

UNIVERSAL
LIBRARY

OU_172596

UNIVERSAL
LIBRARY

CONTENTS

	PAGE
FRANCO-AMERICAN AND FRANCO-BRITISH RELATIONS. By M ANDRÉ SIEGFRIED	225
RECONSTRUCTION IN CHINA By LORD GOSFORD, M.C.	239
TACNA AND ARICA Record of an address by Professor A. C. COOLIDGE, Librarian of Harvard University	245
 REVIEWS OF BOOKS.	
FIDDES, SIR GEORGE V. : <i>The Dominions and Colonial Offices</i> (H. A. Wyndham)	250
MARTIN, C. E. : <i>An Introduction to the American Constitution</i> ; and BOWERS, CLAUDE G. : <i>Jefferson and Hamilton, The Struggle for Democracy in America</i> ; and HIRST, FRANCIS W. : <i>Life and Letters of Thomas Jefferson</i> (J. D. Woodruff)	250
NEARING, SCOTT, and FREEMAN, JOSEPH : <i>Dollar Diplomacy</i> (DOUGLAS Hemming)	252
SETON, SIR MALCOLM <i>The Luda Office</i> (Sir Campbell Rhodes)	253
MURDOCH, the late JAMES. <i>A History of Japan. Vol. III. The Tokugawa Epoch, 1652-1868</i>	255
CORNISH, VAUGHAN <i>Strategical Atlas of the Oceans</i> (Major-Gen. Lord Edward Gleichen)	256
FISHER, PROFESSOR IRVING <i>Mathematical Investigations in the Theory of Value and Prices</i> (R. F. Harrod)	257
BUSTAMANTE, ANTONIO S. DE <i>The World Court</i> (Prof. A. Pearce Higgins)	258
WHEELER-BENNETT, J. W. <i>The World Court in 1925</i> (Prof. A. Pearce Higgins)	259
WHITE, FREDA <i>Mandates</i> (H. A. Wyndham)	259
CIPPICO, COUNT ANTONIO <i>Italy The Central Problem of the Mediter- ranean</i> (Harold E. Goad)	260
HOLL, JOSEPH : <i>The Arab Civilisation</i> (H. A. R. Gibb)	261
SHIVA, RAO B., and GRAHAM-POLE, D. : <i>The Problem of India</i> (H. A. R. Gibb)	262
APPUN, CHARLES : <i>La Politique Allemande pendant la Guerre</i> (Con- stance Vesey)	262
LIBRARY	264
FORTHCOMING MEETINGS	264

The Institute, as such, is precluded by its rules from expressing an opinion on any aspect of International Affairs. Any opinions expressed in this Journal are, therefore, purely individual

JOURNAL
OF THE
ROYAL INSTITUTE OF
INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

SEPTEMBER, 1926

FRANCO-AMERICAN AND FRANCO-BRITISH
RELATIONS

(Paper read on June 15th, 1926.)

IN the brief address which I am going to deliver to-night before this Institute, I should like to study as frankly as possible the spirit of Franco-American relations. Then—and this might look bold, as I am speaking before a British audience—I will try to analyse what I think is the spirit of Anglo-American relations. In the light of this double point of view I shall try to see what is the position of American opinion concerning the relations between the new and the old continent. This will lead me to discuss whether the French feel they have some leading interest in keeping Great Britain closely linked with Europe, or whether France could accept complacently a conception of British policy in which the centre of gravity of British interests would be drawn into extra-European concerns. If I dare to deal with such a vast subject, it is because, too often, the French have neglected, in their study of international affairs, this extra-European aspect. Having recently spent six months in the United States, I may have nothing new to teach such a well-informed audience as this, but it might be of interest for you to know the impressions of a Frenchman.

I

The French hold a special place in American sentiment. In Franco-American relations there is always something excessive, one way or the other. Sometimes there is an illusion of intimate

friendship, and thus enthusiasm overflows. Sometimes, on the contrary, delusion takes the place of illusion, and then there is an excess of bad will and bitterness. I suppose this is because interest does not regulate these relations; they are partly an "affair of passion." On the other hand, with the British, relations are dominated by a sort of family sentiment, which does not exclude quarrels, but which has something safe about it.

The original basis of Franco-American friendship is the aid brought by Lafayette to the Thirteen States, who claimed independence against Great Britain in the eighteenth century, and in the Lafayette sentiment there has been, no doubt, a common anti-British feeling. But nowadays the anti-British mood of the United States is largely gone, and if Lafayette remains a first-rate topic for banquets, it has proved to be, lately, a very poor argument in Franco-American business negotiations.

There is another link between the French and Americans, in their common democratic ideology and logomachy. Both of them use the eighteenth-century formulas. But beware of this, for while the French still respect them, the Americans only pay them lip service. While the French still think politically in terms of "liberté, égalité, fraternité," the Americans practically live and act on the basis of a doctrine of discipline, authority and race-hierarchy. Unconsciously, but obviously, they despise the French for their democratic individualism and for their failure in organising production and society on a collective basis. When they come to Europe it is easy to see that they feel more in sympathy with conceptions prevailing in Switzerland, Germany, and even in Fascist Italy. The Americans who love France as it is are numerous, but not typical. Some of them end by living all the time with us and become more French than the French. They are faithful friends but dangerous advisers, because we are tempted to think that they are representative of their countrymen.

On the contrary, one may well wonder what the typical American can really find to love in France! With us the classification of "values" is utterly different. Our conceptions of family relations, of race relations, of morals completely differ. By courtesy the French gentleman is considered a nordic, but in fact the French "coiffeur" or "maître de danse" is classified by public opinion with the Mediterranean "inferior races." Then, the realism of the French mind, trying to grasp things as they are, is misunderstood and called "cynicism." "Cynical Frenchman"—this is an expression which I heard dozens of times. Also our French love of individuality in creation and in work is looked at

by Americans as something out of date and impossible to harmonise with the modern needs of mass production.

There is thus nothing astonishing in the fact that the friends of France, although practically innumerable, remain separate entities, while the resistance to French ways and conceptions is mostly among collective trends of thoughts. You cannot expect the American nonconformist to like French civilisation, especially as he may imagine it to be according to the extraordinary descriptions of the yellow Press. You cannot forget either that the German influence has been great in America, not only on account of the millions of German immigrants but because German methods have been admired and followed. Would you allow me to add that, in many cases, the British influence plays a leading part in moulding the opinions of Americans on the French, as a very great proportion of the European news comes to America through British channels.

In fact, after observing Franco-American relations for nearly thirty years, I have come to the conclusion that they are not friendly when Franco-British relations are not friendly. I can give examples of this. When I first visited the United States in 1898, the Dreyfus case and the Fashoda affair were raging; it was a few months after the sinking of the *Bourgoigne*. The attitude of the Americans towards the French was really not friendly; every sort of abuse came into the Press, but I daresay some of it had its origin in Great Britain. I was again in America in 1904. The *entente cordiale* had begun to bear its fruits. I was astonished to see that the American attitude had been largely reversed. And this lasted until the War, when, strange to say, it seemed that there was more friendship for us than for you. Often in 1914 I was warned by Americans not to be too confident in the help of the British! But I shall tell you later that I have come to the conclusion that the Americans, while always sincere, are not always to be believed, especially when they speak badly about the British.

You know that, during the War, and especially after 1917, the enthusiasm for the French in the United States was at a climax. I regret I have not taken note of all that was said to me in 1918, when I crossed the American continent with a French mission on its way to Australia. I did not believe that the French had all the extraordinary virtues which were attributed to them by a unanimity of devoted Americans. I should be content if they would agree now that I retain at least one-tenth of these heroic and noble qualities. That was an instance in which "passion" played its part.

I can hardly explain why this changed so suddenly and so quickly. As early as March 1919, when the American army came back, signs of a change of tide could be discerned. Probably American opinion had been carried too far by an excessively efficient propaganda. Then very quickly the German-Americans—who had been silenced during the War—recovered and spoke against the French. I must add that the constant criticism of the French attitude in your leading papers after the Peace Conference seems to have been of great weight in creating in America an unfavourable judgment about France.

The French took quite a long time to realise that the great enthusiasm of 1917-1918 had passed away. The French may be quick in their brain-work, but they are slow in modifying their sentimental attitudes. I had, myself, to wait until my visit in the United States in 1925 to realise certain things. Discussing the awkward debt question with typical Americans I nearly always encountered the same remarks. "But," I would say, "we have been allies?" "Excuse me," was the answer, "We have been associates." "True," I said, "but we have fought at least for a common cause?" "Excuse me," was again the answer, "we have supported you because we thought your cause was a just one, but we had no interest in the matter. We did it because it was our duty, and now, since we have helped you to attain victory it is our duty to see that you make a fair use of it." You can see in that short talk, where the Frenchman gets a cold douche—he had expected to talk with an ally and he finds a judge. This illustrates in what way there is something unnatural in Franco-American relations. They are sometimes very friendly and occasionally cool. But they are lacking (at least in the mind of the Americans) in this essential quality—reciprocity. I shall deal again later with this point. But you might ask now why I really think the Americans went to war? Was it really from a mere sense of duty? I think the question cannot be answered if you have not studied Anglo-American relations.

II

I realise that I am here intruding on family ground, and I apologise. I understood that when a book I had written on Great Britain was translated into English and sold in the United States. Now, this book had had a favourable reception in England: you are quite "sporting" and also, I think—and I envy that in you—a little indifferent to foreign blame or to

foreign praise. Well, the American critics were much more severe to me than were the British, and the tone of their articles seemed to mean: "It is not the business of that Frenchman to judge the British! How does he know?" I saw that I had shocked them a little by writing about the British, and I then understood something important: a Frenchman should not speak ill of the British in the United States. If such a thing is to be done, it should be done by the Americans themselves, and is a privilege reserved to them.

Do you realise that such an opinion would appear quite paradoxical to the French? They have a rooted—and from my point of view false—belief that the British and Americans are permanently at loggerheads like cats and dogs.

We have an excuse for thinking so, because three Americans out of four, when they talk with us, talk in quite an unfriendly way about the British—they are out of date, lazy, perfidious. The old expression, "Perfidious Albion," rather out of date in France, still seems to mean something on the other side of the ocean. Now, my firm belief is that, when the Americans speak in this way, we ought not to believe them. First, the man who says so may often be an Irishman. Secondly, even if he is a "hundred per cent." American, he may utter such words, but they do not really express the heart of his sentiment. As long as the French do not understand that point, I am afraid they will miss something essential.

There again, in my lifetime, I have been able to watch a considerable evolution. Up to the Spanish war, it seems that the old anti-British tradition meant something deep to the Americans. The recollection of the War of Independence, of the bombardment of Washington by the English troops was often mentioned and was kept alive in the school books. Traces of it are still found in special circles, for example—so I was told—in the old navy. Again, the time is not so far off when the twisting of the lion's tail was the best trick of politicians in order to get applause. The least acute foreign observer now can see that all that trend of anti-British opinion is at its end. The past of the eighteenth century is forgotten. It seems that, since about the Spanish war, a feeling of cordiality has replaced it. What is now dominant is the consciousness of a community of race. Since the Slavo-Latin and Catholic wave of immigration of the 'eighties, the Americans feel that it is necessary to form with the British a common Protestant and Anglo-Saxon front against the "foreigners." In that respect the old anglophile tradition of

the New-Englander has won. That New-Englander may be, politically speaking, anti-British; I do not know if you realise how pro-British he is socially.

This consciousness of belonging to a common race and to a common civilisation is most strong among the Americans of Anglo-Scottish origin, but it exists among many others and especially among those who have succeeded in life. There is a sort of snobbishness, among the rich, in proclaiming their faithfulness to British civilisation in America. Even the successful German Jew is occasionally tempted to become Episcopalian and join the smart set of people of British origin.

This sentiment goes even deeper. I could easily discern a feeling of confidence in the British ways of doing things, especially in business. The Americans do not feel strange in the British world. If you realise that the old Anglo-Scottish stock is still socially the most powerful and holds traditionally those offices where the real influence rests (could you quote many Presidents who have not been Protestant and of Anglo-Scottish descent?) you will realise that, even when apparently an Anglophobe, the influential American will never consider the Britisher as a foreigner—like the other foreigners. And I think that this will last as long as the United States remains Anglo-Saxon and Protestant—though this might not mean for ever.

The character of Anglo-American relations thus appears clearly defined; you may be at times enemies, but you are at any rate brother-enemies. You cannot come to a state of definite alliance, but on the other hand a complete rupture would be unthinkable. It is a family affair. It would be impertinent of me to analyse here the sentiments which I guess to be yours towards the Americans. Let me say that I detect no enthusiasm from your side for this younger cousin, and something tells me that, when you speak ill of the Americans I can believe you. But, at the same time, you seem to have the impression that collaboration with the United States is a necessity. There is something more: when British and Americans are together among "foreigners," this fact creates between them a sort of *union sacrée*: they have the same language, the same manners (or at least approximately), the same way of approaching the main problems. This was easy to observe at the Peace Conference and also at Washington in 1921-1922.

The Americans seem to consider the British as quite useful to them in the world. In non-European commercial relations they feel that the British are valuable brokers. As I said earlier,

British civilisation satisfies them as a safe one. The commercial morality of the Empire (with certain reservations) seems to them the most acceptable, and they certainly would consider a downfall of the Empire as a real catastrophe. I have only mentioned non-European relations. But, even in Europe, there is some truth in the idea that the Americans would follow British guidance. They would not admit it, but it is so. The average American is afraid of Europe, which he does not know, and only understands with difficulty. He does not like the "cynical" Frenchman or the "Machiavellian" Italian. In the long run, through a sort of laziness, he listens to the Protestant Englishman and very often takes his view, because it is expressed by a "co-religionist," speaking the same language as himself. It then appears that a country backed by Great Britain is, in the long run, adopted by the United States, just as a country which the British dislike is in the end disliked by the Americans. For us, I do not see any useful and practicable possibility of basing a friendship with America on a rivalry between London and Washington.

But obviously there are limits to this tacit understanding. If the British try to draw the United States into a European system of policy in order to back, on the Continent, a purely British point of view, the United States Government would flatly snub them. We have seen this several times since the War, and especially at the Genoa Conference. The conclusions seem to be that Great Britain mainly interests the United States in so far as she is a non-European Power, and possibly this might explain the fundamental reason why the United States went to war. If you ask Americans, they will say that they made war from a sense of duty. If you talk with more realistic people they will say that, after many "Lusitanias" and many notes threatening that they would declare war to defend the freedom of the seas, a time came when they were obliged to declare war. But, going deeper into the motives which decided the rulers, quite a few thoughtful Americans will admit that they fought, not for France, not for Belgium, but to safeguard the maintenance of British civilisation in the world against the danger of a German attack. We then detect that there exists an Anglo-Saxon commonwealth whose limits are wider than the British Empire itself.

III

I happened to be in New York on August 2nd, 1914, and two points of view were expressed. Some people said, "We are going

to enrich ourselves enormously by furnishing the belligerents with food, war material and ammunition." But others said, "That is true, but after that Europe will be ruined and lost to us as a useful customer." Which one of these two alternatives has proved to be true? The most delicate flattery to the Americans is not to tell them that they are rich (they know it). It is not, either, to tell them that they are poor (which would be ridiculous, and they would not like it). It is to tell them "You are rich, but if there had been no war, you would be much richer!" I think the Americans have benefited by the first alternative and have reached a decided advantage by selling huge quantities of goods to the Allies. But I should say, at the same time, that they are not suffering seriously from the ruin of Europe. In the present state of affairs they are not dependent on European prosperity.

It is not my subject to describe the United States as self-sustaining. Yet, nothing true can be said of the United States if this feature of economic autonomy is not strongly emphasised. The United States only import eight per cent. of the goods they consume (1924). Except rubber, silk, coffee, tea, and to a certain extent wood and wool, they have everything they want in their own territory.

The same is true of exports. They export only eight per cent. of their total production which means, practically, that they are not in need of foreign buyers. While your principal British industries export at least fifty per cent. of their production—and some of them, like the cotton yarn, over two-thirds—the principal American industries only export extremely small proportions of the goods they produce: automobiles five per cent., pianos five per cent., boots two per cent., cotton yarns two per cent. These industries may export large quantities in actual figures, but the percentage is for them a mere trifle, and they feel a sense of independence, which you have no chance of feeling.

The question is to know whether this situation may last for the United States. I gathered the impression, from talks with the most sensible people, that it may last as long as the country is not obliged to import food and raw materials in great quantities. If a time comes when the United States is obliged, as is Great Britain, to buy abroad the main elements of its food and of the materials for its manufactures, then, very naturally, they will be obliged to export in order to pay for increased imports. When such a situation arises there may be a great change in the present status of the country: they will have to compete in foreign markets

with countries having a lower standard of living, and this they will only be able to do either by having a distinct superiority in the lowness of their cost of production or by lowering their extraordinary and abnormally high standard of living. But this is a thing of the future—possibly of a distant future. For the present, the Americans have the feeling—more than that, the conviction—that, on account of their immense natural resources, they can live their own life, at a much higher material level than Europe. This standard appears to them as an almost sacred conquest, and they will do anything to preserve it. They will admit no sacrifice of that standard of living, even a small one. This means that while you may find charitable individuals in the United States (and we French know they exist) the country at large has no sense of solidarity with the outside world—none with Asia, and hardly more with the continent of Europe. In a certain sense we could say that the main economic policy of the United States is a policy tending to defend the American standard of living.

Under what conditions is that defence carried on at present? It is easy to see that, everywhere where mass production is possible, the superiority of America is overwhelming. There they have advantages which Europe cannot have; I mean an internal market of over a hundred millions of people who all have standardised tastes, and whom it is possible to satisfy by manufacturing only a small number of varieties of any given article.

In this respect the United States could not be beaten, even if Europe were to become economically "the United States of Europe." Nowadays the real defence of American industries lies not in a customs tariff but in the condition of the American market. If the main industries remain protectionist it is more by tradition than on account of a real need of it.

The advantage of the Americans to a certain extent vanishes in lines of production where a great deal is demanded from the personality of the producer, where the number of varieties is great, where articles have to be produced "on order." Then, the high wages weigh heavily in the balance, and it becomes more difficult to have a low cost of production while at the same time you have to pay the high wages of less efficient workers. In those industries, which generally are refined industries, requiring skill and tradition, Europe keeps its superiority (especially in the high grades) and America has to defend itself by a protective tariff. This shows that there remains a great difference in the genius of the two continents and that they cannot afford to imitate each other entirely.

If I have insisted at some length on this aspect of the question, it is in order to show that the attraction of the United States does not seem to be towards Europe. The United States only buy thirty per cent. of their imports in the old continent : they buy there mostly high-grade manufactured articles and occasionally wood pulp or refined food products. But the main raw materials and foods needed by the country are bought either in America or in the continents bordering on the Pacific Ocean. These continents in the future will appear more and more interesting to the American buyer.

To return to American exports, up to fifty-three per cent. of the total go to Europe, but they are mainly exports of raw material. In the future the United States will keep more and more their raw products for their own consumption and Europe must try to find new sources of raw products in its own colonies. At the same time it is uncertain that the United States will always find a market in Europe for their standardised manufactured articles, since Europe may be tempted to manufacture similar articles herself. On the other hand, non-European countries may for a long time buy manufactured goods of the serial type in America and sell their raw products to the Americans. It then appears that the United States and the non-European countries are to a large extent complementary, while the United States and Europe are largely rivals. (The main point in which they are complementary resides in this, that the United States are superior in mass production and Europe in luxury and refined articles.)

I will then conclude that there is something unhealthy in the relations between the United States and the Continent of Europe. Europe needs American cotton, American wheat, and to a large extent American money. America is in no need of Europe. Europe is perhaps for her an interesting customer ; but in the future South America and Asia or Australia may, in this respect, appear more interesting.

If we observe American investment abroad, especially in Europe, it is striking to see how different the spirit is from what we see in British investment. The far-seeing aim of the British investor is to secure in the long run new customers. You help new countries to develop and then they buy your products. There is an exchange of services, in which either party has something to give, and which is healthy. The investments of the United States in South America partake of that character, and they are about seventy-eight per cent. industrial and only twenty-two per

cent. Government loans. But the American investments in Europe are very different : seventy-three per cent. of them have gone to Governments and only twenty-seven per cent. to industries. While it is obviously the interest of the United States to develop new countries producing raw materials, it is not obviously her interest to create new industries in Europe. In fact, American money—especially lately—has been attracted to Europe mainly by exceptional conditions in the rate of interest and also because, the United States being industrially over-equipped since the War, the overflow of capital had to go elsewhere. The way the American has invested his money looks more like the way of the French investor before the War, and I am afraid I cannot say that as praise when I compare it with your system of investment.

Without discussing whether these huge American investments of American money abroad are likely to last (and they might not continue to the same extent if the favourable balance of trade were to disappear), I want to insist on a characteristic of them which seems to me unhealthy—the absence of reciprocity between the services which the Americans render to Europe and the services they receive from her. Although the advantage of Europe is great in receiving the help of American capital at a time when she is hard pressed, there is some danger in relations which are not the relations of equals, but the relations between a lender and a borrower. It is even more dangerous, since the Americans have a sincere feeling not only of their superiority but of their “ duty ” towards Europe. They somewhat naïvely think that the fact that they bring money gives them the right of preaching to the Continent. If you do not realise that every American is an evangelical missionary you do not realise the peril which lies in this tax-collector being at the same time a sermon-maker. Much of the uneasiness in relations which otherwise would be excellent comes from that.

In the United States the mass of the public seems to desire to restrict the relations with Europe as much as possible. You find this feeling among the farmers of the west and among the great manufacturers for whom export business is not the main interest. Most of them consider Europe as a mad house “ full of sound and fury,” from which it is best to keep aloof. Among financiers you do not find this state of mind to the same extent, but often they seem to consider Europe from the point of view of “ liquidation.” They look like receivers. But, when other continents are considered, there is no reluctance in dealing with them. The far-seeing people consider that sooner or later the United States

must have, just as Great Britain had before, a policy of international communications, and a policy regarding raw materials. They feel that the United States will soon have, towards the rest of the world, a position which might be analogous to that which existed between Great Britain and Europe in the nineteenth century. To what extent are the British Empire and France and the continent of Europe concerned in such a new development of American evolution?

IV

I happen to have spent many months in England in 1923. British statesmen then appeared to be hesitating at the parting of two roads. Some said that Great Britain could never disinterest itself from Europe, that Great Britain, especially since the War, was decidedly a part of Europe. Others said that Continental people behaved like men stricken with madness, and that the best thing for Great Britain was to have nothing to do with them, and that she should turn towards the Dominions and the United States, in order to make a practical union of English-speaking countries. In that second conception Great Britain would cease to be mainly European and would displace to a certain extent her centre of gravity.

I can say that, parallel to such doubts, France is also tempted to follow one of two ways. The deep desire of the French (and they have repeatedly shown it) is to keep Great Britain in Europe and to have her interested in the equilibrium of the Continent. But, if they feel that the price to pay for that is too high, if they always see Great Britain taking the opposite view to their own on Continental affairs, if they suspect that the policy of Great Britain is to divide in order to rule and to be more that of a banker than that of a friend, then they are tempted to look to the Germans and to arrange with them separate agreements, based not on "credit" but on "real goods," and on the equality of two Continental countries. We French have well understood that to please you we must not quarrel too much with the Germans, but that, at the same time, we should not be too friendly with them. This is a delicate balance, which with much skill and good will we may realise. But the temptation of a direct agreement permanently exists, since both France and Germany have respectively a common admiration for their bravery and their high culture.

Now, whether Great Britain chooses to be more or less European, is a thing which may have important reactions on the French attitude. France also may be tempted to rely on America,

to the exclusion of the British. Some French papers repeatedly advise such an attitude. They think we can profit by your supposed quarrels. Ill-advised people suggested such a policy at the Washington Conference. I think they are wrong and that we should not consider Franco-American relations without the link of good Franco-British relations. There is, of course, a sense of gratitude to the Americans for their help during the War. Do not think they make us forget what *you* have done.

I honestly think—whatever people may say—that in France a strong fraternal feeling for the British Ally persists. To have fought five years together on the same battlefields, as allies and for a common cause (this you would not deny), is something which cannot easily be wiped out. The French have not the "sporting" idea that, after the match, you should at once shake hands with the adversary. Sentimentally they remain a long, long time faithful to the Ally.

You would still find this state of mind in France, even after six years of international and inter-allied conferences! You would also find, among thoughtful people, the deep feeling that Great Britain is a necessary element in the European order. Less openly, but actually, you would also find the belief that Great Britain is a necessary link between Europe and the other continents. We know the advantage of using the economic liberty of the British Empire for the needs of our foreign trade. We know how precious it is, for France and the rest of the Continent, to have at our doors the huge British *entrepôt* of goods, through which the produce of the world is drawn towards the Old Continent. We know that, through Great Britain, a large part of the world (and especially the Dominions) gravitates around Europe. Without England the Continent of Europe could not remain the economic centre of the world.

We are perfectly aware of the dangers which threaten that economic position, and we know that some of these dangers lie in the conceptions the British Empire may have of itself. We cannot be blind to the fact that by and by some of the Dominions may feel attracted (not politically, but economically or racially) towards new centres. It is not the American *entrepôt* which threatens the British *entrepôt*, it is rather the huge attraction of the immense American market. Australian wool and Canadian pulp or wheat are attracted to the United States according to laws which remind us of the cosmic laws of universal attraction. Then also, there is an ethnical attraction of the Dominions which possess a frontage on the Pacific towards that imposing mass of

a hundred million white Americans. Australia and Canada, although fully faithful to the British flag, instinctively look to Washington for their ethnical defence against some future supposed peril from the yellow race. If Great Britain, deserting her place in Europe, consents to be only a partner in the huge concern of the Anglo-Saxon races outside the Old World, she then is threatened with losing the first place in that concern. And we French, we Europeans are threatened with seeing the Dominions and large parts of the British Empire cease to gravitate around us, thus shifting the centre of gravity of the planet very far from the Old Continent. We prefer by far a Great Britain who will remain the undisputed centre of its own Empire and who will keep the rôle of link, of *trait d'union*, between Europe and the rest of the world. This of course does not go with narrow conceptions of a too jealously closed Empire, in which the old principles of liberty, of Cobden and Gladstone, would give place to excessive "preference" or "privilege." Brokers must be free-traders and offer their services on equal terms to all.

I will conclude by saying that those conceptions which recommend a Europe without England or without Russia have never been popular in France. Without England we consider that the Continent would lose a large part of its influence upon the world and be merely a "small peninsula of Asia." Our feelings of interest as Frenchmen and as Europeans agree here with our sentiments as friends of Great Britain.

ANDRÉ SIEGFRIED.

RECONSTRUCTION IN CHINA

(Address given on July 15th, 1926.)

THERE could be no better indication of the difficulty and complexity of the situation in China than the titles of articles dealing with the China situation in the Press and the current literature of England and America. Perhaps the most frequent and characteristic epithet used in describing that situation is the word chaos. And there is no lack of material to illustrate the point.

But in addressing the members of the Royal Institute I am conscious of an audience experienced in foreign affairs, and I believe you will wish me to be analytical and critical rather than descriptive.

We are all conscious of the trouble in China, and we all have a general idea of the facts—the breakdown of the Central Government, the struggles of the military leaders for political predominance, the growth of a new nationalist sentiment, and the agitation against the treaties governing conditions of foreign residence and trade in China.

It will be my aim to examine the reasons for these movements, and to try and assess their significance to our people and our Empire.

Paradoxical as it may appear, I believe that the present intensity of unrest is an indication of reconstruction—that China, indeed, is on the brink of a new creative period such as has marked many stages in her long history. Both the people of China and the neighbours of China are conscious of her growing-pains.

The Western world has suffered from the same malady as a result of the social, political and economic changes following the industrial revolution. China remained comparatively immune from those changes, mainly as a result of geographical conditions, for several generations after her neighbour Japan, and even the detached foreign communities of the Treaty Ports within her borders, had become accustomed to the new thoughts and the new manner of life inaugurated by a period of intensive invention and discovery.

The root of the present disturbances in China will be found, I am convinced, not in any weakness in the character or culture of the Chinese, but in their somewhat sudden realisation of the new forces and the new possibilities of the modern world.

This sudden release of new forces over a vast area of country and among a vast population has not unnaturally proved an explosive process. The Chinese are seeking a new form of government, a new social machinery, a new basis of material life, and a new relationship with their neighbours; and in consequence they are in the throes of internal and external disturbances.

I do not hesitate to state my own belief that the history of the next few years in China will prove of the greatest moment to the world. That, rightly handled, the new China will offer to the world a good neighbour and a market of unsurpassed importance. That, wrongly handled, it will form a focus of international discord and inevitable war.

Let us glance briefly at the internal and external situations.

Internally, the outstanding feature is the breakdown of organised government. The Manchu Dynasty fell in 1911. A Chinese Republic was inaugurated and a number of military leaders were sent to the provinces to maintain order. They had first to maintain themselves, a process which necessitated regional armies and regional taxes with which to pay them. Manchuria, Central China, the Yangtze Delta and Canton, as well as a number of subsidiary provincial units, now exist as practically independent zones each under its own military chief. There is a natural rivalry among them, a struggle for political power and predominance. They form into groups and then again regroup themselves with startling rapidity. The uninitiated foreigner is unable to assess their relative strengths. They fight, they bargain, they have apparently no common aim, no common policy.

And yet there emerges occasionally some factor which produces a similar reaction in every part of China. There is an undercurrent of nationalism, a desire to see China strong and united, which manifests itself most conspicuously in periodic outbursts against every form of foreign interest. There is also a very general interest in education, and a constructive impetus in municipal affairs, in road-building, in banking, in industry and commerce.

But great national assets—such as the railways and other means of communication, the machinery of organised taxation

and the currency—are rapidly deteriorating, exploited as they are for regional military purposes. The farmers and traders are suffering gravely from lack of all security. There is a general spirit of despondency and unrest.

Brigandage and piracy are rife, and there is little security of life or property in the interior. The brigands are armed with rifles, revolvers and artillery imported from abroad or manufactured in the Chinese arsenals. It is difficult to distinguish between actual brigands and the unattached and irresponsible bodies of men who have broken away from the main regional armies whilst still retaining their uniforms and equipment.

The internal unrest indeed is sapping the productive life, and undermining the national strength of China.

The external situation is complicated by two main factors—by the proximity of two strong neighbours in the north, Soviet Russia and Imperial Japan, which represent two different political conceptions and which meet in dangerous contact on the railway systems of Manchuria; and by the foreign communities in the Ports, such as Shanghai, Hankow, Tientsin and Canton, living and trading under the terms of treaties and other contractual obligations.

The internal and external situations have both been complicated by the action of Russian leaders who have intervened actively in China's internal affairs and party struggles at various points, and especially at Canton. A body of Chinese troops, recruited in the north, is being trained and equipped by Russian leaders at Canton, thus introducing a foreign element into the internal disputes and accentuating the regional differences between north and south and between China and the outer world. As a result an acute situation has arisen between Canton and the neighbouring British colony of Hong Kong.

The political situation in China is therefore one of confusion and bewilderment. The individual Chinese are suffering greatly, the strength of China is being sapped, and the interests of every foreign Power in China are in jeopardy. Trade has come to a standstill over large areas, a considerable amount of coastal and river shipping is lying idle, and the British investor is becoming anxious as to the security for the substantial loans advanced to China during the last thirty years. A country of vast resources, a people of sterling quality, and a market of unparalleled opportunities, are all harassed by a situation which has slipped beyond the control of normal direction.

In such circumstances everyone is seeking for a remedy, and

many remedies have been suggested. There has been an insistent demand for some form of intervention on the part of the Great Powers. But intervention in the internal affairs of other peoples is repugnant to the British tradition. Our Government has pursued a policy of reticence and impartiality. Experiments at intervention on the part of various Powers in the past have not been so successful as to offer any hope of progress along those lines. And it must not be forgotten that China now presents a series of armed camps, with rifles, machine and field guns, modern military equipment and aeroplanes, such as would render any local incident a serious undertaking.

An increasing responsibility rests upon the small fleet of British, American, Japanese and French gunboats which have pursued, quietly and patiently, for a number of years the task of policing the waterways against piratical attacks on shipping and trade. Collisions between these patrols and the Chinese free-lances who seek to interfere with international trade have recently become somewhat frequent, both in the Canton Delta and in the Yangtze Valley, and they may eventually lead to serious incidents.

I believe the time is approaching when the Great Powers will feel bound to make some offer of help to China rather than run further risks of serious international disturbance.

The Chinese are of all peoples the most prone to arbitration. If only the Great Powers with outstanding interests in China could agree upon a common policy in regard to China I am convinced that they would have no great difficulty in convening a conference of Chinese regional leaders and arriving at some understanding. The Chinese want peace. Peace is essential to the continuance of international trade. And the situation has become so confused that there appears little prospect of peace unless the Powers are prepared to rally to the assistance of China in an unselfish way, in full accord with one another and with no thought of aggression or direct reward. Beneath apparent conflicts of interest there lies one supreme interest common to them all—the desirability, indeed the necessity, of a peaceful and strong China, secure and free.

The first step towards an international understanding can only be found in a free and frank exchange of views, especially between this country, the United States and Japan. The real interests of those three countries in China are identical. A common aim and a common programme could surely be found if the facts were faced. A first effort was made to find such a common programme at Washington in 1921, but the various

delays in making effective the Washington agreements have rendered that programme obsolete. A renewed effort is now essential and the task is worthy of the efforts of one of our greatest statesmen. It is greatly to be hoped that this will be realised by His Majesty's Government.

Given an understanding between the major Powers interested in China, it is most desirable that those Powers should use their influence to convene a conference of all the Chinese Parties. A few simple decisions will be necessary. It must be clearly understood :—

1. That the Powers have no ulterior motives and that their assistance is offered merely as arbitrators—in a manner similar to that so successfully used by Lord Balfour and Mr. Hughes in facilitating an understanding between Japan and China at Washington in 1922 ;
2. That protection and security will be afforded to the lives and property of all who live and trade in China ;
3. That a central government, representing all Parties, will have the support of the Powers ;
4. That the legitimate position of the Chinese provinces, both as regards administration and revenue, will be safeguarded ;
5. That treaty revision will be undertaken as soon as the Chinese Government is in a position to fulfil its share of mutual obligations.

There is one other point which appears to me of first importance. The interested Governments can help greatly to re-establish peace in China. But their best intentions can only be made effective by the earnest and consistent efforts of every member of the British and other foreign communities to support their Governments in founding a new and better understanding with the Chinese people. The forces which have been mobilised against our interests in China have drawn their greatest strength from the exploitation of minor grievances on the part of the Chinese against the foreigners in their midst. Those grievances must be removed, and they can only be removed by the co-operation of the individual foreigner resident in China.

If I may be allowed to use an illustration of my meaning I can find no better one than in the recent visit to China of our distinguished Chairman. Lord and Lady Willingdon went to China at a time when feeling was running high and when the position of our fellow-countrymen in that country was one of

great anxiety. By their personality and courage, and by their untiring determination to meet and know the Chinese of every Party and every class, they have revealed many facts and they have removed many misunderstandings. They have rendered a service to British interests in China which cannot easily be assessed and which is worthy of the highest traditions of British statesmanship. But above all they have set an example to us all, and opened a channel to a better understanding. It now remains for us to build a new relationship with our Chinese neighbours upon the foundations that they have laid so well.

GOSFORD.

Note.—Among those who took part in the discussion following Lord Gosford's address were: the Chairman (Lord Willingdon), and Sir Charles Addis, Mr. Lionel Curtis, Major-General Sir Neill Malcolm, Mr. Warren Swire, Miss Helen Ward.

TACNA AND ARICA

Record of an Address given by PROFESSOR A. C. COOLIDGE, Librarian of Harvard University and one of the Directors of the Council on Foreign Relations in New York, on July 20, 1926, together with a summary of the discussion following.

PROFESSOR COOLIDGE said that there had been many South American boundary disputes. The South American republics, like the United States, had grown up from a number of colonial settlements on or near the coast, which had been pushed into the interior. There had been many disputes as to the division not only of this interior but of the coast-line itself. The arguments had been the usual ones, historical, geographical and economical, ethnographical, etc. There had been endless negotiations, bickerings, treaties and in not a few cases outsiders had been called in to assist the parties by mediation. Gradually things had been straightened out and there was not much disputed territory left.

In early days the United States took little interest in all this, but the beginning of a new period arrived with the Secretaryship of Mr. Blaine, who issued invitations to the first Pan-American Congress in 1881. Not very much was accomplished then, but a further Conference met in 1889, and from that time the United States took greater interest in South American affairs.

The first time the United States intervened in a South American boundary question was on the occasion of Cleveland's famous and abrupt Venezuela message in December, 1895. This message was based on the ground that, as the territorial dispute was one between a European Power (Great Britain) and an American one (Venezuela), the apparent disposition of the European Power to occupy the disputed region constituted an extension of European dominion in America in violation of the Monroe Doctrine, and that it therefore behoved the United States to look into the question and, if need be, take action. This sharp squall, whatever we may think of the merits of the case, cleared the air, for it not only made the American attitude much plainer to the world, but it greatly increased the consciousness of American public opinion on the Monroe Doctrine and Pan-Americanism.

It was important to remember that, closely connected as were the Monroe Doctrine and Pan-Americanism, they were not identical. Pan-Americanism was a general movement in which all took part; the Monroe Doctrine was a unilateral declaration of the policy of the United States, for which she had so far refused to allow the other American States any part or responsibility.

The United States had not objected in the past to European arbitration in American territorial questions (the King of Holland and the Emperor of Germany had arbitrated between Great Britain and the United States, Great Britain between Chile and Argentine, France between Costa Rica and Panama, Spain between Venezuela and Colombia), yet, with the growing power of the United States and the growth of the Pan-American idea, there had arisen a growing dislike to

anything that seemed like European intervention, however well-meant and beneficial to its object. It was a question whether the United States would not oppose any important European arbitrations in the future, and this applied to the League of Nations as well as to a single European Power. There were plainly possibilities of trouble in that direction.

The United States had always recognised that the Monroe Doctrine and Pan-Americanism involved duties as well as rights and advantages. Among these duties had been the assumption of a certain amount of responsibility for the international conduct of the American States (clearly discussed by Roosevelt) and also a responsibility for trying to smooth out difficulties between them.

With regard to the Tacna-Arica dispute, the Treaty of Ancon, which terminated the Chilean-Peruvian-Bolivian war, provided that Tacna-Arica should be left in Chilean hands, with the guarantee of a plebiscite after ten years. There were always troubles about an arrangement of this kind, and it inevitably piled up difficulties for the future. It would not seem an unfair guess to say that, at the time the arrangement was made, the Chileans had every intention of keeping the territory but were merely trying to make the wrench from Peru a little less violent; indeed, it had been claimed that no Peruvian Government could have been got together which would have accepted a definite cession, and that the provision was made to save Peru's face. There was no formal peace with Bolivia for many years.

The ten years passed; Peru went through a series of revolutions and remained weak; Chile flourished and grew stronger, but the people of the ceded regions retained their Peruvian sympathies, and therefore, on one pretext or another, Chile postponed a vote. There followed a quarter of a century of fruitless dispute, Peru being too weak to do anything, but maintaining her protest. The next stage was one of Chilean colonisation and deportation. As a result of this displacement of population Chile became more inclined in recent years to grant a plebiscite, conducted by herself; Peru to refuse it and to make a stand on historic rights. Various compromises were suggested in vain, and the question was further complicated by the claim of Bolivia to a sea-port.

The World War, and especially the territorial settlements under the Peace Treaty, such as the restitution of Alsace-Lorraine to France, and the promulgation of President Wilson's doctrine of the necessity of unobstructed access to the sea, roused new hopes in both Peru and Bolivia. The latter naturally thought—if a Polish corridor, why not a Bolivian one? There was a chance that Peru might appeal to the League of Nations, but she had now withdrawn from it to please the United States.

It could thus be seen why the desire to heal this running sore, which tended to poison the whole body of Pan-Americanism, should have been strong in Washington. It was always dangerous to claim an unselfish motive for any national (even more than for any individual) action, but he thought the United States Government might be absolved of any low motive in this connection. Very few people in the United States cared in the least whether Tacna and Arica went to Chile or to Peru. What they wanted was a settlement of the question. Professor Coolidge added that he had yet to hear that any occult financial influence was affecting the U.S. State Department, though it was quite possible that such allegations had been made.

Unfortunately the United States was in a particularly delicate position as regards Chile. Americans appreciated the Chileans as being perhaps the steadiest and most progressive of the South American peoples, but there had been a series of disputes between the two Governments. Secretary Blaine took an interest in the Chilean-Peruvian war and was anxious to bring it to a close in 1880, but the Chileans, as the winning party, resented this. If he had remained Secretary of State longer he would very possibly have intervened in the peace treaty. It was, therefore, not easy for Washington to persuade the Chilean Government to accept arbitration, nor was it easy for the Chilean Government to persuade the Chilean people to do so. The Chileans were in possession of the territory and fully realised that possession was nine points of the law. They felt they had little to gain by arbitration, while the Peruvians had everything to gain. However, they finally accepted arbitration, though with many misgivings, and the matter was formally referred to the United States in 1922.

The case was elaborately prepared with eminent American counsel on both sides. The sentence of the arbitrator was in general interpreted as favourable to Chile, and its critics regarded it as based on legal rather than on moral grounds. It ordered that a plebiscite should be held—as Chile had of late been demanding and Peru opposing. The decision gave satisfaction in Chile but caused consternation in Peru, who protested and demanded that, if there was to be a plebiscite, all the Chilean officials and troops should be withdrawn and the government taken over by the U.S. Commission. It was difficult to do this after more than forty years of Chilean rule, and the United States Government refused, but promised explicitly that the plebiscite should be carried out with every guarantee of fairness and protection for the voters.

General Pershing was appointed as Commissioner. There was no reason to doubt his impartiality or his desire to bring the plebiscite to the most satisfactory conclusion. There were a great number of points to be settled, as to who had a right to vote, what constituted residence, the vote of officials, of exiles, of people convicted of (perhaps political) crime, etc.

The Chileans allowed their partisans and officials to mishandle the other side, which was a great mistake if they felt sure of winning on a fair vote, as they professed to be. It was difficult to get reliable testimony; violent and extravagant charges were made on both sides; but there could be no adequate reason to doubt the statements of American observers that Peruvian partisans were outrageously treated, not only by Chilean voters, but were too often left unprotected, and sometimes actually ill-treated, by the Chilean authorities. Washington, foreseeing a probability of failure, had tried its best to substitute mediation for arbitration and to persuade the contending parties to come to some sort of compromise.

Finally the Chileans demanded that the date of the plebiscite should be fixed in the near future. The majority of the Commission declared that it would be impossible to hold a plebiscite under fair conditions, and the Commission therefore broke up and returned to the United States, whereupon Chile withdrew her request for the good offices of the United States.

A complete *impasse* appeared to have been reached. There was no doubt that it was a dangerous situation; public feeling in both

Peru and Chile was more roused than ever. The plebiscite scheme was dead and the United States could not be called in again as an arbitrator. Suppose Peru were to begin hostilities, she would probably be quickly defeated, but she might calculate that the United States could not leave her to her fate. Or suppose she only threatened to fight; the United States would endeavour to restrain her, but might feel that it was hard, after what had happened, not to give her support. Peru would not appeal to the League of Nations, for that would mean the loss of United States assistance. (It was perhaps a fortunate thing for the League.)

Altogether it was an ugly situation, but, evidently, Washington would keep on trying to solve it, and could count on outside assistance (notably from the Argentine); she was, also, in a position to apply very considerable pressure. The rôle of "big brother" was a pretty thankless one, but there was no need to despair of a satisfactory outcome to what was now a very serious as well as a very difficult question.

MR. WYNDHAM BEWES, in opening the discussion, said that he had always considered the aggressive policy of Chile, beginning about 1850, to be inexcusable. In 1895 she proposed a treaty with Bolivia to the effect that if Chile secured territory by the plebiscite she would hand it over to Bolivia for a money payment; she left the treaty for eight years unratified and finally refused to ratify it. The attitude of the United States in objecting to European countries acting as arbitrators in South American disputes was insolent to Europe and presumptuous to the world. It was the co-operation of British citizens and not United States effort which had helped forward the independence of the South American nations and had subsequently developed them economically. He was sorry to hear it said that European countries must not act as arbitrators, but glad to know that the pronouncement had been made, for it was time it was known.

MR. F. B. BOURDILLON suggested a comparison with the plebiscites held in Silesia and Slesvig. In the case of Silesia, as in that of Tacna-Arica, the commissioners reported after nine months that a fair plebiscite was impossible. Still it was successfully held, owing to the introduction of Allied troops, and that gave him grounds for optimism. The Danes of North Slesvig had had to wait about fifty-four years for their plebiscite: Tacna-Arica had only waited forty-three. So he hoped Professor Coolidge would not abandon hope. The lesson from the European plebiscites was, however, that to carry out a plebiscite satisfactorily a neutral body must have control over the officials, the police and any armed forces which it might be necessary to maintain in the area.

MR. WILSON HARRIS considered the Monroe Doctrine as at present interpreted—an interpretation very remote from the original doctrine—as an intolerable invasion of the rights of the Latin-American peoples. If this view of the doctrine were to continue there would indeed be a risk of conflict so long as the Latin-American nations remained members of the League of Nations. Meanwhile the League must not compromise the situation. The United States was now proposing to adhere to the Permanent Court of International Justice conditionally on a reservation which had been interpreted in America to mean that the United States might veto the League from getting the advice of the Court in a dispute submitted to them by two member States

from South America. To accept such a reservation would, he felt, be inadvisable in the extreme.

MISS IRENE WRIGHT thought that there were resemblances between North and South Americans in their political ideals, and still more in their economic outlook into the future. Pan-Americanism was therefore a most important movement, which might even serve as a corrective to the "insolent umbrella" of the Monroe Doctrine as now interpreted.

THE VISCOUNTESS ASTOR considered that women of the United States differed as profoundly from South American women as an Englishwoman from a Spaniard. Was not this an obstacle to Pan-Americanism?

MISS WRIGHT replied that a change of heart was undoubtedly necessary, but changes came quickly in South America.

MISS MARY SHEEPSHANKS gave an account of her personal experiences in Chile, Bolivia, and Peru at the time when the Commission began its labours. In May, 1922, the Peruvian priests at Cuzco carried in procession an image known as "the Lord of Earthquakes" to obtain a satisfactory result from the plebiscite. The local Indians, however, considered that it was wrong to employ the image to redress matters outside the proper scope of his employment. So far as she could gather, there was some suspicion of the political influence of the United States.

LT.-COMMANDER E. S. WILLIAMS dwelt on the importance of access to the sea for any nation, and saw a prospect of settlement of the dispute on these lines. He pointed out that the problems of Danzig and Fiume were analogous, and considered that the Turkish action over Smyrna was consistent with the general law.

MR. PHILIP KERR wished to know whether South America wanted the intervention of the League of Nations. Professor Coolidge said he was unable to answer this question.

PROFESSOR A. F. POLLARD, the Chairman, said that the main difficulty was indicated by the lecturer in a chance phrase used by him—"the outside world." Did that mean outside the United States, or outside the whole of two continents? The latter view of "America" he condemned as "hemisphericalism," a schism between hemispheres being the most disastrous possible. He hoped the Tacna-Arica dispute would not come before the League of Nations. Force could not be applied in settling it; and without the possibility of sanctions, the League could hardly act. For these reasons he thought that Mr. Bourdillon's optimism, derived from recent European experiences, was hardly justified in this case.

PROFESSOR COOLIDGE, in reply, emphasised the fact that the views expressed by him were merely individual to himself. He did not think the danger of Pan-Americanism at present very great, since Canada was outside the movement. If a plebiscite involved the use of foreign troops, he hoped those troops would not be those of the United States. In defence of Pan-Americanism he concluded by suggesting some analogy between that ideal and those of the British Commonwealth.

REVIEWS

The Dominions and Colonial Offices. By SIR GEORGE V. FIDDES. 1926. (London: Putnam's Sons. 8vo. 288 pp. 7s. 6d. net.)

SIR GEORGE FIDDES' method of compressing his vast subject into the small compass of this volume is to begin by giving a short account of the history and organisation of the Colonial Office and of its methods of administration; then to deal with certain special problems, such as currencies, indentured labour, and Indian immigration; and finally to take the Dominions and each group of Dependencies in turn and give a masterly bird's-eye view of their histories and problems. In his preface he warns us to understand that, even where not apparent on the face of the narrative, all the matters thus treated have been associated with a continuous flow of departmental work, whether of criticism, decision, initiation, or direct executive action. This method has the advantage of bringing home to us the variety of peoples, countries and problems with which this great office has had to deal, but it makes a rather disjointed and bewildering narrative, during the perusal of which, in spite of the warning in the preface, the Colonial Office is apt to disappear into the background. Nor does it bring out the practical difficulties of a government office controlling administrations scattered all over the world. Sir George Fiddes rightly emphasises the anxiety of these administrations to be free of Treasury control as early in their career as possible. But it must not be inferred from this that they are always happy under the Colonial Office. Sir Frederick Lugard, in Chapter VIII of *The Dual Mandate in British Tropical Africa* deals with some suggested reforms. As the great Dependencies grow in importance the problem of their relationship with the Colonial Office will grow also. A discussion of this aspect of our Imperial future would have added to the value of this interesting survey of the achievement of the Colonial Office. It would have served as a counterpart of the chapters in which Sir George Fiddes so admirably summarises the development in the relationship of the Dominions and the mother country by means of the Imperial Conferences.

H. A. WYNDHAM.

THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION

An Introduction to the American Constitution. By C. E. MARTIN. 1926. (New York: Oxford University Press. 8vo. xliii + 440 pp. 18s. net.)

Jefferson and Hamilton. The Struggle for Democracy in America. By CLAUDE G. BOWERS. 1925. (London: Constable & Co. 8vo. xvii + 531 pp. 21s. net.)

Life and Letters of Thomas Jefferson. By FRANCIS W. HIRST. 1926. (London: Macmillan & Co. 8vo. xviii + 588 pp. 25s.)

THE American Constitution is a chief stumbling-block to Englishmen who endeavour to understand and follow the public life of the United States. It is highly complex and only intelligible in the light

of American history, which English education wholly neglects. Yet some knowledge of its many curious features is essential to any coherent view of the United States as a world Power, since these features determine the activities of American politicians. Such a book as Professor Martin's is, in consequence, of the greatest usefulness on this side of the Atlantic. Written primarily for American law pupils, it is exceedingly well-arranged and treats legal questions with a delightful lucidity. In the first two parts of the book the method is historical. Starting with the ideas prevalent in colonial America the author traces the making of the Constitution and its subsequent modifications. Particularly clear is the account of the fourteenth amendment and the summary of the influence of the Supreme Court under Marshall and Taney. The third part is devoted to an analysis of the spirit of the Constitution. It is little more than a hundred pages and is more general and elementary. American international ideals are briefly mentioned—non-intervention, neutrality, the World Court, arbitration. President Wilson is happily described in the sentence that "he felt it his duty to try to do several conflicting things"

The ten most critical years in the making of the Constitution are brilliantly painted in Mr. Bower's great canvas of the duel between Thomas Jefferson and Alexander Hamilton. The great quality of his book is its skilful use of the Journals of the time. These were written by able and passionate men, of whom for some years Cobbett was one, and the extracts, on almost every page, give one the very feeling of the times. Even in these ashes live their wonted fires. Mr. Bowers takes his readers through the decade from 1789-1800, in and out of the boarding-houses and coffee-houses, explaining as he goes who is who and what each eager politician is aiming at at the moment. His own sympathies, like those of all good Americans to-day, are with Jefferson rather than Hamilton on the prime question whether the people or an oligarchy shall rule. But he enables us to understand how reasonable it was to think with Washington and Adams and most of the Fathers of the country that some government on the English model was the best and only guarantee of life and property, and that the Federal Government would rightly be removed more and more from the possibility of mob control. The original states were very English and the violence in France which produced such reaction in England naturally produced similar fears in the late colonies. It was the expansion to the West which made democracy in the States, rendered permanent Jefferson's victory and produced the further development of Jacksonian democracy and the menace of majority tyranny.

Where Mr. Bowers writes as a dramatist, delighting in the great play of politics, Mr. F. W. Hirst writes as a disciple.

His life and letters of Thomas Jefferson is a most refreshing book. It is written with all the robust vigour and quick flashes of temper which mark his political writing. Woe betide those who have written ought against Mr. Jefferson, for they shall learn that even in 1926 there is at least one Jeffersonian democrat who is very much alive. All good biography, it has been said, must be written *con amore*. Mr. Hirst carries his readers easily through six hundred pages because of the enthusiasm with which he writes. He has what may be called a warm style, and he is a very thorough biographer. Few men have lived fuller lives than Jefferson, who once made the revealing observation that "it was surprising how much may be done if one is always doing something." Mr. Hirst follows everywhere, devoting special

care to any point where Jefferson has encountered criticism, and triumphantly demanding complete acquittal. The supreme quality in Jefferson which secures Mr. Hirst's discipleship is the combination in the same man of a passionate love of liberty and a passionate love of democratic government. These two things met naturally enough in the eighteenth or even the nineteenth century. They were the basis of old English Liberalism of the school of Cobden, Bright and Mill. But the later history of democracy, especially in Jefferson's country, has been towards an increasing disregard of individual rights. As the author of the amendments safeguarding personal liberty, and of the dictum "that government is best which governs least" Jefferson has never been properly admired by his own countrymen. His religious heterodoxy has been an even greater reason for passing him lightly over, for he had much of the outlook of the eighteenth-century philosophers. On this second point Mr. Hirst shows that his outlook was not substantially different from that widely-approved and held among modern "non-fundamentalist" American preachers. Like them, he accepted as his guide the ethical precepts of the New Testament while abandoning the supernatural in the fashion of his time. On the first political reason for Jefferson's eclipse, Mr. Hirst has no compromise to offer. It is modern America that is moving on the wrong lines and must answer the call "back to Jefferson."

J. D. WOODRUFF.

Dollar Diplomacy. By SCOTT NEARING and JOSEPH FREEMAN. 1926. (London: George Allen and Unwin. 8vo. xv + 353 pp. 10s. 6d. net.)

SOME men go through life on the strength of their instinct for Big Business, while others are known as connoisseurs of old wines. But Scott Nearing has a veritable flair for names. Like so many Americans-of-the-second-generation he came under the spell of the movement for assimilation, and determined to be more American than the Americans themselves. So Zabriskie, like many another name of European origin, became Scott Nearing, and no one will say that he has not hit upon a thoroughly happy title for himself.

And now comes *Dollar Diplomacy*, a comprehensive analysis of modern American history and intensely interesting to those interested in the imperialist aspirations of the United States. The book is so solid, and the title is so clever! But "Dollar Diplomacy"—how brief, how alliterative and how American this paraphrase of the heavy British expression—"Trade follows the flag." Scott Nearing goes even further, and proves that "the flag follows trade."

Collaborating with Scott Nearing, sociologist, is Joseph Freeman, educator.—The descriptions are as crisply American as the word "Probe" in the headlines of a New York paper! They write with the cynicism of Socialists, for both have half a dozen works of reform already to their credit. Much of *Dollar Diplomacy* will doubtless find its way into Labour propaganda and out again through the surface medium of tub-thumping oratory. But owing to their very completeness and accuracy, the elaborate footnotes will also be seized on by English Die-Hards seeking a smashing retort for a penny lecture from across the Atlantic!

And so our Socialists lay bare this dollar diplomacy—dollar

imperialism—that has penetrated its feelers into Cuba, Haiti and the Philippines, and has conceived the “Dawes Plan,” that “most complete modern system of exploitation ever devised and applied in the relations between Great Powers.” The Monroe Doctrine they describe in detail, and show that it is in reality not the passive attitude of a nation that has shaken the dust of Europe off its disgusted feet, but an aggressive determination to dominate the entire American hemisphere. They also dwell at length on the efforts to capture the trade of Latin America, the “Big Sister” policy described by the leader of the Republican Party in 1898 as a “policy of peace, friendship and commercial enlargement.” As good Americans they restrain themselves from adding that the campaign was less successful than that of either England or Germany, and that its principal monument is still the beautiful Pan-American Building at Washington.

Also as good Socialists they fail to point out that people who require capital will continue to borrow it, and those who have surplus funds will take ordinary precautions to see that the interest is paid. At times this requires the services of the marine corps, for officials in the Central American Republics have great respect for uniforms and brass buttons, and still greater respect for guns. In its outcry against the imperialistic ambitions that have always inspired American foreign diplomacy, the book recalls much that has been written—especially in the United States—on British rule in India. As in India, the dominating race has replaced turmoil by tranquillity in both Haiti and Cuba.

And finally let me sum up with the publisher’s “blurb” which “probes” the book in half a dozen lines: “The aim is to reveal the extent to which the U.S.A. is following an imperial policy, and secondly to suggest some of the outstanding characteristics of her foreign policy. Armed intervention in Mexico and Haiti, revolutions in Hawaii and Panama, annexation of the Philippines and (practically) of Cuba, financial pressure in Europe, concession-hunting in China and the Near East—these are the phases in the technique of Imperialism which American statesmanship has devised to make the world safe for the dollar.”

DORIS HEMMING.

The India Office. By SIR MALCOLM M. C. SETON, K.C.B. 1926.
(London: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, Ltd. 8vo. 299 pp. 7s. 6d. net.)

THIS book, from the pen of a ready writer, is the third of the Whitehall series, which is to deal successively with the various departments of the British Government. To Sir Malcolm Seton has been allotted a task of more than ordinary difficulty. The functions of the Home Office and the Ministry of Health, of the Army and the Admiralty, are familiar to the general reader, but it is impossible to describe the special features of the India Office without entering upon some account of the Indian Constitution and of the administrative work done in India itself. To do so, without overburdening the book, is a problem which the author has successfully solved. The result is a most entertaining survey of the work done in the India Office and at the same time a book of ready reference for those who have to deal with Indian administrative problems, and who, like those who indulge in bridge or golf, are apt to play the game with only a rudimentary idea of the rules. The India Council has no counterpart in any other

branch of the British administration. It is a relic of the old days of the East India Company Directorate, and consists mainly of retired members of the Indian services. The Council has certain functions of a purely advisory character, but has also powers which, as our author points out, might theoretically bring it into collision with the High Court of Parliament itself, though such a possibility seems somewhat remote. Regarded alternatively as a bulwark against the precipitation on India of rash, ill-digested experiments, or as a reactionary institution that cumbereth the ground, the Council functions behind closed doors, and what truth there is in either view is known only to those who come into intimate relationship with it. Sir Malcolm Seton has performed a work of great utility, at a most opportune moment, in drawing aside the curtain that shrouds the dark corridors of the India Office. As an integral part of the Government of India, the functions of the India Office come under review when in 1929 a Royal Commission is appointed to appraise the work of the 1919 reforms, and to decide on the direction of the next step in constitutional evolution. That Commission will have a difficult work to do, and the book under review will be most helpful to those who are called upon to determine the future functions of the India Office.

It is perhaps well to warn the casual reader not to take up the book in expectation of finding a cure for insomnia, for he will be disappointed. The lightness of the touch and the brilliance of some of the unexpected terms of phraseology make it difficult to put the book down before the final page is reached. In his description of the inauguration of the Star of India and of the Order of Precedence, Sir Malcolm Seton has given full play to a keen and subtle sense of humour.

Probably one of the most useful, as it is one of the most concise, chapters in the work is that on the Indian services. It is only a couple of years ago that the universities appeared to have abandoned India as a field of employment for their more brilliant graduates. Thanks to the labours of the Secretary of State and to some of the members of his Council, the position is now better understood. It is recognised that the possibilities under the Reform Scheme are greater than ever before; perhaps not for those who look for a safe job and steady promotion by seniority, but certainly for that finer type of English manhood that is willing to back itself to make good in the face of great difficulties and greater opportunities. Sir Malcolm Seton gives a most useful summary in Chapter VIII of the various services in India open to young men from our universities and public schools. There is, however, a slight error on p. 138, where the age of admission to the Indian Police is inadvertently stated as seventeen to nineteen instead of nineteen to twenty-one.

The days have gone when a debate on Indian affairs emptied the House of Commons and when no editor of a British newspaper would dare to worry its readers with news from India of less moment than a mutiny or earthquake. This new work can be recommended confidently to the growing number who are becoming interested in the great constitutional experiments that are taking place there to-day.

CAMPBELL RHODES.

A History of Japan. Vol. III. The Tokugawa Epoch, 1652-1868. By the late JAMES MURDOCH, M.A. Revised and edited by the late JOSEPH H. LONGFORD. 1926. (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co. 8vo. xviii + 823 pp. 45s. net.)

ASIATIC history is the student's despair. We know certain dates and events, and some details concerning the lives and deaths of famous people. But the inner history of the construction and development of the Asiatic world is seldom available. Perhaps it would have little to offer beyond the simple scheme of the nomad tribe or the village community, and the monotonous records of successive tyrannies and court intrigues. Japan, however, alone of the nations of Asia, is a nation in the fullest European sense. Japan alone could be transplanted entire from the Pacific to the northern shores of the Mediterranean, and could flourish there without excessive incongruity. This is not due merely to that genius for imitation which, according to superficial observers, accounts for all of Japan's achievements, but to the character of her people and her institutions—that something which a French writer has called *la force romaine du peuple japonais*.

During the two hundred years covered by the last volume of Professor Murdoch's great history, Japan deliberately rejected and excluded Europe. In the sixteenth century contact with Western thought, combined with the expansionist ambitions of Hideyoshi, might well have led to the foundation of a great Japanese maritime empire and a very different development of Asiatic history. But Hideyoshi wasted the nation's strength on his Korean campaigns, and his successor, Tokugawa Iyeyasu, reversed the policy of expansion overseas. Iyeyasu, who was one of the greatest statesmen of all time, turned his attention to the pacification of the warring principalities of Japan and the unification of the country under the ægis of his own house. His immediate successors closed Japan to all foreigners, except to the Chinese and the Dutch, who were allowed to trade at Nagasaki under humiliating conditions, and the death penalty was imposed on all Japanese daring to travel abroad. It is the history of this period of seclusion (but by no means of stagnation) that Professor Murdoch tells so admirably in this third volume.

"In the matter of political and military ability [he writes of the immediately preceding age] the Japanese of those days compared more than favourably with the statesmen and soldiers of contemporary Europe. The re-unification of the empire under a strong and stable government was a problem of greater difficulty than any that received its permanent solution from Christian statesmen of the same period. And the fact must not be overlooked that the Japanese military operations of the age were on a much vaster scale than those of any Western state or combination of states. . . . Altogether in the camp and at the council-board it is tolerably safe to assert that in Japan men of genius were then fully as plentiful as they were in Europe, while in the administration of their fiefs even men of second-rate ability, such as Kato Kiyomasa, Date and Uyesugi, might advantageously have served as models to the majority of Western princelets. Apart from Hideyoshi or Iyeyasu, either of whom was superior in achievement to any Western contemporary, there are perhaps a dozen Japanese who must be accorded very high rank among the world's men of action of the later sixteenth century."

And they were contemporaries of the "spacious days of great Elizabeth!"

This volume tells the story of the decline and fall of the Tokugawa Shogunate. Gradually the attention and loyalty of the clans transferred themselves from the Shoguns' castle at Yedo to the half-

forgotten Mikado's court at Kyoto. The reasons for the change are analysed carefully and in detail; the political characters of the time are admirably sketched. The foundations of the Tokugawa régime were already insecure when in 1853 Commodore Perry's squadron arrived off the coasts of Japan. In 1858 Lord Ii of Hikone became Tairo (Prime Minister), and a desperate attempt was made to stop the rot, to control the refractory clans and to make terms with the foreigners. The ten years which followed were among the most intense and adventurous in the history of any nation. There was a sudden effervescence of all the repressed passions and enthusiasms of an emotional and spirited people. Japan's *risorgimento* was like the eruption of one of her own volcanoes, or the sudden shock of an earthquake. The complacent mediævalism of the Tokugawa era was shattered, and on its formidable ruins modern Japan has been built up in feverish haste.

But modern Japan cannot be understood without a knowledge of her past. Professor Murdoch's three noble volumes, the life-work of a remarkable man, are a classic in their way, and there is no other Japanese history which begins to compete with them. The two earlier volumes have been out of print for many years, but they are now reprinted by Messrs. Kegan Paul, so that the complete history is available henceforth in a convenient form up to the year 1868; from that date onward it can best be read in Professor W. W. McLaren's *Political History of Japan during the Meiji Era, 1867-1912*. These works will long remain unchallenged, for the historian of Japan requires very special qualifications—of which inexhaustible patience is not the least important. For the reader, Professor Murdoch provides solid fare, but his style, though massive, is far from dull. Volume III is edited by the late Joseph Longford, former Vice-President of the Japan Society and himself a writer on Japanese history; it is prefaced by an interesting account of Professor Murdoch's life and character.

Strategical Atlas of the Oceans. By VAUGHAN CORNISH, D.Sc., F.R.G.S.
With Letter-press. 1926. (London: Sifton Praed.)

THE above is the title printed outside the work—which consists of six large double pages (unnumbered, by the way) and five maps. It is therefore a little surprising to find that the title-page and page-headings inside describe it as “Singapore and Naval Geography”—which is perhaps not quite the same thing. As a matter of fact it is a mixture of both.

The substance of the letter-press is a paper read by Dr. Cornish to the Colonial Institute last year, in which he points out the great strategical importance of Singapore as a naval base—especially now that Hong Kong is no longer available—and the equally important fact that it will be some nine years before the two new docks there will be ready to hold our biggest ironclads. Expressing very sound views on the Washington Treaty and the areas covered by the French, American and Japanese fleets, he leads us on—despite one or two rather loose statements—“by a process of exclusion to the final result, that the one great gap of a remediable character which exists in the strategical communications of the Empire is at the passages to the Indian Ocean between the East Indian islands; so that the claims of Singapore are paramount.” In so doing he gives us some useful information about the Panama and Suez Canals and the dimensions

of the Singapore base, and points out that the Dutch Navy will in consequence have probably to be doubled in size.

Combined with all this Dr. Cornish has evolved a practical system of dividing up the world (on paper), so as to make the future strategical aspect of naval movements more understandable by the ordinary reader. This he accomplishes by giving us, and explaining, four maps (on the Mollweide projection) of world-hemispheres, centred respectively on 20° E., 110° E., 160° W., and 70° W. longitude. A few places of importance mentioned in the text are not marked on the maps: but the general result is good—and clear.

EDWARD GLEICHEN.

Mathematical Investigations in the Theory of Value and Prices. By Professor IRVING FISHER 1925 (Yale University Press. London: Humphrey Milford. 8vo. xii + 126 pp 4s. 6d. net)

PROFESSOR IRVING FISHER has given us a reprint of his important paper on value, first published in the *Transactions of the Connecticut Academy of Arts and Sciences* in 1892. It treats of the fundamental definitions and identities of economics, a firm grasp of which is essential to the comprehension of almost any economic theorising. Professor Fisher has since become famous as a master of lucid explanation, and a casual glance at this work, where a large measure of continuous literature is mixed in with the formulæ, might rouse the hopes of an un-mathematical reader. Professor Fisher has chosen in this case to illustrate his meaning by an elaborate mechanism of cisterns and levers, of which models have since actually been constructed in his American laboratory. This method of exposition may be exceedingly helpful to those well accustomed to the use of such instruments, but the lay reader will probably find his perplexities greatly increased. A purely analytic treatment, while more arduous at the outset, would probably have proved easier for him in the long run.

This treatise is embellished with a very thorough discussion of the economists' notion of Utility. Professor Fisher correctly holds that the writers of the school of Jevons did wrong to identify utility with pleasure and thus make it necessary for the economist to postulate that "all men act for pleasure." This proposition may or may not be true and raises interesting psychological problems, but should be and is quite irrelevant to economic analysis. But Professor Fisher, while protesting against the dragging in of these psychological irrelevances, makes the same mistake himself. He identifies utility with desirability and says that we must assume that "each individual acts as he desires." This either is untrue or involves the use of desire in a Pickwickian sense, and it embroils us in the disputes of psychologists, not to say of metaphysicians. All postulates of this type are otiose in economics. This may be seen if we amend Professor Fisher's definition (p 12) as follows: "The utility of A units of one commodity or service (a) is equal to the utility of B units of another (b), if the individual ~~has no desire for~~ does not choose (or, does not act favourably to) one to the exclusion of the other." Choose here refers not to a process antecedent to an act, but to the act itself.

Of great interest is Professor Fisher's conclusion that when the utility of many commodities is interdependent, it may be impossible to integrate utility at all. Integration is quite unnecessary, as the

author observes, "if we seek only the causation of the objective facts of prices and commodity distribution" But sometimes our interest ranges beyond this, and we seek something more. We may be considering public interference to increase social welfare. We cannot consent to remain stultified without an instrument of analysis. We need not only to integrate, but to "compare one man's utility with another's." For these purposes, but for these only, we shall need to find a more subjective definition of utility.

This essay contains much that is stimulating, and we welcome its republication in a compendious form.

R. F. HARROD.

The World Court. By ANTONIO S. DE BUSTAMANTE. 1925. (New York: The Macmillan Company. 8vo. xxv + 379 pp. 12s. 6d.)

THIS is an important account of the Permanent Court of International Justice written by one of the Judges, a distinguished Professor of the University of Havana. It contains an Introductory Word on "Looking at things internationally" by Mr Conrad W. Bok, the Founder of the American Peace Award, under whose auspices the book has been translated from the Spanish by Elizabeth F. Reed and published. In a comparatively small compass Judge Bustamante has given an account of the historical antecedents of the Court under which he deals with the various projects of statesmen, publicists, societies and governments for the establishment of an international Court of Justice. The proceedings at The Hague in 1899 and 1907 are set forth and the result is stated to be that on the fundamental consideration that there should be a court all nations were in accord, but it remained to get them on to common ground for the realisation of the plan. The interesting experiment of the Central American Court of Justice, established by the five republics of Central America in 1907, is described, and the causes of its failure indicated. An account of the proceedings of the Advisory Committee of Jurists in their work of preparing the Statute for the Permanent Court leads to a detailed examination of the Statute as it was finally adopted by the League of Nations. A chapter is devoted to the cases which have been decided by the Court, and in the last chapter the author deals with the position of the United States in relation to it.

Judge Bustamante has produced a book which should help to clear away many doubts and difficulties in the minds of those who are suspicious of the value of this new Court of Justice. In particular, its independence of the League of Nations is emphasised and proved by examples: it is not a mere piece of machinery for registering the wishes of the Council of the League as its detractors sometimes declare. The Judges are not deemed to be representatives of the countries to which they belong, though this principle receives a set-back in cases where the Bench does not include a judge of the nationality of one or of neither of the parties. Judge Bustamante discusses the question of establishing international jurisdiction in criminal matters and lays stress on the great difficulties which exist in doing so; he suggests that States should rather agree that international criminals should be punished under the appropriate national jurisdiction, but there is the difficulty of defining an international crime. One curious feature appears in the author's doctrine that a local atmosphere is essential for justice and that certain questions of the New World ought to be argued and decided in an American atmosphere. The patriotism of

the author shows itself in his selection of Havana as the place where the Court should sit for the purpose of hearing cases involving American matters. The book contains a valuable bibliography and the texts of the Statute and Rules of the Court.

A. PEARCE HIGGINS.

The World Court in 1925. By J W WHEELER-BENNETT. (First Annual Supplement to *Information on the Permanent Court of International Justice*) 1926 (London: Association for International Understanding, Sentinel House, Southampton Row, W.C.I. 8vo, 27 pp. 6d net)

THIS is a pamphlet of 27 pages giving an outline of the work of the Permanent Court of International Justice for the year 1925. It also contains a short list of books and articles dealing with the same subject which appeared during that year

A. P. H.

Mandates By FREDA WHITE. 1926. (London: Jonathan Cape 8vo. 196 pp 3s. 6d. net)

MISS WHITE adopts the same arrangement of her almost equally abundant and varied material as Sir George Fiddes in his book on the Colonial Office, reviewed on page 250 of this issue. She opens with an account of the Mandates system, then gives a short description of each mandated territory, thus indicating the problems with which the Mandates Commission deals, and then ends with a chapter entitled "Doubts and Hopes". She uses her material very fairly, but allows her feelings rather to run away with her in dealing with the difficulties that have arisen in South West Africa. Such phrases as "the slaughter of May 1922," "the Bondelswart Massacre" are to be deprecated. Nor do I believe that for hundreds of years Hottentots will point to the hill of Guruchas and say "that is where the white men shot us from the great white birds and slew men, women and children." In this unfortunate affair the Mandatory was to blame. But the efficacy of the Mandates system should not rest on any disproportionate emphasising of such episodes. It must not be supposed that the Bondelswarts would not have had their advocates in the Union even if no Mandates Commission had existed. Nor do I think that she is quite fair to the Mandatory in her account of the Rehoboth affair, when she asserts that "it seemed as though the Bondelswart massacre might be repeated." Even in Mandated territories the law must be maintained by force if necessary, and the new Raad was in fact unconstitutional and in open rebellion. But perhaps judgment in this matter should be deferred until the judicial commission has reported. Let us hope too that Miss White will prove a false prophet when she says that "this is the beginning of what must be a long story." May we not hope that the force of public opinion will contribute to cut the story short? Sir Frederick Lugard, in his interesting foreword, sums up the position, when he says that "the sole compelling power and driving force which the Mandates Commission can exert is the force of the public opinion of the world." In the use of this power in the future in the same judicious way as it has been used in the past, lies the hope of the Mandates experiment being successful.

H. A. WYNDHAM.

Italy : The Central Problem of the Mediterranean. By COUNT ANTONIO CIPPICO. 1926. (New Haven : Yale University Press. London : Humphrey Milford. 8vo. xi + 110 pp. 10s. 6d. net.)

THIS book consists of lectures delivered by Senator Cippico to the Institute of Politics at Williamstown last summer. It sets forth candidly and clearly two great needs of Italy—security for her vital trade-routes overseas by the “Freedom of the Mediterranean” and the acquisition of new tropical colonies, not so much for the settlement of superabundant population, as for the supply of raw materials needed by growing industries for the employment of her prolific working-class at home. Both these theses have been effectually illustrated since the lectures were delivered—the first by the recently concluded Treaty of Friendship and Arbitration between Italy and Spain, and the second by the Agreement for the delimitation of zones of economic exploitation between Italy and Great Britain in Abyssinia.

Count Cippico begins with a brief summary of the history of the Mediterranean from the earliest times of its supreme importance as the cradle of Western civilisation, through the centuries of its decline, until the cutting of the Suez Canal restored its primacy as the chief highway of the world. He shows how almost by accident, “by the imperial instinct of the British people rather than by conscious plan,” the keys of the Mediterranean’s gates remain to-day in the hands of a world-Power, “whose shores are not washed by its waves.”

Count Cippico says that “more than forty-one millions of Italians could be starved in a few weeks, if those who hold the gate-ways were suddenly to close them to the imports of grain, coal, fuel-oils, iron and all the raw materials essential to the life of a modern civilised nation.” Be this as it may, it is obvious at least that the “freedom” of this world-thoroughfare is a matter of more intimate importance to the new industrial Power exclusively confined to it than to England, France or Spain, which have ports on other seas. But Count Cippico does not forget the cordial friendship that has ever inspired the policy of the gate-keeper towards the inmate, or the pledge that the latter holds in her undoubted power of severing by submarine and aeroplane the former’s all-important road to India and the East. Nevertheless, the recent Treaty of Friendship with Spain at least suggests some means of insurance against possible imprisonment, as well as the strengthening of fraternal bonds between two Latin nations and a timely reinforcement of mineral supplies.

With regard to Signor Mussolini’s emphasis of Italy’s patent need for colonies, alarmist rumours recently asserted that he contemplated war with Turkey for the acquisition of territories in which to settle Italian peasants. Englishmen should surely know how difficult and how costly it is to make such settlements, conquest apart; and were not the Greek experiment in Anatolia sufficiently discouraging, the experience of Tunis, where it has taken half-a-century to settle about one hundred thousand Italians, and of Tripolitania, where it is estimated that it will take as long to establish a similar number, should surely prove the futility of a war for land to absorb the surplus of a population increasing at the rate of half-a-million a year! Far more easily with peace and trade expansion can Italy’s growing industries employ her superfluous population, provided only that adequate sources of raw material can be secured. Italy alone of the victorious nations acquired at the peace no new fields for the production of

cotton, rubber, petrol and similar products, which their tropical colonies abundantly supply to Britain, France, Belgium, Holland and Portugal; and Italy not unnaturally chafes at her dependence upon rivals for what must signify more and more henceforth their only means of livelihood for millions of her citizens. Coal, too, all her rivals have in plenty; how many Englishmen consider the check that the British Coal Strike has given to Italian industries by raising the price of German coal by some forty per cent.? The Agreement with Britain over Abyssinia is designed to encourage the growth of cotton for Lombard industries and thus to ease in one respect the economic net that puts Italy at the mercy of the richer nations.

Count Cippico concludes his course by a record of the progress made in Italy under the Fascist régime—a record now generally accepted. His book is rich in memorable thoughts and pregnant phrases, expressing the author's dynamic view of politics. "There are three creative elements in the history of all nations. the Idea, which is Will, the geographical situation and the demographic force." "Empire is not necessarily territorial; it may be political, economic or spiritual." "A nation that conquers itself achieves far more for its future than it could derive from any territorial conquest." If the object of the study of international affairs be the promotion of peace by the sympathetic understanding of the point of view of other nations, then Count Cippico's candid book should contribute not a little to the peaceful solution of the Central Problem of the Mediterranean.

HAROLD E. GOAD.

The Arab Civilisation. By JOSEPH HOLL. Translated from the German by S. Khuda Bukhsh, M.A., B.C.L. 1926. (Cambridge: Hefter. 8vo. xvii + 128 pp. 8s. 6d.)

To attempt, with our present knowledge, a summing-up of "Arab civilisation" is a task that requires either courage or foolhardiness. Professor Holl's book, unlike a recent French work (also lately, by excess of superfluity, translated into English), has a serious value, which is further vouched for by the eminent Indian scholar who has brought it within the range of the English and Indian general reader. There is room for criticism, of course, on points of detail; no writer on *Islamica* can hope to avoid that. It is disappointing to find the author apparently remaining faithful to the older general works of von Kremer and others at many points where they have been superseded by later researches; but one would be clearer about this if the footnotes added by the translator had been distinguished from those (if any) of the original author. The most interesting chapters of the book are those which describe in some detail the scientific and architectural triumphs of the mediæval Muslims. It may fairly be argued, however, that these branches of activity by no means exhaust our idea of a civilisation. The student of the modern Islamic world, face to face with social, political, economic and other problems, whose roots lie deep in the Middle Ages, will find little here that will help him to understand them.

H. A. R. GIBB.

The Problem of India. By B. SHIVA RAO and D. GRAHAM POLE. 1926. (London: Labour Publishing Co., Ltd. Sm. 8vo. 96 pp. 2s. 6d.)

THIS book has the merit of containing in small compass much useful information on social and industrial conditions in India, the present system of government, and the political programmes of various Indian bodies. That the reader is left in no doubt as to the bias of the authors should also perhaps be reckoned in their favour. It is not they, after all, but the publishers, who claim for this booklet that it gives the facts and solves the problem of the British Empire in India "clearly and fully." In reality, some of the most serious obstacles to the development of an Indian democracy are either evaded or dismissed with light-hearted comments that have a flavour of the platform orator, while no attention whatever is paid, on the one hand to the fundamental economic problem, on the other to the temporary financial embarrassments of the post-War period. The distortion would be still greater were it not for Lord Olivier's Foreword, which seems designed in part to correct the too-sweeping statements made or quoted here. The value of the book, in short, lies less in the contribution it makes to the elucidation of the "problem of India" than in the exposition it gives of the views about India held by a section of opinion in this country.

H. A. R. GIBB.

La Politique Allemande Pendant la Guerre. By CHARLES APPUHN, *Agrégé de l'Université, chef de section à la Bibliothèque de la Guerre.* (Publications de la Société de l'Histoire de la Guerre, troisième série. 1926. Paris: Alfred Costes. 8vo. 132 pp 10 fr.)

THE first of these three articles, which have been published at intervals since the War, appeared in the *Bulletin de la Société de la Guerre* in 1920. In it, M. Appuhn surveys the fluctuations of feeling in Germany during the War, his aim being to show how much less unanimity there was, even in the feeling towards France, than had been generally supposed, and how strongly domestic politics and party strife influenced both the feeling in the country and the attitude of the German Government towards this or that enemy at different periods of the War.

In estimating the dominant feeling during the early stages of the War as having been more one of pity for a France sacrificed to ambitious politicians than of animosity towards the French people, M. Appuhn is probably not far wrong, for, at that time, England was represented as the arch-enemy, exploiting a vain and ignorant people for her own selfish ends, and it may well be that the efforts made to conciliate France after the failure of the Verdun offensive were largely due to recognition that her powers of resistance had been underestimated, and that it might be worth while making some sacrifice in order to detach her from England. In any case, there is no doubt that, at that time, there was a very strong feeling in favour of conciliating the French people, and M. Appuhn thinks it even possible that, had the Entente successes continued, Bethmann-Hollweg, who had been brought round to this view, might have eventually carried his point. Early in July, 1917, however, when Poincaré announced in the

Chamber that no further operations on a great scale could be contemplated for some time to come, the Kaiser was won over to the point of view of the military party, and with Bethmann-Hollweg's resignation, all hope of an understanding with France perished.

The three months which elapsed between this event and Kühlmann's famous pronouncement in the Reichstag on the 9th of October, were decisive, in M. Appuhn's opinion, both as regards German feeling towards France and the general history of the War. The struggle between the tendencies in Germany continued as before, but he points out that it became a struggle between advocates and opponents of a peace of understanding with England, and that on the 9th of October, 1917, Germany may be considered to have declared war on France for the second time and, this time, war to the knife, which continued to the end.

In a postscript to this article, M. Appuhn notes that since it was written events have taken place which were certainly not calculated to diminish the bitterness of German feeling against France. It is to be regretted that in stating his reasons for believing, in spite of this, in the possibility of a future Franco-German understanding, he does not refer to the proof of good-will given by Germany in the Locarno agreement.

In the second article M. Appuhn expressly avoids expressing any opinion as to whether either France or England would have accepted a peace without victory. His aim is merely to show that those responsible for Germany's policy in 1917 were perpetually divided between anxiety for the peace they recognised was necessary and fear of making concessions that might not be necessary—a frame of mind which must inevitably have blocked the way to a peace of understanding, however strongly such a peace might be favoured by the current of opinion on the opposite side. This is perhaps the most interesting article of the three, for it deals with the internal difficulties in Germany and Austria in 1916, the efforts made to win over Pope Benedict XV to the side of the Central Powers and secure peace through the intervention of the Papal Sec, and the part played by Erzberger in the negotiations which preceded the step taken by the Pope on the 1st of August, 1917, the particulars being derived from authentic sources to which the reader is referred.

Amongst points of importance in this connection, M. Appuhn notes that before that date Bethmann-Hollweg had been replaced by Michaelis, that the military authorities had insisted on his being replaced, that the Centre Party, and Erzberger in particular, did not stand by him at this juncture, that Hertling, to whom the post was first offered, refused it on the ground of his inability to contend with the military authorities, and that the famous "peace without annexations" resolution could only be regarded by Germany's enemies as either a *ruse* or a sign of weakness, and consequently merely to serve to create internal dissension. It was, in fact, never regarded as anything but a manoeuvre, for it was evident that the peace terms Germany would offer or accept would depend on the military situation, and it is well known that the efforts made by the Pope to bring about negotiations between the belligerent Powers failed owing to the difficulty in obtaining any satisfactory assurance from Germany with regard to Belgium.

The third article deals with Germany's domestic policy during the War, showing how the measures of Parliamentary reform promised

by the Kaiser, and regarded as essential by successive Governments in order to allay the growing discontent among the masses, were opposed by the extremists of the Conservative and National Liberal Parties and only carried too late to avert the revolution which destroyed the whole régime. It also gives interesting details of the struggle between the civil and military authorities during the latter part of the War, when the latter completely gained the upper hand, in spite of the promise given by the Kaiser to Hertling on his accepting office in October, 1917.

CONSTANCE VESEY.

LIBRARY

THE Library Committee wishes to record a special vote of thanks to Sir Matthew Nathan for a most valuable collection of books on China, Hong Kong and the Far East generally, which he has generously given to the Library.

The Committee also wishes to record its thanks for gifts to the Library from Mr. J. W. Brown, Mr. P. A. Buxton, M. Emil Cammaerts, Major A. G. Church, Mr. Lionel Curtis, Miss E. Jeffries Davis, Dr. Abraham Flexner, Mr. H. O. Frind, Miss A. Ruth Fry, Colonel V. Gabriel, Signor Amedeo Giannini, Mr. R. F. Harrod, Mr. Headlam-Morley, Mr. Manley O. Hudson, Mr. B. Kumar, Miss Caroline Playne, Sir John Power, Mr. Francis Rodd, Sir John Stavridi, Miss Katharine Thring, Professor Arnold Toynbee, Mr. Stanley Unwin, Sir Arnold Wilson, The Hon. Hugh Wyndham, Dr. Silvio Zanutto, the Agent-General for Reparation Payments, the Anglo-Hellenic League, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, the Czechoslovak Legation, the German Embassy, the Gilchrist Trustees, Institute of Pacific Relations, Istituto per l'Oriente, League of Nations Union, the Malay States Information Agency, the Mexican Foreign Office, the Mexican Legation, Publicity Bureau for South China, M. Minoslav Sichinsky, the Student Christian Movement.

FORTHCOMING MEETINGS

At Chatham House, 10 St. James's Square, S.W. 1, at 8.15 p.m.

Tuesday, October 12th.	Seventh Annual General Meeting of the Institute
„ October 19th.	“The Seventh Assembly of the League of Nations.” Speaker: The Rt. Hon. SIR GEORGE FOSTER, G.C.M.G. (First Canadian Delegate to the League of Nations). Chairman: The Rt. Hon. The VISCOUNT CECIL OF CHELWOOD, K.C.
„ November 16th.	“The Irish Free State and the British Empire.” Speaker: SIR JOHN KEANE, D.S.O. Chairman: The Rt. Hon. SIR HORACE PLUNKETT, K.C.V.O.
„ November 30th.	“The Imperial Conference.” Chairman: The Right Hon. L. S. AMERY, P.C., M.P.
„ December 7th.	“Bulgaria.” Speaker: LADY MUIR. Chairman. The LORD NEWTON, P.C.
„ December 14th.	“The International Aspects of the Migration Problem.” Speaker: Mr. D. C. TAIT. Chairman: Professor ARNOLD TOYNEE.

THE LIBRARY

A REMINDER OF ITS NEEDS

Extract from letter circulated to members, December 10, 1921:

“ It is hoped that members of the Institute will assist in the formation of the Library, and I am, therefore, on behalf of the Executive Committee, to ask you whether you would be able to contribute gifts of books (especially modern standard books on international relations and foreign countries) or periodicals or modern maps and atlases. If so, would you be kind enough to address to the Secretary a list of any works which you are able to offer.”

CHATHAM HOUSE,
10 ST. JAMES'S SQUARE,
LONDON, S.W. 1.

Tel.: REGENT 6906-7

Publications issued under the auspices of
The Royal Institute of International Affairs

A History of the Peace Conference of Paris.
Edited by H. W. V. TEMPERLEY. Six volumes. 1921-1924.
8vo. £10 10s.; for members of the Institute: £9. Single
volumes: £2 2s.

The World after the Peace Conference. By
Arnold J. TOYNBEE. 1925. 8vo. 91 pp. One Map. 5s.
net.

Survey of International Affairs, 1920-3. By
Arnold J. TOYNBEE. 1925. 8vo. xv + 526 pp. Six
Maps. 25s.; for members of the Institute: 18s.

Survey of International Affairs, 1924. By Arnold
J. TOYNBEE. 1926. 8vo. xiv + 528 pp. Six Maps. 25s.;
for members of the Institute: 18s

The British Year Book of International Law.
Yearly since 1920. 16s.

The Dominions and Foreign Affairs. Address by
Professor A. F. POLLARD, Litt.D. 1921. 15 pp. 1s.

Recent Revelations on European Diplomacy.
By G. P. GOOCH, D.Litt. 1922. (*Reprinted from the
Journal.*) 29 pp. 1s. 6d.

The Draft Treaty of Mutual Assistance. Record
of Discussion by Viscount CECIL, Mr. AMERY and others.
1924 (*Reprinted from the Journal.*) 38 pp. 1s.

*Belgium and Western Europe since the Peace
Treaty.* Translation of an Address by M. JASPAR,
formerly Belgian Foreign Minister. 1924. (*Reprinted
from the Journal.*) 29 pp. 1s.

The Geneva Protocol of 1924. By Sir John F.
WILLIAMS, K.C., C.B.E. 1924. (*Reprinted from the Journal.*)
Published by Messrs. George Allen & Unwin 18 pp. 1s.

The Murder of Sarajevo. Translation of an article
written by M. Ljuba JOVANOVIĆ. 1925. (*Reprinted from
the Journal.*) 15 pp. 1s.