelt the New Dealer.

To this complicated situation, conspicuously outsizing party politics, cause of giant unemployment and intolerable distress to small men, doctrinal Marxism appeared to offer an easy key. If opinion had not yet turned, the reason was to be found in capitalist camouflage and the common man's timidity. "Gradualism" and mere "social reformism"—verbal coinage, too much worn by the pawing hands of men essentially conservative—appeared after the Great War and (still more, because economic) after the Great Depression to be outmoded. Marxism, as never before in Anglo-Saxon countries, took possession of the field. In the West it had never been tried in the saddle of government, despite unhappy attempts in Bavaria and Hungary, while the East was full of the glad noise of Bolshevik factories and tractors. The common mood became near-revolutionary. Social Democracy and Fabianism disbelieved in themselves and proved unequal to meeting the popular onslaught. Liberals in Britain, with no New Deal to their credit or Roosevelt at their head, complacently regarding Marxism in the West as a mere slight rash, caught by adolescents, thought that a mild inoculation would do no harm and even be popular. The stigma of having no theory of *economic* democracy, their own political disgrace, would be removed. The Fabian Society, left in the hands of epigoni, became seized with the sense of its own unimportance and lost itself in harmless, obliging trivialities. The worship of Lenin the Saviour was too overwhelmingly insisted upon, in these quarters, to be lightly resisted.

The transition, in Laski's case, to his third phase was through scepticism and a—not unintelligible—pessimism to a new perspective. It appeared, as 1931 passed on into 1934 and beyond, that Britain was doomed to sink into perhaps sixty years of dictatorship—not necessarily even proletarian dictatorship but perhaps like that of some South American Republic. Already, in *The Grammar of Politics*, Laski had written, "political philosophy cannot contribute hypotheses to a period of unreason." Speaking in 1932 on "Representative Democracy" (published in *Where Socialism Stands To-day*, 1933, and in the symposium, *Recovery through Revolution*, 1933), he declared:

> To anyone who, like myself, accepts the ideal of a democratic society as preferable to any alternative, the essential fact which emerges from the

present situation is that *the conditions are not present* in which such a society can function.

"The State belongs to the holders of economic power." In a situation of economic contraction the limits of reform for which the rich would pay without resort to arms had, he was quite confident, been reached. A peaceful solution seemed scarcely probable. The successful working of the British Parliamentary system was probably a thing of the past. It involved suppositions of compromise and of agreement on social and moral fundamentals which no longer applied. There was no *community* in state, nation or society—it was a myth, and a deceptive one, save perhaps in class community.

> The rapid changes in economic technique [machines, unemployment and need for the expert] . . . leads one to enquire whether political democracy has not, so to say, *arrived too late upon the scene* to control the total process by which it is confronted.

On the same political platform on which Mr. Laski spoke, Sir Stafford Cripps, son of Lord Parmoor, outlined a scheme for an "Enabling Act to Deal with the Emergency by Orders in Council," and declared that "the inconvenience must be removed" whereby an individual could challenge in the Courts the use of any particular power exercised by a Minister as being outside the sphere determined by Parliament. The House of Lords must be abolished by the use of the prerogative powers of the Crown. Parliament might need, on the initiative of the Cabinet, to prolong its own life "for the duration" of the New Plan, and to repeal the basic Quinquennial Act, limiting the life of a Parliament to five years. Anyhow there should be no constitutional checks to the immediate electoral majority will.

To these Socialist League projects it would be fair to describe Laski's attitude as one of benevolent independence. He preserved an open mind about their necessity. Mr. Baldwin, however, warned the country that Laski and Cole were the "intellectual dictators" of the Labour Party (a statement which British Trade Unionists with their happy, sublime contempt for intellectuals as negligible, even in this world of life-and-death ideologies, would doubtless have dismissed with laughter) and also warned the public: "Those who are trying to change the constitution—watch them."

In America, in 1937, Laski favoured procedure by Act, carried by party majority, limiting the ages of Supreme Court Judges instead of procedure by Constitutional Amendment; and he substituted a doctrine of general will—elsewhere called "the right of the majority

to act upon its purposes"—for the traditional American one of division of powers.

In his criticism of the Liberal Parliamentary State Laski concurred with Lord Bryce that Parliamentary or Congressional institutions presume a fundamental sense of community beneath party divisions. He threw, however, pessimistic doubt upon the question of whether such a sense can any longer be supposed to exist. Like Cole, he suggested it might have been a happy accident. He went further. Democracy, he had said, acted on the presumption that the similarities in society were deeper than the dissimilarities. Laski was now in process of denying the existence of the national community. The lethal doctrine, spelling civil war, was being reached that *there was no community.* The only operative community was economic class. The Anglo-Saxon habits of accommodation no longer worked—were outmoded. Universal suffrage and its democracy had arrived too late in a world of technical controls held by men who Marxists knew would know no accommodation but only oppression. A pessimism of predetermination to damnation from now on colours Laski's philosophy; and, in a world admittedly strained and explosive, hope of adjustment is bedevilled by Laski as by Strachey by a doctrinaire knowledge that the present social system (*e.g.*, of France and America as something catalogued "bourgeois capitalist," even under a Roosevelt or Blum) inevitably means war, civil and foreign. This is the end of the Anglo-Saxon system of practical adjustments and the death of the humanist idea.

Whether parliamentary institutions can be presumed much longer to be in fact workable is open to vehement doubt. As Professor Rappard of Geneva comments:

"The most significant statement in Professor Laski's recent book is, however, that in which he clearly repudiates Parliamentary Democracy if it is to constitute an obstacle to the advent of Socialism."

This is indeed the necessary consequence of the Marxist acceptance of a basic *stasis* in society, over which class-war parliamentary customs and democratic discussions and compromises are suspended like a thin crust of lava over the boiling volcanic current below. It cannot be said that Laski is a democratic parliamentarian in the sense of offering encouragement to the belief that the parliamentary presuppositions of minority acquiescence and of basic patriotic unity are, in fact, likely to endure—nor, on his side, does he hold out much promise of a Benthamite *mood of compromise.* The impact of Russia on his mind is clear, although his period of residence there as an invited lecturer in Moscow was very brief. In *Democracy in Crisis* he writes, expressing

his purely personal view (not shared by the Labour Party Executive majority):

> I believe, therefore, that the attainment of power by the Labour Party in the normal electoral fashion must result in a radical transformation of parliamentary government. Such an administration could not, if it sought to be effective, accept the present forms of its procedure. It would have to take *vast powers*, and legislate under them by ordinance and decree; it would have *to suspend the classic formulae of normal opposition* . . . We are bound to ask ourselves whether these inferences [of minority acquiescence] are justified when the common ground between parties is narrowed *so as to exclude that area upon which the whole character of the system has previously depended* . . . The rules of the game surely become different under these conditions. . . . If the measures stand, their consequence, within some such period as a generation, is the erosion of capitalist democracy by its own consent. This second possibility need not be overlooked. Of it I would only venture to say that it is in *direct contradiction to the previous history of all* other social systems.

Mr. Laski here overlooks for his own purposes one section of history, that of England, and especially the bloodless changes of 1688–1689 and of 1832. Admittedly these changes supposed a will to moderation and a reluctance to tear the country in civil war thanks to recognition that the Puritan Revolt had been followed by the Restoration and that "physical force" Chartism would prove a fruitless road—and this will might well have been sapped by a fatalistic, metaphysical, Marxist pessimism about its practicability, had such existed at the time.

The peculiar *déraciné* pessimistic psychology and German metaphysical abstractness of Marxism here show their influence and pigmentation: we are thinking in terms not of the mutual adjustments of men but of the logical incompatibilities of philosophic entities, "systems," and precisely drawn "classes," as distinct from economic groups detectable in mass observation and known to sociologist and psychologist. These entities, nevertheless, can in part be *created* by doctrine and faith, just as pessimistic prophecy can, of all prophecy, be most readily self-realizing. We are indeed "bound to ask ourselves . . . " What is of interest is what Laski's practical conclusion will be from these deliberations and how a temperamental conclusion may colour his doctrine.

✓In Britain, in 1936, Laski was active in the matter of the abdication of King Edward VIII, which appeared to establish the constitutional principle that the King not only acts on the advice of ministers—whichever ministers will take responsibility—but that he must act

on the advice of his ministers *of the moment* and also that he has not (as has the King of Sweden) the right of direct appeal to the people. This doctrine, by removing the last check, places a British Cabinet with a party majority in a position of final control where, in principle, even the indefinite prolongation of a Parliament and Cabinet—"until its work is done"—and for that matter, the suppression of the Opposition would be without constitutional difficulties. It is noticeable that Laski, on this occasion, maintained the thesis that a general election or appeal to the people would be *un*desirable "on so emotional an issue."

Laski here, by taking a leading part, as was stressed by Mr. Postgate, in publicizing the need for the abdication of a British King, was intervening in a matter in which the agelong sentiment of born Englishmen was deeply affected. The hesitations which wrung a Cromwell do not seem to have troubled the flow of Laski's explanations. Much more was involved than any sentimentalism or moral opprobrium in connection with the particular case. It had a detectable relevance to a central constitutional issue, which might well, as a consequence of events in 1936, have been held by default to have become defined in a particular sense, *i.e.*, that the King in the gravest issues is not free to insist on *referring his ministers to the electorate.* The abdication itself possibly can be held to have been no grave issue. The relevant constitutional precedent is perhaps rather that of George V, in 1910, in suggesting an election on the Lords' Veto Bill. The abdication crisis was, however, held by many far-sighted critics to have a definite bearing on this issue, of far graver importance than some issue of divorce and remarriage (although divorces, since the days of Henry VIII, have played their fantastic part in English history).

In his recent book, *Parliamentary Government in England* (1938), Laski re-expounds his view. He repudiates the contention of an eminent authority, Professor Berriedale Keith, that the King is "the guardian of the constitution," in the sense that on a grave constitutional issue, where his prerogative powers are invoked to subdue the Lords, the King [in the absence in the English system of a written constitution, Supreme Court and fixed term of Congress or of Referendum] can insist on *an appeal to the electorate* if their previous mandate is not specific. That the issue arises, in Great Britain, peculiarly on prerogative control of the Lords, historically tends to make it an issue of querying and queering radical, rather than reactionary, legislation. The remedy for this lies in the substitution, for the House of Lords, of a differently balanced Second Chamber. The issue would yet be substantially the same if, for "King," we were to read "President."

The fact remains that, at base, the issue is one between Parliamentary (House of Commons or Congressional) sovereignty and Democratic or plebiscitary sovereignty in the ultimate and critical last resort. The concrete situation visualized is one of a House of Commons, in Britain *effectively controlled by a Cabinet or Inner Cabinet*, which has got an electoral mandate on a general programme and which objects to resubmitting proposals for revolutionary change to an electorate which, approached in this way, may reject them or otherwise prove, in Laski's phrase, too "emotional."

Laski's constitutional thesis, put forward, as he states, against "the books," however superficially non-monarchical and democratic, must be watched in the light of three things. These are the announced preference for "vanguard" (*i.e.*, oligarchic) theory and tactics, of Marxists and Fascists alike; their ambiguous attitude to the slow-thinking electorate; and their detestation of checks and balances—whether by Constitution, Judiciary, Senate, Second Chamber or Plebiscite—as obstacles on the road to power of the people's saviours.

Laski, in summary, came to draw a sharp line of division between the political ideal outlined in his previous works, and now transferred to Kingdom-Come, and the present unpleasant political situation in which a philosopher could only acquiesce in a situation dominated by force. In fact, no longer at the background of his mind was the problem of a religious minority or of thinking individuals protesting their rights against a menacing State Leviathan, but of a working class, now visualized by intellectuals as a clear-cut proletariat, insurgent, impatient of mere "liberalism," which class itself proposed to be dominant, to overthrow "the ruling classes" and to use or break the State machine. All talk of compromise, as in the Mond-Turner conferences of 1928, merely amounted to this—that the ruling class was prepared to do "anything in the world for the workers save get off their backs." [Tolstoi] The doubt yet haunted Laski's mind whether, owing to the power of the army, revolution could succeed. In general it may be said that, under modern conditions, no revolution has any serious prospect of success so long as the loyalty of the armed forces to the government has not become a matter of doubt. There is the heart of sovereignty. Of Adolf Hitler he was still contemptuous, in his journalistic articles in 1933, as an unsuccessful beerhouse politician. In a *Daily Herald* (London) article of November 19, 1932, entitled "Hitler —Just a Figurehead," Laski wrote: "Accident apart it is not unlikely that Hitler will end his career as an old man in some Bavarian village who, in the Tiergarten in the evening, tells his intimates how he nearly

overturned the German Reich." Success depended upon the *domestic* military situation. The full impact of National Socialism upon schemes to revolt against domestic oppression, had not yet been felt. However, in a contribution in *The Intelligent Man's Way to Prevent War* (1933), Laski demonstrated that international war was *inevitable* under the capitalist system.

> Progress in these directions [League of Nations organization and by education] is possible, without the certainty of the foundations of a system which makes war appear either necessary or desirable being attacked at its root. They would not destroy its [war's] *inevitability*. . . . Thus the push towards imperialism is, in the assumptions of the system, an *irresistible* one, the history of the United States and, still more recently, of Japan, would appear to manifest . . . peace itself, in this context, is no more than a troubled breathing space in which the men who protest their devotion to it, some of them, no doubt, in all sincerity, are driven to make the preparations for *inevitable* war.

John Strachey maintains the same thesis of inevitability. It is not a mood likely to weigh for hope in a bourgeois world the trembling balance of peace. In 1937, Laski stated, when interviewed, that the American people expected the early outbreak of European war. By this time, however, in this war, bourgeois capitalist powers such as France and America were presumably visualized as allied with M. Stalin against the Fascists. Nevertheless, theoretically, only the destruction of bourgeois, non-Marxist democracy can ensure the destruction of war and fascism.

The new position is stated in a series of books: *Democracy in Crisis* (1933—delivered as lectures in 1931), *The State in Theory and Practice* (1934), *The Rise of European Liberalism* (1936). In the first of these, Laski concludes,

> Capitalist values are challenged at their foundations. *Capitalism* is presented with the choice of cooperating in the effort at socialist experiment, or of fighting it; and I have given reasons for believing that *it may well prefer the alternative of fighting.*

The question, indeed, thus phrased by Laski is almost self-answering. Capitalism is viewed as an integral entity and abstract whole, a compact, black somewhat, "it." "Socialism" is usually alluded to as the negation of "capitalism" and is frequently considered as its logical contradictory. It is obvious, therefore, that "it" will fight. The wording is loaded. The actual issue, however, is the very different one: Will "capitalists" or rich men with investments in industry or trade and also all the very small men who are stockholders in the great "mo-

nopolies" and "trusts" and also the managers of these trusts who may not be capitalists themselves—not indeed co-operate—but acquiesce in socialist measures voted by a constitutional majority without resort to treason and machine guns: and, if so, how far? Would they co-operate with socialist democracies in the event of war with Fascist powers; or would they seize their opportunity to revolt in arms or by planned sabotage in the class war? Is the situation latently that of crypto-*saboteurs*, as it is announced to be in Russia? How far Laski will go to encourage the other mood of "co-operation" is not very extensively developed. The impression is left that it would create surprise verging upon intellectual annoyance.

Even so, Laski's book, *The State in Theory and Practice* (1934), did not escape Marxist chastisement as "psychologically bourgeois." A reviewer, James Sand, in the *Workers' Age* (August, 1935) wrote:

> [Laski attempted] to save the individual from the ravages of authority. Now he realizes that the problem is, not to put the State in its place, but to place the State in the hands of a new class. For one who in 1920 grew rhapsodical over the fact that French Socialism was founded upon Proudhon rather than Marx, this is truly a revolution. For one who has busied himself defending liberty and freedom, the discovery that there is only class liberty and class freedom should mean a complete overhauling of his principles . . . he lets himself in for additional confusion by attempting to justify coercive power in terms of the measure of its satisfaction of maximum demand. This is arrant scholasticism. The justification for coercive power has always resided in itself. Only those who do not have it, or will not wield it when they have it, seek to justify it by anything but itself. Laski shrinks from the Thrasymachean view of justice as the will of the stronger because again he fails to ask the *ad hominem* question: Who is the stronger?

Laski had reached the stage of sketching a rational world; weeping over it; and passing on. "When ideas arm themselves for conflict, the voice of reason is unlikely to be heard." [Why? unless reason is private foible.] To the non-Marxist, however, Laski's earlier appeal to Proudhon may count for virtue. As for his reviewer's theme—that "reason is a cloak for those who will not take sides in a conflict" . . . "chewing rags in one's sleep" [Lenin's remark on Kautsky]—the discussion of it will be found in Plato. For the rest, the hazard that force may not be on his side, may not adequately have occurred to the Marxist reviewer, preoccupied with predestined dialectic.

Laski, indeed, later concedes that, although no matter for optimism, the "forces of property . . . may concur in the erosion of their

principles." Moreover, "in normal times"—although Marxist discussion presumes the impossibility of normal peace—social change must be made "upon the basis that the will of the electorate favours its innovation." Moreover, "prudence is a primary virtue in political behaviour."

In *The State in Theory and Practice* we are still told, individualistically enough, that "the postulates of any social theory are, in fact, value-judgements born of the experience of the *individual* thinker who makes them"; and, with the old sceptical positivism, become more Hobbesian in tone, that "conflict is inherent in the foundations of the society" where groups have different economic relations to the productive process, and that "the state is a special way of exercising power . . . special because it is coercive." Recognition of the significance of the recent conquests of Fascism in Germany has by now violently impinged upon Laski's theory. The consequence is pessimism, tinged with alarmism.

> I have been arguing that when the political democracy seeks to transfer that ownership [of private property] to the community *the capitalist class will, if it can, use the state-power to suppress democratic institutions.* I have therefore urged that, at this stage of economic development, the difference between classes *can only be settled by force.*

The contemporary experience, for example, of Governor Olsen, in Minnesota, in confronting with state forces the illicit activities of employers in a strike, is not quoted. Nor is the activity of the Department of Labor, under the New Deal, stressed. Attention is called to the indubitable contingency of force, not to the successful avoidance of it in early nineteenth-century England. Laski entirely rightly points out that a contingency which Fairfax had to face in the seventeenth and Washington in the eighteenth century is one that it would be naïve to ignore in the twentieth. Laski, however, while remaining within the ambit of the democratic system, advances beyond the assertion that a democratic Socialist government will use that legal force against resistance which the constitution entitles it to use, and proceeds to consider the contingency of a reactionary government using, in an extraordinary fashion, legal state power. Laski's own abandonment of the principles of checks and balances facilitates the development of such a situation. Laski himself, while choosing to define the state's activities in narrowly economic or material terms, as a matter of economic interests, yet points out that this reactionary abuse of power may appear to its holders to be exercised for lofty reasons.

> The state is never neutral in political struggles of this kind . . . by its very nature, [it] is simply coercive power used to protect the system of rights and duties of one process of economic relationships from invasion by another class which seeks to change them in the interests of another process. For, on analysis, the state appears as a body of men issuing orders to fulfil purposes they deem good. *Their conception of good is the outcome of the place in the process which is challenged.* To alter it, they must yield their place; and while, of course, such abdication is *possible*, it is also one of the rarest phenomena in history.

The earlier notion of the political structure as the reflection of the ideas of an epoch is here jettisoned or at least subordinated to a Marxian economic determination that is rather stated historically than metaphysically, but of which the practical consequences, subject to a pale possibility, are entirely the same. It follows that Laski accepts the basic Marxist thesis stated by him at the time of the Abdication crisis in the phrase that there is *no* one community of the nation. In this assertion indeed he has the verbal precedents of Plato and Disraeli, but, whereas both of these recognized the fact of class struggle of interests, both rejected the Marxian tactic of exacerbating class war and of designedly raising divergence of interests to conscious war *à l'outrance*, as a malignant prescription. They pursued the contrary course of *stressing community*, while prescribing—in Plato's case, at least—radical remedies for discontent. Laski, indeed, in all his phases has been distrustful of developing the meaning of community as the basis of co-operation, as distinct from discussion or majority will; or, more precisely, this community is discussed (not without ground, but without adequate reservations) in terms of a common economic level of experience.

In *The Rise of European Liberalism*, which Laski interprets in economic terms, he is primarily concerned to diagnose Liberalism's decline and to assume its decease. Liberalism "as a doctrine was shaped by the needs of that new society—at the end of the Middle Ages; and, like all social philosophies, it cannot transcend the medium in which it was born." It is bound up with the ethos of capitalism. This ethos is its effort to free the owner of the instruments of production from the need to obey rules which inhibit his full exploitation of them. *The rise of liberalism is the rise of a doctrine which seeks to justify the operation of that ethos.*" Apart from the historic system, with its temporal party connections, are there then no permanent values contributed by that liberalism which is one expression of humanism? This is the criticism made upon Laski's position by no less progressive a

liberal than Señor de los Rios, late ambassador of the Spanish Republic. There may be these values, but even these Professor Laski finds pleasure in dismissing from contemporary application; so liberalism loses both ways. "When ideas fly to arms there is no room in society for liberal doctrine . . . the owners of property [since the Great War] were no more prepared to forego the privileges of ownership than were their feudal predecessors." The precise implications of the word "prepared" are left ambiguous.

Since 1936 Laski has been one of the three selectors in a vigorous political organization called The Left Book Club along with Victor Gollancz, the publisher, nephew of Sir Israel Gollancz, and Mr. John Strachey. In its *Left News*, in August, 1937, commenting on *The Labour Party in Perspective* of Mr. C. Attlee, leader of the Labour Party, Laski wrote without disagreement:

> The communists . . . argue that it is overwhelmingly unlikely that capitalism will respect democratic processes and that those who seek to replace it must, accordingly, be prepared for the forces of privilege to prefer conflict to peace.

He continued, in an editorial:

> The Club exists to promote a certain body of ideas which, as they are victorious, will destroy war and fascism. We may be Communists like Strachey, or members of the Labour Party, like Gollancz and myself. Within the Club, our loyalty must go first and foremost to the general idea we serve. We must use its resources, as our judgment best indicates, to see that the idea has the speediest possible triumph.

Since this date, in the New York *Nation* (February, 1939), Laski has completed to its anticipated goal the pilgrimage of his third phase. In his article, "Why I Am a Marxist," he confesses to the early sin, as charged, of scholasticism and to undue disregard of "the processes of history," such as show the virtues of Marxism in Austria and Spain. Again we hear the theses, now central: "No class voluntarily abdicates from the possession of power . . . [What does "voluntarily" mean?] Men, broadly, think in terms of experience made and unmade by their *class* position . . . Capitalism [?Tories, shareholders and rich men] will respect *no* principle . . . The will of the people is unable to use the institutions of capitalistic democracy for democratic purposes." The need for profit seekers to make profits by expansion abroad, and hence the inevitability of war, is expounded as a key certainty of history—and here the argument passes over to that of Strachey to whom we shall turn. One notes how incredibly grave are the consequences

made to pivot on this technical and allegedly inevitable factor.* We learn that, at the time of the Reformation, "those who lived by the privileges inherent in the old order [?More and Fisher and the monks] were ready to fight for them."

Laski, like Rousseau and Fichte, is a writer of transition and, thus, significant. Like Rousseau, he has the abiding justification that he is attacking something essentially evil. Certainly, I will not challenge the militant validity of the statement: "For those who have been taught by long use to regard privileges as right are rarely able to adjust themselves to the admission that their right may be built upon what other men have come to experience as wrong." Like Rousseau, however, the transition is from the more to the less satisfactory, if more resonant, position. Laski has indeed now announced himself as a Marxist, and in that fold his task will be to discover his alignment to well-established orthodoxy in the tabernacles of Engels, Lenin, Stalin or, maybe, Trotsky.

We have travelled a long distance from the definition of liberty (in *The Grammar of Politics*, 4th impression) as negative, "an absence of restraint," in the direction of implementing the "right of the majority to act upon its purposes." Even the seizure of power by a "vanguard" or minority, *provided* there is a revolutionary mass feeling and not a "playing with revolution," is viewed without disfavour. The early "agreement to disagree" vanishes under the necessities of organization for the triumph of "a certain body of ideas." Laski, in brief, has become a broker of Marxism to the middle-class intelligentsia. Apart from a marked psychological attitude of antagonism to the national "ruling class," is there any common philosophy between the early pronounced individualism and the later sympathy with Marxian Communism?

I suggest that there is a logical transition, as well as a psychological continuum of antipathy to ruling groups: the belief enunciated, in *Liberty in the Modern State* and elsewhere, that equality is the condition to liberty. In this book the expert of ability is treated as being a potential tyrant who must be "on tap but not on top"; and equality involves primarily economic equality. The implications, for the transitional period of Marx's pungent *Critique of the Gotha Program*, with its criticism of this equality, are not considered; but it is pointed out that the Soviet Union seeks "planned production for community consumption." Next after the assertion of the right of the questioning individual to challenge superior status of class or race, this belief in human equality is the basic impulse shaping Laski's political philosophy. This belief is the best of a Communism and indeed of a religious sentiment

Cf. p. 689.

that, I could urge, is far, far wider and more profound than Marxism. It has come, however, to be fatally linked with belief in the pessimistic and disruptive Marxian prophecy of imminent civil violence, the expectation of violence. Of this at once the fulfilment and the nemesis are writ large, in Marxism and [as Laski had earlier said] in Fascism, throughout Europe today. The decorous instillation of this belief—the noiseless assumption of *its* assumptions—does not, because of the allusive method, seep the less deeply. The hope of equality is, nevertheless, warmed by a genuine generosity, within the major limits of policy, and by an ambition to conduct life on the principle of being a champion of the other side against the mighty, as David teaching a lesson to the English Philistia.

4

Evelyn St. Loe John Strachey (1901–), great-grandson of one of the authors of the remorseless New Poor Law of 1834, son of the late St. Loe Strachey (editor of the Conservative *Spectator*), and heir presumptive, in the baronetcy, of Lord Strachie, after being educated at Eton, was the associate of Sir Oswald Mosley when the latter joined the Labour Party (after being, first, the youngest Conservative Member of Parliament and, then, Independent) on the Irish issue. Strachey left the Labour Party in February, 1931, and entered Sir Oswald's New Party, inviting others to follow in an article in the *Political Quarterly*. Like Laski, however, he has significantly, although more abruptly, changed his position. Leaving Sir Oswald when the latter founded the British Union of Fascists, Mr. Strachey became a Communist sympathizer but, touring America in 1935, explained that he was not a member of the British Communist Party. His threatened expulsion then from the United States led to no small publicity for his books as those of "one of Europe's outstanding thinkers." He may indeed be described—together with Mr. Palme Dutt, a Swede—as the leading literary propagandist of strict Marxism in the English-speaking world.

Strachey's first book, dedicated to Mosley "who may some day do the things of which we dream," was entitled *Revolution by Reason* (1925) and was based upon a pamphlet by Mosley with the same title written for the Independent Labour Party. It is characterized by obvious sincerity and embodies what at the time were known as the Birmingham Proposals of the I.L.P.

We owe [writes Mr. Strachey] the very best account of the Socialist conception of the rational planning and organisation of our productive resources

to our leader, Mr. Ramsay Macdonald himself. . . . Socialists have always maintained that poverty—this lack of goods and services—is due, not to the community's real inability to produce more of them but to a glaring defect in economic organisation. And they have unanimously diagnosed this defect as the result of a permanent, and hopeless, maldistribution of ownership.

Strachey provides a sympathetic discussion of the Catholic individualist School of Hilaire Belloc and G. K. Chesterton which seeks to remedy the evil of politically dominant concentrations of wealth by an equitable redistribution—"Distributivism."

The Socialist proposal is designed to achieve the same end but in a different way. We suggest that, instead of giving each citizen ten thousand bricks in a cocoa factory, or three trucks, and half a refreshment room, on the Great Western Railway, it would be more practical to give everybody collectively the whole factory and the whole railway [which, however, is merely unlike the ten thousand bricks in *not* being each citizen's *own* but revolver-guarded]. In other words, we advocate the "Collectivist State" in which the citizens equally and collectively, through some appropriate body, *not necessarily the State*, own the means of production, and so the wealth of the Nation.

The so-called Birmingham proposals involved a universal minimum wage; public control of banking and credit; issue of new money circulated through public loans; State planning in return for acceptance of loans. Several of these suggestions have been put forward in other quarters and some of them are commonplaces of radical reconstruction. The point is that they have as yet only seen very partial fulfilment in the Western democracies. Strachey, therefore, directs his indictment against the system which stands in the way—the System of *Private* Capitalism—on behalf of public capital ownership. Along with Mosley he stressed the possibility of substituting a large measure of self-sufficiency and home production in lieu of the import-export trade. He confronts the problem of national crash and seemingly unavoidable unemployment.

The Capitalist system is founded on forced labour. The fact that its workers are punished, not by hanging or imprisonment, but by starvation or the workhouse, raises them but one degree above the status of the slave. . . . This is the classical Marxian case against the private ownership of the means of production. It submits that Capitalism is a blind alley. Whichever way it turns, there is no escape; if to competition, then it cannot give the people who do not own any of the means of production enough money to buy the things it makes. Thus it is led to the race for markets, economic Imperialism, war. If it turns to combination then it must throw away its one great claim to respectability—the safe-guarding of the consumers' interests by the "free

play of economic forces." It must become a frank and open tyranny, condemned alike by Lord Hugh Cecil and Karl Marx. But while Capitalism hesitates before this dilemma, the ground is being cut from under its feet by a change in the public conscience which will no longer tolerate economically forced labour, which is the condition of its very existence. . . . In such a struggle the course of action of the supporters of the Birmingham Proposals would be especially clear and unequivocal. They have made, while there was yet time, what contribution they could towards a solution of our difficulties.

In this book, although there is a presentation of "the classical Marxian case" and an alternative offered of revolution by reason, including proposals most of which would be acceptable to those who today advocate "a Middle Way" against the background of the British Owenite tradition and contemporary economic facts, there is no mention of Fascism, and its Italian model has not yet impinged on the retina of Mr. Strachey's mental eye.

The fiasco, however, of the never very important New Party, with its motto of "Take Action," which in effect consisted of Sir Oswald and four Members of Parliament, convinced one of them, Mr. Strachey, that "*the position of social compromise was becoming untenable.*" There was a "*revolutionary situation which we all* [Mosley and Strachey] *agreed must sooner or later come upon Great Britain.*" Mosley chose the Fascist path upon this instant supposition; Strachey that of Leninist Russia. There was an "unavoidably revolutionary task . . . of taking away the means of production from the Capitalists." It should be noted that, at this time, Strachey is talking in traditional Marxist terms of *proletarian organized physical revolution*, impelled by economic pressure, and not in the newer terminology of *proletarian expectation of Fascist violence* against a constitutional Socialist government and of the constitutional need to repress this violence.

However, the tactical situation was sharply altered by the 1929 economic Great Depression—which made Marx-Leninism and Marxist Communism, for the first time, a significant force in Anglo-Saxon countries because Marxism alone seemed to offer an adequately radical explanation. And it was altered by the entrance of German Fascism upon the political scene as a major force in the elections of 1930. Marxism was confronted by a doctrine as fully armed as itself, alluring not only capitalist paymasters but a middle class that "dialectically" should have disappeared but actually had not—and a doctrine that preached disciplined violence with as much gusto as did Marxism. If Fascism (and in a first-class Power) were a genuinely novel phenomenon, then, "in the inevitable dialectic of history," it would equally

have to be the inevitable stage or antithesis chronologically succeeding and presumably superseding Marxism. Its place in the dialectic was indeed not quite clear. It was ultimately assigned locus by the Marxian professors as "the death struggle of capitalism." That yet much of its doctrine was as novel a monster as any doctrine may claim to be will be clear to anyone inspecting the past pages of this book—although this is scarcely a matter for despair except for those who, for empiricism, substitute a belief in dialectical forces moving relentlessly in trajectory down the pathway of history.

In 1932 John Strachey wrote *The Coming Struggle for Power*, published by Gollancz. This was acclaimed by the Conservative *Spectator*, his father's erstwhile journal, with which his family remained connected, as "the work of a young man of probably unique sophistication. . . . It is just possible . . . a contribution which will survive when [Sir Arthur Salter's] *Recovery* is long forgotten." Already having achieved some modicum of publicity as Sir Oswald's adjutant, from this time "the young master" took position as a recognized leader of a consistent Marxian school of thought and action, which regarded Left-wing Socialists as too far Right and, for more effect, attacked with superb superiority and in barbed phrases, "some English liberals such as . . . Mr. Harold Laski." This book was followed by *The Menace of Fascism* (1933).

The master key to this well-reasoned book, with its stinging attack on Fascist intolerance, was the economic proposition, laid down as indubitable, that a planned economy and a market-price economy cannot be conjoined or dovetailed. It is proper to say that this fundamental proposition was flatly denied by many professional economists and that no little research work has been done on this matter. Mr. Strachey attacked the German Social Democrats, although Marxian, and still more the non-Marxian British Labour Party. They are, he argued, like the duped followers of Fascism who "genuinely do not see the impossibility of any form of planning while the private ownership of the means of production persists." There is here, for example, no question of planning spreading out from nuclei in vital industries or of the public acquisition of existing cartels. It is a clear case of *either—or* (a customary Marxist technique of logical dilemma).

Strachey rightly raised the basic issue: how can the powers of invention and machine production be made instruments for increasing wealth and not, by a grim paradox, for increasing, under capitalist distribution, unemployment and poverty. "Our marvellous powers of production" demand planning and symmetry. But it follows, on the

one hand, that the free price system (taken as a bloc) is inconsistent with this and private property (taken *en bloc*) demands this free price system. Therefore, "any program of social advance" is impossible. All who hold the opposite are by implication Social Fascists, even if too stupid to be so consciously.

> One cardinal condition must be fulfilled before our modern machines will give us blessings instead of plagues, and that is the [total] abolition of the private ownership of the means of production. . . . Planning, if it means anything, means the refusal to leave the three vital questions of what is to be produced, who shall produce it, and how much of it shall be produced, to the free play of profits and prices. . . . The clash between modern machinery and the existing social system [taken *en bloc*] became more and more pronounced. . . . Today, in one country after another, the whole situation *demands decision. Ever more violently, ever more imperatively, it demands decision.* For, so long as there is no decision, so long, that is, as we take *neither* the Socialist path to the abolition of our present social system, *nor the Fascist path to the destruction in war of our modern machine production,* the situation for everyone of us will become ever more intolerable.

The Fascist path (here identified with industrial destruction) is, however, apparently more tolerable than inaction. On the other hand, what is Fascism? It follows that it is

> the movement for the preservation by violence, *and at all costs,* of the private ownership of the means of production. This and nothing else is the real purpose of Fascism . . . the Fascists are only the capitalists and their dupes in fancy dress.

"Fascism has *chosen* an internal policy which inevitably involves war." Strachey passes over with aplomb the inevitable class-war and civil-war implications of Marxism itself, as well as the alleged inevitability of war between capitalist and communist states. Fascism may mean war because of its laudation of militarism and the Fascist premise of the ultimate and sacred character of each nation-state. These grounds, however, although absolutely sound humanist objections, are not economic or consonant with the orthodox doctrine of economic determination.

Engels, in one passage (*Letter to the Socialist Academy,* 1890) in self-defense against criticism, superficially appears to modify this doctrine. Properly understood, however (*cf.* p. 579), it is questionable whether he in fact does so—a superb opening for glosses by the Marxian Talmudists.

> Marx and I are partly responsible for the fact that younger men have sometimes laid more stress on the economic side than it deserves. In meeting the

attacks of our opponents it was necessary for us to emphasize the dominant principle denied by them, and we did not always have the time and opportunity to let the other factors which were concerned in the mutual action and reaction get their desserts. . . . According to the *materialistic* view of history, the factor which in the last instance is decisive in history is the production and reproduction of actual life [? heredity and biology: a change indeed]. More than this neither Marx nor I have ever asserted. But when anyone distorts this so as to read that the economic factor is the sole element, he converts the statement into a meaningless, abstract, absurd phrase. *The economic condition is the basis*, but the various elements in the *superstructure*—the political forms of the class contests and their results, the results, the constitutions, the legal forms and also all the reflexes of the actual contests in the brains of the participants, the political, legal, philosophical theories, the religious views—all these exert an influence on the development of the historical struggles and in many instances determine their *forms*.

Strachey, therefore, finds a necessary ground for war in Fascism because of the capitalist necessity to maintain its rate of interest; hence to invest abroad and in backward countries where this interest is higher (or not perpetually falling, as at home); hence to involve itself in Imperialist territorial expansion. The case of Dollar-empire is not enlarged upon. What is made to stand out is that militarily to fight Fascism is synonymous with ending war: we must "fight war, and Fascism."

D. Jay and other economists have argued that the existence of this supposed inevitable resort of capitalism [or Fascism] to investment abroad, for economic reasons of maintaining the rate of profit, is not borne out by the economic facts ascertained by non-propagandist research. However, the arguments that Fascism leads to war on grounds of prestige and national glory, confirming dictators in popularity and power; grounds of laudation of expansion and population growth; grounds of economic sufficiency and invulnerability for war, if not of economic self-sufficiency, are arguments that are watertight. Fascism is a national-war political theory just as Marxism is a civil-war, or ideological-world-war, political theory.

Strachey, however, vigorously criticizes Scott Nearing, *de haut en bas*, for suggesting that the object of National Socialist or Fascist policy is "autarky" or [military-economic] self-sufficiency. There is no shift of power, as Hitler's appointment of Hugenberg shows. (Howbeit, Hugenberg afterwards was put under key.) Scott Nearing is guilty of "an entire misconception." Fascism is indefinitely territorially expansionist, and this for the economic reasons of filling empty bellies given above—"Imperialist expansion at any hazard," including

backward territories. Fascism impoverishes its people by its campaign for economic self-sufficiency for military reasons; failing in entire self-sufficiency it has to look further for essential raw materials; but because its people are impoverished and its *individual private capitalists* want their profit Marxist theory shows that it must look to conquest throughout the world in order to secure these compensations. Private capitalism anywhere has an innate drive to world empire; and Fascism is its most virulent form.

In a striking couple of chapters on "The Policy of the Lesser Evil," John Strachey vehemently attacks the policy of the [Kautskian] Marxist Social Democrat Party of Germany. It was gradualness in reverse gear. If the German Social Democrats had led, in 1918, what would then have been the united workers to the seizure of power, ignoring warnings about possible Allied action, success would have been assured. Strachey does not discuss the policy of the Comintern, but he is probably right in supposing that the psychological moment for confronting Clemenceau with a Communist insurrection, and concluding for Germany as it were a Brest-Litovsk treaty, was lost. Instead the Social Democrats sought to pursue a gradualist policy, against Allied obduracy, by coalition. Strachey represents them as saying, in 1923: "Let [us], at any rate, put [our] main emphasis upon . . . broad liberal and democratic aims. . . . Powerful allies—the Roman Catholic Centre, for example, and the interests which it represents, the Liberals, the German People's party [Stresemann], representing the more progressive industrialists—can thus all be recruited for the right against reaction." (In brief, a policy not so dissimilar to that now advocated by the Comintern itself.) "There was thus no general revolutionary movement."

The Nature of Capitalist Crisis (1935) is almost entirely occupied with a technical discussion of Marxian economics, which have been outlined earlier.* Strachey explains that he is not a trained economist; but the book in part is an exposure of the theories of certain other Marxian economists. "Mr. Cole" (author of *What Karl Marx really Meant*) "has fallen into this extraordinary error [of supposing high wages possible for capitalists] by neglecting the main factor of the situation, the falling tendency of the rate of profits." Capitalism *must* produce a fall in real wages—"any tendency for wages to rise above their value [subsistence level] was the most fatal thing that could happen to capitalism"—save so far as high profits abroad, due to—and the cause for—Imperialism, may be brought in artificially to

* *Cf.* p. 581. *Cf.* also p. 689, footnote.

repair the balance. Otherwise "it would be impossible for the capitalists ever to extract surplus value (on a sufficient scale), let alone to realize it." Mr. Roosevelt is another high priest of capitalism. The New Deal, for example, has "a, to some tastes, nauseating character of duplicity." Much is given with one hand but *more* taken away with the other. Mr. J. A. Hobson's under-consumptionism is an "error of economic theory." Mr. G. D. H. Cole and others, "such as Sir Stafford Cripps, Mr. Pritt, Mr. Mellor, and other leaders of the Socialist League, are able to prevent a large number of British Socialists from taking the revolutionary path." Presumably they also are by implication Social Fascists. Professor Sidney Hook's discussion of prediction and the labour theory of value "is fallacious from beginning to end."

> If the labour theory of value is abandoned, the whole of Marx's gigantic construction crashes to the ground. . . . A series of recent writers, including Mr. G. D. H. Cole, Professor Sidney Hook, and Mr. Raymond Postgate, have attempted either to preserve the labour theory of value in an abstract and meaningless form, or to abandon it and yet preserve the conclusions which Marx draws from it

—like abandoning a ground floor to the flames and hoping the upper floors would stand. The Marxist theory of value is not a theory of value-in-*exchange*. It is

> predominantly a theory of production. . . . It is, even in the form in which Marx perfected it, largely irrelevant [sic] to the day-to-day problems of commercial life . . . [*but*] we shall be able to give a convincing and self-consistent account of each phase of the economic cycle of capitalism and shall be able to reach conclusions which have prediction value. . . . Once the term value has been defined there is nothing unreasonable in saying that machines do not create value.

This, after all, Strachey urges, is no more abstract than the orthodox economics of Professor Lionel Robbins, which have reached the social bankruptcy of declaring that "there is no way of comparing the satisfactions of different people" [*cf.* Herbert Spencer]. But the disease of classical economics is "the abandonment of an objective standard of value." Of this Marxism is not guilty.

> The Labour theory of value bids us ascertain the amount of *socially necessary* labour time contained in commodities if we would know their value . . . it is only to the sum total of commodities that the labour theory of values applies . . . unless we realize that prices represent real quantities, *viz.*, amounts of socially necessary labour time, a total of prices is a meaningless

expression. . . . *If commodities could be priced so that they sold at their value, costs would be brought back into direct relation to human effort.*

Why, basically, are they not so related? The capitalists' surplus profit is the answer—every year becoming more difficult to extract at the same rate (hence the Imperialist land avarice for new fields). "The fall of the rate of profit as an observed fact of experience is hardly in question"—this is the very nerve of capitalist despair. "'That wars and panics will occur and capitalism break down' are not 'propositions too general to be enlightening.' On the contrary, our whole conduct as rational beings must hang on whether we accept these propositions or not." For Marxism they are even *inevitable.* But classical economics cannot explain [? abolish in terms of exclusive private ownership] these crises of boom and crash. Only the incandescence of the class war can cure the evil by the illumination of it into flaming self-consciousness, the burning of it out.

In commenting on this theory a technical economist, Mr. E. F. M. Durbin, first points out the distinction between "profits" as "the share of the real product going to the *capitalist and rentier classes*" and "profits" as "that type of monetary receipt which causes entrepreneurs [*e.g.*, State trusts] to expand or contract the scale of industry." In Russia today, because it is a backward country now in process of rapid development and therefore without unemployment (whatever the wage level may be), profits in the latter sense (not the former, by definition) exist on a colossal scale. Mr. Durbin continues:

Mr. Strachey's main contention on theory can be summarised in three propositions: (1) the capitalist system is controlled by the search of the rentier class for a higher profit income; (2) as the volume of fixed capital increases (in proportion to circulating capital) the Rate of Profit (or Rate of Interest) is bound to fall; (3) that consequently the rentier class must attempt to save a larger and larger proportion of the total social income if prosperity is to be maintained. This they cannot do without starving the market for finished goods of purchasing power. Hence the paradox of "poverty in the midst of plenty" is involved in the self-frustrating logic of the profit mechanism alone.

That, I believe, is the sole contention of the vital part of Mr. Strachey's book (Part IV).

Unfortunately every one of these contentions is either ambiguous or false.

1. We have already seen that while it is true that capitalist enterprise is controlled by profits defined in a certain way it is quite untrue to say that its general activity is determined by the real income of the rentier class. As a proportion of the total that type of income could fall as expansion went on.

2. But even supposing that the distribution of income is such as to lead to a steady accumulation of capital and a steady increase in the proportion

fixed capital bears to current labour it is a fallacy of the first water to suppose the Rate of Profit (or Rate of Interest) must fall. There are whole decades in which the rate of accumulation (or saving) has been rapid and the Rate of Profit stationary or rising. That is a platitude of economic history. Why then has Mr. Strachey been led into advancing such a false argument? Because he has wholly neglected the existence of technical change—the fact of *invention*—lying behind the demand for capital. Because new inventions are continuously made, because new uses for new capital are always being found it is perfectly possible for accumulation to go on without any tendency in the Rate of Profit to fall, or the dire consequence of Mr. Strachey's analysis to follow. If new discoveries are continuously made it will not be necessary to save an ever larger fraction of the social income. It will not be necessary to choke the market for consumption goods. All Mr. Strachey's nightmares are merely nightmares because the Rate of Interest *can* be maintained. There is nothing in the dilemmas of Mr. Strachey's Marxian economics.

3. And as if this were not enough Mr. Strachey falls into yet a third more subtle trap in his final proposition. Here he supposes that the rentiers must obtain more for the system of capitalist enterprise to expand *as a class*. That has never been supposed by the theory of competition, and it is not the case. Such a view is based upon a fallacy of composition. Increased profit in Mr. Keynes' sense, is only necessary to the expansion of the individual enterprise. It is neither necessary that the total rentier income from the individual enterprise nor the total rentier income of the whole society should increase in order that industrial expansion should be maintained. There is nothing incompatible with a falling share accruing to property and a steady economic growth. Indeed as long as competition exists *there is no conceivable reason for supposing that the rentiers as a class must become richer*, much less that they must enforce their own income growth by greater saving. To suppose so is part of the mystical theology of the Class War. The share of property in our own national income has certainly fallen in the last twenty years, but it has been accompanied by a large increase in the total real income of the community. [See Mr. Colin Clark, *Economic Journal*, 1933.] There is therefore nothing left of Mr. Strachey's account of the capitalist crisis.

All that I have said must not be taken as a defence or exposition of what some people are pleased to term "orthodox economics." I am radically opposed to the organisation of economic life upon a competitive basis. . . .

No doubt when Mr. Strachey and his party come to power all canting economists and snivelling Social Democrats like myself will find themselves sentenced to the mining camps of South Wales or to the chain gangs in the Western Highlands. A few of us will face the firing squads of the "enlightened vanguard of the proletariat." Perhaps Mr. Strachey will be in charge of the squad I may be called upon to face. But before he gives the order to fire I hope he will take a bet I now suggest—namely, that when he is promoted to the chairmanship of the Supreme Planning Commission of the United Soviets of Great Britain he will proceed to create "profits" as defined by Mr. Keynes

as fast as ever he can or face a later firing squad of outraged proletarians himself. After all it is a safe bet. If he loses I shall not be there to claim the debt.

These academic criticisms, however, are unlikely to deter any man of Mr. Strachey's skill in his role as lecturer to popular audiences and as propagandist. The reason, indeed, for the vitality of the Marxist theory lies in another, political quarter. It is, logically enough on the doctrine of union of theory and practice, regarded as indecent—that is, "negative," "unconstructive," counter-revolutionary, traitorous and superfluous—to inquire into nice points of knowledge available to disinterested research, when the customary presentation is making disciples quite successfully, without this pedantry. The position is precisely analogous to that of a private soldier who, in war-time, insists upon asking his superior officer inconvenient questions.

Actually some capitalists, for their own greedy or obstinate ends, produce speculatively and foment crises, just as some megalomaniac jingoes produce war by talking of "homeland and honour threatened," or as others, not excluding Germany and the Soviet Union, provoke it by very heavy armaments on the plea, presumably, "who wills peace must prepare war." That disruptive greed will be checked only by public action or plan—not necessarily for the sake of planning *an sich*, "for its own sake," but to obviate economic fevers resulting in unemployment, destruction of human morale, starvation and irrational, functionless and intolerable inequalities. Speculators will oppose that action, some more, some less. Owing, however, to its Hobbesian psychology, Marxist philosophy is essentially a doctrine of all or nothing. For Strachey, *planning must be all or nothing;* the opposition to social planning must be total, class against class; and the achievement of it revolutionary. That is the dogma, and the dogma is infallible. Were it not infallible, half its religio-propagandist impetus would be lost. After all, we are here dealing with a *secular theology.*

Marxism, in kernel, shows men "how they may rebuild civilization on a new and higher basis. In five-sixths of the world Marxism is accomplishing this task: in one-sixth of the world [Stalin's] this task is already on the road to full accomplishment." An opposition to control, it may be agreed, is to be expected. The problem of political therapeutics is that of the amount of pressure required to check and control it. But it is attractive to consider that, if only adequate passion is generated, a head of force will certainly result, able to smash investors' resistance mechanically, as with a steam hammer, even if the

mechanism of repression may at the same time explode. This is called "revolution, not compromise."

Strachey's political views were set out in *The Coming Struggle for Power* (1932), *Socialism in Theory and Practice* (1936) and *What Are We to Do?* (1938), all published by Gollancz. Of these the first ranges from economics through science, religion and literature. Mr. Wells is dealt with on one page; Mr. Shaw is "debunked" on another. Mr. H. G. Wells is damned for quoting and endorsing Lord Acton's saying—"It is [the historian's] function to keep in view and to command the movement of ideas, which are not the effect but the cause of public events." Mr. Shaw is damned for his "almost commercial sense" of what is possible. Of Mr. J. M. Keynes we learn that there is "a complete contradiction between our diagnosis of the present situation and that of Mr. Keynes." Mr. Keynes is wrong. Fascism, at this date (1932), receives slightly over eight pages of attention: "Fascism has no theory and needs no theory." It does not reach that level. The next chapter is devoted to "the Rule of Mr. Baldwin" who yet—oddly enough, as an imperialist—knows "that war would be wholly disastrous to the British Empire now, and at all costs a respite must be obtained." The classless society is momentarily forgotten in the comment that Fascism "does not seek to *substitute the rule of one class for that of another* which is the only genuinely revolutionary act." However, Mr. Strachey quotes Hilaire Belloc to show that a State is not servile where all must "labour at the discretion of State officials . . . a servile condition only exists by contrast with a free condition. . . . " He very rightly insists that the spread of income, in Russia, is from 50 to 1,000 roubles a month or 1:20 whereas, in Great Britain, it is from £5 to £120,000 or 1:30,000. He adds, however, "power is relative." Nor does he comment on the value of the rouble; or on the frequency of this unjustifiable spread. The contrary argument has been used by Max Eastman to show that the spread in Russia between unskilled worker and factory manager is frequently greater than in America.

5

What, then, is the conclusion? It is that, in the inevitable clash with Capitalists, the Workers must adopt the revolutionary route. This warning is necessary because "the chief future function of the Social Democrats" is to persuade the workers to submit to "immense deprivations." The situation will become desperate: "the 'literal-

minded statesmen,' the 'enlightened intellectuals,' the whole paraphernalia of constitutionalism, are bundled off the stage" (surely a true prophecy). Mr. Lloyd George has said, Britain "is more top-heavy than any country in the world, and if it begins to rock, the crash here, for that reason, will be greater than in any other land." When, then, will the Revolution begin? Mr. Strachey replies:

> A workers' dictatorship in Great Britain could, in fact, only be, as we shew below, *a part* of a widespread working-class assumption of power extending to considerable areas of Europe at least. . . . It is improbable that Britain will be the next place in which, after Russia, the conflict of class comes to the point of decision . . . The workers will probably obtain power in Poland or Roumania or Spain or Hungary or Austria or Germany, for example, before they do so in Britain.

Revolution is categorically imperative; but its success appears to be remote.

It was with reference to this book that Mr. R. B. Bennett, Conservative Prime Minister of Canada, said, in effect, as publicized by Gollancz, that the views of John Strachey had influenced him to a great extent. "Mr. Strachey is one of the profound thinkers of our time." Mr. Strachey is, however, it may be suggested, too pessimistic about his own thesis. A revolution by force is perfectly possible now in Britain, granted the miseries of defeat or of a protracted war against Fascist opponents, especially if that war were preceded by a spell of severe unemployment. It is a matter of organization. The cost, however, would appear to be, after the overthrow of the bourgeois government by class civil war, the subjection of the British Commonwealth to a Peace of Brest-Litovsk, the loss of all but a pocket handkerchief of territories, and the continuation of the Communist Revolution on sufferance by the Fascist victor, so long as the latter, being preoccupied with dismembering the Commonwealth, found this convenient. There are, of course, the alternatives that misery on both sides and stalemate in a world war might produce, by coincidence, simultaneous world revolution; or that Marxist Communism might be used for export as a democratic technique for disrupting Fascism in its home lands—as by Germany in Russia, in 1917—its violence being the nemesis and measure of Fascist violence.

Strachey's *The Theory and Practice of Socialism* (1936), first advertised, it is of some interest to note, as *Communism for Britain and America*, sets out to say plainly what, in Strachey's opinion, the working-class movement of the world is striving for. It will be recalled

that, for Marxist Communists, Socialism is merely the technical term for the dictatorial phase of transition to complete Communism. What it is striving against has already been made clear. In *The Coming Struggle* Strachey repeated his key thesis of the pursuit of higher profits by exploitative capitalism abroad and the depression of the worker at home. He cited, rather unexpectedly, Sir Arthur Salter, as witness to the, slightly different, free-trade proposition (itself to be checked by the facts of American experience since 1929) that "*international* capitalism can only exist by means of foreign lending, and the increase in such lending is one of its essential methods for staving off crisis."* International capitalism, nevertheless, is falsely so called and stimulates national militant aggressiveness. This is called its inherent contradiction. Strachey proceeds, in *The Theory and Practice*, to discuss capitalist façades. Mr. Franklin Roosevelt's Democratic Party in America is a means whereby capitalists can "claim to have obtained the workers' assent to the capitalists' dictatorship. But that fact does not mean that their rule is not still a dictatorship."

It is essential for his argument that Strachey treats capitalists, *i.e.*, private investors, great and small, *as a class* and speaks of "their rule." All is clear black and white. Similarly, as a matter of course, he speaks of the workers or proletariat (those without interest from investment) as a class. It is a necessary consequence of the metaphysical nature of Marxist Communism that this should be so. It is impossible to have a tidy dialectic of history, unless "classes" are substantialized as entities, units or separable forces. This supposition is the basis of the whole "inevitable-class-war".doctrine. Strachey, not unjustifiably, complains that "political theory as taught in British and American universities ignores the existence of classes." although H. J. Laski's *The State* is noted as an honourable exception. This doctrine of the class as a separable integer has practical consequences. As Strachey says, in *What Are We to Do?:*

> There was not then [1919], as there is not even now, a realization among the British workers that, when substantial class interests are at stake, the question of keeping or breaking a promise will *never receive the slightest consideration* from a ruling class.

That is the heart of the matter. It fits in with the Leninist theory of religion and morals. There is just enough documented evidence and common experience behind it for a doctrine of sharp classes (although whether two or three is a matter that shifts to convenience) to appear

* In this connection, *cf.* Staley: *War and the Private Investor*, 1935, for criticism.

as a theory that brilliantly explains the Machiavellianism of practice. Marxism is such a theory.

Marxism, however, was built up upon the basis of Marx's experience in the 1840's and 1850's. The very thesis of Marxism is indeed that material conditions determine ideas. As, then, technology changes, so ideas should change. In a century technology has greatly changed. If the factory "hand" has even more entirely supplanted the master handicraftsman, the engineer and skilled technician have yet become of unprecedented importance. Revolution itself can no longer (as in 1789) be a popular *émeute*, but involves a new technique. What then is the relation of Marxism to this skilled and determinant sub-class or reinforced middle class? In these days of fusion of trained intelligence and manual skill, has not Marx's old group dubbed the intelligentsia changed its shape and social significance?

In *The Theory and Practice* Mr. Strachey, as an intellectual leader and an Etonian criticizing those whose plutocratic power derives from hereditary wealth, deplores that "the able serve the dull." Like all the Marxist school he necessarily rejects radically the notion of one community, of the locality, functioning cooperatively as an organic whole. Edmund Burke, who urged this view, is referred to as "a sort of inspired charlatan."*

There are two communities. Nevertheless, in the workers' community there is a distinguishable vanguard. These are the disciplined Party members (whom the Webbs, in a flash of intuition and wit, compared in function to the Jesuits in the Catholic world—men having, in the Webbs' phrase "the vocation of leadership"). Among them are the intellectuals—not only "agitators," effective in moving crowds to action, but "propagandists," men who understand theory and practice. What is their part? In *What Are We to Do?* Strachey goes into this issue thoroughly, and in a very Leninist fashion. The answer is based upon "scientific Socialism," *i.e.*, Marxism as brought up to date. It is inspired by Lenin's distrust of "mere working class mentality."† It is useful to read in connection with this answer, Aldous Huxley's brilliant and very fundamental satire, *Brave New World*, with its praise of rule by a kind of Sacred College of the Intelligent in a society scientifically conditioned to receive that rule.

The idea that the workers will come to Socialism easily and automatically *as the result of their efforts to better their conditions* of life is an over-simplification of the Socialist view. . . . There is nothing contrary, then, to what an in-

* *Cf.* the remark of that eminent Liberal bourgeois leader, Mr. Augustine Birrell, that no one who does not understand Burke can govern Britain.

† *Cf.* p. 612.

structed Socialist would expect in the undoubted fact that the idea of Socialism comes, primarily, from *thinkers drawn from the middle class.* . . . Marx himself was the archetype of such thinkers. . . . The distinguishing characteristics of political parties built on the new model are as follows. First they possess the ideology which we have called scientific socialism . . . *the new model political party is, in one of its aspects, the vehicle, the incarnation, of scientific Socialism* [Marx-Leninism]. . . . Such a party must consist of, and above all be guided by, men and women who have completely mastered the whole body of political and economic science indicated above . . . not only do they possess the ideology known as scientific Socialism, *they possess no other ideology.* In a word, *they do not tolerate within their ranks the coexistence of more than one ideology.* . . . The revisionists began by making the claim, not that the whole Socialist movement should come over to their point of view, but that the advocates of this point of view *should have "freedom of criticism" of scientific Socialism.* It was against this tendency that Lenin launched his full powers. . . . Does it not in effect deny that *Socialism is a science at all?*

Mr. Strachey uses the word "science" rather as the theologians spoke of their "divine science." What then is to be done, and whither is this "New Model"—presumably an allusion to Cromwell's New Model Army*—to lead?

The existing State is part and parcel of the class which owns it, and that consequently its transference to another class involved its more or less complete abolition and the construction of a new kind of State, *suitable to the needs of the new ruling class.*

The issue, then, apparently is to be a disciplined and intellectually unified New Model Party (comparable to a Church), led by Marxist theologians of social science, such as Mr. Strachey, regulating a society which, for the practical present (as anybody who will take the trouble to read Karl Marx on the Gotha Program will understand), must be a society of unequal wage payments and interest on State bonds. For the rest, Marxism is a pill that will work only if swallowed whole or a "science" based on the exclusion of free inquiry: "no other ideologies." This all appears to come very near to the attitude of a fanatical and persecuting monkery.

Mr. Strachey proceeded to a denunciation of non-Marxist or of non-revolutionary Socialism and especially of what he terms "British Socialism."

The British Labour and Socialist movement has suffered severe defeats in the last fifteen years because its comprehension both of the socialist objective and of the methods necessary to social change was inadequate.

* But *cf.* p. 297.

During this period, it should perhaps be noted, the Labour Party had twice achieved sufficient electoral success to become the Government, and had permanently replaced the great Liberal Party, in a fashion that, before the War, would have been regarded as incredible, as the official Opposition in Britain. Also the fact is not mentioned that John Strachey himself had changed from his mistaken comprehension of the Socialist objective within the ranks of (*a*) Social Democracy and (*b*) Sir Oswald Mosley's New Party. What was consistent in his course was the pursuit of New Model Parties led by intellectually superior persons, such as he knew himself to be.

Strachey continued, in a chapter in *What Are We to Do?*, entitled "The End of British Socialism": "British Socialism as an ideology was wholly bankrupt," although Mr. Attlee "evidently still sincerely believes in the whole ideology of British Socialism." Strachey attacks as typical the official Labour Party manifesto entitled *Democracy and Dictatorship*, with its statement that:

> The War, the Reparations policy of the Allies and the occupation of the Ruhr have created economic and psychological conditions favourable to aggressive Nationalism and the growth of Communism in Germany, and finally to the triumph of the Hitler Dictatorship. The reaction of the upper classes throughout Europe has strengthened the demand for Dictatorship of the Working-class. The fear of the Dictatorship of the Working Class in turn has evoked the iron Dictatorship of capitalism and nationalism. . . . After the War, British Labour denounced the vengeful follies of Versailles and the extravagant stupidity of the Reparation Clauses. In thirty years, the British Labour Movement has gained political strength by its fight for democratic principles and its firm belief in the attainment of Socialism by peaceful means. Today, in a world that is being driven by capitalist ruthlessness into Dictatorship, British Labour stands firm for the democratic rights of the people.

Strachey says:

> The British Labour movement was never converted to Marxism, but it was in the end converted to the form of Socialism preached by the Fabians. . . . [The English Marxists] failed because they were not themselves really interested enough in social theory to undertake the work of introducing Marxism, *as a science*, to the British Labour movement. . . . Fabianism is the rejection of what had been, hitherto, the main tenets of Socialism [*cf. contra.* R. Owen], namely the theory of the class struggle and the labour theory of value, as inapplicable to a capitalist society which had adopted a democratic constitution. . . . We know that this development [of capitalism, in economic crises], if it is not interrupted, will certainly destroy organised human society. . . .

Unfortunately in present day society no such entity as the community exists. . . . It was this ideology (which was itself the application to post-war conditions of Fabian or British Socialism) which prevented the British Labour movement from achieving historic success in the 1920's. . . . It was not enough. For *that Socialism was of a bastard kind.*

It is a trifle that R. H. Tawney's work is dismissed as utterly lacking in "a comprehension of historical forces" and the tract on Marx of A. D. Lindsay, Master of Balliol, Oxford, as a "plausible, fallacious and superficial little book." So much for the Anglo-Saxon Tradition of empirical philosophy, from Bacon and Locke to today, so far as it has expressed itself in British Socialism, in the judgment of a Marxist "of probably unique sophistication."

6

In his book *Hope in America* (1938), written since the new Dimitrov policy* went into force, Strachey noticeably altered his line and expounded the newest Marxism.

Surely we have *no need to prove* any elaborate and special "interpretation of History" in order to be able to agree that, if, for any reason, masses of people find it impossible to make their livings, the world is bound to fall into disorder and violence? Is there the slightest doubt that what has checked, stopped and now reversed *the undoubted progress which the world was making up till recent times* is that our economic system is going to bits.

The answer obviously is: "no need"—as Mr. Strachey suggested. However the implied interpretation of, *e.g.*, modern German politics in terms solely of the "economic system" (for Mr. Strachey *had*, after all, a special interpretation) is more questionable. Let us pass this. Why is it "going to bits"? Capitalism and wage-slavery. Mr. Strachey brings in some lay figures: the American professors of economics. If only, Strachey pillories these gentlemen as saying, the American workers'

wages had been high enough they would have bought the entire output of the productive system and there would not have been any unemployment or slump.

It is all such simple writing, in such good style, for quite simple people; and Strachey finds inextinguishable humour in the efforts of Professors Levin, Moulton and Warburton on all these issues. Strachey, however, entirely *disbelieves* that private employers can, consistently

* *Cf.* p. 646.

and as a whole, pay high wages.* Therefore the expensive goods whose making gives employment will be purchased by the American worker—since the capitalist, by hypothesis, must not exist—presumably as part of "the entire output." The farmer, who is not a wage-slave—and, therefore doubtless prosperous—may be expected to assist. The abolition of luxury production, admirable as a long-term remedy, here is to be the panacea for next year's economic crisis—just like that . . . Nor will the poorly paid wage-slave abroad be suffered to rush goods into America at cheap prices so that part of "the entire output" remains unwanted. Doubtless he will be prohibited from doing this by a Marxian high tariff, which will aid in the return of international prosperity . . . Or perhaps, as Lenin suggested, the American worker will have to wait until every other wage-slave is also satisfied.

As was pointed out at the beginning of this chapter, there is grave disparity between what the few rich hold and what the many poor hold of American and British wealth. That disparity is a cancer in our economic system. This has been emphasized by most Socialists, including what Strachey elsewhere called "the bastard British" kind. Their explanations have not, indeed, been so simple, in terms of "surplus-value" and the Marxian text, as his. But they have perhaps been more profound.

What, then, was the reason for the grievance that Strachey nourished against the comrades? What is Strachey's constructive view? For one thing he had now newly discovered that Roosevelt, the "capitalist dictator," must be supported—so long as he pushes forward to certain ends. What? The substantial ownership of capital by the American worker—but through public ownership. The actual worker, Smith, will be paid . . . wages . . . and, of course, be it understood, unequally. "What we object to is—that the highest pay of all is given for no work at all"—exploitation. The exploiters must be dispossessed. How will these exploiters who do no work at all stand energetically in the way of reform so clearly needed—against all the popular force? Admittedly the exploiters, *i.e.*, those who perform no social service comparable to their pay, are parasites and should be abolished. All Socialists agree. But *how shall they resist* granted a majority popular determination? "Everybody, of course, hopes that social change will come in the most peaceful way possible." But—although communists

* *Cf.* p. 682. Mr. Strachey, whom I know as personally pleasant as well as intelligent, will, it is to be hoped, not object to counter-humour here. Unfortunately his master, Nikolai Lenin, and *his* spiritual godson in method, Adolf Hitler, have no sense of fun save of the quite grimmest order.

wish to abide [*vide* Lenin*] by the democratic system—"they cannot pretend that they think that the representatives of the capital owners will abide by democracy." The exploiters *own the state* because they own, even in a democracy, the means of production and—they may start a financial panic. Strachey was not unaware of the existence of plans, by Socialist and even non-Socialist governments, some already in force, for meeting financial panic. Such panic is, indeed, not new since the 1832 Reform Bill was carried, against the Duke of Wellington, by the aid of it.† What more then does Strachey fear?

At this point the book ends, but there is a hint that the workless exploiters will offer violence. The threat is indeed so grave that preparations are needed instantly of an unusual democratic character. In Russia, if the workers' leaders betray them, these leaders are shot. In Britain, according to Strachey (p. 179), they are put in the Cabinet. Strachey stated that he preferred the former method. "It is not a difference of which I as a Britisher am proud." Almost Strachey presented the exploiters with a claim that there may be worse tyranny than *their* idle tyranny. He forgot that propagandists may take him at his word. Russia, indeed—even its political trials—not Rooseveltianism, is the model . . . Whereas in Germany, Strachey added, there is unemployment and in Italy no holidays with pay, in Russia there is never unemployment and there are holidays with pay.‡ In conclusion Strachey's *Hope in America* appears less remote in its consequences from those issuing from Lenin's hope in Russia than Mr. Strachey's cultivated tongue might at first lead the simple to suppose.

As touching the means of victory, Mr. Strachey's views on coalitions changed since he denounced such associations with other groups as instances of the imbecility of the deplorable German Social Democrats. The Dimitrov directive, to which Mr. Strachey responded, has supervened.§ He now castigated Attlee, parliamentary leader of the British Labour Party, for refusing to have anything to do with non-Socialists.

> We may hope for a modification in Mr. Attlee's attitude . . . the growth of the Communist Party is a pre-requisite for a proportionate, and far larger, growth of a Labour Party. . . .
>
> We saw that the need of the hour in both countries (Britain and France) was not merely for a united Labour movement, containing an adequately developed model party, but for an alliance of such a movement with all the

* *Cf.* p. 627. † *Cf.* p. 651.

‡ Of these four statements three are open to question on point of fact.

§ *Cf.* p. 646.

progressive and democratic, but non-Socialist, forces. . . . There is a tough, non-Socialist, radicalism still current in Great Britain which should not be under-rated.

However, the reason why the Labour Party would grow is because it would be invigorated by that self-conscious Marxism which for the Communist is the only true dogma. But "specious, plausible appeals to unite the party," that do not pivot on a central basis of sound Stalinist ideology, are to be condemned. For the rest it is an empty bogy to suppose that Marxists advocate violence if peace can be had on proper terms or, as it were, "for the hell of it."

The workers can never finally choose what methods they will use in their struggle. . . . Confiscation of means of production can, in the nature of things, only occur *in a revolutionary situation, after, say, a capitalist government has been defeated in war.* . . . There is no objection to compensating dispossessed capitalists . . . out of taxation from the rich. The objection is to the illusion that this will reconcile the capitalists to Socialism, and so avoid the necessity of overcoming their resistance, *which they will certainly attempt (though they need not be allowed to succeed in this attempt) to make into violent and armed resistance.*

There is, then, basically a Marxist expectation of violence—"they will *certainly* attempt"—and this is the distinctive key of Marx-Leninist policy. Presumably there must, as a matter of common sense, certainly be armed counter-resistance. It will be noted that Strachey (*a*) visualized European war; (*b*) revolution after a non-Communist government has lost prestige in this war; and (*c*) the success of this revolution.

Whether Mr. Strachey is a Communist or not was, oddly, a question of considerable difficulty. His colleague of the Left Book Club, Mr. Laski, who should surely know, says he was. Mr. Strachey from Ellis Island, in the fateful Days of October, 1938 (and who will not say that, aided by Mr. Quincy Howe, he should be given leave to speak? who will not exclaim—with Milton, about Salmasius—that, the more he is heard, the better he will be answered?), is reported by the New York press, as saying:

Laws passed to exclude aliens who are Communists are now being extended beyond members of the Communist Party to those like myself who hold Socialist beliefs . . . even Russia hasn't yet become a Communist society . . . If an article in the *Daily Worker* makes me a Communist, doesn't one in the *Spectator* turn me back into a Tory?"

He could scarcely accept the New York Times compromise that he was "a parlour Communist." Moreover, that great journal totally mis-

understood Leninism if it supposed that the role of the intellectual middle-class propagandist—as was Lenin—in breaking down cultural resistances is a trifling matter for fun. No one who has studied the past pages need suppose that it is necessary for Mr. Strachey to belong to the Communist Party, any more than that every papalist need be a Jesuit. Its more eminent supporters can be dispensed from the rigours of membership. As Marx said, in the *Manifesto*, "Communists are not a special party," but "in" other parties; and Lenin saw many Communists as outside party membership. The core of all Protean shapes would appear to be Marx-Leninism; and Strachey, as a precisionist, would not presumably have objected to being described as a Marx-Leninist.

7

The vogue of Marxism swept over Britain and on to America—in the former country having previously left, on Strachey's own statement, almost no impression—when the inevitability of economic gradualness was rudely interrupted by the Crisis of 1929, and it appeared dubious whether the national wealth, under capitalist or even evolutionary and demi-capitalist arrangements, could sustain further socially imperative reforms with their fiscal consequences. The Marxists maintained that it could not. They had a theory, tidy and dogmatic, ready at a time when the Social Democrats of the slow Anglo-Saxon world had permitted a vacuum of theory. They won. Theirs was a catastrophic theory and it suited catastrophe. We have noted the impact on Laski's transitional thought, which also accepted the catastrophic and non-Fabian hypothesis.

Both Strachey and Laski are thinkers whose incisive arguments and influence cannot be complacently ignored, although Laski is the subtler by far of the two. The outstanding social fact which they confronted was that the difference between the upper economic levels of the rich and the lower economic levels of the poor was far too great, and too devoid of assignable moral or functional justification, to satisfy any thoughtful man's notion of tolerable social justice. After all, the stomachs of the rich and poor were not made differently. The difference was so great and was felt to be so intolerable as to provoke mass movements of revolutionary force. Social Democrats, such as Dr. Dalton and Jay, felt that an adequate remedy involved much greater material equalization, *e.g.*, by the extinction of inherited, unearned wealth in the third generation. The prevention, moreover, of gross and undeserved poverty, due to unemployment arising from

asymmetrical production, involved certain measures, in vital industries and in finance and investment, of public planning and of social control (probably, but *not* necessarily, or always desirably, State control). It was merely untrue, in terms of the twentieth-century wealth system, to say that poverty was, for the most part, due to indolence, or riches due to personal thrift and stinting. Nor was the owner of capital always the man of technical managerial ability. The latter might even prefer responsible office in a great public company. On this there was agreement among Fabian Socialists and even in circles not explicitly Socialist.

The issue with Marxism—no less with propagandists in Anglo-Saxon countries, such as Strachey, than elsewhere—was on the question of the expectation of violence in carrying through the needed reforms and, yet more fundamentally, on two different philosophies of the community. According to the Aristotelian non-Marxists, there was such a reality of community to be counted on in most human societies that it could be practically anticipated that imperatively needed reforms would, with proper statesmanship, be carried through without *stasis*, civil war and bloodshed. This Laski and Strachey denied or doubted with considered pessimism. The non-Marxian Socialists did not, of course, deny the reality of divergent group economic interests; the thrust of group against group, or "class struggle"; or the Benthamite doctrine of pressures. It did not deny the need of vigorously organizing these legitimate pressures. The Marxists, however, Hobbesians in tradition, were pessimistic about these humane or ethical suppositions. Their prime axiom was: "In present day society no such entity as the community exists."* *Stasis* was regarded as inevitable; an obvious deduction from the basic "class war"; even if not explicit, only awaiting to be awakened and lit up; and to be prepared for. Neither side excluded the possibility of forceful revolution. But, whereas the one school held that there was just enough sense of community for an evolutionary change to be viable, thanks to mutual forbearance, compromise and common sense, the other school regarded this as sentimentality, identified compromise with class treason or "ratting," and amelioration with counter-revolutionary action, viewed humanitarianism with favour only when it made good propaganda, and prepared for the inevitable trial of force.

Since the Marxists did not presume that, unlike themselves, the apologists of the existing system could be operatively interested in social justice, the ethical bond lapsed. The issue became one of mere

* *Cf.* p. 698.

force and the State "an instrument for the oppression of one class by another"—on which issue the Marxists presumed that, by force of numbers, they must inevitably win. It was yet ethically self-evident that adherents of the other side were parasites and saboteurs, without assignable social function or justification against forcible liquidation as criminals. Procedure against this scum was so obviously just that it could be undertaken by a disciplined minority. Majority endorsement of action for the interest of the morally significant whole could well wait until after the liquidation. The Marxists had great contempt for ethical appeals to citizens who also derived some income from saving or even to trade unionists; and had a great confidence, especially among the intellectuals, in what well-applied force could do in principle. Nor did temporary reverses discourage them, in view of their dialectical certainty of victory in the event of world revolution or world war. What might be the Hegelian antithesis (by their own suppositions) to the Marxist thesis; what might be the synthesis, democratic and technological, most consonant with the basic demands of human nature; whether all talk of inevitability was not dangerous hocus-pocus—this, for obvious reasons, did not receive consideration from those who had already "found truth." All was a matter "of vast armies, of an alignment of all the class forces of the given society *for the final and decisive battle*" (Lenin: *Left-wing Communism*). The duty was to wait until bourgeois powers became involved in war, and then to strike.

READING

John Strachey: *What are We to Do?*, Chaps. XIV–XVI.

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE

Hugh Dalton: *Practical Socialism for Britain*, 1935.
Max Eastman: *Marx, Lenin and the Science of Revolution*, 1926.
K. C. Hsiao: *Political Pluralism*, 1927.
D. Jay: *The Socialist Case*, 1937.
* H. J. Laski: *Grammar of Politics*.
* H. J. Laski: *Democracy in Crisis*, 1933.
John Strachey: *The Coming Struggle for Power*, 1932.
John Strachey: *The Nature of Capitalist Crisis*, 1935.
* R. H. Tawney: *The Acquisitive Society*, 1924.
Victor Gollancz; *Our Threatened Values*, June 1946.
K. Ingram: *The Communist Challenge*, 1948. **The Pope and the People*, documents, 1931, also *Rerum Novarum*.

Chapter XXI

Internationalism and Fascism: Benito Mussolini, Adolf Hitler

1

ALONG with the memory of the *respublica Christiana* a legacy was left of pacifism and of internationalism. These views are not indeed novel. Long ago, Lao-tse, the Chinese philosopher, said, "to joy in conquest is to joy in the loss of human life." Nevertheless, they were especially articulate in the last days of the Catholic dominance. Even Machiavelli comments, in his *Art of War*, in words here reminiscent of Thomas More: "War makes thieves and peace hangs them." Erasmus declared, with irony, "When princes propose to exhaust a commonwealth they speak of a just war: when they unite for that object they call it a collective alliance for Peace." That other great humanist, John Colet, Dean of St. Paul's, declared, "There can be no such thing as a good war or a bad peace." It is the normal attitude of the humanists. Voltaire and Goethe, as well as Dr. Johnson and Edward Gibbon—and indeed Ruskin and Spencer—express it. All regard themselves as clerks (*clerici*) in an international republic. Voltaire defines a soldier, a drummer, as "a murderer in a red coat beating with two sticks an ass' skin." This line of thought has received again distinguished expression, in our own day, in Bertrand Russell's *Cost of Peace* (1936) and in Aldous Huxley's *Means and Ends* (1937).

The most elaborated expression of this humanist tradition is to be found in the *Eternal Peace* (1795) of Immanuel Kant. Kant here advocates a world federal republic or what he calls a "Cosmopolitical Institution." The thesis of the book is that war settles no issues of right. It is, indeed, hypocrisy to talk of just judgement where there is no impartial judge, not a party to the case. There has then, to date, been *no war* that can be asserted to be just. The settlements issuing from wars, and decided by them, are merely amoral, without significance to the moral conscience. Civilization, however, and its values dictate peace as an immediate duty and (adds Kant rather inconsistently) even war must be so conducted as not to destroy confidence. To make peace effectual requires an organization armed with final

authority. The mere writings of the international lawyers, Grotius or Vattel, have no binding force but are only expressions of pious opinion. There must be a "common external authority." Into this somewhat legalistic but doubtless valid argument about the relation between sovereignty and war Kant introduces an appeal, entirely characteristic of him, both to duty and to egoism. The establishment of the world republic is a moral categorical imperative *and* is dictated by enlightened self-interest:

> The problem of the formation of the federal state, hard as it may sound, is not insoluble even for a race of devils, if intelligent.*

The corpus of an International Law is a continuous legacy through the ages—no mere aspiration like hope of eternal peace and no attempt at a new construction such as Kant's "federal republic." Emanating from the Greek notion of Natural Law it took shape, as we have shown, in the Roman law which was in fact universal, as a law actually applied, throughout the Western world. In a qualified fashion, it had force during the Middle Ages in the shapes of the Civil Law and the ecclesiastical Canon Law, applied in the courts Christian. The disruption of papal Christianity and the localization and decadence of the Holy Roman Empire left this universal law suspended as it were in mid air without courts of authority in which it could be administered. Hence we find, concurrently, in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the development of a law superior to nations by the Spanish school of international lawyers, such as Vittoria and Ayala—who presumed at least a *de jure* sovereign judge in the Pope—and a development by Protestant writers, such as Gentilis and Grotius, who have to appeal to universal conscience, and to dispense with a common executive authority. They rely upon the maxim (torn from its historical, highly social context)† that the law is above men.

Franciscus de Vittoria (1480–1546) completes the development of that doctrine of "just war" to which reference has already been made,‡ and which had been developed by St. Augustine, St. Thomas Aquinas, St. Antonino of Florence and, in the sixteenth century, Cardinal Cajetan. There are three conditions of a "just war" such as alone is permissible. These are (*a*) that it be declared by public authority; (*b*) that it be for a just cause, *i.e.*, because the enemy's actions violate the laws of nations; and (*c*) that it be waged with right intention, *i.e.*, to

* This theme of a union of peoples has recently been revived by Lionel Curtis and C. K. Streit and in the present writer's *Anglo-Saxony and Its Tradition.*

† *Cf.* p. 83. ‡ *Cf.* p. 168–174.

re-establish this law. Cajetan had written: "He who wages a just war acts as a judge proceeding against a criminal." Vittoria adds, with pleasant irony: "War cannot be just on both sides at the same time except in a case of invincible ignorance."

HUGO GROOT (GROTIUS, 1583–1645) is the outstanding representative of the Protestant school, to which the exiled Gentilis, later Professor at Oxford, also belongs. It is interesting to note that the representatives of an imperial nation such as Spain, because Catholic and looking back upon the *respublica Christiana*, are able to expound a theory of universal natural law, whereas Protestant international law is expounded, with a moralistic appeal to conscience, by representatives of *small* nations, such as the Dutchman Grotius. It is opposed by representatives of great Protestant nations, such as Hobbes and Selden. International law becomes, for the first time since Rome arose, only another name for the higher morality. It is also of interest that Grotius assumes the existence of the modern states in their plurality and of war. He occupies much of his great book, *De jure belli et pacis* ("Concerning the Right of War and Peace"), by discussing that contradiction in terms, the laws of war. Moreover Natural Law develops into an Universal Law that is not *ius gentium* ("law of peoples") but is rather a novel *iura inter gentes* ("laws between peoples") and, for the first time, Inter-national Law.

Deprived of a universally recognized papal arbiter, Grotius endeavours to rehabilitate and systematize his *ius gentium* on the basis of the Bible, universally recognized among Christians, and the jurisprudence of the Roman law which is at the base of our Western tradition. Further, since Grotius was an infant prodigy and was attorney general of the Low Countries at the age of twenty-four, he became a virtuoso of erudition, capable of pouring forth an inexhaustible store of quotations. Hence, Grotius supplements Bible and Civil Law by proof texts, from Christian Fathers and pagan poets. The underlying idea is that these poets are natural prophets of the voice of reason and instinct. Grotius indeed finds a basis for his international law in the old natural-law tradition. This he does in a highly interesting fashion. In opposition to the Social Contractualist school (of which Hobbes is a contemporary and highly individualist member), Grotius lays down, as basis, the Aristotelian principle of the *natural sociability* of man.

> Among these properties which are peculiar to man is a desire for society; that is, a desire for a life spent in common with fellow-men. . . . And there-

fore the assertion that, by nature, every animal is impelled *only to seek his own advantage or good, if stated so generally as to include man, cannot be conceded.* . . . And this tendency to the conservation of society, which we have now expressed in rough manner and which tendency is in agreement with the nature of the human *intellect,* is the source of *Jus* or Natural Law, properly so called.

All of which does not prevent Grotius from maintaining that the waging of war may be justified; and that there is nothing in the New Testament to the contrary that cannot be explained away. Christ intended to preach not pacifism but patience, and indeed

equity and common sense teach us that, in order to avoid that sense of passages which would lead to extreme inconveniences, we may limit the range of general terms, and explain ambiguities, and even depart in some degree from the propriety and received use of words.

He has, however, to confess that there may be another rule prohibiting war for those "of eminent purity," and ends by falling back *gauchement* upon the Catholic distinction between counsel of perfection and moral command. "Speaking generally such is perhaps the tendency of Christian counsel, and the scheme of the highest Christian life; still it is no command." One feels that, in the laying down of sociological rules of conduct likely to be observed among states, not conspicuously moved towards a life spent in common with their fellows, Hobbes has the best of the argument. The German, Pufendorf (1632–1694) and the Swiss, Vattel (1714–1767), follow the Social Contract tradition as the premise in their international-law constructions, and not that purely of Grotius. Still more is this true of Kant who, however, takes pains to point out the pathetic abstract weakness of an "international law" or *responsa iurisprudentium* detached *in vacuo* from any organized society or executive power. We must proceed, as has been preached by that new encyclopaedist and humanist, H. G. Wells, from legalism to world organization, in the movement away from national egoism.

Ever since Pierre Dubois, the French lawyer, as we have shown,* the notion of some such organization of humanity, other than Roman-German Empire and Catholic Church, had floated before men's minds. While these, however, had still some virility no purpose was served, save for jealous secular or national ambition, by paper schemes to replace them. Dante, the Florentine, strives to vindicate the necessity for the world of the "Holy Roman Empire" (albeit "of the German

* *Cf.* p. 178.

People," the First Reich). Another Frenchman, the great minister of Henry IV, Sully, in his *Économies royales*, after his retirement sketches out a "Grand Design" of a Christendom controlled by a permanent Council, with under it fifteen equal and federated dominions, thus (of course, merely incidentally) holding in check the swollen power of the House of Habsburg and the Roman-German Reich. The Grand Design is itself but the adaptation of an earlier scheme of the little known Crusé, *Le Cinée d'estat*, 1622, which had suggested a Council of Ambassadors [as in 1918] and freedom of commerce. Sully had merely conventionalized this by cutting out the ambassadors of non-Christian powers, such as that of the Sultan—and also of the Scythian Czar. Such paper Utopias abound, as that which the galley-slave, Gargaz, got through, a century later, into the sympathetic hands of Benjamin Franklin. Among others, the philosopher Leibnitz outlined a scheme.

The Abbé de Saint-Pierre (1658–1743), only progenitor of the doctrine of Human Progress, accustomed to explain to inquiring friends that he was a simple child in affairs and indeed aged five years, in 1716 sketched his Project of Perpetual Peace, which oddly aspired to establish this desired condition upon the basis of a *status quo*—that established by the Peace of Utrecht—confirmed by permanent alliances. Voltaire himself hoped and explained, prior to his death just before the great Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars, that the folly of war would come to civilization no more; while Rousseau, in a tractate, amplified Saint-Pierre's scheme and gave it recommendation, to those practical men who require the blessing of a man of action, by attributing to the hero, Henry IV himself, approval of the project of Sully. Henry at least was no fool and Sully no visionary; therefore peace might be.

After the Napoleonic Wars, the allied and associated powers sought to stabilize peace permanently upon the basis of the territorial and constitutional, legitimist *status quo*, established at the Congress of Vienna, with the co-operation of the French statesman-bishop, Talleyrand, and confirmed by the Holy Alliance, instituted by the Czar Alexander I. This Alliance was found in practice to crush liberalism, nationality and legitimate state ambitions and ended in disillusion. However, at the Congress of Aix, in 1818, Robert Owen, the socialist co-operator, was able to present a scheme for the international limitation of the working day which is still being discussed in our own century; while, in 1847, one Le Grand put forward a paper project for international legislation for the limitation of hours and the protection of workers. In 1880, the Swiss Confederation suggested an international

conference on this issue of labour and, in 1889, the German Kaiser Wilhelm II, following in the steps of Lassalle and Bismarck, again agitated the issue—but, not unexpectedly, found the French averse. However, in 1898, the Czar Nicholas II, watching with anxiety the modern developments of Austrian artillery, effected the convocation of the First Congress at The Hague for the discussion of lasting peace. From these deliberations at The Hague sprang the scheme for a panel available, *when asked*, to deliberate upon international disputes, generally but misleadingly called The Hague Court.

Thomas Woodrow Wilson (1856–1924), President of the United States, earlier professor at Bryn Mawr and president of Princeton University, grandson of a Scotch Presbyterian minister, made himself the interpreter of the demand for a more permanent international organization, which had already been agitated by Lord Cecil of Chelwood, Henry Noel Brailsford and others. In his famous speech of January 18, 1918, embodying the Fourteen Points, Woodrow Wilson said:

> The day of conquest and aggrandizement has gone by. . . . An evident principle runs through the whole program I have outlined. It is the principle of justice to all peoples and nationalities to live on equal terms of liberty and safety with one another, whether they be strong or weak. . . . A free, open-minded and absolutely impartial adjustment of all colonial claims [Point V]. . . . The peoples of Austria-Hungary . . . should be accorded the freest opportunity of autonomous development [Point X].

After the Great European War, which Pope Benedict XV had denounced as "a useless massacre" and for which the responsibility is put by Trotsky squarely, if fallaciously, upon the back of the French and Russians, the assembled statesmen acquiesced in an international system which should stabilize peace permanently upon the basis of the territorial *status quo* established at the expense especially of Germany (and without the co-operation of her statesmen) by the French premier and militant secularist, Georges Clemenceau, *le tigre*, and others, at the Peace of Versailles. For constitutional and other reasons, the inclusion of the Soviet Union, the newly democratized Germany and the Holy See was not felt to be strictly essential for universality of membership and impartiality of administration in the League.

Largely owing to the efforts of Senator Henry Cabot Lodge, of Massachusetts, and partly for internal reasons connected with Party views on the Constitution of the United States and the traditional

jealousy between Senate and Executive, Woodrow Wilson's policy was defeated. The United States neither signed the Covenant nor entered the League nor pledged the French any armed guaranty of security, thereby conspiring with the makers of the Peace to render the next war highly probable. Sir Austen Chamberlain later enunciated the doctrine that the League was "a free assembly of sovereign states" [as under the old Polish Constitution with its independent nobles with their "free veto"].

The odds seem to be against the likelihood that, after the next great world war, another wiser and more obstinate Woodrow Wilson will arise—again combining the vision of a philosopher with the power of an American President—who, by imposing some better, more reasonable peace, will roughly check the vicious spiral, and unceremoniously establish a sovereign assembly of free states, thereby terminating the full sovereignty of the various countries of both hemispheres, just as that of Virginia was once terminated. In the alternative, it would appear as if this task must needs be completed by a Napoleon or by a world revolution, which will explode lesser claims. By one route, or another, more or less oppressive, the World State will doubtless be established. Regional State-*fusion*, in confederations of great *blocs* after the model of the American Articles of Confederation, has also been suggested as a stage. If so, the portion of the world would appear to lie between the U.S.S.R., China Mittel-Europa (by the *Anschluss* of Germany and Austria and reconstitution of the First Reich), and an Anglo Saxony in which the United States of America and British Commonwealth had also concluded an *Anschluss*.

Woodrow Wilson was inspired in his policy by a definite philosophy set forth in his book, *The State* (1898 and 1918, revised) as well as in his excellent little treatise entitled *Congressional Government* (1885). This philosophy is a restated Jeffersonianism which exalts, on the one side, the Individual and, on the other, Society against Government and the State. Evolution, Wilson states, has been upwards and away from the day when individual values were not recognized (as Kant would have them recognized), the totalitarian Hellenic days when "the ancient State was the only individual."

> Society is vastly bigger and more important than its instrument, government. . . . The end of government is the facilitation of the objects of society. . . . Once having arisen, government was affected, and profoundly affected, by man's choice; only that choice entered, not to originate, but to modify government. . . . Society . . . is an association of individuals organized for mutual aid . . . to self-development.

The basic idea is J. S. Mill's, of variety in association. In *such* an association the organization of the varied nationalities of mankind seemed not impracticable.

The authorized editor of *The State* (ed. 1918) concludes:

> The success of such a League must depend upon the whole-hearted acceptance by its members of the obligations it imposes. The small states will find in it a source of protection that will free them from a fear of aggression and conquest and their acceptance of it may naturally be anticipated, but the large and powerful states will be equally benefited through the prevention of a repetition of another world war. . . . President Wilson has declared that the United States can never again be neutral in a great European war. The world has become too closely knit together for us to pursue in the future the policy of isolation. The hope of such a League and the possibility of its realization have been immeasurably advanced by the destruction of autocracy and the universal establishment of democracy.

Unfortunately clauses VIII and XIX of the Covenant, providing for general disarmament (so far indeed as might be "consistent with national safety") and the revision of treaties, were honoured in the disuse, thanks largely to the belief of the French Government that, deserted by its allies, including America and Britain, it must rely upon a large army and a "realistic policy." Pious promises about disarmament were, not unnaturally, treated by the French as lacking "realism" and indeed as having been entered upon under the influence of an "American idealism" that fired no gunpowder. No less pious organizations asserted the sanctity of questionable treaties. Democracy, to the genuine astonishment of many, did not long remain universal in a world where eminent statesmen still maintained that peace was "an alternative means of waging war." Dictatorship having thus arisen, the need was seen for a united front of nonconcession "against war and fascism"; and also, in a world of obstinately sovereign states, for the maintenance of the balance of power against the German threat.

2

The rising Nationalism of the nineteenth century, conceived in the fashion that reached articulate expression in Mazzini, was not necessarily inconsistent with the internationalism characteristic of the educated classes, the *clercs*, of preceding centuries or with the notion of international federation. It primarily protested against the domination of States, merely mechanically and administratively framed after the style described by Hobbes and practiced by Metternich in Vienna, over

Nations with a spiritual and cultural unity—a domination justified by strategy, 'reason of state' and considerations of power.

Joseph Mazzini (1805–1872) proclaimed as an Italian to Europe that tradition of self-conscious nationalism, as the bond uniting a people, which Carnot had fanned into fighting fury in France. But Mazzini—in the sense that Carnot, or Napoleon, or even Danton was not—was "a good European." He announced his ambition as being to substitute a "European Republican Apostolate" for a French Apostolate of Nationalism. In his essay on *Faith and the Future* (1835), he states his position.

> We believe, therefore, in the Holy Alliance of the *Peoples* as being the vastest formula of association possible in our epoch; in the liberty and equality of the peoples, without which no true association can exist—in nationality which is the conscience of the peoples, and which, by assigning to them their part in the work of association, their function in humanity, constitutes their mission upon earth, that is to say, their individuality; without which neither liberty nor equality are possible—in the Sacred Fatherland, cradle of nationality; altar and workshop of the individuals of which each people is composed.
>
> And since the law is one; since it governs alike the two aspects, internal and external, of the life of each being; the two modes—personal and relative—subjective and objective—of every existence—we hold the same creed with regard to each people, and the individuals of which it is composed, that we hold with regard to humanity, and the nations of which it is composed. As we believe in the association of the peoples, so do we believe in the association of the individuals of which each people is composed.

The views, however, of Nietzsche, as we have shown, as "a good European"—or (still more) the views of Otto von Bismarck and of Treitschke—were not morally those of Mazzini upon the meaning of Nationalism.* And German Hegelian thought, of the Right, expressed by Treitschke, was to have temporarily a greater influence upon the coming century, after 1870, than the Humanist-Éclaircissement thought, with its federal Europeanism and afterglow of the international Christian Republic, of Mazzini.

Further, the Hegelian Right-wing doctrine of the State as a self-sufficient moral entity or entelechy, reinforcing the earlier legal doctrine of the State as self-sufficient sovereign, subject to none, was itself reinforced by certain schools of sociologists. Whereas the main line of sociologists, following the indications given by the founder

* *Cf.* pp. 528, 537.

of the science, the positivist Comte,* but improving upon his methods, sought to found their generalizations upon empirical observations, two schools, not sharply distinct, sought to improve the appeal of, and meretriciously to strengthen, their science by introducing biological analogies.

The first school elaborated the doctrine of Social Organism. Their chief drawback was that they lacked any leader approaching the eminence of Hegel, with his neo-Hellenic doctrine of the State as moral "all" or entelechy. Such sociologists as René Worms and Paul von Lilienfeld compare the body physical and the body social and indicate that more than a mere analogy exists. Evolution has produced the human body. What, asks Schaeffle, in his *Structure and Life of the Social Body* (1875), shall come next in evolution, save the development of a real social organism of which the units are as incomplete apart from the whole as a blood corpuscle is apart from the animal body? Bluntschli, as we have shown,† freely made this appeal. Studies by Espiñas on insect life stressed the force of the argument. Psychologists such as McDougall, in his *Group Mind* (1930), did not commit themselves so far as this, but the psychologist W. H. R. Rivers wrote, in *Psychology and Politics*, 1923:

> It must be enough to say that modern knowledge concerning the living organism, both on the physiological and the psychological sides, teaches us that there is much less difference between society and organism than was formerly supposed and that the difference between them is rather to be sought in the degree of plasticity and capacity for modification.

The psychologists here support the somewhat complex attempts of the sociologist Émile Durkheim‡ to obliterate any radical distinction between the mental stuff of the individual and of society.

Biological students such as Morley Roberts, in his *Bio-politics* (1938), and Dendy, in his *Biological Foundations of Society* (1924), go further. The former has developed the organic concepts of Herbert Spencer at the expense of his individualism and concludes in favour of "a national social organic instinct" and a caste system as best for social health. The latter writes:

> Almost every organ that the body possesses has its counterpart in the social system, and as the organs are merely the means by which the functions of life are carried on, it follows that the life of the community as a whole forms a close parallel to that of the individual man.

* *Cf.* p. 745.
† *Cf.* p. 533.
‡ *Cf.* p. 749.

The theory, then, of Social Organism is born out of a conjunction of tendencies—the seventeenth-century lawyers' theory of Sovereignty, illustrated by the individualist Hobbes himself with an organic analogy, "Leviathan" and his vivid talk of "worms in the body politic"; *i.e.*, corporative guilds; the nineteenth-century German "Historical School" lawyers' theories (of a national spirit moulding law, in Savigny, and of a group life, in Gierke); the philosophic theory of the objective idealists, such as Hegel and Bosanquet, not to speak of Treitschke and Bluntschli, of a moral entelechy; the sociologists' theory of a group life or social entelechy, such as that of Schaeffle, or collective consciousness, as with Durkheim,* or even of a real body social, as with Worms; the social theories of exponents of the new and expanding sciences of biology and psychology.

The difficulties are that, if the doctrine is, as by some of its professors, to be taken quite literally then this social organism must have a physiological structure, and a chemical analysis such as have hitherto transcended empirical observation. At this point exponents usually run away into analogy, moralistic theories or spiritualistic hypotheses, just as the earlier exponents of Social Contract excused themselves from saying when precisely this contract took place. The danger is illustrated of following over-simple writers such as Bagehot, in his *Physics and Politics* (1869), and of accepting metaphors that may turn into dogma and prove merely a curse to thought. Such analogies are best left—as this one of social organism was left by Plato, Livy and St. Paul—in the realms of literary metaphor.

A second objection, which the French sociologist Fouillée vainly endeavours to overcome—and which has great practical importance—is: granted a social organism, *even as a convenient myth*, like that of the mystic body of Christ, does it include within its skin *only a particular society or all humanity*, as Samuel Butler and Bernard Shaw have suggested? If the former, then the question arises: *which*—society, State, Church, Commonwealth, Nation, township, family? Even in the case of States, men migrate from one to another; and also there was an historical time before that recent social form, the State, existed and probably there will be a time after it has gone. How then shall a man be a corpuscle in many different social organisms?

On the other hand, just as the theory of Social Contract enshrined a fundamental truth about the value of individual personality, so the

* "Représentations collectives," not necessarily social consciousness in the common sense but involving a distinctive theory of mind. *Vide Durkheim's Rules of Sociological Method* (trans. Solovay and Mueller, 1938) ed. by G. Catlin, preface.

theory of Social Organism enshrines a truth about the value of consciousness of the community—a value only in part natural to men and of which the appreciation can be greatly enhanced by myth and education. Some of the recent work of Mr. Gerald Heard (*Social Substance of Religion*, 1931) and of Mr. Aldous Huxley bear by implication upon this theme, especially in its psychological statement, to which also the important work of Professor MacIver (*Community*, 1929) is relevant.

A second sociological school, tending to look friendlily upon the social organism theory but actually only presuming the empiric cohesion of State or (especially) of national groups, perfused—as did Marx himself—their sociological doctrine with Darwinian theories. Even Spencer was not guiltless of this, just as (despite his militant individualism) he succeeded also in being a social organicist. "Natural rights in a social organism," Spencer wrote, "are as much out of place as a vacuum in a solid." Whereas, however, Marx thought of the age-long struggle for survival as taking place between individuals *or* classes (a significant transition, for which Marx can offer no consistent philosophical or psychological explanation beyond the common *interest* [of individuals]), the Austrian soldier and sociologist, Gustav Ratzenhofer, offered an alternative theory in his book, *The Essence and Aim of Politics* (1893). Ratzenhofer was himself a follower of L. Gumplowicz (1838–1909), of Jewish-Polish extraction, professor in the University of Graz, in Austria, the author of *Race and State* (1875).

Both writers operate with the concept of groups, and of group interests; of these groups as being engaged in struggle, in a fashion biologically beneficial; but they speak of race or nationality as formative of the primary groups in this *Rassen-Kampf* or race struggle. It is Marxism in one aspect—but with race substituted for class, and blood for profit and bread. Gumplowicz, following the French writer Gobineau, further developed the theme that the human race did not constitute *one* human species, but several, with no common term save on the sub-human level. Consolidation is by war. Class stratifications are to be explained in terms of national conquests. Although taken over by Oppenheimer and adapted so as to support Marxist conclusions, this statement is, sociologically and historically speaking, not warranted. This "Darwinian" school is guilty of selecting certain aspects of social life; injecting its own moral prepossessions *au* Treitschke; and then calling these the facts.

Georges Sorel (1847–1922), a student of Durkheim's, a syndicalist propagandist* rather than a sociologist, who was the centre of a certain

* *Cf.* pp. 653, 752.

cult in French "advanced" political circles, put forward a theory comparable, on the one side, to that of the Austrian Sociologists and, on the other, to the Revisionism of Eduard Bernstein.* Struggle was essential for achievement. To be more precise, the *notion* of struggle was essential. The fact, entered upon rashly, might end in defeat. But the notion, and the emotions it inspired, both served to stir the apathy of the proletariat and intimidated, by bluff, their opponents. The class struggle was then a myth; *but* it was an essential myth. To take Sorel's favourite specific instance, in his book *Réflexions sur la Violence* (1906–1907), the general strike of the workers might not, at any given time, be practicable but this specific myth of a strike, just as the circumambient sentiment of violence, must be maintained unless the movement for change was to relapse and sink into inanition. It is, very literally, "the red flag."

The core of Sorel's argument is the important one—symptomatic of the new century and of the debility of the liberal, rationalist tradition of the eighteenth century—that men are moved, *not* by their reason, but by their emotions. Sorel derived encouragement from the teachings of the popular French Jewish philosopher of instinct, Henri Bergson, in his thesis. Ideas moved men when presented, not as scientific truths, but as wish-fulfilling myths. Lenin represented an earlier tradition. He was, however, for obvious reasons, much admired by Sorel, although he repaid the compliment by calling Sorel "that muddle-head."

Sorel was indeed unstable and, in an intermediary phase, joined forces with the *Action française* group which, under the leadership of Maurras, continued the high conservative tradition of De Maistre and De Bonald. For Sorel violence was a sign of virility; and the increasing bourgeois distaste for violence, compared with their capitalist forbears, was a biological proof of decadence. It follows that belief in majorities and ballots, not force and bullets, is a sign of decadence. There must not be a dictatorship of timidity or incapacity. Class collaboration was the direct route to turning trade union leaders into satisfied bureaucrats and to the deadening of all that was vital in the upward revolutionary thrust of the classes below. Let the workers strike and the forces of public order would be found to be poltroon, protecting themselves behind "the chimaera of social peace."

Sorel quotes a remark by fascist Clemenceau, anti-religionist, later premier of France: "Any man or power, whose action is always that of concession, can only end by cutting himself out of existence. Who lives, resists; who does not resist lets himself be torn to bits fragment

* *Cf.* pp. 604–606.

by fragment." The English Liberals are for ever preaching concession so that the noble sentiments of great thinkers today seem to be simply another name for degradations of the sentiment of honour. Violence is good as raising classes to self-consciousness of their mission. Its manifestations must be "the brutal and clear expression of the struggle of classes." Its opponents are reactionaries.

> Not only can proletarian violence assure the future revolution but, further, it seems the only means of disposing the European nations, degenerate with humanitarianism, to recover their ancient energy. . . . *Thus proletarian violence has become an essential factor of Marxism.* Let us add, again, that it will have as effect, if it is suitably guided, *the suppression of parliamentary socialism* which will no longer be able to pass itself off as the master of the workers and the guardian of order.

The distinction will be noted between the Benthamite reformist doctrine of "pressure" towards peaceful social change, judged by rational utility and the greatest happiness test; the earlier Marxist doctrine of the inevitability of forcible revolution at the fit *economic* season; and the radically and permanently anti-peace, neo-Marxist Sorelian doctrine of the *psychological* stimulation of revolution because violence and war are good biological symptoms in the healthy struggle for survival, so that the myth of violence is to be preached, even when the fact is temporarily absent.

Vilfredo Pareto (1848–1923), to whom we shall revert,* *inter alia* journalistic associate of Sorel, in his *Trattato di Sociologia Generale* (1916) made certain contributions that are relevant here. Pareto had a disappointed aristocrat's contempt for the bourgeoisie and the speculators; for him such words as "humanitarian" and "liberal" were terms of abuse; he admired Machiavelli; and alleged that, like him, he was seeking solely to study how man actually did conduct himself in history. The general effect of his sociology was to devalue the importance of rational calculations in human transactions and to exalt the role played by the *irrational*, the "residues" or instincts and emotions, as distinct from rationalizations, in human life. Emotion dictates the end. Experimental reason is called in, sometimes, to discover the means. Psycho-analytical studies, by Freud and Adler, and certain modern literary trends, as, *e.g.*, in D. H. Lawrence, have given vogue to this approach which has been a strain in European thought since Byron and the Marquis de Sade.

* *Cf.* p. 751.

3

BENITO AMILCARE ANDREA MUSSOLINI (1883–), named after Benito Juarez, the Mexican revolutionist, and after two Romagnuole anarchists, was the son of Alessandro Mussolini, blacksmith, at one time deputy mayor of Predappio near Forlì, in the Romagna, first an anarchist member of the International, then a Marxian. For Alessandro, revolution was the means, anarchism the end; Marxism provided the doctrine of revolution. Benito described his father as "a good man and at times excessively altruistic," and his house as a place of asylum for all "who had accounts to settle with bourgeois justice."

Benito Mussolini, unlike Marx and Engels, Lenin or even Trotsky, let alone Strachey, was a genuine proletarian, accustomed in childhood to share in the common dish or to sleep on a grass mattress. However, his mother, a devout Catholic, was the village schoolmistress and, after the days had gone by when the future dictator could "crawl on the floor amid the legs of the little girls and fascinate them with his big black eyes" or even smoke a Tuscan cigar at the age of four, Mussolini could continue his home education at the high school of a near-by town. He graduated as a licensed elementary-school teacher in 1901. Although there was at one time talk of his "trying his fortune" in America, after a brief spell as a substitute teacher in Emilia—where he reported to his superiors that

> discipline obtained by coercive methods is not discipline. That sort of discipline represses the child's individuality and generates bad feelings . . .

he tried his fortune, along with thousands of other Italian emigrants, in Switzerland, arriving with 2 lire 10 centesimi in his pocket.

Here he acted as a mason's hodman and as butcher's boy, starved for a while, sometimes for twenty-six hours without food—on one occasion had "no metal in my pocket but a nickel medallion of Karl Marx." Rumour says that, leaping from a thicket, he snatched bread from a picnic party of affrighted Anglo-Saxon tourists. In July, 1902, he was arrested at Lausanne for vagrancy; but by November, an educated school-teacher, he was secretary of the Italian trade union of masons in that town. His brother, Arnaldo, at this time was also working as hodman and gardener in Switzerland. Angelica Balabanov, a woman of upper middle-class nurture and, later, first secretary of the Third International, met him in Lausanne, aided him and began an association which was to last on to the days, in 1914, when both were on the staff of *Avanti*, Mussolini as editor. However, by January, 1903, for

advocating a protest parade in connection with a carpenter's strike, he was again arrested and expelled. Returning to Zürich, in March, 1904, he presented a report referring to the objects of Marxian socialism,

whose aim is eminently subversive and revolutionary: to abolish private property, the first cause of economic inequality, and the State—the instruments of class oppression.

Mussolini later wrote:

Against the new theory of collaboration or compenetration of classes, there stands firm and unshaken, in its Marxist foundations, the theory of class struggle. . . . We do not deny that certain parts—the secondary ones—of the Marxist economic doctrine are weak, but the basic concepts of Marxism are still intact and criticism has tried in vain to contradict them.* . . . We say: "Wretched are those poor who do not know how to gain their kingdom on this earth." . . . Christ said: "Resign yourselves!" We say: "Rebel!" . . . The Congress maintains that the practice of the Catholic or any other faith is incompatible with socialist consistency, and it resolves upon the expulsion from the party of those members who follow religious practices or tolerate them in their children. . . . The freebooters of the piratical and sanguinary bourgeoisie of the West [the United States] are preparing a fresh murder. To retrieve the defeat undergone four years ago when Moyer, Haywood and Pettibone were snatched away from the homicidal noose of the law by the huge, spirited and tremendous protest that the entire working class of the land roared out, they have prepared another colossal blow to break the back of the proletarian organization. . . . It is Christianity which has given us this morbid mercy that is characteristic of hysterical women. [Marxist] Socialism instead is a rude, fierce thing, made up of contrasts and of violent elements. Socialism is war. And in a war, woe to the merciful! They will be vanquished.

During this early sojourn in Switzerland he also wrote his first pamphlet, entitled "That God Does Not Exist."

These are days of omnivorous reading. In 1908 Mussolini is writing an essay on Nietzsche, entitled "The Philosophy of Force"—this immediately after spending fifteen days in jail for threatening to strike a blackleg with a cane. Nietzsche is "the most extraordinary mind of the last quarter of the last century." Max Stirner's *Ego and His Own* is "the greatest poem that has ever been sung to the glory of man become god."† The writings of Sorel are also read, first applauded and later criticized; and Schaeffle (also author of *The Impossibility of Social*

* *Cf.* G. D. H. Cole, p. 586.

† *Cf.* p. 526.

Democracy) and Labriola seem to have had influence. Purely Sorelian is Mussolini's phrase:

> Humanity needs a *credo*. It is faith that moves mountains because it gives the illusion that mountains move. Illusion is perhaps the only reality of life.

It is not, therefore, remarkable that Mussolini writes: "Were it not for Sorel, I would not be what I am." At Lausanne, for a few months, Mussolini was a summer school student under Pareto, whom he later honoured, as dictator, by inviting him to become a Senator of the fascist Italian Senate. Meanwhile whether as editor of the local Forlì paper, entitled *The Class Struggle*, or as French tutor (or Professor—a title generally applied to him at this time, and linking him with the distinguished company of professorial dictators or rulers, Salazar of Portugal, Benes of Czechoslovakia, Wilson of America) or as political secretary of local organizations, he wages his war against moderate reformist socialism. Even political assassination is praised. The desperadoes in the "Battle of Sidney St.," London (1911), were not criminals, but anarchist heroes. "Are these volunteers of destruction the last violent men of the old world or the first violent men of the new world?" Over Mussolini's bed was nailed the motto *Viver liberi*—"Live free." Nietzsche wrote: "Live dangerously."

> A Russian proverb says that a man can call himself a man only after 6 years in high school, 4 in a university and 2 in prison.

That maxim Mussolini took for his own. His Genoese colleagues of his professorial period saluted him as one of those

> who do not enjoy excessive favour with the low-down Italian police. . . . We, who had him as a brother in arms in recent battles, hold dear the memory of his mild and refined character, his clear and lively intelligence.

The war found Mussolini an outstanding figure in that section, led by Lazzari, of the revolutionary or syndicalist socialists who had not been expelled from or left the Socialist Party Conference, dominated by the reformist section, in 1908. "Down with Party Unity" [with the reformists] had been his cry in 1910. In 1912, at Reggio Emilia, the revolutionary section had staged a triumphant return, on the issue of the Italo-Turkish war; expelled Bissolati, the reformist leader; taken over control of the Executive Committee and of *Avanti*, the (hitherto reformist) Party journal; and subordinated the still reformist Parliamentary Executive. Mussolini became editor (under control) of *Avanti*, "the Lenin of the Red [strike] week." When the war came his policy was one of absolute non-collaboration with the

Italian national government. But the mood of Mussolini was the antithesis of that of a pacifist. He saw himself in a new heroic role; and as editor (not under control) of the *Popolo d'Italia*—perhaps not unpersuaded by Marcel Cachin, the French Communist—a mysterious change took place and he took the lead in the demand for Italian intervention. In November, 1914, at Bologna he was expelled from the Party. But he was by now, whatever the Party might do, a figure of national importance. And the Hegelian Dialectic of History had taken a decisive change.

Fasci Siciliani, workers combined for their common advancement, were suppressed violently by Crespi, nineteenth-century Italian premier. The name was remembered. After Caporetto, in 1917, D'Annunzio proposed to Mussolini a *Fascio di Resistenza* to strengthen Italian morale and persistence in the policy of intervention. After the war, the shadow of Russia lay over the dreams of the manufacturers, while the Italian populace—furious with Wilson, the non-fulfilment of the Secret Treaties and the rise of prices—made the baiting and beating of soldiers and interventionists a pastime. With his "copy-book blotted" irreparably with the Socialists, reformist and revolutionary alike, Mussolini was found by Premier Giolitti, "old parliamentary hand," and by the manufacturers to have his utility, both he and his paid stalwarts. Giolitti allowed them arms. At least Mussolini was a master, almost by birthright, of the technique of the revolutionary braves of the Romagna.

As sure as the clouds were in the sky, the wind was certain to change from soldier-baiting to patriotism. Equally surely the men who were talking big about class war, without considered plans, would ride for a fall. The sit-down strikes and occupation of the factories by the workers in 1920, although peaceful, had alarmed thoroughly the men of property and, not less, the war profiteers. More to the point, the "inevitable class war" doctrine had reached its nemesis. At last the slothful middle class had decided to take the class war seriously—had accepted the thesis that what mattered was, not goodwill and compromise, but *interest* and *mass power*. Neither employers nor Marxists conducted themselves by any other principle. Despite Marx's arguments, the middle class had not disappeared. It had to take sides; and found itself to be, by definition, bourgeois. It decided to come down on the other side of the barricades to Karl Marx.

In August, 1921, Mussolini proposed a deal with his opponents and pacification; but his own followers would have none of it, just as in Russia, in 1917, Lenin was carried by his supporters beyond his immedi-

ate program. The Communist movement was patently already on an ebb; but the recollection of the incoming Communist tide did not disappear. Mussolini resigned the leadership of his movement, organized since 1919 ("Fascism is my son. . . . I will either correct him or make his life impossible"); then compromised with his followers, and resumed leadership, believing it better to live to fight another day. "Down with Parliament," the talkers and compromisers, was now the Blackshirt cry. In 1922, the country was economically on the upgrade. Don Sturzo, the Catholic pacifist priest, was gaining support for his Popular Party. However, in Machiavelli's *Prince*, years before, Mussolini had read: "All armed prophets have conquered, and the unarmed been destroyed." The army leaders, under Di Bono and others, were ready for a *coup d'état*. Failing D'Annunzio, they chose Mussolini as *duce*. On October 26, 1922, the Fascisti sent their ultimatum to Premier Facta and his government. The King hesitated; talked of abdication; got false information; surrendered. On the evening of the twenty-ninth, Mussolini left Milan by train for Rome to form his ministry. It was established without bloodshed. The marchers arrived in Rome by various routes and were reviewed without resistance. There was no civil war, although some four thousand were killed in the preceding clashes.

4

Machiavelli's work was the topic chosen for a brief thesis by Benito Mussolini when he was awarded, in 1924, an honorary doctorate at Bologna. Marx belonged to that "realistic" school, with its pessimistic emphasis on force, which derives through Hobbes from the Florentine. Mussolini returns frankly to the source. The thesis is entitled, *Comment of the Year 1924 on the "Prince" of Machiavelli*. Mussolini begins by quoting Machiavelli's dictum, "States are not maintained by words." No learning is interposed between the dictator and his master. The comment is that the nature of man, in individuals and peoples, does not change and that it warrants a profound pessimism. Machiavelli's references are "*to man without limitations of space or time.*" Régimes have never and can never rest solely on consent because the egoistic nature of man forbids it. So-called democracies are deceptions since the vital issues, those of peace and war, they do not submit to this "people" that is never defined. Machiavelli identifies Prince and State. People and State must never be put into antithesis, for the State alone is able to control that egoistic atomism of the members which a Liberalism, essentially anarchic, releases. This same emphasis on "realism" is

shown in Mussolini's comments: "My program . . . is action, not talk." "Fascism is based on reality; Bolshevism is based on theory." There is, nevertheless, a distinctive Fascist theory of what *is* "reality."

In the official statement of the Fascist philosophy, in the Italian Encyclopaedia, Mussolini refers to Sorel and to new ideas stirring in the Italian trade union movement before 1914, but explicitly states that, at the time of the creation of "the Fascist Revolutionary Party" (which he dates from January, 1915), "I had no specific doctrinal attitude in mind. . . . My own doctrine, even in this period, had always been a doctrine of action." Action, however, as Mussolini came to recognize involved a program and a program involved some guiding principles, although (as with Locke *after* the English Revolution) the development of these into a consistent philosophy could be left until later.

Actually, Mussolini's doctrine is a compound of two dissimilar parts: the revolutionary syndicalist ideas which he carried over from his Marxist days and which were part of the man and even of his family tradition, proclaimed by his father Alessandro, the once anarcho-internationalist; and new ideas of society, adjoined to these, coming from right-wing Hegelian and idealist sources. These latter are so far novel that Mussolini does not trust himself to outline them, in the statement referred to, the article entitled *Dottrina Fascista*. The uniting of them is left to another hand, that of Giovanni Gentile (1875–), well-known Italian idealist and professor in the University of Rome. Marxist violence comes to the aid and "toughening" of idealism.

The Mussolinian doctrine involves stress on this notion of achievement through force, struggle, danger; the rejection of pacifism; the violent rejection of liberalism and toleration; the organization of the masses through an *élite* or vanguard, leading and dominating a popular movement; and (for reasons of Mussolini's personal history) the rejection of internationalism, and the substitution of "nation," based on the middle class, for "class," meaning proletariat. All these doctrines, save the last, are compatible enough with Mussolini's revolutionary Marxist upbringing. The doctrine of Gentile is the traditional one, emphasizing the importance of the community as the matrix of the full moral life; and identifying this society with the coercive Modern State (or armed and organized Nation).

In the early, uncertain days after the March on Rome, when the Fascists formed a government in coalition with other elements, the notion of patriotic obligation is stressed.

With this limitation I believe that every one should have the fullest liberty; but all the same I believe that duties are more important than rights.

As the movement consolidates itself by power, it becomes possible to dispense with coalition, and to substitute the system of one-party government with plebiscites as demonstrations of popular support. The Catholic Popolari and the Free Masons, as well as Communists and Mussolini's Socialist opponents, are objects of attack, chiefly by bludgeonings and castor oil but, in cases of outstanding verbal provocation as by Matteotti, by a more drastic method of liquidation. It was necessary to "kill the sons of Brutus," as Machiavelli wrote. Napoleon had the Duc d'Enghien assassinated and Henry II liquidated St. Thomas à Becket. And, like St. Thomas, Matteotti could cry: "The idea that is in me will never die."

Fascismo is monolithic. . . .* When a group or party is in power [wrote Mussolini] it is under an obligation to fortify itself and to defend itself against all. . . . All the opposition newspapers have been suppressed, all the anti-Fascist parties have been dissolved. The special police already gives signal service. The political bureaux of secret investigations have been created. The Special Tribunal has been created; it functions in a remarkable fashion. . . . The State is like a violin in the hands of a *maestro.*

Along with Marxism [class war and determinant economic interest],

Fascism combats the whole complex system of democratic ideology and repudiates it, whether in its theoretical premises or in its practical application. Fascism denies that the majority, by the simple fact that it is a majority, can direct human society; it denies that numbers alone can govern by means of a periodical consultation, and it affirms the immutable, beneficial and fruitful inequality of mankind, which can never be permanently leveled through the mere operation of a mechanical process such as universal suffrage. The democratic régime may be defined as, from time to time, giving the people the illusion of sovereignty, while the real, effective sovereignty lies in the hands of other concealed and irresponsible forces [*cf.* the Marxist thesis].

Whether it be Gentile or Mussolini who is responsible for this passage, it was Mussolini himself, in March, 1923, who wrote:

Liberalism is not the last word; it does not represent any final and decisive formula in the art of government. . . . Today the most striking of post-war experiences, those that are taking place before our eyes, are marked by the defeat of liberalism. Events in Russia and in Italy demonstrate the possibility of governing altogether outside the ideology of liberalism and in a manner opposed to it. *Communism and Fascism have nothing to do with liberalism.* . . .

* *Cf.* p. 645.

The truth, apparent to every one whose eyes are not blinded by dogmatism, is that men are perhaps weary of Liberty. They have had a surfeit of it. Liberty is no longer the virgin, chaste and severe, fought for by the generations at the beginning of the last century. For the intrepid youths who present themselves at this new dawn of history, there are other words that move them more deeply, such as Order, Hierarchy, Discipline. . . . The goddess of Liberty is dead and her body is already putrescent.

Gentile [?] cites Ernest Renan, the French historian, man of letters and sceptic, as a witness, quoting him:

"*It is not necessary for the existence of reason that everybody should understand it.* And in any case, if such a decimation of truth were necessary, it could not be achieved in a low-class democracy, which seems as though it must of its very nature extinguish any kind of noble training. The principle that society exists solely through the well-being and the personal liberty of *all* the individuals of which it is composed does not appear to be conformable to the plans of nature, in whose workings the [human] race alone seems to be taken into consideration, and the individual sacrificed to it. It is greatly to be feared that the last stage of such a conception of democracy (though I must hasten to point out that the word 'democracy' may be interpreted in various ways) would end in a condition of society in which a degenerate herd would have no other preoccupation but the satisfaction of the lowest desires of common man." Thus Renan. Fascism denies, in democracy, the absurd conventional untruth of political equality dressed out in the garb of collective irresponsibility [sovereignty], and the myth of "happiness" and indefinite progress. But, if democracy may be conceived in diverse forms—that is to say, *taking democracy to mean a state of society in which the populace are not reduced to impotence in the State*—Fascism may write itself down as "an organized, centralized, and authoritative democracy." [*Cf.* 1919:"Let us get back to the individual."]

Civilization indeed is the converse of "liberty." "To Work: to Struggle: to Obey," here is the motto.

The stress alike upon struggle, assertion and organization as a social unit, means, as in Sparta, ethical approval of war and imperialism, and condemnation of international co-operative pacifism. The final plan of Fascism, now consolidated at home, is imperialist.

Fascism, the more it continues [writes Mussolini] and observes the future and the development of humanity quite apart from political considerations of the moment, believes neither in the possibility nor the utility of perpetual peace. It thus repudiates the doctrine of Pacifism—born of a renunciation of the struggle and an act of cowardice in the face of sacrifice. War alone brings up to its highest tension all human energy and puts the stamp of nobility upon the peoples who have the courage to meet it.

The self-sacrifice of inventor and physician is not enough. "The word 'peace' is worn out." There is "a bloody struggle of men in the light of the sun," and "blood alone moves the wheels of history." In connection with the Corfu incident, it is unnecessary to listen to "sonorous breathings of eloquent personages at Geneva."

It should be noted that, although Fascism makes play with the principle of nationality and even with talk of a Pelasgian race, fundamentally it is a Roman doctrine of the State, and not a doctrine of the Nation, which is emphasized. It is a governmental doctrine of objective authority; not (as German National Socialism) a sentimental or mystical doctrine of subjective blood feeling. Hence its inspiration is the restoration of a Roman Empire which, as before, has no strong race sense and can include many peoples, even Ethiopians.

The general political attitude of Fascism determines its constitutional attitude—its stress upon leadership, the State-will culminating in the personal will of the dictator, as for Machiavelli (in his *Prince;* not the *Discourses*) and for the Roman Empire.

> Representative systems belong rather to a mechanical than to a moral system. . . . No one can see where the people begins and where it ends. It is a purely abstract entity. . . . There is not and there never has been such a thing as government by consent . . . it has never existed and never will exist. The word sovereign as applied to the people is a tragic joke.

At an earlier stage, before the dissolution of Opposition Parties, the Acerbo law of 1923 enabled that party which held a plurality of votes to command a majority of seats in the Chamber of Deputies.

This attitude also determines Fascism's economic program. Mussolini's program of 1919 involved a capital levy; seizure of the property of religious associations; the allocation of the landed estates to the peasants; and participation of working men in the conduct of industry. These earlier points have been dropped and the latter have been modified in the course of the development of the theory of the Corporative State, with its obvious original affiliations with the theories of syndicalism and of the Soviets. In each case this theory is that of representation on an occupational basis, rather than on a territorial basis. In the Italian system, alongside corporations of the workers existing, at least in blue-prints, in each locality and region for the respective major industries, there are corresponding employers' corporations. On principle the government holds the balance in these dyarchies or dual controls; and the Minister of Corporations or Duce is the coping stone of the pyramid. The scheme has hitherto been only

partially applied in practice. The actual effect is that of severe governmental *control* in all essential matters; but not of any marked *re-allocation* of wealth or class position. Employers, however, can be compulsorily brought under regulation in consortia, while strikes are prohibited. It should be added that, as in Russia, the *élite* of party members has ascended to positions of responsibility across the barriers of economic or social classes. Unlike Russia, however, members of higher economic groups have not descended from positions of influence. Against this background must be put the theory of the Corporative State:

> There are collective interests; Fascism teaches the subordination of the interests of individuals and of categories of the people to the interests of the nation.

The ideal is to have "from forty to fifty thousand men functioning with the regularity of clockwork," and recalls the admiration for machine-like Chicago already noted in Russia.

Such a totalitarian political and economic scheme implies something little short of the Roman worship of the divine state as an emotion alone powerful enough to hold it together. The inspiration of the Marxist Messianic vision of a classless Utopia of economic contentment after struggle is precluded. Historically the tradition of the sacred state and the divine king has seldom been far in the background of the human mind since the Pharaohs. It promises stability of structure and the happiness of habitual adaptation. Fascism exalts this notion of the State society, the Leviathan. Mussolini uses phrases almost verbally reminiscent of Hegel and of Burke.*

> The State is the legal incarnation of the Nation. Political institutions are *efficient* in so far as national values find in them expression and protection. . . . The Nation is not merely the sum total of living individuals, still less the instrument of parties for their own ends, but *an organism* comprising the unlimited series of generations of which individuals are merely transient elements, it is the supreme synthesis of all the material and spiritual values of the race. . . . The State is a spiritual and moral fact . . . incorporates the political, juristic and economic organization and such an organization is in its birth and development a manifestation of the spirit. The State reaches beyond the short span of life of the individual. . . . One of the fundamental characteristics of the Fascist State is judicial penalization when moral duties are not fulfilled voluntarily. . . . Any other régime than ours may believe it useful to renounce the education of the young generations. In this field I am intractable. Education must be ours. Our children must be educated in

* *Cf.* p. 327. Also my *Anglo-Saxony and Its Tradition*, p. 209.

our religious faith, but we must round out this education; we need to give our youths a sense of virility and the power of conquest.

This control of education means that here, as with all other government functionaries, no teacher is tolerated in the higher schools unless he not only supports the régime but also has explicit party approval. One consequence of this regulation of education, culture and morals, was a clash with the Catholic Church which declared, through the mouth of Pius XI, such doctrine to be "a major heresy." "Nothing built on violence ever endures." In the Encyclical of 1931, Pius said:

You ask us, Venerable Brethren, in view of what has taken place, what is to be thought about the formula of an oath which even little boys and girls are obliged to take about executing without discussion orders from an authority which, as we have seen and experienced, can give orders against all truth and justice, and in disregard of the rights of the Church and its souls, which are already by their very nature sacred and inviolable, and have them swear by all their strength even to the shedding of blood. The cause of a revolution that snatches the youth from the Church and from Jesus Christ, and educates its own young forces to hate, to deeds of violence, and to irreverence . . . such an oath as it stands is unlawful.

There is here a conflict between militaristic, secular *ethos* and incompatible humanitarian, ecclesiastical *ethos*. Mussolini, in dealing with this issue, does not change from the position of Marxism which was earlier his own. In 1921 he declares his attitude.

Fascism is the strongest of all the heresies that strike at the doors of the churches. Tell the priests, who are whimpering old maids: Away with these temples that are doomed to destruction; for our triumphant heresy is destined to illuminate all brains and hearts.

A totalitarian society lives by a common culture usually expressed in a common myth. That myth itself needs focus in a personal symbol. In Russia the Trinity of Marx, Engels and Lenin has been supplemented by the living Stalin as standard bearer. In Italy, with no doctrine of economic determinism but a Caesarean tradition, this process has been carried further. Although the personal power of Mussolini is probably not greater than that of Stalin, itself far greater than that of the Czar, the system is the old imperial one, autocratic (subject to a *lex regia*), not ideocratic or monarcho-oligarchic. For this formal reason it bears a far closer resemblance than the Russian régime to that species of popular government which Aristotle defined under the name of tyranny. The Duce is not within the constitutional system but above it. Thus, on the release of Serrati by the judges, he declared

(in phraseology anticipatory of later words of General Goering, at the Reichstag trial of 1934 to Dimitrov):

> The next time an affair like this comes along I shall send a patrol of national militia to San Vittore to await the liberated prisoner. The judicial authorities may liberate him but I will shoot him. Each man to his functions.

The Fascist Decalogue put in general circulation in 1929, contains the clauses: "One thing should be dear to thee above all: the life of the Duce" and "Mussolini *ha sempre ragione*" ("Mussolini has always reason on his side"). A later version of 1931 omits these but begins:

> God and country first: all other affections come after these. He who is not ready to sacrifice body and soul to Italy and to serve Mussolini without question is unworthy to wear the blackshirt, symbol of Fascism.

Elsewhere Mussolini says:

> A man who cannot command his fortune but is run by it is in no different case from the nation of whom that is true; we could have done nothing here unless money patriotically subserved the health and higher weal of Italians instead of being a rover and adventurer of its own without reference to any such vital moral end . . . It is a sanity and relief to recall that the basic wealth all this time is still in farms, forests, orchards, quarries, livestock—and still more in the real men and women who work them. And these have been mercilessly milked—long enough—by the secondary, tertiary and non-essential activities. We have stopped all that. This regime shall revolve around *man-value*. . . . Cities dazzle and blind the people. But the primary forces of life are immortal: and too much complexity is the beginning of death. [*cf.* Goethe, in *Hermann and Dorothea*—but used by Goethe as an argument against politicians and war.] Palaces and pyramids vanish, but the farmer and his plough last forever. The number of goods needed to ensure a life of health and fair comfort—yes, and with intelligence, culture and piety—is not large, is indeed surprisingly small. The rest are artificial and gratuitous and begin all our problems—individual and national.

As in Russia the attainment of the common object has involved privation. In Russia Borodin explained to me that one must "take the long view." However, despite the starvation of the civil war and famine, the condition of the Russian worker and peasant, exceedingly low before the war, is now, in most fields, somewhat higher, although not up to the average western European workers' level of real wages. The condition of the Italian workman, by the pragmatic test of real wages, higher than the Russian before the war, has shown no similar increase. According to the International Labour Office indices, the

standard of real wages in 1930 in the United States stood at 190; in Britain at 100; in Germany at 73 and in Italy at 39. Italy is of course a country neither so self-sufficient nor so rich in raw materials as Russia. A remedy may perhaps be found in war. It was Polybius who wrote of the Roman war against North African Carthage: "The military men told the people that they would get important military benefits from it." Mussolini took as his motto that of the revolutionary, Louis Auguste Blanqui (1805–1881), intended in a proletarian sense: "Whoever has arms has bread." Mussolini, speaking in 1930 about Italy's capacity to fulfil what he regards as her national destiny, said:

> Fortunately the Italian people has no ambition to eat many times a day; and, having a modest level of life, feels less lack and suffering. . . .
>
> By the year 1950 Italy will be the only country of young people in Europe, while the rest of Europe will be wrinkled and decrepit. People will come from over the frontier to see the phenomenon of the blooming spring of the Italian people. . . . *Today I affirm that the idea, doctrine and spirit of Fascism are universal.* It is Italian in its particular institutions but it is universal in spirit; nor could it be otherwise, for spirit is universal by its very nature. . . . The State is resuming its right and its prestige as the sole and supreme interpreter of the needs of society.

In the *Dottrina* it is stated:

> *Fascism is now a completely individual thing, not only as a doctrine. And this means that today Fascism, exercising its own critical sense upon itself and upon others, has formed its own distinct and peculiar point of view,* to which it can refer and upon which, therefore, it can act in the face of all problems, practical or intellectual, which confront the world.

The notion of joint action on this basis with Germany, to restore a common European culture and discipline, and "*la grandezza nordico-romana,*" is developed by J. Evola, in his *Revolt against the Modern World* (1934).

Plato spoke of philosophers being kings. Today those who are Caesars—more than kings—thanks to the doctrine of the "fusion of theory and action," insist that they are also in very truth precisely philosophers—not pedants of the chair, but teachers. The problem, however, of the succession of the Caesars in the purple has not yet been solved nor (as the great historian of Rome, Professor Ferrero, points out) was it solved in the days of the ancient Roman Empire at the heart of whose administration was not order but, for so long, a chronic violence.

5

In 1923, Arthur Moeller van den Bruck (born 1876), Prussian on his father's side, Spanish-Dutch on his mother's, translator of Dostoevsky, convert of the Russian mystagogue Merezhkovsky, author of eight volumes on *The Germans*, wrote *Das dritte Reich*. In his youth a "good European," even meditating emigration to America, in full aesthetic revolt against Germany, as from 1908 he had become its champion as the fittest guardian of distinctive "European values." *Das dritte Reich* ("The Third Reich") is a product of the bitterness of the war and of the humiliation of the "Peace," published in the year of the occupation of the Ruhr. "Amid all the insanity we found a meaning in the thought that the German nation would now be driven into becoming politically minded: now, at last belatedly." The theme is the same as that to be found in the writings of another German of high cultivation, who also reacts against "good Europeanism" and the tradition of Voltaire and Goethe—Friedrich Sieburg, author of *Germany, My Country*. Van den Bruck's book outlines the totalitarian state which alone, in his view, Germany could afford: "Instead of government by party we offer the ideal of the third empire." The Munich *putsch* of Ludendorff and Hitler took place on Nov. 9, 1923; van den Bruck dedicated his book in December. In December, 1924, the National Socialist vote fell from the two millions of May to under one million. In 1925 van den Bruck committed suicide. His work was not determinant, but it was symptomatic. It was written against the same background of events and resentments as Oswald Spengler's anti-Semitic *Prussianism and Socialism* (1919) and *Decline of the West* (1922), and the more academic *True State* (1923) of Othmar Spann, professor in the University of Vienna, as well as Carl Schmitt's *Concept of Politics* (1933) and Friedrich Wieser's *Law of Power* (1926) with its discussion of the principle of leadership and of the conditions of dictatorship, and its appeal to youth.

This historic background, after the acceptance of Wilson's "Fourteen Points," is stated by van den Bruck:

> The German people ran a red flag up to their masthead—understanding it to be really a white one—and were amazed when the other ships did not follow with red streamers. Instead, they saw each proudly flying its national flag as a flag of victory. The German people had intended to do the wise thing. They had done the unwise one. Our scorn must be reserved for the intellectuals who had persuaded the German people to this folly. . . . Their Heinrich Mann had promised us "a world set free" and we were confronted with a "world en-

slaved." These intellectual blockheads still maintain the eternal validity of the principles: World Democracy, the League of Nations, International Arbitration, the End of War, the Reign of Peace. They will neither see nor hear nor confess that they bear the blame for the fact that all round us men are suffering under foreign domination, that four peace treaties have created a host of plundered, homeless men, while wars continue. *They still do not perceive the gulf between a "reason" which represents things as men would wish them, and an "understanding" which investigates and inexorably represents things as they are.* Revolution is self-help. . . . The Revolution will have significance only if it is able to suck the entire people into its vortex and from the underlying strata bring to the top burning, fluid forces to displace the cold, petrified upper stratum of our ruling classes.

Liberalism has taught the West to turn its principles into tactics to deceive the people. . . . *Liberalism was the ruin of Greece.* . . . It is the immemorial privilege of youth to fight for freedom. If liberalism spelt freedom, then our youth would not abandon it. But liberalism bears nowadays no relation to freedom. The liberal is a mediocre fellow. . . . Liberalism is only self-interest protectively coloured. . . . The liberal is an acquiescer by profession, he eats any dirt that is flung at him. . . . Liberalism and the Kaiser lost the war. . . . There is a revolt against the age of reason.

Moeller van den Bruck here, rather infelicitously, supports himself by quoting from Mephistopheles (*Faust* I, 2038):

> Grau, teuer Freund, ist alle Theorie
> Und grun des Lebens Goldner Baum.*

He continues:

Democracy is the expression of a people's self-respect—or it is no democracy at all . . . a democracy with a leader, not parliamentism. . . . Democracy may imply stoicism, republicanism and inexorable severity; or it may imply liberalism, parliamentary chatter and self-indulgence . . . In Germany the parliamentary system has no tradition. . . . The English always talked of freedom. . . . There was no hypocrisy in this: though it looked like hypocrisy. . . . Their trump card was their stupidity, and in their stupidity lay their highest shrewdness. . . . Only the fighting parties, whether of the Right or of the Left have any convictions. Only they have any driving power. . . .

It is intolerable that the nation should have permanently under its feet a proletariat that shares its speech, its history and its fate, without forming an integral part of it. . . . Industrial developments, by segregating the proletarian more and more, tended to weaken his sense of these values. It never occurred to Marx that it would have been the duty of Socialism to

* "All theory, my dear friend, is grey,
But green the golden tree of life."

strengthen the consciousness of these values instead of dissolving it. A homeless rationalist like Marx failed to realize how gravely he was impoverishing the people who believed in him. . . . It did not occur to him that perhaps national socialism might be a condition precedent of universal socialism; that men can only live if their nations live also. . . . He ignored the imponderabilia that were the foundations of their existence. . . . We believe that only *the nation as a whole* can set itself free.

Moeller van den Bruck, over against "reaction," sets up a theory of what he calls "*konservativ-revolutionär*" thought.

Revolutions are only interludes in history. . . . *Conservative thought is based not on force but on power . . . indwelling power. . . . No conservative seemed to remember that a conservative's function is to create values which are worth conserving.*

And he quotes the phrase: "The power of releasing more and more completely that in us which is eternal—is my conception of what is conservative." However Italian Fascism (1922) is dismissed briefly.

Italy has formulated a few powerful rhetorical maxims—now tinged with Roman, now with Machiavellian doctrine—and enforced them by a reign of terror. The chief of these maxims is the discipline of the state.

The stress upon "inwardness" in Germany places National Socialist thought in contrast to the *étatisme* (state-ism) and "external" imperialistic thought, typically Roman, of Italy. Much more stress is placed upon the notion of "race"—essentially alien to the Italian system. In Germany, however, although following Leo Frobenius' work, *Kulturkunde*, an historic role has been assigned to the sun-worshipping Aryan race with its swastika symbol and to the Nordic branch, the notion has not been a merely anthropological one of "pure race" but of "types" which, in effect, in turn becomes one of "cultures" and reassimilates with the Italian concept. In both cases praise has been given to "blood thinking," not solely as a national differential due to blood bond but in contrast to non-emotional, non-Bergsonian* rationalism, of the abstract, categorizing order.

Further, out of discussion of the relations of state, society and community, tracing from Savigny, Adam Müller (*Elements of Statecraft*, 1809) and Freiherr von Stein, from Tönnies (*Community and Society*, 1887), Gierke, Meinecke and Rathenau, such writers as Max Boehm (*Corporate Body and Community*) and Othmar Spann developed

* *Cf.* p. 712.

an economic corporative theory, specifically pointing out the superficial resemblance between their theory and that of Cole and the English Guild-socialists. Along with this goes, in German National Socialism, unlike Italian Fascism with its machine-worshipping "futurism," a deliberate turning away from the town and large-scale industry to the country and the crafts so far as is (later) consistent with the Four Years Plan of Goering. Not less important, in encouraging the appropriate climate of thought in Germany, must be reckoned such esoteric literary influences as that of Stefan Georg, with its cult of men-gods and such saviours.

Alfred Rosenberg (1893–), a Balt, who lived in Moscow as an architect during the Revolution and left Russia with the German armies, himself a follower of the Scottish *émigré*, Houston Stewart Chamberlain, biographer of Wagner and author of the *Foundations of the Nineteenth Century* (1899), has set forth his theory of National Socialism in his *Myth of the Twentieth Century* (1930). Rosenberg's position, however, in the Party is not beyond question and his right to act as official interpreter must be received with as much caution as that (until recently) of, *e.g.*, Bukharin, in Russia. Although, however, his attacks upon Christianity and especially Catholicism have fallen short of official approval, his general thesis can be taken as orthodox enough, and a commonplace of all totalitarian schemes, Fascist and Marxist, to wit, that sound ideology constitutes a coherent system in which deviations are not permissible by party members or opposition by anyone. As a certain National Socialist *Reichstadthalter* or governor expressed himself in Thuringia (June, 1931): "In future in Thuringia there must be one political faith only. The National Socialists claim the right to be intolerant in view of the necessity for uniform thinking and acting in the nation as a whole." Dr. Goebbels, the coauthor of the Nazi Revolution, expressed (March, 1934) the same, not novel, sentiment:

> National Socialism cannot be judged right in this and wrong in that respect. As we, the National Socialists, are convinced that we are right, we cannot tolerate any other in our neighbourhood who claims also to be right. We deny the right to criticize the government to those who have no share in the responsibility and the burden of work. . . .
>
> There is no freedom of the individual; there is only freedom of peoples, nations or races, for these are the only material and historical realities through which the life of the individual exists.

Dr. Goebbels has recently used almost verbally a phrase of Gentile's—itself so closely reminiscent of Dr. Bosanquet—where Gentile says:

Both fascism and nationalism regard the State as the foundation of all rights and the source of all values in the individuals composing it. For the one as for the other the State is not a consequence; it is a principle.

Normally, more over, National Socialist speakers are more cautious than Italian Fascists or Dr. Bosanquet in speaking of the State, as differentiated from the Nation.

Rosenberg, however, specifically protests against the application to German National Socialist ideology of the Italian epithet "totalitarian." This implies the predominance of the State and leads to the rise of a bureaucrat class, distinct from the people. The nineteenth century suffered because it had no common Platonic myth, that welded the community. "Bourgeois and Marxist Germany was mythless; it had no supreme value any longer in which it believed and for which it was ready to struggle" (*kämpfen*, as in *Klassen-kampf*, "class struggle" or "class war"*). "A healthy people does not recognize either Individualism or Universalism as a standard." As Rosenberg says, in his *Statement of the Idea* (1936),

It is imperative for all National Socialists to speak no more of the totalitarian State but of the integrity or totality of the National Socialist outlook, of the Party as the incarnation of this outlook and of the National Socialist State as an instrument for making secure the soul, spirit and blood of National Socialism as the mighty manifestation which has taken its rise in the Twentieth Century.

ADOLF HITLER (1889–), born at Braunau, in Austria, is the son of Alois Schicklgrüber or Hitler—the grandparents were not married, but Hitler was the father's name—first cobbler, then Austrian customs officer, employed on the Bavarian border, and Klara Poelzl, his wife, stated to be a Bohemian. Adolf may, therefore, be half Austrian and half Czech; and was, it is alleged, despised by his school friends as part Czech [Lengyel]† as well as by his German cousins for being an Austrian. As a boy (like Hobbes in the Age of Exploration) he lay poring over maps and incurred paternal rebuke for burning the lamp-oil late; or explored in the forests; or dreamed of being an abbot like the abbots of Lambach. His father's ambition was to make an official in turn of Adolf. He was, therefore, sent from elementary to secondary school. The death first of the father, then of the mother, put an end to these ambitions. From the secondary-school boy, hearing history lessons by

* *Cf.* p. 596.

† The non-German name, Poelzl, appears to bear out Lengyel's statement (*Hitler*, p. 3). Olden states that Klara Poelzl was German; but that Alois Hitler's first wife, from whom the family got its little patrimony, was Czech.

a dissatisfied Austrian in praise of Prussia, and enthralled by Wagner, Adolf Hitler had no option but to become a decorator's and house painter's apprentice. He, therefore, unlike Marx and Lenin and like Mussolini, can claim to be by practice and descent a genuine proletarian.

Before the age of twenty he came to Vienna with fifty gulden in his pocket, in 1909, and, after two rejections by the Vienna Academy of Art, he found work by day as a builder's labourer and recreation after dark reading by candle in a workman's doss-house, in a bed rented for the night. His future career, however, was different from the comparable one of Rousseau.

I drank my bottle of milk and ate my bit of bread in some corner and carefully studied my new surroundings or pondered my miserable lot. Yet I heard more than enough. It often seemed to me that they moved nearer to me, perhaps in order to draw me into the discussion. In any case what I heard was such as to make me extremely indignant. They rejected everything: the Nation, as an invention of the "capitalist classes"—how often had I to hear that phrase; the Fatherland, as an instrument of the bourgeoisie for the exploitation of the working class; the authority of the Law, as a means for the suppression of the proletariat; the Schools as a means for training slaves as well as slave-owners; religion, as a drug for people destined to be exploited; morals, as a sign of sheep-like stupidity, and so on. . . . On the building site the debate often became hot. I fought, and daily became better informed than my opponents on their own subjects, until one day they used the means which certainly overcomes reason most easily: terror—force. Some of the spokesmen of the other side compelled me to choose between leaving the building at once or being thrown off the scaffolding. As I was alone, resistance seemed to be hopeless, and, richer by my experience, I preferred to leave . . . At that time my mind struggled with the problem whether these men were still worthy to belong to a great nation. (*Mein Kampf*, 3d German ed., 1933, pp. 41–42.)*

After spells of unemployment and shortage of food, "scanty bread which never even sufficed to satisfy ordinary hunger"; of shovelling snow in the winter without an overcoat, getting free soup from the brethren at a monastery, Hitler was able, "terribly shy," to eke out a living colouring and selling postcards. Herr Olden describes his existence as "below the level of the proletariat"—whatever that may mean. He was nevertheless a frequenter of the public gallery in the

* Translation is given from the London edition, *My Struggle*. This is seriously abbreviated. For convenience of reference, the page is given of the German edition. A new New York, unabbreviated and unexpurgated authoritative translation (edited by Alvin Johnson) has now been published under the title, *Mein Kampf*.

Austrian Reichsrat (Parliament) and a reader of political pamphlets. Hitler writes in *Mein Kampf* (1924–1926; German ed., p. 55):

> Linz possessed very few Jews. Throughout the centuries they had become externally European and like other humans; in fact, I looked on them as Germans. The wrongness of this conception was not clear to me, since the only distinguishing mark I saw in them was their unfamiliar religion. As I thought they were persecuted on that account, my aversion to remarks in their disfavour almost grew into abhorrence (*fast zum Abscheu werden*). Of the existence of deliberate Jewish hostility I had no conception. Then I came to Vienna.

He continued, at his trial in 1923, "I left Vienna a convinced anti-Semite, a mortal enemy of the Marxian World-outlook and a pan-German"—this after two years of "the deepest internal conflicts." In brief, he had confounded Jewry and its national sentiments with the class war. He left Vienna, in 1913, "because it was not respectable enough" [Roberts]—"this great city . . . the embodiment of racial incest"—and came to German Munich, reporting himself for Austrian military service at Salzburg but being rejected. In August, 1914, he applied to serve as a volunteer in the Bavarian army, and served through to October 14, 1918, when he was gassed. Although he remained a lance-corporal to the end, he had forty-eight engagements and four decorations to his credit. In hospital, he heard rumours of the armistice and the revolution, of soldiers' soviets. A delegation came to the hospital and "he summoned enough courage" to talk to them "before he finally made up his mind" [Roberts]. "On November 9th, 1918, I resolved to become a politician."

Hitler returned to Munich and was allocated a post as education officer of the Bavarian Defence Regiment. He complains of "insults to the fighting troops" and of "dragging their cockades in the mud." The Bavarian Soviet Republic of Kurt Eisner and the "Menshevik" Communist Revolution of Ernst Toller, the dramatist, had ended with the assassination of the first by Count Arcos-Vally in February, 1919, and the collapse and temporary imprisonment of Toller, in April, 1919. Both were Jews. It is not unexpected, then, that Adolf Hitler should develop his favourite theme. To this were now added two further items that explain his rise to power: bitter resentment against "the dictate of Versailles" which had struck at Germany both in her land and by incredible economic demands* after starving her in blockade; and

* Perhaps not more incredible than the German terms dictated at Brest-Litovsk, although this gave liberty to certain nations.

obsession with "the Communist menace" which he associated with "the stab in the back," munition workers' strikes and the like, before the armistice.

In September, 1919, Adolf Hitler was enrolled as adherent "number 7" of the German Workers' Party, in Munich—alternatively the "Free Workers' Committee for a Good Peace," founded in 1915—of which Karl Harrer was leader and Alfred Rosenberg already a member. In October Hitler became propaganda officer; and Harrer, discontented, later resigned. On August 7, 1920, the National Socialist German Workers' Party (N.S.D.A.P.) was given its title and claimed 3,000 members, having already, on February 25, 1920, adopted its program in the Hofbräuhaus hall, in Munich.

The program, connected with the name of Feder and now perhaps to be regarded as only a pious aspiration, demanded the union of all Germans in a Gross-Deutschland; like rights with other nations in despite of the Treaties of Versailles and St. Germain; outlet for surplus population including colonies; full citizen rights for co-nationals only, others to be under laws governing resident aliens; the filling of posts from considerations of character and ability, not of Party; also:

All citizens shall be equal as regards rights and duties;

The activities of the individual must not clash with the interests of the whole—Common interest before Private interest;

Abolition of incomes unearned by work;

Abolition of "the thralldom of usury";

Personal enrichment in the war to be regarded as a crime;

Extensive development of provision for old age;

The creation and maintenance of a healthy middle class;

Powers to confiscate land illegally acquired;

Reconstruction of the educational curriculum in accordance with the requirements of practical life, "the development of the gifted children of poor parents, whatever their class or occupation, at the expense of the State";

Protection of mothers and infants, and obligatory gymnastics;

Formation of a national army;

Legal warfare against dissemination of lies in the press, and licensing and censorship of vernacular press;

Liberty for religious denominations so far as these are not a danger to the moral feelings of the German race;

A strong control power of the Reich, a politically centralized Parliament and the formation of Chambers of corporations for the different occupations.

In 1920 Communist occupations of the factories took place in Saxony, under Max Hoelz, while Hungary had seen a Communist

régime until 1919 under Bela Kun, also Jewish. Simultaneously "strong-arm" groups multiplied, characterized by the spirit of the men behind the Kapp *putsch* of 1920 and of the Feme assassins of Rathenau and Erzberger. In Coburg, Röhm captained such a group. In Bavaria a march against Berlin was the talk of the cafés and the Pan-German Union was busy.

It was at this time that a distinguished sojourner in Bavaria, General Ludendorff, allied himself with the head of the young National Socialist Party, Adolf Hitler, who understood both propaganda and the love of revivalism of the Bavarian people. On November 8, 1923, Hitler and Goering decided to appoint the quite comfortably installed nationalist administrators of Bavaria, at the point of the pistol in the Bürgerbräuhaus, to the post of revolutionary dictators. The administrators considered for twenty-four hours, and decided to decline the offer with bullets. Hitler and Ludendorff were arrested. Hitler was taxed with thinking himself "the German Mussolini" and was subjected to ten months political imprisonment, during which time he wrote the first part of *Mein Kampf*. The Party was dissolved. But Hitler was by now an historical figure, a national force. And, as he comments, "the major upheavals on the planet would have been unthinkable had their driving forces been only the civil virtues of law and order instead of fanatical and even hysterical passions."

In 1925 the Party was reconstituted. On January 30, 1933, Adolf Hitler was appointed by President von Hindenburg Reichschancellor. The Nationalists believed that they had him in office as their hostage. General von Schleicher, in his second term, had ventured to attack the pockets of the East Prussian junkers; moreover at critical moments he fell ill with gallstone. Herr von Papen in alliance with Hugenberg, the great industrialist, hoped both to trump his rival who had ousted him, as well as Brüning, and to attract safe popularity by alliance with the noisy National Socialists and their leader whom he patronized. Moreover the fortunes of this party were declining and, to von Papen, too great a diminution of this counterweight to the Social Democrats might be inconvenient. Only this stands out, that of 36 million voters, 24 million were hostile to Brüning's efforts to steer the ship of state according to bourgeois principles; and that the Social Democrats, who were constitutionalist enough, were too great formalists to support General von Schleicher, ruling with extraordinary powers, at the critical moment—although he was friendly to them.

Von Papen reckoned without Goering in Prussia; without the Reichstag fire; without his own unpopularity and the factions among

the Prussian ruling classes. Only Hitler could be trusted to bring the people to their side—they had to admit to their own lack of grip. The tradition of Frederick the Great no longer held—or rather too much bureaucracy had killed political initiative. Moreover, although (as Knickerbocker shows) the Communist capacity for effective revolutionary action—"the Communist menace"—had, as in Italy, grown less with the passage of time, the Communist vote, *e.g.*, in Berlin, had risen concurrently with the National Socialist at the expense of the constitutionalist parties. Hitler on every placard announced himself as saviour of Germany from a Communist "Armed Uprising" planned for April.

It was the little Austrian corporal who, by taking the Chancellorship, held von Papen and Hugenberg at his disposal. By 1938 he was to refound, as President and Führer, Charlemagne's Roman Empire —"of the German People"—in imperial Vienna; and to put his hands on the regalia of the Caesars. As Charlemagne claimed direct continuity as sixty-eighth Augustus from Octavian, so Adolf could pose as successor to Francis II of Habsburg, last Roman Emperor. He had accomplished this as leader of a movement which—more than in the case of either Italy or Russia with their theologies—was a new religion, a political religion of the sword, a new Islam with himself as its Mohammed.

In *Mein Kampf* Hitler explains his technique (he is, however, speaking of war propaganda as practised, *e.g.*, by Northcliffe and Lloyd George):

> All propaganda should be popular and should adapt its intellectual level to the receptive ability of the least intellectual of those whom it is desired to address. Thus it must sink its mental elevation deeper in proportion to the numbers of the mass whom it has to grip. If it is, as it is with propaganda for carrying through a war, a matter of gathering a whole nation within its circle of influence, there cannot be enough attention paid to avoidance of too high a level of intellectuality. The receptive power of the masses is very limited, their understanding small; on the other hand, they have a great power of forgetting. This being so, all effective propaganda must be confined to a few points (*Mein Kampf*, 3d ed., p. 97.)

In this connection his comment on the Parliamentary system has relevance:

> Is the leading statesman's task to consist not so much in producing a creative thought or plan as in the art with which he makes *the genius of his proposal* comprehensible to a flock of silly sheep for the purpose of imploring

their final consent? Must it be the criterion of a statesman that he must be strong in the art of persuasion as in that of statesmanlike skill in the selection of great lines of conduct or decision? (p. 86.) . . . Organization must be an embodiment of the endeavour to place the brains over the multitude and to subjugate the multitude to the brains. Thus organization may not prevent the brains from emerging from the multitude, but it must, on the contrary, by its own conscious action, make it in the highest degree possible and facilitate it. The hard fight for life, above all things, causes the brains to emerge. (p. 397.)

The dangers of this *Führer-princip* or Leadership principle will be seen in the gloss of Goering, which has gone beyond even the vision of Stalin. Goering says, in *Germany Reborn:*—

We Nazis believe that, in political affairs, Adolf Hitler is infallible, just as the Roman Catholic believes that, in religious matters, the Pope is infallible. . . . His will is my law. . . . The laws of Nature demand that authority should be exercised from above downwards and responsibility from below upwards . . . the leader at the top is responsible to the people as a whole and to their future.

Herr Hans Kerrl writes:

As Christ in his twelve disciples raised a stock fortified unto martyrdom, whose belief shattered the great Roman Empire, even so in Germany we are experiencing the same thing . . . Adolf Hitler is the true Holy Ghost.

The philosophy of Benevolent Despotism returns—or of Plato's "Most Kingly Man"—with stress, however, not on efficiency in the governmental art or upon fatherhood of the nation, but upon leadership endorsed by plebiscitary acclamation. Hitlerism shows itself throughout strongly Wagnerian in its poses. Hitler himself is the new Siegfried, if not the new Charlemagne. However, in criticizing Monarchy, Hitler says that one of its evils was the inculcation of the belief that "as a matter of course, government was from above." If this government was, then, unconscientious, "passive obedience and childlike faith were the worst evils imaginable."

What is the scheme of society which this propaganda aims to realize?

Every general world theory, whether religious or political in nature—it is sometimes hard to say where one begins and the other ends—fights not so much negatively to destroy the opposing world of ideas as positively to establish its own. . . . *Every attempt to combat a world theory by means of force comes to grief in the end so long as the struggle fails to take the form of aggression in favour of a new intellectual conception.* It is only when two world theories are wrestling on equal terms that brute force, persistent and ruthless, can

bring about a decision by arms in favour of the side which it supports (pp. 188–189). [Bismarck had "lacked the platform of a new world theory."] . . . A *world-theory* is intolerant and is not content with being one Party among a number of other Parties . . . Political Parties are always ready to compromise; world theories never are (Mein Kampf, pp. 506–507).

That was a contention with which no Marxist could well quarrel. The same dosage of intolerance that they had served out was being served out to them again. As Hitler added reflectively: "Much may be learned from the Roman Catholic Church."

The State has nothing to do with any definite economic conception or economic development. It is not an assembly of commercial negotiators during a period with defined limits for the purpose of carrying out economic objects, but the organization of a community, *homogeneous in nature and feeling*, for the better furtherance and maintenance of their type, and the fulfilment of the destiny marked out for them by Providence. This and nothing else is the object and significance of a State (p. 164) . . . The State's duty is merely to make use of its organizing strength for the purpose of promoting the nation's free development (p. 436).

Adolf Hitler continues:

It should not be forgotten, as a general rule, that *it is not the highest aim of man's existence to maintain a State or government, but to conserve its national character. . . . Human rights are above State rights* (pp. 104–105).

It is here, however, that the National Socialist propaganda notion of truth comes into play; its over-compensatory objection to reality and objective truth (which Hitler interestingly suggests that only the pacifists have); its notion of "our truth—truth for us" as a nation, making for our national (not class) success; its anti-humanism.

The national State will look upon science as a means for increasing national pride. Not only world-history, but also the history of civilization, must be taught from this point of view. An inventor should appear great not merely as an inventor, but even more so as a fellow countryman (p. 473) . . . For us the State in itself is but a form, whereas the essential is that which it includes, namely the nation, the people [*das Volk*] (p. 645) . . . *The right to personal freedom comes second in importance to the duty of maintaining the race.*

The race will only continue if there is "understanding and ruthless application of age-old natural laws." Unfortunately, the German people lack "that herd-like unity, with which other peoples [such as the British] are blessed."

All that we admire on this earth—science, art, technical skill and invention —is the creative product of only a small number of nations, and originally, perhaps, of one single race. *All this culture* depends on them for its very existence. If they are ruined, they carry with them all the beauty of this earth into the grave (p. 316).

For class, then, Adolf Hitler substitutes the idea of race or nation. This determines his attitude towards, on the one side, economic improvement through class war and, on the other, Trade Unionism.

I am convinced that the Trade Unions cannot possibly be dispensed with. In fact, they are among the most important institutions in the economic life of the nation. It (the Union) is not an instrument of class-war, but one for the defence and representation of the workers. . . . The primary object of the Trades Union system is not to fight in any war between classes, but Marxism forged it into an instrument for its own class-war.

What then is to be the relation of nations? Here Hitler's answers are in terms of the particular. The pacifist humane idea may be perhaps a good one ultimately when "the human (Mensch) at the top"—the Emperor or Aryan—"has first subdued the world." For the present free nations must live for their own responsibilities. The test question is a single one: "Will it help our nation now or in the future or will it injure it?"

Diplomacy has to see to it that a nation does not perish heroically but maintains itself in a practical way. . . .

Our object must be to bring our territory into harmony with the members of our population. *The demand for the restoration of the frontiers of* 1914 *is foolish.* . . . It is the duty of us National Socialists to cling steadfastly to our aims in foreign policy, and these are to assure to the German nation the territory which is due to it on this earth.

Colonies, demanded in the original program, are not of primary importance. The British had better retain India. "We turn our eyes eastwards." So far as continuous territory is concerned specifically this seems to mean—as well as Gross-Deutschland—the Baltic lands, Courland and the neighbouring area—"along the road of our former knights of the Teutonic Order." "There would never have been a world war" if Germany, under the Kaiser, had pressed for an alliance with England. "No sacrifice would have been too great in order to gain England's alliance," including renunciation of colonies and refraining from interfering with trade. Many of the European states, such as Holland and unlike Germany, have only their apexes in Europe. The base of these pyramids is outside. This is their weakness. The great

strength of the United States is that for which Germany should aim—its self-sufficient, concentrated block of territory. How then about Britain?

> Even Britain is no proof to the contrary, for we are apt to forget the true nature of the Anglo-Saxon world in its relation to the British Empire. If only on account of her community of language and culture with the American Union, England cannot be compared with any other State in Europe.

Under the stress of the German national effort, the standard of living has not risen since 1931, although major public works and such social facilities have been undertaken, as they were also in the inflation years. This failure to provide an economy of abundance is explained in terms of this effort; of the Dawes Plan; and because "international capital . . . spares no pains to turn the peace into a Hell." Nor has the concept of the national community led by the Party been undisturbed by "liquidations" whether of the immoral Röhm and his friends, on June 30, 1934, or of more innocuous citizens. As touching the former, Benito Mussolini commented that there are "exceptional occasions when the individual servant of revolution has the right to administer justice with his trigger finger."

6

In France and Britain, as well as Southeastern Europe, Fascist movements have sprung up, not without significance, but of no especial political importance. The operative conditions have hitherto been absent. These are: nationalist reaction, especially in the class with small savings, against a growing Marxian Communism and a sense of outrage (by "Peace terms" or otherwise) to the self-respect of the national community. The first condition itself requires political mass excitement; the development of overt class war in the name of liberty or peace; and the broken morale, division or loss of vitality, of decisive conservative groups, often due to failure or inefficiency in war.

In Britain Sir Oswald Mosley (1896–), late Socialist Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, founded his British Union, the nature of which he has explained in *The Greater Britain* (1932) and *To-Morrow We Live* (1938). It is interesting to note, as part of the reaction against nineteenth-century Intellectualism and the triumph of Sorel and Bergson, that Adolf Hitler speaks of being, in policy, "a somnambulist," and Benito Mussolini says: "I resemble the animals, I scent the times, I follow my instinct and I never make a mistake." So Sir Oswald says: "I have had enough of the people who think. I am going to get

the people who feel." What matters is *mythos*, not *logos;* or perhaps the *logos* is itself an instinctive destiny, not a co-ordinative reason. While using the customary Marxist charges against "financial democracy" or bourgeois democracy, with the control of the so-called "free press" by "money lords," Mosley states that "liberty to the mass of people means primarily economic liberty . . . the effective power of action in government is the prerequisite of individual freedom."

> Nothing but the rationalized State can hope to overcome the problem created by rationalized industry . . . the [beginning of liberty is the end of economic chaos . . . (there are)] those who have erected liberty into the negation of action . . . somebody must be trusted or nothing will ever be done.

The scheme outlined is that of the corporative state with employers and trade union leaders as "joint directors of national enterprise under the general guidance of corporative government." Foreign policy centres on the maxim "Mind Britain's business"—"to interfere in no quarrels which are not our concern"—coupled with the declaration that "we will give leadership and make contribution to secure the material and spiritual union of Europe." The movement, however, is at present hamstrung by British national considerations of foreign policy and international alliances to check the predominance of Germany in Middle Europe. Nationalist theory is counterchecked by national practice, which favours the opposite side, just as militant Catholicism was held in check by the pro-Protestant policy of Cardinal Richelieu and militant Protestantism by the anti-Dutch alliances of Oliver Cromwell.

In several countries movements exist, not accurately called Fascist, which are merely continuations of the system of alternating tyrannous dictatorships by bloody *coups d'état* such as are endemic in these lands. In other countries movements not explicitly Fascist have prohibited the reading of literature that is "out of sympathy with the totalitarian idea." In Greece an instruction from the Ministry of Education to schools suggested, on these grounds, that the Funeral Speech of Pericles be not read, but passages from Plato substituted. No longer the great words of Pericles should be taught:

> For our government is not copied from those of our neighbours. We are an example to them rather than they to us. . . . Our laws secure equal justice for all in their private disputes, and our public opinion welcomes and honours talent in every branch of achievement, not for any sectional reason but on grounds of excellence alone. And as we give free play to all in our public life,

so we carry the same spirit into our daily relations with one another. We have no black looks or angry words for our neighbour if he enjoys himself in his own way, and we abstain from the little acts of churlishness which, though they leave no mark, yet cause annoyance to whoso notes them. Open and friendly in our private intercourse, in our public acts we keep strictly within the control of law.

This would appear to be an unhappy aberration by one of the greatest of nations (although Pericles did not escape persecution from the Athenians of his own day and was clearly regarded by Thucydides as dangerous). It is less comprehensible than the interdiction in Japan of the circulation of J. S. Mill's *On Liberty*. We have traced history from Confucius to confusion. As at the end of the Roman Empire, in the days of Theodoric, the Ostrogoth, we await a Boëthius to write a *Consolation of Philosophy*. An eminent biologist, J. B. S. Haldane, advises us to build under London about 1000 miles of 7-foot tunnel, in order that, in these last times, man may return to those caverns whence, fearful, he emerged as a cave-haunting ape. It is arguable that we have completed the cycle and live in the decline of the European Age when Middle European and Western European will destroy each other, in the struggle between Reds and Blacks, thesis and resultant antithesis; and when only Chinese man and Anglo-Saxon man in his American branch will survive with power.

The reason for Japanese action is explained by exponents of that piety towards the sacred ancestors and divine king which is the distinctive and immemorial ideology of Japan. In an exposition of Nipponese National Principles (1937) Chigaku Tanaka says:

> The Empire of Nippon is not a baseless existence but one that is never to change, with its eternal life and far-off origin.

Having explained the sacred and mystic significance of the ideogram or hieroglyph which stands for "Emperor" ("Tenno"), he continues:

> For the purpose of unifying easterly civilization by means of heavenly, which is "the Way of the Prince" [*i.e.*, that the prince rules and the people obey] created by the gods, the administering of the state begun by the Imperial ancestors has been succeeded to, and by the Emperor Jimmu's (600 B.C.) declaration, advocacy and practice, "the Great Way of the Tenno of the Empire of Nippon" was established upon the earth for the first time. In reality it is our mission to guide and induce every country in the world to become a "state ruled by the Way of the Prince." Now our neighbour state, Manchoukuo, has taken the lead in establishing the state in "the Way of the Prince" as its basis, and for Nippon it is one of the realizations of our ideal

in one corner of the globe . . . and then be expanded to the various countries both in the East and the West, and change the whole world into a great paradise governed by "the Way of the Prince" ("Michi") . . . to establish in the world absolute peace . . . Humanity with the same goodness, the world one family; it is the state called the Great Nipponese Empire that is the embodied form, not a theoretical one, of this principle. . . .

However well we may explain, our Kokutai [loyalty] will not appear unless Kokutai really proves serviceable by revealing itself. Originally, the Kokutai of Nipon is an inherited thing which has to be practised, in silence but not by reasoning, by all the successive sacred sovereigns beginning with the Sun-goddess. . . . The teachings of Jesus Christ have a right aim but they have developed only as a religion. . . . The Emperor of Nippon alone is such a personage of virtue as is unique, really existing and unchangeable for good with his origin in Heaven; "the Emperor is a God or Morality itself" and is at the same time the representative of distributing the blessings of the universe: again "the Emperor is nothing but the nation" and including its people, and as the centre source of morality, favour, throne, authority and power in the universe, is a real existence that is as incomparably solemn as *Michi* is. . . . This is the unique country, Nippon.

We hear the authentic tones of the writings of the Egyptians, the land of the Sacred Pharaohs, "beloved of Ptah and Isis, ever living, lords of diadems." There is no political theory save a worship. We are back in the beginning of the age.

The gain yet lies in the establishment through the centuries of the Humanist tradition by reiteration of its principles. It so stands, a rock of the ages, against which the waves beat. At this moment, historically, alike the northern Fascism of Germany and the Marx-Leninism of Russia, with their fanatic ideologies, batter against it. But, since human civilization will not perish, this tide must subside and the old civilized values be re-recognized. The dialectic waves ascending will by antithesis recede, doubtless leaving some new synthetic alluvial deposit of ideas and achievements behind them, as well as flotsam and jetsam of destruction.

The assailing seas yet run against each other. Catholicism, liberalism, social democracy are alike attacked, as are reason, scientific objectivity and natural neighbourly trust. But this common repudiation is nothing in force compared with the hatred between totalitarian Fascism and totalitarian Marxism. The older force, on the defensive, looks to its own protection and that of Stalin's frontiers. As Voigt says, in *Unto Caesar*, "Nothing could suit Russia better than an Anglo-German war. Her conception of the 'indivisible peace' is one that conceals the wish to transfer the potential battlefields of Europe from

the east to the west." Diplomacy supplements dialectic. Against this must be set the determination to be dominated by neither of the military totalitarianisms, red or black. That requires a cognizance of the proven values and a spiritual integrity resting on that knowledge.

READING

Benito Mussolini: *The Political and Social Doctrine of Fascism.*

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE

* Adolf Hitler: *Mein Kampf*, trans. Dr. Alvin Johnson and others, New York, 1939; trans. Dr. J. Murphy, London, 1939. Subtitle, *My Struggle.*

Benito Mussolini: *Autobiography*, foreword by Richard Washburn Childs, 1928.

H. A. Heinz: *Germany's Hitler*, 1934 (laudatory).

C. B. Hoover: *Germany Enters the Third Reich*, 1933 (painstakingly impartial).

H. R. Knickerbocker: *Germany, Fascist or Soviet*, 1932 (by the correspondent of the *Philadelphia Public Ledger*).

G. Megaro: *Mussolini in the Making*, 1938 (critical).

* A. Moeller van den Bruck: *Germany's Third Empire*, trans. Lorimer, 1934.

E. A. Mowrer: *Germany Puts the Clock Back*, 1933 (critical, by the correspondent of the Chicago *Daily News*).

S. Roberts: *The House That Hitler Built*, 1937 (critical).

G. Seldes *Sawdust Caesar*, 1935 (in America) (critical).

(Since the preceding words were written many things have happened singularly to confirm the prophecy here made. Stalin the menace has become Stalin the friend and then has become Stalin the menace again. The issue now is not between three but between two. Nevertheless the shape of a future more permanent order, socially at home and internationally throughout the world, ever increasingly clearly emerges.

Following the example of Goethe, men speak again of being world citizens. The world government and "cosmopolitical institution," adumbrated as categorical imperative by Immanuel Kant, has been sketched in more detail in projects for federal union by Lionel Curtis and Clarence Streit, Lords Lothian and Beveridge, and in the resolutions, incited by the energy of Mr. Humber, passed by the legislatures of many States of the American Union. While Mr. F. D. Roosevelt gave cold comfort to Streit, he sacrificed much to establish a United Nations, a novel but scarcely progressive version of the old League of Nations, which exalted further

the influence of the Great Powers. To this Mr. Roosevelt, mindful of the tragic example of Wilson, wooed the United States Senate and the Union of the Socialist Soviet Republics by the compromise of a veto, all too reminiscent of the wrecking *liberum veto* of the old Polish Constitution. This project, announced hopefully at San Francisco despite the ominous bargainings of Yalta and Dumbarton Oaks, having led to the disillusionment that could have been expected, regional schemes for maintaining peace have come to the fore. The scheme of European Union of Victor Hugo and Coudenhove-Kalergi, Briand and Benes was revived. So was Rhodes's dream of an Anglo-American Union renewed by Streit (1941), Wendell Willkie (1941) and also by the present writer (1938).* Mr. Winston Churchill, later backed in part by Mr. Bevin, advocated both projects, which now assume the shape of Western Union and Atlantic Union. Admittedly these are but half-way houses to a union of one world, which many think will be more democratic if federal, while others uphold the working model of the British Commonwealth.

Meanwhile, inspired by the example of Tolstoi, Ruskin and Christian and Hindu sacred writ, Mahatma Gandhi advocated non-violent non-co-operation. challenging the very basic concept and psychology of Marxism. It is true that he told Indian villagers that those who could not understand the doctrine must fight, and he told this writer that he was not opposed to a strictly impartial international police force which indeed, under certain circumstances, might be necessary. But his fundamental stress—turning away from concern about environment remoulding character, as Hume said, through political institutions and the Leviathan social order—was with the heart of man, a new psychological analysis and a new psychological discipline in co-operation, not domination, based on religious devotion to truth—*satyagraha*. We return thus at the end to the early concept of "a Spiritual Power." *Addendum*, 1949).

*Clarence Streit; *Union Now with Britain* (1941), cf. G. Catlin, *Anglo-Saxony and its Tradition*, 1938, also *One Anglo-American Nation*, 1941.

Part IV

Chapter XXII

Conclusion and Prospect

1

Is Civilization today in decadence before an oncoming Dark Age? Or is it at some turn in the spiral cycle? The political philosophers have now become theologians and necromancers, reiterating incantations. What have the men of political science and the sociologists, who lay claim to objectivity, to say? Is there hope here that we shall learn the secrets of control of man's civilization by man?

Auguste Comte (1798–1857), secretary and, according to some, exploiter of the ideas of Saint-Simon, is the father of Sociology. He himself described Saint-Simon as "a depraved charlatan" and insisted upon his own spiritual affiliation to Condorcet. Few parents could have been more inappropriate than Comte for the nascent study. The background of his sociology is a philosophy of history which, having an encyclopaedic if a priori mind, he developed at length in his *Positive Philosophy*. According to Comte's thesis the world's intellectual history has progressed through three phases: the theological or animistic, when men detected in its unrolling the finger of supernatural personal activity; the metaphysical, when for this personal activity of gods, as motive force, was substituted some abstract scheme of ideas; and the positive, inaugurated by himself, when men, aided by the natural sciences, would be content to observe social events, detect the laws of social statics and social dynamics and build up the social sciences.

Comte, however, was not so much unable to forget the unessential, although the philosophy of history in the "Social Dynamics" of his *Positive Polity* (1851–1854) is immensely prolix, as in error in his conception of the essential. Whereas the conclusion of his philosophy was the abandonment of the supernatural for the natural sciences, his manner was not only a priorist but revivalist. Over against the supernatural he put supermen, the heroes of mankind, and invited men to hero-worship. The subtitle of his *Positive Polity* announced it as "instituting the religion of humanity." Nor is it correct to speak of

two Comtes, the positivist and the prophet. His commentator, Professor Lévy-Bruhl, has shown that his "whole life was the full and orderly execution of one program," under the influence of Condorcet, in which the scientific study moved on to the moral. His mood was indeed precisely pseudo-scientific. Astronomy was rejected as a study not deserving deep attention because it had no significant bearing upon human affairs. Comte's "positivism," in brief, arrogating to itself the name "scientific," was but one more version of French anti-clericalism. Indeed the endeavour of Comte is to establish a new clericalism, a secular hierarchy guaranteeing a "more rational" order, over against the old Catholic clericalism and feudal aristocracy. Comte protests (*Essays*, "Plan of the Scientific Operations necessary for Reorganizing Society," 1820), in the mood of a technocrat:

> In our day Society is disorganised under both its Spiritual and Temporal aspects. Spiritual anarchy has preceded and engendered temporal anarchy . . . our first efforts to terminate the Revolutionary Epoch should aim at reorganizing the Spiritual Power. . . . *This anarchical state of intellect, when erected into a fundamental principle, is a manifest obstacle to the Reorganisation of Society.* . . . The "Sovereignty of the People" tends to dismember the body politic by placing power in the least capable hands; while "the Right of Private Judgement" tends to the complete isolation of thinkers, by investing the least enlightened men with an absolute right of control over the system of ideas conceived by superior intellects for the guidance of Society. . . . In Astronomy, Physics, Chemistry and Physiology there is no such thing as Liberty of Conscience.

Briefly, Comte is disturbed by the disappearance—since the decline of a Catholicism that he repudiates—of a common culture, a *speculum mentis*, an accepted myth. Like Robert Owen he has "a New View," but with Owen's profoundly important principle of voluntary co-operation lacking. "The exercise of a general and combined activity is the essence of *society*." It is for this that he incurs the rage of Bakunin and it is here that he has significance as pointing forward to Fascism, to John Strachey's Model Party and to Aldous Huxley's Brave New World. "The Scientific Class in our day possesses," writes Comte, "to the exclusion of all other classes, the two fundamental elements of Spiritual Government, Capacity and Authority in matters of Theory."

Comte protests against the view that:

> Government is, then, no longer regarded as the head of Society, destined to bind together the component units and to direct their activity to a common end. It is represented as a natural enemy encamped in the midst of our Social system.

No view could be more disturbing to J. S. Mill, who expresses his objections to this "completest system of spiritual and temporal despotism which ever yet emanated from a human brain," in his *Auguste Comte and Positivism* (1865) and in his *Autobiography*, while himself developing the methodology of the genuine social sciences in the Fourth part of his *Logic*. No view, also, could be more distasteful to Herbert Spencer.

HERBERT SPENCER (1820–1903),* however, had his own disqualifications as a sociologist, although he can claim with Comte to be a co-founder. A pronounced and even violent individualist in his political views, he also felt it to be incumbent, as a "progressive," to acknowledge, in his Synthetic Philosophy, the influence not only in biology but also in sociology of Charles Darwin. The result is an amalgam of competitive individualism verging on what Thomas Huxley called "Administrative Nihilism," on the one side, and culminating in the famous chapter of Spencer's *Social Statics* entitled "The Right to Ignore the State," with a theory of society as an organism or organisms, on the other. The link that renders the whole consistent is the doctrine of selection through struggle for existence; but this, again, has to be reconciled with Spencer's profound aversion to the military form of life as reactionary. Spencer forgets that Tyranny is Individualism writ large. Reconciliation is found in the notion of industrial competition. What happens to the proletariat (who nevertheless, unlike animals in the Darwinian struggle, survive) Herbert Spencer did not consider—but Marx did. There is a happy confidence that the existence of wealthy individuals [units]—even if only at the top among "the captains of industry"—granted theoretically "equal opportunity," spells of itself a sound happy society. The fatal weakness of classical or Cobdenite Liberalism lies in this fact.

Herbert Spencer's early *Social Statics* (1850) explains certain "primordial principles"—there is a "law of equality—every man has freedom to do all he wills provided he infringes not the equal freedom of any other man." Immediately one notes that Spencer's preoccupation in sociology is with morals, not economic fact. This law is a moral law, albeit based upon a survey of psychology and anthropology—of what Spencer calls "Moral Physiology." It is affirmed after a vigorous criticism of Utilitarianism, called "the expediency philosophy." This criticism is on the ground that, such is the incomparability of satisfactions of human individuals and such the law of change, no statement

* *Cf.* p. 406.

about an enduring *common* greatest happiness can be made, such as the Benthamites (and especially those later who began to allow for the succession of generations, such as J. S. Mill) were alleged to posit. Here Spencer, with Jefferson, appears to be right in that the "greatest common good" was unknowable by Bentham's method of elaborate calculations, and only to be decided by votes and force. But Spencer is wrong, as against Bentham, in forgetting that the liberty of the "small man" is contingent on the use of coercive authority against the rest and that all civil liberty and law are secured by social authority, swayed by a conflict of interests. "Non-infringement of the liberty of another" has, as Thomas Huxley showed, wider consequences than Spencer dreamed. Nevertheless Spencer does, in fact, pass over from moralism to a certain naturalism or positivism, unsatisfactorily co-ordinated.

Spencer puts sociology on the right route, of simplicity in the premises, by asserting that it must start from study of the actual individual. The laws of liberty and of equality (not of equal ability, but of equal liberty of the unequal) are assigned psychological bases. "All evil," we are told, "results from the non-adaptation of constitution to conditions." "The law that motion follows the line of greatest traction or least resistance" applies to social change also. There are complementary laws of social integration and differentiation.

> In the social organism integrative changes are abundantly exemplified. . . . But it is not only in these external unions of groups with groups, and of the compound groups with one another, that the general law is exemplified. It is exemplified also in unions which take place internally, as the groups become better organized . . . human progress is towards greater mutual dependence, as well as towards greater individuation . . . transformation of the homogeneous into the heterogeneous.

We shall be better able to comprehend the significance of this when we come to the theories of Durkheim.

Gustav Ratzenhofer (1842–1904), whom we have already discussed* in a different connection, was no less guilty than Herbert Spencer, as a sociologist, of selecting his facts to fit his Social Organic thesis: that society integrated into an organic entity, with a common culture, for the sake of survival in competition. On the other hand, a school of German jurists of whom Professor Rudolf von Ihering (1818–1892), of Göttingen, was the most eminent, restated the other side of the Spencerian contradiction, the individualist position that social obedience is yielded for Hobbesian reasons of individual interest. *Law as*

* *Cf.* p. 711.

Means to an End (1877–1882) was the title of von Ihering's best known book and of itself explains the thesis concerning the grounds of obedience. In submitting to law as the condition of civil order,

> everyone acting for others acts also for himself . . . the world exists by taking egoism into its service, by paying it the reward it desires . . . the way is that of connecting one's purposes with the other man's interest . . . law is the well-understood politics of power.

Von Ihering appeals to biology. "The infusorium is egoism—he knows and wills only himself and yet creates a world." Professor von Ihering, with his physico-sociological appeals, at least here avoids the Kantian formalism of his colleague Professor Rudolf Stammler, of Berlin. Stammler, in his *Doctrine of Just Law* (1902), could only define the end of law as the promotion of a community of free-willing men. His valuable phrase about "a natural law with changeable content" conceives this natural law in a fashion which marks no significant advance upon the formal ethical school of natural law, of Suarez and the Catholic teachers followed by H. Ahrens, of Brussels (*Course of Philosophy*, 1834), and by Del Vecchio (1878–), of Bologna, among contemporary writers. Von Ihering, it should be added, proposed to write a second part to his book which should explain the nature of common ethical ends, supplementing his discussion of individualist, coercive means. This distinction between the ethical and voluntary, and the coercive, as we shall see,* is important.

Émile Durkheim (1858–1917),† professor of sociology in the University of Paris, provides in his work a solution of the Spencerian dilemma: does social evolution lead to the differentiation of the individual or to the integration of society, and does social integration spell the increased heterogeneity of the life of the society or the increased homogeneity of its culture? Durkheim is confident that there are "social facts," dwelling in that intermediary realm between that surveyed by the psychological study of the individual and that of the materialist study of physical phenomena. He is, moreover, confident that these "facts" can themselves be systematically studied by a technique which he explains in his *Rules of Sociological Method* (1895)‡. In his *Division of Social Work*, following up the famous observations of Adam Smith which had also occupied Marx, he showed—in a fashion to which von Ihering had

* *Cf.* p. 765.

† *Cf.* p. 710.

‡ Trans. by Solovay and Mueller, edit. with intro. by the present writer, 1938.

already pointed—the relation between social functional heterogeneity and social integration, the increasingly efficient integration of the whole carrying with it the increasing non-self-sufficiency of the parts. Léon Duguit's theory of law, as the reflex social action of the whole against resistant parts in this totality, integrated for purposes of civilized living, is a direct deduction from the theories of his master Durkheim. At this level a synthesis takes place between the Doctrines of Social Contract and of Social Organism, although weighted in favour of the latter; and von Ihering's thought is carried a stage further. No direct influence of von Ihering need be supposed; but the influence of Schaeffle, Wundt, Renouvier and Espiñas, the student of insect life, upon Durkheim may well, as has been alleged, be significant.

Durkheim with time changes, or rather evolves, from the positivist thinking after the intention (not the performance) of Comte, assimilating sociology to natural science, to something very near to a champion of a notion of society as a substantial idea. There is a social mind, although mind itself is redefined in a neo-realist fashion. As his nephew, Professor Marcel Mauss, says, speaking of Durkheim's theory:

> In the same way that psychologically, a man thinks, stretches, acts, feels at the same time with his entire body, in the same way this community of bodies and spirits, which a society is, feels, acts, lives and *wills to live* with all the bodies and all the spirits of these men . . . thus we may arrive at a science of the bodies and souls of societies.

Durkheim's elaborate studies in primitive religion predisposed him to conclusions towards which the organic theory of society also pointed. Moreover, it was neat to identify the social as vehicle of *ideal* values and object of duties with the social as *actual* seat of authoritative command—and if this society, projected as ideal, was on that plane identical with the very concept of God this linking of duty and command would tidily follow. What might be the *test of social value save success* in tribal survival—the tribal heresy in morals—was not so clear. Plato discussed all this with Thrasymachos long ago. Durkheim, the rationalist and positivist secularist, ended as a secularist who had filled the religious hiatus Comte felt by creating a new, non-Catholic god, the clan's projection of its own life. The practical conclusion was seen in Durkheim's fierce defence of the French totems against "the old German god" during the last Great War.

Georg Simmel (1858–1918) advances beyond Durkheim, who provided not so much a sociological science as a distinctive method, by an attempt to lay the bases of a formal sociology as study of the relation-

ships between actual individuals. For his follower, Alfred Vierkandt, this lapsed into a study of "situations" and a denial—as against the tradition that runs back through Bentham and Holbach, Hobbes and Machiavelli to Aristotle—that constant properties can be posited, within the frame of reference, for human nature as a basis of social science. The same over-concrete historical, or anecdotal, method of study of cultures and abhorrence of scientific hypotheses and generalizations—which nevertheless permitted in this case a study of "types" —characterized the work of Professor Max Weber (1864–1920), of Heidelberg. His major work lay in his balancing—as later was done by Mr. R. H. Tawney (1880–)—of the Marxist theory of the materialist determination of cultures by expounding the complementary religious and cultural determination of social modes and economic drives. The hen of idealism was sent by Professor Weber chasing through history after the egg of materialism.

Vilfredo Pareto (1848–1923),* student of mathematics, practising engineer, professor of economics in the University of Lausanne, returning to a sound method, affirmed, on the contrary, that sociology was, in its field, "just a quest for uniformities, and that's the end of it." In brief, it was not merely historical but schematic and used the abstract-hypothetical method of the natural sciences. His exchange with the economist, Gustav Schmoeller, is well known. Schmoeller had interjected, at an economic lecture by Pareto, "But are there laws in economics?" Later that day the shabbily dressed Pareto sidled up to the unsuspecting Schmoeller. "Please can you direct me to a restaurant where one can eat for nothing?" "Not, my good man, where you can eat for nothing." "Ah! there *are* then laws in economics?"

Pareto reaffirmed the position of Plato and Aristotle, of Hobbes and Spinoza, of Montesquieu D'Holbach and Hume, of Bentham and J. S. Mill and Sidgwick, of Comte and Spencer, of Marx and Lenin, that there is such a thing as a political or sociological science and that it had laws. He did this with a contumely characteristic of himself and richly deserved by opponents obsessed by their revolt towards factual history from the excesses and errors of the too complacent classical economists or bemused by misapplications of Darwinian theories of evolution or by *Kultur-geschichte*—or merely ignorant with the especial invincible ignorance of the mistrained academic. Pareto made this restatement by a sharp separation of means—what Croce denominated, in his own language, "the economic," and Pareto "the logico-experi-

* *Cf.* p. 713.

mental"—from the "sentiments" or drives which determined ends while giving rise to a cloud of "residues" or agreeable rationalizations of conduct.

Pareto supplemented this psychologico-sociological study by more purely political observations on the role of minorities, especially aristocratic minorities or "*élites*" of ability. This line of thought was to have considerable confirmatory influence although it had already been well developed by the Marxists, with their theory of the "class-conscious vanguard"; by revolutionary conspirators of the type of Blanqui and, in practice, Mazzini; and, academically, by such earlier Italian writers as Professor Gaetano Mosca, of Turin, in his *Elements of Political Science* (Pt. I, 1895; Pt. II, 1922) with his thesis of a "political class," existing and directive in every society, which however is combined with a denial of the doctrine of race superiorities and with the classical assertion of political laws appropriate for all humanity.* Pareto's technique in exploring the social sciences, like that of Mach and Poincaré, is deliberately an abstract and hypothetical one, making suppositions and operating *as if* these were true and watching for results.

Since Pareto chose, in his *Treatise of General Sociology* (1916), with a detectable pleasure, to analyze as (dishonest) "rationalizations" most of the "reasons" for action assigned by idealists; to give the instinctive nature of man, rather than "ends" and "teleology," as his driving force *a tergo;*† and to suggest, with Spengler, that history might be rather cyclical than marked by the lineal—or dialectical—progress accepted as automatic alike by Spencer and by Marx, the general effect of Pareto's work, as of that of Durkheim's student, Georges Sorel‡ and of his colleague, Henri Bergson, was to strengthen the forces of non-rationalism. These were also fortified by the work of the psychologists, both of the psycho-analytical school of Freud (1856–) and the behaviourist school of Watson (1878–). This fate, however, befell "rationalism" or "intellectualism" [there is a difference] only because the theologians of particular doctrinaire schools of "reason" and "progress" had replaced the truer rationalists who were content to

* There is evidence that Mosca's work had a direct influence on Mussolini. Attention is also called to the plea of the great historian of the Roman Empire, Professor G. Ferrero, in 1921, for the reestablishment—perhaps by aid to Italy from the Western Democracies from the resources of their great prosperity—of the principle of respect for authority in the modern world, imperilled so gravely, and in a fashion so comparable to its down-fall in Rome after Septimius Severus. How rich is Professor Ferrero's irony when his plea is re-read today.

† *Cf.* p. 101.

‡ *Cf.* p. 711.

observe before they concluded. Actually, Pareto's work is a rational inquisition into the "manner of the working of things" in social activity, attaining to the stature of a work of genius. In a brilliant commentary on *Pareto's General Sociology* (1935) Professor Lawrence J. Henderson, of Harvard, wrote:

> Why have social scientists not followed Machiavelli's example? In what manner and how far have they been influenced by their own sentiments and interests, by the sentiments of others, and by "public opinion"? . . . [Pareto] demonstrated the abundant presence of certain kinds of residues and derivations in the writings of social scientists and explained how this condition interfered with the advancement of learning.

In brief, Pareto stated trenchantly the case of the political scientists' the politicists, which has at last begun to come into its own, against the astrologers, soothsayers and political theologians both of the Hegelian Right and of the Hegelian Left. He stated the case by dissecting the myth makers and their "residues."

A new CHICAGO SCHOOL of social scientists, including Professors Charles E. Merriam, Robert Park, Ernest Burgess, L. L. Thurstone, T. V. Smith, F. Schuman, Harold Lasswell and Harold Gosnell, succeeded to the earlier Chicago School of pragmatic or humanist philosophy associated with the name of Professor John Dewey. While Professor Znaniecki, of Columbia and Poznan, elaborated the formal concept of sociology, Professor Gosnell, by experiments in non-voting cleared up moot points in its status (or that of the science which, according to valid definitions is indistinguishable from it, political science) as a science of observation and experiment. The quantitative nature of politics was emphasized—appropriately enough, since on the walls of Chicago University are written the words of Lord Kelvin:

> When you can measure . . . you know something about it.

The Lynds, at Columbia, enriched the available sociological material. Charles Merriam and T. V. Smith sought to give to the whole historical and philosophical perspective. With this work may be coupled that of Professors W. F. Ogburn, Stuart Rice, Beyle and Max Lerner in America; of Professors Lancelot Hogben and Sargant Florence in Britain; and of M. Rueff in France.

Professor Talcott Parsons, of Harvard, in a work reminiscent in its close-knit quality of that of A. F. Bentley, entitled *Structure of Social Action* (1938), compared the conclusions reached from dissimilar premises and against dissimilar cultural backgrounds, of Alfred Marshall, the last and perhaps greatest of the utilitarian classical

economists, Max Weber, Émile Durkheim and Pareto. He discovered there a convergence of conclusions which he was only able to ascribe to the correspondence of their observations with the warranty of the facts. The new theory, implicitly held by all four separately, which Talcott Parsons detected, departed alike from positivist naturalism and from idealism. It supposed what is called a "voluntaristic theory of action," and presumed three elements in the social structure: (*a*) hereditary and environmental elements conditioning action; (*b*) the field of logico-experimental or means-ends relationships, generally discussed by the schools of Hobbes and Bentham; (*c*) "the third is the whole group of elements clustering about the ultimate-value system in so far as it is integrated and not reducible to the random ends of utilitarianism." He discovered in societies, as basic, their "common value system." This triple assumption or hypothesis is found to be the most appropriate tool for enlightenment in sociological research. It will be noted that, in so far as it is accepted, the Marxist "materialist interpretation" of social phenomena, which is exclusive, is deliberately rejected. This, of course, does not affect the possible validity of Marxist materialism as an effective myth of equality (or of inequality*), or just as a "myth of the workers" as a section in domination over against the rest, the few or minority, without further significance in terms of scientific truth beyond the use of the spell-word "scientific." Examination of it would be on the same basis as examination of early Christian theology, and in both cases the vital drive would be given by the struggle for, and prophecy of, some new order whether "social justice and classless peace," by revolution, or "spiritual peace and brotherhood," by conversion.

Harold D. Lasswell (1902–), on the basis of studies of biography and of propaganda, carried forward the formulation of political science.

> Politics is the sphere of conflict . . . the process by which the irrational bases of society are brought out into the open . . . the transition between one unchallenged consensus and the next. It begins in conflict and eventuates in a solution. But the solution is not the "rationally best" solution, but the emotionally satisfactory one. The rational and dialectical phases of politics are subsidiary to the process of redefining an emotional consensus. (*Psychopathology and Politics*, 1930.)

"Who gets what, when, how" is the issue which every influential *élite* has to settle; or (as it was put, in 1936 by the Secretary of the

* *Cf.* p. 599.

Comsomol, adapting Lenin) "We young people of the U.S.S.R.—led by the great Stalin—have an extraordinarily arduous and most important historic task—to declare who shall destroy whom, in the whole world." In this issue symbols are of the first importance. They enable a political system to be produced because a group, that is able to spread propaganda, wants it, within the limits set by environment and heredity.

Dialectical materialism is the reading of private preferences into universal history, the elevating of personal aspirations into cosmic necessities, the remoulding of the universe in the pattern of desire, the completion of the crippled self by the incorporation of the symbol of the whole. No competing symbolism rose to such heights of compulsive formulation.

Professor Lasswell might here have referred to national socialist "Race theory" and to the projection of the dream-ego upon the person of the Leader, which makes "the small man" a willing fascist marching, against speculators and saboteurs, and disruptive Marxists, forward and upward in the great movement to common victory.

Crisis demands dictatorship, centralization, concentration, obedience and bias. Inter-crisis permits concessions towards democracy, decentralization, dispersion, originality and objectivity. (*Politics*, 1936.)

The section entitled "Control," of Lasswell's *World Politics and Personal Security* (1935), significantly enough begins with a chapter entitled, "In Quest of a Myth." A myth is alone able to bring peace by assigning to every man some function which fortifies his self-respect by entitling him to deference and allaying the expectation of violence from his neighbour (Hobbes) or neighbouring group (Marx). This cannot, however, be effective until the root causes of discontent are removed. What are these?

Who gains by the centralized dictatorship which is in transition toward a socialist state? The answer appears to be: the *skilled*, those who *sacrifice* to acquire technique. In the dictatorship and the socialist state (as distinguished from hypothetical socialist [Communist] society), differences in material reward are tolerated, although high money incomes are no longer permitted to financiers, industrialists, merchants and landlords. This suggests that the socialist ideal is, in fact, the ideal of the lesser bourgeoisie, springing from resentment at the capitalist distortion of the relation between *reward* and *sacrifice* exhibited in the rise of plutocracy . . . the true proletarian does not sacrifice to acquire a complex skill. . . . This second bourgeois revolution, conducted in the name of the proletariat, has for the time being eliminated the

class struggle from Russia. The manual toilers of little skill have no prospects of united action. With the restoration of a more equitable relation between sacrifice (of the acquisition of skill) and reward, through the extinction of aristocracy and plutocracy, the class struggle among different skill groups comes gradually to the front. (*World Politics and Personal Insecurity.*)

Where the landowner and priest first stood, there stand the merchant and minister, the industrialist and financier; and there will stand the engineer, the artisan, the professional and the technocrat, as well as the party organizer in "parties" having a new, religious significance as sects. The present epoch, however confused by the traversing considerations of foreign policy and financial imperialism, witnesses the replacement of the second by the third group as the French Revolution and the British Reform Bill of 1832 saw the replacement of the first by the second group.

The use of the term "proletariat" was an over-generalization of the protest of the middle-income skill groups [*e.g.*, Marx himself] against the plutocratic consequences of modern industrialism. It was an over-generalization because the true "proletarian" has no skill; he has not sacrificed to obtain it. . . . Sacrifice in obtaining socially useful skill constitutes a first claim on social reward.

Professor Lasswell here probably underestimates the real significance behind the myth of human equality, namely, the assertion of brotherhood of all—if not by physical birth then by service and loyalty and duty done, however humbly, in a common society, a true community—coupled with the practical demand for a tolerable minimum real wage upon the part of the unskilled whose acquiescence or imitative cooperation is necessary for the success of any revolution, Marxist or Fascist. What is noticeable is the tendency of contemporary societies ever more to fall under the control of limited disciplined groups, having the characteristics of religious aristocracies, who intimately share a system of common values or myth. Writers as varied as the Webbs and Aldous Huxley (*Brave New World*, 1932) have discussed this.

2

Bertrand Russell (1872–) may also be appropriately mentioned here, especially as he has recently been associated with Chicago University while he shares at many points the characteristic thought of its political school. A descendant of the Lord Russell who was executed on the scaffold with republican Algernon Sidney under Charles II, and of Lord John Russell of the Reform Bill of 1832, Ber-

trand Russell, Earl Russell and Baron Amberly, in his early days was a sympathetic exponent of philosophic anarchism while finding, in *Roads to Freedom* (1918), practical solutions along guild socialist lines. Profoundly Russell is a humanist and, like so many humanists (and like John Dewey), he has preoccupied himself with education.

His essay "A Freeman's Worship" in his *Philosophical Essays* is surely one of the finest expressions in the English language of belief in the ultimate value of the individual and fits in well with a philosophy that owes much to Leibnitz. His political leanings again showed themselves in a sympathetic study entitled *The Problem of China*, with its admiration for a civilization that exalted Lao-tse, who preached the natural goodness of unfettered man, and that maintained itself for millennia without discovering the need for a State Leviathan. Conversely they showed themselves in his critical *Practice and Theory of Bolshevism* (1920).

> When I suggested that whatever is possible in England can be achieved without bloodshed, he (Lenin) waved aside the suggestion as fantastic. . . . The sort of revolution that is recommended is never practically grander except in a time of national misfortune; in fact, *defeat in war* seems to be an indispensable condition. . . . It is by slower and less showy methods that the new world must be built. . . . Russian Communism may fail and go under, but Communism itself will not die. And if hope rather than hate inspires its advocates it can be brought about without the universal cataclysm preached by Moscow. The war and its sequel have proved the destructiveness of capitalism; let us see to it that the next epoch does not prove the still greater destructiveness of Communism but rather its power to heal the wounds which the old evil system has inflicted upon the human spirit.

In *The Prospects of Industrial Civilization* (1923) he continued his advocacy of "democracy tempered by group autonomy," including checks upon the power of officialdom.

> Rights will never be respected unless they have power to make themselves respected, but this power can always be won by organization and energy. The result may be for a time a tug of war of rival interests, but in the end people will come to rely upon negotiation, all the more readily when no more favourable result is to be expected from more violent methods.

In this book Russell confronted, as he did later elsewhere, not only the problem of nationalism, but the basic problem of the technical requirements of the Expert State, for assuring security to the masses through organization, in relation to the values of the Free State.

In *Power* (1938), Russell again stresses the psychological as distinct from the environmental forces in politics. Against an economic inter-

pretation, he brings himself into general line with the Chicago school by asserting a "power interpretation" of politics, of which he regards the forces as being, in many fields, quantitatively measurable. The need for a coercive power against crime is admitted. But the conclusion is an assertion that the lust for power is natural in humanity; that it must be controlled; that it can and does rationalize itself in idealism, fanaticism and bigotry, appealing to violent means; and that Humanism (for Russell remains ethical philosopher rather than political scientist) must oppose this as well as psychology explain it. The permanent political solution of the problem of power is co-operation, not domination [*cf.* Aristotle]; the immediate individual duty is the unintimidated statement of permanent ethical values against fanaticism, Marxist or Fascist, and, if necessary, through pacifist non-violent resistance (*not* passive obedience).

I believe that when I die I shall rot, and nothing of my ego will survive. I am not young, and I love life. But I should scorn to shiver with terror at the thought of annihilation. Happiness is none the less true happiness because it must come to an end, nor do thought and love lose their value because they are not everlasting. Many a man has borne himself proudly on the scaffold: surely the same pride should teach us to think truly about man's place in the world. Even if the open windows of science at first make us shiver after the cosy indoor warmth of traditional humanizing myths, in the end the fresh air brings vigour, and the great spaces have a splendour of their own.

Politics is the study of power. Violence is the basic evil. It is the enemy of reason. Man is too sensitive to the allurements of power to be trusted, save with the utmost pragmatic caution (*e.g.*, in the criminal law), to use violence to repel it. Most of the impassioned appeals to do so are the old harlotry of the lust for power of some new, cocksure, dogmatic group that will do no more good or less evil than its predecessors, however fair its protestations. Especially is this true in international affairs where—each being judge and party in his own case, as Kant said—war and victory breed yet more war and the disruption of civilization. The use of force is *sometimes* permissible, where there is the minimum possibility of illusion; crusading *never*, except we suppose some impartial judge, above particular interests and sectional ideologies.

Criticizing the Marxian Communists, Russell writes: "The attitude of uncompromising heroism is attractive, and appeals especially to the dramatic instinct. But the purpose of the serious revolutionary is not personal heroism, nor martyrdom, but the creation of a happier world." We have *to study human nature*, of which the qualities in effect are permanent, and natural law.

Nevertheless, perhaps Russell's greatest contribution is that, by his mathematical studies against the background of his distinctive neo-realist philosophy, he has perfected a logical justification, hitherto lacking, for Empiricism. Leibnitz is brought in to reinforce Bentham. The position is the precise opposite of that head-lined as a principle of German National Socialism: *Vom Parlamentarismus zum Heroismus*, "From Parliamentarism to Heroism," *where* (*but only where*) heroism involves a claim to such personal knowledge of absolute truth as to involve the right to impose it on others. The opposite heroism is that of Abraham Lincoln, who claimed that no man was so good as to be entitled to regulate the lives of his fellows and thereby empty their personalities of free will and moral choice.

Russell's weakness is a tendency to underestimate the force of exaltation, vivid emotion, imagination, passion. There is a Benthamite tendency to confound these things with "interests." There is a pessimism about moral indignation. The romantic poets, men of will and blood, to whom reason is depressing, partisans of Party and that by principle, servants of the Evil, in fact coexist with the philosophers, men of reason, humble seekers after truth, servants of the Good.

No synthesis has yet subsumed the two, or ruled the heady, romantic passions of power or abashed the pride of the ignorant men of fine words who know that they know. These are the men who brashly label truth with their party label, Arian or Athanasian, Catholic or Protestant, Red or Black. They may perhaps be subsumed in action by the heroism of truth and the devotion to empiric truth, and by the disciplining of the frenzied, romantic poets to the antique, calm values. That indignation for the cause of justice and science lies in the future. Assuredly ideas, even false ones, do rule men, making heroes and martyrs, stirring crusades and shaping organizations, which in turn, rather than mass numbers, achieve power over trumpery practical men and conquer the world. Of this the truth has never more abundantly been demonstrated than in our own times and among our own militant, evil propagandas and mythologies. Nor is indignation as a passion deprived of value if it is horse, and not rider, to the true idea.

3. It may be well to provide a summary statement of the view of the Chicago School, in the broadest sense, and of its adherents.* ***Political science is a study of means.*** Politics is a science in the same sense,

* I advise the common reader to omit this section which is of interest only to technicians and to turn back, at this stage, to those "readings" which have been provided for his convenience and his pleasure. It should be added that perhaps the most important book in political philosophy published in recent years in Aldous Huxley's *Brave New World* (1932). If it does not provide the answers, it puts the relevant questions—and anybody can read it.

neither less nor more, as economics. It is a quantitative, observational and experimental study of means. Its field is that of the relation of human individuals or wills in a system of control, that is, of power whether by domination or co-operation. Whether it is, as a social science, indistinguishable from sociology is a subsidiary matter of use of words. Subject to the above definition it is, briefly, a study of society in the power relationship—the *Science of Power.** It is the science of the *actual* will to power and of its rational co-ordination in society. The correct description is in terms of this function and of the nuclear or typical situations that display this relationship.

Political science is, therefore, *wrongly defined as the study of the modern State;* it is equally the study of religious and industrial communities and associations, Jesuits, Communists, Trades Unions, of the city, of the "great society," of primitive tribal forms and of social forms after the state shall have "withered away."

To maintain peace has been the justifying function of coercive government, despite all its tyrannies, since the days of the Pharaohs. Since the state is merely a modern transitional form between the mane- and the world federation or world empire, which is alone competent perfectly to fulfil the state function of *maintaining peace*, the state doubtless *will* be superseded.

The study of politics has traditionally supposed and still supposes certain constants in our human nature, which express themselves in different cultural forms but with the same emotional content and hence, granted comparable conditions, it supposes a recognizable and recurrent "manner of the working of things."

Politics is the study of social recurrences. Especially it is this study in the configuration of units and unit activities. This assertion, traditional in political theory, is reaffirmed by Pareto with his "quest for uniformities, and there's the end of it."

Whereas Natural Rights, when taken *in vacuo*, involve untenable metaphysical suppositions, Natural Rights are defensible bases for claims against temporary Human Institutions when these rights are taken as inhering in Natural Law. This is true when this law is stated, not solely as a matter of abstract ethics (as in the later days of the decadence of the doctrine), but with naturalistic implications as it was first stated by the Stoics. As such, *laws of human nature and psychology may be rationally and empirically affirmed to exist*, which constitute

* Much of what is here set out will be found set out more fully in the works of the present writer, especially his *Science and Method of Politics* (1927) and his *Principles of Politics* (1931). *Vide*, especially, *Science and Method*, pp. 222*ff*.

bases both, objectively, for the moral law or social authority for mankind and, subjectively, for the individual's so-called natural rights or indefeasible instinctive claims as a sentient and human being.

That which is contrary to Natural Law cannot be historically successful. All positive law of such a character will as a matter of fact prove void because, in the long run and apart from especial accidental conditions, it will be unenforceable, provocative of needless tension and imprudent or "bad." Tyrannies may be pushed over; but they will also fall by their own weight when they go beyond the degree of tyranny (which is, however, much) that mankind actually likes. Whereas Natural Rights and "private conscience," stated *in vacuo*, may appear anarchical, unwarranted by reason, Natural Law cannot be irrational since it is the rational schema, empirically verified, of our own fundamental human nature, although this nature is itself not merely intellectual but also emotional and appetitive. The disinterested study of this Natural Law as laws of human nature is within the province of political science. The attempt, as by the Marxists and political race-theorists, to claim exclusive scientific control through other means is political magic or superstition.

The instinctive claim to freedom is one such claim of human nature. Freedom as initiative or struggle may be hypothetically affirmed to be a final *value* good in itself. There is no reason to presume the contrary. The physiological, biological and psychological evidence is in favour of supposing it to be a datum in our nature, if suppressed then perverted and morbid, but not extinguished. On the moral level, it is the ground of the dignity of the human spirit. This does *not* mean that it is good or healthy in *every* form in which, *e.g.*, as civil liberty, it may be expressed. Freedom is conditioned by like potential claims from all individuals, although certainly not by like actual claims. Society being also a datum of human life, authority is the completion of my freedom through social liberty as well as, also, the restriction of the freedom of others (and of myself). The technique of this necessary restriction, especially on the economic side, is the task of expert government. The first political problem of today is to reconcile the Expert State and the Free State. Totalitarianism is a false alternative. So is Anarchism. The solution is in terms of the relation of ends and means.

Both freedom *and* authority are, therefore, "natural," *i.e.*, irremovable in social health or contentment; but authority, which in equilibrium involves co-operation, in disequilibrium involves domination, as liberty in disequilibrium involves anarchy. *All solutions in politics are in terms of balance. No solutions are final:* history is always

still to be made. Where external pressure is increased, internal liberty is diminished. Thus the trend of our generation is towards authority, owing to the threat of nation against nation and of class against class, and will continue so long as this threat continues until the arrival of World-State and classless society. This trend, inspired by fear and ending in dictatorship, is to be sharply distinguished from the increase of co-operative organization directly designed to safeguard the liberty of the common man through social agencies of an economic and welfare character. The former authoritarianism will continue until the world empire is constituted by domination or pacifist co-ordination.

The demand for power is a secondary and self-protective phase of the demand for liberty. The desire to persecute and lust of cruelty are perversions of the desire for power. Power, however, is not only the relation of domination and subjection. Power over nature is not such. It is the assurance of control. Assured *co-operation* is a species of power and provides the balanced solution to power problems. The Hobbesian psychology of Marx is at fault at this point, although less disastrous than rationalizing and "opiate" philosophies which deny the existence of the power problem.

Politics as science of power involves study of the social structure as shaped by the interplay of individual or group liberty and group or social authority. It is objectivity that matters if we are to learn, advance, control. There is, then, a political physiology and a political therapeutics. In the words of Mr. Bernard Shaw the rational, connected study of these controls is "the science by which alone civilization can be saved." The method of political study must not, however, initially, be that of observation of such highly complex phenomena as "societies"—still less "Society"—in their organic reality.

The method, as in all other sciences, must be by abstraction and hypothesis. Assumption must be made of a certain kind of dominant conduct, *e.g.*, the pursuit of power (as, in economics, of wealth), as an interpretative instrument in research.* Even Herbert Spencer's concrete "individual" is too complex a unit. We must take Spinoza's political man.† Or we must concentrate on some simplest form of the political act,‡ what Talcott Parsons calls the "act-unit," some relation of wills of which (unlike wars or high acts of State) in an average day of an average life there will be a thousand examples, sufficient for

* *Cf.* p. 196.
† *Cf.* p. 254.
‡ *Cf.* p. 753.

observation, comparison, and experiment. Politics or sociology is not the high secret or "mystery" of statesmen and class politicians. It is a branch of the study of human nature, a social science.

The immediate political object of men, that is, their object within the field of means, is power, not justice. Its pursuit, like that of freedom (of which it is the obverse), is natural in all humanity, even Marxists. It is an illusion to suppose otherwise—and a very dangerous one, especially among equalitarian idealists. Distributive justice, on the other hand, is only one of many possible ends of men, including, not only a concept of justice which involved (as in India) the permanent subordination of certain functions or classes as according to nature and divinely willed, but also race survival; or the happiness of a greater, or smaller, group; or the self-development to the highest pitch of a select few; or the glory of the whole by the sacrifice of individuals. It may mean giving equal things to all or equal to equals.

Nevertheless, in an integrated society, *stability of power depends upon that co-operation* which Plato called Harmony and Justice. This does *not* necessarily involve one common end, of which the conclusion is totalitarianism; but may be achieved, as Leibnitz thought in his schemes for social peace, by an established harmony of parallel ends, and may take shape in a utilitarian federation of monads, whether individuals or likeminded groups, as well as in a homogeneous community. This also may be a "common-value system," but one stressing liberty and adjusting differences empirically. Here is the root difference between dictatorial and democratic constitutions.

Co-operation would appear to involve a classless but not a functionless society, just so far as the two can be placed in contrast. In so far as irrational class privilege distinguishes itself from rational function, so far liberty becomes identified with a demand for renewed equality and the abolition of functionless inequality. However, an agreed myth concerning function can harmonize inequalities into equality of service by representing the distinction of function as rational. When rational distinctions are replaced by irrational, co-operation is lost and replaced by individual, or individual-group, domination.

Domination involves tyranny, which is individualism writ large, unrestrained by reason. Liberty also, unrestrained by reason and hence becoming a heady liberty to disregard others when inconvenient, issues in tyranny. Tyranny, being the negation of free co-operation and the exaltation of force, means the war of man against man only checked by terror or by the distraction of foreign war and greater

fears. Class domination, as Aristotle said, involves tyranny when the persecuted groups or individuals fulfil a true social function, but not when, like criminals, they do not.

Personal dictatorship is tyranny when it is not popularly supported or when (as Aristotle held), being popularly supported, it yet persecutes groups or individuals, not mere malcontents but performing some true function as citizens. Domination, however, in revolution and war, by a man or through a system, is actually normal. The objection to it, if the end be adequate, is a matter of measure and expediency. The permanency of the class war or the permanency of instant threat of war of nations involves *pro tanto* the permanency of such dictatorial domination. Nevertheless the means condition the attainability of the end; nor can the ends of civilization be readily attained by frenzy, those of humanism through barbarism or those of tolerance and experimental progress through canting fanaticism, however well-intentioned and "sure that it is sure" about the right.

Coercion is only justified, that is, in the long view intelligent, if it is in accordance with Natural Law. It is improbable that man by his nature knows absolute truth. He advances to truth empirically and by accumulation of knowledge. It is in this empiric and tolerant climate of mind that science and civilization flourish. It is contrary to empiricism to claim for any social myth that it is absolute truth, and unnatural to impose this by coercion.

Violence is, by nature, dogmatic. On the record it is not conspicuously more successful in the achievement of the concrete ends of civilization than where the presumptions are made of communal co-operation. There is, however, no inherent reason for tolerating the intolerant. The intolerant may be persecuted—as Milton and Locke held—if expedient. All known political authority involves a measure of force. But, since the intolerant may be the novel, the significance as experiment in living of such fanatics and intolerant idealists, even when imprisoned, must not be forgotten nor liberty curtailed—even that of the votaries of tyranny—in quiet times when there is no proximate danger.

It is not true in politics that there must be no liberty for the common man, but only servitude, in following error—since our knowledge is merely pragmatic of what is error and what servitude. There is a natural right to choose wrong. The Catholics think Protestantism infallibly servitude; the Marxists so think the errors of the idealists; and the National Socialists the errors of other Socialists. In this, in probability, they all err.

There is no objection to any like-minded group of men voluntarily accepting a myth and agreeing to treat it *as if* it were absolutely true. Some of the world's most significant movements, Islam, the Jesuits, the Marxists, have developed in this way. Cultural homogeneity, then, is unnatural if coercively imposed but unobjectionable in a voluntary community such as that of the Owenites, the monks or the Communists of the North American settlements and of Palestine. The *coercive state* is tolerable when it does *not* pretend to possess and impose a common ideal; but is utilitarian, co-ordinating actual interests on parallel lines, merely safeguarding by force (as an agreed common value) the maximum liberty of each. As such it, although coercive, is still a free society, so long as emigration is still free. A *voluntary community*—a community, as Plato said, "of pleasures and pains"—a like-minded group, such as a church or party, Catholic or Communist, is entitled to *impose on its own members a common ideal.*

The ideal voluntary community and the utilitarian, coercive state are two different types of society, equally necessary for social health. The first may be Platonic, Hegelian, *i.e.*, idealist; the second should be Leibnitzian, Benthamite, individualist, or it tends to tyranny: the first, ethical, concerned with "the good life"; the second, Benthamite, fustian and prosaic. Socialists often confound the two, to their undoing, as do also socialistically minded Tories and churchmen. The result of the confusion is Leviathan, totalitarianism and fascism—indeed Hobbes's Leviathan is an innocent animal compared with it. The rule of the coercive state, unless unnatural or tyrannic, must be one of pragmatic compromise between the *pressures* of actual interests. The appropriate philosophy is that of Bentham.

This compromise in the State must be the basis of that practical democracy—accepting, as a practical expedient, *majority rule on the assumption of compromise* between the parts, not intransigence in principles—which Aristotle calls "polity." The alternative to compromise or agreement is perversion and tyranny. The repudiation of compromise is the repudiation of the empiric, democratic world for the dogmatic and totalitarian. There is nothing to preclude voluntary parties from being among the most powerful of these organized pressure groups nor anything undemocratic in this. It is what Bentham recommended throughout his practical work of reform. His group was the Utilitarians. How yet shall such voluntary groups express more than a pious, monkish wish? Let us consider, then, the history, and how great has been the effect on history, of these monks, friars, reformers, Jesuits, Jacobins, Quakers, Mazzinians, Marxists! The dynamic issue is how

those of greater ability, the more expert or more humane, are to obtain control of the coercive state. Otherwise stated, how shall the wise rule?

The "vanguard" or *élite* or technocrats, Jacobins or Bolsheviks or Blackshirts, may seek to rule by violence, first however identifying themselves as leaders with some powerful group, "the patriots" or "the workers," and ousting the rest by force, appealing the while to some "dynamic" conception of history. They are "voluntary" only in their first stages and in order to coerce those not of the elect. Such men falsely presume that their own vision of the dynamic end (unless the revolution be "dynamic" for its own sake) is absolute or exclusive and must be regarded by others as rational, natural and entitling them to regiment and persecute. We are left with force against force with chance holding the scales, tipped by leaders of personality. The truth, not being a partisan, becomes unseasonable and contemptible when the issue is who shall kill whom, in a race between tyranny and anarchy.

Or the few may seek through education to appeal rationally, and disinterestedly, to those who are educated, with the risk of being overwhelmed by technical publicity, propaganda and passion. They will learn that the philosopher is hustled off the stage when it is occupied by those there by right—the politician, the publicity man and the actor and the natural exhibitionist.

Or they may themselves, as Plato first recommended, modestly study propaganda, the lever of public passions; study an art to be learned; and study the political science, both psychologic and economic, of aligning quantities of support behind given nuclei as means to the architectonic ends, warranted by their respective philosophies. They must humble their necks to be *skilful* men. They must study to guide and serve to lead. They will learn that, if their ideas are warranted by insight into man's nature and their vision clear and their energy flaming enough to capture public imagination, those passions will be almost too soon at their service, tempting them to substitute the pursuit of immediate power for that of the taskmistress, objective truth. That is the condition of creative leadership which induces co-operation.

4

What, then, shall we say of ends? We have reviewed over three thousand years of human history. We have seen it illuminated in the consciousness of the most brilliant minds of their times and estimated by their judgements. We have striven "to depict what all great art strives to convey; a vast slice of humankind through the delineation of one character, a whole period through the experiences of one victim," and

to do this period by period. There is yet *no reason to regard these three thousand years, if we look to moral ideals, as a history of progress.*

If the poets of Greece and the sculptors of Athens were as fine as those today, Homer as good as Walt Whitman and Pheidias as good as Epstein and Aristotle and Archimedes at least as intelligent as modern man, still more is it true that twenty centuries have marked no moral advance on the vision of Christ or even on the wisdom of Buddha and of Confucius. On the contrary, the practice of the disciples of the sages in that early dawn is nearer to the ideals with which we begin the history of man's philosophy of man than is the practice announced by the leaders of men in these latter days. I see nothing in political practice today which shows a marked advance in vision upon the moral precepts of Confucius as he stands on the threshold of recorded civilization out by the Yellow River in the sixth century before Christ. In these matters the distinction has been between the sages and the world. The leaders have spoken one language. There has been no sure moral advance among the rest, although there have been ages when men were more or less ready to be disciples, ages of greater and lesser vision, ages when it was happier or more miserable to be alive, ages benighted and of decadence, ages of illumination and renascence. Progress is here individual, by the clarity of vision of each disciple.

This yet is true, as Huxley has said, that *the teaching of the sages is astoundingly uniform* nor are the maxims of Christ unanticipated by Plato and Buddha. The vision of eternal values through the ages has not significantly changed, although the practice of common men, for example, in respect of cruelty almost certainly has varied (but not always progressed). There is, then, at the highest levels of civilization *a heritage.* And, in so far as culture finds its focus in ethics, this heritage is culture itself and of civilization the most sacred charge.

This heritage was lost for a millennium when fanatical Christian monks suppressed with blasphemous hands the mathematical pagan school at Alexandria and extinguished the torch of non-propagandist learning; and when Islamic stupid counter-fanatics burned the library at Alexandria with praises to Allah, because no wisdom might be better than their Koran. Compared with the importance to humanity of the preservation of this heritage, like a precious masterpiece or a delicate instrument of science, the issue of which recent State shall have which acres of territory or which ideological bigotry shall triumph is a trivial matter. It is better that a thousand human beings perish than that there be a new Dark Age. Civilization, however, is not something disconnected from men, their choice, their hopes and their powers.

Ideas should be the clothes of men's minds. The fanatic regards men as the mere body armour of his idea. The true Word is incarnate, not an abstraction or spook or Book. And is not the lesson of the history of mankind the utterly negligible importance of the politics of states? If men are to perish in Armageddons of torture, it must be for more than that. *What matters is men, not states and movements and mass man.* Goethe himself, true Humanist and good European, said: "Mankind? It is an abstraction. There are, always have been, and always will be, men and only men." That was also the lesson of Humanism Goethe sought to teach in *Hermann und Dorothea.*

This, then, is the question put to us by Aldous Huxley and Bertrand Russell, the most incisive of contemporary political philosophers, Humanists both. They insist that the noisy "political aims" of states shall be placed in the perspective of history and of their bearing on invention and progress. Will not a new Dark Age come when men plow their fields into mud and assassinate civilization, for the sake of "the Book," *Das Kapital* or *Mein Kampf,* with mechanized crusading hordes?

There is one tenable answer. Humanism itself must be defended. But, when we say this, let us remember that *Humanism is itself a matter, not of abstractions and doctrines, leviathans and frankensteins, but of sentient men and their creative qualities,* and of the heroism and "decency" of which they are capable for humane ends—so long as the ends of sacrifice be nothing less than the enlargement of mercy.

How yet shall we assess and judge the ideals of humanism, the justifications of heroism? What *are* these values? When is heroism not bigotry? It is Mussolini himself who quoted an early Christian as saying, "What does it matter to me if the Roman Empire goes to ruins so long as the cross of Christ rises in its place?" Shall we agree? Mussolini, however, has since said, What does it matter if peace perishes so long as the Empire and the Roman eagles rise in its stead? Is it not better than peace that the Roman Empire be restored under Caesar? Who then shall judge between Christ and Caesar? Or between Cross and Sickle or Sickle and Fasces? What is the norm? *What are the standards of the good?* Is there truth? That is what men today demand.

We are entitled to detect in the course of history what we shall call the "Grand Tradition," in which indeed the great moral teachers have their part—but only a part, if pre-eminent. To this main stream of tried and received values we certainly can set no precise limit or edge, of race, religion, school or class. We can yet be sure that certain names and teachings cannot be omitted from the tale. We can hold it probable

that others are well beyond the border—and this by test of inconsistency. These stand for values but extravagant values, curious vagaries of experience rather than gnomons and canons by which to judge it. There are voices speaking as having authority. They establish a wisdom that endures. Time has brought, again and again, a reappreciation of their vision and has *reaffirmed their mastership.* Sure of a certain central vision they can give a reason for belief.

The reactionary seeks to conserve whatever is to his interest or soul's comfort. In such stagnant souls superstition grows like fungus. True conservatism is that which selects what is worth conservation, that is, the enduring values, not the dead. These values are liberal and humane. The revolutionary, seeking higher aims by lower means, rediscovers the old truth that every man, released from Divine Reason, is ruled by the Original Sin of swine and jackal—as precise matter of biological fact, is cousin of the filthy, curious ape.

We can detect currents of thought moving away from this tradition, in which we have no option but to include not only a Confucius and a Buddha but a Plato and Aristotle; and again we detect currents moving back. We are entitled, in Western history, to include in this tradition those who deliberately sought to revive the spirit of the great Greeks and to interpret that tradition by them—that is, the Humanists, except where misled by the egoistic extravagance of the Renaissance. We can link Erasmus with Plato through the churchly tradition which was background for the one and found source in the other. *The appeal to reason, reason nevertheless as "logos"—as the discovery of measure and harmony and of a pattern or order of which the science gives control over Nature*—makes a common note. We remark it in Plato, in Thomas, in Cusanus, in Erasmus. And opposition to violence. The Humanists, moreover, are especially educators.

The Humanists, however, are not only rationalists. In the Catholic and later the French culture the scholastic logic held sway, but the men of the Renaissance were in reaction from logic towards objectivism in the study of facts. The same *free curiosity* inspired the German Humanists, those men who wore the cloak of Hellenism like a shirt of Nessus; who were, nevertheless, true if troubled Humanists, and, above all, Goethe. Both Voltaire and Goethe are equally entitled to inclusion within these ranks. *"Homunculus," in Faust, lives in a glass tube, his artificial civilization without which he would perish.* All Goethe's life work is dedicated to the glorifying of that civilization. *Tolerant and empiric,* here more Aristotelian than Platonic, the Humanist tradition is favourable to science but not especially democratic.

However, because thus favourable and concerned with inquiry into the actual fact, it has to include the explicit empiric school from Bacon to Locke and from Locke to Bentham and from Bentham to Dewey—in brief the Anglo-Saxon tradition which, because empiric, is also democratic, since it will exclude neither new ideas nor new ability. The working faith of Anglo-Saxony falls within the tradition.

This Grand Tradition must be construed as wide enough to include both Plato and Aristotle, both Thomas and Erasmus, both Newman and Bentham, since each indubitably belonged to it. Of this notion, it should be added, Comte had some vision, although inadequate and confused, correcting the intellectualism and "individual-conscience" doctrine that were weaknesses in Mill. It should be added also that, for all the rationalism of the great teachers, from Confucius down—even including William James—*ritual, manners and myth* have played a large part with many of them. Ritual gives shape to civilization.

In the Confucian classic, the *Li Chi* or *Record of Rites of the Younger Tai* (cent. I or II A.D., late Han dynasty), the goal of human advance is stated:

> When the principle of the Great Similarity prevails, the whole world becomes a republic, possessing a common spirit. The people elect men of talents, virtue and ability. Their words are sincere and they cultivate universal harmony. Thus men do not regard as their parents only their own parents [*cf.* Plato], or treat as their children only their own children. A competent provision is made for the aged until their death, employment for the able-bodied, and means of education for the young. The widowers, widows, orphans, childless men and those who are disabled and diseased are all sufficiently maintained. Each man has his own proper work and each woman has her own proper home. They produce wealth, disliking that it should be thrown away upon the ground, but not wishing to keep it for their own gratification. Disliking idleness, they labour, but not alone with a view to their own advantage. In this way selfish schemes are repressed and find no way to arise. Robbers, filchers and rebellious traitors do not exist. Hence the outer door remains open, and is not shut. This is the stage of Great Similarity.

Confucius also says, "if you fail in your duty to men, how can you serve spirits?"

There has always been an heretical fringe, explicitly repudiating the attitude not only of the religious teachers, but of the Humanists, and including in its numbers eminent soldiers and statesmen and certain freemartin thinkers such as Machiavelli and Hobbes and, perhaps, although a phil-Hellene, Nietzsche. All these have held that *power makes values and, among values, makes truth.* Nor would I include

in the Grand Tradition an irrationalist such as Bakunin, despite his appeal to the Law of Nature.

There is, indeed, a counter-tradition of storm and fury, Gothic, romantic, worshipping Thor and Woden, an aspiration towards the incommensurable and uncircumscribed by reason, contemptuous of law and order as being hostile to the spirit of power-loving life . . . and power-vindicating death. It is *not* only German. As Heine (who was no German) and also Nietzsche saw, it was the "counterpoint" in Hellenic civilization; it was the element Dionysian, chthonic, Panic. It pervaded Dravidian Hinduism; was repudiated by the Brahminic culture; reached its complete repudiation in Sankara.* In a Hitler, as in a massacring Charlemagne or the Viking chiefs, it reaches heroic stature. So also in Luther. It is the tradition of a country culture, a rural culture; not a civic culture, not Mussolinian (which is of the well-recognized Empire-making, old-diplomacy style). It is expressed, but as a very minor key, in the revolutionary and "prophetic" elements in Marx, in reaction against the polished French Enlightenment and transcending smug English economism. It is more genuinely expressed in the Slav, Bakunin.

Its spurring justification lies in revolt against cultures, Byzantine or French, of egoistic formality. Its opposition is to materialism, but also to rationalism, to megalopolitanism or internationalism, to the Roman legal scheme and its equality under the law. It is of far too deep tragic significance to be ignored in the history of culture. It expresses one side of human psychology, what Freud chooses to call the "Death-instinct"—one side of every man.

This "counter-tradition" is, naturally, not marked by any inner intellectual consistency. The resemblance between Hobbes and Nietzsche is more superficial than true.

In this connection the Anglo-Saxon tradition, itself Germanic, is of quite peculiar significance. A Nordic culture, a *furor Teutonicus*, however inspired by Viking heroes—a modern Germanic Islam, however led by a modern Mohammed—which yet expresses itself through a Roman Fascist (or national *socialistic*) totalitarianism, carries around its own fetters and contradiction. It points out its own termination as a movement, and the dialectical next stage. Anglo-Saxon America is yet a bridge and nexus since, below the surface in American civilization, are the same pioneering individualism and the same Nordic violence. But in America the junction has been between Nordic heroism and

* The common reader must forgive me if at this stage I do not explain myself. It would require another book. Anyhow we said farewell (friends, I hope) on page 759.

mastery of the physical facts, issuing in gigantic *natural power;* in Germany it has been between Nordic heroism and mastery of men, issuing in *domination*. As "Faustian," it finds in Faust, the inquirer, the Baconian, alchymist-chemist, the indication of the answer to its problem. Its polar and admitted opposite is American mechanization.

Anglo-Saxon empiricism (pioneering; science) transcends, then, at this point the gulf between the Grand Tradition and the counter-tradition.

The beautiful power of New York, in its engineering, however evil and "external" a beauty, with its edge of sublime promise that sometime man will actually conquer the stars, the power of this Babel-tower, is a gigantic symbol of the junction of the classical and the heroic in human creation. The other quality of value in the counter-tradition, its sense for the tragic, is not peculiar to it. Absent or weak in secular Humanism, especially in the shallower French Humanism and in Utilitarianism, Comtism and the rest, it is deep in Christian Humanism, as a spring of living water in the gardens of piety and mercy. Only sadism, sadistic ego tragedy, is omitted. And if Rousseau may belong to the counter-tradition, Rousseau, the "self-expressionist," a democrat for the same reasons as Hitler—an inspirationist—Dante emphatically belongs, as much as Sophokles, to the Grand Tradition.

This does not mean that the Grand Tradition cannot be improved upon or developed. But it does mean that, for that purpose, it must be transcended by a wider and more convincing synthesis. For the present it is *the ark of our values*, since by the judgement of its masters we are able to estimate what we mean by values. It is an Olympus persisting by co-option. This Tradition, its preservation, matters more than human happiness of the greater or smaller numbers, *because it includes them* as humanist. It answers Bentham's conundrum that puzzled Mill: What transcends pleasure? Happiness. And *my* happiness? The happiness of the greatest number, I being by nature a social being. And the greatest happiness of this generation? That of the society or State or Church or Class, which transcend generations. And this State? The Tradition of Values. In a narrower sense and for the Western world, it is "Christian Humanism," expressed in *respublica christiana*, a world federation. Its symbol is the priest-scientist.

5

If, however, in the field of values, individual men have been more sensitive or less, but there is no reason to suppose progress in the race, *the case is different with material civilization, as distinct from the spirit.*

Professor Gordon Childe, in *Man Makes Himself* (1936), adopts as a test of progress, increase of numbers. "If the total *numbers* turn out to be increasing, the species may be regarded as successful."[1] However, apart from paucity in reproduction, which need not necessarily affect such increase if survival is equal or greater, it sometimes appears that "higher cultures" die out. Professor C. L. Becker, in his *Progress and Power* (1936), taking a survey from Java man, 500,000 years ago, when he "was launched from the leafy stocks to set out on his annexation of the earth," until today, notes that "from the beginning of the Time-Scale man has increasingly implemented himself with *power*."

That power, in part (and most clearly so at first), has been power of the sword. "Without the Sword, the Pen would never have had much to do except to keep account and chronicle small beer." But, with time, come other *instruments of power*, instruments of precision and hence of machine power, able to increase material goods. This progress through recent ages is beyond all doubt. Its creators are the technocrats, men who owe their inventions to previous material discoveries but also to their own intelligence and genius. Those who have benefitted are the millions able to enjoy goods, machine-made, which once, hand-made, were available for only the privileged, wealthy few—or were not available at all.

Hitherto the world's moral philosophies, philosophies of spiritual values, have been—for the most part—scarcity philosophies, disciplines for steeling man against necessary privation. The sins of greed, envy and uncharitableness may be checked either by satisfaction and contentment or by the discipline of a workhouse philosophy. But the latter has yet this disadvantage that no measure of asceticism will fill the stomach of a starving man or cure the health of a sick one. It has this class advantage that (in a world where the comfortable have not troubled, "blessed in possession," and no new techniques of wealth and health have as yet been invented) this philosophy constitutes no threat to the wealthy and abases the resistance of the poor. Becker writes:

> The social revolution is not carried through by philosophers standing apart from the men who are to be regenerated, but by the men themselves; and so it happens that the eternal laws of Nature, which philosophers think God has engraved on the hearts of all men, are hardly distinguishable from the ideas imprinted upon the minds of the dominant social class. We note then that the dominant social class [of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries], the bourgeoisie, finding its expanding activities hampered by the arbitrary power of kings and the privileges of nobles and priests, identify the eternal law of Nature with the freedom of the individual from royal and corporate and class restraints. Philosophers tell them that when everyone is free all will be

equal, when all are equal everyone will have enough, when everyone has enough no one will be unreasonable or inhumane.

The values, however, which would give to all "enough," appear to those possessing classes who are about to be dispossessed, to be low values; and they inquire how cheap and little "enough" may be. To this the answer might be "as much as themselves have" or, in the formula of political science concerning stable societies, "that which actually produces contentment." The bourgeoisie becomes less interested in this pursuit of sufficiency for all when fine talk of social co-operation interferes with the advantage of those who have advantage, if not as noblemen by the sword, then under free private enterprise through the stock market. And, by such ways as walked the bourgeois bankers, by such walk the commissars in their turn.

The only ascertainable progress then in world history, as distinct from the *spiritual progress of individuals* towards heights scaled in the past, has been in *material progress of the mass—of the common man and his family—in the spreading of the benefits of those material gains among widening circles of common people;* and, perhaps, in the moral values of initiative and imagination, in contrast to cruelty, which favour this spreading of merely material advantage. More probably—values being constants—the progress has been in *technical devices* making possible this material progress; initiative more easy; imagination more fruitful; cruelty less necessary for survival.

This progress is measurable and quite objective, a thing of commonplace matters for common people. This material advantage, by presenting men with new problems, new pleasures and more complex environments and powers that may be *abused*, may be contrary to the preservation of the older morality intact and may therefore be regarded by honest dogmatists as disruptive. Hence the reiterated pleas by divines for a moratorium on scientific invention until (the proviso is often forgotten) political science has caught up. They then do little to make it catch up, save by contributing the salt of common-sense scepticism and a little discouragement. The science itself languishes unendowed. After all, they are comfortable and have leisure for the luxury of ideals. Nevertheless he who works for this material advance, works for the only ascertainable mass progress in the historical scale.

The demand for this progress, arising from comparisons with wealth by those of a more miserable condition, and consequent discontent, breaks the shell of earlier cultures and threatens the tradition of civilization with blind violence and aboriginal cruelty. It momentarily seems unimportant if civilization perish so be that vengeance

is taken. Goethe's phrase: "I prefer injustice to disorder," seems the final bourgeois blasphemy to nations asserting their race claims against rule of law. Evil arises to redeem the world from the stagnant reverence for that stable goodness which is in all ancient civilization and upon which the privileged have counted to suck comfort and fatness to themselves. In our recent days, with Sorel, Mussolini, Djerjinski of the O.G.P.U., and the like, it finds its apostles of violence and its red saints, as once it did in Robespierre and St. Just. Talk of violence, as Sorel understood, is the very nerve of demagogy in quarters where emotion identifies this talk with proof of sincerity.

Aristotle explained, two millennia ago, the social law of evolution from the democracy of compromise to class democracy and from this to popular dictatorship, worked upon by propaganda, and, thence, to tyranny. Nothing that that great scientist then said has been disproved. Rather all has been confirmed. Further, Aristotle, speaking consonantly with the great tradition which praises reason and denounces violence, selected *stasis* as the supreme curse of the community. This *stasis* is precisely class war. Beyond, however, praising the middle class and demanding race purity, Aristotle does not explain how this class war is to be averted whereby, with a given quantum of wealth available, the have-not classes make demands on the haves.

The expansion by invention of the quantum, together with recognition of a heritable citizen-minimum, a "floor," in a standard of living maintained by the state, is the only means to avoid head-on collision. That expansion is the work of the discoverer, inventor, technocrat. The man of property, being comfortable, unless made uncomfortable, will oppose it. That expansion is the landmark which separates one age from another; and that opposition is recurrent.

Invention is pointless for progress unless the fruits of invention are shared. This, unless unemployment is to be caused by the very invention itself and its cheapness, involves social plan—not for the sake of planning but for the sake of distribution and the liberty that springs from fair distribution. Such a plan is no necessary enemy of initiative in production or distribution; but only of the frustration of the legitimate human ends of this human initiative. It is no necessary enemy of the money-maker as ambitious manager. The planner, moreover, is also an inventor.

How then shall the inventor be permitted to plan and the technocrat take charge? How to get the man of disinterested ability into the saddle? There is nothing in history to warrant the assumption that pious aspirations for radical reformism or radical reconstructionism

will overcome the comfortable apathy of those *beati possidentes*, men of inherited and functionless advantages. There remain the route of revolution, which destroys; and the alternative route of those pressures on "interests" to which Bentham referred. The magnitude of the task by the route of reform, where the law is antiquated or the judiciary partial, is not to be underestimated.

Save in the variant pressure of discontent and misery there is no force known in politics that makes progress (which is the satisfaction of this discontent of man's nature) certain. Discontent, like functional disorders of the body, is always with us. It is the business of those who love their fellows to organize healing pressure so as to allay in time these diseases. It is the task of social physicians intelligently to direct the cure.

There is, however, a law that makes the tendency to retrogression, i.e., return to stagnation, automatic. It lies in the biological fact that to think also is uncomfortable and to be avoided. The brain was developed to overcome difficulties that need not have existed. Struggle is life.

A small example here will illustrate the point. The Romans were great horse-users and charioteers. But instead of inventing that simple thing, a collar-harness, for all their thousand years, they tied the horse direct to the shafts so that the harness pressed against the windpipe and prevented the horses from pulling their full weight. Similarly their aqueducts are giant monuments of their dullness of wit in natural science. The illustration displays how inefficiency is natural and congenial to the human mind and the inventive, technical mind a biological rarity. Brain and intelligence have been evolved as organic instrument and technique to overcome difficulties. The basic natural desire is that there should be neither difficulties nor brain nor any unpleasantness. It is reaction, then, that is automatic. Against it, in his own nature, the free spirit of man must perpetually renew itself by the immortal light of emulation, which is the redemption and sublimation of the instinct of power. That struggle is the highest moral imperative and criterion of a civilization.

6

The great, secular foe of Humanism—of Civilization—is the spirit of fanaticism and flighty dogmatism, the spirit that approves intellectually docile, unalive, short cuts to certainty, that ends in disillusion. It is by their superstitions that the ambitious rule men. After two centuries of bloody turmoil about misbegotten "ideals" a people forgets what it has been fighting about. These ideals are "residues,"

rationalizations of other motives. A country that has with patience pursued its course to the announced objects gathers the concrete rewards as speedily as one that has proclaimed and pursued its aims through fanaticism, fury and blood. So did Britain in the nineteenth century in comparison with Revolutionary France; so will the Anglo-Saxon world again in comparison with Revolutionary Russia. The fine words and furious deeds, provoking their own inevitable compensating reactions according to the laws of political psychology, have little relevance to effectual achievement. The announced heroism of Italy will end in disillusion and cynicism; only the frontiers and the masonry, but not full bellies or free souls, will be left. The task is to harness the requisite energy for quiet *achievement in terms of the time and place.* The skill to apply this requisite direction, without making cure worse than disease, is the first aim of our politico-medical art.

The Hegelian philosophy, aberrant from the rationalism of Plato and from the voluntary fraternity of Catholicism in the direction of the worship of the False State, is a dogmatic philosophy. It not only presumes to know, but will use the instruments of coercion against those who will not presume either to know or to agree. It is a false therapeutic relying upon myth and magic. Over against it is set the Empiric Tradition which is the specific Anglo-Saxon tradition from Bacon to today. (It has, indeed, recently been furnished with philosophic instruments of defence, even in the field of logic, by Bertrand Russell, whose distinguished work sounds the limits of that free spirit so favourable to initiative and to the modesties of true science.) This empiricism confronts, on an equal philosophic level, the presumptuous dogmatism of the Hegelian Dialectic, and the two totalitarian derivatives of Hegelianism, Right and Left, National Socialism and Marxist Communism. It confronts Lenin. It confronts Goebbels. The political implications of an empiric-realist philosophy, and their defence, await elaboration. This book has indicated their character.

Marxism, accepting the scheme of the omniscient Hegelian Dialectic, adds the dogma of Materialism. Over against this may be placed the philosophical thesis of energy and creative vitality. Marxism proceeds to a material dialectical interpretation of history (yet including the notion of energy) by economic environment exclusively. Over against this must be set the political and psychological truths of vital will—free will and moral choice. Over against economic factors, will for power. Marxism proceeds to the economic necessity of revolution (while uneasily including this notion of will to power). This advocacy of predestined violence and counter-violence should be put in perspec-

tive against an alternative, the possible solution by co-operation of all functional groups possessing skill and social value in order to set up a planned society. Revolution by the skilled worker yet remains a residual possibility and a driving threat against the reaction that is too comfortable to stir. Thereby Marxism itself has a function as a religion offering salvation from intolerable evil, and even rewards in this world through hunger and blood.

Fascism—militarist to the core, but replacing "class" by "race"—is a function of Marxism, succeeding later as theory, and in practice not always occurring where Marxism has arisen, but never occurring in any definable form where it has not. For this unwanted child of the Dialectic March, Marxism cannot historically rid itself of the responsibility. It does not, therefore, follow that it is desirable to revert to Liberalism. It is not desirable because it is not possible. A Third Way must be sought elsewhere; nor will empty repetition of the undefined word "democracy" discover it. Most talk of "democracy" as of "liberty" is mere parroting of ancient pieties, *flatus vocis*—empty noise. The Third Way must be that of the warrior in the name of Civilization itself—raceless and classless, but neither without the cultural autonomy of nations nor without the functions of varied groups.

Aristotle makes the assumption, from his observations, that the central principle of a healthy polity is a strong middle class. The Marxians obviously made a grave error of historical interpretation in assuming that the middle class would disappear, ground away between the concentration of capital and the growing fury of a proletariat "inevitably" brought lower and nearer to subsistence level. Increasingly the wage-workers themselves join the middle class. The Fascists have seized upon this strategic error; but have themselves adopted a Spartan worship of violence which puts them into antagonism with the Humanist tradition. This does not mean that danger is not a sorter-out of men; or that without the courting of danger and struggle, itself the nerve of liberty, the ritual of civilization would not formalize itself into a polite, Byzantine stagnation.

The future of civilization involves the connection of this readiness for struggle with the humanistic ideals that give it value. These ideals include freedom, tolerance and empiricism, "an open world" [James]. Here alone—not in glossing over incompetence, delay, apathy, selfish complacence and hog-wash—are the philosophic defences of democratic compromise against all self-styled supermen and self-conscious vanguards. They include the notion of human civilization as such. The

nation, as object of sacrifice, is no longer enough; but only the nation in the service of federated humanity. It is the task of those who use brain and skill, educated in a new, not an otiose fashion, to understand this. Such a doctrine contains the best in Marx, without his cult of force—and the best in Augustine,* with his spiritual community.

If this group of *the skilled men* of all ranks understands and leads, it can give means and meaning to a philosophy of abundance—that is, to a philosophy which presumes, with Aristotle and the Cyrenaics and the men of the Renaissance, the abundance of means; and thus it may be able to consider as possible an art in life for every man, and not a mere lean struggle for existence. There is then promise, granted a proper training in the ritual of values, for the full spiritual satisfaction of each, as well as for material optimism; for co-operation; and for the abatement of the fear-ridden Hobbesian struggle for power. Nor is a myth or eternal dogma necessary any longer, since this art supposes the perpetual solving of living problems without asserting the logical permanency of any solution. This dogma is an insufferable clog, imposed by inhuman arrogant theorists. The theorists are dangerous leaders to mankind distressed. Empiricism is consistent with art as with science; but the arts and imposed dogma have no kinship—the relationship is the death of art.

If those possessing intelligent skill and the temperament of reason do not understand, do *not* assume their responsibilities, then an unskilled proletariat, spurred by discontent and heated by a fanaticism of professional revolutionaries that rejects compromise as a sin against its religion, impassioned by superstitious faith in its own myth, will be led by that faith to war. It cannot be blamed. It will be strong enough to strike down the men of skill, in persecution, civil war and famine, although not strong enough to construct save by rebuilding again, under some Stalin, after misery, slow labour and great loss, the technical group that it has first destroyed.

It lies in the nature of these political myths that they are integral and monolithic, not subject to discussion at any point but effective as faith *because* swallowed like pills as a whole. Hence these myths are military expedients; hostile to civilization but closing the social ranks against a foe; temporally efficient as such; and dictating their own morality. They are sustained by an idealism which rejoices in ascetic self-cruelty, and in the desire to demonstrate the power of the ideal, which is "ultimate-good-in-the-long-run," by the death or subjection of its opponents. The religionists have their compensation

* *Cf.* p 142.

in the enjoyment of power themselves in the short run; and their followers feel satisfaction in a shared and reflected glory partaken with "their" heroes. The non-attainment of concrete achievements and "tightening the belt" appear, until the noon of enthusiasm fades, to be a lesser matter. Rather the multiplication and exacerbation of warfares and struggles are good . . . What, however, in fact *should* matter is precisely the contrary: *the concrete result.*

The maintenance of *Humanism*—so an objector may well say—and of decency and manners is appropriate for a *clerc* class, whose education is its capital. It is appropriate for countries either free from military menace or with wide-flung interests. Its philosophy is that civilization is a continuity not to be broken, involving duties; and that civilization, being human immortality, with its appropriate ritual, matters more than private this-life happiness. Its values are eternal. They are rational: and in the beginning was the Word, not the Act. These values forgotten, there is nothing left to give aim to life. Humanism preaches "my happiness" in my reputation as a member of a society of the dead, the living and the unborn, showing these values. It has restored a connected meaning to living. It exposes fanaticism for the insolent pretentiousness and barbarism that it is. But a philosophy of *clercs*, giving guidance in the hierarchy of ultimate values, is not, it may be argued, a practical movement in politics or even an emotional mythos. Much learning is small power and unarmed prophets seem ever to be conquered. The enthusiast demands: Show me the enemy. Whom shall I kill? The demand for blood is the emotion of politics as the demand for power is its active principle.

The man of skill, the organizer of industry, let us yet note, are not in fact interested in protecting the loaner of money derived from inherited wealth. But the *proletarian resentment against the cutting of labour costs*, before private profits, is in fact profound, bitter and only to be remedied by change. Marx thought in the pre-nationalist terms of Adam Smith and industrial classes. In the dialectic of history Fascism has succeeded to Marxism, the fount of the evil. But the latent canker and weakness threatening Fascism, despite its violence, its cynical anti-humanism, its inherited *Macht-Theorie*, is that it has not radically remedied this abusive inequality while constraining, like the Marxists, individual imagination and invention (for all its talk of individual struggle) to totalitarianism.

In highly industrialized countries, the men of high wage-earning capacity without inheritance, who above all are both interested in liberty and capable of expert skill, *the middle classes in this widest*

technical sense, neither unskilled from lack of means nor not-workers from excess of means, hold the key of power. Their political course is decisive for the rest.

In 1789 the men of money and of property were already in actual power before, appealing to the masses to follow, they swept aside a constitutional system that was rotten since the decline of feudalism and ousted the lords from power. For a while the generated passion of revolution ran beyond them. It returned to stagnancy with Thiers, in France, and to a recognition of the social facts. The Czardom also, in 1917, was rotten before it fell and had so been recognized for a generation. A handful of Marxist Jacobins knocked it down with the goodwill of the huddled peasant masses. The political and industrial bureaucracy was the only living force, men of such families as Lenin's own, but able to secure the co-operation of the workers and strikers.

In days of pyramided control, as Berle and Means* have shown, it is not the titular owners of property, inventors, shareholders, who have power but the managers. Nor does the manager-owner of the private company any longer dominate the scene. The organizers of industry and of invention, the technicians, who have for their own reasons attachment to liberty—this is the emergent governing class. Communism and Fascism compete to offer it a position of command, but on their own terms. It can have mass support if it concedes the inarticulate mass demand, focussed against "the rich man" or "the profit system." It can have mass support if, as the totality of technicians, *it can in fact provide an economy of abundance*, not scarcity, with its appropriate outlook. It can have the support of the chosen few from all ranks, the men of disinterested public spirit. If not, then—granted the misery of war or increased unemployment—the consequence is certain: the civil war of Fascism against Communism and the passage of history into the epoch of dictatorship, the Marii and the Sullas, first Octavian and then Caligula.

The totalitarian systems, be it noted, black or red, approved in some fashion by Plato and Machiavelli, by Hegel and (in transition) by Marx and by modern "organic" writers, cannot be dismissed as folly. They have in fact renewed, however brutally, the strength and pride of great peoples. Their achievements are written in stone and steel. They will not ever be surpassed, even by those who follow a tradition freer and more favourable to science and humanity, unless they are surpassed by men superior in ability, in organization, in devotion, in discipline—not less concerned but more with the pride and dignity of

* *The Modern Corporation and Private Property*, 1932.

their citizens. Otherwise Rome will meet Carthage and it is Carthage that will be deleted. The ramshackle empires of liberalism will be replaced by the militant social organism with one set of cultural values, homogeneous, of one voice, "marching like clock-work." Many will see the grandeur of the stone and the brightness of the steel, and admire it. Those who do not wish this must bear their lives in their hands and be ready to attack incompetence in high places and plausible disruption or empty boasts in low ones.

The fate of states and empires may be the small dust of history. One can be uninterested in the fate of this or that land-patch. The Grand Tradition will doubtless survive. But whether the Ark of Civilization will be borne through these next centuries without a new Dark Age, without atrocities and massacres of tens of thousands—be it in Germany, be it in Russia, be it nearer—that is the issue of history, presented for this generation. Despite Spengler, it rests with our wills. It will not be achieved without a discipline Cromwellian—more than totalitarian and mechanical—because self-imposed for the sake of liberty. Such must be the historic synthesis, the next phase of the creative spirit.

6

Each country will doubtless answer these issues in its own way, in accordance with its character and place in space and in historical time. There is yet an urgency of choice. Biological time, by which is measured the rise and fall of races by reproduction, is infinitely faster than geological time. Faster yet by far are those economic and political changes which determine the downfall of empires, as Rostovtzev shows in his magisterial *Social and Economic History of the Roman Empire.* Our survey of human history may lead us to regard many issues, such as the Arian Controversy, the Crusades and the Wars of Religion, as negligible which their times viewed with impassioned fury. It cannot lead us to the conclusion that there are never decisions, critical to the future, that have to be taken speedily. The Anglo-Saxon tradition that we have described gives an indication how, in terms of experiment, freedom and anti-dogmatism, we are likely to seek to solve our own problems as against totalitarian nations, organized in every part and armed. The weakness of the Anglo-Saxon tradition is a certain easy optimism, the fragility characteristic of democratic, highly varied civilization, and too low a respect for trained skill. On the other hand, Anglo-Saxony has unparallelled responsibilities, since it includes or

controls a quarter of the earth's surface and more than a quarter of this earth's population.

It is the especial duty of men of skill, not to wait for a lead, but to give one. The reconciliation of the problem of the need for skill and the need for liberty is the individual in community, the man of skill in defence of liberty, including his own scientific liberty to experiment. He may then vindicate those values in practice which the sages have displayed as worthy of vindication. The age of exclusive industrial and commercial preoccupations, of common sense, Cobdenite indifference and of optimistic Victorian expansiveness, each going as he pleases, has gone by. Wise men will still keep their eyes on concrete objectives and be distrustful of myths. But, whether we like it or not, the ages of crisis, of religion and of faith, whether named after Sickle or Fasces or Cross, have returned. In these we seek the Men of Power.

The onslaught of organized armed nations, human termitaries, social organisms, cannot be met by sporadic competitive individuals of talent. They must, then—the men of skill—find their voluntary community which, as Plato taught, is the stuff of their moral being in a Party designed and disciplined to achieve certain ends. These ends are those of Humanism, which provides the criteria of decency; of bread and health for the masses; decency for the many, heroism for the few; of progress to a wider life, more apt for the heritage of civilization, for the common man in his own community and in a World State sovereign over all communities as humanity is above nations; of enmity against the bigot fanatics and their atrocities, as well as the little tricksters; of gathering our own strength, without commitment to tyrannies, against the day of reckoning. Primarily the fount of power is in the ideal since it alone gives consistency. For the rest, let us recall that States are not maintained or changes made by words, but by disciplined action directed by ideas by which the world is ruled. And the ideas that are hopeless today in the sight of practical men, tomorrow prevail.

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE

*Bertrand Russell: *Power, a New Social Analysis*, 1938.
G. Catlin: *Principles of Politics*, 1931 (Allen & Unwin).
H. D. Lasswell: *World Politics and Personal Insecurity*, 1935.
R. M. MacIver: *Society, Its Structure and Changes*, 1931.
H. van Loon: *Story of Mankind*, 1927, 1931.

Bradley, F. H., *514–517*
Brahmins, 14–16
Brailsford, H. N., 705
Brahe, Tycho, 230
Bramhall, Archbishop, 232
Brandes, 525
Braxfield, Mr. Justice, 306, 311, 327
Brest-Litovsk, Peace of, 688
Bright, John, 405
Brissot, 8, 552
British Union of Fascists, 676, 740
Brook Farm, 52, 142, 553
Brougham, Lord, 357
Brown, John, 421
Brown, Thomas, 383
Brownists, 213
Bruck, Moeller van den, 542, *727–730*
Brüning, Dr., 735
Brutus, 275
Bryce, Lord, 666
Buccleugh, Duke of, 372
Buchanan, G., 222, 272, 275
Buckle, H. T., 354, 373, 577
Buddha (Sakyamuni), *5*, 15–17, 75, 767, 769
Burgess, Professor E., 753
Burke, Edmund, 306, 309, *325–331*, 335, 351, 362, 363, 366, 384, 385, 399, 400, 471, 506, 540, 690, 723
Burkhardt, J., 220
Burnett, Bishop, 243
Burton, R., 230, 231
Bury, Professor, 148
Butler, Joseph, Bishop, 350, 368, 501
Butler, Samuel, 710
Byron, Lord, 343, 353, 356
Byzantium, 61, 102

C

Cabala, Jewish, 188
Cabet, 578
Cachin, Marcel, 717
Caesar, Augustus, 41, 107, 109, 126, 158, 274
  Caligula, 41, 94, 121, 288
  Julius, 12, 41, 70, 93, 119, 323
  Nero, 41, 94, 115, 121
  Tiberius, 41, 121
Caesarism, 124, 162, 165, *539–541*
Caird, Edward, 508
Cajetan, Cardinal, 701
Calhoun, J. Caldwell, *505–506*
California, 280
Callicles, 44, 46–49, 248, 540
Calvin, J., 167, 173, *215–220*, 229, 275, 286, 291
Calvinists, 118, 248
Campanella, 543
Canon Lawyers, 86, 164, 168, 227
Capitalism, *260–262*, *605–606*, 677
Caracalla, 108
Carlyle, A. J., 186
Carlyle, Thomas, 348, 379, 393, 411, 417, 421, 471, *497–501*, 504, 508, 518, 549, 560, 565
Caroline, Queen, 350
Carthage, 11, 25, 67, 82, 102, 782
Castellion, 275
Castlereagh, 342
Catalina, 70
Catholicism, 4, 8, 28, 45, 51, 56, 62, 84, 86, *133–139*, *161–168*, 284, 288, 415, 417, 491, 502, *503–504*, 512
Cato, the Elder, 31
Cavendish, earls of Devonshire, 227, 242
Cecil, Lord Hugh, 678, 705
Cellini, B., 190
Celsus, 122
Cerinthus, 125
Cervantes, 417
Chalcedon, Council of, 133
Chamberlain, Austin, 706
Chamberlain, H. S., 730
Chamberlain, J., 347
Channing, W. E., 320
Charlemagne, 149, 736
Charles I, of England, 221, 246, 320, 469
Charles II, of England, 193, 227, 228, 233, 243
Charles V, Emperor, 129, 164, 175, 273
Charles IX, of France, 204
Chartism, 336, 388, 549, 565, 566, 649, 651, 657
Chartres, 184
  bishop of, 225
Chesterton, G. K., 677
Chicago School, 753, *759–766*

Childe, Professor Gordon, 773
Children, Communism of, *61–63*
Chiliasm, 215, 220
Chillingworth, 219
China, 11, 15–18, 21, 23, 127, 141, 145, 267
Chi-Wang-Ti, Emperor, 17
Chou dynasty, 17
Christ (*see* Jesus Christ)
Christian Socialists, 549, 650
Christianity, 92, 110, 117, *122–125*, 133, 135, *141–144*, *181 186*, 276, 504, 528, 535, 563, 580, *624–625*
Church, theory of, 125, 135, *139–142*, *164–165*, 167, 177, *180–186*, 229, *239–240*, 263, 267, 274
Church Fathers (Patristic writers), 27, 30, 190, 216, 283, 520
Churchill, Winston, 31
Cicero, M. Tullius, *119–121*, 125, 149, 187, 234, 235, 320
Clapham, Professor, 343
Clarendon, earl of, 243, 245, 349
Class, theory of, 112, 127, 145, 267, 400, 548
Claudian, 126
Clemenceau, Georges, 682, 705, 712
Clement, St., of Alexandria, 136, 138
Clement VII, Pope, 192
Clement XIV, Pope, 267
Clericalism, 183
Cobbett, William, 348, 373, 376, 379, 518
Codex Justinianus, 129
Cohen, Professor Morris, 658
Coke, Sir E., 225, 229, 230, 272, 274, 309
Colbert, 370
Cole, G. D. H., 649, 653, 665, 683
Coleridge, S. T., 343, 348, 382, 389, 497, 549
Colet, J., 543, 700
Collectivism, 286, 431, *558–560*
Colquhoun, P., 346
Columbus, C., 190
Comitia, 128
Communism, 8, 28, 40, 46, 59, 68, 69, 98, 135–137, 142, 182, 259, 262, 268, 281, 286, 288, 399, *525*, 548, 550, 552, 553, 556, 607, 625, 629, *631–645*, 660, 675, 717
Communist Manifesto, 566, 574
Community, 23, 238, 308, 516
Comte, Auguste, 428, 515, 533, 552, 554, *745–747*, 751, 770
Conciliarists, 266, 267
Condillac, 349
Condorcet, marquis de, 329, 376, 400, 466, 467, 552, 554, 745
Confucius, *17–23*, 43, 51, 73, 82, 767, 769, 770
Congregationalists, 307
Consent, theory of, 224, 266, 267, 274, 278, 279, *281*
Constantine the Great, 127, 133, 161, 204
Constantinople, 148, 170, 175, 187
Constitution, of United States, 272
Contract, governmental, 152, 155, 272, 274, *275*, 276–279
  political, 294
  social, 118, 235, 243, 274, *278*, 409, 449, 451, 452, 455, 462, 479, 703, 710, 750
  (*See also* Locke)
Convention, 129
Coolidge, Calvin, 654, 655
Co-operation, theory of, 245
Co-Operative Magazine, 558
Co-operatives, 401, *546–548*, 551, 554
Copernicus (Koppernigk), 27, 188, 190
Corporate State, theory of, 159, 239
Cosin, Bishop, 229
Cotton, John, 307
Coulton, Dr., 189
Counter-reformation, *210–220*, 267
Covenant, 155, 279
Cowper, William, 353
Cranmer, Archbishop, 417
Cripps, Sir Stafford, 656, 665, 683
Croce, B., 488, 576
Cromwell, O., 64, 66, 68, 220, 228, 229, 234, 239, 246, 280, 300, 499, 651
Cues, Cardinal Nicholas of (Cusanus), *265–266*, 267
Curiales, 108, 139
Custom, 224, 238, 267, 268, *270–271*, 274, 278, 288
Cynics, 29, 92, 112, 113, 115, 116, 123, 135, 266, 322
Cyprian, St., 139, 142

Cyrenaic School, *112–113*, 117
Cyrus, the Persian, 23

D

Dalton, Hugh, 697
Damiens, 339
Dana, C. A., 567
Daneau, L., 276
Dante, 75, *176–177*, 178, 179, 190, 196, 199, 208, 248, 252, 703, 772
Danton, 348, 304, 472
Darwin, C., 29, 188, 403, 408, 528, 747
David, King, 59, 122, 150, 155
Dawes Plan, 740
De Bonald, 553, 656, 657, 712
Decalogue, Jewish, 214
Deists, 342
De Leon, 661
De Lolme, J. L., 246, *305–306*
De los Rios, Señor, 674
Delphi, 26, 30, 33
Democracy, 27, 28, 38, 48, 55, 69, 89, 199, 216, 228, *266–268*, 270, 271, 307, 388, 398, 463, *555*, 557, 607, 634
Democritus, 232, 251, 563, 570
Demosthenes, 320
Descartes, R., 25, 230, 232, 243, 249, 251, 412, 483
Desmoulins, Camille, 472
Despotism, Benevolent, 417
Dewey, Professor John, 52, 85, 368, 580, 753, 770
Diadochoi, 105
Dialectic, Marxian, *572–576*
Dialogues, 32, 42
D'Ibelin, Jean, 154
Dickens, Charles, 346
Dictatorship, 28, 200, 238, 239, 274, 607, 626, 632, 634, 641
Diderot, D., 7, 169, 351, 441, 449
Dimitrov, G., 646
Diocletian, Emperor, 109–140
Diogenes Laertius, 63, 77, 112
Dion, 35, 67, 68
Dionysius, of Oenanda, 35, 36, 43, 65, 67–69, 73, 118
Disraeli, Benjamin, earl of Beaconsfield, 38, 76, 402, 507
Distributivism, *554–555*, 677
Divine Right of Kings, theory of, 215
Dogma, 231, 285, 287
Dominic, St., 163, 168, 173, 262, 264
Dominion, 269, 270
Dominium Civile, 158
Donatus, 149
Dorislaus, 228
Dover, Treaty of, 193
Dubois, Pierre, 178, 205, 304, 703
Duguit, L., 658, 663, 750
Dühring, E., 566, 578, 625
Dumont, 357
Duns Scotus, 173, 187, 221, 263, 282
Duplessis-Mornay, 276
Du Pont de Nemours, 370, 371
Durbin, E. F. M., 684
Durkheim, E., 397, 709, 748, *749–750*, 754
Dutt, Palme, 676

E

Eastman, Max, 687
Éclaircissement, 468
Economic law, 375
Economics, 3, 372
Economists, classical, 202, 348, 370, 374, 376, 403
Eddington, Professor, 619
Edict, Perpetual, 129
Education, 548
Edward I, of England, 178, 281
Edward VIII, of England, 667
Edwards, Jonathan, 339
Egoism, 18
Egypt, 11, 12, 15, 16, 23, 24, 34, 74, 146, 182
Ehud, 273
Einstein, Professor, 70
Eisenach, 578
Eisner, Kurt, 733
Eleatic School, 115
Eliot, George, 406
Elizabeth, of England, 209, 220, 276
Elliott, Professor W. Y., 267, 347, 661
Emancipation, Catholic, 193
of slaves, 651
Emden, 159
Emerson, Ralph Waldo, 420, 422

Empire, theory of, 125, *126–127*, *177–180*, 248, 274
Empiricism, 169, 190, 227, 231, 622, 777, 779
Encyclopaedists, 25, 443, 554
Engels, F., 352, *563–601*, 602, 604, 606, 618, 619, 622, 625, *627–630*, 635, 643, 675, 680
Epictetus, 108, 115
Epicurus, 29, 113, *117–119*, 135, 563, 570
Épinay, Madame d', 442
Equality, theory of, 112, 115, 138, 224, 414, 546, 553, 560, 643
Er, the Pamphylian, 66
Erasmus, D., *211–212*, 232, 362, 700, 769
Erastus, 193, 204
Erskine, 332
Espinas, 709
Ethics, theory of, 33, 52, 74, 97, 113, 512, 514, 625
Eudemus, 77
Eugenics, 28, 69
Euripides, 28, 38, 61, 72
Executive, 237, 259, 279
Experiment, 286, 287
Eyre, Governor, 391

F

Fabian Society, 551, 650–652, 664
Factory Act, 649
Famine, 645
Fascism, 4, 8, 48, 51, 79, 91–98, 98, 137, 262, 274, 281, 286, 288, 559, 576, 581, 678, 680–682, *700–744*, 778, 780
Fascist Decalogue, 725
Faust, 5
Federalism, theory of, 161, 266
Feiling, K., 406
Feminism, 28, 40, 61, 69
Fénelon, Archbishop, 224
Ferdinand, of Spain, 205, 273, 408
Ferrante, King of Naples, 189
Ferrero, Professor, 145, 726
Feudalism, *150–159*, 207, 208, 221, 274
Feuerbach, L., 563, 571, 573, 618, 619
Fichte, J. G., *476–480*, 484, 534, 621, 675
Field, R., 226
Figgis, Dr. J. N., 145, 205, 255, 266, 653
Filmer, Sir R., *224*, 226, 234, 288, 336
Fitzherbert, T., 227
Fitzhugh, G., 504
Fitzralph, Archbishop, 157
Flavius Clemens, 122
Fletcher, of Saltoun, 66
Flexner, A., 70
Florence, 176, 191, 192, 197
Florence, Professor P. Sargant, 753
Force, idea of, 207, 652
Ford, Henry, 226, 332
Fortescue, Sir J., *264–265*, 266, 271
Fouillée, 710
Fourier, C., *553–554*, 556, 558, 578
Fourteen Points, 705, 727
Fox, Charles James, 29, 319, 331, 343
Fox, G., 308
France, Anatole, 463
Francis, St , 163, 180, 262, 497
Francis II, of Habsburg, 736
Frankfurter, Felix, 654
Franklin, Benjamin, 308, 351, 352, 372, 376, 379, 394, 704
Fraser, Sir James, 11
Frederick I, Barbarossa, Emperor, 164, 175
Frederick II, Emperor, 175
Frederick II, of Prussia, 324, 351, 413, 536, 736
Free trade, 343, 379, 478
Freedom, theory of, 513, 761
Freud, S., 713
Friends, Society of (Quakers), 114, 212, 213, 307, 308, 409
Führer-princip, 55, 737

G

Gaius, 130
Galen, 131
Galileo, 227, 230
Gassendi, 230
Gelasius I, Pope, 165, 175, 247
General will, theory of, 452–454
Genghiz Khan, 147
Gentile, Giovanni, 719, 730
Gentilis, 701, 702
Gentillet, 194
George, David Lloyd (*see* Lloyd George, David)

George, H., *551*
George II, of England, 193, 350
George III, of England, 319, 326, 332, 347, 358, 359, 361
George V, of England, 655, 668
Gerard, 339
Gerber, C. E. von, 532
German Socialists, 578
Ghibellines, 4
Gibbon, E., 140, 302, 352, 700
Gierke, O. von, 160, 183, 186, 653
Giovanni Maria, of Milan, 190
Girondins, 241, 403, 469
Gladstone, W., 311, 402, 567
Godly price, theory of, 215
Godwin, W., 334, *337–341*, 343, 354, 366, 374, 376, 380, *544*, *555*, 560
Goebbels, Dr., 85, 541, 730
Goering, General, 44, 725, 735, 737
Goethe, W., 88, 211, 402, 417, 426, 476, 552, 700, 769, 775
Goldman, Emma, 430
Goldsmith, O., 325
Gompertz, T., 402
Gooch, G. P., 255
Gordon Riots, 346
Gore, Charles, Bishop, 502, 549
Gorki, M., 624
Görres, 475
Gosnell, Professor H., 753
Gospels, Holy, 78, 249
Gotha, 603, 642
Goths, 144
Gournay, 370
Government, theory of, 216, 246, 270, 336, 398
Governmental contract (*see* Contract, governmental)
Gracchi, 119
Gratian, canonist, 133, 260
Gratian, Emperor, 161
Green, T. H., *508–514*, 518, 549, 630
Gregory I, Pope, 149, 165
Gregory VII, Pope, 131, 161, 165, 168, 207, 410
Gregory IX, Pope, 245
Gregory X, Pope, 173
Gregory, St., of Tours, 149
Grey, Lord, 332
Grimm, Baron, 444
Groot, H. (or Grotius), 235, 236, 238, 268, 701, *702–703*
Groups, concept of, 711
Guedalla, P., 347
Guild Socialism, 160, *555*, 730
Guises, 203
Guizot, 567
Gumplowicz, L., 711

H

Habsburgs, 203, 220
Hadrian, Emperor, 111, 121, 129
Hadrian IV, Pope, 161
Hadrian VI, Pope, 184
Haeckel, Professor, 621
Hague, First Congress of, 705
Haldane, J. B. S., 742
Haldane, Lord, 655
Hall, Charles, *545*
Hamilton, Alexander, 310, 314, 323, 345
Happiness, theory of, 349, 350
Hardie, Keir, 560
Harmony Hall, 546
Harnack, 162
Harrington, J., 96, 272, 300, 303, 577
Harrison, F., 516
Hartley, 395
Hartmann, E. von., 477, *526*
Harvey, 230
Hastings, Warren, 327
Hazlitt, 325, 356, 368
Heard, Gerald, 453, 711
Hearnshaw, Professor, 192
Hedonism, 367
Hegel, G. W. F., 45, 48, 78, 160, 253, 285, 403, 444, *475–496*, 504, 508, 511, 514, 523, 525, 531, 533, 535, 554, 563, 570, 580, 604, *620–624*, 708–710, 723, 777, 781
Heine, 412, 564
Hekademos, 37
Hellas, 24, 25, 27, 28, 32, 33, 38, 60, 61, 72, 79 82, 96, 103
Heloïse, 166
Helvétius, 338, 349, 351, 366, 369, 394
Henry, Patrick, 315
Henry IV, Emperor, 156

Henry VII, Emperor, 176, 177
Henry I, of England, 271
Henry II, of England, 152
Henry III, of England, 171
Henry IV, of England, 240
Henry VI, of England, 264
Henry VII, of England, 205, 438
Henry VIII, of England, 94, 165, 213, 215, 272, 326, 407, 668
Henry III, of France, 205, 209, 275
Henry IV, of France, 203, 204, 222, 275
Heptaplomeres, 205, 249, 250
Heracles, 48, 72
Heraclitus, 28–30, 43, 52, 251
Herakleides, 68
Herald Tribune, 569
Herman of Metz, Bishop, 165
Hermias, 73
Herodotus, 26, 43, 55, 65, 108
Hibben, President, 617
Hill, Octavia, 550
Hindu, 66, *525*
Hippias, 34, 52
History, 164, 202, 233, 254
  economic interpretation of, *576–581*
Hitler, Adolf, 65, 95, 96, 126, 177, 204, 353, 378, 480, 669, *731–740*
Hoadley, Bishop, 320
Hoang-Ho, 17, 24
Hobbes, T., 47, 85, 250–252, 254, 264, 269–272, 275, 277–279, 288–290, 295, 298, 301, 313, 327, 349–351, 356, 366, 367, 369, 384, 402, 413, 415, 437, 454, 457, 501, 521, 570, 572, 578, 628, 630, 703, 707, 751, 770
Hobhouse, L. T., 523
Hobson, J. A., 612, 683
Hobson, S. G., 653
Hoelz, Max, 734
Hogben, Professor Lancelot, 753
Holbach, Baron d', 366, 466, 563, 751
Holmes, O. W., 405, 555, 654
Holy Alliance, 704
Holyoake, G. J., 546
Homer, 23, 40, 529
Homogeneity, cultural, 226
Hook, S., 521, 580, 683
Hooker, R., 226, 233, 279, 282, 289, 292, 293, 306, 321
Hoover, President, 664
Hôpital, Sieur Michel de l', 204
Hopkins, S., 309
Horace, 113, 117
Hotman (Hofman), *273–274*
Houseman, A. E., 367
Howe, Quincey, 696
Hu Shih, 176
Huguenots, 273–276, 283
Human progress, doctrine of, 704
Humanism, Christian, 772
  theory of, 768, 780, 783
Humanists, 769, 770
Humboldt, A. von., 567
Humboldt, W. von, 397, 415, *417–420*, 421, 552
Hume, David, 332, 349, *351–356*, 367, 368, 372, 376, 380, 412, 420, 444, 560, 563, 571, 617, 621–623, 751
Huns, 147
Huss, J., 158, 267
Huxley, Aldous, 83, 103, 418, 419, 551, 690, 700, 711, 756, 768
Huxley, Thomas, 411, 507, 617, 621, 623, 748
Hyndman, H. M., 409, 550, *602*
Hypatia, 144

I

Iamblichus, 122
Ibsen, 52
Ignatius Loyola, St. 163
Ihering, Professor R. von, 416, 748, 749
Independence, Declaration of, 310, 316, 318, 365
Independent Labour Party, 551, 560
Index, Papal, 58, 206
Individualism, theory of, 112, 114, 125, 220, 233, 270, 273, 275, 279, 284, 286
Indulgence, declaration of, 204
Inge, Dean, 113, 212
Innocent III, Pope, 166, 167
Innocent IV, Pope, 208, 261
Innocent VIII, Pope, 189
Inquisition, Holy, 58, 205
Instinct, 131, 268
International, Amsterdam, 559
  First Socialist, 427

International, Moscow, *559*
Vienna, *559*
Internationalism, *700–744*
Investiture Controversy, 164, 179
Irenaeus, St., 161
Ireton, General, 229, 280, 317
Isidore of Seville, St., 131, 142, 221, 264
Islam, 144, 181
Isocrates, 82
Ivan the Terrible, 94
I.W.W., 653

J

Jackson, A., 231, 311, 324, 363, 643
Jacobin, 331, 343, 409, 420
Jaeger, Werner, 77
James, Henry, *52*
James, W., 191, 282, 621, 663, 770
James, I, of England, 219, *222–224*, 233, 268, 272, 275, 277, 320
James, II, of England, 204, 246, 271, 282, 291, 319
Jandun, Jean of, 179
Jansen, Bishop, 163
Jeans, Professor, 619
Jefferson, T., 8, 231, 282, 310, *315–324*, 351, 368, 410, 456, *517*, *556*, 748.
Jellineck, George, *533*
Jerome, St., *149–156*,
Jerusalem, Kingdom of, 153
Jesus, Society of (Jesuits), 29, 61, 169, 211, 229, *267–271*, 274, 279, 465, *551*, 765
Jesus Christ, *5*, 30, *122–124*, 212, 767
Jews, 98, 111, 135, 170
Joad, Cyril, 32
John, King of England, *155*, 327
John, St., 125, *166–167*
John of Gaunt, 156, 158
John of Salisbury, 190, 215, 225, 273
John XXII, Pope, 262, 266
Johnson, Dr. Samuel, *59*, 349, 353, 367, 443, 700
Jonson, Ben, 227
Joseph, H. W. B., *523*
Jowett, B., 79
Judiciary, 237, 259
Jukes, Margaret, and family, 407, *519*
Julian, Emperor, 117
Jurieu, 283
Jurisprudence, 37, *130–133*
Jus gentium (Law of Nations), 128, 130, 269
Jus Naturale (*see* Law, Natural)
Justin, Martyr, St., 122
Justinian, Emperor, 129, 134, 148
Juvenal, 104, 110

K

Kaganovitch, 639
Kallisthenes, 105
Kamenev, 614, 639
Kant, I., 296, 354, 365, 391, *411–417*, 444, 483, *511*, *514*, *527*, *528*, *535*, *560*, *571*, 617, 622, 623, 700, 703
Kapital, Das, *566*, *569*
Kautsky, Karl, *574*, *576*, 604, *606–609*, *626–628*, 634
Keith, Professor Berriedale, 668
Kelvin, Lord, 6, 753
Kerensky, *613–615*, 635
Kerrp, Hans, 737
Keynes, J. M., 390, 687
Keyserling, Count von, 541
Kheops, Pharaoh, 12
Kingship, Divine, 11
Kingsley, Charles, 549
Kleanthes, 116, 117, 265
Kleobulos, 24
Knight-service, 151
Knossus, 23
Knox, John, 203, 271, 275
Koppenigk (Copernicus), 190
Kratinos, 36
Kritias, 31
Kublai Khan, 147
Kun, Bela, 735
Kung Ki, 20

L

La Rochefoucauld, 254, 349, 395
Laband, Paul, 533
Labour, manual, 423
Lacedaemonian, 92
Lafayette, marquis de, 318

Langenstein, Henry of, 262
Langton, S., Cardinal, 271, 327
Languet, H., 276
Lansbury, George, 549
Lao-Tze, 18–20, 22, 43, 120, 430, 700, 757
Laski, H. J., *654–676*, 696, 697
Laski, Nathan, 654
Lassalle, Ferdinand, *502–503*, 568, 705
Lasswell, Professor H., 753, *754–756*
Lastheneia, of Mantinea, 37
Lateran, Third Council of, 261
Laud, Archbishop, 221, 225, 271
Law, Ancient, 10
  Canon, 86, 130, 133, 158, 168, 263
  Civil, 130, 132
  Common, 130, 229, 230, 241, 271, 272, 275
  Constitutional, 225, 271, 272, *531–534*, 629
  Moral, 240
  Natural, *116*, 120, *130–131*, *167–168*, 206, 207, 209, 225, 227, 236, 241, 246, 251, *264–266*, *268–269*, 272, 274, 276, 511, 662, 760, 761
  Roman, *128–132*
  theory of, 107, 115, 133, 159, 241, 246, 269, 360
Lawrence, D. H., 713
Lawrence, T. E., 77
Laws, The, 42, 55, 57, 59, 74, 92, 97
League of Nations, 177, 281, *522*, 705–707
Legislature, 279
Leibnitz, G., 243, 252, 403, 412, 416, 765
Leisure, problem of, 28
Lenin, N., 319, 353, 540, 560, 572, 574, *575*, 580, 608, *609–633*, *634–638*, *640–645*, 653, 657, 664, 675, 695, 712, 751
Leo I, Pope, 161
Leo X, Pope, 279
Leo XIII, Pope, 503
Lerner, Professor Max, 753
Leroux, P., *555*, *557*, *559*
Lessing, 205, 417, 444, 475, 563
Levasseur, 471
Levellers, 234, 281
Leviathan, 228, 233, 243
Levin, Professor, 693
Levy, Professor H., 7
Leyden, Jan van, 212
Liberalism, 94, 201, 220, 222, 287, 402, 408, *557*, 720
Liberty, theory of, 34, 40, 133, 217, 240, 250, 283, 257, 288, 398, 414, 415, 506, 527, *534–535*, 556, 560
Liebknecht, W., 568, *603–604*, 613
Lilienfeld, P. von, 709
Lincoln, Abraham, 103, 324, 456
Lind, John, 319
Lindsay, A. D., 356, 693
Linguet, *552*
Livingston, E., 357
Livius, T., 233
Lloyd George, David, 630–631, 633, 654, 688
Locke, J., 8, 242, 259, 278, 279, *282–298*, 302, 303, 306, 309, 314, 318, 320, 321, 323, 324, 351, 354, 367, 372, 374, 384, 403, 509, 770
Lodge, Senator H. C., 705
Long Parliament, 219
Lorenzo the Magnificent, 188, 190, 203
Lorenzo the Younger, 192
Louis IX, of France, 171
Louis XI, of France, 205, 264, 438
Louis XV, of France, 225, 301, 324
Louis XVI, of France, 29, 468, 469
Louis Philippe, *556*, *560*, *566*
Lowell, President, 655
Lucretius, 111, 118, 232, 242
Ludendorff, General, 735
Ludwig IV, Emperor, 179, 263
Lumpenproletariat, 86
Luther, M., 204, *211–213*, 220, 221, 232, 271, 276, 286, 296, 460, *535*, *553*
Lyceum, 73, 78
Lyons, Council of, 261

M

Mably, Abbé de, *552*
Macaulay, Lord, 47, 348, 374, 382, 384–386, 403
McCulloch, 370, 375
Macdonald, J. R., *655*, 663
McDougall, 709
Macedon, Philip of, 72, 73
Mach, 617, 620, 621, 623

Machiavelli, N., 4, 48, 49, 158, 173, 191–208, 209, 220, 226, 227, 240, 243, 254, 275, 295, 300, 304, 356, 366, 389, 700, 718, 722, 751, 770, 781
McIlwain, Professor, 186, 255, 264, 272, 310
MacIver, Professor, 711
Madison, President, 357
Magna Carta, 155, 230, 271, 272, 291
Magnificat, 159
Maine, Sir H., 10, 332, 435
Mainwaring, 221
Maistre, de, 553, 712
Maitland, F. W., 152, 160, 186, 246, 313 411, 653
Majorities, theory of, 244
Malinowski, B., 63
Malthus, R., 320, 370, *375–380*, 381, 403, 408, 577
Manchester School, 405, 406
Mandeville, 349
Manigold, 155
Manning, Cardinal, 502
Mansel, Dean, 502
Marat, J., 470
March on Rome, 718, 719
Marcus Aurelius, 110, 111, 115, 122, 141
Mariana, J., *273*, 275, 276
Maritain, J., 182, 259, 504, 657
Marius, 70, 119
Marshall, Alfred, 753
Marshall, John, 311
Marsiglio, of Padua, *178–181*, 188, 204, 208, 209, 240, 245, 250, 252
Martineau, H., 497
Martov, 611, 661
Marx, Edgar, 568
Marx, H., 561
Marx, Jenny, 562
Marx, Karl, 8, 59, 79, 96, 101, 142, 165, 285, 298, 300, 427, 504, 523, 554, 556, 558–560, *561–614*, *616–645*, 678, 711, 751, 780, 781
Marxism, 59, 651, 652, 659, 662, 664, 673, 678, 680, 686, 690, 697–699, 777, 778, 780
Marxist, 4, 7, 59, 64, 90, 136, 241, 329, 366, 352, 364
Masham, Sir E., 282
Materialism, 232, 243, *570–572*, 573, 574, *578–580*, 606, *617–622*, 623, 624
Mathematics, 230, 231, 233
Mather, Cotton, 307
Matteotti, 720
Maultasch, Margaret, 179
Maurice, F. D., 549
Mauss, Professor M., 750
Maximinus, Emperor, 41
Mayhew, Jonathan, 320
Mazarin, Cardinal, 234
Mazzini, 609, 707, 708
Means, G. C., 401, 781
Medici, Catherine de', 199, 203, 204
Medici, Julian de', 192
Melancthon, P. (also Schwartzerd), 24, *213–216*
Melbourne, Lord, 384
Mellor, W., 683
Melos, 208
Melville, H., 219
Mencius (Meng), 21, 22, 209
Menenius Agrippa, 233
Mensheviks, *611–613*, 633
Mercier, Cardinal, 370
Merriam, Professor Charles E., 753
Metternich, 707
Mikado, 72, 94, 95
Milan, Edict of, 204
Mill, James, 282, 357, 373, 374, *381–389*, 392, 402
Mill, J. S., 282, 314, 334, 350, 362, 374, 375, 379, *390–403*, 411, 417, 419, 428, 435, 436, 506, 512, 517, 623, 704, 747, 751
Milton, J., 271, 276, 280, *283–285*, 306, 320, 384, 517
Mind and matter, theory of, 484, 485
Minorities, rights of, 90, 281
Mirabeau, 29, 320, 370, 379, 418
Mitford, 28
Mithraism, 107, 122, 133
Moerbeke, William, Bishop of, 140
Molière, 386
Monarchies, new, 205, 221, 278
Monarchomachi, 275
Monarchy, N., 94, 228, 238, 241, 243, 246, 273, 274, 280, 284
Monasticism, *142–143*, *162–163*

Monism, *575*
Montaigne, M. de, 282
Montesquieu, 83, 300, 301–305, 327, 354, 661
More, Sir Thomas, 66, 271, 402, *543–544*, 545, 550
Morel, E. D., 631
Morelly, *551–552*
Morley, Lord John, 162, *507–508*, 655
Morris, William, 519, *549–551*
Morton, Regent, 272
Moses, 131
Mosley, Sir Oswald, 676–678, 692, *740–744*
Motley, *275*
Moulton, Professor, 693
Montfort, Simon de, 264
Müller, A., 480
Mussolini, B., *65*, 95, 195, 196, 353, 378, 540, *714–726*, 740, 768
Myres, Professor, 9
Mysticism, 573

N

Nantes, Edict of, 204
Napoleon I, 41, 48, 72, 93, 126, 129, 342, 348, 417, 472, 499
Napoleon III, 93, 554
Napoleonic Wars, 704
National Socialist (Nazi) (*see* Fascism; Internationalism)
National Socialist Programme, 734
Nationalism, 191, 210, 707
Natural Law (*see* Law, Natural).
Nature, 116, 118, 129, 231, 273, 276, 618
  human, 201, 224, 230, 232, 254
  State of, 278, 446–448
Nearing, Scott, 681
Negro, American, 38
Neo-Platonism, 121, 123, 135, 144, 170, 174, 190
Nerva, Emperor, 129, 222
Netherlands, 276
Nettleship, 513
Nevinson, H. W., 655
New Deal, 664, 672, 683
New Harmony, 546
New Jersey, 280
Newman, J. H., Cardinal, 287, 354, 501–502, 549, 770
Newton, Sir I., 75, 286, 320, 323, 342, 350
Nicholas II, Czar, 705
Nicholas III, Pope, 262
Nicholas V, 175
Nietzsche, F., 29, 33, 47, 69, 403, 480, *526–528*, 536, 708, 770
Nihilists, Russian, 427
Nobility (*see* Aristocracy; Oligarchy)
Nordhoff, 142, 546
North, Lord, 327
Northmen, 147
Novalis, 417, 478, 563

O

Obedience, passive, 213, 215, 221
Occam, William of, 156, *179*, 180, 262, 263, 270, 366
O'Connor, F., 566
Octavianus Augustus, 107, 109, 126, 158, 274
Ogburn, Professor, W. F., 753
Oligarchy, 89, 199, 200, 216, 266
Oliver, Garcia, 480
Oliver, Lord, 651
Olsen, Governor, 672
Organism, social, 239, 270, 281, 709–711, 747–750
Orosius, 135, 144
Orphic mysteries, 33, 133, 546
Otto of Freising, Bishop, 164
Owen, Robert, 322, *545–549*, 554, 556–560, 573, 577, 578, 704
Oxford Idealists, 508
Oxford Movement, 653

P

Pacifism, doctrine of, 135, 700
Paine, T., 298, 334, *335–337*, 342, 343, 347, 361, 380, 534
Paley, Archdeacon, 329, 346, 349
Palmerston, Lord, 346
Pandects, 129
Pantheism, 101
Papacy, 30, 95, 136, 152, 161, 165, 175, 179, 181, 267, 269, 270, 274, 277
Papen, von, 735
Pareto, V., 713, *751–753*

Park, Professor R., 753
Parliamentarians, 320
Parr, Dr., 345
Parry, Major, 357
Parsons, Professor T., 753, 754
Pascal, 287, 329, 354, 395
Pater, Walter, 417
Paul, St., 124, 215, 220, 222, 233, 266, 270, 334
Paul III, Pope, 190
Pauline Epistles, 71
Paulinus of Nola, St., 143
Peace, public, 107, 125, 127, 204, 207, 252, 273, 280, 283, 285
Pearson, Karl, 619
Peel, Sir Robert, 344, 547
Peisistratos of Athens, 94, 95
Peking, 147
Penn, William, 308, 421
People, 239, 276–278, 280
Percival, Spencer, 342, 343
Periander of Corinth, 24, 94, 95
Pericles, 35, 106, 741
Peripatetic School, 73, 111
Persia, 11, 14, 34
Personality, 281
Pestalozzi, 395
Peter, St., 124, 193
Peters, Dr. Hugh, 332
Petronius, 117
Petty, Sir William, 371
Pharaohs, 11, 12, 16, 23, 34, 35, 69
Philip Augustus II, of France, 152, 167
Philip le Bel, of France, 178, 181
Philip of Macedon, 72
Philip II, of Spain, 273, 276
Philip III, of Spain, 268, 273
Philo, 122
Physiocrats, 86, 370, 374, 551
Pi y Margal, 430
Pico della Mirandola, 56, 138, 190
Pilgrim Fathers, 280
Pindar, 45, 48
Pitt, William the Younger, 327, 342, 358
Pius II, Pope, 279
Pius V, St., 203
Pius X, Pope, 162
Pius XI, Pope, 503, 724
Plan, Five-Year, 66
  Four-Year, 66
Plato, 5, 15, 28, 30–32, 34, *35–71*, 73, 74, 76, 79, 80, 82, 83, 87, 89–91, 93, 95–101, 104, 106, 108, 113, 115, 118–121, 123, 136, 137, 143, 144, 162–164, 169, 174, 180, 182, 190, 223, 233, 243, 249, 251, 260, 267, 284–286, 304, 320, 409, 460, 516, 517, 519, 529, 531, 630, 726, 751, 769, 781, 783
Pleistocene Age, 4
Plekhanov, 608, 611, 613, 618, 627
Pliny, 122
Plotinus, 121, 144
Pluralism, 160, 653, 658
Plutocracy, 200, 227, 245
Poggio, 188
Poincaré, H., 619
Poland, 281
Polis (city-state), 24, 32, 61, 73, 82, 84, 88, 97, 98, 102, 109, 116, 118, 125, 127, 128, 141, 181, 208
Politicist, 202, 227, 231
Politics, science of, 3–7, 80, 102, 103, 191, 195, 196, 200, 201, 206, 226, 227, 231, 233, 254, 507, 509, 759, 760
Politiques, *204–205*, 207, 250
Polity, 89
Polizian, 190
Pollock, Sir F., 279
Polybius, *119*, 270, 326, 726
Poole, R. L., 162
Possession, theory of, *555*
Power, idea of, 159, 198, 206, 230, 246, *251*, 275, 762, 763
Praetors, 128
Pragmatism, 30, 574, 663
Prague, 131, 168
Price, Dr. R., *332–335*
Priest-kingship, 11, 12
Priestley, Dr. J., 329, *332–334*, 346, 368, 397
Progress, human, doctrine of, 187, 188, 376, 414, 520
Proletariat, 29, 38, 245, 562, *607–608*, 616, *627–629*
Prometheus, 45
Property, *260–261*, 269, 281, *509–510*
  private, *543–544*, 554, 555

Protagoras, 30, 41
Protestant, 56, 183, 211, 212, 219, 266–268, 274
Proudhon, P. J., 98, *554–557*, 560, 564, 574
Psychology, *231–233*, 279
Ptolemy, of Lucca, 170
Public Health Act, 649
Puiset, Sieur de, 152
Puritans, 51, 115, 117, 229
Pythagoras, 29, 37, 113, 115, 191

Q

Quakers (*see* Friends, society of)
Quesnay, 370, 372
Quiritanian Law, 128

R

Race, 210
Radicals, 348
Randolph, Edmund, 318
Randolph, Thomas J., 316
Ranke, L. von, 534
Rappard, Professor, 666
Ratzenhofer, Gustav, 711, *748–749*
Ravaillac, 339
Raynal, Abbé, 376
Reality, theory of, 123, 251
Reason, 51–54, 110, 115, *120–121*, 132, 206, 211, 216, 220, 221, 225, 231, 232, 241, 252, 254, 268, 283, 286, 288, 554
Reform Bill, 651
Reformation, *210–220*, 274
Reichsführer-schule, 62
Religion, 285
Renaissance, 3, 27, 76, *187–210*
Renan, E., 249, 721
Republic, 38, 39, *41–43*, *46–48*, 50, *55–59*, 68, 80
Republic, French, 87
Republica Christiana, 164, 206, 209, 264, 265, 276
Resurgence of learning, 27
Revisionism, 604
Revolution, 201, 234, 505, 508, 509, *612–615*, *626–631*, 635, 640
  American, 8, 316
  English, 8, 291, 310, 342
Revolution, French, 316, *331–332*, 335, 417, 467
  Industrial, 8, 343
  Russian, 316, Chap. XIX
  theory of, 28, 40, 569, 578
Rhodes, Cecil, 347
Ricardo, 370, *373–375*, 376, 545, 577
Rice, Professor Stuart, 753
Richard II, of England, 156, 158, 207, 223
Richelieu, Cardinal de, 203, 220, 234
Right, Divine, of kings, 215, 271, 276
  of popes, 215
Rights, moral, 511
  natural, 236, 241, 252, *266*, *269*, 274, 294, 406, 511, 630, 661, 760, 761
Ritualism, 18
Rivers, W. H. R., 709
Rivière, Mercier de la, 320
Robbins, Professor Lionel, 683
Robert I, of France, 185
Robert, of Sicily, 159
Roberts, Morley, 709
Robertson, W., 332
Robespierre, M., 342, 470, 471, 497, 539, 552
Robinson, J., 226
Rochdale Pioneers, 549
Roches, Peter des, Bishop, 281
Rochester, Lord, 349
Rockingham, Lord, 349
Rodbertus, 602
Roman Empire, *126–127*, 133, *175–177*, 186, 207, 210
Rome, *106–111*, 288
Romilly, Sir Samuel, 357, 360, 361
Roosevelt, Franklin D., 664, 683, 689
Rosenberg, Alfred, *730–731*
Rosenberg, Arthur, 646
Rostovtzev, 782
Rousseau, J. J., 57, 58, 61, 65, 90, 157, 278, 279, 293, 298, 302, 324, 328, 338, 342, 355, 374, 413, 418, *435–474*, 492, 493, 525, 534, 540, 554, 559, 560, 563, 636, 663, 675, 704, 772
Rueff, Monsieur, 753
Ruge, 564
Ruggiero, 557
Rurik, 146
Ruskin, John, 79, *549–550*, 700

Russell, Bertrand, 18, 298, 308, 316, 415, 431, *525*, 560, 579, 580, 700, *756–759*, 768, 777
Russia, 146, 378, *503*, *558*, 606, 609
Rutilius Namatianus, 122
Rykov, 640

S

Sade, Marquis de, 713
Sages, Seven, 24
St. Bartholomew's Day, Massacre of, 199, 203
St. Etienne, Rebaut de, 471
Saint-Pierre, Abbé de, 334, 376, 466, 704
Saint-Simon, C. H. de, *522–523*, 427, 554, 745
Salaman, M., 279
Salisbury, 184, 274
Salter, Sir Arthur, 689
Salvian, 144
Samurai, 64
Sand, James, 670
Sappho, 24, 61
Sardanapalus, 395
Savigny, K. F. von, 332, *532*, 710
Say, 375
Sceptics, 501
Schaeffle, 709, 710
Schelling, 570
Schiller, 418, 475
Schlegel, F. von, 478, 480
Schleicher, General von, 735
Schleiermacher, 570
Schmitt, Carl, 727
Schmoeller, Gustav, 751
Schnitzler, 58
Schopenhauer, A., *525–526*, 528, 576
Scott, Robert Falcon, 395
Scotus (*see* Duns)
Seckt, Otto von, 110
Selden, J., 242, 269
Seneca, 115, 116
Septimius Severus, Emperor, 437
Serapis, 122
Servetus, 218
Seydel, Max von, 532
Sforza, Galeazzo M., 189
Sforza, Giovanni M., 190
Shaftesbury, first earl of, 282
third earl of, 234, 418, 419
Shaw, G. B., 6, 33, 58, 64, 85, 96, 140, 242, 519, 553, 651, 652, 687, 710, 762
Shelburne, "Malagrida," marquess of Lansdowne, 358, 359
Shelley, P. B., *554*, *565*
Shu-King, 23
Shung Dynasty, 21
Sidmouth, Lord, 342
Sidney, Sir Algernon (Sydney), 288, 318, 320
Sidonius, 144, 147
Sieburg, F., 727
Simeon, 348
Simmel, George, *750–751*
Sin, Original, 286
Sinister interests, doctrine of, 363
Sirius, 12
Smiles, Samuel, 380
Smith, Adam, 345, 348, 362, 370, *371–372*, 407, *545*, *577*
Smith, H. A., 247
Smith, Professor T. V., 753
Snowden, Viscount, 695
Social contract (*see* Contract, social)
Social credit, 86
Social Democratic Federation, 550
Socialism, 88, 504, 530, 602, 605, *606–609*, 616, 628, 643
Socialist League, 365
Society, theory of, 50, 59, 86, 121, 267, 270, 280, *281*, 511, 557
Socrates, *30–34*, 35, 37, 41–47, 52, 60, 64, 67, 77, 83, 97, 98, 101, 112, 212, 296, 322
Soderini, Pietro, 192
Solipsism, 484, 622
Solon, 24, 35, 253
Sophists, 29, 30, 43, 65, 99, 116, 129
Sophokles, 25, 92, 772
Sophronisterion, 58
Sorel, Georges, *711–713*, 752, 775
Southey, R., 348, 380, 497
Sovereignty, doctrine of Popular, 445, 456, 472
theory of, *207–210*, 229, 236, *237–239*, 274, 275, 288
Spann, Professor O., 727

Sparta, 38, 42, 60, 91
Spence, G., 571
Spencer, Herbert, 405, *406–411*, 421, 435, 436, 507, 509, 519, 700, 711, *747–748*, 751
Spengler, O., 25, 102, 146, 538, 727
Speusippus, 37, 69
Spinoza, B. de (Espinoza), 80, 242, *248–254*, 283, 301, 353, 356, 366, 488, 489, 570, *575*, 751
Staël, Madame, de, 357, 419
Stahl, F. J., 533
Stakhanov, 62, 83
Stalin, J., 65, 95, 203, 363, *616–617*, *638–645*, 646, 724
Stammler, Professor Rudolf, 749
Star-souls, 121
Stasis, 68, 91, 96–98, 238, 243, 556, 775 (*See also* Class)
State, science of, 531
  Theory, of, 3, 25, 151, 164, 181, 197, 204, *207–210*, 267, *270–271*, 274, 284, 436–437, 515, 520, 521, 534, 555, 657
Static theory of society, 174
Stein, L. von, 577
Stephen, Sir James Fitzjames, *506–507*
Stephen, Sir Leslie, 255, 305, 325, 374, 380, 389
Stephen, of Tournai, 164
Stirner, Max, 430, *526–527*
Stoics, 33, 34, 74, 92, 102, 114–118, 120, 130, 131, 135, 251, 266, 268, 281, 501, 527, 539, 760
Stopes, Dr. Marie, 378
Strachey, John, 558, 670, 674, *676–699*
Strachey, St. Loe, 676
Strauss, 563, 570
Stuart, Mary, Queen of Scots, 219
Stubbs, W., 158, 270, 332
Suarez, F., *268–270*, 276, 279
Sulla, 70, 93
Sully, 326, 704
Sumner, Archbishop, 379
Supreme Court, of United States, 272
Surplus value, theory of, *581–587*
Süssmilch, 376, 704
Sybel, von, 534
Symmachus, 143
Syndicalism, 430, 555, 653
Synesius, of Cyrene, 144

T

Tacitus, 107, 109, 110
Talleyrand, Prince de, 348, 357, 467
Tanner, 632
Tawney, Professor R. H., 291, 693, 751
Taylor, Professor A. E., 79
Taylor, Mrs. Helen, 391, 402
Taylor, John, of Caroline, 315, 324
Taylor, O., 186
Tenison, Archbishop, 242
Tennyson, Alfred, 513
Tertullian, 138, 287
Testament, Old (*see* Bible)
Themistokles, 188
Theodoric II, 144, 742
Theodosius II, Emperor, 129, 161, 205
Theokritos, 101
Theon, 144
Theophrastus, 72, 231
Third Estate, 468
Thirty Tyrants of Athens, 31, 34, 42, 67
Thirty-nine Articles, 359
Thomas à Becket, St., 166, 179
Thomas Aquinas (*see* Aquinas, St. Thomas)
Thomasius, 279
Thompson, William, 545
Thomson, Sir Arthur, 6
Thoreau, Henry, *420–422*, 525
Thrasymachus, 43, 45, 48, 49, 248, 369
Thucydides, 39, 228, 742
Thurston, Professor L. L., 753
Tillotson, Archbishop, 363
Timon, 101, 114
Titian, 190
Tocqueville, de, 400
Toleration, doctrine of, 201, 204, 228, 241, 250, 282, 283, 287
Toller, Ernst, 733
Tolstoi, Count Leo, *422–425*, 427, 525
Tomsky, 539
Torquemada, 205
Torricelli, 230
Totalitarianism, 62, 559, 560, 781
Townshend, George, 316

Trade unions, 547, 550, 551, 560, 602, 604, *612–639*, 739
Tradition, Anglo-Saxon, 771, 777, 782
grand, theory of, 768, 770–772
Trajan, 121, 147
Treitschke, 517, *537–548*, 708, 710
Trent, Council of, 220
Troeltsch, E., 163, 164
Trotsky, L., 287, 363, 609, 610, *612–615*, *633–638*, 639, 646, 675, 705
Trusteeship, 279
Tucker, Archdeacon, 317, 379
Turgot, 370, 372
Tyranny, 89, 166, 224, 226, 229, 238, 239, 244, 245, 270, 275, 276

U

Ulianov, Alexander, 609
Ulianov, Vladimir (*see* Lenin)
Ulpian, 129, 131
Ulysses, 418
Unitarians, 342, 368
Universities, 187
Utilitarians, 16, 169, 187, 242, 245, 270, 272, 273, 342, 348, 351, 355, 362, 366, 399, 500, 507, 747
Utility, theory of, 349, 358, 365, 367, 369, 383, 395–397, 409
Utopia, 66, 543, 544
Utrecht, Peace of, 704

V

Vandals, 144, 147
Vane, Sir F., 307
Vane, Sir W., 282
Variety, theory of, 285
Vattel, 703
Vaughan, Professor C. E., 444
Vega, Lope de, 357
Versailles, Treaty of, 705
Vesalius, 190
Vespasian, Emperor, 109
Vico, 202, 204
Victorian Age, 345, 348
Vienna, Congress of, 704
Council of, 261
Vierkandt, A., 751
Vindiciae Contra Tyrannos, 276
Vinogradoff, 145
Virgil, 148, 278
Vittoria, F. de., 701
Voigt, F., 743
Voltaire, 8, 267, 370, 394, 403, 417, 449, 512, 517, 700, 704, 769

W

Wagner R., 528
Wallas, Graham, 519, 651, 655
Wallenstein, 418
Walther von der Vogelweide, 186
War, 226, 259, *537–538*
of Austrian Succession, 467
class, 28, 38, 40, 59, 69, 90, 97, 98
English Civil, 225, 234
Seven Years, 467
Warburton, 693
Ward, Mrs. Humphrey, 513
Warens, Mme. de, 440, 441
Washington, George, 303, 311–313
Webb, Sidney and Beatrice, 137, 651–653, 690, 756
Weber, Professor Max, 751, 754
Wedderburn, Lord Loughborough, 358
Weimar, 65
Weitling, *565–566*
Wellington, first duke of, 29, 347
Wells, H. G., 64, 551, 651, 653, 655, 687, 703
Wenceslaus, Emperor, 224
Wesley, John, 348
West, R., 139
Westminster, Statute of, 308
Westphalia, Peace of, 438
Whateley, Archbishop, 375, 379
Whigs, 4, 259, 282, 287, 290, 309, 320, 348, 532
White, President, 426
Whitehead, Professor Alfred North, 7 187, 211
Wilde, Oscar, 31
Wildman, 281
Will, popular or general, 281, 435
theory of, 114
Willard, Emma, 400
William I, the Conqueror, 153, 274, 291, 336

William II, Emperor of Germany, **225**, **504**, **705**
William III, of England, **282**
Wilson, James, **315**
Wilson, President, **705**, **706**
Winckelmann, **417**, **444**
Witt, Cornelius de, **249**
Witt, Jan de, **249**, **250**
Wollstonecraft, Mary, **400**
Wordsworth, W., **343**
Workers, **629**, **631**
World-Parliament, *552*
World State, **495**
Worms, René, **709**
Writing, freedom of, **28**, **40**
Wu-Ti, **147**
Wyclif, John, *156–158*, **193**, **214**, **263**

X

Xavier, St. Francis, **267**
Xenophon, **32**, **40**

Y

Yang-Chu, **21**
York Tractate, **157**

Z

Zeno, of Citium, **113–115**, **117**
Zeno, Emperor, **144**
Zinoviev, **612**, **614**, **633**, **638**, **639**, **643**
Znaniecki, Professor, **753**
Zoroaster (Zarathustra), **74**, **75**