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*HOW MANY*  
**WORLD WARS?**



# *HOW MANY* **WORLD WARS?**

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*The Warning of Foch*

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BY

Maurice Léon

DODD, MEAD & COMPANY

*New York · 1942*

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*Among the Living*

TO MY SON, MAURICE LÉON, JR., WITH LOVE  
AND TO WINSTON CHURCHILL,  
FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT AND WENDELL WILLKIE  
LEADERS IN A GREAT CAUSE

*Among the Dead*

IN MEMORY OF MY BELOVED SON, GOODRICH LÉON, AND OF  
FERDINAND FOCH, JULES JUSSERAND,  
RAYMOND POINCARÉ AND THEODORE ROOSEVELT  
WHO VALIANTLY STROVE FOR A LASTING PEACE  
THIS BOOK IS DEDICATED



## FOREWORD

In his address before Congress, delivered December 26, 1941, Winston Churchill, British Prime Minister, the man thanks to whom the cause of freedom was preserved from irretrievable disaster in 1940, said:

✓ "If we had kept together after the last war, if we had taken common measures for our safety, this renewal of the curse need never have fallen upon us.

"Do we not owe it to ourselves, to our children, to tormented mankind, to make sure that these catastrophes do not engulf us for a third time?"

The pages that follow have been written as a contribution to the elucidation of that most momentous question.

The American people, in order to win both this second Pan-German war and the peace which will follow it, need to take to heart a lesson as yet only dimly understood, namely that to our failure to heed the advice of Marshal Foch are due the immeasurable perils that confront us. Victory to be achieved requires that we know why we fight again in order that we may make sure that the fruits of military victory shall not be thrown away again for a mere truce pending a third Pan-German war. The danger of this is much greater than is realized at present. Until recently our public has ignored a truth so plain as to be axiomatic, namely that the maintenance of world peace is the very foundation on which our welfare as a nation rests. After Woodrow Wilson had bungled the peace, his

opponents, instead of correcting his blunders, put Harding in the White House and fooled the people into believing that a virulent kind of selfishness passing under the name of isolationism was for the nation's best interests.

The result was that not only did we throw away our own sacrifices, great chiefly in money, for the victory of 1918, but also through our elected leaders we rendered nugatory the stupendous price which others paid not only in riches but in blood for the security of their freedom. Today France and Belgium have been reduced to slavery by a system of international thuggery which owes its opportunities first and foremost to the practices of American politics. This is a hard truth to swallow, but to escape it would be infinitely dangerous, and indeed it is to that kind of escapism that we owe our present precarious situation.

What are the facts about France's downfall? For centuries she had stood nearest to a people ever willing to follow with docility its war lords in enterprises of pillage and devastation. From 1914 to 1918 France's territory was scourged by the German invaders and in defending their native soil a million and a half French soldiers laid down their lives while 800,000 more were maimed. During that time civilian deaths in France exceeded births by another 883,000. When the fighting was over, France had lost half her young manhood; her richest provinces had been laid waste. The victory had been won under the leadership of France's greatest son, Marshal Foch, who had devoted his entire life to the problem of his country's defense. No man then living knew the situation in Europe as deeply and completely as he did; none understood so

thoroughly the needs of an enduring peace and the means of attaining it. He voiced France's appeal for measures that would effectively prevent the recurrence of the pan-German blight. He urged the maintenance of an international police force to control the Rhine bridgeheads, not for a few years but permanently, that the war party to the right of the bank might be faced with the certainty that an attempt at rearmament would bring in time sufficient force to render it ineffectual.

But Woodrow Wilson, President of the United States, would have none of it. And his opponents at home, instead of undoing his work, so acted that they made sure that the damage he had wrought at the Peace Conference should prove irreparable. Between them they paved the way for the advent of a partner and successor of Ludendorff named Hitler. He and his accomplices received their opportunity first of all at the hands of these American politicians. Let the facts speak for themselves. They prove that this war is due chiefly to the acts and omissions of two men elected by the American people to the highest office in the land, Woodrow Wilson and Warren G. Harding, and to a third, wished on the country and indeed on the world, by the people of Idaho: William E. Borah, a descendant of German forbears named Borach, according to the revelation of one of his intimates—the man who acted as intermediary between him and Bernstorff during American neutrality in 1914–1917.

Thank God, we have today in Wendell Willkie a descendant of German forbears who is the antithesis of Borah. Had he been in Harding's place in 1921, America would not have scuttled the peace, and concepts of reason

and justice would be dominant in the world today. But for Willkie we would have the kind of disloyal opposition right now which dealt world peace a death blow in 1919-1921. He has saved the honor of the Republican Party, sadly imperiled by those who had an infallible formula for keeping us out of war.

Everyone who had any part of responsibility for influencing the disastrous decisions which rendered possible this second Pan-German war has disqualified himself from having any voice in the formulation of the peace which is to forestall a third Pan-German war.

What I write is addressed to those who wish to be enlightened by facts and who are determined to do what they can in the light of the facts to render impossible a recurring threat to the liberties of mankind.

What is the lesson to be derived from this, the greatest crisis of mankind since the dawn of history, a crisis when for the first time the future of mankind as a whole is at stake? That lesson was plainly discernible in 1918 to those willing to "stop, look and listen." The Pan-German concepts of which Adolf Hitler is now the chief exponent were not new in 1914; they almost prevailed in the spring of 1918. Nevertheless, those who in the United States and Great Britain held fast to theories of pacifism which take no heed of the starkest realities combined with the accomplices of the German high command to insure the rejection of the teachings of experience which required that by permanent control of the Rhine the free nations should be in a position at all times to intervene effectually in order to prevent a stealthy German rearmament. By keeping thus the German war party under

permanent discredit it might have been possible, after several generations, to eradicate its strain from the German body politic, to cure the German people of the moral leprosy with which it sought to inoculate the world. This international prophylaxis would have given France a chance to recover from the all but mortal wounds she had suffered during 1914-1918. France had lost that war because by it her vitality had been crippled. It was essential therefore that she should not lose the peace which was to follow. Thus control of the Rhine became the condition *sine qua non* of the protection of the western hemisphere from attack in the Atlantic as well as protection of the British Isles from attack on all sides, the latter being a necessary part of the former.

All this is not hindsight. On November 25, 1934, when the evidence known to our government as well as to those of Great Britain and France proved overwhelmingly that another Pan-German war was in preparation on a vast scale, I ventured to address Rudyard Kipling, whose cousin, Stanley Baldwin, leader of the Conservative Party, was the most influential member of the British government. My letter stated:

"Twenty years after, another war looms, approaching with horrible swiftness. Now as then the war party rules in Germany and her people are at work night and day making ready to strike, in deliberate violation not only of the Treaty of Versailles, but of like provisions in the Berlin Treaty of 1921.

"Some of my fellow-countrymen are shortsighted enough to think it is no concern of theirs. No doubt some of your fellow-countrymen think likewise. My suggestion is that those who grasp the situation must

urge action now, because in another year it will be too late. Those who are threatened should not wait until the Germans are ready to strike again. They should on the contrary go into Germany, hold the Rhine and Ruhr so that if there is any fighting to be done it will be done right there—that means there will be mighty little of it to do. Mr. Baldwin said not long ago that ‘our frontier is on the Rhine,’ and when he said that he spoke for Western civilization. Words are not enough in this case—action must make them good. It would discredit the German war party and the lesson would not be lost on its mate in Japan.”

Mr. Kipling replied to me from his home, Bateman’s, Burwash, Sussex. His letter dated 10th December 1934 stated that my letter raised “very large issues and is full of suggestions which must receive careful thought” and, in conclusion, stated “I agree in thinking the whole situation most hazardous.”

The co-ordination of effort between the leading free nations, of which Winston Churchill was the leading protagonist, and which might have headed off the second Pan-German war, did not materialize.

If we win this time (this is still a big “if” only because we are not yet fully awake to our peril) we must make up our minds to do that which the statesmanship of foresight might have achieved in 1919. Our slogan, paraphrasing Cato, should be “*delenda est Pan-Germania*”—Pan-Germany should be destroyed. Pan-Germany is a state of mind and it will die only if force in the defense of freedom is so used and maintained for a century as to render its revival impossible.

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# I

Toward a truce which became Wilson's  
"Peace without victory"

(1914-1917)

## — R E M I N I S C E N C E S —

**The first  
German  
plot in U.S.,  
August, 1914**

From 1914 on throughout the hostilities I had been in close touch with a friend of mine at the Bar, Mr. John Quinn, whose services to the Allied cause during those years were known to me to be of exceptional value, all the more so that they were rendered without fanfare. He did an extraordinary thing in August, 1914, in defeating a German plan involving the sale of the German merchant ships in American harbors to the Government of the United States to be operated as a Government-owned merchant marine for neutral trade—in other words, for supplying Germany through Holland and Denmark. For the purpose of creating American interest in the sale of the ships and at the same time providing themselves with a slush-fund for putting the necessary legislation through Congress, the Germans were endeavoring to borrow from the National Bank of Commerce in New York, for which Mr. Quinn was Counsel, a sum of several million dollars on the security of the German merchant vessels and upon terms giving the holders of the loan a bonus payable out of the purchase price of the ships. Mr. Quinn

scented at once the corruption plot, and it was made more manifest when, as an inducement for favorable action by him, the German interests offered him a fee of \$25,000. Upon excellent legal grounds he advised the Bank against making the loan and thus killed the plan at the National Bank of Commerce. The scheme was then taken to the National City Bank of New York, whose President, Mr. Frank A. Vanderlip, informed me of it. There it did not reach the stage of negotiation. The matter was submitted to Mr. James Stillman, who was in Paris and who promptly vetoed it so far as his Bank was concerned. At about the same time, upon Mr. Stillman's instructions, Mr. Vanderlip sent the French Ambassador, Mr. Jusserand, a cheque for a million francs for the French Red Cross. The Ambassador told me that when he opened the envelope and saw a cheque for a million francs drop out he thought it a practical joke until he read the letter. The attitude of the National City Bank in those days, due to the personal sentiments of Mr. Stillman, Mr. Vanderlip and Mr. Samuel McRoberts, was of great aid to the Allied cause and to France in particular.

The German ship scheme was being promoted in Congress with the aid of Secretary of the Treasury McAdoo when, the attempt to create American interest in its fulfillment having failed, Ambassador Jusserand on behalf of the Allies expressed himself not only to the State Department but to the White House in terms which made clear that the Allies were unalterably opposed to the scheme, despite Mr. McAdoo's glib assurance to the contrary before a congressional committee. Ambassador Jusserand wrote me of the action he had taken in Wash-

ington on the subject, and with that letter and a clipping of the Washington dispatch quoting Secretary of the Treasury McAdoo as assuring a congressional committee that the plan would not be opposed by the Allies, I paid a visit to Mr. Rollo Ogden, then editor of the *New York Evening Post*. I first showed him the newspaper clipping, which he read with care, it having appeared in his own paper, and then I showed him Ambassador Jusserand's letter, which he likewise read with great care. He handed them back to me and thanked me. The next day the *New York Evening Post* published a blistering editorial on the attitude of Mr. McAdoo in promoting a scheme the obvious effect of which would be to embroil the United States in a quarrel with the Allies for Germany's benefit. Nothing more was heard of the plan for some months. In February, 1915, there was an attempt by the German government to revive it. It failed, and nothing was heard of the scheme after that.

It had been brought to the National Bank of Commerce by the Hamburg-American Line, one of whose most influential friends in the United States, Mr. Paul M. Warburg, had retired from the Board of Directors of that Bank to become a member of the Federal Reserve Board a few days previously. It was brought to the National City Bank by a well-known banker, born in Germany, who at that time was still a British subject by naturalization and who, as I learned contemporaneously, had stated in August, 1914, at a meeting of the Board of Directors of an important banking institution in New York of which he was a director, that information received by his firm, which emanated from the German

General Staff, indicated that the German armies would be in Paris by the middle of September, within six weeks from the beginning of the war.

The senior partner of that firm was outspoken in support of the German cause. After the Battle of the Marne, however, the banker in question told me he was at heart favorable to the Allied cause, though his other German-born partners were not, and asked me how he might be of help to it. I replied that he might make a donation to the French Red Cross through Madame Jusserand, wife of the French Ambassador, and he did so, sending me a check to her order for one thousand dollars, which I transmitted to the Embassy on November 12, 1914. During the conversation which led to the delivery of this check I made a reference to the German ship scheme, and the banker assured me that he had taken it up with the National City Bank because he did not want his firm to go into it. Actually what he had done in this respect early in September, 1914, had been of aid to me when I approached the National City Bank on behalf of the French Government because it had elicited from Mr. James Stillman a statement so strong in opposition to any aid to the Germans as to leave no doubt that he was whole-heartedly on the side of the Allies.

\* \* \* \* \*

Caillaux,  
French  
appeaser

Since the Agadir crisis in the summer of 1911, which I spent in France, it had seemed obvious to me that a German invasion of France, while it might be postponed, could not be delayed long, and that in preparation for what was sure

to become their life and death struggle the French should acquire with their savings the means of buying war supplies in the United States. That summer I expressed the view to several leading Frenchmen that the Paris Bourse should be required to list no foreign securities except a selected few seasoned American issues which in case of need could be turned into dollars and applied to American purchases. I happened to be staying at the Pavillon Pailard at Bellevue-Meudon, overlooking the Paris airdrome at Issy-les-Moulineaux, and discovered that the apartment next to mine was occupied by the French Prime Minister, Joseph Caillaux. One morning he and I met as we were leaving our rooms. "I hear you are from New York," he said. "Let us have a talk some evening, after dinner." At that very time he was negotiating with Germany a settlement involving the grant of privileges which would facilitate German penetration into Morocco and a gift of vast territories in the French Congo, all by way of appeasement of the Kaiser. Two days later we had our after-dinner talk, during which I made the suggestion that he proceed at once to enable French investors to concentrate on the purchase of the best dollar securities for use in case of war. M. Caillaux at that time was both Prime Minister and Minister of Finance and as such in direct control of French financial policy. His answer to my suggestion was brief: "There will be no war." I was dumbfounded. "You mean, M. le President, that there will be no war now." He replied, "No, I mean there will be no war at all." "In that case, M. le President, what I suggest is of no importance, but only in that case." This talk enlightened me as to the mental processes of appeasers. When the war did break

out in August, 1914, I was more than ever convinced that without American supplies France could not hold out, and I so expressed myself to France's representative in Washington, Ambassador Jusserand, a truly great Frenchman and a great friend of America, whom I found in complete agreement. France's dollar resources were negligible. It seemed to me at the time, during the first days of September, 1914, shortly before the battle of the Marne, that if France was crushed England might succumb and America would soon be in deadly peril. We were in the hands of an administration whose foreign policy had been entrusted to the foremost pacifist of the country. The night Woodrow Wilson's election as President of the United States had become certain Count Bernstorff, German ambassador, had made this cryptic remark: "This gives us four years."

\* \* \* \* \*

**First French  
war loans in  
U.S., 1914-15**

At the request of Ambassador Jusserand I acted in his behalf in arranging a war loan to the French Government. Such a loan had been attempted through J. P. Morgan & Co. in August, 1914, and had failed when that firm received from William Jennings Bryan, Secretary of State of the United States, a message on August 15, 1914, informing it that loans to belligerents were deemed by the Government to be contrary to the true spirit of neutrality, while the Government saw no objection to loans to neutral countries. Mr. Bryan, besides being a pacifist, harbored considerable animosity against the firm of J. P. Morgan & Co. because of the elder Morgan's successful financing of the McKinley

campaign in 1896. When this position of the Government was taken, both Ambassador Jusserand and his British colleague, Sir Cecil Spring Rice, were in London. They returned to Washington early in September, 1914.

I had pointed out in the press that the policy announced by Secretary Bryan, while professing to be in furtherance of neutrality, was in reality a violation of neutrality because it constituted an attempt to depart from a rule of international law after the outbreak of the War in a way to prejudice one of the belligerents for the benefit of the other. I pointed out that when this new policy was announced Great Britain and France were in undisputed mastery of the sea lanes, able to transport supplies purchased in the United States and therefore able to use to good purpose loans for the financing of these supplies; while Germany, not being able to transport goods from America due to the British blockade, had no use for such loans. I also pointed out that American policy during the Russo-Japanese War had permitted Japan, in conformity with international law, to borrow large sums in the United States for her war requirements, although it was contrary to the interests of the United States that Japan should acquire a dominating position in the Pacific. I was convinced that the fate of the War would be vitally affected by whether or not the Allies were able to finance large purchases in the United States upon a scale far beyond their ability to pay for them out of their cash resources. Germany had been preparing for the War for years, building up a stupendous army, while Great Britain's land forces were negligible and the French army, for all its valor, which turned the tide at the Marne, lacked ade-

quate heavy artillery and machine guns to an alarming degree. Ambassador Jusserand having arrived, I took up that situation with him. His personnel at the time consisted of one secretary, all the rest having joined the colors. He asked me to act for him in obtaining a loan, and said he would lose no time in stating his objections to the policy announced by Secretary Bryan.

I thereupon called upon Mr. Frank A. Vanderlip, President of the National City Bank of New York, and had my first conversation with him during the second week of September, 1914. I told him that I had been authorized by the French Ambassador to ascertain whether the National City Bank would be willing to purchase French Treasury bonds. Mr. Vanderlip asked me whether I knew the circumstances which made any such transaction almost impossible of fulfilment: that the New York Stock Exchange was closed indefinitely, that the City of New York owed a hundred million dollars in gold in London which he was endeavoring to find means to pay, finally that the Administration in Washington had expressed its opposition to any such transaction. I answered that I knew of these difficulties, but that France and Great Britain were in a struggle forced upon them in which I believed they were fighting for a cause which was also America's cause, that the odds against them were very great, and that the position taken by the Administration in Washington was not only contrary to international law but was not supported by any United States statute and was fundamentally wrong. In all this Mr. Vanderlip concurred, while continuing to dwell on the difficulties in the way of any such transaction. I then told him that the im-

portance of the service would be greatly increased by the difficulty of rendering it. He then asked me what amount I had in mind. I replied that that very morning the newspapers had published a dispatch to the effect that Rothschild Bros. in London had purchased French Treasury bonds for an amount of two million pounds sterling, and that I had in mind a transaction of a similar amount—ten million dollars. Mr. Vanderlip at the conclusion of our interview told me that, notwithstanding all the difficulties, I could rely on it that he would do his utmost to carry the transaction through.

From that point on he and Mr. Samuel McRoberts took up resolutely the main problem, which was to persuade the Administration at Washington to see the wisdom of not obstructing the proposed transaction. Mr. McRoberts dealt personally with Secretary Bryan. The way had been prepared for him by a conversation which Ambassador Jusserand had had with the Secretary of State, in the course of which the Ambassador said that France, by defending her own liberty, was upholding the cause of freedom, that her cause was worthy not only of the sympathy but of the aid of America, not less so than the cause of the American colonies had been worthy of the aid of France, thanks to which American independence was won. Mr. Bryan had finally told the French Ambassador that if he wished to contract a loan for his country in the United States he (Bryan) knew of no way he could prevent it. Whereupon Mr. Jusserand said that was all he wished to know. Subsequently the National City Bank wrote the State Department outlining the proposed transaction and pointing out that the sale of supplies to the Al-

lies would aid in lessening unemployment, which at that time had reached vast proportions in the United States. The State Department, with Mr. Bryan's approval and that of the White House, gave a statement to the press in which it made a distinction between long-term loans and short-term financing. I asked Ambassador Jusserand to obtain for me by cable from the Ministry of Finances then at Bordeaux the form of French Treasury bond to be used in printing the bonds in New York so as to save time. It soon came and I had the bonds printed and the transaction was closed, after Mr. Vanderlip had written a letter to the French Ambassador confirming the terms agreed upon. When Mr. Vanderlip handed me that letter he remarked that the Bank would make no profit on the transaction, that the bonds which were to be redeemable in one year and were to be discounted, would be sold by the Bank virtually at the same price at which he had purchased them from the French Government. He added that the Bank was doing this as a demonstration of its desire to be of service to the French Government. I asked Mr. Vanderlip to make mention of this in a postscript to the letter, and he did so in his own handwriting. The various steps necessary to complete the transaction took up about seven weeks. When they were completed, on November 4, 1914, the stumbling block in the way of American financing of Allied war purchases had been removed. The bonds incidentally were redeemable at the office of J. P. Morgan & Co. in New York although that house did not take part in the transaction; in fact, in order to allay Mr. Bryan's antagonism, I saw to it that J. P. Morgan & Co. had nothing whatever to do with this first operation. But four

months later, in March, 1915, again acting at the request of the French Ambassador, I arranged with J. P. Morgan & Co., the National City Bank and the First National Bank a second similar transaction of twenty-five million dollars. And this time I negotiated with Mr. J. P. Morgan and his partner, Mr. Thomas W. Lamont. The loan was issued April 1, 1915.

\* \* \* \* \*

Anglo-French  
war loan, 1915

Shortly afterward I prepared a memorandum which was forwarded to London and Paris setting forth a plan for an Anglo-French loan to be placed in the United States for one billion dollars. J. P. Morgan & Co. had become the purchasing agents for both Great Britain and France. The question of future financing of their purchases was bound to arise as their cash resources in the United States grew less. About a week before the *Lusitania* was sunk I had a conversation with Mr. Thomas W. Lamont on this crucial question and he advised that for the time being France ship gold, thinking that if France were to send to New York one hundred million dollars in gold the effect on her credit would be excellent. I passed that suggestion on to Ambassador Jusserand and the gold was shipped. In the course of that conversation with Mr. Lamont he told me with great earnestness that some way should be found to end the war within three months because the flower of the youth of Britain and France was being sacrificed on the battlefield and because in another three months all the belligerent countries would be bankrupt. I told him that I did not know how long the war would last but that

I was convinced it would continue until the overwhelming defeat of Germany. I also said that I did not believe Great Britain and France would go bankrupt, that as long as credit existed on earth they would enjoy it. But it is significant to recall that although Mr. Lamont as a partner in his firm was bound to gain from the continuance of the War over a long period, he felt so keenly the loss which continuance of the War meant in terms of the young manhood of Great Britain and France that there was a note of anguish in his voice as he spoke of the urgency of stopping the War. It was manifest that he gave no thought to war profits as he spoke.

The inexorable course of events was such that four months later J. P. Morgan & Co. brought out the Anglo-French loan of five hundred million dollars.

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Revival of  
Lafayette  
tradition

During the summer of 1915 I had sought an idea to bring home to the American people the significance of the struggle of the Allies as a cause which was that of America as much as their own. Late in July, while looking over a biography of Lafayette, I noted that he was born on September 6, 1757. I was struck by the coincidence that the Battle of the Marne, in which the armies of France and Great Britain and Belgium made their victorious stand against the German armies, began on September 6, 1914. Here, then, was a double anniversary, that of the birth of Lafayette and that of the Battle of the Marne. Lafayette, when a youth of nineteen, had come to the aid

of the American colonies struggling to establish free institutions in the Western Hemisphere. His example had ultimately brought about the Treaty of Alliance between the colonies and the King of France in February, 1778, by which the King had stipulated that the sole aim of the alliance was to achieve the independence of the United States of America and by which he forewent in advance any territorial or other gain for himself or his country. One hundred and thirty-six years after this momentous alliance, one hundred and thirty-three years after the inception of the Battle of Yorktown, at which French forces ashore and afloat, outnumbering their American comrades in arms two to one, French artillery and French ships of war had provided the overwhelming preponderance of strength which prevailed and thereby won American independence, French and British soldiers, fighting shoulder to shoulder, had begun on Lafayette's birthday the victorious offensive which gave the cause of freedom victory at the Marne. Surely there was a fact to appeal to the imagination of the American people. I drew up a call for the observance of Lafayette's birthday on September 6, 1915, recalling in that connection that on September 6, 1914, General Joffre had issued the famous order of the day which had marked the beginning of the Battle of the Marne, thus making the date of September 6, 1915, a doubly memorable anniversary for the cause of freedom. I sent copies of the call to a certain number of my fellow citizens, asking them to sign it and return it to me. The signers included Theodore Roosevelt, former President of the United States; Joseph H. Choate, former Amba-

sador of the United States to the Court of St. James; Myron T. Herrick, former American Ambassador to France, who remained in Paris during the Battle of the Marne; Charles W. Eliot, President of Harvard University; Henry Watterson, editor of the *Louisville Courier Journal*; Judson Harmon, formerly Governor of Ohio and Attorney General of the United States—to name only the most illustrious among the signers. The appeal was published generally by the press, which devoted numerous articles to the services of Lafayette and of France to the cause of freedom in America.

The next year the double anniversary was marked by a great meeting which took place in the Aldermanic Chamber of the New York City Hall. I was in charge of the arrangements on behalf of the signers of the call of the previous year acting as a national committee. Among the speakers were two great friends of the Allied cause: John H. Finley, associate editor of the *New York Times*, and Robert Bacon, sometime Ambassador to France. The guest of honor was Ambassador Jusserand, who was accompanied by Madame Jusserand, and on hand to welcome him was the American Ambassador to France, George C. Sharp, who was home on leave. The great moment of that meeting was when Robert Bacon, turning to Ambassador Jusserand, said, "And I say to you, sir, what Rochambeau said when he met George Washington: 'Entre vous, entre nous, à la vie, à la mort.'" ("Between you and us, for life and unto death.")

Wilson's  
foreign  
policy

We were then in the throes of a presidential campaign which ended in the re-election of Woodrow Wilson as President of the United States to the slogan "He kept us out of war." Soon thereafter Mr. Wilson began his campaign for "peace without victory," a move which was rightly viewed with alarm by all the friends of the Allied cause and which the pro-Germans in America regarded with delight. However eloquent his words, President Wilson wanted a peace which in effect was bound to be a truce between Pan-Germanism and the free nations. Ultimately he was to bring about in November, 1918, the false peace for which he pleaded in December, 1916—a truce which the war party in Germany wished for in order to be given the opportunity of resuming operations as it has done under the sign of the Swastika. The *New York Sun* on January 26, 1917, published an article in which I analyzed Mr. Wilson's course. It is reproduced here for the light it throws upon what Mr. Wilson did later, in 1918-19, which gave Pan-Germanism its present opportunities:

(*The New York Sun*, January 26, 1917)

### LOGIC AND CHRONOLOGY OF THE PRESIDENT'S PEACE CAMPAIGN

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AN EXAMINATION INTO THE BEARING WHICH HIS  
ENDEAVORS MUST HAVE UPON BELLIGERENTS' PRO-  
GRAMMES, ESPECIALLY THAT OF THE ALLIES

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It will be recalled concerning the draft of Mr. Lansing's note of December 18, asking the belligerent Powers to define their aims in this war, that in the text

which was delivered to the allied Governments the President caused to be inserted the following:

"The suggestion which I am instructed to make the President has long had it in mind to offer. He is somewhat embarrassed to offer it at this particular time, because it may now seem to have been prompted by the recent overtures of the Central Powers. It is, in fact, in no way associated with them in its origin, and the President would have delayed offering it until those overtures had been answered but for the fact that it also concerns the question of peace and may best be considered in connection with other proposals which have the same end in view."

It will be recalled that on December 21, the day of the publication of that note, Mr. Lansing put forward an explanation of the reasons for sending it in which it is stated:

"Of course the difficulties that faced the President were that it might be construed as a movement toward peace and in aid of the German overtures. He specifically denies that that was the fact in the note itself."

Later in the day, after conferring with the President, Mr. Lansing put forth an explanation of his explanation, which, however, did not in any way refer to the subject matter of the paragraph just quoted, but was restricted to the single point that Mr. Lansing, by his earlier comments, "did not intend to intimate that the Government was considering any change in its policy of neutrality."

The President's disclaimer to the Allies with regard to any possible connection between the President's step and the German peace proposals stood untouched; indeed, the President's assurances were emphasized by his Secretary of State's explanations.

The Allies, in replying to the President, expressly took note of those assurances and proceeded, in reliance upon them, to define their aims in answer to his inquiry.

That reply, dated January 10, was published January 12; it was supplemented by Mr. Balfour's note of the 13th, published on the 18th.

Three days later, on Monday, January 21, 1917, the President of the United States, breaking a century old tradition, addressed the Senate. After referring to the forwarding of his note of December 18 and the receipt of a reply from the Central Powers in which his inquiry concerning their war aims is evaded, he states:

"The Entente Powers have replied much more definitely, and have stated, in general terms, indeed, but with sufficient definiteness to imply details, the arrangements, guarantees and acts of reparation which they deem to be the indispensable conditions of a satisfactory settlement."

Then comes this disclosure of the President's purpose in initiating this correspondence:

"I have sought this opportunity to address you because I thought that I owed it to you, as the council associated with me in the final determination of our international obligations, to disclose to you, without reserve, the thought and purpose that have been taking form in my mind in regard to the duty of our Government in these days to come when it will be necessary to lay afresh and upon a new plan the foundations of peace among the nations."

Then comes, after various generalities, a formulation of the "new plan." It begins as follows:

"The statesmen of both of the groups of nations now arrayed against one another have said, in terms that could not be misinterpreted, that it was no part of the purpose they had in mind to crush their antagonists. But the implications of these assurances may not be equally clear to all—may not be the same on both sides of the water. I think it will be serviceable if I attempt to set forth what we understand them to be.

"They imply first of all that it must be a peace without victory. It is not pleasant to say this. I beg that I may be permitted to put my own interpretation upon it, and that it may be understood that no other interpretation was in my thought. I am seeking only to face realities and to face them without soft concealments. Victory would mean peace, forced upon the loser, a victor's terms imposed upon the vanquished. It would be accepted in humiliation, under duress, at an intolerable sacrifice, and would leave a sting, a resentment, a bitter memory upon which terms of peace would rest not permanently, but only as upon quicksand."

If this language means anything it can only mean that the influence of this nation, in so far as the President is able to exert it, is to be used to prevent either side to the conflict from gaining a victory over the other. The President, of course, may change his mind and probably will, but his position on this point was stated with sufficient clearness to leave no doubt concerning his state of mind on Monday, January 21, 1917, between 1 and 2 o'clock P.M.

What, then, becomes of the assurances given by the President to the Allies in his note of December 18, in which, as Mr. Lansing put it on December 21, the President specifically denied that it was to be understood as "a movement toward peace"?

If what Mr. Wilson is engaged in is not "a movement toward peace," what is it? What other meaning can be given to the interest he manifested in the military outcome of this war, speaking as he did at a time when the hopes of the Central Powers have dwindled down to the very "peace without victory" wished for by Mr. Wilson, a peace which Germany is straining every nerve to bring about, by hook or crook? And if that is what he is engaged in, has he not practised gross deception upon the Entente Powers? This quite apart from

his motives, although it should be borne in mind that the legal rule founded upon experience that one is presumed to intend the natural and probable consequence of his acts applies to every one, including the President.

Ever since Mr. Wilson's address to the Senate the press of all shades of opinion has noted the undisguised joy which pervaded the precincts of the German Embassy from the moment the President's fluent professions in behalf of humanity, civilization, justice and liberty began to filter through to that centre of philanthropic endeavor made so genial by the social graces of its host. "Peace without victory" forsooth! What about the German Ambassador's triumphant siege of the White House and the masterly strategy of its capture through the subterranean passage of the Treasury Department? Is that not victory enough?

But in gauging the victory it will be well to bear in mind that the value of the object of capture has been greatly lessened by the capture itself; that as a rule neutral rulers and statesmen from the moment the Kaiser's tag is tied to them lose much of their influence in the world; witness, for instance, Constantine and his present status, due to relationships acquired through marriage. It is a question whether the policy of insurance against defeat by the Allies which Mr. Wilson has just handed the Kaiser's envoy is worth the paper it is written on.

MAURICE LEON

In December, 1916, while Mr. Wilson was uttering resounding but on the whole confusing phrases as an apostle of peace, other things were taking place, some of them very secretly, which gave the German High Command cause to rejoice. The Federal Reserve Board, which included two active pro-Germans, had taken measures to

prevent further credits to the Allies whether by means of loans or by means of banking facilities, and President Wilson, privately appealed to, had stated with an enigmatic smile that, while he had appointed these gentlemen of the Federal Reserve Board, he made it a rule not to interfere with them. Greatly encouraged by the President's attitude, Count Bernstorff, the German Ambassador, and his friends obtained from Mr. Wilson a favor so incredibly un-neutral that the State Department earnestly protested against the granting of it. Count Bernstorff had pleaded that he was trying to bring about complete adherence by his Government to the plan of mediation of the War by President Wilson but that he was hampered in his efforts by the Allied censorship. He asked, therefore, that the President grant him the privilege of sending messages to his Government through the State Department and the American Embassy in Berlin and that he receive replies through the same channel. In other words, the German Ambassador would deliver a message to the State Department, which would cable it to the American Embassy in Berlin, which would deliver it to the German Foreign Office, and the reply would come through the same channels. Secretary of State Lansing, who was aghast at this suggestion, made a vehement protest but was overruled by the President, who granted the German Ambassador the facilities he was seeking. Needless to say, the messages were in code, and the State Department neither had the German code nor was it given the translation of any message exchanged between the German Ambassador in Washington and the German Foreign Office in Berlin through these American channels. But the

American Ambassador in Berlin was a man of considerable sagacity, as the event proved.

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**A German plan  
to partition  
the U.S.**

When the German High Command saw that all was going its way in Washington, that American war supplies would no longer be available to the Allies due to the lack of credits with which to pay for them, that the President, while still maintaining in speech the attitude of a neutral, was secretly aiding Germany and therefore had put himself in Germany's power, it became bold. The decision was then made by Hindenburg, Ludendorf, Tirpitz and the Kaiser to resume the sinking without warning, by U-boats, of merchant vessels, notwithstanding the promise made by Germany early in 1916 to abstain from these piratical acts. The German High Command, having reached this decision late in December, 1916, decided upon the First of February, 1917, as a suitable date on which to begin operations to starve England. But there had been Congressional elections in the United States on the date President Wilson was re-elected, and Congress had the power to declare war irrespective of the wishes of the President. What if the new Congress should declare war? The German High Command in its omniscience had an answer to that question. Germany was to form an alliance with Japan and Mexico against the United States in case the latter declared war on Germany. This precedent for the tripartite alliance of Germany, Italy and Japan was to come into being thanks to generous promises made by Germany to Japan and Mexico. Germany was to promise

to Japan no less a reward than the gift of—California. Germany also was prepared to promise to Mexico the equally munificent gift of Texas, New Mexico and Arizona. And the German High Command, in a mood of sardonic humor, used the facilities benignly bestowed upon it by President Wilson as a means of sending to Count Bernstorff in Washington not only instructions to notify the American Government of the decision to resume sinkings without warning of merchant vessels by U-boats, but also instructions to put through the alliance with Japan and Mexico on the terms mentioned. The code message to that effect was handed to Ambassador Gerard in Berlin for transmission to the State Department. The German Foreign Office had tried to induce Ambassador Gerard to transmit its code messages by wireless, but Mr. Gerard, using his own judgment in the matter, resorted to the cable. A wireless message might get through without its text coming to the attention of the British Censorship; but, Britain being in control of the cables, British censors would have the opportunity to try and ascertain the contents of cable messages emanating from Berlin which, while sent by the American Ambassador, were manifestly not in the State Department's code but in the German code. Mr. Gerard did not know whether or not British War Intelligence could decipher the German code. He hoped for the best and had no doubt that, if the messages which he was reluctantly handling under imperative instructions from his Government turned out to contain something inimical to the United States and if British censorship was able to decipher the text, the British Government would notify Washington.

It so happened that His Britannic Majesty's Naval Intelligence had the German code. A clever young woman had engineered the making of a photographic copy of that valuable document, which had been withdrawn for a few hours from a safe belonging to the German Naval Attaché in the United States and had been returned to that safe without its absence being noticed. The message came through about three weeks before notice was to be given to the American Government by the German Ambassador that the U-boats would resume their piratical operations the next day. Admiral Sir Reginald Hall, Chief of Naval Intelligence in London, had the entire message translated and in his hands. But London had the wisdom to wait before it acted, in order to see what Bernstorff would do upon receipt of the message which the State Department delivered to him. Bernstorff's instructions were to act in co-operation with the German Legation in Mexico in putting through the alliance with both Japan and Mexico. British Intelligence in Mexico was watchful and in due course was able to observe that Bernstorff, by means of a code message, had relayed his instructions to his colleague in Mexico City. The proof of this was transmitted to London. When the German Ambassador notified the State Department on January 31, 1917, that the U-boats would resume their murder at sea the next day, President Wilson began to realize that—to use a colloquialism—the Germans had been “taking him for a ride.” He lost no time in expressing his anger by instructing the State Department to hand his passports to the German Ambassador and to recall the American Ambassador to Berlin. But this break in diplomatic relations was not in-

tended by him to go further than the enforcement of armed neutrality. He asked Congress to vote funds for the latter purpose. In the Senate there was a group of some thirteen senators who were responsive to the pro-German element, consisting of Germans naturalized in the United States but still maintaining allegiance to the Kaiser and of Irish haters of Great Britain. These senators decided to oppose the President's request by a filibuster which, with the zealous efforts of Senators Borah, Reed, Stone and O'Gorman, occupied the time of the Senate until the expiration of the Congressional session on March 4, 1917. The funds asked for by the President were not voted, but U-boat murder at sea was being practiced on a large scale.

A few days before, Walter Hines Page, the American Ambassador to the Court of St. James and a staunch friend of the Allied cause, who because of that friendship had forfeited that of his chief, President Wilson, was invited to call at the Foreign Office. There he was received by Arthur Balfour, who put before him proof of an irrefutable nature showing that the instructions sent by the German Government to its Ambassador in Washington to carry out a plan for a military alliance against the United States on the basis already explained had been transmitted for the German Government by the American Embassy in Berlin in a message to the State Department which the latter had delivered to the German Ambassador, who had relayed his instructions to his colleague in Mexico. Sir Reginald Hall was on hand to give Mr. Page all explanations of a technical nature. These facts were set forth by Ambassador Page in a report which he cabled to the State Department, his message being pre-

ceded by a code word which required the Secretary of State personally to decipher it. When Secretary of State Lansing had done so he had before him the uncontrovertible proof that his advice to his chief not to grant the German Government facilities so greatly at variance with the duties of a neutral was sound and had been fully vindicated by the event. He took the report to President Wilson. Up to that time only the British Government, Ambassador Page and Secretary Lansing were aware of all the facts. But what if the President's opponents in Congress were to learn what he had done and the consequences which had followed his highly imprudent act? When he read that report Mr. Wilson must have realized that his whole course, unless radically reversed, was leading him straight to an impeachment trial. It was known at that time that the new Congress, if convened, would meet U-boat murders at sea by a declaration of war against Germany; but the new Congress was not to meet until the 4th of December unless convened earlier in extraordinary session by the President. Mr. Wilson convened the Congress and, appearing before it on April 2, 1917, urged a declaration of war against Germany. But not until he was out of office, not until the so-called Kautsky report had been published by the German Reichstag and the final volume of the letters of Ambassador Page had been published was any public mention made of any of the facts referred to here regarding the secret favor which President Wilson bestowed upon the German Government and the use which the latter made of the facilities which the President placed at its disposal. When the so-called Zimmermann note, being the message

of the German Government to Bernstorff ordering him to proceed with the plan of an alliance with Japan and Mexico, was published a month before the United States entered the War, the intimation was given that it had been intercepted by the American Government. The British Government had no desire to inform Berlin that it was in possession of the German code, and so kept silent. When the full revelation was made in the last volume of the Page letters, the inner circle of Wilson adherents became exceedingly bitter against the memory of that sterling American. The fact that on one occasion he had suggested to Sir Edward Grey, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, how to answer an unfriendly message which Mr. Page had been ordered to deliver to the British Government was harped upon as indicative that Mr. Page had not been faithful to his trust. But an American Ambassador is not only the personal representative of the President of the United States; he is also the chosen representative of the American people. His appointment to be valid must be confirmed by the Senate. When Mr. Page was ordered to deliver a message to the British Government which he knew to be inspired by a spirit of neutrality which took no heed of the realities of the struggle, he, like the good American he was, made a suggestion to the British Foreign Secretary as to the way of avoiding an unpleasant controversy, and in doing this, while he may have departed from the spirit which actuated his eminent chief, he certainly was acting for the best interests of the United States.

House's in-  
trigue against  
Ambassador  
Spring Rice

The British Ambassador to the United States throughout the period of American neutrality was Sir Cecil Spring Rice, an Irishman who was both a true British patriot and a sincere friend of the United States, as I had occasion to observe in my contacts with him throughout the period of American neutrality. He strove particularly to have the American point of view on the Irish question understood in London and was entirely favorable to the cause of self-government for Ireland with the important reservation that Ulster should not be coerced. The devious ways of the Wilsonian neutrality as practiced by the President with the aid of Colonel House, his confidant, and Secretary of the Treasury McAdoo, his son-in-law, did not deceive Sir Cecil Spring Rice, who stood firm throughout in his devotion to the cause of his country, in consequence of which he lost his post and died a premature death, a tragic end of an honorable career which President Wilson and Colonel House brought about, as the following details will show.

In the Autumn of 1916 I met Mr. Sidney Brooks, a British publicist who had come to this country at the invitation of Colonel House for a visit at the home of the latter. Receiving this unusual invitation, he was able to arrange with Lord Northcliffe to send from America a series of articles for publication in the Northcliffe papers. With these articles he also sent Lord Northcliffe private letters of a confidential nature. Having arrived in America, he was heartily welcomed by Colonel House, who told him that Sir Cecil Spring Rice had proved a complete

failure at his post in Washington and that in his, Colonel House's, opinion it would be a splendid thing if Sir Cecil was replaced as British Ambassador to the United States by Sidney Brooks himself. This I learned from the latter, and I have no doubt that the information was communicated by him to Lord Northcliffe. When the President in December, 1916, launched his Peace Without Victory campaign, regarding this development as evidence in support of the charge that Sir Cecil was a failure in Washington, Northcliffe had an editorial published in the *Daily Mail* in which it was hinted that perhaps after all Sir Cecil had outlived his usefulness in Washington and should be replaced by one more likely to succeed. At the very time this editorial appeared, Sir Cecil was battling valiantly for his country's cause, and there is no doubt that he felt keenly this sniping from behind. Realizing what was afoot, I ventured to cable Lord Northcliffe that he was totally misinformed, that Spring Rice, far from having outlived his usefulness, was doing magnificent work in Washington and with time his conduct of the British cause there would be fully vindicated.

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*The Outlook*  
opposes  
"peace with-  
out victory."

At this very time I had been notified by a staunch friend of the Allies in New York that the leading newspapers had become thoroughly cowed by the Peace Without Victory campaign and would not dare to turn the spotlight on its origins, nor on the activities of Mr. Paul M. Warburg, the most influential member of the Federal Reserve Board, in bringing about the stoppage of

all war credits to the Allies. I was able to satisfy myself by inquiring of Mr. Wright, the editor of the *New York Globe*, that such was the situation with the daily newspapers. But Mr. Wright added that if the facts were published in a periodical, the newspapers would reprint the item. I called upon Mr. Lawrence Abbott, editor of *The Outlook* (a weekly) and one of the closest friends of former President Theodore Roosevelt, and told him the whole story of the stoppage of Allied war credits under the inspiration of Mr. Paul M. Warburg, and of the President's attitude which showed that what was being done was done with his hearty approval. When I was through, Mr. Abbott said, "I suppose you would like me to write an article about this." And when I answered in the affirmative he sent for his secretary and dictated the article. As the secretary was about to leave the room he recalled her and dictated for the article the following title, "Why the Allies Think the President's Note Pro-German." This was the note to the belligerents by which the President opened his Peace Without Victory campaign, whose whole purpose was to bring about his mediation and thereby, regardless of what he intended, break the spirit of the Allies and insure a German victory. Mr. Abbott promised to let me have an advance proof of the article, and said it would be published in the first number of *The Outlook* to appear in 1917, the number of January 3rd. When I received the proof of the article I tried to locate Sir Cecil Spring Rice, and found that he was in New York. I took the article to him and he read it with care, after which he handed it back to me saying, "It is all true." On my way back to my office I decided to show

the article to the friend of the Allies through whom I had learned of what had taken place behind the scenes in the stoppage of the war credits to the Allies. I found him still disheartened, for obviously he thought, as I did, that, should these measures stand, it would be only a matter of months before the lack of American supplies would compel the Allies to accept the inconclusive peace which the German High Command desired so much to bring about, knowing that it would prove in time to be a victorious peace for Germany. When he read the article he visibly became more cheerful. As soon as the article appeared I saw to it that it came to the attention of the President, his Cabinet, all leading members of Congress, the Washington press correspondents and, last but not least, the New York City newspapers. Two of the latter, the *Herald* and the *Globe*, reproduced it. At that very time, as it turned out, the Germans were preparing the Zimmermann note, whose transmittal from Berlin to Washington has been recounted and which started the train of events leading to the entry of the United States into the War.

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Germany's  
friends in  
Washington

The day the article appeared in *The Outlook* I happened to be in Washington and had lunch with Ambassador and Madame Jusserand. There were only the three of us at the table, and I expressed myself emphatically as to the dire consequences which I foresaw of the lack of adequate American supplies for the Allied armies which was bound to be felt in a few months due to the stoppage of American credits. Mr. Jusserand agreed that the situation was

very bad, but I noted a suggestion of reserve in his acquiescence. At the end of the meal he said to me, "I will give you a piece of news which will please you," and then he told me that without any doubt the Germans were on the point of resuming the sinking of merchant vessels by U-boats without warning. This piece of news seemed utterly incredible to me despite my complete trust in the Ambassador's word. I put the question to him: "Why should the German High Command, seeing victory in its grasp, risk defeat by a move which might bring the United States into the War?" Mr. Jusserand answered, "You will see, they will do it." How he had learned the facts I did not know and never asked. Obviously it was not from the Zimmermann note because at the time of the conversation, on January 3, 1917, the note had not been transmitted from Berlin. It is evident, however, that at that time the Allied Intelligence must have been exceedingly well informed on the plans of the German High Command. The significance of the situation was that, while Bernstorff, with the aid of Paul M. Warburg in Washington, was winning the War for Germany by bringing about the stoppage of Allied credits in America and a Peace Without Victory campaign whose effect was injurious chiefly to the Allied cause, the German High Command, Hindenburg, Ludendorf, Tirpitz and the Kaiser were coming to the rescue of the Allies by taking steps the effect of which was to bring the United States into the War against Germany. The irony of fate is well illustrated here, and the moral of it all is not lessened by pondering the fact that the man who, at the time, was almost successful in achieving German victory in Washing-

ton, Paul M. Warburg, belonged to a famous Jewish banking family of Hamburg. His own elder brother, Max Warburg, who became late in 1918 one of the German delegates to the Peace Conference, is now an exile in America. The Warburgs were prominent members of German big business; their devotion to Germany was natural. When military defeat overtook Germany they strove to bring about a peace on terms which did not end Germany's power. The work of three men served the same purpose: Woodrow Wilson, first and foremost; Colonel House; and, when the latter lost Mr. Wilson's confidence, Bernard M. Baruch, who succeeded him as the President's closest adviser from March 14, 1919 on. These men contributed most to the defeat of Marshal Foch's plan of having an international police force in permanent control of the Rhine to implement the provisions of the League covenant forbidding aggression.

Shortly after we entered the war in April, 1917, I communicated with Colonel House, pointing out that it would be advisable in view of his record during the period of neutrality that Mr. Paul M. Warburg's connection with the federal government should be severed. At Colonel House's request, a man intimately connected with him appealed to me not to press the suggestion because in the view of Colonel House the enforced resignation of Mr. Warburg from the Federal Reserve Board would be resented by his brother-in-law, Mr. Jacob H. Schiff, with results which would be regrettable from the standpoint of national unity. My reply was that I did not agree with that view, but that the responsibility for the continuance of Mr. Warburg in his influential position at Washington necessarily rested

with the President and his chief advisers; that I had no intention to embarrass them in view of the state of war and that therefore I would not press the matter further.

After the expiration of Mr. Warburg's appointment to the Federal Reserve Board in August, 1918, I learned that at first he had been given to understand on behalf of the President that he would be reappointed for an additional four-year term; but that as the President was about to make this decision official he found on his desk the reports of the army, navy and war trade intelligence services dealing with Mr. Warburg's activities as a friend of Germany and thereupon realized that in the face of these revelations it would be impossible for him to reappoint Mr. Warburg. Characteristically enough, however, Mr. Wilson did not let Mr. Warburg know that he had changed his mind and months went by while Mr. Warburg continued as a hold-over member of the Board, no successor having been appointed. Finally, however, and of course rightly, he insisted upon being told whether he was going to be reappointed or not and was then told that it was impossible. Thereupon an interchange of letters took place between him and the President and the latter on that occasion praised Mr. Warburg's patriotism.

My conviction that Mr. Warburg should never have been a member of any important official body of the federal government was not based primarily on hearsay, though all I heard came from absolutely reliable sources. I knew him and esteemed him when, on the morning of Saturday, August 1, 1914, on Pine Street, I ran into him. A conversation which, to me, was unforgettable ensued.

That morning the newspapers had carried Washington

dispatches to the effect that opposition in the Senate to the confirmation of Mr. Warburg's appointment to the Federal Reserve Board had been withdrawn in view of the war emergency, and that ratification by the Senate was expected to take place shortly. I was about to extend cordial wishes for the successful discharge of his new duties when Mr. Warburg began the conversation as follows:

"Mr. Léon, I am sorry that we are to be on opposing sides."

I said:

"Mr. Warburg, if Germany invades France, Germany has my sympathy."

Mr. Warburg: "How so? Do tell me all about it."

I answered: "Because in that case England is sure to come in on the side of France, and Germany will be crushed."

This answer drew laughter from Mr. Warburg. He said:

"You are misinformed. England is not coming in."

I replied:

"I have no information about it. Just the same, I am convinced that if Germany invades France, England is sure to come in and if I had half your influence in Germany I would keep the cables hot warning them not to do it."

Mr. Warburg disclaimed having much influence in Germany and went on to assure me that if war ensued it would not be the Kaiser's fault; that the Kaiser had done all he could to avert it. The Kaiser had bestowed the Prussian Red Eagle on Mr. Warburg in 1912 shortly after Mr.

Warburg had forsworn allegiance to him on becoming a citizen of the United States by naturalization.

Sir Cecil Spring Rice during the autumn of 1914 told me that during the spring of that year Count Bernstorff, the German Ambassador, had tried to impress him with the tremendous advantages he possessed in the United States and among other things had boasted that he enjoyed the services of the ablest financial adviser in America. When Sir Cecil asked who that might be, Bernstorff's answer was: "Mr. Paul M. Warburg."

Sir Cecil also told me that Mr. Warburg's butler was connected with the German intelligence and that he had reason to believe that statements made at Mr. Warburg's table by American officials were repeated to the German Embassy by that same butler.

In the communication which the *New York Herald Tribune* published on January 4, 1935, in which I referred to the acceptance by France, as a substitute for international control of the Rhine, of a treaty specifically guaranteeing American and British assistance in case of an unprovoked attack by Germany, I stated:

"It is indeed a painful fact that the Senate of the United States was not told all this when the treaty was transmitted to it. If it had known to what extent the honor of the United States was involved in making good the promise by which France had been induced to give up the plan of security devised by her great leader, Foch, to accept the plan tendered in its place by the President of the United States and the British Prime Minister, would American public opinion have tolerated the buncoing of France through trust in the word of a President of the United States?

"This situation has never been faced by the American people because the facts are still largely unknown to it. It is time they were made known. Mr. Bernard M. Baruch did not have an inconsiderable part in this whole business. He should tell his fellow countrymen the whole story."

Writing to Mr. Baruch on January 7, 1935, to call his attention to my letter in the *Herald Tribune*, I stated:

"I hope you will agree with me that the present is a favorable time for you to give the American people the benefit of your knowledge concerning this particular episode. No one is left of the American delegation at the Peace Conference except one man whose knowledge on this particular subject is incomparably less valuable than yours."

Replying to me the next day, Mr. Baruch stated that he did not know where I had got the information (1) in the paragraph in which I referred particularly to him and (2) many of the other matters referred to. He assured me that if ever called upon to make a statement in reference to the subjects referred to in my letter to the *Herald Tribune*, it would not be to my liking; that if the article were a true reflection of my views, he did not consider it based on fact.

I met this challenge by referring him to seven of the documents which I have reproduced at the beginning of the appendix to this book, namely those numbered 1 to 5 inclusive and 9 and 10, documents the authenticity of which was vouched by Prime Minister Clemenceau, Colonel House and Mr. Tardieu shortly after the Peace Conference, and which the French government published

in 1924 in the yellow book entitled *Ministry of Foreign Affairs—Diplomatic Documents—Documents Relating to the Negotiations Concerning the Guaranties of Security Against an Aggression by Germany (January 10, 1919–December 7, 1923)*, printed by the National Printing Office, Paris, 1924. My copy of this book was given me by Mr. Poincaré. It contains his letter as President of the French Republic to Prime Minister Clemenceau, written on April 28, 1919, and which was published in the *Paris Temps* on September 12, 1921, of which the following is an extract:

“It is answered that once the occupation (of the Rhine bridgeheads) is ended, it may be resumed in case of nonpayment. This faculty of reoccupation may seem seductive today on paper. It is full of inconveniences and perils.

“Let us transport ourselves by thought to sixteen or seventeen years hence. Germany has paid regularly for fifteen years. We have evacuated the whole left bank of the Rhine. We have returned within the political frontiers which present no military solidity. Let us suppose Germany again seized by imperialism. Let us suppose her only acting in bad faith. She suspends her payments. We are forced to reoccupy. We give orders in consequence. What assures us that we can have them executed without difficulty? First Germany will not fail, with her ordinary propaganda processes, to distort the facts and to claim that we are the aggressors and as, in reality, it is our troops which will re-enter German territory, we will easily pass indeed as the invaders.

“And then, can we be sure to find the left bank without German troops? It is said that Germany will have agreed to have neither troops nor fortresses on the left bank and within a zone of fifty kilometers to the east

of the Rhine. But the treaty makes no provision for permanent supervision of the forces and the armaments either on the left bank or in the rest of Germany."

I also referred him to the article in the *Encyclopædia Britannica*, supplement of 1922, Volume 32, page 39, entitled "Peace Conference," by Henry W. C. Davis, Professor of History at Manchester University and member of the Advisory Staff of the British Delegation at the Peace Conference. In that article the following statement occurs:

"Great Britain and America had offered France defensive treaties ('the three-power treaty') in lieu of these cumbrous precautions (March 14)."

The so-called cumbrous precautions involved the permanent holding of the Rhine bridgeheads by the allied forces. I also referred him to the book *Peace Making 1919* by Harold Nicolson of the Diplomatic Staff of the British Peace Delegation, at pages 206-207, in which Mr. Nicolson states:

"The whole treaty had been constructed on the assumption that the United States would be not merely a contracting but an actively executant party. France had been persuaded to abandon her claim to a buffer state between herself and Germany in return for a guarantee of armed support from the United States."

Finally, I called Mr. Baruch's attention to the following:

"With reference to your own part in the matter I must tell you that the late John Quinn was an intimate friend of mine and made me one of his executors. He

told me contemporaneously of a suggestion that you made to him that he sound leaders of the Senate on its probable action concerning the treaty of defense and of your comments when he reported the results to you. Mr. Quinn was a man whose accuracy of statement cannot be challenged and my recollection of what he told me is very clear.

"But whatever your knowledge of the matter is I think it would be a good thing to have you tell it before everybody concerned is dead, even though it may not be to my liking. Either you did or did not have any important part in this episode. If you did your fellow-citizens would, I am sure, be glad to have your testimony and weigh it in the light of the known facts."

(Letter of January 9, 1935.)

Mr. Quinn had told me that at the request of Mr. Baruch he had sounded leading senators during the summer of 1919 concerning the prospect of ratification of the so-called Treaty of Assistance and had found that with one single exception, namely Senator Underwood, none of these senators favored ratification. He had told me that when he reported this to Mr. Baruch, the latter gave every indication of being greatly upset by the news and had said to Mr. Quinn, in substance, that France had acted in reliance upon assurance that ratification of that treaty could be counted on. Mr. Quinn in telling me of this expressed the belief that Mr. Baruch would not have been so upset by the information if he had not had a personal part in assuring the French delegation that ratification of that treaty could be counted upon.

After the documentary record had been called to Mr. Baruch's attention, I heard nothing further from him. On January 11, 1935, I sent him a memorandum containing

the source material to which I had referred and in my letter stated:

"If there is anything that I have said concerning this Treaty of Defense which is not fully borne out by the authorities cited in the enclosed memorandum I should be glad to be told what it is. Because the French plans were discarded in exchange for an Anglo-American promise which has not been made good the German Republic has given way to a war-minded despotism which has reduced your father's kinsfolk in Germany to the status of untouchables. If I were in your place I should have no peace until this great wrong was undone."

Mr. Baruch continued to keep mum. He has not yet taken his fellow-countrymen into his confidence. In this instance a man's silence is more eloquent perhaps than anything he can say.

It is easy enough to understand the attitude of the Warburg brothers. They and their family had been associated with Germany's plans of expansion, they had aided in the development of the Hamburg-America Line under the leadership of their friend, Ballin. Max and Paul Warburg were leading figures of German big business, as such interested in maintaining Germany in a dominating position in Europe and in the world. The ruling powers in Berlin, as a means of enhancing Germany's power in the world at the expense of the democracies, had promoted the Russo-Japanese war: the Kaiser had egged on the Czar, knowing well the risks to Russia in such a venture, and knowing also that the weakening of Russia might save Germany from the prospect of a war on two fronts, enabling the German government by a policy of threats to

the peace of the world to obtain what it wanted without fighting. Max and Paul Warburg were not only brothers, but partners in the Hamburg banking house, and Paul Warburg was in Japan for an appreciable time before settling in New York. Whether he actually helped the Japanese government to obtain the loans in London and New York which financed its victory over Russia (Japan borrowed the equivalent of 800 million yen abroad during 1904-1905) I cannot say for certain, but it is probable. When in 1902 he became a partner in the New York banking firm with which he was connected at the time he was appointed to the Federal Reserve Board, he had been a partner of M. M. Warburg & Co. for many years, and he remained such after joining the New York banking firm. His name appeared for the first time in *Who's Who in America* in its Volume IX of 1916-1917. No mention is made in the biographical note, which he must have furnished for insertion in that volume, of his ever having been a partner of M. M. Warburg & Co. of Hamburg, nor of his stay in Japan.

No sooner had the defeat of the Russian Army at Mukden become known in Berlin on March 13, 1905, than the Kaiser's government prepared to drop the mask. Seventeen days later the Kaiser landed at Tangiers, called upon the Sultan of Morocco, made a threatening statement aimed at the Franco-British entente and in this way opened the European crisis which culminated in Germany's declarations of war against Russia, France and Belgium in the summer of 1914. Thanks to the timely and skillful intervention of President Theodore Roosevelt in the spring of 1905, the German invasion of France, sched-

uled for that summer, had to be postponed; and when it came off in 1914 the conditions were far less favorable to Germany than in 1905. Meanwhile, appeasers had been at work in Paris and London, and the financial group of which the Warburg brothers were prominent members exerted great influence in the British and French capitals. That the Warburgs had a place, indeed a prominent place, in German big business throughout that period and that their prestige gained from the increased power of Imperial Germany and her threatening attitude is undeniable. They probably would have preferred to have Germany continue to rely upon threats while her economic power grew by leaps and bounds throughout the world, rendering it ultimately unnecessary for Germany to resort to war. In other words, they can be credited with having preferred a policy much shrewder than that which the Hohenzollerns and their perverted courtiers resolved upon which they not only gave Austria-Hungary a free hand to crush Serbia, but made it plain that unless she did, their friendship would be withdrawn.

The case of Mr. Baruch is less easily understood, though his father came from Prussia. Apparently, his chief interest was in becoming Wilson's closest and most influential adviser. This he succeeded in doing in Paris in March, 1919. There is amusing significance in the fact that *The Intimate Papers of Colonel House* do not even mention the name of Mr. Baruch, but contain a long refutation by Arthur Balfour of the charge that Colonel House had had a hand in the plan to sidetrack the formulation of a League of Nations covenant and omit inserting a covenant in the terms of peace in defiance of senatorial opposition ex-

pressed in a "round-robin" signed by more than one-third of the senators.

What is plain is that when it came to backing the Wilson scheme of peace without victory, the Warburg brothers and Mr. Baruch saw eye to eye, the Warburgs because, Germany having lost the war, they did not wish that she should lose the peace, and Mr. Baruch because by staunchly supporting the Wilson scheme he was able to take the place of Colonel House in Mr. Wilson's confidence.

But the Warburgs and Baruch, by aiding Wilson in various ways to defeat the Foch plan, accomplished results they did not dream of—not only the ultimate crushing of France, Belgium, Holland, Denmark, Norway, Czechoslovakia, Greece, Poland and Yugoslavia, but the martyrdom of their fellow-Jews throughout the Continent of Europe. This surely they did not intend, yet it came about through what they did in bringing about the situation in which France found herself without the Rhine barrier and without the Anglo-American treaty she had accepted in its place. No doubt Wilson and his supporters wished to bring on the millennium. They brought on hell on earth, on the floor of which the pavement of their good intentions can still be seen.

Today among the martyrs for freedom and religion those who stand foremost are the Jews of Europe, the Poles, the Czechs, the Greeks and the Serbs. Let this be said to their everlasting honor that Pan-Germanism treated them as its most deadly foes. They have been brothers in agony; for the common cause of freedom they have given blood, sweat and tears to a degree unequaled

outside China. Through this unexampled suffering may the brotherhood of man become at last a reality and banish the very concept of race, distorted to fiendish ends by the Pan-Germans. May the noble axiom of Herbert Spencer come to be accepted at last:

“Morality knows nothing of geographical boundaries or distinctions of race.”

Nearly two centuries before the Christian era, Terence, the African, had left the immortal legacy of his confession of faith:

“Homo sum; humani nihil a me alienum puto.”

“I am a man—I deem naught that is human to be alien to me.”

Thus spoke one of the precursors of a Galilean Jew named Jesus, whose name is revered by all save the pagan perverts of Germany.

Several keen observers of conditions in occupied France who have arrived in this country lately say that as the result of the ill-treatment of the Jews in that territory by the Nazis and their accomplices, anti-Semitism among the French population has vanished. Thus do those to whom freedom is dearer than life react to the cruel and false racial doctrines of the Nazis.

A chance meeting with Paul M. Warburg a short time before his death led to a friendly talk which gave me the impression that he regretted his course of 1914-1919. I had real personal regard for him and deplored the necessity of opposing him in the one capacity of sympathizer with the German cause, as he himself had foreseen would

be the case when we met on that fateful morning of August 1, 1914.

\* \* \* \* \*

**Lest history  
repeat itself**

It might be asked: Why refer today to the action of the German banking group in question since quite obviously most, if not all, the survivors and successors of that group are anti-Hitler due to the persecution of the Jews by Germany? My answer is that Hitler is the spiritual heir of Ludendorff and that prior to Hitler's advent to power this group showed willingness to co-operate closely with the leaders of Pan-Germanism, with Ludendorff and Hindenburg; that if Germany is defeated it is more than likely that we will see the attempt to have the same process repeated by which Pan-Germanism obtained a truce when the Kaiser was sent to Holland and the German general staff set up a "democratic" regime. This time Hitler and his gang would be removed and the German general staff would put forward men suited to the purpose of reassuring the world as to Germany's good intentions—so as to obtain another truce.

When that day comes we may expect that the so-called "good" Germans will be brought forward, that they will be found willing to act in response to an appeal to "save Germany."

We may see a group formed from leading personalities of the second Reich, former cabinet ministers, bankers, industrialists, writers and scholars, Catholics, Protestants and Jews. Back of them all will be the great German general staff which, although outlawed under the Versailles

and Berlin treaties, never ceased to function under the second Reich and which will seek to continue to pull the strings. It should not be forgotten that the second Reich incubated the third (Nazi) Reich; that before the time Hitler had been brought forward, Hindenburg, Stresemann, von Seckt, von Mackensen, von Schleicher, von Papen, Brüning and Curtius, with the aid of German big business, Stinnes, Krupp, von Bohlen, Schacht and Warburg, had got rid of every hindrance to re-militarization and had prepared the ground for a new Pan-German attempt at world domination. The Rhine bridgeheads had been surrendered by France in 1929, five years ahead of schedule, on the faith of the Locarno treaty and the Briand-Kellogg pact. Many hundreds of millions of dollars had been borrowed from American investors and banks and large sums in sterling from British banks, which were used for German re-armament.

Meanwhile von Seckt, Commander of the Reichswehr, was perfecting the blitzkrieg. His subordinates were in Russia gaining training in tank and aviation tactics. All this was taking place under the second Reich. Militarily, industrially, financially, diplomatically and by propaganda the second Reich is guilty as an accomplice before the fact of the third Reich's war on freedom. Goebbels was at work in the German radio service under the second Reich which devised and carried on for twelve years the whole lying propaganda on war guilt and disarmament which Goebbels continued under the third Reich in his own virulent style.

When the time comes to determine the measures most likely to prevent a third Pan-German attempt at world

domination, we should be on our guard not only against the so-called "good" Germans of the second Reich but against their friends in London, New York and Washington; the men who helped German re-armament by vast loans to German industries, municipalities and commercial banks which yielded large commissions for banking groups and large fees for their lawyers.\* The power of money and position should not again be put to such uses. The fact that these men did not intend that American money should be so used merely proves that they were too easily duped by the lure of large money rewards. We should be ready to let no pretexts or plans of any kind deviate us from requiring that the precautions against Pan-Germanism which were not taken at the Peace Conference in 1919 shall be taken. Next time the watch on the Rhine should continue for as many generations as are necessary to make sure that the German people has changed its outlook and ceased permanently to maintain allegiance or submission to the predatory system to which it has clung so long and with such terrible consequences to mankind.

\* \* \* \* \*

Ambassador  
Spring Rice  
supplanted by  
Lord Reading

After the United States entered the War, I spent an evening with Frank Cobb, editor of the *New York World*, around the first of May, 1917. He dined with me at Delmonico's on Fifth Avenue, and we talked

\* In Berlin the lawyers usually employed were Heinrich Albert of the famous brief case the revelation of whose contents led to his precipitate departure from the U.S. in 1916, and his partner Westrick whose mysterious mission to the U.S. in 1940 was exposed by the *N.Y. Herald Tribune* as in the nature of espionage on a grand scale.

over the stirring events of the preceding few months. Mr. Cobb said that toward the middle of March (1917) he had spent the entire day at the White House with the President, discussing with the latter the question of whether Congress should be convened promptly in extraordinary session. Mr. Cobb told me that the President during that long meeting brought up every possible argument against convening Congress and asked Mr. Cobb to give his views on each point, with the result that finally the President admitted that there was no way out, that he had to convene Congress, and Mr. Cobb said that the President wept when he said that. We discussed the relations between the President and Sir Cecil Spring Rice, and Mr. Cobb said that at one time in 1916, when the situation between the two men was tense, he undertook to try and bring about a better feeling between them. With this end in view, he had a talk with Sir Cecil Spring Rice: "Mr. Ambassador," said Cobb to Spring Rice, "you ought to have no difficulty whatever in getting along with the President, you ought to easily understand him. The key to his character is that he is Scotch." "Oh no," said the Ambassador, "he is a North of Ireland man." "What is the difference?" asked Cobb, and the Ambassador answered, "As much difference as between a crocodile and a lizard." There was grim truth in this, as it turned out, and Spring Rice in time became the victim of a man who in speech was a high idealist and in action proved at times as pitiless as a crocodile.

Events certainly had vindicated Ambassador Spring Rice. Soon after Mr. Cobb and I had our talk, Prime Minister Lloyd George, who owed more to Lord Northcliffe

than to any other man for being Prime Minister, sent Lord Northcliffe to America as British High Commissioner in charge of the War Mission. Had Sir Cecil been a cynic, his course with Lord Northcliffe would have been easy: he would have received him very pleasantly, given a dinner in his honor, showered him with compliments and every onlooker remembering the *Daily Mail* editorial of December, 1916, would have realized that the British Ambassador, with his tongue in his cheek, was exhibiting to his guests a journalist whose judgment had been proved completely wrong. But Sir Cecil was not that kind of a man. When Northcliffe called on him he told him exactly what he thought of what he had done, with the result that Northcliffe demanded his peremptory removal from the ambassadorship, and Lloyd George promptly complied, replacing him in that post with Lord Reading, who, before his elevation to the Lord Chief Justiceship of England, had acted as counsel to the Northcliffe newspapers. The replacement of Spring Rice by Lord Reading was not merely part of a tragedy which cost Spring Rice's life—he died broken-hearted at Ottawa soon after leaving the United States—but it was one of the factors which led the British Government to run past all warning signals at the Peace Conference in disregarding the fact that President Wilson at that time no longer was the spokesman of American public opinion, but only of a minority party. The Wilson-Lloyd George team work at the Peace Conference precipitated a domestic political controversy in the United States which led to the withdrawal of the United States from participation in the maintenance of world peace until the day when a war which was not

ended flared up again and the Pan-German threat became again worldwide, aimed ultimately at the Western Hemisphere. When that day came, Woodrow Wilson's Assistant Secretary of the Navy of the Peace Conference period, understanding fully the bitter lesson of a peace that failed and the revival in intensified form of the Pan-German threat to freedom everywhere, was able at last to open the eyes of his fellow-countrymen to what the future reserved for America if Pan-Germanism prevailed over the British Commonwealth. The Lease-Lend Act having been followed by the joint statement of the President of the United States and the British Prime Minister which presents a program of victory and of peace to which all those who love freedom have rallied, we find ourselves again belligerents in a world war.

\* \* \* \* \*

**Who shall  
guard the  
guards?**

In 1918-1919 the American people stood by, powerless, while their President, Woodrow Wilson, demanded a peace based exclusively on paper guarantees formulated by him with a dogmatism irritating both to his political opponents at home and his co-conferees abroad. His failure was colossal, but no less so was that of the Republican party which elected Harding on his promise to bring about an association of nations for the maintenance of world peace and promptly forgot that promise. Herbert Hoover, after siding with Wilson in the Congressional campaign of 1918, was one of the upholders of the policy of the Harding administration, shortsighted to say the least; and when he became President he not only continued that policy

but put his name to the Smoot-Hawley tariff bill which rendered irretrievable the ruin of world trade and brought about the collapse of American economy as the direct consequence of American policy. Yet to this day Herbert Hoover appears oblivious to his own part in the havoc. As of old, the question which confronted freedom-loving peoples remained: *Quis custodiet custodes?* Who shall guard the guards? In an economically ravaged world with collective safeguards neglected by the free nations, Great Britain embarked on an Empire-preference trade policy just as America was ready at last to give and take. The effect of English-speaking disunion was disastrous; international gangsterism lifted its head and was on the march. The milestones bear the names of Manchuria, Ethiopia, Austria, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Norway, Holland, Belgium, until finally, France's Atlantic ports having been reached by the Nazi hordes, what we had bargained for had happened. Having decided that we would contribute only high-sounding phrases to the maintenance of world order, letting others pay the cost while we collected war debts, we are now pouring out our best blood as well as many billions for our self-preservation, realizing at last that if Britain is overwhelmed we shall be pounced upon on all sides—our birthright of freedom in mortal peril.

A few of us for years have warned, crying in the wilderness. Now that what we foresaw has happened, the first business is to defeat the slavemongers and free the unfortunates they hold in thrall. But not for a moment should we forget the lesson of this war begun in 1914 which might have been ended in 1919 had we been awake to our vital interests and done our part after the victory of 1918.

Unless we face at last our share of the responsibility for the catastrophe, we have no starting point for doing what we should have done before; and we therefore remain in danger, even after Pan-Germanism is overthrown again—as it shall be—of again failing in our duty to ourselves. I cannot hope by means of this book to bring this point home to the masses of our people. But if I can reach enough men and women among the educators of America, the teachers, publicists, leaders in public and private life, and move them to bring out the lesson conveyed by the facts I have stressed, I shall not have labored in vain.

## II

### Victory without Peace

(1918-1919)

#### — R E M I N I S C E N C E S —

Theodore  
Roosevelt  
opposes a  
barren  
victory

Early in August, 1918, information reached me to the effect that President Wilson and Colonel House were apprehensive that an overwhelming military victory over Germany would militate against the President's ability to secure the adoption of his peace program.

A Congressional campaign was impending and the reports to the White House indicated that the popular majority in that campaign would be Republican. Theodore Roosevelt was looming as the uncontested leader of the reunited Republican Party and as the most potent voice of America in matters pertaining to war and peace. His nomination for President in 1920 was regarded as certain.

I learned that the President and Colonel House were eager to bring about an early armistice with Austria-Hungary, to be followed by an armistice with Germany. I laid the situation before Colonel Roosevelt, pointing out that the President's plan, if applied, would mean that the forces of Pan-Germanism would not be effectively dealt with and that the result would be that they would have

another chance to threaten free institutions throughout the world with extinction, a chance they would be sure to make the most of. I appealed to Colonel Roosevelt to emphasize before the country and the world that the one essential of the peace settlement would be the effective extinction of the Pan-German threat to freedom.

I previously had arranged with Colonel Roosevelt that he was to deliver the principal address at a meeting to be held in the Aldermanic Chamber of City Hall in New York City to commemorate the birth of Lafayette and the Battle of the Marne, coinciding anniversaries which fell on September 6th.

Colonel Roosevelt's reply to my appeal was characteristically to the point. It came in a letter as follows:

#### THE KANSAS CITY STAR

Office of  
Theodore Roosevelt

New York Office  
347 Madison Avenue  
August 20th, 1918.

My dear Mr. Leon:

I thank you, and I shall make my speech on Lafayette Day along the lines you indicate.

Faithfully yours,  
THEODORE ROOSEVELT

Mr. Maurice Leon,  
60 Wall Street  
New York City.

In that address, Colonel Roosevelt emphasized above all the following:

"The peace that we win must guarantee full reparation for the awful cost of life and treasure which the Prussianized Germany of the Hohenzollerns has inflicted on the

entire world; and this reparation must take the form of action that will render it impossible for Germany to repeat her colossal wrongdoing."

His whole address bristled with warning against reliance on German promises.

A few days before, Colonel House had made an attempt to start through the press a movement for the granting of an armistice to Austria-Hungary, and had failed, with the result that the country regarded the maneuver with great suspicion, and the prospects of a large Republican majority at the Congressional elections to take place November 5, 1918, had reached the stage of a virtual certainty.

\* \* \* \* \*

**Idealism and  
duplicity**

But the President and Colonel House were determined that come what may the peace would have to be a Wilson peace and that that end, as it turned out, justified any and every means. Colonel House in his book *Robert Dru, Administrator*, which was in the nature of a day-dream, had made manifest his conviction that to get his way a statesman should have no scruples. He was about to show that the day-dream could be turned into reality.

Through September and the first three weeks of October, the German High Command furnished every evidence that its chief reliance was a Wilson peace. All its appeals were directed to Wilson. But the more this plan of theirs stood out in clear outline, the greater was the determination of American public opinion that it should not succeed.

Finally, on October 26, 1918, the morning papers car-

ried the appeal of President Wilson to the American people. It begins as follows:

"My fellow countrymen: The Congressional elections are at hand. They occur in the most critical period our country has ever faced or is likely to face in our time. If you have approved of my leadership and wish me to continue to be your unembarrassed spokesman in affairs at home and abroad, I earnestly beg that you will express yourselves unmistakably to that effect by returning a Democratic majority to both the Senate and the House of Representatives.

"I am your servant and will accept your judgment without cavil." \*

Thus the appeal was coupled with a pledge to the American people to abide by the outcome of an election which he had made a national referendum concerning his leadership. This he had done of his own free will, for nothing compelled him either to make the appeal or to couple it with the pledge.

The verdict of the nation went heavily against him.

In the same issue of the morning papers for October 26, 1918, there was another Washington dispatch to the effect that Colonel House had just arrived in France as the personal representative of President Wilson. The Associated Press dispatch said that he was there as "the eyes and ears of the President." There was no intimation that he was delegated to act in a dictatorial capacity in forcing the Allies to accept the President's peace program regardless of the verdict of the American people to be rendered

\* This appeal was endorsed by Herbert Hoover in a letter made public by Frederic R. Coudert, an active supporter of President Wilson.

November 5, 1918, on President Wilson's own solicited referendum regarding his peace program.

On November 6, 1918, the verdict of the American people was announced as strongly adverse to the President. But at the same time the surprising news emanated from Paris that the Allies had agreed to accept the President's peace program with reservations on the scope of reparations and on the freedom of the seas.

How this result had been achieved was unknown, as strict censorship and secrecy had prevented the slightest inkling of the event from reaching the American people until after the fact. It was not until years later that the truth became known, namely, that Colonel House had obtained the adherence of Prime Minister Clemenceau on November 4, 1918, one day before the American election, by warning him that unless he yielded, he (Colonel House) could give him no assurance that President Wilson would not make a separate peace with Germany.\* These revelations were confirmed by General Weygand, Chief of Staff of Marshal Foch, in articles which appeared in France late in 1938 and were reproduced in the *London National Review* early in 1939.

In December, 1918, Colonel Roosevelt went to the hospital and he died early in January, 1919. No greater calamity could have befallen the world, for he alone in the United States had the power of public opinion behind him to insure that peace would not be emasculated so as to give Pan-Germanism another chance to undertake the destruction of freedom in the world.

\* See the *Intimate Papers of Col. House*, Vol. IV, p. 170.

When in November, 1918, it became plain that Mr. Wilson would disregard his pledge to abide by the will of the American people as expressed at the Congressional elections which resulted in a great Republican victory, the *New York Sun* published my comments on the situation in its issue of November 22, 1918, as follows:

### SPOKESMAN OF DEMOCRACY?

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#### PRESIDENT INSISTS ON IGNORING RECENT DEFEAT AT THE POLLS.

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President Wilson desires to be welcomed at the peace conference as the supreme spokesman of democracy.

Ten days before the recent Congressional elections President Wilson asked the people of the United States to uphold his leadership at the peace conference by electing a Democratic Congress. He pointed out that while the Republican party in Congress was "pro-war" it was not pro-Wilson, especially on the President's terms of peace. In conclusion, Mr. Wilson agreed to abide by the result, whatever it might be, as befitted his position as "a servant of the people." The Democratic National Committee thereupon flooded the press with page advertisements in which it was stated that what was at stake was above all approval by the country of the President's peace programme.

The Republican party accepted the challenge; its recognized spokesmen pointed out the dangers and obscurities of the President's personal programme of peace and presented their party's constructive, unequivocal views. The President's appeal to the people elicited another signed by Theodore Roosevelt and William Howard Taft by which the issue was clearly defined. The American people spoke; the President was beaten

decisively, and the next House of Representatives is Republican by a substantial majority.

And now this supreme spokesman of democracy, who agreed to abide by the result, whatever it might be (as indeed he was bound to do in any event), proposes to go to the peace conference to enforce his views on our allies after they have been rejected by us, confiding the details of their carrying out to a delegation in which the minority of the American people, to which he belongs, will have three or four representatives, and the majority of the American people but one representative, while the personnel of experts, advisers and assistants will be wholly made up of his own creatures, not to speak of the hired shouters sent in advance to organize a cheering mob.

Democracy, what shams are perpetrated in thy name!

MAURICE LÉON

New York, Nov. 21.

In connection with his course from that time on it is interesting to recall that Mr. Wilson when he addressed the Senate on January 21, 1917, stated:

"I have sought this opportunity to address you because I thought that I owed it to you, as the council associated with me in the final determination of our international obligations, to disclose to you, without reserve, the thought and purpose that have been taking form in my mind in regard to the duty of our government in these days to come when it will be necessary to lay afresh and upon a new plan the foundations of peace among the nations."

"These days to come" having arrived in November, 1918, Mr. Wilson did not consult the Senate while laying afresh and upon a new plan the foundations of peace

among the nations. Yet the Senate was still the council associated with him in the final determination of America's international obligations. Instead of consulting the Senate he flouted it and it in turn defied him. These political animosities, equally discreditable to both sides because their sole beneficiary turned out to be the German war party, then stricken down and gasping for breath, resulted in world-wide demoralization when America abandoned her comrades-in-arms and made a separate peace with the common enemy which paved the way for the present war.

\* \* \* \* \*

**"The Senate  
cannot  
negotiate"**

In February, 1919, being about to go to France for professional reasons having nothing to do with the Peace Conference, I sought an interview with Senator Lodge, whom I met at the office of Will H. Hays, Chairman of the Republican National Committee, No. 452 Fifth Avenue, New York. There were present at that conference Senator Lodge, Mr. Hays and several men whom I had asked to attend and who were familiar in a general way with the purpose of the conference. On that occasion I presented the suggestion to Senator Lodge that as the President was conducting the business of the executive in Europe, the Senate should consider the ways and means of performing its constitutional duty to advise the President with reference to the Peace Treaty then being negotiated; and that the performance of that duty by the Senate would be facilitated if it sent to Paris a sub-committee of its Committee on Foreign Relations that it might be on hand to act as a medium of transmission between the President and the

Senate should the President wish to avail himself of the Senate's advice in the course of the negotiation of the Treaty. After hearing me, Senator Lodge stated that he considered adoption of my suggestion impossible and he gave only one reason, in these words: "The Senate cannot negotiate." I urged upon him that my suggestion did not call for any negotiation but for the exercise of the treaty-making power of the United States as intended by the Constitution, so as to avoid the calamity of eventual nonparticipation by the United States in the Peace Treaty. Senator Lodge, however, was adamant, repeating: "The Senate cannot negotiate."

\* \* \* \* \*

The Wilson-  
Lodge feud

During the sea voyage to France, our ship was in wireless communication with the *George Washington*, on which the President was coming home, as it turned out, to sound the leaders of the Senate on the peace negotiations. Soon after I reached France, I read in the *London Daily Mail* that President Wilson had found Senate leaders cold to his approaches, and in his speech at the Metropolitan Opera House, delivered on the eve of his return to Paris, had hurled a challenge at his Senate critics by saying that he meant to bring back a treaty so interwoven with the covenant of the League of Nations that the peace terms could not be disentangled from the terms of the covenant; and I also read in that paper that more than one-third of the Senators had joined in a so-called "round-robin" warning, in effect, that if the President carried out his plan, the Treaty of Peace would fail of ratification. This was disturbing news

indeed. I took advantage of my being in Paris to call upon Ambassador Jusserand at his apartment and we talked over these disquieting developments. He then revealed to me the reason for Senator Lodge's bitter hostility: When the popular verdict went against the President at the Congressional election of November 5, 1918, and at the same time the world learned that the Allies had accepted his peace program in the main, Ambassador Jusserand realized that the situation was full of dangerous potentialities. He was on friendly terms at all times not only with President Wilson but with the leaders of both parties in the Senate. The Republicans had won a majority of one in the Senate, which meant that they would have the Chairmanship and a majority of all committees, with Senator Lodge as Chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations. Ambassador Jusserand had a conversation with Senators Lodge and Knox and asked them whether in case they were invited by President Wilson to form part of the American Peace Delegation they would accept and cooperate with the President. Both Senators answered affirmatively. The Ambassador remarked in that connection that he knew without questioning these Senators that it would be the fulfilment of their hearts' desire to participate in the one world Peace Conference of their careers. Having heard from their lips their categorical assurance, he then went to President Wilson and told him in substance: "I bring you the assurance that the Treaty you are about to negotiate will be ratified by the Senate." He then told the President of his conversation with Senators Lodge and Knox. The President said neither "yes" nor "no," but not long afterward he announced the make-up of his

Peace Delegation, which included a personal friend of Senator Lodge, former Ambassador Henry White, but a man who in no way was qualified to speak for the Republican majority in the Senate.

Plainly war had broken out between the President and the Senate before the President left for Paris. Shortly before Christmas, 1918, Senator Lodge made it clear to me that in his view the Senate was not bound by any agreement on the Fourteen Points because none had ever been made, that while the Democrats had complained that the Republican Senators ought not to find fault with the Fourteen Points at that time because they did not reject them when they were first presented in January, 1918, not even the Democrats had claimed that the Republicans had made any agreement about them. In Senator Lodge's view the Fourteen Points were, so to speak, all things to all men. He was firm in urging that no attempt be made to settle finally the question of the League of Nations as part of the Peace Treaty.

After hearing Ambassador Jusserand, I understood clearly the deep sense of antagonism which President Wilson had aroused in the Republican leaders of the Senate and that the whole matter of world peace had become a football of partisan politics at Washington, greatly envenomed by personal feelings. This disquieted me more than ever.

While crossing to France, I had learned by means of a wireless message published on board that Prime Minister Clemenceau, head of the French Peace Delegation had received a bullet in the chest and was expected to recover from the wound. Next to him, the most important man on

the French Peace Delegation was André Tardieu, who enjoyed the confidence of Clemenceau and was the most prominent foreign editor writing for the French press before the war.

\* \* \* \* \*

**Wilson breaks**      On March 13, 1919, having tried to get  
**with House**      in touch with Mr. Tardieu, I received a message from him that he would expect me to call at his office that afternoon. President Wilson was due to arrive at Brest that same day. I called on Mr. Tardieu and we had quite a lively conversation. When I told him that it looked to me as though there would be a deadlock in Washington over the President's plan to interweave a covenant of the League of Nations with the peace terms, Mr. Tardieu told me that no such danger existed because the American delegation had just agreed that no attempt would be made to formulate a covenant in connection with the peace terms and that they would be framed so as to contain a clause that a covenant of the League of Nations would be subsequently prepared for discussion and ultimate adoption. When Mr. Tardieu told me this, I replied rather abruptly that I did not think he was right. His face reddened and he remarked to me that I must admit he was in a position to know what was going on. I then told him in detail about the happenings at Washington and New York during the President's brief stay on the American side before his second voyage to France, and added that if Mr. Tardieu knew that the President had changed his mind after delivering his speech at the Metropolitan Opera House in New York on the eve of sailing and from the

ship had wirelessly to the American Delegation to do the exact opposite of what he had announced he would do, then and in that event Mr. Tardieu's information was better than mine, otherwise mine was better than his. There was a painful silence after which Mr. Tardieu said to me: "Léon, you know that you have greatly worried me." The conversation then continued and at the conclusion of it, he told me: "You may assure Senator Lodge that I will do all I can to prevent the insertion of a covenant in the peace terms." I was noncommittal, and in fact never told Senator Lodge about this conversation.

During that conversation with Mr. Tardieu on March 13, 1919, I spoke of the necessity of taking precautions against the recurrence of the Pan-German peril, and suggested that the measures insure peace for a century to come. Mr. Tardieu said in reply: "If we could only hope for fifty years of peace! . . . Our danger point will come beginning in 1935 when, due to our losses in this war, French manpower will be at its lowest."

I thought of this sixteen years later when Hitler gave notice to the world that Germany would no longer be bound by the land and air disarmament clauses of the Treaty of Peace, though she would comply with the naval clauses. An Anglo-German naval treaty which scrapped those clauses (hence inferentially the military and air clauses too) was then being negotiated by Prime Minister Ramsay MacDonald and Foreign Minister Sir John Simon. The news of this treaty burst like a bomb shortly after the Stresa Conference, causing consternation and despair throughout France. Here was the sequel to the defrauding of France in 1919, when control of the Rhine

bridgeheads was given up in exchange for an Anglo-American Treaty of Assistance which failed of ratification. One of the ablest American observers of the Peace Conference, Frank H. Simonds, had summed up the effect on the French of this tragic episode of 1919 in these words:

“For every Frenchman, therefore, the Treaty of Versailles became at once a gigantic fraud. The rejection of the guaranty treaties was similarly a colossal betrayal. Clemenceau had been duped and France deserted. What had been won by the victory had been lost by the peace treaty. What had been saved at the Marne and at Verdun had been sacrificed at Versailles. A million and a half of French soldiers had died in vain, and France was again in danger.” (*How Europe Made Peace Without America*, page 97.)

Within a few days after seeing Tardieu I called on Ambassador Jusserand and had the conversation to which I have referred. Viewing the situation as it stood then, in mid-March, 1919, following President Wilson’s defiance of the Senate and publication of the so-called “Round-Robin,” by which more than a third of the membership of the Senate had announced that it was unalterably opposed to the insertion of the covenant of the League of Nations in the Peace terms, Mr. Jusserand summed up his conclusion as follows: “And now no one can tell what will happen when the Treaty is submitted to the Senate.” He told me with a wry smile that he was on hand in Paris to act as adviser to the French Peace Delegation, but that so far he had been given no opportunity to offer any advice.

At about that time I also had a conversation with Mr. Leon Bourgeois, a member of the French Peace Delegation, who was particularly in charge for France of all questions relating to the creation of the League of Nations, a matter to which he had devoted himself to a greater extent than any other French statesman. Mr. Bourgeois could well be called one of France's elder statesmen, having had a distinguished career in the course of which he had been Prime Minister and Foreign Minister. I mentioned to him the so-called "Round-Robin" and its significance from the standpoint of what would happen in Washington if President Wilson succeeded in forcing adoption of a covenant of the League of Nations as part of the peace terms. Mr. Bourgeois told me that he was at a loss to understand what sort of a man President Wilson was, and proceeded to tell me that in the very room in which we were talking President Wilson, before his departure for America, had called upon him and asked him to explain to him the French point of view on a League of Nations. Mr. Bourgeois said that he had spent two hours giving a complete exposition of the French point of view, at the end of which he said to Mr. Wilson, "Now tell me the American point of view," whereupon Mr. Wilson seemed to wake up out of a trance and said, "I don't know. I have not thought about it enough. I cannot tell you." And Mr. Bourgeois then exclaimed, "What sort of a man is this? Is he irresolute?" To which I replied that I thought Mr. Wilson had not then made up his mind as to the political effect in matters of domestic policy of the League of Nations prob-

lem, but that apparently he had made up his mind just before sailing to return to the Peace Conference and had then decided to defy all opposition to his course.

The late Frank H. Simonds, who was covering the Peace Conference for a newspaper syndicate, had a room close to mine at the Hotel Continental. I had known Mr. Simonds for some years, and we talked freely as we met. He kept himself exceptionally well informed on happenings. One of his best sources of information was Mr. Ray Stannard Baker, who was close to Mr. Wilson and who was to become the official historian of the armistice from the Wilson point of view.

I had seen Mr. Bourgeois the very day of the publication of the Senate "Round-Robin." On March 13th I had had my meeting with Mr. Tardieu. The next day I went to the French Foreign Office to meet an old friend, then acting as head of the American division of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, with whom I had an appointment for lunch. When I reached the Foreign Office I noticed that the little Quai d'Orsay railroad station across the street from the Foreign Office was still bedecked with flags for the return of President Wilson, who had arrived there shortly before noon. My friend told me that he had witnessed the scene when Mr. Clemenceau, despite the wound in his chest caused by the attempt on his life a month earlier, had come to greet President Wilson. As my friend put it, the crowd gave the two statesmen a great ovation, in which the cries "Vive Clemenceau" predominated.

That evening, when I saw Mr. Simonds, he told me that he had learned that immediately upon his arrival

President Wilson had requested that the French Government issue a press communiqué to the effect that there was no truth in the report that the American delegation had agreed not to insert a full covenant of the League of Nations in the peace terms, that Mr. Clemenceau had refused to put out any such communiqué, and that the situation was tense. As to what led to this request by President Wilson, Mr. Simonds told me that, when the *George Washington* reached Brest, Bernard M. Baruch, Herbert Bayard Swope and Ray Stannard Baker had immediately called on President Wilson, that Mr. Baruch had told the President of the decision made by Colonel House to agree to the Franco-British proposal that no attempt be made to formulate a full covenant of the League of Nations as part of the Peace terms, and that the President had expressed himself as having been betrayed by his friend Colonel House in this vital matter. A few days later I had my conversation with Ambassador Jusserand.

\* \* \* \* \*

The treaty-  
making power  
discussed

During that period I had met Mr. André Cheradame, whom I had met previously during his stay in the United States in 1918. Mr. Cheradame had done more than any other man to make known the Pan-German plan of world domination, which he was the first to reveal in his book published in 1901, *Europe and the Austrian Question on the Threshold of the 20th Century*. This plan, adopted by the German General Staff in 1895, contemplated the gradual conquest by Germany of the entire globe by

1950. Mr. Cheradame took me to dine at his club in the Rue Volney, and during that evening I had occasion to hear and meet Lord Robert Cecil, who was there as the club's guest of honor. Lord Robert's utterances on that occasion had impressed me as impassioned but vague.\* Not long afterward Mr. Cheradame brought me an invitation to attend a lunch being given by Mr. H. Wickham Steed, who had become editor of the *London Times*. During the luncheon, at which there were about twenty present, seated at a round table, my neighbours to the right and left began questioning me on the President's position and on the state of American public opinion. I mentioned the Senate "Round-Robin" and the speech of President Wilson at the Metropolitan Opera House as indicative of the very serious political cleavage, and mentioned also that, while the President could enter into any treaty he saw fit, the treaty would have no validity unless ratified by a two-thirds vote of the Senate. I had hardly had a chance up to that time to speak to my host,

\* Two years after the Peace Conference, Lord Robert Cecil was the guest of honor at a dinner held at the University Club, New York. His speech was a plea for American adherence to the League of Nations. In the discussion which followed I pointed out that the League plan had been emasculated by the omission of any concrete method for coping with aggression, such as an international police force. Replying to me, Lord Robert began as follows: "I am afraid my friend is a believer in the heresy of force." Lord Robert, now Viscount Cecil of Chelwood, is European President of the "Free World Association for Democratic Victory and World Organization." At the Peace Conference, he was particularly influential in the British delegation and probably did more than anyone else in getting Lloyd George to back Woodrow Wilson in defeating the Foch plan of permanent international control of the Rhine bridgeheads. In time he became converted to "the heresy of force"—when it was too late to prevent the present Pan-German war. It is hoped he will have no hand in rendering possible a third one.

who was across the table. Mr. Steed, who had overheard my remarks, then spoke and, addressing me, said it was lamentable that Americans on hand in Paris should speak in ways to discredit their Government. This brought about a general silence and, answering Mr. Steed, I then said that he was mistaken, that I was not discrediting my Government but explaining to persons unfamiliar with its workings how my Government functioned and particularly with reference to the Treaty making power. I concluded as follows: "If you should make a treaty unsatisfactory to American public opinion, and the treaty should not be ratified, don't complain afterward that you were not warned." The conversation then continued without further reference to the incident. This meeting was the beginning of a friendship with Mr. Steed which has never faltered. I realized at the time that my warning words would have no effect, because to the Europeans at the conference it was unthinkable that the head of the American Government should take so great a part in the formulation of a treaty for the whole world and America reject it.

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**A premonition of World War 2 in April, 1919**

Immediately upon my return from France on April 4, 1919, I was interviewed by the *New York Evening Sun*, which the next day commented editorially on my report. I foresaw the disaster to France which would one day have terrible consequences for the whole world if Mr. Wilson's ideas prevailed. For the warning it gives today, for the light it throws on why another

World War is upon us, I venture to reproduce here this interview and append to it the *Evening Sun's* editorial.

## FRANCE WANTS SECURE FUTURE

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MAURICE LÉON OF NEW YORK  
TELLS OF FEELING THERE

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SUSPICIOUS OF FINE PHRASES

---

Believe They Are Entitled to Saar  
Valley—Wilson Distrusted

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The delay in effecting a peace settlement may bring on a cataclysm.

The American people are prevented from knowing the truth about the Peace Conference by a censorship too mysterious to fathom. No one in France is willing to accept something called "League of Nations" which leaves France exposed to another attack such as nearly destroyed her vitality.

This information is given to *The Evening Sun* by Maurice Léon, attorney and expert in international law, who has just returned home from Paris.

"I did not go to France to save the world, but solely on legal business," said Mr. Léon. "But while there I could not help noticing how some people thought the world could be saved. It impressed one as a way likely to cause incalculable harm.

"The world cannot be kept in a state of suspended animation while discussions on 'self-determination' and other thought-killing phrases proceed. And phrases that kill thought destroy much else of usefulness, sometimes."

*Self-Determination*

"The argument of 'Self-determination' used against the return of the Sarre Valley (the French way of spelling) to France and holding the Rhine crossings by Allied forces is regarded by the French people as without justification on its merits and as resulting in making a peace ruinous for France," he said.

"The French are amazed at the operation of a censorship which obscures the French point of view, while it feeds the American press with fables, leading the American people not to realize that endless discussions are caused by attempts to apply phrases like 'self-determination' in disregard of the facts. Thus the victory bought with 2,000,000 of French lives and endless suffering and loss is being jeopardized.

"The substance of a League of Nations, from the French standpoint, is its ability to keep the German peril in abeyance by supplying timely measures of force against that peril, which will surely reassert itself as soon as 80,000,000 Germans see any chance of striking at France, with less than half that population."

The French originally received Mr. Wilson as the spokesman of the entire American people, said Mr. Léon. They did not attempt to analyze the strange silence and noncommittal attitude of the American President.

*Failed to See War Havoc*

But with his second arrival on French soil, and subsequent refusal to see for himself what the Germans had wrought in the way of devastation in their richest provinces, the French people have learned to distinguish between him and the majority in this country.

Many prominent Frenchmen deplored the loss of Theodore Roosevelt, and inquired anxiously whether any

worthy successor can be found, realizing apparently, said Mr. Léon, that America needs the perpetuation of the traditions for which Roosevelt stood.

"There is no doubt that when Premier Clemenceau expressed his misgivings concerning the proposal for the league he had in mind not the form but the substance. France, with her body bleeding from countless wounds; with her richest provinces turned into a desert; with half the flower of her youth under ground or maimed—France is unwilling to accept words, however high-minded, in place of the tangible security necessary to her very life.

*Phrase "League of Nations"*

"And her fear is that the phrase 'League of Nations' may be one of those phrases that kill thought (one hears that 'kill thought' everywhere, and many times a day), capable of meaning all things to all men, urged upon the French as a magic protection for the future but holding out to the Germans the prospect of their getting out of the war with the economic victory which, as things stand, they have won by reason of the unprecedented devastation and blood sacrifice inflicted by them on France.

"In all that I have heard, in all the desolation I have seen, there stands out the message which the French nation is seeking desperately and against great odds—including a censorship the ways of which are too mysterious to fathom—the message which, briefly, is this:

*France's Situation*

"Does America want France to live?

"If so, the maximum that France can obtain from Germany is barely sufficient to insure her recuperation.

"Does America want France to continue to be the bulwark of civilization against the German peril?

"If so, Germany's disarmament must be as complete as Foch can make it, and must be kept up permanently by every means of inspection and enforcement.

"The French deem themselves entitled to the Saar Valley, not for a time, but for good, as compensation for the general destruction not only of their coal fields but of all means of production in northeast France.

"Can any American politician purporting to speak for the American people honestly assert that if war were to be resumed now the American people would want it resumed anywhere nearer to Paris than the Rhine?

"If that be so now, why not in the future?

"What remains to be seen is whether it is possible for the President to give and take, whether he can divest himself of his natural disposition to dictate.

"The Germans alone hope that he may be the dictator of the conference; also their friends among the politicians and journalists in Paris."

(Editorial in *The Evening Sun*, Saturday, April 5, 1919)

### THOUGHT-KILLING PHRASES

Mr. Maurice Léon has done a great public service in the acid bite of his comment upon the way things are going at Paris. Said he:

"The world cannot be kept in a State of suspended animation while discussions on 'self-determination' and other thought-killing phrases proceed. And phrases that kill thought destroy much else of usefulness, sometimes."

There is a deep cutting diagnosis of much of the world's trouble. "Thought-killing phrases." It is the malady with which we, and, to a less measure, England, have been suffering. Salvation by rhetoric! Hifalutin words that ring sonorously but mean less than nothing, when one tries to reduce them to practicality.

We have had a long string of them: from "too proud to fight" and "he kept us out of war" to making the "world safe for democracy" and "self-determination." All fine words:

—full of sound and fury,  
Signifying nothing.

How many thousands of lives have been sacrificed to it, how many billions of dollars wasted in its name—who shall compute? For the end is not yet.

There is a fine, orotund richness about the phrase "a league of nations." Everyone will agree that some such thing is much to be desired. But let us know, first, just exactly what it means. If it be no more than a "thought-killing phrase," can we afford to let it create a period of "suspended animation"?

As Gilbert sang of Prince Agib:

His gentle spirit rolls  
In the melody of souls—

Which is pretty, but I don't know what it means.

Let us find out what the phrase-making melodist means, if he means anything at all, before we decide to ratify his vagaries.

\* \* \* \* \*

Take the 14  
points or  
else—

Reference has been made above (at page 57) to the revelations contained in the book by Professor Seymour, now President of Yale University, entitled *The Intimate Papers of Colonel House*. The book was written under the guidance of Colonel House. This is shown by his "prefatory note" in which he states that "it treats only of such matters as came within the orbit of my own activities.

. . . My chief desire has been to let the papers tell their own story, and for this reason I have preferred to leave their arrangement in the hands of an historian."

Professor Seymour in his "note of acknowledgment" says:

"The comment and advice of Colonel House have been invaluable. . . . For the time and interest and freedom which he has given me I am profoundly grateful. It is a rare privilege for the historian that his documentary material should be explained by the chief actor in the drama."

General Weygand in his recollections of the pre-armistice period, which were published in the *Revue des Deux Mondes* in Paris in December, 1938, and in the *London National Review* in January and February, 1939, referred to these revelations. The testimony of Colonel House on what he himself did in Paris during the period October 25–November 3, 1918, as it is set forth in Professor Seymour's book, shows conclusively that in order to obtain acceptance by France of the fourteen points, House went so far as to threaten that the United States would drop out of the war and make a separate peace with Germany, and that one of the consequences of this would be to deprive the Allies of all aid for their civil populations as well as for their armies from that time on.

At the time this threat was made, President Wilson had complete control of the only important source of food to which the French people could look pending the first peace harvest. The pressure thus put on France in

the name of the President of the United States therefore amounted to coercion, as the following passage will show:

“The French and the Italians were not impressed by the dangers to Anglo-American amity that might proceed from British control of the sea unless regulated by a revision of maritime law. Furthermore, they had their own objections to the Fourteen Points, and they readily joined with Mr. Lloyd George in opposition to a general endorsement of them. The Italian Foreign Secretary demanded that the President be informed categorically that at this time the Allies could give him no assurance that his Points would be acceptable. It was impossible, said Sonnino, to agree upon a peace programme at the moment of making the armistice. As regards British use of naval power ‘it had to be remembered that nations, like animals, had different weapons; one animal had teeth, another tusks, another claws, and so it was with nations.’ All that could be done at the moment, he felt, was to settle the military and naval terms of the Armistice; the bases of peace must be left until later.

“Such postponement of an agreement upon principles was, of course, exactly what House wished to avoid. So long as Germany was still in the field and the Allies were uncertain of her acceptance of the armistice, the influence of the United States remained very strong; once Germany had surrendered, it might prove easier for the Allies to disregard that influence and make any sort of peace they pleased. Col. House accordingly maintained inflexibly the position which he had assumed. If the Allies persisted in their refusal to accept the Fourteen Points, upon which Germany based her request for an armistice, there could be only one result: the negotiations with Germany would have to be wiped off the slate; President Wilson would have no alternative but to tell the

enemy that his conditions were not accepted by the Allies. The question would then arise whether America would not have to take these matters up directly with Germany and Austria.

"‘That would amount,’ said Clemenceau, ‘to a separate peace between the United States and the Central Powers.’

"‘It might,’ replied Colonel House.

"‘My statement,’ he telegraphed the President, ‘had a very exciting effect on those present.’ \*

"‘The statement was bound to have such an effect, and was doubtless so designed, not merely because the withdrawal of the United States from co-operation with the Allies would necessarily touch very closely their economic welfare (for they counted upon American assistance during the period of reconstruction) but also because of the moral influence exercised by President Wilson at this time in Europe.’ (*The Intimate Papers of Col. House*, Seymour, Vol. IV, pp. 169-171.)

There is another passage in the book which shows that as late as March, 1919, President Wilson adhered staunchly to the notion of making a peace without victory. The testimony of Colonel House, as reported by Professor Seymour, dealing with developments in Paris following Mr. Wilson’s second arrival there on March 14, 1919, is clear:

“The chief stumbling-blocks in the path of agreement were as always the problems of Germany’s western frontier, reparations and the military security of France. On March 26, Lloyd George assumed the leadership in the movement of protest against French claims by pre-

\* This report was cabled to President Wilson on October 29, 1918. See *Woodrow Wilson, Life and Letters—The Armistice*, by Ray Standard Baker, p. 527.

sending a note entitled 'Some considerations for the Peace Conference before they finally draft their terms.' It was a skillful exposition of Wilson's own position, a protest against the peril involved in a peace of victory. 'Injustice, arrogance displayed in the hour of triumph will never be forgotten or forgiven.' . . .

"But Lloyd George was himself standing upon shaky ground. The French replied that his suggestions applied merely to Germany's continental position. The concessions he suggested would not reconcile Germany. The Germans cared just as much about their colonies, their navy, their mercantile marine. Would the British agree to yield their own demands on these points which seemed vital to British security? If England's imperial position must be protected, the same was true of Continental France and of the new nations of Central Europe who would prove the last bulwark against the Bolshevism Lloyd George feared." (*The Intimate Papers of Col. House*, Seymour, Vol. IV, 407.)

This unflinching adherence by Woodrow Wilson to the concept of peace without victory is explainable by his peculiar psychology. He had grown up in the South in reconstruction days in an atmosphere heavily laden with the bitterness of defeat. The peace of overwhelming victory which had been imposed by the armies of Grant and Sherman was profoundly repugnant to him. These passionate feelings of his childhood he rationalized into a doctrine. But what he overlooked in this process was that there was nothing in common between the generous spirit of the South and its leaders, men like Robert E. Lee, Stonewall Jackson and Jefferson Davis, and the predatory spirit of the forces of Pan-Germanism and its leaders, men like Hindenburg, Ludendorf and Tirpitz.

Wilson had forgotten Grover Cleveland's wise remark: "Conditions, not theories, confront us."

The basic truth of this remark was ever present in the minds of two men, the two most formidable antagonists of Pan-Germanism in 1918, Theodore Roosevelt and Marshal Foch. Roosevelt's leadership had asserted itself in the autumn of 1914. Lashing at Wilson's nebulous policy, resolutely opposed to the concept of peace without victory, he had demanded terms of peace which would "make it impossible for the Prussianized Germany of the Hohenzollerns to repeat her colossal wrongdoing." This thought Marshal Foch, the Supreme Commander of the allied armies, had translated into a demand that an international police force hold the Rhine permanently and thus enforce the maintenance of peace, rendering the German war party powerless to resume control. Against this policy of Theodore Roosevelt and Foch, Wilson used all the resources at his command to bring about his peace without victory and particularly to prevent the establishment of an international police force and the permanent international control of the Rhine. In this light, the death of Theodore Roosevelt on January 6, 1919, was a world calamity: it left Foch alone to contend with Wilson, and the latter, with the aid of Lloyd George, defeated Foch.

Let it be clearly understood that but for this outcome of the struggle of Theodore Roosevelt and Foch against Wilson we would not be in the throes of this second Pan-German war. All other circumstances which contributed to rendering unavoidable this war for and against world freedom are subsidiary to the outcome of the struggle at

the Peace Conference: Wilson's peace without victory gave us Hitler.

Not long after the Peace Conference, Sir John Simon made a stay in this country and a prominent New York lawyer whom I knew well gave a luncheon in his honor downtown at which one of my good friends was present. The party included an international banker of German extraction. That same afternoon my friend told me that the conversation at the luncheon was indicative of a feeling among Germany's financial friends, both here and in London, that Germany had won a truce and would renew the war at a time not far off, as had been foreseen by Marshal Foch in March, 1919.

### III

#### WILSON, HARDING AND BORAH AGAINST FOCH

**A good idea  
is killed**

A group of Americans, of which I happened to be a rank and file member, launched early in 1916 the plan of a League to enforce peace. It was an explicit proposal for co-operation by the free nations to outlaw wars of aggression by the creation of an international police force for instant use against the aggressor. This plan President Wilson did not adopt. He brought forward an emasculated scheme in which the feature of an international police force shone by its absence.

First of all let us consider the means President Wilson employed to further his end, means which, as will be seen, account to a great extent for the defeat of his end.

On October 26, 1918, the press published his appeal to the American people to uphold his leadership at the peace conference by electing democratic majorities in both houses of Congress on November 5, 1918. In that appeal he mentioned that his political adversaries, while strong upholders of the national war effort, did not share his views on peace. In point of fact, the foremost leaders of the Republican party at the time, Theodore Roosevelt and William Howard Taft, were supporters of the League-to-enforce-peace movement, but they regarded

with suspicion Mr. Wilson's single-handed negotiations with a German government which, for reasons well known to itself and obvious to all informed observers, was eager to make Mr. Wilson the arbiter of peace on the basis of his fourteen points.

\* \* \* \* \*

Wilson's  
pledge  
violated

In his appeal, President Wilson pledged himself to abide by the decision of the American people. He said:

"I am your servant and will accept your judgment without cavil. But my power to administer the great trust assigned to me by the Constitution would be seriously impaired should your judgment be adverse, and I must frankly tell you so because so many critical issues depend upon your verdict. . . . If the control of the House and the Senate should be taken away from the party now in power an opposing majority could assume control of legislation and oblige all actions to be taken amid contest and obstruction. The return of a Republican majority to either house of the Congress would, moreover, be interpretative on the other side of the water as a repudiation of my leadership."

What did Mr. Wilson's voluntary pledge to accept without cavil the people's judgment expressed at the polls mean unless it meant that if the Congressional election which he had turned into a plebiscite on his peace program went against him he would abide by the result by appointing members of the opposition on the delegation to the peace conference, so that the treaty negotiated might be such as the Senate was likely to ratify? On the eve of making this public pledge Mr. Wilson had sent

Colonel House secretly to Paris on a mission which if successful would give him an excuse for violating his pledge. And Colonel House in secret negotiations in Paris, held at the very time his chief's pledge was made, was using the threat that President Wilson might make a separate peace with Germany unless the Allies, without waiting for the outcome of the Congressional election, accepted immediately a peace based on his fourteen points as requested by the German government. By this means he succeeded in wringing acceptance from the aged Clemenceau and the nimble Lloyd George, both unwilling to give the world the spectacle of discord between their countries and the United States at a time when the opposing armies were still locked in battle on the western front. Not until after the votes were cast, resulting in a decisive rejection of the President's appeal for a democratic Congress, did the American people learn that the Allies had agreed to the President's fourteen points as a basis of peace. But the means by which this result had been achieved did not become known until long afterward. Meanwhile Mr. Wilson announced that while disappointed by the popular verdict he was compelled to proceed with his peace plan because the Allies and Germany had accepted it. No defense of Mr. Wilson's methods can prevail in this matter; no end, however noble, could have justified the means he resorted to in trying to achieve it. But the point is that the means he used not only did not achieve the end; they defeated it: President Wilson's adversaries, outraged by his failure to live up to his word, denounced him as unworthy of confidence. He became for them a marked

man—whatever he put forward was regarded with the utmost suspicion. Thus he became the principal obstacle to the success of his own cause. For this he and his alter ego, Colonel House, must share the blame before history and no attempt to turn him into a saint and martyr for a sacred cause will stand in the light of facts which cannot be gainsaid. The truth is that he proved untrue to his trust. Had the cause of world peace been uppermost for him, it is doubtful that he would have sought to advance it by methods bound to set it back, as the test proved.

But among his adversaries those who prevailed against him proved equally unscrupulous. Theodore Roosevelt having died in the beginning of 1919, the Republican party lost in him the only real leader it possessed.

\* \* \* \* \*

Harding's  
pledge  
ignored

Throughout American neutrality, Senator Borah had argued for a policy of aloofness which found its chief support among the friends of Germany in this country. He and his followers had been driven underground when Congress declared war. But when President Wilson acted as he did in connection with the peace negotiations, Borah came to life as Mr. Wilson's most formidable opponent. He fought a battle which elicited joy in Berlin and corresponding gloom in Paris, London and Brussels.

When President Wilson decided on a trip through the country to obtain support for the League of Nations, Senator Borah came forward as his chief antagonist, speaking in the same cities and getting larger audiences. On the surface it looked as if Senator Borah was a pa-

triot defending the supposed legacy left by George Washington in his farewell address, a legacy which became distorted into isolationism, a policy which the statesmanship of Washington would not have tolerated for a moment under the conditions prevailing in 1919. What the public did not know, however, was that two Pittsburgh multimillionaires each had contributed \$5,000 to Senator Borah's "traveling expenses" on that trip. As he actually cannot have spent more than a small part of that amount, it can be seen that every speech he delivered brought him a substantial fee. One of these Pittsburgh patriots was none other than Andrew Mellon.

In 1920, the Republican boss in Pittsburgh, Mayor Edward Vose Babcock, as a means of interesting Mr. Mellon in the usefulness of a very large campaign fund to elect Harding President, and, of course, elect all the candidates in Pennsylvania who ran on the same ticket, dangled before Mr. Mellon the prospect of making him Secretary of the Treasury under Harding. The scheme worked and Doherty got Harding's approval for it. The first and most important thing Mr. Mellon devoted himself to was to put the screws on the British government to make an early settlement of the war debt so as to enable the greatest American income taxpayer, as Secretary of the Treasury, to induce Congress to reduce the surtax in the higher brackets.

As a means to that end, George Harvey had been selected as Harding's Ambassador to the Court of St. James. Behind Harvey there was another great taxpayer—a Democrat—Thomas Fortune Ryan. Messrs. Mellon and Ryan, while belonging to opposing parties, were of one

mind on tax questions. So Harvey, after he had made himself at home in London, took occasion to inform the Prime Minister, Mr. A. Bonar Law, that unless the British government sent to Washington a commission to settle the war debt, the Harding administration would be unable to prevent a debate in Congress which would be very damaging to British credit all over the world. This warning—or threat—brought Stanley Baldwin to Washington. Harvey came on his heels and, to make sure Harding did not waver, stopped at the White House while Mr. Mellon performed the major operation, which consisted in handing Mr. Baldwin a war-debt settlement for the full amount for which Great Britain had assumed liability at inflated prices. The amount was payable not in goods but in gold at three and three-eighths per cent interest. Mr. Mellon accompanied this document with soft assurances that the burden would be gradually eased as commodities of the British Empire needed in the United States rose steadily to higher prices, the exact opposite of what actually happened. (Mr. Mellon later enlarged on that subject in correspondence with President Hibben of Princeton University.) Thereupon Mr. Baldwin, after publicly thanking the Harding administration for the generous terms granted, returned to London with George Harvey again following on his heels.

During the session of the British cabinet which considered the settlement, and when it seemed plain that it would be rejected, the American Ambassador, Mr. Harvey, did the unprecedented thing of requesting that the Prime Minister leave the cabinet room to speak to him,

and when the latter did so, Harvey told him in substance: "You had better take this settlement; you will never get as favorable terms again." Mr. Bonar Law might have asked Harvey how much more he thought the United States could exact than the full amount with three and three-eighths per cent, payable in gold, for value received in goods at prices anywhere from one hundred to three hundred per cent of normal. But Mr. Law was ill at that time (he died not long afterward). He went back to the cabinet meeting and the settlement was accepted.

It would be difficult to determine to what extent the desperation engendered by this sad episode in Anglo-American affairs led the men in control of monetary policy at London to bring the monetary structure which made international payments easy crashing down when flight to gold was precipitated by the demonetization of the silver rupee in India, ending in sterling becoming a managed currency. What is certain, however, is that from the time this measure was taken in India the prices of commodities kept on dropping with every aggravation of the flight to gold.

Of course, the intentions of Woodrow Wilson when he dealt with the momentous question of world peace cannot be questioned. But after all, the intentions of an elected representative of the people when he deals with the fate of his own countrymen and of the world are not as important as the results of what he does. That Woodrow Wilson, the former teacher, flunked on peace no less disastrously than the most unsuccessful student who ever

flunked his course on jurisprudence and politics at Princeton cannot be gainsaid. Warren G. Harding is said to have taught school at one time. When his turn came he flunked on world peace no less disastrously than his immediate predecessor, and this second Pan-German war is before us to prove it.

During the 1920 campaign Harding had pledged himself to the creation of an association of nations for the maintenance of world peace. Messrs. Hughes, Hoover and others had endorsed that stand. It is interesting to recall that in a message which the writer received from Mr. Harding and which he read at the United States Military Academy, West Point, on September 6, 1920, in the presence of General Douglas MacArthur, Superintendent of the Academy, and of Mr. Herbert Hoover, principal speaker on the occasion of the anniversary of Lafayette's birthday and of the Battle of the Marne, Mr. Harding said:

"Twice has France contributed to our liberty, once when Lafayette came to the aid of America in her fight for independence, again when France stood as a bleeding bulwark for the freedom and democracy of the world against the military onslaught of an autocracy. . . . If the opportunity ever comes to me I will represent the American people in giving practical proof of our national friendship. Our true friendship may only be effectively expressed in deeds rather than in words, in a relationship that will stand rather than fall, in workable machinery of international good will and good faith."

In his first message to Congress, President Harding said:

"We make no surrender of our hope and aim for an association to promote peace, in which we would most heartily join."

Having been elected, Mr. Harding with his cabinet embarked on "normalcy" and not only forgot his pledge but negotiated the separate peace with Germany to avoid which Clemenceau had submitted to Wilson's dictation. The Republican party treated the League of Nations as a leper colony and limited itself to pious words, as if world peace could be sustained by lip service.

At the Washington Conference for the limitation of armaments held in November, 1921, the Hughes plan was adopted. Under this plan the United States scrapped all but two capital ships under construction, while Japan sank one old one, and Japan promised to observe a five-five-three ratio with Great Britain and the United States, and also not to fortify mandated islands in the Pacific. That this promise remained a dead letter has long been known.

\* \* \* \* \*

The wisdom  
of Foch

Nor is this all. One man at the peace conference urged the essence of the principle on which the League to enforce peace was founded. He was not a delegate, but he was the commander-in-chief who had organized the allied forces and won the victory over the central powers. He urged, he implored the statesmen to provide for an international police force for the maintenance of peace by control of the Rhine bridge-heads. On January 10, 1919, he made his purpose manifest in writing:

"There is no question of entrusting the guardianship of this common barrier to any one power, but of assuring by the moral and material support of all the democratic powers the defense of their lives and futures by forbidding Germany, once for all, to carry war and her spirit of domination across the river."

On March 31, 1919, he warned that unless such a force was provided and entrusted with the holding of the Rhine bridgeheads "no neutrality, no disarmament, no written clause of any kind can prevent Germany from seizing the Rhine and debouching from it at an advantage. The Rhine remains today the barrier essential to the safety of the peoples of Western Europe, and therefore of civilization."

Prophetic words, which mark Foch as the true sage of the peace conference!

He knew the school of thought which had dominated so long across the Rhine, the school whose philosophy had been revealed by von Bernhardi and which was summed up in the title of his book *Weltmacht oder Niedergang* (*World Might or Oblivion*). This philosophy has just been restated by the present director of Pan-German propaganda, Paul Joseph Goebbels, in his article in the magazine *Reich*. Echoing von Bernhardi, he sums up the Nazi philosophy in almost the same words, saying that the choice before Europe is Germany's "new order" or "chaos."

In 1919 Foch had foreseen that a peace lacking the safeguard of a watch on the Rhine would not be respected by the forces of Pan-Germanism. He foresaw the rebirth of Pan-Germanism in even more virulent

form. While Wilson was pursuing the will-o'-the-wisp called "idealism" by his followers Foch held on firmly to the reality he knew. He told Wilson and his colleagues on March 31, 1919:

"I urgently ask the Allied and Associated Governments, which in the most critical hours of the war entrusted to me the conduct of their armies and the future of our common cause, to consider that the future can only be permanently assured—tomorrow as it was yesterday—by the military frontier of the Rhine and its occupation by the Allies. This essential position must therefore be held."

Instead of heeding this warning, President Wilson did all he could to defeat the proposal of Marshal Foch and thereby to deprive the League of Nations of the international police force vital to its success, indeed to its survival. He succeeded in inducing Clemenceau to accept as a substitute for the Foch plan a treaty undertaking by the United States to come to the aid of France should Germany violate the provisions of the peace treaty creating a demilitarized zone along the Rhine. He signed this treaty which contained his agreement to transmit it to the Senate with the treaty of peace. He did not so transmit it but waited two weeks and under pressure sent it to the Senate with a message in which he did not disclose the circumstances under which the treaty had been made. The conduct of President Wilson in this instance is of a piece with what he did in the matter of his pre-election pledge. But nothing that President Wilson did or failed to do can excuse or condone the callous indifference to the fate of world peace which marked the

course of the Republican party from the time Harding repudiated his pledge to enter an association of nations for the maintenance of world peace and made a separate peace with Germany.

After these developments, Harding inaugurated the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier at Arlington on November 11, 1921. That inauguration was in reality a desecration: the Unknown Soldier had died in vain. Pan-Germanism, thanks to Wilson, Harding and Borah, had won a new lease on life.

Mr. Hoover in recent articles has revealed that at the Peace Conference he did all he could to induce President Wilson to avoid effective commitments for the enforcement of peace. No doubt his course thereafter as a member of the Harding and Coolidge cabinets and as President was in harmony with this attitude of his at Paris in 1919. Hoover had been like those of whom it was said of old: "They have eyes but see not; and ears but hear not." Mr. Hoover's judgment was manifestly at fault at the Peace Conference; from then on his course continued to be mistaken to such extent that henceforth he should subside, letting those whose judgment has been proved sound furnish leadership which it was not in him to give.

In his foreword to André Tardieu's book *The Truth About the Treaty* (Bobbs-Merrill, 1921), Edward M. House, writing on March 3, 1921, states concerning Mr. Tardieu:

"He was in all truth the one nearly indispensable man at the Conference.

"Therefore, if one would know of those fateful days

in Paris when the Allies of France had gathered from the ends of the earth to have their reckoning with the Central Powers, it would be well to read *The Truth about the Treaty*, for here it is told by him who knows."

This foreword is followed by an introduction written by Mr. Clemenceau, France's war premier and head of the French delegation at the Peace Conference, which begins as follows:

"It was near your heart, in face of the virulent attacks on our Peace Treaty, to set up the *truth* in print."

Thus the man who next to President Wilson was the most important member of the American delegation and the man who headed the French delegation of which André Tardieu was the chief member next to Mr. Clemenceau both vouch for the facts given in his book.

Chapter VI of this book, under the title "Treaties of Guarantee," begins on page 202 as follows:

"It was on March 14, 1919, that Mr. Lloyd George and President Wilson proposed to M. Clemenceau, in place of the inter-allied occupation of an independent Rhineland, the undertaking by Great Britain and the United States to come immediately to the assistance of France in case the latter should be the object of an unprovoked aggression by Germany."

Concerning President Wilson's part in this matter, Mr. Tardieu states at page 205:

On March 28, he put this solution into concrete form, and handed the head of the French Government the following:

"In a separate Treaty with the United States, a pledge by the United States, subject to the ap-

proval of the Executive Council of the League of Nations, to come immediately to the assistance of France as soon as any unprovoked movement of aggression against her is made by Germany."

This formula, approved by Mr. Lloyd George, became the basis of the negotiation.

A treaty was signed, on the part of the United States of America, by Woodrow Wilson, President of the United States, and Robert Lansing, Secretary of State of the United States, and on the part of the French Republic, by Georges Clemenceau, President of the Council of Ministers, Minister of War, and Stephen Pichon, Minister of Foreign Affairs. This treaty, signed June 28, 1919, specifically provides in Article IV:

"The present treaty will be submitted to the Senate of the United States at the same time as the Treaty of Versailles is submitted to the Senate for its advice and consent to ratification."

It was transmitted to the Senate July 29, 1919, with a message from the President of the United States in which he refers to the fact that he had transmitted the Treaty of Peace two weeks previously.

President Wilson's message will be scanned in vain for the remotest revelation of the fact that this Treaty had been offered by him to France as a substitute for the permanent security of the Rhine frontier and had been accepted by France in exchange for her agreement to limit the occupation of the Rhine bridgeheads to fifteen years.

Article I of this treaty specifically refers to the provisions of the Treaty of Peace forbidding military occupation or fortification of the left bank of the Rhine by Ger-

many and providing that violation by Germany of these provisions should constitute "a hostile act against the powers signatory of the present treaty and as calculated to disturb the peace of the world."

The separate treaty then specifies that should these provisions constitute "inadequate security and protection to France, the United States of America shall be bound to come immediately to her assistance in the event of any unprovoked movement of aggression against her being made by Germany."

This meant, in plain terms, that should Germany violate the provisions of the Treaty of Peace under which the left bank of the Rhine was demilitarized, this would constitute an act of aggression, and the United States would be bound to come to the aid of France in meeting this act of aggression.

This Treaty, Senate Document No. 63 in the 66th Congress First Session, was not ratified. The Senate had no opportunity to learn the facts bearing on its offer to France and acceptance by France until long after it had been withdrawn from its consideration by President Wilson at the same time that he withdrew the Treaty of Peace. His message merely gave "high obligations of gratitude and tested friendship" as the reason for making the treaty.

Mr. Tardieu in his book revealed that Marshal Foch had taken the definite position in November, 1918, that nothing short of the Rhine frontier would secure peace, and that he had been unswerving in maintaining that position.

The story of the struggle to defeat the measure which

the Allied Commander-in-Chief, whose greatness was not confined to mastery on the battlefield, regarded as indispensable to peace is best told in contemporary documents which are reproduced in the appendix to this book of which the following is a list:

Document 1—Conclusion of Marshal Foch's Memorandum of January 10, 1919.

Document 2—Proposal of the French Government to the heads of the Allied and Associated Governments (March 12, 1919).

Document 3—Note of the French Government handed to the heads of the Allied Governments (March 17, 1919).

Document 4—Text of Offer made March 28, 1919, by President Wilson to Prime Minister Clemenceau as a substitute for Rhine Frontier.

Document 5—Conclusion of Statement made by Marshal Foch on March 31, 1919, before the heads of the Allied Governments and the Commanders-in-Chief of the Allied Armies.

Document 6—Letter dated May 5, 1919, written by Marshal Foch to Messrs. Georges Clemenceau, Woodrow Wilson and Lloyd George.

Document 7—Letter dated May 6, 1919, written by President Wilson and Secretary of State Lansing to Mr. Clemenceau, French Prime Minister.

Document 8—Extract from observations presented by Marshal Foch at the plenary meeting of the Peace Conference held May 6, 1919.

Document 9—Message of President Wilson of July 29, 1919, transmitting Agreement between the United States and France signed June 28, 1919, to secure to France the immediate aid of the United States in case of an unprovoked movement of aggression against her on the part of Germany.

Document 10—Agreement of assistance to France in the event of unprovoked aggression by Germany.

The maxim "*Verba volant scripta manent*" ("Words fly away, writings remain") applies here. I am not here questioning President Wilson's motives. He died a broken man because by his failure he had assumed a responsibility before the conscience of mankind greater than could be borne by a mere mortal, to recall a prophecy made in the early stages of the Peace Conference. President Wilson should have given the Senate the facts which led to his offer of the Treaty of Assistance to France and its acceptance. Without those facts, the Senate had no opportunity to judge of the character of the obligation which the only officer of the Government of the United States having power to conduct its foreign relations had assumed on behalf of the people of the United States, subject only to ratification by the Senate. By withholding the facts from the Senate, President Wilson withheld them also from the people of the United States, which to this day is largely unaware that the Government of France when it was in a position to hold the permanent security of the Rhine frontier gave up that security in reliance on and in exchange for the undertaking contained in the Treaty of Assistance.

The French Government must, of course, be taken to have known that President Wilson's treaty without ratification by the Senate would not legally bind the United States. But the facts completely dispose of the idea so widely prevalent among our people that the present European situation was Europe's own doing and solely the result of European action with which we had noth-

ing at all to do. The fact that the surrender of the Rhine bridgeheads which made German aggression possible was actually effected in reliance on an obligation undertaken on our behalf, by our Chief Executive, who alone had the power to enter into it, subject to subsequent ratification by the Senate, shows conclusively that we had our part in bringing about the present tragic situation; and this having been shown it should follow that we must take our full share in a war which is ours in more senses than one. This we are only beginning to do.

Some people have asked me: Why did not France take advantage of the opportunity she had at the time of the Ruhr to rewrite the treaty and make the Rhine her frontier?

To give a true answer to this question it is necessary to realize that the failure to make a treaty enforceable to the extent of preventing the return to power of the war party in Germany had set in motion forces of demoralization not only in France itself but in Great Britain, where the influence of Mr. Lloyd George, Lord Curzon and Sir John Simon was exerted in such a way that British policy was constantly at work thwarting the efforts of patriotic Frenchmen to correct the blunders of the peace treaty. Indeed that influence was exerted not only in Great Britain but in the United States also in a manner detrimental to any co-operation between the English-speaking nations, France and Belgium when it came to coping with the danger of another Pan-German war. The culmination of this state of demoralization came at Munich in the summer of 1938.

The French went into the Ruhr in the latter part of 1923 after a German default in the reparation payments and deliveries had been established beyond question. The French forces were in the Ruhr when in December, 1923, Mr. Francis P. Garvan, president of The Chemical Foundation, asked me to undertake a confidential mission to France which had to do with the setting at naught of a German plan to control the French chemical industry—a plan which had been launched successfully shortly before occupation of the Ruhr. Reaching Paris a few days before Christmas, I decided that I should call first of all upon Marshal Foch. He received me with his customary cordiality at his home in the Rue de Grenelle, and from that time on throughout my visit, which lasted about three weeks, I was in frequent contact with him. He was at that time in supreme command of the French Army and had carried out the occupation of the Ruhr without a hitch. During our conversations he informed me on several points of considerable interest in connection with the Armistice and the Peace Treaty, and also threw considerable light on the situation then existing by reason of the occupation of the Ruhr, a step taken by France in co-operation with Belgium and Italy, but which was strongly opposed by the British cabinet of which Lord Curzon was Foreign Minister. Marshal Foch in the course of these conversations referred to the circumstances under which he had undertaken to negotiate the armistice between the Allies and Germany.

President Wilson had carried on a correspondence with the German government, headed by Prince Max of

Baden, following the appeal on behalf of Germany for a peace based on his fourteen points. As I happened to know, the opposition to Mr. Wilson's course had forced him to relinquish any attempt to negotiate an armistice with Germany. The well-nigh unanimous sentiment in the United States had found expression in the slogan "Leave it to Foch" which newspapers everywhere had been carrying, some of them next to their title on their first page.

Marshal Foch told me that Prime Minister Clemenceau had summoned him and informed him that the Allied and Associated Powers were in agreement in entrusting to him the negotiations of the military terms of an armistice with Germany; and that when the expression "military terms" was used by Mr. Clemenceau the Marshal had told him that in his opinion what the situation called for was not merely the formulation of military terms, but economic, financial and territorial terms, so that the armistice should itself constitute a firm foundation of peace. The Marshal informed me that in response to his suggestions, Mr. Clemenceau had stated:

"Ça, ça ne vous regarde pas."

"That is none of your business."

The Marshal added that he soon realized that the three great men, Wilson, Lloyd George and Clemenceau, individually and collectively did not know what they wanted as terms of peace, and he decided that all he could do was to exact from the Germans compliance with conditions such that they would be unable to re-

sume fighting no matter what the three great men ultimately decided they wanted the Germans to agree to in the way of peace terms.

I mentioned to the Marshal that many people in the United States had stressed the point that the Allied armies should have gone to Berlin so as to prove to the Germans that they were beaten. Marshal Foch said that General Bliss during the pre-armistice conferences had stated that the Germans should be asked to agree to an unconditional surrender, but that in answer to the Marshal's inquiry as to how this unconditional surrender was to be translated into fact, whether it would involve occupation of all German cities, seizure of the banks, post offices, and custom houses, General Bliss did not specify.

The Marshal then went on to say that since the Allies still held the bridgeheads over the Rhine he had had no difficulty in carrying out without a hitch the occupation of the Ruhr, and he added that if he should be asked to occupy any other part of Germany, Berlin or any other point, he would have no difficulty in doing so. He concluded with these significant words:

"As long as we hold these Rhine bridgeheads the situation is absolutely safe, but it will not be after we let go of them."

He then explained to me why the opportunity afforded by the occupation of the Ruhr to redraw the Peace Treaty along common-sense lines was slipping away. This is the gist of what he said:

Anglo-  
American  
pressure on  
France

Alexandre Millerand, President of the Republic, and Raymond Poincaré, Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs, were in a deadlock. Millerand wished to take advantage of the fact that the Germans were ready to accept France's terms. But Poincaré, under the pressure of London and Washington, wished some international agreement to furnish the sanction of new terms. And Poincaré insisted that as Prime Minister he alone had the power to deal with the situation, that Millerand must keep hands off. Precious time was slipping by and the golden opportunity to establish peace on firm foundations for the future was being lost.

Thus the demoralization which had set in as the result of President Wilson having forced what amounted to a truce—a peace without victory—persisted: Lord Curzon was moving heaven and earth to block a clean-cut solution and the State Department was heartily co-operating with Lord Curzon. At the State Department the view had been held ever since the inception of the Harding administration that Mr. Poincaré was a "militarist." That very term was applied to him by one of the foremost spokesmen of that administration in conversation with me. He had continued under President Coolidge and was still in office during the occupation of the Ruhr. I could not help thinking of him as Marshal Foch told me:

"You will pardon my saying this to you who are a lawyer, but Poincaré, great patriot that he is, has a professional deformation. Being first and foremost a lawyer, he is waiting for a court to give him judgment,

while Millerand, who is also a great lawyer, though not as great perhaps as Poincaré, but certainly a great patriot, is a more practical one when it comes to measures to safeguard peace. He wants to act, knowing the Germans are prepared to accept new terms, while Poincaré waits for someone else to render judgment in his favor."

Before I left Paris in January, 1924, Mr. Poincaré, after studying the situation which I had come to bring to his attention, had taken the steps necessary to prevent the German chemical trust from placing the French chemical industry under its influence. In May, 1924, the forces under his leadership were defeated at the parliamentary elections and Mr. Edouard Herriot succeeded him at the head of the government. Throughout these events Myron T. Herrick was American Ambassador to France. Would that he had been President of the United States!

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Briand the  
appeaser

But the forces on the left under Herriot disintegrated in the summer of 1925, and the Chamber of Deputies, which under Herriot had compelled Millerand to resign the Presidency of the Republic, turned to Poincaré's leadership. The latter called in Briand as Foreign Minister, and Mr. Briand, who was an appeaser, insisted that, to please his friend Stresemann, control of the Rhine bridgeheads should be surrendered without awaiting the expiration of the fifteen-year period specified in the Treaty of Versailles.

I last saw Marshal Foch in the summer of 1928. He asked me to inform him on the presidential campaign in

the United States and I did so as best I could, predicting that Mr. Hoover would win. The Marshal said:

"I know him. We had a tussle, he and I, during the Peace Conference. He was in too much of a hurry to go to the aid of the Germans."

On that occasion we talked of the question of military training and the Marshal expressed the opinion that the United States would be greatly benefited by adopting a plan of universal training adapted from that of Switzerland. He said that due to lack of training the casualties of the A.E.F. had been about five times greater than they should have been, taking into account the extent of American participation in the fighting. His last words to me were:

"You are less poisoned than we are (*vous etes moins intoxiqués que nous*)—you can do more to avert great calamities for the world."

Thus he had foreseen the leadership which our President and the chief of the loyal opposition have given and are giving to the national effort for our freedom which, if it succeeds, will free the world.

Following upon Japan's aggression, our choice has at last been made for us by the pressure of events easily foreseen and which could have been headed off—we are at war with all three aggressor nations. This brief account is written in the conviction that notwithstanding setbacks victory will come to the free nations and that it is none too early for them to think of the ways and means of achieving a foolproof peace.

First of all, we must banish from our minds the idea that the German people are like any other people; they are not. The whole problem lies in the necessity, if we are to have peace, of bringing about the same change in the Germans within Germany which, according to our experience, has taken place in the great majority of the Germans and their descendants who have come to America. In this connection it is well to recall the maxim of the greatest Frenchman of the twentieth century, Marshal Foch: "There is no real disarmament except moral disarmament."

Why are the Germans different from their neighbors? Why is the Golden Rule a dead letter for them? It is because the spirit of the robber barons, which has receded everywhere else in Europe, still controls in Germany. Prussia is its fortress and has been such uninterruptedly since the rise of the House of Hohenzollern in the seventeenth century. Writing in 1917, the late Theodore Roosevelt said: "In international relations, the Prussianized Germany of today stands for ruthless self-aggrandizement, and contempt for the rights of other nations. She stands for the rule of might over right; of power over justice. If Germany now conquered France and England, we would be the next victim; and if the conquest took place at this moment we would be a helpless victim!" It is easy to imagine what Theodore Roosevelt would say today if living, because of what he said in 1917.

Pan-Germanism is merely an attempt to satisfy on a world-wide scale and in the guise of a patriotic movement the appetites of men who are thugs at heart and who desire to loot the world for their own benefit. And

while it may be granted that when Hindenburg the Junker called in Hitler and made him the super-slave-monger of Pan-Germanism, about half of the German population still held to Christian concepts, that half consisted of elements ready to obey orders without question. By now the doctrine of spoliation has become the faith, the only faith, of the overwhelming majority of Germans of both sexes who did not attain adulthood until after the last war. It is with these people, who are still under the age of forty-five, that we have to reckon. They constitute the German armed forces, the Gestapo, the great bulk of the Nazi Party and, last but not least, of the general staffs of the army, navy and air force.

The first problem is to win the war against these forces and the corresponding elements in Italy and Japan. In the case of Japan, the victory of China, the liberation of all the peoples on the Asiatic continent now subjected to Japanese tyranny, the elimination of Japanese war industries and the enforcement of fair trade standards enabling Japan to obtain by legitimate commercial methods essential raw materials and food will furnish the basis for a settlement which will serve to put an end to the domination of a barbaric and ruthless leadership by keeping the Japanese people where they belong—in Japan. As between us and Japan the clash of concepts of honor and decency was exemplified by what happened at Pearl Harbor. We have the proof that what we regard as the depth of perfidy is regarded by the Japanese as a noble act because it had the sanction of their god-emperor, who after mass murder was done in his name found it

fitting to go to a shrine and boast of the deed to the spirits of his ancestors. Behind this ritual we find the working of the policy of a small oligarchy of unscrupulous militarists bent on domination and exploitation. When we shall have forced a Japanese surrender, it will be well for us to require the confinement of Hirohito, his entire family and ring of Nippon militarists at Pearl Harbor while the masses of Japan are given a chance to prove that they are able to evolve institutions founded upon good faith in the conduct of international relations.

But in the case of Germany much more must be done. Germany is not an island empire. Her neighbors have found their frontiers difficult to defend. To attain the moral disarmament which Marshal Foch wisely held to be the only real disarmament it will be necessary to take heed of the lessons which Pan-Germanism has taught the world by organizing forces whose presence along the Rhine will maintain the leaders of Pan-Germanism, of the party of war and spoliation, under permanent discredit, thereby giving the timorous elements of the German population—those who hitherto have been ruled with an iron hand by the Pan-German leadership—a chance to emancipate themselves from domination.

The first measure, after Germany is defeated and disarmed, and the German leaders responsible for mass murders of civilians in Poland, Czechoslovakia, Norway, Yugoslavia and France shall have been duly tried and hanged, thereby creating a long over-due precedent bound to deter similar conduct in the future, is obviously to carry out the establishment of a permanent international police force for the control of the Rhine from the

Swiss border to the Dutch border and to give it the task of supervising Germany's industrial production so as effectively to prevent a stealthy rearmament.

At the same time, the commerce of Europe should be made free. The people of Germany and of every other European country should be enabled to exchange the products of their labor by honest trade methods for the raw materials and food and other essentials which they need to maintain a decent standard of living. Unemployment and starvation on a large scale anywhere should be regarded as the permanent twin foes of free men, to be fought ceaselessly lest their progress again should bring in its train the terrible evils of war, pestilence, famine and bankruptcy.

Undoubtedly, the treaties of peace of 1919 contained important defects, the chief one being the failure to provide a working system for the economy of the Continent of Europe. But these defects could have been corrected if Europe had been protected against the recurrence of Pan-German war. That precaution was the necessary foundation for all future betterments; with that safeguard lacking, any real accomplishment in solving Europe's economic problems became gradually unattainable. The German Reichswehr under General von Seckt devoted itself to perfecting the blitzkrieg. The pacific Ebert in 1925 was succeeded by the war lord Hindenburg, who surrounded himself with Pan-German advisers and saw to the secret expansion of the German General Staff. Locarno was from the start what it proved to be, a game of dupes, with Briand and Sir Austin Chamberlain in the role of appeasers and Stresemann

the Pan-German in the congenial role of cheat. When Briand induced Poincaré to consent as a gesture of good will to the withdrawal of the French forces on the Rhine in 1929, five years before the expiration of the treaty period, the stage was set for a second Pan-German war. On President Hoover's initiative reparations were virtually canceled. Von Papen took Brüning's place as chancellor and ultimately made way for Hitler.

It has been suggested that with the development of aviation the holding of a land position such as the Rhine would be as ineffective as the Maginot Line proved to be. This objection overlooks the fact that in the eighth point of the Atlantic Charter it is declared to be essential that "nations which threaten, or may threaten, aggression outside their frontiers" must be disarmed. This means that Germany will be deprived of military aviation as well as of all other war equipment and will, therefore, be unable to prevent the enforcement of measures needed to prevent her rearmament. The essential requirement of the disarmament of Germany will necessarily entail supervision of her industrial plants to the extent necessary to prevent stealthy rearmament. This will mean that as soon as warning is received that an attempt is being made by the German War Party to resort to rearmament, the fact that the Rhine bridgeheads are held by an international police force will make it easy to reach the industrial plants wherever they may be located in Germany in time to make the attempt at rearmament ineffectual without this involving any extensive fighting.

The weakness of the Rhine position while it was held under the Treaty of Versailles was not military but po-

litical, due to the fact that first the forces of the United States and later those of Great Britain were withdrawn, thereby not only leaving the task of enforcement of the disarmament provisions to France and Belgium but imposing upon them the handicap of the opposition of the English-speaking nations which the leaders of Germany were able to exploit with success. It was thus that France was denounced as militaristic by Germany's agents and dupes in the English-speaking world; that the system of alliances for European security between France, Belgium, Poland, Czecho-Slovakia, Yugoslavia and Rumania was denounced as involving brutal domination of peaceful and defenseless Germany; that the propaganda on such themes as "war guilt" and "disarmament" and generally in denunciation of the Treaty of Versailles was kept up incessantly. The articles of various American professors, among them Sidney B. Fay, Harry Elmer Barnes and Edward M. Borchard, contributed to this campaign, the corrosive effect of which on the measures to prevent the return of the German War Party to power became more and more obvious until the day when the second Reich having prepared the ground for the second Pan-German war, Hitler became Hindenburg's chancellor and the spearhead of Pan-Germanism.

There is no truer saying than that eternal vigilance is the price of liberty. That vigilance free men should and could have exercised upon the frontier of civilization which is the Rhine. Unless what could and should have been done after the first Pan-German war is done after the second Pan-German war, liberty is doomed.

The eighth point of the Atlantic Charter clearly an-

ticipates that disarmament will be enforced and therefore that the Rhine will be held. The measures contemplated by the other seven points will be possible only if the promise of the eighth point is fully carried out.

Today it is essential to our welfare as a nation that we face the teachings of the past unflinchingly. The course of our politicians of both parties of the Wilson-Harding era in what concerned world peace was lamentable from every aspect. It gave us a bogus peace, a mere truce with the Pan-German forces, followed by a more terrible second World War.

This record of Presidents Wilson and Harding in relation to the League and the treaty pertaining to the Rhine is like the whited sepulchers of which Matthew speaks "which indeed appear beautiful outward but are within full of uncleanness." It contributed greatly to the creation of a world situation fraught with unprecedented dangers to our national security and future. Our responsibility for electing these leaders instead of choosing men with vision and character in keeping with their duty to the country cannot be ignored. They erred and we erred and for this we are called upon to pay heavily. The best we can do is to reverse our course of the past, take our full share in coping with the foes that confront us and realize that when liberty is threatened throughout the world, not only American machines but American soldiers, sailors and airmen are needed in its defense so that the greater our effort now the less will be the cost ultimately.

First of all, Pan-Germanism must be overwhelmingly defeated. In the process of accomplishing this, however,

we should hold on to the resolve that after it is accomplished Pan-Germanism shall not get still another chance to ravage the world. We simply cannot afford the luxury of another truce with Pan-Germanism; defeating it again will have cost enough. The watch on the Rhine which is indispensable as an international police force against aggression should be established and maintained until the day when it can fairly be said that the spirit of Pan-Germanism has left the German people for good. This is bound to take several generations. We know by experience that the immense majority of those of German stock in the United States abhor the predatory system—made perfect by the Pan-German brain trust of which General Haushofer is the master mind—as much as Americans of other origins—perhaps more so. The maintenance of an international police force on the Rhine will give an opportunity to the spirit of freedom to come to life among the German people and to spread. No longer will it be possible for Germany to re-arm secretly, for another Hindenburg to give a free hand to another von Seckt to thwart disarmament provisions and ultimately to appoint another Hitler. Danger of the repetition of this lurks as long as well-intentioned efforts exist to prepare for an apotheosis of Woodrow Wilson after the fighting ceases. But for Woodrow Wilson and his determination that paper guarantees alone should be adopted at the Peace Conference against the recurrence of world war, the American people would not be paying for another defeat of Pan-Germanism the price which the victory of 1918 cost them multiplied at least fourfold.

Particularly let us not delude ourselves again into mak-

ing a treaty with Germany no matter who is put forward to sign it on that people's behalf. I am assuming now that when we attain victory we will be asked to negotiate with so-called "Good Germans." That is what took place in 1918; let us not go through that farce again. No treaty Germany has ever made has ever been worth the paper it was written on. When the day of victory comes for the free nations let them not discuss with gangster-ridden nations what the means of enforcing the international law they flouted shall be. Let them rather rely on aid only from those who have striven and suffered for the restoration of decent rules of international conduct. Let them not give another Hitler the chance to write a sequel in the spirit of *Mein Kampf* and shed crocodile tears over the innocent, peace-loving and cruelly treated people of Germany, who have proved so fond of that sort of hypocrisy, knowing how easy it is to fool Americans by it. The peace should be written by men of good will. May they act with wisdom and preserve the virility thanks to which the victory will have been won.

No attempt has been made in this small book to do more than touch upon what are deemed to be essential points relating to the establishment of world peace on firm foundations such as to safeguard us against the danger of a third Pan-German war, and to present reminiscences which have a bearing on the defeat of the efforts to make a gangster-proof peace in 1919.

*April 14th, 1942.*

In the appendix to this book there will be found, in addition to the documents listed at pages 98-99, the reproduction of

an article which appeared in the issue of February 24, 1932, of the weekly *The Commonwealth*, and some additional contributions by the writer to the discussion of American policy in relation to world peace during the last ten years.

## APPENDIX

### DOCUMENT 1

*Conclusion of memorandum delivered January 10, 1919, by Marshal Foch to the Commanders-in-Chief of the Allied and Associated Armies, based upon Marshal Foch's memorandum to Prime Minister Clemenceau of November, 1918.*

Marshal von Moltke placed the military frontier of Germany at the Rhine and at the end of one of his papers writes: "There can be no doubt about the ordinary strength of our theatre of operations on the Rhine. One thing only could endanger it—a premature offensive by us on the left bank with insufficient forces." And elsewhere he states: "The main line of defense of Prussia against France is the Rhine with its fortresses. This line is so strong that it is far from requiring all the forces of the monarchy."

To-day this situation is reversed in favour of the coalition. The coalition cannot renounce its advantages, cannot relinquish its buckler of defense in that region—the Rhine—without seriously compromising its future. The "Watch on the Rhine" must be its slogan.

Henceforth the Rhine must be the Western frontier of the German peoples. Germany must be deprived of all access to or military utilization of it, that is to say, of all territorial sovereignty on the left bank of this River—in a word, of every facility to reach by sudden invasion, as in 1914, Belgium and Luxemburg, the shores of the North Sea and threaten England; to move around France's natural defenses, the Rhine and the Meuse; to conquer her northern regions and approach that of Paris.

This is, for the present and the near future, a guarantee indispensable for the maintenance of peace, because:

1. Of Germany's material and moral situation.
2. Of her numerical superiority over the democratic countries of Western Europe.

The Rhine, a military frontier indispensable for the maintenance of peace, which is the aim of the coalition, offers no territorial advantage to any country. There is no question indeed of annexing the left bank of the Rhine, of increasing the territory of France or of Belgium but simply one of maintaining on the Rhine the common barrier of security essential to the society of democratic nations. There is no question of entrusting the guardianship of this common barrier to any one Power, but of assuring by the moral and material support of all the democratic powers the defense of their lives and futures by forbidding Germany once for all to carry war and her spirit of domination across the river.

Of course it will be the function of the Peace Treaty to fix the status of the inhabitants of the left bank of the Rhine not included within the French and Belgian frontiers.

But this arrangement, whatever it be, must take into consideration the military necessity set forth above and therefore,

1. Absolutely forbid to Germany all military access to, or political propaganda in, the Rhenish territories of the left bank, perhaps even protecting this territory by a neutral zone on the right bank.
2. Assure the military occupation of the Rhenish territories of the left bank by Allied forces.
3. Guarantee to the Rhenish territories of the left bank the outlet necessary to their economic activities by bringing them into a customs union with the other Western States.

On these conditions, and in accordance with the universally accepted principle of the liberty of peoples, it is possible to conceive the establishment, on the left bank of the

Rhine, of new autonomous States, governing themselves subject to the above reservations, an arrangement which with the aid of a strong natural frontier, the Rhine, will alone be capable of assuring Peace to Western Europe.

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## DOCUMENT 2

*Proposal of the French Government to the heads of the Allied and Associated Governments. (Excerpt)*

(March 12, 1919)

### WESTERN FRONTIER OF GERMANY

1. In the general interest of peace and to assure the effective working of the constituent clause of the League of Nations, the Western frontier of Germany is fixed at the Rhine. Consequently Germany renounces all sovereignty over, as well as any customs union with the territories of the former German Empire on the left bank of the Rhine.

2. The line of the Rhine to be occupied under a mandate of the League of Nations by an inter-allied military force.

The extent and conditions of occupation in German territory of the bridgeheads of Kehl, Mannheim, Mayence, Coblenz, Cologne and Dusseldorf, necessary to the security of inter-allied forces to be fixed by the final Treaty of Peace. Until the signature of the said Treaty the conditions of occupation established by the Armistice of November 11, 1918, to remain in force.

In a zone of fifty kilometers east of her Western frontier Germany shall not maintain nor erect fortifications.

3. The territories of the left bank of the Rhine (except Alsace-Lorraine) to constitute one or several independent States under the protection of the League of Nations. Their Eastern and Southern frontiers to be fixed by the Peace Treaty. Germany undertakes to do nothing which could hinder the aforesaid State or States in the fulfillment

of the duties or the exercise of the rights devolving upon them from the causes or the conditions of their creation.

4. Within one month after the signature of the present preliminaries of peace, the general conditions of evacuation of the higher German and Prussian civil officials at present on duty on the left bank of the Rhine, to be settled by a special agreement between the signatory Powers and the German Government.

5. Within two months from the signature of the present preliminaries of peace, a special agreement between the signatory Powers and the German Government to determine, under the guarantee of the League of Nations, the general conditions of liquidation of the German economic interests on the left bank of the Rhine.

6. The German Government undertakes to furnish every year to the independent State or States, which may be created on the left bank of the Rhine, the amount of coal necessary for their industries. This amount shall be credited to Germany in the general reparations account.

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### DOCUMENT 3

*Note of the French Government handed to the heads of the Allied Governments.\**

(March 17, 1919)

#### I

#### RÉSUMÉ OF THE FRENCH PROPOSAL OF FEBRUARY 25, 1919

(1) The military occupation of the Rhine by an inter-allied force (with this immediate and lasting result, separation of the left bank from the German Reich and Zollverein) is, in the present state of international relations, a vital necessity for France and of common interest to the

\* Including the United States of America.

Allies. A detailed memorandum has proved this assertion.

The object is to prevent the renewal of that which we have undergone twice in fifty years and for that to deprive Germany of her essential means of attack (the left bank, the railroads and the bridges of the Rhine).

As a guarantee of this the military occupation of the Rhine border is indispensable to France, with a far smaller population than Germany, deprived of Russia's alliance, and without good natural frontiers.

On the other hand the Overseas Democracies cannot fight in Europe if the French ports and railroads are not substantially protected. The last war demonstrated how serious for them is this danger which might completely deprive them of a European battlefield.

(2) The limitation of the military forces of Germany is not a sufficient guarantee against this danger until experience has proved the method efficacious, and especially so long as Germany has at her disposal more than three million men who are trained to war, because they fought in war. The total suppression of the German fleet was not sufficient reason for the naval countries to disarm their own fleets. On land, France, too, has need of physical guarantee.

The League of Nations is also not a sufficient guarantee. The present draft of its clauses makes final victory almost certain. But the League is too slow moving a mechanism to prevent territorial invasion at the beginning of a war. Here also, therefore, a physical guarantee is necessary.

This physical guarantee is the military occupation of the Rhine and the control of its bridge traffic.

(3) The objections presented do not modify this conclusion.

It is feared on the left bank that there may be a movement for union with Germany. But the left bank is different from the rest of Germany. It fears Bolshevism and war-taxes. It is conscious of its economic independence. It has no liking for Prussian officials forced upon it by the Empire.

Separatist tendencies are already making themselves felt despite the strict reserve we have maintained.

A nationalist irritation in Germany is foreseen. Defeat has aroused this sentiment. The question resolves itself into protecting ourselves against its possible consequences.

It is thought that the proposed solution may be suspected of imperialism. But it is not a question of annexation, it is a question of creating under the safeguard of the League of Nations, an independent State in accordance with the interests of the inhabitants and with the aspirations of a very large number of them. This is not a Bismarckian solution.

Anxiety is expressed concerning the effect upon British and American opinion. But the whole lesson of the war is that the Rhine is the military frontier not only of France and Belgium, but of the Overseas Democracies as well, "The Frontier of Freedom," as President Wilson expressed it. These Democracies will understand this as they understood the necessity of conscription during the war, as British democracy understands to-day the channel tunnel.

The danger is pointed out of the indefinite duration of the occupation. But as the entire organization of the left bank is to be in the hands of the League of Nations, the latter will always have the right to alter it.

Therefore, the physical guarantee which will make impossible a renewal of the 1914 situation, remains of vital necessity to France in the present state of international relations.

## II

### EXAMINATION OF THE SUGGESTION PRESENTED BY OUR ALLIES

(1) The suggestion presented on March 14, that Great Britain and the United States should pledge themselves in case of aggression by Germany to bring their military forces to the aid of France without delay, is a recognition that France needs a special guarantee; but in place of the physical guarantee demanded by France it substitutes a po-

litical guarantee designed to curtail by a definite pledge the time which would elapse between the menace of war and the joint action of the Allied forces.

The French Government fully appreciates the great value of such a guarantee, which would profoundly change the international situation, but this guarantee to be effective must be supplemented and defined.

(2) In the first place there will always be, on account of distance, a period in which France attacked will have to defend herself single-handed without her overseas Allies; she must be able to do this under fairer conditions than in the past.

On the other hand, it is important there should be no doubt about the substance and scope of the pledge—that is as to the obligations imposed upon Germany, the methods of their enforcements, the nature of the act which shall constitute a menace of war, the right of France to defend herself against it, and the importance of the military aid to be furnished by Great Britain and the United States.

(3) In other words, before we can consider giving up the first guarantee (a material guarantee founded on space) it is essential that the second guarantee (founded on time, that is on the speedy aid of our Allies) lend itself to no uncertainty and that it be supplemented by some of the other safeguards contained in the first guarantee.

It is really not possible for France to give up a certain safeguard for the sake of expectations.

### III

#### POSSIBLE BASES OF AGREEMENT

Wishing to respond to the suggestion which has been made to it, the French Government thinks it its duty to set out in detail the general bases upon which agreement might be reached, these bases being the minimum guarantees indispensable to France.

It should be agreed, in the first place, that:

In case Germany, in violation of the peace conditions imposed upon her by the Allied and Associated Governments, should commit an act of aggression against France, Great Britain and the United States would bring to France the aid of their military forces.

Therefore:

(1) The date and the conditions of evacuation of the bridgeheads on the right bank, and of the territories on the left bank of the Rhine, to be fixed by the Peace Treaty (as one of the guarantees to be taken for the execution of the financial clauses).\*

(2) Germany to maintain neither military force nor military organization on the left bank of the Rhine nor within fifty kilometers east of the river. The German Army to be forbidden to manoeuvre there. Recruiting to be forbidden there—even appeals for volunteers. Fortifications to be demolished there. No new fortifications to be erected there. No war material to be manufactured there. (Certain of these clauses already figure in the preliminary peace proposals: but in the present hypothesis it would be necessary to strengthen them.)

(3) Great Britain, the United States and France to have the right to satisfy themselves by means of a permanent Commission of Inspection that the conditions imposed upon Germany are complied with. (For without this right the preceding clause would be worthless.)

(4) Great Britain, the United States and France to agree to consider as an act of aggression any entry or attempted entry of all or any part of the German Army into the zone fixed in paragraph 2.

(5) Furthermore, Great Britain and France to recognize the right of France to occupy the line of the Rhine with five bridgeheads of a radius of twenty kilometers in case

\* In other words, an occupation for thirty years.

Germany, in the opinion of the Commission of Inspection, should violate the terms of paragraph 2 or any one of the military, aerial, and naval clauses of the peace preliminaries. (*In fact, if France gives up after thirty years' permanent occupation she must at least in case of danger of war resulting from Germany's violation of her pledges, be able to advance her troops to the only good defensive position, that is to the Rhine.*)

(6) Great Britain and the United States to recognize to France her frontier of 1814 and by way of reparation the right of occupation without annexation of that part of the coal basin of the Sarre not included within this frontier.

P. S. *It goes without saying that by act of aggression against France, the French Government also means any aggression against Belgium.*

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#### DOCUMENT 4

*Text of offer made March 28, 1919, by President Wilson to Prime Minister Clemenceau as a substitute for Rhine Frontier.*

In a separate Treaty with the United States, a pledge by the United States, subject to the approval of the Executive Council of the League of Nations, to come immediately to the assistance of France as soon as any unprovoked movement of aggression against her is made by Germany.

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## DOCUMENT 5

*Conclusion of statement made by Marshal Foch on March 31, 1919, before the heads of the Allied and Associated Governments and the Commanders-in-Chief of the Allied and Associated Armies.*

To sum up, unless we hold the Rhine permanently, no neutrality, no disarmament, no written clause of any kind, can prevent Germany from seizing the Rhine and debouching from it at an advantage.

The Rhine remains to-day the barrier essential to the safety of the peoples of Western Europe, and therefore, of civilization.

In the circumstances, it seems difficult to refuse to the nations in the forefront of battle—France and Belgium—the protection they deem indispensable to enable them to live and fight until their Allies arrive. . . .

Whether the inhabitants of the left bank of the Rhine remain German or not, the political frontier between the Western European nations and Germany is the Rhine.

To renounce the Rhine barrier is to admit this inconceivable monstrosity, that although beaten, Germany, steeped in blood and crimes, Germany, responsible for the death of millions of human beings, Germany, which wished to destroy our country and leave it covered with ruins, Germany, which undertook to dominate the world by force, should still be maintained, by our voluntary abandonment of the Rhine in the capacity of renewing her enterprise as if she had been victorious.

I urgently ask the Allied and Associated Governments, which in the most critical hours of the war entrusted to me the conduct of their armies and the future of our common cause, to consider that the future can only be permanently assured—to-morrow as it was yesterday—by the military frontier of the Rhine and its occupation by the Allies. This essential position must therefore be held.

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## DOCUMENT 6

*Letter dated May 5, 1919, written by Marshal Foch to Messrs. Georges Clemenceau, Woodrow Wilson and Lloyd George.*

The importance of an examination of the entirety of the Treaty of Peace in its definitive text will not escape you. It appears particularly as to the military clauses which were revised several times. Being ignorant of these military conditions—in particular of those which concern the frontiers of the France,—and with a view to examining them as also in their relation with the other clauses, I have the honor to ask you that there should be communicated to me the Treaty as a whole which settles a peace rendered possible by the victories of the allied armies which your confidence placed under my orders.

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## DOCUMENT 7

*Letter dated May 6, 1919, written by President Wilson and Secretary of State Lansing to Mr. Clemenceau, French Prime Minister. (Original text in English.)*

The stipulation relating to the left Bank of the Rhine contained in the Draft Treaty of Peace with Germany are as follows:

“1. Germany is forbidden to maintain or construct any fortifications either on the left bank of the Rhine or on the right bank to the west of a line drawn fifty kilometres to the east of the Rhine.

“2. In the area defined above, the maintenance and the assembly of armed forces, either permanently or temporarily, and military manoeuvres of either kind, as well as the upkeep of all permanent works for mobilisation, are in the same way forbidden.

“3. So long as the present treaty is in force, Germany

undertakes to cooperate in any enquiry which the Council of the League of Nations, acting if need be by a majority, may deem necessary."

As these conditions may not at first provide adequate security and protection to your country, I agree to submit to the Senate, for its advice and consent, a treaty with France by which the United States of America shall be bound to come immediately to her assistance in the event of any unprovoked movement of aggression against her being made by Germany.

The Treaty will be in similar terms to that entered into by Great Britain and will come into force when the latter is ratified.

The Treaty must be recognized by the Council of the League of Nations as being consistent with the Covenant of the League, and will continue in force until, on the application of one of the parties to it, the Council of the League agrees that the League itself affords sufficient protection.

WOODROW WILSON  
R. LANSING

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## DOCUMENT 8

*Extract from observations presented by Marshal Foch at the plenary meeting of the Peace Conference held May 6, 1919.*

If I were asked what solution I propose, I would say just about this: The question of the Rhineland is absolutely conditioned by the Rhine. This river settles everything. The mastery of the Rhine means the mastery of the Rhineland. When the Rhine is not held, all is lost. I will not go very far to seek a comparison. If we wished to defend ourselves in this room, it would suffice to hold the doors in order to forbid their passage to the enemy. Inversely, when we will

have lost the doors, the enemy can pass. Hence as long as we hold the Rhine barriers, we are entirely masters on the left bank at little cost. If, on the contrary, we give up the Rhine, we will need much greater forces to hold a country in which we shall be weak in any event since the enemy will be free to come and attack whenever he wishes.

From the military point of view, therefore, the Rhine alone is important. The rest does not matter. The occupation of the Rhineland is of use only by holding the Rhine. By withdrawing, as has been said, we give up security, we open doors, we place ourselves in an inferior position because we are compelled to occupy a country without obstacle and to place there much greater forces, that is to say, in a way which is far more expensive.

To maintain the occupation of the Rhine is the most economic and surest formula. I may be mistaken, and this is why I have asked that other military experts should join me to reexamine this chapter. For how long is the Rhine to be held? For as long as it will be desired to keep guaranties, since there are no others. . . .

Please note that I ask that the occupation of the Rhine be maintained, not that of the Rhineland: it is on this point that we are in a divergence of opinion. The objection is made to me that I occupy a country; this is absolutely inaccurate: I occupy the passages of the Rhine which requires very little in the way of forces.

When the performance of the Treaty shall have progressed, when the German countries will have shown an indubitable goodwill, when disarmament shall have been effected, it will be possible to lighten everybody's burdens, those of the allies and those of the Germans by reducing again the troops of occupation; and the reduction will be made as you see not by giving up territory but by the reduction of the occupation forces.

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## DOCUMENT 9

*Assistance to France in the event of unprovoked aggression by Germany.*

MESSAGE FROM THE  
PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES  
TRANSMITTING

An agreement between the United States and France which was signed at Versailles, June 28, 1919, to secure the Republic of France the immediate aid of the United States in case of unprovoked movement of aggression against her on the part of Germany

July 29, 1919—Read; referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations and ordered to be printed

MESSAGE OF TRANSMITTAL

*Gentlemen of the Senate:*

I take pleasure in laying before you a treaty with the Republic of France, the object of which is to secure that Republic of the immediate aid of the United States of America in case of any unprovoked movement of aggression against her on the part of Germany. I earnestly hope that this treaty will meet with your cordial approval and will receive an early ratification at your hands, along with the treaty of peace with Germany. Now that you have had an opportunity to examine the great document I presented to you two weeks ago, it seems opportune to lay before you this treaty which is meant to be in effect a part of it.

It was signed on the same day with the treaty of peace and is intended as a temporary supplement to it. It is believed that the treaty of peace with Germany itself provides adequate protection to France against aggression from her recent enemy on the east; but the years immediately ahead of us contain many incalculable possibilities. The Covenant

of the League of Nations provides for military action for the protection of its members only upon advice of the Council of the League—advice given, it is to be presumed, only upon deliberation and acted upon by each of the governments of the member states only if its own judgment justifies such action. The object of the special treaty with France which I now submit to you is to provide for immediate military assistance to France by the United States in case of any unprovoked movement of aggression against her by Germany without waiting for the advice of the Council of the League of Nations that such action be taken. It is to be an arrangement, not independent of the League of Nations, but under it.

It is, therefore, expressly provided that this treaty shall be made the subject of consideration at the same time with the treaty of peace with Germany; that this special arrangement shall receive the approval of the Council of the League; and that this special provision for the safety of France shall remain in force only until, upon the application of one of the parties to it, the Council of the League, acting, if necessary, by a majority vote, shall agree that the provisions of the Covenant of the League afford her sufficient protection.

I was moved to sign this treaty by considerations which will, I hope, seem as persuasive and as irresistible to you as they seemed to me. We are bound to France by ties of friendship which we have always regarded, and shall always regard, as peculiarly sacred. She assisted us to win our freedom as a nation. It is seriously to be doubted whether we could have won it without her gallant and timely aid. We have recently had the privilege of assisting in driving enemies, who were also enemies of the world, from her soil; but that does not pay our debt to her. Nothing can pay such a debt. She now desires that we should promise to lend our great force to keep her safe against the power she has had most reason to fear. Another great nation volun-

teers the same promise. It is one of the fine reversals of history that that other nation should be the very power from whom France fought to set us free. A new day has dawned. Old antagonisms are forgotten. The common cause of freedom and enlightenment has created new comradeships and a new perception of what it is wise and necessary for great nations to do to free the world of intolerable fear. Two governments who wish to be members of the League of Nations ask leave of the Council of the League to be permitted to go to the assistance of a friend whose situation has been found to be one of peculiar peril, without awaiting the advice of the League to act.

It is by taking such pledges as this that we prove ourselves faithful to the utmost to the high obligations of gratitude and tested friendship. Such an act as this seems to me one of the proofs that we are a people that sees the true heart of duty and prefers honor to its own separate course of peace.

WOODROW WILSON

The White House, July 29, 1919

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## DOCUMENT 10

*Assistance to France in the event of unprovoked aggression by Germany.*

AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND FRANCE  
SIGNED AT VERSAILLES JUNE 28, 1919

Whereas the United States of America and the French Republic are equally animated by the desire to maintain the peace of the world so happily restored by the treaty of peace signed at Versailles the 28th day of June, 1919, putting an end to the war begun by the aggression of the German Empire and ended by the defeat of that power; and

Whereas the United States of America and the French Republic are fully persuaded that an unprovoked movement of aggression by Germany against France would not only violate both the letter and the spirit of the Treaty of Versailles to which the United States of America and the French Republic are parties, thus exposing France anew to the intolerable burdens of an unprovoked war, but that such aggression on the part of Germany would be and is so regarded by the Treaty of Versailles as a hostile act against all the powers signatory to that treaty and as calculated to disturb the peace of the world by involving inevitably and directly the states of Europe and indirectly, as experience has amply and unfortunately demonstrated, the world at large; and,

Whereas the United States of America and the French Republic fear that the stipulations relating to the left bank of the Rhine contained in said Treaty of Versailles may not at first provide adequate security and protection to France on the one hand and the United States of America as one of the signatories of the Treaty of Versailles on the other;

Therefore, the United States of America and the French Republic having decided to conclude a treaty to effect these necessary purposes, Woodrow Wilson, President of the United States of America, and Robert Lansing, Secretary of State of the United States, specially authorized thereto by the President of the United States, and Georges Clemenceau, President of the Council, Minister of War, and Stephen Pichon, Minister of Foreign Affairs, specially authorized thereto by Raymond Poincaré, President of the French Republic, have agreed upon the following articles:

#### ARTICLE I

In case the following stipulations relating to the left bank of the Rhine contained in the treaty of peace with Germany signed at Versailles the 28th day of June, 1919, by the United States of America, the French Republic and the British Empire among other powers:

"ARTICLE 42. Germany is forbidden to maintain or construct any fortifications either on the left bank of the Rhine or on the right bank to the west of a line drawn 50 kilometres to the east of the Rhine.

"ARTICLE 43. In the area defined above the maintenance and assembly of armed forces, either permanently or temporarily, and military manoeuvres of any kind, as well as the upkeep of all permanent works for mobilization are in the same way forbidden.

"ARTICLE 44. In case Germany violates in any manner whatever the provisions of Articles 42 and 43, she shall be regarded as committing a hostile act against the powers signatory of the present treaty and as calculated to disturb the peace of the world."

may not at first provide adequate security and protection to France, the United States of America shall be bound to come immediately to her assistance in the event of any unprovoked movement of aggression against her being made by Germany.

## ARTICLE II

The present treaty, in similar terms with the treaty of even date for the same purpose concluded between Great Britain and the French Republic, a copy of which treaty is annexed hereto, will only come into force when the latter is ratified.

## ARTICLE III

The present treaty must be submitted to the Council of the League of Nations, and must be recognized by the Council, acting if need be by a majority, as an engagement which is consistent with the Covenant of the League. It will continue in force until on the application of one of the parties to it the Council, acting if need be by a majority, agrees that the League itself affords sufficient protection.

## ARTICLE IV

The present treaty will be submitted to the Senate of the United States at the same time as the Treaty of Versailles is submitted to the Senate for its advice and consent to ratification. It will be submitted before ratification to the French Chambers of Deputies [aux Chambres françaises] for approval. The ratifications thereof will be exchanged on the deposit of ratifications of the Treaty of Versailles at Paris or as soon thereafter as shall be possible.

In faith whereof the respective plenipotentiaries, to wit: On the part of the United States of America, Woodrow Wilson, President, and Robert Lansing, Secretary of State, of the United States; and on the part of the French Republic, Georges Clemenceau, President of the Council of Ministers, Minister of War, and Stephen Pichon, Minister of Foreign Affairs, have signed the above articles both in the English and French languages, and they have hereto affixed their seals.

Done in duplicate at the City of Versailles, on the twenty-eighth day of June, in the year of our Lord one thousand nine hundred and nineteen, and the one hundred and forty-third of the Independence of the United States of America.

[Seal]

WOODROW WILSON

[Seal]

ROBERT LANSING

[Seal]

G. CLEMENCEAU

[Seal]

S. PICHON

\* \* \* \* \*

(*The Commonwealth*, February 24, 1932)

## FRANCE AND DISARMAMENT

BY MAURICE LÉON

At the disarmament conference now in progress, no doubt the main question considered will be Germany's claim that under the Treaty of Versailles she was promised that, following her own disarmament, the other nations of the world would bring their armaments down to the level provided for Germany; that failure to carry out such a plan would justify Germany in disregarding the provisions of the Versailles Treaty limiting her armed forces.

This has been the theory of a German campaign which has raged now for years and which has been at its most acute stage during the past year. It is the Nazi doctrine and it has been voiced by others not usually reckoned among the followers of Hitler, for example, by President von Hindenburg in his recent radio address.

If the German campaign is correct in its assumptions, it should follow that we would find in the Versailles Treaty not only provisions fairly contemplating that France's army shall be reduced to the proportions specified in the treaty for Germany's army, but also that Great Britain's navy should be brought down to the treaty level provided for in the case of the German navy. If France is not fairly entitled to preponderance on land as against Germany, neither is Great Britain entitled to preponderance on the sea as against Germany. Therefore, the problem is in any event not one merely between France and Germany but a problem between Germany and the rest of the world, or such part of it as recognizes a concern in the maintenance of world peace and possesses willingness to coöperate to that end.

The Versailles Treaty and the official documents which passed between the contracting parties prior to the signature of that treaty expressing their intentions with reference to the disarmament clauses, will be scanned in vain for provisions supporting the German theory. On the contrary, the official correspondence between the Allied and Associated Powers on one side and the German Delegation on the other, demonstrates that the German contention based upon the Versailles Treaty lacks any serious foundation.

In the treaty itself there is no promise of any sort by the Allied and Associated Powers to Germany that Germany's level of armaments shall be adopted by the Allied and Associated Powers. All there is, indeed, is a unilateral statement on Germany's part by way of preamble to Part V of the treaty, as follows:

In order to render possible the initiation of a general limitation of the armaments of all nations, Germany undertakes strictly to observe the military, naval and air clauses which follow.

Initiation of a general limitation of the armaments of all nations has already taken place. Considerable progress has been made in relation to naval armaments. France has been unremitting in her efforts to bring about an understanding by which the entire problem of security—not the security of France alone but the security of all nations—would be dealt with by measures of coöperation. This plan remains the sound plan. Sooner or later it will be adopted if civilization is to survive. It does not behoove Germany to cause any setback to the prospects of that plan by rendering the conditions of security for all her neighbors more precarious than they now are.

When the terms of peace were submitted to the German Delegation at Versailles, that delegation made proposals which, concerning the disarmament provisions, state the following:

Sustained by the thought that the League of Nations proposes to carry out the idea of justice, and with the expectation that Germany may enter the League with equal privileges immediately upon the conclusion of peace, the Government of the German Republic is prepared to agree to the fundamental ideas for the regulation of army, navy and air forces as proposed in Part V. . . . The readiness of the Government of the German Republic to agree to reduce its armaments before the other powers do so is the best proof that it has *forever abandoned all militaristic and imperialistic tendencies*. [Italics mine.]

In the reply of the Allied and Associated Powers to the observations of the German Delegation on the conditions of peace, dated Paris, June 16, 1919, and addressed to the President of the German Delegation at Versailles, Count Brockdorff-Rantzau, it is stated on that subject:

The Allied and Associated Powers wish to make it clear that their requirements in regard to German armaments were not made *solely with the object of rendering it impossible for Germany to resume her policy of military aggression*. They are also the first steps toward that general reduction and limitation of armaments which they seek to bring about as one of the most fruitful preventives of war and which it will be one of the first duties of the League of Nations to promote. [Italics mine.]

These provisions indicate that by common consent the general reduction and limitation of armaments was to depend upon the value of the pledge given on behalf of Germany by her delegation that she had forever abandoned all militaristic and imperialistic tendencies. Before the treaty was signed the Allied and Associated Powers made it clear to Germany that an essential object of the military, naval

and air clauses in Part V of the Versailles Treaty was "the object of rendering it impossible for Germany to resume her policy of military aggression." While that was not the sole object, it was made plain that it was an essential object.

Part I of the Versailles Treaty consists of the Covenant of the League of Nations. After the Locarno Conference of 1925 had resulted in treaties of mutual guarantee by which Germany accepted her western boundaries under the Versailles Treaty and agreed not to resort to war to change her eastern boundaries, Germany became a member of the League of Nations and thereby became bound by the obligations of the Covenant, of which Article 8 provides:

The members of the League recognize that the maintenance of peace requires the reduction of national armaments to the lowest point consistent with national safety and the enforcement by common action of international obligations.

The Council, taking account of the geographical situation and circumstances of each state, shall formulate plans for such reduction for the consideration and action of the several governments.

Such plans shall be subject to reconsideration and revision at least every ten years.

These provisions of Article 8 of the Covenant express a doctrine and a policy to which France has adhered both in letter and in spirit, but the respect of which is threatened by the German armaments campaign.

It is impossible any longer to shut one's eyes to the menacing character of the Hitler-Hugenberg movement in Germany, whose aim plainly expressed is to destroy the republican institutions of Germany, tear up the Young Plan, reestablish German armaments on a pre-war scale, deprive Poland of access to the sea through territory in which Poles heavily predominate, and establish German

hegemony in Europe by carrying out the Mittel-Europa plan, which was the most essential feature of the German purpose openly avowed as long as German armies had the upper hand.

Chancellor Bruening, head of the republican coalition in the German Parliament, is the *bête noire* of the Hitler-Hugenberg forces whose growth in two years has been the chief political phenomenon of Europe during that period. Latterly Dr. Bruening has shown signs of weakening, particularly when he espoused the Nazi-monarchist program of destruction of the Young Plan. Not only his fate as a statesman and leader but the political fate of the republican coalition he represents—indeed the fate of free institutions in Central Europe—depends upon his remaining faithful to the spirit of international obligations, upon his resolute refusal to open the Pandora box of repudiation and thereby to betray the cause of European understanding confided to his hands by all those who are loyal to the German Republic, constituting the still sane half of the German people. When he asks the creditor powers and their creditor, the United States, to agree upon common action to prevent top-heavy tariffs and debts from remaining the insurmountable obstacles to world trade they now have become, in consequence of the suspension of the gold standard by Great Britain and many other countries, he is on unassailable ground. The creditor powers may not deny to others the right to live without imperiling their own.

The monetary crisis calls for urgent steps to improve the operation of the gold standard and preserve its essential advantages while liberating trade throughout the world from the shackles imposed by monetary instability now actually prevailing over most of the globe and feared elsewhere. It is one of the most baffling mysteries of an international situation full of so much that is strange, that after more than two years of depression, each of the great nations adheres to a policy based on the wholly exploded notion that a

country can preserve its own prosperity without taking heed of the prosperity of the rest of the world. America under President Hoover is the greatest of world powers, yet clings to a policy of aloofness formulated by George Washington, not for all time, but for the period when the American republic was a puny experiment in every respect except territorial expanse. This is enough to make the victors of Yorktown turn in their graves and ask what has become of the virile ideal they bequeathed in perpetuity to the people of the United States that freedom shall not perish from the earth.

Freedom in Europe is threatened today by two great movements which, while they profess to be at war with each other in principle, have demonstrated that their methods in dealing with free institutions are essentially the same: Communism, dominant in Russia; Fascism, dominant in Italy. Where these two hold sway, freedom of speech and of the press—indeed freedom of any kind—cannot live.

The greatest safeguard on the Continent of Europe for freedom, wherever it exists in Europe, is a strong France. In France freedom of conscience, of speech and of the press, equality before the law, institutions founded on the brotherhood of man, exist, and while they are safe there, they are safe elsewhere in Europe: in Belgium, Holland, Denmark, Switzerland—in fact wherever free institutions are found on the Continent, from Scandinavia to Greece and Spain. What every Frenchman knows is that eternal vigilance is the price of liberty. That blessing of the Frenchman's home has been dearly bought by repeated struggles in the past 143 years. Monarchical coalitions forced the French people to relinquish freedom and turn to a strong man as a means of saving their national independence under Napoleon. Again when the Prussian Junker suppressed the movement for freedom in Germany in 1848 and the Prussian threat arose, France made Napoleon III emperor. Following the German invasion of 1780 and now for upward

of sixty years, France through ups and downs has resolutely clung to free institutions and her friends in Europe are the friends of freedom in the British Isles and on the Continent.

Communism and Fascism alike reduce man to the status of a cog in a big machine. Freedom has a different conception of man. Only where freedom prevails does the dignity of man survive and the Golden Rule hold sway. The spirit of Fascism and of Communism is coercion; the spirit of freedom is fair play.

Which of the two shall prevail in Europe? The answer to this question will depend wholly on the willingness and ability of those who believe in fair play to work together that freedom shall be safe and shall live. It depends above all upon the firmness of solidarity between the English-speaking world and the French-speaking world, not against the German, the Italian and the Slav, but in demonstrating by the clearest proof that where freedom prevails, the Four Horsemen of the Apocalypse shall be driven out, never to return.

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(*New York Times*, April 30, 1934)

## THE WAR DEBT QUESTION

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MISHANDLING OF TWO PROBLEMS BLAMED FOR WORLD'S  
POSITION TODAY.

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*To the Editor of The New York Times:*

Your editorial relative to the English war debt awakens in one who has followed the history of it the wish that at this late date the matter might be considered both realistically and according to the dictates of fair play in the quest of a solution mutually beneficial.

Not only the war, but the mishandling of the two great problems which a victorious peace brought to the fore, must be considered as furnishing the great cause of the present topsy-turviness in world affairs—namely, the problem of giving mankind a stable peace, which meant inevitably that the nations possessed of a law-abiding spirit should unite and thus make their influence for peace irresistible, and the subsidiary problem of liquidating the financial burdens of the war according to the principles of equity.

Much might be said as to who is responsible for the mishandling of these two great problems, but probably the fairest view to take is that all concerned have an ample share of responsibility, although of course the war party of Germany, now again in the saddle, has the responsibility of thwarting every effort made to avert war in 1914 and therefore of causing the immense losses which followed, while the mishandling of the peace problems was primarily due to British and American blunders.

As to the financial problem in particular, American in-

sistence on the sanctity of financial obligations—the doctrine back of “it is so written in the bond”—was part of a complex policy used in inducing Congress to take off the higher brackets of the income tax which the war debt settlements appeared to render unnecessary. America has paid dearly for that policy.

It is time this whole matter were reconsidered in the light of reality. That should be part of the New Deal, because it will further its success. We should ask the British to make payments commensurate with what they really received, and to help restore the machinery of payments, because we are at last ready to give as well as take and will play fair, although we also want fair play in return.

There were times when the standard of statesmanship was foresight, but nowadays statesmen are more apt to follow than to lead. They cannot be warned too plainly that there is no time to be lost in attaining real and effective cooperation of the English-speaking nations in world affairs. As they are the largest group in which a law-abiding spirit prevails, they should unite with the other nations possessed of a like spirit for the single end of averting another world conflict which would be fatal to Christendom.

MAURICE LEON

*Irvington-on-Hudson, N. Y., April 22, 1934.*

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(*New York Herald Tribune*, August 2, 1934)

## THE RHINE FRONTIER

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MUST BE ONE OF FREEDOM, SAYS MAURICE LEON

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*To the New York Herald Tribune:*

The events which have recently taken place in Austria were the inevitable consequence of German policy and quite characteristic of the mentality of the German war party when it is dominant. I think it would be a mistake to regard the fall of Hitler as a fortunate development if a monarchical restoration were to follow or any combination which would leave the forces back of Hitler in the ascendancy.

The statement by Mr. Baldwin the day before yesterday that the real British frontier is at the Rhine marks a turning point in history. Mr. Baldwin merely stated a fact which existed in July, 1914, which still existed during the armistice, and has existed ever since. The agile but shortsighted statesmanship of Mr. Lloyd George at the Peace Conference, based on fallacies which pervaded the minds of nearly all the British delegation and most of the American delegation (see "Peacemaking," by Harold Nicholson), prevented adoption of the common-sense solution offered by Marshal Foch and approved by M. Poincaré, founded upon recognition of the fact the existence of which Mr. Baldwin recognized and was able to state succinctly in the House of Commons on Monday because at last his fellow countrymen were willing to face realities brought home to them.

This is a most heartening development. It brings measurably nearer teamwork between Great Britain and France

for the maintenance of world peace in the spirit expressed by the League to Enforce Peace when it was founded in Washington early in 1916, a conception fundamentally different from that which inspired the Covenant of the League of Nations. While they are awake to their responsibilities, the three leading nations of the world, the United States, Great Britain and France, constitute a league to enforce peace founded upon an unwritten covenant.

But the vigilance which is the price of liberty should never be relaxed. Just as sound leadership makes for freedom, law and order internally, so its needs must be exerted to the same end internationally. When great nations choose to take refuge in a policy of so-called aloofness, which in this country is sought to be justified by distorting Washington's farewell message, a policy of unenlightened selfishness, whether the great nation be the United States or Great Britain or France, the result is equally appalling both on the continent of Europe and on the Asiatic continent.

If Germany should show herself capable of ridding herself of her war party without outside aid, nothing could be more fortunate. But such a result is improbable. It could only occur if the "purge" were to be repeated on a very large scale and with equal casualties between that section of the war party calling itself Nazi and that other section calling itself monarchical, and a substantial number of coal, iron, chemical and other big industrial magnates included among the casualties on both sides. Such a development might hearten the fundamentally timorous, although numerically large, freedom-loving elements in Germany.

Lacking so great a boon to world peace, it is obvious that the sooner Great Britain and France, with the backing of free men everywhere, make sure that the Rhine proves a reliable frontier of freedom, the more likely is that result to be brought about without necessitating another stupendous calamity such as you rightly pictured the World War to have been in your editorial published today.

Proved defiance by the Nazi government of all its obligations under international law, which has earned for Germany the reputation of an international Dillinger, even in such impartial countries as Switzerland and Holland, renders it advisable that the sanitary measures to which Mr. Frank H. Simonds referred in your columns on Monday should be applied before the German war party is ready to strike again.

MAURICE LEON

*New York, Aug. 1, 1934.*

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(*New York Herald Tribune*, April 3, 1935)

## WAR AS AN EPIDEMIC

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UNITED STATES IS URGED TO JOIN IN PREVENTION

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*To the New York Herald Tribune:*

Ever since the European situation became critical it has served as a touchstone of leadership in this country in what pertains to peace. Some, among whom Father Coughlin is conspicuous, advocate neutrality. Strangely enough, Mr. Baruch is in that camp. Others, for example, Senator Pope, of Idaho, say that the only way to keep out of a major war is to successfully help prevent one from breaking out.

In 1914, when the German Kaiser gave Austria-Hungary a free hand to crush Serbia, German leadership was convinced that the United States would be neutral in the great war which was then precipitated. Today the German war party, whose mouthpiece is Hitler, no doubt cherishes a like conviction in relation to American neutrality in whatever conflict may arise consequent upon the reduction of the Treaty of Versailles to the status of a scrap of paper.

But have not the Berlin dictators overlooked that the military clauses contained in that treaty form an integral part of the treaty between Germany and the United States which was signed in Berlin in April, 1921? This latter treaty was not a "diktat." It was freely negotiated some two years after the Versailles Treaty. It also has now been treated as a scrap of paper in defiance of all that has been done by the United States to promote the limitation of armaments; a policy predicated upon the desire of the American government and people to avoid repetition of the immense catas-

trophes caused by the war which broke out in 1914.

America is no longer the puny power of the days of the Farewell Address, but is the great world power which the author of that address foresaw she would become, a power whose people have interests in every land and clime—interests bound to be jeopardized by war. The situation is as different today in this respect from what it was in George Washington's time as is the situation in respect to contagious diseases and the measures to prevent their spread. Today, if typhus epidemic broke out in any country we would promptly join in measures to quarantine that country and furnish any assistance in our power to limit the spread of the disease and stamp it out.

This is the day of preventive precautions against calamity. War is epidemic as is typhus, whose bacteria are among the weapons held in readiness by those who believe in promoting their interests through war; there is only one effective way of keeping out of war, as Senator Pope well said, and that is to help with all our might the collective efforts of a preventive nature that they may prove successful.

MAURICE LEON

*New York, April 2, 1935.*

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(*New York Herald Tribune*, March 25, 1936)

## THE RHINE AND THE UNRATIFIED TREATY

*To the New York Herald Tribune:*

Speaking in Paris Saturday night, General Maxime Weygand, chief aide of Marshal Foch, said concerning the present situation:

"We are paying for the mistakes which have been made since the armistice. These mistakes have been that we have grasped at the shadows instead of the substance. We let go of the Rhine for promises of alliances that have not been kept."

The memories which General Weygand thus awakened involve this country vitally. They concern America's good name and her responsibility for the return to power in Germany of the military party which was the very soul of the Prussian system under the Hohenzollerns.

General Weygand is one of the chief living witnesses of the episode to which he refers when he says that France let go of the Rhine for promises of alliances that have not been kept.

Marshal Foch, backed by President Poincaré, brought to the problem of peace in Europe a knowledge unrivaled by that of any other participant in the peace conference. He understood that the problem was to choose the means most likely to prevent the return to power of the military party in Germany. This, he believed, could not be done unless there was international control of the Rhine bridgeheads.

He proposed, therefore, that they be held under the authority of the allied and associated powers acting as trustees of world peace for an indefinite period. He made it clear that his plan did not contemplate any interference

with the right of the Rhineland population to manage its own affairs. He understood thoroughly the psychological effect on all warlike elements in Germany of making it certain that if there was to be any fighting it would not take place in Belgium or France, but along the Rhine.

At this point President Wilson and Premier Lloyd George, in a supreme effort to induce the French government and people to give up the Foch plan, offered as an alternative a treaty by which the United States and Great Britain unconditionally promised to come to the aid of France if she were attacked by Germany. That treaty was accepted in place of the Foch plan. It was wholly independent by its terms of the treaty of peace, but was to be transmitted to the Senate at the same time and the President was in honor bound to disclose the circumstances that led to its making.

It was not so transmitted. After the peace treaty had been submitted to the Senate the question arose whether there was not another treaty signed at the same time. Under pressure President Wilson transmitted it. The reasons he gave for making the treaty were so vague as to suggest that no real obligation existed to ratify it. It was not ratified. It was not even voted on.

As to this episode another witness, whose recent premature death is deeply regretted, Frank H. Simonds, says:

At all events, Clemenceau's major conception at Paris was to preserve the alliance which had won the war. For him, the security of France was to be guaranteed only by the continuing support of the great Anglo-Saxon allies. When their opposition to the Foch proposal demonstrated that this program could only be realized at the cost of the destruction of the association which was to Clemenceau vital, he abandoned it. But he only abandoned it in return for the treaties of guaranty.

When, however, the United States Senate rejected the

treaty of guaranty, and the British insurance fell consequently, Clemenceau was disarmed in the presence of the soldiers, statesmen, press and public opinion which he had flouted. What was infinitely worse, France was without all promise of security. To obtain these Anglo-American pledges, Clemenceau had, in the Treaty of Versailles, abandoned in advance every detail of the Foch program. Now this surrender was beyond recall.

For every Frenchman, therefore, the Treaty of Versailles became at once a gigantic fraud. The rejection of the guaranty treaties was similarly a colossal betrayal. Clemenceau had been duped and France deserted. What had been won by the victory had been lost by the peace treaty. What had been saved at the Marne and at Verdun had been sacrificed at Versailles. A million and a half of French soldiers had died in vain, and France was again in danger.

*(How Europe Made Peace Without America, by Frank H. Simonds (1927), pp. 96-97.)*

President Wilson's failing health, no doubt, had much to do with whatever was omitted to be done at that time. The fact remains that this separate treaty was never considered on its merits.

It is a sound saying that nothing is ever settled until it is settled right. France did not seek this treaty—she accepted it because the only authorized spokesman of America asked her to do so and to relinquish her own plan for her own protection, taking instead an American plan assuring her American and British assistance in case of need. It cannot be that the only purpose to be fulfilled by this treaty, offered and signed on behalf of the United States of America, was to cheat France of the benefits of the permanent peace to achieve which 1,500,000 of her sons had died. Yet today the reconstituted German General Staff is doing business

as usual. The German military party is in control. Hitler is the voice, but the masters are the present war lords of Germany, Blomberg, Fritsch, Eischenauer. While Hitler talks as the Kaiser used to do, these war lords rule as their predecessors used to do.

It cannot be the wish of any American worthy of the name that this particular episode should remain as a blot on the American escutcheon. What is needed to remove it? That the separate treaty should be resubmitted, that the whole truth about it should be disclosed in resubmitting it and that it should be debated and action on it taken in the light of all the facts.

When questions like this arise, it is the habit of super-patriots to invoke the Farewell Address and to speak of it as if George Washington's advice to the America of his own time, a weak nation of 3,000,000 souls, was meant by him to govern American policy a century and a half later, without regard to the tremendous growth of its population and wealth and to the annihilation of distance by the new means of transport. What George Washington's purpose was in speaking as he did he made perfectly plain in these words:

With me, a predominant motive has been to endeavor to gain time to our country to settle its yet recent institutions and to progress without interruption to that degree of strength and consistency which is necessary to give it, humanly speaking, the command of its own fortunes.

While he urged neutrality in the then pending European conflict, he foresaw that "if we remain one people, under an efficient government, the time is not far off . . . when we may choose peace or war as our interest, guided by justice, shall counsel." That is what we did in the World War. And at the peace table it was our declared purpose

not to hold back any co-operation needed to assure the maintenance of world peace. We gave pledges which others accepted. Were we Indian givers in this respect?

MAURICE LEON

*New York, March 23, 1936.*

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(*New York Herald Tribune*, October 22, 1938)

## NATIONAL BLUNDERS

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NOT ALL HAVE BEEN MADE ACROSS THE ATLANTIC

*To the New York Herald Tribune:*

It is difficult to take issue with Mr. Lippmann's somber forebodings as to the outlook when one considers the failure of the democracies to work together for their mutual welfare. For years it has been in their power to organize prosperity for themselves and spread it throughout the world by putting in effect give-and-take policies. Yet in five years' time it has not been possible to produce an Anglo-American trade pact, and sterling remains a managed currency. Mr. Lippmann thinks it is now too late to make progress with Mr. Hull's plans. I wonder whether he takes into account the importance of the British Empire and the United States as producers and consumers. Let a joint Anglo-American trade policy come into being, backed by the stable and permanent monetary standard it is in the power of London and Washington to establish with the French, Dutch, Swiss and Belgian co-operation in place of the day-to-day system now in force—and the democracies will lead the world on its way back to normal life.

The French national motto, "Liberté, Egalité, Fraternité," was not devised for France alone, but for mankind.

The spirit it expresses could not be manifested at this time better than through a realization by each of the great democracies of their own contributions to the present world mess.

A great evening newspaper says editorially today that America will pursue an isolationist policy because Sir John

Simon as Foreign Minister in 1931 rejected Mr. Stimson's proposal for measures of a joint character regarding Manchuria. Of course Sir John Simon blundered in 1931. But are there no American blunders in the record of the last twenty years in relation to world peace? What of the American President who induced France to give up control of the Rhine bridgeheads beyond a limited period in exchange for an Anglo-American guaranty against aggression which he later withdrew from the Senate and which now rests in a State Department pigeonhole, unratified?

It is time each nation took to heart the lesson of its own blunders and did something to overcome their effects.

MAURICE LEON

*Irvington-on-Hudson, N. Y., Oct. 18, 1938.*

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(*New York Herald Tribune*, April 2, 1939)

## BAN ON GERMAN WAR MATERIAL

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THAT, A READER SAYS, IS THE ONLY HOPE OF DEMOCRACIES,  
EXCEPT HOSTILITIES

*To the New York Herald Tribune:*

The governments of the United States, Great Britain, France and Russia have served notice on Germany that they regard the seizure of Czecho-Slovakia as an unlawful act—to use the language of a statement forming part of the American note, as an act of wanton lawlessness. The four powers refuse to recognize that Germany by that act has acquired any title to Czecho-Slovak property.

In particular the British government has taken measures to prevent Czecho-Slovak assets under its jurisdiction from being turned over to Germany. This includes about two-thirds of the Czecho-Slovak gold reserve, of which the remaining third has fallen into the hands of the German forces.

The most significant consequence of this act of wanton lawlessness to the rest of the world is that Germany has obtained possession of the famous Skoda works and other large plants, and thereby has practically doubled her capacity for producing weapons and war material of all kinds, save airplanes, as to which her capacity of manufacturing is already so colossal that the added capacity of Czecho-Slovak plants does not materially affect the situation.

The immediate question which confronts the four protesting powers is: Will they sell to Germany the commodities, chiefly raw materials, which she needs in order to keep up the production of the Czecho-Slovak munition

plants, seizure of which they have denounced?

If they do, they will be stultifying themselves, they will confess that their protests are hollow sham, that having branded Germany as wantonly lawless in her seizure of Czecho-Slovakia they are nevertheless willing to help her to profit by her lawless act by selling to her at the market price all she needs to keep the Skoda works and other Czecho-Slovak plants busy turning out war material, even taking in payment gold from that part of the Czecho-Slovak monetary reserve which her forces were able to lay their hands on.

Is that what Mr. Chamberlain and his supporters mean to do while talking of declarations against the next aggression? Is it going to be "business as usual" with those who now hold the Skoda works?

Our own government also cannot escape that question, nor can any nation that sells to Germany raw materials for war production.

Every day that such raw materials move toward Germany from sources controlled by the United States, or the British Empire, or France, or Russia, to that question the answer is being given by them that where the principles of decency enunciated in diplomatic notes conflict with commercial gains, the principles must give way. What Russia will do as to this is her affair. But if the democracies will not give an example at least of self-respect to the world, how can there be any hope for their self-preservation?

A postponement of the decision on the question which confronts the democracies is itself an answer to that question which makes them, for a consideration, accomplices after the fact in the act of wanton lawlessness whereby nine million Czechs and Slovaks have become the serfs of Hitler Germany.

On the other hand, an embargo of raw materials needed for war production in Germany is the only measure short

of war left to them which is at all likely to prove effective. It is a measure which, not being directed at the German food supply, will have the approval of those Germans who dread war—and they must be legion. Finally it will prove that the impotence which the democracies have shown in dealing with the Hitlerian brand of Pan-Germanism is at an end.

MAURICE LEON

*New York, March 27, 1939.*

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(*New York Times*, October 29, 1939)

## MR. HOOVER IS CRITICIZED

### SOME STATEMENTS MADE BY FORMER PRESIDENT ARE QUESTIONED

Two men of vast experience in world affairs have presented their views on the war: Herbert Hoover in *The Saturday Evening Post* and the Marquess of Lothian before the Pilgrims of the United States.

*The New York Times* has rendered a real service by publishing the address of the new British Ambassador. It is a great utterance, and what distinguishes it above all is the unflinching facing of all the essential facts, including those which can only be recalled in a spirit of contrition for British mistakes.

Reading these two documents side by side, one is led to regret that a former President of the United States found himself unable to admit America's share of blame for the crisis now confronting mankind. Throughout his article there is apparent a disposition by Mr. Hoover to deal with every development since 1914 in terms of self-justification, not only for America, but for himself in his different capacities as an adviser at the Peace Conference, as a Republican Cabinet officer with his share of responsibility for Republican policies under the Harding and Coolidge Administrations, for his acts as President and later for his attitude in the opposition.

### *Questions of Propaganda*

Only with respect to war propaganda does Mr. Hoover admit American culpability. After making general assertions to the effect that during the World War truth, justice and

tolerance were thrown to the winds when a mere lie promised to save a life or gain an advantage, that before our entry in the World War propaganda was organized without moral restraint, he adds that all this we did ourselves the moment we entered the great war.

Such sweeping assertions are unjust. Most of the publicity emanating from Great Britain and France prior to our entry in the World War consisted of reports from correspondents employed by American newspapers, who sent news which was censored only to eliminate information which might aid the enemy.

Dealing with present conditions, Mr. Hoover makes this general statement which I submit is utterly unwarranted: "There is not a dispatch out of Europe that is not tainted by half-truth or untruth."

This is a gross injustice to American correspondents abroad. In this instance also Mr. Hoover takes an exception for the rule.

### *The Matter of Loans*

Mr. Hoover is equally careless when he refers to loans made prior to America's entry in the war. He says: "We loaned money recklessly to warring nations which would never have been repaid, even had we not gone into the war."

All the loans placed during American neutrality were paid back by the Allies. Several of them were secured by the deposit of large amounts of American securities as collateral. Mr. Hoover makes no allusion to the fact that during American neutrality Great Britain and France paid for most of their purchases by using the proceeds of American securities furnished by their own nationals and by shipments of gold.

The picture which Mr. Hoover presents of our participation in peace-making does not take into account facts of vital importance—for example, the liberation of oppressed

nationalities, the protection of the rights of minorities, the real effort made to strengthen in Europe institutions assuring freedom and justice.

What he overlooks particularly is the capital fact of American responsibility for the failure to implement the new order by military measures without which it could not survive. I refer to the triumph of hope as expressed by President Wilson over experience as expressed by Marshal Foch, when in place of military control of the Rhine bridgeheads which Marshal Foch considered to be the only safeguard against the recurrence of Pan-German aggression, there was substituted President Wilson's pledge on behalf of the United States to come to the aid of France in case of German aggression, a pledge which failed when the treaty embodying it was withdrawn from consideration of the Senate after President Wilson had refused to agree to the Senate's reservations regarding the treaty of peace.

### *Considerations Overlooked*

Mr. Hoover's account of American policy from the beginning of the Harding Administration takes no heed of events for which he has his share of responsibility as Cabinet member and as President:

1. The non-fulfillment of the promise that the Harding Administration would bring about the adherence of the United States to an association of nations pledged to uphold world peace.

2. Insistence that the Allies pay in gold for war debts contracted in goods at prices several times above the normal level, on the Mellon theory that these debts would be greatly reduced in value by reason of a steady increase in the value of commodities to be purchased by the United States, the proceeds of which would be available for the payment of these debts, an expectation which proved to be the exact opposite of what happened.

3. The signing of the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Bill, which

destroyed all hope that the war debts might be paid for in the only feasible way, by the sale of goods imported into the United States.

Aside from matters which are overlooked, Mr. Hoover makes statements such as this: "Our President refused to accept for America an inch of land or a dollar of indemnities in which we had a right to participate."

By our separate treaty of peace with Germany we retained all rights and advantages stipulated in the Treaty of Versailles and defined in Section 1 of Part IV, and in Parts V, VI, VIII, IX, X, XI, XII, XIV and XV. By Section 1 of Part IV Germany renounced in favor of the principal allied and associated powers all her rights and titles over her overseas possessions. This enabled us to secure by agreement with the Japanese Government valuable cable rights in the Pacific which formerly had been controlled by Germany. Under other provisions we retained all German merchant vessels seized when we entered the war, the Siasconset and Sayville wireless stations, and all other property of the German Government which came into the possession of the United States on and after April 6, 1917. All United States patents belonging to German nationals were seized and condemned at a value of \$250,000 and the benefit of their real value, which amounted to many millions, inured to the American chemical industry and through it to the people of the United States.

It cannot be said, therefore, that we got nothing from Germany out of the war, although what we did get was small in proportion to the enormous cost of the war forced on the United States by the aggressions of Germany.

### *Points Unexplained*

Mr. Hoover puts all his stress on keeping out of the war, no matter what the developments are. Yet he thinks that we can advise in the making of peace, that "we can, as President Wilson did in 1919, secure some justice, some

freedom, some hope to the world." How this will be done in case the totalitarian dictatorships should dictate the peace he does not explain. He is unwilling to face the fact that America contributed heavily to the prevention of safeguards against the recurrence of Pan-German aggression, to the failure to make possible the return to healthy economic conditions in Europe, to the intensification of economic nationalism by reason of which world trade broke down and the American depression was aggravated.

I commend to Mr. Hoover the admirable address of the Marquess of Lothian as a presentation of facts and considerations which he has forgotten or ignored and as a straightforward exposition of Franco-British aims. I urge upon Mr. Hoover that if Great Britain and France prevail in their struggle, freedom will have a chance in Europe, but not otherwise—that the fate of freedom in Germany, in Poland, in Czecho-Slovakia, in Austria, in the Baltic and in the Balkans depends on Franco-British victory; that Hitlerism is merely the new name of the age-old predatory Pan-German forces with headquarters in Prussia, forces which are the arch-enemies of freedom in Europe and the world; and that it behooves the American people, if it is to be true to the cause of freedom set forth in the Declaration of Independence, to consider the war in Europe from one main standpoint—namely, that the interests of the United States, moral and material, will be furthered if the forces of Pan-Germanism are defeated and measures taken to prevent new aggressions on their part.

MAURICE LEON

*New York, Oct. 26, 1939.*

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